Yes, Premier: Labor Leadership in Australia's States and Territories

yes, premier

yes, premier L ABOR LEADERSHIP in A u s t r a li a’s St a t e s a n d Te r r i t o r i e s

Since 2002 – and for the first time since Federation – all state and territory governments in Australia have been held by the Australian Labor Party. Yes, Premier features a chapter on each state or territory, and in each case focuses on the leader who has led their party to power and so created this unprecedented and historical situation. It examines each Labor premier (and in Tasmania’s case, two!) and territory chief minister’s individual rise to power and their political and personal style. The chapters are written by experts in the politics and political culture of their home state. Part personal and part political biographies, the chapters also assess the instruments of leadership any modern state or territory leader must master in order to remain in the top job.

Edited by WANNA and WILLIAMS

UNSW PRESS ISBN 0-86840-840-9

9 780868 408408

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UNSW

PRESS

Edited by JOHN WANNA and PAUL WILLI AMS

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JOHN WANNA holds the Sir John Bunting Chair in Public Administration in the Political Science Program at the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, and is a Professor of Politics and Public Policy at Griffith University. He is co-author of Managing Public Expenditure in Australia (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2000) and Controlling Public Expenditure (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham [UK], 2003), and is co-editor of the Australian Journal of Public Administration. PAUL WILLIAMS is a lecturer in the Department of Politics and Public Policy, Griffith University, and is a regular media commentator on state politics.

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ANZSOG Program on Government, Politics and Public Management The Australia and New Zealand School of Government (ANZSOG) is a network initiative of five jurisdictions (the Australian and New Zealand governments, New South Wales,Victoria and Queensland) and nine universities. Established in 2003, ANZSOG represents a new and exciting prospect for the development of world-class research and teaching in the public and community sectors. ANZSOG has announced an extensive research program that promotes innovative and cutting-edge research in partnership with academia and the public sector (). In association with UNSW Press,ANZSOG has undertaken to publish a series of books on contemporary issues in Australian government, politics and public management.Titles in this program will promote high-quality research on topics of interest to a broad readership (academic, professional, students and general readers) and will include teaching texts relevant to the ANZSOG consortia in the areas of government, politics and public management. Series editors are Professor John Wanna and Professor R.A.W. Rhodes, Research School of Social Sciences,Australian National University, Canberra. Recent titles include: Terms of Trust: Arguments over ethics in Australian government by John Uhr and Westminister Legacies: Democracy and Responsible Government in Asia and the Pacific edited by Haig Patapan, John Wanna and Patrick Weller.

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YES, PREMIER Labor Leadership in Australia’s States and Territories

Edited by John Wanna and Paul Williams Caricatures by Bob Faulkner

UNSW PRESS

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A UNSW Press book Published by University of New South Wales Press Ltd University of New South Wales Sydney NSW 2052 AUSTRALIA www.unswpress.com.au © UNSW Press 2005 First published 2005 This book is copyright. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, research, criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright Act, no part may be reproduced by any process without written permission.While copyright of the work as a whole is vested in UNSW Press, copyright of individual chapters is retained by the chapter authors. Inquiries should be addressed to the publisher. National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry Yes, Premier: Labor leadership in Australia's states and territories. Includes index. ISBN 0 86840 840 9. 1. Australian Labor Party - Biography. 2. Premiers Australia - Biography. 3. Politicians - Australia Biography. 4. Australia - Politics and government. I.Wanna, John. II.Williams, Paul D. 324.29407 Cover design Di Quick Printer Hyde Park

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CO N T E N T S

Contributors

7

Preface and acknowledgements

10

Chapter 1

The twilight zone of state leaders John Wanna and Paul Williams

12

Chapter 2

Bob Carr:The unexpected Colossus David Clune

33

Chapter 3

Peter Beattie:The ‘boy from Atherton’ made good John Wanna and Paul Williams

61

Chapter 4

Steve Bracks:Victoria’s ‘nice guy’ who won against the odds Brian Costar and David Hayward

89

Chapter 5

Geoff Gallop: A new generation Labor man Harry Phillips and David Black

115

Chapter 6

Clare Martin:The ‘discreet revolutionist’ David Carment

145

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Chapter 7

Jon Stanhope: What you see is what you get Gwynneth Singleton

169

Chapter 8

Mike Rann: A fortunate ‘king of spin’ Haydon Manning

197

Chapter 9

Jim Bacon/Paul Lennon:The changing of the guard — from ‘the Emperor’ to ‘Big Red’ Tony McCall and Peter Hay

225

Chapter 10

Leaders and the leadership challenge Brian Head, John Wanna and Paul Williams

253

Index

265

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CO N T R I B U TO R S

David Black Professor David Black has written and published extensively over the years on Western Australian history and politics. He is currently Parliamentary Fellow (History) with the Parliament of Western Australia and Historical Consultant to the John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library at Curtin University of Technology.

David Carment David Carment is Professor of History at Charles Darwin University in Darwin, where he has lived since 1981. He has published extensively in Australian political history, north Australian history and cultural heritage studies. His most recent book is A Past Displayed: Public History, Public Memory and Cultural Resource Management in Australia’s Northern Territory (Northern Territory University Press, Darwin, 2001). In 2003 he was made a Member of the Order of Australia (AM).

David Clune David Clune is the Manager of the Research Service in the NSW Parliamentary Library and the NSW Parliament’s Historian. His continuing research interest is NSW political history. He is the editor, with Michael Hogan, of The People’s Choice: Electoral Politics in Twentieth Century NSW (Parliament of New South Wales and University of Sydney, Sydney, 2001).

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Brian Costar Dr Brian Costar is an Associate Professor of Politics at Melbourne’s Monash University. His research interests include the politics of Victoria, parties and elections, and rural politics. His most recent publication (with Dr Jennifer Curtin)is Rebels with a Cause: Independents in Australian Politics (UNSW Press, Sydney, 2004).

Peter Hay Peter Hay is Reader in Geography and Environmental Studies at the University of Tasmania. He is the author of Main Currents in Western Environmental Thought (UNSW Press, Sydney, 2002; Indiana University Press, Bloomington [IN], 2002), A Companion to Environmental Thought (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2002) and Vandiemonian Essays (Walleah, Hobart, 2002). He has worked as an adviser to the Australian Labor Party at both Commonwealth and state levels.

David Hayward Dr David Hayward is Associate Professor and Director of the Institute of Social Research at Melbourne’s Swinburne University of Technology. A particular research interest is the economy and public finances of Victoria. He has recently co-edited Visions for Victoria (The Vulgar Press, 2003).

Brian Head Brian Head is Professor of Governance at Griffith University. He has held a number of senior positions in the Queensland government and has edited or authored ten books on Australian public policy and management. He is currently researching leadership, integrity, community engagement, and intergovernmental policy issues.

Haydon Manning Dr Haydon Manning, Senior Lecturer with the School of Political and International Studies, Flinders University, chronicles South Australian politics for the Journal of Australian Politics and History and researches electoral behaviour, elections, political parties and political satire.

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CONTRIBUTORS

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Tony McCall Tony McCall is Senior Lecturer and Project Leader, Academic Development Project, Cradle Coast campus, University of Tasmania. He is on secondment from the School of Government. His research interests are regional development policy, public administration and public policy. He worked as an adviser to the Green Independents during the Labor/Green Accord in Tasmania (1989–92).

Harr y Phillips Dr Harry Phillips has published widely on Western Australian politics, civic education and sport.As a Parliamentary Fellow (Education), he is currently working on a book titled Presiding Officers of the Western Australian Parliament. He is still active with political commentary in the media, and is an Adjunct Professor at Edith Cowan University.

Gwynneth Singleton Dr Gwynneth Singleton is a former Associate Professor in Politics at the University of Canberra, joint author, with D. Aitkin, B. Jinks and J. Warhurst, of Australian Political Institutions (7th edition, Longman, Sydney, 2003), editor of The Howard Government (UNSW Press, Sydney, 2000), and author of articles on Australian Capital Territory politics and government–business relations.

John Wanna Professor John Wanna holds the Sir John Bunting Chair in Public Administration in the Political Science Program at the Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, and is a Professor of Politics and Public Policy at Griffith University. He is co-author of Managing Public Expenditure in Australia (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2000) and Controlling Public Expenditure (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham [UK], 2003), and is co-editor of the Australian Journal of Public Administration.

Paul Williams Dr Paul Williams is a lecturer in the Department of Politics and Public Policy, Griffith University, and is a regular media commentator on state politics.

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P R E FAC E A N D AC K N OW L E D G E M E N T S

he genesis for this book on state and territory leaders was two-fold. On the one hand, we were concerned that although there was a rich vein of biographical studies of federal leaders, there was not much coverage of state leaders. In particular, there was little material written on the role – changing or otherwise – of state leaders and their leadership styles. On the other hand, by mid-2003 we were intrigued to find all eight state and territory leaders were from the same party – the Australian Labor Party – confronting a Liberal–National coalition government in Canberra.We were interested in explaining this phenomenon – was it a reaction to John Howard’s federal agenda? Was it something about Labor’s electability in the sub-national jurisdictions? Was it due to a fundamental transference of allegiance away from the state-based conservative parties? Was it merely an unexpected accident of timing? Or was it more to do with them as political leaders? In commencing this study we intended to answer these questions, but we also recognised that we needed the expertise of specialist political analysts in the various jurisdictions. Hence the book brings together some of Australia’s best-known commentators and chroniclers of state and territory politics, all writing knowledgeably about their subject from a common set of questions and issues of leadership. Our interest in this topic was heightened by the fact that our current batch of leaders all appeared in command and secure in their positions. They gave the impression of being astute, well liked, popular, confident and communicative. They have also gone to great pains to demonstrate their ordinariness, their mundaneness, but also their ‘in touch-ness’ with the electorate. Most clearly have not forgotten their often humble begin-

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nings or inauspicious career starts. The meek, it seemed, had come to inherit the Earth. Or at least mass democracy had succeeded in propelling the ordinary into the top office. Moreover, our incumbents appeared to represent a new generation of state and territory leaders, exuding a different style and set of leadership skills. We are interested here in examining how and why they have been able to address the electorate’s expectations to date – and whether or not they can continue to do so in the medium term. A number of people have assisted in preparing this book. Besides the contributors, we would like to thank Brian Head, John Warhurst, Steve Bartos, Andrew Parkin, John Nethercote, Rod Rhodes, John Uhr, Tanya Liebrecht, Ashley Lavelle, Rod Cavalier and Evert Lindquist for contributing to the project and contributing to the two-day workshop at which earlier drafts of chapters were collectively presented and discussed. Patrick Weller, the Director of the Research Centre for Governance and Public Policy at Griffith University, provided encouragement and a small seeding grant that allowed us to hold the workshop.The Political Science Program in the Australian National University’s Research School of Social Sciences provided the venue and organisational expertise. We wish to thank Mary Hapel for assisting with the arrangements for the workshop and accommodation, and Tanya Liebrecht and Tracey Arklay for research assistance with some chapters.Tracey Arklay also assisted with putting the finished manuscript into a publishable format and with gaining reproduction rights for the photographs and cartoons. Jenni Craik maintained her usual equanimity throughout the many telephone calls and messages. We are deeply indebted to Bob Faulkner, who contributed the splendid original caricatures of the leaders and produced camera-ready versions in a short time. This is his second set of published portraits of political leaders. Finally, John Elliot, Publishing Manager at UNSW Press, has been a strong supporter of research on Australian politics. He has guided this project to fruition with the deftest of all touches. John Wanna Australian National University and Griffith University Paul Williams Griffith University

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Chapter 1

T H E T W I L I G H T ZO N E O F STAT E L E A D E R S

John Wanna and Paul Williams remiers and chief ministers are strange beasts – neither fish nor fowl. They are ministers for everything, and for nothing in particular.They occupy a position for which there is no job description. They invent, shape and reinvent their jobs themselves. There are few constitutional roles or duties they must perform. Sometimes they are not even mentioned in state or territory constitutions – if their positions are mentioned, it is often en passant. They have been promoted into the top job in their jurisdiction, and as a consequence there is nowhere else for them to go.The premiership is often the last serious job they have.There is no security of tenure – they are removable not only by the electorate at periodic intervals, but instantaneously by colleagues and rivals anxious to take over. Occasionally they are ousted by ill-health (as Jim Bacon and Don Dunstan were), but very few have actually died in office (since World War II, only Joe Cahill, Ned Hanlon and Jack Pizzey have).1 More frequently they are dragged down by political scandals or torpedoed by the electorate. There are few formal powers premiers and chief ministers enjoy, but paradoxically, also few limits to their authority. Their roles and responsibilities have indistinct boundaries. They are responsible for everything done in the government’s name, yet they can accept or off-load much of that responsibility. It falls to them to maintain an eye on winning the next election; this determines their short-term and longer-term longevity. They have carte blanche to enter whatever policy area they choose, but limited time and attention spans to oversee something for long. They have access to departments that no other minister has. They

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can make decisions on personal whim or act spontaneously; they can commit the government to certain courses of action or make appointments to senior positions without the consent of their colleagues. They can choose to be highly involved in the detail of administration or totally dismissive of ‘the detail’. But there are also legal and political constraints to their actions, and the ever-present scrutiny of the media, interest groups and the community. Most noticeably, these chief ministers are the figureheads of their governments – the public face usually equated with their government.They are leaders of their own polity, big fish in a middle-sized pond. But they are not national leaders, as they are suspended between two other levels of government – local government and the Commonwealth. They generally control their own jurisdictional politics and are well known and highly visible, dominating the airwaves and media columns of capital city newspaper dailies.Yet they may be virtually unknown outside their milieu. They are parochial kings but cosmopolitan paupers. Few state leaders, after Federation, have made it in national politics. If they are known in foreign parts of Australia it is generally for something exceptional or bizarre. Don Dunstan was known outside his Athenian South Australia for wearing pink hotpants to parliament (something he did but once, and on a dare with his then partner). Neville Wran was known outside the bearpit of NSW politics for his teflon voice; Bob Askin for his bullying and reputed corruption; Joan Kirner for her rock-and-roll impromptu performances; Jeff Kennett for his quiff and ‘jeff-off ’ manner; Joh Bjelke-Petersen for mangling the English language; and Peter Beattie is widely recognised outside Queensland only for his Cheshire cat grin. Jim Bacon was almost unrecognisable on the mainland until the flurry of media interest that occurred after his diagnosis with lung cancer early in 2004. Four months after his forced retirement from politics, Bacon succumbed to the disease. It’s the odd things that resonate with us. Premiers and chief ministers seem immensely powerful when in office – little tyrants in their own principalities. But once gone, they are quickly forgotten. Their political powers and reputations as fearsome dictators soon evaporate. The office retains the authority, and the new incumbent (even if considered a most unlikely prospect) soon adopts the mantle of power. Few Australians can ever name the predecessor of their current state or territory leader. Former premiers are thrown into the

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dustbin of history like former prime ministers, and as a nation we do not really know what to ‘do’ with any of them.There is no chance of basking in post-office influence as Lee Kuan Yew, Deng Xiaoping or Nelson Mandela have done in their respective jurisdictions. We do not celebrate them or their period of leadership as Americans do – establishing libraries and providing subsequent important positions for them. In Australia, if they hang around or offer gratuitous advice they are only seen as getting in the way. It’s a brutal end. All our premiers and chief ministers inhabit this temporal twilight zone.Their positions defy precise description and their powers are contingent.They shoulder the burden of being at the centre of government, and accept the costs and benefits of notoriety.They know their grip on power is transitory and that once their time is over they will be suddenly surplus to requirements. They get pleasure from exercising power but eschew the scrutiny of external inquisitions. It is commonly believed that the buck starts and stops with them even if they themselves would on occasion prefer to think it lies elsewhere – Canberra is their most popular choice. Their day-to-day life in the job is full of uncertainty; instead of offering the assurance of a vocation or calling, their jobs seem only to offer perpetual risk. Every day has the potential to bring surprise and a crisis to be managed. It is a world of unreality, with few havens or roadmaps to assist them in their journey. As conservative British political theorist Michael Oakeshott might have said, the task of premiership is akin to flying blind – without reference points, a compass or a safety net. So why do they do it? What is the job’s appeal and why do they seek the office? What do they do when they get there? Do they seek high office for its own sake – as the ultimate political accolade – or to make a difference? Do they readily accept the limitations of their position or actively create their own political ‘space’ in which to govern? This collection of portraits of premiers and chief ministers in power will suggest answers to these questions.

Do or die premiers – the consolation of minority rule Currently, the eight sub-national leaders are all from the Labor side of politics. This is the first time since Federation that there have been Labor leaders in each sub-national jurisdiction simultaneously.What does this tell

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us? Why have the seemingly unelectable Labor parties of yesteryear now become so electorally dominant at the state and territory level? Not so long ago, under different leaders and in different circumstances, many of these parties were swept out in disgrace by voter backlashes (Brian Burke and Carmen Lawrence in Western Australia, John Cain and Joan Kirner in Victoria, Barrie Unsworth in New South Wales, John Bannon and Lynn Arnold in South Australia, and Wayne Goss in Queensland).The phenomenon of all leaders being from one side of politics has only occurred once before: from May 1969 to May 1970, when non-Labor leaders were in office in the six states and at the federal level. Accordingly, a study of state and territory leaders today will simultaneously be a study of Labor leadership. Yet, how Labor they are is a moot point. Some of the current crop are accused of heading regimes that are more associated with their personal style and preferences than with traditional Labor values. Bob Carr has remade himself from the bookish ghoul to a political ‘colossus’ in New South Wales. Peter Beattie has acquired a personal hegemony over Queensland politics, often despite his own party. He has campaigned in his last two elections as TeamBeattie in ads and on his official website – centring attention on himself while eliminating mention of the Australian Labor Party (ALP) entirely. The personalisation of leadership is explicitly addressed in this volume. Equally true, and not to be dismissed lightly, is the fact that all these leaders have managed to claw themselves up through the local Labor Party factional battlefields. They have risen through the sometimes Byzantine politics of the modern ALP machine. Is there a pattern here, or did they all do it their own way? It is possible that many of these leaders will be around for some time – because of their perceived dominance over state and territory politics and/or because their political opponents are less than competitive. Additionally, as long as the federal coalition led by John Howard and Peter Costello is dominant nationally, the lot of state Labor leaders will be eased, and this may increase the chances of their re-election; they may feel like counterweights to their federal contemporaries. Paradoxically, many of the current batch of state and territory leaders emerged after long stints in opposition (thankless periods of apprenticeship and heartburn) or initial periods of minority government. But fate smiled on them: they learned how to survive – and sometimes there was

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an absence of alternative candidates for the top job. As a group, today’s leaders have now led their parties for a combined total of 68 years (eight years on average). Bob Carr served for over seven years in opposition and looked to be heading nowhere when he seized the premiership in April 1995. He has now led the NSW Labor Party for sixteen and a half years. Mike Rann had survived for eight years as opposition leader before he unexpectedly won the March 2002 election in South Australia. Three other leaders served at least three years leading their parties in opposition (Geoff Gallop, Jon Stanhope and Clare Martin). It is hard to find one of the current Labor leaders who was widely expected to win when in opposition – ‘stopgap leaders’ was one of the kindest epitaphs most of them could have hoped for. Their elevation to government often started as leadership ordeals, where they had to put together various carefully crafted coalitions to govern their jurisdictions. Four current governments began as tenuous minority governments – Peter Beattie in Queensland in 1998; Steve Bracks in Victoria in 1999; Jon Stanhope in the ACT in 2001; and Mike Rann in South Australia in 2002.2 Another two governments came to office with just a one-seat majority – Bob Carr in 1995 and Clare Martin in 2001. Only two began as majority governments:Tasmania’s Jim Bacon commanded a comfortable majority (14 to 11) in his first term of 1998, and Geoff Gallop had a seven-seat majority (32 to 25) in Western Australia in 2001. Labor leaders have traditionally been unused to coalition relationships, being majoritarians by instinct and wanting a winnertakes-all outcome. Hence their political skills were tested from the outset. They were apprentice leaders held ‘on notice’ by party sceptics. Every decision they took or were considering had the potential to bring down their fledgling governments.Yet they came through this formative period and gained strength and electoral support for their efforts. The three eastern seaboard premiers each pulled off landslide victories after an initial shaky term. Why? Many of the current leaders have remained ashamed of their party predecessors. They have gone to great lengths to dissociate themselves from previous governments (of their own side and/or of their opponents). They peddle ‘not’ statements such as: ‘we are not like the former government’ … Steve Bracks is adamant that he is like neither Jeff Kennett nor John Cain. Peter Beattie constantly makes it clear that his

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government is not going to adopt the uncompromising stance of his Labor predecessor Wayne Goss. Geoff Gallop is at pains to distinguish his new accountable style from that of Brian Burke or Carmen Lawrence. Jon Stanhope is anxious not to develop the showy, self-promotional style of his predecessor, Kate Carnell. Mike Rann remains affectionate towards the memory of Don Dunstan (for whom he worked), but clearly does not wish to be compared with former Liberal premiers such as John Olsen, Dean Brown and Rob Kerin. Interestingly, many of these leaders are self-declared populists, claiming to have a deep affinity with their electorate. They portray themselves as having an almost mystic insight into the wishes of ordinary voters. They espouse policy stances that are overwhelmingly popular even if they are at odds with party doctrine and/or bureaucratic advice. They are no mere ciphers slowly boring away at Weber’s hard boards of politics. Being populist also means that these leaders are likely to take public stands against their party or Cabinet/caucus colleagues. They may use their populist orientation to wield greater personal power over their own side of politics – and not remain chained to the party’s standard policy-making processes and points of reference. Moreover, in recent decades, states and territories seem to have increased their policy capacities. State leaders have ridden this wave and become more important political actors, with wider policy interests. They have been active in establishing national policy frameworks and extending their policy horizons. They have their own presidium where new agendas can be debated and resolutions agreed – institutions such as the Council of Australian Governments and the State Leaders’ Forum. Premiers in particular regularly present themselves as national statesmen, pontificating on issues as diverse as the Iraq war, Peter Hollingworth’s tenure as GovernorGeneral, heroin injecting rooms and republicanism. Nevertheless, in the context of global pressures to impose greater domestic policy consistency and international compliance, there is debate as to whether state jurisdictions are still relevant. After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and with the increased interest in security issues, states have surrendered many of their law and order powers (although they still implement and administer many national decisions). With national policy frameworks gaining in scope and domination, states are increasingly forced into a position of ‘agent or provider’ to the Commonwealth’s

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‘principal or purchaser’ policy role.True, the states and territories have an important voice in these new intergovernmental forums, but the traditional raison d’être for their existence – the ability to make policy according to local political preferences and offer diversity across a federal structure – has clearly been eroded.

Why the focus on style of leadership? Personal and political style has always been an important aspect of political power. But in the Australian states and territories the style of leadership is changing significantly, as is the scope of politics. The old knockabout, ‘rough diamond’ type of state leader has been replaced by more urbane, suave, sophisticated, educated, couth, and engaging leaders. The old ‘boss style’ of leadership (of premiers such as Henry Bolte, Bob Askin, Vince Gair, Joh Bjelke-Petersen, Charles Court, Tom Playford and Eric Reece) has given way to a more fluid form of leadership. The previous generation of fire-in-the-belly ideological warriors has gone, and in their stead have emerged new leaders who ‘read issues’ and watch the opinion poll findings.They are flexible, malleable, pragmatic populists, but are not considered vacillating. They often want to do the ‘right’ thing while reconstructing electoral support across political divides – a similar desire as that exemplified in the ‘third way’ politics of Bill Clinton and Tony Blair. Most leaders have made career-long investments in developing and honing their political style. It is not just a convenient act; they have become consummate media performers (even if their own party initially had doubts about their ability to communicate with the ordinary person). They use sophisticated media techniques, knowing exactly what the media will be interested in. They have perfected spin-doctoring, and often control media presentations across the full array of portfolios. They have offered accessibility and a friendly attitude to the media – and cultivated a disarming charm. When challenged, they are confident that they can triumph if they can explain, put their case, shape the contours of debate. Some have also perfected the art of apologising when they are perceived to have erred or overstepped the mark. Some have become proficient in policy backflips and ‘U-turns’ – often managing to turn their change of heart into an electoral positive. They demonstrate populist flexibility, not just listening to but also acting on the views of the electorate. In each

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jurisdiction, local leaders have perfected and crafted their style to suit local conditions and local politics. New patterns of dominance certainly appear to be emerging. These leaders dominate not just their Cabinet colleagues, lower houses of parliament and the upper echelons of the public service (the conventional traditions of strong state leadership); they now also exercise dominance over other domains, domains that were in the past less penetrable. They dominate the media, the intelligentsia, interest groups and community forums, and are active in brokering political deals through various institutional prisms, such as with other governments or through their own upper houses. Often their dominance is based on the classical political skills of persuasion, consultation, coaxing, even personal pleading. Although not necessarily charismatic in the strict sense of the word, their new-found populism appears to have carried their political fortunes to new heights. But can they be regarded as a new breed of populist? Studies of populism generally locate the phenomenon historically or as a distortion

State and territory leaders hold a press conference following a walk-out from the Premiers’ Conference in 2003 (The Weekend Australian, 30–31 August 2003, picture by Ray Strange).

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of class politics. Historically, some populist leaders tended to promote the purity of rural life, nostalgia for a romanticised world, simple panaceas and grassroots empowerment – they also articulated conspiracies of danger and expressed strong anti-elite sentiments.The term ‘populist’ has also been used to denote voting patterns (either Left or Right populism) that do not accord with class interests – such as working-class support for right-wing xenophobic parties such as Le Pen’s National Front or Pauline Hanson’s One Nation.3 For many, especially the political establishment and intelligentsia, populism is usually a pejorative term – denoting craven expediency and unprincipled government. Reactionary populism implies pandering to prejudice, appealing to the lowest common denominator or to the less well-informed – and usually stigmatising a targeted enemy. None of these interpretations has much to offer our analysis of these state leaders. But populism can also be an ability to speak up on behalf of ‘the people’, to communicate with ‘the battlers’, to stand up for the silent majority. Populism approaches the incarnation of the popular will – a common sovereignty regarded as inherently superior to the legislative and judicial processes and to other sectional political institutions (parties, interest groups, lobbying). As a political style of leadership, the populist maintains an appeal to people’s values and aspirations that resonates directly and personally – not via representative structures. As we suggest in the book’s conclusion, there are elements of episodic populism in the leadership of today’s state and territory leaders, but how well they qualify as new populists is open to debate. In this study we are interested in whether or not this new style matters. Is it cosmetic or does it have real consequences? What are the current characteristics of this style of leadership? What are the leadership qualities associated with the more populist and pragmatic leadership displayed by these sub-national chief ministers? Are there similar political contours running through Australian jurisdictions? Do these eight chief ministers from the same party, from similar backgrounds and all of similar ages (between 50 and 58 years of age at the time of going to press) share elements of the same style? Are their noticeable characteristics peculiar to them as individuals or indicative of a new era of political leadership? Table 1 provides a brief profile of their political careers to date.

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Table 1.1 PREMIER & STATE

Bob Carr; New South Wales

PERSONAL

Born 28.9.1947; Married 1973 to Helena; Atheist; Nicknames Robbie, Bob, ‘Bob the Builder’

EDUCATION & AWARDS

Matraville State High School; BA Hons (UNSW); Awards: 1998 World Conservation Merit Award; 1999 Fulbright Fellow

WORK HISTORY Industrial affairs journalist 1969–72, 1978–83; Education officer of the NSW Labor Council 1972–78 PARTY INFORMATION

Labor Party branch activist 1969–80 (including campaign director Kingsford-Smith and secretary and president Maroubra branch ALP); Factional alignment: Right

PARIAMENTARY

21 years in Parliament; Elected to Parliament: 1983; Experience as Minister or Opposition leader: 4 years as minister (Planning & Environment) 1984–88; 7 years as Leader of Opposition 1988–95

TIME AS PREMIER

9 years, since March 1995;Won three elections: 1995, 1999, 2003; Next due: 2007

PREMIER & STATE

Peter Beattie; Queensland

PERSONAL

Born: 18.11.1952; Married: 1975 to Heather; 3 children; Nicknames: Premier Pete, Chairman Beattie

EDUCATION & AWARDS

Atherton State High School; BA LLB (University of Queensland); MA (Research) (Queensland University of Technology); Awards: Hon. Doctor of Science (University of Queensland)

WORK HISTORY Solicitor, Supreme Court of Queensland; union secretary PARTY INFORMATION

State Secretary and State Campaign Director 1981–88; ran for three seats unsuccessfully before being preselected for Brisbane Centra; Factional alignment: Non-aligned/Labor unity

PARIAMENTARY

15 years in Parliament; Elected to Parliament: 1989; Experience as Minister or Opposition leader: 6 months as minister (Health) 1995–96; 2 years as Leader of Opposition 1996–98

TIME AS PREMIER

6 years, since June 1998;Won three elections: 1998, 2001, 2004; Next due: 2007

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PREMIER & STATE

Steve Bracks; Victoria

PERSONAL

Born: 15.10.1954; Married: 1983, to Terry; 3 children; Catholic; Nickname: Bracksie

EDUCATION & AWARDS

St Patrick’s College Ballarat; Diploma of Business Studies (Accounting) (Ballarat University); Graduate Diploma of Education (Education) (Ballarat University)

WORK HISTORY Teacher 1976–81; Municipal Officer 1985–89; Executive Director education centre 1989–93; Executive Director printing industry 1993–94 PARTY INFORMATION

Joined the party in 1974; Ministerial adviser to Premiers John Cain and Joan Kirner 1990; principal adviser to Neil O’Keefe, federal parliamentary secretary, 1993; manager of state-wide employment programs 1989–93; Factional alignment: Non aligned

PARIAMENTARY

10 years in Parliament; Elected to Parliament: through by-election 1994; Experience as Minister or Opposition leader: 3 years as shadow treasurer 1996–99; 6 months as Leader of Opposition March–October 1999

TIME AS PREMIER

5 years, since October 1999;Won two elections: 1999, 2002; Next due: 2006

PREMIER & STATE

Geoff Gallop;Western Australia

PERSONAL

Born: 27.9.1951; Married: to Beverley; 2 children

EDUCATION & AWARDS

Geraldton Senior High School; D. Phil. (University of Western Australia); BEc (Murdoch University); MA (Oxford University); Awards: Centenary Medal 2003; National Fellow IPPA 2003

WORK HISTORY Resident Fellow, Oxford University, 1979–81; Lecturer in Politics, Murdoch University, 1981–86 PARTY INFORMATION

Factional alignment: Non-aligned/Right federally

PARIAMENTARY

18 years in Parliament; Elected to Parliament: 1986; Experience as Minister or Opposition leader: 3 years as Minister; 4 years as Leader of Opposition 1996–2001

TIME AS PREMIER

3 years, since February 2001;Won two elections: 2001, 2005; Next due by 2009

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PREMIER & STATE

Clare Martin; Northern Territory

PERSONAL Catholic

Born: 15.6.1952; Partner: David; 2 children; Non-practising

EDUCATION & AWARDS

Loreto Convent Normanhurst; BA (Sydney University)

23

WORK HISTORY ABC reporter and presenter 1979–88, 1990–94 PARTY INFORMATION

Unsuccessfully contested seat of Casuarina for ALP at the 1994 elections; Preselected for Fannie Bay seat at 1995 by-election; Factional alignment: Non-aligned/Right

PARIAMENTARY

9 years in Parliament; Elected to Parliament: through by election 1995; Experience as Minister or Opposition leader; 3 years as Leader of Opposition 1999–2001

TIME AS PREMIER

3 years, since August 2001;Won one election: (First Labor victory in NT) 2001; Next due: by October 2005

PREMIER & STATE

Jon Stanhope;Australian Capital Territory

PERSONAL

Born: 29.4.1951; Married: to Robyn; 4 children

EDUCATION & AWARDS

LLB (Australian National University)

WORK HISTORY Public Service Manager, Senior Executive Service PARTY INFORMATION

Chief of staff to Attorney-General Michael Lavarch; Senior adviser to Kim Beazley, federal Leader of Opposition 1996–98; Factional alignment: Non-aligned

PARIAMENTARY

6 years in Parliament; Elected to Parliament: 1998; Experience as Minister or Opposition leader: 3 years as Leader of Opposition 1998–2001

TIME AS PREMIER

3 years, since October 2001 (as ACT chief minister);Won two elections: 2001, 2004; Next due: September 2007

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PREMIER & STATE

Mike Rann; South Australia

PERSONAL

Born: 4.1.1953; Divorced, 3 children; Nickname: Media Mike

EDUCATION & AWARDS

Northcote College, New Zealand; MA (Auckland University)

WORK HISTORY Political journalist, Radio New Zealand, 1976–77; PARTY INFORMATION

Press secretary to premiers Don Dunstan and Des Corcoran 1977–79; press secretary to John Bannon, as Leader of Opposition, 1982–83, and as Premier, 1983–85; Factional alignment: Centre left

PARIAMENTARY

19 years in Parliament; Elected to Parliament: 1985; Experience as Minister or Opposition leader: 8 years as Leader of Opposition 1994–2002

TIME AS PREMIER

2 years, since March 2002;Won one election: 2002; Next due: 2006

PREMIER & STATE

Paul Lennon;Tasmania

PERSONAL

Born: 8.10.1955; Married: to Margaret, 2 children, 1 grandchild; Catholic

EDUCATION & AWARDS

St Virgil’s College, Austin’s Ferry

WORK HISTORY Storeman clerk 1974–78; Union organiser 1978–82; National Vice-President Storeman & Packers Union 1982–84; ACTU national executive 1986 PARTY INFORMATION

Factional alignment: Labor unity

PARIAMENTARY

14 years in Parliament; Elected to Parliament: 1990; Experience as Minister or Opposition leader: 2 years as Deputy Leader of Opposition 1996–98; 6 years as Deputy Premier 1998–2004; Acting Premier from February 2004 (due to ill-health of Jim Bacon)

TIME AS PREMIER

6 months as Premier, since March 2004; Not faced election as Premier; Next due: 2006

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PREMIER & STATE

Jim Bacon;Tasmania

PERSONAL

Born: 15.5.1950; Died: 20.6.2004; 2 children; Married: Honey in 1995; Raised as Presbyterian, later no religion

EDUCATION & AWARDS

Scotch College Melbourne (on scholarship); Monash University; Awards: Centenary Medal 2003

WORK HISTORY Union organiser Builders’ Labourers Federation (BLF) (Vic.) 1973–79; State secretary of BLF (Tas.) 1980–89; Secretary,Trades and Labour Council (Tas.) 1989–95 PARTY INFORMATION

Factional alignment: Non-aligned (Left leaning)

PARIAMENTARY

8 years in Parliament; Elected to Parliament: 1996; Experience as Minister or Opposition leader: 1 year as Leader of Opposition 1997–98

TIME AS PREMIER

6 years, since 1998;Won two elections: 1998, 2002; Resigned due to ill-health, 2004

Previous interest in state leaders While national politics in Australia attracts considerable attention and study (mainly covering key institutions and personalities), the coverage of state and territory politics is surprisingly sparse. There does not appear to be a single overwhelming reason for this, or a convincing explanation for it. Perhaps previous scholars found state politics too limited or dull – an odd response given that much of the colour of Australian politics is found at the state level. Certainly, few state and territory leaders (or those who worked closely with leaders) have elected to write their memoirs or have attracted detailed studies of their ‘life and times’ in politics. In recent years, Dunstan, Cain and Carr (twice) have written autobiographical accounts of their time in office – Carr’s Thoughtlines (Penguin Books Australia, 2002) is in fact more a series of essays. Few journalists have penned studies of state politics or premierships, although there are a couple of notable serious exceptions. Perhaps publishers have been wary about commissioning or publishing subnational research publications, fearing insufficient market interest. Universities teaching politics have tended to orient their teaching material to the

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federal and international level, and thus have encouraged textbooks with a national/international focus.There may be other reasons for the neglect of state leaders and the regimes they have led. The main sub-national literature to date consists of snapshot surveys of the main contours of state politics at various times. Although occasional articles on NSW administration had appeared in Public Administration, the collection published by S.R. Davis on state governments and administrations was the first systematic exploration into this field.4 This study was followed by a series of book-length studies published by the University of Queensland Press (UQP) into the government and politics of each of the states and territories. In the end this series covered all jurisdictions except Western Australia.5 Its focus was on the main institutions and politics at the state level. Comments about premiers and leadership were sprinkled in these volumes – especially when relating to colourful premiers or ones who displayed longevity. Jean Holmes, for instance, aptly summarised Sir Henry Bolte’s ‘bossism’ as a ‘political power [that] seemed to be without limit’, in contrast to Rupert Hamer who, after six years as premier, was still ‘learning the ropes’ and adopting a ‘low-profile stance’.6 State politics also became a topic of interest through the intergovernmental studies promoted by the Australian National University’s (ANU’s) Federalism Research Centre (FRC – formerly the Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations, which operated from 1972 to 1995). This centre published many essays from state and territory leaders on topical issues, but not on state governments or state leaders themselves. In 1986 the FRC commissioned an edited study of the politics of state regimes, covering each state and territory as a discrete entity. The prime focus here was on the policy roles and capacities of these sub-national governments, an approach that was taken further by the comparative policy studies in the follow-up volume, edited by Brian Galligan and published in 1988, on policy domains and thematic topics cross-cutting the various jurisdictions. This approach was continued in the FRC’s study of intergovernmental politics.7 Few other books demonstrated such breadth of coverage of subnational politics until the volume edited in 2003 by Jeremy Moon and Campbell Sharman, which pursued the themes of electoral patterns and party dynamics but treated the sub-national jurisdictions discretely.8 Some cherished institutions at the state level have been the subject of occasional study. Parliaments have perhaps attracted the most attention,

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possibly because a number of these institutions have sponsored histories and biographies of members. Other state institutions with relevance to state leaders have fared worse, although some studies have explored the dynamics of the core executive.9 Scott Bennett’s assessment of state politics contained a chapter on the leadership styles of premiers that employed a strong/weak dichotomy of leadership.10 There are the occasional biographical portraits of premiers, usually penned by journalists (but none yet of territory leaders). These often present in-depth studies of particular leaders shortly after they have reached the height of their powers: Mike Steketee and Stewart Cockburn’s 1986 study of Neville Wran; a biography of Henry Bolte by Peter Blazey in 1972; Tony Parkinson’s recollections of Jeff Kennett in 2000; David Nicholas’s promotion of Tom Playford, written in 1969, followed by Walter Crocker’s 1983 study and Stewart Cockburn’s 1991 account of the ‘benevolent despot’; Jamie Walker’s assessment of Wayne Goss (while Goss was still premier) in 1995; Derek Townsend’s hagiography of Joh Bjelke-Petersen in 1983 and a more balanced coverage of him in Hugh Lunn’s two editions of Joh, published in 1978 and 1984. Academics have produced valuable historical biographies of former premiers (though usually of those who had federal careers or were nationally significant – Henry Parkes, George Reid, Samuel Griffith, T.J. Ryan, Ted Theodore and Jack Lang, for example.11 But few academics have contributed biographies of postwar state leaders. Paul Reynolds has provided a historical interpretation of Mike Ahern’s brief tenure in Queensland, and Rae Wear has traced the influence of fundamentalist religion on Bjelke-Petersen’s long and turbulent career.12 A recent unpublished study examined the political leadership of Richard Court and Jeff Kennett (one of the few comparative research studies).13 There are three volumes of biographical essays on Queensland premiers, with the last running through to an early account of Peter Beattie’s rise to the premiership.14 And a century of WA premiers were assessed in Reid and Oliver.15 Researchers in both New South Wales and Victoria are collating similar collections of their state leaders. Of the contemporary group of leaders, only Bob Carr has attracted serious biographical attention.16 Although former state leaders have tended to preserve their papers, speeches and interview transcripts, relatively few have published their reflections – especially those in office since the war. Exceptions include

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Don Dunstan’s Felicia, penned in 1981; John Cain’s 1995 account of his rise and downfall; and Joh Bjelke-Petersen’s aptly titled Don’t You Worry About That, published in 1990. Other quasi-biographies include Tom Prior’s interviews with Henry Bolte, and Geoffrey Blainey and Ronda Jamison’s edited autobiography of Charles Court, published in 1985. Bob Carr has written an account of NSW Labor’s revival, and more recently a series of short observations about various political topics, and Peter Beattie, long before he became premier, provided interviews for his early memoirs, published in 1990. Geoff Gallop has published a number of policy essays and political assessments, but nothing autobiographical. Some premiers have attracted sensationalist or scurrilous accounts of their political careers.These less than salubrious assessments have appeared because of known or alleged foibles or because they presided over scandals or crises. At the end of his term in office, Don Dunstan, for instance, was subjected to various journalistic attacks, while personalised critiques of Bjelke-Petersen’s cronyism and vindictiveness appeared at regular intervals. Nick Greiner’s sudden exit from the premiership in 1991 was probed by Michael Gleeson, Toni Allan and Michael Wilkins in 1992; and the financial crises that brought John Bannon down attracted a journalistic study by Chris Kenny, entitled State of Denial, in 1993. Surprisingly, former NSW premier Bob Askin escaped this treatment, despite being generally regarded as corrupt. Academics have written serious accounts of particular state governments – usually focused on a premiership or on the transition between two premiers. Flinders University scholars have written sequential studies loosely based around governmental leadership from Tom Playford to Don Dunstan to John Bannon.17 Allan Patience has also edited an excellent collection on the Bjelke-Petersen premiership, and Peter Coaldrake charted its demise in 1989. John Wanna and Bron Stevens evaluated the cautious performance of the Goss Government in the context of regime change and high community expectations. Neville Wran’s rise to power was depicted as The Wran Model (1985) by Ernie Chaples, Helen Nelson and Ken Turner. The demise of John Cain’s government was charted by Mark Considine and Brian Costar, and by Robert Murray and Kate White, both in 1992, and Jeff Kennett’s rise and decline was chronicled in a 1999 edited collection by Brian Costar and Nick Economou. The business-like NSW government of Nick Greiner (and then John Fahey) was the subject of

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much interest throughout Australia, but its chronicling had to wait until the book-length edited collection by Martin Laffin and Martin Painter in 1995. The big omission in the research on state politics to date is the systematic analysis of state leaders. Hence this study of political leadership examines the ways state premiers and chief ministers operate within the constraints and parameters imposed on their office. Each of the subsequent chapters locates the leader in the political context of his or her jurisdiction and its political culture. The contributors ask what personal characteristics the current incumbents have brought to the position; how they came to the leadership; how they exercise leadership now; what style of leadership has emerged; what their ‘vision’ for their jurisdiction is; and to what extent they have adopted new forms of populist politics.The sources of power available to sub-national leaders, both formal and informal, are examined, along with their power over and above their political party and caucus colleagues.There is interest in whether or not these leaders have had to reinvent themselves or realign their political styles. Some have changed the institutional balance at the centre of government; others have left the arrangements alone but responded to them in different ways. It is important to record how and to what extent these leaders have personalised power, and personalised the levers of power available to them.Their purchase on political discourse and use of rhetoric are also important parts of their leadership styles. To answer these questions each contributor has analysed his or her leader in the context of the main four areas where political leadership is required.The areas are: • as policy broker or policy entrepreneur – the key policy conduit through which the government declares its agendas; • as decision-maker – how these leaders choose to make decisions, the degree of centralisation of decision-making power on the leader, and evidence of their ability to pull off (or avoid) decisions; • as crisis manager – how these leaders operate in a crisis, and when their stocks are down, and how they rebound; and • as election campaigner – as the main drawcard of their party, how they campaign, and whether they out-manoeuvre their opponents, or become the natural party of government. Each chapter, beginning with the longest-serving premier, Bob Carr, through to the shortest serving, Paul Lennon, uses this framework to explore questions of leadership style and substance.

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Notes 1

2

3

4 5

6 7

8 9

10 11

12

13

Only six premiers have died in office since Federation: two in New South Wales (John Storey 1921 and Joe Cahill 1959), two in Queensland (Ned Hanlon 1952 and Jack Pizzey 1968), one in Western Australia (George Leake 1902) and one in Tasmania (Albert Ogilvie 1939). None has died in office in Victoria, South Australia, the Northern Territory or the ACT. Initially, Steve Bracks had fewer parliamentary seats (41) than the coalition (43), but this changed after Labor won two by-elections. Unusually, the three conservative independents sided with the smaller of the two political blocs. Stokes refers to Hansonism as a form of ‘conservative populism’; see G. Stokes in M. Leach, G. Stokes & I.Ward (eds), Rise and Fall of One Nation, University of Queensland Press (UQP), Brisbane, 2000. S.R. Davis (ed.), The Government of the Australian States, Longmans, Melbourne, 1960. Victoria was written by Jean Holmes in 1976; Tasmania by Bill Townsley in 1976; South Australia by Dean Jaensch in 1977; New South Wales by Bob Parker in 1978; the ACT by Ruth Atkins in 1978; the Northern Territory by Alistair Heatley in 1979; and eventually Queensland by Colin Hughes in 1980. J. Holmes, The Government of Victoria, UQP, Brisbane, 1976, pp. 35–36. The three works are: B. Galligan (ed.), Comparative State Politics, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1986; B. Galligan (ed.), Comparative State Policies, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1988; B. Galligan, O. Hughes & C.Walsh, Intergovermental Relations and Public Policy, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1991. J. Moon & C. Sharman (eds), Australian Politics and Government:The Commonwealth, the States and the Territories, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2003. L. Rose, The Framework of Government in NSW, Government Printer, Sydney, 1972, investigated the core executive institutions surrounding the premier. The Queensland Cabinet has attracted two studies: B. Galligan, J.R. Nethercote & C.Walsh (eds), Decision Making in Queensland Government, Federalism Research Centre, Canberra, 1992 and G. Davis, A Government of Routines: Executive Coordination in an Australian State, Macmillan Education, South Melbourne, 1995. The premier’s own department has also been examined: see J. Scott, B. Stevens, R. Laurie & P. Weller, The Engine Room of Government: the Queensland Premier’s Department 1859–2001, UQP, Brisbane, 2001. S. Bennett, Affairs of State: Politics in the Australian States and Territories, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1992. Among the best here are: A.W. Martin’s biography of Henry Parkes (Melbourne University Press [MUP], Melbourne, 1980); B. Nairn’s life of Jack Lang (The ‘Big Fella’, MUP, Melbourne, 1986); Denis Murphy’s historical study of T.J. Ryan (UQP, Brisbane, 1990); and Ross Fitzgerald’s ‘Red Ted’Theodore (UQP, Brisbane, 1994). P. Reynolds’ biography of Mike Ahern: Lock, Stock and Barrel, UQP, Brisbane, 2002; and R.Wear’s biography Johannes Bjelke-Petersen:The Lord’s Premier, UQP, Brisbane, 2002. S. Barton,‘The nature of political leadership: a case study of Australian state premiers

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15 16 17

31

Court & Kennett’, PhD Thesis, University of Western Australia (UWA), Perth, 2002; and S. Barton & P. van Onselen, ‘Comparing Court and Kennett leadership styles’, Policy and Society, vol. 22, no. 2, December 2003. D. Murphy & R. Joyce (eds), Queensland Political Portraits, 1859–1952, UQP, Brisbane, 1978; D. Murphy, R. Joyce & M. Cribb (eds), The Premiers of Queensland, UQP, Brisbane, 1990; and D. Murphy, R. Joyce, M. Cribb & R. Wear, The Premiers of Queensland, UQP, Brisbane, 2003. G.S. Reid & M.R. Oliver, The Premiers of Western Australia, 1890–1982, UWA, Perth, 1982. M. Dodkin, Bob Carr:The Reluctant Leader, UNSW Press, Sydney, 2003 and A.West & R. Morris, Bob Carr: A Self-made Man, HarperCollins, Sydney, 2003. N. Blewett & D. Jaensch, Playford to Dunstan: The Politics of Transition, Cheshire, Melbourne, 1971; A. Parkin & A. Patience (eds), The Dunstan Decade: Social Democracy at the State Level, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1981; A. Parkin & A. Patience (eds), The Bannon Decade:The Politics of Restraint in South Australia, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1992.

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Chapter 2

BOB CARR: THE U N E X P E C T E D CO LO S S U S

David Clune * ne of the challenges facing Bob Carr when he was elected premier of New South Wales in March 1995 was that there was no obvious model of government for him to follow.The postwar developmentalist Labor style was largely irrelevant in an age of environmentalism and economic uncertainty. Most other state governments were heavily influenced by New Right policies, with an emphasis on smaller government and the superiority of market mechanisms.Although attracted by such ideas, Carr had to reconcile them with Labor’s traditional belief in a strong public sector and government regulation. After a turbulent period of gestation, Carr successfully formulated an approach that combined microeconomic reform with a commitment to maintaining the public sector and a concern for the environment. Carr’s rise is also interesting in that it was far from inevitable. Elected Labor leader virtually by default, he won office narrowly and unexpectedly. In his early period as premier, Carr’s chances of re-election seemed uncertain at best.Yet his convincing 2003 election victory showed that he is now one of the most electorally successful of all NSW premiers.

O

‘Crash or crash through’ or play it safe? Labor’s political fortunes in 20th century New South Wales fall into two distinct periods, separated by World War II. Labor became the official opposition with the emergence of a two-party system after the 1904 election, and won office in 1910. Re-elected in 1913, the party won every second election after that up to 1930. In other words, from 1913 onwards, Labor was never returned after a term in government.Although the electors liked what Labor had to offer, the party repeatedly self-destructed in office.The nadir was Jack

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Lang’s dismissal by the Governor and the landslide defeat in 1932. After two more crushing defeats Lang was replaced in 1939 by William McKell. By nature a moderate and a conciliator, McKell led Labor to an overwhelming victory in 1941. In office, he was determined to show that Labor could govern effectively and responsibly while implementing an agenda of beneficial if unspectacular reforms. His moderate, efficient style of government gave Labor the crucial middle ground. His successors, principally John Cahill, consolidated this hold to the point where it seemed unbreakable.After 1941, Labor won seven successive elections. McKell and Lang represent the two dominant paradigms for NSW Labor premiers. On the one hand there is Lang’s aggressive, populist radicalism and ‘crash or crash through’ style. On the other there is McKell, the seeker of consensus and proponent of safe politics, ever concerned to conciliate electoral opinion, delivering reform but not at the cost of losing office.The McKell style places a premium on good government and sound economic management. The two most successful Labor premiers since 1965, Neville Wran and Bob Carr, have governed very much in line with the McKell model. Carr, indeed, has frequently proclaimed that he is deliberately reviving and building on the McKell tradition.

A teenage anti-communist Robert John Carr was born on 28 September 1947.1 The son of a train driver, Carr grew up in a modest fibro cottage in Matraville, a less than affluent part of Sydney’s eastern suburbs. Carr’s parents were non-practising Catholics who had been married in an Anglican church.They did not have their son baptised, but he attended Sunday school at the local Presbyterian church when young. Carr was educated at Matraville High School and was dux in his final year. He won a scholarship to the University of New South Wales and graduated with an arts degree with honours in history. In 1969 Carr became a trainee journalist with the ABC. Determined to pursue a career in politics, Carr joined the Australian Labor Party (ALP) when he was 15. He was a fervent supporter of Gough Whitlam’s crusade to modernise the Labor Party and end the long Liberal dominance of federal politics. Carr was aligned with the Labor Party’s right faction, and was strongly anti-communist. He was a Labor activist in his campus days, and was elected president of Young Labor in 1970. His intellectual ability, fluency in debate and polemical skill as a journalist brought him to the attention of the controllers of the right and led to Carr becom-

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ing education officer at the Labor Council in early 1972. He was part of a group of talented young recruits who succeeded in giving the right a more up-to-date, intellectually credible image. In the 1970s Carr became a strong advocate of European social democracy as a model for Australian Labor. After a falling out with key power broker John Ducker in 1978, Carr left the Labor Council to become a journalist with Kerry Packer’s The Bulletin. Carr was keen to enter federal politics, but failed to gain the support of the right faction for Senate preselection. The federal seat of KingsfordSmith, which included his home turf, was his long-term goal. However, the sitting Member of Parliament (MP) in that seat, Lionel Bowen, who was Deputy Prime Minister from 1983 to 1990, was in no hurry to leave politics. In the meantime, an opportunity opened up in the state seat of Maroubra, held by Bill Haigh. Carr was secretary of the Maroubra branch of the ALP, and went about unobtrusively building his strength, until Haigh concluded that he did not have the numbers, and decided to go quietly.2 Carr was preselected without opposition and entered the NSW Legislative Assembly at a by-election on 22 October 1983. The picture that emerges from Carr’s early life and career is of someone who is confident of his own ability, intelligent, ambitious, and singleminded in pursuit of a goal – to the point of being driven.There is also at times an abrasiveness and a ruthless streak that would not let friendship stand in the way of success. A central paradox in the Carr personality also emerges. He is an intellectual who does not drink or drive a car and has no interest in sport.This has sometimes led to his being derided and underestimated. Yet the man whose idea of a perfect day off is staying at home reading and listening to opera also has an aggressive side that revels in the exercise of power and the destruction of enemies.

The sloughs of opposition Carr’s rise was rapid. He was widely perceived as a future minister from the start, and in May 1984 was appointed chairman of the Public Accounts Committee, at the time a stepping-stone to further promotion. In December 1984, after the sudden death of Attorney-General Paul Landa, Carr lobbied hard for the Cabinet vacancy, and was endorsed by the right.3 Elected unopposed, he was given the planning and environment portfolio. Carr proved a successful minister: he was hardworking, gained good media coverage and was able to savage the opposition in parliament.4 He also displayed a genuine

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concern for the environment and had some real achievements to his credit, such as a strong Wilderness Act, passed in 1987.There was a personal political side to all this achievement too: Barrie Unsworth, who had led Labor from July 1986 onwards, was looking deeper in trouble all the time. Carr saw the environment issue as a way of winning middle-class professional votes, particularly in marginal seats. In the government’s dying days he succeeded in convincing Cabinet to gazette large areas of forest as national park.5 In the short term these efforts were to no avail: Labor suffered a crushing defeat in 1988. One result of the large swing was that many of the most promising of the new generation of Labor ministers – including the right’s Peter Anderson and Terry Sheahan and the left’s Frank Walker and Rodney Cavalier – lost their seats. Carr was, in effect, the last man standing. The party machine saw Carr as the best leadership option available if Labor were to be a credible opposition. The leader of the caucus left, Andrew Refshauge, offered to run for the leadership with him, as deputy, on a joint ticket. The only problem with this plan was Carr himself. Given to occasional periods of introspection and self-doubt, he had deep misgivings over his ability to handle the job. After much persuasion, he reluctantly agreed to stand and was elected leader (unopposed) on 6 April 1988.6 Carr faced a daunting task. Labor held only 43 of the 109 seats and had polled a mere 38.49 per cent of the primary vote, after a swing against it of more than 10 per cent.The party had lost seats in heartland areas such as the Hunter and Sydney’s western suburbs. After this electoral carnage, the talent available on the front bench was thin. Some had misgivings about Carr’s bookish image, and feared it would not appeal to ordinary voters. His appearance was also against him in an era of image politics, although he did have the asset of a mellifluous, resonant and convincing voice, a legacy of his days in ABC radio, when he had taken lessons from a theatrical coach to improve his delivery.7 At the time, it seemed to many that Carr was a stopgap leader: he was there until Labor’s electoral prospects improved and a more viable leader came along. There was certainly not the air of inevitability about his rise to the premiership that there had been in the case of the two previous Labor leaders who made the transition from opposition – McKell and Wran. Carr was opposition leader for much longer than either McKell or Wran: they served about a year and a half and two and a half years respectively. Partly as a result of the four-year term introduced in 1984, Carr was in opposition for seven long years.The negativity and barrenness of oppo-

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sition had, at times, a corrosive effect on him, and on several occasions he considered quitting.8 However, he also enjoyed the power and influence that came with the position – and he was surprisingly effective. Carr built a strong staff team and made good use of his media skills. An early riser, he would often begin his day by phoning editors and newsrooms to get a comment in the day’s media.9 He also travelled the state, spending time particularly in the Hunter and Illawarra, to rebuild Labor’s support. After one such visit he recorded in his diary: I’ll do this kind of thing Saturday after Saturday. It’s the fanaticism required to get us into government.The kind of detailed attention to winning vote by vote, that got me a pre-selection and my own seat … If enough people meet me face-to-face, get to talk about local problems … they’ll vote for me rather than Greiner …10

Carr made the most of the limited talent in caucus, carefully supervising the performance of his shadow ministers and insisting they work on policy development.11 Most important, and this is a hallmark of the Carr style now as much as it was then, was his superior performance in parliament. Eloquent, forceful and theatrical, Carr made devastating use of sarcasm and ridicule to score off his opponents. His speeches were always well prepared and exploited the government’s difficulties to the maximum. Carr was assisted in his task of rebuilding Labor by the fact that the new premier, Nick Greiner, came to office with a strong commitment to market liberal economics. He immediately unleashed a wide-ranging program of public sector reform. This gave Carr a reservoir of electoral resentment to tap into and a readymade opportunity to offer an attractive policy alternative. He made much of Labor’s traditional commitment to the public sector and stressed that government was not just about economics. The turning point came at the May 1991 election. Greiner was so confident that he went to the polls almost a year before he needed to. Carr was written off by most commentators and pollsters. Refusing to give up, he fought a skilful campaign capitalising on the unpopularity of Greiner’s ‘reforms’ and undermining his economic credibility with allegations of waste and mismanagement. Carr was rewarded with a 3 per cent two-party preferred swing to Labor. It was not enough to make him premier, but it was enough to deprive the government of a majority in its own right. For most of its second term, the coalition had to depend on the support of three self-styled ‘unaligned’ independents.While

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the results in terms of parliamentary democracy may have been good, it was a political disaster for the government, creating an image of instability and disarray. Added to this was a series of highly public scandals involving ministers and government backbenchers. Most spectacularly, in June 1992 Greiner was forced by the independents to resign, because he had appointed former education minister Terry Metherell, who had left the Liberal Party after the election, to a public service position. In a decision that was subsequently reversed on appeal, the Independent Commission Against Corruption had found that Greiner had acted corruptly.12 But Carr’s problems were not over. Dissatisfaction with his leadership re-emerged.There was a feeling among sections of the caucus that he could not win against the new premier, John Fahey, who had backtracked on much of the Greiner agenda. Projecting the image of a beer-drinking, footballloving ‘ordinary bloke’, Fahey rated well ahead of Carr as preferred premier and restored the government’s advantage in the polls. In March 1994, Carr was so despondent that he briefly flirted with the idea of swapping jobs with the federal Health Minister, Senator Graham Richardson.When Richardson resigned soon after, Carr asked Prime Minister Paul Keating for Richardson’s vacancy in the Senate and Cabinet, but was rebuffed.13 The dissatisfaction with Carr crystallised around Peter Anderson, who had returned to the Legislative Assembly at a by-election in April 1989 – ironically, under Carr’s auspices. In early 1994, Carr eliminated the leadership threat with ruthless efficiency. He secretly encouraged the left to field a candidate in the preselection ballot for Anderson’s seat of Liverpool and ensured that the party machine did not intervene to save Anderson. Carr’s office even falsely led wavering preselectors to believe that Anderson would be found a seat in the upper house. On 30 April the left candidate duly triumphed. Carr privately gloated,‘They still haven’t found my fingerprints on the axe handle.’14 Carr entered the 1995 election as the underdog again, with the polls predicting a coalition victory. Once more he showed what a good campaigner he was, constantly working the marginal seats, doing effective street walks, always with a line to feed the media, staying focused on his campaign themes. Carr promised no more privatisation of core public sector responsibilities, and more police and teachers.To dramatise Labor’s commitment to improving health care, he promised to resign if hospital waiting lists were not halved within his first year in office. Fahey’s promise to gaol for life those convicted three times of the same offence was matched with a pledge

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to introduce a new category of ‘horrific crime’ that would attract a life sentence. Carr also capitalised on his environmental credentials by promising more national parks and an end to logging in old-growth forests. Labor advertising highlighted the disarray in the government’s ranks. It was a classic opposition campaign, tapping into the resentment of groups in the community with a specific grievance against the government and generally undermining the voters’ faith in the government’s ability to deliver basic services such as health, education and law and order. Labor won 50 of the 99 seats but polled only 49 per cent of the two-party preferred vote. Carr had triumphed, against the odds, but it was hardly a resounding vote of confidence.15

A turbulent star t During his first 18 months, it seemed probable that Carr would be a oneterm premier. Unlike Wran, who also came to office with a one-seat majority but quickly looked increasingly secure, Carr stepped from crisis to crisis. Seven years’ apprenticeship in opposition should have been an asset to Carr, but instead, the attainment of office unleashed a pent-up desire for action and achievement. He drove his agenda aggressively, sometimes with little regard for the electoral consequences. The Carr style was compared by some with that of Whitlam, his old hero, though not in terms that either would have appreciated – the similarity, it was said, was in political rashness rather than in vision.16 Added to this was Carr’s conversion, in spite of his public statements in opposition, to many of the economic ideas of the new right. Carr pushed through a microeconomic change program involving corporatisation of ports, the break-up of the state’s electricity authority into a number of corporatised, competing units, and the opening up of railway freight operations to competition. Treasurer Michael Egan’s first Budget slashed public expenditure. Egan pledged to deliver a budget surplus in two years.The government’s commitment not to increase taxes meant this could only be achieved by cutting public spending. Carr’s justification was that social and environmental reform needed to be underpinned by a ‘robust budgetary position’.17 However, there was strong opposition from public sector workers, the union movement, the left faction of the party and backbenchers in seats likely to be affected by job losses. There was also an electoral backlash, particularly over cuts to the free school travel scheme. In August 1995 the government reneged on its election promise to eliminate the tolls on the M4 and M5 motorways, when it was revealed that

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compensation to the private contractors would be much higher than expected. Labor’s credibility suffered greatly.At the beginning of 1996, Carr announced that hospital waiting lists had been cut by 56 per cent, thus fulfilling his pledge. However, the Australian Medical Association claimed that the figures had been manipulated. While the government strongly denied this, the public’s impression was that another attempt was being made to evade an election commitment. Waiting lists had blown out again by April.18 There was much dissatisfaction with the Carr Government in rural New South Wales over lack of consultation about controls imposed on native vegetation clearing and plans to restrict water use. Job losses and costcutting in the Department of Agriculture also caused a strong negative reaction in the bush. In January 1996, without any attempt to prepare public opinion, Carr announced that the new NSW Governor, Gordon Samuels, would no longer reside at Government House. An estimated 15,000 people demonstrated against this perceived downgrading of the vice-regal role.19 Another political disaster was an attempt in June 1996 to close St Vincent’s Hospital, in inner-city Sydney, and reallocate its resources to the outer suburbs. The announcement came as a surprise,as there had been almost no prior consultation. Cabinet and caucus had not been involved in the decision.After an outcry from the local community, doctors, nurses, unions and other stakeholders, Carr admitted that consultation had been inadequate and dropped the plan.20 The government’s standing in the polls plummeted, as this table shows. Table 2.1 Newspoll: Primary vote July/August 1995 – November/December 1996 Survey July/August 1995 September/October 1995 November/December 1995 January/February 1996 March/April 1996 May/June 1996 July/August 1996 September/October 1996 November/December 1996

ALP % 46 38 40 39 31 38 36 36 38

SOURCE .

Coalition % 41 43 44 45 51 48 47 47 43

Democrats % 05 09 06 09 11 09 11 11 11

Others % 08 10 10 07 07 05 06 06 08

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The demise of the Keating Government in March 1996 was partly attributed by some to the ‘Carr factor’.There was much concern in Labor circles that the only ALP government left in Australia was heading for defeat. The Labor Council, the party machine and caucus were openly expressing their unhappiness with the government’s style. There were complaints about the premier’s remoteness, lack of consultation and disregard of the political cost of decisions.21 In such a situation, some leaders would have withdrawn into intransigence; others would have been intimidated by the challenge. But Carr, with the determination to succeed that has marked his entire career, proceeded to reinvent his government. Unpopular decisions were reversed and efforts were made to get alienated groups back on side. Carr put all his skills as a communicator into conveying the message that he was listening and consulting.The government’s successful late 1996 forestry package, which had brought together loggers and conservationists in a process of exhaustive consultation, was heavily promoted as indicative of its future style. A deliberate effort was made to create a distinct Labor approach as an alternative to the orthodoxies of economic rationalism then dominant in most other states.The tight budgetary strategy was relaxed and the commitment not to increase taxes was dropped. Carr stated that he believed the electorate was ‘prepared to accept higher taxes provided they were equitable and they meant better services’.22 The new financial approach attempted to combine responsible economic management with a relatively high level of public expenditure.The government was still committed to microeconomic reform, but it was also committed to maintaining a strong public sector. Bringing down his 1997 Budget, Treasurer Egan described it as ‘every inch a Labor one’. He went on to say that ‘good government can’t be mean and shrivelled, it must provide support and protection … Our values are very different from other Governments in Australia.’23 In a mid-term interview, Carr outlined his new policy vision: It’s apparent in our vast and ambitious restructuring of forestry … In the 38 additional national parks created since I’ve been Premier … It’s apparent in our quest for quality jobs; it has yielded us the best job figures in the country … We are funding extra child protection workers, extra literacy teachers in the school system at a time of public sector restraint … We’re building a competitive economy in this State without a slash and burn approach to the public sector.24

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The government received a much-needed boost in May 1996 when it won the north coast seat of Clarence from the National Party at a by-election. Labor fielded a good candidate and ran a strong campaign based on local issues.This victory meant that the government no longer needed the Speaker’s casting vote to stay in office. Carr’s new strategy began to turn Labor’s fortunes around. By early 1998 the government had caught up to the opposition in the polls, and it moved steadily ahead during the second half of the year.25 In December, convinced of its impending defeat, the Liberal Party dumped Peter Collins as leader and installed Kerry Chikarovski. From the beginning, Chikarovski failed to establish herself as a credible alternative. Her media performances were uncertain, and she appeared to be out of her depth on policy issues. She never looked like matching Carr’s rating as preferred premier and did not provide the opposition with their hoped-for boost in the polls. The opposition’s campaign for the March 1999 election was negative and polldriven, and lacked any consistent, credible message. Chikarovski’s performance was unimpressive, and there were some embarrassing gaffes. The other problem for the opposition was that the Carr Government had so effectively seized the middle ground that it had nowhere to go. On the crucial issue of law and order, for example, the Liberals were pushed to the far right with increasingly draconian policies, thus alienating many moderate voters. Labor ran a tight, well-disciplined campaign with few lapses. The government was portrayed as safe, moderate and responsible. Carr freely admitted past mistakes and stressed that the government had learnt from experience. Voters were reminded that Labor had some real achievements to its credit, such as increased spending on schools and hospitals and the creation of national parks. No excessive, high-cost promises were made. Labor won 55 of the 93 seats; the opposition won 33. There were big swings against the Liberals in many of their safe seats. In two-party preferred terms, the swing to Labor was 7 per cent, giving it 56 per cent of the overall vote. The primary vote, however, rose only marginally, from 41.3 per cent in 1995 to 42.2 per cent.

Caution tempered by aggression With the resounding election victory in 1999, the mature Carr style had emerged. It could be characterised as caution tempered by occasional aggression. His approach now was measured and confident, without the

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previous haste to prove himself and make his mark. Carr also recovered the sound political judgement that he had displayed earlier in his career. Always inclined to an authoritarian style of leadership, Carr’s power over Cabinet and caucus was greatly strengthened. As he wrote in his diary in May 1999: ‘Success gives authority, strength, further success.’26 Carr is more dominant than Wran, who always had a hard core of muted opposition from the old Catholic right. The parliamentary party during Wran’s time also contained a number of independent-minded MPs who had come up the hard way and were beholden to no one. Graham Freudenberg, speechwriter and adviser to Wran and Carr, has said that while Wran was ‘undoubtedly the star, he was not a one-man band in the way that Bob is a one-man band. Bob Carr is the be-all and end-all of the Carr Government.’27 Although Carr makes effective use of the Cabinet process to consult ministers and to ensure that all decisions are thoroughly Bob Carr (photo courtesy of Premier’s Department, NSW). considered, his own views usually prevail. Most of the key decisions are, in reality, made by a small inner group consisting of Carr, his close advisers and a few key ministers, including Egan, Craig Knowles and John Della Bosca, the former ALP Secretary who joined the Cabinet after the 1999 election.The two most important public servants are Roger Wilkins, head of Cabinet Office, and the Director-General of the Premier’s Department, Col Gellatly. Wilkins advises on policy; Gellatly’s role is supervising the administration and acting as a general troubleshooter. Although influential, neither is anything like as powerful as Gerry Gleeson, the head of the Premier’s Department, was under Wran. Extremely hardworking himself, Carr expects his ministers to perform, and does not hesitate to let them know if he thinks they are not. He has, however, usually stuck by his colleagues when they have been in political trouble – sometimes for too long. There have been few Cabinet changes between elections, and ministers who had become a political liability, such as Transport Minister Brian Langton, Community Services Minister Ron Dyer and Education Minister John Aquilina, were moved only when the

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pressure became irresistible. Although firmly in control, Carr is not overly interventionist. He tends to concentrate on the major issues facing the government, leaving the day-to-day running of portfolios to his ministers. He does, however, keep a watching brief and will quickly intervene if problems develop. Carr uses Cabinet committees, both ad hoc and standing, as a means of supervising his ministers and driving the agenda. The powerful Budget Committee, for example, scrutinises all proposed expenditure.After the 2003 election, Carr set up a Cabinet committee of himself, Egan and Della Bosca to oversee a drive for improved service delivery and increased efficiency in the public sector. This committee is systematically reviewing the work of all ministers and their departments. Carr’s dealings with caucus have been more turbulent. During the government’s first term there were a number of caucus revolts. In November 1995, after a heated meeting with many complaints of lack of consultation, a motion asserting the traditional ‘primacy’ of caucus in decisionmaking was passed overwhelmingly.28 Unhappiness over claims that the Police Royal Commission was not investigating paedophilia vigorously enough led to 21 MPs demanding a special caucus meeting in October 1996 to consider broadening the commission’s terms of reference. Carr strongly resisted this challenge, but when it came to a showdown, 12 MPs still voted for a wider inquiry.29 An attempt by Carr and Egan in 1997 to push through a proposal to privatise the electricity industry led to a caucus rebellion.This, plus widespread opposition at all levels of the party, derailed the proposal.30 From 1999 onwards, caucus was much less restive. Carr was no longer pursuing unpopular policies that were causing MPs problems in their electorates. MPs were more inclined to defer to him because he had proven himself an election winner. The entrenched strength of the factions has made caucus management easier. MPs are in many cases entirely beholden to their faction for their arrival in parliament, and for their future survival. They are thus under great pressure to vote as instructed.Tight control by a few faction power brokers makes it easier to do deals and to deliver on them. Promotion is usually through factional backing, so aspiring ministers are not inclined to break ranks. Carr can usually command a dependable block of votes in caucus with the support of the ministry and those who see themselves as part of that ministry in the future. Carr has had good relations with the ALP machine, as is to be expected

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given his history as a foot soldier of the right. Della Bosca was a particularly influential adviser and supporter during his term as party secretary (1990–99).With its overriding concern for electoral success, the dominant faction has taken care to protect the premier from embarrassing rebuffs and has generally delivered the numbers when needed. The right’s power has been used to clamp down on dissent and stage-manage the ALP Annual Conference. This has been assisted by the fact that the influence of the factions has generally made the conference a predictable event, with backroom deals determining the outcome on the floor.ALP head office has also assisted Carr by running extremely efficient election campaigns.

‘Lashing them into sense’ Relations with the union movement have been less happy.To a certain extent this was inevitable, as the government has to control public expenditure and is committed to creating a more efficient public sector.A disruptive and damaging dispute with the left-wing Teachers’ Federation extended over most of the government’s first 18 months in office. In 1997, both left-wing and right-wing unions combined in opposition to Carr’s attempt to privatise the electricity industry. Concerns that the government was pursuing a cost-cutting agenda after its 1999 election victory triggered widespread industrial action by public sector employees.To head off union unrest, at the ALP Annual Conference in October Carr announced the formation of a State Labor Advisory Council consisting of senior ministers and ALP and union officials; its aim was to give the union movement more input into government policy.A generous pay deal with most public sector employees in December took much of the heat out of the industrial climate.31 However, a further bitter conflict with the Teachers’ Federation was not resolved until May 2000.32 Government decisions to privatise an engineering unit of the electricity authority and the state’s coalmines triggered union protests in 2002. Carr’s response, as recorded in his diary, was: ‘These are all absolutely right decisions and I love forcing them through.That’s part of good government.’33 The most serious clash with the union movement took place in 2001 over Carr’s plans to reform the financially troubled workers’ compensation scheme. The proposed changes were vigorously opposed by the unions. Attempts to reach a compromise failed, and on 19 June union picketers blockaded Parliament House to prevent the legislation being introduced. Opposition MPs were, however, allowed into the building, as they had

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pledged to oppose the Bill. The government was in a dangerous position, as the Legislative Assembly was due to meet at 2:15 pm. If no Labor MPs were present, the opposition would be able to take control of the House and pass a no confidence motion in the government. Constitutionally, this would not have forced Carr’s resignation, as he was only temporarily without a majority. However, it would have provoked a minor constitutional crisis and caused the government some embarrassment. Many Labor members were reluctant to cross a picket line. Carr threatened to resign if they did not defy the protesters. He had, in fact, already secretly entered Parliament House. Most of caucus finally decided to brave the blockade, and a substantial police contingent forced a way into parliament for the MPs. According to Carr: Finally they march across. I greet them on the steps. I flash a victory sign.Why not? … I ram the workers comp package through – emotional debate, I speak, lash them into sense … Then on Wednesday [20 June] I speak on the legislation in the House, start restoring unity. I didn’t care whether they threw me out. That gave me careless courage. And I had no alternative but to stand firm. All in all I enjoyed this crisis.34

The episode was a complete disaster for the unions and an indication of Carr’s dominance over all sections of the labour movement. Yet Carr could not be described as anti-union. At some political cost to himself, he took a strong stand against the 1998 attempt by Patrick Stevedores to break the Maritime Union of Australia.35 He has also delivered some real benefits to the union movement.The previous state coalition government’s emphasis on bypassing unions by devolving industrial relations to the workplace level was replaced by a public sector-wide approach. New industrial relations legislation passed in 1996 restored the central role of unions and the Industrial Relations Commission. In 1999, the government backed away from proposals for competitive tendering for rail and road maintenance in the face of union opposition.36 The unions also know that although they have from time to time been unhappy with the Carr Government, the inescapable reality is that it is better than the alternative. As Carr pointedly reminded public sector unionists, ‘the alternative to our sensible management of public sector services is the slash and burn approach of conservative governments, and that will be inevitable one day unless from time to time we keep our budget in order’.37

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Taking care of business While Carr’s dealings with organised labour have been turbulent, his relations with the business community have been relatively harmonious. His right-wing ideology has ensured that investment, economic growth and job creation have been key objectives. Carr’s early championing of social democracy was replaced in the 1980s by a vision of an Australia: in which jobs were secure not because of ramshackle tariff walls but because we were producing excellent products that the world would buy from us and our workers were union protected but high paid and high skilled … in which our public services were as good and responsive as anything in the world, [with] modernisation and upgrading of the public sector … I wanted to see an Australia that was streamlined and competitive, that offered higher living standards, that could settle industrial disputes without airline strikes and transport blockades.38

One of Carr’s first acts as premier was to convene a summit of business leaders to convey the message that the government wanted to work with the private sector to promote economic growth. Similar summits have been held regularly since. Carr has actively encouraged private sector involvement in infrastructure provision. The government has also won business support with a big-spending public works program. Although the government is responsive to the needs of business, there is no favoured network of ‘mates’. Carr and Egan ‘like to consult broadly, and no particular business figures have their ear’.39 An indication of how comfortable business is with the Carr Government is that it was endorsed by wealthy businessman Richard Pratt at the 2003 election in these terms: ‘I am a capitalist. Capitalists can’t vote for Labor but I think voting for Bob Carr is a vote for industry and big business.’40

Governing for all the people Carr is particularly sensitive to the needs of rural and regional New South Wales. He has never forgotten the reverses Labor suffered in its heartland in 1988. Carr is also genuinely committed to governing in the interests of all sections of New South Wales. He makes regular high-profile visits across the state.Within weeks of coming to office he embarked on a tour of droughtaffected parts of New South Wales ‘in the way Roosevelt had done in America in the thirties, but with helicopters instead of trains. He visited

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farms in Mudgee, spoke from the verandah of a Dubbo pub and addressed a group of farmers in Temora from the back of a truck.’41 When BHP announced it was closing down its steelmaking operations in the Hunter in 1997, Carr immediately visited Newcastle to express his concern. He backed this up by creating a $10 million Hunter advantage fund to help the region attract new industries.42 In 1999, a similar fund was established for the Illawarra.A number of other regional development programs have been funded and some government agencies have been relocated outside Sydney. In 1995, the positions of minister assisting the premier for the Hunter and parliamentary secretary for the Illawarra were created as a tangible sign of Carr’s recognition of regional needs. In 2000, a minister assisting the premier for the Central Coast was appointed.After the 2003 election, these became full-scale ministries. Labor has traditionally been electorally successful in country New South Wales; it was almost a semi-rural party for the first half of the 20th century.43 Carr has had some success with his efforts to re-establish a presence for Labor in the bush after the debacle of 1988, when Broken Hill was the only country seat the party held in New South Wales – this was its worst result since 1932.At the 1999 election the government won five rural seats. In an attempt to consolidate and expand this base, the ALP officially established a rural subsidiary, Country Labor, which was registered as a political party in its own right.At the 2003 election, Country Labor nominated 22 candidates and won 4 (out of a total of 25) seats spread across all regions of the state. It polled 6.64 per cent of the Legislative Assembly vote; the National Party polled 9.63 per cent.44 NSW premiers have traditionally reaped rich electoral rewards from attacks on the real and alleged failings of the Commonwealth Government. Part of the reason Labor was in office from 1941 to 1965 was that Menzies, who was prime minister for most of this period, was a convenient scapegoat for the NSW Government. However, although there have been occasional periods of conflict, ‘Canberra bashing’ has not been a major feature of the Carr style. One reason is that Carr has often been prepared to put politics aside in the interests of good policy outcomes. In the wake of the Port Arthur massacre, for example, he immediately supported John Howard’s push for tougher gun laws.45 There are some policy similarities between Carr and Howard: both are socially conservative and give priority to economic management. They have, on the whole, had a reasonable

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working relationship.At a Premiers’ Conference in April 1999, all the other states combined to oppose a new formula proposed by the Grants Commission that would have given extra funding to New South Wales. According to Carr’s diary account: We’re one out. How will Howard and Costello react …? To my intense relief [Howard] says he won’t – cannot – overturn a recommendation of the Grants Commission unless the States are unanimous. Strong. Fair. I won’t hear ill of this man.This gives me a victory to talk about to the Sydney media and I praise the Prime Minister. I’ve learnt that the more unaligned electorate loves this kind of non-partisanship.46

Another reason that Carr has not been more aggressive towards Canberra is that Howard has done well electorally in New South Wales. Carr and Howard had the support of the same voters on the outskirts of Sydney after the 2001 federal election. Seats that Howard won or consolidated his hold on, such as Hughes, Lindsay and Dobell, were safe Labor seats at the state level. The proportional representation system in place in the Legislative Council has ensured that no government has controlled the upper house since 1988. After the 1999 election there were 16 Labor Members of the Legislative Council (MLCs), 13 coalition members and 13 independent and minor party members. Lack of control of the Legislative Council has not proved to be the problem for Carr that it was for previous Labor governments. This is partly because the government has not had a large program of controversial legislation it is determined to push through. As a majority of the crossbench MLCs are, broadly speaking, more sympathetic to Labor than to the coalition, the government has often been able to attract enough support to win divisions. At other times it has been able to negotiate deals with specific crossbenchers, often in return for concessions. However, while Carr has not faced major obstruction in the Legislative Council, legislation has often been amended, sometimes against the government’s wishes. Lack of a majority in the upper house has meant that the government has had to negotiate and compromise to get its program through.47

Crisis avoidance and crisis management Crisis avoidance is as much a part of the mature Carr style as crisis management is. Decisions are carefully assessed from the political as well as

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the policy viewpoint. Carr reads public opinion astutely and is careful not to get too far ahead of the voters. He constantly monitors community feeling and endeavours to position the government accordingly. Carr also takes considerable notice of opinion polling although he denies such an approach is ‘about being sleazily poll driven, it’s trying to do proper research to see that your commitments bear some relationship to what people truly perceive’.48 With contentious issues, widespread consultation is usually undertaken before a decision is made. One commentator has noted that ‘bringing critics into the tent has been a hallmark second term strategy for Carr’.49 This has been assisted by the fact that as Carr has seemed increasingly secure electorally, opponents have been forced to come to terms or risk being left out in the cold. A favourite device is a summit conference that includes representatives from the community or communities involved, other stakeholders, professionals, the bureaucracy and politics. Such summits have been convened on illicit drugs, salinity, obesity and alcohol abuse. Carr has often been prepared to implement the recommendations of these gatherings, even if they are contrary to the government’s previous position. An important example was the drug summit’s recommendation for a trial of a medically supervised injecting room for intravenous drug users. Carr had taken a strong stand against the idea in the past, but after some soul-searching, he accepted the recommendation.50 A key part of the Carr style is communication. An excellent media performer himself, Carr has always been aware of the vital importance of media management to political success. He is omnipresent in the media, not only defending the government and selling its policies, but also floating ideas and showing the electorate that he is listening and in touch. Carr makes himself available: to provide a near daily flash of television images and quick grabs for the evening news … [H]e offers easy access to radio and newspapers … Radio reporters say Carr’s staff will regularly ring a newsroom or individual journalist, offering a specific time when the Premier will call to provide a ‘grab’ … Unlike press conferences, though, there’s no room in this routine for questions.51

Carr has a populist ability to speak out as the voice of the ordinary citizen in response to events causing concern in the community. When a series of revenge shootings linked to a feud between Lebanese families

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received much publicity in October 2003, Carr bluntly stated:‘My message is simple – obey the law in Australia, or ship out of Australia. We are not going to see, step-by-step, our civilisation dragged back to medieval standards of revenge cycles.’52 As opposition leader, Carr carefully monitored his shadow ministers’ media performance, telling them to keep a diary recording all their appearances – he occasionally checked these.53 He maintains this scrutiny as premier. Ministers and bureaucrats are all likely to receive early-morning calls from Carr chiding them for their comments or asking why they have not responded to stories. More positively, Carr often takes advantage of his own long experience to advise colleagues on media management. Proactive media management has reached a sophisticated level under Carr.The premier’s ‘personal interest in the day’s media coverage is intense, forensic; his desire to lead, shape – and his critics say manipulate – public debate is inexhaustible’. Carr has a strong media team in his office. As a supplement to this, his ministers have ‘an army of specialised press secretaries … Further down the PR food chain is another media army of marketing and communications people employed by the Public Service …’ The media machine maintains a steady output of press releases and stories, aimed at least in part at blocking attempts by the opposition and minor parties to gain coverage. As soon as a story breaks, the government ‘spin’ machine goes into action, to either give ‘early extra oxygen’ to positive stories or ‘suffocate the negatives’.54 As an example of the latter, a shadow minister has complained that when he put in freedom of information requests the material was given to the media with a favourable ‘spin’ before it was released to him.55 Carr’s emphasis on media management has been strongly criticised.Veteran journalist Quentin Dempster has written: Issues management is now dominating public administration. Media monitoring by departments and agencies is a fully funded obligation so that instantaneous briefs can be provided to ministers for immediate planning of media strategies. For the author, covering state politics has become a process of engagement with ‘spin doctors’ who now outnumber accredited journalists. Such is the level of Cabinet, departmental and agency secrecy and paranoia that only those with time to develop backchannel sources of information can hope to discover what is really going on.56

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When a decision is badly received or a crisis emerges, the government’s first response is a media barrage to soften opposition or deflect the electorate’s attention. Carr has been described as ‘a master of damage control by distraction, pulling out a controversial new policy or appointment to divert the public spotlight from the drama’.57 Another Carr technique is to distance himself from problems. The premier announces good news, bureaucrats and ministers often bear the brunt of public ire.A method Carr has also used successfully to defuse a crisis is to admit frankly that there is a problem and set up a public inquiry. When a series of chronic problems with Sydney’s rail system culminated in a derailment that killed seven people on the eve of the 2003 election, the government looked in serious trouble. Carr immediately visited the scene and announced that Justice Peter McInerney, who had conducted a robust inquiry into an earlier derailment, would fully investigate the accident. This successfully put the issue on hold until after the election. If all else fails, Carr does not hesitate to admit he was wrong and backtrack on unpopular decisions. Before the 2003 election, for example, the premier: moved swiftly to jettison the lead in his electoral saddlebags … In one fell swoop, two schools earmarked for closure were given a second lease of life, the harbourside Callan Park [was] saved from development [and] residents around Lake Macquarie and a clutch of increasingly volatile electorates on the Central Coast won a reprieve from a plan to open their lakefronts to public access.58

The Carr model Carr’s ideological conservatism and political pragmatism have combined to produce what is in many ways a 1950s style of government, with much emphasis on job creation, development and the provision of basic services such as health, transport, education and law and order. An enlightened conservative, Carr has not hesitated to pursue reform when he believes it necessary. However, his reforms are of a targeted, practical kind, not grand visions for changing society. Carr has said that ‘fundamentally the defining approach of NSW Labor’ is that of ‘a practical party of government, trying to solve problems for the people of New South Wales’.59 The new ingredients Carr has added to this traditional style of government are a commitment to market liberal economics with

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a human face and a concern for the environment. Economic efficiency and environmental sustainability are the major elements of the Carr model. Carr and Egan have been reasonably successful in their attempts to combine sound financial management with a relatively high level of public spending. The 2003/04 Budget predicted an eighth consecutive surplus while increasing expenditure on health, education, community services, transport and public safety. General government debt has fallen from 7.4 per cent of Gross State Product in 1995 to 1.5 per cent in 2003.Taxes have been reduced in recent Budgets although New South Wales remains a relatively high-taxing state. Another economic achievement was the funding of the 2000 Olympics without incurring any debt liability. The opposition and some commentators, however, claim that the government’s success has been due more to booming revenues, particularly from Sydney’s buoyant property market, than to good management. The area where Carr’s right-wing agenda has perhaps been most controversial is that of law and order. There have been a succession of measures increasing police powers, toughening sentencing laws and reducing judicial discretion, all of which have been heavily criticised by civil libertarians and sections of the legal profession. Carr’s enthusiasm for such measures is as much a reflection of his deeply conservative views about preservation of the social order as it is vote-chasing populism. After the introduction of legislation giving police increased search powers in 1998, Carr privately reflected: ‘I’ve reached the position where I much prefer to err [by] giving police too much support. The enemy are crazyeyed, dope-pumped, knife-armed desperadoes. The rest of us have our civil liberties.’60 Carr further angered civil libertarians by decisively rejecting a 1999 proposal for a bill of rights. With a traditional conservative scepticism of abstract schemes to improve society, he argued: The protection of rights lies in the good sense, tolerance and fairness of the community. If we have this, then rights will be respected by individuals and governments, because this is expected behaviour and breaches will be considered unacceptable. A bill of rights will only have the effect of turning community values into legal battlefields, eventually undermining the strength of those values.61

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The government does, however, have some social reforms to its credit. It has banned discrimination against transgender people and those with carers’ responsibilities. Legislation has been passed to provide property rights for same-sex couples.A uniform age of consent of 16 has been introduced.The focus in juvenile justice has been on rehabilitation and alternatives to court proceedings. In 2003, Carr announced a proposal for a trial of the use of cannabis for medicinal purposes and extended the trial of the safe injecting room for four years. Critics characterise some of these reforms as gestures to placate the left faction, and note that they have been introduced immediately after elections, when there is little possibility of an electoral backlash. There are a number of areas where Carr has consistently displayed a genuine zeal for reform. In education, he has introduced literacy testing for all students at the start of high school, made the School Certificate an external exam and reshaped the Higher School Certificate so that it is more rigorous academically and it also provides greater opportunities for vocational education. However, serious questions remain about the quality of public education, as demonstrated by the continued decline in enrolments. In 2002, 35 per cent of all NSW high school students were in the private system.62 Carr has not hesitated to take on powerful interest groups if he believes that it is necessary in the interests of good government. In particular, he has pushed through a series of reforms involving the legal profession and the insurance industry in the face of strong opposition. His aim has been to prevent ‘an American-style culture of litigation taking hold’.63 After announcing his workers’ compensation reforms in 2001, Carr exulted: I have cost the law profession hundreds of millions. First, freeing business conveyancing from the lawyers’ monopoly in 1995. [Then] the reforming of [motor] accident compensation (cost them hundreds of millions alone) in 1999. Now cutting them out of the action on workers comp. It’s not worth being Premier unless you can take privileges off the undeserving.64

In 2001, the government passed legislation to reform medical indemnity insurance.The following year, Carr was at the forefront of reforms to deal with the crisis in public liability insurance, legislating to cap damages for personal injury compensation and remodel the law of negligence.

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But above all these achievements, the environment is the area where Carr has been most active. In July 2001, the Director of the Total Environment Centre said: In environmental terms, Bob Carr is the best State Premier Australia has ever had. More than a million hectares of high conservation value and wilderness forests have been added to the national park estate; far western landscapes have been bought for conservation; a raft of laws affecting pollution, waste, threatened species, native vegetation and water have been dramatically upgraded … There have been air pollution and salinity strategies … [and] a comprehensive coastal protection package that will stop harmful development.65

Legislation in 2002 made New South Wales the first state to impose mandatory greenhouse gas emission controls on electricity retailers. Another environmental achievement in late 2003 was a new, integrated system of natural resource management that devolved authority to local catchment management committees under the supervision of a Natural Resources Commission. It was welcomed by both environmentalists and farmers’ groups as a historic breakthrough. Conservationists, however, point out that the natural environment remains seriously degraded.The creation of the new natural resource management system was an admission that policies in the areas of water use and native vegetation clearing needed improvement. The government’s record on the urban environment is a source of criticism, with transport, waste disposal, urban consolidation and water and energy conservation seen as problem areas. Controlling urban development remains a major challenge, particularly given the influence of property developers who are generous contributors to ALP funds.

The 2003 election: a presidential campaign In March 2002, the unelectable Chikarovski was replaced by John Brogden, who turned 33 the day he won the opposition leadership. Brogden soon established himself as a serious challenger. A good media performer, he gave the Liberal Party a more credible image. The opposition also began to release some electorally attractive policies. Labor suffered a slump in the polls for about 12 months from mid-2001. Carr, however, maintained and increased his substantial lead as preferred premier, as the following table shows.

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Table 2.2 Newspoll: Better Premier, April 2002 – March 2003 Bob Carr % John Brogden % Uncommitted % 12–14 April and 19–21 April 2002 May/June 2002 July/August 2002 September/October 2002 November/December 2002 January/February 2003 7–10 March 2003 19–20 March 2003 SOURCE

51 49 56 58 61 61 65 64

20 20 19 18 16 18 16 22

29 31 25 24 23 21 19 14

.

The March 2003 election was the first Carr campaign that could be described as truly presidential. The entire Labor strategy was built around him. Carr’s image is more comfortable than charismatic. He is seen by many voters as capable, reliable and trustworthy, supplying some certainties in an uncertain post-September 11 world.The other main feature of the government’s campaign was its cost, estimated at more than $11 million. Labor spent almost three times as much as the coalition on advertising.66 Brogden campaigned well but was hampered by the war in Iraq that commenced in the last week of the campaign, making it almost impossible for the opposition to get its message across.The general uneasiness the war created in the community may also have made voters reluctant to experiment. Although some electorates changed hands, it was a status quo result, with Labor winning 55 seats – as in the previous parliament.The swing to the government on primary votes was 0.47 per cent. Labor increased its two-party preferred vote by 0.2 per cent to 56.2 per cent. However, the overall trend concealed the fact that the Liberals came very close to losing some seats and Labor greatly increased its hold on many of its marginals.To win a majority at the next election, the Coalition would need a swing of over 12 per cent. Labor polled well in the Legislative Council, gaining two extra seats.67 This has made management of the upper house easier, as the government has only to gain the support of 4 of the 11 crossbench MLCs to win divisions. After his 2003 triumph, Carr stood like a colossus in the electoral landscape, a result few would have dared to predict in 1995. If he is still in office in May 2005, he will become the longest continuously serving NSW

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premier. However, Carr made great efforts to avoid any hint of triumphalism or complacency. Conscious of the need to revitalise the government, he reconstructed his ministry dramatically, creating for the first time in NSW history an inner Cabinet of 14, with 7 junior ministers. Four senior ministers were dumped and 9 new faces were introduced. Major administrative changes were made. A new ‘super ministry’ of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources was set up, under Knowles, to give more coherence to planning and natural resource management policies. Three assistant ministers – for Forests, Lands and Planning Administration – report to Knowles. Della Bosca, assisted by a junior Minister for Fair Trading, took on the newly created commerce portfolio that included industrial relations, fair trading, information technology and public works and services. In spite of his strong electoral position, Carr faces major challenges in his third term. There are many and conflicting demands on the government’s finite budget resources. Basic services such as transport, health and education are under growing pressure. Challenges to public order are increasing. Population growth and the degradation of the urban environment are unresolved problems. Formidable difficulties remain in the social welfare area. While media management can often deal with their surface manifestations, these and other problems have to be confronted on a longterm basis. A former Labor MLC has put it this way: Today there’s still a shortage of textbooks in state high schools, people wait four hours for hospital transport, there are no seats on trains for people commuting to work every day. Labor can’t say, ‘What do you expect us to do about it?’ any more.68

Notes 1 2 3 4 5

6 7 8

This account of Carr’s early career is largely drawn from A.West & R. Morris, Bob Carr: A Self-made Man, HarperCollins, Sydney, 2003. West & Morris, Bob Carr: A Self-made Man, pp. 127–30. West & Morris, Bob Carr: A Self-made Man, pp. 137–39. For a perceptive account of Carr as Environment Minister, see R. Ostrow,‘Carr: a shark cruising in for the kill’, Australian Financial Review, 25 October 1985. J. Hagan & C. Clothier, ‘1988’, in M. Hogan & D. Clune (eds), The People’s Choice: Electoral Politics in 20th Century NSW, Parliament of NSW and the University of Sydney, Sydney, 2001, vol. 3, pp. 268–6. M. Dodkin, Bob Carr:The Reluctant Leader, UNSW Press, Sydney, 2003, pp. 4–8. West & Morris, Bob Carr: A Self-made Man, p. 56. Dodkin, Bob Carr:The Reluctant Leader, pp. 23, 28–35, 47–49.

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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44

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Dodkin, Bob Carr:The Reluctant Leader, p. 11. Carr diary, quoted in Dodkin, Bob Carr:The Reluctant Leader, p. 71. Dodkin, Bob Carr:The Reluctant Leader, p. 43. A. Green, ‘1991’, in Hogan & Clune, The People’s Choice, vol. 3. West & Morris, Bob Carr: A Self-made Man, pp. 247–48. Dodkin, Bob Carr:The Reluctant Leader, pp. 92–99. T. Smith, ‘1995’, in Hogan & Clune, The People’s Choice, vol. 3. See, for example, K. Gosman, ‘Whitlam’s fate haunting Carr’, Sunday Telegraph, 3 September 1995. The Australian, 12 September 1995. Sydney Morning Herald, 28 February 1996; 19 April 1996. Sydney Morning Herald, 31 January 1996. The Australian, 2 July 1996; 3 July 1996. See, for example, Sydney Morning Herald, 19 March 1996. The Australian, 10 May 1997. Sydney Morning Herald, 7 May 1997. Sydney Morning Herald, 21 March 1997. For poll figures see R. Smith,‘1999’, in Hogan & Clune, The People’s Choice, vol. 3, p. 385. Quoted in Dodkin, Bob Carr:The Reluctant Leader, p. 192. Quoted in West & Morris, Bob Carr: A Self-made Man, p. 284. Sydney Morning Herald, 15 November 1995. D. Clune, ‘NSW political chronicle, July–December 1996’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 43, no. 2, 1997, p. 231. D. Clune, ‘NSW political chronicle, January–June 1997’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 43, no. 3, 1997, pp. 386–87. D. Clune, ‘NSW political chronicle, July–December 1999’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol 46, no. 2, 2000, pp. 224–25. D. Clune, ‘NSW political chronicle, January–June 2000’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 46, no. 4, 2000, pp. 564–65. Quoted in Dodkin, Bob Carr:The Reluctant Leader, p229. Carr diary quoted in Dodkin, Bob Carr:The Reluctant Leader, pp. 215-16. Dodkin, Bob Carr:The Reluctant Leader, pp. 169–70. M. O’Donnell, ‘Continuity and change: the NSW public sector under Labor’, Australian Journal of Public Administration, vol. 59, no. 4, 2000, pp. 93–99. Dodkin, Bob Carr:The Reluctant Leader, p. 196. West & Morris, Bob Carr: A Self-made Man, p. 131. A. Hepworth, Australian Financial Review, 12 December 2002. West & Morris, Bob Carr: A Self-made Man, p. 365. West & Morris, Bob Carr: A Self-made Man, p. 286. Dodkin, Bob Carr:The Reluctant Leader, p. 157. D. Clune, ‘The State Labor Party’s electoral record in rural NSW 1904–1981’, Labour History, no. 47, November 1984. A. Green, ‘2003 NSW election – final analysis’, NSW Parliamentary Library

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Research Service, Background Paper No. 6/03. 45 Dodkin, Bob Carr:The Reluctant Leader, p. 142. 46 Quoted in Dodkin, Bob Carr:The Reluctant Leader, p. 189. 47 G. Griffith, ‘The NSW Legislative Council: an analysis of its contemporary performance as a house of review’, Australasian Parliamentary Review, vol. 17, no. 1, 2002. 48 Sydney Morning Herald, 20 July 2002. 49 P.Totaro, Sydney Morning Herald, 12 August 2002. 50 Dodkin, Bob Carr:The Reluctant Leader, p. 191. 51 P.Totaro, Sydney Morning Herald, 15 June 2002. 52 Daily Telegraph, 16 October 2003. 53 West & Morris, Bob Carr: A Self-made Man, p. 188. 54 Totaro, Sydney Morning Herald, 15 June 2002. 55 Sun Herald, 7 September 2003. 56 Q. Dempster,‘Media rules in the court of Carr’, Griffith Review, Autumn 2004, p. 46. 57 Sydney Morning Herald, 9 September 2002. 58 Sydney Morning Herald, 26 October 2002. 59 Sydney Morning Herald, 13 November 2000. 60 Carr diary quoted in Dodkin, Bob Carr:The Reluctant Leader, p. 168. 61 Policy, vol. 17, no. 2, 2001, p. 20. 62 Sydney Morning Herald, 28 July 2003. 63 The Sydney Papers, vol. 14, no. 3, 2002, p. 103. 64 Carr diary, quoted in Dodkin, Bob Carr:The Reluctant Leader, p. 213. 65 J. Angel, Sydney Morning Herald, 2 July 2001. 66 The Australian, 1 August 2003. 67 Green, ‘2003 NSW election – final analysis’. 68 P. O’Grady, Sydney Morning Herald, 19 July 2003. * I would like to thank Rodney Cavalier, Carl Green and Ken Turner for their assistance.

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Chapter 3

P E T E R B E ATT I E : T H E ‘ B OY F R O M AT H E RTO N ’ M A D E G O O D

John Wanna and Paul Williams eter Beattie is one of a new breed of professional political actors who have spent their entire adult life engaged in an apprenticeship for public office. Indeed, Beattie has been politically active since his arrest as a university student at a demonstration in 1971. He gained considerable notoriety in the 1970s as secretary of the Queensland Railway Employees Union, and in the 1980s as state secretary of the Queensland Australian Labor Party (ALP). Entering parliament in 1989, at the age of 37, he became the most discussed backbencher in decades.Yet despite his obvious talent and high public profile, Beattie was excluded from Cabinet for five and a half years, only joining the outgoing Labor ministry in July 1995. In a bloodless coup, he was elected party leader after a political crisis in 1996. He then toiled away as opposition leader for more than two years. He has now served eight years at the head of the parliamentary Labor Party (more than half his time in parliament) and has been premier since 26 June 1998 – over six years. He is regularly rated by opinion polls as one of Australia’s most popular leaders, and after his second landslide (in early 2004), he appears in total command. He has stated publicly that he has a private agreement with his wife Heather as to when he will quit politics, but to date he has refused to make the details of this agreement public – except to announce in June 2004 that he would anoint a successor from among his current batch of ministers. Despite Beattie’s unquestionably strong standing among voters and within both government and the party, his ascent to the premiership was no insider’s run. Indeed, far from being handed a political silver spoon, Beattie had to fight at every stage of his career, first with the factional power

P

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brokers in the state party machine, and later with the ‘praetorian’ guard of the Goss regime. His first taste of leadership was only begrudgingly given to him, and when he assumed the leadership, after Wayne Goss’s spectacular decline in 1995–96, he was regarded by many a ‘stopgap’ leader. Critics were sure Beattie would fail and that Labor would be relegated to opposition for several terms.1 Significantly, when he was able to claim the premier’s commission in June 1998, it was only as head of a minority government, following a surge in support for the One Nation Party. Thus Beattie began his premiership with uncertainty, and that uncertainty was underscored by a legal challenge because of a disputed electoral return in one seat. Through a mix of tireless hard work and a lacklustre opposition, Beattie did, however, find early success as premier. But he has learned not to take this success for granted. He constantly works at being the ‘people’s premier’, and via an arsenal of clearly orchestrated and media-savvy strategies, he appears to be permanently in campaign mode. He plays the charismatic showman.2 Yet there seems nothing particularly special about Beattie. He went to ordinary state schools in regional Queensland, sometimes barefoot, was raised by his grandmother and, by most accounts, endured the humblest of childhoods. He has pedestrian social and cultural tastes, and is happiest relaxing with pizza and red wine on the balcony of his inner-city Brisbane home, reading a racy crime thriller, or taking an early morning walk in an oversized rugby shirt with Heather and their dog, Rusty – this is an iconic image regularly captured by the media. Like Kim Beazley, Beattie has struggled with his weight: he has embarked on numerous diets, and has even provided diet tips to a national women’s magazine.

A torrid political apprenticeship Politicised by a police baton during the mass demonstrations over the 1971 Springbok rugby tour, Beattie joined the Australian Labor Party (ALP) to vent his opposition to the local excesses of the Bjelke-Petersen Government.This contrasts with his predecessor,Wayne Goss, who joined the ALP because he was outraged in 1975 by federal politics – in particular by Governor-General John Kerr’s dismissal of the Whitlam Government. As a young activist, Beattie was thrown into the mire of an insular and longdefeated state Labor Party that remained, even well into the 1970s, an undemocratic, unrepresentative and unelectable organisation. He became

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involved in the party’s democratisation and rebuilding. He most famously joined forces with academic Denis Murphy and federal MP Manfred Cross (Brisbane) in imploring the federal party to intervene to reform the Queensland branch. In the interim, Beattie oversaw a ‘parallel’ Labor Party organisation, one where the fractured party ran two sets of financial accounts. His reformist push eventually succeeded in 1980, when his ‘reform’ cell convinced the federal body to replace the autocratic Queensland central committee with a more progressive and accountable state executive and administrative committee. Equally important, however, was the fact that during this process, Beattie gained substantial favourable public exposure: he quickly became the face of reform and of the reinvented Labor Party. These early acrimonious intra-party battles hardened the young Beattie and provided him with both the skills and the credentials for premiership. Specifically, Beattie’s role in the face of internecine party brawling had two consequences. First, Beattie was distrusted by those Old Guard factional power brokers he had challenged and sought to remove. His hardline stance against the powerful union chiefs of the Old Guard faction earned him a reputation as unreliable, something of a ‘loose cannon’.3 Second, many newcomers recruited by Beattie later received (and claimed) much of the credit for the party’s reforms.4 As a union secretary, Beattie developed a deft touch with the media and close links with journalists. He learned early the importance of tempered and moderate rhetoric, simple phrases and a plain and earthy style of delivery. In short, over time, Beattie perfected his own modern folksy style, and with it, reinvented Queensland populism in a way that would furnish him with an unparalleled political advantage. In the process, however, Beattie was accused of conducting a campaign of self-promotion in the media – at times he even contradicted official ALP policy. Indeed, Labor’s state executive in 1987 banned Beattie from making public statements without Administrative Committee clearance. As state secretary, Beattie oversaw the 1983 and 1986 state election campaigns, with a brief that included selecting candidates for winnable marginal seats.The 1983 campaign, under the leadership of Keith Wright, was relatively successful (although Labor lost), with the party winning 44 per cent (up from 41.5 per cent) of the vote state-wide and 32 (up from 25) of the 82 parliamentary seats. Some of the notable performers first

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elected in 1983 were Wayne Goss, Anne Warner, Keith DeLacy, David Hamill, Ken McElligott, Pat Comben and Denis Murphy (who died shortly after, in June 1984). Beattie saw the 1986 election as his own opportunity to enter parliament. Having failed at his only previous attempt – as a candidate for the safe Liberal federal seat of Ryan in 1980 – Beattie turned his attention to a winnable state seat. After finding little support in 1984 for a tilt at the safe Labor seat of Archerfield, in 1985 he contested party preselection for the bayside seat of Redlands. He lost against Con Sciacca in a combined plebiscite and electoral college vote, with all three main factions opposing him. This episode led Beattie to recall the Shakespearean line ‘There’s daggers in men’s smiles.’5 The 1986 campaign, under Nev Warburton’s lacklustre leadership – with the inauspicious slogan ‘Nev for Premier’ – saw Labor’s primary vote fall back to 41.35 per cent, and a net loss of two seats. Without close factional alignment, Beattie was marginalised in party machinations; a ‘Stop Beattie’ campaign emerged across the Australian Workers Union (AWU), the Old Guard and the Socialist Left. Beattie soon gravitated towards the ‘independents’ and centre-left MPs at both state and federal levels, but they were far from a potent force. He eventually won preselection in 1988 for Brisbane Central, with 71 per cent of the plebiscite vote.6 For two decades, Beattie – and others – fought an uphill battle to make the ALP electorally relevant. The reform team recruited an attractive and formidable leadership, broadened and modernised the party’s policy base, and encouraged the union-derived factions to enter a power-sharing arrangement that resulted in a consociational alliance.7 This torrid phase of Beattie’s political apprenticeship was often played out before the media, and he learned much better than his internal opponents did how to use the media to push his arguments and directly communicate with voters. Beattie soon found a measure of favour with the public, and the weight of public opinion became a lever he used often and effectively later.

Frozen out in the ‘wilderness’: life on the backbench Elected to parliament in 1989, Beattie looked to have a promising immediate future. But it was not to be; he was stigmatised and distrusted.These initial experiences became a formative influence on his style of politics.

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Beattie was not considered for the ministry, because Goss had given undertakings that his shadow ministry would be his first ministry. Instead, Beattie was given the high-profile job of chair of the parliamentary committee overseeing the Criminal Justice Commission (CJC). He took to this role with enthusiasm and energy, exercising his independence punctiliously, advising the commission, reviewing its work and advancing policy agendas. Yet his attempt at genuine non-partisanship was poorly received by his caucus colleagues and he quickly became ‘offside with the Goss Government’, who had in fact wanted him to act as a political control over the commission.8 Government members considered him too supportive of the commission’s head, former Liberal deputy premier of Tasmania Sir Max Bingham – particularly when he stood by the CJC’s investigation into travel rorts. These implicated politicians of both sides from the previous parliament, and took the scalp of Old Guard power broker Terry Mackenroth. Moreover, Beattie was venturing into controversial areas of policy where Goss was fearful to tread: he was advocating the decriminalisation of cannabis and the legalisation of prostitution through regulated brothels as a way to control organised crime. In raising community expectations and contradicting party policy, Beattie was only further alienating himself from a cautious government and a conservative premier. The combined effect of these activities saw Beattie frozen out, and he remained out of favour until the melt-down after the 1995 state election. When Labor was returned at the 1992 poll Beattie was again overlooked, despite others (of arguably less talent) being promoted.9 He was given no job save as an ordinary member of the Public Works Committee.The lack of support among his caucus colleagues was exacerbated by his reluctance to align with a faction (unlike other previously non-aligned MPs, who had quickly drifted to one or other of the major factional groups after the win). It was widely rumoured that Beattie was in his own faction of two: himself and fellow outsider Wendy Edmond. As an outsider, he became an astute observer of Goss’s personal style of leadership and the government’s administrative mode. Beattie formed the view that Goss was unnecessarily cautious and had wasted the opportunity for bold reform he’d had during his ‘honeymoon’ period. He would later blame Goss’s insular and process-dominated leadership style for the party’s loss of support after 1994 – the fact that the Goss Government allowed its relations with the public sector unions to degenerate into acrimony, he claimed, was a sign of the

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government’s inability to consult effectively and indicative of its inability to dampen down areas of potential conflict. In contrast, Beattie reaffirmed the need for an ‘inclusive populist’ style.10 Although generally accepting his isolation in silence, Beattie cut loose on several occasions, either to pursue agendas close to his heart and/or to draw attention to his own leadership ambitions. One occasion was a speech delivered in 1992, in the hinterland town of Eumundi, in which he criticised the government’s oligarchic style. Incensed by his second exclusion from Cabinet after the 1992 poll, Beattie took a shot at Goss: berating the Labor Party factional system, suggesting that the Labor government (run by the two Waynes – Wayne Goss and Wayne Swan) was led by opinion polls, that some of the leaders sought power as an end in itself, and that ordinary ALP members had little say in the party.11

He was also vexed that certain ‘opportunists within the party’ were assuming credit for rehabilitating Labor while dismissing the roles of Denis Murphy and himself in that rehabilitation. In the Eumundi speech he alleged that ‘a handful of opportunists within the party in recent times have sought to rewrite history for their own self-promotion and self-justification [and] to play down Denis’s role in building the party’, and although he did not mention names, few were in any doubt it was Swan he was referring to.12 Responses to such outbursts ranged from ignoring them to mild amusement; to the party power brokers, they merely confirmed that Beattie was unreliable and therefore dangerous. By this stage, however, Beattie was attracting increasing media attention. As the broadsheet press questioned the ability of a lethargic Goss ministry, Beattie’s name invariably emerged as a talented figure languishing on the backbench. Furthermore, Beattie attracted support from partisan intellectuals such as Ross Fitzgerald, who extolled Beattie’s virtues at every opportunity.Thus when the Goss Government survived the 1995 election by one seat, Beattie was a long-overdue choice for the ministry. With little love lost between Goss and Beattie, the premier awarded the newcomer the complex portfolio of health – a poisoned chalice. However, the new minister not only survived; he soon flourished. He trialled his consultative style while sensitively reorganising the department and wider hospital system.After spending his first ‘100 days … listening’, he announced his four-point plan in November 1995.13 He had acquitted himself well in

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the portfolio (better than his predecessors), and was by this stage regarded as a successful minister by colleagues and senior staff. His brief (six months) period as health minister did not, however, prevent the Borbidge Government from criticising him for allowing hospital waiting lists to rise.

Travails in opposition With the defeat of Labor by the conservative coalition in the Mundingburra re-election in February 1996, Goss resigned as Labor leader, and despite urgings from his colleagues, refused to be redrafted. His deputy,Tom Burns, also resigned, and indicated that he would soon retire. In their absence, the parliamentary party, now with 44 seats, faced a potentially destructive leadership contest. In addition to Beattie – whom some were reluctant to endorse given his scant ministerial experience – other contenders included Keith De Lacy, Terry Mackenroth, Jim Elder and David Hamill. Beattie countered his lack of experience with his high media profile, one that many saw as a powerful electoral asset.14 With no single candidate enjoying majority support, the factions negotiated a ‘dream ticket’ headed by Beattie (now supported by the Old Guard), with Jim Elder (AWU) as his deputy, and with Terry Mackenroth (Old Guard) given third billing. Given the by now dispirited nature of the party, the caucus elected (unopposed) the Beattie–Elder team. His long time in opposition allowed Beattie to traverse the policy spectrum and identify those issues on which he personally sought to make a mark – or that he could at least use as ‘wedge’ issues between Labor and the coalition. He worked closely with former senior officials of the Goss years and with key party policy groups.Volumes of new policy papers were generated, but importantly, Beattie personally distilled these into a few core policy commitments: he believed this was a way to attract maximum electoral support. It was clear that he did not approach policy the same way his predecessor had. While Goss often held fixed personal views that led him to overwrite the policy details of his ministers, Beattie quickly determined that it was more important to eschew detail and to promulgate instead the broad directions of policy. In so doing, he presided over a collective and consulted shadow Cabinet; he was, like Bob Hawke, more interested in consensus than in dictatorship. Equally importantly, though, he was not a vague or prevaricating leader. On the contrary, he was determined to communicate his policy positions to electors strongly and simply. In 1997, for example, he

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boldly announced that a 5 per cent unemployment target would be his principal aim as premier and that ‘jobs, jobs, jobs’ would be his mantra. He also announced that he would reshape the public service and re-establish a department of state development to promote economic growth. Although One Nation played a major spoiler role in the 1998 campaign, taking votes and seats from both sides, Labor managed to maintain a singularly clear message.The result saw Labor returned with the same number of seats, 44: it had won 6 from the coalition but lost 6 to One Nation. Once the result was clear (Labor had no majority), Beattie crafted an agreement with newly elected independent Peter Wellington that included a six-page letter outlining his government’s intentions and meeting some of Wellington’s demands, including a promise to consider the issue of citizen-initiated referenda. Wellington accepted the agreement, which allowed Beattie to form a minority government on 29 June 1998.15

An engaging personal style of communication – manufacturing sincerity Part of the explanation for Beattie’s success in politics is his genuine and engaging interest in people. More specifically, he is interested in people being interested in him.This might partly be ego, but it is not an ego driven by arrogance or a sense of superiority. Quite the reverse. Beattie demonstrates genuine humility. He clearly enjoys meeting people and exchanging both pleasantries and ideas. He is especially effective engaging with crowds, where his style of address is sincere and disarming, even endearing, and his laugh is infectious.This is not an act put on around election times – it is an easy-going rapport that comes naturally and effortlessly. Moreover, those who meet him generally feel buoyed by the experience, believing he is relating to them as individuals and not merely imparting some prerehearsed patter. One staffer travelling with Beattie noted, for example, that the premier, despite meeting thousands of people across the state, never used the same introductory lines twice; he simply spoke directly to those he met with whatever came to mind.This ability to put people from different walks of life at ease (voters, lobbyists, bureaucrats, business figures, even schoolchildren) – a gift few have – evokes comparisons with world leaders such as Bill Clinton, Pierre Trudeau or Nelson Mandela. Political colleagues and senior officials at regional community Cabinet meetings and consultation councils recall many local citizens attending

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simply to meet the premier and shake his hand. To sceptical bureaucrats, investing a day each month to meet and greet locals was a waste of valuable time; to Beattie, it was the entire rationale of community engagement and the core function of responsible and representative government. Indeed, one senior adviser to Goss and subsequent Beattie minister remembered that: Wayne Goss used to go to shopping centres at election times to open or announce something or unveil a plaque, and arrive just before it was due to commence and leave as soon as the ceremony concluded. If it was suggested to him to stay and walk around and meet a few people, he responded that he had lots to do back at the Executive Building. Beattie, on the other hand, goes walkabout meeting everyone in the centre if he can, talking to people about what they are thinking, what concerns them … You have to push him towards the car most times. He’s a natural.16

Beattie again used his ‘listening’ technique on the eve of the lead-up to the 2001 state election campaign. He toured Queensland, probing electors about whether or not his government should go to the polls early in the wake of the Shepherdson Inquiry into vote-rorting in the state ALP.17 At

Peter Beattie and wife Heather, at the start of the 2004 election campaign (Sydney Morning Herald, 17–18 January 2004; photograph by Andy Zakeli).

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the time, his government was plagued by a major scandal, with allegations of electoral malpractice over preselection battles involving around 30 ALP members.The deputy premier, Jim Elder, had been forced to resign, as had former state ALP secretary Mike Kaiser.With evidence of factional rorting tainting his government and his parliamentary majority disappearing, Beattie announced to the expectant media that voters wanted to clear the air with an early election. Beattie duly called the election in mid-January, catching his opponents off-guard. The ‘listening’ strategy had allowed him to buy time, set a new agenda, clean up the party and deflect attention from the scandal – and most importantly, it had allowed him to communicate directly with the electorate and gauge their mood without an opposition counter-campaign. It was a brilliant tactic. In his victory speech at the Brisbane tally room in 2001 Beattie was characteristically earnest, modest, and inclusive. Instead of gloating over the win, he told Queensland: Yes, tonight has been a magnificent win for my government, but we will not change.We are humble people. I’m still the boy from Atherton, a country boy from Atherton, and that will not change. We will keep our feet very firmly and squarely on the ground … There are many people who voted Labor today for the first time in their lives.We have to win their support for the long term, not just for one election, and I am determined that we will do just that … thank you, Queensland. I love you. You’ve been magnificent to me, we’re going to be magnificent to you.18

He obviously considered this speech pretty good, because he gave virtually the identical speech to the tally room in 2004, after his second crushing victory. Indeed, because his personal style is to engage the electorate in a ‘permanent campaign’, his tally room speeches might be considered not the last of the old campaign, but the first of the next. Despite the shoddy treatment previously meted out to him by the ALP factions, Beattie does not appear to bear grudges or display personal bitterness. He resents harking back to past events, and if questioned on the past, will instead reply that the party has ‘moved on’ and that ‘we’ve learned from our experiences and do things differently now’. His lack of desire for vendetta has borne fruit: several factional bosses who once kept him down have emerged as close colleagues and senior ministers in his governments. Terry Mackenroth and Jim Elder are prime examples, as was Bob Gibbs,

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who later departed Cabinet and was found a lucrative sinecure as trade commissioner to Los Angeles. Interestingly, Beattie has adopted the same approach with his former adversary Joh Bjelke-Petersen, and despite the ire of many ALP members, he has articulated publicly a degree of admiration for the former premier and acknowledged Bjelke-Petersen’s record in state development. Some journalists have speculated that Beattie’s conciliatory attitude towards ‘Old Joh’ was a conscious tactic to lure rural voters to the Beattie juggernaut. Photos of Beattie gently pushing a frail Sir Joh in a wheelchair do seem calculated to impress.19 Yet Beattie’s intentions may also be an indication of his genuine desire to close a divisive and bitter chapter in Queensland’s political history.

Smar t operator but no policy entrepreneur Beattie is not essentially a policy entrepreneur. He is not a Mark Latham, and has not attached his popularity or political instincts to the marketplace of policy ideas. Instead, policy to Beattie is more a technical set of questions and issues, the details of which usually fall to professionals once the main message has been conveyed to the electorate. It is rare, for example, for him to attach his credibility to a specific policy or outcome. Instead, he is more comfortable focusing on the essence of policy with such memorable and media-friendly catchphrases as the ‘Smart State’, or the ‘engine room of growth’, buzzwords designed to describe the government’s overall strategy to develop biotechnology, information technology, education and other innovation-based industries. He often underscores such phrases with populist rhetoric, including ‘jobs, jobs, jobs’ and ‘we’ll fix it’, jargon startlingly similar to Bjelke-Petersen’s ‘don’t you worry about that’. When Beattie has backed policy initiatives it has generally been to promote an idea originating from within government. His passionate advocacy of an extra year of early schooling, for example, has been central to his education pitch for over two years.While he has embraced the policy with enthusiasm, he has also been quick to acknowledge that the idea came from two senior ministers, Anna Bligh (Education) and Matt Foley (formerly Employment and Training). His own department does not now play the same policy incubator role it had under Goss; rather it oversees crossportfolio matters, and its task is essentially to keep the premier informed. With responsibilities for policy, governance, trade and international matters, his staff are able to probe areas of policy sensitivity – and he has adopted a

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centralised clearance procedure for the issuing of press releases by other ministries (see below). He has been fortunate to have two departmental heads, Glyn Davis and Leo Keliher, who have differing styles but have run a professional policy process and have often been far more entrepreneurial in policy matters than their boss.20 Though he doesn’t focus on policy details, Beattie diligently prepares strategies to defend and sell his government’s intentions. In terms of his target of 5 per cent unemployment by 2003, for example, the premier was relatively unconcerned about how the figure was to be attained, despite unemployment hovering around 9 per cent. Beattie continually pressed his ‘jobs, jobs, jobs’ mantra, with the expectation, indeed requirement, that all departments consider employment outcomes in every Cabinet submission. Departments are left in little doubt as to his broader policy objectives, and at various times departmental heads have been upbraided by him when perceived to be under-performing.21 At other times, Beattie’s lack of concern with policy detail has had amusing results.When, for example, the state’s seven priorities were announced in 1999, the premier could not always remember them all – to solve this problem, he instructed that they be reduced to five, so that they could be counted off on the fingers of one hand. He was also, of course, implicitly suggesting that seven priorities might be too many for his departments and the community to digest. Another Beattie response is to be reactive – he allows others to set agendas, and gives the policy a public endorsement only if it turns out to be acceptable. In the families portfolio, for example, Beattie pursued the recommendations of the Forde Inquiry, then called for a further report by the Crime and Misconduct Commission (CMC) into foster care arrangements. Ostensibly Beattie called the 2004 election on the issue of family and foster care, and he publicly committed his government to spending an additional $120 million in the area and implementing all 110 recommendations of the CMC.22 Similarly, in relation to domestic violence and alcohol abuse in Aboriginal communities, Beattie called for an external report from former crime investigator Tony Fitzgerald. Fitzgerald’s report thereafter became the basis of Beattie’s policy approach for improving the management of indigenous communities. Conversely, Beattie has played an active role as a policy broker and has often arranged a compromise when intended proposals have struck snags. Instances of this include his shuttle diplomacy over the 2002 amendments

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to anti-discrimination legislation (opposed, for different reasons, by the gay lobby and the churches), the financial arrangements over the ambulance levy, and salary negotiations between the government and key public sector unions (teachers, police, nurses). At other times, Beattie has been frustrated in his attempts at compromise by other levels of government or powerful interest lobbies. In his attempts to reduce tree-clearing and introduce sugar industry reform, for example, Beattie was anxious to provide relief to those affected, piggybacking on federal funding, but a satisfactory consensus eluded him, principally because of intergovernmental intransigence. Interestingly, both these issues were prominent in the 2004 election, with Beattie’s inability to reach compromise contributing to the erosion of Labor’s vote in such seats as Burnett, Burdekin and Charters Towers.

Decision-making: balance and inclusivity Although not a policy innovator, Beattie has nevertheless run a disciplined government with clear objectives and rigorous internal processes. Executive decision-making procedures are largely transparent to internal actors – despite media perception that the government is secretive, and hostile to freedom of information.23 In Cabinet, Beattie is a consensual chair who weighs all opinions offered, no matter what quarter they come from. He is astute enough to lean on the political acumen of his experienced ministers – Terry Mackenroth, Anna Bligh, Jim Elder, Steve Bredhauer, Paul Lucas, Paul Braddy, Matt Foley, Robert Schwarten and Steve Robertson (some of these have now departed politics). Ministers have commented that Beattie has demonstrated less dogmatic views and fewer preconceived ideas on policy matters than Goss. In short, Beattie invites open debate at the Cabinet table; this approach is often appropriate when there is a strong commitment to ‘do something’, but it is less effective when there are differences of opinion over what to do. Ineffective or quiet ministers in his second term were accused of being ‘dead wood’ or of coasting – providing the opportunity for some in the media to complain that Beattie did little in his second term. Beattie has gone to great lengths to maintain a balanced Cabinet. It is factionally balanced, for example, even though factional loyalties play no real role inside the Cabinet room. The premier has, however, appointed selected individuals on the basis of factional alignment when vacancies have occurred. He has placed more women onto the frontbench than any previous government, with five women (out of 19) having served in both his

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second and third ministries. He has also attempted to include regional representation in Cabinet. When constructing his third ministry, Beattie issued instructions to the factions to select candidates for the five vacancies from those regions where Labor had not polled well, including the Gold and Sunshine Coasts, and north Queensland.24 During his first term Beattie conceived the term ‘TeamBeattie’, initially as a website featuring the premier and providing information about Labor’s achievements in government. In an effort to make the term appear inclusive, Beattie has used the term repeatedly even though it seems to render Cabinet and caucus largely invisible. TeamBeattie can mean something as vague as the entire caucus, or the ministry, or even his personal office.The term has focused attention on his imprimatur – almost implying that the Queensland Labor Government and Peter Beattie are interchangeable entities. Again, this is startlingly similar to Bjelke-Petersen’s approach. Yet this does not mean that Beattie is dictatorial or deaf to advice or grievances; indeed, the contrary is true. Beattie has, for example, continued Goss’s tradition of regular briefings to the backbench, with many longserving MPs commenting that they now feel better informed. Before taking decisions, Beattie relies heavily on a key group of insiders and advisers. His media presentations are vetted by his principal media minder, Steve Bishop, who has managed, against all odds, to discipline Beattie’s loquaciousness and cultivate a degree of focus in his media performances. During Beattie’s opposition years and early months as premier, he would deliver long interviews that meandered across a range of topics, often making statements and commitments he later regretted.While still extraordinarily accessible to the media, he has curtailed his penchant for ‘off-the-cuff ’ remarks and now seems to prefer orchestrated events or designated photo opportunities (the morning walk, getting into his car, greeting shoppers).These events underscore his ordinariness, while at the same time offering little chance for rigorous interrogation or verbal gaffes. Occasionally he still stumbles, as with an overheard quip during the 2004 election campaign that a radio announcer would require a lobotomy to impersonate the opposition leader.25

Crisis manager : distract, retreat, apologise Since 1998 Beattie has weathered a number of political crises that would have proved catastrophic for a less adroit politician. The most severe crisis he faced was undoubtedly the allegations of electoral corruption and the

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subsequent Shepherdson Inquiry (in late 2000) into vote rorting in the Queensland ALP. Sparked by allegations of rorting in Townsville, and later confirmed by the jailing for three years of Labor’s one-time candidate for Mundingburra, Karen Ehrmann, the allegations threatened to be a re-run of the Fitzgerald Inquiry that so effectively crippled the National Party in the late 1980s.26 Amazingly, Labor won in a landslide at the 2001 state election, showing that despite media saturation, the fallout from the Shepherdson Inquiry was minimal, even non-existent. Beattie, in his role as the government’s principal crisis manager, deserves most of the credit for his party’s successful resistance to an electoral backlash. How did Beattie defuse this potentially lethal political storm, and was it part of a pattern of dealing with crises? The premier’s preferred mode of leadership in political crises is to act as a ‘firefighter’ – a leader who rises to the challenge and responds to crises as they arise.27 Particularly in the six years he has been premier, Beattie has developed and honed a compendium of firefighting strategies that are effective in extinguishing political spot-fires. The electoral rorting scandal illustrates one of Beattie’s favourite crisis management strategies – the resort to an inquiry. As the first allegations surfaced, Beattie wasted no time in calling for a public inquiry and ‘did not attempt to interfere with the course of its investigations … [h]e claimed the inquiry [would be] painful but would have longer-term beneficial effects’.28 Beattie’s hitherto undisclosed role in persuading three sitting members to resign (Jim Elder, the then deputy premier, and two backbenchers, Mike Kaiser and Grant Musgrove) also undoubtedly headed off criticism. By moving quickly to establish an inquiry, and insisting that rorters would not be tolerated in ‘his’ party, Beattie led the firefight from the front, moving the issue on, and reinforcing public confidence in his integrity. In so doing, he minimised the opportunity for both media and opposition to smear him or the wider party in the crucial lead-up to the election.This, more than any other example, illustrates Beattie’s efficacy as a crisis manager: he turned the situation around by demonstrating his own personal integrity and ‘moral capital’.29 There are other examples of Beattie’s predisposition to use the inquiry tool while he attempts to redraw the political landscape. A damaging case that destabilised the government in its first term (in mid-1999) was the socalled ‘Net Bet’ affair. With government hanging by a thread, Beattie was embarrassed when it was revealed that his Treasurer, David Hamill, had

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awarded an internet gaming licence to the Gocorp group, a company which counted among its investors three senior ALP figures, including two sitting members (one being deputy speaker Bill D’Arcy, about whom allegations of paedophilia had already been made). Each investor stood to make significant financial gain. The government’s initial response was to ‘deflect criticism’ by insisting that Hamill had ‘followed due process’, but later Beattie forced Hamill to stand aside while an inquiry investigated the issue.30 While Hamill was found innocent of any wrongdoing, his reputation for astute political judgement was damaged. Beattie’s reputation, however, remained intact, a development assisted by his introduction of retrospective legislation to prevent politicians and their families profiting from the internet gaming industry.31 Other examples of Beattie’s swift and decisive action in calling public inquiries include two commissions into allegations of the abuse of children in care: the 1999 Forde Inquiry, and the 2003 CMC inquiry into the Families Department. In each case, the inquiry allowed Beattie to buy time and parade his own political integrity. Lesser political crises have drawn a different response, namely the policy ‘backflip’ – this strategy is used by other political leaders as well, of course, but it seems to have been adopted by Beattie with unparalleled relish.This response, though often painted by the media as a failure of leadership, appears extremely popular among voters. Indeed, rather than being seen as weak leadership, voters regard the backflip as evidence that their premier remains flexible and genuinely amenable to negotiation; in short, it indicates a politician willing to listen and accede to demands when a serious backlash threatens. Beattie has used the backflip on a number of policy issues: in mid-2000 after a plan to remove the state’s petrol subsidy (scrapped following outrage by motoring groups); most spectacularly, in late 2002–03 when he did a U-turn over plans to fund the state’s ambulance service via a levy placed on local government rates notices (scrapped after opposition from councils); and in 2003 over a dubious ALP fundraising scheme that offered exclusive access to ministers for a $5500 ‘sponsorship’ fee (scrapped after criticism from the media and the opposition).32 In each of these cases, Beattie’s sensitivity to public opinion forced him to reconsider his position. This aspect of his leadership – being attuned to expediency and populism – is not at all like Goss’s leadership. Yet the backflip strategy has not been limited to major crises; it has also been employed to extinguish smaller spot-fires that had the potential for greater conflagration.

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Examples include: overturning a proposal to install second-hand public service computers in schools;33 relaxing fishing quotas;34 abandoning plans to force church schools to hire homosexual teachers;35 and deciding to meet with a sex abuse victim.36 A third response, and one he has made his hallmark, is the mea culpa: the personal and sincere apology, usually delivered at a press conference. Beattie frequently and willingly concedes when his or any other government errs; a firm and humble pledge to undo the mistake follows, often in conjunction with another strategy, such as the setting up of an inquiry. His strategy is to admit to policy failure before he is cornered either by the media or the opposition, so that he appears pro-active and solution-seeking rather than reactive. To him, apologies are not signs of weakness, self-doubt or a blight on one’s political record (compare this with John Howard’s refusal to say ‘sorry’ to Aboriginal people), but an indication of inner strength, and of a determination to cut to the core of an issue. Notable instances include apologies for serious failures, such as presiding over the administration of child abuse in foster care, as well as for relatively trivial ones, such as his description of his deputy,Terry Mackenroth, as a strong ‘son of a bitch’.37 More recently, despite coalition advertisements portraying him as too apologetic, Beattie was forced to apologise for his poor-taste ‘lobotomy gaffe’ at the opposition leader’s expense.38 Indeed, Beattie’s apologising has become so prolific that the Nationals engaged in some negative advertising during the 2004 election campaign, targeting his ‘Re-Pete’ apologies.The advertisements appeared to have little impact, but certainly some have accused him of faking sincerity when apologising or denying knowledge of previous errors – perhaps contributing to some community scepticism over his apologising antics. Beattie has a predilection for buck-passing – passing blame to other actors, be they political opponents, other states, Canberra, or the media – but he does this less than most other heads of government. A prime example of this response can be found in Beattie’s accusation of media bias when the media suggested that his government favoured consultants who enjoyed links with the Labor Party. Beattie fiercely defended his personal and political integrity, slamming the accusation as partisan. His actions in this instance placed him somewhere between Bjelke-Petersen and Jeff Kennett. A more populist example is when he periodically laments skyrocketing petrol prices (at Easter, or long weekends), pinning the blame on other states or the Commonwealth. Other examples in this state-chau-

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vinist vein include haranguing federal ministers over industrial relations policy, criticising inadequate compensation packages to farmers for treeclearing and sugar industry reforms and, most commonly, complaining of inadequate health funding.39

Preparing the media ‘spin’ Beattie takes the notion of perpetual campaigning seriously. He has finetuned a backroom set of procedures to keep him abreast of any media issue – significant or trivial. He relies heavily on his senior ministers and media specialist advisers in terms of how to play issues, what image to project, what line to take. Sometimes this media planning is imperceptible, but it is effective nonetheless. For instance, in the 2004 election campaign, when many expected him to be a dominant presidential figurehead of the government, he elected, after consulting with his advisers, to play down his presidential style, be ordinary, and not to campaign too hard.40 Over time he has learned to place faith in the regular briefings he has with his chosen media advisers. Generally, Beattie begins his day at 6 am with a meeting with his chief of staff (and long-term friend) Rob Whiddon, and his principal media advisers, including Steve Bishop and Fiona Kennedy.41 At least two of his most senior ministers will also attend, most usually his deputy, Terry Mackenroth, affectionately referred to as the ‘the Fox’ for his sharp political acumen, and the leader of the government business in parliament, Anna Bligh, the person most often tipped as Beattie’s successor as Labor leader. It is at these meetings that the most elaborate media micro-management occurs, with particular reference to the ‘schedules of accident-prone ministers’ in order to anticipate developments likely to cause ‘bad publicity’.42 It is clear that Beattie runs a ‘tight ship’ in preparing his daily media management, dealing with the immediate politics or giving whatever spin is necessary to the policy of the moment.43 Press releases have to be authorised by Beattie’s office, and ministerial background briefings with journalists must also be vetted by his office’s media managers.44 The vetting is not simply about authorisation; it is also about the substance and timing of leaks. Leaks are designed to ‘test the waters’ with policy ‘kite-flying’ or to release bad news early and strategically. Authorisation for leaks must, without exception, come from the 15th floor of the executive building – Beattie’s office.45 The government’s testing of the contentious ambulance levy was a prime example. Beattie has also

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leaked internal Labor Party polling (in 2001 and 2004) and other party briefings supposedly canvassing election dates and campaign tactics. But of course even these tight controls cannot prevent public relations mishaps or ministerial blunders.When these occur, ministers have been known to ‘go to ground’, leaving it to the media-adroit premier to speak on their behalf. Two notable examples are dissension over salinity problems in regional Queensland and an industrial dispute between the Health Department and the state’s nurses. In each case, the minister – Stephen Robertson and Wendy Edmond respectively – maintained an exceptionally low profile.46 In more extreme cases, media advisers have been ‘reassigned’, as in the case of the media adviser for former families minister Judy Spence during the ‘children in care’ crisis.47 Spence had earlier ‘gone quiet’ after sensationalised claims about the cost of the refurbishment of her ministerial suite, including an expensive toilet brush! Ministers, then, remain on a tight rein in terms of communication with journalists. More critically, public servants are strongly discouraged from speaking publicly.48 The obvious rationale for this centralised and controlled approach is to ensure that the Queensland Government speaks with one voice.Yet such pragmatism attracts the criticism that Beattie does not trust his own Cabinet to make consistent policy pronouncements or to mount coherent defences to opposition or media attacks. Beattie’s media machine has also attempted to rehearse a preferred collective ministerial line, as a crude form of spin doctoring. For instance, as part of their orchestration of the selling of the 2003–04 state Budget, media managers advised ministers to ‘laugh off ’ any suggestion of fiduciary trouble or looming deficits – this

Spoof campaign ad, courtesy of The Bug, January 2004, p. 5.

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was an area where the government was vulnerable, according to the premier’s office. Once exposed, the government appeared sheepish over its tactics.49 Beattie defends this approach, insisting that it is entirely consistent with the Westminster tradition in terms of both Cabinet solidarity and a silent, non-partisan bureaucracy.50 Others have argued that such tight control over ministerial utterances is contrary to Westminster practice and that as a result of ‘interference’ from the premier’s office, the traditional line management of public service departments has been disrupted. Some journalists have commented that the TeamBeattie ministers are rapidly becoming ‘increasingly invisible’ and ‘swamped by the weight of the Beattie persona and the Beattie PR machine’.51

Election campaigner – one step ahead Over recent decades, as the impact of long-term political cleavages such as class and religion have declined, the importance of short-term influences on the vote has increased. The personality of the leader, more than party image, has emerged as a potent political attractor. Leadership has become the main poll issue in recent Queensland elections, even if this has not generally been articulated in an overt manner. Beattie’s natural and relaxed ‘presidential’ style plays to this dynamic and has paid dividends. It has also meant that during election campaigns Beattie has become the campaign – the main protagonist, the main issue and the focal point of attention. Labor’s strategists have designed campaigns around Beattie as the consensual ‘bridge builder’ – an ordinary man from regional Queensland who understands the different aspirations held by all sections of the community. Beattie is presented as the ‘inclusive premier’, who spans the ‘great divides’ of the state’s economic, geographic, social and cultural schisms. His emphasis on inclusion appears to have allowed Beattie to bridge that greatest of all divides – traditional party loyalty. There is evidence, for example, that many long-time Liberal voters in Brisbane supported Labor for the first time in 2001 (the so-called ‘Beattie Liberals’), as did many dyed-in-thewool Nationals in hinterland seats. Moreover, the ALP’s repeat landslide victory in 2004 suggests that many conservatives who voted for Beattie in 2001 were prepared to continue their support. His ability to secure what were once traditionally safe conservative seats may be attributed to his charismatic appeal, reinforced by his skill in campaigning.

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The first election campaign 1998 – scraping across the line with promises of stability Beattie entered the June 1998 election campaign with foes on at least two fronts. Challenging a troubled first-term coalition government, Beattie, as opposition leader, also had to contend with a rising, but unknown, quantity in the form of Pauline Hanson’s new One Nation Party.The historical odds were stacked against the ALP; since 1915, only one other government had been defeated after just one term. Thus for the first and only time, Beattie could lay genuine claim to the ‘underdog’ tag. Beattie’s response was to position his party as a policy innovator, a party that offered development, growth and future direction. The centrepiece of his campaign was, as mentioned earlier, a promise to bring the state’s unemployment rate down to 5 per cent – a contentious commitment, but one which cut through the verbiage of electoral banter. Although some dismissed this target as naïve and unrealistic, the commitment nonetheless gave Labor’s campaign a distinctive focus, something that the National-led government, warring with the fledgling One Nation movement, was not able to achieve. Beattie’s ‘jobs, jobs, jobs’ mantra, repeated ad nauseam, provided him with a popular and tangible platform from which he could simultaneously attack the Borbidge Government and build himself a profile as a likeable and an accessible leader working hard for ordinary Queenslanders. Of the three campaigns Beattie has so far fought as leader, the 1998 campaign was the least leader-centric. Yet even in that campaign Beattie assumed an undeniably high profile and attempted to paint himself, and the ALP, as the only real choice for strong and stable government. Beattie’s campaign strategy was largely, though not entirely, successful. Labor won 44 seats (the same as it held prior to the election), but its primary vote dropped to 38.86 per cent. Labor was by far the largest party in the Legislative Assembly – the Nationals dropped from 29 to 23 and the Liberals from 14 to 9. In addition, One Nation, with 22.7 per cent of the vote, captured 11 seats, all of them won by anti-politician novices. Beattie’s tactic of running hard against One Nation as a racist and reactionary party appeared to have been successful in converting city Liberals to Labor’s cause. In contrast to Beattie’s strong and principled position of placing One Nation last on all ALP how-to-vote cards, the coalition parties prevaricated, and the Liberals’ decision to follow the Nationals in placing One Nation ahead of Labor cost them seats. It also meant that much of the campaign was fought on the issue

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of preferences to One Nation, which was a major distraction to the coalition. In the midst of increasing volatility in the conservative ranks, Beattie offered voters the only prospect of stability, with a unified party in government.52 Once ensconced (after gaining Wellington’s support), Beattie was able to entrench himself in George Street. Beattie and Labor state secretary Mike Kaiser experimented with a ‘just vote 1’ strategy in the late 1998 byelection for Mulgrave – Labor won it, giving the government a majority of 1 seat in parliament.53

The listening larrikin with luck – the landslide of 2001 After having survived two and a half years of his first term, Beattie faced his greatest challenge in the lead-up to the 2001 poll. The Shepherdson Inquiry of late 2000 into allegations of vote rorting in the ALP rocked his government: three sitting members resigned from the party and indicated that they would also resign from their seats. Beattie did not dare recall parliament. Dozens more AWU factional members were also expelled from the party’s organisation. How Beattie defused a potentially explosive crisis in the lead-up to the February 2001 election remains one of the most fascinating studies in leadership in modern Australian political history. Beattie’s 2001 campaign for re-election began unofficially in early January. With fallout from the Shepherdson Inquiry still reverberating, Beattie refused to be pegged as a passive defender of the indefensible, and instead took the initiative and embarked on a three-week ‘listening tour’ of the state, during which he met with many ‘ordinary’ Queenslanders. This ‘listening tour’ was a masterstroke of campaign tactics: Beattie had effectively gazumped the non-Labor parties with a significant head start in campaigning. It also allowed him to engage in any number of media ‘stunts’ – such as swimming with sharks – in order to both promote Beattie the man as an affable, even larrikin, politician, and distract attention from the seedier revelations coming from Shepherdson.54 When the issue of vote rorting did surface during the campaign, Beattie refused to ‘duck and weave’, as people might have expected older-style premiers to do; instead he pledged his absolute commitment to cleaning out the rorters from his beloved party, including a promise to introduce legislation to ensure that voting procedures inside all parties would become transparent. Fortuitously, there were also allegations of Liberal branch-stacking in Brisbane federal

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seats. So in imploring voters to trust him to fix the mess of party corruption, the premier effectively transformed a negative into a positive. Indeed, the success of this strategy led him to be described as ‘Mr Fixit’. Beattie’s campaign in 2001 was personal and presidential. He appealed directly to the electorate over the head of the party, apologising for the party’s disarray. More than ever, the government became TeamBeattie, with ministers and other officials relegated to oblivion.55 He relentlessly urged voters to ‘just vote 1’ for Beattie, implicitly highlighting the divisions among the conservatives (he was being challenged by four separate conservative parties in 2001). Under pressure from a revitalised premier, the Nationals’ campaign collapsed in disarray over the issue of One Nation preferences, and by mid-campaign Borbidge had threatened to quit as opposition leader. Benefiting from the collapse of the coalition’s campaign, Beattie swept to a landslide victory, with 66 seats of the 89 member Legislative Assembly (74 per cent – a considerably inflated majority given that Labor won only 48.9 per cent of the vote). Labor’s primary vote increased by 10 per cent, with the party claiming a huge gain of 21 new seats, some of which, such as Burdekin or Burnett, were in decidedly non-Labor territory. Beattie’s high profile and constant presence in the campaign was an effective means to communicate his message not only to Labor voters, but also to former coalition supporters.

Re-Pete performance – holding the heartland in 2004 Labor’s campaign for re-election in 2004 had many parallels to that of 2001, but also some important differences. As he had done in the previous election, Beattie returned to work early after the Christmas break, called the election in mid-January and – somewhat incredibly – again managed to catch his opponents off-guard. He began the campaign with a plea to voters to provide his government with another mandate, this time to allow the premier to ‘fix’ the problem of the abuse of children in foster care. As he had done so convincingly with Shepherdson, Beattie again appealed to the electorate’s sense of morality and justice. Again he advised voters to ‘just vote 1’ – a tactic both the Liberals and Nationals this time copied.The result was a first-past-the-post election, with the Right still divided between the coalition parties, One Nation and conservative independents. Despite this similarity to 2001, Beattie’s approach to this campaign broke all the rules of modern party campaigning in other ways. Instead of a

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razzamatazz presidential campaign focused on him personally, he chose an understated performance, downplaying his political persona and engaging the electorate only perfunctorily. He did not perform at media stunts or staged events of showmanship. Beattie sensed that the voters could easily be antagonised with a campaign that was stage-managed and over the top.The worry was that voters might punish anyone talking ‘serious policy’ or ‘hardnosed politics’, so Beattie campaigned as if he were enjoying a holiday with his ever-present wife, Heather. He avoided ‘talking politics’, turned off the hype and released only a few policy statements – ones that were designed to neutralise the opposition’s announcements. Most of all, facing a new opposition leader, Lawrence Springborg, who was relatively positive and likeable, Beattie tried to avoid any hint of adversarial conflict or hostility towards his opponent. Even the leaders’ ‘great debate’ in the campaign became farcical: both candidates were ‘too nice’ to one another, it was felt. In short, Beattie went about the three weeks as if he were the sole candidate in a one-party state running a ‘non-campaign’ based on structured underachievement.56 Predictably, public interest in the campaign never lifted above rock bottom – this was, of course, an advantage to the incumbents. The result of Beattie’s understated campaign was a near repeat of the 2001 landslide. Labor achieved almost the same vote (47.01 per cent – down just 1.9 per cent) and held 63 of its 66 seats (losing 4 but winning 1). The conservatives had hoped for a ‘natural correction’, but gained only 5 seats, and the immediate recriminations that flowed from the humiliating loss saw them again dissolve the coalition. Labor now appeared to be the natural party of government, and Beattie the state’s natural leader.

Conclusions At the time of writing, Beattie is Australia’s second longest-serving current state or territory leader, behind New South Wales’s Bob Carr. He has served as premier for over six years – and has now overtaken Wayne Goss’s tenure and become the second-longest serving Labor premier of Queensland (behind Forgan Smith’s 10 years). He is well shy of Bjelke-Petersen’s record – over 19 years – but it can be argued that he matches him in the degree of dominance he wields over the state’s politics. And in Beattie’s case, this has been achieved under much fairer electoral laws. His leadership and charismatic aura have been of monumental importance in changing the electoral contours of the state and in repositioning Labor as the natural

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party of government there. His crushing electoral victories have given him supreme authority over his party (at least for the moment), and significant political latitude in decision-making. He has also articulated a more cosmopolitan, educated and progressive vision for Queensland, while attempting to bridge the many social, political and economic divides within the state. This is a major achievement, especially in a state often regarded as deeply conservative, and dominated for the previous three decades by an agrarian, corruptible, authoritarian regime. If Bjelke-Petersen remade conservative politics in the deep north of the 1970s and 1980s, Beattie is in the process of remaking Labor politics in today’s Queensland.

Notes 1 In 1996–97 critics were quick to write off Beattie’s chances of immediate electoral success, as it was argued that no one could win from one term in opposition. Only one other opposition leader, Labor’s Forgan Smith (1932–42), had previously defeated a government that served just one term (the Country party’s Arthur Moore, 1929–32) – and that was at the time of the Great Depression. 2 F. Robson,‘Out for a spin with Premier Pete’, Sydney Morning Herald, Good Weekend magazine, 8 May 2004, p. 33. 3 See N. Preston,‘Peter Douglas Beattie: the inclusive populist’, in D. Murphy, R. Joyce, M. Cribb & R. Wear, The Premiers of Queensland, University of Queensland Press (UQP), Brisbane, 2003, p. 401. 4 Only much later did Beattie receive appropriate kudos for his leading role in the ‘reform’ push. He told his version of events in his early memoirs In the Arena (Boolarong Press, Brisbane, 1990). But success has many midwives, and other actors were quick to come forward and claim credit. In the early 1990s Beattie threatened to sue his former colleague (and successor as state secretary) Wayne Swan after the latter claimed credit for restoring Labor’s electoral credibility in a chapter in the book Political Crossroads:The 1989 Queensland Election (C. Hughes & R.Whip (eds), UQP, Brisbane, 1991). See also P. Charlton,‘Wayne Swan: a man in a hurry’, Courier-Mail, 24 November 1993. 5 Beattie, In the Arena, p. 88. 6 Beattie, In the Arena, p. 129. 7 See J.Wanna,‘Queensland: consociational factionalism or ignoble cabal?’, in J.Warhurst & A. Parkin (eds), The Machine: Labor Confronts the Future, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2000, pp. 130–51. 8 See Preston,‘Peter Douglas Beattie’, p. 403. 9 By the end of Goss’s second term, Matt Foley,Tony McGrady, Ken Hayward, Jim Elder, Molly Robson and Warren Pitt had all been elevated, while Beattie was spurned. 10 Preston,‘Peter Douglas Beattie’. 11 J.Wanna,‘Queensland – political chronicle’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 39, no. 2, 1993, p. 250. 12 P. Beattie, ‘A reformist party in government: the courage needed for reform’, Denis Murphy Memorial Lecture, 14 November 1992, Eumundi, p. 6. 13 Queensland Health, Outlook: Planning the Future for Queensland Health, 13 November 1995, p. 1.

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14 Preston,‘Peter Douglas Beattie’, p. 404. 15 Although Peter Wellington and another independent, Liz Cunningham, had negotiated as a pair, Cunningham felt miffed that Wellington had single-handedly sided with Beattie. She nevertheless reversed her previous support for the coalition (1996–98) and announced that she would support Labor on confidence and supply motions because it was the only side able to form government. 16 Senior ministerial staffer who served both under Goss and Beattie, interview November 2003. 17 The Shepherdson Inquiry:An Investigation into Electoral Fraud, Criminal Justice Commission, Brisbane,April 2001. 18 P. Beattie,‘Peter Beattie’s tally room speech’, TeamBeattie,Australian Labor Party, Brisbane, 17 February 2001, p. 1. 19 See Robson,‘Out for a spin with Premier Pete’. Significantly, while Beattie has apparently buried the hatchet with political foes, he can paradoxically become tired of journalists (the group through whom he has arguably made his career). Robson noted that, ‘Beattie seems to despise the media process almost as much as he needs it.’The premier commented wryly to him:‘Now I have to go back and have a cranky news conference … They’ll be shitty … They are so intellectually sound and are people of such great depth, you’ll hear their stinging questions and you’ll be in awe, Frank.You’ll walk out thinking,“What’s happened to my profession?”.’ Robson,‘Out for a spin with Premier Pete’, p. 35. 20 For instance, in line with the government’s consultative style, the Department of Premier and Cabinet adopted a ‘no surprises’ policy for Cabinet deliberations; under this procedure, all briefings from central agencies on the submissions from other departments are available to all Cabinet members as part of the weekly Cabinet bag. This procedure was adopted to rebuild trust in the Cabinet process and prevent ‘ambushing’. 21 See Courier-Mail, 14 February 2004. 22 S. Bennett & G. Newman, ‘Queensland election 2004’, Current Issues Brief No. 8, 2003–04, Parliamentary Services, Canberra, 2004; and T. Arklay & J. Wanna, ‘The Queensland election of 2004: the art of non-campaigning’, Australasian Parliamentary Review, forthcoming (2005). 23 Often media criticisms of secretive government focus on relatively trivial issues: ministerial car use, or numbers of accidents ministers have had in their cars, or ministerial perks such as free tickets to the Rugby World Cup. The Beattie Government has largely been unco-operative in providing the media with such personally damaging information, and has accordingly borne the brunt of media criticism. Queensland governments have gradually tightened Freedom of Information (FOI) access and made journalistic trawls much more expensive for media corporations. 24 Only one new minister (Liddy Clark, Clayfield) out of the five new ones appointed came from Brisbane. The others represented Logan/Gold Coast (John Mickel, Margaret Keech), the Sunshine Coast (Chris Cummins) and North Queensland (Desley Boyle).This was intensely contentious, as many ministerial aspirants (such as Neil Roberts, Linda Lavarch, Geoff Wilson and Karen Struthers) held Brisbane seats and were overlooked. 25 See A. Wilson & J. Walker, ‘Beattie sorry over lobotomy gaffe’, The Australian, 21 January 2004, p. 7. 26 J.Wanna,‘Queensland – political chronicle’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol.

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47, no. 2, 2001, p. 269. 27 M. Herrmann, ‘Ingredients of leadership’, in M. Hermann (ed.), Political Psychology, Jossey-Bass, San Franscisco, 1986. 28 Wanna,‘Queensland – political chronicle’, 2001, p. 270. 29 ‘Moral capital’ is a term used to denote an almost charismatic-like moral authority of certain political leaders. It was coined by John Kane in The Politics of Moral Capital (Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2001). 30 J.Wanna, ‘Gambling on pulling through’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 46, no. 2, 2000, p. 239. 31 Wanna,‘Gambling on pulling through’, p. 239. 32 S.Wardill,‘Beattie backflip on cash donors’, Courier-Mail, 1 March 2003. 33 M. Michael,‘Labor hit by backflip on school computers’, Courier-Mail, 4 January 1999. 34 C. Jones,‘Anglers force rules backflip’, Courier-Mail, 13 December 2002. 35 C. Jones & D. Butler,‘Backflip on gay teachers’, Courier-Mail, 25 November 2002. 36 R. Odgers,‘Beattie backflip over meeting abuse victim’, Courier-Mail, 12 April 2002. 37 S. Balogh & S. Emerson, The Australian, 8 November 2000. 38 Wilson & Walker,‘Beattie sorry over lobotomy gaffe’. 39 J.Wanna,‘Fighting a series of political bushfires’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 45, no. 4, 1999, pp. 577–78. 40 Arklay & Wanna,‘The Queensland election of 2004: the art of non-campaigning’. 41 S.Wardill,‘Parties call in masters of perception’, Courier-Mail, 17 January 2004. 42 C. Johnstone,‘Spin twins keep news hounds at bay’, Courier-Mail, 29 March 2003. 43 P. Syvret,‘Roll of the dice’, The Bulletin, 7 August 2002. 44 S. Parnell & R. Odgers,‘Cabinet gagged’, Courier-Mail, 13 December 2003. 45 Johnstone,‘Spin twins keep news hounds at bay’. 46 P. Syvret,‘Roll of the dice’. 47 R. Odgers & M. Madigan,‘Spence loses media adviser’, Courier-Mail, 14 August 2003. 48 Few Directors-General have publicly commented or outlined policy since Beattie has been premier. One exception was a newspaper article from the head of Treasury, Gerard Bradley, early in Beattie’s second term. 49 M. Franklin, Courier-Mail, 13 July 2003. 50 Parnell & Odgers,‘Cabinet gagged’. 51 Syvret,‘Roll of the dice’. 52 Immediately after the poll, as the final seats were being determined in late counting, Rob Borbidge entertained the notion of forming a ‘coalition’ government of Nationals (23), Liberals (9), One Nation (11) and both independents, which would give him 45 in total – a majority of just 1. However, combining pro-market city Liberals with protectionist, xenophobic Hansonites and genuine independent members proved too difficult to achieve. 53 With 45 seats, Labor provided the Speaker, and then had 44 on the floor of the Legislative Assembly, but Beattie often won 46 votes in divisions (with both independents voting with the Labor Government), against the combined non-Labor vote of 42 (from late 1998, after the Mulgrave by-election). 54 T. Arklay & J. Wanna, ‘Playing smart politics with a divided opposition’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 47, no. 4, 2001, p. 552. 55 He also experimented with another website for the 2001 election, Beattie2001.net, but dropped this after the election. 56 Arklay & Wanna,‘The Queensland election of 2004: the art of non-campaigning’.

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Chapter 4

ST E V E B R AC K S : V I C TO R I A’ S ‘ N I C E G U Y ’ W H O WO N AG A I N ST T H E O D D S

Brian Costar and David Hayward olitical leaders are often defined by the historical context in which they emerge and make their mark. This is particularly true in the case of Steve Bracks, whose successful time as premier can only be properly understood in the context of what went before him. His predecessor, Jeff Kennett, was a larger-than-life character, a man whom many would consider one of the few event-making political leaders of modern Australia.1 Kennett dominated Victorian politics for the seven years before Bracks became leader in a way that has not been seen for a generation. His ‘reform’ agenda transformed almost all aspects of the public sector, and Victorian cultural life in general.The conservative values which had for so long been the hallmark of the ‘Victorian establishment’ were turned upside down by Kennett’s desire to modernise and commercialise, to restore a climate favourable to business investment at almost any social cost – including that of the democratic checks and balances which permeated Victorian governance. Steve Bracks emerged triumphant in the 1999 election, but his premiership would be, at least for the first term, a wrestle with Kennett’s ghost. Where Kennett had been brash and uncompromising, Bracks went out of his way to listen and be inclusive. Kennett had been always on the move, but Bracks was cautious, unwilling to change institutional arrangements until he was convinced that a consensus had been built in support of change. Kennett had rarely changed his mind, but Bracks was always prepared to do so if the objectors’ voices become loud enough to sound like political risk. Kennett had been everywhere, but Bracks was content to let his ministers run their portfolios with very little intervention from his office.The leadership styles

P

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could not be much further apart, and so far this has been of considerable political benefit to Bracks. If we use the criteria of electoral success, Bracks has been Labor’s most successful premier: in his second election, his government won a record majority in both houses of parliament, leaving open the possibility of dramatic social democratic reform. Yet this opportunity has not been seized by Bracks; his inclusive, cautious and careful leadership style is not suited to a radical change agenda. And here is the paradox at the heart of the Bracks leadership: its cautious and trusting tone has given Labor the electoral chance of a generation to fundamentally alter Victoria’s society and economy, but, ironically, that opportunity is unlikely to be realised precisely because of the premier’s leadership style.The long-term test of Bracks’ leadership will be the reforms his government bequeaths, but this does not appear to be an issue with which Labor or Bracks himself seems overly concerned.

Early background Stephen (Steve) Bracks, the seventh Labor premier of Victoria, was born in the provincial city of Ballarat on 15 October 1954. Both sets of his grandparents had emigrated to Sydney and Ballarat from the Lebanese town of Zahle in the Bekka Valley in the 1890s. The paternal grandfather’s name was Brax but the family assimilated quickly into their adopted society, anglicising their surname to Bracks and replacing their Byzantine-rite Melchite Catholicism with the Roman variety. Bracks is only the third Labor head of government to come from a non Anglo-Celtic heritage, joining Chris Watson ‘Tanck’ (prime minister, 1904), whose father was German, and Ted Theodore ‘Teodorescu’ (Queensland premier, 1919–25), whose grandparents were Romanian. He is also the first Catholic Labor premier of Victoria since Ned Hogan (1929–32). Bracks has consciously avoided politicising either his ethnicity or his religion, though. When pressed as to why he didn’t promote his multicultural past in a state where to do so would have been an advantage, he replied:‘I didn’t want to sound phoney, because it’s so far back … I don’t really like people who promote their ethnicity or circumstances as a way of saying that they have some advantage over someone else. They’ve either got the ability or they haven’t.’2 He did, however, assume the multicultural affairs portfolio on becoming premier in 1999. Bracks’ grandfather became a gold buyer and retail trader. In 1946, his

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father, Stan, married Marion Davis, whose family owned a women’s clothing boutique. They moved to Ballarat, where Stan and his brother Ron continued the family’s commercial heritage by opening the Bracks Brothers grocery store – in the 1960s it became the city’s first self-service store.The future premier’s family was financially comfortable, and he recalls having ‘an extremely happy’ childhood.3 Educated at Catholic St Patrick’s College, which he has described as ‘a tough school’,4 he developed a love of sport, especially long-distance swimming (he still participates). His former principal, Br Ron Stewart, recalls that ‘in terms of a student, he was 100 per cent co-operative … he had a clear mind and was well-behaved. I would not give him top marks in terms of being prominent, though …’5 Given his family’s involvement in small business, it was not surprising that Bracks completed a diploma of business studies (accounting) and a graduate diploma of education (economics) at what is now Ballarat University. One of his lecturers said,‘I wouldn’t call him brilliant, but he got good results by hard work.’6 Rather than pursue a career in business, he became a secondary school commerce teacher in 1976, and while teaching at Maryborough Secondary School he met Terry Horsfall, who came from a Liberal-voting family.They married in 1984 and now have three children. Bracks’ strong commitment to his family is obvious, but again he does not seek to exploit it for political gain. His career before entering parliament in 1994 was diverse: after teaching he was an employment and recreation officer in Ballarat (1981–85); director of the Ballarat Education Centre (1985–89); manager of Victoria’s employment programs (1989–93); and the executive director of the Victorian Printing Industry Training Board (1993–94). He also served as an adviser to Labor premiers John Cain and Joan Kirner and to federal Australian Labor Party (ALP) parliamentary secretary for transport and communications Neil O’Keefe.

A political life Bracks recalls being politicised by the dismissal of the Whitlam Labor Government in 1975 – he helped carry a coffin down the main street of Ballarat to symbolise ‘the death of democracy’. But the future premier’s political baptism had in fact occurred in his early teens, courtesy of his father Stan, who was a devout Catholic and Laborite who transferred his loyalties to the Democratic Labor Party (DLP) after the 1955 split. Each evening after his mother and four sisters had left the dinner table, father and teenage son

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would vigorously debate the political issues of the day. Bracks has declared ‘a great affection for his father’, who returned to the Labor fold in the 1980s,7 and attributes his ‘sense of social justice to his religious upbringing’ and his father’s open and generous Catholicism.8 Steve Bracks is a practising liberal Catholic, but does not seek to impose his religion’s moral stance on issues of public policy such as abortion. Stan Bracks died in 1987. The premier remains close to his mother, Marion, who still lives in Ballarat. Bracks joined the ALP in 1975 and was campaign manager for the federal seat of Ballarat in 1980, 1983, 1984 and 1987. More significantly for his longer-term career, Bracks contested three state elections in the 1980s. The first was in 1985, when he stood for the Legislative Assembly seat of Ballarat North. He polled 43 per cent of the vote. Stan Bracks, despite being a personal friend of the sitting Liberal member, Tom Evans, handed out how-to-vote cards for his son. When Evans retired in 1988 Bracks was again the candidate.This time he managed to achieve a swing to the government of 1 per cent, but he lost to Stephen Elder, a nephew of long-time Liberal premier Henry Bolte. This unusual by-election swing to a government at the end of its second term encouraged premier Cain to call an early election for 1 October 1988 – Labor won it narrowly. Bracks was again the candidate for Ballarat North, but despite gaining a further 3.5 per cent swing, he lost for a third time. However, during these three campaigns Bracks had attracted the positive attention of Labor ‘Bracing up for the election’: Steve Bracks and power brokers, who marked him John Brumby emerging from an early morning swim, as a future parliamentarian. His Williamstown beach 1996 (photo courtesy of campaign manager and good Fairfaxphoto, The Age). friend, Jim Reeves, described

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him ‘as a fantastic candidate in what was really a graveyard for Labor people’. Bracks himself later said that the campaigns were personally beneficial because they gave him access to Cabinet ministers and the Melbourne ALP machine, and improved his public speaking and media skills.9 By 1990, when Bracks joined Cain’s staff as an adviser, the government had begun to implode in the wake of a severe economic recession and a number of spectacular financial collapses. Cain resigned under party factional pressure in August 1990 and was replaced by Joan Kirner, whose government lost the October 1992 election to Kennett’s Liberal/National coalition in a landslide. Bracks’ close-at-hand observation of the terminal months of what had earlier been lauded as a model state Labor government encouraged in him a cautious political style and fiscal conservatism. When he became Labor leader in 1999 he was asked what influence Cain had had on him, and he replied that while he admired Cain’s social policy achievements, he was ‘also acutely aware that when the [1990–91] recession hit, the Government didn’t respond properly or adequately to tighten the belt on expenditure’.10 It was a mistake he was determined not to repeat as premier.

A quick rise to the top Joan Kirner served as opposition leader until March 1993, when she resigned. She was replaced by former deputy premier Jim Kennan, but he resigned – and left parliament altogether – after only three months in office, having been continually frustrated by his denigration by factional leaders. The party then turned to John Brumby, who had been the member for the federal seat of Bendigo from 1983 to 1990. He had entered the Victorian Legislative Council via a by-election in February 1993, and in September 1993 he replaced Kennan in his Legislative Assembly seat. Labor, with only 27 out of 88 lower house seats, had had three leaders in less than a year. Kirner herself retired from parliament in early 1994 and Bracks, who had moved from Ballarat to Melbourne in 1999, decided to contest the preselection for her seat. To win the party endorsement he had to overcome a number of obstacles: first, Kirner’s seat, Williamstown, was a socialist left fiefdom. Second, the locals were keen for her replacement to be a woman. Bracks had recently transferred from the small and increasingly marginalised independent faction to the right-wing Labor unity faction, then headed by federal Senator Robert Ray.While Bracks denied that any factional pressure was brought to bear, there was controversy over the decision of the socialist

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left candidate, Luisa Bizani, to withdraw her nomination for ‘personal reasons’. The issue continued to be raised throughout the by-election campaign by the Democrat candidate, Lyn Allison.11 Williamstown was one of the few safe Labor seats remaining in 1994 (Joan Kirner won 64 per cent of the two-party preferred vote in 1992), and the decision of the Liberal Party not to run a candidate assured Bracks of victory; he duly won with 60 per cent of the final vote.This was a creditable performance at a time when Labor’s general electoral stocks were very low. Opposition leader John Brumby welcomed Bracks’ election, describing him as ‘a man of great ability’, but adding that ‘like everyone else, he will have to earn his place in shadow Cabinet’.12 His inaugural parliamentary speech contained little in the way of political philosophy, but it did expound on two themes that were to mark his persona as opposition leader and premier: he promised to be an inclusive politician and ‘to represent all people in the electorate’; and he argued that members of parliament (MPs) needed to be better resourced to be able to scrutinise the executive.13 His ability, plus his public and private sector management experience – and the dearth of talent in the Labor ranks – saw Bracks appointed as shadow minister for employment, industrial relations and tourism and assisting Brumby in the shadow Treasury portfolio in December 1994. Labor continued to languish in the opinion polls, and Brumby was unable to gain traction against a rampant, if accident-prone, premier Kennett. The 1996 Victorian state election maintained the coalition dominance in both houses of parliament. While the ALP secured a 2.8 per cent two-party preferred swing for a net gain of 2 seats, its biggest swings occurred in the coalition’s safe seats. A notable feature of the election, and one that was later to contribute to Bracks becoming premier, was the strong performance of independent candidates in rural Victoria. Despite this disappointing electoral performance (Labor had set itself a target of 6 additional lower house seats), Brumby was re-elected unopposed as opposition leader. His position, however, became increasingly untenable, despite a surprise ALP victory at the Mitcham by-election in late 1997 and a lacklustre performance by Kennett throughout much of 1998. Soon all the wellknown signs of a deteriorating opposition leadership were on public display: low approval ratings in the opinion polls; constant leaks and speculation about challenges from within the party; and even public criticism by Labor front and backbenchers. Matters came to a head on the eve of a

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major policy launch by Brumby in February 1999, when left-wing frontbencher Carlo Carli strongly criticised the leadership on SBS radio.14 This proved the catalyst for cross-factional negotiations on the need to replace Brumby. Brumby himself instigated a meeting on 17 February 1999 with factional leaders Greg Sword (Right) and Marsha Thomson (Left), and they convinced him that his leadership was in its death throes. Brumby soon announced his resignation as leader. Throughout the prolonged period of leadership turmoil, three names were regularly cited as possible replacements for Brumby: the deputy, John Thwaites, shadow Attorney-General Rob Hulls and Bracks. For a time Thwaites seemed to be the preferred candidate, but Bracks had made good use of his shadow portfolio of industrial relations to build a network of support among influential union officials, though not in a way that could be portrayed as disloyal to Brumby. Thwaites’s problem was that unlike Bracks, he had remained in the tiny independent faction, and had made political enemies in both the socialist left and the Labor unity factions. Intense factional lobbying over the weekend of 20–21 February saw Bracks emerge as the unanimous choice, partly because the socialist left conceded that it had no credible candidate.15 The factions’ choice was endorsed by a caucus meeting on 22 February – the relief that the leadership issue had been resolved was palpable, with one journalist describing the atmosphere as akin to ‘a cricket club’s trophy night’.16 Bracks had the advantage of gaining the leadership without having to challenge the incumbent, thereby avoiding factional discord, but he also carried the stigma of being seen as the creature of the factional chieftains who made him leader. It was not an auspicious point in the electoral cycle to take on the leadership of the Victorian ALP. Initially, Bracks’ elevation had little impact on Labor’s performance in the opinion polls,17 and one commentator argued that in overlooking the best candidate – Thwaites – the party had given Kennett another assured election victory.18 Yet by the middle of the year Bracks’ approval rating had reached 54 per cent, a considerable contrast to Brumby’s poor performances in 1997 and 1998. However, Bracks did not have to contend with the destabilising dissent from within the party that had constantly beleaguered Brumby.This was partly because it was widely believed that Kennett would call an early election. When he did so – the election was set for 18 September 1999 – the opinion polls indicated that the ALP would lose seats to the coalition. The actual result came as a

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complete surprise: an unprecedented revolt against Kennett in regional and rural Victoria produced a hung parliament – the coalition secured 43 seats to Labor’s 41, and 3 rural independents held the balance of power. Further drama was injected into the political equation by the death of a candidate on polling day; this necessitated a supplementary election in the former Liberal seat of Frankston East. It was scheduled for 14 October.19 The hung parliament raised the probability that minority government was to return to Victoria for the first time in 50 years.The three independents who would decide the complexion of the government were: Russell Savage, a former police officer, who won the seat of Mildura in 1996 and who was a social conservative; Susan Davies, who won Gippsland West at a by-election in 1997 after having stood as the ALP candidate in 1996; and Craig Ingram, a farmer and abalone fisherman, who won Gippsland East in 1999 and whose ideological position was unknown. Led by Davies, the independents drafted a Charter of Good Governance20 and declared their support for whichever party would promise to legislate its contents. In the month-long negotiations that followed, Bracks, who had been opposition leader for only six months, displayed considerable political skill and maturity in out-manoeuvring the previously dominant Kennett. Here was a straight contest between ‘agitator’ Kennett and ‘negotiator’ Bracks.21 Backed by large majorities in both houses of parliament, Kennett’s political style as premier was to be the ‘CEO of Victoria’: he pursued his objectives with an at times breathtaking disregard for consultation and a dismissive attitude towards any opposition.These traits were to be his undoing. Kennett’s initial response to the independents was a combination of political bribery and bluster; he offered each of them the job of Speaker of the Legislative Assembly, and then announced (on radio station 3AW) that they had no choice but to support the coalition because they represented ‘conservative’ electorates. He also attempted to rewrite various clauses of the charter, much to the annoyance of the independents.When he did concede to some of their requirements he was repudiating policies that he had previously declared non-negotiable, and thus appeared opportunistic and insincere. Bracks, in contrast, left the independents largely to their own devices. He had the advantage, denied to Kennett, that almost all of the contents of the charter were settled Labor policy. When the major parties formally responded to the independents, Bracks supported the charter ‘in its entirety’,22 whereas Kennett rejected calls to change the voting system in

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the upper house to one of proportional representation. Bracks then acted with uncharacteristic boldness, sending a memorandum of understanding to the independents that sought their formal support for a Labor Government. Craig Ingram signed the memo but gave it to Susan Davies with instructions to tear it up if Labor failed to win the next day’s Frankston East supplementary election. The ALP won easily, and at a press conference on the following Monday, 16 October, the three independents announced their support for a minority Labor Government. Bracks’ achievement in negotiating this outcome should not be underestimated, because it was never a foregone conclusion that the independents would back the ALP. Kennett never fully comprehended this. Had he not vetoed upper house reform it would have been difficult for the independents not to have supported the coalition, because only the coalition had the numbers in the upper house to amend the constitution to change the voting system.

The accidental premier and winning the peace Winning the peace is always more difficult than winning the war, and after Labor’s euphoria had abated, the magnitude of the task facing Bracks was all too apparent. The party did not have a majority in either house of parliament and its Cabinet was vastly inexperienced – six of its members were sworn in as ministers before they were sworn in as members of parliament. The party, not expecting victory, had developed only a rudimentary ‘transition to government strategy’, and after the election it quietly engaged former Cain Government ministers and civil servants to tutor the new ministers in how to carry out their duties. Bracks recounted a story about the first month of government: ‘As I left my office a journalist called out, “Premier”, and I just kept walking. He kept yelling out “Premier” – [finally] he started yelling out “Bracksey”, and I turned around.’23 The new government had some fortuitous early successes that strengthened the position of the premier. Kennett announced his retirement from parliament, and at the subsequent by-election, in November 1999, the ALP won his seat of Burwood; as they did the retiring National Party leader Pat McNamara’s seat of Benalla in early 2000. Bracks was a prominent campaigner in both by-elections, and their results, which confirmed the trend of the 1999 election, strengthened Labor’s legitimacy. Although the party still lacked an absolute majority in the Legislative Assembly, it now held more seats than the combined Liberal and National parties.

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% of GSP

Figure 4.1: Underlying expenses as a percentage of Gross State Product, 1989/90 – 2003/4

Year to June SOURCE NOTE

BUDGET PAPERS, VARIOUS YEARS.

PAYMENTS HAVE BEEN ADJUSTED FOR ONE-OFF PAYMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH SUPERANNUATION, REDUNDANCIES, ETC.

The new government’s resolve was soon put to the test, though. In January 2000 an industrial dispute between the Electrical Trade Union (ETU) and the privatised Yallourn Energy Company led to severe power restrictions in Melbourne and other parts of Victoria. Bracks was overseas, and the media and business became critical of the allegedly hands-off approach adopted to the dispute by Acting Premier Thwaites and the Minister for Industrial Relations.The government was constrained, of course, by the fact that it no longer owned the power company and by Kennett’s having dismantled the Victorian Industrial Relations Commission. Bracks returned to Victoria in early February and immediately took charge of the dispute. His firm action dispelled the belief that he was a ‘nice guy’ but weak. He insisted that the parties attend conciliation meetings chaired by former Cain Government industrial relations minister Neil Pope, and threatened to invoke the emergency powers legislation to end the dispute. While this response was criticised by some trade unions, the parties quickly settled their differences and the power restrictions were lifted.24 On the policy front Labor had a readymade agenda in the contents of the Charter of Good Governance, all of which, save reform of the upper house, were accepted by the coalition majority in the Legislative Council. They proved more intransigent towards other government legislation,

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however. For example, when Labor attempted to legislate to extend the entitlements of Victorian workers who were unable to transfer to the federal industrial relations systems, the upper house rejected the Bill.25 The Budget, and state finances more generally, were areas in which Labor moved quickly and decisively. In opposition the ALP had crafted a conservative financial policy, drawing readily on the advice of neoliberal economic think tanks.26 It had done so in the belief that Labor needed to distance itself as clearly as possible from the Cain/Kirner governments, and from the perception that they were big-spending and high-taxing governments that liked to borrow money to pay for their promises. The strategy seemed to be to emulate the Kennett Government as much as possible on financial policy in order to highlight the significant differences between Labor and the Liberal coalition government on issues to do with democratic rights and social policy. If this meant committing Labor to even more austere financial policy settings than the Liberals, so be it. Labor went to the 1999 election with a very modest set of election promises, involving financial commitments barely more than $200 million per year; this earned it warm praise from the Right for being prudent.27 Labor’s financial conservatism has been on display throughout its period in office, both as a minority (1999–2002) and majority (2002+) government. Conceptually it is evident in the striking similarity between Labor’s budget framework and Kennett’s.28 Foremost is Labor’s commitment to an operating surplus of at least $100 million per financial year and its pledge to keep taxes at or below the Australian state average: this leaves it little choice but to budget for large surpluses in case the economy unexpectedly slumps, and prevents the spending ministers from developing expensive reform proposals. Labor’s determination to run large operating surpluses and to play down state financial liabilities sits uncomfortably next to the data showing that Victoria’s debt is already very low by world standards. The effect on spending is evident in Labor’s reluctance to return real spending to preKennett levels, and to restore public service levels to what they were when Labor was last in power. Overall, the number of public sector employees is almost 15 per cent less than when Kennett won office in 1992 (see Table 4.1). And while the number of general government employees (broadly defined as public servants, teachers, nurses, etc), is slightly higher (3.5 per cent) than a decade ago, there are still 6.4 per cent fewer on a per capita basis than was the case when Kennett first came to power.

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Table 4.1 Public servants, general government employees and population of Victoria, 1992, 1996, 1999, 2003 Public sector wage General government sector and salary earners wage and salary earners Number Per 1000 Number Per 1000 (000s) population (000s) population August 1992 291.8 65.4 236 52.9 August 1996 226.4 49.5 211.8 46.3 August 1999 220.3 46.9 210.2 44.7 August 2003 248.2 50.3 244.3 49.5 1992–03 –14.9% –23.1% 3.5% –6.4% 2000–03 13% 7% 16% 11% SOURCES

(FOR

Population

4,460,824 4,570,326 4,700,404 4,933,648 10.6% 5%

UNPUBLISHED ABS DATA FROM ABS CAT. NO. 6248.0.55.01 CAT. NO. 3101.

EMPLOYMENT); ABS

Inevitably, Labor’s conservative financial policy framework has antagonised Labor supporters keen to see services rapidly returned to pre-Kennett levels, and it has been a challenge for Bracks to manage these tensions. He has been helped by the willingness of those with a grievance to keep their concerns largely within the party; this reflects their gratitude to Bracks for having defeated Kennett. Periodically, though, the tensions have bubbled over into public squabbles. The 2001 Budget provoked a long and bitter dispute with the Australian Education Union, with the union’s state secretary, Mary Bluett, describing it as ‘the cruellest [Budget] in a decade’.29 The 2003 Budget also provoked a storm of protest from public sector interests, with ‘productivity savings’ expected from the non-government community sector triggering a dispute that continued throughout the winter of 2003. A projected cut of $30 million from the education budget also led to a short-lived period of industrial tension between the government and the Community and Public Sector Union. If the Budget has been Labor’s strong point, how much credit for this is due to the premier? Bracks was Labor’s shadow treasurer for almost three years, and oversaw the development of the financial policies that Labor took to the 1999 election. He was also Treasurer for the first six months of Labor’s first term. Hence it would be reasonable to assume that the government’s economic strategy is of his making.This, however, would be an overstatement. There can be little doubt that the thrust of the financial policy settings was put in place by John Brumby during the mid-1990s,30 and it is

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Brumby who has been Treasurer since Bracks relinquished that role in mid2000. Bracks has generally given Brumby a free hand on financial matters, leaving it up to him not only to control the financial policy framework, but also to implement the Budget. It is Brumby, not Bracks, who is unpopular with the social welfare sector, and whether by accident or design, this has meant that Labor’s conservative financial policies have done Bracks’ leadership little harm among the ALP’s traditional constituency. At the same time, Bracks has been assiduous in developing a good relationship with Victoria’s business community. This community was once close to Kennett, and was highly suspicious of the Labor Government, whose election came as a severe shock. Given his family’s background in small business and his tertiary studies in commerce, Bracks did not come to the office of premier with any personal animosity towards the private sector.Also, given that Victoria’s is a capitalist economy, the performance of that economy is heavily dependent on the health of businesses, both large and small. Conversely, a poorly performing economy will reflect negatively on the electoral standing of state governments. But Bracks also needed to appreciate that many in his party, and within the trade union movement, held decidedly hostile views towards Melbourne’s financial establishment and associated neoliberal think tanks – they believed this group had all received preferential treatment from Kennett and were natural allies of the Liberal Party, not of Labor. These tensions became all too obvious in September 2000, when the Asia Pacific Economic Summit held a major forum at Melbourne’s Crown Casino – itself a controversial icon of ‘Kennett kapitalism’. The meeting attracted large ‘anti-globalisation’ demonstrations, some of which turned violent, with claim and counter-claim being made as to who was responsible for the violence: the demonstrators or the police. Bracks accepted an invitation to chair a session of the summit on government–business relations, and in his summing-up he stated that ‘the consensus of the session was that there were not too many services which could not be outsourced as long as the rules were set and a level playing field established’. At an earlier press conference he declared that the role of government in a globalised economy was to be an ‘urger, a promoter and a protector’.31 When he condemned the demonstrators as ‘fascists and un-Australian’ people who ‘deserved what they got’, and announced that he would be holding a congratulatory barbecue for the police officers involved in confronting them, he attracted a storm of protest from party members.32 Even his own

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ALP branch condemned him; the matter was only defused when the barbecue proposal was quietly shelved. Bracks has certainly been good to business, but he has not been too close. In much the same way that he has allowed Brumby to bear the complaints of the social sector, he has also been content to allow his Treasurer to work closely and openly with business. It is noticeable that while Labor’s Budgets have enjoyed a mixed reception from the Victorian Council of Social Services, the Community and Public Sector Union, the Australian Education Union, the Victorian Nurses Federation and the Victorian Trades Hall Council, such is not the case with business. Each Budget has been warmly received by peak business groups such as the Victorian Employers Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VECCI) and the Australian Industry Group. Business enthusiasm towards Labor reached something of a crescendo in 2004 with the release of an unexpected economic statement a fortnight before the Budget. Writing in The Age, Darren Gray explained the significance of the statement this way: Business got its way. The Victorian Employers’ Chamber of Commerce and Industry, which had long championed land tax cuts, got virtually everything it asked for ...33

The statement delivered on a wish list of business expectations, drawing the following vote of thanks from VECCI: The Economic Statement represents a major policy victory for VECCI and the Victorian business community. Since the 2002 Victorian election,VECCI has campaigned for a series of measures designed to lower business costs and deliver economic growth … Virtually all of these measures were met in the Economic Statement …34

The premier and his par ty Despite recent electoral successes, the Victorian branch of the ALP remains the least successful in Australia, and since 1970, it has been the most factionalised. A major component of the party’s electoral revival after 1976 was a commitment from the factions to co-operate in the broader interests of the party.When Cain led Labor to office in 1982 the party contained two large factions: the right-wing Labor unity faction and the socialist left, with the smaller independents holding the balance of power on the floor of state

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conference and on the Administrative Committee. This ‘constructive’ factionalism persisted until after the 1988 election, when the government’s economic crises led to increased internal party disharmony and a ‘destructive’ factional culture.35 The situation worsened after the defeat of 1992. Not only did the factions engage in open conflict, but both the Labor unity faction and the socialist left also experienced internal schisms. The most obvious manifestation of factional warfare was unrestrained branch-stacking: factional warlords paid the party membership fees of members of various ethnic communities in order to secure branch positions for members of their faction. So notorious was the practice that the ALP established a panel of review in 1998 (the Dreyfus Review) to recommend ways to curtail it. The reforms recommended by Dreyfus were moderately successful, but instances such as the sending of shotgun cartridges with the names of party members engraved on them in advance of elections for the Deer Park ALP branch reveals the intensity of factional conflict.36 The Bracks Government came to power at a time when internal Labor Party relations were ominously volatile, but the discipline imposed by minority government did act as a restraining influence. Restraint, however, was little in evidence in mid-2002, when inter-union and personality disputes within the factions seriously compromised the authority of the premier as party leader. In March 2002 a number of left-wing unions, unhappy with the cautious approach of the government, threatened to disaffiliate from the ALP, and ETU secretary Dean Mighell resigned from the party and joined the Greens.37 Of greater concern was a simmering dispute among key unions within the Labor unity faction.At its source was the frustration of the National Union of Workers (NUW) and its federal secretary, Greg Sword, who felt that the faction was dominated by the Australian Workers Union (AWU) and the Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees Union (SDA), to the detriment of the NUW. In early June Sword announced that the NUW had left Labor unity and had reached an agreement with the socialist left.38 Sword then turned on his erstwhile allies in the right, targeting ALP State Secretary David Feeney. Feeney was a combative Labor unity power broker, allied with the AWU and SDA and with connections to the NSW Labor right. He had earlier been forced to resign from opposition leader Brumby’s staff over branch-stacking allegations, and in 1999 settled a defamation case arising from an election in the Health Services Union of

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Australia.39 On the credit side, Feeney had been the ALP’s campaign director at the 1999 state election that ousted Kennett. Bracks was out of the country when this dispute escalated, and on his return he issued an illadvised public statement of support for Feeney, whose position by then was untenable. The factional leaders ignored the premier, who then had to negotiate a face-saving compromise: Feeney was removed as secretary, but was retained as the party’s election campaign manager – he was later appointed to Bracks’ personal staff.40 The damage that could have been caused by this public humiliation of the premier by his own faction was fortunately subsumed by the 2002 election campaign, but it highlighted the dangers for Bracks of being the parliamentary leader of a party whose organisation was fragmented by factional rivalries driven largely by powerseeking and personal animosity.

The premier and his opponents Despite losing the 1999 election by only the narrowest of margins, the coalition parties went into a steep political decline, and despite retaining control of the upper house until October 2002, were unable to exploit the inexperience of the government or to dent Bracks’ popularity or political dominance. Kennett was the driving force of the coalition government from 1992 to 1999, and his unforeseen and rapid demise left the Liberal Party, which had over-invested its political capital in him, bereft. In fact the 1999 election saw the Liberals lose almost a generation of potential leaders. Unconcerned at the possibility of defeat, Kennett in July 1999 unilaterally announced the ‘retirement’ of six senior ministers, in order to inject new blood into a postelection Cabinet. A possible future replacement for Kennett, Rob Knowles, was a surprise electoral casualty. Kennett’s resignation, followed soon after by that of National leader Pat McNamara, left a leadership vacuum: it was filled by Dr Denis Napthine (Liberal) and Peter Ryan (National). Napthine had been a relatively junior minister from 1996 to 1999; Ryan had no ministerial experience. The opposition was further weakened by the dissolution of the coalition of the Liberal and National parties in June 2000. The very cautiousness of the Bracks minority government offered little opportunity for a dispirited opposition to gain political traction. The Liberal Party descended into destructive factionalism reminiscent of the 1980s. As in most state divisions, the factionalism was personality based

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rather than ideologically based, yet the leading Victorian protagonists, Michael Kroger and Kennett, held no official party positions. In a manner typical of Australian state politics, the incumbent premier’s personal popularity soared and that of the hapless opposition leader languished. Napthine was a solid performer but was dogged by a wooden media image, and after the usual rumours and leaks he was replaced as leader by the allegedly more aggressive Robert Doyle in August 2002 – ten weeks before the election, which Labor won in a landslide. One effect of the 2002 Liberal electoral rout was a comprehensive victory for the Kroger faction – now led by Kroger’s former wife Helen – over the remnants of the Kennett loyalists in the internal party elections held in March 2003. The temptation to exaggerate the current travails of the Victorian opposition and its incapacity to damage the government, particularly a government that holds record majorities in both houses of parliament, needs to be tempered by historical memory. The Bracks state government is not the first, and nor will it be the last, to be so dominant over an apparently impotent opposition as to appear invincible. Sub-national politics in Australia is volatile, and today’s victors will eventually be vanquished, as often as not by their own hand. For example, the state of the opposition in Victoria today is no worse than that of Labor in the mid-1990s, yet that did not prevent a change of government in 1999.

The premier, the Legislative Council and the governor Relationships among premiers, governors and the Legislative Council in Victoria have regularly produced conflict and drama, and the premiership of Bracks was to prove no exception. Given his generally cautious and riskaverse leadership style, Bracks seemed an unlikely constitutional warrior, yet within his first three years in office he removed a governor and enacted the most sweeping changes to the Victorian constitution in 150 years. In April 1997 Kennett appointed former Supreme Court judge Sir James Gobbo as the 25th Governor of Victoria. In a departure from convention, Sir James was appointed for a fixed term – until 31 December 2000 – to avoid, according to Kennett, any complications that might arise if the scheduled 1999 federal referendum transformed Australia into a republic. Apparently the governor and Kennett had an understanding that if the referendum failed, which it did, Gobbo’s term would be extended to the usual five years, with the likelihood of a renewal.

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Bracks surprised everyone when he announced on 7 August 2000 that Gobbo’s term would not be extended beyond the end of the year.As explanation, he pointed out that all governors served ‘at pleasure’, and while praising Sir James, he said he had decided that it was time for a change. He categorically denied charges that Gobbo was removed because of his membership of the conservative group ‘the rumour tank’ which met for lunch regularly at the Athenaeum Club.41 Rumours spread that Sir James and Lady Gobbo, who was described as ‘more regal’ than her husband, were upset by Bracks’ decision – which attracted an intense but short-lived storm of protest.42 Newspaper editorialists and Liberal politicians denounced the decision on the grounds that it was partisan and that it was an insult to Victoria’s Italian community – Gobbo being the first governor to come from a non-English speaking background.43 Bracks, however, quickly stifled this criticism by announcing that Gobbo’s replacement would be former Olympic athlete and environmental scientist John Landy. The swift appointment of the popular Landy was an adroit move, because it meant that continuing to criticise the removal of Gobbo could now be portrayed as a negative reflection on the governor-elect. When Gobbo left office Bracks appointed him as Victoria’s first investment commissioner for Italy.44 One commentator observed that Bracks’ removal of Gobbo ‘shows that under the nice-guy image so assiduously presented to voters there lurks a ruthless politician’.45 It also showed, in the way he silenced his opponents, that Bracks can be a skilful politician. Bracks’ place in Victorian Labor history, and indeed in the state’s constitutional history, was assured by his enacting significant changes to the Legislative Council and its relations with the government in the Legislative Assembly. Here Bracks succeeded where many of his predecessors over the past 150 years had failed. Given that before the 2002 election the Labor Party had enjoyed a majority in the Legislative Council for only three months (in 1985), it is hardly surprising that the party has been less than enthusiastic about the Victorian version of bicameralism. Before the late 1970s, the ALP’s policy was to abolish the upper house; this policy was replaced by a policy to introduce a proportional representation (PR) voting system in 1981. The Cain and Kirner governments (1982–92) made no fewer than six attempts to change the Legislative Council’s voting system to PR, but all foundered. Following its surprise victory in September 1999, the Bracks minority government moved on its promise to the independents and introduced a

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broad-ranging Constitution (Reform) Bill on 24 November 1999.The Bill encountered difficulties when some of the independents expressed reservations about removing the Legislative Council’s right to block supply, and about the geographical size of the proposed rural provinces (electorates). The Bill was formally withdrawn in June 2000 and replaced by a Constitution (Amendment) Bill, which dealt with parliamentary terms and supply, and a Constitution (Proportional Representation) Bill, which concentrated on electoral and related matters. Both Bills were rejected in the opposition-controlled Legislative Council in October 2000. Bracks established the Constitution Commission Victoria on 19 March 2001, and empowered it to make such recommendations as would ‘enable the Legislative Council to operate as a genuine house of review’.The commission was chaired by recently retired Supreme Court judge George Hampel, who was to be assisted by former Liberal federal and state parliamentarians Ian McPhee and Alan Hunt – the latter had been president of the Legislative Council in the 1980s.While the appointment of the impartial Hampel and the former Liberal MPs was politically adroit, the opposition still attacked the commission as ‘a blatant political con’.46 The commission issued a discussion paper in August 2001, conducted seminars, regional consultations and invited submissions from the public. A Consultation Paper containing a summary of the views received was released in December 2001, and the final report, A House For Our Future, appeared on 1 July 2002.The recommendations of the commission were to form the basis of the Bracks Government’s new legislation, but few predicted that it would be presented to a parliament that, as a result of the November 2002 election, would have Labor majorities in both chambers (62 of 88 in the Legislative Assembly and 25 of 44 in the Legislative Council). The key components of the Constitution (Parliamentary Reform) Bill 2003 were: the replacement of the single-member, preferential voting system in the Legislative Council by a Senate-style proportional representation system; the removal of the power of the upper house to reject supply Bills; and the introduction of deadlock resolution provisions which constrained, but did not eliminate, the capacity of the Legislative Council to impede a government’s legislative agenda.47 The Bill passed the Legislative Council on 27 March 2003 and was proclaimed on 8 April. Given that numerous premiers of all political persuasions, dating back as far as Graham Berry (1875–77), had failed in attempts at upper house reform, Bracks was

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justified in describing the 2003 legislation as his ‘most satisfying achievement’.48 Most of Victoria’s media, however, remained unenthused; they were focused on the looming outbreak of war in Iraq.

Tribulations Successive Victorian governments of all political persuasions have consistently claimed that the state’s police force is the least corrupt in the country. This claim has involved a degree of historical amnesia: about the Kaye Inquiry of the late 1960s and about the 1970s Beach Inquiry (which exposed bribe-taking and other malfeasance on the part of police officers). As late as 1990 it was revealed that there had existed for many years an arrangement whereby police received ‘spotter fees’ from window shutter companies.49 Despite all these revelations, both Liberal and Labor premiers have rejected calls for the establishment of an independent anti-corruption body to oversee the police – Bracks has done the same. While regularly cited as one of the world’s safest cities, Melbourne has a parallel history of gangland warfare, be it over control of the wholesale fruit and vegetable market in the 1960s or the drug wars involving the Ships’ Painters and Dockers Union of the 1970s.The illicit drug trade is the centre of the current underworld conflict, which has resulted in the unsolved murders of 27 ‘gangsters’ since 1985. One of the first actions of newly appointed Police Commissioner Christine Nixon in 2001 was to disband the Police Drug Squad: a number of its former members are currently facing serious criminal charges. As the gangland murders continued, Bracks, Police Minister Andre Haermeyer and Police Command all refused to admit a link between the killings and the activities of corrupt police. The most recent killing occurred on 16 May 2004, when police informer Terence Hobson and his wife were ‘executed’ in their Melbourne home. It was then revealed by ABC journalists that confidential police documents relating to Hobson had been circulating in Victoria’s underworld for a week before his killing. Bracks engaged former Queensland Corruption Commissioner Tony Fitzgerald to investigate the leak, but still refused to establish a permanent anti-corruption commission. Instead, he increased significantly the powers of the State Ombudsman and Police Commissioner, but it was done in such a reactive manner as to suggest that policy was being developed ‘on the run’.50 That this was an unusually inept

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piece of political management was borne out by an opinion poll which found that 81 per cent of Victorians were in favour of some form of independent anti-police corruption body.51 It is in the very nature of politics that leadership triumphs are counterbalanced by failures. Given his status as the leader of a minority government and lacking a majority in the upper house from 1999 to 2002, Bracks encountered relatively few public political embarrassments. One, which involved an appointment to a senior government post, he handled so clumsily that it briefly dented his reputation for high standards of probity. On 19 October 2001 it was announced that Jim Reeves, then chief of staff for the Labor Lord Mayor of Brisbane, was the successful applicant for the $300 000 a year position as managing director of the Urban and Regional Land Corporation (URLC). In parliament on 22 November the opposition alleged that Reeves was not the preferred candidate of the URLC Board: he had got the job, they said, because he was a ‘mate’ of the premier, and there had been inappropriate ministerial interference in the selection process.52 Bracks described Reeves ambiguously as a ‘past friend’, by which, he later explained, he meant ‘that I have known him for a long time’.53 Bracks was ill-advised to imply that his friendship with Reeves was ‘past’ – it was on the public record that they had continuously been friends and political allies since their student days in Ballarat in the 1970s, and that the two families had holidayed together as recently as early 2001.54 The opposition parties demanded a judicial inquiry into the appointment, and when the government refused to do so, they themselves established a Legislative Council select committee to investigate the matter.The crisis was defused somewhat when Reeves announced that he had decided not to accept the job.The Legislative Council committee reported in early October 2002: a majority report was highly critical of Bracks and other ministers and a minority report was equally critical of the opposition majority on the committee.55 By now the story was 12 months old, though, and it was further overtaken by Bracks announcing on 4 November that Victoria would go to the polls on 26 November.

Brackslide: the 2002 state election As fewer voters now identify strongly with political parties than in the past, leadership plays an increasingly important role in electoral outcomes – especially in the Australian states, where successful premiers can crowd the

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political space, much to the disadvantage of opposition leaders. The 2002 Victorian election provided a textbook example of this phenomenon and produced the best seat result for the ALP in its 100 year history. Bracks, around whom the ALP’s campaign was centred, is by far the state’s most electorally successful Labor premier – he has led the party to its only genuine landslide victory. The statistics tell an impressive story: the ALP’s 2002 Legislative Assembly two-party preferred vote of 57.84 per cent was the highest recorded by any party since 1967 (however, its primary vote of 47.95 per cent was less than the 50.00 per cent obtained by Cain in 1982 and 1985, which probably reflects increasing voter support for minor parties); and its Legislative Assembly seat share of 70.50 per cent was the best since 1976.What confirmed Bracks as a Labor electoral hero, however, was the party’s clear – but unexpected – victory in the Legislative Council, which made him the first ALP premier of Victoria to have secure majorities in both houses of parliament.56

Conclusion: style and substance In the introduction to this chapter, we suggested that Bracks’ time as premier can only properly be understood in the context of what went before him. We talked there of Kennett. But there is another giant of modern Victorian state politics who must also enter the equation: Cain dominated Victorian state politics throughout the 1980s, delivering three successive Labor election victories, and leaving a legacy of social democratic reform in all parts of the Victorian public sector. Cain modernised Victoria, and elevated the voice of social justice until it was an almost equal partner with economics as a driving force of policy reform.The savage early 1990s recession took a heavy toll on Cain, who resigned amidst mounting unease over the condition of public sector finances. Bracks’ time as premier is characterised by his desire to be not just different from Kennett, but also different from Cain.This has presented him with a challenge. He will be remembered as the Labor leader who at long last modernised the upper house. While this is indeed a momentous achievement, at the time of writing his efforts seem to pale in comparison with the achievements of the major premiers who preceded him. Liberal leader Henry Bolte, who governed Victoria throughout the 1960s and the early 1970s, will be remembered for his unashamed pro-economic development stance and his social conservatism. His successor, Dick Hamer, will

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be remembered for his enthusiasm for the environment and his socially progressive liberalism. Cain will be regarded as the champion of social justice and social democracy more generally. Kennett’s legacy is there for all to see, with much of Victoria’s public sector having been privatised or transformed through a rapid and far-reaching commercialisation program. Bracks’ time in office seems destined to result in much more modest highlights than those of these earlier premiers. If there is one criticism that Labor has taken to heart over the last five years, it is the repeated claim it is a ‘do-nothing government’, timid, unwilling to take bold decisions; that the premier is a tortoise when the state needs a hare. Bracks is aware of this criticism, and responds by saying that he is a careful leader, and likes to be sure he is taking everyone with him rather than forcing them to do things they do not want to do. He is courteous and inclusive. He is not soft or indecisive, he says: ‘People might mistake my courteous nature, my treating people properly and with decency, as soft. It’s not.’57 Asked to describe himself, Bracks replied: ‘Balanced, even-handed, inclusive.’58 Asked what he would like to be remembered for, he replied: ‘For leading a financially conservative and socially progressive government, one which builds the whole of Victoria, not just part of it.’59 Perhaps it is this that Bracks will be remembered for. He is the courteous man who managed to remain as premier for two terms – and in fact probably three – without making enemies. He is the nice guy who won against the odds, the premier of the people, someone who managed to lead without making many major policy changes, leaving the more difficult decisions to be handled by ministers hemmed in by conservative financial settings and a powerful Treasurer successfully pursing another agenda heartily approved of by business, but not recognisably Labor.

Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

See B. Costar & N. Economou (eds), The Kennett Revolution:Victorian Politics in the 1990s, UNSW Press, Sydney, 1999. Sunday Age, 9 May 1999. The Australian, 23 October 1999. Sunday Age, 9 May 1999. Herald Sun, 23 October 1999. Herald Sun, 29 May 1999. The Age, 2 March 2004.

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8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

20 21 22 23 24 25 26

27 28

29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39

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Herald Sun, 23 October 1999. Herald Sun, 6 August 1994. The Age, 23 February 1999. Herald Sun, 6 August 1994. The Age, 15 August 1994. The Age, 15 August 1994, and Victorian Parliamentary Debates, Assembly, 7 September 1994, pp. 100ff. Herald Sun, 26 February 1999. The Age, 20 February 1999; Herald Sun, 21 February 1999. The Age, 23 February 1999. Morgan Poll 3183, 14 April 1999. The Bulletin, 30 March 1999. D. Woodward & B. Costar, ‘The Victorian election of 18 September 1999: another case of electoral volatility?’, Australian Journal of Political Science, vol. 35, no. 1, 2000, pp. 125–33. B. Costar & J. Curtin, Rebels with a Cause: Independents in Australian Politics, UNSW Press, Sydney, 2004, pp. 37–43. H. Lasswell, cited in R.A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (5th edition), Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1984, pp. 115–16. Costar & Curtin, Rebels with a Cause, p. 41. Herald Sun, 23 October 1999. The Australian, 9 February 2000. The Age, 19 June 2000; Australian Financial Review, 27 October 2000. D. Hayward, ‘How Mr Kennett won and how Labor helped him do it’, Australian Rationalist,Winter 1996; D. Hayward,‘How Kennett lost and how the coalition let him do it’, Dissent, vol. 1, no. 1, 1999. See D. Hayward, ‘How Mr Kennett won’. For details, see D. Hayward & J. Quiggin, ‘A financial vision for a long-term Labor government in Victoria’, in D. Hayward & P. Ewer (eds),Visions for Victoria,The Vulgar Press, Melbourne, 2003, pp. 29–50. Quoted in N. Economou, ‘Political chronicle: January to June 2002’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 48, no. 3, 2002, p. 534. D. Hayward, ‘How Mr Kennett won’. The Age, 12 September 2000. The Age, 1 September 2000; 2 October 2000. The Age, 21 April 2004. R. Holyman, letter to VECCI members, 21 April 2004, accessed at , 26 May 2004. J. Warhurst & A. Parkin (eds), The Machine: Labor Confronts the Future, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2000, p. 38. The Sunday Age, 30 May 2004. Herald Sun, 19 March 2002. The Age, 4 June 2002. The Australian, 7 August 2000.

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40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56

57 58 59

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The Australian & Herald Sun, 17 June 2002. The Australian & Herald Sun, 11 August 2000. The Age, 12 August 2000. The Age & Herald Sun, 9 August 2000; Victorian Parliamentary Debates, Assembly, 15 August 2000, pp. 24–26. Herald Sun, 16 May 2001. E. Hannan, The Age, 9 September 2000. The Australian, 20 March 2001. For full details of the reforms see B. Costar & G. Gardiner,‘From breaking governments to a brake on government: a new bicameralism in Victoria?’, Australasian Parliamentary Review, vol. 19, no. 1, 2003, pp. 33–45. Herald Sun, 17 January 2003. D. Baker, ‘Police, policy and practice’, in Costar & Economou, The Kennett Revolution, pp. 240ff. C. Lewis, The Age, 21 June 2004. The Age, 17 June 2004. Victorian Parliamentary Debates, Assembly, 22 November 2001, pp. 1906ff. Victorian Parliamentary Debates, Assembly, 28 November 2001, p. 2060. Herald Sun, 29 May 1999; 15 March 2000; AM, ABC Radio, 29 November 2001. Victorian Parliamentary Debates, Council, 10 October 2002, pp. 191ff. For a full discussion of the 2002 election see B. Costar & J. Campbell,‘Realigning Victoria: the state election of 30 November 2002’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 49, no. 2, 2003, pp. 313–23. Steve Bracks, The Age, 29 January 2000. Herald Sun, 20 September 1999. Herald Sun, 31 January 2000.

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Chapter 5

G E O F F G A L LO P: A N E W G E N E R AT I O N LABOR MAN

Harr y Phillips and David Black n 10 February 2001, Geoff Gallop led the Australian Labor Party (ALP) to electoral victory in Western Australia and became the 27th premier of that state. His first political stint had been three years as a local government councillor in Fremantle; he had accumulated nearly 15 years of parliamentary experience since then, after winning the traditionally Labor Legislative Assembly seat of Victoria Park in a by-election. Significantly, at that stage, he described himself as ‘a new generation Labor man’.1 In parliament he was very active in terms of speech-making and committee work, including a term as chair of the influential Public Accounts Committee, often regarded as a stepping-stone to the ministry. Under premier Carmen Lawrence from 1990 until the ALP lost office three years later, he had had a range of ministerial responsibilities, including education, parliamentary and electoral reform, fuel and energy, and economic reform. Thereafter, in opposition, he was allocated a large number of shadow portfolios, eventually succeeding Jim McGinty (now Attorney-General) as leader of the opposition in a smooth transition of power a few months before the 1996 state election. This relatively long apprenticeship meant that when Gallop became premier, there was a lot of information on the public record about the key elements of his political thought, and even his style, though there was conjecture about how the former university lecturer in social and political theory would lead his new government. This account canvasses Gallop’s early family history, educational background and political thought, and attempts to assess his premiership, focusing on his role as an election campaigner, policy broker, decision-maker and crisis manager.

O

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‘Senator’ Geoff Born on 27 September 1951 in the country town of Geraldton, some 500 kilometres north of Perth, Gallop was a descendant of one of the state’s best-known pioneering families. His great-great-grandfather on his father’s side, James Gallop, and his brothers Richard and Edward, arrived on the Lotus in 1829 – they were part of the first group of European settlers to arrive in the Swan River colony. His great-great-grandmother also came to Western Australia in that first fleet. Gallop House in Nedlands is a reminder of the family’s early prominence in the state. They played a part in the development of North Perth, Fremantle and York through market gardening and wine production.2 Geoff Gallop’s father, Douglas John Gallop, was a company secretary whose political leanings were similar to those espoused by Bob Menzies and Charles Court. However, his mother Eunice came from a family with trade union and Labor affiliations, and the household was one where political debate was not avoided.3 His parents never attempted to steer him towards politics, but a family friend, known as Auntie Dorothy, used to call the young Geoff ‘Senator’.4 Perhaps she read his schoolboy essay making the case for Australia to become a republic – and perhaps she would not have been surprised by his attendance at the 1999 Constitutional Convention arguing for a republic with a directly elected president.Although living in a war service home with his parents and a brother and a sister, Gallop says that ‘never wanted for anything’.5 His parents stayed in Geraldton throughout his childhood, and he completed his primary education at the local Beachlands Primary School. From 1964 to 1968 he attended Geraldton Senior High School, where he was both an outstanding student and a keen sportsman – and a school prefect in his final year. Cricket was a major interest, but he also played a range of other sports, including Australian rules football and tennis, and he was also a keen debater and actor – his first public role was in a primary school theatrical production staged in the Geraldton Town Hall.6 When he moved to Perth to commence his tertiary studies, Gallop played cricket for the university, then for Nedlands in the WACA competition, and then for Murdoch in the suburban turf competition. In addition, he was a member of the volleyball and table tennis associations. His interest in Aussie rules continues, and as premier he received the honour of being the No. 1 ticket-holder for Swan Districts in the state league, and membership of the West Coast Eagles.

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As a scholar Gallop’s record was outstanding, and in the course of completing his several academic qualifications he won a number of major prizes. After completing undergraduate studies in philosophy, politics and economics at the University of Western Australia, he was selected as a Rhodes Scholar in 1972 – he followed the same areas of interest at Oxford University. Further postgraduate courses at Murdoch University (1975–77) and Oxford (1979–81, as a Nuffield Fellow) eventually led to the award of a Doctor of Philosophy from Oxford in 1983. Gallop also held a range of tutoring positions before becoming a lecturer in social and political theory at Murdoch University from 1981 to 1986. Significantly, his student days were marked by a shift of political allegiance from Liberal to Labor. Initially, he joined the university Liberal club, where one of his close colleagues was Bob French, who later became president of the Native Title Tribunal, and then a Federal Court judge. However, Gallop became uncomfortable with the conservatism of the Liberal Party, particularly its continued commitment to the Vietnam War. In the wave of change roused by federal Labor leader Gough Whitlam in 1972, he accepted an invitation from Bob McMullan to join the ALP. Gallop also became a political radio commentator, and by 1983 he was providing expert commentary on the state and federal elections.7 Some time after he had been elected to the Legislative Assembly he published a number of his parliamentary speeches, under the title Labor’s Case for Parliamentary Democracy, and later many of his thoughts were captured in another publication: A State of Reform: Essays for a Better Future (Helm Wood Publishers, Wembley, 1998). The latter included a foreword by Tony Blair, Britain’s Prime Minister, whom Gallop had become close friends with at Oxford University, and who had on two occasions been to Perth to stay with the Gallops.8 According to Blair, Gallop was: quite simply, one of the most decent, straightforward people you could meet … he is also one of the brightest and most thoughtful. He influenced me enormously both at University in Oxford and after … the great thing about Geoff is his intellectual honesty … in essence he has extracted the core [values] of the Labor Party’s tradition … justice, community, citizenship – the belief that as individuals we prosper best within a strong and unified society of others.9

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In April 2004 Gallop visited Blair at 10 Downing Street with a contingent of students who were on tour visiting war memorials promoting the ANZAC tradition.While Gallop and Blair had to agree to disagree on the wisdom of participating in the Iraq War, it was a meeting of two articulate and educated ‘third way’ Labor leaders, both of whom viewed their parties as vehicles for political participation rather than for ideological dogma and both of whose policy packages could be depicted as inclusive, not ‘classridden’. Also, both have reputations for delivering keynote addresses to major forums. In recognition of his study and practice of public administration the Institute of Public Administration made Gallop a National Fellow in 2003.10

Making modern Australian democracy work In his maiden speech in the WA parliament, in 1986, Gallop argued strongly for constitutional reform. In his opinion the two basic state Acts, the Constitution Act 1889 (WA) and the Constitution Acts Amendment Act 1899 (WA), needed to be consolidated into one, with meaning given to key terms such as ‘responsible government’, ‘premier’, ‘Cabinet’ and ‘opposition’. The language needed to be made clearer ‘in the interests of political education generally and in the interests of interpretation, so that it is harder for the lawyers to read what they would like into those Acts’.11 Furthermore, he was critical of Westminster-type systems that permit constitution Acts to be amended by parliament rather than by referendum. He was initially chosen to chair a select committee on the issue of constitutional consolidation, but had to step aside when he was elevated to the ministry. On federalism, Gallop claimed that it ‘provides the most appropriate form of government for Australia’.12 In his view,‘not only does it reflect our history, the development of our country as a nation, but also it guarantees a degree of political diversity so easily lost in a unitary system’.13 While Gallop thought that ‘the States also have an enormous degree of political importance in our society’, it was true that their ability to exert that legislative and political power was circumscribed by financial considerations.14 Nevertheless, he added,‘I often wonder whether the ability to impose a tax translates as easily into the power to do it as those who lament its loss seemed to imply.’15 While Gallop was supportive of federalism, because it promoted governance with checks and balances, he also thought it needed to be capable of development and flexibility ‘if it is to be productive of the

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social good’.16 Many years later, as premier, he was prepared to admit that ‘sometime down the track [I am] interested in Australia’s role in the world, and that would mean entry to the federal parliament’.17 This statement may have been prompted by the galling experience of having Western Australia scrutinised by the enforcers of national competition policy and being criticised for not deregulating liquor trading hours and some products (such as potatoes). The Commonwealth penalised Western Australia for this financially and rejected out of hand Gallop’s arguments for continued regulation based on a concept of ‘social good’. During his early years as a parliamentarian Gallop continued to display a keen interest in constitutional issues, particularly the role of the Legislative Council, and to contribute ideas to the field. In essence, his proposals gave primacy to the lower house while still giving recognition to the role of an upper house acting as a ‘house of review’. Despite the fact that the ALP had never commanded a majority in WA’s Legislative Council, which was heavily weighted towards rural representation, Gallop did not support the old Labor policy of abolishing the upper house. He was also dismissive of a Liberal Party proposal in 1988 to introduce a form of citizen-initiated referendum, to be limited to the repeal or veto of legislation passed through parliament. He noted that parliamentary representatives often have to take the interests of future generations – and the wishes of minority groups – into account, and argued that modern legislatures, and indeed governments, are being pressured and influenced by a great many lobby groups, and by a media-driven process of public opinion formation. Organised groups can now quickly mobilise opinion, and quickly put together sophisticated, wellfunded campaigns, he said; he believed that it would be dangerous to allow a few citizens (perhaps as few as 500 or so), or groups who might not be able to garner support for their views in the first instance, to veto legislation that would have long-term benefits for the state. And he pointed out that while citizens may accept the overall purpose of an Act, if it were to go to them in a referendum, they would not be able to vote on any particular clauses – they would have to give a flat ‘yes’ or a ‘no’.18 Although Gallop did not accept the idea of citizen-initiated referenda, on a later occasion he did concede that ‘quite often Members can be elected and drift through their parliamentary careers without being subject to [the kinds of] accountability tests applied to most in today’s workforce’. 19 ‘This itself,’ he contended, ‘[was] a source of aggravation to many in the

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community when confronted with the powers and privileges associated with being a Member of Parliament.’20 In Gallop’s view, ‘one thing is certain about contemporary politics, and that is the alarming degree to which MPs [Members of Parliament], and, to a lesser extent, our political system, are held in disrepute’.21 He regarded a new level of professionalism, and codes of conduct for members, as ‘inevitable’,22 and believed that in order to improve their standing in the community, MPs needed to better understand the range of responsibilities they were required to exercise. In different ways, in a complex juggling act, he said, they are simultaneously responsible to their electorate, their political party, their parliamentary party, their portfolio, the parliament and the whole community. Interestingly, with regard to the latter, Gallop said: it is now a well-established tradition that MPs should respect and promote the range of interests in our society even if they are not fully in accord with their particular objectives. Because the community is the foundation stone of an active, participatory democracy, it needs to be supported by those with responsibility.23

Active citizenship, which requires all individuals to have the knowledge, skills and attitudes that will allow them to participate effectively in their society, is a cause that Gallop has long promoted. Aware that opinion polls have indicated that Australians know little about their political system, and that they are often cynical about that system, Gallop has espoused the aim that our young people should leave school knowledgeable about and capable of participating in our democratic system.24 Importantly, Gallop does not view citizenship narrowly – in terms of youth and voting, say; he sees it as being made up of a wide range of participatory mechanisms, from pressure group activity by the professions through to local ratepayers’ and residents’ groups, as well as voluntary participation in sporting, cultural, religious and other similar organisations. He has been critical of the undue reliance placed on conventional measures of progress such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which measures the flow of goods and services in an economy.25 His contention is that the health of the community, particularly of the suburbs of Perth, is closely linked to participation, via a range of voluntary associations, in political and planning processes. He argues that the ‘social capital’ created by this participation is now recognised as a necessary element of an active and progressive democracy – this reflects the influence of the writings of US political theorist Robert Putnam.26

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A modern-day Char tist A ‘minimum condition’ of modern democracy, in Gallop’s view, is an electoral system that is based on the notion of ‘one person, one vote, one value’. A commitment to this principle was confirmed by his studies of the British radical reform movement in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, including the Chartists.According to Gallop, the force of argument and common sense ‘which establishes voting rights for everyone – that we are all in the most important sense “equal” – also establishes the right of all to have one vote of the same value’:27 It does not make sense logically or ethically to establish the right of a person to vote and then diminish the value of that vote in relation to the votes cast by others. Indeed, in an extreme case this would undermine the very basis for community life itself by creating socially destructive inequalities in the distribution of political power.That, of course, is precisely what malapportionment does.28

He has taken every opportunity to communicate this passion for ‘one person, one vote, one value’.This has included submissions to constitutional bodies and parliamentary committees, to academic and other publications, and many seminars. In parliament he regularly argues for the cause and is invariably dismissive of counter-claims for vote-weighting, such as: since rural areas produce the real wealth of the nation they should have more say in government; the problems of communication in the sparsely settled areas demand smaller-enrolment electorates; numerical domination by the metropolis will overwhelm rural interests and therefore representation of interests rather than people is essential.As events have transpired, despite the claim that ‘one person, one vote, one value’ has become a central feature of electoral systems at both the Commonwealth and state levels, even as premier he has not been able to overcome the resistance in the Legislative Council – it refused to pass the legislation his government proposed. Even more galling for Gallop has been his perception that electoral equality is not accepted by the Supreme and High Courts as a fundamental principle of representative democracy.29 In every sense, then, constitutionalism, for Gallop, clearly incorporates the notion of equality in a modern representative democracy. Against this background and throughout his political career, he has been concerned about the effect of our adoption of British constitutional principles on Aboriginal peoples. In his first parliamentary speech Gallop cited one of his

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predecessors, Thomas Gallop (illiterate and living in England), instructing someone to write back to his sons – who had settled in 1829 in the Swan River colony – that problems with the Aboriginal population should be considered with the advice ‘recollect you are intruders in their country’.30 Gallop recognised that to most of the first European settlers, Aboriginal Australians had no claim on the land or title to it through habitation, cultivation or management. Australia was considered terra nullius, so most people saw no need to bother about indigenous Australian views of the landscape, as the Aboriginal peoples themselves had no right to the land. Later he cited the opinions of those such as professional historian Henry Reynolds, who in his The Law of the Land (Penguin, Melbourne, 1987) noted that from the 1820s onwards, a number of settlers did conclude that the Aborigines had a strong sense of identity with a specific homeland. In an address in 1993, Gallop said: Tragically, though, it was to be another two centuries [before] the concept of a native title to land was to become a part of the law of our nation, by way of the Mabo decision of the High Court in 1992. How different our history, and indeed our landscape, may have been if the High Court’s proposed regulation of the intersection between Australia’s Aboriginal and European destinies had been law in 1788.31

Gallop sees the gulf between the Aboriginal and the European way of seeing the landscape, but feels that it reflects ‘not so much the intellectual difficulty of coming to grips with the Aboriginal world-view [– that earth–sky–water–tree–spirit–human complex existing in space [and] time which is the Aboriginal world –] as … the power and politics of the situation’.32 Land rights, mostly in the form of native title cases, and ecological and environmental considerations, have been important issues since Gallop became premier. By that stage, however, Gallop had recognised that the delivery of land rights and environmental policies had to be integrated with the economic dictates of his government. Another theme that Gallop has constantly revisited is the changing role of the state, particularly in an increasingly globalised economy. Citing Menzies, who once said ‘there is hardly a section of the community that doesn’t in one breath protest undying hostility to government interference and next, pray for it’,33 Gallop has made it clear that he recognises that ‘relations between State and business are inherently complex and contradictory’.34 According to

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Gallop, ‘one thing is for certain. There is no set formula for determining what is the best relationship. Indeed ideologies like socialism and capitalism which have a rigid, ideal-type view of the matter inevitably come unstuck in the real world of politics and economics.’35 Too much time is spent, he says, looking for the best example of government/business co-operation: on one hand there is the Anglo-American model in which the emphasis is on deregulation, privatisation and flexibility of the labour market; on the other there is the ‘continental model, where the emphasis is on social inclusion, co-determination and intervention’.According to Gallop,‘the truth is [that] both models have had their successes and both carry their problems’.36 The Burt Commission on Accountability (1989) and the Commission on Government (COG) (1995) both made clear statements on the need for transparency, and for the incorporation of more checks and balances in respect of the use of public monies. Acknowledging that Western Australia was still grappling with the issues of the 1980s as outlined in the Report of the Royal Commission into Commercial Activities of Government and Other Matters, often labelled the ‘WA Inc. Royal Commission’, Gallop contended that the time when the state should be a banker was over. His statements succeeded in dissociating his government from the failed rescue of Rothwell’s Bank and other ‘WA Inc.’ dealings by Brian Burke’s Labor Government in the 1980s, but the state’s role as provider – if not funder – of infrastructure has remained: the North-West Shelf gas project, which does involve state support, is cited as an example of a viable model. Markets, according to Gallop, do not easily incorporate longer-term requirements or strategic considerations, hence good governments have to adopt this role and develop infrastructure plans for the future.37

Election campaigner Gallop’s first foray into electoral politics was in local government, in the City of Fremantle. In a reminder of the electoral scene of an earlier generation, when election by acclamation was common, Gallop was elected unopposed for a council ward in 1983 – and then twice ran unsuccessfully for the safe Labor seat of Cockburn in state parliament. However, after a deal, he succeeded in securing the seat of Victoria Park, which borders the eastern outskirts of Perth’s central business district. With votes lost to a breakaway ALP candidate, there was a significant fall in the vote for the ALP on the primary count and a swing against the party of 8.9 per cent on a

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two-party preferred basis, but despite this, Gallop was returned without the need for preferences to be distributed.38 Faced with defending what was in danger of becoming a marginal seat, Gallop quickly went about improving his electoral fortunes. He purchased a family home in the district, a practice he advocated for his colleagues when he became leader, and immediately commenced publishing short histories of suburbs in Victoria Park in the community newspaper.39 Friday, a non-sitting day for the Legislative Assembly, became his day for doorknocking and ensuring that local concerns were addressed. Over successive elections Gallop has managed to increase his majority: after the 2001 state election, when he became premier, a two-party preferred swing of nearly 14 per cent would be required to unseat him. Interestingly, after becoming premier he became embroiled in a constituency issue, facing angry protests over his government’s decision to expand the Nyandi ‘family-friendly’ women’s prison in Bentley from 49 to 70 beds. However, as a consequence of an electoral redistribution in 2003, the prison was then located in the adjoining electorate – South Perth, which was held by independent liberal Phillip Pendal. A spokesperson for the Nyandi Action Group claimed that Gallop, who had refused to waste taxpayers’ money on a development elsewhere, had been given a ‘get out of jail free’ card, with Pendal left to argue that a more suitable site was Acacia in Wooroloo, the home of Western Australia’s only private prison.40 The first major test for Gallop as a campaigner took place when the leadership of the ALP was thrust upon him on 8 October 1996, a few months before a state election. McGinty, Labor leader since Ian Taylor had resigned from the post in 1994, stepped down because he believed that his deputy had the better leadership credentials.41 The late accession to the leadership for Gallop was obviously a factor in premier Richard Court’s decision to call a general election on 12 December 1996 – he planned to catch Labor in mid stream, with insufficient time organise itself (elections were usually in February or March). In a manner reminiscent of the Kennett Government’s ‘guilty men’ theme during an earlier Victorian election campaign, a number of the coalition television and radio advertisements linked the new Labor leader with the WA Inc. era.This was despite the fact that Gallop, although an MP during the Burke and Dowding governments, had not become a minister until February 1990, when Lawrence had become premier. Gallop reacted angrily to these ‘personal’

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attacks during a radio debate with Court – most commentators agreed that the premier had emerged ahead on points.42 In contrast, in the only television debate of the campaign, Gallop was able to regain some lost ground by elevating the government’s controversial privatisation program to the forefront of the campaign.43 Under the banner ‘Getting the Priorities Right’, the leader contended that the coalition’s ‘bean counter’ approach to state finances was responsible for significant cuts to essential services. As part of his quest to shake off the WA Inc. past, Gallop pledged to produce budget surpluses every year, reduce public sector net debt, cap increases in essential government charges at or below the rate of inflation, and work to restore the state’s triple A credit rating. Promises (which were actually delivered when he later won government) were made to reduce the size of the Cabinet and to prune the upper echelons of the public service. According to the Gallop prescription, cuts to government advertising, travel and consultancies, and amalgamating departments, would produce substantial savings without reducing services. Another Labor commitment was to implement the vast majority of the COG recommendations, which the Court Government had been surprisingly reluctant to support. However, Gallop’s problems were exacerbated by the ongoing fallout from the adverse findings of the 1995 Marks Royal Commission, which investigated former premier Lawrence’s actions and ‘motivations’ in the tabling of a petition pertaining to the late Penny Easton and Brian Easton, her estranged husband, in the Legislative Council shortly before the 1993 election. At the official party launch, Gallop promised a social and economic contract in education, health care, transport and the environment. He also stated that his ‘politics is founded on a fundamental belief in the power and good of education’.44 In pursuit of this objective, commitments were made to reduce junior primary class sizes and to provide a technology package that included access to one new computer for every ten children. Another important policy in the campaign, designed to mend fences with the trade union movement, was a commitment to repeal the coalition’s industrial relations legislation, restore the award safety net and commission a review of work hours.45 Against a continuing background of opinion polls showing the opposition trailing badly, Labor apparatchiks made a strategic decision to concede defeat publicly just three days before the poll. Presumably they hoped that the party’s underdog status plus the protest vote would limit the

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scale of the expected coalition victory. It was an extraordinary move, and drew the wrath of some Labor candidates in marginal seats. The final outcome in 1996 was a ‘status quo’ result – and relief in Labor circles that it had not suffered a much heavier defeat. Even so the party lost 5 seats in the Legislative Assembly, leaving it with only 19 of the 57 seats, its lowest tally in that chamber since the conscription split in the 1917 election.What remained unclear, however, was the part the normally optimistic and positive Gallop had played in the highly unusual ‘white flag’ campaign strategy. Perhaps it indicated only that the party, including its leadership, had lacked the time to plan a co-ordinated campaign. Gallop’s acid test as a campaigner, and perhaps also as a leader, was to come with the election of 10 February 2001. One interpretation of the result was that it was a stunning success for Gallop. Labor gained more seats to win government (14) than any other party in WA history (though this was recorded from a relatively low base), lost only 1 seat (in its traditional stronghold of Kalgoorlie), and emerged with a comfortable 7 seat majority in the Legislative Assembly. In the Legislative Council, a traditional Labor stronghold, the ALP vote combined with the 5 Greens could yield a legislative majority even if Labor took the presidency of the chamber, giving the party scope to pass some contentious social policies, such as decriminalisation of cannabis use, prostitution registration and lesbian and gay law reform. However, only if Labor or the Greens did not supply the president would Gallop be able to secure a constitutional majority of 18 of the 34 Legislative Council votes and thus achieve his cherished constitutional reform, particularly the abolition of vote-weighting.As it transpired, Labor’s John Cowdell, previously deputy president, was elected the first ALP Legislative Council president, and the government had therefore to attempt to achieve its electoral law changes on the basis of a simple legislative majority.This approach, based on a creative interpretation of the state’s Electoral Act, foundered when a legal challenge saw the legislation declared invalid by both the state Supreme Court (in 2003) and the High Court (in 2004). This judicial outcome occurred because constitutional amendments in Western Australia, including the redistribution of electoral boundaries, require an absolute majority of the full membership of both the Legislative Assembly and Legislative Council. So Labor, under Gallop, had fallen 1 seat short in the Legislative

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Council of being able to fully achieve what it regarded as its ‘mandate’ – its prospects for electoral reform in the next few years. But a closer examination of the 2001 vote, even the Legislative Assembly vote, revealed that the party had done better in terms of seats than in terms of votes. Labor had improved on its 1996 performance by only 1.41 per cent: its aggregate primary vote of 37.23 per cent was only 0.15 per cent better than in 1993, when Lawrence was swept from office.46 As political scientist Bruce Stone observed, ‘Labor’s parliamentary majority was a windfall delivered by the poor performance of its principal opponent and the flow of preferences under the alternative vote electoral system’,47 and it was achieved in an election when the performance of One Nation significantly eroded the coalition’s primary vote. In Stone’s view, the Court Government had made ‘a sustained contribution to its own demise’.48 In the final week of the campaign, for example, the Court Government’s ‘qualms’ over the new accountabilities recommended by the COG were tested when it was revealed that a Liberal backbencher, Bob Bloffwitch, had not publicly revealed his share portfolio despite being chair of a parliamentary committee that considered MPs’ financial interests.49 Moreover, the same MP had not revealed his financial interests when development alternatives were being considered in his electorate of Geraldton. In Albany, the incumbent, Police Minister Kevin Prince, was facing allegations about his handing of a financial matter. This did not appear to be serious, but Prince still lost his seat. Even more damaging was the ‘Finance Brokers’ Scandal’, which resulted in heavy losses to many elderly investors, including those in the Alfred Cove district held by Fair Trading Minister Doug Shave. The latter’s handling of the issue proved electorally disastrous for the Court Government, with Shave losing his seat to Dr Janet Woollard (the Liberals for Forests candidate) and leaving a legacy of ill-will towards both himself and his supporters in the Liberal Party. As well, Western Australia was the ‘first cab off the rank’ in the aftermath of the controversial goods and services tax (GST) and the petrol pricing controversies of the federal government; however, opinion polls had still predicted a narrow coalition victory. Paradoxically, the possibility – and then reality – of a significant One Nation vote caused much confusion, mainly because the direction of their preferences could not be predicted accurately. Certainly the anatomy of Labor’s victory raises questions about what share

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of the credit Gallop should take for Labor’s leap to government. Was it, in Stone’s words, ‘more a case of protracted suicide’ committed by the Court Government after eight years in office?50 Under Gallop, though, Labor’s policy mix has been carefully crafted.This was the first state election when the policy packages of the parties were widely available to the public and frequently visited via the internet. The campaign, featuring Gallop as the key Labor salesman, began to turn Labor’s way when the West Australian carried the headline ‘Hospitals full’ in midJanuary. Ongoing industrial action by nurses also kept health problems to the fore.51 By the eve of the election Gallop had succeeded in making health the top talkback issue.A great deal of emphasis was also placed on the alleged failings of the education system, but perhaps the most telling promise of all during the campaign was Gallop’s commitment to stop logging in oldgrowth forests immediately; this was the move that swung the allocation of preferences from the Greens and from the emerging Liberals for Forests to Labor. Gallop’s better reading of the electorate came alongside strong opposition from union leaders representing potential displaced workers, who were to receive a compensation package. Gallop was also sensitive to the need to maintain the perception that his government was strong on law and order issues, and therefore supported the contentious policy of mandatory sentencing. One component of the campaign which apparently backfired for the coalition was its attempt to remind electors, through the media and billboard advertising, of Labor’s past problems and union links by featuring photographs of former premier Burke and prominent union official Kevin Reynolds (who was Geoff Gallop (photo courtesy of Office of the known, ironically, as a critic of Premier, Western Australia). Gallop).

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Once again, the campaign included a single televised debate between the leaders, scheduled for 31 January 2001 – after the Liberal Party policy speech, but before Labor’s official campaign launch, which Gallop delayed until the last week of the campaign. Opinions varied as to whether or not a clear winner emerged from the debate, but most agreed that Gallop was able to convey a ‘premier-like-presence’, perhaps winning more of the substantial undecided vote.The last poll released by Newspoll (on election day) suggested that Gallop had drawn level with Court as preferred premier.52 During the debate Court had done poorly with penetrating questions about whether he was in ‘deficit denial’, but Gallop, too, had made mistakes: he had been unwisely drawn into a promise that under his leadership a Labor Government would not raise taxes.53 Equally troublesome for Gallop subsequently was the impression that Labor would ‘fix the health system’.

‘Good news Geoff ’: decision-maker and policy broker As premier, Gallop faced the major challenge of being the state’s key decision-maker and policy broker.Among the government’s first decisions were the establishment of an expenditure review committee (out of Cabinet) and the decision to delay bringing down the state Budget from May until August or September.Treasury advice was that the budgetary situation was ‘tight’.This had been signalled in oblique terms before the election, but the realisation that Western Australia’s triple A status was under threat gave the government little scope to address some of the major expenditure areas, such as health and education. A machinery of government task force, chaired by experienced public servant Stuart Hicks, was also established: its brief was to recommend structural changes to the state’s public sector. Indeed, in the first 100 days, some 40 reviews, encompassing virtually every portfolio, were established. In June a Royal Commission, headed by Ian Temby QC, was announced to inquire into the Finance Brokers’ Scandal, and a drug summit was scheduled for August: this paved the way for decriminalisation of cannabis use legislation. New opposition leader Colin Barnett disputed Labor’s claims about the budgetary situation and also claimed that the government was opting for the establishment of review panels as a substitute for effective decision-making.When the government surprised everyone with an announcement that the Legislative Assembly

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would forego one of its scheduled sitting weeks, Barnett said Gallop’s government had ‘not got its act together’.The government retorted that it needed to negotiate with the new configuration of parties in the Legislative Council.54 With ministers (now reduced in number from 17 to 14 as an economy measure) coming to grips with their new responsibilities, the review phase could be regarded as sound administration. It thwarted the possibility of any ‘crash through’ reputation for the new premier, but it may also have denied his government the ‘honeymoon’ phase which seems almost a political fact of life in Australian jurisdictions. Though it can be argued that Labor never had a popular mandate, subsequent polls suggested that Labor’s vote remained near its election day vote, with a peak in mid-August 2001 of some 43 per cent (according to Westpoll55) then a drop towards the end of the year (according to Newspoll) to 35 per cent.56 This remained the pattern for the government over the next two years. In October 2003 the Westpoll reading was down to 36 per cent,57 but it rose again in February 2004 to an unexpectedly high 47 per cent.58 Once again, though, a Newspoll covering the January to March months of 2004 returned the Labor vote to 37 per cent.59 Although the Gallop Government had by then faced a round of industrial disputes with police, teachers and public servants, the electoral impact of this had been cushioned by leadership and preselection difficulties in the Liberal Party.60 However, the Labor vote was lower in rural areas, and not holding in the Kimberley and Pilbara. In December 2003, Gallop critic Larry Graham, a Labor MP until the 2001 election, when he ran and won Pilbara as an independent after losing preselection, said the ALP was so paranoid about repeating the mistakes of WA Inc. that the state had become paralysed.The Gallop Government, said Graham, had betrayed people living in the country.61 Gallop, however, continued to defend the performance of his government in the north of the state. Significantly, Gallop’s own ratings as premier have remained high during most of his premiership.62 This requires some explanation, although it has to be conceded that most of the present-day premiers have high ratings and profiles, particularly when compared with their opposition counterparts. Most of what the Labor Government does in Western Australia is done in the name of the premier. Key announcements in each portfolio are invariably presented to the public via Gallop addressing the

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media. Being articulate, neatly attired and regularly described as having ‘a Clark Kent appearance’ certainly helps.63 Command of policy across all the portfolios is another Gallop attribute. Opposition leader Barnett has argued that Gallop does not carry enough of the ministerial load – because he broke with WA tradition and did not combine the role of premier with the exacting task of being Treasurer. Instead, Gallop’s additional portfolios were federal affairs, public sector management, citizenship and multicultural affairs and science. A more substantial criticism is implied with the label ‘good news Geoff ’. Thus during the lead-up period to the delivery of the state Budget in May 2003, the premier made a series of capital works projects announcements, leaving his Treasurer, Eric Ripper, to make the announcements about unpopular taxation increases in the official Budget speech. Much of the criticism of the Budget – and it was a Budget characterised by excellent growth and good employment figures – was levelled at a 15 per cent increase in stamp duty, and was accompanied by reminders of Gallop’s preelection promise of no taxation increases. Nevertheless, the increase survived, unlike an earlier premium tax on all residential properties with an improved land value of $1 million. Although a similar tax had been introduced five years earlier in New South Wales, the Gallop Government was forced first to modify and then to scrap the tax completely, as it threatened to jeopardise the prospects for Labor candidates in the forthcoming federal election. When the polls for the Gallop Government took a dip in the second half of 2003, the premier reshuffled his public relations staff, with key figure Kieran Murphy being moved sideways and being replaced by the more genial Guy Houston. It was reported that some Labor MPs had grudgingly referred to Murphy as the 15th member of Cabinet, in the style of Tony Blair’s pressman Alistair Campbell, and as having ‘a powerful influence in government and a head-butting approach to dealing with the media’.64 Steve Pennells, a leading political columnist, argued: Since coming to power in 2001, the Gallop government’s media strategy has been increasingly modelled on the man Dr Gallop calls ‘my mate Tony’, a reference to Britain’s Prime Minister Tony Blair. He has been shielded from the bad news and wheeled out at every positive media opportunity, no matter which Minister’s portfolio it falls under.There are remarkable parallels between the

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way Mr Blair and Dr Gallop have moulded their public profiles, right down to the operating styles of their media svengalis. In a bid to remain popular, the pair have been populist. But the tactic has turned them into the proverbial leaders without a cause and both are finding public trust waning as a result.65

Ironically, these observations were made after Gallop and his Cabinet had made two major decisions. In June 2003 Gallop made a special flight to Ningaloo, in the state’s northwest, the site of a long-proposed resort development, to announce that his government had ‘drawn a line in the sand and declared that we will not accept developments that threaten the precious fragile coast’.66 In September of the same year Gallop announced that a major Chevron-Texaco Gorgon gas project at Barrow Island had received the green light from Cabinet, with State Development Minister Clive Brown nodding in sync.The Ningaloo decision meant Gallop was depicted as ‘the environmentalists’ best mate’,67 but Gorgon saw him described as ‘seducing big business’.68 Aiming for balance, the premier released Hope for the Future: the Western Australian State Sustainability Strategy, with an announcement that his government was drafting a Sustainability Bill. Meanwhile, across town, Consumer and Employment Minister John Kobelke was left to defend the Gallop Government about a series of industrial disputes with police, teachers and public sector workers, all of which were contributing to the poor poll ratings. Ministers seemed to deliver the bad news, while the good news was invariably delivered by Gallop.69 The West Australian is the state’s only daily newspaper, which makes all premiers, and their respective governments, particularly vulnerable to the paper’s editorial judgement. Gallop, who is generally widely available to the media, has conceded that the front page of the West Australian is important in setting his political agenda.70 There is little doubt that Gallop’s government has generally been subject to a very critical press in Western Australia, on both the big and the not so big decisions.When Gallop chose to list his government’s achievements in its first 1000 days, for example, the West Australian immediately responded with a somewhat arbitrarily prepared report card – it gave ‘good’ ratings for education, social reform and economics; ‘fair’ for law and order, health and environment; and ‘poor’ for industrial relations and accountability.71 The tone of the report was surprisingly good considering the constant stream of critical editorials, but it did predict that health was an area likely to dog the government in all polls.And

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in fact Gallop’s 1000 day address had been interrupted by a delegation of residents from the wheatbelt town of Moora, protesting the government’s decision not to honour a commitment to rebuild the dilapidated Moora Hospital.72 With the next election looming on 26 February 2005, decisions had to be made in the health portfolio, even though many of the difficulties there stem from federal policies or the lack of synchronisation between the two levels of government. In June 2003 Gallop had made a bold move, persuading his highly effective and powerful Attorney-General, Jim McGinty, to switch to the health ministry – the move was widely welcomed by the medical profession. Opposition leader Barnett conceded that McGinty, who had been in effect restructuring the judicial system of the state, was the person most capable of handling health, but thought the appointment was at least six months too late. McGinty soon made some unpopular decisions, including cutting a number of small programs, some of which had to be reinstated. However, the ‘big picture’ was McGinty’s focus, and he worked closely with Professor Michael Reid, a former NSW health director, who had earlier been commissioned to fix the state’s ailing health system. The planned reconfiguration, which was announced in March 2004, and which was to take 15 years altogether, would mean a host of closures, and hospitals being designated to specialise in certain areas of medicine. It would also mean streamlining and rationalising the teaching hospitals’ specialty services. Whether or not the necessary consensus could be achieved remained a formidable challenge for the premier. Countless previous reviews have achieved little, but on this occasion Gallop selected the appropriate reviewer and the right minister to follow through. Nevertheless, as the 36th Parliament came to a close in 2004, there were very few signs of a major overhaul of the health system.

Unflappable crisis manager Gallop’s first headache as premier came in unusual circumstances. Even before he tabled a promised ministerial code of conduct, he was embarrassed when his newly appointed Transport Minister, Allannah MacTiernan, lost her driver’s licence: she had had a number of breaches, including two drink-driving offences. The premier resisted calls for the dismissal of MacTiernan, but he did move the responsibility for road safety matters to

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Michelle Roberts, the Police Minister. Fortunately, the wider ministry remained relatively scandal-free, despite opposition calls for Bob Kucera to stand down over sensational revelations that police had concocted evidence against the Mickelberg brothers in the Mint Swindle. At that time, Kucera was the officer in charge at the Belmont police station, where one of the interrogations had taken place. Gallop steadfastly supported Kucera, and refused to indicate to the parliament whether or not his minister had been named in the ongoing Police Royal Commission, which included the Mickelberg controversy within its terms of reference. Gallop also refused to rebuke Attorney-General McGinty over criticism that he had breached the law by showing a copy of an affidavit to Kucera.73 On another occasion Gallop rejected a motion of no confidence in the Minister for the Environment, Judy Edwards, over the handling of her portfolio. Indeed, when he unveiled a reshaped Cabinet in June 2003 – to ‘streamline the government’s focus in core areas’ – he retained Edwards, supposedly after strong representation from some environmental groups, who respected her credentials for the post.74 And when Tom Stephens, as Housing and Works Minister, introduced a controversial policy that restricted construction companies to four government contracts worth over $1.5 million each at one time, Gallop’s approach was to gently transfer the portfolio to another minister, Nick Griffiths. As mentioned earlier, Gallop did reshuffle his ministry – without changing personnel – but was publicly very supportive of his team. In July 2003 he again rejected Barnett’s call for the dismissal of Kucera, this time on account of Aboriginal health funding matters, although he did concede that his minister could have acted more quickly over missing monies. Later in the same year he was stoutly supportive of Planning Minister MacTiernan’s ability to budget for major projects, after her department presided over cost blowouts on the southwest rail line to Mandurah.75 In some circles it has been suggested that both Gallop’s defence of his government, and the style of some of its more colourful members (such as MacTiernan), can ‘be over the top’.76 Others suggest that this is part of what happens under the Westminster system, and that Gallop sees parliament as a debating chamber with room for theatre. This is an interesting view, because when he was leader of the opposition in 1997, Gallop supported the introduction of a ‘citizens’ right of reply’ – he believed the procedure would enhance accountability and openness in parliament and give citizens extra

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rights without diminishing the protection parliamentarians have under parliamentary procedure.77 As premier, Gallop witnessed the opening of parliament in May 2001 with Governor Lieutenant General Sanderson acknowledging the traditional custodians of the land Parliament House is built on. For the first time ever, an indigenous people’s ceremony took place on the front steps of Parliament House, and inside, Carol Martin, a new Labor member and the first Aboriginal woman elected to an Australian parliament, was given the symbolic honour of moving the address-in-reply speech in the Legislative Assembly. This gave Gallop a deal of satisfaction, as when he had been leader of the opposition, he had presented a motion, supported by then premier Court, to offer a public apology to indigenous peoples for past policies under which Aboriginal children were removed from their families.78 Indeed, Gallop’s empathy for the Aboriginal perspective may have avoided more crises in this portfolio area. His government has been generally proactive in relation to the vexed question of native title, and has been prepared to pursue negotiated settlements rather than face the increasingly higher levels of proof of continuous ownership required by the courts. In August 2002 Gallop described the epidemic of family violence and child abuse in Aboriginal communities as ‘a national disaster’.79 Earlier, in November 2001, he commissioned children’s court magistrate Sue Gordon to examine how governments dealt with complaints of family violence and child abuse in Aboriginal communities, following the inquest into the death of 15-year-old Susan Taylor at the Swan Valley Nyungah community. The Gordon Report contained 197 findings and recommendations, and the Gallop Government responded in December 2002 with a range of initiatives, including more child protection staff and more remote police stations. Only one of the recommendations was finally rejected outright, with the government preferring new lease arrangements over drawing up a memorandum of understanding for the management of the community. A leader of the Nyungah community, Robert Bropho, had attempted to stop police and welfare workers from visiting the camp in late 2002. More than six months later Bropho conducted a ‘hunger strike’ on the steps of the parliament,80 but the government’s approach won strong editorial support in the West Australian.81 Another controversial stance, which also received strong editorial and

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opinion poll support,82 was Gallop’s decision in June 2003 to impose a youth curfew on the streets of Northbridge (just north of Perth). Gallop defended the policy as necessary to protect children and the rights of people going about their business. Some critics suggested that the curfew had racist overtones, because the area was primarily an indigenous community, and others questioned the legality of the police surveillance that went along with the curfew. And when a state-based human rights group (Human Rights WA. Inc.) reported in March 2004 on the work of government and other community groups in relation to identified United Nations rights, it ‘scolded’ the Gallop Government for the Northbridge curfew on the grounds that it brought many young people into conflict with the police and justice system who would otherwise be unlikely to have any contact with either system.83 Although the group thought the overall record of the government was ‘reasonable’, it also criticised the continuation of the three strikes mandatory sentencing legislation for juveniles and the so-called anti-bike laws, because of the absence of due process provisions. On the other hand, the Gallop Government was credited with doing well on gay rights laws, Aboriginal domestic violence and child sexual abuse problems.84 A future report will presumably evaluate the outcomes of the royal commission into the police force headed by retired Supreme Court judge Geoffrey Kennedy. Even before the delayed final report was tabled (in March 2004), the Gallop Government had acted on an interim report from Kennedy with legislation to revamp the Anti Crime Commission with a strengthened Crime Corruption Commission, subject to the oversight of an independent parliamentary inspector. Other major problem areas for the Gallop Government are energy and water resources. In the latter sphere, made critical by a succession of dry winters and low dam levels, the government again used the approach of working with key stakeholders, this time in a water symposium held in October 2002.This was followed by the publication of a state water strategy and a Waterwise rebate program. It is difficult to gauge the degree of success achieved by the water program, except by looking at the government’s ability to avoid increasing the level of water restrictions. For the ‘salinity crisis’,85 covering the wheatbelt and beyond, a task force was quickly established, but finding long-term solutions has been difficult because of the scale of the problem and the need for considerable federal financial assistance.86 Energy posed more of an immediate electoral threat

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for Gallop.The disaggregation of Western Power, together with associated reforms, was a major platform of the Gallop Government, comforted by support from the Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Chamber of Minerals and Energy. However, reluctance by the Greens and former energy minister (and now opposition leader) Barnett to back the measures in the Legislative Council meant that the Gallop Government had to temporarily abandon its plan for restructuring Western Power. Then a series of major power failures during a heatwave in February 2004 led to calls for the dismissal of Energy Minister and Treasurer Ripper. Gallop refused to remove Ripper from his post, instead supporting the minister in sacking yet another chief executive officer of the instrumentality, who shouldered much of the blame for the crisis. The theory articulated was that statutory authorities such as Western Power have a large amount of autonomy today, and that this means the minister has no direct responsibility for events surrounding them.87 Indeed the Gallop Government, in its first two years, was attacked for ‘golden gag’ practices whereby some 60 senior public servants resigned or were made redundant, all of them signing agreements preventing them from criticising the government.88 The likely electoral fallout of another controversial issue for the Gallop Government, namely public funding for elections, was lessened by McGinty, the Electoral Affairs Minister, who withdrew the legislation after Liberal Party leader Barnett reversed an earlier indication that his party would back the proposal. Although similar public funding legislation has been the law for two decades at the Commonwealth level, and in most other states, the West Australian newspaper vehemently attacked the behind the scenes ‘poll tax’ bipartisan deal with ‘snouts in the trough’ banner headlines.89 Its campaign resulted in a flood of letters from angry readers, and a poll finding that four out of five voters opposed public funding for state elections.90 Opposition leader Barnett was subjected to a scathing public attack by a Liberal backbencher over his handling of the issue, coupled with a party room decision not to support the legislation; this allowed the Gallop Government to temporarily move on from the matter and pursue other reforms of the electoral law, such as a fixed term for the Legislative Assembly. Crises such as terrorism and natural disasters have invariably been sensitively handled by Gallop as premier. In the aftermath of the October 2002 Bali bombing, in which some 15 West Australians lost their lives, plans for

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an appropriate memorial were drawn up.As with other projects, the Gallop approach was to seek community submissions rather than proceed with his proposals.The premier, with his interest in the state’s history, has also been continually supportive of major state celebrations such as the 2004 series of events to mark the 175th year of European settlement and the 100th year of the WA parliamentary building. One item on the agenda was a joint sitting of the parliament when consideration was given to Gallop’s keenly sought constitutional reforms. For the 175th year celebrations the premier launched a competition to identify the state’s icons, leading with his own suggestion – the Swan River. His published New Year resolution was ‘to foster debate about the past, present and future of Western Australia in its 175th year’.91

Setting a benchmark: Sir John Forrest Historian Geoffrey Bolton once suggested to Gallop that ‘Forrest is the benchmark upon which you should judge your performance.’92 Gallop, too, has cited the eminent Martyn Webb’s observation that while people think of Forrest as a political figure,‘he was fundamentally a scientist.As a geographer he used his powers of observation as a foundation on which to build ideas and to think holistically about Western Australia.’93 Another prominent historian, Frank Crowley, observed that Forrest had a strong sense of purpose and a clear vision of the colony’s future. He thought government ‘should be bold but cautious, always remembering that it was a trustee for the future’.94 Gallop has long admired the expansive view that Forrest took of politics, including his creation of formidable infrastructure schemes and the role he believed Western Australia could play in an Australian nation. Following from this view, several of the parliamentary recesses during Gallop’s terms as both opposition leader and premier have seen him take short trips all over the world – to China, Japan, the United States and Mexico – promoting investment in the state’s major development projects.95 Forrest, as the first premier of Western Australia and a founding Federation father, is a model Gallop can revere without political cost. Sir Charles Court also had broad visions and many infrastructure projects, but mention of Richard Court and the ‘Court dynasty’ does not appeal to Labor. Reference to Forrest further distances ‘Gallop Labor’ from ‘Burke Labor’, which is both ideologically convenient and electorally advantageous.

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Gallop has qualifications as a social scientist and has been a keen advocate of science, with the latter as one of his portfolios. One columnist, though, has suggested that Gallop lacks the ‘gift of common man’s gab’96 in his regular radio and television appearances. The same observer has indicated that he thinks: Dr Gallop is a victim of his own high standards. I don’t know if it’s the academic in him, but he wants, and feels, he must answer every question with technical detail. He treats talkback callers like political opponents when all they’re looking for is a little empathy.97

Gallop has attempted to articulate a vision, but has to deal with more constraints than Forrest, who commanded the parliament for many years, before the introduction of formal party structures – and usually with a compliant Legislative Council. And there are other significant differences. In the lead-up to the 2005 state election, on 26 February, the Labor Party has been stricken with preselection squabbles in critical seats, and Gallop has been accused of ‘leadership failure’ for not initially taking decisive action;98 in Forrest’s pre-party patronage era, over 30 per cent of seats were filled by acclamation.99 Modern accountability measures and institutions, including the media, are a constant check on a contemporary premier. On the other hand, today’s premier has a coterie of advisers, a Department of Premier and Cabinet, and a team of public relations staff. Moreover, it is extremely unlikely, given the more volatile contemporary voting public, that Gallop, as a ‘new generation Labor man’, will be able to emulate Forrest in either being at the helm of his state for more than a decade or leaving a comparable mark. Gallop’s ultimate record will be enhanced if the Mandurah railway is completed without burdensome debt, if the restructuring of the health system is viable, and if the state’s future water needs (coupled with salinity containment) are provided for sustainably. Gallop himself would regard maintaining the state’s triple A investment status, and the creation of major development projects to help maintain satisfactory growth and employment figures, as vital.Advances in education, particularly in science, would be another thing Gallop would regard as important. Constitutional reform and plans for increased engagement of citizens in their communities are long-run objectives he holds dear. If Gallop were to win a second four-year term, Bolton’s suggested comparison with Forrest, despite the different political settings, would be an exercise that could be meaningfully undertaken.

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POSTSCRIPT: Dr Geoff Gallop was returned for a second term at the State election held on 26 February 2005 with an increased majority (of at least seven seats in parliament).The election result seemed to hinge on the Opposition's campaign blunders as much as on the government's record.

Notes 1 2

3 4 5 6 7

8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

18 19 20 21 22 23 24

The Sunday Times, 8 June 1986, p. 18. One of Geoff Gallop’s relations, George James Gallop Warden Miles, was a North Province member of the Legislative Council from 1916 to 1950. Conservative in outlook, Miles started as an independent but became a Liberal towards the end of his long parliamentary career. Interview with Geoff Gallop, Parliament House, Western Australia, 16 December 2003. N.Aisbett,‘Dr Who?’,West Australian,The Big Weekend, 13 January, 2001. p. 4. Aisbett, ‘Dr Who?’, p. 3. Aisbett, ‘Dr Who?’. Gallop’s early writings included a chapter on Western Australia in Brian Galligan’s edited work Australian State Politics (Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1986) and a tract called Pigs’ Meat: The Selected Writings of Thomas Spence (Spokesman, Nottingham, 1982). Aisbett, ‘Dr Who?’, p. 3. Cited in G. Gallop, A State of Reform: Essays for a Better Future, Helm Wood Publishers,Wembley, 1998, p. v. Institute of Public Administration, IPAA News, April 2004, p. 2. Western Australian Parliamentary Debates (WAPD), 18 June 1986, p. 439. WAPD, 18 June 1986, p. 438. WAPD, 18 June 1986, p. 438. WAPD, 18 June 1986, p. 439. WAPD, 18 June 1986, p. 439. WAPD, 18 June 1986, p. 439. WAPD, 15 October 2003, p. 15. Given the ‘big agenda’ for Western Australia, Gallop later ruled out ever seeking a federal seat. See West Australian, 2 April 2004, p. 6. WAPD, 13 September 1988, pp. 2682–83. Gallop, A State of Reform, p. 104. Gallop, A State of Reform, p. 104. Gallop, A State of Reform, p. 104. Gallop, A State of Reform, p. 107. Gallop, A State of Reform, p. 107. Gallop, A State of Reform, pp. 51–53.

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25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46

47

48 49 50 51 52 53 54

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Gallop, A State of Reform, p. 99. Gallop, A State of Reform, p. 109. Gallop, A State of Reform, pp. 4–5. Gallop, A State of Reform, pp. 4–5. Gallop, A State of Reform, p. 67. WAPD, 18 June 1986, p. 438. Gallop, A State of Reform, p. 38. Cited in Gallop, A State of Reform, p. 37. Gallop, A State of Reform, p. 120. Gallop, A State of Reform, p. 120. Gallop, A State of Reform, p. 120. Gallop, A State of Reform, p. 121. Gallop, A State of Reform, pp. 122–23. D. Black, ‘Political chronicle: Western Australia’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 32, no. 3, 1986, pp. 489–90. See G. Gallop, From the Swan to the Canning: Historical Notes on Victoria Park and Surrounding Districts, G. Gallop,Victoria Park, 1989. West Australian, 6 August 2003, p. 12. Aisbett, ‘Dr Who?’, p. 3. D. Black & H. Phillips,‘Western Australian election 1996: a new era dawns’, Current Affairs Bulletin, vol. 73, no. 1, 1997, p. 14. Black & Phillips, ‘Western Australian election 1996’, p. 14. Black & Phillips, ‘Western Australian election 1996’, p. 15. Black & Phillips, ‘Western Australian election 1996’, p. 15. D. Black & H. Phillips,‘Commentary: the Western Australian election of 10 February 2001: coalition demolition’, Australian Journal of Political Science, vol. 36, no. 2, 2001, p. 361. B. Stone,‘The West Australian election of 10 February 2001: more a case of protracted suicide than of assassination’, Australasian Parliamentary Review, vol. 16, no. 1, 2001, p. 31. Stone, ‘The West Australian election of 10 February 2001’, p. 27. Stone, ‘The West Australian election of 10 February 2001’, p. 29. Stone, ‘The West Australian election of 10 February 2001’, p. 27. West Australian, 15 January 2001, p. 1. The Australian, 10 February 2001, p. 2. Black & Phillips, ‘Commentary: the Western Australian election of 10 February 2001’, p. 357. D. Black & H. Phillips, ‘Political chronicle: Western Australia – January to June 2001’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 47, no. 4, 2001, pp. 560–67.

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55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66

67 68 69 70 71 72

73

74 75 76 77

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West Australian, 16 August 2001. The Australian, 26 December 2003. West Australian, 18 October 2003. West Australian, 13 March 2003. The Australian, 1 April 2004. West Australian, 13 March 2004. G. Armstrong, ‘If Gallop had gift of common man’s grab’, Sunday Times, 14 March 2004, p. 54. Newspoll, The Australian, 1 April 2004, p. 6. Aisbett,‘Dr Who?’, p. 1, and S. Pennells,‘Moves and makeovers set for political idolatry’, West Australian, 26 December 2003, p. 21. S. Pennells, ‘Gallop media tough spun out in reshuffle’, West Australian, 12 December 2003, p. 17. S. Pennells, ‘Have the wheels fallen off Labor?’, West Australian, 13 September 2003, p. 9. D. Black & H. Phillips, ‘Political chronicle: Western Australia – January to June 2003’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 49, no. 4, 2003, p. 596. Pennells, ‘Have the wheels fallen off Labor?’, p. 9. Pennells, ‘Have the wheels fallen off Labor?’, p. 9. Pennells, ‘Have the wheels fallen off Labor?’, p. 9. Phillips, Interview with Dr Geoff Gallop. West Australian, 8 November 2003, p. 9. Upon an announcement of a further $231 million in Grants Commission funding, Gallop announced in March 2004 that his government would build a $6.3 million hospital at Moora. See M.Videnieks, ‘Gallop reverses Moora hospital reverse after grant windfall’, West Australian, 29 March 2004, p. 37. D. Black & H. Phillips, ‘Political chronicle: Western Australia – July to December 2002’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 49, no. 2, 2003, p. 286. Black & Phillips, ‘Political chronicle: Western Australia – January to June 2003’, p. 591. D. King, ‘Premier backs minister’, The Australian, 30 December 2003, p. 4. Aisbett, ‘Dr Who?’, p. 4. D. Black & H. Phillips, ‘Political chronicle: Western Australia – July to December 1997’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 44, no. 2, 1998, p. 277. WAPD, 27 May 1997, pp. 3232–43. Black & Phillips, ‘Political chronicle:Western Australia – July to December

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2002’, p. 287. 80 Black & Phillips, ‘Political chronicle:Western Australia – July to December 2002’, pp. 284–85. 81 West Australian, 5 December 2002. 82 West Australian, 9 July 2003. 83 Human Rights WA Inc., Human Rights in Western Australia: A Report on Developments in 2003, Human Rights WA. Inc., Inglewood, 2004. 84 B. Hickman,‘Scolding for Gallop on rights’, The Australian, 17 March 2004, p. 6. 85 See Q. Beresford, H. Bekle, H. Phillips & J. Mulcock, The Salinity Crisis: Landscapes, Communities and Politics, University of Western Australia Press, Crawley, 2004, pp. 271–81. 86 F. Frost, B. Hamilton, M. Lloyd & D. Panell, Salinity: A New Balance – The Report of the Salinity Taskforce Established to Review Salinity Management in Western Australia, Perth, 2001. See also Government’s Response to the Salinity Taskforce Report, ‘Salinity:A New Balance’, Government of Western Australia, Perth, 2002. 87 R. Martin,‘Power chaos was avoidable’, The Australian, 1–2 May 2004, p. 7. 88 Black & Phillips, ‘Political chronicle: Western Australia – January to June 2003’, p. 591. 89 West Australian, 31 October 2003. 90 West Australian, 3 November 2003. 91 West Australian, 1 January 2004, p. 10. 92 G. Gallop, Inaugural John Forrest Lecture, Australasian Association of Constitutional Law State Conference, The Western Australian Constitutional Centre, 22 March 2003, p. 1. 93 Cited in Gallop, ‘Inaugural John Forrest Lecture’, p. 2. 94 F. Crowley, Big John Forrest 1847–1918: A Founding Father of the Commonwealth of Australia, University of Western Australia Press, Nedlands, 2000, p. 151. 95 D. Black & H. Phillips, ‘Political chronicle: Western Australia – July to December 1998’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 45, no. 2, 1999, p. 277, and S. Pennells, ‘Running on gas’, West Australian,Weekend Extra, 3 January 2003, pp. 3–4. 96 Armstrong, ‘If Gallop had gift of common man’s grab’, p. 54. 97 Armstrong, ‘If Gallop had gift of common man’s grab’, p. 54. 98 R. Taylor & M. Videnieks, ‘Faction fighters point to Gallop leadership failure’, West Australian, 1 May 2004, pp. 14–15. 99 H. Phillips, A Citizen’s Guide to the Western Australian Parliament, State Law Publisher, Perth, 2004, pp. 101–102.

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Chapter 6

C L A R E M A RT I N : T H E ‘ D I S C R E E T R E VO LU T I O N I ST ’

David Carment * he politics of the Northern Territory (NT) have in recent years attracted much more attention than its small population would appear to warrant.The election to office of the territory’s first Labor government, in 2001, was a topic of considerable interest in other parts of Australia.After 27 years of Country Liberal party (CLP) rule, even the most experienced observers of Australian and NT politics had not anticipated a Labor victory. An 8 per cent swing was required to topple the ruling CLP – and that party had not lost a sitting member’s seat in a general election since 1980. Not even the Labor leader, Clare Martin, anticipated the result.Yet within hours of the close of polling on 18 August 2001 the Labor Party had captured CLP heartlands in Darwin. Martin became the first female Australian political leader outside the Australian Capital Territory to take a party from opposition to government.Territory politics would never be the same again. Since then, Martin and her colleagues have found themselves making hard decisions as a government, instead of being in what would be for most of them the much more familiar role of criticising government decisions. Commentators have written in some detail about the 2001 election and the vital role Martin played in Labor’s successful campaign.1 But there has been little serious analysis of Martin as chief minister after then: various aspects of her performance have been noted in political chronicles,2 and the national and local media offered some superficial assessments of her record on the first and second anniversaries of Labor’s election to office. On 19 August 2002, for example, the Northern Territory News editorialised that after taking setbacks such as the Ansett collapse into account, Martin and her government had done ‘a reasonable job’ and should be commended for

T

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Clare Martin in the NT chief minister’s chair (photo courtesy of The Weekend Magazine, photographer Nick Cubbin).

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fiscal responsibility and fulfilling most of Labor’s election promises. Journalist Nicolas Rothwell has provided the most thoughtful analyses of the chief minister so far, in wide-ranging surveys of her ideas and political style in The Weekend Australian. The ‘controlled’ and ‘elegant’ Martin, he wrote in June 2003, ‘radiates all the calm of a discreet revolutionist who knows her program is on track’. He pointed to some major economic projects, such as the gas plant in Darwin Harbour, that were coming to fruition, efforts to promote good relations with indigenous land councils, and a new blueprint for statehood.The conservative opposition was, he observed, ‘conveniently tearing itself apart’.3 In early 2004 Rothwell contended that Martin had ‘the key gift required in today’s Australian politics – the ability to attract voters from the opposite camp – and it is this that makes her reign in Darwin such an intriguing blueprint for federal ALP strategists’.4 Martin’s political style and role since late 2001 have not, however, been subjected to sustained and detailed scrutiny.This chapter discusses the reasons for her rise to power, the characteristics of her style and apparent dominance, and how her leadership can best be understood. It argues that the NT Government and its leader do matter as far as the lives of territory residents and other Australians are concerned.The chapter explores ways in which Martin operates within the parameters of the territory’s constitutional arrangements and political culture. In doing so, it also says something about relevant aspects of the territory’s social, political and economic context and Martin herself. It then selectively examines specific areas where the chief minister has been active and that illustrate her beliefs and approaches. Finally, it offers conclusions about the strength of her leadership that set it in a wider context.5

A transient ‘state’ The Northern Territory’s population in 2002 was just 198,013, making it the least populated of Australia’s self-governing states and territories apart from Norfolk Island. On the other hand, the territory occupies about a fifth of Australia’s landmass. Much of the workforce is young, mobile and transient. The 2001 Census revealed that 25.1 per cent of the population was indigenous (the real figure is closer to 30 per cent) and that 15.5 per cent were born overseas. The population of 7 of the 25 Legislative Assembly electorates is over 50 per cent indigenous.The major urban centres, Darwin and Alice Springs, lack the industrial base and associated workforce that in other parts of Australia provide Labor with considerable support. Trade

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unions are comparatively weak.The major industries include construction, fishing, mining, agriculture, pastoralism and tourism. The mining industry nationally contributes 4.7 per cent of the GDP, yet in the territory it contributes 17.7 per cent. Many territory workers are employed as public servants or in the defence forces. Without Commonwealth financial assistance, the NT Government’s budget would be unsustainable.6 Constitutionally, the Northern Territory differs from the states in that the Commonwealth retains control of Aboriginal land rights legislation, uranium mining and two large national parks.The Commonwealth Parliament has the right to disallow territory legislation. Successive CLP governments have argued for full statehood since the 1980s, but when the issue was put to a referendum in 1998, it was narrowly rejected.The great majority of Aboriginal people voted against statehood, which they associated with the CLP Government and its long record of opposition to indigenous land rights.7

The impressive ‘Sydney girl’ Clare Majella Martin was born in Sydney on 15 June 1952 into a large Catholic family. Her father was Noel Martin, Professor and Dean of Dentistry at the University of Sydney. She was educated at Loreto Convent in the Sydney suburb of Normanhurst and the University of Sydney, where she graduated as a Bachelor of Arts. Between 1978 and 1995 she was an ABC journalist and broadcaster. Much of her career, from the early 1980s on, was in Darwin. She became very well known there as a result of both radio and television work in the current affairs area. Her partner, David Alderman, is a lawyer and they have two children. She describes her interests as ‘being fit, reading, music and family’.8 Her parents were, at least for a period, strong supporters of the Democratic Labor Party, and involved their children in letterboxing and handling out leaflets for the party. Martin moved to the left of the political spectrum as a student activist at university, but did not join the Australian Labor Party (ALP). Her close association with Labor developed only during the early 1990s. ‘I’d never dreamed,’ she recalled in 2001, ‘of being a member of a political party … You can’t be a political journalist and be a member of a political party. It creates a conflict of interest that I think is unacceptable.’9 Bob Collins, leader of the NT Labor Party during the early 1980s and later a federal minister, remembered in 2004 that, ‘We conspired for years to recruit her. We hatched many plots.’10 However, it was the well-known

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Darwin writer and Labor activist Barbara James who persuaded her to join the ALP, in order to contest a CLP-held Legislative Assembly seat – Casuarina – in 1994. Although unsuccessful on that occasion, she won Fannie Bay from the CLP in a 1995 by-election. Martin was immediately made a shadow minister, and took over as leader of the opposition in 1999, following yet another Labor defeat.11 Howard Jacobson, a well-known British writer, met Martin in a Darwin ABC studio during the travels that resulted in his popular 1987 book In the Land of Oz. She was, he recounted,‘a Sydney girl’ with a ‘long, steely, Sydney stare’. He described her ‘fierce pride’ in Darwin, her admission that she was ambitious (as she checked quickly to ensure that the microphones were off)12 and her assessment that the then leader of the NT Labor Party, Bob Collins, had been let down by the federal party’s decisions to ‘renege’ on indigenous land rights and ‘change its mind’ on uranium.13 Maxine McKew, in a Bulletin article on her meeting with Martin not long after the election victory, wrote, ‘It’s hard not to be impressed. Given our similar tribal markings (ABC, nuns and all that), I’d made a sturdy resolve to maintain a healthy disinterest. I failed … With her cool communication skills and socially progressive views, Martin is … a marketer’s dream.’14 Physically striking and usually carefully dressed, she looks impressive on a television screen or in a newspaper photograph. Those who work closely with Martin or who know her well speak of her coolness under pressure, her capacity to work through and understand daunting amounts of detail, and the ways in which she is a leader rather than just a co-ordinator of her ministerial team.15 She is no longer a practising Catholic, but readily acknowledges the church’s influence on her intellectual development and social ideas. Ideologically, she is often mistakenly identified with Labor’s right faction. She strongly denies being a member of any faction, and asserts that her parliamentary caucus does not work on factional lines.16 And even her critics concede that as a consequence of her extensive broadcasting experience she is highly articulate and has a sound understanding of how to handle the media.

The election campaigner : winning government in 2001 Martin did not expect to win in 2001. Her prediction was that she would increase Labor’s number of Legislative Assembly seats – she hoped this

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would provide a solid launching pad for the following election. On election night she sat on the back verandah of her Darwin home, sharing a meal with her family and thinking of the concession speech she would have to give.17 For a range of reasons, she turned out to be rather more successful that night than she had anticipated. The CLP election campaign was marked by errors that greatly assisted Martin and the Labor Party.The campaign had an inauspicious start: owners of postal boxes received a message from chief minister Denis Burke, before the election date had even been confirmed, exhorting them to support his government.18 The announcement that the Timor Sea gas project was being deferred also weakened a ‘fundamental plank’ of the CLP’s campaign.19 The party’s television advertisements warned direly that the territory might be the nation’s last conservative bastion, as Labor could soon win the SA election and the federal election. Another CLP television advertisement showed a woman saying that one day she ‘might even’ vote Labor – this unintentionally endorsed that party as far as some viewers were concerned.20 While the CLP did not resort to anti-Aboriginal rhetoric, as it had done in many previous campaigns, it did adopt some rather bizarre tactics, such as distributing playing cards with CLP candidates’ faces on them and making gifts of frozen kangaroo tails to voters in largely Aboriginal electorates. Martin loomed large in what was frequently described as a ‘presidential’ Labor campaign. Her face and voice were both very prominent in advertising material. She took advice from people such as former Tasmanian premier Michael Field. Before the election she was influential in ensuring that strong,‘good-fit’ Labor candidates were selected for winnable seats, especially in Darwin’s middle-class northern suburbs. Examples included future ministers Jane Aagaard, Chris Burns and Kon Vatskalis, all of whom were university educated and in professional positions. She announced a major surprise on 2 August 2001: a commissioned Access Economics report stated that on the basis of election promises, a Labor Government deficit would be less than the CLP’s deficit in 2001–02, with corresponding reductions in the deficit each succeeding year.21 She also appealed to business, promising cuts to payroll tax, government absorption of the HIH collapse and the introduction of an Office of Territory Development. Labor advertising strongly focused on an ‘It’s Time’ theme, and described the CLP as arrogant, divided and tired. Martin strongly attacked the CLP’s record of

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financial management. At her party’s campaign launch, she argued that ‘if experience means running up an interest bill of $500,000 a day … perhaps it’s time for a new experience’.22 Law and order, particularly the territory’s controversial mandatory sentencing legislation, was an area of considerable national interest: Labor promised to repeal the legislation. Martin later claimed that she had a strong personal desire to remove what she described as this ‘damaging law’, in spite of its apparent popularity among voters.23 In responding to CLP claims that Labor was soft on crime, Martin countered by arguing that crime had quite dramatically risen under the CLP and the mandatory sentencing law, and that a tough alternative to mandatory sentencing would be introduced. The results, as already stated, were a major upset. Labor won 13 of the 25 Legislative Assembly seats, a gain of 6 seats. Labor did not win a majority of the two-party preferred votes, but managed to receive preference flows in the right places.The largest swings to Labor were in Darwin’s northern suburbs.24 There are, of course, many reasons why Labor won, and only some of them relate to Martin’s performance.The CLP’s main problems, as already mentioned, were largely of its own making. It was unable to combat the widespread belief that right-wing hardliners had captured the parliamentary wing of the party. Many public servants were concerned about their jobs if the CLP was returned. The government was increasingly perceived as punishing public servants who did not openly support it and rewarding those who did.The CLP itself blamed the loss on having been in power too long, on internal feuding within the party and on the decision to direct preferences to One Nation ahead of Labor (this last decision led to much criticism in multicultural Darwin). The CLP’s campaign was viewed by many as tired and inept, and thus unlikely to attract new voters. Also, a flat economy denied the CLP the opportunity to make its usual claims about sound economic management. It had frequently been argued that Labor’s lack of success in previous elections was due to inappropriate candidates, a bias towards Aboriginal issues, anti-development policies and, most importantly, an inability to convince the majority of the electorate that it could bring economic prosperity to the territory; in 2001, Martin played a significant part in overcoming these perceptions. As academic and political theorist Dean Jaensch commented, Martin was ‘pivotal’: She was a different Labor leader for the Territory party. She did

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not fit the image of traditional Labor, did not have the very close connections with the Aboriginal communities, had a professional background, was very much a pro-economic development leader, and was a conservative on issues such as law and order – but opposed mandatory sentencing. In other words, she showed characteristics and emphasized issues that would be attractive to the urban and increasingly urbane residents of Darwin.25

In comparison with the CLP effort, Labor’s campaign, under a leader with wide-ranging media experience and skills, was seen as positive and vibrant. ‘I enjoy performing,’ Martin later admitted. ‘I enjoy the media and I suppose I understand its needs.’26 The media certainly presented her in a much better light than it had earlier Labor leaders, including its only previous female leader, Maggie Hickey. The often pro-CLP Northern Territory News, the territory’s only daily newspaper, was far more even-handed in its coverage of the election than it had been on many previous occasions. Martin and her advisers also proved adept in developing policies that were based on some public concerns about the government. Labor’s promises of freedom of information legislation and more transparent government, for example, were successful in addressing the deep reservoir of public servants’ discontent.27

The decision-maker : the ministr y and the bureaucracy Martin’s first government was announced on 24 August 2001. In accordance with a Labor election commitment, there were seven ministers, two fewer than in the CLP administration. Some large departments were given two or more ministers, each controlling different parts of them. One immediate constraint was the apparent need to include all those who had been shadow ministers.This meant that John Ah Kit, whom Martin had dropped before the election, was appointed as the only Aboriginal minister. Jane Aagaard and Kon Vatskalis were appointed straight to the ministry without previous parliamentary experience.Aagaard, a public relations specialist, was given the important and politically sensitive health ministry, a move Martin later came to regret. In spite of her professional background,Aagaard proved a poor administrator and communicator – she was dropped from the ministry in December 2003. The chief minister herself took seven additional portfolios. Some, such as arts and museums, reflected particular

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personal interests or were administered within the Department of the Chief Minister; others, especially the onerous Treasury portfolio, suggested a lack of complete confidence in the abilities of her colleagues and a wish to personally control key areas of government activity. Not surprisingly, Martin had a different interpretation:‘I was Shadow Treasurer … I put a lot of effort into understanding the workings of Treasury and was very keen to continue as Treasurer.’28 She also announced her intention to nominate the independent members of the Legislative Assembly Loraine Braham and Gerry Woods as speaker and deputy speaker respectively, a shrewd move that ensured both would vote for government appropriation Bills and not support no-confidence motions except in very special circumstances.29 On 13 November, as a consequence of a major restructure of the public service, the ministry was reshuffled. The principal casualty was Ah Kit, who had struggled with details of his transport and infrastructure portfolio during parliamentary sessions and was moved to less onerous duties.30 After a year in office, Martin conceded that there were some problems with her initial approach to Cabinet-making. On 18 October 2002 she appointed an eighth minister, Chris Burns. She admitted for the first time that the combined responsibilities of being chief minister and Treasurer had taken a personal toll.31 She was, the Northern Territory News commented on 19 October, one of several ministers feeling the strain of office. According to media reports, Burns’ appointment revealed factional differences the chief minister had to contend with. It allegedly angered those members of the Labor caucus who believed that Marion Scrymgour should have been elevated. Some apparently felt that it was a victory of the right faction over the left. Martin herself denied that factional divisions played any part in the process, arguing that the caucus supported Burns because of the ability he had demonstrated as a backbencher.Asked whether or not there was dissent regarding Burns’ appointment, she responded, ‘We have a democratic process and that was the outcome.’32 The most recent reshuffle, on 15 December 2003, saw Aagaard’s demotion. She was replaced by Marion Scrymgour, in a move many observers felt was long overdue. In spite of her impressive background and admirable personal qualities,Aagaard had been in trouble with the health portfolio for over a year. She was, however, someone from outside the Labor Party, someone Martin had encouraged to become a Labor candidate in 2001 and someone Martin clearly wanted to succeed. Aagaard was only removed

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when it became plain that there were no other options. Martin added the key tourism portfolio to her already formidable load, a move that the tourist industry welcomed, but which again perhaps reflected the chief minister’s lack of trust in the ability of any of her colleagues to effectively handle the key job.As well as being chief minister and tourism minister, she currently looks after territory development, the AustralAsia railway, indigenous affairs, arts and museums, young territorians, women’s policy and senior territorians.33 Martin paid close attention to her personal needs in the chief minister’s office.An early decision was Dennis Bree’s appointment as her chief of staff. An experienced and most efficient public servant, Bree made what must have been a difficult decision – he stood down as the endorsed Labor candidate for the federal seat of Solomon in order to work for the new chief minister. Previously identified with the party’s centre-left and moderate factions, he was compatible with and of great assistance to Martin. Public regret was expressed when he returned to a senior public service position in July 2003. He was replaced by Jamie Gallacher, a former journalist.34 Other advisers were also carefully chosen. Mickey Dewar, for example, who joined the chief minister in late 2002 to work in the arts and museums area, was a well-qualified historian who took leave from her position as curator of history at the NT Museum and Art Gallery in order to accept the new position. Most public servants responded well to the change of government, but there was quite considerable and understandable nervousness among senior bureaucrats, many of whom were close to the previous administration. Some were also political appointees. Initially Martin tried hard to soothe any fears. Bree’s appointment was a key element here. On 30 August 2001 he commented that the government was ‘mightily impressed with the professionalism of the public service’.35 On 13 November 2001, however, Martin announced what the Northern Territory News described as ‘Clare’s super shake-up’. This involved a reduction in the number of government departments and agencies from 35 to 18, and was intended to deliver better co-ordination of resources and efforts, achieve efficiencies, create a better environment for career and personal development and enhance a regional presence. Margaret Lyons, chief executive officer of the Attorney-General’s Department, had been dismissed three days earlier.A political appointee, she had stood for the CLP against Martin in the Fannie Bay by-election.

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Fifteen other chief executive officers were demoted but retained their salaries and conditions. The chief minister guaranteed that other than Lyons, no public servants would lose their jobs.36 Given the very extensive politicisation of the bureaucracy under the CLP, though, it was not surprising that – for various stated reasons – a large number of senior bureaucrats, most of them clearly well disposed to the previous government, left the public service in the following 12 months. In mid-December 2001, Deputy Police Commissioner John Valentin claimed that he had been driven out of the police force because of the belief that he was a CLP supporter.37 But there were also some survivors. Barry Chambers, for instance, was retained as a chief executive officer despite being much closer to the old regime than many of his senior colleagues who were in effect demoted.38 An interesting issue is the extent to which Martin’s gender has affected the nature of the government’s public service appointments:39 at the middle management level the number of females appears to have increased, but even today most chief executive officers are males.

The policy broker : the economy, indigenous affairs and statehood Paul Toohey complained in January 2002 that the chief minister ‘talks only about business and jobs and seems to have a distaste for discussing traditional Labor priorities’.40 In some respects the comment was simplistic, but there is no doubt that Martin has always placed a particularly high personal priority on dealing with economic policy matters. As Michael McGuire commented in early 2004, ‘Martin’s strategy for reshaping the territory’s society relies on consistent growth: she dreams of a modern, sophisticated, tropical culture thriving in the north.’ Martin herself said at the same time: ‘Building the north is a national priority – the northern part of Australia simply hasn’t had the same development as the south. Australia needs to shift its psyche to the north.That’s where our future growth is, our potential is.’41 Discussing her government’s future agenda in March 2004, she devoted special attention to job creation, the development of infrastructure, education and training and the tourist industry.42 A key factor here was that the new government had inherited a very difficult economic situation in 2001. On 28 August 2001 Martin warned of ‘holes’ in the territory Budget.43 On 4 September she accused the

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former government of leaving a deficit of more than $100 million, and announced that an inquiry had been set up to investigate the claim.44 She appointed Percy Allan, former head of the NSW Treasury, to probe the territory’s forward estimates. Although the CLP denied Martin’s claims and accused her of wanting to renege on overly expensive election promises, Allan found that the deficit had blown out by $95 million more than the $12 million admitted to by the CLP in May 2001.45 Martin subsequently said that she ‘felt sick’ on learning the bad news,46 and claimed that the CLP had manipulated Budget figures, especially in health and education. She ensured that the former chief minister, Burke, and two former ministers, were censured in parliament for their roles in regard to the Budget. On 2 October 2001, following the example of Hawke’s federal Labor Government, the chief minister announced that her government was organising a two-day economic summit aimed at preparing a plan for economic recovery. A wide cross-section of the community would participate.47 The summit met in Parliament House in Darwin on 5 and 6 November.The delegates, including many from the business sector, made a variety of recommendations. Prominent among them were the urgent need for gas to be brought onshore in Darwin, the rejuvenation of tourism and mining, improved education and training, and more Aboriginal economic development.48 Delegates observed the chief minister’s apparent willingness to consult and her ‘people skills’ – her easy mixing and conversing with those at the summit left many business people impressed by her inclusive style. Martin assured delegates that the government would act on their recommendations.49 As Treasurer, Martin handed down the government’s crucial first Budgets. A mini-Budget delivered on 27 November 2001 included new charges for government services and reductions in government spending in some areas, but ensured that there were also increased allocations in education, health and police, fire and emergency services, to honour election promises.50 Her next Budget, announced on 20 August 2002, ‘managed to increase spending and cut the deficit at the same time’, she argued. But the good result was at least partly achieved by borrowing more than $100 million. She achieved some key political objectives as well, delighting business leaders with a $430 million capital works program and appealing to traditional Labor supporters by boosting spending on health

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and education. The opposition complained that the Budget was based on unsustainable assumptions and increased debt. It was primarily seen, though, as a deft piece of political footwork that appealed to most sections of the community.51 The chief minister’s grand economic plan was first outlined to the Legislative Assembly on 26 February 2002. Her government, she declared, would develop Darwin as the fourth Australian gas hub, alongside reserves in Western Australia, South Australia and Victoria. It planned to shift the territory’s economic focus by establishing it as a possible area for timber processing and chilled fish exports as well as mining and resource development. The NT Government would join its SA counterpart to re-establish the Northern Territory/South Australia economic working group.52 The plan was developed further when on 11 June 2002, following detailed work by the economic summit’s reference group, she presented a strategy for economic growth that included development of new industries, the improvement of economic outcomes for Aboriginal people, a boost to training opportunities, development of the territory’s regions and development of an attractive investment climate.53 It is difficult to assess accurately the extent to which such statements were based on Martin’s own ideas, as she relied on a number of others in their formulation – perhaps most notably Bob Collins, who was now working as a senior government adviser. But she took strong and energetic ownership of them and used all her media skills in their presentation. She was also keen to deal directly with key figures outside the territory who might assist its economic growth. In late January 2002 she met President Megawati Sukarnoputri in Indonesia; the two leaders planned to revitalise a memorandum of understanding between the NT Government and the Indonesian Government.54 On 21 March in the same year she met the Commonwealth Minister for Resources, Ian Macfarlane, in Canberra, and presented to him the case for bringing gas from Shell Woodside’s offshore Sunrise field to Darwin – this included asking the Commonwealth to contribute money to building a pipeline from the Timor Sea to Wickham Point in Darwin Harbour.55 In December 2002 she travelled to Europe and the United States, meeting executives of various companies who might be involved in territory projects.56 In 2003, in response to some less than encouraging economic data, particularly a rise in unemployment and a slight decline in the population,

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Martin was closely involved in efforts to persuade companies in other parts of Australia to invest more in the territory. She constantly sought customers for the Darwin to Adelaide railway project, ‘aiming to connect local businesses with the mid-range development projects’ the transport corridor would bring.57 In November 2003 she was in southern Australia on an ‘investment road show’. Agreeing that the territory economy was ‘flat’, Martin stressed that she was ‘marketing very specific things.We’re marketing a new rail link, a new trade link for Australia, and we’re not competing with anyone there … The reason we’re doing it is to market the opportunities in the territory, to try to turn around some of the misconceptions.’ Her view of the territory’s future was, at least for public consumption, rosy and upbeat.And, as the ABC’s Luisa Saccotelli conceded,‘business seems to like the party pitch … Transport company Toll Holdings is already onboard NT Inc., investing $18 million over four years in a new business park.’58 Before her entry into parliamentary politics, Martin had had little direct association with Aboriginal organisations. She felt it important, nevertheless, to retain control of the indigenous affairs portfolio from its creation in November 2001, with John Ah Kit assisting her. There are mixed opinions about the extent to which she has had interest and involvement in this area since late 2001, but when indigenous issues were at the forefront of political debate her presence was very much felt. It needs to be emphasised here that the NT community had been extremely divided on Aboriginal issues for at least the previous two decades. In addition, the CLP’s push for statehood had involved a wish for the Commonwealth to give the territory control of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth).59 In late September 2002 Martin made it plain to the Commonwealth government that her administration was not interested in the repatriation of the Land Rights Act.60 In a significant break with past practice, during the following month she announced that her government would negotiate directly with Aboriginal stakeholders regarding land claims and native title claims that could jeopardise the status of and public access to territory national parks and reserves.61 Opposition leader Burke responded that this was no more than a ‘smokescreen’, and that in fact the government planned to hand over parks and reserves to Aboriginal land councils.62 Undeterred, on 19 September 2003 the Martin Government offered to ‘settle’ all present and future Aboriginal claims over its parks and reserves. Aboriginal owners

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were given until June 2004 to take up the offer.63 On 21 May 2003 Martin surprised many observers by announcing that a referendum on statehood would occur within the next five years. The Prime Minister, John Howard, she confirmed, supported a campaign for statehood. A possible time frame might see this change coincide with the 30th anniversary of self-government, in 2008. Delegates to a state convention would be elected rather than appointed (they had been appointed before the ill-fated 1998 referendum).64 As Rothwell later observed, there were strong political motives in the chief minister’s sudden relaunching of the drive for statehood: ‘This should be a strong vote winner,’ he wrote, ‘for the territory, like most small communities, displays a fiercely insular brand of local patriotism.’ But, he warned, ‘the statehood option needs delicate playing. We have been here before.’ Martin seemed to feel that consensus on this matter – within the NT Government, between the Commonwealth and the NT governments, and between the major parties both federally and in the territory – was essential; this was most evident in the manner in which she ensured that she had the prime minister’s support. She telephoned Howard, ‘told him her plans, asked for his support and got it. Since the most likely path to statehood lies in an act of the federal parliament, this was far from being just a courtesy call.’65 Yet the chief minister’s vision of statehood was considerably different from that of her CLP predecessors: Statehood should be part of a maturing, the development of a more inclusive territory, that sense of taking the political tension that was here out of the place … It can be a growing, learning process. I see it in the next few years as a healing process as well, bringing the community together.Yes, statehood can actually be healing for the territory.66

As academics Baiba Berzins and Peter Loveday noted: Martin did not mention how the political tension would be taken out of the statehood referendum but by not mentioning the ownership of parks, uranium and royalties and Aboriginal affairs in this context she evidently hoped that over time accommodations with the Federal Government on these matters would emerge without the acrimony of the preceding years.67

Martin was similarly keen to promote uncomplicated notions of territory identity. An events grants scheme, a territory service medal and a

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commemorative vehicle licence plate were launched at Parliament House in Darwin on 25 June 2003 to mark the 25th anniversary of NT selfgovernment. Although the CLP had been in power for most of those 25 years, and they were thus a bleak period for many Labor supporters and indigenous territorians, all territory residents were asked to ‘celebrate’ the past and special community grants were provided to enable them to do so.68

The crisis manager : the Bonson affair and gay law reform Embarrassments for the government have, for the most part, been relatively minor. The CLP opposition has from time to time called on ministers to resign for various reasons, and has attacked some government processes and policies, but generally it has had little impact. Until 14 November 2003 the leader of the opposition was Burke; he handled the job poorly and was ultimately deposed by his own parliamentary colleagues. Not long before that occurred, one of his former senior advisers, Peter Murphy, warned that ‘continued support for leadership failure means the end of the political road for a long, long time’.69 Though Labor and the CLP undertake their own polling, publicly available opinion poll information is almost non-existent in the territory. A two-party preferred swing to the government of 9.5 per cent in the October 2003 Katherine by-election, however, indicated that its approval was at a fairly high level.70 Life is becoming tougher for Martin with the new CLP leader,Terry Mills, a former school principal.Articulate, enthusiastic and energetic, he possesses some of the key skills his predecessor lacked. As this chapter was being completed, the government was attempting to counter widespread public criticisms of its tough legislation on private swimming pool fences, and had agreed to amend the legislation so that it was less prescriptive.71 When crises have occurred, the chief minister has often taken the lead in defusing them.While she has had the usual assistance of media advisers in her own office, especially the experienced journalists Fred McCue and Craig Rowston, her own media skills have also frequently come into play. A crisis with the potential to destabilise the government erupted very early in its term, on 14 March 2002, when Matthew Bonson, a Labor parliamentarian, bashed another player in a brawl following a basketball match in which both were involved.72 His electorate (Millner) was Labor’s most marginal, and its loss in a by-election would see the party lose its

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absolute majority in parliament. The CLP demanded Bonson’s resignation but the chief minister, no doubt realising the possible implications, refused to support this. Instead, and with full media fanfare, she strongly criticised Bonson, telling him that such behaviour was not to occur again. She refused on 18 March to speculate on the fate of her government if the police investigation into the incident showed that Bonson should be prosecuted.73 Martin’s refusal to dismiss Bonson from the parliamentary Labor Party for a time looked as if it might cost the government much public support, but in the end her judgement was correct. He was not charged, and what he described as a ‘heated argument’ that ‘got out of hand’ was soon forgotten.74 In November 2003 the Legislative Assembly debated the Gender Law Reform Bill, which lowered the homosexual age of consent to 16. Martin and her colleagues never fully explained the urgency of this legislation, but as Murphy noted, the ‘so-called gay law reforms dominated the news, strained political party loyalties and moved sections of our ethnic communities to demonstrate outside Parliament’.75 Opposition leader Mills expressed a widely held community view when he argued that the proposed legislation would ‘expose the vulnerable’.76 On 20 November the leaders of the territory’s large and influential Filipino and Greek communities called on the chief minister to allow a conscience vote on the Bill, and threatened a voter backlash against Labor if it were enacted. Public protests were organised. One CLP parliamentarian, John Elferink, recounted how he had been sexually assaulted as a teenager.77 While the CLP allowed its parliamentarians a conscience vote, Labor did not.The Bill was passed on 26 November by 15 votes to 9, with just 2 CLP members supporting it.78 The Sunday Territorian suggested that three of Martin’s ministers disagreed with the Bill but were directed to vote for it.79 The chief minister denied this, saying that a conscience vote was not necessary because all members of the caucus supported the proposed legislation.80 On 7 December, Murphy contended that the Bill was a cynical and largely successful ‘red herring’ designed to deflect public attention from the government’s problems.The government was happy, he contended, to take ‘a few bruises on the age of consent, rather than get into a debate on the real issues, like where have all the jobs gone?’81 There is no available evidence to support Murphy on this, but a widespread perception that the chief minister failed to handle the ‘gay law reforms’ with her usual efficient aplomb led to speculation about her motives in pushing ahead with the

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legislation, and may have caused some long-term damage to her government’s electoral prospects.

Conclusion As chief minister of the Northern Territory, Martin has created new patterns of dominance shared by the political leaders of other Australian states and territories.As is the case with Bob Carr in New South Wales and Peter Beattie in Queensland, and in spite of some mistakes made along the way, Martin dominates her Cabinet, her party room, the parliament and the public service.The territory media, its intelligentsia, and many, but certainly not all, local interest groups are also, to varying degrees, under her influence. She is decisive and keen to achieve the goals that secured her victory in 2001. All her election policies, she insisted shortly after winning office, were fully costed, and ‘every single one of our initiatives is scheduled to come in’.82 ‘Underneath that sweet exterior,’ Bob Collins commented in early 2004,‘is a leader who knows exactly what she wants to do to produce outcomes.’83 Her dominance is not, however, the consequence of crude authoritarianism. It is, instead, due to her being highly articulate, committed, personable and energetic. Martin’s urban middle-class background, her intelligence and her political moderateness are also important factors in her appeal – and in her methods. She is a charismatic leader who is not above identifying herself with populist policies. She has a close affinity with important sections of the electorate, particularly urban dwellers in Darwin. A consummate media operator and performer, she is now a well-known figure in Australian politics who has actively pursued some national issues. Rothwell identified her as ‘the model leader for a viable national Labor government’, saying that the voters federal Labor needs are ‘precisely the swing voters Martin was able to attract in her election victory’.84 The territory’s economic development, and relations between its indigenous and non-indigenous residents, are particular areas where the territory government under Martin has made crucial decisions. Like all other current state and mainland territory leaders, Martin is on the Labor side of politics. She is not, perhaps paradoxically, someone with a strong or lengthy Labor background, only joining the party when headhunted to stand for parliament. Some more traditional Labor members in the territory still rather resent her sudden rise and her lack of active involvement in the trade union movement, but they also acknowledge that without

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her Labor would not have won the last election. If, as Jaensch once argued, the NT Labor Party remains divided into ‘traditionalists’ (mainly linked with the unions) and middle-class technocrats,85 Martin clearly fits into the latter group. But she stands above and apart from the factional squabbles that were so destructive to some of the earlier territory Labor leaders.86 According to one long-time territory Labor member, Brian Reid, ‘What Martin did (by calculation or conviction) was to shun factions and loudly put the NT first. This appealed to the voters, although not necessarily [to] the factions.’87 Another interpretation is that by the time Martin became party leader, Labor Legislative Assembly members had already developed a ‘consensus majority’ based on the centre and moderates of the left and right, and that this made it easy for her to keep out of the factional competition; that competition was by then focused on the territory’s federal parliamentary seats and on party administrative committee positions.88 Perhaps the most striking feature of Martin’s success is that it has come in an environment that some observers see as being especially tough for women politicians. She paid attention to this when explaining her rise to power: I’m very aware that the image of the Territory was very male, that you had to prove yourself tougher than the average man if you [were] going to be accepted as a woman. So I had to do a lot of that toughening up a bit when I was Opposition Leader … I’ve been a very strong feminist and will always be one, but I’ve refused to say that being a woman is a disadvantage … I think it’s been a real boost for Territory women that there’s a girl in the top job.

At the same time she acknowledged the influence of the ‘fantastic’ nuns who taught her at school and the strength she gained from her hardworking mother.89 Rothwell has remarked, however, that while she dealt well with men, she was less keen on rival women. Official photographs, he claimed, ‘will invariably show her surrounded by a gaggle of obliging, subservient male colleagues; she sacked a female Cabinet colleague with pointed public brutality’.90 When asked in 2001 to name her role models and mentors, the only female politician very briefly mentioned was former Victorian premier Joan Kirner. Much greater credit was given to Bob Collins, Gough Whitlam, Bob Hawke and Paul Keating.The most powerful influence was Collins, from whom she ‘learnt about not being cautious’.91

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Clearly, Martin has used most of the sources of power available to her. These include the chief minister’s position and other important ministerial portfolios.While various ministers, such as Syd Stirling and Peter Toyne, are now regarded as hardworking and effective, none even approaches Martin’s prominence in the government or looks like challenging her. In the early stages of her administration she made key decisions affecting the shape and functions of the public service. She has used her power to implement a lot of the agenda that she presented to electors in 2001. None of this, however, may be enough to re-elect her if the government stumbles badly over the next year, or the economy deteriorates or the CLP reinvents itself into the force that it once was.The willingness of many territory electors to change government in 2001 may indicate a new volatility, and such volatility could easily send the Labor Party back into opposition in 2005. She also needs to be careful to ensure that her government does not overly offend key interest groups.92 Yet from the perspective of late 2004 she still appears well placed to deal with future difficulties.

Notes 1

2 3 4 5

6

See D. Carment & B. Wilson, ‘Change at the top: the 2001 Northern Territory election’, Journal of Northern Territory History, 13, 2002; D. Jaensch, ‘Commentary: the Northern Territory election of 18 August 2001’, Australian Journal of Political Science, vol. 37, no. 1, 2002; P. Loveday, D. Jaensch & B. Berzins, Labor’s Win:The Northern Territory Election 2001, Baiba Berzins, Sydney, 2002;W. Sanders, ‘The 2001 Northern Territory election: the end of an era’, Australian Quarterly, vol. 73, no. 6, 2001. These have appeared biannually in the Australian Journal of Politics and History. The Weekend Australian, 28–29 June 2003. N. Rothwell, ‘Northern star’, The Weekend Australian, Magazine, 6–7 March 2004, p. 25. I mostly use evidence from the public record. I have, however, known Clare Martin since the early 1980s and have also been friendly with people who have worked with her. She was for six months a student in a postgraduate History subject I taught at the Northern Territory University. Inevitably some of my more personal impressions also influence the judgements that are made. Loveday et al., Labor’s Win, chapter 2, and Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘2015.7 Census of Population and Housing Selected Social and Housing Characteristics for Statistical Local Areas, Northern Territory’, .

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7

8 9

10 11

12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37

165

Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘2015.7 Census of Population and Housing’, and A. Heatley, ‘The rise and fall of statehood in the Northern Territory’, in Xavier Pons (ed.), Departures: How Australian Reinvents Itself, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 2002. Who’s Who in Australia 2004, Crown Content, Melbourne, 2004, p. 1373. ‘Recorded interview with Clare Martin. Interviewer: Baiba Berzins. Date of interview: 17 October 2001’, National Library of Australia, Oral History Section, TRC-4812, p. 16. Rothwell, ‘Northern star’, p. 24. Rothwell, ‘Northern star’, p. 24, communications with the late Barbara James, Baiba Berzins email to the author, 20 January 2004 and ‘Recorded interview with Clare Martin’. H. Jacobson, In the Land of Oz, Penguin, London, 1988 (1987), pp. 33–34. Jacobson, In the Land of Oz, p. 34. M. McKew, ‘Clare Martin’, . Communications from various sources. ‘Recorded interview with Clare Martin’, p. 21 and notes of discussion with Clare Martin, 12 March 2004. Also see Loveday et al., Labor’s Win, p. 33. Loveday et al., Labor’s Win, p. 23 and record of interview of Clare Martin by Bill Wilson, 13 November 2001. Northern Territory News (hereafter NTN), 1 August 2001. The Weekend Australian, 4–5 August 2001. NTN, 15 August 2001. NTN, 3 August 2001. NTN, 13 August 2003. McKew, ‘Clare Martin’. Loveday et al., Labor’s Win, chapter 7. Jaensch, ‘Commentary’, pp. 162–63. ‘Recorded interview with Clare Martin’, p. 23. These points are made in some detail in Carment & Wilson, ‘Change at the top: the 2001 Northern Territory election’. ‘Recorded interview with Clare Martin’, p. 25. NTN, 25 August 2001. NTN, 14 November 2001. NTN, 19 October 2002. NTN (including source of quotation), and notes of discussion with Clare Martin. NTN, 16 December 2003. NTN, 17 July 2003 and Loveday et al., Labor’s Win, p. 32. NTN, 31 August 2001. NTN, 15 November 2001. NTN, 19 December 2001.

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38 Dennis Bree, apparently, held him in high regard and urged that he be retained. Communication from a close former colleague of Bree, 2001. 39 Anita Angel, email to the author, 22 January 2004. 40 The Weekend Australian, 26–27 January 2002. 41 The Australian, 15 January 2004. 42 Notes of discussion with Clare Martin. 43 NTN, 29 August 2001. 44 NTN, 5 September 2001. 45 Percy Allan, oral presentation to the Northern Territory Economic Development Summit, 5 November 2001. 46 ‘Recorded interview with Clare Martin’, p. 25. 47 NTN, 3 October 2001. 48 NTN, 6 & 7 November 2001. 49 Based on my own recollections as a Summit delegate. 50 NTN, 28 November 2001. 51 NTN, 21 August 2002. 52 NTN, 27 February 2001. 53 NTN, 12 June 2002. 54 NTN, 29 January 2002. 55 NTN, 22 March 2002. 56 NTN, 14 December 2002. 57 The Australian, 15 January 2004. 58 ‘Martin drums up support for the NT’, 16 November 2003, . 59 Berzins, email to the author. 60 NTN, 21 September 2002. 61 Sunday Territorian, 27 October 2002. 62 Sunday Territorian, 3 November 2002. 63 NTN, 20 September 2003. 64 NTN, 21 February 2003. 65 The Weekend Australian, 28–29 June 2003. 66 The Weekend Australian, 28–29 June 2003. 67 Berzins, email to the author. 68 NTN, 26 June 2003. 69 Sunday Territorian, 31 August 2003. 70 NTN, 7 October 2003. 71 In her discussion with me on 12 March, Martin said that this was a most difficult issue for the government. 72 NTN, 15 March 2002. 73 NTN, 19 March 2002. 74 NTN, 19 March 2002. 75 Sunday Territorian, 7 December 2003. 76 Sunday Territorian, 16 November 2003.

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77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85

86

87 88 89 90 91 92

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NTN, 26 November 2003. NTN, 27 November 2003. Sunday Territorian, 30 November 2003. Notes of discussion with Clare Marin. NTN, 7 December 2003. ‘Recorded interview with Clare Martin’, p. 24. Rothwell, ‘Northern star’, p. 25. Rothwell, ‘Northern star’, p. 25. D. Jaensch, ‘Northern Territory: idiosyncratic politics’, in A. Parkin & J. Warhurst (eds), Machine Politics in the Australian Labor Party, George Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1983, p. 224. For a description of intense Labor factional squabbles in the mid-1980s see D. Carment, The Tuxworth Government: A Political History, University College of the Northern Territory, Darwin, 1987, pp. 27–29. Brian Reid, email to the author, 20 January 2004. Loveday et al., Labor’s Win, p. 33. ‘Recorded interview with Clare Martin’, p. 26. Rothwell, ‘Northern star’, p. 25. ‘Recorded interview with Clare Martin’, p. 26. Bill Wilson, email to the author, 20 January 2004, discusses this issue in greater depth.

* I am grateful to Baiba Berzins, Kathy De La Rue, Peter Loveday, Brian Reid, John Wanna, Paul Williams, Bill Wilson and participants at a workshop in Canberra in February 2003 for their useful comments on earlier drafts of this article, and to Nicolas Rothwell for his ideas and information. Clare Martin kindly allowed me to use and quote from the interview she recorded for the National Library of Australia and met me to discuss to particular aspects of her career on 12 March 2004.

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Chapter 7

J O N STA N H O P E : W H AT YO U S E E I S W H AT YO U G E T

Gwynneth Singleton * he Australian Capital Territory (ACT) is a small parliamentary jurisdiction with a single chamber, a Legislative Assembly of 17 members drawn from three multi-member electorates; members are elected for a fixed term. The length of term was extended in November 2003 from three to four years.The chief minister is elected by members of the Legislative Assembly at its first meeting after an election. Even though the proportional system has delivered minority governments, the Legislative Assembly has always elected as chief minister the leader of the party that will form the government.The chief minister then appoints up to four ministers. A chief minister can be dismissed by a vote of no confidence in the Legislative Assembly. The current chief minister of the territory is Jon Stanhope, leader of the Australian Labor Party (ALP) in the Legislative Assembly. Stanhope was born on 29 April 1951 at Gundagai in New South Wales. He is married, and has four children. He has no formal religion. He was brought up in an Anglican household but his parents were not churchgoers and he was not introduced to religion or church at home.1 He has described his family as ‘battlers’, and has talked of growing up in ‘very straitened circumstances’ – he was the first of his family to go to university.2 Keeping fit is important to him. He jogs every lunchtime and regularly attends a local gym. Stanhope joined the Australian Labor Party (ALP) in 1976 as a direct consequence of the 1975 dismissal of the Whitlam Government. He says this clarified his thinking about the nature of politics. He was deeply affected and affronted by the dismissal, in particular the elements of class politics attached to the way the ‘born to rule’ conservatives had overthrown a working people’s government.3

T

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Between 1976 and 1998 he did not seek advancement within the ALP – or public office – because he was conscious of the harshness of political life and the disruption it would cause to family life. His attitude changed in 1996 after the election of the Howard Government. At this time he was a permanent public servant, seconded from the Attorney-General’s Department to the office of Labor’s federal Attorney-General, Michael Lavarch. He returned to his department when Labor lost office, only to be advised that he was surplus to requirements and there was no position in the department for him.This led him to search for a new career: he nominated for Labor preselection for the 1998 ACT Legislative Assembly election. Labor, in opposition, was not doing well at the time, and Stanhope believed he could make a contribution.4 He is passionate about ‘fixing up’ disadvantage and is regarded as a ‘passionate defender of justice and equality’, a ‘genuine humanitarian’ and ‘a proud defender of Aboriginal rights’.5 These attributes, plus his ‘process-driven’ approach to government,6 have strongly influenced his time as chief minister. Stanhope was elected to the Legislative Assembly at the 1998 election and was then selected as party leader by the Labor caucus.This was unusual: party leaders usually have served some time in the legislature and developed a profile in the electorate.The ALP had done very poorly at the election, winning only 27.6 per cent of the vote.The party retained 6 seats in the Legislative Assembly, but three sitting Labor members lost their seats and the left faction lost its dominance over caucus.Wayne Berry, who had led Labor into the election – and this disastrous result for the party – was not popular with the electorate.7 There was a view within the ALP that new blood, and a new, younger leader who could reinvigorate the party, were needed. Stanhope had been targeted as a potential leader when he was preselected. The revamped Labor caucus, in which neither the left nor the right faction had a majority, looking for a fresh face, chose unaligned Jon Stanhope as its new leader and Ted Quinlan (from the right), also newly elected in 1998, as his deputy.8 Stanhope may have been a parliamentary ‘rookie’, but he brought to the Labor leadership considerable community, political and managerial experience. He had completed a Bachelor of Laws at the Australian National University and had had a career in the Australian Public Service as a legal officer in various Commonwealth departments, including a position in the senior executive service. He was heavily involved in a range of ACT community sporting and civil liberty activities. Stanhope had gained

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a substantial grounding in practical political life working as senior adviser to federal Labor leader Kim Beazley and Attorney-General Michael Lavarch. He had been secretary to the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, and had initiated and managed a parliamentary inquiry on issues related to equality for women.9 In October 2001 Stanhope led Labor to electoral victory and was elected by the Legislative Assembly as chief minister. An examination of his performance as election campaigner, policy broker and entrepreneur and crisis manager will help tease out the defining characteristics of his leadership style.

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Stanhope relaxing at home with a beer, 2001 (photo courtesy The Canberra Times, photographer: Gary Schafer).

Election campaigner – a Labor bloke with vision Stanhope has led ACT Labor at the polls twice - as opposition leader in 2001 and as chief minister in 2004. Elections for the Legislative Assembly are conducted under a proportional Hare Clark system, with Robson rotation of the placement of candidates on ballot papers. Political canvassing, including handing out party how-to-vote cards, is banned within 100 metres of a polling place. Thus party how-to-vote cards are of little use, which means that name recognition within the electorate becomes a more significant factor. Party candidates issue their own campaign material, with the primary focus on personal attributes and issues in their electorate.They raise their own funds and campaign against their party colleagues.10 This might suggest that the significance of the party leader in ACT election campaigns is diminished.The findings of a Datacol poll conducted

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in the ACT before the 2001 election (see Table 7.1) ranked the order of importance for voters of policies, community involvement, party identification, managerial experience and leadership.11 Table 7.1 What is important to voters in a candidate? (2001) Characteristic Party Leader Political experience How nice the leader seems to be Previous involvement in ACT community Experience in managing complex organisations Whether male or female How well they speak in the media How much you agree with their policies SOURCE

Low Medium High Don’t know (percentage) (percentage) (percentage) (percentage) 16 14 21

33 39 43

51 46 35

0 1 0

40

43

16

0

12

30

58

0

10

38

51

1

83

13

4

0

10

45

44

0

3

15

82

0

DATACOL.

The fact that Stanhope was not the most favoured leader, yet his party won the election, suggests that there is truth in the Datacol poll finding that policies are an important factor in influencing how people vote, but the relationship between leadership and other factors in determining electoral success is complex. The ACT electoral system, a factor not addressed in the Datacol poll, adds its own dynamic to voting behaviour and political campaigning.The Canberra Times advised its readers about the significance of voting for individuals because there was no party preselected order on the ballot

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paper.12 Labor chose its candidates 11 months before the election,13 which gave the candidates plenty of time to ‘work’ their electorates and gain name recognition. Labor candidates ran their own campaigns, and had their own support teams,14 and Stanhope left them ‘to do their own thing’.15 The Liberals’ Helen Cross ‘door-knocked, visited shopping centres, attended a lot of events’ and raised $20,000 from her mortgage to fund her media campaign, including television advertisements. Labor’s Katy Gallagher spent $10,000 on her campaign.16 Both were elected. For others, name recognition did not guarantee election: former Liberal chief minister Trevor Kaine, for one, was not successful. High-profile Legislative Assembly independents Paul Osborne and Dave Rugendyke were defeated, author Scott Bennett suggests, because of a rejection of ‘their views and past actions’, a strong indication that policies and issues do indeed play an important role in voter choice.17 Labor was criticised after the 1998 election for not highlighting the deficiencies of the Liberals and for having inadequate policies.18 The party undertook a major policy review before the 2001 election and began its campaign six months earlier than the Liberals, with a series of key policy statements and policy fact sheets plus an attack on the ‘behind closed door’ deals and ‘the failure of process’ of the government of the incumbent, Kate Carnell.19 Carnell, the high-profile and media-savvy Liberal leader, ran a successful presidential-style campaign in 1998. Her ‘can do’ approach to government and her high media profile gave her great electoral popularity, until a series of mishaps placed her leadership under a cloud. These included a car accident on the way home from a social event, the fiasco of grassing the Bruce Stadium with turf sourced from Queensland (it died, as it was clearly not suitable for Canberra conditions), and the hospital demolition that caused the death of a bystander. Problems with accountability relating to the redevelopment of Bruce Stadium and the subsequent loss of majority support in the Legislative Assembly led to her resignation in October 2000. At the 2001 election, the Liberals sought to distance themselves from her style of government and the ‘big-ticket items’ that had been a characteristic of her regime.20 Her successor, Gary Humphries, ran a less presidential style of campaign, focusing on ‘back-

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to-basics’ issues, small government, and with the slogan ‘Canberra Liberals, a local approach’.21 In his campaign, Stanhope emphasised that he did not want to be involved in ‘mindless and futile exchanges with a veneer of personal politics’; he wanted to ‘concentrate on the issues’.22 He delivered a series of keynote speeches and addresses focused on Labor’s vision, the values it shared with the community, and the party’s priorities for government. The excesses of the Carnell Government would be replaced, he said, with a ‘code of good government’ that would clarify the core values and qualities of a Stanhope-led Labor government – it would focus on openness, fairness, responsiveness and responsibility. Under Labor, the budget process would be ‘rigorous, open and measured’, but would also include community debate, the Freedom of Information Act and Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act would be overhauled, and Labor would not hide behind ‘a cloak of confidentiality’ in its commercial dealings. Labor would respect the ‘traditional public service values of responsibility, dedication, impartiality and professionalism’.23 Stanhope promised to ‘get the basics right’ on health, education and planning, and ‘to restore confidence in the political process’.24 Deputy leader Quinlan presented the party’s economic statement. Bill Wood presented the policy on poverty and disadvantage. Simon Corbell received good media coverage for the party’s proposals for planning reform. In all, 24 policy statements, 12 policy fact sheets and 4 keynote policy addresses, spanning a broad range of policy issues, were prepared and delivered well before the election. Labor’s campaign advertisements portrayed Stanhope as ‘a serious and concerned leader, passionate about hospitals and schools’. They attacked the Liberal Government’s mismanagement of the Bruce Stadium redevelopment25 and questioned its competence to govern. The election was conducted against a backdrop of major national and international political drama: the 11 September World Trade Center disaster, the Tampa and its asylum seekers and the 10 November federal election were dominating the media. There was, however, good coverage of the issues and profiles of candidates in the Canberra Times and the Canberra Chronicle, and on local radio stations. The Canberra Times said, on the eve of the election, that the campaign might have been dull, but there had

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been ‘a fair concentration on issues’.26 Author and analyst John Warhurst argues that while Labor’s poor performance before the 2001 election was partly ‘a consequence of its own limitations’, it was also due to ‘its failure to match the personality of Kate Carnell’.27 Labor’s loss in 1998, when it won a mere 27.6 per cent of the vote, was blamed partly on the unpopularity of Labor leader Berry: his approval rating during the campaign was only 24 per cent, compared with 59 per cent for Carnell.28 The Liberal campaign attacks on Berry as a left-winger were also a factor in Labor’s defeat.29 Stanhope was credited by the federal Labor member for Canberra, Annette Ellis, with bringing about a ‘sea change’ in the party’s ACT branch after the sound defeat in 1998.30 He committed himself to working to reduce factional divisions within the Labor Party and ‘to reconcil[ing] old wounds’.31 Interestingly, he also supported the move (from some within the party) to shut unions out of any say in choosing Labor’s election candidates, in favour of full rank and file preselection – he took a fairly direct approach to party reform and was clearly prepared to pursue what he believed was right. This particular move was made easier because he won preselection without union backing.32 Stanhope was ‘the man for the moment’, a leader distinctly different in style from Carnell, a ‘middle-ground leader’ who allowed Labor ‘to shed its image of being faction ridden and dominated by the “loony Left”’.33 The Labor team ‘consolidated around Stanhope’s leadership’, and he had the ‘full support of the ACT branch’ from the start.34 In November 1999, a Datacol poll showed electoral support for Stanhope at 40 per cent, ahead of Carnell, who had fallen to 38 per cent as a result of her political mistakes. Stanhope was identified as ‘trustworthy’, ‘dependable’, ‘caring for people of the ACT’ and ‘honest’.35 These characteristics framed his leadership in opposition and his bid to lead Labor to government in 2001. Stanhope admitted that he was not ‘a natural communicator’; according to Liz Armitage, of the Canberra Times, he struggled with approaching people to ask for their vote – and his television ad was ‘complete with ums’.36 Neither Stanhope nor Humphries, the Liberal leader, was ‘charismatic or inspirational’. Compared with the ‘flamboyant’ Carnell, they were ‘steady, locally focused politicians’.37 During the election campaign,

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the author of this chapter heard discussion on a local radio station about the low level of recognition of Stanhope’s name within the ACT. Humphries, on the other hand, was well known because of his service as a minister and chief minister in the Legislative Assembly. In the 2001 election, Labor won 8 seats and 41.7 per cent of firstpreference votes across the ACT, a significant improvement on the 1998 result. Stanhope achieved 24.48 per cent of the vote in Ginninderra, or nearly 1.5 quotas, making him the first Labor leader to win a quota in his own right since the introduction of the Hare Clark system in 1995.38 Labor, with 8 out of 17 seats, was able to form a minority government, and with the support of either the Greens or the Australian Democrat Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs), would be able to pass its legislation. Labor supporters and Stanhope’s colleagues attributed the turnaround in Labor’s electoral fortunes to his leadership.39 The Canberra Times said that Stanhope had pieced the party together, ‘picked up a shattered unelectable party in1998 and turned it into an electable force’.40 He was not inspiring, but he was ‘steady and diligent’. However, Stanhope’s leadership may not have been the critical factor in getting Labor into government – he was not the ACT’s preferred leader. Pre-election polling showed Labor ahead in all three electorates,41 but Stanhope lagging behind as preferred chief minister, polling 38 per cent against 41 per cent for Humphries.42 Humphries said ‘the polls were pleasing but would not be a decisive factor in the election’.43 His major problem was still fallout from the disastrous Carnell Government. Stanhope presented himself to the electorate as honest. He promised open and accountable government and was concerned about the key issues facing the people of Canberra. He had the community involvement and managerial experience that voters had indicated were significant characteristics in determining their vote, and he was the leader of the preferred party. The Canberra Times assured its readers that Labor was capable of governing and that the ACT Government ‘would be safe’ in Stanhope’s hands.44 The most significant factor in Labor’s win, however, was the failure of the Carnell leadership, which hung like a dead weight around the Liberals’ campaign. Stanhope responded to his victory in a relaxed and laid-back manner,

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with ‘a beer and a barbie’ at home with his family, staff and helpers. He said ‘he didn’t experience any great feeling of exhilaration’, but was pleased that Labor was back in a winning position, and was ‘feeling really good’ about his role in achieving that result.45

Policy broker/policy entrepreneur – a man with plans Stanhope’s performance as policy broker and policy entrepreneur in government has built strongly and solidly on the policies Labor featured in its 2001 campaign – in particular, the development of a long-term strategy for dealing with the ACT’s economic, social and urban planning needs. Stanhope was offended by the weaknesses and excesses of the Carnell Government and determined not to follow the same path. He promised that leadership and honesty would be the hallmarks of his government.46 He reaffirmed that his government would develop its policy priorities for education and training, health, sustainability, economic growth, community engagement and safety and public service capacity within the framework of the party’s values and vision of fairness, integrity, honesty, compassion, open and accountable government, leadership and egalitarianism.47 The new committees added to the Legislative Assembly’s committee system (social equity, legal affairs, the environment and public accounts) reflect that commitment. Labor had undertaken considerable community consultation when developing its election policies. Broad-based consultation has also been a hallmark of Stanhope’s approach to dealing with problems and crises in government; he believes government should involve a genuine partnership with community interests.48 The result has been the establishment of task forces and representative reference groups, community consultation, and the development of strategic plans. Some examples include: • the ACT health summit (involving the government, interested groups and stakeholders) to discuss problems within Canberra’s health system – this produced an action plan for health; • a consultation process on sustainability in the ACT that resulted in the policy document People Place Prosperity; • a policy for sustainability, and the establishment of an ongoing sustainability expert reference group; • a bill of rights consultative committee;

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a joint union/management council to improve consultation between the government and unions on public service issues; • a ministerial advisory council on ageing – this produced an ageing strategic plan for 2003–05; and • the 2003–04 ACT road safety action plan – in this case, community consultation on its recommendations followed the plan. The most significant policy development process undertaken by the Stanhope Government has been a series of forward-looking and wideranging reviews of Canberra’s social, urban and economic needs.The idea came out of the Labor caucus’s pre-election policy review, and was a response to what Stanhope describes as Carnell’s ‘shooting from the hip’ style of policy-making and fundamentally flawed administration.49 Sources within the Labor Party agree that the emphasis on planning was a reaction to Carnell’s policy style – under her government, it had seemed that everything was up for grabs, with various interest groups all putting in their bids in relation to policy. During the 1960s, the British Labour Government embraced social and economic planning as a tool for economic management, including the development of a National Plan. Australian Labor followed suit in the 1980s with the Accord, the Economic Planning Advisory Council and industry advisory councils. These processes resulted in a range of plans, including the car plan and the steel plan. These approaches are similar to the newer ‘third way’, which uses the idea that social capital can be best developed through the participation of community groups and other stakeholders.The Stanhope Government’s focus on planning and consultation can thus be located within both Australian Labor and British New Labour traditions. On the other hand, it can equally be seen as having developed alongside modern-day management practice, which also focuses on strategic planning – Stanhope, as mentioned above, is considered ‘process-driven’. Stanhope has described the processes of long-term strategic planning and community consultation undertaken by his government as ‘measured and deliberate’.50 He says the planning process was a case of practical politics as much as of ideology, because some of the essential planning work had not been done.‘If we are serious,’ he says,‘we have got to plan for the future.You cannot just work to a three-year electoral cycle.’The city-state size of the ACT, he argues, makes it easier to plan to overcome poverty

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and disadvantage. His government provides the agenda and works in genuine partnership with community interests.51 The social plan has been identified by sources within Labor as Stanhope’s ‘personal baby’, related to his view that there needed to be a bigger-picture perspective to social policy, and to his whole-of-government approach to policy development. There is a culture of planning in the ACT – Canberra was, after all, a planned city. Community consultation is a tradition there; it is a small jurisdiction, and is home to a lot of well-organised, well-informed, enthusiastic people who want to participate and have input into policy development. There is a view that because of this, Canberra is one place where community consultation is likely to work.The Stanhope Government has been able to draw on this existing network of groups for the planning process. Strong networks can, however, be an impediment and a political nuisance to a minority government if they are opposed to what the government is seeking to do. In this sort of situation, the best way for governments to co-opt, or neutralise, representative organised groups is to draw them into the policy process through consultative networks or advisory bodies.This has not generally been necessary in relation to the Stanhope Government, and many consultative committees, such as the ministerial advisory council on ageing and the sustainability reference group, are made up of people selected through an open nomination process. Other committees have included representatives from a broad range of groups and individuals from a particular sector, rather than selected peak organisations. However, this does not mean that all organised groups have always been happy with the government. Some groups described the urban planning process as ‘purported consultation’ with ‘quality catering’.There was a view that the government gave strong direction at these meetings, and that there was a tendency for groups to ratify the agenda presented by the bureaucrats.There is an opinion within the multicultural community, for example, that consultation has been confined mainly to the Multicultural Council of the ACT, and that the government does not want a strong and independent lobbying body.This criticism, however, has to be considered in the context of the factionalised nature of multicultural community interests in Canberra and opposition to the leadership of some peak groups from within the multicultural community. Draft plans for a multi-

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cultural centre have been put out for community comment and opportunities have been given for feedback through the internet and public meetings. Despite these criticisms, Stanhope is regarded by most as a moderator who listens to the views of others.52 Many people in community groups say that he does listen to what is said and does take advice. A prime example of the extent of community consultation undertaken by the government is the spatial plan, which the government claims has involved the ‘most consultative planning process ever undertaken’ in the ACT. It encompassed a discussion paper released for public comment and community consultation, advertisements on ACTION buses, brochures distributed to all Canberra households, telephone surveys of 3200 households, 15 focus group meetings, 6 community workshops in each district, a Canberra Plan forum, 3 community congresses, 2000 community survey responses, a public summit, industry and community round tables, a public round table,ACT Government inter-agency workshops, a community peak groups round table, a business peak groups submission, and a NSW local authority and NSW Government round table.53 When all this is combined with the consultative processes attached to the social plan and the economic plan, it is not surprising that there is a view within community groups that they have been ‘consulted to death’. The consultation process has provided groups with effective input into the policy process and given those who participated a sense of ownership of the resulting policy. However, the process has not been entirely open-ended. The government has made it clear to these groups that it is working with them in a co-operative spirit, but the resulting policy must remain within the parameters of what is practically achievable, such as budgetary constraints.There is also an ideological dimension: observers within the party say the government has been diligent in keeping its policy agenda within the framework of its vision and ideals, and will if necessary say, ‘No, we are not going to do that because it doesn’t fit with what we believe in.’ The result has been a series of significant plans, all of them based on broad consultation with a large number of groups and individuals, and with government policy being modified to take into account the ideas and concerns raised through that process.The plans, listed below (in Table

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7.2), have been incorporated within an omnibus Canberra Plan that Stanhope has identified as his government’s ‘long-term vision’ for Canberra over the next 25–35 years.54 Table 7.2 Plan Canberra Plan

Scope Strategic framework to guide the development of the ACT over the coming generation Spatial Plan To provide a clear strategic framework to manage urban growth and change Economic To provide for the future White Paper economic growth of the ACT Social Plan

Non-Urban Study

Progress Released March 2004 Released March 2004 Released December 2003 To guide the government and Released February 2004 its many partners in community reach their potential and share the benefits of our community A detailed set of ideas, options Report released 5 November and recommendations about the 2003 bushfires

There have also been a number of other plans, including a draft water strategy, a draft city west master plan, and a draft ACT recreational strategy. The Canberra Plan, according to Stanhope, ‘is the most ambitious and the most comprehensive strategic plan ever produced in the ACT’.55 Longterm planning by governments is not common; they more often adopt an ad hoc, quick-fix approach to dealing with problems, with a keen eye on re-election.The systematic and determined way in which Stanhope and his ministers have pursued long-term planning could be described as bold and brave.The Canberra Plan was two years in the making, and was released six months before the 2004 election.

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The government sought to deflect criticism that it had been engaged in lots of plans but not much policy by announcing a $60 million implementation program along with the Canberra Plan, including money for child and family centres, venture capital for research, facilities for a school of health sciences, $33 million towards public and community housing and funds to implement key recommendations of the Shaping Our Territory report.56 The October 2004 election revealed that the electorate is prepared to accept the long view.

Crisis manager – cool, calm and collected Stanhope’s personal involvement with the January 2003 ACT bushfire crisis began when he attracted national media coverage after stripping to his underwear and diving into Bendora Dam with the ACT’s chief fire officer to help rescue an unconscious helicopter pilot. He was humble about his actions, saying he ‘felt seriously inadequate’, and ‘regretted not having paid more attention to some basic lifesaving techniques’.57 On 14 October 2003 he was given a rescue award by the Royal Life Saving Society of Australia. He said he felt awkward about receiving the award, and that in struggling to get the pilot to shore he had convinced himself that he’d drowned the pilot.58 Stanhope’s major crisis as chief minister has been the devastating bushfires that swept through Canberra on 18 January 2003: the fires took lives and destroyed over 500 homes, plus public infrastructure and assets in surrounding non-urban parks, farms and forest plantations. The quick and efficient way with which Stanhope dealt with the catastrophe was a defining moment, and cemented his leadership credentials and popularity with the electorate. Stanhope immediately put in place a series of measures to give relief to the bushfire victims and to plan for longer-term recovery. On 20 January 2003, two days after the fires, he announced financial assistance packages for bushfire-affected residents who had lost their homes and launched a bushfire appeal. A community recovery centre was established by Stanhope on 24 January 2003. It was to function as a one-stop shop where all ACT Government agencies and other relevant bodies could provide information, support and advice to bushfire-affected residents. The centre provided referrals to government and community support organisations, housing assistance, property assessment and recovery, assistance with Centrelink claims, financial assistance applications, counselling, insurance advice, and

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child-minding. Despite starting with ‘no safe precedent to rely upon, no manual, no best-practice guidelines and models’, the centre soon developed its own merged case management and community development model, and an outreach model involving people from every government department and agency. The initiative has been described as ‘exemplary’ and ‘groundbreaking’, and has attracted attention in Australia and overseas as a model for post-disaster organisation.59 Stanhope established the ACT bushfire recovery task force on 24 January 2003 as the core co-ordinating body for the centre. It was headed by Sandy Hollway, the former head of the Sydney Olympic Games Organising Committee. It held its first meeting on 28 January. The task force was supported by a secretariat made up of senior executives and specialists from all government departments and key agencies. A community and expert reference group (CERG) was established to advise the task force, with members drawn from architectural, planning, building, business, union, social welfare and community sectors. CERG, with its flexibility and capacity to work across all areas of government with support from the chief minister, was regarded as a ‘positive and effective initiative’ that ‘fostered community participation and increasing community confidence in the recovery process’.60 Stanhope’s response to the bushfire crisis was immediate and decisive. In what some consider a gutsy move, Stanhope told critics of emergency service workers to ‘blame me’. ‘I stand with them,’ he said. ‘I defend them, and I’m asking people not to point the finger at them.’61 A number of ACT, NSW and federal government inquiries were established to examine the causes of and responses to the bushfires. Stanhope accepted the criticisms that emerged from this process and committed himself ‘to fully implementing all 61 recommendations’ of the McLeod Report. ‘My government is determined to learn the many lessons from the devastating January bushfires,’ he said.62 A communications and community engagement plan prepared for the task force suggested that the ‘recovery leadership must be “shared but separated” between the Taskforce chair and the Chief Minister’.63 It recommended that the chief minister ‘should link recovery efforts to the broader ACT agenda, such as the Canberra Plan’, set the agenda on ‘big picture recovery issues’, ‘provide the definitive vision of the rebuilt Canberra and the paths to get there’ and ‘lead the ongoing effort to recognise individual, community and business sector support and achievements’. As part of that

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process a Community Update newsletter was published weekly and notices were regularly published in the Canberra Times, advising residents and victims how to access information and advice. Stanhope’s post-fire leadership was seen as engaging rather than directive. His response was part and parcel of his consultative and process-driven management style. He worked closely with the task force team and took its advice. He tapped into Canberra’s strong community and business networks. The challenge, according to Stanhope, ‘was to set a clear vision and time frames for the way ahead, motivate community participation, widely share information, effectively coordinate government and nongovernment resources, and recognise the immense value that “non kin” support brings to fire-affected residents. The Canberra recovery had to be truly community based, very much a partnership between many organisations, with the government working as a catalyst and as a coordinator.’64 The Canberra Times praised Stanhope for his personal involvement in the crisis ‘from the very start’ and commented that in the crisis Canberrans had ‘seen a very different Jon Stanhope to the civil libertarian and politician who emerged in public life during the 1998 elections’. ‘Two weeks before the fires,’ it said,‘Mr Stanhope would have been the least recognisable of all the country’s political leaders’, but now he had ‘become a national identity and a genuine leader in a time of crisis’, and thanks to him, the legacy of the crisis would ‘be shot through with a rich sense of civic pride’.65 Rodd Pahl, writing in the Canberra Business Council newsletter, the business link, said that the bushfires had ‘made Jon Stanhope as Chief Minister’, that Stanhope ‘created real momentum for the recovery by (uncharacteristically) taking risks – creating the dynamic tension between the Taskforce and the Community Reference Group needed to flush out the difficult issues, by separating out the recovery process from government and by funding quickly and effectively the early heavy lifting required in the recovery’.66 He said that credit had to be given to Stanhope ‘for his determination to break the mould on what needed to be done’.

Political leadership – a man of principle People who have dealt with Stanhope say he is ‘robust in what he thinks’, and describe his personal consultative style as blunt and defensive, but pragmatic. They say he is testy, petulant, with a tendency to act imperiously if the position he is adopting is backed by departmental advice and is chal-

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lenged. He is considered ‘volatile’, ‘thin-skinned’ and overly sensitive to criticism, and if he is caught out in public or has locked himself into a position, he will ‘dig in his heels’. He puts a lot of hard work into policy development and coming to a decision, which may explain why he takes any criticism of policy personally. He has a reputation for being short-tempered. One Labor Party member says he saw Stanhope in a rush and bad-tempered at a public function, yet a business source says he has never seen Stanhope ‘snap or get grumpy’. Stanhope is reserved, and not at all interested in self-promotion. His distaste for the flashy Carnell political style means he will not do media stunts. His commitment to ethics in government also applies to his dealings with interest groups. He is said not to ‘do lunches’, preferring to meet people in his office. He sees this as part of being transparent and open as a government, and says that for him, the office is ‘a more comfortable environment’. It was suggested by one source that there is a handy coincidence between his natural demeanour, his code of good government and his interest in personal fitness – he uses the lunchtime break to go for a run. Within the business sector Stanhope is liked as a person, but is thought to have a natural distrust of business and to believe that the business community should be looking after itself. He is said to be ‘as dry as dust with his delivery of important speeches’ and to leave policy related to business to the bureaucrats and relevant ministers. Business representatives have commented that it is very difficult to get an appointment to see him, compared with the ready access they had to Carnell. He does not have an economics background and appears uncomfortable dealing with business. According to one small business representative, Stanhope has ‘an extremely poor understanding of small business’, and this ‘transforms into an aggressive and negative attitude when confronted by small business advocates’. Some business interests feel disenfranchised, and some business people feel there is a policy vacuum related to business. The overall business response to the government’s planning initiatives, however, indicates that there is some support for what the government is doing. Australian Business Limited, for example, ‘welcomed’ the economic white paper with the comment that it was ‘a step in the right direction’ that ‘should prove to be positive for ACT business’, and that ‘the government’s commitment to small business was particularly welcome’.67 The Canberra Business Council said

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they liked the words of the Canberra Plan, but wanted continual discussion with the government to make it a reality.68 The Housing Institute and the Property Council were more negative, but this may be related to particular decisions about urban development.69 The author’s conversations with some Canberra builders and developers indicate that there is strong antipathy towards Stanhope – and perhaps more towards Corbell – because of the government’s planning decisions. A public spat between Stanhope and Chris Peters, chief executive of the ACT and Region Chamber of Commerce and Industry, highlights Stanhope’s sensitivity to criticism and the fact that all is not well between Stanhope and some sections of the business community. Stanhope responded to Peters’ criticism of the government’s economic white paper as ‘disappointing’ by calling him an ‘ideological and political enemy of the government’.70 On the other hand, one businessperson who was interviewed for this chapter said that if Stanhope ‘applied direction and got on with it, he would be inspirational’. There is general praise among business groups, though, for his leadership and preparedness to accept advice from community and business groups during the bushfire disaster. Community groups, in comparison, have found Stanhope approachable, ‘a breath of fresh air after Carnell and Humphries’, ‘not a terrible leader’ and ‘doing a pretty good job’.They say that if they have the opportunity to have a conversation with him before he has made up his mind about an issue, he can be accommodating. He is considered principled but pragmatic – though not ‘brutally pragmatic’ – and prepared to compromise to consensus to ensure that his policies are implemented. The community sector has appreciated the government’s willingness to consult, but also complains that they feel ‘a bit reviewed-out’.71

A leader with integrity and commitment Stanhope is seen as a person of vision in terms of his social justice and social reform agendas. He is considered ideologically driven, with passionate core commitments he will go for, and a tendency to retreat to his ‘ideological roots’. He provides the leadership within the government on the things he is committed to, such as the bill of rights, the social plan and his opposition to Australia’s participation in the war in Iraq. However, he has sought to bring the community along with what he wants to achieve through extensive consultation, and has been prepared to accept modifications to his ideas

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to achieve consensus. A bill of rights was one of his ‘babies’. He established an ACT Bill of Rights Consultative Committee (which produced a report recommending a Human Rights Act for the ACT) and a program of public consultation to get feedback on the report, including ‘have your say’ public meetings. The ACT Human Rights Bill 2003, ‘the very first human rights legislation anywhere in Australia’,72 was presented to the Legislative Assembly on 18 November 2003. Stanhope’s government also passed the Parentage Act, which removed discrimination based on sexuality in ACT laws relating to the family, including adoption, and introduced the Sexuality Discrimination Legislation Amendment Bill, to remove sexuality discrimination in all ACT law. This strength of purpose in pursuing what he considers to be right has brought Stanhope into conflict with the Howard Government. Stanhope has defended public schools against criticism from Howard. He has been banned by the Commonwealth Government from participating in future citizenship ceremonies because of comments he made at an Australia Day ceremony relating to Australia’s participation in the Iraq War. Howard has written to Stanhope expressing his displeasure at the Human Rights Bill and the legislation allowing gay couples to adopt children.The Commonwealth Government could overturn this legislation, because under section 122 of the Australian Constitution the Commonwealth has the power to make laws for the territory. The fact that the ACT and the Commonwealth Government share the administration of Canberra, as the nation’s capital, has also caused tension between them. The Commonwealth overrode the ACT Government’s decision on the location of the Gungahlin Drive extension. There have been disagreements over the sale of Commonwealth land at Tuggeranong and criticism from federal territories minister, Wilson Tuckey, about the management of hazard clearing in national parks in the ACT following the January 2003 bushfires. The ACT Government, on the other hand, gained major concessions from the prime minister when it broke ranks with other state and territory leaders to sign the Commonwealth’s health agreement.

A firm hand on the tiller The ACT is a city-state where ‘the fusion of state and municipal functions broadens the range of activities of the ACT administrative system and the small numbers in the legislature stretch available capacity much further than

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in any other jurisdiction’.73 The ACT Government has a cabinet of only five ministers to attend to all these functions, with the chief minister including the portfolios of attorney-general, community and environment in his workload.The chief minister also acts as spokesperson, giving regular interviews to WIN TV news, and answering questions from the public on talkback radio about a broad range of local issues, from the placement of a pedestrian crossing, and grass cutting, to problems with the health or education systems. The chief minister has played a key role in promoting and selling the policies of his government, and in promoting the grand design and vision of the Canberra Plan. All these activities make the chief minister a very busy person; this level of activity is increased by his ‘hands-on’ approach and attention to policy detail. He is said to want to see everything in writing and to read background documents and arguments ‘to get his head around the detail’ so that he can form his own opinion. He reportedly read every word of the government’s bushfire notices to ensure their accuracy. There is no doubt that he personally keeps a keen eye on the detail of what is happening in the territory. One community group leader commented that emailed replies from Stanhope’s office often have touches that indicate that each is a considered reply, with a little of Stanhope’s own input. Groups say they have never seen a chief minister like him, that he is busy beyond belief. How dominant is Stanhope within the government? If the experiences of the author in seeking information for this chapter are any indication, he is in control. Inquiries about the party’s pre-election policy process addressed to Labor MLAs, with the exception of Corbell, were deflected to Stanhope. An inquiry about reforms to Legislative Assembly processes addressed to the Legislative Assembly was forwarded to Stanhope’s office for attention.This is partly a function of the smallness of the ACT as an administrative structure, but it also indicates deference to his leadership. The nature of his relationships with his staff, department and Cabinet suggest a more complex situation. Stanhope points out that while the function of the chief minister’s department in the states is focused on ‘policy and thinking’, his department has to take on a range of departmental responsibilities because of the smallness of the ACT jurisdiction and the multiple portfolios held by the chief minister. He describes it as ‘a doing department’, engaged in service delivery as well as policy advice.74 He is regarded as particularly strong in setting the priorities for his government, but willing to take advice

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from his department, including business and planning. There have been rumours that he did not get on well with former head of the Chief Minister’s Department, Robert Tonkin, an appointee of the Carnell Government. Tonkin resigned in November 2003 to take up a position with the COAG national bushfire inquiry, but Stanhope denied that there had been any pressure on Tonkin to move.75 He is also Attorney-General – this is the portfolio most closely associated with his personal interests and policy agenda. Stanhope’s own office employs ten people: a chief of staff, an office manager, three advisers, two media advisers and three departmental liaison officers.The ACT party secretary acts as the political antenna, providing an electoral focus and regular feedback to Stanhope and the caucus. Stanhope, not the staff, is reputed to provide the political judgement. He says his staff provide some policy analysis and independent advice, but that they have more of a liaison function, working with the department on policy initiatives.76 Observers have commented that his staff have to check everything with him – none of them, apart from his chief of staff, has the authority to speak to the media on significant issues. Others say he hides behind ‘his minders’ when he is unsure about anything. It is said that he ‘sticks with his staff ’ and that the staff in turn try to protect him from the ‘noise’ coming from the community. This last comment is interesting given the breadth of community consultation that has been a feature of his government. It may stem from an expectation within the ACT community that everyone should be able to have personal contact with the chief minister as soon as they request it – the pressures of work make this expectation difficult to fulfil. Despite this, and despite Stanhope acknowledging that security is an issue, both he and his government are generally very accessible to the public.The government has taken its Cabinet meetings to the suburbs to increase its contact with the electorate, and Stanhope is readily available for comment to the media, who have his home and mobile telephone numbers. Both he and his ministers are regularly seen in town, popping out to get some lunch, and often stopping to talk to people.77 The executive does, however, maintain its distance from the opposition and members of the crossbench. Stanhope is thought to be disdainful of the crossbench – it is said he would rather they did not exist. However, he has to shop around for support for his legislation; he tries to work with the Greens where possible, and with the Democrats as ‘second choice’. Appar-

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ently it is a ‘rare occasion’ when he seeks out the Democrats’ Roslyn Dundas to talk. It has also become rare for Stanhope, unlike other ministers, to visit the offices of media representatives. After the 2001 election, departing from previous practice, the Labor caucus gave Stanhope the power to personally select his Cabinet. This no doubt stemmed from the fact that neither the left nor the right had a majority in caucus. Stanhope chose a four-member Cabinet, two nonaligned, one right and one left. Former leader Berry was made speaker. In 2002, when Stanhope increased the ministry to five to spread the workload, the appointment reverted to a vote by the Labor caucus. MLA John Hargreaves, who missed out on a ministry in 2001, was instrumental in getting a motion passed at the Labor Party conference to return to a caucus vote. Gallagher (left faction), with Stanhope’s support, defeated Karin McDonald (right faction) for the position.78 The Stanhope Government is executive-driven. Of the eight Labor MLAs, five are ministers, one is speaker and one is whip – this leaves only one backbench member. The relationship between Stanhope and his Cabinet is complex. In opposition, the caucus worked together to develop the 2001 election policies. In government, however, on issues where Stanhope has undisputed carriage of the matter, he has been able to influence the agenda. Despite his dominance, factional and personal tensions within Cabinet have caused what some have described as ‘interesting tussles’: with right-winger Quinlan, a conservative Treasurer, and left-winger Corbell, media savvy, strong-willed and ambitious.There is a rumour that Stanhope and Quinlan would like to see planning removed from Corbell’s portfolio because of his high profile in this area. Labor’s Berry, described as an ‘old factional warrior put out of the primary action by having been made speaker’, publicly attacked the government’s proposals to review the operations of Totalcare, a government-owned enterprise, and criticised the leadership for being ‘out on the cocktail circuit, and out of touch with the issues and concerns of the people they were supposed to be representing’.79 Overall, however, Stanhope has worked well with his Cabinet to develop the government’s policy agenda.

Mr 84 per cent Stanhope has a reputation as ‘not the most exciting bloke on the planet’, but an honest and genuine leader with a great deal of integrity. He has

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described himself as ‘phlegmatic’ and ‘pragmatic’.80 He began his term as chief minister as an unknown quantity, ‘too boring’ and too ‘hopeless to lead the Labor Party to government’.81 The Canberra bushfires transformed his leadership from ‘low key’ to high profile, and earned him respect. A January 2004 poll asking Canberra respondents who they considered the most honest leader in Australia placed Stanhope at the top with 48 per cent, compared with Howard at 26 per cent, and ACT Liberal leader Brendan Smyth at 14 per cent.82 Also in January 2004, ALP polling results obtained from focus groups involving Labor, Liberal and swinging voters across the territory revealed that Stanhope had built an approval rating of 84 per cent – and could thus claim to be the most popular politician in Australia. The reasons were ‘his heroic efforts in helping to save the life of a drowning helicopter pilot and his strength during the bushfire crisis, coupled with his “straight up” leadership style’.83 His popularity has made him untouchable, safe from any challenge to his leadership from within the party. Stanhope is a committed family man and presents himself to the people of Canberra as a fellow Canberran concerned about its future. He entered office promising to govern ethically,‘not for a privileged few, or for selected interest groups’, but ‘for all Canberrans’.84 He has followed through on this commitment with broad-based, open consultation and the development of policy in partnership with the community. He acknowledges that ‘populist decisions are tempting in an election year’, but has stuck to his principles by delivering a Human Rights Bill and gay and lesbian adoption legislation, which he knew would not yield many votes. He has embarked bravely upon a journey of long-term planning that did not deliver quick-fix results for the October 2004 election. He responds to critics who say his government has been all plans and no action by pointing out that 90 per cent of Labor’s promises have been, or are in the process of being, implemented.85 Stanhope himself was not exhilarated about his success in leading Labor to government in October 2001. He considered it ‘a job well done’ and a ‘significant achievement by the Labor Party’.After 12 months in the job he felt vindicated about his low-key leadership style: One of the things that intrigues me and amuses me and sometimes bemuses me is the enormous range of gratuitous advice I’ve received through the pages of the Canberra Times and on radio, about what I was doing wrong, what I needed to do better, why I’d never succeed, why I’d never be elected and why I was para-

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noid. I reflected on it all and continued to back my own judgement, my own intuition. And I’m here now.86

The following comments from a Labor Party member encapsulate the evolution of Stanhope’s leadership from unknown parliamentary ‘rookie’ to ‘Mr 84 per cent’: Stanhope seemed to be a very unlikely leader and possibly someone who would be an embarrassment as leader of the party. He seemed to lack charisma and had trouble putting sentences together … He only won government because Carnell was on the nose, Berry had lost the last election and was so unpopular with the people of Canberra.There was no-one else to be leader, so Stanhope fell into the job … We in the party are very proud of him now … his policy initiatives have been very impressive … I think he is a decent bloke, with his heart in the right place, and he has developed tremendously in office … I will be more than happy to letterbox, campaign for him and vote for him this October.The Labor Party in the ACT is lucky to have him.

POSTSCRIPT: Labor won 9 seats at the ACT Assembly election held on 16 October 2004. This is the first time since self-government began in 1988 that the governing party has achieved a majority of seats in the Assembly. Stanhope’s popularity as chief minister, discussed in this chapter, carried over into the election campaign and was clearly a factor in Labor’s success. Stanhope personally achieved 2.215 quotas in his Ginninderra electorate.The ACT Labor Government will now be able to pass its legislation through the Legislative Assembly without having to negotiate with minor parties and/or independents, and is keen to proceed with the reform agenda embodied in the Canberra Plan and associated policies.

Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Jon Stanhope, interview, 2 April 2004. Liz Armitage, Canberra Times, 3 November 2001. Stanhope, interview, 2 April 2004. Stanhope, interview, 2 April 2004. Armitage, Canberra Times, 3 November 2001. Armitage, Canberra Times, 3 November 2001. Canberra Times, 14 October 2001. J.Warhurst, ‘Australian Capital Territory: diminished Capital’, in John Warhurst

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10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

24

25 26 27

28 29 30 31 32 33 34

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& Andrew Parkin (eds), The Machine: Labor Confronts the Future,Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2000, pp. 204–05. Australian Labor Party, ‘Jon Stanhope – Labor leader, Chief Minister, MLA for Ginninderra’, Canberra, 2004, . G. Singleton,‘Political chronicle: Australian Capital Territory – July to December 2001’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 48, no. 2, 2002, p. 296. Datacol poll, ‘Why do people vote the way they do?’, Canberra Times, 25 October 2001. Canberra Times, 19 October 2001. S. Bennett,‘Australian Capital Territory election 2001’, Research Note No. 15, Department of the Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 2002. Singleton, ‘Australian Capital Territory: July to December 2001’, p. 298. Canberra Times, 19 October 2001. Canberra Times, 18 October 2001. Bennett, ‘Australian Capital Territory election 2001’. R. Pickering, ‘Socialists triple their vote in ACT election’, Green Left Weekly, 1998, online edition, . ACT Labor Party,‘Labor’s plan for good government for all’, Fact Sheet 1, 2001, . Bennett, ‘Australian Capital Territory election 2001’. Canberra Times, 19 October 2001. Canberra Times, 14 October 2001. J. Stanhope, ‘A code of good government’, Address, Labor Leaders’ Breakfast, Canberra, 14 March, 2001, . J. Stanhope, ‘ACT Labor’s 2001 Legislative Assembly election policy speech’, National Museum, Canberra, 10 October 2001, . See Singleton, ‘Australian Capital Territory: July to December 2001’, p. 298–99. J. Chalmers, ‘Commentary: the Australian Capital Territory election of 20 October 2001’, Australian Journal of Political Science, vol. 37, no. 1, p. 166. Canberra Times, 19 October 2001. J. Warhurst, ‘Australian Capital Territory’, in J. Moon & C. Sharman (eds), Australian Politics and Government, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2003, p. 219. G. Newman,‘Against the odds: the 1998 ACT election’, Research Note No. 37, Department of the Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 1998. Warhurst, ‘Australian Capital Territory: diminished Capital’, p. 209. Canberra Times, 28 June 1999. Canberra Sunday Times, 21 October 2001. Canberra Times, 22 June 1999. Armitage, Canberra Times, 3 November 2001. ALP Senator Kate Lundy, quoted in Canberra Times, 28 June 1999.

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35 Canberra Times, 9 November 1999. 36 Armitage, Canberra Times, 3 November 2001. 37 Chalmers, ‘Commentary: the Australian Capital Territory election of 20 October 2001’, pp. 165–66. 38 Elections ACT, ‘2001 Election – first preference results’, Canberra, 2001, . 39 Canberra Times, 21 October 2001; 3 November 2001. 40 Canberra Times, 19 October 2001; 20 October 2001. 41 Canberra Times, 12 October 2001. 42 Canberra Times, 14 October 2001. 43 Canberra Times, 14 October 2001. 44 Canberra Times, 19 October 2001. 45 Canberra Times, 22 October 2001. 46 Canberra Times, 25 February 2002. 47 G. Singleton, ‘Political chronicle: Australian Capital Territory – January to June 2002’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 48, no. 4, 2002, p. 599; J. Stanhope,‘Ministerial statement’,ACT Legislative Assembly, Hansard, 11 December 2001, p. 78. 48 Stanhope, interview, 2 April 2004. 49 Stanhope, interview, 2 April 2004. 50 Jon Stanhope, ACT Legislative Assembly, Hansard, 27 August 2002, p. 2852. 51 Stanhope, interview, 2 April 2004. 52 Canberra Sunday Times, 21 October 2001. 53 Simon Corbell, ‘The Canberra Spatial Plan: most consultative process ever undertaken’, media release, 5 March 2004. 54 J. Stanhope, ‘Chief Minister backs a sustainable future for Canberra’, media release, 27 March 2003. 55 J. Stanhope, ‘Chief Minister launches The Canberra Plan with $60 million to kick start implementation’, media release, 11 March 2004. 56 Stanhope, ‘Chief Minister launches The Canberra Plan’. 57 Canberra Times, 14 January 2003. 58 Canberra Times, 15 October 2003. 59 C. Hull, ‘Inventing a new administrative wheel’, Canberra Sunday Times, 24 August 2003. 60 The Report of the Bushfire Recovery Taskforce,Australian Capital Territory, October 2003, p. 281, . 61 The Age, 20 January 2003. 62 J. Stanhope,‘Stanhope welcomes McLeod Report and takes immediate action’, media release, 4 August 2003. 63 DPM/bluegrass,‘Accelerating the recovery’, Communications and Community Engagement Plan, Canberra, 2003. 64 J. Stanhope, ‘After the fires: the challenge of rebuilding the bush capital’, Canberra Bulletin of Public Administration, no. 108, June 2003, p. 62. 65 Canberra Times, 23 January 2003.

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66 Rodd Pahl, ‘The Buzz’, the business link, Issue 17, February 2003, p. 3; Issue 20, May 2003, p. 3; Issue 22, July 2003, p. 3. 67 Canberra Times, 3 December 2003. 68 Canberra Times, 12 March 2004. 69 Canberra Times, 12 March 2004. 70 Canberra Times, 3 January 2004. 71 Canberra Times, 20 October 2002. 72 J. Stanhope,ACT Legislative Assembly, Hansard, 18 November 2003, p. 4249. 73 J. Halligan & R.Wettenhall,‘A city-state in evolution’, Canberra Bulletin of Public Administration, no. 103, March 2002, p. 6. 74 Stanhope, interview, 2 April 2004. 75 Canberra Times, 8 November 2003. 76 Stanhope, interview, 2 April 2004. 77 Stanhope, interview, 2 April 2004. 78 Canberra Times, 18 December 2002. 79 Canberra Times, 17 March 2003. 80 Canberra Times, 22 October 2001. 81 Canberra Times, 20 October 2001. 82 Canberra Times, 21 September 2003. 83 Canberra Times, 15 January 2004. 84 Stanhope, ‘A code of good government’. 85 Canberra Times, 14 February 2004. 86 Canberra Times, 20 October 2002. * The author wishes to thank the many people who were interviewed for this chapter, but who wish to remain anonymous. It would not have been possible to write this work without their input.

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Chapter 8

M I K E R A N N : A F O RT U N AT E ‘KING OF SPIN’

Haydon Manning * e seems a bloodless figure. He doesn’t have Steve Bracks’ looks, or Peter Beattie’s bonhomie, or Bob Carr’s aura of superior intelligence … His face is hardly memorable and, despite his gift of the gab and his broadcaster’s training, he comes across as stilted, a bit fake. His image is shocking … His voice on television in short grabs is unattractive. He smiles too much. And his taste in collars and ties is terrible.1

H

In 2004 Mike Rann entered his third year as premier, his 18th as a member of the South Australian Parliament and his 27th year of engagement with state politics (if we include his time serving former state Labor leaders).The observations above come from Rann’s political ally, friend and personal speechwriter, the well-known author and political satirist, Bob Ellis. Given a friend’s suggestion that he may be ‘a bit fake’ and suffers an image problem, it’s not hard to see why many South Australians, until relatively recently, were sceptical about a politician widely referred to as ‘Media Mike’. His critics, of whom there are many both inside and outside the Australian Labor Party (ALP), almost universally concur that ‘king of spin’ most accurately depicts his political style. Yet beyond the spin, and two years into office, there are signs of a reformist, and even visionary zeal, which few commentators or seasoned journalists foresaw when Rann took the premiership following the 2002 poll. Within a year of becoming premier his past low rankings in the opinion polls were reversed – the September 2002 Newspoll indicated that he had replaced Peter Beattie as the ‘most popular’ premier.2 Rann had managed to turn the tide, to forge stable government despite Labor lacking

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a majority. He presided over a government focused on restoring the state’s financial reputation, and assiduously appealed to popular prejudice for his tough and almost perpetual campaign on law and order. His apparent populism and long apprenticeship make him among the more self-consciously constructed of our current state premiers, and lend some credence to the view that he lacks substance. I argue, however, albeit cautiously, that his quasi-presidential style and his preparedness to seek new ideas from outside government – plus his good fortune in facing a weak and ineffectual opposition – will give him time to prove the doubters wrong. Rann is now well placed to realise something that his two most recent predecessors, Don Dunstan and John Bannon, almost achieved: a decade in office.

Luck, contradictions and ironies Luck plays a large part in politics, and Rann owes a considerable debt to political luck, which means that while it does not diminish his achievements, luck cannot be discounted from any balanced assessment of his political career. At least four pieces of luck readily come to mind.3 First, there is the relative ease of his election to the leadership in 1994. Following Labor’s massive defeat at the 1993 state poll, he suddenly found himself without a rival among the more senior ranks of serving Labor Members of Parliament (MPs). Second, his leadership received a major boost at the 1997 state election, when it nearly resulted in Labor taking office despite their having received a mere 34 per cent of the primary vote – basically as a consequence of the deep internal divisions within the Liberal Party (which saw John Olsen oust Dean Brown in a party room coup in late 1996).Allegations before the poll that Olsen had leaked Cabinet documents to Rann, in an effort to destabilise Brown, made the disintegration of the Liberal Government abundantly clear to the public.4 Third, luck played a large part in the negotiations underlying the formation of minority government following Labor’s relatively poor result at the February 2002 poll. Late in the afternoon of 13 February, recognising that his career was probably over – ‘I’m cactus’, he is reported to have said – he turned on his office radio to find out which way independent MP, Peter Lewis, would go. Listening to Lewis’s tortured speech, he and his staff eventually heard these words, ‘Against its philosophical beliefs and some of its practices of the last few years, I nonetheless give my support to the Labor Party.’5 Rann’s chief media adviser, Randall Ashbourne, had befriended

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Lewis and his wife some months before the poll, and apparently, midafternoon, an opportune moment was grasped and he managed to persuade Lewis that Labor would be better placed to deliver Lewis his wish list of parliamentary reforms and assorted other benefits for his Murray Mallee electorate.6 It was described by The Advertiser as ‘one of the most dramatic days in the state’s political history’ – Rann surely could not have believed his luck!7 Of course one makes one’s own luck, at least in part, and it is not my intention to downplay Rann’s perseverance during his eight years as opposition leader, but he did come within a whisker of defeat and quite probably the end of his political career. Finally, his run of luck continues in that during his two years as premier he has faced an opposition widely considered to be the most inept in living memory, and has presided over an economy in a recovery phase. While luck has been important, there are other contradictory or paradoxical aspects to Rann as premier. While none bespeak great flaws, their trajectory over his first term (and perhaps, as most pundits expect, a second term), is worth highlighting. First, his strong law and order stance and penchant for what many commentators see as populism sit uncomfortably with Dunstan’s aim: to be slightly ahead of popular opinion. Rann claims Dunstan as his mentor and gushes whenever he recalls those halcyon days of working for Don; indeed, one of his first acts as premier was to name the city’s main dramatic art centre the ‘Dunstan Playhouse’. Whether or not Dunstan held Rann in similarly high regard is a moot point. Rann critics point to Dunstan’s last interview, in which Rann is not mentioned and ‘polldriven’ leaders are cursed.8 I argue below that some of Rann’s reforms, especially the recommendations of the Strategic Plan announced in April 2004, are in the mold of Dunstan reformist spirit, but the jury is still out regarding their implementation, and many who well recall the Dunstan era are quick to scorn the premier’s populism and his ‘surfing’ of Dunstan’s legacy. Second, controlling both the agendas and the media messages is a hallmark of contemporary government, and Rann is widely regarded as a master of media manipulation – in the political vernacular, a master of ‘spin’. Interestingly, for all his effort to control the political message, his appointment of three strongly spirited individuals to chair his government’s three advisory boards was a bold one. As one former adviser to a premier pointed out,‘to risk losing control of the agenda is just not worth the risk’. These appointments suggest a presidential dimension to his leadership, but

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over time, the boards may in fact cause his government discomfort. Any dissatisfaction felt by the boards’ chairs, or their membership, would present journalists with avenues for criticism that are currently cut off, largely because of the tight control of information exercised by Rann’s office. Third, strong rhetoric is a feature of Rann’s leadership style. His opposition to the federal government’s proposal to locate a low and intermediate level national nuclear waste disposal facility in the state’s north was a typical example of his populist style. Rann has a history of opposing matters nuclear. In the early 1980s he wrote a pamphlet warning of the occupational health and safety risks associated with uranium mining, and in 1989, while he was a backbencher in Bannon’s government, he tackled the Liberals’ plans to consider a uranium enrichment plant.9 His rhetoric opposing the nuclear dump, as it is popularly referred to, belies a deep irony, though, for less than 100 kilometres away from the proposed site is Australia’s largest uranium mine – Olympic Dam, at Roxby Downs.Western Mining is major employer and contributor to state taxes, but its mining operations are reported as frequently suffering serious environmental leaks and spills.10 The company is protected from the scrutiny of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the 1982 indenture legislation that established the mine, and the Environment Protection Act 1993 (SA): remarkably, this Act exempts all mine wastes.While he opposes the ‘dump’, Rann is not prepared to amend the Act to give effective regulatory power over Olympic Dam to the EPA. Fourth, while Rann enjoys high regard as a campaign strategist, his two campaigns as leader have actually brought results that were far from impressive. Given that only a few months before the 2002 poll the Liberals installed the largely unknown Rob Kerin as premier, Labor’s primary vote of 36 per cent was poor. Olsen struggled constantly to stamp his moral authority on government, but Rann, for the most part, trailed him by about 15 points on Newspoll’s ‘better premier’ scale.The regularity of his vitriolic attacks on Olsen may have contributed to his having a negative public image – an irony, considering his efforts at media management – and nearly lost him the opportunity to govern. Finally, Rann has championed the anti-privatisation cause during two election campaigns, and whenever an opportunity arose to lampoon previous Liberal governments. At the recent state Labor Party convention, however, a report by international credit rating agency Standard and Poor’s was circulated with approval, as it promised an imminent credit upgrade for

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the state to AAA, which would align South Australia with other mainland states. Ironically, the main reason for such a positive outlook, according to the document, was the reduction in state debt made possible by privatisation.The old cliché,‘you can’t have your cake and eat it too’ seems to have little bearing on the premier’s conduct.

‘I want to be journalist and a Labor politician’ Michael David Rann was born in the small English city of Sidcup, Kent, on 5 January 1953. He spent most of his childhood in south London, where his father worked as an electrician. During World War II his mother worked in an armaments factory and one grandfather toiled as a dustman; the other was a fitter and turner. In 1962 Rann’s family migrated to a rural village in New Zealand, where his father worked in the hydroelectric industry. Rann recalls that when he was twelve he told his teacher of his wish to one day be a journalist and a Labor politician.11 Conscious and proud of his working-class background and troubled by social injustice and environmental degradation, the young Rann studied politics at Auckland University. He then completed a Master of Arts (MA) in political science, and remembers that his worst mark was for a paper on Don Dunstan, deemed by examiners too ‘laudatory’.12 He was active in student politics, and was a member of the New Zealand Greenpeace executive that sent Greenpeace III to Mururoa Atoll in 1972 as part of the international protest against French nuclear testing in the Pacific. During his student years he worked on NZ Labor campaigns, including that of friend (and later New Zealand Labor leader) Mike Moore (recently Rann appointed Moore to his Economic Development Board).13 After university he worked as a political journalist with Radio New Zealand, where it was reported that he struggled with being ‘objective’.

Constructing a political career – ‘I want to be premier, one day’ In 1977 Rann returned to New Zealand after a brief stay in Adelaide to attend his brother’s wedding, but he was soon back in Adelaide, having accepted a position with Dunstan’s Unit for Industrial Democracy. After a short time there he was seconded to the Premier’s Office as press secretary. He was working for one of the nation’s most reformist premiers, and later commented that it was a ‘fantastic apprenticeship’, and that Dunstan ‘taught

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me that being principled and developing policy is not enough, you have to bring people with you. Dunstan was able to be radical and different – and to win four elections in a row.’14 One commentator notes that Rann was among Dunstan’s inner circle of ‘favoured associates’, and that in contrast to Bannon’s cool electoral pragmatism, ‘Rann was frankly inspired by Dunstan’s idealism.’15 While working for Dunstan and his successor, Des Corcoran, Rann wrote speeches and helped develop civil liberties, land, gay and women’s rights policies, and the party’s then critical stance on uranium mining. Clearly a considerable vein of idealism ran through the younger Rann, and while he has never joined a faction, his early predilection was left of centre. During this period it was not uncommon for him to talk of his ambition to one day be premier, and looking back on his political career, it is clear that he deliberately constructed a professional politician’s persona. In some respects this became a handicap; he was forced to defend his

Don Dunstan Tribute, February 1999; Mike Rann, ‘Don Dunstan – maestro of the possible’ [photo courtesy Labor Herald: ].

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‘professionalism’ during the 2002 campaign, when it became obvious that he was struggling to combat the down to earth Kerin. He responded: ‘Winston Churchill was a professional politician, so is John Howard and so was Malcolm Fraser. The last thing South Australia needs at this stage is to be run by amateurs.’16 The essence of his professionalism derives from an early commitment to knowledge of election strategy and technique. He began to gain a reputation as an election strategist when working on Corcoran’s disjointed ‘Follow the Leader’ campaign in 1979, but learned much more during Bannon’s successful 1982 campaign to topple the Tonkin Liberal Government, in which he played a key advisory role.Trips to the US to study Democrat election campaigns saw him gain a reputation as one of Labor’s shrewdest campaign strategists. Rann is credited with being one the first to encourage direct mailing, and is noted for his knack of finding the right phraseology for campaign advertisements – he openly admits that he loves election campaigning. Close friend NSW Premier Bob Carr has sought his assistance on a number of his campaigns. Rann was also an early advocate of the use of opinion polls, and helped pollster Rod Cameron (Australian National Opinion Polls [ANOP]) convince Bannon of the need for government to poll the community frequently. Demonstrating his instinct for the media message, Rann urged Bannon, unsuccessfully, to pool all the government’s press secretaries and, according to one Labor insider, to adopt plans for action across government portfolios. In 1986, with cross-factional support he was preselected for Briggs, a safe predominantly working-class seat in Adelaide’s northern suburbs. He won easily, with 57 per cent of the primary vote. A keen student of US presidential speeches and language, his maiden speech echoed President Lyndon Johnson’s 1960s declaration of ‘war on poverty’: An unconditional war on poverty will require Federal and State Governments to take a hard-headed approach in assessing priorities and in determining areas where we can effect real change. It will require bipartisan political commitment and the support of churches, service and community groups, businesses and unions. We are talking of a coalition of concern. That will require a change in attitude.

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Perhaps indicating another feature – his unremittingly adversarial style – he also could not resist launching into a searing attack upon opponents he had moments earlier begged to join in bipartisanship: Sadly, all we have heard on poverty from the Liberals in recent months has been the suggestion that there be an Operation Noah-type phone-in on social security abuse. Interestingly, there is no suggestion that a parallel phone-in be arranged to enable accountants to dob in tax avoiders.17

The speech also stressed the importance of the environment and occupational health and safety. Rann served one term as a backbencher; Bannon promoted him to the ministry following the 1989 election. Little is written about Rann the person; there are only brief accounts by journalists. Miriam Cosic explains that he is ‘hellishly untidy and no longer drives a car because he is “geographically challenged”’. Recalling Ellis’s observation that Rann cannot do without company, Cosic writes: Ellis calls it the ‘orphan syndrome’, dating back to a childhood spent moving from school to school. ‘He’s got more friends than he can probably handle. He spends a lot of time on the mobile, calming people down and saying “mate” a lot,’ Ellis says.‘Orphans often have a great feeling of a lack of personal worth; I think he’s got that.A need for friends; he’s certainly got that.And a need for family; he’s certainly got that.’18

Yet like the public, few Labor Party members warm to him. Most are reluctant to be effusive about their leader, and then tend, without prompting, to mention a negative. On the other hand, journalists, and those who have reasonable acquaintance with Rann, share the view that he is a lively and humorous conversationalist, something of a gossip, a competent mimic and prone to amusing self-deprecation. Similarly, it is agreed that he rarely mentions his childhood or relationship with his parents – the orphan theme Ellis alludes to, perhaps.Thus his background remains a mystery; the general view is that it is ‘hard to know what makes him tick’ – all that is known is the constructed politician, the man whose obsession is politics.Whereas Victoria’s Steve Bracks is regarded as a ‘nice man’, the same sense does not emerge regarding Rann. He is clearly a tough man, prepared to square off robustly with Liberal opponents and perhaps, more threateningly, with those within his party whom he feels have wronged him.

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At war on all fronts – Rann in opposition The December 1993 state election decimated Labor: five ministers were defeated, and the party was reduced to 10 lower house members (the Liberals had 37). With a paltry 30.4 per cent of the primary vote, psephologist Dean Jaensch observed that the ‘last time something similar happened was in the early 1930s and Labor then remained out of office for more than 30 years’.19 Times were grim for Labor.The party was facing the prospect of at least three, or more, terms out of office. Leader Lynn Arnold told caucus that he would only stay on as leader for a short while, and indeed 10 months later he resigned from parliament. Rann found himself in a fortunate position: he had been elected deputy in December 1993 when his more senior colleague, Frank Blevins, vacated the deputy’s position, saying that he would not contest the next election.With Arnold’s departure, Rann became the most experienced member of the lower house ‘cricket team’, as it was referred to derisively in the media, and won the leadership uncontested. Sources indicate that he accepted the unenviable role of opposition leader with assurances from colleagues and the party office that he would be given two elections as leader. The Advertiser editorialised that he was ‘a bonny fighter in the parliamentary cockpit, a man with a keen eye for publicity’, and his mentor, Dunstan, proffered the view that Rann would be as he himself was, ‘rather more radical than the party’.20 For Rann, the prospect of opposing a government with a huge majority prompted the following comment: People are sick and tired of political bickering, sick and tired of aggro, sick and tired of alibis and excuses and name calling … We are going to be a positive, patriotic Opposition. We will put the Government under close scrutiny at all times, tough scrutiny.21

At the outset he chose to avoid daily battles with the government – this would come later. Instead, following the strategy of British Labour in the late 1980s, he embarked on ‘Labor Listens’, convening meetings with community and interest groups across the state, meetings which were also attended by various shadow ministers and endorsed Labor candidates. In April 1996, commentator Vern Marshal felt that Rann had ‘had little success in taking the Liberal government to task’, and while ‘respected for his earnestness and strategic talents, there is criticism of Rann’s leadership from within his Party, albeit muted at this stage’.22 Doubts concerning his leadership diminished as the focus shifted to the Liberal Government’s internal

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divisions.These were dramatically exposed when Premier Brown’s factional rival, Olsen, launched a successful challenge to his leadership and became premier in November 1996. Olsen faced an already divided parliamentary party, and when it emerged that he may have leaked confidential Cabinet documents to Rann as part of the destabilisation of Brown, these divisions became bitter. Under parliamentary privilege, Rann named Olsen as the source of the documents, and later claimed that Olsen had called him a ‘liar’ during a doorstop interview. Rann quickly applied to sue Olsen, thus keeping Olsen’s conduct before the public eye throughout the months leading up to the election. The 1997 election campaign was the most presidential yet seen in South Australia, and given the backdrop of the defamation case, it was bitter and frequently negative in tone. The Advertiser’s long-serving political reporter, Greg Kelton, reported that ‘both Labor and Liberal MPs admit that they cannot recall such a tightly run campaign’.23 Rann was widely thought to have won the election debate, and his campaign staff thought him ‘just a genius’ on the campaign trail.24 In some respects good fortune visited Rann once again: Olsen’s hopes to capitalise on voters being distracted by the Adelaide Football Club’s finals campaign actually worked in Labor’s favour. One week from polling day Adelaide won the grand final. The state had indeed become distracted, and as journalist Mathew Abraham observed, football fever saw the election become ‘the nation’s first four-day campaign, a quirk which suited Labor’s strapped finances’.25 Low on funds – a legacy of the 1993 defeat – Labor benefited greatly, focusing its limited television advertising on the campaign’s last few days, using the theme that the election was a ‘referendum on privatisation’. Obviously vulnerable to Olsen’s constant endeavour to remind voters of the State Bank, Rann tried to persuade the electorate that Olsen had secret plans for further privatisation. Time proved him correct: in 1998, Olsen broke his election promise not to seek to privatise the state-owned power utility. Again illustrating his decisive campaign style, Rann surprised his party by also pledging no new taxes or increases in existing taxes above inflation, and offered to resign if this pledge were broken by his government.This statement, along with his commitment to pursuing a tough law and order policy which would see persons jailed if convicted a third time for burglary, unsettled some Labor MPs and party members.26 Demonstrating a type of conceit that often accompanies his rhetoric, Rann announced on election night, before the party faithful, that the result

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was the ‘sweetest defeat of them all’.27 Two days earlier he had commented to friend and campaign companion Ellis that he expected to win 1 seat and lose the leadership.28 Labor’s primary vote had improved by 4.8 per cent to 35.1 per cent, and the Liberals took a hammering, losing 12.4 per cent, most of it to the Democrats, who enjoyed a 7.3 per cent swing. Clearly, a healthy swag of Liberal voters were protesting Olsen’s ruthlessness, and their second preferences flowed to Labor, which won 11 seats, 3 short of a governing majority. Rann knew his leadership was now secure: opinion within the caucus, before the election, had been that anything less than a 7 or 8 seat gain would have spelt trouble ahead. Rann’s post-1997 leadership was notable for its relentless attack on the government; this became an almost daily feature on radio and television news bulletins. It was a very conscious adversarial strategy, but one that largely failed, which the formation of a minority government in 2002 tended to disguise. Rann’s hard-hitting style did not produce encouraging opinion polls – his yearly averages on the ‘better premier’ measure kept falling after 1997.The only line to show any significant steady improvement was voting intention, but this too dipped as the 2002 poll approached. Figure 8.1 Rann and Labor, Newspoll/The Australian, 1995–2003 70 60 50 % 40 30 20 10

Better Premier rating of Mike Rann

Satisfaction with performance? ‘satisfied’

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

0 Voting intention: Labor primary vote

SOURCE Survey details appear courtesy of Newspoll and The Australian.

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The polls, post-1997, should be viewed against the backdrop of Olsen’s reneging on his pledge not to privatise the state’s power supply, and controversy over his misleading parliament.This swamped him for much of 2001 and eventually forced his resignation. Considering Olsen’s difficulties, it is not unreasonable to suggest that Rann should have fared better. One may doubt the wisdom of total adversarial war when examining Rann’s intemperate outburst over the government’s announcement of its preferred consortium to take up what had become the lease of power utilities, rather than their sale. Not unreasonably, Rann began his response by saying that people deserved to know more about the $3.5 billion deal with Hong Kong-based consortium Hutchinson-Whampoa. Upon learning that it had joint venture links with a company owned by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Rann said, ‘I guess what people want to know is if they flick on their switch to their power, would the Red Guards be rejoicing. When you pay your power bill, there will presumably be rejoicing between the Red Guards.’29 The Australian editorialised that this comment won ‘this year’s award for pig ignorance and political stupidity’ and SA Labor Senator Nick Bolkus concurred when he said he thought the statement was ‘illconsidered’ and likely to ‘play into the hands of One Nation’.30 Not to be deterred, Rann pushed on, accusing the government of engaging in ‘gutter tactics’ to silence critics. In a media release, he said: The Olsen Government is very quick to attempt to play the ‘race card’ to silence those who oppose the ETSA sell-off.When I criticised the highly paid ETSA consultants (as gringos), I was accused of racism against the Americans. Now that I am asking questions about the links of the company buying ETSA to the Chinese communist regime and about their employment and environment records, I’m accused of racism against the Chinese.31

Reporter Kelton commented: While there is nothing wrong with questioning overseas investment and it was a significant issue in the water contract furore, Mr Rann’s comments appeared petulant, almost childish … all he has succeeded in doing is giving the Government, and those in his own party who would like to see him replaced, some more ammunition.32

This episode is indicative of what would become a feature of his style as premier: strong rhetoric whenever he felt public opinion was behind an issue.

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Rann’s last years in opposition were not impressive, because he failed to win over public support at a time when the government had faltered badly. In mid-2001 rumours circulated that moves were afoot within caucus to replace him, but his likely challengers, shadow treasurer (right faction) Kevin Foley and (non-aligned) John Hill, refused to be drafted. Reliable sources confirm that Rann responded to the rumours by reminding his parliamentary colleagues that he had been ‘promised’ two campaigns and, more ominously, that he would create havoc if deposed.

Victor y from the ashes of defeat – the 2002 election Labor entered the 2002 election knowing that it must construct a less presidential campaign: its own polling confirmed the published polls, which reported that Rann was not well liked by the electorate.The question was, had Rann’s years of heavy-handed adversarial politics and efforts at media management missed the mark? It seems Labor was aware of the question mark against Rann’s name, and answered by developing a campaign in which Rann rarely attacked his opponents; this task was left to shadow treasurer Foley. Rann played it safe by keeping his campaign thrusts squarely on themes he had hammered for a long time – support for families, state schools and hospitals, and, of course, hostility towards privatisation and the nuclear dump.33 He also stressed Labor’s budgetary prudence and pro-business stance, making frequent references to Labor’s proposals for economic reform, Ernst & Young’s vetting of Labor’s policy costings and business lobby support from SA Business. Rann was by far the more experienced campaigner, but he struggled to combat his opponent’s avuncular and avowedly ‘non-politician’ style. Ellis recalls that Rann was ‘deeply depressed’ by the popularity Kerin enjoyed.34 In sharp contrast to Rann and his predecessor, Olsen, Kerin campaigned in a relatively non-scripted manner, and with an element of self-deprecation about his profession. For example, one television advertisement began remarkably, with Kerin stating,‘People joke, “Trouble with elections is that whoever you vote for you always end up with a politician.”’ Ellis summed up an exasperated Rann parodying Kerin – ‘Who? Me? Politics? No way, I’m just a good bloke! Holding a barbecue fork! Vote for me, I’m harmless, whatever my name is!’35 The Liberals knew Rann’s Achilles heel from their polling: to the public he looked like a fake. Ironically, he was too much the ‘professional’.

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Breaking with recent tradition, Kerin launched the Liberals’ campaign in a barbecue setting. Labor went for the staged set piece speeches in front of party dignitaries. Rann’s speech evoked nostalgia for the Dunstan years (Dunstan had died in 1999), and Bob Hawke, according to Ellis, said it was the best political speech he’d heard.36 During the middle period of 2001 Rann and his strategy team carefully planned a campaign – down to the minute every day – against Olsen, and when Rann made an oblique apology at the campaign launch for his ‘professionalism’, it became clear that Kerin’s casual style, described by one journalist as ‘dagginess’, was troubling him.37 Days before the poll, Dean Jaensch commented, ‘Given the history of the Olsen Government and all its problems I would have expected Labor to have been well ahead, but they’re not.’38 Labor ended up forming a minority government, as mentioned earlier, with 49.1 per cent of the two-party preferred vote and a mere 36.3 per cent of the primary vote. The 47 seat lower house chamber saw Labor with 23 seats to the Liberals’ 20, 1 National (not in coalition with the Liberals), and 3 independents who, with clear conservative leanings, were expected to back Kerin to form government. The wildcard in this mix was the former

Cartoon courtesy Michael Atchison and The Advertiser, 6 March 2002.

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long-serving Liberal MP Peter Lewis. Expelled by Olsen’s party room for constantly voting with the opposition and publicly criticising the government, Lewis won his rural seat, running under the banner ‘Community Leadership Independence Coalition Party’. His relationship with the Liberal Party was poisonous, but few thought he would support Labor, because he appeared to have ruled this prospect out in his campaign advertisements. Four days after the election he became the centre of attention as he signed a ‘compact’ with the Liberals, a copy of which was reproduced in The Advertiser. However, late in the day he had a change of heart and backed Labor instead – because, in his judgement, Rann offered greater prospect of stable government and hence the delivery of his wish list. He warned that he would withdraw support should Rann renege on their deal, which included the speakership, a constitutional convention on parliamentary reform and a bunch of benefits for his electorate and regional areas in general.39

Authority and the power of office Rann’s experience working for a number of premiers is perhaps the key to understanding his strong sense of the power of the office of premier. His long apprenticeship makes him arguably the most professional politician among the current crop of Labor premiers. What he lacks in charisma (Beattie) and intellectual gravitas (Gallop and Carr) he makes up for in knowledge of what it takes to use the office of premier and project the image of a strong and decisive leader. His tenure commenced with desperation over the ‘compact’ with Lewis.As one prominent Labor frontbencher recalled:‘We were like prisoners of war: we had to escape and Lewis offered a way out.’ Notwithstanding this precarious beginning, Rann was quick to set the tone for his ministers, saying that he would govern as if there were ‘a majority of five or even seven MPs and [would] propose a bold new vision for the State’.40 Three themes define Rann’s leadership during his first two years as premier: his presidential style; populism; and planning for a new style of governance.

A presidential premier? The early months saw Rann set in train a cautious government, a government whose first Budget was a model of prudence as it aimed for credit rating agency approval.41 Shrewdly, Rann cultivated the support of Bob Such, a small ‘l’ liberal independent, appointing him deputy speaker and

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asking him to represent the government on a trade mission and act as special government envoy at an energy conference in Paris.42 Warming to the government, Such said,‘I’d have to say the Labor Government, thus far, hasn’t done anything that would raise my concern.’ After a survey of his constituents clearly indicated that stable government was a top priority, it was evident that Rann had played his cards well.43 In November 2002 he produced a trump, one that took his own side by surprise. Upsetting a few ministerial aspirants, he appointed conservative independent MP Rory McEwen to the ministry. Moreover, he guaranteed McEwen a place at the Cabinet table should the government and McEwen be returned at the next election.While the defection of backbencher Kris Hanna to the Greens was a blow, it nevertheless remains the case that Lewis no longer holds sway and the government is stable – something no one predicted at the outset. Unilateral decision-making is also part of Rann’s presidential style, and illustrates the fact that he is prepared to use the power of the premier’s office much more than Bannon did; Bannon, though, was partly beholden to a group of longer-serving ministers from the Dunstan era. Rann will go out on a limb without much prior consultation with his parliamentary colleagues, and the public see in him a preparedness to compromise his party’s traditions for the betterment of the state.The ‘whining carping Mike Rann’ of opposition has been rapidly forgotten, and has been replaced by a decisive leader. His management of Cabinet and caucus is viewed as being more consultative than authoritarian. He is regarded as not particularly arrogant and, in general, as a reasonable listener. Apart from not consulting Cabinet on the McEwen appointment, Rann is considered a consensual leader in Cabinet.

Populism? – ‘Go ahead, make my day’ It is common today to refer to various state premiers – most notably Beattie, Carr and Rann – as populists. Strictly speaking, the political science usage of this term denotes a much more orchestrated role for leaders in appealing to and, more importantly, mobilising groups in society against other groups. Usually this takes the form of demonising a section of society on the basis of their racial background or success in business – the latter group are often foreign investors or, as was the case pre-World War II in Australia, bankers, industrialists and brewers.44 Former Queensland premier Joh Bjelke-Petersen gained a reputation as a right-wing

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populist for his demonising of union leaders and student protesters, and Pauline Hanson was later described the same way because of her attacks on Asians,Aboriginals and ‘elites’. Such populist politicking does not apply to the premiers listed above; they tend to appeal to popular prejudices rather than seek to mobilise hatred. Generally, the issues they use to drum up public anger are bipartisan: law and order and criticising the Commonwealth. However, as incumbents, premiers are better able (than opposition leaders) to command attention and make it look as though they alone have discovered the neglected concerns of the general public. Rann is a champion of such politics. One of his first moves was to convene a ‘drug summit’, at which he canvassed a series of tough new laws.45 This was soon followed by an unprecedented move to refuse Parole Board recommendations, a move which prompted Law Society President Chris Kourakis QC to comment: ‘Rejection of the Parole Board’s recommendation was not the right track to “get tough” on crime.’ He argued that the government should instead legislate to make sure that prisoners serve ‘a longer proportion of their sentence or all of it in jail’.46 This was a prelude to the saga of the Nemer case, over which Rann came into conflict with Paul Rofe QC, head of the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). Rann was appalled that a wealthy young man, Paul Nemer, through his highly paid defence lawyer, was able to secure a ‘plea bargain’ which saw him receive a suspended sentence after being found guilty of having shot and grievously wounded a man he thought was harassing two young women (his friends). Rann condemned the light sentence: ‘I think that there is going to be genuine public outrage in South Australia about the fact that Nemer is not in jail where he belongs … Mr Nemer is a criminal who should be behind bars.’47 As some members of the legal profession protested at what they saw as Rann’s interference in the legal process, the premier cranked up his rhetoric: I will not be censored by the lawyers of this State or by the courts in this State from doing my proper job as Premier of this State. They can go ahead and make my day … They will not stop me from doing the job of being Premier ... If the people don’t like what we have done they can throw me out at the next election – that’s ultimately what the test is. I am accountable, and what I am trying to do is make the law fraternity accountable.48

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He chided lawyers as a ‘clubby legal fraternity’, and appeared to relish the opportunity to capture headlines and nightly news bulletin sound bites with the ‘make my day’ comment, a reference to Clint Eastwood’s tough cop character, Dirty Harry.While this verbal joust was going on, he pointedly announced increased police recruitment and DPP funding. Soon after this there was another example of Rann taking on the tough law and order issues. ‘Blowtorch on Bikies’ was the title The Advertiser used for its front page report of Rann’s speech to the House of Assembly in October 2003, in which he accused motorcycle gangs of ‘murder after murder, rape after rape, drug deal after drug deal … [and] shootouts and bombing in our suburbs’.49 Public concern had been fuelled by newspaper reports linking the gangs to security guards at nightclubs: it was alleged that security guards were selling amphetamines to club patrons. Rann moved to ban all known gang members from holding security licences and stressed his policy of empowering police to destroy any fortified motorcycle club prem-

Front page, The Advertiser, 8 March 2004.

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ises.Whether these matters warranted the amount of front page and nightly news bulletin attention they were given, relative to other issues, is debatable. But they did achieve something: maintaining an ongoing campaign on law and order is now a settled aspect of Rann’s style of government. The news report on the page opposite suggests that Rann is also prepared to challenge Labor’s close relationship with the union movement. With less than 25 per cent of the workforce being union members and only 10 per cent of union members affiliated as de facto Labor members, the Labor Party continues to wrestle with maintaining a politically sensible relationship with union leaders.50 Rann took a tough stand against public servants over a pay dispute in March 2004, attempting to further cement his image as a premier for all South Australians. While this is the media face, behind closed doors Rann meets fortnightly with factional union leaders – Don Farrell from the right and Mark Butler from the left – in what are described as amicable and important meetings aimed at resolving factional tensions.

A new style of governance? Restoring the state’s AAA credit rating is the government’s holy grail, and underpins its unity of purpose. Looking beyond this, though, we find a more challenging agenda emerging. Rann has created three boards that are nominally independent of government yet centrally placed to influence government – and, if disgruntled, they are in an ideal position to inform the public of perceived government shortcomings. The Economic Development Board (EDB) and Social Inclusion Board (SIB) were announced as policy during the 2002 campaign; the latter was an idea Rann took from British Labour leader Tony Blair.51 The third board, the Premier’s Round Table on Sustainability (PRTS), represents the logical next step: Rann’s objective is to use triple bottom line reporting and to achieve at a high level in each of the three areas this style of reporting monitors: economic, social and environmental.52 The EDB aims to promote freer markets, and the SIB and PRTS are charged with ensuring a balance by explicitly considering the social and environmental harms that can arise from freer markets. In this respect Rann’s government differentiates itself from Bannon’s government which, according to Allan Patience, pursued a ‘managerialist rather than a reformist image’ and was largely dominated by ‘the prevailing climate of economic rationalist opinion’.53 The jury is still out over whether such a forthright endeavour to balance market forces, societal fairness and envi-

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ronmental sustainability will work. It is early days, but given that each board is chaired by a powerful non-party individual – founder and former chief executive of Normandy Mining Limited, Robert Champion de Crespigny (EDB), Monsignor David Cappo,Vicar-General of the Catholic Archdiocese of Adelaide (SIB) and Tim Flannery, environmentalist, author and director of the SA Museum (PRTS) – there is reason to conclude that each board will play a significant role in changing the nature of governance. There are prominent business, community and environmental leaders and experts on each board, making the boards difficult instruments for government to direct or control. The EDB, the most influential of the boards, has been critical of attempts in the past to implement more co-ordinated government, and so made the idea of a state ‘Strategic Plan’ the central plank of its May 2003 recommendations: The EDB recommends that this government should take a new approach and implement a whole of government state Strategic Plan that is effective, transparent, long term and measurable … [the Plan] must provide an implementation framework whereby the government’s objectives in key areas – economic and financial policy, land use and infrastructure policy, and social and environmental policy – are coordinated across the various government agencies, … convey a clear message to business and the community about the intended policy directions for South Australia [and] provide guidance and discipline to government agencies on priorities for action.54

Most of the EDB’s recommendations were accepted by Rann; those advocating public sector redundancies were not.55 The recommendations cover economic development and export strategies; government efficiency, effectiveness and leadership; population and education policy; government financing; infrastructure; and, importantly, implementation. The EDB’s recommendations on implementation are revealing – they assert strongly that the board will take an active interest in how its recommendations progress. For example, the board proposes to establish its own ‘implementation committee’, whose ‘only role would be to meet with those in government responsible for implementation, set timelines and reporting deadlines, and review the performance of agencies’.56 Development of the Strategic Plan had stalled by December 2003; a draft prepared by the Department of Premier and Cabinet had missed the

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core concept – developing a whole-of-government methodology. To address this, Rann convened a committee of senior ministers.The Strategic Plan was eventually released on 1 April 2004. It committed Rann’s government to implementing some 80 policy objectives.‘There is a renewed sense of purpose in the air,’ he proclaimed.57 He stressed that all objectives had time lines that would be reviewed every two years. Prominent among the objectives are achieving a AAA credit rating within three years, trebling exports by 2013, achieving an economic growth rate better than the national average over the next ten years, attaining a positive inflow of people to the state by 2009 and reducing landfill waste by 25 per cent within ten years. Notwithstanding the fact that many of the targets are set for beyond 2014 and may therefore outlive Rann’s tenure, he welcomed the fact that ‘we will be measured along the way’ and appeared to be looking forward to the task ahead – ‘most people think this is politically dicey and that we have created a rod for our own back. I think this is a good thing.’58 He stressed that the key players in the review process would be the three boards: their task, he said, was to pressure ‘every public service head and every minister’ to meet the targets. What do these developments mean for Rann as a leader, compared with his predecessors? Figure 8.2 locates Rann as a leader, and while it must be considered tentative, given his short time as premier, it is based on the potential for the boards and new plan to define improved governance and public policy outcomes.The vertical axis shows the policy implementation style; the horizontal shows the pace of change.59 The presidential nature of the boards’ appointment, their independence from government and their role as monitors of policy progress all appear genuinely innovative.Accordingly, Rann is placed close to Dunstan as a reformer, even though his tenure, so far, has been more concerned with processes than with actual reforms. Cynics argue that the boards were initially mainly about giving Rann’s government a sense of moral authority to govern, something it sorely lacked when it took office. They claim that the boards are expendable, especially should Labor gain a working majority after the next election, and are not in fact about promoting new forms of governance.Time will tell on this, but it is possible that Rann is beginning to demonstrate a substantial vision. More importantly, he is demonstrating a capacity to use the office of premier to drive the so-called triple bottom line in a meaningful direction.

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FIGURE 8.2

Consensual Bannon Arnold Rann

‘Great Leap’

Incremental Dunstan

Corcoran

Impositional

Rann has clearly set the EDB’s recommendations as a benchmark for assessing the bona fides of his reformist objectives. In this respect two issues are of particular interest: the zero net borrowing funding constraint and the desire to spend more on infrastructure.The board argues that zero borrowing is ‘not compatible with a long-term economic development strategy’, a position that any social democrat would surely support.60 It will be interesting to see how the government – either on its own, or in partnership with the private sector – balances the need for budget prudence with the need for increasing debt to support infrastructure development.

A fall from grace – ‘the Ashbourne affair’ Premier Rann has not yet faced a political crisis of any great consequence but this might soon change – when the trial of his former senior adviser, Randall Ashbourne, begins. Ashbourne was a minder, spin-doctor and confidant of Rann and enjoyed special status in Rann’s office. He was something of a political maverick, a player of power politics par excellence, until his fall from grace. He will be on trial for ‘abuse of public office’, and if convicted, he could serve up to seven years in jail. A matter concerning improper inducements became public in June 2003 after the opposition received a leak from (presumably) Labor sources, which indicated that the

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government had offered former Labor deputy leader, Ralph Clarke, statutory board appointments in return for cessation of a court case, and that it then tried to cover up the matter. The opposition alleged that Ashbourne made the offer in return for the withdrawal of defamation proceedings against Attorney-General Michael Atkinson. Rann’s office first learned of Ashbourne’s activities in November 2002, but as opposition leader Kerin stated, the ‘real issue is that this has been hidden for seven months’.61 Rann was clearly not forthcoming about the matter until it became public knowledge, which has fuelled conjecture over whether Ashbourne acted independently or was directed by Rann. In July 2003 the premier made a statement in parliament: no direction had been given to Ashbourne; various actions (which he outlined) had been taken in late 2002 to investigate the matter;Ashbourne had been ‘severely reprimanded’ in December 2002; and the matter had been referred to the police to investigate.62 Apart from raising questions regarding the authority and power of ministerial advisers, this case has the potential to embarrass Rann severely. Should Ashbourne say in court that he took direction from Rann, this would certainly be Rann’s greatest political test to date.

Conclusion Is ‘king of spin’ a fair summation of Rann the Labor leader and state premier? His critics, and those of a cynical disposition, certainly feel this is apt; one former adviser describes his government as being akin to a ‘newsroom’. Much of the debate surrounding Rann’s leadership rests upon the question of whether or not he is capable of leading a government that focuses on anything other than populist causes. It is clear that Rann’s strong suit is rhetoric and matching media imagery, but that does not mean one should comfortably settle for the cynics’ assessment. No political leader today can afford to be less than highly competent in dealing with the media and producing the ten-second sound bite, something which has become an inescapable malady of contemporary political life. Rann’s ability to exploit the media is not a weakness, but it has clearly tarnished his political character – see Ellis’s comments and Labor’s low primary vote in 2002. Over the next two years, and conceivably into the first part of his second term in office, more certain judgement regarding the question of substance will be possible. In large part this judgement will be determined by the state’s economic fortunes, which can be assessed via

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indices and statistics, rather than by promises of new processes, plans and targets. For the moment, his presidential style and highly visible presentation of government policy has reassured voters after years of divided Liberal government. There is good reason to believe that his future as premier is bright. If his innovative boards succeed in establishing a new pattern of governance, the Rann years may come to be viewed favourably in comparison with the Dunstan years. Alternatively, the political edifice could crumble quickly if board chairs and members feel that the government is high on rhetoric and promise but low on outcome and vent those frustrations. In such circumstances Rann would need to be more than a master of spin to survive.

Notes 1

B. Ellis, in M. Cosic, ‘Rann the man – South Australian premier’s success has surprised everyone, including his own party’, The Australian, Colour Magazine, 8 March 2003. 2 Newspoll, reported in The Advertiser, 27 September 2002. 3 Reflecting on luck in politics, Bob Ellis observes, ‘Carr always had luck … the kind of luck Evatt, Calwell, Hayden lacked, and lacked in spades … You do not make your own luck … There are tidal flows in history that, like great winds, move crucial hundreds, thousands of constituents aberrantly, eccentrically your way … And sometimes, like Beattie in 1998 … it can all, however narrowly, like a spring rush your way’: B. Ellis, Goodbye Babylon,Viking, Melbourne, 2002, p. 71. 4 By mid-2000 the Liberals’ infighting caused the otherwise supportive Advertiser to editorialise that ‘despite more than six years of bitter infighting and instability, the Liberals still haven’t learned the most basic lessons. It is a situation which borders on the ridiculous’: The Advertiser, 7 and 9 July 2000. 5 Transcript of speech, The Advertiser, 14 February 2002. For the atmosphere in Rann’s office, see Ellis, Goodbye Babylon, pp. 607–16. 6 Interviews confirm the crucial role played by adviser Randall Ashbourne; also see The Advertiser, 14 March 2002. 7 The Advertiser, 14 March 2002. 8 The Advertiser, 13 February 1999 and George Negus interviewing Don Dunstan,ABC TV, 5 February 1999 (copy of interview held in Dunstan Collection, Flinders University Library). 9 The News, ‘Rann to lead U-plant fight’, 31 October 1989. 10 The Australian, 17 December 2003.

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16 17 18 19

20

21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37

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The Advertiser, 19 September 1994. The Advertiser, 22 September, 1994. M. Cosic, ‘Rann the man’, and Who’s Who in Australia 2004. M. Cosic, ‘Rann the man’. A. Patience, ‘The Bannon decade: preparation for what?’, in A. Parkin & A. Patience (eds),The Bannon Decade:The Politics of Restraint in South Australia,Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1992, p. 346. The Advertiser, 24 January 2002. Parliamentary Debates, First Session of the 46th Parliament, 11 February 1986, p. 37. M. Cosic,‘Rann the man’. Also see M. Price,‘So lucky to be in the presence of greatness’, The Australian, 1 March 2003. D. Jaensch,‘Rebuilding from the rubble’, The Advertiser, 13 December 1993. See also C. Pearson,‘Labor impaled on the city of spires’, Sydney Morning Herald, 17 December 1993. The Advertiser, 21 and 22 September 1994. Also see summary, in Vern Marshall, ‘Political chronicle: South Australia – July to December 1994’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 41, no. 2, 1995. The Advertiser, 19 September 1994. See summary, in Andrew Parkin, ‘Political chronicle: South Australia – July to December 1996’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 43, no. 2, 1997. G. Kelton, ‘Paranoia the password’, The Advertiser, 18 September 1997. The Advertiser, 13 October 1997. The Australian, 13 October 1997. See summary, in Vern Marshall, ‘Political chronicle: South Australia – July to December 1997’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 44, no. 2, 1998. The Australian, 13 October 1997. Ellis, Goodbye Babylon, p. 172. The Australian and The Advertiser, 15 December 1999. The Australian, 15 December 1999. The Advertiser, 15 December 1999. The Advertiser, 18 December 1999. Edited statement, The Advertiser, 16 January 2002. Ellis, Goodbye Babylon, pp. 70, 456. Ellis, Goodbye Babylon, pp. 499–500. The Advertiser, 4 February 2002 and Ellis, Goodbye Babylon, pp. 562–63. M. Skulley, ‘Pulped factions to come’, Australian Financial Review, 7 February 2002. See also The Australian, 16 January 2002; Australian Financial Review, 17 January 2002. The Advertiser, 9 February 2002.

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39 See summary, in Haydon Manning, ‘Political chronicle: South Australia – January to June 2002’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 48, no. 4, 2002. 40 The Advertiser, 6 March 2002. 41 Financial journalist Alan Mitchell commented that Rann’s first Budget was ‘a better budget than those produced by the Liberals, in that it promises a return to a more sustainable fiscal position’: The Australian Financial Review, 12 July 2002. 42 The Advertiser, 29 March 2002. 43 The Advertiser, 12 April 2002. 44 For example, see Peter Love, Labor and the Money Power, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1984. 45 The Advertiser, 25 June 2002. 46 The Advertiser, 27 and 24 April 2002; Sunday Mail, 9 June 2002. 47 The Advertiser, 31 July 2003. 48 The Advertiser, 31 July 2003 and 8 August 2003. See summary, in Haydon Manning, ‘Political chronicle: South Australia – July to December 2003’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 50, no. 2, 2004. 49 House of Assembly, Hansard, 21 October 2003, p. 523 and The Advertiser, 22 October 2003. 50 See R. Cavalier’s analysis of the Labor–union relationship in J. Warhurst & M. Simms (eds), 2001 The Centenary Election, University of Queensland Press, Brisbane, 2002. 51 With the exception of the recently established Premier’s Round Table on Sustainability, each board has a website with a mission statement, reports, and (in the case of the Social Inclusion Board) minutes of meetings. EDB: ;SIB: . 52 For reports concerning the Sustainability Round Table, see The Advertiser, 19 April 2003. The terms of reference for the Round Table are: 1] developing an agreed vision and strategic view of the issues to be dealt with to ensure the long-term environmental sustainability of South Australia; 2] identifying for consideration by Government the strategic issues and priorities to be addressed to implement this vision; 3] ensuring a high level of stakeholder collaboration and community participation in the development and delivery of this sustainability agenda; and 4] providing advice on specific matters as referred to by the minister from time to time. 53 Patience, ‘The Bannon decade: preparation for what?’, p. 350. 54 A Framework for Economic Development, Economic Development Board, SA, p. 24. See also The Advertiser, 13 May 2003.

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55 The Advertiser, 18 July 2003. 56 A Framework for Economic Development, p. 99. 57 The Advertiser, 1 April 2004 and South Australia Strategic Plan: Creating Opportunity, Government of South Australia, March 2004. 58 Radio interview, ABC 89.1, Mornings, 1 April 2004. 59 The model is taken from S. Barton & P.Van Onselen, ‘Comparing Court and Kennett leadership styles’, Policy and Society, vol. 22, no. 2, 2003, p. 124. 60 A Framework for Economic Development, p. x. 61 See summary, in Andrew Parkin, ‘Political chronicle: South Australia – January to June 2003’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 49, no. 4, 2003. 62 House of Assembly, Hansard, 14 July 2003, p. 3577. See summary, in Manning, ‘Political chronicle: South Australia – July to December 2003’. * I wish to thank current and former Rann Government advisers, public servants, opposition leaders and journalists who participated in interviews. My colleagues at Flinders, Andrew Parkin, Dean Jaensch and Geoff Anderson, are thanked for their valuable comment on earlier drafts. The interpretation presented and any factual errors are solely the author’s responsibility.

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Chapter 9

J I M B ACO N / PA U L L E N N O N : T H E C H A N G I N G O F T H E G UA R D — F R O M ‘ T H E E M P E R O R ’ TO ‘ B I G R E D ’

Tony McCall and Peter Hay * n the morning of 23 February 2004, Tasmania’s Premier, Jim ‘the Emperor’ Bacon, made official Tasmania’s least well-kept political secret: ‘I have no choice but to inform the people of Tasmania that I was diagnosed … with lung cancer, and that the condition is inoperable.’1 Despite Bacon’s efforts to control the announcement through (mostly successful) appeals to local media editors to hold off on the story until he was ready, speculation in The Weekend Australian had blown the cover two days beforehand.2 Bacon was typically upbeat and optimistic in the face of this personal tragedy. He declared that he and his wife, Honey, were ‘optimistic about the future and we want it to be a bit of fun’.3 He then went on to thank the people of Tasmania, his colleagues and staff, and to refer to a number of small projects he hoped to complete before his resignation. Significantly, these included legislation to secure a further land transfer to the Aboriginal people of Cape Barren Island, one of his political passions.The government’s attempt at land transfer had met rejection in the Legislative Council, but Bacon was convinced that the new Bill would meet with approval.4 Bacon confirmed that Paul Lennon, his great mate and deputy, would be acting premier:‘Paul and I have worked together so long.We understand each other so well that that has been an absolute delight. We have been working closely together now for over 20 years. I can think of no one else who can take over the leadership of our great state better than the acting premier.’5 Lennon, affectionately known as ‘Big Red’ by friends and colleagues because of his auburn hair and moustache and formidable size, was formally sworn in as premier on 21 March 2004, and announced his new Cabinet the next day.

O

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Tasmania’s highly regarded Treasurer, Dr David Crean, had announced his decision to leave politics due to ill health on 1 February 2004, which meant that within two months, Labor had lost two of its powerful government triumvirate – Bacon–Lennon–Crean. Jim Bacon lost his battle with cancer on Sunday, 20 June 2004. A state funeral was held in Hobart on the following Thursday, and large numbers of Tasmanians paid their respects. What has been the Bacon leadership legacy and what can Tasmania expect from the new premier, Paul Lennon?

Bacon’s ‘new Tasmania’ Bacon was ‘often referred to as “the Emperor” because of his perceived right to rule and ambition to be a populist premier’.6 Elected to parliament in 1996, he became Labor leader in 1997, upon the retirement of Michael

‘Iron fist and the velvet glove’ – Bacon announces his retirement from politics (photo courtesy of The Weekend Australian).

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Field, and premier in 1998.The Labor Party was re-elected in 2002, gaining 52 per cent of the vote. Bacon’s parliamentary career was short but spectacular in terms of political achievement. On its victory in 1998, the Bacon Government took the reins of an island economy that had regained a level of investor confidence not seen for 30 years.The state had its lowest levels of unemployment in 20 years and the domestic economy was enjoying the benefits of growth driven by tourism and real estate investment, both of which were contributing dramatically to the state’s coffers. Revised Treasury figures indicated that the budget bottom line was a significant $75 million over estimates for 2003–04.7 When Lennon presented his first Budget as premier and Treasurer on 20 May 2004, the surplus was in excess of $160 million, and the forward estimates were most inviting for anyone aspiring to be in government in 2007–08.8 At the macroeconomic level,Tasmania began to catch up to the mainland states and territories after a 20 year period during which significant disparities had emerged across a range of socio-economic indicators. The state Budget delivered a surplus for the first time in 100 years – today’s government is reaping the benefits of the fiscal strategy put in place by Field’s minority Labor Government (1989–92) to reduce the state’s crippling debt. Politically, the levels of support for the Labor Government are consistently high, notwithstanding the continuing community unrest over contentious policy areas such as forestry, gambling and (particularly in the northwest of the state) health care delivery. Before Bacon’s resignation, the Labor Party’s real political opposition had been provided by the Greens, both within and outside the parliament; Labor had decisively outflanked the Liberals in the Liberals’ own constituency, the business sector. Bacon stood aside at a time when Tasmania’s Labor Government was enjoying record voter support, anchored by the charisma and sense of populist destiny embodied in his vision for a ‘new Tasmania’ – economically viable, socially and culturally vibrant, and strongly marketed as a ‘clean, green and clever’ island oasis. While Bacon was keen to proclaim a new Labor dynasty, this dynasty was to be built on a leadership style deeply embedded in Tasmanian political culture. His successor, Lennon, regarded as the ‘hard man’ of Tasmanian politics, fits perfectly into the tradition of strong political leadership embodied in the style of Labor icon ‘Electric Eric’ Reece (premier from 1958 to 1969) and Liberal premier Robin Gray (1982–89).

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From Maoist to premier : Bacon’s path to political leadership James Alexander Bacon was born in Melbourne in 1950. He won a scholarship to Geelong’s elite Scotch College, and then went to Monash University, where he had a reputation as a Maoist firebrand.9 His rise through the union movement brought him to Tasmania in 1980, as the replacement for William ‘Speed’ Morgan as state secretary of the Builders’ Labourers Federation (BLF). Bacon was thought to represent a new style of pragmatic union leadership.10 From 1989 to 1995 he was secretary of the Tasmanian Trades and Labour Council. He was elected to the House of Assembly in the Tasmanian parliament in 1996 (shortly after the Port Arthur massacre), and became premier in 1998. Bacon’s experience of leadership in the Tasmanian union movement shaped his style as a political leader: his collaborative, inclusive approach to politics was developed during his time in the union movement.Though the BLF had a reputation throughout Australia as a militant body, its record in Tasmania was distinctly moderate. When Bacon was made secretary, some observers believed that he had in fact been given the job of making the Tasmanian BLF a more formidable force.11 What Bacon did, though, was overcome the serious ideological divides that had bedevilled the Tasmanian union movement throughout the 1960s and 1970s,12 and put in place a collaborative relationship between business and labour – this allowed some significant industrial reforms to be achieved. Employers and employees collaborating in legislative reform was typical of Bacon’s ‘brokerist’ policy style, a style that later characterised his premiership.

Bacon as pragmatic populist: the lead-up to the 1998 election The year before Bacon was elected premier, 1997, was a crucial time for Tasmania politically.The political opportunities presented to Bacon in this period laid the foundation for his success. In 1996 the federal coalition government promised an investigation into the Tasmanian economy, in order to advise on policies that would remedy Tasmania’s chronically below-average economic performance.13 Peter Nixon, a National Party minister in the Fraser Government, was appointed to chair the Commonwealth–State Inquiry into the Tasmanian Economy. His findings were released publicly in July 1997 as The Nixon Report: Tasmania into the 21st Century.14 Nixon was scathing about the Tasmanian political economy.

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Recommendations resulting from the inquiry included parliamentary reform (involving a dramatic reduction in the level of democratic generosity within the formal political system), local government amalgamations and, most controversially, the sale of the Hydro Electric Commission (HEC).The latter was seen as crucial to the key policy priority, which was retirement of the state’s public sector debt. The Nixon Report was a highly political document. It was released three months after Tony Rundle’s minority Liberal Government’s Directions Statement, an election manifesto, and not surprisingly, Nixon endorsed much of what was advocated in the Directions Statement. The Liberals’ document promoted several contentious policies that reappeared the Nixon Report, including ‘reform’ of the political system, and the sale of the HEC.15 The Liberals failed to generate public support for Nixon’s proposals, though, and the sale of the HEC became a particularly divisive issue.At the end of 1997, Labor, by now led by Bacon, offered an alternative strategy to Nixon’s (and Rundle’s) economic rationalism.16 Central to the Labor ‘vision’ was the creation of partnership agreements between local government, businesses and the community in order to foster industry, development, and job creation.17 This type of politics, focused on partnerships and collaboration, linked policy development to Bacon’s political style. Bacon argued that Tasmania’s debt problems could be ‘managed’, that with sound economic management there should be no need for the drastic remedies advocated by the Liberals at both state and federal levels. The possible sale of the HEC dominated the 1998 election.The Liberals had softened their position to one of partial sale, and no longer endorsed Nixon’s recommendation for a full sale; Bacon’s strongly contrasting campaign consisted of an emotive crusade to save ‘the community’s Hydro’. The HEC had been central to Tasmania’s economy for 70 years and had ‘long occupied a special place in the Tasmanian polity’.18 ‘Only Labor will save the Hydro,’ Bacon warned, adding that if the Rundle Government were returned, the Hydro’s profits would ‘leave Tasmanian hands forever’.19 One opinion poll revealed that one in five voters considered the issue influential in terms of their vote; another showed that two-thirds of Tasmanians opposed the sale.20 Bacon had capitalised on an issue of emotional significance for the electorate, tapping into the political culture of Tasmania, which involved a preference for strong political leaders, and the idea of the community as defender of the state’s ‘crown jewels’.

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Bacon’s first term: the rhetoric of inclusiveness Bacon’s campaign rhetoric in 1998 focused on the importance of partnerships and community governance. He argued that the best way to deal with social and economic decline in Tasmania was for the role of government to change to one in which partnerships were valued. He claimed that ‘we will work in partnership with the Tasmanian people because all recent experience has shown that it is the only way forward’, and that his government would encourage people through ‘an extensive and inclusive process of consultation’.21 Bacon’s election in 1998 altered the political landscape in Tasmania. He was leading the first majority Labor Government since 1979; and the Liberals had received their lowest vote since 1972.The Greens lost 3 seats, reducing them to just one member due to the reduced size of the House of Assembly.22 The Liberals were left in disarray; this became an ongoing political asset for Bacon. He often effectively diverted attention from his own budgetary and policy dilemmas by pointing to the lack of credibility of the Liberal Party, with its constant leadership tensions and policy failures in the area of health care.23 Bacon’s first year in office gave him the usual ‘honeymoon period’, and he put it to good use: ‘the Bacon government came to office on a sea of good will. It was well attuned to what the electorate wanted.The flow-on of the national economic recovery to the state … left Tasmanians feeling more confident than they had for many years.’24 After a year in office Bacon felt able to take credit for a restoration of public confidence, an improvement in the economy, developments in Aboriginal reconciliation, new levels of ‘listening’ and consultation (Bacon took his Cabinet and senior public servants to community meetings in remote Tasmanian regions), and Tasmania’s first balanced Budget for 100 years.25 These were significant political achievements. Buoyed by these successes, Bacon’s style became increasingly confident. His address to parliament in September 2000, his ‘Vision for the next generation’, highlighted his growing self-assurance. In this address, he did not follow the usual procedure of outlining the legislative program for the coming year – his speech instead focused on where Tasmania should be in the next twenty years. It was a Tasmanian version of the ‘State of the state’ address that emphasised the here and now, but also outlined a future vision. Bacon claimed that under his government, Tasmanian economic funda-

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mentals had been addressed without the sale of the ‘crown jewels’ – the Hydro – and that it was now time to unlock the potential of the people, to restore the confidence of the community in itself. This is a style that is almost classically populist: the leader takes on the role of articulating the community’s aspirations, and also emphasises a restored faith in the state’s identity and capacity. In this he can be seen as part of a broader trend among Labor leaders. As Victorian Premier Steve Bracks has said, current Labor leaders in Australia ‘are all relatively younger leaders who display a set of values which are about economic growth and economic responsibility coupled with social responsibility, bringing the people with them’.26

From rhetoric to rhetoric: Tasmania Together – Bacon’s Achilles heel? Bacon’s boldest and most explicit attempt at ‘bringing the people with him’ was Tasmania Together, a community-based social and economic plan for the island. Tasmania Together established a ‘vision’ for the state:‘together we will make Tasmania an icon for the rest of the world by creating a proud and confident society where people live in harmony and prosperity’. This vision was expressed through 24 goals and 212 benchmarks.27 Tasmania Together initially had tri-partisan support, enabling Bacon to demonstrate a commitment to consensus-style politics, but the Greens and the Liberal Party later withdrew their support for the process. Tasmania Together has been described as ‘potentially one of the most interesting, important and ambitious projects in postwar Australian politics’ – but also as difficult, complex and high risk.28 Whether or not it represented genuine aspirations to transform his rhetoric of community consultation into reality was, and continues to be, questionable. Many party members, for instance, were not pleased to have the generating of policy targets removed from party structures, and there were similar misgivings in state agencies. Tasmania Together has been the subject of some approval, much lack of interest, and occasional rigorous dissent. In particular, controversy emerged over the benchmark that set a date for the end of clearfelling of old growth forests. Despite the fact that Bacon had promised to implement all recommendations emanating from the Tasmania Together process, and had even legislated for a progress board to oversee their implementation, he chose to ignore the benchmark that called for old growth logging

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in areas of high conservation value to cease in 2003.29 In fact, Bacon’s government initiated a review of this benchmark through the progress board. For many Tasmanians this one benchmark was the test of Tasmania Together’s legitimacy; for them, the failure to support this key benchmark meant that Tasmania Together had failed. Bacon’s failure to address those benchmarks that were at odds with his own political agenda cast doubt over his claims that through Tasmania Together, ‘the community has been given a real stake in shaping a safer, fairer, more prosperous and environmentally sustainable Tasmania’, and that Tasmania Together was ‘based on the belief that to move Tasmania forward, we must ask the people of Tasmania about their hopes and aspirations’.30 Bacon’s rhetoric of inclusive, consensus-driven politics also seems to have been at odds with the Tasmania Together process, which critics condemned as ‘adversarial and nasty’.31 ‘Listening but not hearing’ was one description of the process. There were also recurring criticisms that the government had tried to manage the Tasmania Together output, and some claimed that the proclaimed commitment to community empowerment had been unmasked as a blatant exercise in political cynicism, and entirely bogus. Despite Bacon’s presenting himself as a politician who valued community participation, his government was accused of refusing to accommodate a diversity of views and of discrediting those who opposed them.32 With Bacon’s departure, much of the dwindling political support for Tasmania Together is likely to evaporate.

Selective engagement: Bacon and interest group dissent Critics argue that Bacon’s rhetoric of inclusive, consensus-driven politics was not matched by his style when engaging with interest groups critical of his policies. Geoff Law, a prominent Wilderness Society campaigner, argued that Bacon’s strategy for dealing with interest groups whose agenda did not conform to his own was to distance himself from them. He allegedly refused to even meet with conservationists to discuss forestry issues – and these are the most politically divisive and contentious issues in Tasmanian politics. Once decided on a policy, Bacon was defiant, and ‘anyone who [spoke] against it [was] demonised by him’.33 In some circles he developed a reputation as compulsively vindictive; a man much given to personal vendettas.

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Bacon came under fire from critics during 10 Days on the Island, Tasmania’s biennial cultural festival, for referring to artists opposed to Forestry Tasmania’s sponsorship of the event as ‘extremists’ and ‘cultural fascists’.34 Despite high-profile writers – including Peter Carey,Tim Winton and Richard Flanagan – boycotting the festival, and Nobel Laureate Günter Grass agreeing to be patron to an alternative event, Future Perfect, Bacon refused to compromise on the issue of Forestry’s sponsorship.35 His stubbornness was highlighted by his rebuff of Flanagan, who offered to act as a mediator – Bacon claimed that ‘they [the artists] seem to think there is something to mediate – there isn’t’.36 Law suggested that Bacon wished to remain in a ‘statesman-like’ public role: he ‘launched ferries, cut ribbons, and announced government sponsorships’, but refused to engage in dialogue with critics of his policies. The government defence of forestry practices in Tasmania was left to Lennon, now premier but previously Bacon’s deputy, and minister for economic development, energy and resources.Those close to Bacon argue that he was ‘moving on forestry’, and there is some evidence of active engagement late in his premiership. Bacon’s ‘State of the state’ address on 23 September 2003, ‘Sharing the rewards of the new Tasmania’, indicated that he would ask Forestry Tasmania to respond to the contentious Tasmania Together benchmark: ‘I have asked Forestry Tasmania to consider how government might address the Tasmania Together benchmark of phasing out clearfelling of old growth forests by 2010 on public land, with a context of maintaining sawlog and veneer supplies to industry, contractual arrangements, safety and employment.’37 How might they meet that benchmark? Bacon extended the timeline, giving Forestry Tasmania a seven-year leeway beyond the original timeline – 2003 – attached to this Tasmania Together benchmark. The next day, when Lennon was asked to respond to Bacon’s announcement, he simply replied that Forestry Tasmania would not be doing anything that threatened the employment of Tasmania’s forestry communities (workers). In April 2004, and with Lennon installed as premier, Forestry Tasmania released five issues papers outlining the implications of changing clearfelling silviculture strategies in Tasmania’s public old growth forests.While outlining alternative approaches, these papers emphasised cost factors, volume and yield factors, employment implications, contractual obligations under the Regional Forest Agreement (RFA), the safety considerations for workers and a range of forest management issues.38

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Bacon’s second term: retreat to the bunker Bacon called an election on 21 June 2002 and polling took place exactly 28 days later – this is the minimum time allowed under Tasmania’s Election Act.39 It seemed inevitable that Bacon would defeat Bob Cheek’s Liberal Party, which had shown little sign of recovering under his somewhat eccentric leadership. Bacon stressed the importance of a stable majority government for Tasmania, arguing that the result of not voting Labor would be minority government – an unstable coalition between the Liberals and the Greens.40 The Labor Party’s election slogan, ‘One leader, one team, one direction’, drew attention to the leadership instability within the Liberal Party. Bacon’s style throughout the 2002 campaign was that of an extremely relaxed, confident leader. A journalist claimed that Bacon’s campaign style was ‘Vote for me because why would you vote for anyone else?’, and that he had an attitude of supreme confidence.41 The Bacon Government had, after all, experienced a comfortable four years in office. It had ‘presented a united face, its leadership had made no serious blunders, and some of its policies, such as those to do with the gas industry and the purchase of the Bass Strait “twin ferries” appeared popular’.42 Labor had also managed to reduce the state’s debt and produce a budget surplus. Treasurer Crean claimed that the 2001 Budget focused on ‘caring for communities and boosting business’, and that it was an ‘unashamedly expansionary Budget’, containing ‘$152 million in new spending and tax initiatives’.43 The government portrayed itself as sound economic ‘managers’, in contrast to the simplistic cry for ‘jobs, jobs, jobs’ coming from the Liberal Party,44 and this claim of superior economic policy management rang true with the electorate. Bacon’s approach was that his government had laid the foundations for a ‘new Tasmania’ during its first term, and that only Labor had the skills to keep Tasmania ‘heading in the right direction’. Despite once claiming that ‘there is no single “big bang” solution to all our problems’,45 Bacon followed a venerable Tasmanian strategy of promoting large infrastructure projects.46 These included: the Basslink energy plan linking Tasmania to the national energy grid; delivering natural gas to Tasmanian industry and providing competition in the energy market, which would for the first time challenge the Hydro’s monopoly; and the purchase of two new Bass Strait ferries in order to boost tourism to the state. In January 2004 a third ferry

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began operating on the Sydney–Devonport route. Efforts to counter public opposition to forestry policy were led in the campaign not by the government, but by the dominant private sector actor within Tasmania’s forest industry, Gunns Ltd. Gunns’ advertisements called for voters to support ‘stable majority government’ – in other words, to vote Labor.47 Irony, never far from the surface of Tasmanian politics, also emerged in the form of support for Labor from former Liberal premier Gray, now a Gunns board member. Gray publicly and prominently endorsed ‘majority government’. Bacon was returned, in the first back-to-back Labor election win since 1979.The party’s 1998 vote of 44.8 per cent was increased to 51.9 per cent; this was perhaps evidence that Tasmanians were indeed seeking majority government,48 but the economic record of Bacon’s first term and an ineffective opposition were probably more important factors.The Greens won their highest-ever state-wide vote, with 18.2 per cent,49 securing 4 seats, 3 more than they managed in 1998.The Liberals retained a rump of 7 seats, but both Cheek and deputy leader Denise Swan lost their seats. In the wake of his electoral triumph, Bacon’s political style became increasingly dogmatic and autocratic. Political commentator Wayne Crawford, writing in The Mercury, argued that while ‘this may just be a matter of style’, it could also be ‘symptomatic of a government that has become too powerful, too comfortable, and which is beginning to believe it has life tenure on the Treasury benches’.50 Bacon appeared increasingly averse to criticism and debate. When asked by a journalist during his post-election press conference whether it was time to rethink forestry policy in light of the Green vote, Bacon retorted that ‘Labor has just got 54 per cent [sic] of the vote in Tasmania. Don’t come here and start telling me there’s something wrong with our policies, this morning of all mornings.’51 Bacon’s high-handedness extended to his behaviour in parliament. When questioned by Greens leader Peg Putt on the government’s plans for staffing the new Bass Strait ferries, he replied: The people of Tasmania elected my Government just under 12 months ago and they elected us to be the government of Tasmania.They did not elect us to be a debating society with you or the Liberals about everything.They elected us to get on with being a good majority government and leading the state and that is what we are doing.52

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Outbursts such as this highlight Bacon’s increasing authoritarianism, which was of course at odds with his rhetoric about an inclusive style of politics. A senior journalist claimed that when Bacon was confronted with questions that he didn’t like, ‘he dismissed them with disdain, and sometimes with a great deal of verbal ridicule’.53 He was said to be ‘scathing’, ‘snide’ and ‘openly critical’ of journalists,54 and was accused of threatening reporters, telling one interviewer that if she wasn’t careful she would join his ‘black list’. Challenged in parliament about his language and threats to journalists, he claimed that if he had said such things he had only been joking.55 Even within the parliamentary party Bacon seems to have been far from inclusivist – certainly by comparison with his predecessor Field, whose instincts (within the party, at least) were to engage, consult and include. Bacon, by contrast, set up a government within the government, a triumvirate – sometimes more disparagingly labelled ‘the troika’ – of himself, Lennon, and his government’s highly regarded and extremely competent Treasurer, Crean. Some ministers resented the policy faits accomplis the triumvirate would present them with in Cabinet.56 At the same time, Bacon’s government employed a record number of minders and ‘spinmeisters’, the most influential and public of them having been recruited from the press gallery, and the government’s press office became the most interventionist and powerful ever seen in Tasmanian state government. It insisted upon vetting all public documents issuing from government agencies and ministerial offices, and was therefore much resented within the state service.

Bacon’s legacy Bacon was acutely concerned with his place in history; so much so that the future, rather than the present, often framed his ‘big-picture’ political aspirations. His government increasingly took a ‘brokerist’ approach to government: ‘deal-making’ appeared to be the most common modus operandi, and private interests were often dressed up as the public interest.This approach was particularly evident in the forestry, tourism and recreation sectors, where the key industry players – Gunns Ltd and Federal Hotels – often seemed ‘joined at the hip’ to the Labor Government. The renewal of Federal Hotels’ monopoly gambling licence without a public tender process, plus its huge investments in tourism development and racing sponsorship, indicate the extent of this ‘brokerist’ style of

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governance. Social policy analyst James Boyce investigated the deal between Federals and the government, and reached the conclusion that Tasmania’s legislative oversight body, the Public Accounts Committee, should have protested but, inexplicably, did not. And in the words of respected columnist Wayne Crawford, the government failed to extract ‘a single dollar from Federals for a licence which [Boyce] estimates “could easily have fetched over $300 million” had there been an auction among such operators as Tattersalls, TabCorp and even Tasmania’s own publicly owned Tote Tasmania’.57 Over time, criticisms of the government’s brokerism increased, and became more harsh, and descriptors such as ‘corruption’ eventually became commonplace. In a speech at a forests rally in 2003, Flanagan spoke of ‘the corruption of an executive government that is deeply, disturbingly in bed with the top end of town’, and described the Bacon Government as ‘the most pro-big business government we have ever had. If you are not Gunns, Federal Hotels, Duke Energy or Woolworths, doors slam closed.’58 As he pointed out: Gunns’ shares were languishing at $1.40 when the Bacon Government came to power in August 1998. Its subsequent growth was dizzying. Within four years, it had recorded an increase of 199 per cent in profits, with another 39 per cent in 2002/3.With the acquisition of two rival companies, Gunns took control of more than 85 per cent of logging in Tasmania. Five years after Bacon won government, Gunns was worth more than $1 billion, with shares trading in excess of $12. It had become both the largest logging [company] in Australia and the largest hardwood woodchip exporter in the world.59

Though Gunns is a Tasmanian company, Flanagan notes that only 15 per cent of the company’s profits stay in Tasmania, and that ‘of that 15 per cent, one third goes to one man’, Gunns’ Chairman and CEO, John Gay.60 Bacon’s last public appearance before he stood down was to attend a football match with Gay: indeed, it was to open a new grandstand bearing Gay’s name. This style of brokerist politics is likely to continue under Lennon, a leader who is more comfortable forging deals than engaging in complex debate about values and ideas. He is, for example, personally close to Gay, and in 2003 accompanied Gay on a trip to Scandinavia to look at new pulp mill technologies.

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Some saw Bacon’s political style as symptomatic of a government that had become too confident and that lacked effective opposition. Even members of the Labor Party alleged that Bacon was ‘testy, touchy and arrogant – to the point of brooking neither criticism nor debate’.61 Before his illness he was increasingly defiant, and seemed to see his second term majority government as having a mandate to impose his agenda without opposition or even debate. He met ‘public dissent with increasing belligerence’,62 and criticism with personal attack.63 As Flanagan notes – and Flanagan has had to endure the government’s excessively personalised wrath more than most – has described it: ‘lies, innuendo, smears, the threat of no more employment: all these devices are used and used to great effect to bring an oppressive silence back on this island’,64 because ‘this government will seek to destroy your reputation. It will seek to intimidate you and you will be presented over and over again as an enemy of your own society.’65 Such criticisms notwithstanding, Bacon was Tasmania’s most popular premier in the last 20 years.66 Since his departure, polls continue to indicate strong support for the Labor Party. Bacon’s popularity was enhanced by his being a ‘relentless purveyor of good news’,67 and by his ability to distance himself from issues that were particularly contentious in Tasmanian politics. Lennon, on the other hand, remains linked to negative media imagery attached to a ‘scorched earth’ approach to forestry management, particularly in relation to the clearfelling of old growth forests and the use of 1080 poison to protect seedlings against native wildlife. His abrupt and often inept handling of this issue, particularly in the national media, confirmed his image as a ‘bully boy’, one who, in contrast to Bacon, preferred to ‘crash or crash through’. Bacon projected himself as a leader who was receptive to public opinion. His government, he claimed, was ‘adventurous’, ‘enterprising’ and ‘at times controversial’.68 He presented himself as a visionary leader who looked beyond the next election to the next generation.69 Lennon’s first commitment, as premier, was to continue to pursue the vision that Bacon had presented to Tasmanians and those looking in from the outside. In his first statement as acting premier, Lennon acknowledged the contribution of his triumvirate colleagues to the new Tasmania:‘Jim, David and I have worked side by side over all of that [Tasmania’s unprecedented economic growth] for almost six years. He [Bacon] has indicated today that

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he’s handing on the baton, but that light will continue to be the guiding force. I owe it to Jim Bacon, our colleagues and the Labor Party to continue the vision and the way forward he has created. Less than two years ago he said he wanted to give Tasmanians a hand up, not a handout. And I make him a promise today that we will carry that out.’70

‘Big Red’ becomes premier Paul Lennon is a man to whom much political folklore is attached.The ‘hard man’ of Tasmanian Labor, the government’s enforcer, is often portrayed as the man who didn’t aspire to be premier, who preferred to be the real power behind ‘the Emperor’s’ throne. Some believe he is unelectable as premier, given his propensity to divide rather than unite.A Catholic by conviction and personality, Lennon strongly guards his private life and family from public scrutiny. He and his wife Margaret and their family have shared the same house in Glenorchy for 20 years. He is a father and grandfather. He enjoys a game of golf and has interests in the horseracing industry. In response to Bacon’s illness, at 48 years of age he gave up a lifetime’s smoking habit. Lennon’s union and labour movement networks remain extensive. A workaholic, he loves the stuff and intrigue of politics. He is a vigorous if not always convincing defender of Tasmania’s forest practices and of the workers in the industry. He may have felt uncomfortable with the leadership role bequeathed him by the retirement of his good mate, but he will carry the mantle because he owes everything he has achieved in public life to the union movement and the Labor Party. Educated at St Virgil’s in Hobart, Lennon earned his union stripes in the Storemen and Packers Union in Tasmania, where he rose to organiser (1978–80), then secretary (1980–84). He played significant roles within this powerful union at the national level, including being senior vice-president from 1982 to 1984. In 1986 he was a member of the ACTU Executive. In Tasmania, the Storemen and Packers had strong links to Labor dissident Brian Harradine, who later became an influential independent federal senator. Lennon, as a fellow Catholic, maintains close ties with Harradine, ties that for several years prevented Lennon from joining the Labor Party – he door-knocked for Harradine. Lennon was elected to the House of Assembly in 1990: he won the seat of Franklin, vacated by a retiring icon of Tasmanian Labor, Ken Wriedt, on a countback. At his swearing-in ceremony, Premier Lennon reaffirmed his govern-

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ment’s commitment to the jobs focus that the Bacon–Lennon–Crean triumvirate had laid as the foundation for the new Tasmania:‘Tasmania is in its strongest position in living memory, and my Government will do nothing to jeopardise that. Let me make it clear that the leadership of the Government may have changed but its focus will not. Jim has handed on the baton and it’s a challenge I will embrace. I will not let Tasmanians down.’71

Cabinet under Bacon and Lennon Bacon’s strategy of distancing himself from contentious issues in order to remain popular was reflected in the structure of his Cabinet.When he was first elected in 1998, Bacon moved quickly to centralise power around his office, in particular by creating a Department of State Development (DSD). The DSD drew together the industry development functions of all government agencies, with the aim of providing a single coherent and cohesive approach to development.72 Under Bacon, the ‘DSD became the contact point and implementation facilitator for major development projects, as well as initiating and coordinating the state industry policy’.73 But as Bacon’s reign as premier progressed, he shed the more important portfolios, including economic development, to his then deputy, Lennon. Bacon kept responsibility only for what The Mercury claimed were ‘warm and fuzzy portfolios’, portfolios that kept him out of trouble and allowed him to present himself as the avuncular statesman.74 The growing influence of Lennon was made particularly apparent in the aftermath of the 2002 election. In the post-election allocation of portfolios he was given the heavyweight ministry of economic development, resources and energy; this stood in sharp contrast to the premier’s ‘soft’ portfolio of tourism, parks and heritage.75 In the February 2004 mid-term reshuffle, and despite the retirement of Crean from the crucial Treasury portfolio, Bacon declined to add to his own Cabinet responsibilities. Lennon acquired the role of Treasurer, lost direct responsibility for forestry, but maintained his position as minister for economic development (he chose to retain the Treasury portfolio after becoming premier). He was, in many eyes, already the de facto premier, with the actual premier increasingly content to bask in the glow of his government’s achievements. As premier, Lennon moved quickly to establish his team. He supported the elevation of veteran David Llewellyn to the deputy leader position over

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the inexperienced Bryan Green. Llewellyn has the ministry of police and public safety together with the ‘poisoned chalice’ of Tasmanian portfolios, health and human services. Green took over Lennon’s responsibilities for infrastructure, energy and resources, which includes forestry. Two new ministers were given demanding portfolios: Lara Giddings took on economic development and the arts and Ken Bacon (no relation) became minister for tourism, parks and heritage. Both face considerable policy challenges. Giddings, relatively young but talented, will oversee the implementation phase of Tasmania’s infrastructure projects in gas, and fibre optic rollouts. Ken Bacon will face inevitable comparison with his namesake as he attempts to present Tasmania to the world at a time when the expectations for Tasmanian tourism have been greatly increased by the three-ferry strategy initiated by the Bacon Government. The early indications are that Lennon is intent on being his own man as premier. One agency head – a Bacon appointment, Jeff Kelly – has had his employment abruptly terminated, and Bacon’s chief of staff, Scott Gadd, has moved from the premier’s office to head up tourism, parks and heritage. Lennon has appointed the editor of The Examiner, Rod Scott, as his chief of staff. Under Scott’s editorship, The Examiner ran a strong pro-forestry industry line; he was no doubt well aware of how much of the paper’s advertising revenue came from Gunns. Even Lennon’s ministerial choices say much about Lennon the man and the politician. Lennon’s background in the Catholic right and the union movement have shaped him as a ‘can-do’ politician, a man at his best with his coat off, negotiating deals around the table, but uncomfortable around intellectuals, and ill at ease in discussion of abstract or complex ideas. The surprise elevation of Ken Bacon to the ministry, and to a lesser extent the responsibility entrusted to Llewellyn, reflect this. Both are old-fashioned non-intellectual Labor men, the kind of men Lennon is most comfortable with. Even Giddings was a Lennon protégé, having been mentored by Lennon during his time as deputy premier.Whether this aspect of Lennon’s character turns out to be a strength or a weakness remains to be seen. If there is truth in the aphorism that ‘for every complex problem there is a simple solution – and it is almost always wrong’, Lennon’s tendency to see the world in simple black-and-white terms may well become his Achilles heel. Lennon’s ‘crash or crash through’ political style was immediately evident when he became acting premier and in the early months of his

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tenure as premier. He moved quickly to offer key public sector workers – police, ambulance and nurses – significant pay increases, ranging from 21.5 per cent for nurses through to 30 per cent for police over three years. State public servants are also set to accept a $60 million offer for a three-year period. Lennon defended the state against the recommendations of the Commonwealth Grants Commission’s five-yearly review, arguing that they would amount to a $38 million reduction in payments. He exploited state/Commonwealth friction to maximum effect: ‘We are continually having to dip into our own resources to meet the shortfalls created by the Commonwealth [in health and housing]. While they give with one hand, they take with the other.’76 When Rosevears Member of the Legislative Council Kerry Finch made allegations of corruption in a hearing into the TT Line’s purchase of the Bass Strait ferry, Lennon was outraged, immediately demanding that Finch back up his claim by supplying contact details and the content of any discussions with his alleged Norwegian informant.When Finch was unable to sufficiently substantiate his claims he was forced to apologise for using parliamentary privilege to make wild allegations; he later conceded that the claims were ‘absolute rubbish’. Lennon was quick to condemn Finch and take the ethical high ground:‘yesterday was a sad day for Tasmanian politics but Mr Finch has moved quickly to correct the record and for that, he deserves some credit … Let’s hope that Mr Finch and other Members of Parliament will learn from this and accept that parliamentary hearings are not the appropriate venue to air untested and unsubstantiated grievances.’77 The issue of parliamentary privilege, dissent and grievance then re-emerged in a familiar policy arena for the combative Lennon: forestry management practices in Tasmania.

Lennon and forestr y Lennon has form in forestry. His electorate of Franklin in the state’s south straddles Tasmania’s southern forests, the scene of a 25 year battle over forestry practices and the home of Tasmania’s tall forests. Lennon was minister for resources under Bacon, and therefore forestry minister, though much of the day-to-day decision-making in forestry rested with a government business enterprise (GBE), Forestry Tasmania. The relationship between Forestry Tasmania and the government is sufficiently blurred under this arrangement to make it difficult to target the minister in any tangible way.

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Lennon has vigorously defended all aspects of forestry management in Tasmania. Despite his often inept media handling of the complex issues surrounding clearfelling of old growth forests and the use of the poison 1080 in regeneration operations, his one-dimensional view of forestry – no changes that will cost jobs – mirrors the position of the powerful industry and industry-front pro-forestry groups in Tasmania. He deploys tactics that he would no doubt condemn if directed towards the industry or his own ministerial role. For example, as Flanagan asserted, during the 2002 state election Lennon sought to link Tasmania’s conservation movement to vandalism against machinery in the southern forests. Unsubstantiated allegations were served up at a time when the government’s handling of its Southwood forestry project was generating sufficient community action to fuel Green political support in Lennon’s own seat of Franklin.78 When whistleblower Bill Manning, a former employee of the Forest Practices Board, appeared before the federal Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee hearing into plantation forestry to voice his concern about ‘bullying, cronyism, secrecy and lies’, Lennon rose in parliament to deliver an hour-long response to Manning’s accusations.79 The context for this extraordinary attack was a Greens private member’s Bill calling for a commission of inquiry into the administration of forestry in Tasmania. Lennon began his response: ‘The allegations made by Mr Manning have been comprehensively reviewed. His allegations were broad sweeping statements delivered without substantiation … I have publicly encouraged Mr Manning to bring forward evidence for these allegations to the proper authorities.To my knowledge he has failed to do so.’ Lennon concluded his response, ‘… sadly, Mr Manning has been used by the games of the Greens, who have been calling for an inquiry into forests ever since there has been a Greens member of this parliament’.The motion for an inquiry was lost 18 to 4, the Liberals voting with the government. Greens leader Putt concluded: ‘… in respect of Mr Manning’s allegations, the defence that the Deputy Premier tried to launch earlier today was very thin. We have had additional evidence in relation to cronyism and the shenanigans that go on that have come forward this past week … Furthermore, he [Lennon] did not answer the substantive claims that were made by Mr Manning.’80 In a recent national television defence of forestry practices in Tasmania, Lennon told ABC’s Four Corners reporter Ticky Fullerton that there were

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conditions attached to Bacon’s review of clearfelling options for old growth forests: ‘We have some non-negotiable conditions attached to that. First of all we’re not prepared to sacrifice a single job in meeting that deadline [2010].We want also to be reassured that forest workers will be able to work safely in the forests.’81 Lennon responded aggressively to the suggestion that a ‘boys’ club’ was running forestry in Tasmania; he refused to acknowledge that people were scared to criticise the industry; and he expressed satisfaction with Forestry Tasmania’s financial performance, despite an AuditorGeneral’s report quoting a net loss of $11 million.82 Though this program was widely criticised as poorly researched by Four Corners standards, the impression given was that the then deputy premier was overly aggressive in defending what are, at the very least, questionable forestry practices and management, and that he was not prepared to acknowledge or debate forestry management in Tasmania. Though an eye-opener for mainland viewers, this was vintage Lennon: gruff and trite, crashing through and leaving no prisoners, delivering the prepared lines and the brisk responses.This is how Lennon does the business of politics.That is his style; he is full of threats and intimidation, and has scant regard for the complexities of policy-making. It is a leadership style that endears him to his political allies, but may not fit a premier’s mantle.

Richard Butler as governor? Nothing better illustrates the differing styles of political leadership exhibited by Bacon and Lennon than the appointment and subsequent handling of Richard Butler as governor of Tasmania. In August 2003 Bacon appointed Butler to the position of governor of Tasmania, replacing the long-serving and popular Sir Guy Green. Butler’s surprise appointment was typical of Bacon’s ‘shock’ style of political leadership. He wanted his decisions to be noticed. In this case he rationalised the decision in terms of the profile Butler had, and claimed that the appointment would advance Tasmania in the eyes of the global community:‘He will be an “ambassador” for the state and play a major role in bringing the world to Tasmania.’83 Expremier Doug Lowe suggested that Bacon appointed Butler because he wanted to ensure that there would be change in Tasmania84 – that this was part of the vision for Tasmania that Bacon had outlined in the 1998 campaign: the ‘dream of a Tasmania culturally confident, economically vibrant and politically progressive’.85

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Given Butler’s high profile as a UN weapons inspector, there was some concern about how he might approach the role of governor. One prominent political analyst, Richard Herr, queried what he saw as a politicisation of the office of the governor, observing that Butler’s appointment as governor appealed to Bacon because it was ‘instant celebrity for Tasmania’.86 Bacon resorted to his much-used strategy of discrediting his critics under parliamentary privilege, claiming that Herr was not an expert on Tasmanian politics.87 It seems likely, though, that Bacon was attracted to the vicarious credit attaching to the appointment of a high-profile, internationally renowned figure to the position of governor of Tasmania. Governor Butler attracted unfavourable comment after his 2004 Australia Day address. It elicited the accusation from federal Tasmanian Liberal senator and Special Minister of State Eric Abetz that he was ‘making partisan comment which fell neatly into line with federal Labor politics’.88 The premier did not comment, leaving the response to parliamentary secretary Giddings. Within a week of Lennon becoming premier a report in The Mercury again raised the possibility that His Excellency had transgressed, this time in a luncheon for local business leaders. Butler, it was reported, had criticised the US for reserving the right ‘to beat the living daylights’ out of anyone who threatened it, regardless of international law. He was quoted as saying, in relation to the 2000 US election result: ‘it resulted in the installation of the most highly nationalistic and self-centred Government we have known. Their election promise was to be more selfish, more selfcentred, more determined to use American power for their interests – and they have kept their promise.’89 Liberals at state and federal level were once again aggrieved. Senator Abetz suggested that ‘by taking a partisan stand in controversial issues, Mr Butler diminishes the respect for and impartiality of the office of governor’, adding that there had always been concerns about Butler’s links to the Labor Party, but he (Abetz) had been prepared to give the governor the benefit of the doubt. Now, though, said Abetz,‘I think he’s started to become an embarrassment.’90 This time Lennon’s rebuke was timely and succinct.The day the story broke he announced that he had spoken to the governor, who had agreed that he would no longer comment on foreign or domestic policy.‘I expect this undertaking to be strictly adhered to,’ Lennon said.91 The governor

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made no announcement in concurrence. Three weeks later, however, he ‘pulled the pin on controversy’ when he delivered a speech (for the Royal Society of Tasmania) on weapons of mass destruction to a packed audience in Hobart Town Hall. The Mercury reported that Mr Butler said he had chosen the subject because he thought it important, because of his experience, and because weapons of mass destruction were politically controversial: ‘but on the third of those reasons,’ he said to appreciative laughter, ‘I shall make no comment’.92 Despite these reassurances, the governor’s resignation was announced on 10 August 2004. This followed a three-hour meeting with Premier Lennon the night before and much speculation as to the reasons for the resignation. Key staffers had left the governor’s employ and the media chased the governor while he was on leave in Sydney. Both parties claimed that the resignation was necessary to ensure the good name of Tasmania. The governor said he was the victim of a ‘malicious’ campaign against him.93 Just ten months into a five-year term, Mr Butler received a $650,000 payout.

Conclusion Two tumultuous months in Tasmanian politics dramatically changed the Labor Government’s firm grip on the destiny of Tasmanian politics. Bacon’s departure from the leadership, coupled with the resignation of Treasurer Crean, rattled the confidence of the government and the community. Labor seemed suddenly vulnerable, at the very time when Bacon’s ‘new Tasmania’ was producing employment growth, investment growth and community confidence not seen for 20 years. Bacon and his government laid the foundations for these outcomes during their first term in office: Bacon’s leadership style, built around a commitment to collaboration with the community, struck a chord with the majority of Tasmanians. Such was Bacon’s success that after the election triumph of 2002, when Labor routed its Liberal opponents and rode on the policy outcomes of its first-term strategy, there was little for commentators to criticise other than signs of complacency. Claims of arrogance and aloofness entered the public discourse. Issues which are chronically difficult to contain or manage bubbled along: forestry management practices, the whiff of corruption emanating from Labor’s ‘mate’s rates’ style of doing business, gambling, health delivery, and education.94

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Enter Lennon, the feisty ‘hard man’ of Labor and the state’s new premier, a man with an unequivocally stated commitment to the vision of his great mate, Bacon, and a key member of the triumvirate that was so successful between 1998 and 2004. But unlike Bacon, Lennon is a divider, not one who unites. He is a leader who did not necessarily want to be leader, but who enjoys the exercise of power; a leader with untried ministers in key policy areas; a leader who knows what the vision is but may struggle to sell it. Labor is in transition, and the Liberals, at last showing signs of an energy recharge, are looking for ways to avoid what had seemed, at the beginning of 2004, inevitable and perpetual electoral failure. Political leadership and style are crucial in a modern liberal democracy. Between 1998 and 2002, Bacon’s capacity to tap the emotional wellsprings of the electorate was a triumph of political craftsmanship. Between 2002 and 2004 the populist rhetoric of Bacon’s first term began to turn into something less attractive, but the socio-economic benefits flowing to Tasmanians meant that electoral support for the Labor Government remained buoyant. But with Bacon’s death in mid-term, all bets are off, and the contest for the voting allegiance of the electorate is on again in earnest. Lennon’s quest for a long period of stable Labor rule rests on much shakier foundations than his predecessor’s. He is not a visionary or a thinker of nuance or complexity.There are doubts concerning the capabilities of his ministerial team, and while the forward estimates of his first Budget point to a bright future for Tasmania, it is not yet clear whether he has the leadership skills, the policy savvy and the wide-ranging electoral appeal needed to negotiate the rapids ahead: there is intractable community unrest over forests policy, and a persistent sense that this government is less than fully committed to democratic process, plays favourites, and makes decisions in a manner that renders it vulnerable to claims of corruption.

Notes 1 2 3 4

Premier’s statement, (accessed 15 March 2004). The Weekend Australian, 21 February 2004. Premier’s statement. Premier’s statement.

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Premier’s statement. J.Tierney,‘Tasmania goes to the polls’, 7.30 Report,ABC TV, 18 July 2002, transcripts available at . Government of Tasmania, Department of Treasury and Finance, Mid-year Financial Report as at 31 December 2003, (accessed 16 April 2004). Government of Tasmania, Budget Papers 2004. I. Munro, ‘The power and the passion’, The Age, 26 August 1998. S. Dally, ‘ALP bids to bring home the Bacon: new leader wants a uniquely Tasmanian approach to government’, The Mercury, 25 August 1998, p. 12. D. Lowe, personal communication, 18 December 2003. D. Lowe, personal communication. Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), ‘Nixon Report: Tasmania into the 21st century’, (accessed 27 January 2004). ABS, ‘Nixon Report:Tasmania into the 21st century’. T. McCall,‘Political chronicle:Tasmania’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 44, no. 7, 1998, p. 307. J. Bacon, ‘The one way forward’, 1998 Campaign Launch Speech, 17 August 1998. The Mercury, 29 November 1997, p. 5. S. Bennett, Research Note No. 6, 1998–99, Politics and Public Administration Group, Department of the Parliamentary Library, 1999. Bennett, Research Note No. 6, 1998–99. Bennett, Research Note No. 6, 1998–99. Bacon, ‘The one way forward’. Bennett, Research Note No. 6, 1998–99. McCall, ‘Political chronicle:Tasmania’, p. 300. M. Haley, ‘Pressure on Labor: sea of goodwill starts to turn rough for Bacon’, The Mercury, 6 December 1999, p. 9. T. McCall,‘Political chronicle:Tasmania’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 46, no. 2, 2000, p. 269. S. Neales & J. Hollingworth, ‘The Williamson interview: Steve Bracks, 2000’, (accessed 27 January 2004). Tasmania Together, (accessed 27 January 2004). M. Salvaris, D. Hogan, L. Rubenstein, R. Ryan and T. Burke, ‘Tasmania Together: benchmarking community progress’, Institute for Social Research, Swinburne Institute of technology & Centre for Civics and Education, University of Tasmania, 2000, p. 10. T. Newman, ‘A seismic change in Tasmania’, The Parliamentarian, vol. 84, no. 2, 2003, pp. 161–67.

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30 Labor Herald, July 2000, (accessed 2 October 2003). 31 A. Pafitis, personal communication, 19 January 2004. Pafitis had been a community group representative in the Tasmania Together process. She and fellow representative Gerard Castles became public critics of the process. 32 Pafitis, 19 January 2004 and Geoff Law, personal communication, 22 January 2004. 33 Geoff Law, personal communication, 21 January 2004. 34 The Wilderness Society, Press Release,‘Tasmanian Premier Criticised for Bullying Tactics’, 16 April 2002, available , (accessed 21 January 2004). 35 L. Tuffin, Granite chips, 15 December 2003, (accessed 20 January 2004). 36 M. Pos, ‘Bacon spurns Flanagan festival mediation offer’, The Mercury, 10 May 2002, p. 10. 37 Jim Bacon, State of the State Address, Sharing the Rewards of the New Tasmania, 23 September 2003, p. 19. 38 Forestry Tasmania, Alternatives to Clearfell Silviculture in Tasmania’s Public Oldgrowth Forests, (accessed 2 April 2004). 39 Newman, ‘A seismic change in Tasmania’, p. 161. 40 Newman, ‘A seismic change in Tasmania’. 41 Unnamed authoritative source, personal communication, 29 January 2004. 42 Scott Bennett, Research Note No. 7, 2002, Tasmanian Election 2002, Department of the Parliamentary Library, 2002. 43 D. Crean, ‘Caring for communities, boosting business’, Budget Speech, Parliament of Tasmania, 24 May 2001. 44 Crean, ‘Caring for communities, boosting business’. 45 Premier’s address, Hansard, Parliament of Tasmania, 21 September 1999. 46 T. McCall & M. Haward, ‘The Tasmanian election of 20 July 2002’, Australian Journal of Political Science, vol. 38, no. 1, 2003, p. 133. 47 Newman, ‘A seismic change in Tasmania’, p. 164. 48 Newman, ‘A seismic change in Tasmania’, pp. 162–63. 49 Newman, ‘A seismic change in Tasmania’, pp. 163–64. 50 W. Crawford, ‘For Jim it’s a ferrytale jaunt’, The Mercury, 28 June 2003. 51 ‘Bacon’s not out of the woods yet’, The Age, 26 July 2002. 52 J. Bacon, Hansard, Parliament of Tasmania, 24 June 2003. 53 Unnamed authoritative sources, personal communication, 29 January 2004. 54 Unnamed authoritative sources, personal communication, 29 January 2004. 55 S. Onslow-Brown,‘Blacked and blues’, Sunday Tasmanian, 8 November 1998, p. 19. 56 One minister privately told one of the authors during Bacon’s first term,‘Fieldy always asked me what I thought about things. Jim never does – he only speaks to me to tell me what the decisions are.’ 57 W. Crawford,‘Ta – for nothing’, The Mercury, 12 June 2004, p. 44. See also James Boyce,‘A mates’ deal: the cost of the Tasmanian Government’s special relation-

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ship with Federal Hotels’. Boyce’s analysis was described by Crawford as ‘a forensic examination’, but in Hillary Bray’s opinion,‘every hack in this country should read this article – if for no other reason than to see how an articulate, well researched, well argued piece is written’: (accessed 15 June 2004). R. Flanagan, As sun to the mountain (text of a speech made at forest rally, St Davids Park, Hobart, 29 March 2003), Dont Press, Melbourne, 2003, pp. 2, 3. R. Flanagan, ‘The rape of Tasmania’, The Bulletin, Summer Reading Special, 2003–04, p. 44. R. Flanagan, in ‘The loss of democracy’, transcript of an Australian Fabian Society forum, 22 April 2004, p. 21, (accessed 15 June 2004). W. Crawford, ‘For Jim it’s a ferrytale jaunt’, The Mercury, 28 June 2003. G. Law, cited in The Wilderness Society, Press Release, 16 April 2002. Pafitis, 19 January 2004. Flanagan, As sun to the mountain, p. 4. Flanagan, in ‘The loss of democracy’, p. 12. A. Ramsey,‘Laying ’em in the isle’, Sydney Morning Herald, 20 July 2002. D.Woolford, ‘Beauty and the beast’, Advocate, 31 December 2001, p. 11. Woolford, ‘Beauty and the beast’. Woolford, ‘Beauty and the beast’. Paul Lennon, ‘Acting Premier’s statement’, Tasmanian Government Media Release, 23 February 2004. Paul Lennon, ‘Passing the baton to a new leader’, Tasmanian Government Media Release, 21 March 2004. J. Bacon, Hansard, Parliament of Tasmania, 6 October 1998. T. McCall,‘Political chronicle:Tasmania’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 45, no. 4, 1999, p. 599. . R. Herr,‘Tasmania’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 49, no. 2, 2003, p. 295. Paul Lennon, ‘Commonwealth funding slap in the face’, Tasmanian Government Media Release, 3 March 2004. ‘Finch apology for TT-Line slur’, Tasmanian Government Media Release, 5 March, 2004. R. Flanagan, ‘Still waiting, Paul’, (accessed 15 March 2004). Hansard, Parliament of Tasmania, 29 October 2003, part 2, pp. 31–104. Hansard, Parliament of Tasmania, 29 October 2003, part 2, pp. 31–104. Four Corners, ABC TV, interview with Paul Lennon, 30 January 2004. Four Corners, 30 January 2004. Bacon’s press statement, cited in A. Darby,‘How “Red Richard” earned a governor’s pleasure’, The Age, 23 August 2003. D. Lowe, personal communication, 18 December 2003.

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Bacon, ‘The one way forward’. R. Herr, quoted in Darby, ‘How “Red Richard” earned a governor’s pleasure’. J. Bacon, Hansard, Parliament of Tasmania, 23 September 2003. Heather Low Choy, ‘Butler sparks political storm’, The Mercury, 24 January 2004, p. 1. The Mercury, ‘Butler’s fierce barrage at US foreign policy’, 31 March 2004, pp. 1–2. The Mercury, ‘Butler gagged by Premier’, 1 April 2004, pp. 1–2. Paul Lennon, ‘Governor’s commitment to premier’, Tasmanian Government Media Release, 31 March 2004. The Mercury, ‘Butler steers clear of WMD controversy’, 21 April 2004, p. 7. ABC Newsonline, (accessed 11 October 2004). Another may be coastal protection.The 2004 real estate boom presages massive coastal development that not only threatens significant environmental despoliation, but also bids fair to lock ordinary Tasmanians out of a share of the coast. At the time of writing, The Mercury was determinedly pushing this issue to the forefront of the political agenda, with major investigative pieces appearing on 12 and 13 June, and a toughly worded editorial on 14 June. The government responded on 14 June, but critics who doubt the government’s will to resist the stated wants of large interstate capital, are likely, for the nonce, to remain sceptical.

* The authors wish to acknowledge and thank Kate Law, from the School of Government, University of Tasmania, for her research assistance in the preparation of this chapter.The usual caveat applies.

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Chapter 10

LEADERS AND THE LEADERSHIP CHALLENGE

Brian Head, John Wanna and Paul Williams he head of the NSW Cabinet Office, Roger Wilkins, claimed recently that today’s state premiers are all different in their personal approach to leadership, have different styles of managing politics and different operating procedures in running government and Cabinet.1 According to Wilkins, the mode of leadership is all down to a series of intangibles: personal preferences, personal style, and how comfortable the incumbent is with his or her key people and processes. He spoke not only from extensive experience at the centre of NSW executive politics, but as a keen longterm observer of chief ministers in other states through regular interaction with them and their departments. To what extent, then, are all our state and territory leaders different from each other? Certainly, the current heads of government have distinct differences and personal characteristics. In some cases their work backgrounds are widely dissimilar – they emerge from the media, the union movement, academia, and the public service. But there are also many shared qualities, and extensive similarities. Despite operating in different political contexts, these leaders have much in common in their approach to leadership. They are receptive, aspirational, anticipatory, pragmatic, adaptable, occasionally populist, managers of expectations and, above all, good communicators. So does this portend a new form of state leadership and a new way of addressing subnational politics? We think so.There are indications that the nature of state leadership is changing and the way in which it is performed is being transformed – by both the leaders in situ and the context in which they now operate. Here, in this conclusion, we highlight the parallels in the making of

T

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each one’s leadership.We begin from the empirical.We point to patterns in how they made it to the top position, how they inherited power and how they became the victors – and remain survivors. We argue that whereas former state leaders, when faced with problems, often had a cushion of favourable electoral malapportionment and generally were less intensively scrutinised, the current batch do not enjoy such fortune.There is less political insulation from investigation today, scrutiny is ongoing (not just from the media, but also from independent commissions, courts and special investigators), and electoral outcomes are today much fairer. State leaders now need to use their wits and have a capacity to reinvent themselves if they are to survive.They must be able to confront and explain issues rather than dismiss or ridicule them with statements such as, ‘Don’t you worry about that.’Accordingly, skills in crisis management have emerged as a political must-have for state and territory leaders. Finally, we trace the emerging contours of a form of state leadership that is still perhaps in its formative stages, but that stands in considerable contrast to previous styles of governing. We highlight the crucial elements of contemporary leadership: acceptance of new accountability regimes; professional perspectives; communication skills; transcendence over sectional interests; cautious pragmatism; anticipation of public responses to decisions/events/scenarios; the use of participatory and community engagement techniques; and the cultivation of ‘ordinary populism’.

Similar trajectories Most chapters have given accounts of the current leaders’ rise to power – through the ranks of their regional Australian Labor Party (ALP) branch and through their machines and parliamentary party configurations into the premiership. All won local significance and prominence through their local ALP branch. Interestingly for a set of jurisdictions noted for their parochialism, more than half the original sample of eight heads of government surveyed here were born outside the state or territory they now head – and clearly this has not harmed their political chances.The five who were born outside the territory they now govern are Peter Beattie and Clare Martin (both Sydney-born), Jon Stanhope (born in rural New South Wales), Jim Bacon (born in Melbourne) and Mike Rann (born in Kent in the UK and reared in New Zealand). Only Bob Carr, Steve Bracks and Geoff Gallop were

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locally born – and more recently Paul Lennon can be added to this list. Significantly, however, wherever they were born, they assiduously served their apprenticeship and built their political careers in their chosen jurisdiction. Almost all the premiers covered in this book had earned considerable local recognition before entering parliament.They had had an independent public life and had developed a public profile before they entered the Byzantine world of caucus politics. But making the switch to a political career tended to follow one of two routes – the organisational wing of the local party either tried to block the way of an unwanted showpony or paved the way for the talent it had recruited. Some were definitely repeat ‘triers’ at the outset of their careers – they attempted numerous preselections and kept battling away at the entry point of parliament. Despite having the talent to become future leaders, Steve Bracks, Peter Beattie and Geoff Gallop all found it hard to enter state politics. Some were either not helped or actually impeded by the party power brokers at the time. Bracks, for example, served as campaign manager on four occasions and went on to lose three times when preselected for lower house seats.These setbacks were character-building, and each future leader found ways to overcome these disappointments or actively resist the blockers. Others were recruited to fill vacancies by people who considered them credible talent, with perhaps even a celebrity quality to them. This latter group includes Bob Carr, Clare Martin (successful at her second attempt at a seat), Mike Rann and Jim Bacon. Most commenced their apprenticeship as leaders not being the first choice of the party; some were the only person left standing after an electoral wipe-out, others were simply the person the party turned to in the doldrums of opposition. They were not necessarily the preferred leaders when they were in opposition, and they were not generally considered likely to be successful. Some were seen as stopgap appointments – they were there only until better talent could be found.Yet all but one of these premiers won office for themselves from opposition at an election; only Lennon, in Tasmania, inherited the position from a Labor predecessor. And once there, they have hung on tenaciously, trying hard to embed themselves in the position. Leaving aside Lennon, these premiers have on average survived eight years as leaders in office (as at late 2004) – no mean feat given the prevailing electoral volatility. Interestingly, none of these state leaders currently has a credible rival for the top job; their leadership seems to be secure against the ranks of their

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parliamentary colleagues (unlike their federal counterparts, who often labour under a leadership cloud, with a main rival pressing repeatedly).The deputies of the premiers are often not seen as likely to succeed them. In the Tasmanian case, Lennon inherited the premiership in unusual circumstances, but was still regarded by many among his own party as unelectable as premier. This means that while these premiers have worked hard to construct their own political edifice, many have not laid the foundations for their succession.Transferring power mid-term to a deputy or challenger at the state level is fraught with difficulty. It has not happened often, but when one successful leader has handed over to a successor within a parliamentary term, the result has not usually been a successful outcome.There appears to be some inherent tension between building up a particular leadership regime and grooming a successor, or even providing space for a successful succession. There are examples in previous decades: New South Wales’s Barrie Unsworth was unable to capitalise on the Neville Wran style; in South Australia, Des Corcoran was no Don Dunstan; and Mike Ahern was no new Joh Bjelke-Petersen in Queensland. And the stopgap leaders who appeared in Western Australia, Victoria and South Australia after financial scandals in those states were doomed to electoral defeat. Most of today’s incumbents won office unexpectedly (some famously so) and most won in very difficult times – sometimes with the support of independents. Carr surprised many with his victory in 1995. Beattie was no certainty in 1998 – if the Nationals’ Rob Borbidge had gone to the polls earlier, before One Nation entered the fray, he would probably have defeated Labor. An over-confident Jeff Kennett threw away the election in 1999, giving Bracks an entirely unpredicted win. Equally unexpected were the 2001 elections of Gallop over the presiding Liberal Government of Richard Court, Clare Martin’s win over the entrenched Country Liberal Party and Jon Stanhope’s over the high-profile Liberal ACT Government. But most spectacular of all was the Rann ‘victory’ in 2002: he fell short of a majority, and seemed defeated by a fractious array of conservative opponents, only to gradually peel off his dissident opponents, making two of them speaker and deputy speaker, and eventually providing two others with ministries. Interestingly, three premiers were propped up by conservative independents – Beattie by Peter Wellington; Bracks by Russell Savage, Susan Davies and Craig Ingram; and Rann by Peter Lewis and Bob Such.2 In contrast, Stanhope’s government was supported from the left by the

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Greens, although in the ACT there was little prospect of an alternative conservative government after the elections of 2001. As premiers, all have been incredibly loyal – even when this stretched credulity. Beattie has been fiercely loyal to his two deputies: Jim Elder, who was rumoured to be eying the top job when in opposition and was eventually brought down by the electoral rorts scandal, and Terry Mackenroth, who had helped keep Beattie on the outer in his first years in parliament. Carr has transcended tribal allegiances to extend loyalty to his deputy, the left’s Andrew Refshauge. Bacon and his fellow triumvirate members (Crean and Lennon) were almost cabalistic in their loyalty to each other, using the relationship to underscore the stability of their government in a state used to minority and unstable governments. All premiers have been tolerant of miscreant ministers – notably Gallop and his ‘bat-out-of-hell’ driver, the transport minister, Allannah MacTiernan; and Beattie and a succession of hapless, weaker ministers who had a particular knack of inviting unenviable attention for their shortcomings. Bracks staunchly stood by his campaign director and state secretary David Feeney when he was under pressure from union factions led by Greg Sword. So why the loyalty – especially when the premiers were often not shown such magnanimity in their own earlier life? Is it because they were shunned or shafted during their rise to power that they have adopted a more tolerant and pluralistic style of leadership? Generally these leaders have grown in the job and increased their popularity over their pre-premiership levels. Why has their popularity grown and why are they so popular? Is it because of their personal style or just because they occupy the office of head of government? Familiarity, profile and increased recognition are certainly factors that have counted in their favour. Their predecessors had also built significant recognition and prominence (even notoriety), but this alone was not enough to save them. Perhaps the other factor that has been important in their own rise has been the deterioration of the conservative opposition – this has occurred in New South Wales, Queensland,Victoria, the ACT, the Northern Territory, South Australia and Tasmania. Indeed, there appears a neat symmetry in the rise in the political stocks of the premiers and their government generally and the declining fortunes of their opposing party/parties. Moreover, given that the state leaders are all Labor, the policy directions and behaviour of the federal Howard–Costello–Anderson conservative coalition have helped

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make these state leaders the preferred adversarial counterparts for the electors – enhancing their popularity even though they have mostly dispensed with the traditional state sport of Canberra-bashing. But it is clear that this degree of popularity is transient and can evaporate quickly – witness the demise of Nick Greiner/John Fahey, Jeff Kennett, Richard Court, Kate Carnell, Robin Gray and Tony Rundle, and the revolving door team of John Olsen/Dean Brown/Rob Kerin in South Australia. Popularity can turn, in almost a moment, it seems, into notoriety and arrogance – an inflated self-image can suddenly begin to irritate the same electorate that earlier endorsed the person’s leadership. This may be just the fickleness of fame, or it may reflect a fatal flaw – excessive self-assurance – that affects all long-term rulers. Perhaps to guard against this, the current premiers are far more malleable than their predecessors.They are modern-day ‘ordinary populists’ – purposely non-elitist, a little mundane, attempting to be ‘everyman’ or ‘everywoman’, frequently uncertain, at times apologetic, and sometimes accident-prone. They are not classically charismatic; instead, they have a natural common touch.They have cultivated the image of the normal, ordinary, relaxed, accepted leader attuned to his/her community. It is an image that is not necessarily fake, although it may be hammed up at times. But while they are populists, they are no mere ciphers or delegates of public opinion. Their leadership style remains centralised, presidential, and highly sophisticated. They all use the latest media techniques and are experts in media spin; they are all direct communicators, and they are generally good at articulating and responding to community concerns. They have centralised communications around themselves and their office – even if they have allowed ministers greater discretion in policy development and portfolio decisions. Most have imposed their own priorities on the Labor Party they lead and seem to be actively remaking the party from the top down.There are parallels federally here with Mark Latham’s remaking of the Labor opposition.At the state level this has involved these leaders, once in office, handpicking their own ministries, electing and promoting celebrity candidates, stepping outside the factional plays, forcing decisions through against the odds and standing alone on a point of principle in times of adversity.These strategies tend to compound in effect: each time a leader successfully negotiates an issue, his or her latitude or space for political authority is increased.

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Crisis management as a political norm Management of political crises has always been critical to the success or failure of leaders.Yet in recent times, as the rules of engagement between premiers and their constituencies have changed, so have their strategies for containing crises. Previously, crisis management existed as an ad hoc tactic – an afterthought – a way to ‘mop up’ a political mess after its occurrence. Today, with parties in continuous campaign mode, and with leaders assiduously reading public opinion polls, sophisticated crisis management has become the norm. Put simply, no premier can ignore emerging dramas and expect political longevity. The management of political crises is now both an elaborate and a legitimate part of governance. The reason for this increased emphasis undoubtedly lies in the states’ recent political and economic environments. In the 1980s and early 1990s, most state governments were embarrassed by either political corruption or economic mismanagement. In response, voters in these years elected only governments that were committed to reform, prudence, transparency and accountability – this included a commitment to admit and fix problems when they arose. More than a decade on, state leaders are still acutely aware that these remain key criteria on which they and their governments are assessed. If they are to continue to parade mantles of political probity and fiscal responsibility before increasingly sophisticated electorates, state leaders must rise to meet new standards of public/political behaviour, and when those standards are breached, they must be able to defuse or at least ease the resulting crises. It would be misleading to suggest that the wheel of crisis management has been wholly reinvented. But the approaches and tactics used have changed and been refined. In the past, premiers would attempt to ignore or deny crises, obfuscate and stonewall in the face of criticism, bully their critics, attack the person rather than the issue, suffocate bad news stories and invent good news stories to provide distractions. Increasingly, today’s premiers – in response to a citizenry and a mass media that are both more sceptical – have recognised that they need to implement a raft of new and more constructive strategies. Often these positive strategies are devised and executed by the teams of media and policy advisers who are responsible for managing the credibility of the leader and the government.Their aim is to avoid or head off political crises – often by anticipating unfolding events. This objective has led to a growth in ‘clientelism’ in the making of public

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policy, where key stakeholders are brought together to negotiate the policy outcomes which will have the greatest community acceptance and satisfy the greatest number. Crises are now managed according to new rules.When they erupt, they are not things to be hidden from; they are to be treated seriously and responded to decisively. How premiers act when confronted with a crisis is a real measure of their leadership and survival. For instance, premiers often respond by calling a public inquiry into matters of potential public wrongdoing.While this was once a strategy of last resort, today it is often the first move, because it is likely to retain the confidence of electors, and perceptions of probity must be maintained at all costs. In conjunction with this, a couple of state leaders in very recent times have opted for the mea culpa strategy, in which they acknowledge government error and commit themselves to a public remedy – often via community consultation or judicial inquiry. In addition, premiers have taken to the policy ‘backflip’, in which they concede a poorly made decision and vow to reverse it in the name of listening to the people. The benefits of such approaches are obvious: by admitting error, calling public, independent inquiries and reversing unpopular decisions, state leaders negate the grounds on which both their parliamentary opposites and the media can marshal criticism. By openly and willingly conceding fault, premiers can simultaneously undermine critics and parade their own high levels of integrity. In author John Kane’s terms, they are adding a ‘moral capital’ dimension to their leadership.3 It also means that they can appear to be shaping their leadership according to the contours of popular expectations, which leaves them open to charges of populism. But it is a selective and partial populism – very issuespecific and only employed in exceptional circumstances. Internally, good crisis management skills give these leaders additional power and influence over their colleagues and party organisations.They are able to bring contentious or problematic issues into their own departments – which now have extensive policy and issue-management capacities.When they choose to, premiers are able to ‘micro-manage’ other ministries to an unprecedented degree.This, in turn, has led to two further developments: a growth in and centralisation of the power and prestige of the premiers’ own departments (in terms of policy development and public relations); and an imperative for premiers to authorise and monitor the media statements of their ministers. Premiers are increasingly the conductors of an orchestrated communication strategy from the whole government.

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A new form of state/territor y leadership? What do the previous chapters suggest about the recent emergence of a new approach to state level leadership in Australia? And to what extent has this new generation of leaders been able to influence political institutions and electoral behaviour? It is possible to discern some features of this new approach.While it is not entirely clear-cut or consistent across all jurisdictions, it does represent an important set of changes, and is having a great impact on this country’s political life. We have noted eight features of the new approach to state-level leadership: • Embracing accountability: the modern approach to leadership has had to recognise and embrace a complex accountability agenda, an agenda that has broadened considerably since the 1980s. The cavalier disregard for accountability of yesteryear’s ‘boss’ premiers has been replaced by a concern to be seen to be accountable and responsible. A plethora of new accountability laws and institutions have both confined the political space open to leaders and opened up new possibilities. Faced with this accountability regime, leaders have on occasions sought to manufacture sincerity as a means of enhancing their credibility and managing the expectations surrounding the new accountabilities. • Professional perspectives: leaders, like the electorate at large, are becoming better educated and more comfortable with new ideas about strategy and performance, new techniques of management, and the need for fresh thinking to address some of the intractable problems in service delivery. Intellectually, they are interested in comprehensive solutions to problems, not piecemeal bandaids – and are willing to engage in federal/national agendas to achieve progress. This new generation of leaders understands and promotes the benefits of knowledge-based industries.They also promote tolerance of social and cultural diversity. • Resourceful communicators: leaders are highly trained and competent in using and responding to the mass media.They are resourceful and ubiquitous communicators who interact daily with the media, either to anticipate and deflect criticisms, or to realign their views with key sections of public opinion. Most of them have centralised media communications for the whole government in their office.They make extensive use of market research.They are aware of the different information channels needed to reach diverse audiences, and use several levels of communication to sell their message.

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Transcendence over their sectional base: leaders have managed to assert an increasing degree of personal influence and authority within their political party, including relative independence from the traditional Labor power base of trade unions. Leaders increasingly claim to govern for all citizens, across class and regional divides.This stance is linked to the decline of ‘machine politics’, the decline of class ideology, the professionalisation of political parties, and the supremacy of successful parliamentary leaders over party organisational managers. Their governments are highly personalised – arranged around them and their priorities; this is a point of continuity with past leaders, but today’s leaders are less dependent on autocratic style. Cautious pragmatism: leaders have become more flexible and adaptable in style and substance in the post-ideological age. Politically, they seek a steady supply of short-term wins, and avoid the higher-risk options advocated by the ideologues. They seek evidence about likely impacts of policies and programs.They often promote broad visions, values and general approaches rather than locking into specific solutions, so as to allow for changing circumstances and give themselves room to adjust policies and programs accordingly. Anticipatory and receptive leadership: leaders are good at reading and responding to majority public opinion and adapting their strategies accordingly.They manage expectations and tailor their presentations to sit within what is acceptable to the majority.They are poll-sensitive but tend to shape their strategies in line with medium-term (up to five years) projections about which issues are and will be of concern.They can also anticipate, and they seek to educate the electorate about upcoming policy options/policy problems, honestly laying out options for discussion or for pending decisions so that eventual solutions are widely accepted. Participatory and community engagement techniques: leaders have initiated and championed extensive processes of community consultation and participation, as part of the new politics of engaging more seriously with citizens. The new leadership approach emphasises inclusive processes and taking the extra time necessary to conduct consultative exercises in both policy formation (priorities) and policy implementation (delivery).While some of these may be criticised as symbolic rather than substantive, the desire to build better linkages with community

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and business groups is genuine. These leaders often use summits and round tables with key non-government organisations to exchange views and enhance understanding of the government’s directions. Cabinet meetings are held in country towns. Ministers are encouraged to use a range of consultative and advisory committees. The potential strengths of this approach include the development of new collaborative partnerships and increased community buy-in of options, and possibly enhanced confidence in government. • The cultivation of ‘ordinary populism’: leaders claim to be ‘of the people’ and ‘in touch with the community’, rather than elitists who already have the answers.They claim to listen as well as to lead and guide.They are cautious about moving too far ahead of public opinion.They sometimes change their views, and portray this as a strength, a reflection of their commitment to the community – this also removes their opposition’s ability to portray such movement as weakness or vacillation.This pragmatic populism is sometimes criticised as being conservative and risk-averse. However, leaders can use it to mobilise support for energetic innovation and reform, because they can ensure beforehand that such change is grounded in widely understood social values (such as prosperity, fairness, integrity, improved services, protection against risks and threats). Unlike ideological populism or anti-establishment populism, the ordinary populism of successful premiers is strongly based on commitment to parliamentary institutions, probity and human rights. These eight features of leadership have evolved unevenly across Australia over the past twenty years, developing perhaps more noticeably in the more populous states. They have been further stimulated by situations where electoral survival of a new government required respectful negotiation with independent members of parliament and more extensive consultation with the legislature and with marginal constituencies. Not all these elements are new – indeed, some of them have existed previously and can be found in some measure in earlier premiers. For example, many old ‘boss style’ leaders managed to insulate themselves from the party base and dictate policy over the heads of the party faithful.What has been distinctive in recent years is the combination of these features into a new style of political management. Exceptions and reversals are always possible in politics. If the political

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climate rapidly changed in respect of major crises and emergency responses, it is possible that a brash or tough leadership style might re-emerge to deal with these special circumstances. Kennett’s ‘crash through’ reform style in Victoria after October 1992, for instance, was supported by the media as a necessary corrective to the perceived maladministration of previous Labor governments. But it seems increasingly unlikely that party leaders who eschew the new approach would be successful, except as stopgap or transitional figures. Party leaders who are seen as bullies, head-kickers or creatures of backroom factions are not widely respected by the electorate and have seldom survived the transition from opposition leadership to premiership. In contrast, leaders who have demonstrated their ability to push through and succeed can now build their personal influence in ways that transcend party politics. There is also a personal aura and confidence surrounding nascent leaders who have challenged and defeated adversities. Leaders who embrace the new politics of responsiveness are not soft or weak. The new approach simply provides a more effective platform for strong leadership. As such, we may be witnessing the emergence of a new phase of personalised, one-party government in the states and territories of Australia.

Notes 1 2 3

Roger Wilkins’ address to an Australian and New Zealand School of Government research workshop on governance, Australian National University, February 2004. See B. Costar & J. Curtin, Rebels with a Cause: Independents in Australian Politics, UNSW Press, Sydney, 2004. J. Kane, The Politics of Moral Capital, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2001.

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INDEX

Aagaard, Jane 150, 152, 153 Abetz, Eric 246 Abraham, Matthew 206 accountability and premiers 38, 82–83, 109, 119, 123, 125, 127, 130, 132, 134, 135, 139, 152, 173, 174, 176, 177, 184, 190, 215, 217, 237, 243, 254, 259, 261 advisers, see policy advisers Ahern, Mike 27, 31, 256 Ah Kit, John 152, 153, 158 Allan, Percy 156 Allen,Toni 28 Allison, Lyn 94 Anderson, John 257 Anderson, Peter 36, 38 Aquilina, John 43 Armitage, Liz 175 Arnold, Lynn 15, 204 Ashbourne, Randall 198–99, 218, 219 Askin, Bob 13, 18, 28 Atkinson, Michael 219 Australian Labor Party 14–15, 34, 35, 36, 42, 45, 55, 62, 64, 81, 92, 93, 95, 101–04, 105, 115, 124, 162, 170–71, 175, 191, 254, 255 factions and factional loyalties 15, 21–25, 34–35, 39, 44, 45–46, 53, 54, 61–67, 70, 73, 92, 93, 95, 102–04, 149, 153, 162, 175, 189,

203, 208, 215, 257, 259 NSW Labor 13, 15, 16, 33–34, 38–39, 42, 52 Northern Territory Labor 148 preselection contests 35, 38, 64, 70, 92–93, 130, 153, 162, 170, 172, 175, 203, 255 Queensland Labor 15, 62–65, 67, 70, 73, 76 South Australia Labor 16, 17 Victorian Labor 92, 93, 101, 103, 104 backflips and U-turns by premiers 18, 38, 52, 76, 137, 260 Bacon, Jim 12, 13, 16, 24, 25, 225–40, 241, 242, 243, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249–53, 254, 255, 257 Bacon, Ken 242 Bannon, John 15, 24, 28, 31, 198, 200, 202, 203, 204, 212, 215 Barnett, Colin 129–30, 131, 133, 134, 137 Beattie, Heather 21, 61, 62, 84 Beattie, Peter 13, 15, 16, 21, 27, 28, 61–85, 162, 197, 211, 212, 220, 254, 255, 256, 257 Beazley, Kim 23, 62, 170 Bennett, Scott 27, 173 Berry, Graham 107 Berry,Wayne 170, 175, 189–90, 191

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Berzins, Baiba 159 Bingham, Max 65 Bishop, Steve 74, 78 Bizani, Luisa 94 Bjelke-Petersen, Joh 13, 18, 27, 28, 31, 71, 74, 77, 84, 85, 212, 256 Blainey, Geoffrey 28 Blair,Tony 18, 117–18, 131–32, 215 Blazey, Peter 27 Blevins, Frank 205 Bligh, Anna 71, 73, 78 Bloffwitch, Bob 127 Bluett, Mary 100 Bolkus, Nick 208 Bolte, Henry 18, 26, 27, 28, 92, 110 Bolton, Geoffrey 138, 139 Bonson, Matthew 160–61 Borbidge, Rob 67, 81, 83, 89, 256 boss-style of premiers 18, 26, 27, 227, 261, 263–64 Bowen, Lionel 35 Boyce, James 237 Bracks, Steve 16, 22, 30, 89–113, 197, 204, 231, 255, 256, 257 Braddy, Paul 73 Braham, Loraine 153 Bredhauer, Steve 73 Bree, Dennis 154 Brogden, John 56 Bropho, Robert 135 Brown, Clive 132 Brown, Dean 17, 198, 206, 258 Brumby, John 92, 93, 94, 95, 100–01, 102, 103 budgets/fiscal responsibility 15, 28, 37, 39, 41, 44, 48–49, 53, 57, 79, 97, 99–102, 118, 125, 129, 131, 142, 145, 147, 150, 152, 155–56, 161, 174, 180, 198, 206, 209, 211, 215, 217, 218, 227, 230, 234, 260 bureaucrats and bureaucratic advice 17, 50, 51, 52, 68–69, 79, 80, 97, 154, 184, 230 Burke, Brian 15, 17, 123, 124, 128, 138

Burke, Denis 150, 156, 158 Burns, Chris 150, 153 Burns,Tom 67 business, relations with 35, 47, 101–02, 111, 122, 132, 136, 155–57, 182, 184–85, 208, 209, 227, 228, 234–36, 237, 246, 251 Butler, Mark 215 Butler, Richard 245, 246, 247 by-elections, see elections, by-elections Cabinet 17, 19, 35, 36, 43, 44, 61, 67, 68, 71, 72, 73, 74, 80, 93, 97, 125, 129, 131, 132, 153, 161, 187, 188, 189, 198, 206, 212, 225, 230, 241, 254, 264 Cahill, Joe 12, 34 Cain, John 15, 16, 22, 25, 28, 91, 92, 93, 97, 98, 99, 102, 106, 110, 111 Cameron, Rod 203 campaigning by premier 29, 37, 38, 42, 56, 63–64, 70, 77, 80–84, 92, 123–29, 149, 171–76, 200, 203, 206, 209–10, 230, 234, 260 Campbell, Alistair 131 Cappo, David 216 Carey, Peter 233 Carli, Carlo 95 Carnell, Kate 17, 173, 174–77, 185, 186, 189, 191, 258 Carr, Bob 15, 16, 21, 25, 27, 28, 29, 31, 33–59, 84, 162, 197, 203, 211, 212, 220, 254, 255, 256, 257 caucus (Labor party room) 17, 29, 36, 37, 38, 44, 46, 65, 67, 74, 149, 153, 170, 189, 204 Cavalier, Rodney 36 Chambers, Barry 155 Chaples, Ernie 28 charismatic leadership 19, 56, 62, 84, 161–62, 258 Cheek, Bob 234, 235 Chikarovski, Kerry 42, 55 Churchill,Winston 203

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Clarke, Ralph 219 Clinton, Bill 18, 68 Coaldrake, Peter 28 Coalition parties (Liberal/National) 37, 38, 46, 49, 56, 67, 68, 75, 82, 83, 86, 97, 99, 104, 145, 148, 173, 205–06, 208, 210–11, 220, 229 Cockburn, Stewart 27 Collins, Bob 148, 149, 157, 162, 163 Collins, Peter 42 Comben, Pat 64 Commissions of Inquiry 14, 38, 44, 52, 65, 69, 72, 75, 76, 82, 83, 108, 123, 129, 134, 135, 136, 182–83, 228–29, 244, 254, 260 communication ability and skills 34, 50, 63, 64, 67, 70, 71, 74, 96, 121, 161, 175, 254, 260, 261 Considine, Mark 28 consultation and consultative style (community engagement) 47, 50, 65–67, 69, 74, 80, 89, 98, 120, 137–38, 156, 162, 177–80, 183, 184, 186, 188, 190, 212, 215–16, 228–32, 254, 263, 264 Corbell, Simon 174, 188, 190 Corcoran, Des 24, 202, 203, 257 corruption 38, 75, 82, 108, 123, 125, 130, 136, 237, 247, 248, 259 Cosic, Miriam 204 Costar, Brian 28 Costello, Peter 15, 49, 257 Court, Charles 18, 28, 116, 137 Court, Richard 27–31, 124, 125, 128, 135, 138, 256, 258 Cowdell, John 126 Crawford,Wayne 235, 237 Crean, David 226, 234, 236, 238, 241, 247, 257 crisis management and premiers 14, 28, 29, 39, 40, 46, 48, 49–52, 70, 74–78, 108–10, 133–38, 159–61, 177, 181–84, 190, 218–19, 243, 245–47, 254, 258, 259–60

267

Crocker,Walter 27 Cross, Helen 173 Cross, Manfred 63 Crowley, Frank 138 D’Arcy, Bill 76 Davies, Susan 98, 99, 256 Davis, Glyn 72 Davis, S.R. 26 decision-maker (premier as) 12, 16, 29, 41, 44, 45, 46, 49, 50, 73–74, 96–97, 106, 110–11, 129–38, 139, 145, 152, 163, 176–81, 182, 199, 211, 212, 245, 255, 261 de Crespigny, Robert Champion 216 DeLacy, Keith 64, 67 Della Bosca, John 43, 44, 45, 57 Dempster, Quentin 51 Deng Xiaoping 14 Dewar, Mickey 154 Dowding, Peter 124 Doyle, Robert 105 Ducker, John 35 Dundas, Roslyn 190 Dunstan, Don 12, 13, 17, 24, 25, 28, 31, 198, 199, 201–02, 205, 210, 212, 217, 220, 257 Dyer, Ron 43 Easton, Penny and Brian 125 Economou, Nick 28 Edmond,Wendy 65, 79 Edwards, Judy 134 Egan, Michael 39, 41, 43, 44, 47, 53 elections 15, 16, 26, 45, 48, 49, 56, 61, 80–84, 110, 121, 137, 155, 171–73, 174, 255 Australian Capital Territory 170, 189, 191, 256 by-elections 30, 35, 38, 42, 67, 92, 93, 94, 97, 115, 160 election campaigning, see campaigning NSW 33–34, 36, 42, 49, 54, 55–57

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Northern Territory 145, 149–52, 257 Queensland 61, 63, 65, 67, 68, 69, 70, 73, 74, 75, 78, 80–84 South Australia 198, 200, 205, 206, 209–10, 257 Tasmania 230, 234, 241, 244 Victoria 91, 96, 97, 101, 11–12, 257 Western Australia 114, 126–27, 133, 139, 257 Ehrmann, Karen 75 Elder, Jim 67, 70, 73, 75, 258 Elder, Stephen 92 Elferink, John 161 Ellis, Annette 175 Ellis, Bob 197, 204, 207, 209, 210, 219 Evans,Tom 92 Fahey, John 28, 38, 258 Farrell, Don 215 Federalism/federal politics 13, 15, 17, 18, 26, 34, 48–49, 73, 120, 121, 136, 147, 148, 159, 186, 228, 243, 246 Feeney, David 103, 104, 258 Field, Michael 150, 226–27, Finch, Kerry 243 Fitzgerald, Ross 66 Fitzgerald,Tony 72, 108 Flanagan, Richard 233, 237, 238, 244 Flannery,Tim 216 Foley, Kevin 209 Foley, Matt 71, 73 Forrest, John 138, 139, 143 Fraser, Malcolm 203, 228 French, Bob 117 Freudenberg, Graham 43 Fullerton,Ticky 244 Gadd, Scott 242 Gair,Vince 18 Gallacher, Jamie 154 Gallagher, Katy 173, 190 Galligan, Brian 26

Gallop, Geoff 16, 17, 22, 28, 115–43, 211, 255, 256, 257, 258 Gay, John 237 Gellatly, Col 43 Gibbs, Bob 70 Giddings, Lara 242, 246 Gleeson, Gerry 43 Gleeson, Michael 28 Gobbo, James 105–06 Gordon, Sue 135 Goss,Wayne 15, 17, 27, 28, 62, 65, 66, 67, 69, 71, 73, 76, 84, 86 Graham, Larry 130 Gray, Darren 102 Gray, Robin 227, 235, 259 Green, Bryan 242 Green, Guy 245 Greiner, Nick 28, 37, 38, 259 Griffith, Samuel 27 Griffiths, Nick 134 Haermeyer, Andre 108 Haigh, Bill 35 Hamer, Rupert (Dick) 26, 110 Hamill, David 64, 67, 75–76 Hampel, George 107 Hanlon, Ned (Edward) 12 Hanna, Kris 212 Hanson, Pauline 20, 30, 81, 213 Hargreaves, John 190 Harradine, Brian 240 Hawke, Bob 67, 156, 163, 210 Herr, Richard 246 Hickey, Maggie 152 Hicks, Stuart 129 Hill, John 209 Hobson,Terence 108 Hogan, Ned 90 Hollingworth, Peter 17 Holmes, Jean 26 Houston, Guy 131 Howard, John 10, 15, 48, 49, 77, 159, 170, 187, 190, 203, 257 Hulls, Rob 95

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Humphries, Gary 173–74, 176, 176, 186 Hunt, Alan 107 Independents in parliament 38, 49, 68, 82, 86, 96–97, 107, 124, 130, 140, 152, 211, 212, 257 Ingram, Craig 96, 97, 257 inquiries (public), see Commissions of Inquiry Jacobson, Howard 149 Jaensch, Dean 151, 162, 205, 210 James, Barbara 149 Jamison, Ronda 28 Johnson, Lyndon 203 Kaine,Trevor 173 Kaiser, Mike 70, 75, 82 Kane, John 75, 260, 264 Keating, Paul 38, 41, 163 Keliher, Leo 72 Kelly, Jeff 242 Kelton, Greg 206, 208 Kennan, Jim 93 Kennedy, Fiona 78 Kennedy, Geoff 136 Kennett, Jeff 13, 16, 27, 28, 77, 89, 93, 94, 95–97, 98, 99–101, 104–05, 110, 111, 124, 256, 258, 264 Kenny, Chris 28 Kerin, Rob 17, 200, 203, 209, 210, 219, 259 Kerr, John 62 Kirner, Joan 13, 15, 22, 91, 93, 94, 99, 106, 163 Knowles, Craig 43, 57 Knowles, Rob 104 Kobelke, John 132 Kourakis, Chris 213 Kroger, Michael 105 Kucera, Bob 134 Labor Party, see Australian Labor Party

269

Laffin, Martin 29 Lander, Paul 35 Landy, John 106 Lang, Jack 27, 31, 34 Langton, Brian 43 Latham, Mark 71, 258 Lavarch, Michael 23, 170, 171 Law, Geoff 232, 233 Lawrence, Carmen 15, 17, 115, 124–5 leadership 16, 26, 28, 29, 36, 38, 41, 61, 80, 89, 93, 109, 172, 176, 181, 207, 228, 262, 263, 264 personal style and image 15, 16–18, 27, 29, 34, 36, 38, 42–44, 48, 52–55, 62–63, 65–67, 68–71, 73, 74, 77, 80, 89–90, 94, 106, 110–11, 120, 131, 138, 147, 151–52, 170, 173–76, 183–85, 190–91, 197, 198, 199, 200, 204–05, 208, 211, 219–20, 225, 227, 230, 233, 235–36, 238, 240, 242, 245, 247, 254, 255–59, 263 qualities/characteristics of 20, 75, 93, 184, 218, 253, 261–63 See also boss-style of premiers, charismatic leadership Le Pen, Jean-Marie 20 Lee Kuan Yew 14 Lennon Paul 24, 29, 225, 226, 227, 233, 236, 237, 238, 240–53, 255, 256 Lewis, Peter 198–99, 211, 212, 256 Llewellyn, David 241, 242 lobbying and lobbyists (sectional interests, interest groups) 13, 20, 45–46, 50, 54, 68, 73, 119, 161, 177–79, 184, 187, 190, 205, 209, 232, 235, 236–37, 254, 262 Loveday, Peter 159 Lowe, Doug 245, 249, 253 Lucas, Paul 73 Lunn, Hugh 27 Lyons, Margaret 154

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Macfarlane, Ian 157 Mackenroth,Terry 65, 67, 70, 73, 77, 78, 257 MacTiernan, Allannah 133–34, 257 McCue, Fred 160 McDonald, Karin 190 McElligott, Ken 64 McEwen, Rory 212 McGinty, Jim 115, 124, 133, 135, 137 McGuire, Michael 155 McInerney, Peter 52 McKell,William 34, 36 McKew, Maxine 149 McMullan, Bob 117 McNamara, Pat 99, 104 McPhee, Ian 107 Mandella, Nelson 14, 68 Manning, Bill 244 Marshal,Vern 205 Martin, Carol 135 Martin, Clare 16, 23, 145–67, 255, 256, 257 media performance and media techniques (spin-doctoring) 13, 18, 37, 38, 42, 50–52, 55, 57, 62, 64, 66, 75, 78–80, 82, 84, 132, 145, 146, 173, 187, 197, 199, 207, 209, 215, 218–19, 236, 258 earlier career in 21, 23, 24, 34, 35, 117, 149, 201–02, 253 media advisers 51, 74, 78, 160, 198, 260 relationship with 19, 36, 43, 51, 62, 63, 67, 71, 73, 77, 108, 125, 128, 131–32, 135–36, 137, 145, 149, 174, 183, 187, 189, 200, 204, 205, 225, 235, 236, 238, 244, 255, 259 Menzies, Robert 48, 116, 122 Metherell,Terry 38 Mighell, Dean 103 Mills,Terry 161 ministers and ministries 12, 35, 38, 43, 44, 48, 51, 52, 57, 65, 66, 70, 73–74, 83, 115, 127, 130, 133, 134,

150, 152, 170, 187, 189, 205, 212, 241–42, 257, 258, 263 relations with ministers 43, 53, 57, 65, 70, 71, 73, 75, 77, 78–79, 102–04, 135–36, 139, 154, 190–91, 219, 227, 228, 240, 243 minority government 16, 62, 68, 81–82, 96–97, 109, 170, 175, 178, 197–98, 210, 212, 229, 234 Moon, Jeremy 26 Moore, Arthur 85 Moore, Mike 201 Morgan,William 228 Murphy, Denis 63, 64, 66 Murphy, Kieran 131 Murphy, Peter 160, 161 Murray, Robert 28 Musgrove, Grant 75 Napthine, Denis 104, 105 Nelson, Helen 28 Nemer, Paul 213 Nicholas, David 27 Nixon, Christine 108 Nixon, Peter 228, 229 Oakeshott, Michael 14 O’Keefe, Neil 22, 91 Oliver, M.R. 27 Olsen, John 17, 198, 200, 206, 207–11, 258 One Nation 20, 68, 81, 82, 83, 127, 151, 208, 257 opinion polls and market research 34, 40, 42, 50, 51, 55, 56, 61, 79, 94, 95, 109, 119–20, 125, 129–30, 131, 133, 136, 171–72, 175, 176, 190, 197, 199, 200, 203, 207, 209, 229, 238, 260, 262, 263 Opposition and political opponents 15, 35–39, 42, 46, 55, 56, 62–64, 70, 84, 99, 104–05, 110, 147, 151, 189, 198, 204, 205, 218–19, 227, 230, 238, 257, 260

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INDEX

leaders of the opposition 39, 55, 77, 81, 83, 84, 94, 104, 105, 134, 135, 137, 160, 205, 213 term served before becoming premier 15–16, 21–25, 36–39, 51, 61, 62, 67–68, 95–97, 100, 115, 124–25, 145, 199, 205–09, 255 Osborne, Paul 173 Packer, Kerry 35 Pahl, Rodd 184 Painter, Martin 29 Parkes, Henry 27, 31 Parkinson,Tony 27 parliament 19, 26, 35, 36, 37, 38, 45–46, 48–49, 56, 61, 64, 65, 81, 90, 92, 96–97, 105, 134, 135, 139, 147, 151, 155, 156, 161, 170, 171, 197, 205, 219, 235, 246 parochialism 13, 14, 48, 77–78, 158, 213, 254 Patience, Allan 28, 215 Pendal, Phillip 124 Pennells, Steve 131 Peters, Chris 186 Playford,Tom 18, 27, 28, 31 Pizzey, Jack 12 policy advisers 43, 45, 51, 68, 69, 74, 78, 91, 93, 139, 152, 153–54, 157, 159, 171, 188, 218, 236, 260 policy broker 52, 67, 68, 71, 72–73, 96, 128, 129–38, 27, 153–65, 176–81, 228, 23–37, 261 policy capacity, policy preferences/directions 17–18, 33, 39, 40, 47, 48, 53, 54, 57, 65, 66, 67, 71, 72, 76–77, 96, 98–99, 106–07, 115, 118, 123, 125, 126, 131, 147, 170, 174, 176, 200, 229, 232, 258, 263 economic policy 33, 37, 39, 41, 47, 48, 52–53, 68, 71, 72, 99, 101, 120, 122, 125, 132, 138, 146, 150, 153, 156, 162, 177–79, 185, 215–16,

271

227, 230–31, 234, 242 education 39, 41, 42, 45, 52, 53, 54, 71, 77, 78, 125, 128, 132, 139, 155, 174, 216 environment 32, 33, 35, 36, 39, 40, 41, 42, 53, 55, 73, 77, 78–79, 122, 125, 128, 132, 136, 204, 232–33, 235, 240, 243–45 industrial relations 46, 78, 98, 130, 132, 204 infrastructure 39–40, 52, 54, 76, 109, 134, 138, 139, 153, 180, 208, 216, 229, 234 health 39, 40, 42, 52, 53, 54, 76, 78–79, 102, 125, 128, 132, 133, 155, 174, 177, 230, 242 law and order 39, 44, 52, 106–07, 108, 118–19, 124, 126, 128, 132, 136, 150, 198–99, 206, 213–14, 242 social 39, 48, 50, 53, 57, 72, 73, 76, 77, 80, 84, 90, 93, 101, 102, 118–19, 121, 122, 124, 125, 126, 129, 135, 136, 146, 147, 153, 158, 160–61, 177, 179, 186, 190, 213, 233 Pope, Neil 98 popularity of premier 33, 44, 49, 61, 68, 75, 80, 83, 89, 101, 105, 129, 130, 173, 175, 181, 190–91, 227, 230, 235, 238, 248, 257–58 Populism and populist leadership 17, 18, 19–20, 29, 30, 34, 47–48, 50, 53, 62, 66, 71, 76, 77, 80, 101, 190, 199, 208, 212, 219, 226, 231, 248, 253–54, 260, 262, 263 power of premiers 12, 14, 15, 18, 29, 43, 46, 63, 66, 68, 70, 97–99, 103–05, 130, 160–62, 187–89, 200, 211, 232, 235–36, 238, 261 pragmatism 20, 52, 90, 110–11, 118, 137, 190, 255, 263 Pratt, Richard 47 premiers, early careers 12–13, 16,

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21–25, 62–65, 90–93, 100, 115, 116–23, 148–49, 162–63, 164, 170–71, 183, 190, 197,198–204, 226–27, 228, 240 died in office 12, 13, 30, 226, 238–40, 248 Prince, Kevin 127 Prior,Tom 28 professionalism of political leaders 61, 71, 79, 85, 117–18, 120, 130, 160, 203, 209, 210, 254, 261 public service/public sector reform 33, 37, 39, 44, 46, 79, 89, 100, 102, 125, 129, 132, 137, 147, 151, 153–55, 163, 170, 176, 215, 216, 217, 230, 242, 243, 254 Putnam, Robert 120 Putt, Peg 235, 244 Quinlan,Ted 170, 174, 190 Rann, Mike 16, 17, 24, 197–223, 255, 256, 257 Ray, Robert 93 Reece, Eric 18, 227 Reeves, Jim 92, 109 Refshauge, Andrew 36, 258 Reid, Brian 163 Reid, George 27 Reid, Gordon 27 Reid, Michael 133 responsiveness of premiers 20, 44, 47, 70, 74, 110–11, 120–21, 157, 208, 262–64 Reynolds, Henry 122 Reynolds, Kevin 128 Reynolds, Paul 27 Richardson, Graham 38 Ripper, Eric 131, 137 Roberts, Michelle 134 Robertson, Steve 73, 79 Rofe, Paul 213 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 47 Rothwell, Nicolas 147–48, 159,

162–63 Rowston, Craig 160 Rugendyke, Dave 173 Rundle,Tony 229, 259 Ryan, Peter 104 Ryan,T.J. 27, 31 Saccotelli, Luisa 158 Samuels, Gordon 40 Sanderson, John 135 Savage, Russell 96, 257 scandals and controversies 12, 28, 38, 70, 74–76, 103, 108, 123, 125, 127, 129, 134, 137, 160, 173, 218–19, 236, 243, 244, 245–46, 257 Schwarten, Robert 73 Sciacca, Con 64 Scott, Rod 242 Scrymgour, Marion 153 Sharman, Campbell 26 Shave, Doug 127 Sheahan,Terry 36 Smith,W. Forgan 84, 85 Smyth, Brendan 191 Spence, Judy 79 Springborg, Lawrence 84 Stanhope, Jon 16, 17, 23, 169–95, 254, 257 Steketee, Mike 27 Stephens,Tom 134 Stevens, Bron 28 Stirling, Syd 164 Stone, Bruce 127, 128 Such, Bob 211, 212, 257 Sukarnoputri, Megawati 157 Swan, Denise 235 Swan,Wayne 66, 85 Sword, Greg 95, 103, 257 Taylor, Ian 124 Taylor, Susan 135 TeamBeattie 15, 74, 80, 83, 86 Temby, Ian 129 Theodore,Ted (Edward) 27, 31, 90

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Thomson, Marsha 95 Thwaites, John 95, 98 Tonkin, David 203 Tonkin, Robert 189 Toohey, Paul 155 Townsend, Derek 27 Toyne, Peter 164 Trudeau, Pierre 68 Tuckey,Wilson 187 Turner, Ken 28 union movement 21, 24, 25, 39, 45–46, 61, 64, 100, 101, 103, 125, 128–29, 147, 175, 182, 213, 214–15, 228, 240, 254, 263 Unsworth, Barrie 15, 36, 257 Valentin, John 155 Vatskalis, Kon 150, 152 Walker, Frank 36 Walker, Jamie 27 Wanna, John 28

273

Warburton, Nev 64 Warhurst, John 175 Warner, Anne 64 Watson, Chris 90 Wear, Rae 27 Weber, Max 17 Webb, Martyn 138 Wellington, Peter 68, 82, 86, 256 Whiddon, Rob 78 White, Kate 28 Whitlam, Gough 34, 39, 62, 91, 117, 163, 169 Wilkins, Michael 28 Wilkins, Roger 43, 253, 264 Winton,Tim 233 Wood, Bill 174 Woods, Gerry 153 Woollard, Janet 127 Wran, Neville 13, 27, 28, 34, 36, 39, 43, 256 Wriedt, Ken 240 Wright, Keith 61

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Also published by UNSW Press

TERMS OF TRUST Arguments over ethics in Australian government John Uhr Public trust in Australia’s governments and our political leasdership is at an all-time low, according to many opinion polls. Shaken by years of broken promises, political spin, shady deals, obfuscation, and even brazen lies, many consider the condition terminal.According to John Uhr the situation is not irretrievable, though serious, and immediate consideration needs to be given to finding means by which our political leaders can re-earn the confidence of the community. In Terms of Trust John Uhr poses, and answers, fundamental questions about our governments’ leadership: • How can we make political leadership compatible with ethical leader ship? • How relevant is personal character to public life? • Why do we need to widen the scope of ‘leadership’ to include all public officials and not just those at the top? • How can citizens become more informed about the extent of government trustworthiness? With such questions in mind,Australians can now get down to business and spell out the ‘terms of trust’ compatible with the exceptional high hopes – but also the everyday low practices – of our democracy. Terms of Trust is the first book-length analysis of the role of ethics in Australian government. It scrutinises what actually happens in practice against the democratic theory, and identifies the strengths and weaknesses of public-sector ethics. ISBN 0 86840 639 2

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Also published by UNSW Press

WESTMINSTER LEGACIES Democracy and Responsible Government in Asia and the Pacific Edited by Haig Patapan, John Wanna and Patrick Weller Westminster Legacies examines the ways in which the Westminster system has been influential in shaping responsible government and democracy across Asia, Australasia and the Pacific. It devotes chapters to each of the following countries: India, Pakistan, Nepal, Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Fiji and the smaller Pacific island nations. Westminster Legacies explores the way Westminster understandings of the executive, bureaucracy, parliament and responsible government have been influential in these countries – home to such diverse histories, cultures and traditions. It examines the ways the Westminster system has been adapted in the light of local practices and traditions, and considers how Westminster remains important for understanding political institutions and practices in these countries. It also looks at the conditions under which Westminster legacies have taken root and endured, and those conditions that have eroded or significantly changed its influence. Some of the countries Westminster Legacies surveys have teetered on the edge of becoming ‘failed states’ (especially in terms of legitimate democracies), while others remain robust adversarial democracies. ISBN 0 86840 848 4

yes, premier

yes, premier L ABOR LEADERSHIP in A u s t r a li a’s St a t e s a n d Te r r i t o r i e s

Since 2002 – and for the first time since Federation – all state and territory governments in Australia have been held by the Australian Labor Party. Yes, Premier features a chapter on each state or territory, and in each case focuses on the leader who has led their party to power and so created this unprecedented and historical situation. It examines each Labor premier (and in Tasmania’s case, two!) and territory chief minister’s individual rise to power and their political and personal style. The chapters are written by experts in the politics and political culture of their home state. Part personal and part political biographies, the chapters also assess the instruments of leadership any modern state or territory leader must master in order to remain in the top job.

Edited by WANNA and WILLIAMS

UNSW PRESS ISBN 0-86840-840-9

9 780868 408408

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UNSW

PRESS

Edited by JOHN WANNA and PAUL WILLI AMS

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