Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria

WORD AND MEANING IN ANCIENT ALEXANDRIA During the late Hellenistic and early Imperial periods (B.C. 50 – A.D. 300), imp...

Author: David Robertson

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WORD AND MEANING IN ANCIENT ALEXANDRIA During the late Hellenistic and early Imperial periods (B.C. 50 – A.D. 300), important developments may be traced in the philosophy of language and its relationship to mind. This book examines theories of language in the work of theologians and philosophers linked to Ancient Alexandria. The growth of Judaism and Christianity in cultural centers of the Roman Empire, above all Alexandria, provides valuable testimony to the philosophical vitality of this period. The study of Later Greek philosophy should be more closely integrated with the Church Fathers, particularly in the theologically sensitive issue of the nature of language. Robertson traces some related attempts to reconcile immaterial, intelligible reality and the intelligibility of language, explain the structure of language, and clarify the nature of meaning. These shared problems are handled with greater philosophical sophistication by Plotinus, although the comparison with Philo, Clement, and Origen illustrates significant similarities as well as differences between Neoplatonism and early Jewish and Christian philosophy.

This book is dedicated to Josie Robertson

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria Theories of Language from Philo to Plotinus

DAVID ROBERTSON

© David Robertson 2008 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. David Robertson has asserted his moral right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the author of this work. Published by Ashgate Publishing Limited Gower House Croft Road Aldershot Hampshire GU11 3HR England

Ashgate Publishing Company Suite 420 101 Cherry Street Burlington, VT 05401-4405 USA

Ashgate website: http://www.ashgate.com British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Robertson, David, 1967– Word and meaning in ancient Alexandria : theories of language from Philo to Plotinus 1. Plotinus 2. Origen 3. Philo, of Alexandria 4. Language and languages – Philosophy 5. Alexandrian school I. Title 401 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Robertson, David, 1967– Word and meaning in ancient Alexandria : theories of language from Philo to Plotinus / David Robertson. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7546-0696-3 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Language and languages–Religious aspects–Christianity. 2. Language and languages– Philosophy. 3. Christian literature, Early. I. Title. BR115.L25R58 2007 401–dc22 2007028310 ISBN 978 0 7546 0696 3 Printed and bound in Great Britain by MPG Books Ltd. Bodmin, Cornwall.

Contents Preface Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations

vii ix xi

Introduction

1

1

Philo

9

2

Clement

29

3

Origen

45

4

Plotinus

63

Conclusion Bibliography Index Locorum Index of Names and Subjects

97 99 109 112

This page intentionally left blank

Preface This book took shape like a great many human lives. It was conceived at leisure, birthed in uncertainty, matured in confused alternations of pleasure and pain, and completed in difficult circumstances. I can point to a chance meeting in April 2000 with Sarah Lloyd from Ashgate, at the British Society for the History of Philosophy Conference ‘Athens and Jerusalem’, University of Keele. The shape of this project emerged from my five years of research in London, although I left England with ambitions to write something far more centered in ancient linguistics than the book in your hands. It is meant to provide the sort of contribution in Later Hellenistic and Early Imperial philosophy that I would have liked to read at the dissertation stage. I owe uncountable debts to Mary Margaret McCabe, Verity Harte, Raphael Woolf, Josef Lössl, Paul Helm, Bob Sharples, David Sedley, Martin Stone, and John Lee, among many others, who all provided indispensable assistance during and after my stay in London. At Felician College, David Rice and Gerry O’Sullivan were enthusiastically supportive of this project. As noted above, the Ashgate managers, editors, and administrators deserve the greatest credit for their patience over several years, particularly Sarah Lloyd, Anne Keirby, Paul Coulam, Rachel Lynch and Emily Ruskell. And I offer warmest thanks to Richard Sorabji, my doctoral thesis supervisor at King’s College London, who spotted me working in a thicket of books one fateful day in the Institute of Classical Studies, cozily nestled in its old Gordon Square lodgings. It was a divine appointment. Richard Sorabji enlisted me in a series of research project tasks connected with the massive Ancient Commentators Project, including serving for several years as postgraduate assistant in preparation of the Sourcebook in the Philosophy of the Ancient Commentators 200–600 AD (3 vols, London, 2004). After my repatriation in America, Prof. Sorabji generously met with me in New York and Austin. Without his advice, encouragement, references, hospitality, anecdotes, and moral exhortation, this sort of research would be simply inconceivable. Any shortcomings noted by the attentive reader may be charged solely to my willful refusal to listen to his counsel. Finally, I express my gratitude to my parents, who were unwittingly granted a perpetual work in progress for an eldest son, and my wife and two daughters, who will greet the publication of this monograph with a sense of wonder vastly incommensurate to its merits. Now I must say a word about the title. I mean to pay my respects to Quine’s

Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria

viii

tough and witty classic of analytic philosophy, Word and Object.1 It was the first truly important work of contemporary philosophy I read, devoured (and re-devoured) in countless railway platforms, subway trains, and chilly bus stops in North London. Well, it was contemporary—to compare great things with small, I am comforted by the possibility that a deeply flawed book could sustain its interest. Finally, I would like to comment on my system of references to ancient texts. I have adopted the most common scholarly conventions for the references to ancient texts whenever possible, usually including the name of the editor or editors in the reference. At times, as in the case of passages from Clement and Origen, I have also included information following the name of the editor or editors, which presents the pages and lines of the cited Greek or Latin text. Thus for Clement and Origen, the page numbers are presented towards the end of the reference, followed by the line numbers. (In cases of multiple pages in the reference, I adopt a format of page number, line number–page number, line number.) I trust that the reader will interpret this scholarly notation with no difficulty.

1

W.V.O. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, MA, 1960).

Acknowledgements I acknowledge the permission of University of Pennsylvania Press, for allowing me to reproduce the copyrighted material from my published article, ‘Mind and Language in Philo’, Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 67, iss. 3 (July 2006) in the body of Chapter 1. Credit for translations pressed into service from published sources is noted upon the first appearance of the source in each chapter. Otherwise, the translated texts are my own. In no instance have I used previously published translations from my own hand, with the exception of the Philo texts.


List of Abbreviations Ancient Texts Abr.

De Abrahamo

Abst.

De abstinentia

Agr.

De agricultura

An. Post.

Posterior Analytics

An. Proc. Tim.

De animae procreatione in Timaeo

Cat.

Categoriae

Cels.

Contra Celsum

Col.

Colossians

Congr.

De congressu eruditionis gratia

1 Cor.

1 Corinthians

D.L.

Diogenes Laertius

Decal.

De decalogo

Det.

Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat

Did.

Didaskalikos

Diss.

Dissertationes

Div.

De divinatione

Enn.

Enneads

Ep.

Epistula

Fr.

Fragmenta

Fug.

De fuga et inventione

Gen.

Genesis

Gig.

De gigantibus

Gramm.

Grammatica

Her.

Quis rerum divinarum heres sit

xii

List of Abbreviations

Immut.

Quod deus sit immutabilis

In Joh.

In Johannem

Int.

De interpretatione

Jn.

John

Leg. All.

Legum allegoriae

Lk.

Luke

Marc. Aur.

Marcus Aurelius

Math.

Adversus mathematicos

Migr.

De migratione Abrahami

Mos.

De vita Moysis

Mt.

Matthew

Mut.

De mutatione nominum

Nat. Hom.

De natura hominis

Opif.

De opificio mundi

Paed.

Paedagogus

Phd.

Phaedo

Phaedr.

Phaedrus

Phil.

Philebus

Philoc.

Philocalia

Plac.

De placitis reliquiae

Plac. Hipp. Plat.

De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis

Plant.

De plantatione

Post.

De posteritate Caini

Princ.

De principiis

Prov.

De providentia

Ps.

Psalm

Quaest. Ex.

Quaestiones et solutiones in Exodum

Quaest. Gen.

Quaestiones et solutiones in Genesim

Rep.

Republic


Sacr.

De sacrificiis Abelis et Caini

Sch. in Dionys. Thr.

Scholia in Dionysium Thracem

Sext. Emp.

Sextus Empiricus

Somn.

De somniis

Somn. Scip.

In somnium Scipionis

Soph.

Sophist

Spec. Leg.

De specialibus legibus

Strom.

Stromata

Theaet.

Theaetetus

Tim.

Timaeus

Tusc.

Tusculan Disputations

Vit. Plot.

Vita Plotini

xiii

Reference Works, Standard Works, Collections, and Series ANRW

Aufsteig und Niedergang der römischen Welt

EK

Posidonius. Fragments and Commentary, L. Edelstein and I.G. Kidd (eds) (3 vols, Cambridge, 1989).

FDS

Die Fragmente zur Dialektik der Stoiker, K. Hülser (ed.) (Stuttgart, 1987–8)

GCS

Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte

LP

Lexicon Plotinianum, J.H. Sleeman and G. Pollet (eds) (Leuven, 1980).

LS

The Hellenistic Philosophers, A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley (eds) (Cambridge, 1987)

PGL

Patristic Greek Lexicon, G.W.H. Lampe (ed.) (Oxford, 1961)

RAC

Realexikon für Antike und Christentum

RSV

Revised Standard Version, H.G. May and B.M. Metzger (eds) (Oxford, 1962).

SVF

Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta


Introduction In the past century of research of the history of philosophy, a great many reclamation projects have been carried out in intellectual terrain previously submerged in obscurity. Later Greek philosophy, once the province of pioneers and specialists, holds no philosophical Atlantis for the ambitious young scholar. It is increasingly crowded with impressive work, and this study is informed by quite a number of precedents. Origins of Research I hoped at the dissertation stage to forge a major new approach to the study of ancient linguistics, namely through a more thoroughgoing study of Greek Patristic writers in coordination with other materials, but scholars such as Ineke Sluiter and Bernhard Neuschäfer had eloquently made the case, while developing some interesting lines of inquiry.1 They have shown that there is the greatest opportunity for further studies of this kind—the general principle that the study of ancient philosophy should be more closely integrated with the Church Fathers. I have opted to investigate theory of mind and language in the less traveled period of roughly the first century B.C. to the third century A.D., in the hope of filling a significant gap. I try to show some related attempts to cope with the philosophical difficulties of reconciling physical and intelligible reality, explaining the structure of language, and clarifying the nature of meaning. The main problem seems to be explaining how the intelligibility of language is related to the intelligibility of divine or immaterial reality. It seemed natural to narrow my focus to four philosophers and theologians who are often placed together, starting with Philo and making an end with Plotinus. It may appear that I am tacking Plotinus, who is only associated with Alexandria at one stage in his life, onto a book that rightly belongs to the study of philosophy in Christian Antiquity. However, my intention is 1 Bernhard Neuschäfer, Origenes als Philologe (2 vols, Basel, 1987); Ineke Sluiter, Ancient Grammar in Context. Contributions to the Study of Ancient Linguistic Thought (Amsterdam, 1990). My early research was inspired by this trend. For example, see David G. Robertson, ‘Grammar, Logic, and Philosophy of Language: The Stoic Legacy in Fourth-Century Patristics’, PhD Thesis, Department of Philosophy, King’s College London, 2000; ‘Basil of Caesarea on the Meaning of Prepositions and Conjunctions’, Classical Quarterly, 53 (2003): 167–74.

2


to draw in an utterly evenhanded way from the treasures of Late Antiquity, pagan and Christian. A more comprehensive book, stretching beyond connections to Alexandria, would work in far more of the later Stoic, Platonist, and Peripatetic traditions, including Posidonius, Panaetius, Hierocles, Cornutus, Chaeremon, Antiochus of Ascalon, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Porphyry, Plutarch, Numenius, among others. Alternatively, several other figures, such as the fifth-century Neoplatonist Hierocles of Alexandria, could have been easily adapted into the overall scheme, within the intellectual context of Ancient Alexandria. Hopefully, further studies will bring to light the philosophical riches of this period in theories of language, including far greater consideration of the architectural, literary, religious, social, and historical dimensions of these issues.2 The Stoic Legacy The most persistent theme here in relating developments in Jewish and Christian philosophy of language with the philosophical schools is developed with an eye to the Stoics, particularly the later Stoics. As with most of the themes running through this book, this theme is inaugurated in Philo. The relevance of the Stoic legacy to the major intellectual developments in Late Antiquity is quite complicated, it can be discussed from various angles. In the early stages of formulating this project, I hoped to build a foundation in the philosophical achievements of the later Stoics Posidonius and Panaetius. These studies did not, I confess, prove promising enough to work directly into the research on Philo and friends. At the time, I felt that I would gain an improved perspective with some work in Stoic metaphysics before I began the book chapters in earnest, and this eventually was channelled into research in Hellenistic philosophy of mathematics.3 But this is not a book that could be titled, Stoicism in Plotinus and the Church Fathers. It may surprise some readers that Stoicism is usually the dominant philosophical reference point in a book that ends with Plotinus.4 Actually, 2 For example, I would mention in this connection the interesting recent work on allegory by Robert Lamberton, Homer the Theologian (Berkeley, 1986); David Dawson, Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revision in Ancient Alexandria (Berkeley, 1992). 3 David G. Robertson, ‘Chrysippus on Mathematical Objects’, Ancient Philosophy, 24 (2004): 169–91. 4 As one might expect, the Stoic contribution to Plotinus is extensive. One helpful resource is the survey of Andreas Graeser, Plotinus and the Stoics (Leiden, 1972).

Introduction

3

the importance of the Stoic legacy to Greek Patristics is extensive and relatively unexplored. For my part, I have examined possible Stoic contributions in logic, rhetoric, and grammar. It should be a commonplace of Patristic scholarship that a dominant tributary of classical culture is the study of rhetoric. There is much promise in further studies of rhetoric in the Church Fathers, while the volume of recent work in later Greek rhetoric has never received the attention it deserves. Among the Stoics, we discern strong interest in grammar and rhetoric, continuing at least up to the time of Posidonius.5 However, there is some disappointment in this quarter, in that Stoic rhetorical theory seems to have attracted precious little following from the Hellenistic period onwards.6 Other strands of ancient rhetoric are more relevant. The story is quite otherwise with respect to Stoic physics, theology, theory of mind, and even linguistics. This is required reading for the student of Patristic thought and I have happily selected several points of contact to pursue in the chapters on Jewish and Christian philosophy. The Transmission of Philosophy and Philology I will continue framing the Stoic legacy with a closer look at some developments in Stoic influence. It is easy to disregard the role in the Hellenistic and Imperial age of various kinds of resources which served philosophy in a book deprived age, for better or for worse. I mean the prevalent influence of textbooks, handbooks, compendia, and doxographical works, which encapsulate the sacred remains of hundreds (thousands?) of treatises penned in the development of philosophical schools at least from the time of Plato and Aristotle onwards. This is a major source of philosophical learning for Philo, Clement, and Origen, even in the intellectual setting of Alexandria, a city which boasted the finest library of the Ancient World. I will illustrate this point in what follows, bypassing Plotinus, who, like Porphyry, read a substantial number of philosophy books rather closely for teaching or study purposes.7

5 I refer to the invaluable collection of texts relating to Posidonius by L. Edelstein and I.G. Kidd (eds), Posidonius. Fragments and Commentary (3 vols, Cambridge, 1972–99), EK F192. 6 Catherine Atherton, ‘Hand Over Fist: The Failure of Stoic Rhetoric’, Classical Quarterly, 38 (1988): 392–427. Jonathan Barnes, Logic and the Imperial Stoa (Leiden, 1997), pp. 58–75 provides an overview of rhetorical arguments and the study of enthymemes in the Imperial period. 7 The following material is adapted from Robertson, ‘The Stoic Legacy in Fourth-Century Patristics’, pp. 12–33.

4


The increasing use of such works is a feature of the Hellenistic age. A good example of the codification of philosophical positions and doctrines in the rival Hellenistic schools is the composition of texts capturing Stoic highlights during the course of the third century B.C., a natural step given the massive corpus of writings left from the early Stoics.8 In fact, it has been argued that much of an early compendium of Stoic ethics is preserved for us by later doxographers.9 As for grammar and logic, it is possible that the Stoicinfluenced work preserved under the name of Dionysius Thrax was the first systematic textbook of grammar to be written, an important document for the origins of technical grammar in Antiquity.10 In addition, there is testimony to Imperial use of introductions (ehisagwgaí) and outlines (Hupotup´wseiß) in Stoic logic.11 In grammatical study, important to my understanding of Origen, there are two basic levels of teaching in learned circles. Grammar in some contexts is just the learning of basic literacy, rudimentary skills in reading and writing Greek. But from the Hellenistic age onwards, talk of grammar is usually talk of the much more sophisticated Alexandrian tradition of philology, and an important part of this sort of grammatical study is the technical grammar represented by the famous treatise of Dionysius Thrax. It is this technical sort of grammar which corresponds most closely to the traditional grammar

8 Manfred Fuhrmann, Das systematische Lehrbuch (Göttingen, 1960), p. 154. 9 Fuhrmann, Das systematische Lehrbuch, p. 154 agrees with the suggestion of other scholars that Chrysippus himself had prepared such a work, titled H Upograf`j toü lógou toü [hjqikoü] pròß Qeóporon, whose content is reflected to some degree in Diogenes Laertius 7.85–116 and other doxographical sources. 10 Fuhrmann, Das systematische Lehrbuch, p. 145. There have been serious challenges to the attribution of the técnj attributed to Dionysius Thrax, which is considered in most recent scholarship to have been written toward the end of the second century B.C. However, there is general agreement that at least some initial portion of the treatise was composed by Dionysius, the student of Aristarchus and contemporary as fellow student with the important grammarian Apollodorus of Athens. Richard Janko, ‘Crates of Mallos, Dionysius Thrax and the Tradition of Stoic Grammatical Theory’, in L. Ayres (ed.), The Passionate Intellect. Essays on the Transformation of Classical Traditions Presented to Prof. I.G. Kidd, Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities (New Brunswick and London, 1995), pp. 213–33 at 213–16 gives a brief but useful overview to the complicated questions involved. Recent studies on the work attributed to Dionysius recognize the influence of the Stoics as well as the purposes and methods of Alexandrian philology. 11 Barnes, Logic and the Imperial Stoa, pp. 73–4, n. 200 provides some references. There is additional information on Varro and other sources in Fuhrmann, Das systematische Lehrbuch, pp. 166–8.

Introduction

5

12

known to the history of linguistics. The system of philological instruction familiar to us from the scholiasts to Dionysius Thrax served as the basic outline for studies of literature from the end of the Hellenistic Age until the fourth century A.D., perhaps even later. I will not dwell on the particular features of this traditional system of philological instruction, characterized by the Dionysian scholiasts as ‘ancient’, or on the relative contributions of the supposed ‘Alexandrian’ and ‘Pergamene’ factions to the philological scene. Rather, I will concentrate on philological study in Late Antiquity with reference to Origen. Of course, Origen taught as a grammarian in Alexandria, prior to the ecclesiastical and theological phase of his career. And it is important to keep in mind the elements of his extensive apprenticeship in Imperial school philology. Neuschäfer argues that Origen provides valuable evidence for grammar, rhetoric, and textual criticism in the schools of the Imperial period. Also, he shows abundant testimony in the received corpus of writings from Origen in confirmation of what is independently known regarding philological studies in Alexandria and other centers of learning such as Athens. These conclusions make sense in light of the reports describing Origen’s extensive grammatical and philological training. For Origen was exposed to elementary grammatical studies, basic philological training, advanced philology, rhetoric, dialectic, and certainly the ‘cycle of humanistic learning’ (hegkúklia paideía), the precedent for later encyclopedic efforts up to the present day (think of Wikipedia). This ‘cycle’ was studied, based on the earlier Greek works of the Hellenistic period, in overview of a ‘circle’ of standard disciplines, all written up by a single author. Probably the best known ancient example of this comprehensive educational tool is Varro’s influential Disciplinaram Libri, which contained books devoted to Grammar, Dialectic, Rhetoric, Geometry, Arithmetic, Astronomy, Music, Medecine, and Architecture.13 One of the major themes of Neuschäfer’s work is that in Origen there is abundant evidence of the use of Stoic technical terms and Stoic definitions, as well as evidence of knowledge of Stoic linguistics in an Origen compendium such as the Philokalia. Neuschäfer explains the Stoic inheritance of grammar in Origen from deeply rooted trends in Alexandrian

12 Michael Frede, ‘The Origins of Traditional Grammar’, in R. Butts and J.K.K. Hintikka (eds), Historical and Philosophical Dimensions of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science (Dordrecht, 1997), pp. 51–79 at 52. 13 Fuhrmann, Das systematische Lehrbuch, p. 163; H. Fuchs, ‘Enkyklios Paideia’, RAC, 5 (1962): 365–98.


6 14

grammar. These changes, he thinks, may have been generated or boosted when Chairemon the Stoic, whose work ‘On Comets’ (Perì komjt¨wn) Origen mentions, was appointed head of the Alexandrian grammar school. As several scholars have pointed out, the first-century B.C. Alexandrian grammarian Dionysius Thrax, whose identity has been questioned, shows an openness to currents beyond strictly Alexandrian sources. This is shown by the contributions of Stoic sources (técnj perì fwn¨jß) to his grammar. The surviving grammatical texts seem to confirm the shift in the use of Stoic technical terms, which Neuschäfer considers operative at least a century before Origen’s work.15 In his conclusions, Neuschäfer posits two basic grounds for the strands of Stoic influence in Origen. The first is the exposure, during the Hellenistic period, of the proud tradition of Alexandrian philology to Stoic grammatical theory; it appears that this development was even more advanced in the early third century A.D. than when Dionysius Thrax and Apollonius Dyscolus composed their treatises. This sounds plausible enough, to judge from the surviving material. But Neuschäfer takes the additional step of claiming a special affinity of Origen to Stoic grammar and indeed to Stoic philosophy of language, beyond what was mediated and transmitted by the grammatical tradition in Alexandria.16 Obviously, this second claim is more difficult to support than the argument for Stoic grammar seeping into Alexandrian school philology. Although Neuschäfer is probably correct that it is broad shifts in Alexandrian school philology and not the dissemination of Pergamene Homer exegesis that is most relevant to understanding Stoic material in Origen, the Pergamene school may have still contributed to

14 Neuschäfer, Origenes als Philologe, p. 215. 15 Neuschäfer, Origenes als Philologe, pp. 216–17. ‘Das Eindringen stoischgrammatischer Nomenklatur nicht nur in das Lehrbuch des Dionysius Thrax, sondern auch in die Abhandlungen des Apollonios Dyskolos verdeutlicht, dass ein Jahrhundert vor Origenes bestimmte “termini technici” und ihre spezifische Bedeutung, aus dem ursprünglichen Zusammenhang gelöst, längst grammatikalischterminologisches Allgemeingut geworden waren ... Nun fällt allerdings folgendes auf: Origenes gebraucht mit grösster Selbstverständlichkeit stoische Termini, deren Inanspruchnahme bei Dionsius Thrax und Apollonios Dyscolos noch umstritten ist.’ Neuschäfer, Origenes als Philologe, p. 219 argues for the growing use of Stoic grammar in Imperial Alexandrian philology in part by adducing the influence of Stoic rhetoric on Alexandrian Homer exegesis from A.D. 100 to 300, but this does not strengthen his case too much, in my opinion. 16 Neuschäfer, Origenes als Philologe, pp. 217–18, p. 155, n. 120.

Introduction

7

knowledge of grammar and logic in all the major intellectual centers of the Imperial period.17

17 Neuschäfer, Origenes als Philologe, p. 219. ‘Dieser Bereitschaft zur Aufnahme stoischer Einflüsse im kaiserzeitlichen Alexandrien scheint zumindest nicht hinderlich gewesen zu sein, dass diese philosophische Richtung einst entscheidend die Auslegungsmethodik des pergamenischen Gegenlagers geprägt hatte.’


Chapter 1

Philo The Jewish theologian and philosopher Philo of Alexandria (about B.C. 30–A.D. 45) is a unique figure in what remains to us of the philosophy of the late Hellenistic and early Imperial period. As a philosopher, he is too often treated lightly in scholarly work, apart from specialized studies into the origins of ‘Middle Platonism’. Yet Philo is the only figure in the period following Posidonius, Panetius, and Cicero, and before Seneca, Marcus Aurelius, Epictetus, and Sextus Empiricus, who has left us with a rich legacy in all major areas of philosophy, including reflections on mind and language.1 In Philo we encounter the transformation of philosophical views into a Mosaic ‘blend of truth’ which sees philosophy in harmony with the Hellenistic Jewish tradition.2 Philo, the Jewish Platonist, presents a kind of dualism of thought and language. This dualism is nourished by a rich fund of ideas, scriptural and philosophical, about logos, the fount of speech and rationality. David Runia summarizes Philo’s basic view. Philo’s philosophical conception of man is dualist. Man is basically sunamfóteron of body and rational soul or mind. Both of these parts are created by God, but only with respect to one of them, the mind, is man related to Him. Philo nowhere denies that man’s body is created by God. It is only with respect to he irrational soul that he has doubts ... Philo’s dualism stands in a long tradition, from Plato to Descartes and beyond.3 1 The body of this chapter is adapted from David G. Robertson, ‘Mind and Language in Philo’, in Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 67, iss. 3 (July 2006). Reprinted by permission of the University of Pennnsylvania Press. Paul S. MacDonald, History of the Concept of Mind (Aldershot, 2003), pp. 92–4 limits his consideration of Philo’s concept of mind to a brief outline of the mix of Greek and Hebrew ideas characteristic of his thought. 2 Philo blends Greek philosophy into a scheme that also develops the Hellenistic Jewish tradition of biblical interpretation, an achievement well described by Hans-Friedrich Weiss, Untersuchungen zur Kosmologie des hellenistischen und palästinischen Judentums (Berlin, 1966), pp. 35–58; David T. Runia, Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato (Leiden, 1986), pp. 480–519; Gretchen Reydams-Schils, ‘Stoicized Readings of Plato’s Timaeus in Philo of Alexandria’, Studia Philonica Annual, 7 (1995): 85–102. 3 David T. Runia, ‘God and Man in Philo of Alexandria’, Journal of Theological Studies, 39 (1988): 48–75 at 71–2.

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The relationship of immateriality and materiality in Philo’s concept of our logos is crucial to his philosophy of language. We find much that is drawn from Stoicism and Platonism, although Philo also develops some ideas which appear to depart from Greek philosophy, such as his notion of divine creative activity by speaking things into being. I think Philo emerges as a significant figure in the history of engagement with problems of the nature of mind, the intelligibility of language, and the possibility of communication. Philo deserves credit as the first detailed and surviving expositor of the view that meanings are thoughts, immaterial items from the mind which are carried about in the bodily vehicle of spoken discourse to other minds. Divine Logos and Human Language Let me briefly introduce the divine logos in Philo. I will not give a detailed presentation of the complicated notion of logos in Greek philosophy (Heraclitus, Plato, and the Stoics) and Jewish tradition, including the various ways the term is used. This is very important background to Philo, but it has already received a lot of scholarly attention.4 For Philo, everything that exists, the incorporeal as well as the corporeal world, was created by the 4 David Winston, Logos and Mystical Theology in Philo of Alexandria (Cincinnati, 1985), pp. 9–25 goes into the Platonist background to Philo’s doctrine of logos, which features the contrast of inner logos and outer logos. Although the Stoics were not the first philosophers to draw a distinction between inner and outer speech, they developed the notion from Plato (Soph. 263E3–9; 264A1–2; Phil. 38E; Theaet. 189E6–190A; 206D1ff.) and Aristotle (An. Post. 76b24; Cat. 4b34). The Stoics seem to have influenced many later uses of the distinction, a philosophical commonplace in Hellenistic and Later Greek philosophy; Richard Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators 200–600 AD. A Sourcebook (3 vols, London, 2004), vol. 3, pp. 211–13, 245–9 introduces several Neoplatonist views on thoughts as an inner language. On Stoic ideas about the relationship of thought and language in connection with Philo consult Max Pohlenz, ‘Philon von Alexandreia’, Nachrichten von der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen (Göttingen, 1942), pp. 409–87 at 445–7; Gregorios D. Farandos, Kosmos und Logos nach Philon von Alexandria (Amsterdam, 1976), pp. 240–52; Winston, Logos and Mystical Theology, pp. 17–18; Gertraut Kweta, Sprache, Erkennen und Schweigen in der Gedankenwelt des Philo von Alexandrien (Frankfurt, 1996), pp. 58–66. On the Stoics, I favor the work of Max Pohlenz, ‘Die Begründing der abendländischen Sprachlehre durch die Stoa’, Nachrichten von der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen (Göttingen, 1939), pp. 151–98 at 196–7; Max Mühl, ‘Der lógoß hendiáqetoß und proforikóß von der älteren Stoa bis zur Synode von Sirmium 351’, Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte, 7 (1962): 7–56 at 8–16; Wolfram Ax, Laut, Stimme und Sprache (Göttingen, 1986), p. 105; Julia Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1992), p. 63.

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rational principle or speech (lógoß) of God (Migr. 6 Wendland; Opif. 16–37 Cohn). There are two basic theological notions in Philo. The logos is the image of God and as such it is closely associated with the thought and mind of God, but it is also the instrument of the divine being (Migr. 6 Wendland; Leg. All. 3.96 Cohn).5 Hence in some prior sense, the incorporeal world came to be first by the agency of logos and ‘was established (Hidruqeíß) in the divine logos’ (Opif. 36 Cohn). The divine logos is the ‘place’ of the noetic realm (Opif. 20 Cohn). The intelligible world (kósmoß nojtóß) is a world contained in God’s mind, comparable to the ‘intellectual blueprint’ of an architect who engages in rational planning for the sake of building a city (Opif. 24–5, 36 Cohn). The sensible world is an inferior realm, a mere copy of the perfect incorporeal world which is the model (parádeigma) for it. What is difficult to find in this picture is much room for the creation and composition of the world soul of Plato’s Timaeus.6 Doing much of the work of the Platonic world soul is the divine logos, bridging intelligible and sensible reality.7 Runia, who does not consider Philo a proper Middle Platonist, has pointed out how important Philo’s notion of the logos is to his story of God and world, departing in some respects from Platonism and Stoicism.8 Runia also notes that later Platonists, possibly under the influence of the Stoic cosmic logos which unites all things in the Stoic world, continue the trend observable in Philo of speaking of God’s logos in a way that takes over the roles previously occupied by the Platonic world soul of the Timaeus.9 Philo gives the divine logos the starring role of creating the universe by shaping matter into well formed things. The divine logos represents the focus 5 I choose to ignore here Philo’s occasional claim that God’s being, under the name of ‘the one that is’, is beyond all attributes or functions, for example Abr. 120–23 Cohn. 6 Runia, Philo and the Timaeus, pp. 177–208, 446–51 points out that it is also hard to find the idea of the cosmic body of the cosmos, another theme familiar from the Timaeus. 7 Philo never makes clear whether the divine logos is a reality independent from God, in passages such as Migr. 6 Wendland; Fug. 101 Wendland; Her. 206 Wendland; Leg. All. 3.150 Cohn. Mühl, ‘Der lógoß hendiáqetoß und proforikóß’, pp. 18–24; Weiss, Untersuchungen, pp. 267–9; Runia, Philo and the Timaeus, pp. 207–8; Runia, ‘God and Man’, pp. 72–3 address the related theological issues. 8 Runia, Philo and the Timaeus, pp. 446–51, 482–3, 505–16. 9 Runia, Philo and the Timaeus, p. 206. Other scholars, such as Winston, Logos and Mystical Theology, p. 15, have acknowledged early Middle Platonist tendencies for the divine logos to subsume or displace the Platonic world soul, traced by John Dillon, The Middle Platonists (Ithaca, 1977), p. 83 as early as Antiochus of Ascalon.

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of God’s thoughts in relation to the cosmos and the fullness of God’s powers (Opif. 20–21 Cohn), uniting the creative functions familiar from the Timaeus of demiurge, model, and cosmic soul.10 The sensible world is formed from the pattern of what is intelligible (Opif. 15–36 Cohn). The intelligible world is constituted by the Ideas inherited from Alexandrian Platonism; for Philo, these Ideas are identified with the thoughts of God. Actually, the Timaeus’ demiurgic creation story (involving demiurge, matter, noetic or intelligible cosmos) is divided by Philo into two separate accounts. There is a creation of the immaterial noetic world in the mind of God, and there is a creation of physical reality from the model of the noetic world and unformed matter (Opif. 32–5, 134–6, 171 Cohn).11 Like the sensible cosmos, the human being is created as the image (ehik´wn) not of God’s own self but rather in the image of the divine logos (Opif. 25 Cohn; compare Gen. 1.27).12 In fact these aspects of creation are nothing less than gospel for Philo; his enthusiastic appraisal of God’s work (for example, Mos. 1.38 Cohn) underwrote the later tradition of Patristic hexaemeral literature. 10 Runia, Philo and the Timaeus, pp. 449–51. Pohlenz, ‘Philon von Alexandreia’, pp. 447–8; J.C.M. Van Winden, ‘The World of Ideas in Philo of Alexandria’, Vigiliae Christianae, 37 (1983): 209–17 at 211–17 claim (wrongly) that Philo goes so far as to identify the divine logos and the Ideas. Farandos, Kosmos und Logos, pp. 293–302; Runia, Philo and the Timaeus, p. 447, n. 224 show that there is some distinction. Another related element in Philo’s thought is the relation of the divine logos to the divine ‘powers’ (dunámeiß), entities associated with the divine Ideas, examined by Pohlenz, ‘Philon von Alexandreia’, pp. 442–7; Dillon, The Middle Platonists, p. 165; Winston, Logos and Mystical Theology, pp. 19–21; Abraham P. Bos, ‘Philo of Alexandria: A Platonist in the Image and Likeness of Aristotle’, The Studia Philonica Annual, 10 (1998): 66–86 at 75–84. The ‘powers’ of God seem at times to be virtually identified with the divine logos in Philo, or rather, the logos itself is one of the divine ‘powers’. Philo considers two ‘powers’ to be higher than the others, namely the ‘regal’ power and the ‘creative’ power. Weiss, Untersuchungen, pp. 259–75; Dillon, The Middle Platonists, pp. 161–6 show that the ‘powers’ are (a) distinguished from God himself, (b) similar in important respects to the Stoic ‘seminal logoi’ or the immanent Stoic logos, by virtue of the close involvement of the ‘powers’ in the material world (compare D.L. 7.147), and (c) essentially subordinated to their source (the logos), although some texts speak of the these entities in parallel fashion. Admittedly, the ‘powers’ seem at times to be almost identified with the divine logos. Less prominent in Philo than the ‘powers’, but likewise associated with divine logos, is the traditional Jewish figure of Wisdom (Sophia), discussed by Dillon, The Middle Platonists, p. 164. 11 Roberto Radice, ‘Observations on the Theory of the Ideas as the Thoughts of God in Philo of Alexandria’, The Studia Philonica Annual, 3 (1991): 126–34 at 127. 12 Runia, ‘God and Man’, pp. 66–73.

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Now let us work Philo’s notion of logos more thoroughly into the picture. There are two kinds of logos in the scheme of things, conceived in parallel fashion to the two kinds of logos in the human being (Mos. 2.127 Cohn). In divinity there is one logos, a higher logos, which has to do with the incorporeals and Ideas which structure the intelligible world. And there is another lower logos, which has to do with the structure of the sensible things created by God. The lower cosmic principle in this scheme works like an immanent formal principle which structures all things. Thus it bears some comparison to the Stoic ‘seminal logos’ (lógoß spermatikóß: Her. 114–19 Wendland; Leg. All. 3.150 Cohn). This immanent logos is necessary to provide an account of how rational order can be instituted in the sensible world from the intelligible world. Plato’s Timaeus does not allow the divine creative intellect to directly intervene in the world, establishing instead the world soul, constructed as an intermediate entity in a blend of ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ materials. It functions as an instrument of rational government; without a cosmic soul in hand, it is hardly surprising that Philo helps himself to this role of logos inherited from Stoicism.13 Philo’s notion of God’s creative work as speech reflects the biblical language of divine creation in terms of what God says (Gen. 1; Sacr. 65 Cohn; Decal. 47 Cohn). ‘God speaks, and all at once he does it, allowing nothing between the two; but if one ought to present a truer teaching, his speech (lógoß) is his accomplishment (‘ergon).’14 The logos of God unifies 13 Stephen Menn, Descartes and Augustine (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 88–90, 106 traces attempts among the later Platonists to deal with this fundamental problem. Pohlenz, ‘Philon von Alexandreia’, pp. 450–53 observes rightly the tension in Philo between an immanent logos and a transcendent logos, but does not see the significance of a higher and a lower logos. Pohlenz, ibid.; Kweta, Sprache, Erkennen und Schweigen, pp. 164–7 treat further complications on these issues; at times Philo develops his notion of the ‘nature’ (fúsiß) of the world, itself the creation of logos, much like a Platonic world soul. Weiss, Untersuchungen, pp. 259–60; Dillon, The Middle Platonists, pp. 159–60; Runia, Philo and the Timaeus, p. 483, n. 45; Reydams-Schils, ‘Readings of Plato’s Timaeus’, p. 92 outline the Stoic background to ‘seminal logos’ in Philo. 14 Sacr. 65 Cohn. There has been much controversy over what Philo presupposes in God’s work of creation. H.A. Wolfson, Philo. Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (2 vols, Cambridge, MA, 1947), vol. 1, pp. 303–4; Runia, Philo and the Timaeus, pp. 290–91. When Philo talks about creation as the formation of things out of matter, he usually seems to have in mind not elements or something with some qualities, but rather matter which is completely unformed and disorderly, compare ‘prime matter’ in the Aristotelian tradition, R. Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion (Ithaca, NY, 1988), pp. 3–59, apart from a few anomalous passages (for example, Opif. 134–7 Cohn) which suggest that primordial matter already has some qualities present. But there is the deeper problem that Philo does not present

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all the divine powers (dunámeiß) in its activity, it is set over these powers and they are all the contents and modes of expression of God’s logos.15 John Dillon points out that in one text (Fug. 94–105 Wendland), Philo talks about the logos of the ‘powers’ but also about the one who speaks (toü légontoß), ‘a logical counterpart to the term Logos, certainly, but not a term for God that I find used anywhere else in the Greek tradition.’16 There is a renewed emphasis on divine speech in Philo. Of course, even if human speech reflects divine creative action, Philo would acknowledge that the creative powers of human speech are vastly inferior. If I say ‘horse’, I utter articulate sounds in the form of the word ‘horse’, but I do not produce a horse.17 Characteristics of Mind In spite of Philo’s statements that the essence and nature of the mind is unknowable to us (for example, Somn. 1.30–34 Wendland), he discusses its nature, characteristics, and activities in several treatises. Christopher Stead notes this attention to the mind in Philo, in connection with the history of the concept of God as mind. I am inclined to think that as time went on orthodox Christians became more discreet (or less enterprising) in their use of this metaphor, and ignored certain characteristics of the mind which are important to Philo and to some early Judaizing Christians, including Gnostics. Philo sees the mind as receptive, nimble, and resourceful, and infers similar qualities in God himself. The mind’s quickness is proverbial; it can ‘go anywhere’ (in imagination) without lapse of time; it understands, but it cannot be understood (thus breaking the rule that like is known by like); it has no form or sensible configuration of its own, yet it

a consistent account of the relation between God and matter in creation. Dillon, The Middle Platonists, p. 158; Runia, Philo and the Timaeus, pp. 426–33, 451–5 reject creation ex nihilo in Philo. Nonetheless, in spite of some divergent passages (for example, Her. 160 Wendland), Philo sometimes claims (for example, Leg. All. 2.2 Cohn; Prov. 1.6–7 Aucher) that nothing existed prior to God’s creation, for God was lacking nothing. Every created thing came into being at a single stroke, as argued by R. Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum (Ithaca, NY, 1983), pp. 203–9. 15 Weiss, Untersuchungen, pp. 273–4; Dillon, The Middle Platonists, pp. 164–6. See also my n. 10. 16 Dillon, The Middle Platonists, p. 166. 17 Etienne Gilson, Linguistics and Philosophy. An Essay on the Philosophical Constants of Language (Notre Dame, IN, 1988), p. 21.

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can ‘assume’ or ‘contain’ perceptible forms and sense qualities, just as soft wax receives tangible and visible impressions.18

I would agree with Stead’s claim, if properly qualified, that the concept of God as mind, along with more general discussion of the mind, is gradually lost in Greek Christian thought, certainly by the latter part of the fourth century. Of course, the story is quite different in the Latin tradition; the metaphor of the mind and its characteristics is notoriously alive and kicking in Augustine and his successors. As Stead would suggest, it is characteristic for Philo to explain the capacities of the human mind with an eye to the characteristics of the divine mind: we can comprehend all things as a universe, we can know God, the good, and virtue. In fact, our mental activities and knowledge can extend beyond space and time.19 The quickness of mind and the speech it produces is compared to the speed of time itself (Sacr. 65–6 Cohn): Now the first virtue of beginners is that the imperfect strives to imitate the perfect Teacher as much as possible. But the Teacher outstrips even time, not even moving alongside when he created the universe, since time itself began to co-subsist with the world coming into being. For when God speaks, he accomplishes all at once, putting nothing between the two. If one ought to present a truer teaching, his logos was his accomplishment. And there is nothing swifter than speech among mortal stock, for the rush of the names and verbs passes by, outstripping the grasp of the mind upon them. Just as the ageless streams being poured out by the springs preserve unceasing motion, the oncoming flow always overtaking the cessation, so also the current of speech, when it begins to be moved, runs along with the mind the swiftest of what is in us, that which surpasses the winged natures. So then according as the one who does not come into being outstrips all that comes into being, so also the speech of the one who does not come into being outruns the speech of that which comes into being, even if it is most speedily carried upon the clouds.20 18 Christopher Stead, Divine Substance (Oxford, 1977), p. 170; compare Christopher Stead, ‘The Concept of Mind and the Concept of God in the Christian Fathers’, in B. Hebblethwaite and S.R. Sutherland (eds), The Philosophical Frontiers of Christian Theology (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 39–54 at 39. Stead leaves the Cappadocian Fathers, not to mention Marcellus of Ancyra, completely out of consideration. 19 This point has received attention from recent scholarship: Runia, Philo and the Timaeus, p. 472; Kweta, Sprache, Erkennen und Schweigen, pp. 229–31; Gretchen Reydams-Schils, ‘Philo of Alexandria on Stoic and Platonist Psycho-Physiology: The Socratic Higher Ground’, Ancient Philosophy, 22 (2002): 125–47 at 136–7. 20 Sacr. 65–6 Cohn. Pr´wtj dè t¨wn ehisagoménwn haret`j tò didáskalon Hwß ‘enesti téleion hateleïß mimeïsqai glícesqai. H O dè didáskaloß fqánei kaì tòn crónon ohudh “ote tò pän hegénna sunerg´jsanta, hepeid`j kaì ahutòß ginomén^w t^¨w

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Philo conceives these characteristics of divine speech in a relation of eminence over characteristics of human speech. Although Philo seems to be illustrating theological claims on the basis of observing human nature in this particular discussion, at other times human speech is explained in light of divine speech. As I have already suggested, Philo tends to develop his remarks on human speech in analogy to his account of the divine creation of the sensible world. Human speech is an imitation of divine creative activity, bringing order out of disorder. The anthropic logos not only thinks and contemplates, it expresses in rational order the immaterial thoughts of the mind in audible, material speech through the bodily vocal organs. Philo never makes clear how it is possible for divine mental activity to be faster than human mental activity; in this connection we should consider Philo’s view from another passage (Det. 89 Cohn, compare 90 Cohn) that mental activity is timeless or faster than time. How can God’s timeless activity be faster than any other timeless activity? Presumably, the superiority of divine power makes this possible. For the mind, itself unique among the things in us since it is swiftest of all, outstrips and passes by even the time in which it seems to find itself, timelessly touching upon the whole and the parts and the causes of these (earthly) things according to unseen faculties. And at this point, having come not only up to the limits of land and sea, but also of air and sky, not even there does it stop, considering the cosmos to be a narrow boundary of the continuous and unceasing course, striving to proceed further to grasp even the incomprehensible nature, if possible, insofar as (the mind seeks) not only with respect to Being.21

kósm^w sunufístato≥ Ho gàr qeòß légwn “ama hepoíei, mjdèn metaxù hamfoïn tiqeíß≥ ehi dè cr`j dógma kineïn haljqésteron, Ho lógoß ‘ergon ~jn ahutoü. Lógou dè hoxukinjtóteron ohudèn kaì parà t^¨w qnjt^¨w génei, parameíbetai gàr Hj Hrúmj t¨wn honomátwn kaì Hrjmátwn t`jn heph ahutoïß fqánousa katáljyin. “ Wsper o~un tà dià kroun¨wn hekceómena haénaa Hreïqra ‘aljkton ‘ecei t`jn forán, hepikatalambánontoß haeì t`jn l¨jxin toü hepióntoß Hreúmatoß, o“utwß Hj toü lógou pl´jmmura, “otan ‘arxjtai féresqai, t¨wn hen Hjmïn t^¨w hoxukinjtotát^w dianoíâ, ”o kaì tàß ptjnàß parameíbetai fúseiß, suntrécei. Kaqáper o~un Ho hagénjtoß fqánei päsan génesin, o“utwß kaì Ho toü hagen´jtou lógoß paraqeï tòn genésewß, k’an hoxútata hepì nef¨wn kataférjtai. 21 The words in round brackets appearing in the translation are meant to complete the sense of the Greek text. Det. 89 Cohn. Mónon gàr hautò t¨wn parh Hjmïn Ho noüß “ate pántwn hwkudrom´wtatoß kaì tòn crónon, hen ˆ^w gínesqai dokeï, fqánei kaì parameíbetai, katà haorátouß dunámeiß hacrónwß toü te pantòß kaì mer¨wn kaì t¨wn toútwn ahitíwn hepiyaúwn.‘ Jdj dè ohu mónon ‘acri t¨wn g¨jß kaì qaláttjß hallà kaì haéroß kaì ohuranoü perátwn helq`wn ohudh hentaüqa ‘estj, bracùn “oron toü sunecoüß kaì hapaústou drómou nomísaß

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The emphasis in this passage is on the incommensurability of mind with the movements of objects in space and time, which Philo presents by way of confusing what the mind thinks about and the speed of thought itself. Ultimately the ‘reach’ of intellect for higher realities leaves behind the world which is subject to the parameters of space and time. However, we do not find a detailed account, as in Plotinus, of how the relations of likeness between our intellect and divine intellect make possible our ascent. Immateriality of Mind Now for Philo, the mind is sharply distinguished from the body. These are the two basic parts or aspects of human nature. In one passage (Somn. 1.34 Wendland; compare Det. 90 Cohn), Philo says that the human mind is a ‘piece of the divine’ (hapóspasma qeïon). In another passage (Quaest. Gen. 2.59 Aucher; compare Her. 283 Wendland) he says similarly that the substance of the rational soul is divine, immaterial pneuma.22 This strongly suggests that the mind, the rational part of the soul or the ‘soul of the soul’ (Her. 55 Wendland), is immaterial. As Runia claims, ‘Both of these parts [body and rational soul] are created by God, but only with respect to one of them, the mind, is man related to Him.’23 Of course, the Platonist dualism of mind and body as adapted into Philo’s thought is not the only dualist option available in his day. For example, there is the Stoic dualism of two equally corporeal cosmological principles (one tòn kósmon e~inai, proswtérw dè cwr¨jsai glicómenoß kaì t`jn hakatáljpton qeoü fúsin, “oti m`j pròß tò e~inai mónon, katalabeïn, ’jn dúnjtai. 22 There is an interesting comparison here to Cicero, Tusc. 1.60–67 on the nature of the mind (mens), perhaps representative of contemporary Middle Platonism, addressed by Eyjolfur K. Emilsson, ‘Platonic Soul-Body Dualism in the Early Centuries of the Empire to Plotinus’, ANRW, 2.36.7 (Berlin, 1994), pp. 5331–62 at 5333–4, 5339–40. This Platonist view is that the mind is divine, whether it is breath (anima), fire, or aether. With respect to Philo, John Dillon, ‘Asômatos: Nuances of Incorporeality in Philo’, in C. Lévy (ed.), Philon d’Alexandrie et le langage de la philosophie (Turnhout, 1998), pp. 99–110 discusses how the human mind or the divine logos can be fiery substances and yet immaterial and beyond all sensibles. Philo sometimes affirms that we are partially divine; our minds can be in harmony with the divine mind in dreams or ecstatic states, Somn. 1.2, 2.2–3 Wendland; compare Det. 92 Cohn; Spec. Leg. 1.219 Cohn. Some scholars see overtones here of Posidonius’ theory of divination (Cicero, Div. 1.63, 1.129–30 Müller). Pohlenz, ‘Philon von Alexandreia’, pp. 440–41; Weiss, Untersuchungen, p. 253; Farandos, Kosmos und Logos, p. 269; Kweta, Sprache, Erkennen und Schweigen, pp. 244–6 review the long scholarly tradition of tracing material in Philo back to Posidonius. 23 Runia, ‘God and Man’, p. 71.

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active, one passive), while in another camp, probably much less prominent, there is the Aristotelian view which distinguishes the nature of body as a substance from the soul as incorporeal but not a substance. Philo would then be lumped in with the ‘classic dualists’ who sharply distinguish psychic and corporeal realities. These dualists are Platonist and Pythagorean philosophers who consider the soul to be a substance, not itself a body and independent of the body.24 Philo’s arguments for the incorporeality of the mind must be adapted from the Platonists of his day.25 In these arguments, Philo presumably falls into line with contemporary Alexandrian Platonists, about whom we know very little. Of course, some claims and assumptions about the soul, its origin, and the proper objects of thought are standard in a great deal of later Platonism.26 The particular Platonist arguments that emerge from other sources diverge from Philo, who may stand in a tradition we know only to a quite limited degree. It has been argued that the Platonist tradition behind Philo includes the first century B.C. philosopher Eudorus of Alexandria, besides even more shadowy figures.27 Although the mind or the soul is at times spoken of as an immaterial substance, Philo views the mind in the train of the (materialist) Stoics as the rational part of the soul, governing the body in harmony with

24 Nemesius, Nat. Hom. 2.67–124 Morani; Cicero, Tusc. 1.18–24; Aetius, Plac. 4.2.1–4.4.7 Diels. 25 Robertson, ‘Mind and Language in Philo’, pp. 430–32 examines the arguments for the incorporeality of mind in Philo and the Platonists. Kweta, Sprache, Erkennen und Schweigen, pp. 59–60, 515, n. 77; Reydams-Schils, ‘Philo of Alexandria on Stoic and Platonist Psycho-Physiology’, p. 137 point out that Philo has no consistent story of the location of the rational part or leading part of the soul, compare Det. 90 Cohn; Post. 137–8 Wendland; Somn. 1.32 Wendland. 26 Many Middle Platonists hold the orthodox Platonic view (Rep. 509D) that the objects of the mind’s thought are immaterial, compare Somn. 1.186–8 Wendland; if like is required to know like, the mind must be immaterial as well. And in Alcinous, Did. 177.19–23 Hermann we find the later Neoplatonist (Plotinian) notion of the rational soul as an intelligible, incorporeal substance. Plotinus, the focus of Chapter 4, teaches that our souls have their origin in the intelligible world but now reside in bodies, for example Enn. 4.1 Henry-Schwyzer. John Whittaker, ‘Platonic Philosophy in the Early Centuries of the Empire’, ANRW, 2.36.1 (Berlin, 1987), pp. 81–123 at 116–17; Emilsson, ‘Platonic Soul-Body Dualism’, p. 5335 complete the picture. 27 Dillon, The Middle Platonists, pp. 114–83 asserts that the influence of Eudorus on Philo is probable yet not dominant. On some points Philo has different views, for example on the categories, where Philo seems to follow Platonist-Pythagorean criticisms of Aristotle. Nevertheless, Eudorus and Philo seem to stand more or less in the same Platonist tradition, particularly in comparison to the Stoicizing Platonism of Antiochus of Ascalon with its materialist tendencies.

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28

nature. But there is also the Platonic notion that the mind can obtain knowledge by contemplative ascent to the intelligible realm, by progressive removal from the limitations of the body. The immateriality of the mind is certainly required by certain elements in Philo’s metaphysical scheme, such as the thoroughgoing parallel between divine and human nature. Our incorporeal thoughts are the products of our immaterial minds. They are expressed outwardly by ordered utterances, by physical sounds which are shaped by the vocal organs of the body. Thus Philo represents for us in his era the stubborn tendency among philosophers from Antiquity to the present day to view the connection of thought and language in terms of a contrast between the physical and the immaterial.29 It seems that Philo sees things in this light even when he talks, as he does on occasion (for example, Mos. 2.127 Cohn), of the ‘region’ (c´wra) of the mind in much the same way as he speaks of the ‘region’ of the vocal organs. It is not far off the point that the rational is twofold. For the logos is twofold both in the universe and in human nature. Throughout the universe there is the logos which has to do with the incorporeal and modelling Ideas, from which the noetic cosmos was framed, and there is the logos which has to do with the visibles, which are but imitations and copies of those Ideas, from which this sensible (cosmos) was brought to completion. On the other hand, in the human being there is the (logos) inwardly residing, and the (logos) outwardly expressed. And the former is something like a water spring, while the latter is sonorous, flowing from that (water spring). And the region of the former is the leading part of the

28 When Philo speaks of the mind, the soul, or the body as substances, he means simply ‘realities’ or ‘natures’, for example, Opif. 135 Cohn; Leg. All. 1.31–2 Cohn; Post. 163 Wendland; compare Immut. 46 Wendland. As I note in Robertson, ‘Mind and Language in Philo’, pp. 431–2, there are further complications to Philo’s uses of the important philosophical term ohusía. 29 Gilson, Linguistics and Philosophy, pp. 20–21, 69, 81–7 is a recent example of this, arguing for the metaphysical nature of language, that language involves ‘the order of the immaterial’. He presents an argument for the metaphysical nature of language. ‘All that is physically real is material and particular. The universal, whose nature we are seeking to understand, is immaterial by definition. It is necessary therefore that that which produces it ought to be equally immaterial if one does not wish its production to be quasi-miraculous. But the order of the immaterial, of the nonphysical, is precisely that of the metaphysical. Language, therefore, involves the reality of the metaphysical by the very fact that it involves an element of universality.’ Some contemporary metaphysicians argue for and against immaterial aspects to mind and thought, for example, John Gray Cox, ‘Must Mental Events Have Spatial Location?’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 63 (1982): 270–74; James Ross, ‘Immaterial Aspects of Thought’, The Journal of Philosophy, 89 (1992): 136–50.

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Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria soul, while (the region) of the latter, which is expressed outwardly, is the tongue and mouth and everything else of the vocal organs.30

Philo uses here the standard Stoic term for the ruling part of the soul (tò Hjgemonikón), which is for the early Stoics just as corporeal as any other part of the body (compare Leg. All. 2.6 Cohn; Opif. 117 Cohn). But in this passage the analogy to the sensible and intelligible realms is quite overt; we are confronted with another case of Stoic ideas and terminology converted into the service of Philo’s Hellenistic Jewish Platonism.31 Obviously, these terms tend to be tied in some way or other to the sensible world in their philosophical uses. The Physical and the Immaterial Of course on either level, whether in divine creative activity or in human speech, there is the question of how to bridge the metaphysical gap between intelligibles and sensibles (compare the familiar ‘mind-body problem’).32 We can recast this basic problem into the question, how can immaterial, intelligible thoughts be associated with audible utterances? Perhaps Philo would respond by adducing the role of logos as an intermediary between material utterances and immaterial thought, explaining the causal relations between mind and body by denying any direct contact between them. In his theology, Philo conceives the divine logos as the agent of God’s creation of the physical world. And it is clear the human mind does not itself speak on its own; rather, it requires an interpreter of thought which is its logos (Migr. 81 Wendland). So then the currency of inner logos is thoughts, while it is represented to the world in the voice. Philo would then 30 Mos. 2.127 Cohn. I follow the corner brackets of Cohn in the Greek. Diploün dè tò logeïon ohuk hapò skopoü≥ dittòß gàr Ho lógoß ‘en te t^¨w pantì kaì hen hanqr´wpou fúsei≥ katà mèn tò pän “o te perì t¨wn haswmátwn kaì paradeigmatik¨wn hide¨wn, hex ˆwn Ho nojtòß hepágj kósmoß, kaì Ho perì t¨wn Horat¨wn, ”a d`j mim´jmata kaì hapeikonísmata t¨wn hide¨wn hekeínwn hestín, hex ˆwn Ho ahisqjtòß oûtoß hapeteleïto≥ hen hanqr´wp^w dh Ho mén hestin hendiáqetoß, Ho dè proforikóß, oîá tiß pjg´j, Ho dè gegwnòß haph hekeínou Hréwn≥ kaì toü mén hesti c´wra tò Hjgemonikón, toü dè katà proforàn gl¨wtta kaì stóma kaì Hj ‘allj päsa fwn¨jß horganopoiía. 31 It would be valuable to compare similar notions of the ‘region’ (c´wra) or ‘place’ (tópoß) of the mind in Hellenistic and Imperial philosophy. Keimpe Algra, Concepts of Space in Greek Thought (Leiden, 1995), pp. 31–71 examines concepts of place and space in Hellenistic philosophy, but nothing quite like this. 32 Sorabji, Philosophy of the Commentators, vol. 1, pp. 182–216 presents the leading soul-body issues in Later Greek philosophy.

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seem to be compelled to claim immateriality for our human logos, to deal with the contents of our minds.33 One objection to this approach, however, would be to ask what is it that does the work of contact with the speech organs of the body on behalf of the immaterial logos. Perhaps Philo would countenance an additional mediating logos in us which is neither immaterial nor corporeal, being of an aetherial nature like the superlunary heavenly bodies.34 Philo might find himself positing an infinite regress of logoi if he went down this path, in addition to the loss of clarity and simplicity in conceiving the role of logos. Another objection could arise from a sort of creeping material infection. To preserve the physical dimensions at the interface of logos and speech organs, the interface mechanism, however conceived, would be explained in terms which involve the physical aspects of the limits of the interfacing parties, the place of contact, and so on. This explanation will drive physical conceptualizations into the nature of logos. Our logos, unless Philo adduces a higher logos and lower logos story in order to defuse the objection (compare Mos. 2.127 Cohn), turns out to be a material entity after all. We are then faced with the equally knotty problem of explaining the interface between a material logos and an immaterial mind.35 Let me introduce a second possible Philonic response, namely by considering audible speech itself to be non-corporeal in status, sharing some properties with the mind. I will anchor this idea in a passage (Migr. 50–52 Wendland) where Philo says that only two things in us are invisible, mind and speech (noüß kaì lógoß). Being innovative in all things with respect to knowledge and innovating in this thing particularly and unusually, he says that voice is visible, (even though) it is, 33 Perhaps it is telling that Philo, as far as I know, never makes clear that our human logos is immaterial to the same degree the mind is. Philo says that the divine logos is immaterial only on rare occasions, as in Quaest. Ex. 2.122 Aucher. 34 With respect to the possible intermediate ontological status, compare the ‘soul vehicles’ of later Platonists, a container for the soul of intermediate status, made of pneuma or aether. Emilsson, ‘Platonic Soul-Body Dualism’, pp. 5339–40, compare Sorabji, Philosophy of the Commentators, vol. 1, pp. 221–9, describes these ‘soul vehicles’ as follows. ‘The ‘ocjma acted as an intermediary in the causal relationship between the two [soul and body]; and the ‘ocjma itself could also come quite close to the incorporeal soul in its attributes: Proclus describes the ‘ocjma of the higher soul as immaterial and impassible.’ 35 Compare Andy Clark, ‘Time and Mind’, The Journal of Philosophy, 95 (1998): 354–76 at 362 for ‘creeping material infection’ in the mind. Later Platonists explain that soul is non-spatially related to body precisely in order to avoid conceiving the soul along the lines of the behavior of spatial entities, as pointed out by Sorabji, Philosophy of the Commentators, vol. 1, pp. 204–10.

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Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria subtracting the mind, nearly the only one of the things in us not to be visible. For all things are visible under the purview of the other senses, the colors, the tastes, the odors, the warmths, the chills, the smooths, the roughs, the softs and hards, insofar as they are bodies. Why this is, I will speak of more clearly. The taste is visible, not insofar as it is a taste, but only insofar as it is body, for the sense of taste will know it insofar as it is a taste. And the odor, insofar as it is an odor, will be examined by the nostrils, but insofar as it is a body, by the eyes also (it is examined). And the other cases too will be explained in this way. On the other hand, voice is of a visible nature neither as an audible nor as a body, if indeed it is a body at all, but these two of the things in us are invisible, mind and speech. Actually our voicebox is not on the level of the divine vocal organ, for ours is mixed with air and flees to the place suited to it, the ears, while the divine one is of pure and unmixed speech, escaping hearing on account of lightness, but seen by a pure soul on account of the keenness in seeing.36

Philo excuses the words of Moses, which are strictly speaking quite wrong. The human voice has the unique property of not being accessible by our sight-perception. The voice is mixed in with some rather fine stuff (the air), indeed Philo appears unsure as to whether the voice is a non-corporeal ‘audible’ (hakoustón) or a body (s¨wma). There is an interesting comparison here to another text (Plant. 24 Wendland), where Philo speaks of the mind, being light in nature, being whirled upwards towards God as if it were drawn upwards by a mighty divine breath or wind. Clearly, Philo maintains some contrast with divine speech, which is entirely intelligible in nature. But Philo may not understand so wide a metaphysical gap between voice and thought, insofar as the human voice assumes some of the attributes of the mind. The problem remains, of course, of accounting not only for the interface with the visible, physical organs of speech but also for the organs of hearing. Overall, this text could be interpreted as an attempt 36 Migr. 50–52 Wendland. Kainòß dh ’wn hen “apasi t`jn hepist´jmjn kaì toüth hidíwß kaì xénwß kekainoúrgjken ehip`wn Horat`jn e~inai t`jn fwn´jn, T`jn mónjn scedòn t¨wn hen Hjmïn ohuc Horat`jn Hupex^jrjménjß dianoíaß≥ tà mèn gàr katà tàß ‘allaß ahisq´jseiß pánq’ Horatá, tà cr´wmata, oHi culoí, oHi hatmoí, tà qermá, tà yucrá, tà leïa, tà tracéa, tà malakà kaì skljrá, ^ˆj s´wmata. Tí dé hesti toüto, safésteron her¨w≥ Ho culòß Horatóß hestin, ohuc ^ˆj culóß, hallh ^ˆj mónon s¨wma, tò gàr ^ˆj culòß e‘isetai Hj geüsiß≥ kaì Ho hatmóß, ^ˆj mèn hatmóß, Hupò Hrin¨wn hexetasq´jsetai, ^ˆj dè s¨wma, kaì pròß hofqalm¨wn≥ kaì tà ‘alla taút^j dokimasq´jsetai. Fwn`j dè o‘uqh Hwß hakoustòn o‘uqh Hwß s¨wma, ehi d`j kaì s¨wmá hestin, Horatòn e~inai péfuken, hallà dúo taüta t¨wn hen Hjmïn haórata, noüß kaì lógoß. h Allà gàr ohuc “omoion tò Hjméteron hjceïon t^¨w qeí^w fwn¨jß horgán^w≥ tò mèn gàr Hjméteron haéri kírnatai kaì pròß tòn suggen¨j tópon katafeúgei, tà ~wta, tò dè qeïon hakrátou kaì hamigoüß hesti lógou, fqánontoß mèn hako`jn dià leptótjta, Horwménou dè Hupò yuc¨jß hakraifnoüß dià t`jn hen t^¨w blépein hoxútjta.

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to make the relationship of mind and meaning to the outer, physical world more plausible. The Nature of Meaning The Hellenistic philosophical schools addressed the problem of explaining our comprehension of spoken language. Thus the various parties to the Hellenistic debates adopted views on the nature of meaning. Philo, it has been argued, seems to be aware of all the major differences, at least as expressed in doxographical form.37 I will now present his claim that meaning is in the head, that thoughts are what is in spoken language. It is easy to show that Philo identifies meanings with thoughts, an idea that might be traceable back to Aristotle on word meaning (Int. 16a3–10). Philo claims that vocal sound receives thoughts in the course of being articulated by the speech organs (Det. 127–8 Cohn; compare Migr. 3–4, 79 Wendland; Somn. 2.260 Wendland; Post. 106–8 Wendland). For whenever the mind becomes aroused and receives an impulse towards one of its proper objects, either having been moved from within itself or having registered various impressions from external objects, it is pregnant and it labors with thoughts. And although it wishes to give birth, it is incapable of doing so, until the sound (produced) by means of the tongue and the other speech organs carries the thoughts in the manner of a midwife and thus brings them out into the light.38

Philo’s metaphor is of articulated sound ‘carrying in its hands’ the thoughts of the mind.39 The idea seems to be that our corporeal speech contains meaning in an invisible way, a ‘piece of our minds’ that is immaterial and 37 David T. Runia, ‘The Beginnings of the End: Philo of Alexandria and Hellenistic Theology’, in D. Frede and A. Laks (eds), Traditions of Theology. Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (Leiden, 2002), pp. 281–316 at 281–6. 38 Det. 127–8 Cohn. h Epeidàn gàr Ho noüß hexanastàß próß ti t¨wn ohikeíwn Horm`jn láb^j ’j kinjqeìß ‘endoqen hex Heautoü ’j dexámenoß hapò t¨wn hektòß túpouß diaférontaß, kuoforeï te kaì hwdínei tà no´jmata≥ kaì boulómenoß hapotekeïn hadunateï, mécriß ’an Hj dià gl´wttjß kaì t¨wn ‘allwn fwnjtjríwn horgánwn hjc`j dexaménj maíaß trópon ehiß f¨wß proagág^j tà no´jmata. 39 The ‘conduit’ or ‘decoding’ metaphor has enjoyed a very long career in philosophy. Recently it has been challenged in favor of other components of interpretation such as the role of inferences, a development summarized in Steven Pinker, The Language Instinct (New York, 1994), pp. 190–230; Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson, Relevance. Communication and Cognition (Oxford, 1995), pp. 1–64.

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not accessible to sense-perception. Presumably, our logos functions both as agent of transfer and as interpreter of the mind, but Philo never makes things entirely clear. A similar metaphor used by Philo is of vessels of speech being filled with the water which springs from the mind (Det. 92 Cohn). So then of the living power, of which blood is what is essential in it, a certain portion obtains voice and speech as an eminent prize, not the stream flowing through mouth and tongue, but rather the source from which the containers of uttered (speech) are filled up by nature. And the source is the mind, through which we utter petitions and cries to the one who is, (and we do so) sometimes voluntarily, sometimes involuntarily.40

Elsewhere Philo describes human speech itself as like a stream of water, which carries thoughts along with it (Migr. 71, 81 Wendland). But more frequently, Philo simply speaks of the ‘stream’ of speech issuing from the mind (Mos. 2.127 Cohn; Somn. 2.238–47 Wendland; Mut. 69 Wendland; Congr. 33 Wendland; Det. 40 Cohn; Sacr. 65–6 Cohn).41 The Inferiority of Speech It was hinted above that Philo views spoken language as inferior, a mere image of the unspoken speech of the mind. We met this idea in connection with the function of logos as an intermediary between mind and the physical world. David Winston explains some of the metaphysical motivation for this. In the majority of passages Philo seems to emphasize the inferiority of the spoken word to that which is within the mind alone. The inferiority of the former is ascribed to the fact that utterance belongs to the sense perceptible realm of body, and involves duality and infirmity, whereas the latter is based on the indivisible Monad and is characterized by perfect stability and resembles the pure and unalloyed speech of God.42 40 Det. 92 Cohn. T¨jß o~un zwtik¨jß dunámewß, ˆjß tò ohusi¨wdeß aîma, moïrá tiß hexaíreton ‘esce géraß fwn`jn kaì lógon, ohu tò dià stómatoß kaì gl´wttjß Hréon näma, hallà t`jn pjg´jn, hafh ˆjß aHi toü proforikoü dexamenaì pljroüsqai pefúkasin≥ Hj dè pjg`j noüß hesti, dih oû tàß pròß tòn ‘onta henteúxeiß kaì hekbo´jseiß t¨^j mèn Hekónteß t¨^j dè kaì ‘akonteß hanafqeggómeqa. 41 Mühl, ‘Der lógoß hendiáqetoß und proforikóß’, p. 17; Kweta, Sprache, Erkennen und Schweigen, p. 524, n. 182 cover the philosophical Begriffgeschichte of language coming from a source or spring. 42 David Winston, ‘Aspects of Philo’s Linguistic Theory’, The Studia Philonica Annual, 3 (1991): 109–25 at 125, compare Kweta, Sprache, Erkennen und Schweigen,

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Philo also emphasizes in one passage (Immut. 83 Wendland) not mentioned by Winston that God’s speech is superior by virtue of its perfect unity, being completely free from mixture with air, which involves a duality.43 I will build on these remarks with two further observations. First, it is generally observable that Philo likes the idea that the inferior part of something (the perceptible), can be joined together with the superior part of something (the intelligible), in the structure of a divinely ordained product. An example of this is found in Philo’s detailed description of the tabernacle and its furnishings, which includes its correspondence to the natural order (Quaest. Ex. 2.50–124 Aucher; Mos. 2.66–108, 136–40 Cohn; Spec. Leg. 1.82–96 Cohn; Her. 216–19 Wendland). Moses enjoyed access to an exalted vision, an intelligible and divine model, which provided the pattern for the earthly imitation. There are echoes of the Timaeus here in a creation, joining body and soul, to be made as perfect as possible according to a divine model, but within the constraints of material substances.44 Philo’s earthly tabernacle features an inner sanctuary, ‘which is symbolically the intelligible (nojtá)’ (Mos. 2.81–3 Cohn). In short, we are given the impression of intelligible treasure housed in humble jars of perceptible clay. Second, in one text (Abr. 82–3 Cohn) we find some confirmation for understanding Philo’s views of mind and language, as Winston does, in light of a contrast between audible word and intelligible meaning or thought. This contrast is spelled out in terms of the relationship between parent and child. Abram is, when interpreted, ‘father raised on high’, while Abraham is ‘father elect of sound’. The first shows one called the astrologer and meteorologist, in such a way devoting attention to the Chaldean doctrines as some father would devote attention to his offspring; the second shows the wise man. For by means of the ‘sound’, he (Moses) hints obscurely at the spoken logos, while by means of the ‘father’ (he hints at) the ruling mind—insofar as the inward (logos) is by pp. 62–3, 76, 274–8. There is some tension between positive and negative views of speech. Philo understands the human capacity for speech, a key distinguishing feature of human beings (Somn. 1.28–9, 1.108–11 Wendland; Leg. All. 2.22–3 Cohn), as an important part of our likeness to the divine nature. However, Philo also considers all human speech (especially rhetoric and sophistic argument) to be obscured and to fall short of perfect intelligibility, Leg. All. 3.41 Cohn; Fug. 92 Wendland; Gig. 52 Wendland. Also compare Immut. 83–4 Wendland, which contrasts divine speech (an unmixed unity) and human speech (associated with the mixture of the dyad). On the other hand, the wise men think and communicate with clarity and truth, Mos. 2.128–9 Cohn; compare Mut. 193–4 Wendland. Philo claims at Mos. 2.37–40 Cohn that the translators of the Septuagint perfectly matched Greek words to reality. 43 This may explain why Philo never uses the term lógoß proforikóß for divine speech, as observed by Pohlenz, ‘Philon von Alexandreia’, p. 447. 44 Runia, Philo and the Timaeus, pp. 255, 382 covers the Platonic background.


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nature father of the sonorous (logos), being senior to it and secretly sowing the things which are said—while by means of the ‘elect’ (he hints at) the man of refinement. For the worthless character is aimless and confused, while the good man is the elect, selected from all according to merit.45

The image is that of a father begetting, not a son, but rather a sort of linguistic offspring. The logos which is utterance features insubstantiality and instability in contrast to the stable, authoritative logos of the mind. The meanings of language are ‘secretly sown’ in the mind.46 The Stoic Legacy In the course of presenting his creative mixture of Stoic and Platonic strands in his theory of language, we look for Philo to explain more clearly how the mind’s relation to the intelligibles is built into language. I would argue that the limited resources in Philo to respond are based on the Stoic tradition. In one passage, Philo describes spoken language as uniting the intelligibles, but I doubt that this is meant to concern higher realities. The meanings of pieces of language, letters, syllables, words, phrases, sentences, and discourses, seem to be the ‘intelligibles’ (Quaest. Ex. 2.111 Aucher). A harmony of these elements is formed when things play their proper and natural role in our speech. Language is articulated by ‘natural bonds’ (fusikoïß desmoïß), parallel in structure to the harmonious composition of elements in God’s creation of the world, establishing the order of nature (fúsiß). Unfortunately, Philo does not address in a disciplined way the problem of how these linguistic intelligibles are related to the divine intelligibles (the Ideas in the mind of God). However, it is true that some passages (Her. 280–83 Wendland; Mos. 2.128–9 Cohn; Mut. 193–4 Wendland) claim that in cases of exceptional virtue, the human mind can ascend to contemplation of the Ideas. 45 Abr. 82–3 Cohn: hAbram mèn gàr Hermjneuqén hesti pat`jr metéwroß, hAbraám dè pat`jr heklektòß hjcoüß, tò mèn próteron hemfaïnon tòn hastrologikòn kaì metewrologikòn hepikaloúmenon, o“utwß t¨wn Caldavik¨wn dogmátwn hepimeloúmenon, Hwß ‘an tiß pat`jr heggónwn hepimeljqeíj, tò dh “usteron tòn sofón. dià mèn gàr t¨jß hjcoüß tòn proforikòn lógon ahiníttetai, dià toü patròß dè tòn Hjgemóna noün—pat`jr gàr Ho hendiáqetoß fúsei toü gegwnoü presbúteróß ge ’wn kaì tà lektéa Hupospeírwn—dià dè toü hepiléktou tòn hasteïon≥ ehikaïoß mèn gàr kaì pefurménoß Ho faüloß trópoß, heklektòß dè Ho hagaqóß, hepikriqeìß hex Hapántwn haristíndjn. 46 Philo uses here the Stoic terminology of ‘sayables’ (tà lektéa), more on this shortly. Philo presents some elementary Stoic handbook material in another passage (Agr. 141 Wendland), although this material does not use the distinctive technical term which appears in the De Abrahamo passage.

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These special individuals are allowed to experience some limited contact with God’s mind.47 Thought and speech are perfectly formed by the sage or saint, as in the case of Moses speaking the laws of God to the people of Israel. As we have seen, Philo thinks that mind and language alike reflect the order of nature. As part of this order, our minds occupy a position subordinate to divine logos yet superior to the physical world.48 Much of this story sounds like the portrait of a Stoic sage, with some Platonist overtones.49 Let me also point out that Philo himself may have considered his view of what meaning is to be straightforwardly Stoic. The Stoics seem to have discussed the nature of meaning more than any other school of Hellenistic philosophy, and there are many other areas of substantial Stoic influence traceable in Philo.50 Perhaps Philo represents a broader tendency in the late Hellenistic period to identify ‘sayables’ with thoughts. Certainly the early Stoics may have been twisted in this direction. Their view is that what is understood by the hearer is an incorporeal item, a ‘sayable’ (lektón). They have some being as incorporeal ‘somethings’, but are still distinguished from bodies. ‘Sayables’ are closely associated with thoughts, doxographically defined as subsisting in accordance with a special kind of thought, a ‘rational impression’.51 The sources suggest that orthodox Stoic theory distinguishes between utterances, thoughts, and ‘sayables’. Were all later Stoics in complete agreement with the original views of Chrysippus and Cleanthes? Perhaps some later Stoics altered Stoic theory to the point of identifying ‘sayables’ with thoughts outright. This would collapse some of the previous Stoic distinctions. One could argue that in Posidonius we can trace just this sort of development, establishing a more Platonist ontology which views reality on two levels, the material and the immaterial (D.L. 7.135 = LS 50E; Macrobius, Somn. Scip. 1.14.19 Willis; Plutarch, An. Proc. Tim. 1023B–D Hubert). Perhaps then for Posidonius, meanings would fall into the class of straightforwardly immaterial objects, being identified with thoughts. Even if these guesses are incorrect, Stoics 47 There is more detailed explanation in Kweta, Sprache, Erkennen und Schweigen, pp. 243, 264–7. 48 Kweta, Sprache, Erkennen und Schweigen, pp. 164–7. 49 Compare, from the Stoic school, Marc. Aur., Ad se ipsum 10.6.1 Dalfen; [Theodosius], Gramm. 17, 17–31 Göttling = FDS 536A; Sch. in Dionys. Thr. 356, 1–4 Uhlig = FDS 540; Sch. in Dionys. Thr. (ex Heliodoro) 514, 35–515, 5 Uhlig = FDS 540. 50 Dirk M. Schenkeveld and Jonathan Barnes, ‘Language’, in K. Algra, J. Barnes, J. Mansfeld, and M. Schofield (eds), The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 177–225. 51 References for Stoic ‘sayables’ include Sext. Emp., Math. 8.12 Mutschmann = LS 33B; Math. 8.70 Mutschmann = LS 33C; D.L. 7.63 = LS 33F.

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after Posidonius might identify ‘sayables’ and thoughts under Aristotelian or Platonist influence. In any case, there are several other points at which Philo clearly departs from Stoic theory of mind and language. A good example of this is his two levels of mental activity, including a notion of the ‘higher’ operation of thought than what involves speech (for example, Her. 4, 14–17 Wendland). Behind this feature lurks Philo’s dualist leanings, which contrast fundamentally with Stoic materialist monism. This Philonic dualism of thought is an interesting feature, which would anticipate the later Neoplatonic distinction between discursive and non-discursive thought.52 The contemplation of the intellect (noüß) proceeds among higher realities on a level independent of speech, the mind leaves behind sensory perception and the dyad as it draws nearer to divine perfection and realizes its true destiny in the monad. This sounds particularly independent of Stoicism insofar as the Stoics lay emphasis on the linguistic character of thought.53 Conclusion I have argued that Philo is a valuable witness to the late Hellenistic-early Imperial blending of Platonist and Stoic concepts of mind and language. As such, he occupies a significant position in the history of philosophy in his attempt to engage the enduring philosophical problems of the nature of mind and its relationship to the natural order. He deserves historical credit for his forthright identification of meanings with thoughts.

52 Kweta, Sprache, Erkennen und Schweigen, pp. 240–78, 380–83 illustrates the distinction between discursive and non-discursive thought in Philo. Other differences from standard Stoicism are noted by Weiss, Untersuchungen, pp. 42, 258–63, 279; Farandos, Kosmos und Logos, p. 266; Runia, ‘Philo of Alexandria and Hellenistic Theology’, pp. 295–6. 53 For example, in an argument attributed by Galen to Chrysippus for locating the ruling part of the soul in the heart, the activity of the mind is inner discourse (Galen, Plac. Hipp. Plat. 3.7.42–3 De Lacy = FDS 451). Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, p. 63; Catherine Atherton, The Stoics on Ambiguity (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 95–7 clarify the role of content in Stoic philosophy of mind.

Chapter 2

Clement Clement of Alexandria represents an important early attempt to reconcile Christianity and Greek philosophy, writing in the last quarter of the second century and the beginning years of the third. It is estimated that he lived, studied, and taught in Alexandria for at least twenty years (perhaps A.D. 175–202).1 In view of Clement’s intellectual openness to a variety of different sources of knowledge, it would be strange if he did not draw heavily from his Jewish predecessor Philo, who is generally recognized as the first to attempt an ambitious mediation of Hellenistic and biblical traditions. Fortunately, this vital link has been extensively studied, to the point that we see how much of Clement’s work is composed with Philonic treatises before him as a strong and consistent undertow to his writing activity.2 Language in its own right is not usually at the center of Clement’s attention, preferring to dwell on the fundamental concepts of truth, wisdom, and knowledge. Putting one in mind of Philo (or even Plutarch), virtually every topic celebrated in ancient literature is treated in scattered passages. Language and meaning are considered from various angles, particularly with reference to spiritual knowledge. For my purposes, there are fundamental tensions in Clement between the value of language and its limitations. As recent work on his relationship to contemporary Platonism has shown, Clement attempts to balance the status of God beyond thought and language with his Christian Logos theology of divine revelation.3 Nevertheless, in the case of created, 1 Eric F. Osborn, The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria (Cambridge, 1957), p. 3; Rüdiger Feulner, Clemens von Alexandrien (Frankfurt, 2006), pp. 21–7; Henny F. Hägg, Clement of Alexandria and the Beginnings of Christian Apophaticism (Oxford, 2006), pp. 51–70. 2 Annewies Van den Hoek, Clement of Alexandria and his Use of Philo in the Stromateis (Leiden, 1988), pp. 5–19 provides a brief review of several generations of scholarship on the dependence (and creative uses) of Clement in relation to Philo. This turns out to be a complicated relationship, but Van den Hoek, Clement of Alexandria, pp. 214–24 notes that often Clement simply works by some path or other through a Philonic treatise, adapting material for his own purposes. 3 Hägg, Clement of Alexandria, p. 214. ‘Christ’s coming as Logos ends the pre-incarnational silence and sanctions material reality, including language. Clement sees the paradox central to Christian Platonism to a great extent, but not wholly, in terms of a distinction between the Son as the revealer of God and God himself who


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non-angelic rational beings, our destiny lies beyond language in our contemplation of God in assimilation to the divine nature. Clement, like Philo before him, represents a significant stage of reflection on language at the origins of Christian philosophy. I will try to show how Clement upholds the Philonic view that meanings are thoughts—language is a window to many stages of knowledge on account of intelligible divinity. As we will see, there is a strong theological concern attached to holding thoughts as the meanings of language. For on the divine level, God’s knowledge of meaning penetrates immediately to the level of thought, independent of spoken utterance and the senses. The Divine Logos Mark Edwards, among others, has pointed out that by the time of Clement, the classic ‘two stage’ theory of divine Logos, a favorite theme for a few of the second-century apologists, was losing ground among Greek Patristic writers. This theory, however, is not a feature of Clementine theology. According to this [‘two stage’ concept of the Logos], the Logos was embedded from all eternity in the Father, and became a second hypostasis when the Father brought it forth, ‘before the ages’, as his instrument of creation. This doctrine, which entails that only the nature and not the person of the Logos is eternal, was a heresy for most Christians after the council of Nicaea, and there is no doubt that it had already lost ground in Alexandria by the time of Clement’s death.4

According to Edwards, Clement upheld the eternal generation of the Logos as a distinct reality (Hupóstasiß), not a theory of procession of the Logos in two stages, against the heresy of the Valentinian Gnostics. Clement does not use either the term logos prophorikos or the term logos endiathetos to speak about the divine Logos, as we find in some of the early apologists, who use these terms to describe a scheme of stages developed from the divine mind.5 is unknowable. Language operates only as far as the level of the Son, beyond which there is silence.’ 4 Mark J. Edwards, ‘Clement of Alexandria and his Doctrine of the Logos’, Vigiliae Christianae, 54 (2000): 159–77 at 159. Hägg, Clement of Alexandria, pp. 189–94 is in fundamental agreement with Edwards, attributing to Clement a ‘single stage theory’. 5 Edwards, ‘Clement of Alexandria’, pp. 162–70. There is a brief notice of Clement’s position in Max Mühl, ‘Der lógoß hendiáqetoß und proforikóß von der älteren Stoa bis zur Synode von Sirmium 351’, Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte, 7 (1962): 7–56 at 48. The stubborn preference for the language of logos prophorikos and logos endiathetos in presenting Clementine theology continues in the work of Feulner, Clemens von Alexandrien, p. 119.

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Such use of the term logos prophorikos would introduce concepts too gross and earthly for the lofty reality of the Logos.6 On the other hand, it is entirely possible that Clement closely associates the divine mind with the Logos, or outright identifies God’s intellect with his Logos, in spite of the lack of solid textual evidence.7 And some would claim that Clement has a role for the Platonic Forms as couched in the Logos in some sense. There may be a contrast on this score with Origen, who apparently shuns talk of the Forms as the thoughts of a divine mind, although it is arguable that Origen adapts these traditional Platonist ideas when presenting his notion of divine Logos. The tendency in Clement is to emphasize the ruling and saving activity of the Logos towards the world. Like Philo, he explains the Logos as a mediating being, at work to reconcile the poles of divinity and cosmos. And this Logos is the key to the intellectual and spiritual aspirations of the Christian sage, perfected in mind and speech by an active divine power, as we will see in further parts of this chapter.

6 There is an interesting comparison here with Origen, In Joh. 1.38 Preuschen, pp. 49, 3–50, 11. In this passage, Origen expresses concern with the insubstantiality of utterance in discussion of God’s logos. 7 These views are ascribed to Clement by Robert M. Berchman, From Philo to Origen. Middle Platonism in Transition (Chico, CA, 1984), p. 68; Edwards, ‘Clement of Alexandria’, pp. 166–8. However, I cannot find any Clementine text which clearly identifies the Logos with the mind or thoughts of God; most texts cited in the literature seem to be about Plato, not Clement. The text which comes closest to expressing this view from Clement himself, a text frequently cited by Berchman and others, is Strom. 5.16.3 Stählin-Früchtel, p. 336, 8–9. Another frequently cited passage considered to show the divine mind as the place of the Forms (Strom. 4.25.155.2–4 Stählin-Früchtel, p. 317, 10–20) is heavily focused on Plato, but mixes in the ascent of the soul to the Forms to be with Christ in contemplation. I find all this confusing material inconclusive, but this very passage leads Eric Osborn, Clement of Alexandria (Cambridge, 2005), pp. 65–6 (compare pp. 126–30) to suppose that Clement has a role for the Forms in the dialectical ascent of the gnostic, as the objects of contemplation. ‘It is worth noting that elsewhere Clement speaks of the logos not so much as of higher rank than the forms, but as the place wherein they find their meaning.’ For my part, I cannot understand how Platonic Forms ‘find their meaning’ in God. Osborn, Clement of Alexandria, p. 67 also points out, I think correctly, that the intensified Christian focus on divine power lessens any possible role of Platonic Forms. ‘Clement’s dialectic is only possible because the intellectual world is within the mind of God. A world of forms (as in Timaeus) which stood over against God was of no interest to him. God’s conceptual activity is, like his creative act, subject to his will. It is not static but dynamic.’

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Dialectic and Language Clement is noteworthy among Greek Patristic writers for his enthusiastic embrace of Greek philosophy within a Christian framework of thought. Christianity is the ‘true philosophy’ which was happily anticipated by many strands of Greek philosophy, literature, and religion. As a philosophical enterprise under substantial Platonist (Middle Platonist) influence, seeking wisdom must involve the discipline of dialectic.8 Clement devotes considerable attention to dialectic. Plotinian dialectic is the pure study of immaterial reality, a stage of intellectual ascent which transcends language. For Clement, dialectic is a way in which philosophy contributes to the demonstration of the faith. Clement also upholds the traditional Stoic view of language as a rational phenomenon. Of course the practice of dialectic requires spoken language, and this connection is drawn in a passage of his most ambitious intellectual achievement, the Stromata (Strom. 1.9.45.4–5 Stählin-Früchtel, p. 30, 10–16). Clement claims that speech is a ‘work’ (‘ergon), apparently an item of indeterminate ontology, which we might compare with Plotinus, who considers speech to be an action or activity, in particular an incorporeal ‘signifying activity’ (poíjsiß sjmantik´j). And it is generally Clement’s view that works (tà ‘erga) follow the gnostic’s knowledge as the shadow follows the body, which should be especially true of the demonstration of knowledge in language (Strom. 7.13.82.7 Stählin, p. 59, 11).9 Clement loads this short discussion of speech with Christian notions of the Word as embodiment of God’s will. What is the knowledge of answering questions? The same as the knowledge of asking questions. This would be of course dialectic. What then? Is speaking not a work, and activity comes to be from spoken language (logos)? If we are not acting according to rational logos, we would be acting irrationally. The rational (logikon) work is brought to fulfillment according to God. ‘And nothing came into being without him,’ he (John) says of the Logos of God. Did the Lord not do everything by his Logos?10 8 Salvatore R.C. Lilla, Clement of Alexandria. A Study in Christian Platonism and Gnosticism (Oxford, 1971); Berchman, From Philo to Origen, pp. 55–81; Hägg, Clement of Alexandria, pp. 71–133 attempt to locate Clement within the tradition of Middle Platonism. 9 Hägg, Clement of Alexandria, p. 152. 10 I adapt the translation of John Ferguson (trans.), Clement of Alexandria. Stromateis. Books One to Three (Washington, DC, 1991), p. 56. As usual, I supply words in parentheses which do not strictly appear in the Greek. Strom. 1.9.45.4–5 Stählin-Früchtel, p. 30, 10–16. Tíß o~un Hj gn¨wsiß toü hapokrínasqai; “ Jtiß kaì toü herwtän≥ e‘ij dh ’an a“utj dialektik´j. Tí dh ; Ohucì kaì tò légein ‘ergon hestì kaì tò poieïn hek toü lógou gínetai; Ehi gàr m`j lóg^w práttoimen, halógwß

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Clement’s discussion trades on the basic ambiguity of logos in Ancient Greek (spoken discourse, rationality). What Clement seems to want to show is that God’s work of creation is really an activity of speech, a claim that we have already traced in Philo. The relevance of dialectic is obscure in this passage, but there is help on this in a later passage of the first book of the Stromata (Strom. 1.28.176–9 Stählin-Früchtel, pp. 108, 24–110, 11). Here Clement claims dialectic as more than a part of Christian philosophy, it is a major ingredient in all true philosophy; it yields knowledge of divine matters in an intellectual and spiritual ascent towards God. Eric Osborn has written about the significance of Clementine dialectic extensively. ‘Clement’s account of dialectic shows how he makes logical procedure not merely a technique for the protection of truth but an important part of knowledge. ... It [the dialectic of the philosophical schools] concerns neither reality nor truth but aims merely at the development of argumentative skill. ... Dialectic can confirm what is true by demonstration and can remove doubts.’11 The relevance to language primarily consists in the issue of dialectic in discursive correctness and skill, guided by the possession of divine truth and the knowledge of intelligibles (Strom. 1.28.177.1 Stählin-Früchtel, p. 109, 10–11). Let us now turn from the pursuit of truth by dialectic to the nature of language itself. The Intelligibility of Language I will try to construct Clement’s account of the intelligibility of language from a few scattered passages. As we will see, the main focus of interest is the different levels of understanding utterances, or the various ways of failing to understand them. On the other hand, Clement does not address in a philosophically rigorous way the sort of problems that exercise Plotinus. He is more interested in explaining spiritual development in a Christian frame of mind. For a start, there is Clement’s unremarkable claim that all natural languages are intelligible (Strom. 1.16.78.1 Stählin-Früchtel, p. 50, 21–6). This discussion is situated in the course of a wider argument that barbarians, not Greeks, originated most human skills. Unintelligible speech is a special case which is recognized by Clement, although he brackets this ‘speaking to poioïmen ‘an. Tò logikòn dè ‘ergon katà qeòn hekteleïtai≥ kaì ohudèn cwrìß ahutoü hegéneto, fjsí, toü lógou toü qeoü. ’ J ohucì kaì Ho kúrioß lóg^w pánta ‘eprassen; 11 Osborn, The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria, p. 153. There is further elaboration in Osborn, The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria, pp. 148–57, and in his more recent work, Osborn, Clement of Alexandria, pp. 62–8.

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the air’ off from the natural languages which are meaningful to competent speakers of them. ‘So then if I do not know the meaning of the utterance (t`jn dúnamin t¨jß fwn¨jß), I will be a barbarian to the speaker and the speaker a barbarian to me.’12 This point could only come from a writer versed in the words of St. Paul on the topic of glossalalia (1 Cor. 14.2–40), for the prospect in this connection is that words are spoken in ecstatic utterance which are unintelligible, or at least not understood by the speaker; hence the need for the Spirit to equip someone with an interpretation (1 Cor. 14.13). Clement also argues that it is possible to produce utterances without complete understanding of realities in a quite different sense. This is presented as part of a long discourse about the shortcomings of the Greek philosophers, who never quite plumbed the depths of God in spite of all their theological and philosophical insight (compare Strom. 2.1.3.1–2 Stählin-Früchtel, p. 114, 7–14). Clement tries to illustrate, from the lack of intellectual grasp (‘ennoia) behind mimetic bird cries, something of the intellectual depth in the gnostic, based on faith and denied to many Greeks. Clement draws some linguistic distinctions while he touches on something like knowledge of meaning (Strom. 6.17.151.1–152.2 Stählin-Früchtel, pp. 509, 28–510, 16). Actually, let it suffice to say that God is the Lord of all. Lord of all ultimately, nothing omitted by way of exception. Since there are two forms of the truth, names and things—some discuss names, who make much of the beauty of language, the philosophers among the Greeks, while among us, the barbarians, things (are discussed). Moreover, the Lord did not will to use the lowly shape of the body to no good purpose, to the end that someone admiring and marvelling the loveliness and beauty (of speech) might disregard what is said and be divorced from the intelligibles by excessive attention to what is (to be) renounced. Accordingly, we must attend to the meanings, not the expression (only). So then, the logos 12 Clement uses the same term in the plural (dunámeiß) to talk about the ‘powers’ of the divine Logos (Strom. 4.24.156.1–2 Stählin-Früchtel, pp. 317, 24–318, 2); the idea is that the Son is not limited to the concept that concerns each of the spiritual powers (h Aparémfatoß dè hesti t¨jß perì Hekástjß ahutoü t¨wn dunámewn hennoíaß). But there is no close terminological parallel to the passage about barbarian speech. In fact, Clement’s semantic terminology varies from passage to passage. For example, in his description of the miraculously uniform translation of the Hebrew Scriptures into Greek by seventy scholars, the translations agreed in word (léxiß) and meaning (diánoia), Strom. 1.22.149.2 Stählin-Früchtel, p. 92, 18–20. In a sentence in the Paedagogus, Clement recommends that we find the correct expression (tò Hrjtòn) appropriate to the meaning (diánoia) for his purposes at hand, (Paed. 6.37.3 Stählin, p. 112, 20–21; compare Strom. 7.14.84.4 Stählin, p. 60, 16–20). There is another class of linguistic terms which are contained in texts which present Stoic material, for example Strom. 8.9.26.4–5 Stählin-Früchtel, pp. 96, 23–97, 7.

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is not entrusted to those susceptible to the expression and not making progress towards knowledge, for even the crows imitate human voices, although they lack understanding of the thing which they speak, but intellectual apprehension depends on faith. In this way, Homer too says ‘Father of men and gods’, without knowledge who is the Father and in what manner he is the Father. Just as to the one who has hands it is according to nature to grasp and to one who has healthy eyes it is (according to nature) to see the light, so also to the one who obtains faith it is suitable by nature to partake of knowledge, if he desires to construct and to build gold, silver, precious stones upon the foundation (already) laid. Accordingly, this person does not (merely) profess to wish to partake, but has made a beginning; nor (merely) to intend but he is established to be kingly and illuminated and gnostic, not in name (only) but in action it is fitting (for him) to will to take hold of the things.13

Clement mixes various strands from the philosophical schools of Hellenistic and Imperial philosophy. There are traces of the Hellenistic animal rationality debates between Stoics and Skeptics, the worries about the close attention to logic and language among the Stoics and other schools of dialectic, and the criticisms of rhetoric in the Platonist tradition, to name a few of the currents worked into Clement’s Christian views. The linguistic terminology agrees with what Clement knows from the handbooks and notebooks of ancient logic. On the other hand, the combination 13 The translation from the Greek is entirely my own. Strom. 6.17.151.1– 152.2 Stählin-Früchtel, pp. 509, 28–510, 16. Kaí moi hapócrj fánai qeòn e~inai tòn kúrion pántwn. Ahutotel¨wß dè légw tòn kúrion pántwn, ohudenòß Hupoleipoménou katà hexaíresin. h Epeì toínun dúo ehisìn hidéai t¨jß haljqeíaß, tà te honómata kaì tà prágmata, o”i mèn tà honómata légousin, oHi perì tà kállj t¨wn lógwn diatríbonteß, oHi parh “ Elljsi filósofoi, tà prágmata dè parh Hjmïn hesti toïß barbároiß. Ahutíka Ho kúrioß ohu mátjn hjqéljsen ehuteleï cr´jsasqai s´wmatoß morf^¨j, “ina m´j tiß tò Hwraïon hepain¨wn kaì tò kálloß qaumázwn hafist¨jtai t¨wn legoménwn kaì toïß kataleipoménoiß prosanécwn hapotémnjtai t¨wn nojt¨wn. Ohu toínun perì t`jn léxin, hallà perì tà sjmainómena hanastreptéon. Toïß mèn o~un hantiljptikoïß kaì m`j kinjqeïsi pròß gn¨wsin ohu pisteúetai Ho lógoß, hepeì kaì oHi kórakeß hanqrwpeíaß hapomimoüntai fwnàß ‘ennoian ohuk ‘econteß oû légousi prágmatoß, hantíljyiß dè noerà pístewß ‘ecetai. O“utwß kaì “ Omjroß e~ipen pat`jr handr¨wn te qe¨wn te, m`j ehid`wß tíß Ho pat`jr kaì p¨wß Ho pat´jr. H Wß dè t^¨w ceïraß ‘econti tò labeïn katà fúsin kaì t^¨w hofqalmoùß Hugiaínontaß kektjmén^w tò f¨wß hideïn, o“utwß t^¨w pístin ehiljfóti tò gn´wsewß metalabeïn ohikeïon péfuken, ehi prosexergásasqai kaì prosoikodom¨jsai crusón, ‘arguron, líqouß timíouß t^¨w katabljqénti qemelí^w glícoito. Ohu toínun Hupiscneïtai boúlesqai metalambánein, hallà ‘arcetai≥ ohudè méllein, hallh e~inai basilikón te kaì fwteinòn kaì gnwstikòn kaq¨jken, ohudè honómati, hallh ‘erg^w heqélein “aptesqai t¨wn pragmátwn pros¨jken.

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of linguistics and theology is not so easily traced to other sources. As we will find with Origen, key linguistic terms come into play in this kind of passage.14 Clement employs a word for things or realities (prágmata) in contrast to names (hon´ómata), much like he does elsewhere.15 Dialectical studies will enable the spiritual and wise person to see the distinction of names and things clearly, promoting ‘great light’ in the souls of men (Strom. 6.10.82.3 StählinFrüchtel, p. 473, 1–4). He also presents a distinction between expression (léxiß) and meaning (tà sjmainómena); unfortunately, he does not explain the relationship between ‘what is said’ (tà legómena) and ‘the intelligibles’ (tà nojtá). Let me explain more closely the contours as well as the limits of this fragmentary account. Clement’s view is that meanings are intimately connected with thoughts, as emerges from the focus on the operation of intellect (‘ennoia, hantíljyiß noerá) in this passage. Clement makes a contrast in other passages between the language of Scripture, and the thoughts (tàß dianoíaß kaì tà Hupò t¨wn honomátwn djloúmena) that come into play in signification (Strom. 6.15.132.3 Stählin-Früchtel, p. 498, 29–32).16 Richard Sorabji has pointed out that some Neoplatonists and Commentators, who take thoughts to be the significations of words, consider such thoughts as some sort of inner language, but I cannot find this inner

14 Compare Origen, Cels. 4.84 Koetschau, p. 355, 13–22; Origen, In Joh. 4 = Philoc. 4.1 Robinson, p. 41, 9–15. 15 The first occurrence of tà prágmata in this very passage is listed with several other interesting uses in the PGL entry, ‘3. object, reality, opp. name’. Alain Le Boulluec, ‘Clément d’Alexandrie et la conversion du “parler grec”’, in C.G. Conticello (ed), Alexandrie antique et chrétienne. Clément et Origène (Paris, 2006), pp. 63–79 at 66–7 assumes too hastily that Clement is drawing heavily from Stoic linguistics in this passage. It is helpful to take into account the terminology from the logical treatise which comprises Book 8 of the Stromata, especially Strom. 8.8.23.1 Stählin, p. 94, 5–12. Clement distinguishes here between names, concepts, and things (honómata, no´jmata, prágmata). Osborn, Clement of Alexandria, pp. 206–7 touches briefly on the Aristotelian and Stoic roots of this treatise. 16 This is a difficult passage in other respects besides the points that I find most interesting. Osborn, Clement of Alexandria, p. 59, tracks the contrast of style and meaning in Clement’s thought. ‘Prophecy does not bother about lucidity of style but conceals the truth in many ways, so that the light will dawn only on those initiated into knowledge, those who in love seek the truth (6.15.129.4). ... We do not look to the words but to the thoughts or noetic realities displayed by the words. The words are the body of the earthly Moses. We make every effort to find the heavenly Moses who is with the angels (6.15.132.3).’ Osborn assumes that the thoughts expressed in the Scriptures are closely identified with noetic realities, but I do not see where Clement explains the connection.

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language definitely operative in Clement. Or take the Aristotelian heritage oféxplaining rational thought by rejecting the role of Platonic Forms and using universal concepts (no´jmata), forms (e‘idj), and essences, or rather, using propositional judgments of what is and is not the case. This apparatus employing universal concepts and judgments presupposes language, in that universal concepts require words, while propositional judgments require sentence structure. I don’t quite find these elements developed anywhere by Clement into a coherent account of the relationship of mind and language. What we do find are claims that the gnostic is mentally shaped and purified into the divine image (ehik´wn) by the power of the divine mind, hence his communication with other parties is ordered by divine truth. Also, the ascent of the soul will ultimately experience the complete indwelling of Logos, filled with pure light of truth beyond the structures of language (lógoß hascjmátistoß).18 I will round off my consideration of this passage with some notice of how philosophy relates to language. Clement’s central argument proceeds along the following lines. Under the governance of divine providence, philosophy came as a propaedeutic gift which points towards the fulfillment through Christ. Language involves two basic elements, speech and intelligible content. The meaning of language is more important than its mode of presentation to the hearer, in fact the philosophers are too engrossed with the logical and rhetorical properties of language.19 Elsewhere, Clement claims 17 Richard Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators, 200–600 AD. A Sourcebook (3 vols, London, 2004), vol. 3, pp. 205–13. 18 Strom. 3.5.42.6, Stählin-Früchtel, p. 215, 23–5; Strom. 4.23.152.3 StählinFrüchtel, pp. 315, 31–316, 4; Exc. 27.3–5 Stählin, p. 116, 2–14. Clement says memorably at Strom. 6.3.34.3 Stählin-Früchtel, p. 448, 14–18, Hor¨âß, “opwß Hj kuriak`j fwn`j lógoß hascjmátistoß≥ Hj toü lógou dúnamiß, Hr¨jma kuríou fwteinón, hal´jqeia ohuranóqen ‘anwqen hepì t`jn sunagwg`jn t¨jß hekkljsíaß hafigménj, dià fwtein¨jß t¨jß prosecoüß diakoníaß hen´jrgei. I refer the interested reader to further references and elaboration by Le Boulluec, ‘La conversion du “parler grec”’, pp. 78–9. 19 Osborn, Clement of Alexandria, p. 25. ‘The Greeks are concerned with words and the barbarians are concerned with things. Appropriately, the Lord had a physical body of quite ordinary aspect, so that he would draw people by the intelligible content of his message rather than his outward charm. Expression is not as important as signification. There was a widespread tradition concerning the absence of physical beauty in Christ.’ Osborn, Clement of Alexandria, p. 25, n. 86 provides several references to these fascinating early Christian claims about the physical appearance of Christ. Perhaps more directly relevant is the tendency in several later Greek sources (for example, Epictetus, Diss. 1.8.4–10 Schenkl) to warn against excessive attention to the sort of subtleties of logic and language found in the Stoics and Dialecticians, a moralistic tradition evaluated by Jonathan Barnes,

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that the Greek philosophers are dependent on the Barbarians, who benefited from divine grace (cáriß); the Greeks cleverly dressed up these truths with their language (Strom. 6.7.54.1–56.2 Stählin-Früchtel, pp. 459, 19–460, 16). Their understanding of truth is inferior to the divinely instructed gnostic, similar to the shortcomings in representation we discern in skilled painters who follow the laws of perspective rather than the laws of nature. But even the Greek language can be reformed to express the truth along the lines of the prophetic language captured in the Septuagint, not by streamlining the style so much as by showing the truth indirectly and enigmatically.20 Language, Immateriality, and Prayer Clement boosts the tradition in Greek Patristics, continued by Origen and paralleled to some extent in Neoplatonism, of philosophical explanation of prayer. The Neoplatonists Porphyry and Iamblichus consider the problem of how it is possible for intellectual beings to hear our speech, in the wake of similar Stoic worries. And it has been argued that Clement’s notion of prayer as a pure communion of soul meeting God, without the constraints inherent to the human languages, is dependent on the Platonist tradition, attested by Plutarch, of communication between sages and ‘demonic’ intellects.21 However, the Neoplatonists conceive of the communication between divine and human as like touching like—one might compare the Stoic piety of assimilation to divine rationality. No divine physical organs of hearing are required, insofar as the prayer is offered in some sense incorporeally within the incorporeal knowing embrace of the gods.22 Clement is similarly interested Logic and the Imperial Stoa (Leiden, 1997). It is this tradition that Clement twists in a Christian direction, charging the philosophers with linguistic artifice. It is his brand of Christian intellectualism, as Le Boulluec, ‘La conversion du “parler grec”’, 69–71 shows, which takes him beyond simply promoting a neutral communication of thought, including the deeper knowledge based on faith and the otherworldly insight of the Hebrew prophets as expressed in Ancient Hebrew. 20 Le Boulluec, ‘La conversion du “parler grec”’, pp. 69–75 pursues this point, and I return in the next section on prayer to what I call his ‘obscurity is helpful’ story. 21 Le Boulluec, ‘La conversion du “parler grec”’, pp. 76–7. 22 Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators, vol. 1, pp. 369–410 provides an introduction to the philosophy of religious practice among Neoplatonists and Christians, a topic of increasing research attention. In particular, the conversation between Porphyry and Iamblichus is presented in a series of translated passages in Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators, vol. 1, pp. 390–96. The fascinating topic of Stoic religious practice is addressed by Keimpe Algra, ‘Stoic Theology’, in B. Inwood (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics (Cambridge, 2003),

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in how communication with an immaterial God is possible for the embodied soul seeking perfection by the indwelling power of the divine Logos.23 It is noteworthy that these particular worries do not figure in Origen’s treatise On Prayer, while Clement’s valuable discussion in the seventh book of the Stromata amounts to a treatise on prayer in its own right. Several interesting arguments and views are presented in connection with prayer, including the relationship of speech to sensory perception, as well as why language is transcended in the ascent of the Christian sage. Let us first consider his response to the problem in the course of a detailed elaboration of the qualities of the Christian sage, including his practice of prayer (Strom. 7.7.43.1–5 Stählin, p. 32, 17–32).24 We will then examine other passages which connect to central themes in his theory of language. Every place is sacred, in reality, in which we receive the thought of God, as it is with time also. And just when the rightly intentioned and thankful (gnostic) makes petition by prayer, to an extent he co-operates in some way with a view to receiving (an answer to prayer), joyfully laying hold of what is petitioned through his prayers. For whenever the giver of blessings receives the superabundance from us, all goods at once come upon the (prayerful) apprehension itself. However one looks at it, the method is by prayer, in the way things stand with a view to what is fitting. And if voice and expressions are granted to us for the purpose of (communicating) thought, how will God fail to hear the soul and mind itself, seeing that in our present estate, soul hears soul and mind hears mind? From this (we see that) God is not limited by polyphonic tongues, as (bedevils) the interpreters, but rather at one strike attends the thoughts of all men, and the very thing the voice means for our benefit, this our thought speaks to God, which (God) already knew prior to creation would come to (our) intellection. So then it is not possible (for the gnostic) to send prayer by the voice to heaven, exerting only from within the entire spiritual into intelligible voice, according to the continuous reversion towards the divine.25 pp. 153–78 at 174–7. I note with pleasure Algra’s dismissal of the remarkable claim of Max Pohlenz that aligns the Stoic concept of deity with the Hebraic (and Christian) theology of a transcendent God, in Algra, ‘Stoic Theology’, p. 172, n. 52. 23 Osborn, Clement of Alexandria, p. 261. ‘Within intimacy of prayer and conversation with God the true sage finds perfection. Such prayer is so precious that no occasion for it must be neglected. ... So close is this relation with the father who is the almighty power, that the content of prayer is received immediately and the believer is joined to the spirit in boundless love.’ 24 I refer the reader to Osborn, Clement of Alexandria, pp. 261–4 for a detailed presentation of the spiritual theology germane to the philosophical problems of interest. 25 The translation is entirely my own. I complete the sense of the Greek with words in round brackets. Strom. 7.7.43.1–5 Stählin, p. 32, 17–32. Päß o~un kaì tópoß Hieròß t^¨w ‘onti, hen ^¨w t`jn hepínoian toü qeoü lambánomen, kaì crónoß. “ Otan dè

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Clement’s answer is that God does not hear like we do, for a divine being has the power of spiritual hearing, while lacking physical organs of communication. This emerges from the argument for the claim that God receives prayer from human minds alone, in view of the communicative success of incarnate human minds using spoken language. God’s hearing is spiritually and immaterially accomplished, in fact audible human vocal utterance would be irrelevant from the divine point of view. In other passages, Clement stresses the impotence of human speech, particularly in comparison to divine speech (Strom. 6.7.57.4–5 StählinFrüchtel, pp. 460, 29–461, 3; 6.18.166.1–2 Stählin-Früchtel, p. 517, 17–23); this is the consequence of inferiority in power.26 Our language suffers from inadequacy, it can be dangerous to speak of holy things plainly. In fact, speaking obscurely and symbolically can express the truth in philosophy more adequately (Strom. 5.9.56.1–5.10.65.3 Stählin-Früchtel, pp. 364, 4–370, 3). Allegorical interpretation is a powerful way to capture the general sense behind (or above) the words (ohuc Hapl¨wß katà pánta tà honómata ... hallh “osa t¨jß dianoíaß t¨jß kaqólou sjmantiká). As for theology, God is above language and concept, divine power reveals God even if divinity cannot really be expressed (Strom. 5.10.65.2 Stählin-Früchtel, p. 369, 26–8; Strom. 5.11.71.5 Stählin-Früchtel, p. 374, 20–22).27 The gnostic will eventually assume intelligible contact in the course of spiritual ‘reversion’ (hepistrof´j) towards the creator. Perhaps Clement understands different levels of mental activity, with the fullness of divine power beyond all possible levels intellectual and spiritual attainment— similar to the view we find rigorously explained in a number of Plotinian treatises on the progressive unification of the soul with the One. As Henny

Ho ehuproaíretoß Homoü kaì ehucáristoß dih ehuc¨jß ahit¨jtai, Ham^¨j gé p^j sunergeï ti pròß t`jn l¨jyin, hasménwß dih ˆwn e‘ucetai tò poqoúmenon lambánwn. h Epàn gàr tò parh Hjm¨wn ehuepíforon Ho t¨wn hagaq¨wn láb^j dot´jr, haqróa pánta t^¨j sull´jyei ahut^¨j “epetai tà hagaqá. h Amélei hexetázetai, dià t¨jß ehuc¨jß Ho trópoß, p¨wß ‘ecei pròß tò pros¨jkon. Ehi dè Hj fwn`j kaì Hj léxiß t¨jß no´jsewß cárin dédotai Hjmïn, p¨wß ohucì ahut¨jß t¨jß yuc¨jß kaì toü noü hepakoúei Ho qeóß, “opou ge ‘jdj yuc`j yuc¨jß kaì noüß noòß hepaíei; “ Oqen tàß poluf´wnouß gl´wssaß ohuk hanaménei Ho qeòß kaqáper oHi parà hanqr´wpwn Hermjneïß, hallh Hapaxapl¨wß Hapántwn gnwrízei tàß no´jseiß, kaì “oper Hjmïn Hj fwn`j sjmaínei, toüto t^¨w qe^¨w Hj ‘ennoia Hjm¨wn laleï, ”jn kaì prò t¨jß djmiourgíaß ehiß nójsin “jxousan hjpístato. ‘ Exestin o~un mjdè fwn^¨j t`jn ehuc`jn parapémpein, sunteínonta mónon [dh ] ‘endoqen tò pneumatikòn pän ehiß fwn`jn t`jn nojt`jn katà t`jn haperíspaston pròß tòn qeòn hepistrof´jn. 26 I owe this reference to Hägg, Clement of Alexandria, p. 248. 27 Hägg, Clement of Alexandria, pp. 147–61 provides a more detailed account.

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Hägg points out, Clement relies heavily on reverential silence as a higher condition than speech, as well as his ‘obscurity is helpful’ story. Whereas language is seen as a commitment to the senses, the mind is the medium through which man may worship God in ‘silence and holy fear’ (Strom. 7.2.3), in some kind of speechless contemplation. So when enigmas, metaphors, and allegories have imperfectly pointed at the truth, what is left is nothing but silence. The cause which is beyond (tò hepékeina a‘ition) lies beyond the realm of language and cannot be transmitted by words, but is to be worshipped in silence (sig^¨j). ... Silence is for Clement a symbol of a higher form of knowledge, a symbol of pure thought. Words, belonging to the realm of senses, are naturally of a lower quality.28

Clement is not too forthcoming about the features of pure thought, in particular how it relates to the divine mind. In any event, adopting some standard Platonist ideas, Clementine prayer involves a ‘reversion’ away from worldly things. Prayer not only functions by bringing us closer to God, there is also the mental communion with a distinct spiritual entity. This intelligible contact is to some degree assimilated to the unity of divine nature, not diversified into different languages or discretely presented in parcels of meaning. And surely this purer and more continuous mental contact is closer to the commerce of angels. For it is removed from utterance, as the perfected soul is endowed with the perfect divine Logos beyond language (Strom. 7.7.39.3–6 Stählin, p. 30, 8–18, compare Strom. 1.21.143.1 Stählin-Früchtel, p. 88, 18–22).29 Now I turn to a further dimension of the connection between unspoken communication and God’s knowledge of meaning. I will try to show the Stoic contribution to Clement’s thought. Clement wants to show that God is like us in that God attends to matters on earth, particularly the expressions of the elect, but is quite removed from human nature by dispensing with sense perception in the divine life of pure mind and spirit. For God knows all speech and thought alike, although it is also claimed that the prayers of the 28 Hägg, Clement of Alexandria, pp. 163–4. 29 Osborn, Clement of Alexandria, pp. 25–6 presents this point eloquently. ‘Finally, the soul of the true Christian becomes so endowed with logos that it reaches the condition of the great high priest and is directly inspired by the logos himself. No longer is such a soul taught by scripture, but lays hold of ultimate reality; no longer is it joined to the logos but becomes logos itself (exc 27.3–5). The voice of the lord is word without shape, pure light and truth itself. So beyond all language there remains another order of communication conveyed by the metaphor of light in a relationship which is face to face with God; in this relationship, light becomes logos.’ Osborn, Clement of Alexandria, pp. 263–8 further describes the immediacy of spiritual contact involved in the higher reaches of prayer.

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saints penetrate heaven and earth, due to the intellectual provenance of such thoughts (Strom. 7.7.36.5–37.6 Stählin, pp. 28, 23–29, 15). For he (the gnostic) is convinced that God knows and hears everything, not only in regard to voice, but also in regard to thought, because the hearing in us, operating through bodily orifices, does not have the comprehension by virtue of the bodily power, but rather by virtue of a certain psychical perception and intellection distinguishing vocal utterances which signify something. In point of fact, God is not anthropomorphic for the sake of this, in order that (God) truly hears, nor is there need to Him of sense perceptions, according to the Stoics, particularly in the case of hearing and sight, for it is not possible ever to comprehend otherwise. But actually the receptivity of the air, and the extremely acute intellectual perception of the angels, and the power touching the soul in its awareness by a certain unspeakable power apart from sensory hearing, knows all things at the moment of thought. And if someone should say that the voice does not arrive with God, being rolled about down here in atmospheric dispersal, on the contrary (we claim that) the thoughts of the saints pierce not only the air, but also the entire cosmos.30

This argument has a similar structure as the ‘prayer’ argument above, which concluded that divine hearing is spiritually and immaterially accomplished. Clement moves here from human understanding of utterances by virtue of the power of soul, in order to show universal divine knowledge of meaning. The flaws of this argument will not detain us. Actually, the argument has the virtue of showing us how Clement conceives of the subordination of the physical to the intellectual in explaining perception, which in turn helps explain divine omniscience with reference to human thought and language meaning. When communication and understanding is conceived as essentially an intellectual matter, the problems of how God attends to everyone, how God hears prayer without the use of ears, how God might change His mind, and so on, might 30 The translation is entirely my own. The Greek text of Stählin places the kaì in square brackets as shown. Strom. 7.7.36.5–37.6 Stählin, pp. 28, 23–29, 15. Pépeistai gàr ehidénai pánta tòn qeòn kaì hepaíein, ohuc “oti t¨jß fwn¨jß mónon, hallà kaì t¨jß hennoíaß, hepeì kaì Hj hako`j hen Hjmïn, dià swmatik¨wn pórwn henergouménj, ohu dià t¨jß swmatik¨jß dunámewß ‘ecei t`jn hantíljyin, hallà diá tinoß yucik¨jß ahisq´jsewß kaì t¨jß diakritik¨jß t¨wn sjmainous¨wn ti fwn¨wn no´jsewß. O‘ukoun hanqrwpoeid`jß Ho qeòß toüdh “eneka, [kaì] “ina hakoús^j, ohudè ahisq´jsewn ahut^¨w deï, kaqáper ‘jresen toïß Stwikoïß, málista hako¨jß kaì ‘oyewß, m`j gàr dúnasqaí pote Hetérwß hantilabésqai≥ hallà kaì tò ehupaqèß toü haéroß kaì Hj hoxutátj sunaísqjsiß t¨wn haggélwn “j te toü suneidótoß hepafwménj t¨jß yuc¨jß dúnamiß dunámei tinì harr´jt^w kaì ‘aneu t¨jß ahisqjt¨jß hako¨jß “ama no´jmati pánta gin´wskei≥ k’an m`j t`jn fwn´jn tiß hexikneïsqai pròß tòn qeòn lég^j kátw perì tòn haéra kulindouménjn, hallà tà no´jmata t¨wn Hagíwn témnei ohu mónon tòn haéra, hallà kaì tòn “olon kósmon.

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not appear so pressing. This general understanding of divine hearing apart from sense perception has been traced to Philo, who may have influenced Clement on this point.31 However, the mention of the Stoics evokes the possibility that Clement depends on Stoic theology to some extent, which was always connected to Stoic physics. And some Stoic physics seems to be woven into Clement’s assumption here of cosmic unity and cohesion, under the control of pervading ‘pneumatic tension’ in the world, pneumatikòß tónoß (Strom. 5.8.48.2–3 Stählin-Früchtel, p. 358, 15–8 = SVF 2.447). In fact, Chrysippus is reported by Diogenes Laertius in very similar terms as in Clement’s own testimony of Stoic ‘pneumatic tension’. Intelligence (noüß) pervades the entire ordered world, much like the soul permeates the entire body (D.L. 7.138)—an immanent Stoic deity is thoroughly mixed in with matter. This shows more clearly how it is natural for Clement to assume a sort of field in which thought zips around the cosmos by the power of intellection. Thought is received with no constraints to obstruct divine immediate knowledge of prayer, which strictly speaking concerns an entirely transcendent God. Other sources show the Stoics in defense of their materialist, immanent view of divinity. Leaving aside detailed consideration of the broader question of Clement’s possible appropriation of Stoic rejection of anthropomorphic theology (contrary to Epicurus), I will merely point out the following.32 It is arguable that at least by the time of Diogenes of Babylon, the Stoic denial of theological anthropomorphism included denial of divine sense perception, with special reference to sight and hearing.33 This would correspond nicely to what we find in Clement. Conclusion I find it difficult to show that Clement has worked out the relationship of language and mind, particularly in the area of relating intelligible divine 31 In one passage (Quaest. Ex. 2.34 Aucher), Philo speaks of a peculiar ‘direct hearing’ when commenting on Ex. 24.7. I owe this reference and the following quote to H. Gregory Snyder, Teachers and Texts in the Ancient World (London, 2000), p. 133. ‘Philo believes that a special kind of reading is indicated, one in which the sound does not fall on the ear from outside. It is as though the strings of the understanding were plucked directly, circumventing the act of hearing.’ 32 Dirk Obbink (ed.), Philodemus. On Piety, Part 1 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 5–12 examines the anthropomorphic tendencies of Epicurus’ theology. 33 I refer to Obbink, Philodemus, pp. 19–23; Algra, ‘Stoic Theology’, pp. 156–78. Of course, this point deserves to be examined with far greater attention than I can offer here.

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reality to the structures and meaning of language. However, his contributions are worthwhile. We encounter in Clement the Philonic view that meanings are thoughts, as well as his claim that the knowledge of meaning sought by the Christian sage depends on God’s active power, rather than an independent structure of immaterial reality. We are to be directed upwards to the intelligible world, which will bring us beyond language to a stage of pure thought. Clement develops the picture somewhat better on the other end of knowing, in that God’s knowledge of meaning penetrates to the level of thought apart from the senses and bodily organs, perceiving all thoughts directed by the practice of prayer.

Chapter 3

Origen Origen, a Christian theologian and biblical exegete of the third century (A.D. 185–A.D. 254), is an influential figure who lived, taught, and studied in the intellectual world of Alexandria. It is certain that he was influenced by Philo’s body of work, although he departs from Philo at times.1 In this chapter I will argue that Origen essentially agrees with Philo that language involves an immaterial and intelligible component, although he introduces some points of his own. Usually, Origen presents a traditional (Philonic) view of incorporeal meanings conveyed by the vehicle of vocal utterances. But in Origen we also find the claim that logos (language) is something distinct from the human voice. I will try to relate this view to his understanding of how in our embodied state we are dependent on physical means of communication. Communication is still possible for us by virtue of the indwelling power of logos. Origen distinguishes between voice and language. Instead of relying heavily on the traditional logos distinction, we find Origen introducing alternative conceptual schemes. In his commentary on John’s gospel, the voice is not usually conceived as the outward version of the inner language of the soul. Instead, the voice, not intelligible in its own right, presents intelligible language. For the voice, a corporeal entity, can only be understood by virtue of language, a separate incorporeal entity. In what follows, I will try to explain these remarkable philosophical shifts, and to show that on occasion, there are partial echoes of the traditional logos distinction.

1 David T. Runia, Philo in Early Christian Literature (Assen, 1993), pp. 157–83; David T. Runia, Philo and the Church Fathers, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae (Leiden, 1995), pp. 117–25; Hans G. Thümmel, ‘Philon und Origenes’, in L. Perrone, P. Bernardino and D. Marchini (eds), Origeniana Octava. Origen and the Alexandrian Tradition, Papers of the 8th International Origen Congress, Pisa, 27–31 August, 2001 (2 vols, Leuven, 2003), pp. 275–86 have addressed these questions recently. I will not argue for dependence of Origen on Philo for any of the ideas emerging in this chapter, limiting myself to some key comparisons.

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Christian Platonism, Psychology Origen must be understood in light of his intellectual relationship to Platonism. Origen has often been understood to be a Christian Platonist in a strong sense, whose familiarity with Greek philosophy induced him to depart from the apostolic doctrines. This view has recently come under close scrutiny.2 At least it is beyond dispute that he defends certain uses of pagan philosophy for purposes of theological reflection and biblical interpretation and his uses of philosophical terminology are abundant. Speaking of Origen’s ‘weak’ Christian Platonism might be closer to the mark. It is clear that the teachings of the philosophical schools make important contributions to Origen’s philosophical views and arguments. A good example of the complexity of philosophical influence emerges in connection with Origen’s stance towards the standard distinction familiar from previous chapters. Max Mühl claims that Origen, in contrast to the early Christian apologists as well as many subsequent theologians, does not make much constructive and explicit theological use of the traditional philosophical distinction between inner speech (lógoß hendiáqetoß) and outer speech (lógoß proforikóß), according to which inner speech is the domain of reason, while outer speech is the expression of reason in language. As noted in Chapter 2, Mark Edwards vigorously defends this kind of view, claiming that already in the time of Clement some previous uses of the logos distinction among the Greek Christian apologists were considered theologically unacceptable, in view of the eternal generation of the Logos from the Father.3 I agree that as a theological formula it is generally avoided. This development is all the more intriguing for the Origen scholar on account of his general knowledge of the distinction in the philosophical debates

2 Mark J. Edwards, Origen Against Plato (Aldershot, 2002) argues that Origen’s understanding of human nature is anti-Platonist in essentials, against a long scholarly tradition, including the outstanding revisionist work on Origen’s ‘Platonism’ by Hal Koch, Pronoia und Paideusis (Berlin und Leipzig, 1932), pp. 229–304. 3 Max Mühl, ‘Der lógoß hendiáqetoß und proforikóß von der älteren Stoa bis zur Synode von Sirmium 351’, Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte, 7 (1962): 7–56 at 52–3; Mark J. Edwards, ‘Clement of Alexandria and his Doctrine of the Logos’, Vigiliae Christianae, 54 (2000): 159–77. Compare Christopher Stead, ‘The Concept of Mind and the Concept of God in the Christian Fathers’, in B. Hebblethwaite and S.R. Sutherland (eds), The Philosophical Frontiers of Christian Theology (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 39–54 at 50–51. Cels. 6.65 Koetschau, p. 135, 18–25 represents a partial exception to the views of Mühl and Edwards that Origen has no positive theological use for the logos distinction. Mark J. Edwards, ‘Clement of Alexandria’, p. 162 points out that there is no evidence for employment of the distinction in Stoic theology.

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of the Hellenistic period, as is clear from the Contra Celsum. Besides its theological defects (in one passage Origen insists that the Logos is not mere utterance but rather is substantial), Origen may have doubted that the logos distinction corresponds closely to anything taught in the Scriptures. In this connection, Origen interprets the Scriptures in terms of a divided psychology of soul (yuc´j) and spirit, in which the spirit, often closely identified with the mind (noüß), is the better part of the soul in the struggle against the lower desires. Usually, neither the Platonic tripartite soul is meant, nor the Stoic division between the ruling, rational part of the soul and the other parts with their respective functions.5 The Immateriality of Mind Since all of Origen’s Christian philosophy has a distinctly theological tint, we should begin with the immateriality of the divine mind. Origen introduces the immateriality of divine mind very early in his exposition of God the Father in his On First Principles (Princ. 1.1.6–7 Koetschau, pp. 20, 24–24, 21). God is not in any sense a body nor is God contained in a body, rather God is a simple intellectual nature (intellectualis natura simplex). Origen also claims in his defense of Christianity against Celsus (Cels. 7.38 Koetschau, p. 188, 11–12) that God is mind (noüß), simple and invisible and incorporeal. Berchman summarizes Origen’s Platonist Christian theology as follows. For Origen God the Father is an eternal, ungenerated intellect (noüß); an intellect at rest. Moreover as first principle God is called ohusía, monáß, “enaß ... That God is called a One and an intellect is common in Middle Platonism. That Origen calls his first principle substance (ohusía) is also not unprecedented in later Platonism and Aristotelianism.6 4 Henry Chadwick, ‘Origen, Celsus, and the Stoa’, The Journal of Theological Studies, 48 (1947): 34–49 at 36–7. 5 Paul S. MacDonald, History of the Concept of Mind (Aldershot, 2003), pp. 132–3 references a few passages in Origen which seem to adopt Platonic psychology. Koch, Pronoia und Paideusis, p. 207 outlines some differences from Stoicism, not confined to psychology. As Anders-Christian L. Jacobsen, ‘Origen on the Human Body’, in Origeniana Octava, pp. 649–56 at 650 has recently pointed out, in Origen’s early work there is a ‘cooling’ transformation of mind (noüß) into soul (yuc´j), Princ. 2.8.3–4 Koetschau, pp. 155, 7–162, 10. However, as is also clear from this passage, the transformation is not total and is complicated by the persistence of the mind as the better part of the soul in human incarnate existence, being stronger in some people than in others. 6 Robert M. Berchman, ‘Origen on The Categories: A Study in Later Platonic First Principles’, in R.J. Daly (ed.), Origeniana Quinta. Origenism and Later Developments, Papers of the 5th International Origen Congress, Boston,

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God characterized as mind, and God is the source from which springs every other intellectual nature or mind. In the wake of Philo, Origen constructs a dualist picture of the minds created by God in sharp contrast to bodies, in general agreement with the Platonist and Pythagorean tradition.7 Origen argues extensively against the view that the mind and the soul are corporeal (Princ. 1.1.7 Koetschau, pp. 23, 15–24, 21). However, in these arguments Origen does not rely on a two world scheme such as we find in Philo; Origen seems to have little use for the ‘noetic cosmos’ of the Platonists. Edwards points out some crucial differences. Origen formally denies in his First Principles the existence of a world distinct from our own and constituted by the Ideas, or intellectual Forms, of Greek philosophy [Princ. 2.3.6 Koetschau] ... he adopts the locution kosmos noêtos sparingly, and only in one instance does it clearly denote a world of incorporeals superior to the human intellect.8

The mind may be directed towards intelligible objects, but not Platonic Forms as proper objects of knowledge, nor, as in Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism, the Ideas as the upper reaches of religious devotion.9 Voice and Language Let me preface this section with some remarks on Origen’s notion of the divine Word. The Logos is derived from the Father, being unquestionably divine although subordinate in status. Unlike Philo, Origen’s Logos proceeds 14–18 August, 1989 (Leuven, 1992), pp. 231–52 at 236. In spite of his focus on philosophical issues, it is not fair to place Berchman in the ‘strong’ Christian Platonism camp attacked by Edwards (see my n. 2). Berchman tends to view Origen as essentially a Christian thinker who is conditioned in complex ways by various strands in the philosophical tradition. 7 The adapted traditional metaphysical dualism I find in Origen has little to do with the cosmological and anthropological dualisms discussed by some Origen scholars, for example Padraig O’Cleirigh, ‘The Dualism of Origen’, in Origeniana Quinta, pp. 346–50. MacDonald, History of the Concept of Mind, pp. 133–4; Gerald Bostock, ‘Origen and the Pythagoreanism of Alexandria’, in Origeniana Octava, pp. 465–78, are more in tune with the dualism of body and spirit. 8 Edwards, Origen Against Plato, p. 96; compare Berchman, ‘Origen on The Categories’, p. 236 who seems to miss this point. Gerald Bostock, ‘Origen’s Philosophy of Creation’, in Origeniana Quinta, pp. 253–69 at 253–4 emphasizes that the realm of incorporeal reality tends to be identified by Origen with the spiritual world of Biblical tradition. 9 Koch, Pronoia und Paideusis, pp. 233–4.

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from the Father as a distinct hypostasis, being eternally distinct as generated as the ‘revealed mind’ from the Father (Princ. 1.2.3 Koetschau, p. 30, 9–19; 1.4.5 Koetschau, pp. 67, 16–68, 3; compare Cels. 3.21 Koetschau, p. 218, 3–5). Of course, there is also the doctrine of the incarnation of the Logos. Being made incarnate, the Logos is subject to separation from the Father, although his divinity is preserved. Certain attributes are shared with God (for example, immortality) in a unique way.10 The Logos represents God’s mind towards the world in such a way as to make possible the understanding of God.11 Philo distinguishes more sharply than Origen the contents of the divine mind from God’s providential work and communication towards the world. Nevertheless, Origen also sounds vaguely Platonist at times. Similar to a Middle Platonist second principle, his Logos reveals the truth from a transcendent source.12 And although he shuns talk of the Ideas or Forms as the thoughts in God’s mind, he does seem to build them right into his notion of divine Logos.13 The Logos is active in the created order in bringing about the divine will, but unlike the Stoic logos as the active and creative principle immanent in all things, mediation between heaven and earth is the dominant idea in Origen.14 Now we turn to the alternative philosophical scheme. We must examine Origen’s distinction between voice (fwn´j) and language (lógoß), presented in a key text (In Joh. 2.32 Preuschen, pp. 89, 22–90, 10). This distinction is part of an interesting and neglected account of why vocal sounds are intelligible. It is logos that explains why the human voice is intelligible to hearers. It forms 10 Hermann J. Vogt, ‘Beobachtungen zum Johannes-Kommentar des Origenes’, in W. Geerlings (ed.), Origenes als Exeget (Paderborn, 1999), pp. 187–205 at 200–201 presents this aspect of the incarnate Logos, the true image of God, by contrast with the limits of Christ, the Son of Man, with reference to Origen’s commentary on John’s gospel. 11 Koch, Pronoia und Paideusis, pp. 71, 288 discusses this point, arguing that Origen’s distinction between a human Jesus who suffers and lives (like us) and a changeless, passionless Logos (unlike us) undermines the role the Logos is supposed to serve in revealing God to humanity. 12 Berchman, ‘Origen on The Categories’, p. 236; J. Rebecca Lyman, Christology and Cosmology (Oxford, 1993), p. 72 provide detailed accounts. 13 Henri Crouzel, Origène et la philosophie (Paris, 1962), p. 52 wrongly presents Origen’s divine logos in terms more proper to Philo’s divine logos. ‘Le Verbe a pour Origène un double rôle dans la création, celui d’exécuteur ad extra de la volonté du Père et celui de modèle, en tant qu’il est Sagesse, Monde intelligible contenant les idées et les “raisons” des êtres.’ Koch, Pronoia und Paideusis, pp. 255–6 provides discussion and a comparison to Albinus, the Middle Platonist. 14 Bostock, ‘Origen’s Philosophy of Creation’, p. 259 discusses the unity but also the separation of transcendent Father and mediating Logos with reference to creation of the sensible world.

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the basis for some of his most interesting remarks on language, in connection with his commentary on Jn. 1.6 (‘There was a man sent from God, whose name was John.’). Origen’s theological point is that distinguishing voice and language is useful not only to explain the role of John the Baptist, but also to avoid any harmful notions of divinity arising from the homonymy of the lexicographically complicated Greek word logos. I think that just as voice and logos differ in us—surely voice signifies nothing insofar as it is capable on some occasion of being uttered without logos, while it is possible for what is in fact logos to be recited in the mind apart from voice, as when we meditate within ourselves—so also John, being a voice by analogy while Christ is logos, differs from this man the savior, who is according to a certain notion logos. And John himself invites me to this (view), as to who he is, when responding to those questioning (him): ‘I am the voice of one crying in the wilderness, prepare the way of the Lord, make straight his paths.’ And perhaps for this reason Zacharias lost the voice when he disbelieved the origin of the voice revealing the logos of God, receiving it again when the voice, the forerunner of the logos, was born. For it is necessary to listen attentively to voice, to the end that after these things the mind is capable of receiving the logos revealed by the voice. Hence John is a little older according to birth than Christ. For we perceive voice before logos. And also John reveals Christ; for logos is presented by voice. And also Christ is baptized by John, John admitting that he should be baptized by him. In the case of men, logos is purified by voice, although logos naturally purifies every voice that signifies. And in truth when John reveals Christ, a man reveals God and savior who is incorporeal, as also voice (reveals) logos (which is incorporeal).15 15 The words in round brackets are meant to complete the sense of the Greek. In Joh. 2.32 Preuschen, pp. 89, 22–90, 10. H Jgoumai dè “oti “wsper hen Hjmïn fwn`j kaì lógoß diaférei, dunaménjß méntoi gé pote fwn¨jß t¨jß mjdèn sjmainoúsjß proféresqai cwrìß lógou, o“iou te dè ‘ontoß kaì lógou cwrìß t^¨w n^¨w hapaggéllesqai fwn¨jß, Hwß hepàn hen Heautoïß diexodeúwmen, o“utw toü swt¨jroß katá tina hepínoian ‘ontoß lógou diaférei toútou Ho h Iwánnjß, Hwß pròß t`jn hanalogían toü cristoü tugcánontoß lógou fwn`j ‘wn.h Epì toüto dé me prokaleïtai ahutòß Ho h Iwánnjß, “ostiß potè e‘ij, pròß toùß punqanoménouß hapokrinómenoß≥ h Eg`w fwn`j bo¨wntoß hen t^¨j her´jm^w≥ H Etoimásate t`jn Hodòn kuríou, ehuqeíaß poieïte tàß tríbouß ahutoü. Kaì táca dià toüto hapist´jsaß Ho Zacaríaß t^¨j genései t¨jß deiknuoúsjß tòn lógon toü qeoü fwn¨jß hapóllusi t`jn fwn´jn, lambánwn ahut´jn, “ote gennätai Hj pródromoß toü logoü fwn´j. h Enwtísasqai gàr deï fwn´jn, “ina metà taüta Ho noüß tòn deinúmenon Hupò t¨jß fwn¨jß lógon déxasqai dunjq^¨j. Dióper kaì holíg^w presbúteroß katà tò gennäsqai Ho h Iwánnjß hestì toü cristoü≥ fwn¨jß gàr prò lógou hantilambanómeqa. h Allà kaì deíknusi tòn cristòn Ho h Iwánnjß≥ fwn^¨j gàr parístatai Ho lógoß. h Allà kaì baptízetai Hupò h Iw´ánnou Ho cristóß, Homologoüntoß creían ‘ecein Huph ahutoü baptisq¨jnai≥ hanqr´wpoiß gàr Hupò

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Let me make some preliminary remarks. The main business of this passage, of course, is to develop a conceptual parallel which explains the nature and function of John the Baptist in relation to Christ. Why does Origen adopt a distinction between voice and language in departure from the traditional logos distinction? One way of explaining this departure is that Origen wishes to avoid any harmful notions of divinity arising from certain uses of the word logos. Of course, this may not be as directly relevant as his thoughts about language being developed in view of the unique biblical role of John the Baptist. In another piece of his Johannine commentary (In Joh. 1.24 Preuschen, p. 29, 17–31), Origen censures the heretics for seeking scriptural passages to support their theology of a divine logos conceived merely as the voice or utterance (proforàn) of God; this would amount to a denial of the reality (Hupóstasin) or substance (ohusían) of the Logos, which is quite unacceptable. So Origen may have in mind this sort of worry when he distinguishes voice and language, with the aim of securing a superior reality for the divine Logos. Edwards points out some similar worries in Philo. The learned Jew perceived that the divine will to communicate, evinced both in creation and in scripture as the record of creation, was better represented by this term [logos] than by its Platonic rivals, nous and paradeigma; on the other hand, both commonsense and piety forbade him to imagine that the speech of God consists of sounds like those emitted by the human larynx. The instrument of creation in Philo’s thought is therefore not so much a ‘word’ as a changeless pattern which abode in the mind as a coherent scheme of being when it had not yet taken shape in space and time.16

Edwards may have stretched the point about the nature of Philo’s ‘instrument of creation’ a little too far (see Philo, Sacr. 65 Cohn; Decal. 47 Cohn; Migr. 6 Wendland; Opif. 16–37 Cohn), but there certainly is a greater emphasis in Origen on the creative and communicative role of the Logos, a divine power which is distinguished from the purely physical yet inspired fwn¨jß kaqaíretai lógoß, t^¨j fúsei toü lógou kaqaírontoß päsan t`jn sjmaínousan fwn´jn. Kaì Hapaxapl¨wß “ote h Iwánnjß tòn cristòn deíknusin, ‘anqrwpoß qeòn deíknusi kaì swt¨jra tòn has´wmaton, kaì fwn`j tòn lógon. 16 Edwards, Origen Against Plato, p. 67. The words in square brackets supply what is clear from the context of discussion. Edwards covers a number of basic contrasts with Philo on the Logos, particularly the basic shift in Origen away from the Philonic notion of the Ideas as thoughts in the mind of God, towards speaking of items or contents in the divine mind. Thümmel, ‘Philon und Origenes’, pp. 282–3 discusses the distinction in Origen between Sophia and Logos, which suggests to me that Origen’s Sophia is a notion closer to Philo’s Logos; as Thümmel points out with reference to the Johannine commentary, Origen’s Logos is more heavily oriented towards rational beings and their destiny.

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voice from God. Origen may have registered the theological worries shared with Philo by distinguishing clearly between voice and language, raising the reality of the divine Word to a superior level above mere voice. The Logos is stable and not subject to physical limitations, yet it is separated from the divine mind as well in being revealed in the world. On the anthropic level, Origen does little to clarify the connection between incorporeal and corporeal (audible) linguistic entities, apart from observing that human logos is more independent. Our vocal faculty cannot produce meaningful utterances by itself (compare St. Paul on glossolalia, 1 Cor. 13.1), its utterances cannot independently attain the power of spoken language; on the other hand, language may be produced by itself, being unspoken within the mind. However, we are told that utterances depend on the ‘purifying’ function of incorporeal language to make them meaningful (t^¨j fúsei toü lógou kaqaírontoß päsan t`jn sjmaínousan fwn´jn). Why does Origen load his semantics with hieratic notions? What does he mean by the ‘purifying’ function of language? I would explain the matter as follows. Origen points out that human logos can be independent of vocal sound, being freely active in the mind without any verbal expression, in contrast to the voice, which depends on language to be meaningful. Of course, there are important connections between voice and language. This is seen from the examples of John the Baptist as well as Zacharias, which show that hearing the voice precedes the mind’s understanding of language. But we are also told that utterances depend on the ‘purifying’ function of incorporeal logos to make them meaningful. Perhaps Origen means by ‘purifying’ the ordering and completion of vocal sound by logos (compare In Joh. 10.28 Preuschen, pp. 201, 28–202, 1). We might compare the rational ordering of logos to the creative activity of the divine Logos in forming bodies by inserting qualities into matter.17 Presumably, the function of human logos emerging from this passage also makes meaningful utterances reflect truth, a capacity which ultimately derives from divine reason.18 Now I will briefly introduce some broader philosophical comparisons. I have already pointed out Origen’s emphasis on the activity of incorporeal Logos in the world. For the Logos is required to assume an outward role, in accord with standard Stoic ideas as well as the Johannine view of the Word made incarnate. Denying logos an outward role would also depart sharply from contemporary Platonist Peripatetics such as Origen’s nemesis Porphyry, who stands firmly in the logos distinction tradition. For Porphyry, logos is 17 Compare Bostock, ‘Origen’s Philosophy of Creation’, p. 259. 18 Compare Robert M. Berchman, ‘Self-Knowledge and Subjectivity in Origen’, in Origeniana Octava, pp. 437–50 at 438–9, 442–4.

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speech articulated by the tongue, ‘signifying (sjmantik`j) of the inward affections (paq¨wn) of the soul.’19 However, this distinction of meaningful speech and the contents of mind differs from Origen’s distinction. Origen denies that speech is intelligible in its own right, rather it is understood by virtue of language, a view which is not prominent in the philosophical mainstream. Mind and Body in Language In Chapter 1, we saw that Philo presents speech as the physical vehicle of meaning. In Origen, we have reviewed one text which distinguishes voice and language, detailing differences in the function and nature of these elements. However, Origen is not always quite so concerned to distinguish voice and language, even in this monumental work of biblical commentary, nor does he use the same semantic terminology in everything he writes. On occasion, he slips into the traditional ‘container’ or ‘vehicle’ images familiar from Philo and other writers. For example, when discussing the entry of Jesus into Jerusalem riding on an ass (Jn. 12.12–14), Origen writes as follows (In Joh. 10.29 Preuschen, p. 202, 13–16). ‘And perhaps (someone) might reasonably compare the vocal sounds which envelop the logos which brings them into the soul to an ass, for the beast is a burden bearer, and a great burden and a heavy load are revealed from the text.’20 Here Origen locates language within voice, its vehicle. Besides this passage, other passages are more closely aligned with philosophical tradition in terminology and conceptual resources, as we will see a bit later. It is possible that Origen senses a lack of biblical support for the ‘container’ and ‘vehicle’ models—most of the relevant biblical passages focus on the mouth and the heart, for example, Ps. 15.2; Ps. 44.2; Mt. 12.34; Lk. 6.45. There may also be philosophical discomfort in the interaction of intelligible and sensible realities. How is an intelligible content or meaning lodged in an enveloping articulate sound? The relation between the incorporeal and the bodily is a notorious problem for Origen’s theology in general. In his 19 Porphyry, Abst. 3.3 Nauck, p. 188, 17–20. At least in the bit about signifying internal affections, Porphyry says something that sounds Aristotelian (Aristotle, Int. 16a5–6) and not too close to anything reported from the Stoics. 20 In Joh. 10.29 Preuschen, p. 202, 13–16. Kaì táca ohuk halógwß ‘on^w ehikása tàß peristásaß fwnàß tòn ‘agonta ahutàß ehiß t`jn yuc`jn lógon≥ hacqofóron gàr tò z¨^won, polù dè tò ‘acqoß kaì fortíon barù djloüntai hapò t¨jß léxewß. I adapt here the translation of Robert E. Heine, Origen. Commentary on the Gospel According to John. Books 1–10 (Washington, DC, 1989), pp. 295–6.

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reflections on language, the problem is equally pressing, and there is also the difficulty of accounting for the role of bodily organs in the sensory perception of utterances. For although Origen would claim that the incorporeal mind cannot hear anything, insofar as it is not itself the organs of hearing, it must receive the intelligible content transmitted by the voice in order to grasp what is said. Apparently, as we also find in Clement, the human mind can receive from the ear as well as directly from another mind; the divine voice is received immaterially in the person to whom God speaks or received immaterially by God in prayer.21 There seem to be two ways of hearing, according to the spiritual and sensory aspects of us.22 It is difficult to assess whether this sort of philosophical discomfort is important to Origen’s thinking in these exegetical passages. We can expand this story a bit further by reference (primarily) to Origen’s early treatise On First Principles (Princ. 2.1–3, 2.8–9 Koetschau). The human mind, nearest in resemblance to its divine creator, finds itself enmeshed in the sensible world, having previously been originally created to enjoy a bodiless spiritual existence. In the course of Origen’s arguments that the mind is superior to the body and of a different nature, it is said (Princ. 1.1.7 Koetschau, p. 24, 18–21) that the mind alone can apprehend divinity, being an ‘intellectual image’ (intellectualis imago) of God by virtue of its special kinship (propinquitas quaedam). Turning away from the divine good resulted in being clothed in bodily (and psychic) garments suited to life here on earth. These earthly garments are a necessary vehicle for God’s plan to

21 Origen mentions a Stoic definition of vocal sound, among others, in two passages which distinguish the characteristics of human voice from divine voice, Cels. 2.72 Koetschau, p. 194, 11–19; Cels. 6.62 Koetschau, p. 132, 16–21. Henry Chadwick (trans), Origen. Contra Celsum (Cambridge, 1953), p. 121, n. 5 provides full references. The voice defined as ‘concussed air’ is part of a standard philosophical definition by this time. It appears in at least one text of Philo (Immut. 83 Wendland). 22 However, there is no possibility, as we find occasionally in Philo, of a special non-corporeal status for the voice which falls short of the incorporeality of the mind. On the other hand, Origen employs a theory of aetherial bodies (astronomical, anastatic, and christological) for other purposes, a complicated topic which has received substantial scholarly attention in recent years: Crouzel, Origène et la philosophie, pp. 33–4; Alan Scott, Origen and the Life of the Stars (Oxford, 1991), pp. 116–21, 150–57; MacDonald, History of the Concept of Mind, p. 133; Richard Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators 200-600 AD. A Sourcebook (3 vols, London, 2004), vol. 1, pp. 229–38. It is in contrast to these special aetherial bodies that the trinitarian God alone is declared to be absolutely incorporeal; Origen seems to associate some kind of bodily condition with every created being.

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restore humanity to original conditions (existence in a resurrected, spiritual body) by means of corrective punishments germane to bodily life.23 So Origen’s explanation of why the immaterial mind needs the body would include as a special case his story of why we need speech to communicate what we have in mind to others. Since the mind or intellect (noüß) is a remnant of original rational perfection, Origen might say something like the following. The mind, guided by divine providence in its earthly life, adopts this flawed system of words to communicate its contents to other people. This general kind of adaptation is described in passages about divine speech (for example, Cels. 4.71, Koetschau, pp. 340, 17–341, 8; compare Cels. 7.13 Koetschau, p. 165, 3). God accommodates the weakness of humanity by lowering divine language to our level. ‘The Logos speaks like this because he assumes (for¨wn), as it were, human characteristics for the advantage of men.’24 The entire divinity and truth of the Logos would be too overwhelming for all humanity, although some people are selected for greater exposure than others.25 By analogy, the rational part of the soul needs the ‘garment’ of vocally shaped sound for mundane advantage. So far, I have said little about the relationship between logos and mind; it does not seem to attract Origen’s concern to the same degree. The main problem would be explaining how the ‘word’ or language in us is distinguished from the mind and can be separated from it, besides the problem of how the mind is represented in language. I will present another passage which distinguishes the work of the Word and the intellectual, governing power of the divine mind (In Joh. 1.38 Preuschen, pp. 49, 23–50, 9). Origen is developing here a spiritual interpretation of Ps. 45.1. ‘My heart overflows with a goodly theme (h Exjreúxato Hj kardía mou lógon hagaqón), I address my verses to the king.’ This was a favorite text for theologians before and after Origen.26 What, then, is his ‘heart’, that ‘the good word’ should appear consequent upon the heart? For if the term ‘word’ does not need interpretation, as they (some biblical interpreters) suppose, obviously neither does the term ‘heart’. It is very strange 23 Bostock, ‘Origen’s Philosophy of Creation’, p. 258, 260–62; Edwards, Origen Against Plato, p. 89; Jacobsen, ‘Origen on the Human Body’, pp. 648–56 pursue these points in detail. I cannot devote myself here to the scholarly controversy about the pre-existence of souls in Origen, or whether pure intellects required a spiritual body or soul in their pre-incarnate state. 24 Cels. 4.71, Koetschau, pp. 340, 17–341, 8. OHioneì hanqr´wpou trópouß pròß tò hanqr´wpoiß lusitelèß for¨wn Ho lógoß toiaüta légei. In preparing my translation, I adapt the translation of Chadwick, Contra Celsum, p. 240. 25 Koch, Pronoia und Paideusis, pp. 68–74 offers a detailed account. 26 Cecile Blanc, Origène. Commentaire sur Saint Jean, Sources Chrétiennes, No. 120 (Paris, 1966), p. 203, n. 2 provides references.

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Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria to suppose that the heart is a part of God, similar to the heart in our body. But we must remind them that as God’s hand, and arm, and finger are mentioned, we do not attach our understanding to the literal sense, but we examine how we should understand these expressions correctly and in a manner worthy of God, so also we must take God’s heart to be his intellectual and governing power concerning the universe, and the term ‘word’ to be the expression of those matters in that (heart). But who, other than the Savior, announces the will of the Father to the creatures who are worthy, and who has come into existence in accordance with them? Perhaps also the term ‘uttered’ was used intentionally, for a number of other expressions could have been used in place of ‘uttered’. For example, ‘My heart cast forth a good word’; ‘My heart has spoken a good word.’ But perhaps as an exhalation is the emergence of hidden wind into the open, as though the one exhaling breathes in this way, so the Father non-continuously exhales forth visions of the truth and produces their form in the Word, and for this reason the Word is called the ‘image of the invisible God’.27

Origen makes an important theological point in that there are no parts in God; there is an emphasis on the divinity of the Logos in terms of the divine image, not in terms of parthood. It is interesting that Origen employs a notion of divine power (dúnamiß) and not of mind. Origen probably is influenced not so much by divine ‘powers’ as we find so prominently in Philo, but rather by the language and theology of Clement, who talks about the Logos active in the world as the power of God. However, a more complete picture is obtained from an adjacent passage (In Joh. 1.38 Preuschen, p. 49, 3–8) which prefaces Origen’s interpretation of 27 The translation, including the additional translated text added below, is adapted from Heine, Origen. Commentary on the Gospel According to John, pp. 91–2. In Joh. 1.38 Preuschen, pp. 49, 23–50, 9. Tíß o~un Hj kardía ahutoü, “ina hakoloúqwß t^¨j kardíâ Ho agaqòß lógoß fan^¨j; Ehi gàr Ho lógoß ohu deïtai dijg´jsewß, Hwß hekeïnoi Hupolambánousi, d¨jlon “oti ohud’ Hj kardía≥ “oper hestìn hatop´wtaton, nomízein t`jn kardían Homoíwß t¨^j hen [t^¨w] Hjmetér^w s´wmati e~inai méroß toü Qeoü. h Allh Hupomnjstéon ahutoùß “oti “wsper ceìr kaì bracíwn kaì dáktuloß honomázetai Qeoü, ohuk hereidóntwn Hjm¨wn t`jn diánoian ehiß yil`jn t`jn léxin, hallh hexetazóntwn p¨wß taüta Hugi¨wß heklambánein kaì haxíwß Qeoü deï, o“utwß kaì t`jn kardían toü Qeoü t`jn nojtik`jn ahutoü kaì proqetik`jn perì t¨wn “olwn dúnamin hekljptéon, tòn dè Lógon t¨wn hen hekeín^j tò hapaggeltikón. Tíß dè hapaggéllei t`jn boul`jn toü patròß toïß t¨wn genjt¨wn haxíoiß kaì pàrh ahutoùß gegenjménoß ’j Ho swt´jr; Táca dè kaì ohu mátjn tò hexjreúxato≥ muría gàr “etera hedúnato légesqai hantì toü hexjreúxato≥ proébalen Hj kardía mou lógon hagaqón, heláljsen Hj kardía mou lógon hagaqón≥ hallà m´jpote “wsper pneúmatóß tinoß hapokrúptou ehiß faneròn próodóß hestin Hj herug`j toü hereugoménou, oHioneì dià toútou hanapnéontoß, o“utw tà t¨jß haljqeíaß qewr´jmata ohu sunécwn Ho pat`jr hereúgetai kaì poieï tòn túpon ahut¨wn hen t^¨w lóg^w, kaì dià toüto ehikóni kaloumén^w toü haorátou Qeoü.

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the Psalm text. This passage addresses mind and logos. We find a distinction not between voice and language, but rather between language and mind. But the Logos can also be ‘the Son’ because he announces the secrets of that Father, obtaining as a mind in correspondence to the Son being called ‘Logos’. For as the logos in us is the messenger of the things seen by the mind, so the Logos of God, having known the Father, reveals the Father whom he has known, insofar as none among created beings can come into contact with him without a guide.28

Origen is primarily concerned to explain why the Logos performs a special communicative purpose. Note how the separate phase of language in relation to the mind is built into the analogy with human speech capacities. On both human and divine levels, there is a single logos (contrast Philo’s two logoi) which is the mediator between the intelligible and sensible realms. I think Origen moves a bit closer to the traditional logos distinction here. And in the exegetical discussion of the Psalm text that follows, we are told that the form (túpoß) of the divine mind is represented in the Logos, and Origen cites Col. 1.15 which describes the Son as the image (ehik´wn) of the invisible God (In Joh. 1.38 Preuschen, pp. 49, 23–50, 9). This part, I would argue, evokes the dependence of spoken utterance on a more fundamental reality, along the lines of the traditional logos distinction. Other Influences Let us turn to some different ideas which appear elsewhere in Origen. One notable discussion of voice, meaning, and mind appears in the debate with Celsus over animal rationality. This appears in a stretch of argument from the Contra Celsum which is also preserved in the Philocalia (Cels. 4.73–99 Koetschau, pp. 343, 5–373, 21 = Philoc. 20.1–26 Robinson, pp. 125, 1–151, 27). As Chadwick points out, the parameters of debate with Celsus are inherited from the Hellenistic philosophical schools. But it is far more common to find Origen supporting the Stoa against the Academy ... most notably in the long discussion at the end of contra Celsum book 4 on the rationality of animals and their inferiority to human beings. ... We find a

28 In Joh. 1.38 Preuschen, p. 49, 3–8. Dúnatai dè kaì Ho lógoß uHiòß e~inai parà tò hapaggéllein tà krúfia toü patròß hekeínou, hanálogon t¨^w kaloumén^w uHi^¨w lóg^w noü tugcánontoß. H Wß gàr Ho parh Hjmïn lógoß ‘aggelóß hesti t¨wn Hupò toü noü Horwménwn, o“utwß Ho toü Qeoü lógoß, hegnwk`wß tòn patéra, ohudenòß t¨wn genjt¨wn prosbaleïn ahut¨^w cwrìß Hodjgoü dunaménou, hapokalúptei ”on ‘egnw patéra.

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Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria remarkably similar discussion in Philo’s Alexander, in which Philo supports the Stoic opinion against the Academic criticism.29

Origen defends the Christian ‘anthropocentric’ position against Celsus’ equally traditional Skeptic and Platonist view that providence endows and favors humans no more than animals. By Origen’s lights, the animals, no matter how well equipped and well organized they are, do not act by virtue of reason. Man alone is created in the image of God, which is God’s reason (qeoü Ho lógoß). At one turn in this argument, Celsus adduces the conversation of ants and Origen responds (Cels. 4.84 Koetschau, 355, 13–22 = Philoc. 20.11 Robinson, 135, 12–21). The ants are a surprising choice in view of the more likely candidates (birds, elephants) which turn up elsewhere in the tradition (Sext. Emp., Math. 8.275 Mutschmann; Porphyry, Abst. 3.4 Nauck, p. 191, 3–13). For he speaks of the ants as though they had discussions with one another, saying the following. ‘And in fact when they meet together they have discussions with one another, and this is why they do not lose their way; accordingly they also have a completely developed rational faculty, and common notions of certain general matters, and a voice with respect to objects and meanings.’ If a person is to have a discussion with another, this must take place by means of a voice which expresses some meaning, and which for the most part makes utterance concerning the so-called ‘objects’. How is it not most ridiculous of all, to say these things in the case of ants?30

A rational discussion (tò dialégesqai) requires both elements, voice (fwn´j) and meaning (ti sjmainómenon). But Origen also would say, presumably, that this expressive capacity of voice is only possible by virtue of our language faculty, a key feature of human rationality. Origen develops these ideas with a notion of reference, in that our meaningful utterances represent things (tugcánonta), that is, objects in the world. Beyond this,

29 Chadwick, ‘Origen, Celsus, and the Stoa’, p. 36. 30 I adapt the translation of Chadwick, Contra Celsum, p. 251. Cels. 4.84 Koetschau, p. 355, 13–22 = Philoc. 20.11 Robinson, p. 135, 12–21. Fjsì gàr perì t¨wn murm´jkwn Hwß dialegoménwn hall´jloiß toiaüta≥ kaì mèn d`j kaì hapant¨wnteß hall´jloiß dialégontai, “oqen ohudè t¨wn Hod¨wn Hamartánousin≥ ohukoün kaì lógou sumpl´jrwsíß hesti par’ ahutoïß kaì koinaì ‘ennoiai kaqolik¨wn tinwn kaì fwn`j kaì tugcánonta kaì sjmainómena. Tò gàr dialégesqaí tina pròß “eteron hen fwn¨^j gínetai djloús^j ti sjmainómenon, pollákiß dè kaì perì t¨wn kalouménwn tugcanóntwn hapaggelloús^j≥ “aper kaì hen múrmjxi légein e~inai p¨wß ohu pántwn ’an e‘ij katagelastótaton;

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Origen says nothing of what things can be represented in language (states of affairs, predicates, propositions, concrete objects, or abstract objects). The basic scheme in this passage is voice expressing a meaning, in contrast to the commentary passages introduced above in which language (logos), not a proposition or a meaning, is expressed by voice. My general impression is that the Contra Celsum presents something closer to a Stoic or Philonic view of separable meanings associated with vocal utterances. This shift can be explained by the terms of the Hellenistic rationality debates, as well as the general Stoic influence in the Contra Celsum. In any case, it is remarkable that similar ideas and terminology crop up elsewhere in the Philocalia. However, these other uses show Origen’s reliance on the terminology and techniques of the philological tradition.31 An interesting discussion of dealing with rough spots in biblical texts is preserved from a missing book of Origen’s commentary on John’s gospel (Book 4). Origen addresses the issue of solecisms and bad style in the Scriptures. We reviewed similar themes in Clement in Chapter 2, with reference to the attention to language among the philosophers. For Origen as well as for Clement, the unimpressive language of the Scriptures should not present a problem for readers anticipating perfection, for it is the thought that is beautiful and not always its expression in language.32 I will present only the first few lines of the excerpt (In Joh. 4 = Philoc. 4.1 Robinson, p. 41, 9–15). The one who distinguishes for himself between voice and meanings and things, upon which the meanings are based, will not stumble on the solecism of the expressions, when by searching he finds the things healthy, upon which the expressions are based. And in particular when the holy men confess that their discourse and message is not in vessels of the wisdom of words, but in demonstration of the spirit and of power.33

Once more we find ‘meanings’ (sjmainómena) within a scheme which distinguishes voice, meaning, and object. His term for ‘objects’ in the world

31 I refer the reader to the important work of Bernhard Neuschäfer, Origenes als Philologe (2 vols, Basel, 1987) on Origen’s debts to ancient philology. 32 Crouzel, Origène et la philosophie, pp. 125–33 expands this point to consider not only Origen’s view of the scriptual texts but also the qualities of his own style. 33 The translation is my own. In Joh. 4 = Philoc. 4.1 Robinson, p. 41, 9–15. H O diair¨wn parh Heaut^¨w fwn`jn kaì sjmainómena kaì prágmata, kaqh ˆwn keïtai tà sjmainómena, ohu proskóyei t^¨w t¨wn fwn¨wn soloikism^¨w, hepàn hereun¨wn eHurísk∆ tà prágmata, kaqh ˆwn keïntai aHi fwnaì, Hugi¨j≥ kaì málista hepàn Homolog¨wsin oHi “agioi ‘andreß tòn lógon ahut¨wn kaì tò k´jrugma ohuk hen peiqoïß sofíaß e~inai log¨wn, hall’ hen hapodeíxei pneúmatoß kaì dunámewß.

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is changed (prágmata, compare tugcánonta in Cels. 4.84), but the rest is the same.34 It appears that when Origen deals with a traditional philological issue, he adopts a tripartite semantic scheme, imported from ancient grammar and philology with its Stoic roots.35 All of these terms in the Philocalia are familiar from the grammarians and scholars of the Hellenistic and early Imperial period. There are even passages in which Origen works with a linguistic scheme which only counts expressions and objects in the world. I doubt that these passages betray an important shift in what Origen thinks about language and meaning, contrary to the claim that Origen dispenses with the role of the ‘signification’ (sjmainómenon) altogether.36 We find this apparent conceptual alternative in the Contra Celsum (Cels. 1.24–5 Koetschau, pp. 74, 4–77, 10), where Origen speaks of words meaning things in the world, or more precisely, of words (tà honómata) incorporating a special dimension in their referring function. Names are not assigned by arbitrary convention by the people who use them (Cels. 5.45 Koetschau, p. 48, 10–11). The focus is on the phonological properties of the names themselves and the spiritual power contained in them.37 There is no separate role mentioned here for meanings. Rather, we are told that human languages have a supernatural dimension at their origin, which Origen does not explain in detail (Cels. 5.45 34 Compare Origen’s uses of ‘subject’ (Hupokeímenon), references in Marguerite Harl, ‘Origène et la sémantique du langage biblique’, Vigiliae Christianae, 26 (1972): 161–87 at 183–4. Origen’s linguistic terminology varies somewhat from work to work, a similar feature to what I noted in Clement. It is helpful to compare with some of the Stoic concepts and terminology noted earlier in my chapter on Philo, p. 26–8. Gennaro Lomiento, ‘“Pragma” und “lexis” in den Jeremiahomilien des Origenes’, Theologische Quartalschrift, 165 (1985): 118–31 details the terminological variations for ‘expression’ and other key semantic features. 35 Partly in connection with this Philocalia passage, there is detailed consideration of the influence of Stoic grammar in Neuschäfer, Origenes als Philologe, pp. 206–13. 36 Ineke Sluiter, Ancient Grammar in Context (Amsterdam, 1990), pp. 34–6. 37 H. Gregory Snyder, Teachers and Texts in the Ancient World (London, 2000), pp. 36–7 notes the tendency in Late Antiquity to take the phonological properties of words quite seriously, citing some Stoic-redolent material in Seneca, Ep. 94.47, among several other references. Snyder makes a quite sweeping claim about the power of utterance. ‘Such sentiments strike post-Cartesian thinkers conditioned to think of separation between intellectual and physical domains as rather odd. However, we are reminded that people in antiquity generally saw the state of the soul and the state of the body as fundamentally intertwined. ... So in the ancient world, the pharmacological mechanisms of good advice are quite intelligible.’

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Koetschau, p. 48, 11–15; compare Philo, Opif. 148–50 Cohn; Quaest. Gen. 1.20 Aucher). This explains why ‘spiritually sensitive’ utterances lose their power when translated into another language.38 Conclusion Origen’s possibly innovative philosophical views on mind and language are blended with his theological concerns, although it is also easy to find examples of more conventional views represented where theological concerns are not so dominant. In his commentary on John’s gospel, Origen departs from use of the logos distinction, in that spoken language is not simply the outward expression of inner discourse. Rather, it is voice by which language is revealed. I do not see how the ‘container’ or ‘vehicle’ models of language and meaning, familiar from Philo, fit into this picture. In this connection, Origen would appear to be motivated by theological and exegetical concerns, but he may also be mindful of philosophical concerns, or a lack of biblical support for these models, insofar as most of the relevant biblical passages focus on the relationship of mouth and heart. In any case, in other passages Origen slips back into the comfortable ‘container’ or ‘vehicle’ images. Origen’s departure from the logos distinction, largely motivated by his theological and exegetical interests, is an interesting philosophical shift. Regrettably, Origen does not provide much in the way of an explanation of why human speech is intelligible, besides adducing a mysterious, incorporeal logos which does the work. (Perhaps this reflects the general Patristic tendency to take our linguistic faculties as basic, arguing for other claims on their back.) Further, we might ask why, if language is incorporeal, it is not more clearly confined to the mind. This move would iron things out considerably, avoiding difficult questions of how language can have being separate from the mind. I suppose Origen does not take this route on account of the correspondence to his doctrines of the distinct role of the Logos in the Godhead, as well as the incarnation of the Logos in separation from the divine mind.

38 John Dillon, ‘The Magical Power of Names in Origen and Later Platonism’, in R. Hanson and H. Crouzel (eds), Origeniana Tertia, The Third International Colloquium for Origen Studies, Manchester, 7–11 September, 1981 (Rome, 1985), pp. 203–16 offers an account of Origen’s theory of magical names, including the extensive background in Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism. Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators, vol. 3, pp. 213–26 introduces the various strands of debate on names in Later Greek philosophy.


Chapter 4

Plotinus Plotinus (A.D. 205–71), the most important philosopher of Late Antiquity and the touchstone of Neoplatonism, was intimately connected with the intellectual life of Alexandria. We know from Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus that Plotinus settled in Alexandria in about A.D. 233, living a happy ten years there in philosophical studies under the Platonist philosopher Ammonius Saccas (Vit. Plot. 3 Henry-Schwyzer). Plotinus then moved on to other climes. To the disappointment of countless generations of scholars, it is unlikely that Plotinus crossed paths with Origen the Christian during this Alexandrian sojourn, although the two figures are roughly contemporary. However, it is reported that they both studied with a teacher named Ammonius, and in fact someone named ‘Origen’ is mentioned as a fellow student of Plotinus (Vit. Plot. 3 Henry-Schwyzer).1 Origen and Plotinus provide interesting comparisons. One good example of Origen and Plotinus parting ways is Origen’s derivation of the second from the first principle in terms of the act of the will from the mind, in contrast to the rejection of such anthropomorphic notions in the emanation of Intellect from Plotinus’ One.2 Plotinus does not conceive of pure divinity as divine mind, nor as showing many of the traditional features of mind.3 Instead, Plotinus 1 There is an ongoing scholarly dispute over whether Origen studied under the same Ammonius as Plotinus. Mark J. Edwards, ‘Ammonius, Teacher of Origen’, The Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 44 (1993): 169–81 has recently argued that Origen’s tutor was a different Ammonius (perhaps a Peripatetic philosopher mentioned by Longinus) than Ammonius Saccas the Platonist, departing from the more agnostic position of Richard Goulet, ‘Porphyre, Ammonius, les deux Origène et les autres ...’, Revue d’histoire et de philosophie religieuses, 57 (1977): 471–96. Goulet is uncertain as to whether Origen the Christian ever studied with Ammonius Saccas (he dismisses study with any other Ammonius). Goulet, ‘Porphyre, Ammonius’, p. 482 also touches on the interesting question of Porphyry’s meeting with Origen the Christian. 2 Eberhard Schockenhoff, ‘Origenes und Plotin. Zwei unterschiedliche Denkwege am Ausgang der Antike’, in R.J. Daly (ed.), Origeniana Quinta, Papers of the 5th International Origen Congress, Boston, 14–18 August, 1989 (Leuven, 1992), pp. 284–95. 3 Henri Crouzel, Origène et Plotin. Comparaisons doctrinales (Paris, 1991), pp. 38, 85–98.

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envisions three basic ‘hypostases’ (immaterial metaphysical entities) in his system: One, Intellect or Being, Soul. At the intermediate level, mind is prominent. For in the perfect, self-thinking cognition of Intellect the Forms have their being—there is a unity of thought and being. Beyond Being, there is no mind, no definition for reality. Below Being, language emerges as a symptom of the developing inferiority towards increased involvement with matter. As I will try to show, in clearly recognizable form Plotinus places language at the level of Soul.4 Language is not the purest expression of exalted union, intellectual and spiritual. Why are spoken utterances intelligible? Plotinus explains linguistic understanding in light of metaphysical principles, not primarily as the transfer of meaning from one mind to another. Meaning is explained as the presence of immaterial Form to the air, a special kind of activity which depends on Intellect. The reception of meaning in attending souls is explained in view of the actualization of Form. This account of linguistic understanding and the nature of meaning has some important advantages over the simple models (vehicle, wellspring, container, garment) we have reviewed in his Jewish and Christian Alexandrian counterparts. For Origen, Clement, and Philo, language is a dominant feature of human rationality and divine power. They usually claim that language involves immaterial meaning, carried by a material vehicle. By contrast, Plotinus considers language to be entirely incorporeal in essence, an activity which relates to the Forms. This account has been largely ignored in Plotinian scholarship, providing balance to the usual scholarly emphasis on the limits of discourse to speak of the One. I argue that Plotinus develops his theory in connection with the ethical and political dimensions of his philosophy, a topic of increasing interest in Plotinian studies. This will involve Plotinus’ concept of unification with Intellect, which I argue emerges from consideration of some key texts on audience reception and political discourse (especially 6.5.10, 11–40 HenrySchwyzer). In the later stages of this chapter, we will review the unique blend of mystical rigor and practical concern that informs Plotinus’ account of moral and political discourse. The Metaphysics of Language Plotinus considers language to be a case of the general intelligibility of everything governed by Soul, the bearer of Intellect. In other words, the capacity of language to be understood depends on the presence of the One. In view of the highest principle, all things are, all 4 By the term ‘Soul’ I mean the third hypostasis in Plotinus’ system, which is the model of all souls.

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things possess a share of value and form. Even the intelligibles themselves are sequents of the One, entirely dependent on it for their being. The soul’s pursuit of unity returns it upwards to perfect knowledge, consummated in union with the One. Our highest calling leaves mind empty of itself and full of the One. In his overall scheme of reality, Plotinus claims a highest, albeit incomparable, rung in the ontological ladder which lacks all definition, quality, and articulation as an explanation of why everything else has definition, quality, and articulation. But it is this very source of reality to which our souls aspire in spiritual attainment. Image and Representation Hence language is not relevant to our ‘higher’ life. Language is an achievement of human nature in a rather low sense, as we might recognize it in this terrestrial life. By comparison, contemplation is the proper function of the soul—only by this primary activity is the soul to reach towards Being, but also to constitute itself.5 As we will see, for Plotinus, in our ascent towards contemplative actuality, reality and representation become increasingly unified, until representation is eliminated. This will be experienced at the point that language, or any other mode of representation (impression, symbol, sign, image, picture) becomes irrelevant. For all representation we use is provisional, removed from the realities themselves (5.8.4, 47–9 Henry-Schwyzer). In the road to reality, the soul will assume contemplative fulfillment, much like nature itself engages in contemplation more continuously than what lies below it (3.8.1, 1–2 Henry-Schwyzer). Souls will surpass lower forms of cognition which trade in images or impressions (6.5.7, 1–8 Henry-Schwyzer, especially 6.5.7, 4–6 Henry-Schwyzer). ‘So then if we have a share in true knowledge, we are those (Beings), wresting them not into ourselves, but rather we are in them.’ We will actually rise into being the intelligibles, our soul being one with its objects of knowledge. In fact, Plotinus institutes a developed activity of language and reasoning as a function of Soul, not of Intellect (6.7.23, 18–20; 5.5.5, 16–27 HenrySchwyzer).6 There are different levels of expression, according to greater 5 Paul Kalligas, ‘Living Body, Soul, and Virtue in the Philosophy of Plotinus’, Dionysius 18 (2000): 25–38 at 32–3. 6 John H. Heiser, Logos and Language in the Philosophy of Plotinus (Lampeter, 1991), pp. 49–57; Frederic M. Schroeder, Form and Transformation. A Study in the Philosophy of Plotinus (Montreal and Kingston, 1992), pp. 69–79 claim misleadingly that language is operative at the level of Intellect. They claim this under the sway of 5.3.10, 32–42; 5.3.14, 8–19; 5.8.5, 21–2 Henry-Schwyzer, perhaps also 5.4.2, 27–39 Henry-Schwyzer. However, any form of expression or cognition at this level is not linguistic, it is more unified than Schroeder recognizes. The Intellect only ‘speaks’

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and lesser degrees of unity. Images and icons express truth in a way that more clearly reflects Being, the Forms (5.8.5–6 Henry-Schwyzer; compare 6.7.38, 1–25 Henry-Schwyzer). In Plotinus ... , the thinking of intellect is viewed as non-propositional, in contrast to the discursive thinking of reason. The gods do not see propositions (axiômata) but images (agalmata). We may compare Egyptian hieroglyphs, or if Plotinus did not mean hieroglyphs, ideograms on their temple walls, which being agalmata, do not imitate the utterance of axiômata, but are all together at once (athroon). The objects of intellect are not premisses (protaseis), axiômata, or statements (lekta).7

This purer linguistic representation is proper to the level of Intellect, depending more directly on the Forms. These representations are clearer images of intelligible realities (5.8.6, 1–13 Henry-Schwyzer). The wise men of Egypt too, I think, grasped by understanding, whether practised or innate, that when they wanted to reveal something through their wisdom, they should not use the imprint of letters, which expound sentences and claims, nor use those which imitate the vocal utterances of propositions, but should draw icons and imprint in their temples one icon each for each thing, to express the non-discursiveness there (in the higher world of Being). The implication is that each icon is a kind of understanding and wisdom and a coherent reality, not discursive reasoning or thinking. At a later stage, based on this (wisdom) in its coherence, there is an image with a different (status) yet now unravelled, speaking it in discursive form and inquiring after the causes, according to which it happens that there is wonder as to the beauty of the generated world in such an excellent state.8 insofar as there is an expression at a lower level of its perfection. There is a ‘primal response’ of Intellect to the One, not intelligible as a propositional, predicating, or otherwise articulated response. Language and discursive reason comes into play with soul in all its levels, as noted in John M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality (Cambridge, 1967), pp. 100–101; Heiser, Logos and Language, pp. 6–9, 17–24, 49. 7 Richard Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators 200–600 AD. A Sourcebook (3 vols, London, 2004), vol. 1, p. 91. 8 The words in parentheses supplement my translation of the Greek text. I have adapted the translation from Sorabji, Philosophy of the Commentators, vol. 3, pp. 228–9. 5.8.6, 1–13 Henry-Schwyzer: Dokoüsi dè moi kaì oHi Ahiguptíwn sofoí, e‘ite hakribeï hepist´jm^j labónteß e‘ite kaì sumfút^w, perì ˆwn heboúlonto dià sofíaß deiknúnai, m`j túpoiß grammátwn diexodeúousi lógouß kaì protáseiß mjdè mimouménoiß fwnàß kaì proforàß haxiwmátwn kecr¨jsqai, hagálmata dè gráyanteß kaì ”en “ekaston Hekástou prágmatoß ‘agalma hentup´wsanteß hen toïß Hieroïß t`jn hekeï ohu diéxodon hemf¨jnai, Hwß ‘ara tiß kaì hepist´jmj kaì sofía “ekastón hestin ‘agalma kaì Hupokeímenon kaì haqróon kaì ohu dianójsiß ohudè boúleusiß. “ Usteron dè haph ahut¨jß haqróaß o‘usjß e‘idwlon hen ‘all^w

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As a product of soul, language expresses truth less perfectly than icons. Yet all levels of representation are images, suggestive of the ‘image’ status of all levels of reality below the One. Egyptian icons are considered more coherent than units of language. Even Intellect is an image, an icon (ehik´wn) of the One (5.1.7, 1–2 Henry-Schwyzer). In turn, the Intellect is the archetype of all other images, for it contains the pure images which furnish identity for all the lower beings subject to difference. An interesting comparison could be made between the wisdom of the Egyptian sages in expressing unity in representation, and other ‘political’ texts I will take up later, describing the nascent wisdom of citizen-souls attaining unity, with or without the guidance of elders (6.4.15, 18–40; 6.5.10, 11–40 Henry-Schwyzer). Remarkably, Plotinus tries to use his scheme of exemplar and image to unify all philosophy.9 The Logos of Plotinus There is a rich conceptual investment in Plotinus’ notion of logos. Since this is well known as a crucial element in Plotinus’ metaphysics and cosmology, I will limit my reflections to a few points.10

hexeiligménon ‘jdj kaì légon ahutò hen diexód^w kaì tàß ahitíaß, dih ”aß o“utw, hexeurískon, Hwß tò kal¨wß o“utwß ‘econtoß toü gegenjménou qaumásai. 9 Lloyd P. Gerson, ‘Metaphor as an Ontological Concept: Plotinus on the Philosophical Use of Language’, in M. Fattal (ed.), Logos et langage chez Plotin et avant Plotin (Paris, 2003), pp. 255–69 at 260 provides an admirable discussion of the ‘iconic’ status of all cognition and language, in dependence on Intellect. ‘Everything that is produced by the One with the instrumentality of Noüß is doubly an image. That is, it is an intelligible image of Noüß and an existential image of the One. The latter point is just the direct consequence of the fact that the One is the cause of the existence of all. This duality of imagery, as we may term it, guarantees the ontological groundedness of metaphor representations of everything inferior to intelligible reality. Whereas in a non-Plotinian world we can readily distinguish an image qua image from the same image qua what it really is, for Plotinus everything is permanently an image of the first principle over and above the fact that it is or contains an image of Noüß.’ 10 R.E. Witt, ‘The Plotinian Logos and its Stoic Basis’, Classical Quarterly, 25 (1931): 103–11; A.H. Armstrong, The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of Plotinus (Cambridge, 1940), pp. 98–108; Heiser, Logos and Language, pp. 17–21; Kevin Corrigan, ‘Essence and Existence in the Enneads’, in L.P. Gerson (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 105–29 at 110–23. Rist, The Road to Reality, pp. 84–102 argues rightly that logos is not a hypostasis distinct from Soul. A similar point is made by Michael F. Wagner, ‘Plotinus on the Nature of Physical Reality’, in The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, pp. 130–70 at 136–7, 156–67.

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Plotinus hierarchically arranges all manifestations of soul as derivations of the highest Soul which is the primal rational expression (lógoß eîß) of Intellect (4.3.5, 14–18 Henry-Schwyzer). Plotinus even claims that higher logoi have priority in the Intellect over Disposition, Nature, and Soul (5.9.5, 24–5 Henry-Schwyzer). Soul, the expression of Intellect, functions as an image (ehik´wn) of the Intellect. Soul is conceived as the activity and life productive of being, issuing from Intellect like heat from fire (5.1.3, 6–10 Henry-Schwyzer). And the cosmic rational structure which is the work of Soul, or rather World Soul subsumed under highest Soul, is formed by the ‘blueprint’ of all the more partial rational principles (lógoi) that spring from the highest Soul. As we find in many later Platonists, the mediation between immaterial realities and sensibles is assumed by the World Soul (4.4.9–10 Henry-Schwyzer). It is noteworthy that Plotinus does not rely as heavily on the traditional logos distinction as other Alexandrians such as Philo. The distinction still appears in the relationship of logos in utterance, an imitation of inner logos, and logos in the mind, an imitation and interpreter of intellect (1.2.3, 27–30 Henry-Schwyzer).11 Like Clement, Origen, and Philo, Plotinus features an account of creation. But there is no anthropomorphic creator in whose image we are made, and there is no concept of ‘speaking things into being’. In fact, the possibility of a linguistic dimension to all structuring outflow from the One is misleading—lower entities are connected to their source by reversion

11 Rist, The Road to Reality, pp. 100–101, denies any relations of influence between Philo and Plotinus in connection with the logos distinction, for the differences are too significant. ‘Plotinus, we then find, knows of the doctrine of the two logoi (hendiáqetoß and proforikóß). He makes use of this distinction in at least two places in the Enneads: 1.2.3.27 and 5.1.3.7. What he says in these passages fits well together. In 1.2.3.27 lógoß hen fwn^¨j (the equivalent of proforikóß) is an imitation (mímjma) of lógoß hen yuc^¨j (=hendiáqetoß). Similarly lógoß hen yuc^¨j is an imitation and an interpreter (Hermjneúß) of Noüß. In 5.1.3.7 the lógoß hen profor^ä is an image (ehik´wn) of the lógoß hen yuc^¨j (hendiáqetoß) while the lógoß hen yuc^¨j is an image of noüß. First we may notice a similarity with Philo. The word Hermjneúß is used in discussing the two logoi in both Philo and Plotinus. But there is also a difference. In Philo it is the lógoß proforikóß which is an ‘interpreter’ while in Plotinus this role is played by the lógoß hen yuc^¨j (or hendiáqetoß). The fact of the matter is that Plotinus has not followed Philo in fixing the lógoß hendiáqetoß in the world of Forms. If Plotinus had followed Philo, this logos would have been his second hypostasis—which it is not. Like the Stoics, but unlike Philo, Plotinus has employed both logoi at the level of the World Soul. What then must our general conclusion be? The use of the word Hermjneúß—in different ways—in the two authors can be given little weight.’

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back towards the perfection of the One, in contact with a metaphysical structure progressively abstracted and unified.12 Everything is formed by the unintentional emanation of the higher principles downwards in progressively heavier material involvement. Plotinus’ two world dualism of intelligible realities and sensible things unfolds from the emanation from the highest principle of perfect unity downwards into things enmeshed in matter. This basic metaphysical structure is the path the soul must follow back to its source and life. On every level, whether supraterrestrial, cosmic, or anthropic, bodies are blessed with soul to govern with a view to the best. Soul must trouble itself with running things well and establishing the characteristics that make sensibles to participate in Being (intelligible reality). There is a goodness in worldly things on account of this projected activity of Soul, a reflection of the noetic realm, in spite of some harsh words from the master philosopher Plato (4.8.1–6 Henry-Schwyzer).13 This goodness applies equally in the case of the soul’s linguistic activity, as we will see.

12 On this point, I cannot follow Florent Tazzolio, ‘Logos et langage comme liens à l’Origine dans l’hénologie plotinienne’, in Logos et langage, pp. 161–88. There is no ‘language of the One’ which structures Plotinus’ entire metaphysical system by connecting all entities to their source. Tazzolio presents his case as follows (p. 172). ‘Acte de l’Un, le Logos est Verbe dans un sens, génération de l’Intelligence dans la Forme transcendante et de l’Idée propre à Platon, et, en même temps qu’acte du noûs, vie et produit de l’Intelligence aussi. Le langage des Ennéades, dans l’engendrement des êtres conduits par le Logos est celui de la contemplation. ... Le Logos, unité ontologique de l’image, est le mode linguistique de la procession.’ But as Agnes Pigler, ‘De la possibilité ou de l’impossibilité d’un Logos hénologique’, in Logos et langage, pp. 189–209 has shown in some detail, even the highest logos of Intellect is not a ‘henological logos’ conceived as a primary activity of the One. Pigler (p. 198) notes the amorphous aspect of the One, without definition. ‘L’Un ne peut jamais être réduit à l’ordre du logos, sinon il serait une Forme, et c’est pourquoi il y a un abus certain à comprendre l’Intelligence comme son logos.’ Plotinus seems to say in one text that Intellect is the logos of the One (5.1.6, 45–6 Henry-Schwyzer), but it is vital to emphasize the silent isolation of the One (5.1.6, 12–13 Henry-Schwyzer). Plotinus tries to account for why other entities arise, speaking of a kind of mysterious, rebellious response to the One (tólma). Intellect ‘dares’ to stand apart from the One, John Bussanich, The One and its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus (Leiden, 1988), pp. 80–83. 13 Soul’s activity improves lower levels of existence by its presence, Stephen R.L. Clark, ‘Plotinus: Body and Soul’, in The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, pp. 275–91 at 286–7. Rist, The Road to Reality, pp. 113–16 takes the disanalogy between our souls and World Soul a little too far, taking his cue from passages such as 4.8.4–8 Henry-Schwyzer on the orientation and status of World Soul. World Soul

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When speaking about the inferior work of logos and its subordinate logoi, the logoi immanent in the material world, logos is Nature (fúsiß, 3.8.3–8; 5.8.3 Henry-Schwyzer). All things below conform to their immaterial formative principles, including human individuals, being mere images and imitations. All such principles have a unity in the single, highest logos, the chief emanant of Intellect and the highest attainment of undescended Soul, not a separate principle or hypostasis distinguished from Soul.14 The different parts of things are blended into a unity in which life can flourish according to physical laws of nutrition, combination of elements, and natural functions. However, there is one important feature of this theory of logos. Plotinus has left a gap between metaphysical principles (logoi), immaterial items accessible to the soul (6.3.15, 29–38 Henry-Schwyzer), and accounting for propositional truths. In other words, the truth of the claim ‘Socrates is a man’ is presumably related to the principle which captures the being of Socrates (as well as other metaphysical insights), but it is left mysterious exactly how this works in view of the soul’s grasp of immaterial realities. Plotinus might point out that the soul relates to the structures of language in view of the intelligibles, for it is suited to understand and institute the logoi of the intelligible world for every purpose, even for inferior imitations of truth (1.2.3, 27–30; 5.5.1 Henry-Schwyzer). In his discussion of the truth of Intellect, he claims that truth pure and simple is self-expressing, and the knowledge of Intellect does not directly support the truth of structured, complex expressions (5.5.1–3 Henry-Schwyzer). In what follows, we will review the eruption of Soul into pure expression, imitating the birth of Intellect (5.5.5, 16–27 Henry-Schwyzer). Of course, more detailed explanation of this topic from Plotinus would be helpful. Or, as Gerson has recently argued, we could understand this problem as more a confusion of thinking and being than a failure to integrate two philosophically tasks distinguishable in other philosophers, such as Aristotle.15 Limitations of Language, Origins of Language Now we turn to the story of why language comes into being. Plotinian scholarship has explored the limits of language in view of the One, a prominent theme in Philo.16 Plotinus’ two highest metaphysical principles, is distanced from Being and the One in much the same way as our souls are alienated, World Soul must respond to perfect Soul just like any other soul. 14 Rist, The Road to Reality, pp. 86, 99–100 and others argue this unity of Soul and its logos. 15 Gerson, ‘Metaphor as an Ontological Concept’, pp. 258–61. 16 Frederic M. Schroeder, ‘Saying and Having in Plotinus’, Dionysius, 9 (1985): 75–84; idem, ‘Plotinus and Language’, in The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus,

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the Intellect (noüß) and the One (“en), attract discussion in several treatises as to what can be said about them (for example, 5.3; 5.4; 6.9 Henry-Schwyzer). I will bypass this issue, for the most part. Language, although a falling away from perfection, is distantly inspired by the ineffable source of everything; as I have argued, Plotinus connects language (like discursive reasoning) to Soul more closely than to Intellect. Abiding in light and silence, speechless commerce, closer union, these are truer responses to the ultimate.17 In one late treatise (5.3.14, 8–19 HenrySchwyzer), Plotinus claims that the One is beyond linguistic expression, but also the One gifts language to us. We cannot understand the One, but we can be mystically influenced by the One. Just like the enthusiasts and the possessed would understand only so much, that they have a greater within themselves, even if they do not see what it is, from which things they are moved and speak they take some perception of that which moves (them), being other than that which moves (them), so also we are likely to be oriented towards that (Supreme), whenever we possess pure Intellect, divining that this is the Intellect within, conferring substance and all else which is of this order; but it (the Supreme) is itself of a sort as not to be these things, but something superior to this which we call Being, and also fuller and greater than all our talk, for it is itself superior to language and intellect and perception, providing these but not in its own right being these.18

Language (logos) is ultimately yet distantly inspired by the One, which is distanced from language, intellect, and perception by ‘providing these but pp. 336–55 at 343–51; Crouzel, Origène et Plotin, pp. 103–5; Heiser, Logos and Language, pp. 59–72. 17 Schroeder, Form and Transformation, pp. 79, 89; idem, ‘Plotinus and Language’, pp. 349–51 argues for the mimetic character of language as the expression of union with higher realities. In spite of its inferiority, language (like all logoi) indirectly depends on the One, as argued by Gerson, ‘Metaphor as an Ontological Concept’, pp. 260–62. 18 The words in parentheses supplement my translation of the Greek text. The translation is my own. The words in round brackets are meant to complete the sense of the Greek. 5.3.14, 8–19 Henry-Schwyzer. h Allh “wsper oHi henqousi¨wnteß kaì kátocoi genómenoi hepì tosoüton k’an ehideïen, “oti ‘ecousi meïzon hen ahutoïß, k’an m`j ehid¨wsin “o ti, hex ˆwn dè kekínjntai kaì légousin, hek toútwn a‘isqjsín tina toü kin´jsantoß lambánousin Hetérwn ‘ontwn toü kin´jsantoß, o“utw kaì Hjmeïß kinduneúomen ‘ecein pròß hekeïno, “otan noün kaqaròn ‘ecwmen, cr´wmenoi, Hwß oûtóß hestin Ho ‘endon noüß, Ho doùß ohusían kaì tà ‘alla, “osa toútou toü stoícou, ahutòß dè oîoß ‘ara, Hwß ohu taüta, hallá ti kreïtton toútou, ”o légomen ‘on, hallà kaì pléon kaì meïzon ’j legómenon, “oti kaì ahutòß kreíttwn lógou kaì noü kaì ahisq´jsewß, parasc`wn taüta, ohuk ahutòß ’wn taüta.

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not in its own right being these’. One interesting feature of this passage is the role of Intellect which is present to the soul, its knowledge fulfilling us yet making us aware of its superior, the Supreme, which is beyond the limits of what is perceptible, knowable, expressible, and speakable. As Plotinus claims elsewhere, the intellect may report its union (t`jn sunousían) with the One (for example, 6.9.7, 16–23 Henry-Schwyzer). Such a report of unity is formed at a derivative stage. But it is also true that in some sense, all uses of language are derived from the primal response of enlightenment. For souls, this requires conformity with Intellect. Plotinus says we are in accord with Noüß in two ways: (1) ‘by having something like its writing written in us like laws (nómoiß)’ and (2) by being as if filled with it and able to see it and be aware of it as present” (V, 3 [49], 4, 2–4). These two ways of being in accord with Noüß, expressed in Plotinus’ typically allusive manner, should I believe be viewed from the perspective of metaphorical usage. The ‘laws’ of Noüß, whatever exactly these may be, mediate to us eternal truth. The mediation is through the language of thought or expressions of thought in words.19

All truths of language are dependent on the ‘writing’ in the soul, the ‘writing’ which issues from Intellect, although I doubt that the laws of Intellect are extended in linguistic structures. Plotinus merely intends a loose comparison to the inscription of laws. This dependent status of language is described in other passages in terms of imitations of the imitations of the One, the Forms which constitute Intellect (1.2.3, 27–8 Henry-Schwyzer). We must rely on images of truth, as well as unknowing, mystical attainment. Although language is remotely connected to the One, Plotinus demeans language for involving difference and multiplicity. For one thing, language has a scattered, discursive character (5.8.6, 1–9 Henry-Schwyzer), more extended and dispersed than more unified forms of expression (5.8.5–6, 6.7.38, 1–25 Henry-Schwyzer). This recalls the cognitive limitations of our incarnate condition, in which reasoning is required (logismóß, compare the similar Plotinian uses of dianójsiß, diánoia, lógoß, boúleusiß), as Kalligas describes. Another important feature of discursive reasoning is its relation with linguistic expression. Although linguistic formulations are by no means a necessary prerequisite for the engagement in such reasoning, they reflect in the most apposite way the mental process implied since, by the use of terms and various combinatory forms, dianoia produces propositional statements, which can then be asserted or denied, or even combined by means of syllogistic sequences and thus form series of arguments or demonstrations purporting to reflect soul’s 19 Gerson, ‘Metaphor as an Ontological Concept’, p. 267.

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insights into whatever it conceives as being reality. But this reality only vaguely reflects the tightly-woven structure that—as we already saw—holds together intelligible reality into a multiple unity. The disparity of the objects commonly refered to or envisaged by the soul is such that only through logos they can be brought together as to form ‘things’ bearing the semblance of unity and being. And their shadowy instability causes them to appear as continuously changing, either coming to be and passing away or undergoing all sorts of alterations which, again, language is well-suited to describe.20

So reasoning, like language, is a consequence of diminished mental and spiritual powers (4.3.18, 1–7 Henry-Schwyzer; compare 3.7.11, 35–45 Henry-Schwyzer, 5.8.6, 1–12 Henry-Schwyzer).21 Reasoning is inferior to our more static, unified thought, often termed by Plotinus ‘intellection’ (nójsiß). This higher thought reaches for the continuous thinking of our true intellect (noüß), a higher activity of soul beyond the brokenness of the incarnate condition. This higher thought operates more at a strike, less as a cognitive process. This continuous connection of the highest part of the soul with the intelligible realm shows why it cannot be true that the soul apart from body is rational, in a discursive, reasoning sense, and then becomes irrational upon incarnation.22 Our reasoning down here must struggle along, like a craftsman who fishes about in thought in dealing with problems. Although the emphasis in Plotinus is on the mimetic nature of language, it is useful to compare the Stoic view of the unity of propositions in terms of a whole logos composed of an arrangement of parts.23 For the Stoics, human language, in its basic structure, shows the rationality which orders the cosmos. This rationality can be discerned in the grammatical structures of language, which amounts to the nature of the parts of speech and the construction of 20 Kalligas, ‘Living Body, Soul, and Virtue’, p. 30. 21 Henry J. Blumenthal, Plotinus’ Psychology (The Hague, 1971), pp. 100–105 details how Plotinus uses the Greek terms tò dianojtikón and tò logistikón, logismóß/lógoß and dianójsiß/di´ánoia in a way that is highly parallel. There is a significant difference between higher thought, captured in the undescended soul which thinks without interruption, and the lower thought assumed by these Greek terms, the reasoning which we do as incarnate souls. At its best, the lower can act in conformity with the higher function. 22 Paul S. MacDonald, History of the Concept of Mind (Aldershot, 2003), p. 118 misses the significance of different levels of thought in Plotinus. ‘In its origin in the intelligible realm every soul is rational; it is only through its descent into the host body that soul becomes irrational.’ 23 In Stoic linguistics, articulate, meaningful speech (lógoß) is formed from the parts of speech which mirror the constituents of an incorporeal ‘sayable’ (lektón) ordered by a syntactical system. Stoic ‘sayables’ are introduced on p. 26–8 in connection with the Stoic background to Philo.

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these parts with one another. The human capacity for producing well ordered linguistic structures reflects rational goodness, although only in the case of the sage is it perfected. In contrast to Plotinus, linguistic sequences are not an imitative unpacking of something which is more august, perfect, and unified. Heiser develops this comparison. Plotinus does not represent Soul, via Nature, as ‘uttering’ the Universe like some cosmic logos prophorikos. He uses the Stoic term ‘utter’ exclusively for human verbal utterance. But logos, whether it is being ‘uttered’ by a learner or simply emerging on a lower level of reality as Nature’s creation, is always an ‘unfolding’ (anaptyssein) or an ‘unrolling’ (exelittein, anelittein) into multiplicity of something more truly itself—because more one—at the higher level of Intellect. It is always an expression and explication of a higher and more unified contemplation.24

Much of the difference from Stoic intellectual and spiritual perfection (assimilation to divine rationality) lies in the contemplative, unchanging destiny of the soul, a key point in my later discussion of discourse in political communities. Contemplative unity with Intellect provides perfection in truth, the soul being one with intelligible structure.25 And still higher beckons union with the One, quite foreign to Stoic ideals.26 Unlike the Stoics, achieving the ultimate in thought is pure activity, above particularity of soul and linguistic representation.27 24 Heiser, Logos and Language, p. 19. 25 Kevin Corrigan, ‘La discursivité et le temps futur du langage chez Plotin’, in Logos et langage, pp. 223–45 overstates the renewed, altered role of the future tense for expressing the immense and undetermined sense of Plotinian metaphysics. However, his remarks (p. 241) on the limits of commonly accepted truths are very helpful. ‘Les représentations, les explications plausibles et les théories scientifiques pertinentes peuvent nous rendre aveugles face à la réalité si nous les prenons pour la vérité absolue sans les critiquer, mais elles peuvent aussi nous ouvrir à la réalité, si nous sommes prêts à les faire voler en éclats afin d’entrevoir à travers elles la réalité. ... Comme Plotin le précise: nous ne devrions pas confondre nos explications au sujet du pourquoi des choses qui sont telles avec le fait qu’elles soient telles (V, 8 [31], 7, 36–44).’ 26 Keimpe Algra, ‘Stoic Theology’, in B. Inwood (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 153–78 presents the essentials of Stoic theology and spirituality. 27 Asger Ousager, Plotinus on Selfhood, Freedom and Politics (Aarhus, 2004), pp. 31, 54 notes Plotinus’ adaptation of Aristotle’s idea that actual thought is identical with its objects. Ousager argues (pp. 32–8) that there is no basis for distinguishing individual souls on the level of assimilation to Intellect. However, Ousager argues that there are Forms of particular souls which by necessary consequence serve in the individuation of particulars, these Forms of our souls related to Soul as species falling under a genus. Ascent to our particular Forms in Intellect is important to

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A difficult passage about the birth of Being suggests an origin to expression in the intelligible world as a type of response to the One, the source of all things (5.5.5, 16–27 Henry-Schwyzer). In the discussion that leads into this passage, an analogy is prepared with reference to number. The model from which the numbers take their being, the monad, makes possible a dependence in being in generating a sequence of numbers. A similar process is described for the establishment of Being. The emergence of language is explained in light of the primal relationships of these intelligible realities to the unmoved, self contained One. What is spoken of as Being, this primal from there above, advanced a little outward, so to speak, yet willed to come no further, rather being turned inward it stood firm, and came to be the reality and home of all things. It is like when in the case of voice someone stresses (one’s voice), the word for One takes shape (hen), meaning derivation from the One, and the word for Being is formed (on), meaning that which has sounded as much as possible (for it to sound). In this way, surely, what comes to be and reality and what-it-is-to-be involve imitation, being effluent from the power of it (namely, the One). The Soul, seeing, being moved by the sight, imitating what it sees, (the Soul) erupts into speech, (uttering) ‘Being’ and ‘what-it-is-to-be’ and ‘reality’ and ‘home’. These vocalizations wish to signify the reality of that which has come into being by labored utterance, copying, insofar as it is possible with them, the genesis of Being.28

explain our unification with other souls, which we examine later in this chapter. The debate over individual Forms in Plotinus seems to be resolving in favor of their role in explaining our higher identity, for example Henry J. Blumenthal, ‘On Soul and Intellect’, in The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, pp. 82–104 at 99–100. 28 The words in parentheses supplement my translation of the Greek text. The translation is my own. 5.5.5, 16–27 Henry-Schwyzer. Tò gár toi legómenon ’on toüto pr¨wton hekeïqen oîon holígon probebjkòß ohuk hjqéljsen ‘eti prósw helqeïn, metastrafèn dè ehiß tò e‘isw ‘estj, kaì hegéneto ohusía kaì Hestía Hapántwn≥ oîon hen fqógg^w henapereísantoß ahutòn toü fwnoüntoß Hufístatai tò ”en djloün tò hapò toü Henòß kaì tò ’on sjmaïnon tò fqegxámenon, Hwß dúnatai. O“utw toi tò mèn genómenon, Hj ohusía kaì tò e~inai, mímjsin ‘econta hek t¨jß dunámewß ahutoü Hruénta≥ Hj dè hidoüsa kaì hepikinjqeïsa t^w ¨ qeámati mimouménj ”o e~iden ‘errjxe fwn`jn t`jn ‘on kaì tò e~inai kaì ohusían kaì Hestían. Oûtoi gàr oHi fqóggoi qélousi sjm¨jnai t`jn Hupóstasin gennjqéntoß hwdïni toü fqeggoménou hapomimoúmenoi, Hwß oîón te ahutoïß, t`jn génesin toü ‘ontoß. I have benefited from the textual discussion of the latter portion of this passage in R. Ferwerda, ‘Plotinus on Sounds. An Interpretation of Plotinus’ Enneads V,5,5, 19–27’, Dionysius, 6 (1982): 43–57, although my translation here reflects several differences in interpretation, in particular rejecting some of his conjectures for textual emendation.

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Plotinus explains these difficult concepts from the phonetic properties of Greek words, to show the derivation of Being from the greater power of the One (5.5.6, 1 Henry-Schwyzer). Plotinus makes clear that Soul produces these simple expressions, not Intellect. Even at this rarified level in the intelligible realm, expressions are properly the work of Soul, in its imitative response to Intellect. Apparently, the utterances of Soul at this level are not predications. Its utterance is formed in the reversion towards its primal source in the emergence of vocal sound. The mimetic capacity of unified, single expressions (‘on, tò e~inai, ohusía, Hestía) is explained along the lines of a natural relationship between word and object.29 These pure eruptions of vocal sound from Soul express reality (in fact, the birth of Being) even more perfectly than the images and icons of the wisest souls (5.8.6, 1–13 HenrySchwyzer). The Nature of Language Up to this point, the focus has been the mimetic worth of all expressions of soul. The presence of Intellect to soul (and to Soul) leads it upward to the intelligibles, and the articulation of Intellect in logos provides order to the plurality in the intelligible world (and in the sensible cosmos). In a final sense, all order depends on the One, but Intellect is dominant in Plotinus’ theory of knowledge and truth. But we need a more complete metaphysical picture, regarding the nature of language itself. In responding to the Aristotelian categories, Plotinus provides valuable additional argument and clarification of linguistic meaning (6.1.5, 1–14; 6.4.12, 1–28; 6.7.18, 41–5 Henry-Schwyzer). Plotinus claims that the essence of language (logos) is incorporeal. Knowing the truth in what someone says is an illumination of reality for the soul. There is one passage which I will highlight, providing some clarification of his views on what makes language intelligible. It occurs in the course of his responses to the Aristotelian categories. This passage is found in Plotinus’ discussion of the category of quantity (6.1.5, 1–11 Henry-Schwyzer) which takes up a few candidates to be quantities (Language, time, motion). Language and time and motion, how (do these count as quantities)? First, concerning language, if you like, for it is subject to measure. Yet language, being this much in amount, is a (quantity), but insofar as it is language, it is not a quantity. For it is signifying, like in the case of name and verb. Air is the matter of it, like in the case of these (parts of speech). In fact, it (that is, language in the looser sense) is composed from them. To be more precise, language is the 29 Also compare Origen on ‘magical’ as distinguished from ‘conventional’ names, p. 60.

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striking, and not merely the striking, but the impression which is formed, like shaping (of the air). So then it is an action and a signifying action. Actually, one could reasonably affirm that this motion and striking is an action, while the counter motion is an affection, or each (motion) is an action of one thing and an affection of another thing, or (this motion and striking) is an action into the substrate, while (the counter motion) is an affection within the substrate.30

Other passages on similar topics are not nearly as well developed as this (4.5.5, 1–31; 6.4.12, 1–28; 6.7.18, 41–5 Henry-Schwyzer). Here we are told that language signifies on account of the imposition of immaterial, clarifying Form upon air. Air is the matter of spoken language (6.1.5, 4–5 Henry-Schwyzer), not vocal sound or fuzzy noise. The intelligibility by the presence of Form is the essence of language, language qua language (lógoß ˆ^j lógoß, 6.1.5, 1–4 Henry-Schwyzer). There is a useful comparison here with the soul’s activity in sense perception. As in his account of the soul’s activity of sense perception, the soul apprehends the qualities which come to bodies, the Forms (tà e‘idj) which make their impression (4.4.23, 1–3 Henry-Schwyzer).31 The objects of sense perception, much like audible vocal sounds, are not strictly what things are; the essence of objects of sense perception is a something (tí) which is a logos (rational principle). Rather, the objects of perception count as sensible substances, each sensible substance is a quale (poión), being a mere imitation of its logos (6.3.15, 24–38 Henry-Schwyzer). The objects of sense perception depend on ‘individual’ intelligible reality to keep them in order. In the case of sense perception as in the case of utterances, there is a looser sense of the being of objects, which is connected to categories like

30 The words in parentheses supplement my translation of the Greek text. The translation is my own. 6.1.5, 1–11 Henry-Schwyzer. H O dè lógoß kaì Ho crónoß kaì Hj kínjsiß p¨wß; Pr¨wton dè perì toü lógou, ehi boúlei, metreïtai mèn gár. h Allà lógoß ’wn tosósde hestín, ˆ^j dè lógoß, ohu posón≥ sjmantikòn gár, “wsper tò ‘onoma kaì tò Hr¨jma. “ Ulj dh ahutoü Ho ha´jr, “wsper kaì toútwn≥ kaì gàr súgkeitai hex ahut¨wn≥ Hj dè pljg`j mällon Ho lógoß, kaì ohuc Hj pljg`j Hapl¨wß, hallh Hj túpwsiß Hj gignoménj, “wsper morfoüsa≥ mällon o~un poíjsiß kaì poíjsiß sjmantik´j. T`jn d`j kínjsin taútjn kaì t`jn pljg`jn poíjsin mällon ’an ehulógwß tiß qeïto, t`jn dè hantikeiménwß páqoß, ’j Hekástjn ‘allou mèn poíjsin, ‘allou dè páqoß, ’j poíjsin ehiß tò Hupokeímenon, páqjma dh hen t¨^w Hupokeimén^w. There are textual difficulties. I have retained the reading of the manuscripts (kaì) instead of the conjecture of Henry-Schwyzer (katà) at 6.1.5, 8 Henry-Schwyzer. Also I reject their transposition of metreïtai mèn gár from 6.1.5, 2 to fit into the following sentence (6.1.5, 3) in correspondence to Aristotle, Cat. 4b32–3. However, I follow Henry-Schwyzer in reading h Allà lógoß at 6.1.5, 2. 31 Blumenthal, ‘On Soul and Intellect’, pp. 87–90.

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quality and quantity, and a stricter sense of the being of objects, which is the essence. Now I will add further remarks on how the nature of language relates to Plotinus’ doctrine of the categories. The essence of language is described in his discussion of the category of quantity (6.1.4–5 Henry-Schwyzer), in parallel with time and motion. Language, time, and motion are quantities in a secondary sense, while number is quantity in a primary sense (6.1.4, 1–52 Henry-Schwyzer). In a sense, these items are quantities, but in another sense, they are not. The essence of language is activity, an incorporeal ‘signifying activity’ (poíjsiß sjmantik´j, 6.1.5, 7–8 Henry-Schwyzer).32 This activity has the form of a ‘striking’ of air (tup´wsiß, 6.1.5, 6–12 Henry-Schwyzer; compare 4.5.5, 8–27 Henry-Schwyzer), evoking Stoic terminology of forming an impression in some malleable stuff.33 Like time, language is not (strictly speaking) a quantity, but only in a secondary sense. Plotinus does not return to the case of language in his full discussion of the category of activity (6.1.15–22 Henry-Schwyzer). However, Plotinus does not assume the Stoic distinction of corporeal voice and incorporeal lekta, which we find adapted in Philo. Instead, Plotinus uses the distinction between form and matter, the components of composite things. The essence of language is an activity, and essences are always higher entities than the composites that depend them (for example, 6.3.8, 30–37 Henry-Schwyzer). Essences are freer from material constraints, so the essence of language, being incorporeal in nature, is not subject to the limitations of a 32 Kalligas, ‘Living Body, Soul, and Virtue’, p. 32 points out that the term poíjsiß is usually used by Plotinus for the secondary activity of the soul, while the primary activity of the soul is contemplation (qewría), the prototype of the higher activity of the soul (präxiß). ‘Like präxiß in Aristotle, Plotinus’ primary activity is a realization and actualization of a being’s nature in a way which implies the presence of the aim of the act within itself, so that it can be considered as being perfect and complete at any particular moment. ... In the case of the soul, this means that its primary activity is directed towards the Intellect as a whole since, as we saw, the foundation and the core of its being lies there and, moreover, comprises—in a way which is peculiar to all intelligible beings—all the rest of the intelligible realm. This amounts to saying that the proper, primary activity of the soul is its contemplation.’ I assume in my discussion below (in connection with 6.7.18, 41–5 Henry-Schwyzer) that the activity of language, at any level, is subordinate to the proper activity of the soul. 33 Compare Stoic epistemology, defining the impression (fantasía) as a ‘striking’ ´(tup´wsiß) in the soul (Plutarch, Comm. Not. 1084F Pohlenz = SVF 2.847). However, the nature of ‘striking’ attracted controversy in the school (Sextus Empiricus, Math. 7.228 Mutschmann = SVF 1.484). The Stoic definition of vocal sound is formulated as a ‘concussion’ of air (pljg´j) (SVF 2.138–42), although unlike Plotinus this is conceived as a bodily item.

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composite entity. Of course, the essence of language is precisely that which is understood when there is insight in discouse situations. In a final sense, it is a reflection of Intellect and thus it reflects the perfection of the One. However, Plotinus does not always adopt concepts along these exact lines. In other passages, voice is an entity dependent upon the individual who speaks. This is shown in the following passage (6.7.18, 41–5 HenrySchwyzer).34 The primal activity is good, and what is defined in dependence on it is good, as well as both together. And there is the good (which is the Intellect) that is generated by it (which is the One), the good that is the intelligible order generated from it, and the good that is both (Intellect and intelligible order) together. Derived from it, then, not identical, for example if from the same (man) is derived voice and walking and anything else, everything being set in proper order.35

Apparently, voice (fwn´j) is metaphysically the same sort of item as the activity of walking. They are both derived from the individual, being dependent in being on him, but these items are not qualities which inhere in the individual, perceptible man. In light of the role of voice in parallel with walking, this aspect of speech would be an activity. It is probably not the proper activity of language qua language, although I don’t think that Plotinus means to deliver a developed account in this brief notice about voice. The involvement of voice with material constraints is likely. In any case, we could interpret Plotinus to mean that voice is subject to a double dependence. It is dependent not only in the sense of being a derivative of the logos which is the activity of being the man. But also voice is dependent in the sense of being subject to the proper activity which is the essence of language.36

34 Plotinus makes clear in other passages that the perceptible individual is a composite of form and matter (6.3.4, 1–37; 6.3.15, 24–38 Henry-Schwyzer). And I think that in this passage regarding what is derived from the man, he has in mind the perceptible man, in spite of the correspondence drawn to immaterial metaphysical principles. Hence I suggest that perceptible persons, sounds, and walks are in question. 35 The words in parentheses supplement my translation of the Greek text. The translation is my own, supplemental words are supplied in round brackets. 6.7.18, 41–5 Henry-Schwyzer. Kaì gàr Hj henérgeia Hj pr´wtj hagaqòn kaì tò heph ahut^¨j Horisqèn hagaqòn kaì tò sunámfw≥ kaì tò mèn “oti genómenon Huph ahutoü, tò dh “oti kósmoß haph ahutoü, tò dh “oti sunámfw. h Aph ahutoü o~un, kaì ohudèn tahutón, oîon ehi hapò toü ahutoü fwn`j kaì bádisiß kaì ‘allo ti, pánta katorqoúmena. 36 I will pursue the issue of the status of activities further, when I turn to Plotinus’ metaphysics of light and sound.

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Now we have a more detailed picture of the nature of meaning. As an incorporeal power bringing life to airy matter, the essence of language is an activity in which the Forms are present. In orderly language use, the logos in the soul is an activity, it functions as an interpreter of Intellect.37 Schroeder points out the cosmic witness which expresses the goodness of Intellect in the universe. Plotinus gives voice to the cosmos’ declaration of its creator: ‘Looking upon it one might readily hear from it, “A god made me,”’ (3.2 [47].3.19–21). This passage seems to be reflected in St Augustine’s powerful phrase: Ecce sunt caelum et terra, clamant, quod facta sint. Speech as declaration is located, not only in ourselves, but in the cosmos of which we speak. We bring it to articulation. As the word is not just our project but part of creation as a whole, we need not read this passage merely in terms of the literary device of personification. As Intellect creates the world, its icon, the creation, speaks to us of Intellect and (indirectly) Intellect thus speaks to us, summoning us to itself.38

In my view, there is nothing fundamentally unique about our language as an accomplishment of human nature. Our speech is merely a special case of the intelligibility of everything, dominated by this immaterial structuring. It is not a magic gift which enables culture and technological progress, in spite of its important role in political affairs. By this point, we have seen how the intelligibility of language depends on Intellect, which will emerge below as the key to Plotinus’ explanation of the knowledge that blesses political communities. Soul and Body, Light and Sound With our preliminary examination of the nature of language in place, we can look further into the way language enters the world. Let us briefly consider how soul and body are related, then we will consider the cases of light and sound. These two phenomena are Plotinus’ favorite illustrations of how the life of soul is projected into the inferior level of the body. These related topics are crucial in attaining a clearer view of the way understanding of the intelligible is possible in discourse.39 In particular, Plotinus addresses the 37 Schroeder, Form and Transformation, pp. 78–9 provides extensive explanation of this point. 38 Schroeder, Form and Transformation, pp. 72–3. 39 In general, I am indebted here to the work of Schroeder, Form and Transformation, pp. 28–36, 48–54, for recognizing the significance of light to Plotinus’ theory of language. I agree that language has important connections to light, although there are limits to the comparison. There has not been much work on the Stoic contribution to Plotinus’ use of light and sound in his metaphysical

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question of how linguistic meaning is made accessible to a field of auditors. Thus he provides additional explanation of how articulate vocal sound in the air is suited for linguistic understanding, which in turn undergirds his claims about the uniformity of wisdom in political discourse. Light is an important conceptual tool to explain the flow of perfection downwards to lower realms, providing a useful point of comparison to the intelligibility that blesses human utterances. The problem of how an incorporeal soul can be related to material things draws attention in several treatises (1.1.4, 14–16 Henry-Schwyzer; 4.3.22, 1–9 Henry-Schwyzer; 6.4.14–15 Henry-Schwyzer; 6.5.4–7 Henry-Schwyzer). Our souls address the familiar activities of the body (for example, eating, drinking, vision)—yet in a sense, the soul remains unaffected by the body. We see this point better in the power of light. Light is not affected by the environment it suffuses. For something to be full of light is not for some object to become actual or to contribute to the effect of being illumined. Light is not blended with air, although it is present to the air by enveloping it. ‘As the air is in light, so the body is in soul, rather than soul in body.’40 For Plotinus, light is an incorporeal entity, which is produced from corporeal sources like the sun or fire. Light is ontologically dependent on the existence of a luminary source, as an activity (henérgeia) determined by the nature of its source (4.5.6–7 Henry-Schwyzer). As it penetrates the atmosphere, it travels from its source to illuminate objects on earth. Although it suffers no change, other things are changed by its activity. Plotinus favors this metaphysics of light as the clearest case of the derivation of everything from the One.41 Plotinus’ metaphysics of light trades on his ‘double activity’ theory, which as adapted from Aristotle is also used to explain the procession of Intellect from the One.42 Abiding in its source is the higher activity of light, yet light also acts in procession from its source; the activity (henérgeia) which is explanations, although Bussanich, The One and its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 98 suggests some possible connections. 40 Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators, vol. 1, p. 205. 41 Schroeder, ‘Plotinus and Language’, p. 343. ‘Powers proceed from the intelligible to the sensible world as light from light (VI.4.9.25–7). The examples of spring and streams, snow and cold, and flower and scent work to the extent that they illustrate this principle. Yet its paradigmatic instantiation is the procession of light from its source. Thus the procession of sensible from intelligible reality is not merely likened to the procession of light from its source. It is such a procession.’ 42 Bussanich, The One and its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, pp. 28–31 provides detailed explanation, including Plotinus’ divergence from Aristotle. Both Plotinus and Aristotle appear to treat henérgeia as activity as much as substance, depending on the context of discussion (compare Bussanich’s remarks on dúnamiß as potentiality as well as power).

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substance (ohusía) produces a subordinate activity which is substance (5.4.2, 26–37 Henry-Schwyzer). For example, take the procession of heat from a fire. The master activity of being fire abides in the fire, but a subordinate activity of the fire issues from the fire, namely the fire’s activity of heating. This relationship bears out the general principle that in everything there is both a static activity (the power to act) and a dynamic activity derived from it (the resulting action).43 If we assume an analogous scheme in our talk, the essence of language is an activity which issues from a superior psychic activity. Presumably this amounts to the same distinction expressed occasionally by Plotinus in terms of inner and outer logos (1.2.3, 27–30 Henry-Schwyzer). It is arguable that both of these activities are substances, although the external activity does not proceed from the internal activity in a rigorously simple way, as in the case of fire or light. Heat issues from light by necessity, in a way removed from these activities of soul. Caught amid the hazards of bodily experience, the soul is not primarily conceived as exercising freedoms to express itself, but rather as traveling through experience, called to stability, quietude, liberation from the body and its passions in desiring what is real and true.44 I suggest that Plotinian speech is not produced by necessity like heat from fire, although it could be tightly ordered, insofar as it issues from rational human control over actions.45 Of course, there are other important differences between the nature of language and the nature of light. Light seems to be a unique case of something incorporeal issuing from a corporeal source.46 And sensible light is entirely incorporeal, there is no material substrate which receives the form of light. In some respects, the complicated discussions of light are more sophisticated than the passages on language. The metaphysics of light shows how light makes things intelligible, whether visible or invisible light is in question. For example, light makes other objects intelligible, yet light itself can be an object of sight (5.5.7 Henry-Schwyzer). This is a purer moment of vision. So in this

43 Schroeder, Form and Transformation, pp. 28–36, 62. 44 Georges Leroux, ‘Human Freedom in the Thought of Plotinus’, in The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, pp. 292–314 at 305–12. 45 Pauliina Remes, ‘Plotinus’s Ethics of Disinterested Interest’, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 44 (2006): 1–23 at 7–13 helpfully elucidates the Neoplatonic sage and action for ordinary living, which I cannot address within the limits of this chapter. 46 Schroeder, Form and Transformation, pp. 24–39, 45–6, 50–53.

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sense, Plotinus regards light itself as an object of perception distinguishable from its illumination of objects.47 Another of his favorite examples uses sound to show the soul’s presence to body (6.4.12, 1–28 Henry-Schwyzer; compare 2.8.1, 17–29). Sound is a useful case for Plotinus to show the ubiquity of the intelligible. In addition to the argument from sound, to establish the way soul is present, there is some explanation of the way the intelligible is present when vocal sounds are involved in auditory perception. This passage addresses the way meaning (the presence of Form) is in the air from a slightly different angle than the category of quantity discussion. And just as the ear, being attentive, receives and perceives when on many occasions voice is (dispersed) throughout the air and language (being) in the voice, and even if you should interpose another (ear) in the vacuum, the language and voice comes to it, or rather the ear comes to language, and many eyes look towards it and all are filled with the vision, yet the object of vision is separated, because the eye is one case, the ear is another case. In just this way, surely, that which has the potential to obtain soul will obtain it and one thing, and still another, will obtain it from the same (source). Now the voice is everywhere in the air, not being one (voice) being partitioned, but rather one whole (voice) everywhere. And with respect to sight, if the air by being affected takes the shape, it does not take it partitioned; for wherever sight is positioned, there it possesses the shape. But not every teaching countenances this view (of sight), nevertheless let it be said, on account of that (observation), that the participation is from the same unity. But the clearer case is that of voice, the Form is present as a whole over the air space; for otherwise, it would not be true that every listener hears the same thing, insofar as the language having been voiced would not be present in every sector as a whole, and each hearing would not take in the entirety in a uniform way. If it is not true even here that the whole voice is extended over the entire air, so that one part of it is yoked with this bit, another mingled in with another, why need one hesitate (to draw our conclusions), that the one soul is not extended by being distributed, but is omnipresent wherever it is present and is not partitioned at every point of the all? Coming into the condition of physical bodies, as if it were generated, it will be correlative to the voice when it is voiced in the air, while (the soul being considered) prior to bodies (will be correlative) to someone voicing and about to voice; although even when coming to be in a body, not thus does it desist from being according to someone voicing, who by voicing both holds voice as well as produces it.48 47 I owe much to Schroeder, Form and Transformation, pp. 28–36, 48–54; idem, ‘Plotinus and Language’, pp. 341–2. 48 The words in parentheses supplement my translation of the Greek text. The translation is my own. 6.4.12, 1–28 Henry-Schwyzer. “ Wsper dè fwn¨jß o‘usjß katà tòn haéra pollákiß kaì lógou hen t^¨j fwn^¨j o~uß mèn paròn hedéxato kaì ^‘jsqeto, kaì ehi “eteron qeíjß metaxù t¨jß herjmíaß, ~jlqe kaì pròß ahutò Ho lógoß

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When the voice (fwn´j) is uttered, it is present at each point.49 Plotinus emphasizes that the sound is present, which is analogous to the presence of ‘the Form as a whole’ (“olon tò e~idoß). Let us tease out some of his theory of auditory perception. Form is actualized when the ear attends to it by its receptive capacity, but this actualization can only occur uniformly (Homoíwß). In fact, Plotinus’ argument for the omnipresence of Form in the air contains the claim that every listener hears the same thing. In another passage (3.8.9, 24–8 Henry-Schwyzer), Plotinus’ omnipresence of voice over space shows the way exalted realities, the Intellect and the One, are close to the soul.50 Something in the soul kaì Hj fwn´j, mällon dè tò o~uß ~jlqe pròß tòn lógon, kaì hofqalmoì polloì pròß tò ahutò e~idon kaì pánteß hepl´jsqjsan t¨jß qéaß kaítoi henafwrisménou toü qeámatoß keiménou, “oti Ho mèn hofqalmóß, Ho dè o~uß ~jn, o“utw toi kaì tò dunámenon yuc`jn ‘ecein “exei kaì ‘allo a~u kaì “eteron hapò toü ahutoü. ~ Jn dè Hj fwn`j pantacoü toü haéroß ohu mía memerisménj, hallà mía pantacoü “olj≥ kaì tò t¨jß ‘oyewß dé, ehi paq`wn Ho ha`jr t`jn morf`jn ‘ecei, ‘ecei ohu memerisménjn≥ oû gàr ’an ‘oyiß teq^¨j, ‘ecei hekeï t`jn morf´jn. h Allà toüto mèn ohu päsa dóxa sugcwreï, ehir´jsqw dh o~un dih hekeïno, “oti hapò toü ahutoü Henòß Hj metáljyiß. Tò dè hepì t¨jß fwn¨jß henargésteron, Hwß hen pantì t^¨w haéri “olon tò e~idóß hestin≥ ohu gàr ’an ‘jkouse päß tò ahutò m`j Hekastacoü “olou ‘ontoß toü fwnjqéntoß lógou kaì Hekástjß hako¨jß tò pän Homoíwß dedegménjß. Ehi dè mjdh hentaüqa Hj “olj fwn`j kaqh “olon tòn haéra paratétatai, Hwß tóde mèn tò méroß ahut¨jß t^¨wde t^¨w mérei sunezeücqai, tóde dè t^¨wde summemerísqai, tí deï hapisteïn, ehi yuc`j m`j mía tétatai summerizoménj, hallà pantacoü oû ’an par^¨j páresti kaì ‘esti pantacoü toü pantòß ohu memerisménj; Kaì genoménj mèn hen s´wmasin, Hwß ’an génoito, hanálogon “exei t^¨j ‘jdj hen t^¨w haéri fwnjqeís^j fwn^¨j, prò dè t¨wn swmátwn t^¨w fwnoünti kaì fwn´jsonti≥ kaítoi kaì genoménj hen s´wmati ohudh ˆwß hapéstj toü katà tòn fwnoünta e~inai, “ostiß fwn¨wn kaì ‘ecei t`jn fwn`jn kaì dídwsi. 49 This text should not be translated, from the opening words onwards, along the lines of the ‘vehicle’ model. MacKenna’s venerable translation loosely slips into this mistake when Plotinus introduces the comparison, Stephen MacKenna (trans.), Plotinus. The Enneads (London, 1991), p. 450. ‘Think of a sound passing through the air and carrying a word; an ear within range catches and comprehends.’ Rather, the basic notion is clearly of atmospheric uniformity ‘through the air’ (katà tòn haéra), not transfer of meaning. 50 Bussanich, The One and its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, p. 97 notes in commentary on 3.8.9, 24–8 Henry-Schwyzer the importance of this illustration in Plotinian metaphysics. ‘This remarkable auditory metaphor for describing how the soul can actualize the presence of the One has received little attention. Plotinus often uses the sound of a voice to symbolize metaphysical doctrines. In the cosmic metaphor at III.2[47].17.65–75 the sounds of all voices harmonize in a universal melody. At V.1[10].12.14–20, to dramatize the omnipresence of Intellect to the soul, he counsels the soul to rouse its ‘power of hearing to catch what, when it comes,

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identifies with the intelligible, like an immense voice sounding everywhere, available to the attentive soul. Here also the omnipresence of the higher entity makes possible participation in this entity (5.5.9, 11–16 Henry-Schwyzer). In the passage I have translated, Plotinus mentions the attention of the ear (6.4.12, 1–18 Henry-Schwyzer). The soul is present to the body everywhere yet nowhere, not confined by material limitations to a physical location, being attendant as a whole to every bodily part. This feature, the presence of soul as a whole to the several parts of the body, is used by Plotinus in other parts of the Enneads to argue for the difference in nature between soul and body, a classic Platonist claim that is also operative in Philo.51 The parts of the body are extended and divisible in space, being diverse in nature and function; under direction of soul, a faculty of auditory perception emerges in the ideal location of the ears, nerves, and brain, best suited for receptivity (6.4.11, 3–14 Henry-Schwyzer). If a creature is not suited for receiving meaningful vocal sound by the prior work of World Soul, the utterance is experienced as mere sonic impact in spite of its meaningful content (6.4.15, 1–14 HenrySchwyzer). This creates a special connection with bodily organs, where the principle (harc´j) of the actualization of the faculty for hearing is located (4.3.23, 9–21 Henry-Schwyzer). But the psychic power of hearing, which transcends the body, uses the physical organs of hearing instrumentally (4.3.23, 17–21 Henry-Schwyzer). In other words, the World Soul in a prior phase makes certain bodily parts suitable for receiving intelligible utterances. In another (posterior) phase, soul affects the body in making actual the faculty of hearing in these prepared organs of hearing. It has been argued that Plotinus’ explanation of the psychic faculties provides a model for other difficult cases of understanding the presence of immaterial powers which show their activity at special points in the physical world.52 For example, take the case of Intellect being nowhere and yet being located in a special location at the edge of the universe. ‘If this sounds strange, it might be helpful to compare these ubiquitous powers ... to radio and television waves which, despite being present nearly everywhere, require (functioning) radios and televisions for their actualization.’53 For like

is the best of all sounds which can be heard’ (16–17), i.e. that of the intelligible world.’ 51 Ejolfur K. Emilsson, ‘Platonic Soul-Body Dualism in the Early Centuries of the Empire to Plotinus’, ANRW, 2.36.7 (Berlin, 1994), pp. 5331–62 at 5350–53 summarizes all of Plotinus’ major arguments in defense of this claim. 52 J. Wilberding, ‘‘‘Creeping Spatiality”: Nous in Plotinus’ Universe’, Phronesis, 50 (2005): 315–34 at 328–34. 53 Wilberding, ‘Creeping Spatiality’, p. 328.

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the activity of light in the air, the presence of the intelligible in the air is not a local presence.54 In summary, Plotinus’ frequent uses of light and sound serve to highlight important features corresponding to the presence of Intellect to the soul, as well as the presence of intelligible entities in space. In fact, the omnipresence and uniformity of Intellect to souls provides the metaphysical scaffolding for Plotinus’ account of the omnipresence and uniformity of wisdom to all souls in considering the general civic welfare, which I pursue in what follows. Language and Communion Now we are ready for the interpersonal, ethical, and political dimensions of Plotinus’ theory of communication. There is a general tendency to subordinate all human activities to an austere ideal of contemplation. It is undeniable that his extravagant program of dialectical ascent and metaphysical speculation is a dominant theme. So it is remarkable that Plotinus devotes some thought to the uniformity of wisdom in the discourse of political communities. I will try to show that the reception of wisdom by souls is supported by his metaphysics of the presence of the intelligible to the air, to make linguistic understanding possible. The importance of Plotinus’ political philosophy, and its relevance to his ethics, has only recently attracted substantial attention.55 Plotinus is well aware of the requirements of human life in civic society, and the actions and choices that we must make in order to be virtuous (2.9.9 Henry-Schwyzer). This is an important part of his rejection of Gnosticism’s dark vision of life in the material world (2.9.4–5, 9, 16–18 Henry-Schwyzer). In civic discourse, souls can rise above their particular points of view. And in seeking wisdom, there is a sense in which souls are unified, by virtue of their connection to Intellect. Plotinus’ philosophy of language does not take its cue from diversity of understanding, the untidy negotiations of interactive talk.

54 Schroeder, Form and Transformation, pp. 25–8, 45–6, 50–53. 55 Ousager, Plotinus on Selfhood, Freedom and Politics, pp. 211–84; Remes, ‘Plotinus’s Ethics of Disinterested Interest’, pp. 1–23; Leroux, ‘Human Freedom in the Thought of Plotinus’, pp. 292–314. Leroux makes a few inviting comparisons with Kantian moral and political theory.

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Soul Connection For Plotinus, language is intimately associated with the incarnate state of the soul held in a worldly body (4.3.18 Henry-Schwyzer).56 Purer experience is possible in a higher form of life freer from the body, however our incarnate difficulties require discourse about many particulars. Similar to Origen, Plotinus describes the requirement of language in our troublesome embodied state to communicate our minds. Yet on an advanced level, Plotinus refines language past recognition, or simply discards it, as souls ascend to pure knowledge.57 Some passages describe a pure communion of souls in the intelligible realm—I will argue that this concept of soul connection in Plotinus can easily be misunderstood. It must be carefully qualified in view of the centrality of Intellect. This concept of exchange is interpersonal but not overtly political. In one of the lengthy tractates on problems of the soul (4.3.18, 7–24 HenrySchwyzer), Plotinus describes a more closely unified form of shared knowledge among souls than is possible in the sensible world. Now if there above (things are) without reasoning, how would (souls) still be rational? Perhaps because, someone might reply, they have the potential, when circumstance (arises), to be flush in deliberation. And we must understand the reasoning that is of this sort—if we understand reasoning which always flows from the Intellect, being in them a disposition, a standing activity, being like a reflection (of Intellect); (in this sense) there would be (souls) engaged in reasoning there above. Certainly, in my opinion, we should not consider that (souls) use vocal sounds in the intelligible world, although in the heavens (souls) altogether possess bodies. As many things as they discuss on account of needs or difficulties here below, there above it would not be so; but rather acting in perfect arrangement and according to nature, they order no particulars nor is counsel taken, rather they know from one another in understanding. For even here below, silent eyes have knowledge of many things, while there above all body is pure

56 Rist, The Road to Reality, pp. 135–51; Crouzel, Origène et Plotin, pp. 227– 404 address the issues of psychology, metaphysics, soteriology, and ethics which are raised by Plotinus’ understanding of the predicament of souls embodied here on earth. 57 It has been argued that Plotinus also goes far beyond Origen in working out a detailed theory of the grades of virtue, in John Dillon, ‘Plotinus, Philo and Origen on the Grades of Virtue’, in H.-D. Blume and F. Mann (eds), Platonismus und Christentum. Festschrift für Heinrich Dörrie (Münster Westfalen, 1983), pp. 92–105.

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Word and Meaning in Ancient Alexandria and each (being) is, as it were, an eye, nothing hid or counterfeit, but by sight alone it knows prior to speaking to another.58

Our dependence on language is necessary for present purposes, but it is merely a dim reflection of higher forms of understanding when we are free from our familiar bodily existence. The argument proceeds from silent knowledge shared from visual contact in our present state, to establish the dominance of vision in sharing knowledge in the life to come.59 Communication is described as still, immediate, complete. Bodily hindrances will be removed to attaining knowledge in ‘understanding’ (súnesiß), a somewhat lightly used word in Plotinus which often concerns the contact of the soul with the intelligible realm (nojtóß tópoß).60 Plotinus notes the role of ‘soul vehicles’, although vocal sound is not part of the picture in an environment without the air we experience down here.61 Actually, I find this passage a little misleading, in that some key elements are not visible on the surface of this discussion. For as I will argue below, communication among souls on every level is fundamentally explained by their inner access to higher realities. In the intelligible world as well, these purer connections among souls can only be forms of contemplation. Contemplation is a still, silent activity which assumes the perfections of

58 The words in parentheses supplement my translation of the Greek text. The translation is my own. 4.3.18, 7–24 Henry-Schwyzer. h Allh ehi hekeï ‘aneu logism¨wn, p¨wß ’an ‘eti logikaì e~ien; ’ J “oti dúnantai, e‘ipoi tiß ‘an, “otan perístasiß, ehupor¨jsai diaskopoüsai. Deï dè tòn logismòn labeïn tòn toioüton≥ hepeì e‘i tiß logismòn lambánei t`jn hek noü haeì ginoménjn kaì o~usan hen ahutaïß diáqesin, kaì henérgeian Hest¨wsan kaì oîon ‘emfasin o~usan, e~ien ’an khakeï logism^¨w cr´wmenai. Ohudè d`j fwnaïß, o~imai, cr¨jsqai nomistéon hen mèn t^¨w nojt^¨w o‘usaß, kaì pámpan s´wmata dh hecoúsaß hen ohuran^¨w. “ Osa mèn dià creíaß ’j dih hamfisbjt´jseiß dialégontai hentaüqa, hekeï ohuk ’an e‘ij≥ poioüsai dè hen táxei kaì katà fúsin “ekasta ohudh ’an hepitáttoien ohudh ’an sumbouleúoien, gin´wskoien dh ’an kaì tà parh hall´jlwn hen sunései. h Epeì kaì hentaüqa pollà siwp´wntwn gin´wskoimen dih hommátwn≥ hekeï dè kaqaròn pän tò s¨wma kaì oîon hofqalmòß “ekastoß kaì ohudèn dè kruptòn ohudè peplasménon, hallà prìn ehipeïn ‘all^w hid`wn hekeïnoß ‘egnw. 59 Ousager, Plotinus on Selfhood, Freedom and Politics, p. 43 discusses the Platonic roots of the ocular metaphor for the soul. 60 For example, 5.8.13, 23 Henry-Schwyzer; compare Plato, Rep. 517B5. 61 The concept of the soul’s otherworldly garment is inherited from Plato (Plato, Phaedr. 247B, Phd. 113D, Tim. 41D–E; Plotinus 4.3.18 Henry-Schwyzer; 4.4.5 Henry-Schwyzer). Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators, vol. 1, pp. 221–41 introduces vehicles of soul in Later Greek philosophy.

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highest Soul (5.1.2, 11–14 Henry-Schwyzer). At an even higher level of focus, the soul has no separate object for its contemplation; it unifies with Intellect and finally with the One. Eyes and ears have no place in experience of the highest things, where intellection is perfected (5.5.12, 1–14 HenrySchwyzer). In the end, souls merge into the One, abandoning particularity.63 Of course, the actualization of intellect in the soul, whether stimulated by a process of thought or by communication, is not really knowledge of anything the soul does not already know. Knowledge is only accessible by the soul’s prior connection to the Forms, it must only be awakened by some spark. The two main uses of recollection in the Platonic dialogues are to prove the prior existence of the soul and to show how learning is possible. Plotinian Platonic recollection is an awakening to knowledge, a purification of the mind in restoration to its transcendent wellspring (5.3.2, 9–14; 6.2.22, 3–7 HenrySchwyzer), attaining a greater awareness of the higher, continuous activity of soul in accessing the intelligibles.64 I have argued that Plotinus’ notion of soul connection is fundamentally the soul’s contemplation of Intellect. Now I will try to show that linguistic understanding can be seen as the unification of souls in their assimilation to Intellect, with reference to ethics and public life. There are two passages which deserve special attention (6.5.10, 11–40; 4.4.39, 11–22 HenrySchwyzer)—we have already noted the disarray, compared to higher communions, that afflicts many interchanges in our worldly sphere of talk (4.3.18, 7–24 Henry-Schwyzer). In my opinion, Plotinus recognizes degrees of linguistic understanding in this-worldly situations of discourse, in spite of the dependence of all linguistic intelligibility on the uniformity and wholeness from the Forms of Intellect. For some contributions to political discussion are more orderly than other contributions birthed from uncontrolled desires, by reflecting wisdom and truth in the intelligible world more perfectly (6.4.15, 18–40 Henry-Schwyzer). In the spirit of Plato’s vision of a happy political community ordered by philosophical knowledge in the Republic, Plotinus maintains an ideal of civic unity in view of the intelligibles.

62 Above the level of soul, a similar theme of silent unity appears in the self knowledge of Intellect (5.3.10, 45–6 Henry-Schwyzer). Plotinus describes an irruption of duality into this still, silent intellection, when thinking splits the thinker in twain. 63 Regarding the significance of individual Forms in the ascent to the One, I defer to the work of Ousager, Plotinus on Selfhood, Freedom and Politics, pp. 95–110. 64 Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators, vol. 1, p. 172. ‘Recollection is acknowledged by Plotinus. But it is needed only by the lower soul, not by the undescended soul which is uninterruptedly thinking the Forms.’

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Plotinus claims that unities formed in civic debates imitate the contemplative activity of the soul communing with the intelligibles.65 This imitation depends on souls becoming one with intellect.66 Wisdom is present to each assembled communicant as a whole, similar to the omnipresence of vocal sound in an auditory field, or the omnipresence of Form in the air. The higher calling of the soul to contemplation of the forms (Intellect) is the resource to unify citizen-souls in a public assembly, as well as what makes the actions of the Plotinian sage good.67 The Unity of Souls in Politics Plotinus conceives the state, when functioning well, as a perfectly harmonious political unity. On occasion, Plotinus describes the cosmic order in similar terms as the civic order and the anthropic order, although there is a hierarchy of orders. Members of the cosmic order (the stars and planets) are subject to law (2.3.8, 1–9 Henry-Schwyzer), while it is meet for the souls who live in the city to honor virtue and law (1.2.1, 46–53; 1.2.2, 13–26 HenrySchwyzer). In fact, it is possible for the laws of the city to be perfected by an ecstatic vision, as in the case of Minos, whose laws capture higher truths in political application (6.9.7, 23–6 Henry-Schwyzer). The civic order is also the work of the cosmic principle (logos), the universal expression of Intellect applied to government. The following text describes legislation and civic harmony being established in analogy to the logos of the All (4.4.39, 11–22 Henry-Schwyzer). The logos of the All would be more in accordance with the logos that establishes the order and law of a city, which knows already what the citizens will do and for what reasons they will do it, legislating in view of all these things, weaving together by the laws all their experiences and actions and the rewards and punishments upon the actions, everything proceeding smoothly into harmony as if of its own accord. The signification is not (present) for the sake of this, to the end that there is signifying primarily; but when things happen in this way, different things are signified from different quarters. (This is the case) because all is unity and belonging to unity, and one thing is known by way of another, a cause in the

65 Ousager, Plotinus on Selfhood, Freedom and Politics, pp. 274–84 addresses the power of philosophical contemplation applied to the civic arena. 66 Remes, ‘Plotinus’s Ethics of Disinterested Interest’, pp. 10–11 discusses different levels of virtue, including the higher virtues of the sage, which may not be shared by all citizens. 67 Kalligas, ‘Living Body, Soul, and Virtue’, pp. 31–3; Remes, ‘Plotinus’s Ethics of Disinterested Interest’, pp. 11–13.

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light of the caused, the posterior as arising from the prior, the compound from the constituents, in that (the order) makes the constituents connected together.68

Actually, this passage about law, civic order, and signification provides no explanation of linguistic understanding in its own right. The knowledge belonging to logos, active in excellent political function, is loosely parallel to the knowledge of what happens in the universe under its cosmic legislation (2.3.8, 1–9 Henry-Schwyzer). In fact, the point of signification in this passage has no direct relevance to linguistic political functions, such as informing benighted citizens of their limited condition, along the lines of the Allegory of the Cave in the Republic.69 This is a more sovereign kind of signification than linguistic signification, although it is also true, of course, that laws and customs may be articulated in linguistic form. Rather, this signification has to do with the intellectual foresight accessible by dint of Soul’s recourse to civic logos in administering the city; there is no need for language or reasoning when wisdom and knowledge are in control. (Compare 4.4.11, 1–13 Henry-Schwyzer on the simplicity of the administration of the universe by cosmic intelligence, which features no extended intellectual processes.) In the All, different stars signify different things, under the governance of cosmic law. Plotinus repeatedly claims that this signifying activity only foreshows what is to come, but the heavenly bodies do not enter into causal relationships (2.3.1–10 Henry-Schwyzer). In accordance with this cosmic scheme, the activity of this civic logos consists in knowing future events and the general order which subsumes the parts. Even in their limited state, souls within the political community might understand this order, perhaps by attending to some partial aspect of the entire civic harmony, even when the underlying unity is not a focus of awareness to the soul. The duties, customs, 68 The words in parentheses supplement my translation of the Greek text. The translation is my own. 4.4.39, 11–22 Henry-Schwyzer. h Allà mällon ’an heoíkoi Ho lógoß toü pantòß katà lógon tiqénta kósmon pólewß kaì nómon, ‘jdj ehidóta ”a práxousin oHi polïtai kaì dih ”a práxousi, kaì pròß taüta pánta nomoqetoüntoß kaì sunufaínontoß toïß nómoiß tà páqj pánta ahut¨wn kaì tà ‘erga kaì tàß hepì toïß ‘ergoiß timàß kaì hatimíaß, pántwn Hod^¨w oîon ahutomát^j ehiß sumfwnían cwroúntwn. H J dè sjmasía ohu toútou cárin, “ina sjmaín^j projgouménwß, hallh o“utw gignoménwn sjmaínetai hex ‘allwn ‘alla≥ “oti gàr ”en kaì Henóß, kaì haph ‘allou ‘allo gin´wskoith ‘an, kaì hapò ahitiatoü dè tò a‘ition, kaì tò Hepómenon hek toü projgjsaménou, kaì tò súnqeton hapò qatérou, “oti qáteron kaì qáteron Homoü poi¨wn. 69 The question of how the enlightened philosopher addresses the city is dominant in the recent discussions of the ‘political’ Plotinus by Ousager, Plotinus on Selfhood, Freedom and Politics, pp. 274–84; Remes, ‘Plotinus’s Ethics of Disinterested Interest’, p. 13.

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contributions, and concerns of civic life would all be significations in this sense from some angle or other. And in a sense, when we are in tune with Intellect, something like laws are inscribed in our souls (5.3.4 Henry-Schwyzer). This is our true kingship, it is self knowledge. The good citizen will know what is lawful and virtuous to do in the political community in light of these truths delivered from Intellect, with knowledge relevant to whatever might transpire in political discourse and civic administration.70 Let us turn to the second key passage about the life of souls governed by civic order. This is the clearest presentation in the Enneads of linguistic understanding, showing a focus on the discovery of virtue in the civic sphere (6.5.10, 11–40 Henry-Schwyzer). And it is true that wisdom is as a whole for all (souls). Hence wisdom is compresent (to all), not being in this way for one, in another way for another. For it would be absurd that wisdom is limited with respect to place. Wisdom is not like whiteness, for wisdom is not (an accident) of a body; rather if we truly participate in wisdom, it must be as one, the same, all united with itself. And from there (wisdom is present) in this way, (we are) not appropriating portions of it, nor I one whole having been torn away, you another whole. And even the assemblies and every meeting imitate (this process of unification), in that individuals come into unity with respect to wisdom. In fact each man separately is weak in wisdom, although growing together into unity every man in the meeting and understanding which is genuine begets wisdom and discovers it. What then will hinder mind from one quarter or another from being in the same (center)? Rather, when we are at one we do not seem to be at one; for example, if someone touches the same (string) with many fingers, one believes another (string) and still another to be touched, or strikes the same string even unawares. Or yet consider (our) souls insofar as we contact the Good; I do not grasp a piece of it and you another, but the same thing, not the same thing yet one effluent coming from above for me while another for you, to the end that (the Good) is in some sense above while its effluents are down here. In fact the giver to the partakers, so that they might truly receive, [and the giver gives] not to alien (partakers), but to domestic ones. Since not a work of transmission is the intelligible giving, since even in the case of bodies divorced from one another in respect of localities the giving is cognate one to another, and the giving and producing is directed towards it (in the bodily realm), and the bodily in the All acts and is affected within itself, with nothing from outside (coming to bear) on it. Now if in the case of body, which is by nature of a sort to slip away from itself, nothing from outside (incurs), how (is it possible for anything from outside to enter) in the case of the unextended?71 70 Compare Phdr. 276A1–9 on the logos written with knowledge in the soul. 71 The words in parentheses supplement my translation of the Greek text. In the Greek text I closely follow the bracketing of Henry and Schwyzer, this appears in the translation as corner or square brackets. The translation is my own. 6.5.10,

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The chief element in this process is the discovery and begetting within the individual, when there is genuine alignment, of intellectual enlightenment. There is an awakening to truth in souls in the community like the cloaked harmony of lyre strings. This deepening of intellect cannot be adequately explained simply as the mutual understanding achieved in talk exchanges. As I have translated Plotinus, ‘not a work of transmission is the intellectual giving’. I would argue that the enlightenment ‘behind’ such occasions in the civic sphere is essentially an inner identification with Intellect. The intelligible is sufficient and complete to all citizens, similar in Plotinus’ eyes to the sufficiency, wholeness, and stability experienced by lovers of Beauty (6.5.10, 1–11 Henry-Schwyzer; cf. Symp. 203C6–D3). In this sense, under the concept of linguistic understanding as an approach to immaterial, undivided reality, there is a unification of souls in the public arena. This unification is not achieved, apparently, by means of attaining partial or negotiated understanding among souls locked in public discourse over time. Particular intellects come to transcend their points of view, indeed the shared knowledge is described as progressively divorced from all individual perspective. Wisdom and truth is just what is, without regard for what is good for one person, what is good for another person, or even for a body of citizens; it is the Good for all, in that it is perfectly and evenly good, and yet 11–40 Henry-Schwyzer. Kaì gàr kaì tò froneïn päsin “olon≥ diò kaì xunòn tò froneïn, ohu tò mèn ˆwde, tò dè Hwdì ‘on≥ geloïon gár, kaì tópou deómenon tò froneïn ‘estai. Kaì ohuc o“utw tò froneïn, Hwß tò leukón≥ ohu gàr s´wmatoß tò froneïn≥ hallh e‘iper ‘ontwß metécomen toü froneïn, ”en deï e~inai tò ahutò pän Heaut^¨w sunón. Kaì o“utwß hekeïqen, ohu moíraß ahutoü labónteß, ohudè “olon heg´w, “olon dè kaì sú, hapospasqèn Hekáteron Hekatérou. Mimoüntai dè kaì hekkljsíai kaì päsa súnodoß Hwß ehiß ”en tò froneïn hióntwn≥ kaì cwrìß “ekastoß ehiß tò froneïn hasqen´jß, sumbállwn dè ehiß ”en päß hen t^¨j sunód^w kaì t^¨j Hwß haljq¨wß sunései tò froneïn hegénnjse kaì eûre≥ tí gàr d`j kaì dieírxei, Hwß m`j hen t^¨w ahut^¨w e~inai noün haph ‘allou; h Allh Homoü ‘onteß Hjmïn ohuc Homoü dokoüsin e~inai≥ oîon e‘i tiß polloïß toïß daktúloiß hefaptómenoß toü ahutoü ‘allou kaì ‘allou hefáptesqai nomízoi, ’j t`jn ahut`jn cord`jn m`j Hor¨wn kroúoi. Kaítoi kaì taïß yucaïß Hwß hefaptómeqa toü hagaqoü hecr¨jn henqumeïsqai. Ohu gàr ‘allou mèn heg´w, ‘allou dè sù hefápt^j, hallà toü ahutoü, ohudè toü ahutoü mèn, proselqóntoß dé moi Hreúmatoß hekeïqen ‘allou, soì dè ‘allou, “wste tò mèn e~inaí pou ‘anw, tà dè parh ahutoü hentaüqa. Kaì tò didòn toïß lambánousin, “ina ‘ontwß lambánwsi, [kaì dídwsi tò didòn] ohu toïß hallotríoiß, hallà toïß Heautoü. h Epeì ohu pómpioß Hj noerà dósiß. h Epeì kaì hen toïß diestjkósin haph hall´jlwn toïß tópoiß s´wmasin Hj dósiß ‘allou ‘allou suggen´jß, kaì ehiß ahutò Hj dósiß kaì Hj poíjsiß, kaì tó ge swmatikòn toü pantòß dr^ä kaì páscei hen ahut^¨w, kaì ohudèn ‘exwqen ehiß ahutó. h Ei d`j hepì s´wmatoß ohudèn ‘exwqen toü hek fúsewß oîon feúgontoß Heautó, hepì prágmatoß hadiastátou p¨wß tò ‘exwqen;

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it is good for none, insofar as it is good independent of any point of view.72 And apparently, this wisdom accompanies public discourse. Souls receive enlightenment from the intelligibles in assemblies and meetings when wisdom prevails, when souls are awakened to genuine understanding. Presumably, on these civic occasions there is a particularly sovereign actualization of the Forms of Intellect made accessible to an audience, a higher connection than the intelligibility present whenever there is linguistic understanding (2.8.1, 17–29; 6.4.12, 1–28 Henry-Schwyzer). This seems to be operative in Plotinus’ description of the quiet unity of the elders in the assembly, spread throughout the tumultuous multitude by an inspired speech (6.4.15, 18–40 Henry-Schwyzer). Conclusion Now for some concluding remarks. Plotinus’ explanatory recourse to higher realms might seem extravagant, in view of the familiar purposes served by language use. The point of discourse is serving ulterior purposes, for example, warning someone of the hazards of military service (suggested in 3.2.8, 31–7 Henry-Schwyzer). Language use takes shape in the process of understanding one another in view of these purposes. I think Plotinus would handle the objection as follows. His view of language subsumes it in his panoramic scheme of intelligible order. Similar to the subordinate role of the civic virtues in his ethics, the standard quotidien functions of language have their place in his philosophy of language. For all language use fits into a higher order which may be understood to govern human interaction and political community. So even the interactive, negotiated aspects of ordinary talk exchanges are dependent on our recourse to Intellect, in that all linguistic communication, however distorted, belongs to the unity overseen by the logos that establishes civic order (4.4.39, 11–22 Henry-Schwyzer).73 72 Plotinus may be sharply contrasted with Nietsche, who did not focus heavily on communication issues but is notorious in the history of philosophy for rejecting truths and embracing perspectives, as detailed by Nick Trakakis, ‘Nietzsche’s Perspectivism and Problems of Self-Refutation’, International Philosophical Quarterly, 46 (2006): 91–110. There are no truths to be known, rather there are only interpretations, which issue from some individual perspective. 73 In fact, it is reported that Plotinus, Porphyry, and other philosophers worked extremely hard to obtain mutual understanding about highly difficult matters, such as the relation between soul and body (Porphyry, Vit. Plot. 13 Henry-Schwyzer). This must have involved questions of clarification of key terms, raising further questions, a messy process of seeking linguistic understanding in a community of philosophical souls. Of course, this is a record of highly abstruse metaphysical discussion, a struggle for shared understanding, but far removed from civic affairs.

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There is a possible comparison of the everyday purposes of language use to the civic or ‘lower’ virtues, which occupy a derivative status in Plotinian ethics. This subordinate role is clear in his critical evaluation of the ‘worldliness’ of Stoic virtue, insofar as it does not recognize the importance of higher sources of virtue (5.9.1 Henry-Schwyzer). The virtues directly relevant to actions and choices are part of good living, but they must take shape under the sovereignty of intelligible reality (the Good) (1.2.6–7 HenrySchwyzer). The Plotinian sage lives according to these higher lights by which all of life may be ordered in virtue and knowledge, even the most mundane actions which are necessary for bodily existence in a political community. The Stoics are right to dwell on the careful governance of assent, for the sake of managing actions and emotions for the welfare of the soul. But they fail to honor the ultimate grounds for virtue in the intelligibles. By analogy, the linguistic actions we pursue for everyday purposes, such as warning others about the hazards of military service in wartime, have their place in the philosophical life. The point is that these uses cannot be sufficiently explained in terms of their instrumentality alone, for their ultimate explanation lies in the intelligibility which souls pursue in unification with their source. Plotinus insists that the contemplative destiny of the soul does not diminish when the concerns of earthly life are foregrounded. For our true nature is always occupied with Intellect, where our happiness lies. This connection to our higher calling furnishes the intelligibility of our everyday linguistic activities and makes the actions of the sage in relation to other moral agents good. In summary, I have tried to show why Plotinus does not present discourse as the transfer of meaning from one soul to another. It has become commonplace in recent philosophy and communication theory to reject the traditional view of ‘meaning transmission’, according to which utterance transcendent meanings are transferred from one mind to another. In a unique way, Plotinus shows how the simple transmission model can be avoided in an ancient theory of language. On the other hand, it is not easy to put all the pieces together from these difficult texts of Plotinus. Plotinus tends to dwell on the intelligible architecture present in various levels, accessible to some form of thought, at the expense of linguistic signification, the logical structure of language, and conversation. And to my knowledge, there is no discussion of linguistic signification in the Enneads, whether in civic debates or in personal talk exchanges, which is carefully developed in light of his metaphysics of language.


Conclusion For Plotinus, all linguistic understanding takes shape from above. Understanding what is said is dependent on immaterial realities, the only possible ground of understanding spoken utterances. Hence Plotinus is set apart from Philo, Clement, and Origen. For these other Alexandrians, meanings are thoughts, immaterial meanings which are transferred to other minds in bodily vehicles. They do not work out a comprehensive scheme explaining how language relates to immaterial entities. They take their cue from the divine being, conceived as a God whose word is creative goodness. Human linguistic function is an image of this ultimate divine perfection, retaining a power to articulate thoughts in words. Providing an interesting contrast, there seems to be less authority and goodness in the structures of discourse according to Plotinus, for the soul’s restoration to its primal unity in the One lifts it above the contours of thought and language. Plotinus argues for the presence of the intelligible, when vocal sound commands the air in such a way as to be accessible for auditory perception. When Plotinus locates discourse on earth, it is woven into the political community—true understanding is at heart an opening of souls to Intellect, transcending the mental limitations of lives lived in embodied particularity. Nevertheless, the other Alexandrians also come to light with valuable philosophical contributions. I have argued that Philo is a valuable witness to the blend of Platonist and Stoic ideas concurrent in his age. As such, he presents an interesting conceptual stage in his regular identification of meanings with thoughts. In several passages, we find the simple view that these meanings are conveyed in vehicles of speech. We also encounter in Clement the Philonic inheritance that meanings are thoughts, as well as the claim that the knowledge of meaning sought by the Christian sage depends on God’s active power, rather than a structure of immaterial reality independent of divine will. The gnostic is to be directed upwards to the intelligible world, which will bring us beyond language to a stage of pure thought. Origen’s apparently novel claims about mind and language are blended with his theological concerns. In his commentary on John’s gospel, Origen avoids outright use of the logos distinction, in that spoken language is not simply the outward expression of inner discourse. Rather, it is voice by which language is revealed. I take this as a departure from the ‘container’

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or ‘vehicle’ models of language, familiar from Philo. Still, in some passages Origen slips back into the traditional ‘container’ or ‘vehicle’ models. The relationship of thought and language is a perennial philosophical issue. Plotinus addresses problems common to the other Alexandrian figures, although he does so with far greater metaphysical sophistication. All four Alexandrian theologians and philosophers develop their theories in response to the philosophical traditions honoring the ordering principle of logos in soul, cosmos, and divine intellect. It would be extremely helpful to contrast these four with the Later Platonists (aside from Plotinus) who articulate the Aristotelian tradition in the centuries which provide a bridge from Antiquity to the Middle Ages. Linguistic understanding, from whatever source, is the human charism that promises insight even as it multiplies its puzzles.

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Index Locorum

Ancient Texts Aetius Plac. 4.2.1–4.4.7 Diels, 18 Alcinous Did. 177.19–23 Hermann, 18 Aristotle An. Post. 76b24, 10 Cat. 4b32–3, 77; 4b34, 10 Int. 16a3–10, 23; 16a5–6, 53 Cicero Div. Müller 1.63, 17; 1.129–30, 17 Tusc. 1.18–24, 18; 1.60–67, 17 Clement Exc. 27.3–5 Stählin, 37 Paed. 6.37.3 Stählin, 34 Strom. 1.9.45.4–5 Stählin-Früchtel, 32; 1.16.78.1, 33; 1.21.143.1, 41; 1.22.149.2, 34; 1.28.176–9, 33; 1.28.177.1, 33; 2.1.3.1–2, 34; 3.5.42.6, 37; 4.23.152.3, 37; 4.24.156.1–2, 34; 4.25.155.2–4, 31; 5.8.48.2–3, 43; 5.9.56.1–5.10.65.3, 40; 5.10.65.2, 40; 5.11.71.5, 40; 5.16.3, 31; 6.3.34.3, 37; 6.7.54.1–56.2, 38; 6.7.57.4–5, 40; 6.10.82.3, 36; 6.15.132.3, 36; 6.17.151.1–152.2, 34, 35; 6.18.166.1–2, 40; 7.7.36.5–37.6, 42; 7.7.39.3–6, 41; 7.7.43.1–5, 39; 7.13.82.7, 32; 7.14.84.4, 34; 8.8.23.1, 36; 8.9.26.4–5, 34 Diogenes Laertius 7.63, 27; 7.85–116, 4; 7.135, 27; 7.138, 43; 7.147, 12 Epictetus Diss. 1.8.4–10 Schenkl, 37

Galen Plac. Hipp. Plat. 3.7.42–3 De Lacy, 28 Macrobius Somn. Scip. 1.14.19 Willis, 27 Marcus Aurelius Ad se ipsum 10.6.1 Dalfen, 27 Nemesius Nat. Hom. 2.67–124 Morani, 18 Origen Cels. 1.24–5 Koetschau, 60; 2.72, 54; 3.21, 49; 4.71, 55; 4.73–99, 57; 4.84, 58, 60; 5.45, 60; 6.62, 54; 6.65, 46; 7.13, 55; 7.38, 47 In Joh. 1.24 Preuschen, 51; 1.38, 31, 55, 56, 57; 2.32, 49, 50; 4, 36, 59; 10.28, 52; 10.29, 53 Princ. 1.1.6–7 Koetschau, 47; 1.1.7, 48, 54; 1.2.3, 49; 1.4.5, 49; 2.1–3, 54; 2.8.3–4, 47; 2.8–9, 54 Philo Abr. 82–3 Cohn, 25, 26; 120–23, 11 Agr. 141 Wendland, 26 Congr. 33 Wendland, 24 Decal. 47 Cohn, 13, 51 Det. 40 Cohn, 24; 89, 16; 90, 16, 17, 18; 92, 17, 24; 127–8, 23 Fug. 92 Wendland, 25; 94–105, 14; 101, 11 Gig. 52 Wendland, 25 Her. 4 Wendland, 28; 14–17, 28; 55, 17; 114–19, 13; 160, 14; 206, 11; 216–9, 25; 280–83, 26; 283, 17 Immut. 46 Wendland, 19; 83, 25, 54; 83–4, 25 Leg. All. 1.31–2 Cohn, 19; 2.2, 14; 2.6, 20; 2.22–3, 25; 3.41, 25; 3.96, 11; 3.150, 11, 13

110


Migr. 3–4 Wendland, 23; 6, 11, 51; 50–52, 21, 22; 71, 24; 79, 23; 81, 20, 24 Mos. 1.38 Cohn, 12; 2.37–40, 25; 2.66–108, 25; 2.81–3, 25; 2.127, 13, 19, 20, 21, 24; 2.128–9, 25, 26; 2.136–40, 25 Mut. 69 Wendland, 24; 193–4, 25, 26 Opif. 15–36 Cohn, 12; 16–37, 11, 51; 20, 11; 20–21, 12; 24–5, 11; 25, 12; 32–5, 12; 36, 11; 117, 20; 134–6, 12; 134–7, 13; 135, 19; 148–50, 61; 171, 12 Plant. 24 Wendland, 22 Post. 106–8 Wendland, 23; 137–8, 18; 163, 19 Prov. 1.6–7 Aucher, 14 Quaest. Ex. 2.34 Aucher, 43; 2.50– 124, 25; 2.111, 26; 2.122, 21 Quaest. Gen. 1.20 Aucher, 61; 2.59, 17 Sacr. 65 Cohn, 13, 51; 65–6, 15, 24 Somn. 1.2 Wendland, 17; 1.28–9, 25; 1.30–34, 14; 1.32, 18; 1.34, 17; 1.108–11, 25; 1.186–8, 18; 2.2–3, 17; 2.238–47, 24; 2.260, 23 Spec. Leg. 1.82–96 Cohn, 25; 1.219, 17 Plato Soph. 263E3–9, 10; 264A1–2, 10 Phd. 113D, 88 Phaedr. 247B, 88; 276A1–9, 92 Phil. 38E, 10 Rep. 509D, 18; 517B5, 88 Symp. 203C6–D3, 93 Theaet. 189E6–190A, 10; 206D1ff., 10 Tim. 41D–E, 88 Plotinus Enn. 1.1.4, 14–16 Henry-Schwyzer, 81; 1.2.1, 46–53, 90; 1.2.2, 13–26, 90; 1.2.3, 27–8, 72; 1.2.3, 27–30, 68, 70, 82; 1.2.6–7, 95; 2.3.1–10, 91; 2.3.8, 1–9, 90, 91;

2.8.1, 17–29, 83, 94; 2.9.4–5, 86; 2.9.9, 86; 2.9.16–18, 86; 3.2.8, 31–7, 94; 3.7.11, 35–45, 73; 3.8.1, 1–2, 65; 3.8.3–8, 70; 3.8.9, 24–8, 84; 4.1, 18; 4.2.1–2, 94; 4.3.5, 14–18, 68; 4.3.18, 87, 88; 4.3.18, 1–7, 73; 4.3.18, 7–24, 87, 88, 89; 4.3.22, 1–9, 81; 4.3.23, 9–21, 85; 4.3.23, 17–21, 85; 4.4.5, 88; 4.4.9–10, 68; 4.4.11, 1–13, 91; 4.4.23, 1–3, 77; 4.4.39, 11–22, 89, 90, 91, 94; 4.5.5, 1–31, 77; 4.5.5, 8–27, 78; 4.5.6–7, 81; 4.8.1–6, 69; 4.8.4–8, 69; 5.1.2, 11–14, 89; 5.1.3, 6–10, 68, 96; 5.1.6, 12–13, 69; 5.1.6, 45–6, 69; 5.1.7, 1–2, 67; 5.3, 71; 5.3.2, 9–14, 89; 5.3.4, 92; 5.3.10, 32–42, 65; 5.3.10, 45–6, 89; 5.3.14, 8–19, 65, 71; 5.4, 71; 5.4.2, 26–37, 82; 5.4.2, 27–39, 65; 5.5.1, 70; 5.5.1–3, 70; 5.5.5, 16–27, 65, 70, 75; 5.5.6, 1, 76; 5.5.7, 82; 5.5.9, 11–16, 85; 5.5.12, 1–14, 89; 5.8.3, 70; 5.8.4, 47–9, 65; 5.8.5, 21–2, 65; 5.8.5–6, 66, 72; 5.8.6, 1–9, 72; 5.8.6, 1–12, 73; 5.8.6, 1–13, 66, 76; 5.8.7, 36–44, 105; 5.8.13, 23, 88; 5.9.1, 95; 5.9.5, 24–5, 68; 6.1.4, 1–52, 78; 6.1.5, 1–4, 77; 6.1.5, 1–11, 76, 77; 6.1.5, 1–14, 76; 6.1.5, 2, 77; 6.1.5, 3, 77; 6.1.5, 4–5, 77, 78; 6.1.5, 6–12, 78; 6.1.5, 7–8, 78; 6.1.5, 8, 77; 6.1.15–22, 78; 6.2.22, 3–7, 89; 6.3.4, 1–37, 79; 6.3.8, 30–37, 78; 6.3.15, 24–38, 77, 79; 6.3.15, 29–38, 70; 6.4.11, 3–14, 85; 6.4.12, 1–18, 85; 6.4.12, 1–28, 76, 77, 83, 94; 6.4.14–15, 81; 6.4.15, 1–14, 85; 6.4.15, 18–40, 67, 89, 94; 6.5.4–7, 81; 6.5.7, 1–8, 65; 6.5.7, 4–6, 65; 6.5.10, 1–11, 93; 6.5.10, 11–40, 64, 67, 89, 92; 6.7.18, 41–5, 76,

Index Locorum 77, 78, 79; 6.7.23, 18–20, 65; 6.7.38, 1–25, 66, 72; 6.9, 71; 6.9.7, 16–23, 72; 6.9.7, 23–6, 90 Plutarch An. Proc. Tim. 1023B–D Hubert, 27 Comm. Not. 1084F Pohlenz, 78 Porphyry Abst. 3.3 Nauck, 53; 3.4, 58 Vit. Plot. 3 Henry-Schwyzer, 63; 13, 94 Posidonius EK F192, 3 Sch. in Dionys. Thr. 356, 1–4 Uhlig, 27; 514, 35–515, 5, 27 Seneca Ep. 94.47, 60 Sextus Empiricus Math. 7.228 Mutschmann, 78; 8.12, 27; 8.70, 27; 8.275, 58 [Theodosius] Gramm. 17, 17–31 Göttling, 27

111

Biblical Texts Gen. 1, 13; 1.27, 12 Ex. 24.7, 43 Ps. 15.2, 53; 44.2, 53; 45.1, 55 Mt. 12.34, 53 Lk. 6.45, 53 Jn. 1.6, 50; 12.12–14, 53 1 Cor. 13.1, 52; 14.2–40, 34; 14.13, 34 Col. 1.15, 57


Index of Names and Subjects

Abraham 25 Alexander of Aphrodisias 2 Alexandria 5 library 3 Ammonius Saccas 63 ancient philosophy 1 ant conversation, Celsus on 58 Antiochus of Ascalon 2 Apollonius Dyscolus 6 Aristotelianism 47 Aristotle 81 Athens 5 barbarians, Clement on 33–4, 37fn19, 38 Being, in Plotinus 64, 69, 75 Berchman, Robert M. 47 body, and mind, in language 53–7 cave allegory, Plato 91 Celsus on ant conversation 58 Origen, debate 57–8 Chadwick, Henry 57 Chaeremon the Stoic 2 ‘On Comets’ 6 Christian Platonism 46 Origen 47 Christianity, anticipation of, in Greek philosophy 32 Chrysippus 27, 43 Cicero 9 civic order, Plotinus on 90 Cleanthes 27 Clement of Alexandria 3, 29–44 on barbarians 33–4, 37fn19, 38 on dialectic 32–3 on divine logos 39, 41 on God’s immaterial perception 41–3

on language intelligibility 34–8 Logos theology 29 two-stage concept 30–31, 32 on meaning, and thought 36 Philo, influence of 29 philosophy of language 37–8 on prayer 39–40, 41 prayer, concept 38 rationality, logos as 32, 33 significance 43–4 on silence 41 on speech divine/human 40 logos as 32, 33 Stoic contribution 41–3 works On Prayer 39 Stromata 32, 33, 39 contemplation, Plotinus 88–9 Cornutus 2 cosmic order, Plotinus on 90 Descartes, René 9 dialectic in Clement, Osborn on 33 Clement on 32–3 in Plotinus 32 use 33 Dillon, John 14 Diogenes of Babylon 43 Diogenes Laertius 43 Dionysius Thrax, grammar treatise (attrib) 4–5, 6 divine logos Clement on 39, 41 and divine power 12fn10, 34fn12 and language 10–14 material/immaterial bridge 20–21, 24, 57

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Origen on 31, 49, 51, 52 Philo on 10–14, 19–21, 27, 51 ambiguity 11fn7 role 11–12 soul as 11 two stage theory 30 and Wisdom (Sophia) 12fn10 see also human logos dualism Origen 48 Philo 9, 17–18, 28 Plotinus 69 Stoicism 17–18 Edwards, Mark on Clement’s Logos theory 30–31, 46 on Origen 48 on Philo 51 Epictetus 9 Eudorus of Alexandria 18 Forms, Platonic 31, 37, 48 in Plotinus actualization 64, 84 of Intellect 89, 90, 94 see also Ideas glossalalia 34, 52 Gnosticism 86 Gnostics 14 God immaterial perception, Clement on 41–3 as mind Origen on 47–8 Philo on 14–15 reception of prayer 40 speech, superiority of 25 grammar scope of 4–5 treatise, Dionysius Thrax (attrib) 4 Hägg, Henny 41 heat, Plotinus on 82 Heiser, John H. 74

Hierocles of Alexandria 2 human logos 21 Origen on 52 Iamblichus 38 Ideas 12, 13, 26, 48 see also Forms image, and representation 65–7 incarnation, of Logos 49 Intellect (macrocosm) 95 Clement 31, 36 Origen 47, 48 Plato 13 Plotinus 17, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69fn12, 70, 71, 72, 74, 76, 79, 80, 81, 84, 85–6, 87, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 97, 98 intellect (microcosm) Origen 55 Philo 28 Plotinus 17, 66, 68, 71, 72, 73, 89, 93 John the Baptist, Origen on 50–51 Kalligas, Paul 72–3 language intelligibility, Clement on 34–8 logos as 45, 49–50, 59, 71, 76 mind and body in 53–7 Philo on 26 Plotinus on 64–86 rationality of 73–4 and reasoning 72–3 voice, distinction, Origen’s 49–50 light, Plotinus on 81, 82–3 logos ambiguity 33 endiathetos 30, 46 in Greek philosophy 10fn4 human, Origen on 52 as language 45, 49–50, 59, 71, 76 Logos, distinction 46–7, 57, 61 mind, distinction 55–6 Plotinus 67–70, 77, 79

Index of Names and Subjects of the All 90–91 civic 91, 94 as cosmic principle 90 inner and outer 82 prophorikos 30, 31, 74 as rationality 32, 33 in Clement 32, 33 in Plotinus 77 soul as 11 as speech 10fn4, 20 in Clement 32, 33 in Philo 13–14, 26 in Porphyry 52–3 Stoic 11 as thought 20 types 13 see also divine logos; human logos; Logos Logos 46 Clement’s concept 30–31, 32 incarnation of 49 logos, distinction 46–7, 57, 61 Origen’s concept 48–9, 51–2, 55–7 theology, Clement 29 see also logos Marcus Aurelius 9 meaning nature of, Philo on 23–4 Plotinus on 64 thought Clement on 36 connection 23 mind body in language 53–7 separation 17 God as 14–15 Origen on 47–8 immateriality of 17–20, 47–8 logos, distinction 55–6 in Philo 10, 14–15, 16–17 quickness of, Philo on 15–17 Minos 90 Moses 22, 25, 27, 36 Mühl, Max 46

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Neoplatonism 38, 48, 63 Neuschäfer, Bernhard 1, 5–6 Numenius 2 the One, Plotinus 64, 65, 70, 71, 72, 75, 81, 84 Origen 3, 4, 31, 38, 45–61, 63 on biblical bad style 59 Celsus, debate 57–8 Christian Platonism 47 on divine logos 31, 49, 51, 52 dualism 48 Edwards on 48 on God as mind 47–8 grammarian 5 on human logos 52 on John the Baptist 50–51 John’s Gospel, commentary on 50–51, 61 Logos concept 48–9, 51–2, 55–7 logos, distinction 46–7, 57, 61 mind, immateriality of 47–8 Philo, influence of 45 speech, concept of 53 Stoic influence in 6 voice/language (logos) distinction 45, 49–51, 53 works Contra Celsum 47, 57, 59, 60 On First Principles 47, 48, 54 On Prayer 39 Philocalia 5, 57, 59, 60 Osborn, Eric, on Clementine dialectic 33 Panaetius 2, 9 Philo of Alexandria 1, 3, 9–28 Alexander 58 Clement, influence on 29 on divine logos 10–14, 19–21, 27, 51 dualism 9, 17–18, 28 Edwards on 51 on language 26 on meaning, nature of 23–4

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on mind 10, 14–15, 16–17 immateriality 17–20 Origen, influence on 45 philosophy of language 10 Runia on 9, 11 significance 28 on speech, inferiority of 23, 24–6 Stoic influence 27 on the tabernacle 25 Winston on 24, 25 philosophy see ancient philosophy; philosophy of language philosophy of language 2 Clement 37–8 Philo 10 Plotinus 86–7, 94 Stoicism 6 Plato 9 Republic 89 cave allegory 91 Timaeus 11, 12, 13, 25 Platonism Alexandrian 12, 18 Middle 32, 47 see also Christian Platonism; Neoplatonism Plotinus 1, 3, 63–95 Being 64, 69, 75 on civic order 90 communication, theory of 86–94 contemplation 88–9 on cosmic order 90 dialectic in 32 dualism 69 Enneads 92, 95 Forms, actualization 64, 84 on heat 82 hypostases 64 the Intellect 68, 71, 72, 76, 84, 85–6, 87, 90, 92, 93 language 64–95 and categories doctrine 78 incorporeality of 64 intelligibility 76–7 logos as 71 nature of 76–80

and the One 64–5 origins 70–76 and Soul 64, 68, 71, 76 soul, product of 67 on light 81, 82–3 logos 67–70, 77, 79 of the All 90–91 civic 91, 94 as cosmic principle 90 inner and outer 82 on meaning 64 the One 64, 65, 70, 71, 72, 75, 81, 84 philosophy of language 86–7, 94 Porphyry’s life of 63 soul contemplation of Intellect 89 and language 64, 68, 71, 76 rationality of 87 and sound 83–5 on wisdom 92 Plutarch 2, 29 Porphyry 2, 3, 38 Life of Plotinus 63 logos as speech 52–3 Posidonius 2, 3, 9, 27, 28 prayer Clement on 39–40, 41 Clement’s concept of 38 God’s reception of 40 incorporeality of 38 reasoning, and language 72–3 Runia, David, on Philo 9, 11 ‘sayables’ 27 Seneca 9 Sextus Empiricus 9 silence, Clement on 41 Sluiter, Ineke 1 Sorabji, Richard 36 Soul (macrocosm), and language 64, 68, 71, 76 soul (microcosm) as divine logos 11 in Plotinus

Index of Names and Subjects contemplation of Intellect 89 and language 64, 68, 71, 76 rationality of 87 and sound 83–5 sound, and soul, Plotinus on 83–5 speech divine/human, Clement on 40 God’s, superiority of 25 inferiority, Philo on 23, 24–6 and intelligible content 37 logos as 10fn4, 20 Origen’s concept 53 Philo on 24 quickness of 15–16 see also logos Stead, Christopher, on mind in Philo 14–15 Stoicism Clement, contribution to 41–3 corpus 4 dualism 17–18 legacy 2–3, 26–8 monism 28

Origen, influence in 6 Philo, influence on 27 philosophy of language 6 tabernacle, Philo on 25 thought logos as 20 meaning Clement on 36 connection 23 Varro, Disciplinaram Libri 5 voice, language distinction, Origen’s 45, 49–50, 53 Winston, David, on Philo 24, 25 wisdom, Plotinus on 92 world incorporeal 11 intelligible 11, 19 sensible 11, 12, 19, 54 see also logos

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