1989-2009. Godine prevrata : početak inkluzije ili ekskluzije? (zbornik radova sa međunarodne konferencije)

1989 – 2009. GODINE PREVRATA: POČETAK INKLUZIJE ILI EKSKLUZIJE? u saradnji sa Izdava~: Fondacija Heinrich Böll, Ured...

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1989 – 2009. GODINE PREVRATA: POČETAK INKLUZIJE ILI EKSKLUZIJE?

u saradnji sa

Izdava~: Fondacija Heinrich Böll, Ured za Bosnu i Hercegovinu Published by the Heinirch Böll Foundation, Office for Bosnia and Herzegovina [tampano u Bosni i Hercegovini, Sarajevo 2009. Printed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo 2009. © Autori i Fondacija Heinrich Böll, Ured za Bosnu i Hercegovinu. Authors and the Heinirch Böll Foundation, Office for Bosnia and Herzegovina Sva prava pridràna. All rights reserved. Za izdava~a / For the publisher: Mirela Grünther-\e~evi} Priredila / Editing: Nermina Mujagi} Prijevod na engleski jezik / Translations in English: Svjetlana Pavi~i} Lektorica / Corrector: Ferida Durakovi} Korektorica / Proofreader: Rusmira âmo Koordinacija / Coordination: Amela Sejmenovi} Fotografije na naslovnici / Cover picture: Danilo Krstanovi}, Sarajevo april 1992. i Metin Yilmaz, Berlinski zid 1989. Tira` / Copies: 500 Stavovi i mi{ljenja iznesena u ovom tekstu su autorska i ne predstavljaju izri~ite stavove i mi{ljenja izdava~a. Views and opinions presented in this text are the author’s own and do not reflect the views and opinions of the publisher. ————————————————————————CIP - Katalogizacija u publikaciji Nacionalna i univerzitetska biblioteka Bosne i Hercegovine, Sarajevo 323:327](497.6)”1989/2009” MEÐUNARODNA konferencija 1989-2009. Godine prevrata : po~etak inkluzije ili ekskluzije? (2009; Sarajevo) [Hiljadu devetsto osamdeset deveta-dvije hiljade deveta godina] 1989-2009. godine prevrata : po~etak inkluzije ili ekskluzije? : zbornik radova / [prijevod na engleski Svjetlana Pavi~i}]. - Sarajevo : Fondacija Heinrich Böll, Ured za Bosnu i Hercegovinu, 2009. - 213 str. ; 24 cm Na spor. nasl. str.: 1989-2009 years of upheaval. - “... me|unarodnoj konferenciji “1989-2009. godine prevrata : po~etak inkluzije ili ekskluzije?”, koja je odràna u Sarajevu 19. i 20. 06. 2009...”—> uvod. - O autorima: str. 103-105. - Abouth the authors: str. 211-213. Bibliografija i bilje{ke uz tekst ISBN 978-9958-9889-6-7 COBISS.BH-ID 17645062 ————————————————————————-

Publikacija se moè naru~iti na / This publication can be ordered at: Fondacija Heinrich Böll, Ured za Bosnu i Hercegovinu, êkalu{a 42, 71000 Sarajevo, Bosna i Hercegovina T: +387-33-260 450 F: +387-33-260 460 E: [email protected] W: www.boell.ba

Zbornik radova sa međunarodne konferencije:

1989 – 2009. GODINE PREVRATA: POČETAK INKLUZIJE ILI EKSKLUZIJE?

Sarajevo, 2009.

SADRŽAJ

STR. 5 Uvod Mirela Grünther-Ðečević Nermina Mujagić

Izazovi za političku teoriju 9

Ugo Vlaisavljević

17

Asim Mujkić

27

Wolfgang Klotz

Nevidljivi zidovi Evrope Der Untergang: 1989-2009 – 20 godina liberalizacije ili kanibalizacije? Kontinuitet vs. odnos – retorika vs. habitus

Tranziciona iskustva evropskih zemalja 35

Pavol Demeš

39

Gajo Sekulić

53

Nenad Zakošek

Tranziciona iskustva: raspad čehoslovačke federacije i put Slovačke ka Evropskoj uniji Godina 1989: šta je zbiljski srušeno rušenjem Berlinskog zida? Dinamika promjena: koliko se razlikuju rezultati transformacije u postjugoslavenskim državama?

61

Bodo Weber Zapadnobalkanske nevolje s tranzicijom: između konformizma i kolektivizma

Evropska integracija: između tranzicije i identiteta 69

Tanja Petrović

77

Nerzuk Ćurak

87

Kurt Basseuner

95

Vladimir Pavićević

Zapadni Balkan je na jugu - diskursi na temu pristupanja Zapadnog Balkana u Evropskoj uniji Treća Evropa i metafizika Evropske unije Tobožnja tranzicija Bosne i Hercegovine: privid bh. demokratije i lažne pretpostavke Evropske unije 1989−2009: od isključenja ka integraciji (slučaj Srbije)

101

Zaključci s konferencije

103

O autorima

109

1989-2009: Years of Upheaval: Beginning of Inclusion or Exclusion?

110

Contents

4

UVOD

Godina 2009. obiljeàva 20. godi{njicu pada Berlinskog zida kao i 20. godi{njicu mirne revolucije. Ovi su doga|aji prouzrokovali dalekose`ne promjene {irom svijeta. Oni ozna~avaju kraj hladnog rata i podjela u Evropi. Mnogi ljudi se ìvo sje}aju potresnih dana u jesen 1989. godine. Pad Berlinskog zida bio je novi po~etak za Njema~ku, ali i za cijelu Evropu. Tako|er, prije dvadeset godina zemlje Centralne, Isto~ne i Jugoisto~ne Evrope krenule su u tranziciju, koja je podrazumijevala odbacivanje starog i prihvatanje novog sistema ure|enja dràve, ekonomije i dru{tva. No, {ta se konkretno u tim godinama desilo sa zemljama biv{e Jugoslavije, a posebice sa Bosnom i Hercegovinom? I {ta se i dalje de{ava s Bosnom i Hercegovinom? Umjesto korjenitih promjena, umjesto novog po~etka i novih {ansi, u Bosni i Hercegovini se desio uàsan rat, desilo se nasilno rastakanje zemlje, podjele, genocid u srcu Evrope. Ovdje, na tlu Bosne i Hercegovine, nacionalisti~ke i nacionalne politike ru{ile su mostove, dàmije, crkve, sinagoge, vije}nice, biblioteke, fabrike, bolnice... sve one institucije koje su podsje}ale na multikulturni ìvot u Bosni i Hercegovini. ‘Razuzdana sloboda’, prepu{tena nacionalisti~kim snagama u ruke, u~inila je BiH najve}im koncentracionim logorom u Evropi. Danas, dvadeset godina kasnije, moèmo se samo upitati: je li padom Berlinskog zida zaista osvojen op}i ‘prostor slobode’? I, ako jeste, kakva je to sloboda koju mi ovdje uìvamo? Sloboda da razdvajamo djecu po etni~kom klju~u, sloboda neznanja, sloboda u konformizmu, sloboda u oportunizmu? Razuzdana sloboda koja sve vi{e li~i na anarhiju? „Bosna i Hercegovina jo{ ìvi podjele umjesto integracija; zidovi koji su se prije dvadeset godina u drugim zemljama Evrope uru{avali, unutar Bosne i Hercegovine se i dan-danas podiù“ – re~eno je, izme|u ostalog, na dvodnevnoj me|unarodnoj konferenciji „1989-2009. godine prevrata: po~etak inkluzije ili ekskluzije“, koja je odràna u Sarajevu 19. i 20. 06. 2009. godine u organizaciji Heinrich Böll Stiftung Ured za BiH i Udruènja za politi~ke nauke u BiH. ^lan Predsjedni{tva BiH @eljko Kom{i}, koji je otvorio konferenciju, podsjetio je da u BiH ima mnogo zidova koji nas dijele od Evropske unije i nas samih. “Na{ put vodi u Evropsku uniju, koliko }e to trajati ne zavisi od nas samih. Upitno je koliko smo mi spremni za Evropsku uniju i EU za nas”, zapitao se Kom{i}.

5

U Evropi je prije dvadeset godina bilo potrebno ru{iti zidove kako bi se zemlje izvan Evropske zajednice integrisale u dana{nju Evropsku uniju. Isto tako i danas, potrebno je ukloniti zidove unutar i oko Bosne i Hercegovine kako bi se i ona {to prije pribliìla EU. Proces pribliàvanja Bosne i Hercegovine Evropskoj uniji, dakle proces koji su druge zemlje regije ili uspje{no okon~ale ili su na najboljem putu da ga okon~aju, u ovom trenutku izgleda – paradoksalno – kao proces sa distancom. Ovaj zbornik, s autorskim tekstovima Uge Vlaisavljevi}a (Sarajevo), Asima Mujki}a (Sarajevo), Wolfganga Klotza (Beograd), Kurta Bassuenera (Sarajevo), Pavola Deme{a (Bratislava), Gaje Sekuli}a (Sarajevo), Nenada Zako{eka (Zagreb), Tanje Petrovi} (Ljubljana), Nerzuka ]urka (Sarajevo) i Vladimira Pavi}evi}a (Beograd), objavljujemo kako bismo poku{ali analizirati procese tranzicije i kako bi se pokrenula {ira diskusija o procesima tranzicije iz autoritarnih u pravcu demokratskih ure|enja u Evropi. Autori na ubjedljiv na~in daju komparativnu analizu tranzicionih iskustava, s posebnim osvrtom na Bosnu i Hercegovinu, te ukazuju na potrebu uspostavljanja vizije budu}nosti za cijelu regiju Jugoisto~ne Evrope. Radujemo se {to vam moèmo prezentirati rezultate i nastojanja ove konferencije.

Mirela Grünther–\e~evi}, direktorica Fondacije Heinrich Böll, Ured za Bosnu i Hercegovinu Nermina Mujagi}, predsjednica Upravnog odbora Udruènja za politi~ke nauke u BiH

6

IZAZOVI ZA POLITIČKU TEORIJU

Izazovi za političku teoriju

NEVIDLJIVI ZIDOVI EVROPE Ugo VLAISAVLJEVIĆ

Pad Berlinskog zida je veliki doga|aj, jer nije dijelio samo jedan grad nego ~itav jedan kontinent. Ru{enjem ovog zida Evropa je prestala da bude jedno ime za dva svijeta, za Zapadnu i Isto~nu Evropu, te je napokon mogla postati jedna ujedinjena Evropa. Kada sve~ano obiljeàvamo dvadesetogodi{njicu pada Berlinskog zida, mi slavimo ujedinjenu Evropu. Ali to ipak nije bio doga|aj njenog kona~nog ujedinjenja. Evropa ni danas nije ujedinjena. To je, u stvari, bila objava mogu}nosti da }e se i isto~noevropske dràve mo}i priklju~iti procesima evropskog ujedinjenja koji su ve} bili prili~no napredovali u Zapadnoj Evropi. O velikim uspjesima na putu stvaranja uistinu ujedinjene Evrope govori ~injenica da je danas ve}ina isto~noevropskih dràva uklju~ena u Evropsku uniju. Me|utim, o ujedinjenoj Evropi se jo{ ne moè govoriti, ne samo zato {to jo{ ima dràva koje dijele zidovi od EU, poput dràva Zapadnog Balkana, nego i zato, prije svega zato, {to i sama EU nije ujedinjena nego je jo{ na putu ujedinjenja. Ni pad Berlinskog zida niti neki kasniji politi~ki doga|aj nisu proizveli ono famozno „Mi Evropljani“, onaj politi~ki narod na ~ijoj volji se temelji Francuska republika ili Ameri~ka deklaracija o neovisnosti.1 Ujedinjena Evropa danas ne postoji kao dràva2 nego kao grozd dràva koje su prije ili kasnije u{le u proces integracija, tako da se nalaze na razli~itim putanjama i kre}u razli~itim brzinama integracije. Ole Weaver je stoga prikazao EU sa njenom sloènom i dinami~nom strukturom integracije kao izvjesnu kozmi~ku maglinu koja se vrti oko svog pretpostavljenog sredi{ta.3 Ovakvo slikovito predstavljanje, u kojem je evropsko ujedinjenje shva}eno ne kao jedan nego kao ~itav splet procesa integracije vi|enih kao silnice centripetalnih gravitacijskih sila, moè nam pomo}i oko pitanja evropskih granica danas. Kao {to je to Balibar pokazao, mno{tvo je takvih granica, pogotovo unutra{njih, koje su u novije doba uspje{nih integracija ~vrsto postavljene i koje ~esto nisu ni{ta vi{e prekora~ive nego {to je to nekad bio Berlinski zid. Da li je sa Berlinskim zidom pao i posljednji veliki zid evropskih podjela, ili je sa padom tog zida po~elo razdoblje ne1

2

3

Vidi o tome Jacques Derrida, „Déclarations d’indépendance“ u: Otobiographies, Galilée, Paris, 1984, str. 13-32. Etienne Balibar, “Es gibt keinen Staat in Europa” u: Nous, citoyens d’Europe? Les frontières, l’Etat, le peuple, Ed: La Découverte, Paris, 2001, str. 221-241. Ole Waever, “Identity, Integration and Security,” Journal of International Affairs, Winter 95, Vol. 4B Issue 2, str. 389.

9


vidljivih zidova, dubokih podjela koje nikakvi zidovi vi{e ne trebaju osiguravati? Zidovi su nestali, ali ne i granice koje se ne mogu pre}i. Zidovi su nestali jer dràvne granice nisu vi{e istovjetne sa naj~vr{}im granicama podjele. Treba li zato slaviti Evropu bez velikih zidova podjele? Na isti na~in na koji EU uspostavlja unutra{nje granice podjele, niti njene vanjske granice ne trebaju zidove. O tome rje~ito govore granice koje je EU uspostavila prema (jo{) neintegriranom ostatku Evrope. Niti tu, makar naizgled, nema nikakvih zidova – iako su granice dobro osigurane i te{ko prekora~ive. Zapadni Balkan kao ostatak neintegrirane Evrope, ili ta~nije kao dezintegrirani dio Evrope, ve} odavno, od pada Berlinskog zida, podlijeè, da tako kaèmo, sna`nim atrakcijama gravitacijskog pojasa EU. Kao {to to svakodnevno isku{avaju lokalni politi~ari i dràvni slu`benici, integracija po~inje daleko prije uklju~ivanja u evropsku zajednicu dràva, kao {to ne prestaje nakon toga. Dràvne granice ne spre~avaju integraciju u EU niti ova integracija ukida ove granice. Trebalo bi ispitati kako se odvijaju evropske integracije s obzirom na dràvne granice, polaze}i od uvida da ih ove integracije ne naru{avaju, a pogotovo ne ukidaju. O~ito je da ima neke su{tinske povezanosti izme|u ~injenice da ni u samom jezgru evropskih integracija dràvne granice nisu postale nepotrebne i ~injenice da ove integracije djeluju prili~no sna`no izvan dràvnih granica ~lanica Evropske unije. Va`no je primijetiti kako integracijski procesi djeluju na dràvne granice: oni ih ~ine poroznim i propusnim, a da ih nimalo ne slabe. Ne{to se svakako de{ava sa granicama, naro~ito u Evropi i naro~ito nakon pada Berlinskog zida. Balibar }e primijetiti da granice „podrhtavaju“. U svom ogledu o „Granicama Evrope“ on }e re}i: „Granice podrhtavaju: no to ne zna~i da i{~ezavaju. Manje nego ikad na{ je dana{nji svijet nekakav svijet bez granica. Naprotiv, to zna~i da se one umnoàvaju i smanjuju u svojoj lokalizaciji i svojoj funkciji, da se rasteù ili se udvostru~uju, postaju}i zone, regije, pograni~ne zemlje u kojima se boravi i ìvi. Upravo je odnos izme|u ‘granice’ i ‘teritorije’ preokrenut. To zna~i da su one postale predmet potraìvanja i osporavanja, upornog oja~avanja, i to posebno njihove bezbjednosne funkcije.“4 Govore}i o preokretanju odnosa granice i teritorije Balibar nas uvjerava kako su vanjske granice postale u velikoj mjeri unutra{nje, fizi~ke su postale simboli~ke, a vidljive nevidljive. Zid koji ~uva vojska je, izme|u ostalog, postao strogi vizni reìm koji nadgleda policija. To je zato {to su „granice /frontières/ prestale da ozna~avaju one crte /limits/ gdje se zaustavlja politika“. Umjesto da kao nekad budu „ivice politi~kog“ /bord du politique/, granice su postale „predmeti u prostoru politi~kog“, pri ~emu 4

10

Etienne Balibar, „Les frontières de l’Europe“ u: La crainte des masses. Politique et philosophie avant et après Marx, Ed. Galilée, Paris, 1997, str. 386-387.


je, po Balibaru, promijenjena uloga policije: „cjelokupna grani~na policija je danas organ unutra{nje bezbjednosti“.5 Balibar primje}uje da se Evropa ne izgra|uje kao nekakav „zatvoreni entitet“ koji bi bio nalik „federalnoj dràvi“ ili „multinacionalnoj imperiji“. Umjesto da podlegnemo iluziji njihovog brisanja, granice Evrope prije treba traìti kao granice „otvorene cjeline“. Novi entitet name}e novu strategiju povla~enja granica: Ova cjelina otvorena prema vani (...) nije zbog toga manje niti }e biti manje iznutra pregra|ena izvjesnim brojem ‘granica‘ koje je nemogu}e ukinuti: ne samo dràvnim politi~kim granicama nego naro~ito pokretnim dru{tvenim granicama, ‘nevidljivim‘ na kartama, ali materijaliziranim u administrativnim uredbama i u dru{tvenim praksama, ‘unutra{njim granicama’ izme|u populacija koje se razlikuju po svom porijeklu i po svom mjestu u podjeli rada.6 Ova preobrazba granica se na veoma opipljiv na~in isku{ava u Bosni i Hercegovini kao zemlji izvan EU, ali odavno upregnutoj u procese evropskih integracija i podvrgnutoj evropskoj politici granica. Tu se evropska bezbjednosna politika pojavljuje kao strogi reìm kontrole ulaska i izlaska ljudi i roba, a posebno kao vizni reìm. Ovaj reìm se, u stvari, provodi izvan dràvnih granica EU, u „suverenom“ prostoru ove zemlje, ali u zonama eksteritorijalnog prisustva EU. Vizni uredi ambasada ~lanica EU upravo funkcioniraju kao policijske ispostave ovih zemalja, sa karakteristi~nim procedurama koje se ne razlikuju od unutra{nje sigurnosne politike ovih dràva prema strancima koji se zateknu ili obitavaju na njihovoj teritoriji. Kada se govori o ru{enju zidova me|udràvnih podjela u novijoj povijesti Evrope, treba svakako do}i u Sarajevo i vidjeti te uvezene policijske bastione: velike zidove, èljezne ograde sa kopljastim vr{cima, bodljikave ìce, kojima su opasane ambasade dràva koje lokalno stanovni{tvo nalazi najatraktivnijim kada èli da putuje u EU, kao {to su Njema~ka, Austrija i Francuska. Torturu kontrole i pregleda koja se nekada prolazili na dràvnim grani~nim prelazima, Bosanci i Hercegovci sada prolaze u svojoj vlastitoj zemlji: uglavnom ponizno i skru{eno, kao da ih je njihova vlastita policija zatekla u kakvom nedjelu.7 Usprkos tome {to „podrhtavanje granica“ ima upe~atljive razmjere, kao {to pokazuje novija smjena u ovda{njim ambasadama EU, u kojoj su diplomate ustupile mjesto profesionalnoj policijskoj birokraciji, Balibar ide predaleko kada tvrdi da se „ve} sada mo}no rasta~e moderna, su{tinski ‘grani~arska’ (carinska, identitarna) jednad`ba gra|anstva i nacionalnosti“.8 Koliko god postale porozne, jedva vidljive, pomjerene od vanjskih rubova teritorija ka procedurama i reìmima „unutra{njih poslova“, granice su 5 6 7

8

Ibid., str. 387. Etienne Balibar, “Es gibt keinen Staat in Europa”, str. 228. Vidi o tome Ugo Vlaisavljevi}, “Njema~ki logor u Sarajevu”, Pripitomljavanje nacionalizma, MaunaFe, Sarajevo, 2007, str. 232-236. Etienne Balibar, „Les frontières de l’Europe“, La crainte des masses, str. 386.

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ipak ostale, kao granice svih granica, dràvne granice. EU ne samo da ~uva, u svom srcu, u gravitacijskom jezgru svojih integracija takve granice nego ih i nalaè svim onim zemljama koje su se kandidirale da pristupe takvim integracijama. Brojni neuspjesi BiH da ispuni zahtjeve koji su neophodni za pribliàvanje EU mogu se svesti na njenu nesposobnost da osigura svoje granice. Ova nesposobnost osiguravanja vlastitih granica samo je vanjski znak kontinuiranog neuspjeha ove dràve da se konsolidira kao nacija-dràva – a to zna~i da ispuni na zadovoljavaju}i, na tipi~no evropski na~in, jednad`bu gra|anstva i nacionalnosti.9 Od svih jugoslavenskih secesionisti~kih dràva, BiH je u najteòj prilici da ispuni ovu jednad`bu. Shodno principu uti possidetis na temelju kojeg su unutardràvne granice biv{e Federacije zadale mjeru u priznavanju samoodre|enja naroda, BiH je kreirana kao dràva tri ravnopravne nacije.10 Kao {to se moglo i o~ekivati, konsocijalno ure|enje ove nekada{nje centralne jugoslavenske republike dovelo ju je na za~elje onih dràva koje poku{avaju da ispune zahtjeve pristupa EU. Me|utim, neuspjesi u kandidaturi ove dràve kompliciranog ustavnog ure|enja ne govore samo o dubini njenih nacionalnih podjela nego i o presudnoj va`nosti koju EU pridaje ispunjenju jednad`be gra|anstva i nacionalnosti. Kako god shvatili svrhe kompliciranog ispunjavanja zahtjeva za prijem u ~lanstvo evropske zajednice dràva, ovo kondicioniranje pretpostavlja konsolidaciju nacije-dràve. Za takvu konsolidaciju, lako je doku~iti, me|u dràvama kandidatkinjama su najvi{e mogle biti spremne monoetni~ke nacije-dràve poput Slovenije, a najmanje konsocijacije poput BiH. Dakako, nacija-dràva je model evropske dràve par excellence. Zna~i li to da se multinacionalne dràve u jakom smislu, naime one koje imaju najmanje dvije ravnopravne nacije, ne mogu uklopiti u tipi~an evropski okvir? Nije li nakon pada Berlinskog zida propast multinacionalnih federacija, êhoslova~ke i Jugoslavije, tek pruìo njihovim konstitutivnim nacijama mogu}nost pristupa EU? Kao {to tvrdi Dominique Shcnapper, istina je da su sve velike evropske nacije multietni~ke, ili ~ak multinacionalne,11 ali one su se upravo uspje{no konsolidirale kao nacije-dràve zahvaljuju}i dominaciji uvijek samo jedne temeljne nacije (core nation). Nakon raspada Jugoslavije pokazalo se da je princip priznavanja secesionisti~kih dràva, u stvari, bio princip nacionalnosti (jedna nacija jedna dràva), ali u svom reduciranom obliku (jedna monoetni~ka nacija – jedna mini dràva).12 BiH je kao samostalna dràva ugledala svjetlo dana kao prili~no neobi~na dràva kod koje se zbog teritorijalne raspr{enosti i izmije{anosti etni~kih nacija nije mogao primijeniti ovaj princip. Kao {to pri9

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12

O ovaj sakrosanktnoj formuli vidi jo{ Etienne Balibar, “L’Europe des citoyens” u: Nous, citoyens d’Europe? Les frontières, l’Etat, le peuple, str. 245. Vidi o tome pobliè kod Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination, Oxford University Press, 2007, str. 340-341. Dominique Schnapper, La communauté des citoyens. Sur l’idée moderne de nation, Gallimard, Paris, 1994, str. 98. Vidi o tome David Miller, On Nationality, Oxford University Press, 1995, str. 187-195.


mje}uje Margaret Moore, niti priznanje gra|anske BiH niti priznanje na samoodre|enje njenih nacija nije moglo predstavljati prihvatljivo rje{enje za me|unarodnu zajednicu. Neophodnost priznanja jednakog prava svih nacija je, stoga, morala voditi izvjesnom „ma{tovitom rje{enju“ koje „ide preko tradicionalnog vestfalskog modela nacije-dràve“.13 Dejtonski ustav je poku{aj da se ide u tom pravcu „labave federacije“ u kojoj se „suverenost spu{ta ka relativno autonomnim konstitutivnim jedinicama, ali tako|er i razvijaju aran`mani zajedni~kog suvereniteta“.14 Da je o ure|enju Bosne i Hercegovine trebalo „ma{tovito razmi{ljati“ implicira se dvostrukom nemogu}no{}u: niti da se usvoji unitarni princip gra|anske nacije, niti da se dopusti primjena secesionisti~kog rje{enja. Trebalo je djelomi~no uvaìti i jedno i drugo. Pa ipak se moè re}i da je u provo|enju secesionisti~kog rje{enja me|unarodna zajednica i{la dokle god se moglo i}i. Pritom treba imati u vidu cijeli prostor biv{e Jugoslavije, a ne samo BiH. Kada Moorova navodi glavni razlog za{to se u ovoj zemlji nije moglo provesti secesionisti~ko rje{enje, onda ona smatra da je to zbog toga {to bi takvo rje{enje vodilo „opetovanoj secesiji“ /recursive secession/, secesiji nakon secesije, a u BiH bi to „podrazumijevalo pa~vork enklava ili dèpova suverenih jedinica diljem ~itave ove republike“.15 Pogledamo li kuda se sve na dana{njoj politi~koj karti Zapadnog Balkana prostiru dràvne i subdràvne granice, vidjet }emo upravo ~itav jedan pa~vork mini dràva i kvazidràvnih enklava: od Slovenije, preko Republike Srpske i Herceg-Bosne do Kosova i Zapadne Makedonije. Zagledamo li se malo bolje, i u tim enklavama }emo nazrijeti jo{ manje „dèpove suverenih jedinica“, pri ~emu treba imati na umu da niti je istina da ove mini dràve imaju punu suverenost o kojoj su sanjale, niti da ove najmanje jedinice kolektivnog etni~kog posjedovanja teritorije nemaju nikakvu suverenost. BiH u svojoj administrativnoj raskomadanosti nije nikakva iznimka me|u susjednim nacijama-dràvama, nego samo pruà upe~atljivu sliku kraja puta do kojeg su do{li administratori me|unarodne zajednice primjenjuju}i secesionisti~ko rje{enja nakon raspada Jugoslavije. Upravo zato konsocijalno ure|enje BiH i velika ovisnost ove dràve o EU mogu, zauzvrat, osvijetliti ~itav novi dràvni poredak regije. Imaju li se u vidu novonastale mini dràve, a pogotovo njihova ovisnost spram EU koja je dovoljno velika da je u ovom pogledu svejedno da li su integrirane u EU poput Slovenije ili to jo{ nisu, moglo bi se re}i da je ~itav ovaj postjugoslavenski poredak jedno sloèno konsocijativno ure|enje. Dakle, s jedne strane imamo od Triglava pa do Gevgelije ~itav taj zgusnuti mozaik politeja-enklava, a s druge strane ~ini se nesumnjivim da bez ovakve EU ovaj poredak, toliko nalik srednjevjekovnim kneèvinama, ne bi mogao ni postojati.

13 14 15

Margaret Moore, The Ethics of Nationalism, Oxford University Press, 2001, str. 238. Ibid. Ibid., str. 237.

13


Kao {to je primijetio John Gray, konsocijativni reìmi nisu stabilni i mogu preìvjeti samo uz pomo} neke „vanjske sile“. Upravo nam mo`da ovaj teoreti~ar moè pomo}i u osnaìvanju na{e hipoteze o konsocijativnom poretku ~itave regije, iako se on koleba da iznese takvu hipotezu. Osvrnut }emo se na dvije intervencije me|unarodne zajednice na Balkanu i razloge koji, prema Grayu, stoje u njihovoj pozadini. Prva je intervencija da se sprije~i ili makar zaustavi rat: „Diplomatska i vojna intervencija na Balkanu je izvr{ena zato {to se uspostavljanje nacija-dràva prema evropskom gra|anskom modelu pokazalo nemogu}im, a poku{aji da se uspostave etni~ki homogene nacije-dràve doveli su do grubih kr{enja temeljnih ljudskih prava. Ishod toga je uspostavljanje, u nekim oblastima biv{e Jugoslavije, izvjesnog broja manje ili vi{e konsocijalnih reìma ~iju stabilnost izvana jam~e sile koje su ih i postavile.“16 Gray zatim kao djelomi~no konsocijalne (pored elemenata liberalnog ure|enja, ali i de facto podjela koje tako|er sadrè) izri~ito navodi reìme u Bosni i na Kosovu. Ove „hibridne forme vlasti“, ~ija sigurnost ne ovisi o dogovoru nego o podr{ci vanjskih sila, on }e bez dvoumljenja nazvati protektoratima. Ali jesu li ova dva „ovisni~ka“ reìma ono {to je mislio ovaj autor pod „izvjesnim brojem manje ili vi{e konsocijalnih reìma“? To bi onda bili izuzeci, a ne reprezentativni primjeri stanja u ovoj regiji. Time bi se onda upravo izgubila poenta njegovog uvida u glavni smisao intervencije me|unarodne zajednice u dobu nakon rata: „Poput onog koji je vladao pod otomanskim upravlja~ima, mir nametnut Balkanu po~iva na temelju manje nesigurnom nego {to su to sporazumi me|u razli~itim zajednicama koje ga uìvaju. Ono ~emu svjedo~imo na Balkanu na prelasku u dvadeset prvo stolje}e moglo bi se pokazati kao ponovni izum institucije imperije kao lijeka za sva ona zla koja su proistekla iz poku{aja da se izgrade etni~ke nacije-dràve. Pa ipak, sasvim je upitno da li ove imperijalne institucije koje se grade mogu ponovo stvoriti multietni~ka dru{tva.“17 Kada govori o obnavljanju institucije imperije iz nu`de, Gray ima u vidu ta~no odre|enu imperiju, onu koja se poput oseke povukla s ovog podru~ja ostaviv{i u naslije|e kasnijim vremenima obnavljanje nekog oblika konsocijalnog poretka.18 Rije~ je, dakako, o Otomanskoj Imperiji, za koju }e ovaj autor napomenuti da „se moè smatrati nekim vidom konsocijalnog reìma“. Ako EU obnavlja na izvjestan na~in imperijalne institucije, ako vanjska intervencija, bez koje ne moè opstati na duì rok nijedan lokalni konsocijalni reìm, podrazumijeva imperijalnu mo}, onda se na Balkanu i

16 17 18

14

John Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism, The New Press, 2000, str. 129. Ibid., str. 130. Vidi o tome Michael Walzer, On Toleration, Yale University Press, 1997, str. 22.


EU, pored SAD koje ne kriju svoje imperijalno lice, ustanovljuje kao svojevrsna imperija, makar je imenovali kvaziimperijom.19 Izmije{ane na istoj teritoriji, razli~ite etni~ke zajednice, a danas su to na Balkanu samosvjesne etni~ke nacije, nalaù u svrhu osiguranja svoje miroljubive koegzistencije „rasparivanje zakonske jurisdikcije i teritorijalne suverenosti“,20 a to je upravo ono {to pruàju konsocijalni aran`mani. Ovo rasparivanje je neophodno upravo zato {to ove nacije ne mogu da ispune jednad`bu gra|anstva i nacionalnosti. Dràvne granice koje u EU jam~e za sigurnost dràvnog/nacionalnog identiteta ukazuju na va`nost ove jednad`be i u najnovijim fazama evropskih integracija, tako da EU, i pored izvjesnih konsocijalnih elemenata u svome ure|enju, i dalje ostaje prije svega unija nacija-dràva.21 Ako je rastakanje jednad`be nacionalnosti i gra|anstva ne{to {to prema glavnim tendencijama integracijskih procesa predstoji EU a Balibar ve} vjeruje da je to u dobroj mjeri slu~aj, onda EU, prelaze}i put od ekonomskog i vojnog saveza do politi~ke zajednice koja ima svoj demos, mora pro}i kroz konsocijativne me|ufaze. Nije li onda model konsocijacije bliì idealu gra|anske EU nego {to je to model grozda nacija-dràva u kojem dràvne granice jo{ jam~e ono {to je bilo najva`nije i prije evropskih integracija: jednad`bu gra|anstva i nacionalnosti? Kao {to sada postoji najve}i afinitet izme|u EU i „etni~ki ~istih“, dovoljno „konsolidiranih“ mini dràva Balkana, tako bi mo`da ve} sutra to nadomjestio jedan drugi afinitet daleko vi{e gra|anske EU prema konsocijacijama poput BiH. Va`no je uo~iti da BiH kao konsocijalni reìm u teku}oj dràvno-politi~koj konstelaciji Balkana predstavlja veliki problem upravo kao umanjena slika evropske multinacionalne zajednice. Daleko ljep{i odraz, ve}u mjeru „evropskog politi~kog duha“ sude}i po spremnosti koje su pokazale za izazove integracija, ~ini se da pruàju lokalne karikature nacije-dràve formirane na reduciranom principu nacionalnosti. Nespremnost EU da energi~nije intervenira u ratu u Bosni bi se, izme|u ostalog, mogla pripisati i zlokobnom preklapanju principa etni~ke nacionalnosti, koji je usvojen kao glavni princip legitimacije u gradnji novih dràva Balkana, i principu etni~kog ~i{}enja. Imaju}i u vidu va`nost ispunjenja jednad`be gra|anstvo-nacionalnost i podesnosti za kandidaturu u EU, mogli bismo bez velikog pretjerivanja ustvrditi da su ratna zaposjedanja teritorija, pa tako i genocid u Srebrenici, bili pre{utni dio kondicioniranja pristupa mladih secesionisti~kih enklava EU. Ako ve} treba ispitati karakter vanjskih i unutra{njih granica dana{nje EU, onda pogled iz Bosne na ove granice moè biti prili~no instruktivan. Ne ra~unaju}i posebnu situaciju na Kosovu, od svih dràva Zapadnog Bal19 20 21

Etienne Balibar, “L’Europe des citoyens”, Nous, citoyens d’Europe?, str. 253. John Gray, op. cit., str. 129. Vidi o tome, na primjer, Matthijs Bogaards and Markus M. L. Crepaz, „Consociational Interpretations of European Union“, European Union Poliics, Volume 3, 2002, str. 357-381.

15


kana BiH je mo`da najvi{e zaostala u procesu pribliàvanja evropskim integracijama. Ako se, dakle, ispituju vanjske granice „tvr|ave Evropa“ – kako je EU nazvao Balibar imaju}i u vidu njenu rigidnu politiku granica – onda je BiH najudaljenija od njenih zidina, ili su oni prema ovoj dràvi najvi{e u~vr{}eni. I upravo u slu~aju ovog posebnog odnosa, u kojem granica osigurava razliku vanjsko-unutra{nje i treba da funkcionira na klasi~an na~in, moè se vidjeti koliko je Balibar u pravu kada ukazuje na promjenu funkcije granica i njihovo povla~enje prema unutra, tako da tvr|avi ne trebaju nikakve vanjske zidine. Naime, BiH je istovremeno vi{e nego ijedna zemlja kandidatkinja za prijem uklju~ena u EU: preko vojske (EUFOR), preko policije (EUPM) i suverene vlasti svog specijalnog predstavnika (EUSR), koji se zahvaljuju}i specijalnim bonskim ovlastima moè postaviti iznad najvi{e dràvne vlasti. Tako se ~ini da je BiH, budu}i jo{ nesposobna da bude integrirana u EU, inkorporirana u klasi~ni oblik imperijalne vlasti.22 Nazovimo to paradoksom postimperijalne inkorporacije. To je ona vlast koja ru{i sve zidove u Evropi.

22

16

Balibar govori o izvjesnoj zoni „unutra{nje kolonizacije“ koju provodi EU kao „prava Evropa“ prema „vanjskoj Evropi“, a u tu zonu su uklju~eni Kosovo, Albanija i ve}i dio biv{e Jugoslavije. Cf. Etienne Balibar, „Europe difficile: les chantiers de la démocratie“ u: Nous, citoyens d’Europe?, str. 306.


DER UNTERGANG: 1989-2009 – 20 GODINA LIBERALIZACIJE ILI KANIBALIZACIJE? Asim MUJKIĆ

Osloba|aju}i se komunizma, smatrali smo da se osloba|amo svake forme ‘samjeravanja’ nas obi~nih ljudi s ne~im {to nadilazi na{u svakodnevnu praksu, s ne~im ne-ljudskim, apstraktno-kategorijalnim, odnosno ideolo{kim, uop}e s bilo kakvim apropriranjem. îni se da nas je u tom pravcu navodilo emancipatorsko ‘liberalisti~ko’ obe}anje, prema kojem je kombinacija parlamentarna demokratija + slobodno trì{te predstavljala magi~nu formulu za uspjeh. S dana{nje distance, moglo bi se u~initi da smo u svemu tome, a posebno u insistiranju da ‘liberalni demokratski poredak nema alternative’, pokazali samo svoju naivnost, ili bolje re}i politi~ku nezrelost. S druge strane, i liberalno-demokratski poredak se tokom devedesetih, a osobito nakon po~etka novog milenija pretvorio u ne{to sasvim drugo – neoliberalni globalni kapitalisti~ki poredak, razviv{i svoju ideolo{ku naraciju tzv. ‘slobodnog svijeta’ koja po~iva na viziji spasa kroz trì{nu demokratiju i konzumerizam. Walter Mignolo opisuje taj trend kao proces u~vr{}enja „naturaliziranog uvjerenja koje se pro{irilo svijetom da su progres i razvoj dobri za sve i svakoga; {to vi{e proizvodi{ i {to vi{e ljudi konzumira, bivaju utoliko, kao konzumenti, sretniji. Unutar takve strukture, oni koji su u njoj ìve da bi radili; da bi konzumirali. Uspjeh je kona~ni horizont“.1 S druge strane, radikalno i prezrivo odbacivanje marksisti~kog redeskriptivnog vokabulara i dobrih pola stolje}a izgradnje na{ih identiteta, ~ija je naracija bila ili protkana metaforama tog vokabulara ili razvijana u opreci prema njemu, u~inilo nas je slijepim za ~injenicu da se iza ‘povelja o ljudskim pravima i slobodama’, iza liberalisti~ke mantre o ‘slobodi protoka ideja, ljudi, dobara i kapitala’, koja stoji ~ak u preambuli Ustava BiH, krije jedno novo samjeravanje prema ne~em ne-ljudskom, koje u tzv. ‘postideolo{koj’ konstelaciji neoliberalizma nije bilo vidljivo. Ideolo{ku ‘crvenu nit‘ ovog postideolo{kog doba ponajbolje, po mom mi{ljenju, odslikavaju dva Fukuyamina stava izre~ena odmah nakon teroristi~kih napada na New York i Washington u kratkom tekstu pod naslovom „Ostajemo na kraju historije“:2 1

2

Marina Grìni~: „De-linking Epistemology from Capital and Pluri-Versality – A Conversation with Walter Mignolo“, Reartikulacija, No. 4, Ljubljana, poletje/summer 2008 (20-22); 21. Francis Fukuyama: “Ostajemo na kraju historije”, Odjek br. 2, jesen-zima 2001, Sarajevo, prijev. Asim Mujki}, 38-39.

17


1.

„Iza liberalne demokratije i trì{ta, ne postoji ni{ta vi{e prema ~emu moèmo jo{ evoluirati ... Premda postoje retrogradna podru~ja koja se tom procesu opiru, te{ko je zamisliti neku alternativnu civilizaciju u kojoj bi ljudi uistinu htjeli ìvjeti – posebno nakon {to su socijalizam, monarhija, fa{izam i druge verzije autoritativne vladavine diskreditirane“;

2.

„Demokratija i slobodno trì{te nastavi}e sa {irenjem postaju}i dominantni principi organizacije za ve}i dio svijeta“.3

Kao prvo, neobi~na je intelektualna drskost tvrditi da se bilo kakav socijalni konstrukt nalazi na kraju ‘evolutivne ljestvice’, da vi{e ne postoji ni{ta ~emu bi ljudi mogli dalje teìti. Posebno je neitelektualno ustvrditi, kao ovdje implicitno, ali drugdje i eksplicitno, da se dovr{ava historijski razvoj ~ovjeka. Kraj historijskog razvoja bio bi i kraj historijskog bi}a ~ovjeka. Svaka od onih ‘autoritativnih vladavina’ koje pominje Fukuyama imala je svoju naraciju o kraju historije, o kona~nom ozbiljenju ~ovjekove misije na Zemlji koja bi na neki na~in proisticala iz same njegove transcendentalne su{tine. Vidimo, sa Fukuyamom i neoliberalizam dobija svoju zaokruènu naraciju o okon~anju jedne takve misije ~ovjeka. Gotovo je nevjerovatno u postmetafizi~kom razdoblju ~uti takav kruti, ahistorijski i duboko metafizi~ki stav kao ovaj koji izri~e Fukuyama. Sa kojih pozicija Fukuyama govori? Iznositi tvrdnje o kraju ljudskog historijskog razvitka, epohi ~iji je paradoksalno sinonim ‘dru{tvo bez ideologije’, moè se jedino ako se do~epamo pozicije koju Hilary Putnam zove ‘God’s–eye–view’ 4, {to do sada ni jednom ~ovjeku – proizvodu historije i kontingencije – nije po{lo za rukom. Jedina pozicija koja bi mogla opravdati ove Fukuyamine navode je ideolo{ka u metafizi~kom smislu, {to je jo{ Friedrich Engels definirao kao „specifi~nu strukturu svijesti, naro~ito klasnog dru{tva i posebno klasnih ideologa kao onog sloja ljudi koji teorijski oblikuju klasnu svijest i koji se ‘bave mislima kao samostalnim su{tinama, koje kao da same za sebe egzistiraju’“.5 Odbacivanje jedne, u ovom slu~aju komunisti~ke ideolo{ke matrice, nakon dvije decenije takozvane tranzicije postkomunisti~kih dru{tava, kao da je rezultiralo prihva}anjem nove, u na{em slu~aju neoliberalisti~ke ideolo{ke matrice. Ako prihvatimo Engelsovo odre|enje ideologije kao ‘govora samih su{tina’, onda moramo zaklju~iti da kao govor su{tina, a ne kao neko komunikativno su-djelovanje, ideologija op}enito po~iva na mreì onoga {to Rorty odre|uje kao ‘conversation-stoppers’ – zaustavlja~a razgovora – kao onih gradivnih, rekli bismo doktrinarnih elemenata ideolo{ke naracije koji se ne smiju propitivati. Na taj na~in, ti narativni elementi nisu ni{ta drugo do vrsta Denkverbota (zabrana mi{ljenja), pa se moè o 3

4 5

18

O tome sam ekstenzivnije pisao u Asim Mujki}: „Liberalizam vs. neoliberalizam – rasprava u povoju“ u John Rawls i perspektive liberalne demokratije u BiH, Adnan Huski}, Asim Mujki} ur. (Sarajevo: Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, 2003); 19-33; Pozicija “boànskog pogleda”- A.M. prev. Enciklopedija leksikografskog zavoda, 3, (Zagreb: Jugoslavenski leksikografski zavod, 1967).


tranziciji postkomunisti~kih dru{tava razmi{ljati, kako sugerira niz kriti~ki nastrojenih autora, kao o tranziciji s jednog fundamentalnog Denkverbota na jedan drugi fundamentalni Denkverbot. Slavoj @ièk insistira da se dana{nja liberalno-demokratska hegemonija odràva vrstom nepisanoga Denkverbota sli~nog zloglasnom Berufsverbotu u Njema~koj s kraja {ezdesetih – onog trenutka kada se pokaè i najmanji znak uklju~enja u politi~ki projekt koji za cilj ima ozbiljno dovesti u pitanje postoje}i poredak, odgovor odmah stiè: „Kako god bio benevolentan, on }e nu`no okon~ati u novoj vrsti Gulaga!“ Ideolo{ka funkcija konstantnog referiranja na holokaust, gulag i, u skorije vrijeme, katastrofe Tre}eg svijeta tako sluì podràvanju ovog Denkverbota kroz konstantno podsje}anje kako je sve moglo biti mnogo gore: „Samo pogledaj oko sebe i sam vidi {ta }e se desiti ako svi budemo slijedili tvoje radikalne pojmove“. Ono sa ~im se susre}emo ovdje je drasti~an primjer onog {to Ana Dinerstein i Mike Neary nazivaju projektom disutopije, „ne samo privremenog odsustva utopije ve} politi~ko slavljenje kraja socijalnih snova“.6 Ve}ina gra|ana europskog istoka, osobito u prvoj fazi tranzicije, umjesto u udobnosti liberalne demokratije i kapitalisti~kog konzumerstva probudila se u ko{maru korumpiranog sebi~nog protokapitalizma ili, jo{ gore, u raljama militantnog nacionalizma, samo ovaj put bez ikakvog utopijskog horizonta nade s kojim su i u{li u avanturu revolucije. Bez naracije nade ostala je samo naracija fakticiteta – navodno ostvarene nade: uspostave liberalno-demokratskog poretka. Taj pad iz jednog u drugi Denkverbot za ovaj dio Europe ozna~ava istovremeno pad u {utnju: elementi doju~era{njeg identiteta nepoèljni su za javno izno{enje, ~ak su neki sankcionirani krivi~nim zakonima u nekim od postkomunisti~kih zemalja, a propitivanje trenutnih dominantnih identitetskih naracija prokazano kao suludo. Ta cijela situacija, odnosno „politi~ka scena u nas pokazuje se kao pad. Najrazorniji izraz tog pada (...) je da stara skrahirana ideologija nije bila zamijenjena politi~kim mi{ljenjem nego novom ideologijom. Vladaju}a ideologija je smjesa grabe`ljivog pragmatizma i otrcanog moraliziranja“.7 Kako jedno takvo bivanje u neizrecivosti, {utnji Denkverbota, u ‘nemi{ljenju’, izgleda u prakti~nom ìvotu, ilustrirano je sljede}im primjerom: Jedina situacija kad se porijeklo u Isto~noj Njema~koj okre}e protiv vas je kad iznesete stav da ovakav buròasko-demokratski sustav ne ozna~ava ujedno i kraj povijesti. I onda kad kaète da nije kona~an nego da bi ga jednog dana mogao zamijeniti neki drugi. On }e, kao i svaki drugi sustav, jednog dana nestati, prije ili kasnije, mo`da za pedeset, mo`da za stotinu godina, a onda }e trebati razmi{ljati o tome {to }e uslijediti nakon njega i kakvo }e 6 7

Slavoj @ièk, Repeating Lenin (Zagreb: Arkzin, 2001); 8-9. Karel Kosik, O dilemama suvremene povijesti (Zagreb: Razlog, 2007); 236-7.

19


dru{tvo tada nastati. Ali to je tema koja predstavlja apsolutni tabu, jer ako vas ~uju da govorite tako ne{to, odmah }e pomisliti: ‘Ah, ona èli da se ponovno vrati DDR’, a uop}e se ne radi o tome ... Zapadnim Nijemcima uop}e ne predstavlja nikakav problem postaviti pitanje kako smo uop}e mogli ìvjeti u DDR-u, ali smatram da nikad nisu ni pomislili kako odgovoriti na pitanje nekog autsajdera pedeset godina u budu}nosti koji bi mogao pitati: „Kako ste vi uop}e mogli ìvjeti u Saveznoj Republici Njema~koj s tolikom nezaposleno{}u, s problemom gladi i s besku}ni{tvom“.8 Metafora Isto~ne Europe tako bi se mogla saèti u liku Petka iz Defoevog Robinsona Crusoea: naime, Petko je „kanibal kojega Crusoe spa{ava od opasnosti da bude pojeden i konvertira ga, kao pokajnika, u kr{}anstvo“.9 Nije li 1989. godine Zapad u ulozi prosvije}enog, poduzetnog Crusoea spasio ‘necivilizirane’ s Istoka da budu pojedeni u smrtonosnom zagrljaju kanibalske sovjetske imperije? Nakon {to je Robinson spasio Petka od toga da bude pojeden, po~eo ga je civilizirati – u~iti jeziku i manirima svoje civilizacije, potpuno negiraju}i Petkov dotada{nji identitet (Za{to se Robinson nije potrudio da nau~i barem poneku rije~ Petkovog kanibalskog jezika?) da bi ga po spasenju, tako civiliziranog, poveo sa sobom, u svoj svijet u kojem je Petkov kanibalizam tabu, u svijet gdje Petko kao takav moè opstati samo pod o~inskom za{titom Robinsona, kao njegov mali egzoti~ni divljak. Petko moè boraviti u Robinsonovom svijetu samo ako je svoj prethodni identitet ispraznio od bilo kakvog sadràja. Postavlja se opravdano pitanje: nije li Petko ipak, na kraju, naskroz pojeden? Tabu predcivilizacijskog identiteta se ne smije spominjati, premda se on moè legitimirati u Robinsonovom svijetu samo kao roba. Tako je tabu predrevolucionarnog identiteta isto~njaka – na primjer, crvena zvijezda petokraka – u nekim zemljama Isto~ne Europe danas krivi~no sankcioniran, premda se ta ista crvena zvijezda petokraka nesmetano moè pojavljivati u tim dràvama kao trade mark Heinekenovog piva! Crvena zvijezda kao ideolo{ki simbol je zabranjena, ali je kao kapitalisti~ki brand dozvoljena. Ova civilizatorska aproprijacija Istoka nema svoje ideolo{ko utemeljenje samo u neoliberalisti~koj naraciji. O nu`nosti kapitalisti~kog ‘civiliziranja’ Istoka pisali su i sami klasici marksizma. Karl Marx i Friedrich Engels svojedobno nisu pokazivali ni trunke milosti prema onima koje treba ‘aproprirati’, samjeriti, dovesti u red, ukratko – civilizirati. Osim Poljaka, prema klasicima marksizma, na istoku Europe ne postoji niti jedan narod koji bi se mogao okarakterizirati modernim u smislu da je bio u stanju proizvesti svoju buròaziju i, konsekventno tome, stvoriti operativnu nacionalnu dràvu, taj „sine qua non zahtjev za opstanak nacionalne 8

9

20

Dominic Boyer: „Nostalgija i politike sje}anja u Isto~noj Njema~koj“, Odjek, god. LXII, br. 1, Sarajevo, prolje}e 2009 (53-63); 60. Steven Lukes, Liberals and Cannibals / The Implications of Diversity, (London, New York: Verso, 2003), 29.


zajednice u kapitalisti~kom na~inu proizvodnje. Nacionalne zajednice koje nisu u stanju formirati nacionalne dràve prepreke su razvoju progresivne centralizacije i uniformnosti ~ovje~anstva, te stoga moraju biti asimilirane od strane ‘vitalnijih’ i ‘energi~nijih’ nacija koje su u stanju formirati nacionalne dràve sa demokratijom ‘kao kompenzacijom’“.10 U kojem smislu ova redeskripcija klasika marksizma odre|uje identitete na{ih malih naroda u kontekstu kapitalizma kojem smo se ‘vratili’? [ta su nacionalne zajednice koje nisu bile u stanju do sada da formiraju nacionalne dràve, odnosno zdravi sloj buròazije? Zastra{uju}e je i pomisliti {ta u ovakvoj apropriraju}oj viziji ~eka multikulturna ili multietni~ka dru{tva. To su, prema klasicima marksizma, ‘nepovijesni narodi’. Ako se na~as vratimo u duhovni vokabular devetnaestog stolje}a, to bismo mogli interpretirati kao narodi koji nisu subjekti svog povijesnog razvoja, odnosno subjekti „historijskih transformacija koje }e ja~ati kapitalisti~ku ekonomiju“,11 ve} objekti tu|eg posredovanja. Nepovijesni narodi tako „ne mogu razviti buròaziju jer su ili ‘selja~ki narodi‘ ili ne mogu razviti vlastitu dràvu, ili ìve izmije{ano, ili su suvi{e mali da stvore unutarnje trì{te. U takvim uslovima ‘nepovijesni narodi’ moraju traìti saveznika u onima koji brane ‘stari poredak’, jer je to jedini na~in da osiguraju svoj opstanak12. ‘Nezaustavljivi tok progresa‘ zahtijeva dobrovoljnu asimilaciju ili anihilaciju ovih nacionalnih zajednica“.13 Za Marxa i Engelsa nepovijesni narodi su ‘feudalne enklave’, legla reakcije. Njihovi nacionalni identiteti i kultura su, u pore|enju s vitalnim kapitalisti~kim nacijama, nazadni. Njihov nacionalizam, za razliku od nacionalizma razvijenih kapitalisti~kih nacija, reakcionaran je: Ako nacionalizam „ukida feudalni sistem izgra|uju}i ‘nacionalnu dràvu’, onda nacionalisti~ki pokret zasluùje podr{ku kao ‘oru|e’ progresivne dru{tvene promjene. Me|utim, ako se nacionalisti~ki pokret javlja me|u jezi~kim ili kulturnim zajednicama koje nisu u stanju preìvjeti prevrat kapitalisti~ke transformacije jer su premale ili imaju slabu ili nikakvu buròaziju, onda nacionalisti~ki pokreti postaju ‘regresivna’ snaga – ona koja je nesposobna prevazi}i stadij ‘selja~ko-feudalne’ dru{tvene organizacije“14. Takve skupine trebaju biti asimilirane, uklonjene, drugim rije~ima pro`derane. Njih tako ~eka sudbina Robinsonovog Petka. Sofisticiranije promi{ljanje o ovom dijelu Europe upravo je polazilo od diverziteta ljudi i naroda s ishodi{nim pitanjem: Moè li pluralitet na{ih razli~itosti biti prednost? Tako se u emancipatorskoj viziji disidenata o ko10

11 12

13 14

(U daljem tekstu: Doubt, manuskript). Ephraim Nimni: “Marx, Engles and the National Question” u The Rights of Minority Cultures, Will Kymlicka, ed., (Oxford University Press, 1997), 72. Ibid., 70. Paradoksalno, nisu li takvu vrstu ‘za{tite’ uìvali u okviru Var{avskog pakta. U tom kontekstu, i za federaciju ju`nih Slavena se moè re}i da je imala istu funkciju. Nimni pominje da, prema Marxu i Engelsu, ako “slavenski isto~noeuropski narodi ne mogu konstituirati nacionalnu dràvu, njihova jedina nada u opstanak bila je u stvaranju federacije ‘slavenskih naroda’ pod vo|stvom Cara sve Rusije, tog bedema europske reakcije”, Ibid., 69. Ibid., 71. Ibid., 63.

21


munizmu mislilo i kao o „carstvu duhovne slobode, diverziteta i tolerancije... domu jednakih naroda sa prebogatim koloritom kulture, njegovanog diverziteta jezika, religija, tradicija i li~nosti“15 (Einstein, Kafka, Lukacs, Krleà, Milosz, Havel, Kolakowski, Menzel i drugi). Prelazak na uniformiraju}u nacional-dràvnu, etni~ki homogenu kapitalisti~ku matricu, uz izuzetke, ovaj je region pretvorio u podru~je „mr`nje, netolerancije, etni~ke i vjerske“.16 Ova alternativna, no moram ovdje re}i genuina ‘miteleuropska’ naracija diverziteta, izraèna u djelima i mislima tzv. ‘disidentskih intelektualaca’, koja je kao naracija socijalne nade utrla put revoluciji iz 1989, naprosto nije imala {ansu u sudaru s novim ideolo{kim valom sa Zapada. Czeslaw Milosz se u strahu pitao ve} 1990. godine: „Da li }e godine patnje pod totalitarnom vladavinom sada biti potrane, izbrisane da bi ljudi otpo~eli ni od ~ega? Trebaju li se mislioci, pjesnici i umjetnici pridruìti svojim zapadnim kolegama u donekle marginalnoj ulozi koja im je namijenjena u dru{tvima zaokupljenim prodajom i kupovinom?“.17 Trebalo se, tako, nakon svrgavanja komunizma svesti na ‘ni{ta’, na to ‘kao da ni~ega prije nije bilo’, zajedno s naracijama nade u dru{tvenu pravdu doma}ih intelektualaca utonuti u ti{inu novog Denkverbota slobodnog trì{ta i parlamentarne demokratije. Steven Lukes od samog po~etka tranzicije Srednje i Isto~ne Europe upozorava da je jedna od „stvarnih mogu}nosti da u potpunom odbacivanju realnog socijalizma postrevolucionarne elite prihvate puni paket kontra-ideologije liberalizma slobodnog trì{ta, koja, poput marksizma, mada na razli~itim temeljima, tako|er odbacuje sami pojam ‘dru{tvene pravde’“.18 ê{ki filozof Karel Kosik takvu je transformaciju slikovito opisao na sljede}i na~in: „Ne ulazimo u Evropu, nego prelazimo iz jedne pe}ine u drugu: iz pe}ine sive, kasarnske, opkoljene bodljikavom ìcom, u pe}inu prezasi}eno komfornu, osvijetljenu reklamama koje zasjenjuju zvijezde i sunce“.19 Tako su biv{e komunisti~ke dràve Srednje i Isto~ne Europe, ~ini se danas, slijedile ideolo{ki diktum po kojemu je za ontogenezu, odnosno izgradnju moderne kapitalisti~ke, demokratske dràve, imperativno da ponovi put filogeneze – put stvaranja takve vrste dràve, jedan ubrzani preslik kapitalisti~kog razvoja od prvobitne akumulacije, etni~ke homogenizacije koja treba da odredi dominantnog nacionalnog referenta dràve, do dominantnog oblika laissez-faire kapitalisti~kog egalitarizma u formi konzumerizma. Ukratko, za dvadeset godina trebalo je rekapitulirati dvjestogodi{nju povijest modernog kapitalizma i nacionalne dràve.

15

16 17

18

22

Adam Michnik: “Gray is Beautiful: Thoughts on Democracy in Central Europe”, Dissent, Vol. 44, Spring 1997. Michink, ibid. Milosz prema Jerzy Jedlicki: „The Revolution of 1989: The Unbearable Burden of History“ u Eastern Europe / Transformation and Revolution 1945 – 1991, Lyman H. Legters ed. (Lexington Mass., Toronto: D.C. Heath & Company, 1992); 635-43; 641. Steven Lukes: „Marxism and Morality: Reflections on the Revolutions of 1989“ u Eastern Europe / Transformation and Revolution 1945 – 1991, Lyman H. Legters ed. (Lexington Mass., Toronto: D.C. Heath & Company, 1992); 612-21; 620.


Rekontekstualizacija Srednje i Isto~ne Europe u kapitalisti~ku matricu istovremeno se odvijala na dva kolosijeka, u formi „restauracije podivljalog kapitalizma devetnaestog stolje}a“20 kao i u formi „prodora sofisticiranog neokapitalizma dvadesetog stolje}a“;21 dakle, s jedne strane, tranzicija je tekla u pravcu uspostave klasi~ne nacionalne kapitalisti~ke dràve koja je prema laissez-faire i marksisti~koj doktrini podrazumijevala ustanovljenje ja~eg burùjskog sloja, ili ‘lumpenburòazije’22 kako je naziva Kosik, no istovremeno se odvijala i u kontekstu globalnog kapitalizma i neoliberalisti~ke ‘nadnacionalne’ naracije, pa je ~in konstitucije nacionalne dràvnosti gotovo istovremeno bio i ~inom njezine dekonstitucije i utapanja u discipliniraju}im procedurama nadnacionalnih integracija kao {to je ~lanstvo u EU, a jo{ prije toga ~lanstvo u NATO paktu. Na kraju procedure discipliniranja, nestanka, Kosik primje}uje da se „sa zadovoljstvom konstatira da nitko vi{e ne iska~e iz reda, svi nastupaju, pa bilo da imaju ‘desne’ ili ‘lijeve’ vlade, disciplinirano u jednom poretku“.23 Pa ipak, ima li jo{ uop}e smisla govoriti o ovom prostoru europskog kontinenta kao o nekoj zasebnoj cjelini? Najprije, taj prostor koji se proteè od Baltika do Adrijatika nije u cijelosti apropriran. S nedavnim prijemom Rumunije i Bugarske u Europsku uniju oko takozvanog jo{-neapropriranog regiona Zapadnog Balkana zatvorio se krug, poput nekog cordon sanitaire kojem je cilj ome|iti rezervat ‘domoroda~kih’ ili, marksisti~kim rje~nikom kazano, nepovijesnih naroda – pripadnika podijeljenih dru{tava i gra|ana nedovr{enih dràva koji su jo{ uvijek na prvoj stepenici tranzicije – uspostave homogene nacionalne dràve, potom osiguranja sigurnosnog ambijenta, nakon ~ega }e uslijediti ulan~avanje u globalno trì{te. Izgleda kao da Europa hermeti~ki zatvara ovaj region u i{~ekivanju „kona~nog rje{enja“ za zemlje kao {to su Srbija, Bosna i Hercegovina, Makedonija, Albanija i Crna Gora, odnosno taj cijeli, jo{ nedovoljno etni~ki raspleteni ‘kanibalski’ arhipelag u kojem svaka od pomenutih zemalja u sebi nosi potencijalnu opasnost daljih podjela i destabilizacije. Istovremeno, svaka od ovih dràva je slaba, nedovr{ena i nedore~ena dràva i moè biti, u ve}oj ili manjoj mjeri, smatrana unutar sebe podijeljenim dru{tvom. Slijedom marksisti~ko-neoliberalisti~kog ideolo{kog obrasca, te bi dràve mo`da trebalo ‘dovr{iti’ pretvaraju}i ih u zaokruène etni~ki homogene nacionalne dràve; ali takav napor bi mogao uvu}i ovaj region u novi krug nasilja. U suprotnom, klju~no pitanje bi moglo glasiti: kako o~uvati multikulturna i multietni~ka dru{tva upravo s obzirom na to da danas govorimo o ovim zemljama kao izvorima nesigurnosti? Da li bi uop}e bilo mogu}e, ma kako to fantasti~no i utopijski zvu~alo, da ove

19 20 21 22

23

Karel Kosik, O dilemama suvremene povijesti (Zagreb: Razlog, 2007); 246. Kosik, 250. Ibid., 250. Kosik upozorava da se ‘lumpenburòazija’ „regrutira od oboga}enih, ali za razliku od normalnih, pristojnih pripadnika svoga sloja, spaja svoje poduzetni{tvo s mafija{tvom, podvalama, s kriminalnim podzemljem“, Ibid., 238. Ibid., 347.

23


posljednje, ‘zaobi|ene’ jo{-ne-europske zemlje u multikulturalnosti prona|u novu snagu i ponude jedan plauzibilni model za Europu sutra{njice? Treba, zato, propitati koliko prazno mjesto dominantne ‘ve}inske nacije’ namjesto izvora konflikta i frustracije moè postati izvorom slobode. Nedostatak krajnjeg, dominantnog etnonacionalnog referenta – kao prve faze postkomunisti~ke tranzicije do sada je poticao zazivanje preciznih razgrani~avanja, po~esto krvavih ‘disolviranja plurala’ u nekoliko odjelitih singulara. Upravo u odnosu prema upra`njenom mjestu dominantnog nacionalnog referenta, nakon propasti socijalizma izgra|ivali su se dominantni, odnosno homogeni etni~ki identiteti u svom naro~itom singularitetu, kako na vanjskom planu – kroz odnos prema drugim, naj~e{}e suparni~kim etni~kim singularitetima, tako i na unutra{njem planu – kroz internu dinamiku etni~ke grupe unutar koje se uspostavlja i silom (ekonomskom i politi~kom) odràva koncepcija hegemonisti~kog etni~kog identiteta. S tim u vezi, mo`da je potrebno pretresti opcije koje ovim zemljama stoje na raspolaganju – ako jo{ uop}e takvih opcija ima – ali isto tako i poku{ati shvatiti {ta uistinu zna~i to frapantno zaobilaènje zemalja Zapadnog Balkana u dosada{njim ‘eurointegracijskim’ procesima, osim oficijelnog obja{njenja iz Bruxellesa kako ove zemlje jo{ ne zadovoljavaju kriterije iz takozvanih mapa puta. Otvoreno bismo trebali postaviti pitanje: da li dosada{nji ‘napori’ me|unarodne zajednice i Europske unije – premda iza ovih ozna~itelja, naravno, ne postoji nikakvo koherentno ‘ozna~eno’24 barem kada su u pitanju slu~ajevi BiH, Srbije i Makedonije – nedvojbeno ukazuju na to da je za sada jedini na~in na koji ‘svijet’ izlazi na kraj s multietni~no{}u ‘zatvaranje o~iju’ pred sukobom dok se etni~ki ne homogeniziraju odre|ena podru~ja izme|u kojih se uspostavlja mir zagarantiran prisustvom NATO ili ‘natoidnih’ trupa da bi se, barem kao prijelazno rje{enje, izna{ao neki ad hoc modus etno-teritorijalne konfederacije. Ne ~ini li takav pristup na{a dru{tva jo{ podjeljenijim, a na{e dràve, ako se takvima uop}e mogu nazvati, nedovr{enijim? Moè li ‘svijet’, ili barem Europa, bolje? U suprotnom, vizija Zapadnog Balkana je zastra{uju}a: hermeti~ki zatvoren, u staklenom zvonu, on }e se nastaviti uru{avati na etni~ke enklave me|usobno neprijateljski raspoloène dok se ne ustanovi jasna geografija mladih ‘suverenih’ dràva s jasnim ‘etni~kim titularom’ kojim }e upravljati etnopoliti~ke oligarhije na {tetu svojih gra|ana, njihovih ljudskih prava i sloboda. Ne pokazuje li upravo petnaestogodi{nje bosanskohercegova~ko iskustvo da princip etni~ke teritorijalnosti ugroàva individualnu sigurnost i prava, da pove}ava nestabilnost o~ekivanja gra|anina u vidu stalne neizvjesnosti, produènja statusa vanrednog stanja; nadalje, ne opstruira li on politi~ku 24

24

Ako prihvatimo da je ono {to stoji ‘iza’ neoliberalna ideologija koja prati kretanje globalnog kapitala, onda se otvara, kako to Marina Grìni~ ukazuje, interesantan horizont koji karakterizira upravo fragmentacija referencijalnosti: „upravo je sam kapital kroz cijelu historiju poticao rasap svake referencijalnosti, svakog ljudskog cilja, i do kraja razlabavio svaku distinkciju izme|u la`nog i istinitog, dobrog i zlog, zato da bi uveo neumoljivi zakon jednakih i zamjenjivih vrijednosti, ~eli~ni zakon vlastite vlasti“. Vidjeti u M. Grìni~, Estetika kibersvijeta, 63.


participaciju gra|ana zahvaljuju}i upravo svojim diskriminatornim praksama i karakteristikama na kojima zasniva svoje postojanje? @elimo li na taj na~in dovr{iti svoje dràve, onda se moramo suo~iti s njihovim potpunim raspadom. U {irem smislu, dilema Zapadnog Balkana jo{ se moè odnositi na cijeli prostor Srednje i Isto~ne Europe. Pitanje ovog regiona je, usudio bih se re}i, klju~no pitanje za opstanak pluralisti~ke demokratije i mogu}nost vizije dru{tva u kojem ni{ta ne}e upravljati sudbinom ljudskih bi}a, nikakva metanaracija ili naturalizirana ideologija – marksisti~ka ili neoliberalisti~ka, svejedno. Susan George navodi Karla Polanyija, koji je prije vi{e od pedeset godina izrekao, danas moèmo re}i proro~anski stav: „Dopustiti mehanizmu trì{ta da bude jedini upravitelj sudbine ljudskih bi}a i njihovog prirodnog okoli{a ... rezultiralo bi uni{tenjem dru{tva“.25 Prokletstvo ili prednost ovog prostora je da je uvijek bio na ideolo{koj periferiji, kao ono stalno ‘izme|u’, osu|eno na pluralitet ìvotnih formi i stalne, cikli~ne poku{aje kona~nih rje{enja koje su nudile osvaja~ke ideologije. Tome nasuprot, primje}uje Kosik: Subjekt Srednje Europe su narodi koji traè – u konfliktima, zabludama, nesporazumima – na~in suìvota i supostojanja koji bi osiguravao njihovu samobitnost, a istovremeno stvarao uzajamni respekt svih prema svima kao sudionicima jedinstvene slobode i jedinstvene pravednosti. Historija Srednje Europe je traganje za mo}i (i njenoga simbola) koja bi objedinjavala razli~itosti, prevladavala odvajanje, svladavala partikularizam i nesno{ljivost ne vanjskom i grubom silom odozgo nego voljom iznutra26.

25 26

Susan George: „A Short History of Neoliberalism“, http://www.tni.org/archives/George/bangkok.htm Karel Kosik, O dilemama..., 69-70.

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KONTINUITET VS. ODNOS – RETORIKA VS. HABITUS Wolfgang KLOTZ

U vrijeme kada politi~ka {ala nestaje, ~ini se da na njeno mjesto dolazi ne{to {to moèmo nazvati “ozbiljnom anegdotom”. Tipi~an primjer ovog ànra nedavno se mogao pro~itati u Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitungu, od 29. maja: u ma|arskom gradu Szombathely trebalo je nakon dvogodi{nje restauracije vratiti Pu{kinovu bistu na isto mjesto u parku, ali je jedan slu`benik gradske uprave stopirao postavljanje biste rekav{i: “Ne obezbje|ujemo javni prostor za takve komuniste”. Ova anegdota razotkriva jedan poseban kontinuitet i jedan dobro poznat li~ni habitus: moèmo pretpostaviti da je taj ~inovni~i} cijeli svoj ìvot nastojao biti tik uz svoje nadre|ene (ili barem tamo gdje je pretpostavljao da se oni nalaze). Da je kojim slu~ajem radio jo{ u doba Kádára, onda bi sigurno pozdravio Pu{kina kao heroja oslobodioca. Ozbiljniji od ovoga je izvje{taj o izlo`bi odrànoj u gradu Kőszegu, dvadesetak kilometara od Pu{kinove biste, gdje je gradski muzej organizirao prikupljanje dokumenata koji su pripadali Ferencu Szálasiju, osniva~u i vo|i ‘Pokreta strelastog krià‘ i dokumenata o njemu. Na~in na koji su politi~ki stavovi Szálasijevog pokreta okarakterizirani na izlo`bi 2003. godine mogu se sumirati pomo}u dva dokumenta prikazana na izlo`bi. Prvi je citat samog Szálasija, u kojem kaè: “Me|u svim onim ljudima koji danas (tj. 1944. godine) odre|uju budu}nost Ma|arske, pola njih uop}e nisu Ma|ari, a druga polovina su lo{i Ma|ari” (pod “uop}e nisu Ma|ari” mislio je: oni su Jevreji). A u drugom tekstu, koji su o~igledno napisali kustosi muzeja, napisano je da ‘Pokret strelastog krià‘ “nije identi~an italijanskom fa{izmu niti njema~kom nacionalsocijalizmu s obzirom da pripadnici Ma|arskog strelastog krià ne predlaù totalitarnu dràvu niti rasnu nadmo}. Ali, oni jesu bili vatreni neprijatelji bolj{evizma i me|unarodnog kapitalizma” (pojam “me|unarodni kapitalizam” se i ovdje odnosi na Jevreje). I, naravno, osobe odgovorne za izlo`bu kojom hvale Szálasijev “talent, vredno}u i apsolutno nematerijalisti~ki karakter” tvrde da u svemu tome “nije bilo politike”. Ova pri~a ukazuje na neke posebne odnose i dobro znanu retoriku, uveliko rasprostranjenu ne samo u dana{njoj Ma|arskoj, gdje “Crna garda” opet redovito i javno patrolira ulicama mnogih gradova i gdje od po~etka

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ove godine biljeìmo brojne fizi~ke napade na romska naselja, kada je osam osoba spaljeno ili ubijeno prilikom poku{aja bijega od spaljivanja. Ovdje su napravljene eksplicitne reference na “antibolj{evizam” i “antikapitalizam” kako bi se zamaskirao pravi odnos koji djeluje u glavama autora, a to je njihov odnos prema antisemitizmu. Slučaj s Kozare Hrvatski pisac Boris Deùlovi} je prije nekoliko sedmica objavio ~lanak na beogradskom informativnom Internet portalu e-Novine, u kojem spominje poznatu fotografiju @orà Skrigina iz 1944. godine. Na fotografiji je prikazana “iscrpljena majka koja bjeì od usta{a po bespu}ima Kozare, jednom rukom drè}i k}erku, a u drugoj nose}i sina”. Ova slika je poznata ne samo zato {to je izloèna u Muzeju holokausta u Auschwitzu. Prema Deùlovi}u – ta fotografija je bila ilustracija u svim ud`benicima historije za sve razrede njegove generacije u biv{oj Jugoslaviji. Autor dalje govori o Branku Tepi}u, “penzioneru iz Gradu{e kod Siska. Do 1991. godine je ìvio u Sisku, odakle je pred ratom pobjegao u vikendicu u Gradu{i. Hrvatske vlasti oduzele su mu stan i on se u Sisak nije mogao vratiti. êtiri godine ìvio je u vikendici, dok nije do{la 1995, kada nakon akcije Bljesak sa suprugom, sinom, snahom i unucima opet bjeì, sada put Kozare. Punih osam godina }e pro}i prije nego se opet vrati u Gradu{u, da tamo okon~a svoj ìvot.” Taj Branko Tepi} nije niko drugi do onaj dje~a~i} u naru~ju one majke sa fotografije izloène u Muzeju holokausta, a koja je bila ilustracija u ud`benicima biv{e Jugoslavije. “Ta fotografija odredila je put kojim, evo, i danas idem“, pri~ao je kasnije Branko Tepi}. „Odredila mi je put izbjeglice koji se nikada nije skrasio tamo gdje su mu korijeni.” Ova pri~a nam pokazuje neprekinutu patnju zavijenu u {utnju. Ona do nas stiè u obliku sjajne bujice rije~i zato {to je jedan daroviti pisac svoj glas posudio {utljivom Branku Tepi}u; no, samom Branku ne trebaju nikakvi odnosi jer oni uop}e ne bi skinuli teret s njegova ìvota ~ak i ako bi ljude koji su bili izvor njegovih patnji nazvao bolj{evicima ili kapitalistima, usta{ama, ~etnicima ili kakogod. Fondacija Heinrich Böll pozvala vas je na ovu konferenciju kako biste se prisjetili godine pada komunisti~kih sistema i kako biste sagledali divergentne pravce dru{tvenog i politi~kog razvoja u kojim su razna dru{tva u regiji i{la tokom dvadeset godina nakon toga. Moj dosada{nji tekst evidentno pokazuje da nisam ni histori~ar, ni znanstvenik sociologije, niti sam analiti~ar nekog politi~kog think tanka. Uìvam u privilegiji koju mi daje moj status promatra~a Srednje Evrope ve} dvadeset godina, ~ak i po cijenu toga da kaète kako vas zamaram banalnostima.

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Ali vi{e nego za svih tih dvadeset godina promatranja Srednje i Isto~ne Evrope, za svega nekoliko mjeseci boravka u Beogradu spoznao sam da svaki javni diskurs tamo (a mo`da i ovdje) vrvi od historijskih odnosa koje oblikuju pojedinci, ili dru{tvene grupe, ili gotovo cijelo dru{tvo. Ti odnosi, s jedne strane, prave se da bi se definirao i opravdao vlastiti stav; one se tako|er pripisuju drugima da bi se opisao i diskvalificirao njihov stav. Ljudi koji za sebe kaù da djeluju i razmi{ljaju u tradiciji antifa{izma smatraju svoje protivnike “fa{istima”. I vice versa: oni koji su navodni ili iskreni fa{isti koji sebe smatraju ba{tinicima tradicije veli~ajnosti, slave i ~asti nacije, imputiraju svojim antifa{isti~kim protivnicima da su “komunisti” ili “bolj{evici”; i samo onda kada su – kao u ma|arskom primjeru Szálasija – ti ba{tinici nacionalne slave ponosni {to su po svom karakteru “apsolutno nematerijalisti~ki”, onda mogu dodati i to da su njihovi protivnici ~ak i “kapitalisti”. Mo`da je istina da se jedino pitanje, zajedni~ko za sva postkomunisti~ka dru{tva u periodu izme|u 1989. i 1991. godine, odnosilo na potrebu za referentnom ta~kom u vlastitoj nacionalnoj historiji od koje bi po~eli postkomunisti~ka budu}nost i proces transformacije. Samo je Njema~ka Demokratska Republika bila ili li{ena mogu}nosti da prona|e vlastiti historijski odnos ili – kako tako|er moèmo re}i u drugoj interpretaciji – njoj jednostavno jedan takav trenutak samopouzdanja nije trebao da bi prona{la svoj put u budu}nost. Ujedinjenje je napravilo takve odnose nepotrebnim ili – opet u druga~ijoj interpretaciji – ujedinjenje je diktiralo referentnu ta~ku. Kasnije }u se vratiti na ovu specifi~nost Njema~ke. Sagledamo li sva ta razna postkomunisti~ka dru{tva, otkrit }emo da su postojale znatne razlike ve} u na~inu na koji je komunisti~ki sistem pao u svakom pojedinom dru{tvu kao i, ~ak ranije, u na~inu na koji se provodila komunisti~ka politika desetlje}ima prije toga. A naravno, svi mi u glavi imamo izgra|ene stereotipe u vezi sa takozvanim “karakterom nacije” koji nam, kao, obja{njava za{to je, na primjer, Václav Havel mogao postati predsjednik u Pragu, a nijedan pandan Havelu to u Beogradu nije mogao. Ipak, uvijek je bilo Havelâ (Havelâ u smislu li~nog habitusa) i u Beogradu, a pravo pitanje je za{to je glavni trend srpske politike desetlje}ima padao u ruke drugih. To se definitivno nije dogodilo zbog nekakvog “karaktera srpske nacije”, ~ak i ako su oni koji su preuzimali politi~ko vodstvo u Srbiji ~esto referirali na ne{to kao “specifi~ni karakter srpske nacije” i tvrdili kako djeluju u savr{enom skladu s njim. Nakon kraja komunizma vidimo kontinuitet (naravno, i diskontinuitet), kao i odnose (pa i nepostojanje odnosa). @elio bih posmatrati kontinuitet kao fenomen kako individualnog tako i kolektivnog nesvjesnog, dok mi se odnosi vi{e ~ine rezultatom individualne ili kolektivne odluke. Zato odnosi imaju tendenciju operiranja rije~ima, pojmovima i imenima. To su konstrukti, pa se lako mogu zamijeniti. Kao {to znamo, mnogi veliki igra~i biv{e komunisti~ke nomenklature nisu se nikad ustezali da preko

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no}i pre|u s jednog sistema odnosa na drugi; nazvali su sebe pobo`nim katolicima iako su samo dan prije bili vo|e komunisti~ke omladinske organizacije – kao {to je to bio slu~aj, na primjer, sa gospodinom Orbanom, biv{im i vjerovatno budu}im premijerom Ma|arske. Stoga }e nam, u vezi s tim primjerima, sagledavanje njihovog habitusa re}i mnogo vi{e o njima nego ako bismo promjenu njihovog odnosa uzeli zaozbiljno. Ne mogu se osloboditi dojma da je veliki dio politi~ke konfuzije – uklju~uju}i i moju vlastitu – rezultat manje-vi{e permanentnog me|usobnog mije{anja namjernih veza i nesvjesnih kontinuiteta. Kako bih prona{ao odre|enu jasno}u u ovoj konfuziji, èlio bih va{u pa`nju na trenutak odvu}i u neku vrstu filmskog sna: Na ekranu vidite jednu platonisti~ku akademsku “skup{tinu filozofa” Srednje Evrope na samom kraju komunizma. Skup{tina po~inje s Adamom Michnikom, Jacekom Kuronom, Bronisławom Geremekom, Tadeuszem Mazowieckim iz Poljske; kamera lagano prelazi na grupu poslanika koji predstavljaju êhoslova~ku toga doba; pa onda vidimo Václava Havela, Ludvíka Vaculíka, Milana [imeckog, Jiřija Dienstbiera; kamera prelazi na predstavnike Ma|arske – tu su G. M. Tamás, Mihály Vajda, stari mudraci Ferenc Fejtő, István Eörsi, pa nastavlja dalje; vidimo dugi red, u kojem sjede Andrei Pleşu iz Bukure{ta, pa sve do Ivana Krasteva i Alexandera Kiosseva iz Sofije, te Fatosa Lubonje iz Albanije. [ta je svima njima zajedni~ko? [ta oni uistinu predstavljaju kao zajedni~ku historijsku referentnu ta~ku za budu}nost ovog dijela Evrope? S moje ta~ke gledi{ta, ono {to je svima njima zajedni~ko, kao neka vrsta zajedni~kog naslije|a, nije toliko zajedni~ki odnos koliko je to habitus. Usu|ujem se pretpostaviti da taj habitus ima svoje korijene u tradiciji evropske buròazije1 s kraja 19. i po~etka 20. stolje}a. I ponekad vi{e volim taj pojam, buròazija, nego engleski ekvivalent “gra|ansko dru{tvo” samo zato {to buròazija definira vi{e li~ni habitus prema dru{tvu nego institucionalnu strukturu dru{tvenih sektora. Me|utim, duboko sam uvjeren da bi sasvim razli~iti pravci kojima su se postkomunisti~ka dru{tva kretala u posljednjih dvadeset godina, kao i njihov divergentan dru{tveni i politi~ki razvoj, mogli postati malo uvjerljiviji i razumljiviji ako bismo ih posmatrali iz perspektive predstavljanja te evropske buròaske tradicije u ovim razli~itim dru{tvima. To pitanje je tijesno povezano s postojanjem i dru{tvenom snagom disidentskog pokreta 1950-ih i 1980-ih, jer su disidenti bili prava podloga i nositelj te tradicije kroz cijeli period hladnog rata. êhoslova~ko dru{tvo iz 1990. godine podsje}alo je na period Masaryka i 1930-ih, kada je bruto doma}i proizvod po glavi stanovnika u êhoslova~koj bio vi{i nego u Francuskoj. I ovaj odnos se pokazao dovoljno jakim da ~ak pripitomi nacionalisti~ku energiju u procesu raspada dràve. 1

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„Buròazija“ u zna~enju njema~kog pojma „Bürgertum“.


Poljska je, naravno, dobila vlastitoga Svetog oca, koji je uprkos svojoj tradicionalnoj duhovnosti sprije~io radikalan povratak zemlje na klerikalnu tradiciju; ograni~io je ponovnu klerikalizaciju na radio-stanicu “Radio Marija” i dopustio tek kratko trogodi{nje oìvljavanje reakcionarne politike nakon svoje smrti. Bez njega bi katoli~ka Poljska 1990-ih mo`da po{la putem na kojem danas vidimo katoli~ku Ma|arsku. Odnos prema evropskoj buržoaskoj tradiciji Svugdje su, ~ini se, dinamika, odrìvost i uspjeh tranzicije bili, i jo{ uvijek su povezani s kolektivnim odnosom prema toj evropskoj buròaskoj tradiciji: • Koliko su jaki i duboki bili njeni dru{tveni korijeni u referiranom periodu? • Koliko je ipak bila zastupljena u kolektivnom sje}anju u trenutku kada je taj odnos napravljen? • Koliko su je sna`no fizi~ki u dru{tvu predstavljale osobe koje su je utjelovljivale? [ta to zna~i u slu~aju zemalja Jugoisto~ne Evrope, a posebno dràva na prostoru biv{e Jugoslavije? Mislim da ste svi vi kompetentniji od mene da procijenite korisnost ovog pristupa za analizu i razvoj perspektive za budu}nost. Nau~io sam za vrijeme kratkog boravka u Beogradu da tamo{nji ljudi – kada vam govore o drugim osobama – obi~no kaù da on/ona “pripada nama” i da on/ona “pripada njima”. Time se obiljeàva linija izme|u dva politi~ka tabora, koji se ugrubo mogu definirati kao konzervativci i liberali, s tim {to konzervativci obuhvataju sve od radikalnog nacionalizma do sada{nje vlade, a liberali obuhvataju gotovo sve one koji su izvan pomenutog spektra. Ipak, postoji jedna stvar koja je za mene kao Nijemca sasvim neobi~na: radi se o ~injenici da o~igledno niko u Beogradu ne}e ustvrditi da je biv{i komunizam njegov odnos niti njegov kontinuitet. Ovo se po svaku cijenu mora izbje}i, kao kuga. Istovremeno, ~itam njema~ke novine u Beogradu i doznajem da se u Berlinu vodi ozbiljna debata o tome moèmo li ili ne moèmo okarakterizirati Njema~ku Demokratsku Republiku kao “dràvu bez vladavine prava”. Tako, o~igledno, njema~ki postkomunisti i DDR-nostalgi~ari imaju daleko ja~u poziciju u dru{tvu nego njihove kolege u Beogradu. U suprotnom, ne bi mogli nametnuti njema~kom dru{tvu raspravu o tome da li je DDR bila tek izuzetak koji dokazuje pravilo o ina~e gra|anskom dru{tvu u kojem vlada zakon.

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Ali opet, s druge strane, ne mogu se oteti dojmu da su u stvari ti sljednici biv{e komunisti~ke nomenklature daleko sna`niji u dana{njoj Srbiji nego {to su u Njema~koj. Za{to se onda ovaj kontinuitet izbjegava kao najopasniji tabu? To }emo donekle shvatiti tek ako napravimo konkretnu razliku izme|u odnosa i kontinuiteta: njema~ki DDR-nostalgi~ari sebi pripisuju pravo i legitimitet formiranja odnosa: oni èle referirati na svoj “stvarno postoje}i socijalizam” kao na ipak “bolju verziju Njema~ke”. Istovremeno, oni prihvataju i diskontinuitet: danas odlaze na Majorku i u Antaliju ba{ kao i njihovi zapadni sunarodnici, a tek pokoja obi~ajna razlika po plaàma ponekad ih u~ini prepoznatljivim. U Srbiji, s obzirom da jugo-nostalgija vi{e nije bila pogodna referentna ta~ka, srbo-nostalgija je popunila upra`njeni prostor. I po{to je pokojna jugoslovenska verzija socijalizma bila progla{ena zlim birokratskim sistemom, potomstvo tog zlog sistema èstoko je zanijekalo to porijeklo. Umjesto toga, uspostavljen je odnos sa carstvom nacionalnih simbola. No, njihov habitus, ipak, nenamjerno razotkriva odakle oni uistinu stiù. Dozvolite mi da zavr{im, ponovo jednom anegdotom, koju sam ~uo prije tridesetak godina na Univerzitetu u Nijmegenu, u Nizozemskoj: pri~ali su mi o jednom profesoru, Jevreju, koji je na tom univerzitetu predavao medicinu 1940-ih. Gestapo ga je uhapsio 1943. godine, a SS-ovci ga deportirali u koncentracioni logor, gdje je preìvio godinu i po dana i do~ekao oslobo|enje. Vratio se u Holandiju, gdje je 1947. godine ponovo po~eo raditi kao profesor medicine. Nakon gotovo ~etiri godine odsustva, na po~etku prvog predavanja 1947. godine studentima se obratio sljede}im rije~ima: “Kao {to smo nau~ili na na{em posljednjem ~asu...” Ne mogu dokazati je li ovo istinita pri~a, ali bih uistinu volio da jeste, s obzirom da ne poznajem ni jedan izraz ja~eg suvereniteta i mo}nijeg samopouzdanja ljudskog bi}a u odnosu na cjelokupni teret koji nam historija i biografija ho}e nametnuti.

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TRANZICIONA ISKUSTVA EUROPSKIH ZEMALJA

Tranziciona iskustva europskih zemalja

TRANZICIONA ISKUSTVA: RASPAD ČEHOSLOVAČKE FEDERACIJE I PUT SLOVAČKE KA EVROPSKOJ UNIJI Pavol DEMEŠ

Dame i gospodo, veliko mi je zadovoljstvo {to sam ponovo u mom voljenom Sarajevu i {to imam priliku obratiti se publici uglednih stru~njaka u sferi dru{tvenih i politi~kih nauka. Moram priznati da sam, ustvari, vi{e prakti~ar, sa iskustvom u gra|anskom i politi~kom domenu u mojoj zemlji, biv{oj êhoslova~koj, a dana{njoj Slova~koj. Osim toga, u posljednjih deset godina sam kao predstavnik Njema~kog Marshallovog fonda SAD-a angaìran u vi{e zemalja – u va{oj zemlji tako|er - koje prolaze kroz proces tranzicije. Organizatori ovog skupa pozvali su me da s u~esnicima podijelim na{a iskustva nakon podjele biv{e êhoslova~ke i integracije Slova~ke u Evropsku uniju, a koja mogu biti relevantna za va{ “put u Evropu”. Meni je drago da je slova~ki ambasador u Bosni i Hercegovini, gospodin Miroslav Mojìta, koji je na du`nosti na Balkanu ve} dugi niz godina, danas s nama. Kao istinski stru~njak, on sigurno moè obogatiti moje izlaganje kasnije, u toku diskusije. Slova~ka i Bosna i Hercegovina su sli~ne iz nekoliko aspekata – imaju sli~an broj stanovnika, obje su postkomunisti~ke, prete`no slavenske zemlje, i obje su nastale nakon podjele dvije velike komunisti~ke federacije – êhoslova~ke, odnosno Jugoslavije. Obje zemlje vide svoju budu}nost u evropskim i transatlantskim institucijama. Slova~ka je ve} integrirana u glavne zapadne strukture Evropske unije i NATO, za razliku od va{e zemlje, ~iji su napredak u politi~koj, dru{tvenoj i ekonomskoj tranziciji nedavni tragi~ni sukobi ozbiljno usporili. Kao {to vjerujemo i za mnoge druge zemlje, vjerujemo da je i va{a budu}nost u demokratskoj i prosperitetnoj evropskoj porodici. Kao {to znate, Bosna i Hercegovina se nalazi me|u prioritetima vanjske politike Slova~ke, ne samo zato {to na{ ministar vanjskih poslova Miroslav Laj~ák, koji je sve donedavno bio visoki predstavnik i specijalni predstavnik EU u Bosni i Hercegovini, vrlo dobro poznaje va{u zemlju. Koje su to klju~ne razlike i pouke koje va{a zemlja moè izvu}i iz ~ehoslova~kog, posebno iz slova~kog puta u modernu Evropu? Jednostavno re~eno, mi smo to uradili na bar{unast na~in, suzdràv{i se od

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nasilja. Bar{unastom revolucijom u novembru 1989. godine mirnim je putem svrgnut komunizam u êhoslova~koj, a takozvani bar{unasti razvod 1. januara 1993. godine zavr{io se bez me|uetni~ke mr`nje unutar biv{e ~ehoslova~ke federacije. Na mapi Evrope pojavile su se nove dràve, koje su uspostavile tijesnu saradnju. U pore|enju sa situacijom na Balkanu, moèmo ~ak re}i da je to bila gotovo bajka. Ali mnoge stvari nisu bile ba{ tako jednostavne, lake i predvidive. Bili su potrebni ogromna dobra volja, pregovori, kompromis, strpljenje i sre}a. To je potrebno uvijek u historijskim trenucima kada se na|u razni ljudi ispunjeni emocijama, osje}ajem nesigurnosti i nadom. Bar{unasta revolucija, koja je zapo~ela samo jednom iskrom, napadom policije na studente u toku mirnih demonstracija u Pragu 17. novembra, prvo je mobilizirala intelektualce {irom zemlje. Formirani su nepristrasni masovni pokreti, Gra|anski forum u Pragu i Javnost protiv nasilja u Bratislavi. Komunisti~ka partija êhoslova~ke predala je vlast u roku od nekoliko sedmica i nove politi~ke elite, koje su se sastojale uglavnom od biv{ih disidenata, li~nosti iz kulture i stru~njaka iz svih sfera ìvota, zauzele su funkcije na svim nivoima. Biv{oj komunisti~koj nomenklaturi nije bilo dozvoljeno da zauzme visoke funkcije u vlasti. To je bio izuzetno vaàn korak, koji se umnogome razlikuje od onog {to se desilo u Jugoslaviji, a koji je oblikovao stil i budu}i politi~ki kurs demokratskih reformi i stvorio jasnu prozapadnu orijentaciju biv{e komunisti~ke federacije. U tek slobodnoj êhoslova~koj malo se razgovaralo o podjeli zemlje. Klju~ni slogani u oba dijela federacije su bili “sloboda i demokratija” i “povratak u Evropu”. Tek kasnije je zapo~ela debata izme|u ~e{kih i slova~kih politi~kih predstavnika o ustavnoj reformi i redefiniranju vlasti izme|u saveznog i republi~kog nivoa. Javile su se znatne razlike me|u klju~nim politi~kim akterima, koje su se kasnije pokazale toliko dubokim da su se sloìli da saveznom parlamentu êhoslova~ke dostave odluku o podjeli zemlje. Bio je to politi~ki ~in, bez referenduma, sa relativno dobro pripremljenim i kontroliranim procesom podjele, bez etni~kih tenzija i grani~nih sporova. Me|unarodna zajednica je stoga prihvatila tu mirnu podjelu i dvije novonastale dràve – Republika ê{ka i Republika Slova~ka, stvorene su 1. januara 1993. godine, koje su zemlje {irom svijeta ubrzo nakon toga priznale. Najva`nija stvar je da smo mi, Slovaci i êsi, to uradili na civiliziran na~in, po{tuju}i Ustav i zakone, nismo uznemirili me|unarodnu zajednicu i nismo zaprijetili destabiliziranjem regije Srednje Evrope. U toku podjele zemlje nije postojala etni~ka mr`nja, niti su je podgrijavali politi~ari i mediji. Naprotiv, veliki dio populacije u obje republike nije slavio kraj zajedni~ke dràve. Gra|ani su prihvatili novu politi~ku realnost kao pragmati~no rje{enje koje je otvorilo prostor za jednu novu evoluciju dvije bliske nacije, skupa s njihovim etni~kim manjinama. Najevidentniji dokaz zrelosti politi~kih elita i stanovnika jeste sada{nja odrìvost obiju dràva i neprekidni odli~ni odnosi izme|u êha i Slovaka

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na politi~koj, kulturnoj i dru{tvenoj ravni. Jedini problem je taj {to su danas êsi ne{to bolji u hokeju na ledu, a {to Slovaci imaju euro i proizvode vi{e automobila. Dalja modernizacija Slova~ke i njen ulazak u evropske i transatlantske strukture bili su prili~no obijeèni usponima i padovima, ali sve se na kraju ipak okon~alo uspje{no. Kao manji dio êhoslova~ke, Slova~ka je morala gotovo od nule graditi hardware i software za novu dràvu. U toku procesa izgradnje dràve Slova~ka je morala izgraditi odnose sa svojim susjedima, Evropskom unijom i drugim dijelovima svijeta. Iako su susjedi Slova~ke prihvatili novu politi~ku stvarnost s razumijevanjem, moram priznati da na po~etku {ira me|unarodna zajednica nije pokazivala velike simpatije prema podjeli êhoslova~ke. Nije bilo lako objasniti stranoj javnosti da podjela nije bazira na etni~kim tenzijama i da se njome ne}e pove}ati problemi vezani s raspadom druge dvije postkomunisti~ke federacije. Osim toga, mnogi stru~njaci i politi~ari sa Zapada nisu bili sigurni da li Slova~ka posjeduje potencijal za razvoj funkcionalne ekonomije i uprave prema modelu EU. Prve godine neovisnosti Slova~ke predstavljale su mje{avinu iznena|uju}ih postignu}a u procesu izgradnje dràve, razvoja civilnog dru{tva i neometanog ulaska i integracije s me|unarodnim institucijama. Ali, javili su se i neki negativni trendovi u praksi upravljanja zemljom, koje je zastupao neoautoritarni i politi~ki dominantni premijer Vladimir Me~iar. Iako je tvrdio da zastupa strate{ku orijentaciju prema evropskim i transatlantskim strukturama, po{tivanje politi~kog pluralizma i ljudska prava i prava manjina, Me~iar je po~eo kr{iti osnovne demokratske principe. Njegov reìm su karakterizirali masivna korupcija i autoritarni napadi na politi~ke protivnike, medije, vo|e civilnog dru{tva i druge koji su upu}ivali kritike na njegove postupke i predstavljali prijetnju njegovim igrama na vlasti. Njegov nacionalisti~ki i populisti~ki program dominirao je doma}im politi~kim diskursom i doveo do diskvalifikacije Slova~ke iz procesa pregovaranja o ulasku zemlje u EU i NATO. Od deset postkomunisti~kih zemalja koje su se do danas priklju~ile EU, Slova~ka je jedina s kojom je EU obustavila pregovore usljed nedostatka demokratskih procesa. Ovaj negativan trend mobilizirao je demokratsku politi~ku opoziciju i {ire civilno dru{tvo protiv mo}nog reìma, koji je na kraju poraèn u redovnim izbornom procesu na va`nim parlamentarnim izborima odrànim u jesen 1998. godine. Nagla{avam da se to dogodilo mirnim putem i bez strane intervencije. Bila je to slova~ka utakmica na doma}em terenu, s tim da je zemlja imala veliku korist od politi~ke, diplomatske i finansijske podr{ke koju je dobila od svojih evropskih i ameri~kih partnera, koji su vodili ra~una o samoj zemlji i njenoj ambiciji da postane dio civilizirane porodice. Ako ste zainteresirani da doznate ne{to vi{e o mirnom demokratskom prodoru Slova~ke i njenom utjecaju na druge zemlje, pozivam vas da pro~itate knjigu pod nazivom Reclaiming Democracy. Civil Society and Electoral Change in Central and Eastern Europe, koju

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smo objavili prije dvije godine. Moète je na}i na web stranici Njema~kog Marshallovog fonda SAD-a (GMF). Nakon {to je nova velika koalicija formirala vladu na ~elu sa premijerom Mikulá{om Dzurindom i preuzela vlast 1998. godine, Slova~ka je zapo~ela period “sustizanja” drugih. Politi~ke elite, civilno dru{tvo i gra|ani èljeli su nadoknaditi izgubljeno vrijeme u procesu pristupanja EU. Otpo~ele su do tada nevi|ene politi~ke, ekonomske i socijalne reforme kako bi se ispunili kriteriji zadati svim zemljama kandidatima za ~lanstvo u EU. Reforme su imale privremene bolne konsekvence po slova~ke gra|ane u vidu visoke nezaposlenosti i drugih socijalnih nedostataka, i utjecale su na popularnost onih politi~ara koji su reforme uveli. Slova~ka je pokazala ogroman fokus na klju~ne strate{ke ciljeve u tom periodu i kapacitet za postizanje konsenzusa ~ak i me|u najo{trijim politi~kim rivalima. To je dovelo do suàvanja jaza izme|u najprogresivnijih zemalja kandidata za ~lanstvo u EU iz Srednje i Isto~ne Evrope i Slova~ke. U “big bang” pro{irenju EU u prolje}e 2004. godine, nakon prave utrke s vremenom, zemlja se pridruìla drugim ~lanicama Unije, svega nekoliko sedmica nakon {to je postala ~lanica NATO saveza. Slova~ka se kona~no usidrila u demokratskoj i prosperitetnoj porodici koja se temelji na pravilima, korak po korak ru{e}i zidove i granice. To se nikad ne bi dogodilo da nije bilo preovladavaju}eg dogovora me|u politi~kim elitama, intelektualcima i akterima civilnog dru{tva koji su trebali reformu i proces integracija preto~iti u djelo i javnost ubijediti da im pruì podr{ku. Danas, dvadeset godina nakon Bar{unaste revolucije, {esnaest godina nakon “bar{unastog razvoda” i pet godina nakon {to se priklju~ila EU i NATO savezu, Slova~ka je standardna evropska zemlja. Nisu nam potrebne vize da bismo putovali u EU i mnoge druge zemlje svijeta, uklju~uju}i i SAD. Ne moramo voditi debatu oko toga ~iji }e nacionalni heroji biti na nov~anicama s obzirom da smo uspje{no uveli euro u januaru ove godine. Postali smo od zemlje primatelja pomo}i zemlja donator i danas pomaèmo drugima, me|u njima i Bosni i Hercegovini, u njihovom procesu tranzicije. Ali, bez obzira na sve makro uspjehe, jo{ uvijek postoje brojna nerije{ena pitanja i ne moèmo na njih “staviti ta~ku”. Brzo smo ustanovili da ~ak i kad se priklju~ite EU i NATO savezu, vi ipak niste imuni na populizam, nacionalizam, ekstremizam i korupciju u javnom ìvotu. Duboke socijalne i regionalne nejednakosti te problemi s vladavinom prava i obrazovnim sistemom nisu nestali. Ali klju~ svega je da imamo slobodu i priliku da pravimo korekcije i da mlada generacija ne sanja, kao nekad, o emigraciji. Osim toga, dio smo porodice koja je spremna biti od pomo}i ~ak i u periodu obiljeènom previranjima globalne finansijske i ekonomske krize. Nadam se da }e primjer neravnog puta kojim je moja zemlja pro{la potaknuti dana{nju diskusiju i barem djelimi~no inspirirati vas kojima je istinski stalo do dobrobiti va{e domovine – Bosne i Hercegovine.

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GODINA 1989: ŠTA JE ZBILJSKI SRUŠENO RUŠENJEM BERLINSKOG ZIDA? Gajo SEKULIĆ

„Jede politische Revolution ist die Revolution der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft“ (Karl Marx, Zur Judenfrage, 1843)

U tekstu najprije problematiziram metodu uskog parcijalnog tuma~enja 1989. godine, zatim ukazujem na povijesnu strukturalnu povezanost zna~ajnih simboli~kih godina, i to 1968, 1989. i 2009. godine, budu}i da tek {ira povijesna perspektiva tuma~enja mnogozna~nih posljedica velikih transformacija dru{tva nakon 1989. moè pruìti ta~an uvid u stanje i domet filozofskih, socijalnih, ekonomskih i politi~kih teorija danas, da bih u zaklju~nom dijelu artikulirao neke sugestije za istraìvanje granica klasi~nog i postmodernog liberalizma sa stajali{ta zbiljskih mogu}nosti liberalno-demokratskog socijalizma. (Ova struktura rada je logi~ka a ne formalna.) Na ovaj na~in poku{avam negativno odgovoriti na pitanje iz naslova: da li je ru{enjem primitivnog komunizma ili „realno-egzistiraju}eg socijalizma“ principijelno destruirana ideja liberalno-demokratskog socijalizma, a s njom i relevantnost izvorne kriti~ke teorije Karla Marxa i njegovih originalnih nastavlja~a, kao {to je to recimo, ne samo zbog njegovog 80. ro|endana, upravo 18. juna o.g., filozofski otvoreni interdisciplinarni splet Habermasovih teorija, ve} prvenstveno zbog otvorene kriti~ke razine njegove politi~ke teorije, koja ide kako sa Marxom tako i protiv Marxa, nadmo}ne nad klasi~nom kao i nad postmodernim liberalizmom, a da ne spominjem teorijsko bespu}e fanatizovanih i primitivnih etno-liberala i la`nih „biv{ih“ marksista u prostorima nekada{njeg realno-egzistiraju}eg socijalizma koji su navodno ostali bez predmeta kritike. Utoliko je podsje}anje na glavne dimenzije politi~ke teorije J. Habermasa u kontekstu zna~enja i posljedica 1989. godine ipak u prvom planu ove studije.

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I 1989: značaj i posljedice Sedam tematskih impulsa za razumijevanje i nadvladavanje pretpoliti~kog etnocentrizma novih demokratija i krize politi~ke teorije danas. Ka mi{ljenju {ansi liberalnodemokratskog socijalizma

*** Jubilej kao i svaki jubilej. Misliti 1989. godinu samo kao jubilej je besmisleno. Ona moè biti samo vanjski podsticaj za ahistorijske akademske teze o kraju povijesti, zato {to je sru{ila pretpostavke „hladnog rata“ zamijeniv{i ga, mo`da, „hladnim mirom“ kao dugoro~nom i sve opasnijom strategijom me|unarodnih odnosa. Iza ove primitivne ideologije stoji veoma arogantna ideolo{ka trijumfalisti~ka iluzija o ostvarenju sna o kraju komunizma kao kraju svake ideje o povijesnim {ansama liberalnodemokratskog socijalizma, kojih se u principijelnom smislu ne odri~e ~ak ni Rawls1, ili/i druga~ijih povijesnih neodemokratskih radikalnijih alternativa sa minimumom bar skepti~ke etike i humanizma. Slijepi entuzijazam kakav pokazuje npr. Jacques Rupnik 2001. godine, i danas je komi~an, mada je jo{ uvijek duhovno nesavladana ideolo{ka fantazma novih demokratija. On kaè: Ipak bi bilo neadekvatno 1989. posmatrati jedino kao novo izdanje ili produènje 1789. ... U tom smislu 1989. zaklju~uje eru revolucija, koje su po~ele 1789. a 1917. doìvjele novi polet. 1989. osta}e u povijesti kao mirna „revolucija“ par excellence i kao „revolucija qua restauracija.“ Ono {to ostaje od 1989 – ~itano o~ima 1989 – jeste ideja demokratije na {tetu ideje revolucije.2 Ostaje sasvim upitno da li se demokratija i revolucija mogu razdvajati na ovako dirljiv srednjoevropski na~in. „Mi“, s Juga, ne{to smo drugo i nismo u tom filmu. Ova godina ne moè se istraìvati izolirano i mimo {ireg povijesnog konteksta. Unazad – bez razumijevanja posljedica i zna~enja 1968. godine, unaprijed bez razumijevanja krize finansijskog kapitalizma u njegovoj najnovijoj fazi „neuro-kapitalizma“ ili prema najnovijoj sintagmi „kasino-kapitalizma“:3 Fenomenologija duha indignirano se odstranjuje. Tuce znanosti, kao neuro-antropologija, neuro-pedagogika, neuro-teologija, neuro-estetika i neuro-ekonomija stupili su na scenu. Njihov samosvjesni nastup 1 2 3

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John Rawls, Gustizia come equita.Una riformulazione. Feltrineli, Milano 2002, p.154-155 Jacques Rupnik und Dominique Moïsi, „1989 in historischer Perspektive“, Merkur, 2/1991, S.7 „Das Kasino Kapitalismus. Globalisierung und Krise“, Edition Blätter, Berlin 2009. U njoj grupa internacionalnih eksperata lijeve orijentacije razmatra alternative „finansijsko-trì{nom kapitalizmu“ (Altvater, Fraser, Amin, Sassen i dr.)


odaje uzurpatorsku sklonost neuro-znanosti da budu ne samo jedina prirodoznanstvena duhovna znanost, ve} i vode}a znanost 21. stolje}a. Temelj, impetus i obe}anje ovog zahtjeva je njihova maksima da je cjelokupno ljudsko pona{anje odre|eno zakonitostima aktivnosti nervnih }elija i na~inom kako su one organizirane u mozgu. âk i ako se ospori univerzalna va`nost ove maksime, s dobrim razlogom moè se postulirati da postoji novi, neuro-kapitalizam – ili da je takav u nastajanju...4 Rupnikova iluzija o tome da je 1989. godina, „revolucija kao restauracija“, pobije|ena od demokratije, ili ta~nije, da je „ideja revolucije“ izgubila od „ideje demokratije“ zasluìvala bi iscrpniju analizu, ali se umjesto toga opredjeljujem za generalnu tezu ove studije, proisteklu iz duha kriti~kog tuma~enja Marxove teze o svakoj politi~koj revoluciji kao revoluciji koja neizbje`no pripada bitnim mogu}nostima „gra|anskog dru{tva“. Ovaj genitiv je kako genitivius subiectivus tako i genitivus obiectivus. Marxova razina mi{ljenja politi~ke revolucije pojmljiva je samo u kontrapunktu „univerzalne revolucije“, {to je posebna tema koja je danas aktuelnija nego ikada.5 Ne radi se samo o diferenciji izme|u univerzalizma kao navodnog esencijalizma i kontekstualizma u postmodernim varijantama koji je navodno prevladao svako fundamentalisti~ko ili esencijalisti~ko zasnivanje. Obje linije su ipak bliskije nego {to se misli u tekstovima Rortyja, Deriddae ili Liotharda. âk i najumniji zaboravljaju da je rodno mjesto demokratije najve}im dijelom u povijesnom smislu upravo revolucija, i to kao politi~ka revolucija. Za mene je jo{ uvijek sasvim otvoreno pitanje da li su granice demokratije odre|ene granicama politi~ke revolucije. Na njega se metodi~ki moè odgovarati i ispitivanjem grani~nih dometa liberalizma, za {to je u teorijskom pogledu najprikladnije polazi{te znamenita diskusija izme|u Habermasa i Rawlsa.6 Tako|er bi bez ironije trebalo nekom drugom prigodom promisliti pretpostavljenu naturalisti~ku7 neuro-znanstvenu iluziju da su duhu kapitalizma prilago|ene i nervne }elije upravo na~inom njihove organizacije u mozgu. Odatle do teze da su prirodi nervnih }elija i njihovoj praksi u mozgu potpuno neprirodni zahtjevi liberalnodemokratskog socijalizma – nije uop{te daleko. Marksova kritika dru{tvenih odnosa kao prirodnih odnosa odavno nije dobila ta~niju pohvalu.8 4 5

6

7

8

Henric Jokeit und Ewa Hess, „Neurokapitalismus“, Merkur, Nr. 721, Juni 2009, S. 541 U „na{oj“ doma}oj literaturi vidi posebno: Gajo Petrovi}, Mi{ljenje revolucije, Izabrana djela, Naprijed, Zagreb, 1978; 2. izdanje, Odabrana djela, 2, Zagreb/Beograd, 1986. Vidi: G. Sekuli}, „Da li je rasprava Habermas-Rawls zavr{ena? Grani~ne mogu}nosti liberalizma i demokratije (socijalizma)“, Zbornik radova sa skupa o J. Rawlsu: John Rawls i perspektive liberalne demokratije u Bosni i Hercegovini. FNS, Sarajevo 2003, str. 9-18. Kritiku naturalisti~ke ekspanzije u duhovnim znanostima u posljednje vrijeme je inicirao Habermas u knjizi Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion, Suhrkamp Verlag,2005. Engl. prijevod: Between Naturalism and Religion, Polity Press, 2008. S tim fenomenom suo~io sam se jo{ po~etkom 70-ih godina. G. Sekuli}, Filozofija i proletarijat u djelu Karla Marksa, Radni~ki univerzitet, Subotica, 1980, ali i u drugim tekstovima, kao npr.: G.S., Aktualnost Marksovog Kapitala, Zagreb, RU 1982.,str..111-129.

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1. Kraj komunizma ili „realno egzistiraju}eg socijalizma“? Teze o pretpostavkama teorijsko-povijesnog novog utemeljenje liberalno-demokratskog socijalizma. Put ka prevladavanju principijelne krize svake kriti~ke teorije danas, a naro~ito vladaju}eg etnocentrizma tzv. „postsocijalisti~kih“ zemalja imao bi najprije da argumentirano sugerira potrebu za istraìvanjem zna~aja i posljedica 1989. godine tako {to bi neodlo`no trebalo da poku{a odgovoriti na pitanje o ta~nosti ili la`nosti tuma~enja 1989. kao kraju ili po~etku kraja tzv. komunizma, i to pod pretpostavkom da je ne{to takvo ikada postojalo. Ako nije, a vjerovatno nije osim u formi „primitivnog komunizma“ u smislu koji je ovoj sintagmi dao Marx prije vi{e od 160 godina u Ekonomsko-filozofskim rukopisima (iz 1844), onda treba govoriti o po~etku kraja ili kraju tzv. realno egzistiraju}eg socijalizma koji je u Evropi zaista „pao“ 1989. godine. Zanimljivo je kako ideolo{ka sljepo}a previ|a da ~ak ni ovaj tip socijalizma nije sru{en u cjelini, jer preìvljava u Kini (i drugdje) u specifi~noj simbiozi s nekim elementima trì{ne kapitalisti~ke ekonomije. Dana{nja filozofska, politi~ka, socijalna, kulturna i ekonomska teorija zaraèna je obiljem nejasnih ideolo{kih „post-izama“. Veoma su rijetka djela koja pouzdano operiraju pojmovima kao {to su „postmoderna“, „postkomunizam“, „postsocijalizam“, „postmarksizam“, „posthumanizam“, „posthistorija“ itd. Knjiga J. Habermasa Die nachholende Revolution,9 napisana i objavljena na sâmom po~etku ovih doga|anja, koju sa~injavaju njegovi objavljeni, ali i oni do tada neobjavljeni radovi, krajem 1980-ih godina najdelikatnija je interpretacija 1989. godine, oblikovana na samom po~etku velikih promjena. Ve} u kratkom pregovoru Habermas jasno iznosi svoj stav: Doga|aji dnevno mijenjaju internacionalnu i unutarnjema~ku scenu. Me|utim, nadokna|uju}a revolucija (die nachholende Revolution) ne baca nikakvo novo svjetlo na na{e stare probleme. Ove, kako bi mogao da kaè Adorno, negativne konstante usred jedne ubrzane povijesti mogle bi da opravdaju moja stajali{ta posljednjih godina.10 Svoju bojazan i skepsu nasuprot po~etnom vlastitom i op{tem entuzijazmu Habermas iscrpno i analiti~ki najbolje razvija u ~lanku (prvi put objavljenom u ovoj knjizi) pod naslovom „Nadokna|uju}a revolucija i lijeva potreba za revizijom. [ta zna~i socijalizam danas?“.11 Tada{nja medijska pripovijest govori o „raz-~arenju socijalizma“, o „propasti jedne ideje“ sa dominantnim refrenom: „...da utopije i filozofije povijesti moraju zavr{iti u podjarmljivanju“. Habermas se kre}e na kriti~koznanstvenom nivou i pita:

9 10 11

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Jürgen Habermas, Die nachholende Revolution, Suhrkamp Verlag, F a/M, 1990. Ibid., 7. Ibid., 179.


Kako treba procijeniti historijski zna~aj revolucionarnih promjena u Isto~noj i Srednjoj Evropi? [ta zna~i bankrot dràvnog socijalizma za politi~ke pokrete i ideje koje su ukorijenjene u 19. stolje}u, i {ta on zna~i za teorijsko naslje|e zapadnoevropske ljevice?12 Temeljna historijska pretpostavka za promjene je historijska ~injenica radikalnih promjena u SSSR-u, odnosno u Rusiji,13 tj. propasti projekta dràvnog socijalizma, {to vaì kako za zemlje lagera tako i za DDR: Promjene u Poljskoj bile su rezultat „trajnog otpora pokreta Solidarnost potpomognutog od katoli~ke crkve, u Ma|arskoj posljedica borbe za vlast izme|u politi~kih elita; u DDR-u i êhoslova~koj kao prevrat koji su iznudile demonstriraju}e mase na miran na~in, u Rumuniji kao krvava revolucija, u Bugarskoj na ìlav na~in. Uprkos mno{tvu pojavnih formi revolucije u ovim zemljama mogu se od~itati na doga|ajima: revolucija ra|a svoje datume. Ona se na odre|en na~in moè razumjeti.... kao revolucija koja osloba|a put da se nadoknade propu{teni razvoji.14 „Negativne konstante“ i „nadokna|ivanje propu{tenih razvojnih {ansi“ dvije su ~injenice od kojih polazi Habermas u razumijevanju zna~aja 1989. godine. Iz obilja zna~ajnih momenata ove analize ograni~avam se na eksplikaciju njegove klasifikacije postsocijalisti~kih zemalja u odnosu prema socijalizmu kao projektu poslije propasti dràvnog socijalizma (a) ostavljaju}i nu`no po strani njegovu diskusiju odnosa prema Marxovoj teoriji poslije 1989. godine (b). (a) [est razli~itih odgovora na pitanje dalje sudbine socijalizma poslije 1989. godine Habermas dijeli na dvije grupe: tri „afirmativna“ i tri „kriti~ka“ historijska odgovora. Nadokna|uju}e revolucije omogu}uju „povratak demokratskoj pravnoj dràvi i priklju~ivanje na kapitalisti~ki razvijeni Zapad“, ali odbacivanjem modela revolucija koje polaze od 1917. godine, {to bi mo`da moglo objasniti „potpuni manjak inovativnih ideja, ideja koje ukazuju na budu}nost“.15 Mada su ove revolucionarne promjene na{le veoma razli~ite i me|usobno isklju~uju}e interpretacije, Habermas je sabrao {est modela interpretacije 1989. godine u odnosu prema socijalizmu. „Obje grupe mogu se u simetri~kom slijedu poredati kao staljinisti~ko, lenjinisti~ko i reformskokomunisti~ko tuma~enje s jedne strane, i kao postmodernisti~ko, antikomunisti~ko i liberalno na drugoj strani“.16

Staljinisti~ko tuma~enje pori~e revolucionarni karakter promjena i poima ih kao „kontrarevolucionarne“. Lenjinisti~ko tuma~enje posmatra 12 13

14 15 16

Ibid., 179. O ruskoj kapitalisti~koj revoluciji koja je navodno uspjela u uvo|enju trì{ne ekonomije na {tetu demokratije vidi me|u novijim studijama, naro~ito: Anders Åslund, Russai’s Capitalist Revolution. Why Market Reform Succeeded and Democracy Failed, Peterson Institut for International Economics, Washington DC, October 2007. Jürgen Habermas, Die nachholende Revolution, Suhrkamp Verlag, F a/M, 1990: 180. Ibid., 181. Ibid., 181.

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promjene kao „konzervativnu revoluciju“ (J. Kuszynski) unutar historijskog dugog revolucionarnog proseca u kojem se revolucija iznutra „~isti“. Ve} dalji procesi pokazuju da se ne radi o „pukoj samokorekturi dràvnog socijalizma“. Tre}i, afirmativni model tuma~enja, reformsko-komunisti~ki, naro~ito u Pragu s Dub~ekom, i u DDR-u, kao tre}i put izme|u socijalnodràvnog kapitalizma i dràvnog socijalizma, poku{ava revitalizirati ideju demokratskog socijalizma, koju Habermas smatra nerealisti~nom jer su se mase poslije iskustva totalitarizma sovjetskog tipa odlu~no okrenule protiv te mogu}nosti. Ekstremna pozicija nije se oblikovala na uvjerljiv na~in ni na strani tri modela tuma~enja doga|aja koja su kriti~ka prema socijalizmu. „Postmodernisti~ka kritika uma“ fascinirana je nenasilnim ru{enjem dràvnog socijalizma, pa je ta revolucija navodno kraj dobâ revolucija. „Nadokna|uju}a revolucija“ na Istoku pribliìla se duhu Zapada, ne samo njegovoj tehni~koj civilizaciji nego i njegovoj demokratskoj tradiciji. Habermas je veoma skepti~an prema postmoderni~koj kritici uma, koja stilizira povijesnu {emu inspiracijom u Nietzscheu i Heideggeru. Antikomunisti~ki model tuma~enja 1989. godine slavi promjene kao „pobjedonosni kraj svjetskog gra|anskog rata koji su bolj{evici proklamovali 1917. godine; nanovo jedna protiv vlastitog izvora okrenuta revolucija“. Habermasova interpretacija antikomunisti~kog modela tuma~enja 1989. godine interpretira prevo|enje nekada{nje „internacionalne klasne borbe“ u izraz „svjetski gra|anski rat“, te pod uticajem Carla Schmitta prvi izraz iz jezika teorije dru{tva prevodi u jezik jedne „hobsovske teorije mo}i“. Pripovijest o „svjetskom gra|anskom ratu“ nastala je u doba konflikta Istoka i Zapada. Histori~ar Ernst Nolte je njen glavni zagovornik. U namjeri da negira lenjinizam, njegov antikomunizam (njegova je znamenita teza da je fa{izam historijski odgovor komunizmu) samo je njegova obrnuta strana. Liberalno tuma~enje 1989. godine je najva`nije. Liberalni trijumfalizam izrazili su u Zeitu17 veoma ta~no Daniel Bell i Ralf Dahrendorf. Habermas kaè: Preostaje liberalno tuma~enje koje najprije samo registrira da se sa dràvnim socijalizmom po~inju raspadati posljednje forme totalitarne vlasti u Evropi. Epoha koja je po~ela s fa{izmom ide svom kraju. S demokratskom pravnom dràvom, trì{nom ekonomijom i dru{tvenim pluralizmom uspostavljaju se ideje liberalnog poretka. Na taj na~in, ~ini se, kona~no se ostvaruju zavodljive ideologije o kraju ideologija... Liberalno tuma~enje nije lo{e. Me|utim, ono ne vidi brvno u vlastitom oku.18 Pretjeruje li Habermas s ovim brvnom u oku liberalnog modela tuma~enja zna~aja i posljedica 1989. godine? Prema njegovom mi{ljenju trijumfalne liberalne interpretacije li~e na Marxovu „himni~ku“ deskripciju revolucionarne uloge buròazije (gra|anstva) 17 18

44

Die Zeit, 29. Dezember 1989. Jürgen Habermas, Die nachholende Revolution, Suhrkamp Verlag, F a/M, 1990. 186.


u prvom odjeljku Manifesta komunisti~ke partije, koja nu`no sva podru~ja svijeta podvrgava svojoj logici i interesima. Ali, ovdje Marx govori o „takozvanoj civilizaciji“ kapitalizma, {to liberali zaboravljaju. Habermas na sljede}i na~in razumijeva ovo Marksovo su{tinsko ograni~enje njegovog ta~nog, gotovo reklamnog (Marx kao PR kapitalizma!) opisa civilizacijske uloge buròazije, ili gra|anstva kako se danas ideolo{ki mistificiraju najnovije transformacije tzv. „personifikacija Kapitala“: Marx je mislio da svaka civilizacija koja se pot~injava samooplodnji kapitala u sebi nosi klicu razaranja, budu}i da se ona na ovaj na~in pravi slijepom protiv svih relevancija koje se ne mogu izraziti u cijenama.19 Danas su svakako bitno promijenjene okolnosti iz Marxovog opisa. Nosilac kapitalisti~ke ekspanzije nije vi{e ona buròazija, ve} jedan privredni sistem koji se odvojio od ~ulno identificiraju}ih klasnih struktura, koji je postao anoniman i koji djeluje na svjetskoj razini. A na{a dru{tva koja su se u ovom sistemu popela na „privredni vrh“ ne li~e vi{e man~esterskoj Engleskoj, ~iju je bijedu Engels nekada davno opisao na drasti~an na~in. Ova dru{tva su, naime, u me|uvremenu u socijalno-dràvnom kompromisu na{la odgovor na sna`ne rije~i Komunisti~kog manifesta i ustrajne borbe evropskog radni~kog pokreta. Allein, der ironische Umstand, dass Marx für eine Situation, wo das anlagesuchende Kapital auf die staatssozialistisch ausgelaugten Märkte drängt, immer noch die besten Zitate liefert, stimmt ebenso nachdenklich wie die Tatsache, dass Marxens Zweifel gleichsam in die Strukturen der fortgesrittesten kapitalistischen Gesellschaften selbs inkorporiert worden ist.20 Ironijska okolnost sastoji se u tome da kao {to Marx nudi jo{ uvijek najbolje citate za razumijevanje stanja i tendencija u „dràvnosocijalisti~kim“ dru{tvima u koja prodire kapital na divlji na~in, tako je prikladna i njegova sumnja koja je inkorporirana u strukture najrazvijenijih kapitalisti~kih dru{tava. Preko Marxa ovdje se, dakle, susre}u Istok i Zapad poslije 1989. godine. Na toj osnovi Habermas je rezerviran prema liberalnom odbacivanju socijalizma, ~ije je naslje|e prividno ostvareno u socijaldemokratsko doba21 (188). Zato na radikalan na~in postavlja pitanje o tome da li su s likvidacijom isto~nog dràvnog socijalizma propali i svi teorijsko-duhovni izvori iz kojih „zapadnoevropska ljevica crpi svoje teorijske poticaje i normativna orijentiranja“. Njegov odgovor je sloèn i u svakom slu~aju nije negativan.22 U svakom slu~aju, Habermasova istraìva~ka preporuka ovih fenomena finalizirana je u stavu da bi sva 19 20 21 22

Ibid., 187. Ibid., 187. Ovaj dio citata namjerno ostavljam na njema~kom zbog njegovog zna~aja.(prim. autora) Ibid., 188. Habermasova analiza polazi od teze da ljevica ne moè raditi tako kao da se 1989. godine nije ni{ta dogodilo, ali nema razloga da djeluje kao da je sve oti{lo u prah i pepeo. U drugom dijelu ove studije Habermas u 6 ta~aka kriti~ki inspirativno polemizira s Marxom u svrhu argumentiranja njegove relevantnosti danas, sa jednim nizom argumenata na koje do danas u literaturi niko nije odgovorio, - {to nu`no ostaje izvan funkcije ovog rada.

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tzv. „postsocijalisti~ka dru{tva“ imala sljede}u historijsku zada}u: „Danas socijalnodràvni kompromis, koji se u~vrstio u dru{tvenim strukturama, predstavlja temelj od kojeg mora po}i svaka politika u na{oj okolini“.23 Da li se to bilo gdje dogodilo na pravi na~in? Koliko je samo od tog povijesnog polazi{ta po{lo „u demokratiju“ onih za sada sedam novih dràva na tlu biv{e Jugoslavije? I da li bi ne{to sli~no moglo biti polazi{te za ozbiljno interdisciplinarno istraìvanje dvadesetogodi{nje tragi~ne, mada nejednako raspore|ene prema principu vojne, politi~ke i me|unarodne mo}i, historije „na{ih“ prostora? I, napokon, s tog stajali{ta i te razine povijesne promjene moglo bi se problematizirati sljepilo ameri~kih i evropskih Komesara Demokratije u odnosu na dramu Bosne i Hercegovine: ovih dana planira se ulazak u {engensku sretnu bra}u Srbiji i Crnoj Gori, dok se ìvim dru{tvenim individuumima i fiktivnim gra|anima – dràvljanima BiH to pravo bez ikakvog pravnog i moralnog obrazloènja odlaè za neku od idu}ih godina! Ontologijski i antologijski {kandal evromandarina!

2. Potrebno je sistematski istraìvati razliku i sli~nost izme|u yu realno egzistiraju}eg socijalizma i Realno Egzistiraju}eg Socijalizma kao takvog Dvadeset godina prevrata 1989-2009. zasluìvalo bi tematiziranje pitanja historijske, politi~ke, kulturne, ekonomske i eti~ke prirode RES-a. Budu}i da se ovaj okrugli sto odràva u Sarajevu (BiH, ali i ranija Jugoslavija), posebno bi se mogla istraìvati differentia specifica ex-yu socijalizma ili Yu Realno Egzistiraju}eg Socijalizma. Osnovni historijski i znanstveni razlog za ovu liniju zasniva se, pored ostalog, u potrebi za ta~nijim znanstvenim razumijevanjem ~udnog historijskog paradoksa izme|u rasprostranjene teze o nekoj vrsti izvrsnosti i relativne izuzetnosti yu socijalizma u odnosu na paradigmatski staljiniziranu sovjetsku skupinu zemalja, koja pod pritiskom paklenog pogona prava naroda na samoodre|enje kao i neuspjelog ekonomskog prosperiteta, uglavnom, bar u prvoj fazi, uspijeva da izbjegne ratne forme nasilja sa jednim minimumom demokratske procedure, dok region dana{njeg Zapadnog Balkana biva iznutra i spolja izru~en najraznovrsnijem nasilju. Agresije, gra|anski ratovi, ratni zlo~ini, masovni ratni zlo~ini sve do zlo~ina genocida, mr`nja, strah, ksenofobija, etni~ka distanca itd... Za{to je to tako? Za{to je drug Gorba~ov bio mudriji od gomile mo}nih Titovih nasljednika? Za{to liberalna demokratska ljevica ex-Jugoslavije nije prona{la nikakav odgovor preko no}i nadmo}nim protagonistima etnonacionalisti~ke preddemokratske i ru{ila~ke stihije koja pravi sedam novih etni~ki ~istih dràvica kroz gra|anske ratove i agresije sa vjerskim i etni~kim naàlost uspje{nim fantazmama? Ve} je nepregledna literatura o tome, ali za ta~nijim odgovorima ima jo{ da se traga. Predstoji niz neura|enih i nezapo~etih kritika ideologija i praksi etnonacionalizama. Na tlu biv{e zajedni~ke zemlje jo{ uvijek se vode najraznovrsniji 23

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Jürgen Habermas, Die nachholende Revolution, Suhrkamp Verlag, F a/M, 1990., 197.


ideolo{ki i politi~ki gra|anski ratovi bez vidljive zavr{nice. Pored toga, Veliki Brat iz Evrope i SAD jo{ nije sagledao razmjere tragedije Jugoslavije i njenih biv{ih gra|ana, a naro~ito Bosne i Hercegovine. Humanisti~ke, socijalne i politi~ke znanosti u zavisnosti od novih Gradskih sela na tlu ex-Jugoslavije nikako ili jedva izlaze iz etni~kih àbljih perspektiva. Potpuno zanemarene u dràvnim budètima, one }e na kraju ostati bez znanstvenog podmlatka, koji je izloèn velikoj konkurenciji na Zapadu – ako dospije do njega.

3. Isto~na i zapadnja~ka demokratija u istom ~amcu pred izazovima 21. stolje}a Godina 1989. je po~etak radikalnije demokratske transformacije velike grupe tzv.,− kolokvijalno i neznanstveno re~eno, “postsocijalisti~kih zemalja.“ Transformacija rigidnih totalitarnih i birokratiziranih sistema i svijeta ìvota ide nejednakim brzinama, razli~itim intenzitetom i politi~kim putevima. O tome ve} postoji velika literatura. Moram se ograni~iti samo na nekoliko najva`nijih autora. Tako Agnes Heller u tekstu „Ten years later“24 smatra da se danas, 2009. godine, ne moèmo trijumfalno radovati poslije toliko godina nakon promjena. U Ma|arskoj novi demokrati prave „zlatno tele“: U ovih posljednjih dvadeset godina Ma|arska je postala ~lanica Evropske unije i time je gotovo dovela do toga da drugi potpuno zaborave (kako smo i mi sami danas zaboravili) da smo se u dva svjetska rata borili na pogre{noj strani. Mogla bih ~ak re}i da se ovaj put napokon zemlja pridruìla pobjedni~koj strani. Ono {to nedostaje je demokratski duh, èlja za poduhvatima, hrabrost i patriotizam – rijetke osobine.25 Veoma je zanimljiv intervju sa Agnes Heller u australijskom ~asopisu Thesis Eleven, u kojem ona povodom, po mome mi{ljenju, idealisti~kih pretjerivanja o nenasilnim revolucijama 1989 (Poljska, Ma|arska, êhoslova~ka), podsje}a na unutarnju logiku revolucije i nasilja, pri ~emu sam revolucionarni ~in ne prati pretjerano nasilje (Oktobar 1917). Ono dolazi kasnije.26 Adam Michnik27 smatra da je 1989. godina ipak bila annus mirabilis: Godina 1989. donijela je revoluciju bez revolucije. Borba protiv komunizma otvorila je vjeru u smisao ljudske slobode. Ova sloboda donijela je ipak paradokse. Radnici koji su u Poljskoj iz{trajkali slobodu bili su prve `rtve transformacije. Sredi{njice Solidarnosti 24

25 26 27

Agnes Heller, „Ten years later“, Eurozine (www.eurozine.com) First published in The Hungarian Quarterly, 193/2009. Ibid. An Interview with Agnes Heller, Thesis Eleven, Number 97, May 2009, 99-105. Adam Michnik, Verteidigung der Freiheit. Reflexionen über 1989. âsopis Osteuropa, 2-3/2009. Preuzeto iz: www.eurozine.com

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banktrotirale su. Ali, u ~itavom tom prostoru, izuzev Balkana i Rusije, nije bilo boljih 20 godina. Danas Evropa u svakom slu~aju stoji pred probom vlastite vjerodostojnosti. Cinizam koji minira svaki sistem vrijednosti i autoritarna isku{enja ugroàvaju slobodu. Radi se o odbrani Republike.28

4. Ljevica pred izazovima najnovije svjetske krize kapitalisti~ke ekonomije Postoji stanovita povijesna veza izme|u krize realno egzistiraju}eg socijalizma prije 20 godina, dakle u vrijeme neobuzdanog trijumfa neoliberalizma i finansijskog {pekulantskog kapitalizma i njegove dana{nje sveobuhvatne krize u kojoj se on u prvoj fazi vra}a projektu dràvnog kapitalizma. Ovdje je ta~ka gdje treba nagovijestiti pitanje povijesnog odnosa izme|u krize i propasti projekta dràvnog socijalizma i krize dana{njeg dominantnog kasino-dràvnog kapitalizma. Tako njema~ki teoreti~ar Friedhelm Hengsbach29 misli da je {ansa u velikoj promjeni: namjesto finansijskog trì{ta, koje „treba deglobalizirati“, {ansu treba pruìti „privrednoj demokratiji“. Ovdje treba dodati da bar u Njema~koj raste interes za „demokratiju savjeta“.

5. Granice historijskog preìvljavanja kapitalizma sa stanovi{ta novih {ansi demokratije Kao {to toliko dugo o~ekivani i poèljni historijski poraz RES-a nije iscrpio bitne mogu}nosti „liberalno-demokratskog projekta socijalizma“, isto tako kapitalisti~ki na~in proizvodnje ìvota navodno jo{ nije izgubio njoj inherentnu sposobnost beskona~nog revolucioniranja proizvodnje i globalnog na~ina ìvota.30

6. Najteà zada}a: istraìvanje neistovremenosti i strukturalne bliskosti dviju velikih kriza: 1989. i 2008-2009. Danas treba misliti ovu neistovremenost dvije velike krize i njihovo susretanje danas. Kobno ili spasonosno? Za sada mo`da znamo u glavnim linijama kuda vodi razrje{avanje prve krize, ili da li to stvarno znamo? Bolje znanje o tome bismo mogli imati ukoliko se razrje{enje dana{nje krize kapitalisti~kog way of lifea bude odvijalo bez nasilja, sa bar minimumom nasilja, i sa minimumom nacionalnih, regionalnih i globalnih demokratskih procedura. 28 29

30

48

Ibid. Friedhelm Hengsbach, Nach der Krise ist von der Krise. Für eine Wirtschaftsdemokratie ohne Finanzkapitalismus, Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, 5/2009, S. 53-61. Danas bi bilo veoma poèljno diskutirati o entuzijazmu politi~kih ekonomista predatorskog kapitalizma manifestiranom u specijalnom broju ~asopisa Merkur (653/654) pod naslovom „Kapitalismus oder Barbarei“? i taj ideolo{ki hajekovski galimatijas uporediti sa tekstovima velikih autora liberalne orijentacije danas koji pi{u ipak – o bankrotu bar finansijskog kapitalizma i povratku dràvnom (=etatisti~kom) kapitalizmu.


7. Da li je jo{ mogu}a liberalnodemokratska socijalisti~ka ljevica? Globalni i svaki mogu}i U~itelj ljudskog roda31 je za sada i{~ezao. Niko vi{e ne moè biti sâm. Svjetovi ìvota postsocijalizma susre}u se, mo`da, s obrisima ili barbarstva postkapitalizma u njegovom predatorskom obliku ili bitne alternative kapitalizmu, me|u kojima je svakako i ona liberalnodemokratskog socijalizma, kojoj predstoji veliki rad na duhovnom naslje|u i novom utemeljenju liberalnodemokratskog socijalizma. Moderna socijaldemokratija u Evropi suo~ena sa izborom izme|u socijaldemokratije tre}eg puta kao katastrofe i istinskog, novim mogu}nostima demokratije utemeljuju}eg liberalnodemokratskog socijalizma.32 Postsocijalizam je ne{to nau~io od kompleksnijih demokratskih dru{tava Zapada. Da li on sa novom energijom demokratije moè otvoriti nove civilizacijske vidike? Treba precizirati: umjesto pristajanja na sve ja~i i la`niji ideolo{ki govor o „postkomunizmu“, pa i o „postsocijalizmu“ kao jo{ uvijek akademskih samorazumljivih po{tapalica naro~ito biv{ih dogmatskih marksista, ali naro~ito novope~enih etnonacionalisti~kih revolucionara kao trijumfalisti~kih pristalica liberalizma bez granica, treba sistematski razviti duhovni otpor destruktivnoj duhovnoj desnici, kako u regionu i „na{im“ entitetima tako i {ire. Istomi{ljenici tek treba da se prepoznaju uprkos elektronskim brzinama formalne komunikacije, a mo`da da tek i nastaju.

II Evropa i „Mi“ poslije 1968. i 1989.33 1. Duh ‘68. (a) i njene bitne posljedice po Evropu danas (b): a) Uprkos momentima radikalnijeg nasilja34 socijalno-kulturni i politi~ki protest studenata i radni{tva u Zapadnoj Evropi i ostatku razvijenog svijeta bio je u najmanju ruku posljednji globalni principijelno nenasilni poku{aj humaniziranja ili neutraliziranja grubih hegemonijalnih 31

32

33

34

“U~itelj ljudskog roda“ je Hegelov najvi{i kompliment misliocima u Predavanjima iz povijesti filozofije. Za njega su to u svakom slu~aju Platon, Aristotel i jo{ neki izuzeci. Vidi: Albrecht von Lucke, Europa und die Krise der Linken, Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, 7/2009, S.5-8. Zbog prostornog ograni~enja radi publiciranja II i III dio ove studije za sada ostaju samo u naznakama. (primjedba autora) Velike kontroverze nastale su u Njema~koj i {ire nakon objavljivanja knjige Götz aAlyja Unser Kampf. 1968, S. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main 2008. U knjizi se istraùju paralele izme|u „{ezdesetosma{a“ i „tridesettre}a{a“ na jedan dosta komotan, neuvjerljiv i istovremeno zavodljiv, ali svakako provokativan na~in, nasuprot eufori~nom „revolucionarnom“ samoosje}anju dana{njih ne{to starijih {ezdesetosma{a. On kaè:“Treba Bogu zahvaliti {to njihova djeca (tj. djeca tridesettre}a{a) nisu uspjela“ 1968. godine. G. Aly je daleko od ozbiljnog istraìvanja povijesnog zna~enja i posljedica Pokreta 1968. godine, u kokem je svakako bilo veoma razli~itih opcija. Svima je na kraju zajedni~ki samo poraz.

49


formi reprodukcije i {irenja Kapitala protiv Rada, ali i nagovje{taj bitne alternative kapitalizmu. Studentski pokret na Istoku i{ao je protiv autoritarnog realno egzistiraju}eg socijalizma, daleko od radikalnih formi revolucionarnog djelovanja putem nasilja, kao npr. u ma|arskoj pobuni/revoluciji 1956. godine. b) On svakako nije uspio ni u jednoj liniji svojih pretenzija nigdje u svijetu u principijelnom smislu, osim {to je doprinio nekim blagim i simboli~kim korekturama na Istoku. Zapad od tada samo gubi vlastite emancipatorske potencijale, kako u ekonomiji tako i u kulturi i demokratiji. Glavna pouka: princip beskompromisnosti poslije ‘68 bitno je doveden u pitanje. Moje pitanje glasi: da li je Oskar Negt danas u pravu kad poziva na odbacivanje „privida principijelne beskompromisnosti“ („Kompromisslosigkeit“).35 Lutherovo „Ovdje stojim i ne mogu druga~ije“ svojstveno je samo jakoj identitetskoj prisili u crkvama i sektama, misli Negt, u ovom tekstu preporuka kao pouka iz zbivanja 1968. Nije li to prerano? U svakom slu~aju prihvatam princip nenasilnosti kao regulativnu ideju svake budu}e radikalne promjene modernog kapitalisti~kog dru{tva od Tokija, preko Moskve do Berlina, Beograda, Zagreba i Sarajeva. Me|utim, utemeljenje ovog principa zahtijeva i sistematsku rekonstrukciju pro{losti i njoj odgovaraju}ih oblika znanja i samosvijesti.

2. Duh ‘89. (a) i njene posljedice (b) (a) Godinu 1989. posmatram samo kao simboli~ku najavu dugoro~nog osloba|anja od strukturalnih naslaga autoritarizma i bezalternativnog kapitalizma Zapada, kao i totalitarizma Istoka putem demokratizacije i ukidanja njegovih nedemokratskih reìma. Ovo osloba|anje je neizvjesno, povr{no i dijaboli~no, zbog toga {to je gotovo u svim zemljama demokratski diskurs imao etatisti~ku a ne republikansku formu. Zapravo, preovla|uje tzv. liberalni nacionalizam (Poljska, ê{ka, Slova~ka). Jedan od uzroka leì u ~injenici principijelnog i dugog zastoja socijalne demokratije u kompleksnim dru{tvima (od USA do BRD). (b) Bitna negativna posljedica ‘89. je neèljena redukcija demokratije na golu legitimizaciju i legalizaciju (etno)nacionalizma kako na nivou nacionalnih dràva radi radikalnog legitimiranja projekta ~istih nacionalnih dràva (i starih i novih) tako i za sada i do sada formalnih nadnacionalnih politi~kih zajednica (EU kao druga Usamerika). Glavna pouka ‘89: danas je potrebnije nego ikada argumentirati liniju djelovanja i mi{ljenja na liniji radikalne nenasilnosti ili nenasilne radikalnosti. Drugim rije~ima: ILI – ILI / ENTWEDER – ODER, kao princip koji je povijesno legitimirao pravo na nasilje radi vi{ih ciljeva moè se

35

50

Oskar Negt, Achtundsechzig. Politische Intellektuelle und die Macht, Steidl Verlag, Göttingen 1995, S.401-402.


prihvatati ili odbacivati samo na osnovu univerzalnog vaènja ili nevaènja principa nenasilnosti (Gewaltlosigkeit).36

III Neke skeptičke preporuke za tzv. znanstvenike, intelektualce, liberale i bivše marksiste Samo na tendencijski i normativno sli~no mi{ljenim osnovama mogu}e je govoriti o civiliziranom radikalnom nenasilnom prevazilaènju mundijalne nasilne mo}i tzv. Neoliberalizma, {to je ideolo{ki eufemizam za gotovo apsolutnu realnu i formalnu supsumciju Rada pod „transcendentalnu mo}“ Kapitala. O tome se ne moè ni{ta pouzdano znati bez nove lektire Marxovih spisa koji spadaju u njegovu Kritiku politi~ke ekonomije. Kada je veliki mislilac tragike egzistencije kako mislioca tako i dru{tvenog individuuma, Richard Rorty, nedavno povodom jedne godi{njice Manifesta studentima preporu~io lektiru Novog Testamenta i Manifesta komunisti~ke partije, kao, uz svu Rortyjevu melanholiju i skepticizam, a mo`da i ironiju, jo{ uvijek inspirativne tekstove zbog njihovih intencija ka vrednotama bratstva i socijalne pravde, vjerovatno je negdje u duhu pretpostavljao da je ona debela knjiùrina u tri toma, − nikad u cjelini za ìvota zavr{ena za objavljivanje, Kapital, koji ne samo slavi kapitalisti~ku „takozvanu“ civilizaciju, − mo`da ipak prirodni nastavak one radikalno alternativne linije u Manifestu. Ovim se svakako neprivilegira otvorena Marxova kriti~ka teorija ve} samo uzima u obzir u interdisciplinarnoj kriti~koj diskusiji sa drugim i druga~ijim teorijama.

36

Kod nas su veoma zanemareni mislioci kao Johann Galtung i Diether Senghas, kao moderni utemetiljitelji kriti~ke teorije mira i principa nenasilnosti, koji se kao pitanje uop{te ne moè postaviti bez argumentacije J. Habermasa u njegovoj dvotomnoj Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (1981) i kasnijim spisima.

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DINAMIKA PROMJENA: KOLIKO SE RAZLIKUJU REZULTATI TRANSFORMACIJE U POSTJUGOSLAVENSKIM DRŽAVAMA? Nenad ZAKOŠEK

Jedno od najzanimljivijih, no ujedno uvelike zanemarenih, politolo{kih pitanja jest koliko se me|usobno razlikuju politi~ki reìmi u postjugoslavenskim dràvama te, ako su razlike velike, kako se mogu objasniti? To je pitanje osobito zanimljivo s obzirom na to da su ti reìmi proiza{li iz zajedni~kog ishodi{ta, naime jugoslavenskog komunisti~kog reìma. Postoje op}enite i naizgled {iroko prihva}ene predod`be o kvaliteti demokracije i stabilnosti poredaka u tim dràvama danas, prema kojima je Slovenija najnaprednija demokracija, a BiH najnerazvijenija i najnestabilnija (ako zanemarimo Kosovo, koje se nalazi tek na po~etku izgradnje dràve i uspostave demokracije). Budu}i da su nove dràve i njihovi politi~ki reìmi proiza{li iz zajedni~kog naslije|a, mogu li se te razlike objasniti nekim drugim povijesnim razlikama, primjerice razli~itim stupnjem ekonomskog razvoja ili specifi~nim kulturnim obilje`jima postjugoslavenskih dràva? Takva su se obja{njenja doista pojavila u znanstvenim raspravama, osobito devedesetih godina, te su uspjeh ili neuspjeh demokratske tranzicije, izgradnje dràve ili tipa nacionalizma u postjugoslavenskim dràvama poku{ala objasniti dugotrajnim povijesnim hipotekama.1 Me|utim, pretpostaviti tako zna~ajan utjecaj strukturnih faktora zna~ilo bi prihvatiti vrlo visok stupanj i dugotrajni u~inak strukturnog determinizma, koji nije plauzibilan sa stajali{ta dru{tvenih znanosti usredoto~enih na djelovanje pojedina~nih i kolektivnih aktera. Uzroke za razli~ite rezultate tranzicije na prostoru biv{e Jugoslavije treba, dakle, traìti drugdje.

1

Vidi: Nenad Zako{ek, 2007: The Heavy Burden of History: Political Uses of the Past in the Yugoslav Successor States, Politi~ka misao, god. 44, br. 5, 29-43, Nenad Zako{ek i Goran ûlar, Croatia, pogl. 13, u: Sten Berglund, Joakim Ekman i Frank H. Aarebrot (ur.), The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe, 2. izdanje, Cheltenham i Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2004, 451-492 Nenad Zako{ek, Democratization, State-building and War: The Cases of Serbia and Croatia, Democratization, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2008: 588-610.

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Međunarodni indeksi demokratizacije Ako nas zanima ocjena demokratske kvalitete i stabilnosti politi~kih reìma, utemeljena na diferenciranim i metodolo{ki jasno utemeljenim kriterijima, moèmo posegnuti za nekim od poznatih me|unarodnih indeksa koji to mjere. Tu je, primjerice, Freedomhouseov (FH) Indeks politi~kih prava i gra|anskih sloboda (FH PR&CLI), koji ocjenjuje te kategorije od po~etka neovisnosti postjugoslavenskih dràva, ili pak ne{to kompleksniji Freedomhouseov Indeks tranzicijskih nacija (Nations in transit, FH NIT), koji se od kraja devedesetih godina prezentira u godi{njim izvje{tajima. Napokon, od 2003. na raspolaganju je i Bertelsmannov Indeks transformacije (BTI).2 Na prvi pogled, i ti indeksi potvr|uju op}i sud o razvijenosti demokracije na postjugoslavenskim prostorima, po kojem je demokracija najrazvijenija u Sloveniji, a najslabije razvijena u BiH. Me|utim, podrobnija usporedba tih indeksa pokazuje zna~ajne razlike u rangiranju pojedinih postjugoslavenskih reìma. Najjednostavniji indeks, FH PR&CLI, nudi nam dihotomnu sliku skupine od {est postjugoslavenskih dràva. Tri dràve imaju potpuno slobodne reìme: Slovenija, Hrvatska i Srbija, dok tri dràve pripadaju u skupinu djelomice slobodnih: Makedonija, Crna Gora i BiH. Pri tom Slovenija postiè maksimalni bodovni rezultat, dakle izjedna~ena je s najrazvijenijim demokracijama, Hrvatska i Srbija su ne{to slabije, Makedonija i Crna Gora jednako su ocijenjene, dok je BiH jednozna~no najslabije ocijenjena. Rafiniraniji Freedomhouseov indeks, FH NIT, nudi prili~no druk~iju sliku: jedino je Slovenija ocijenjena kao konsolidirana demokracija, uspje{nija ~ak i od najboljih isto~noeuropskim dràva poput ê{ke i Estonije. Hrvatska, Crna Gora, Srbija i Makedonija sve su ocijenjene kao polukonsolidirane demokracije na podjednakom nivou. BiH je jedina ocijenjena kao hibridni reìm, dakle reìm koji kombinira demokratske i autoritarne elemente. Naposljetku, BIT kao metodolo{ki najkompleksniji indeks, nudi sasvim druk~iju kategorizaciju postjugoslavenskih reìma. Slovenija i Hrvatska ocijenjene su kao dràve koje su „vrlo napredne“ u politi~koj i ekonomskoj transformaciji u pravcu liberalne demokracije i trì{ne ekonomije (pri ~emu je Slovenija na ljestvici 1-10 ocijenjena za ~itav bod bolje od Hrvatske). Makedonija, Crna Gora i Srbija ocijenjene su kao dràve koje su postigle naprednu transformaciju, pri ~emu je Makedonija ne{to bolje ocijenjena od Srbije i Crne Gore. BiH je jedina svrstana u skupinu dràva s ograni~enom transformacijom. Usporedba me|unarodnih metoda mjerenja kvalitete demokracije pokazuje, dakle, da ne postoji konsenzus o rangiranju postjugoslavenskih reìma. Naravno, karakter tih indeksa demokracije ovisi o metodologiji mjerenja, kao i nepristranosti i upu}enosti eksperata koji evaluiraju reìme. Me|utim, upravo nedostatak konsenzusa upu}uje na ozbiljnije nedostatke takvoga postupka indeksiranja reìma. Upozorit }u na neke najva`nije slabosti koje su po mom mi{ljenju inherentne toj metodi usporedbe reìma: 2

54

Vidi Prilog.


• Path dependancy (ovisnost o odabranom putu): status neke zemlje, odnosno njezina reìma uvelike ovisi o po~etnim – pozitivnim ili negativnim – ocjenama. Kasniji evaluatori te{ko }e obrazloìti ve}a odstupanja od ranijih ocjena. To se moè ilustrirati usporedbom najnerazvijenijih isto~noeuropskih reìma, poput rumunjskog i bugarskog, s postjugoslavenskim (osim Slovenije) u FH indeksima: prvi u pravilu bolje prolaze od potonjih, zahvaljuju}i po~etnom bonusu, iako ta ocjena ~esto nije uvjerljiva. • Stati~nost: usprkos dijakronijskom karakteru (evaluacija se ponavlja u pravilu u intervalima od jedne ili vi{e godina), metoda indeksa ne moè zahvatiti stvarnu dinamiku politi~kih reìma. Umjesto toga, dobivamo seriju dijagnoza trenuta~nih stanja, koje evaluatori ocjenjuju kao „pobolj{anja“ ili „pogor{anja“ sustava u odnosu na zadani cilj. Ta je perspektiva primjerena logici me|unarodne „pedagogije“ izvanjskog uvjetovanja demokratizacije ili europeizacije reìma, ali ne i logici dru{tvenih znanosti, koje nastoje objasniti i interpretirati dru{tvene i politi~ke procese. • Teleolo{ka perspektiva: promjene se ocjenjuju sa stajali{ta dovr{enog procesa konsolidacije demokracije, dakle utvr|uje se odstupanje stvarnih obilje`ja reìma od toga pretpostavljenog modela. Time se, me|utim, ne mogu razumjeti uzroci ve}ih ili manjih „devijacija“ u odnosu na idealni model. • Apstraktnost i nedovoljna prilago|enost mjernih instrumenata specifi~nostima dru{tava koja se vrednuju: u na~elu je rije~ o univerzalnim kriterijima kojima je ponekad te{ko zahvatiti specifi~ne lokalne konstelacije aktera i problema. Sasvim je nedvojbeno da su rezultati politi~kih promjena u postjugoslavenskim dràvama razli~iti. Kao polazi{te za preciziranje tih razlika mogu posluìti navedeni me|unarodni indeksi, no obja{njenje tih razlika, njihova specifi~na „logika“, mora se potraìti drugdje, primjerice u politolo{kim teorijama tranzicije. Kao odgovor ponudit }u vlastitu analizu geneze tranzicijskih reìma u postjugoslavenskim dràvama, te }u se osobito usredoto~iti na dinamiku promjena, u kojoj rezultati promjena proizlaze iz konstelacija aktera i vremenskog slijeda doga|aja. Akteri i političke agende Politolo{ka teorija tranzicije, tj. prelaska iz jednog tipa reìma u drugi, fokusira se prvenstveno na aktere i njihove me|usobne odnose. Razli~ite tipologije aktera – primjerice one Adama Przeworskog, Juana Linza i Alfreda Stepana, ili pak Jona Elstera i Clausa Offea3 – nastale su 3

Usporedi: Adam Przeworski, Democracy and Market, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991; Juan J. Linz. i Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, Baltimore i London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996; Jon Elster, Claus Offe, i Ulrich K. Preuss, Institutional Design in Post-communist Societies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996; Claus Offe, Varieties of Transition, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998.

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analizom empirijskih konstelacija sa stajali{ta teorije racionalnog izbora. Klju~ni politi~ki akteri reìmske tranzicije su politi~ke elite i organizirani kolektivni akteri. Na tragu te tradicije moè se predloìti i tipologija aktera koji su odredili dinamiku promjena u postjugoslavenskim dràvama. U uvjetima sloma komunisti~kog jednopartijskog reìma, stare i nove politi~ke elite organizirale su se u politi~ke stranke kao privilegirane aktere koji se na izborima natje~u za vlast. Stoga je za razumijevanje dinamike promjena klju~an razvoj stranaka i strana~kih sustava u postjugoslavenskim dràvama. Uspjeh ili neuspjeh stranaka, kao i postkomunisti~kih institucija vlasti (vlada, parlament) koje one uspostavljaju i za ~iju se kontrolu natje~u, ovisio je i o nizu kolektivnih aktera koji na njih utje~u ali ne teè neposrednom preuzimanju vlasti: to su udruènja civilnog dru{tva poput vjerskih organizacija, sindikata, udruènja proiza{lih iz rata (asocijacije veterana, izbjeglica, `rtava i sl.), udruènja nacionalnih manjina, novih dru{tvenih pokreta i sl. Napokon, na zbivanja u svim postjugoslavenskim dràvama velik su utjecaj imali strani akteri, tj. vlade utjecajnih dràva i me|unarodnih organizacija (prije svega Europske unije). S obzirom na vrlo razli~ite uloge koje su imali ti strani akteri, moèmo razlikovati veto-aktere, uvjetuju}e (kondicioniraju}e) aktere i medijatore (posredni~ke aktere). Treba re}i da je potonja tipologija analiti~ka, dakle da su isti akteri istodobno ili u razli~itim razdobljima mogli nastupati u razli~itim ulogama veto-sila, kondicioniraju}ih ili posredni~kih aktera. Za razvoj stranaka i strana~kih sustava klju~ne su linije polarizacije te njihov me|usobni odnos, koji je bio presudan za dinamiku transformacije i {anse demokratske konsolidacije. Pritom èlim analiti~ki razlikovati linije polarizacije od klasi~nog politolo{kog pojma rascjepa (cleavages): linije polarizacije su sukobi oko klju~nih pitanja ideolo{ko-politi~kog su~eljavanja me|u strankama (= politi~kim elitama), te u tom smislu mogu biti i konjunkturni (kratkotrajni) fenomeni koji polariziraju politi~ki prostor na razini elita, dok su rascjepi linije polarizacije koje se podudaraju sa dugotrajnijim podjelama u dru{tvu, poput etni~kih, konfesionalnih i socijalnih podjela i koje u bira~kom tijelu tvore trajnije ideolo{ko-politi~ke blokove. Za analizu klju~nih politi~kih aktera transformacije u postjugoslavenskim dràvama predlaèm sljede}u tipologiju linija polarizacije (koja je na~elno primjenjiva na sve politi~ke reìme u Europi): 1. Centar-periferija: sukob oko temeljnog koncepta formiranja dràve i nacije; u postjugoslavenskim dru{tvima uklju~uje i odnos prema pro{losti i zlo~inima koje su po~inili sukobljeni politi~ki tabori u 2. svjetskom ratu. 2. Reìmska polarizacija demokracija-autoritarizam: sukob oko temeljnih pravila politi~kog reìma, potaknut monopolskim poloàjem jednog aktera (stranke, koalicije). 3. Za i protiv europske integracije: u postjugoslavenskim dràvama u pravilu nije rije~ o radikalnom euroskepticizmu (iako on postoji na des-

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nom, a djelomice i lijevom rubu politi~kog spektra – osobito u Srbiji), nego o dinamici ispunjavanja politi~kih i ekonomskih uvjeta u procesu europske integracije. 4. Klijentelisti~ka polarizacija: sukob oko pristupa prora~unskim sredstvima radi zadovoljavanja apetita klijentelisti~kih skupina. 5. Programska polarizacija: sukob socioekonomskih koncepata razvoja, uklju~uju}i i reforme velikih socijalnih sustava (zdravstvo, mirovine, {kolstvo). 6. Nove ideolo{ke polarizacije: vrijednosni sukobi oko novih svjetonazorskih pitanja, npr. regulacije spolnosti (homoseksualnost, reproduktivna prava, umjetna oplodnja i sl.), uloge vjerskih zajednica u dru{tvu i sl. Moja osnovna hipoteza je sljede}a: uspjeh ili neuspjeh demokratizacije i stabilizacije dràvnih institucija ovisi o sposobnosti politi~kih elita (tj. vodstava najva`nijih politi~kih stranaka) da postignu konsenzus oko prva dva tipa linija polarizacije, tj. polarizacije centar-periferija (oko formiranja nacije i dràve) i reìmske polarizacije (dakako u korist demokracije), te politi~ko su~eljavanje premjeste na ostale polarizacijske linije. Pritom sukobi za i protiv europske integracije, te klijentelisti~ki sukobi, oteàvaju uspostavu stabilne liberalne demokracije; no oni nisu karakteristi~ni samo za tranzicijske reìme, nego i za mnoge napredne liberalne demokracije. Napokon, kvaliteti demokracije najvi{e pridonosi sposobnost politi~kih elita da strana~ko natjecanje organiziraju oko programskih polarizacija te svoje bira~ko tijelo mobiliziraju upravo na tim pitanjima. Valja naglasiti da ta vrsta su~eljavanja nije uvijek prisutna ni u razvijenim demokracijama, u kojima na strana~ku utakmicu tako|er utje~u i ideolo{ke i klijentelisti~ke polarizacije. Pogledajmo pobliè dinamiku transformacije prema predloènim kriterijima u pojedinim postjugoslavenskim dràvama. Temelj uspjeha slovenske tranzicije bilo je upravo rano postizanje {irokog politi~kog konsenzusa oko polarizacijskih linija centar-periferija i demokracija-autoritarizam: sve relevantne politi~ke stranke podràvale su dràvnu neovisnost Slovenije i prihva}anje pravila liberalne demokracije. Naravno, to ne zna~i da se nacionalizam nije u Sloveniji manifestirao i u svojim radikalnijim oblicima, primjerice u odnosu prema dodjeli dràvljanstva zna~ajnoj skupini stanovnika Slovenije koji nisu etni~ki Slovenci ili oblicima radikalnog kulturnog partikularizma i ksenofobije. Ipak, te su teme i akteri koji su ih promovirali ostali izvan fokusa demokratskog politi~kog ìvota. Izraz konsenzualne prirode politi~kog natjecanja u Sloveniji bile su ~este velike koalicije tijekom devedesetih i dominacija centristi~ke Liberalne demokracije Slovenije, koja je povezivala koalicijske partnere na ljevici i desnici. U skladu s tim, rano je postignut konsenzus oko europske integracije Slovenije. Od 2002. dolazi do polarizacije slovenske politike na temama povezanim s klijentelisti~kim, programskim i novim ideolo{kim polarizacijama (ali djelomice i na otvaranju polarizacije

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centar-periferija, koja se u Sloveniji ti~e odnosa prema partizanskim zlo~inima u Drugom svjetskom ratu). Strani akteri imali su mali utjecaj na slovensku transformaciju, osim u kontekstu izlaska iz jugoslavenske dràve i integracije u EU. Deficit hrvatske transformacije u devedesetima povezan je s nepostojanjem konsenzusa u prve dvije dimenzije polarizacije: srpske politi~ke elite u Hrvatskoj odbijale su i dràvnu neovisnost i pluralisti~ku demokraciju, a reformirani postkomunisti (dana{nji SDP) zagovarali su ispo~etka opstanak jugoslavenske federacije i nisu podupirali hrvatsku neovisnost. Radikalizacijom hrvatsko-srpskog sukoba postkomunisti se pridruùju nacionalnom konsenzusu oko formiranju neovisne dràve. Istodobno, me|utim, ve} od 1992. produbljuje se sukob oko polarizacijske linije centar-periferija na pitanju odnosa prema integritetu dràve BiH. Tako|er se produbljuje i reìmska polarizacija demokracija-autoritarizam zbog autoritarnih inklinacija vladaju}eg HDZ-a. Uspostava konsenzusa oko hrvatske dràve i demokracije iza 2000. rezultat je niza doga|aja: vojnog poraza radikalnog srpskog nacionalizma, neuspjeha ekspanzionisti~kog hrvatskog nacionalnog programa uslijed intervencije me|unarodnih veto-aktera te izbornog poraza HDZ-a i njegove postizborne transformacije u pravcu umjerenog nacionalizma i ~vrstog prihva}anja demokracije. Konsenzus oko pristupanja EU pospje{io je temeljni politi~ki konsenzus. Me|unarodni akteri sve do danas imaju vaàn kondicioniraju}i utjecaj na Hrvatsku. Strana~ko natjecanje uglavnom je obiljeèno su~eljavanjem oko klijentelisti~ke polarizacijske linije i novih ideolo{kih polarizacija, uz stalno obnavljanje polarizacije centar-periferija u odnosu prema historijskoj svijesti (odnos prema NDH i partizanskim zlo~inima). Programsko natjecanje nije se razvilo. Preostale ~etiri postjugoslavenske dràve nisu do kraja razrije{ile sukob oko polarizacije centar-periferija, i to je glavni uzrok slabosti demokracije. Ipak svaka od njih ima specifi~nu unutarnju dinamiku konsenzusa i sukoba. U Srbiji nesposobnost politi~kih elita da rije{e pitanje statusa Kosova stalno drì otvorenom polarizaciju centar-periferija, a time omogu}uje i kontinuiranu prisutnost sna`noga radikalno nacionalisti~kog aktera (SRS). Reìmski konsenzus u korist demokracije uvelike je uspostavljen, no SRS ga i dalje povremeno dovodi u pitanje.4 Glavna linija polarizacije ti~e se ispunjavanja uvjeta me|unarodnih aktera i pitanja ulaska u EU. U Crnoj Gori polarizacija centar-periferija razrije{ena je – uz me|unarodno posredovanje – referendumom o neovisnosti i uspostavom samostalne crnogorske dràve. Ipak, novoformirani segment srpskoga etni~kog identiteta potencijalni je izvor obnavljanja sukoba oko tog pitanja. Ve}i je problem reìmska polarizacijska linija s obzirom na fakti~ki dominantnu 4

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Usporedi: Vladimir Goati: Izbori u SRJ od 1990. do 1998., Beograd: Centar za slobodne izbore i demokratiju, 1999, Zoran Lutovac (ur.): Politi~ke stranke i bira~i u dràvama biv{e Jugoslavije, Beograd: Institut dru{tvenih nauka i Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2006; Du{an Pavlovi} i Slobodan Antoni}: Konsolidacija demokratskih ustanova u Srbiji, Beograd: Slu`beni glasnik, 2007.


poziciju postkomunista i nemogu}nost da do|e do smjene vlasti. U Makedoniji je politi~ki ìvot u sjeni nerije{enih problema dràvnosti, koji se ti~u kako odnosa s Gr~kom tako i poloàja albanske manjine.5 Napokon, u BiH sukob oko nerije{enih pitanja polarizacije centar-periferija blokira demokratizaciju, iako su prisutne skupine politi~ke elite koje se natje~u i oko drugih polarizacijskih linija, osobito klijentelisti~ke.

5

Vidi: Svetomir [kari}: Democratic Elections in Macedonia, 1990-2002, Berlin: edition Sigma, 2005.

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Prilog

1. Freedomhouse: Nations in transit indeks (FH NIT) 6

Ocjene: 1-2,99 konsolidirane demokracije; 3-3,99 polukonsolidirane demokracije; 4-4,99 tranzicijski ili hibridni reìmi; 5-5,99 polukonsolidirani autoritarni reìmi; 6-7 konsolidirani autoritarni reìmi

2. Freedomhouse: Indeks politi~kih prava i gra|anskih sloboda (FH PR&CLI)7

Ljestvica: 1-7, 1 = najvi{i stupanj slobode, 7 = potpuni nedostatak slobode; rangiranje: 1-2,5 slobodni, 3-5,5 = djelomice slobodni, 5,5-7 = neslobodni

3. Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) 8

Ljestvica: 8,5-10 = vrlo napredna transformacija, 7-8,5 = napredna transformacija, 5,57 = ograni~ena transformacija, 4-5,5 = vrlo ograni~ena transformacija, 0-4 = neuspjela ili blokirana transformacija 6

7 8

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Freedomhouse: Nations in transit i Political rights and civil liberties index, dostupno na: http://www.freedomhouse.org Ibid. Bertelsmann Foundation: Bertelsmann Transformation Index, 2003-2008: dostupno na http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/11.0.html


ZAPADNOBALKANSKE NEVOLJE S TRANZICIJOM: IZMEÐU KONFORMIZMA I KOLEKTIVIZMA Bodo WEBER

Godina 2009. u Evropi te~e u znaku proslava 20-godi{njice 1989. godine, godine „mirnih revolucija”, ru{enja reìma realsocijalisti~kih sustava i pada Berlinskog zida; godine koja je ozna~ila kraj bipolarne podjele svijeta, a samim time i kratkog 20. vijeka (Eric Hobsbawm). Taj historijski datum slavi se u cijeloj Evropi, a posebno u srednjoevropskim i isto~noevropskim zemljama koje po rije~ima Adama Michnika, jednog od klju~nih aktera tada{njih zbivanja „nikada u svojoj novijoj historiji nisu imale tako dobrih 20 godina”.1 Rije~ je o dvije decenije ubrzane transformacije jednopartijskog politi~kog sistema i sistema komandne ekonomije u parlamentarne demokratije, pravne dràve i trì{ne privrede, kao i o procesu politi~ke i ekonomske integracije evropskog kontinenta pod institucionalnim ki{obranom Evropske unije. U zemljama biv{e Jugoslavije to je slavlje manje-vi{e izostalo. Sem Slovenije, zemlje Zapadnog Balkana te{ko da mogu predstavljati neku success story sli~nu onoj u Poljskoj, ê{koj ili drugim zemljama Srednje Evrope. Naprotiv, parafraziraju}i Michnika, mogli bismo re}i da su one u posljednje dvije decenije doìvjele svoj najve}i nazadak u novijoj historiji, a transformacijski procesi ~ak su i danas krhki i ambivalentni, sa nesigurnim ishodom. Ovaj okvir djelomice moè obrazloìti te{ko}e {to ih imaju ne samo vanjski analiti~ari zbivanja na evropskom kontinentu u posljednje dvije decenije nego i dana{nje politi~ke elite i stanovni{tvo u jugoisto~nom dijelu kontinenta da sudbinu svojih dru{tava u prethodne dvije decenije identifkuju sa 89. godinom, te da odrede mjesto Jugoslavije i postjugoslovenskih dru{tava u tom globalnom kontekstu. Kako se 1989. godina u Jugoslaviji nije desila i zašto se ipak dogodila Gdje, dakle, smjestiti Jugoslaviju u tom okviru prevrata 1989. godine i transformacije biv{ih realsocijalisti~kih dru{tava? Gledaju}i s pojavne razine 1

Adam Michnik, „Verteidigung der Freiheit. Reflexionen über 1989“, in: Osteuropa Nr.2-3 (2009), Berlin, S.15

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glavnih aktera i zbivanja, Jugoslavija zaista izgleda kao izuzetak koji ispada iz glavnih tokova. U Jugoslaviji se ni 1989. ni narednih godina nije desila nikakva „mirna revolucija”. Nisu se desili masovni protesti koji bi sru{ili reìm. Nije se narod po~eo konstituisati kao „demos” niti je nastala neka demokratska opozicija van komunisti~ke nomenklature koja bi od paralizovanog reìma preuzela politi~ku inicijativu. U Jugoslaviji je, u sukobu izme|u dijelova dràvno-partijskog aparata, fragmentiranog du` linija federalnih jedinica, jednostavno nestao cijeli reìm, a s njim i same dràvne institucije na centralnom nivou. Reìmi koji su bili glavni akteri u toj konfrontaciji (Srbija i Slovenija), kao i njihovi sateliti, izbjegli su pad putem etni~ke transformacije, dok su ostali reìmi, koji nisu bili dorasli konfliktu (Hrvatska i Bosna i Hercegovina) potpuno izgubili mo}. No, to se desilo u trenutku kad su strah i opsjednutost „kolektivnim identitetima” ve} uveliko dominirali svim demokratskim i socio-ekonomskim dru{tvenim pitanjima, ~ime je bio odre|en su{tinski razli~it karakter i pravac regime changea od onoga u drugim zemljama evropskog istoka. Masovne demonstracije u tako bitno razli~itom ambijentu nisu nigdje mogle prerasti u formu konstituisanja nekog novog „demosa”, nego su svugdje djelovale kao populisti~ka institucija transformacije dosada{njeg „radnog naroda” u „etnos” (Ivan ôlovi}). No, kad pomjerimo pogled sa pojedina~nih aktera i de{avanja na dublje dru{tveno-politi~ke uzroke, postaje jasno da raspad socijalisti~ke Jugoslavije ipak ne pripada nigdje drugdje nego u taj globalni kontekst 1989. godine i uru{avanje dru{tvenih poredaka sovjetskog socijalizma. Kao i u slu~aju dru{tvenih sistema sovjetskog tipa socijalizma, kriza koja je zahvatila Jugoslaviju tokom 1980-ih godina nije predstavljala neki prelazni problem nego je kroz nju do izraàja do{la dugogodi{nja strukturna bolest realsocijalisti~kog poretka. Ekonomska kriza u isto~nom dijelu Evrope stajala je na kraju jedne duge faze razvoja u kojoj je, za razliku od sredine 1960-ih godina, kad se na Zapadu jo{ vjerovalo u mogu}nost da }e komandna ekonomija prete}i kapitalisti~ku privredu, svima postalo jasno da socijalisti~ka ekonomija nije u stanju da konkuri{e trì{nim ekonomijama. U Jugoslaviji je politi~ka nomenklatura ve} po~etkom 1970-ih godina prestala da ozbiljno poku{ava graditi neki sistem baziran na principu samoupravljanja. Umjesto toga, zacementirala je postoje}e odnose snaga i koncentrisala se na zamagljivanje osnovnih protivrje~nosti ekonomskog sistema, te na izmi{ljanje pragmati~nih, u osnovi nesocijalisti~kih instrumenata (radni~ka migracija ka Zapadnoj Evropi, otvaranje zemlje za turizam, zapadni krediti), pomo}u kojih je bilo mogu}e kompenzirati nerazumne ekonomske poteze na odre|eno vrijeme, ali ne i sprije~iti kona~ni kolaps. Konstanto {irenje neformalnih i poluformalnih socijalnih odnosa tokom vi{e od dvije decenije unutar i mimo zvani~nih institucija, s ciljem odràvanja nefunkcionalnog poretka i zadovoljavanja i u samoj Jugoslaviji

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djelomi~no legitimnih individualnih potreba, zbivalo se ne samo u privredi nego i u svim drugim sferama zvani~nog sistema do kraja 1980-ih godina i skoro potpuno erodiralo dràvne i sve ostale dru{tvene institucije. Sli~nu sudbinu doìvjela je i zvani~na ideologija. Ideologija samoupravnog socijalizma je iz vjerskog sistema, koji je odre|ivao ne samo etos nego i stil ìvota ~lanova Komunisti~ke partije, derogirana u instrument vanjske demonstracije odanosti sistemu i li~ne promocije najve}eg dijela pripadnika dràvno-partijskog aparata. To {to su se socijalisti~ki poreci najve}im dijelom ve} bili uru{ili iznutra kad su „akteri promjene” stupili na scenu, zajedni~ka je karakteristika Jugoslavije i svih ostalih isto~noevropskih dràva. To obja{njava ne samo karakter revolucija koje to nisu bile, nego i to {to su se autoritarno-zatvoreni reìmi predali bez ispaljenog metka i {to niko na Zapadu nije predvidio pad reìma u Isto~noj Evropi. Tako|e obja{njava i specifi~nu dinamiku velikog prevrata, historijski trenutak u kojem je „eksplodiralo vrijeme”. Rije~ je o jednom specifi~nom odnosu izme|u glavnih dru{tvenopoliti~kih aktera i dru{tvene dinamike promjene, koji na jednoj strani otvara do tada nezamislive prostore za djelovanje pojedinaca, novih aktera, ali u isto vrijeme bitno ograni~ava njihov utjecaj na dru{tveno kretanje. U toj eksploziji vremena, u kojem je ono „{to je ju~er bilo nezamislivo danas ve} prevazi|eno”, dru{tvena dinamika sve aktere vu~e za sobom. To {to je i socijalisti~ka Jugoslavija u svom krvavom raspadu bila objekat te dominacije dru{tvene dinamike u postjugoslovenskim dru{tvima do dana{njeg dana uglavnom se previ|a. To vaì koliko za op{tu dru{tvenu percepciju toliko za nau~nu literaturu. Tamo jo{ uvijek dominira personalizovano razumijevanje dru{tveno-politi~kih de{avanja koja su fokusirana na navodno klju~nu ulogu glavnih politi~kih aktera, na njihove namjere i „planove“. îni se da jedan od klju~eva za razumijevanje problema koji zemlje Zapadnog Balkana do dana{njeg dana mu~e leì u tome da u najve}em dijelu regiona nije uspje{no zaustavljena dinamika ubrzanog vremena. Etnizacija kao negativna transformacija umjesto tranzicije Dok je dinamika promjene sve dràve biv{eg isto~nog bloka odvela na tranzicijski put prema zapadnim sistemima i zapadnom blagostanju, jugoslovensko dru{tvo je odvela u nasilnu etnizaciju i raspad, u rat i sveobuhvatno razaranje dru{tva. Pojavljivanje agresivnog etnonacionalizma na Balkanu zbunilo je svijet, koji je bio u o~ekivanju „kraja historije“ (Francis Fukuyama), globalnog prodora „sistema koji nema alternativu“. [ok koji je izazvao povratak rata i masovnih zlo~ina na evropsko tle krajem 20. vijeka u~inio je atraktivnom percepciju da se radi o specifi~no „balkanskom“ problemu, o jedinstvenom slu~aju izuzetku. I to unato~ tome {to je „nacija“ postala dominantna matrica raspada realsocijalisti~kih dru{tvenih sistema. Veliki prevrat 1989. godine u srednjoevropskim

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dràvama, mirno razdvajanja ê{ke i Slova~ke, kao i najve}im dijelom mirni raspad Sovjetskog Saveza, sve se to odvijalo u ime „nacionalnog osloba|anja“ od sovjetskog imperijalizma, odnosno u ime ponovnog uspostavljanja „nacionalnog suvereniteta“ iz pretkomunisti~kog doba. Ujedinjenje Isto~ne Njema~ke sa Saveznom Republikom Njema~kom de{avalo se pod danas op}eprihva}enim sloganom „Wiedervereinigung“ (ponovno ujedinjenje), unato~ tome {to se radilo o bitno razli~itim dru{tvima sa slabim osje}anjem za zajedni~ku pripadnost, te sa potpuno nepripremljenom politi~kom elitom u Zapadnoj Njema~koj. Izgledalo je kao da se vratio 19. vijek, politi~ki akteri, pokreti i stranke sebe su predstavljali u kontinuitetu sa pretkomunisti~kim vremenima, dok se u svjetskoj javnosti i dru{tvenim naukama uveliko pri~alo o povratku doba nacionalizma, doba formiranja nacionalnih dràva. Zajedni~ki im je imenitelj potiskivanje osnovne ~injenice da se krajem 20. i po~etkom 21. vijeka radi o sasvim novim dru{tvenim odnosima koji se samo interpretiraju u starim kategorijama, pomo}u konstruisanja nacionalnih i kulturnih kontinuiteta i tradicija. Takva upotreba starinskih kategorija poprima karakter proizvoljnog zato {to su modernizacijski procesi i procesi duboke detradicionalizacije koji su se zbivali u drugoj polovini 20. vijeka duboko podrivali materijalnu bazu ideje o identitetu nacije, teritorije i kulture (koja je ve} krajem 19. vijeka bila krhka), podrivali bazu tradicionalnih socijalnih (religijskih, kulturnih) odnosa. Ali upravo to ih ~ini vrlo privla~nim jer se time pove}ava mogu}nost njihove globalne upotrebe. Ta proizvoljnost tek omogu}uje dru{tveni mehanizam kolektivnog samosporazumijevanja o „identitetu“, „tradiciji“, „kulturi“, „religiji“ itd. Njihova neo~ekivana snaga poslije 1989. godine leì u njihovoj konformisti~koj dru{tvenoj funkciji. Diskursi o kolektivnom identitetu su „dru{tveni diskursi izbjegavanja“, diskursi ~iji smisao o~igledno manje leì u konkretnim („ideolo{kim“) sadràjima nego u svojoj dru{tvenoj funkciji, to jest u mogu}nosti izbjegavanja razmi{ljanja o konkretnom dru{tvu. A u isto vrijeme nude maglovit osje}aj pripadanja i smisla. On se nudi kao medijum izraàvanja negodovanja u vezi s postoje}em dru{tvom bez obaveze da se ponudi neka alternativa. U slu~aju realsocijalisti~kih dru{tava, interpretacija dru{tvene realnosti u starinskim kategorijama omogu}ila je izbjegavanje suo~avanja s neizvjesnom budu}no{}u u op{toj krizi i raspadu postoje}eg poretka. Nestala je blokovska podjela svijeta koja je sistematizovala dru{tvenu realnost – od me|unarodnog politi~kog sistema do svakodnevnog ìvota. Dok se ~ini da je savremena atraktivnost diskursa kolektivnog samosporazumijevanja op{ta, njihovi dru{tveno-politi~ki u~inci razli~iti su za svako pojedina~no dru{tvo. Neosporno je da je „povratak nacionalnom“ imao emancipacijski efekat, kako u slu~aju Isto~ne Njema~ke tako i u drugim dràvama Var{avskog pakta; omogu}io je impozantne procese politi~ke i ekonomske transformacije. No, koliko je upotreba tih kategorija ambivalentna vidi se, na primjer, u slu~ajevima ksenofobi~nih atentata na

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strance u Njema~koj tokom 1990-ih godina ili u aktuelnom politi~kom razvoju u Ma|arskoj, jednom od modela postsocijalisti~ke transformacije. Postjugoslovenska dru{tva na{la su se u nekoj sasvim druga~ijoj „transformaciji“, u dinamici nasilne etnizacije svih dru{tvenih sfera, u procesu kolektivnog dru{tvenog petljanja u autoritarnu vladavinu, nasilje i masovne zlo~ine. Razloge za taj specifi~ni put mnogo manje treba traìti u pretkomunisti~koj historiji jugoisto~ne Evrope nego u teritorijalizaciji grupnih konkurencija kao posljedice autoritarne decentralizacije, te u poluformalnom karakteru institucionalizacije etniciteta koji su razlikovali jugoslovenski socijalizam od sovjetskog. Na prostoru raspadaju}e jugoslovenske dràve dru{tveno-politi~ke promjene 1990-ih godina tako su poprimile protivrje~an karakter paralelnih procesa uspostavljenja osnovnih normativnih i institucionalnih elemenata zapadne demokratije i nasilne etnizacije. Dru{tvene nauke su se trudile da se nose s tim specifi~nim razvojem pomo}u nekih pojmovnih inovacija poput „demokrature“, no nju ne moèmo razumjeti bez kriti~nog analiti~nog pristupa karijeri kategorija kolektivnog identiteta u datom historijskom kontekstu 1989. godine. Rezultati tih dru{tveno-politi~kih promjena tokom 1990-ih godina bez sumnje su negativni. Etnizacija dru{tva omogu}ila je nastavak politi~ke tradicije autoritarne vladavine pod formalno pluralisti~kim uslovima putem daljeg {irenja poluformalnih i neformalnih odnosa i mreà, tj. umreàvanja politi~kih i privrednih elita, ali time je dugoro~nije dovela i do nastavka erozije svih dràvnih institucija i dru{tvenih autoriteta u cjelini. Etni~ka ideolo{ka homogenizacija, te {iroko dru{tveno legitimisanje nasilja i masovnih zlo~ina, nisu vodili do neke vrste prirodnog jedinstva novih etni~kih zajednica nego, naprotiv, do duboke desolidarizacije ispod povr{ine novih dru{tava. Praksa parlamentarne demokratije, vladavine prava i trì{ne privrede u takvim je uslovima dovela do devalvacije demokratskih vrijednosti i do kvara svih uklju~enih aktera, kako reìmskih tako opozicijskih. Zbog toga ima smisla govoriti o negativnoj transformaciji koja razlikuje jugoistok Evrope od drugih dijelova Isto~ne Evrope. Mirne revolucije 1999. godine i perspektive „naknadne tranzicije” Ta~no jedno desetlje}e poslije 1989. godine, to jest tokom 1999. i 2000. godine do{lo je i na Balkanu do promjene reìma, prvo u Hrvatskoj pa onda u Srbiji. Oba doga|aja su bila nazvana „mirnom revolucijom”, u doma}oj jednako kao i u svjetskoj javnosti. Da li se zaista radilo o de{avanju zaka{njele 1989. godine, koja je ozna~ila pravi prevrat, po~etak prave tranzicije? Ako postoji ijedna paralela, onda ona leì u neadekvatnosti pojma „mirna revolucija”. To {to su reìmi koji su bili odgovorni za desetine i stotine hiljada mrtvih i milione izbjeglica predali mo} bez ispaljenog metka dokaz je da su i oni, kao i prethodni reìmi realsocijalisti~kog tipa, iznutra bili uru{eni mnogo vi{e nego da ih je sru{ila opozicija, koja

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je tokom svih 1990-ih godina patila od hroni~ne slabosti. Prema tome, mnogo adekvatnije bi bilo govoriti o „imploziji poslije implozije” nego o mirnoj revoluciji. Banalna je istina da se historija ne ponavlja ovdje se ve} zavr{avaju sli~nosti a po~inju su{tinske razlike. Dok su glavni cilj opozicijske kritike krajem 1990-ih bile autoritarna vladavina i koruptivna politi~ka praksa vladaju}ih reìma, njihova ideolo{ka osnova, to jest etnonacionalizam, nije izgubila legitimitet, a nije ga izgubila ni do dana{njeg dana. Drugi vaàn faktor ~ini razli~ita uloga dru{tvenog konformizma: dok je konformizam igrao neosporno bitnu ulogu u transformaciji realsocijalisti~kih sustava u dràvama Srednje i Isto~ne Evrope, na Balkanu je konformizam imao ulogu klju~ne psihosocijalne osnove za autoritarno-regresivnu dru{tvenu dinamiku. Prema tome, ne iznena|uje to {to su unato~ optimizmu iz „revolucionarnih” dana transformacijski procesi u ovoj decenije ostali ambivalentni, ni blizu onom linearnom razvoju koji sugeri{e predstava o tranziciji. Koje su, dakle, perspektive dovr{avanja zaka{njele transformacije zapadnobalkanske regije i njene evropske integracije? Najve}u nadu daje razvoj doga|aja u Republici Hrvatskoj, gdje se nacionalni (nacionalisti~ki) konsenzus negdje sredinom ove decenije utopio u evropski i postao glavna osnova jednog integracijskog i prate}eg reformskog procesa koji daleko prednja~i pred susjednim dràvama. No, ve} u hrvatskom slu~aju postavlja se pitanje pravog odnosa izme|u reformske fasade i su{tine. [ta su dometi demokratskih reformi koje su bazirane na dru{tvenom konsenzusa koji je do prije nekoliko godina stajao iza kolektivnog petljanja u antidemokratsku transformaciju i masovne zlo~ine? Tim vi{e {to se dràve Zapadnog Balkana suo~avaju sa mnogo teìm zadatkom prevazilaènja duplog naslije|a – socijalisti~kog i postsocijalisti~kog, tj. etnonacionalisti~kog? Koji su dometi transformacije pod ki{obranom evropskih integracija u ostalim dru{tvima jugoistoka Evrope (Srbija, Bosna i Hercegovina), gdje je takvo utapanje nacionalnog u evropsko samo djelomi~no mogu}e?

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EVROPSKA INTEGRACIJA: IZMEÐU TRANZICIJE I IDENTITETA

Evropska integracija: između tranzicije i identiteta

ZAPADNI BALKAN JE NA JUGU - DISKURSI NA TEMU PRISTUPANJA ZAPADNOG BALKANA EVROPSKOJ UNIJI Tanja PETROVIĆ

U junu 2007. godine, prije nego {to }e Portugal preuzeti predsjedanje Evropskom unijom, ambasador Portugala pri Evropskoj uniji Álvaro de Mendonça e Moura izjavio je, nabrajaju}i prioritetne zadatke predsjedni{tva EU u toku portugalskog mandata, da }e zbog svoje kolonijalne pro{losti fokus Portugala u vanjskoj politici biti saradnja s Afrikom, dok }e ljudska prava biti u prvom planu (24ur.com, 11. juni 2007). Nekoliko mjeseci nakon toga, u vrijeme kad se Slovenija nalazila usred priprema za preuzimanje predsjedni{tva EU od Portugala, The Financial Times je prenio izjavu Janeza Jan{e, u to vrijeme slovenskog premijera, u kojoj je rekao da u regionu [Zapadnog Balkana] Slovenija ima interese koji su sli~ni portugalskim interesima u Africi (Mladina 31, 4. avgust 2007, str. 11). Ma koliko bizarno i apsurdno ovo zvu~alo, bilo bi pogre{no shvatiti navedene rije~i kao jo{ jednu ekscentri~nu izjavu biv{eg premijera Slovenije. Ona je dio daleko ozbiljnijeg fenomena i {iroko rasprostranjene diskurzivne prakse preko koje dio Evrope koji se danas naziva Zapadnim Balkanom oblikovatelji “evropskog kursa” iz ideolo{kih razloga sve vi{e guraju ka jugu, izvan granica Evrope i poistovje}uju ga, odnosno relociraju u “tre}i svijet” u simboli~noj geografiji savremene Evrope. Diskurzivni {abloni koji se direktno ili indirektno odnose na kolonijalizam imaju istaknutu ulogu u ovom procesu ideolo{ke relokacije motivirane potrebom za konstrukcijom “evropskog identiteta”. Zapadni Balkan i evropski identitet Savremena historija Evrope obiljeèna je neprekidnim traganjem za identitetom. Ono je posebno dobilo na intenzitetu po zavr{etku hladnog rata i nestanku vrlo jasne granice izme|u “Evrope” kako ju je doìvljavao zapadni dio kontinenta i biv{eg isto~nog bloka ili “druge Evrope”. U narednom koraku, u kojem su se zemlje obiju Evropa ujedinile u politi~ki okvir EU, pitanja karaktera i sadràja evropskog identiteta, evropskih

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vrijednosti, evropskih vjerovanja i evropske granice postala su neizbje`ne komponente politi~ke retorike i akademskih debata.1 Predstavljanje Balkana kao ‘evropske zone tre}eg svijeta’ sigurno je pomoglo stvaranju dojma o tako neophodnom kolektivnom identitetu i doìvljaju Evropske unije.2 Balkan se tradicionalno doìvljava kao regija na periferiji koju moraju kontrolirati evropski centri mo}i i usmjeravati je “kako ne bi zapadala u iste gre{ke iz pro{losti”.3 Tvrdnja da Balkanu treba neka vrsta kolonijalne nadmo}i kako bi se spasio od haosa – i da bi se za{titila Evropa od opasnosti koje haos nosi sa sobom – ~esta je u zapadnja~kim novinskim i pseudoakademskim pisanjima na temu Balkana.4 Takvo stajali{te je sna`no oìvljeno u toku pro{irenja EU na istok i jugoistok evropskog kontinenta. U politi~kom diskursu, proces pristupanja EU u zemljama Zapadnog Balkana obi~no je predstavljen kao putovanje ka cilju punopravnog ~lanstva u EU. Osim toga, zemlje kandidati na tom putu treba da se iz temelja transformiraju iz neevropskih u evropske zemlje. Za transformaciju su im potrebni pomo} i usmjeravanje na tom putu. Takav stav ilustrira slijede}a izjava, koju je dao slovenski politi~ar i ~lan Evropskog Parlamenta Jelko Kacin, koji je istaknuo da EU treba koristiti svoje cjelokupno akumulirano znanje, stru~nost i finansijsku podr{ku za upravljanje Balkanom na njegovom putovanju do Brisela (EP, 30. decembar 2006). Zona ekspertize / interesa i primjena kolonijalnih odnosa Diskurs o pristupanju EU, u kojem se zemlje kandidati uvjeravaju da su evropski kurs i evropska perspektiva obiljeèni ”paradoksom postmodernog ambiguiteta”5: u ovom diskursu “niz preduvjeta za ulazak u EU je proizvoljan za prido{lice u EU, dok su europeizacija i tranzicija predstavljene kao ‘putovanje od precizno definirane ta~ke polaska do jedinstvenog i precizno definiranog odredi{ta’”.6 Svaki korak na ovom putovanju biva pohvaljen od strane evropskih politi~ara, {to neizostavno prati izjava u kojoj se kaè da je ciljano odredi{te jo{ uvijek daleko, mada nije popra}ena jasnim obja{njenjem zbog ~ega; dobra ilustracija takvog diskursa su izjave njema~kog ministra vanjskih poslova Steinmeiera u vezi sa

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2

3 4 5

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Hammond, Andrew: Balkanism in Political Context: From the Ottoman Empire to the EU. Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture 3(3), 2006, str. 6. Erjavec, Karmen and Zala Vol~i~: ‘War on terrorism’ as a discursive battleground: Serbian recontextualization of G.W. Bush’s discourse. Discourse & Society 18(2), 2007, 123-137.; za opse`niji uvid v. Mastnak, Toma` : Evropa: med evolucijo in evtanazijo. Ljubljana: Apes – Studia humanitatis, 1998. Andrew Hammond, ibid., str. 19. Andrew Hammond (ibid., str. 20) daje nekoliko ilustrativnih primjera ovog diskursa. Busch, Brigita i Micha Krzyżanowski 2007: Inside/Outside the European Union: Enlargement, migration policy and the search for Europe’s identity’. Geopolitics of the European Union Enlargement:Expansion, Exclusion and Integration in the European Union, J. Anderson, A. Warwick (ur.). London: Routledge, str. 107-124. Fairclough, Norman: Transition’ in Central and Eastern Europe. British and American Studies 11, Timisoara, 2005, str.4. Vidi o tome i u: Majstorovi}, Danijela.: Construction of Europeanization in the High Representative’s Discourse in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Discourse & Society 18, 2007, str. 627-651.


Srbijom: Sada{nja vlada Srbije je jasno zauzela kurs prema Evropi. (...)Svi mi vidimo reformske napore koji se preduzimaju u va{oj zemlji. Naravno, jo{ mnogo toga treba da se uradi, ne samo ovde u Srbiji, nego u ~itavom regionu Kada razgovaram sa va{im politi~arima, ose}am u svakoj re~enici njihovu odlu~nost da Srbiju pribliè Evropi. Naravno, treba savladati jo{ mnogo prepreka, to vlasti u Beogradu znaju isto kao i ja (b92.net, 27. januar 2009). Takva ambivalentnost i nedostatak jasno}e ostavljaju veliki prostor za politi~ku imaginaciju u kojoj balkanski Drugi, osim svog tradicionalnog imidà poludivlje i polucivilizirane evropske periferije, tako|er stje~e odlike kolonijalnog Drugog. Kolonijalnu predstavu o Zapadnom Balkanu ja~aju politi~ki diskursi koji dolaze iz zemalja ~lanica EU koje imaju zajedni~ko historijsko naslije|e sa zemljama Zapadnog Balkana – to su prije svega Austrija i Slovenija. Mo`da se uo~iti neka vrsta “natjecanja” izme|u ove dvije zemlje za titulu eksperta za Zapadni Balkan. Obje su tokom predsjedavanja EU navodile Zapadni Balkan kao jedan od prioritetnih zadataka (Austrija je predsjedala EU u prvoj polovini 2006, a Slovenija u prvoj polovini 2008. godine). Historijsko naslije|e koje Austrija i Slovenija dijele sa zemljama Zapadnog Balkana ~ini osnovicu za pozivanje na posebno znanje o ovom regionu i prisvajanje posebne uloge – uloge eksperta za Zapadni Balkan unutar EU.7 Tvrdnje o posjedovanju posebnog znanja i o ulozi eksperta za Zapadni Balkan su nerazdvojivo povezane s ekonomskim aspektom koji ih obavezno prati (ili im prethodi?). Austrija je najve}i inozemni investitor u Sloveniji i jedan od najva`nijih investitora na Zapadnom Balkanu, dok najve}i dio slovenskih stranih ulaganja odlazi u Srbiju; 2007. godine u regiju Jugoisto~ne Evrope odlazila je jedna {estina cjelokupnog slovenskog izvoza.8 Slovenski antropolog Bojan Baskar je 2003. godine istakao: ”Slovenci su navikli da na ostatak Jugoslavije gledaju kao na ’svoje trì{te’. Slovenski povratak na bosansko, hrvatsko, a sada i na srbijansko trì{te se odvijao brzo i bio je vrlo ambiciozan, ~ime je izazvao neke kritike u tim zemljama u pogledu slovenskog ‘ekonomskog imperijalizma’.”9 Mitja Velikonja citira izjave slovenskih politi~ara kojima podràvaju takvo gledi{te; izme|u ostalih, izjavu predsjedavaju}eg Slovenskog panevropskog pokreta: Za nas je to [Balkan] podru~je u kojem moèmo ostvarivati svoje interese i u tom pogledu imamo veliku prednost nad drugima, kao i izjavu predstavnika stranke ‘Slovenija je na{a‘: U okvirima EU, 7

8 9

Porijeklo ovog znanja se, me|utim, tretira druga~ije u austrijskim a druga~ije u slovenskim diskursima: dok austrijski politi~ari i novinari eksplicitno pominju zajedni~ku pro{lost koja je posljedica austrijskih osvajanja na jugoistoku, tvorci javnih diskursa u Sloveniji radije pre}ute izvor svoga znanja o Zapadnom Balkanu. Drugim rije~ima, ne pominju jugoslovensko i socijalisti~ko naslije|e. EU i dràve JV Evrope. Dnevnik, 17. januar 2009, str. 6. Baskar, Bojan: Within or Without? Changing Attitudes towards the Balkans in Slovenia, Ethnologia Balkanica 7 (2003), str. 199.

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Slovenija mora preduzeti vode}u ulogu u Jugoisto~noj Evropi i organizirati svoju diplomatsku mreù na na~in da funkcionira tako da je u slu`bi slovenske ekonomije i njene nauke.10 Uloga eksperta za Zapadni Balkan nerazdvojiva je od ekonomskog utjecaja u ovom regionu i ekonomskih interesa svake zemlje ~lanice EU. Diskurzivni obrasci i odnosi mo}i koji stoje iza njih me|usobno se potpomaù i legitimiziraju te tako stvaraju logi~nu, mada historijski ~esto neosnovanu cjelinu: slovenski politi~ari tretiraju Zapadni Balkan na kolonijalan na~in uprkos ~injenici da ne postoji kolonijalno iskustvo iz pro{losti. To pokazuje da politi~ki predstavnici dràva bez kolonijalnog naslije|a tako|er mogu oblikovati kolonijalisti~ki diskurs. To omogu}ava kontekst u kojem ~lanstvo u EU djeluje kao osnova za inkluziju i ekskluziju i stvara “skladi{te” diskurzivnih obrazaca koji su na raspolaganju zemljama ~lanicama EU i koje one koriste za artikulaciju diskursa o Drugom kada govore o onima koji nisu dio ujedinjene Evrope. U tom novom kontekstu, kolonijalne predstave i odnosi unutar ovog regiona dobijaju jo{ jedno, prili~no ru`no lice. @ivotni uvjeti radnika na privremenom radu u Sloveniji, od kojih ve}ina dolazi iz Bosne i Hercegovine, Makedonije i iz drugih dijelova biv{e Jugoslavije, i koji rade uglavnom za slovenske gra|evinske firme na osnovu ugovora, nevjerovatno su lo{i. Oni dnevno rade vi{e radnih sati nego {to je to zakonom propisano, a postoje}i vizni reìm i politika izdavanja radnih dozvola ~ini ih u potpunosti ovisnim o poslodavcu. Brutalnost njihove situacije itekako podsje}a na mehanizme eksploatacije koji su se koristili u kolonijalno doba u Zapadnoj Evropi. Kori{tenje takvih mehanizama ne bi bilo mogu}e da Slovenija nije ~lanica EU, za razliku od zemalja iz kojih ti radnici na privremenom radu u Sloveniji dolaze. ^lanstvo Slovenije u EU tako|er ima sredi{nju ulogu i u otvoreno rasisti~kim diskursima, kao {to je to poruka koju je gra|evinska firma Vegrad za radnike iz Bosne i Hercegovine oglasila na kontejnerima u Beìgradu, u Ljubljani, u kojima radnici borave. Firma je upozorila radnike iz Bosne da ne smiju ni poku{ati provoditi svoju kulturu i pona{anje koji su u nekim slu~ajevima izuzetno neodgovaraju}i. Trebate znati da trenutno ìvite u Ljubljani, glavnom gradu Republike Slovenije, dràve ~lanice EU. Ovdje vladaju zakon i pravila koji su na vi{em nivou. Prema rije~ima Borisa Deùlovi}a, ovakav diskurs predstavlja “tipi~an srednjoevropski kli{e: ure|ena ‘urbanizirana sredina’ je po definiciji ‘dru{tvena sredina na vi{em kulturnom nivou’, u kojoj ìve ‘visoko situirani ljudi’, drugim rije~ima, veoma kulturni gra|ani s visokim primanjima koji ‘ne}e jo{ dugo tolerirati’ do{ljake i gastarbajtere, prljave ju`njake, Afrikance, Arape, Turke, Cigane, Hrvate, Srbe ili, u ovom primjeru, Bosance koji remete njihovu urbanu idilu. U tim ‘dru{tvenim sredinama na visokom kulturolo{kom nivou‘ po{tuju se druga~ija pravila pona{anja, dok je jedini zadatak do{ljaka da svoj jeftini rad posvete 10

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Velikonja, Mitja: Eurosis – A Critique of the New Eurocentrism. Ljubljana: Mirovni in{titut, 2005, str. 25.


izgradnji tih ‘urbanih sredina’”.11 U ovom slu~aju, “prljavi ju`njaci” su ljudi iz “tre}eg svijeta” – bez politi~ke mo}i i bez osnovnih prava; to vi{e nisu ju`njaci iz drugih republika biv{e Jugoslavije, ~ija je pozicija bila daleko bolja uprkos njihovoj getoizaciji i rasprostranjenim stereotipima. Tako|er, u tu skupinu se ne ubrajaju drugi sezonski radnici, oni iz Slova~ke ili iz drugih isto~noevropskih zemalja koje su ~lanice EU – sam njihov pravni poloàj je daleko povoljniji, a osim toga, niske naknade za rad i lo{i uvjeti ìvota i rada u Sloveniji privla~e samo mali broj radnika iz tih zemalja (njihov broj je daleko manji nego {to se o~ekivalo kada je Slovenija pristupila EU). Opasno blizu Osim ekonomskih interesa, drugi razlog zbog kojeg je u dana{njoj politi~koj imaginaciji Zapadni Balkan uveliko kategoriziran kao jug, “tre}i svijet”, odnosi se na aspekt sigurnosti: zemlje koje grani~e s dana{njom EUropom prema istoku, jugoistoku i na istoku ~ine podru~je koje je u o~ima Evrope opasno blizu i iz kojeg vrebaju kojekakve opasnosti – organizirani kriminal koji podràvaju korumpirane politi~ke elite, krijum~arenje droga, nelegalni imigranti, terorizam (s obzirom da je muslimanska populacija “autohtona” i na Balkanu i u Sjevernoj Africi, to podru~je se moè povezati sa Al-Qaedom i ‘globalnim terorizmom’) itd. Zemljama Zapadnog Balkana ne moè se osporiti njihovo geografsko smje{tanje u Evropu ~ak i u novoj politi~koj realnosti, ako i zbog ~ega drugog onda zato {to se na dana{njoj politi~koj karti Evrope pojavljuju kao “crna rupa” okruèna teritorijom EU. Ako bi im se iz tog razloga trebalo “dozvoliti da u|u u Evropu”, to je opravdano potrebom za sigurno{}u: prije nego {to je Francuska preuzela predsjedavanje EU, njen predsjednik Nicolas Sarkozy je izjavio da Pariz podràva pristupanje balkanskih zemalja EU zato {to je to na~in da zavlada mir u regionu u kome je po~eo jedan svetski rat i u kome jo{ uvek vladaju tenzije. (b92.net, 1. juli, 2008); ili, kao {to je napisano u Programu za slovensko predsjedni{tvo EU, stabilnost Zapadnog Balkana – regiona okruènog zemljama ~lanicama – od najve}e je va`nosti za sigurnost i prosperitet cijele Unije.12 U ovom primjeru, novi {abloni ekskluzije ponovo su u harmoniji sa starima – diskurs o “problemati~noj prirodi” balkanskih zemalja i njihovoj odgovornosti za nasilje i ratove u Evropi danas se nastavlja kroz predstavljanje balkanskih zemalja kao “rasadnika terorizma”, dok se slike varvarstva, primitivizma i grubosti u savremenoj varijanti prenose kroz diskurse o kriminalu, korupciji, terorizmu i nelegalnim migracijama. Potreba za kontrolom je, stoga, konstanta i u starim i u novim diskursima – zemlje Zapadnog Balkana moraju se primiti u EU kako bi se mogle nadzirati i sprije~iti u izazivanju novih problema u Evropi.

11 12

Deùlovi}, Boris: Vegradovo okolje na vi{jem kulturnom nivoju. Dnevnik, Objektiv, 22. novembar 2008. http://www.eu2008.si/includes/Downloads/misc/program/Programme_en.pdf, pristup ostvaren 8. marta 2009.

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Život u različitom vremenu Stav prema historiji, memoriji, pro{losti i budu}nosti jo{ je jedno podru~je u kojem je u savremenim politi~kim diskursima povu~ena jasna granica izme|u “Evrope” i “ne-Evrope”, pri ~emu je Balkan izjedna~en s “tre}im svijetom”. U politi~kim i medijskim diskursima pristupanje zemalja Zapadnog Balkana EU je prikazano kao njihov opredeljenje za budu}nost (i kona~an raskid sa reakcionarskom pro{lo{}u); ovu vrstu diskursa podràva prostorna metafora napretka na putu ka Evropi. Zvani~nici i politi~ari EU neprekidno ponavljaju da zemljama Zapadnog Balkana treba ponuditi evropsku perspektivu ili evropsku budu}nost i te zemlje opisuju kao zemlje koje idu evropskim putem, koje su odabrale evropski put i sli~no. Pristupanje EU se ovdje predstavlja kao jedina na~in da se zemlje Zapadnog Balkana oslobode tereta pro{losti i destruktivnih nacionalizama i okrenu ka budu}nosti. Pojmovi povezani s EU u ovom diskursu su budu}nost, napredak, stabilnost i zdravlje, a nasuprot tome, neuklju~ivanje u EU je povezano s pro{lo{}u, nestabilno{}u, haosom, nacionalizmom, bole{}u, odnosno sa svim onim karakteristikama koje su tradicionalno povezane sa zemljama balkanskog poluotoka.13 Stoga je EU istovremeno preduvjet za normalnost i onaj ko defini{e normative za kvalifikaciju za normalno. Dana 28. januara 2008. godine, kada je Vije}e Evropske unije razgovaralo o budu}oj saradnji sa Srbijom, u Guardianu je objavljen ~lanak Olli Rehna pod naslovom „Balkan na putu ozdravljenja“ (Balkans on the Mend).14 Izme|u ostalog, u ~lanku se kaè da se ljudi na Balkanu ove godine suo~avaju sa te{kim izborom: njihov region bi mogao ili kona~no rije{iti svoje jo{ uvijek nerije{ene probleme koji datiraju iz ratova hiljadu devetsto devedesetih godina ili ponovo zapasti u nestabilnost i ekstreme nacionalizma. Prva opcija bi ih povela u stabilnost, prosperitet i evropske integracije. Ali mnogi komentatori vjeruju da je ova druga neizbje`na.15 Balkan, dakle, moè ozdraviti, postati normalan i izbje}i rastu}i nacionalizam samo ako postane dio EU, samo ako postane Evropa. Ono {to se pri pravljenju tako polarizirane slike dva svijeta pre}utkuje je savremena realnost EU gdje se mnoge dràve ~lanice suo~avaju sa sve ve}im nacionalizmom, rasizmom, ksenofobijom, ja~anjem ekstremnih desnih politi~kih snaga i sli~nim “uàsima” – ukratko, pojavama koje se pripisuju isklju~ivo onim zemljama pred kojima stoji jo{ mnogo posla prije nego {to steknu mogu}nost da budu nazvane evropskim i prije nego {to se budu mogle priklju~iti velikoj evropskoj porodici. Ovakvi diskursi sugeri{u slijede}u “vremensku mapu” Evrope: sada{njost EU je budu}nost Zapadnog Balkana, pri ~emu on danas ìvi ne u 13 14

15

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Vidi: Todorova, Maria: Imagining the Balkans. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Istu metaforu ozdravljenja upotrijebio je i Dejan Steinbuch, kolumnist slovenskih besplatnih novina @urnal, u ~lanku pod naslovom „Kako izlije~iti Srbe od nacionalizma“. Izme|u ostalog, napisao je: Stoga smatram da je krajnje vrijeme da na{e srbijanske prijatelje izlije~imo od nacionalizma i da im pomognemo na njihovom putu u budu}nost (@urnal, 23. februar 2008, str. 18). Rehn, Olli: Balkans on the Mend. Guardian, 28. januar 2008.


sada{njosti nego u pro{losti kojom vladaju nacionalisti~ki mitovi. Slika u kojoj realnost zemalja Zapadnog Balkana nije realnost sada{njosti nego pro{losti ~ini njihovu transformaciju nu`nom, a razliku izme|u Evrope (EU) i Zapadnog Balkana izrazitom, spre~avaju}i nas da uo~imo sli~nosti izme|u dva dijela kontinenta. Na Balkan se tradicionalno gleda kao na podru~je naseljeno narodima koji su opsjednuti historijom, koji grade vlastiti identitet na mitovima i koji nisu u stanju “suo~iti se sa sada{njo{}u” i “okrenuti se budu}nosti”. Evropa pripisuje iste karakteristike zemljama “tre}eg svijeta”: Tragedija Afrike je {to Afrikanci nikad nisu doista stupili u historiju. U tom imaginarnom svijetu gdje sve uvijek po~inje iznova nema mjesta za ljudsku avanturu niti ideju napretka. ôvjek nikad ne gleda u budu}nost. Nikad ne prekida ciklus ponavljanja … To je problem Afrike, izjavio je predsjednik Sarkozy prilikom obra}anja mladim Afrikancima u Dakaru.16 S druge strane, sude}i po na~inu na koji Evropa percipira samu sebe, ideja napretka njoj je priro|ena; to je prostor koji karakterizira linearan tok vremena, za razliku od neevropske, cikli~ne percepcije vremena i beskona~nog ponavljanja. Osim toga, Evropa sebe vidi kao zajednicu dràva koje je udruìla upravo njihova sposobnost da se suo~e s traumati~nom pro{lo{}u, da je prevazi|u i da kroz katarzu izgrade bolje i eti~nije dru{tvo.17 Nasuprot tome, Balkan ìvi u pro{losti, opsjednut je pro{lo{}u, a istovremeno se s njom ne moè i ne èli suo~iti. Po{to kao takav predstavlja ozbiljnu prijetnju predstavi koju Evropa ima o samoj sebi, Balkan treba smjestiti izvan evropskih granica. Da li je Evropa moguća? Godine 1999. francuski politi~ki filozof Etienne Balibar istakao je u svom predavanju u Solunu da se “o sudbini evropskog identiteta danas odlu~uje u Jugoslaviji i op}enitije na Balkanu (iako to nije jedina lokacija njegove ku{nje)” i da Evropa ima dvije opcije: “Ili }e Evropa prepoznati u balkanskoj situaciji ne monstruoznost urezanu u njena prsa, patolo{ku ‘posljedicu’ nerazvijenosti ili komunizma, nego sliku ili posljedicu vlastite historije i po~eti se suo~avati s njom i rje{avati je te tako dovesti sebe u pitanje i transformirati se. Tek bi tada Evropa vjerovatno po~ela postajati opet mogu}a. Ili }e odbiti da se suo~i sama sa sobom i nastavit }e tretirati problem kao spolja{nju prepreku koja se moè prevazi}i spolja{njiim sredstvima, izme|u ostalog i kolonizacijom.”18 16

17

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Tatli}, [efik [eki: Mikrob v Evropi. Reartikulacija 2, 2007/2008, http://www.reartikulacija.org/novi_ fasizmi/novi_fasizmi2.html, pristup ostvaren 29. juna 2009. U svojoj studiji historije Evrope 20. stolje}a, Mark Mazower uvjerljivo dekonstruira ovaj evropski narativ o katarzi~noj konfrontaciji s pro{lo{}u i isti~e da je nacizam bio “ko{marno razotkri}e destruktivnog potencijala evropske civilizacije – okrenuo je imperijalizma naglava~ke tretiraju}i Evropljana kao Afrikanca” (Mazower, Mark: Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century. London et al.: Penguin books, 1998, str. xiii). Balibar, Etienne: We, the People of Europe? Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004, str. 6.

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Detaljniji uvid u evropske diskurse na temu Zapadnog Balkana otkriva da dana{nja Evropa nije mogu}a u ve}oj mjeri nego {to je bila prije deset godina, kada je Balibar izgovorio citirane rije~i. Mogu}e je re}i upravo suprotno: sredstva kojima se konstruira slika Zapadnog Balkana kao podru~ja izvan Evrope postala su jo{ eksplicitnija; kori{tenje dobro poznatih mehanizama supervizije i kolonizacije prati jo{ ve}i nedostatak refleksije, a ta su sredstva postala dostupna svima onima unutar EU. Najve}u ekonomsku korist od te simboli~ne i diskurzivne kolonizacije Balkana imaju upravo one zemlje koje naj~e{}e upotrebljavaju te mehanizme, dakle ~lanice EU koje su smje{tene du` njenih jugoisto~nih granica. [to se ti~e Evrope u cijelosti, ova kolonizacija joj omogu}ava da nastavi sa izgradnjom i odràvanjem samodopadljivog imidà, prikrivaju}i, ili pripisuju}i onima koji su vani sve {to bi takav imid` moglo dovesti u pitanje. U takvoj Evropi nema prostora za “mirnu, uzgajanu i njegovanu raznolikost”19 i takva Evropa nije sposobna za samorefleksiju. U takvoj Evropi mediji svakodnevno prenose izjave politi~ara u kojima odjekuju dobro poznati uzorci koji su obiljeìli najtamnije periode evropske historije. Zbog toga je te{ko osloboditi se neprijatnog osje}anja ponavljanja – uprkos {iroko rasprostranjenom uvjerenju da je ponavljanje problem Afrikanaca i balkanskih naroda, ali nikako i Evropljana.

19

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Garton Ash, Timothy: Europe’s True Stories. Prospect Magazine 131, februar 2007.


TREĆA EVROPA I METAFIZIKA EVROPSKE UNIJE Nerzuk ĆURAK

Je li Evropska unija neosporna ~injenica budu}nosti? U javnoj sferi dominira mi{ljenje da jeste. Za nas eurofile konstitucija Evropske unije kao nadnacionalne trajektorije predstavlja ireverzibilan proces. No, zadatak znanosti je da dominiraju}e diskurse i ve}inske predstave dovodi u pitanje, kako bi se potvrdio ili opovrgnuo smisao nekog povijesnog procesa. A EU nesumnjivo jeste trajna ~injenica historije. Ipak, Agnes Heller u svom znamenitom tekstu „Evropa Epilog?“ kaè: “Izvan domena tehnologije… vi{e nema socijalnog projekta usredsre|enog na budu}nost, niti je Evropa jo{ mjesto gdje se elaboriraju grandiozne ideje koje se ti~u bolje budu}nosti u politi~koj, socijalnoj ili nekoj drugoj sferi”.1 Ovu pesimisti~ku argumentaciju koja, i nehtiju}i, s nostalgijom priziva evropsku socijalnu imaginaciju, moramo dovesti u pitanje, jer se pred politi~kom filozofijom i politologijom kao zahtjev nu`nosti ispostavlja analiza (radikalnokriti~na i antiapologetska) evropskog politi~kog i ekonomskog institucionalizma kao mogu}eg paternalisti~kog izvora evropskog transgrani~nog socijalnog univerzalizma, iz kojega se moè iznjedriti i “nova evropska kultura… kao lai~ka kultura u okviru koje lokalne i nacionalne kulture mogu da prosperiraju”.2 Ta “autenti~na nova evropska kultura ne sadrì nu`no ‘obe}anje sre}e”,3 {to je dobra vijest. Bez utopisti~kog diskursa budu}nost Evrope jeste prisutna u na{em Sada, jer mi, gra|ani Evrope4 mi, koji dijelimo evropski san nismo u mogu}nosti da zamislimo epilog.5 To zna~i da je mogu}e da na{ “san postane stvarnost”6 jer kada u teorijskim postavkama (kao {to je postavka Hellerove) koje sumnjaju u mogu}nost razvoja evropske kulture ili, u politi~koj ravni, evropske federacije, pa ~ak i evropske republike, pronalazite tragove da je to ipak ostvarivo, sa novom politi~kom i kulturnom mitologijom (nadnacionalni evropski pravni okvir, Evropska unija kao politi~ki entitet i evropska kultura kao “isticanje gra|anske vrline, ukusa, edukacije ~ula, civilnosti i 1

2 3 4 5 6

Agnes Heller: “Europe an Epilogue?”, u Feher Ferenc, Agnes Heller: The Postmodern Political Condition, Columbia University Press, New York, 1988, str. 146-159. Ibid. Ibid. Etienne Balibar: Mi, gra|ani Evrope?, Beogradski krug, Beograd, 2003. Heller, ibid. Heller, ibid.

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civilnog dru{tva, urbaniteta, radosti, plemenitosti, formi ìvota proètih dostojanstvom i senzibilitetom za prirodu”7), onda vrijedi raditi i vjerovati u Morinovo evropsko zajedni{tvo sudbine. To zajedni{tvo nikako ne izvire iz na{e pro{losti koja mu protivurje~i. Jedva da izvire iz na{e sada{njosti, jer je na{a budu}nost ono {to je name}e. Prema tome, nikada do sada nije nastala svijest ili osje}anje zajedni~ke sudbine polaze}i od budu}nosti, od onog {to jo{ nije bilo. Tako se nalazimo suo~eni sa paradoksalnim gordijskim ~vorom evropskog identiteta. Diobe i sukobi su uzroci kulturne raznolikosti koja je postala konstitutivna za evropski identitet. Uop{te gledano, na{ evropski identitet i jedinstvo proizlaze iz podjele i sukoba. Mi smo, dakle, iz na{eg izvornog prokletstva izvukli blagoslov, ali smo isto tako sa~uvali samo prokletstvo, Dràvu-Naciju, ne vi{e u paranoidnoj formi koja raspaljuje ratove, nego u bezuslovnoj suverenoj formi koja odbacuje svaku vi{u instancu koja bi je podre|ivala-8 Pred idejom ujedinjene Evrope kao “vi{e instance” koja ho}e opravdati svoje pojavljivanje u svijetu, stoji geopoliti~ki problem najvi{eg reda: region Zapadnog Balkana, konstruiran kao politi~ka kategorija koja objavljuje svoju nemogu}nost da bude u Sada, s konekcijom na budu}nost, bez posredovanja lo{e pro{losti. Zar je zaista tako te{ko demistificirati uzro~nost?! Lo{u uzro~nost! Pristajanje da se u Sada su{tinski bude tek u zakrvavljenoj pro{losti, volens-nolens, zna~i da nismo u Sada. A to je ve} tipska manifestacija herojskog duha kao bijednog oblika palana~kog duha zemalja regije ~iju geopolitiku istraùjem kako bih je ponudio kao mirovnu formu a ne formu rata. To je izuzetno te{ko, jer geopolitiku je najlagodnije motriti kao “nauku o teritorijalnim sukobima i protivure~nim predstavama”.9 Evropa svojom povijesnom egzistencijom potvr|uje da je u njenoj historiji rat imao centralno mjesto10 – time je izazov za opojmljivanjem i teorijskim (re)konstituiranjem geopolitike mira jo{ ve}i i zna~ajniji. Zato }e u ovom istraìvanju Teorija kao respektabilni oblik spoznaje biti od najve}e va`nosti. Zapad jeste rodno mjesto nasilja, ali i rodno mjesto Teorije: jedino (je) ‘Evropa’ teorijski (to jest na nivou fundamentalnih kategorija koje oblikuju historijsko mi{ljenje) spoznatljiva; sve ostale istorije stvar su empirijskog istraìvanja koje nadogra|uje su{tinski ‘evropski’ teorijski skelet. Jednu verziju ove tvrdnje nalazimo u predavanju Edmunda Husserla, odrànom u Be~u 1935. godine, u kojem on tvrdi da se ‘orijentalni filozofi’ … su{tinski razlikuju od ‘gr~ko7

8 9 10

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Muìjevi} Pero: Evropa: prolog – epilog. U Republika, godina XV, br. 322-323, Beograd. Vidi na: http://www.republika.co.yu/arhiva/2003/#4, zadnji put provjereno 29.06.2009. Edgar Morin: Kako misliti Evropu, Svjetlost, Sarajevo, 1989, str. 132. Michel Foucher: Evropska republika, Stubovi kulture, Beograd, 2000, str. 15. “Porijeklo Evrope iskovano je u ognju rata”. Vidi u R.A. Brown: The Origins of Modern Europe, London 1972. str. 93. Za razumijevanje rata kao konstrukcijskog subjekta evropske povijesti inspirativna je i studija Michaela Howarda Rat u evropskoj istoriji, Studentski kulturni centar, Beograd, 1999.


evropske nauke’) ili kako je on dodao, ‘univerzalno govore}i: filozofije’) po{to ovi drugi mogu da proizvedu ‘apsolutne teorijske uvide’, koji su ‘theoria’ (univerzalna nauka), dok su prvi ‘prakti~no-univerzalni’, i otuda ‘misti~no-religiozni’ po karakteru.11 U registar apsolutnog teorijskog uvida po kojem se svijet teoriji sam predstavlja kao tematski12 moèmo uklju~iti i uvjerenje teoreti~ara znanosti da se Teorija, uz sva ograni~enja informati~ke, tehnokineti~ke i megavirtualne civilizacije koja Apstrakciju iz bibliotekarskog Logosa preseljava u tehne kao dovoljnu apstraktnu kona~nost ne moè prekriìti ako Sama ne kandidira svoje razvla{}ivanje neuvaàvanjem promijenjenih dru{tvenih okolnosti koje od znanosti traè da se stvarno o~ituje a ne da bjeì u ugodu akademskih zidina izbjegavaju}i razgovor sa drugim diskursima, ni{ta manje va`nim i zna~ajnijim od znanstvenog. Naàlost, znanstvenicima ~ije je teoretiziranje utemeljeno na “pretpostavci da je znanost, ona koja se danas provodi, etno-znanost”13, te{ko je prihvatiti detronizaciju Teorije kao paradigme svih paradigmi. No, upravo ta demisija spa{ava Teoriju od metafizi~kih pretpostavki i dekonstruira njenu evropsku, dakle kolonijalnu zasnovanost. Radosna je vijest da se takva dekonstrukcijska misao koja èli u povijest vratiti i nezapadnja~ku znanost razvija, uz zna~ajne otpore evropske etno-desnice, ba{ na Zapadu. S druge strane, nije dobra vijest da se u Jugoisto~noj Evropi kao tre}oj Evropi14 Teorija jo{ uvijek razvija na zasniva~koj paradigmi, a svijet se, kako smo prethodno konstatirali, u aktualnoj dionici povijesti znanosti tematski otkriva kao univerzaliziraju}a koegzistencija partikularija a ne kao entelehija univerzalnog razuma15 koja je, uz to, jo{ i lokalizirana, etnicizirana i dubinski historiografi~na, dakle kolektivisti~ki subjektivizirana. Takav duh antivremena prije~i razvoj stabilne regionalne zajednice, Jugoisto~ne Evrope kao europeizirane balkanske agende koja ne}e biti u opreci sa svojim suverenitetskim lokalnostima – nacionalnim i kvazinacionalnim dràvama. Zahvaljuju}i znanstvenom diskursu koji se uglavnom stavio u slu`bu nacionalnih politika i fakti~ki izjedna~io s politi~kim diskursom u svim zemljama Jugoisto~ne Evrope, regija kao zajednica gra|ana16 koju Prva Evropa prièljkuje kao liminalni konstituent svoje pankontinentalne geopolitike, jo{ uvijek je na ~ekanju. Razlog je {to cjelina (regija) i dijelovi (dràve) ne tvore mogu}e neoktroirano jedinstvo. Jugoisto~na Evropa i dràve Jugoisto~ne Evrope razdvojene su, huserlovski 11

12 13 14

15 16

Dipesh Chakrabarty: „Postkolonijalnost i majstorija istorije: ko govori u ime ‘indijskih’ pro{losti”. U Razlika/Difference, ~asopis za kritiku i umjetnost teorije, godina II, br. 3-4 Tuzla, 2003. str. 142. Ibid. Ziauddin Sardar: Thomas Kuhn i ratovi znanosti, Naklada Jesenski i Turk, Zagreb, 2001, str. 72. U hegemonijskoj gradaciji strukture evropskog poretka koja korespondira sa zahtjevima klasi~ne geopolitike ro|ene u pojasu Mittel-Europe, pod Prvom Evropom misli se kontinentalnoatlantska Evropa, shva}ena kao prostor katoli~ko-protestantske civilizacije; Drugom Evropom definira se prostor Isto~ne Evrope kao pomjerenog limesa Prve Evrope, dok se pod Tre}om Evropom misli Jugoisto~na Evropa kao geopoliti~ki potkontinent koji stalno zahtijeva neki oblik imperijalne uprave. Chakrabarty, ibid., str. 141. Dominique Schnapper: Zajednica gra|ana. O modernoj ideji nacije, Izdava~ka knjiàrnica Zorana Stojanovi}a, Sremski Karlovci, Novi Sad, 1996.

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kazano, “zjape}im ponorom smisla”.17 Bez teorijske artikulacije koja }e ponuditi most preko ponora, izgra|en od ~vrstog materijala znanstvene neutralnosti, postmoderna ideja regije18, a postmoderna nije ni{ta drugo do dekonstrukcijski razgovor s mrtvima, ne}e oìvjeti. U toj varijanti kraj balkanske povijesti se nazire: nacionalni feudalizam u demokratiziranim oblandama. Nastavak vladavine ljudi, a ne vladavine zakona.19 Ta opasnost je podcijenjena u na{im debatama. Ako je misao ulog za budu}nost, onda sam u ovom istraìvanju vo|en mi{lju da je do{lo vrijeme kada budu}nost treba veberovski raz-~arati, a to zna~i osloboditi je utopisti~kih okova i raditi na njoj i za nju kao da je na{a stvar, kao da je Sada. Mi{ljenje o Budu}nosti kao mi{ljenje za Budu}nost nema budu}nosti ako nije pobunjeni~ki i remetila~ki prisutno u ontologiji Prezenta. Pa poku{ajmo biti remetila~ki faktor. Na evropskoj sceni je zbunjuju}i igrokaz: novo stvaranje Staroga Svijeta kao civilizacijskog zbira geofilozofije i geopolitike, uz institucionalno normiranje tog zbira i njegovo ozakonjenje kroz deteritorijalizirani evropski pravno-politi~ki poredak. (Radi se o deteritorijaliziranom poretku jer EU nema svoj povla{teni teritorij ve} ga iznajmljuje od imanentnih dràva). No, moè li Brisel, kao simboli~ko i metafori~ko mjesto sabiranja tih evropskih razvojnih paradigmi, supsumirati i Atinu (geofilozofija) i Rim (geopolitika)? Geofilozofija i geopolitika ~vori{ne su vertikale evropskog irenolo{ko-polemolo{kog identiteta. Obje su relativizirane, ali ne i obesmi{ljene uranjanjem Evrope u nacionalnu konstituciju historije. Ta partikularna agenda, naravno, ne ide svome kraju jer nacija je uspostavljena kao transpovijesni standard;20 ipak, dobra vijest je da se u evropskoj sada{njosti nacionalno kona~no i u zna~ajnoj mjeri ne protivi univerzalnom. Tokom nacionalizirane evropske povijesti nije bilo tako, iako “univerzalno, kao mogu}nost, postoji u svakom mi{ljenju i u svakoj kulturi. Ali nijedno ga nije postavilo kao pokreta~a svoje posebne kulture. Upravo zato {to je to univerzalno protivurje~ilo svim egoizmima i egocentrizmima individue, nacije i kulture, ono se neprestano izvitoperavalo, izvrtalo smisao i izdavalo u toj evropskoj kulturi u kojoj je poniklo”.21

17 18

19

20 21

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Vidi u Emanuel Levinas: Druk~ije od bivstva ili s onu stranu bivstvovanja, Jasen, Nik{i}, 1999, str.54. Motrenje regije kao postmodernog geopoliti~kog iskaza korespondira sa Cooperovim stavom o postmodernom svijetu u koji je me|unarodna zajednica djelimi~no ve} u{la, za {to je o~igledan dokaz rast mo}i EU kao poretka koji je razvio “sustav me|usobnog uplitanja u tu|e unutarnje poslove, sve do pitanja o pivu i kobasicama”. No, problem sa Jugoisto~nom Evropom je izrazito teàk: kako elemente predmodernog svijeta, koji su se infiltrirali u moderni svijet i prije~e po{teniji regionalni ìvot, transferirati u politi~ki i kulturni poredak postmodernog svijeta, onoga svijeta koji ra~una na dràve ~ije elite stvarno ho}e da su “granice svakim danom sve manje va`ne”. Vidi u: Robert Cooper: Slom dràva. Poredak i kaos u 21. stolje}u, Profil, Zagreb, 2009, str. 41, 45. Izvrsne redove o ova “dva poimanja vladavine” sa zdu{nim zalaganjem za vladavinu zakona, ispisao je doajen evropske lijeve misli, italijanski politi~ki filozof i politolog Norberto Bobbio u eseju Vlast ljudi ili vlast zakona. Esej je dostupan i na na{im jezicima u dvije Bobbijeve knjige: Budu}nost demokratije, u izdanju Filipa Vi{nji}a iz Beograda, 1990. i u knjizi Liberalizam i demokracija, u izdanju Novog Libera iz Zagreba, 1992. Anthony Smith: Nacionalizam i modernizam, Fakultet politi~kih znanosti, Zagreb, 2003. Edgar Morin: Kako misliti Evropu, Svjetlost, Sarajevo, 1989, str. 102.


Ako je univerzalno poniklo u evropskoj kulturi, a sloì}emo se s Morinom da jeste, evropsko mi{ljenje je samom svojom historijom predestinirano za razumijevanje globalizacije, {to ne isklju~uje i kritiku globalizacije kao amerikanizirane razvojne paradigme svijeta, napose i Evrope. No, je li na{ mra~ni kontinent22 sposoban za prevladavanje tmurnog dvadesetog i izgradnju radosnog, postnacionalnog 21. stolje}a? Mogu li geofilozofija, geopolitika i globalizacija pomo}i izgradnju evropskog politi~kog i kulturnog identiteta? Mogu ako ih problematiziramo, sukladno epohi razdrobljenog, virtualnog vremena, vremena bez vremena,23 a to zna~i tako da odbacimo kona~nost, vjerujemo u neograni~eno, ignori{emo princip realnosti upravo u trenutku kada se on name}e.24 Ili, kako to kaè Richard Falk, “usmjeravanje na{eg pogleda iznad horizonata dosti`nog, jedini je ‘realisti~ki’ na~in bjekstva od geopoliti~kog bezna|a“.25 [ta je u predmetnom kontekstu geofilozofija? To je politi~ka filozofija prostora uronjena u vrijeme. Institucionalno politi~ko dominira prostorom i vremenom. Zadatak geofilozofije i politi~ke filozofije je da misle dominantno, da misle to politi~ko. Misliti politi~ko, ono politi~ko koje se opire imenovanju (jer je ve}, navodno, imenovano kao institucionalno) i izmi~e znanstvenim kategorijama, zahtjevan je intelektualni zadatak. Iako, kako to primje}uje Derrida, za filozofiju, znanost je “apsolutno nezaobilazna”26 jer zahtijeva disciplinu, geofilozofija mora misliti i “ono {to se ne moè disciplinovati”27 a to je, izme|u ostaloga, upravo prostor politi~kog, evropski prostor politi~kog, evropsko politi~ko, nabijeno pluralitetom, kao malo koja destinacija kolektivnog ìvota.28 Geofilozofija i politi~ka filozofija upu}eni su misliti pluralnost politike i pluralnost prostora, pluralnost deteritorijaliziranog politi~kog prostora, jer u raskorijenjenom svijetu bez “utemeljuju}e funkcije”29 mnoìna svakodnevnih pojava (ibid.) objavljuje se, bez ikakve najave, kao “osnovna ideja (koja) danas sve vi{e odre|uje na{e mi{ljenje i osje}anje”.30 Dominacija partikularnog, kao osnovnog sadràja pluralnog,31 zahtijeva od geofilozofa, geopolitologa i politi~kih filozofa mudrost nepristajanja na cjelovit odgovor, jer mora se sa~uvati “horizont nepojmljivog”32 koji sprje~ava pojavu totalitarnog uma.

22 23 24 25 26

27 28 29 30 31

32

Mark Mazover: Mra~ni kontinent. Evropsko dvadeseto stolje}e, Prometej, Zagreb, 2004. Vladimir Tasi}: Matematika i koreni postmodernog mi{ljenja. Svetovi. Novi Sad, 2002, str. 27. Morin, ibid., 103. Richard Falk: Veliki teroristi~ki rat, Beograd, Filip Vi{nji}, 2003, str. 283. Wolfgang Welsch: Na{a postmoderna moderna, Izdava~ka knjiàrnica Zorana Stojanovi}a, Sremski Karlovci, Novi Sad, 2000, str. 341. Ibid. Ibid., 342. Ibid. Ibid. „Ne}e biti dovoljno spoznati razli~itosti, ‘ra{~laniti’ ih, nu`no je upitati se kako je do{lo do odvajanja i koji ga je logos proizveo. Samo ako je ~ovjek sposoban za logos cijepanja, mo}i }e re}i da ga je pojmio, a poimaju}i mo}i }e biti u stanju svesti ga na sklad.“ Vidi u: Massimo Cacciari: Geofilozofija Evrope, Ceres, Zagreb, 1996, str. 8. Ibid., 341.

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Historija Evrope, ~ijem je ratni~kom (geopoliti~kom) duhu filozofija kao polemolo{ka geofilozofija posudila smisao, puna je nastojanja da se nepojmljivo opojmi u konkretnim svjetovima ljudske patnje, pa je eshaton iz nepojmljive onostranosti u{etao u ovostranost, opojmljuju}i je i obujmljuju}i totalizacijama koje su morale zavr{iti u zlo~inu, jer od umne ljubavi za cjelinu svijeta nisu vidjele svijet pojedina~nih ljudi. Inkvizicija, fa{izam, komunizam… Jahanje na razli~itim Talasima Totaliteta jedan je od prauzroka {to se i recentna politi~ka filozofija kontinentalne Evrope, odnosno geofilozofija kao politi~ka filozofija, uglavnom svela na poku{aj opravdavanja ere Evropskog Nadnacionalnog Institucionalizma, tog novog pseudoprostornog Totaliteta kao politi~kog iskaza duha vremena. Tako geofilozofija, u transferu od metafizike rata u utilitarnu metafiziku pro{irene Evropske unije, fakti~ki bez kriti~kog diskursa, nasuprot tradiciji agore i trga, postaje slu{kinja Velike Birokratske Norme koja svoj behemontsko-levijatanski pla{t spu{ta na sve dijelove tijela stare dame kao na jedan izma{tani politi~ki prostor33 od Brisela do Viljnusa, od Berlina do Kijeva, ba{ kao da je evropska nadnacionalna birokratska citadela nanovo objavljeni Svjetski Duh. âk i kada bi bilo tako, a nemogu}e da je tako u svijetu premo}ne vladavine Partikularija i Zasebnosti, svaka nova ideja u Evropi koja posjeduje zavodljivost kona~nog rje{enja (a tu zavodljivost posjeduje i EU jer zna~ajan broj va`nih Evropljana vjeruje da EU jeste najzad prona|eno rje{enje za kontinent nastao u ognju rata) morala bi biti podvrgnuta ra{~aravanju, i to od strane same pluralne Evropske unije, kako bi se sprije~ila neokonzervativna evropska desnica u nastojanju da ba{ ona izvr{i to ra{~aravanje. Naàlost, Evropska unija je protiv geofilozofije koja je dovodi u pitanje. Evropska unija je protiv kritike svoje Svrhe, pa se i kroz istraìva~ke znanstvene projekte naveliko gura samo preduzimljiva znanost, biznis znanost, granska znanost, institucionalno opravdana znanost, nesocijalna znanost, projektna znanost, fokusirana znanost, znanost koja ne misli, ~ime se filozofiji, napose geofilozofiji koja poku{ava domisliti pro{ireni zajedni~ki evropski prostor, {alje poruka da nije u stanju motriti pojedina~ni svijet, da ne zna stanovati u Partikulariji i da je ne zna zagrabiti za svoje istraìvanje. Ergo, da je suvi{na. To je neozbiljno. Odlaganje geofilozofije u pretinac metafizi~kih suvi{nosti, ostavlja evropski geopoliti~ki prostor obezduhovljen i on gubi svoju filozofsku prirodu, gubi identitet i postaje suvi{an u institucionalnoj projekciji Evropske unije. A marginalizacija prostorne komponente politi~kog naru{ava 33

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“Ako bi stvarno ‘zajedni{tvo’ jednog ‘politi~kog prostora’ (politi~kog prostora EU, opaska N.].) odlu~ilo nametnuti svoj identitet, tada bi nametnuta, ‘totalna’ sila njegove istine neotklonjivo postala nasilni~kom prema prisutnosti onoga {to se ne odslikava u takvom identitetu, odlaze}i time u ve} poznate oblike getoizacije, odnosno, ako bi dopustila da vlastita mnogovrsnost razlika zagospodari nad identitetom ‘zajedni~koga prostora’, nije~u}i njegovu strogo ‘politi~ku’ dimenziju, takvo bi zajedni{tvo fakti~no nestalo, a ostavilo bi prostor jednostavnom koordiniranju specifi~nih sloboda a na koje po sebi uvijek pretendiraju pojedina~ne razlike.” Vidi u Riccardo Panattoni: Bratska zajednica kao ljubav prema slobodi pojedinca. U Zborniku radova Sloboda u jedinstvu razlika, Me|unarodni forum Bosna, Sarajevo, 1998, str. 54.


ravnoteù prostor-vrijeme i vodi ka tiraniji (kapitalisti~kog) vremena,34 zaboravljaju}i da je “prostor bio empirijski opisan i prakti~no djelotvoran jo{ prije nego {to ga je teorija proizvela u pojam”.35 Kao takav, pojavan prije nego {to je opojmljen, prostor ne moè podnijeti redukciju na deteritorijalizirano vrijeme. On traì da bude shva}en ne samo u pravno-politi~kom, sociolo{kom, ekonomskom i antropolo{ko-kulturnom, ve} i u geofilozofijskom smislu. A taj smisao zahtijeva interpretaciju prostora kao mythosa,36 kao vlastitosti izvan logosa, jer logos zna da ozna~ava i “varljivi i zaboravni govor mno{tva”.37 Kroz mythos shva}en kako ga interpretira Cacciari, prostor potvr|uje svoju egzistenciju u epohi vremena i vra}a izgubljeni geopoliti~ki smisao u deteritorijaliziranom vremenu postmoderne. Eklatantan primjer takve mo}i, mada svjesno ignoriran od briselske birokracije, upravo je Evropska unija, koja se potvr|uje kao geopoliti~ki poredak ali i kao geopoliti~ki diskurs. Ovo je fundamentalna distinkcija koju su razvili Agnew i Corbridge. Po njima, geopoliti~ki poredak odnosi se na politi~ku ekonomiju prostorne prakse, odnosno hijerarhijsku organizaciju prostora, a geopoliti~ki diskurs odnosi se na geopoliti~ku zamisao hijerarhijske organizacije prostora, koja u svom sredi{tu ima interpretaciju toga prostora, ali koja se nu`no ne mora u cijelosti ostvariti, odnosno koja u svojoj biti ne mora biti ispravna.38 Iz prethodnog ra{~lanjivanja vidljivo je da geopoliti~ki poredak Evropske unije pripada globalizaciji, a da geopoliti~ki diskurs isijava razli~ita koncepcijska i morfologijska zna~enja, me|u kojima geofilozofijsko dominira, misle}i evropski prostor kao nadolaze}u domovinu, kao Evropu u nastajanju: U isku{enjima stvaranja jednog javnog prostora, djela dugog daha, treba preraditi osnove (zajedni~ke vrijednosti, prava ~ovjeka, nacija), tako|e bi trebalo raspraviti razlike i podjele, ne samo u interesu promocije zajedni~kih vizija, uniformiranih i vje{ta~kih, nego da bi se stvorio unitas multiplex koji moè utemeljiti novi evropski pluralisti~ki i samokriti~ki identitet, svjestan ambivalentnosti i otvoren pluralnosti svijeta. Stari identitet, ako povjerujemo Edgaru Morinu, bio je ‘demokratski i imperijalisti~ki i ponovo je stekao dvostruki

34

35

36

37 38

„Sveprisutnost, trenutnost i naseljavanje vremena zamjenjuje naseljavanje prostora. Trajno upravljanje kontinentima se povuklo pred op{tom neumereno{}u transfera i transmisija... Vi{e ne postoji borba za prostor. Sada se osvaja vrijeme.“ Paul Virilio: Kriti~ki prostor, Umetni~ko dru{tvo Gradac, â~ak, 1997, str. 86. Misao Henri Lefebvrea. Vidi u Pu{i} Ljubinko: Grad, dru{tvo, prostor, Zavod za ud`benike i nastavna sredstva, Beograd, 1997, str. 45. Pozivam se na Massima Cacciarija, koji u Geo–filozofiji Evrope nastoje}i nadi}i mnogo „praznih brbljarija o anti~kom poimanju vremena i prostora“, priziva Hekateja iz Mileta i njegov termin mythos, kojim ovaj gr~ki histori~ar, zemljopisac i logograf ozna~ava “vlastiti istinski govor... Mythos je za njega jo{ uvijek zvuk, vox same stvari, stvar kad se potvr|uje“. Vidi u: Massimo Cacciari: Geofilozofija Evrope, Ceres, Zagreb, 1996, str. 9. Ibid. Agnew John & Corbridge Stuart: Mastering space: Hegemony, territory and international political economy, Routledge, London and New York, 1995.

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identitet {armantne zavjese svoje kulturne spiritualnosti; on se zasniva na izvjesnosti da posjeduje razum i civilizaciju.39 Ta izvjesnost zavr{avala je kroz dugu (nacionalnu) evropsku povijest, kakve li ironije, ratni~kim upadom u Prostor Drugoga. Genocidom. Holokaustom. Vi{e ne to je na{a velika nada. Jer: Europa ne èli vlastiti svr{etak, {to }e re}i: ne èli samu sebe – ne èli vjerovati u ono na {to ukazuje njezino vlastito biti occasus. Boji ga se, poima ga kao jednostavnu, neposrednu sudbinu, vidi ga kao proizvod vanjskih snaga, umjesto da ushtjedne samu sebe kao onu {to zalazi. A ipak je to jedinstvena, autenti~na odluka, koju joj name}e epoha. Zalazak ne zna~i i{~upati se-iz-sebe nego okrenuti se vlastitom dnu i tamo slu{ati pokoriti se Posljednjem, po ~ijoj mjeri svi razli~iti, ukoliko su razli~iti savr{eno, priznaju nu`nost vlastitog raspitivanja kao domi{ljanja. I to bi bilo nemogu}e za Europu? Ono {to se nikad nije poimalo kao mogu}e? Pa dobro, to nemogu}e jedina je njezina budu}nost.40 I za tom nemogu}no{}u koja se odlaè treba tragati. Grabiti naprijed, bez obzira {to je “europska posebnost visoko postavljen, vrlo riskantan identitet: on se oblikovao kompozicijom suprotnosti, prevladavanjem suprotnosti u sintezi; pluralno{}u uklopljenom u {arenoliko jedinstvo; napetostima koje su rezultirale harmonijom, plodonosnim kontrastima”.41 No, moè li u sada{njosti zapo~eti taj relativno riskantni identitetski projekat za budu}nost? Moè li Evropa prevladati prethodne negativne anticipacije koje sam konstruirao, {pekulirao ili pokupio iz nabujale rijeke evropskog nihilizma? Kazano u okvirima geopoliti~ke kodifikacije moè li Evropa prevladati geopolitiku kao nasilni~ku tvorevinu imperijalnog uma i raditi na geopolitici mira kao prakti~noj politi~koj aplikaciji geofilozofije Evrope u organiziranom evropskom prostoru?42 Taj prostor ima svoju ideologiju. To je, kako ga naziva Lefebvre, prostor “kapitalisti~kog dru{tva”.43 Taj prostor ima svoje granice. One prate nefiksiraju}u geografiju Evropske unije, koja bez Tre}e Evrope ostaje nedovr{ena pri~a. Budu}i da je nedovr{enost povijesno stanje Evrope, nije li na{a jedina izvjesnost to da Zapadni Balkan ostane stvarno ime te nedovr{enosti, permanentna nestabilna situacija koja ima prirodnu sklonost ka degeneraciji.44 I zbog toga, kao i zbog povijesne barutane, pitam se: da li Balkan do daljnjega ostaje “vitalno geopoliti~ko pitanje”45, regija ~ija nerje{iva historija postaje èljena prepreka za evropsku dovr{enost. 39 40 41 42

43

44 45

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Michel Foucher: Evropska republika, Stubovi kulture, Beograd, 2000, str. 160. Massimo Cacciari: Geo-filozofija Evrope, Ceres, Zagreb, 1996, str. 156-157. Wolfgang Kraus: Budu}nost Evrope. Na putu ujedinjenja. PanLiber, Osijek - Zagreb – Split, 2000, str. 15. Christer Jonsson, Sven Tagil, Gunnar Tornqvist: Organizing European Space, Sage Publications, London Thousand Oaks - New Delhi, 2002. Vidi u Pu{i} Ljubinko: Grad, dru{tvo, prostor, Zavod za ud`benike i nastavna sredstva, Beograd, 1997, str. 48. Alain Minc: Novi srednji vijek, Alfa, Zagreb, 2008, str. 233. Philippe Moreau Defarges: Geopoliti~ki rje~nik, Centar za geopolitolo{ka istraìvanja, Zagreb, 2006, str. 25.


Wolfgang Schmale u Istoriji evropske ideje primje}uje: “Ne samo politi~ko nego i kulturno integrisanje Evrope nezavisno od prostiranja EU sadrì samo dijelom pitanja upu}ena historiji; drugim dijelom ono zavisi od htijenja, od odluka usmjerenih ka budu}nosti, koje se mogu utemeljiti politi~ki i eventualno moralno, ali ne i historijski.46 Bilo bi izvrsno da je tako. Naàlost, sva pitanja izviru iz historije, pa se i politi~ki i moralni univerzum (nove) evropske civilizacije gradi na uranjanju u historiju. To i nije ~udno budu}i da je, kako mudro primje}uje Karl Jaspers, “Evropa donijela svijetu ideju Historije”,47 pa se rje{enje nekog problema uvijek moè blokirati traènjem povijesnog smisla. Ima li ulazak zemalja Zapadnog Balkana u Evropsku uniju povijesni smisao? Za novu evropsku desnicu, koja je zapo~ela dugi mar{ prema Briselu, to nema nikakvog smisla. Za nas, gra|ane nekih zemalja Jugoisto~ne Evrope, biti dio Evropske unije pretvaranje je snova u stvarnost. Uvjet svih uvjeta da se to desi je izlazak evropskog kontinenta iz historije. Ali, opravdano je pitanje: {ta nas ~eka ako kona~no iza|emo iz historije? êka nas neki oblik postteritorijalne politi~ke zajednice,48 nejasna ”ogromna, heterogena teritorija koja posjeduje (samo) zajedni~ki politi~ki okvir”,49 ali i potencijal da se htijenjem ljudi koji su nadi{li okove suvereniteta transformira u zajedni~ki evropski prostor na ~ijem postimperijalnom politi~kom tijelu kao nova esencijalna norma50 rastu posthistorijske institucije univerzalnog evropskog vremena. Semanti~ka distinkcija51 izme|u starih imperijalnih geopoliti~kih poredaka i novog evropskog poretka, koji }e mo`da nastati a mo`da i ne}e, o~igledna je kao i razlika izme|u nacionalnog i kosmopoliti~kog52 suvereniteta. Trijumfom ovog drugog, bez primjesa imperijalne hijerarhije, Evropska unija postaje i ostaje nesporna ~injenica kontinentalne budu}nosti.

46 47 48

49 50

51 52

Wolfgang Schmale: Istorija evropske ideje, Clio, Beograd, 2003, str. 314. Edgar Morin: Kako misliti Evropu, Svjetlost, Sarajevo, 1989, str. 88. David Chandler: Critiquing Liberal Cosmopolitanism? The Limits of the Biopolitical Approach. U International Political Sociology, Volume 3, Issue 1, March, 2009, p. 54, 55, 56. Eric Hobsbawm: Globalizacija, demokratija i terorizam, Arhipelag, Beograd, 2008, str. 111-112. Kessler Oliver: Toward a Sociology of the International? International Relations between Anarchy and World Society. U International Political Sociology, Volume 3, Issue 1, March, 2009, p. 104. Ibid., 105. Chandler, ibid., 58, 59, 60, 67, 68.

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TOBOŽNJA TRANZICIJA BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE: PRIVID BH. DEMOKRATIJE I LAŽNE PRETPOSTAVKE EVROPSKE UNIJE Kurt Bassuener

Godina 1989. vjerovatno je pogre{an referentni okvir za diskusiju o Bosni i Hercegovini, kao, i o svim drugim zemljama nastalim raspadom biv{e SFRJ, osim Slovenije. U svakoj federativnoj jedinici (namjerno koristim taj izraz) ju`no od Slovenije, liberalna demokratija, ona koju je u to vrijeme Evropska unija o~ekivala i onakva kakvu je podrazumijevala, uslijedila je tek kasnije, nakon stjecanja samostalnosti, a poslije èstokih (ratnih?) sukoba. Po mom mi{ljenju, ni u jednoj od tih biv{ih republika tranzicija jo{ nije zavr{ena. Neko moè ~ak ustvrditi da se u Bosni i Hercegovini demokratska tranzicija nikad nije ni dogodila. Mnogi teoreti~ari – David Chandler posebno1 tvrde da je uloga me|unarodne zajednice omela normalnu demokratsku funkciju. Inicijativa za evropsku stabilnost (ESI) u ~lanku objavljenom 2003. godine u Journal of Democracy pod naslovom “Travails of the European Raj2” istaknula je ovo: da se me|unarodna zajednica, posebno Ured visokog predstavnika, jednostavno skloni, Bosna bi mogla prona}i vlastitu demokratsku politi~ku ravnoteù i na vlastiti na~in krenuti ka ~lanstvu u EU i NATO-u. Ne slaèm se ni sa jednim ovim argumentom. Me|unarodna zajednica je akter u bosanskohercegova~koj politici od 1995. godine, a posebno od 1998. godine, kada su se po~ele primjenjivati bonske ovlasti Visokog predstavnika. Ipak, pripisati nefunkcionalnost BiH OHR-u ili me|unarodnim faktorima op}enito predstavlja duboko nerazumijevanje bh. politike. Takav je i osje}aj da bi bh. politika prona{la ravnoteù koja bi omogu}ila postizanje konsenzusa po pitanju struktura, funkcionalnosti i reformi potrebnih da bi se pristupilo klubovima poput EU i NATO. Ove su strane prona{le konsenzus, iako bremenit zbog rata, ali on sigurno nije u javnom interesu. Radi se o istinskoj podjeli zemlje, njenih javnih funkcija i resursa na feude pod kontrolom politi~kih stranaka.

1

2

Vidjeti http://www.davidchandler.org/books/books_bosnia.html u vezi sa sinopsisom njegove knjige iz 1999: Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton. Vidjeti ~lanak u PDF formatu na http://www.britishcouncil.org/brussels-democraticpapers-travails-ofthe-european-raj.pdf

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Posljednje tri godine, protekle pod prethodna dva visoka predstavnika – Christianom Schwarz-Schillingom i Miroslavom Laj~ákom – u biti su period u kojem su bh. politi~ari mogli djelovati slobodno, bez upliva me|unarodne zajednice, i izna}i vlastita politi~ka rje{enja. Iako su bonske ovlasti kori{tene, prijetnja nekome razrje{enjem du`nosti zbog antidejtonskog pona{anja, po percepciji mnogih, odumire. Politi~ka atmosfera je ispunjena ne s manje nego s vi{e gnjeva, a uz to se smanjio kredibilitet me|unarodne zajednice u o~ima bosanskih politi~ara. To je bilo vrijeme igre za bosanske politi~are. Svakako, nije ba{ normalno da u demokratskom politi~kom sistemu koji je funkcionalan eksterne snage djeluju kao najefikasnije (i sve donedavno jedino stvarno) sredstvo odvra}anja od nezakonitih akata ili kao administrativna la`no-legalna brana. I upravo je to ono {to èlim re}i: prema sada{njem ustrojstvu, dejtonska BiH nije funkcionalna liberalna demokracija, ~ak ni ona u povoju. Ona, u stvari, funkcionira – i tvrdim, koncipirana je da funkcionira – kao de facto oligarhija, sa nacionalisti~kim strankama koje predstavljaju “svoje” konstitutivne narode (Srbe, Hrvate i Bo{njake). Pro{la je ona, naravno, kroz raznorazne faze, od potpisivanja Dejtonskog sporazuma 1995. godine i prvih poslijeratnih izbora, koje su mnogi promatra~i nazvali “etni~kim referendumom”, do faze koja bi se mogla imenovati kao “konkurentna oligarhija”. U svakom konstitutivnom narodu postoje stranke koje se takmi~e da preuzmu ulogu koju bih nazvao “klasi~nim nacionalisti~kim strankama”, od po~etka do sredine 1990-ih: Srpska demokratska stranka (SDS), Stranka demokratske akcije (SDA) i Hrvatska demokratska zajednica BiH (HDZBiH). Ipak, temeljno ime igre se nije promijenilo. Sukladno dejtonskom sistemu, politi~ari nisu primorani da traè {iroko glasa~ko tijelo, nego samo ono unutar vlastitoga konstitutivnog naroda. Ne postoji politi~ki centar – u stvari, postoje tri zasebna politi~ka spektra. A budu}i da se svaka stranka takmi~i da sebe predstavi kao najvjerodostojnijeg “za{titnika”, strah i dalje predstavlja sasvim djelotvorno politi~ko sredstvo homogenizacije i mobilizacije. Svaki od ta tri etni~ka politi~ka spektra ima u sebi ugra|enu gravitacijsku silu koja vu~e udesno. Ta prinuda da se nasmrt prepla{e ili razljute bira~i u svakom izbornom ciklusu (izbori se od Dejtona odràvaju u dvogodi{njem intervalu, jednom op}inski, drugi put op}i) konstantno se i opetovano pokazuje. Iako stranke imaju svoje platforme i manifeste koji obuhvataju dru{tvena i socijalna pitanja, ona se rijetko kad na|u u prvom planu u izbornoj komunikaciji ili politi~kom diskursu tokom predizbornih kampanja. Tako|er, postoji jedna posebna prednost za bh. politi~are, koja proizlazi iz ovog strukturno usmjerenog fokusa na strah: gotovo potpun nedostatak bilo kakve odgovornosti prema javnosti. To uti~e na izuzetnu stabilnost politi~kih elita u Bosni i Hercegovini. Od 1995. godine javila su se nova

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lica – premijer Republike Srpske Milorad Dodik i predsjednik SDA Sulejman Tihi} predstavljaju najevidentniji dokaz tog ‘ubiranja kajmaka’. Ali, oni su izuzetak koji potvr|uje pravilo. Jedini na~ini na koji je mogu}e napustiti najvi{e e{alone politi~ke mo}i i utjecaja u BiH od Dejtona su smrt, hap{enje, bijeg od krivi~nog gonjenja te rascjep u mati~noj stranci i formiranje nove, neuspje{ne stranke. Iako se one stranke koje nisu nacionalne poku{avaju takmi~iti, prije svega Socijaldemokratska stranka (SDP) i od 2008. godine Na{a stranka, one su u{le u nelojalnu konkurenciju zbog dinamike sadràne u ustavnom i izbornom sistemu. SDP je stranka koja djeluje na cijelom prostoru zemlje i zastupljena je i u vrhovima vlasti, iako je u opoziciji na svim nivoima vlasti osim op}inskog, na kojem je dobro predstavljena. Uspon Milorada Dodika otkako je postao premijer RS-a po drugi put, 2006. godine, dokazuje jo{ jednu àlosnu ~injenicu. Dejtonski sporazum, sa Ustavom iz Aneksa 4, koji je sastavni dio Sporazuma, zami{ljen je tako da sa~uva sna`nu ulogu svih potpisnika i njihovih stranaka. To nimalo ne iznena|uje. Ali Dodikova promjena kursa prema sna`nom nacionalizmu tokom predizborne kampanje 2006. godine dokazuje kako Dejtonski ustav generira nove nacionaliste tako {to strah i etni~ke podjele ~ini politi~ki profitabilnim. U Dodikovom slu~aju, nakon propasti “aprilskog paketa” predloènih ustavnih reformi 2006. godine, koje bi funkciju dràvnog premijera u~inile privla~nijom da je paket usvojen (navodno je o~ijukao s idejom da preuzme tu ulogu), on je napravio logi~an zaklju~ak. Funkcija premijera RSa je najsna`nija funkcija u dràvi s obzirom da ima sna`nu vertikalu mo}i unutar RS-a, pa stoga RS moè na dràvnom nivou stopirati bilo {ta. I to je uistinu tako. Otkako je preuzeo uzde, Dodik je najmo}niji ~ovjek u BiH – i toga je sasvim svjestan. Da sumiram: za razliku od novih ~lanica EU iz Srednje i Isto~ne Evrope, pa ~ak i svojih prvih susjeda Hrvatske i Srbije (pri ~emu je Srbija problemati~nija), BiH nikad nije pro{la kroz demokratsku tranziciju. Ali ona i nije autoritarna zemlja. Ona je ponajprije konkurentna oligarhija, s politi~ko-poslovno-kriminalnim vezama, koja se oslanja na klijentelizam, patronat i strah uprkos ma{ineriji jedne izborne demokracije. Nedavni spektakl od Kongresa SDA odrànog 26. maja 2009. ilustracija je jo{ jednog aspekta bosanskohercegova~ke politi~ke kulture. Razlog zbog kojeg je kongres bio toliko vaàn leì u ~injenici da ishod unutarstrana~kih izbora za predsjednika stranke nije bio poznat prije izbora. Ve}ina strana~kih kongresa u BiH zavr{ava se krunisanjem. Nijedna stranka pribli`nog zna~aja, ~ak ni SDP, nije pokazala takvu dozu neizvjesnosti do samog progla{enja rezultata.

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Pogrešna dijagnoza vodi opasnim receptima Uloga me|unarodne zajednice u BiH trenutno je u limbu, s okon~anjem misije provedbe dejtonskog mira, a kona~ni arbitar sporazuma, institucija Visokog predstavnika, ovisi o pet ciljeva i dva uvjeta koje je postavilo Vije}e za provedbu mira u februaru 2008. godine. Nije vjerovatno da }e se desiti su{tinski napredak u ostvarenju preostala dva cilja – a to su imovina dràve i vojna imovina – na sjednici Vije}a za provedbu mira krajem juna. A cjelokupna politi~ka klima, u kojoj je Skup{tina RS-a dovela u pitanje legitimnost Ureda visokog predstavnika i prijenosa ustavnih nadle`nosti s entiteta na dràvni nivo, najvjerovatnije ne}e uvjeriti sve ~lanove Upravnog odbora Vije}a za provedbu mira da je situacija dovoljno stabilna da bi opravdala zatvaranje OHR-a – {to je fleksibilna su{tina drugoga cilja. Ve} dugo se u raspravama ~uju uporni glasovi koji zahtijevaju “tranziciju” iz OHR-a u “oja~anu” misiju specijalnog predstavnika EU, kao i nastupaju}e {vedsko predsjedavanje Evropskom unijom. Ali u vrijeme pisanja ovog teksta jo{ nije jasno pitanje sastava misije, njenog mandata i ovlasti. Za sada, ~ini se da bi se zajedni~ki pristup EUSR-a i Delegacije Evropske komisije fokusirao na takozvani “evropski put” pripreme BiH za evropske integracije, bez uklju~ivanja u dublje ustavne razloge za nefunkcioniranje dràve. îni se da EU – pod tim podrazumijevam njene institucije i ve}inu njenih ~lanica – ~vrsto zastupa pristup koji se, iako donekle druga~iji od pristupnog modela primijenjenog na druge zemlje koje su u novije vrijeme podnijele zahtjev za ~lanstvo u EU i na ~lanice, jo{ oslanja na niz pretpostavki neprimjenjivih na BiH. Prvo, EU o~ekuje pregovore s reprezentativnim demokratskim politi~arima. Brisel tako|er pretpostavlja da ti politi~ari iza sebe imaju politi~ki i dru{tveni konsenzus za tako ozbiljan i teàk posao potreban da bi se ispunili kriteriji EU. Na kraju, EU pretpostavlja da su njeni sugovornici na dràvnom nivou pravi zastupnici mo}i i da posao mogu obaviti. Ni{ta od ovoga se ne moè primijeniti na BiH. Takozvani “prudski proces”, kojega se o~ajna me|unarodna zajednica dograbila kao dokaza o napretku, pokazuje da su pravi posjednici mo}i strana~ki lideri a ne politi~ari na funkciji (u Dodikovom slu~aju to je i jedno i drugo). “Prudski proces” je o~igledno bio namijenjen za me|unarodnu konzumaciju i svoju svrhu je ispunio. Dosad je malo toga donio, iako se nadanje me|unarodne zajednice ~ini neiscrpnim. Prudska formulacija – tri strana~ka lidera ‘svi na jednom mjestu’ koji sebi daju za pravo da govore svaki u ime “svoga” naroda – pokazuje koliko su pretpostavke EU pogre{ne. Povrh svega, postoji gotovo teolo{ki otpor ne samo uvi|anju nego i priznavanju te proturje~nosti. Na isti na~in, iskustvo novih zemalja ~lanica EU posmatra se kao privla~an putokaz za BiH u njenim nastojanjima da u|e u EU. Vjerujem

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da se u ovome pretjeralo, izme|u ostalog i u zemljama Srednje Evrope, a me|u njima i prethodni visoki predstavnik Miroslav Laj~ák. Da se razumijemo, postoje neke sli~nosti i iskustva koji mogu biti pou~ni. Ali razlike su tako|er va`ne. Nakon {to su postale ~lanice EU, Rumuniji i Bugarskoj prigovaralo se da nisu prethodno provele sve reforme koje su od njih traène. Ali razlika u odnosu na BiH sasvim je o~ita. Posmatrano ~ak i iz ugla najve}e zavisti, evidentno je da su politi~ke elite Rumunije i Bugarske bile u stanju posti}i konsenzus kako bi barem odglumile ispunjenje kriterija EU. U BiH se politi~ari ne osje}aju primoranim da urade ~ak ni to prije nego {to dostave zvani~ni zahtjev za status kandidata. Postoji o~igledna nada me|u brojnim zemljama ~lanicama EU da }e put Srbije u EU a Srbija je i sama rezultat op}erasprostranjene èlje da se proglasi napredak u nadi da }e se nakon toga desiti ne{to sli~no natjerati politi~are u BiH da ubrzaju vlastite napore. Ovo se iskustvo, po svemu sude}i, naslanja na srednjoevropsko iskustvo Slova~ke, koja je doista iz dubine osjetila pritisak da se pridruì srednjoevropskoj dominantnoj politi~koj struji – za manje od pet godina otrgnula se i o njoj se vi{e nije govorilo na isti na~in kao o njenim susjedima Republici ê{koj, Ma|arskoj i Poljskoj, Milo{evi}evoj Jugoslaviji i Luka{enkovoj Bjelorusiji. No, ova je analogija pogre{na. Bez obzira koliko je vlada Vladimira Me~iara postala korumpirana i nacionalisti~ka, gra|ani su pred sobom imali samo jedan cilj na koji su fokusirali sav svoj gnjev zbog zastoja. U zemlji je postojala administrativna struktura koja je djelovala. I uprkos kratkom periodu od 1989. godine, civilno dru{tvo je pustilo duboke korijene, koji su omogu}ili strate{kom aktivizmu da kona~no iznudi politi~ke korekcije. Razlozi zbog kojih BiH zaostaje strukturni su i politi~ki ne jednostavno samo politi~ki. Osim toga, {to je i opasno, druga~iji su poticaji za politi~ke aktere u slu~aju srbijanskih “ubrzanih” integracija, kao {to to neki zagovaraju, me|u njima i nastupaju}e {vedsko predsjedni{tvo EU. RS i Srbija su u svojim specijalnim odnosima zaklju~ile brojne sporazume, koji su teoretski, prema Dejtonu dozvoljeni, s tim da ih nikad nisu primjenjivali sve do pospanog Schwarz-Schillinga i njegovog perioda me|unarodne dokolice. Ukoliko se, recimo, Srbiji dozvoli liberalizacija viznog reìma prije nego BiH, sve ve}i broj bosanskih Srba }e donijeti logi~nu odluku da iskoriste mogu}nost i podnesu zahtjev za srbijanski paso{, ~ime }e se dràva jo{ vi{e oslabiti. Ideja da }e srbijanski napredak pota}i napredak u BiH je zabluda – stvarnost bi vjerovatno bila sasvim suprotna. EU treba samu sebe kriviti za percepciju me|u bh. politi~arima da je ona lako ostvariv cilj. Iako nije primarno odgovorna za dejtonski ustavni ustroj, EU je bh. politi~arima odaslala jasne signale da su uvjeti koje ona postavlja rastegljivi. Parafiranje Sporazuma o stabilnosti i pridruìvanju (SSP) sa EU odmah nakon neslavnog poraza visokog predstavnika Laj~áka od strane premijera RS-a Dodika, uprkos tome {to nije provedena reforma policije, a {to je bio jedan od kriterija Evropske komisije, tu je poruku samo osnaìlo. Stoga turobna situacija u pogledu ispunjenja kriterija EU

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od potpisivanja Sporazuma o stabilizaciji i pridruìvanju 2008. godine ne bi trebalo da bude iznena|enje. Bh. politi~ari temperirani su da vjeruju kako }e im EU otvoriti svoja vrata u svakom slu~aju. [to je jo{ gore, utjecaj koji se vr{io na BiH da ispo{tuje ono {to je vremenom postalo neka vrsta standardnog teksta Evropske unije na temu pro{irenja zavr{io se pritiskom institucija EU i mnogih njenih ~lanica da se u BiH sru{e preostali dijelovi ‘za{titne ograde‘, prvobitno postavljene radi bezbjednosti potrebne za provo|enje mira, a prije svih ‘sigurnosna ograda’ – Visoki predstavnik – koji je kona~ni dejtonski arbitar i preventivna vojna sila, koja se od 2004. godine nalazi pod zastavom EU kao EUFOR. Logika je sljede}a: s obzirom da je EU potpisala s BiH Sporazum o stabilizaciji i pridruìvanju, njoj, po definiciji, nisu ni potrebne ove institucije. Ova dogmati~na nefleksibilnost pokazuje ne samo nedostatak imaginacije i nerazumijevanje aktuelne dinamike nego je i sasvim opasna – ne samo za BiH nego i za samu EU. Jer, bez odràvanja ‘sigurnosne ograde‘, koja je sprije~ila izbijanje novog nasilja i rata u posljednjih 13 godina, me|unarodna zajednica }e sama sebe li{iti pravno utemeljene mogu}nosti sukladno Poglavlju 7 da intervenira u slu~aju krize bez direktnog poziva UN-u ili rezolucije Vije}a sigurnosti UN. Nije te{ko zamisliti komplikacije u slu~aju potrebe za pozivom upu}enim od podijeljene, nefunkcionalne vlade, ili za rezolucijom Vije}a sigurnosti u kojem Rusija ima pravo veta. Neki tvrde da nema rizika i da sukob trenutno ne ide u prilog nijednom politi~kom interesu. Ali u igri su brojne varijable, mnoge (poput privatnih za{titarski firmi) koje oni odgovorni za njihovo prou~avanje – EUFOR, na primjer jo{ nisu analizirali. A ni 1992. godina nije prava mjera za odre|ivanje nivoa potencijalne opasnosti. Korelacija snaga je umnogome razli~ita. Ali s obzirom na ubrzan porast broja lakog naoruànja, na umnogostru~ene politi~ke tenzije koje su pove}ale strah, kao i na mnogo razli~itih neostvarenih planova, postoje mnogostruki rizici, ali oni ipak ne predstavljaju rat u pravom smislu rije~i koji bi mogao BiH bespovratno gurnuti u bezdan. Prevenciju bi trebalo uvijek bazirati na raspoloìvim a ne zami{ljenim kapacitetima niti na mogu}oj namjeri. S obzirom na ograni~ene tro{kove odràvanja pravnog i dostatnih vojnih kapaciteta, da li bi jednostrano razoruànje bilo vrijedno rizika? Ako ne bude OHR, onda mora biti postdejtonska BiH Problem u BiH je strukturne prirode, pa se stoga me|unarodna zajednica s njim mora suo~iti direktno, kao {to sam nedavno napisao u kratkom izvje{taju za ameri~ki Institut za mir. 3 3

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“Unfinished Business in Bosnia and Herzegovina: What is to be Done?” Kurt Bassuener i James Lyon, USI Peace Briefing, maj 2009. U PDF formatu na http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_ briefings/2009/0519_bosnia_herzegovina.html


Kako i koliko god je BiH funkcionirala od Dejtona do danas, sve se to pripisuje ulozi Visokog predstavnika i njegovim ovla{tenjima. înjenica da nije nikako funkcionirala prve dvije godine nakon Dejtona izazvala je potrebu za bonskim ovlastima. U protekle tri godine bilo je mogu}e primijetiti {ta se doga|a kada Visoki predstavnik i njegovi predstavnici nemaju zaokruènu strategiju ni volju da koriste instrumente koji sve to uspje{no podupiru. Logi~na ta~ka tranzicije iz mandata Visokog predstavnika koji se odnosi na provedbu mira na pristup koji podrazumijeva pristupanje EU javit }e se kada BiH bude strukturno sposobna da odgovori na poticaje koje joj daje EU kako bi provela reforme potrebne za pristupanje Uniji. A da bi postigla funkcionalnost potrebnu za efikasan rad u interesu svojih gra|ana (i odgovornost prema njima), a mnogo manje za ispunjenje standarda EU, Bosna i Hercegovina treba ozbiljnu strukturnu reformu, a izme|u ostalog i reformu Ustava i amandmana na izborni zakon. Da bi se to postiglo, EU i SAD moraju skupa raditi na ostvarenju tog cilja. EU ima potencijalnu polugu utjecaja i mo}i, na osnovu ~ega moè traìti i omogu}iti provo|enje tako duboke reforme jo{ treba samo da poja~a politi~ku volju da ih i primijeni. I upravo ovdje stupa na scenu uloga Amerike. Jer, iako prevaga ide u prilog EU, njoj nedostaje potrebna urgentnost, jedinstvo i volja da ih primijene, ovaj logi~an cilj – a to je cilj, moram dodati, koji bi i{ao u prilog njenim vlastitim interesima. SAD su po svemu sude}i, sude}i po govoru potpredsjednika Joea Bidena pro{log mjeseca u Parlamentu BiH, shvatile ru`nu stvarnost u BiH bolje nego Brisel. Stoga, ako se cjelovita strategija ikad pojavi, SAD moraju djelovati kao katalizator da bi se ona i provela, i mora raditi sa pojedinim zemljama ~lanicama EU kako bi se okupila kriti~na masa. Za sada, ~lanice koje na bh. situaciju gledaju sa sli~nom zabrinuto{}u su u stvari malobrojne: Velika Britanija, Nizozemska, i mo`da Njema~ka. Grupa koja èli zatvoriti OHR {to je prije mogu}e mnogo je ve}a, a nju predvodi [vedska, zemlja koja }e u narednom periodu predsjedavati EU, a tu su jo{ i Francuska, Italija, [panija i ve}ina zemalja ~lanica Unije iz Srednje Evrope. Mnoge zemlje ~lanice se ~ak i ne pretvaraju da imaju politiku za BiH, i one }e pratiti slijed doga|aja. Zato se ovdje radi o pitanju inicijative. Ne poduzme li se nikakva inicijativa za izradu odre|ene politike me|u zemljama ~lanicama EU, ta politika }e biti ono {to izroni iz briselskog mlina kao najnièg zajedni~kog imenitelja – i kao takva }e propasti. Izgradnja te kriti~ne mase bit }e izuzetno naporna i, po mom mi{ljenju, zahtijeva imenovanje specijalnog predstavnika predsjedavaju}eg EU, koji }e uraditi sve {to je potrebno u prijestonicama EU i drugim ~lanicama Vije}a za provedbu mira, uz briselsku ma{ineriju, a i u regiji Zapadnog Balkana. Cilj ovog nastojanja bio bi izgradnja radnog konsenzusa u vezi s nekoliko najva`nijih elemenata. Ponajprije treba kao su{tinsku prihvatiti ~injenicu da je situacija postala opasna i da }e zahtijevati izvr{ni autoritet koji }e sprije~iti sukob. Definiranje strate{kog cilja kao su{tin-

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skih funkcionalnih reformi u Bosni, uklju~uju}i promjene politi~kih poticaja u ustavnom i izbornom sistemu, predstavlja krajnju ta~ku ovoga niza. Instrumenti i mandat “oja~anog EUSR-a”, kao i uloge SAD-a i drugih saveznika, treba konfigurirati oko onoga {to je potrebno da bi se postigao strate{ki cilj. Bidenova posjeta pove}ala je pozornost Washingtona, ali kako }e se to trajno manifestirati u smislu politike ni izbliza nije jasno. “Odgovornost za državu” treba početi sa ustavom koji će imati opći legitimitet Ve} vi{e od jednog desetlje}a pojam “odgovornost za dràvu” koriste pripadnici me|unarodne zajednice koji èle vidjeti Bosance i Hercegovce kako preuzimaju odgovornost za upravljanje vlastitom zemljom i rje{avaju probleme u vezi s tim. Prema Ustavu iz Aneksa 4 Dejtonskog sporazuma, koji politi~arima nudi veli~anstven nedostatak odgovornosti, to je tek ne{to vi{e od izbjegavanja odgovornosti. Ali ne smije biti sumnje u to da bh. gra|ani – Srbi, Hrvati, Bo{njaci i oni koji se ne èle uklopiti u te kutije i zovu se “ostali” – moraju biti vlasnici svakog ustavnog poretka nakon Dejtona. Iznalaènje modela koji }e prihvatiti sve proklamirane grupe ne}e biti nimalo lak zadatak. Ali to je sine qua non za opstanak Bosne i Hercegovine, a mnogo manje za njenu sposobnost da u|e u EU. EU i SAD ne mogu stvoriti taj konsenzus. Ali zato mogu – i moraju – stvoriti kontekst u kojem je mogu}e do}i do takvog konsenzusa, bez ikakvog straha od novog sukoba i u kojem je mogu}e djelovati kao katalizator da bi se do njega do{lo. To }e zahtijevati odre|eni nivo koordinacije i saradnje koju EU i SAD nisu nikad ranije pokazali. Ali to je itekako mogu}e. S obzirom na ulog, vremena za gubljenje nema.

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1989-2009: OD ISKLJUČENJA KA INTEGRACIJI (slučaj Srbija) Vladimir PAVIĆEVIĆ

Ru{enje Berlinskog zida 1989. godine je u dràvama Centralne i Isto~ne Evrope ozna~ilo po~etak transformacije njihovog ekonomskog, pravnog i politi~kog sistema u moderne zajednice koje se temelje na trì{no orijentisanoj privredi, vladavini prava i politi~kom pluralizmu. Usmerenost ka novim vrednostima bila je jasno determinisana i inspirisana idejom o ~lanstvu u Evropskoj zajednici (EZ), {to je trebalo da obezbedi kona~no ujedinjenje dva dela evropskog kontinenta koja su tokom pola veka bila razdvojena neprobojnim zidom. Od svih komunisti~kih dràva u Evropi, evropska perspektiva je 1989. godine bila najblià tada{njoj Jugoslaviji (SFRJ), koju je ~inilo {est federalnih jedinica (Srbija, Hrvatska, Bosna i Hercegovina, Makedonija, Slovenija i Crna Gora) i dve autonomne pokrajine (Kosovo i Vojvodina). Autonomne pokrajine administrativno su bile deo Srbije, ali su svoje predstavnike i pravo odlu~ivanja imale i u federalnim organima. Za razliku od drugih dràva Centralne i Isto~ne Evrope, koje su propa{}u komunizma ~lanstvo u EZ definisale kao svoj veoma udaljeni ali prioritetan cilj, u biv{oj Jugoslaviji su narasli etni~ki sukobi doveli do rata i raspada zemlje, a evropska budu}nost nekada zajedni~ke dràve potisnuta je kao manje va`no pitanje, koje je tek nakon ratova postalo politi~ki prioritet njenih naslednica. Od svih dràva koje su nastale na tlu biv{e Jugoslavije jedino je Slovenija postala punopravna ~lanica Evropske unije 2004. godine, dok se preostale zemlje nalaze u predvorju Evrope. Hrvatska ima status kandidata za ~lanstvo u EU; otpo~ela je pregovore o punopravnom ~lanstvu i o~ekuje se da }e ih tokom 2010. godine da zaokruì. Makedonija je, uprkos problemima, dobila status kandidata za ~lanstvo u EU 2005. i priprema se za po~etak pregovora za ~lanstvo. Crna Gora je u decembru 2008. godine predala zahtev za ~lanstvo i o~ekuje da }e tokom 2010. godine osigurati status kandidata. Albanija i Bosna i Hercegovina imaju potpisan Sporazum o stabilizaciji i pridruìvanju, i ~ekaju priliku da podnesu zahtev za ~lanstvo kako bi nakon toga stekle status kandidata. Nakon promena 2000. godine, otpo~etih uklanjanjem Slobodana Milo{evi}a s vlasti, status evropske integracije Srbije i dalje je neizvestan. Srbija je potpisala Sporazum o stabilizaciji i pridruìvanju, ali se odredbe 95


Ugovora jo{ ne primenjuju zbog nedovoljne saradnje Srbije sa Ha{kim tribunalom. Tako se Srbija, u procesu evropskih integracija, na{la na poslednjoj poziciji me|u dràvama Zapadnog Balkana, zauzev{i mesto iza Hrvatske, Makedonije, Crne Gore, Albanije i Bosne i Hercegovine. Proces evropske integracije Srbije dodatno je usporen nakon {to je 17. februara 2008. godine Skup{tina Kosova donela odluku o progla{enju nezavisnosti. Time je pitanje na~ina na koji Srbija treba da reaguje na progla{enje kosovske nezavisnosti potisnulo raspravu o evropskoj perspektivi Srbije i dovelo u pitanje integraciju Srbije u Evropsku uniju. Lo{a pozicija u formalnom procesu pridruìvanja i pristupanja Srbije Evropskoj uniji suo~ava nas sa dve klju~ne politi~ke prepreke koje usporavaju ozbiljno uklju~enje Srbiju u evropske procese integracije: (1) neuspeh definisanja dràvnih granica Srbije, i (2) nepotpuna saradnja Srbije sa Me|unarodnim krivi~nim sudom za biv{u Jugoslaviju. U srì prve prepreke nalazi se potreba postoje}ih elita u Srbiji da produè krizu izazvanu raspadom Jugoslavije i da pitanje dràvnih granica drè otvorenim. Ovakav stav elita manifestuje se u politici prema Bosni i Hercegovini, i jo{ jasnije u pristupu prema re{avanju pitanja Kosova. Nepotpuna saradnja s Me|unarodnim krivi~nim sudom za biv{u Jugoslaviju odnosi se pre svega na lociranje i hap{enje Ratka Mladi}a, potom i na odsustvo volje za suo~avanje sa zlo~inima iz pro{losti. Predstava izolovane zemlje, isklju~ene iz ve}ine me|unarodnih foruma, odnosila se na Srbiju devedesetih godina 20. veka. U novo stole}e Srbija je u{la sa idejom da od glavnog remetioca na Zapadnom Balkanu postane jedan od pouzdanih partnera. Tek {to je nova politika dobila priliku, Srbiju je zadesio najve}i {ok u prvoj deceniji 21. veka: po~etkom marta 2003. godine ubijen je prvi demokratski izabrani premijer Srbije Zoran \in|i}. Zorana \in|i}a ubio je pripadnik Ministarstva unutra{njih poslova Srbije i ~lan zlo~ina~kog udruènja koje je formirano tokom Milo{evi}eve vladavine i koje je i nakon demokratskih promena zadràlo zna~ajna upori{ta u dràvnim organima. Uskoro se pokazalo da je taj doga|aj zako~io i Srbiju u poku{aju da od remetila~kog faktora postane dràva integrisana u evropske tokove. Vra}anje Srbije na viziju ubijenog premijera \in|i}a podrazumeva promenu politike u nekoliko oblasti. Jedna od najzna~ajnijih je promena politike prema susedima. Srbija je devedesetih godina 20. veka prema susedima uglavnom vodila neracionalnu politiku, koja je ostavila posledice na odnose sa nekim od susednih dràva, u vidu sporova koji se re{avaju ili }e se re{avati na bilateralnom ili me|unarodnom nivou. Sporazumom o stabilizaciji i pridruìvanju istaknuta je ugovorna obaveza Srbije da neguje dobrosusedske odnose u regionu, a Evropska komisija i Evropski parlament su u svojim izve{tajima isti-

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cali da je regionalna saradnja jedan od klju~nih pokazatelja proevropskog karaktera Srbije. Zato sva otvorena pitanja Srbije u odnosima sa susedima treba da budu re{ena, a saradnja s njima trebalo bi da bude intenzivna u oblastima politike i ekonomije. Nakon {to su Hrvatska, Crna Gora i Makedonija priznale nezavisnost Kosova stvorena je izuzetno lo{a atmosfera u diplomatskim odnosima Srbije i njena tri suseda. Nerazumno o{trom i emotivnom reakcijom, iz Beograda je proterana ambasadorka Crne Gore, kao i ambasador Makedonije, {to je drasti~no unazadilo diplomatske odnose sa dve dràve i izazvalo zabrinutost evropskih institucija. Normalizacija odnosa sa Makedonijom i Crnom Gorom predstavlja nu`nost na putu ostvarenja pune evropske integracije Srbije. Zato je izuzetno va`no da Vlada Srbije, kroz organizovanje zvani~nih poseta Skoplju i Podgorici i povla~enje odluke o progla{enju ambasadora nepoèljnima, pruì ruku saradnje susedima, koji su na evropskom putu stigli dalje od Srbije. Hrvatska bi mogla biti glavni partner Srbije na putu ka Evropskoj uniji, uprkos zao{travanju retorike prema njoj nakon priznanja nezavisnosti Kosova. Zagreb treba da bude glavni partner Beograda po pitanju u~lanjenja u EU i NATO, ali i po pitanju povratka raseljenih u Hrvatsku i re{avanja ostalih nere{enih pitanja iz perioda ratnih sukoba iz devedesetih godina. Tu`be koje su Me|unarodnom sudu pravde uputile obe dràve treba, u slu~aju nemogu}nosti vansudskog re{enja spora, prepustiti Sudu, ~iju presudu Srbija mora da po{tuje. Istovremeno, pograni~ni spor Srbije i Hrvatske oko granice na Dunavu treba, {to je pre mogu}e, re{avati kroz bilateralne razgovore sa hrvatskom vladom, kako bi se spre~ilo da ovo pitanje postane nepremostiva prepreka u trenutku pristupanja Srbije Evropskoj uniji. U slu~aju Bosne i Hercegovine Srbija bi, kao garant Dejtonskog sporazuma, trebalo da podràva sve napore me|unarodne zajednice da se BiH ustavnom reformom redefini{e i u~ini efikasnijom. Bez ustavne reforme u BiH, ne}e biti njene unutra{nje stabilnosti, a ni stabilnosti u regionu, koja je neophodna za brzu evropsku integraciju svih dràva Zapadnog Balkana. Druga va`na ta~ka nove politike Srbije odnosi se na zaokruènje saradnje sa Ha{kim sudom. Sporazum o stabilizaciji i pridruìvanju i Prelazni trgovinski sporazum sa Evropskom unijom ratifikovani su u parlamentu Srbije 9. septembra 2008. Usled protivljenja holandske vlade, ratifikacija ovih sporazuma jo{ uvek nije po~ela u EU, zbog izostanka pune saradnje Srbije sa Ha{kim tribunalom. Srbija bi trebalo da obezbedi hap{enje Ratka Mladi}a i Gorana Hadì}a, ili pruì supstantivan dokaz da to ne moè da uradi i time pokaè da ostvaruje punu saradnju sa Ha{kim tribunalom. Time bi Srbija pokazala sposobnost da ispunjava svoje me|unarodne obaveze, pre svega one utvr|ene presudom Me|unarodnog suda pravde u sporu Bosne i Hercegovine protiv Srbije, ali i usmerenost

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ka istinskom opredeljenju za osnovne vrednosti ujedinjene Evrope – po{tovanje ljudskog dostojanstva, slobode, demokratije i vladavine prava. Tre}u ta~ku predstavlja neophodnost ustavne reforme u Srbiji. Na svom putu ka Evropskoj uniji Srbija }e morati da promeni pojedine odredbe svog Ustava, kao {to su to ~inile i druge dràve u okruènju, poput Slovenije, koja je svoj Ustav menjala ~ak dva puta pre ulaska u Uniju. U Ustavu Srbije koji je usvojen 2006. godine postoje dve klju~ne prepreke na putu ka ~lanstvu Srbije u Evropskoj uniji: a) odredbe o Kosovu, i b) odredbe o nadle`nostima Srbije i (ne)postojanju primata me|unarodnog prava nad nacionalnim. Preambulom Ustava Srbije, kao i tekstovima zakletve koje polaù najvi{i dràvni nosioci vlasti, Kosovo je definisano kao autonomna pokrajina u sastavu Srbije. Krutim insistiranjem na uno{enju ove odredbe u najvi{i pravni akt smanjena je mogu}nost manevarskog prostora u pregovorima sa predstavnicima kosovskih Albanaca o svim teku}im pitanjima na Kosovu. Budu}i da je status Kosova definisan me|unarodnim aktima, razumno pona{anje politi~ke elite na vlasti u Srbiji jeste zalaganje za promenu ovih odredbi Ustava Srbije, kako bi se spre~ila svaka eventualna budu}a manipulacija evropskom integracijom Srbije koja bi bila povezana sa tzv. kosovskim pitanjem. Ustav Srbije, s druge strane, nije definisao primat me|unarodnog prava nad nacionalnim. Tako je potpuno lai~ki predvi|eno da svaki me|unarodni ugovor mora biti uskla|en sa Ustavom. Iako Srbija i Kosovo imaju odvojeni put integracije u Evropsku uniju, a Sporazum o stabilizaciji i pridruìvanju se ne odnosi na Kosovo, ova odredba Ustava mogla bi biti iskori{}ena kao formalna prepreka ~lanstvu Srbije u EU i zato kao takva mora biti prioritetno promenjena. Istovremeno, Odeljak IV Ustava ne predvi|a prenos suverenih nadle`nosti na nadnacionalnu organizaciju, tj. na Evropsku uniju, {to tako|e moè biti veoma ozbiljna formalna prepreka ulasku Srbije u ovu organizaciju. Kona~no, posebnu ta~ku ubrzanja integracije Srbije u Evropu ~ini odnos prema kosovskom pitanju. Predlog politike koji bi relevantne aktere u Srbiji i na Kosovu usmerio ka re{avanju ovih problema pretpostavlja nekoliko koraka. Najpre bi Srbija, usmeriv{i se na racionalno i objektivno sagledavanje me|unarodnih prilika, trebalo da uputi jasan signal Evropskoj uniji da je mogu}e posti}i dogovor kojim }e Srbija, pod pretpostavkom da se postigne saglasnost o narednim koracima, prihvatiti fakti~ko stanje na Kosovu. Budu}i da Srbija ne moè da spre~i ~lanice Evropske unije da priznaju nezavisnost Kosova, onda je racionalno da otvori, a ne da zatvori svoju evropsku perspektivu. Sa Evropskom unijom i predstavnicima Albanaca sa Kosovu Srbija bi trebalo da inicira dogovor koji }e da reguli{e status Srba na Kosovu,

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ostvarenje njihovih ljudskih i gra|anskih prava, njihovo dràvljanstvo, slobodni pristup kulturnim spomenicima i slobodno kretanje ljudi izme|u Kosova i Srbije. Srbija bi istovremeno od Evropske unije trebalo da traì jasnu garanciju za dobijanje statusa kandidata za ~lanstvo u Uniji i datum otpo~injanja pregovora o ~lanstvu. U okviru regionalne saradnje Srbija bi, nakon dobijanja statusa kandidata, trebalo da uspostavi diplomatske odnose s Kosovom, {to }e biti uslov za u~lanjenje u Evropsku uniju. Predloèna politika u vezi s pitanjem re{avanja statusa Kosova i ubrzanja evropske integracije Srbije bi, nakon dvadeset godina sukoba i ratova, omogu}ila da se defini{u novi odnosi izme|u zemalja u regionu. Ona bi Srbiji dugoro~no donela najve}e koristi, a za zemlje Zapadnog Balkana stvorila pretpostavke za uspostavljanje stabilnosti i ja~anja me|usobnog poverenja.

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ZAKLJUČCI S KONFERENCIJE

1. Godina 1989. ozna~ila je po~etak inkluzivnih procesa za biv{e socijalisti~ke zemlje Isto~ne, Srednje i Jugoisto~ne Europe, ali se moè zaklju~iti da nije rije~ o jednozna~nim procesima. Inkluzija podrazumijeva, kako to dvadesetogodi{nja tranzicija pokazuje, i mikrostrategije ekskluzije (Vlaisavljevi} i Mujki}), od kojih su najo~itije antiimigracijska politika i pristup Zapadnom Balkanu. Ova kompleksnost inkluzivnoekskluzivnih procesa moè se smatrati odrazom potrage Europe za vlastitim politi~ko-kulturnim identitetom, pa se padom Berlinskog zida podiù istovremeno novi zidovi, od kojih je najupe~atljiviji {engenski, odnosno s poni{tenjem Podjele u{lo se u proces novih podjela ~ijem se multipliciranju ne nazire kraj (Mujagi}). Stoga ova svojevrsna dijalektika inkluzije i ekskluzije, kontinuiteta koji po~iva na diskontinuitetu (Klotz) svoje razrje{enje ~eka u naraciji koju }e Europljani morati dati o svom identitetu. 2. Priklju~ak redu „uspje{nih demokratija“ podrazumijevao je, u procesu iniciranom 1989. godine, starim pojmovima shva}en proces konsolidacije nacionalnih dràva i njihovih slobodnih trì{ta na temelju koncepcije prava naroda na samoodre|enje. Taj prostor je istovremeno pobudio stare nacionalne mitove, animozitete i konflikte ~ija je akomodacije ovisila ponajvi{e o djelovanju politi~kih elita – razli~iti pravci djelovanja tih elita najvidljiviji su na primjeru ^SSR i SFRJ – osobito volje srpske politi~ke elite u slu~aju biv{e Jugoslavije, pa se izvor krize i devijacija procesa demokratizacije na Zapadnom Balkanu moè razumijevati iz konteksta neuspjeha definicije dràvnih granica Srbije (Pavi}evi}). U tom kontekstu treba tuma~iti zauzimanje druga~ijeg kursa „tranzicijskih procesa“ u Jugoisto~noj Europi. Stoga je izuzetno va`no analizirati djelovanja i vrijednosne orijentacije politi~kih elita (Zako{ek). 3. Prihva}aju}i tvrdnju Etiennea Balibara da se sudbina europskog identiteta rje{ava na Balkanu, previranja u artikulaciji europskog identiteta tijesno su vezana za odsustvo uvezuju}e naracije dru{tvene nade, koja je bila motivacijska snaga Revolucije iz 1989. godine. Naracije nade (Deme{), ili naracije dru{tvene pravde koju vezujemo za Rawlsovo u~enje (Sekuli}), nema bez emancipatorskog diskursa, a taj je u krizi od samog pada Berlinskog zida. Nada je tijesno vezana za slobodu, a slobode se danas, u jednom neoliberalisti~kom kontekstu koji poprima obrise ideolo{kog sistema, javljaju u formi konzumerskih sloboda i slo-

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bode kretanja kapitala. Posebno danas osje}a se potreba za ‘remetila~kom mi{lju’ (]urak) koja bi se mogla suprotstaviti dominantnim, dobrim dijelom orijentalisti~kim diskursima Europske unije prema ovom dijelu svijeta (Petrovi}), nasuprot discipliniraju}em mi{ljenju kakvo se name}e, na primjer, kroz bolonjsku reformu visokog obrazovanja. Ako, kako zaklju~uje Bogdan Denitch, „genuina demokratija zahtijeva barem minimalnu privrènost socijalnoj pravdi“, mora se na}i mjesta za taj diskurs na cijelom podru~ju biv{eg komunisti~kog bloka, a osobito na podru~ju Zapadnog Balkana. Asim MUJKI]

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O autorima

Ugo Vlaisavljevi} redovni je profesor na Filozofskom fakultetu u Sarajevu, predaje ontologiju na Odsjeku za filozofiju i epistemologiju na Odsjeku za psihologiju. Glavni urednik ~asopisa Dijalog (Sarajevo) i ~lan redakcije me|unarodnog ~asopisa Transeuropéennes (Paris). Predsjednik PEN centra BiH. Autor deset knjiga i brojnih ~lanaka. Poznat je i kao prevodilac novije filozofske literature (pored velikog broja kra}ih tekstova preveo je s njema~kog, engleskog i francuskog knjige B. Waldenfelsa, J. Habermasa, J.-L. Nancyja i J. Derride).

Asim Mujki} ro|en je 1968. godine u Br~kom. Doktorirao filozofiju na Filozofskom fakultetu u Sarajevu 2002. godine. Radi kao vanredni profesor na Fakultetu politi~kih nauka Univerziteta u Sarajevu na predmetima etika i politi~ka etika. Autor je knjiga Neopragmatizam Richarda Rortyja (2000), Kratka povijest pragmatizma (2005) te Mi, gra|ani Etnopolisa (2005). Zamjenik je glavnog i odgovornog urednika Odjeka, bosanskohercegova~ke revije za kulturu i dru{tvena pitanja.

Wolfgang Klotz (1954), teolog, direktor Isto~no/zapadnoevropskog kulturnog centra PALAIS JALTA (1990-1999), osniva~ i direktor Online biblioteke Srednje i Isto~ne Evrope C.E.E.O.L (2000-2008); od 2009. regionalni direktor Heinrich Böll fondacije za Jugoisto~nu Evropu (ured u Beogradu).

Pavol Deme{ je od januara 2000. godine direktor za Srednju i Isto~nu Evropu Njema~kog Marshall fonda Sjedinjenih Ameri~kih Dràva, sa sjedi{tem u Bratislavi, u Slova~koj. Prethodno je bio izvr{ni direktor SAIA Servis centra za tre}i sektor. Tako|er je bio savjetnik predsjednika Republike Slova~ke za vanjske poslove (1993-97), a u periodu 1991-92. obavljao funkciju slova~kog ministra za me|unarodne odnose. Me|unarodno priznati lider NVO, Deme{ je bio ~lan upravnih odbora doma}ih i me|unarodnih udruènja i fondacija. Prije “bar{unaste revolucije” u novembru 1989. godine radio je kao biomedicinski istraìtelj na Comenius univerzitetu u Bratislavi. Zavr{io je Univerzitet Charles u Pragu 1980.

Boìdar Gajo Sekuli} (1938) profesor je emeritus Univerziteta u Sarajevu. Doktorirao iz oblasti filozofskih nauka na Sveu~ili{tu u Zagrebu 1963. godine. Znanstvena i filozofska polja interesa: geneza i zna~enje Marxove teorije, kriti~ka teorija dru{tva, teorija nenasilne revolucije, teorija mira, teorija pravednosti, teorija revolucije, teorija demokratije, teorija postvarenja i priznanja itd. Objavio nekoliko knjiga iz oblasti filozofije i kriti~ke socijalne i politi~ke teorije. Objavio oko 40 radova na stranim jezicima. Bio gostuju}i profesor na Univerzitetu u Bremenu. Prevodi s njema~kog jezika (Arendt, Altermat, Habermas itd). îtav radni vijek proveo na Fakultetu politi~kih nauka u Sarajevu. Predavao historiju socijalne i politi~ke misli, historiju savremenog marksizma, uvod u filozofiju, politi~ku filozofiju, etiku i savremenu filozofiju.

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Nenad Zako{ek doktor je politi~kih znanosti, redovni profesor na Fakultetu politi~kih znanosti Sveu~ili{ta u Zagrebu, gdje predaje uvod u komparativnu politiku, komparativne politi~ke sustave, klasi~ne teorije dru{tvenog razvoja, suvremene teorije dru{tvenog razvoja. Autor je knjiga Politi~ki sustav Hrvatske (Zagreb, 2002), i Bira~i i demokracija: utjecaj ideolo{kih rascjepa na politi~ki ìvot (koautori Mirjana Kasapovi} i Ivan [iber, Zagreb, 1998). Njegov znanstveni interes uklju~uje istraìvanja u podru~ju izbora, stranaka, politi~kih sustava. Komparativna analiza procesa transformacije u Srednjoj i Jugoisto~noj Europi, potom teorija modernizacija i teorije politi~kog razvoja, osnova su njegova bogatog istraìva~kog iskustva.

Bodo Weber doktorira sociologiju na Univerzitetu u Hannoveru. U doktoratu se bavi postsocijalisti~kom etnonacionalizmom i etni~kim nasiljem, {to podrazumijeva analize nacionalisti~ke ideologije, sistema vladavine, dinamike nasilja i ratne ekonomije u prvoj polovini 1990-ih godina. Bio urednik ~asopisa Perspektiven (Perspektive) iz Frankfurta na Majni; objavio razne ~lanke i studije o balkanskim dru{tvima i dràvama nakon 1990-ih. Izme|u ostalog objavio: „O poku{ajima reformiranja dràve bez dru{tva – nekoliko razmi{ljanja“ (bosanski-engleski), u: Foreign Policy Review No. 2 (2007), Sarajevo, pre{tampan u: Republika, No. (2008), Beograd; Kriza univerziteta i perspektive mladih nau~nika u BiH (bosanski/engleski/njema~ki), Sarajevo 2007; “Ein Täter vor Gericht. Der Prozess gegen den bosnisch-serbischen Politiker Mom~ilo Kraji{nik” [Po~inilac pred sudom. Proces protiv bosanskosrpskog politi~ara Mom~ila Kraji{nika], u: Der Überblick No.1-2 (2007), Hamburg; “Bosnie-Herzegovine: Les condition d’un accord d’association avec l’UE”, u: L’etat du monde 207: annuaire economique et geopolitique mondial, Paris: La Decouverte 2006.

Tanja Petrovi} diplomirala je i magistrirala na Filolo{kom fakultetu Univerziteta u Beogradu, a doktorirala je na Institutum Studiorum Humanitatis u Ljubljani. Trenutno radi kao istraìva~ u Nau~noistraìva~kom centru Slovenske akademije nauka i umjetnosti u Ljubljani i u Balkanolo{kom institutu u Beogradu. Pored toga, predaje na dodiplomskom i postdiplomskom programu Univerziteta u Novoj Gorici. Njeni istraìva~ki interesi odnose se na podru~je dodira i presijecanja jezi~kih, dru{tvenih i kulturnih pojava na Balkanu i u Srednjoj Evropi. Prije svega zanimaju je na~ini konstruisanja razli~itih dru{tvenih ideologija i sje}anja.

Nerzuk ]urak doktor je politi~kih znanosti, vanredni profesor na Fakultetu politi~kih nauka Univerziteta u Sarajevu, esejist, publicist, gra|anski aktivist... Autor je knjiga Geopolitika kao sudbina: Slu~aj Bosna. Postmodernisti~ki ogled o perifernoj zemlji (Sarajevo, 2002), Dejtonski nacionalizam (Sarajevo, 2004), Obnova bosanskih utopija. Politologija, politi~ka filozofija i sociologija dejtonske dràve i dru{tva (Sarajevo-Zagreb, 2006). Njegov znanstveni interes uklju~uje istraìvanja u podru~ju geopolitike, geofilozofije, mirovnih studija, me|unarodnih odnosa, me|unarodne sigurnosti, politi~ke filozofije, politi~ke religije i ideologije politi~kih stranaka.

Kurt Bassuener samostalni je politi~ki analiti~ar s boravkom u Sarajevu, Bosna i Hercegovina. Trenutno s ambasadorom Jeremyjem Kinsmanom pi{e knjigu Podr{ka razvoju demokratije: Priru~nik za diplomate (Diplomats’ Handbook for Democracy Development Support), u okviru projekta Zajednica demokratija. Radio je kao strate{ki analiti~ar u Uredu visokog predstavnika u Sarajevu od maja 2005. do decembra. 2006. godine. Prethodno je radio kao politi~ki i izborni analiti~ar pri misiji OSCE-a i ODIHR-a za pra}enje izbora u Ukrajini 20042005; sufinansirao je i supredsjedavao Institutom za politiku demokratizacije sa Ericom Witte (2000-2002); bio je pomo}nik direktora za vladine poslove pri Me|unarodnom komitetu spasa (2001); radio je na programu ameri~kog Instituta za mirovnu balkansku inicijativu (2000-2001); bio je pridruèni direktor Vije}a za balkansku akciju (1998-2000) i politi~ki analiti~ar pri Institutu za Balkan (1997-1998). Magistrirao je evropske studije na Srednjoevropskom univerzitetu u Pragu (1994); u svojoj tezi je zastupao postojanje stalne mirovne divizije UN-a sastavljene od dobrovoljaca pod zapovjedni{tvom Vije}a sigurnosti. Dodiplomski studij je zavr{io na Ameri~kom univerzitetu, Odsjek za me|unarodnu slu`bu.

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Vladimir Pavi}evi} ro|en je 1978. godine u Kotoru. Bio je student me|unarodnih studija na Fakultetu politi~kih nauka Univerziteta u Beogradu. Magistrirao je na Univerzitetu u Bonu (Njema~ka) odbranom rada „Veliki kompromis: iskustva iz procesa konstituisanja Evrope i SAD“. Usavr{avao se u Njema~koj, Austriji i SAD. Trenutno je doktorski kandidat na Fakultetu politi~kih nauka Univerziteta u Beogradu, gdje je zaposlen kao asistent magistar. U Beogradskoj otvorenoj {koli je od 2004. godine angaòvan kao programski direktor Odjeljenja za napredne dodiplomske studije. Predsjednik je Savjeta za evropske poslove Liberalnodemokratske partije.

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1989–2009: YEARS OF UPHEAVAL: BEGINNING OF INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION?

Proceedings from the conference:

1989–2009 YEARS OF UPHEAVAL: BEGINNING OF INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION?

Sarajevo, 2009.

CONTENTS

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Preface Mirela Grünther-Ðečević Nermina Mujagić

Challenges for Political Theory 115

Ugo Vlaisavljević

123

Asim Mujkić

133

Wolfgang Klotz

Invisible Walls of Europe Der Untergang: 1989-2009 – 20 Years of Liberalisation or Cannibalisation? Continuity versus Reference – Rhethorics versus Habitus

Transition Experiences in the European Countries 141

Pavol Demeš Transition Experiences: The Dissolution of the Czechoslovak Federation and Slovakia’s Road to the European Union

145

Gajo Sekulić

159

Nenad Zakošek

167

Bodo Weber

1989: What Really Came Down With the Fall of the Berlin Wall? The Dynamics of Changes: How different are the Transformation Results in Post-Yugoslav Countries Western Balkan Troubles with Transition: Between Conformism and Collecivism

European Integration: Between Transition and Identity 177

Tanja Petrović

185

Nerzuk Ćurak

195

Kurt Basseuner

203

Vladimir Pavićević

The Western Balkans is in the South: Discourses on the Western Balkan Countries’ EU Accession A Third Europe and the European Union Metaphysics Bosnia's Phony Transition: The Mirage of Bosnian Democracy and False Assumptions of the EU 1989-2009: From Exclusion to Integration (case of Serbia)

209

Conclusions

211

About the authors

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PREFACE

The year 2009 is the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall and also the 20th anniversary of the peaceful revolution. These events caused far-reaching changes across the whole world. They marked the end of the Cold War and divisions across Europe. Many people still have vivid memories of the harrowing days in the autumn of 1989. The fall of the Berlin Wall was the new beginning for Germany, and also for the whole of Europe. Also, twenty years ago, the countries of Central, East and Southeast Europe embarked on transition which implied rejection of the old and acceptance of the new system of government, economy and society. But what exactly happened during those years in the former Yugoslav countries and especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina? And what is still going on in Bosnia and Herzegovina? Instead of radical changes, instead of a new beginning and new chances, Bosnia and Herzegovina saw a horrible war on its soil, a violent break-up of the country, divisions, genocide – in the very heart of Europe. Here, on the soil of Bosnia and Herzegovina, nationalist and ethnic policies were destroying bridges, mosques, churches, synagogues, city halls, libraries, factories, hospitals... all those institutions which once symbolized a cross-cultural life in Bosnia and Herzegovina. ‘Unrestrained freedom’, left in the hands of the nationalist forces, turned BiH into the largest concentration camp in Europe. Today, twenty years later, we can only ask: was the general ‘space of freedom’ conquered with the fall of the Berlin Wall? If it was, what kind of freedom do we enjoy here? The freedom to segregate children along ethnic lines, the freedom of ignorance, freedom in conformism, freedom in opportunism? Unrestrained freedom which resembles anarchy ever more? “Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to experience divisions instead of integration; the walls which came down in other countries of Europe twenty years ago continue to be erected within Bosnia and Herzegovina, even at present day“, was said, among other things, at the two-day international conference on “1989-2009: Years of Upheaval: Beginning of Inclusion or Exclusion“, which took place in Sarajevo on 19-20 June, 2009. It was organized by the Heinrich Böll Stiftung Office for BiH and the Association for Political Science in BiH. @eljko Kom{i}, member of the Presidency of BIH, who opened the conference, reminded the participants that there are many walls across BiH which separate us from the

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European Union and ourselves. “The journey we embarked on leads us to the European Union; how long it is going to last does not depend solely on us. The question is how much we are indeed prepared for the European Union and the EU for us“, Kom{i} asked. Twenty years ago, it was necessary to knock down the walls in order for the countries outside the European Community to integrate into the present-day European Union. Also today, it is equally necessary to remove the walls within and around Bosnia and Herzegovina in order for this country to move forward towards the EU accession as quickly as possible. Bosnia and Herzegovina’s EU accession process, the process which other countries of the region have successfully completed or they are moving along the road to success, looks – paradoxically – like the process at a distance. These conference proceedings of academic papers by Ugo Vlaisavljevi} (Sarajevo), Asim Mujki} (Sarajevo), Wolfgang Klotz (Belgrade), Kurt Bassuener (Sarajevo), Pavol Deme{ (Bratislava), Gajo Sekuli} (Sarajevo), Nenad Zako{ek (Zagreb), Tanja Petrovi} (Ljubljana), Nerzuk ]urak (Sarajevo) and Vladimir Pavi}evi} (Belgrade), are published in an attempt to analyze the process of transition and to launch a broader discussion on the processes of transition from authoritarian towards democratic systems in Europe. The authors provide the convincing comparative analysis of transition experiences with a special reference to Bosnia and Herzegovina and stress the need to develop a vision of the future of the whole region of Southeast Europe. We are glad to present the findings and attempts of the conference to you.

Mirela Grünther–\e~evi}, Director, Heinrich Böll Foundation Office for Bosnia and Herzegovina Nermina Mujagi}, President of the Steering Committee Association of Political Science in BiH

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CHALLENGES FOR POLITICAL THEORY

Challenges for Political Theory

Invisible Walls of Europe Ugo Vlaisavljević

The fall of the Berlin Wall was the landmark event because it had divided not only a city but the entire continent. With the Wall torn down, Europe stopped being one name for two worlds, Western and Eastern Europe, and it could eventually become a single, united Europe. When we officially mark the twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, we celebrate a united Europe. Still, this did not mark Europe’s unification. Europe is not united even today. In fact, it was an announcement of the possibility for Eastern European countries to join the processes of European integration which were already considerably advanced in Western Europe. The fact that today most of East European countries are European Union members speaks of great successes made toward creating a truly united Europe. However, we cannot yet speak of united Europe, not only because barriers continue to divide some, like the Western Balkan countries, from the EU, but primarily because the EU itself is not united. Rather, it is still on the path to unification. Neither the fall of the Berlin Wall nor any subsequent political event produced that famous “We, the Europeans“, the political people whose will the French Republic or the American Declaration of Independence expressed.1 United Europe does not exist today as a state2 but as a cluster of states which joined the integration process at some earlier or later stage, so that they find themselves in different orbits, moving at different speeds of integration. Ole Weaver described the EU with its complex and dynamic structure of integration as a certain cosmic nebula floating around its assumed centre.3 This figurative description, in which the European unification is understood not as one process but as a whole medley of integration processes, seen as lines of centripetal gravitational forces, can help us deal with the issue of present-day European borders. As Balibar pointed out, there are myriad borders – internal ones in particular – which are firmly set in the recent times of successful integration and which are often no more penetrable than the Berlin Wall was. Did the last great wall of 1 2

3

See Jacques Derrida, “Déclarations d’indépendance“ in: Otobiographies, Galilée, Paris, 1984, p. 13-32. Etienne Balibar, “Es gibt keinen Staat in Europa” in : Nous, citoyens d’Europe? Les frontières, l’Etat, le peuple, Ed : La Découverte, Paris, 2001, p. 221-241. Ole Weaver, “Identity, Integration and Security,” Journal of International Affairs, Winter 95, Vol. 4B Issue 2, p. 389.

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European partition fall together with the fall of the Berlin Wall or did the era of invisible walls, deep divides that no walls need to secure, begin with the fall of the Berlin Wall? The walls disappeared but still impenetrable borders remain. The walls disappeared because national borders are no longer the strongest lines of division. Should Europe, freed from great walls of division, be celebrated instead? Given the manner in which the EU has been delineating its internal borders of division, its external borders need no walls. The borders which the EU set against the (still) non-integrated part of Europe are quite instructive in this respect. There are no walls there, at least seemingly, although the borders are secured well and hardly penetrable. The Western Balkans, as a remaining part of non-integrated Europe, or rather, as a disintegrated part of Europe, has been subjected for a long time, since the fall of the Berlin Wall, to strong attractions of the EU gravitational field, as it were. Just as local politicians and civil servants are experiencing it every day, integration begins much before the accession to the European community of nations, and it does not stop with the accession either. State borders do not prevent integration into the EU nor does the integration eliminate the borders. It will be interesting to examine European integration processes regarding the state borders, given the fact that this integration does not undermine, let alone abolish them. There is some obvious link between the fact that the state borders did not become obsolete in the core of the European integration and the fact that the integration has a rather strong impact beyond the exterior state borders of the European Union. It is important to notice the impact of the integration processes on the state borders: they make the borders porous and leaky, without making them weak though. Something does happen with the borders, especially in Europe and especially after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Balibar observes that the borders are “vacillating“. He said in his study “Borders of Europe“: “Borders are vacillating: this does not mean that they are disappearing. Less than ever is the contemporary world a world without borders. On the contrary, borders are being both multiplied and reduced in their localization and their function, they are being thinned out and doubled, becoming border zones, regions or countries where one can reside and live. The quantitative relation between ‘border’ and ‘territory’ is being inverted. This means that borders are becoming the object of protest and contestation, as well as of an unremitting reinforcement, notably of their function of security.“4

4

Etienne Balibar, “Les frontières de l’Europe“ in: La crainte des masses. Politique et philosophie avant et après Marx, Ed. Galilée, Paris, 1997, p. 386-387. “The Borders of Europe”, translated by J. Swenson, in: Pheng Cheach & Bruce Robins (eds.), Cosmopolitics. Thinking and Feeling beyond the Nation, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota, 1998, p. 220.

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Balibar affirms that the relation between border and territory is being inverted: external borders become largely internal, while physical borders become symbolic, and visible ones invisible. The wall which is guarded by the military became, among other things, a strict visa regime supervised by the police. This is so because the “borders“ /frontières/ have stopped marking the limits where politics ends“. Instead of being “shores of politics“ /bord du politique/ as they were in the past, the borders have become “objects within the space of the political itself“ where, according to Balibar, the role of the police has changed: “every border patrol is today an organ of internal security“.5 Balibar observes that Europe is not built as a “closed entity” which would be similar to a “federal state“ or a “multinational empire“. Instead of getting succumbed to the illusion of their elimination, we should rather look for frontiers of Europe as the frontiers of an “open aggregation“. A new entity imposes a new strategy for drawing frontiers: “This externally open aggregation (…) is not and will not be any less partitioned by a number of ineliminable ‘frontiers’. These are not just political state frontiers but, above all, moving social frontiers, ‘invisible’ on the maps but materialized in administrative regulations and social practices; ‘inner frontiers’ between populations who differ in origin and in their location within the division of labour.”6 This inversion of borders is being very tangibly tried out in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a country outside the EU, but harnessed to European integration processes since a long time ago and subjected to the European border policy. Here, the European security politics emerges as a strict regime of controlling entries and exits of people and goods, and as a visa regime in particular. In fact, this regime is being implemented outside the EU state borders, in the “sovereign” territory of this country, but in the zones of the EU extraterritorial presence. The consular offices of the EU member states are functioning as police sections of those countries with specific procedures which are no different from internal security policies those countries apply to aliens who stay or reside in their territory. When it comes to tearing down the walls of divisions of states in the recent history of Europe, one should indeed come to Sarajevo and see those imported police bastions: huge walls, spear top wire fences, barbed-wire fences around the embassies of the states which the local citizens find most attractive in the EU, such as Germany, Austria and France. The torture of control and checks that passengers sometimes have to go through at the border crossings is applied to Bosnians and Herzegovinians in their own country: in most cases, it is a

5 6

Ibid., p. 387. Eng. translation ibid. Etienne Balibar, “Es gibt keinen Staat in Europa”, p. 228. Eng. translation Es Gibt Keinen Staat in Europa: Racism and Politics in Europe Today, New Left Review, (March-April 1991) p. 10.

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humiliating and exasperating manner as if they were caught in crime by their own police.7 Despite the fact that “vacillation of borders“ has remarkable proportions, just as the recent replacements in the EU Embassies in which diplomats were replaced by professional police bureaucracy, have shown, Balibar goes too far when he claims that “modern, substantially ‘borderguard’ (customs, identitarian) equation of citizenship and nationality is already now in the process of being powerfully disintegrated“.8 No matter how much they may become porous, hardly visible, moved from outer rims of territories to procedures and regimes of “home affairs“, the borders still remain, as borders of all borders, state borders. Not only does the EU keep in its heart, in the gravitational core of its integration, such borders but actually orders them to all those countries which have applied for accession to such integration. BIH’s numerous failures to fulfil the requirements which are necessary if BIH is to move forward to the EU come down to its inability to secure its own borders. This inability to secure its own borders is only an external sign of continuing failure of this country to get consolidated as a nation-state – which means to fulfil the equation of citizenship and nationality in a satisfactory, typically European way.9 Out of all Yugoslav secessionist states, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BIH) is in the most difficult situation to fulfil this equation. Under the uti possidetis principle, on the basis of which internal state borders of the former Federation gave a measure to the recognition of self-determination of the peoples, BIH is created as a state of three equal ethnicities.10 As it could be expected, consociational organization of the former central Yugoslav republic placed it at the bottom of the states which are trying to fulfil the EU requirements. However, the failures related to the candidacy of this state with a complicated constitutional order do not speak only of the depth of its ethnic divisions but also of a crucial importance which the EU has attached to the fulfilment of the equation of citizenship and nationality. No matter how we can understand the purposes of a complicated fulfilment of the requirements for accession to the European community of states, this conditionality presumes consolidation of a nation-state. Among all candidate countries, mono-ethnic nation-states, like Slovenia, could be prepared best for such consolidation – it is easy to conclude – and such consociations as BIH is are least prepared. Of course, a nation-state is the model of a European state par excellence.

7

8 9

10

See Ugo Vlaisavljevi}, “Njema~ki logor u Sarajevu”, Pripitomljavanje nacionalizma, Mauna-Fe, Sarajevo, 2007, p. 232-236. Etienne Balibar, “Les frontières de l’Europe“, La crainte des masses, p. 386. For that sacrosanct formula, see Etienne Balibar, “L’Europe des citoyens” in: Nous, citoyens d’Europe? Les frontières, l’Etat, le peuple, p. 245. For more details see Allen Buchanan, Justice, legitimacy, and self-determination, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 340-341.

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Does this mean that multiethnic states in the strong sense of the word, i.e. those which have at least two equal ethnic groups, cannot fit into a typical European frame? Did the fall of multiethnic federations, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, not offer to their constituent ethnic groups the possibility to accede to the EU? As Dominique Shcnapper claims, the truth is that all big European nations are multiethnic or even multi-national11, but they all got successfully consolidated as nation-states thanks to the domination of only one core nation in every country. Following the disintegration of Yugoslavia, it turned out that the principle of recognizing secessionist states was, in fact, the principle of nationality (one nation, one state), but in its reduced form (one mono-ethnic nation – one ministate). 12 Independent BIH emerged as a rather odd state in which it was not possible to apply this principle because of its territorial dispersion and ethnic patchwork. As Margaret Moore observes, neither the acceptance of a civic BIH nor the acceptance of national self-determination could be an acceptable arrangement for the international community. Thus the necessity to recognize equal rights to all ethnic groups has led to a certain “imaginative arrangement“ which “moves beyond the Westphalian nation-state model“. 13 The Dayton Constitution seeks solution in the direction of a “loose federation“, “not only through devolved sovereignty, into relatively autonomous constituent units, but also by developing shared sovereignty arrangements where groups in the society wish this”. 14 That there has been “the need to think imaginatively” about the organization of BIH is implied by double impossibility: neither a unitary civic state nor a secessionist arrangement present a plausible solution. Both should have been partly accepted. Still, we can say that in implementing a secessionist arrangement, the international community went as far as it was possible to go. Here we should keep in mind the entire territory of former Yugoslavia, and not only of BIH. When Moore gives the main reason why a secessionist arrangement could not be implemented in this country, she thinks that the reason is that such an arrangement would have led to a recursive secession, secession after secession, and in BIH “it would imply a patchwork of enclaves or pockets of sovereign units throughout that republic“.15 If we take a look at the present political map of the West Balkans and see how far the state and sub-state borders stretch, we shall see precisely a whole patchwork of mini-states and quasi-state enclaves: from Slovenia, via Republika Srpska and Herzeg-Bosnia, to Kosovo and Western Macedonia. If we take a deeper look, we shall discern even smaller “pockets of sovereign units“ 11

12 13 14 15

Dominique Schnapper, La communauté des citoyens. Sur l’idée moderne de nation, Gallimard, Paris, 1994, p. 98. See David Miller, On Nationality, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 187-195. Margaret Moore, The Ethics of Nationalism, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 238. Ibid. Ibid., p. 237.

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within those enclaves, while we should keep in mind that neither it is true that those mini-states have the full sovereignty which they dreamed about, nor do those smallest units of collective ethnic possession of territory have any sovereignty. In its administrative fragmentation, BIH is no exception among its neighbouring nation-states; rather, it only provides an impressive image of the end of the path which the administrators of the international community have reached applying secessionist arrangements after the break-up of Yugoslavia. This is precisely why a consociational organization of BIH and its strong dependence on the EU may in turn shed light on a completely new political system in the region. If we keep in mind the new ministates, and especially their dependence on the EU – which is so strong that it does not matter in this context whether they are integrated in the EU, like Slovenia, or have not been integrated yet – we could say that the entire post-Yugoslav system is a complex consociational system. Thus, on the one hand, there is a thick mosaic of politeie-enclaves, while on the other, it seems without a doubt that without such EU this organization, which is so much reminiscent of medieval princedoms, could not exist. As John Gray observed, consociational regimes are not stable and can survive only with the support from an “external force“. This theoretician could perhaps help us reinforce our thesis about a consociational organization of the whole region, although he hesitates to present this hypothesis. Let us focus on two interventions by the international community in the Balkans and the underlying reasons, according to Gray. The first is the intervention to prevent or at least to stop the war: “Diplomatic and military intervention in the Balkans came about because establishing nation-states on the European civic model has proved impossible and attempts to establish ethnically homogenous nation-states have occasioned gross violations of rudimentary human rights. The upshot in parts of former Yugoslavia has been the establishment of a number of more or less consociational regimes whose stability has been guaranteed from outside, by the powers which installed them.“16 As part consociational (part liberal but also involving some de facto partitions), Grey then refers to the regimes established in Bosnia and Kosovo. These “hybrid forms of governance“ whose security does not depend on consent but on the support of external powers, he calls, without hesitation, protectorates. But are those two “dependent” regimes what this author thought of when he said “a certain number of more or less consociational regimes“? Then those would be exceptions, and not representative examples of the situation in this region. It would take away 16

John Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism, The New Press, 2000, p. 129.

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the point from his interpretation of the main sense of international community’s intervention after the war: “Like that which prevailed under its Ottoman rulers, the peace that has been imposed in the Balkans rests on a foundation less uncertain than agreements among the various communities who are its beneficiaries. What we are witnessing in the Balkans at the turn of the twenty-first century may prove to be the reinvention of the institution of empire as a remedy for evils that flow from the attempt to construct ethnic nation-states. Yet it is far from clear that the imperial institutions that are under construction can recreate multi-ethnic societies.”17 When he talks about the reinvention of the institution of empire out of necessity, Gray has in mind a specific empire, the one which withdrew from this region like the tide, leaving to the future a restoration of some form of consociational order.18 Of course, it is the Ottoman Empire, of which this author says that it “can be seen as a consociational regime“. If the EU is recreating in some way the imperial institutions, if external intervention, without which no local consociational regime can survive in the long run, implies imperial power, then the EU, in addition to the US which is not hiding its imperial face, is being established as a kind of empire, no matter whether we call it a quasi-empire. 19 Mixed in the same territory, diverse ethnic communities - today in the Balkans, those are self-conscious ethnic nations - are ordering for the purpose of their peaceful co-existence “that legal jurisdiction be decoupled from territorial sovereignty“20, which is precisely what consociational arrangements offer. This decoupling is necessary precisely because those nations are unable to fulfil the equation of citizenship and nationality. The state borders which in the EU guarantee the security of the state/ national identity indicate the importance of this equation also in the most recent phases of the European integration, so that the EU, regardless of some consociational elements in its organization, remains a union of nation-states in the first place.21 If the dissection of the equation of nationality and citizenship is something which the EU will be facing under the main tendencies of integration processes while Balibar believes this is already largely the case, then the EU, walking the path from economic and military alliance to political community with its demos, has to go through consociational intermediate steps. Is the model of consociation not closer to the ideal of a civic EU than the model of a cluster of nation-states, in which state borders continue 17 18 19 20 21

Ibid., p. 130. See Michael Walzer, On Toleration, Yale University Press, 1997, p. 22. Etienne Balibar, “L’Europe des citoyens”, Nous, citoyens d’Europe?, p. 253. John Gray, op. cit., p. 129. See, for example, Matthijs Bogaards and Markus M. L. Crepaz, “Consociational Interpretations of European Union“, European Union Poliics, Volume 3, 2002, p. 357-381.

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to guarantee what was the most important even before the European integration: the equation of citizenship and nationality? The obvious strong affinity between the present-day EU and “ethnically cleansed“, sufficiently “consolidated“ mini-states in the Balkans, may be soon substituted by another affinity of a far more civic EU toward such consociations as BIH. In the current constellation of states and political regimes in the Balkans, BIH, as a consociational regime, presents a huge problem being precisely a reduced image of the European multi-national community. More satisfactory impression, more of “European political spirit“, judging by the level of their ability to tackle with the challenges of EU integration, seems to be offered by the local caricatures of nation-states formed on the reductionist principle of nationality. The EU’s lack of will to intervene more vigorously during the war in Bosnia may be ascribed, among other things, to a disastrous overlapping of the principles of ethnic nationality, which was accepted as the main principle of state legi-timacy in the state-building processes in the Balkans, and the ethnic cleansing principle. Bearing in mind the importance of fulfilment of the citizenshipnationality equation and its applicability for the EU candidacy, we could say without exaggeration that the occupations of territories during the war, and equally so the Srebrenica genocide, were a tacit part of the EU accession conditionality set forth for the young secessionist enclaves. If the specific character of external and internal borders of the present-day EU is to be examined, then the view from Bosnia on those borders may be rather instructive. Apart from Kosovo and its exceptional situation, BIH is lagging behind all West Balkan states in its accession to the European integration processes. If the external borders of the “Europe fortress“ – as Balibar calls EU, having in mind its rigid border control policy – are to be analyzed, then BIH is the farthest from its walls or the walls are fortified most strongly against BIH. It is precisely this case of the special relation in which the border ensures the difference between the external and the internal and should be functioning in a classical way that shows how much Balibar is right when he points at the changing function of the borders and their moving inwards, so that the fortress needs no outer walls. Namely, the EU is present in BIH more than it is in any other country candidate for accession: through the military force (EUFOR), the police (EUPM) and the sovereign rule of its Special Representative (EUSR), who may be above the highest authorities of the state thanks to the special Bonn powers invested in him. So it seems that BIH, still incapable of getting integrated into the EU, is incorporated in a classical form of imperial rule. 22 Let us call it a paradox of post-imperial incorporation. It is that same rule which has been demolishing all the walls of division in today’s Europe. 22

Balibar speaks about a certain zone of “internal colonisation“ implemented by the EU as the “real Europe“ toward “external Europe“, and that zone includes Kosovo, Albania and the major part of former Yugoslavia. Cf. Etienne Balibar, “Europe difficile: les chantiers de la démocratie“ in: Nous, citoyens d’Europe?, p. 306.

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DER UNTERGANG: 1989-2009 – 20 YEARS OF LIBERALISATION OR CANNIBALISATION? Asim MUJKIĆ

While freeing ourselves from communism, we believed that we were freeing ourselves from just any form of ‘correlating’ us, the ordinary people, with something which exceeds our day-to-day practice, with something non-human, abstract-categorical or ideological, generally with just any appropriation. We seem to have been steered in that direction by an emancipatory ‘liberalistic’ promise under which a combination of parliamentary democracy + free market represents a magic formula for success. From today’s distance, one might get the impression that in all that, and especially while insisting that ‘liberal democratic order has no alternative’, we showed nothing but our naivety, or rather, our political immaturity. On the other hand, also the liberal democratic order turned in 1990s and in the early new millennium in particular, into something completely different – a neoliberal capitalist order, developing its ideological narration of the so-called ‘free world’ which rests on the vision of deliverance through market democracy and consumerism. Walter Mignolo describes this trend as a process of consolidating “...naturalized belief that has now spread around the world that progress and development is good for all and everybody; the more you produce and the more people consume, the happier they – the consumers – are. Within that structure, those who are in it, live to work; live to consume. Success is the final horizon.“ 1 On the other hand, radical and contemptible rejection of the Marxist re-descriptive vocabulary and the building of our identities over a good half a century, the narration of which was either imbued with metaphors of that vocabulary or developed in the opposite direction, made us blind to the fact that a new correlation with something non-human, which in the so-called ‘post-ideological’ constellation of neoliberalism was not visible, is concealed behind the ‘charters of human rights and freedoms’ and the liberalist mantra about ‘free flow of ideas, people, goods and capital’, enshrined even in the Preamble to the Constitution of BiH. An ideological “recurring theme“ of this post-ideological era is, in my view, best illustrated by Fukuyamin’s two positions which he made public immediately

1

Marina Grìni~: “De-linking Epistemology from Capital and Pluri-Versality – A Conversation with Walter Mignolo“, Reartikulacija, No. 4, Ljubljana, poletje/summer 2008 (20-22); 21.

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after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington in his short essay entitled “...We Remain at the End of History“2. 1. “...Beyond liberal democracy and markets, there was nothing else towards which we could expect to evolve. ... While there were retrograde areas that resisted that process, it was hard to imagine an alternative civilization in which people would genuinely want to live – particularly after socialism, monarchy, fascism, and other varieties of authoritarian rule had been discredited“; 2. “...Democracy and free markets will continue to expand over time as the dominant organizing principles for much of the world.“3 First, it is an unusual intellectual arrogance to claim that any social construct is at the end of ‘evolutive scale’, that there is nothing left which people could aspire to. It is especially non-intellectual to say, implicitly here, and explicitly elsewhere, that a historical development of man comes to completion. The end of historical development would also be the end of historical being – the man. Each of those ‘authoritative rules’ which Fukuyama mentions had its own narration about the end of history, about the final realization of the man’s mission on the Earth which would in a way stem from its own transcendental substance. We can see, with Fukuyama also neoliberalism gets its rounded narration about the completion of such a man’s mission. It is almost incredible to hear in a post-metaphysical period such a rigid, ahistorical and deeply metaphysical position such as Fukuyama’s. Which positions does Fukuyama speak from? It is possible to claim the end of human historical development, an epoch the synonym of which is, paradoxically enough, ‘society without ideology’ only if we reach the position which Hilary Putnam calls ‘God’s–eye–view’, something which no human being – product of history and contingency – has so far managed to do. The only position which could justify Fukuyama’s assertions is ideological in metaphysical terms, which Friedrich Engels defined as “...specific structure of consciousness of a class society in particular and especially class ideologists as the layer of the people who give a theoretical shape to the class consciousness and who ‘are dealing with thoughts as independent substances, as if they existed for their own purposes.“4 Rejection of one, in this case, communist ideological matrix after two decades of the so-called transition of post-communist societies seems to have resulted in accepting a new, in our own case, neo-liberalist

2

3

4

Francis Fukuyama: “We Remain at the End of History”, Odjek No. 2, autumn-winter 2001, Sarajevo, translated by Asim Mujki}, 38-39. (Francis Fukuyama: “We remain at the end of history”, October 11, 2001: http://license.icopyright.net/user/viewFree Use.act?fuid=NDA0Njc3NA%3D%3D 06. 07. 2009) I wrote more extensively on this in Asim Mujki}: “...Liberalizam vs. neoliberalizam – rasprava u povoju“ in John Rawls i perspektive liberalne demokratije u BiH, Adnan Huski}, Asim Mujki} ed. (Sarajevo: Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, 2003); 19-33; Enciklopedija leksikografskog zavoda, 3, (Zagreb: Jugoslavenski leksikografski zavod, 1967).

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ideological matrix. If we accept Engels’s definition of ideology as the ‘speech of substances’ then we have to conclude that as the speech of substances, and not as a communicative co-action, ideology generally rests on the network of what Rorty defines as ‘conversation-stoppers’, as those building – we would say – doctrinal elements of ideological narration which must not be challenged. In this way, those narrative elements are nothing but a type of Denkverbot (thought embargo), so the transition of post-communist societies may be thought about – as a series of critical authors suggest – like a transition from one fundamental Denkverbot to another fundamental Denkverbot. Slavoj @ièk insists that “Today’s liberal-democratic hegemony is sustained by a kind of unwritten Denkverbot similar to the infamous Berufsverbot in Germany of the late 60s – the moment one shows a minimal sign of engaging in political projects that aim to seriously challenge the existing order, the answer is immediately: “Benevolent as it is, this will necessarily end in a new Gulag!“ The ideological function of the constant reference to the holocaust, gulag and the more recent Third World catastrophes is thus to serve as the support of this Denkverbot by constantly reminding us how things may have been much worse: “Just look around and see for yourself what will happen if we follow your radical notions!“ What we encounter here is the ultimate example of what Ana Dinerstein and Mike Neary called the project of disutopia, “not just the temporary absence of utopia, but the political celebration of the end of social dreams“.5 Most of citizens of European East, especially in the phase of transition, woke up not in the comfort of liberal democracy and capitalist consumerism, but amid the nightmare of corrupt selfish proto-capitalism, or, what is even worse, in the jaws of militant nationalism, this time without any utopian horizon as the hope with which they had embarked on adventure, revolution. Without narration of hope remains only narration of facticity – the seemingly realised hopes: the establishment of a liberal-democratic system. The fall from one to the other Denkverbot is for this part of Europe also the fall into silence: the elements of yesterday’s identity are undesirable in the public discourse, some are even punishable under the criminal codes in place in some post-communist countries, and challenging the current dominant identity narrations is proscribed as silly. This entire situation or the “...political scene here“ is presented as the fall. The most devastating expression of that fall (...) is that the old failed ideology was not replaced by a political opinion; rather, it was replaced by a new ideology. The ruling ideology is a mixture of greedy pragmatism and trite moralizing“. 6 How such existence in inexpressibility, the Denkverbot silence, in ‘non-thinking’ looks in practice is illustrated by the following example:

5 6

Slavoj @ièk, Repeating Lenin (Zagreb: Arkzin, 2001); 8-9; Karel Kosik, On Dilemmas of Modern History (Zagreb: Razlog, 2007); 236-7;

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The only time being East German works negatively against you is when you express opinions that this bourgeois-democratic system does not represent the end of history. And, when you suggest that it is not final and that something may come after it one day. Because, like any system, it is going to come to an end sooner or later, maybe in fifty maybe in a hundred years and then one has to think about what will come after it and what kind of a society that should be. But that is completely taboo to talk about the end of this system because the moment they hear you say something like that they think, “Oh, she wants the GDR back,“ which is not the point at all.... The West Germans have no problem asking us how we could have lived in the GDR, but I do not think they have ever thought about how they would answer an outsider’s question fifty years from now who would ask them, “How could you have lived in the Federal Republic of Germany with its unemployment, with hunger and homelessness.“7 The metaphor of Eastern Europe could thus be summarized in Friday, the character from Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe: “Friday was a cannibal whom Crusoe rescues from the danger of being eaten and converts, as a penitent, to Christianity“. 8 Did the West, playing the role of an enlightened, venturous Crusoe, not saved in 1989 the ‘uncivilized’ from the East from being eaten in the fatal stranglehold of the cannibal Soviet empire? After Robinson saved Friday from being eaten, he started civilizing him – teaching him the language and the manners of his own civilization, while completely neglecting Friday’s previous identity (Why did Robinson not try to learn at least few words of Friday’s cannibal language?). Having saved him, he took a civilized Friday with him, to his world in which Friday’s cannibalism is a taboo, to the world in which Friday as such may survive only under Robinson’s fatherly protection, as his little, exotic savage. Friday may live in Robinson’s world only if he emptied his previous identity of all content. Here, there is a legitimate question: was Friday in the end completely eaten? The taboo of the precivilization identity may not be mentioned, although it can be legitimised in Robinson’s world only as goods. So the taboo of the pre-revolutionary identity of easterners – for example, the five-pointed red star – is regarded as a criminal offence in some countries of East Europe, although that same five-pointed red star may be freely displayed in those countries as the Heineken beer trade mark. The red star, as an ideological symbol, is forbidden, but is allowed as a capitalist brand. This civilizatory appropriation of the East has its ideological foundation not only in neo-liberal narration. The classics of Marxism wrote 7

8

Dominic Boyer: “...Ostalgija i politike sje}anja u Isto~noj Njema~koj“ (Ostalgie and the Politics of the Future in Eastern Germany), Odjek, LXII, No. 1, Sarajevo, Spring 2009 (53-63); 60; Steven Lukes, Liberals and Cannibals / The Implications of Diversity, (London, New York: Verso, 2003), 29;

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about the necessity of capitalist ‘to civilize’ the East. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, in their own time, did not show even a modicum of mercy for those who should be ‘appropriated‘, surveyed, disciplined, in short – civilized. Except for Polls, according to the classics of Marxism, there is no nation in Europe’s East which could be characterized as modern in terms of its capability to produce its own bourgeoisie and consequentially, to create an operational national state, that “...sine qua non functional requirement for the survival of a national community in the capitalist mode of production. National communities incapable of forming national states are hindering the development of the progressive centralization and uniformation of humanity, and must therefore assimilate to more ‘vital’ and ‘energetic’ nations capable of forming national states with democracy ‘as compensation’.9 In what sense does this redescription of classics of Marxism define the identities of our small peoples in the context of capitalism that we ‘returned to’? What are the national communities which have so far been incapable of forming national states, or the sound layer of bourgeoisie? It is horrifying even to think of what multi-cultural or multi-ethnic societies will face in such an appropriating vision. According to classics of Marxism, those are ‘non-historical nations’. If we return for a brief moment to the spiritual vocabulary of the 19th century, we could interpret it as nations which are not the subjects of their historical development, or the agents of “...historical transformation, that will further the formation of a strong capitalist economy...“ 10 but subjects to someone else’s mediation. The non-historical nations “were understood as incapable of having national states of their own because they were either ‘too small’ or they lived in areas of mixed population, in the midst of a ‘more energetic stock’ (usually German, but also Magyar), in a situation in which the other national community was considered ‘more advanced’ and ‘better-equipped’ in terms of its ability to build a national state. (…) but given that national communities persisted in preserving their ‘backward’ national identities and culture, they could only subsist on condition that they locate themselves within the sphere of influence of the equally ‘backward’ semi-feudal Russian absolutism“11. Thus, “The ‘irresistible flow of progress’ requires the voluntary assimilation or the annihilation of those national communities“.12 For Marx and Engels, nonhistorical nations are ‘feudal enclaves’, the hotbed of reaction. Their national identities and culture, in comparison with capitalist nations, are 9

10 11

12

Ephraim Nimni: “Marx, Engels and the National Question” in The Rights of Minority Cultures, Will Kymlicka ed., (Oxford University Press, 1997), 72. Ibid., 70. Paradoxically enough, did they not enjoy that kind of ‘protection’ within the Warsaw Pact? In this context, it could be said also of the federation of South Slavs that it had the same function Nimni mentions that according to Marx and Engels, “if the Slavonic East European nationalities cannot constitute national states, their only hope for survival was to constitute a federation of ‘Slavonic Nations’, under the leadership of the Czar of all Russia, the ‘bulwark of European reaction’”, Ibid., 69. Ibid., 71.

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retrograde. Their nationalism, unlike the nationalism of developed capitalist nations, is reactionary: If nationalism “...abolishes the feudal system building a ‘national state’, then the nationalist movement deserves support as a ‘tool’ for progressive social change. If, however, the nationalist movement emerges among linguistic or cultural communities incapable of surviving the upheavals of capitalist transformation because they are too small or have a weak or non-existent bourgeoisie, nationalist movements becomes a ‘regressive’ force–one which is incapable of overcoming the phase of ‘peasant-feudal’ social organization“.13 Such groups need to be assimilated, removed, in other words, eaten. Their fate will be that of Robinson’s Friday. A more sophisticated thinking about this part of Europe started precisely from the diversity of nations and peoples with the underlying question: can the plurality of our differences be the advantage? So in the emancipatory vision of dissidents in communism there were thoughts also about “...the realm of spiritual freedom, diversity and tolerance... a home of equal nations with an abundant, colorful culture, nurtured by a diversity of languages, religions, traditions and personalities“14 (Einstein, Kafka, Lukacs, Krleà, Milosz, Havel, Kolakowski, Menzel and others). Transfer to a uniform nation-state, an ethnically homogenous capitalist matrix, with some exceptions though, turned this region into the area of “...hatred, intolerance, both ethnic and religious“.15 This alternative – here, I have to add, a genuine ‘Mittel-European’ narration about diversity, expressed in the works and thoughts of the so-called ‘dissident intellectuals’ and which, as the narration of social hope, paved the way for the 1989 revolution – simply did not have a chance in a clash with a new ideological wave from the West. Czeslaw Milosz, fearing, asked himself already in 1990: “...Will the years of suffering under totalitarian rule be obliterated, erased and the people start from scratch? Should the thinkers, poets, and artists join their Western colleagues in the somewhat marginal role assigned to them in societies busy with selling and buying?“ 16 So, after communism was overthrown, it should have been reduced to ‘nothing’, to ‘as if nothing had happened before’, together with narrations of hope in social justice by domestic intellectuals, sunk into the silence of a new Denkverbot, free market and parliamentary democracy. Steven Lukes has been continually warning, since the very beginning of transition of Central and Eastern Europe, that “...one real possibility is that, in full recoil from real socialism, the post-revolutionary elites will embrace the full package of the counter-ideology of free-market liberalism, which,

13 14

15 16

Ibid., 63. Adam Michnik: “Gray is Beautiful: Thoughts on Democracy in Central Europe”, Dissent, Vol. 44, Spring 1997. Michink, ibid. Milosz according to Jerzy Jedlicki: “The Revolution of 1989: The Unbearable Burden of History“ in Eastern Europe / Transformation and Revolution 1945 – 1991, Lyman H. Legters ed. (Lexington Mass., Toronto: D.C. Heath & Company, 1992); 635-43; 641;

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like Marxism but on different grounds, also rejects the very notion of ‘social justice’“17. Czech philosopher Karel Kosik described graphically such transformation: “...We are not going into Europe, rather, we go from one cave to another: from the gray, barracks-cave, besieged by barbed wire to a cave surfeited with comfort, lit with commercials that overshadow stars and the Sun...“18 So the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, it seems today, followed an ideological dictum under which it is imperative for ontogenesis, or the building of a modern capitalist, democratic state, that it repeats the path of phylogenesis – the path of creating such a type of a state, an accelerated copying of capitalist development from a national referent of the state to a dominant form of laissez-faire capitalist egalitarianism in the form of consumerism. In short, it was necessary to recapitulate a two-hundred-year-long history of modern capitalism and a national state within twenty years only. Re-contextualization of Central and Eastern Europe into the capitalist matrix was taking place simultaneously on two tracks in the form of “...restoration of the berserk capitalism of the 19th century19 and also in the form of “penetration of the sophisticated neo-capitalism of the 20th century...“ 20, i.e. on the one hand, transition went towards establishing a classical national capitalist state which, under laissez-faire and Marxist doctrine, implied the establishment of a more powerful bourgeois class or ‘lumpenbourgeoisie’21, as Kosik calls it, and at the same time, it took place within the context of global capitalism and neo-liberal ‘supranational‘ narration, so that the act of constitution of a national state was almost at the same time the act of its deconstitution and coalescence into disciplining procedures of supranational integrations, such as the EU membership, and prior to that, the membership in NATO. At the end of the disciplining procedure, the disappearance, Kosik observes that “...it is said with pleasure with nobody breaks ranks any longer, all are performing, regardless of whether they have ‘right’ or ‘left’ governments in one order, in a disciplined manner.“ 22 Still, is there any sense in talking about this area of the European continent as a separate region? First of all, that area, from the Baltic Sea down to the Adriatics, has not been fully appropriated. With the recent accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the European Union, the 17

18

19 20 21

22

Steven Lukes: “...Marxism and Morality: Reflections on the Revolutions of 1989“ in Eastern Europe / Transformation and Revolution 1945 – 1991, Lyman H. Legters ed. (Lexington Mass., Toronto: D.C. Heath & Company, 1992); 612-21; 620; Karel Kosik, O dilemama suvremene povijesti (On Dilemmas of Modern History) (Zagreb: Razlog, 2007); 246. Kosik, 250; Ibid., 250; Kosik warns that ‘lumpen-bourgeoisie’ “...is recruited from the enriched ones, but unlike normal, polite members of its class, it ties together its entrepreneurship with the mafia rule, deceits, with the criminal underground“,Ibid., 238; Ibid., 347.

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circle around the so-called yet-not-appropriated West Balkan region is now complete, like a cordon sanitaire the aim of which is to form the boundary around the reserve of ‘aboriginal’ or, in Marxist terms, nonhistorical nations – members of divided societies and citizens of incomplete states who are still on the first step of transition – the establishment of a homogenous national state, then the insurance of a security environment, and eventually linking up with the global market. Europe seems to be closing up hermetically this region, while expecting a “...final solution“ for such countries as Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro, or the entire, yet-not-ethnically-disentangled ‘cannibal’ archipelago in which each of the above countries poses a potential threat of further divisions and destabilization. At the same time, each of these states is a weak, incomplete and unfinished state and can be, to a larger or smaller degree, considered as an internally divided society. Following the Marxistneo-liberalist ideological pattern, those states should, perhaps, be ‘completed’ by turning them into complete homogenous national states although such an effort could drag this region into a new wave of violence. Otherwise, the key question could be: how could multi-cultural and multiethnic societies be preserved precisely as we are discussing today those countries as the sources of insecurity? Would it be possible at all, no matter how fantastic or utopian it may sound, that those last, ‘circumvented’ yet-notEuropean countries find a new strength in their multi-culturism and offer a plausible model for Europe of tomorrow? This is why it would be necessary to explore the possibility for a vacant place of a dominant ‘majority nation’ to become a source of freedom instead of a source of conflict and frustration. The lack of the ultimate, dominant, ethno-national referent – as the first phase of the post-communist transition – has so far encouraged evoking precise boundary demarcation, often bloody ‘dissolution of plurals’ into a number of separate singulars. It is in relation to the vacant position of a dominant national referent, following the fall of socialism, that dominant, or homogeneous ethnic identities were built in their pronounced singularity externally – through the attitude towards others, most often adversarial ethnic singularities, and internally – through an internal dynamics of an ethnic group within which the concept of a hegemonist ethnic identity is established and maintained by force (both economic and political). In this regard, perhaps it would be necessary to hash over the options available to those countries – if such options still exist – and also to try to understand the real meaning of that flagrant circumvention of the West Balkan countries in the ‘Euro-integration’ processes so far, except for the Brussels’ official explanation that those countries have not yet met the requirements from the so-called road maps. We should ask openly: do the ‘efforts’ made so far by the international community and the European Union – although, of course, there is nothing coherently ‘signified’ behind these signifiers23 - at least when it comes to the cases of BIH, Serbia and Macedonia – indicate clearly that, for the 23

If we accept that what stands ‘behind’ is a neo-liberal ideology which follows the movement of global capital, then, as Marina Grìni~ observes, an interesting horizon gets open which is characterized

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time being, the only way in which the ‘world’ is coping with multiethnicity is its ‘closing eyes’ to the conflict until ethnic homogenization of some areas among which peace, guaranteed by NATO presence or ‘Natoid’ troops, is being implemented in search for an ad hoc modus of ethnic-territorial confederation at least as an interim solution? Does that approach not make our societies even more divided and our states, if they can be called a ‘state’, even more incomplete? Can the ‘world’ or at least Europe do it better? Otherwise, the vision of the West Balkans is horrifying: hermetically closed, in a bell jar, it will continue to implode into ethnic enclaves, hostile toward each other, until a clear geography of young ‘sovereign’ states is established with a clear ‘ethnic titular’, managed by ethno-political oligarchies to the detriment of their citizens, their human rights and freedoms. Does the fifteen-year-long experience of Bosnia and Herzegovina not show that the principle of ethnic territorialism endanger individual safety and rights, that it increases instability of citizens’ expectations in the form of continual uncertainty, prolonged state of emergency; further, does it not obstruct the political participation of citizens thanks precisely to its discriminatory practices and characteristics on which its existence is based? If we want to complete our states in that way, then their full disintegration will be inevitable. In broader terms, the Western Balkan dilemma cannot refer yet to the entire area of Central and Eastern Europe. The issue of this region is, I will take liberty to say, the key issue for the survival of pluralist democracy and the possibility of the vision of the society in which nothing will shape the human destiny, no metanarrative or naturalized ideology – either Marxist or neo-liberalist, it does not matter. Susan George quotes Karl Polanyi who said more than fifty years ago what we can call now a prophetical position: “...To allow the market mechanism to be the sole director of the fate of human beings and their natural environment ... would result in the demolition of a society...“ 24. The damnation or advantage of this area is that it has always been on the ideological periphery, as something always ‘in between’, doomed to the plurality of life forms and permanent, cyclical attempts to find final solutions, offered by the occupying ideologies. Contrary to this, Kosik observes: The subject of Central Europe are the nations who are seeking – in conflicts, fallacies, misunderstandings – the way of living together and co-existence which would ensure their identity, and at the same time create mutual respect of all for all as participants in a single freedom and single justice. The history of Central Europe is search for power (and its symbols) which would bring together diversities, overcome separation, vanquish particularism and intolerance not by an external and brute force from above but by the will from within25.

24 25

precisely by fragmentation of referentialism: “...it is precisely the capital that throughout the whole history prompted disintegration of every referentialism, every human goal and that fully loosened every distinction between false and true, good and evil, in order to introduce a relentless law of equal and replaceable values, the iron law of one’s own power “ See in M. Grìni~, Estetika kibersvijeta, 63. Susan George: “...A Short History of Neoliberalism“, http://www.tni.org/archives/George/bangkok.htm Karel Kosik, O dilemama..., 69-70.

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Continuity versus Reference – Rhethorics versus Habitus Wolfgang Klotz

In times, when the political joke disappears, it seems to be replaced by something we can characterize as “serious anecdote”. A typical sample of this genre could recently be read in the “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” of May 29: in the Hungarian city of Szombathely a statue of Pushkin was to be put up again in the park after two years of restoration, but a public official of the city administration stopped the reinstatement of the statue saying, that “We do not provide public space for such communists”. This short anecdote reveals a specific continuity and a well-known personal habitus: we can assume that this small clerk all his life had tried to be alongside with his chiefs (or at least where he supposed them to be). In case he were on duty already in Kádár times, he would certainly then have welcomed Pushkin as a hero of liberation. More serious is the report on an exhibition shown in the city of Kőszeg, some 20 km from Pushkin’s statue, where the local museum had arranged a collection of documents from and about Ferenc Szálasi, the founder and chief of the “Arrow Cross Movement”. The way how the political attitude of Szálasi’s movement was characterized in the 2003 exhibition can be summarized by two documents presented in the showcases. The first is a quotation of Szálasi himself where he says: “Among all those people who today (i.e. in 1944) determine the future of Hungary, half of them are no Hungarians at all, and half of them are bad Hungarians” (while “not being Hungarian at all” means: they were Jews). And the second text, obviously written by the curators, says that the arrow cross movement was “not identical with Italian fascism, nor German National Socialism, since the Hungarian Arrow Cross men did not propose a totalitarian state or racial supremacy. But they were fervent enemies of Bolshevism and international capitalism” (while the term “international capitalism” again tends to the Jews). And of course the persons being blamed responsible for that exhibition, in which they praise “the talent, the diligence and the absolutely non-materialistic character” of Szálasi, claim that all that was “free of politics”. This story shows us some specific references and a well-known rhetoric, which is far spread not only in nowadays Hungary, where the 133


“Black guard” is again regularly and publicly patrolling the streets of various cities and where, since the beginning of this year, we count numerous assaults on Roma people dwellings with a death toll of eight victims either burnt or shot down when they tried to escape from the fire. Explicit references are made here to “Anti-Bolshevism” as well as to “Anti-Capitalism” in order to mask the real references working in the minds of the authors, i.e. their references to Anti-Semitism. The case from Kozara The Croatian writer Boris Deùlovi} published an article a few weeks ago in the Belgrade online-daily “E-Novine”, where he refers to a well known photography @or` Skrigin had made in 1944. The photography is showing “an exhausted mother, who runs away from Ustashas across the pathless Mount Kozara, holding her daughter’s hand and carrying her son on her arm”. This picture is well known not only because it is displayed in the Holocaust Museum at Auschwitz. According to Deùlovi} – it had been printed in all the history textbooks used by school-classes of his generation in former Yugoslavia. The writer continues telling us about Branko Tepi}, “a pensioner from Gradu{a near Sisak. He lived in Sisak until 1991, where from, fleeing the war he escaped to his summer house in Gradu{a. Croatian authorities confiscated his flat and he could not go back to Sisak. He lived in the summer house for four years until 1995 when, following the ‘Operation Flash’, he had to run away again, with his wife, son, daughterin-law and grandchildren, this time towards the Mount Kozara. It would take him eight years before he could go back to Gradu{a, to end his life there.” That Branko Tepi} was none other than the young child on the arm of his mother on the photo from the Holocaust Museum and the schoolbooks of former Yugoslavia. “That photo has predestined the path which I am still following,” Branko Tepi} said later. “That photo has fated my trail of a refugee who never settled where his roots are.” This story shows us a continuity of suffering in a habitus of silence. It comes to us in a wonderful rhetoric, because it’s a talented writer who lends his voice to the tacit Branko Tepi} and Branko himself doesn’t need any references, since it wouldn’t disburden his life at all to denominate those people who made him suffering as Bolshevists or Capitalists, as Ustasha, êtniks or whatever. The Heinrich Boell Foundation invited you to this conference in order to remember the year of the breakdown of the communist systems and to look at the divergent lines in social and political development different societies of the region were taking during those 20 years since then. My text up to here makes evident that I’m neither a historian nor a social scientist nor an analyst from a political think-tank. I enjoy the

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privilege of just being an observer of Central Europe since 20 years, even if I risk bothering you with banalities. But more than in all those 20 years of observing Central- and Eastern Europe I’ve learned in the few months I’m now living in Belgrade, that any public discourse there (and may be also here) is cram-full with historical references, made either by individuals, by social groups or by an nearly entire society. References, on the one hand, are made to define and to justify the own position, and they are imputed to others in order to describe and to disqualify their position. People defining themselves as acting and thinking in the tradition of anti-fascism consider their antagonists as being “fascists”. Vice versa those alleged or true fascists, considering themselves as heirs of a tradition of national greatness, glory and honour, impute to their antifascist adversaries being “communists” or “bolshevists”, and only where – like in the Hungarian example of Szálasi – those heirs of national glory feel proud to be of an “absolutely non-materialist character” they may add even “capitalists”. It might be true that the only question, all post-communist societies between 1989 and 1991 had in common, was the need of a point of reference in their own national history, from where to start the postcommunist future and the process of transformation. Only the German Democratic Republic was either deprived of the chance to find its own historical reference, or – as we can say in another interpretation – it just didn’t need such a moment of self-assurance in order do find its way to future. Unification just made such a reference needless or – again in the other interpretation – unification dictated where to refer to. I’ll come back to this German specification later. If we look at all these various post-communist societies, there were, of course, significant differences already in the way how the communist system had collapsed in each particular society, as well as, even earlier, in the way how communist policy had been carried out in the decades before. And, of course, we have all in mind our stereotypes regarding so called “national characters”, which pretend to explain us, why Václav Havel could become president in Prague, but no counterpart of Havel could do so in Belgrade. Yet, there were at any time some Havels (Havels in terms of a personal habitus) in Belgrade as well, and the real question is why the mainstream of Serbian politics for decades fell into the hands of others. This definitely didn’t happen because of a particular “Serbian national character”, even if those, who assumed political leadership in Serbia, quite often referred to such thing as a “specific Serbian national character” and claimed to act in perfect accordance with it. After the end of communism we can see continuities (and of course discontinuities) as well as references (and lacks of references). I would like to consider continuity as a phenomenon of both the individual and

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collective unconscious, while references seem to me rather the result of an individual or collective decision. Therefore references tend to operate with words, with terms and with denominations. They are constructions and, hence, they are easily replaceable. As we know many big players of the former communist nomenklatura displayed no restraint at all to switch from one reference-system to the other over night, they called themselves devotional Catholics while one day before they still had been chief of the communist youth organisation – as happened for instance with Mr Orban, the former and probably future Hungarian prime minister. So, in those cases, looking at their habitus will tell us much more about them than taking their referential change as serious. I can’t get rid of the impression that a great part of political confusion – including my own one – results from the more or less permanent interference of deliberate references and unconscious continuities with each other. To find some distinctness in this confusion I would like draw your imagination for just a moment into a kind of dream movie: On the screen of this movie you can see a kind of platonic academic “parliament of philosophers” of Central Europe in the very moment of the end of communism. The assembly starts with Adam Michnik, Jacek Kuron, Bronisław Geremek, Tadeusz Mazowiecki from Poland, the camera slowly turns to the group of delegates representing the at that time still existing Czechoslovakia, we see Václav Havel, Ludvík Vaculík, Milan [imecka, Jiři Dienstbier; the turn continues to Hungary with G. M. Tamás, Mihály Vajda, the old wise man Ferenc Fejt, István Eörsi, and so it continues showing a long line from Andrei Pleşu in Bukarest until Ivan Krastev and Alexander Kiossev from Sofia and Fatos Lubonja from Albania. What do they have in common? What do they represent as a common point of historical reference for the future of this part of Europe? From my point of view what all of them share as a kind of common heritage, is not so much a common reference but a habitus. I dare assume that this habitus has its very roots in the tradition of the European bourgeoisie1 of the late 19th and early 20th century. And I sometimes prefer this term of Bourgeoisie to the English equivalent of “civil society” just because this Bourgeoisie defines a personal habitus towards society rather than an institutional structure of social sectors. I am, however, deeply convinced that the very different ways, postcommunist societies were going in the last two decades, their divergent social and political development might become a little bit more plausible and comprehensible, once we consider them from the perspective of the representation of this European bourgeois tradition in these different societies. This question is closely linked to the existence and the social strength of a dissident movement in the 1950ies to the 1980ies, because 1

“Bourgeoisie“ in the meaning of German “Bürgertum“

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the dissidents were real substrate and bearers of this tradition through the entire cold war period. The Czechoslovak society in 1990 reminded the period of Masaryk and the 1930ies, when the gross domestic product per capita in Czechoslovakia was higher than in France. And this reference proved to be strong enough even to tame nationalist energies in the process of state disintegration. Poland, of course, got its own Holy Father who, despite of his traditional spirituality, prevented the country from a radical backslide into clericalist traditions, limited the re-appearance of clericalism to a “Radio Maria” radio channel, and allowed only a short three years revival of reactionary politics after his death. Without him, catholic Poland would perhaps from 1990 have gone the way on which we see catholic Hungary today. Reference to European bourgeois tradition Everywhere, it seems the pace, the sustainability and the success of transition was and still is related to the collective reference to that European bourgeois tradition: • how strong and deep were its social roots during the period referred to? • how strong was it still represented in collective memory at the moment when the reference had been made? • How strong was it physically represented in the society by persons incorporating it? What does that mean regarding South Eastern European countries and especially the states on the area of former Yugoslavia? I think all of you are more competent than me to evaluate the usefulness of this approach for an analysis and for the development of a perspective for the future. I have learned in that short time in Belgrade, that people there – when speaking to you about other persons – use to say, that he / she “belongs to us” and he / she “belongs to the other side”. This marks the line between the two political camps which can roughly be defined as conservatives and liberals, while being conservative ranges from the radical nationalists to the current government and liberals comprises nearly all those out of this range. Yet one thing seems to me as a German really remarkable: it’s the fact that obviously nobody in Belgrade is going to claim for himself either a reference to or any continuity with former communism. This, at any cost, must be avoided like plague.

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At he same time I’m reading German newspapers in Belgrade and I learn that in Berlin they run a serious debate whether or not we may characterize the German Democratic Republic as a “state without rule of law”. So, obviously the German post-communists and these GDR-nostalgics have a much stronger position in society than there counterparts have in Belgrade. Otherwise they would not be able to impose on the German society such a discussion whether torture in the GDR was just an exception that proves the rule of an otherwise civil and lawful society. But again on the other hand, I can’t avoid the impression, that in fact those successors of the former communist nomenklatura are much stronger in today Serbia than in Germany. Why then this continuity is bewared like the most dangerous taboo? Again we find some comprehension only if we make a specific distinction between reference and continuity: German GDR-nostalgics claim the right and the legitimacy of referencing: they want to refer to their “real existing socialism” as the still “better version of Germany”. They at the same time accept discontinuity, because today they visit Mallorca and Antalya like their western compatriots and only habitual differences make them sometimes still distinguishable at the beach. In Serbia, since Yugo-nostalgia was no appropriate point of reference any more, Serbia-nostalgia filled this vacant space. And since the late Yugoslav version of socialism had been declared an evil system of bureaucracy, the offspring from this evil system fiercely denied any such parentage. They instead made their reference to the realm of national symbols. But their habitus unintentionally still reveals where they are really coming from. Let me finish with again an anecdote which I’ve been told some 30 years ago at the University of Nijmegen in the Netherlands: people there told me about a Jewish professor who taught medicine at this university in the 1940ies. The Gestapo arrested him in 1943 and SS deported him to a concentration camp where he survived one and a half years until the final liberation. He returned to Holland where, in 1947, he resumed his position as professor of medicine. And after nearly four years of absence he started his first lecture in 1947 by saying to the students: “As we have learned in our last lecture....” I cannot proof the story to be true, but I very much like it to be so, since I do not know any expression of stronger sovereignty and more powerful self-assertion of a human being against all the burden, history and biography wants to impose us.

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TRANSITION EXPERIENCES IN THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Transition Experiences in the European Countries

TRANSITION EXPERIENCES: THE DISSOLUTION OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK FEDERATION AND SLOVAKIA’S ROAD TO THE EUROPEAN UNION Pavol DEMEŠ

Ladies and gentlemen, it is my great pleasure to be in my beloved Sarajevo again and to have the opportunity to address this audience, of distinguished experts in the social and political sciences. I must admit, I am rather a practitioner with a background in civic and political engagement in my home country, formerly Czechoslovakia and now Slovakia. Moreover, in the last decade I have been engaged in various countries experiencing the transition process, including yours, as a representative of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. I was invited by the organizers of this meeting to share some of our experiences following the split of former Czechoslovakia, and the integration of Slovakia into the European Union, which may be of relevance for your own “journey to Europe”. I am glad that the Slovak Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr. Miroslav Mojìta, who has served in the Balkans for many years, is with us today. As a true expert, he can surely enrich my presentation during the discussion period. Slovakia, Bosnia and Herzegovina have several things in common – they have a similar population, are post-communist, predominantly Slavic countries, and both were created following the division of two larger Communist federations – Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, respectively. Both see their future in European and transatlantic institutions. Slovakia has already been integrated into the main Western structures of the European Union and NATO, unlike your country whose progress was seriously slowed down in political, social, and economic transition caused by the recent tragic conflicts. Similar to many other countries, we believe your future is in the democratic and prosperous European family. As you know, Bosnia and Herzegovina is among foreign policy priorities for Slovakia, and not only because our Foreign Minister, Miroslav Laj~ák, who was until recently High Representative and EU Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, knows your country very well. What are the key differences and lessons your country can learn from Czechoslovak, and particularly the Slovak road to modern Europe? Simply said, we did it in velvet way, refraining from using violence. The

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Velvet Revolution in November 1989 peacefully abolished communism in Czechoslovakia, and the so-called velvet divorce on January 1st, 1993 ended without causing any ethnic hatred within the former Czechoslovak federation. Two new, closely cooperating states appeared on the map of Europe. In comparison with the Balkan situation, we can argue this was almost a fairy tale. But many things were not that simple, easy and predictable. An enormous amount of good will, negotiations, compromise, patience and luck were necessary. These things are always necessary in historical moments involving diverse people filled with emotion, uncertainty and hope. The Velvet Revolution, which was sparked by a police attack on students during a peaceful demonstration in Prague on November, 17, first mobilized intellectuals across the country. Broad based non-partisan movements, namely the Civic Forum and the Public Against Violence, were created in Prague and Bratislava, respectively. The Communist party of Czechoslovakia gave up power within a few weeks and the new political elites, consisting mostly of former dissidents, cultural figures and experts from all walks of life, entered government offices on all levels. Former communist nomenclature was not allowed to occupy high government positions. This was a very important step, rather different from Yugoslavia, which shaped the style and future political course of democratic reforms and created a clear pro-western orientation for the former Communist federation. There was little debate about the split in the newly free Czechoslovakia. Key slogans in both parts of the federation were “freedom and democracy” and “going back to Europe”. It was only later, that debate on constitutional reform and the redefinition of power between the federal and republic levels started among the Czech and Slovak political representatives. Significant differences occurred among key political players, which eventually proved to be so deep, that they agreed to take the decision to the Federal Czechoslovak Parliament to divide the country. It was a political act, without referendum, with a relatively well prepared and controlled process of division, that was unaccompanied by ethnic tensions and border disputes. The international community, therefore, accepted this peaceful division and the two new states – the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, were created on January 1, 1993 and quickly recognized by countries around the world. The most important thing was that we, the Slovaks and the Czechs, did it in a civilized way, respecting the constitution and laws, without disturbing the international community or threatening to destabilize the Central European region. There was no ethnic hatred fueled by politicians and media during the split. On the contrary, a large part of the population in both republics did not celebrate the end of a common state. The people accepted the new political reality as a pragmatic solution that opened the space for a new evolution of both close nations with their ethnic minorities. The most

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evident proof of the maturity of the political elites and the population is the current viability of both states and continued excellent relations between the Czechs and Slovaks on political, cultural and social levels. The only problem is that the Czechs are now doing a bit better in ice hockey and football and the Slovaks have the Euro and produce more cars. Slovakia’s further modernization and entry into European and transatlantic structures was rather bumpy, but in the end successful. As a smaller part of Czechoslovakia, Slovakia had to develop, almost from scratch, both hardware and software for the new state. During the state building process, Slovakia had to develop relationships with neighbors, the European Union, and other parts of the world. Although the neighbors of Slovakia accepted the new political reality with understanding, I must admit that the broader international community was not very sympathetic to the division of Czechoslovakia at the beginning. It was not easy to explain to foreign audiences that this division is not based on ethnic tensions and that it would not enlarge problems linked to the separation of the other two post-communist federations. Moreover, many western experts and politicians were not sure if Slovakia had the potential to develop a functioning economy and EU style governance. The first years of Slovakia’s independence were a mixture of surprising achievements in the state building process, civil society development, and smooth entry and integration into international institutions.. But, there were also some emerging negative trends in governance practices represented by the neo-authoritarian and politically dominant Prime Minister Vladimir Me~iar. While claiming strategic orientation at European and transatlantic structures, respect for political pluralism, and human and minority rights, Me~iar started to violate basic democratic principles. His regime was characterized by massive corruption and authoritarian attacks on political opponents, media, civic leaders and others who were critical of his practices and who threatened his power games. His nationalist and populist agenda dominated domestic political discourse and resulted in Slovakia´s disqualification from the negotiation process to enter the EU and NATO. Out of the ten post-communist countries which have joined the EU so far, Slovakia was the only one, from all the ten, with which the EU interrupted accession talks due to democratic deficits. This negative trend mobilized democratic political opposition and broader civil society against the powerful regime, which was finally defeated during the regular electoral process in important parliamentary elections in the fall of 1998. Again, it was done peacefully and without foreign intervention. It was Slovakia´s own game, but the country benefited greatly from the political, diplomatic and financial support from European and American partners who cared about this country and its ambition to be part of a civilized family. If you are interested in learning more about this peaceful democratic breakthrough in Slovakia and its influence on other countries, I invite you to read the book Reclaiming Democracy. Civil

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Society and Electoral Change in Central and Eastern Europe, which we published two years ago, and is available on GMF’s website. After the new, broadly based coalition government, lead by Prime Minister Mikulá{ Dzurinda, came to power in 1998, Slovakia started its “catch up” period. Political elites, civil society, and population at large wanted to overcome the lost time in the accession process to the EU. Unprecedented political, economic and social reform started in order to fulfill the criteria given to all EU applicants. Reforms had temporarily painful consequences for Slovak citizens in the form of high unemployment and other social deficiencies, as well as impacting the popularity of those politicians who had introduced them. Slovakia showed remarkable focus on key strategic goals in this period and the capacity to reach consensus even among the most bitter political rivals. This resulted in narrowing the gap between the most progressive Central and Eastern European applicant countries and Slovakia. In the “big bang” EU enlargement, in spring 2004, after a true race with time, the country joined others in the Union, only a few weeks after joining NATO. Slovakia was finally anchored in the rules based, democratic and prosperous family, step by step dismantling walls and borders. This would have never happened if there had not been prevailing agreement among political elites, intellectuals and civil society actors who needed to translate reform and the integration process into action, and convince the public to support it. Today, twenty years after the Velvet Revolution, sixteen years after the “velvet divorce” and five years after joining EU and NATO, Slovakia is a standard European country. We do not need a visa to enter the EU and many other countries around the world, including the United States. We do not have to debate which national hero will be depicted on our bank notes, since we successfully introduced the Euro in January of this year. We turned from a recipient to a donor country, and are now assisting others, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, with their transition processes. But, even with all of these macro-successes there are still numerous areas where we are far from satisfaction and can´t “check many boxes”. We discovered quickly that even if you join the EU and NATO you are not immune to populism, nationalism, extremism and corruption in public life. Deep social and regional inequalities, problems with the rule of law and education system have not disappeared. But the key is that we have the freedom and the chance to make corrections, and that the young generation is not dreaming about emigration as before. Moreover, we are part of family which is ready to be of help even in a period marked by the turmoil of a global financial and economic crisis. I wish that the example of the bumpy road of my country will stimulate discussion today, and at least partly, serve as an inspiration for you who care so deeply about the well- being of your homeland - Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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1989: What Really Came Down With the Fall of the Berlin Wall? Gajo Sekulić

“...Jede politische Revolution ist die Revolution der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft“ (Karl Marx, Zur Judenfrage, 1843)

In the study below, first of all, I problematize the method of a narrow, partial interpretation of the year 1989, then I indicate the historical structural link between important symbolic years – 1968, 1989 and 2009 – since only a broad historical perspective of interpretation of multi-meaning consequences of big transformations of the society after 1989 may provide an accurate insight into the situation and range of philosophical, social, economic and political theories of present day, and in conclusion, I articulate some suggestions for a research into the boundaries of classical and postmodern liberalism from the viewpoint of the real possibilities of the liberal-democratic socialism. (This structure is logical rather than formal.) In this way I am trying to provide a negative answer to the question from the title: was the idea of liberal-democratic socialism destructed in principle with the fall of primitive communism or the “...realexisting socialism“, and with it, the relevance of the original critical theory of Karl Marx and his original successors, such as, say, not only because of his 80th birthday, precisely on June 18 of this years, a philosophically open inter-disciplinary mixture of Habermas’s theories, but primarily because of an open critical level of his political theory which is both for and against Marx, superior to both classical and postmodern liberalism, let alone a theoretical wilderness of fanaticized and primitive ethno-liberals and false “...former“ Marxists within the space of the former real-existing socialism who were allegedly left without the subjects of criticism. This places the reminder of the main dimension of J. Habermas’s political theory in the context of meaning and consequences of 1989 in the forefront of this study.

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I 1989: Significance and Consequences Seven thematic impulses for the understanding and surpassing pre-political ethnocentrism of new democracies and the crisis of the political theory today. Towards the opinion of chances of liberal-democratic socialism

*** Anniversary just as any other anniversary. To think the year 1989 just as an anniversary would be senseless. It can only be an external stimulus for ahistorical academic theses about the end of history because it brought down the “...Cold War“ assumptions and replaced it, perhaps, with the “...Cold Peace“ as a long-term and ever more dangerous strategy for international relations. Behind this primitive ideology lies a very arrogant ideological triumphalist illusion about the realization of the dream about the end of communism as the end of every idea about historical chances of the liberal-democratic socialism, which, in principle, even Rawls1 does not abjure, and/or different historical non-democratic radical alternatives with the minimum of at least sceptical ethics and humanism. The blind enthusiasm, demonstrated by, for example, Jacques Rupnik in 2001, is comic even today, although ideological phantasm of the new democracies has not yet been spiritually subdued. He says: However, it would be inappropriate to consider 1989 only as a new edition or continuation of 1789. ... In this regard, 1989 completes the era of revolutions, which began in 1789 and gained new momentum in 1917. 1989 will go down in history as a peace “revolution“ par excellence and also as the “...revolution qua restoration.“ What remains of 1989 – seen with the 1989 eyes – is the idea of democracy to the detriment of the idea of revolution.2 It remains quite questionable whether democracy and revolution may be separated in such a touching Central European way. “...We“, from the South, are something different and we are not in the same boat. That year cannot be researched in isolation and beyond a broader historical context. Backwards – without understanding the consequences and meaning of 1968 and forward without understanding the crisis of financial capitalism in its latest phase of “...neuro-capitalism“ or, under the most recent syntagma, “...casino-capitalism“:3

1 2 3

John Rawls, Gustizia come equita. Una riformulazione. Feltrineli, Milano 2002, p.154-155 Jacques Rupnik und Dominique Moïsi, “1989 in historischer Perspektive“, Merkur, 2/1991, S.7 “Das Kasino Kapitalismus. Globalisierung und Krise“, Edition Blätter, Berlin 2009. The group of international left-oriented experts considers alternatives to “ financial-market capitalism“ (Altvater, Fraser, Amin, Sassen et al.)

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Phenomenology of spirit is being cast away with indignation. A dozen of sciences, like neuro-anthropology, neuro-pedagogy, neurotheology, neuro-aesthetics and neuro-economics, emerged to the scene. Their self-confident appearance lays bare the neuro-science’s usurping tendency to be not only the natural science spiritual science but also the leading science of the 21st century. The foundation, impetus and promise of this requirement are their maxim – that the overall human behaviour is determined by the regularities of the activities of nerve cells and the way in which they are organized in the brain. Even if the universal importance of this maxim is challenged, it is possible to postulate, with good reason, that there is a new, neuro-capitalism – or that as such it is in the making....4 Rupnik’s illusion that the year 1989, “...revolution like restoration“, was won over by democracy, or more precisely, that the “...idea of revolution“ lost from the “...idea of democracy“ would require an in-depth analysis. Instead, my choice is the general thesis of this study, which arises from the spirit of the critical interpretation of Marx’s thesis about every political revolution as the revolution which inevitably belongs to important capabilities of the“civil society“. This genitive is both genitivius subiectivus and genitivus obiectivus. Marx’s level of thinking about political revolution can be comprehended only in the counterpoint of “...universal revolution“, which is a separate topic, today more topical than ever before.5 It is not just about the difference between universalism as the alleged essentialism and contextualism in the postmodern variants which surpassed, allegedly, every fundamentalist or essentialist foundation. Both lines are still closer than it is thought in the texts by Rorty, Deridda or Liothard. Even the wisest ones keep forgetting that the democracy’s birth place is largely in historical terms precisely revolution, as a political revolution. For me, it remains an open issue whether the boundaries of democracy are determined by the boundaries of political revolution. This question can be answered, in terms of method, also by testing how far liberalism goes, for which, in theoretical view, the most adequate starting point is the remarkable discussion between Habermas and Rawls.6 It would also be necessary to consider on another occasion, without irony, the presumed naturalist7 neuro-scientific illusion that the nerve cells are adapted to the spirit of capitalism precisely by the way they are organized in human brain. From there to the thesis that the 4 5

6

7

Henric Jokeit und Ewa Hess, “Neurokapitalismus“, Merkur, Nr. 721, Jun 2009, S. 541 In “our“ domestic literature see especially: Gajo Petrovi}, Mi{ljenje revolucije, Izabrana djela, Naprijed, Zagreb, 1978; 2. edition, Odabrana djela, 2, Zagreb/Belgrade, 1986. See: G. Sekuli}, „Da li je rasprava Habermas-Rawls zavr{ena? Grani~ne mogu}nosti liberalizma i demokratije (socijalizma)“, Zbornik radova sa skupa o J. Rawlsu: John Rawls i perspektive liberalne demokratije u Bosni i Hercegovini. FNS, Sarajevo 2003, p. 9-18. The critique of naturalistic expansion in spiritual sciences as of recently has been initiated by Habermas in his book Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion, Suhrkamp Verlag, 2005. English translation: Between Naturalism and Religion, Polity Press, 2008.

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requirements of liberal-democratic socialism are completely unnatural to the nature of nerve cells and their practice in the brain – it is not too far at all. It has been a long time since Marx’s criticism of social relations as natural relations received a more accurate praise.8

1. The end of communism or “...really existing socialism“? Theses on presuppositions of theoretical-historical new foundation of liberal-democratic socialism. The road which leads to overcoming the principled crisis of every critical theory today, and especially of the ruling ethno-centrism of the socalled “...post-socialist“ countries should, first of all, suggest, providing sound arguments, the need for a research into the importance and consequences of 1989 by attempting, without delay to answer the question about the accuracy or falsely of the interpretation of 1989 as the end or the beginning of an end of the so-called communism, under the presupposition that something like that has ever existed. If not, and probably it has not, except for the form of “...primitive communism“ in the sense which Marx attached to this syntagma more than 160 years ago in The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (of 1844), then we should talk about the beginning of an end of the so-called really existing socialism which indeed “...came down“ in Europe in 1989. It is interesting how ideological blindness anticipates that even this type of socialism was not completely overthrown, as it survived in China (and elsewhere) in a specific symbiosis with some elements of capitalist economy. Present-day philosophical, political, social, cultural and economic theory is infected with a myriad unclear ideological “...post-isms“. Quite rare are the works that reliably operate with such terms as “...post-modern“, “...post-communism“, “...post-socialism“, “...post-Marxism“, “...post-humanism“, “...post-history“ etc. The book by J. Habermas Die nachholende Revolution9, which was written and published at the very beginning of those events and which consists of his both published and unpublished works, was by the end of 1980s the most delicate interpretation of the year 1989, shaped at the very beginning of great changes. Habermas makes his position clear already in a brief introduction: The events are changing on a daily basis both the international and internal German scenes. However, the catching-up revolution (die nachholende Revolution) does not shed any new light on our old problems. These, as Adorno could say, negative constants amid an accelerated history, could justify the views I have maintained over the last several years. 10 8

9 10

I encountered this phenomenon in the early 1970s. G. Sekuli}, Filozofija i proletarijat u djelu Karla Marksa, Radni~ki univerzitet, Subotica, 1980, and also in other texts, e.g.: G.S., Aktualnost Marksovog Kapitala, Zagreb, RU 1982, p. 111-129. Jürgen Habermas, Die nachholende Revolution, Suhrkamp Verlag, F a/M, 1990. Ibid., 7.

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His fear and scepticism as opposed to his own and general enthusiasm in the beginning, Habermas develops exhaustively and analytically best in the article (published for the first time in that book) under the title “...Catching-up revolution and the left need for review. What does socialism mean today?“ 11 The then media story speaks of “de-magicalization of socialism“, of “...the failure of one idea“ with a dominating refrain: “... that utopias and philosophies of history have to end up in subjugation“. Habermas moves on the critical-scientific level and asks: How should the historical meaning of revolutionary changes in East and Central Europe be evaluated? What does the bankruptcy of state socialism mean for political movements and ideas which are deep-rooted in the 19th century, and what does it mean for the theoretical legacy of the West European Left?12 The fundamental historical presupposition for a change is the historical fact of radical changes in the USSR, that is in Russia13, i.e. the historical fact of the failure of the project of state socialism, which is true for both the ex camp countries and the GDR: The changes in Poland were the result of “...permanent resistance by the Solidarnost movement supported by the Catholic Church, in Hungary they resulted from the struggle for power among the political elites; in the GDR and Czechoslovakia, it was the upheaval resulting from peaceful massive demonstrations, in Rumunia, it was the bloody revolution, and in Bulgaria, in a resilient way. Despite the multitude of the manifested forms, the revolution in those countries is proven by events: revolution generates its dates. It can be understood in a certain way... as a revolution which frees the way for catching up on missed developments.14 “...Negative constants“ and “catching up on missed development opportunities“ are the two facts that Habermas starts from in his understanding of the importance of 1989. In a myriad of important parts of this analysis, I shall focus on the explication of his classification of postsocialist countries in regard to socialism as the project after the fall of state socialism (a) while leaving aside his discussion on the attitudes towards Marx’s theory after 1989 (b). (a) Habermas divides six different answers to the question of the future destiny of socialism after 1989 into two groups: three “...affirmative“ and three “critical“ historical answers. Catching up revolutions enables

11 12 13

14

Ibid., 179. Ibid., 179. On the Russian capitalist revolution which allegedly was successful in introducing market economy to the detriment of democracy, see among the latest studies in particular: Anders Åslund, Russia’s Capitalist Revolution. Why Market Reform Succeeded and Democracy Failed, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington DC, October 2007. Jürgen Habermas, Die nachholende Revolution, Suhrkamp Verlag, F a/M, 1990: 180.

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the “...return to the democratic rule of law and accession to the capitalist developed West“ but also the rejection of the model of revolutions which start from 1917, which could explain the “...complete lack of innovative ideas, the ideas which point to the future“.15 Although these revolutionary changes had very much different and mutually exclusive interpretations, Habermas summed up the six models of interpretation of 1989 in regard to socialism. “...Both groups can be lined up in a symmetrical order as Stalinist, Leninist and reform communism interpretation on the one hand, and as postmodernist, anti-communist and liberal, on the other.“ 16

Stalinist interpretation denies the revolutionary character of the changes and perceives them as “counter-revolutionary“. Leninist interpretation considers changes as a “conservative revolution“ (J. Kuszynski) within a historical long revolutionary process in which a revolution is “purged“ from within. Already next process shows that it is not about a “sheer selfcorrection of the state socialism“. The third, affirmative model of interpretation, the reform-communist model, especially in Prague with Dub~ek, and in the GDR, as a third road between social-state capitalism and state socialism, tries to revitalize the idea of democratic socialism, which Habermas considers to be unrealistic as the masses, having experienced the Soviet-type totalitarianism, were resolved in their decision not to resort to that option. Even on the side of the three models of interpretation of events which are critical towards socialism, an extreme position was not developed in a convincing way. “...Postmodernist criticism of mind“ is fascinated by a non-violent overthrow of the state socialism, so that this revolution is allegedly the end of the eras of revolutions. “...Catching-up revolution“ in the East came closer to the spirit of the West, not only to its technical civilization but also to its democratic tradition. Habermas is very much sceptical about the postmodernist criticism of mind, which stylizes the historical scheme by the inspiration in Nietzsche and Heidegger. Anticommunist model of interpretation of 1989 celebrates changes as a “...triumphant end of the world’s civil war which the Bolsheviks proclaimed in 1917; again a revolution turned against its own source.“ Habermas’s interpretation of anticommunist model of interpretation of 1989 interprets translation of the former “...international class struggle“ to the term “...the world’s civil war“ and under Carl Schmitt’s influence, translates the first expression from the language of the theory of society to the language of one “...Hobbes’s theory of power“. The story about the “...world’s civil war“ was created in the period of a conflict between East and West. Historian Ernst Notle was its main advocate. In his intention to negate Leninism, his anti-communism (his well-known thesis is that fascism is a

15 16

Ibid., 181. Ibid., 181.

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historical response to communism) is just his adverse side. Liberal interpretation of 1989 is the most important. Liberal triumphalism was expressed in Zeit17 quite accurately by Daniel Bell and Ralf Dahrendorf. Habermas says: What remains is liberal interpretation which, first of al, only registers that with the state socialism the very last forms of totalitarian power in Europe began to fall apart. The epoch which began with fascism is moving towards its end. In parallel to the democratic rule of law, the market economy and social pluralism, the ideas of liberal order are also established. In this way, the tempting ideologies about the end of ideologies are finally coming true. ... Liberal interpretation is not bad. However, it fails to notice the log that is in it own eye.18 Does Habermas exaggerate with this log in the eye of the liberal model of interpretation of the meaning and consequences of 1989? According to his opinion, the triumphant liberal interpretations resemble Marx’s “...hymnic“ description of the revolutionary role of the bourgeoisie (citizenry) in the first chapter of The Manifesto of the Communist Party, which necessarily subjugates all the areas of the world to its logic and interests. But here Marx talks about the “so-called civilization“ of capitalism, which liberals keep forgetting. This is how Habermas understands Marx’s substantial limitation of his accurate, nearly advertising (Marx as the PR of capitalism!) description of the civilization role of the bourgeoisie or the citizenry as the new transformations, the so-called “...personification of capital“, are ideologically mystified today. Marx thought that every civilization which subjugates itself to selfreproduction of capital carries inside itself a seed of devastation as in this way it pretends to be blind to all the relevancies which cannot be expressed in prices. 19 Today, the circumstances from Marx’s description are significantly different. The pillar of the capitalist expansion is no longer that bourgeoisie, but one Economic system which got separated from sensually identifying class structures, which became anonymous and which operates on the global level. And our societies, which climbed in this system to the “...economic top“ no longer resemble the Manchester England the misery of which Engels described a long time ago in a drastic manner. Those societies in the meantime found, in a socialstate compromise, a response to the strong words from the Communist Manifesto and tenacious struggle by the European labour 17 18 19

Die Zeit, 29. Dezember 1989. Jürgen Habermas, Die nachholende Revolution, Suhrkamp Verlag, F a/M, 1990. 186. Ibid., 187.

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movement. Allein, der ironische Umstand, dass Marx für eine Situation, wo das anlagesuchene Kapital auf die staatssozialistisch ausgelaugten Märkte drängt, immer noch die besten Zitate liefert, stimmt ebenso nachdenklich wie die Tatsache, dass Marxens Zweifel gleichsam in die Strukturen der fortgesrittesten kapitalistischen Gesellschaften selbs inkorporiert worden ist.20 The irony is that as Marx offers still the best quotes which help understand the situation and tendencies in the “...state socialist“ societies penetrated by capital in illegal ways, his doubt which is incorporated in the structures of the most developed capitalist societies is equally appropriate. Through Marx, East and West meet here after 1989. In this regard Habermas is reserved towards liberal rejection of socialism with a seeming legacy in the social-democratic era21 (188). This is why he puts his question in a radical way about whether all theoretical and spiritual sources from which “...West European Left draws its theoretical stimuli and normative orientation failed with the liquidation of Eastern state socialism“. His response is complex and in any case it is not negative. 22 In any case, Habermas’s research recommendation of these phenomena is finalized in the position that all so-called “post-socialist societies“ would have the following historical task: “Today, the social-state compromise, which took root in social structures, represents the foundation from which every politics in our environment has to start.“23 Has it happened anywhere in the proper way? How many of those, at this time, seven new states in the territory of former Yugoslavia started their journey to “democracy“ from that historical position? Could something similar be a starting point for a serious inter-disciplinary research into a twenty-year long tragic, albeit unequally distributed history of “our“ areas under the principle of military, political and international power? Eventually, it is from this position and this level of historical change that one could argue about the blindness of the American and European Democracy Commissioners in relation to the drama in Bosnia and Herzegovina: these days, the entry of Serbia and Montenegro into the Schengen happy brothers group is being planned while the same right for the living social individuals and fictitious citizens – BIH nationals – without any legal or moral explanation – is being postponed to one of the years to come! Ontological and anthological scandal of Euromandarins!

20

21 22

23

Ibid., 187. I intentionally leave this section of the quote in German because of its significance (note by the author) Ibid., 188. Habermas’s analysis starts from the thesis that the Left cannot operate as if nothing had happened in 1989 although there is no reason for it to act as if everything had gone to ashes. In the second part of this study, in item 6, Habermas develops an inspiring polemic with Marx for the purpose of providing arguments for his relevance today, with a series of arguments that nobody in literature has yet answered to – which necessarily remains outside the function of this paper. Jürgen Habermas, Die nachholende Revolution, Suhrkamp Verlag, F a/M, 1990., 197.

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2. It is necessary to research systematically the difference and similarity between the yu real existing socialism and the Real Existing Socialism as such Twenty years of upheaval – 1989 – 2009 – would deserve a debate on historical, political, cultural, economic and ethic nature of the RES. As this roundtable is taking place in Sarajevo (BiH but also former Yugoslavia), the differentia specifica of the ex-yu socialism or the Yu RealExisting Socialism could be researched in particular. The main historical and scientific reason for this line is based, among other things, on the need for a more accurate academic understanding of a strange historical paradox between the widespread thesis about some kind of excellence and relative uniqueness of the yu socialism in relation to paradigmatically Stalinized Soviet group of countries, which, under the pressure of the infernal propulsion of the right of the people to self-determination as well as of the failed economic prosperity, mainly, at least in the first phase, manages to avoid the warlike form of violence with a minimum of democratic procedure, while the region of what is today referred to as the West Balkans is surrendered, from within and outside, to the most diverse violence. Aggressions, civil wars, war crimes, massive war crimes ranging to the crime of genocide, hatred, fear, xenophobia, ethnic distance etc.... Why is that so? Because comrade Gorbachev was wiser than a huge mass of Tito’s powerful successors? Because liberal democratic left of exYugoslavia failed to find a response overnight to the superior protagonists of ethno-nationalist pre-democratic and devastating elements creating seven new ethnically clean mini-states through civil wars and aggressions with religiously and ethnically, sad to say, successful phantasms? There is an immense literature on this issue, although a more accurate response is yet to be found. A whole series of undone and unbegun criticisms of ideologies and practices is ahead of us. On the soil of what used to be a joint country all sorts of ideological and political civil wars continue without an end in sight. Besides, the Big Brother from Europe and the U.S.A. has not yet explored the proportions of the tragedy of Yugoslavia and its former citizens, and of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Humanistic, social and political sciences, depending on the new city villages in the territory of ex-Yugoslavia are hardly getting rid of, if at all, ethnic worm’s-eye views. Completely neglected in the state budgets, in the end they will be left without a scientific successor generation, exposed to a big competition in the West – if ever it reaches as far as the West.

3. Eastern and Western democracy in the same boat facing the 21st century challenges The year 1989 was the beginning of a more radical democratic transformation of the large group of the so-called – colloquially and unscientifically said – “...post-socialist countries“. Transformation of rigid to-

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talitarian and bureaucraticized systems and the world of life is taking place at different paces, with different intensity and along different political paths. There is immense literature written about this. I have to restrict myself to only a few important authors. Agnes Heller in her “...Ten Years Later“ 24 observes that today, in 2009, we cannot be triumphantly joyous after so many years following the change. In Hungary, new democrats are making the “...golden calf“: Over these twenty years, Hungary has become a member state of the European Union, and in so doing it has almost got others to forget completely (as we ourselves have forgotten) that we fought on the wrong side in both world wars. I might even say that this time, for once, the country has joined the winning side. What is missing is a democratic spirit, a zest for enterprise, bravery and patriotism – scarce commodities.25 Extremely interesting is an interview with Agnes Heller in Australia’s magazine Thesis Eleven, in which she reminds, in my view, in reaction to idealistic exaggerations of non-violent revolutions in 1989 (Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia), of the internal logic of a revolution and violence, where the act of revolution itself does not excessively follow violence (October 1917). It comes later.26 Adam Michnik27 believes that the year 1989 was, after all, annus mirabilis: The year 1989 brought a revolution without revolution. The struggle against Communism revealed a belief in the importance of human freedom. But this freedom brought with it paradoxes. The workers who went on strike in Poland to win their freedom were the first victims of the transformation. The Solidarno{} strongholds went bankrupt. But throughout this great expanse, save for the Balkans and Russia, there have never been a better 20 years than the past two decades. Present-day Europe is in any case being put to the test of its own credibility. Cynicism, which undermines every value system, and authoritarian temptations are threatening freedom. The defence of the Republic is at stake.28

24

25 26 27

28

Agnes Heller, “Ten years later“, Eurozine (www.eurozine.com) First published in The Hungarian Quarterly, 193/2009. Ibid. An Interview with Agnes Heller, Thesis Eleven, Number 97, May 2009, 99-105. Adam Michnik, Verteidigung der Freiheit. Reflexionen über 1989. Magazine Osteuropa, 2-3/2009. Taken from: www.eurozine.com Ibid.

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4. The Left facing the challenges of the latest world’s crisis of capitalist economy There is a substantial historical link between the crisis of the real-existing socialism 20 years ago, during the time of an unrestrained triumph of neo-liberalism and financial speculation capitalism and its comprehensive crisis of today in which, in the first phase, it returns to the state capitalism project. Here comes a period, where the question of a historical relationship between the crisis and the fall of the state socialism project and the crisis of the currently dominant casino-state capitalism should be suggested. Thus German theoretician Friedhelm Hengsbach29 thinks that a chance lies in a big change: in place of the financial market, which “...should be de-globalized“, a chance should be given to “...economic democracy“. Here we should add that at least in Germany, there is a growing interest in the “...democracy of advice“.

5. Boundaries of the historic survival of capitalism from the viewpoint of new chances of democracy Just as so long awaited and desirable historical defeat of the RES did not exhaust important possibilities of the “...liberal-democratic project of socialism“, the capitalistic manner of life production has allegedly not yet lost its inherent ability of an indefinite revolutionization of production and global way of life.30

6. The most difficult task: research into nonconcurency and structural closeness of the two major crises: 1989 and 2008-2009. Today, we should think about this nonconcurrency of the two major crises and their encounter today. Which is ominous or life-saving? For now we might know, in the basic outlines, where a solution to the first crisis leads, or do we really know it? We could have a better knowledge about it if a solution to present-day crisis of the capitalist way of life is done without violence, with at least minimum of violence, and with the minimum of national, regional and global democratic procedures.

29

30

Friedhelm Hengsbach, Nach der Krise ist von der Krise. Für eine Wirtschaftsdemokratie ohne Finanzkapitalismus, Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, 5/2009, S. 53-61. Today, it would be very desirable to discuss enthusiasm of political economists of predatory capitalism manifested in the special issue of the magazine Merkur (653/654) under the heading “...Kapitalismus oder Barbarei“? and compare that ideological Hayekian galimatias to the texts of the present great authors of liberal orientation who write – nevertheless – about bankruptcy of at least financial capitalism and return to the state (=statist) capitalism.

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7. Is the liberal-democratic socialist left still possible? Global and any other possible teachers of mankind31 has for the time being disappeared. Nobody can any longer be alone. The worlds of life of post-socialism meet, perhaps, with the contours of either barbarianism of post-capitalism in its predatory form or important alternatives to capitalism, among which is certainly that of liberal-democratic socialism, facing a major work on spiritual legacy and the new foundation of liberal-democratic socialism. Modern social democracy in Europe, faced with a choice between a third way social democracy as a disaster and real, new possibilities of democracy of the founding liberal-democratic socialism.32 Post-socialism learned something from more complex democratic societies of the West. Can it open new civilization vistas with a new energy of democracy? Here, we should be precise: instead of agreeing to an ever stronger and falser ideological speech about “...post-communism“ even about “post-socialism“ as still academic self-explanatory prop-phrases of especially former dogmatic Marxists and in particular of the newly fledged ethnonationalist revolutionaries as triumphalist adherents of liberalism without borders, it is necessary to develop systematically a spiritual resistance to a destructive spiritual Right in both the region and “...our“ entities and beyond. The like-minded people are yet to be recognized despite electronic speed of formal communication, and perhaps, they are just emerging.

II Europe and “We“ After 1968 and 198933 1. The spirit of ‘68. (a) and its important consequences for Europe today (b): a) Despite the moments of a more radical violence, social-cultural and political protest of students and workers in West Europe and the rest of the developed world was least to say the last global in principle nonviolent attempt to humanize or neutralize rough hegemonic forms of reproduction and spread of Capital against Labour but also an indication of an important alternative to capitalism. The student movement in the East went against the authoritarian real-existing socialism, far from

31

32

33

“Teacher of mankind“ is Hegel’s highest compliment to the thinkers in Lectures on the History of Philosophy. For him those are certainly Plato, Aristotle and a few more exceptions. See: Albrecht von Lucke, Europa und die Krise der Linken, Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, 7/2009, S.5-8. Due to limited space of the publication, II and III parts of this study remain only as indications. (note by the author).

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radical forms of the revolutionary action through violence like, for example, in the Hungarian rebellion/revolution in 1956.34 b) Of course, it did not have success on any line of its pretensions anywhere in the world in principle, except for making a contribution to some mild and symbolic corrections in the East. The West has since been losing its own emancipatory potentials in both the economy and culture and democracy. The main message: the principle of uncompromisingness after ‘68 was seriously called into question. My question is as follows: is Oskar Negt right today when he calls for rejection of “...an illusion of principled uncompromisingness“ (“Kompromisslosigkeit“).35 Luther’s “...Here I stand. I can do no other“ is typical of only strong identity coercion in churches and sects, Negt thinks, in this text a recommendation as a lesson from the events in 1968. Is this not too early? In any case, I do accept the principle of non-violence as a regulatory idea of every future radical change of modern capitalist society from Tokyo, via Moscow to Berlin, Belgrade, Zagreb and Sarajevo. However, the foundation of this principle requires also a systematic reconstruction of the past and the appropriate forms of knowledge and self-confidence.

2. The ‘89 spirit. (a) and its consequences (b) (a) I consider the year 1989 as a symbolic announcement of a long-term liberation from structural layers of authoritarianism and capitalism of the West without an alternative, as well as of totalitarianism of the East through democratization and abolition of its non-democratic regimes. This liberation is uncertain, superficial and diabolic because in nearly all countries a democratic discourse had a statist rather than republican form. In fact, the so-called liberal nationalism (Poland, the Check Republic, Slovakia) prevails. One of the causes lies in the fact of the principled and long impasse of social democracy in complex societies (from the US to the FRG). (b) An important negative consequence of ‘89 is an undesirable reduction of democracy to the sheer legitimization and legalization of (ethnic) nationalism at both the level of national states for the purpose of radical legitimization of the project of pure national states (both old and new) and at the level of what have for the time being and so far been formal supranational political communities (EU as another US34

35

Huge controversies were triggered in Germany and beyond by Götz Aly’s book, Unser Kampf.1968, S. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main 2008. The book investigates the parallels between “...68-ists“ and “...33ists“ in a rather easy-going, unconvincing and at the same time tempting and certainly provocative way, unlike an euphoric “revolutionary“ self-feeling of today’s somewhat older 68’s. He says, “We should be thankful to God that their children (i.e. children of the 33-ists) did not succeed“ in 1968. G. Aly is far from a serious research of the historical meaning and consequences of the 1968 Movement, in which there were certainly different options. All of them share one thing in common – defeat. Oskar Negt, Achtundsechzig. Politische Intellektuelle und die Macht, Steidl Verlag, Göttingen 1995, S. 401-402.

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America). The main message of ‘89: it is more necessary than ever before to provide arguments in support of the line of action and opinion on the line of radical non-violence or non-violent radicalism. In other words: EITHER – OR / ENTWEDER – ODER as a principle which historically legitimized the right to violence for the purpose of some higher goals may be accepted or rejected only on the basis of universal validity or non-validity of the principle of non-violence (Gewaltlosigkeit).36

III Some sceptical recommendations for the so-called scientists, intellectuals, liberals and former Marxists It is only on tendentiously and normatively similarly meant basis that it is possible to speak of the civilized radically non-violent overcoming of the global non-violent power of the so-called neo-liberalism, which is an ideological euphemism for an almost absolute real and formal subsumption of the Labour under “...transcendental power“ of Capital. No reliable knowledge about this is possible without a new reading of Marx’s files within his Critique of Political Economy. When the great thinker of the tragedy of existence of both thinker and social individual, Richard Rorty, advised students, in connection with the Manifesto anniversary, that they should read The New Testament and The Manifesto of Communist Party as still inspiring texts, along with Rorty’s melancholy and skepticism, and perhaps even irony, because of their intentions towards brotherhood and social justice, he must presumed deep inside his soul that the thick huge book in three volumes – never completed for publication. Capital, which does not glorify just the capitalist “...so-called“ civilization – is perhaps a natural continuation of the radically alternative line in the Manifesto. This, of course, does not give privilege to Marx’s open critical theory but only takes it into consideration within inter-disciplinary discussion with other and different theories.

36

Here are neglected such thinkers as Johann Galtung and Diether Senghas, as modern founders of critical theory of peace and the principle of non-violence which cannot be raised as a question without argumentation by J. Habermas in his Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (1981) in two volumes and later works.

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THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGES: HOW DIFFERENT ARE THE TRANSFORMATION RESULTS IN POST-YUGOSLAV COUNTRIES Nenad ZAKOŠEK

One of the most interesting and also greatly neglected political science issues is how much political regimes are different in the post-Yugoslav states and if the differences are huge, how they can be explained. This question is particularly interesting since those regimes have one and the same origin – they all stem from the Yugoslav communist regime. There are general and seemingly broadly accepted conceptions about the quality of democracy and stability of orders in those states today, under which Slovenia is the most advanced democracy, while BiH is the lest developed and the most unstable (if we disregard Kosovo which has just started its path to building a state and democracy). Since the new states and their political regimes arose from the legacy they all share, can those differences be explained with some other historical differences, for example, by a different degree of economic development or some specific cultural features of the post-Yugoslav countries? Such explanations do exist in academic debates, most notably in 1990s, trying to explain the success or failure of democratic transitions, state building or the type of nationalism in the post-Yugoslav countries with the heavy, longstanding burden of the past.1 However, to assume such an important influence of structural factors would mean to accept an extremely high degree and a long-lasting effect of structural determinism, which is not plausible from the viewpoint of social sciences focused on the impact of individual and collective players. Causes of different results of transition in the region of former Yugoslavia should thus be sought elsewhere.

1

See: Nenad Zako{ek, 2007: The Heavy Burden of History: Political Uses of the Past in the Yugoslav Successor States, Politi~ka misao, year 44, No. 5, 29-43, Nenad Zako{ek and Goran ûlar, Croatia, Chapter 13, in: Sten Berglund, Joakim Ekman and Frank H. Aarebrot (ur.), The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe, 2nd edition, Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2004, 451-492 Nenad Zako{ek, Democratization, State-building and War: The Cases of Serbia and Croatia, Democratization, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2008: 588-610.

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International indices of democratization If we are interested in the assessment of democratic quality and stability of political regimes, which is based on differentiated and methodologically clearly based criteria, we can rely on some of the well-known international indices measuring them. There is, for instance, Freedom House (FH) Political Rights and Civil Liberties Index (FH PR&CLI) which has been used to measure those categories ever since the post-Yugoslav countries became independent, or somewhat more complex Freedom House Nations in Transit Index (FH NIT), presented since the late 1990s in annual reports. Finally, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) has been available since 2003.2 On the face of it, these indices confirm the general judgment on the level of democracy in post-Yugoslav areas, under which democracy is most developed in Slovenia, and least developed in BiH. However, a more in-depth comparison of those indices shows some important differences in ranking individual post-Yugoslav regimes. The simplest index, FH PR&CLI, offers a dichotomic picture of the group of six post-Yugoslav countries. Three states have fully free regimes: Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia, while three states belong to the group of partly free regimes: Macedonia, Montenegro and BiH. Slovenia receives the highest numeric rating, i.e. it is equated with the most advanced democracies; Croatia and Serbia receive somewhat lower rating; Macedonia and Montenegro receive the same rating, while BiH is unequivocally rated lowest. The more refined Freedom House index, FH NIT, offers a rather different picture: only Slovenia is rated as a consolidated democracy, as more successful than even the best East European states like the Czech Republic and Estonia. Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia and Macedonia are all rated as semiconsolidated democracies on a comparably equal level. Only BiH is rated as a hybrid regime, i.e. the regime which combines democratic and authoritarian elements. Eventually, the BIT, as the most complex index in methodological terms, offers a completely different categorization of the post-Yugoslav regimes. Slovenia and Croatia are assessed as the states which are “highly advanced“ in political and economic transformation towards liberal democracy and market economy (Slovenia is given on a scale of 1 to 10 one solid score higher than Croatia). Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia are assessed as the states which have achieved advanced transformation, where Macedonia is rated somewhat higher than Serbia and Montenegro. Only BiH is in the group of the states with limited transformation. The comparison of international methods of measuring the quality of democracy thus shows that there is no consensus on the ratings of the post-Yugoslav regimes. Of course, the character of those indices of democracy depends on the measurement methodology as well as on impartiality

2

See the Attachment.

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and knowledgeability of experts who evaluate the regimes. However, it is precisely the lack of consensus that indicates some serious weaknesses of such a procedure of indexing the regimes. Let me point out some of the most important weaknesses which are, in my view, inherent to the method of comparing the regimes:

• Path dependency: status of a country, or its regime, depends largely on initial – either positive or negative – assessments. The evaluators in later stages will hardly ever explain some major deviations from the previous ratings. This can be illustrated by comparing the most underdeveloped East European regimes, such as Romanian and Bulgarian, to the post-Yugoslav (except for Slovenia) in the FH indices: the former, as a rule, are rated higher than the latter thanks to the initial bonus, although that assessment is often unconvincing. • Static quality: despite the diachronic character (as a rule, evaluation is done in intervals of one or more years), the index method may not cover the real dynamics of political regimes. Instead, we get a series of diagnoses of the current situations, which the evaluators assess as “improved“ or “deteriorated“ systems in regard to the set benchmark. This perspective fits the logic of international “pedagogy“ of external conditionality set for democratization or Europeization of the regimes, and not the logic of social sciences which are trying to explain and interpret social and political processes. • Teleological perspective: changes are assessed in regard to a level of completed process of consolidating democracy, i.e. the deviation of the real features of the regime from a benchmark model. However, this does not help understand the causes of bigger or smaller “deviations“ from an ideal model. • Abstractness and insufficient adaptability of measuring tools to the specific features of the societies under survey: in principle, those are universal criteria which sometimes fail to cover the specific constellations of players and problems. There is no doubt that the results of political changes in post-Yugoslav states are different. The above-mentioned international indices may serve as a starting point for specifying those differences although the explanation of those differences, their specific “logic” has to be sought elsewhere, for example, in political science theories of transition. As a response, let me offer my own analysis of the genesis of transition regimes in the postYugoslav states. In doing so, I shall focus specifically on the dynamics of changes in which the results of changes arise from constellations of players and the time sequence of events.

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Players and political agendas Political science theory of transition, i.e. the movement from one type of regime to another, focuses primarily on the players and their mutual relations. Different typologies of players – for example, those developed by Adam Przeworski, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, or Jon Elster and Claus Offe3 - resulted from the analysis of empirical constellations from the viewpoint of the theory of rational choice. The key political players of the regime transition are the political elites and organized collective players. Along the lines of this tradition, it is possible to propose also a typology of players who set the dynamics of changes in post-Yugoslav states. Under the conditions of the fall of the communist mono-party regime, the old and new political elites organized themselves into political parties as privileged players who compete for power at elections. This is why the development of parties and party systems in post-Yugoslav states is the key to understanding of the dynamics of changes. Success or failures of the parties, and also of the post-communist institutions (government, parliament) which they establish and vie to get the upper hand over them, depend also on a vast array of collective players who affect them but do not aspire to directly take over power: those are the civil society groups such as religious organizations, trade unions, war-related associations (associations of veterans, refugees, victims etc.), associations of ethnic minorities, new social movements etc. Finally, foreign players, i.e. the governments of influential states and international organizations (primarily those of the European Union) have had a strong influence on the developments in all post-Yugoslav states. In view of extremely different roles played by those foreign players, we can make a difference between veto players, conditional players and mediators (mediating players). It should be said that the latter typology is analytical, i.e. those same players could play different veto, conditional or mediating player roles at the same time or in different periods. The lines of polarization and their mutual relations which were crucial to the dynamics of transformation and a chance for democratic consolidation are key to the development of parties and party systems. Here, I want to make an analytical difference between the lines of polarization and the classic political science notion of cleavages: the lines of polarization are the conflicts over the key issues of ideological-political interface among the parties (=political elites) and in this sense they can also be conjunctural (short-term) phenomena which polarize the political space on the level of elites, while cleavages are the lines of polarization

3

Cf.: Adam Przeworski, Democracy and Market, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991; Juan J. Linz. and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996; Jon Elster, Claus Offe and Ulrich K. Preuss, Institutional Design in Post-communist Societies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996; Claus Offe, Varieties of Transition, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998.

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which are congruous with the long-lasting divisions in the society, such as ethnic, confessional and social divisions, and which create rather durable ideological and political blocs in the electorate. I propose the following typology of the lines of polarization (which is in principle applicable to all political regimes in Europe) for the analysis of the key political players of transformation in post-Yugoslav states: 1. Centre-periphery: the conflict over the fundamental concept of forming a state and nation; in post-Yugoslav societies, it also includes the relation towards the past and the crimes committed by the warring political camps in the World War Two. 2. Regime polarization of democracies – autoritarism: the conflict over the fundamental rules of political regime, prompted by the monopolistic position of one player (party, coalition). 3. For and against European integration: in post-Yugoslav states, as a rule, it is not about radical Euro-scepticism (although it does exist on the right and partly on the left edges of the political spectrum – particularly in Serbia), rather it is about the dynamics of the fulfilment of political and economic requirements within the European integration process. 4. Clientelist polarization: conflict over the access to the budget for the purpose of satisfying appetites of clientelist groups. 5. Programme polarization: conflict of socio-economic concepts of development, including the reforms of the large social systems (health, pensions, education). 6. New ideological polarization: value conflicts over the issues arising from new view-of-life, e.g. regulation of sexuality (homosexuality, reproductive rights, artificial inovulation etc.), roles of religious communities etc. My basic hypothesis is the following: success or failure of democratization and stabilization of state institutions depends on the ability of political elites (i.e. the leaderships of the most important political parties) to achieve a consensus over the first two types of the lines of polarization, i.e. polarization of centre-peripheries (over the formation of a nation and a state) and the regime polarization (for the benefit of democratization, naturally), and to move political interface to other lines of polarization. The conflicts in favour of and against the European integration, and clientelist conflicts, make the establishment of a stable liberal democracy difficult; but they are not specific only for transition regimes but also for numerous advanced liberal democracies. Eventually, the ability of political elites to organize the competition among political parties around programme polarizations and to solicit votes on those issues makes the largest contribution to the quality of democracy. It should be emphasized that this type of interface is not always present

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in developed democracies either, in which the race among political parties is affected also by ideological and clientelist polarizations. Let us take a closer look at the dynamics of transformation against proposed criteria in some of the post-Yugoslav states. The foundation of the success of Slovenian transition was precisely its early broad-based political consensus over the lines of centre-periphery polarization and democracy-autoritarism: all the relevant political parties supported Slovenia’s independence and acceptance of the liberal democracy rules. Of course, this does not mean that nationalism did not manifest itself in Slovenia also in its more radical forms, for example, in relation to granting citizenship to a fairly large group of citizens of Slovenia who are not ethnic Slovenians or in the forms of radical cultural particularism and xenophobia. Still, those topics and the players who promoted them remained outside the focus of democratic political life. The expressions of consensual nature of political competition in Slovenia were frequent big coalitions in 1990s and the domination of centralist Liberal Democracy of Slovenia, which tied together the right-wing and the leftwing coalition partners. Accordingly, they reached a consensus over Slovenia’s European integration early. In 2002, Slovenian politics came to polarize over issues related to clientelist, programme and new ideological polarizations (and partly over opening the centre-periphery polarization which, in Slovenia, concerns the attitude towards the crimes committed by partisans in the World War Two). Foreign players had a small influence on Slovenian transformation, except for Slovenia’s withdrawal from the Yugoslav state and the EU integration. The deficit of the Croatian transformation in 1990s is related to the absence of consensus in the first two dimensions of polarization: Serb political elites in Croatia refused both the state’s independence and pluralist democracy, and reformed post-communists (today’s SDP) advocated, since the very beginning, the Yugoslav federation, without giving support to Croatian independence. It was not before the Croatian-Serb conflict became radicalized that post-communists joined the national consensus over forming an independent state. At the same time, however, it was already around 1992 that the conflict over the centre-periphery polarization line over the integrity of the BIH state became deeper. Also the regime democracy-autoritarism polarization became deeper over authoritarian inclinations of the ruling HDZ. The consensus over the state of Croatia and democracy after 2000 resulted from a series of events: military defeat of the Serb radical nationalism, failure of Croatian expansionist national programme as a result of the intervention by international veto players and the election defeat of HDZ and its post-election transformation towards moderate nationalism and firm commitment to democracy. The consensus over the accession to the EU prompted a fundamental political consensus. International players continue, up until this date, to have an important conditioning influence on Croatia. The party competition is

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marked mainly by interface over clientelist polarization line and new ideological polarizations, along with incessant resumption of centreperiphery polarization in relation to historical awareness (relation towards the Independent State of Croatia and the crimes committed by partisans). Programme competition did not develop. The remaining four post-Yugoslav states have not fully solved the conflict over the centre-periphery polarization, which is the main cause of weak democracy. Still, each of those states has a specific internal dynamics of consensus and conflict. In Serbia, inability of political elites to solve the issue of Kosovo status keeps centre-periphery polarization constantly open, thereby enabling also the continuing presence of a strong radical nationalist player (SRS). The regime consensus in favour of democracy has largely been established, but the SRS challenges it from time to time.4 The main polarization line concerns the fulfilment of requirements set by international players and the issue of the EU accession. In Montenegro, the centre-periphery polarization was solved – through international brokering – by an independence referendum and the establishment of independent state of Montenegro. Still, the newly formed segment of Serb ethnic identity is a potential source of renewed conflicts over that issue. A bigger problem is the regime polarization line in view of the factually dominant position of post-communists and the impossibility to change government. In Macedonia, the political life lies in the shadow of unsolved statehood-related problems which concern both the relations with Greece and the status of the Albanian minority.5 Finally, in BiH, the conflict over unsolved issues of the centre-periphery polarization blocks democratization although the groups of political elites are present, competing also over other polarization lines, and the clientelist in particular.

4

5

Cf: Vladimir Goati: Izbori u SRJ od 1990. do 1998., Belgrade: Centar za slobodne izbore i demokratiju, 1999, Zoran Lutovac (ed.): Politi~ke stranke i bira~i u dràvama biv{e Jugoslavije, Belgrade: Institut dru{tvenih nauka and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2006; Du{an Pavlovi} and Slobodan Antoni}: Konsolidacija demokratskih ustanova u Srbiji, Beograd: Official Gazette, 2007. See: Svetomir [kari}: Democratic Elections in Macedonia, 1990-2002, Berlin: edition Sigma, 2005.

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Attachment

1. Freedom House: Nations in Transit Index (FH NIT)6

Democracy score: 1-2.99 consolidated democracy; 3-3.99 semiconsolidated democracy; 44.99 transitional or hybrid regime; 5-5.99 semiconsolidated authoritarian regime; 6-7 consolidated authoritarian regime

2. Freedom House: Political Rights and Civil Liberties Index (FH PR&CLI)7

Scale: 1-7: 1 = the highest degree of freedom, 7 = full absence of freedom; rating: 12.5 free, 3-5.5 = partly free, 5.5-7 = not free

3. Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI)8

Scale: 8.5-10 = highly advanced transformation, 7-8.5 = advanced transformation, 5.57 = limited transformation, 4-5.5 = very limited transformation, 0-4 = failed or blocked transformation 6

7 8

Freedom House: Nations in Transit and Political Rights and Civil Liberties Index, available at: http://www.freedomhouse.org Ibid. Bertelsmann Foundation: Bertelsmann Transformation Index, 2003-2008: available at: http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/11.0.html

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WESTERN BALKAN TROUBLES WITH TRANSITION: BETWEEN CONFORMISM AND COLLECTIVISM Bodo WEBER

Europe is devoting the whole year 2009 to celebrating the 20th anniversary of 1989, the year of “peaceful revolutions”, the overthrow of the real-socialist systems and the fall of the Berlin Wall; the year which marked the end of a bipolar division of the world and thereby of the short twentieth century (Eric Hobsbawm). This historical date is being celebrated throughout Europe and especially in Central and Eastern European countries which, according to Adam Michnik - one of the key actors of the then developments – “have never had in their recent history so good 20 years.” 1 It is about the two decades of an accelerated transformation of the mono-party political systems and command economy into parliamentary democracies, the rule of law and market economies. And also about the process of political and economic integration of the European continent under the European Union’s institutional umbrella. In the countries of former Yugoslavia, the same level of fervour is more or less missing. Except for Slovenia, the Western Balkan countries can hardly present a success story which would be similar to that of Poland, the Czech Republic or other Central European countries. On the contrary – paraphrasing Michnik – one could say that in the last two decades they have seen the highest level of regression in the recent past, while transformation processes remain fragile and ambivalent until present day, with an outcome still uncertain. This frame gives a partial explanation of the difficulties facing not only external analysts of the developments on the European continent over the last two decades, but also today’s political elites and the populations in the south-eastern part of the continent in identifying the fate of their respective societies over the past two decades with the year ’89 and determining a place for Yugoslavia and post-Yugoslav societies in that global context.

1

Adam Michnik, “...Verteidigung der Freiheit. Reflexionen über 1989“, in: Osteuropa No. 2-3 (2009), Berlin, S. 15

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How the year 1989 passed Yugoslavia by, and why it nevertheless happened Indeed, where could Yugoslavia be placed within the frame of upheaval in ’89 and the transformation of the former real-socialist societies? Looking from the manifestational level of the stakeholders and developments, Yugoslavia does seem to be an exception outside the mainstream. In Yugoslavia, there was no “peaceful revolution” in either 1989 or the years after. There were no massive protests to overthrow the regime. The people did not constitute themselves as “demos” nor was a democratic opposition ever formed outside the communist nomenclature that would have taken over a political initiative from the paralyzed regime. In Yugoslavia, amid the conflict among the parts of the state-party apparatus, fragmented along the lines of the federal units, the regime simply disappeared and with it also the state institutions at the central level. The regimes which were the main actors of that confrontation (Serbia and Slovenia), as well as their satellites, were avoiding the fall through ethnic transformation, while other regimes, unable to handle the conflict (Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina) lost power. But this happened at the moment when fear and obsession with “collective identities” largely dominated all democratic and socio-economic social issues, which in turn determined the substantially different character and direction of the regime change from that in other eastern countries. Massive demonstrations in an importantly different environment could not turn into a form of constituting a new “demos”; rather, everywhere they acted like a populist institution of transforming the then “working people” into “ethnos” (Ivan ôlovi}). But when we turn eyes from individual actors and events to deeper social and political causes, it becomes clear that nonetheless the dissolution of the socialist Yugoslavia does not belong to anywhere else but the ’89 global context and the implosion of the social systems of the Soviet socialism. Just as the social systems of the Soviet type of socialism, the crisis in Yugoslavia during 1980s was not an interim problem. Rather, the crisis laid bare a long-time structural disease of the real-socialist order. The economic crisis in the eastern part of Europe came at the end of a long development in which, unlike mid-1960s when the West still believed in the possibility for command economies to outdo capitalist economies, it became clear to everybody that socialist economies were unable to compete with market economies. It was already in the early 1970s that the nomenclature in Yugoslavia gave up a serious attempt to build a system based on the principle of self-management. Instead, it cemented the existing power relations, concentrating on obfuscating the basic contradictions in the economic system and making up some pragmatic, basically non-socialist instruments (labour migration to Western Europe, opening the country for tourism, western

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loans) with which it was possible to compensate economic irrationalities over a certain period of time but not to prevent a final collapse. Continual spread of informal and semi-formal social relations over more than two decades within and outside official institutions for the purpose of maintaining a dysfunctional system and meeting also in Yugoslavia only partially legitimate individual needs not only in economy but also in all other spheres of the official system eroded by the end of 1980s the state and all other social institutions almost entirely. The official ideology had the same fate. The ideology of self-management socialism was derogated from a belief system, which defined not only ethos but also the life style of the communist party members into an instrumental means of an outward demonstration of commitment to the system and personal promotion, for the vast majority of the members of the stateparty apparatus. It is a common characteristics of both Yugoslavia and all other Eastern European countries that the socialist sistem had already been by far dissociated from within at the time when the “actors of change” appeared at the scene. Not only does it explain the character of revolutions which were not that, i.e. why authoritarian closed regimes surrendered without a single shot and why nobody in the West had anticipated the fall of regimes in Eastern Europe, but actually the specific dynamic of a great upheaval, a historical moment in which the “time exploded”. It is about a specific relation between the main social and political actors and the social dynamics of change which, on the one hand, opened until-then inconceivable areas for individual actions, new actors, and on the other, set rather strict limits on their influence on the social development. Amid this explosion of time, in which “what was inconceivable yesterday is overcome today”, the social dynamics drags all actors along with it. That socialist Yugoslavia in living through its bloody disolution has been the object of this dominant role of the social dynamics is mainly overlooked in the post-Yugoslav societies until today. This refers to the gerenal social perception as much as to academic literature. Instead, a personalized understanding of socio-political developments dominates that centers around the assumed key role of main political actors, its intents and “plans”. It seems that one of the keys to understanding the problems still tormenting the Western Balkan countries lies in the fact that this dynamics of accelerated time has not been stopped in the larger part of the region.

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Ethnisation as negative transformation instead of transition While the dynamics of change took the countries of former Eastern bloc to a journey into transition towards the Western systems and Western prosperity, it took the Yugoslav society into a forced ethnisation and dissolution, war and comprehensive destruction of the society. The appearance of aggressive ethnic nationalism in the Balkans confused the world which was expecting “the end of history“ (Francis Fukuyama), the global emergence of the “system which has no alternative“. The shock caused by the return of the war and massive crimes on the European soil toward the end of the 20th century made an attractive perception of a specifically “Balkan“ problem, a unique case – an exception, despite the fact that the “nation“ became a dominant matrix of the break-up of the real-socialist social systems. The great upheaval in 1989 in Central European countries, a peaceful separation of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia as well as a largely peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Union took place in the name of “national liberation“ from the Soviet imperialism or the re-establishment of “national sovereignty“ from the pre-communist era. The unification of East Germany with the Federal Republic of Germany took place under the still generally accepted slogan “Wiedervereinigung“ (reunification), despite the fact that those were significantly different societies with a weak feeling of the declared joint affiliation and completely unprepared political elite in West Germany. It appeared as if the 19th century had come back; political actors, movements and parties were continually identifying themselves with the pre-communist times, while the world’s public and social sciences talked considerably about the return of the era of nationalism, the era of forming nation-states. Their common denominator is repression of the basic fact that by the end of the 20th and in the early 21st century, completely new social relations emerged. But they are interpreted only in old categories by the help of constructing national and cultural continuities and traditions. The use of this old categories takes on the character of arbitrariness because modernization processes and the processes of deep de-traditionalization in the second half of the 20th century undermined the material base of the idea about the identity of nation, territory and culture (which was fragile already at the end of the 19th century) and the base of traditional social (religious, cultural) relations. But it also makes them greatly attractive, for it thereby increases the possibility of their global use. It is this arbitrariness that enables a social mechanism of collective self-understanding of “identity“, “tradition“, “culture“, “religion“, etc. Their unexpected power after ‘89 lies in their conformist social function. Discourses about collective identity are “social discourses of avoidance“, discourses the sense of which obviously lies less in its concrete (“ideological“) contents than in their social function, i.e. in the possibility of avoiding

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thinking about a concrete society. At the same time, they are offering a vague feeling of affiliation and sense. It is offered as a medium for expression of disapproval of the present society without an obligation to offer an alternative. In the case of real-socialist societies, the interpretation of the social reality in the old categories helped avoid facing an uncertain future amid the general crisis and the break-up of the existing system. The division of the world into the blocs, which systematized the social reality – from international political system to everyday life – had disappeared. While it appears that the modern attractiveness of the discourse of collective self-understanding is general, their social and political effects are different in every individual society. It is beyond dispute that the “return to national“ had an emancipatory effect in both East Germany and other countries of the Warsaw Pact, it enabled some great processes of political and economic transformation. But how much the use of these categories is ambivalent is seen, for example, in the cases of xenophobic attacks on foreigners in Germany in 1990s or the present political development in Hungary, one of the role-models of post-socialist transformation. Post-Yugoslav societies found themselves in a completely different “transformation“, in the dynamics of forced ethnisation of all social spheres, in the process of collective social entaglement in authoritarian rule, violence and massive crimes. The reasons for that specific path should be far less sought in the pre-communist history of Southeastern Europe than in territorialization of group competitions as a consequence of a process of authoritarian decentralization and in the semi-formal character of the institutionalization of ethnicity, which made the Yugoslav socialism different from Soviet socialism. In the area of disintegrating Yugoslav state, social and political changes in 1990s thus assumed a contradictory character of parallel processes of establishing the basic normative and institutional elements of Western democracy and forced ethnisation. The social sciences were trying hard to cope with that specific development through some notional innovations such as “democrature“ but it cannot be understood without a critical analytical approach to the career of the categories of collective identity in the given historical context of ‘89. The results of those social and political changes in 1990s are negative beyond doubt. Ethnisation of the society enabled a continuation of political tradition of the authoritarian rule under formally pluralist conditions through further spread of semi-formal and informal relations and networks, i.e. the networking of political and economic elites, which, in the long run, led to a continued erosion of all state institutions and social authorities as a whole. Ethnic ideological homogenisation and a broad social legitimization of violence and mass crimes did not lead to some kind of natural unity of the new ethnic communities but, on the contrary, to the deep de-solidarisation beneath the surface of the new

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societies. The practice of parliamentary democracy, the rule of law and market economy under such conditions led to devaluation of democratic values and the damage caused to all actors involved, those from the regime and the opposition. This is why there is point in talking about a negative transformation which makes the Southeast of Europe different from other parts of Eastern Europe. Peaceful revolutions in ’99 and prospects of “subsequent transition” Precisely one decade following 1989, i.e. over the course of 1999 and 2000, regime change took place also in the Balkans, first in Croatia and then in Serbia. Both events were dubbed “peaceful revolutions” in both national and the world’s public. Was it indeed the delayed ’89 developments, which marked the real upheaval, the beginning of the real transition? If there is one parallel, then it lies in the inappropriate term: “peaceful revolution”. That the regimes, responsible for tens and hundreds of thousands of the dead and millions of refugees handed over power without a single shot proves that they, just as the regimes of the realsocialist type before them, imploded from within much more than they were subverted by the opposition which suffered throughout 1990s from a chronic weakness. Thus, it would be much more appropriate to talk about “implosion after implosion” than about a peaceful revolution. Beyond a banal truth that history does not repeat itself, here similarities end and substantial differences begin. While the opposition’s criticism toward the end of 1990s focused on the authoritarian rule and corrupt political practice of the ruling regimes, their ideological basis, i.e. ethnic nationalism, did not lose legitimacy nor has it lost legitimacy until present. Another important factor is the different role of social conformism: while conformism played an incontestably important role in the transformation of real-socialist systems in the Central and Eastern European countries, conformism in the Balkans played the role of the key psycho-social basis for an authoritarian and regressive social dynamics. Thus, it is no surprise that despite the optimism from “revolutionary” days, the transformation processes in this decade remain ambivalent, they are too far from that linear development suggested by the perception of transition. What are the prospects of completion of the delayed transformation of the Western Balkan region and its European integration? The biggest hope is being offered by the development in the Republic of Croatia where national (nationalist) consensus blended into European sometime in the middle of this decade and became a base for an integrating and accompanying reform process steaming far ahead of the neighbouring countries. But already in the Croatian case, the question about the relationship between reform façade and substance has to be raised. How far can democratic reforms go if they are based on a social consensus

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which, until a few years ago, stood behind collective entanglement in antidemocratic transformation and mass crimes? All the more so as the Western Balkan countries are facing a far more difficult task of overcoming double legacy – socialist and post-socialist, i.e. ethnic nationalist? How far can transformations go under the umbrella of the European integration in other Southeastern European societies (Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina), where such blending of national into European is possible only partly.

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EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: BETWEEN TRANSITION AND IDENTITY

European Integration: Between Transition and Identity

THE WESTERN BALKANS IS IN THE SOUTH: DISCOURSES ON THE WESTERN BALKAN COUNTRIES’ EU ACCESSION Tanja PETROVIĆ

In June 2007, just before Portugal assumed the EU Presidency, the Portuguese Permanent Representative to the European Union, Álvaro de Mendonça e Moura, stated, when listing the priority tasks of Portugal’s Presidency, that because of its colonial history Portugal’s focus in foreign policy will be cooperation with Africa, and human rights will be in the foreground (24ur.com, June 11, 2007). Several months later, at the time when Slovenia was in the midst of preparations for taking over the EU Presidency from Portugal, The Financial Times quoted Janez Jan{a, Slovenian PM at the time, saying that in the region [the Western Balkans] Slovenia has interests that are similar to Portugal’s interests in Africa (Mladina 31, 4 August 2007, 11). However bizarre and absurd this may sound, it would be a mistake to understand it as yet another eccentric statement of the former Slovenian PM. It is a part of much serious phenomenon and wider and prevalent discursive practice in which the part of Europe which is today called the Western Balkans is increasingly pushed for ideological reasons by the shapers of “European” discourses towards the south, outside the borders of Europe and equated with, or rather relocated, to “the third world” in the symbolic geography of contemporary Europe. Discursive patterns directly or indirectly referring to colonialism have a prominent role in this process of ideological relocation motivated by a need to construe “European identity”. The Western Balkans and European identity The contemporary history of Europe has been marked by incessant search for identity. It became particularly intense after the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the clear-cut boundary between “Europe” as perceived by the Western part of the continent, and the former Eastern block or “Other Europe.” In the next step, in which the countries of both Europes were united within the political framework of the EU, the questions of the nature and content of European identity, European

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values, Europeans’ beliefs and Europe’s border, became the inevitable components of political rhetoric and academic debates1. Representation of the Balkans as the ‘European third world zone’ certainly helped create the impression of so urgently needed collective identity and the sense of the European Union.2 The Balkans were traditionally perceived of as being on the periphery that must be controlled by European centers of power and guided “to avoid slipping into the mistakes from the past.”3 The point that the Balkans need some kind of colonial supremacy in order to save it from chaos — and to protect Europe from the dangers that chaos would bring — is frequently made in the Western journalistic and pseudoacademic writings on the Balkans.4 Such view was emphatically revived during the EU enlargement to the east and southeast of the European continent. In political discourse, the accession process in the Western Balkan countries is usually represented as a journey towards the goal of becoming a full EU member. Moreover, candidate countries are to be profoundly transformed along this journey from non-European to European countries. To implement this transformation, they need assistance and guidance along the road. Such attitude is exemplified in the following statement of the Slovenian politician and member of the European Parliament Jelko Kacin, who emphasized that the EU should use all of its accumulated knowledge, expertise and financial support to steer the Balkans on its determined journey towards Brussels (EP, December 30, 2006). The zone of expertise / interest and employment of colonial relations The accession discourse, in which candidate countries are ensured the European course and the European perspective, is marked by the “the paradox of postmodern ambiguity:”5 in this discourse, “the set of preconditions for entering the EU is volatile when it comes to EU newcomers, juxtaposed with Europeanization and transition construed as ‘a passage from a well-defined point of departure to a unitary and welldefined destination.’”6 Every step on this passage earns praise from European politicians, inevitably followed by a statement that the target 1

2

3 4 5

6

Hammond, Andrew: Balkanism in Political Context: From the Ottoman Empire to the EU. Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture 3(3), 2006, p. 6. Erjavec, Karmen and Zala Vol~i~: ‘War on terrorism’ as a discursive battleground: Serbian recontextualization of G.W. Bush’s discourse. Discourse & Society 18(2), 2007, pp. 123-137.; cf. also: Mastnak, Toma`: Evropa: med evolucijo in evtanazijo. Ljubljana: Apes – Studia humanitatis, 1998. Andrew Hammond, ibid., p. 19. Andrew Hammond (ibid., p. 20) provides some illustrative examples of this discourse. Busch, Brigita and Michał Krzyżanowski 2007: Inside/Outside the European Union: Enlargement, migration policy and the search for Europe’s identity’. Geopolitics of the European Union Enlargement: Expansion, Exclusion and Integration in the European Union, J. Anderson, A. Warwick (ed.). London: Routledge, pp. 107-124. Fairclough, Norman.: Transition’ in Central and Eastern Europe. British and American Studies 11, Timisoara, 2005, p. 4. See also: Majstorovi}, Danijela.: Construction of Europeanization in the High Representative’s Discourse in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Discourse & Society 18, 2007, pp. 627-651.

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destination is still far away, albeit not accompanied with a clear explanation of why this is so; a good illustration of such discourse are the statements of the German Foreign Minister Steinmeier on Serbia: The Government of Serbia clearly chose the course leading to Europe (…) We can all see your great effort to enact reform in your country. Undoubtedly, there is a lot more to be done, not only in Serbia but in the entire region. When I speak to Serbian politicians I can sense in every sentence their determination to bring Serbia closer to Europe. Undoubtedly many more obstacles have to be overcome, and the government in Belgrade knows this as well as I do (b92.net, January 27, 2009). Such an ambivalence and lack of clarity leave ample room for political imagination in which the Balkan Other, in addition to its traditional image of a semi-wild and semi-civilized European periphery, also acquires the traits of the colonial Other. This colonial image is strengthened by political discourses from the EU members which share historical legacies with the Western Balkans countries, in particular Austria and Slovenia. One may observe a kind of “contest” between the two countries competing for the title of expert on the Western Balkans. Both countries cited the Western Balkans as one of their priorities during the EU Presidency (Austria held the EU Presidency during the first half of 2006, and Slovenia during the first half of 2008). The common historical legacy shared by Austria and Slovenia with the countries of the Western Balkans is the basis for invoking a special knowledge of the region and appropriating a special role as an expert on the Western Balkans within the EU.7 Claiming the possession of special knowledge and the role of an expert on the Western Balkans is intrinsically connected with economic context that necessarily comes after (or before?) these kinds of discourse. While Austria is the largest foreign investor in Slovenia and one of the most important investors in the Western Balkans, the largest part of Slovenia’s foreign investment goes to Serbia; in 2007, the SE European region accounted for one-sixth of all Slovenian exports.8 As Slovenian anthropologist Bojan Baskar argued in 2003, “the Slovenians have developed a habit of considering the rest of Yugoslavia as ‘their markets’. The Slovenian comeback to Bosnian, Croatian and now also Serbian markets has been fast and very ambitious, thereby inviting some criticism in these countries regarding Slovenia’s ‘economic imperialism.’”9 7

8

9

However, the origin of this knowledge is differently treated in Austrian and Slovenian discourses: while Austrian politicians and journalists explicitly mention the shared experience arising from Austria’s expansion to the southeast, the producers of public discourse in Slovenia rather conceal the source of their knowledge about the Western Balkans. In other words, the Yugoslav and socialist legacies are not mentioned in this discourse. EU i dràve JV Evrope [The EU and the Countries of Southeastern Europe]. Dnevnik, January 17, 2009, p. 6. Baskar, Bojan: Within or Without? Changing Attitudes towards the Balkans in Slovenia. Ethnologia Balkanica 7 (2003), p. 199.

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Mitja Velikonja (2005, 52) quotes Slovenian politicians’ statements that support such view, one by the chairman of the Slovenian pan-European movement: For us, this [the Balkans] is the area in which we can pursue our interests, and in this respect we have a great advantage over others, and another by a representative of the party Slovenija je na{a [Slovenia is Ours]: Within the EU framework, Slovenia must assume the leading role in South Eastern Europe and organize its diplomatic network in such a way that it will function as a service to the Slovenian economy and its science.10 The role of the expert on the Western Balkans is inseparable from the economic influence in this region and economic interests of individual EU member states. The discursive patterns and power relations behind them are mutually supportive and they legitimize and create a logical, albeit frequently historically unfounded, link: Slovenian politicians treat WB in colonial way despite the lack of any colonial past. It shows that political representatives of states with no colonial legacies can also shape colonialist discourses. This is made possible by the context in which EU membership functions as a basis for inclusion and exclusion and creates the shared “repository” of discursive patterns available to the EU member states to produce the discourse of Otherness when referring to those who are not part of a united Europe. Within this new context, the colonial representations and relations within this region acquired still another, rather ugly face. The living conditions of temporary workers in Slovenia, most of whom come from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and other parts of former Yugoslavia and mainly work under contracts for Slovenian construction companies, are incredibly poor. They work more hours per day than prescribed by law and the valid visa regime and work permission policy make them completely dependent on their employers. The brutality of their situation is strongly reminiscent of the exploitation mechanisms used during the colonial era in Western Europe. The use of such mechanisms would not be possible unless Slovenia were an EU member unlike the countries from which these temporary workers come. Slovenia’s EU membership also plays a central role in openly racist discourses, as it is a message by the construction company Vegrad addressed to the workers from Bosnia-Herzegovina, posted in March 2008 on the containers in which they live in the Ljubljana district of Beìgrad. It warned the Bosnian workers against trying to practice their culture and behavior, which in some cases is extremely inappropriate. You should be aware that you currently live in Ljubljana, the capital of the Republic of Slovenia, an EU member state. Here we observe the laws and rules that are of a higher level. In the words of Boris Deùlovi}, this example of discourse involves a “typical

10

Velikonja, Mitja: Eurosis – A Critique of the New Eurocentrism. Ljubljana: Mirovni in{titut, 2005, p. 25.

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Central European cliché: an ordered ‘urbanized environment’ is by definition a ‘social environment of a higher cultural level,’ inhabited by ‘highly situated people,’ meaning highly cultured citizens with high wages who will ‘not much longer approve’ of any kind of newcomers and guest workers, dirty southerners, Africans, Arabs, Turks, Roma, Croats, Serbs, or Bosnians in this example, disturbing their urban idyll. In these ‘social environments on a higher cultural level’ different rules of behavior are observed, and the newcomers’ only task is to commit their cheap labor to building these ‘urban environments’.”11 In this case, “dirty southerners” are people from the “third world” – without any political power or basic rights; these are no longer southerners (ju`njaki / ju`njaci) from other republics of former Yugoslavia, whose position was much better despite their ghettoization and widespread stereotypes. Similarly, this group does not comprise other seasonal workers from Slovakia or other East European EU countries — the legal treatment of these workers is different, and moreover, the low wages and poor living and working conditions in Slovenia attract only few workers from these countries (their number is much lower than was expected after Slovenia joined the EU). Dangerously close Apart from economic interests, another reason why in today’s political imagination the Western Balkans are largely categorized as the south, the “third world,” is the security aspect: the countries that border contemporary EUrope to the east, south-east and the east form an area that in Europe’s eyes is dangerously close, and where lurk all sorts of dangers – organized crime supported by corrupted political elites, drug smuggling, illegal immigrants, terrorism (because the Muslim population is “autochthonous” both in the Balkans and in North Africa, this area can be associated with Al Qaeda and ‘global terrorism’) etc. The countries of the Western Balkans cannot be denied their geographical placement in Europe even within the new political reality, if only because on today’s political map of Europe they appear as a “black hole” surrounded by the EU territories. If for that reason they should be “allowed into Europe,” it is justified by the need for security: before France assumed the Presidency of the EU, President Nicolas Sarkozy stated that Paris supported the accession of the Balkan countries to the EU, as this is to way to bring peace to the region where one world war started and where tensions still run high (b92.net, July 1, 2008); or, as it was written in the Program of Slovenian Presidency of the EU, [t]he stability of the Western Balkans – a region encircled by Member States - is of major importance for the security and prosperity of the entire Union.12 In this example, new patterns of exclusion again tally well with 11 12

Deùlovi}, Boris: Vegradovo okolje na vi{jem kulturno nivoju. Dnevnik, Objektiv, 22. novembar 2008. http://www.eu2008.si/includes/Downloads/misc/program/Programme_en.pdf, accessed on March 8, 2009.

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the old ones — the discourse on the “problematic nature” of the Balkan countries and their responsibility for violence and wars in Europe is now carried forward through the representation of the Balkan countries as the “seedbed of terrorism,” while the images of barbarism, primitivism and rudeness are in the contemporary variant conveyed through discourses on crime, corruption, terrorism and illegal immigration. The necessity of supervision is therefore a constant trait in both old and new discourses – the Western Balkan countries have to be admitted into the EU so that they can be supervised and prevented from causing new troubles to Europe. Living in different time The attitude towards history, memory, the past and the future is still another area in which in contemporary political discourses a clear dividing line is drawn between “Europe” and “non-Europe,” whereas the Balkans is equated with the “third world.” In political and media discourses the Western Balkan countries’ accession to the EU is portrayed as their opting for the future (and the final break with the reactionary past); this type of discourse is supported by the spatial metaphor of progress along the road to Europe. EU officials and politicians continually repeat that the Western Balkan countries should be offered the European perspective or the European future, and talk about these countries taking the European course, choosing the European course and the like. The accession to the EU is here presented as the only option for the Western Balkan countries to rid themselves of the burden of the past and destructive nationalisms, and turn to the future. The notions linked with the EU in this discourse are the future, progress, stability, and health, and conversely, non-inclusion in the EU is related to the past, instability, chaos, nationalism, disease, meaning the traits that are traditionally associated with the countries of the Balkan peninsula.13 The EU is therefore both a precondition for normality and the prescriber of normative requirements for qualifying as normal. On January 28, 2008, on the day when the Council of the European Union was discussing future cooperation with Serbia, the Guardian published an article by Olli Rehn entitled Balkans on the Mend.14 Among other things, it says that (p)eople in the Balkans face a stark choice this year: their region could either finally resolve its outstanding problems from the wars of the 1990s or fall back into instability and extremes of nationalism. The first option would take them forward towards stability, prosperity and European integration. But many commentators believe the second is inevitable.15

13 14

15

Cf. Todorova, Maria: Imagining the Balkans. New York: Oxford University Press,1997. The same metaphor of cure/mending was used by Dejan Steinbuch, a columnist for the Slovenian free newspaper @urnal, in an article entitled How To Cure the Serbs From Nationalism. Among other things, he wrote: Therefore I think that it is high time we cured our Serbian friends from nationalism and helped them on their way to the future (@urnal, February 23, 2008, p. 18). Rehn, Olli: Balkans on the Mend. Guardian, January 28, 2008.

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The Balkans can therefore mend themselves, become normalized and escape growing nationalism only by becoming part of the EU, only by becoming Europe. What is kept concealed when painting such a polarized picture of the two worlds is the contemporary reality of the EU, with many of its members confronting growing nationalism, racism, xenophobia, strengthening of extreme right political forces and similar “horrors” — in short, the phenomena that are attributed exclusively to those countries that have a lot of work ahead of them before they can be called European and before they can join the big European family. This type of discourse proposes the following “time map” of Europe: the EU’s present is the Western Balkans’ future, with the latter now living not in the present but in the past governed by nationalistic myths. The image in which the reality of the Western Balkans is not the reality of the present but of the past makes the transformation of these countries indispensable and the difference between Europe (the EU) and the Western Balkans explicit, preventing us from perceiving the similarities between the two parts of the continent. The Balkans is traditionally perceived as an area inhabited by peoples obsessed with history who build their identity on myths and are not capable of “facing the present” and “turning to the future.” Europe attributes the same characteristics to the “third world” countries: The tragedy of Africa is that the African has not satisfactorily entered history. … In this imaginary world where everything starts over and over again there is no place for human adventure or for the idea of progress. The man never looks towards the future. Never breaks the repetition cycle…. That is the problem of Africa, said President Sarkozy addressing young Africans in Dakar (Tatli} 2007/2008). On the other hand, in Europe’s perception of itself, the idea of progress is inherent to Europe; it is a space characterized by a linear flow of time, as contrasted with the non-European, cyclic perception of time and endless repetition. In addition, Europe sees itself as a community of nations joined together precisely by their ability to face their traumatic past, overcome it and build a better and more ethical society through such catharsis.16 By contrast, the Balkans lives in the past, is obsessed with the past and on top of that is unable or does not want to face that past. Since as such, it seriously threaten Europe’s self-image, it is suitable to place the Balkans beyond the European borders.

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In his study of the 20th century history of Europe, Mark Mazower convincingly deconstructs this European narrative about the cathartic confrontation with the past and points out that Nazism was “a nightmarish revelation of the destructive potential of European civilization – turning imperialism on its head and treating Europeans as Africans” (Mazower, Mark: Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century. London et al.: Penguin books, 1998, p. xiii).

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Is Europe possible? In 1999, French political philosopher Etienne Balibar pointed out in his lecture given in Thessaloniki, that “the fate of European identity as a whole is being played out in Yugoslavia and more generally in the Balkans (even if this is not the only site of its trial)” and that Europe has two options: “Either Europe will recognize in the Balkan situation not a monstrosity grafted to its breast, a pathological ‘aftereffect’ of underdevelopment or of communism, but rather an image of effect of its own history, and will undertake to confront it and resolve it and thus to put itself into question and transform itself. Only then will Europe probably begin to become possible again. Or else it will refuse to come to face-to-face with itself and will continue to treat the problem as an exterior obstacle to be overcome through exterior means, including colonization.”17 A deeper look into the European discourses on the Western Balkans shows that today Europe is no more possible than it was ten years ago, when Balibar made the statement quoted above. One could even argue to the contrary. The means used to constitute the Western Balkans as an area outside Europe have become even more explicit; the use of well known mechanisms of supervision and colonization is characterized by an even greater lack of reflection, and these means have become accessible to all those inside the EU. The main economic beneficiaries from this symbolic and discursive colonization of the Balkans are precisely those countries that most frequently make use of these mechanisms, i.e. EU members located at the EU’s southeastern border. As to Europe as a whole, this colonization enables it to continue with construction and maintenance of a self-satisfied image while shunning, or ascribing to those outside, everything that might possibly challenge such an image. In this kind of Europe there is no room for “peaceful, managed and nurtured diversity,”18 and this kind of Europe is not capable of self-reflection. In this kind of Europe, the media bring on the daily basis politicians’ statements echoing the well known patterns that marked the darkest periods of European history. Because of this, it is difficult to get rid of an unpleasant feeling of repetition — despite the deep-rooted opinion that repetition is a problem of the African man and of the Balkan peoples, and by no means of Europeans.

17

18

Balibar, Etienne: We, the People of Europe? Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004, p. 6 Garton Ash, Timothy: Europe’s True Stories. Prospect Magazine 131, February 2007.

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A THIRD EUROPE AND THE EUROPEAN UNION METAPHYSICS Nerzuk ĆURAK

Is the European Union an incontestable fact of the future? The public sphere is dominated by the opinion that it is. For us, Europhiles, the constitution of the European Union, as a supranational trajectory, is an irreversible process. But the task of the science is to challenge dominating discourses and the mainstream opinion in order to prove or disprove the sense of a historical process. And the EU is, undoubtedly, a permanent fact of history. Still, Agnes Heller in his famous “...Europe-An Epilogue?“ says: “...Outside the technology domain...there is no longer a social project centred on the future, nor is Europe yet a place where grandiose ideas concerning a better future in political, social or another sphere are elaborated“. 1 We have to challenge this pessimistic argumentation which, not deliberately, evokes with nostalgia the European social imagination, because the political philosophy and political science demand an analysis (radically critical and anti-apologetic) of the European political and economic institutionalism as a possible paternalistic source of European trans-border social universalism which may give rise also to “a new European culture...as layman culture within which local and national cultures may prosper“.2 That “authentic new European culture does not contain the necessary ‘promise of happiness‘“3, which is good news. Without a utopian discourse Europe’s future is present indeed in our Now for we, the people of Europe4, we who share the European dream are unable to envisage an epilogue. 5 This means that it is possible that our “dream becomes a reality“6 for when you find traces in theoretical tenets (such as Heller’s) which are suspicious about the possibility for European culture or – on the political level – for the European federation, even the European republic – to develop, which prove that it is nevertheless possible with a new political and cultural mythology (supranational European legal framework, the

1

2 3 4 5 6

Agnes Heller: “Europe an Epilogue?”, in Feher Ferenc, Agnes Heller: The Postmodern Political Condition, Columbia University Press, New York, 1988., p. 146-159. Ibid. Ibid. Etienne Balibar: Mi, gra|ani Evrope?, Beogradski krug, Belgrade, 2003. Heller, ibid. Heller, ibid.

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European Union as a political entity and European culture as “giving prominence to civic virtue, taste, the education of the senses, civility and civil society, urbanity, joy, nobility of mind, forms of life permeated with dignity and sensibility for nature“7) then it is worth working and believing in Morin’s European unity of destiny. That unity does not arise from our past which contradicts it. It hardly arises from our present, for it is our future that imposes it. Thus, there has never been the awareness or a feeling of shared future created on the basis of the future, of what has not yet happened. So we are facing a paradoxical Gordian knot of the European identity. Divisions and conflicts are the causes of cultural diversity which has become constituent for the European identity. Generally, our European identity and unity arise from the division and conflicts. This means that we drew the blessing from our original damnation and also preserved that damnation, the nation-state, no longer in a paranoid form which stirs up wars but in an unconditional sovereign form which rejects every higher instance which would make it subordinate-8 The idea of a united Europe as a “higher instance“ which wants to justify its appearance in the world is faced with a geopolitical problem of the highest rank: the West Balkan region, constructed as a political category which is announcing its inability to be in the Now, with a connection to the future, without the mediation by the bad past. Is it really so difficult to demystify the causality?! Bad causality! The acceptance of substantially living the bloodstained past Now, nolens-volens, means that we are not in the Now. This in turn is a typal manifestation of the heroic spirit as a pathetic form of the parochial spirit of the countries of the region, the geopolitics of which I am researching in order to offer it as the form of peace, rather than war. This is extremely difficult, for it is most comfortable to consider geopolitics as “the science about territorial conflicts and contradictory positions“.9 Europe confirms with its historical existence that the war takes a central place in its history10 - this makes the challenge to conceptualize and theoretically (re)constitute geopolitics of peace even bigger and more important. This is the reason why in this research Theoria as a respectable form of cognition, will be most important. The West is the birthplace of violence indeed, but also the birthplace of Theoria:

7

8 9 10

Muìjevi} Pero: Evropa: prolog – epilog. In Republika, year XV, No. 322-323, Belgrade. See at: http://www.republika.co.yu/arhiva/2003/#4, retrieved on 29 June, 2009. Edgar Morin: Kako misliti Evropu, Svjetlost, Sarajevo, 1989, p. 132. Michel Foucher:Evropska republika, Stubovi kulture, Belgrade, 2000, p.15. “Porijeklo Evrope iskovano je u ognju rata”. See in R.A. Brown: The Origins of Modern Europe, London 1972., p. 93. For the understanding of the war as a building block of the European history, inspiring is also the study by Michael Howard, Rat u evropskoj istoriji, Studentski kulturni centar, Belgrade, 1999.

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Only ‘Europe’, the argument would appear to be, is theoretically (that is, at the level of the fundamental categories that shape historical thinking) knowable; all other histories are matters of empirical research that fleshes out a theoretical skeleton that is substantially ‘European’. There is one version of this argument in Edmund Husserl’s Vienna lecture of 1935, where he proposed that the fundamental difference between ‘oriental philosophies’..... and ‘Greek-European science’ or as he added ‘universally speaking: philosophy‘) was the capacity of the latter to produce ‘absolute theoretical insights’, that is, ‘theoria’ (universal science), whereas the former retained a ‘practical-universal‘ and hence ‘mythical-religious’, character.11 The register of absolute theoretical insight under which the world presents itself as thematic12 may also include the conviction of theoreticians of science that Theoria, along with all restrictions of information technology, technokinetic and mega-virtual civilization – which moves Abstraction from the library Logos to techne as a sufficient abstract finality – cannot be crossed out unless It puts up its own disempowerment by non-respecting changed social circumstances which demand that science take a real stand instead of fleeing to the comfort of academic walls avoiding discussion with other discourses, which are no less important or relevant than the scientific one. Unfortunately, scientists whose theorising is based on “the presupposition that it is the science that is being implemented today, the ethno-science“13 can hardly accept dethroning Theoria as a paradigm of all paradigms. But it is this demission that saves Theoria from metaphysical presuppositions and deconstructs its European, that is, colonial foundation. The happy news is that such a deconstructing thought, attempting to return also non-Western science into history, is being developed, under considerable resistance by ethno-right wing, precisely in the West. On the other hand, it is not the good news that in South Eastern Europe, as a third Europe.14 Theoria is still being developed on the founding paradigm – whereas the world, as we have said above, is being thematically laid bare in the present section of history as a universalizing co-existence of particularities rather than as an entelechy of universal reason15 - which is moreover localized, ethnicized and in-depthly historiographic, hence colectivistically subjectivized. Such a spirit of anti-time 11

12 13 14

15

Dipesh Chakrabarty: ”...Postkolonijalnost i majstorija istorije: ko govori u ime “indijskih” pro{losti”. In Razlika/Difference, Art Theory and Criticism Journal, year II, No. 3-4 Tuzla, 2003. p.142. Ibid. Ziauddin Sardar: Thomas Kuhn i ratovi znanosti, Naklada Jesenski and Turk, Zagreb, 2001, p. 72. In a hegemonic gradation of the structure of the European order, which corresponds to the requirements of classic geopolitics born in the Mittel-European belt, First Europe means Continental Atlantic Europe, understood as a space of Catholic-Protestant civilization; Second Europe defines the area of East Europe as a shifted limes of the First Europe, while a Third Europe is Southeast Europe as a geopolitical sub-continent continually requiring some form of imperial governance. Chakrabarty, ibid., p.141.

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hinders the development of a stable regional community, South Eastern Europe as a europeized Balkan agenda which will not be in collision with its sovereign localities – national and quasi-national states. Thanks to the scientific discourse which serves the purpose of mainly ethnic policies and in fact equated itself with the political discourse in all South East European countries, the region as a community of citizens16 which the First Europe is wishing for as a liminal constituent if its pan-continental geopolitics is still being awaited. The reason is that the whole (region) and parts (states) do not constitute the possibly non-imposed unity. South Eastern Europe and the states of South Eastern Europe are divided by, as Husserl said, “a gaping abyss of sense“.17 Without a theoretical articulation which will offer the bridge over the abyss, constructed of the solid material of scientific neutrality, the post-modern idea of region18 - while postmodern is nothing but the deconstructing talk with the dead – will not get revived. In that variant the end of the Balkan history is looming: ethnic feudalism in democratic disguise. Continuation of the rule of men, and not the rule of law. 19 This danger is underestimated in our debates. If a thought is a stake in the future, then I am guided in this research by the thought that the time has come when future needs to be demystified, to employ Weber’s word, meaning, to free it from utopian shackles and work on it and for it as if it were our own matter, as if it were Now. The opinion about the Future as the opinion for the Future has no future unless it has a rebellious and disrupting presence in the ontology of Present. So let us try and be a disrupting factor. There is a confusing play going on on the European scene: a new creation of the Old World as a civilization totality of geophilosophy and geopolitics, along with an institutional standardization of that totality and its legalization through a de-territorialized European legal and political order. (It is a de-territorialized order as the EU does not have its privileged territory; rather, it rents it from the immanent states). But can Brussels, as a symbolic and metaphorical place of summing up of those 16

17 18

19

Dominique Schnapper: Community of Citizens. On the Modern Idea of Nationality, Izdava~ka knjiàrnica Zorana Stojanovi}a, Sremski Karlovci, Novi Sad, 1996. See in Emanuel Levinas: Druk~ije od bivstva ili s onu stranu bivstvovanja, Jasen, Nik{i}, 1999, p. 54. Observation of the region as a post-modern geopolitical expression corresponds to Cooper’s position about the post-modern world which the international community has partly stepped into already, the evident proof of which is the EU’s growing power as the order which has developed “the system of mutual interference with someone else’s home affairs, going as far as the issues of beer and sausages”. But the problem with Southeast Europe is extremely difficult: how the elements of the pre-modern world, which got infiltrated into the modern world and prevent a fairer regional life, can be transformed into political and cultural order of the post-modern world, the world which counts on the states the elites of which have a most sincere wish for “the borders to be less and less important every day”. See in Robert Cooper: Slom dràva. Poredak i kaos u 21. stolje}u, Profil, Zagreb, 2009, p. 41, 45. Brilliant works on those “...two notions of the rule“ with his wholehearted advocacy of the rule of law were written by the doyen of the European left thought, Italian political philosopher and political scientist Norberto Bobbio in his essey The Rule of Men or The Rule of Law. The essay is available also in the local languages in two Bobbio’s books: Budu}nost demokratije, published by Filip Vi{nji}, Belgrade, 1990 and in Liberalizam i demokracija, published by Novi Libero, Zagreb, 1992.

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European development paradigms, sub-totalize both the Athens (geophilosophy) and Rome (geopolitics)? Geophilosophy and geopolitics are the junctional verticals of the European irenologic-polemologic identity. Both are relativized, although not made senseless by immersing Europe into the national constitution of history. This particular agenda, of course, is not moving towards its end as a nation is established as a trans-historical standard;20 still, the good news is that in the European present, national is finally not, to a large extent, opposing the universal. During nationalized European history it was not so, although “universal, as a possibility, exists in every opinion and in every culture. But none has ever set it as a driving force of its special culture. Precisely because that universal is contradictory to all egoisms and egocentrisms of an individual, nation and culture, it has continually been twisted, it has distorted sense and betrayed in that European culture from which it emerged.“21 If the universal has its origins in the European culture – we shall agree with Morin that it has – the European opinion is by its own history predestined to understand globalization, which does not exclude also criticism of globalization as an Americanized development paradigm of the world, and of Europe in particular. But is our dark continent22 capable of overcoming the gloomy twentieth and building a happy, post-national twenty first century? Can geophilosophy, geopolitics and globalization help build the European political and cultural identity? They can if we problematize them, in accordance with the epoch of crumbled, virtual time, time without time, 23 which means that we reject finality, believe in limitless, ignore the principle of reality precisely at the moment when it imposes itself. 24 Or, as Richard Falk said, “...directing our eyes above the horizons of what is reachable is the only ‘realistic’ way to escape geopolitical hopelessness“.25 What is geophilosophy in this context? It is political philosophy of space immersed in time. Institutional political dominates space and time. The task of geophilosophy and political philosophy is to think dominant, to think that political. To think political, that political which resists naming (as it is allegedly already named as institutional) and eludes scientific categories, is a demanding intellectual task. Although, as Derrida notices, for philosophy, science is “absolutely unavoidable“ 26 as it requires discipline, geophilosophy has to think also “what can not be disciplined“ 27 which is, inter alia, precisely the space of political, the European space of political, European political, charged with plurality as hardly any destination of collective life. 28 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

27 28

Anthony Smith: Nacionalizam i modernizam, Faculty of Political Science, Zagreb, 2003. Edgar Morin: Kako misliti Evropu, Svjetlost, Sarajevo, 1989, p. 102. Mark Mazover: Mra~ni kontinent. Evropsko dvadeseto stolje}e, Prometej, Zagreb, 2004. Vladimir Tasi}: Matematika i koreni postmodernog mi{ljenja. Svetovi. Novi Sad, p. 27, 2002. Morin, ibid., 103. Richard Falk: Veliki teroristi~ki rat, Belgrade, Filip Vi{nji}, 2003. p. 283. Wolfgang Welsch: Na{a postmoderna moderna, Izdava~ka knjiàrnica Zorana Stojanovi}a, Sremski Karlovci, Novi Sad, 2000, p. 341. Ibid. Ibid., 342.

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Geophilosophy and political philosophy are directed to think plurality of politics and plurality of space, plurality of de-territorialized political space, for in an unrooted world without a “founding function“ 29 the plurality of everyday forms (ibid.) reveals itself, without any announcement, as the “basic idea (which) today determines ever more our opinion and feeling“.30 Domination of the particular, as the basic content of the plural31, requires from geophilosophers, geopolitical scientists and political factors wisdom of non-accepting a holistic answer because the “horizon of incomprehensible“32, which prevents an occurrence of totalitarian mind, has to be preserved. History of Europe – philosophy as polemologic geophilosophy lent sense to its warring (geopolitical) spirit – is full of attempts to give sense to the incomprehensible in the concrete worlds of human suffering, so, eschaton walked from incomprehensible otherworld into this world, giving it sense and enveloping it with totalities which had to end in crime as their mental love for the whole world, in all its totality, prevented them from seeing the world of individual people. Inquisition, fascism, communism... Riding different Waves of Totality is one of the primordial causes of the recent political philosophy of the continental Europe, or geophilosophy as political philosophy, coming down mainly to an attempt to justify the era of European Supranational Institutionalism, that new pseudo-spatial Totality as the political expression of the spirit of the times. So geophilosophy, in the transfer from metaphysics into utilitarian metaphysics of an enlarged European Union, in fact, without a critical discourse, in contrast to the agora tradition, becomes a servant to the Great Bureaucratic Norm which puts down its Behemoth-Leviathan mantle across all the parts of the Old Lady’s body, like a fantasized political space33 from Brussels to Vilnius, from Berlin to Kiev, as if the European supranational bureaucratic citadel was The World’s Spirit revealed anew. Even if so, although it is not possible that it is so in the world of an overwhelming rule by Particularities and Individualities, every new idea in Europe which possesses the allurement of a final solution (and the same allurement exists also in the EU as a significant number of important Europeans believe that the EU is the solution finally found for 29 30 31

32 33

Ibid. Ibid. “It will not be sufficient to perceive the differences, ‘break them down’, it is also necessary to ask how separation happened and which logos produced it. Only if the man is capable for the logos of fission he will be able to say that he understood it and by understanding it he will be able to reduce it to harmony.“ See in: Massimo Cacciari: Geo-filozofija Evrope, Ceres, Zagreb, 1996. p. 8. Ibid., 341. “If the real ‘unity’ of one ‘political space’ (the EU political space, note by N.].) decides to impose its identity, then the imposed ‘total’ force of its truth would compellingly become violent against the presence of what is not reflected in such identity, thereby resorting to the already known forms of ghettoization, or if it allows its own multiplicity of differences to master the identity of the ‘common space’, denying its strictly “political“ dimension, such a unity would actually disappear and would leave the space to the simple coordination of specific freedoms to which individual differences always pretend“. See in Riccardo Panattoni: Bratska zajednica kao ljubav prema slobodi pojedinca. In Zbornik radova Sloboda u jedinstvu razlika, Me|unarodni forum Bosna, Sarajevo, 1998, p. 54.

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the continent the origins of which were forged on the anvil of war) should be subjected to demystification precisely by the plural European Union itself in order to prevent the neo-conservative European right wing from carrying out that demystification. Unfortunately, the European Union is against geophilosophy which calls it into question. The European Union is against any criticism of its Purpose, which is why only entrepreneurial science, business science, sectoral science, institutionally legitimate science, non-social science, project science, focused science, the non-thinking science is being pushed on a large scale even through scientific research projects, whereby a message is being sent to philosophy, and especially geophilosophy which is trying to think out an expanded shared European space that it is unable to contemplate individual worlds, that it is unable to reside in Particularity and to scoop it up for its own research. Hence, that is it redundant. That is not serious. Filing geophilosophy away into the tray of metaphysical redundancy leaves the European geopolitical space spiritless and it loses its philosophical nature, identity and becomes redundant in the institutional projection of the European Union. On the other hand, marginalization of a spatial component of the political tilts the space-time balance and leads to tyranny of (capitalist) time34, forgetting that “the space was empirically described and practically effective even before theory turned it into notion“.35 As such, manifested before it was given a notion, space cannot stand reduction to de-territorialized time. It demands that it should be understood not only in legal-political, sociological, economic and anthropologic and cultural terms, but also in geophysical sense. And this sense requires interpretation of space as mythos36, as distinctiveness outside logos since logos can also stand for “deceitful and forgetful talk by the multitude“.37 Through mythos, understood as it is interpreted by Cacciari, space confirms its existence in the epoch of time and brings the lost geopolitical sense back in the de-territorialized time of post-modernism. A striking example of such power, although consciously ignored by the Brussels bureaucracy is the European Union, which confirms itself as a geopolitical order, and also as a geopolitical discourse. This is the fundamental distinction developed by Agnew and Corbridge. According to them, geopolitical order refers to political economy of spatial practice, or hierarchical organization of space, and geopolitical 34

35

36

37

“Omnipresence, imminence and settlement of time are being replaced by settlement of space. Permanent governance of the continents withdrew before the general intemperance of transfers and transmissions... There is no longer struggle for space. Now the time is being conquered.“ Paul Virilio: Kriti~ki prostor, Umetni~ko dru{tvo Gradac, â~ak, 1997, p. 86. Henri Lefebvre’s thought. See in Pu{i} Ljubinko: Grad, dru{tvo, prostor, Zavod za ud`benike i nastavna sredstva, Belgrade, 1997. p. 45. I refer to Massimo Cacciari, who in Geo-Philosophy of Europe trying to surpass many “...empty idle talk about antique understanding of time and space“ evokes Hecataeus of Miletus and his term mythos, with which this Greek historian, geographer and logographer, marks “...one’s own true speech...... Mythos is for him still a sound, vox of the thing itself, the thing which confirms itself.“ See in: Massimo Cacciari: Geo-filozofija Evrope, Ceres, Zagreb, 1996, p. 9. Ibid.

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discourse refers to geopolitical idea about hierarchical organization of space with interpretation of that space in its centre, but which does not necessarily have to materialize fully, or which does not have to be correct in substance. 38 The above analysis shows clearly that the geopolitical order of the European Union belongs to globalization, and that geopolitical discourse radiates various conceptual and morphological meanings among which geophilosophical dominates, taking the European space as an emerging homeland, as an emerging Europe: In temptations of creating one public space, long-winded works, it is necessary to re-do the basis (common values, human rights, nation), it would also be necessary to discuss differences and divisions, not only in the interest of promoting common visions, uniform and artificial ones, but to create unitas multiplex which may found a new European pluralist and self-critical identity, aware of ambivalence and open to the world’s plurality. The old identity, if we trust Edgar Morin, was ‘democratic and imperialistic and re-gained a double identity of a charming curtain of its cultural spirituality; it is based on certainty that it possesses reason and civilization.39 That certainty was ending through the long (national) European history, what an irony, with the military invasion of the Space of Another. With genocide. With the Holocaust. Never again – that is our big hope. For: Europe does not want its own end, which means: it does not want itself – it does not want to believe in what its own to be occasus suggests.40 It has fears of it, perceives it as a simple, imminent destiny, sees it as the product of external forces, instead of longing for being the one which is now waning. Still, it is a unique, authentic decision, thrust upon it by the epoch. The wane does not mean to wrench itself free from itself but to turn to its own bottom and listen – yield oneself to the Last, under whose standard all different ones, if they are perfectly different, admit the necessity of their own enquiries as conjecture. And this would be impossible for Europe? What has never been perceived as possible? Well, that impossible is its sole future. It is that impossible, which is being delayed, that one should search for. Lope ahead, regardless of the fact that the “European particularity is a highly set, very risky identity: it is shaped by the composition of the opposites, by overcoming the opposites in a synthesis; by plurality fitted into a motley unity; by tensions which resulted in harmony, 38

39 40

Agnew John & Corbridge Stuart: Mastering space: Hegemony, territory and international political economy, Routledge, London and New York, 1995. Michel Foucher: Evropska republika, Stubovi kulture, Belgrade, 2000, p.160. Massimo Cacciari: Geo-filozofija Evrope, Ceres, Zagreb, 1996, p.156-157.

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fruitful contrasts“.41 But can that relatively risky identity project for the future begin at present? Can Europe overcome the previous negative anticipations which I have constructed, speculated or picked up from the river swollen with European nihilism? Said within the frame of geopolitical codification – can Europe overcome geopolitics as a tyrannical construct of the mind and work on the geopolitics of peace as a practical political application of geophilosophy of Europe in an organized European space? 42 That space has its ideology. That is, as Lefebvre calls it, the space of “capitalist society“.43 That space has its boundaries. They follow a nonfixed geography of the European Union, which, without a Third Europe, remains an incomplete story. Since incompleteness is a historical property of Europe, is our sole certainty not that the West Balkans remains the real name for that incompleteness, permanent instable situation with a natural tendency towards degeneration? 44 For this reason and also by reason of the historical powder chamber, I ask: will the Balkans remain indefinitely a “vital geopolitical issue“ 45, the region the unsolvable history of which is becoming a desired obstacle to the European completeness? Wolfgang Schmale in History of European Ideas observes: “Not only political but also cultural integration of Europe independently from the EU stretching contains only partly the questions for history; partly, it depends on the wish, on the decisions directed to the future which may have a political and possibly moral foundation, but not historical.46 It would be perfect if it were so. Unfortunately, all questions emerge from history so that the political and moral universe of the (new) European civilization is being built on immersion into history. This is not strange since, as Karl Jaspers observes wisely, “Europe brought the world the idea of History” 47 which is why a solution to a problem can always be blocked by searching for a historical sense. Does the accession of the West Balkan countries to the European Union have a historical sense? For the new European right wing, which has started the long march to Brussels, there is none. For us, the citizens of some of the countries of Southeast Europe, being part of the European Union means translating dreams into reality. The prime condition for that to happen is that the European continent leaves history behind. But, the following question is legitimate: what shall we get if we 41

42

43

44 45

46 47

Wolfgang Kraus: Budu}nost Evrope. Na putu ujedinjenja. PanLiber, Osijek - Zagreb – Split, 2000, p. 15. Christer Jonsson, Sven Tagil, Gunnar Tornqvist: Organizing European Space, Sage Publications, London Thousand Oaks - New Delhi, 2002. See in Pu{i} Ljubinko: Grad, dru{tvo, prostor, Zavod za ud`benike i nastavna sredstva, Belgrade, 1997, p. 48. Alain Minc: Novi srednji vijek, Alfa, Zagreb, 2008, p. 233. Philippe Moreau Defarges: Geopoliti~ki rje~nik, Centar za geopolitolo{ka istraìvanja, Zagreb, 2006, p. 25. Wolfgang Schmale: Istorija evropske ideje, Clio, Belgrade, 2003, p. 314. Edgar Morin: Kako misliti Evropu, Svjetlost, Sarajevo, 1989, p. 88.

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finally leave history? We shall get some form of a post-territorial political community48, an unclear “huge, heterogeneous territory which has (only) a common political frame“ 49 but also the potential to get transformed by the will of the people who surpassed the shackles of sovereignty, into a common European space with post-historical institutions of the universal European time growing like a new essential form50 on its post-imperial political body. Semantic distinction51 between the old imperial geopolitical orders and the new European order, which will, or will not, be established, is as obvious as the difference between national and cosmopolitic52 sovereignty. With the triumph of the latter, without tinges of imperial hierarchy, the European Union becomes and remains an undeniable fact of the continental future.

48

49 50

51 52

David Chandler: Critiquing Liberal Cosmopolitanism? The Limits of the Biopolitical Approach. In International Political Sociology, Volume 3, Issue 1, March, 2009. p. 54, 55, 56. Eric Hobsbawm: Globalizacija, demokratija i terorizam, Arhipelag, Belgrade, 2008, p. 111-112. Kessler Oliver: Toward a Sociology of the International? International Relations between Anarchy and World Society. In International Political Sociology, Volume 3, Issue 1, March, 2009, p.104. Ibid., 105. Chandler, ibid., 58, 59, 60, 67, 68.

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Bosnia’s Phony Transition: The Mirage of Bosnian Democracy and False Assumptions of the EU Kurt BASSUENER

1989 is probably the wrong frame of reference for discussing Bosnia, and probably all of the countries of the former SFRJ, probably save Slovenia. In every federal unit (and I use the term on purpose) south of there, liberal democracy as expected and understood in the EU at the time followed independence only later, following violent conflict. In none of these former republics is the transition complete, in my view. One can argue that in Bosnia and Herzegovina there never was a democratic transition. Many academics – David Chandler in particular1 – have argued that the international community’s role has impeded normal democratic function. The European Stability Initiative (ESI) in its 2003 Journal of Democracy article “Travails of the European Raj2,” made the point that if the international community, especially the Office of the High Representative, simply got out of the way, Bosnia could find its own democratic political equilibrium and move forward under its own steam toward EU and NATO membership. I disagree with both arguments. The international community has been an actor in BiH politics since 1995, and especially since 1998 when the High Representative’s Bonn Powers began to be employed. Yet to attribute Bosnia’s dysfunction to the OHR or international factors in general is a deep misreading of Bosnian politics. So is the sense that BiH po-litics would find an equilibrium that would allow for consensus on the structures, functionality, and reforms needed to enter clubs like the EU and NATO. These parties have found consensus, albeit fraught, since the war, but certainly not in the public interest. That is to effectively divide the country, its public offices and resources into party-controlled fiefdoms.

1

2

See http://www.davidchandler.org/books/books_bosnia.html for a synopsis of his 1999 book Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton. See the article in PDF format at http://www.britishcouncil.org/brussels-democraticpapers-travails-of-theeuropean-raj.pdf

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The past three years, under the previous two High Representatives – Christian Schwarz-Schilling and Miroslav Laj~ák, have essentially been a period in which Bosnian politicians could act unimpeded by meddling international interference to find their own political solutions. While the Bonn Powers have been used, the threat of being removed from office for anti-Dayton behavior is perceived as moribund. The political atmosphere has become more, not less, rancorous with diminution of international credibility in the eyes of Bosnian politicians. It’s been playtime for Bosnian politicians. Of course, it is hardly normal that in a functioning democratic political system that external forces act as the most effective (and until recently only real) deterrent to official malfeasance, or as an administrative quasi-legal failsafe. But that is precisely the point I mean to make: that as presently constituted, Dayton BiH is not a functioning liberal democracy, even one in its infancy. It rather functions – and I argue was designed to function – as a de facto oligarchy, with nationalist parties representing “their” constituent people (Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks). It has of course undergone development of sorts since the signature of the Dayton Accords in 1995 and the first postwar elections, which were termed as an “ethnic referendum” by many observers, to a stage where one might call it a “competitive oligarchy.” Among each constituent people, there are a number of parties which vie to assume the role of what I’ve taken to calling the “classic nationalist parties” of the early to mid1990s: the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), and Croatian Democratic Union of BiH (HDZ BiH). Yet the fundamental name of the game has not changed. Under the Dayton system, politicians are not compelled to seek a broad constituency, but only within a given constituent people. There is no political center – there are effectively three separate political spectrums. And since each party is competing to present itself the most credible “protector,” fear remains a very effective political tool to homogenize and mobilize. Each of the three ethnic political spectrums has a built-in gravitational pull to the right. This compulsion to scare the hell out of or anger voters in each electoral cycle (which have been following in two-year intervals since Dayton, one municipal, one general) has manifest itself repeatedly. While parties do have platforms and manifestoes that address social issues, these rarely are prominent in electoral communication or political discourse during campaigns. There is also a distinct benefit for BiH politicians from this structurally driven focus on fear: almost complete lack of accountability. This is reflected in the remarkable stability of Bosnia’s political elites. There are new faces since 1995 – Republika Srpska Premier Milorad Dodik and SDA leader Sulejman Tihi} are the most visible evidence of some churning. But they are exceptions that prove a rule. The only ways out of the top echelons of political power and influence

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in BiH since Dayton have been death, imprisonment, being a fugitive from prosecution, or forming an unsuccessful splinter party. While non-ethnic parties try to compete, most notably the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and as of 2008 Na{a Stranka (“Our Party”), these parties compete at a disadvantage as a result of the dynamics included in the constitutional and electoral system. The SDP is a statewide party with representation at high levels, though it is in opposition at all levels of government beyond the municipal, where it is well-represented. The rise of Milorad Dodik since his assuming the RS Premiership for the second time, in 2006, proves another unfortunate fact. The Dayton Accords, with their integral Annex 4 constitution, were designed to preserve strong roles for all the signatories and their parties. This is hardly surprising. But Dodik’s veering in a strongly nationalist direction in the 2006 general election campaign proves that the Dayton constitution generates new nationalists by making fear and ethnic divisiveness politically profitable. In Dodik’s case, after the failure of the “April package” of proposed constitutional reforms in 2006, which would have made the state-level prime minister office more attractive (he was reportedly flirting with the idea of the role), he made a logical deduction. The RS Premiership is the most powerful office in the state, since it has a strong vertical of power within the RS, and the RS can stop anything from moving forward at the state level. And this has indeed been the case. Ever since assuming the reins, Dodik has been the most powerful man in Bosnia – and he knows it. So to sum up, unlike Central and Eastern European new members of the EU, and even its immediate neighbors Croatia and Serbia (the latter more problematic), Bosnia never underwent a democratic transition. Yet nor is it an authoritarian state as such. Rather, it is a competitive oligarchy with a political-business-criminal nexus which relies on clientelism, patronage and fear, despite the machinery of an electoral democracy. The recent spectacle of the SDA’s May 26th party congress is an illustration of another facet of BiH’s political culture. The reason it was so remarkable was the fact that the outcome of the leadership contest was not known in advance. Most party congresses in Bosnia end in coronations. No other party of similar weight, including the SDP, has had any such uncertainty. Misdiagnosis Leads to Dangerous Prescriptions The international community’s role in Bosnia is currently in limbo, with the closure of Dayton’s peace enforcement mission, and the agreement’s final arbiter, the High Representative, subject to five objectives and two conditions set by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) in February

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2008. It is unlikely there will be substantial progress toward meeting the remaining two objectives – state property and defense property – at the late June meeting of the PIC. And the overall political climate, in which the RS Assembly has challenged the legitimacy of the Office of the High Representative and transfers of constitutional competence from the entity to the state-level, is hardly likely to convince all members of the PIC Steering Board that the situation is sufficiently stable to warrant OHR’s closure – the flexible essence of the second condition. There are insistent voices calling for the long-mooted “transition” away from OHR to a “reinforced” EU Special Representative mission, including the incoming Swedish EU presidency. But as of the time of writing, the question of what that mission’s composition, mandate and powers will be remains opaque. As of now, it appears a joint EUSR and European Commission Delegation approach would focus on the so-called “European path” of preparing BiH for European integration, and not involve itself in the deeper constitutional reasons for state dysfunction. The EU – by which I mean its institutions and most of its member states – seems wedded to an approach, while somewhat different from the accession model of other recent applicants and members, still relies on a set of assumptions that do not apply in Bosnia. First, the EU expects to negotiate with representative democratic politicians. Brussels also assumes that these politicians have a political and social consensus behind them to do the heavy-lifting required to meet the EU’s criteria. Finally, the EU assumes its interlocutors at the state-level are the real powerbrokers, and can deliver. None of these apply in Bosnia. The so-called “Prud process” which a desperate international community grasped as evidence of progress proves the power brokers are partyleaders, not office-holders (though in Dodik’s case, he is both). The “process” was clearly designed for international consumption, and served its purpose. It has delivered little thus far, though apparently hope springs eternal in the international community. Prud’s formulation – one stopshopping with three men arrogating unto themselves the presumption they can speak for “their” peoples – shows the EU’s assumptions to be false. And yet there seems an almost theological resistance to recognizing, much less acknowledging, that contradiction. In the same vein, the experience of new EU member states has been touted as giving guideposts for BiH in its efforts to enter the EU. I believe this has been overplayed, including by some Central Europeans themselves, like the previous High Representative, Miroslav Laj~ák. There are some similarities and experiences that can be instructive, to be sure. But the differences are at least as important. There has been much postaccession grumbling that Romania and Bulgaria had not fulfilled all the reforms that were asked of them. But the contrast with Bosnia is stark. Viewed even through the most jaundiced lens, Romania and Bulgaria’s political elites were able to forge a consensus to at least fake meeting the

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EU criteria. In Bosnia, politicians don’t even feel compelled to do that prior to talking about tendering a formal application for candidacy. There is manifest hope among many EU members that Serbia’s forward movement toward the EU, itself heavily a result of a wide desire to declare progress in the hope reality will follow in its wake, will compel Bosnia’s politicians to accelerate their own efforts. This seems to draw on the Central European experience of Slovakia, which indeed did feel the pressure from below to rejoin the Central European mainstream – it had gone from being spoken of in the same breath with its neighbors the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to Milo{evi}’s Yugoslavia and Lukashenko’s Belarus in a matter of less than five years. But the analogy is flawed. However increasingly corrupt, authoritarian and nationalist the Vladimir Me~iar’s government became, citizens had a singular target on which to focus their ire for being stuck. The country had an administrative structure that worked. And despite the brief period from 1989, civil society struck the deep roots that allowed strategic activism to ultimately force a political correction. Bosnia’s reasons for falling behind are structural and political, not simply the latter. Furthermore, and dangerously, the incentives for political players differ in the case of Serbia’s “fast track,” as some, including the incoming Swedish EU presidency, advocate. The RS and Serbia have concluded numerous agreements in their special relations, in theory allowed by Dayton, but never exercised until the somnolent Schwarz-Schilling period of international disengagement. Should, for example, Serbia get visa liberalization before BiH, Bosnian Serbs will logically increasingly decide to avail themselves of Serbian passports, further weakening the state. The idea that Serbian progress will spur progress in Bosnia is deluded – the reality is likely to be the opposite. The EU has only itself to blame for the perception among Bosnian politicians that it is an easy mark. While not primarily responsible for the Dayton constitutional construct, the EU has sent Bosnian politicians clear signals that its conditionality is malleable. The initialing of a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU immediately on the heels of an ignominious defeat of High Representative Laj~ák at the hands of RS Premier Dodik, despite the failure to achieve police reform, which was among the EC’s declared criteria, reinforced that message. So the dismal delivery on EU criteria since the signature of the SAA in 2008 shouldn’t come as a surprise. Bosnia’s politicians have been conditioned to believe the EU will accept them anyway. Worse yet, the same impulse to adhere to what has become over time a sort of standard EU enlargement playbook has led to pressure from EU institutions and many members to dismantle the remaining peace enforcement guardrails in Bosnia, most crucially the legal failsafe of a High Representative to act as final arbiter of the Dayton Accords and a military deterrent force, since 2004 under the EU flag as EUFOR. The

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rationale is thus: since the EU signed an SAA with Bosnia, it must not need these institutions, by definition. This dogmatic inflexibility not only shows a lack of imagination as well as a misunderstanding of the dynamics at play, but is outright dangerous – not only for Bosnia, but for the EU itself. For without maintaining the guardrails that prevented the re-emergence of violent conflict for the past 13 years, the international community will divest itself of the Chapter 7 legal ability to intervene in a crisis without a direct invitation or a UN Security Council Resolution. It is not difficult to imagine the complications of either securing an invitation from a divided, dysfunctional government, or getting a resolution through the Security Council with Russia able to cast a veto. Some argue that the risks are remote, and that conflict serves no political interest at the moment. But there are numerous variables at play, many (such as private security firms) unstudied by those who have the responsibility to address them, such as EUFOR. Nor is 1992 the right yardstick with which to measure the potential threat. The correlation of forces is very different. But given the proliferation of small arms, the amplified political tensions which have bred increased fear, and the divergence of unfulfilled agendas, there are manifold risks that fall short of full scale war that could push BiH beyond the point of no return. Deterrence should always be based on the capabilities at hand, not perceived or likely intent. Given the limited cost of maintaining legal capacity and sufficient military capability, is it worth the risk to unilaterally disarm? If there is to be no OHR, then there must be a post-Dayton BiH The problem in Bosnia is structural, so the international approach here must address that frontally, as I wrote in a recent US Institute of Peace briefing3. To the extent BiH has worked since Dayton, it has done so because of the role of an empowered High Representative. The fact that it didn’t work at all for the first two years after Dayton necessitated the Bonn Powers. For the past three years, it has been possible to see what happens when the international community and its representatives lack an overall strategy and the will to employ those tools effectively behind it. The logical transition point from the High Representative’s peace enforcement mandate to the EU’s accession approach would be once Bosnia is structurally capable of responding to the EU’s incentives to conduct reforms for membership. 3

“Unfinished Business in Bosnia and Herzegovina: What is to be Done?” Kurt Bassuener and James Lyon, USIPeace Briefing, May 2009. Available in PDF format at http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_ briefings/2009/0519_bosnia_herzegovina.html

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To acquire the functionality to work effectively (and accountably) for its citizens, much less meet EU standards, Bosnia needs serious structural reform, including constitutional reform and amendment of the election law. To achieve this, the EU and US must work jointly toward this goal. The EU has the potential leverage to demand and facilitate such deep reform, should it only develop the political will to employ it. And this is where the US role comes into play. For while the EU holds the preponderance of the leverage, it lacks the requisite urgency, unity and will to apply it to this logical end – and end that would serve its own interests, I hasten to add. The US seems to have grasped the ugly reality in Bosnia better than Brussels, judging from Vice President Joe Biden’s speech to the BiH Parliament last month. So if a coherent strategy is ever to emerge, the US has to act as a catalyst to bring it about, working with individual member states to assemble critical mass within the EU. As of now, the members that view the Bosnian situation with similar concern appear to be relatively few: Britain, the Netherlands, and perhaps Germany. The group that wants to close OHR as quickly as possible is much larger, and is led by Sweden, the incoming presidency of the EU, and includes France, Italy, Spain, and most Central European members of the Union. Many member states don’t even pretend to have a Bosnia policy, and will go with the flow. So this is a question of initiative. Should no initiative be taken to build the policy among the EU member states, then the policy will be what emerges from the Brussels lowest common denominator sausage machine, and it will fail. Building that critical mass will be very labor intensive, and in my view require the appointment of a Presidential Special Envoy to do the necessary work in capitals of EU and other PIC members, with the Brussels machinery, and in the Western Balkans region. This effort would aim to build a working consensus on a number of crucial elements. Accepting that the situation has become dangerous and will require executive authority to prevent conflict is the essential starting point. Defining the strategic goal as substantial functional reforms in Bosnia, including changing the political incentives in the constitutional and electoral system, is the endpoint of the continuum. The tools and mandate of the “reinforced EUSR,” as well as the roles of the US and other allies, need to be configured around what is necessary to be able to achieve the strategic objective. The Biden visit showed increased attention from Washington, but how that will durably manifest itself in terms of policy is far from clear. “Ownership” Ought to Begin with a Popularly Legitimate Constitution For over a decade now, the term “ownership” has been employed by members of the international community who wish to see Bosnians take responsibility for their own governance and problem-solving. Under the

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Dayton Annex 4 constitution, which allows politicians a splendid lack of accountability, this has been little more than a cop-out. But there must be no doubt that Bosnia’s citizens – Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks, and those who do not want to fit into those boxes and are “others” – have to own any post-Dayton constitutional order. Finding a model that a majority of each self-identified group can accept will be no easy task. But it is the sine qua non of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s survival, much less be able to enter the EU. The EU and US cannot create that consensus. But they can – and must – create a context in which such a consensus can be forged, free of the fear of renewed conflict, and act as a catalyst to bring it about. Doing so will require a level of coordination and collaboration that the EU and the US have never shown before. But it is well within the realm of the possible. Given the stakes, there is no time to lose.

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1989-2009: FROM EXCLUSION TO INTEGRATION (case of Serbia) Vladimir PAVIĆEVIĆ

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 marked in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe the beginning of transformation of their economic, legal and political systems into modern communities based on marketoriented economy, the rule of law and political pluralism. Orientation to new values was clearly determined and inspired by the idea of membership in the European Community (EC), meant to ensure the ultimate unification of the two parts of the European continent which had been divided by an impenetrable wall over half a century. Out of all communist states in Europe, in 1989, the European prospects were the brightest for the then Yugoslavia (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), which consisted of the six federal units (Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Slovenia and Montenegro) and two autonomous provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina). The two autonomous provinces were within Serbia, in administrative terms, but were represented in the federal institutions and decision-making processes. Unlike other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which set the EU accession after the fall of communism as their priority albeit quite a distant goal, in former Yugoslavia mounting ethnic tensions resulted in armed conflicts and dissolution of the country, while the European future of what used to be a joint country was relegated to the bottom of the agenda. It did not become a political priority of its successors until after the wars ended. Out of all countries created in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, only Slovenia became the full member of the European Union, in 2004, while other countries are standing in the vestibule, the waiting room for Europe. Croatia has a candidate status; that country has opened negotiations on its full EU membership and their completion is expected in the course of 2010. Macedonia, despite its problems, was granted EU candidate status in 2005 and is getting prepared for the commencement of accession negotiations. Montenegro presented its official application for EU membership in December 2008 and expects to get candidate status in the course of 2010. Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina signed Stabilization and Association Agreements and are now waiting for an opportunity to present an official application for EU membership and get a candidate status as the next step. 203


Following a change in 2000, which began with ousting Slobodan Milo{evi} from power, the status of Serbia’s European integration continues to be uncertain. Serbia signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement, although there has been no implementation of the SAA provisions yet over insufficient level of Serbia’s cooperation with the Tribunal in The Hague. This was how Serbia, amid the European integration process, came down to the bottom of the list of the West Balkan states, ranking behind Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The European integration process in Serbia was slowed down even more after the Assembly of Kosovo decided on 17 February, 2008, to declare Kosovo’s independence. Serbian reaction to Kosovo’s declaration of independence was put before the discussion about Serbia’s European prospects, which consequently called Serbia’s integration into the European Union into question. Serbia’s bad position in the formal process of association with and accession to the European Union confronts us with two key political obstacles which slow down Serbia’s meaningful inclusion in the European integration processes: (1) unsuccessful definition of Serbia’s state borders, and (2) Serbia’s insufficient cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The need on the part of the present-day elites in Serbia to prolong the crisis caused by the dissolution of Yugoslavia and to keep the state border issue open gets right to the core of the first obstacle. This position, maintained by the elites in power, is manifested in the politics pursued towards Bosnia and Herzegovina, and previously in the attitude towards Kosovo. The assessment of insufficient cooperation with the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia refers primarily to the failure to locate and apprehend Ratko Mladi}, and also to the absence of the will to come face-to-face with the crimes committed in the past. The picture of an isolated country, excluded from most of international forums portrayed Serbia from 1990s. But Serbia moved into the new century with the idea of turning from the main disturber in the West Balkans to a reliable partner. As soon as the new politics got a chance, Serbia experienced the greatest shock in the first decade of the 21st century: in the early March 2003, the first democratically elected Prime Minister of Serbia, Zoran Djindjic, was assassinated. Zoran Djindjic was assassinated by a member of the Interior Ministry of Serbia who also belonged to a criminal group formed during Milosevic’s rule, which maintained some important footholds in the state authorities after a democratic change. It turned out soon that the Djindjic assassination blocked Serbia’s attempt to turn from the disturbing factor to a country fully integrated into the European mainstream.

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Return of Serbia to the vision of the late Prime Minister Djindjic implies a change in politics in several respects. One of the most important changes concerns a shift in Serbia’s policy towards its neighbors. In 1990s, Serbia’s policy towards its neighbors was mainly irrational, which left an impact on the relations with some of its neighbors in the form of disputes which are being addressed or will be addressed bilaterally or at the international level. The Stabilization and Association Agreement envisages Serbia’s contractual obligation to foster good neighborly relations in the region, while the European Commission and the European Parliament have always emphasized in their reports that the regional cooperation is one of the key indicators of Serbia‘s pro-European orientation. This is why all pending issues between Serbia and its neighbors should be solved and their cooperation should be intensive in politics and economy. After Croatia, Montenegro and Macedonia recognized Kosovo’s independence, when an extremely bad atmosphere was created in diplomatic relations between Serbia and its three neighbors. Belgrade’s unreasonably harsh and emotional reaction forced the ambassadors of Montenegro and Macedonia to leave Belgrade, which triggered a backlash against Serbia, drastically worsening diplomatic relations with the two countries. This also stirred concern in the European institutions. Normalization of relations with Macedonia and Montenegro is absolutely necessary if Serbia is to integrate fully into Europe. This is why it is extremely important that the Serbian Government extends hand of cooperation to its neighbors who have gone further down the EU path than Serbia by organizing official visits to Skopje and Podgorica and withdrawing its decision declaring the ambassadors of those countries undesirable on Serbian soil. Croatia could be Serbia’s main partner on the path to the European Union, despite Serbia’s toughened rhetoric on Croatia following Kosovo’s independence. Zagreb should be Belgrade’s main partner in the EU and NATO accession and also in refugee returns to Croatia and addressing other still pending issues from the armed conflicts in 1990s. The charges filed by both countries should be left to the International Court of Justice unless bilateral settlement of the dispute is not possible, in which case Serbia will have to respect the Court’s judgment. At the same time, the Danube border dispute between Serbia and Croatia should be settled as soon as possible through bilateral negotiations with the Croatian government in order to prevent this issue from becoming an insurmountable obstacle at the moment of Serbia’s EU accession. Regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, as a guarantor of the Dayton Agreement, should support all the efforts the international community is making to redefine and make BiH more efficient through the constitutional reform. Without a constitutional reform in BiH, there will

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be no internal stability or the stability in the region – which is necessary for the fast European integration of all West Balkan states. Another important point of Serbia’s new politics refers to the successful completion of cooperation with the Tribunal in the Hague. The Stabilization and Association Agreement and the Interim Trade Agreement with the European Union were ratified in the Serbian Parliament on 9 September, 2008. Ratification of these agreements has not yet begun in the EU because of the Dutch Government’s opposition over Serbia’s failure to establish full cooperation with the Tribunal in the Hague. Serbia should ensure the apprehension of Ratko Mladic and Goran Hadzic or otherwise to provide substantive evidence that it is unable to do that, thereby proving its full cooperation with the Tribunal in the Hague. Thereby, Serbia would demonstrate its ability to fulfill its international obligations, primarily those established in the judgment of the International Court of Justice in connection with Bosnia-Herzegovina’s charges against Serbia, and also its genuine orientation to the basic values of united Europe – respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy and the rule of law. The third item concerns the necessity for the constitutional reform in Serbia. On its path towards the European Union, Serbia will have to change some sections of its Constitution just as other countries of the region did, among them Slovenia, the country which changed its Constitution as many as two times before it acceded to the Union. There are two major obstacles in the Serbian 2006 Constitution which impede Serbia’s EU path: a) provisions on Kosovo, and b) provisions on Serbia’s scope of responsibility and the (lack of) primacy of international law over national law. Kosovo is defined in the Preamble to the Serbian Constitution and the texts of the oaths taken by the highest power-holders as an autonomous province of Serbia. The rigid insistence on having this provision in the most fundamental law narrowed the leeway in negotiations with Kosovars on all pending Kosovo issues. Since the status of Kosovo was defined by international documents, the reasonable behavior of the political elite in power in Serbia would be their advocacy of changes in the relevant provisions of the Serbian Constitution in order to prevent any possible manipulation with the Serbian European integration in the future over the so-called Kosovo issue. The Serbian Constitution, on the other hand, does not define the primacy of international law over national law. Thus it is envisaged in a completely amateur way that every international treaty has to be harmonized with the Constitution. Although Serbia and Kosovo are going separate EU paths, while the Stabilization and Association Agreement does not refer to Kosovo, this constitutional provision could be used as

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a formal obstacle to Serbia’s accession to the EU and as such must be changed urgently. At the same time, Chapter IV of the Constitution does not envisage transfer of sovereign powers to the supranational organization, i.e. the European Union, which can also be a very serious formal obstacle to Serbian accession to that organization. Finally, a special point of acceleration on Serbia’s EU path is Serbian attitude towards Kosovo issue. The policy-level road map for both Serbia and Kosovo envisages a number of steps. First of all, Serbia, focusing on rational and objective analysis of the situation in the world, should send a clear signal to the European Union that an agreement is possible under which Serbia, provided that an agreement is reached on future steps, will accept the Kosovo reality. As Serbia is unable to prevent the European Union member-states from recognizing Kosovo’s independence, Serbia should open, rather than close, the chapter of its European prospects, which would be a rational thing to do. Serbia should initiate an agreement with the European Union and the representatives of Kosovars which would regulate the status of Kosovo Serbs, implementation of their human and civil rights, citizenship, free access to cultural monuments and freedom of movement between Kosovo and Serbia. At the same time, Serbia should request from the European Union a clear guarantee that it will be granted a candidate status and a date of commencement of pre-accession negotiations. Within regional cooperation, after it gets a candidate status, Serbia should establish diplomatic relations with Kosovo, which would be a requirement for its accession to the European Union. The above-proposed Kosovo policy and acceleration of Serbia’s European integration would, after twenty years of conflicts and wars, help define new relations among the states in the region. In the long run, it would bring Serbia the greatest benefits, and would create for the West Balkan countries the preconditions necessary for enhancing stability and mutual trust and confidence.

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CONCLUSIONS Asim MUJKIĆ

1. The year 1989 marked the beginning of inclusive processes in the former socialist countries of East, Central and Southeast Europe. Still, it can be concluded that those were not unequivocal processes. Inclusion implies, as the twenty-year-long transition has shown, also the micro-strategies of exclusion (Vlaisavljevi} and Mujki}), of which the most conspicuous are the anti-migration policy and the approach to the West Balkans. This complexity of the inclusive-exclusive processes may be considered as a reflection of Europe’s search for its own political and cultural identity, resulting in the new walls built with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Of them, the most impressive is the Schengen wall; in other words, with the annulment of Division, another process was launched, that of creating new divisions the multiplication of which has no end in sight (Mujagi}). This is why a kind of dialectics between inclusion and exclusion, the continuity which is based on discontinuity (Klotz), is awaiting its solution in the narration which Europeans will have to produce on their identity. 2. Joining the ranks of “successful democracies” implied, within the process initiated in 1989, the process – as understood in the old terms – of consolidating national states and their free markets on the basis of the concept of the right of the people to self-determination. At the same time, that area sparked the old ethnic myths, animosities and conflicts the accommodation of which depended primarily on the action by political elites – different directions of action by those elites are most visible in the example of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – and especially on the will of the Serb political elite, in the case of former Yugoslavia, so that the source of crisis and deviation of the democratization process in the West Balkans may be understood from the context of a failure to define the state borders of Serbia (Pavi}evi}). It is in this context that a different course of “transition processes” in Southeast Europe should be interpreted. This is the reason why it is extremely important to analyze action and value orientations of the political elites (Zako{ek). 3. Accepting Etienne Balibar’s statement that the fate of the European identity is being solved in the Balkans, the upheavals in the articulation of the European identity are closely related to the absence of 209

a connecting narration of the social hope which was a motivating power of the 1989 Revolution. There are no narrations of hope (Deme{) or narrations of social justice which we link to Rawls’s teaching (Sekuli}) without an emancipatory discourse, which has been in crisis ever since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Hope is closely linked to freedom, while freedoms appear today, in a neo-liberalist context, assuming the shape of an ideological system, in the form of consumer freedoms and the freedom of movement of capital. Today in particular, there is a need for a ‘disruptive thought’ (]urak) which could oppose the dominant, largely Orientalist discourses of the European Union towards this part of the world (Petrovi}), opposite to such a disciplining opinion which is imposed, for example, through the Bologna higher education reform. If, as Bogdan Denitch concludes, “genuine democracy requires at least the minimum of commitment to social justice“, room has to be found for that discourse in the entire area of the former communist bloc, and in the West Balkans in particular.

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About the authors

Ugo Vlaisavljevic is Full Professor, University of Sarajevo Department of Philosophy. He teaches Ontology at the Department of Philosophy, and Epistemology at the Department of Psychology. He has written widely on phenomenology, semiotics, political philosophy, and is currently editor-in-chief of the journal of philosophy and social sciences Dialogue (Sarajevo) and member of editorial board of the international journal Transeuropéennes (Paris). President of PEN club of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He is also known as a translator of the latest philosophical literature (numerous short texts and works by B. Waldenfels, J. Habermas, J.-L. Nancy and J. Derrida, from German, English and French).

Asim Mujki} was born in 1968 in Br~ko. He earned a PhD in philosophy at the Department of Philosophy, Sarajevo, in 2002. He is Part-Time Professor at the Faculty of Political Science, Sarajevo University. He teaches Ethics and Political Ethics. He is the author of NeoPragmatism of Richard Rorty (2000), Kratka povijest pragmatizma (Short History of Pragmatism) (2005.) and Mi, gra|ani Etnopolisa (We, the citizens of Ethnopolis) (2005.). He is deputy editor-in-chief of Odjek, Bosnia-Herzegovina’s review of cultural and social issues.

Wolfgang Klotz (1954), theologian, Director of the East/West-European Cultural Centre PALAIS JALTA (1990-1999), founder and director of the Central and Eastern European Online Library C.E.E.O.L (2000-2008); since 2009 regional director of the Heinrich Böll Foundation South-Eastern Europe (Belgrade Office).

Pavol Deme{ has been the Director for Central and Eastern Europe of the German Marshall Fund of the United States since January 2000, and is based in Bratislava, Slovakia. Previously he served as the Executive Director of the SAIA-Service Center for the Third Sector. He also served as Foreign Policy Advisor to the President of the Slovak Republic (1993-97), and from 1991-92 he was the Slovak Minister of International Relations. An internationally recognized NGO leader, Demes has served on the boards of national and international associations and foundations. Prior to the “Velvet Revolution” in November 1989, Demes was a bio-medical researcher at Comenius University in Bratislava. He is a graduate of Charles University in Prague (1980). He received the EU-US Democracy and Civil Society Award (in 1998), Royal Dutch decoration Knight of the Order of Orange Nassau (2005), Yugoslav Star of First Class (2005).

Boìdar Gajo Sekuli} (1938) is Professor emeritus at the University of Sarajevo. He earned his Ph.D. in science of philosophy at the University of Zagreb in 1963. His scientific and philosophical areas of interest: genesis and meaning of the Marxist theory, critical theory of society, theory of non-violent revolution, theory of peace, theory of justice, theory of revolution, theory of democracy, theory of reification and recognition, etc. He is the author of a number of books from philosophy and critical social and political theory. He is also the author of about 40 works, published in foreign languages. He was a visiting professor at the University of Bremen. Translator from German language (Arendt, Altermat, Habermas etc.). Has worked throughout his career at the Faculty of Political Sciences, Sarajevo. He taught: History of Social and Political Thought, History of Modern Marxism, Introduction to Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Ethics and Modern Philosophy.

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Nenad Zako{ek has Ph.D. in political sciences. He is full time professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Zagreb. He teaches: Introduction to Comparative Politics, Comparative Political Systems, Classical Theories of Social Development, Modern Theories of Social Development. Author of Politi~ki sustav Hrvatske (Political System of Croatia) (Zagreb, 2002), and Bira~i i demokracija: utjecaj ideolo{kih rascjepa na politi~ki ìvot (Voters and Democracy: Impact of Ideological Rifts on Political Life) (co-authors Mirjana Kasapovi} and Ivan [iber), (Zagreb, 1998). His scientific interest includes research in the areas of elections, parties, political systems. Comparative analysis of the process of transformation in Central and Southeast Europe, theory of modernization and theory of political development are the foundation of his rich experience in research.

Bodo Weber is completing his Ph.D. in Sociology at Hannover University, a research on the character of post-socialist ethnic nationalism(s) and ethnic violence in the post-Yugoslav societies that examines nationalistic ideologies, systems of authoritarian rule, dynamics of violence and war economy in the first half of the 90ties. He has worked as an editor for the journal Perspektiven (Frankfurt/Main) and has published various articles and analytical papers on Balkan societies and states since the 90ties. Recent publications include: “...Reforming a state without society – some reflections“ (English-Bosnian), in: Foreign Policy Review No. 2 (2007), Sarajevo, reprint in: Republika, No. (2008), Belgrade; The crisis of the universities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the prospects of junior scholars (German/ English/ Bosnian), Sarajevo 2007; “Ein Täter vor Gericht. Der Prozess gegen den bosnisch-serbischen Politiker Mom~ilo Kraji{nik” Perpetrator at court. The process against the Bosnian-Serb politician Mom~ilo Kraji{nik, in: Der Überblick No.1-2 (2007), Hamburg; “Bosnie-Herzegovine: Les condition d’un accord d’association avec l’UE”, in: L’etat du monde 207: annuaire economique et geopolitique mondial, Paris: La Decouverte 2006

Tanja Petrovi} received B.A. and M.A. degrees from the Faculty of Philology, University of Belgrade, and PhD degree from Ljubljana School of Humanities. Currently, she is research fellow at the Scientific Research Center of the Slovenian Academy of Science and Arts in Ljubljana and the Institute for Balkan Studies in Belgrade. She also teaches graduate and postgraduate courses in linguistics and anthropology at the University of Nova Gorica. Her main academic interests lie in the field of intersection of linguistic, social and cultural phenomena in the Balkans and Central Europe, with emphasis on ideologies and remembering.

Nerzuk ]urak holds PhD in political sciences, he is Part-Time Professor at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Sarajevo. He is an essayist, publicist, civic activist. He is the author of Geopolitika kao sudbina: Slu~aj Bosna, Postmodernisti~ki ogled o perifernoj zemlji (Geo-Politics as a Fatum: The Case of Bosnia; A Postmodernistic Essay about the Periphery Land) (Sarajevo, 2002), Dejtonski nacionalizam (The Dayton Nationalism) (Sarajevo, 2004), Obnova bosanskih utopija. Politologija, politi~ka filozofija i sociologija dejtonske dràve i dru{tva (Re-Newal of the Bosnian Utopias. Politology, Political Philosophy and Sociology of the Dayton State and Society) (Sarajevo-Zagreb, 2006). His scientific interest includes research into geopolitics, geo-philosophy, peace studies, international relations, international security, political philosophy, political religion and ideology of political parties.

Kurt Bassuener is an independent policy analyst in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. He is currently co-authoring with Amb. Jeremy Kinsman the Diplomats’ Handbook for Democracy Development Support, a project of the Community of Democracies. He served as Strategy Analyst at the Office of the High Representative in Sarajevo from May 2005-December 2006. Previous positions and projects include serving as Political and Campaign Analyst for the OSCE-ODIHR’s Election Observation Mission in Ukraine in 2004-2005, co-founding and co-directing the Democratization Policy Institute with Eric Witte (2000-2002), acting Assistant Director for Government Affairs at the International Rescue Committee (2001), Program Officer for the US Institute of Peace’s Balkans Initiative (2000-2001), Associate

212

Director of the Balkan Action Council (1998-2000), and Policy Analyst at the Balkan Institute (1997-1998). He received his MA in European Studies from the Central European University in Prague (1994); his thesis advocated a standing all-volunteer UN peacekeeping division under the Security Council. He earned his BA from American University’s School of International Service.

Vladimir Pavi}evi} was born in 1978 in Kotor. He earned his BA in international studies at the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade and MA at the University in Bonn (Germany) on Great Compromise: Experiences from the Process of Establishing Europe and U.S.A. He is a doctoral degree candidate at the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade, where he works as an assistant. He has served as a Programme Director, Department for Advanced Undergraduate Studies, The Belgrade Open School, since 2004. He is President of the Council of European Affairs, Liberal-Democratic Party.

213

1989-2009. Godine prevrata : početak inkluzije ili ekskluzije? (zbornik radova sa međunarodne konferencije)

Zoran Đinđić: etika odgovornosti. Zbornik radova

Rasprave o nacionalnom identitetu Bosnjaka. Zbornik radova

60 godina od završetka Drugog svjetskog rata: kako se sjećati 1945. godine. Zbornik radova

Revizija proslosti na prostorima bivse Jugoslavije. Zbornik radova

Srbi i Jugoslavija: država, društvo, politika. Zbornik radova

Fenomen “krstjani” u srednjovjekovnoj Bosni i Humu. Zbornik radova

Assemanov, ili Vatikanski evangelistar

Imati ili biti

Imati ili biti?

SA [Anthology]

Chi Sa

Revolucija i poredak : o dinamici promena u Srbiji : zbornik radova sa Naučnog Skupa ''Socijalno-Ekonomske Promene u Srbiji Jugoslaviji: Perspektive i Ograničenja'', Beograd, 2. i 3. mart 2001. godine

Die SA

La science, sa méthode et sa philosophie

Englesko-hrvatski ili srpski rječnik

Inteligencija zla ili pakt lucidnosti

I︠U︡lian Otstupnik, ili, Opalennai︠a︡ mechta

Islamska prijetnja: mit ili stvarnost?

Creuser sa Tombe

Capitaine de sa Majeste

Marier sa fille

Capitaine de sa Majeste

Dalej sa tylko smoki

Creuser sa Tombe

Poe sa vie

E usor sa ucizi

Devojka sa zelenim ocima

Knez sa tuznim ocima

Marier sa fille

Creuser sa Tombe

1989-2009. Godine prevrata : početak inkluzije ili ekskluzije? (zbornik radova sa međunarodne konferencije)

Zoran Đinđić: etika odgovornosti. Zbornik radova

Rasprave o nacionalnom identitetu Bosnjaka. Zbornik radova

60 godina od završetka Drugog svjetskog rata: kako se sjećati 1945. godine. Zbornik radova

Revizija proslosti na prostorima bivse Jugoslavije. Zbornik radova

Srbi i Jugoslavija: država, društvo, politika. Zbornik radova

Fenomen “krstjani” u srednjovjekovnoj Bosni i Humu. Zbornik radova

Assemanov, ili Vatikanski evangelistar

Imati ili biti

Imati ili biti?

SA [Anthology]

Chi Sa

Revolucija i poredak : o dinamici promena u Srbiji : zbornik radova sa Naučnog Skupa ''Socijalno-Ekonomske Promene u Srbiji Jugoslaviji: Perspektive i Ograničenja'', Beograd, 2. i 3. mart 2001. godine

Die SA

La science, sa méthode et sa philosophie

Englesko-hrvatski ili srpski rječnik

Inteligencija zla ili pakt lucidnosti

I︠U︡lian Otstupnik, ili, Opalennai︠a︡ mechta

Islamska prijetnja: mit ili stvarnost?

Creuser sa Tombe

Capitaine de sa Majeste

Marier sa fille

Capitaine de sa Majeste

Dalej sa tylko smoki

Creuser sa Tombe

Poe sa vie

E usor sa ucizi

Devojka sa zelenim ocima

Knez sa tuznim ocima

Marier sa fille

Creuser sa Tombe

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