Wielding the Sword While Proclaiming Peace: Views from the LDS Community on Reconciling the Demands of National Security with the Imperatives of Revealed Truth

WIELDING THE SWORD WHILE P OCLAIMING PEACE: Views from the LDS Community on Reconciling the Demands of National Security with the Imperatives of Revealed Truth Edited by Kerry M. Kart chner and Valerie M. Hudso n A Symposium for LOS National Security Professionals 16-17 May 2003

ISBN 0-8425-2579-3

11 111 11111111 1111 111 1111

9 780842 525794

~ DAVID M. KENNEDy'CENS TER .....~ FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

ISBN: 0-8425-2579-3

Wielding the Sword While Proclaiming Peace: Views from the LDS Community on Reconciling the Demands of National Security with the Imperatives of Revealed Truth

Wielding the Sword While Proclaiming Peace: Views from the LDS Community on Reconciling the Demands of National Security with the Imper atives of Revealed Truth Edited by Valerie M. Hudson and Kerry M. Kartchner

David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies, Brigham Young University © 2004 by Brigham Young University. All rights reserved

Printed in the United States of America

ISBN: 0-8425-2579-3

Contents Preface by Jeffrey FRinger ..... .

....... vii

Acknowledgments

....... viii

Introduction by Kerry M Kartchner ........ ........................................................ .................. ............ ............ ix

Part I Honoring the Contributions of Distinguished LDS National Security Professionals and Scholars 1.

A Tribute to Paul Y. Hammond ............... .... . by Valerie M Hudson

2.

Ethical and International Affairs: Some Personal Encounters ..................................... 3 by Stanley A. Taylor

.............................. .......... .... ........ 1

Part II Toward an LDS Doctrine of War and Peace 3.

Waging War While Proclaiming Peace ...................................................................... 11 _by Michael K. Young, Keynote Address

4.

Power's Reality, Power's Illusion: Policy at the Intersection of the Two Kingdoms ......................................................................................... .................. 27 by Valerie M Hudson

5.

U.S. National Security Strategy and the Gospel: Nexus and Divergence .................. 35 by Steven A. Hildreth

6.

From Whence Come Wars and Fighting Among You? An Integration of Secular and Sacred .................................................................................................... .43 by Stanley A. Taylor and Jeremy 0. Evans

Part III Is Just War Compatible with LDS Theology? Competing Viewpoints 7.

YES-The Book of Morn10n as a Touchstone for Evaluating the Theory of Just War. .............................................................................. .... .......... ........ 57 by John Mark Mattox

8.

NO-Murder to Get Gain: LDS Thoughts on U.S. Elements of National Power ......................................................................................................... 67 by Mark E. Henshaw

Part IV LDS Theology and National Security: Policy Perspectives 9.

War and Conscience: An LDS Perspective ............. ................................................... 79 by David M Kirkham

10.

The ' Teancum Option' and Modem LDS National Security Thought.. ..................... 87 by Ryan Chavez

I!.

Mass Destruction: Historical and LDS Perspectives ............................. ................... 101 by Gary L. Stradling

12.

Just War in Iraq? Arab Radical and Refonnist Perspectives .................................... 107 by Brent J Talbot

Part V Are the Strategy and Doctrine of Preemption Compatible with LDS Theology? Competing Viewpoints 13.

YES-Preemption Doctrine: Self Defense or Indefensible? .................................. 129 by Eric T Jensen

14.

NO-A Critique of the U.S. Security Doctrine of Preemptive Military Attacks: Monnon 4:4 ............................................................................................................... 139 by Fred W Axelgard

Part VI Reprinted Selections from the First Volume IS.

What Should America's National Security Objectives Be? The Problems and Possibilities of an LDS Perspective (Abridged) ................................................. lSI by Valerie M Hudson

16.

Securing a Nation: An LDS Perspective on Post-Cold War Strategies for National Security ....................................................................................................... 157 by Joseph C. Seeger

17.

A Case for Monnon Christian Pacificsm ................................................................. 163 by Eugene England

18.

Security and Morality in a Contingent World .......................................... ........ :........ 169 by Paul Y. Hammond

Afterthoughts ,on the 2003 Symposium by Valerie M Hudson ............................ .. About the Contibutors ................................................... ..

........ ............. ............ ............ 181 .. .... ... " ....... .. ......................... 185

vii

Preface This publication marks the return to a subject first explored a decade ago by Dr. Kerry M. Kartchner and Professor Valerie M. Hudson in their book Moral Perspectives on Us. Security Policy: Views from the LDS Community. That book was drawn from a 1993 conference held at the Kennedy Center. Ten years later they explore how thinking on that topic has developed over the last decade. We were pleased to be involved in the first publication and are equally pleased to be involved in this one. The Kennedy Center is proud to be supportive of the efforts of scholars like Kartchner and Hudson. The publication of this book also serves to re-emphasize our commitment to and support of research and scholarship in international affairs. It is a vital and necessary companion to our efforts in undergraduate education. Furthermore, we take seriously the idea that a people's faith and beliefs can influence and inforn1 their professional activities. It is that nexus that particularly interests us in this work. I wish to thank the authors and conference participants, as well as Kennedy Center Publications staff, for their work in preparing this volume. Finally, I should thank the contributors to the Kennedy Center Endowment who make possible our support of research and publications. Jeffrey F. Ringer Director, David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies Brigham Young University Provo, Utah February 2004

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Acknowledgments

In May 2003, a conference was held at the new BYU Milton Barlow Center in Georgetown for Latter-day Saint national security scholars, professionals, and students entitled, "Wielding the Sword While Proclaiming Peace: Reconciling the Demands of National Security with the Imperatives of Revealed Truth in the Dispensation of the Fullness of Times." The conference was sponsored by the David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies, as well as the Washington Seminar Program of Brigham Young University. There were approximately 100 attendees, including students, faculty, and national security professionals. Considerable collaborative efforts go into organizing, sponsoring, and conducting a conference such as this one. The editors wish to gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Ryan Chavez, Tom McIlvain, Steve Hildreth, and Robert Griffiths in organizing and conducting the conference. They also wish to express their appreciation to Jeff Ringer, Scott Dunaway, Cory Leonard, Marilyn Reynolds, and Devin Christensen for their help in sponsoring the conference, making the building available, supporting the travel arrangements for speakers, assisting with the preparation of the manuscript, and countless other contributions.

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Introduction and Overview Kerry M Kartchner

It cannot be a coincidence that so much of modem scripture is devoted to accounts of nearly continuous warfare, especially between the Nephites and the Lamanites. As one author in this volume notes, "It seems clear that the rich reservoir of revelatory guidance in the Book of Mormon, on the matter of war, has come to us by Divine design" (Mattox). Neither is it a coincidence that Latter-day Saints reportedly make up a far greater proportion of the armed services of the United States than would normally be reflected by their proportion in the general population.! This reflects, I am sure, more than the traditional loyalty to nation that is encouraged by our commitment to good citizenship. I think it is also symptomatic of a deep cultural sense that national security is, as a matter of constitutional principle, the government's foremost responsibility, that all other freedoms, rights, privileges, and prosperity that we may enjoy are based on a secure domestic and international tranquility. Yet, despite our loyalty to the Constitution of the United States, and our devotion to principles of good citizenship, and our endorsement of military service, there are few efforts in print to systematically explore the implications for current national security dilemmas of modem revelation, scripture, and Latter-day Saint doctrine. 2 The present volume is an attempt to address that shortcoming. Most of what follows constitutes the proceedings of a conference of Latter-day Saint national security professionals held in May 2003 in Washington, D.C. There were three basic motivations for holding such a conference and for making its proceedings available to the public. The first objective was to promote a sense of community among those Latter-day Saints who have chosen to pursue careers in national security and foreign policy. By focusing on national security and foreign policy specialists, we explicitly acknowledge that this is a legitimate and honorable profession for Latter-day Saints, particularly in this era when peace has been taken from the earth and safety and security issues dominate the national political and spiritual agenda. Toward this end, in putting together the conference program, we did not assign topics to selected speakers but put out a general call for papers to see what our fellow professionals were thinking about, to see what current issues preoccupied their time and attention, and to provide a forum for giving voice to those analytical efforts. It is our primary aspiration that this volume, then, will promote a sense of community among Latter-day Saint professionals in the fields of national security, foreign policy, and international relations-one that will eventually be shared by a wider public. The second objective was to encourage intellectually rigorous, academically systematic, and scripturally sound thinking about the application of the gospel, as reflected in modem revelation, to our professional pursuits and responsibilities, that is, to issues of national security policy. This objective is premised on the notion that there need be no discontinuity or contradiction between our professional endeavors and our private convictions. It is also premised on the desire to promote professional legitimacy for those who would address the broader Latter-day Saint community on issues of national security and foreign policy.

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The third objective for holding this symposium was to identify, elaborate, and advocate morally sound and politically sustainable solutions to current national security policy issues that are compatible with modem scripture and revelation, and the teachings of modem prophets, that address current issues of American foreign and defense policy. For the purposes of this volume, we have necessarily restricted our focus for the most part to the security policies of the United States (the treatment of Arab policies by Brent Talbot is an exception). This is not to say that the policies of other nations have no relevance or bearing on the moral dilemmas of a global environment, only that this is a necessary first step. It is our intention, in future efforts, to expand our scope to include an examination of the security policies of other nations and international organizations, subjecting them to the same principles and standards we apply herein to U.S. national security.

The Central Dilemma of the Latter-day Saint National Security Professional The title we have given this volume is "Wielding the Sword While Proclaiming Peace: Views from the LDS Community on Reconciling the Demands of National Security with the Imperatives of Revealed Truth." This choice of title warrants some explanation. Because peace has been taken from the earth, as Joseph Smith was forewarned in 1835 (see Doctrine and Covenants I :35), it is necessary that We should have to resort to defending ourselves from time to time through force of anns. This is what we mean by "wielding the sword." We considered using the more common phrase "living by the sword," but we do not believe that accurately characterizes our professional endeavors. Most of us are not in the position of having to "live by the sword," meaning that we do not resort by choice to deadly force to resolve all conflicts. But we are commanded to "defend our families even unto bloodshed" (see Alma 43:47), and it is clear that there are occasions when we must take up the sword in our own defense, as many (but not all) of the following chapters will assert. On the other hand, we are also under commandment to "renounce war and proclaim peace" (see Doctrine and Covenants 98: 16). Valerie and I have long believed that the central dilemma facing us as Latter-day Saint national security professionals is how to reconcile the seemingly conflicting commandments to "defend our families even unto bloodshed" on the one hand and to "renounce war and proclaim peace" on the other hand. This volume is a fundamental effort to address this seeming paradox.

The Moroni Model The reader will note throughout the following chapters repeated references to Captain Moroni, and that is entirely appropriate because Captain Moroni represents the clearest example of how to resolve the above dilemma. Captain Moroni took command of the Nephite annies at the age of twenty-five, approximately seventy-two years prior to the birth of Christ in the Old World. It was a period of widespread danger, when wars and rumors of war were rampant throughout the land. The nation Moroni served was beset by traitors within and ravaging annies without. In Alma Chapter 48, the great chronicler Monnon says this of Moroni: " ... If all men had been, and were, and ever would be, like unto Moroni, behold the very powers of hell would have been shaken forever; yea, the devil would never have power Over the hearts of the children of men." He then compares Moroni, a professional soldier, with Ammon, the son of Mosiah, and Alma and his sons, "for they were all men of God" (Alma 48: 17-18).

INTRODUCTION

This validates the notion that serving in the military can be among the most honorable professions, and there need be no discontinuity between living the principles of the gospel (i.e., proclaiming peace) and promoting the nation's secular security (wielding the sword). Mormon further describes those characteristics of Moroni that serve as our guide for reconciling the commandment to "renounce war and proclaim peace" on the one hand, and the commandment to "defend your families even unto bloodshed" on the other. According to Mormon, Moroni (see Alma 48:11-13): 1) Did not delight in bloodshed 2) Took joy in liberty and the freedom of his country and brethren 3) Was humble and grateful for the blessings and privileges God had bestowed upon him and his people 4) Labored exceedingly for the welfare and safety of his people 5) Was finn in the faith of Christ 6) Had sworn an oath to defend his people

These principles, then, may be considered the starting point for reconciling the central dilemma we have posed for consideration by this volume.

Overview This volume has been divided into five parts. Part I begins with a tribute by Valerie Hudson to the distinguished career of Paul Y. Hammond, whom the editors consider the pioneer of modem Latter-day Saint national security scholars. Hammond spoke at our first conference in 1993, and his remarks at that time have been reprinted in this volume. His career spans the modem era of nuclear weapons and politics, and thus he has been an astute commentator on most of the critical issues we still face today. His body of work exemplifies the academic curiosity of a world class scholar who has been unafraid to tackle the most secular of security policy issues. We have then included remarks by Stan Taylor regarding the very kind of ethical dilemmas routinely encountered by Latter-day Saint practitioners and scholars of national security policy. Taylor introduces the key measure of merit for Latter-day Saint national security professionals: what is "right" and what is "wrong" in terms of any given policy alternative, from a moral and ethical perspective-especially one informed by Latter-day Saint theology and conviction. The editors consider Taylor, like Hammond, to be a leading example of someone who has applied Latter-day Saint moral perspectives to pressing issues of national security policy. The reader is advised not to overlook his footnotes, which point to a rich literature of books on moral and ethical constraints as applied to international affairs and public policy. Part II leads off with the May 2003 conference's keynote address by Michael Young. His contribution reviews the evolution of "just war" doctrine, showing how this doctrine has been stretched throughout history to justifY almost any military campaign. But perhaps even more importantly, Young affirms through the experiences of his daughter, who has embarked on a career in the U.S. Air Force, that a decision to make the armed forces one's chosen profession can be reconciled with, even justified by, modem scriptural teachings regarding the right to defend our liberties, our homes, our families, and our right to worship as our conscience dictates. Valerie Hudson lays a foundation for distinguishing between the applications and definition of "power" as seen through the perspective of traditional political realism and applied in the kingdom

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of men, and the power that derives from the gospel and characterizes relationships in the kingdom of God. Steve Hildreth eloquently sketches areas of divergence between traditional U.S. national security objectives and gospel-derived interests. Stan Taylor and Jeremy Evans then take the classical international relations framework, which categorizes the causes of war into three levels of analysis-man, the state, and the international system-and compares these to scriptural references to the causes of war. Part III provides two perspectives on comparing traditional just war doctrine to Latter-day Saint scripture and doctrine. John Mark Mattox argues that a good case can be made for supporting the traditional just war criteria on the basis of Book of Mormon scripture and refers to Mormon's account of the life of Captain Moroni as "the most comprehensive case study on just war contained in holy writ." Mark Henshaw takes on the traditional Christian just war doctrine, arguing that these principles don't hold up in all cases. He then underscores the thesis that doctrines of "just war" must be supplemented by doctrines of "just diplomacy" and "just economics." He asserts that both Latter-day Saint perspectives on U.S. history and the Book of Mormon show potential failings in traditional just war criteria and principles. In Part IV David Kirkham examines the role of "higher law" in trumping secular civil law, and provides an insightful review of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints' position on conscientious objection. Ryan Chavez fearlessly takes on the highly controversial subject of political assassination as an instrument of national security policy, using the Book of Mormon account ofTeancum's slaying of the wicked usurper Amalickiah, who he blamed for causing the deaths of thousands of Nephites and Lamanites and needlessly prolonging an already protracted and bloody war, as a case study. He places the question of targeting individual enemy leaders in a scriptural, historical, and contemporary legal context. If individual men are the source of widespread suffering and misery, and their decisions are the cause of war, then why should whole societies be made to bear the consequences of an individual leader's lust for power? Should they not be the target of violence rather than their nations? This topic seems particularly relevant in light of the U.S. focus on finding and bringing to justice key individuals like Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden. Chavez takes this subject on, incorporating the language of war, with references to "enemy command structures," "tactical versus strategic preemption," "covert operations," and "risk/reward ratios." Gary Stradling takes on a no less contentious issue in addressing historical and Latter-day Saint perspectives on weapons of mass destruction. Brent Talbot lends us his expertise in Middle Eastern affairs through a discussion of radical and reformist thought in modem Islam. While exploring the depth of anti-Americanism in the Arab world, he explains why rising frustration in the Middle East is improperly directed at the United States and the West by government-controlled Arabian media using the West as a scapegoat for their own bad governance, and Arab Islamists who blame the West for their own self-inflicted problems. In Part V, two authors examine, from competing perspectives, the doctrine of preemption recently made an issue by the Bush Administration's public emphasis on preemption as one instrument in the war on terrorism. Eric T. Jensen argnes that gospel precepts of self-defense support a doctrine of preemptive action under circumstances, and states that it is justifiable to resort to violence in "anticipatory self-defense." Jensen cites Moroni's threat to take preemption action against the Lamanites in Alma 54: 11 ~13 as a precedent. Fred Axelgard, on the other hand, dismisses this same scriptural pas-

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INTRODUCTION

sage as more "angry rhetoric than inspired doctrine" and delivers a passionate caution against relying on a doctrine of military preemption. Making no distinction between "offensive warfare" and "preemptive strikes," Axelgard argues that making preemption a major public tenet is to go against the grain of American history. He then addresses a series of legitimate strategic and political questions regarding whether preemption can ever be a militarily or politically effective option. Since the volume of proceedings from the 1993 conference are now out of print, the editors ofthe present volume have decided to reprint several key chapters from that publication, which are noted here as Part VI. These include seminal efforts to relate Latter-day Saint doctrine and scripture to relevant national security themes by Valerie Hudson, Joseph Seeger, Eugene England, and Paul Hammond. Finally, for those interested in further discussions on these topics, a listserv has been established, and instructions for subscribing to the list can be found at http://kennedy.byu.edu/events/enews/listserv.asp The archives of this list, which contain superb examples of this community wrestling with tough national security questions, can be accessed by e-mailing devin_ [email protected] We are in the planning stages for a third symposium, and information on this event will be available on the ldsnatsec listserv. NOTES 1. An entity once known as the "Church Military Relations Committee" (I don't know if such a committee still exists) reported in the early 1980s that while Latter-day Saints made up only about 1 percent of the U.S. population, they accounted for nearly 3 percent of the armed services, concentrated not surprisingly in the branch of the services considered most "family friendly," the U.S. Air Force.

2. An earlier volume that represented the first such effort, based on a conference held at Brigham Young University in 1993, is now out of print. Some of its most salient portions are reprinted in this volume.

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Part I Honoring the Contributions of Distinguished Latter-day Saint National Security Professionals and Scholars

1 A Tribute to Paul Y. Hammond Valerie M Hudson Paul Hammond was one of the first members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints to make Security Studies his professional career. In a sense, then, he is the "godfather" of the movement, begun in the mid-1990's, to forge an explicit link between adherence to LDS beliefs and the implication of those beliefs for scholarship and practice in the field of national security. Paul attended and presented at the first symposium in 1993, entitled Moral Perspectives on U.S. Security Policy, and we are honored to have him here with us today, a decade later, at the second such symposium. To know Paul Hammond is to honor his achievements, and therefore we are pleased to introduce you to the man and his career. Paul grew up in Salt Lake City. He received his B.A. in Political Science from the University of Utah in 1949. He was awarded a graduate fellowship to Harvard University, where he began to pursue a Ph.D., specializing in foreign policy. When the Korean War began, he changed his focus to National Security Policy, impressed with the adage that "war is too important to leave to the generals." He wrote his dissertation under the direction of McGeorge Bundy and William YI. Elliott on civilian control of the U.S. military establishment, which he completed in London on a Fulbright Scholarship in 1953, when he was 24 years old. He began his teaching career at Harvard. Two years later he moved to the Naval War College for a tenn and then to the Naval Academy where he was the Forrestal Fellow in Naval History. He then joined the research staff of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University and a year later, the Political Science Department at Yale. While at Yale, Princeton University Press published his much expanded dissertation under the title Organizing For Defense: the American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century (1961); Columbia University Press published a co-authored book, Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets (1962); and the Alabama University Press published a large volume of case studies on civil-military relations with the two largest cases written by Paul. In 1962, Paul was awarded a Rockefeller Fellowship in international studies. He spent the next two years at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced

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International Studies (SAIS, now the Nitze School). During this time he did policy research as a consultant to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the U.S. Congress and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In 1964, he joined the senior research staff of the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, California. Paul's work at RAND focused mainly on problems of high-level command, control, and conmmnications (C3I, so called). He was also Director of Asian Studies and Director of Strategic Studies and during his last three years at RAND, Head of the Social Science Department. He participated in RAND's early work on terrorism and lead a team of RAND researchers which, at the behest of the then National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, produced the first design of a computer-based information system for the National Security Council (NSC)-which was never implemented. During his RAND period, in addition to producing research project reports, Paul wrote two books on American foreign policy: The Cold War Years (1969) and Cold War and Detente (1975), and edited a volume, Political Dynamics in the Middle East (1972). In 1976, Paul joined the faculty of the University of Pittsburgh School of Engineering as the Weidlein Professor of Environmental and Public Policy Studies, where he became the co-founder (with James C. Fletcher) of Pitt's Energy and Environment Research Center. During the next six years he devoted most of his non-teaching time to energy policy-related issues and co-authored a book, Individual Energy Conservation Behaviors (1980). In 1983 he moved over to University of Pittsburgh's Graduate School of Public and International Affairs (GSPIA), where he became a Distinguished Service Professor. During his years at Pittsburgh, until 1992, Paul carried out a variety of defense policy projects, usually for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He continued to deal with the command and control requirements for secure nuclear forces. He participated in work that sought to develop criteria for allocating resources within the national intelligence community. But his primary focus was on NATO and its future. His major projects on this subject were for the Director of Net Assessment in the Reagan Administration and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in the first Bush Administration. On the academic side, he published in 1992 a book entitled LBJ and the Presidential Management of Foreign Relations. In the early nineties, Paul shifted his teaching and research interests to Asia, spending a sabbatical in Singapore, and to the broader issue of American hegemony. He continues to teach graduate students at GSPIA. He plans to retire next year (2004) and expects then to take up residence in Salt Lake City, near the University of Utah where his academic adventure began fifty-eight years ago.

2 Ethical and International Affairs: Some Personal Encounters Stanley A. Taylor I am honored to open the International Forum Lecture for the Kennedy Center this year and only hope I can do justice to the traditions established in past years and anticipated this year. My remarks are essentially the same as the talk I gave last month when I was honored by the International Society of the Kennedy Center, whose annual conference theme focused on ethics and international affairs. Kennedy Center Director Jeff Ringer approached me shortly after that event and asked if I would repeat the same presentationas part of this lecture series. I attached endnotes to both talks for those who want to do further research on some of the issues I raise. For the August speech I was asked to engage in some personal reflections about ethical issues in international affairs which I had encountered. Interest in this subject has been around for centuries and its various permutations can be traced by anyone interested in reviewing a rather extensive body of literature. 1 Since I was asked to give personal reflections on this topic, I will mention three political issues with which I have been personally involved that raised ethical concerns. The first is quite brief and occurred in 1971 while I was serving as the administrative assistant to newly elected U.S. Congressman from Utah, Gunn McKay. Gunn, while very familiar with state politics, was somewhat unfamiliar with national politics. But he brought to the office a very keen sense of honesty and ethics. I, on the other hand, was more steeped in the philosophical tradition known as political realism, but was anxious to make a contribution to a genuinely good person who had little taste for Washington, D.C. political machinations. The issue involved the supersonic transport (SST) airplane. The idea of airplanes breaking the sound barrier had been around for many years and various fighter aircraft in several nations had already done so. But the thought that commercial aircraft could transport passengers at speeds greater than the speed of sound was quite new. In 1962, the governments of France and the United Kingdom announced that they had entered into a collaborative effort to design, construct, and operate the first SST for commercial passenger service. Since private enterprise could not possibly fund such a massive effort, the joint program called for an infusion of vast amounts of public money in a joint Anglo-French public-private enterprise. Not wanting to be outdone, U.S . President John F. Kennedy announced in 1963 that he would support a U.S. effort to develop an SST. But this unleashed a lengthy debate in the United States over whether or not the American government should get involved in an industry traditionally left to private enterprise. For about six years, while the Anglo-French program continued to press ahead, politicians, interest groups, and opinion leaders debated the merits of the

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United States program. As this debate was continuing, the first test flight of the AngloFrench Concorde took place in 1969. This successful test flight inflamed the debate in America with supporters of the program claiming that the U.S. would fall behind and opponents arguing that we should not get the government involved in what was better left to private enterprise. In February 1971, after Congress had been in session about a month, Gunn returned to his office from the House chambers one day quite concerned over the issue which was very new to him. He said that a vote was coming up in March and that he did not know what stance he should take. He asked me to brief him on the issue during the next week. I applied all of the skills I had learned as a student at Brigham Young University and at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. I followed all of the principles I had been teaching at Bentley College in Boston and at BYU. On the day I was to brief him, I walked into his office with pages of infonnation and began my briefing. I carefully and exhaustively listed every reason why the SST was a good idea and every reason why it was a bad idea, using my best academic "on the one hand and on the other hand" approach. At the end of the hour, I put all of my papers down and looked at Gunn with some degree of pride in my work. He looked at me, his eyes somewhat glazed as a result of a clear case of infonnation overload, and in complete honesty and candor asked me a question I have never forgotten. "Well, OK, Stan," he said, "but what's the right thing to do?" The question stunned me. I had never thought of it in that way. I could tell him all of the advantages and all of the disadvantages of government involvement in an SST program, but I could not tell him what was right. I remember thinking to myself that I had been teaching for five or six years about what was "right" or "left" in American politics, but I had seldom thought about what was "right" or "wrong" in American politics. On 24 March 1971, Gunn joined the majority of the House and voted against the SST program. But he taught me a very important lesson and changed much of what I would do in the future. In the broad scope of history, the SST debate was relatively unimportant. But the question Gunn asked continues to haunt me in much of my work. What is the right thing to do? The second matter involved efforts to bring the collection of evidence against Americans cooperating with hostile and foreign intelligence services under the same legal standards as common domestic criminals. This issue arose while I was serving as a senior staff member of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI). Utah Senator Jake Garn was one of the first appointees to this new Senate committee and invited me to join the staff as it was undergoing transition from what had been called the Church Committee into the new-standing Intelligence Committee. The SSCI was concerned because, in the absence of constitutionally and legally accepted standards covering espionage, most U.S. citizens who were betraying their country were not being prosecuted since the courts were throwing out the evidence as unacceptable. Time does not pennit me to go into this in great detail, but Senator Garn played a significant role in this process and allowed me to represent his interests in the process that led to the creation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)2 This Act created a FISA court that was able to weigh requests to conduct certain types of surveillance and then to authorize through a "warrant-like" procedure more intrusive evidence collection. As long as such evidence was collected according to the tenns of FISA, it was accepted in the FISA court. I have always been a little proud of my modest contri-

ETHICAL AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

bution to this process, because I believe we made it possible to enhance the principle of due process while at the same time making it easier to catch and imprison traitors. 3 My third experience involved a more, and still, controversial issue-the right of the U.S. government to conduct covert activities abroad, even up to and including the assassination of foreign political leaders. According to newspaper headlines, the Church Committee had documented U.S. government involvement in the death of several foreign leaders in a report released in November 1975. 4 The report was a bombshell. While allegations and suspicions had circulated for several years, this was the first time an official government body with access to classified information had confirmed such involvement. While the headlines were sensational, they were, as is often the case, wrong. The Church Committee had sorted through scores of allegations involving specific foreign leaders, but only those involving five individuals carried enough factual evidence to warrant a complete investigation. And of the five, only one individual could be said to have been the target of a U.S. government assassination effort. That was Fidel Castro. In the other cases, Lumumba, the Congolese prime minister; Trujillo, the Dominican Republic Dictator; Diem, the South Vienamese president; and Schneiter, the military chief of staff in Chile, the evidence showed that the U.S. had wanted these individuals out of the picture, and, in the case of Lumumba, had actually planned a plot, but that "no foreign leaders were killed as a result of assassination plots initiated by officials of the United States."5 Nevertheless, the story was sensational and the Church Committee had recommended that the new Senate committee should introduce legislation establishing tighter controls over intelligence agencies, including an assassination ban. So our committee staff spent a lot of time drafting what was called "an intelligence charter" for the U.S. intelligence community that included an assassination ban. While this work was going on, three u.s. presidents issued Executive Orders regulating intelligence agencies and each Executive Order contained an assassination ban. 6 The SSCI staff played a small part in drafting the language of two of those bans. With other staff members, I represented the views of the Senate, particularly Senator Gam, to Carter White House officials as they grappled with intelligence reform, particularly with the assassination ban. In 1981, I was still acting as a consultant to the Senate Intelligence Committee and engaged in several discussions with both Senate and White House officials regarding President Reagan's Executive Order 12333 and its assassination ban. Even though Congress has passed two subsequent Intelligence Oversight acts, the assassination ban contained in President Reagan's Executive Order 12333 is still today the only legal restraint against assassination. I have received criticism for my participation in, and support of, the assassination ban. My favorite story relating to this occurred in 1986. President Reagan, in retaliation for Libyan sponsorship of terrorist actions against Americans in Europe, authorized U. S. forces in England to bomb Libya on the night of April 14, 1986. This action unleashed wide public debate about whether or not President Reagan would have violated his own Executive Order had the Libyan President, Muammar Quadaffi, been killed in the raid (It was not a violation, by the way, but I will get to that later.). Shortly after the Libyan raid, Brigham Young University and its Communications Department invited long-time director of news at CBS, Fred Friendly, to speak on campus. At a small evening dinner in his honor hosted by BYU President Jeffrey Holland, Mr. Friendly raised the issue of

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the American attack on Libya and then, for several minutes, excoriated the assassination ban as well as any congressional interference with the intelligence agencies. As I recall, his final statement was, "I wish I knew who those idiots were who came up with that ban." I remember the look on his face when I raised my hand and said, "I am one of those idiots." The chances of having "one of those 'idiots' attending a small dinner in Provo, Utah must have seemed very remote to Mr. Friendly. The broad issue of secret organizations in a democracy is something to which I have since given a great deal of thought and about which I continue to write. The issue of covert action, in general, and assassination, in particular, sets off all kinds of ethical bells and whistles. I say ethical, because I believe that the legal questions are largely resolved. Legal ramifications still abound, but I believe that the national security provisions of the Constitution coupled with subsequent legislation, particularly the National Security Act of 1947, give Congress the right to authorize or to ban nearly any kind of covert action and that the President, while acting under the law of the land, has the right to either pennit or prohibit such acts. Moreover, I believe that both traditional international law as well as the " inherent right of individual or collective self-defense" authorized in Article 51 of the UN Charter support this notion. 7 And without simplifying a complicated issue too much, I can also say that both in hearings before the Senate and according to existing law, the assassination ban was not deemed to apply to the killing offoreign political officials during a time of declared war, nor in response to attacks against the United States. 8 For example, the joint resolutions passed by Congress three days after the II September 2001 attacks authorized the President to use "all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he detennines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorists attacks."9 Applying ethical standards drawn from particular religions to public policy is both difficult and dangerous. Those of us who worked on these executive orders and the Legislative Oversight Acts came to believe that the best way-perhaps the only way- to address ethical concerns was to focus on two issues- the authority to authorize covert actions and the procedures involved in the approval process. Finally, we believed such efforts were justified by both ethical and prudential considerations. Although ethical concerns surrounding covert actions are complicated, one way to establish standards is to proscribe the decision-making power and prescribe the procedures for using that power. IO That does not address the pure moral question involved in assassinations, but it does place the broader issue of covert actions in a constitutional setting where traditional checks and balances are in play. Thus, both the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 and the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1991 require all proposed covert activities to be authorized in writing by the president through what is called a presidential finding. This does away with the traditional practice of off-the-record conversations and unwritten orders that create what is called, "presidential deniability," in which intelligence agencies engaged in covert activities without specific written presidential authorization . By proscribing this decision-making power, we believed that we came closer to putting all covert actions in a more ethical context without eliminating that option when it might be needed in legitimate national security threats. 11 We also prescribed the procedures or specified the process by which such decisions are made by requiring all proposed covert actions to be reported to the appropriate committees of Congress prior to their being carried out. We did allow emergency actions to be authorized and conducted without such a report as long as the need was

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ETHICAL AND I NTERNATIONAL A FFAIRS

deemed essential to U.S. national security and the action was reported as soon as possible afterwards. 12 We were also successful in persuading the Intelligence Community to adopt their own regimen of reviews of covert action proposals. Executive Order 12333 and the two Intelligence Oversight Acts permit covert actions under a carefully specified process and virtually ban any assassination attempts unless authorized by a specific presidential finding. This model strikes a fine balance between secrecy and accountability and, I believe, enhances moral principles. I mentioned above that those of us who worked on these developments were also concerned with prudential issues. That is, we wanted to eliminate assassination because we worried about the consequences of U.S. government-sponsored assassinations for encouraging other states to do the same. I) Obviously, we viewed as undesirable a global system in which states conducted diplomacy by murder. At the same time, we felt we needed to permit the killing of foreign leaders during times of war and in response to serious threats against U.S. national security. Concern over the social effects of deviant behaviors may well be the origin of many ethical and moral prohibitions. Our prudential concern appeared to be justified according to a study conducted by one of my students several years ago. David Dolson found information concerning 197 cases of actual or attempted political assassinations throughout history. He found that in only twelve cases, literally over hundreds of years, did the assassination or assassination attempt result in a desired change in policy. In fact, he found that, in most cases, either the assassination or the attempt strengthened the policies the perpetrators were trying to change.14 My role in all of these developments has been small, and, in spite of Fred Friendly, I have been proud of being "one of the idiots" who attempted to raise U.S. foreign policy to a higher moral and ethical ground. I hope the story has been interesting to you. NOTES I. Researchers into this topic will obviously want to consult the one indispensable relevant journal, Ethics and International Affairs, published annually by the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs. While I will not make reference in this note to any of the early philosophers and statesmen who wrote about the role of ethics in the relations between sovereign units, I will try to list some of the better sources for both reading about these early contributions as well as about some of the major issues of the twentieth century. My favorite works that survey the landscape quite well are: Nardin, Terry, and David R. Mapel. Traditions of International Ethics, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1992; Thompson, Kenneth W. Schools of Thought in International Relations, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1996; and Ethics and International Affairs: A Reader, Ed. Joel H. Rosenthal, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C., 1995. For works that go beyond literature reviews, one should review Frost, Mervyn. Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996; Warner, Daniel. An Ethic of Responsibility in International Relations, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 1991; and Hoffmann, Stanley. Duties Beyond Borders: On the Limits and Possibilities of Ethical International Politics, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, 1981. For works that focus more narrowly on foreign policy, see McElroy, Robert W. Morality and American Foreign Policy, Princenton University Press, Princeton, 1992; Morality and Foreign Policy: Realpolitik Revisited, Eds. Kenneth M. Jensen and Elizabeth P. Faulkner, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., 1991; and Oppenheim, Felix E. The Place of Morality in Foreign Policy Lexington Books, Lexington, 1991. Also worth mentioning in this category is Craig, Gordon A., and Alexander L. George. "Problems of Law and Moral Restraints on the Use of Force in Foreign Policy," Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time, Third Edition, Oxford University Press, New York, 1995. Two works that focus on the ethics of defense policy, both written by Douglas P.

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Lackey are The Ethics of War and Peace, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1989; and Ethics and Strategic Defense, Wadsworth Press, Belmont, 1989. Joseph Nye's book, Nuclear Ethics, Free Press, New York, 1986 is one of the best on this narrower topic. Works on the role of law in international affairs are too numerous to list, howeyer the Council on Foreign Relations' edited book, Right V Might: International Law and the Use of Force, New York, 1991, contains a short bibliography that includes all of the important works. My own personal favorite on the role of religion in these considerations is Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft, Eds. Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson, Oxford University Press, New York, 1994. For specific LDS perspectives on ethics and international affairs the series edited by the Kennedy Center's own Valerie Hudson and former Brigham Young University student and long-time arms control expeli Kerry M. Kartchner is without peer. The first volume, Moral Perspectives on U.S. Security Policy: Views from the LDS Community was published by the Kennedy Center in 1995, and the second publication is forthcoming and based on papers given at an LDS National Security Symposium at the BYU Barlow Center in Washington, D.C. in May 2003. The chapter contributed by Robert S. Wood, "The Justice of States" and published in Perspectives in Mormon Ethics: Personal, Social, Legal and Medical, Ed. Donald G. Hill, Jr., Publishers Press, Salt Lake City, 1983, is, in my judgment, still the best single introduction to a unique LDS perspective on the ethics of international affairs. Elder Wood is currently serving as a member of the Second Qnorum of Seventy. Anyone interested in a very narrow application of ethics from an LDS scholar might be interested in my "Tobacco and Economic Growth in Developing Nations," first appearing in the journal Business in the Contemporary World, Winter 1989, bnt subseqnently reprinted in several readers. 2. John Elliff, also serving as a senior staff member of the SSCI, played the principle role in the process that led to the FISA. John continues to be one of the leading authorities nationally on the legality of counter-intelligence efforts. See Elliff, John. The Reform of FBI Intelligence Operations, Princeton University Press, 1979, in which he briefly surveys the history of FBI abusive practices and then focuses on rules instituted in the mid-1970s to reform FBI operations and procedures. 3. See Taylor, Stanley A. and Daniel Snow. "America's Cold War Spies: Why They Spied and How They Got Caught," Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 12, pp. 101-25, April 1997, for a more complete description of FISA and its rather dramatic effects on espionage prosecution. 4. U.S. Congress, Senate, Church Committee. Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, S. Rep!. No. 94-465, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., p. 256, 20 November 1975. 5. Ibid. 6. President Gerald Ford issued Executive Order 11905 setting forth new procedures governing intelligence, including an assassination ban. President Jimmy Carter wanted an Executive Order reflecting his views about intelligence and issued Executive Order 12036 which dropped the word "political" from the phrase "political assassination" found in the Ford Executive Order and added a section banning indirect participation in assassination, a reaction to the CIA's sub-contracting the effort to eliminate Castro to elements of the Mafia. President Ronald Reagan came into office in 1981 and felt a need to issue his own Executive Order covering the intelligence community and issued Executive Order 12333 which adopted about the same language regarding assassination as was found in the Carter Executive Order. That Executive Order has not been superceded. 7. See Joyner, Christopher C. "International Law," Intervention in the 1990s: U.s. Foreign Policy in the Third World, Ed. Peter J. Shraeder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, pp. 229-46, 1992. Governments justify having the possibility of covert actions in their arsenal using three arguments: 1) Other states do it, 2) It fills a gap between diplomacy and all-out war, and 3) It is a fonn of justified self-defense that results in fewer, rather than more, deaths.

8. The best short summary of this, including references to the standard literature, is Bazan, Elizabeth B. Assassination Ban and E.o. 12333: A Brief Summary, Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, 2002.

ETHICAL AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

9. Both SJ. Res. 23 and H.J. Res. 64 are in 18 U.S.c. § 288 note. 10. The alliteration "proscription of powers and prescription of procedures" comes from Constitutions and Constitutionalism, Ed. William G. Andrew 3rd ed., Van Nostrand, Princeton, 1968. 11. This same conclusion is reached by another scholar who participated in many of these early negotiations. See Johnson, Loch K. Secret Agencies: u.s. Intelligence in a Hostile World, Yale University Press, New Haven, p. 77,1996. 12. To the best of my knowledge, this requirement has been violated only once in subsequent years. That occurred under President Reagan's National Security Council, in what is called "The Iran-Contra Affair." Those who have sworn on the altar of Justice Sutherland's (a BYU graduate, by the way) opinion in the famous case, United States v. Curtiss-Wright (1936), need to re-read the actual decision itself and then read, at least, Koh, Harold H. The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power after the Iran-Contra Affair, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1990; and Fisher, Louis. "Foreign Policy Powers of the President and Congress," Annals of the American Academy ofPolitical and Social Science, Vol. 499, p. 152, September 1988. The Curtiss-Wright case is often cited as giving the president sole power to conduct foreign affairs, including covert actions. 13. Some people who have had access to classified information, myself included, believe that the Cuban govemment, in response to U.S. attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro, played a role in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. 14. Dolson, David M. The Effectiveness of Political Assassination as a Means of Changing Government Policy, Honors Thesis, Brigham Young University, 1996.

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Part II Toward an LDS Doctrine of War and Peace

3 Waging War While Proclaiming Peace: International Law and LDS Perspectives on War Michael K. Young Introduction When asked to give this presentation, I initially decided to go to my principal source of all information about war and the military, my daughter, Kathryn, who is now a senior at the u.s. Air Force Academy. I was sure that she would have thought through all these issues and would provide all the insight necessary for the presentation I had been asked to give. Unfortunately, her reaction was not quite what I expected-or, more honestly, not quite what I expected, but what I should have expected after having lived with her for twenty years. In her most startled voice, she pointed out that I was totally unqualified to opine on this topic, and, in all events, what in heaven's name did I know about it. After recovering from that body blow to my intelligence and intellect, I renewed my inquiry. Interestingly, she then replied that she and her LDS classmates talked about these matters at great length, but that they too had finally concluded that the matter was too complex to answer on a global scale. Each had, however, wrestled with this issue on a personal- very, very personallevel and had reached conclusions that pertained to their own lives, if not necessarily to the decisions that might be reached by their Commander-in-Chief. For the most part, she informed me, they were all returned missionaries and had considered this matter largely from a gospel perspective. Each, in tum, had determined that they belonged where they were and could reconcile their chosen course-indeed, felt good about their chosen course- because of the things they had read in the Book of Mormon and in Conference talks. For her own part, she could not tell me what Grotius or Wolfgang Friedman said about war (or at least she could not tell me anything I did not already know), but she could tell me at great length what Nephi, Alma, Moroni and Mormon had said. She had studied only in passing what the early Church fathers had said about war, but she was encyclopedic about what Presidents Hinckley, Joseph F. Smith, and even Joseph Smith had said.

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From this, she had concluded, as had each of her LDS classmates in their own ways, that they were committed and prepared to defend their liberties, their homes, their families, and their right to worship as they pleased. Her decisions were not about the propriety of war in some geopolitical sense, but rather about the morality of her position and her behavior in the event of a conflict. I initially thought this was not particularly helpful. After all, today's audience wants to hear about intemational law theory and Christian theology, not the personal musings of a twenty-two-year-old retumed missionary. But, in the final analysis, I concluded that her insights were much more profound and central to today's theme than anything Ian Brownlie or Thomas Aquinas might have to say. But to get to that point in the analysis, let us first tum to what those important thinkers and authors have to say about the moral universe within which war IJ;lay be conducted.

Religious Theories of the "Just War" Early Christian Doctrine-Opposition to All War The earliest Christians refused to accept war as moral under any circumstances. They believed Christ's doctrine was one of both personal and political peace or, put slightly differently, that believers must be peaceful at all costs-literally at all costsand that the state must take care of itself. They wrote and spoke occasionally of civil duties, perhaps identifying with the injunction to render under Caesar that which was Caesar's. But those duties did not extend to engaging in war. At least until 170 A.D., and perhaps even later, Christians were even forbidden to enlist. l Evolution of Christian Doctrine

The Just War St. Augustine Christian doctrine changed almost as quickly and unexpectedly, however, as the fortunes of Christianity itself. Christianity became the official religion of the Empire in the third century. Romans were willing to embrace a religion that required allegiance to something even higher than the Emperor himself, especially given that the Emperor had ordered them to recognize Christianity as the new state religion. But even the most pliant Roman was much less willing to consider the nation's security interests merely another cheek to be tumed. If everyone was to become a Christian, then Christians would have to be up to the task of defending the Empire. Happily for the well-being of the vaunted Roman army, Christian theologians were up to the task of redefining the message of peace and, in short order, wars were not only apparently permissible under Christian doctrine, but might even be considered "juSt."2 St. Augustine (354-430 A.C.E.) was among the first to articulate a doctrine of "just war." He condemned conquest, but argued that certain wars were just and, hence, justifiable under Christianity. He articulated certain conditions for a just war and the theological race was on, showing even now little sign of abatement, especially if the most recent theological pronouncements regarding the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are any indication. 3 St. Augustine defined "just wars" as those that avenged injuries, as, for example, when the nation or city against which war is to be undertaken has neglected either to punish the wrongs committed by its own citizens or to restore to the aggrieved state

WAGING WAR W HILE PROCLAIM ING P EACE: I NTERNATIONAL LAW AND LDS P ERSPECTIVES ON WAR

what has been unjustly taken. He added that God himself would ordain such wars as "juSt."4 Thomas Aquinas- 3 Conditions of the Just War But the more elaborate- and more frequently quoted- articulation of a just war was undertaken by St. Thomas Aquinas, who listed three conditions for a just war. First, the war must be conducted not privately, but under the "authority of a prince." Second, there must be a just cause. His examples of just causes included wars of a defensive nature, wars under divine command, wars to eradicate heresy, and wars conducted because the opposing state has failed to pay a just debt. Finally, he asserted that the "just cause" must be "just" from an objective point of view. In other words, it is not enough that the state be able to aver a just cause, but it must actually believe in that cause, the prince must have the "right intention" to promote good and avoid evil. s St. Thomas Aquinas' influence on Christian theologians has remained significant, even to this day. But even those tied most literally to his text did not believe that his list of just causes was exhaustive; it was instead, they concluded, illustrative. Elaboration of just causes became the central preoccupation of many theologians, especially those with a special relationship to the princes of their particular states.

Islam and Byzantium In the meantime, Islam was developing its own justifications for war and conquest. Unlike Christianity, Islam, as a religion, did not develop in opposition to-or at least independent from-the state. From the very beginning, its theology intertwined state power and religious authority in a much more complex way. But even Islam, though born in conflict, developed religious doctrines that explicated the lawful reasons to resort to war. These included wars of defense, punishment for apostasy, and action against non-Muslims who were somehow preventing the appropriate spread of Islamic truth.6 Even Byzantium had a concept of a holy or just war, which may have derived in part from the Islamic concept of a jihad, or a war against the unfaithful who were somehow impeding throughout the world the proper observance of the one true way. But by the 11 th and 12th centuries, the attitudes of both Byzantium and the Russian empire were largely secular and viewed war not as moral or immoral, but largely as amoral. War was merely another tool of statecraft to be used when it was likely to be effective in advancing the interests of the state and to be avoided when it was unproductive. War, not peace, was generally considered the normal state of the state and religion was not thought to have a great deal to say about its propriety or impropriety. Of course, the princes had frequent recourse to the priests to secure adequate blessings for the success of the war, but not to seek advice on its advisability or morality.7

International Law Theories of the Just War Early Theories-Postglossators Gradually, a strand of international law, separate and apart from theological musings, began to develop, but even it was highly informed by theology for many hundreds of years. Indeed, during much of this period, two strands of thinking, related but separate and independent, began to emerge. The theologians continued to mine the theologically based "just war" shaft, while the so-called postglossators wrote as civil lawyers.

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Supremacy of the Sovereign The international lawyers borrowed heavily from the theological tradition, but focused more on issues of authority, and the dignity and autonomy of the state than did the theologians. They initially established two conditions under international law for a "just war." First, the war could be commenced and undertaken only by a prince who recognized no superior authority in his sovereign territory. Thus, one constituent part of the state could not rebel against the central authority or attack another part of the state over which there reigned a superior sovereign. But one state could attack another state that was equal in stature and dignity to the attacking state. 8 Given that the majority of states were mere principalities or kingdoms, relatively small by the standards of most states today, this permitted a rather robust state of unrest among the competing powers. Just Cause But even a supreme sovereign could not attack merely on a whim. He too needed a "just cause." Here, of course, was where the horse was generally buried. One could attack to avenge a wrong, to escape an injury, to redress "any grave injury to one's reputation or honor,"9 or even because an offending state had refused free passage to the attacking state's troops on their way to fight another (presumably '~ust") war. As time passed, the range of "just causes" increased. Indeed, one cannot help but suspect that the international lawyers were expanding the range of causes considered "just" in order to meet the demands of the sovereigns who had ordered the wars in the first place. The concept of "justice" in a war did not seem to constrain the sovereign as much as the sovereign's decision to go to war spurred the international lawyer to add another "cause" to the list of legally permissible reasons for war. While it may not be entirely fair to say that the international lawyers seemed entirely in the service of their lords, neither does it seem much of an exaggeration. 1o Eventually, even international lawyers themselves began to realize the futility of the task on which they had embarked. Almost anything could be justified and there was no independent body that could fairly determine what was truly a just cause and what was not. T.J. Lawrence finally concluded, pithily but not inaccurately, that distinctions between just and unjust causes of war "belong to morality and theology, and are as much out of place in a treatise on International Law as would be a discussion on the ethics of marriage in a book on the law of personal status. "11 The absurdity of the quest for truly "objective" just causes can be seen in the internationallawyers'-and, in many cases, the theologians'-treatment of the role of the Holy Roman Emperor in all this. Initially, he was considered the supreme authority in all matters, so only he could declare war. In other words, no authority was superior to his and thus all needed his blessing to go to war. But, with alarming frequency, princes seemed to go to war first and ask pern1ission later. Of course, the Emperors could, and frequently did, use moral suasion, and some even demonstrated considerable political savvy and coalition-building capacity to persuade recalcitrant princes to follow their injunctions. But almost from the beginning, the princes had greater de facto power and control of their territories than the Emperor ever did of them. The international lawyers had no trouble with this small conceptual lacunae in their elaborate theories. First, they made clear that the question of authority was not

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one of theory, but of practice. Thus, wars could be undertaken only by an entity which had no superior, but by "no superior," they meant no de facto superior, not .merely a theologICal superior. Thus, if a prince truly controlled his territory, that was enough to him to go to war. 12 The on the other hand, was still pennitted to bless an wars. The Pope was, after all, the "Vicar of Christ," and, as such, his authority extended over all the of the earth. No matter the facts on the ground, the Emperor's authority was of a different sort and could never be refuted by mere geopolitical truth. His authority belonl;ea to a higher sort of truth, and, as such, he could always claim superiority, no matter the actual degree of independence of a state. The Pope stood in a direct line to God in that capacity, he could always rely upon revealed truth and declare, by his words alone, a just cause. 13 This authority came in very handy when the local princes were not creative to justifY a war or conquest themselves. For example, Pope Innocent I issued a series of papal bulls that legitimized the wars against the Indians. Pope Alexander VI issued another famous set of papal bulls in 1493, permitting the and Castilian conquests in the Americas. These bulls not only demarked boundary lines between the competing European claimants, something the European powers had long occuparelied upon the Emperor to do, but also authorized the wars and tions themselves. Wars of conquest in hitherto undiscovered lands were not sornethlDlg that was easily justified under any of the prevailing theories of a just war, at least as applied to the princes themselves. But the Pope, relying on his higher authority and less intellectually constrained mandate, could authorize it and, in virtually all cases, did. 14 Even at its height, however, the notion of just cause was not considered limitor mere lessly expansive. For example, differences of religion> expansion of personal glory were not considered appropriately "just." And even conquest for missionary purposes was generally considered out-of-bounds, at least with respect to pagans and others who were considered beyond the pale of the law. It was not to subjugate those who were not capable of redemption. the Spaniards' But even those limits were more ephemeral than reaL For relentless war against the native inhabitants of the Americas was; in theory, impermissible because the Indians were pagans and beyond the pale of the law. The Spaniards conveniently avoided that restraint, however, by justifYing the war on the grounds that among the Indians had violated the fundamental rights of the Spaniards to travel them, to carry on trade and to propagate Christianity. The clearest evidence of the impediment the Indians imposed on the Spaniards' right to travel was, of course~ the fact that the Indians resisted when the Spaniards took their lands, destroyed their villages, and otherwise trying to decimate them. And the clearest evidence of the Indians' attempts to impede th~ Spaniards' right to propagate Christianity was the very fact that the Indians did not immediately join the Church. IS With these justifications, it seems a little hard to figure out exactly what protection was left for the pagans and those otherwise beyond the pale of the law. But protection of their interests was apparently not in the job description ofthe intemational1awyers of the time. Their loyalties ran elsewhere, most significantly to the princes in whose kingdoms they resided and who hired them. And, of course, as indicated above, the Emperor was always happy to step into the breach and provide a justification when the Europeans merely wanted to expand empire and could not find any other ostensible justification. So, what initially was viewed as

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a constraint on the rights of the

to go to war became among its most salient

moral justifications. Nor did the notion that one could not wage war merely to advance one's religion prove much of a check on the princes. While that concept was designed to consrrain, it was only a constraint on the princes. The himself could declare war on the infidels. to protect persecuted religious He could especially do so if the war was minorities. In addition, even a prince could protect members of minority religions, if they came under attack in a neighboring state. This rubric justified the Warring Period of 1560 to 1660, the German civil wars between the Catholic and Protestant leagues, the and the Thirty Years War. French wars of religion, the Puritan revolution in And even in cases when someone made a mistake and their cause was not in any objective sense 'just," nor could anyone plausibly believe that they believed their cause "just>" the lavryers had a defense at the ready. The party might be acting out of a mistake of fact or a mistake of law, or, in a worst case scenario, acting under "invincible ignorance." In that latter case, the party was incapable of knowing that their acts were wrong, thus they were engaged in a just war. In other words, the more you could not be persuaded or even understand reason, the more justifiable your war. 16 The very 'Nrongfulness of your acts validated them under intemationallaw. If you were the sovereign, it would be hard not to like a theory like that! Even the most morally reprehensible behavior could fmd ample supporters among the internationallavryers and theologians. Aristotle, when discussing "just" war5, even opined that it was appropriate to engage in war in order to capture "men who, though intended by nature to be governed, will not submit" Lest there be any doubt that he meant that conquest for purposes of taking slaves fell into the category of a 'just war," he clearly stated: The art of acquiring slaves, I mean of justly acquiring them, differs from both the art of the master and the art of slave, being a species of hunting or war. The art of war is a natural art of acquisition, for the art of acquisition including hunting, an art which we ought to practice against wild beast, and against men who, though intended by nature to be governed, will not submit; for a war of such a kind is naturally just. 17

Albert the Great took pains to clarify in case there was the misunderstanding on this point: "Whoever are born to subjection and are naturally slaves (as was shown earlier), if they refuse to be SUbjected (for it is just according to nature that they be subjected). Consequently just war can be made on them and this was the cause of the first war."18 Thomas Aquinas also clearly agreed, though later commentators edited much of this out of his work. But if waging war solely for the purpose of subjecting men to slavery is » it is a little hard to think of any type of war that cannot be IU~'L.Ll.l.i;;U. And that is the central point. .I. u'__ -uU.o;;;'H under· intemationallaw-or even within theology, for that matter-for abstract moral justifications for war has been, if not quite a fool's at least unsatisfying in the extreme. One cannot help but sense that the justifiers have been in and the effect of the latter on the fanner has been much, much the pay of the greater than the other way around.

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Post-World War II International Law Theories United Nations With ilie end of World War II came another attempt to leash the dogs of war to the strictures of intemational1aw. The countries left standing after ilie War created ilie United Nations and its seeming limits on the use of war as a tool of statecraft. The UN Charter appears to permit war in only two circumstances. The first is self-defense and the second is when authorized by the UN Security Council, and then only to advance the cause of peace. And even a war authorized by the Security Council in the cause of peace can comprise on1y the action auiliorized by the Security Council, only to the extent authorized by the Security Council~ and only in the manner authorized by the Security CounciL All this seemed a very promising start in devastation iliat was the aftennath of World War II. But while the world has not been ravaged by another world-wide war since the creation of the UN and its Charter, it is not entirely clear how much of the credit should go to the of ilie new rules regarding war. Indeed, many count the past halfcentury as among the bloodiest the world has ever seen. Self-Defense The self-defense exception, while seemingly self-explanatory, has been fraught with problems. What of pre-emptive strikes to prevent an attack by another country? With the advent of nuclear weapons, that has become an issue of more than passing interest, at least to the other nuclear powers. What of a country that is exporting war to your or someone else's shores? Can, for example, the United States plant explosive mines in Nicaraguan harbors in order to prevent from that country from exporting weapons and warriors to other Latin American countries? If Iran launches bombs from oil platforms off its coast at US. ships that are admittedly in intematio-nal waters, can the U.S. destroy those oil platforms? And these are not abstract hypotheticals of the law professor's classroom. Boili are real world cases that have been brought before-and, in one case, decided by-ilie International Court of Justice. Wars of National Liberation What of defense of one's own rights within one's own country? Countries are entitled to defend themselves against the predations of other countries. Are individuals entitled to defend themselves against the evils of their own government? The parallels seemed powerful to many international lawyers and they used this theory to justify wars of national liberation. Peoples have a to self-determination. Colonialism, on the other hand, was an "evil state," against which people were entitled to fight. Claims of justice provided an adequate legal basis. And it was not a far leap from that supposition to the idea that other countries have a to support individuals who are fighting against colonial occupation. This theory has now been criticized by many international lawyers, but it gave political cover to many countries that supported rebel movements in nearby countries, especially during the Cold War. 19 Humanitarian Intervention The latest iteration of 'just war" theory is ''humanitarian intervention." This is not authorized anywhere by ilie UN Charter, even on the part of the Security Council, but it has a certain appeal, especially as one watches humanitarian disasters of unimaginable

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proportion play out all over the world. When those disasters are man-made or, more to the point, inflicted by a government on its own people, the compulsion to intervene is close to irresistible. 20

Genocide International law is also expanding again to accommodate additional notions of a just war. For example, Article I of the Genocide Convention reads: "The Contracting Parties confIrm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime tmder international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish." Some read that merely as authorizing a Contracting Party to follow the mandate of Article VII of the Treaty to "call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide." ... Others, however, read the obligation in Article I "to prevent and to punish" as a mandate to intervene directly in a country whose government is committing genocide. In this context, the.ideal of justice is backed by the authority of the Convention and power of the governments that have signed the Convention. Even the well-intentioned attempts of the post-war international community to limit war only to those situations clearly authorized by the UN Charter have been met with mixed success, at best. International law, like warriors in all international battles, invariably suffers from mission creep. In short, it is difficult to rest assured that international legal theorists (or theologians) will be any more successful now in defIning a just war and, more importantly, constraining the behavior of nation-states than they have been for the past two thousand years.

Latter-Day Saints: Proclaiming Peace While Fighting Wars Mixed Messages? As Latter-Day Saints, we also might have a bit of trouble sorting out the various injunctions regarding peace and war. Christ tells us to love our neighbors (Mark 12:31) and even our enemies (Matthew 5:44) and to turn the other cheek (Matthew 5:39). Yet he also told us that he came not to bring peace, but a sword (Matthew 10:34), and he told the disciples to sell their gannents to buy that sword (Luke 22:36). The Old Testament is even more confusing. The Lord tells us to "speak peace" to our neighbors (Psalms 28:3) and in the next breath to utterly destroy everyone in a city, "both man and woman, young and old, and ox, and sheep, and ass, with the edge of the sword" (Joshua 6:21). And the Book of Monnon is positively bewildering in its mixed messages. We are enjoined to peace and love throughout, and yet chapter after chapter is full of war of the most bloody kind. And the honorable and righteous, indeed, the prophets themselves, often lead the Nephites into battle. The great prophet Nephi tells us in his last literary breath that he has charity for all-his people, the Lamanites, the Jews, the Gentiles (2 Nephi 33:7-8). But his [mal epitaph is given by Jacob: "The people having loved Nephi exceedingly, he having been a great protector for them, having wielded the sword of Laban in-their defence" (Jacob 1:1"0). The great heroes of the Book of Monnon preach with vigor, but, with equal vigor, they consign the less righteous to death to let God sort them all out. No .turning the other cheek there! Even President Hinckley's latest pronouncement on the troubles in the world leaves us plenty of room to seek our own personal inspiration. He clearly condemns

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the cruelty and destruction of war. along with the untranuneled greed and ambition that

often causes it: 21 We sometimes are prone to glorify the great empires of the past, such as the Ottoman Empire, the Roman and Byzantine Empires, and in more recent times, the vast British Empire. But there is a darker side to every one of them. There is a grim and tragic overlay of brutal conquest, of subjugation, of repression, and an astronomica.l cost in life and treasure ... 1 think our Father in Heaven must have wept as He has looked down upon His children through the centuries as they have squandered their divine birthright in ruthlessly destroying one another.

A strong condemnation of war, if ever there were one. But, he continues, on the other hand: But as citizens we are all under the direction of our national leaders. They have access to greater political and military intelligence than do the people generally. Those in the armed services are under obligation to their respective governments to execute the will of the sovereign. When they joined the military service, they entered into a contract by which they are presently bound and to which they have dutifully responded.

But nor is that the final word. On yet the other, other hand: But modem revelation states that we are to "renounce war and proclaim peace" (Doctrine and Covenants 98:16).

So, that is the fmal word? Well, 'no, not quite. On yet the other, other, other hand: When war raged between the Nephites and the Lamanites, the record states, that "the Nephites were inspired by a better cause, for they were not fighting for . power but they were fighting for their homes and their liberties, their wives and their children, and their all, yea, for their rites of worship and their church. And they were doing that which they felt was the duty which they owed to their God; for the Lord had said unto them ... defend your families even unto bloodshed" (Alma 43:45-47).

It is clear from these and other writing that there are times and circumstances when nations are justified, in fact have an obligation, to fight for family, for liberty, and against tyranny, threat, and oppression. Now, that must be the final word! Well, again, not quite, on the other, other, other, other hand: When all is said and done, we of this Church are people of peace. We are followers of our Redeemer, the Lord Jesus Christ, who was the Prince of Peace.

But, President Hinckley points out, even that is not as simple as it seems: But even He said: "Think not that I am come to send peace on earth: I came not to send peace, but a sword" (Matthew 10:34).

And in the final, on-the-one-hand, and on-the-other: This places us in the position of those who long for peace, and who teach peace, who work for peace, but who also are citizens of nations and are subject to the laws of our governments. Furthermore, we are a freedom-loving people, committed to the defense of liberty wherever it is in jeopardy. 22

General Principles and Specific Exceptions So, how do we square this circle? We are peace-loving, but committed to the defense of liberty. We proclaim peace, but sell our garment to buy a sword. We renounce war, but for family, for liberty, against tyranny, threat, and oppression. I certainly do not have an easy answer to any of this. There are no simple rules I can discern. Even more to the point, we must bear in mind the cautionary tale of

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the early Church fathers and international throughout the ages~ who invariably seemed to find ample justification for war whenever the and his troops marched. But it does seem that one can at least begin to wend one's way through the intellectual thicket by applying some simple principles. Let me offer a few that seem helpfuL

Proclaim Peace we should take the general injunctions seriously. We are a people of peace and must proclaim peace. Nevertheless, the World is at War But, at the same time, we must recognize that whatever our personal duties and obligations and whatever injunctions apply to us personally, the overall state of affairs will not necessarily be governed by our individual behavior. That is, even if we seek personal peace, war-in the geopolitical sense-is a permanent state until '"a full end of all nations" (Doctrine and Covenants 87:6). We are told in unmistakable terms that " ... with the sword and by bloodshed the inhabitants of the earth shan mourn; , . Until the consumption decreed hath made a full end of all nations" (Doctrine and Covenants 87:6). That juxtaposition must become our first operative We must strive for in our congregations, in our jobs, in our neighborpeace in our hearts, in our hoods. But, strive as we might and must, we should not expect peace in the world. In other words, the principles that our incividual behavior and responsibilities will not necessarily guide our interaction with those who are beyond our immediate sphere of influence. Or, put slightly differently, we must strive for peace in all our personal scheme of things. That interactions, but we probably ought to expect war in the should not affect our immediate behavior on a day-to-day basis, but it should inform our tmderstanding of world affairs and expand our vision and hope for the future, the long, long distant future. Exceptions

Self-Defense From that inherent tension comes the next principle. There are general rules of behavior-proclaim peace, for example-but they are subject to exceptions. For example, the 98th Section of the Doctrine and Covenants tells us that we may repulse an attack after having warned the attacker three times to desist. From the Book of Mormon, moreover, we have some guidance regarding these special exceptions. for example, along with defense of our liberty, our our wives, and our children, are all instances when the rites of worship, our Lord seems to mandate those exceptions. We should proclaim peace, but may appropriately be taught by our church leaders [our] enemies, even to the shedding of blood if it were to "defend [ourselves] necessary" (Alma 48:14). Instructions From Our Leaders On the other hand, our leaders may be moved to tell us to be still and let the Lord fight our battles. Daniel H. Wells, commander of the Mannon militia "Johnston's War," for example, wrote on the back of every order he issued what was described by his contemporaries as "the lisua: inscription." That inscription read simply

WAGING WAR WHILE PROCLAIMING PEACE: INTERNATIONAL

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"Shed no blood." We understand that our church leaders are entitled to special inspiration in these matters of the greatest import (Alma 43 :23). They will tell' us of the exceptions to the general rules. Instructions From The Lord But perhaps the most important operative principle is that we must await the Lord's instruction in these matters. The Nephites, in perhaps the most violent part of the known world at that time, followed the commandments. That gave them a remarkable insight into precise these matters. And this was their faith, that by so doing God would prosper them in the land, or in other words, if they were faithful in keeping the commandments of God that he would prosper them in the land; yea, warn them to flee or to prepare for war (Alma 48:15).23

Gospel Constrains Both Decision to Fight and How We Fight The next principle that I believe derives from the Book of Mormon is that not only is it important to take the Lord's guidance in whether to wage war, but our religion also imposes upon us special responsibilities regarding our approach to war and how we wage it. Moroni offers perhaps the best example of this principle. He only engages in wars when his people are threatened-in other words, wars of self-defense, classically and narrowly defmed. Second, he only fights when he has received conf1pl1ation from the Lord that fighting in self-defense is truly the Lord's wilL But even more interestingly, Moroni invariably also goes to the prophet to determine where and how to conduct the war. And, upon receiving those instructions, he then wages war only to the extent absolutely necessary to achieve the objective .. Whenever he conquers, he does not press his advantage, but rather makes clear his advantage to his adversary and then offers them very favorable tenus upon which they can surrender. For example, when the Lamanites are surrounded and trapped against the river Sidon, Mormon does not call for a complete elimination of the Lamanites' fighting capacity. Rather, he calls a truce and invites Zerahemnah to surrender, upon which event he promises to let them depart in peace (Alma 44). This is truly an extraordinary action of a general who has a decisive advantage in what is undoubtedly the war's decisive battle. 24 But what follows is even more extraordinary. Upon Zerahemnah's refusal to surrender, Moroni actually returns the confiscated weapons to the Lamanites and allows them to continue to fight. When the Lamanites then finally surrendered, Moroni offers precisely the same terms of surrender. His only requirement is that they stop waging war and not come up against the N ephites again. When Amalickiah stirred up the Lamanites again a few years later, again Moroni, through strategy and clever maneuvers, puts the Lamanites to the run. Once they are on the defensive, again Moroni makes his simple offer. The Nephites will "forbear shedding your blood" if only the Lamanites will not return to battle again against the Nephites (Alma 52). In the final battle, they take the last Lamanite stronghold and pin them, literally, against the walL Moroni's offer is identical to all his past offers. Surrender and promise not to come up again against the Nephites. This time, finally, the Lamanites have wised up, and, as Moroni rather laconically reports, "many

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of the Lamanites ... were desirous to join the people of Ammon and become a free people" (Alma 62:27). Moroni's response to domestic uprisings was precisely the same. He created the Title of Liberty and took up the cause of freedom within his country. Again, his only requirement was that those he conquered put down their weapons and cease their rebellion. Indeed, given that the Nephites were a Semitic people who lived over two millennia ago~ it is amazing that they had so many qualms about warfare and bloodshed. That was, to put it mildly, not characteristic of the people of that time and in the part of the world from which they had come. It does not seem extraordinary to us to learn that Moroni "did not delight in murder or bloodshed~ but he delighted in 55: 19). But, for that people of that the saving of his people from destruction" time, at least in the Old World, that would have been both a remarkable assertion and a virtually disqualification for a militaty leader. General George S. Patton's assertion25 upon the body strewn battle fields of France in World War II-"God help me~ but [ love it. I truly love it"-would have been much more in keeping with the attitude and job qualifications of the successful military general of the time.

Personal Responsibility But all of this discussion and analysis may well be of more interest to generals and other military leaders than it is to most of us. We are not in positions to start or end wars. Nor do we have much say in how they are fought or the precise terms offered for surrender. But that is certainly not the end of the matter, nor is it the end of what the gospel has to tell us about war and our relationship to it. To the contrary, I think the analysis of what is or is not a just war in some geopolitical or perhaps even religious sense is really only the start of the inquiry. Or, put slightly differently, the re8;l issue regarding war is not what our President or our generals do, but rather what we do in response to an the death and destruction in the world. In other words, we are not likely to be in Moroni's position. Indeed, most of us are not even likely to be a warrior in his or anyone else's army. So~ what does all this mean for us?

Relationship Between National Wars and Personal Behavior I start with the simple observation that war is a very, very common theme is LDS speeches and literature. A universal search for the word "war" in the LDS data base of conference speeches alone produced well over 500 entries. Most of these entries speak of a "personal" war against sin, or the war that Satan wages for the souls of men. Pronouncements about war in the geopolitical sense or about armed military conflicts are rare. But the concepts of "war" and of «battles" certainly are not. But here is where it gets interesting. Initially, one might conclude that these discussions of war in the more personal sense and war in a geopolitical sense are umelated. War is simply a metaphor for a personal internal battle we wage against sin. Our Response to War Must Be to Proclaim Peace Bui,"-6i1 reflectlon, f think the connection is much deeper and closer than we might first imagine. President Harold B. Lee shows this cOf'.nection in the most profound sense in his answer to an inquiry some years ago about the Church's position on the Vietnam War. The question had within it a trap. How could a Christian church support war? On the other hand~ opposition to the war might be construed as lack of support for

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our soldiers and our country. But, as prophets frequently do, President Lee answered the question at its deepest level, not at the level necessarily intended by the questioner. Be said: We, together with the whole Christian world, abhor war. But the Savior said, "In me ye might have peace. In the world ye shall have tribulation" (John 16:33). "Peace I leave with you, my peace I give unto you: not as the world giveth, give I unto you" (John 14:27). The Savior was not talking about the peace that can be achieved between nations, by military force or by negotiation in the halls of parliaments. Rather, he was speaking of the peace we can each have in our own lives when we live the commandments and come unto Christ with broken hearts and contrite spiritS. 26

In other words, the answer to our position on geopolitical war is to proclaim personal peace. The gospel brings peace, but not peace as it is conventionally understood and discussed in the New York Times. Rather, peace as it manifests itself in our personal lives. Our Response to War Must Be to Live Righteously Elder Dallin Oaks perhaps put it best: "The peace the gospel brings is not just the absence of war. It is the opposite of war. Gospel peace is the opposite of any conflict, armed or unarmed. It is the opposite of national or ethnic hostilities, of civil or family strife."27

The link between national and civil strife, on the one hand, and family strife, on the other, is particularly interesting. It suggests to us that perhaps we miss the mark when we think personal peace and global peace are entirely different things. Perhaps the relationship between peace in Bosnia and peace in our family is much closer and more intimate than we thi11,k. President Joseph F. Smith made precisely this point during World War 1. He said: For years it has been held that peace comes only by preparation for war; the present conflict should prove that peace comes only by preparing for peace, through training the people in righteousness and justice, and selecting rulers who respect the righteous will of the people .... There is only one thing that can bring peace into the world. It is the adoption of the gospel of Jesus Christ, rightly understood, obeyed and practices by rulers and people alike. 2&

President David O. McKay echoed this same thought: Peace will come and be maintained only through the triumph of the principles of peace, and by the subjection of the enemies of peace, which are hatred, envy, ill-gotten gain, the exercise of unrighteous dominion of men. Yielding to these evils brings misery to the individual, unhappiness to the home, war among nations. 29

Again, we see the connection between the home and the nation. And, equally importantly, the blame for war is not put on people, but rather on the principles of war. War arises because the principles of peace are not observed. All this reminds us of the Lord's injunction to Moses: "If ye walle in my statutes, and keep my commandments ... I will give peace in the land ... neither shall the sword go through your land" (Leviticus 26:3, 6). Elder Oaks makes clear that the causes of war are always rooted in the triumph of the principles that are the enemies of peace. As we seek to understand the causes of wars, persecutions, and civil strife, we can see that they are almost always rooted in wickedness .... All of these slaughters [the Holocaust, Stalin's purges and labor camps, the Biafran War] and others like them, were rooted in the ancient wickedness Satan taught-that man could murder to get gain. 30

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What is the solution? Again, Elder Oaks turns to the principles: Obedience to these commandments [the Ten Commandments]. which are the bedrock moral foundation for all Christians and Jews, would have prevented the greatest tragedies of this century." He continues, "we cannot have peace among nations without achieving general righteousness among the people who comprise them.

Elder John A. Widtsoe makes precisely the same point. He talks about how to build communities that eschew war. His solution mirrors that of Elder Oaks, of President McKay, of President Hinckley: The only way to build a peaceful community is to build men and women who are lovers and makers of peace. Each individual, by that doctrine of Christ and His Church, holds in his hands the peace of the world. That makes me responsible for the peace of the world, and makes you individually responsible for the peace of the world. The responsibility cannot be shifted to someone else. It cannot be placed upon the shoulders of Congress or Parliament, or any other organization of men with governing ability?l

I particularly like the notion that I hold world peace in my hands. The quest for peace starts not with a demonstration on the White House la\VIl, though, of course, there is nothing wrong with that. But rather, my greatest contribution to global peace starts in my home, at my job, within my family, my congregation, at the store where I shop, with the people with whom I come in contact every day. As usual, Elder Oaks says it best and it is on that note that I end. He identifies the precise relationship between global peace and the gospel and, more importantly, my individual responsibility-and capacity-to work towards world peace. He says: The Savior and his Apostles had no program for world peace other than individual righteousness. What can one person do to promote world peace? The answer is simple: keep God's commandments and serve his children. Like the church that sends them forth, our missionaries have no political agenda and no specific program for disarmament or reduction of forces. They circulate no petitions, advocate no legislation, support no candidates. They are the Lord's servants, and his program for world peace depends' on righteousness, not rhetoric. His methods involve repentance and reformation, not placards and picketing. By preaching righteousness, our missionaries seek to treat the causes of war. They preach repentance from personal corruption, greed, and oppression because only by individual reformation can we overcome corruption and oppression by groups of nations. By inviting all to repent and come unto Christ, our missionaries are working for peace in this world by changing the hearts and behavior of individual men and women.,2

Conclusion Among the many important ideas contained in that prophetic insight, I think one phrase bears repeating and particular emphasis: "Only by individual reformation can we overcome corruption and oppression by groups of nations." As Elder Widtsoe so eloquently put it: "Each individual, by that doctrine of Christ and His Church, holds in his hands the pe~~e of.!:he world. That makes me responsible for the peace of the world, and makes you individually responsible for the peace of the world."33 Thus, the words of a song goes round and round in my head as I conclude this presentation. Perhaps these words are not merely the musings of a 1960's hippie, but, to the contrary, perhaps reflect the most profound of all gospel principles relating to war: Let us have peace and let it begin with me.

LAIMING PEACE: :CTIVES ON

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NOTES 1. Von Elhe, Joachim. "The evolution of the Concept of the Just War in International Law," American Jouranllnternational Law, 33'(4), pp. 665-88, 1939; Dinstein, Yoram. War, Aggression' and Self Defence, 3rd Edition, Cambridge University Press, p. 60, 2001.

2. Murphy, Sean D. "Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order," Procedural Aspects of International Law Series, 21, University of Pennsylvania Press, pp. 40-41, 1996. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. 5. Murphy, pp. 40-41; Brownlie, Ian. International Law and the Use afForce by States, Oxford University Press, pp. 5-7, 1963.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 9. Suarez as quoted in Dinstein, Yoram. War; Aggression and Self-Defence, 3rd Edition, Cambridge University Press, pp. 64-65,2001. 10. Dinstein, Yoram. War, Aggression, and Self-Defence, 3rd Edition, Cambridge University Press, 2001. 11. The Principles ofInternational Law, Ed. Winfield, 7th Edition, p. 311, 1923. 12. Brownlie. pp. 5-7.

13. Dinstein~ pp. 64-65. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid. 17. Rickaby, Joseph, S.l. SCholasticism, Dodge Publishers, pp. 66-67, 1908. 18. Ibid. 19. Dinstein, pp. 64-65. 20. Ibid. 21. Hinckley, Gordon B. "War and Peace," Ensign, p. 78, May 2003. 22. Ibid. 23. For a very interesting discussion of the role of prophecy in guiding us in times of war, see Nibley, Hugh. "If There Must Needs Be Offense," Ensign, p. 53, July 1971. 24. For a very interesting and insightful discussion of Moroni and all his activities in war, from which much of the following discussion of Moroni is derived, see England, Eugene. "Moroni and His Captains: Men of Peace in Time of War," Ensign, p. 29, September 1977. 25. Patton, 1970.

26. Lee, Harold B. Ensign, p. 70, November 1982.

27. All quotations from Elder Oaks are from Oaks, Dallin H. "World Peace," Ensign, pp. 71-74, May 1990. 28. Smith, Joseph F. Improvement Era, pp.1074-75, September 1914.

29. McKay, David O. "Gospel ideals: selections from the discourses of David O. McKay," Improvement Era, p. 280, 1953.

30. Oaks, pp. 71-74. 31. Widstoe, A. Conference Report, p. 113, October 1943. 32. Oaks, pp. 71-74.

33. Widstoe, p. 113.

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4 Power's Reality, Power's Illusion: Policy at the Intersection of the Two Kingdoms Valerie M Hudson Most of the 100 or so students in my national security class each year at Brigham Young University are graduating seniors, and most majored in political science or international relations. On the last day of class, I ask them if they got their money's worth. I present them with the following list of insights concerning national security from those fields, and inquire as to whether they had studied these over the course of their undergraduate education.

The Reality of Power 1. Power is finite. There is a finite pie of power, so if you have more power, I have less (zero sum). 2. Power balances. For every power action by one group or individual, another group or individual will react with an equal and opposite action designed to equalize or "balance" power. Thus the balance of power is constantly shifting. 3. My enemy's enemy is my friend. The world is divided into friends and enemies, and others who share my same enemy are my allies. After I vanquish my enemy, however, my former "ally" will likely become my new enemy. 4. A free rider problem will always exist. Within a social group, the person with the most power usually does most of the work. Free riders any them. selves with this power center and accept any benefits the powerful entity produces but typically repay the center of power with criticism and lack of meaningful support. S. Relative power gains are more important than absolute power Thus if a policy decision will result in benefits to us both, I will agree with that decision, but if you will gain more than I, I will oppose that decision. 6. The "security dilemma" is inescapable. As a powerful entity seeks to become more secure, it will become less secure over time for two reasons: (a) since power balances, every move the entity makes to ensure its security win-be-countered by those opposed to it; and (b) in its efforts to make itself more secure, the entity will overextend the limits of its power, drawing counterforces and eventually collapsing. 7. The center cannot hold forever. Centers of power always become less efficient over and eventually the center gives way to other forces.

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8. Situational ethics are required to maintain power. Even if a powerful entity started with our principles, the principles are eventually subordinated to power needs. Power is the end goal, and moral considerations only get in the way. 9. Fight fire with fire. To overcome an enemy, one must do what the enemy is doing to you, only more of it.

I am sure all of you are very familiar with these maxims, which seem quite descriptive of the world we live in, and my students usually nod and tell me that they have learned these things by heart in the classes they have taken in international relations and political science. I then tell them they were cheated. I tell my students they did not get their money's worth. They did not learn the truth about power's reality. They were taught illusion in the place of that reality; they were taught the reality of fallen power-and fallen power is not true power. The logic of true power is vastly different from the logic of fallen power-so different that it is virtually incomprehensible to the fallen minds. As Paul wrote: The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God: for they are foolishness unto him: neither can he know them, because they are not spiritually-discerned ... [And] the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God. For it is written, He taketh the wise in their own craftiness (1 Corinthians 2:14; 3:19; 1 Corinthians 1:17-31).

The True Reality of Power 1. True power is infinite. Everyone can have infinite power and thus equal power. The only time you have less power is if you reject power. 2. Power doesn't balance. It grows until the perfect day. 3. Nobody in the business of being enemies can be my friend. There is no true power in allying myself with people who define themselves by hatreds and exclusions. ' 4. There are no free riders. All are responsible and equal. 5. There are no relative power gains. All can possess infmite power, according only to the speed with which as individuals they are capable of attaining it. 6. Exercise of true power leads to more security, not less. Overextending true power is not possible. The ultimate source of security is righteousness, and the ultimate source of power is Christ-like love in the service oflife. 7. The Center can and will hold forev:er. Death, suffering, and sin have been conquered for all and for all time by Jesus Christ, our Savior. The forces of good will always triumph over the forces of evil. 8. There are no situational ethics; there are only ethics. There is always a better choice, even if a "best" choice is not possible.

sword

9 :"Fight fIre with water. Fight TIrewith love--for thos-e-wno live by thewill perish by the sword. Note that true power actively and forcefully defends the boundary between light and dark and their respective adherents. But this is done out of love, not out of hatred. And it is done out of necessity, not as an avocation.

PO\VER'S REALITY, POV·,iER'S ILLUSION: POLICY AT TIIE INTERSECTION OF THE Two KiNGDOMS

10. True power is always more powerful than "real" power. At this point, many of my students exclaim that they really do know these things, but that this doesn't work in the "real" world. I remind them of a profound statement by Elder Hugh W. Pinnock, who recently passed away. Speaking at a Christmas devotional at BYU on 13 December 1997, "Elder Pinnock said: Seek the world of "reality." Are you seeking the world of reality? Periodically I will hear some less-than-thoughtful person criticize or demean that which we may be doing by saying, "Hey, get real. Join the real world." May I communicate with each of you that the real world is that which our prophet, Church leaders, and scriptures define. It is President Gordon B. Hinckley who is walking in the real world. I

And I am also reminded David's finest hour. Now you know that David had many less-than-fine h.ours, but he did have one that shone like the sun. This is what the ruddy youth said in the valley of Elah that day: And [Goliath] said unto David, Am I a dog, that thou comest to me with staves? And the Philistine cursed David by his gods. And the Philistine said to David, Come to me, and I will give thy flesh unto the fowls of the air, and to the beasts of the field. Then said David to the Philistine, Thou comest to me with a sword, and with a spear, and with a shield: but I come to thee in the name of the LORD of hosts, the God of the annies of Israel, whom thou hast defied. This day will the LORD deliver thee into mine hand; and I will smite thee, and take thine head from thee; and I will give the carcasses of the host of the Philistines this day unto the fowls of the air, and to the wild beasts of the earth; that all the earth may know that there is a God in Israel. And an this assembly shall know that the LORD saveth not with sword and spear: for the battle is the LORD'S, and he will give you jnto our hands (1 Samuel 17:43-47).

The wisdom and and strength of this world, which is ruled by the devil who styles himself as "the god of this world," is no match for the Spirit of God. As Paul wrote, "For it is written, I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and will bring to nothing the understanding of the prudent ... Because the foolishness of God is wiser than men; and the weakness of God is stronger than men" (1 Corinthians 1:19,25). If you accept the rules of fallen power, you may find yourself things in the quest to gain power and control. For example, "we must village to save it," or "offense is moral, defense is immoral," are part of that twisted even straitjacket of fallen power. If we go down this road of fallen power, we commit evil in the name of good causes, such as "1 must accept this bribe so that my party, which is the good party, can stay in power," or "We will hate you stop vulnerhating others." Students going into law, business, or government are able to the idea that we have no choice but to "play the game." But that game has an ignominious end, as Brigham Young commented: Without the power of the Holy Ghost, a person is liable to go to the right or the left. from the straight path of deity. They are liable to do things they are sorry for; they are liable to make mistakes; and when they try to do their best, behold they do that which they dislike.1

Even-the-most-cunning and wise possessor of fallen power will eventually stumble and fall, while the most unlearned man with true power will, in the end, succeed and endure. Now, my students are right to feel frustration when I present this material to them. Until Christ comes again, we must live in fallen nations. We do not have the privilege

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of living in Zion, where the very streams and animals protect its inhabitants from the schemes and invasions of the wicked. We "live in nations that are vulnerable, in great measure because our people are not We do not have the promise of safety extended to peoples of old who obeyed God's commandments. But we and our families and our loved ones live in these fallen nations, and it is our sacred duty to protect them and other innocents unto death if needs be. Many of you assembled here work for the government for that very reason, while simultaneously being very cognizant of the fallen nature of many of our governmental institutions and leaders. In a sense, then, we reside at the intersection of two kingdoms: the kingdom of God on earth, and the kingdom of this fallen world. We know both sheets backwards and forwards. And we struggle to see how we can act in this fallen world in a way that does justice to the real world in which we have faith. How can we, who aspire to live in that real world, interact with those in the world of illusion and not get sucked into that world with them? We have not been left without guidance. We have many scriptures and many examples. For instance: "Be ye ... wise as serpents and harmless as doves" (Matthew 10:16).

Be in the world, but not of it (see John 1S: 19). "Render ... unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's" (Matthew 22:21). "We believe in being subject to kings, presidents, rulers, and magistrates, in obeying, honoring, and sustaining the law" (Article of Faith 1:12). The works of honorable men of war in the Book of Mormon, such as Captain Moroni (see Alma 43-62), Many scriptures in the Doctrine and Covenants that advise the Saints in dealing with evil and corrupt persons who seek to harm them (see Doctrine and Covenants 89:4; Doctrine and Covenants 121; Doctrine and Covenants 122).

As I have pondered these and other scriptures, recent conference addresses by Elder Russell M. Nelson and President Gordon B. Hinckley about war and conflict, I have tried to distill some insights into what types of policy and actions Here is what allow one to that treacherous intersection of the Two I have learned thus far: L Though sometimes there is not a best choice in a situation, there is always a better choice. We are required to find it, and to exercise all our efforts and talents in that pursuit.

2. The key to finding that better choice is purity of heart and pmity of intentions. You must be inspired by "a better cause" (Alma The national interest cannot be defined in tenns of fallen power-there must be a better cause to all that you do. In that cause, there is no room for hatred, revenge, pridefulness, sinfulness, or covetousness. The Spirit can whisper to you-dearly when your heart is"·clean. Seek for leaders" with-dean hands and clean hearts. Be clean yourself. 3. War is not always evil. The use of force is not always eviL Sometimes it is a sacred obligation, as in cases of defense. Sometimes to refuse to use force is evil. But there must be a code of conduct in way or in any use of force.

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Such a code would include: N on-combatants not targeted No criminal behavior-pillage, rape, etc. POWs treated humanely unless they mutiny A spirit of mourning, not triumphalism, must accompany the use of force

4. Pragmatism---or expedience-is not evil unless it gives in to evil. Workable minimums are better than unsupportable, unsustainable maximums. Run no faster than you are able. You can work with others of different values if the divergence is not too gre~t, and if their values do not trample yours. Otherwise, there may be blowback and moral contamination of orie's actions. In such cases, unilateralism is to be preferred to multilateralism. 5. Parochialism is unjustifiable. Doctrine and Covenants 88 is the foundational scripture here. Our policy must include efforts to inform our public and the publics of other nations as to the truth of what is happening. An important part of that endeavor is to chronicle truth and then disseminate it. 6. If others hate and revile your policy, it does not mean it is not the better choice. If others hate and revile you, and call you arrogant or imperialistic, etc., it does not mean that you are. The important test is that outlined in #2. Are you inspired by a better cause? Are your hearts and hands clean? If so, you must have the courage of your convictions. Remember the exchange of epistles between Ammoron and Moroni; Moroni rejects Ammoron's version of events as false and self-serving, and does not shrink from telling Ammoron exactly where he is headed (Alma 54-55). 7. We must be a nation of our word. No more idle promises. No more signing treaties we have no intention of keeping. Or promising Hungari'ans or Shiites that we will come to their aid when we won't. Or telling Saddam Husseins . there will be consequences for bad behavior when there won't be. 8. We must not just stop evil; we must try to sow good. So, for example, the recent congressional initiative to provide significant funding for AIDS prevention in sub-Saharan Africa is a wonderful and good-hearted policy decision. But we can't make everything an better for everyone-it is the privilege and agency of a people to help themselves when they can. 9. Even if you follow all of these maxims, there will still be setbacks and failures and difficulties. The better policy choice is not always the easiest to implement or the swiftest to see results. To have the courage of your convictions, you need to have some convictions! This is where tests #1 and #2 come in. Have you tried your hardest to find the better choice? Are your hearts and hands clean, and are you inspired by a better cause? 10. There is truth and there is falsehood. There is good and there is evil. The of this is complacence. The opposite of complacence is vigilance, planning, and proactivity. But after all we can do, we must rely on God's arm-and only those who are pure in heart can do that. Don't give in to discouragement, despair, cynicism, or fatalism! We can make a difference. Every one of us can. I have been reading in Ezekiel lately, and this is what God said to Ezekiel before destroying the survivors left at Jerusalem, "And I re.~p.IJ....9ilQ§i!~KgrasP

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sought for a man among them Gust one man!), that should make up the and stand in the gap before me for the land, that I should not destroy it: but I found none" (Ezekiel 22:30; parenthetical comment added). We vvill be as accountable for what we were too complacent to do as we are accountable for what we actually do. We can wield the sword while proclaiming peace. Indeed, in this fallen and wicked world, we must. But we must not become part of that lie that is the world's wisdom of about power and security. We must maintain our full membership in the God on earth. Only with devotion to God and to good and to life, only with a clean heart and clean and diligence and hard work, can we hope to emulate those great men of old, such as Captain Moroni, who of necessity took up the sword in a better cause, conducted himself with both skill and humanity during war, and then retired to his home when his people were safe and the peace was won. We have such men today. Let me tell you of one--Captain Chris Carter of the U.S. Army in Iraq: Toward sundown, on a patch of Kuwaiti desert 10 miles south of the Iraqi border, the fIrst sergeant of Attack Company, 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment, caned the men to attention. 4 Their commander,Army Capt. Chris Carter, 31, of Watkinsville, Georgia, strode up to battle dress-desert camouflage, flakjacket, Kevlar helm.et. ... the formation in

fun

In the days ahead, he said in a slow Georgia drawl, thousands oflife-and-death decisions would be made by thousands of soldiers. They were well-prepared, he said. Their training, equipment, and spirit would carry them through. "We are a moral army," he continued. When Iraqi soldiers surrender, "treat them with respect," he said; when they don't surrender, "kill them." But defeating Saddam Hussein's army was only part of the job. They must also earn the trust of the Iraqi people. "We have to go in there and treat them right," he said.... [Later], after three hours offighting, a soldier saw an old woman lying near the middle of the bridge, waving for help. Carter's Bradley lurched forward, he and two ·ofhis men moving in a crouch behind it as small arms fire cracked around them. As they reached the woman, Carter threw a smoke grenade to obscure his position. Carter knelt beside the woman and offered her water, but, fearing a trap, also checked her for hidden explosives. From across the river, Iraqi fighters opened fire. The Bradleys and MIAl Abrams tanks pounded them as Carter called for an armored ambulance. After medics loaded the bleeding woman into the ambulance and backed away, the Bradley backed off the bridge, Carter and his men staying behind it for cover. Later, Carter reflected on why he had put his men in harm's way to save the woman. He had come to Iraq to fight "not just for the political aims of this conflict, but for the people," he said. "To leave out on that bridge would have gone against the grain of why we are here." , .. [Carter] also realized the war had changed him. "It has made me a lot less concerned about worldly things," he said. "It's not about possessions but about taking care of people we know, we love-and takmg care of people we don't know." On April 10 [2003], in downtown Baghdad, Carter heard the latest news: President Bush had declared that Saddam's regime was gone for good and that the Iraqi people

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would soon be enjoying the blessings of liberty. "Good, we've done our job," Carter said. "Now send us home."

May our hearts be strengthened to be like Captain Carter's heart, I pray. NOTES 1. Pinnock, Hugh W. "Christmas Gifts-LDS Style," BYU Devotional, 1997.

2. Young, Brigham. Discourses ofBrigham Young. second president o/The Church ofJesus Christ

0/Latter-day Saints, selected and arranged by John A. Widtsoe, Deseret Book, p. 31, 1925. 3. Hinckley, Gordon B. "War and Peace," Ensign, p. 78, May 2003. 4. "War Tests Courage, Decency," Deseret News, pp. A4, All, 20 Apri12003.

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5 U.S. National Security Strategy and the Gospel: Nexus and Divergence Steven A. Hildreth Introduction At the previous conference, I talked about how I believed a discussion of national security issues among the LDS community was timely, but perhaps long overdue. I outlined some general principles on war and peace that were derived from the scriptures, Church Presidents, and First Presidencies of the Church. 2 Therein, I noted, is found constancy over time. I further noted that although a number of questions could be answered from a general LDS doctrinal framework on security, other key questions remained unanswered. It is interesting to note that in President Hinckley's April 2003 General Conference address on war, many of these issues were touched upon. Today, I want to spend some time talking broadly first about U.S. National Security Strategy and measure that against an LDS doctrinal framework on war and peace issues. I want to do this to demonstrate there are some key areas in which there are convergences and divergences of perspective. Although I'm hoping that some questions might be answered herein, and at this symposium, I recognize that many other questions will remain unanswered, serving instead as continued "food for thought."

U.S. National Security Strategy For much of the past century, U.S. national security strategy focused on several core, interrelated objectives. These include: 1) enhancing U.S. se9urity at home and abroad; 2) promoting U.S. economic prosperity; and 3) promoting free markets and democratic principles around the world. It is important to note that the priority and emphasis that the United States has placed on each of these core objectives has varied from time to time and from place to place since the end of World War II. In addition, the United States has used a broad range of unilateral and multilateral mechanisms to achieve these objectives, again with varying degrees of emphasis at different times and in different locations. These mechanisms have included a number of security/military, diplomatic/political, and economic tools. Thus, the post-World War II legacy of the United States in the world is largely an assessment of the success or failure of these tools, as well as the strategy behind their employment. One of these core objectives-enhancing U.S. security-generally is interpreted as the -effOiCto-protect the nation's interests as defined at the time, but it has also broadly included, for instance: protecting the lives and safety of Americans; maintaining U.S. sovereignty over its values, territory, and institutions; and promoting the nation's well being. In order to protect and defend those interests, the United States has wielded a

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deep and wide range of military, diplomatic/political, and economic tools. These tools include, for instance, the deployment of military forces to deter, dissuade, or compel others; the formation of alliances and coalitions to advance U.S. interests and to counter aggression; and the use of U.S. economic power to advance its agenda or promote democratization in whole or part, or to withhold U.S. economic support to condemn Or punish states hostile to U.S. interests. More often than not, discussions of national security strategy tend to focus on one of these core objectives-enhancing U.S. security--and primarily on one of the main tools-the wide range of military options available to the United States. But we should recognize that national security strategy is much more than that. We should also recognize that the U.S. national security strategy is not the same as the national military strategy, which is how our military has determined at any particular time what should be done to achieve our national objectives as defmed by the nation's leadership. Much could be said about recent shifts in U.S. national security strategy since the end of the Cold War. This is especially so with the changes wrought by the current Bush Administration. 3 Although these changes are very important to note and assess, I wish to focus on the much larger picture-that U.S. national security strategy since the end of World War II has focused primarily around three core objectives that have themselves received varying attention over time, and that the core tools employed in striving to attain these objectives have also received varying attention over time. So, what new emphasis has this administration brought to bear? The answer is not inconsequential. First, in the context of our core national objectives, I believe today we are witnessing the militant and perhaps strident promotion of security, democracy, and free enterprise by the United States abroad. Second, I believe we are witnessing the progressive disengagement from and perhaps deliberate alienation of traditional allies and institutions, except in the application of military force with those few abroad that share this administration's views. Third, I believe this administration has embarked this nation on a pennanent war footing and fostered an atmosphere of fear in part for political purposes unrelated to the U.S. national security strategy.

An LDS Doctrinal Framework Now, let's examine in contrast what an LDS security framework might look like. This framework is based on articles that I have published previously.4 The framework itself is built around the injunction in Doctrine and Covenants 98: 16, to "renounce war and proclaim peace," as well as around the twelfth Article of Faith, which enjoins us to be "subject to kings, presidents, rulers" and to "[obey], [honor], and [sustain] the law." How might this look if we undertake closer examination of a number of securityrelated issues as commented upon by the scriptures, the Presidents of the the Church, and their First P:r:esidencies? I recognize these are largely summarized and simplified, and hence subject to criticism, but in my view their provenance is solid. 5 These issues are divided into three broad areas: war, obligation to the state, and peace. On Wifr,·Warfare, and Weapons--·--·---Warfare largely results from the imperrection of the human condition (war results from iniquity, selfishness, greed, and idolatry, for example). Warfare sometimes results from corrupt political systems (e.g., fascism or communism) and even militaristic democracies.

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Warfare is not a morally sustainable instrwme1o.t of state policy. Warfare is not a morally sustainable approach to dispute resolution, although war is sometimes recognized as the only way to end an existing conflict between states, Warfare is not morally sustainable for purposes of vengeance or domination. Warfare can be justified for self-defense in the face of aggression under a narrow set

of conditions and only after all other alternatives are foreclosed. "God, in His own due time, will pass sentence upon [leaders of nations] ... who in a frenzy of hate and lust for unrighteous power and dominion ... put into motion eternal forces they do not comprehend and cannol: control."6 Coercive force in the conduct of international relations is not morally sustainable. Relying on the arm of flesh for security is idolatry.

Anns buildups are not morally sustainable; weapons are used invariably. Nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence are not morally sustainable.

On Obedience to the State and to the Law Citizens are expected to sustain their respective national leaders. Citizens are expected to obey the laws of their land. U.S. citizens have a special obligation to support the Constitution, which can take precedence over an obligation to national leaders.

If military service is required, citizens are expected to serve honorably and not succumb to the attendant immoralities of war such as hatred; any life taken by honorable soldiers following the legal commands of their leaders will not be accounted against them. If legal alternatives to military service are available, citizens may rightfully pursue them.

On Peace Peaceful relations among nations are preferred. Peace for individuals and nations is attainable through obedience to the principles of Christ's GospeL Secular peace efforts-with an end to promote peace, mutual understanding, negotiated disarmament settlements, and treaties-are morally sustainable.

Nexus So where, if anywhere, does our national security strategy converge with Gospel teachings? Is it possible to make a general case for enhancing our own security within the context of the Gospel? In broad general terms, I believe the answer to be "yes." It seems prudent that some level of defensive measures and mechanisms are appropriate our families. and specifically our ability to worship as to ensure that our way of we please, be protected. As President Gordon B. Hinckley reminded us this past conference, "When war raged between the Nephites and the Lamanites, the record states that 'the Nepl1i!~~~:r52.i~~pired by a better cause, for they were not fighting for .. , power but they were fighting for their homes and their liberties, their wives and their children, and their all, yea, for their rites, of worship and their church.' . , . The Lord counseled them, 'defend your families even unto bloodshed' (Alma 43:45-47)." Having said that, however, what is sufficient? Can there be too much preparation or reliance on security through secular or material means, and if so, at what cost does

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it come? As President Kimball warned on the eve of this nation's bicentennial, at what point does the pursuit of security in this manner transcend the legitimate to idolatryT Can this type of idolatry evolve to or include something such as hubris? Is there such a thing as too much worldly security in the eyes of the Lord? Is it morally justifiable to pursue security to defend against any and all threats from without? If so, whose moral foundation is being used: the Lord's or the world's? What about another core objective, that being our economic prosperity? Although this sphere is not something I have examined in depth, it is clear that economic independence is important to the Church, its members, and by inference to this nation. But let us be clear about what might give birth to this and how it is used. So much of our free-market capitalist society places a premium on the pursuit of materialism and riches. Should this be a means or an end? I would argue that the culture in which we live today sees these as ends. Can there be too much economic prosperity? Are riches a two-edged sword? What can we learn from the Book of Mormon about this subject? Various peoples were blessed with riches at various times. What were the reasons they continued to prosper? When did they fail? What that tell us about our culture today? What does that tell us about our own lives? What things, if any, should we as a people and as a nation be concerned with when considering our economic well being and that of our neighbors and fellow humankind? , Finally, let us look briefly at the major national core Is democratization an inherent "good" that should be foisted upon other countries and cultures? or the and There is not a lot of guidance to be found here in the basic value-freedom teachings of Church leaders, but it is worth noting that a of religion-seems to have allowed the Church to prosper in any number of politically diverse and non-democratic cultures around the world. In relative terms, other demoa strategy that cratic principles or liberties may not be as important. In other encouraged religious freedom might be, in relative terms, more important to us as a people than one that included the full-range of democratic values and institutions.

Divergence So where, if anywhere, do our national security strategy and the Gospel seem to part company? From the outset, we need to recognize and acknowledge that our national security strategy belongs to this world. It is a worldly construct that has helped build a great nation, but it contrasts in several key ways with the Gospel. and perhaps most importantly, this strategy largely promotes self-interest over collective interests. Yes, I understand that you can make a case that the promotion of collective security, global free markets, and democratization, for example, can benefit the larger whole. In principle, that's correct. However, reality is often different than principle. Recent 'events regarding the Iraq war and coalition-building illustrate that although this country" rhetorically promotes the principle of democracy, when other democratic states (such as France, Germany, Russia, and Turkey) act contrary to our own self-interests, we resent them and even attempt to use some of our variou_~ __economic and diplomatic/political tools against our democratIcfrIends. In the final analy~ self-interest generally prevails over collective interests when the two are at odds. But why is this point so impoItan't? The line between self-interest and selfishness is close--even when it comes to nations. I mentioned earlier that from a Gospel perspective selfishness is seen as a key cause of warfare. I maintain that there is a close

p U.S. NATIONAL SECURlTY STRATEGY AND THE GOSPEL

link between a strategy with strong roots in self-interest and the resulting conflict even unto warfare. In contrast, we see that its opposite-selflessness-is touted as a Gospel virtue. Second, there is much to our national security strategy that causes us to rely on the employment of power or coercion in some fonn, whether it is military, diplomatic/ political, or economic power. Again, I recognize this is certainly not always the case, but we often seek to impose our will on others. In contrast, the Gospel urges us to abhor denying others free will or choice, even if it allows poor or bad choices to be made, and even choices that lead to conflict. Third, our national security strategy makes general assumptions about the inevitability of conflict in some form arising from the interaction of states. In contrast, the Gospel and the framework discussed earlier emphasize the general possibility of peace among peoples and nations. The former is pessimistic regarding perceived reality; the latter is optimistic regarding a possible and desirable future. Fourth, the major basis for ensuring our national security in the final analysis is idolatry. This nation and its citizens expend enormous portions of their talent and resources on gods of steel and firepower in a perhaps fruitless effort to deliver them from their enemies. Many of you may argue that this is the central purpose of the state, but you miss my point that in the end this is still idolatrous, as President Kimball chose to remind us of all things he could have addressed in an era of relative peace and low defense spending on the occasion of this nation's bicentennial in 1976. 8 It would require a paradigm shift of a major order for most people, including Church members, to conceive of this nation-state as justified only in providing defenses sufficient to not be perceived as idolatrous. But is it too late to do anything at this point? Is there anything Latter-day Saints in the national security community can do? Perhaps we all should just pack for Zion and wash our hands of all this untidiness.

Conclusion Let me say just a couple of things in conclusion and leave you with a final question or two to ponder. I mink there are profound dilemmas we face as a Latter-day Saint community grappling with issues of peace and security in the international church. There are a number of global issues that may not affect us directly as Latter-day Saints or as a Church, but which are very likely to offend our moral sensibilities. Anyone who has taken the time to look into these things cannot help but be outraged. These include such things as human rights violations, child soldiers, international trafficking of women, genocide, narco-trafficking, civil wars, failing or failed states, and regional conflicts. In light of what I've discussed today, should we as Latter-day Saints be doing something about these issues-and if so, what? I have argued previously and continue to maintain there is little Gospel-related support as I've outlined here and elsewhere for direct military intervention in these areas. Having provided that less-thansatisfactory response, what can we do that might be justified within this framework I've laid out? Certainly, diplomacy and political avenues can be justified and pursued, thOlign-iliey-wilToe frustrating and oftentimes non-productive. I believe in the end We will be judged more by our efforts and less on our outcomes. Finally, as Latter-day Saints, where is our first obligation in times of war? To the state? To the Gospel and its teachings? To our national leaders? Or to what? If our first obligation is to the state, then when nations are at odds with each other over a conflict,

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such as the recent war against Iraq, such a situation obliges us to support our own state and in essence pits Lati:er-day Saints in different countries against each other. Should issues such as this divide the Saints? Yet, if our first obligation is to the Gospel in conditions such as this, are we in essence pitted against our national leaders? J. Reuben Clark once wrote something very helpful in this regard: God provided that in this land of liberty, OUI political allegiance shall run not to individuals, that is, to government officials, no matter how great or how small they may be. Under His plan OUI allegiance and the only allegiance we owe as citizens or denizens of the United States, runs to OUI inspired Constitution which God Himself set up. So runs the oath of office of those who participate in government. A certain loyalty we do owe to the office which a man holds, but even here we owe, just by reason of our citizenship, no loyalty to the nan himself. In other countries it is to the individual that allegiance runs. This principle of allegiance to the Constitution is basic to our freedom. It is one of the great principles that distinguishes this "land ofliberty" from other countries.9

Clark appears to suggest that we as U.S. Latter-day Saints can distinguish what it means to be obliged to support this nation: we have a greater allegiance to the Constitution than to anyone leader or another at anyone time. I suggest this is not inconsequential for us, especially for those among us who work for our government and have taken that oath of allegiance. From the previous BYU Symposium on national security I ended with the following statement, which I continue to hold to as a guide: "Some argue that one loses credibility when one stands for principle yet loses in the policy debate or decision. If the world associates credibility with personal or collective victory, one wonders how valuable such principles are, especially if they so rarely prevail in the world? My answer is, when you stand on a correct principle and lose, you have stood on a correct principle and grown. And in my mind that speaks volumes about a person and a nation." NOTES 1. Any opinions, conclusions, or recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the author alone and do not represent the views of CRS, Congress, the Federal Government, or the sponsors of this symposium. 2. My approach over the years on these topics has been to focus exclusively on the breadth of LDS scriptures, and statements from the Presiden1s of the Church in this dispensation, as well as statements from the various First Presidencies and members of those First Presidencies. 3. I would refer the reader to Fred Axelgard's excellent piece on preemption included in this volume. I am in tight agreement with what he has to say. I would only add to it by suggesting some inclusion of our war/peace obligations from Doctrine and Covenants section 98, which complements Fred's writings. And I would push the analysis to consider whether preemption is justified under any condition and what those conditions might be. 4. Hildreth, Steven A. "The First Presidency statement on MX in perspective." BYU Studies, Vol. 22, No.2, pp. 215---':25, spring 1982; Hildreth, Steven A. "Mormon concern over MX: Parochialism or enduring moral theology?" Journal of Church and State, Vol. 26, No.2, pp. 227-53, spring 1984; Hildreth, Steven A. "An LDS moral perspective on security policy," Moral Perspectives Security Policy: Views from the-LDS Community, Eds. Valerie-M~ Hudson and-Kerry-M. on Kartchner, Kennedy Center Publications, Provo, pp. 117-123,1995. 5. See Ibid. 6. The Improvement Era, no. 5, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, p. 349, May 1942. 7. Kimball, Spencer W. "The False Gods We Worship," Ensign, p. 3, June 1976.

u.s.

-

U.S. NATIONAL SECt)"RITY STRATEGY At-In TIiE GOSPEL

8. Ibid. 7. With thanks to Renee C. Green, Director, World Family Policy Center (NY)~ for pointing this out. See Clark, J. Reuben. Stand Fast by Our Constitution, p. 189.

41

6

"From whence come wars and fightings among you?": An Integration of Secular and Sacred Stanley A. Taylor and Jeremy 0. Evans Introduction The study of war, its causes, conduct, and effects, is central to the academic discipline of international politics. While one can find speculations and idiosyncratic discussions about conflict for as long as there have been political entities, the systematic study of international politics emerged as a distinct academic focus only after World War I. 1 The discipline arose over the issue of World War I-how could such a cruel and devastating war occur? Since that time scholars have produced thousands of treatises examining the causes of war. This article attempts to reduce that literature to a few simple approaches, following fundamentally the framework of Kenneth Waltz, and then to see how various scriptural and general authority insights as to the cause of war fit within those approaches. We will first give a brief introduction to the unique characteristics of the international environment, introduce the study of war (especially the framework of Kenneth Waltz), examine what sacred scriptures have to say about the origin of war, examine what General Authorities of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints have said about war, and draw some conclusions about how the "sacred" analyses can be integrated with the secular.

The Nature of the International Environment It is the ever-present expectation of war that distinguishes international from

domestic politics. Organized violence does occur within states but it is usually more limited and less anticipated. It is useful to focus on the most important characteristic that separates these two levels of politics: in domestic politics there is a general expectation of peace; in international politics there is a general expectation of conflict, if not war. As Robert S. Wood has pointed out, no one understood this better than the eighteenth century philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau who " ... was neither the first nor the last to note that domestic politics and international politics appear to be governed on different foundations and according to different principles."2 Wood prefaces his analysis with Rousseau's well-known statement: The first thing I notice in looking at the state of mankind is a palpable contradiction which makes all stability impossible. As individuals, we live in the civil state, under the control of the Law; as nations, each is in the state of nature 3

All politics is, of course, the process of attempting to create some consensus in an environment characterized by differing perceptions of goals and of the means to attain

44

TAYLORIEVANS

them. But it is the nature ofthe environment- the context in which these conflicts over ends and means occur- which creates the significant distinction between national and international politics. The expectations of those involved in a street brawl are quite different from the expectations of those engaged in a fight according to the Marquis of Queensbury rules. Combatants under each condition enter the fray with a fairly com- · plete but different set of expectations. And it is precisely this difference in expectations that distinguishes domestic and international politics. Even though the study of international politics is relatively new, the difference between these two expectations creates an environment that would be easily recognized by Frederick the Great or Thucydides were they to return to the earth today. The everpresent expectation of war sets the stage on which the drama of international politics is played. War, thus, occupies a central position in the study of international politics. The causes of war and the conditions of peace are at the very heart of this field of study- a concern all the more compelling in an age of nuclear weapons, nearly instantaneous delivery systems, and a panoply of other weapons of mass destruction. The study of war is centuries old. The earliest approaches were usually concerned with the history of war or with military strategy.4 But as war came to be studied more analytically and systematically, investigators confronted one of the most basic of all scientific needs- the need for an analytical framework to provide both a focus and a taxonomy.

The Study of War In the absence of a parsimonious focus, early attempts to study the causes of war were essentially taxonomies- long lists detailing every possible cause of war from anarchy to zealotry. Initially, the most common approach was merely to itemize the causes of war into lists as long as necessary to cover every war.' Some attempted to be more parsimonious. The late Sigmund Neumann used to tell his students that studying international relations was like watching a three-ring circus: one has to watch what goes on in each ring simultaneously. Neumann labeled those rings 1) relations between nations, 2) relations between sub-national groups (states in federal systems), and 3) local politics. While Neumann's effort was interesting, it was not very rigorous. 1. David Singer, on the other hand, has been more empirical and by far the most parsimonious in his division between systemic sources of war and sub-systemic sources of war.6 A more recent textbook speaks of six levels of analysis-world system, interstate relations, society, government, role, and individuaI.7

WaItzian Framework No attempt to create a conceptual framework for the study of war, however, has been more influential or more widely discussed than that of Kenneth N. Waltz. International relations scholars are very familiar with Waltz' framework since it has been around for over forty years. Waltz suggests that all attempts to explain the causes of war fit within three images or levels- the first is human nature, the second is human organizations (particularly the nature of economic or political systems), and the third is the nature of the international political system. First Level The first level (Waltz uses the term "image" rather than level) is human nature. Any attempt to locate the cause of war that focuses on man and his nature falls within

"FROM WHENCE COME WARS AND F1GHTINGS AMONG YOU?"; AN INTEGRAT10N OF SECULAR AND SACRED

this level. In fact, according to this level, all political ills stem from human defectsfrom corrupt city politics to acts of international violence. Whether or not these human defects can be altered divides this level of analysis into two prescriptive positions. The pessimists believe that corrupt human nature (what C.S. Lewis called "bent" human nature) is the source of all political ills and that there is nothing one can do to change human nature. Whether ancient (Augustine and Spinoza) or modem (Niebuhr or Morgenthau), the central notion is the same. Neibuhr spoke of wars arising in a "deep, dark, unconscious comer of man's mind."8 And Morgenthau credits man's lust for power as the chief source of all political illS.9 For both, the assumption is the same: the causes of war are to be found in the minds of men, and these motives are unconscious and ineradicable. Human nature is "bent," it is unchangeable, and we just have to learn to live with it. It is this latter, almost fatalistic, notion that earns the name "realist" for most first level pessimists. First level pessimism is a very popular position among many intellectuals and scholars. Even normally disparate fields of study seem to unite on this one point. Many ethologists have argued that human pugnacity is a biological inheritance from our animal ancestors. 10 Even though the notion that war is in the genes has been very popular among many ethologists in the last twenty years, by no means is there consensus on this point. 11 The same theme has been popular in the fiction of several English writers, particularly English Catholics. It is as if the ideas of the 16th century heretical Catholic theologian Cornelius Jansen have finally found a home. Jansen preached the doctrine of a perverse and unchangeable human nature, so incapable of choosing good that selfflagellation was prescribed. The writings of Graham Greene, Evelyn Waugh, and others speak of this human condition. 12 First level optimists, on the other hand, accept the initial assumption that all political ills (in this case, war) stem from evil human nature, but they argue that human nature can and should be changed. This is nowhere stated as clearly as it is in the Preamble to the Charter of UNESCO: "Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is therefore in the minds of men that the defenses for peace must be constructed." Human nature is still the villain, but, in this case, it is malleable-it can be changed. How human nature can be changed and how long it might take to do so are enormous stumbling blocks but do not detract from the elegance of this level of analysis. Anthropologists, social-psychologists, psychiatrists, and other behavioral scientists have argued that there are ways to change human nature and thus eliminate or reduce the likelihood of war. In its simplest form, second level optimism is exemplified by Margaret Mead's suggestion that war is learned behavior and, therefore, can be unlearned. 13 No political scientist has accepted this argument more forcefully than John Stoessinger. According to him: it has been fashionable to assert that war is not an illness, but, like aggression, an ineradicable part of human nature. I challenge this assumption. Whereas aggression may be inherent, war is learned behavior, and as such can be unlearned and ultimately selected out entirely. 14

Again, whether by education, cultural exchange, psychoanalysis, conversion to religious principles, or other ways of reorienting the mind and "selecting out" unacceptable behavior, first level optimists believe they have found the source of war and they have a variety of prescriptions for change.

45

46

TAYLOR/EvANS

Second Level Second level thinking points to the organization of the state as the source of war. While there is great variety in the different explanations of second level approaches, they all have one idea in common; perfect the state and you reduce the likelihood of war. To a second level thinker, all men could be angels and there would still be war as long as the economic and political nature of the state is flawed. Human natnre is not the CUlprit; human organization is. The earliest systematic manifestations of second level thinking were attacks against monarchial sovereignty. These attacks stemmed from the developing English idea of a limited monarchy. Thus, it was believed that if all states would become liberal, democratic states, there would be no war. European socialism was another manifestation of second level thinking. Babeuf, Saint Simon, and other early socialists believed that domestic justice could be achieved only when workers owned the means of production.!S But it took Marx, Engels, and Lenin to develop the idea that all interstate violence was an outgrowth of capitalism. According to the communist theory of imperialism, all wars are merely a manifestation of domestic class warfare spread abroad as nations fight for colonial possessions.!6 Liberalism and socialism are but two of an infinite variety of "good" states for second level thinkers. Liberalism asserts a political definition and socialism an economic definition. But the second level could accept with equal theoretical ease the notion that war would cease only when all states were fascist, monarchical, democratic, parliamentary, or established under a particular religious ideology. Any approach that suggests that war can be eliminated through the reform of states is a second level approach. Third Level Waltz' third level has to do neither with human nature nor with human organization. According to third level approaches, all humans could be perfect, all states organized correctly and similarly, and there would still be war as long as there was no central source of authority in the interstate system. Third level approaches blame war neither on the presence of human evil nor on the existence of "bad" states, but rather on the absence of central authority. In the absence of a centralized decision-making authority there is anarchy, and conflict and war are inherent in anarchy. Rousseau and Hobbes are perhaps the best theorists of this level.!7 But many who have thought about war and peace have reached third level conclusions. Einstein's suggestion that "as long as there are sovereign nations possessing great power, war is inevitable" is a third level explanation. IS So also is Freud's comment that "so long as there are nations and empires, each prepared callously to exterminate its rival, all alike must be equipped for war."!9 Waltz summarizes third level thinking perhaps better than the philosophers he is analyzing: "Because each state is the final judge of its own cause, any state may at any time use force to implement its policies."20 This framework is purely for analytical purposes and acts as a paradigm for understanding. In reality, the causes of wars are so multifaceted that every one of Waltz' levels will yield suggestive insights. Waltz himself concludes his analysis by suggesting that any comprehensive explanation of the causes of war must encompass all three levels. Nevertheless, it is useful to work with the three levels as analytical tools 2 !

"FROM WHENCE COME WARS AND FIGHTrNGS AMONG YOU?": AN INTEGRATfON OF SECULAR AND SACRED

Causes of War According to the Scriptures After this brief description of Waltz' three levels of analysis, the next task of this essay is to discover in which level the teachings of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints best fit. As is the case with all who have developed theories about the sources of war, neither the scriptures nor the teaching ofLDS officials always fit neatly within any single one of Waltz' three levels. Even in Rousseau, Waltz' prime example ofthird level thinking, there is a little bit of first level analysis 22 To accomplish this task, we perfonned a keyword search of the standard works (using Infobases' LDS Collectors' Library CD) and found 417 references to the words "war" or "wars," not counting those repeated in the Joseph Smith Translation (JST) and the Joseph Smith History. The task of searching on words related to "war" and "wars" (for example, "violence" and "conflict") would yield interesting, though not significantly different, results but is outside the scope of this brief study.23

Table 1: Distribution of Scriptural References to 'War' and 'Wars' SCRIPTURAL WORK

Old Testament New Testament Book of Monnon Doctrine and Covenants Pearl of Great Price Total

NUMBER OF REFERENCES

214 18 168 14 3 417

We classified these 417 references into four categories: hortative (14), descriptive (348), metaphorical or allegorical (42), and analytical or explanatory (20). The hortative references fall into two types: those that, for example, exhort people to "prepare for war" (Joel 3:9) and those that, for example, call on people to "renounce war and proclaim peace" (Doctrine and Covenants 98: 16). As expected, most of the fonner are found in the Old Testament and most of the latter in the New Testament or in scriptures unique to the LDS Church. The second category, descriptive, are those scriptural references that refer to, or say something about, past, present, or future wars. Thus, for example, Matthew's words, "And ye shall hear of wars and rumours of wars" (24: 16) refer to future events. Metaphorical or allegorical references are those that use war or the concept of war as a teaching device or for rhetorical purposes. For example, in order to teach the value of planning and preparation, Luke writes "Or what king, going to make war against another king, sitteth not down first, and consulteth whether he be able with ten thousand to meet him that cometh against him with twenty thousand" (14:30). And Paul, writing about the inner peace which comes from keeping God's law, complains that there is another law (not God's law) within his own body, "warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin" (Romans 7:23). None of these three uses of the idea of war are particularly helpful in suggesting into which of Waltz' three levels of analysis scriptural references might fit. The fourth category, analytic or explanatory, however, contains scriptural references that say something about the source of war. Of the twenty analytical references that exist, seventeen fit relatively cleanly into Waltz' first level. Four of these usages come from the Bible, fourteen from the Book of Monnon, one from the Doctrine and Covenants,

47

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TAYLOR/EvANS

and one from the Pearl of Great Price. Table 2 shows the distribution of all scriptural references into one of Waltz' three levels. Table 2: Waltzian Classification of Analytical Scriptural References to 'War' or 'Wars' WALTZIAN LEVEL

TOTAL

1st Level

17

2nd Level 3,d Level

2

SOURCE

Old Testament, 2 Chronicles 16:9 and Psalms 46:9 New Testament, James 4:1 and 4:2 Book of Mormon, I Nephi 14:15; Jacob 7:24; 7:26; Mosiah 9:13; 29:14; Alma 48:20; 50:21; Helaman 12:2; 3 Nephi 2:11; Ether 11:7 and 13:22 Doctrine and Covenants Section 38:29 Pearl of Great Price, Moses 6: 15 Book of Mormon, Mosiah 29:7 and 29:36 Book of Mormon, 3 Nephi 7:14

In the Bible, James addresses the question as directly as anyone. He asks very specifically, "From whence come wars and fightings among you?" (James 4:1). He answers just as directly, "come they not hence, even of your lusts that war in your members? Ye lust, and have not: ye kill and desire to have, and cannot obtain: ye fight and war, yet ye have not, because ye ask not" (James 4:1-2). He continues by talking about the need to abandon adultery, sin, and to resist the devil. Nothing is said about economic or political systems and no attempt is made to blame conflict on the absence of a superior earthly authority. War, instead, stems from evil conditions in the heart which would change if all were truly converted to Christ. No Book of Mormon scripture is more clear on the cause of war than Mormon's analysis found in Alma 50:21: And we see that these promises have been verified to the people of Nephi; for it has been their quarrelings and their contentions, yea, their murderings, and their plunderings, their idolatry, their whoredoms, and their abominations, which were among themselves, which brought upon them their wars and their destructions.

Again it is a clear example of first level analysis. What is the source of war, according to Mormon? It is neither human organizations nor the international milieu-it is the human condition, it is personal sin. It is no coincidence that of the fourteen analytical Book of Mormon references to war, half were written by Mormon, the great prophet-general-abridger. The Pearl of Great Price reference occurs in Moses 6:15, in Moses' history of the human race: "And the children of men were numerous upon all the face of the land. And in those days Satan had great dominion among men, and raged in their hearts; and from thenceforth came wars and bloodshed." The message is again clear: the seeds of war are planted in our hearts when we allow Satan to enter therein. As mentioned above, we have not examined scriptural statements in which the word war is not contained but that nevertheless refer to the causes of war. But King Limhi's lamentation is illustrative: .. great are the reasons which we have to mourn; for behold how many of our brethren have been slain and their blood has been spilt in vain, and all because of iniquity (Mosiah 7:24).

"FROM WHENCE COME WARS AND FIGHTlNGS AMONG YOU?":

AN INTEGRATION OF SECULAR AND SACRED 49

The theme, " ... all because of iniquity," occurs frequently, even though it is not reported in a keyword search on "war" and reveals the scriptural relationship between personal sin and a variety of social ills. The majority of the scriptural references concerning the sources of war are quite clear. War stems from corrupt human nature-from the sinful human condition. It has little to do with politics or economics and even less to do with an abstract international system. According to analytical references about war in the scriptures, if all would tum to God and cease to corrupt His ways, peace would prevai[.24 If it is correct to assume that the scriptural teachings about the causes of war fall within what Waltz would call the first image or level, then one can ask whether these teachings are what Waltz would classify as optimistic or pessimistic. And one need look no further than King Benjamin's famous sermon and its effects on those who heard it. The sermon contains perhaps the most widely-known Book of Mormon statement about human nature: For the natural man is an enemy to God, and has been from the fall of Adam, and will be, forever, and ever, unless he yields to the enticings of the Holy Spirit, and putteth off the natural man and becometh a saint through the atonement of Christ the Lord, and becometh as a child, submissive, meek, humble, patient, full of love, willing to submit to all things which the Lord seeth fit to inflict upon him, even as a child doth submit to his father. (Mosiah 3: 19)

Two chapters later we are told that one of the effects of this sermon was that the Lord had "wrought a mighty change" and that those so changed "have no more disposition to evil, but to do good continually" (Mosiah 5:2). This is clearly what Waltz would call first level optimism. Virtually all ofthe first level scriptural analyses of war lay the blame on some form of personal sin. The scriptures teach that man can repent of sin, change his nature and, in King Benjamin's words, 'put off' the natural man. The Nephites in the Book of Enos illustrate a practical application of this principle. Their two-fold defense against the Lamanites consisted both of traditional military defense policies and of trying to change the Lamanites through missionary work (see Enos I :20). This strategy continues through the Book of Mormon as the Nephites follow their belief that "the preaching of the word ... [has a] more powerful effect upon the minds ofthe people than the sword" (Alma 31 :5).

What the General Authorities Have Said about the Causes of War If sacred writ adopts a first level approach to the source of war, what have general authorities of the LDS Church added to this analysis? To answer this question, we followed the same general methodology we followed in searching the scriptures-we conducted a word search on the words "war" and "wars" using the Infobase Collector s Library '97. This search resulted in 14,279 references, more than we could analyze without resorting to some form of computerized content analysis. Therefore, we did a second search limited to statements made by presidents of the church while serving in the First Presidency.25 This search yielded 404 references that we classified into the same four categories: hortative (3), metaphorical (33), descriptive (336), and analytical (32). As earlier, we were more interested in the thirty two analytical references that reveal insight into the sources or causes of war. And, as with the scriptural analysis,

50 TAYLOR/EvANS

we classified these thirty two references into one of Waltz' three levels (see Table 3) as follows; first level (28), second level (3), and third level (1). Brigham Young made one of the earlier statements by a general authority of the cause of war. He said: "Let the mothers of any nation teach their children not to make war, the children would grow up and never enter into it. Let the mothers teach their children, 'War, war upon your enemies, yes, war to the hilt!' and they will be filled with this spirit."26 This suggestion that war is a learned behavior harmonizes well with the first-level optimist assumptions of UNESCO, Margaret Mead, and John Stoessinger.

Table 3: Classification of Church Presidents' References to "War" PRESIDENT

Joseph Smith, Jr. Brigham Young John Taylor Wilford Woodruff Lorenzo Snow Joseph F. Smith Heber J. Grant George Albert Smith David O. McKay Joseph Fielding Smith Harold B. Lee Spencer W. Kimball Ezra Taft Benson Howard W. Hunter Gordon B. Hinckley Total

HORTATIVE

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

METAPHORICAL

4 17 2 0 0 0

1 0

3 0 0 0 0

3

DESCRIPTIVE

ANALYTICAL

11

125 7 0 0

65 33 46 0 8

2

11

1

4

0

1

3 33

24 336

2 0 0 0

3 12 0 0 0 0

32

President David O. McKay said in a general conference of the church: If a few more million men in the world could feel that testimony-the testimony. of the reality of our Redeemer-selfishness would be less manifest, war among nations would be eradicated, and peace would reign among mankind.27

President Spencer W. Kimball, quoting from Douglas MacArthur with approbation, said: "Military alliance, balance of power, League of Nations all in tum failed . . . . We have had our last chance. If we do not now devise some greater and more equitable system, Armageddon will be at our door." This reference to the creation of a more equitable international system may seem at first to be a nod in the direction of second or third level thinking. But, President Kimball takes a clear first level position as he concludes, "The problem basically is theological and involves ... improvement of human character. "28 President Howard W. Hunter links global and personal peace to temple attendance: May you let the meaning and beauty and peace of the temple come into your everyday life more directly in order that the millennial day may come, that promised time when "they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruninghooks: Nation shall not lift up sword against nations, neither shall they learn war any more .. . . *[but shall] walk in the light of the Lord" (Isaiah 2:4-5).

"FROM WHENCE COME WARS AND FIGHTTNGS AMONG yOU?"; AN INTEGRATION OF SECULAR AND SACRED

A statement from the First Presidency of the Church in 1943 takes the same clear first level point of view: "There must come a victory of Right and Freedom over Iniquity and Oppression, but war will never be vanquished until men change their hearts and establish new ideals."29 This statement's emphasis on the need for men to "change their hearts" puts the First Presidency clearly in the philosophical tradition that Waltz would call first level optimist. In an expanded search including all general authorities, the most frequently mentioned human characteristic that leads to war is selfishness. Elder Bruce R. McConkie states that "So also there is a gift of selfishness, of putting one's own interests first in all things, of spewing forth hatred and animosity upon others, all of which leads to war.... "30 And according to Elder George A. Smith, "Selfishness [is the] principle cause of war. ... "31 Elder John A. Widtsoe believed that "man's unappeased greed" and selfishness are "transmuted into hate" and lead to war. 32 More recently President James E. Faust stated that "In its simplest terms, wars are so often caused by a great lust for power," following an analysis made popular by the late International Relations scholar, Hans Morgenthau. 33 Twenty-eight of the thirty-two analytical references in our search were classified into Waltz' first level optimist category. None were classified as first level pessimist. Each focuses on the human condition as the source of conflict between nations. It is no contradiction to find, as well, statements of general authorities that fit neatly into other levels. As was noted earlier about Rousseau, the articulation of philosophical analyses may well result in ideas that do not fit neatly into a someone else's subsequent categorical scheme. Moreover, the problem ofthe source of war is sufficiently complex to allow overlapping explanations. Note, however, the neat bridge to second level thinking provided by the previously quoted January, 1943 "Greeting from the First Presidency." That statement began with a clear first level argument ("wars spring from wickedness"), but continued with a call for the reform of nations ("Christ-like nations"), which is a second level position: "Wars spring from wickedness ... but peace will be maintained only by nobler men and by more Christ-like nations."34 Second level analyses within the church preceded an interesting revival of second level arguments among international relations scholars that began in the 1980's and gained center stage in the literature in the 1990's.35 Drawing from the work of Immanuel Kant, international relations scholars began debating the notion that democratic states do not fight one another, thus suggesting that non-democratic states cause war. Although this debate continues, the three references by church presidents that we classified into Waltz' second level would be very comfortable in what is often called the "Zone of Peace" argument. However, President Spencer W. Kimball's forceful denunciation of American militarism in his "The False Gods We Worship," shows that even democracies can be warlike and rely on "gods of stone and steel-ships, planes, .missiles, fortifications" instead ofturning to Christ. 36 Both World War II and the Cold War gave rise to considerable second level thinking in the Church. It became popular to believe that peace could prevail in the world, but only if fascist, militarist, and communist states were eliminated or changed. In 1942, David O. McKay specifically blamed militarism and fascism for causing World War IIY Later, in the middle of the Cold War, he blamed communism as being the source of war and contention in the world. 38 In 1950, President George Albert Smith

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52 TAYLOR/EvANS

blamed war on "nations arming instead of repenting."39 Although this reference has a first level flavor to it, President Smith's call was for militaristic nations to repent of their militarism. President David O. McKay said in 1966, for example, that "the position of this Church on the subject of Communism has never changed. We consider it the greatest satanical threat to peace, prosperity, and the spread of God's work among men that exists on the fact of the earth."40 The argument here is second level. The source of war is not found in human nature, but stems from a particular kind of human organization-in this case, communism. Quite obviously, the main problem with second level analysis is that there is no end of "bad" states. Church members with a conservative political persuasion urge the Church to denounce left-leaning governments and regimes while members with a more liberal political persuasion encourage the Church to denounce right-wing militaristic governments and regimes. That the Church does neither is a reflection of the Church's recognition that it must preach the Gospel in all nations, whatever their political persuasion, and that both prudence and standard diplomatic practices suggest those who freely denounce various political regimes can easily be renounced by those same regimes. At the same time, the Church has never said anything that could be interpreted as condoning any kind of violations of human dignity and human rights. Nor has it condemned efforts in any country meant to improve the treatment of women, children, or disadvantaged people. If there is a "bottom line" in reference to church attitudes towards other state systems, it is that the church encourages policies that allow all people to hear the restored gospel and be baptized into the fold of Christ. The latter-day canon contains few examples of third-level philosophy. But if one assumes, as third level arguments do, that an anarchic system compels each state to be prepared at any moment to use force to protect its own interest, then the following statement by David O. McKay has a definite third level flavor. "Force rules in the world today; consequently, our government must keep armies abroad, build navies and air squadrons, create atom bombs to protect itself from the threatened aggression of a nation which seems to listen to no other appeal than compulsion."41 Joseph Smith also used third-level language to describe Christ's intentions toward earthly governments: It has been the design of Jehovah, from the commencement of the world, and is his purpose now, to regulate the affairs of the world in His own time, to staud as a head of the universe, and take the reins of government in His own hand. When this is done, judgment will be administered in righteousness; anarchy and confusion will be destroyed, and 'nations will learn war no more.' It is for want of this great governing principle, that all this confusion has existed; 'for it is not in man that walketh, to direct his steps;' this we have fully shown.'2

This implies that peace will come to the earth when anarchy is abolished by the reign of Christ, clearly a third-level idea. But this statement by Joseph Smith is also an interesting conclusion to our attempt to see how church doctrine and statements might fit with Waltz's somewhat confining framework. It demonstrates the impossibility of locating the source of war without bridging all three of Waltz' levels. The Prophet's third level statement reveals his understanding that millennial peace, the Zion of the Lord, will come only when Christ

"FROM WHENCE COME WARS AND FIGHTINGS AMONG yOU?"; AN INTEGRATION OF SECULAR AND SACRED

"take[s] the reins of government [third level], when "nations will learn war no more" [second level], and when "judgment is administered in righteousness" or the earth is cleansed of sinners [first level]. The roots of international violence twist and tum through more than one of these analytical levels 43 . And the results of these analyses do not often result in any clear or singular prescription for policy. It is especially encouraging to see an increasing number of LDS foreign policy scholars and practitioners searching the roots of the gospel for perspectives on national security issues 44 It is when we confront the prescriptive question that the analytical level becomes so important. If war arises from corrupt but malleable human nature, then the logical and most effective prescription is to alter the human condition. On the other hand, if war arises from particular kinds of human organization-namely, bad political or economic state systems-then it follows that we should attempt to change or eliminate those kinds of states. It is difficult to ignore the frequent exhortations of groups that preach that only through the elimination of certain kinds of statist ideologies will the world live in peace. Ideologies that deny agency prevent human choice which is necessary for human beings to move towards perfection. This is clearly a prescription that stems from second level analysis. Finally, if war is inherent in a decentralized interstate system, then our efforts to construct some kind of centralized authority or, at least, to create structures that will vitiate the effects of interstate anarchy should be strengthened. Perhaps the talk in the 1990s about a New World Order was based on this analysis. This is the point that prophets understand better than most. It is here that the sacred transcends the secular. Prophetic prescriptions are radical-they go to the root of the problem but they also bring improvements across all of Waltz' three levels. Only when individuals understand the blessings of the Atonement "within the context of a community founded on apostolic authority" will there be a lasting peace. 4S Submission to Christ is a first, second, and third level act.

Conclusion Both the predominance of scriptural analyses about the causes of war and most general authority statements take a position that Waltz would identify as first level optimist. That is, war is caused by defects in the human condition, but these defects can and should be changed. The prevailing thrust of LDS analysis is that the Gospel of Jesus Christ is the only medium than can make a lasting change. If the very ambiguous term "human nature" can be construed to mean what the Book of Mormon talks about when it refers to the natural man, then at least that record is quite clear on this point. 46 "The natural man is an enemy to God, [that is, he is "carnal, sensual, and devilish"], ... and will be, forever and ever, unless he yields to enticings of the Holy Spirit" (Mosiah 3: 19). What the Book of Mormon calls the "wonderful conversion" of Ammon illustrates this potential. If we are to "renounce war and proclaim peace" (Doctrine and Covenants 98:16), it is of some importance that the causes of war be understood as clearly as possible .and that appropriate prescriptions for peace be proclaimed. That it will take too long or that it is too difficult to convert the minds of all men is not an acceptable objection. We ought to pursue what is scripturally sound whether or not it fits within man's finite timetable. The task of the Church is clear: continue to preach the Gospel of the message of peace. When all are truly converted to Christ,

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peace will prevail. But it is equally clear that this is a very protracted process, perhaps a neverending one. In the meantime, the drama of international politics will continue-and wars will occur. Those who are converted will find peace even in the midst of conflict. But the task of the state is also very clear. All states must pursue policies that will protect the basic freedoms and liberties of their citizens. "Bad" states (those which pursue power for the sake of power and gain) hopefully will become more enlightened, and the ambiguities of the international system perhaps will be vitiated by a strengthened rule of law and by improved diplomatic methods. Out of the upheaval brought on by the demise of communism and the increasing integration of international economies, it is possible to see the current time as one of transition-hopefully into a time of greater respect for human rights and a greater respect for the rule of law between nations. To use Waltz ian terminology, while the problem of war ultimately is amenable only to first level solutions, in the meantime, an anarchic interstate system inhabited by states proclaiming widely diverse ideologies and belief systems requires governments to pursue second and third level solutions. While the Church is obliged to pursue policies that hope only for ultimate success, the state, despite temporary successes, must pursue policies which ultimately will fail. International peace depends, thus, on moderate states both pursuing prudent diplomacy and encouraging personal virtue. NOTES 1. See Knutsen, Torbjem L. A History of International Relations Theory, 2d ed., Manchester, Manchester University Press, )997, and Quincy Wright, The Study of International Relations, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955, respectively, for a recent and an older treatment of tbe development of the discipline. One of the better recent summaries of the literature on the causes of war is Michael E. Brown and others, Theories of War and Peace: An International Security Reader, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1998. Other useful works are Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, New York, The Free Press, 1973, Dean G. Pruitt and Richard C. Snyder, Theory and Research on the Causes of War, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hail, 1969, and Keith L. Nelson and Spencer C. Olin, Jr. Why War?: Ideology, Theory, and History, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1979. 2. 'The Justice of States," in Perspectives in Mormon Ethics, ed. Donald G. Hill, Jr., Provo, Utah, Publishers Press, p. 163, 1983. 3. Rousseau, Jean Jacques. A Lasting Peace and the State of War, trans. and ed. C. E. Vaughan, New Haven, Connecticut, Whitlocks, Inc. n.d., pp. 126-27. 4. War as history ranges from Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, to the most recent history of U.S. involvement in the Persian Gulf. War as strategy spans an equally long period of time-from Niccolo Machiavelli, The Art of War, 1520, through Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 1833, to Mao Tse-Tung, On the Protracted War, 1952. 5. See, for example, Quincy Wright's two volume A Study of War, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1942. 6. "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," pp. 77-92.

7. Russett, Bruce, Harvey Starr, and David Kinsella, World Politics: The Menu for Choice, 7th ed., Belmont, CA, Wadsworth Publishing, 2002. 8. Niebuhr, Reinhold. Beyond Tragedy, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, p. 158, 1939. 9. Morgenthau, Hans J. Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, pp. 194-95, 1946. 10. Ethologists are scientists who study the behavior of animals in their natural habitat. For some of the earliest and most scholarly works in support of this thesis, see Kourad Lorenz,

"FROM WHENCE COME WARS AND fIGHTINGS AMONG YOU?": AN INTEGRATION OF SECULAR AND SACRED

King Solomon s Ring, New York, Crowell, 1952, and On Aggression, New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1966. For a more popular work see Robert Ardrey, The Territorial Imperative: A Personal Inquiry into the Animal Origins of Property and Nations, New York, Atheneum, 1966. For perhaps the best (certainly the most lengthy) critical review of this general philosophical position, see Erich Fromm, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973.

11. Carrighar, Sally. "War Is Not In Our Genes," New York Times Magazine, p. 74,10 September 1962. 12. Greene's The Power of the Glory, New York, Viking Press, 1946, and The Heart of the Matter, New York, Viking Press, 1948, are well known; however, almost any Greene novel will do. For a general discussion of this point, see Anthony Burgess, "Politics in the Novels of Graham Greene," ed. Walter Laqueur and George L. Masse, Politics and Literature, New York, Harper and Row, pp. 92-8, 1967. 13. Mead, Margaret. "Warfare Is Only an Invention-Not a Biological Necessity," Asia, 40 No.4, pp. 402-05, 1940. Mead's title for this article was but a paraphrase of a statement made by Jose Ortega y Gasset in The Revolt afthe Masses published ten years before Mead's. Gasset said, "War is not an instinct but an invention." The American edition was published in New York by W. W. Norton in 1960. The quotation is in the epilogue. 14. Why Nations Go To War, 7th ed., New York, St. Martin's Press, p. 207, 1998. 15. See Edmund Wilson, To the Finland Station: A Study in the Writing and Acting of History, Garden City, New York, Doubleday & Co., 1940, for what, in our judgment, is still the best account of the rise of European socialism.

16. This theme is developed by V. I. Lenin in Imperialism as the Highest State of Capitalism published in 1915 but available in a variety of editions. 17. Stanley Hoffmann's discussion of Rousseau and Hobbes in Chapter 3, "Rousseau on War and Peace," of The State of War, pp. 54-87 is superlative. 18. Albert Einstein as told to Raymond Swing, "Einstein on the Atomic Bomb," Atlantic Monthly 176, p.43, November 1945. 19. Freud, Sigmund. Civilization, War and Death, ed. John Rickman, London; The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1952, cited by Waltz, Man, the State, and War, p. 187. 20. Waltz, Man, the State, and War, p. 160. 21. We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for this point. 22. Waltz does not acknowledge this, but Hoffmann discusses it in The State of War, pp. 61-5. 23. We did not perform this extended analysis for several reasons: 1) Initial observations suggested that the results would be essentially the same, 2) It confused the matter in some respects since "violence" and "conflict" appear many more times in reference to interpersonal relations rather than interstate relations, and 3) The breadth of the inquiry would have been beyond our time limitations. While this does eliminate some insightful uses of the idea of the sources of war from the scriptures, it also prevents clouding the issue with some statements that are focused purely on interpersonal relations. For example, of the sixty-six references to "violence" in the Standard Works, none reveal the causes of violence and several talk about idiosyncratic violence (violent theft in Leviticus 6:2; violence to strangers in Jeremiah 22:3; family violence in Zephaniah 1:9; and the violence of waves in Acts 27:41). 24. The one Book of Monnon reference we have classified as third level, 3 Nephi 7:14, is a perfect illustration that, in reality, the roots of war twist through each level. It talks quite clearly of the problem created by anarchy, it makes a clear point that the tribes had different forms of goverrunent, and it concludes by noting that the people had rejected the prophets and fallen into personal sin. 25. In order to capture a comparable range of authoritative statements through the entirety of the Church's history, we relied on Teachings of the Prophet Joseph Smith and Journal of Discourses

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to account for the years preceding the commencement of Conference Report Coverage at the end of the 19th century. Note that this survey did not capture the more recent addresses given by President Hinckley. 26. Brigham Young, Discourses of Brigham Young, Salt Lake City, Utah, Deseret News Press, pp. 199-200, 1954.

27. Conference Report [hereafter cited as CR], p. 92, April 1951. 28. Kimball, Spencer W. CR, p. 7, October 1977. 29. "Greetings from the First Presidency," Improvement Era, 46, pp. 10-11, January 1943. 30. McConkie, Bruce R. A New Witness/or the Articles of Faith, Salt Lake City, Utah, Deseret Book Company, pp. 376-77, 1985. 31. Smith, George A. CR, p. 377, April 1916. 32. Widtsoe, John A. "Foundations of Peace," Improvement Era, 43, p. 125, February 1940.

33. CR, p. 59, October 1998. Morgenthau's thesis is found in his Politics Among Nations, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1956, passim.

34. See the Improvement Era, 46, pp. 10-11, January 1943. 35. Rather than list all of the various participants in this debate, most (both pro and con), if not all, are discussed or referred to in the excellent collection by Brown and others (eds.) Theories of War and Peace, Cambridge, The MIT Press, 1998, Part II. 36. Ensign, pp. 3-6 (quotation is on p. 6), June 1976.

37. CR, p. 71, April 1942.

38. CR, p. 72, April 1959. 39. CR, p. 5, April 1950.

40. McKay, David O. Gospel Ideals, Salt Lake City, Utah, Deseret News Press, p. 304, 1955. 41. McKay, Gospel Ideals, p. 304. 42. Smith, Joseph, Jr. Teachings of the Prophet Joseph Smith, pp. 250-51. 43. For a fascinating set of journal entries that range from first level, through second level, and into third level analyses, see John Taylor, The Gospel Kingdom, Salt Lake City, Utah, Deseret Book Co., pp. 298-305,1943.

44. See the excellent publication resulting from a conference on this very topic, Valerie M. Hudson and Kerry M. Kartchner (eds.), Moral Perspectives on Us. Security: Viewsfrom the LDS Community, Provo, Utah, David M. Kennedy Center Publications, 1993. 45. We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for these words. 46. See Ether 3:2, Alma 19:6, 26:21,41:11, Mosiah 3:16-19; and 16:1-5. See also Louis C. Midgley's excellent discussion, Beyond Human Nature, Provo, Utah, Brigham Young University Press, 1968.

p

Part III Is Just War Compatible with LDS Theology? Competing Viewpoints 7

YES The Book of Mormon as a Touchstone for Evaluating the Theory of Just War Lieutenant Colonel John Mark Mattox! The decision to go to war is, of course, the gravest of all political decisions. Cognizant of the horror and destruction that inevitably attends war, thoughtful persons throughout many ages have sought to identify principles to adjudicate whether military force might justly be applied to resolve international disputes, and if so, how and to what extent. The sum total of these principles, namely, the "just war tradition," goes back in secular history at least as far as Plato and Cicero; is elaborated in a Christian context in the works of Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and others; and now serves as the ' philosophical basis for most international laws respecting warfare. The genealogy of the just war tradition-coupled with the fact that the tradition reached its highest development in the period between the end of the Meridian Gospel Dispensation and the beginning of the Dispensation of the Fullness of Times-is particularly significant for Latter-day Saints. This is so because it means that evaluations of the justice of modern wars are made, particularly in the West, on the basis of principles that come to us from the writings of enlightened pagans and scholastic churchmen of the post-apostolic era, none of whom-sincere though they may have been-lay any particular claim to revelation. Hence, it is not inappropriate for Latterday Saints to consider critically the place that the just war tradition ought to occupy in their world view. Historically, the Christian world has sought to derive, and thus justify, just war to the Bible, with mixed results. In the extreme case, some principles by {r;_·l!lli!~.r:~!Q:QC1.:,~~e Old Testament to justify practically unbounded applications of violence and the New Testament to justify no violence at alP Providentially-as is the case with so many issues that the world at large fmds impossibly perplexing-Latterday Saints can appeal to the great clarifier of the Bible, The Book of Mormon, as a touchstone for drawing important conclusions about theory of just war. Indeed, I wish to defend the thesis that The ,Book of Mormon an extraordinary basis for

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assessing the place that the theory of just war might appropriately occupy for Latterday Saints as they grapple with the profoundly difficult question of how the nation of which they are citizens can justify going to war and of how an ostensibly just war ought to be conducted. Anthropologist John L. Sorenson has identified at least eighty-five instances of war in The Book of Mormon. 3 Of that number, we find a set of conflicts-twenty-eight by Sorenson's count--conducted during the career of Captain Moroni. Taken collecwar theory. Indeed, it is a tively, these wars constitute a remarkable case study case study unparalleled in sacred history. Of equally important note, it seems clear that Captain Moroni's conduct stands as a fit standard which to judge matters of military ethics. As Mormon comments, "if all men had were, and ever would be, like unto Moroni, behold, the very powers of hell would have been shaken forever; yea, the devil would never have power over the hearts of the children of men" (Alma 48: 17). In the light of this endorsement, I propose the methodology: -First, I shall outline briefly the theory of just war. -Second, I shall consider how each principle of the theory of just war is illustrated in the career of Captain Moroni-first, in his decisions to apply military force, and then, in his decisions on how to apply it. -Finally, I shall conclude with some observations on how we might follow Nephi's counsel and liken this aspect of the scriptural record to ourselves and our circumstances as pertaining to the theory of just war (1 Nephi 19:23).

The Philosophical Foundations for the Theory of Just War Given the question, "Is the resort to war ever justifiable?", if one answers "no," one is, by definition, some variety of pacifist If one answers " one invites another question: "Are there limitations on how military force can be applied?" If one answers "no," one is, by definition, some variety of a so-called "military realist." If one answers "yes," one invites still another question: "Does it matter whether a given war, or the way in which the war is fought, is just?" If one answers "no," one is, by definition, some variety of a so-called "moral realist." If one answers "yes," one probably embraces the general outlines of just war theory. This theory rests on two claims: first, that in a perfect world, there would be no war, and second, that since this is not-and as long as the present order of things remains, will not be--a perfect world, such wars as do get fought should be just both in their inception and in their conduct. The latter claim serves as the basis for the fundamental theoretical distinction observed by the theory: the distinction between what traditionally is called jus ad bellum andjus in bello. Jus ad bellum, or "the justice of war," specifies those criteria that define the right of one state to engage in violent action another. In contrast, jus in bello, or "justice in war," specifies the moral limits of military action. That is, the jus in bello component of the just war tradition stands as witness to the claim that "it is not pennitted to employ unjust means in order to win even a j!!~t war. »4 The traditional list of jus ad bellum and jus in bello criteria varies in minor degree from author to author. 5 The reason for this is not so much one of disagreement as to what, in the case of jus ad bellum, constitutes a just war or as to what, in the case of jus in bello, counts as the minimally acceptable standards of conduct for those engaged in war, as it is one of presentation. Some authors opt for a larger list of very specific

YES-THE BOOK OF MORMON AS

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while others opt for a smaller list of more general criteria. This presentation distinguishes nine jus ad bellum criteria as follows: 1. Just cause 2. Comparative justice 3. Right intention 4. Competent authority 5. Last resort 6. Public declaration 7. Reasonable probability of success 8. Proportionality 9. Peace as the ultimate objective of war

In what follows, I shall consider each criterion in tum, both in the light of the Western philosophical tradition war and in the specific context of Mormon's account of the late first-century B.C. Nephite-Lamanite War.

Jus ad Bellum 1. Just Cause. The claim that there exists a just cause to go to war (jus ad bellum principle # 1) implies that at least one party to the conflict has undertaken, or threatened to undertake, violent action for reasons. Traditionally, just reasons to go to war have included the defense of the innocent against armed attack, the recovery or property wrongly taken, or the punishment of eviL Mannon takes great pains to assure his readers that, throughout Moroni's career, his antagonists are the unjust actors. We first encounter Zarahemnah whose objective, according to Mormon, is "to stir up the Lamanites to anger against the Nephites; this he did that he might usurp great power over them, and also that he might power over the Nephites by bringing them into bondage" (Alma 43:8). A later antagonist, Amalickiah, is identified as being "determined . . . to overpower the N ephites and to bring them into bondage" (Alma 48:4). In stark contrast, Mormon informs us that "the design of the Nephites" is incontrovertibly just: it is "to support their lands, and their houses, and their wives, and their children, that they might preserve them from the hands of their enemies; and also that they might preserve their rights and their privileges, yea, and also their liberty, that they might worship God according to their Moroni's reckoning, if there be any grounds at all upon which desires" (Alma 43:9). military action is justifiable, it is on the basis of defending those things just named, which Moroni later will memorialize on his title of liberty (Alma 46: 12). 2. Comparative Justice. The idea of "comparative justice" (jus ad bellum principle #2) is closely related to that of just cause. The theory of just war rests on the assumption that, although war exists as a morally permissible possibility, there also exists a strongprimajacie presumption against the resort to war as a means to resolve international disputes. Thus, comparative justice requires, in addition to a state's having a just cause for the prosecution of war-a position which both parties in a dispute are likely to claim-that the offense against the aggrieved party must be of such magnitudt:.J4

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YES-THE BOOK OF MORMON AS A TOUCHSTONE FOR EVALUAIT\'G THE THEORY OF J UST WAR 61

In any case, Mormon certainly does not characterize Moroni as a usurper or give us any reason to doubt Moroni's right to declare war or conclude peace on behalf of the Nephites. Indeed, Mormon elsewhere informs us that "it was the custom among all the Nephites to appoint for their chief captains (save it were in their times of wickedness) some one that had the spirit of revelation and also prophecy" (3 Nephi 3: 19). To the extent that this point, made later in the record, can be applied to Moroni, 8 he may be held to have possessed divine warrant to function in what sometimes has been thought of in the West as the role of God's duly-authorized "lieutenant" on earth as pertaining to the war-making power. 5. Last Resort. Both Nephite practice and the just war tradition regard evenjustified war as a measure of last resort (jus ad bellum principle #5). Mormon states that "the Nephites were taught ... never to give an offense, yea, never to raise the sword except it were to preserve their lives" (Alma 48:14). Their observance of this ideal had the force of religious obligation; for, it was the faith of the Nephites that by so doing-provided their lives were otherwise in harmony with the divine will-"God would prosper them in the land ... yea, warn them to flee, or to prepare for war, according to their danger" (Alma 48: 15). It is instructive to note that the Nephites of Moroni's day understood that God might direct them to flee rather than to fight. Hence, it seems fair to conclude that they understood the divine warrant to fight-as communicated by their inspired military leader-to satisfy the requirement that their entry into war constitute an act oflast resort. Certainly, such a warrant would obviate the need for further justification. In any case, the record provides no indication that Moroni was anything but hesitant to enter into combat until such entry became unavoidable. 6. Public Declaration. It has long been regarded that, in order to demonstrate that a war truly is the last means available for the resolution of international disputes, the war must be one that the war-making authority is willing publicly to declare (jus ad bellum principle #6). Mormon's abridged history does not include explicit reference to an initial public declaration of hostilities by Moroni prior to engagement in battle; but then again, since the Nephites were fighting defensively and in reaction to Lamanite aggression, there is no reason to expect that they would observe this formality. Nevertheless, it is equally important to note that the need for Moroni to justify his actions in a public forum and to put his enemies on public notice is something that he takes very seriously. Throughout his military career, Moroni is very public in his warnings as to the consequences that surely will follow if war, or its continuation, cannot be avoided. For example, he writes to Ammoron, "And behold, if ye do not this [i.e., exchange prisoners in accordance with Moroni's demand], I will come against you with my armies; yea, even I will arm my women and my childreri, and I will come against you, and I will follow you even into your own land, ... yea, and it shall be blood for blood, yea, life for life; and I will give you battle even until you are destroyed from off the face of the earth" (Alma 54: 12). Although this particular ultimatum appears after Moroni has been at war for many years, the whole tenor of Mormon's account suggests that Moroni always served notice to his enemies (except in the case of morally permissible-stratagems9Yat the earliest possible opportunity. 7. Reasonable Chance of Success. Wars that present little or no hope of serving as vehicles for obtaining satisfaction for just grievances traditionally have not been considered morally justifiable; for a war to be just, there must be a reasonable chance that the righteous aims for which the war is fought can be accomplished (jus ad bellum

principle #7). In the light of this principle, Moroni demonstrates himselfto be a man of extraordinary faith and hope; he considers that, as long as the N ephites are faithful in observing the commandments of God, they cannot fail to conquer: "But now, ye behold that the Lord is with us .... And I would that ye should understand that this is done unto us because of our religion and our faith in Christ. And now ye see that ye cannot destroy this our faith .... God will support, and keep, and preserve us, so long as we are faithful unto him, and unto our faith, and our religion; and never will the Lord suffer that we shall be destroyed except we should fall into transgression and deny our faith" (Alma 44:3,4). On the basis of this Divine undernTiting, Moroni only can conclude that his just engagement in this war with the Lamanites will end on terms favorable to the Nephites, or at least produce a result in keeping with the Divine economy. 8. Proportionality. A just war, the tradition holds, is one in which the moral good expected to result from the prosecution of the war exceeds the amount of evil that naturally and unavoidably results (jus ad bellum principle #8). Although Moroni approaches war mournfully-"sorry to be the means of sending so many of [his] brethren out of this world into an eternal world, unprepared to meet their God" (Alma 48:23)-still he considers his action to be a proportional response to the Nephites' laying down their lives and being "massacred by the barbarous cruelty of those who were once their brethren" (Alma 48:24). He wages war as a "duty ... owed to ... God" (Alma 43:46). Since he takes care to ensure that his people are guilty of neither the first nor even the second offense and that the likely alternative is "death at the hands of [their} enemies" (Alma 43:46), he regards that the decision to go to war falls easily within the requisite bounds of proportionality. 9. Peace as the Object of War. The restoration of happiness and the avoidance of future violence-in short, peace-must be the er.d for which just wars are to be fought (jus ad bellum principle #9). Thus, the determination to wage wars of attrition, demands for unconditional surrender, etc., generally are incompatible with the idea that peace should be concluded as quickly as it properly can. That does not mean that one should feel morally obligated to accept offers of peace that are not coupled with genuine conflict resolution measures, but it does mean that sincere and diligent efforts must be made to effect a just and lasting peace settlement at the earliest possible opportunity. Such is Moroni's continual disposition; he always is willing to terminate the conflict as soon as acceptable terms can be concluded. 10 After Zerahernnah falls into Moroni's hands, Moroni informs Zerahemnah that on condition of his accepting an offer of peace and of covenanting to surrender arms and never to come to war again against the Nephites, he will spare the lives of his forces; for, he does not seek their blood (Alma 44:6). Even after Zerahernnah's subsequent attack on Moroni's person, Moroni is willing to allow Zerabemnah to enter into a covenant of peace, whereupon Zerahernnah is "suffered to depart into the wilderness"36 without threat of further harm. Jus in Bello We ~ now to a discus~~?n of those moral criteria traditionally considered to circumscribe the just conduct ofajust war. The fundamental-assumption of/us tn-bello, or justice in war, is that a war that is initiated on just grounds can cease to be a just war if it is not fought in a just manner. Traditionally, two principles specify the criteria for jus in bello. These principles define the just application of force within the context of an existing conflict:

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1. Proportionality. In the present context, proportionality (jus in bello principle #1) has a slightly different meaning than it does in the context of jus ad bellum. Here it refers to the requirement to apply the minirr.um force necessary, consistent with military necessity!1, for bringing the conflict to a justly peaceful resolution as quickly as possible. Means that cause gratuitous suffering or otherwise cause unnecessary harm fall outside the scope of that considered to be a proportional application of force. In a battle with the armies of Jacob the Zoramite, when it becomes apparent to Moroni that the battle is a rout in favor of the Nephites, Moroni announces to his enemy, "If ye will bring forth your weapons of war and deliver them up, behold we will forbear shedding your blood" (Alma 52:37). Moroni's aim is to exert only that amount of force necessary to effect the submission of the enemy-not to annihilate him. Indeed, even those who surrender but will not lay down their weapons of war are not slain; they merely are taken prisoner (Alma 52:39). Earlier in the conflict, Moroni stops an intense battle when he sees that the men of his opponent Zerahemnah are terrified, and he offers terms of peace (Alma 43:53,54). Even when, during negotiations, Zerahemnah attempts to kill Moroni, Moroni does not require that Zerahernnah be slain (Alma 44: 12). 2. Discrimination. Thejus in bello principle #2, discrimination, enjoins upon belligerent parties to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants with the former normally constituting the only acceptable objects of violent action. Non-combatants traditionally include unarmed civilians, women and children, the aged, the infirm, clerics, or those whose purpose on the battlefield is strictly humanitarian in nature. Moroni's sensitivity to the imperative to observe this principle is clear: ''there was not a woman nor child among all the prisoners of Moroni, or the prisoners whom Moroni had taken" (Alma 54:3). One likewise finds Moroni effectively according non-combatant status to all enemy forces that will cease hostile actions, surrender their weapons, and enter into a covenant of peace. Even when he captures numerous Lamanites by stratagem and could have killed them in their defenseless state, he accords recognition of their non-combatancy and merely takes them prisoners (Alma 55 :22-25). 3. Good Faith. To these two principles ofjus in bello might be added a third principle, namely, good faith in all transactions with the enemy. Even in warfare~ Moroni never breaks an oath he has sworn, not even to his enemies. He never violates a treaty obligation. When he undertakes tactical deceptions, he does so only within the accepted and universally recognized social context for operations in war. This is unambiguously evidenced by the fact that he consciously and conscientiously weighs the propriety of stratagems before undertaking them. 12

Conclusion In addition to the value of this inquiry as a purely intellectual exercise, we also might ask what it means for Latter-day Saints. May I suggest two possible conclusions: First, in a society that recognizes a sharp division between church and state, the church doesnotwage'war and cannot be expected, in its institutional capacity, to justify war as a means for resolving international disputesY However, in a pluralistic society in which the church's members are called upon to be both saint and citizen, rendering due obedience both to Caesar and to God, one can and should proclaim peace 14 and at the same time recognize circ1ll1lstances in which war might justifiably be fought. Do

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such circumstances exist today? I believe it is clear that they do. President Ezra Taft Benson l5 , President Harold B. Lee l6 , and President David O. McKay17 are among the latter-day luminaries who have counselled against the philosophy of "peace at any price." Moreover, as President Gordon B. Hinckley reminded us, some things are worth for. President Hinckley, citing the same experiences of Captain Moroni that are central to the present inquiry, states: "It is clear from these and other writings that there are times and circumstances when nations are justified, in fact have an obligation, to fight for family, for liberty, and against tyranny, threat, and oppres~ sion."18 Indeed, some wars are just. Second, it is nothing less than remarkable that the Lord would inspire His prophet~ historian-army general Mormon to occupy the precious space on the plates with a lengthy and detailed account of a man whose career constitutes the most compre~ hensive case study on just war contained in holy writ. In that case study, we fmd that Captain Moroni, a man of undisputed integrity and virtue, takes full account of the kind of concerns that typify, and are embodied in, the just war tradition--even though that tradition has come down to the Western world through an altogether separate cultural evolution. The message for us as students of both the sacred and the secular would seem to be that we too should take note of this important philosophical tradition and the issues that it identifies. The Latter-day quest for truth embraces truth wherever it is found, for the Gospel of Jesus Christ comprehends all truth. As it is our lot to live in the long-prophesied age of "wars and rumours of wars" (Matthew 24:6), it seems clear that the rich reservoir of revelatory guidance in The Book of Mormon on the matter of war has come to us by Divine design. In its role as a vehicle for reflection upon war in the Dispensation of the Fullness of Times, The Book of Mormon highlights principles that form a striking parallel with those encompassed by the theory of just war. In no sense does The Book of Mormon commend war as the means for resolving disputes-far from it. Nevertheless, it also acknowledges what presently appears to be the inescapable reality that not even just persons will be spared the decision of whether to go to war. In the light of that reality, it is possible to view The Book of Mormon as an endorsement of the claim that the theoretic framework found in the just war tradition is not without utility to those informed with knowledge of the Gospel and intent on minimizing the evils of war in a world where, for the present, those evils pervade. NOTES

1. All views expressed herein are the personal views of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of any agency of the United States Government or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

2. Compare, for example, Tertullian, On Idolatry, translated by S. Thelwall, in The Ante-Nicene Fathers. Edited by Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson. Vo1. III. Grand Rapids, Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1950, and Augustine, Reply to Faustus the Manichrean [Contra Faustum Manichceum, Libri .xxxIIJ), translated by Richard Stothert, in The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathersr_edited by Philip Schaff, .Eirst Series. Vol. IV., Grand_Rapids, Eerdmans P.ublishing Company, 1956. For Augustine, the wars of the Old Testament are evidence of God's chastening hand in the affairs of men-a chastening hand that continues to be recognizable in the wars of the "Christian era," Tertullian, on the other hand, considers the New Testament teachings altogether to supercede those of the Old, such that he finds it impossible to justify participation in war by Christians.

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YES-THE BOOK OF MOR..\10N AS A TOUCHSTONE FOR EVALUATING THE THEORY OF JUST WAR

3. Sorenson, John L. "Seasonality of Warfare in the Book of Mormon and in Mesoamerica," Warfare in The Book of Mormon, ed. Stephen D. Ricks and William J. Hamblin, Salt Lake City, Deseret Book Company, 1990. 4. Richard Shelley Hartigan, "Non-combatant Immunity: Reflections on its Origins and Present Status." The Review of Politics 29, No.2, p. 204, April 1967. 5. For examples of some representative lists of jus ad bellum criteria, see the May 3, 1983, Pastoral Letter on War and Peace issued by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops in Catholics and Nuclear War, ed. Philip 1. Mumion, New York, Crossroad Publishing Company, pp. 277-80, 1983. See also James Turner Johnson, "The Just War Idea and the Ethics of Intervention," address delivered at the United States Air Force Academy, 17 November 1993, The Joseph A. Reich, Sr., Distinguished Lecture on War, Morality, and the Military Profession, number six, Colorado Springs, United States Air Force Academy, pp. 22-25, 1993. Some authors are wont to combine two or more traditionally accepted just war notions under a rather more general heading, while others opt for a greater range of distinctions. (In this essay, I shall tend to the latter approach inasmuch as it will enable us to examine the specific details of the theory of just war with a much higher degree of resolution than otherwise would be possible.) 6. See, for example, 2 Nephi 31:13, Jacob 2: 19,4:5, Mosiah 5:13, and Alma 18:32. 7. On this point, Moroni's epistle to Pahoran (Alma 60) is instructive. Moroni gives tacit acknowledgement ofPahoran's status as head of government by requesting that he exert his influence to ensure the logistical provision of Moroni's armies. However, Moroni also threatens to intervene in the political affairs of government if aid is not forthcoming. Both of these facts suggest that, whatever the relation between the military and political entities of the state, distinctions between them were such that one might safely conclude that the Ne;phites were not typically subject to a "military government" or under what might be thought of today as martial law. See also John W. Welch, "Law and War in the Book ofMorrnon," Warfare in The Book of Mormon, ed. Stephen D. Ricks and William J. Hamblin, Salt Lake City, Deseret Book Company, 1990. 8. This seems altogether reasonable in the light of Monnon's assessment that "there never was a happier time among the people of Nephi ... than in the days of Moroni" (Alma 50:23). Inasmuch as Mormon's record tends to equate true happiness and true righteousness (see, for example, Alma 41: I 0), Moroni's day certainly does not seem to qualify as a time of wickedness in the context required by 3 Nephi 3:19. 9. See, for example, Alma 43:30. 10. See, for example, Alma 44:1-1L 11. In modem parlance, "military necessity" is considered to be "that principle which justifies those measures not forbidden by intemationallaw which are indispensable for securing the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible. Military necessity has been generally rejected as a defense for acts forbidden by the customary and conventional laws of war inasmuch as the latter have been developed and framed with consideration for the concept of military necessity." See The Law of Land Warfare, Department of the Amy Field Manual 27-10, Washington, Government Printing Office, p. 4, July 1956. This general understanding of military necessity can be applied to the case of the Nephite-Lamanite War by embracing the realization that the genuine force of the concept relies on timeless moral principle rather than on the specific demands of any particular codification of secular law. 12. For an extensive treatment of the claim that tactical military deception can be used with moral warrant, see "The Moral Limits of Military Deception," Journal of Military Ethics. Vol. 1, Issue 1, pp. +-T5;-2002;-bTthe present author. 13. "Message of the First Presidency," Improvement Era 45, p. 348, May 1942. 14. See, for example, Mosiah 15:15-17.

15. Elder Ezra Taft Benson, Conference Report, April, pp. 49-54, 1968. 16. Harold B. Lee, Ye are the Light of the World. chapter 28.

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17. President David O. McKay, Conference Report, April, pp. 24-28, 1955. t8. Gordon B. Hinckley, "War and Peace," General Conference, April 2003: Available online at http://wW'W.lds.org/conference/talk/disp lay/O,5232,23-1-3 53-27 ,OO.htmt.

8 NO Murder to Get Gain: LDS Thoughts on U.S. Elements of National Power Mark E. Henshaw Introduction Having toppled two regimes in two years with fairly minimal effort, the United States has chiseled its "hyperpower" status in stone. The stunning victory in the Iraq war has put to rest any questions about whether there is a "Pax Americana." That invasion, made over strenuous international opposition, was a de facto U.S. announcement that American moral values will dominate international diplomacy and that the U.S. will brook no challenges to its supremacy in either the military or diplomatic arenas. Having demonstrated that it can dominate international affairs so thoroughly despite significant opposition, the U.S. has reached that coveted level of influence where just threatening to exercise power is often as effective as the exercise of power itself Like a long lever, mere suggestions of U.S. foreign policy shifts are creating disproportionate effects over very large regions. This state of affairs, made even more obvious by the war, has revived arguments over when and how the military element of power should be used. Obviously, it must not be used callously as some critics have alleged the U.S. has now done. However, President Bush's new "pre-emptive strike" security strategy obviously-and perhaps properly-ignores some of the traditional 'Just war" criteria that might otherwise restrain that power. This situation is particularly problematic for us who, as members of the church, believe that there are eternal principles that govern every situation. We cannot argue that these circumstances justifY a "new morality" that can support pre-emptive strikes. Either gospel principles can support this strategy or they can't. Accordingly, I'm grateful to Drs. Hudson and Kartchner for convening this symposium. More so than at any time since the invention of nuclear weapons these circumstances call for an immediate resumption of the 'Just war" debate.

The Need for "Just Diplomacy" and "Just Economics" However, we LDS scholars should recognize that while the 'Just war" debate is an important discussion to have, there is a wider issue to be considered in parallel. The diplomatic wrangling that preceded the Iraq conflict could illuminate a point that many people seem to be trying to ignore: that the other elements of power (i.e., diplomatic, economic) can be abused just as badly as military power and with equally lethal results. So the best way to solve the "just war" dilemma is to pre-empt war altogether but that's not possible if there are no "just diplomacy" and "just economics" lUles in place. "Just war" doesn't even come into play until diplomatic and economic maneuvers fail,

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and yet we have no diplomatic or economic criteria comparable to the Aquinas rules against which we judge other nations' actions. At present, only military power has true quasi-legal limits on its use. For non-military elements of national power anything goes, even though their abuse can lead to equally lethal results. In short, if there are accepted moral rules governing one element of national power, it seems logical that there should be similar accepted rules governing the others. The Gospel supports this view~ur behavior must be consistently Christlike in all its aspects. It is the height of hypocrisy-a sin the Lord absolutely abhors-if we behave like rogues in our dealings with others and then invoke moral strictures against violence in our own defense when someone takes offense at our behavior. This was demonstrated alternately by the heavy-handed French maneuvering and U.S.-U.K. obstinance in the UN Security Council (UNSC) debate over Resolution 1441. Somebody stepped over a moral line somewhere. The resulting war was either "just" or it wasn't, so somebody was on the wrong side of both the diplomatic and military divides (my money is on the French and their allies). There has been subsequent "moral outrage" surrounding the French veto threats, but it has been based on emotion and not any legal or ethical set of criteria that I'm familiar with. There's been much talk about ingratitude and backs tabbing but none about the violation of any code of ethics. A "just diplomacy" tradition might have forced one of our obstinate nations to accept a solution short of war. A "just economics" tradition might have prevented the violation of UN sanctions that bolstered Saddam and convinced him that he had no friends who would provide cover for diplomatic games. The affair proved that there is still a live schism between Wilsonian foreign policy idealists and practitioners of European old-style power politics. UN member states are implicitly required to follow Wilsonian ideals-the UN charter is based on them. However, the French attempt to confound U.S. demands for implementation of UNSC resolution 1441 was the starkest example of "power politics" diplomacy seen in decades at such a high level. The French claimed a moral opposition to the U.S.fUK position, but it is now generally accepted that the French were either covering up past sins- violations of UN sanctions levied against Iraq~r trying to create a French-led European Union counterbalance to the U.S., and quite likely both. (The fact that success in that effort would have left a tyrant in place, probably holding weapons of mass destruction, largely seems lost on the French and their allies.) This lack of concern for the condition of the Iraqi people speaks to the need for diplomatic and economic codes of ethics, with success measured by quantifiable results and not the meaningless metrics of "unanimity" or "coalition building." It is telling that many U.S. war critics fretted that "we shouldn't go it alone" (which we never did) although everyone conceded from the outset that Saddam's atrocities were ongoing and unspeakable, and that his ouster would leave the Iraqi people better off. The presence or absence of a coalition has never been proposed as a precondition for "just war" condition so it seems pointless to suggest that coalition building should be a metric for success when trying to use diplomatic or economic power to prevent war.

LDS Conflicts with the "Just War" Tradition Unfortunately, the great weakness of any proposed "just diplomacy" or "just economics" ideals and with the existing "just war ideals," is the often-subjective conception of "just." The divergent views on moral principles-or complete lack thereof--defin-

MURDER TO GET GAIN

ing "just" held by the world's various groups, Latter-day Saints included, practically guarantee that there will never be an agreement. We can see it within our own group; both the LDS perspective on U.S. history and the Book of Mormon provides examples that highlight potential failings in Aquinas' three "just war" rules: The war must be started and controlled by the authority of state or ruler. This has been historically interpreted to rule out civil war and rebellion. However, that interpretation would denounce the American Revolutionary War which was prophesied in the Book of Mormon and led to the formation of the United States, whose creation Latter-day Saints consider to have been divinely directed. l That inspired event demonstrated a moral principle not accepted in "just war" theory but codified in both the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution: leaders who act like thugs towards their own people are illegitimate rulers and may be overthrown. Thomas Jefferson explained the idea clearly in the Declaration of Independence, saying: Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes ... but when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is [mankind's] right, it is [mankind's] duty, to throw off such government. A just cause is required; namely that those who are attacked should be attacked because they deserve it on account of some fault. Historical interpretations of this tend to agree that righting a wrong already committed is the primarily acceptable just cause. However, remember that the Gadianton robbers and the Lainanites each justified attempted overthrows ofthe Nephite civilization on false claims of righting a past injustice. 2 The Book of Mormon documents some vitriolic correspondence that Captain Moroni received from his Lamanite counterpart Ammoron discussing the cause of an ongoing war. Ammoron claimed: ... your fathers did wrong their brethren, insomuch that they did rob them of their right to the government when it rightly belonged unto them. And now behold, ifye will lay down your arms, and subject yourselves to be governed by those to whom the government doth rightly belong, then will I cause that my people shall lay down their weapons and shall be at war no more (Alma 54: 17-18). The claim was fallacious, as it presupposed that by separating themselves from Laman's family and forming their own government, Nephi's family had somehow stolen something from future generations of Lamanites. The Lamanites had no legitimate claim and Ammoron knew it- "Moroni ... knew that Ammoron knew that it was not a just cause that had caused him to wage a war. .. "-but it was a legal claim under this "just war" tradition. The belligerents should have a rightful intention, so that they intend the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil. This is usually interpreted to mean that you can only fight for the reasons laid out in the "just cause" for the war. This is problematic because the idea of "rightful intention" is entirely subjective. In his own mind, Ammaron is justified his war by suggesting that imposing Lamanite rule over the Nephites would be a restoration of lost rights, which, on its face, would appear to be "rightful intention." Moroni, of course, raised the Title of Liberty, thereby making a public declaration of his rightful intention to preserve existing liberties (Alma 46:12). Both Captain Moroni and Ammaron were sufficiently convinced that their own cause was "just" that that they each told the other he was going to hell (Alma 54:4-24, with emphasis on verses 11,21-22):

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[Captain Moroni] Yea, I would tell you these things ifye were capable of hearkening unto them; yea, I would tell you concerning that awful hell that awaits to receive such murderers as thou and thy brother have been except ye repent and withdraw your murderous purposes, and return with your armies to your own lands (Alma 54:7). [Ammaron] ... if it so be that there is a devil and a hell, behold will he not send you there to dwell with my brother whom ye have murdered, whom ye have hinted that he hath gone to such a place? But behold, these things matter not (Alma 54:22).

We share Moroni's conception ofright and wrong and hence his justification for the war. No doubt that justification would have a different spin if the Lamanites had won the war and drafted the Book of Mormon. The victors really do write the history books.

Using the Gospel to Define "Just" This is not to say that these 'just war" rules are unhelpful. On the contrary, they often fulfill their purpose, but clearly we Latter-day Saints should not consider ourselves in total agreement with them all the time. Aquinas' and Wilson's principles are a fine start but without explicit gospel-based benchmarks that define 'just" underlying them, those principles will never hold up in all cases. We Latter-day Saints claim that the gospel is for all people, that its principles are applicable to everyone, regardless of culture or other factors, in all circumstances and at all times. The restored gospel, we believe, offers truth, which is defined as "knowledge of things as they are, and as they were, and as they are to come," and not some skewed mortal view of events (Doctrine and Covenants 93:24). God sees all things clearly where we cannot (we're only mortals after all), so only gospel principles based on revelation from Him can properly correct for our lack of omniscience and our mortal biases, derived from the natural man. Accordingly, I propose that the gospel must contain a definition of justice in the restored gospel that can act as that explicit moral benchmark. Any "just" traditions not based upon "justice" as defined by the principles of the restored gospel will inevitably come up against situations where those 'just" traditions will·fail to offer best guidance. Moreover, if we really want to fairly judge "just cause" claims, we must demand that they be based on current, observable violations of gospel values that can be quantified, recorded, and tested for truthfulness. Again, Jefferson summarized this idea in the Declaration of Independence: When, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bonds which have connected them with another... a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation .... The history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over these states. To prove this, let facts be submitted to a candid world.

The rest of the declaration is a laundry list of King George's offenses against the colonies. Jefferson accepted John Locke's proposition that everyone has a divine right to "life, liberty, and property"3 and said that a published chronicle of the rights violations-tangible, observable violations-should precede a fight for those rights. This is a practice that the Lord agrees with. It allows others to benchmark our claims against the truth and judge fairly whether the fight is "just." If the Lord really did give us free

MURDER TO GET GAIN

agency, then He also gave us the right to disagree and we must stop detlning "fault" in tenns of subjective philosophic or political differences. The Mahan Principle- "Murder to get gain" I suggest that a negative lesson taught in the Book of Moses might lead us to that definition of "just" that we are lacking. If we study conflict in the scriptures chronologically, we find that the first recorded act of conflict in the scriptures is Cain's murder of Abel. Admittedly, at first glance it might not be obvious what a murder has to teach us about international relations. For ''just diplomacy" and ''just economics" purposes, if Wilsonian ideals are correct and nations can and should be held to the same standards as individuals, then the morals of Cain's story are directly applicable to nations. In the 1993 LDS National Security Conference, Eugene England made this very point by recounting a First Presidency statement that takes the same position: To all who seek a resolution to conflict, be it a misunderstanding between individuals or an international difficulty between nations, we commend the counsel of the Prince of Peace: "Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you; that you may be the children of your Father which is in heaven." (Matthew 5:44-45) This principle ofloving one another as Jesus Christ loves us will bring peace to the individual, to the home and beyond, even to the nations and to the world"(emphasis added).

For "just war" purposes, this single killing wouldn't qualify as war under any currently accepted standard, this should not necessarily deter us from considering it-war has no universally accepted definition. It seems unlikely that we'll ever agree on tiUly universal "just war" criteria when we cannot even agree on what war is. For example, there is much debate over whether terrorism, which has it's own nebulous set of definitions, is a subset of war or something more separate. 4 But if we consider things from the Lord's point of view, it's quite likely that war, guerrilla war, assassinations, et ai, just appear to Him to be needless violence among His children regardless of the numbers, strategies, or tactics we use to conduct it or our motivations behind it. So even a single killing might teach us something about how the Lord views all conflict, including war. Without going too much into detail, Cain's rebellion against the Lord made him open to learning Satan's principles for doing business. Satan demanded an oath of secrecy from Cain, which he clearly got, and then taught a principle that Cain reiterated in some chilling language: Truly I am Mahan, the master of this great secret, that I may murder and get gain" (Moses 5:31).

On its face, this statement would seem to be another version of Paul's dictum that "the love of money is the root of all evil" (1 Timothy 6: 10). However, it has a deeper meaning. If this life is the "time for men to prepare to meet God" through repentance, which comes only through the exercise of free agency, then it is small wonder that murder is considered so serious. Murder is a terminal abrogation of free agency. It hinders, perhaps permanently, the spiritual progression of another by taking away their freedom to choose "liberty and eternal life ... or captivity and death" (l Nephi 2:27) by closing the window of opportunity when they could make such a choice. Paul's statement deals strictly with greed. Satan's Mahan principle, for lack of a better term, is about the abrogation of another's free agency for personal benefit. Disciples of Christ should consider it a negative example of precisely how we should not conduct our affairs. It

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also gives us a benchmark against which to judge righteous intentions. Actions that violate another's right to life, liberty, or property can be judged against the law. Satan first proposed this false principle in the pre-mortal council when he suggested that he, and not Christ, should be the Savior of mankind. His plan, of course, was to force the mass surrender of individual free agency. Satan suggested that the mass abrogation of free agency would benefit everyone, though clearly he was in it for selfish reasons-"wherefore give me thine honor" (Moses 4: 1). This strategy sounds suspiciously like Clausewitz's definition ofwar-"an act of force to compel an enemy to do our will." Once on earth, Satan had no power to abrogate anyone's free agency so he persuaded Cain to do it for him. The Mahan principle was eventually codified in a series of secret combinations practiced among Cain's own descendants (Moses 5:49-51, 6:15, 28-29, etc.) and the Gadianton robbers in the Book of Mormon. Mormon said that these secret combinations, operating on the Mahan principle, could be the undoing of whole societies if unchecked (Helaman 2:13-14) and backed up his claims by including a story found in 3 Nephi 6-7 where that actually happens. In Cain's case, the "gain" was his brother's flocks that Cain felt he was free to appropriate without consequence after the act-"I am free; surely the flocks of my brother falleth into my hands" (Moses 5:33). However, "gain" need not be limited only to material gain. The Lord has made it clear that we should not seek after riches, titles, honors of men, or any other worldly rewards (2 Nephi 26:29). Also, various Book of Mormon villains spent their time pursuing political power-Amalickiah comes to mind. They did this perhaps as a means to wealth, but the two are not mutually exclusive. Accordingly, "gain" could be political power, influence, office, or title just as easily. In short, it's hard to come up with an example of political conflict that wasn't started by someone trying to outright seize something they didn't have or to maintain a status quo at someone else's expense.

Implications of the Mahan Principle for U.S. National Security If this line of reasoning is accurate, then it carries with it several implications for the approaches we should take to deal with or pre-empt conflicts: Our national security interests should be defined in terms of preserving life, liberty, and property and not just in terms of protecting our material prosperity. The United States has always attributed its rise to power at least as much to its underlyc ing philosophy of government and individual liberties as to its vast natural resources. Although it's a worthy goal to maintain and improve our material quality of life, the lessons of the Mahan principle would be that we can't justify using aggressive military force to do so unless directly threatened (somebody else trying to use the Mahan principle against us). That leaves the protection of individual liberties as the viable underlying national security principle, which is best defined in terms of right to life, liberty, and property. Purely self-interested, material "gain"-oriented diplomatic positions that maintain power at the expense of other nations may succeed, perhaps even indefinitely in some cases, but will create wasteful violent conflicts. The U.S.' primary long-term goal, (emphasis on "long-term") should be the establishment of democracy and international guarantees of life, liberty, and property protections, not the avowed protection of "critical material resources." Churchill claimed that democracy was a terrible form of government, but that it was better than anything else ever tried. The latter half of that statement is true, if for no other reasons, because:

MURDER TO GET GAIN

a) Democracies tend to do a better (though not perfect) job of protecting civil liberties over the long run than other forms of government; and b) All else being equal, democracies are generally less reluctant to engage in military action than other forms of government.

Both of those trends are in line with "just diplomacy" and 'just war" goals. Accordingly, the best long-term national security strategy would appear to be encouragement and defense of democracy worldwide rather than the avowed protection of resources. The successful expansion of democracy should foster an environment in which the u.s. could negotiate more and fight less for the material goods needed to maintain its citizens' quality oflife. Furthermore, the U.S. should push for the United Nations to make such guarantees of life, liberty, and property protections a prerequisite for full membership. At present, the UN has no consistent penalties it applies to nations that abuse their own citizens, as Saddam Hussein did for twenty-four years. While revoking their UN membership might not be the best approach, at a minimum such nations should be barred from participation in such committees as the UN Security Council and the Human Rights Council. It is unreasonable to believe that international peace can be secured when nations that don't protect their own citizens are influencing key decisions. U.S. power primarily should be targeted to eliminate geographic flashpoints where Mahan-style strategies flourish. Like it or not, this means engaging in nation building to some degree. There are many areas, Africa notably, that are so mired in poverty and corruption that it seems likely they will never evolve stable societies without significant outside assistance. Economic aid and advice will be required to reduce poverty through micro development, as will lower trade barriers, and the elimination of illiteracy through increased educational opportunities. However, the lesson of the Mahan principle would be that we should not seek to profit off such endeavors. Largescale debt forgiveness and no-interest (or interest-matching-inflation-only) loans may be prerequisites. That we should not adopt diplomatic or economic positions that would support foreign governments' efforts to restrict the guaranteed liberties of their own people. This might appear problematic on its face, as different cultures have various ideas about what constitutes acceptable liberties. One solution could be the aforementioned encouragement of foreign nations to explicitly and individually establish a Bill of Rights containing aforementioned guarantees of life, liberty, and property protections. The world community could then judge complying nations not by an imposed universal standard (an unrealistic notion) but against their own self-declared standards. Failure to adhere to one's own constitution would trigger international repercussions. This suggests an additional implication that is likely to be controversial: that the international community should not consider national sovereignty to be absolute. If free agency, as expressed in terms of recognized human rights and constitutionalliberties, is truly invaluable then the preservation of it should trump other foreign policy considerations, including sovereignty under egregious circumstances. This notion currently is undermined in a rather lethal way by the UN charter that states: [t]he Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.

Unfortunately, this can and sometimes does run directly counter to the American

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experience I referred to earlier-a leader who behaves like a thug towards his own people loses the legitimacy to rule no matter how he came to power.' This was clearly the case with Saddam for almost thirty years, but despite Saddam's documented atrocities the UN: -Did not revoke Iraq's UN membership. -Explicitly refused to permit his removal from power after the first Gulf War and tried to protect his position before and during the second. -Did not investigate or sanction members (France, Russia, and Iraq) who violated post-Gulf War sanctions put in place against Iraq, thereby permitting the violators' personal enrichment at the expense of the Iraqi people.

This de facto UN position that it will respect the sovereignty even of member states whose leadership, by any standard, clearly deserve to be removed undermines any hope that the United Nations and its associated agencies can be the world's best protector of human rights and individual liberties. Diplomacy is most effective when it is aggressive, consistent in its positions, and when it is clear that diplomacy can be taken only so far. However, even if all of these were followed, inevitably there would still be war. The lessons of the Mahan principle would seem to dictate that: No war may be started purely for selfish material or political gain. No worldly reward can justify the violation of another's free agency. Free agency is a divine gift so valuable that God condemned a third of His children to eternal purgatory rather than withdraw it from the rest (Moses 4:1-4). Our free agency was worth more than Lucifer's opportunity for a mortal life. If free agency is that valuable, it's ridiculous to think that material gain could be worth a fair trade, much less be worth killing for. This is not to say that an aggressor country cannot benefit economically from war. It is not unreasonable to hope that a newly liberated people might want to engage in trade; but it is only ethical if those people make that decision through a truly representative govermnent and not through an aggressor-installed puppet regime that isn't acting in the people's own best interest. There should be no "spoils of war" when we are forced to fight. 6 It is true that the Lord handed spoils of war over to the Israelites. However, the earth is the Lord's and he can divvy it up as He sees fit. By contrast, the Nephites under Captain,Moroni and other righteous leaders never looked to seize Lamanite lands-they only looked to take back cities the Lamanites had seized through invasion. In the absence of a direct revelation from God to the country, we avoid even the appearance of evil by following the latter example and not holding on to anything we didn't have before a war started. Violence used in the defense of our own lives, liberties, and property may be justified. All disagreements that affect only the quality of life and are not considered life threatening must be settled through non-lethal means where possible; but where not possible, self-defense is justified: We believe that men should appeal to the civil law for redress of all wrongs and grievance, where personal abuse is inflicted or the right of property or character infringed, where such laws exist as will protect the same; but we believe that all men are justified in defending themselves, their friends and property, and the government from the unlawful assaults and encroachments of all persons in times of exigency, where immediate appeal cannot be made to the laws, and relief afforded (Doctrine and Covenants 134:11).

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Consider also Captain Moroni's lament that he and his army were the instruments of sending so many of their brethren into the eternal world where, no doubt, an eternity of suffering awaited them: Now, they were sorry to take up anns against the Lamanites, because they did not delight in the shedding of blood; yea, and this was not all-they were sorry to be the means of sending so many of their brethren out of this world into an eternal world, unprepared to meet their God (Alma 48:23). But his defense of the Nephites was justified (Alma 48:23-24). Moroni's words suggest that the spiritual cost of war is infinitely high and so may only be justified in the defense of something infinitely valuable. We may use military force to defend others whose lives, liberties, or property is being threatened. The Lord does not seem to object to standing up in defense of the helpless-Captain Moroni's defense of the Anti-Nephi-Lehis seems to support that position. Although we should respect others' free agency, even that of our enemies, agency is not absolute. "Your right to swing your fist ends where my nose begins." Unfortunately, diplomatic and economic sanctions levied against aggressor states have proven ineffective at establishing reasonable limits. Military action and, perhaps, pre-emptive intervention against states that violate the lives, liberties, or property of their own people or neighboring states becomes morally sustainable. Upon the United States' entry into World War II, then-apostle David O. McKay said: There are ... two conditions which may justifY a truly Christian man to enter-mind you, I say enter, not begin--a war: 1) an attempt to dominate and to deprive another of his free agency, and 2) loyalty to his country. Possibly there is a third, viz., defense of a weak nation that is being unjustly crushed by a strong, ruthless one 7 (emphasis added). The U.S. should, as a matter of policy, always support stripping away the "gains" earned by aggressor nations through violent action. Faced with the prospect that military aggression would gain no spoils of war and could result in material and political loss, aggressive dictators would think twice about invading their neighbors. Saddam likely is wishing he'd never gone after Kuwait in 1991, seeing where it has led him now. The Lord set the pattern for this when He called Cain out, extracted a confession of Abel's murder, and imposed justice. The benefits of the act were taken away and then some, leaving Cain to lament "my punishment is greater than I can bear" (Moses 5:38). Accordingly, the U.S. national security strategy should call for the U.S. to bring its elements of power to bear in some combination against nations that attempt to get gain through violent action. The first Gulf War was a pattern that should be made to hold in all cases. While military power might not be necessary in all cases, making it explicit policy to keep the option open (and the successful application of it as in 1991) might discourage futme aggressors. This idea would also call for full U.S. support of international bodies of arbitration and justice-no pulling out of the UN, and full engagement in the International Criminal Court until these have proven themselves ineffective, unable, or unwilling to live up to their self-proclaimed mandates in a fair, unbiased manner.

Conclusion To conclude, if we really believe that all men are created equal and that they all have inalienable (and infinitely valuable) rights endowed by their Creator, then we

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must also believe that no form of national "gain" can be worth the abrogation of those rights. The U.S. should develop a clear set of "just economics," just diplomacy," and 'Just war" policies and principles and push for their international adoption. Those principles and policies should be founded in the idea that nations operating according to the Mahan principle, abrogating the individual free agency of others for gain, will consistently be confronted using some combination of our national elements of power. Jefferson once declared, "I have sworn eternal hostility to every form of tyranny over the mind of man." That is a fine stand to take-cooperation with those who willfully abuse their own citizens cannot be justified by the gospel. While we do not have the military power to right every wrong, there is always something we can do diplomatically and economically by withholding our support from such regimes. 1fnothing else, we can focus the attention of international forums on such wrong so that evil can't work unhindered in the dark. Consistent, principled, active engagement with all our elements of power is needed. Cooperation for gain with such regimes makes us partners in their sins; refusing to confront aggressive nations out for gain is just passive compliance.

A Proposed LDS Revision to Aquinas' "Just War" Tradition Wars between states must be started and controlled by the legitimate authority of state or ruler. Governments that systematically take the lives, liberties, or property of their own citizens without means for appeal do not constitute a legitimate authority of state. A just cause is required; namely that those who are attacked should be attacked because they deserve it on account of some fault. A 'Just cause" may only be defined in terms of a state attacking or threatening imminent attack against the lives, liberties, or property of a group. The belligerents should have a rightful intention, so that they intend the advancement ofgood, or the avoidance of evil. Such rightful intention may only be defined in terms of protecting the lives, liberties, or property of self or the helpless.

A Proposed LDS "Just Diplomacy" Tradition The negotiators should have a rightful intention, so that they intend the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil. Diplomacy must be conducted in "good faith." Rightful intention may only be defined in telms of protecting the lives, liberties, or property of self or the helpless. No state may propose or support an agreement that would encourage or prolong the killing, political oppression, or impoverishment of any group without means for appeal. We cannot support actions committed by others that we could not do ourselves in good conscience. Doing so makes us conspirators to their violations of others' free agency. States claiming injury must take responsibility for initiating diplomacy to resolve the issue peacefully. The Lord said that we should go to the offender first rather than waiting for him to come us. States claiming injury should be required to begin the diplomatic process and suggest a solution. The obvious exception would be when an attack is underway and the diplomatic option closed. A Proposed LDS "Just Economics" Tradition No state may interfere with another state s ability to secure the necessities of life for its own people. Withholding the necessities of life from any group constitutes a

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de facto attack on their lives, liberties, and property. Accordingly, no state may do so except, perhaps, when war has broken out. Even then, the innocent should not suffer needlessly. No state may demand economic aid or tribute as a requirement for avoiding war. Extortion denies free agency. If it's not acceptable to murder to get gain, it cannot be acceptable tD threaten murder to get gain. North Korea's effort to secure U.S. economic aid through nuclear brinkmanship is a negative example. No state may engage in trade that would cause, encourage or prolong an unjust war, or the political oppression, or impoverishment of any group. No country should profit from the misery of others. Economic support of aggressor nations makes us "murderers to get gain." Economic support of nations that violate their own people's liberties makes us "oppressors to get gain." Economic trade that robs a nation of its precious material resources for less than fair value is simple fraud. NOTES I. See 1 Nephi 13:16-19; Doctrine and Covenants 101:76-80.

2. Among others, Alma 54: 16-24 (particular emphasis on verses 17-18 and 24); and 3 Nephi 3: 1-11 (particular emphasis on verse 10). 3. Locke defined "property" in terms of the me;tns by which people can obtain sustenance. Accordingly, we should be careful to define property for this discussion in terms of the necessities of life (food, clothing, shelter) and not confuse it with the luxuries of life. In this sense, property is a necessary prerequisite to sustaining both life and liberty. 4. Terrorists themselves can't seem to make up their mind about it. One terrorist recently captured in Afghanistan was sent to Guantanamo Bay as an EPW, but then announced he was a U.S. citizen and as such had a constitutional rigbt to a criminal trial instead of a military tribunal. Another sllch al-Qa'ida member, John Walker Lindh, was granted such a trial. Terrorists usually claim that they are soldiers at war with their enemies, but when caught they usually seem to prefer classification as criminals rather than prisoners of war. 5. Consider the Alma chapter 60 declaration (particularly verses 23-30) of Captain Moroni-a plainly righteous man as stated in Alma 48:17-in which he threatens to overthrow the Nephite government because of their perceived neglect of the anny fighting in their defense. 6. Conversely, this suggests that absolute pacifism ("peace at any cost") is not a justifiable philosophy. If the right to free agency is worth more than Lucifer's opportunity to have a mOlial life on earth, then the right to free agency is also worth more than the mortal lives of those here who would take it away. Therefore, it's worth both dying and killing for. 7. Conference Report, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, April 1942.

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Part IV LDS Theology and National Security: Policy Perspectives 9

War and Conscience: An LDS Perspective David M Kirkham Iutroduction If "war is heU" and hell is itself in some degree the burning consciousness of unforsaken sin, then war and conscience are no strangers to one another. Members of The Church of Jeslls Christ of Latter-day Saints, which teaches that the human conscience is the light of Christ that enlightens all who come into the world, would be remiss not to examine the role conscience plays in Latter-day Saint participation in waf. What docs an "LDS" conscience suggest to be the proper reaction to war? When, if ever, are human beings j uslified in its participation? What actions in wartime arc and are not to be regarded as legitimate and "conscionable"? The pages that follow carve out the beginnings of one Latter-day Saint's view of these questions, suggesting that in times of war, as ever, the LDS conscience is as likely to demand action as restraint.

Historical Foundations of the "Higher Law" in America Despite its sometimes complicated histOlY, the United States orAmeriea is widely acknowledged to be a nation committed in theory) and generally in practice, to the rule of law. Democratic and constitutional institutions, structures, and practices in this country have deep roots and have proven themselves able to withstand severe crises. Behind this system of laws, however, lies an equally long tradition in America of "higher law" theory to which there has been a recurring appeal over Ule years by minority elements of a community whose vital interests have been threatened. Sometimes this second tradition has worked in tandem with and has been protected by the civil law; other times its adherents have found themselves on the wrong side of the civil law and have been prompted to commit acts of eivil disobedience or more. The result has been either punishment of the offenders or changes in the societal conditions offensive to the offenders or both. Always this higher law has taken the form of an appeal to conscience, natural law, the laws of God, or to a more fimdamental law of liberty and human rights than was being currently upheld by legal and governmental institutions at the time of the challenge.

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The higher law tradition in America goes back to Colonial times. Puritans came 10 this country in the seventeenth century to establish a religious community that would sit as a "city on a hill," an example to the rcst of thc world of what God could do with a people who had been given the freedom to practice their "true" religion. Their settlement was itself an act of conscience. However, dissenting members of their congregations, Anne Hutchinson and Roger Shennan, to name two, sometimes found themselves expelled from the community for voicing their private conscience in response, according to their claim, to a higher law. In Hutchinson's case, losing the protection of the community cost her lifc. The American Revolution also drew on the higher law tradition, with colonists claiming allegiance to a long tradition of liberty stemming from an almost mythical, ancient English constitution that had been abrogated by British legislation and executive practice. They fought initially for their rights as "Englishmen" but when it became clear that there could be no going back to bctter times with King George, the colonials appealed to "the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God" to justify their complete break [rom the mother country. I The tradition has continued up to the present century. At one time or another in our histolY, abolitionists, suffragettes, civil rights marchers, conscientiolls objectors, even early Mormon pioneer settlers in the Salt Lake valley, have all laid claim to a higher law that would trump the civil law.

Higher Law and War In times of war, given what is at stake, emotions run high, and appeals to the higher law, in this case a law of nonviolence, become 1110re common. For example, in the time period leading up to the recent war in Iraq, a freshman at the U.S. Air Force Academy sent an e-mail to a history professor at a Midwestern uiliversity asking him if he would pass on to his students an invitation to attend the school's annual "Academy Assembly," a forum that brings>' together college students from around the nation to discuss political issues of topical interest. That scholar responded: You ,He "d disgrace to this countlY, and I am furiOlls you would even thiilk I would support you and your aggressive baby killing tactics of collateral damage. Help you recruit. Who, top guns to reign [sic] death and destruction upon nonwhite peoples throughout the world? Are you serious sIr? Resign your commission and serve your country with honor. No war, no, Air Force cowards who bomb countries without AAA (anti-aircraft artillery], without possibility of retaliation. You are worse than the snipers [i.e., the snipers who terrorized Washington, D.C. in fall 2002]. You are imperialists who afC turning the whole damn world against us. September 11 can be blamed in part for what you and your cohorts havc done to the Palestinians, the YC, the Serbs, a retreating :lI"1lly at 13,lsra. You are unworthy of my sllpport. 2

It did not take long before this e-mail exchange had circulated throughout the country, drawing publicity from the likes of the Wall Street Journal, the Chicago 7Hbune, and News and World Report. In the wake of the uproar that followed, the obviously chagrined professor published on his university's web site the following explanation for his actions:

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Again I would like to apologize to all who are oITended, burdened, distracted, and

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war is a velY poor alternative means ofresolving conflicts, the Church considers it the loyal duty of citizenship for members to answer the call of their variolls countries [or militmy service. At the same time, it recognizes the right of the individual member to determine for themselves whether their deep, spiritual consciences will allow them to serve in combat or require them to request assignment to altemate service. The Church will not support a member in the request until he 01' she has consulted with the appropriate bishop and stake president and has spirihml confirmation that the way decided upon hy the member concerned is acceptable to the Lord.6

In virtually all wars, the Church has reaffin~led this position. During the Vietnam War, in a letter dated 20 March 1970, Elder Joseph Anderson, then secretaty to the First Presidency, wrote to a Church member who had inquired regarding the Church's position on conscientious objection: I am directed to tell you that membership in The Church of Jeslls Christ of Latter-day Saints does not make one a conscientious objector. As you are aware, there are thousands of young men of the Church assigned to the variolls services in the military.

As the brethren understand, the existing law provides that men who have conscientious objection may be excused ti'om combat selvice. There would seem to be 110 objection, therefore, to a man availing himself on a personal basig of the exemptions provided hy law.... I am further directed to tell you that the Presidenl, with Congress, must determine the position the countly should take with regard to any national or international question. If it were left to the illdividualto determine whether 01' not we should be involved there would be nothing but chaos. Then too, it is not possible for fill individual citizen to have the information tllat is available to the President and the Congress, and without all of th