Without a Gun: Australians' Experiences Monitoring Peace in Bougainville, 1997-2001

AUSTRALIANS’ EXPERIENCES MONITORING PEACE IN BOUGAINVILLE, 1997–2001

edited by Monica Wehner and Donald Denoon

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AUSTRALIANS’ EXPERIENCES MONITORING PEACE IN BOUGAINVILLE, 1997–2001

edited by Monica Wehner and Donald Denoon

PANDANUS BOOKS Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

© Pandanus Books 2001

This book is copyright in all countries subscribing to the Berne convention. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, research, criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright Act, no part may be reproduced by any process without written permission. Enquiries should be made to the publisher.

Typeset in Syntax 9.5pt on 11.5pt by Pandanus Books and printed on MediaPrint Silk 113gsm by Goanna Print, Canberra, phone 02 6239 1208.

National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry Without a gun: Australians' experiences monitoring peace in Bougainville, 1997–2001. ISBN 1 74076 013 1. 1. Peacekeeping forces — Australia. 2. Peacekeeping forces — Papua New Guinea — Bougainville Island. 3. Peace Monitoring Group, Bougainville. 4. Peace (Philosophy). 5. Women and peace — Papua New Guinea — Bougainville Island. 6. Bougainville Island (Papua New Guinea) — Politics and government. I. Wehner, Monica S. II. Denoon, Donald. 327.172 Editorial enquiries please contact Pandanus Books on 02 6125 3269 Published by Pandanus Books, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian National University, Canberra ACT 0200 Australia Pandanus Books are distributed by UNIREPS, University of New South Wales, Sydney NSW 2052 Phone 02 9664 0999 Fax 02 9664 5420 Production: Ian Templeman, Duncan Beard and Emily Brissenden

To the people of Bougainville who survived the civil war, and to those who did not.

Acknowledgements Many individuals and organisations have contributed their time and energy to this volume. Particular thanks must be given to Hank Nelson, David Hegarty, Anthony Regan and Bob Breen, who facilitated the seminar on which this volume is based. The State, Society and Governance in Melanesia (SSGM) Project at The Australian National University was instrumental in the organisation of that seminar, and has provided invaluable intellectual and financial support in the preparation of this volume. We are grateful to Helen Glazebrook, who proofread an earlier draft, and to Ron May, for his general encouragement. We would also like to acknowledge the financial support of AusAID, which through the SSGM Project, committed funds to the seminar held in 1999. Finally, we would like to thank Pandanus Books, in particular, Ian Templeman, Emily Brissenden and Duncan Beard, for their patience, enthusiasm and professionalism.

Contents

Introduction Monica Wehner

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Why a Neutral Peace Monitoring Force? The Bougainville Conflict and the Peace Process Anthony Regan

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Establishing the Truce Monitoring Group and the Peace Monitoring Group Anthony Regan

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Coordinating Monitoring and Defence Support Bob Breen

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Role of the Military Commander Bruce Osborn

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Role of the Chief Negotiator Rhys Puddicombe

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Peace Finding, Peace Monitoring and Peace-keeping: Lessons from the Truce Monitoring Group Rohan Titus

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Perspectives of Monitors: the Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) Experience A Truce Monitor Jan Gammage Rotokas Patrol: Truce Monitoring, March–April 1998 Andrew Rice Perspectives of Monitors: the Peace Monitoring Group (PMG) Experience Peace Monitoring in Wakunai, 1998 Katherine Ruiz-Avila

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Peace Monitoring in Wakunai, 1998 Trina Parry

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An Indigenous Monitor Tracey Haines

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A Military Analyst Ewan MacMillan

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An Operations Officer Luke Foster

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A Man in Buin Lawrie Cremin

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A Woman in Buin Melissa Bray

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A Policeman’s Lot Shane Austin

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Bougainville — Perceptions and Understanding Yvonne Green

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Exorcising a Colonial Past Donald Denoon

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Appendices A. The Burnham Declaration

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B. The Burnham Truce

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C. Cairns Commitment on Implementation of the Agreement concerning the Neutral Regional Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) for Bougainville

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D. Agreement between New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Australia, Fiji and Vanuatu concerning the Neutral Truce Monitoring Group for Bougainville

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E. Protocol concerning the Peace Monitoring Group made pursuant to the Agreement between Papua New Guinea, Australia, Fiji, New Zealand and Vanuatu concerning the Neutral Truce Monitoring Group for Bougainville

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F. Lincoln Agreement on Peace, Security and Development on Bougainville

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G. Table 1: PMG Personnel — Country and Function — Early 2000 and Early 2001

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H. Table 2: PMG Monitoring and Liaison Teams by Country — Early 2000 and Early 2001

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Glossary and Abbreviations

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Notes on Contributors

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Maps

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Elizabeth Anne Philip, Noela Ben and Angela Areravi Wakurai river, Wakurai, Bougainville (Photo: Jan Gammage)

Introduction

Monica Wehner

BOUGAINVILLE occupies little space in the memories of Australian imagination, which is surprising given the ties of history that bind Bougainville to Australia. The remotest province of Papua New Guinea, 1000 kilometres north-east of the capital of Port Moresby, comprises two islands, Buka and Bougainville, and several islets and atolls. Most of the 160,000 to 200,000 people live in the fertile, coastal regions; the interior of the main island is rugged and largely inaccessible by road. Between 1988 and 1997, conflict raged across the province, causing bloodshed, death and the destruction of provincial headquarters, hospitals and houses. Although several initiatives attempted to resolve the conflict — including the infamous recruitment of mercenaries in the Sandline Affair1 — it was not until October 1997 that the signing of the Burnham Truce brought the fighting to an official end.2 Following the Cairns Commitment in November 1997, an unarmed Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) travelled to Bougainville. Predominantly military in composition, 1

See Sinclair Dinnen, Ron May and Tony Regan, Challenging the State: the Sandline Affair in Papua New Guinea, Canberra, National Centre for Development Studies, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, ANU and Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, ANU, 1997. 2 Attending this gathering were representatives from the PNG Government, the BRA and Resistance, as well as senior PNGDF and Royal Constabulary (RPNGC) officers. See Bougainville: The Peace Process and Beyond, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Canberra: The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia 1999, p. 71.

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it was commanded by the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) and included personnel and logistical support from Australia, Fiji and Vanuatu.3 In May 1998 the TMG was replaced with a Peace Monitoring Group (PMG),4 and command shifted from New Zealand to Australia. Many Australian public servants and military personnel have served as monitors — generally on three-month rotations. Most have been drawn from the Department of Defence (DOD); Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT); the Federal Police (AFP); and AusAID (the Australian Agency for International Development). The PMG has comprised as many as 325 people from Australia, New Zealand, Vanuatu and Fiji. Most monitors are based in Arawa and Loloho; the remainder at team sites at Arawa, Buin, Tonu and Wakunai.5 These sites combine military and civilian personnel, and typically accommodate 20 to 22 people. In September 1999, after discussions with Donald Denoon and Hank Nelson in the Division of Pacific and Asian History at the Australian National University, the State, Society and Governance in Melanesia (SSGM) Project held a day-long seminar to evaluate Australians’ roles. Participants included soldiers involved in the selection, training and command of monitors; they also included former civilian monitors and chief negotiators. Participants presented personal accounts of their experiences; told stories about exchanges with Bougainvilleans; and reflected on what it meant to be a peace monitor, a facilitator of peace, on patrol in sometimes remote places. A rich array of stories and experiences emerged. Without a Gun is a collection of these stories. Most were presented in slightly different form during the seminar; others, including those by Rohan Titus, Yvonne Green and Donald Denoon, have been commissioned for the collection. The collection is framed by background papers from Anthony Regan and Donald Denoon. Anthony, who has been a constitutional adviser to Bougainville throughout the peace process, looks at how the conflict transformed in 1988 from a local dispute centred around the copper and gold mine at Panguna, to a broader separatist movement involving, dividing and affecting all Bougainvilleans. Donald focuses on people’s earlier grievances against the mine, considering the colonial legacies confronting Australian monitors as they seek to rebuild relations with 3 4 5

Ibid Ibid, p. 103 See Operation Bel Isi, Department of Defence, http://www.dod.gov.au/belisi/details.htm

Bougainvilleans in villages, team sites and within the formal context of the peace process. Following overview papers by Bruce Osborn, Bob Breen, Rhys Puddicombe and Rohan Titus, the collection is structured chronologically. It begins with a paper by Jan Gammage, who was part of the first deployment of TMG monitors in December 1997. As Anthony Regan remarks, throughout the conflict many communities voiced strong support for peace, and numerous formal peace-making efforts took place from as early as 1988. Although the collection focuses on Australian experiences, we emphasise the role of Bougainvilleans in initiating and maintaining the peace process, as well as setting the limits of outside influence over it. The participants ask fundamental questions: what is peace? who is a peace monitor? what does it mean to facilitate peace? Everyone on Bougainville is, as Luke Foster remarks, a peace monitor. Several papers consider how Bougainvilleans interpret peacemaking and the concept of peace. Katherine Ruiz-Avila, who served in Wakunai in 1998, notes that her role as a monitor was to present to Bougainvilleans an outline of developments in the process, focusing on key peace agreements and documents. However, she often felt that peace had a different meaning to Bougainvilleans: ‘spiritual rehabilitation’, a vision for the future combined with reconciliation on all levels of community. She often felt ill-equipped to engage with the people on this less tangible level of exchange and understanding. Melissa Gray, a civilian monitor in Buin in 1999, echoes this point. She notes that during her rotation headquarters in Arawa increasingly concentrated on key, invariably male, political players. This eclipsed the real stories of Bougainville, and marginalised certain voices, particularly those of women. Bougainvillean women created many of the conditions that made peace possible. Trina Parry, a monitor in Wakunai in 1998, is critical of the gender bias of the PMG and its failure to recognise women as equal political players and stakeholders. She even received a directive from headquarters that the PMG must not become ‘over-burdened’ by women’s issues — something she never understood. The role of women is important on a broader level. Jan Gammage was part of the rushed deployment of monitors to Bougainville in late 1997. She notes that during these early months military attitudes to women and

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civilians were often negative. It was not clear how women were expected to fit into the TMG and how their roles were defined. Perhaps by 2000 this had changed. Before her deployment Yvonne Green, who was a civilian monitor in Arawa from May to August 2000, heard rumours about the military’s treatment of civilian women, but she felt accepted by the military men with whom she shared duties and responsibilities. An unexpected theme of the seminar — carried through into this collection — was the difficulty faced by civilians in adapting to a military environment. Katherine Ruiz-Avila remarks that she felt quite apprehensive about going to Bougainville because she was unsure how she would be treated by the military. Fortunately, her fears quickly dispersed. Shane Austin, recruited from the AFP as law and order adviser in Arawa in early 1999, also raises adaptation as a theme. He notes that it took some time for the military to accept that AFP representatives had unique and specialist advisory responsibility in the peace process. There is a delicate balance between facilitating and determining a peace process. Getting this right in Bougainville is particularly important given the history behind the Australian presence. Commanders and monitors were very aware of the sensitivity of their positions and roles. Bruce Osborn and Rhys Puddicombe describe how they adapted their roles in the field to take into account the shifting sensitivities and challenges of the peace process. Another way of getting the balance right is to recognise those numerous resources available to the monitors — resources in Bougainvillean society itself and among the other Melanesians (niVanuatu and Fijians) who serve with the TMG and PMG. Lawrie Cremin remarks that as a monitor he often drew on the knowledge, background and understanding of his ni-Vanuatu colleagues to resolve disputes and facilitate reconciliation. There are also special resources and skills among the monitors themselves. Tracey Haines recalls that as an indigenous Australian she had particular capacity and success in building relationships with Bougainvilleans — she could identify with their concerns about land management and ‘caring for country’. In any peace operation it is easy to focus narrowly on the mechanics and logistics, forgetting the importance of mutuality, the role of sympathy, empathy and listening; the exchange of ideas and knowledge from a place of equality and respect. Australia is presently re-engaging with the region, redefining its role, rebuilding and transforming relationships. Australians remain in East Timor under the auspices of the United Nations; they are also in

Solomon Islands, as part of the Australian Government’s assistance to resolve the conflicts on Guadalcanal, Malaita and potentially the Western Province. The peace operations in Bougainville also have indirect, domestic benefits — fostering, for example, closer relations and cooperation between government departments and agencies. These important papers are a record of what most people regard as a successful peace-monitoring operation. This is more than can be said of many similar operations across the globe. As Rohan Titus observes, lessons learned from Bougainville can be applied internationally. It is therefore crucial that the peace monitors’ stories be recorded, given the transitory structure of the Australian public service which impedes the development and retention of corporate memory. These papers also reveal a curious contrast between the TMG/PMG’s official position (as articulated by Bob Breen, Bruce Osborn, Rhys Puddicombe and Rohan Titus) and how that position was translated, modified and adapted as monitors interacted with villagers. Obviously, no one position is correct. Ewan Macmillan records how people’s position on Bougainville shifts with their location: whether they are in Canberra, at headquarters or on patrol. But this contrast points to a need for flexibility on the ground — the importance of encouraging people within limits to adapt their message or action to their situation. These stories speak of humility, goodwill and imagination and the capacity of ‘ordinary people’ to reflect lucidly, evocatively and subtly about their experiences. Andrew Rice’s paper, for example, has ‘literary merit’ on any terms and is simply a very good yarn; Shane Austin’s and Lawrie Cremin’s papers are funny and self-deprecating. As Bob Breen insists, Australians have been transformed by service in Bougainville. Without a Gun is a record of this transformation, and is an invaluable resource for anyone interested in the human dimensions of conflict resolution and peace-making. A continuing misconception of the international community is that peace can be forged only by grand gesture, high level negotiation and the exchange and signing of documents. This volume emphasises that while grand gesture is important, peace is made (and unmade) in villages, in the rebuilding of relations between men and women, in songs, dancing and food, and when peace monitors invest as much energy in small communites as political leaders and representatives.

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You gotta love flying in these things!? (Photo, and feet, Shane Austin)

Why a Neutral Peace Monitoring Force? The Bougainville Conflict and the Peace Process

Anthony Regan

WHEN the peace process began tentatively in Bougainville in mid-1997, there was much hope but little certainty that it would achieve more than previous efforts to resolve a conflict that began in 1988. The limited success of these earlier efforts reflects the complex causes of the conflict, and the bitter divisions and suspicions generated as it unfolded. Three years after the signing of a truce at the Burnham Military Barracks in New Zealand, fighting has ceased and the peace process continues, but it has taken longer than first anticipated. The New Zealandled Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) began to deploy to Bougainville at the end of November 1997, and was expected to be on Bougainville only for a few months. Instead, early in 2001 the Australian-led Peace Monitoring Group (PMG), which replaced the TMG in May 1998, not only remains in Bougainville but the contributing parties are committed to maintaining it as long as it is needed. As negotiations of a political settlement continue, and more time is needed to implement agreements between the parties, the PMG may remain in Bougainville well into 2002. Central concerns for any neutral peace-monitoring operation include the reasons why the operation was needed — why was there a conflict? What was it about the conflict, and the peace process, that led to neutral outsiders being judged necessary? In Bougainville, what

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aspects of the conflict and the peace process required the PMG to remain so much longer than expected? Those issues remain important even for this book, which focuses on Australia’s role in the TMG and PMG, and individual Australians’ experiences as monitors. This chapter provides background on why the TMG and PMG were required, and the context in which they have operated.

The Bougainville conflict, 1988 to 1997 The immediate causes of the conflict involve growing landowner resentment from 1972 to 1989 of the giant copper and gold mine at Panguna, in central Bougainville (Denoon 2000; Connell 1991). Heavyhanded responses by police ‘riot squads’1 and the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) touched off widespread ethnic tensions and separatist demands. The mine is often seen as an imposition against the wishes of Bougainvilleans, benefitting the rest of Papua New Guinea.2 Culturally and linguistically diverse (Oliver 1991; Ogan 1991), with many internal divisions, Bougainvilleans nevertheless saw themselves as sharing an identity which was asserted against outsiders. Separatist sentiment long preceded the development of the mine (Ogan 1972, 1974; Mamak and Bedford 1974; Griffin 1977, 1982, 1990; Oliver 1991). It was fuelled by grievances about neglect and other injustices of the Australian regime; the impact of bitter fighting in World War II; remoteness from the rest of Papua New Guinea; cultural, church and other links to neighbouring Solomon Islands; and roles played by Bougainvilleans elsewhere in Papua New Guinea in the early colonial period (Nash and Ogan 1990; Regan 1999: 547–549; Ghai and Regan 2000). The key marker was the distinctive jet-black skin of most Bougainvilleans. A sense of a distinct 1

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The name commonly applied to Mobile Squads of the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC). Their violence elsewhere in Papua New Guinea has been the subject of trenchant criticism even within the Police. Writing in 1986 about squads in the Highlands, a Research Officer with the RPNGC concluded that, if the word ‘Bougainville’ were substituted for ‘highlands provinces’, the judgement could be regarded as prophetic: ‘Unless present policies are changed, the conclusion must be that the people of the highlands provinces will increasingly perceive the police as an army of occupation to be driven out through mass insurgency and possibly cession from Papua New Guinea; an ironic outcome for a misguided policy’ (Mapusia 1986: 69). There is an extensive literature on the issue, including Momis and Ogan 1972; Dove, Miriung and Togolo 1974; Griffin 1982; Ogan 1974; Bedford and Mamak 1977; and Denoon 2000, as well as the works cited in note 3. See also the bibliography in Wesley-Smith 1992.

ethnic identity and separatist demands were strengthened from the late 1960s by resentment about the mine (Mamak and Bedford; Ghai and Regan 2000). Bougainville attempted to secede just before Papua New Guinea’s independence in 1975. A settlement was reached in 1976 through decentralisation (Conyers 1976; Ballard 1981; Ghai and Regan 1992 and 2000). When armed conflict began in November 19883 it was first localised around the mine. Grievances among landowners ultimately led by Francis Ona concerned the distribution of rents and compensation as well as environmental and other impacts. Initial demands involved closure of the mine and payment of huge amounts of compensation. However, the conflict intensified following the deployment of police ‘riot squads’ in November 1988. Several factors had intensified separatism since 1975: resentment of non-Bougainvillean Papua New Guineans moving to Bougainville; economic stratification; and ‘desocialisation’ of young people with poor education and few jobs (Regan 1998b). Such factors provoked new resentments against the undisciplined and violent responses of the ‘riot squads’ and (from May 1989) the PNGDF. Appalling abuses were committed by both. As support for the Panguna landowners spread, the conflict acquired an ethnic and separatist character. By early 1989 the Bougainville Republican Army (BRA) and Ona were household names, with active support in most areas of Bougainville. The mine closed, and there was ‘ethnic cleansing’ as 15,000 to 20,000 non-Bougainvilleans departed. When the Papua New Guinea security forces quit following a March 1990 cease-fire, all government authority lapsed. The BRA was unable to take effective control and Ona’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence was delayed two months, to May 1990. During this period steps were taken towards a civilian government associated with the BRA — the Bougainville Interim Government (BIG). It brought together some senior BRA leaders (Ona became President) as well as ‘civilian’ political leaders who had not been active supporters of the BRA. The latter included Joseph Kabui, who since 1987 had been Premier of the North Solomons Provincial Government, who became Vice-President of the BIG, much to the annoyance of some in the BRA 3

For the origins and unfolding of the conflict that are touched upon in the following paragraphs, see May and Spriggs 1990; Spriggs and Denoon 1992; Liria 1993; Regan 1998a and 1999: 544–555.

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who distrusted anyone with connections to the previous government. Indeed the whole concept of the BIG was opposed by some BRA leaders, and became the centre of destructive power struggles in the early 1990s. The BRA has never been highly structured. Rather, it is composed of many small local groups. They might cooperate for particular purposes, but there was often tension — and even open conflict — between BRA elements. In the absence of an effective government body, anarchy developed after March 1990. Much of it was localised, and related to traditional and other non-ideological divisions. Human rights abuses were committed by the BRA, in large part modelled on what they had learnt from the PNG security forces. Beginning with Buka Island in September 1990, internal conflict permitted the PNG security forces to return to parts of Bougainville, usually at the invitation of local leaders and with support from armed groups, who laid the basis for the Bougainville Resistance Forces (BRF). Through the early 1990s conflict intensified not only between the BRA and the PNG security forces supported by the BRF but also locally between BRA and BRF elements. While the PNGDF returned by invitation, the accession to power in Port Moresby of a government under Prime Minister Paias Wingti in mid-1992 initiated a more aggressive policy. The conflict escalated. By 1997 there were about 800 PNGDF and 150 police ‘riot squad’ personnel in Bougainville. Precise figures have never been available for the BRA and the BRF. The BRA probably numbered over 2000, armed with perhaps 500 modern automatic weapons (most captured — or purchased — from the PNGDF and ‘riot squads’) and two or three thousand reconditioned World War II and homemade weapons. Only a few hundred were ‘front-line’ fighters, most being ‘home-guards’. The BRF numbered perhaps 1500. Armed by the PNGDF, most were also ‘home-guards’ — and again only a minority were involved in patrolling with the PNGDF or local direct conflict with BRA elements. The conflict had a terrible impact, causing widespread death, injury, trauma and destruction. It contributed to a crisis of government in Papua New Guinea, and reduced the capacity of the PNGDF. Government revenue was lost due to the closure of the mine and the costs of maintaining security forces in Bougainville. Handling the conflict taxed

limited political and bureaucratic resources, and proved deeply divisive among people in Papua New Guinea as a whole and within Bougainville — as was seen after the attempt of the Papua New Guinea Government in early 1997 to engage mercenaries.4 The conflict also resulted in the militarisation of Bougainville and increased acceptance of violence as a means of resolving difficulties: the brutalising impact on members of the PNGDF and ‘riot squads’ affected the way they behaved elsewhere, and undercut discipline. No one knows how many people died, or were injured (but see Regan 1999: 557–559). Several hundred PNG security force members and similar numbers of BRA and BRF were killed. Unknown numbers of Bougainvilleans, probably several thousand, also died in local conflicts (including extra-judicial executions and other deaths caused by all combatant groups) and the blockade imposed by the Papua New Guinea Government from mid-1990. While it is unlikely that deaths directly attributable to the conflict number the 15,000 or 20,000 often suggested, there were several thousand. Many more were injured. The impact in a population of about 175,000 is incalculable. The conflict severely restricted normal life. People were displaced on a massive scale, with perhaps 60,000 — a third of the population — living in ‘care centres’ in the mid-1990s, and thousands more in BRA ‘bushcamps’. Government services, infrastructure and economic activity were destroyed in most of Bougainville. The highly effective administrative arm of the Provincial Government was moribund. The deep divisions between Bougainville and the rest of Papua New Guinea found expression in ethnic stereotypes — ‘redskins’ (the pejorative term applied by Bougainvilleans to other Papua New Guineans) tended to be reviled, while to many security force personnel and Papua New Guinean bureaucrats the Bougainvilleans were ‘black bastards’ who needed to be taught a violent lesson. Many Bougainvilleans were left bitterly opposed to Bougainville remaining within Papua New Guinea, regarding the province as independent following Ona’s May 1990 Unilateral Declaration of Independence. Leaders of the BIG and the BRA entered the peace process committed either to maintaining the independence they had already declared or achieving selfdetermination. On the other hand, not only did many in Papua New 4

On the Sandline affair, see Dinnen, May and Regan 1997, Dorney 1998, and O’Callaghan 1999.

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Guinea oppose any special arrangement for Bougainville, but Bougainvilleans who had opposed the BRA often also opposed their goals, including independence. Within Bougainville, the BRA and their opponents developed parallel institutions that became vehicles for carrying on the conflict. The BIG (the civilian ‘government’ associated with the BRA) opposed the Bougainville Transitional Government (BTG) when it was established in early 1995, as the provincial government under Papua New Guinea law. The BTG had associated combatant force in the BRF, which was represented in the BTG by a nominee. Locally, Councils of Chiefs established by the BRA and the BIG opposed the councils of elders established by the BTG (Regan 2000). There were also opposing women’s organisations. The absence of normal means of social control and dispute resolution in Bougainville increased the power of combatants, extending the range of matters which they regulated. In the absence of police, courts and other institutions, traditional leaders often stepped in and took responsibility for social organisation — including dispute settlement (Regan 2000). There were, however, countervailing pressures. BRA and BRF leaders were mostly based in their own communities. As ‘fighting leaders’ they often had their own standing, especially in societies without hereditary Chiefs, and they could often challenge the authority of clan leaders. During the years of bitter conflict, violence could be even more common, often involving purely local disputes over land and personal relations. Some BRA and BRF elements became little more than criminal gangs. The divisions were multiple and complex, but the major differences between Papua New Guinea and Bougainville and within Bougainville concerned the BRA and BIG demand for independence.

The peace process, 1997–2001 Aspects of the peace process help to explain the origins and role of the TMG and the PMG. One of the most important is the strong community support for peace that developed from the early 1990s, and the lessons learnt from the ‘unsuccessful’ peace efforts. Bougainvillean leaders were acutely aware of the need to bring together the factions. Also important were New Zealand and, to a

lesser extent, Australia and Solomon Islands, helping the factions to work together, which culminated in the Burnham talks of July 1997. The efforts of clan leaders need emphasis, as they provide insight into the success of the peace process. Because so much conflict involved struggles between local combatants over local issues, much conflict was ‘self-limiting’, as clan leaders could often put pressure on ‘fighting leaders’ to restrict the damage to neighbours for fear of setting up cycles of ‘pay-back’. Fear of the human and other costs of conflict often promoted support for a peaceful settlement, pressures on combatants to support peace, and the remarkable experience of local reconciliation efforts. In the matrilineal societies that include most groups in Bougainville, not only have women high status, but senior women are also leaders of lineages. While men tend to take public roles, speaking on behalf of the lineage, female leaders often wield power and influence. While women leaders did not uniformly support peace (any more than males uniformly supported war), female leaders often played major roles in building support for peace and reconciliation. Women added to the pressure for peace through establishing non-government organisations (NGOs) that carried out peace and reconciliation work. The community support for peace in Bougainville was mirrored in Papua New Guinea as a whole, where people questioned the use of deadly force in a civil war. This growing constituency influenced the reaction within the PNGDF to Sandline, and provided support to political leaders who favoured a peaceful resolution. This helps to explain the emergence of the moderate leadership which replaced Prime Minister Chan after Sandline, first on an interim basis from April 1997 (acting Prime Minister Giheno) and then after the July 1997 elections in which Bill Skate became Prime Minister. Skate had been a strident critic of the use of force in Bougainville, and backed his commitment by appointing newly elected Bougainvillean MP and former BRF Chairman, Sam Akoitai, as Minister for Bougainville Affairs. Akoitai demonstrated remarkable ability in building Cabinet support for the difficult choices that had to be made as part of the peace process. Many Bougainvillean leaders supporting a negotiated settlement became convinced that an essential starting point was to deal with differences among Bougainvilleans. A number of efforts were made to

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begin this process. Among the most important was the Arawa peace conference of October 1994, held after a cease-fire was agreed between the BRA and Prime Minister Chan, and with security provided by the South Pacific Peace Keeping Force. Little progress was made because at the last moment most BRA and BIG leaders decided not to attend. However, this conference did prompt the emergence of former judge Theodore Miriung as the leader of ‘moderates’ committed to working towards unity in Bougainville. As Premier of the BTG (the provincial government set up in 1995 with membership primarily from areas ‘supporting’ the national government), Miriung worked to bring the leaders together, finally achieving his aim with two sets of talks in Cairns in September and December 1995 among advisers to, and leaders of, the main factions. These talks led to agreement to continue the intra-Bougainville peace-building. However, after members of the BRA/BIG delegation returning from the talks in a boat from Solomon Islands were fired upon by PNGDF elements in January 1996, the BRA launched retaliatory attacks, which resulted in the lifting of the September 1994 cease-fire and a major escalation of conflict (Regan 1997: 51–56). The fighting of 1996 demonstrated the PNGDF’s incapacity to defeat the BRA, and prompted the Chan government to engage mercenaries. Ironically, the ousting of Sandline by the PNGDF raised expectations in both Port Moresby and Bougainville about the possibility of peace. In Port Moresby it damaged the credibility of a military solution. In Bougainville, BRA perceptions of the PNGDF changed — it was no longer regarded as the implacably evil foe — opening the possibility of communication (Regan 1997). New Zealand made the critical contribution in mid-1997, supporting the Bougainville parties’ efforts to develop a common understanding. Australia’s role was initially limited, mainly due to suspicion among the BIG/BRA leaders of Australian support for Papua New Guinea and the PNGDF. However, Australia supported the New Zealand efforts, and took over the lead role from 1998. The election of a new government in Solomon Islands in mid-1997 favoured peace rather than the manipulation of tensions, as had sometimes been the approach of the previous government. It also provided mediation, through the respected Minister and former Uniting Church bishop,

Leslie Boseto, who also chaired important meetings in the first year of the peace process. Other factors came together in 1997. One was war-weariness. Another was the wide recognition of a military stalemate. Moderate BIG/BRA leaders recognised that the conflict was so divisive to Bougainville that even if they won the war, they might inherit a hopelessly divided society. Partly for these reasons there was a change in the balance of power within the BIG/BRA leadership, reducing the influence of ‘hard-liners’ around Ona and increasing influence for moderates around Kabui, who began to act independently of Ona. Some conflict resolution training in 1997 (by Brisbane lawyers Mark Plunkett and Leo White) encouraged ‘hard-liners’ of the BIG and BRA to move further in the directions that public opinion was suggesting. On the other hand, there were factors militating against peaceful resolution, especially distrust among Bougainvilleans. Jockeying for political and economic power contributed to tensions that erupted into deadly conflict between BRA elements in the south of Bougainville and as many as ten deaths from late 1998 to the end of 2000. There were also tensions between the leaders of factions within the peace process, particularly intense from the end of 1998. New divisions also emerged from the peace process, notably those involving Francis Ona and his staunchest supporters. After ambivalence about the first meeting at Burnham, Ona chose to oppose the process, and opposed the deployment of the TMG if Australian or New Zealand forces were to be involved.5 He declared large parts of Bougainville a ‘no-go zone’ to the TMG and PMG and made strident attacks on leaders who supported the process. In September 1997, he again proclaimed the independence of Bougainville, which by 1998 he called the Republic of Meekamui. The elements of the BRA supporting him were now referred to as the Meekamui Defence Force, and as they — like all other combatants — remained heavily armed, their opposition could not be ignored. At the time of writing (November 2001) the peace process has been in place for four years. For convenience it can be divided into two phases. The first, from July 1997 to the end of 1998, involved a 5

Francis Ona, Media Release, ‘Bougainville: Referendum on independence is necessary; Australian troops not welcome for truce monitoring: Ona’, 23 November 1997.

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primary focus on the process itself, providing the conditions which enabled the parties to commit themselves with confidence. From the end of 1998, there was a shift to the political issues that divided or were likely to divide the parties — disarming combatants, withdrawal of Papua New Guinea security forces, policing arrangements, interim political structures, and Bougainville’s long-term political status (early independence, a referendum on independence, or integration within Papua New Guinea under autonomous or other arrangements). Of course, some important outcomes were achieved in the first phase, for the cessation of armed hostility was itself significant. However, little effort was made to achieve outcomes on the divisive issues.

The first phase6 A meeting, mainly of senior Bougainville leaders from all factions, was held at the Burnham Military Barracks in New Zealand in July 1997. The meeting cemented earlier efforts to bring the factions together, and provided the foundations for trust. In the Burnham Declaration of 18 July 1997, they committed themselves to unity and reconciliation, and to work towards a peaceful settlement through negotiations with the Papua New Guinea Government. A second meeting at Burnham in October 1997 involved mainly officials representing Papua New Guinea and the Bougainville factions. The 80-strong Bougainville delegation included numerous BRA and BRF commanders. For most this was their first formal meeting with PNGDF and police, and began to establish trust between the combatants. Unexpectedly, so much progress was made that a truce — the Burnham Truce — was signed on 10 October. It advised ‘the National Government and leaders on Bougainville to immediately invite a neutral regional group to monitor the terms of the Truce’, a recommendation accepted by both principals. The need for a leaders’ meeting to discuss a ‘political settlement’ was also agreed. It was to be held before 31 January 1998, and the Truce was to run until that point. At the end of November 1997, the TMG under New Zealand leadership began deploying to Bougainville, comprising personnel from New Zealand, Australia, Fiji and Vanuatu. 6

See Regan 1998b and 1999, and Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 1999.

In January 1998 a meeting of leaders and officials representing Papua New Guinea and most Bougainville factions was held at Lincoln University, New Zealand. Under the Lincoln Agreement on Peace, Security and Development on Bougainville of 23 January, a cease-fire was agreed, to take effect from 30 April, and the truce was extended to that time. Provision was also made to establish the PMG as the successor to the TMG. The foundation of the process was no longer a temporary truce but a ‘permanent and irrevocable ceasefire’.7 As the parties believed that there was now a ‘peace’ rather than a ‘truce’ to monitor, a new name with an amended mandate was required.8 The need for a United Nations observer mission was agreed at Lincoln. So were the need for an elected ‘Bougainville Reconciliation Government’ before the end of 1998, talks on Bougainville’s political future before the end of June 1998, and ‘phased withdrawal’ of the PNGDF, subject to ‘restoration of civil authority’. The Agreement addressed other matters concerning reconciliation and restoration of ‘normalcy’. As the most comprehensive agreement, it became a ‘roadmap’ for the peace process, although it was not always strictly followed. On 30 April 1998, an agreement for a cease-fire was signed in Arawa. Among other things, it provided for a formal mandate for the PMG, a request for United Nations Security Council endorsement of the PMG, and elaboration of the United Nations observer mission proposed in Lincoln, which would work in conjunction with the PMG and have its own mandate to monitor and report on the cease-fire. From 1 May 1998, the TMG became the PMG, still comprising personnel from the same four countries, but now under Australian leadership. Two aspects of the Lincoln arrangements did not go as planned: the talks on the political future envisaged by 30 June 1998; and the election of the ‘Bougainville Reconciliation Government’. Both were delayed, and each involved the beginning of efforts to deal with the more divisive issues, and mark the transition to the second phase.

7 8

Lincoln Agreement, clause 3.1. Both mandates are discussed in the next chapter.

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The second phase The second phase began with ad hoc arrangements to establish an alternative to the ‘Bougainville Reconciliation Government’ proposed in Lincoln. The reasons for such arrangements are discussed elsewhere (Regan 1999: 582–588). In summary, most difficulties related to the controversial reform in July 1995 of Papua New Guinea’s provincial governments. Parliament repealed the Organic Law on Provincial Government (enacted in 1977) and introduced the Organic Law on Provincial Governments and Local-level Governments 1995. The reforms greatly reduced the provincial governments’ autonomy, so were opposed by Premier Miriung and the BTG, who had begun negotiations with Prime Minister Chan for ‘the highest possible autonomy’ for Bougainville as an alternative to independence. Recognising the need for special arrangements for Bougainville, the Chan government included special provisions in the amending legislation continuing the operation of the 1977 Organic Law solely in relation to Bougainville until 31 December 1998. The national government negotiated with the Bougainville leaders the details of amendments to the 1977 law as a basis for electing the proposed ‘Bougainville Reconciliation Government’ as well as extending the period of operation of the 1977 law as amended. In December 1998, however, the government failed to muster the numbers in Parliament to pass the amendments. As a result, the reformed system, with reduced autonomy, was due to be established in Bougainville when the 1995 Organic Law came into operation in Bougainville on 1 January 1999. Bougainville leaders should have been negotiating with the national government to resolve the political status of Bougainville, but they naturally objected to reduced autonomy, even on a temporary basis. BRA, BIG and BTG leaders threatened to set up a government outside the constitutional framework. Negotiations were organised, and the national government agreed to new special arrangements, formally suspending the new provincial government required to be established on 1 January 1999, and allowing Bougainville to elect a reconciliation government, called the Bougainville People’s Congress (BPC). That body would have no legal basis, but would become the effective government by virtue of an agreement that it would be consulted by the national government before the powers of the suspended provincial government were exercised by the national government.

These arrangements operated for eleven months, and enabled the continuation of peace-building. However, a primary focus in 1998 had been on consolidating the commitment of the BRA and BIG leaders. What was not recognised until the end of that year was concern among some Bougainvilleans — some MPs, leaders of the Buka local government (the Leitana Council of Elders) and the BRF — that they might be excluded from the proposed Reconciliation Government. From the beginning of 1999 they opposed the establishment of the BPC, and Bougainville MP John Momis mounted a series of legal challenges. Initially he failed, and elections for the BPC were held in May 1999, with Joseph Kabui as BPC President. Momis’ legal challenges succeeded, however, in late November, but rapprochement between Momis and his supporters, and Kabui and the BPC leaders, had already begun. This development resulted from the growing legitimacy of the BPC leadership, concern by Momis and others that they were being marginalised by opposing the BPC, and the growing need for a combined Bougainville position in negotiations with the national government. When Momis became Governor of an interim, appointed provincial government from late 1999, and avoided exclusion from power, he also understood the difficulties if he did not work with the BPC. The BPC leadership was now focused on negotiations with the national government, and as they expected agreement on a deferred referendum and autonomy within a few months, they did not expect interim arrangements to operate for more than a few months. On that basis they were prepared to agree to the provincial government being established on an interim basis. In a spirit of compromise, Momis and the BPC agreed in the Greenhouse Memorandum of December 1999 that the new Bougainville Interim Provincial Government (BIPG) would make its decisions in consultation with the BPC. That agreement permitted the continued operation of dual political institutions — the BPC as an elected body with no formal powers, and the BIPG as an appointed body with legal powers identical to all other provincial governments. The arrangements have not only lasted longer than anticipated, but are also unwieldy and costly (the BPC comprises 106 members and the BIPG 36). On the other hand, the involvement of a wide range of leaders in decisionmaking has probably helped in building understanding of and support

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for the compromises that the leaders have had to make. The arrangements can be expected to continue until an autonomous government is established. In part because of the difficulty in establishing a Reconciliation Government, the first talks between the national government and Bougainville leaders on the political future were not held until 30 June 1999. The Bougainvilleans then put proposals to Prime Minister Skate for constitutional guarantees for a right to hold a binding referendum on independence, and for the highest possible level of autonomy to apply at least until then. The autonomy proposals provided for a Bougainville police force and for limits on deployment of the PNGDF. Following the ousting of Skate as Prime Minister in mid-July 1999, negotiations on the political future have been with the Morauta government. Talks resumed in December 1999, and continued throughout 2000. Early in 2001, the referendum issue was resolved in a compromise brokered by Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Alexander Downer. Talks on autonomy concluded successfully in August 2001, together with efforts to reach agreement on the disposal of weapons and the withdrawal of the PNGDF and the police ‘riot squads’.

The impact of the peace process in Bougainville The formal steps in the peace process have helped to build trust between opponents. However, it is generally possible only for senior leaders to be involved in those steps, and their greater significance is in creating the conditions for building peace at the community level. Even before the Burnham Truce, people began to feel safe enough to leave care centres and return home. Once the Truce was in place, the returns increased in tempo. Economic activities — mostly copra and cocoa production — revived. Basic health and education services, and donor-funded infrastructure restoration projects, previously restricted to areas under national government ‘control’, began to spread. On the other hand, basic infrastructure and services will take many years to return to anything like the standards that existed before the conflict. Police, courts and other aspects of normal law and order arrangements do not operate outside the two main centres (Buka and Arawa), and there are law and order problems of various kinds.

Demilitarisation has made some progress. There are now far fewer PNGDF and riot squad personnel in Bougainville — less than 200 — and weapons are seldom used by members of ‘ex-combatant’ groups. A weapons disposal plan for the BRA and BRF is under negotiation. Local reconciliation efforts expanded rapidly from the second half of 1997. Much more happened in northern and central Bougainville than in the southwest and the far south. Further, even in Buka and northern Bougainville there are disputes of such intensity that they resist reconciliation. Nevertheless, local reconciliation efforts have done more to consolidate popular commitment to peace than any other aspect of the process. Aspects of the process of relevance to the operations of the TMG and PMG are: • the process was initiated by Bougainvillean and Papua New Guinea leaders with deep commitment to peace and reconciliation. While ‘outsiders’ played vital roles, in essence such roles have been largely limited to supporting Bougainvilleans moving in directions that they have themselves chosen; • because of the initial deep suspicion between the parties, and the risks of renewed conflict, the key challenge in the early stages was to build trust. This was not simple, as shown by Momis, the BRF and the Leitana Council of Elders leaders’ fears of being excluded from power over the establishment of the BPC; • the risk of renewed conflict involved not just combatants, but also groups that adopted opposing positions on the validity of the peace process (as in the case of Ona and Kabui) or involved in local conflict (as in the case of BRA elements in south Bougainville). There was also competition for power among those supporting the peace process (as with Kabui and Momis during 1999); • the fact that the combatant groups continued to be armed; • pressure within local communities to break cycles of conflict and bring about reconciliation within and between communities.

Conclusion While there was commitment to peace when the process began, it could easily have been destroyed. What was required was some reason to inspire faith in the process and trust between the parties. It was not

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just a matter of monitoring the truce or cease-fire. Rather, it was necessary to provide ‘political space’ for the parties to consolidate their commitment, and to address divisive issues. Renewed conflict was a major risk in the absence of a neutral force. The TMG and the PMG have made major contributions to the peace process, not least because of the persistence of the factors that inhibited previous peace efforts, especially the complex causes and impacts of the conflict. But the legacies of the conflict mean that the operations of the TMG and PMG have involved serious risks. They are unarmed, whereas all combatant groups have retained their weapons. While most combatant groups support the process, significant groups around Francis Ona have opposed it. There have been tensions among those supporting the peace process. While cease-fire violations have been few, they have occurred, even with shots fired at TMG/PMG elements. The sporadic conflict between BRA elements in south Bougainville has resulted in several deaths. Of course, the TMG and the PMG have been only part of a much broader set of initiatives that together constitute the peace process. Further, those who proposed a neutral force and set up the TMG and the PMG, and who judged the risks, recognised the strong community support for peace and reconciliation, and the commitment to those goals of the leaders of almost all combatants.

References Ballard, J., 1981. ‘Policy-making as trauma: the provincial government issue’, in J.A. Ballard (ed.), Policy Making in a New State: Papua New Guinea 1972–1977. St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, pp. 95–132. Bedford, Richard, and Alexander Mamak, 1977. Compensation for Development: The Bougainville Case. Christchurch: Department of Geography, University of Canterbury. Connell, J., 1991. ‘Compensation and conflict: the struggle for development at the Bougainville copper mine’, in J. Connell and R. Howitt (eds), Mining and Indigenous Peoples in Australasia. Sydney: Sydney University Press, pp. 55–75. Conyers, D., 1976. The Provincial Government Debate: Central Control Versus Local Participation. IASER Monograph 2. Port Moresby: PNG Institute of Applied Social and Economic Research. Denoon, Donald, 2000. Getting Under the Skin: The Bougainville Copper Agreement and the Creation of the Panguna Mine. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Dinnen, S., R. May, and A.J. Regan (eds), 1997. Challenging the State: The Sandline Affair in Papua New Guinea. Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian National University. Dorney, Sean, 1998. The Sandline Affair: Politics and Mercenaries and the Bougainville Crisis. Sydney: ABC Books. Dove, J., T. Miriung and M. Togolo, 1974. ‘Mining bitterness’, in P.G. Sack (ed.), Problem of Choice: Land in Papua New Guinea’s Future. Canberra: Australian National University Press, pp. 181–189. Ghai, Yash, and Anthony J. Regan 1992. The Law, Politics and Administration of Decentralisation in Papua New Guinea. Monograph 30. Port Moresby: National Research Institute. Ghai, Yash, and Anthony J. Regan, 2000. ‘Bougainville and the dialectics of ethnicity, autonomy and separation’, in Yash Ghai (ed.), Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-ethnic States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 242–265. Griffin, James, 1977. ‘Local government councils as instruments of political mobilisation in Bougainville’, in John Connell (ed.), Local Government Councils in Bougainville. Christchurch: Department of Geography, University of Canterbury. Griffin, James, 1982. ‘Napidakoe navitu’, in R.J. May (ed.), Micronationalist Movements in Papua New Guinea. Political and Social Change Monograph No. 1. Canberra: The Australian National University, pp. 113–138. Griffin, James, 1990. ‘Bougainville is a special case’, in May and Spriggs 1990, pp. 1–15. Liria, Yacka, 1993. Bougainville Campaign Diary. Eltham, Vic: Indra Publishing. Mamak, Alexander, and Richard Bedford, 1974. Bougainvillean Nationalism: Aspects of Unity and Discord. Christchurch: Department of Geography, University of Canterbury. Mapusia, Mike, 1986. ‘Police policy towards tribal fighting in the Highlands’, in Louise Morauta (ed.), Law and Order in a Changing Society. Canberra: Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian National University. May, R.J. and Matthew Spriggs (eds), 1990. The Bougainville Crisis. Bathurst: Crawford House Press. Momis, John, and Eugene Ogan, 1972. ‘A view from Bougainville’, in M.W. Ward (ed.), Change and Development in Rural Melanesia, Fifth Waigani Seminar, 1972. Canberra: Australian National University Press, pp. 116–118. Nash, J. and E. Ogan, 1990. ‘The red and the black: Bougainvillean perceptions of other Papua New Guineans’. Pacific Studies 13(2): 1–17. O’Callaghan, Mary-Louise, 1999. Enemies Within: Papua New Guinea, Australia, and the Sandline Crisis: the Inside Story. Doubleday.

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Ogan, Eugene, 1972. Business and Cargo: Socio-economic Change among the Nasioi of Bougainville. Bulletin No. 44. Port Moresby: New Guinea Research Unit, The Australian National University. Ogan, Eugene, 1974. ‘Cargoism and politics in Bougainville 1962–1972’. The Journal of Pacific History 9: 117–127. Ogan, Eugene, 1991. ‘The cultural background to the Bougainville crisis’, Journal de la Societe des Oceanistes 92–93 (1–2): 61–67. Oliver, Douglas, 1991. Black Islanders: A Personal Perspective of Bougainville 1937–1991. Melbourne: Hyland House. Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 1999. Bougainville: The Peace Process and Beyond. Canberra. Regan, Anthony J., 1997. ‘Preparation for war and progress towards peace — Bougainville dimensions of the Sandline Affair’, in S. Dinnen, R. May and A.J. Regan (eds), Challenging the State: The Sandline Affair in Papua New Guinea. Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian National University, pp. 49–72. Regan, Anthony J., 1998a. ‘Causes and course of the Bougainville conflict’, The Journal of Pacific History 33(3): 269–285. Regan, Anthony J., 1998b. ‘Case study: Bougainville’, in P. Harris and B. Reilly (eds), Democracy and Deep-rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators. Stockholm: International IDEA, pp. 169–178. Regan, Anthony J., 1999. Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Inquiry into The Bougainville Peace Process, Canberra, vol. 2, pp. 539–644. Regan, Anthony J., 2000. ‘’Traditional’ leaders and conflict resolution in Bougainville: reforming the present by re-writing the past?’, in Sinclair Dinnen and Allison Ley (eds), Reflections on Violence in Melanesia. Sydney and Canberra: Hawkins Press/Asia Pacific Press, pp. 290–304. Spriggs, Matthew and Donald Denoon (eds), 1992. The Bougainville Crisis: 1991 Update. Canberra: Research School of Pacific Studies, The Australian National University in association with Crawford House Press. Wesley-Smith, Terence, 1992. ‘Development and crisis in Bougainville: a bibliographic essay’, The Contemporary Pacific 4(2): 407–432.

Young BRA men on the road to Pokapa No. 2 Village, near Tinputz. Damasus S. Verosi in black singlet with newsletter in hand (Photo: Jan Gammage)

Establishing the Truce Monitoring Group and the Peace Monitoring Group Anthony Regan

WITHIN seven weeks of the Burnham Truce of 10 October 1997, the first TMG deployed to Bougainville. Even though there was widespread support for a neutral outside force, preferably from the Pacific region, there was also opposition, especially in Port Moresby. Within the region, there was little experience in monitoring, keeping and enforcing peace in small-scale, bitter and complex conflicts that were part secessionist, part internal civil war. The concept of truce monitoring was vague. This chapter describes the TMG and PMG in terms of their roles, structures and composition, and their relation to the framework for managing the peace process. It also surveys how they were established, and how decisions were made.1 The TMG and PMG share remarkable features: a mix of unarmed soldiers and civilians from four countries. This chapter considers the issues involved in creating the TMG, before considering features of its operations. It then looks at the transition from truce to ceasefire and from TMG to PMG, before looking at the PMG in operation.

Establishing the TMG The decisions of October 1997 to establish a truce and to request neighbouring countries to create a neutral monitoring force were made 1

See Appendices A to F.

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by the main groups involved. It was agreed that the peace process and the truce were fragile, and that the TMG was crucial. It was for these reasons that the TMG was rapidly planned, established and deployed. 2 Key issues included: • the basic mandate of the operation; • whether the operation would have a United Nations mandate; be armed or unarmed; composed of military or civilian personnel; or a mixture of both; • whether or not it should be a South Pacific regional operation; • the leadership, cost and size of the operation; • the broader framework into which the TMG would fit, and the relationship to other institutions in that framework. By 1997 there had been several attempts to establish truce-monitoring bodies. International diplomats had supervised the March 1990 ceasefire and the limited arms disposal by the BRA (Kemelfield 1990:69). The Honiara Declaration of January 1991 called for a Multinational Supervisory Team to oversee the restoration of services and the surrender and destruction of arms,3 though most of the Honiara Declaration lapsed. The South Pacific Peacekeeping Force (SPPKF) was deployed to provide security for the Arawa peace conference in October 1994. It comprised personnel from Fiji, Vanuatu, Tonga and New Zealand, with limited support from Australia. The BRA/BIG leaders never attended, but the Bougainville leaders who did attend thought well of the SPPKF. The BIG/BRA leaders had long been committed to the idea of a multinational force, but by 1997 they also wanted a United Nations mandate. This was partly a reaction to the problems of the SPPKF in 1994; it also related to concerns about Australian influence; and reflected a desire to win support for self-determination by involving international bodies. Papua New Guinea Prime Minister Sir Julius Chan was advised by his Department of Foreign Affairs of the dangers of the BIG/BRA’s efforts to internationalise the conflict. When he was forced to stand aside in the Sandline Affair from April 1997, Peter Barter, Minister for Provincial Affairs, was able to implement his Peace Strategy (Regan 1997). He held informal discussions with New Zealand diplomats about 2 3

Papua New Guinea Post Courier, 3 December 1997, p. 3. Honiara Declaration on Peace, Reconciliation and Rehabilitation on Bougainville, 23 January 1991, paragraphs 6 and 10.

the possibility of New Zealanders providing security for a neutral zone in Arawa for peace talks. This concept still had currency in the early stages of the Burnham phase. Before there was any agreement on truce-monitoring, there had to be a truce. There had been an informal truce from early 1997 following PNGDF action in ousting the mercenaries. When Chan stepped aside, a more conciliatory leadership was installed, and the BTG and the BIG/BRA leaders considered peace talks. A critical issue was the fact that the BRA was holding as prisoners five members of the Papua New Guinea security forces. They had been captured at Kangu Beach after a massacre of security force personnel in September 1996. From March 1997 the PNGDF and the Papua New Guinea Government hoped that the cessation of hostility would contribute to their release. In the two months before the first talks at Burnham, there were secret communications between representatives of the BTG and BIG, and New Zealand officials became involved. Among the issues discussed was the need for an early cease-fire or truce, and for a third force, which the Bougainvilleans envisaged as an armed group that would provide security. New Zealand officials began to consider a peace-keeping or peace-monitoring operation many months before the request was made. The meeting at Burnham in July 1997 gave impetus for progress towards a truce (often referred to as Burnham I). As the Papua New Guinea Government did not participate, no cease-fire or truce could be agreed. However, in the Burnham Declaration signed on 18 July 1997, the Bougainville leaders stated that their goal was to end the war and restore lasting peace. Second, the Declaration proposed both a formal cease-fire and a neutral peace-keeping force — the latter being essential to the peace process (paragraph 5.1). Third, at the end of Burnham I the BRA leaders agreed to release the five prisoners of war. This action encouraged the new Papua New Guinea Prime Minister, Bill Skate, to recognise the likelihood of real progress towards peace, and that political popularity could be achieved in the process. The Burnham Declaration envisaged a force under the auspices of the United Nations,4 and a term of up to three years. Reflecting the 4

The Burnham Declaration, clause 5.1.

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concern of the BIG/BRA about lack of consultation on the status of forces agreement covering the SPPKF in 1994, the Declaration stated that the BIG and the BTG be fully consulted and be a party to any status of forces agreement with a peace-keeping force. New Zealand supported the parties’ focus on establishing the process rather than moving towards outcomes. This was one reason why it supported the idea of a neutral force. By contrast, in mid-1997, Australian Government advisers were uneasy about a monitoring force which might draw contributing countries into dangerous commitments. They were more interested in security for a neutral zone, where the parties could negotiate. However, over several months, Australia was converted to a more open-ended process. The Burnham Truce signed at Burnham II on 10 October came unexpectedly, after the first meeting5 of officials of the Papua New Guinea Government and the main Bougainville groups. It was unexpected because this was a meeting of officials, and the Papua New Guinea delegation had indicated that they had limited authority. Key factors contributing to the Truce were the remarkable progress made in establishing communication and trust during the Burnham II talks and the openness of Prime Minister Skate and his Minister for Bougainville Affairs. In addition to the Papua New Guinea Government, signatories included the BTG (together with BRF representatives), and a combined BIG/BRA delegation. The Truce committed the parties to cease armed conflict. There was also provision for field commanders of the PNGDF, BRA and BRF and village chiefs to consult to help resolve any incident which threatened the Truce. The Truce was part of a broader set of arrangements, which included the holding of a major meeting of leaders by 31 January 1998 to discuss a political settlement. The period of the truce was initially linked to the date of that meeting, with the expectation that it would be replaced by a formal cease-fire. It was in the Burnham Truce itself that the proposal was made to invite a neutral regional group to monitor the truce. The reference to a regional body reflected a consensus reached on a contentious issue. The BIG/BRA had been seeking a United Nations mandate, but the New Zealand officials who facilitated the Burnham talks highlighted the 5

That is, the first such meeting as part of the process initiated by Burnham I.

difficulties, especially the likelihood of delays, if a United Nations mandate were required, emphasising the advantages of a regional force. Still concerned about internationalising the situation, Papua New Guinea was clearly opposed to a United Nations mandate. The Bougainvilleans eventually accepted the New Zealand arguments, but continued to insist on a role for the United Nations when the Truce was replaced by a cease-fire.

The parameters for the monitoring operation There was a clear understanding that New Zealand would take the initiative in setting up and leading the truce monitoring body. It had played a leading role in the peace process and was not impeded by the baggage that Australia carried in Bougainville. Papua New Guinea tended to resent what it regarded as Australia’s neo-colonial domination and limited provision of military support during the conflict. The BIG/BRA tended to blame Australia for the Panguna mine and for supporting the PNGDF (notably in providing helicopters). Although Australian officials sometimes resented the extension of New Zealand activities into Australia’s area of influence, they accepted that their New Zealand counterparts were playing positive roles. The operation was bound to be expensive due to the remoteness of Bougainville and the destruction of its infrastructure. The neutral force required a range of services (transport, communications, health). It was unlikely that the New Zealand military could carry the full cost, so discussions were held concerning a substantial contribution from Australia. It was agreed that, with or without a United Nations mandate, the force should have a regional flavour, rather than being made up solely of New Zealanders and Australians. This ensured an appearance of regional endorsement of New Zealand’s and Australia’s roles. Neither country wished to be seen as dominating, and the concept of a regional force was attractive to both Papua New Guinea and Bougainvilleans for similar reasons. Even the relatively small contributions from Fiji and Vanuatu had important symbolic value. In fact, the force was not a regional initiative, but the contributions of Fiji and Vanuatu proved to be more than symbolic.

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The New Zealand/Australia Resource Group At the request of the Papua New Guinea Government and with support from the Bougainville parties to the Truce, a Resource Group of New Zealand and Australian officials visited Port Moresby and Bougainville from 28 October to 7 November 1997 to consult and report on issues and options. The visit was part fulfilment of obligations under the Burnham Declaration to consult the Bougainville parties on all matters concerning status of forces agreements. The Resource Group’s recommendations became the basis for detailed proposals for the treaty and other arrangements covering the TMG. They provide insights into the concerns of the time, and justifications for why the TMG was set up as it was.6 By the time the Resource Group arrived in Bougainville the truce had been operating for three weeks. The Group was impressed by a commitment on all sides to the truce and peace process. However, the safety of the TMG remained a concern, mainly because information indicated that BRA elements associated with Francis Ona regarded the TMG as premature and would not guarantee its safety. The Group concluded that despite strong commitment, the process remained fragile, reinforcing the need for early deployment. The Resource Group believed that a degree of consensus was emerging on key issues, notably New Zealand leadership for the TMG, its regional nature, and the mixture of civilian and military personnel. There was also consensus on the TMG’s tasks, deployment to several centres, its unarmed nature, and the institutional framework for handling reports. However, there were still some difficulties, and a range of views were expressed to the Group. Although New Zealand was leading the TMG it could not cover the bulk of costs. Again Australia was the logical partner, but tensions emerged. Some concerned Papua New Guinea and Bougainville, but given that New Zealand officials stressed the necessity of Australian involvement, these soon modified. Other tensions concerned the relations between New Zealand and Australia especially although not exclusively in the area of defence. Not only did the Australian military see themselves as the senior partner, giving rise to some resentment 6

The following discussion is drawn from interviews with a senior member of the Resource Group.

among the New Zealanders, but they were also concerned that New Zealand had run down its defence capacity and may not be capable of managing the Bougainville operation. Both Papua New Guinea and the BIG/BRA wanted to include Tonga, given the positive impressions made by Tongans while serving in the SPPKF. The BIG/BRA was also interested in Solomon Islands involvement. Otherwise, there was consensus that Fiji and Vanuatu would be welcome, again because of their contributions to the SPPKF. Papua New Guinea wanted strong civilian participation, and a civilian head. The BIG/BRA were also keen to see a significant civilian component to signal a return to normalcy, and inspire confidence in local communities. The BIG/BRA specifically requested female monitors. They opposed Australian military monitors, but were open to Australian civilians, and Australian military in logistical support. Many people in this collection have emphasised how the TMG’s visible presence encouraged a sense of security. The Group endorsed proposals giving the TMG a major role in informing Bougainvilleans about the truce and the peace process. They noted that the process was based on local reconciliation, and emphasised the importance of the TMG working closely with peace committees and clan leaders. There was of course emphasis on investigating breaches of the truce, but also on discouraging breaches by their presence and example to combatants. Noting concerns of both the BTG and the BIG/BRA, the Resource Group proposed a high-level monitoring mechanism to deal with breaches, comprising representatives of signatories to the Truce. The proposal was accepted by the parties at a meeting in Cairns in November, which agreed to establish a Peace Consultative Committee. The notion that the TMG could set an example to combatants was linked to the question of whether it should be unarmed. It is perhaps surprising that all parties expressed a clear preference. The BRA had earlier envisaged an armed third force as a guarantee against PNGDF attacks, but by the time the Resource Group went to Bougainville, its concerns had reduced. In part this change was a result of interaction at Burnham II and the early success of the truce. An important factor underlying recommendations for an unarmed body was the fear that those BRA elements still supporting Francis Ona may misrepresent

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deployment of an armed force as invasion. Emphasis on a return to normalcy was important. Local communities were more likely to be reassured by unarmed monitors than by heavily armed soldiers. There were questions concerning the location of the TMG and whether it should be deployed to a headquarters, or to permanent stations at various centres across Bougainville. These questions were connected to the issue of its role, functions and visibility, and had implications for the size and cost of the operation. The Resource Group noted areas of consensus, and essentially endorsed them. There were also questions about the composition of the TMG and whether it should comprise civilians or military personnel. The Group favoured mainly military. It noted the difficulties of quickly deploying an organisation composed largely of civilians, and the difficulties of providing such a body with communications and transport. The Resource Group heard a range of views on the size of the TMG, with Papua New Guinea wanting a small operation, and the BIG/BRA envisaging a body of perhaps 150 with logistical support. The Resource Group put four options to the parties and donor countries: 1. A 30-person predominantly civilian group, based in one place, with members travelling to investigate incidents or deal with tensions; 2. A group of about 30 monitors with another 50 providing logistical support, based at Arawa, with truce monitoring teams (TMTs) at Arawa, Buka and Buin; 3. A group of 85 monitors with a support element of about 65 deployed as in the second option, but with an additional TMT at Tonu; 4. As in the third option, but with about 135 support personnel. Without making a clear recommendation, the Resource Group evaluated each option. The consensus among Truce signatories, and the need for deployment to various centres pushed the evaluation towards the third and fourth options. Two issues were critical: the TMG had to be large enough to provide its own transport and communications; it also had to be big enough to ensure a presence at places and occasions where tensions arose. These considerations ruled out the first and second options. If the Group had a preference it was for the third option. Pressure from the military in New Zealand and Australia resulted in the deployment of a TMG more in line with the fourth option. They were concerned with

the absence of infrastructure and services and what is regarded as rules for military operations (teeth to tail ratios, which assume that a monitoring force of 85 needs a support element of two to three times that size). While civilian officials argued for a leaner operation, they were overridden by military considerations. The success of military over civilian views determined the size and costs of the operations for three years. By cutting out alternatives such as outsourcing some logistical support, the military flavour of the TMG structure was reinforced. The Resource Group made no recommendation concerning the term of the TMG, but there were diverse views. The Truce was to expire no later than 31 January 1998. In the Burnham Declaration, however, the Bougainville parties had talked of a term for a peace-keeping force of up to three years, and by Burnham II were recommending that the TMG — or something like it — become a peace-keeping force under United Nations auspices, responsible for monitoring the cease-fire that would replace the Truce. However, still concerned about internationalising the situation, the Papua New Guinea Government was more interested in a short-term operation. The New Zealand Government was uneasy about costs, while the more Australia became involved, the more open it became to a long-term role. Although all parties had some reservations about the Resource Group proposals, they were generally well received. The Papua New Guinea Government was sufficiently convinced by the Resource Group arguments that it endorsed the third option. But by the time this decision was made (only days after the Resource Group completed its tour) the military planners were pushing TMG numbers beyond even the fourth option. In most respects, however, the views of the Resource Group became the basis for planning the design of the TMG. Attached to the written report of the Resource Group was a draft multilateral agreement to establish the TMG (based on the agreement used for deployment of the SPPKF in 1994). The final version of that document was signed by Papua New Guinea and the four countries contributing to the TMG on 5 December (see the Agreement Between New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Australia, Fiji and Vanuatu Concerning the Neutral Truce Monitoring Group for Bougainville — the TMG Agreement).7 The report and the draft agreement became the 7

See Appendix D, this volume.

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basis for further consultations during November, partly to ensure that all parties, especially Bougainvilleans, were fully consulted. Bougainvilleans were further consulted when the ninth draft of the agreement was presented to the joint working group of officials of the signatories to the Truce meeting in Cairns from 18 to 24 November (days before elements of the TMG began deploying). On 24 November they signed the Cairns Commitment on Implementation of the Agreement Concerning the Neutral Regional Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) for Bougainville (the Cairns Commitment).8 The parties committed themselves to compliance with the agreement that would establish the TMG, and to respect its mandate, ensuring its safety and providing assistance. By this stage, the organisational framework for the TMG and the peace process more generally had been agreed. The Resource Group proposals concerning a high-level truce monitoring mechanism had been accepted, so the Cairns Commitment established the Peace Consultative Committee (PCC) which was to facilitate consultation among the parties, dealing with TMG reports on adherence to the Truce. However, the PCC was to have no direct involvement in the command or deployment decisions of the TMG. Provision was made for the TMG to report to the PCC.

The TMG in operation With the signatories to the Truce committed to the TMG and satisfied with the TMG Agreement, the next steps involved execution of the Agreement and deployment. In fact, under pressure to deploy as soon as possible, and facing practical difficulties in arranging the signing of the multilateral TMG Agreement, everyone agreed that deployment might begin before the TMG Agreement was executed. As a result, deployment of elements under Brigadier Roger Mortlock began on 28 November. Deployment of Australian personnel began on 6 December, involving 15 public servants (eight from Foreign Affairs and Trade, five from Defence and two from AusAID) and four Australian Federal Police. The TMG Agreement was signed on 5 December. Despite the concerns of the Bougainville leaders, neither the BTG nor the BIG was party to the Agreement. Having been consulted extensively on 8

See Appendix C, this volume.

establishing the TMG, they accepted that it was appropriate for the multilateral agreement to be entered into by the five national governments — Papua New Guinea and the four contributing countries. The bulk of the TMG Agreement covers technical issues concerning the rights and duties arising from the deployment into Papua New Guinea of military personnel of other countries. It does not specify structures of the TMG, the ratios of military and civilian personnel, or their number.9 These matters were left open, to enable the TMG to respond to circumstances. The main provisions of interest in the Agreement are those concerning: • the mandate of the TMG (Article 5); • the framework for the management of the peace process of which the TMG was part (Articles 2 and 3); • command and control of TMG personnel (Article 7); • a requirement that TMG members be unarmed (Article 14); • the term of the TMG (the TMG Agreement provided for its withdrawal by 31 January, unless the parties to the Agreement were to determine otherwise (Article 29(3)). Brief comment is required concerning the first three points. The proposals canvassed by the Resource Group were reduced to three points. The mandate of the TMG was to: 1. monitor and report on the compliance of the parties to the Burnham Truce with the terms of that Truce; 2. promote and instil confidence in the peace process through presence, good offices and interaction with the local community; 3. provide people on Bougainville with information on the truce and peace process. The Agreement made provision for the TMG Commander to report regularly to the PCC concerning the implementation, progress and success of the Burnham Truce (Article 2). The Agreement also created a separate body — the Truce Steering Committee (TSC) — which was to be part of the organisational framework for the TMG. It was to comprise the Commander of the TMG and a representative of each of the four 9

Cairns Commitment, paragraph 3 and Agreement between New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Australia, Fiji and Vanuatu concerning the Neutral Truce Monitoring Group for Bougainville, paragraph 2.

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participating states. It was to be a consultative body, without direct involvement in command and deployment. While it was expected to play a key role, it had in fact little impact on the operation of the TMG. The Agreement did not specify that the Commander had to be from New Zealand, a fact that seems odd when the parties were all agreed on this issue, and when another provision was made for a New Zealand representative to chair the TSC. While the Commander was given operational control of military members of the TMG, they were to remain under national command. This meant that a New Zealand officer was in control of Australian military personnel, a matter of sensitivity to some in the Australian military who tended to regard New Zealand as very much a junior partner in relation to military matters. No mention was made in the Agreement of the place of civilian members in the chain of command.

Numbers, structures and deployment of the TMG The TMG’s average strength was about 250 personnel, with • 120 from the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF); • 110 from Australia, with about 90 from the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and 15 to 20 civilians; • 10 from the Fiji Army; • 8 to 10 Vanuatu government personnel, mostly from police backgrounds. Most equipment used for the purposes of logistical support (including land vehicles, helicopters, communications etc.) was provided by New Zealand, with some Australian contribution. A total of about 85 people were truce monitors — 54 from New Zealand; 19 from Australia; 10 from Fiji; and 6 to 10 from Vanuatu. BIG/BRA concerns about Australian military personnel serving as monitors had been taken seriously in the planning of the TMG; as a result, all Australian monitors were civilians. The monitors were deployed in four teams. One was based at the provincial capital of Arawa; one at Buka Town (on the southern tip of Buka Island); one at Buin (in the far south of Bougainville); and one at Tonu (in the southwest). The work of these teams is described in other papers. The team at Buka covered almost half of the province; it was given

responsibility not just for Buka Island but also for a large part of the northern half of the mainland of Bougainville. Headquarters was set up in Arawa, with most support elements based nearby at Loloho (where port and other facilities for the mine had been situated). The structure of the TMG was similar to that later established for the PMG (see Table 1). One significant difference between the structures, however, is that the most senior position under the TMG Commander was Deputy Leader, filled by the senior Australian civilian with the TMG. The equivalent position in the PMG was Chief Negotiator. Two officers from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade held the position of Deputy Leader at different times. Both had extensive experience in Papua New Guinea and Bougainville, more so than the New Zealand commanders. As a result, not only did Commanders tend to draw on that experience, but there was a division of responsibility with the Commander leaving much of the political work to the senior civilian. The TMG was established, and sent its reports on alleged breaches of the Truce to the PCC. Comprised of representatives of the parties, the PCC sought to resolve those issues raised in the reports. In practice its main role was to provide a forum where representatives of the signatories met and exchanged views on a regular basis. The Truce Steering Committee was also established. While intended to advise and assist the Commander of the TMG, its main role was to provide a forum where representatives of the contributing countries could exchange views about the operations of the TMG. Overall, the TMG operated with a high degree of independence from both the parties and the contributing countries.

From truce to cease-fire, TMG to PMG The leaders’ meeting envisaged by Burnham II was held at Lincoln University from 19 to 23 January 1998 to discuss the replacement of the Truce with a cease-fire. While the Lincoln Agreement10 did agree to a permanent and irrevocable cease-fire, it was not to take effect until the end of 30 April 1998, so it was necessary to extend the term of both the Truce and the TMG. The TMG was ultimately deployed for five months from 28 November 1997 to 30 April 1998. 10 See Appendix F, this volume.

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The Lincoln Agreement left the details of implementation of the ceasefire to later negotiations. There had to be a successor to the TMG to monitor the cease-fire and carry out other aspects of a mandate somewhat wider than that of the TMG. It was also necessary to establish arrangements for the United Nations’ involvement in the peace process. Although senior advisers to the Papua New Guinea Government continued to advise against United Nations’ involvement, Prime Minister Skate and the Minister for Bougainville Affairs agreed that a representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations attend the Lincoln talks. Ultimately the Government accepted Bougainvillean proposals that endorsement of the cease-fire and associated arrangements should be sought from the Security Council, and that a United Nations Observer mission be established to monitor the arrangements for the PMG. The first reference to the ’Peace Monitoring Group’ is found in the Lincoln Agreement arrangements for the implementation of the cease-fire and the transition from truce to cease-fire, TMG to PMG, negotiated between February and April 1998. Two meetings were held by signatories to the Truce, and included representatives from Australia, New Zealand and Solomon Islands, and one representative from the United Nations. The first meeting, involving mainly officials, was held in Canberra from 9 to 13 March 1998. The second was a meeting of leaders and officials that negotiated the details of the cease-fire in Arawa, over the last few days of April 1998. Two documents provided for the transition: the PMG Protocol;11 and Annex 1 to the Lincoln Agreement Covering Implementation of the Ceasefire. The PMG Protocol amended the TMG Agreement12 between Papua New Guinea and the four contributing governments. While there were some criticisms — especially from the Papua New Guinea Government — the TMG was generally regarded as having performed reasonably well, so the primary aim of those negotiating the transition was to make minimal changes to the TMG arrangements. The PMG Protocol leaves most provisions of the TMG Agreement unaltered, and the Agreement on Implementation of the Ceasefire makes only limited provision in respect of the PMG. On the other hand, several 11 See Appendix E, this volume. 12 Paragraph 5 of the TMG Agreement simply says that the countries contributing to the TMG (the Participating States) are to establish the Group [the TMG] which shall comprise military and civilian members.

factors, including a change of government and budgetary constraints in New Zealand, the change from Truce to Ceasefire, and progress in the peace process, prompted changes. Issues considered included: • Would New Zealand or Australia now play the lead role in personnel and equipment? • Would New Zealand or Australia take command of the PMG? • What should be the PMG’s mandate? • Would the PMG fit into the same peace process management framework as the TMG? • What would be the term of the PMG? It was agreed to extend the term of the TMG, but New Zealand was finding the costs prohibitive and had also changed to a government less interested in Bougainville. Although Foreign Minister Don McKinnon retained his post, his relations with the new Prime Minister were cool. He was unable to persuade the New Zealand Cabinet to approve the necessary funding to both keep the TMG in place until 30 April and maintain the New Zealand role beyond that. In February 1998 it was necessary for Australian Prime Minister John Howard to communicate directly with New Zealand Prime Minister Jenny Shipley to secure a commitment to maintain the New Zealand role in the TMG to 30 April. With New Zealand abandoning the leading role, Australia was the only country able to take over. Tensions were exacerbated by petty competitiveness between personnel of the two countries. New Zealanders regarded their personnel as more culturally sensitive to Bougainvilleans than Australians; conversely, Australians regarded the New Zealand military as less professional and less properly equipped than its Australian counterpart. Australia was willing to take over; some Australian advisers were also keen to reassert what they saw as Australia’s primary responsibility for the Southwest Pacific. While budgetary pressures gave Australia the lead role in relation to personnel and equipment, there were serious debates in March and April over whether New Zealand might retain command of the PMG. The argument was that Australian leadership would be unacceptable to some Bougainvilleans (a view expressed by BIG leader, Joseph Kabui).13 Even 13 Protocol Concerning the Peace Monitoring Group Made Pursuant to the Agreement Between Papua New Guinea, Australia, Fiji, New Zealand and Vanuatu Concerning the Neutral Truce Monitoring Group for Bougainville, Done at Port Moresby on 5 December 1997.

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some Papua New Guineans preferred to see New Zealand lead the PMG. However, it was decided that Australia should command the PMG on the principle that command be invested in the country making the largest contribution. The work of the Australian monitors in the TMG and the efforts of AusAID also meant that there were less anxieties about Australian involvement, and therefore little need for concern about Australian leadership of the PMG. This judgement was correct, and the transition to Australian leadership occurred without difficulty. Although the PMG’s mandate was broader than the TMG’s, it was not as broad as was envisaged in the Lincoln Agreement. Paragraph 6 of the Agreement stated that the PMG should provide assistance in restoration and development, and should also assist with the development and training of a Bougainvillean constabulary. It was later agreed that the PMG could compromise its neutrality through these activities, so they were not included in the final agreements concerning the implementation of the cease-fire and the establishment of the PMG. Similar roles could be considered, but only by agreement of all concerned. The PMG’s mandate was to continue to monitor the cease-fire, promoting and instilling confidence in the peace process, and providing people with information on the cease-fire and peace process.14 However, it had two additional mandates to assist15 in the implementation of the Lincoln Agreement. The first related to the provision of transport for the parties; the second would permit the PMG to provide assistance, for example, in elections to establish a government in Bougainville. It was agreed that the Truce Steering Committee be replaced with the Peace Process Steering Committee (PPSC),16 which was to have the same role as its predecessor. Potentially more significant changes involved the replacement of the Peace Process Committee (PPC) and the proposed United Nations Observer Mission in Bougainville (UNOMB). 14 The countries contributing to the TMG and the PMG were not signatories to the Lincoln Agreement. 15 Curiously, the mandate for the PMG as set out in the Agreement on Implementation of the Ceasefire does not make provision in respect of the PMG providing people in Bougainville with information about the cease-fire and other aspects of the peace process, which is the third of the three roles for the TMG set out in the TMG mandate and also in the PMG mandate as provided for in the PMG Protocol. However, the PMG has continued to carry out this function. 16 These additional roles are also provided for in the Agreement on Implementation of the Ceasefire, paragraph 4.

Under the TMG Agreement the PPC was the committee of representatives to which the TMG reported alleged breaches of the Truce. Under the cease-fire implementation arrangements it was to be replaced by the Peace Process Consultative Committee (PPCC). From late 1998 the emphasis in the peace process moved from process to achieving outcomes on divisive issues, and the Lincoln Agreement signalled that change. The PPCC was to have a wider mandate than its predecessor, developing detailed plans not only for the disposal of weapons but also for phased withdrawal of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force and the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary Mobile Riot Squad (Ceasefire Implementation Agreement, paragraph 9). In addition to the original members, the proposed UNOMB and the contributing states were to be invited to sit at meetings of the PPCC,17 with the leader of the UNOMB as chair.18 At the Canberra meeting in March 1998, it had been proposed that the contributing states be full members of the PPCC, and that while the UNOMB leader should chair the PPCC for three months, thereafter the chair should rotate among the UNOMB and the member states of the Peace Monitoring Group in alphabetical order.19 Australia and New Zealand opposed this proposal on the grounds that it would not be appropriate for countries contributing to a neutral peace-monitoring operation to chair a body developing plans for sensitive issues such as weapons disposal and the withdrawal of Papua New Guinea forces. The Australian and New Zealand view prevailed. As for the proposed UNOMB the United Nations Security Council adopted a statement on 22 April 1998 supporting the peace process and requesting the Secretary General to consider arrangements for United Nations involvement. The arrangements had not been finalised by 1 May when the cease-fire came into operation, but the UNOMB was established later in 1998. It is a small operation of five people. The Ceasefire Implementation Agreement (paragraph 5)20 states that the operation is to work in conjunction with the Peace Monitoring Group while maintaining the right to make its own observations and assessments. Its mandate is to monitor and report on the implementation 17 18 19 20

PMG Protocol, Article 5. PMG Protocol, Article 3, and Agreement on Implementation of the Ceasefire, paragraph 7.2. Ibid. Paragraph 8. Paragraph 6.3 of the Implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement, a draft cease-fire implementation agreement prepared at the Canberra officials meeting, March 1998.

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of the cease-fire. The UNOMB leader also chairs the PPCC. Inevitably, then, there is a need for interaction between the PMG and the UNOMB. Under the PMG Protocol, the term of the PMG is reviewed by the contributing countries every three months. This provision was inserted to permit flexibility and to signal to the parties that they should not become dependent on the PMG.

Establishment of the PMG When the PMG began operating, the most important goal was a seamless transition. As far as ordinary people were concerned there should be as little visible change as possible. The principal focus was on the monitoring teams (about one-third of the personnel of both the TMG and the PMG). Those teams had been the public face of the TMG, and it was envisaged that the same would be true of the PMG. While the composition and leadership of the organisation and its mandate and management framework changed, they had little impact on the work of the monitoring teams, and in general the seamless transition was achieved.

Numbers, structures, deployment within Bougainville, and costs of the PMG From May 1998 until mid-2000, the PMG’s average strength was a little over 300. About 260 came from Australia, with about 242 from the Defence Force and 18 civilians. About 29 came from the New Zealand Defence Force, 10 to 12 from the Fiji Military, and 12 to 15 were Vanuatu government personnel. There was adverse comment from New Zealand about the increased numbers in the PMG. In the Australian Defence Force, the numbers were seen as necessary for the safety of the operation. However, to some degree it was a matter of standard calculations as to the kind of support that should be supplied once numbers of personnel reached a certain level. 107 of the personnel were allocated to Peace Monitoring or Liaison Teams: 54 from the Australian Defence Force and 15 Australian civilians; about 18 from New Zealand, about 9 from Fiji and about 11 from Vanuatu. The balance of the personnel were allocated to either headquarters functions (which essentially handle management of the PMG operations) or to the Logistical Support Team (which provides land

and helicopter transport, medical, dental, engineering, catering and supply support). There were about 81 headquarters positions and 124 in the Logistical Support Team. Equipment for logistical support (including land vehicles, helicopters, communications etc.) is provided by Australia. In addition to the Logistical Support Team, there is normally a Royal Australian Navy vessel assigned to assist the PMG. Such a vessel is not, however, under control of the PMG Commander, and the navy personnel are not included in the totals of PMG personnel. In mid-2000, the PMG was reduced by about one-third. This occurred in the context of assessment by the contributing countries that the peace process was well established and supported; and that it was taking far longer than expected to resolve the divisive issues, and a risk of dependence on the PMG was developing. There was also concern in Australia at the financial costs and the strains on personnel given the heavy commitment to peace-keeping in Timor. There was also some chance of contributing to the peace process in Solomon Islands. Following the reduction, total PMG personnel numbered 195. Numbers in the Monitoring and Liaison Teams reduced to 45, and in the headquarters and Logistical Support Team shrank to 59 and 91 respectively. Table 2 (see Appendix H) compares the numbers of personnel carrying out each function (Monitoring, headquarters and Logistical Support) before (early 2000) and after (early 2001) the reduction in the size of the PMG. Table 2 also shows approximate numbers of personnel from each country carrying out each function both before and after the reduction in numbers. The structure of the PMG has varied a little, especially in relations between the commander (an Australian Brigadier) and the senior civilian, now known as the Chief Negotiator. A PMG Organisation Chart showing structures early in 2000 appears at Table 1 (see Appendix G). The unbroken lines represent lines of clear control, as in the case of the Chief of Staff or the headquarters personnel, under clear control of the Commander. Dotted lines between the Commander and the Chief Negotiator indicate relations of incomplete control by the Commander. The organisation of the headquarters functions into X-cells (in the PMG case, from X1 to X6 and also X9); this is a standard organisational structure used by the Australian Defence Force when mounting

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operations. While the organisational arrangements for the TMG were not exactly the same, they were similar. The PMG has deployed to the same four sites as the TMG, but with the addition of one other site, at Wakunai in the northern half of the main island. During 1998 a ‘forward operating base’ for the Tonu Monitoring Team was established at Sirakatau (in Nagovis), mainly to facilitate the involvement of BRA and BTG leaders in the peace process. A military officer commands each of the monitoring and liaison teams. Two are headed by New Zealanders (Buin and Tonu), one by a Fijian (Buka), one by a ni-Vanuatu (Arawa) and one by an Australian (Wakunai). The placement of a team at Wakunai greatly reduced the area covered by the Buka team. Given the relatively normal situation in Buka and far north Bougainville, by 2000 the need for patrolling by the Buka team had diminished and it ceased being a Monitoring Team, and was instead designated a Liaison Team, reflecting the need for close liaison with the political and administrative bodies based in Buka. Table 2 shows numbers from each contributing country for each of the monitoring and liaison team sites in early 2000 and compares those figures with the situation in early 2001, after the reduction in numbers. Both Table 1 and Table 2 show the dominance of Australians in the PMG, and the relatively small numbers of Fijians and ni-Vanuatu. Finally, an estimate made in 1999 indicated that the Australian Defence Force costs specific to the PMG (that is, exclusive of salary costs) for the eight months from May to December 1998 were about $17.5 million.21 That figure suggests an approximate annual cost of $25.5 million.

Conclusions Among the outstanding features of these negotiations and arrangements are their complexity; the central importance of consultation; the fact that the truce, cease-fire and TMG and PMG were all initiated by parties to the peace process. The complexity of the processes has largely been a consequence of the complexity of the conflict itself. Numerous interest groups have to be kept informed and involved. This meant that constant consultation was essential in establishing the TMG and PMG. Without such consultation 21 See also Article 4.2 of the PMG Protocol.

there would have been almost certainly problems like those that hindered the 1994 peace conference and the SPPKF. The fact that neutral outsiders were asked to provide the force meant that once the proposal was accepted, the development of the proposal was largely taken over by those outsiders. Of course, it was essential that what was provided met the needs of the situation, but the balance in decision-making shifted away from the parties to some degree, and was as much a product of consultation and sometimes competition — between New Zealand and Australia — as it was between New Zealand and the parties to the peace process. Tensions concerning the limited control of the parties have persisted beyond the TMG and continue to be a factor in relation to the operations of the PMG. The flexibility of the parties to the peace process has been evident at many points. This flexibility has been part of a broader commitment of the parties and has enabled the process to become so firmly established that the foundations can sustain considerable strains in addressing the political issues that have divided the parties to the conflict.

References Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1999. Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Inquiry into the Bougainville peace process, 1999. Submission no. 26. Submissions, The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Inquiry into The Bougainville Peace Process, Canberra, vol. 2, pp. 485–505. Kemelfield, Graeme, 1990. ‘A short history of the Bougainville ceasefire initiative’, in R.J. May and Matthew Spriggs (eds), The Bougainville Crisis. Bathurst: Crawford House Press. Regan, Anthony J., 1997. ‘Preparation for war and progress towards peace — Bougainville dimensions of the Sandline Affair’, in S. Dinnen, R. May and A.J. Regan (eds), Challenging the State: The Sandline Affair in Papua New Guinea. Canberra: RSPAS, Australian National University, pp. 49–72.

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Coordinating Monitoring and Defence Support

Bob Breen

FOR ME, Operation Bel Isi has been about: • the internal blending of cultures within the TMG/PMG • external cultural and political engagement with Bougainvilleans and PNG government personnel and their security forces, and • the adaptation by military effort from a focus on military mechanics to a focus on political outcomes. Militarily, Operation Bel Isi got off to a shaky and rushed start in late 1997. Some senior Australian Defence Force (ADF) officers were very cautious about being drawn into a New Zealand-led unarmed peace support operation in Bougainville. In the months leading up to Operation Bel Isi they ignored warnings that a peace support operation was in the offing and, secondly, refused to engage the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) in contingency planning. Australian diplomats, however, had realised as early as June 1997 that they could not move a peace process forward in Bougainville unilaterally and that it was essential to have the support of New Zealand and other regional allies like Fiji and Vanuatu. They urged the ADF to recognise the importance of military support in the formation of a TMG, arguing that the TMG was an opportunity for the ADF to get forces offshore and contribute to an important diplomatic initiative.

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They recognised that New Zealand initiatives to hold talks between the protagonists in the Bougainville crisis would serve Australian national interests; they were also the best chance for the Papua New Guinea Government to solve a national problem after the Sandline Affair in March 1997 had opened the door again for a negotiated settlement. Military planning for the TMG did not begin in earnest until midNovember. This resulted in a rushed deployment and saw some considerable friction between Australian and New Zealand military personnel in Bougainville during the initial weeks of the operation. There were also problems in the integration of Australian Public Service peace monitors. Because the ADF had not engaged the NZDF until two weeks before deployment, civilian monitors were selected quickly, preparation and administration were rushed and inadequate. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), the Department of Defence, AusAID and the Australian Federal Police all contributed monitors. Internally, they were from different institutional cultures. Externally all had some difficulty adjusting to the military culture they found themselves in. The military found it difficult to adjust to the monitors. No one had a clear understanding of his or her role. They were the Australian eyes and ears at the cutting edge of monitoring operations, but how much authority did they have? Some monitors felt that the military was incapable of political and cultural engagement. There were difficulties in the integration of Fijian and ni-Vanuatu military personnel as well. Fijians came with a wealth of experience in peace-keeping in the Middle East but found the adjustment to being unarmed and working in monitoring teams, and in two cases commanding monitoring teams, a significant challenge. The Fijians and niVanuatu found some Australian and New Zealand military personnel vulgar, hedonistic and lacking in cultural sensitivity; some ni-Vanuatu personnel were overwhelmed by the scale of the operation and by long patrols carrying heavy loads over rugged terrain. New Zealand and most ADF personnel tended to treat them as interpreters and appeared condescending of their lack of military experience and skills. The adjustment to being deployed into harm’s way without weapons was a challenge for most military personnel. This resulted in the deployment of New Zealand Special Force personnel into

monitoring teams and intelligence assets into Bougainville to monitor the security situation. Consequently, military personnel were often wary and defensive. This focus led to cautious political and cultural engagement with Bougainvilleans. It took some time for the military to appreciate that Bougainvilleans were the best source of force protection. Over time military personnel became more confident. The emphasis in the TMG (and subsequently, the ADF-led PMG) was on military mechanics — partly as a result of concentrating on force protection and partly because the exact nature of monitoring operations was not well practised or understood. Little effort was devoted to political and cultural engagement with the factions and groups on Bougainville. New Zealand and ADF officers and senior NCOs concentrated on patrolling to as many villages as possible to hand out printed material. They convened peace awareness meetings, delivered their message and left. There was also an emphasis on information gathering to identify any threat to TMG/PMG personnel and property. Security consciousness was high and military formalities, routine and procedures, though more relaxed, were still enforced. The result was that while the first New Zealand Commander, his Australian Deputy Commander and his New Zealand Chief Negotiator focused on the political and cultural aspects of the operation, the remainder of the TMG operated as its personnel had been trained on field exercises. This continued for several weeks after the ADF took over in May 1998. So how did this all change? Leadership at the higher levels was a significant factor in turning around the situation. Leadership began with the first New Zealand Commander, Brigadier Roger Mortlock. His professorial, passionate and optimistic style and his desire to engage politically and culturally with all members of the TMG and all the parties to the Burnham II Agreement set an example to each commanding officer. He was committed to keeping members of the TMG safe; he was also committed to the political aspects of the TMG mission. He repeatedly emphasised that the TMG was in Bougainville to give all the factions including PNG security forces the confidence to restart and pursue a peace process. I have come to know each of the New Zealand and Australian commanders very well. Each commander has felt the loneliness of

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command and been challenged by Operation Bel Isi. Every one of them has been able to adapt to the political and cultural dimensions of reporting, monitoring and facilitating the peace process. Every one of them has set an example for others to follow. It should be emphasised that Australian Chief Negotiators have also displayed leadership in the TMG. This is not to deny that some have not been occasionally frustrated by the emphasis on military mechanics. All have provided wise counsel for their commanders on the politics of the peace process, advising on ways that the TMG and PNG could ‘value add’. Indeed the operation has been very fortunate so far: senior officers from Foreign Affairs and New Zealand and Australian defence forces have been able to get on so well so quickly, despite the fact that in all cases they have met for the first time on operations in Bougainville. The second factor contributing to the turnaround was the internal blending of cultures: all personnel shared the adversities and challenges of operating unarmed in remote locations. This shared adversity included pitching in on domestic duties and participating in rosters monitoring radios. Monitoring teams were well led by senior and experienced New Zealand, ni-Vanuatu and Fijian commanding officers who got on with political and cultural engagement and bonded their teams together. It’s been interesting to see how over the last 18 months the shared adversities of those early months and the way those initial New Zealand and Fijian commanding officers led their teams have endured to this day. From the beginning the military culture of communal living, teamwork and everyone pulling their weight applied. All members shared hard physical labour on patrol. All shared the domestic duties of making sure that food was cooked, supplies were brought in, Jerry cans were filled with water and radios were monitored 24 hours a day. Improvements were made to raise the living standards of the whole team by the contribution of individuals. The absence of television and other forms of entertainment meant that teams had to entertain themselves. A guitar and the songs and stories of members of the team were the ingredients for cultural blending and the build-up of mutual respect. The isolated living environment and the military culture of communal living and teamwork, combined with good will and positive

contact with Bougainvilleans, contributed to an internal blending of cultures and facilitated a growing respect for the contributions of all nationalities to the TMG/PMG. The change of focus from military mechanics to political and cultural engagement began with leadership. At times there was an over-emphasis on number of villages visited, information gathered about those villages and reporting on the quantities of printed material delivered. Over time patrols spent longer in villages and patrol commanders were allocated the same villages to visit to facilitate a deepening of relationships. The job was to win trust and create confidence. Patrols took the time to listen to stories, appreciating the world of villagers and creating empathy and trust. There were also opportunities during these visits to establish friendships. Though members of the TMG/PMG were there only for a few months, friendships did form and all of these contributed in their own small way to the Bougainvilleans at the grassroots level having confidence in the peace process. It would be the subject of a separate paper to talk about how active listening and extending the hand of friendship changed the focus from military mechanics to cultural and political engagement. I will briefly cover some aspects of how the TMG/PMG extended the hand of friendship through policy decisions. From the beginning the TMG/PMG was supported by a first-class medical facility. This facility took care of Australians, New Zealanders, Fijians and ni-Vanuatu. However, it treated and continues to treat critically ill Bougainvilleans. The TMG/PMG has saved many lives, particularly those of mothers and newborn babies. The word soon got around that the TMG/PMG didn’t have to do this, but was evacuating and treating critically ill people for humanitarian reasons. Sport was another way to extend the hand of friendship. The TMG/PMG set up sporting competitions. You now have a situation where some former combatants line up to play volleyball and soccer on the same teams. Members of the TMG/PMG also participate. There’s been a strong emphasis on sport facilitating the peace process. Food has been another way of extending the hand of friendship. There’s nothing like scheduling meetings around lunch or dinner time to get people along, when there is plenty of food for all. The sharing

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of food is culturally important. The TMG/PMG reciprocates the generosity and hospitality found in villages all over Bougainville. Music has greatly assisted the effectiveness of the TMG/PMG. Monitors from New Zealand, Fiji and Vanuatu brought their own music and singing. Australians do not have much musical culture to offer but soon joined in and contributed their own interpretations of popular Western music. Australian and New Zealand military bands have toured Bougainville on several occasions. Music, dancing and singing have contributed enormously to breaking the ice. It’s important to point out that the PNG security forces have been included in cultural engagement. Sport, the sharing of food and attendance at musical events have eased the tensions evident at the beginning of the operation. Changes to pre-deployment training have also diminished the focus on military mechanics. Since the first group of civilian monitors completed their tour at the end of January 1998, all monitors have participated in week-long training in Bamaga, located at the tip of Cape York. Monitors are trained by members of the 51st Far North Queensland Regiment who impart military field skills while also giving monitors an opportunity to interact with indigenous Australians over a meal, at church and in their communities. In addition, monitors are acclimatised in a hot humid climate and are given time to adjust to being members of small teams, living in the field and in austere accommodation. Those coming from different government departments quickly bond into small cohesive teams. Key ADF military appointments also undergo special political and military training before deployment. They are bonded into a team and have the opportunity to visit and interact with an indigenous Australian community in the Torres Strait. Language is the window to culture. Civilian monitors and key military appointments receive intensive language training in Tok Pisin (Melanesian Pidgin), the lingua franca of Bougainville and PNG. All military personnel deploying to Bougainville are familiarised with the language. This language training is integrated with political and cultural briefings that assist those about to serve in Bougainville to understand and adapt to the differences between conventional military operations and peace support operations.

During pre-deployment training, civilian monitors and military personnel are informed of the unique contributions that personnel from other nationalities and backgrounds make to the PMG mission. ADF personnel are familiarised with the culture of their allies and are directed to respect their religion and culture. They are also directed to modify and compromise any inappropriate or offensive behaviour. These training programs set an important precedent for other peace support operations in developing countries. In summary, Operation Bel Isi has been a learning experience for the military and has improved the capability of the NZDF, the ADF, the Republic of Fiji Armed Force and the Vanuatu Mobile Force to conduct regional peace support operations together. Secondly, agencies and departments within the Australian Government have had to coordinate an important regional peace support operation. Many lessons should be learnt if these same departments and agencies are required to combine again in the future. Operation Bel Isi has been good for the Australian Public Service. Members from several departments and agencies have trained together under demanding circumstances and have served alongside each other in Bougainville. They have learned how to work within a military environment and to interact with people from another culture. I’ve seen many young men and women go to Bougainville somewhat selfcentred, lacking confidence and maturity. After three months, they come back confident, communicating well, physically fitter and with a more mature understanding of themselves, their capabilities and how to be a part of a team. This maturation builds character and probably makes them more capable of working cooperatively with others. Lastly, Operation Bel Isi has been good for Bougainville and the PNG Government. A four-nation military organisation has provided medical care, confidence, presence and friendship. They have shown Bougainvilleans and PNG Government security forces that the military can be peace makers and not always war makers. As Brigadier Mortlock, first NZ Commander of the TMG, used to say, ‘Supporting the peace process in Bougainville is a good thing, worth doing well.’

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Tung, Buka Island. Padi with the children (Photo: Andrew Rice)

Role of the Military Commander Bruce Osborn

I APPRECIATE the opportunity to review a period that was professionally one of the most rewarding and enjoyable of my 33 years in the Army. The vast majority of people who served with the Truce Monitoring Group and Peace Monitoring Group share this sentiment. It is useful to consider why people experienced such satisfaction serving in Bougainville. It is also worthwhile considering why the TMG and PMG have been so successful — given the failure of similar operations in other parts of the world over the last 43 years. I was on holidays at Christmas in 1997 when I was advised by the Chief of Army that I had been selected to command the TMG beginning in January. I rushed back to Canberra and tried to ‘get up to speed’ as quickly as possible. Preparations became complicated as Australia and New Zealand debated whether New Zealand should retain command. Australia decided that the integrity of the peace process was more important than the leadership and an agreement was reached which resulted in New Zealand continuing in command. I was advised in March 1998 that I would assume command of the Peace Monitoring Group on 1 May. I was grateful for the few extra months of preparation. I realise now the importance of that period: I became familiar with the situation and was involved in planning the

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transition from the TMG to the PMG. Like all military commanders, I did a military appreciation of all the factors relevant to achieving the objectives of the peace process. I sought clarity in my own mind about the courses open to me — how to achieve these and what was required to facilitate the best course. The saying ‘that time well spent in preparation is never wasted’ is as relevant as ever. There was a tendency in Canberra to underestimate the complexity of the Bougainville situation and therefore to understate the complexity of the peace process. Some people thought this would be like Club Med: we would go and talk with the Bougainvilleans and the PNG Government and come to a resolution. In reality the conflict was drawn out and complex. Finding a workable solution would be challenging. I was in Arawa for the cease-fire ceremony on 30 April 1998. It was my second visit to Bougainville; my first was a half-day tour with Commander of the Defence Force, General Baker, a month earlier. I reflected on how we might go forward; I also reviewed the cease-fire agreement that was signed that day. The signatories and the TMG had only agreed on its contents at 3.50 a.m. that morning on HMAS Tobruk — having worked on it for two or three days. The document was vague in many areas. Although it provided flexibility it also allowed parties great room to manoeuvre. This would cause significant problems when pressure came to adhere to the spirit of the agreement. My fears were soon justified as each party sought to interpret or ignore the agreement to suit their purposes. I also thought that the timetable was over-ambitious: only seven months were allocated to establish an elected provincial government. This simply did not allow sufficient time for the people, their representatives and the PNG Government to agree on the steps required to hold an election. But I learned that Melanesian clocks differ from other timepieces and that perhaps I was the only one concerned about the tight timeframe. I quickly adapted to the Melanesian approach despite occasional protests from Canberra. I decided early on that a first step in the peace process was the adoption of a common objective by all Bougainvilleans; for their leaders to speak with one voice. Little would be achieved until then. It was a major concern that Francis Ona remained outside the peace process and that his supporters could, if they chose, stop the process. It was

equally clear that he was still regarded as a leader and highly respected by many. I decided that he needed to be brought into the process as soon as possible and that, if this was not possible, his position be respected so as to ensure that he did not interfere. I adopted this approach throughout my tour although Francis Ona wrote to me the day after I assumed command, telling me that all Australians and New Zealanders should leave because he could not ensure their safety. I also concluded early on that the solution to the Bougainville problem had to be Bougainvillean. The peace process and a reconciliation government had to be built on a solid foundation; it was obvious that the people of Bougainville should drive the process, not their political leaders. It was therefore always my intention to try to force the political leaders to follow what their people wanted rather than vice versa. I encouraged the growth of ‘people power’ and reminded Bougainvillean leaders on many occasions that their political futures were inextricably linked to their ability to represent their people’s views. This strategy proved a challenge but I think it worked. Progressively ordinary Bougainvilleans became involved in the peace process and, by the time I left, they had become its strength and the hope for the future. As I talked to people at the cease-fire ceremony and listened to speeches by Papua New Guinean and Bougainvillean leaders, I realised that they had different objectives. Those objectives were not necessarily complementary and they could pull Bougainvilleans in different directions. It was essential from the outset that the parties to the cease-fire agreement have a common goal. The message was simple. The establishment of the BRG, a provincial government, a single voice for all Bougainvilleans, was clearly the first step, whether one sought independence, autonomy or remained a province of PNG. That strategy was a cornerstone of the process during my six months in Bougainville. Although there was significant early pressure from Canberra to speed up the process, I learned that it had to progress at the pace of the slowest participant. If we were not careful we risked overheating the process and losing what had been achieved. On a couple of occasions I nearly learned that lesson the hard way. The fact was that the factions were not well-organised political parties — they did not

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have administrative support staff. Rather they were often one-man bands with limited capacity to achieve things in a hurry. I remember my first visit to Joseph Kabui’s village: the BIG head office consisted of Joseph, a fax machine and an unreliable satellite telephone. Flexibility was a principle the PMG had to apply at all levels. Again the Melanesian way of doing things gradually modified our thinking. While we carefully planned PMG activities and developed long-term objectives, we also learned that flexibility was a key factor and adopted this approach at all levels. This was one of the most satisfying aspects of our tours: how boring it would have been if we had never been surprised. I realised early that the pace of the peace and reconciliation process was uneven. In the southwest reconciliation had progressed to the point where the factions were co-existing with few problems and were focusing on the peace dividend. In the north of Bougainville and Buka the process was slower, but had advanced to the stage that a district cease-fire committee had been established and there were strong signs of momentum. In the central region, the heartland of the BIG/BRA, little reconciliation had occurred and problems were no more evident than in Arawa, the location of the PMG headquarters. Getting the various areas and factions to a point where they could all equally contribute to the peace process was one of the great challenges, and we focused more resources on certain groups and areas. Before arriving in Bougainville, I thought that the BRA was a united organisation. I soon learned that it was one of the most factionalised organisations on the island. People in the north had not seen Sam Kauona and Joseph Kabui for several years, and they had rarely been sighted in the southwest. A number of BRA leaders outside the central region doubted whether Kabui and Kauona represented them and shared their longer-term objectives. It was essential that the BIG/BRA not factionalise further, or the peace process would have been jeopardised. I decided to facilitate a number of BIG/BRA activities in the hope of promoting reconciliation between the factions and reaching consensus on where to go and how to get there. We were therefore accused by the PNG Government of favouring the BIG/BRA. There was virtually no effective communications throughout Bougainville and communications between Bougainville and Port Moresby

were unreliable. As a result, people and their leaders had no clear picture of what was happening and rumour ran rife. I also found that PNG government leaders were overly dependent on information flowing from PNGDF and RPNGC reports, so that information was invariably late and sometimes incomplete. It followed that another task for the PMG was to keep all parties informed of developments across the island and in Port Moresby. Our ability to provide accurate and timely information became one of our most important and responsible tasks. It was also one of the most challenging, given the importance of neutrality. I developed a simple analogy for describing the peace process based on the building of a house. The foundations of the house were the Bougainvillean people. The walls were the various parties to the peace process. You had to shape, strengthen and unify those walls in order to support the roof, which was the reconciliation government, the one voice of Bougainville. Using that analogy was perhaps one of my smarter decisions because most people could identify with what I was saying.

The PMG The TMG had been very successful. New Zealand had done wonderfully well in facilitating the peace process to the point where the PMG was established. It was important for many reasons to build on that foundation. I impressed on all ranks of the PMG that the transition between the two organisations and to Australian leadership must be seamless and that there be no obvious change in what Bougainvilleans saw or dealt with. I was very conscious of the emotive baggage carried by many Bougainvilleans in relation to Australia and the perception that Australia had assisted the PNGDF during the conflict. I think that the establishment of the PMG was seamless and that the PMG and its Australian members quickly won the confidence of the people. The TMG had been responsible for monitoring a truce, but the PMG was also responsible for facilitating a peace process. Objectives had been established: there was now pressure on all parties to deliver. That pressure placed stress on the leaders; it also placed the PMG in a central position in the peace process. There had been debate in Australia on what was meant by the PMG facilitating the process and to what extent we should be involved. I always knew that the PMG and its commander could not sit

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back and hope that things would happen but must be involved enough to ensure that momentum was maintained. Bougainvilleans expected the PMG to provide guidance, direction and support and I was initially happy to do all those things as long as we were balanced in our approach. As the peace process progressed I found that Bougainvilleans assumed greater responsibility and that the PMG moved into the background. The PMG was a key player in providing the political space for the process. It was the one constant that gave confidence to the various parties to move forward. The multinational nature of the PMG and its cultural diversity were its strengths. I was fortunate to have individuals who were committed, resourceful and exceptionally strong and talented. Australia would not have been as effective by itself. I think the PMG would still be at the starting line if not for the contribution of civilians, other Melanesians, Polynesians and New Zealanders. I was always aware that I commanded a multinational force and was equally responsible to the governments of the four nations contributing personnel, as well as to the Bougainvillean people and the PNG Government. I needed to treat all the people in the PMG as equals. The PMG comprised over 300 people — some serving, some out of uniform, some men, some women. I never found that overly demanding because I had strong deputies and national component commanders who were equally committed to the peace process. I was also lucky to have political advisers in Greg Moriarty and Rhys Puddicombe who provided invaluable support. The safety of the people of the PMG remained a fundamental issue during my period of command. In the first couple of weeks there were armed robberies in Arawa and similar but fewer incidents in other areas. While the object of the robberies was materiel the potential for PMG personnel to be involved remained high as many of the robbers were drunk. I was confident that the Bougainvillean leaders knew that contributing governments would withdraw their personnel if the security situation deteriorated. That confidence was rarely misplaced and this responsibility was one of the issues that galvanised Bougainvilleans to take control of the peace process and their own destiny. The PMG’s facilitating responsibilities included the provision of ideas, information, communications and transport. Communications

and transport were our greatest challenge given the state of the infrastructure and the need for people to interact. In the early days the PMG focused in particular at the grassroots levels as we sought to ensure that all Bougainvilleans were made aware of the peace process and what it sought to achieve. As the process progressed, this facilitation shifted to assisting Bougainvillean leaders to attend meetings and convey information from these meetings to the people. Other aspects of facilitating may not appear obvious yet were critical. The rescinding of the call-out was one issue that nearly halted the process. It was a constant sticking point given that the PNG Government was at first reluctant to meet this obligation arising from the Arawa cease-fire agreement. Indeed the PNGDF was actively working against its implementation. For the BIG/BRA leaders the issue was a litmus test of the PNG Government’s commitment. The decision to rescind the call-out in Arawa resulted from a meeting in Port Moresby between the PMG Commander and Prime Minister Skate.

Lessons learned I do not think that many people in Canberra realised the importance of the PMG; some simply underestimated its significance and centrality to the process. It appeared that once the PMG was established and once the concerns about safety ebbed, DFAT, Defence and other departments focused on the next problem. Suddenly I found myself isolated in an information and political sense and felt that too much responsibility was placed on me to drive the peace process. The situation reminded me of an occasion in 1992 when Lieutenant General John Sanderson, the Military Commander of UNTAC in Cambodia, said, ‘I feel like I’ve been deserted.’ He meant that the UN Secretariat and Security Council were focusing on the next problem. In Bougainville some years later I felt the same. There must be a whole-of-government approach to political backstopping a mission, not just in the preparatory stages. All government departments need to be part of a common plan where they share goals and expectations. Government departments did not always expect the same outcomes for Bougainville. Further, Australia and New Zealand did not share the same views on the future of Bougainville.

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The first selection process for personnel was not satisfactory in that people who volunteered for the mission were by and large accepted. Many received inadequate warning with some getting as little as three days to prepare for an operation in which people were the essential element. As Colonel Breen notes, the different countries involved in the operation had different standards in selecting and sending personnel. We had people with welfare problems who had to be sent back within a couple of weeks. There were also different lengths of tour for the various nationalities which made it difficult to manage and was divisive from time to time. I had a strong but small information-processing organisation, which did a marvellous job in gathering information on developments across the island and allowed me to monitor the peace process and breaches to the cease-fire while keeping parties to the process informed of developments. However, I was not as well served by external agencies. The insights of others would have been most useful in providing updates on developments outside Bougainville, as they saw the situation from a wider perspective.

Conclusion The TMG and the PMG have been outstanding successes by any criteria, and it is essential that we record lessons learned so that our successors do not have to relearn them. But every peace-keeping mission is different and it will be necessary to adapt to each one. Finally, it is the Bougainvillean people who deserve most praise for being brave enough to embrace peace and provide the foundation for its growth.

Namotoa, after another successful visit (Photo: Andrew Rice)

Role of the Chief Negotiator Rhys Puddicombe

Introduction I worked with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade as First Secretary and Policy Officer in the Australian High Commission in Port Moresby from November 1995 to November 1998. My job was to follow the Bougainville conflict and report to Canberra. I was seconded to the TMG from February to April 1998 as Deputy Leader and Chief Negotiator. At that time it was led by New Zealand under a new and shaky truce. I was seconded again as Senior Negotiator to the PMG under Brigadier Bruce Osborn from August to October 1998. The situation was then much more stable and the two experiences were quite different. I would like to compare my roles and activities in those groups, in terms of the guidance I received from Canberra beforehand, in terms of what I was supposed to do and what I did. I will also comment on the role of the Chief Negotiator and the operation of the TMG and PMG. I had been in Port Moresby for over two years when I was seconded to the TMG. I was well placed to do the job. I had followed the 1995 Cairns peace talks; the Security Forces’ attack on the BIG/BRA delegates returning from those talks; the retaliatory BRA attacks led by Ishmael

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Toroama; the PNG Government’s lifting of the cease-fire; the PNGDF’s Operation High Speed Two; the massacre at Kangu; the assassination of Premier Miriung; the development of a peace plan by the PNG Government which was going on while arrangements were being made to hire mercenaries; then the new Truce, and the New Zealand-instigated peace talks. Watching each development had given me a good understanding of the forces at work and of the recent history of the conflict. I established good contacts in the PNG Government, the PNGDF, the Police, the BTG, the resistance, and later in the BIG and BRA. We were not originally allowed contact with the BIG/BRA, but Australia changed that policy in the early stages of the New Zealand-initiated peace talks and we had fruitful contact with them.

Truce Monitoring Group As Colonel Breen notes in his paper, the TMG had a shaky start. Although it had been running for three months under the new truce before I joined, we still did not know exactly what was required and what role we should fulfil. I had no real instructions, but I did have the opportunity of talking to James Batley, who had been Chief Negotiator for the first three months and he gave me a clearer idea of our intended role. The Australia–New Zealand Understanding on the Conduct of the Bougainville Truce Monitoring Group provided some guidance. It stated that the TMG was ‘to monitor and report on allegations of infringements of the Burnham Truce and, in doing that, to support the peace process through presence, good offices and interaction with the local community’. Those guidelines were provided, but we pretty much had to make it up as we went along. We had to be flexible and develop our role, based on experience. My activities with the TMG were well described by Brigadier Osborn when he said the monitoring groups provided the ‘lubricant’ for the peace process: doing whatever was necessary to avoid problems and smooth the process. With the TMG I followed up reports of breaches and fulfilled an important liaison role between the BIG/BRA and the Security Forces and Resistance. These groups were not speaking, although they had formally agreed that they would. A focus of my efforts was to get the groups, in particular, the PNGDF

and BIG/BRA, to make contact and to begin talking through their differences. The general idea was to reduce tension and minimise the chance of the Truce failing. At that time, I think all groups expected the Truce to collapse, like previous cease-fires. Francis Ona was convinced that the peace process would fail without him. The BIG/BRA, PNGDF and Resistance also expected it to fall over — the only question was what would trigger its collapse. I saw myself as having major responsibility in preventing that from happening and for the TMG to do what it could to stop stupid acts that could destroy the Truce. Policing was a big issue because of serious law and order problems, and we addressed that as best we could in consultation with all the parties. Another important role was to provide accurate information to the PNG Government and to the PNGDF Commander. There was no formal arrangement to do so but it was essential to counter the misinformation provided by the PNGDF to Port Moresby. The Government was out of touch with what was happening and often had to make decisions based on incorrect information. In a more general sense, the TMG was there to build confidence and trust between the parties. I also felt a particular responsibility to reduce suspicions of Australia’s interests, because there was a lot of suspicion about why Australia was involved in the TMG. Many Bougainvilleans assumed we were there to get Panguna mine running, so I had to work hard at public meetings and in private discussions to counter that misconception. Last, something that took up a lot of time in the TMG was assistance in the transition from New Zealand to Australian leadership. I was in the last rotation of the TMG and we had to work very closely — myself and the Commander, who was a New Zealander, and the Australian Chief of Staff — to facilitate the seamless transition. Some examples will describe the sorts of things we did. Dealing with reported breaches was one of my core activities. There was no trust between the PNGDF and the BIG/BRA, and no contact, so there was no way of defusing tensions. As a result I spent a lot of time travelling to meet with BIG/BRA leaders and commanders wherever they were, hearing their allegations against the PNGDF and taking those allegations back to the PNGDF Commander on Bougainville.

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There I would hear his explanation, hear his allegations against the BIG/BRA, then go back to the BIG/BRA and start the cycle again. For the first time, there was someone to hear each side of the story and provide explanations, so that the warring parties could begin to understand what was going on and tensions could relax. The first few occasions were fairly interesting. Once I relayed PNGDF allegations that BRA Chief of Staff Ishmael Toroama was smuggling weapons from Solomon Islands. Ishmael was furious and, poking me in the chest, claimed that his trips were to repatriate people who had gone to Solomon Islands for medical treatment. Thankfully, he cooled down and we resolved that problem. After going through the allegation–explanation cycle a few times, everyone got into the habit of venting their frustrations and telling me what had happened, knowing that the information would be relayed, that they would get a hearing at the other end and some feedback and explanations. That process was most interesting, and acted as a critical pressure release valve. Late one night the PNGDF told me that some soldiers in Oria had been attacked by the BRA. This had been relayed to Port Moresby and the PNGDF had been ordered onto ‘full alert’, which meant tensions were instantly raised, the soldiers had returned to their sand-bagged hides and the guns reappeared. Early the next morning I went to a large meeting of BIG/BRA leaders and commanders and asked what had happened. It turned out that the local BRA leader was a former PNGDF member. He explained that in his area they believe that poison men come disguised as owls and bring harm if allowed to stay. Their way of getting rid of them is to make noise, on this occasion by firing an M16. Although they had done this 10 kilometres away, the PNGDF post, uncomprehending, frightened or wanting to look heroic, had reported that they were under attack. At such times in the past, stupid actions often set off a new cycle of violence. I relayed the BRA’s explanation to the PNGDF Commander in Bougainville who agreed to stay put and do nothing. I then went to Port Moresby and reported the misunderstanding to the National Security Advisory Committee, and to the PNGDF Commander, who eventually agreed to take the PNGDF off ‘full alert’. So that was another case of TMG ‘lubricant’. Another important and successful innovation was to institute weekly meetings between the parties. Initially it was difficult to get

them to meet in one room on Bougainville. Once we got them assembled for the first meeting, however, a meeting scheduled for one hour went for six. Once the ice was broken, strong talk and serious allegations emerged, but they kept at it, and at the end of the meeting all were really upbeat and keen to make it a weekly event. They were relieved to get things off their chest and make allegations in the security of the TMG headquarters, with observers present. It was an interesting and very productive exercise, but one that could not have taken place without the TMG. I was also responsible for chairing the first half of the cease-fire talks on board HMAS Tobruk, which led to the 30 April 1998 cease-fire agreement.

Peace Monitoring Group When I returned to the PMG three months later, my job was very different. For a start, my predecessor, Greg Moriarty, had received clear written instructions from the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade about his role, informed by our experience in the TMG. Moriarty’s instructions were: to provide policy advice to the Commander; provide background information to the PMG; and ensure that Australian interests were protected and advanced in respect to Bougainville, PMG and our regional partners. We were to represent Australia on Bougainville and explain government policies; coordinate visits to Bougainville by Ministers and others; ensure that the interests of Australian civilian monitors were taken into account in all aspects of PMG planning and activities; work closely with the Commander and senior regional partners on media management; and report regularly to the Australian Government on all matters affecting the PMG and Australia’s interests and activities. These instructions covered fairly well what I was to do, although you never really knew what you were going to do from one day to the next. Another difference was that I had been the TMG’s only negotiator, whereas now the PMG had a negotiating group which I led and which included the most senior New Zealand and ni-Vanuatu military representatives. The Fijian representative also formed part of the group, but he spent his time mostly with the Arawa Monitoring Team. Having the negotiating group meant that we had more human resources and could share responsibilities.

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A large part of my job concerned the flow of information. A lot of the tension had gone and the parties were cooperating. A key focus now was keeping the parties informed of what was going on. I did this by reporting to Port Moresby — both to the PNG Government and to the Australian, New Zealand and Fijian High Commissions (Vanuatu was not represented in Moresby); reporting to Canberra and reporting to the monitoring teams so that they were better able to explain to the people what was happening, what the outcomes of meetings had been, and so on. Another thing that absorbed a lot of time and effort was ferrying key people to meetings, via the PMG’s helicopter-taxi service. Facilitating the maintenance of law and order remained a large task for the PMG. One example of this role related to the killing of Paul Bobby by other BRA members. We thought the peace process was going reasonably well until Paul Bobby, the BRA Commander for southern Bougainville and an important figure in the BRA hierarchy, was killed on the order of a rival BRA Commander, Thomas Tari, in the Buin area. We believed that his killing held real potential to disturb the cease-fire, which of course worried us a great deal. Bobby was killed at his parents’ home near Buin early on a Sunday. Brigadier Osborn, myself and others decided to send a team, led by me, to Buin very quickly and take senior BRA members to talk to Bobby’s family, and to Tari, to prevent further trouble. The PMG provided logistic support for the BRA on the understanding that they keep us fully informed. We met Bobby’s family and obtained their agreement not to take any retaliatory action and to disarm, although they did not do so as fully as they could. We then met with Tari in the bush and got his agreement to disarm and cause no further trouble. We defused that immediate problem quickly.

General observations Knowing the key people in all groups, and having a strong knowledge of the background were huge advantages. Knowing whom to deal with and how to approach problems was an immense advantage. So was the fact of being a known and trusted face. The PMG’s role of providing good offices meant we built trust by providing transport, fuel, lunch, doctors, dentists — whatever was necessary. A lot of small things did help a great deal at a human level. The key to our success

was identifying and resolving problems as quickly as possible; not letting things fester. My position, along with being known to the BIG/BRA, played an important role in winning acceptance of the TMG/PMG and of Australia’s role in them. Neutrality was difficult because one naturally had more contact with some groups than with others. We had senior BIG/BRA people just about living in the PMG headquarters at one stage. This was their choice and we certainly would not turn them away, but we did need to be careful not to be seen as too sympathetic to their cause. The weekly meetings of all parties helped reduce this perception because they allowed us to have regular and high-profile contact with all parties — except the BTG, which was not represented in Arawa. We set up weekly meetings also with the BTG Premier in Buka, to keep him up to date and to ensure that the PMG was seen to be dealing even-handedly. To be, and to be seen as, neutral was never easy. It was difficult to avoid being drawn into roles with which Canberra was uncomfortable. For example, Canberra considered my role in part-chairing the ceasefire talks as inappropriate. Canberra wanted the TMG to be impartial monitors. They sensibly did not want us to be another player, but in the cease-fire talks the UN was not yet on the ground and the TMG was the only trusted neutral body on the island, so the BIG/BRA asked that I chair the first half of the talks. The TMG Commander, Colonel Jerry Mateparae, chaired the second half which led to the successful conclusion of the extremely important cease-fire agreement. I want to make one general observation on the transition of the TMG to the PMG. The rivalry between New Zealand and Australia at the government level over the revived peace process has been mentioned by others. I make the point that relations on the ground between myself, the TMG Commanding Officer Colonel Jerry Mateparae, and the TMG Chief of Staff Colonel Jeff Wilkinson were always excellent. Our good working and personal relations eased the transition from New Zealand to Australian leadership. There were significant differences in working with the New Zealand and the Australian military. The New Zealand military was heavily weighted with Maori who had instant and close empathy with the Bougainvilleans. The predominance of Maori officers and soldiers was a deliberate and very effective choice. The TMG under New Zealand

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leadership went out of its way to associate itself with the Bougainvilleans, and make them feel welcome in and around headquarters. The TMG also instituted sporting events to break down barriers and provide a new focus for the factions. The New Zealand Army had a closer ‘family’ feel. On the down side, their vehicle transport was fairly appalling and their communications limited. The Australian-led PMG was larger and much better equipped, but had less of a Bougainville-friendly feel. PMG members still got on well with Bougainvilleans but there was a little more distance, at least initially. New Zealand opposition to Australian members of the TMG being allowed in the field was another interesting issue. The first New Zealand TMG Commander, Brigadier Roger Mortlock, considered Australians to be less trusted by Bougainvilleans and therefore more at risk. While there was some truth in this, I think his approach served New Zealand’s interests as well, allowing New Zealand to be on the cutting edge and most visible in the peace process. Australians are thoroughly welcome throughout Bougainville now — except in Panguna — and Australians and the PMG are appreciated and respected. A couple of issues of judgement made the TMG/PMG role difficult. The TMG/PMG was and is seen as a source of transport, fuel and food. There was always a fine line between fulfilling the good offices role, while avoiding being used by various parties. Rejecting requests often caused resentment, and in that sense it was very useful to be able to refer requests to the AusAID officer who was better placed to deal with them. The TMG/PMG have been, as everyone has said, a real success. This is due in large measure to very competent leadership, and to the contributions made by all TMG/PMG members. A key contribution to this success was the timing of the introduction of the TMG. There were enough people wanting peace and enough key people in all parties in a position to make it work.

Lessons for East Timor? Fighting ended on Bougainville only because all parties were sick of it. Some trust — as much as could be expected — was essential. It was also essential that each group control its fighters. The BRA was not a cohesive group. Troublesome BRA members in one area could cause

problems for everyone and stifle the peace process. This was true also for the PNGDF. Therefore inevitable breaches of the truce or cease-fire had to be defused fast and effectively. A forum for regular consultations was equally vital, so that the parties could talk through their problems. As well as a risk of too much speed, some momentum must be maintained. It was critical to the peace process to continue to make step-by-step progress. In East Timor there has been a preoccupation with disarmament. However, on Bougainville disarmament was less of a preoccupation. What was going on in people’s minds, and general progress in the peace process, were more important. If these were going well, we thought disarmament would follow when the parties were ready to do away with their weapons. Disarmament, if it were to happen, had to be fair and equal. There must also be reasonable incentives for fighters to disarm, either a buy-back scheme or perhaps employment. Fighters need to be absorbed into normal society and useful pursuits by employment, education, or a return to village life. In any peace process, plans must be developed and implemented to deal with law and order, including normal peace-time policing. Finally, it is essential to the Bougainville and East Timor peace processes that there be hope for a workable long-term political solution.

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A difficult river crossing (Photo: Andrew Rice)

Peace Finding, Peace Monitoring and Peace-keeping: Lessons from the Truce Monitoring Group Rohan Titus1

THE BOUGAINVILLE crisis went on for 10 years on Australia’s doorstep and forced the closure of the world’s largest open-cut copper mine. It involved the PNG province of North Solomons in a conflict that seriously undermined the stability of the nation of Papua New Guinea. Bougainville assumed an importance in the relationship between Australia and PNG far out of proportion to its size, resources or population (nearly 200,000). Moreover, during the Sandline Crisis, tensions between the Chan government in PNG and Australia over Bougainville policy reached their peak. The end of the armed conflict has already had a direct positive impact on the quality of life of the people of Bougainville as well as the people of the northwestern provinces of Solomon Islands. It has also improved relations between PNG and Solomon Islands, which had been badly affected by the flow-on effects of a rebellion across its border; and has reinforced the importance of an independently sustainable peace-keeping/conflict resolution capacity among the governments of the region, particularly Australia and New Zealand. Most of the lessons learned on Bougainville about the operation of a peace-keeping mission have international applicability. Some lessons have already been applied in East Timor with outstanding success. 1

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade or the Australian Government.

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There are, however, particulars to the Bougainville conflict which require specific remedies and some understanding of the unique situation of Bougainville within PNG. An understanding of the conflict’s root causes is essential in resolving the continuing difficulties faced in maintaining the pace of the peace process. The PMG performs a vital function in ensuring that this understanding is used effectively.

Outline of Bougainville crisis The sources of conflict that engulfed the island of Bougainville from 1988 to the end of 1997 are well documented. Bougainville’s divisions, however, long precede the commencement of mining on the island. Any clear understanding of the difficulties Bougainville faces requires an appreciation of the different relationships between Bougainville’s 19 key language groups and many regional and sub-regional groupings. These relationships do not necessarily conform to allegiances in the broader autonomy/ independence conflict on Bougainville. The countries and organisations striving to assist PNG with the peace process throughout late 1997 and early 1998 were faced with a complex situation. While there was constant liaison, their efforts were not always coordinated to guarantee a unified international response. Factions on the island undertook negotiations within a web of tribal hostilities and suspicions that lay along and across the major lines of conflict. Local conflicts assumed greater regional importance than the wider independence struggle. To give one example, the Siwai region of southwest Bougainville was engulfed in a vicious internal war that was largely driven by local issues. Smaller conflicts in North Bougainville (mainly centred on the Buka Liberation Front) and in the Wakunai area in the northeast were exacerbated by the PNG Defence Force as they strove to identify and cultivate allies on the island. It would be more accurate, therefore, to describe the Bougainville crisis through the 1990s as a series of separate conflicts rather than a unified independence movement fighting against a colonising power. Bougainvilleans identified themselves along sub-regional lines and language groups that were often internally divided by the question of autonomy or independence. Ten years of conflict and crisis resulted in many Bougainvilleans having divided loyalties. Opportunistic local violence further muddied Bougainville’s divisions and spawned the seeds of future conflict.

These conflicts notwithstanding, there have been at least eleven separate peace initiatives on Bougainville. It is apparent from these efforts that at different times in the ten-year conflict, parties from most of Bougainville’s many factions attempted peaceful reconciliation between the warring elements. The number of initiatives and the range of efforts by various groups to internationalise, exacerbate or relieve the tensions hint at the complexity of the island’s situation and the difficulties faced by truce monitors when they arrived in late 1997. It would not be an exaggeration to say that Bougainville was undergoing several revolutions at the end of 1997. These included changes to the nature of society itself, making obsolete older studies of the sociocultural structure of the island. These changes challenged many premises on which traditional Bougainvillean culture was based and are in their own right a field of rich study.

Role of the TMG/PMG The first 20 civilian peace monitors to arrive in Bougainville landed by Hercules C-130 at Aropa airfield in December 1997. Though they were hastily chosen and trained, most had a range of skills and experience of primary importance to the success of the mission. Not least among these was an understanding of Melanesian culture and knowledge of PNG — and in the case of some, knowledge of Bougainville specifically. Their primary task was to act as the operational end of the TMG. They did this by visiting villages across Bougainville and spreading word of the recently agreed Cairns Commitment, which allowed the TMG to operate in Bougainville. The policy guidelines were repeated to Bougainvilleans to ensure that they were aware that, although the bulk of the TMG was made up of military personnel, they were unarmed and under orders to avoid conflict. The mission was to monitor, report on compliance and promote confidence in the peace process. The TMG was divided into several components to achieve its mission. The military components provided the backbone for the operation, including logistics, transport, some rudimentary reconstruction abilities and security for the team-sites. The command of the TMG was based in Arawa under Brigadier Roger Mortlock. Truce Monitoring Teams were established in Buka, Arawa, Buin and Tonu. Two support teams — one operations and one logistics — were based in Arawa and Kieta. Initially,

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no ADF personnel were allowed to participate in the TMTs, restricting their role to the Operations and Logistic support teams in the Arawa/Kieta area. The 20 Australian civilian truce monitors, the only Australians allowed access to the rest of Bougainville, were tasked with liaison at sub-regional level between the various factions. The civilians were based at the four TMT locations. TMT Buka was responsible for the northern third of Bougainville as well as Buka and Nissan (Green) Island. TMT Buin was responsible for the southeast of Bougainville; TMT Tonu was responsible for the southwest and central west parts of the island. TMT Arawa covered central Bougainville and acted as a nexus for discussions with the BRA/BIG. Truce monitors were not empowered to negotiate between the parties, but were able to assist with the mechanics of the negotiation process. They were also able to travel where individual Bougainvilleans were prevented due to hostility between groups on the island and therefore were able to spread the word faster than would have been possible by Bougainvilleans themselves. This role continues but is diminishing as peace and stability return to Bougainville. There are six key lessons from the TMG’s operational approach on Bougainville which assisted in the achievement of its objectives. The TMG should be impartial in the allocation of its resources The peace-keepers were in possession of several assets that had not been available during the crisis — helicopters, landing craft, car ferries, medical facilities, telecommunications and so on. One lesson quickly learned in the environment of constant observation was that the TMG was judged by the impartiality with which its resources were allocated. Bukas from the north quite seriously approached TMG members complaining because they believed the TMG medical facilities in Arawa were used to help Nasioi in central Bougainville more than Bukas. It did not matter to them that they had access to the Buka Hospital during much of the conflict, while the Nasioi of central Bougainville had little access to medical facilities. Such attitudes were very important, and had the potential to sour relations with the TMG regardless of the realities of the situation. The best response was to demonstrate the TMG’s willingness to allocate its resources evenly. The TMG should follow through on its stated aims and intentions Throughout the first phase of Operation Bel Isi, Bougainvilleans asked TMG members when the promised guaranteed freedom of movement

would come into effect. The TMG’s ability to open roads and repair bridges was seen as an immediate tangible demonstration of the peace dividend. Moreover, the TMG’s efforts to broker safe passage along the roads for all Bougainvilleans were of vital importance in furthering the peace process. Not only could Bougainvilleans establish contact with family members separated by the conflict, but also traditional reconciliation ceremonies could commence because clans could travel to each other’s villages with some guarantee of safety. It was important for the TMG to disseminate information about the peace process actively across their area of operations Although village peace councils were quickly established, and regional peace committees set up in each Truce Monitoring Team’s area of operations, the truce monitors were often the only accurate and effective communicators of developments in the peace process. In fairness to the Bougainvilleans, only the TMT sites had satellite up-links for document transfer, allowing daily updates on complex issues. The task of spreading this information was, however, often left solely to the TMTs, with local groups concentrating on letting people know that the TMTs could be trusted. The TMG should not prevent any group from participating in the peace process through actions or omissions of its own. Neither should it promote any one group ahead of others Some of the most tense negotiations between TMTs and Bougainvillean groups occurred when there was a perception that one group had received favourable treatment from the TMG while another had been excluded from participation in the peace process. The incident giving rise to these accusations could have been as simple as the allocation of passenger space in a helicopter or notice of a meeting not reaching a particular group in enough time for them to participate. Many Bougainvilleans believed that the TMG’s resources were nearly infinite and nothing the TMG did occurred without a reason. Because of these perceptions, inner meanings and motives were ascribed to the simplest of TMG actions. This was a natural consequence of different cultures interacting in an environment where trust was hard to earn and tolerance was at a premium. The TMG was prepared for these attitudes and tried very hard to be fair in its dealings. Some measure of trust was therefore developed, resulting in greater pace of reconciliation.

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The peace process must not belong to the TMG, nor should the TMG force the pace of the peace process beyond the pace that the participants are willing to accept There were many occasions when the pace of peace talks both on Bougainville and at Burnham, Cairns and Lincoln was slow. Both on and off the island, parties followed traditional negotiation practices. Thus, before substantive discussions could take place, each senior delegate or village elder spoke, at length, on where they saw the process moving. The multiplicity of languages on Bougainville resulted in most of these negotiations taking place in Tok Pisin or English. Side negotiations, often in Tok Ples, added to the length of deliberations. Bougainvillean reconciliation talks can spread over a significant period of time. During World War II, some Bougainvillean groups sided with the Japanese and some with the Allies. The negotiations for reconciliation following the tribal violence between these groups was not fully concluded until the 1970s! In other words, three years of fighting took a further 25 to reconcile. It is anyone’s guess how long the ten-year Bougainville crisis will take to resolve. The members of the TMG must give a single, focused message TMG members arrived in Bougainville from a number of countries. Their backgrounds were diverse, their experiences different. To the Bougainvilleans, the TMG was a single body representing the outside world’s opinions of their conflict. It was important that all Bougainvilleans saw their struggle in the same way that the international community did. Put bluntly, no nation or international body recognised Bougainvillean independence. The world recognised Papua New Guinea’s sovereignty over Bougainville. Continued violence would not alter world opinion. It was only through negotiation that the parties could resolve their differences. TMG personnel needed to speak with one voice, reflecting their neutrality and role in the peace process. There was no room for personal views or perceptions to influence the focus and nature of TMG operations.

Future role of the PMG Since the Lincoln Agreement of January 1998, there have been many meetings where Bougainvillean groups and national government

representatives and leaders have met to discuss their differences. While there have been isolated instances of lawlessness, the cease-fire continues to hold. In this environment, there will be a continuing role for international observers and peace monitors for some years to come. There will be a role for the PMG in ensuring that the environment remains conducive for the continuation of processes of reconciliation. Australia’s financial underwriting of the PMG from May 1998, when it took over command from New Zealand, already amounts to tens of millions of dollars. While the resumption of civilian transport and other infrastructure development will reduce the cost of the PMG, there is a long way to go before all PMG support can be outsourced to civilian companies. The PMG has no role in reconstruction. If it were to have such a role, its independence and neutrality could be severely compromised. The reconstruction of Bougainville is the task of separate aid agencies. Australia has pledged over A$100 million to Bougainville reconstruction over five years (1997–2002), including assistance in the restoration of law and order. As the law and order situation on Bougainville improves and civil society returns, the need for the PMG will recede. There is no doubt that the Australian Government places central importance on the continuation of the peace process and sees continuing support (and leadership) of the PMG as central to that aim. The PMG’s access to all parts of Bougainville other than Panguna itself has been excellent. Nevertheless, the PMG is not a permanent fixture on Bougainville, a fact the parties acknowledge. There is clear conviction on the part of the governments of Australia, New Zealand, Fiji and Vanuatu to support the PMG as long as necessary to bring about a peaceful solution to the Bougainville problem. It is important, however, that as peace progresses, the parties take more and more responsibility for the facilitation and monitoring of their own peace. After all, the peace process belongs to the people of PNG and Bougainville. Ultimately, it is their responsibility to find a lasting solution to the sources of tension and conflict that led to the crisis. In adjusting the size of the PMG, it is important to ensure that progress to date is not jeopardised, nor confidence undermined. A steady approach of winding back the PMG will be necessary to ensure its presence does not of itself hinder reconciliation and recovery.

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Wakunai women singing ‘Who is Responsible?’ near Wakunai sports field, January 1998 (Photo: Jan Gammage)

Perspectives of Monitors: the Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) Experience A Truce Monitor Jan Gammage

IN DECEMBER 1997 the first truce monitors arrived. I was one of them. I saw an opportunity to help achieve peace in a part of the world that I cared a great deal about. The prospect was exciting, but I was also apprehensive. Although I believed I would never be a direct target, it was possible that the truce could break down and that I would be caught in a nasty situation. Most Bougainville group leaders had agreed to a truce and the need for reconciliation, but not all, and at least one, Francis Ona, was anti-Australian. We arrived when the security situation was still unclear, and women civilians were not included in either the Buin or Tonu teams. Even in north Bougainville where I was sent, the military at first confined women civilians to Buka. The means proposed to help achieve peace seemed to fit my values and beliefs. The TMG was to be neutral and unarmed. Civilian monitors were to work with Bougainville people in support of their truce, while the defence forces of Australia, New Zealand, Fiji and Vanuatu gave logistical backing. I imagined that civilians would monitor the truce by living in villages, getting to know people, finding out what was going on and writing reports. Soldiers would provide infrastructure, such as putting up tents, carrying water, relaying messages and providing the means of escape, if necessary. The fact

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that the soldiers were to be unarmed was very important to me and fitted this scenario. Having been selected as a woman, I also assumed that women would be considered full team members. Of 19 civilians, six were women. It was well known that the women of Bougainville had played an important role in the peace process to that point. I also agreed with the regional approach to this issue. The governments of New Zealand, Australia, Fiji and Vanuatu were all contributing, and the TMG was a ‘first’ in several ways — it was the first time Australia had participated in an activity under New Zealand auspices; Australia was participating at the request of the government of Papua New Guinea not the United Nations; and civilians were to be in the front line. I felt honoured that AusAID had selected me. However, things were not quite what I expected. The operation was run by the army, and attitudes to civilians and women were often negative. For example, I was given a list to help pack. Sensibly, it said ‘all clothing should be cotton and loose fitting: because of the rough washing facilities that will no doubt be in existence, bring old items’. But it went on, ‘It is not a fashion parade and vanity should be discarded prior to deployment,’ and under the heading Feminine Hygiene, ‘discuss with other females. Perfumes and scents will attract bugs’. Three days’ training at Randwick barracks in Sydney was an eyeopener. I started to learn a new language: for example, instead of ‘meeting’ we ‘concentrated’. I discovered that I was part of a military operation known as Operation Bel Isi, and encouraged to prepare for army communal life which depends on group bonding and team spirit. I was impressed with the proposed welfare arrangements — fax numbers, a weekly mail service, a 1-800 number, a Family Information booklet and the possibility of email. I thought it was good that the army made such an effort for its people in the field. At the same time I learnt about ‘getting ready to wait and getting ready to move … maybe’ and that rumours are fundamental to army life. I liked the advice about security: be culturally aware and remember you are in someone else’s backyard; insisting on the Aussie way is not helpful. The Don’ts listed included: no sexual advances; no booze; and no porn. The TMG did attempt cultural sensitivity. In the 23-person Buka Truce Monitoring Team, for example, we civilians were multicultural —

one Maori, one Sri Lankan and three women. The soldiers included no women, but three experienced Fijian peace-keepers, 13 New Zealanders, mostly Maoris, and two ni-Vanuatu whose Bislama is akin to Tok Pisin. (Bougainvilleans enjoyed the hakas and guitar playing.) Yet we were made dependent on the soldiers. The camping equipment was designed for men: the stretchers and tents were heavier than the Thermarest and lightweight MacPac tent which I could put up myself in a couple of minutes. It is demoralising to have to ask for help to kick the legs of your stretcher into place. Sometimes I chose instead to sleep on a bench or a lopsided stretcher. It was not possible for a civilian or even a group of civilians to impose civilian ways. No civil organisation had the resources or equipment, and the TMG civilians were outnumbered and disparate. The military hierarchy was not a particular problem: there was a pleasant informality among civilians and soldiers, including the most senior. It was the military infrastructure and approach that overwhelmed us. Our roles were no longer clear to us or to the army. It took time for the civilians, and especially the women, to convince some soldiers of our value in the team. Some of my civilian skills were appreciated (minute taking, cooking, knowledge of Papua New Guinea and non-government organisations), but others were under-used and devalued. I spent a lot of time on administrative duties at the expense of liaison in the community and with women. On 16 January 1998, expecting to leave on 26 January, I counted how much time I’d spent in the field — a total of nine nights. I wrote: I arrived in BGV on 6/12 and in Buka on 11/12. My first patrol was 29/12. Therefore I had 18 days in and around Buka to start with. No wonder I felt very mixed up and why I feel disappointed now. I guess there are people who’ve done less fieldwork than me, but it’s their job — I didn’t come to do clerical work. When I did get into the field, I felt that sometimes I made a difference, for example speaking Tok Pisin, and helping the women of Wakunai to send a representative to the Lincoln talks. I wondered how distinctive civilians were, even though we did not wear military uniform. In community meetings, I tried always to make

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the point that I was an Australian civilian, but I am sure few Bougainvilleans could distinguish between soldiers and civilians as we bounced around in old Land Rovers or flew about in orange helicopters. The soldiers had to put an enormous effort into maintaining infrastructure. On some days the Buka TMT’s soldiers were so exhausted from lugging generators, 44 gallon drums of fuel, stores etc., that I doubt they could have dealt competently with a security threat. Occasionally some questioned their roles — they’d come to monitor the truce, not work like navvies! At Loloho, our base at Arawa, there were over 200 soldiers, mechanics, cooks, communications experts, intelligence officers, psychologists, doctors, anaesthetists, nurses, dentists, lawyers, clerks, postal officers, pilots, transport officers, stores officers etc. More were offshore. Surely there was a less elaborate means to achieve the same end? Surely there were relevant lessons from aid experience? The military set-up also limited our learning about people’s lives and hopes, or socialising or improving language skills. At first all visitors to our camp were welcome in the central areas. I saw children gather around our guitar-playing major, and a former BRA commander sit at our dining table, having Weetbix for breakfast. I could invite women who had given me vegetables to come in for a cup of coffee. Those who know Melanesian hospitality know how vital such things are, but as the army order became established, visitors were confined to the Command Post area, a noisy part of the camp, with people coming and going, the radio crackling, the computer printer churning out reports and a big generator roaring. The experience was not what I expected, but it was very rewarding. The women impressed me by the way they told their stories — of the horrors of the conflict, dislocation, self-sufficiency, their hopes for a time of peace and development. I was moved by the beautiful singing, of ‘crisis songs’ and religious songs. I took part in evangelical services with a gusto that would amaze my family and friends. My first gift from a Bougainvillean was a copy of ‘Yumi Lotu’, a Tok Pisin hymn book; my most unusual a box of live crayfish sent by plane from ‘a sister’ in Nissan. I began to know fighters from all factions. I had long talks about development with sisters and priests, one of whom had been in Bougainville since 1955.

When we left, the TMG farewelled its civilians in a very special way. At Buka the Fiji and ni-Vanuatu men cooked a delicious farewell dinner and there were speeches and the singing of ‘Waltzing Matilda’ and ‘Esaa Lai’. At the airstrip, all but one of the team — Maori, Pakehas, Fijians and ni-Vanuatu — did a haka. The soldiers lined up and we shook hands and kissed ‘goodbye’ before we climbed into our helicopters and flew to Loloho. A few days later, on leaving Bougainville from Aropa, the Brigadier and others, including BRA and other factional leaders, came to farewell us and made generous speeches about our contribution to peace.

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Aboard the local transport (Photo: Andrew Rice)

Rotokas Patrol: Truce Monitoring, March–April 1998 Andrew Rice

I ALWAYS had a somewhat romantic vision of serving my country in unusual circumstances and wondered when and how the opportunity would arise. I never thought it would be in a mountain village in northern Bougainville, explaining my government’s actions to forgotten and disadvantaged people and seeking to confirm Australia’s commitment to the Bougainvillean people. Between 4 February and 28 April 1998, I served in Bougainville as part of the second civilian rotation in the Truce Monitoring Group. I was a member of TMT Buka; our area of operations (AO) covered all of Buka Island, the Atolls (northeast and northwest of Buka) and the mainland as far south as a line between Wakunai and Torokina. I took part in patrols; conducted liaison with factional and PNG government representatives; acted as duty officer in TMT Buka HQ; carried out escort duties for visiting TMG, Australian and New Zealand officials and military personnel; and performed ‘general hand’ tasks around the TMT. The patrols were the focus of our activities and I was expected to help to plan these activities (particularly after the first six weeks); liaise with local officials to facilitate the entry of these patrols to distant parts of the AO; conduct peace awareness meetings; answer villagers’ questions on the peace process and development; and

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(along with TMT military specialists) assess village infrastructure. I spent 34 days away from Buka on patrol during my three months in Bougainville. I have chosen the story of Callsign 11’s (one-one) patrol into the Rotokas region1 in late March and early April 1998 as the best way to address the theme of monitoring peace in Bougainville. ____________________ Throughout March 1998, TMT Buka continued to spread the Lincoln Agreement message, assessing village infrastructure and responding to the TMG headquarters’ directive to gauge reactions to the news that Australia would take over leadership of the Peace Monitoring Group after the forthcoming cease-fire. We were still working very much to the ‘go forth and multiply’ approach to patrolling, where we sought to reach out to new areas. If anything, this policy became more focused in late March, as we attempted to access the largely neglected mountainous areas of northern Bougainville. Wet season cloud cover, the lack of roads and reducing RNZAF air hours forced TMT Buka to schedule foot patrols for the first time. The initial frame of reference for the patrol was a visit to Sisivi village. A month earlier we had failed to get there, when cloud cover restricted our access by helicopter. By this time TMT Buka had a standard procedure of seeking guidance from locals on villages to visit. I approached the ‘Greenhouse’ (the Bougainville Transitional Government’s administration building in Buka) for help. By chance, both the District Manager of Wakunai, Ezekiel Ivihi, and Paul Akoitai, Resistance Commander of Togarau, were in town. Both were able to recommend villages to visit. Our maps revealed extremely mountainous areas, with frequent watercourses. Planning was complicated when we found that our request for helicopter support had been largely refused and we would receive only one ride over the five-day patrol. Nonetheless we sent Ezekiel back to 1

In April 1998 we received the blanket blessing of L Company Commander Glen Biaras to move about the Wakunai region. We were attempting to enter Laikoia, with Gideon as guide, at the time of the Kabui–Ona split on the cease-fire. Laikoia BRA decided to go against Biaras and bar our entry, citing incorrect clearance from L Company. Gideon’s presence was not helpful — before changing sides from the Resistance (for money, a ni-Vanuatu colleague was told), he had killed people in Laikoia and he had not reconciled with the village.

Wakunai with the message that we would visit the villages over the coming days — he undertook to send runners to these isolated villages. We also followed our standard procedure of putting out a notice on Radio Bougainville. Messengers and the radio station were the only semi-reliable means of broadcasting TMG intentions in our AO. Bill, our newly arrived New Zealand Army Captain, was patrol commander. Other members included Mal, our NZ Army engineer specialist; Chariots, NZ Army medic; Geoff, our jack-of-all-trades NZ SAS (or ‘JA’ — Joint Adviser) signaller; and me as monitor. We gathered our MIST product (the Military Information Support Team newsletters that we distributed on patrol), rations, water and equipment, and with another patrol that was heading to the Wakunai region, boarded the LCM-8 landing craft for one of its regular voyages down the east coast to Wakunai. We had determined that the most effective means to enter our area of operations was by Land Rover from Wakunai up the Rotokas road to Togarau. The road may have been the main thoroughfare, but it was in appalling condition, significantly eroded in most parts, cut by rivers in various states of flood, and very steep. As with most of our road journeys, our passage through villages brought welcoming hordes of screaming pikinini to the roadside, which added its own perils, as the vehicles bumped along and the children tried to find a way under our wheels. We had hoped to meet Paul Akoitai in Togarau, but found him heading out as we arrived. In one of the signs of reconciliation that we saw so often, Paul introduced us to Pedro, whom I first assumed was one of Paul’s Resistance fighters. It turned out that he was the local BRA platoon commander; he would be one of our principal guides. We had learned on a previous patrol that Togarau had mixed allegiances. Paul Akoitai himself had been BRA until he was asked to kill his brother. Arriving in Togarau was always a pleasure. We knew the people well, the village was neat and tidy, commerce (cocoa and vegetable production) was developing, we were always well accommodated in Paul’s house and a nearby waterfall served as our bathroom. I thought Togarau’s prosperity could be traced to several sources. It was the village of Sam Akoitai — then PNG Minister for Bougainville Affairs; it was connected by a passably navigable road to the coast and could get produce out; its mountainous climate was conducive to a range of

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crops. Above all, I thought it was prosperous because of a strong chiefly system backed up by responsible factional leaders. We had arrived in Togarau with a patrol plan, but we sought guidance from Chief Misak and some of the village men. It was intimated to us in a quiet, round-about way that our plan was flawed, due to the distances and the terrain. We were told that we would be mad to attempt our plan and, if we did, we would be on our own. The latter was as dangerous as the physical factors, as a GPS receiver and map meant little in the shifting civilisation that was Bougainville’s mountain area. We risked walking long distances and missing our targets. We accepted the advice and changed our plans. Next morning we rose early and shouldered our packs for the walk to Sisivi. Perhaps fittingly it was April Fools’ Day and as I recorded in my diary, ‘the joke was thinking that we were fit enough to walk the Bougainville hills’. Our guides — Chief Misak, the mysterious Amos our interpreter, Pedro and a few of his ‘boys’ — led us through the cocoa plantations of Togarau and nearby Ruruvu and down to a river. The water was thundering through a series of rapids. The guides in their uniform of footie shorts, singlets and bare feet hopped from rock to rock as we (mostly me) floundered in full TMG uniform, boots and packs. After I had fallen in several times, I took my boots off, Amos carried my pack across the river and we began our uphill march. Except for a short break in the village of Oriva, we walked up for an hour and a half, along razorback ridges, some as narrow as 30 cm and with unstable ground, with enough false crests to break your heart. My selfpity was tempered by learning that this was the only way to Sisivi. Everything and everyone — building materials, the sick, schoolchildren — had to walk this path. Cocoa plantations signalled our approach to Sisivi. Soon, after a promise of ‘three minutes to go’ (read ten), we were there. I thought somewhat whimsically, as we made away along the village path, that this was what it must have been like in the taim blong kiap (colonial days). The white man, with local guides, struggling into the village to deliver news of the outside world, to people with little interest in such things. The picture was completed by my khaki uniform — the ‘son’ of the kiaps arriving with a new kind of news.

We begged an hour’s rest before we gathered with the villagers by a half-complete sak sak hut in a natural amphitheatre. Up to 150 people were present — kids running everywhere; women breastfeeding or sitting silent at the side; the village hierarchy sitting in judgement on the occasion; the BRA ‘boys’ mingled with the people; and countless dogs, generally being flogged senseless. We followed our usual approach: our interpreter read the Lincoln Agreement in Tok Pisin before I spoke on the progress of the peace process and of reconstruction, and the whys and wherefores of the Australian take-over of the PMG. As on other occasions, the interpreter translated my words into Rotokas, the melodious Tok Ples — this was necessary, as the conflict had robbed many people of the chance to learn Tok Pisin. Two hours passed, as I spoke and fielded questions. The questions revealed the usual fears and complaints. A village that built watch-towers to warn of the approaching PNGDF would always be concerned about the security forces’ withdrawal. A place of sak sak huts, one and half hours over difficult and treacherous terrain from a health centre and school, had valid concerns about the promised reconstruction bounty and when it would reach them. One question sticks in my mind. Following my discussion of the impending Australian take-over, I was asked: ‘Are we now in the hands of PNG or Australia?’ I decided to tackle this one front on. I would not apologise for the fact that Australia was PNG’s friend, but I was here to demonstrate that Australia was Bougainville’s friend as well. Perhaps Australia is re-engaging in the Pacific through its Bougainville involvement, but we do so with the legacy of a colonial past and the days when Australian-donated helicopters machine-gunned people such as these. As far as meetings went, it was a great success. Even the flight of a giant hornbill (the high clan’s symbol) through the group during the meeting proved not to be a bad omen. Paramount Chief Francis and BRA Platoon Commander Pedro both made speeches of thanks to us and after my Kiwi brothers did a much appreciated haka, it was time to rest. Later, as part of our normal infrastructure assessment, our medic and engineer toured the village, noting the usual problems of inadequate water storage and malnutrition. Chariots was called to see

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a dying man; when offered a medevac, this man refused, choosing to spend his last days with his people. Late in the afternoon, Bill and I went back to see the village hierarchy to complete the assessment. As usual, we responded to requests for reconstruction assistance with talk of the forthcoming international aid effort and asked for patience. As usual, it did not satisfy and, as usual, I felt inadequate in merely talking about assistance. I was told by a fellow I met in Wakunai that when the crisis came and the electricity generators were destroyed along with other infrastructure, the night descended on people like a restrictive blanket. The churches sought to reassure people through regular services. That April Fools’ night we joined the village for a service and hymn singing in the United Church sak sak hut. Later, the dirge-like music of bamboo wind instruments combined with the orange light of hurricane lamps to create an eerie feeling. Not for the first time, I reflected that the experience seemed a little unreal for a Canberra public servant. We struck out for Oriva next morning, following a farewell from the whole of Sisivi. The march down through dappled sunlight took about an hour and featured none of the agony of the day before. We thought we would be addressing another village meeting but it proved to be a Women’s Fellowship meeting. As seemed to happen in other places, the men attended and hijacked it to a degree. There was much singing, praying and preaching, with our interpreter Amos showing his skills as a lay preacher. We tackled questions on independence and development. The former was always difficult and I am eternally grateful to my Fijian Army colleague who taught me to speak of patience and the danger of an independence won too soon. The words may not always have satisfied, but they were hard to dispute. Here I was introduced to the BRA ‘Administrator’. In Oriva he stood in for the chiefly authority which was normally bestowed by the Sisivi chiefs. (In another Rotokas village I met an administrator who existed alongside the chiefs, but effectively ran the village.) He provided all the infrastructure data that we needed. We set off for Togarau, after a fine feast put on by the women. It had begun to rain with the unique intensity of a tropical wet season, so the river we had crossed the day before was a raging torrent. We made it across, and learned that when the rain comes, the school at Ruruvu

sends the Sisivi children home early, so that they can clear this crossing before the flash floods. And in Australia, we worry about the safety of children getting off the bus… After a night of recharging batteries, we went down to Ruruvu. Our activities that day were similar to Sisivi and Oriva, although our peace awareness meeting gave us a view of the divided loyalties and the fragility of reconciliation that one found in some villages, and the frictions in BRA ranks. The intensity of feeling could not be disguised by the melodious Rotokas tongue. BRA Section Commander Gideon was opposed to further Australian involvement and hostile to my explanations. His attitude prompted another BRA member to criticise him publicly for not following the direction from BRA leadership and I understand that, in an exchange in Rotokas, he was accused of spreading false information on the peace process. Several signs that day — the difference of views between Gideon and his platoon commander Pedro; the comment from villagers about the residual responsibilities of those who had harmed others; the BRA and Resistance living cheek-by-jowl in Ruruvu — made little sense to me at the time. However, they indicated that the local BRA L Company had very loose lines of authority and its ranks included those who had changed sides during the crisis and/or who belonged out of opportunism. This was brought home several weeks later elsewhere in the Rotokas region, when a tree was felled across the road in front of our vehicle to prevent us from entering a village. But that’s another story.2 After a visit to Ruruvu Community School (which served the surrounding area), which featured the usual meagre but dedicated staff, basic teaching resources and happy pikinini, we returned to Togarau. That night as we spoke to Chief Misak and Amos about infrastructure, I recalled again how the TMG experience was a skate across the surface of Bougainvillean culture and how, so often, things are not as they seem. Amos, who followed us like a silent shadow for most of the previous few days (and had interpreted for us on a previous visit to Togarua), who lived in Ruruvu on his wife’s maternal land, who seemed deferential to Chief Misak and who had spoken with quiet modesty, was Togarau’s Paramount Chief. 2

See previous footnote for detail on one of them.

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We had known for a couple of days that, due to air hour restrictions, we had been left to our own devices to get down to Wakunai. We organised a local vehicle to take us. This Toyota tray top had no brakes, no ignition and the crucial cog in the operation was a child who held the gearstick in place as the driver battled the Rotokas road. We had our five-man patrol with all its gear, Pedro and one of his men, and a couple of blokes from Togarau (later the Deputy District Manager Wakunai and his wife also joined). We had to dismount once when the road was too steep, but otherwise we hung on for dear life for the three to four hour journey (probably not much more than 20 km). We broke the journey at Kasarawa, the site of one of Pedro’s platoons. Pedro had asked us to visit here so that his men and the people could hear the peace message. The meeting was remarkable for the attentiveness with which the BRA boys listened. I was reminded again of the value of having women in the TMG, when it took me ten minutes to convince two young women to tell me about their concerns for reconstruction. As on so many other occasions, this visit to staunch BRA territory was a great success. A pig was killed in our honour and another huge feast prepared (the frenzy with which the remains were attacked by the crowd after we rose confirmed the signs of malnutrition). How natural it seemed to visit such places and feel safe, when ten years of perceptionbuilding in Canberra suggested otherwise. I am not critical of government processes, but confirm that the human side of conflict needs to be encountered to be understood. An adventure of this sort needed to conclude appropriately and the re-boarding of our Toyota for the rest of the trip to Wakunai provided it. After several hours of being thrown around, the inevitable occurred. One of the BRA boys, and the toolbox he was sitting on (an old ammunition box), were thrown clear as we struggled up a hill. The driver was not stopping, as he would stall, so as he accelerated up the hill, this poor fellow had to sprint after us, heave on the toolbox, turn and dash back to collect his bush basket, and sprint after us again as the vehicle approached top speed. The only contribution the rest of us made was to laugh deliriously and heave the poor fellow back on when he came within range. The relief was palpable on arrival at Wakunai — it was the vehicle journey of my life.

Wakunai was closure of sorts on Callsign 11’s patrol. The next day, we boarded the LCM-8 and headed back to Buka for the postmortems and report writing. ____________________ I went to Bougainville with some knowledge of the conflict. I knew a little, but virtually nothing of Bougainvillean culture. I learned of the fractious nature of the BRA and the Resistance and the need to scrutinise organisational structures to understand them — my expectation of BRA L Company as something like an Australian army unit was completely inappropriate. I learned too of the mistrust for PNG Government authority and its security forces and I was left questioning the future cohesiveness of Bougainville within PNG. I saw the wholesale destruction of infrastructure and wondered what kind of people would ‘cut off their nose to spite their face’. I learned in places like Togarau and Ruruvu the importance of traditional social structures in rebuilding lives. And I gained a new perception on the Lucky Country and an intolerance of its knockers. I had not been on a peace-keeping operation before, so my knowledge of such things extended to debriefing ADF members and reading about operations. The decision to go to Bougainville unarmed caused some angst in the Defence Force, but it was the right one — at least two encounters might have gone differently if we had been armed. Perhaps more fundamentally, the TMG experience reaffirmed for me that peace-keepers should not only stand between the warring sides, but also encourage the coming together of divided people. I watch East Timor to see whether this approach is also followed. A neglected dimension of the TMG experience is the engagement with our coalition partners. Aside from the benefits of military interoperability, the understanding that comes from knowing the meaning of the haka, participating in the ritual of the kava session and having an insight into the ni-Vanuatu way of life cannot be overstated. I am better, and so is my workplace, for my deeper understanding of the Pacific. Australia’s re-engagement with the Pacific must be more than a romantic khaki-clad adventure. The responsibility rests with individuals, often beyond their comfort zone, to confirm the commitment of

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Australia to the reconstruction of Bougainville. The government needs high quality personnel to go there, because individual words and actions are the genesis of a new relationship with Bougainville. ____________________ Preparing this paper has been difficult. It re-awakened a range of emotions. The catalyst for the strongest emotion — sadness — is my belief that the greatest challenge facing Bougainville is the reconstruction of lives destroyed by the crisis. However, I have great hope. I met many ‘big men’ of Bougainville — generals, ministers and the chairmen — but it was the little people who made it for me. People like BRA Platoon Commander Pedro, who shepherded us throughout our Rotokas patrol; Chief Amos and his quiet dignity; Monica Smith, the women’s representative at Togarau, who called on her village to reconcile; the old man in Sisivi who chose to die among his people; Chief Misak for his stature in adversity; and the countless pikinini who reminded me that hope is a living thing. I wish I had been able to help them more.

The faces of peace — children of our neighbours at MTP What an inspiration! (Photo: Shane Austin)

Perspectives of Monitors: the Peace Monitoring Group (PMG) Experience Peace Monitoring in Wakunai, 1998 Katherine Ruiz-Avila

I AM acutely aware that three and a half months is a very short time to spend in such a complex and layered society as Bougainville. If I learned anything, it was due in large part to the efforts of those Bougainvilleans who went out of their way to convey to me something of their stories, languages, and their dreams for a brighter future. It is these stories which I want to share with you. I was initially apprehensive about going to Bougainville. This had more to do with the prospect of working and living with the military than with Bougainvilleans. As it turned out, my concerns were unfounded. Instead, with three fellow civilians from Canberra, I climbed — still exhilarated — from our helicopter at Wakunai and was welcomed by an assortment of largely dedicated and good humoured people who spent much of their time laughing at each other. Nor were they aloof from the people of Wakunai: increasingly games of touch footy were played on the beach; the PNGDF and RPNGC would emerge from their camp and join many Wakunai people in outclassing the PMG. Interaction with the rest of Wakunai, other than through sport, depended very much on individual monitors. Ni-Vanuatu and Fijian team members, and those who went weekly to a local church, began

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to form relations with the people among whom we lived. Team site members who were not part of the weekly patrol program worked with leaders from the administration, the churches and the factions. But for me, the team-site at Wakunai always seemed a little selfcontained — it was where we worked, liaised with HQPMG in Arawa, went for jogs or swims at our favourite was was, and dreamed up entertainment for Saturday nights. The main exceptions were the frequent visits from the endlessly curious children, and some of the younger women. Only when I left the team-site did I really learn about Bougainvilleans. Because of transport logistics, the team-site worked on a program where three of our four five-member patrols worked away from Wakunai from Monday to Friday, returning ‘home’ for weekends. This allowed us to engage with Bougainvilleans at a level which would not otherwise have been possible. Away from Wakunai we were guests of the people in whose villages and homes we stayed. Our nights were usually spent sitting up late with our hosts: sometimes talking about ourselves, mostly listening to the stories of our hosts, and occasionally singing. We were tasked to conduct ‘Peace Awareness Meetings’. The aim of these planned meetings was to present an outline of the peace process from Burnham to the Arawa cease-fire and any new developments; to describe the monitoring role of the PMG; and to answer questions. Inevitably — and appropriately — this process was hijacked by Bougainvilleans. Rather than arriving in a village, holding an hour’s meeting and moving on, we observed lively debates on how peace agreements made by the leaders translated into village reality. I began to realise that my understanding of ‘peace’ was too narrow to encompass its much more complex meaning for many Bougainvilleans. We peace monitors tended to define peace in terms of the formal truce and cease-fire agreements, and by the absence of inter-factional violence. We went to villages with copies of the Burnham, Lincoln and Arawa agreements. We were briefed on the command structures and leaders of the BRA, Resistance and PNG security forces. But I felt illequipped to engage with Bougainvilleans about their definition of peace. We knew little about the authority and administrative structures on the island, the role of chiefs, women or church groups. We were often

only half-aware of deep divisions in communities, the trauma they experienced, the dislocation, and the strong suspicion towards outsiders, especially Australians. We poorly grasped that peace meant dealing with these less tangible elements that had been exacerbated, if not entirely caused, by ‘the crisis’. We were unprepared to confront individuals who did not welcome the PMG. Reconciliation still had a long way to go in mid-1998. Talking to Bougainvilleans about peace invariably meant talking about their vision for the future, not merely the end of factional conflict. At a basic level this meant the restoration of roads, health and education services, job opportunities and markets. We observed many discussions about the future: the timing of independence; the need for economic self-reliance; the pros and cons of mining revenue; the role of outsiders and so on. Bougainvilleans were keen to show us evidence of community projects completed and underway, and to discuss their ideas for future activities. I remember being startled when the Wasinobus community proudly showed their huge and near-complete school building. This school had been built so high in the central mountain range that it literally sat among the clouds. All the materials had been carried up by hand, and all the labour was provided by community members. On a more complex level, which I only glimpsed, Bougainvilleans seemed committed to ‘spiritual rehabilitation’. Calls for ‘spiritual rehabilitation’ were linked to attempts to articulate the kind of society that they wanted to build, to the restoration of traditional authority, to genuine reconciliation at many levels. Many seemed convinced that they had simply won the war; they saw themselves at a crossroads where they should be able to define the society they wanted, picking and choosing from the modern world. They yearned for a ‘return to normalcy’ as described in the Lincoln Agreement, but did not want to embrace modernity wholesale, in its broadest sense, nor the reality of other Papua New Guinean provinces, nor even Bougainville’s pre-conflict reality. This sense of uniqueness and confidence in being able to shape their future seemed linked to support for political autonomy/independence. Bougainvilleans had enormous expectations that these social changes would quickly follow peace. This led, even in the early days of the PMG, to disenchantment

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with their political leaders, with the PNG national government, and with Australia. The obvious drawback in maintaining a narrow definition of peace was that we risked excluding key people and issues from our assessment of what was relevant to the peace process. Key players such as women and church leaders were barely visible in the peace process — and in the PMG’s efforts to monitor and facilitate that peace. The PMG did try to understand and engage them, but these attempts were sporadic and partial. Our difficulty in understanding Bougainville society, and in seeing its less visible members, was exacerbated by quick staff changes which slowed the engagement and establishment of relations. Further, the PMG — rightly — guarded its limited mandate jealously. The PMG did not prioritise ‘civil affairs’ which were usually seen as outside the main game. Yet sometimes there seemed to be shifts away from factionalism to economic, political, social and institutional tensions. Although we often monitored a peace that we barely understood, we must not underestimate our important — sometimes crucial — role. The PMG was particularly successful in instilling confidence among Bougainvilleans in their own peace process. Our presence provided a space where people could begin to articulate and debate their vision for the future, often literally before our eyes. I hope that this will prove an enduring legacy.

Mount Bagana, west coast, from Torokina (Photo: Andrew Rice)

Peace Monitoring in Wakunai, 1998 Trina Parry

I WAS a civilian monitor at Wakunai from July to November 1998. I had worked in the Defence Department for 11 years acquiring major capital equipment, and had little understanding of the crisis. Going to Bougainville with the PMG was a unique opportunity to work in an unsettled environment as a civilian within the military. I limit my reflections to women and religion. I emphasise that my experience is first hand, and is limited to my Area of Operations. Other teams, indeed other patrols at Wakunai, had different experiences. I begin with how the PMG responds to ‘women’s issues’. Issues affecting western women are often relegated to the private or ‘home’ sphere. This is not unlike what happens to women in Bougainville. It was expected that only female PMG members deal with women’s issues and the concerns of Bougainvillean women were ‘hidden’ from the PMG’s agenda. A directive from headquarters stated that patrols should not be ‘over-burdened’ by women’s issues. I never quite understood that. Perhaps if I had known how not to become over-burdened by men’s issues — and how women’s issues differed from men’s — I could have reached an appropriate balance. Women in Bougainville experienced extreme hardship during the crisis, and still do. They often escaped to the bush where they gave

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birth, raised children and kept the fragments of their family together. Significant numbers died due to a lack of medical attention; many endure gynaecological problems today as a result of difficult bush births. The women had returned to the villages in most areas I visited, only to face challenges of a different kind, notably domestic violence. Much of this violence is linked directly to the use of home bru (home brew; also known as jungle juice). There is an almost agreed silence about rape and incest; I know one village on the West Coast where men used the threat of rape to deter women from travelling to Buka to sell produce. Interestingly the men in this village would travel to Buka to buy home bru, and bring it back to the village. I spoke to some western women on Bougainville who were concerned about the assimilation of ‘rape babies’. Many women are single parents: their husbands died not just as a result of the crisis but more recently from home bru consumption. I visited one village in the Wakunai AO where girls had been caught drinking home bru: this was unusual, and of great concern to women of the area. My patrol presented a discussion on the effects of home bru routinely in Peace Awareness Meetings. A number of villages passed word back to us later, usually through the women, that following the PMG’s presentation the consumption of home bru had declined, greatly improving the daily lives of the women. The women undertake most of the physical work in village gardens, and are the predominant parent in raising children. They prepare meals and educate children where there is no school. The women therefore have a lot to contend with, but peace is at the forefront of their minds. Peace brings safety and stability, which women crave. Many women educate their sons about the problems caused by fighting, and encourage them to pursue peace. In many villages, women have established formal groups or networks to try to improve their lot. Many women told me that while they feel physically secure, they worry about their future and that of their children. Many women’s groups try to develop marketable produce or goods to bring money to their village. They organise sporting teams and coordinate religious activity. It is often the women who try to find ways to occupy young fighters who come back from the bush. The usual way is to organise community projects, such as

building sak sak houses, cutting sporting fields, or encouraging young men to gain an education. It is true that many women are shy in formal gatherings, but they do have strong opinions on the peace process. They distrust officials and politicians, and are often sceptical of the role of the PMG. I was asked twice if the PMG was part of Sandline, but I am not aware of many instances where women did not appreciate the PMG’s interest in their views. One village complained that the previous patrol had spoken only to men, and women felt excluded and angry. The women have a keen interest in political and peace developments, and may form the majority of the population. Women provide a great opportunity for the PMG to learn about the ‘reality’ of the peace process. If you approach the chief of a village about problems in his village he may say ‘there are no problems’ because of his pride and the fact that he feels he may be losing power. If you consult women, they will tell you what really takes place, and give you an insight into the powers of influence of the Chief. While there was an element in headquarters assigned to women’s affairs, I do not feel that the PMG was very interested. I felt that PMG senior members thought that as a woman I should ‘dash away and do that ‘women’ thing’. It seemed to me that the PMG targeted men. Introducing women threatened its ‘comfort’. The military is a masculine, hierarchical organisation and therefore does not have much insight into how to deal with women’s issues. However, it needs to be educated. Considering the needs or concerns of women is not doing them any favour, it is not special treatment; it is simply a recognition that they form a large part of the population and are a significant political force. The women of Bougainville have a right to be involved in their peace process. The PMG should address the concerns of women with as much vigour as the concerns of men. Women’s issues on Bougainville are not ‘soft’ or insignificant; the PMG should not overlook the data-rich environment of women when gathering and disseminating information. It is supposed to be neutral in politics; it should also be neutral in gender. In Wakunai there were three primary, practising religions: Catholic, Uniting Church and Seventh Day Adventist. This combination was

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replicated many times as almost every village we visited had one and often two churches. I experienced one healing ceremony, two crusades and a number of discussions with women who had just talked with Jesus. The healing ceremony took place at a Uniting Church, and consisted of about 12 people being ‘healed’ by a professional ‘healer’. After a great deal of singing and rejoicing, people wishing to be healed made their way to the front of the church. The healer would walk up, speak Pidgin (very quickly!), touch them on the forehead with the palm of his hand and they would fall to the ground. As they fell their eyes fluttered into the back of their head and their fingers and toes went into spasms. On the ground the people responded in various ways, some would clap and chatter loudly (their eyes still fluttering), while others would just lie silently shaking. I was sceptical and made a special effort to focus on ‘healed’ people for signs of deception. By the end of the ceremony though, I realised that I had witnessed something rare. I could not identify fault or trickery. I am still not sure what happened. The crusades reminded me of road shows. Hype, anticipation and even rudimentary posters accompanied their arrival. Both crusades I attended occurred in the evening. The crusaders were very much like western evangelists — loud, emphatic and physical. The crowds were enormous and the crusaders circled them, pointing and shouting at people to rid themselves of sin and follow God. I found such crowds fascinating as they are like an ebbing tide: one minute there would just be a small group of people, then a crowd would appear. The crowds usually disappeared just as quickly. I attended these crusades with Fijians and ni-Vanuatu of the PMG and felt privileged to stand in the background and observe the spiritualness of the gatherings. Many women claimed to have regular, personal discussions with Jesus. One village claimed regular contact with Jesus in their garden. During one visit, Jesus spent three days explaining to the women when he would return to this world. They claimed it would be in 2000. What struck me was their gratitude for what they had, and it was not much. On my last visit the senior Meri, Sarah, held my hands and told me that ‘Jesus would look after me, and I just had to trust in him’. I am not overly religious, but I will never forget the intensity of Sarah’s faith.

Wherever one went, one encountered a church. Some were fibro with smashed windows, some were sak sak houses, while some were open-air thatched frames with rough pews. All had a form of altar, at least one cross, fresh garden flowers and an aura of peace. When the people come together to worship, the material structure is of no consequence. The people have beautiful voices, and spend much time singing as a form of worship in church. To feel the atmosphere in one of these churches when people are conducting a sing-sing, is overwhelming. I do not believe I will ever experience a sensation like it in a western church. However, Bougainville is not all peace and harmony. While in some villages the religions work together for the greater good, there is tension between churches in other villages and women and men will not share information or work together. Even in Wakunai churches do not work well together. I attended the first ‘coming together’ of churches with Padre Willie Saul, to initiate the Interdenominational Council of Churches. The point of the Council was to get the churches working together to better the community. Not surprisingly, it took us five hours just to get representatives elected, and all subsequent meetings were delayed. By the time I left Wakunai no plans were made for the next meeting. Individual religious pride is extraordinary. One village was offered aid by ADRA (the Seventh Day Adventist Aid and Relief Agency) but refused on religious principle. The village was Catholic, and did not want help from another body. Some might call this arrogance, but given the strength of the faith that brought them through the crisis, it is understandable that they do not negotiate. The power of the church should not be underestimated. The church is as much a political force as any other. The ability of the church to organise and motivate is underestimated on Bougainville. While PMG members should not be forced to attend church (as this would be tokenism and people would know it) this area has not been tapped. The PMG would benefit from more religious representatives, particularly at team level, to explore the power of the church. In closing, I reinforce the importance of the PMG becoming more broad-minded and flexible in its approach to the peace process. There are more political forces at work than the high politics, and more voices to be heard than those of men.

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Invitation to Ceremony

An Indigenous Monitor Tracey Haines

THE PURPOSE of my paper is to provide an Australian indigenous perspective on civilian monitoring in Bougainville and to look at why the PMG has been so successful. A significant factor in the success of the PMG is the contribution of indigenous people from Australia, New Zealand, Fiji and Vanuatu. It is appropriate to acknowledge this because one should not underestimate the value of indigenous people in these operations. All indigenous people can relate to issues such as economic development, land management, compensation and ‘caring for country’, and are affected by them. Bougainville can be seen as a model for conflict resolution, assuming that the same level of financial, military and civilian support is duplicated. However, little things can improve the performance of an operation — for example, the selection of suitable people as peace monitors from the region. The skills that indigenous people usually possess can be used to great advantage in the PMG and similar operations. I am not advocating that every position be filled by an indigenous person, but I believe that it is important for selectors of peace monitors to consider targeting suitable indigenous monitors.

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Experiences in Bougainville I served on Bougainville from October 1998 to February 1999. It would have to be the most memorable experience of my career. I found it very informative in terms of understanding issues that affect indigenous people in Bougainville, and personally rewarding to contribute my time and energy and feel that I had made an impact on the peace process. I was overwhelmed by the reaction of Bougainvilleans to me as an Australian indigenous person. They often expressed gratitude to me for coming to their community. I was very impressed by their knowledge of Australia’s history and treatment of Aboriginal people. They seemed to regard any visit by an Aboriginal person as a real treat and honour. My main purpose in going to Bougainville was to work with and help our indigenous neighbours in their time of need. However, I was not prepared for their reaction and how important it was for indigenous people to be represented in the PMG. For example, while addressing the village of Sipi in southwest Bougainville on the latest peace process issues, I told the large group that as an indigenous person I was their wantok and therefore related to them. They clapped and cheered and a woman representative from the group came over and shook my hand. It was a very moving moment. I felt very proud of my Aboriginal heritage and was very thankful to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade for giving me this opportunity to put my indigenous skills to use. Working in Bougainville was a great example of how my indigenous background, knowledge and skills could be used. I hope there will be other times when I can make a difference. Indigenous peace monitors, if used effectively, can add tremendous value to the work of their country and region. When I reminisce about Bougainville, I ask myself if I could have done more, or tried to dig deeper to investigate rumours. Sometimes my patrol had to investigate breaches of the cease-fire agreement, but most of the time focused on updating village data and distributing the weekly Nius Blong Peace newsletters. Our presence reinforced the message that peace had come to Bougainville. My approach was carefully considered. I knew that I had to learn quickly about Bougainvillean society and find out what offended people in order to work effectively and compatibly with local custom. Most

things came quite naturally, while others were surprising. My efforts were rewarded and I felt accepted into many families and developed a close rapport. I am naturally sensitive and aware of the way in which other cultures operate and interact, and I wanted to adapt my style to achieve the best possible working relationships. As an indigenous person operating in ‘two worlds’, I have had many years of experience and time to analyse my Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal worlds. This experience has obvious advantages. For example, shaking hands on greeting was widely used on all occasions and showed respect for elders. I developed close relations with many women and was often invited to participate in ‘women’s business’ (i.e. washing at the river), only to find out that the PMG men who were supposed to accompany me everywhere I went, were not allowed to follow. However, there were special circumstances when I was allowed to ‘disappear’ with the women, and this was received very well. Many Bougainvilleans, especially women, were very quiet speakers. As a quiet speaker myself, I had no difficulty in adapting the tone of my voice, although I would often cringe at PMG men who sometimes came across as loud and offensive. They appeared to be unaware that their behaviour was upsetting, which made the rest of the PMG look culturally insensitive. I also heard negative stories about some methods used in obtaining information from Bougainvilleans. Before people can share sensitive information, it is important to establish rapport, to read non-verbal communication, and to assess when ‘question time’ should cease. The way in which people ask questions must also be considered. Some styles can appear rude and aggressive, with negative consequences for the future. It is also important that PMG men talk and ask questions of Bougainvillean men before approaching women. Bougainvillean women are often more comfortable with female rather than male PMG members. There were many constraints on the way we went about our business. Working in a military environment did not always allow me to stay and talk in a village for as long as I wanted. Most of our visits were rushed, but when I offered to update people on developments, my patrol quickly realised that they had to adapt to each situation. During the evening ‘O’ groups, I would tactfully say to my patrol that it

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was important not to rush our visits, but this advice often fell on deaf ears. Given the security situation, taking account of the cross-cultural environment and adapting working styles to ‘fit in’ with local custom is not only commonsense but essential in protecting PMG monitors. Now that I am home, I am left with a feeling of unfinished business. Until Bougainville returns to some form of normalcy, I will feel a sense of guilt that I am able to live the life that I do. Considering my family and cultural background, I have broken every stereotype barrier to get where I am. A short mission to Bougainville with the PMG was the icing on the cake and the highlight of my public service career to date. I was deeply honoured and humble to be selected and the experience will remain close to my heart. I think everyone would agree that the Maori, Fijian and ni-Vanuatu members of the PMG have an advantage over other members because of their cultural affinity and rapport. They have been very effective as peace monitors and can provide valuable tips to others who are less culturally aware. They are recognised as brothers and sisters of Bougainvilleans, due to proximity in the region and cultural similarities. Their role and contribution made a good impact and helped the PMG facilitate and promote the peace process.

Conclusion The future for Bougainvilleans is not easy. There will be many ups and downs as they try to rebuild their lives and negotiate an acceptable settlement with Waigani. As an indigenous person, I empathise with their struggle. As an officer of the Australian Government and an exmember of the PMG, I hope that my contribution has helped our brothers and sisters move closer to a peaceful long-term resolution.

Red River Bridge, near Wakunai (Photo: Andrew Rice)

A Military Analyst Ewan MacMillan

LIKE MANY who have served in the Australian Defence Force over the last ten years, I recall discussions about Bougainville and the possibility of becoming involved there. I remember being put on stand-by to assist with the evacuation of Australian nationals in the early years of the crisis, and being asked, while on exchange with the British Army, to talk on the Bougainville conflict to a group preparing for peace operations in the former Yugoslavia. In January 1997 I joined the Australian Theatre Joint Intelligence Centre in Sydney as the senior analyst for Papua New Guinea. Almost immediately I had to address the tensions and complexities of the Sandline crisis. Indeed it was shortly after the events of March 1997 that my colleagues and I started to see the possibility of Australians deploying to Bougainville as part of a peace process. We had in fact a bit of a wager with other areas in Defence that Australian troops would be on Bougainville by Christmas. Many dismissed our projections as plain ‘out there’; Australian deployment seemed implausible. We were caught off guard by the speed of preparations for the Truce Monitoring Group following Burnham. I was flooded with questions about the dangers the TMG would face. Our team, none of whom had been to Papua New Guinea, worked long hours to assess where the peace process might go and what the TMG could face.

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Looking back we did pretty well, but having now spent time on Bougainville, I think we were also lucky. We did not grasp the complexities of the conflict. Indeed I now think our assessments reinforced many stereotypes and misconceptions. Throughout 1998 I remained as PNG analyst watching Bougainville from my windowless office in Sydney. My task was made slightly easier by a seven-day visit, although it reinforced how much I didn’t know. So, unlike many people in the TMG/PMG, my deployment in late 1998 was not the beginning of my involvement with Operation Bel Isi. I deployed to Bougainville before Christmas 1998 and completed a sixmonth tour as the Strategic Analyst in PMG headquarters. It was a unique role, and relatively new. It was established in recognition that the PMG lacked understanding of the broader issues of the peace process. I remember deploying with the confidence that my experience with the operation stood me in good stead, but I was quickly disillusioned on arrival, realising again how little I knew. I had read all the books, spoken to over a hundred people who had been on Bougainville, and of course read assessments from many agencies. However, it was from those things that cannot be captured in text — the lie of the land, the density of the jungle, the looks on the faces of young and old, the destruction of infrastructure and the open displays of emotion and commitment to peace — that I learned most about the conflict. My role in the PMG had many facets. The most interesting was to accompany the Commander on his many visits to Port Moresby to talk with government ministers, officials, Opposition Members of Parliament and other interested parties. Apart from the ‘delights’ of Moresby (hot showers, a bed and an occasional beer) these visits gave me unique insight into the divergent perceptions between Waigani and Bougainville that contributed to the longevity of the crisis. I remember thinking that the geography of Papua New Guinea was a most significant factor in the crisis, and a unique challenge for the peace operation. Although Bougainville and Port Moresby are within the same national boundary, the gap between them is not easily overcome. I cannot recall a peace operation that involved such physical separation between the scene of the crisis and the location of the policy makers of a major party to the conflict. Operations in East Timor also faced this challenge. Bridging this gap remains a challenge for the PMG with some in Port Moresby (and in Canberra and Sydney) choosing to criticise the PMG, believing that it has

become too Bougainville-centred. I think this is fair criticism, but having now viewed Bougainville from Bougainville, Sydney, Port Moresby and Canberra, I would argue that most observers are consumed by the immediacy of the issues and interpret events from the perspective of their location. I remember thinking on Bougainville; ‘What are those bozos in Canberra thinking?’ and now in Canberra thinking; ‘The PMG has lost the plot!’ How quickly we forget! I have found analysis of the peace process a rewarding challenge. It seemed that the more you knew and the deeper you looked into an issue (like weapons disposal) the more complex and difficult it became. I found it hard at times to strike a balance between pessimism and optimism. On one hand my role as Strategic Analyst required me to take the worst case view, to advise the hierarchy on what could possibly go wrong and what threats could emerge to jeopardise the safety of our people. This required me to play the ‘what if’ game, which involved many risks and sometimes much nugatory work. I found this approach sometimes over-pessimistic, leading to a feeling that the process was doomed. On the other side, I could not help but be awed by the commitment of ordinary people to rebuilding their lives. While I would participate in doomsday planning, I never had to look far to find cause for optimism. Curiously, back in Canberra my perspectives are more optimistic. Many people ask, ‘Has your time on Bougainville changed you?’ The answer is definitely yes. Apart from my career change, I note many other changes. I waited almost 15 years to put into practice the art and skills I developed in years of military training. I find it incredibly rewarding and a source of pride that my operational service involved my carrying no weapons and was constructively focused to assist a people build and maintain peace. In response to those who see service on Bougainville as just another ‘training exercise’ or detrimental to the Army’s mission to ‘fight to win’, I believe that the unique challenges of negotiation, liaison, communication and interaction (without a gun) will only improve our warriors and their initiative, adaptability, patience and tolerance. Certainly as a nation we could learn a great deal from Bougainville’s reconciliation and recovery. I am incredibly lucky that my Bougainville experience did not end on my return to Australia, and I look forward to more opportunities to serve on Bougainville.

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The hazards of Bougainville driving: a bogged van of patrol from Tonu (Photo: Shane Austin)

An Operations Officer Luke Foster

MY BOUGAINVILLE experience began in 1994 when, as an adviser to the Vanuatu Mobile Force, I helped to train and prepare the contingent that deployed to Bougainville on Operation Lagoon as part of the South Pacific Peace Keeping Force. The commander for Operation Lagoon, Major Lester Roy, was my commanding officer during my tour on Bougainville. This paper presents an operations officer’s perspective, slightly biased as you would expect from Team Arawa, but also heavily influenced by my relationship with the team’s commanding officer. As a result of this relationship I was given considerable autonomy in how the team was run. Arriving in Bougainville I was tremendously excited to be back in a Melanesian society. I spent many hours with Colonel Roy at meetings, meeting chiefs and BRA, BRF and PNGDF personnel. However, late in my second week I began to realise that if the operations officer was out and about, there was a void at the team site. There were a number of security matters demanding attention; assistance and coordination were required to ensure that patrols went out and did their job. I learned early that I was an operations officer, not a patrol commander, and I had to balance my desire to get out and about against the requirement to look after the team.

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An enjoyable aspect of my work was dealing with a diverse and multi-talented group of people. However, since my primary concern was the safety and well-being of the team members, I focused on developing close relations with three key people: the patrol commanders. The patrol commanders were essential in ensuring the safety of patrols. I had to understand the varying degrees of skill and competence of the three men from Australia, New Zealand and Fiji; I had to be confident that they could command a successful patrol. In my book, a successful patrol was one that returned safely: all other issues, including monitoring the peace, were secondary. An unarmed operation is an interesting concept for soldiers but one that is becoming common in peace operations. I have no doubt that being unarmed in Bougainville is correct. Relying on the people for the safety of peace monitors reinforces the point that peace is the people’s responsibility. They are only too aware that should the safety of the PMG be placed at risk, the peace process will be in danger of faltering. This was emphasised on a number of occasions when Bougainvilleans assisted patrols in difficult circumstances. The PMG provides the environment for the peace process and many fear the consequences of its departure. One of the most important lessons from Bougainville is the requirement to live and work in a multicultural and mixed-gender team. Obviously some people are just not suited to this, and an important element of my job was to create an environment in which they most enjoyed living and working. A number of features of the team composition are worth highlighting. Ni-Vanuatu and Fijians had a tremendous advantage in establishing rapport with Bougainvilleans. There were also advantages in having an indigenous Australian on the team. Of course the willingness of team members of all backgrounds to be in Bougainville, mix with the communities and learn the language all helped the peace process. Nothing was more obvious and more damaging than a patrol member who would rather not be in Bougainville. The importance of a woman in each patrol cannot be overstated. For a patrol to be truly successful a link had to be made with women. No male can hope to make this link effectively. A patrol with a female performed better, and was a better small team.

Having civilians on the team was outstanding. They integrated in all cases successfully and contributed to the success of the team and their patrols. The addition of a senior civilian at the team headquarters, towards the end of my tour, also eased my burden of reporting and liaising with the community. It is important to emphasise that everyone in Bougainville is a peace monitor. Their actions, expressions, words and deeds are all examined and evaluated by Bougainvilleans. This included the logistic staff at Loloho or headquarters personnel or short-term visitors. A number of documents suggest that the military personnel were in support roles. In reality no one was in a support role: all are peace monitors. An issue that caused us angst was the provision of aid. Unfortunately the issue is not cut and dried. While the PMG is not in the business of aid it was a continual thorn in our side. Many hours were spent discussing with Bougainvilleans why we were unable to respond to seemingly reasonable and minor requests. Sometimes patrol commanders were placed in extremely difficult positions, and assistance, particularly with helicopters, was sought. On some occasions our inability to assist had to be fudged lest we lose valuable contacts. Occasionally our teams were challenged or tested. The first test came as an offer to sell us gold. In my four months we received three such offers. I have no doubt that we were being tested and there is no doubt the reaction had we chosen to purchase the gold. Rumours of Australians wishing to open the mine or pursue other covert interests were never far from the people’s minds. The second challenge hinged on perceived neutrality. It was easy to become sympathetic to the BRA cause, easy to consider the PNGDF negatively, or equally easy to be considered too close to the PNGDF. Perceived neutrality was important and we adapted well. This was highlighted whenever the team was used as a conduit to lessen tensions between factions. One of my more controversial decisions was to make attendance at church services compulsory (and the controversy was hotter outside the team than within). Let me explain this decision. Anyone who visits Bougainville will understand the importance of religion and church. To be accepted and make the most of the peace process, church

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attendance was essential. Not all team members were happy with the concept, but all undertook the task at hand. In conclusion, the tour gave me a chance to understand the human element of war. The people’s trauma and their passionate desire for peace were poignant. We also learned that a multicultural and mixedgender environment requires all team personnel to adjust, to learn and to understand the cultural sensitivities of their team mates. Few of us returned unchanged.

Sing-sing at Tung’s (Photo: Andrew Rice)

A Man in Buin Lawrie Cremin

DURING MY time in Buin we had the pleasure of hosting a delegation of Australian senators. At our request Paul Koneana, a non-combatant, walked for five hours to meet them. One of their questions was: ‘So Paul, what was it like to be a non-combatant during the crisis?’ Paul, unknown to the Senator, had spent considerable time studying electrical engineering in Canberra and Melbourne. He had worked at the University of Papua New Guinea, and had spent a lot of time with the mining company. Paul was dishevelled; he had no shoes, his clothes were torn and he was covered in dust. He leaned back in his chair, paused, leaned forward and said, ‘Bloody hairy, mate!’ There are cultural resources available to PMG members to help them identify problems and resolve conflicts. That brings us back to the core questions: how to identify sources of conflict and what resources are available to help resolve them? Paul was one resource on whom we could rely for advice and sometimes he intervened to resolve potential conflict. There were many like him from different backgrounds, with varying influence. The challenge was to develop a solid understanding of the sources of social power in order to preserve our neutrality and facilitate conflict resolution.

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Three events illustrate different forms of conflict and how we responded. Once we were caught in crossfire, another time we had to resolve a social conflict, and the third illustrates how the PMG dealt with a political conflict. What we fondly call down at Buin ‘The Night of the Long Knives’ was one of the more frightening experiences of my life. Conflict erupted following a group of BRA and Resistance breaking into a store and exiting down the main roads firing M16s and SLRs across the top of the team site. This was not just unique for a civilian; it was unique for many of the younger soldiers. This example demonstrates the dynamics in a team site and how it deals with conflict unarmed. I was cleverly disguised as a coward, behind one of the female civilian monitors. Whenever I looked up to see what was going on, the dynamics were amazing, for example, the way the younger diggers responded. One inventive chap was adapting, improvising and overcoming by digging into seven feet of concrete with his fingernails. He didn’t do it terribly well because he was next to half a dozen gas tanks as the bullets flew over. It became increasingly clear that we were in crossfire, and I looked to see how team members responded. Certainly, the younger Australian and New Zealand soldiers had their way of dealing with it and wanted to get into the generator bunkers. At one critical point I looked at the Commanding Officer (CO), an experienced New Zealander, but a logistics officer. I saw him glance at one of the Fijian warrant officers who had served in the Middle East. At that point some younger diggers were yelling, ‘Let’s get into the bunkers, we’re going to get hit!’ We were very exposed, in full light under one of the main houses, and any shot could have crossed through us. He looked at the Fijian, who just waved and said, ‘Let’s stay here’. He told me later that it was better that they could see us. This was an interesting example of interaction between two cultures, but also between a subordinate and his officer. Civilians were completely disempowered. We had not been exposed to this type of situation and did not know how to deal with it. The young Australian and New Zealand soldiers were also disempowered. They had no weapons and were not sure how to fit into a fuzzy organisational structure complicated by the presence of civilians and Pacific Islanders. The CO through judgement and experience realised that we were not

the target and looked to senior officers with relevant experience, namely the Fijians. A number of lessons were learned. One was to recognise the ability of a well-focused and organised team to draw on its own resources. The Colonel suggested that if they did come into the team site, the ni-Vanuatu would be most able to deal with the crisis because at this stage some soldiers were reaching for broomsticks as a way of dealing with the problem. An example of the dynamics of a team in a multicultural, multiorganisational and service environment is the long-standing Tari–Bobby conflict which revived when the brother of the late Paul Bobby went down to Lugawai village and cut up one of Thomas Tari’s soldiers. The protagonists are all members of Hotel Company in south Bougainville. We adopted a range of measures to bring some closure to the issue, premised on the belief that reconciliation of a social nature is the best way to address an entrenched political conflict. We drew on ni-Vanuatu priests from the PMG headquarters. This strategy was initially resisted but the problem was intractable and we looked for political solutions. We tried to bring chiefs together; in vain we tried to bring the warring parties together. Introducing a religious dimension, aided greatly by women’s groups, put us in a position where all members of Hotel Company met and decided to put the issue behind them. A key moment in that meeting was when Thomas Tari walked over to another member of the Hotel Company, who had been involved in the assassination attempt on Tari and the assassination of Bobby. He stood and looked at him — Tari’s a fearful-looking character and this guy was visibly frightened — then took two steps towards him and embraced. Tears welled up in his eyes and it was a powerful reminder of the quality of reconciliation and, perhaps, Melanesian forgiveness. Our job was just to bring the people together. That was social reconciliation. Our best approach was not to limit ourselves to specific resources and ways of doing things. A large part of our work involved drawing on the considerable knowledge, background and advice of ni-Vanuatu colleagues. As one Commander put it, ‘force multiplies par excellence’. Later I was in the negotiation cell at headquarters. A key achievement of the cell in that period was bringing Hilary Masiria and Sam Kauona and then Ishmael Toroama together for ‘an island roadshow’, informally

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visiting their soldiers for the first time together. Nothing like this had happened since the cease-fire. The critical achievement was establishing trust, good will and dialogue. At what point do you start initiating dialogue? At what point do you decide to go a little further? And at what stage do you pull back and trust in the natural tendencies of Melanesian cultures, to resolve these conflicts internally? This was a particularly important time in the peace process, leading to the first negotiation package with the PNG Government. We recognised that the potential for the resumption of isolated spots of conflict was real and we were not sure what impact the negotiations would have more generally on the peace process. On balance we decided that the facilitation part of our mandate should be extended, and pushed hard. That certainly ruffled the feathers of the chairman of the Resistance, and Ishmael Toroama was still very reluctant to spend the night in Buin since he was also implicated in a longer version of the Tari–Bobby assassination. I wonder how we pulled that off; how we knew to put Ishmael on the first helicopter out when he said that he did not want to stay the night; how we knew that what Hilary really meant was that it was time to wind things up. Our key asset in the negotiation cell was cultural insight. The key members were a Major from Fiji and a Major from Vanuatu. They led the procedures and provided the lubricant for what is now a continuing consultative process. Some people have talked about the reluctance of senior members to visit the grassroots, but we advanced the peace process by active facilitation and taking the role as agent a bit further. There are lessons in that. What does the PMG experience tell us about responding to conflict in the southwest Pacific? Whether in Australia or in a combined peace monitoring group, you have to trust in the will, the creativity and the desire of the people on the ground. We can provide the environment and perhaps the infrastructure, but the forces for social change always reside in the people. To overstep that mark is inappropriate and counterproductive. Rely on the internal institutions, resources and imagination of the Bougainvilleans in the path to reconciliation, physical recuperation and psychological recuperation.

Not everyone paid full attention (Photo: Shane Austin)

A Woman in Buin Melissa Bray

OUR Commanding Officer at Buin decided that our team should run in relay from Buin to Arawa — around 100 kilometres — to commemorate the anniversary of the cease-fire agreement. We started at around 5.00 a.m. and were pleased to see a Bougainvillean man accompanying our runners, as we had invited locals to join us. He was running barefoot, and carried a large knife. After he had run 10 kilometres with us, we began to question his impressive commitment to our crazy project. He had run so far — how was he going to get home? It occurred to one of us to catch up with him and ask him what he was doing. He was pleased to find out about our run and was vaguely amused. As a matter of fact he was running to his home to collect a few lap laps and other possessions he had left behind. He and his family had just relocated to Laitaro, near Buin, where they had lived before being dispossessed in the crisis. His faith in the peace, his perception that it was finally safe to return to Buin, were a far more important signifier of peace than our run, yet his story was almost eclipsed by the PMG’s flashy commemoration, trundling through the bush in ‘support vehicles’. Perhaps there are other times when the PMG’s activities risk eclipsing the real stories of progress in the peace process. I want to

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explore issues concerning the PMG’s information-gathering processes, and question whether the PMG has access to the information it really needs. An entire world on Bougainville exists outside the PMG’s consciousness, and it is that world that holds many of the keys to lasting peace on Bougainville. I was a civilian monitor at Team Buin from February to May 1999. During my time, the headquarters at Arawa was changing the focus of its information-gathering. The new focus was on liaising with designated key political players — factional leaders, military leaders and political representatives. I felt that these ‘players’ often told us what they thought we wanted to hear. And by speaking regularly with only a handful of people, we were missing most of the story. Women were prepared to be clear and honest in assessing post-crisis tensions, and were willing to communicate freely with us if they saw that the PMG was prepared to listen. I was the only woman in our team at Buin, and this worked for and against me: the lack of women in the team meant that the PMG was seen as an operation run by and for men. However, women embraced me readily because they felt sorry that I had to deal daily with 20 men. I did a lot of work with women’s groups, and these women were extremely active in facilitating contact and discussion between disputing factions. In that sense, they were galvanising the peace. I reported in detail on these women’s activities, since they were integral to political progress throughout the Telei district. Luckily the Chief Negotiator and a few others at headquarters recognised the cultural value and political implications of women’s activities. I sensed, though, that most saw those activities as a quaint diversion from ‘real’ (men’s) politics. By failing to consider women’s thinking seriously, they were skewing the information on which the PMG assessed peace. I went on a boat patrol to Taurato Island, off the south coast of Bougainville. When we arrived, my commander went to speak with the Chief, while I went to speak with the women. Later, on the boat, we collated our information. Many of Taurato’s inhabitants had fled the Buin area during the crisis, and they remain on the island. The patrol commander had been told that the people were happy to remain there, and had no desire to return to Buin. However, the women had told me that they wanted to return but were deeply concerned for their safety

on the Kangu Beach road. They had heard of law and order problems resulting from tensions associated with the increased transport of cocoa along that route. Clearly, the report we were about to make ignored this information from the women — information which showed that the slow increases in cocoa production and transport in Telei could damage stability and law and order between Kangu and Buin. This sort of information disappears as the PMG forms its overview of Bougainville — information that seems small but can have a serious impact locally. As an aside, I am not sure that the PMG was very attuned to cultural values on Bougainville. As the only woman in our team site, I was sometimes taken to be the cook, or providing other services to the team. I had to work to clarify my role. The PMG needs to consider these issues, as they affect the way the operation is perceived, valued and respected by local communities. My major point, though, is that the PMG operation is in danger of eclipsing the real stories on Bougainville. We need to remember why the PMG is there, and to ensure that the operation does not become bigger than the real issues that determine how peace develops. The man running alongside us provides a powerful analogy. The PMG thought he was simply running for the ride, but his story told us something really important about the restoration of stability in Buin and the repatriation of displaced people.

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Police liaison (Photo: Shane Austin)

A Policeman’s Lot Shane Austin

A LETTER home, 14 February 1999 To my dear wife, happy Valentines Day darling and happy first anniversary for next week. I thought I would make a list (edited) of what I like and dislike about being in Bougainville that may give you an idea of what it is like here at the moment. Dislikes Not being with my beautiful wife on our anniversary [I’ll skip the next few!!] Not having regular contact with family and friends No beer or bourbon No restaurants Mass produced food The rain Sweating Always being wet The inability of the army to conceptualise the term ‘sleeping in’ Confinement

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A lack of privacy and personal space Continuous noise (at the opera house) — machinery, helicopters, generators, trucks, 100 farting soldiers Some of the wankers you have to work with Living in a chemical cocktail — blokes in gas masks walk around us once a week spraying clouds of chemicals into the air to kill things. Last week 13 thousand litres of diesel burst from its storage and washed into Loloho bay. We live in a chemical storage dump next to radioactive waste and have to sign a form that states if we start to glow green it’s not the government’s fault Showering, shaving and washing in cold water Showering with dozens of other men Never getting to see all the video Cane toads, bugs and insects Picquet duty. Likes I’m doing something important The wonderful Bougainvillean people, particularly the pikininis The heaps of good people within the PMG I have met It’s warm The rain The money — oh yes — the money! I’m not in Canberra I’m losing weight — slowly but surely it is happening I’m a shade more tanned than when I left I am doing something others only dream of The adventure Bouncing up and down in helicopters over mist topped mountains Bouncing up and down in landing craft on crystal clear waters Bouncing up and down in four wheel drives along jungle tracks Battling with a new language The amazing scenery The fact that I have never done this before The little barking geckoes that sit on every surface of your room talking to you and then falling off the ceiling when they have eaten too many bugs.

I hope these points tweak the memory of a few people as it did for me when my wife handed me the letter last night. I do not intend to fully interpret the Bougainville law and order situation nor draw conclusions from the process. Instead I link a series of reflections and observations. First, the police role in Bougainville. Between 18 January and 14 May 1999, I deployed as the law and order adviser to the HQ Peace Monitoring Group following predeployment training in Canberra, Sydney and Bamaga in far North Queensland. I was one of two AFP members — my colleague was based in Buka. I was originally attached to the civil affairs (×5) cell at the PMGHQ, Arawa, before being transferred to Monitoring Team–Province (MT-P), also in Arawa. Why do we need to send police officers to Bougainville? Although during the TMG and early days of the PMG a New Zealand army captain was the law and order adviser, awareness grew that it was appropriate to: • have police officers talk to police officers; • have police officers talk to the community about their law and order concerns; and • have a police officer analyse the law and order environment and provide policing advice. Police officers tend to connect with other police, irrespective of cultural background, in an entirely different manner from non-police. And that goes for members of the quasi-law and order groups that have sprung up in Bougainville. For their own reasons they desire to be police as well. I recall speaking with a Bougainville-born RPNGC member at Arawa who complained about the many PMG patrols that visited him every day. He understood that they came for information and he would never dream of being rude to them, but he wondered what they could do for him on a professional level. He said: ‘Shane, I am so pleased that you are here now because you understand our problems. You help us and we can help you.’ He was talking about sharing professional intellectual property, not the oft-mentioned desire for physical cargo — although those requests

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also came thick and fast. In exchange for my professional understanding of their role and their challenges, he was happy to part with information needed by the PMG to ensure its security and to analyse the peace process. Professional arrogance made me puzzled about what we could learn from him. But through exposure to things like traditional methods of punishment I did learn about processes that western justice is only just acknowledging — shaming and conciliation. Police can also provide a fresh perspective on analysing developments and originating ideas. Who better to interpret the impact of a criminal act or analyse the criminal environment for danger? Remember that although this was a military operation most of the danger to PMG personnel, and to the process itself, arose from the twin ogres of political and criminal activity. Finally, police are used to dealing with victims and in many ways that is what the people of Bougainville are. I inherited, and further defined, a role for the HQ law and order adviser as: • providing law and order advice and information to headquarters; • providing law and order advice and guidance to monitoring teams; • providing tactical, operational and strategic analysis of law and order trends and issues to headquarters; and • establishing, developing and maintaining effective liaison with all law enforcement representatives throughout the province including those from factions. Law and order is one of the four key issues for the people and the PMG. It is important because it relates to notions of sovereignty for all groups involved, but also goes to the heart of what any citizen associates with peace: • the freedom to move without fear; • to express oneself without reprisal; and • to provide for one’s family in peace. As a law and order adviser I was in the happy position of being a link between the PMG at the level of the team site and headquarters, and ordinary Bougainvilleans from a range of backgrounds, including the RPNGC.

The position of the RPNGC is less than enviable. It faces significant challenges in Bougainville. It must grapple with the task of restoring a rule of law to a population that has fallen back to systems of local and village justice, and is frequently distrustful of the RPNGC and its aims. Trust-building measures, on-the-ground training, increased numbers of Bougainville-born members, patience and time may be the recipe to restore law and order peacefully. These measures will be limited by the quality of the personnel, their commitment to the task, the political environment and the funding to do their job. I do not envy them. That said, in the context of Papua New Guinea, Bougainville’s rates of criminal activity are low and one must consider whether the full re-integration of PNG law into Bougainvillean life will have a major impact on the quality of life. I sense that commercial activity and the freeing-up of investment may have more impact on the quality of life than an increase in prosecutions for bush knife attacks or home brew-related offences. That will be the case while the protective umbrella of the PMG hangs over Bougainville. When the PMG goes — well, that is another state of affairs. As I re-read my letters home I see some common themes. First, civilian personnel working in the military environment. What became obvious to me was the army belief in selfcontainment and self-reliance. The military is still coming to terms with something that other public enterprises have had to embrace, and that is the integration of experts from other organisations. The example of the army captain being law and order adviser in the early days of the TMG/PMG is one of many. It took some time before AFP representatives were accepted by some of the military as having a specialist advisory responsibility — keen to work in the team environment but free to make judgement calls and express opinions. On the other hand, the AFP is responsible for selecting members with appropriate capabilities to support the mission. In essence, I observed the need for all members to understand that all team members bring skills and abilities that enhance the team when properly used.

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Second, team development under pressure. There was a focus on getting civvies to assimilate into the military environment — a useful and necessary exercise. I did observe, though, that binding strangers of different nationalities and organisational cultures into an effective team in rapid order is a significant challenge. Some team sites and some teams proved more effective than others and I wonder if team building strategies, or the lack of them, contributed to this. Third, the environment — beautiful, exotic and wet! As I reported to my wife in February, It rained again this afternoon — what a surprise! What we call rain does not do what occurs here justice. Here the clouds collapse onto themselves and within minutes you are standing in a river where a pathway once was. But s** t — you sure do get sick of being wet. I am sure I spend 75% of my life in some state of saturation. If I am not sweating rivers of perspiration I am standing in a cold shower. If I am not showering then I am being rained upon as I move to wherever the hell it is I am moving to — if it is not raining I am swimming. There is every chance I will return to you the consistency of an aged prune… Fourth, working at close quarters in a remote environment. The resultant family pressures are well known, but again the importance of lines of communication, not only with loved ones but also with home organisations, was highlighted to me through the experiences of many others. It was also a lesson in life to observe grown adults used to 1990s western civilisation, living in each other’s pockets and the resultant tensions that sometimes surface. However, the bigger lesson was the wonderful inventiveness of human beings finding ways to counter the tension and the boredom and the wonderful good nature, good will and good works of the majority. And last, those bloody plastic uniforms! Those that followed us should be overjoyed at not having to wear that particular item of kit.

A couple of key issues: • know and understand your environment; • the importance of good communications to operations and morale; • the value of the ‘true team’; • team building as an operational necessity; and • providing your people with the right tools to do the job. Not for a minute do I suggest that these lessons have not been identified a thousand times before, but I revisit them for my own sake.

Conclusion This deployment was extremely valuable to me both personally and professionally. As with most overseas deployments it provided an opportunity to develop and utilise skills and broaden personal horizons. This is a unique mission that provides AFP members with opportunities to deal with strategic issues and forces them to think outside the square; the AFP is able to display its wares in a high profile manner to the government and ADF while continuing to build relationships with representatives of PNG, Vanuatu, NZ and Fiji. As an end note to the Australian Defence Force: on the whole — great! Thanks for feeding us, caring for us and supporting us. You are the organisation for the job — the only one! And of course, as long as I am not forced to turn myself into a floor tile again because people are firing shotguns at our guards at midnight, then I would do it all again. Then again my wife may have something to say about that!

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Reconciliation Ceremony, Hahon, 29 January 1998 (Photo: Sarah Storey)

Bougainville — Perceptions and Understanding Yvonne Green

OUR LIVES abound in clichés. In all my preparation and training for Bougainville the cliché that was probably most apt was ‘don’t judge a book by its cover’. This is the essence of living and working in Bougainville. We all arrived in Bougainville armed with a slew of expectations about the locals, life with the army and civilians. Others have written stories describing the activities, the heavy packs, the walks up mountains and the villages. I would like to take the concept of perception and understanding as a basis for my story. My name is Yvonne Green and I was a civilian monitor at Monitoring Team Arawa (MT-A) from May to August 2000. Prior to deployment, my knowledge of Bougainville was general and based on the views and ideas floating around the corridors of AusAID. My knowledge of army life was formed from a childhood watching MASH and, occasionally, war movies. The only time I’d ever heard anyone say ‘Sir’ was on The Bill. Our perceptions are shaped by popular culture, current affairs and news broadcasts. Even the most even-handed story of a war zone can not help but portray goodies and baddies. We saw the PNGDF shooting from Australian-supplied helicopters (baddies) and we saw

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BRA soldiers on patrol throughout the jungle (goodies). So how do we feel when faced with these people — with men trained to kill and who will kill again if necessary? It is here that we must suspend judgement. MT-A had a little office in town where we were rostered to sit and chat with the locals. Its aim was to provide a non-threatening environment where people ranging from a villager in Arawa, to Joseph Kabui, could come and chat. The first time I was on duty alone a truck drove down the road with a man on the back shouting through a megaphone. He was all in black and wearing a balaclava. The truck stopped outside our premises as the tirade was directed at the office of the district manager, which stood above ours. The anger in his voice and the poor quality of the megaphone distorted the sound so that the only words I could pick up were Meekamui, and PNG and Australia always seemingly linked. At the end of his tirade, Mr Balaclava hopped down from the truck, pulled off his balaclava and came over and introduced himself, settling down for a good chat about the Australian Rugby League. Later that evening, an old Meekamui man, who had accompanied the Balaclava man, called into the team site for a cuppa and a biscuit to explain what they had been doing all day, and then proceeded to tell me of his student days in the seminary and we compared our memories of learning Latin at school. Life is always full of surprises in Bougainville. Both these men, once they had made their point, were happy to sit and pass the time with representatives of an organisation they did not agree with, part of a peace they did not support. It is this acceptance of differences and generosity of spirit that more than anything else will bring the peace process forward. Again it demonstrates that people we perceive as frightening and threatening are educated and interesting and ready to chat. A shift at the shopfront could be very quiet, and to pass the time I started work on a cross-stitch a friend had given me to do in my spare time. I thought this would be a good talking point with women. I was wrong. It was a talking point, but with the men. Gnarled old hands, more used to working gardens, held up the cloth to the light to see how I had made the patterns. Younger hands more used to bush knives and guns held a needle and attempted to follow my instructions in bad Tok Pisin. At one point Joseph Kabui came down to the shopfront, saying everyone is talking about my sewing and that he wanted to have a look. One of

my colleagues said that tea and biscuits with a BRA Commander was a good definition of surreal. I think this experience of teaching sewing beats tea and biscuits with the various ex-combatants who came to visit the team site. Why were they so interested? To sit and sew could be considered a pointless western pastime, a product of people of leisure, something alien and possibly even offensive in a place where most people have returned to a subsistence lifestyle to feed their families. Instead, these men recognised and respected a skill and showed their love of creativity. I suppose to them it also showed that the PMG members were also human with interests and skills beyond the basic job in Bougainville. As for the PNGDF, the men who showed us their treasured photos of families back home, the man who was delighted to learn that I had a colleague from the same province as him? Again we have to suspend our television-based judgement of these men, still feared to a degree by the locals, and rather see them as the individuals who make up the machine, not the machine itself. Like any organisation, the PNGDF has good and bad people, but I never had personal contact with someone I could neatly put in the ‘baddie’ category. The locals not only had expectations of the PMG which affected their relationships with us, but Melanesian styles of communication are different and so based on expectations of what the listener wants to hear that effective communication is only possible with deep understanding. If we asked a question like, ‘Should we go left or right?’ we would typically be answered with ‘Yes’. ‘Is the weather always like this?’ ‘Yes’, assuming that this was the answer I wanted to hear. One day we went on patrol to the village of Marerau, high in the mountains behind Arawa. After a three-hour drive in the land cruisers along the bumpy damaged roads we came to the end of the road. We then started our five and a half hour walk up narrow mountain paths, and back down, through knee-deep mud and across rivers. Our guide was the local Chief, Mark, a friendly man ever anxious to please our patrol. At the risk of sounding like a small child we would occasionally ask the eternal question, ‘Are we nearly there?’ ‘Yes,’ Chief Mark would respond, beaming, ‘it is just after this mountain’ or ‘it is just around this bend’ or ‘at the bottom of this hill’. What we found as we reached each

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of these points was another mountain to climb. Mark was telling us each time what we wanted to hear. Yes, our long walk was nearly over. On arrival we discovered that the young men from a neighbouring village, not so welcoming of the PMG, had seen us coming and told our village that we were not allowed to stay overnight. In Mark’s anxiety to make us feel welcome he constantly assured us of our safety and assured us the village would look after us and keep us safe. Unfortunately for us and for them we could not rely on his assurances and had to leave, this time by helicopter. So what did the locals think of us, the PMG? Or more particularly, the Australian civilian and military members of the PMG? Initially there was a fear of Australian involvement in the PMG. A fear based on Australia’s close ties with PNG and the ever-present memory of PNGDF soldiers shooting down unarmed civilians from Australian-supplied helicopters. And, of course, Australia’s role in setting up the Panguna mine could never be forgotten. So there we were, Australians in Bougainville. We can never know what they thought deep down, but many people I chatted to at the shopfront saw the Australian presence as almost a moment of reconciliation between the people of Bougainville and Australia. Many may have seen us as complicit in what had happened to their land but they believed our presence was a genuine offer of help from a neighbour. On a personal level, I never experienced anything but loving care and attention from the women who worked daily at the team site, scrubbing our clothes and generally mothering us. Their extra care, they said, was to thank us for our presence in their town. Of course, there were JJ (Jungle Juice) boys who would stone a passing PMG vehicle, but they were also just as likely to invite us to their parties. To a degree we were cloaked in the magic armour of our uniform. Does the wearing of a uniform put us outside the normal operations of society, or does it give the wearers an arrogance that makes them believe they are outside normal social mores? There are many ways of determining how far the peace process has gone. One of these is the state of the local economy. To report on this we often wandered into the local shops and asked questions about how sales were going, what types of goods were selling well, where did they get their stocks from, etc. Most local shopkeepers would be overflowing with information.

Most got stock from Rabaul but things were changing as more and more opportunities were opening up to them. I was often amazed at their openness to us. In normal circumstances asking questions would be rude and cause your average business person to clam up. But we were in PMG uniform and on peace-monitoring duties. This made our inquisitiveness acceptable. We would also visit the homes of local politicians early in the morning, and pop in on school teachers during class time, knowing that they would speak to us. I will never know if it was the natural friendliness of the people or the official nature of our inquiries that made them open up to us. However, I also felt deep down a cringe that we were all returning to the pre-colonial days of white men/women striding round arrogantly assuming the right to interfere. But perhaps that is heightened sensitivity on my part. Finally, what of civilian/military relations? This again is an essential part of the Bougainville experience. Before we arrived, we civilians were given an enormous amount of briefing and training. A substantial amount of this related to coping with life with the military. We were told what their expectation of us would be and how to fit in with their ways. We were also told that they had expectations of us and our behaviour and would be quick to judge. I have never doubted my ability to get on with other people but as a slightly built, mildly asthmatic female, bad at sport and fairly bookish, I wondered what they would think of me? I had heard that as a female you would end up being left with the cooking and cleaning, that everything is designed for men, and women are never taken into account. These stories were as far from the truth as is possible. Military people are used to moving and changing and working in small teams, then leaving and bonding with other teams. Generally they are all able to get along with people and recognise them for what they are. Some of the men I worked with had never worked with civilians and/or never worked with women. In a work environment I was a totally alien experience for them. However, that never stopped these men from valuing and appreciating my role. It seems to me that in the army you are your role. You are the driver, the sig, the patrol commander, and I learnt quickly to get used to being ‘the civvie’. Even now I find myself, when asked what I did in

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Bougainville, responding by saying that ‘I was a civvie’. Well of course, I always am a civilian, but in PMG terms that was my role and thus my existence and one that I am proud of. Until I spent time in Bougainville I could not understand why people join the army. I had vague visions of gun-loving rednecks. I also could not understand the idea that people would willingly call an officer ‘Sir’ or ‘Ma’am’. That was so alien to me. Living with them for three months has changed my perception of the defence forces and given me an understanding of the desire to serve that so many of them have. When I see a soldier on the street now, I look at them with renewed respect. I don’t want to sound like an advertisement for the defence force or make it seem like Bougainville was a piece of cake. There were times when I had to force myself not to cry tears of exhaustion as we walked up an endless hill with heavy packs on our backs. Times when I was genuinely frightened. Times when I sat frustrated at the team site, left behind by my patrol because where they were going was too dangerous for a female. Times when the military hierarchy and styles of communication horrified me. However, when I look back to my time in Bougainville I think of the importance of my tiny contribution to the history of the island. I think of the friendships I made and the personal challenges I achieved. But most of all I remember the perceptions and judgements we all turned upside down, and the sharing in the cultures and lives of each other.

The Panguna mine, Bougainville (photo: Andrew Caldwell)

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Exorcising a Colonial Past Donald Denoon

BOUGAINVILLE is not a propitious place for Australians. Today’s peace monitors, unlike their colleagues from New Zealand, Fiji and Vanuatu, must transcend a long and mainly unhappy colonial history in order to be accepted. Australians came first in 1914 as soldiers to occupy what had been German territory and would become the League of Nations Mandated Territory of New Guinea. Until the Pacific War, few others were interested in this remote province, so that most culture contact involved the Marist order of Catholic missionaries, and Methodists, both based in the British Solomon Islands. Apart from small-scale goldmining near Panguna, the commercial economy was embodied in a few plantations. When the Pacific War erupted, Japanese forces quickly overran Bougainville, but the ensuing campaigns were savage. The Japanese were soon isolated, and Bougainville was strategically irrelevant. Nonetheless the fighting was ferocious, as American marines established a beachhead at the end of 1943, and from October 1944 Australians replaced them and spent the rest of the war attacking the dwindling Japanese XVII Army. When peace returned, the United 1

Quotations and references are from my Getting Under the Skin: The Origins of the Bougainville Mining Agreement, Melbourne University Press, 2000.

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Nations succeeded the League of Nations in supervising Australian rule, and Australia created a joint Administration over Papua and New Guinea in 1947. This swift succession of rulers did little to endear any of them to villagers. Nor did Australian officials feel as comfortable here as they did on the mainland. After 50 years of civilian administration, a report of 1968 noted that: The people are … noticeably blacker in colour than other New Guinea people; they are strongly colour conscious and regard their skin colour as setting them apart from all other races to the extent that they refer collectively to others as ‘redskins’… [T]here is a strong anti-white feeling which is not directed specifically at the Administration, planter, trader or mission communities, but generally against the white-skin… This was no homogeneous population, nor was there any overarching authority above the 20 or so language communities. Precolonial and colonial village polities sustained and enjoyed a condition described by Eugene Ogan as ‘political atomism’. In 1950 there were 32 plantations which employed labourers from the mainland — local families needed cash for head taxes and school fees, and concentrated on their own cash crops. Relations between people and rulers were sour. In 1962, a thousand Nasioi asked the United Nations to transfer the mandate to the United States, alleging that ‘the Australians treated the Nasioi like dogs, that they had failed to improve the villagers’ lot’. The people’s ambitions and frustration were summed up by a villager in 1967: The Japanese war came in — it was not our war...[but] I stepped in willingly... After the war the government said that because you in your way participated in the Japanese war, from now on I’ll treat you as equal to myself but from that time no change took place and since then I have not been brought up these forty three years. How do you mean not brought up? I do not progress in the standards of living.

In the Koromira area, cults had flourished since 1949, according to a government officer in 1968. He gathered that they hoped for a period of no Government, with no police force or army, when people can live as they do now, with their same worldly goods, with no internal strife and in universal brotherhood. … The Marist Mission is in a similar position to the Administration and has had difficulties with both school and church attendance. Even before the development of the Panguna mine then, relations between villagers and Australians were cool. A party of prospectors arrived in Bougainville in 1964, on behalf of Conzinc Riotinto Australia, the Australian branch of Rio Tinto Zinc of London. Their leader was Ken Phillips, in his early thirties. Neville Robinson, a Papua New Guinean Senior Field Assistant for Native Mining, acted as interpreter and intermediary. Two years later, Edward Teori recalled their arrival in his village, and their discussions: We said ‘We don’t want any prospectors in this area’. They said ‘We have a government licence’. We: ‘It is not right as you have not obtained a licence from the government of the Territory which is yet to be formed. For this reason the company must not come in’. They said ‘If you do not let us in we can return and bring police with us’. We said ‘We have committed no wrong — we are speaking of our own rights’. … Mr Phillips said ‘We are paying good money and if the mine is set up we can pay big money for your labour. I do not think you can prevent me from doing my work, I am acting within the law’. We said ‘…the Queen governs everyone in different countries, but we all have different laws and customs and in our land we think if the copper is all dug up when we get our own government our copper will be gone. We want wealth for our own country. Would you let us do the mining in Australia as you are doing to us here?’ There is no reason to doubt that the villagers opposed the prospect of mining. Drilling rigs, helicopters to haul heavy equipment, and a specialist support ship supported exploration parties as they cast north and south, and were supplied by a specialist ship. On every occasion,

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villagers expressed their continuing opposition. At one hearing Daino Oma of Kokardi insisted: All the people of Bougainville are opposed to giving their land to CRA. CRA already has land in Australia, if they want to work they must work on their own land. Our land is Tambu. And opinion was even more severe among those who declined to address tribunals. Their opinions were known, but set aside. The Minister for Territories, Charles Barnes, came to Kieta to tell the people that there would be no direct benefit for landowners, but ‘the development would be for the benefit of PNG as a whole’. As Australian rule wound down, the copper mine at Panguna rather than the local officials came to represent Australia. It was an awesome mine, bigger than any in Australia, with proportionate impact on the physical and social environments. At the peak of construction, the work force exceeded 10,000, few of whom had social links to Panguna. Almost all artisans were foreign, and two-thirds of the labourers came from other parts of Papua New Guinea. The demographic impact was clear in 1971. Roughly 10,000 men (and less than 900 women) from the rest of the Territory had been drawn to the plantations or the mine. Villagers were already antagonistic to ‘redskin’ plantation labourers, single men who were seen as disruptive. Panguna’s workforce compounded this tension since CRA could not discriminate against people from other parts of the country. The mine was drawing in ‘redskins’ who might well try to establish themselves permanently. The construction phase generated a deep cleavage between Bougainvilleans and other Papua New Guineans. When these resentments gave rise to separatist sentiment and secessionist agitation, it was again the Australian Government which discouraged a referendum, and gave full support and sponsorship to the Papua New Guinea Government when it applied for the termination of the mandate and entry into the United Nations as a single independent sovereign state. ____________________

Whether or not they knew it, Australian peace monitors carried heavy colonial baggage into Bougainville. The recurrent and immensely cheering feature of the discussions among monitors has been the sharp contrast between their values and behaviour and those of their forebears. We may simply list — there is not space to consider — their innovation. For the first time, Australians arrived unarmed, neither alluding to nor relying on superior coercive force. For the first time they came with no evident financial interest (a feature which clearly puzzled villagers). For the first time again, they depended entirely — and transparently — on the good will of village people. For the first time they formed part of a multinational enterprise which was not merely an expression of Australian strategic or financial interests. Few monitors recognised then — or now — how radically they departed from precedents known to and expected among villagers. They may not have achieved the millennial condition of post-colonialism, but they have come close. And on the larger stage of regional relations, they provide an exemplary model for the creative projection of Australian authority. While Australia’s political leaders clamoured and jostled to be photographed in flak-jackets alongside armed members of INTERFET, I am grateful to these peace monitors for presenting a very different image of Australia.

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Appendix A The Burnham Declaration By Bougainville Leaders on the Re-establishment of a Process for Lasting Peace and Justice on Bougainville, July 5–18, 1997 We, the leaders of the people of Bougainville, have met in Burnham, New Zealand, from 5–18 July, 1997, in order to end the war and restore lasting peace on Bougainville, hereby commit ourselves to the establishment of a clear process for the achievement of a political settlement to the war on Bougainville with the Government of Papua New Guinea, and declare that we are united in our common stand on the following: 1. Unity and Reconciliation We recognise that the war on Bougainville has divided our people. In order to achieve lasting peace, we must reconcile with ourselves as leaders to ensure that there is unity and reconciliation among our people at all levels of the community. 2. Process for Negotiation We will work together with the Government of Papua New Guinea to set up a process for negotiations between Bougainville Leaders and the Government of Papua New Guinea. 3. Ending the War As soon as the process referred to under Clause 9 below is established between Bougainville Leaders and the Government of Papua New Guinea, we will jointly bring about an end to the war on Bougainville. 4. Declaration of Cease-fire In order to help create a peaceful environment for a neutral peacekeeping force to come and maintain peace on Bougainville, the Bougainville Leaders urge all parties under force of arms to agree to a declaration of a cease-fire, which shall take effect simultaneously with the arrival of the first contingent of the peace-keeping force on Bougainville. 5. A Neutral Peacekeeping Force 5.1 We believe that a neutral Peacekeeping Force is essential to the peace process. We, therefore, request that such a force be invited to

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Bougainville at the beginning of the process for a period of not more than three years under the auspices of the United Nations. 5.2 We desire also that before a ‘Status of Forces’ Agreement is agreed to by the State of Papua New Guinea and countries contributing to the Peacekeeping Force that the Bougainville Interim Government and the Bougainville Transitional Government be fully consulted, and be party to it. 6. Demilitarisation of Bougainville 6.1 The demilitarisation of Bougainville is an essential step in the peace process. We, therefore, call for the complete withdrawal of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force within a time frame to be agreed to between Bougainville Leaders and the Government of Papua New Guinea. 6.2 As part of this demilitarisation process, there shall also be the laying down of arms by all Bougainvilleans, currently under the force of arms over a period of time, which will be supervised by the Peacekeeping Force in conjunction with the Bougainville Transitional Government and the Bougainville Interim Government. 7. Lifting of Blockade and Removal of Restrictions We agree that there is a need for access throughout Bougainville to relevant donor organisations and other humanitarian agencies, including ICRC and UNICEF, for the implementation of health and education programs, and for the restoration of basic needs. We further undertake to pursue discussions with the Papua New Guinea Government to this end. 8. Political Process We undertake to ensure that the people of Bougainville, as a people, freely and democratically exercise their right to determine their political future. 9. Commencement of Process and Venue for First Meeting We will move to have the first meeting of Bougainville Leaders with the Government of Papua New Guinea no later than September 1997 to set up the process and begin its implementation. We further agree that this meeting be held in a neutral place outside Papua New Guinea or Bougainville.

Declared at Burnham this 18 July 1997. Joseph Kabui Leader of the BIG/BRA Delegation Martin Miriori Sam Kauona

Gerard Sinato Leader of the BTG Delegation John Momis MP Sam Akoitai MP

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Appendix B The Burnham Truce RE-AFFIRMING the principles contained in the Burnham Declaration, July 5–18 1997; REPRESENTATIVES of the National Government of Papua New Guinea (PNG), the Bougainville Transitional Government (BTG), the Resistance, the Bougainville Interim Government (BIG) and the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA), having met in Burnham military camp, New Zealand from 1–10 October 1997, recognise the desirability of taking immediate positive measures: • to cease armed conflict • for peace and reconciliation, and • for the return of normalcy and restoration of services by all parties PENDING a formal meeting of leaders desirably by 31 January 1998, HAVE AGREED, as immediate interim measures, to the following: 1. To respect and promote basic human rights and fundamental freedoms; 2. To refrain from all acts of intimidation and armed confrontation; 3. To promote peace and reconciliation in the community; 4. To lift all restrictions, so as to restore freedom of movement and delivery of services to the people of Bougainville subject to appropriate clearances; 5. That Field commanders of the PNG Security Forces, the Resistance and BRA, and Village Chiefs, meet on a regular basis to consult, review and monitor the implementation of this commitment as well as to consult as required, and resolve any incidents which may threaten or breach these understandings as well as to the aspirations expressed herein; 6. Recommend to the National Government and leaders on Bougainville to immediately invite a neutral regional group to monitor the terms of this agreement.

This agreement shall take effect as of the date of signature. Signed at Burnham Military Camp, Burnham, New Zealand on this Tenth day of October, 1997 PNG National BTG Delegation BIG/BRA Government Delegation Delegation Robert Igara Secretary for Prime Minister & NEC and Delegation Leader

Kapeatu Puarta Legal Adviser (BTG) Delegation Leader

WITNESSED BY The Honourable Rev. Leslie Boseto MP CMG SIG Minister for Home Affairs Government of Solomon Islands

Martin Mirori Secretary (BIG) & Delegation Leader

Rt Honourable Don McKinnon MP Minister of Foreign Affairs & Trade Government of New Zealand

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Appendix C Cairns Commitment on Implementation of the Agreement concerning the Neutral Regional Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) for Bougainville Recalling and reaffirming the agreements and recommendations embodied in the Burnham Truce, signed at Burnham Military Camp, New Zealand, on 10th October 1997 (‘the truce’); Acknowledging with appreciation the willingness of States in the region to respond positively to the invitation to contribute personnel and other forms of support to a neutral Regional Truce Monitoring Group for the purpose of monitoring compliance with the truce; and Committed to co-operating in ensuring respect for the letter and spirit of the Agreement establishing the Truce Monitoring Group (‘the Agreement’), including legislation giving the Agreement the status of municipal law — The Parties to the Burnham Truce (‘the Parties’), meeting in Cairns, Queensland, Australia, hereby declare: 1. The bodies and groups represented will:– (a) comply with the letter and spirit of the Agreement establishing the Truce Monitoring Group; (b) respect the mandate, the international and neutral character, and the personnel including support personnel, together with the premises, equipment, supplies and lines of communication of the Truce Monitoring Group; (c) ensure that the Truce Monitoring Group is safe at all times from attack, interference or hindrance; (d) provide all possible assistance to the Truce Monitoring Group in the performance of its mandate; and (e) urge all other bodies, groups and persons under their authority to do the same; (f) maintain consultations should the need for any supplemental arrangements to the TMG Agreement be required. 2. Consistent with the Agreement establishing the Truce Monitoring Group, the parties agree to establish the Peace Consultative

Committee provided for in the Agreement in order to facilitate consultation and liaison • among themselves; • through the Truce Steering Committee, including the Commander, with the Truce Monitoring Group; and • at the local level. 3. The parties recognise that the role of the Peace Consultative Committee is to review and assess implementation adherence by the signatories to the Truce. The Peace Consultative Committee will receive regular reports from the Truce Monitoring Group on the implementation, progress and success of the Truce. The Peace Consultative Committee will have no direct involvement in the command or the deployment decisions made by the Truce Monitoring Group. 4. The Peace Consultative Committee will have the following composition: (a) Core members: National Government – 3, BRA – 2, BTG – 2, Resistance – 2, BIG – 2. (b) The Chairman will be elected from among the core members. (c) The Committee will determine its working arrangements including frequency of meetings. 5. The Peace Consultative Committee may, by unanimous consent of its members, invite representatives of other groups or bodies or person to become members. This Commitment shall take effect as of the date of signature, and shall be reviewed when the leaders meet in January 1998. Signed in Cairns, Queensland, Australia on this 24th day of November 1997. PNG NATIONAL GOVERNMENT DELEGATION: (signed) Robert Igara Secretary for Prime Minister & NEC and Delegation Leader

BTG DELEGATION: (signed) Kapeatu Puaria Legal Adviser (BTG) & Delegation Leader

BIG/BRA DELEGATION: (signed) Martin Miriori Secretary (BIG) & Delegation Leader

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(signed) Lt. Col. Jeffrey Wiri Sirivi PNG Defence Force (signed) Lt. Col. Raniel Niligur PNG Defence Force (signed) Ludwig Kembu, QPM Deputy Commissioner Police (Operations) Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary

(signed) Hilary Masiria Northern Resistance (signed) Donald Hamao Northern Resistance (signed) Hilary Loni Central Reistance

(signed) Sam Kauona BRA Commander (signed) Steven Topesi BRA Task Force Commander (signed) Peter Naguo Chief of Operations

(signed) (signed) Laurie Patrick Ben Kamda Central Resistance BRA Planner (signed) Jacob Naisy Southern Resistance (signed) David Mikisa Southern Resistance Witnessed by: (signed) The Hon. Rev. Leslie Boseto, CMG, MP Minister for Home Affairs Government of Solomon Islands (Chairman) (signed) (signed) David Ritchie Bede Corry Representative Representative Government of Australia Government of New Zealand

Appendix D Agreement between New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Australia, Fiji, and Vanuatu Concerning the Neutral Truce Monitoring Group for Bougainville The Parties to this Agreement; Recognising the need for cooperation between countries in the South Pacific; Noting that on 10 October 1997 the parties to the Burnham Truce agreed to immediate positive measures to cease armed conflict, for peace and reconciliation and for a return of normalcy and restoration of services in Bougainville; Noting that the Burnham Truce provides for immediate interim measures to be taken, pending a formal meeting of leaders, desirably by 31 January 1998; Noting further that the Burnham Truce called for a neutral regional group to monitor the terms of the Truce; Noting the South Pacific Forum’s endorsement of the recent efforts made by the Government of Papua New Guinea in restoring peace to the island and the Forum’s expression of readiness to assist Papua New Guinea wherever possible in its efforts to bring about a lasting and durable peace to Bougainville Province; Noting further the request of Papua New Guinea and other signatories to the Burnham Truce for States in the South Pacific region to contribute to a Neutral Truce Monitoring Group for Bougainville; Desiring to set out in writing the agreed conditions for contributions to the Neutral Truce Monitoring Group for Bougainville; HAVE AGREED as follows:

Article 1 Definitions In this Agreement: (a) ‘Area of Operations’ means all areas throughout the territory of Papua New Guinea where the Group, or any member of it, is deployed in the performance of its functions, and includes military installations or other premises and lines of communication and supply utilised by the Group;

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(b) ‘Burnham Truce’ means the Truce signed on 10 October 1997 at Burnham Military Camp, New Zealand; (c) ‘Commander’ means the Commander of the Group or such other member or members of the Group who may be authorised by the Commander to undertake all or any of his functions; (d) ‘Group’ means the Neutral Truce Monitoring Group for Bougainville established pursuant to Article 5 of this Agreement and comprising military and civilian personnel contributed by Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, Vanuatu or any other Participating State pursuant to this Agreement; (e) ‘Papua New Guinea Authorities’ means the national and local, civil and military courts and authorities from time to time authorised or designated under the law of Papua New Guinea or by the Government of Papua New Guinea for the purpose of exercising the powers in relation to which the expression is used; (f) ‘Participating State’ means Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, Vanuatu or such other State of the South Pacific region which, with the concurrence of the Parties to this Agreement, contributes personnel to the Group.

Article 2 Peace Consultative Committee The Peace Consultative Committee, established by the Parties to the Burnham Truce pursuant to the Cairns Commitment on the implementation of this Agreement of 24 November 1997, shall receive regular reports from the Commander on the implementation, progress and success of the Burnham Truce. It shall have no direct involvement in the command of the Group or the deployment decisions made by the Commander.

Article 3 Truce Steering Committee 1. There shall be a Truce Steering Committee comprising the Commander and a representative nominated by each of the Participating States. 2. The Truce Steering Committee shall be chaired by New Zealand.

3. The Truce Steering Committee shall consult regularly, including with the Peace Consultative Committee as appropriate, on issues arising from the activities of the Truce Monitoring Group and will meet as required from time to time. It shall have no direct involvement in the command of the Group or the deployment decisions made by the Commander.

Article 4 Application Unless specifically provided otherwise, the provisions of this Agreement shall apply in the Area of Operations only.

Article 5 Mandate of the Group The Participating States shall establish the Group which shall comprise military and civilian members. The mandate of the Group shall be to: 1. Monitor and report on the compliance of the parties to the Burnham Truce with the terms of that Truce. 2. Promote and instil confidence in the peace process through presence, good offices and interaction with the local community. 3. Provide people on Bougainville with information on the truce and peace process.

Article 6 Contribution Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement or mutually determined by the relevant Participating States, each Participating State shall be responsible for the funding of its own participation in the Group.

Article 7 Command and Control 1. During the period of their assignment to the Group, the military members shall remain under national command but shall be under the operational control of the Commander, Arrangements for command of military members may be made between the Participating States separately.

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2. The Commander shall have full authority, subject to any arrangements between Participating States, over the deployment, organisation, conduct and direction of the Group. 3. The Commander may request a Participating State to withdraw any personnel contributed to the Group. The Commander shall give reasons for any such request and a Participating State shall comply forthwith with any such request. 4. A Participating State may withdraw any or all of its personnel contributed to the Group at any time on reasonable notice.

Article 8 Entry into and Exit from Papua New Guinea 1. Members of the Group shall be exempt from passport and visa laws and immigration inspection and restrictions on entering or departing from Papua New Guinea territory. They shall also be exempt from any laws governing the residence of aliens in Papua New Guinea, including registration, but shall not be considered as acquiring any right to permanent residence or domicile in the territory of Papua New Guinea by virtue of this Agreement. For the purpose of such entry or departure, members of the Group are required to have only: (a) an individual or collective movement order issued by the appropriate authority of their respective Participating State; and (b) a personal identity card issued by the appropriate authority of their respective Participating State. 2. Members of the Group may be required to present but shall not be required to surrender their personal identity cards upon demand of an appropriate Papua New Guinea Authority. Except as provided in paragraph 1, the identity card will be the only document required for a member of the Group. 3. If a member of the Group leaves the service of his or her respective Participating State while in Papua New Guinea and is not repatriated, or absents himself or herself without leave for more than twenty-one days, the Commander shall forthwith inform the Papua New Guinea Authorities, giving such particulars as may be required. If an expulsion order against such a person is made by the Papua New Guinea Authorities, the Commander shall take all

responsible steps available to ensure that the person concerned shall be returned to his or her Participating State.

Article 9 Respect for Local Law Members of the Group shall respect the laws of Papua New Guinea and shall maintain strict neutrality and refrain from any action incompatible with the impartial and international nature of their duties or inconsistent with the spirit of the present Agreement.

Article 10 Jurisdiction 1. The following arrangements respecting criminal and civil jurisdiction are made having regard to the special functions of the Group and not for the personal benefit of the members of the Group, and, subject to any arrangements made between Participating States, may be waived by the Commander at his discretion. 2. Members of the Group shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective Participating State in respect of any criminal or disciplinary offences which may be committed by them in Papua New Guinea. Participating States undertake, where appropriate and where national law permits, to commence criminal or disciplinary proceedings in respect of any such offences. 3. Members of the Group shall not be subject to the civil jurisdiction of Papua New Guinea courts, including Village Courts, or other Papua New Guinea Authorities, or to other legal process in any matter relating to their official duties. 4. In those cases where civil jurisdiction is exercised by Papua New Guinea courts or other Papua New Guinea Authorities with respect to members of the Group, the Papua New Guinea courts and other Papua New Guinea authorities shall grant members of the Group sufficient opportunity to safeguard their rights. 5. If the Commander certifies that a member of the Group is unable because of official duties or authorised absence to protect his or her interests in a civil proceeding in which he or she is a participant, or appear as a witness in any matter whether criminal or civil, the

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Papua New Guinea court or other Papua New Guinea Authority shall at the request of the Commander suspend the proceeding until the elimination of the disability, but for not more than ninety days. Property of a member of the Group which is certified by the Commander to be needed by the member for the fulfilment of his or her official duties shall be free from seizure for the satisfaction of a judgment, decision or order. The personal liberty of a member of the Group shall not be restricted by Papua New Guinea court or other Papua New Guinea Authority in a civil proceeding, whether to enforce a judgment, decision or order, to compel an oath of disclosure, or for any other reason. 6. If any civil proceeding is instituted against a member of the Group before any Papua New Guinea court or other Papua New Guinea Authority having jurisdiction, notification shall be given forthwith to the Commander. The Commander shall certify to the court or other Papua New Guinea Authority whether or not the proceeding is related to the official duties of such member. Such certificate shall be conclusive of that fact.

Article 11 Arrest, Transfer of Custody and Mutual Assistance 1. The Commander shall take all appropriate measures to ensure maintenance of discipline and good order among members of the Group including the use of persons authorised by the Commander to police the premises referred to in Article 12 of this Agreement and such areas where the Group, or any member of it, is deployed in the performance of its functions. 2. Persons authorised by the Commander may take into custody any person on the premises referred to in Article 12, without subjecting him or her to any routine of arrest, in order immediately to deliver him or her to the nearest appropriate Papua New Guinea authorities: (a) when so requested by the Papua New Guinea authorities; or (b) for the purpose of dealing with any offence or disturbance on the premises. 3. The Papua New Guinea authorities may take into custody any member of the Group, without subjecting him or her to any routine

of arrest, in order immediately to deliver him or her, together with any items seized, to the nearest appropriate authorities of the Group: (a) when so requested by the Commander; or (b) in cases in which persons authorised by the Commander are unable to act with the necessary promptness when a member of the Group is apprehended in the commission of attempted commission of a criminal offence that results or might result in serious injury to persons or property, or serious impairment of other legally protected rights. 4. The Commander and the Papua New Guinea authorities shall assist each other in: (a) the carrying out of all necessary investigations into offences in respect of which either or both have an interest; (b) the production of witnesses; and (c) the collection and production of evidence, including the seizure of and, in proper cases and where practicable, the delivery of items constituting evidence of an offence. The delivery of any such items may be made subject to their return within the time specified by the authority delivering them. 5. The Commander or the appropriate Papua New Guinea authority, as the case may be, shall notify the other of the disposition of any case in the outcome of which the other may have an interest or in which there has been a transfer of custody under the provisions of paragraphs 2 or 3.

Article 12 Premises of the Group The Commander may establish in Papua New Guinea such areas for Headquarters, camps, training areas, or other premises as may be necessary for the accommodation and the fulfilment of functions of the Group. Without prejudice to the fact that all such premises remain Papua New Guinea territory, they shall be inviolable and subject to the exclusive control and authority of the Commander, whose consent shall be required for the entry of persons onto such premises.

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Article 13 Uniforms, Emblems and Flags 1. Military members of the Group shall normally wear, while performing their official duties, their national military uniform together with such distinctive items of uniform as are prescribed by the Commander. The Commander may authorise the wearing of civilian dress. 2. Each Participating State may display within Papua New Guinea territory its own national flag on Headquarters, camps, training areas, posts or other premises, vehicles, vessels, uniforms or civilian dress and otherwise as decided by the Commander. Other flags or pennants including a distinctive flag for the Group may be displayed in accordance with conditions prescribed by the Commander. 3. Vehicles, vessels and aircraft provided and used by the Group shall retain and carry their respective national markings and licences.

Article 14 Arms Members of the Group will be unarmed.

Article 15 Registration, Licensing and Other Permissions 1. A member of the Group shall not be bound by any law of Papua New Guinea that would require the member to have permission (whether in the form of a licence or otherwise) to: (a) use anything; (b) have anything in his or her possession; (c) register anything; or (d) to do anything in the course of his or her official duties. 2. Without limiting the generality of paragraph 1: (a) vehicles, vessels and aircraft provided or used by the Group shall not be subject to registration and licensing under the laws of Papua New Guinea. Papua New Guinea authorities shall accept as valid, without a test or fee, a permit or licence held by a member of the Group for the operation of vehicles, vessels or

aircraft issued by the State to which the member belongs; and (b) doctors and health staff of the Group shall not be subject to registration and licensing under the laws of Papua New Guinea.

Article 16 Import and Export 1. The Group shall have the right: (a) to import, free of duty or other restrictions, equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods which are for the exclusive and official use of the Group; (b) to clear from customs and excise warehouses, free of duty or other restrictions, equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods which are for the exclusive and official use of the Group; (c) to re-export, free of duty or other restrictions, such equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods; and (d) to dispose of within Papua New Guinea, free of duty or other restrictions, such equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods as are no longer required by the Group. 2. Such importation, clearances, transfer or exportation shall be effected with the least possible delay. A mutually satisfactory procedure, including documentation, shall be mutually determined by the Commander and the Papua New Guinea authorities at the earliest possible date.

Article 17 Taxation and Revenue 1. Members of the Group shall be exempt from taxation by Papua New Guinea on the pay and emoluments received from their respective Participating States. Participating States and members of the Group shall also be exempt from all other direct taxes, fees and charges. 2. Members of the Group shall have the right to import and export, free of duty or other restrictions, their personal effects in connection with their duties in Papua New Guinea.

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Article 18 Communications and Postal Services 1. The Commander shall have authority to install and operate a radio sending and receiving station or stations to make direct contact with the Participating States. 2. The Group shall enjoy, within the Area of Operations, the right of unrestricted communication by radio, telephone, or any other means, and of establishing the necessary facilities for maintaining such communications within and between premises of the Group, including the laying of cables and land lines and the establishment of fixed and mobile radio sending and receiving stations. 3. The Group may process and transport mail addressed to or sent from the Group or members of the Group. Papua New Guinea shall not interfere with the mail of the Group.

Article 19 Freedom and Movement The Group and its members, together with its vehicles, vessels, aircraft and equipment shall enjoy freedom of movement throughout Papua New Guinea. Wherever possible the Commander will consult with Papua New Guinea with respect to large movements of personnel, stores or vehicles on roads used for general traffic. Papua New Guinea shall supply the Group with maps and other information which may be useful in facilitating its movements, including locations of dangers and impediments, in particular mines and unexploded ordnance.

Article 20 Use of Roads, Waterways, Port Facilities and Airfields The Group shall have the unimpeded right to the use of roads, bridges, canals and other waters, port facilities and airfields without the payment of dues, tolls or charges either by way of registration or otherwise, throughout Papua New Guinea.

Article 21 Water, Electricity and Other Public Utilities The Group shall have the right to the use of water, electricity and other public utilities free of charge. The Papua New Guinea authorities shall,

upon the request of the Commander, assist the Group in obtaining water, electricity and other public utilities required, and in the case of interruption or threatened interruption of services, shall give the same priority to the needs of the Group as to essential Government services. The Group shall have the right where necessary to generate electricity for the use of the Group and to transmit and distribute such electricity as required by the Group free from regulation, licensing and charges.

Article 22 Locally Employed Personnel The Group may employ locally such personnel as required. The terms and conditions of employment for locally employed personnel shall be prescribed by the Commander and shall generally, to the extent practicable, follow the practice prevailing in the locality.

Article 23 Deceased Members The Commander, shall have the right to take and retain immediate charge of and dispose of the body of a member of the Group who dies in Papua New Guinea territory.

Article 24 Claims 1. Claims involving the Group in the Area of Operations shall be dealt with in accordance with this Article. 2. Each Party or Participating State waives any claim against any of the other Parties or Participating States in respect of: (a) loss of, or damage (including loss of use) to property owned, hired or chartered by a Party or Participating State and used by the Group; (b) maritime salvage of any vessel or cargo owned by a Party or Participating State and used by the Group; and (c) personal injury or death suffered by any member of the Group; which arises out of any act or omission of any member of the Group in the performance of official duties. 3. Papua New Guinea waives any claims against any of the other Parties or the Participating States in respect of loss of or damage to any of its

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state property and personal injury or death suffered by any person employed by or in the service of the Papua New Guinea Government. 4. A claim by a third party in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property which arises out of any act or omission of a member of the Group in the performance of official duties shall be dealt with by the Group in accordance with the following provisions: (a) the claim shall be filed with the Group, which shall consider the claim and settle it in accordance with the law of Papua New Guinea. Papua New Guinea shall provide such assistance and advice as may be requested by the Group in establishing the applicable law. (b) subject to sub paragraph (d) the cost incurred in satisfying the claim, shall be distributed between the Parties and Participating States, as follows: (i) where one Party or Participating State is solely liable in respect of the claim it shall meet the costs of the claim in full; and (ii) where two or more Parties or Participating States are jointly liable in respect of the claim, or it is not possible to attribute liability in respect of the claim specifically between two or more Parties or Participating States, the cost of the claim shall be borne equally by those Parties or Participating States; (c) payment of an amount in satisfaction of a claim in accordance with these procedures shall be binding and conclusive discharge of the claim; and (d) in relation in claims where there has been no requirement for Papua New Guinea to make a payment under sub paragraph (b), Papua New Guinea shall use its best endeavours to reimburse a Participating State 25 per cent of the cost incurred by the Participating State in satisfying any claim, if requested by the Participating State to do so.

Article 25 Supplemental Arrangements Supplemental details for the carrying out of this Agreement may be made as required between the Government of Papua New Guinea and the Governments of the Participating States.

Article 26 Papua New Guinea Currency 1. Papua New Guinea shall, if requested by the Commander, make available to the Group, against reimbursement in a mutually acceptable currency, Papua New Guinea currency required for the use of the Group, at the rate of exchange most favourable to the Group that is officially recognised by Papua New Guinea. 2. The Group may import into the Area of Operations such amounts of currency, including Papua New Guinea currency, as may be necessary for the effective performance of its mandate.

Article 27 Consultations Any matter arising under this Agreement with respect to its interpretation, application or implementation shall be settled by consultation or negotiation between the Parties and shall not be referred to any third party or tribunal for resolution.

Article 28 Variation and Suspension The Parties may agree at the instance of Papua New Guinea or any of the Parties to a variation or suspension, on reasonable notice, of this Agreement or a part or parts thereof.

Article 29 Entry into Force and Duration 1. This Agreement shall be open for signature by Australia, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, New Zealand, Vanuatu and such other states of the South Pacific region which, with the concurrence of the Parties, contribute personnel to the Group. 2. Each Signatory shall notify the others of the completion of the constitutional formalities required by its laws for the entry into force of this Agreement. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of the later of the two notifications by Papua New Guinea on one part and New Zealand or Australia on the other. The Agreement shall enter into force subsequently for each other Party on the date of notification by that Party.

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3. Unless otherwise mutually determined by the Parties, the Group shall be withdrawn from the Area of Operations by 31 January 1998. The Agreement shall expire on the withdrawal of the Group from the Area of Operations. 4. Expiry of the Agreement shall not affect any liabilities, rights and obligations arising out of the Agreement, and any immunity relating to actions taking place during the period of the Agreement. 5. This Agreement shall prevail over any existing Status of Forces Agreement as between any of the Participating States and Papua New Guinea to the extent necessary to give effect to this Agreement.

Article 30 Depository New Zealand shall be the depository for this Agreement. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned being duly authorised by their respective Governments have signed this Agreement. Done at Port Moresby this Fifth day of December One Thousand Nine Hundred and Ninety Seven

Appendix E Protocol concerning the Peace Monitoring Group made pursuant to the Agreement Between Papua New Guinea, Australia, Fiji, New Zealand and Vanuatu concerning the Neutral Truce Monitoring Group for Bougainville DONE AT PORT MORESBY ON 5 DECEMBER 1997 The Parties to this Protocol; Bearing in mind the Preamble of the Agreement Between Papua New Guinea, Australia, Fiji, New Zealand and Vanuatu Concerning the Neutral Truce Monitoring Group for Bougainville; Taking note of the contents of the Lincoln Agreement on Peace, Security and Development on Bougainville, including the commitment to co-operation in achieving and maintaining lasting peace by peaceful means; Noting that the Lincoln Agreement provides for a permanent and irrevocable ceasefire to take effect at 2400 hours on 30 April 1998; Noting that the Lincoln Agreement provides for the restoration of civil authority in Bougainville, including the transition to civilian peacetime policing and the holding of free and democratic elections to elect a Bougainville Reconciliation Government before the end of 1998; Noting the undertaking by the Papua New Guinea Government to seek to conclude the arrangements required for deployment of a Peace Monitoring Group in Bougainville by no later than 30 April 1998; Noting that the Papua New Guinea Government has agreed to seek the endorsement of the United Nations Security Council for these arrangements, including the appointment of a special observing mission to monitor these arrangements; and Taking note of arrangements for implementation of the ceasefire; HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

Article 1 Definitions Article 1 of the Head Agreement shall be amended as follows: (1) Paragraph (d) shall be amended to read: ‘Group’ means the Neutral Peace Monitoring Group for Bougainville established pursuant to

180

Article 5 of this Agreement and comprising military and civilian personnel contributed by Australia, Fiji, New Zealand and Vanuatu or other Participating States. (2) The following new paragraphs shall be inserted into Article 1 of the Head Agreement: (g) shall be inserted to read: ‘Lincoln Agreement’ means the Lincoln Agreement on Peace, Security and Development on Bougainville signed at Lincoln University, Christchurch, New Zealand on 23 January 1998; (h) shall be inserted to read: ‘Ceasefire’ is the ceasefire agreed to in the Lincoln Agreement; (i) shall be inserted to read: ‘Protocol’ means the Protocol concerning the Peace Monitoring Group made pursuant to the Agreement between Papua New Guinea, Australia, Fiji, New Zealand and Vanuatu concerning the Neutral Truce Monitoring Group for Bougainville, done at Port Moresby on 5 December 1997; (j) shall be inserted to read: ‘Head Agreement’ means the Agreement between Papua New Guinea, Australia, Fiji, New Zealand and Vanuatu concerning the Neutral Truce Monitoring Group for Bougainville, done at Port Moresby on 5 December 1997; and (k) shall be inserted to read: ‘United Nations observers’ means persons appointed as official observers for and in accordance with the procedures of the United Nations, in response to an official request from the Government of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea. (3) The definitions described above, in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this Article, shall apply to both the Head Agreement and the Protocol.

Article 2 Purpose and Legal Effect (a) This Protocol is made in accordance with Articles 25 and 28 of the Head Agreement. (b) References to ‘the Group’ in the Head Agreement, and all provisions establishing and facilitating the operations of the Truce Monitoring Group in the Head Agreement shall apply, by virtue of this Protocol, to the Peace Monitoring Group.

(c) References to ‘the truce’ in the Head Agreement shall apply, by virtue of this Protocol, to the ceasefire. (d) The Head Agreement, read together with this Protocol, shall apply to the ceasefire.

Article 3 Peace Process Consultative Committee Article 2 (Peace Consultative Committee) of the Head Agreement shall be amended to read as follows: There shall be a Peace Process Consultative Committee, established by the parties to the Lincoln Agreement, which shall receive regular reports from the Commander on the implementation, progress and success of the Lincoln Agreement, including the permanent and irrevocable ceasefire which will take effect in Bougainville at 2400 hours on 30 April 1998. It shall have no direct involvement in command of the Peace Monitoring Group or the deployment decisions made by the Commander.

Article 4 Mandate of the Peace Monitoring Group (1) Article 5 (Mandate of the Group) of the Head Agreement shall be amended to read as follows: The Participating States shall establish the Group which shall comprise military and civilian members. The mandate of the Group shall be to: (a) monitor and report on the compliance of the parties involved in the Bougainville peace process to all aspects of the ceasefire; (b) promote and instil confidence in the peace process through its presence, good offices and interaction with people in Bougainville; (c) provide people in Bougainville with information about the ceasefire and other aspects of the peace process; (d) provide such assistance in implementation of the Lincoln Agreement as the parties to the Lincoln Agreement and the Parties to this Protocol may mutually determine and available resources allow; and

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182

(e) such other matters as may be mutually determined by the parties to the Lincoln Agreement and the Parties to this Protocol which will assist with the democratic resolution of the situation. (2) The Peace Monitoring Group will co-operate with United Nations observers in respect of the objectives of the Lincoln Agreement, subject to such terms and conditions as may be mutually determined in consultation between the United Nations and the Parties to this Protocol.

Article 5 Peace Process Steering Committee (1) Article 3 (Truce Steering Committee) of the Head Agreement shall be amended to rename the Truce Steering Committee the ‘Peace Process Steering Committee’. (2) Article 3 (2) of the Head Agreement shall be amended to read: The Chairman of the Peace Process Steering Committee shall be chosen by consultation between the Parties to this Protocol.

Article 6 Consultation and Liaison (1) Any matter arising under this Protocol with respect to its interpretation, application or implementation shall be settled in accordance with Article 27 (Consultations) of the Head Agreement. (2) The Parties shall each designate a point of contact in Papua New Guinea to facilitate liaison and urgent consultations between the Parties.

Article 7 Good Offices The Participating States will continue to offer their good offices in supporting the achievement and maintenance of peace in Bougainville.

Article 8 Entry into Force, Review and Duration of this Protocol (1) This Protocol shall be open for signature by Papua New Guinea, Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, Vanuatu and such other states of the

South Pacific region which, with the concurrence of the Parties, contribute personnel to the Peace Monitoring Group. It shall enter into force upon 1 May 1998 for those Parties which have signed it. Notwithstanding anything in the Head Agreement, the Head Agreement shall remain in force until the entry into force of this Protocol. After entry into force of this Protocol, the Head Agreement will only have force as amended by this Protocol. (2) After 1 May 1998, this Protocol may be acceded to by any of the parties to the Head Agreement listed in (1) which have not signed it by then. or such other states of the South Pacific region which, with the concurrence of the Parties to the Head Agreement as amended by this Protocol, contribute personnel to the Peace Monitoring Group. This Protocol shall enter into force for each such additional Party on the date of notification by that Party of the completion of the constitutional formalities required by its laws for the entry into force of the Head Agreement as amended by this Protocol. Accession to this Protocol by a State which is not a Party to the Head Agreement represents accession to the Head Agreement as amended by this Protocol. (3) Noting the agreements reached by the parties to the Lincoln Agreement regarding restoration of civil authority, including civilian peacetime policing and the holding of free and democratic elections to elect a Bougainville Reconciliation Government before the end of 1998, the Parties agree to consult and review the size, composition and role of the Peace Monitoring Group at intervals of three months, or such other intervals as may be agreed, bearing in mind progress towards restoration of civil authority in Bougainville. Participating States will consult the other Parties before altering the size or composition of their respective contributions to the Peace Monitoring Group. (4) Article 29 (3) of the Head Agreement shall be amended to read: Unless otherwise mutually determined by the Parties, the Head Agreement as amended by this Protocol shall expire on the withdrawal of the Group from the Area of Operations. (5) Article 29 (4) and (5) of the Head Agreement shall apply to this Protocol.

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Article 9 Depository of this Protocol New Zealand shall be the depository of this Protocol. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned being duly authorised thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Protocol. DONE AT on the day of the month of of the year one thousand nine hundred and ninety-eight, in a single original in the English language to be deposited with the Government of New Zealand. (signed) FOR THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA (signed) FOR FIJI (signed) FOR VANUATU

(signed) FOR AUSTRALIA (signed) FOR NEW ZEALAND

Appendix F Lincoln Agreement on Peace, Security and Development on Bougainville The Government of Papua New Guinea, the Bougainville Transitional Government, Bougainville Resistance Force, the Bougainville Interim Government; the Bougainville Revolutionary Army and Bougainville leaders (the ‘Parties’) having met in LincoIn University, Christchurch, New Zealand, from 19–23 January 1998. Praying for the AImighty’s forgiveness, guidance and blessing for their common endeavours; Emphasising their firm commitment to peace by building on the achievements in the Burnham Declaration, Burnham Truce and the Cairns Commitment; Acknowledging the suffering, pain and loss on all sides of the conflict that they have agreed to end forever; Committing themselves to peace, reconciliation and working together for the common good; Engaged in a process of consultation and cooperation, initiated by Bougainvillean leaders, which they will continue; Hereby agree: 1. PEACEFUL MEANS The parties will co-operate to achieve and maintain peace by peaceful means. They also pledge to renounce the use of armed forces and violence, and agree to resolve any differences, by consultation both now and in the future. They confirm also their respect for human rights and the rule of law. 2. EXTENSION OF THE TRUCE The parties agree to extend the period of the Truce currently in force to the 30th of April 1998 to allow for consultation as regards the establishment of the cease-fire. 3. CEASE-FIRE 3.1 A permanent and irrevocable cease-fire will take effect in Bougainville at 2400 hours on 30 April 1998.

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3.2 The parties will co-operate to reduce fear in Bougainville and take urgent steps to co-operate in promoting public awareness of, and respect for, the cease-fire. 3.3 Immediately the cease-fire takes effect, the parties will refrain from use of arms, ammunition, explosives and other instruments of death, injury or destruction in Bougainville. 3.4 The parties will not manufacture, trade or distribute weapons and ammunition. 3.5 The parties will co-operate in accordance with law in reporting and preventing the use, manufacture, importation, sale, trade, exchange of weapons and ammunitions. 3.6 The parties will co-operate with the successor to the TMG in recording, locating and arranging disposal of all arms, ammunition, explosives and other instruments of death, injury and destruction, including parts and ingredients of all the parties in Bougainville. 4. WITHDRAWAL OF DEFENCE FORCE FROM BOUGAINVILLE The parties agree to a phased withdrawal of the PNG Defence Force from Bougainville subject to restoration of civil authority. 5. PEACE MONITORING GROUP 5.1 The Papua New Guinea National Government undertakes to conclude the arrangements required for deployment of the successor to the neutral regional Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) by no later than 30 April 1998. 5.2 The Papua New Guinea National Government will seek: the endorsement of the United Nations Security Council for these arrangements, including the appointment of a Special observing mission to monitor these arrangements. 6. MANDATE OF THE PEACE KEEPING FORCE The Mandate of the Successor to the TMG will be to: 6.1 monitor and report on the compliance of the parties to all aspects of the cease-fire; 6.2 promote and instil confidence in the peace process through its presence, good offices and interaction with people in Bougainville; 6 3 provide people in Bougainville with information about the ceasefire and other aspects of the peace process;

6.4 provide such assistance in restoration and development consistent with this Agreement as the parties may agree and available resources allows; 6.5 assist with the development and training and institution of a Bougainvillean constabulary; 6.6 and such other matters as may be agreed to by the parties which will assist with the democratic resolution of the situation. 7. TRANSITION TO CIVILIAN PEACETIME POLICING The parties will co-operate in: (a) reestablishing the Village Court System in Bougainville; and (b) restoration of civilian peacetime policing, including arrangements that will facilitate the recruitment, training and deployment of Bougainvillean police. 8. RECONCILIATION 8.1 The parties will co-operate in promoting reconciliation between Bougainvilleans and with other individuals, groups and organisations in Papua New Guinea. 8.2 The parties agree to free and democratic elections on Bougainville to elect a Bougainville Reconciliation Government before the end of 1998. 9. REMOVAL OF BOUNTIES AND FREE MOVEMENT 9.1 The Papua New Guinea National Government (a) has confirmed the removal of bounties; and (b) will facilitate the free and unhindered movement Bougainvilleans into, within and out of Papua New Guinea in accordance with law. 10. AMNESTY AND PARDON The Papua New Guinea National Government will: (a) grant amnesty to persons involved in crisis-related activities on all sides; (b) following receipt of advice from the Advisory Committee on the Power of Mercy, recommend pardons for persons convicted of crisis offences.

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11. RESTORATION AND DEVELOPMENT 11.1 The parties will co-operate in restoration and development in Bougainville in both the public and private sectors with particular emphasis on rural areas. 11.2 The Papua New Guinea National Government will seek appropriate forms of assistance from intentional organisations, foreign governments, all organisations for restoration and development in Bougainville. 11.3 Assistance for restoration and development in Bougainville will, to the maximum practical extent, be sought and administered so as to promote Bougainvillean participation. 11.4 The Papua New Guinea National Government will prepare an Indicative Program in consultation with the parties to help secure funding and other resources to assist in restoration and development in Bougainville. 11.5 The parties agree to cooperate in restoring normalcy, including the return of Bougainville in care centres to their villages and resuming development in Bougainville by acting without delay to: (a) facilitate communications and access to villages on Bougainville; (b) provide essential services such as health and education. 12. CONSULTATION LIAISON The parties AGREE to promote consultation, co-operation and liaison at the political level among Bougainvilleans and with the Papua New Guinea National Government. 13. POLITICAL ISSUE 13.1 The parties agree to meet again in Bougainville to address the political issue before the end of June 1998. 13.2 Officials will meet as required to prepare for such meetings. 14. PUBLIC AWARENESS The parties will co-operate in promoting public awareness of, and respect for, this agreement.

15. ANNEXES TO THIS AGREEMENT AND SUBSIDIARY ARRANGEMENT Detailed arrangements for implementation and development of this Agreement may, by agreement, be embodied in Annexes or subsidiary arrangements to this Agreement. 16. ONGOING CO-OPERATION In signing this Agreement the parties whose signatures appear below commit themselves to working together for peace, justice, security development in Bougainville by: (a) co-operating with each other; and (b) promoting a bipartisan approach in the National Parliament and in the community as a whole. Done at Lincoln, Christchurch, New Zealand this 23rd day of January 1998.

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Appendix G Table 1 PMG Personnel — Country and Function — Early 2000 and Early 2001 Country

Logistical Headquarters Support Team

Monitoring & Liaison Teams

Total

2000

2001

2000

2001

2000

2001

2000

2001

Australian Military

68

49

120

84

54

17

242

150

Australian Civilian

3

4

—

0

15

10

18

14

New Zealand Military

7

3

4

7

18

9

29

19

Fiji Military

1

2

—

0

9

4

10

6

Vanuatu

2

1

—

0

11

5

13

6

Total

81

59

124

91

107

45

312

195

Source: Figures provided by the Office of the Chief Negotiator, Peace Monitoring Group, Arawa, and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra.

3

4

2

2

22

New Zealand Military

Fiji Military

Vanuatu

Total

8

1

1

1

2

3

2001

21

2

2

5

3

9

2000

9

1

1

1

2

4

2001

Arawa

23

3

2

3

3

12

2000

7

1

0

3

2

1

2001

Monitoring Team

Tonu

15

2

1

1

3

8

2000

9

1

1

2

2

3

2001

Monitoring Team

Buka

26

2

2

5

3

14

2000

12

1

1

2

2

6

2001

Liaison Team

107

11

9

18

15

54

2000

45

5

4

9

10

17

2001

Total

Source: Figures provided by the Office of the Chief Negotiator, Peace Monitoring Group, Arawa, and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra.

11

Australian Civilian

2000

Buin

Monitoring Team

Wakunai

Monitoring Team

Australian Military

Country

Table 2 PMG Monitoring and Liaison Teams by Country — Early 2000 and Early 2001

Appendix H

Glossary and Abbreviations

ADF AFP AO AusAID BDPC BGV BIG BPC BRA BRF BRG BTG BWPF BDPC BCA CBJLOEB CBPM & RC CEC

Australian Defence Force Australian Federal Police Area of Operations Australian Agency for International Development Bana District Peace Committee Bougainville Bougainville Interim Government Bougainville Peoples Congress Bougainville Revolutionary Army Bougainville Resistance Forces Bougainville Reconciliation Government Bougainville Transitional Government Bougainville Women for Peace and Freedom Bana District Peace Committee Bougainville Constituent Assembly Central Bougainville Joint Law and Order Enforcement Body Central Bougainville Peace Monitoring and Reconciliation Committee Congressional Executive Council

194

CMCC CO COC COE COFS COMD DFAT DM EU GOPNG G17 IFRC JA JJ JLOF JLOSC KWLA LCH LCM8 LOES LST LTB LCOE MDF MFAT MOB SQD MT MTT MTB MTA MTW MTP MTG NEC

Combined Movements Coordination Centre Commanding Officer Council of Chiefs Council of Elders Chief of Staff Commander Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australia) District Manager European Union Government of Papua New Guinea Group comprising 17 members of parliament from the PNG islands International Federation of Red Cross Joint Adviser Home-brewed alcohol (Jungle Juice) Joint Law and Order Force (Buin) Joint Law and Order Sub-Committee (Buin) Kieta Wharf Landowners Association Landing Craft Heavy Landing Craft Medium Bana Law and Order Enforcement Service Logistic Support Team Liaison Team Buka Leitana Council of Elders Mekamui Defence Force Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (New Zealand) Mobile Squad Monitoring Team Monitoring Team — Tonu Monitoring Team — Buin Monitoring Team — Arawa Monitoring Team — Wakunai Monitoring Team — Province Meeting National Executive Council

NGO NZ NZDF OBA ODA OPSO OSB PLC PWCB PAM PL PMC PMG PNG PNGDF POM PPC PPCC RPIR RPNGC RFMF SDCW SDWPFG TDWC TMG TMT UXO UBWPFG UNOMB UNPOB

VMF

Non-government Organisation New Zealand New Zealand Defence Force Office of Bougainville Affairs Overseas Development Agency Operations Officer Overseas Services Bureau Police Liaison Committee Provincial Women’s Council of Bougainville Peace Awareness Meeting Platoon Peace Monitoring Committee Peace Monitoring Group Papua New Guinea Papua New Guinea Defence Force Port Moresby Provincial Police Commander Peace Process Consultative Committee Royal Pacific Island Regiment Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary Royal Fiji Military Force Siwai District Council of Women Siwai District Women for Peace and Freedom Group Telei District Peace Committee Truce Monitoring Group Truce Monitoring Team Unexploded Ordnance United Bana Women’s Peace and Freedom Group United Nations Observer Mission Bougainville United Nations Political Office on Bougainville (to be renamed UNOMB — United Nations Observer Mission on Bougainville) Vanuatu Mobile Force

195

Notes on Contributors

Shane Austin: Detective Sergeant, has been a member of the Australian Federal Police for 19 years, mainly in Criminal Investigation. He has interspersed this work with service as a police trainer and with international policing. He has served twice as a UN Peace Keeper in Cyprus. He was Law and Order Adviser to the PMG in Bougainville, and was CID Adviser to the Royal Solomon Islands Police. He now works in the Pacific Islands Liaison Office supporting regional police operations and assisting in the development of Pacific Region law enforcement policy. Melissa Bray: Desk Officer, International Law Section, Legal Branch, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade; was a Civilian Monitor in Buin. Colonel R.J. (Bob) Breen: Is a military historian and Army Reserve officer with a keen interest in Australian peace support operations. He serves as Colonel (Operations Analysis) at Land Headquarters in Sydney and has conducted research in Somalia, Rwanda, Mozambique, the Middle East, Bougainville and East Timor. He has published two books on ADF operations in Somalia. In 2001 he published Mission Accomplished — East Timor: ADF

198

Participation in INTERFET and Giving Peace a Chance — ADF Peace Support Operations in Bougainville in 1994. His next book will be A Good Thing Worth Doing — Peace Monitoring in Bougainville 1997–1998. In 1998 and 1999 he designed and supervised training for nine groups of Australian Public Service peace monitors for service in Bougainville and advised commanders of the Peace Monitoring Group. In 2000 and 2001 his research focused on ADF operations in East Timor. Lawrie Cremin: Desk Officer, Pacific Islands Branch, DFAT (on posting to AHC Honiara, October 1999). PMG 3 & 4, Senior Civilian Monitor MT Buin; Civilian Negotiator HQ Arawa. Donald Denoon: Professor of Pacific Islands History, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, ANU, was head of the History Department at the University of Papua New Guinea and is a member of the UPNG Council. His latest book is Getting Under Their Skins: Australia and the Making of the First Bougainville Agreement (MUP, 2000). Major Luke Foster: Joined the Army in 1979. After Officer Cadet School Portsea, he was commissioned into the Ordnance Corps. He transferred to the Infantry Corps in 1983, and has had regimental appointments. This career has been interspersed with appointments in training, and as Staff Officer at the Directorate of Infantry. From 1994 to 1996 Luke was a Training Adviser to the Vanuatu Mobile Force, for which he was awarded a Conspicuous Service Medal. After attending the Army Command and Staff College in 1997, he was posted to Army Headquarters. The most enjoyable aspect of this posting was his tour to Bougainville as Operations Office, Monitoring Team Arawa over Christmas/New Year 1998/1999. Afterwards he was posted to 2 RAR as Second in Command, and joined the Battalion in East Timor. He has completed a MA in International Relations. He lives in Canberra with his wife, Lorraine, and was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in 2000. Jan Gammage: Program Officer, Infrastructure and Reconstruction Section, PNG Branch, AusAID; worked in the Administrative College of Papua New Guinea in the 1970s, before returning to Australia

and taking up an appointment in AusAID. She lived in Port Moresby in 1972–76, and was a member of the first Truce Monitoring Team in Bougainville in 1997–98. Yvonne Green: Became interested in aid as a student of foreign policy and international relations at university. She was a Civilian Monitor at Monitoring Team from May to August 2000, which proved to be a fascinating and rewarding experience. She had volunteered because of the challenge and the chance of hands-on experience in the peace process; and she looks forward to similar opportunities. Tracey Haines: An Indigenous person from the Kamilaroi people of northern NSW, joined the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in 1993. She has lived in Hobart and Darwin and now resides in Canberra. Tracey has a Bachelor of Education degree from the University of Tasmania and Canberra and a Masters degree in Public Policy from the Northern Territory University. Her background is in Aboriginal education where she has worked as a teacher and home/school liaison officer. Ewan Macmillan: Executive Officer, PNG Section, Papua New Guinea/ New Zealand Branch, DFAT. Former Major in the Australian Army. PMG 3 & 4, Strategic Analyst, HQ Arawa. Brigadier B.V. (Bruce) Osborn: Director-General Career Management — Army in Defence Personnel Executive. Brigadier Osborn has 30 years experience in the Defence Force (including service with 9 RAR in Vietnam in 1968 and 1969). In 1995 he was appointed Director General Intelligence Operations. In April 1998 he was appointed Commander of the PMG. For this and other service he was appointed a Member of the Order of Australia in the Queen’s Birthday 1999 Honours. Trina Parry: Was a Defence civilian when she volunteered for service in Bougainville, from July to November 1998. She was based in Wakunai in Patrol 64, which comprised personnel from Australia, New Zealand and Vanuatu. Patrols were mainly by helicopter insertion and were physically and mentally demanding. The experience changed her views on the world, and emphasised her

199

200

good fortune in living in Australia. The main impact on her life was that she married the second in command. He bossed her around for four months: now it’s her turn. Rhys Puddicombe: Coordinator, International Organisations and Legal Division (ILD), DFAT. He is also working on conservation issues (including Kakadu, whales) in the Environment Branch, ILD. He was First Secretary, Australian High Commission, Port Moresby (1995–98); Deputy Leader and Chief Negotiator, Truce Monitoring Group (TMG 2); then Senior Negotiator, Peace Monitoring Group (PMG 2). Anthony Regan: Fellow of the State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Project, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, ANU, specialises in constitutions, decentralisation and internal conflict in the Third World. He has advised governments in Papua New Guinea and Uganda and parties to the Bougainville peace process. Andrew Rice: Senior Manager in the Policy Group, Chief Minister’s Department, ACT Government, since October 2000, previously worked in the Department of Defence as an intelligence analyst and policy officer. He was a civilian truce monitor in Bougainville, and has been involved in assembling the International Force East Timor (INTERFET). Katherine Ruiz-Avila: Has worked with AusAID since January 1996, and was seconded to the Peace Monitoring Group's Wakunai team site in late 1998. She is now posted with AusAID to the Australian High Commission in Port Moresby as Second Secretary (Law & Justice). Rohan Titus: Executive Officer in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. He was desk officer in the PNG Section in 1997, assisting with arrangements for the Honiara talks of mid-1997, and present at the talks in Cairns and Lincoln. He served in the Truce Monitoring Group in Buka. Monica Wehner: Former Administrator of the State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Project, Australian National University, is now a doctoral student at Melbourne University.

Bougainville in its regional context

NEW IRELAND

Wewak

Rabaul BUKA ISLAND

Madang NEW BRITAIN

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Arawa

BOUGAINVILLE

Lae

Gulf of Papua

Port Moresby

0

AUSTRALIA

100

200

SOLOMON Honiara ISLANDS

300

kilometres

FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA

PALAU

KIRIBATI

NAIRU PAPUA NEW GUINEA

BOUGAINVILLE SOLOMON ISLANDS

TUVALU

VANUATU

FIJI

Cairns Townsville

NEW CALEDONIA

AUSTRALIA Brisbane

Sydney Canberra NEW ZEALAND

Christchurch

202

Bougainville: locations of peace monitors

NISSAN IS

0

20

40

60

kilometres

PMG logistic support team PMG team sites

PACIFIC OCEAN BUKA Tinputz

WAKUNI

BO

UG AI

LOLOHO ARAWA Kieta Aropa Panguna Koromira

NV

ILL E

Torokina

Motupena Pt

Oria TONU

OEMA I

BUIN Kangu Beach

SOLOMON SEA

TAURATO I

EA IN S GU AND W L NE N IS A PU MO PA LO SO

OVAU I

Bougainville and the mining district

NISSAN IS

0

20

40

60

kilometres

Kongara region

Hahalis

PACIFIC OCEAN Hutjena Tinputz Kunua Wakuni

Manetai Torokina

Kieta ARAWA Panguna Guava Aropa Koromira Orami Boku Kongara

Tonu

Tabogo

Buin Kangu Beach

SOLOMON SEA

TAURATO I

EA IN S GU AND W L NE N IS A PU MO PA LO SO

OEMA I

OVAU I

203