Yamamoto Isoroku

LEADERSHIP S TRATEGY CONFLICT YAMAMOTO ISOROKU MARK STILLE © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com YAMAMOTO ...

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LEADERSHIP

S TRATEGY

CONFLICT

YAMAMOTO ISOROKU MARK STILLE © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com

YAMAMOTO ISOROKU LEADERSHIP

MARK STILLE

S TRATEGY

I L L U S T R AT E D

© Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com

BY

CONFLICT

ADAM HOOK

CONTENTS Introduction

4

The early years

6

The military life

8

The hour of destiny

14

Opposing commanders

51

When war is done

55

Inside the mind

59

A life in words

62

Further reading

63

Index

64


INTRODUCTION Official portrait of Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku as Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet. This view conveys some of his confidence and is in keeping with his status as one of Japan’s most exalted naval heroes. (Roger Pineau via Lansdale Research Associates)

Yamamoto Isoroku is the most well-known of Japan’s wartime military commanders and his name will be forever linked to the attack on Pearl Harbor. He personally advocated the attack and went to great extremes to execute it, in spite of almost universal opposition within the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN). This, and a wartime interview in which he was taken by Americans as stating that he would dictate peace terms on the steps of the White House, made him the most recognized and hated of any Japanese commander. As with any famous military commander, there is always reality and myth. For Yamamoto, these stand in stark contrast. Yamamoto’s reputation is built on several major pillars. The most prevalent of these is his supposed opposition to war with the United States, which is based on his accurate predictions as to the outcome for Japan should that conflict ever occur. What he was opposed to was a drawn-out conflict with the United States. There is no record of Yamamoto being opposed to Japan going to war against Great Britain and the Netherlands in 1941. Yamamoto was not against going to war, but was opposed to starting a war that Japan could not win. To Yamamoto’s credit, he clearly saw what would happen if Japan actually went to war with the United States. Though this was not a penetrating insight given the disparity in the potential military power between the two nations, it was a view held by shockingly few of Japan’s senior leaders. However, Yamamoto’s admonitions about going to war with the United States stand in stark contrast to his actions in 1941 as Japan was formulating plans for war against the Western powers. It was at this time that, ignoring his own advice, he conceived and forcefully advocated a daring plan to attack the United States directly.

4 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com

This plan became the attack on Pearl Harbor which changed the course of World War II. Pearl Harbor also all but ensured Japan’s defeat as the attack filled the Americans with a thirst for revenge and an unwillingness to negotiate anything short of total victory, thus removing any hope of a peace favorable to Japan. Yamamoto’s actions are all the more remarkable since he spent much time in the United States before the war and had been assumed to possess great insight into the American psyche. Another pillar buttressing Yamamoto’s reputation was that he was an innovative air power advocate. This was built on the limited time he spent in aviation billets – of Yamamoto’s 35-year career, before taking command of the Combined Fleet in 1939, only six-and-a-half years were spent in aviation or aviation-related billets – and the fact that the IJN created its powerful carrier force while Yamamoto was in command of the Combined Fleet. In reality, his tours of duty in aviation billets were either very short, or limited to staff level positions. With the possible exceptions of his campaigning for the construction of long-range naval aircraft in the 1930s and approving the formation of the First Air Fleet in April 1941, Yamamoto was responsible for no aviation innovations. In fact, his planning for both Pearl Harbor and the battle of Midway indicated that he still did not understand the nature of the instrument he had created in April 1941. It was not until after the Japanese defeat at Midway in June 1942 that Yamamoto oversaw a reorganization of the Combined Fleet which put the carrier as the centerpiece. This was a move that the US Navy had made months earlier. The easiest Yamamoto myth to debunk is his reputation as a brilliant and invincible admiral. Any brilliant insights he exhibited were not translated into success on the battlefield. His signal victory at Pearl Harbor has since been recognized as an act of great strategic folly. It was also a hollow victory in a more strictly military sense since it contributed nothing to Japan’s conquest of Southeast Asia. The initial flush of Japanese victories during the first months of the Pacific War had little to do with Yamamoto and everything to do with ineffective and limited Allied resistance by forces not prepared for war, combined with the tactical excellence of the Japanese forces executing the operations. An examination of Yamamoto’s planning of, and conduct during, the battle of Midway should provide any evidence necessary to prove his shortcomings as a war leader. Midway was Yamamoto’s battle from its inception and planning through to its execution and conclusion. Superior American intelligence and the ineffectiveness of the on-scene Japanese commander have provided Yamamoto cover from the disaster, but the Japanese defeat is directly attributable to the compromises made by Yamamoto before the battle. These compromises led to the defeat at Coral Sea which in turn jeopardized the Midway operation. Also, the incredible lack of professionalism throughout the planning process set up the Combined Fleet for a resounding defeat. The battle of Midway was the only occasion that Yamamoto took a fleet to sea under his direct command. His faulty planning and poor execution resulted in a seminal defeat which stopped Japanese expansion in the Pacific. 5 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com

Despite this, Yamamoto’s reputation has remained high, especially within the IJN. When the Americans launched their first counterattack of the war in August 1942 at the little-known island of Guadalcanal in the Solomons, Yamamoto seemed unable to grasp that it was another opportunity to fight the decisive battle he so earnestly sought. Despite several notable Japanese victories during the campaign, the Japanese never were able to focus their still superior forces to achieve final victory. Yamamoto was killed in action shortly after the end of the Guadalcanal campaign. As a battlefield commander he was responsible for the deeply flawed victory at Pearl Harbor followed by a string of defeats at Coral Sea, Midway and the Solomons; yet, still, his reputation as a great admiral persists.

THE EARLY YEARS Yamamoto was born in the town of Nagaoka in Niigata Prefecture which is located on the northern part of the island of Honshu. Before his birth, Yamamoto’s clan was on the losing side of the Satsuma Rebellion which ended in 1877. This placed Yamamoto’s samurai father, Takano Sadayoshi, in an unenviable position. The victorious Imperial government quickly moved to destroy the samurai system and, as a member of the clan which had opposed the government, it was hard for Takano to find work. As a school teacher, he was forced to drift around northern Honshu to find employment. Eventually, Takano returned to Nagaoka. Shortly thereafter, his wife died. He then married his wife’s younger sister and had three children with her. The youngest, a son, was born in 1884. He was named Isoroku meaning “56,” his father’s age when Yamamoto was born. Takano Isoroku’s early life was marked by poverty and uncertainty. However, he was blessed with a decent education which, at some point, involved Christian missionaries. By Japanese standards, his education was modern since it emphasized science and technology and, in addition to traditional Japanese values, it stressed individual responsibility. This resonated with Yamamoto for the rest of his life. He proved to be a good and serious student, and hoped to use education to escape the poverty of Nagaoka. He found this escape in the spring of 1901 when he won an appointment to the Imperial Naval Academy. Of all the applicants in the nation, Yamamoto had scored the second highest result. The naval academy was, and is still today, located on the island of Eta Jima across the bay from Hiroshima in southern Japan. Naval cadets lived a spartan existence for three years during which they could not date, and were not allowed to drink, eat sweets, or smoke. Their fourth year was spent at sea. It was in this environment that Yamamoto began to come into his own. He thrived under the harsh discipline and was immediately recognized as a leader by his peers. He proved again to be a serious student, and displayed a sense of competition and aggression. Despite the fact he 6 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com

was a small man, standing only 5 ft 3in. tall and weighing some 125–130lb, he became skilled in gymnastics and the martial sport of kendo. He was in many ways different from the other cadets. He was far more serious than most, was known to read the Bible (though he never became a Christian), and decided to stop drinking at an early age after he discovered that he had difficulty with alcohol. Yamamoto graduated from Eta Jima on November 14, 1904. He was the seventh highest graduate out of more than 200. After a short stint on a training ship, he was assigned to the cruiser Nisshin. By this time, Japan was at war with Imperial Russia. The IJN had opened the war against the Russian fleet on the night of February 8, 1904, with a surprise torpedo boat attack on the Russian ships anchored inside Port Arthur in Manchuria. Thus a weaker power began a war against a stronger power by using a surprise attack – a tactic Yamamoto was to use again 37 years later. After Yamamoto was assigned to Nisshin, the war came to a climax. The Russian Baltic Fleet had sailed to the Far East to avenge earlier Russian losses. The IJN waited to fight a decisive battle with this new threat; the winner of the battle would win the war. The decisive battle was fought on May 26, 1905, in the Tsushima Strait. Nisshin was one of the eight Japanese cruisers present, and as the Japanese were short on battleships (only four remained), Nisshin took her place in the battle line. The Russian fleet had more heavy guns than the Japanese, but the Japanese ships were, for the most part, more modern and possessed greater speed and better-trained crews. Certainly, the Japanese were the more accurate gunners. The battle resulted in a resounding victory for the Japanese and only three of the Russian ships got through to their destination of the Russian Far East naval base at Vladivostok; 18 were sunk, ten were captured and another eight were interned in neutral ports. In return, the IJN lost three torpedo boats. It was the decisive victory that the IJN had been looking for and that their nation required. The victory came at a steep personal cost to Yamamoto. After a period of prolonged firing, one of Nisshin’s gun barrels burst. The shrapnel sprayed all over the ship and Yamamoto was badly wounded. He had a large wound in his thigh and was peppered with small metal fragments which disfigured his lower body and remained in him until his death. Most obviously, the shrapnel left two fingers on his left hand hanging by only pieces of skin and had he lost another finger he would have faced mandatory discharge from the Navy. He did not seek treatment until after the battle, but was then evacuated and not able to resume duties until August 5. His bravery was recognized by both congratulations from Admiral Heihachiro Togo, commander of the Japanese Fleet, and later by a formal letter of commendation. He was clearly an officer on the rise.

Yamamoto as a cadet at the IJN Academy at Eta Jima. (Courtesy of Michael A. Oren)


THE MILITARY LIFE

Yamamoto as a commander, probably during his time in the United States. By coincidence, every one of Yamamoto’s promotions between the ranks of commander up to vice admiral was gained when he was overseas. (Courtesy of Michael A. Oren)

Following Tsushima, Yamamoto went on to serve on three different ships. One of these conducted a training cruise to the west coast of the United States, giving Yamamoto his first exposure to America. Yamamoto completed the basic course at the Naval Gunnery School in 1908, and graduated from the advanced course in 1911. A short tour of duty on a battleship followed. In 1913, he attended the Naval Staff College. He did well in this essential prerequisite for advancement and command, and graduated in 1916. After completion, he was appointed to the staff of the Second Battle Squadron. By this time, he was a lieutenant commander and an officer identified as having a promising future. It was during this time that Takano Isoroku became Yamamoto Isoroku. It was not unusual for adults in Japan to be adopted in order to perpetuate a family name. Both his father and mother had died in 1912 and since Isoroku had several older brothers from his father’s first marriage, he would never assume leadership of the Takano clan. The Yamamoto clan needed a male heir, and Isoroku accepted the offer to join the wealthy and influential Yamamoto family. He now had to find a wife to produce sons to perpetuate the family name. He accomplished this by means of an arranged marriage on August 31, 1918. He was 34 years old. While still a lieutenant commander, Yamamoto was assigned to duty in the United States. He left in May 1919, alone, to take up his new post as a naval

Lieutenant Commander Yamamoto as part of the Navy Staff College class of 1915. Yamamoto is first on the left of the front row. (Courtesy of Michael A. Oren) 8 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com

representative. He also enrolled at Harvard where he spent a month studying English as a “special student in English” before withdrawing in the spring term of 1920. He then studied hard on his own to learn English and to educate himself about oil, the lifeblood of a modern navy. By all accounts, he also played hard, spending much time playing bridge and games of chance. As part of his self-assigned duty to understand all he could about oil, he arranged a tour of Mexican oilfields at his own expense, apparently made possible by his gambling winnings. Yamamoto returned to Japan in July 1921 and became an instructor at the Navy Staff College. Once back in professional circles, he displayed two primary areas of interest. One was oil, and the other, despite his background as a gunnery officer, was all matters pertaining to aviation. In August 1922, he returned to sea as the executive officer on the new light cruiser Kitakami. By the end of the year, he was back at the Navy Staff College. In July 1923, because of his knowledge of English, he departed for a tour of the United States and Europe with Admiral Ide Kenji, the Navy Vice Minister. He visited six countries in Europe, including Monaco where he put his gambling skills to the test, reportedly with much success. While overseas, he was promoted to captain. Upon his return, and effective from September 1, 1924, he was assigned to the Kasumigaura Aviation Corps as executive officer. As a captain, he was a latecomer to aviation which brought immediate distrust from the young aviators. Despite their resistance, he was credited with instilling discipline in his rowdy charges. He studied hard to master aviation technology, which was still in its infancy in Japan. Some accounts indicate that he even took flying lessons and became proficient enough to fly a trainer aircraft. By the

Captain Yamamoto pictured in 1928 while in command of the carrier Akagi. (Courtesy of Michael A. Oren)

Captain Yamamoto during his time as executive officer of the Kasumigaura Aviation Corps. This tour cemented Yamamoto’s position as an aviation advocate within the IJN. (Courtesy of Michael A. Oren) 9 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com

The carrier Akagi in 1941 before the Pearl Harbor operation. Yamamoto had a special attachment to this ship since he served as her captain in 1928–29 and later flew his flag on her as a carrier division commander. He personally ordered her scuttling following damage at Midway. (Naval History and Heritage Command)

end of this tour, he had gained the trust of the aviator corps and established himself as an aviation authority in the IJN. In early 1926, he was again assigned to the United States, this time as an attaché. He departed Japan in January 1926, and returned in March 1928. While in America, his fascination with aviation deepened. Yamamoto’s next assignment was command of the light cruiser Isuzu. This short tour was to prepare him for his next command; in December 1928, he took charge of the aircraft carrier Akagi, the IJN’s first fleet carrier. His first major command assignment proved a success. He was a strict disciplinarian, but the crew of Akagi came to love their captain. However, he only held this command until October 1929. His next assignment again made use of his knowledge of English and his familiarity with foreign navies. In preparation, he was temporarily assigned to the Naval Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry. From there he went to London as assistant to the Japanese delegation to the London Naval Conference of 1930. While overseas, he was promoted to rear admiral. Yamamoto was a member of the “treaty” faction within the IJN. This faction advocated maintaining a naval limitation treaty with the United States and Great Britain, even if it meant adhering to the 5-5-3 ratio (Japan being limited to 60 percent of the battleship and carrier strength of the United States and Great Britain) agreed during negotiations for the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty. The “fleet” faction believed that Japan’s defense could not be guaranteed with anything less than 70 percent of the limit of the United States. At the end of the negotiations, the 5-5-3 ratio remained unaltered. Upon his return, Yamamoto became head of the Technical Division of the Aeronautics Department. He was in this post for three years. In October 1933, he was assigned as commander of Carrier Division 1. His flagship was the familiar Akagi. He took his assignment seriously, and tried to master the intricacies of naval aviation. However, although he trained his aviators at a furious pace, he did not pioneer any new tactics or operational procedures during this short time. After only eight months, he was again selected for a key foreign assignment. On September 7, 1934, Yamamoto was appointed chief delegate to the preliminary talks to the Second London Naval Conference. He was by that time a rear admiral serving on the Naval General Staff. Yamamoto was viewed as the perfect officer for the job given his experience of the First London Naval Conference and his knowledge of English. For his part, Yamamoto was not sure he was the right man for the mission as he doubted his ability to press Japan’s claim for a more favorable naval construction ratio. However, eventually, he accepted the job and


Yamamoto and other members of the Japanese delegation to the London Naval Conference onboard the Seiberia Maru in 1930. Yamamoto is in the third row, second to the right. (Courtesy of Michael A. Oren)

he left Japan by ship on September 25, with a four-member delegation. They arrived in England on October 16. As a member of the “treaty” faction, and having his own personal insights into the potential industrial strength of the United States, Yamamoto did not think that the extra 10 percent being demanded by the “fleet” faction was worth the effort. He believed that Japan was better off with a treaty, even if it meant accepting the lower 5-5-3 ratio, than it would be with no treaty as the United States would be allowed to produce a navy that Japan could not match. However, despite his personal opinion, Yamamoto’s instructions were clear; the Japanese government was content to let the treaty lapse. Without extension, the Washington Naval Treaty would expire in January 1937 and the London Naval Treaty in 1935. Yamamoto was instructed to work to disband the Washington Treaty, but not let Japan be the first nation to give the necessary two years’ notice to abrogate the treaty. Japan was willing to create a new treaty, but only one more favorable to her. Yamamoto was promoted to vice admiral on November 15, during the treaty negotiations. During the conference, he impressed the Americans and British with his intelligence, openness and honesty. It was clear to the American delegation that Yamamoto preferred to reach some kind of agreement but was bound by the inflexibility of his government, which was determined to abrogate the Washington Treaty. The views of the Japanese government were made clear by Yamamoto and included a demand for naval parity with the United States and Britain and an overall reduction in the allowable tonnage of all signatories. The Japanese declined to enter into discussions about qualitative restrictions on warships while the ratio limitations were undecided. Yamamoto no doubt understood that this 11 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com

The G4M bombers (later given the Allied codename “Betty”) were long-range bomber aircraft without counterpart in Western navies. Development of these and the earlier G3M (Allied codename “Nell”) was advocated by Yamamoto. Their long-range capability came at a price – they were extremely vulnerable to enemy fire due to a lack of protection. (Lansdale Research Associates)

stance was unacceptable to the Americans and British, thus his efforts were ultimately fruitless. When the formal conference began the following year, no agreement could be reached. Yamamoto returned to Japan by rail, making a stopover in Berlin for a single night. He returned to Tokyo on February 12, 1935, a famous man. Despite this, upon his return he faced a period of forced idleness and considered resigning from the Navy. He later described it as the worst point of his career. He returned from the wilderness when he was appointed as chief of the Aeronautics Department of the Navy Ministry on December 2, 1935. This was an important post as it oversaw all matters involving naval aviation. Yamamoto had realized the importance of air power as early as 1921, after his return from his first stay in the United States. When he returned from the London Conference, he openly lobbied for naval aviation and railed against the orthodox thinkers who still believed that naval power equated to battleships and big guns. He voiced opposition to the planned construction of the superbattleships Yamato and Musashi. In Yamamoto’s mind, the IJN would gain greater striking power by investing more heavily in naval aviation than in vulnerable battleships. In the mid-1930s, the ability of aircraft to successfully attack ships remained untested, so Yamamoto was unsuccessful in his bid to replace the big guns of the battleships with aircraft as the IJN’s principal striking force. While some air power advocates went as far as to argue for the scrapping of Japan’s battleships, Yamamoto himself was never so radical. As late as 1936, he warned against calling battleships white elephants since, in his view, battleships still had “intangible political effects internationally as the symbol of naval power.” As head of the Aeronautics Department, Yamamoto saw some of the projects that he had shepherded as head of the Technical Division come to fruition. However, his precise role in overseeing their development remains unclear. The foremost of these was the Type 96 land-based attack plane. This was an advanced design for its day and featured a range of 3,265 nautical miles, twin engines and a top speed of 258mph. It was a technical achievement unmatched by any other navy of the day and gave the IJN a powerful weapon with which to conduct its strategy of long-range attacks against the American fleet. Yamamoto worked to increase the capabilities of Japan’s aviation industry, which would, he hoped, set the stage for a future expansion of the IJN’s aviation capabilities. These efforts were at least partially responsible for reducing the dependence of Japan’s aviation industry on foreign technology, resulting in Japanese industry producing some of the most


advanced naval aircraft in the period leading up to war. After only a year, Yamamoto’s career took a surprising twist. In the aftermath of the February 26 incident in which right-wing Army officers attempted to install a new nationalistic government by assassination, Admiral Nagano Osami was appointed Navy Minister in the new government. Against his will, Yamamoto acceded to Nagano’s request that he take the job of Vice Navy Minister. He assumed this political job in December 1936. He was a shrewd politician and took the opportunity to restore discipline in the Navy’s top leadership by dismissing those who did not conform to his and his superiors’ top-down leadership style. Yamamoto and Nagano (and later Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa as Navy Minister) worked to curb the influence of the Army and stop the march to war. The February 1936 incident, though unsuccessful, increased the political power of the Army and revealed factions within the IJN; one, mostly middle grade officers, supported the radical vision of the Army rebels and the other did not. Yamamoto and the other members of the top Navy leadership were able to delay the Army’s nationalistic program, but not stop it. In 1937, Japan began an aggressive war in China. Next, the Army increased the pressure for a military alliance with Germany, known as the Tripartite Pact. Yamamoto saw this as a no-win situation for Japan and a development that only increased the possibility of war with the United States. Yamamoto’s opposition to the Tripartite Pact meant that he and the Navy Minister came under increased pressure from the right wing. As was becoming all too frequent in Japanese politics, this involved the threat of personal harm. Yamamoto showed no fear, despite receiving many death threats, and appears to have resigned himself to the notion that he would be assassinated. On August 21, 1939, Germany signed a non-aggression pact with Russia, Japan’s historic enemy. The resulting confusion forced the cabinet to resign on August 23. As a result, Yamamoto lost his job as Vice Navy Minister. In one of his last acts, Yonai secured Yamamoto’s position as Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet. Yonai stated that this was done to send Yamamoto to sea to prevent him from being assassinated. Yamamoto was one of the most popular officers in the Navy, but he was a curious choice as its top operational commander. He was seen as a reluctant warrior at a time when Japan appeared to be heading for war. For much of his career he had been a political admiral. Prior to assuming the IJN’s top combat post, he had had little command experience and had spent the previous six years in shore billets.

A segment of the Japanese battle line pictured before the war. Though Yamamoto had the reputation of being an air power advocate, his handling of the battleships during the war indicates that he still clung to many traditional IJN precepts regarding their role and importance in a war with the United States. (Naval History and Heritage Command)


Yamamoto at Tokyo Station in August 1939 on his way to assume command of the Combined Fleet. (Courtesy of Michael A. Oren)

On August 30, 1939, Yamamoto took up his appointment. The Combined Fleet was the most important command in the IJN since it controlled all of the Navy’s combat units except for a few area and coastal defense commands. Despite his own doubts about his suitability for the job, Yamamoto readily took to being back in the fleet and out of Tokyo. He immediately ordered the fleet to intensify training until it was conducted under almost wartime conditions. The new government under Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro finally approved the Tripartite Pact on September 27, 1940. As soon as Yamamoto and Yonai had left their government jobs, the pro-German factions in the Navy could not be contained. In the weeks before the pact was eventually concluded, Yamamoto made his views known but did not officially object, probably because of his respect for the tradition that only the Navy Minister had the authority to participate in politics. Later in his career, he did not hesitate to use the threat of resignation to get his way. However, at that time, when the stakes were arguably at their highest, Yamamoto remained quiet. It is impossible to know what effect, if any, Yamamoto’s resignation would have had, but as Yamamoto predicted, Japan’s entry into the Tripartite Pact placed it on a path to war with the United States. Now, ironically, Yamamoto as a staunch opponent of war with the Americans, was in the position of being a central figure in planning for a war against the United States when it occurred. It was during this time that Yamamoto offered his remarkably accurate view on the ability of the IJN to conduct war with the United States. He assured Konoe that he was confident about the first six months, but that he had absolutely no confidence if the war went on for two or three years.

THE HOUR OF DESTINY Just as Yamamoto had predicted, the actions of Japan’s militarist government were leading to a war with the United States. He did not fear a war with the other Western powers, which were fully engaged in a war against Japan’s new ally, Germany, but he did not favor taking on the United States. However, events began to move faster which gave new impetus to training the Combined Fleet for war. Japanese aggression in China was the principal disagreement between the United States and Japan. The Americans were committed to defending Chinese sovereignty, but had few means of forcing Japan to cease prosecuting 14 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com

the war, which they were doing with increasing breadth and brutality. The one lever the Americans did possess, and could readily employ, was economic pressure. This the United States used, without success, throughout 1940 to try and curb Japan’s expansionist ambitions. This pressure came to a head in July 1941 when, in an attempt to reverse the Japanese advance into French Indochina, the United States froze all Japanese assets and announced a complete trade embargo on Japan, including the export of oil. This was followed by a total embargo by Great Britain and the Netherlands. This was tantamount to a declaration of total economic war by the Western powers since Japan imported 90 percent of all oil that it consumed. This embargo caused a crisis for not only the Japanese government, but the IJN as well, as it was the largest consumer of oil in Japan. Without action, the nation and the Navy would run out of oil in 18–24 months. Something had to be done, and Japan had two choices. It could either submit to the United States or seize alternative sources of vital resources by force of arms. Since the price of submission was too high in the minds of Japan’s militarist government, there was little debate about which course to pursue. While negotiations with the United States were undertaken, preparations for war were also begun. There are no indications that Yamamoto opposed using force to save Japan from its 1940–41 dilemma. The primary concern for the IJN in the upcoming conflict was gaining the time required to seize the lightly defended oil resources in the Dutch East Indies and British possessions in the Far East, which offered Japan a way to escape the effects of the Allied trade embargo. In the minds of most of the Japanese leadership, including that of the IJN, the United States was linked strategically with the other Western powers in Asia. This meant that the price of going to war with Great Britain and the Netherlands was war with the United States as well. Thus, plans for war would have to include provisions for dealing with the Americans. Nagano thought that the Dutch East Indies could be attacked without drawing the United States into the war. A strong case can be made that Nagano was correct, but Yamamoto was wedded to the assumption that American entry into the war was inevitable. Yamamoto also asserted that a traditional victory against the Americans was not possible. He believed that the key to victory was to shatter American morale and force the Americans to accept a negotiated peace. The traditional IJN plan for war against the United States was to engage the American fleet as it approached Japan and defeat it in decisive battle in an updated version of Tsushima. If forced to fight the Americans, Yamamoto wanted to abandon this passive strategy in favor of an initial blow so crippling that it would undermine American morale. This was the basis for Yamamoto’s greatest gamble – the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Admiral Nagano Osami, chief of the Naval General Staff before the Pacific War. As such, he was charged with the development of overall Japanese naval strategy. He did not energetically oppose Yamamoto’s efforts to seize control of the responsibility of naval strategy, which ultimately proved disastrous. (Naval History and Heritage Command)


Bataan Apr 8

Hong Kong Dec 25

Nanking

16


May 7

BORNEO

Brunei Jan 6

S OUT H C H IN A S EA

Tarakan Jan 10

Leyte

O C E A N

I N D I A N AUSTRALIA

Darwin

PHILIPPINES

MINDANAO May 7

Manila

LUZON

P H IL I PPI N ES SEA

Formosa

EA ST C HI NA SE A Ryukyu Okinawa Islands

Shanghai

Y EL LO W SEA Nagasaki

Iwo Jima

Bonin Islands

Tokyo

JAPAN

Truk

Admiralty Island

Shortland Island Mar 30

Port Moresby

CORAL Espiritu Santo SEA

Guadalcanal

New Ireland Rabaul Jan 23

Solomon Islands

Marcus Island

Kurile Islands

Caroline Islands

Lae Salamaua Mar 8

New Guinea

Palau Islands

Tinian Saipan Guam Dec 10

Mariana Islands

SEA OF JAPAN

KOREA

Port Arthur

Singapore Feb 15 Balikpapan Jan 24 CELEBES Kendari SUMATRA Makassar Jan 24 Feb 13 2 Feb 9 JAVA Dutch surrender Mar 9 Feb 28 TIMOR Feb 20

1

Saigon

FRENCH INDOCHINA Corregidor

Hainan

Canton

CHINA

Tientsin

Peking

USSR

New Hebrides Islands

Fiji Islands

Ellice Islands

Limit of Japanese control, May 1942

750

0

Phoenix Islands

Hawaiian

1,500km

1,000 miles

Christmas Island

Palmyra

Equator

Pearl Harbor Islands Attacked Dec 7

500

0

Dec 23 Date of Japanese occupation

Johnston

Samoa Islands

O C E A N

P A C I F I C

Midway Island

Prince of Wales and Repulse sunk by air attack, December 10 Battle of the Java Sea, February 27

Tarawa Dec 10

Gilbert Islands

Marshall Islands

Wake Island Dec 23

2.

1.

Initial Japanese successes in the Pacific

Yamamoto and the planning for Pearl Harbor Japan’s approach in 1941, which consisted of negotiations in parallel with preparations for war, never gave the negotiations any realistic chance of success unless the United States agreed to Japan’s conditions. Thus, increasingly, war became the only remaining option. An Imperial Conference on July 2, 1941, confirmed the decision to attack the Western powers. In early September, the Emperor declined to overrule the decision to go to war and the final authorization for war was given on December 1. By this time, Yamamoto’s Pearl Harbor attack force was already at sea. Yamamoto alone came up with the idea of including the Pearl Harbor attack into Japan’s war plans and, because the attack was so risky, it took great perseverance on his part to get it approved. It says much for his influence and powers of persuasion that the event even occurred. The attack was successful beyond all expectations, making it central to Yamamoto’s reputation as a great admiral, and as it had strategic and political ramifications far beyond what he imagined, it made Yamamoto one of World War II’s most important commanders. Yamamoto was not the first person to think of attacking the American naval base at Pearl Harbor. As early as 1927, war games at the Japanese Navy War College included an examination of a carrier raid against Pearl Harbor. The following year, a certain Captain Yamamoto lectured on the same topic. By the time the United States moved the Pacific Fleet from the West Coast to Pearl Harbor in May 1940, Yamamoto was already exploring how to execute such a bold operation. According to the chief of staff of the Combined Fleet, Vice Admiral Fukudome Shigeru, Yamamoto first discussed an attack on Pearl Harbor in March or April 1940. This clearly indicates that Yamamoto did not copy the idea of attacking a fleet in its base after observing the British carrier raid on the Italian base at Taranto in November 1940. After the completion

Massed Japanese naval air power at Pearl Harbor. The IJN was the first to assemble a large number of carriers into a single operational unit. This move was supported by many air power advocates, and when approved in April 1941, it provided one of the prerequisites for the Pearl Harbor attack. (Naval History and Heritage Command) 17 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com

of the Combined Fleet’s annual maneuvers in the fall of 1940, Yamamoto told Fukudome to direct Rear Admiral Onishi Takijiro to study a Pearl Harbor attack under the utmost secrecy. After the Taranto attack, Yamamoto wrote to a fellow admiral and friend stating that he had decided to launch the Pearl Harbor attack in December 1940. If it is to be believed that Yamamoto decided on his daring attack as early as December 1940, several issues are brought into focus. First and foremost, it can be established that Yamamoto had decided on this risky course of action even before the advantages and disadvantages of such an action could be fully weighed. Also, in late 1940, Yamamoto did not even possess the technical means to mount such an operation. Another question that needs to be asked is why Yamamoto thought it was his job to formulate grand naval strategy, which was the responsibility of the Naval General Staff. The planning for the attack was a confused and often haphazard process. In the beginning, there was only Yamamoto’s vision. Gradually, and against almost universal opposition, Yamamoto made his vision become reality. In a letter dated January 7, 1941, Yamamoto ordered Onishi to study his proposal. This was followed by a meeting between Yamamoto and Onishi on January 26 or 27 during which Yamamoto explained his ideas. Onishi was selected by Yamamoto to develop the idea since he was the chief of staff of the land-based 11th Air Fleet and was a fellow air advocate and a noted tactical expert and planner. Onishi pulled Commander Genda Minoru into the planning in February. After Genda was shown Yamamoto’s letter, his initial reaction was that the operation would be difficult, but not impossible. With Yamamoto providing the driving vision and political top-cover, Genda became the driving force in actually turning the vision into a viable plan. Genda believed that secrecy was an essential ingredient of planning and that to have any chance of success, all the IJN’s carriers would have to be allocated to the operation. Genda was charged with completing a study of the proposed operation in seven to ten days. The subsequent report was a landmark event in the planning process since most of his ideas were reflected in the final plan. Onishi presented an expanded draft of Genda’s plan to Yamamoto on about March 10. On November 15, 1940, Yamamoto had been promoted to full admiral and, as the planning for war increased in intensity, he began to wonder about his future. It was customary for the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet to serve for two years. In early 1941, Yamamoto was thinking of his impending change of duty and was pondering retirement. He would have liked to have been appointed commander of the First Air Fleet (the IJN’s carrier force), to lead his bold attack, but realized that such an event was impossible. During this time, he told one of his friends: If there’s a war, it won’t be the kind where battleships sally forth in a leisurely fashion as in the past, and the proper thing for the C. in C. of the Combined Fleet would be, I think, to sit tight in the Inland Sea, keeping an eye on the 18 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com

situation as a whole. But I can’t see myself doing anything so boring, and I’d like to get Yonai to take over, so that if the need arose I could play a more active role.

In spite of his desires, Yamamoto did not leave his post in mid-1941 after his two years were up.

Yamamoto takes on the Naval General Staff Perhaps harder than resolving any technical and operational difficulties to make the attack on Pearl Harbor possible was Yamamoto’s task of convincing the Naval General Staff that the Pearl Harbor operation was viable. Since the Naval General Staff had responsibility for the overall formulation of naval strategy, any questions about whether, and how, to attack the United States in the initial phase of the war clearly fell under its jurisdiction. However, in another indication of the muddled Japanese planning process, Yamamoto wanted to seize this prerogative for himself. In late April, Yamamoto entrusted one of his principal Combined Fleet staff officers to begin the process of convincing the skeptical Naval General Staff. The initial meeting did not go well for Yamamoto since the Naval General Staff did not believe his contention that the attack would be so devastating that it would undermine American morale. The focus of the Naval General Staff was on guaranteeing the success of the southern operation and this required the use of the Combined Fleet’s carriers. Their biggest concern was that the Pearl Harbor attack was simply too risky. In order to gain the Naval General Staff’s approval, Yamamoto began to stress the fact that his Pearl Harbor attack would also serve to guard the flank of the southern advance by crippling the Pacific Fleet at its principal base. In August, the same staff officer returned to Tokyo to plead Yamamoto’s case. Though the Naval General Staff remained opposed to the idea, it did agree that the annual war games would include an examination of the Pearl Harbor plan. These began on September 11 with the first phase focusing on the conduct of the southern operation. On September 16, a group of officers selected by Yamamoto, including representatives of the Naval General Staff, began a review of the Hawaii operation. The results of this controlled tabletop maneuver seemed to confirm that the operation was feasible, but also served to confirm that it was risky and that success depended heavily on surprise. At the end of the two-day exercise, the Naval General Staff remained unconvinced. Basic concerns, such as whether refueling was possible to get the entire force to Hawaii and how many carriers were to be allocated to the operation, also remained unresolved. On September 24, the Operations Staff of the Naval General Staff held a conference on the proposed Hawaii

Yamamoto on his flagship the Nagato before the war. His oversight of the Combined Fleet’s planning process relied more on the traditional Japanese consensual approach, rather than firm leadership and deep involvement in planning details. (Naval History and Heritage Command)


Official portrait of Vice Admiral Nagumo Chuichi. Yamamoto and Nagumo were polar opposites, with Yamamoto known as the impetuous gambler and Nagumo having the reputation as indecisive and mired in detail. Nagumo was responsible for conducting Yamamoto’s Pearl Harbor operation, though he never believed it would succeed. Later, Nagumo played a critical role in Yamamoto’s Midway operation. His performance during the battle was indecisive at best and contributed to the defeat. (Naval History and Heritage Command)

attack. Yamamoto became enraged when he learned that once again the Naval General Staff had rejected his plan. On October 13, the Combined Fleet’s staff held another round of table maneuvers on Yamamoto’s flagship, the battleship Nagato, to refine aspects of the Pearl Harbor operation and toreview the southern operation. Only three of the IJN’s fleet carriers were used, Kaga, Zuikaku, and Shokaku, because they had the range to sail to Pearl Harbor; the other three fleet carriers, Akagi, Soryu, and Hiryu were allocated to the southern operation. For the first time, fleet and midget submarines were included in the planning for the Pearl Harbor attack. The next day, there was a conference to review the plan, and where all admirals present were invited to speak. All but one was opposed to the Pearl Harbor attack. When they were done, Yamamoto addressed the assembled group and stated that as long as he was in charge, Pearl Harbor would be attacked. The time for dissension and doubt among the Combined Fleet’s admirals was finished. With the support of his own commanders assured, Yamamoto was determined to bring the issue to a head with the still skeptical Naval General Staff. In a series of meetings on October 17–18, Yamamoto played his ace card. His staff representatives revealed that unless the plan was approved in its entirety Yamamoto and the entire staff of the Combined Fleet would resign. Since to Nagano the notion of going to war without Yamamoto at the helm of the Combined Fleet was simply unthinkable, this threat served to bring the Pearl Harbor debate to a close. In the end, it was not logic that carried the day for Yamamoto, but the threat of resignation and it was not to be the last time that he would use this tactic. The staff of the First Air Fleet conducted the actual planning for the operation. On April 10, 1941, Yamamoto had given the go-ahead to form the First Air Fleet by combining Divisions 1 and 2 into a single formation. This was a revolutionary step which had been considered for some time, and in April Yamamoto judged that the time was right to take that step. As an air power advocate, he felt it was necessary to maximize the striking power of the carrier force. By concentrating the carriers into a single force, Yamamoto had created the most powerful naval force in the Pacific and gained the means by which to conduct his Pearl Harbor operation. By late April, the staff of the new First Air Fleet, led by Genda, who had been assigned as staff air officer, was engaged in fleshing out the details of the operation. Gradually, the problems associated with refueling, executing torpedo attacks in the shallow waters of Pearl Harbor, and making level bombing against heavily armored battleships a viable tactic, were solved.


The Pearl Harbor plan For Yamamoto, the purpose of the Pearl Harbor attack was to sink battleships rather than carriers. Battleships were so deeply entrenched in the minds of the American public as a symbol of naval power that by shattering their battle fleet Yamamoto believed American morale would be crushed. He even considered giving up the entire operation when it appeared that the problem of using torpedoes in the shallow harbor could not be solved – torpedoes were required to sink the heavily armored battleships, whereas dive-bombing would have sufficed to sink the lightly armored carriers. This emphasis on the targeting of battleships rather than carriers calls into question Yamamoto’s credentials as a strategic planner as well as his status as a true air power advocate. The final plan was completed by Genda and reflected the difference in opinion between Genda and Yamamoto. Genda, the air power zealot, devoted more weight to sinking carriers, and less to sinking battleships. The first wave of the attack included 40 torpedo planes which were broken down into 16 against the two carriers that might be present, and the other 24 against as many as six battleships, which were vulnerable to torpedo attack. Fifty level bombers carrying specially modified armor-piercing bombs were also allocated to attack the so-called “Battleship Row” where most of the battleships were berthed. Level attack was the only way to strike inboard areas of the battleships when two ships were moored together. Fifty-four dive-bombers and the escorting fighters were ordered to attack the many airfields on Oahu. In all, the six carriers in the attack force planned to use 189 aircraft in the first wave. The second wave was planned to comprise 171 aircraft. The 81 dive-bombers were the centerpiece of this group and were given orders to concentrate on completing the destruction of any carriers present, followed by attacks on cruisers. The relatively small bombs carried by the dive-bombers were insufficient to penetrate battleship armor, so the first wave had the job of inflicting maximum damage on the heavy ships. The remainder of the second wave aircraft, which included 54 level bombers, was to complete the destruction of American air power on Oahu in order to prevent any return strikes on the Japanese carriers. Despite the fact that the strikeforce (the Kido Butai) embarked at least 411 aircraft for the operation, making it the most powerful naval force in the Pacific, the attack remained a risky undertaking. If the Americans detected the raiders

One of the most perplexing aspects of the Pearl Harbor attack was the inclusion of six midget submarines as they could have jeopardized the surprise element of the entire operation. They achieved nothing and all were lost. This one was depth charged by American destroyers and raised after the battle. (Naval History and Heritage Command)


in time to prepare their air defenses, the attack could be catastrophic for the Japanese, a fact they had ascertained in their pre-attack gaming. If exposed to counterattack, the Japanese carriers were vulnerable. Nagumo Chuichi had under his control a large portion of the IJN’s striking power, and to lose the force on the first day of the war would be a disaster.

The Pearl Harbor raid The Kido Butai departed its anchorage in the Kurile Islands on November 26. The transit was undetected and by the morning of December 7, from a position some 200 miles north of Oahu, six Japanese carriers had begun to launch the first attack wave. At 0753hrs the strike leader sent the signal “Tora, Tora, Tora,” indicating that the element of surprise had been gained. This signal was picked up aboard Yamamoto’s flagship Nagato which was located in the Inland Sea. The well-trained Japanese aircrews dealt a series of heavy blows against the Pacific Fleet. The 40 carrier attack planes, armed as torpedo bombers, were the most important part of the plan since most were to attack the American battleships moored in Battleship Row. Of the eight battleships present, five were exposed to potential torpedo attack. The 16 torpedo bombers that were supposed to attack the carrier berths achieved little since the carriers were not present and there was no solid back-up plan in place to deal with this eventuality. The 24 torpedo aircraft allocated to strike Battleship Row were much more successful. All told, these aircraft accounted for the quick sinking of the battleships Oklahoma and West Virginia, put two torpedoes into the battleship California, which eventually sank, and hit Nevada with a single torpedo that led to her sinking. In addition, torpedoes damaged two light cruisers and sank a target ship and a minelayer. All this was accomplished in only 11 minutes for the loss of only five torpedo bombers.

The climactic moment of the Pearl Harbor attack was the destruction of the battleship Arizona by Japanese level bombers. This is the moment of Arizona’s destruction following the detonation of her forward magazines. (Naval History and Heritage Command) 22 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com

The attack on Pearl Harbor Kahuku Point

1

N

Radar site Military base Airfield Route of First Attack Force Route of Second Attack Force Parent submarine operational area Japanese submarine

Opana Radar Site Waialee Kahuku

A

2

Laie

5

Kawailda Radar Site

Waialua Bay Haleiwa Field

B O

Waialua

K

Kaena Point

Kaawa Radar Site

O L

7

Kualoa Point

A U

WA I RA ANA NG E E

Waikane

R A N

9

G

Waianae

6

8 Ewa

Barbers Point

Fort Weaver

E

C

Louvre

F

Pearl City

3

10

Heeia Ford Island NAS Pearl Harbor D Fort Shafter Fort Shafter Radar Site Hickam Field Fort Kamehameha Honolulu Sand Fort Armstrong Island

Ewa Marine Corps Air Station

Mamala Bay

Mokapu Point

Kailua Bay

Waimanalo Bellows Field

Makapuu Point

Fort Derussy Fort Ruger Diamond Head

Koko Head Radar Site Maunalua Bay Koko Head E

10 miles

0 0

NAS Kaneohe Bay

ay eB

4

G

eoh

Wheeler Field

Kan

Schofield Barracks

10km

First Attack Force 1. The 183 aircraft of the first wave approach Kahuku Point at approximately 0740hrs. 2. The First Flight breaks off and swings to the west. These 89 B5N2 carrier attack planes are headed for Battleship Row in Pearl Harbor. 3. The 49 high-level bombers of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Attack Units skirt the western coast of the island. These aircraft will attack Battleship Row from the south. 4. The 40 torpedo-armed bombers approach Pearl Harbor from the southwest and have the mission of striking the battleships and carriers normally berthed on both sides of Ford Island. 5. The 2nd and 3rd Flights (94 fighters and dive-bombers) head south over the island. 6. The dive-bombers of the 15th Attack Unit from Shokaku are tasked to hit Hickam. Field (9 aircraft) and Ford Island (17 aircraft). 7. The entire 16th Attack Unit (25 dive-bombers from Zuikaku) is headed to attack Wheeler Field. 8. The 1st and 2nd Fighter Combat Units are ordered to attack Hickam Field and Ford Island Naval Air Station. 9. The 3rd and 4th Fighter Combat Units attack Wheeler Field and Ewa. 10. The 5th and 6th Fighter Combat Units attack Naval Air Station Kaneohe Bay on the east side of the island.

Second Attack Force A The second wave of 167 aircraft reaches Oahu at about 0840hrs. B The 18 fighters of the 1st and 2nd Fighter Combat Units break off and head inland. C The 1st Fighter Combat Unit attacks Hickam Field; the 2nd attacks Ford Island. D The remaining fighters from Soryu and Hiryu attack Kaneohe Bay and Bellows Field. E Most of the 27 level bombers of the 5th Attack Unit track along the east coast of the island to eventually attack Ford Island from the south; nine are targeted against Kaneohe. F The 6th Attack Unit (27 carrier attack planes) bomb Hickam Field G The principal strength of the second wave is the 78 dive-bombers from Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, and Hiryu comprising the 2nd Flight. These aircraft are ordered to attack naval targets in Pearl Harbor.


The American battle line under attack on the morning of December 7, 1941. Complete tactical surprise was achieved and the torpedo bombers of the first wave delivered heavy blows. The battleship Oklahoma in the center of the view is already listing to port and soon capsized. (Naval History and Heritage Command)

The Arizona burning after her magazine exploded. Of the eight American battleships present on the morning of the attack, five were sunk. In spite of this, the military impact of the attack was marginal. (Naval History and Heritage Command)

The efforts of the torpedo bombers against Battleship Row were complemented by those of 49 level bombers. Dropping their 1,760lb armor-piercing bombs from 10,000ft, ten hits were scored. One of these bombs provided the most iconic moment of the entire attack when it penetrated the forward magazine of the battleship Arizona. The resulting explosion completely destroyed the ship. The other hits slightly damaged the battleships Maryland, West Virginia, and Tennessee as well as damaging a repair ship moored alongside the Arizona. The 167 aircraft that actually launched for the second wave included 78 dive-bombers. Despite the fact that these were flown by the best dive-bomber crews in the entire IJN, the results of their attack were disappointing and contributed little to the destruction already achieved by the first wave aircraft. Five bomb hits were scored against the battleship Nevada as she moved down the channel to the harbor entrance, forcing her to beach. A single hit was scored against the battleship Pennsylvania, located in dry dock, which resulted in light damage. The light cruiser Honolulu suffered a near miss that caused moderate damage and the 78 dive-bombers scored only 15 hits in total. By the time the Japanese aircraft had finished their work, American naval power had been shattered.


Incredibly, the Japanese carrier force was not even spotted, much less attacked, and only 29 aircraft had been shot down. Yamamoto’s great gamble had paid off even beyond his expectations. For his part, Yamamoto received news of the success at Pearl Harbor without jubilation. Despite the myth, there was little argument on Nagumo’s flagship, nor among the Combined Fleet staff, about whether to conduct a second attack on Pearl Harbor. After all, a great victory had been achieved. Yamamoto put an end to any discussion of a possible second attack with the following comment: It would be fine, of course, if it were successful. But even a burglar hesitates to go back for more. I’d rather leave it to the commander of the task force. A man who wants to do a thing will do it without being told. He isn’t going to do it just because he’s prodded from a distance. I imagine Nagumo doesn’t want to.

The impact of Yamamoto’s raid There is no doubt that the attack on Pearl Harbor was a severe psychological shock to the United States. However, on a military level, while losses were heavy, when placed in a greater context they were ultimately insignificant to the outcome of the war. The attacks sank or damaged 18 ships. Of most importance to Yamamoto, five battleships were sunk or beached. Of these all but two (Arizona and Oklahoma) returned to service; one (Nevada) returned in 1943 and the other two (West Virginia and California) returned to the fleet in 1944. The three other battleships damaged in the attack were all back in service by February 1942. Despite being given a high priority for attack, no cruisers were sunk, and the last of the three damaged cruisers was back in service by September 1942. Yamamoto’s emphasis on sinking battleships proved to be folly. The attack did not break American morale, and militarily it was illogical. The Pacific Fleet quickly moved from a battleship-centric organization to one based on fast-moving carrier task forces. In the wake of the Pearl Harbor attack, there had been little alternative since the battle line had been at least temporarily shattered. Also, more obviously, the change came about because the carrier had usurped the battleship as the center of naval power. Yamamoto’s great raid had demonstrated the vulnerability of the battleship to air attack, thus undermining the very objective of the attack. While Yamamoto’s goal had been to break American morale, he sold the attack to the Naval General Staff by telling them that it would provide the six months they needed to complete the conquest of the southern resource areas. In fact, the Pearl Harbor attack was unnecessary for achieving this. The Combined Fleet held a numerical advantage over the Pacific Fleet in every category, and with the Japanese-held islands in the Central Pacific providing a barrier, the Pacific Fleet did not have the means militarily or, even more importantly, logistically to interfere with the Japanese conquest. The ultimate irony of the attack was that it was the idea of a Japanese admiral who was seen as having unusual insights into the American mindset. 25 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com

The ultimate conclusion to Yamamoto’s obsession with attacking Pearl Harbor was war with the United States. Here, President Roosevelt delivers his request for a declaration of war against Japan on the day following Pearl Harbor. (Naval History and Heritage Command)

Yamamoto had the common sense to realize that any war between the United States and Japan would end badly for his country. Given the disparity of power between these two adversaries, Japan’s best course of action would have been to gain her objectives by not fighting the United States at all. However, Yamamoto ascribed to the thinking of most Japanese strategists and believed that an attack on British and Dutch possessions would bring the United States into the war. We will never know if, and how, the Americans would have responded to a Japanese attack solely against Dutch and British colonies, but it is clear that Roosevelt did not have the required level of support to take America to war in 1941 over such Japanese aggression. Yamamoto’s Pearl Harbor operation saved Roosevelt from such a dilemma. The ultimate irony of Yamamoto’s raid was that it had the exact opposite effect on American morale from that intended. Rather than break American morale, the Pearl Harbor attack scuttled any prospect of a negotiated settlement with the United States. “Remember Pearl Harbor” became the watchword for Japan’s total and utter defeat.

The initial Japanese expansion Yamamoto got his Pearl Harbor operation approved, but he was not the final arbiter of Japanese grand strategy. Real power was invested in Imperial General Headquarters which had responsibility for developing large-scale strategic plans. This was most often a divisive process since the two components of the body, the Army and Navy sections, had distinctly different views. The head of the Navy section was Admiral Nagano, who held the post of chief of the Naval General Staff. Nagano and his staff were charged with developing overall naval strategy and then placing it into the 26 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com

context of national strategy through negotiations with the Army. Nagano’s control of naval strategy was far from absolute, as the planning for the Pearl Harbor operation indicated. Yamamoto’s role in strategy formulation was already considerable before the war, and after the success of the Pearl Harbor attack, his influence grew. Both the Army and the Navy agreed that Japan was fighting a limited war in which it would seize key objectives and use the power of the defensive to defeat American counterattacks which in turn would lead to a negotiated peace. The initial period of the war was divided into two “operational phases.” The First Operational Phase was further divided into three separate parts. During these, the major objectives of the Philippines, British Malaya, Borneo, Burma, Rabaul, and the Dutch East Indies would be occupied and pacified. The Second Operational Phase called for further expansion into the South Pacific by seizing eastern New Guinea, New Britain, the Fijis, Samoa, and “strategic points in the Australian area.” In the Central Pacific, Midway was targeted as were the Aleutian Islands in the North Pacific. Though strategic differences between the Army and Navy, and between Yamamoto and the Naval General Staff, would be very apparent during the Second Operational Phase, the First Operational Phase went according to plan. In fact, Combined Fleet losses were lower than expected. The invasion of Malaya and the Philippines began in December 1941 and was met with ineffective Allied resistance. A notable success was scored on December 10 when Japanese land-based, long-range bombers sank the British capital ships Prince of Wales and Repulse in the South China Sea. This attack was conducted by the aircraft that Yamamoto had championed when he was director of the Technical Division of the Aeronautics Department. For Yamamoto it was an affirmation of his belief that battleships were obsolete and could be countered by aircraft alone. The American island of Guam was seized on December 8 after token resistance, and the British Gilbert Islands were seized on December 9 and 10. The only rebuff was the repulse of the first attempt to seize Wake Island on December 11. In response to this failure, Yamamoto gave orders that a carrier division from the Pearl Harbor attack force should be diverted to soften up the island for the next attempt. On December 22, the Japanese successfully landed on Wake and forced the garrison to surrender. Manila, the capital of the Philippines, fell on January 4. The bastion of British power in the Far East, the fortress of Singapore, surrendered on February 15. Allied naval forces were unable to stop the Japanese advance during the First Operational Phase. In the first major surface engagement of the war on February 27, the battle of the Java Sea, a Japanese force defeated an Allied naval force of similar size. The Allies were also unable to counter the Kido Butai which, following the Pearl Harbor operation, was employed to cover the capture of Rabaul in January 1942 and the Dutch East Indies in February. The combination of massed air power, together with excellent aircraft and aircrew, made the Kido Butai invincible. 27 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com

This poor-quality wartime photo from a Japanese wartime magazine shows the British carrier Hermes under attack by Japanese dive-bombers. The carrier was sunk on April 9, 1942, as it withdrew south following the Japanese attack on Trincomalee on Ceylon. (Courtesy of Michael A. Oren)

On February 12, Yamamoto moved his staff to the superbattleship Yamato. Quarters on the immense warship were far more spacious than those on Nagato. Yamamoto was now at the height of his popularity. Stacks of mail arrived daily praising his success as leader of the Combined Fleet. Yamamoto was uncomfortable with his new-found acclaim and the national euphoria surrounding him and the IJN. According to members of his staff, it was during this time that Yamamoto displayed signs of impatience as there had been no political movement to capitalize on the military successes he had predicted. Yamamoto believed that the right time for a negotiated peace would be after the fall of Singapore, which he believed would occur within six months of the opening of the war. He told a fellow admiral that Japan should seek peace even at the cost of returning the territories it had already conquered. Obviously, this view was not going to gain favor in Tokyo, especially when Japan was at the peak of its power. It shows Yamamoto at his best and worst. He knew that a prolonged war with the United States would end badly, but his idealistic thoughts on how to end it had no foundation in reality. Yamamoto stuck to his notion that the Pacific War could be ended as the Russo-Japanese War had – with a negotiated peace. With absolutely no progress towards a negotiated peace, Yamamoto and his staff had to plan the next phase of the war. The matter of future strategy invariably brought Yamamoto into conflict with the Naval General Staff. The Naval General Staff wanted to pursue a South Pacific campaign that fulfilled the original aim of the Second Operational Phase, which was to cut the lines of communication to Australia. This would prevent it from being used as a springboard for an American counterattack. The Combined Fleet had an even more grandiose scheme. It proposed an attack into the Indian Ocean that would destroy Great Britain’s position in India meaning that the Japanese could eventually link up with German forces when they advanced into the Middle East. This would require a massive contribution from the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) since it was estimated that five divisions would be required to conquer the island of Ceylon (now Sri Lanka). This plan was unrealistic as the shipping requirements to mount and support such an operation were untenable, and when the Army indicated that it would not support it in any way, it died a quick death. An offshoot of this plan remained, however. In April, the Kido Butai sailed into the Indian Ocean to raid British naval bases on Ceylon and to engage and cripple the Royal Navy’s Eastern Fleet. Nagumo’s carriers attacked the bases at Colombo and Trincomalee heavily and sank a British light carrier and two heavy cruisers at sea. However, they were unable to locate and destroy the main British fleet. A Japanese cruiser raiding force wreaked havoc on British shipping in the Bay of Bengal. Despite this, the entire operation was a


strategic dead-end since it was only a temporary projection of power into the Indian Ocean that could not be sustained, and only served to put more strain on the Japanese carrier force. As the Japanese carriers rampaged through the Indian Ocean, the seeds of a deadly compromise between the Naval General Staff and the Combined Fleet were being sown.

Yamamoto vs. the Naval General Staff, round two Once the Second Operational Phase was underway, the strategic visions of Yamamoto and the Naval General Staff began to diverge. This phase was planned to expand Japan’s strategic depth by adding eastern New Guinea, New Britain, the Aleutians, Midway, the Fijis, Samoa, and “strategic points in the Australian area.” The phasing of these objectives was key to success. The Naval General Staff favored an advance to the south to seize parts of Australia. This was quickly vetoed by the IJA which declined to contribute the forces necessary for such an operation. Even with this setback, the Naval General Staff still advocated cutting the sea links between Australia and the United States by capturing New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa. Since this required far fewer ground forces, on March 13 the Naval General Staff and the IJA agreed to operations with the goal of capturing Fiji and Samoa. The first part of the Second Operational Phase started well with Lae and Salamaua on eastern New Guinea being captured on March 8. The Americans reacted quickly and on March 10, US carrier-based aircraft struck the invasion force. In addition to inflicting considerable losses on the small invasion force, this attack stopped additional advances until Japanese forces in the South Pacific were reinforced to deal with potential future intervention by American carriers. The strength of the American response made the Japanese put on hold future expansion into the South Pacific until some of the Combined Fleet’s carriers could be allocated to the area to provide cover. As events in the South Pacific took center stage, Yamamoto refused to let go of his vision for Japanese naval strategy. In Yamamoto’s view, it was essential to complete the destruction of the Pacific Fleet. To accomplish this, the Combined Fleet would need to attack a target that the Americans could not afford to lose. This kind of target was not to be found in the South Pacific, he believed, but in the Central Pacific. The obvious choice was Hawaii, but the Japanese lacked the capability to successfully attack the islands. As a substitute, Yamamoto selected Midway Atoll. He deemed it close enough to Hawaii for the Pacific Fleet to be forced to contest a Japanese move against it and far enough away from Hawaii to make it impossible for the large, land-based air force stationed there to be able to intervene. His vision competed with that of the Naval General Staff and things came to a head during a series of meetings in Tokyo on April 2–5 between theNaval General Staff and representatives of the Combined Fleet. The Naval General Staff pointed out the difficulties of a Midway operation. Their main concern was how to keep Midway supplied if it were captured, given the island’s proximity to the Pacific Fleet’s main base at Pearl Harbor. However, 29 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com

The carrier Hornet launches B-25B bombers to raid Japan on April 18, 1942. This event humiliated Yamamoto and deepened his determination to finish the destruction of the Pacific Fleet. It was not the determining factor in getting the approval to conduct his Midway operation, since he had already gained that some two weeks earlier. (Naval History and Heritage Command)

no amount of logic could persuade Yamamoto to discard the idea of a Midway operation. By April 5, through the implied threat of resignation, Yamamoto had got his way. He had again succeeded in hijacking the formulation of Japanese naval strategy, but this time his victory was not complete. In exchange for permission to conduct the Midway operation, Yamamoto had to agree to two demands from the Naval General Staff. Both of these directly led to the failure of the Midway operation. Yamamoto agreed to allocate part of the Kido Butai to cover the planned early May invasion of Port Moresby on New Guinea, which was part of the renewed offensive in the South Pacific. He also agreed to include an attack to seize selected points in the Aleutians as part of the Midway operation. Both of these moves needlessly dissipated Yamamoto’s operational strength at Midway. However, with the IJN in thrall to Victory Disease brought on by its string of victories, no danger was foreseen in conducting multiple operations against weak American resistance.

The battle of the Coral Sea The attack on Port Moresby, codenamed the MO operation, was divided into several phases. In the first phase, Tulagi would be occupied on May 3. The two fleet carriers contributed from the Kido Butai were to conduct a wide sweep through the Coral Sea to counter landings by Allied forces. the Japanese did not believe that the Allies would show up in strength until late in the operation. The landings on Port Moresby were scheduled for May 10. As was typical in Japanese operational planning, the success of the MO operation depended on the close coordination of widely separated forces. Any delay in any aspect of the plan had the potential to throw the entire operation into disarray. Another hallmark of the plan, and of Japanese planning in general, was the almost complete disregard for the actions of the enemy. By committing only a portion of the Kido Butai, Yamamoto not only jeopardized the success of the MO operation, but exposed those units involved to potential defeat in detail. If the carriers involved were lost or damaged, they would be unable to participate in Yamamoto’s decisive Midway operation. In fact, the two carriers of Carrier Division 5 constituted the decisive edge the IJN’s carrier force held over the US Navy’s carrier force. Thus, in essence, Yamamoto was making his decisive Midway operation hostage to the outcome of the subsidiary MO operation. This shows the inflexibility present in Japanese planning. It was assumed that Carrier Division 5 would successfully conduct the MO operation in May and then


The battle of the Coral Sea N

PACIFIC OCEAN

New Ireland

Rabaul Green Island

New Britain Bougainville

To Rabaul May 8

Solomon Islands

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Shortland

To Rabaul May 8 May 7, 2400hrs

Trobriand Island Woodlark Island

May 7, 2400hrs

Tulagi Malaita May 7, 0000hrs May 8, 2400hrs

May 7, 0000hrs

Guadalcanal

PAPUA May 7, 1100hrs

May 7, 0630hrs China Strait

Misima Island

Long Reef

Jomard Passage

Deboyne Island

Shoho sunk

Tagula Island

Rossel Island May 8, 0530hrs Calvados Reef

Louisiade Archipelago May 7, 2400hrs

San Cristobal

May 7, 2400hrs

May 7, 2400hrs

May 8, 1100hrs

Shokaku damaged May 8, 1045hrs May 7, 1800hrs

May 7, 0000hrs

May 7, 1945hrs

May 7, 0625hrs

May 7, 0000hrs

May 7, 0740hrs

May 7, 1045hrs

May 7, 2400hrs

May 8, 0625hrs

May 8, 2000hrs

Rennell Island

Lexington and Yorktown damaged May 8, 1100hrs

Lexington sunk

CORAL SEA

May 8, 2000hrs

May 8, 2400hrs

MO Main Force MO Carrier Striking Force Covering Force MO Invasion Force Task Force 17 Support Group

0 0

50 100

100

150 miles 200km


The first strategic Japanese reverse of the war came in May 1942 at the battle of the Coral Sea. The Japanese light carrier Shoho is shown here under attack by American torpedo bombers; the carrier later sank. This was the start of a disastrous 30-day period for Yamamoto and the IJN which saw Japan’s offensive naval capabilities blunted. (Naval History and Heritage Command)

quickly move into the Central Pacific to take part in the Midway operation. No thought was given to the possibility of failure. When events did not go to plan, Yamamoto simply assumed that the weakened Kido Butai would still be strong enough to conduct the Midway attack. The MO operation was a major offensive for the IJN and brought about the largest naval battle of the Pacific War to date. It featured a force of 60 ships under Vice Admiral Inoue Shigeyoshi, which included two large carriers (Shokaku and Zuikaku), one light carrier (Shoho), six heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, and 15 destroyers. Additionally, some 250 aircraft were assigned to the operation including 140 aboard the three carriers. The fragility of the Japanese plan was quickly demonstrated. Tulagi was successfully seized on May 3, but the following day aircraft from the American carrier Yorktown struck the Tulagi invasion force without retaliation. The Americans were present in strength much earlier than the Japanese thought possible. For the next two days, both the American and Japanese carrier forces tried unsuccessfully to find each other. On May 7, both carrier forces went into action, and both achieved disappointing results. The Japanese carriers launched a full strike on a target reported to be the American carriers. The report turned out to be false, and the strike force found and struck only an oiler and a destroyer. The American carriers also acted on incomplete reconnaissance. Instead of finding the main Japanese carrier force, they were forced to settle for an attack against the Shoho, which was quickly sunk. This was the largest Japanese ship lost so far in the war. Finally, on May 8, the opposing carrier forces found each other and exchanged full strikes. In this exchange, the Japanese fared better. The 69 aircraft from the two Japanese carriers succeeded in sinking the carrier Lexington and damaging the Yorktown. In return, the Americans damaged the Shokaku, but left the Zuikaku undamaged. However, the Zuikaku’s aircraft losses were heavy, and the Japanese were unable to support a landing on Port Moresby. As a result, during the afternoon of May 8, Admiral Inoue cancelled the MO operation. When Yamamoto learned of this, he took immediate steps to restart the battle. He ordered Japanese forces to head south to pursue and complete the destruction of the American force. It was too late; the battle was over. For the Japanese, the Coral Sea represented a series of lost opportunities. The Japanese carrier force had the chance to ambush the American carriers, but was let down by incredibly poor reconnaissance. Despite this, the loss of the Lexington and the damage inflicted on the Yorktown were a significant


blow to the Pacific Fleet. Nevertheless, the battle was a disaster for the Japanese. Not only was the attack on Port Moresby stopped, giving the Japanese their first strategic setback of the war, but the battle was a major factor in Yamamoto’s failure to destroy the Pacific Fleet. The damaged Yorktown survived the battle and was in action at Midway less than one month later, but none of the three Japanese carriers committed to the battle were available for Midway. The light carrier Shoho had been sunk, the Shokaku damaged, and the Zuikaku’s air group was shattered and would take time to rebuild. Yamamoto had violated the principle of mass and had allocated insufficient forces to a subsidiary operation thus imperiling the success of the main operation. It is a damning fact that after the Pearl Harbor attack the six carriers of the Kido Butai never again acted together as a single group.

Yamamoto’s plan for Midway The Japanese plan for the battle of Midway will be examined in detail since Yamamoto’s staff drew it up and Yamamoto himself approved it. Yamamoto never considered Pearl Harbor to be a true test, since it was fought against a sleeping opponent. Midway was to be Yamamoto’s signature victory and the decisive battle of the war. Unfortunately for the Japanese, their plan for the MI operation (as the attack on Midway was codenamed) was deeply flawed. As usual, the plan

The Shokaku at Coral Sea under attack by American carrier aircraft. The carrier was struck by three bombs and could not be repaired in time for the Midway operation. Her sister ship, the Zuikaku, was also unable to participate in the Midway operation after her air group suffered crippling losses. This removed one third of Yamamoto’s heavy carriers from his would-be decisive battle. (Naval History and Heritage Command)

During the battle of the Coral Sea, the Japanese inflicted heavy losses on the Pacific Fleet with the carrier Lexington, shown here exploding, being sunk and a second carrier, Yorktown, being damaged. (Naval History and Heritage Command) 33 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com

required flawless timing from widely dispersed forces. As usual, the plan was based on a series of assumptions regarding the response of the Americans. More than usual, these assumptions exhibited almost no insight into how the Americans planned to fight the battle. The attack on Midway was scheduled to open on the morning of June 3 with an air raid by the aircraft from Nagumo’s carriers. For this operation, Nagumo had only four carriers and these would approach Midway from the northwest to knock out Midway’s air strength. Strategic and tactical surprise was assumed. Further air strikes were planned against Midway on June 4 to prepare for a troop landing. A transport group was to deliver a total of 5,000 troops to Midway Atoll on June 6. Several forces supported the landing including a Close Support Group of four heavy cruisers and two destroyers, a minesweeper group, and the Invasion Force Main Body with two battleships, another four heavy cruisers, eight destroyers, and a light carrier. Following the quick capture of the island (another faulty assumption as the combat elements of the landing force were not much larger than the entrenched American defenders), Japanese construction troops were tasked with making the base operational. They were given exactly one day to accomplish this before the expected clash with the American fleet. The seizure of Midway was only the prelude to the most important phase of Yamamoto’s plan. The entire battle was being fought under the premise that an attack on Midway would force the Pacific Fleet into battle. Midway was the bait for the American fleet, which would dutifully depart Pearl Harbor to counterattack the Combined Fleet after Midway had been captured. Another startling assumption made by the Japanese was that the MI operation would gain the element of surprise and the Pacific Fleet would need three days to sortie from Pearl Harbor to Midway to give battle. This would give Yamamoto plenty of time to lay his trap. Yamamoto was concerned that an overwhelming show of force by the Combined Fleet could make the Americans think twice about playing their part in the drama and could prevent them from joining battle at all. This concern perhaps explains Yamamoto’s dispersal of forces, as a degree of deception was required so the Americans would not gauge his true strength. After Midway was captured, the Invasion Force would remain near the island as bait to induce the Americans to fight. Nagumo’s carriers would move to a position some 500 miles to the northeast of the island. The other Japanese heavy forces would linger to the north, out of range of American reconnaissance. The Main Body, which contained Yamamoto’s flagship Yamato, would be positioned some 300 miles to the west of Nagumo’s force, and the other battleship force would move to a position some 500 miles north of the Main Body. Meanwhile, the two carriers assigned to the Aleutians operation would move south and take up position some 300 miles east of the Guard Force. With all the Japanese forces in position it was assumed that the Pacific Fleet would then make an appearance to hit the invasion force near Midway. Another assumption was that the Pacific Fleet’s response would include 34 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com

not only the remaining American carriers, but also the Pacific Fleet’s remaining battleships. This would allow the Combined Fleet to use its well-rehearsed tactics from the pre-war plans to destroy the Pacific Fleet. The Combined Fleet’s massed battleships would deliver the final blow. An important aspect of Yamamoto’s decisive battle was Operation AL, the plan to seize two islands in the Aleutians at the same time as the attack on Midway was being undertaken. Despite persistent myth, the Aleutian operation was not a diversion to draw American forces away from Midway; Yamamoto wanted the Americans to be drawn to Midway, not away from it. Operation AL called for a carrier strike against the American naval base at Dutch Harbor on June 3, the same day as the originally scheduled strike on Midway. Landings on the islands of Kiska and Adak were scheduled for June 6. Another optional landing was planned on Attu on June 12. The forces directly engaged in this operation were a considerable drain on Yamamoto’s resources. These included, most importantly, two carriers, along with six cruisers and 12 destroyers. Another four battleships, two light cruisers and 12 destroyers provided distant cover for Operation AL. All this effort was excessive for a secondary objective. Any diversion of forces from the decisive battle was unwise and unnecessary. If the Midway operation went well, the Aleutians could be seized at Yamamoto’s leisure. If the Midway operation were a failure, any gains made in the Aleutians could not be held anyway, as was proven later in 1943. Any forces sent north to conduct Operation AL were in no position to support the MI operation and, therefore, were essentially worthless in Yamamoto’s decisive battle against the Pacific Fleet. However, in Yamamoto’s mind he did not need to mass his forces at Midway against the weak remnants of the US Navy. By any reasoning, Yamamoto’s Midway plan was deficient. It was built on a series of flawed assumptions, was too complex and, perhaps most importantly, prevented mutual support between the 12 different forces deployed over a vast expanse of the Pacific. By dispersing his forces, first at the Coral Sea, then for the AL operation, and finally for the invasion of Midway itself, Yamamoto had squandered his numerical advantage over the Pacific Fleet. Yamamoto was presented with the problem that such a large operation could not be deceptive (as all Japanese plans traditionally had to be) and at the same time mutually supporting. Yamamoto should have chosen mutual support over

Midway Atoll showing the airfield on Eastern Island with Sand Island in the background. Yamamoto carefully selected Midway as the site of his decisive battle to complete the destruction of the Pacific Fleet. The only planning assumption before the battle that was correct was that the Americans would fight for Midway. However, the result was not what Yamamoto anticipated. (Naval History and Heritage Command)


deception. The ultimate result of the choice of deception was that the Japanese were actually outnumbered at the point of contact where the outcome of the battle was decided. An American force of 26 ships faced the 20 ships of the Kido Butai, with an aircraft count of 233 (348 if the aircraft on Midway are included) against Nagumo’s 248. As stated, Yamamoto’s plan was driven by a series of flawed assumptions. His biggest assumption was in fact correct: the Americans were going to fight for Midway. However, his assumptions about how they would conduct the battle were entirely wrong and his belief that the entire operation would gain strategic and tactical surprise was disastrously wrong. When Yamamoto’s plan was overlaid over equally faulty tactical planning by the staff of the Kido Butai, the IJN was set on course for an epic defeat.

The battle of Midway Unbeknownst to Yamamoto, the Americans knew that a major Japanese operation was planned in the Central Pacific. By June 2, three American carriers were positioned 325 miles northeast of Midway to ambush the Kido Butai. Yamamoto’s inadequate pre-battle reconnaissance meant that this movement went unnoticed by the Japanese. The battle opened on June 3 when American aircraft from Midway spotted the Japanese transport group 700 miles west of Midway. Because the Kido Butai had departed Japan a day later than planned, the air strike on Midway was moved to June 4. At 0430hrs on June 4, Nagumo began to launch a 108-aircraft strike on the island. The attackers brushed aside Midway’s defending fighters, but failed to deliver a decisive blow to the island’s facilities. Most importantly, the strike aircraft based on Midway had already departed to attack the Japanese carriers which had been spotted at 0530hrs. This information was passed to the three American carriers, and soon 116 carrier aircraft, in addition to the aircraft from Midway, were on their way to attack the Kido Butai. The aircraft from Midway attacked bravely, but they failed to score a single hit against Nagumo’s force. In the middle of these uncoordinated

Yamamoto at Midway Yamamoto’s greatest victory was to have been the decisive battle he designed around the attack on Midway Atoll. He hoped that this attack would force what remained of the Pacific Fleet into battle. The resulting trap would then crush the Americans and set the stage for a negotiated peace. From the start, Yamamoto’s elaborate scheme did not go according to plan. The element of surprise was not achieved and on the morning of June 4, 1942, the Japanese carrier force was attacked by American land-based aircraft from Midway and then by American carrier aircraft. At 1050hrs, word reached Yamamoto aboard his flagship Yamato that three of the four Japanese carriers were on fire. It was a devastating blow which meant the battle was lost. Yamamoto is shown here in the uniform of a full admiral (1), around him stand his staff – a captain (2), a commander (3) and a lieutenant commander (4), who comes from the aviation branch. 36 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com

1

3 2 4


The Japanese assumption that they would gain strategic and tactical surprise at Midway was immediately dispelled when the battle opened on June 4. Here, the carrier Akagi is shown under attack by B-17 bombers from Midway. (Naval History and Heritage Command)

attacks, one of Nagumo’s scout aircraft reported the presence of an American task force. It was not until 0830hrs that the presence of an American carrier was confirmed. This gave Nagumo a huge dilemma. Despite Yamamoto’s orders to maintain a reserve aircraft force to attack surface targets, Nagumo had already begun to re-arm his reserve force with weapons suitable for re-attacking Midway. Now, under air attack from Midway and later from the first of the American carrier aircraft, Nagumo could either launch an immediate strike against the American force with the aircraft only partially armed to attack ships, or recover his first Midway strike aircraft and prepare a large-scale attack against the Americans with a properly armed force. Nagumo opted for the latter. This was not to be. Beginning at 1022hrs, American carrier dive-bombers surprised and successfully attacked three of the Japanese carriers. With their hangar decks strewn with fully fueled and armed aircraft, all three were turned into blazing wrecks. A single carrier, the Hiryu, remained and she launched an immediate counterattack. Both of her attacks hit the Yorktown

The carrier Hiryu at full speed evading bombs dropped by B-17s. Attacks by Midway-based aircraft were ineffective, but by the end of June 4, dive-bombers from American carriers had crippled all four of Nagumo’s carriers. (Naval History and Heritage Command) 38 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com

and put the carrier out of action. Later in the afternoon, the two remaining American carriers found and destroyed the Hiryu. The striking power of the Kido Butai had been destroyed and the battle lost. During the battle, Yamamoto was suffering from acute stomach pains which were later diagnosed as worms. When an American carrier were sighted, the Combined Fleet’s staff was optimistic that the carriers’ destruction would just occur a little earlier than planned. Soon, word reached the flagship at 1050hrs that three Japanese carriers were on fire. When disaster befell Nagumo, Yamamoto was some 500 miles to the west on the Yamato. On receipt of this news, Yamamoto is reported to have merely grunted. There were high hopes for the Hiryu’s counterattack. Nagumo’s last carrier was led by the aggressive Rear Admiral Yamaguchi Tamon, a friend of Yamamoto and seen by many as a fitting potential future leader of the Combined Fleet. At 1220hrs, Yamamoto issued a series of orders aimed at regaining control of the battle. The Main Body and the invasion covering force were ordered to move to support the Kido Butai. The transport force was moved to the northwest to await developments. The carriers in the Aleutians force were ordered to head south. At 1310hrs, Yamamoto provided additional instructions for the cruisers of the covering force to shell and destroy the airfield on Midway. Yamamoto’s hopes of snatching victory from defeat were shattered when the Hiryu was set on fire by an American air attack at around 1700hrs. Even after word of the Hiryu’s demise had arrived, and knowing from reconnaissance reports that several American carriers remained operational, Yamamoto’s night orders issued at 1915hrs indicated that he did not yet understand the gravity of the situation. He planned to have Japanese surface forces engage the American carrier force in a night battle; meanwhile, Midway would be neutralized by bombardment. Not until 0015hrs on June 5 did he bow to the inevitable and order the Japanese naval forces racing to the east to look for the American carriers to break off and join the Main Body. At 0020hrs the cruiser bombardment was canceled. Finally, at 0255hrs, Yamamoto called off the Midway operations. He dismissed his staff’s suggestion that battleships be used to put Midway out of action with the comment “You ought to know that of all naval tactics, firing one’s guns at an island is considered the most stupid.” During the battle, Yamamoto had to personally order the scuttling of his old command the Akagi which sank on the morning of June 5. He took

In comparison to Japanese losses at Midway, American losses were minimal. Here, the carrier Yorktown is struck by a Japanese air-launched torpedo. (Naval History and Heritage Command)


40


0

0

R

KOREA

s

nd

sla

Okinawa

Japanese forces

k yu

uI

500km

500 miles

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Iwo Jima

1200hrs/28

Bungo Strait

Tokyo

HONSHU

1100hrs/30

1100hrs/30

1100hrs/1

Guam

1100hrs/29

Mariana Islands

1000hrs/2

Kiska Invasion Force

2200hrs/3

1000hrs/1

1100hrs/31

1100hrs/2

1100hrs/30

1000hrs/1

1000hrs/4

0900hrs/5

Close Support Group (Kurita)

Wake Island

1. 2. 3.

1

ds Dutch Harbor 0200hrs/4

0740hrs/5

Task Force 16 (Spruance)

Task Force 17 (Fletcher)

Is l a n

1000hrs/1

Midway Island

3

1200hrs/2

Adak

Aleutian

1025hrs, June 4: Akagi, Kaga and Soryu bombed. All later sink 1705hrs, June 4: Hiryu bombed; she sinks the next day 1209–1443hrs: Yorktown bombed and torpedoed. She sinks on June 7.

0300hrs/5

2300hrs/4

0900hrs/4

2

2nd Kido Butai (Kakuta)

Kiska

1st Kido Butai (Nagumo)

1000hrs/4

0700hrs/5

1000hrs/2

0700hrs/5

1000hrs/3

Minesweeping Group 1100hrs/31

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1000hrs/2

1000hrs/2

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1000hrs/4

Attu

Attu-Adak Invasion Force

1000hrs/4

1000hrs/4 0300hrs/4

Main Body (Yamamoto)

1000hrs/1

Transport Group (Tanaka)

1100hrs/31

1000hrs/3

2200hrs/4

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PACIFIC OCEAN

1100hrs/31

il e

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1100hrs/29

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HOKAIDO

Ku r

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Kamchatka

The battle of Midway

In addition to the loss of four carriers at Midway, the Japanese lost the heavy cruiser Mikuma, shown here on June 6 after being attacked by American carrier-based dive-bombers. (Naval History and Heritage Command)

responsibility for the lost battle, telling his staff that he would apologize to the emperor himself. He further ordered that the Nagumo force was not to be criticized. The next day, Yamamoto retired to his private cabin and was diagnosed with a case of worms. He did not appear until June 10 when Nagumo and other staff officers from the Kido Butai were brought aboard the Yamato. The outcome of the battle had deeply shocked Yamamoto. Not only was the battle a disaster for the IJN, but it undercut any chance Japan had of dictating a negotiated peace. The initiative in the Pacific War was now anyone’s for the taking, but Yamamoto did nothing to seize it. The Japanese advances into the South Pacific were called off. On August 7, the US Navy landed on the islands of Guadalcanal and Tulagi in the Solomons. Now Yamamoto had to fight a defensive campaign for the first time.

The American heavy cruiser Quincy under attack from Japanese cruisers during the battle of Savo Island on August 9, 1942. Despite the fact that the Japanese inflicted heavier losses than they received during the many surface battles fought throughout the Guadalcanal campaign, Yamamoto’s piecemeal commitment strategy condemned the Japanese to eventual defeat. (Naval History and Heritage Command)

The Guadalcanal campaign The American Marines overran the defenders on Tulagi and by the end of August 8 the incomplete airfield on Guadalcanal was also in American hands. The local Japanese naval commander, Vice Admiral Mikawa Gun’ichi, commander of the new 8th Fleet at Rabaul, reacted quickly. He gathered up all available forces, five heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and a destroyer, and ordered an attack on the Allied invasion force for the night of August 8–9. Mikawa’s bold response resulted in a brilliant victory during 41 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com

Vice Admiral Mikawa Gun’ichi was in command of the 8th Fleet during the Guadalcanal campaign. He was an aggressive commander, but missed an opportunity to destroy the American transports in the immediate aftermath of the Savo Island battle. (Naval History and Heritage Command)

which four Allied heavy cruisers (three American and one Australian) were sunk. No Japanese ships were lost. It was one of the worst American naval defeats of the war, only mitigated by Mikawa’s failure to attack the defenseless transports. Had he done so, the first American counterattack in the Pacific could have been stopped dead in its tracks. Yamamoto expressed his disappointment in Mikawa’s oversight, but did not relieve him and he served well for the remainder of the campaign. Imperial General Headquarters originally deemed the American landings to be nothing more than a “reconnaissance in force,” but eventually reason took hold and the IJN assessed that a division of Marines was present on Guadalcanal. However, soon after, the estimate of the extent of the American forces was revised downward and a fatal pattern of piecemeal commitment by the Japanese was begun. Instead of a large attack, with ground forces, that was originally planned to include a brigade, two regiments and Special Naval Landing Forces, the IJA convinced itself that the Americans could be expelled promptly with the lead elements of a single regiment. On August 21, a Japanese reinforced battalion attacked the dug-in Marines and was annihilated. Yamamoto and the Combined Fleet were slow to respond to the American challenge. By the middle of August, Yamamoto had assembled a force to deal with the American incursion. It totaled four battleships, three carriers, 16 cruisers and 30 destroyers. Yamamoto employed this force on August 24–25 to cover the movement of a small transport convoy to Guadalcanal and to crush any American naval units in the area. The ensuing clash, known as the battle of the Eastern Solomons, included the third carrier battle of the war. The Combined Fleet achieved neither of its goals – the American carrier force was not destroyed and the reinforcement convoy failed to reach the island. Japanese losses were heavy with 75 aircraft lost and a light carrier, a transport, and a destroyer sunk. In return, the American carrier Enterprise was damaged, but managed to elude Japanese attempts to complete her destruction. Overall, despite an advantage in numbers, the Japanese performance was disappointing and was marked by a lack of aggression by the carrier force and a general lack of coordination in efforts to protect the convoy. With the airfield on Guadalcanal now operational, convoys of slow transports could not be run to the island. Until the airfield was suppressed, Japanese reinforcements could only be delivered by inefficient nightly destroyer runs to the island. The Japanese continued to underestimate the number of Marines on the island. By the time some 6,200 men had been delivered by destroyer for another attack on the Marine perimeter, the Japanese estimated that only 2,000 Marines were on the island. However, the actual number was closer


to 20,000. The Japanese attack, launched on two successive nights from September 12–14, also failed. Yamamoto and the Combined Fleet staff criticized the Army for being overconfident. Meanwhile, the struggle for control of the waters around Guadalcanal was going better for the Japanese. A Japanese submarine sank the carrier Wasp on September 15. This left a single American carrier, the Hornet, active in the Pacific. During the same period, the Japanese possessed up to four operational carriers in the South Pacific, making it the time when they had the greatest advantage in terms of carrier numbers. Yamamoto failed to recognize or grasp this advantage. Life for Yamamoto during this grinding battle of attrition was anything but unpleasant. He maintained his flag on the spacious Yamato anchored in Truk lagoon. The inaction of Yamato during the campaign earned her the nickname “Hotel Yamato.” Even under wartime conditions, the food on the Yamato remained of the highest quality and visitors often remarked on the high state of living on the flagship. In addition, Combined Fleet staff officers sheltered Yamamoto from any unpleasantness, such as having to observe wounded personnel, so as not to cloud his judgment. Despite this, during his stay in Truk, Yamamoto’s hair became noticeably grayer. His correspondence became decidedly more downbeat, and he often suggested that his death was imminent. His growing underlying pessimism can be summed up in this extract from a letter to a friend: Things here are hard. I felt from the beginning that America was not likely to relinquish easily positions established at the cost of such sacrifice, and I insisted that a high degree of preparation and willingness to make sacrifices of our own would be necessary, but everybody here always persists in facile optimism.

The first carrier battle of the Guadalcanal campaign was fought on August 24. Here, a Japanese bomb explodes aboard the carrier Enterprise. The battle ended as a draw, but Yamamoto failed in his objective of destroying the American fleet or at least getting a small transport convoy through to the island. (Naval History and Heritage Command) 43 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com

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New Britain

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1 3 5 9

2 8 11 13 14

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10

San Cristobal

Maramasike

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N

August 7: 1st Marine Division lands on Tulagi and Guadalcanal. August 9: battle of Savo Island. A Japanese cruiser force inflicts heavy losses on the Allied surface force covering the invasion in a night engagement but fails to attack the defenseless transports. August 21: first Japanese land offensive against the Marine perimeter fails. August 24: battle of the Eastern Solomons. The third carrier battle of the war ends indecisively, but Japanese suffer heavier losses and fail to get a convoy through to Guadalcanal. September 12–14: second Japanese land offensive fails. October 11–12: battle of Cape Esperance. An American cruiser force defeats the IJN in a night action for the first time in the war. October 14: battleship bombardment of Henderson Field. Two Japanese battleships temporarily neutralize the airfield. October 15: Japanese convoy with three merchant ships reaches Guadalcanal. October 24–25: third Japanese land offensive fails. October 26: battle of Santa Cruz. The fourth carrier battle of the war results in a Japanese victory. Heavy losses prevent Japanese from following up their success. November 13: First Naval battle of Guadalcanal. An American cruiser force intercepts a Japanese battleship force attempting to bombard the airfield. The bombardment is stopped; both sides suffer heavy losses. November 14: air attacks on an 11-ship Japanese convoy sink or force back seven transports. Only four reach Guadalcanal where they are beached and later destroyed. November 14–15: Second Naval battle of Guadalcanal. In the Pacific War’s first battleship duel, two American battleships sink a Japanese battleship to stop another Japanese attempt to bombard the airfield. November 30: battle of Tassafaronga. A Japanese destroyer force inflicts heavy damage on an American cruiser force in a night action. February 1–7, 1943: Japanese evacuate remaining troops on Guadalcanal by destroyer. April 18, 1943: Admiral Yamamoto shot down over Bougainville and killed.

Santa Isabel

15. 16.

14.

13.

12.

11.

8. 9. 10.

7.

5. 6.

3. 4.

1. 2.

The campaign for Guadalcanal

Yamamoto reserved his especial ire for the IJA whose overconfidence translated into a parade of defeats suffered while trying to dislodge the Marines. Yamamoto once remarked that they were more dangerous than the Americans. Nevertheless, he was moved by the plight of the Army personnel on Guadalcanal and tried his best to support them. He appeared to be in good spirits to most around him. When there was no major operation underway, Yamamoto had time to engage in replying to mail that he received or doing calligraphy (he was known as an accomplished expert in this art). By October, it was obvious even to the Japanese that the battle for Guadalcanal was shaping up to be a decisive clash. This battle could only be won if the Japanese garrison on the island was dramatically reinforced. For the next attack, an entire division would be employed. Therefore, efforts were intensified to get the required force to Guadalcanal by October 13 or 14 so that the offensive could be launched by October 20. To do this, the Combined Fleet promised to step up night runs by destroyers and seaplane carriers (carrying heavy equipment) to Guadalcanal, to increase air bombardment of the airfield, and to plan to run a large convoy of transports directly to the island. On September 28, several Army officers flew to Truk to seek Yamamoto’s approval for the plan. One officer described how the personnel on Guadalcanal suffered from a lack of supplies. To this, Yamamoto replied, “If Army men have been starving through lack of supplies, then the Navy should be ashamed of itself.” He further promised, “I’ll give you cover even if I have to bring the Yamato alongside Guadalcanal myself.” Yamamoto agreed to the plan, including the use of transports, and put into motion an idea that his staff had been considering since early September. Battleships would be used to suppress the airfield allowing the convoy to deliver enough troops to Guadalcanal to overwhelm the Americans. Yamamoto now defined the Combined Fleet’s primary mission as supporting the recapture of the island; the destruction of the Pacific Fleet was reduced to secondary importance. On the night of October 13–14, Yamamoto made good on his promise. Two battleships bombarded the airfield on Guadalcanal. They used 918 14in. rounds to destroy 40 aircraft and put the airfield temporarily out of commission. When the admiral in charge of the operation protested his orders

Yamamoto endorsed the idea of using battleships to bombard Henderson Field on Guadalcanal late in the campaign. His reasons remain unclear, but undoubtedly involved a general lack of fuel in the forward areas and a reluctance to commit battleships which were held in reserve for a decisive battle. Eventually, the more expendable Kongo-class units were used. This is Hiei in 1942 before she was committed to a bombardment mission and sunk in November 1942. (Naval History and Heritage Command)


The Japanese carrier force gave its best performance of the war during the battle of Santa Cruz on October 26, 1942. In this view, a well-coordinated strike of Japanese dive and torpedo bombers cripples the carrier Hornet which later sank. (Naval History and Heritage Command)

by arguing that the risks to the battleships outweighed the gains, Yamamoto ended the argument by stating that he would lead the operation personally if need be. The action was the most successful Japanese battleship operation of the war. With the airfield out of action, Yamamoto ordered the Combined Fleet to engage the American fleet. The Japanese convoy arrived at the island on the night of October 14–15. It was preceded by two heavy cruisers which again shelled the airfield. Aircraft from two carriers flew air cover over the transports. American aircraft did succeed in sinking three of the six transports, but not until 4,500 men had been landed along with two-thirds of their supplies and equipment. Yamamoto kept up the pressure with another cruiser bombardment on the night of October 15–16 and more reinforcement destroyer runs. After several delays, the Army started its offensive on October 24. The main Japanese attack finally commenced on the night of October 25–26. Despite claims of victory, all attacks were repulsed with heavy losses. Concurrent with the attacks on land, Yamamoto planned the largest naval operation to date to counter and defeat any American naval forces operating in support of the Marines. The Combined Fleet departed Truk on October 11. Yamamoto exercised overall control aboard the Yamato which remained anchored in Truk lagoon. The main force numbered four battleships, four carriers, nine cruisers and 25 destroyers. In addition, Mikawa’s 8th Fleet numbered four more cruisers and 16 destroyers. After the preliminary naval actions, Yamamoto ordered the main body of the Combined Fleet to close in on and destroy the Americans on October 25. The battle of Santa Cruz, which followed on October 26, was the fourth carrier clash of the war. It was Yamamoto’s greatest victory over the American Navy, with the exception of Pearl Harbor. The Japanese sank one carrier, the Hornet, and claimed that all three of the American carriers they believed present were sunk. In fact, the Enterprise was damaged but escaped again. Yamamoto ordered his subordinates to seek a night battle to finish off the Americans, but a lack of fuel forced the Japanese fleet to return to Truk by October 30. American losses were high, but the Japanese had been turned back, their carrier air groups having been decimated and two carriers heavily damaged. These losses made Santa Cruz a pyrrhic victory for the Japanese and prevented Yamamoto from following up his victory. The campaign came to a climax in November. The Combined Fleet planned another massive effort to reinforce the troops on the island.


An attack identical to the October offensive was envisaged. A larger convoy would be preceded by an increased air assault on the airfield. The night before the convoy would land, a battleship bombardment would neutralize the airfield. The convoy would deliver the supplies and heavy guns needed to permanently put the airfield out of commission. The Combined Fleet was sure that the naval balance had swung in its favor after the great victory at Santa Cruz. However, the Americans were also mustering all available forces for the next round. The mission to bombard the airfield was given to a force of two battleships, one cruiser, and 11 destroyers, which departed Truk on the night of November 12–13. This attempt to attack the airfield was thwarted by a smaller American force of five cruisers and eight destroyers, which intercepted the Japanese and forced a vicious night action at close range. Losses were heavy on both sides. The battleship Hiei was damaged and when daylight came was helplessly circling in the waters off Guadalcanal. Instead of putting a new plan together to deal with the problem of neutralizing the airfield, Yamamoto and his staff spent much of November 13 in discussion on how to save the Hiei. Yamamoto decided that the Hiei should not be scuttled, so as to draw off American aircraft that might otherwise hit the convoy. Yamamoto moved the intended day of arrival for the convoy to November 14 and assembled a new force to attempt another bombardment. This was centered on a single battleship with a large cruiser and destroyer escort. Additional battleships were available, but were not employed. This attempt was met by the last major American surface assets in the Pacific – two modern battleships. In another savage night battle on the night of November 14–15, the Japanese were again turned back. In the first battleship duel of the Pacific War, the Japanese lost the battleship Kirishima. The November night battles, known as the First and Second Naval battles of Guadalcanal, were the decisive events of the campaign. The Americans had delivered additional troops and supplies during the battle. However, despite their large-scale effort, the Japanese only managed to deliver 2,000 troops and few supplies. All ten transports in the convoy were lost since American aircraft from the undamaged airfield were able to intervene. Naval losses were heavy for both sides. The Americans lost two cruisers, seven destroyers sunk, and many of their ships were damaged. The Japanese lost two battleships, a heavy cruiser, and three destroyers. In the end, the Japanese defeat was due more to their timid leadership than being out-fought.

The carrier Enterprise shown under attack on October 26, 1942, at the battle of Santa Cruz. The carrier was damaged but managed to escape and played a critical role in the decisive phase of the Guadalcanal campaign in November. (Naval History and Heritage Command)


The convoy was not supported and suffered accordingly. Yamamoto had failed again to mass his superior forces for a decisive attack.

The battle is lost

A6M “Zero” fighters on one of Rabaul’s airfields. Aircraft from Rabaul carried the brunt of the Japanese air offensive against Henderson Field on Guadalcanal from August 1942 until January 1943. They were ultimately unsuccessful and some 500 land-based aircraft were lost with their highly trained crews, crippling the IJN’s land-based air force. (Juzo Nakamura via Lansdale Research Associates)

The battle of attrition was too much for Imperial General Headquarters. On January 4, the Navy Section instructed Yamamoto to prepare to withdraw the remaining troops from Guadalcanal. This major defeat meant a loss of face for Yamamoto and the IJN. At the same time, Yamamoto was also tasked to reinforce defensive outposts on the Central and Northern Solomons and on New Guinea. Despite the Army’s suspicions that the IJN would abandon them on Guadalcanal, Yamamoto and his Combined Fleet staff made every effort to rescue the remnants of the garrison. The evacuation operation was carefully planned to take three destroyer lifts and would begin in late January. Yamamoto himself thought that losses among the participating destroyers would total half of those committed and that only one-third of the garrison would be rescued. The first evacuation run was carried out on February 1 using 20 destroyers. Another run, with 20 destroyers, occurred on February 4. The third run took place on February 7 and was conducted with 18 destroyers. The operation was successful and the best sources indicate that 10,652 men, most severely emaciated, were rescued. The Japanese lost just one destroyer. The Japanese attributed its success to careful planning, boldness on the part of the evacuation forces, and good air cover. It is fair to wonder why this level of commitment was not displayed when the battle was still in the balance. On February 11, Yamamoto shifted his flag to the Yamato’s sister ship, the Musashi. With Guadalcanal lost, the focus shifted to the Central

Last gasp at Guadalcanal The last large-scale attempt by the Japanese to reinforce Guadalcanal was made in mid-November. Yamamoto organized a large convoy of 11 merchant ships to deliver reinforcements escorted by Rear Admiral Tanaka Raizo’s destroyer flotilla. Because the American airfield on Guadalcanal had not been neutralized, the convoy came under air attack on November 14 in the waters northwest of Guadalcanal. Soon, seven of the 11 transports were either sunk or forced to turn back. Yamamoto ordered Tanaka to take the last four transports and beach them on the island. This view shows the transport Kinugawa Maru, beached on Guadalcanal on the morning of November 15, under attack by American Dauntless dive-bombers. The failure of the November convoy meant the Japanese had lost the battle for Guadalcanal. 48 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com


The purpose of Yamamoto’s trip to Rabaul was to personally direct operations and raise morale for the I-Go-Sakusen operation. Here, Yamamoto, resplendent in his whites, addresses pilots on Rabaul before a mission. (Juzo Nakamura via Lansdale Research Associates) Yamamoto watches an A6M “Zero” fighter take off as part of Operation I-Go-Sakusen, which featured four major attacks. In the first phase, 67 dive and torpedo bombers escorted by 110 fighters attacked shipping off Guadalcanal. (Juzo Nakamura via Lansdale Research Associates)

Solomons and New Guinea. In another sign of declining Japanese fortunes, during the battle of the Bismarck Sea on March 2–4, Allied air attack destroyed a convoy attempting to move troops from Rabaul to Lae on New Guinea. To redress Japan’s declining position in the Solomons, Yamamoto devised a major air offensive under his personal command to suppress the growing Allied strength in the region. He moved the air groups of the Combined Fleet’s four carriers, totaling about 160 aircraft, to Rabaul to join the 190 aircraft of the 11th Air Fleet. This brought Japanese air strength to some 350 aircraft. On April 3, Yamamoto also moved to Rabaul to set up his advanced headquarters. The air offensive was codenamed Operation I-Go-Sakusen and consisted of four major attacks against Allied positions on Guadalcanal (April 7), Buna (April 11), Port Moresby (April 12), and Milne Bay (April 14). Japanese pilots claimed great success against Allied shipping and defending fighters. Yamamoto took these claims at face value. He declared the operation a success and ordered its conclusion on April 16. In fact, little had been achieved and Japanese losses were heavier than those suffered by the Allies. It is hard to understand how Yamamoto thought that four strikes could reverse the air balance in the region following the failure of the IJN’s air force over the many months of the Guadalcanal campaign. Ironically, just days after Yamamoto called off the air offensive, he was dead, shot down by American aircraft from an airfield he believed was suppressed.


OPPOSING COMMANDERS In a real sense, it did not matter which American admiral opposed Yamamoto as long as he possessed a minimum degree of professional competence. As Yamamoto himself knew, the United States had the potential to overwhelm the IJN in a prolonged war. Even with Japan’s initial successes and the devastation of the attack on Pearl Harbor, any losses suffered by the Pacific Fleet would be ultimately insignificant when placed in the overall context of America’s wartime naval production. During the war, the US Navy commissioned 18 fleet, nine light, and 77 escort carriers; eight battleships, 13 heavy, and 33 light cruisers; 349 destroyers, 420 destroyer escorts, and 203 submarines. In comparison, the Japanese completed five fleet, six light, and four escort carriers; two battleships, no heavy, and five light cruisers; 32 destroyers, 32 destroyer escorts, and some 100 submarines. As commander of the Combined Fleet, Yamamoto was playing a losing hand. Any hope of victory rested upon a negotiated peace before the swell of American production crushed the IJN. In addition to this numerical advantage, the US Navy was blessed with an abundance of superb leadership. Yamamoto’s primary opponent was Chester William Nimitz. Nimitz assumed command of the Pacific Fleet on December 31, 1941 in the aftermath of the Pearl Harbor disaster. He was selected by President Roosevelt who had observed Nimitz during his two tours in Washington. Like Yamamoto, Nimitz was viewed by many in the US Navy as a political admiral and his appointment was not received well by many other flag officers, especially given his relative lack of seniority. After his 1905 graduation from Annapolis, Nimitz initially served in submarines and later in cruisers and battleships. Unlike Yamamoto, he had no background in naval aviation. While Yamamoto possessed a high degree of personal charisma, Nimitz projected a cool air of authority which inspired confidence. Despite his background as a submariner and a surface officer, he was not seen as favoring any of the Navy’s competing factions. He was viewed as a fine administrator and possessed a sense of optimism, which was immediately tested when he arrived in Hawaii. Unlike Yamamoto, Nimitz had an uncanny ability to pick good leaders (though to be fair to Yamamoto, he was unable to direct his Navy’s personnel assignments to the same degree that Nimitz was). Nimitz let his talented subordinates do their jobs. Yamamoto was also not viewed as a meddler, and in fact was at times minimally involved

Yamamoto waving to fighters from No. 204 Air Group taking off from a Rabaul airfield. Behind him is the Combined Fleet chief of staff Vice Admiral Ugaki. In the second phase of I-Go-Sakusen, the Japanese attacked targets on New Guinea but, despite claims to the contrary by the Japanese aviators, losses to Allied shipping and defending fighters were light. (Robert C. Mikesh via Lansdale Research Associates)


Admiral Chester Nimitz on Midway after the battle. Midway was his signal victory during the war and showed that he was just as aggressive as Yamamoto, but had the advantage of superior intelligence and better staff work. (Naval History and Heritage Command)

in the planning process. However, this was a by-product of the IJN’s staff system and did not necessarily reflect on Yamamoto. Conversely, Nimitz was an active participant in the planning and would carefully scrutinize and comment upon planning drafts. What made Nimitz a formidable opponent for Yamamoto, or any other Japanese admiral, was his aggressiveness and strategic insight. His aggressive nature was evident early in the war when he conducted a series of carrier raids on the Gilberts and the Marshalls, and on the islands of Wake and Marcus. The greatest raid that took place under his command (though it cannot be said to have been his idea) was conducted in April 1942 when the carriers Enterprise and Hornet approached to within 620 miles of Japan to launch 16 B-25 bombers to attack Tokyo and three other cities. There is a persistent myth that the raid on Tokyo allowed Yamamoto to push through his Midway operation. However, as we have already seen, the plan was approved some 11 days before the first bomb fell on Tokyo. Nevertheless, the raid was a bold move which humiliated Yamamoto deeply. Any lingering resistance to his Midway operation melted away in the aftermath of this attack on the Japanese homeland. In addition to being commander of the Pacific Fleet, Nimitz was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Ocean Areas (which included the North Pacific and the Central and South Pacific Areas) in April 1942. This gave Nimitz broad geographic responsibilities and placed him directly in the path of Yamamoto’s last offensive operations. The new command arrangement was muddled by the fact that Nimitz was not intended to have direct control of South Pacific operations. While Nimitz exercised direct control of the Central and North Pacific, this was not the case in the South Pacific where Vice Admiral Robert Ghormley was appointed as Commander, South Pacific Area and Force. However, since Ghormley was not in place by the time the Japanese launched their Coral Sea offensive, Nimitz also exercised direct authority in the South Pacific in May 1942. In response to warnings from his cryptographers, Nimitz began to reinforce his forces in the South Pacific. In mid-February, a task force centered on the carrier Yorktown joined the task force on the carrier Lexington which had returned to the region. In preparation for the coming battle, Nimitz sent his orders to his on-scene commander, Rear Admiral Jack Fletcher, on April 22. Of note, he sent Fletcher his objectives but did not tell him how to accomplish them. That was up to Fletcher. Nimitz was not afraid to take risks if he saw an opportunity to inflict significant losses on the Japanese. In an April 25–27 meeting with the commander of the US Fleet, Admiral Ernest King, he proposed the bold step


of stripping the Central Pacific and Hawaii of carrier protection and deploying all of the Pacific Fleet’s carriers to the South Pacific to set up a major carrier battle. Nimitz thought that Port Moresby was only the first objective of a much wider Japanese offesnive in the South Pacific. This course of action was approved, but the second pair of carriers did not manage to reach the scene of the Coral Sea battle until mid-May (after the battle). While Yamamoto let his striking power be dissipated all over the Pacific, Nimitz was prepared to mass his available resources. Despite the late arrival of the carriers Enterprise and Hornet, the two carriers already in the Coral Sea inflicted a sharp defeat on the Japanese. Midway was Nimitz’s greatest victory. It was his battle from the very start. He convinced King that Midway was the target of the pending Japanese offensive and then committed every available ship and aircraft to his plan. Throughout the battle, Nimitz retained “grand tactical control” from Hawaii. Despite myth, Nimitz’s decision to engage the might of Yamamoto’s Combined Fleet at Midway was not a desperate gamble against impossible odds, but a carefully calculated plan with the potential to cause great damage to the Japanese forces. Nimitz did have a high degree of insight into Japanese intentions and strength, again through the efforts of his cryptographers, but this insight was not as complete as is commonly believed. Nevertheless, Nimitz seized the opportunity to conduct a major fleet action against Yamamoto’s forces even though he was facing a force much larger than his own. Nimitz knew that the attack on Midway would fall during the first week of June. To prepare, he dispatched all three available carriers, including the Yorktown which had been hastily repaired after Coral Sea, and packed Midway with fighters, bombers and patrol aircraft. His total air strength outnumbered Yamamoto’s carrier force 348 aircraft to 248. Despite continuous suggestions by King to employ the Pacific Fleet’s battleships aggressively, Nimitz decided that the slow battleships had no place in his battle plan and he kept them out of harm’s way on the West Coast. In contrast, the supposedly air-minded Yamamoto gave the Combined Fleet’s battleships a central role in the upcoming operation. Most importantly, Nimitz knew that his most important assets were his remaining carriers. He informed Fletcher and Rear Admiral Raymond Spruance, his on-scene commanders, not to risk their carriers, and to let the Japanese attempt a landing on Midway if necessary. Although he was willing to place his precious remaining carriers in a position where they could do the most damage to the unsuspecting Japanese, he was not prepared to risk them recklessly. In short, Nimitz sized up the situation at Midway with greater accuracy and insight than Yamamoto. It is true that Nimitz was the recipient of superior intelligence, but he used it to the best advantage. In contrast, Yamamoto possessed almost no credible intelligence and filled in the gaps with a series of incorrect assumptions. Whereas Nimitz was prepared to fight a modern battle based on aircraft and fast-moving carrier forces, Yamamoto 53 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com

desired a re-creation of the IJN’s intricate pre-war decisive battle plans in which carriers were a supporting arm. Nimitz was a modern admiral. He did not feel the need to exercise command from sea, but kept his flag ashore where he had better communications and could coordinate his forces more effectively. Yamamoto did not shift his flag ashore, but took the traditional route of making a battleship his flagship. After Midway, Nimitz was quicker to seize the initiative. Under the prodding of King, he assembled a large invasion force to seize Guadalcanal and Tulagi, effectively blocking any further Japanese move into the South Pacific thus mounting the first step of King’s plan to re-capture Rabaul. The battle for Guadalcanal amounted to a battle for the island’s airfield and Yamamoto was continually one step behind. Nimitz successfully fed in enough air, naval, and ground forces to keep the airfield operational. Possession of the airfield meant control of the surrounding seas during daylight, which was required for the garrison to be supported adequately. Yamamoto eventually realized this, but even when he did, he never committed forces to ensure the airfield could be neutralized for a sustained period. When required, Nimitz could be ruthless with his subordinates. The commander of the forces on Guadalcanal was Ghormley, who ran the campaign from his headquarters at Noumea and was a source of pessimism and indecision. In late September, Nimitz visited Ghormley and then flew in to Guadalcanal to visit the Marines. The contrast between Ghormley and the determined Marines on the island was a stark one. Nimitz determined that Ghormley must go. In his place, he appointed Vice Admiral William Halsey on October 18. It was an inspired choice. Halsey’s arrival had an electric impact on American morale. He was determined to support the Marines with whatever he had. If anything, Halsey was too aggressive, but this was the perfect time for an abundance of aggression. Unlike Yamamoto, who carefully held much of the Combined Fleet in reserve, Nimitz sent everything he could to the South Pacific, where Halsey employed it without reserve. Halsey’s dedication to the Marines was undoubted, as was his ability to make courageous decisions. At the battle of Santa Cruz he sent his two carriers against Yamamoto’s four, with the ultimate result of turning the Japanese back. By the time the campaign entered its decisive phase in November, Halsey was down to a single carrier (the damaged Enterprise), two battleships, four heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, and 22 destroyers. He knew the battle would be decided in the next couple of weeks when the Japanese mounted another large convoy operation to reinforce their garrison on the island. Though seriously outgunned by Yamamoto, Halsey did not shrink from committing everything he had. When Yamamoto sent a battleship force to knock out the airfield, Halsey sent cruisers against it. The resulting American losses were heavy, but the airfield was saved from destruction. Halsey was at his best when he decided to commit his two battleships on the night of November 14–15 to save the airfield from a renewed bombardment attempt. This was the decisive moment of the entire campaign. The risky decision to 54 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com

commit battleships at night, in restricted waters, ended in victory, and again the airfield was saved from a devastating bombardment. In contrast, despite his promise that he would personally lead Yamato to Guadalcanal if required, Yamamoto never risked his most modern battleships in the waters around the island. When Yamamoto sent the large convoy to Guadalcanal in November, Halsey skillfully destroyed it using a combination of aircraft from the damaged Enterprise, which was operating just out of Japanese attack range, and aircraft based at Guadalcanal airfield. Halsey’s understanding that the airfield was the key to victory paid off handsomely. Nimitz never backed away from taking calculated risks. When his cryptographers handed him Yamamoto’s inspection schedule in April 1943, he did not hesitate to order Halsey to “Get Yamamoto.”

WHEN WAR IS DONE After the conclusion of the I-Go-Sakusen operation, Yamamoto announced his desire to tour the bases closer to the front in order to lift the spirits of the men stationed there. Several staff officers attempted to dissuade him from his trip, but he would not listen. On April 13, the 11th Air Fleet sent a message about the intended visit to some smaller bases in the northern Solomons. The message gave Yamamoto’s exact itinerary for a one-day trip on April 18: from Rabaul to Ballale Air Base by 0800hrs, then by subchaser to Shortland Island Naval Base, returning to Ballale by 1030hrs. From Ballale, Yamamoto was then scheduled to depart at 1100hrs in an aircraft to Buin Air Base. If all went according to schedule, and Yamamoto was known for being punctual, he would be back in Rabaul by 1540hrs. The same American insight into Japanese naval codes which had bedeviled Yamamoto throughout the war would lead directly to his death. The message containing his itinerary was intercepted and decoded by American cryptographers. With the Admiral’s exact schedule in their hands, the Americans had a chance to attempt to kill him. Such was Yamamoto’s reputation that even though such a focused attack could reveal the vulnerability of Japanese codes, it was decided to attempt Operation Vengeance. Nimitz ordered Halsey to conduct the operation. In turn, Halsey gave responsibility for the mission to Rear Admiral Marc Mitscher, Commander

Yamamoto’s death occurred in this type of aircraft, the G4M “Betty”. In 1943, this was the mainstay IJN land-based, long-range bomber capable of carrying bombs or torpedoes. Its lack of protection and self-sealing fuel tanks meant that many were lost during the Guadalcanal campaign. (Lansdale Research Associates)


Yamamoto’s seat from his crashed aircraft. The hole in the back of the seat matched Yamamoto’s fatal wound. It is now on display in Japan. (George Chandler/Second Yamamoto Mission Associates via Lansdale Research Associates)

Air, Solomons. Flying from the base on Guadalcanal, the only American fighters with the range to execute the mission were the Army Air Force P-38 Lightnings. Even then, special large, long-range belly tanks were required. Eighteen pilots from the two P-38 fighter groups based on Guadalcanal were selected for the mission. Fourteen of them would remain at 18,000–20,000ft to provide cover against the heavy Japanese fighter defenses expected from the nearby bases and the best four pilots were formed into a special flight to attack Yamamoto’s aircraft before it could land. The attack was scheduled for the morning of April 18 as Yamamoto was on the first leg of his inspection trip. The mission leader was Major John Mitchell, commander of the 339th Fighter Squadron. He decided on the details for the attack, planned the route, and, most impressively, performed flawless dead-reckoning navigation over some 600 miles of ocean flying at 50 feet or lower. After taking off at 0720hrs, the interception was planned for 0930hrs, 40 miles from Ballale Island. If all went well, the intercept would occur over Bougainville Island just as Yamamoto’s aircraft began its approach to Ballale. The longest aerial interception mission of World War II began as planned on the morning of April 18. However, one aircraft blew a tire while taxiing and another had fuel tank problems. Both were forced to abort, and both were from the flight allocated to attack Yamamoto’s aircraft. Two airborne spare aircraft were ordered to take their places. As the American P-38s approached Bougainville, the Japanese formation was spotted almost exactly

The death of Yamamoto Admiral Yamamoto was killed only 16 months into the war. Despite warnings, he insisted on conducting an inspection visit of forward Japanese positions in the northern Solomon Islands. Details of the trip were known to the Americans and since the route was within range of P-38s from Guadalcanal, an interception operation was planned. This scene shows the moment when the American aircraft spotted Yamamoto’s G4M1 Type 1 “Betty” (1) bomber on the morning of April 18. The bomber is from 705 Kokutai and bears minimal unit markings. Being a new aircraft, its green camouflage is minimally worn. Behind the Betty is a P-38G fighter from the 339th Fighter Squadron piloted by Lieutenant Rex Barber (2). The Betty is trying to evade Barber by skimming over the surface of the Bougainville jungle. Barber had little difficulty shooting down the Betty owing to its lack of armor and unprotected fuel tanks. The crash killed all onboard, including Yamamoto. The next day, his body was recovered from the jungle and his cremated remains were eventually returned to Japan. 56 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com

1 2


After the crash, the Japanese garrison on Bougainville created a shrine at the crash location. The tail of Betty bomber “323” can be seen in the background. The shrine remains in the same location today. (George Chandler/Second Yamamoto Mission Associates via Lansdale Research Associates)

as expected. However, instead of the one G4M “Betty” bomber carrying Yamamoto, there were two. Six A6M “Zero” fighters were providing escort. Immediately, the attack flight of four aircraft zoomed towards the bombers flying at 4,500ft. At that moment, one of the P-38s in the attack group could not drop his belly tanks. This pilot and his wingman were forced to abort the attack leaving only two P-38s to attack the two bombers. The bomber carrying Yamamoto spotted the approaching P-38s and dived for the deck, skimming over the treetops of the jungle of Bougainville. The six escorting Zeros also dived from altitude to intercept the Americans. The P-38 piloted by First Lieutenant Rex Barber made the first attack after banking hard to the right and firing on the lead Betty from the rear. The bomber began to belch smoke and headed south losing speed. It crashed near the village of Aku on Bougainville. The second bomber was attacked by Captain Thomas Lanphier and the pilots of the two aircraft with earlier fuel problems. This bomber was observed to crash in the water near Moila Point in the passage between Bougainville and Shortland Island. The first bomber was the one carrying Yamamoto. He had been seated on the starboard side of the aircraft, behind the plane commander. The official autopsy indicated that Yamamoto had been struck by two bullets, one in the jaw which exited near his right temple and one in the shoulder. These killed Yamamoto before the aircraft crashed. It took the Japanese until late the next day to reach the wreck of Yamamoto’s aircraft. The bomber had broken in two on impact with the tail left largely intact but the forward section crushed and burned. Among the bodies thrown from the wreckage was that of Yamamoto, who was found to the left of the fuselage still strapped to his seat. The site of the wreckage was made into a shrine by the Japanese during the war and remains on Bougainville to this day. On April 20, the bodies were taken to Buin for autopsy and cremation. From there, the ashes were taken to Rabaul on April 22. On April 23, a flying boat took the ashes back to Truk where Yamamoto’s flagship, the Musashi, was still anchored. Yamamoto’s remains were secretly moved into his sea cabin. The Musashi departed Truk on May 17 and arrived in Japan on May 21. Not until then was word of Yamamoto’s death released to the nation. On June 5, a state funeral was held for Yamamoto in Tokyo. The Japanese estimated that one million people lined the route in Tokyo as the ashes passed by. One urn of ashes was buried alongside Admiral Togo, the IJN’s first great hero and victor of the battle of Tsushima in 1905. The other half of the ashes was returned to Yamamoto’s home, Nagaoka, on June 7. They


were buried on the grounds of a small Buddhist temple next to the grave of his adoptive father. The grave was marked with a simple headstone. The death of Yamamoto was certainly a shock to the Navy and the nation. It may have shaken military and civilian morale, but it had no great long-term effect on Japan’s struggle for survival. Yamamoto’s successor was the hand-picked Admiral Mineichi Koga. He led the Combined Fleet without real success until he died in a plane crash off the Philippines in March 1944. After Yamamoto’s death, the IJN did not enjoy another important victory. Yamamoto’s prediction about the fate of Japan in a prolonged war with the United States was fully realized, and there was nothing that Yamamoto or any other Japanese admiral could have done about it.

INSIDE THE MIND Yamamoto had several significant strengths. He undoubtedly possessed great intelligence. His biography written by the US Office of Naval Intelligence called him “exceptionally able, forceful, and a man of quick thinking.” Yamamoto was recognized by his contemporaries as possessing a razor-sharp mind. He was a man of moral courage who never compromised his professional principles. Above all, Yamamoto’s rarest attribute was his capacity for making bold and imaginative decisions. This was a very rare characteristic in a member of the IJN’s officer corps and Yamamoto occasionally took it to extremes. His stark individuality was so rare that a former colleague called it a “product of mutation.” He was a man who hated pomposity. By many accounts, he was prone to bouts of sentimentality. Reportedly, he wept on several occasions when informed of the deaths of subordinates. He could also be hard, as shown by his reaction to a spate of training deaths during his time as commander of Carrier Division 1. In response to the deaths, he gave the statement: “Our fleet suffers in comparison with the air strength of other navies. Time is short for Japan to catch up. We must accept the cost of intensive training. I regard death in training as a hero’s death.” By almost all accounts, Yamamoto was a charismatic man. He had the ability to reach all ranks under his command. In the words of one of his Combined Fleet staff officers, “His concern for subordinates struck the heart of every sailor, and each was ready to die for him. His leadership pervaded the lowest reach of the Navy and inspired every man. There was never any wavering in his command.” Yamamoto could also be insightful and was, on occasion, remarkably far-sighted. This is shown by his 1936 quote about the nature of naval

The wreckage of Yamamoto’s plane pictured in 1988. Most of the bomber remains in place, but one of the wings has been moved to Japan for display. Souvenir hunters have removed the number “323” from the vertical stabilizer. (Dr. Charles Darby via Lansdale Research Associates)


Another view of the wreckage of Yamamoto’s aircraft in the jungles of Bougainville taken in 1988. After the attack, a controversy developed between the two lead pilots as to who attacked the bombers since both claimed to have shot down Yamamoto’s aircraft. When the aircraft was inspected, the only evidence of damage was from the rear, supporting Barber’s claim that he was the pilot who shot down Yamamoto. (Dr. Charles Darby via Lansdale Research Associates)

warfare in the Pacific: “As I see it, naval operations in the future will consist of capturing an island, then building an airfield in as short a time as possible – within a week or so – moving up air units, and then using them to gain air and surface control over the next stretch of ocean.” His views on the wartime utility of the IJN’s battleships were also summed up accurately with this pre-war comment: “They are like elaborate religious scrolls which old people hang in their homes – a matter of faith, not reality.” His views about the United States were well known, and his opposition to a war with the Americans has been well documented. Both of these can be summed up in this September 29, 1941 statement to Nagano: It is obvious that a Japanese-American war will become a protracted one. As long as tides of war are in our favor, the United States will never stop fighting. As a consequence, the war will continue for several years, during which material will be exhausted, vessels and arms will be damaged, and they can be replaced only with great difficulties. Ultimately we will not be able to contend with [the United States]. As a result of war, the people’s livelihood will become indigent … and it is not hard to imagine [that] the situation will become out of control. We must not start a war with so little chance of success.

While Yamamoto appears to have been one of the few senior Japanese leaders who understood the almost certain final result of a war with the United States, he failed to predict how that war would play out. Despite his advocacy of air power, his handling of the Kido Butai suggests that he saw aircraft as only a raiding force and still adhered to the traditional view of the battleship as the decisive weapon. He clearly failed to foresee the nature of the American threat to Japanese wartime commerce and took no steps before the war to prepare for its defense despite having seen the impact of German submarines on British shipping during the first part of the war. Likewise, he failed to consider that Japanese submarines could have had a similar effect on American supply lines. Despite being the executive officer of an aviation training command earlier in his career, he made no pre-war preparations for expanding naval aviation training to handle the protracted war he feared. If, as quoted above, he saw the building of airfields as a critical wartime function, why did he make no effort to create units that could execute this task? (The lack of a rapid runway construction capability was a key factor in Japan’s loss of the Guadalcanal campaign.) While gifted in many ways, Yamamoto was no military genius. His confused thinking leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack meant that, despite a wealth of experience in the United States, he badly miscalculated the


American national character and selected the course of action most likely to undermine his goal of a negotiated peace with the Americans. Yamamoto’s entire Pearl Harbor experience can be described as an unhealthy fixation. His leadership after Pearl Harbor was increasingly erratic and became marked with an autocratic streak. He handled operations during the Second Operational Phase with both confusion and overconfidence. During the debate leading up to the Midway operation, his imperial style of leadership meant that he did not argue his plan on its merits, but simply used the threat of resignation to get his own way. This was Yamamoto the gambler on display, but without the foundation of sound operational planning, which was a recipe for disaster. During the Guadalcanal campaign, Yamamoto seemed stunned after the defeat at Midway and the unexpected American challenge. He was never able to fully identify the fact that this was the decisive battle he was seeking. He instead used piecemeal tactics that ensured that the campaign became an unwanted battle of attrition. This is when Yamamoto the gambler was needed to force a decision, but he seemed unable to muster his old spirit. Yamamoto’s personal life was marked with a predilection for gambling. This trait carried over into his professional life. He was a sophisticated man, by Japanese standards, with a zest for life. However, along with his desirable personal traits, such as his lack of pomposity, he had a selfish side which was demonstrated by the fact that he was a womanizer who largely ignored his family. He was clearly no saint in his personal life despite efforts by his supporters to whitewash this side of him after his death. For all his gifts, Yamamoto could not rise above the system that created him. A truly great leader could have taken control of the situation he was faced with, but Yamamoto never seemed able to do this. He could never overcome the IJN’s flawed command processes. In the IJN, staffs wielded much authority – much more than in Western navies. While the commander retained responsibility, the authority for devising plans and conducting operations were handed to his staff. More often than not, important decisions were made by relatively junior officers of commander and lieutenant commander rank. Yamamoto accepted this system and was content to leave the details to his staff while providing only general oversight. The staff planning process was built on a series of unchallenged assumptions that were invariably incorrect since they were seldom based on solid intelligence and almost never took into account any unexpected enemy actions. When these assumptions were proven incorrect during combat, the response of the Combined Fleet’s staff was most often disorganized and ill-considered. This combination translated into defeat on several occasions. Despite its obvious weaknesses, Yamamoto did not rise above the system. A truly great admiral would have recognized the flaws in the system and still found a way to work successfully within it; Yamamoto never tried.

Once Yamamoto’s death was announced to the nation, he was given a state funeral. The lead participant was Combined Fleet staff officer Commander Watanabe Yasuji who is bearing the sword indicating Yamamoto’s posthumous rank of fleet admiral. (Courtesy of Michael A. Oren)


A LIFE IN WORDS Yamamoto is considered a national hero in Japan. Along with Admiral Heihachiro Togo, he is the IJN’s most exalted figure. This is evident from display in a special room in the museum at Eta Jima and by the prominent coverage given to Yamamoto at the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo. The literature on Yamamoto largely reflects his status as a hero. While there have been many Japanese biographies of Yamamoto, almost none (with the exception of one mentioned below) take a critical view of him as an individual, or as a war leader. Even the Japanese official histories of the war are unwilling to place blame for Japanese defeats on Yamamoto. The lack of material in English on Yamamoto makes the job of a Western historian very difficult when trying to gain insights into the man. The only in-depth Japanese work about Yamamoto that has been translated into English is a best-selling biography published in Japan by the prominent writer Agawa Hiroyuki. This did take a critical view of Japan’s cherished naval hero. While other biographies published in Japan are much more flattering and in keeping with Yamamoto’s status as a national hero, the Agawa biography includes references to Yamamoto’s extramarital activities and gives details of his affairs with several geishas. However, the account is frustratingly incomplete, especially with regards to Yamamoto’s role as a war leader. There have been few books on Yamamoto by Western historians. The first was Yamamoto: The Man Who Menaced America by John Deane Potter. Published in 1965, it makes no use of Japanese sources and is riddled with factual inaccuracies. It retains no value for the modern scholar. The prolific Edwin P. Hoyt published an account in 1990 titled Yamamoto: The Man Who Planned the Attack on Pearl Harbor. The book does make use of Japanese sources, but appears to rely heavily on Agawa’s account. It fails to examine the larger record of Yamamoto’s command history and its many factual errors mean it must be used with caution. Several essays have been published on Yamamoto in larger surveys of prominent naval leaders. The first was by IJN historian Roger Pineau in 1976. It is still worth consulting, and is the first account to call into question Yamamoto’s reputation as an invincible admiral. The second, by Stephen Howarth, was included in the 1992 book Men of War. It is superficial, contains many factual inaccuracies, and does little more than perpetuate some of the myths surrounding Yamamoto. It makes the unsupported contention that as long as Yamamoto lived, the IJN fought a “clean” war. By far the best essay on Yamamoto is the 1997 piece by H. P. Willmott. This is a balanced account which brings into question all aspects of the Yamamoto myth. It is essential for understanding the man and his career. Supplementing the works devoted to Yamamoto are books on broader Pacific War topics which use Japanese sources and which attempt to examine Yamamoto’s role in specific actions. Especially noteworthy are Gordon Prange’s seminal At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor, 62 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com

the 2005 work by Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully on the battle of Midway titled Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway and the aptly named Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle by Richard B. Frank. It remains true that nothing close to a definitive biography of Yamamoto exists in English. This is a serious shortcoming since few command figures had the impact on the course and outcome of World War II that Yamamoto did.

FURTHER READING The following works are either focused on Yamamoto or contain valuable sections that deal with specific aspects of his career. Books consulted for general background to the Pacific War are not included. Agawa, Hiroyuki, The Reluctant Admiral, Kodansha International, Tokyo (1979) Originally published in Japanese in 1969 under the title Yamamoto Isoroku Asada, Sadao, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland (2006) Evans, David C. and Peattie, Mark R., Kaigun, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland (1997) Frank, Richard B., Guadalcanal, Random House, New York (1990) Howarth, Stephen, “Admiral of the Fleet Isoroku Yamamoto” in Men of War, St. Martin’s Press, New York (1993) Hoyt, Edwin P., Yamamoto, Lyon Press, Guilford, Connecticut (2001) Parshall, Jonathan, and Tully, Anthony, Shattered Sword, Potomac Books, Washington, D.C. (2005) Pineau, Roger, “Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto” in The War Lords, Little Brown and Company, Boston (1976) Potter, John Deane, Yamamoto, Paperback Library Edition, New York (1965) Prange, Gordon W., with Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, At Dawn We Slept, McGraw-Hill, New York (1981) Willmott, H. P. “Isoroku Yamamoto” in The Great Admirals, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland (1997) Wolf, William, 13th Fighter Command in World War II, Schiffer Publishing, Atglen, Pennsylvania (2004) Zimm, Alan, Attack on Pearl Harbor, Casemate Publishers, Havertown, Pennsylvania (2011)


INDEX Akagi, IJN 10, 10, 20, 38, 39 Aleutians (AL) Operation, IJN 35, 39 Arizona, USS 22, 24, 24, 25 Barber, Lt. Rex 56–57, 58 ‘Betty’ G4M bomber (IJN) 12, 55, 56–57, 58, 58, 59 Bismarck Sea, battle of (1943) 50 Bougainville 56, 58, 60 California, USS 22, 25 Ceylon (Sri Lanka) 28 China, war with Japan (1937) 13, 14–15 Coral Sea, battle of (1942) 5, 30–33, 31, 32, 33, 52, 53

London Naval Conferences (1930/34) 10–12 trade embargo and oil supplies 15 Tripartite Pact with Germany 13, 14; war with China (1937) 13, 14–15 Java Sea, battle of (1942) 27 Kaga, IJN 20 Kasumigaura Aviation Corps 9, 9 Kido Butai carrier strike force, IJN 21, 22–25, 27, 28, 30–33, 36–41, 40, 60 King, Admiral Ernest 52, 53, 54 Kinugawa Maru 48–9 Kirishima, IJN 47 Kitakami, IJN 9 Konoe Fumimaro 14

Dutch East Indies 15, 27 Eastern Solomons, battle of (1942) 42, 43 Enterprise, USS 42, 43, 46, 47, 53, 54, 55 Eta Jima Academy, IJN 6–7 First Operational Phase, IJN war strategy 27 Fletcher, Rear Admiral Jack 52, 53 Fukudome Shigeru, Vice Admiral 17, 18 Genda Minoru, Commander 18, 20, 21 Germany, Tripartite Pact with Japan 13, 14 Ghormley, Vice Admiral Robert 52, 54 Gilbert Islands 27, 52 Great Britain 26, 27, 28 London Naval Conferences (1930/34) 10–12 trade embargo of Japan 15 Guadalcanal campaign (1942–43) 6, 54, 55; battleship bombardments of Henderson Field 45–46, 47 First and Second Naval battles 47, 54–55 Henderson Field 45–46, 47, 48, 54 IJA evacuation 48 November convoy 47–48, 48–49 US Marine Corps 41, 42–43, 45 Halsey, Vice Admiral William 54–55 Heihachiro Togo, Admiral 7, 58 Henderson Field, Guadalcanal 45–46, 47, 48, 54 Hermes, HMS 28 Hiei, IJN 45, 47 Hiryu, IJN 20, 38, 38–9 Honolulu, USS 24 Hornet, USS 30, 43, 46, 46, 53 Ide Kenji, Admira l9 I-Go-Sakusen Operation 50, 50, 51, 55 Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) 28, 29 Evacuation of Guadalcanal 48 initial war strategy 27 Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN): 5th Carrier Division 30–32 8th Fleet 41, 42, 46 11th Air Fleet 18 First Air Fleet formation (1941) 5 First Operational Phase 27 General Staff opposition to Pearl Harbor operation 18, 19–20 General Staff relations with Yamamoto, 1942 29–30 initial successes and expansion in the Pacific (1942) 16, 26–9 Russo-Japanese war 7, 28 Second Operational Phase 27, 28, 61 Inoue Shigeyoshi, Vice Admiral 32 Isuzu, IJN 10 Japan: aviation industry 12–13 February 1936 incident 13 Imperial Conference, July, 1941 17 Imperial General Headquarters 26–27 initial successes and expansion in the Pacific (1942) 16, 26–29

Lanphier, Captain Thomas 58 Lexington, USS 32, 33, 52 Lightning P-38G, USAAF 565–8, 56–57 London Naval Conferences (1930/34) 10–12 Manila, surrender of 27 Maryland, USS 24 Midway, battle of (1942) 10, 20, 36–41, 36–37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 52, 53 IJN operational planning 5, 6, 29–30, 33–36, 61 USN Pacific Fleet assumptions 34–35 Midway Atoll 34, 35 Mikawa Gun’ichi, Vice Admiral 41–42, 42, 46 Mikuma, IJN 41 Mineichi Koga, Admiral 59 Mitchell, Major John 56 Mitscher, Rear Admiral Marc 55–56 Mitsubishi Type 96 attack planes, Japanese 12–13 Musashi, IJN 12, 48, 58 Nagano Osami, Admiral 13, 15, 15, 20, 60; 26–7 Nagato, IJN 20, 22, 28 Nagumo Chuichi, Vice Admiral 20, 20, 22, 25, 28, 34, 38–9 Netherlands 26 trade embargo of Japan 15 Nevada, USS 22, 24 Nimitz, Admiral Chester William 51–55, 52 Midway operational planning 53–54 Nisshin, IJN 7 Oklahoma, USS 22, 24, 25 Onishi Takijiro, Rear Admiral 18 Pearl Harbor raid (1941) 5, 6, 15, 22–25, 22, 23, 24, 51, 60–61 impact of 25–26 midget submarine role 20, 21 operational planning 17–22 targeting battleships rather than carriers 21 Pennsylvania, USS 24 Port Arthur, IJN torpedo attack (1904) 7 Port Moresby 30, 32, 33, 50, 53 Prince of Wales, HMS 27 Quincy, USS 41 Rabaul 27, 41, 48, 50, 50, 51, 54, 55, 58 Repulse, HMS 27 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 26, 26, 51 Russo-Japanese war 7, 15, 28, 58 Santa Cruz, battle of (1942) 46, 46, 47, 47, 54 Satsuma Rebellion, Japan (1877) 6 Savo Island, battle of (1942) 41, 41–42 Second Operational Phase, IJN 27, 28, 29; Seiberia Maru 11 Shokaku, IJN 20, 32, 33, 33 Singapore, fall of 27, 28 Soho, IJN 32, 33 Soryu, IJN 20

Soviet Union 13 Spruance, Rear Admiral Raymond 53 Takano Sadayoshi 6 Tanaka Raizo, Rear Admiral 48 Taranto, battle of (1940) 17, 18 Tennessee, USS 24 Tokyo raid (1942) 52 Truk 43–44, 45, 46, 47, 58 Tsushima Strait, battle of (1905) 7, 15, 58 Tulagi 30, 32, 41, 54 USA Australian sea links 29 Chinese sovereignty 14–15 London Naval Conferences (1930/34) 10–12 trade embargo of Japan 15 and the Tripartite Pact 14 USAAF, mission to intercept Yamamoto’s aircraft 55–58, 56–57 USN Pacific Fleet leadership qualities of the high command 51–5 move to Pearl Harbor (1940) 17 Pearl Harbor raid impact 25–26 response to Japan’s Second Operational Phase 29 shipbuilding during the war 51 Wasp, USS 43 Watanabe Yasuji, Commander 61 West Virginia, USS 22, 24, 25 Yamaguchi Tamon, Rear Admiral 39 Yamamoto Isoroku 4, 8, 9, 19 adopts the name Yamamoto 8 Aeronautics Department, IJN 10, 12–13 airpower vs battleship debate 12, 13, 13 Akagi command 10 Aleutians (AL) Operation 35, 39 aviation technology studies 9–10 Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet 13–14, 14 death of 6, 50, 55–59, 56–57, 58, 59, 60 early years 6–7 Eta Jima IJN Academy 6–7 First Air Fleet formation (1941) 5 I-Go-Sakusen operation 50, 50, 51 and the IJA’s overconfidence at Guadalcanal 43, 45 impact of Pearl Harbor raid 25–6 inside the mind of 59–61 Isuzu command 10 Kasumigaura Aviation 9, 9 London Naval Conferences (1930/34) 10–12, 11 Midway (MI) operational planning 5, 6, 29–30, 33–36, 61 military life (1908–40) 8–14 naval attaché appointment, US (1926–28) 10 Naval General Staff opposition to Pearl Harbor operation 19–20 Naval General Staff, relations with, 1942 29–30 Navy Staff College 8, 9 Pearl Harbor operational planning 17–22 reputation 5–6 resignation threats 20, 30, 61 state funeral 58, 61 at Truck 43–44, 46 US posting, 1919 8–9 Vice Navy Minister appointment 13 view on protracted war with the US 28, 60, 61 Yamato, IJN 12, 28, 34, 41, 43, 48, 55 Yonai Mitsumasa, Admiral 13, 14 Yorktown, USS 32–33, 38–39, 39, 52, 53 Zero A6M fighters 48, 50, 58 Zuikaku, IJN 20, 32, 33


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Yamamoto Isoroku

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Cat Yamamoto. Кот [U]

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