Weapons of Mass Destruction: Options for India

WEAPONS

OF

MASS DESTRUCTION

WEAPONS

OF

MASS DESTRUCTION

Options for India

Editor RAJA MENON

SAGE Publications New Delhi M Thousand Oaks M London

Copyright ©United Service Institution of India, 2004 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilised in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. First published in 2004 by Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd B-42, Panchsheel Enclave New Delhi 110 017 Sage Publications Inc 2455 Teller Road Thousand Oaks, California 91320

Sage Publications Ltd 1 Oliver’s Yard, 55 City Road London EC1Y 1SP

Published by Tejeshwar Singh for Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd, typeset in 9.5/11.5 Century751BT at C&M Digitals, Chennai and printed at Chaman Enterprises, New Delhi.

Library of Congress Cataloging-iin-P Publication Data Weapons of mass destruction: options for India / editor, Raja Menon. p. cm. Includes index. 1. Weapons of mass destruction—India. 2. India—Military policy. 3. India— Defences. I. Menon, Raja. U793.W43279 358′.3′0954—dc22 2004 2004015318

ISBN:

0–7619–3301–8 (Hb) 0–7619–3302–6 (Pb)

81–7829–425–7 (India-Hb) 81–7829–426–5 (India-Pb)

Sage Production Team: Sunaina Dalaya, Sushanta Gayen, and Santosh Rawat

CONTENTS Introduction Raja Menon

7

Part I—Theory of Effectiveness 1. 2. 3.

The Nuclear Dimension Pran Krishan Pahwa The Effectiveness of Chemical Agents B.S. Malik The Effectiveness of Biological Agents Raja Menon

21 30 47

Part II—Threats to India 4.

Formal and Non-formal Nuclear Threats M.S. Mamik

63

Part III—Current International Regimes 5. 6.

The Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime Matin Zuberi The Chemical and Biological Weapons Regimes Arundhati Ghose

79 110

Part IV—India’s Negotiating Positions 7. 8.

The Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime in Crisis Matin Zuberi Trends in the CWC and BTWC: Implications and Options for India’s Security Interests Arundhati Ghose

129 198

6 M RAJA MENON

Part V—India’s Options 9. Protection against Chemical Agents B.S. Malik 10. Protection against Biological and Toxin Warfare Raja Menon About the Editor and Contributors Index

223 247 267 270

INTRODUCTION Raja Menon

T

he strategic scenario regarding possible sources of conflict underwent its most dramatic change in 1990–91 with the collapse of the former Soviet Union (FSU). The immediate aftermath of the collapse was the birth of the idea that the United States, as the sole superpower, could now intervene militarily in any part of the world with impunity. Western military forces began to prepare themselves, tactically and technologically, to fight ‘overseas’. The western coalition began to assume that conflict had, for the immediate future, ended in North America and Western Europe. Since then tactical thinking has progressed quite far down this road, with the Americans having coined the strategic expressions—From the Sea, Battlespace Dominance of the Littoral and Littoral Warfare. At the same time, a number of political movements, which during the Cold War years would have found superpower backing, began to look for strategic ballast. Without the backing of state military power these movements inevitably looked for alternate solutions, giving rise to an increasing number of terrorist initiatives. In the Cold War years many of these terrorist activities would have been given political acceptability as wars of national liberation. Yet, a third line of thinking also emerged from the ashes of the Cold War and that was the demise of ‘deterrence’ or the need to depend on deterrence as the cornerstone of strategic stability. To summarise, the three new major strands of politico-military thinking that emerged were: • The end of nuclear deterrence as the foundation of stability. • The validity and merits of the sole superpower’s strategy of Littoral Warfare. • The response of various smaller actors in resorting to terrorism as a way of being heard.

8 M RAJA MENON

It is clear that these three movements are deeply interlinked, and in many instances one of these drivers often activates the other two. For instance, the removal of strategic deterrence, coupled with terrorist threats gave rise to the concept of counter-proliferation, with nuclear weapons being ‘used’ to deter smaller powers from using Biological and Toxin Warfare (BTW) and Chemical Warfare (CW) in response to Littoral Warfare. As can be seen, the link between the continued relevance of nuclear weapons and Littoral Warfare was the possibility of the use of biological and toxin, and chemical weapons. Again, this idea has been carried forward farthest in the Pentagon who, as early as 1995, established an Office of Counter Proliferation. That this is due to the natural evolution of a relevant strategic idea is evidenced in the Indian nuclear policy document which articulates a possible first nuclear use scenario in response to a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) attack on Indian forces anywhere. What has occurred while pursuing this chain of thought is that, first, a state’s use of Biological Toxin (BT) and Chemical (C) agents is posited against another state; and second, the threat of nuclear retaliation is assumed to reduce the chances of BT and C use by that state. The development of this idea grew so strongly that this double event–response chain has been given a name in the strategic community—that of asymmetric warfare. Over the 1990s the idea of asymmetric warfare has become fairly well entrenched. It is important to understand this in India, which politically is somewhere in the middle of all this. While all the western nations have joined the Americans as ‘doers’ in Littoral Warfare, smaller nations have yet to get their act together on what to do to prevent such warfare from being ‘done’ to them. India stands in the middle, as stated earlier, because it is perceived as a ‘doer’ of Littoral Warfare by the smaller Indian Ocean states, while New Delhi itself often has to deal with the anxiety that it could also be a ‘victim’ of Littoral Warfare. In the corelation of forces that the Indian strategic planners visualise, there is a possibility that a smaller nation with which India is engaged, could use BT and C agents to offset its conventional asymmetry. It is important to understand this assumption because the contributors to the volume have argued that in the probability matrix, the need to deal with state-sponsored BT and C attacks is low. The reasons for this major assumption are spelt out ahead. Coming to the possible use of BT and C agents by non-state actors (a scenario that this volume deals with extensively) the Indian narrative and the world narrative run parallel to one another, though somewhat apart. The world narrative is marked by some important

INTRODUCTION M 9

milestones: the World Trade Center (WTC) bombing in 1993, the September 11 attack on the WTC, the IRA bombing in London, and a couple of spectacular attacks on passenger aircraft. The Indian narrative is much more intense, longer, more painful, and largely ignored in the world literature that traces the strategic narrative just described. India fought bitter terrorism in Punjab followed by J&K in 1989, the extensive Bombay blasts in the spring of 1993, and the escalating violence in Kashmir and outside India, as the Kashmir movement was hijacked by the Taliban and the international jihadi movement. These major events, largely ignored in the world narrative, makes it necessary that India does its strategic thinking independently. The world, for instance, thinks of 9/11 as a watershed, and since the world thinks so, it becomes so. In India, however, to accept that 9/11 was a defining moment in international terrorism would be entirely unacceptable. The events of 9/11 have in fact changed the nature of the Indo-US relationship, but neither has 9/11 nor the changed nature of the relationship made any difference to India’s lonely fight against state-sponsored terrorism. This fight will have to continue. It is in this context that the study on WMD assumes significance in India. Unlike the example of the main participants of the Cold War, it is true that the standard theories of deterrence still hold good in the subcontinent. Indeed, this is perhaps the only area in the world where this is so, and cold warriors are often surprised to hear the language of the early Cold War when they visit the subcontinent. But superimposed on the Cold War nuclear theology is the active engagement of the country in fighting its old enemy—terrorism. To study the implications of the possible use of biological and chemical agents, and nuclear risks to Indian society, a study group was convened at the United Service Institution of India in New Delhi. The first issue that this study group had to get out of the way was whether the country faced a greater WMD threat from states or from non-state actors. It would have been easy to opt for the worst case scenario and cater for both kinds of threats. However, it was strongly felt that BT and C have varied effectiveness when used by states in pursuit of a political crisis. Such cases are quite different from using BT and C agents for the well-known and classic objectives of terrorist behaviour, namely, to attract attention to neglected causes, to demand negotiations or to extract revenge. The arguments in the succeeding paragraphs provide an understanding of how the study group arrived at its approach to the link between BT and C agents and non-state actors.

10 M RAJA MENON

Of the three categories of WMD there is no doubt that chemical weapons lend themselves to the easiest form of state use. While the use of chemical agents can be particularly lethal against civilian populations and poorly-trained forces (like the Kurds), properly trained armies can successfully resist CW. Furthermore, a side using chemical weapons will initially have to protect its entire front with protective gear, which reduces the effectiveness of soldiers to about 30 to 60 per cent of their normal capabilities. It is therefore not surprising that the world has met great success in reaching an agreement on banning chemical weapons and ensuring that the agreement is respected. There is a vast difference between a state moving towards a full-fledged chemical weapons capability and a state merely developing a small dual-use facility to produce enough chemical agents to terrorise a small civilian population, or a few weapons for low-scale tactical use. If a country intends to acquire the former it would normally be difficult to conceal the entire process. It is true that normal dual-use plants, like those manufacturing organic phosphorous pesticides or flame retardants, could be converted to producers of CW agents of a low grade. Detecting the proliferation of chemical weapons inside a chemical weapons regime and outside it are quite different. The former assumes that the monitoring is cooperative while the latter would require unilateral intelligence gathering capabilities. Then again there is the question of the continued production of illicit gases in a known facility. Proliferant countries intending to create a genuine chemicals capability would either build a dedicated clandestine facility or convert an existing dual-use facility used for producing pesticides etc., into a chemical agent factory. It is known that of all the chemical agents ever used, only 60 have been specifically manufactured and stored with the intention of using them as weapons. The Office of Technical Assessment (OTA) has given a sequential list of steps that a proliferant country would go through on its path to militarising its chemical weapons capability. These include the manufacture of the chemical agent, the development of suitable munitions, the combining of the two, the issue of chemical ordnance to the military supply and logistic chain, and the development of tactical plans for its use. What would eventually lead a proliferant state to break the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) would be the low cost of a chemical weapons plant, estimated at $5 million to $10 million for a sophisticated chemical agent factory. On the other hand, the long sequence of converting mere manufacturing into actual military capability has to go through the processes mentioned.

INTRODUCTION M 11

In actual fact, what the country’s intelligence needs to do is to keep a track of any upcoming facility in a target country, which has dual-use capabilities in manufacturing what is called a processor chemical. Since thousands of tons of basic feedstock chemicals are used by many countries and it is virtually impossible to keep track of these ordinary chemicals as they are of little value, the movement of the precursor chemicals is controlled under the Australia Group list. Nevertheless, it is possible to substitute one of the precursor chemicals by another one, but difficult to do so without raising an alarm. For a country like India, keeping tabs on the chemical industry of a target country is not difficult provided the Indian intelligence agency at work is staffed by people who know what to look for. However, even if the basic C agent manufacturing capability exists, its weaponisation process would still require that the agent be stabilised, often ‘thickened’ or mixed with carriers. Stabilisation is the process of increasing the shelf life of agents for long periods of storage with the military. Thickening is the process of increasing the agents viscosity to increase the persistence of the chemical. Mixing is the process of adding the chemical to an aerosol or a powder for easier dispersal. From all these processes it becomes clear that there is a big difference between developing a C agent for state use, for example, by the military, and the clandestine development of a token capability to pass on to non-state actors. The former means deliberately breaching the agreement on the CWC, while the latter makes terrorist misuse of a C agent, with state support, the most likely condition that we need to study. Biological and Toxin Warfare (BTW) has often been called public health in reverse because it involves the deliberate use of diseases to kill people. Often referred to as the poor man’s atom bomb, states and non-state actors can embark on producing BW agents far more surreptitiously than producing C agents. The latter, as explained earlier, needs the production of distinctive precursor agents and specialised equipment that leave behind large telltale signs of the attempt to embark on the manufacture of chemical weapons. Furthermore, small amounts of BW agents can be produced in a clandestine manner. In terms of pure theory it is true that a small quantity of biological organisms can infect a large number of people, but their long incubation period is a major limitation on their tactical use in the battlefield. This does not automatically mean that BW agents can be used against the civilian population because the delayed effect on the people, crops or animals also takes place with delayed effect. Such use, which might be meant to damage the morale of a people or coerce them into

12 M RAJA MENON

war terminations would also occur with delayed effect during which the circumstances surrounding the event would have changed. However, it would be prudent to assume that because of their potential to cause great damage, small states might consider using BW agents in regional conflicts or when threatened by a nuclear state. The practical difficulties of delivering BTW agents in a predictable manner needs to be discussed in more detail to substantiate the stand taken in this volume that the use of BTW against the military has by and large been disregarded. Incorporating BTW agents into area delivery weapons like cluster bombs requires that complex engineering hurdles be overcome. Reliability in military use can be ensured only if the agent can be made to perform consistently. This is achieved by converting the agent into a non-volatile solid to be disseminated either as a liquid slurry or a freeze dried powder of freeze dried toxins or organisms. Once this is done aerosol spraying either from an aircraft or from the back of a truck, or in cluster bomblets as the payload of a ballistic missile is possible. But there are still many more obstacles. Protein toxins are subject to severe environmental stresses such as heat, oxidation and shear forces. The challenge is to overcome the rapid decay of BT agents when sprayed. The aerosol must have dimensions that can overcome the body’s natural filters and penetrate deep enough to cause illness. To keep the aerosol suspended in the air they must be between 1 and 5 microns. Particles smaller than 5 microns will travel over long distances. Particles larger than these collapse to the ground on collision with each other or with other objects, while particles below 1 micron are exhaled by the victim. So when actual tests are conducted, it is found that almost all BT agents do not meet the stability requirements in an aerosol. Furthermore, the use of mechanical devices to generate aerosols reduces the number of infectious cells. Once released the cloud decays rapidly over time and even more rapidly under the influence of heat and ultraviolet light. If an explosive is used to disperse the aerosol, the initial blast and heat may cause as much as 95 per cent of the BT agents to become ineffective. Heavy spores such as anthrax could settle on the ground without decay and continue to be virulent. The classic scenario of a drone or a Ultra-light Aerial Vehicle (UAV) being used to spray BT agents is technically feasible but requires a sophisticated level of agent formulation as well as UAV technology. A UAV attack on a cold clear night with a stable atmosphere would be most suitable for the creation of a large cloud. For all these reasons, with immense imponderables for subsequent tactical events, the use

INTRODUCTION M 13

of BT agents on the battlefield in the Indian scenario is virtually ruled out. This categorical assertion does not include the possibility of use of BT agents against Indian forces overseas in areas beyond the subcontinent, in which case these conditions don’t hold good. A great deal of discussion took place on the scenario for the use of Nuclear (N) weapons in the study group. It was difficult to argue that the concept of deterrence had collapsed in the subcontinent. Therefore, it was reasoned that the best preventive against the use of such weapons remained the weapon itself. The possible use and manufacture of nuclear weapons was also discussed is great detail. While unauthorised access to nuclear weapons remained a possibility in states where societal cohesion might collapse, the use of such weapons manufactured by non-state actors did not enthuse the group. Theoretically, a crude nuclear device is not beyond the manufacturing capability of non-state actors. However, in the area around the subcontinent the hurdles to be crossed by terrorist organisations attempting to manufacture a nuclear device seemed beyond the limits of legitimate credibility. The services of friendly scientists etc., was also discussed, but it would appear that friendly scientists might more readily assist in the theft of nuclear weapons than the manufacture of one, over a number of years. In India, these subjects have been rarely dealt with in detail. There is a plethora of information on the international regimes that attempt to curb N, BT and C proliferation. For a number of years the national effort seemed reduced to relying solely on international regimes to ensure the safety of the nation. Partly, this may have been because the discussions on the country’s approach to the international regimes were unclassified and academics had free access to enough materials for discussion. The debate in the country is therefore reasonably sophisticated when it comes to international regimes and quite unsubstantial when it comes to the mechanics of use and the protection of society. This volume opens with three chapters that address the issue of the dangers posed by the N, BT and C agents, in general, and towards governments and people. There is a need for a dispassionate analysis here to avoid both overstating the possibility of N, BT and C use, while not minimising their effectiveness if used. Thereafter the study looks at the threats actually posed to both the Indian government and the Indian people. The third part of the study looks at what needs to be done to protect India from these threats. In these chapters it becomes clear that while the nuclear threats are addressed mostly by creating institutions, procedures and command structures to manage

14 M RAJA MENON

India’s nuclear arsenal, the other two threats require substantially different approaches. The chemical and biological threats are seen to emanate largely from non-state actors, either with or without host nation support. In the case of the former, there is a need to move down the track of what the Americans call counter-proliferation so that the power of the Indian state is used to deter or dissuade granting of support or sanctuary to non-state actors. The more pressing problem remains the one of protecting our people, particularly from BT use. This capability is seen largely to fall into the category of dealing with large-scale medical disasters. It is interesting to note, for instance, that the Indian state is not without experience in this area since more than a million people died each year from the plague between 1900 and 1905. The last sets of chapters in this volume deal with the positions that the Indian government needs to take in international fora while addressing international initiatives to prevent N, BT and C use. It is possible that the passage of time may date some aspects of this study, but the core of the study will remain relevant for many years because it is concerned with the mammoth task of protecting people. There are portions of this volume that should attract the general reader, as also the specialist and the policy maker. This volume has not ignored aspects related to international relations and the international regime, but rather it has concentrated much more on the protection of society and the armed forces against both state and non-state actors armed with BT and C weapons. In this respect the volume breaks new ground. Perhaps the many recommendations made here could be summarised, if the policy makers want ready access to such a list of recommendations. However, a ready- to-use list of recommendations is given here: • A Joint Parliamentary Committee to be formed from all the political parties to address the problems of command, authority to take measures, and accountability and funding at the national level to combat BT and C terrorism. • The National Security Adviser (NSA) run an office to centrally coordinate the intelligence and interdepartmental work concerned with combating terrorism. • The central authority coordinating all active measures to protect the people be placed under the Home Ministry and through the Home Ministry under the Department of Home Affairs in each state.

INTRODUCTION M 15

• The Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) be tasked to write a national strategic plan to combat BT and C terrorism nationwide. • The coordinating ministry, the Home Ministry be tasked to write a national strategic plan, based on the national disaster management plan (which was passed off to the Ministry of Agriculture) to deal with bio-terrorism. The national plan could have the state plans incorporated as appendices. States however would have no idea of how to go about writing a plan without a sample plan from the centre. • The National Institute for Communicable Diseases (NICD) be tasked to write a National Laboratory Network Plan to be incorporated under the ICMR. Part of the cost of networking national labs be recovered from the laboratories themselves. • A national logistic plan be written by the ICMR to support the national strategic plan made by the Ministry of Home Affairs. • The role of the military be clearly defined by the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the training for static and mobile units designated to support civilian authority be given. • The Central Board of Revenue be tasked to write a national plan for the customs authorities to upgrade training and surveillance to check the movement of BT and C agents across India’s borders. • The Coast Guard be designated to actively patrol using special equipment to monitor the movement of BT and C agents. • The ICMR be tasked to open a government subsidised vaccine production plant for the necessary medicines to be manufactured. • A Metropolitan Medical Response System to be written separately, somewhat like the Mumbai Disaster Relief Scheme. The effects of BTW and CW are far more catastrophic within large metropolitan areas, and since their administration runs through a slightly different, quicker channel than in the countryside, large cities like Delhi, Mumbai, Bangalore, Chennai, Kolkata, Ahmedabad etc., should therefore have more specific schemes. • An intergovernmental coordination body be instituted consisting of the customs, the Coast Guard, the immigration and airport authority, Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), and the Border Security Force (BSF) to discuss the monitoring at our borders. Coordination meetings be held with national security agencies of neighbouring agencies, as has been done for narcotics control, to coordinate preventive action against N, BT and C agents.

16 M RAJA MENON

• The National Security Adviser and the National Command Post be given the authority and held accountable for running a countrywide disaster control plan in conditions where a national emergency has not been declared and the provisions of the Union War book are not quite applicable. • The Home Ministry and the MOD run schemes to bring the Home Guards, the fire services, the NCC and the reservists into the system of disaster management. Finally, it is necessary to take a quick look at the last outbreak of the plague in Surat to see the lessons that can be learnt on how to improve matters. The incredible fact to be noted about the last Surat plague outbreak, is that, to this day, there is no unanimity over whether the disease was a natural form of plague or a deliberate attempt to introduce a biowarfare agent into India. The brief facts are that the NICD started its investigation on 2 September 1994 on the report of a suspected plague case. But until 22 September, the general consensus was that the disease, which had already caused 17 deaths, was actually pneumonia. The NICD did call in the CDC from USA and the World Health Organization (WHO) immediately. Although quarantine of a plaque-infested area is permitted, panic-stricken people began to flee and took the disease with them to many other parts of India. By 11 October, when the government appointed a Technical Advisory Committee (TAC), there were totally opposite views in the country on whether the disease was a natural outbreak or a deliberately introduced strain. The TAC created even more confusion when one member of the committee refused to sign the findings that the deaths had been caused by bubonic plague. Quite possibly, the entire controversy was unnecessary, but the point to note is that unless there are strong mechanisms in place before an outbreak, this kind of controversy is bound to recur. Almost all the fears of the experts—the fleeing of people from the scene of the disaster, the lack of clarity on the source of the pathogen, the setting up of ad hoc bodies—are all occurrences that need to be avoided for the future. To summarise, the essential strategy in this volume is to create a layered defence against BT and C use against the people of this country. Here counter-proliferation, deterrence and Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) measures like the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) are the farthest layers of defence, and consequence management the last. In between these are the set of measures which include

INTRODUCTION M 17

mobilising the border management agencies like the BSF and customs, stockpiling of vaccines and medicines, mobilising the ICMR and the NICD, and making the armed forces the lead agency in fielding mobile teams. The lead agency for the management of the three tiers of defence are as follows: • The outer tier (deterrence, CTR, PSI etc.)—NSA. • The middle-tier action by ICMR, NICD, BSF, Customs National Terrorism Center (MHA). • The inner tier consequence management—state governments, sample scheme by MHA, sample mobile units by the armed forces (MOD). The Home Ministry has already organised the raising of six disaster management battalions to be fielded within 24 hours to combat natural disasters. This is a good model for doing something similar in the consequence management of B and C disasters. Similarly, a National Disaster Knowledge Network (NANADISK) exists to exchange information on natural disasters. Both this network and the Indian Disaster Resource Network (IDRN) into which a joint project of the Government of India and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) could also be pressed into service in case of a B or C disaster. The state of Maharashtra has an earthquake emergency rehabilitation programme (EERP) funded by the World Bank after the Latur disaster. This is a more grass-roots organisation with 37 V-SAT terminals in 37 districts. Thus, existing infrastructure is being used in defending the people of this country against BT and C use.

PART I THEORY OF

EFFECTIVENESS

CHAPTER

1 The Nuclear Dimension Pran Krishan Pahwa

N

uclear, chemical and biological weapons or Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) pose a serious threat to the entire world today. Of these, nuclear weapons are the most potent in the short run because they have the capability of causing large-scale human and material damage in a very short period of time. Whereas the use of chemical weapons is already banned and a convention for the ban of biological weapons is being negotiated, there is no international treaty or convention which bans the use of nuclear weapons and there is little likelihood of one being agreed upon in the future. Countries not restrained by the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) can legitimately use nuclear weapons against other countries if they so decide. Some non-nuclear states could also acquire nuclear weapons clandestinely and use them to threaten other countries. There is also the disturbing possibility of some terrorist organisations managing to acquire a nuclear weapon and using it to blackmail or inflict physical damage. The chances of this have increased of late because of the relatively easier availability of nuclear related materials and the spurt in smuggling and trafficking in them after the breakup of the former Soviet Union (FSU).1

22 M PRAN KRISHAN PAHWA

India is vulnerable to both these types of threats. Two of its neighbours, China and Pakistan, are nuclear states and India has strained relations with both. Several well-organised terrorist and separatist groups, some of them enjoying foreign state patronage, are operating in the country. It is quite conceivable that any one of them could take the extreme step of acquiring nuclear weapons to achieve their aims. This is admittedly the less likely choice vis-à-vis the other WMD,2 but the possibility is real and the country has to be aware of it.

USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY ANOTHER STATE For India, such a threat can only come from China or Pakistan at present as they have nuclear weapons. To decrease the possibility of conventional war or a low intensity conflict escalating into a nuclear exchange it is necessary that the political hostility that drives the danger of nuclear war be reduced. This may be easier said than done. Meanwhile, recognising that political hostility exists, a separate set of measures needs to be taken and intimated to the other side so that the nuclear arsenals are seen to be totally under control. Following is a list of the measures that can be undertaken: • Proper accounting of all nuclear weapons and materials by national legislation. • Ensuring security and safety of nuclear weapons and materials during transportation. • Incorporating technical safety measures such as authentication codes for launching, Permissive Action Links (PALs), and Environmental Sensing Devices (ESDs) in the weapons. • A reliable command and control system with a clear-cut chain of command and procedural checks like the two-man rule for launching a weapon. • Periodic verification, including background, of all personnel involved with the production, storage, transportation, handling and security of nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan have only recently become overt nuclear weapons states and are still in the process of organising their nuclear forces.

THE NUCLEAR DIMENSION M 23

Very little information is available on whether the aforementioned measures have been put in place by them. If not, then there could be a threat of an unauthorised or accidental nuclear attack to India from Pakistan. China, on the other hand, is an old and established nuclear power. It is, however, very secretive about divulging any information on nuclear matters, but it may be presumed that it would have, by now, taken sufficient preventive measures against any unauthorised or accidental nuclear firing. Apart from safety there is also a need for some nuclear risk reduction and confidence building measures between the three countries. These include: • Keeping each other informed of the broad nature of the safety measures undertaken. • Maintaining a ‘hot-line’ between the political and military leaders of the three states. • Keeping each other informed of the various states of readiness laid down for the nuclear forces of these countries and their implications. • Forewarning the others about nuclear and missile tests. • Providing technology for nuclear safety if requested. There has been very little progress in establishing these confidence building measures (CBMs) till now. China refuses to discuss nuclear CBMs with India on the grounds that the NPT does not recognise India as a nuclear power. With Pakistan some measures were put in place before the countries carried out their nuclear tests in 1998 but the subject has since been linked with the Kashmir issue. Although there was great progress at Lahore, Kargil has brought an end to the Lahore process.

NUCLEAR TERRORISM Nuclear terrorism has two major advantages for terrorists: It can cause maximum casualties in the shortest possible time and it can bring instant and worldwide recognition and notoriety to the group that practises it. Terrorists groups are also of two types—those out to gain recognition for themselves and their cause, and those seeking revenge against the state or a section of the people.3 The former

24 M PRAN KRISHAN PAHWA

announce their identity and in all probability use the nuclear threat only to cause panic or to acquire publicity. This may be counterproductive in the long run because the terrorists and their cause are likely to lose international sympathy and no country or group would like to be seen to be associated with them.4 The latter type of terrorist group works anonymously and seeks satisfaction in causing maximum casualties and damage, thereby wreaking revenge. The threat from terrorist groups could be in one of the following forms: • Use of a nuclear weapon. • Use of a radiological weapon.5 • Attack on a nuclear plant from inside or outside, including use of a truck-bomb.6

AVAILABILITY

OF

NUCLEAR MATERIALS

One of the reasons why nuclear terrorism is the less preferred choice of terrorist groups and has not been used so far is because of the difficulties involved in procuring or fabricating nuclear weapons and obtaining fissile and radioactive materials. This problem is no longer as acute as it was after the breakup of the FSU. The situation regarding the availability of nuclear materials, consequent to the breakup of the FSU, can be summarised as follows: • Economic conditions in the FSU have deteriorated. Pay for workers in key industries and facilities are poor and military morale is low. Organised crime is on the increase and there is a considerable amount of corruption and criminality in the Russian military as well as the bureaucracy.7 • There has been an increase in the number of attempts at smuggling of nuclear materials.8 • The Russians admit to the theft of substantial quantities of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) within their own borders.9 • Former Russian National Security Adviser Alexander Lebed has alleged that 100 portable suitcase bombs of 1 kt each have been unaccounted for since the breakup of the FSU. The Russians however claim that there never were any such weapons.10 • There are approximately 950 sites of all types for HEU and plutonium in the FSU. Physical security measures at most of them are inadequate and the system of accounting is poor.11 There

THE NUCLEAR DIMENSION M 25

has been a case where a Russian naval officer, without any great difficulty, managed to steal 4 kg of HEU from a storage area of the Northern Fleet HQ.12 A large number of agencies are involved in the control of fissile materials13 and the authorities are said to unaware of the total amounts and types of materials held in the country.14 • Russia insists that its nuclear materials are safe and properly accounted for but this is contested by outside observers.15 • Russia currently has fissile material amounting to 200 t of plutonium and 800 to 1200 t of HEU. About 6 t more of plutonium and 30 t of uranium is likely to be added to it in the next 15 years on account of the dismantling of nuclear weapons under various arms agreements.16

USE

OF

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Terrorists could use a nuclear weapon to threaten or cause casualties. Since nuclear weapons would not be readily available to them, the option would be to either procure one or build one. The only way of procuring a nuclear weapon is to either steal one or to illegally buy one from one of the nuclear-armed states. So far these states have managed to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists.17 At least there is no reported case of any missing weapons. There was come concern about the security of Russian tactical nuclear weapons deployed in the conflict areas on its periphery but it has been confirmed that these have all been successfully withdrawn.18 Nevertheless, if a terrorist group were to think of obtaining a nuclear weapon, the obvious source would be Russia. The corruption and state of morale of the Russian military have already been commented upon. Detonating the stolen weapon could be a problem because of the inbuilt safety arrangements, but this could be overcome with the help of a nuclear scientist. It is also claimed that not all Russian nuclear weapons are fitted with the necessary safety devices.19 The other possibility is that a hostile nuclear armed state may make two nuclear weapons available to a terrorist group (the second weapon would be required to deter any possible retaliation after the use of the first one).20 Formerly, conventional wisdom maintained that individuals and terrorist groups were incapable of building a nuclear bomb.21 This is no longer true. Growing globalisation has made nuclear materials and technology more easily available.22 The breakup of the FSU has

26 M PRAN KRISHAN PAHWA

further helped the process. Carson Mark, former head of the nuclear weapons development division at Los Alamos has stated that a team of a dozen specialists comprising nuclear physicists, a mechanical engineer, a chemist, an explosives expert and a mathematician could build a nuclear weapon in one year.23 These again could come from the FSU where many nuclear scientists are now out of a job.24 Some have already reportedly accepted lucrative appointments with countries like Iraq, Iran and Libya. In 1992, 32 scientists were prevented from emigrating to North Korea by Russia.25 Nevertheless, it would appear that the support of a state is necessary to facilitate the clandestine manufacture of a nuclear weapon. A terrorist nuclear bomb would most likely be a simple fission bomb. The most important requirement for it is fissile material, either U-235 or Pu-239. The Natural Resources Defence Council of USA has noted that for a crude bomb, 15–25 kg of fissile material would be required.26 Once again the source for this is likely to be the FSU for the reasons already mentioned. Even reactor grade plutonium could be used but would be less reliable and would require a larger quantity to achieve critical mass.27 Delivering the bomb to the target would not be a very difficult proposition under Indian conditions. We have a long coastline along which smuggling is common. A few years ago an aircraft brazenly violated our airspace and dropped arms inside the country. In the north we have an open border with Nepal along which there is little security. Arms are regularly being smuggled into the country for terrorist and separatist groups from Pakistan, China, Myanmar and Bangladesh. Smuggling in a nuclear bomb that is likely to weigh around 1 t, broken up into parts if necessary, should therefore not be too difficult. It could even be brought in through the normal trade routes as part of a normal consignment with lead shielding around the fissile core to avoid detection. With so much material coming into the country everyday there is every chance that a nuclear bomb could get through.

USE

OF

RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS

Nuclear weapons and fissile materials are difficult to procure. A cheaper and technically more feasible option is the use of radiological weapons made up of non-fissionable radioactive materials like Cesium-137, Strontium-90 or Cobalt-60.28 These can be a potent tool in the hands of terrorists. Radioactive materials can be delivered through a conventional

THE NUCLEAR DIMENSION M 27

explosive device, through the air-handling system or introduced into the water supply.29 Depending on its nature, a radioactive substance could either cause cancer or induce acute radioactive poisoning resulting in heavy casualties. A small cylinder tied to a hand grenade would kill everyone within a 1 km radius.30 The feasibility of this form of terrorism was demonstrated by Chechen rebels in 1995 when they planted 32 kg of Cesium-137 in a Moscow park and informed a news channel about it. The substance was found to be of industrial standards used in X-ray equipment but it could have produced a poisonous fallout had it been mated with a conventional explosive.31

NUCLEAR PLANTS A nuclear plant can be turned into a nuclear weapon by terrorists according to Ted Taylor, a nuclear weapons designer.32 Nuclear plants can be attacked and captured by terrorists using handheld weapons and explosives from the outside along with a little help from the inside.33 While a thermonuclear explosion is not possible at an electricity generating nuclear plant, terrorists could cause a steam explosion that would suddenly eject large amounts of radioactive particles into the atmosphere.34 It is also possible to use a truck-bomb to ram into a nuclear plant and achieve the same results.35

CREDIBILITY

OF

NUCLEAR TERRORIST THREAT

It is not necessary for a terrorist group to establish the credibility of its threat if it is out to cause damage to seek revenge. It would simply act without any warning. This would not be essential for a group merely seeking publicity for itself and its cause either. The very fact that the group has made a nuclear threat will get it international headlines. Credibility is required by that group which seeks to achieve concessions through nuclear blackmail. It is a two-way requirement. The government needs to determine if the threat is really credible and the terrorist group needs to convince the government that it really has a nuclear or radiological weapon. The terrorists could try and prove to the government that they actually have a nuclear weapon by sending it a schematic diagram of the weapon or plant a sample of the fissile material (as in the case of the Chechens). They could even explode a device in a remote area if they have more than one. In case the weapon has been stolen they could

28 M PRAN KRISHAN PAHWA

send the serial number and other identification details of the weapon to the government.36 The government would need very little evidence to be persuaded because it would be under tremendous pressure from the public as was seen in the case of the hijacking of the Indian Airlines plane to Kandahar. It would most probably have to give in. That is what nuclear terrorists would bank on.

CONCLUSION India faces a nuclear threat from both its nuclear armed neighbours, China and Pakistan as it has strained relations with both. There could also be an accidental or unintended use of nuclear weapons by any of the three countries because of lack of nuclear CBMs among them. There also exists the possibility of use of nuclear or radiological weapons by any of the several terrorist groups operating in India though the chances are slim. Whereas fissile materials and nuclear technologies are more accessible to them today than any time in the past, the risks involved and the resources required to produce or steal a nuclear weapon are likely to be beyond reach. There is no evidence that any terrorist organisation has obtained nuclear materials or devices37 but the possibility remains and the country must be prepared to meet it if it ever materialises.

NOTES

1.

2.

3.

See Guy B. Roberts, ‘Nuclear Weapons Grade Fissile Materials: The Most Serious Threat to US National Security Today?’, INSS Occasional Paper 8, Proliferation Series, January 1995, USAF Institute for National Security Studies, US Air Force Academy, Colorado. Dr John M. Deutch, Director, Central Intelligence, in his Speech at the Conference on Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons Proliferation and Terrorism, 23 May 1996. See Dr Gordon C. Oehler’s statement for the record titled ‘The Continuing Threat From Weapons of Mass Destruction’, at http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/ product/go_testimony_032796.html. Dr Oehler is Director, Nonproliferation Center, CIA.

THE NUCLEAR DIMENSION M 29 4. Barry L. Rothberg, ‘Averting Armageddon: Preventing Nuclear Terrorism in the United States’, Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, 8(1), p. 79. 5. Ibid. 6. Testimony of Paul Levanthal on behalf of the Nuclear Control Institute on the Recommendations of the NRC Safeguard Performance Assessment Task Force. You can also access his testimony online at http://www.nci.org/t/t5599.htm. 7. Graham H. Turbiville Jr., ‘Weapons Proliferation and Organised Crime: The Russian Military Force Dimension’, INSS Occasional Paper 10, Proliferation Series, June 1996. See http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss/occasion.htm. 8. Canadian Security Intelligence Service, ‘Smuggling of Special Nuclear Materials’ Commentary No. 57. For further details see ‘Chronology of Nuclear Smuggling Incidents—Appendix A’ at http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/ product/go_appendixa_032796.html. 9. See notes 4 and 7. 10. See abcnews homepage for the nine search engines with information on the Russian suitcase bombs. Also see http://www.dhushara.com/book/explod/ plnt.htm. 11. See note 8. 12. See note 7. 13. See note 8. 14. Ibid. 15. See note 7. 16. See note 4. According to this document 500t of U-235 and 300l of Pu-239 from dismantled weapons and other sources must eventually be disposed as a result of the arms control agreements. 17. For Nuclear weapons description access http://www.milnet.com/milnrt/ nukedesc.htm. 18. See note 7. 19. See note 4. 20. Ibid. 21. See note 8. 22. See note 3. 23. See note 4. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid. 26. Ibid. 27. Ibid. 28. See note 3. 29. See note 4. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. See http://www.tmia.com/sabter.html. 33. See note 6. 34. See note 32. 35. See note 6. 36. See note 4. 37. See note 2.

CHAPTER

2 The Effectiveness of Chemical Agents B.S. Malik

P

rofessor Schrefeld produced a poison gas which the Germans unleashed for the first time on 22 April 1915 at Ypres, with disastrous results. The new weapon caused high casualties but the Germans failed to exploit the situation tactically. The Allies retaliated in kind in September 1915, but they too could not take advantage of the sudden breakthrough and the German lines, though breached, remained intact. This incident showed the usefulness of gas as a surprise weapon but was not strategically decisive. However, gas continued to be used by both sides throughout the remaining part of World War I. Thus started Chemical Warfare (CW), a term which came to include the use of poison gases. CW also encompasses smoke-producing devices and incendiary materials. Though its primary focus started with poison gases, the term was soon commonly used to explain the use of various temporarily disabling or lethal gaseous substances. There has been considerable debate against including non-lethal materials into the gamut of CW, since these are used to control mobs both in civil disturbances and war situations.

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OF

CHEMICAL AGENTS M 31

Different methods were used to deliver gas in an attack. In the gas cloud, or mist, the wind became the favoured carrier of gas. The methods of delivering CW agents through mines, mortar and artillery shells were developed and perfected. The technique of spraying poison gases from low flying aircraft increased the range as also retained the surprise element so crucial to success in CW. It is notable how Rudolph Binding, graphically captured the effect of gas in, A Fatalist at War.1 The effect of the successful gas attack was horrible. I am not pleased with the idea of poisoning men. Of course the entire world will rage about it first and then imitate us. All the dead lie on their backs with clenched fists; the whole field is yellow. Perhaps not many people know that the wife of the inventor of poison gas committed suicide on hearing of the use of her husband’s invention. This general revulsion never left the psyche of mankind and CW at best remained an ungentlemanly means of conducting war. Never popular with the troops or the commanders, technical difficulties were often raised by them when the use of gas was ordered. Chemical agents were never fully integrated into land warfare, because of the undefined technical character of these weapons, and the indirect limits they place on all forms of combat activity.

A BRIEF HISTORY

OF

CHEMICAL WARFARE

The use of CW in World War I had so stunned the world that the Geneva Protocol of 1925 was adopted soon thereafter to bring an end to these horrible weapons. Whatever may have been the reservations of some countries, even the nations who started CW in World War I refrained from using it during World War II. The history of CW in many ways has been very closely linked to the views of the erstwhile USSR and USA, and hence we need to amplify them in some detail. Till much after World War II, USA did not ratify the 1925 Geneva Protocol on CW, but it developed a strong Chemical Corps with considerable R&D and a massive training programme. However, it also started operation ‘Cut Hole And Sink Them (CHASE)’, to get rid of its old stockpile of CW weapons from 1946 to 1974. Thereafter, USA went through some policy convulsions on CW due to public opinion and subsequent political pressure. On the other hand, the Soviet

32 M B.S. MALIK

Union continued with CW research and the results were evident in the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 banning CW was resubmitted to the US Senate in 1969. The Senate ultimately approved both the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the Geneva Protocol of 1925 on 16 December 1974. The US President signed it on 22 January 1975. Due to the prevailing political mood, based on the controversy arising from the use of herbicides and napalm in Vietnam, no money was made available for further developments like binary weapons till 1977. On 8 April 1975, the US government renounced the first use of herbicides as a result of the post-Vietnam reforms. The Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) was formed in 1973 and it took up discussions about removing the ‘hollowness’ of the US army. The results of the Arab-Israeli war became the immediate cause for the reappraisal of the CW capability through studies conducted by TRADOC. In August 1976, bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the US took place in Geneva on the subject of a global chemical weapons ban.2 By this time, however, a revival of CW capability had started in the US and the proposed plans to disband the Chemical Corps were cancelled. The early 1980s saw efforts to standardise military operations in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The funds for chemical and biological weapons were increased and British protection equipment was purchased in big numbers. By 1911 plans had been made for collective protection systems in all armoured vehicles. President Jimmy Carter ordered an executive review of the US army’s CW policy and posture. However, no funds were alloted till 1977 for binary production facilities because of the ongoing US-Soviet efforts to control chemical weapons3 and the domestic political controversy over the use of napalm and herbicides in Vietnam. The outbreak of anthrax in the Soviet Union in April 1979 followed by the invasion of Afghanistan made the US take note of the serious biological and chemical warfare threat. The four years of CW discussions between the Soviet Union and USA (1976–80) had proved futile. By 1981 the use of third-generation chemical agents in Afghanistan and Laos had become public. Some samples were identified as trichothe mycotoxins (T2 toxin) or yellow rain. The Soviets used CW not to support the tactical battle but in a strategic supporting role, bombing villages in terrain denial missions in Afghanistan. According to reports, the use of chemical agents by the Soviet Union declined sharply after 1982 due to public condemnation. It was also observed that the reduced usage of the chemical agents was not so

THE EFFECTIVENESS

OF

CHEMICAL AGENTS M 33

much due to moral reasons, but limited strategic gains and restrictions on their own troop movements in Afghan terrain where movement was already restricted. Other weapons like fuel air explosive (FAE), incendiaries and anti-personnel mines proved much more effective. Accordingly, in an effort to advance the cause of banning CW, the US followed a two-pronged approach. First, to launch an intensive diplomatic effort in a multinational forum to complete a chemical arms elimination treaty, and second, to revitalise the CW capability of the US armed forces.4 A four nation mission (Australia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland), sent by the UN Secretary General, confirmed in March 1984 that Iraq had obtained much of the materials for its CW programme from the international chemical industry. This reinitiated the quadripartite conference between America, Britain, Canada and Australia (ABCA) the purpose of which was to revitalise the old technical community of the Vietnam years. The UK had had problems with a public campaign against chemical weapons and the offensive CW programme had to be abandoned in the 1950s at Porton Down. President Reagan announced that a draft chemical weapons ban treaty would be presented in Geneva but simultaneously called for congressional support for the modernisation of the chemical stockpile. Since the Cold war began, tactical CB weapons have been discussed in the same terms as strategic, megaton nuclear devices—as so-called ‘weapons of mass destruction’ or WMDs. Our national policy of responding to enemy use of CB weapons has shifted over the years from one extreme to the other, from retaliation using similar CB weapons to massive conventional retaliation to (most recently) nuclear retaliation.5 The often quoted examples of CW attacks are as follows: • In 1968 during the Yemeni civil war. First use of CW after the world war. • Extensive use of Agent Orange by US forces in Vietnam against the country’s ecology • In 1975 and 1981, in Laos, 261 attacks by Vietnamese and Laos forces caused 6,504 deaths using T2 toxin, nerve agents and riot control agents using sprays, rockets and bombs from AN-2 and captured American L-19 and T-28/41 aircraft. • In 1979 and 1981, in Kampuchea, 124 attacks and 981 deaths through the T2 toxin, CW agents and riot control agents.

34 M B.S. MALIK

• In 1979 and 1981, in Afghanistan, 47 attacks by the Soviets caused 3,042 deaths using nerve agents, T2 toxin and riot control agents using aircraft and helicopters firing rockets, sprays and bombs. • In 1982, a several thousand of their 7,000 to 10,000 casualties of Iranians were caused by the mustard gas. Iraq used Mi-8 helicopter sprayers and artillery shells. • In 1984, in the Hawizeh marshes near Basra, mustard gas caused 12,000 to 20,000 casualties of Iranians. • In 1988, mustard and nerve gas used on four occasions around Basra against a civilian population at Halabjah. Reports indicate use of phosgene and hydrogen cyanide by Iranians and blood agent by the Iraqi forces on 17 April at Al-Faw Peninsula. Iraq used mustard gas and nerve agents against Kurds in June–July. From over a million military and civil casualties, 45,000 were caused by CW.

DEVELOPMENT

OF

CW AGENTS

Choking agents such as chlorine and phosgene gases were the first to be used in World War I. Subsequently, blood agents such as hydrogen cyanide gas (so called for they choke the transfer of oxygen from the blood to the vital organs) were used. Both choking and blood agents are generally non-persistent, lasting a short while (minutes to hours). A simple mask can protect one against these. Not very effective in mortar bombs and artillery shells, the usual form of dispersion of these agents was from cylinders. These were needed in large quantities for effect and were put to better use in offensive operations. During World War I, persistent agents like mustard gases and lewisite were used, and they could linger on the ground for days and weeks. These chemical agents were not lethal in small quantities and affected the moist areas of the body like the eyes, throat, underarms and groin. Contact with blister agents resulted in large blisters after a few hours. For protection, special clothing was required, in addition to the mask. These liquids were dispersed as an aerosol mist in the air using land mines, artillery shells, mortars and aircraft spray tanks. As World War II came to a close, nerve agents were developed as a pesticide. The first G-nerve agent was non-persistent. The later V-type agents developed after the war were made more persistent. The present nerve agents

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OF

CHEMICAL AGENTS M 35

are organophosphate compounds, and are odourless and colourless liquids. They cause symptomatic reactions on evoporation, leading to extreme muscle spasms and death. There has been no further development in CW except that nerve agents are now produced in binary form consisting of two components which mix on launch. The detailed characteristics of all the CW agents are explained in the succeeding paragraphs. Table 2.1 shows the physiological classification of different nerve agents. Table 2.1 Physiological Classification of Nerve Agents Types of Agents

Composition

Nerve agents Vasicants Blood agents Irritants Lung damaging agents Psychochemicals Plant damaging agents

Sarin, Soman, Tabun, VX SM, NM, Lewisites HCN, CNCI CN, CS, CR Phosgene BZ 2, 4D, 2, 4, 5-T

Following is the mechanism of the nerve agent acetycholine. It is the chemical transmitter shown on the left of the formula and so called because it transmits impulses from the nerve endings to the muscles.

Acetylcholine

AchE

Choline and Acetic Acid

H2O However, in the presence of another nerve agent AchE is inhibited and so the enzyme action is impaired. AchE or acetycholine estrate, shown on top of the arrow is an enzyme which is present at the neuromuscular junction. As indicated, in the presence of the nerve agent, acetycholine estrate’s enzyme action of breaking into choline and acetic acid is impaired. This leads to accumulation of acetycholine estrate causing neuromuscular toxicity resulting in excessive twitching, constriction of pupils, respiratory depression and muscular paralysis. Lesser production of AchE is called myasthenia.

36 M B.S. MALIK

DETAILED CHARACTERISTICS

OF

CW AGENTS6

BLISTER GASES Blister gases such as mustard gas produce a reddening of the eyes, skin and mucous membranes, followed by blisters. The bronchial tubes are irritated and pneumonia usually develops. Mustard gas often remains on the ground for several days. Mustard gas, which is lethal only in heavy concentrations, is used to incapacitate troops.

CHOKING GASES Choking gases such as chlorine, phosgene and diphosgene, attack the respiratory tract. Chlorine produces quick irritation and choking. The immediate effect of phosgene and diphosgene is less noticeable, but the lungs slowly fill with fluids and the victim suffocates within a few days.

NERVE GASES Nerve gases such as Tabun (or GA), Sarin (or GB) and Soman (or GD) are colourless, odourless and tasteless. These gases destroy the normal functioning of the nerves and muscles. They enter the body through the lungs, skin or mucous membranes killing the victim within a few minutes of the poisons entering the blood.

PSYCHO-CHEMICAL GASES Psycho-chemical gases such as BZ are incapacitating agents that attack the brain, inducing hallucination and giddiness in the victims. They are not lethal. BZ was developed by the United States after World War II. Its chemical composition is not very well known.

VOMITING GASES Gases such as DM (diphenylaminochloroarsine) rarely kill, but cause severe sneezing, coughing, headache, nausea and vomiting. DM, also

THE EFFECTIVENESS

OF

CHEMICAL AGENTS M 37

called adamsite, was developed during World War I. Vomiting gases are mainly used in riot control.

TEAR GASES Gases such as CN (chloroacetophenone) and CS (ochlorobenzalmalononitrile) produce severe eye irritation, resulting in a blinding flow of tears. Tear gases are used principally by police and troops for mob control. CN was first widely used during World War I and was developed by the British in the 1950s. The United States used CN mixed with the vomiting gas DM in the Vietnamese war.

VX AGENT The VX agent is a thick liquid with a consistency similar to that of motor oil, but colourless and odourless. The suspended particles are not gas but suspended drops of water, like an aerosol that did not evaporate quickly. This agent was designed to contaminate ground and materiel for days.

BINARY AGENTS The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) provisions made some nations very worried and they, therefore, went in for binary ammunitions. Specially-developed nerve agents by the Russians fall into this category. These agents have two components and it is only after mixing on launch that the nerve gas is formed with all its lethal affects. Albert J. Mauroni has noted in his book, America’s Struggle with Chemical–Biological Warfare, that the chemical weapons were the first researched and produced unconventional weapons because of the comparative safety in their development and production. They used modified technology of conventional artillery, aircraft and other weapons for deployment. The fact that they do not affect buildings or equipment and cause modest casualties in a smaller tactical area of immediate concern makes them attractive for countries with lesser technological means. Historically, Mauroni further noted that: Putting all three weapon systems (NBC), into one common view is much like comparing an M1 rifle, a 203 mm mortar, and an

38 M B.S. MALIK

8-inch howitzer and deciding that a military force should use the same defence against all three because they all use ballistics as a principle of operation. While use of tactical nuclear weapons could be construed as mass destruction, chemical and most biological weapons do not make the same impact, despite fears to the contrary. The real evolution of the term ‘weapons of mass destruction (WMD)’ is more politically motivated than it is logical or reasonable, and is confusing since most people are talking about nuclear weapons when they speak about WMDs in the general sense.7 However, this study group disagrees with this view which possibly has been prompted by the fact that chemical and biological weapons do not neatly fit, in the classical sense, on the scale of lethality in the growth of weapons (as shown in Figure 2.1). In the Iraq-Iran war, out of about 1,000,000 military and civil casualties, 45,000 were indeed caused by the chemical agents. However, the number of casualties is a slippery factor in determining a weapon as being capable of mass death/destruction. Where do we draw the line?

Age of missile Nuclear Weapons Air Power WW II weapons Rifled artillery Age of Gunpowder

K I L L I N 100000000 G 10000000 1000000 100000 10000

12 Pdr Gun Age of Muscle Sword BC

1000

Crossbow Stand of weapons 1000

1300

AD 1600 PERIOD

100 Close in 50 weapons 20 1900

C A P A C I T Y P E R H O U R

Figure 2.1 The Growth of Lethality Source: T.N. Dupuy, Numbers, Predictions and War (London: Mcdonald & Jane’s, 1979).

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OF

CHEMICAL AGENTS M 39

The quest to acquire CW capability continues. In 1980, the US government reported 13 countries as possessing a chemical arms programme. The CW Review Commission included in its report 16 countries in 1985 (including USA and USSR) as known or probable owners of chemical weapons. The count went up to 25 in 1991, which prompted the British, French and Germans to modernise their respective chemical defensive capabilities.

WEAPONISATION

AND THE

MILITARY VIEW

Chemical weapons act very quickly but can be detected easily and affect only a limited area. Conversely, biological weapons have an inbuilt delay system due to the use of living organisms, their effect takes a long time to manifest itself. In the same context, nuclear weapons affect instantaneously, and the use of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) may lead to strategic nuclear exchange. Consequently, the pattern seen over the years suggests that ‘nations invest in chemical weapons first, biological weapons second, and nuclear weapons third. This minimises risk and maximises investment with limited resources, while increasing technological capabilities at each stage’.8 Though appearing simple, CW is a very confused area due to the fine distinction between the weaponisation and the employment of ammunition loaded with nerve gas, napalm or CS gas. This has been aggravated by sensationalistic journalists, authors and others. Napalm and CS gas are conventional munitions related to chemical munitions in design only.9 Soldiers find CW a very strange weapon which cannot be seen and thus difficult to fight and protect against. One is never sure of the efficacy of protective gear like clothing and masks. It is not possible to say with certainty when the area is clear of the harmful effect of the CW agents. During pendency of this confirmation, even the simplest tasks become difficult to perform. All military action, including the use of weapons and other equipment, becomes difficult for the soldiers in the field in a CW situation. The result of the Combined Arms in a Nuclear/Chemical Environment (CANE) exercises conducted by the US army, from 1983 to 1992, gives us some idea of the effect of fighting in protective clothing, due to physical degradation and psychological isolation.

40 M B.S. MALIK

The results are as follows: • A 52 per cent drop in direct fire and 360 per cent rise in friendly fire. • A 46 per cent drop in battle intensity and 25 per cent less enemy engagement. • A 22 per cent drop in threat forces killed in offensive attacks, a 25 per cent drop in defensive actions by night and a 11.5 per cent rise in day actions. • A 47 per cent rise in radio traffic took 53 per cent longer to be understood. • A 209 per cent rise in calls for indirect fire support in the offensive and an 11 per cent drop in defence. • A 340 per cent rise in time taken to replace the chain of command. The US army’s operational concept for individual and collective measures for chemical and biological and radiological (CBR) defence released on 30 July 1982 stressed a three-tiered approach of contamination avoidance, protection and decontamination. The new trend now emphasised is to continue the mission even if contaminated with NBC agents.

EQUIPMENT DEVELOPMENT Between 1945 and 1967, protective clothing was dependent on the likely CW agent. Impermeable suits were used by the specialists involved in the decontamination tasks, while others used impregnated permeable protection clothing. The debate continued on ‘zero’ risk to the soldiers, which meant increased protection but also increased heat stress. Since most biological agents and radiological particles could not penetrate the skin physically like chemical agents could, the stress was on lighter clothing which could be discarded. The combined requirement of protection against atomic, biological and chemical (ABC) threats changed the ‘gas mask’ into a ‘protective mask’. This was achieved by including a particle filter that stopped 2–5 micron particles and a carbon filter that absorbed vapours. The technical problem of detection is time critical. The longer the time the better the analysis and fewer the false alarms. If there were

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OF

CHEMICAL AGENTS M 41

no time to put on the protection gear there would be casualties. While balancing the requirements of early warning, detection, reconnaissance, identification and monitoring post-attack presence of solid, liquid and vapour chemical and biological warfare agents, there is always a conflict between the precision required by the specialists and the cheap and easy solution required by others. The safety standards for protective clothing in the US is based on the worst case scenario of 10 g of nerve agent per m2 of ground representing a fairly typical exposure near ground zero of the chemical artillery barrage. The UK accepts a standard of 2 to 3 g of nerve agent per m2 of ground in selecting their protective clothing. Radiological particles and biological organisms could be washed off with soap and water eliminating any threat to the soldiers with a low technology approach. Non-persistent agents do not remain long enough to require decontamination. However, chemical agents such as mustard, thickened soman and VX require thorough decontamination. Decontamination equipment in the US is based on a system of x to 5x rating which has been worked out based on the accepted decontamination level. The symbol x indicates that the item is partially decontaminated and 3x indicates that the item is 99.9 per cent clean. However, for the equipment to be completely clean and released to the general public the required rating is 5x. This requires exposing the equipment to 538°C (1000°F) heat for 15 minutes. It basically means incinerating the material. The requirement of troops to take off their masks for performing certain tasks, like manning radar, and monitoring signal communications and logistical areas like field hospitals and the like gave rise to the collective protection requirement. This is not a very high technology area since it is based on shelter and provision of clean air. The focus remained on providing integrated vehicular protection. The power demand and the weight of the systems and the large filters remain the constraining factors.

ESSENTIAL CW ISSUES There are two schools of thought: One believes in doing away with all CW weapons and even refraining from the defensive programmes lest

42 M B.S. MALIK

the adversary is given an excuse to develop a stronger CW capability to overcome the proposed defensive measures. The second believes in having a big enough ‘stick’ of credible offensive and defensive capability so that retaliation in kind is possible and it can thus force the adversary to return to conventional warfare after exchanging a few CW weapons if inevitable. The main issue here is not merely having a capability, but the heavy and unrealistic costs that would accompany the near total, if not total protection, against CW. It would follow from this that the costs of operating as normally as possible on a CW battlefield would require a whole family of CW capable equipment and weapons, designed beyond their actual functional needs to serve their basic functions, just to cater for the eventuality of the chemical weapons being used. The degradation in capability and the acceptance of dual costs would be a very serious proposition even for the very rich nations. Consequently, in our context, while considering the mountain scenario, the Iraq-Iran war experience did not enthuse us very much. In the desert, the high temperatures create problems for effective CW and the mechanised columns have both greater protection and mobility against CW. However, the use of CW in the plains is a possibility. Though the area is heavily populated on both sides of our western borders and militarily it will require favourable winds and very precise targeting, the army would be better prepared than the civilians through defensive measures like protective clothing. The air force would have a problem because the high performance aircraft cannot be flown with protective gear and also the tolerence level of chemical exposure for fliers is very low. (They need very sensitive detectors to detect very low levels of nerve agents, levels which can cause myosis, blurred and dim vision because of pin-pointed pupils.) The navy is well protected against CW. Military personnel cannot merely survive a contaminated battlefield; they must be able to sustain combat operations as well. Mauroni argues that it all boils down to choice: How much of a shield (defensive capability) and how much of a sword (CB ammunitions) is required to protect the troops. What is the balance required to survive and sustain the forces on a modern battlefield? In the ultimate analysis the military commanders must appreciate that CW agents can be defined, analysed and cleaned up. They are just chemical compounds like any other chemical (acids, fertilisers, pesticides) and can be studied and handled safely.

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WMD TERRORISM (CW) The observation of Brian Jenkins takes the wind out of the oft-repeated argument of WMD terrorism, because according to him ‘Terrorists want a lot of people watching but not a lot of people killed’. If this were the case then the desperation of the terrorists would have to be supported by a state. The problem then would be of providing high technical training to terrorist groups. They would have to be told all about the inbuilt technical safeguards, self-destruct mechanisms and various other controls and authorisation protocols that accompany WMD. First, this would require a high level of scientific expertise; the scientists of the concerned state would have to virtually accompany such groups. Next comes the question of the vulnerabilities of that state itself. What if the terrorist group turns against its mentors? How safe is it to trust the WMD to such non-state actors? And even then, the conditions of use, chances of accident, transit, custody and issues of storage will pose serious problems. There is only one example of Aum Shinrikyo quoted by Joseph F. Pilat, where a well-funded technologically capable group was unable to produce high purity sarin and was not, in Falkenrath’s words, ‘proficient in its delivery’.… However, most terrorists have not yet demonstrated that they can fully exploit the (technological) vulnerabilities, nor that they desire and are able to wield WMD instruments effectively. Vulnerabilities to WMD,10 terrorism must be understood in this light and addressed on the basis of sober assessment and a prioritisation of risks. After the Tokyo attack, some people see weaknesses everywhere. Of course, a wide spectrum of vulnerabilities exist in the West and in the World, not only from WMD threats but also environmental degradation, disruption of critical infrastructure and the prospect of an asteroid striking the earth. But not all of these vulnerabilities can be addressed effectively—or, in some cases at all.11 Joseph Pilat basically questions the premises of Richard Falkernath’s assumptions and lack of technical solutions. If the threat assessments are vague, lack focus and the technological abilities quoted in

44 M B.S. MALIK

an abstract manner—more in terms of possibilities—then the responses based on available capabilities can be made to look inadequate. Fear is a difficult emotion to control and it can lead to an irrational response, quite disproportionate to the threat. In the debate over WMD terrorism, all is not simple for the terrorists. Apart from the technical difficulties, they have to contend with information leaks as also their own conscience. A defector from the Ku Klux Klan, in April 1997, informed the FBI about the plan to blow up a natural gas refinery. Similarly, a member of the dreaded Aum Shinrikyo knowingly did not arm a biological weapon due to his conscience at the last minute. Any terrorist plan contemplating the use of chemical weapons will require the highest cohesion, discipline, motivation and the highest technical expertise, secure surveillance and communication means with unlimited secure finances. Above all foolproof security (intelligence and counter-intelligence) with a system of checks and balances which can ensure that former members, approvers and deserters do not spill the beans. It will be apparent from this that even governments find it difficult to meet all these conditions. Given here are some figures to assess the effectiveness of CW agents: • About 1 t of sarin gas would be required to cause 10,000 fatalities (as reported by Richards K. Betts12). Another estimate by the US Congress Office of Technology Assessment, reported by John Mueller and Karl Mueller,13 concluded that 1 t of sarin perfectly delivered in ideal conditions may cause between 3,000 to 8,000 deaths in a heavily populated area. If the sun was out or there was moderate wind, the casualties would have been reduced to 300–800 only. • About 1 t of nerve gas or 5 t of mustard gas would be required in 1 km2 of open area to cause heavy casualties. Even for the nerve gas this would require concentrated delivery into a rather small area of about 300 heavy artillery shells or 7x 500-pounds bombs, according to Matthew Meselson from Harvard University (as reported by John Mueller and Karl Mueller).14 • The bomb used in the World Trade Center attack in 1993 was laced with cyanide, which burnt up in the explosion due to lack of expertise, as per reports from Richard K. Betts15 though not independently confirmed. • Aum Shinrikyo released sarin into a Japanese subway in 1995; the attack caused 5,000 casualties but only 12 deaths. (As reported by John Mueller and Karl Mueller.)16

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• Iran reported that in March 1987, of the 27,000 gased by the Iraqis only 262 died. (As reported by John Mueller and Karl Mueller.)17 • On the other hand, infant mortality rose from the pre-Gulf War rate of 3.7 per cent to 12 per cent in 1998; an increase of 40,000 deaths of children and 50,000 of older Iraqis. (As reported by John Mueller and Karl Mueller.)18 WMD terrorism is a threat which needs to be assessed realistically, and has to be met intellectually, politically and militarily. Jessica Stern, commenting on the wrongful targeting of the Al Shifa plant in Sudan on 20 August 1998 based on incomplete information, says Whether or not the plant was producing VX for Bin Laden as the US government alleged, the desire to retaliate swiftly seems to have led policy-makers to lower their standards of evidence. The US government’s inability (or refusal) to persuade the international community that it targeted the right facility in Sudan on 20 August 1998, suggests that policy-makers are not fully prepared for the threat of WMD19 terrorism—intellectually, militarily or politically. The risk of an apocalypse is essentially nil, but the threat of terrorism with chemicals is real and growing. It demands better intelligence, careful analysis and sober, steady and careful response; not hasty judgement. Accordingly, we should selectively invest in CW reconnaissance Electronic Warfare (EW), detection and protection. ‘Knowledge is “Power” in “Gas Defence”. It saves casualties, increases the confidence of men in their own capability to protect them selves and reduce fear.’20

NOTES

1. See Binding, Rudolph, A Fatalist at War, translated by F.D. Morrow (Allen and Unwin,1929). 2. See Charles H. Bay, ‘The Other Gas Crisis–Chemical Weapons’, Parameters— Journal of the US Army War College, September 1979, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 70–72.

46 M B.S. MALIK 3. See Albert J. Mauroni America’s Struggle with Chemical–Biological Warfare (West Port: Praeger Publisher, 2000), p. 11. 4. Office of the Program Manager for the Binary Munitions, Binary Chemical Munitions Fact Sheet. Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, September 1989. p. 1. As quoted by Mauroni, op. cit. (Note 3), Chapter 6, p. 76. 5. See note 3. 6. See the New Standard Encyclopedia—1987, (Chicago, Illinois: Standard Educational Corporation). Printed in the States, Volume 11, pp. 434–35. 7. See note 3. 8. Same as note 3, p. 74. 9. See note 3. 10. NBC changed to WMD here and in next paragraph by the author to make following the text easy in this context. 11. See Joseph F. Pilat, ‘Prospects for NBC Terrorism After Tokyo’, in Brad Roberts (Ed.), Terrorism with Chemical and Biological Weapons: Calibrating Risks and Responses (Alexandria, VA: Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1997), pp. 4–15. 12. Richard K. Betts, ‘The New Threat of Mass Destruction’, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 1998, Vol. 77, No. 1. Betts is Director, National Security Studies, Council of Foreign Relations, and Professor of Political Science and Director at the Institute for War and Peace Studies, Columbia University. 13. John Mueller and Karl Mueller, ‘Sanctions of Mass Destruction’, Foreign Affairs, May/June 1999, Vol. 78, No. 3. John Mueller is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Rochester. Karl Mueller is Assistant Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the school of Advanced Airpower studies at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. 14. Ibid. 15. See note 12. 16. See note 13. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. 19. See note 10. 20. Brigadier General Alden Waitt, Gas Warfare (1943), quoted in Mauroni, op. cit. (note 3), p. 255.

CHAPTER

3 The Effectiveness of Biological Agents Raja Menon

T

he discovery that micro-organisms create diseases in humans and animals led, almost instantaneously, to the development of biological weapons that were first used in World War I against the draft animals of the other side. This was followed by the Japanese programme against Chinese civilians in the 1930s. Today’s biological warfare agents are classified into bacteria, viruses, toxins and bioregulators. Toxins may also be found under both biological warfare (BW) and chemical warfare (CW) agents. The evolution of biotechnology, spurred by the Genome Project could result in dramatically more dangerous BW agents.1 During the Cold War the two superpower rivals developed massive stocks of BW agents such as anthrax and botulinum toxins (BTX). These two are still the favoured agents of new BW powers owing to the relatively low cost of their manufacture. The Soviet Union apparently concentrated on using new genetic engineering techniques to modify the antibiotic resistance to the plague2 while the US concentrated more on BTX and staphylococcal enterotoxin B (SEB). So, to worry that the new biotechnological capabilities

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could be used in combination with the Genome Project to target specific ethnic groups while leaving the other ethnic groups unaffected would not be far-fetched. In reality, chemical and bio-weapons form a combined spectrum which ranges from classical gases such as mustard gas and nerve gas to bacteria, viruses and rickettsia. In between lie the toxins and bioregulators which are chemicals of biological origin, including BTX. To understand the subsequent work on BW, it would be useful to adopt the French classification of BW agents into the following:3 • Living agents capable of self-reproduction like bacteria and fungus. • Living agents capable of reproduction only in a host cell like viruses, for example, small pox. • Non-living agents incapable of reproduction but created by living organisms, i.e., peptides and toxins, example, Ricin. • Non-living agents obtained by chemical synthesis. This classification of biological agents has been accepted worldwide with United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), along with World Health Organization (WHO), publishing a comprehensive list. It is necessary to start with a basic list so that when we eventually reach the international regimes and the possibility of verification we know what we are dealing with.4 Refer to Appendix 3.1A. Biological agents like bacteria and virus have not found as much favour as toxins because they need time to multiply in the victim even after delivery in order to incapacitate him. It is for this reason that toxins are preferred. The standard method of delivery being to release the agent close enough to the intended victim so that the agent is inhaled directly into the lungs. For this reason, the early US bio-warfare agents were composed entirely of BTX and SEB. The former causes almost certain fatality while the latter incapacitates the victim for days. Botulinum is caused by bacteria whose spores exist in the environment and is produced in contaminated food. The toxin produced by this bacteria affects the central nervous system. However, for it to be fatal, the naturally occurring toxin would have to be processed through many stages. The toxic ricin, produced from the castor oil plant has been used for criminal purposes over centuries and was almost certainly the toxin used to kill the Bulgarian dissident, Georgi Markov, in London, when he was stabbed in the thigh with the tip of an umbrella coated with ricin.

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The 1995 UNSCOM report on Iraq’s BT weapon programme spoke of attempts to manufacture anthrax, risin, bolutinum toxins, afla toxins and myco toxins. The use of afla toxin created much confusion originally, as it could cause liver cancer in humans, but only over a period of years. This lead investigators to believe that it may have developed as a long-term weapon against a specific ethnic group.5 It is, however, against plants that the longest levels of BW have so far been used. The type of agent used is a bioregulator, which is a chemical produced by the living organism as part of the regulatory process of its natural life. When the chemical is introduced in unnatural quantities it leads to the death or mutation of the plant. Although called herbicides, they are not the kind of anti-weed chemicals that can be found in garden shops, but include agents that may cause the plant to die from dehydration or by defoliation. These two processes are normal to all herbicides but added in BW agents are regulators (that cause the plant to die), soil stimulants and catalysts that help the agent stick to the foliage.6 The most widely used BW agent, Agent Orange, is a mixture of dichlorophenoxyacetic acid and trichlorophenoxyacteic acid whose action on plants was to shrivel the leaves or kill the roots. Herbicides were first considered as weapons in World War II when scientists suggested that they could be used to kill foodgrain crops; however, the war concluded before they could be deployed. The civilian equivalent, D, commercially called ‘Weedone’ was a roaring commercial success. It was initially used in Malaya by the British during the anti-insurgency campaign for defoliating the jungle, but subsequently more for destroying crops in areas that were under communist control. The density of use in Vietnam was calculated at about 33 kg per ha which was about 50 times the concentration permitted for domestic use. While there were side effects on humans, the effect on the ecosystem was catastrophic. The agent destroyed all living organisms and the areas attacked with Agent Orange or Agent Blue could not be repopulated for upto 10 years. The ecology remained unbalanced for upto 30 years or more. However, the extreme effectiveness of the new variants of weedkillers generated huge profits in the agriculture markets, where it was claimed that farm outputs would be doubled or trebled by selective use of weedkilling chemicals. The world is witnessing great scientific breakthroughs in the Human Genome Project, of which, along with Stage II, the physical

50 M RAJA MENON

mapping has been completed. Among the goals to be achieved by 2005 are the following: • Understand the human sequence variation. • Complete Gene identification through full-length DNA. • Complete the DNA sequences of certain model organisms leading to that of a mouse. At the time of signing the first Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), it was known that B agents could create millions of casualties. What has become clear in the last few years is that a malign use of the Genome Project could create a ‘super bug’ resistant to known medicines. As is usual with developments in technology, the problem arises from dual-use capabilities. For instance, it is now known that certain toxins were useful in medical treatment, particularly the well-known BW agent botulinum, which today is licensed for production to cure certain diseases. Recently, its use in removing the effects of ageing upon the skin of the elderly has brought it fame as a cosmetic agent. As a result, toxins are being produced in kilogram-sized quantities. Specifically, it is feared that genetic to engineering along with beneficial advances could also be used produce the following: • • • •

A toxin or malign regulator by modifying a benign molecule. Micro-organisms resistant to vaccines including antibiotics. Micro-organisms with enhanced aerosol stability. Immunologically altered micro-organisms able to evade current detection methods.

These fears are well founded because the ability to do at least two of the four alterations is required by medical science, as we shall see later. For instance, altering a bioregulator may be an activity needed to enhance an existing cure, but the possibility of misuse is just as great. Ever since inhalers became popular with asthma patients the advantage of depositing minute quantities of the curing drug to the affected organ has been recognised. So, the stability of drugs and micro-organisms in an aerosol are actually part of beneficial medical activity that could simultaneously be misused. The military use of toxins requires that they be dispersed as an aerosol (as sub-cutaneous, i.e., through the skin, introduction has been ruled out). This requires that the drug be stored as an aerosol

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and spread over a geographical area so as to give each victim the requisite concentration into his lungs. Assuming a division of troops or tanks could be spread over an area of 100 km2, it has been calculated that to achieve the required concentration of killing, 50 per cent of those exposed would require about 80 t of chemical toxins that are stable in aerosols. The danger of course is that bacterial toxins are required in concentrations of one hundredth of chemical toxins. At present, producing such large quantities of bacterial toxins from nature is still a problem. However, genetic research may make it possible to produce large quantities at cheaper rates in times to come. Hence the concern that advanced medical research could be a dual-use capability. Currently, two chemical toxins are on the CWC list—ricin and saxitoxin,7 both chemically derived although 10 toxins are on the Australia Group Export Control List (see Appendix 3.2B). The newer toxins are more or less all aimed at attacking the body’s immune system, which today remains the best defence against bacterial BW. In the early 1990s, the method of overcoming the immune system8 was noticed in the staphylococcal toxins which were already being used in BW, but whose actions had not been fully understood. The ingenuity and evil in man as seen in BW technology is truly represented in the illegal manufacture of what are called bioregulators. These are natural substances provided by each human body to regulate its natural functions such as vasodilation, muscle contraction, blood pressure, temperature, heart rate, and immune responses. A broad relationship between the way in which peptides act on body functions is given in Table 3.1.9 Table 3.1 Regulation of Body Functions Function Pain

Blood Pressure

Temperature Arousal Level and Motor Activity

Peptides The substances P and Livadikinin transmit pain; Opiodi and Cholecystokin (CCK) inherit pain. The Corticotrophic Relaxing Hormone (CRH) releases the hormone opiodi, and neuropeptide Y decreases blood pressure. Somatostatin elevates temperature, CCK lowers body temperature. CRH and Substance P increases arousal; CCK reduces it.

52 M RAJA MENON

A list of new toxins and bioregulators along with a list of bioregulators that have been synthesised artificially are given in Appendix 3.2B. The isolation of these peptides (as they are called) and their synthesisers has made it possible to introduce these substances in an aerosol form to produce unwanted effects on the body that cannot be ascribed to an outside attack, if and when diagnosed. Another side issue is the combination of the benefits of the Genome research with computer-aided molecular design and computer-aided drug design. This has been possible by understanding how the body’s organisms have the ability to sense the important chemicals in their environment. The signalling of messages across cells is done by a signalling chemical called ligand which has an effect on the victim cell by acting through a cell receptor. For the ligand to reset effectively with a cell receptor, it must remain in contact with the receptor for some time. This is effected by a chain of amino acids; there are 20 of these in our body. The nature of the amino acid decides the change in the structure of the receptor and hence that of the cell. Medical cures are effected in the body by the actual process of interfacing with the cell in a benign way. It would be just as easy to interfere with cells in a malign way and hence the worry in medical circles of the vast potential for misuse of the short cuts now offered by Genome research. Delivery of BW agents needs careful study. The lethality of a BW agent is expressed in the formula LD50 or the dosage at which 50 per cent of those exposed to the toxin would die. A comparative table of toxins in also contained in the Australia List given in Appendix 3.2B. In 1992, a paper produced to study the verification measures for the BTW Convention did a comparative analysis of the amount of toxin required to create scenario lethalities. The targets studied were a military base (10 km2) a city (1,000 km2) and a battlefield 3,000 km2.10 Assumption of LD50

Mly Base

City

Bttlfd

10 ng 100 ng

1g 10 g

1 kg 10 kg

3 kg 30 kg

At the time, the lethality figures for chemical agents were better understood. In which case, for comparison, it was found that botulinum toxin, if distributed over the same area, say 60 km2 would cause as many deaths as 15 t of nerve gas. But this would depend a lot on the efficiency of distribution because the calculation is based

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purely on lethality and concentration. Over the years we have developed a clear understanding of the way aerosols behave in human lungs and this research has further developed the method of delivering aerosol medicines for curing cystic fibrosis, for instance. Medical advancement requires that many peptides and proteins be delivered by aerosols and action taken to prevent them from being broken up easily by the enzymes in the body. One method that has been developed is to encapsulate the drug particle in a degradable polymer coating. The possibilities for misuse are obvious. Similarly, the possibility of attacking the central nervous system by delivering drugs directly to the brain is part of ordinary medical research which requires that the blood-brain barrier be breached. Agents that can attack the brain have already been developed—Agent BZ. That biotechnology would be used for warlike purposes was clear once the research on the AIDS virus, which targets the human immune system, began. At the time, considerable beneficial work was being done on suppressing the functioning of the immune system which is necessary to effect successful organ transplants. The possibility of misusing advanced medical research increases in direct proportion to the level of advance, but it is unclear whether the worst development could be used in the near future for causing immense casualties. The use of chemical agents for criminal activities is evident even for political assassinations without detection. Just as worrying is the enormous possibility of agricultural warfare which again could be a by-product of the measures undertaken to destroy large areas of poppy cultivation. Similarly, as the world moves towards ethnic strife, could the misuse of BW be seen as a weapon for ethnic cleansing?

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APPENDIX 3.1A Potential Agents for Biological Weapons Disease

Mortality

Viral Chikungunya fever Dengue fever Eastern equine encephalitis Tick-borne encephalitis Venezuelan equine encephalitis (VEE) Influenza Yellow fever Smallpox

Very low Very low High (>60%) Variable (upto 30%) Low Usually low High (upto 40%) Variable (but usually upto 30%)

Rickettsial Q-fever Psittacosis Rocky Mountain spotted fever Epidemic typhus

Low Moderately high Usually high (upto 80%) Variable (but usually upto 30%)

Bacterial Anthrax (pulmonary) Brucellosis Cholera Glanders Melioidosis Plague (pneumonic) Tularemia Typhoid fever Dysentery

Almost invariably fatal Low Usually high (upto 80%) Almost invariably fatal Almost 100% fatal Almost 100% fatal Usually low (can be upto 60%) Moderately high Low to moderately high

Fungal Coccidioidomycosis

Low

APPENDIX 3.2B Australia Group Export Control List: A Summary 1. New entries in the Export of Goods (control) Order, 1992, covering biological materials as follows: IC 351 Human pathogens, Zoonosis and toxins IC 352 Animal pathogens IC 353 Genetically-modified micro-organisms

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2. New entry in the EG© O 1992 covering biological equipment as follows: 2B 352 equipment capable of use in biological manufacturing 3. Warning guidelines IC 351 Human pathogens, zoonosis and toxins a. Viruses, whether natural enhanced or modified, either in the form of isolated live cultures or as material including living material which has been deliberately inoculated or contaminated with such cultures, as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

Chikungunya virus Congo-Crimean haemorrhagic fever virus Dengue fever virus Eastern equine encephalitis virus Ebola virus Hantan virus Junin virus Lassa fever virus Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus Machupo virus Marburg virus Monkey pox virus Rift Valley fever virus Russian Spring-Summer encephalitis virus Variola virus Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus Western equine encephalitis virus White pox Yellow fever virus Japanese encephalitis virus

b. Rickettsia, whether natural, enhanced or modified, either in the form of isolated live cultures or as material including living material which has been deliberately inoculated or contaminated with such cultures, as follows: 1. Coxiella burnetii 2. Rickettsia Quintana

3. Rickettsia prowasecki 4. Rickettsia rickettsii

c. Bacteria, whether natural, enhanced or modified, either in the form of isolated live cultures or as material including living material which has been deliberately inoculated or contaminated with such cultures, as follows: 1. Bacillus anthracis 2. Brucella abortus 3. Brucella melitensis

8. Pseudomonas mallei 9. Pseudomonas pseudomallei 10. Salmonella typhi

56 M RAJA MENON 4. 5. 6. 7.

Brucella suis Chlamydia psittaci Clostridium botulinum Francisella tularensis

11. Shigella dysenteriae 12. Vibrio cholera 13. Pasteurella pseudotuberculosis var pestis (Yersinia pestis)

d. Toxins, as follows: 1. Botulinum toxins 2. Clostridium perfringens toxins 3. Conotoxin 4. Ricin 5. Saxitoxin

6. Shigatoxin 7. Staphylococcus aureus toxins 8. Tetrodotoxin 9. Verotoxin 10. Microcystins (Cyanginosins)

IC 352 Animal pathogens as follows: a. Viruses, whether natural, enhanced or modified, either in the form of isolated live cultures or as material including living material which has been deliberately inoculated or contaminated with such cultures as follows: 1. African swine fever virus 2. Avian influenza virus which are: i. Uncharacterised; or, ii. those defined in EC Directive 92/40/EC, as having high pathogenicity, as follows: • Type A viruses with an IVPI (intravenous pathogenicity index) in 6 week old chickens of greater than 1.2; or • Type A viruses H5 or H7 subtype for which nucleotide sequencing has demonstrated multiple basic amino acids at the cleavage site of haemagglutinin. 3. Bluetongue virus 4. Foot and mouth disease virus 5. Goat pox virus 6. Porcine herpes virus (Aujeszky’s disease) 7. Swine fever virus (Hog cholera virus) 8. Lyssa virus 9. Newcastle disease virus 10. Peste des petits ruminants virus 11. Swine vesicular disease (Porcine enterovirus type 9) 12. Rinderpest virus 13. Sheep pox virus 14. Teschen disease virus 15. Vesicular stomatitis virus

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c. Bacteria, whether natural, enhanced or modified, either in the form of isolated live cultures or as material including living material which has been deliberately inoculated or contaminated with such cultures, as follows: 1. Mycoplasma mycoides IC 353 Genetically-modified micro-organisms, as follows: a. Genetically modified micro-organisms or genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences associated with pathogenicity and are derived from organisms or genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences coding for many of the toxins specified in head d. of entry IC 351. 2B 352 Equipment capable of use in biological manufacturing, as follows: a. Containment facilities at Containment Level (ACDP) 3 or 4, and related equipment, as follows: 1. Facilities that meet the criteria for Containment Level 3 or 4 as specified in guidance from the Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens approved by the Health and Safety Commission (published by HMSO, Second Edition 1990). Note: The criteria for Containment Level 3 or 4 in head a. of this entry are equivalent to the criteria for p3 or p4, BL3, L3 or L4 containment as specified in the WHO Laboratory Biosafety manual (Geneva, 1983). 2. Independently ventilated protective full or half suits. 3. Biological safety cabinets or isolators, which allow manual operations to be performed within whilst providing an environment equivalent to Class III biological protection. Note: In this entry, isolators include flexible isolators, dry boxes, anaerobic chambers and glove boxes. b. Fermenters, bioreactors, chemostats and continuous-flow systems capable of operation without the propagation of aerosols, having all the following characteristics: 1. Capacity of 300 l or more. 2. Double or multiple sealing joints within the steam containment area. 3. Capable of in-situ sterilisation in a closed state. c. Centrifugal separators or decanters, capable of continuous separation without the propagation of aerosols, having all the following characteristics: 1. Flow rate exceeding 100 l per hour. 2. Components of polished stainless steel or titanium.

58 M RAJA MENON 3. Double or multiple sealing joints within the steam containment area, and 4. Capable of in-situ sterilisation in a closed state. d. Cross-flow filtration equipment, designed for continuous separation without the propagation of aerosols, having both of the following characteristics: 1. Equal to or greater than 5 m2. 2. Capable of in-situ sterilisation. e. Steam sterilisable freeze drying equipment with a condenser capacity exceeding 50 kg of ice in 24 hours and less than 1,000 kg of ice in 24 hours. f. Chambers designed for aerosol challenge testing with pathogenic micro-organisms or toxins and having a capacity of 1 m3 or greater.

WARNING GUIDELINES Although items in the categories listed ahead have not been brought under export control, it is possible that these could be used in BW proliferation programmes and thus enquiries or orders relating to such items should be carefully assessed. a. ACDP (Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens) Hazard group 4 and group 3 micro-organisms not controlled and some Hazard group 2 micro-organisms, such as the following: Clostridium perfringers Clostridium tetani Enterohaemorrhagic Escherichia coli serotype 0157 and other verotoxin producing serotypes Legionella pneumophila Yersinia pseudotuberculosis Absettarov virus Hanzalova virus Hypr virus Kyesanur forest virus Louping ill virus Mopeia virus Murray Valley encephalitis virus Omsk haemorrhagic fever virus Oropouche virus Rocio virus St. Louis encephalitis virus

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b. Toxogenic micro-organisms not controlled, such as species of clostridia and corynebacteria. c. Pathogens harmful to plants, fish or bees, and capable of causing serious economic or environmental damage. d. Genetically modified micro-organisms (GMOs) other than those controlled, which cause disease in man, animals, or plants, or harm to the environment, or which contain genes associated with pathogenicity; but excluding pesticides and herbicides active against weed plants. e. GMOs having enhanced expression of innate toxins or of other toxic organic chemical is considered to be one containing at least one carbon–carbon bond. f. Some types of genetic material, such as genomic libraries from toxogenic or pathogenic micro-organisms, potential host organisms for genetic modification, and nucleic acid factors relevant to expression. g. Toxins not controlled, including the following: Abrin Cholera toxin Tetanus toxin Trichothecene mycotoxin h. Media for cultivating agents, especially when ordered in unusually large quantities. i. Tissue culture cell lines suitable for large-scale growth of viruses, rickettsia, or chlamydia. j. Equipment other than controlled, on pilot scale or larger, suitable for use in the production, harvesting, drying or micro-encapsulation of pathogenic micro-organisms, or for the purification of toxins or of other organic chemicals of biological origin. k. Equipment suitable for the dissemination of biological agents, such as aerosol generators. Source: http://www.state.gov/t/np/2001/3525.htm.

NOTES

1. 2.

Malcolm Dando, The New Biological Weapons (Boulder: Lynne Riener, 2001), p. 33. R. Preston, Annals of Warfare: The Biopioneers in New Yorker, March, pp. 52–65; US Army, US Army Activities in the US Biological Warfare Programmes, vol. 122 (Washington: Department of the Army, 1977).

60 M RAJA MENON 3.

4.

5.

6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

The French classification is simple and useful. After 1991 an ad-hoc committee was established to examine verification measures for the implementation of the biowarfare in the light of rapidly changing technology. Four such meetings were held known as VEREX meetings in March 1992, November 1992 and September 1993. For more information see BWC/ CONF III/VEREX/WP 13, Geneva, 1 April 1992. The master list for agents against man is produced by the UN in Chemical and Bacteriological Weapons and the Effects of their possible use, Annex IV (New York: UN E 69.1.24, 1969). A modified list is given in Appendix 3.1A, as produced by Dando, Biological Warfare in the 21st Century (London: Brassey, 1994), p. 31. UN Secretary General, Report of the Secretary General on the Status of the Implementation of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) Plan for the Monitoring and Verification of Iraq’s Compliance with Section C of Security Council Resolutions 687,1991.s/1995/864 (1995). US Army, Field Manual Military Chemistry and Chemical Components, FM3-9 (Washington: Department of the Army, 1975). See Appendix 3.2B, the Australia List. Same as note 1, p. 44. Same as note 1, p. 79. Biological Weapon Convention, BWC/CONF.111/VEREX/WP 88, Geneva, 4 December 1992.

PART II THREATS TO

INDIA

CHAPTER

4 Formal and Non-formal Nuclear Threats M.S. Mamik

T

hreats are those conditions that inhibit one’s freedom to think and act naturally. They can result from different causes. This chapter deals with the fear that emanates from the threat of nuclear weapons being used in two situations: between states; and between non-state and/or state, society or group or place, city, facility, etc. In India, this threat is heightened by the time factor—the few minutes of missile flight time between our western neighbour, Pakistan, or even China, and the US, so that even the most well-designed and executed evacuation or defence measures will not save many lives in the subcontinent in the event of an attack. This chapter deals with the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in terms of the following: • • • •

What is the threat (background and calibration)? Who is threatening whom (state and non-state actors)? Where the threat emanates from. Does the source of the threat change—from state to non-state actors, and vice versa. • What needs to be done?

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BACKGROUND Currently, WMD threats emanate from its evolutionary dynamics, namely: • The use of WMD in World War II as war terminator and in the Cold War as dissuader. • The use of WMD for deterrence, compellance and blackmail today. (Latest use by Pakistan in 2001.) • Nuclear weapon states now use their arsenals for deterrence, compellance and blackmail. • WMD have been politically attractive, viable and effective instruments in conflict and crisis resolution/management/transformation, as well as arms control and technology transfer or denial.1 • Radiological devices are now a tool of terrorism too.

CALIBRATION STATE

TO

OF

THREATS

STATE THREATS

These threats emanate from various dimensions based on a complex strategic calculus of a number of environmental factors2 and political, historical, economic and socio-religious, and cultural3 factors. Some of these are tangible and some are perceived or merely feared. Conventional assessments of military capabilities can be made somewhat realistically by discounting a host of factors from weapon counts4 and organisation inputs listed in Jane’s Yearbooks to assess the residual capability. Making a calculus for nuclear weapons is different. Currently we see that the state to state threat is generally declining among erstwhile adversaries due to reduction in nuclear arsenals, deployment, de-targeting, lowering of alert states or readiness and other risk-reduction measures. Another development, though yet militarily unproven, is anti-missile defence.5 The significant reason for this is the end of the Cold War. Another reason is that accurate alternatives are available to a few, and also because the economics of disarmament are beginning to make an impact. But the same cannot be said for Asia. On the other hand, the probability/likelihood of the use of WMD by non-state actors (including those with covert or overt state support) is increasing due to

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easier access to material and technology and increased boldness on the part of these groups (9/11 is the best example of this).

FACTORS RELEVANT TO NUCLEAR THREATS—CALIBRATION NON-RELEVANCE

OF

PARITY

Small arsenals do deter larger ones and nukes (nuclear weapons) are often quoted as conventional disparity equalisers. The first important difference is the non-essentiality of arsenals to have parity as this concept rests on the ability to deliver disproportionate punishment or destruction through deterrence and compellance; many doctrines6 have evolved over the years with the most famous being Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Non-relevance of parity depends on the condition that each side has something to lose if the other side uses nuclear weapons, as also in the case of retaliation.

STRATEGIC STABILITY In the Cold War period, strategic stability was achieved through a combination of crisis stability and arms race stability.7 What is the present situation?8 History shows an undeclared arms race of two nascent nuclear states in the subcontinent having passed through three crises including one localised war. However, China’s status was a component of India’s9 strategic asymmetry since 1964. As China grew in capability and diversity along with an undeclared but more credible Pakistani capability, India was really hemmed into a nuclear corner10 with border disputes as well as socio-religious conflict continuing with the two adversaries at varying levels. Strategic stability is relevant only in state to state calculations but is null and void in an asymmetric situation when any non-state actor is involved.

POLITICAL WEAPON—USE NOT GUARANTEED Mere possession of a nuclear weapon does not guarantee its use in a time of crisis as it is not a military but a political weapon. In conventional

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usage, where war is an extension of politics by military means, the decision to go to war is made by the leadership based on a perceived gain or better strategic balance, when the leadership has a fair chance to both perceive and weigh its chances. India’s nuclear dilemma begins on this reality that in Pakistan,11 the weapon is owned and controlled by the military and that, overwhelmingly, the application of a nuclear weapon could be in pursuit of a military strategy, not a political one.12

MISPERCEPTION

AND

MISCALCULATION

The military control and command structure in Pakistan is destabilising. This is unprecedented in nuclear history and is the most dangerous element.13 India’s arms control efforts and those of others— namely the US—have not addressed the transfer of nuclear weapons to civilian control, which is virtually impossible under a military regime.

ALL AZIMUTH DIRECTION

AND

DUALITY

OF

THREAT AXIS

India’s problem14 is accentuated due to the presence, simultaneously, of two adversaries who are close political and military allies and who are also using this alliance as a strategic pincer to pressurise India on many fronts. The other factors which differ from the erstwhile US-USSR relationship is the fact that both these powers once fought as allies and had found a way of doing business throughout the Cold War. The Cold War was more ideological and as soon as the Communist face of the former Soviet Union changed, the nuclear tensions drastically reduced even though the weapons still existed. But here, in the subcontinent, there exists a history of religious animosity superimposed on misplaced perceptions of the strength of regional sub-nationalism and increasing fundamentalism. On the Chinese front is the realism of both countries being ancient civilisations which have survived history and the test of time.

GEOMETRY The short missile flight time makes it impossible to issue warnings to the civilian population. Yet, they may be primary targets because

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of the poor accuracy of South Asian missiles which can only hit cities. While Pakistan suffers from the same vulnerability as India with most of its countervalue and counterforce targets located close to its borders (though India does enjoy some degree of depth), the situation with regard to China is radically different and asymmetric. Most of China’s economic capacity and important population centres are near the coast and significantly far from India’s reach with at least a 10–15 minutes missile flight time between the two countries. Thus, the geometry of the threat from the two different axes, if simultaneous, can be very dangerous. It is necessary therefore to always ensure non-simultaneity of threat as one of India’s policy objectives. One can conclude that asymmetry of target vulnerability and geometry as well as simultaneity are features different from the Cold War strategies so far enunciated under the one-to-one deterrence formulae.

METEOROLOGY The prevailing westerlies favour our western adversary.15 This can be illustrated using data and target analysis from the Indian Meterological Department to see the impact of nuclear weapons.

GEOGRAPHY Factors such as terrain, built-up area and their relative position affects the overall destructive impact of a nuclear weapon based on the enemy’s capability. The same weapon can have a different destructive impact in a different country due to developmental differentials. Is economic vulnerability a consequence of better development?

DOCTRINE India’s and China’s ‘No First Use’ doctrines16 do not seem to provide any further reassurance or confidence building than the paper on which they are written. This is due to historical factors and the proven record of both countries of acting in their national interest when confronted with international obligations or even selfpronounced unilateral measures. Thus, our ‘no first use’ fails to

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reassure Pakistan as does China’s failure to make any allowance for India’s calculations.17

CONTROL Another destabilising factor—aspects of control—is also loaded against India. Whilst Pakistan has established and exercised its National Security Council (predominantly military) as the supreme decision-making body, in India the National Security Council (NSC) with its plethora of components and ambiguous weaponisation neither enhances nor reflects credibility of use of nuclear weapons even under retaliatory circumstances. On the other hand, the Chinese decision making with their Central Military Commission as well as established diversified and mobile arsenal have a time tested, decisionmaking apparatus with party–military interactions smoothened out.

DISARMAMENT Countries use the instrument of disarmament18 and arms control to advance national security interests through reduction or constraints on their adversaries. But in India we see that the arms control and disarmament measures yield little in terms of advancing the country’s own national security interests. The clandestine weaponisation of Pakistan, the de facto passage of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in the General Assembly and resolutions passed after Pokhran show very little convertible power and influence in shaping India’s security environment.

CREDIBILITY

OF

THREATS

The simple question is who is making the threat and what is his capability and credibility. The factors that need to be considered while evaluating the threats of WMD of the nuclear type are as follows: • Capability—Warheads and Delivery Means and Protection: These essentially look at types, numbers, levels of sophistication, reliability, purity of fissile material availability, reliability, storage

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•

• • •

•

•

•

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and safety. The delivery systems include type diversity, response, mobility, storage, penetrability, range survivability, MIRV/multiple target, multiple warheads, etc. Vulnerability: This includes availability of targets within range and targeting (force/value targets, leadership), strategic vulnerability of installations of economic and public utility, relative asymmetry/symmetry of capability vs vulnerability between adversaries. Credibility: Includes perceived vs actual threats and the inherent gaps between the two. It is determined by the type of government/ decision-making apparatus, and ethnic homogeneity. Cultural Factors: These include tolerance vs totalitarianism or a theocratic–military/failing state based on hatred of others.19 Disaster Management and Recovery: A demonstrated good and effective disaster management and recovery system (compared to a poor, ineffective one) gives the adversary lesser chance of creating panic and leadership decision uncertainities. Anti-Missile Defences (AMD): The deployment of anti-missile defences by the US and its Allies especially in Asia’s Far East will have a downstream effect as China responds with enhancements in the quality of its Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicle (MIRV’s), decoys, defences, as well as quantity in terms of numbers, range, yield etc. This will cause the strategic balance of India’s simultaneous dual deterrence against its two nuclear capable neighbours to shift towards a position of disadvantage. Accidental20 and Unauthorised Use by both Own and Adversary due to Proximity: The possibility of accidental21 and unauthorised use or self-made threat stems from lacunae in custodial care, movement, access or control and release deficiencies, as also terrorism resulting from such lapses. Such an event can also be due to shortfalls in technology or reliability or component failures for which a stockpile stewardship and testing programme is vital. The danger of malfunction or inadvertent activation of both warhead or delivery systems can be real if security, handling and transportation are not handled with adequate care. Anti-proliferation/Counter-proliferation Initiatives of Other States: It may be possible that actions taken by other states under counter-proliferation/anti-proliferation initiatives may at times lead to surprisingly unintended disasters or occurrences which can pose a threat to the targeted state.

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NUCLEAR TERRORISM ‘The greatest threat to the world’s security probably stems from the proliferation and the increasing technical sophistication of weapons accessible to terrorist organizations’22 The serious issue is that WMDs are increasingly becoming accessible to rogue states, organisations, and groups who are also becoming bolder probably because of the asymmetric rules of the game in the civilised societies which they subvert. They act in a catalytic manner, directing societal terror to target the state—a dangerous situation for a threatened party as it is a totally disproportionate and asymmetric situation. It would involve in Churchill’s world ‘never in the field of human history were so many threatened by so few’, as also another corollary ‘never in human history were so many searching for so few’.

FACTORS

FOR

GROWTH

Following are the factors fostering the growth of nuclear terrorism: • A perception of a long unsolved grievance, and prosperity for violence supported by misguided religions faith. • Better capability, access to material and technology. • A perceived lack of state readiness or competence or will to respond to a nuclear attack. • Exploiting existing societal/demographic factors in the current political, military or socio-cultural state of the entity threatened. • Weakness or irresoluteness of target. • External response and support or lack of coordination in the response.

RESPONSE The response to a state nuclear threat by a state is well analysed by existing bureaucracies. There are adequate case histories like the cuban crises and the form Kipper war, when the US went to DEFCON3. A state response to nuclear terrorism is still a grey area and not well researched. A few points that affect response are as follows:

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• Effort: A disproportionate effort would be involved in mobilising resources to track and neutralise the threat in a highly timecompressed situation. • Retaliation: One of the main questions would be whom to retaliate against. It would be difficult to surmise who could have attacked, and to track and respond to the attack successfully. • Force against Non-sstate Actors: The perpetrators of nuclear terrorist threats are mostly non-state actors—individuals, groups, organisations23 with apocalyptic goals, who are difficult to identify and even more difficult to retaliate against. With the increased relevance of suicide bombers as carriers, desperate acts even with radiological material cannot be ruled out. Limits to Response: The response is also • Collateral Damage—L compounded by considerations of collateral damage and risk to population. New technology, difficulty in checking and restraining mentally-challenged individuals or those with extreme religious beliefs in democratic societies with respect for human rights, are additional factors which come into play while dealing with those seeking to abet such acts. • Own Nuclear Arsenal: In such cases one’s own nuclear retaliatory capability is of little or no use, and could instead, be at risk. • Asymmetry of Threat: The net implication is that whilst a nuclear state threat is directed against a state, a nuclear terrorist threat can target a range of entities, from groups of individuals, to facilities, cities, economic centres, communication choke points, vital installations and nuclear facilities. This can be done using conventional destructive devices or by merely placing radiological material at important points to cause maximum dislocation and fear. The net fear effect is easy to assess by the fictionary multiplication of the effects of the word ‘nuclear’ and ‘terrorism’ in the human mind. In a strife-torn society where religious–ethnic conflict is superimposed upon the territorial designs of a neighbour, the chances of nuclear terrorism can only be discounted at the nation’s peril. The scale and variation of this theme encompasses a wide spectrum of possibilities depending on the resources that the elements can bring to bear. The chances of active outside state support to such adventures cannot be ruled out especially by a military regime which seeks to leverage state aid to terrorism to its advantage and also use terrorism coupled with nuclear blackmail as an instrument of state policy. The important factor in dealing with such threats is the belated

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realisation that when it occurs not enough has been done in peace time to respond to it in terms of infrastructure, technology or operational and individual protection measures. The various contingencies that could be likely under such a scenario are: • A crude or improvised device or radiological material at a sensitive or populated location. • A stolen suitcase device that ex-KGB/erstwhile USSR obtained clandestinely from other groups being reported to be on the move or sighted. • A device being smuggled into an Indian town/city industrial centre. • Small quantities of fissile materials stolen from own facilities and reported to be in wrong hands. • Using the ruse of a terrorist group threatening to use any crude device/radioactive material in a religious place to blow it up. • Crude conventional suicide attacks on any nuclear installation/economic centre to obtain radioactive materials or nuclear devices to embarrass the government. • Takeover of a nuclear power plant with a threat to remove coolants and cause an explosion similar to Chernobyl, or to blow it up using conventional explosives to release radiation— a remote possibility considering double containment. • Gaining unlawful access to nuclear power plants, threatening employees, making demands and holding the people inside hostage. • Lacing conventional explosives with radiological materials.

RECOMMENDATIONS It is necessary to be brief while recommending the measures necessary to deal with such a vast canvas as nuclear terrorism. Primarily, these recommendations rest on the pillar of eternal and all encompassing vigilance by the entire society and not exclusively by the government or security agencies. Anything nuclear or would-be-radiological should be kept apart from a prospective terrorist or anti-social element. All would agree that finding a prospective terrorist before his strike is certainly a difficult but not impossible task. In illustrating this point lessons can be learnt from recent Hollywood movies like Peacemaker, Broken Arrow, Crimson Tide etc.

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• Denial of Capability: Denial of state support to fabricate complex devices even though general information may be available in open literature. • Check Unauthorised Activity: There should be procedures and deterring conduct clauses in place for those handling radioactive materials. • Information Security: This is a new area and is tantamount to a certain amount of policing of the web. • Human Security: This subject is referred to in the US as Personnel Responsibility Programmes, where a certain amount of intrusive verification is necessary for personal working in sensitive posts. • Proactive Intelligence. • Training and simulation exercises, of situations, decision making and communicating while safeguarding public morale. • Crisis management centres, national rapid response teams and negotiators with language training. • Specialised equipment to locate, defuse and reduce collateral damage. • Legislative measures to check implementation by the severest punishment.

MEASURES

TO

RESPOND

TO SUCH INCIDENTS/ACTIVITIES

• There should be a situation asessessment using a crisis centre, action plan and activation of communications and authorities as required at the centre/state/district/facility/area level. • Communication links should be established with those claiming responsibility if known. A check should be made for any state backing. • There should be information management with a proactive information strategy right from the outset to delink cause and focus on danger to humanity—removing media advantage from the terrorist while maintaining public morale. • Locating, isolating and cordoning the affected area with medical prophylactic measures superimposed. • Using systemised evacuation as required. • Using National Rapid Response Teams24 with specialised equipment. • Surveillance effort including air and electronic human and other surveillance.

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• Maintaining a dossier on groups responsible for such incidents with the aim of ascertaining their characteristics, composition and ideology. • A coordination of the global response. • Prevention of fear psychosis and paralysis of administration. • Medical and administrative response and readiness. • Use of non-governmental organisations to infiltrate terrorist networks.

NOTES

1. See the conclusion of Hypothesis I in unpublished Ph.D Thesis, M.S. Mamik, ‘Effectiveness of Sea Based Nuclear Weapons in International Relations’, University of Madras, p. 365, 1995. 2. See C.J.M. Mathew, ‘India’s Nuclear Dilemma’, Monograph Sabina Printing Press, 1981. 3. Asia nanda and Hakemulder, Nuclear Subcontinent’ (New Delhi: Minerva Press, 2000). 4. For the size of current arsenals, access the Center for Defence Information document ‘Current World Nuclear Arsenals’ at www.cdi.org/issues/nukef&f/ database/nukestab/html. Also see different editions of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists under the heading NRDC Nuclear Notebook as follows: • • • • • • • •

Nov/Dec 2000, p. 78–79: ‘Chinese Nuclear Forces’. May/June 2001, p. 65: German Plutonium, Where it is (Table). September/October 2000, p. 69–71: ‘French and British Nuclear Forces’. May/June 2000, p. 69–71: ‘US Nuclear Forces 2000’. March/April 2001, p. 77–79: ‘US Nuclear Forces 2001’. May/June 2001, p. 78–79: ‘Russian Nuclear Forces 2001’. July/August 2000, p. 70–71: ‘Russian Nuclear Forces 2000’. July/August 2000, Strategic Rocket Forces (Table).

5. For AMD rationale, see John Isaacs, ‘A Political Decision’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2000, Vol. 56, No. 2, pp. 23–25. 6. See William Arkin, ‘The SIOP—Forever Immoral, The Last Word’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 57, No. 2, p. 4. 7. See Gaurav Kampani, ‘The Military Coup in Pakistan: Implication for Nuclear Stability in South Asia’, Center for Non-Proliferation Studies (CNS), October 1999. 8. See Gaurav Kampani and Haider K. Nizamani, ‘Pakistan: Shift Away from Indo-Centrism’, CNS Outside Publication, (reproduced in Dawn, 2001).

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9. For India’s quest rationale and logic behind its decision to go nuclear see George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb—The Impact on Global Proliferation (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000). 10. See Raj Chennappa, Weapons of Peace (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers, 2000). 11. See Mohammed Ahmedullah, ‘Let ‘em Eat Nukes’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2000, Vol. 56, No. 5, pp. 52–57. 12. See, Mario E. Carranz, ‘An Impossible Game: Stable Nuclear Deterrence after the Indian and Pakistani Tests’, Nonproliferation Review, Spring/ Summer 1999, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 11–24. 13. See Clayton P. Bowen and Daniel Wolven, ‘Command and Control Challenges in South Asia’, Nonproliferation Review, Spring/Summer 1999, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 25–35. 14. See Gopal Raj, Reach for the Stars, (New Delhi: Viking Publisher, 2000). 15. See Brig. Vijay K. Nair, Nuclear India (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1992). 16. Ashley Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001). 17. For details on India’s nuclear theology see K.R. Menon, A Nuclear Strategy for India (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000). 18. The total number of nuclear weapons built between 1945 and 2000 is estimated at 128,060. The total holding today among the nuclear weapon states (NWS) is 3,535 (2000) from a peak of 69,478 in 1986 (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists). 19. See Jessica Stern, ‘Meeting with the Muj’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2000, Vol. 57, No. 1, pp. 42–51. 20. See Cristina Chuen and Michael Jasinski, ‘Russia’s Blue Water Blues’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2001, Vol. 57, No. 1, pp. 65–69. 21. Details of nuclear-related mishaps at sea and on board ships are given in Neptune Papers No. 3, Naval Accidents 1945–88, and also in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, various editions. 22. In Carpentier De Gourdon, ‘The War Machine and New Security Hazards: The System is Poised to Devour its Own Children’, World Affairs, April–June 2001, Vol. 5, No. 2. 23. See chapter titled ‘Taliban at the Helm—What does it Portend’, in J.N. Dixit, An Afghan Diary: Zahir Shah to Taliban (New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 2000). 24. See US Congress Senate Hearings for nuclear material thefts in erstwhile USSR, the formation of Emergency Response Teams and its functions.

PART III CURRENT INTERNATIONAL REGIMES

CHAPTER

5 The Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime Matin Zuberi

I

nternational regimes consist of rules and regulations, and rights and obligations accepted by a group of states. The nuclear nonproliferation regime is an interlocking network of international treaties, domestic legislation, bilateral, regional and multilateral verification systems called ‘nuclear safeguards’, positive and negative security assurances, economic sanctions, technology controls, and nuclear-weapon-free zones.1 The crown jewel of this regime is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that came into force in 1970. The nodal agency for the regime is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. Unlike the verification regime of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) as well as the proposed Protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the nuclear non-proliferation regime sharply demarcates nuclear-weapon powers from other members of the international system of states. The NPT initially rested on the geopolitical authority of the two superpowers that were not only leaders of the rival alliance systems, but were also the most advanced in military as well as civilian uses of nuclear technology. The treaty was negotiated in the period of

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transition from pre-industrial to industrial atomic ages.2 This was a period of nuclear euphoria when countries could have legitimate peaceful nuclear aspirations without being suspected of harbouring secret military ambitions. An American scholar who had the privilege of moulding the non-proliferation regime, however, later articulated the logic of inequality embedded in it. ‘Paradoxically’, he pointed out, ‘under many circumstances the introduction of a single bomb in some non-nuclear state may be more likely to lead to nuclear use than the addition of a thousand more warheads to the US, and Soviet stockpiles.’3 The states that assumed the role of nuclear Galahad would, of course, require thicker armour to look after the lesser breed. The initial targets of the NPT were West Germany and Japan. In West Germany it was called a ‘Nuclear Versailles’ and a ‘Second Yalta.’ About 90 deputies in the Bundestaag voted against its ratification. Manfred Woerner, who later became Secretary General of NATO, was one of them.4 While the two superpowers had proposed a treaty of unlimited duration, West Germany and Italy favoured 25 years to be followed by a conference to decide its future. It was suggested that an American commitment on uninterrupted supply of enriched nuclear fuel for German reactors should be made a precondition for German accession to the treaty. Washington accepted the West German condition that the dissolution of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would lead to German withdrawal from the treaty. The provision allowing non-explosive military research was inserted due to the Italians lobbying for it.5 Japan was one of the last countries to accede to the treaty. It secretly made a cost-benefit analysis of going nuclear before acceding to it in February 1970.6 The treaty became operational on 5 March 1970. The Japanese government issued a long list of reservations at the time of accession. These were about the long duration of the treaty as well as the possible adverse impact of IAEA safeguards on Japan’s energy economy. It, however, pointedly took note of the withdrawal clause in the treaty. A safeguards agreement with the IAEA was concluded six years after accession to the treaty.7 Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had spelled out the basic framework of India’s nuclear policy and strategy. He declared in 1954 that India was prepared “even to limit, in common with other countries, our independence of action…provided it is for the common good and not exercised in a partial way, and not dominated over by certain other countries, however good their motives.”8 As the NPT is basically a discriminatory treaty, India decided not to join it.

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ARTICLES I

AND

II

OF THE

NPT

Article I of the NPT prohibits nuclear weapon states from transferring their nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over them, directly or indirectly, to non-nuclear weapon states. Article II contains a parallel commitment by the non-nuclear weapon states not to receive them. The normal procedure is to register reservations regarding any treaty commitment at the time of accession to it. The United States, instead, evolved its unilateral interpretation of these commitments in consultation with allies and showed it only to the Soviet Union and some other delegates. It was later made public during the US Senate hearings. Attached to Secretary of State Dean Rusk’s Letter of Transmittal of the draft treaty to the President, dated 2 July 1968, were undated questions on it asked by US Allies together with answers given by the US government. The following answers included a broad interpretation of the NPT: The treaty deals only with what is prohibited, not with what is permitted. It does not deal with, and therefore does not prohibit, transfer of nuclear delivery vehicles or delivery systems, or control over them to any recipient, so long as such transfer does not involve bombs or warheads. It does not deal with arrangements for deployment of nuclearweapons within allied territory as these do not involve any transfer of nuclear weapons or control over them unless and until a decision were made to go to war, at which time the treaty would no longer be controlling. It does not deal with the problem of European unity, and would not bar succession by a new federated European state to the nuclear status of one of its former components.9 The initial signatories to the NPT thus came to know about these interpretations from the Hearings. American nuclear weapons are at present located on the territories of six non-nuclear NATO countries, their fighter-bombers use dual-capable aircraft, and their pilots are trained to use nuclear weapons. A classified memorandum of 1964, recently partially de-classified, stated that ‘the non-nuclear NATO partners in effect become nuclear powers in time of war.’ NATO’s North Atlantic Council

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approved, in May 2000, a document called MC-400/2 retaining the use of nuclear weapons in deterring countries possessing chemical and biological weapons and their delivery systems. Would nuclear sharing in such contingencies be valid under the NPT?10 Dean Rusk also stated that ‘if NATO were to dissolve’ some member countries might withdraw from the treaty.11 NATO is thus a non-proliferation tool! Non-nuclear weapon states are now complaining about the contravention of Articles I and II of the NPT. In 1995, Mexico questioned the provision for control over American nuclear weapons in Europe under NATO command to be transferred to a non-nuclear weapon state in case of hostilities. South Africa raised concerns in 1997 about the ‘non-proliferation implications’ of NATO’s expansion into Eastern Europe. The joint statement of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1998 opposed ‘nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements.’12 The movement’s working paper for the 1999 Preparatory Committee for the NPT review conference of 2000 called for ban on ‘nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements.’13 Germany’s non-nuclear weapon status was reaffirmed in the TwoPlus-Four Agreement that facilitated German unification in 1990. ‘When Europe becomes a federal state’, however, said a senior European official, ‘logic would dictate that Germany and the rest must co-inherit whatever is the nuclear weapons legacy of France and Britain.’ While German officials describe their country as ‘nonnuclear, forever’, the issue of an eventual German co-possession of nuclear weapon has been articulated by non-officials in the context of the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 that mandates common defence for a future United Europe.14 Article II of the NPT contains an undertaking by non-nuclear weapon states ‘not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.’ The treaty, however, does not define ‘manufactures’ or ‘other nuclear explosive devices.’ While the first American draft prohibited the ‘manufacture’ of ‘nuclear weapons’, a subsequent Soviet draft added ‘prepare for the manufacture’ to the prohibition. This prompted Ambassador Alva Myrdal of Sweden to probe the various stages of the manufacturing process. She maintained that prohibiting just the final act of ‘manufacture’ might be too late in these long chains of decisions. However, to probe the preliminary thinking of politicians and the laboratory research of scientists was, obviously, difficult and would be considered undesirable intervention. ‘Could a middle link be found on which the prohibitory regulation should most definitely be focused?’15 Sweden had kept the

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nuclear option and the Swedish military authorities supported the development of tactical nuclear weapons.16 As the proposed definitions were either too narrow or too broad, the negotiators gave up in despair. Hence, the extraordinary fact that the NPT does not contain precise definitions of what it prohibits. American chief negotiator William C. Foster, however, listed activities that were not prohibited: ‘Neither uranium enrichment nor the stockpiling of fissionable material’ for peaceful purposes under safeguards would violate Article II. ‘Also clearly permitted would be the development, under safeguards, of plutonium-fueled power reactors, including research on the properties of metallic plutonium, nor would Article II interfere with the development or use of fast breeder reactors under safeguards.’17 While ratifying the treaty, the West German government made public its reservations. It contended that no nuclear activities in the fields of research, development, manufacture or use for peaceful purposes are prohibited nor can transfer of information, materials and equipment be denied to non-nuclear weapon States merely on the basis of allegations that such activities or transfers could be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Japan made a similar reservation. Australia went a step further and maintained that ‘no nuclear development should be prohibited except when such activities would have no other purpose than the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices.’ In a working paper submitted to the Geneva disarmament conference on 7 July 1975, the Japanese government asserted that the ‘NPT does not explicitly prohibit weapons-oriented R&D short of production of nuclear explosive devices.’18 These deliberate ambiguities ensured that the industrialised states’ capability to manufacture nuclear weapons would not be impeded by treaty stipulations.

MULTIPOLAR CIVILIAN NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGICAL ORDER The industrial foundations of the NPT regime were shaken soon after accession of the target countries. The 1970s witnessed dramatic

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efforts by west European countries to enrich themselves through nuclear commerce. Having imported the American light water, enriched uranium reactor systems, they were sensitive to their dependence on the United States for fuel. The United States manipulated its enrichment monopoly—a lucrative by-product of its massive nuclear weapons programme—for commercial gain and as an instrument of the non-proliferation policy. Thus, when the Dutch and West German groups started to investigate the gas centrifuge technology of enrichment, Washington managed to get their work classified. Research, however, proceeded in secret until an official announcement made by the Dutch Stating that research on ‘enriching uranium under the ultracentrifuge method has progressed far enough for the construction of a pilot plant in 1969 to be considered.’19 Two factors made centrifuge technology attractive: One, that power consumption was less than a quarter of that of diffusion plants; and, two, greater flexibility in construction and operation due to the smaller unit size of centrifuge plants that could be scaled up as work proceeded. Moreover, unlike the gigantic gaseous diffusion plants, centrifuge enrichment work could be concealed in a modest-sized laboratory. An Anglo-Dutch-West German agreement to corner a large slice of the enrichment market was, accordingly, signed on 4 March 1970. Not to be left out, France announced on 26 February 1971 its decision to build a gaseous diffusion plant.20 The French plant was partly financed by Belgium, Italy, Spain, and Iran. American monopoly on supplies of enriched uranium was broken.

COMMERCIAL COMPETITION

AND

SAFEGUARDS

It is through nuclear exports that the tentacles of the regime have spread far and wide. And commercial competition has resulted in periodic rediscovery of non-proliferation concerns and tightening of safeguards and economic and technology controls. Prospects of commercial competition in the peaceful uses of atomic energy in the post-Second World War soured Anglo-American relations even during the Manhattan Project. The Americans suspected that British interest in the project was commercial. The British were simply bewildered by this charge. To remove this contentious issue, Roosevelt and Churchill agreed that

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any post-war advantages of an industrial or commercial character shall be dealt with as between the United States and Great Britain under terms to be specified by the President of the United States to the Prime Minister of Great Britain.21 Some early transactions like the Indo-Canadian agreement for the supply of the CIRUS research reactor contained only an Indian pledge that it would be used for peaceful purposes. The verification regime had not yet been established. Later bilateral agreements for cooperation in peaceful uses of atomic energy between the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and recipient countries provided for broad inspection rights; but were confined to the supplied nuclear material or facility.22 The need to respond to commercial competition from Britain and the former Soviet Union led to a partial lifting of nuclear secrecy and the inauguration, in December 1983, of the ‘Atoms for Peace’ programme of the United States.23 Contrary to common assumptions, the first international nuclear power reactor sales were of natural uranium units from Britain, Canada, and France (see Appendix 5.1A at the end of the chapter). As more countries started to develop their nuclear industries, it was feared that nations might shop around and buy nuclear equipment and material from states that imposed the least controls or even no controls.24 As US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles put it: No one nation can, alone, indefinitely police the spread of nuclear power plants… . Sovereign nations would accept an international system of broad acceptability. But they will not long be content to have their electric-power systems under continuous supervision by technicians merely serving another nation.25 Obviously, long-term and safe foreign markets for American nuclear equipment and materials required an international system of safeguards. These anxieties resulted in the establishment of the IAEA. ‘This is’, assured Dulles, ‘essentially a made-in-America project.’ Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Lewis Strauss asserted that the Agency would ‘create a practical working model of an inspection system’ for a distantly envisioned nuclear disarmament.26 When the agency’s first safeguards document was proposed, there were acrimonious debates and ‘the air in the boardroom was reminiscent of Agincourt’.27 As the industrialised countries required no assistance from the agency, it was feared that its controls would be imposed on nuclear industries in the developing countries. That would lead to an extraordinary situation in which the industrialised

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world that had the capability to embark on weapons programmes would escape all controls. India and several other non-aligned countries were worried about the uneven impact of the controls. Homi Bhabha pointed out that industrialised countries had the technical and material resources to push forward their own atomic programmes without any assistance from the agency ‘and to make atomic weapons, if they so wished.’ He correctly predicted that the maximum verification effort would be directed against developing countries that were ‘ipso facto least in a position to make atomic weapons.’ He also foresaw the possibility of what happened in Iraq: Nuclear weapons efforts in parallel with peaceful programmes under safeguards.28 Three nuclear verification systems are now in operation:

EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY (EURATOM) SAFEGUARDS France, West Germany, Italy and some other West European countries established their own organisation that contained provisions for mutual inspections. Here, friends inspect each other.29 As a result of the sophistication of their fuel cycles and the largest amounts of fissile material, 70 per cent of IAEA inspections were conducted in Germany, Japan and Canada. EURATOM and IAEA have recently concluded a new ‘partnership agreement’ reducing IAEA inspections by two-thirds.30 The locus of safeguards has shifted to certain ‘sensitive’ developing countries. This fundamental change in the verification regime has occurred in violation of the basic premises of the non-proliferation regime.

PRE-NPT SAFEGUARDS Their objective is ‘to ensure, so far as it is possible, that assistance provided … is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose.’31 Indigenously produced facilities are not subjected to inspection and control. There are five basic elements of this safeguards system: A subsidiary agreement between the agency and the recipient country regarding control provisions; a design review of the nuclear facilities under control; provision of records (ledgers, details of chemical composition of nuclear materials, etc.); reports to the agency based upon the records; and, on-site inspection by the agency.32 This facility-specific system is applicable to three categories of agreements: Project agreements in which IAEA provided assistance; unilateral submissions by member-states (the NPT nuclear-weapon

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states have voluntarily submitted some of their nuclear facilities, not directly related to their military programmes, to such safeguards); and, safeguards transfer agreements when a member-state transfers its safeguards rights contained in a bilateral agreement to the IAEA. For instance, Canada and the United States transferred their safeguards on the Rajasthan and Tarapur Power Stations to the IAEA. The rest of the Indian fuel cycle is free from any foreign intrusions. Canada also transferred its safeguards on the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant to the IAEA. There were controversies regarding their implementation in the mid-1970s and during 1981–82. In the first instance, the agency’s surveillance cameras could not track the inventory of fissile material in the plant.33 On the second occasion, IAEA Director Sivgard Eklund advised the agency’s Board of Governors that since Pakistan had acquired an un-safeguarded nuclear fuel-reprocessing plant, it was no longer possible to certify that nuclear material had not been diverted for military purposes. A substantial upgrading of surveillance technology was, therefore, necessary.34 It was only in 1983 that the IAEA was once again in a position to safeguard the Karachi Power Plant. By the mid-1970s, however, the growth of a nuclear grey market provided opportunities to circumvent the non-proliferation regime through clandestine purchases of components and materials for Pakistan’s weapons programme.35

NPT SAFEGUARDS In view of the stringent safeguards imposed by the NPT, it is interesting to recall the first American and Soviet drafts of Article III of the treaty. The American draft contained a single sentence: ‘Each of the States Party to this Treaty undertakes to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency or equivalent international safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities.’ This draft was not discriminatory as it applied to all states, whether they were nuclear weapon powers or not. The Soviet draft was even more permissive than the American one: ‘The Parties to this Treaty shall refrain from offering any support, encouragement, or inducement to States seeking to own, manufacture, or exercise control over nuclear weapons.’ They were obliged not to encourage other states in the manufacture of, and control over, nuclear weapons. Subsequent drafts drew a sharp distinction between non-nuclear weapon countries whose civilian nuclear enterprises were to be subjected to surveillance and control, and the privileged few nuclear-weapon powers that escaped them.36

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The objective of these safeguards is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear facilities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection. The terms ‘manufacture’, ‘nuclear weapons’, or ‘other nuclear explosives’, however, are not defined. ‘Significant Quantities of Nuclear Material’, however, are defined as 8 kg of plutonium and 25 kg of enriched uranium. In order to protect the commercial interests of the industrialised non-nuclear weapon countries, the human element of inspection is reduced to the barest minimum. Safeguards apply to the nuclear material and the facilities through which it passes; these are listed in a subsidiary agreement between the agency and the state concerned. This is a countrywide nuclear material-accounting system; the flow of nuclear material is checked not throughout the fuel cycle but at Material Balance Areas (MBAs). The frequency of agency inspection is set according to the volume of nuclear material passing through the MBAs. The more extensive the fuel cycle of the inspected state, the greater the flow of nuclear material.37 Tamper-proof seals, surveillance and checking of records are supposed to ensure that there has been no diversion of materials for military purposes. An important way of checking the flow of nuclear materials is to take into account what is called ‘limits of error in material unaccounted for’ (LOEMUF). There is also a provision for the ‘material unaccounted for’ (MUF), resulting from discrepancies between book inventory and physical inventory of nuclear material. If the discrepancy cannot be attributed to the normal loss in an extensive fuel cycle, it has to be reported to the IAEA. According to one Japanese expert, in a country with an extensive fuel cycle, the amount of material unaccounted for could total 10 to 50 bombs every six months.

INTENSIFIED COMMERCIAL COMPETITION Hoping to reap rich dividends from nuclear commerce, Britain and France invested in plutonium reprocessing technology. In March

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1970, Britain, the Netherlands and West Germany entered into an agreement for building a gas centrifuge enrichment plant; France chose gaseous diffusion technology for enrichment services. A boost to the West European efforts to achieve nuclear self-reliance was provided in 1974 when the US Atomic Energy Commission unexpectedly raised the price of enrichment services to its customers and imposed stringent conditions for new contracts. The Soviet Union then started supplying enriched uranium to West European countries at a rate that was 5 per cent lower than the American price. ‘By mid-1974, the United States no longer ruled the nuclear roost.’ American ‘high-handed attitude towards enrichment services’ had left ‘a legacy of distrust and a general aspiration for self-sufficiency.’38 The emergence of France and West Germany as aggressive competitors, coupled with the loss of the US monopoly on enriched uranium services, completely transformed the global nuclear commercial landscape. American corporations like Westinghouse and General Electric had to compete with their former licensees, West German Kraftwerk Union and Fromatome of France. America’s success in making light water reactors the dominant system in the world thus undermined its control over global nuclear commerce. The United States and its military allies were now locked in intense commercial competition. Not having the American advantage of a large domestic market, these former licensees were especially dependent on exports. France was negotiating the sale of a reprocessing plant to Pakistan. The West German-Brazilian deal of June 1975 for the supply of eight nuclear power plants as well as enrichment and reprocessing facilities was estimated to be worth more than $4.5 billion. Described as the ‘deal of the century’, it triggered an upheaval in nuclear commerce. It was later revealed that Westinghouse had unsuccessfully offered a similar package to Brazil. West Germany dismissed misgivings about proliferation implications due to the deal as a case of sour grapes. It was pointed out that safeguards had been imposed not only on the facilities sold but also on any replicated technology that could be developed by Brazil. This further extension of the scope of the NPT safeguards was imposed by a country that had itself replicated American nuclear technology. Worried about the sudden escalation of nuclear competition, especially from France and West Germany, Senator Ribicoff proposed that the US should share the global nuclear market on an equitable basis.39

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THE LONDON CLUB The competition was further intensified because of the energy crisis of 1973–74 and the inflated projections of demand for nuclear power plants from developing countries.40 At the behest of the United States, a secret conclave of representatives from the US, UK, USSR, France, West Germany, Canada and Japan took place in London in 1975. As a consequence of the threats of withdrawal from France and the USSR, the proceedings were kept secret. The main objective of this effort was to rein in West Germany and France, and to bring the USSR into a broader coalition. The inclusion of France was especially needed because it was not yet a party to the NPT. Soviet nuclear exports until then were confined to members of the Warsaw Pact. The recipient countries were supplied enriched fuel for Sovietbuilt reactors and were obliged to return all spent fuel rods for reprocessing.41 Soviet leaders had learnt a bitter lesson from their nuclear assistance to China;42 they did not allow reprocessing and enrichment activities within East European countries. After more than two years of intense commercial and political pressures, the club produced the so-called London Guidelines for nuclear commerce. West Germany and France agreed not to sell reprocessing technology until further notice.43 Suppliers of nuclear material and equipment had earlier been brought together in 1971 under a committee called the Zangger Committee after its first chairman, Claude Zangger of Switzerland. It prepared what is called the ‘Trigger List’ of export items that would trigger IAEA safeguards.44 The London Guidelines went far beyond this Trigger List that itself had gone beyond the basic undertakings of the NPT. As a result, France, under American pressure, cancelled its reprocessing deal with Pakistan in 1978.45 On 28 October 1976, President Ford admitted in a statement on nuclear policy that the US could no longer ‘control world-wide nuclear development’ and asserted that ‘avoidance of proliferation must take precedence over economic interests.’ Unilaterally reversing the direction the US had set for decades for global nuclear technological development, he declared: ‘I have decided that the United States should no longer regard reprocessing of used nuclear fuel to produce plutonium as a necessary and inevitable step in the nuclear fuel cycle.’ He also asked all concerned governments to affirm that they would regard ‘nuclear wrongdoing as an intolerable violation of acceptable norms of acceptable behaviour, which would set in motion

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strong and immediate countermeasures.’46 It was because of this that for the first time, each shipment of low enriched uranium fuel for the Tarapur Station was subjected to public hearings.47

THE US NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ACT OF 1978 The Carter administration embarked on a wholesale change in the future direction of civilian nuclear technology. According to the new policy, plutonium reprocessing and breeder reactors were no longer inevitable parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. Britain and France had made considerable investments in the hope of capturing the global market with reprocessing services. In the name of a non-proliferation crusade, ‘the entire thrust of a 30-year technical assumption that breeders were the ultimate reactor types was suddenly to be halted.’ As Britain, France, Germany, and Japan were proceeding down the breeder path, they resented President Carter challenging the foundations of their domestic nuclear policies. Expressing his frustration with the sudden change in nuclear policy, a Japanese diplomat told his American counterpart, ‘For 20 years we have followed US guidance on nuclear policy. Now you are saying you made a complete mistake. But it is too late.’48 The Nuclear Non-proliferation Act of 1978 provided for renegotiation of all nuclear contracts with foreign countries and mandated full-scope safeguards as a condition for nuclear transactions. It also unilaterally extended US jurisdiction to cover any nuclear fuel, regardless of origin, utilised in a reactor or facility, partially or fully, supplied by the United States. If, for example, Namibian uranium was used in an American-supplied Japanese reactor, US jurisdiction would extend over it. This American nuclear revisionism, entailing unilateral changes in multilateral accords, did not go down well with the West Europeans and the Japanese. ‘The proposal to renegotiate existing cooperative agreements,’ wrote two experts, ‘while commitments under these agreements were not being fulfilled was viewed as contrary to the assurances of reliability of supply and further contributed to the erosion of confidence.’49 The Japanese resented the American posture of a ‘God-granted guardian’ of nuclear technology and the tendency ‘to ignore history’.50

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By the late 1970s, the definition of proliferation changed from the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons to developing ‘nuclear explosive capability’ (through a complete nuclear fuel cycle). The objective of safeguards consequently changed from the detection of diversion to the prevention of nuclear explosive capability. This change in the objective of safeguards was contrary to their original purpose. An American architect of the NPT safeguards had earlier asserted: The safeguards system is not, was never intended to be … a system for the prevention of diversion…. If an IAEA inspector saw someone walking out of a plant with nuclear material, I do not think he would have the slightest authority to stop him. The occurrence can only be reported to the IAEA.51

NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE EVALUATION Even the American nuclear industry was up in arms against the new policy. Some 5,000 delegates at the 11th World Energy Conference ‘roundly criticised it’.52 America’s military allies/ commercial competitors simply refused to accept the new definition of proliferation. They were furious about efforts to coerce them on reprocessing where they viewed that they had an advantage over the US, and resented attempts to eliminate European competition by changing the rules of nuclear commerce. Faced with this opposition, the US convened an International Fuel Cycle Evaluation Meeting. Between November 1978 and February 1980, 590 nuclear experts from 46 countries, including India, held 61 sessions for this purpose. Conceived as a technical exercise and not a diplomatic negotiation, it brought together industrialised and developing countries to explore proliferation-resistant technologies. The fact that the US felt compelled to convene such an exploration stood testimony to her inability to impose unilaterally conceived restrictions on the flow of nuclear technology. The gathering produced 20,000 pages of documents but it was a technically disappointing exercise. There were no technical fixes and the industrialised countries were determined to pursue their own trajectory of civilian nuclear development.53

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After three years of bitter controversy, a nuclear truce was declared. The industrialised countries were allowed to have complete nuclear fuel cycles necessary for their energy autonomy. A political consensus eventually emerged: Drawing a line, not between ‘sensitive’ and dangerous technologies, but between ‘sensitive’ countries that could not be allowed to have enrichment, reprocessing and breeder technologies, and the industrialised non-nuclear weapon countries. The NPT had only made a distinction between nuclear-weapon powers and non-nuclear weapon countries. Another layer of discrimination was now added—non-nuclear weapon countries that were free to develop enrichment, reprocessing and breeder technologies, and others who were allowed only a fragmented nuclear fuel cycle.54 The industrialised countries thus formed a joint front under US leadership. Commercial competition took an unexpected turn when technological problems and anti-nuclear power movements gathered momentum in the US and in Western Europe. The last nuclear power plant that was not subsequently cancelled in the United States was ordered in 1974 (see Appendices 5.2B, 5.3C, 5.4D at the end of this chapter). The collapse of the American civilian nuclear industry, in which successive US administrations had invested billions of dollars, is a disaster on a monumental scale.55 With the exception of France, several West European countries have reduced their dependence on nuclear power. Environmental concerns, however, are now expected to revive civilian nuclear industry.56

NPT SAFEGUARDS SINCE THE GULF WAR

OF

1991

A resurgence of restrictive approaches following the Gulf War of 1991 led to further tightening of the non-proliferation regime. Until the early 1990s, safeguards covered only the declared facilities and materials. They were not designed to detect clandestine nuclear facilities and material. The IAEA was not ‘an international espionage organisation’ with the right ‘to roam over a country to locate clandestine nuclear plants.’57 Revelations about the Iraqi nuclear-weapons programme (see ‘Coercive Disarmament of Iraq’ in the Chapter 7) led to criticism of the IAEA safeguards. Iraq had, however, embarked upon an ambitious nuclear-weapons programme

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by developing a covert nuclear fuel cycle that did not intersect with its declared facilities that were regularly inspected. IAEA inspectors, therefore, could not detect any diversion of nuclear material for military purposes. Despite considerable effort, Iraqi scientists had produced only 3 g of plutonium and 465 g of enriched uranium, much less than the ‘significant quantities’ of the verification system. Thus, even if the IAEA inspectors had detected this amount of diversion from its declared facilities, it would not have been in violation of its obligations. IAEA Director-General Hans Blix conceded that ‘Iraq did not divert any material for its weapons programme.’58 The industrialised countries that had in the past opposed an intrusive verification system now favoured it. Ironically, these were the countries that had profited from nuclear exports to Iraq. Now they wanted verification efforts shifted away from countries with large civilian fuel cycles to what they called ‘suspect’ countries. The IAEA Board of Governors accordingly decided in 1992 to assert the right of ‘special inspections’ of any nuclear facility in a country under agency safeguards. The objective of safeguards was again changed in 1992 to: Prevention of the transfer of capabilities ‘for use in a non-nuclear weapon state in a nuclear explosive activity or an un-safeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activity.’ In a major departure from the original NPT safeguards, the IAEA can now use the National Technical Means of member states to locate undeclared nuclear material and facilities in an inspected state. New sensitive techniques for sampling rivers and the atmosphere to trace isotopes indicating clandestine operations are to be used by IAEA inspectors. ‘Country profiles’ of what are called ‘sensitive’ countries are being prepared.59 The Model Protocol Additional to Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards, approved by the Board of Governors in May 1997, prescribes a more intrusive verification system. States accepting the Protocol would be obliged to provide information about their current and planned nuclear power plans. Inspectors would have access not only to nuclear sites but also to other locations that could contribute to a nuclear programme, such as research in manufacturing facilities. They would use state-of-the-art technologies to trace nuclear activity by taking samples from the environment as well as use surveillance and monitoring systems placed at key locations in the concerned state.60 Each signatory to the NPT has to negotiate with the IAEA a revised safeguards

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agreement. By mid-2003, only 81 out of 187 signatories had negotiated such agreements; and only 37 had ratified them.61

SOUTH AFRICA DISMANTLES NUCLEAR WEAPONS South Africa’s Safari I reactors, the Koeberg nuclear power reactors, a hot cell facility, and nuclear fuel imported from France were under pre-NPT safeguards. Several facilities, including the Valindaba pilot and semi-commercial enrichment plants, a uranium conversion plant at Valindaba and a fuel fabrication plant at Pelindaba, however, remained outside the verification regime. Soon after the General Conference of IAEA adopted a resolution in September 1987 proposing suspension of the apartheid regime, South Africa announced its intention to subscribe to the NPT.62 On 10 July 1991, South Africa joined the NPT and a safeguards agreement was signed on 11 September 1991. The IAEA inspected 77 locations in November 1991. Reporting the complexities of inspecting installations of a de facto nuclear-weapon state, the IAEA Director-General declared that the inspection team had found no evidence of undeclared facilities. The team mentioned ‘the inherent difficulties associated with the evaluation of historical data extending over a period of fifteen years and the quality of the nuclear material accountancy system in use during that time.’63 The inspectors suspected existence of a weapons programme from the large inventory of weapon-grade uranium, but they kept these suspicions to themselves because of the rule of complete confidentiality of the verification procedures.64 Then on 24 March 1993, President Frederik de Klerk disclosed that a South African weapons programme had been started in 1974 and that six nuclear devices had been produced, and a seventh was being built. He added that the devices were dismantled between July 1990 and September 1991. This crucial information was withheld from the IAEA for fear of comprehensive inspections like those being conducted in Iraq. Moreover, the weapons were dismantled secretly without any international verification. Pretoria rejected the US offer to buy the highly enriched uranium on condition of a comprehensive verification.65 The non-proliferation regime does not (and cannot) explicitly prohibit a member state that has dismantled its nuclear weapons from retaining its knowledge and experience in

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building and dismantling nuclear weapons. Can this knowledge be erased and verified like some physical object? The fact remains that when South Africa acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state, it had six nuclear weapons in its possession and all the facilities necessary for a full-fledged weapons programme. Nuclear weapons were dismantled without international supervision. By September 1991, nuclear material was removed from the weapons, melted down and stored. Major non-nuclear components of the weapons, design drawings and photographs still remained. Their destruction began in 1992. By the time of de Klerk’s announcement sensitive weapons components were destroyed or damaged and most of the classified documents shredded. It is reported that about 400 kg of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) were removed from the dismantled weapons. As less than 25 kg can be consumed in the Safari research reactor annually, South Africa will continue to have a sizeable amount of bomb-grade material for more than a decade. It also had several hundred kilograms of HEU enriched between 20 and 80 per cent that was not in the weapons. Despite repeated requests, it has refused to publish even a summary of the inventory of its HEU. The scientists and engineers who produced and dismantled the weapons remain in South Africa. There was a bizarre episode when 16 former members of the weapons programme threatened to reveal secret information to the highest bidder unless they were given more than a million dollars in unemployment benefits. The South African government had to obtain a court injunction prohibiting them from disclosing such sensitive information.66 As a Japanese expert has observed, there are questions as to the actual number of nuclear weapons, and whether all of them and their components have been completely destroyed, together with the capability to manufacture highly enriched uranium.67 Can a country, which had produced nuclear weapons, be put on par with other parties to the NPT, which are innocent in these matters? South Africa joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group as well as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

BELARUS, KAZAKHSTAN

AND

UKRAINE

One of the successes of the non-proliferation regime has been the transfer of Soviet strategic nuclear weapons from Belarus, Kazakhstan and

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Ukraine to the Russian Federation after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Approximately 3,000 strategic nuclear weapons were deployed in the three republics. Ukraine had 34 nuclear-armed strategic bombers, 176 land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and more than 1,200 nuclear warheads; it could qualify as the second most powerful nuclear weapon state in Europe.68 The removal of ICBMs along with their warheads, and their safe transportation to locations in the Russian Federation was a complex diplomatic and technical operation. Through diplomatic pressure and economic incentives Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine were persuaded to join the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states; their nuclear installations, until 1991 an integral part of the Soviet nuclear weapons complex, then came under the IAEA verification regime. Nuclear safeguards are generally applied from the beginning of a reactor’s operational life; this enables the agency to have a complete inventory from the start-up of nuclear facilities. The IAEA, therefore, faced the unprecedented task of preparing an authentic and complete inventory of fissile material in the nuclear installations of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. The expansion of the verification system to more states has caused a drain on the meagre budgetary resources of the IAEA. The verification effort in South Africa, Argentina and Brazil under the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials in 1993, for instance, entailed the expenditure of $2,100,000.69

EXPANDING WEB OF TECHNOLOGY CONTROLS Article IV of the NPT provided for ‘the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of atomic energy.’ The basic bargain of the NPT was assistance by nuclear-weapon powers for peaceful use of atomic energy in exchange for verified undertakings by the non-nuclear weapon countries. It was generally assumed that whatever was not prohibited by the treaty was permitted and even had to be encouraged. The non-nuclear weapon states that were party to the NPT were assured:

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The whole world of nuclear science associated with electric power production is available now. This includes not only the present generation of nuclear power reactors, but also the advanced technology, which is still developing, of fast breeder reactors.70 Even non-nuclear weapon states not party to the NPT (like India until May 1998) were told that there was ‘no requirement under the Treaty that (IAEA) safeguards must be extended to the entire peaceful nuclear programmes of a non-party as a condition of exports from a party.’71 Non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT, with the exception of industrialised countries like Germany and Japan, are no longer allowed to have enrichment and reprocessing technologies even under IAEA safeguards. And, fullscope safeguards are now the standard condition for all nuclear transactions. The nuclear suppliers revived the London Group as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). It’s meeting at Warsaw in April 1992 adopted 40 documents. Its new guidelines say that the objective of non-proliferation is the prevention of transfer of goods that could further ‘nuclear explosive activities’ or ‘nuclear fuel cycle activities’, which are not subject to safeguards. Moreover, international cooperation in the civilian nuclear enterprise is made dependent on promotion of this newly defined non-proliferation policy. While the Zangger Committee’s and London Group’s controls apply only to ‘nuclear unique’ equipment and material, the NSG published a list of 65 dual-use items of technology for which tight licensing procedures are required (see Appendix 5.5E at the end of the chapter). This ‘dual-use regime’ almost abrogates Article IV of the NPT. China joined the Zangger Committee in 1997; it now has 35 members and 38 supplier states comprise the NSG. There is a considerable overlap in the membership of the two groups. In contrast to the Zangger Committee, the NSG members are not required to subscribe to the NPT. While the Zangger Committee controls apply to transfers to non-nuclear weapon states not party to the NPT, the guidelines of NSG are for transfers to all non-nuclear weapon states.72 With French and Chinese accession to the NPT in 1992 and its unlimited extension in May 1995, the nuclear non-proliferation regime now consists of five categories of states:

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• NPT nuclear-weapon powers (Britain, China, France, Russia and the US); • non-NPT nuclear-weapon powers (Israel, India and Pakistan); • NPT non-nuclear weapon countries; • NPT ‘virtual’ nuclear countries (industrialised countries with developed nuclear fuel cycles, especially Germany and Japan). Among non-nuclear weapon states signatory to the NPT, Japan now has the largest inventory of separated plutonium; and, • South Africa, which became an NPT non-nuclear weapon country after it dismantled its nuclear weapons. It retains the HEU from the dismantled weapons as well as the knowledge to build and dismantle them. Since some of their nuclear installations are under pre-NPT safeguards, Israel, India and Pakistan continue to be part of the nonproliferation regime. Israel is generally credited to have a sophisticated nuclear arsenal. The lifting of sanctions imposed by Canada, Japan and the US after the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of May 1998 indicates that the international community has now acquiesced in the new their status. Since Germany and Japan operate complete extensive nuclear fuel cycles and have accumulated large stockpiles of separated plutonium under IAEA safeguards, they belong to the new category of ‘virtual’ nuclear powers in the sense that they have the capacity to build a nuclear weapons arsenal ‘in a matter of months.’73 The nuclear non-proliferation regime has been universalised. In the words of a former chairman of the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission, however, ‘the obligations of non-nuclear weapon states have been unilaterally increased while the undertakings of the weapon states have been diluted.’74 As global diffusion of technology has gathered momentum, there have been successive revisions of the definition of nuclear proliferation and the objectives of nuclear safeguards. The elaborate regime now touches every aspect of nuclear technology throughout the world and the future prospect is one of an ever-expanding web of export controls as well as a more intrusive verification regime. Adherence to the NPT verification regime, however, is no longer considered a sufficient guarantee against proliferation. Counter-proliferation and ballistic missile defences are new additions to the regime.75

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APPENDIX 5.1A Early Exports of Nuclear Power Plants Date of Sale

Seller

Buyer

1957 1958 1959 1959 1959 1959 1960 1961 1962 1962 1963 1965 1965 1965 1965 1965

USA USA UK USA UK USA USA USA USA Canada USA USA Canada Canada France France

Belgium West Germany Japan Italy Italy Italy Japan France West Germany India India Spain Pakistan India Spain West Germany

Source: Adapted from Lee C. Nehrt, International Marketing of Nuclear Power Plants (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966), p. 350.

APPENDIX 5.2B Profile of US Market Growth and Decline Date

Annual Orders

1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974

20 39 16 7 14 22 38 41 26

Cancellations – – – – – – 6 0 8

THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME M 101 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982

4 3 4 0 0 0 0 0

11 2 9 13 8 16 6 16

Source: Adapted from Mark Hertsgaard, Nuclear INC.: The Men and Money Behind Nuclear Energy (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983), p. 288.

APPENDIX 5.3C US Domestic Orders and Cancellations Time Period 1965–69 1970–74 1975–78 1979 1980–84 1985–87

Orders

Cancellations

81 140 13 0 0 0

0 14 35 8 54 3

Source: Adapted from Steve Cohen, ‘The Political economy of Nuclear Power (1945–1990): The Rise and Fall of an Official Technology’, Journal of Economic Issues, September 1990, Vol. XXIV, No. 3, p. 800; Christopher Flawin, ‘Nuclear Power’s Burdened future,’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 1987, pp. 26–31.

APPENDIX 5.4D Profile of US Reactor Exports Date

US World Market

Share, Annual 1968 1969

18% 26%

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30% 43% 61% 8% 20% 22% 14% 7% 13% 33% 0% 0% 0%

Source: Mark Hertsgaard, Nuclear INC.: The Men and Money Behind Nuclear Energy (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983), p. 290.

APPENDIX 5.5E The Nuclear Suppliers Group List of Nuclear-rrelated Dual-u use Equipment and Materials and Related Technology

1. INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8

Spin-forming and flow-forming machines ‘Numerical control’ units, machine tools, etc. Dimensional inspection systems Vacuum induction furnaces Isostatic presses Robots and effectors Vibration test equipment Furnaces—remelt, electron beam, and plasma

2. MATERIALS 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4

Aluminium, high-strength Beryllium Bismuth (high purity) Boron (isotopically enriched in boron-10)

THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME M 103 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.10 2.11 2.12 2.13 2.14 2.15 2.16

Calcium (high purity) Chlorine trifluoride Crucibles made of materials resistant to liquid actinide metals Fibrous and filamentary materials Hafnium Lithium (isotopically enriched in Lithium-6) Magnesium (high purity) Maraging steel, high-strength Radium Titanium alloys Tungsten Zirconium

3. URANIUM ISOTOPE SEPARATION EQUIPMENT AND COMPONENTS 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.10 3.11 3.12 3.13 3.14

Electrolytic cells for fluorine production Rotor and bellows equipment Centrifugal multiplane balancing machines Filament winding machines Frequency changers Lasers, laser amplifiers, and oscillators Mass spectrometers and mass spectrometer ion sources Pressure measuring instruments, corrosion-resistant Valves, corrosion-resistant Superconducting solenoidal electromagnets Vacuum pumps Direct current high-power supplies (100 V or greater) High-voltage direct current power supplies (20,000 V or greater) Electromagnetic isotope separators

4. HEAVY WATER PRODUCTION PLANT RELATED EQUIPMENT (OTHER THAN TRIGGER LIST ITEMS) 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5

Specialised packings for water separation Pumps for potassium amide/liquid ammonia Water-hydrogen sulfide exchanged tray columns Hydrogen-cryogenic distillation columns Ammonia converters or synthesis reactors

104 M MATIN ZUBERI

5. IMPLOSION SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT EQUIPMENT 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5

Flash x-ray equipment Multistage light gas guns/high-velocity guns Mechanical rotating mirror cameras Electronic streak and framing cameras and tubes Specialised instrumentation for hydrodynamic experiments

6. EXPLOSIVES 6.1 6.2

6.3 6.4

AND

RELATED EQUIPMENT

Detonators and multipoint initiation systems Electronic components for firing sets 6.2.1 Switching devices 6.2.2 Capacitors Firing sets and equivalent high-current pulsers (for controlled detonators) High explosives relevant to nuclear weapons

7. NUCLEAR TESTING EQUIPMENT AND COMPONENTS 7.1 7.2 7.3

Oscilloscopes Photomultiplier tubes Pulse generators (high speed)

8. OTHER 8.1 8.2

8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7

Neutron generator systems General nuclear related equipment 8.2.1 Remote manipulators 8.2.2 Radiation shielding windows 8.2.3 Radiation-hardened TV cameras Tritium, tritium compounds, and mixtures Tritium facilities or plants and components Platinised carbon catalysts Helium-3 Alpha-emitting radionuclides

Source: IAEA document INFCICR/254/Rev. 1/Part2, July 1992, reproduced in SIPRI Yearbook 1993 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 242–43.

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NOTES

1. See Centre for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Inventory of International Organisations and Regimes (Monterey, CA, August 2000). 2. Bertrand Goldschmidt, ‘From Nuclear Middle Ages to Nuclear Renaissance’, in Joseph F. Pilat, Robert F. Pindley and Charles K. Ebinger (Eds), Atoms for Peace: An Analysis After Thirty Years (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985), p. 112. 3. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., ‘NPT: The Logic of Inequality’, Foreign Policy, Summer 1985, No. 59, p. 128. Emphasis added. 4. Theo Sommer, ‘Germany’s Reservations’, Survival, 1967, Vol. IX, No. 5, p. 144; Carl F. von Weizsacker, ‘Nuclear Inspection’, Survival, 1967, Vol. IX, No. 5, p. 148. 5. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), The NearNuclear Countries and the NPT (New York: Humanities Press, 1972), pp. 51–67. 6. See Yuri Kase, ‘The Costs and Benefits of Japan’s Nuclearisation: An Insight into the 1968/70 Report’, The Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2001, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 55–68. 7. SIPRI, op. cit. (note 5) pp. 35–42; Ryukichi Imai, ‘The Non-Proliferation Treaty and Japan’, Survival, September 1969, Vol. XI, No. 9, pp. 280–86. 8. Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi, 1961), p. 193. Emphasis added. 9. See Nonproliferation Treaty: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. Executive H, 90th Congress, Second Session, July 10, 11, 12, and 17, 1968 (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1968), pp. 262–63. 10. See Otfried Nassauer, ‘Nuclear Sharing in NATO: Is it Legal?’, Science for Democratic Action, May 2001, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 1, 13–14. 11. See Nonproliferation Treaty, op., cit. (note 9) p. 43. 12. Rebecca Johnson, ‘Troubled Treaties: Is the NPT Tottering?’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 1999, Vol. 55, No. 2, pp. 16–18. 13. Emily Y. Bailey and John Simpson, ‘Issues and Options for the 2000 NPT Review Conference’, Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN) Issue Review, April 2000, No. 17, p. 5. 14. Mark Hibbs, ‘Tomorrow, a Eurobomb?’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 1996, Vol. 52, No. 1, pp. 16–23. 15. George Bunn and Roland M. Timerbaev, Nuclear Verification under NPT: What Should It Cover—How Far It May Go?, PPNN Study Five, April 1994, p. 3. 16. Karl E. Birnbaum, ‘Sweden’s Nuclear Policy’, Survival, December 1965, Vol. VII, No. 9, pp. 314–18, 333; Steve Coll, ‘Sweden’s Quiet Quest: Nuclear Arms Option’, International Herald Tribune, November 26–27, 1994. 17. Nonproliferation Treaty, op. cit. (note 9), p. 39.

106 M MATIN ZUBERI 18. George Bunn and Roland M. Timerbaev, op. cit. (note 15), p. 3 and endnote 2 on p. 20. Emphasis added. 19. ‘New Move on the Dutch Uranium Plant’, New Scientist, October 3, 1968, pp. 6–7. 20. Nicholas Vallery, ‘The Billion Dollar Enrichment Business’, New Scientist and Science Journal, September 16, 1971, pp. 617–19; Hans Mohrhauer, ‘Enriching Europe with Gas Centrifuge’, New Scientist, October 5, 1972, pp. 12–14. 21. Margaret Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy 1939–1945, (London: Macmillan, 1965), p. 439. 22. See Michael A. Bauser, ‘United States Nuclear Export Policy: Developing the Peaceful Atom as a Commodity in International Trade’, Harvard Journal of International Law, Spring 1977, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 227–71. 23. Harold L. Nieburg, Nuclear Secrecy and Foreign Policy (Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1964), pp. 78–83. 24. For ‘reactor wars’ leading to the emergence of the American light water reactor as the dominant reactor system in the world, see M. Zuberi, ‘Nuclear Commerce and Nuclear Technology’, Man & Development, 1983, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 150–61. 25. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Senate members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 55th Congress, Ist session, May 10, 14, 15, and 20, 1957, (Washington D.C.: USGPO, 1957), p. 5. 26. Ibid., p. 14 and p. 88. 27. Allan McKnight, Atomic Safeguards: A Study in International Verification (New York: UNITAR, 1971), p. 48. 28. Conference on the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Oral Record, Chairman, Indian Atomic Energy Commission, Homi Bhabha, IAEA/CS/OR. 7 (September 27, 1956). 29. Lawrence Scheinman, ‘EURATOM and the IAEA’, in Bennett Boksey and Mason Willrich (Eds), Nuclear Proliferation: Prospects for Control (New York: Dunellen, 1970), pp. 63–79. 30. David A. Fischer, The Future of the IAEA, PPNN Issue Review No. 2, December 1993, p. 5. 31. International Atomic Energy Agency Vienna, IAEA. Information Circular INFCIR/66. 32. For the evolution of safeguards in the context of nuclear technology and commercial competition, see M. Zuberi, ‘Nuclear Safeguards: The Servitudes of Civilian Nuclear Technology’, in K. Subramanyam (Ed.), Nuclear Myths and Realities (New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1981), pp. 1–20. 33. Ashok Kapur, Pakistan’s Nuclear Development (London: Croom Helm, 1987), p. 6. 34. Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today (New York: Carneigie Endowment/Vintage Books, 1984), pp. 93–94. 35. See Lewis A. Dunn, ‘Nuclear “Gray-Marketeering,”’ International Security, Winter 1976–77, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 107–18. 36. Frank Barnaby, ‘Safeguards—With or Without Strings?’, New Scientist and Science Journal, February 1971, pp. 430–32.

THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME M 107 37. See W. Hafele, ‘NPT Safeguards’, in SIPRI, Nuclear Proliferation Problems (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1974), pp. 142–57; Laurance Scheinman, The International Atomic Energy Agency and World Nuclear Order (Washington D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1987), pp. 147–71. 38. Michael J. Brenner, Nuclear Power and Nuclear Proliferation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 67. 39. Abraham A. Ribicoff, ‘A Market-Sharing Approach to the Nuclear Sales Problem’, Foreign Affairs, July 1976, Vol. 54, No. 4, pp. 763–87. 40. See Richard J. Barber Associates, Inc., LDC Nuclear Power Prospects, 1975–1990: Commercial, Economic and Security Implications, ERDA-52 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, 1975). 41. Gloria Duffy, ‘Soviet Nuclear Exports’, International Security, Summer 1978, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 87. 42. See M. Zuberi, ‘Soviet and American Technological Assistance and the Pace of Chinese Nuclear Tests’, Strategic Analysis, October 2000, Vol. XXIV, No. 7, pp. 1248–55 and 1263–65. 43. Frank Barnaby, ‘A Gentleman’s Nuclear Agreement’, New Scientist, February 24, 1977, p. 469. 44. The committee meets regularly since then and updates the Trigger List. It has made eight ‘clarifications’, the last in June 1999. See Fritz Schmidt, ‘NPT Exports and the Zangger Committee’, The Non-proliferation Review, Fall-Winter 2000, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 136–45; see also Mark Hibbs, ‘China to Join Zangger Committee, But Not With Full-Scope Safeguards’, Nucleonics Week, October 2, 1997, p. 1. This reservation should be read in the context of China’s continuing nuclear and missile exports to Pakistan even after China acceded to the NPT in 1992. 45. ‘France Falls out with Pakistan over Reprocessing’, Nature, 2 February 1978, pp. 397–98. 46. Atomic Energy Law Journal, Fall 1976, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 230–52. Emphasis added. 47. Professor Joseph Nye, Deputy to the Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology, supported the export licence application for four months’ supply of fuel because Prime Minister Morarji Desai had given assurances that India had ‘no need whatsoever for an atomic bomb’, and that India would ‘unilaterally desist from making nuclear tests.’ See ‘Nuclear Policy: Nuclear Fuel Exports to India’, Department of State Bulletin, July 1978, p. 46. 48. Peter Pringle and James Spigelman, Nuclear Barons (London: Michael Joseph, 1982), pp. 382–83. 49. Bertrand Goldschmidt and Myron B. Kratzer, Peaceful Nuclear Relations: The Creation and the Erosion of Confidence (London, New York: The Rockefeller Foundation/The Royal Institute of International Affairs, November 1978), p. 47. Goldschmidt had been a member of the French Atomic Energy Commission and, later, French representative on the IAEA Board of Governors. Kratzer was senior American delegate for the Committee of the IAEA Board of Governors that devised the NPT safeguards. 50. Ryukichi Imai and Henry S. Rowen, Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Proliferation (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 3–14.

108 M MATIN ZUBERI 51. Myron Kratzer in Mason Willrich (Ed.), Civil Nuclear Power and International Security (New York: Praeger, 1971), p. 72. 52. ‘Atom Advocates: US. Policy Draws Heavy Fire’, Time, September 22, 1980, p. 72. French, German, Japanese and Spanish experts had condemned Carter’s nuclear policy at the International Conference on Nuclear Exports held at New York in March 1978. The conference was organised by the US Atomic Industrial Forum. See Nuclear News, May 1977, pp. 38–40. 53. Pierre Lellouche, ‘International Nuclear Politics’, Foreign Affairs, Winter 1979–80, Vol. 58, No. 2, pp. 336–50. 54. See George Quester, ‘INFCE and the Less Developed Countries’, in Rodney W. Jones, (Ed.), Next Steps After INFCE: US Nuclear and Non-proliferation Policy (Washington, D.C.: March 1980), pp. 201–50. 55. See John L. Campbell, Collapse of an Industry: Nuclear Power and the Contradictions of US Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988). 56. See Richard Rhodes and Dennis Beller, ‘The Need for Nuclear Power’, IAEA Bulletin, 2000, Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 43–50; Bill McKibbon, ‘Some Like It Hot’, New York Review of Books, July 5, 2001, Vol. 48, No. 11, pp. 35–38. 57. Herbert Scoville, Jr., ‘Technical Capabilities of Safeguards,’ in Bennett Boksey and Mason Willrich (Eds), Nuclear Proliferation: Prospects for Control, op. cit. (note 29), p. 54. 58. Hans Blix, ‘The Non-proliferation Outlook’, United Nations, Disarmament, Vol. XVI, No. 2, p. 9. The elimination of Iraq’s capability to produce weapons of mass destruction was in accordance with a mandate from the UN Security Council. For the findings of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) on Iraq, see ‘Iraq: The UNSCOM Experience,’ SIPRI Fact Sheet, October 1998. 59. David Fischer, Ben Sanders, Lawrence Schienman and George Bunn, A New Nuclear Triad, PPNN Study Three, September 1992. 60. International Atomic Energy Agency, INFCIRC/540 (Corrected), September 1997; see The UN Disarmament Yearbook, 1999, pp. 29–30. 61. George Bunn, ‘The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: History and Current Problems’, Arms Control Today, December 2003, Vol. 33, No. 10, p. 8. 62. Warren H. Donnelly, South Africa, Nuclear Weapons, and the IAEA (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Update June 9, 1989). 63. PPNN Newsbrief, No. 19, Autumn 1992, p. 6. 64. Institute for Science and International Security, ‘South Africa’s Secret Nuclear Weapons,’ ISIS Report, March 1994, pp. 2–3. 65. John B. Wolfsthal, ‘IAEA Inspects South African Nuclear Programme’, Arms Control Today, October 1992, p. 36; David Albright, ‘South Africa and the Affordable Bomb’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 1994, Vol. 50, No. 4, pp. 37–47; PPNN Newsbrief, No. 25, First Quarter 1994, p. 13. 66. Institute for Science and International Security, ‘South Africa’s Secret Nuclear Weapons’, op. cit. (note 64), p. 19; David Albright, Frans Berkhout and William Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1992 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 384, 403. This book was published by Oxford for SIPRI. 67. Ruyukichi Imai, ‘Post-Cold War Non-Proliferation and Japan’, Japan Review of International Affairs, Fall 1994, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 317, 327.

THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME M 109 68. M. Zuberi, ‘Cooperative Denuclearization: NPT Safeguards and India’s Nuclear Strategy’, International Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2, p. 153; see also ‘Nuclear Backsliding in Ukraine’, New York Times (editorial), May 4, 1993; ‘Kazakhstan, the Nuclear Holdout,’ New York Times (editorial), May 18, 1993; PPNN Newsbrief, No. 26, Second Quarter 1994, p. 8. 69. David Fischer, ‘Innovations in IAEA Safeguards to Meet the Challenges of the 1990s’, in David Fischer, Ben Sanders, Lawrence Scheinman and George Bunn (Eds), A New Nuclear Triad, op. cit. (note 59), p. 29. 70. Cited in Karl Kaiser, ‘The Great Nuclear Debate: German-American Disagreements’, Foreign Policy, Spring, No. 30, 1978, p. 84. 71. See comments of Myron Kratzer in Mason Willrich (Ed.), Civil Nuclear Power and International Security, op. cit. (see note 51), p. 68. 72. Centre for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Inventory of International Non-proliferation Organisations and Regimes, op. cit. (see note 1), pp. 31–39. 73. See Marc Dean Milot, ‘Facing the Emerging Reality of Regional Nuclear Adversaries’, Washington Quarterly, Summer 1994, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 41–71; Patrick J. Garrity, ‘The Depreciation of Nuclear Weapons in International Politics: Possibilities, Limits, Uncertainties’, Journal of Strategic Studies, December 1991, Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 475–79. 74. Munir Ahmad Khan, Nuclear Energy and International Cooperation: A Third World Perspective on the Erosion of Confidence, (London, New York: The Rockefeller Foundation/The Royal Institute of International Affairs, September 1979), p. 32. 75. Joseph F. Pilat and Walter L. Kirchner, ‘The Technological Promise of Counter-proliferation’, Washington Quarterly, Winter 1995, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 153–66; James Clay Moltz, ‘The Impact of National Missile Defence on Non-proliferation Regimes’, The Non-proliferation Review, Fall/Winter 2000, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 61–74.

CHAPTER

6 The Chemical and Biological Weapons Regimes Arundhati Ghose

ORIGINS If the word ‘regime’ is taken to mean a set or sets of legal obligations accepted by states which share certain norms of behaviour, the norms themselves usually emanate from civil society at large (where civil societies have the awareness, access to information and the ability to articulate their concerns), reacting to certain events or practises. These reactions, at least as far as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) are concerned, usually have their origins in humanitarian rather than strategic concerns, and have sometimes been codified into non-binding, though norm-setting International Humanitarian Law (IHL).1 The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) emanate directly from the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (even though there were earlier ‘declarations’—Brussels, 1874 and The Hague, 1899) which, in the public

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revulsion to the effects of the use of chemical weapons during the First World War, prohibits the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare.2 The protocol prohibits the use of Chemical Weapons (CW) and Biological Weapons (BW) in war, but does not include any reference to the development, production, stockpiling or deployment of BW or CW, nor the procedures to deal with violations. Of the 133 states that signed the protocol about 40, including the then Government of India, entered their reservations with respect to the protocol to the effect that they would, first, be bound by the protocol only as regards those states parties that had signed and ratified it, and second, that they would not be bound as regards any country whose armed forces, or the armed forces of whose allies, violated the provisions of the protocol.3 Many of these states, including the Government of UK, eventually withdrew their reservations; some after the conclusion of the BTWC in 1972 and others after the entry into force of the CWC in 1997. The Government of India has not, to date, withdrawn the reservation made on India’s behalf. The Geneva Protocol can be seen as the norm setter as far as BW and CW are concerned. In fact, in the preambles of both conventions, the states parties reaffirm their adherence to the principles, objectives and obligations of the Geneva Protocol. In 1948, the UN Commission for Conventional Armaments identified CW and BW as ‘weapons of mass destruction’. The use of chemicals and defoliants by the US during the Vietnam War, and the accidental release of nerve gas from a US army proving ground in Utah, led to the issue being taken up, in 1968, as a distinct issue, in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (the predecessor of the Conference on Disarmament). The UN Secretary General produced a report in 1969 on ‘Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of their Possible Use’, after the UN General Assembly (UNGA) commissioned an international group to study the issue. On 25 November 1969 the new Nixon administration announced its support for the Geneva Protocol, excluding the use of tear gas and chemical defoliants from its purview; it also unilaterally renounced BW, even in retaliation, as well as lethal and incapacitating chemical weapons. All stocks of BW were to be destroyed and research on them stopped. Britain tabled a draft treaty banning only BW, at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). The Soviet Union also submitted a draft, but covered both CW and BW. The Anglo-Saxon powers, however, maintained that CW had already been used in warfare and

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the verification of a ban against them was thus extremely difficult. Although BW stockpiles could be concealed, these weapons had not been tested under ‘realistic conditions’. These powers were, therefore, willing to subscribe to a ban on BW with minimum inspection provisions. The Soviet argument was that a ban on BW alone would tend to legitimise CW and would also be a blow to the Geneva Protocol. The deadlock was broken when, on 30 March 1971, the Soviet delegation tabled a draft on CW, and separate negotiations on a BTWC commenced. The CCD forwarded an agreed draft convention to the UNGA on 30 September 1971. The BTWC entered into force in 1975. The text of the BTWC contains an explicit call for ‘consideration of progress on the abolition of CW at its Review Conference’ (Article XII). As will be seen ahead, just as developments in the biotech industry was one of the factors leading to the establishment of VEREX, an intergovernmental group of experts working on verification mechanisms for BTWC, the modernisation of the chemical industry in many countries, coupled with reports of CW possessors and use of CW in the Iran-Iraq conflict spurred the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to commence work on a convention on chemical weapons. It was, however, the 1991 Gulf War, and the perceived threat by the Western allies of the use of CW by Iraq, that gave the definitive impetus to the flagging negotiations on CW (and possibly resulted in the highly intrusive verification system finally agreed upon). The CD concluded its negotiations within a year and the CWC was opened for signature in 1992, and entered into force in 1997. Work on a protocol to strengthen the BTWC, focusing on verification and compliance measures commenced in 1991, again spurred by the fallout of the Gulf War, with its work significantly influenced by the CWC. The Ad Hoc Group of states parties to the BTWC produced a compromise ‘Chairman’s composite text’ which, in July 2001, was rejected by the US. Work on the protocol has remained moribund since. Notwithstanding the fact that both CW and BW have been treated as categories of WMD, distinct from nuclear weapons, there is no doubt that the three regimes are, in a sense, intertwined. Apart from the substantive aspect, there has also been a direct interrelationship between the verification regimes negotiated. As noted by Alan Dowty4 the United States, in particular, has increasingly invoked its nuclear arsenal, implicitly or explicitly, as a deterrent to chemical or biological attack…. Egypt and Syria see their chemical

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arsenals as a needed counter to Israel’s nuclear capability; they and other Arab States have refused to sign or ratify the CWC until Israel joins the NPT. He also notes that Taiwan and southern Asian nations bordering India and Pakistan have either not signed or ratified the CWC. In his view, it is increasingly impossible to separate nuclear arms control from efforts to eliminate chemical or biological weapons…. Nuclear arsenals are justified as a hedge against chemical and biological attack, while CBW is pursued as ‘the poor man’s nuclear weapon.’ The latest exposition of this view is found in the US National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction in which it is stated We know from experience that we cannot always be successful in preventing and containing the proliferation of WMD to hostile states and terrorists. Therefore, the US military and appropriate civilian agencies must possess the full range of operational capabilities to counter the threat.…5 On the verification side, the intertwining of nuclear weapons (NW) with chemical and biological weapons (CBW) regimes is more than speculative. The first comprehensive and extremely intrusive verification regime was adopted in the CWC, concluded in 1993. While this regime will be examined later, it would suffice to say that the IAEA Protocol on Additional Safeguards Agreements approved in May 1997 (Programme 93+2) drew heavily on the CWC intrusive verification techniques (even while retaining the special status of the five NPT Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and that of India, Pakistan and Israel).6 The same verification techniques, (except for the International Monitoring System) was adopted in the CTBT and further ‘refined’ in the Chairman’s composite text on the BTWC Protocol, which was eventually rejected by the US. Here, it is worth underlining the point that unlike the nuclear regime, the BW and CW regimes are universal in their application to all states parties, and they can abolish an entire category of weapons, thereby making their possession illegal. The NPT does not delegitimise nuclear weapons. This has created major difficulties for the WMD powers—exemplified in the US conditions attached to the NPT’s ratification of CW and culminating in the country’s withdrawal

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from the BTWC Protocol negotiations. Other major players, particularly Russia and China, have sheltered behind the objections of others to protect their interests. As in the case of Article XIV of the CTBT, which was adopted, as drafted, on the insistence of these two countries, the US withdrawal from the BTWC Protocol negotiations too saw no tears from the delegations of these two countries. On the other hand, while the CWC and BTWC take cognisance of the importance of the civilian use of the relevant technologies, the nuclear regime is almost purely weapons oriented, and, in fact, can be said to be biased against even the civilian uses of nuclear energy. Finally, while the nuclear regime can be said to have evolved along a given path, the BW and CW regimes developed, not only asymmetrically, but almost abruptly. The development or establishment of these regimes was uneven, perhaps because public or civil society’s reaction in the West (which had led in the establishment of all WMD and WMD regimes) has been more limited against the use of BW and CW when compared to the anti-nuclear movement. In spite of the fact that chemical weapons were used in World War I and were deployed, though not used during World War II, and BW were used against China by Japan during the same period, and more recently, allegedly by Iraq against Iran, BW and CW were not. BW and CW are still not considered effective as weapons of war by many military strategists. It is only recently, with the Gulf War and the US fear of Iraqi use of biological and chemical weapons; the collapse of the Soviet Union and the controls on biological and chemical weapons facilities and the agents produced/stockpiled by them; and, the emergence of non-state actors on the international stage, as combatants, with easy access to technology and funds to purchase these weapons, that international interest in controls on biological and chemical weapons have sharpened.

CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, STOCKPILING AND USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION (CWC) The CWC, like the BTWC, is of unlimited duration and, as of 2003, 151 states had ratified/acceded to it—the major hold-outs being the Arab states. Like the BTWC, the CWC abolished an entire category of

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weapons. Unlike the BTWC, however, the CWC was negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament and became the first, and so far the only multilaterally negotiated disarmament treaty under full international verification procedures. Article I of the CWC prohibits the use, development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention and transfer, direct or indirect, of CW. It also stipulates the destruction of CW, owned or possessed or abandoned on its territory and of CW production facilities. Article II (read with the Schedules in the Annex), contains detailed provisions spelling out definitions and criteria of terms used in the convention, and the chemicals considered to be toxic chemicals or their precursors, both in terms of their potential for CW application and extent of industrial applications. Articles III–V and IX with the Verification Annex form the core of the CWC. A deadline of 10 years is stipulated for the destruction of CW and CW facilities under strict international supervision. The institutions established by the CWC, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Conference of States Parties, the Executive Council, the Technical Secretariat etc., find a reflection not only in the BTWC Chairman’s composite text but also in the institutional set up of the CTBT. The definition and categorisation of chemical weapons and their potential brings both military and industrial facilities in countries under the purview of the verification regime. To ensure compliance with the CWC, a two-prong verification regime comprising of national declarations and on-site inspections has been established. By their national declarations, 11 countries have declared possession of existing or former CWproduction facilities, including China, France, India, Iran, Japan, Republic of Korea, Russia, United Kingdom and the United States. Four countries have declared CW stocks: India, Republic of Korea, Russia and the USA. Other countries have declared old or abandoned CW on their territory. On the basis of these national declarations, the OPCW is expected to assemble a reasonably comprehensive picture of CW capabilities and of the facilities handling dual-use chemicals in member states. Information on military and industrial facilities heretofore sequestered from the eyes of all but those operating these plants must now be deposited with the Technical Secretariat on an annual basis. On-site inspections in turn grow out of the data in the declarations.7

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The verification procedures provide for the following: • ‘Routine’ on-site inspection of declared sites. • A procedure for consultations, cooperation and fact finding. • Challenge inspections, according to which each state party has the right to request an on-site inspection of any facility or locations in any other state party to deal with questions of possible non-compliance. Even for so-called ‘routine’ inspections, the treaty states that inspectors are to be granted ‘unimpeded access’ to the site. They have the right to examine records and interview personnel. They may also visit relevant parts of the facility, including chemical production, storage and waste treatment areas. If necessary, inspectors can ask to take photographs or samples. In addition, they can place seals and tags on munitions.8 In fact, these routine inspections would give a clear picture of a state’s military and industrial chemical activities. Challenge inspections, on the other hand, are supposed to proceed on the basis of ‘managed access’ wherein the challenged state can restrict the access of the inspectors to only information considered absolutely necessary. On conclusion of such a visit the inspectors would not only file a fact-based report but would also comment on the degree of cooperation accorded them by the host states. To date, no challenge inspection has taken place. The CWC also contains articles relating to restrictions of transfers of certain chemicals and requires the enactment of a national implementing legislation to, inter-alia, prohibit individuals under its jurisdiction or control from engaging in activities prohibited by the convention. Each state party is obligated to designate or establish a national authority to serve as the focal point for liaison with the OPCW and with other state authorities. India ratified the CWC in 1996. She has established a national authority under the Cabinet Secretariat. It is headed by a civilian, who is not necessarily a part of the national security establishment. Several inspections have taken place in India, particularly following India’s declaration of possession of CW, after her ratification of the CWC. During the negotiations of the CWC, an agreement was signed between India and Pakistan on chemical weapons in 1992. The agreement provided for the complete prohibition of chemical weapons and

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included a commitment towards not developing, possessing or using chemical weapons.

THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION (BTWC) The BTWC, even though it did not contain any specific verification provisions nor prohibit its use, does consolidate the norm against BW. The convention is of unlimited duration. The major elements of the BTWC are contained in Articles I, II, III and XII: Article I prohibits, ‘in any circumstance’, the production, development, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of BW, while Article II sets a deadline of nine months after the entry into force of the convention, for the destruction of all BW specified in Article I and their means of delivery. Article III bans transfers while Article XII calls for five annual Review Conferences ‘with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention … are being realized’ (in the event, a concept of continuing review was introduced at the First Review Conference). Action against non-compliance, including carrying out investigations was left to the UN Security Council (Article VI). The BTWC regime evolved through its Review Conferences: The First Review Conference called for declarations of BW possession to be made, which later became a confidence-building measure (CBM), and the initiation of the sharing of legislative experience at the national level. The voluntary submission of declarations was made politically binding in 1986, by the Second Review Conference, and in 1991, the Third Review Conference set up an Ad-hoc Group of Governmental Experts (VEREX) to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint. This move towards a verification regime was in part prompted by allegations in 1979 of a suspicious outbreak of anthrax in Sverdlovsk, eventually traced to an accidental release from a Soviet BW facility (the US and USSR had been formally permitted by WHO to retain, until 1995, small quantities of the smallpox virus) the advance in biotechnology and reports that other countries had BW programmes.

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With the easing of the Cold War in 1992, President Yeltsin conceded that the Soviet Union had violated the BTWC and issued a decree outlawing the continuation of the BW programme. In 1992, an agreement was reached between the three co-depository states—Russia, US and UK—giving each other access to their biological research facilities. Also, after the Gulf War of 1991, the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) uncovered evidence that Iraq had an ongoing BW programme, and a report on the risk of use of BW by non-state groups, was published. The report of VEREX was presented to a Special Conference of States Parties in 1994, and it was decided to set up an Ad-hoc Group ‘to consider appropriate measures including possible verification measures, and draft proposals to strengthen the BTWC, to be included, as appropriate, in a legally binding instrument.’9 The Ad-hoc Group after more than six years of negotiation, ultimately came up with a ‘Chairman’s composite text’ in July 2001, a text which commanded a wide degree of consensus, but from which the US withdrew, even though it sees itself as a prime target of BW attack. According to its intelligence sources, 12 other countries have BW programmes including India and Pakistan, and seven have an offensive BW capability: China, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Russia and Syria. The elements of the ‘Ad Hoc Committee’s Chairman’s composite text’ are as follows: • Establishment of an OPBW, with an Executive Council and a Technical Secretariat. • Under ‘Compliance Measures’, three types of measures are contemplated: i. Declarations: Possession of BW and facilities from 1946; use of BW; national biological defence programmes or activities; annual reports of ‘maximum biological containment’ facilities producing vaccines; annual reports on national biological defence programmes or activities which are permitted. Facilities to also report on ‘biological materials’ produced and held. Failure to comply with declarations would be penalised. ii. Visits and Clarification Procedures: There are three types of visits and one investigation as follows: • • •

Voluntary assistance visits. ‘Randomly selected transparency visits’. ‘Clarification’ visits, i.e., challenge inspection visits.

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iii. Investigations: Field and facilities investigations with elaborate control procedures. • A number of measures to protect an investigated state, including ‘managed access’. The composite text requires states parties to review and report on their national export controls and annual declarations of data of export of certain equipment which may have dual-use purposes. It is evident how the CW model has influenced even a compromise BW protocol text, even though there is a great difference in the type of weapons and therefore, in the type of verification mechanisms.10 During the negotiations, the UK took a lead role in pushing for a highly intrusive verification regime. It was supported by most NATO countries, though the US had, even before its walkout, been ambivalent throughout, especially after their experience of CW. China and Russia opposed the degree of intrusiveness, while Iran and Pakistan, albiet supporting them also pushed for the abolition of the ad-hoc export control groups and the promotion of international cooperation in the field of biotechnology. India’s position was more muted—she supported intrusive verification with some limits. Issues relating to India’s position will be handled in Chapter 8. After the US walkout on the grounds that the text was flawed, and would not prevent cheating, but would, on the other hand, expose their facilities to international inspection, the status of the text is indeterminate.

EXPORT CONTROL GROUPS The two export control groups which have an impact on the BW and CW regimes are the Australia Group and then Wassenaar Arrangement on export controls for conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies. The Australia Group was established in 1985 and is an informal association of mainly NATO countries set up to limit the spread of CBW through the control of chemical precursors, CBW equipment, and BW agents and organisms. During the CWC negotiations an informal understanding had been reached with the Australia Group that it would be disbanded once the CWC came into force. However, one of the conditions of the US ratification of the

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CWC was the strengthening of the Australia Group. According to latest information, the group which now has a common export control list, continues to operate. It has admitted the Republic of Korea and the Czech Republic to its membership.11 The Wassenaar Arrangement is basically composed of the same country’s as the Australia Group but includes Russia. One of the purposes of the arrangement, which is a successor to the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCOM) is to complement and reinforce the existing export control regimes for WMD and their delivery system by focusing on threats which may arise from transfers of sensitive dual-use goods and technologies. The arrangement basically deals with conventional weapons and not CBW. However, the information sharing among group members and end-use certification requirements for each category of dual-use technology would have an impact on the transfers of equipments to non-members of the arrangement.

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APPENDIX 6.1A PROTOCOL FOR THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE IN WAR OF ASPHYXIATING, POISONOUS OR OTHER GASES, AND OF BACTERIOLOGICAL METHODS OF WARFARE (GENEVA PROTOCOL) Signed at Geneva: 17 June 1925 Entered into force: for each signatory as from the date of deposit of its ratification; accessions take effect on the date of notification by the depositary Government. Depositary Government: France. The Undersigned Plenipotentiaries, in the name of their respective Governments: Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world; and Whereas the prohibition of such use has been declared in Treaties to which the majority of Powers of the world are Parties; and To the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of International Law, binding alike the conscience and the practice of nations; Declare: That the High Contracting Parties, so far as they are not already Parties to Treaties prohibiting such use, accept this prohibition, agree to extend this prohibition to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare and agree to be bound as between themselves according to the terms of this declaration. The High Contracting Parties will exert every effort to induce other States to accede to the present Protocol. Such accession will be notified to the Government of the French Republic, and will take effect on the date of the notification by the Government of the French Republic. The present Protocol, of which the English and French texts are both authentic, shall be ratified as soon as possible. It shall bear today’s date. The ratifications of the present Protocol shall be addressed to the Government of the French Republic, which will at once notify the deposit of such ratification to each of the signatory and acceding powers. The instruments of ratification of and accession to the present Protocol will remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the French Republic.

122 M ARUNDHATI GHOSE The present Protocol will come into force for each signatory Power as from the date of deposit of its ratification, and, from that moment, each Power will be bound as regards other Powers which have already deposited their ratifications. In witness whereof the Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol. Done at Geneva in a single copy, the seventeenth day of June, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Five.

APPENDIX 6.2B India had deposited its Instrument of Ratification of ‘Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Teriological Methods of Warfare’, signed at Geneva on 17 June, 1925, known as the 1925 Geneva Protocol (Annexure II), on 9 April, 1930, with the following reservation: (i) The said Protocol is only binding on His Britannic Majesty as regards those States which have both signed and ratified it, or have finally accepted thereto. (ii) The said Protocol shall cease to be binding on His Britannic Majesty towards any Power at enmity with Him whose armed forces, or the armed forces of whose allies, fail to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol.

APPENDIX 6.3C AUSTRALIA GROUP (AG) Established: 1985 Membership: 30 states—Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and US. The EU Commission participates in AG meetings. AG is an informal association, which works on the basis of consensus. Regime goal: to limit the spread of CBW through the control of chemical precursors, CBW equipment, and BW agents and organisms. Regime procedures: national control laws and procedures; common control list (precursors, equipment, agents, and organisms); guidelines for the industry to assist in identifying potential chemical weapon equipment transactions; and, information-sharing among members when suspicious inquiries are received,

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cases are denied, or information suggests possible international procurement for untoward purposes. In 1989, 50 dual-use chemicals appeared on the AG ‘warning list’ with a suggestion that AG members place controls on them. In 1991, AG agreed on additional control lists of: (i) equipment related to the manufacture of chemical weapons precursors; and (ii) biological organisms and equipment. AG members have agreed to control all 50 (currently 54) precursor chemicals on a worldwide basis. AG is considering imposing controls on BW-related dual-use equipment and micro-organisms having BW applications. At the May 1991 meeting, Group members developed a dual-use CBW equipment list, which was adopted during the December 1991 meeting. Since the conclusion of the CWC in 1992, meetings of the Group have focused closely on the interaction between Group controls and the nonproliferation and trade encouragement measures, which came into operation when the CWC entered into force. At their 4–8 October 1999 meeting, the AG members reaffirmed that their national chemical and biological export licensing measures were directed at CBW non-proliferation, and were designed not to hamper legitimate trade. They also endorsed individual members’ actions in hosting regional seminars aimed at encouraging countries not participating in the Group to consider implementing similar measures to prevent CBW proliferation. In 1998, the AG met from 9–15 October. The members reaffirmed the importance of the implementation of national measures as a way to meet their obligations under the CWC and BTWC, and agreed to keep national legislation under review. They also emphasised the important role of seminars for countries not participating in the Group. The AG’s 1997 meeting was held from 6–9 October. Participants continued to review national exporting licensing policies, reaffirmed their commitments to the CWC, and welcomed the progress of efforts to strengthen the BTWC in the negotiations taking place in the Ad Hoc Group of BTWC States Parties in Geneva. Participants also agreed to continue contacts with countries not participating, and in this context, endorsed the importance of regional seminars as valuable means of widening on export controls held in Tokyo in January 1997 and the regional CBW export control seminar for countries of central and eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States held in October 1996. In 1996, the AG met on October 14–17 to discuss the continuing problem of CBW proliferation. The participants reiterated their strong belief that full adherence to the CWC and to the BTWC was the best way to eliminate these types of weapons. In this context, the maintenance of effective export controls will remain an essential practical means of fulfilling obligations under the CWC and the BTWC. South Korea took part for the first time in the AG consultations. Experts from participating countries discussed national export licensing systems aimed at preventing inadvertent assistance to the production of CBW. They agreed to continue working to focus these national measures efficiently and solely on preventing any contribution to CBW programmes, and also

124 M ARUNDHATI GHOSE agreed to continue a wide range of contacts as well as briefings for countries not participating in the Paris consultations of the AG. The statement noted that 24 of the 30 countries participating in the AG had already ratified the CWC, and reaffirmed participants’ prior declarations of intent to become original parties. At the 16–19 October 1995 meeting AG agreed to several amendments to the lists of biological weapons relevant materials and equipment, taking into account developments since these lists were last reviewed including revelations concerning the Iraqi BW programme. The participants also exchanged views on their national approaches to ensure that all relevant regulations promoted the object and purpose of the CWC and to ensure they would be fully consistent with it upon its entry into force. They expressed the view that the lessons derived from practical experience in export licensing would assist individual countries in their preparations for national implementation of their principle obligations under the CWC while ensuring that they would not restrict or impede trade and other exchanges not prohibited by the convention. Participants also considered how best to contribute to international dialogue on the need for and role of national measures focused on preventing assistance to CBW production in line with the international bans on these weapons. They agreed to continue with a wide range of contacts, including a further active programme of briefings for countries not participating in the talks, and to promote regional consultations to further awareness and understanding of national policies in this area. The meeting also discussed the terrorist use of CBW noting that recent developments had heightened concerns about such risks. At the May 1994 meeting, the Group’s discussions centred on their increased focus on activities in support of the entry into force of the CWC. A group of technical experts considered the interaction between the AG’s list of chemicals, the export of which should be monitored, and the CWC chemical schedules. All AG members agreed to review their export licensing procedures to ensure consistency with the CWC. The AG finalised a common approach to licensing of chemical mixtures and agreed on the need for a more active dialogue with non-members on the role of export licensing measures in preventing the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. At this session, the Czech Republic was admitted to the group. At the meeting of the Group in Paris from 29 November to 1 December 1993, participating countries discussed national export licensing systems aimed at preventing any inadvertent assistance to the production of CBW. They agreed to continue working to focus national measures efficiently and exclusively on preventing association with CBW programmes and agreed to continue with a wide range of contacts, including a further active programme of detailed bilateral briefings for non-participating countries. The June 1993 meeting, held at the Australian Embassy in Paris, focused primarily on technical aspects of the AG’s work, as well as considered how to make this work better known and understood among countries not participating in the Group. Consolidation of the Group’s common export control

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lists was achieved as a result of three subsidiary experts’ meetings, which covered BW issues, CW dual-use equipment, and CW precursor chemicals. The consolidation of the Group’s export control lists resulted in agreement on a comprehensive range of key materials (54 chemicals, agents and toxins, dual-use equipment), which could be used in CBW programmes. The AG meets once a year in Paris with Australia as a chair. (Until 1994, AG averaged two meeting each year.) Seat of the AG Meetings: Embassy of Australia, 4 Rue Jean Rey.

NOTES

1. While there are several international conventions on human rights relating to IHL, the foundations of IHL rest on the four Geneva conventions of 1949 and the two additional protocols of 1977: Convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field; convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of the armed forces at sea; Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war. The two additional protocols of 1977 are: Protocol I relating to protection of victims of international armed conflicts and Protocol II relating to protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts. (India is not party to Protocol II.) These conventions were, inter-alia, used by the International Court of Justice in 1996 in giving its opinion on the question of the legality of the use of nuclear weapons. 2. Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare (Geneva Protocol) 1925. (See Appendix 6.1A for full text.) 3. Text of the Reservation given in Appendix 6.1A. 4. Alan Dowty, ‘Making “No First Use” Work: Bring all WMD Inside the Tent’, The Nonproliferation Review, Spring 2001, Vol. 8, No. 1. 5. See National Security Presidential Directive 17, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, Office of the President of the United States, Washington, D.C., December, 2002. 6. See Richard Hooper, ‘The IAEA’s Additional Protocol’, Disarmament Forum, 1999, on on-site inspections: Common Problems, Different Solutions. In fact, at the conclusion of the CWC negotiations, the Pakistan ambassador warned of the verification regime setting a precedent. The former Director General of the IAEA, Hans Blix, has also been quoted as saying:‘(The CWC) marks a considerable achievement in arms control and disarmament. Successful implementation of the CWC will have an impact beyond the scope of the Treaty’, May 1997; quoted by Leslie-Anne Levy in ‘The CWC: A Unique OSI Framework’, Disarmament Forum, 1999, Vol. 3. 7. Leslie-Anne Levy, op. cit. (note 6).

126 M ARUNDHATI GHOSE 8. 9. 10.

11.

Ibid. From the Final Declaration of the 4th conference held in 1996. See Jonathan B. Tucker, ‘Verification Provisions of the CWC and their relevance to the BWC’, Biological Weapons Proliferation, The Stimson Center, Report No. 24 (January 1998). For a brief background of the Australia Group and its discussions upto October 1999 please see Appendix 6.3C.

PART IV INDIA’S NEGOTIATING POSITIONS

CHAPTER

7 The Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime in Crisis Matin Zuberi

W

hen the nuclear non-proliferation regime was established, nuclear technology was like ‘a huge spokes wheel with the United States as its centre’. The Soviet Union had a superpower status in nuclear weaponry, but it did not have a role in global civilian nuclear transactions. The United States stood alone at the hub.1 The diffusion of nuclear technology led to the emergence of a multipolar civilian nuclear technological order that challenged the supremacy of the United States. Groupings of West European countries and Japan in the crucial sectors of uranium enrichment and reprocessing soon transformed the character of the regime. Having failed in attempts to coerce its military allies/economic competitors, the United States reinterpreted, actually overturned, various provisions of the NPT to cater to their demands. In this endeavour the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provided invaluable assistance. The competitors, in turn, were willing to be led by their alliance leader as long as they were not hampered in their pursuit of technological development. In the process, they became ‘virtual’ nuclear-weapon

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powers—literally a ‘screw driver away’ from the cherished goal, to use the phrase inappropriately applied by non-proliferation pundits to the developing countries. A new structure of supply and demand has now emerged, the nuclear market is diversified, and all essential fuel technologies are in the commercial domain. The United States still has the largest number of nuclear power stations (104) in operation. No new nuclear reactor, however, has been ordered since 1978; and every reactor ordered between 1974 and 1978 has been cancelled. France, Japan and Russia have 59, 53, and 29 power plants respectively in operation. The French share of nuclear power in electricity consumption, at 76.4 per cent, is now the highest; the South Korean, Japanese, German and American shares are 40.7 per cent, 33.8 per cent, 30.6 per cent and 19.8 per cent respectively.2 One recent example demonstrates the transformation in the technological capabilities of major powers. The United States once had the dominant share in the global sales of nuclear power plants while British presence in the civilian nuclear marketplace was negligible. In 1999, British Nuclear Fuels, once an enterprise catering only to British domestic needs, bought the American giant Westinghouse Electric Co., that designed 69 per cent of the nuclear power plants in the United States and a half of those in the rest of the world. This British company now boasts a 12 per cent share of the global nuclear commerce and hopes to build new power plants in the United States.3

COLLAPSE

OF A

PILLAR

OF THE

REGIME

The regime did not envisage the disintegration of one of its major upholders, and the weakening of its central control over thousands of nuclear weapons and a mountain of fissile material. Even before this tectonic shift that fractured the brutal certainties of the regime, the International Chetek Corporation of Moscow promoted the novel idea of using nuclear explosions to vaporise all kinds of dangerous waste. Vladimir B. Dimitriev told an international conference in Moscow that his company was willing to export its peaceful nuclear explosive services to dispose of toxic waste, decommissioned reactors and retired nuclear weapons. Startling a conference in Ottawa by suggesting a trial waste-elimination explosion in Russia under

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international supervision, he maintained that ‘it’s the cheapest way to get rid of really dangerous waste’. A Canadian expert present recalled ‘everybody in the room thought they were nuts’. Ray Kidder, weapons expert at the Livermore laboratory, however, said that the notion of nuclear explosions to incinerate hazardous waste and even nuclear warheads had technical merit. Alexander K. Cherneyshev of the Arzamas-16 weapons laboratory proposed decommissioning nuclear reactors and retired nuclear warheads without any preliminary dismantling. Soviet deputy minister of atomic energy and industry wrote to the United Nations offering to destroy Iraqi chemical weapons.4 There were no takers for this bizarre project. The implosion of the Soviet Union led to fears about nuclear scientists and technicians offering their services to dictatorial ‘rogue’ regimes. Secretary of State James Baker plunged deep into the Urals to visit Chelyabinsk-70, one of the 10 closed nuclear cities spread around Russia that had 16,000 employees, about 9,000 of whom were technicians and 1,000 production engineers and scientists. As his motorcade arrived at the Institute of Technical Physics, every window in the nine-storey building was packed with scientists, technicians, and their staff, ‘creating a remarkable multi-story tableau of smiling faces and waving hands.’ As he sat down in front of a blackboard in a classroom filled with the senior bomb designers, Baker observed: ‘This is every bit as remarkable for us as it is for you.’ The Russian scientists talked about the hard times that had descended on their secretive and privileged world. Vladimir I. Nitikin, deputy director of the institute, said the maximum salary of a top nuclear scientist in Russia was less than $15 at the current exchange rate. ‘It is important’, Chief Scientist Yevgeni Avrorin told Baker, ‘not just to have money for living but also interesting work.’ He stressed, however, that he and his colleagues were not begging. Scientists at the institute had been developing synthetic microscopic diamonds that would put an edge on knives that would never have to be sharpened. They had also done sophisticated work on fibre optics and various applications of nuclear medicines and nuclear magnetic resonance. Avrorin suggested joint mathematical research between Chelyabinsk-70 and Los Alamos laboratory. Responding to these suggestions, Baker said that he realised that scientists wanted to do interesting and intellectually rewarding work and to earn a decent living. Donning a white robe and protective gear, he toured the laboratory where he received a warm welcome. The scientists appeared almost desperate in their desire to obtain civilian contracts from the West. This was a truly remarkable encounter.5

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One country’s disaster can be another’s opportunity. Vitaly Ginsburg, one of the most famous theoretical physicists, simply said, ‘We are dying’.6 A number of Western organisations and companies stepped into the Russian turmoil and ‘signed up Russian scientists and even entire laboratories for a song’. General Atomic planned to pay $90,000 to 116 scientists at the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy in exchange for one year’s worth of Tokamak experiments to aid the American fusion programme. Robert Galluci of the US State Department testified before Congress in early March 1992 that he had already received more than a hundred proposals from federal agencies and the private sector for collaborative projects with Russian scientists. Siegfried Hecker and John Nichols, directors of Los Alamos and Livermore laboratories respectively, returned from a tour of the two Russian weapons laboratories, Chelyabinsk-70 and Arzamas-16, with several proposals for joint projects.7 The Sun Microsystems Inc., hired Boris A. Babayan, whose role in the former Soviet Union paralleled that of Seymour R. Cray and who designed the Elbrus III supercomputer, along with his team of about 50 software and hardware designers.8 The US government signed a contract for one year that provided the services of 116 scientists for $90,000 (only $65 a month for a scientist) to help harness the vast energy of nuclear fusion.9 An International Science and Technology Centre was established in Moscow, with financial contributions from the United States, Japan, Canada, and the European Community, to provide professionally rewarding jobs for the weapon scientists by redirecting their talents to non-military endeavours.10 Aspersions about the easy availability of Russian weapon scientists to those with ready cash rightly angered Sergei Kapitza, president of the Russian Physics Society and son of the legendary Peter Kapitza. ‘Are the services of a nuclear bomb-maker for sale’, he asked, ‘placing him in the same category as a paid assassin, with only price and risk at issue?’ To single him out, despite his travails, ‘is an expression of distrust, if not a direct insult’ to the scientific community.11 A working scientist, if he has no other option, would migrate to a country where he can continue with his research work. Contrary to western apprehensions, therefore, no Russian nuclear scientist was reported to have gone to a developing country to sell his nuclear knowledge. By early 1998, 15,200 Russian scientists had acquired foreign citizenship, at least 500 were working abroad on a long-term basis, and about 17,000 scientists in Russia were working for American corporations.12 The greatest beneficiary,

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in terms of scientific and technical expertise, from the Soviet collapse was thus the United States. This, indeed, was a windfall in the pursuit of non-proliferation! Washington started a variety of cooperative ventures to cope with the disintegrating nuclear weapons complex. For the safe transport of Russian nuclear warheads to storage sites, 25 specially fitted rail cars were offered. Their safety features included slanted couplings that could drive them up and over, rather than into, each other in case of an accident.13 Britain offered 250 transport containers and 20 special armoured vehicles.14 Japan sanctioned $100 million for nuclear warhead blankets and decommissioning of abandoned Russian nuclear submarines.15 The US Co-operative Threat Reduction Programme provides American equipment and financial support for the safe transportation of nuclear warheads, safe destruction of strategic delivery systems, physical protection of nuclear weapons storage sites, and safe destruction of chemical and biological weapons. A large storage facility where 50,000 containers of fissile material are to be located is to be constructed with American financial assistance. The programme is supporting 2,400 Russian nuclear weapons designers in their civilian research projects.16 A Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting Programme is designed to provide advanced security systems at Russian nuclear facilities. The Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention programme promotes joint ventures between American companies and Russian technical institutes. Global Partners Venture is investing in Russian defence conversion. American industrial firms, however, are the main beneficiaries because of insistence that construction contracts should be given to them or American equipment should be bought and transported to Russia. The Nuclear Cities Initiative is designed to improve living conditions of Russian scientists.17 By far the biggest source of income for the Russian complex is the agreement to purchase 500 mt (metric tons) of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) from the dismantled Russian warheads over the next 20 years to be blended down to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) before shipment to the United States. Its estimated purchase price of $12 billion is to be recovered by selling the LEU on the commercial market for civilian nuclear power stations. The Energy Department, because of its obsolete enrichment technology, had lost about half its market share of enrichment services to the Russians and the Europeans. The deal could have made Russia and the United States partners, instead of rivals, in the global enrichment market.18 It has

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been calculated that 500 mt of HEU, enough to build more than 20,000 nuclear weapons, when converted into nuclear fuel, would save more than $50 billion worth of oil. This most innovative and mutually beneficial ‘megatons to megawatts’ deal, first proposed by Thomas Neff of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), was signed on 18 February 1993. In an ironic twist, the fissile material of the weapons that could have incinerated American cities was to provide electricity to those very urban centres. Russia has sent about 10 per cent—the equivalent of about 2,000 nuclear weapons— of the total amount of HEU to the United States. The deal, however, got entangled in the privatisation of the US Enrichment Corporation that is running at a loss and needs profits from the Russian deal to subsidise its domestic operations. ‘USEC’, asserted Thomas Neff, ‘cannot cover its high fixed costs without a Russian subsidy.’19

PAKISTAN CIRCUMVENTS

THE

REGIME

By 1975, nuclear recession and the consequent unemployment among nuclear engineers and technicians produced a global grey market of ‘nuclear mercenaries’.20 Abdul Qadeer Khan, a Pakistani metallurgist, worked between 1972 and 1975 with a Dutch engineering firm at Almelo that was part of the Anglo-Dutch-West German centrifuge enrichment consortium created in 1971. Lax security at the facility provided him access to its complete design plans, and inside knowledge of the firms supplying components for the ultracentrifuges. One task assigned to him was the translation of technical documents, including a top-secret report about a breakthrough in centrifuge technology. Khan returned to Pakistan, determined to evade all international verification mechanisms and technology controls through clandestine transactions. Pakistan established a covert purchasing network to obtain equipment and components ranging from electrical frequency inverters to maraging steel. The Pakistani technique included: floating numerous dummy corporations and trading companies in Britain, Canada, the Netherlands, the United States and West Germany that sometimes dissolved after a single covert purchasing operation; acquisition of components with various non-nuclear applications to circumvent nuclear export controls; purchases of dual-use items in a foreign country and then transferring them to Pakistan; quietly

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purchasing components piece by piece through a series of dummy trading companies; anonymous purchasing agents and falsified ‘end use’ statements. Pakistani agents succeeded in cloaking their real intentions for some time; but when the use of an item could only be in an enrichment programme, they relied on subterfuges. Purchases of electric power controls for high frequency motors, for instance, were made ostensibly for textile machines. Lax controls and legal loopholes enabled Pakistan to obtain most of the components, and in one case the whole gassification and solidification unit. The latter was transported from Switzerland to Pakistan by three specially chartered Hercules C-130 planes. The Swiss government declared that ‘American protests about the deliveries are very old hat’ and that since ‘many other countries’ were also selling similar technology it had ‘no intention’ of putting Swiss firms at a competitive disadvantage. Tightened technology controls subsequently drove Pakistani agents from the ‘grey market’ into illegal channels. Despite the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the elaborate IAEA safguards, Pakistan successfully circumvented the regime.21

CHINA

AND THE

NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME

China denounced the NPT for more than two decades on three counts: It prohibited non-nuclear weapon states from acquiring nuclear weapons but did not stop nuclear weapon states from building more weapons; it did not prohibit nuclear-weapon states from using or threatening to use them; and, the NPT safeguards hindered civilian nuclear development in non-nuclear weapon states. ‘The obligations imposed on the non-nuclear weapon states’ it was cogently argued, ‘are specific and strict, whereas the obligation on the nuclearweapon states … is devoid of any binding force and therefore of little meaning.’22 Beijing, however, must have welcomed Japan’s accession to the treaty. Deng Xiaoping asserted in February 1979 that ‘the nuclear powers have no right to prevent non-nuclear countries from possessing nuclear weapons.’ Beijing exported nuclear materials and technology to several countries and forged one of the most enduring nuclear relationships of the nuclear age with Pakistan. With Deng’s economic reforms began the second phase of China’s non-proliferation policy. It adopted a strategy of using every step

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towards joining the regime to wring substantial concessions from Washington. China joined the IAEA in 1984 and formally agreed to impose IAEA safeguards on its nuclear exports. In response, the Reagan administration proposed to Congress in July 1985 an agreement for cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Beijing’s opposition to the NPT, however, continued with occasional endorsement of its non-proliferation objectives. American intelligence reports then revealed that China had given Pakistan the design of the nuclear warhead used in its fourth nuclear test of 1966 with enough weapon-grade uranium to fabricate two weapons, and that Chinese scientists were regularly visiting the Kahuta enrichment complex to facilitate its operation. It was later found that China supplied Pakistan a research reactor along with 1 kg of HEU, and had agreed to build a 300 MW reactor. The agreement for cooperation was, therefore, not implemented. The third phase began with Chinese observers attending the Fourth NPT Review Conference in 1990. In November 1991 China verbally agreed to observe the Missile Technology Control Review (MTCR) guidelines in its missile exports and confirmed that ‘this applies to the M-9 and M-11 missiles’. In return for this oral commitment, it demanded removal of American sanctions imposed on Chinese companies in retaliation for missile exports to Pakistan. China also joined the NPT on 9 March 1992. This move was designed to secure the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) trade status from Washington, to deflect criticism of nuclear export policies, and to claim the status of a nuclear-weapon power that the treaty had already accorded to China. Even after the sanctions were waived on 23 March 1992, China happily continued its missile exports, leading to re-imposition of American sanctions in 1993. Meanwhile, the need for Chinese cooperation in resolving the North Korean crisis provided another opportunity for China to extract concessions. According to the SinoAmerican agreement of 4 October 1994, the sanctions were removed in return for a Chinese commitment not to export missiles ‘inherently capable of reaching a range of at least 300 km with a payload of at least 500 kg.’23 China joined the Zangger Committee in 1997. The Clinton administration promptly agreed to implement the old agreement for cooperation in peaceful use of nuclear energy.24 China has been engaged in a frantic effort to modernise its nuclear and conventional military forces, unconstrained by international commitments. A computer-modelled study of 1990 had concluded that China might consider participation in nuclear arms reduction talks once the arsenals of the superpowers were reduced to 600

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warheads each. A Chinese scientist maintained that even ‘100 weapons would be enough to maintain deterrence and still have stability.’ On 5 April 1995, a Chinese official statement on negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states declared that this commitment applied only to those non-nuclear weapon states that ‘are signatories of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or nonnuclear countries which have made a similar internationally binding pledge on the nonproduction and nonprocurement of nuclear devices’.25 This statement was apparently aimed at India. Just three days after committing itself to exercise ‘utmost restraint’ at the NPT Review and Extension Conference in May 1995, China conducted a nuclear test. Developing smaller warheads with a higher yield–toweight ratio for a new generation of ballistic missiles necessitated more tests. China, therefore, reluctantly joined negotiations for the CTBT by dropping its earlier insistence that it should be within the ‘framework of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons’. Its sudden interest in peaceful nuclear explosions during the CTBT negotiations was a delaying move so that it could complete its test series well before conclusion of the final draft.26 Having completed its test series, China joined the CTBT.

JAPAN

AND THE

NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME

‘Japan has very little in the way of indigenous energy’ it has been rightly observed, ‘except for the odd earthquake and the tsunami— not the softest of renewable energy resources.’ Its ambitious civilian nuclear programme was designed to achieve energy independence through a closed nuclear fuel cycle. Reprocessing was generally considered a necessary component of an efficient fuel cycle, an essential step in nuclear waste disposal, and a logical move toward the projected development of a ‘plutonium economy’ through the development of breeder reactors. Plutonium used as fuel in breeder reactors producing more plutonium would complete the fuel cycle. Civilian nuclear industries are designed to suit the uranium resources of their countries. Canada, for example, endowed with rich uranium deposits and needing relatively little energy, is not interested in reprocessing and breeder technologies. It has adopted a ‘throwaway’ fuel cycle. At the other extreme are West European industrial countries and Japan with little or no indigenous uranium resources and a high demand for energy. For them reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel

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lengthens their energy supplies and the breeder reactor that burns uranium 60 times as efficiently as light water reactors is the path for energy independence. The United States and the former Soviet Union had large supplies of uranium but also high demands for energy. They invested in building reprocessing plants and breeder reactors. The United States, however, did not succeed in developing these technologies and conveniently discovered their proliferation potential. Japan and West European countries refused to accept the new American guidelines for nuclear propriety promulgated in the late 1970s, to forego reprocessing and breeders. Japan’s acute sense of vulnerability to disruption in energy supplies was heightened by the energy crises of the 1970s. By 1978 Japan already had 14 nuclear power reactors in operation and was committed to the ‘plutonium economy.’27 The American debate on reprocessing and breeders is best summarised in two articles.28 Taking advantage of the American exit from the reprocessing market, Britain and France decided to corner this lucrative business. Japan had imported its first power plant from Britain and reprocessing technology from France. Exploiting old linkages, it signed reprocessing contracts with Britain and France and made substantial investments in the reprocessing facilities at Sellafield (Britain) and La Hague (France). Germany also signed similar reprocessing contracts. Two nuclear-weapon powers thus formed a mutually beneficial integrated industrial group linking two non-nuclear weapon states to their state-owned commercial enterprises. Japanese fuel contracts constituted about 35 per cent of their foreign transactions and Japan became their most patient customer. Dismissing the American argument regarding the proliferation potential of reprocessing, the British company argued, in 1978, that provision of reprocessing facilities, under international safeguards, ‘contributed to de-proliferation’; it discouraged them from developing their own reprocessing facilities. The company’s senior officials took a relaxed view even of a nuclear conflict. One of them observed that a limited nuclear war in remote countries using weapons produced with reactor-grade plutonium need not necessarily escalate to global conflagration and would be ‘survivable even for the countries involved’.29 Japan’s plutonium plans were complicated by political, commercial and technological shifts in the global nuclear industry. Opposition to civilian nuclear industry grew within the United States and then spread to Western Europe, France being an exception.30 The Chernobyl accident intensified this opposition. The consequent recession in orders for nuclear power plants in the United States made uranium

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widely available at moderate prices. This, in turn, raised questions regarding the commercial viability of reprocessing of spent fuel and the desirability of going in for the breeder. The French breeder reactor Superphenix ran into major technical problems shortly after it began operation. It was later shut down. Moreover, West Germany decided not to operate a completed breeder reactor at Kalkar because of domestic opposition. The Japanese spent nuclear fuel and plutonium shipments are subject to an international agreement and a bilateral accord. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material of 1980, together with the guidelines of the IAEA, requires that shipments of separated plutonium must be escorted. The more important regulatory framework is provided by an agreement of 1988 between the United States and Japan that replaced a former accord of 1986. Washington has retained substantial extra-territorial jurisdiction over reprocessing of American-origin fuel. Instead of a case-by-case American approval of shipments, the Reagan administration gave a blanket approval to transfer, separate and use in Japanese power reactors a minimum of 135 t of plutonium for the next 30 years. Japan had been quietly transporting its spent fuel for many years. And there were 14 transfers of separated plutonium from Europe to Japan between 1970 and 1984. Eight of them were by air and six by sea. International commerce in separated plutonium by air naturally raised security concerns; the plutonium air cargoes were stopped in 1973. Japan faced opposition when it attempted in 1984 to transport 253 kg of plutonium from France through the Panama Canal. The Japanese freighter Seishin Maru carried no other cargo and French and American ships escorted it.31 The Japanese ship Akatsuki Maru, equipped with anti-collision radar, advanced fire-prevention and fire-fighting devices, and a reinforced double-hulled and double-bottomed structure, embarked on its controversial voyage from Yokohama in August 1992. It was to bring a ton of separated Japanese plutonium from France. It had no other cargo and was escorted by a heavily armed Japanese vessel. The plutonium cargo was sealed within lead-lined casks designed to resist water pressures at depth of 10,000 m and a fire of 800 degrees Celsius for 30 minutes. An American nuclear powered attack submarine tracked the return journey. For safety reasons the Japanese authorities kept its route a closely guarded secret. A large number of countries, however, publicly voiced their concerns about it. South Africa warned that the ship should not come within 200 miles of its coast. Malaysia raised the issue at the fifth ASEAN Ministerial

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Meeting on Science and Technology held in Singapore in September 1992. The Indonesian foreign minister declared that his country had pressed Japan not to use Indonesian waters. Singapore, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific Islands were also anxious about the movements of the Japanese ship. There were apprehensions regarding the possibilities of the ship passing through the Malacca Straits known for frequent shipping accidents and incidents of piracy. The environmentalist group Greenpeace tracked the ship around the Cape of Good Hope and then abandoned its monitoring activities. One American Congressman described Akatsuki Maru as a ‘floating Chernobyl’. Hiroyuki Kishing, director of the Nuclear Agency Division of the Japanese Foreign Ministry reassured the public that the ship was keeping more than 200 miles away from the coastal regions and that its movements were continuously monitored from an operation centre in Japan. The ship reached Japanese waters in January 1993.32 By 1981, about 800 kg of separated plutonium from Britain arrived in Japan. It was the last such shipment. Britain still retained 1,286 kg of Japanese plutonium in 1993. Japan has shipped more than 5,500 t of spent fuel for reprocessing to Britain and France. The last shipment of spent fuel had left for Europe in mid-1999. At the end of 2000, around 30 t of plutonium remained in Britain and France.33 The paradox is that the plutonium that was supposed to provide energy independence to Japan has exposed its continuing dependence of foreign sources. Japan also has an ambitious indigenous reprocessing programme. The Rokkashomura plant is the largest industrial project in Japan because of its capacity to reprocess 800 t of spent fuel each year it will absorb 20 per cent of IAEA’s annual nuclear safeguards budget. For this purpose, an enhanced safeguards system has been devised that will be the first of its kind to be applied in a non-nuclear weapon state.34 It was officially reported that in December 1996 Japan had an inventory of 5,000 kg of separated plutonium and an estimated 49,500 kg in spent nuclear fuel. Of the latter amount, some 48,000 were inside reactors and 1,000 kg at the reprocessing plants. In addition, 15,100 kg of separated plutonium was stored outside Japan.35 All Japanese plutonium is, of course, under IAEA safeguards. A former director of the Nuclear Energy Division of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs observed that Chinese ‘military expansionism backed by a strong nuclear force and delivery system, is sure to pose the most serious security threat to all other countries in the region.’36 Former Prime Minister Hosokawa has bluntly stated that

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the annual burden of $5 billion for maintaining American troops in Japan ‘hangs like a darkening cloud’ over the Japanese-American alliance and that it was in American interests to ensure that Japan did not withdraw from the NPT.37 A North Korean ballistic missile was fired over Japan in August 1998. Vice Defence Minister Shingo Nishimura, therefore, urged the Diet to consider arming Japan with nuclear weapons. Following a public uproar, however, he was forced to resign.38 Japan is already a virtual nuclear-weapon power. Its withdrawal would almost certainly trigger the collapse of the NPT.

A TREATY

FOR

ALL TIME?

The 98 original NPT signatory states took 19 years to ratify it.39 Acceleration of the nuclear arms race, delay in the conclusion of the CTBT, tightening of safeguards, lack of promotion by IAEA of civilian nuclear power in developing countries, technology controls, and the absence of security guarantees to the non-nuclear weapon states were the major contentious issues at the Review Conferences of 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990. By the end of 1989 there were 127 signatories to the treaty. In an article provocatively entitled ‘Lessons of the Next Nuclear War’ whose publication coincided with the NPT Review and Extension Conference, Michael Mandelbaum of the prestigious Council of Foreign Relations bluntly stated: ‘The main obstacle to the spread of nuclear weapons is not the NPT but the United States’. He clarified that while the promise contained in the NPT to assist developing countries in the peaceful uses of atomic energy was ‘hollow’ the promise of negotiations on nuclear disarmament was ‘false’. Steep reductions and ultimate abolition of nuclear weapons would promote rather than discourage nuclear proliferation. He predicted that in the ‘future wars of non-proliferation’ the United States would have to play a pre-eminent role and ominously concluded: ‘The next Hiroshima could create in American public opinion a consensus in favour of preventive war to keep the bomb out of the hands of the rogue states.’40 The Review and Extension Conference assembled in New York in April–May 1995 under a propaganda barrage highlighting the positive features of the global nuclear order.41 Concerted efforts ensured adherence to the treaty by as many states as possible and their attendance at the conference. The Corfu Summit of the European Union,

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held on 25 June 1994, decided on joint action to make the treaty permanent; this involved a campaign to exert diplomatic and economic pressure on countries, which seemed likely to raise uncomfortable issues at the conference. Australia, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy and Japan, led by the United States, mounted this campaign. Some significant states—Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Algeria and Argentina—were persuaded through economic assistance and security assurances to accede to the treaty. The number swelled to 172 by 1995 and by the time the conference met the tally was 178. Chile became 179th party to the treaty. By January 1992, however, only 88 non-nuclear weapon states had concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA.42 The Clinton administration had set up a 24-hour monitoring operation in Washington to keep track of the shifting positions of delegates at the conference. Energy Secretary Hazel O’Leary visited the conference at a critical moment and had discussions with about 90 ambassadors after which about a dozen non-aligned states decided to support an unlimited extension. During the last 48-hours of the conference, President Clinton took charge of the campaign. He sent what an American official spokesman called ‘tough messages’ to Egypt and Mexico saying that he would find it difficult to understand why friendly countries that had received American assistance could not be more cooperative. The Egyptian stand changed overnight. Miguel Marian Bosch, deputy leader of the Mexican mission, admitted that the American campaign was most impressive. Some delegates talked of great pressure from American embassies in their capitals and by American officials lobbying at foreign embassies in Washington. Adolfo Toylhardat, leader of the Venezuelan delegation, resigned after his government suddenly changed its position from support for limited to unlimited extension.43 South Africa had a special status at the conference as the first ex-nuclear weapon state emphasising the virtues of renunciation. It played a crucial role by presenting a package that linked a set of general proposals on non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament and for strengthening the review process with the indefinite extension of the treaty that became the axis around which the conference revolved. American ambassador to South Africa warned Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo on 10 March that an unwelcome position on the NPT would adversely affect the American view of South Africa’s ‘non-proliferation credentials’.44 More than half of the 111 sponsors of the Canadian Resolution seeking unlimited extension were small states without the resources or the need to develop nuclear

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weapons—Antigua and Barbuda, Benin, Cote d’lvoire, Croatia, Fiji, Gabon, Grenada, Iceland, Lichtenstein, Malta, Marshall Islands, Federal States of Micronesia, Monaco, Republic of Palau, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and so on. Voting on extension would have shown that a significant number of countries were dissatisfied with the manner in which provisions of the treaty had either been completely ignored or twisted to suit the requirements of the nuclear-weapon powers. A large number of delegates called for the total elimination of all nuclear weapons. Jayantha Dhanapala, president of the conference, presented a package of three ‘decisions’ which, in his view, were generally acceptable to the delegates—Strengthening the Review Process, Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, and Extension of the Treaty. The assembled delegates silently agreed to accept this clever compromise without casting their votes. Many delegates expressed their reservations at the outcome of the conference after the ‘decision’. The Malaysian delegate declared that the conference had justified ‘nuclear weapons for eternity’. The conference ended without a consensus Final Document on the review of the working of the NPT. The Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament stated that ‘pending the entry into force of Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty’, the nuclear-weapon states should exercise ‘utmost restraint’.45 During the Extension Conference, it has been estimated, the United States spent $780 million on nuclear weapons and the continued modernisation of its nuclear forces. Britain sent its first Trident ballistic missile submarine on patrol armed with nuclear weapons, France inaugurated the construction of a new laser facility to simulate nuclear explosions, and Russia and China continued to produce new nuclear warheads.46 The Negative Security Assurances given to the non-nuclear weapon signatories to the NPT in the past were reformulated and solemnly presented to the UN Security Council and incorporated into Resolution 984 adopted on 11 April 1995. These assurances, offered at the NPT Review and Extension Conference as part of the quid pro quo for an indefinite extension of the NPT, have eroded since the conference. The new thinking, however, is that an American pledge not to use nuclear weapons would encourage non-nuclear weapon states to acquire chemical or biological weapons.47 The US Nuclear Posture Review (discussed ahead) specifically mentions some non-nuclear

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weapon signatories to the NPT as potential targets of American nuclear weapons. Negotiations for the CTBT provided another opportunity to define ‘nuclear weapons’ and ‘nuclear explosive devices’. It conspicuously failed to define a nuclear test. The Clinton administration’s analysis of the treaty submitted to the US Senate, however, stated that the United States decided that a formal definition of ‘nuclear explosion’ was ‘unnecessary and problematic’. It then listed ‘illustrative’ examples of activities that are not prohibited, including hydrodynamic experiments involving subcritical amounts of fissile materials, inertial confinement fusion (ICF) experiments using pulsed-power facilities, and so on.48 Ambassador Sir Michael Weston of Britain conceded that the CTBT ‘bans the bang, not the bomb’.49 Britain, Russia and China succeeded in inserting an extraordinary clause in the draft treaty, requiring the signature of 44 states that had nuclear installations, for it to become operational. No treaty had specified such a large number of countries to ratify it before entering into force. Significantly, the NPT specified ratification by only three sponsoring states—Britain, the United States and the former Soviet Union. India was the main target of this unprecedented intrusion on the sovereign right of states to adhere to or to reject an international accord. During the hearings on the legality of nuclear weapons at the International Court of Justice, legal experts from Britain, France and Russia, and the United States asserted that these weapons had contributed to peace and stability. The NPT recognised their possession of nuclear weapons without placing any limitation on the threat or use of them. The British government actually advised the court to drop the case regarding the legitimacy of nuclear weapons because the international community had ‘sensibly selected to draw a veil of constructive silence’ over the issue. A French professor said the court had been put in the position of a ‘mathematician asked to solve an equation containing an infinite number of unknowns’. An American legal luminary pointed out that each of the nuclear-weapon powers had made an immense investment in human and material resources in building the nuclear arsenals upon which ‘many other states decided to rely for their security’. A Russian lawyer candidly maintained that human rights treaties were ‘not designed with a view concerning situations in which nuclear weapons could be used’. And a British pundit was bold enough to utter words that would have been out of place at the Geneva negotiations: ‘nuclear weapons might be used in a wide variety of circumstances with very different results in terms of likely civilian casualties!’50

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Kathleen Bailey, a senior fellow at Livermore laboratory, commented: ‘Nuclear weapons will continue to exist and they are likely to be used—politically, if not militarily—regardless of the World Court’s advisory judgment.’ If the use of these weapons were not allowed, there would be at least two serious consequences: First, deterrence would be compromised; and, second, it would lead to efforts to ban the possession of nuclear weapons that would be antithetical to stability and security.51

VIRTUAL NUCLEAR TESTING In anticipation of the CTBT, the US Department of Energy’s research and development, testing, and materials production programmes were reclassified as ‘stockpile stewardship’ and its weapons production was reclassified as ‘stockpile management.’52 The new Science Based Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programme (SBSSMP) provides for $40.5 billion to be spent in 10 years on a virtual testing regime. Its flagship is the National Ignition Facility intended to bring about thermonuclear fusion within small confined targets. Using 192 laser beams to produce 500 trillion watts of energy for 3 billionth of a second it will fleetingly create conditions that exist only within stars and thermonuclear explosions. Weapons designer Ted Taylor says that if the facility works, the United States could daily conduct dozens of nuclear explosions. The Los Alamos, Livermore and Sandia weapons laboratories are developing comprehensive plans to extend the life of each weapon system slated for the ‘enduring stockpile’. The Accelerated Computing Initiative and the Nuclear Weapons Information Project will further enhance simulation capabilities. Computer simulation will be assisted by archival data from more than a thousand American tests and diagnostic information obtained from inertial confinement, and pulsedpower fusion experiments. This frantic collection of weapons-related data reveals a determination to prolong American nuclear domination into several decades of the 21st century. The SBSMP is tied to a new certification procedure. Departments of defence and energy, assisted by the joint chiefs of staff, must review each type of weapon in the enduring stockpile every year and certify its safety and reliability for the next year. Veteran weapons designers from the laboratories will be available to lend their expertise to the certification process. If either the secretary of defence or the secretary of energy expressed lack of confidence in the safety

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or reliability of a particular type of weapon deemed critical to the American nuclear deterrent, the president, in consultation with the Congress, could withdraw from the CTBT under the ‘supreme national interest’ clause and order resumption of testing.53 Even after the Partial Treaty of 1943, the United States maintained, for 30 years, three installations, one at the Nevada Testing Ground and two in the Pacific, to facilitate resumption of atmospheric testing at short notice. By 1993, when this secret programme was cancelled, the US had spent $3 billion on it.54 Arzamas-16 has an advanced laser facility ‘Iskra-5’ capable of studying the physics for thermonuclear fusion. The French Laser Megajoule facility is also designed to create small thermonuclear explosions in the laboratory. As Vladimir Inkimets, a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, has put it, ‘instead of test sites we will have the information test site’.55 By April 2000 the United States had conducted 11 subcritical tests.56 Despite the CTBT being in a limbo following the failure of the US Senate to ratify it, an intrusive global verification system for monitoring nuclear explosions is being created.57

URANIUM, PLUTONIUM, PANDEMONIUM58 The NPT regime was initially built around the difficulty of producing the fissile materials necessary to manufacture nuclear weapons. It was feared that such materials might be diverted from civilian to military purposes; the IAEA, therefore, became a fissile materialsaccounting organisation. A regime built around denial has now to cope with a surfeit of such materials. The major portion of the global stocks of plutonium and HEU, however, belongs to the five original nuclear-weapon states. The NPT regime is blind to them.59 Only about 30 per cent of this plutonium and less than 1 per cent of HEU are safeguarded by the IAEA. About 1 t of plutonium is enough for about 200 nuclear weapons and 1 t of HEU for 50 nuclear weapons.60 The civilian stock of plutonium is estimated to be enough for 25,000 nuclear weapons.61 About 1,115 mt (metric tons) of plutonium were produced in civilian power programmes by the end of 1998.62 Most of this plutonium was produced in the industrialised countries. In February 1999, Germany had between 32 and 38 mt (metric tons) of separated plutonium, enough for 4,000 to 4,750 nuclear weapons.63 The Japanese Atomic Energy Commission estimates that 80 to 85 t of plutonium would have been separated by 2010 in

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Japan or under commercial contracts with Britain and France.64 The German and Japanese plutonium is under IAEA safeguards. Britain has more than 60 mt (metric tons) of separated plutonium that will grow to around 110 t by the end of the decade.65 France, Japan and Russia plan to burn their separated plutonium in civil nuclear reactors.66 Plutonium for the Russians is their ‘blood money’ because of the enormous financial and human sacrifices in producing it.67 Belgium, Britain, China, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, Switzerland and the United States have formed an International Plutonium Management Group.68 American weapon-grade plutonium production peaked in the early 1960s at the rate of 6 mt (metric tons) per annum. Moreover, 254 kg from Canada, 79 kg from Taiwan and 50 kg from 13 other countries were procured. In a barter deal the United States acquired 5.4 t of British plutonium in return for 7.5 t of HEU and 6.7 kg of tritium. At peak production, the United States could produce more than 80,000 kg of HEU annually.69 The current US stockpile of plutonium consists of 99.5 mt (metric tons), of which 85 mt (metric tons) are weapons grade.70 Nuclear arms control agreements have not limited nuclear warheads per se. SALT-I and II and the INF Treaty removed launchers and delivery vehicles. START-I and II, in addition, limited the number of deployed warheads and bombs. The ‘unit of account’ for destruction has been ballistic missiles, their silos, submarine missile tubes and heavy bombers. While the number of deployed warheads has decreased, the stockpile of stored warheads has been increasing.71 Stockpiling of fissile materials from dismantled warheads is creating a glut of weapon-grade plutonium and HEU, posing a daunting security challenge.72 It is estimated that if all the ‘excess’ plutonium from dismantled warheads were measured in units of 8 kg—the IAEA’s ‘Significant Quantity’ enough to fabricate one bomb—then there is enough excess weapon-grade plutonium to build about 9,000 nuclear weapons.73 Modern nuclear weapons, however, typically contain, on average, 3–4 kg of plutonium and 15 kg of HEU.74 In 1999, Washington and Moscow agreed to dispose of 68 t of their excess weapons plutonium by burning some as Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel in nuclear power reactors and by immobilising and disposing of the rest as waste.75 The prospect of large quantities of HEU entering the fuel market will make the burning of plutonium in power reactors even harder to justify on the grounds of commercial advantage.76 The IAEA was initially expected to be the repository of fissile materials from dismantled nuclear weapons to be used in nuclear

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reactors, thereby promoting nuclear disarmament and simultaneously encouraging peaceful uses of atomic energy. Article XII A.5 of the IAEA Statute made such a provision. Stringent security and accounting measures are now required to cope with the daunting task of preventing theft and repackaging of this fearsome component of nuclear warheads. As the number of deployed warheads decreases, uncertainties about the total stockpile of warheads and the amount of fissile material available for new warheads is looming larger. Moreover, there is no international arms control accord on tactical nuclear weapons. Since they do not have unique delivery vehicles and launchers, only verified limits on tactical nuclear weapons could ensure transparency. A transparency regime should include declarations of nuclear warheads and fissile material inventories that should be updated at periodic intervals. It must also ensure that the materials from dismantled warheads would not be used for additions to the arsenals.77 There is some controversy regarding the usefulness of reactorgrade plutonium for producing nuclear weapons. Weapon-grade plutonium is generally considered to be about 93 per cent plutonium-239. Rector-grade plutonium has plutonium-239 concentration of less than 70 per cent and plutonium-240 concentration of more than 20 per cent. The high rate of neutron emissions from plutonium-240 form spontaneous fission raising the problem of a ‘fizzle yield’ or pre-detonation. Fission yield, however, depends not only on the moment of initiation, but also on the rate of supercriticality, i.e., the design of the nuclear explosive.78

FISSILE MATERIAL CUT-OFF A ban on the production of fissile material for military purposes was occasionally discussed between 1956 and 1969 as part of a package starting with a CTBT, followed by a fissile materials cut-off, paving the way for the eventual dismantling of the nuclear stockpiles. It was thus proposed as a disarmament measure but was ignored because of the intensification of the nuclear arms race. The revived proposal was conceived as a non-proliferation measure; not a single warhead could be dismantled as a result of the proposed cut-off. The main objective was to indirectly bring Israel, India and Pakistan within the NPT framework. The resolution approved by the UN General Assembly on December 1993 called member states to negotiate

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a non-discriminatory, multilateral, internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. All non-nuclear weapons states party to the NPT are already prohibited from producing, or diverting, fissile materials for military purposes. The United States, Russia, Britain, France and China are reported to have stopped all or some of their production facilities for military purposes because fissile materials at their disposal are ‘coming out of their ears’. China’s first indigenous nuclear power plant started generating electricity in 1991. It is estimated that China’s stockpile consists of at least 3 mt (metric tons) of HEU and 1 t of separated plutonium.79 Chinese experts now claim that China has observed a production moratorium since approximately 1991. These unilateral declarations cannot be verified.80 What the proposed ban should prohibit is a hotly contested issue. Countries like Pakistan and Egypt would like existing stocks also to be brought under the verification regime. The mandate given by the UN resolution, however, did not mention existing stockpiles; the prohibition is with regard to future production. There are many technical, financial and environmental problems involved. Three types of facilities would have to be included in any arrangement: Declared operating fissile materials production facilities, declared such facilities that have been shut down, and undeclared production facilities. Most of them are highly contaminated, making it almost impossible for any inspection to be conducted. Although about 30 plutonium production reactors, four reprocessing plants, and four enrichments facilities of the five NPT nuclear powers have already been shut down or about to be mothballed, over 20 reprocessing and enrichment plants would be included in the list of facilities to be safeguarded. The verification task would be a gigantic one, involving about 300 nuclear facilities in the US alone. Decades of environmental, health and safety abuses have left an estimated 4,500 contaminated sites covering tens of thousands of acres in the United States. Some of the facilities of the American nuclear weapon complex are so extensively contaminated that they may be called ‘national sacrifice zones’ that may be left without cleaning them up. The US Energy Department estimates that a comprehensive clean-up ‘could cost something in the range of $500 billion over a period of 75 years’. The Russian complex is even more contaminated. The financial cost and the environmental hazards of a fissile material cut-off applicable only to the United States and Russia will be staggering.81

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Negotiations for a cut-off have been stalled for years because the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) insists on a linkage between nuclear disarmament and cut-off while China has linked it to nonweaponisation of space. The cut-off is a relic of the past when Israel, India and Pakistan were to be indirectly brought into the NPT fold. What is needed is an agreement among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council to codify their moratoria on new material production with effective safeguards.

PROBLEM

OF

DETERRING ‘ROGUE’ STATES

The bipolar world of the Cold War was, ‘in a perverse way’, distinctly convenient in intellectual terms because it produced an environment that was relatively simple.82 The confrontation was between a stable state and a highly rational, cautious leadership that found nothing shameful about retreating in the face of superior force. The former Soviet Union as an adversary is remembered with some nostalgia because the threat came from those who were part of western civilisation and culture. It is now admitted that the Russians ‘loved their children, too, and they could, therefore, be deterred.’ The prevailing view now is that nuclear deterrence may be ineffective in dealing with well-protected autocrats imbued with ideas of martyrdom.83 ‘Twenty-first century threats know no boundaries’, said Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, and the United States must arms itself ‘against a viper’s nest of perils’. These perils run the entire gamut from reckless ‘rogue’ states to terrorist gangs and genocidal violence provoked by ethnic hatred.84 As a former high-ranking American official put it, If a group of Iranian mullahs one day has a very long-range ballistic missile—and decides that not only they but all their countrymen can go to heaven if they just launch a nuclear weapon at the ‘Great Satan’—that’s not the kind of people deterrence would work against.85 The new arms race, according to recent American thinking, features a diverse cast of characters racing to arm themselves to offset US military superiority; the main competitors are China, North Korea, Iran and Iraq, ‘but others could emerge in the future.’86

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COUNTER-PROLIFERATION There is a general realisation of the limitations and weaknesses of the regime. The NPT, however, remains a sacrosanct document and the regime will continue to tighten nuclear safeguards and technology controls, but covert smuggling networks and nuclear mercenaries are already operating. It is admitted that the regime is not merely breaking down, it is breaking down asymmetrically.87 The NPT treaty has certainly stemmed the tide of technological diffusion across the globe. Innovative strategies have to be evolved to cope with the unprecedented problems of safely dismantling nuclear warheads in a verifiable manner, accounting for fissile materials taken out of them, as well as protecting this deadly material from pilferage and theft.88 Despite these problems, the regime serves the interests of all the major powers in the international system and the weaker members of the system seem reconciled to their status in it. US Defence Secretary Les Aspin launched the Defence Counter-proliferation Initiative in December 1993. It is the American response to proliferation at any level of weapons development and subsumes traditional non-proliferation objectives. It covers the full range of efforts to combat proliferation, including diplomacy, arms control, intelligence collection and analysis, and export controls ‘with particular responsibility for assuring that US forces and interests can be protected should they confront an adversary armed with weapons of mass destruction or missiles.’89 Although its focus was on using conventional forces against weapons of mass destruction, counter-proliferation was perceived as a scheme to develop pre-emptive nuclear options.90 The Bush administration’s national security strategy is now based on the assumption that the intricate network of treaties, safeguards and export controls have not succeeded in stemming the flow of nuclear knowledge, technology and materials. Nuclear proliferation is no longer a political problem; it poses an urgent challenge to national security that demands a military response. The United States now ‘reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force—including through resort to all our weapons—to the use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies.’91

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Israel resorted to counter-proliferation on 7 June 1981, when it attacked the French-built Tamuz research reactor in Iraq before it became operational. The IAEA inspectors were present when the first batch of enriched fuel arrived in June 1980. The fuel elements were counted, identified and the initial inventory of about 12 kg of HEU was certified. A second inspection was conducted in January 1981 and it was decided that when more fuel elements were delivered from France, the facility would have to be inspected more frequently. Discussing the implications of the Israeli air attack, IAEA Director-General Sivgard Eklund told its Board of Governors: ‘A nonNPT country (Israel) has evidently not felt assured by our findings and about our ability to continue to discharge our safeguarding responsibilities effectively.’92 Iraq embarked on an ambitious uranium enrichment programme in the early 1980s, simultaneously exploring five enrichment technologies—gaseous diffusion, electromagnetic separation, gas centrifuge, laser and the chemical method—at a cost of about $1 billion. All these five approaches encountered problems. Impatient with the slow progress of the ambitious enrichment effort, Iraq started a crash weapons programme shortly after invading Kuwait in August 1990. The new goal was to produce a single nuclear device as quickly as possible by diverting safeguarded enriched uranium supplied by Russia and France for imported research reactors at the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Centre. The IAEA had conducted a routine inspection of Iraqi facilities in November 1990 and found the nuclear material intact. The fissile material was to be diverted before the next IAEA inspection in April 1991. The Al Atheer Materials Center was to be the site where the weapon was to be produced. It was an unlikely scenario; in fact, no diversion occurred. By the beginning of the Allied bombing, however, Iraq had not produced an implosion design or a neutron initiator.93 By 1991 only the gas centrifuge effort appeared promising. Iraq imported maraging steel from European companies and three German centrifuge experts provided technical support. Iraqi scientists, however, encountered formidable problems in building a cascade without further foreign assistance. Allied aircraft conducted about 970 strikes against nuclear, chemical and biological weapons sites and 1,500 missions against the Iraqi Scud missile force.94

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1991

The coercive and comprehensive disarmament of Iraq, mandated by the United Nations Security Council, is unique in the history of disarmament. Resolution 687 of April 1991 established the terms of the ceasefire and created the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) to ensure verified elimination of Iraq’s biological and chemical weapons as well as of ballistic weapons with a range of more than 150 km. The IAEA was charged with doing the same for nuclear weapons. The commission was a subsidiary organ of the Security Council. The Security Council passed several resolutions during the next few years, describing Iraqi non-cooperation with the inspectors as a ‘material breach’ and demanding ‘full, final and complete disclosure’ of all weapons programmes subject to elimination. Despite obstructions, however, the IAEA inspectors started demolition work including the destruction of Al Atheer’s eight production and testing facilities and equipment worth hundreds of millions of dollars. They also began sending weapons-usable fissile material out of the country. The IAEA had finished a complete accounting of all weaponusable fissile material by February 1994 and had removed the last quantities of HEU, including the nearly 50 kg that Iraq had obtained from France and the former Soviet Union. It had supervised the verified destruction of all known facilities and specialised equipment used in Iraq’s nuclear weapons programme. In May 1998, some members of the Security Council even wanted Iraq to be declared disarmed of its nuclear weapons. A Russian proposal to stop further investigation of the Iraqi nuclear programme was, however, rejected.95 By October 1997 the IAEA had conducted 30 inspection campaigns involving over 500 site inspections and supervised the destruction of more than 50,000 m2 of floor space of nuclear facilities, about 2,000 nuclear-related items, and more than 600 mt metric tons of special alloys. It also supervised the removal of all weaponsrelated nuclear materials. It reported to the Security Council that there was no indication of Iraq having produced a nuclear weapon. Nor had Iraq the capability to produce significant amounts of fissile material. ‘Apart from a few politically motivated grumbles,’ says Garry Dillon, Iraq had adequately cooperated with the inspectors. Its refusal in August 1998 to cooperate was provoked by statements that sanctions on Iraq would not be lifted as long as President Saddam

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Hussein remained in power.96 Dillon was the leader of the IAEA Iraq Action Team from June 1997 to November 1999 and was previously Section Head in the Department of Safeguards. ‘If the U.N. estimates of the human damage in Iraq are even roughly correct,’ observe two American scholars, ‘economic sanctions may well have been a necessary cause of the death of more people in Iraq than have been slain by all so-called weapons of mass destruction throughout history’.97 The inspectors withdrew on 16 December 1998, just hours before American and British fighter jets bombed Iraq in ‘Operation Desert Fox’. The IAEA then confirmed there was ‘no indication that Iraq possesses nuclear weapons or meaningful amounts of weapon-usable nuclear material or that Iraq had retained any practical capability (facilities or hardware) for the production of such material’. At the same time it cautioned that the absence of such evidence was not the same as a statement of their ‘non-existence’. Iraq had failed to provide important technical documents, such as its nuclear weapon and gas-centrifuge design drawings. It had also not provided the name or location of a foreign individual who allegedly offered to assist Iraq’s nuclear weapons programme.98 Declassified American intelligence reports and the inspectors’ records indicate that almost every nuclear facility was bombed during the Gulf War. The containment structures of reactors and control rooms were destroyed. The Congressionally mandated CIA reports reveal that until 1998 the American intelligence community was satisfied with the work completed by the inspectors.99 Meanwhile, American and British bombing in the so-called no-fly zones in the north and south of Iraq continued. In early December 2001 President Bush issued an ultimatum demanding that Saddam Hussein allow weapons inspectors back in Iraq or ‘find out’ the consequences. When he had to deliver his annual State of the Union address to US Congress on 29 January 2002, his speechwriter David Frum was asked: ‘Can you sum up in a sentence or two our best case for going after Iraq?’ Playing around with the idea of a new enemy axis like the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis of the Second World War, he hit upon the idea of an ‘axis of hatred’ comprising stateless terrorists and terror-sponsoring states. It was later transformed into ‘axis of evil’ consisting of Iraq, Iran and North Korea.100 Ari Fleischer, President Bush’s spokesman, bluntly announced ‘The policy is regime change’ and as for the removal of the Iraqi dictator, ‘the cost of a one way ticket is substantially less than [that of an invasion]. The cost of one bullet, if the Iraqi people take it on themselves, is substantially less than that.’101 In September 2002, US National

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Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice invoked the threat of an Iraqi mushroom cloud. On 16 March 2003 Vice President Cheney confidently asserted that the Saddam regime had ‘reconstituted nuclear weapons’. He is reported to have pressed intelligence agencies to package their evidence as the administration desired. Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld established his own special unit for this purpose. As a former intelligence operative, Greg Theilmann, observed, ‘The administration had a faith-based intelligence attitude. “We know the answers, give us the intelligence to support those answers.”’102 Exaggerating the destructive potential of Iraqi chemical and biological weapons, a British document even claimed that they could be fired within 45 minutes of an order to do so. This notorious claim eventually led to the suicide of Inspector David Kelly that was subjected to an inquiry conducted by Lord Hutton. Resolution 1441 of November 2002 was passed unanimously after considerable linguistic wrangling at the Security Council. The letter jointly written by former IAEA Director-General Hans Blix, heading the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), successor to UNSCOM, and IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei, annexed to the resolution, provided for an extremely intrusive inspection regime. A novel feature of the resolution was the right of the inspectors to transport Iraqi scientists and their entire families outside the country for unencumbered interviews. The inspectors rightly viewed this demand with circumspection because any refusal by young and old members of the families to leave the country, even the concerned scientists agreed to go out, could be deemed as non-cooperation. Did the resolution really give the inspectors the right of extradition?103 The resolution also demanded the safety of Anglo-American operations in the so-called no-fly zones. The Iraqi Declaration detailing its weapons programmes, submitted on 7 December 2002, covered almost 12,000 pages. It was presented to the ambassador of Columbia, president of the Security Council for the month. Instead of circulating it to all members, he promptly gave it to the Americans who distributed copies only to the other four permanent members. About 9,000 pages of the declaration were deleted and the truncated version given to the non-permanent members. Norway protested against this unprecedented and improper procedure. Syria refused to accept the mangled text. This extraordinary procedure was adopted, it was claimed, in order to protect ‘sensitive material’ pertaining to weapons that only the five permanent members could share. The real reason, however, was that one section of it contained detailed

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listing of about 150 foreign companies or governments that had business transactions with Iraq in the proscribed technologies; these included 80 German, 24 American and 17 British companies. And Swiss, Japanese, Italian, French, Swedish and Brazilian firms were not far behind in minting money from such transactions.104 The UN inspectors began their work on 27 November 2002 and left on 18 March 2003, a day before the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq. The IAEA had conducted 237 inspections at 148 sites, including 27 sites not previously inspected and found no evidence that Iraq was pursuing a nuclear weapons programme.105 The Al Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Centre, one of the first Iraqi targets bombed by American aircraft in the Gulf War, was found to be a vast scrap yard of rusting missile casings, pressure vessels, pipes, valves, fuel tanks and control panels. Billion of dollars worth of equipment was destroyed in bombing raids or blasted into futility by the first group of IAEA inspectors. The new team visited plants producing baby formula, cement, steel, fiberglass, ceramics, commercial electronics and industrial chemicals such as chlorine and sulphuric acid. They pulled lecturers out of their classes in universities demanding access to laboratories. They took gamma radiation readings all over Baghdad and drew water, sediment and vegetation samples from drainage basins along the Tigris and the Euphrates.106 ElBaradei confirmed that by 1992, the IAEA had ‘largely destroyed, removed, or rendered harmless’ all Iraqi nuclear facilities and equipment and that his inspectors ‘found no evidence that Iraq had revived its nuclear weapons programme’.107 These findings were repeated in his report of 14 February 2003 to the Security Council. Meanwhile, American and British official sources alleged that Iraq had recently purchased aluminium tubes for its centrifuges and that large quantities of uranium were obtained from Niger. ElBaradei, however, concluded that the aluminium tubes were for ‘the reverse engineering of rockets’ and that reports of uranium from Niger were ‘not authentic’.108 On 19 March 2003 Hans Blix and ElBaradei submitted reports to the Security Council about the progress in ridding Iraq of weapons of mass destruction. The discussion had a surreal quality about it because the inspectors had been withdrawn a day earlier in view of the impending Anglo-American invasion was also for the ostensible purpose of disarming Iraq.109 Despite Anglo-American dissatisfaction with the pace of verified destruction of Iraqi weapons, however, it was the most comprehensive nuclear disarmament of any country under the auspices of the United Nations. The Iraqi nuclear weapons infrastructure was

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dismantled and all fissile material taken out of the country. There has been no evidence so far of its attempted revival. The inspectors did not achieve similar success with regard to all Iraqi chemical and biological weapons and equipment. Donald Rumsfeld articulated American impatience with the inspectors’ findings with the classic statement that ‘absence of evidence is not evidence of absence of weapons of mass destruction’.110 It also provided a justification for a preventive attack on Iraq.

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How serious the invading forces were about the Iraqi nuclear threat was revealed by the fate of the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Centre that had been under IAEA safeguards from 1991 until the war. While the invading forces immediately secured the Iraqi oilfields and even the Iraqi oil ministry building, they did not bother to protect the centre and six other nuclear sites. Donald Rumsfeld acknowledged during a 14 May 2003 hearing before the Senate Appropriations Committee that widespread looting had taken place at nuclear sites that were unguarded by US forces.111 The Time magazine’s interviews with Iraqi scientists, government officials and middlemen revealed that the Iraqi nuclear weapons infrastructure was destroyed or dismantled in the 1990s and never rebuilt. Professor Nabil al-Rawi and his colleagues who worked on it before the Gulf War of 1991 confirmed that it was never resumed. Some analysts suspect that Saddam Hussein was indulging in a ‘sly form of deterrence’ to keep everyone guessing about his nuclear arsenal. Ironically, his attempt to pretend having weapons that no longer existed only resulted in the destruction of his own regime and the military occupation of his country.112 The Iraq Survey Group appointed by the Bush administration after the war to hunt for the weapons of mass destruction found no evidence that Iraq had taken any decision after 1998 to build nuclear weapons or produce fissile material. There were only indications of some interest, beginning in 2002, in reconstituting a centrifuge enrichment programme.113 Even after the capture of Saddam Hussein and the scientists, no weapons of mass destruction have been found in Iraq. A self-proclaimed war for disarmament has simply failed to locate the dreaded ‘weapons of mass destruction’. The Iraqi case has raised

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a number of troubling questions about the deliberate denigration of the verification regime of the IAEA by the United States and Britain. The Bush administration exerted pressure on Blix and ElBaradei to submit reports that confirmed American allegations. Cheney warned them that if the Bush administration found fault with Blix’s judgements, ‘we will not hesitate to discredit you.’ On another occasion, Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz ridiculed the inspectors’ caution, adding, ‘you know they have weapons of mass destruction, don’t you?’114 The most disturbing feature of this sorry episode is the reluctant admission that the United States and Britain exaggerated the findings of their own intelligence agencies to justify the invasion of Iraq. In a major departure from the original NPT safeguards, the IAEA is now authorised to use the National Technical Means of member states for locating undeclared nuclear material and facilities in an inspected state. This political use of national technical means by the main architects of the NPT, however, has brought into disrepute the entire verification procedure of the IAEA. Major efforts would be needed to restore the legitimacy of the non-proliferation regime.

NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL North Korea joined the NPT in 1985 and concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1992, listing its nuclear facilities and the amount of nuclear material they contained. It acknowledged the possession of a graphite-moderated research reactor at Yongbyon, that had begun operation in 1986 and also of a ‘radiochemical laboratory’ capable of reprocessing plutonium. The IAEA conducted five inspection missions in 1992 and concluded that on completion, the radiochemical laboratory would be a reprocessing plant.115 A joint declaration of South and North Korea on the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula was signed on 20 January 1992. More stringent than the provisions of the NPT, this historic document banned enrichment and reprocessing facilities, and prohibited the presence, development and production of nuclear weapons. In 1993, the IAEA as well as the Security Council declared Pyongyang to be in noncompliance with its safeguards agreement because the agency had not been provided with the necessary access to information and locations in order to verify that the agreement contained correct and complete information regarding all nuclear facilities and materials.116

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On 9 February 1993, the IAEA demanded a ‘special inspection’ of nuclear facilities. North Korea not only flatly rejected the demand, but also by announcing its intention on 12 March 1993, to withdraw from the NPT, became the first country to do so. Then US Defence Secretary William Perry warned of ‘devastating consequences’ for North Korea and hinted at the possibility of bombing North Korean nuclear facilities. The option, however, was considered too risky; it could spread lethal radioactive clouds over South Korea and other neighbouring countries.117 Responding to American pressure, North Korea decided on 11 July 1993, to ‘suspend’ its withdrawal from the NPT.118 Washington and Pyongyang eventually concluded an ‘Agreed Framework’ on 21 October 1994, that provided for the supply of two South Korean light water nuclear power reactors to North Korea costing $5 billion, with South Korea to pay $3.2 billion. Japan is committed to contribute $1 billion. The European Union agreed to pay yearly instalments of $70 million over five years. The US hoped that ASEAN countries would be able to add $30 million to the kitty. North Korea, in exchange, agreed to ‘freeze’ construction and operation of its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities, with a commitment to eventually dismantle them and to cooperate with the IAEA inspections of five nuclear facilities outside the frozen ones. An international consortium—North Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO)—was formed in March 1995 to implement the Agreed Framework. As an additional inducement, the Clinton administration authorised payment of $15 million to KEDO for the supply of 150,000 t of heavy fuel oil. By the end of 1999, and despite 12 rounds of technical discussions, however, the IAEA was unable to verify that North Korea had declared all nuclear material in accordance with its safeguards agreement. The agency, nevertheless, continued to monitor the freeze on its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities. Pyongyang, however, kept up its militant rhetoric and threats to restart its graphite-moderated reactors. Shortly after the signature of the turnkey contract for the construction of two light water reactors, it warned the US of ‘serious consequences’ in case of delays in the building schedule. It also warned that it would withdraw North Korean workers from the building site unless their monthly wages were raised from $110 to $600. Pyongyang has thus used its threat of withdrawal from the NPT to get out of its diplomatic isolation and to obtain substantial concessions from western powers. According to former member of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Victor Gilinsky, the two 1,000-MW

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light water power reactors would have been incompatible with the North Korean electric grid.119 The Agreed Framework froze the North Korean plutonium route to the bomb. It also provided for gradual improvement in relations with the United States. The Republicans in US Congress, however, denounced the accord as appeasement; their opposition constrained the Clinton administration in moving toward normalisation of relations. The inspection schedule of the IAEA was tied to progress in the construction of the first light water reactor. While it was supposed to be completed by 2003, its groundbreaking ceremony took place only in August 2002. Pyongyang was reluctant to comply with the inspection schedule, as it feared that early compliance would leave KEDO with no incentive to complete the reactor project. KEDO, however, was unwilling to waste millions of dollars on the project without an assurance regarding Pyongyang’s compliance with IAEA safeguards. As a result of these conflicting calculations there were inordinate delays in the implementation of the Agreed Framework.120 A senior policy adviser in the US Energy Department visited Pyongyang in November 1994 and was given unprecedented access to all the facilities at the Yongbyon nuclear complex, including the 5 MW graphite-moderated natural uranium reactor that had been the object of proliferation concern. Such reactors have been discarded except for a few still operating in Britain. The American official found 700 damaged spent fuel rods—a sign that the reactor had a troubled operating record. The rest of them were lying in a concrete-lined pool of water and the filter equipment was heavily contaminated. He left North Korea ‘sobered’ by what he had observed. The US Congress accordingly sanctioned a fuel rod project and by 1997 each spent fuel rod had been washed, rinsed and encased in steel containers. The reactor remained closed and the reprocessing plant remained idle since 1994. The freeze continued to be monitored by resident IAEA inspectors.121 North Korea fired a ballistic missile over Japan in August 1998 that led to murmurs in favour of a Japanese nuclear deterrent. Meanwhile, South Korean President Kim Dae Jung paid a spectacular visit to Pyongyang and won the Nobel Peace Prize for 2000 largely for his ‘sunshine’ policy of peaceful resolution of all issues between the two Koreas. Many Korean families, separated for more than 50 years, were allowed to embrace each other and it seemed that North Korea could no longer be called a ‘rogue state’. The joint communique issued on 12 October 2000 after Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok’s visit to Washington declared, ‘neither government would have hostile intent

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toward the other.’ This opened the way to a missile deal. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright then travelled to Pyongyang for parleys with Kim Jong II. They discussed a freeze on missile tests, nuclear transparency, normalisation of relations, and a possible trip by President Clinton to Pyongyang. The visit never materialised. The Bush administration in March 2001 publicly repudiated the South Korean policy of reconciliation. It also demanded prompt implementation of inspection. The text of the Agreed Framework, however, reads: ‘When a significant portion of the LWR project is completed, but before delivery of nuclear components,’ North Korea ‘will come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA.’ President Bush later included North Korea in the ‘Axis of Evil’. This did not go down well even in Seoul.122 Choon Sun Lee, a senior North Korean official, had fled in 1999 and was captured by the Chinese authorities for interrogation. He disclosed that North Korea operated a secret uranium enrichment site underneath mountain Chun-Ma. The Chinese sent him back to North Korea where he was probably executed for his indiscretion.123 As the Agreed Framework had blocked the plutonium route to the bomb, North Korea secretly embarked on the enrichment route with Pakistani assistance. American intelligence agencies discovered that North Korea was trying to acquire high-strength aluminium that is used in gas centrifuge plants. When American envoy James Kelley confronted North Korean negotiators with this information in October 2002, they initially denied the allegation; the next day they seized the chance to admit having a secret parallel programme to produce HEU. They added, for good measure, that North Korea had ‘more powerful things as well’ and had already ‘nullified’ the 1994 agreement.124 Even after Washington informed him about intelligence reports of an enrichment project, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi went for confabulations with the Kim Jong II on 17 September 2002 and was willing to pay billions of dollars in disguised reparations. Kim, in a gesture of transparency, confessed that his countrymen had in the past kidnapped some Japanese to train North Korean spies and that a few of them were already dead.125 While favouring a dialogue with North Korea, Japan suspended its economic assistance and insisted on dismantling the nuclear weapons programme. Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi, however, maintained that the abduction issue remained a top priority for Japan. Nothing should be done to spoil negotiations on the fate of the surviving abducted Japanese visiting Japan for the first time after a quarter century and of their families in

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North Korea. Tokyo also wanted the seven children of the five surviving abducted Japanese to be brought to Japan ‘so they can decide their future in a free environment’.126 Pyongyang’s admission of a secret uranium enrichment programme upset the delicate balance on the Korean Peninsula and embarrassed President Bush who was mustering Congressional support on the way to war with Iraq. South Korea was in the midst of a hotly contested presidential election. Until 1998, a team of two IAEA inspectors had supervised the placing in canisters of 8,000 spent fuel rods from which weapon-grade plutonium could have been extracted. Raising the ante, Pyongyang announced that it would immediately reopen the nuclear reactor that had been closed for eight years and would resume construction of other such facilities. This was in response to the American decision to suspend deliveries of heating oil. In a letter addressed to Mohamed ElBaradei, Pyongyang requested the agency to remove surveillance cameras at the Yongbyon complex.127 North Korea began removing the monitoring equipment thereby escalating tension three days after South Korea elected Roh Moo Hyun who was dedicated to a reconciliation with the North and more independence from Washington. During the election campaign South Koreans were seething with anger over the death of two young girls in an army training accident and the subsequent acquittal of the soldiers responsible for the accident by a US court-martial; they continued their massive demonstrations for over a month.128 Late in December 2002 North Korean officials contemptuously removed the surveillance equipment installed at the Yongbyon complex in the presence of the two IAEA inspectors. They cut the seals and reopened the reactor and the nearby reprocessing facility. A smiling official later went to the guesthouse where the inspectors were staying and ordered them to leave the country immediately, helpfully informing them that two seats were available on a flight to Beijing. The inspectors flew out with 24 discs of surveillance record and 200 discarded seals.129 This is the first occasion when a signatory to the NPT has actually expelled the IAEA inspectors and has, therefore, directly challenged the entire non-proliferation regime. The IAEA is obliged to report to the Security Council when confronted by the non-compliance of a treaty signatory.130 China, however, rebuffed American attempts to obtain a condemnatory statement from the Security Council. Pyongyang’s response to the charge of violation of NPT was to accuse the United States of violating its commitments under that

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treaty: ‘The act of a nuclear state [the U.S.] putting a non-nuclear state [Iraq] on it preemptive strike list goes against the philosophy of the NPT.’131 The contrast between the hundreds of IAEA inspections being conducted in Iraq and the expulsion of IAEA inspectors from North Korea was too great to be missed.132 On 10 January 2003, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT. It argued that the mandatory requirement of three months’ notice before such a withdrawal would be fulfilled the next day because its original decision to withdraw from the treaty, announced on 12 March 1993, was merely suspended one day before it would have become legally binding.133 The day the new South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun was installed in February 2003 in the presence of Colin Powell and representatives of Japan, Russia and China, Pyongyang fired a missile. The primary objective of North Korea has shifted from forcible unification of the Korean Peninsula to the simple task of the survival of the regime in Pyongyang and to make sure that it will not be turned into another Iraq.134 Pyongyang is seeking an end to its hostile relationship with the United States and has used self-generated crises as negotiating ploys to extort aid, food, fuel or diplomatic concessions. There are striking parallels between the North Korean negotiating style during the 1993–94 negotiations and the more recent crisis beginning in October 2002. It is a ‘crisis-oriented negotiating style’ that relies on threats, bluff and forms of blackmail to extract maximum concessions from the United States.135 Pyongyang has deployed as many as 100 Nodong missiles with a range of 1,300 km, enough to target most of Japan. It also launched the Taepodong-1 missile on 31 August 1998.136 Washington is reluctant to make any concessions that could be interpreted as succumbing to blackmail. Pyongyang claimed that only a non-aggression treaty could prevent ‘a catastrophic crisis of war’ on the Korean Peninsula. Its nuclear brinkmanship had a definite objective. Kim Yong Nam, North Korea’s highest-ranking leader next to Kim Jong II, said his country was ‘ready to resolve security concerns through dialogue’ provided the United States were ‘willing to withdraw its hostile policy’. An American analyst succinctly put the North Korean position as, ‘What they are saying is that they are prepared to negotiate an end to all nuclear activity and allow inspections, if we agree to two things: not to threaten them militarily and to pursue normalised relations.’137 North-east Asia is different today than it was a decade ago and the realities of complex and interlocking relationships are forcing all the interested powers towards a negotiated settlement of this complex

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issue. The stunningly rapid economic growth of South Korea and a generational change in its leadership have produced a newly assertive foreign policy. It was expected to invest $1 billion in China in 2003 and about 8,000 South Korean companies employ hundreds of thousands of Chinese workers. While China is North Korea’s largest trading partner, with a two-way annual trade of $740 million, two-way annual trade with South Korea now exceeds $30 billion. Moreover, South Korean annual direct investment in China is as high as $900 million.138 South Korea is resolutely against the use of force. Recalling the 1994 crisis, Roh said that Seoul later learned that North Korea and the US were on the brink of nuclear war; and ‘that would have meant a massive sacrifice on the part of the Korean people.’ This time around, he insisted, Seoul needed closer cooperation and coordination with the United States.139 South Korean national pride does not countenance foreign intervention and prefers a negotiated solution outside the United Nations.140 The two Koreas have moved from unremitting hostility toward a wary but creeping accommodation. A glimpse of their northern neighbour has revealed to many South Koreans ‘a charity case than a security threat’. They are worried about the negative impact of Kim’s brinkmanship on their economy. Simultaneously, they now resent the highly visible American military presence in their crowded country. North Korea has also developed better relations with Japan, China and Russia. The Japanese are afraid that any American strike on the North Korean nuclear facilities would lead to retaliatory attack on Japan. Beijing is worried about the prospect of millions of impoverished North Koreans flooding into its territory.141 Russia also favours a diplomatic solution. Neither Beijing nor Washington would like to see Japan acquire nuclear weapons as a consequence of the growing North Korean threat. Preoccupied with Iraq, Washington has pushed China to play a larger role.142 According to the most senior officials of the Bush administration, North Korea has had at least a couple of nuclear weapons for some years. The embrace of a cautious American posture in contrast to the military solution favoured to deal with Iraq, shows, according to American non-proliferation expert Gary Milhollin, ‘the difference between dealing with a country that already may have nuclear weapons and one that doesn’t.’143 In a clever move, Pyongyang invited an unofficial American delegation led by Professor John W. Lewis of Stanford University, who had made 10 trips to North Korea since 1987, to visit the Yongbyon

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nuclear complex where about 8,000 spent fuel rods had been safeguarded by IAEA inspectors. The delegation included John Pritchard, who resigned as special envoy for negotiations with North Korea in August, and Seifgried Hecker, a former director of the Los Alamos nuclear weapons laboratory. It noticed that all the 8,000 rods had been removed. Hecker, therefore, surmised that the North Koreans ‘were looking for a way to get some independent confirmation’ of their reprocessing activity. Pritchard has suggested that the Bush administration should ‘step out from behind China’s diplomatic skirts’ and resolve the crisis before Pyongyang could build a nuclear deterrent.144 Russia, China, Japan and South Korea share with the United States a commitment to a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula. Building a diplomatic consensus on this issue, however, is a major challenge. The outcome of the North Korean nuclear crisis could have profound implications for the non-proliferation regime as well as for stability in North-east Asia.145

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IN THE

NPT

Despite North Korea’s flamboyant withdrawal from the NPT, there is some ambiguity about its treaty status. While some countries consider withdrawal from the treaty a fait accompli, others maintain that its withdrawal is invalid because, as required by the NPT, it did not explain what ‘extraordinary events’ led to its announcement of 10 January 2002. The Preparatory Committee of the NPT, held between 28 April and 9 May 2002, failed to pronounce on it. Recognising that there were ‘diverging views’ on the country’s status, Chair of the PrepCom Lazlo Molnar decided ‘under his own responsibility not to open a debate’ and ‘to retain the nameplate’ of North Korea ‘temporarily in his custody’. Despite this clever bid to avoid a debate, some delegates insisted that the withdrawal clause in the treaty applied only to NPT signatories ‘in good standing’ at the time of withdrawal. As Pyongyang had violated safeguards’ obligations prior to invoking the withdrawal clause, it could not leave the treaty until those violations had been properly dealt with. The French representative argued that the withdrawal procedure was ‘not designed to legitimise non-compliance with the Treaty and the development of nuclear weapons.’146

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IRAN’S SECRET QUEST

FOR

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Though Iran was a signatory to the NPT, the regime of Shah Reza Pahlavi had initiated a secret nuclear weapons programme in the early 1970s. The programme dissipated in the wake of the Islamic Revolution, but was reportedly resuscitated in 1984 at the height of the war with Iraq.147 Through the 1990s, Iran was trying to complete the nuclear power plant at Bushehr, which was begun during the Shah’s reign with German assistance. But Germany had frozen further assistance in the wake of the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Tehran finally turned to Russia for assistance with the project and an agreement was concluded in 1995 for this purpose. Russia is currently helping Iran with the construction of the plant and has also undertaken to supply fuel for it. Till the August 2002 revelations, US concerns were focused on this project in the mistaken and by now conventional belief that spent fuel from Bushehr would be used to reprocess plutonium for the bomb.

GAS CENTRIFUGE ENRICHMENT Iran’s gas-centrifuge enrichment programme dates back to 1985 and consists of a pilot-scale facility and a larger commercial facility at Natanz. These secret facilities, including a heavy water production plant at Arak and a laser-based uranium enrichment facility, were brought to light by an Iranian opposition group, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, in August 2002.148 The Natanz facility houses 160 centrifuges, and uranium hexaflouride (UF6) gas was introduced into them under IAEA safeguards in June 2003 despite international appeals not to do so.149 The site also has facilities for testing centrifuges and assembling them. During their February 2003 visit, ElBaradei and his team also saw enough components for another 1,000 centrifuges. Iran subsequently confirmed that it was building a much larger centrifuge facility at Natanz that is housed in underground buildings and is designed to hold tens of thousands of centrifuges. American experts calculate that a relatively small fraction of this capacity could be used to make enough HEU for three bombs a year.150 On 9 February 2003, President Mohammaed Khatami broke with the previous position and emphatically stated that Iran should

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control the entire fuel cycle of the Bushehr reactor, to include the development of indigenous fuel and not sending the spent fuel to Russia. He also declared that Iran was engaged in mining uranium reserves as well as building uranium-concentration and conversion facilities and fuel fabrication plants.151 Gholamreza Aghazadeh, Iran’s vice president and head of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI), followed up with the revelation that there were plans to establish a uranium-conversion facility at Isfahan, which would refine yellow cake into uranium oxide, uranium hexaflouride and uranium metal. Aghazadeh also confirmed that the uranium enrichment and heavy water projects were started at the same time because his organisation was not sure which project would succeed. In the event, both succeeded. Mohamed ElBaradei visited Iran on 20–21 February 2003 and met with officials across the political spectrum, including President Khatami, Majlis Speaker Mehdi Karroubi, and Chairman of the Expediency Council Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, all of who expressed the commitment to develop the entire nuclear fuel cycle.152 Initially, Iranian officials claimed that only low levels of enrichment were envisaged for use in civilian nuclear power plants. But environmental samples taken by IAEA inspectors at the Natanz plant and the Kalaye Electric Company in July 2003 revealed traces of weapon-grade uranium.153 When confronted with this information, Iranian officials claimed that imported equipment must have already been contaminated before its delivery to Iran. This contradicted the previous claim that the centrifuge programme was indigenous; this transaction was never reported to the IAEA. Iran finally admitted that it obtained the design plans for the centrifuge in 1987, though the transfer of technology continued for several years thereafter. And the source was Pakistan.154 A letter written to the IAEA on 21 October 2003 by Aghazadeh acknowledged the following: • Between 1999 and 2002, Iran had carried out the testing of centrifuges through the introduction of 1.9 kg of UF6— imported in 1991 from China—into centrifuges at Kalaye Electric Company, which Iran had earlier claimed was a watch factory.155 • Between 1991 and 2000, a laser enrichment programme was pursued, which used 30 kg of uranium metal not previously disclosed. • Between 1988 and 1992, Iran had irradiated 7 kg of UO2 targets and extracted small quantities of plutonium.156

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Earlier, on 9 October 2003, Iran had acknowledged that, contrary to earlier denials, it had indeed produced ‘practically all of the materials important to uranium conversion … in laboratory and bench scale experiments between 1981 and 1993’ at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre (ENTC) and the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre (TNRC). For these purposes, it had used nuclear material imported in 1977 and 1982. Some of this material was exempt from safeguards; Iran later declared the un-safeguarded portion as ‘a process loss’. In February 2003, Iran had declared that it had used nuclear material imported in 1991 to conduct experiments for the conversion of UF4 to UF6 as well as the conversion of UO2 to UO4.157

LASER ENRICHMENT In August 2003 Iran had allowed IAEA inspectors to visit a laboratory located at Lashkar Ab’ad. At that time, it had claimed that though the plant was originally designed for laser fusion research and laser spectroscopy, its focus had subsequently been changed to the research and development and manufacture of copper vapour lasers. It was only in October 2003 that Tehran finally acknowledged that it had had contracts with sources in four countries for laser enrichment starting in the 1970s and that a pilot plant for laser enrichment had indeed been established at Lashkar Ab’ad in 2000. It had carried out, between October 2002 and 2003, laser enrichment experiments with previously undeclared imported natural uranium metal. Tehran further stated that all the equipment was dismantled in May 2003 and subsequently presented to IAEA inspectors on 28 October 2003.158

HEAVY WATER REACTOR On 12 July 2003 the Iranian authorities made a presentation to the IAEA on the technical features of the heavy water nuclear research reactor to be constructed at Arak. They planned to use it for the production of radioisotopes for medical and industrial purposes using domestically-produced UO2 and zirconium. This project was undertaken after attempts to acquire a reactor from outside the country had failed. When queried about the absence of hot cells—necessary for the declared purpose—in the design drawings, Iranian authorities confirmed in October that two hot cells were indeed foreseen but

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that they had not yet been able to design the actual layout because they were unsure about the characteristics of certain equipment to be procured. And, in November, they further confirmed that there indeed existed plans for the construction of another facility at the Arak site for the housing of hot cells.159

IAEA’S FINDINGS As of November 2003, the agency’s understanding was that the Iranian nuclear programme consisted of ‘a practically complete front end of a nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium mining and milling, conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, heavy water production, a light water reactor, a heavy water research reactor and associated research and development facilities.’ After initial denials, Tehran finally acknowledged that it had indeed been developing for 18 years, a uranium centrifuge enrichment programme, and for 12 years, a laser enrichment programme. It also admitted that it had produced small amounts of LEU using both methods and had not disclosed any of the activities related to this to the IAEA.160

INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE

AND ITS IMPACT

The revelations and findings of the IAEA led to the exertion of concerted western pressure on Tehran. Western concerns were especially acute, given the clubbing together in the post-September 11 world of the three evils of terrorism, rogue states and weapons of mass destruction. Iran was long identified by Washington as a ‘rogue’ state and George Bush elevated it to an ‘axis of evil’ in 2002; Tehran is known to support terrorist groups like the Hezbollah; and then came revelations about Iran’s secret enrichment and heavy water reactor projects. The strength of this pressure was evident in the IAEA resolution of 12 September 2003, which called upon Iran to ‘provide accelerated cooperation and full transparency’ regarding its nuclear activities. It demanded that Iran ‘suspend all further uranium enrichment related activities’, and also its reprocessing activities as a confidencebuilding measure pending the conclusion and application of the provisions of the Additional Protocol. It further urged Tehran to ‘sign, ratify and fully implement the Additional Protocol promptly and unconditionally.…’161

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The IAEA resolution also carried an explicit threat that Iranian non-compliance would have to be referred to the UN Security Council. At the same time, Japan, Russia and the European Union countries suspended cooperation to Iran in some areas. Concurrent with these threats of punishment, Britain, France and Germany launched a separate diplomatic initiative to cajole the Iranian leadership, through promises of further assistance to civilian nuclear projects, into addressing the IAEA’s concerns and suspend uraniumenrichment and plutonium-reprocessing activities.162 The issue was temporarily resolved on 21 October 2003, when Iran issued a joint statement with the foreign ministers of Britain, France and Germany that it would indeed cooperate with the IAEA. According to the statement, Iran agreed to: • Fully cooperate with the IAEA to address and resolve … all requirements and outstanding issues … and clarify and correct any possible failures and deficiencies …; • sign the IAEA Additional Protocol, and commence ratification procedures … [but] continue to co-operate with the agency in accordance with the protocol in advance of its ratification; and, • suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA.163 However Hassan Rowhani, Secretary of the High National Security Council, who had played the leading role in articulating Iran’s nuclear policy and who led the negotiations with the European foreign ministers, declared on the same day that ‘it could last for one day or one year; it depends on us’.164 On 19 November 2003, Iran conveyed to the IAEA its readiness to sign the Additional Protocol and as well as its decision to suspend, with effect from that day, all enrichment and reprocessing activities. It also specifically undertook to ‘freeze all activities on the site of Natanz, not to produce feed material for enrichment processes and not to import enrichment related items.’165 While it is true that Iran signed the Additional Protocol in December 2003 and has agreed not to further pursue even its tentatively non-peaceful nuclear activities, it may be too early to argue that the issue has been fully resolved. This was clearly brought out by fresh revelations on 13 February 2004 about Iran not declaring that it possessed blueprints for the more advanced P-2 or Pak-2 type of gas centrifuge, Pakistan’s second generation centrifuge design. One speculation is that Iran had tried to build some P-2 prototypes, but

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finding it difficult to manufacture the steel-rotors for this, opted for the easier P-1 using aluminium rotors.166 Though it does not indicate any new capability, this latest revelation is bound to raise the question of Iran’s credibility. It only seems to confirm the view articulated by Rose Gottemoeller, a former US non-proliferation official, that ‘the Iranians have not been telling the whole story. We’ve seen all along that they dribbled out information only when confronted, and that they reluctantly acquiesced to certain steps.’ An indication of the Bush administration’s view on Iran and its nuclear programme was given by US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who reacted to this latest disclosure by stating: ‘There is no doubt in our mind that Iran continues to pursue a nuclear weapons program…. They have not been fully forthcoming.’167

THE EPICENTRE

OF

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and missile programmes have relied heavily on covert operations with the help of shady middlemen and dummy companies. Abdul Qadeer Khan has, since the mid-1970s, thrived on his linkages with a network of greedy underworld operators. These covert operations bred an organisational culture of deception. Khan expanded his network over the decades into a global nuclear black market. Successive Pakistani regimes denied any covert international nuclear transactions. It was the discovery by the IAEA of Pakistani involvement in Iran’s enrichment efforts and a series of detailed reports in American newspapers that forced President Musharraf, in November 2003, to order a probe into the activities of Pakistani scientists. It was officially stated that eight current and former scientists, including Mohammad Farooq, Yasin Chohan and Nazir Ahmad, two brigadiers, and a retired major were being interrogated. Farooq was in charge of dealing with foreign suppliers and Chohan headed metallurgical research at the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL). A senior Bush administration official said that all three had been ‘well known to our intelligence folks’. Major Islam Ul Haq, a director at KRL, was taken into custody while having dinner at Khan’s residence.168 A number of skeletons are now tumbling out of the Pakistani nuclear cupboard. A secret Iraqi document found by IAEA inspectors after the Gulf War of 1991 mentioned Khan’s offer of blueprints of a nuclear weapon and uranium enrichment equipment through

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a company in Dubai in return for a handsome payment of $5 million. This offer was made two months after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; the Iraqi government did not take it up.169 Two senior members of the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Abdul Majid, were arrested on 23 October 2001 for their alleged involvement in al-Qaeda’s search for a nuclear weapons capability. Bashiruddin had contributed significantly to the enrichment and plutonium routes to the Pakistani bomb. Majid, trained at a plutonium facility in Belgium, had been chief engineer of the PAEC. Bashiruddin claimed that only his knowledge about Pakistan’s nuclear programme was a secret not to be revealed; the expertise he had acquired on enriching uranium or producing weapon-grade plutonium, however, could be shared with others.170 Bashiruddin’s assets were frozen and he was under house arrest, ‘with a guard watching over him 24 hours a day’. Professor Rifaat Hussain of Quaid-e-Azam University says Bashiruddin had a ‘totally crazy mindset’. According to his colleague Professor Pervez Hoodbhoy, there are too many ‘long beards’ in the Pakistani nuclear establishment.171 The public humiliation of a scientist of Bashiruddin’s stature could hardly be triggered simply because of his meetings with the Taliban. The incriminating evidence eventually led the US government to designate Bashiruddin Mahmood as well as Abdul Majeed as terrorist individuals on 20 December 2001.172 In October 2002, Pakistani involvement in North Korea’s covert nuclear weapons enterprise was exposed. In the midst of American pressure on North Korea to renounce its nuclear weapons option, then Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto arrived in Pyongyang to clinch a deal. In a ‘perfect marriage of interests’, Pakistan gave Pyongyang the designs for gas centrifuges and much of the machinery it needed to make HEU. Her delegation left with plans for North Korea’s Nodong missile. One western diplomat, who was in Pyongyang in May 1998, recalled witnessing an odd celebration. He was in the Foreign Ministry talking to a North Korean official who suddenly broke into a big smile and announced the Pakistani nuclear tests with pride. Referring to the Pakistani transfer of centrifuge technology to North Korea, professor of Physics at Quaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad A.H. Nayyar observed, ‘The clearest possibility is that the Pakistanis gave them the blueprint. “Here it is. You make it on your own.”’ American intelligence agencies had silently monitored this ‘deadly barter’ with North Korea. They tracked, in July 2002, the landing of

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an American-built C-130 (supposed to be used in the war against the al-Qaeda terrorists) at a North Korean airfield carrying a shipment of components of ballistic missiles for Pakistan. This covert transaction took place in full view of American spy satellites. Secretary of State Colin Powell, however, said General Musharraf told him, ‘Four hundred per cent assurance that there is no such interchange taking place now.’ Pressed further, he smiled tightly and said, ‘We didn’t talk about the past.’ One American official, who has reviewed intelligence reports, however, asserts that the North Korean enrichment technology ‘has “Made in Pakistan” stamped all over it.’ This relationship continued even after General Musharraf ’s military coup.173 Khan is reported to have visited North Korea 13 times under a cloak of secrecy. A senior American journalist quotes an American official: ‘The transfer of enrichment technology by Pakistan is a direct outgrowth of the failure of the United States to deal with the Pakistani programme when we could have done so. We’ve lost control.’174 North Korea’s Fourth Machine Industry Bureau delivered the Nodong missile (itself a derivative of the Scud missile); rechristened Ghauri, it was first tested on 6 April 1998. ‘Through means both overt and covert’, admits retired Lt. Gen. Talat Masood, ‘we began picking up capabilities, and may have relied on the North Koreans for about 10 per cent of our programme.’ Ballistic missiles expert Joseph Bermudez, however, asserts that Ghauri ‘is a North Korean missile, made, manufactured and assembled there, although some were assembled in Pakistan.’175 Pakistani assistance to North Korea in developing gas centrifuges was publicly known in the US government circles at least since 1999.176 Musharraf had secretly informed the US in 2000 that a number of its scientists and military officials were personally responsible for providing technology to North Korea and that ‘tens of thousands of dollars’ were deposited over ‘a number of years’ into the personal bank accounts of scientists at the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) and of senior military officers.177 Despite General Musharraf ’s flat public denials, two former Assistant Secretaries of State, Karl Inderfurth and Robert Einhorn, have confirmed that the issue of North Korean supply of Nodong missiles to Pakistan and Pakistan’s nuclear assistance to that country was discussed with both Nawaz Sharif and General Musharraf on three occasions.178 Preoccupied with the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, Secretary of State Colin Powell asked, ‘What are they going to do with another two or three nuclear weapons?,’ and with a rhetorical shrug of the shoulders added, ‘If they have a few more, they have a few more.’179

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Washington did not invoke sanctions against Pakistan. In March 2003, Washington imposed sanctions on a North Korean corporation for transferring missile technology to the KRL that, in turn, was sanctioned for receiving it. In an extraordinary statement, however, a state department spokesman clarified that the KRL had been brought into the orbit only for a ‘missile-related transfer’ and not for the transfer of technology to North Korea.180 Conceding the awkward fact that Pakistan is governed in a secretive manner, ‘with its intelligence services and military running affairs in spheres of international concern’, a former adviser to Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif warned that once Pakistan’s indispensability waned, the accusations could lead to sanctions against a less compliant regime in Islamabad.181 Under heavy American pressure, Musharraf ‘retired’ Khan from the KRL in March 2001 and offered him the compensatory post of ‘adviser to the chief executive’. Meanwhile, a Pentagon office tracking foreign scientific publications found many scientific papers and reports on classified centrifuge technology written by Khan and his associates. A more conspicuous evidence of KRL’s proliferation activities was a sales brochure, its cover bearing a seal of the ‘Government of Pakistan’ and Khan’s photograph set in a drawing of a mushroom cloud. The brochure was being secretly circulated within the community of aspiring proliferators, middlemen and suppliers of contraband. The network stretched ‘from Germany to Dubai and from China to South Asia.’ Its tracks led to the KRL and Pakistan-directed, what a former official in the Clinton administration called a, ‘brotherhood of rogues’.182 The detailed reports about Khan’s proliferation record published by American newspapers were part of an apparently concerted campaign to force Musharraf to take corrective action. A meeting of Pakistan’s National Command Authority (NCA) chaired by him, with the prime minister, the foreign, defence, interior, and finance ministers, chairman, joint chiefs of the staff committee, chiefs of the air and naval staffs, vice chief of the army, senior civil and military officials, and the chairman of the KRL in attendance, stated that the government ‘condemns and distances itself from individual acts of indiscretion in the past.’ Significantly, the statement stated that no such incident had taken place since the establishment of the NCA in February 2002. It also asserted that Pakistan took its international obligations ‘with the utmost seriousness’. In order to ‘facilitate’ the investigation, Khan was removed from the post of adviser to the prime minister.183 Musharraf later vowed that scientists who sold

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nuclear secrets to rogue nations would be punished as ‘enemies of the state’.184 ‘There was a time when they used to call themselves heroes of Pakistan,’ said Interior Minister Faisal Saleh Hayat, ‘but now the real face of some of those heroes has been exposed.’ According to Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai, commander of Pakistan’s Strategic Planning and Development Cell, Khan had masterminded an elaborate and wholly unauthorised smuggling network involving chartered cargo flights, clandestine overseas meetings and a Malaysian factory that reconditioned centrifuge parts discarded from Pakistan’s nuclear programme for sale to foreign clients. He also supplied Iran and Libya with surplus, outmoded equipment from the laboratory. Referring to Khan’s lavish lifestyle, Kidwai said it was ‘the worst-kept secret in town’ that should have triggered some investigation.185 In the midst of newspaper leaks about Khan’s extensive properties, two government officials summoned a group of hand-picked journalists to announce that he had signed a detailed confession admitting that he transferred secret designs of centrifuges and had given personal briefings to Iranian, Libyan and North Korean scientists in covert meetings abroad. He was responsible for the transfer of centrifuge components and blueprints of nuclear weapons to Iran between 1989 and 1991, meeting Iranian scientists in Karachi and Malaysia. He admitted to transfer of enrichment technology to North Korea and Libya between 1991 and 1997; some additional assistance to North Korea continued until 2000. He met Libyan scientists in Casablanca, Morocco and in Istanbul. Mohammad Farooq worked closely with a Sri Lankan middleman who established a factory in Malaysia to build components of centrifuges based on Pakistani designs. He accompanied Khan for the meetings with Libyan officials in Istanbul and Casablanca. The smuggled material was shipped through Dubai, and through chartered flights as well as government planes to North Korea. He also tried to send overland nuclear hardware to Iran with the help of a Karachi businessman and asserted that he provided assistance to Islamic countries in order to deflect international pressure on Pakistan’s nuclear programme. The officials revealed that Khan had threatened to kill one of his subordinates in 2001 if he divulged anything about the secret transactions. They also accused Khan of urging Iranian officials to destroy some of their facilities and to tell officials that the Pakistanis who aided them had died. It is now reported that the son of Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi owns the company that has been building components of centrifuges.186

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Khan was coerced to confess his guilt. Lt. Gen. Ehsan ul-Haq, head of the ISI and Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai showed Khan ‘reams of evidence’ that he not only benefited from his foreign clients financially, but also from improper deals with suppliers of equipment even for Pakistan’s weapons programme. They threatened to make the evidence public if he did not sign a confessional statement. After discussing his options with a former law minister S.M. Zafar, Khan agreed to sign the proposed document drafted by Attorney General Makhdoom Ali Khan. He was asked to make a public statement that he had signed it of his own free will.187 Before the Pakistanis could recover from the shock of Khan’s confession, Qazi Hussain Ahmad, leader of the Muttahida Majlise-Amal, declared that Khan had told him that he had made no confessional statement. The next day, an official Pakistani television channel showed a clipping with the general sitting stone-faced in his commando uniform giving an audience to a contrite Khan, who found himself in the unaccustomed role of a supplicant for mercy. Khan later read out a carefully drafted statement. Addressing his traumatised countrymen, he took full responsibility for all his ‘errors of judgment’ that were committed ‘in good faith’ and added: ‘I wish to clarify that there was never any kind of authorisation for these activities by the government.’188 The secret deal—admission of guilt followed by presidential pardon—was brokered by Chaudhry Shujaat Hussein, a wheeler-dealer of the official Muslim League. It was designed to save the armed forces from any critical scrutiny, to avoid a backlash against the government, and, significantly, to prevent details of China’s nuclear weapons assistance to Pakistan from becoming public. Chinese officials were insisting that the inquiry should be closed at the earliest. A senior official of the ruling party said the government feared Khan would publicly spill the beans about extensive Chinese assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programmes, including the design of a nuclear weapon. Musharraf said Khan was still his hero and was ‘still high in the sky’ for him. He added: ‘This hero has given us grace and respect’. He, however, admitted that Khan had pocketed large sums to pay for a lavish lifestyle. The scientist ‘had a lust for wealth.’189 Khan had earlier decided to hit back at the army. During interrogations, he had insisted that the three chiefs of the army staff— General Aslam Beg, Jihangir Karamat and Pervez Musharraf—were well aware of his efforts to transfer technology to other countries. A retired Pakistani army corps commander has asserted that the barter

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arrangement with North Korea was clinched during Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s trip to Pyongyang at the request her Chief of Army Staff General Abdul Waheed. Musharraf was then Director General for Military Operations. When Karamat succeeded Waheed, he secretly visited North Korea in December 1997. Khan had also asserted that Musharraf was aware of the agreement with North Korea because he took over responsibility for the Ghauri missile programme when he became army chief of staff in October 1998.190 Qazi Hussein Ahmad dismissed Khan’s television apology as nothing more than a confession obtained under duress. The Pakistani public reaction has been one of total scepticism about the non-complicity of the top military brass in Khan’s activities. The Qazi has contemptuously dismissed the probe as the ‘worst kind of victimization of national heroes to please the Bush administration.’ A respected Pakistani columnist commented: ‘Surrounded by layers of security and under the watchful eye of the intelligence agencies,’ it was absurd to suggest that ‘rogue’ scientists of the lab could have peddled nuclear secrets on their own. Such a claim amounted to the indictment of the entire national security establishment.191 Mir pointed out that it was not particularly astute to think that by exonerating army chiefs (the real guardians of the Pakistan’s nuclear programme), and making sacrificial lambs of Khan and his colleagues the world would be convinced of Pakistan’s good intentions.192 By accepting blame, Pakistanis believe, Khan has done one more service to his country and that Pakistan had not been ‘publicly whipped’ because of its usefulness to the United States. Pakistan should have protected Khan by using its services in Afghanistan as a bargaining chip.193 ‘How can you blame a person who enjoyed explicit authority from the state to beg, borrow or steal for no less than 20 years to deliver his nation its nuclear bomb?’ an army general said. ‘What harm has he caused Pakistan by extending the same knowledge to another Islamic country?’194 In a strongly worded editorial, the Washington Post accused Pakistan of having committed ‘some of the worst crimes of nuclear weapons proliferation ever committed.’ It added: ‘Were Pakistan not a professed ally of the United States, its behavior would meet the criteria for preemptive military intervention outlined in Mr. Bush’s national security strategy.’195 The view in Washington is that the deal with Khan, absolving the military of any involvement in the proliferation racket, is ‘a polite fiction that the White House may be willing to live with if it is the only way to keep a close ally in power while dismantling the Khan trading network.’196

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American and British intelligence operatives have now pieced together details about Khan’s audacious global network of illicit nuclear transactions. As one close aide to Musharraf recently put it, ‘Khan had a complete blank cheque. He could do anything. He could go anywhere. He could buy anything at any price.’ He began slowly, placing orders for twice the number of components needed for Pakistan, and then selling the excess to other countries. ‘We were not the first beneficiaries of this network,’ said a Pakistani military official involved in the investigation of Khan’s activities. ‘But the intensity of Pakistan’s nuclear acquisition effort did enlarge the market. Everybody knew that there is a buyer out there, loaded with money and hell-bent on getting this ultimate weapon.’ British engineer Peter Griffin says that he had been a supplier to Pakistan for two decades. ‘Anything that could be sent to Pakistan, I sent to Pakistan,’ he said, adding that all his sales were approved by British trade authorities. Shady businessmen, including German, Dutch and French middlemen, rushed to Pakistan with sales brochures eager to supply whatever Pakistan needed. Eventually the flow of technology reversed and the old smuggling network was used for sending technology out of Pakistan, the official said. ‘The same network, the same routes, the same people who brought the technology in, were also sending it out.’ Government cargo planes were pressed into service and Dubai was the place for shipments and for payments. As Pakistan’s own centrifuges became more sophisticated, Khan dispensed with old centrifuges by palming them off to foreign customers. The Iranians were unhappy to find that they overpaid for old contaminated centrifuges. To Libya he sold centrifuges and crude weapons designs. The designs closely resembled the warhead design that China had given to Pakistan and were wrapped in bags which belonged to a dry cleaner in Islamabad. Libyan officials said they bought them apparently for more than $50 million. What the Libyans purchased, in the words of an American weapons expert, was ‘both the kitchen equipment and the recipes’.197 The scandal of Khan’s black market is unlikely to end in the near future. There are many troubling questions about it. Did he offer his services to other countries not mentioned in his confession? How could a few scientists preside over a thriving nuclear black market without the complicity of the civilian and military rulers? Whether a country whose rulers failed to protect nuclear secrets could be trusted with nuclear weapons? Then there is the still more gnawing concern about nuclear secrets and hardware falling into the hands of terrorists. The international community has to evolve a new consensus to cope with the peddlers of nuclear knowledge and

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hardware beyond the NPT framework. Those who are part of this framework and those who are outside of it have an equal stake in ensuring that the black market is dismantled and the nuclear knowhow does not fall into the hands of non-state actors. Table 7.1 provides an overview of the global stock of nuclear weapons. The global stock of nuclear weapons peaked at 69,478 weapons in 1986. By 1985 the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and the former Soviet Union contained 8 billion t of TNT, approximately 640,000 times the explosive power of the bomb dropped Table 7.1 Global Nuclear Stockpiles 1964 USA USSR UK France China Total

31,600 5,100 310 4 1 37,015

1970 USA USSR UK France China Total

26,600 12,700 280 36 75 39,691

1980 USA USSR UK France China Total

24,300 36,300 350 250 280 61,480

1986 USA USSR UK France China Total

23,400 45,000 300 355 423 69,478 (Cont)

180 M MATIN ZUBERI Table 7.1 (Cont) 1990 USA USSR UK France China Total

21,000 38,000 300 504 432 60,236

2000 USA USSR UK France China Total

10,500 20,000 185 450 400 31,535

Source: Adapted from NRDC Nuclear Notebook, ‘Global Nuclear Stockpiles, 1945–2000’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2000, Vol. 56, No. 2, p. 79.

on Hiroshima.198 Substantial reductions, to be sure, have taken place, and nuclear redundant warheads have been dismantled. In the United States about 12,000 warheads have been dismantled since 1990 and Russia has been dismantling about 2,000 warheads every year.199 From the perspective of the non-proliferation regime, however, these reductions do not seem dramatic enough. In 1970, when the NPT came into force, the global stockpile contained an estimated 39,691 warheads; their tally had declined to 31,535 by 2002. About 95 per cent of these weapons are in American and Russian stockpiles, and more than 1,600 are operationally deployed.200 The United States has the most sophisticated arsenal containing ‘more than 12,000 nuclear weapons of nine distinct designs refined through 1,030 nuclear tests conducted over 47 years,’ maintained by a powerful scientific–industrial complex.201 Russia’s economic plight, according to an American security analyst, has sealed the fate of its nuclear arsenal ‘on a path toward oblivion’. Within 15 years its arsenal would shrink to between 200 and 100 nuclear warheads, and obsolescence is overtaking its missile fleet.202 Nuclear weapons are viewed as ‘the keystone of the arch of freedom from war’ and nuclear deterrence is supposed to have kept proliferation at bay.203 ‘We have reached the point’, however, exclaims

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recently retired commander of US Space Command General Eugene Habinger, ‘when the senior military generals responsible for nuclear forces are advocating more vocally, more vehemently, than our politicians, to get down to lower levels.’204

THE US NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW The classified Nuclear Posture Review of 2001, portions of which were leaked to the press, proposed major changes in the role of nuclear offensive forces in the American deterrent strategy. Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld announced that the United States would no longer plan its nuclear forces as if the Russian threat posed to American security were only a smaller version of the Soviet threat. Adopting a capabilities-based approach for nuclear planning, the document maintained that a strategic posture relying solely on offensive nuclear forces was no longer sufficient for deterring potential adversaries; a broader array of capabilities was required to defeat any aggressor, including terrorists or ‘rogue’ states. The review called for more flexible nuclear forces and attack options to destroy ‘hardened and deeply buried targets’; it recommended the development of new types of nuclear warheads that ‘reduce collateral damage’, as well as ‘possible modifications to existing weapons to provide additional yield flexibility’. It specifically enumerated Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea and Syria—in addition to Russia and China—as potential targets of US nuclear weapons in ‘immediate’ or potential contingencies. It implied new war-fighting strategies involving a mixture of nuclear and conventional forces. Unlike the previous triad of US forces that was exclusively nuclear, the proposed new triad would consist of nuclear and non-nuclear offensive strike systems; active and passive defences, and a revitalised defence structure able to respond in timely fashion to deal with emerging threats. The first leg of the triad, composed of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), and strategic bombers, would be integrated with new non-nuclear strategic capabilities, thereby strengthening offensive deterrence. ‘Exquisite’ intelligence on the intentions and capabilities of possible adversaries would enhance the effectiveness of the triad. The review called for a reinvigoration of US ‘nuclear infrastructure’, including the design and production of new nuclear weapons,

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and shortening the period of US readiness to resume nuclear testing. It proposed the integration of nuclear and conventional strike options in a manner that would erode the threshold between nuclear and conventional weapons. It betrayed a negative view of the nonproliferation regime and the arms control accords that constrain US military options. On the positive side, the document promised major reductions in the American nuclear arsenal.205 Chairman of the US Senate Armed Services Committee Carl Levin, however, said that the review proposed simply to move those warheads from one location to another. But just as Enron [company] couldn’t make its debts disappear by moving one set of books to another, we are not going to make nuclear warheads go away by moving them from launchers to warehouses.206 It was noted in the American press that the United States had graduated from Mutual Assured Destruction to Unilaterally Assured Destruction. The negative reaction to the document is summed up in an editorial entitled ‘America as Nuclear Rogue’ with this observation: ‘If another country were planning to develop new nuclear weapons and contemplating preemptive strikes against a list of non-nuclear powers, Washington would rightly label that nation a dangerous rogue state.’ The editorial added that lowering the threshold for using nuclear weapons would undermine the NPT.207 The treaty signed by Presidents Bush and Putin in Moscow on 24 May 2002 called for reduction in operationally deployed nuclear warheads on both sides to about 1,700 to 2,200 by 2020. It, however, only proposed storage, not destruction, of non-deployed warheads or bombs. Either party could withdraw from the treaty with 45 day’s notice; unless renewed, the treaty would expire in 2012.208 Moreover, thousands of tactical nuclear weapons, withdrawn from forward positions, continue to be unaccounted for by the arms control process. If other categories of US nuclear weapons—‘responsive force’, ‘nonstrategic’ bombs, ‘spare’ strategic and non-strategic warheads, the intact warheads in the ‘inactive reserve’ stockpile, and the stored plutonium ‘primary’ and HEU ‘secondary’ components that can be re-assembled into weapons—are included, the total US stockpile would consist of 15,000 nuclear weapons. Non-accountable nuclear warheads will soon represent more than half the total US stockpile. As the number of deployed warheads declines there is a new prospect of growth in clandestine nuclear arsenals.209

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NUCLEAR TESTING?

To ensure that new designs of nuclear weapons can be tested, the Bush administration seeks to shorten the time necessary to resume testing from the current two to three years, to as little as 12 months. Although there are no immediate plans to resume testing, the weapons laboratories are directed to establish teams of scientists dedicated to explore advanced concepts for new warheads in order to train the next generation of weapons designers and engineers. The ‘enduring’ nuclear stockpile necessitates successive generations of such talented people. President Bush had asked Congress for $15.5 million in the fiscal year 2003 for research to modify the existing warheads so that deeply buried targets could be destroyed. Another $15 million were requested to improve the readiness of the Nevada Nuclear Test Site to resume testing.210

RECOMMENDATIONS The war against international terrorism cannot but shake up the entire international system of sovereign states in unexpected ways. Coping with the threat of international terrorism is moving the nonproliferation regime deeper into the world of intelligence-gathering and pre-emptive use of force. The new assessment is that ‘there is less danger of complete annihilation, but more danger of mass destruction’ through local disruptions. Moreover, nuclear weapons no longer represent the cutting edge of technology and have increasingly become primitive and the ‘weapons of the weak’.211 The global nuclear order, of which the non-proliferation regime is an important component, rested on two mutually supportive arrangements—nuclear deterrent relationships based on a rational calculus of nuclear-weapon powers, and arms control accords ensuring nuclear stability. This nuclear order, organised around multiple layers of security arrangements, is now undergoing a major transformation. Reckless ‘rogue’ regimes led by tyrants, it is feared, may not buy into the old deterrence theory.212 The catastrophe of 9/11 that ‘turned the foot of Manhattan into the mouth of Hell’ has blurred the distinction between the permissible and the impermissible.213 The United States, chief architect and

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upholder of the global nuclear order, seems to have lost faith in the usefulness of the NPT verification system to slow down the diffusion of nuclear and missile technologies. Moreover, the North Korean, Iranian and Libyan cases indicate how ineffective it has been in inhibiting these member states from cheating on their treaty commitments.214 A US state department research paper of 28 May 1968 entitled ‘After NPT, What?’ had perceptively observed that it was possible for a country ‘to achieve an advanced state of nuclear pregnancy, while remaining within the strictures of the NPT.’215 Arms control that provided the link between nuclear deterrence and the non-proliferation regime is now viewed as a relic of the Cold War. This has resulted in the withdrawal of the US from the ABM Treaty conditions being attached to ratification of the CWC, nonratification of the CTBT, and the rejection of the draft protocol to the BWC. The new mantra is that arms control agreements do not work because responsible states don’t need them and irresponsible ‘rogue’ states cheat. As one senator graphically put it, the United States, constrained by such accords, is like a ‘Gulliver in the land of Lilliputians, stretched out, unable to move, because he has been tied down by a whole host of threads.’216 Donald Rumsfeld compared international treaties with ‘a plate full of spaghetti’.217 Arms control agreements, consequently, ‘have fallen like leaves in the breeze’.218 India could not find a place in the non-proliferation regime that was commensurate with its human and material resources and capabilities. The present turmoil in the regime, however, provides an opportunity for us to acquire the status of a full-fledged nuclearweapon power. Decisions needed in the scientific–technological, military, and administrative spheres in support of that status should be taken without delay. • The wisdom of keeping out of the NPT trap has been amply demonstrated. There are suggestions that India should explore possibilities of incrementally becoming a member of the nonproliferation regime. Separating the military and civilian components of our nuclear enterprise, leading to acceptance of NPT safeguards on the civilian nuclear facilities, has been suggested. Apart from the difficulty of separating the civilian and military sectors, however, the historical record of the regime is not encouraging. Treaty commitments have been repeatedly flouted and new conditions and restrictions have been imposed far beyond what was legally permitted. It has also been suggested that India should join the Nuclear Suppliers Group, as it

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would facilitate an indirect recognition of its new status. The group, however, includes nuclear-weapon powers as well as non-nuclear weapon countries. India can join the regime only as a recognised nuclear-weapon power. India must have the missile capability to hit designated targets of adversaries; this necessitates more missile tests. Any attempt to transform the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) into a legally binding arrangement should be resisted. The Atomic Energy Act should be amended so it conforms with India’s status as a nuclear-weapon power. We should build a new plutonium production reactor and accelerate production of HEU and tritium. We should conduct subcritical tests to demonstrate our technological competence and to enhance our simulation capabilities. In view of the possibilities of American resumption of nuclear testing in the not too distant future, we should also prepare ourselves to take full advantage of such a development. Domestic legislation on nuclear exports in conformity with the broad guidelines of the regime would be in continuation of India’s past restraint.

NOTES

1. Lawrence Scheinman, ‘Security and a Transnational System: The Case of Nuclear Energy’, International Organisation, Summer 1971, Vol. XXV, No. 3, p. 636. 2. See ‘Nuclear Power Status Around the World’, and ‘Nuclear Share of Electricity Generation’, IAEA Bulletin, 2001, Vol. 43, No. 4, p. 58. 3. Terje Langeland, ‘Here, There, Everywhere’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December, 2001, Vol. 57, No. 6, p. 57. 4. See William J. Broad, ‘A Soviet Company Offers Nuclear Blasts for Sale to Anyone With the Cash,’ New York Times, November 7, 1991; Tariq Rauf, ‘Cleaning up With a Bang’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/ February 1992, pp. 9 and 47. 5. Thomas L. Friedman, ‘Ex-Soviet Atom Scientists Ask Baker for West’s Help’, New York Times, February 15, 1992, pp. 1 and 4; David Hoffman, ‘Baker Reassures Elite Ex-Soviet Scientists: Russians at Nuclear Complex Plead for Commercial Work’, International Herald Tribune, February 15–16, 1992. 6. Steven Dickman, ‘Soviet Science: A Struggle for Survival’, Science, December 1991, Vol. 254, pp. 1716–19.

186 M MATIN ZUBERI 7. David P. Hamilton, ‘Piecemeal Rescue for Soviet Science’, Science, March 27, 1992, Vol. 255, pp. 1632–34. 8. John Markoff, ‘Russian Computer Scientist Hired by American Company’, New York Times, March 3, 1992. 9. William J. Broad, ‘U.S. Plans to Hire Russian Scientists for Fusion Research’, New York Times, March 6, 1992. See also William J. Broad, ‘U.S. Is Shopping as Soviets Offer To Sell Once-Secret Technology’, New York Times, November 4, 1992. 10. PPNN Newsbrief, No. 17, Spring 1992, p. 10. 11. Sergei Kapitza, ‘Soviet Scientists: Low Pay, No Pay, Now Insults’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 1992, p. 8. It is estimated that 80 per cent of Russia’s world-class mathematicians and 50 per cent of its most prominent physicists have left the country. See Igor Khripunov and Maria Katsva, ‘Russia’s Nuclear Industry: The Next Generation’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2002, p. 55. 12. Robert Cottrell, ‘Russia’s Dream City’, New York Review of Books, April 23, 1998, pp. 40–42. 13. William J. Broad, ‘Moving A-Arms by Rail: Can Terrorists Be Foiled?’, New York Times, February 18, 1992. 14. PPNN Newsbrief, No. 17, Spring 1992, p. 9. 15. Ryukichi Imai, Japan’s Nuclear Diplomacy: Focus on Nuclear Energy, Not Weapons, IIPS Policy Paper 23IE, June 1998, p. 23. 16. For more details, see John M. Shields and William C. Potter (Eds), Dismantling the Cold War: U.S. and NIS Perspectives on the Nunn-Lugar Threat Reduction Programme (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press: 1997). 17. Matthew Bunn, Oleg Bukharin, Jill Cettina, Kenneth Luongo and Frank von Hippel, ‘Retooling Russia’s Nuclear Cities’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 1998, Vol. 54, No. 5, pp. 44–50. 18. Thomas W. Lippman, ‘Russia Aims to Unload Its Uranium in the U.S.: Deal Moves Slowly Through Thorny Issues’, Washington Post, August 20, 1992. 19. Thomas L. Neff, ‘Privatizing U.S. National Security: The U.S.-Russian HEU Deal At Risk’, Arms Control Today, August/September 1998, pp. 8–14; Terje Langeland, ‘Megatons to Mega-problems: Did USEC Ever Stand a Chance?’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2002, Vol. 58, No. 3, p. 50. 20. Thomas F. Dorian and Leonard S. Spector, ‘Covert Nuclear Trade and the Nonproliferation Regime’, Journal of International Affairs, Spring/ Summer 1981, Vol. 35, No. 1, pp. 29–60. 21. For more details, see Matin Zuberi, ‘The Road to Chagai’, in Vice Admiral K.K. Nayyar (Ed.), Pakistan at the Crossroads (New Delhi: Rupa, 2003), pp. 2001–70. 22. Geoffrey Hunt, ‘China’s Case Against the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty: Rationality and Morality’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 1986, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 183–99. 23. Zachary S. Davis, ‘China’s Nonproliferation and Export Control Policies’, Asian Survey, June 1995, Vol. XXXV, No. 6, pp. 587–603. 24. Gerald Steinberg, ‘Chinese Policies on Arms Control and Proliferation in the Middle East’, China Report, July–December 1998, Vol. 34, Nos. 3&4, p. 388.

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25. Banning N. Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser, ‘Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control’, International Security, Winter 1995/96, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 43–78. 26. Ibid., pp. 53–63. 27. ‘The Japanese Connection’, Nature, March 23, 1978, p. 304. 28. Albert Wohlstetter et al., ‘The Military Potential of Civilian Nuclear Energy: Moving Towards Life in a Nuclear Armed Crowd?’, Minerva, Autumn–Winter 1977, Vol. XV, Nos. 3–4, pp. 397–538; and, Alvin M. Weinberg, ‘The Use of the Breeder Reactor’, Minerva, Winter 1978, Vol. XVI, No. 4, pp. 581–85. 29. Robert Walgate, ‘Mr. Justice Parker and Technical Fact’, Nature, March 23, 1978, p. 301. 30. See Samuel McCracken, ‘The War Against the Atom’, Commentary, September 1977, pp. 33–47; Irvin C. Bupp and Jean-Claude Derian, Light Water: How the Nuclear Dream Dissolved (New York: Basic Books, 1978); and Dorothy Nelkin and Michael Pollak, The Atom Besieged (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1982). 31. Walter C. Patterson, ‘Japan’s Perilous Plutonium Flights’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 1988, pp. 9–11; Frans Berkhout, Tatsujiro Suzuki and William Walker, ‘The Approaching Plutonium Surplus: Japanese/European Predicament’, International Affairs, 1990, Vol. 66, No. 3, pp. 523–43; William Walker and Frans Berkhout, ‘Japan’s Plutonium—and Europe’s,’ Arms Control Today, September 1992, pp. 3–17. 32. Matin Zuberi, ‘The Voyage of Akatsuki Maru and the Hazards of Plutonium Shipments’, The Indian Ocean News & Views, March 1993, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 11–12 and 14. 33. Shaun Burnie and Aileen Mioko Smith, ‘Japan’s Nuclear Twilight Zone’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2002, Vol. 58, No. 3, p. 60. 34. Ibid., pp. 58–59. 35. PPNN Newsbrief, No. 41, First Quarter 1998, p. 5. 36. Kumao Kaneko, ‘Japan Needs No Umbrella’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 1996, Vol. 52, No. 2, p. 51. 37. Morihiro Hosokawa, ‘Are U.S. Troops in Japan Needed? Reforming the Alliance’, Foreign Affairs, July/August 1998, Vol. 77, No. 4, pp. 2–5. 38. ‘Japanese Minister Resigns Over Nuclear Remarks’, Arms Control Today, November 1999, Vol. 29, No. 7, p. 28. For an American perspective on recent developments in East Asia, see Clifton W. Sherrill, ‘The Need for a Japanese Nuclear Deterrent’, Comparative Strategy, 2001, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 259–70. 39. John D. Holum, ‘A Treaty for all Time’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 1994, Vol. 50, No. 6, p. 20. 40. Michael Mandelbaum, ‘Lessons of the Next Nuclear War’, Foreign Affairs, March/April 1995, Vol. 74. No. 2, pp. 22–37. 41. Spurgeon M. Kenny, Jr., ‘The NPT: A Global Success Story’, Arms Control Today, March 1995, p. 3–7. 42. SIPRI World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 598. 43. Joseph Cirincione in ‘An ACDA Briefing on Indefinite Extension and on the Moscow Summit’, Arms Control Today, June 1995, p. 16; Barbara Crossette, ‘Treaty Aimed at Halting Spread of Nuclear Weapons Extended: 170 Nations Agree to Continue Pact Indefinitely’, New York Times May 12, 1995.

188 M MATIN ZUBERI 44. Tom Zamora Collina, ‘South Africa Bridges the Gap’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 1995, Vol. 51, No. 5, pp. 30–31. 45. PPNN Newsbrief, No. 30, Second Quarter 1995, pp. 2–4 and 26: William Epstein, ‘Indefinite Extension—With Increased Accountability’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 1995, Vol. 51, No. 5, pp. 27–30. 46. Hans M. Christensen and Joshua Handler, ‘Changing Nuclear Targets,’ INESAP Information Bulletin, No. 6, July 1995, pp. 1 and 3. 47. Matin Zuberi, ‘Changing Nuclear Targets: Doctrinal Issues’, unpublished paper presented at IDPAD Seminar on Nuclear Weapons and Global Security: Challenges for the New Millennium, Peace Palace, The Hague, May 10–12, 2000. 48. Richard L. Garwin, ‘The Future of Nuclear Weapons Without Nuclear Testing’, Arms Control Today, November/December 1997, Vol. 27, No. 8, p. 3. Emphasis added. 49. Arms Control Today, January/February 2001, Vol. 31, No. 1, p. 20. 50. John Burroughs and Jaqueline Cabasso, ‘Nukes on Trial’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April, 1996, Vol. 52, No. 2, pp. 41–45; Mike Moore, ‘World Court Says Mostly No to Nuclear Weapons’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 1996, Vol. 52, No. 5, pp. 39–42 and Jeremy J. Stone, ‘Less Than Meets the Eye,’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 1996, Vol. 52, No. 5, pp. 43–45. 51. Kathleen Bailey, ‘So What?’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 1996, Vol. 52, No. 5, pp. 46–47. 52. Robert A. Manning, ‘The Nuclear Age: The Next Chapter’, Foreign Policy, Winter 1997–98, No. 109, p. 78. 53. Hisham Zerriffi and Arjun Makhijani, ‘The Stewardship Smokescreen’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 1996, Vol. 52, No. 5, pp. 22–28; Tom Zamora Collina, ‘The National Ignition Facility: Buyer Beware’, Technology Review, February/March 1997, pp. 35–40; Richard L. Garwin, ‘Stewardship: Don’t Claim Too Much or Too Little’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 1997, Vol. 53, No. 3, pp. 21–24; Raymond Jeanloz, ‘Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship’, Physics Today, December 2000, Vol. 53, No. 12, pp. 44–50. 54. PPNN Newsbrief, No. 22, Second Quarter 1993, p. 6. 55. Jacqueline Cabasso, ‘Nuclear Weapons Testing: Now and Forever?’, INESAP Information Bulletin, No. 6, July 1995, pp. 1, 4–7. 56. PPNN Newsbrief, No. 50, Second Quarter 2000, p. 10. 57. ‘Verification Case Study: The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty’, Science for Democratic Action, February 2000, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 13–15; Trevor Findlay and Oliver Meier, ‘In Verification We Trust’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2001, Vol. 57, No. 1, pp. 13–15; Oliver Dahiman, Jenifer Mackby, Svein Mykkeltveit and Hein Hask, ‘Cheaters Beware’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2002, Vol. 58, No. 1, pp. 29–35. 58. The Economist, June 5–11, 1993, p. 78. 59. David Albright, Frans Berkhout and William Walker, World Inventory of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium, 1992, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 211. This book was published by Oxford for SIPRI.

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60. Richard L. Garwin and Georges Charpak, Megawatts and Megatons (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2001), p. 329. 61. Allison Macfarlane, Frank von Hippel, Jungmin Kang and Robert Nelson, ‘Plutonium Disposal: A Third Way’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/ June 2001, Vol. 57, No. 3, p. 53. 62. See Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), Plutonium Watch, May 1999, p. 1. 63. Martin B. Kalinowski, Wolfgang Liebert and Silke Aumann, ‘The German Plutonium Balance, 1968–1999’, The Nonproliferation Review, Spring 2002, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 147–48. 64. Kumao Kaneko, op. cit. (note 36), p. 47. 65. Fred Barker and Mike Sadnicki, ‘Meanwhile, in Britain’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2001, Vol. 57, No. 3, p. 56. 66. Harold D. Bengelsdorf and Fred McGoldrich, ‘International Custody of Excess Plutonium’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2002, Vol. 58, No. 2, p. 31. 67. Richard L. Garwin and Georges Charpak, op. cit. (note 60), p. 329. 68. Martin B. Kalinowski, Wolfgang Lierbert and Silke Aumann, op. cit. (note 63), p. 146. 69. David Albright, Frans Berkhout and William Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium, 1996: World Inventories (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 37, 42, 63, 81. Published by Oxford for SIPRI. 70. Mike Moore, ‘Pu by the Ton’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2001, Vol. 57, No. 4, p. 44. 71. Frank von Hippel, ‘Paring Down the Arsenal’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 1997, Vol. 53, No. 3, pp. 33–40. 72. Frank von Hippel, Marvin Miller, Harold Feiveson, Anatoli Diakov and Frans Berkhout, ‘Eliminating Nuclear Warheads’, Scientific American, August 1993, Vol. 269, No. 2, pp. 44–49. 73. Allison Macfarlane, Frank von Hippel, Jungmin Kang and Robert Nelson, op. cit. (note 61), p. 53. 74. David Albright et al., op. cit. (note 59), p. 6. 75. Michele Boyd, ‘U.S.-Russian Plutonium Disposition Agreement’, Science for Democratic Action, February 2001, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 12–14. 76. David Albright et al., op. cit. (note 59) p. 215. 77. John P. Holdren, John F. Ahearne, Richard L. Garwin, Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky, John P. Taylor and Matthew Bunn, ‘Excess Weapons Plutonium: How to Reduce a Clear and Present Danger’, Arms Control Today, November/December 1996, pp. 3–9; Steve Fetter, ‘A Comprehensive Transparency Regime For Warheads and Fissile Materials’, Arms Control Today, January/February 1999, Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 3–7. 78. D. Albright and H.A. Feiveson, ‘Plutonium Recycling and the Problem of Nuclear Proliferation’, Annual Review of Energy, 1988, Vol. 13, p. 259. For a Japanese perspective, see Ambassador Riyukichi Imai, Review of New Mechanisms to Stem Nuclear Proliferation, IIGP Paper 101E, October 1992, p. 4. For a detailed technical discussion, see an article by the long-time Director of Theoretical Division, Los Alamos National Laboratory

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79.

80.

81.

82. 83.

84. 85. 86. 87.

88. 89.

90. 91.

John Carson Mark, ‘Explosive Properties of Reactor-Grade Plutonium,’ Science and Global Security, 1993, Vol. 4, pp. 1–13. Lisbeth Gronlund, David Wright and Yong Liu, ‘China and a Fissile Material Production Cut-off ’, International Security, Winter 1995–96, Vol. 37, No. 4, p. 151. Hui Zhang and Frank von Hippel, ‘Eyes in the Sky—Watching for Weapons Work’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2001, Vol. 57, No. 4, pp. 61–66. Frans Berkhout, Oleg Bukharin, Harold Feifson and Marvin Miller, ‘A Cut-off in the Production of Fissile Material’, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 167–202; Defence Monitor, 1994, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2, pp. 1–3; Linda Johnson, ‘Nothing Clean about “Cleanup”’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 1995, Vol. 51, No. 3, p. 34. Michael Quinlan, ‘The Future of Nuclear Weapons: Policy for Western Possessors’, International Affairs, July 1993, Vol. 69, No. 3, p. 485. Christopher Bellany, ‘Soldier of Fortune: Britain’s New Military Role’, International Affairs, July 1992, Vol. 68, No. 3, p. 450; Keith B. Payne, Post-Cold War Requirements for U.S. Defence Policy (Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, 1998). Andrew J. Bacevich, ‘Policing Utopia: The Military Imperatives of Globalisation’, The National Interest, Summer 1999, No. 56, p. 10. Cited in Janne E. Nolan, An Elusive Consensus (Washington D.C.: Bookings Institution Press, 1999), p. 71. Leon Sloss, ‘The New Arms Race’, Washington Quarterly, Autumn 2001, Vol. 24, No. 4, p. 140. Ted Galen Carpenter, ‘Closing the Nuclear Umbrella’, Foreign Affairs, March/April 1994, Vol. 73, No. 2, p. 11; John F. Sopko, ‘The Changing Proliferation Threat’, Foreign Policy, Winter 1996–97, No. 105, pp. 3–20; Richard K. Betts, ‘The New Threat of Mass Destruction’, Foreign Affairs, January/February 1998, Vol. 77, No. 1, p. 35. Robert A. Manning, ‘The Nuclear Age: The Next Chapter’, Foreign Policy, Winter 1997–98, No. 109, p. 73. Joseph F. Pilat and Walter L. Kirchner, ‘The Technological Promise of Counterproliferation’, Washington Quarterly, Winter 1995, Vol. 18, No. 1, p. 156; Brad Roberts, ‘From Nonproliferation to Antiproliferation’, International Security, Summer 1993, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 139–73; Joachim Krance, ‘Proliferation Risks and their Strategic Relevance: What Role for NATO?’, Survival, Summer 1995, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp, 135–48. Janne E. Nolan, op. cit. (note 85), p. 73. White House, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington D.C.: December 11, 2002); Jason D. Ellis, ‘The Best Defence: Counterproliferation and U.S. National Security’, Washington Quarterly, Summer 2003, Vol. 26, No. 2, p. 115–33; see also Physicians for Social Responsibility, What Wrongs Our Arms May Do, August 2002, pp. 33–59; Robert S. Litwak, ‘The New Calculus of Pre-emption’, Survival, Winter 2002–2003, Vol. 44, No. 4, pp. 54–79; Brad Roberts, American Primacy and Major Power Concert: A Critique of the National Security Strategy, IDA Paper P-3751 (Washington D.C., December 2002).

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92. Quoted in H. Gruemm, ‘Safeguards and Tamuz: Setting the Record Straight’, IAEA Bulletin, December 1981, pp. 10–14. Gruemm was deputy director-general of the agency’s safeguards department; see also Simon Rippon, ‘Time of crisis for IAEA’, Nuclear News, November 1981, p. 68. 93. David Albright and Robert Kelley, ‘Has Iraq Come Clean at Last?’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 1995, Vol. 51, No. 6, pp. 53–64; for Iraqi attempts to deceive IAEA inspectors, see Khidhir Hamza, ‘Inside Saddam’s Secret Nuclear Programme’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 1998, Vol. 54, No. 5, pp. 26–33. 94. Robert S. Litwak, op. cit. (note 91). p. 63. 95. ‘Iraq: A Chronology of UN Inspections And An Assessment of Their Accomplishments’, Arms Control Today, October 2002, pp. 6, 21–22. 96. Garry B. Dillon, ‘The IAEA in Iraq: Past Activities and Findings’, IAEA Bulletin, 2002, Vol. 44. No. 2, pp. 13–16. 97. John Mueller and Karl Mueller, ‘Sanctions of Mass Destruction’, Foreign Affairs, May/June 1999, Vol. 78, No. 3, p. 51. 98. Op. cit. (note 95). This gentleman is suspected to be none other than Abdul Qadeer Khan of Pakistan. 99. John Prados, ‘A Necessary War?’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2003, Vol. 59, No. 3, p. 33. 100. Julian Borgar, ‘Revelations on the Genesis of ‘Evil”’, Guardian Weekly, January 16–22, 2003; Hendrik Hertzberg, ‘Axis Praxis’, The New Yorker, January 13, 2003, pp. 27–29. 101. Cited in Anthony Lewis, ‘Bush and Iraq’, New York Review of Books, November 7, 2002, p. 4. 102. John Prados, ‘Will the Real Revisionists Please Stand Up?’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2003, Vol. 59, No. 5, pp. 21–23; Linda Rothstein, ‘A Call for a Public Hearing’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2003, Vol. 59, No. 5, p. 2. 103. Garry Dillon, ‘Postscript’, IAEA Bulletin, 2002, Vol. 44, No. 2, p. 15. 104. Jim Hoagland, ‘Target the Suppliers as Well as Buyers’, International Herald Tribune, December 12, 2002. 105. Paul Kerr, ‘Inspectors’ Accomplishments in Iraq, 2002–2003’, Arms Control Today, July/August 2003, Vol. 33, No. 6, p. 16. 106. James F. Burns, ‘The Hidden Secrets of Iraq’s Los Alamos’, International Herald Tribune, December 28–29, 2002. 107. ‘The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq’, Statement to the United Nations Security Council, New York, January 27, 2003, Mohamed ElBaradei. (United Nations Information Centre, New Delhi.) 108. ‘The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq: An Update’, Statement to the United Nations Security Council, New York, March 7, 2003, Mohamed ElBaradei (United Nations Information Centre, New Delhi); see also Michael R. Gordon, ‘Atomic Agency Challenges Bush’s Key Claim’, International Herald Tribune, January 11–12, 2003, and Seymour M. Hersh, ‘Who Lied to Whom?’, The New Yorker, March 31, 2003, pp. 41–43. 109. Wade Boose, ‘Unfinished Business in Iraq’, Arms Control Today, April 2003, Vol. 33, No. 3, p. 21.

192 M MATIN ZUBERI 110. Cited in G. John Ikenberry, ‘America’s Imperial Ambition’, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2002, Vol. 81, No. 5, p. 51. Emphasis added. 111. Daryl G. Kimball, ‘The Case of Iraq’s ‘Missing’ Weapons’, Arms Control Today, June 2003, Vol. 33, No. 5, p. 2. 112. Nancy Gibbs and Michael Ware, ‘Chasing a Mirage’, Time, October 6, 2003, pp. 26–30. 113. Statement by David Kay on the Interim Report on the Activities of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) before the House Permanent Select Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defence, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, October 2, 2003. Access it online at http://www.cia.gov. Emphasis added. See also James Risan and Judith Miller, ‘No Illicit Arms Found, But Expert Says Intent Existed’, International Herald Tribune, October 4–5, 2003; ‘The Iraqi Weapons Puzzle’ (editorial), International Herald Tribune, October 13, 2003; ‘Wielders of Mass Deception?’ and ‘The More Deceived?’, The Economist, October 4, 2003, pp. 13–14 and 24–28. David Kay resigned in January 2004, saying that there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. 114. Cited in James P. Rubin, ‘Stumbling Into War’, Foreign Affairs, September/ October 2003, Vol. 82, No. 5, p. 55. 115. SIPRI Yearbook 1993 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 244–46; see also Richard P. Cronin, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Programme: U.S. Policy Options, CRS94-470F (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, June 1, 1994). 116. Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, ‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Revisiting the Basics’, IAEA Bulletin, 2002, Vol. 44, No. 2, p. 5. 117. ‘Closing Pandora’s Box’, The Economist, January 4, 2003, p. 21. 118. SIPRI Yearbook 1994 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 610. 119. PPNN Newsbrief, No. 32, 4th Quarter 1995, pp. 11–12; PPNN Newsbrief, No. 39, 3rd Quarter 1997, pp. 16–17; PPNN Newsbrief, No. 44, 4th Quarter 1998, p. 11; PPNN Newsbrief, No. 47, 3rd Quarter 1999, pp. 6 and 18; PPNN Newsbrief, No. 49, First Quarter 2000, p. 14; Victor Gilinsky, ‘Fixing the 1994 US-DPRK Agreed Framework’, an unpublished paper presented at the Pugwash Workshop on East Asian Security, Seoul, April 3–6, 2001. 120. See James M. Minnich, ‘The Denuclearisation of North Korea: A Critical Analysis of the 1994 Agreed Framework’, The Korean Journal of Defence Analysis, Fall 2002, Vol. XIV, No. 2, pp. 5–20. 121. Robert Alvarez, ‘North Korea: No Bygones at Yongbyon’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2003, Vol. 59, No. 4, pp. 37–43. 122. Leon Sigal, ‘North Korea Is No Iraq: Pyongyang’s Negotiating Strategy’, Arms Control Today, December 2002, Vol, 32, No. 10, pp. 8–12. 123. David Albright and Holly Higgins, ‘North Korea: It’s Taking Too Long’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2002, Vol. 58, No. 1, p. 58. 124. Joby Warrick, ‘Metal Tipped off U.S. to North Korea’, International Herald Tribune, October 19–20, 2002; David E. Sanger, ‘Shock from North Korea’, International Herald Tribune, October 18, 2002. 125. Robyn Lim, ‘A Test of Skill for America’, International Herald Tribune, November 7, 2001.

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126. ‘Japan Sets Terms for North Korea’, International Herald Tribune, October 29, 2002. 127. Don Kirk, ‘Pyongyang Lifts Freeze on Building Reactors’, International Herald Tribune, December 13, 2002; Don Kirk, ‘Pyongyang Asks to Get Access to Fuel Rods’, International Herald Tribune, December 14–15, 2002; William Safire, ‘Take China to Task for its Rogue Child’, International Herald Tribune, December 27, 2002; Don Kirk, ‘Pyongyang Moves to Oust Inspectors’, International Herald Tribune, December 28–29, 2002. 128. James Brooke, ‘Anti-U.S. Surge Unchecked by Seoul Officials’, International Herald Tribune, January 8, 2003. 129 Romesh Ratnesar, ‘How Dangerous is North Korea?’, Time, January 13, 2003, p. 14–16. 130. Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glossman, ‘Pyongyang vs the International Community’, International Herald Tribune, January 3, 2003. 131. Cited in Vidya Subrahmaniam, ‘Thus Far, No Further: The Illogic of Unilateral Thinking’, Times of India, October 29, 2002. 132. Michael R. Gordon, ‘A Tale of Two Crises’, New York Times, February 17, 2003. 133. Paul Kerr, ‘North Korean Nuclear Crisis Chronology’, Arms Control Today, June 2003, Vol. 33, No. 5, p. 33. 134. Victor D. Cha, ‘North Korea’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: Badges, Shields or Swords?’, Political Science Quarterly, 2002, Vol. 117, No. 2, pp. 216–19. For North Korea’s ‘tit-for-tat’ nuclear diplomacy, see Leon V. Sigal, Disarming Strategies: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998). North Korea ‘floats concession on a tide of threats.’ See Leon V. Sigal, ‘Negotiating with the North’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2003, Vol. 59, No. 6, p. 20. 135. For a detailed analysis, see Roland Bleiker, ‘A Rogue is a Rogue is a Rogue: U.S. Policy and the Korean Nuclear Crisis’, International Affairs, July 2003, Vol. 79, No. 4, pp. 719–37. 136. Hun Kyung Lee, ‘North Korea’s Missile Programme and US Nonproliferation Strategy’, The Korean Journal of Defence Analysis, Fall 2002, Vol. XIV, No. 2, pp. 51–72. 137. Don Kirk, ‘Pyongyang Wants More Dialogue’, International Herald Tribune, October 22, 2002; Howard W. French, ‘ North Korea’s Admission: Sign of a Desperate Leader?’, International Herald Tribune, October 22, 2002. 138. Doug Bandow, ‘Ending the Anachronistic Korean Commitment’, Parameters, Summer 2002, pp. 80–81. 139. Michael Schulman, ‘ Peace and War’, Time, March 3, 2003, p. 38. 140. Haksoon Paik, ‘Steering Between Red Lines: A South Korean View’, Arms Control Today, May, 2003, Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 15–18. 141. Bates Gill and Andrew Thompson, ‘A Test for Beijing: China and the North Korean Nuclear Quandary’, Arms Control Today, July 2003, pp. 12–14. 142. Morton Abramowitz and Stephen Bosworth, ‘Adjusting to the New Asia’, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2003, Vol. 82, No. 4, pp. 118–31. Emphasis added. 143. Steven R. Weisman, ‘“Axis” Math: This Time, The Solution is Diplomacy’, International Herald Tribune, October 19–20, 2002.

194 M MATIN ZUBERI 144. John Pritchard, ‘What I Saw in North Korea’, New York Times, January 21, 2004; Glenn Kessler, ‘Scientists Discuss North Korean Motives: Hecker Toured Nuclear Plant’, Washington Post, January 21, 2004. 145. Joel S. Wit, ‘A Strategy for Defusing The North Korean Nuclear Crisis’, Arms Control Today, January/February 2003, Vol. 33, No. 1, pp. 6–10. 146. Rebecca Johnson, ‘Rogues and Rhetoric: The 2002 NPT PrepCom Slides Backwards’, Disarmament Diplomacy, June/July 2003, No. 71, p. 4. 147. Brenda Shaffer, ‘Iran at the Nuclear Threshold’, Arms Control Today, November 2003, p. 7. 148. Ibid., p. 8 149. Arms Control Today, October 2003, p. 20. 150. David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, ‘Iran: Furor Over Fuel’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2003, Vol. 59, No. 3, p. 15. 151. Reported in Arms Control Today, March 2003, p. 21. 152. David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, op. cit. (note 150), pp. 12, 14–15. 153. Brenda Shaffer, op. cit. (note 147), p. 8. 154. Joby Warrick, ‘Iran Admits Foreign Help on Nuclear Facility: U.N. Agency’s Data Point to Pakistan as the Source’, Washington Post, August 27, 2003. 155. Iran imported 1,800 kg of uranium hexaflouride [UF6], uranium tetraflouride [UF4] and uranium dioxide [UO2] from China in 1991 and failed to disclose this to the IAEA as required by its Safeguard Agreement. See Arms control Today, July/August 2003, p. 20 for more details. 156. IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, November 10, 2003, p. 4. 157. Ibid., p. 5. 158. Ibid., pp. 7–8. 159. Ibid., p. 8. 160. Ibid., p. 9. 161. Ibid., pp. 2–3. 162. Brenda Shaffer, op. cit. (note 147), p. 8. 163. The full text of the Declaration is reprinted in Arms Control Today, November 2003, p. 25. 164. Cited in Brenda Shaffer, op. cit. (note 147), p. 11. 165. IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement, op. cit. (note 156), pp. 4–5. 166. Cited in David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, ‘Iran Admits That It Has Plans for a Newer Centrifuge’, New York Times, February 13, 2004. 167. Cited in Joby Warrick, ‘Iranian Nuclear Plans Found: U.N. Team’s Discovery Raises Doubts About Tehran’s Vow of Candor’, Washington Post, February 13, 2004. 168. William J. Broad, David Rohde and David E. Sanger, ‘Inquiry Suggests Pakistanis Sold Nuclear Secrets’, New York Times, December 22, 2003. 169. Joby Warrick, ‘Alleged Nuclear Offer to Iraq Is Revisited: Memos Indicate Attempt to Sell Pakistani Bomb Plans, Equipment on Eve of ’91 War’, Washington Post, February 5, 2004. 170. David Albright and Holly Higgins, ‘A Bomb for the Ummah’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2003, Vol. 59, No. 2, pp. 49–55.

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171. Peter Baker, ‘Pakistan Atomic Expert’s Tie to bin Laden Confounds Officials’, International Herald Tribune, March 4, 2002. 172. State Department Updated List of Terrorist Individuals and Groups, Fact Sheet, Public Affairs Office of the US Embassy, New Delhi, October 16, 2002. 173. David Sanger, ‘In North Korea and Pakistan, Deep Roots of Nuclear Barter’, New York Times, November 24, 2002; and also, David E. Sanger and James Dao, ‘U.S. Links Pakistan to Korean Arms’, International Herald Tribune, October 19–20, 2002. 174. Seymour M. Hersh, ‘The Cold Test: What the Administration Knew about Pakistan and the North Korean Nuclear Program’, The New Yorker, January 27, 2003, pp. 43–44. 175. Howard W. French, ‘North Korea Sired Pakistan’s Nuclear Missile Capability’, International Herald Tribune, May 27, 2002. 176. Robert Alvarez, op. cit. (note 121), p. 43. 177. Don Kirk, ‘Reactor is Entered by North Korean Technicians’, International Herald Tribune, December 26, 2002. 178. See ‘Karl Inderfurth confirms Pak Help for N. Korea Nukes’, Hindustan Times, October 20, 2002. 179. Cited in James E. Goodby, ‘Try to Engage with Pyongyang’, International Herald Tribune, January 6, 2003. 180. Paul Kerr, op. cit. (note 133), p. 33. 181. Husain Haqqani, ‘The Pakistan-North Korea Connection’, International Herald Tribune, October 30, 2003. ‘Pakistan Should be Warned’, thundered an editorial in the New York Times reproduced in the International Herald Tribune, December 4, 2002. 182. David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, ‘From Rogue Nuclear Programs, Web of Trails Leads to Pakistan’, New York Times, January 4, 2004. 183. Amir Wasim and Nasir Iqbal, ‘Dr Qadeer Khan Removed to “Facilitate” Probe: Government Dispels Fears of N-plan Rollback’, Dawn, February 1, 2004. 184. Vijay Dutt, ‘Pak Nuclear Scientists to be Punished’, Hindustan Times, January 28, 2004. 185. John Lancaster and Kamran Khan, ‘Musharraf Named in Nuclear Probe: Senior Pakistani Army Officers Were Aware of Technology Transfers, Scientist Says’, Washington Post, February 3, 2004. 186. David Rohde and David E. Sanger, ‘Key Pakistani Is Said to Admit Atom Transfers’, New York Times, February 2, 2004. 187. John Lancaster and Kamran Khan, ‘Pakistani Scientist Apologizes: Nuclear Assistance Unauthorized, He Says’, Washington Post, February 5, 2004. 188. Rafaqat Ali, ‘Dr Khan Seeks Pardon’, Dawn, February 5, 2004. 189. David Rohde, ‘Nuclear Expert Receives Pardon From Musharraf ’, New York Times, February 6, 2004. 190. John Lancaster and Kamran Khan, ‘Musharraf Named in Nuclear Probe: Senior Pakistani Army Officers Were Aware of Technology Transfers, Scientist Says’, Washington Post, February 3, 2004. 191. Ayaz Amir, ‘Overloading the National Grid’, Dawn, January 23, 2004. 192. Ayaz Amir, ‘Pakistan’s Agonises’, Dawn, January 30, 2004.

196 M MATIN ZUBERI 193. Ayaz Amir, ‘Khan, Scapegoat or Magician Extraordinary?’, Dawn, February 6, 2004. 194. Cited in John Lancaster and Kamran Khan, ‘Pakistan Fires Top Nuclear Scientist’, Washington Post, February 1, 2004. 195. ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Crimes’, Washington Post, February 5, 2004. 196. David Rohde and David E. Sanger, ‘Key Pakistani Is Said to Admit Atom Transfers’, New York Times, February 2, 2004. 197. William J. Broad, David E. Sanger and Raymond Bonner, ‘A Tale of Nuclear Proliferation: How a Pakistani Built His Network’, New York Times, February 12, 2004; William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, ‘Warhead Blueprints Link Libya Project to Pakistan Figure’, New York Times, February 4, 2004. 198. Bruce Blair, Strategic Command and Control (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985), p. 15. 199. Nicholas Zarimpas (Ed.), Transparency in Nuclear Warheads and Materials: The Political and Technical Dimensions (Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 6. Published by Oxford University Press for SIPRI. 200. From the Board of Directors: ‘It’s Seven Minutes to Midnight’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2002, pp. 4–5. 201. Joseph Cirincione, ‘The Assault on Arms Control’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February, 2000, Vol. 58, No. 1, p. 32. 202. Bruce Blair, ‘Removing the Hair Trigger on Nuclear Forces’, in Joseph Cirincione (Ed.), Repairing the Regime (New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 266. 203. Michael Quinlan, ‘Nuclear Weapons and the Abolition of War?’, International Affairs, April 1991, Vol. 67, No. 2, pp. 293–301. 204. Cited in George Perkovich, ‘Executive Privilege’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2000, Vol. 79, No. 6, p. 165. 205. Michael R. Gordon, ‘U.S. Nuclear Plan Sees New Targets and New Weapons: Contingencies for North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Libya’, New York Times, March 10, 2002. More than 20 pages of excerpts from the classified Nuclear Posture Review are available at: http://www.global security.org/wmd/library/ policy/dod/npr.htm. 206. Cited in John Isaacs, ‘Nuclear Posture: Ready, Aim, Fire’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2002, Vol. 58, No. 4, p. 69. 207. ‘America as Nuclear Rogue’, New York Times, and reproduced in the International Herald Tribune, March 13, 2002; see Sydney Drell, James Goodby, Raymond Jeanloz and Robert Peurifoy, ‘A Strategic Choice: New Bunker Busters Versus Nonproliferation’, Arms Control Today, March 2003, pp. 8–10. 208. Steven Weinberg, ‘The Growing Nuclear Danger’, New York Review of Books, July 18, 2002, p. 18. 209. See Natural Resources Defense Counsil (NRDC), ‘Faking Nuclear Restraint: The Bush Administration’s Secret Plan For Strengthening U.S. Nuclear Forces’, NRDC Backgrounder. Hans M. Kritensen, ‘Bomb Deal a Dud, Part One’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2002, Vol. 58, No. 1, p. 25. 210. Daryl C. Kimbal, ‘The Test Moratorium’s Uncertain Future’, Arms Control Today, May 2002, Vol. 32, No. 4, p. 2.

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211. Richard K. Betts, ‘The New Threat of Mass Destruction’, Foreign Affairs, January/February 1998, Vol. 77, No. 1, pp. 26–29. 212. Matin Zuberi, ‘Uncertain Future: NPT and the Global Nuclear Disorder’, RUSI Journal, December 2003, Vol. 148, No. 6, pp. 42–45. 213. ‘The Talk of the Town’, The New Yorker, September 24, 2001, pp. 27–28. 214. See Centre for Global Security Research, Atoms for Peace: The New Challenges and Opportunities, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, December 2003. 215. Cited in Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 299. Emphasis added. 216. Cited in John Cirincione, ‘The Asian Nuclear Chain Reaction’, Foreign Policy, Spring 2000, No. 118, p. 121. 217. Cited in Editorial ‘Yesterday—Does the Past Still Matter?’, INESAP Information Bulletin, September 2001, No. 18, p. 2. 218. Going It ALONE’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2002, Vol. 58, No. 4, p. 36.

CHAPTER

8 Trends in the CWC and BTWC: Implications and Options for India’s Security Interests Arundhati Ghose

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ost arms control regimes and treaties are in a state of uncertainty and flux today. In fact, some multilateral negotiating fora are in a state of absolute impasse. Even the non-proliferation regime appears to be fraying at the edges, not only because of ‘break-outs’ by states members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but also because of the current US administration’s approach to multilaterally negotiated treaties, and, a shift in US policy post 9/11, in which terrorism, particularly WMD terrorism, has been sought to be pushed to centre stage in the international security arena, displacing disarmament and arms control. Of late, however, a subtle change appears to be emerging, with, on the one hand, no progress on nuclear issues, but signs of some positive developments in the areas of chemical and biological weapons. Even the conventions pertaining to the latter have been through a recent rocky patch and their effectiveness in the future is still indeterminate: In 2001, the US rejected the draft Protocol which was being negotiated

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to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), and attempts were made to discard the ‘acquis’ of the past Review Conferences and the work and mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group; the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was in a state of suspended animation for over a year; its expertise was not utilised even by the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) in Iraq (a non-member party); and, the US, dissatisfied with the director-general, lobbied for his removal, thereby effectively putting many OPCW activities on hold. Notwithstanding these negative developments, the Fifth Review Conference of the BTWC resumed in Geneva on 11 November 2002 after having been disrupted for over a year with the US proposing the termination of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Group. With the instatement of Rogelio Pfirter as the new director-general, the Seventh Session of the Conference of States Parties held from 7 to 11 October 2002, was able to take some important decisions and the First Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was held from 28 April to 9 May 2003. While neither of these Review Conferences can be said to have achieved resounding success, the fact that they were able to take any decisions at all is in stark contrast to the multilateral disarmament scenario in the rest of the UN system, particularly in the nuclear field. The Conference on Disarmament has not been able to agree even on an annual programme of work since 1997; the UN Disarmament Commission, which meets annually in New York cancelled its 2002 session and at its meeting in March–April 2003 failed to reach any consensus on the two items that had been under consideration since 2000—The ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament, and practical confidence building measures. The US boycotted the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Entry Into Force Conference held during the 2001 General Assembly (and succeeded in considerably diluting the Programme of Action adopted by the UN Conference on Illicit Trade in Small Arms, by threatening to withdraw altogether). At the first session of the PrepCom for the 2005 NPT Conference, not only had the US a series of reservations on the chairman’s summary, but it explicitly stated that it now only ‘generally agrees’ with the conclusions of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, Specifically, it ‘no longer support(s) some of the Article VI conclusions in the final document …’ and cited the CTBT as ‘another example of a treaty we no longer support’.1 The Second NPT PrepCom was held in Geneva from 28 April to 9 May 2003. It has been categorised as an expression of ‘resurgent marginalisation of disarmament … best illustrated by the US response

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that “compliance with Articles II & III”—covering the basic obligations of the non-nuclear weapon states—“are at the NPT’s heart”’.2 Though there is a general feeling of helplessness that discussions on disarmament and non-proliferation enter a period of ‘hibernation’ until the US moderates its unilateral policies towards arms control agreements, the international community would appear to have some cause for hope on the issues relating to BW and CW. Whether there is a real shift in the recently pronounced US policy of ‘going it alone’, or whether the US, faced with an intolerable situation in Iraq, or stung by almost universal criticism of its unilateralism has made only tactical moves, is difficult to assess at this point in time. What is more likely, is that US allies, and, indeed, the international community as a whole, has begun adapting to a world dominated by a single superpower. Whatever the causes, the impact of the recent developments in the Chemical Weapons (CW) and Biological Weapons (BW) regimes on India’s interests, need to be assessed.

THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC) The OPCW, based in The Hague, the Netherlands, was operationalised in 1997, after the requisite number (65) of nations had ratified the CWC; there are 151 states parties today. The first director-general was the Brazilian diplomat Jose Bustani. In spite of several constraints, particularly financial ones, the OPCW was able to carry out more than 1,100 inspections in more than 50 member states, including in the US and India. By 1 October 2002, it had verified the destruction of 7,050 mt (metric tons) of chemical agents, amounting to over 10 per cent of total stockpiles declared by the four possessor states parties. However, due to paucity of funds, no challenge inspections were carried out. Ironically, it was the non-discriminatory nature of these inspections and their intrusiveness that had apparently turned the US administration against the director-general. It may be recalled that at the time of depositing the instrument of ratification, the then US administration had, as the only way to get the CWC past their Republican-dominated Congress, filed as many as 23 ‘reservations’, which, the US stated, limited only the actions of the US administration and would not impinge on the functioning of the OPCW (see Appendix 8.1A). One the most important points which had been emphasised by India and other developing countries during the CWC negotiations was that

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the application of the treaty would be ‘non-discriminatory’. The US had felt that the number of inspections to which they were subjected constituted a ‘bias’ by the director-general against the US. The directorgeneral’s formal response, made the day before his dismissal, was: What is bias for some is in reality my commitment to ‘equal treatment for all’. I insist that the scope of access for our inspectors should be the same in all countries. I also insist that States Parties cannot pick and choose those areas which inspectors may or may not verify. I insist that the verification effort, in full accordance with the Convention, should be aimed at inspectable facilities, rather than at certain countries. I insist on measures that will ensure that OPCW inspectors verify those weapons and equipment which the OPCW must verify, rather than merely those which might be volunteered by a state party for verification.3 Clearly, the US, with its huge and powerful chemical industry and proprietory rights to protect, was being treated, as intended by the CWC, on par with, for example, Iran. The latter is also a party to the convention with a much smaller civilian chemical industry and has been accused by the US of clandestinely developing chemical weapons. In spite of the strong US objections to the continuance of Bustani (speaking at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies [CNS], US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton, said in January 2002, ‘… we are finding ongoing difficulties in the operationalisation of the CWC. The OPCW itself … is troubled in its management. I said that during my confirmation hearing and it remains the subject of very intense review and discussion by the US …’4) the OPCW was able to promote international cooperation and assistance programmes, ‘to establish a credible system to protect state parties from an attack, including a terrorist attack, with chemical weapons’5 and to keep states informed of the progress in the destruction of Russia’s chemical weapons. Bustani had also proposed ‘that Russia’s utilization of international assistance be scrutinized by the international community.’6 It will be recalled that under the Nunn-Lugar Act of 1992, the US was to provide financial and other assistance to dismantle Russia’s nuclear and chemical weapons to prevent proliferation of the weapons and related technology. However, not only were the available amounts inadequate, they were also stopped for a considerable period of time. (Russia has received an extension to meet the deadline set in the CWC to destroy its chemical weapons mainly due

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to its inability to meet the financial burdens of destruction.) More recently, the G-8 countries have agreed to assist Russia’s disarmament efforts financially, to the tune of $1 billion under the G-8 Global Partnership Programme. India itself has been subjected to several inspections with little objection from its chemical industry. Jose Bustani was dismissed on 22 April 2002, despite strong support for his independent policies (48 votes, including India’s favoured his dismissal—China, Russia and Iran were among the six countries which voted against Bustani’s dismissal—and they represented 88 per cent of those voting, but only 33 per cent of all state parties). On 16 July 2002, Argentine diplomat Rogelio Pfirter was appointed by acclamation by the OPCW’s Executive Council. He was confirmed in this post on 25 July by the First Special Session of the Conference of States Parties. The fifth anniversary of the entry into force of the CWC in April 2002 was overshadowed by these traumatic developments. The new director-general has identified two key themes for action— transparency and the promotion of a dialogue between the Secretariat and states parties. There appears to be a general desire to return to normality and consensus-based decision making. The US, which had not been paying its dues to the OPCW, has now officially stated that it ‘will work closely with other concerned member states to restore the Organisation to a sound financial footing and to overcome the other difficulties that it has faced in recent years’.7 If, however, the US is consistent with its views on its approach to the BTWC Protocol, it is likely to insist on verification targeting specific countries, rather than the non-discriminatory approach followed so far. That this is a realistic prognostication, became evident at the First Review Conference. Another policy area that might get affected would be, as a result of the strengthening of the Australia Group (AG)—one of the ‘reservations’ put in by the US at the time of ratification—the whittling down of the role of OPCW in promoting international cooperation under Article XI of the CWC. This article, which for many developing countries, including India, was a ‘make-or-break’ article during negotiations of the CWC, inter alia, states that the convention would be implemented in a manner, ‘including the international exchange of scientific and technical information, and chemicals and equipment for the production, processing or use of chemicals for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.’8 India and other developing country states parties continue to demand the dismantling of the AG, which appears to be strengthening its activities. At its meeting on 3–6 June 2003, the AG adopted new guidelines regulating the export of sensitive and dual-use chemical and biological material and equipment.

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According to the AG’s press release on the subject, these guidelines were aimed at ‘preventing the spread of chemical and biological weapons (CBW), including to terrorist groups’ (Appendix 8.2B; extract from press release of AG, 7 June 2003). As mandated by the CWC, the OPCW (the 151 member states and the Technical Secretariat) held its First Review Conference earlier this year, to review the operation of the convention, taking into account scientific and technological developments, as also the effectiveness of the verification regime. The conference produced two documents, a political declaration and a review document. There was an attempt at the outset of the conference for the US to try and target specific countries—in the general debate, the US named Iran, a state party, and three non-state parties, Libya, Syria and North Korea of stockpiling and actively pursuing chemical weapons. This led to a strong riposte from Iran. Fortunately for the conference, the issue of targeting specific countries was ultimately not reflected in the two documents which were finally produced. The major issues highlighted at the Review Conference included the declaration and subsequent destruction of CW. Reportedly, 11 countries have declared possession of existing or former CW production facilities including, France, India, Iran, Japan, Republic of Korea, Russia, UK and the US. Some countries of the Middle East (not states parties) are suspected of having active CW facilities. Only four have declared stocks—India, Russia, Republic of Korea and the US, though Korea prefers to be referred to officially only as a ‘State Party’. Other countries have reported the location of old CW facilities on their territory. Only India appears to be adhering to the time schedule laid down in the CWC. At the Review Conference, the Indian delegate stated ‘So far as India is concerned, we have successfully completed our fourth destruction campaign in February, 2003, destroying more than 40 per cent of our declared Category I chemical weapons under OPCW verification’.9 Russia, which had received an extension of final destruction deadline for all CW stocks (April 2007) from the Executive Council meeting in October 2002, announced, at the Review Conference that it had completed the destruction of 1 per cent of its CW arsenal. This target should have been achieved three years after the entry into force of the CWC. The US, at the time of the Review Conference stated ‘Since entry into force, we have met every treaty milestone, and to date have destroyed over 22 per cent of our stockpile.’10 Subsequently, on 3 September 2003, the US Department of Defence announced ‘that the US will not meet the 45 per cent chemical weapons stockpile

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destruction deadline of April 29, 2004 as set down by the CWC’ and stated its intention to seek extension of the 45 per cent destruction deadline from the OPCW.11 The statement also indicated that the US was considering the extension of the final 2007 deadline, possibly by the five years allowed by the CWC. The review document reaffirms the obligation of CW possessors to destroy their arsenals, while all other states parties are called upon to support these efforts and provide assistance where possible. On the non-proliferation and non-production front, it again appears that the implementation of the CWC has been dismal: Many states parties have not even submitted basic information to the Technical Secretariat, and only 56 per cent had notified the adoption of national implementing legislation. The Indian delegate to the conference announced that India had already adopted ‘comprehensive national legislation’ which ‘provides for stiff penalties for individuals and companies that are conclusively proved to have violated any regulations set out in the national implementing legislation’.12 Given the growing awareness of the threat of CW terrorism, this situation certainly remains a cause for concern. The review document satisfied itself by merely calling on ‘States Parties that have not already done so, to inform the OPCW by the next regular session of the Conference of the status’ of their national implementation measures.13 On the issue of challenge inspections, of which none have taken place, traditional battlelines, between the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries and the European Union (EU), were drawn, with the one side demanding a more intrusive, ‘anywhere, anytime’ approach and the other, as a ‘last resort and as part of the process of consultation and fact finding’. The review document does not appear to have made much headway on this issue either, as it says that ‘without prejudice to the right of any State Party to request a challenge inspection, States Parties should, wherever possible, first make every effort to clarify and resolve, through exchange of information and consultation among themselves’ any specific complaint.14 On trade regulations, in particular, the AG positions remained as they have been from the time of the negotiation of the CWC. Even those in favour of non-proliferation of CW, particularly in the context of terrorism, did not seem able to break out of the straitjackets of their positions. The final document contains a number of steps to be taken by the organisations of the OPCW, and to that extent, the regime continues its rather precarious existence. A scholar15 has assessed the Review Conference as a success, to the extent that pursuit of national interest ‘… did not lead to the

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effectiveness of the Convention being undermined.’ According to him we are faced here with the more general phenomenon that the fundamental premises and principles of multilateralism in the disarmament and non-proliferation field are currently under threat … if compared with other disarmament and non-proliferation regimes, the CWC is faring well.

THE BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIC WEAPONS CONVENTION (BWC OR BTWC) In July 2001, just before the Fifth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention was to take place, despite the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group negotiating the Protocol to strengthen the BWC and almost 90 per cent agreement on his ‘composite’ text, the US rejected the Protocol. It said that no negotiations or formulations could paper over the major problems it had with the text and, indeed, with the entire approach of the Protocol. The main reasons given by the US for its stand were that the draft provisions would not, in fact, assure that BW were not being developed, produced or stockpiled, and that the mechanisms to enforce the verification arrangements would be overly intrusive and impinge on the commercial and proprietary rights of the bio-chemical industry. In January 2002, US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton, presenting the Bush administration’s views, added another reason for the US objection to the Protocol: The US administration’s view was that the draft Protocol and the work of the Ad Hoc Group would undermine ‘our system of export controls and the multilateral framework of export controls, known as the Australia Group to prevent the export of both dual-use items and others that could be used in an offensive BW programme.’ Later, in response to a question, Bolton categorically stated: ‘We’re not going to proceed with the draft Protocol ...’ and claimed that the US had been able to stop ‘the momentum of this seven-year-long process….’16 The US solution, according to Bolton,17 is that ‘instead of a focus on negotiation, a focus on compliance and on exerting international pressure on non-compliant States to bring themselves into compliance or face the consequences is really … more likely to be productive.’

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Later, ‘… further discussions about inspection regimes ... are not likely to be any more effective than the underlying BWC.’ Apart from also proposing ‘new domestic law enforcement requirements’ that would criminalise activity that could lead to the production or use of biological weapons, the objective would appear to be to target countries on the US government’s list of state sponsors of terrorism, in the way the Commission on Human Rights targets specific countries. To quote Bolton again, a ‘cost’ to a country violating the BWC would be to be ‘shamed internationally and risking other political and economic relationships.’ The US attitude had led many countries to propose a Protocol without the US, and, in any case, to preserve the ‘acquis’ of the last four Review Conferences and the agreed portions of the chairman’s composite text. As of now, however, there is no concrete solution on the horizon and the BTWC Protocol is in limbo. Meanwhile, international security concerns have focused on access by terrorists to BW (and CW), especially after the anthrax incident in the US, that even disrupted the functioning of a number of American governmental agencies, albeit for a short period. It would appear, therefore, that the prospects of BW being used in a direct inter-state war, as a battleground weapon, has been set aside for the moment as the international community struggles to grapple with the threat of bio-terrorism. At a symposium of high-level experts to discuss terrorism and disarmament (October 2001), the Chairman of the Ad hoc Working Group and the President of the Fifth Review Conference Tibor Toth of Hungary, proposed some specific and concrete recommendations18 which the Review Conference might make: • Enacting national legislation and other measures to exclude the use of biological and toxin weapons in terrorist or criminal activities; • enacting legislation on the physical protection of laboratories and facilities to prevent unauthorised access to, and removal of, biological agents; • sharing information about the legislation enacted; • the investigating mechanism prescribed by the United Nations Security Council for the United Nations Secretary-General; • assistance to be provided to states parties in case of the use of biological weapons and the coordinating role of the United Nations; • the issue of cooperation in the area of infectious diseases, strengthening of public health and disease control;

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• the strengthening of data reporting and surveillance of infectious diseases; and, • cooperation on vaccine development and vaccine production facilities. When the Review Conference was held in Geneva (from 19 November to 7 December 2001) even an agreement on the draft final declaration, reviewing the convention, was held up by the US, which tabled a proposal to terminate the work and mandate of the Ad Hoc Group. It proposed, instead, a process of annual meetings to consider and assess the progress by states parties in implementing any new measures adopted at the Fifth Review Conference and a subsequent meeting of experts to examine any measures identified by the annual meeting for further consideration. While there was apparent support for both the annual meetings and the expert group, other state parties reacted sharply to the proposal to terminate the mandate of the Ad Hoc Group, which, in effect, would have ended seven years of arduous negotiating work. To find a way out of the impasse, on the suggestion of the president of the conference, it was agreed that the conference would be suspended for a year. The Review Conference reconvened on 11 November 2002. Once again, the US proposed that it be terminated with only a decision to hold another Review Conference in 2006. Ambassador Tibor Toth, president of the conference proposed a draft decision, which was ultimately unanimously adopted, without negotiation, on 14 November 2002. The decision clearly tries to find a middle ground between the US position and the desire of the rest of the international community to retain some of the gains of the past. It mandates a one-week meeting of states parties in each of the three years (2003–05) leading up to the next Review Conference. These ‘political’ meetings are to be preceded by two weeks of expert-level meetings. The agenda has been set for each meeting and does not include any possible resumption of the protocol negotiations. Even the subject of the 2006 Review Conference has been settled—that of reviewing the outcome of the new process. In the first year, the political-level meetings are to discuss, first, the adoption of necessary national measures to implement the prohibitions set forth in the convention, including the enactment of penal legislation, and second, ‘national mechanisms to establish and maintain the security and oversight of pathogenic microorganisms and toxins’. In 2004, as scheduled, the meeting discussed, first, ‘enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigations and mitigating the effects of cases of, alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease’ and second, ‘strengthening

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and broadening national and international institutional efforts and existing mechanisms for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases affecting humans, animals and plants’. In the third year, ‘the content, promulgation and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists’ will be addressed.19 According to one analyst20 ‘The work programme closely resembles the proposals set forth in the United States’ opening statement at the onset of the Fifth Review Conference in 2001. Indeed, the topics for the 2003–05 yearly meetings are a subset of the proposals US Under Secretary for Arms Control John Bolton made at that time. Under the threat of a US walkout, the states parties acquiesced in Ambassador Toth’s proposal, and in the process abandoned substantial segments of the Draft Final Declaration already agreed upon, such as confidence building measures (CBMs), ‘use’ of BW and consultations and cooperation. Marie Isabelle Chevrier has felt that ‘over the next three years, States Parties will once again have the opportunity to strengthen the BWC in a meaningful way’. However, this would depend on how the US interprets these provisions at that point in time. In August 2003, the new multilateral process under the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) began formally, with the convening of the BWC Experts Group meeting. While there was no single report, summary or document emanating from that meeting, the fact that the experts met and held substantive discussions, has put the BWC back on life support. While not a part of the BWC regime, which is a disarmament regime, it is noteworthy that the World Health Organization (WHO) has already initiated action with regard to measures to deal BW and CW. Just as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has initiated action against nuclear terrorism, the WHO has acted fast and a guide, entitled Public Health Response to Biological and Chemical Weapons, has been released. It established a Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network in April 2000, which is supported by the Global Public Health Intelligence Network that continuously and systematically scans websites, news wires, local online newspapers and public health e-mail services, to collect informal news that gives cause for suspecting any unusual outbreak. This is supplementary to the formal sources of information, including governments, universities, networks of military laboratories and NGOs working in areas prone to epidemics. The World Health Assembly, in May 2002, authorised the director-general, inter-alia, ‘to treat any deliberate use, including local, of biological and chemical agents and radionuclear attack to cause harm also as a global public health threat …’ and,

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to examine the possible development of new tools, within the mandate of WHO, including modelling of possible scenarios of natural occurrence, accidental release or deliberate use of biological, chemical agents and radionuclear material that affect health and collective mechanisms concerning the global public health response to contain or mitigate the effects of natural occurrence, accidental release or deliberate use of biological, chemical agents and radionuclear material that affect health.21 For obvious reasons, this action does not meet the objectives which the BWC was intended to serve.

IMPACT OF THE DEVELOPMENTS INDIA’S SECURITY INTERESTS

ON

INDIA’S NEGOTIATING POSITIONS/OPTIONS IN THE CURRENT SCENARIO Unlike the nuclear regime, the CW and BW regimes are basically confined to two distinct treaties, though the BWC has built up, through its Review Conferences, a recommendatory framework for its implementation. The intention behind the aborted BWC Protocol was to complete, as it were, the original treaty, by adding legally binding obligations on states parties, including on verification, compliance and action consequent on the finding of non-compliance. India has been traditionally averse to intrusive inspection regimes, and on some points, our interests would appear to coincide with those of the US, particularly as regards the proprietary rights in the cuttingedge field of biotechnology. However, interests have diverged widely with the US on issues of non-discrimination, exclusive ad hoc export control groups such as the AG, and targeting of specific countries identified by one country or a group of countries as being non-compliant, rather than verification on the basis of inspections of facilities (after all, the anthrax vaccine that terrorised the US last year has been traced to a US military bio-defence laboratory). India had, by and large, gone along with the chairman’s ‘composite text’ of the BWC Protocol and had been amongst the first 65 countries to ratify the CWC. India had, as required by the convention, declared her chemical weapons stocks, even if they were still only in the laboratory;

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India is, perhaps, the only ‘possessor’ country adhering to the destruction timetable set out in the convention. Other countries suspected of having chemical weapons programmes have not declared their chemical weapons stocks; the two other ‘possessor’ states, Russia and the US, have sought extensions in their destruction schedules. Clearly, a close look is required at what national interest of India is served by the CWC (and the evolving BTWC), particularly in light of the recent developments. Obviously, India’s approach to both treaties should be based on the recognition that these treaties are pure disarmament treaties, unlike the NPT. Since the status of the two treaties is somewhat different, our approach to both, while coordinated, needs to be disaggregated. In both cases, India’s approaches and objectives need to be approved at the highest political level, and be clearly established. This is preferable to merely reacting, on an ad hoc basis, to initiatives taken by other countries. This would imply a detailed interdepartmental and interdisciplinary examination, factoring in political, economic and military aspects, before the political decision identifying approach and objectives is taken. This would have to take into account the following: • Whether there are any perceived threats to our security from the use of these weapons, either by a state or by sub-national groups, funded and promoted by a hostile state; in either case, would the possession of BW and CW capability by any state be in our security interest? • Whether we have or should have such weapons i.e., whether their possession enhances our security or not—are we a potential victim or a potential user, even in retaliation. Would these weapons be effective as battleground weapons? What would be our response to a proven BW or CW attack, militarily? • Can our commercial proprietary interests, especially given the size of our chemical industry and the progress made in biotech, be protected during the course of intrusive inspections/challenge inspections? Given the state of flux in both regimes, we would have to consider the ‘opportunity’ provided to us to try and ensure that our overall interests are protected, by ensuring that the directions of the implementation of both treaties take the aforementioned factors into account.

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STATUS OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC) As has already been stated, it is too early to judge the direction in which the OPCW will move under the new dispensation; an opportunity therefore exists for India to ensure that this convention operates as the disarmament treaty it was intended to be. Given the fact that India has declared herself as a ‘possessor’ state and has been, as required by the convention, destroying such chemical weapons under OPCW supervision, on schedule, any option of being a ‘user’ has been effectively ruled out. In any case, this convention, together with the BTWC, has established a norm against the ‘use’ of these WMD by any state, state party or non-state party. The effectiveness of these weapons as battleground weapons have also not been convincingly proved. The task before the country would, therefore, be to ensure the nondiscriminatory and effective implementation of the convention as a disarmament tool. The issues before the policy makers are examined in three sets: first, the issues of universality, compliance, including declarations, national legislation and export controls, proliferation and the possibility of CW terrorism; second, the verification and monitoring issues, including challenge inspections, confidentiality, equitability in the application of inspection visits, and above all, the protection of commercial proprietary rights; third, the ‘political’ issues such as targeting of specific countries, which together with the implicit international acceptance of the doctrine of preemptive strikes, needs modulation and tempering. The link that the Government of India has established with the doctrine of ‘no-first-use’ of nuclear weapons becomes relevant in this context. In examining each of these sets of issues, the policies of the US, with its undisputed power and influence will necessarily have to be kept in mind. It should also be borne in mind that the CWC was ratified by the US with 23 ‘reservations’ or conditions imposed by the US Senate. Two US policy analysts have emphasised that When the Chemical Weapons Convention came up for Senate consideration, its rejection was advocated by Dick Cheney, now Vice President and Douglas Feith and Richard Perle, now key advisors to Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld. The Senate nevertheless approved the convention, although it added conditions

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regarding US compliance with inspections that have been cited as a precedent by other States seeking to limit scrutiny.22 In the first set of issues, it would be in India’s interest to press for universality of the CWC, in all relevant fora. This would enable the international community to ensure that clandestine CW programmes are brought within the ambit of the OPCW verification mechanisms. During the implementation of the CWC, some loopholes became evident, which could be detrimental to India’s security e.g., the lack of inspections of buried CW or CW in underground storage. Possession is accepted on the basis of reports by the state concerned (Pakistan has reported ‘nil’ in such sites). At a conference, it could be proposed that all inspectable or suspected sites, on ground or underground, should also be inspected. This might, of course, place us in a difficult position too, as allegations could easily be made causing harassment. Also, since we are now a declared chemical weapons possessing state, the inspections could prove more rigorous for India. Similarly, it would, perhaps, be necessary to clearly differentiate between visits to the territory of a state requesting an investigation, from situations where the state is requesting a visit to another state. (There are unconfirmed reports that during the Kargil War, Pakistan had planned to plant some chemical weapons on Indian territory and would have then sought an inspection.) This distinction would need to be incorporated into guidelines for inspections. At the Review Conference, on the issue of export controls, India maintained its traditional stance (with Iran and Pakistan) against the AG, at a time when the group was issuing new guidelines ‘regulating the export of sensitive and dual-use chemical and biological material and equipment,’23 and when India’s own vulnerability to CW terrorism should promote international efforts to monitor international trade and transfers in CW material, technologies and equipment. Joining the AG (even if accepted by AG members) may be ineffective; the exclusivity itself being an encouragement to ‘break-outs’, and therefore a cause for instability in the regime. On the other hand, stringent export controls through national action under the aegis of the OPCW, would be an essential component of a strategy against CW terrorism. At the Review Conference, unfortunately, the discussions on export controls got bogged down in the ‘political’ debate on the AG; with the result that references to export controls are fairly general in nature in both documents. As far as India’s own position is concerned, it appears that the AG’s export controls have not adversely affected India’s trade in chemicals; the issue, therefore,

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is to balance the need for trade in chemicals and export controls to prevent weapons acquisition or development. The tendency of the AG to target non-members of their group complicates the issue and makes finding a balance more difficult. The importance of the set of issues in the second group is selfevident; India’s main interest should be focused on the protection of commercial proprietary rights, particularly during routine inspections. In order to bolster the independence of the OPCW we need to keep a close watch on the inspections being undertaken and ensure that they are applied in a non-discriminatory way. Thus, specific countries seen as ‘hostile’ by the US would receive the same treatment as the US, both in terms of quantity and scope of inspections. This can be ensured by each country inspected being given the right to raise, either in the Executive Council or the Conference of States Parties, the scope and number of inspections carried out in their territory, so that all states are able to compare the OPCW inspection performance, at least once a year. Second, strict confidentiality must be maintained by the OPCW secretariat, so that the inspection teams do not open themselves to charges such as those levelled against the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM). Reports of investigations cannot be made available to any single country exclusively, a demand the US had earlier reportedly made. Finally, there is no doubt that it would not be in India’s interest to permit the doctrine of ‘targeting’ specific countries to become acceptable in the OPCW. While the need for cooperation on export controls should lead India to consider proposals such as participation in the USsponsored Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the fact that PSI targets certain countries identified by the US could lead to undesirable consequences for India’s own interests, e.g., in the case of Iran. What could be considered, as an interim measure till the CWC becomes truly universal and is implemented globally in a non-discriminatory way, could be a flexible approach to ad hoc groups seeking to restrict access to CW material and technology to specific countries, i.e., a selective PSI.

STATUS OF THE BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIC WEAPONS CONVENTION (BTWC) As mentioned earlier, the states parties to the BTWC have acquiesced in the US approach to the CWC. At its meeting in Geneva in July

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2002, the UN Secretary General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament, which had been specifically requested by the secretary general for recommendations on dealing with WMD terrorism, the board agreed that ‘efforts to strengthen the BWC regime were also conducive to combating bio-terrorism.’ It identified some measures in this regard: • Penalising, in national legislation and in international criminal law, the abuse of biotechnology for terrorist purposes, including activities running counter to the provisions of the BWC, and to strictly enforce such law. • Developing national capabilities of detection and investigation by strengthening international cooperation between intelligence communities and law enforcement agencies on bilateral and multilateral levels. • Promoting bilateral and multilateral cooperation and assistance in the field of non-proliferation aimed at reducing the BW threat. • Enhancing international cooperation at the multilateral level to prevent illegal trafficking of biological agents and equipment that can be used for terrorist purposes.24 A comparison with what was finally decided at the resumed Review Conference, makes interesting reading. India herself should, before the Review Conference, take some national steps to improve her negotiating weight. For example, the reservation placed by the British Government of India to the Geneva Convention of 1926, can be withdrawn; national legislation enacted with strict controls on pathological labs and retailers of vaccines; strict control on and reporting of any sales/purchase of any biological agent; stricter export control laws requiring end-user certificates; reporting personnel directly involved in biotech research and an emphasis on public health and sanitation. None of these ends are achievable in a day, but model legislation already exists in other Commonwealth countries, viz., Australia, Canada and the UK. The reason for this emphasis is because India is a potential victim of BW attacks or blackmail by sub-national groups, acting either alone, at the behest of a hostile country or the mafia. The threat to India is real and action needs to be taken urgently, if we are to prevent any incident that might have disastrous consequences for the country as a whole. Once again, as in the CWC, the issues of national legislation and export controls become overwhelmingly important. The problem arises not from the guidelines and rules adopted by the AG, but in

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the approach of that group to non-members. Once again, as with India’s chemical industry, India appears to have faced no problems in accessing material, equipment or technology for medical research. India’s own bio-defence research programme is in a nascent stage, and the focus, I believe, should firmly be on BW terrorism and the access of non-state entities to BW or BW technologies or material. Yet, the apprehension, perhaps legitimate, is that in the current dispensation, with no neutral oversight body, AG members could use their ‘national technical means’ to target countries of their choice and adversely impinge on India’s growing bio-tech research and development. While the chances of an oversight, a neutral mechanism such as the OPCW emerging in the area of BW is at present slim, preparations for discussions on the need for such a body in the context of the 2006 Review Conference would be well worth pursuing.

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APPENDIX 8.1A SUMMARY OF THE 23 AGREED CONDITIONS ON THE CWC (1) Effect on Article XX—Asserts the Senate’s right under the Constitution to add reservations to the convention. (2) Financial Contributions—Assures congressional oversight of any funds provided under the CWC. (3) Establishment of an Internal Oversight Office—Requires that the CWC organisation have an Inspector General. (4) Cost-sharing Arrangements—Holds down US costs by requiring costsharing arrangements. (5) Intelligence Sharing—Establishes strict standards for sharing US intelligence information with the CWC organisation. (6) Amendments to The Convention—Requires the executive branch to submit all amendments to the CWC to the Senate for its advice and consent. (7) Continuing Vitality of The Australia Group and National Export Controls—Requires the President to obtain assurances from our Australia Group allies that Article XI is fully consistent with the maintenance of strict export controls on dangerous chemicals. (8) Negative Security Assurances—Requires a classified report on the assurances we offer to other countries that forswear the use of nuclear weapons. (9) Protection of Advanced Biotechnology—Protects the legitimate commercial activities of US chemical, biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms. (10) Monitoring and Verification—Requires detailed annual country-bycountry reports on chemical weapons activities, compliance problems and monitoring policy of the Intelligence Community. (11) Enhancements to Robust Chemical and Biological Defence—Requires the Secretary of Defense to ensure that US Armed Forces are effectively equipped, organised, trained and exercised to conduct military missions in CW and BW environments. (12) Noncompliance—Requires the President to ensure that that instances of noncompliance will be subject to tough US enforcement action. (13) Primacy of The United States Constitution—Ensures that nothing in the Convention requires any action by the US prohibited by the Constitution. (14) Financing Russian Implementation—Requires the United States to reject any effort by Russia to make Russia’s CWC ratification contingent upon US financial guarantees to cover Russian destruction costs.

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(15) Assistance under Article X—Requires the United States to limit its assistance to certain countries of particular concern to medical antidotes and treatments. (16) Constitutional Prerogatives—Sense of the Senate that US negotiators should not agree to future treaties that bar reservations. (17) Additions to The Annex on Chemicals—Further protects US industry by requiring the President to notify and consult with Congress when a chemical is proposed for addition to the CWC schedules. (18) Effect on Terrorism—Senate finding that CW terrorism remains a threat. (19) Constitutional Separation of Powers—Senate declaration that the United States should not be denied its vote in the CWC organisation. (20) The On-site Inspections Agency—Sense of the Senate that OSIA should be authorised to provide assistance to US facilities subject to routine inspections under the CWC. (21) Further Arms Reductions Obligations—Sets forth the Senate position reaffirming its role regarding agreements that limit or reduce US forces or armaments. (22) Treaty Interpretation—Reaffirms Senate role in treaty making. (23) Chemical Weapons Destruction—Confirms that the President will explore possible alternative technologies for the destruction of the US chemical weapons stockpile. (end summary)

WILLIAM J. CLINTON PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

OF

AMERICA

TO ALL TO WHOM THESE PRESENTS SHALL COME, GREETING: Considering That: The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (the ‘Chemical Weapons Convention’ or CWC), with Annexes, was done at Paris on January 13, 1993 and signed that date by the United States; and The Senate of the United States of America by its resolution of April 24, 1997, two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein, gave its advice and consent to ratification of the Convention; with Annexes, subject to the condition which relates to the Annex on Implementation and Verification, that no sample collected in the United States pursuant to the Convention will be transferred for analysis to any laboratory outside the territory of the United States.

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APPENDIX 8.2B DISARMAMENT DIPLOMACY, ISSUE NO. 66, SEPTEMBER 2002 News Review: Australia Group Adopts New CBW Export Control Guidelines Meeting in Paris on June 3–6, the 34 members of the Australia Group (AG) met to adopt new guidelines regulating the export of sensitive and dual-use chemical and biological material and equipment. According to a June 7 press release from the Group, the measures are aimed ‘at preventing the spread of chemical and biological weapons (CBW), including to terrorist groups’. The release continues: ‘The thirty-three participating countries, from Europe, the Asia-Pacific and the Americas, plus the European Commission, have agreed to: •

•

• • • •

Adopt formal guidelines governing the licensing of sensitive and biological items. These guidelines are public, consistent with the Group’s strong commitment to transparency. All countries are encouraged to adhere to these guidelines in the interest of peace and security. Include a ‘catch-all’ provision in its guidelines. This is the first time that an export control regime has agreed to include a ‘catch-all’ clause in its public guidelines, reflecting the resolve of participating national governments to use all means at their disposal to fight the spread of CBW. Apply more rigorous controls to the export of fermenters, lowering the volume threshold from 100 litres to 20 litres. This offers a substantial increase in security against terrorists seeking equipment for CBW attacks. Add eight new toxins to the Group’s biological control list, raising to 19 the total number of controlled toxins. Control technology associated with dual-use biological equipment which could be used to manufacture biological weapons. Control, for the first time, the intangible transfer of information and knowledge which could be used for CBW purposes.’

Anticipating criticism of the regulations as the consolidation of the Group’s elite position in the world commercial market—as well as a complication of efforts to agree universal, non-discriminatory export control arrangements— the press release concludes by insisting: Participants reiterated their commitment to fair and transparent trade in chemical and biological materials for peaceful purposes. They agreed that the non-discriminatory application of national export licensing

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measures allows legitimate trade to expand unhampered by proliferation fears. All Australia Group participants are parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). These conventions legally oblige all state parties, inter alia, not to assist in any way the development and production of chemical and biological weapons anywhere. Participants re-affirmed the central role of national export controls in this regard. Note: The members of the AG are—Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States. Related material on Acronym website: •

Australia Group adopts new guidelines, June 6

Reports: Guidelines for transfers of sensitive chemical or biological items, Australia Group (http://www.australiagroup.net), adopted June 6; New measures to fight the spread of chemical and biological weapons, Australia Group Press Release, June 7; Australia Group adopts new guidelines, Global Security Newswire, June 21.

NOTES

1. Statement made by a US representative to the 2002 NPT PrepCom, quoted in Rebecca Johnson, ‘The 2002 PrepCom: Papering over the Cracks?’, Disarmament Diplomacy, May/June 2002 No. 64. 2. See Rebecca Johnson, ‘Rogues and Rhetoric: The 2003 NPT PrepCom Slides Backwards’, Disarmament Diplomacy, June/July 2003, No. 71. 3. Statement made by the director-general at the Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties, April 21. For more information access the OPCW website at http://www.opcw.org. 4. Statement made by Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John R. Bolton, 11 January 2002 at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies. For more details access http://www.cns.miis.edu/cns/dc/011102.htm. 5. Statement made by the director-general at the Special Session of the Conference of States Parties, April 21. For more information access the OPCW website at http://www.opcw.org.

220 M ARUNDHATI GHOSE 6. Ibid. 7. Statement made by State Department spokesperson Eliza Koch (April 22), reported in news agencies: Reuters, AP, BBC News Online. 8. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC). 9. Statement made by Ambassador Shyamala B. Cowsik, Permanent Representative of India to the OPCW and Leader of the Indian Delegation to the First Review Conference of the CWC, 29 April 2003. For more information access http://www.acronym.org.uk/cwc/03india.htm. 10. The US national statement to the CWC Review Conference, by Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Stephen G. Rademaker, 28 April 2003. For more details log on to http://www. acronym.org.uk/cwc/03us.htm. 11. See ‘US Chemical Weapons Destruction Extension Requested’, US Department of Defence News Release No. 650–03, 2003 September 3, quoted in Disarmament Diplomacy, October/November 2003, No. 73. 12. Statement made by Ambassador Shyamala B. Cowsik, Permanent Representative of India to the OPCW and Leader of the Indian Delegation to the First Review Conference of the CWC, 29 April 2003. For more details access http://www.acronym.org.uk/cwc/03india.htm. 13. CWC Review Conference, 28 April–9 May 2003, see Review Document at http://www.acronym.org.uk/cwc/03revdoc.htm. Full text available at http:// www.opcw.org/html/global/wgrc/2k3/rc1-revdoc.html. 14. Ibid. 15. Alexander Kelle, ‘The CWC After Its First Review Conference: Is The Glass Half Full Or Half Empty?’, Disarmament Diplomacy, June–July 2003, No. 71. Alexander Kelle is Marie Curie Research Fellow, Department of Peace Studies, Bradford University, UK. 16. Statement by John R. Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, 11 January 2002 at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies. For more details access http://www.cns.miis.edu/cns/dc/011102.htm. 17. Ibid. 18. Statement made by Ambassador Shyamala B. Cowsik, Permanent Representative of India to the OPCW and Leader of the Indian Delegation to the First Review Conference of the CWC, 29 April 2003. For more information access http://www.acronym.org.uk/cwc/03india.htm. 19. Marie Isabelle Chevrier is associate professor, Department of Social Sciences, University of Texas, Dallas, Texas, and member of the Federation of American Scientists’ Working Group on Biological Weapons. Marie Isabelle Chevrier, ‘Waiting for Godot or Saving the Show?’, Disarmament Diplomacy, December 2002–January 2003, No. 68. 20. Ibid. 21. US national statement to the CWC Review Conference, by Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Stephen G. Rademaker, 28 April 2003. For details log on to http://www.acronym.org.uk/cwc/03us.htm. 22. Nicole Deller and John Buroughs, ‘Arms Control Abandoned: The Case of Biological Weapons’, World Policy Journal, Summer 2003, Vol. XX, No. 2. Nicole Deller and John Buroughs are from the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy.

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23. See ‘Australia Group Adopts New CBW Export Control Guidelines’, at http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd66/66nr18.htm. 24. Report of the UN Secretary General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament, July 2002, Department for Disarmament Affairs, DDA Document, for more details see http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/AdvisoryBoard/.

PART V INDIA’S OPTIONS

CHAPTER

9 Protection against Chemical Agents B.S. Malik

‘Knowledge is “Power” in “Gas Defence”. It saves casualties, increases the confidence of men in their own capability to protect themselves and reduce fear’. —Brigadier General Alden Waitt1

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It may not be well known that chlorine gas can be made from simple common salt, and sea water or petroleum brines. Sulphur and ethylene are produced by many refineries through comparatively simpler processes. These go on to make mustard gas, an oily liquid, through three relatively simple processes: Reacting vinyl chloride, which can be made from ethylene or acetylene and hydrogen sulphide; reacting ethylene and sulphur monochloride; or, reacting thiodiglycol with hydrogen chloride after making thiodiglycol from ethylene oxide and

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hydrogen sulphide. However, manufacturing becomes a problem when large amounts of mustard gas are required. It would be pertinent to note here that during the First World War, about 27 kg of mustard gas were required per casualty. Only 2 per cent of the casualties died.2 Elemental phosphorous is the building block of the organophosphorous industry. Therefore, it is phosphorous that is basically needed to make nerve agents such as G agents, Tabun (GA), Sarin (GB) and Soman (GD), as also the V agents, such as VX and Edemo (M). There is a wide range of possible chemical precursors to the production of gas warfare. It is believed that the simple chemicals acquired by Iraq may have been used for making deadly gases like thiodiglycol and chloroethanol (mustard gas), dimethalmine, dimethalmine hydrochloride and phosphorous oxychloride (Tabun or GA nerve gas), and dimethalmine methylphosphonate, di-fluoro or methylphosphonyl and potassium fluoride (Sarin or GB nerve gas).3 Admittedly, it is more difficult to make nerve gases than mustard gases, but then there are more processes available to do so, through the use of many different types of chemicals, such as pinacolyl alcohol, potassium fluoride, phosphorous oxychloride, phosphorous trichloride and trimethyl phosphite. The good news is that all these chemicals are easy to track because of their limited commercial applications.4 The scientific developments in Chemical Weapons (CW) have been quite extensive. Research on HI-6, one of the antidotes to nerve gases, has shown that the antidote passes the blood-brain barrier in the central nervous system, where it protects against severe symptoms. Research on the toxicity and breakdown of mustard gas has contributed towards the development of analytical methods to identify metabolites formed in the detoxification of ‘mustard gas’ in the body. The persistence of chemical agents is generally dependent on three factors: First, the dispersal method, i.e., as liquid or aerosol; second, temperature; and third, wind conditions. Gases last much longer in the cold weather, and sometimes the difference can be as big as 1:3 in terms of the dispersal time. The Swedish Defence Research Establishment (FOA) has helped the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRV) in setting up a number of ‘Chemical Support Teams’, which are chiefly intended to assist individual member states of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), in connection with international operations. FOA’s support has involved experts who can join chemical support teams, offer advice on such matters as equipment and procedures, and the training of personnel. The risks

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of inhaling chemicals or otherwise coming into contact with chemical weapons during winter and summer have been calculated for some representative scenarios. The results show that:5 • CW remain on snow-covered surfaces for a significantly longer time than on snow-free surfaces during summer. • The outdoor risk-radius is substantially greater under winter conditions as compared to summer conditions. The FOA has developed a new, non-toxic chemical exercise agent for mustard gas. Unlike the old exercise agent, this substance can be dispersed with a detonation device and indicated with chemicalindicating instruments. With regard to the risks of chemical accidents in civil society, the FOA has contributed with the following measures: • The development of a computer system for the simulation of chemical accidents. • Studies of risks with ammonia as a coolant in ice rinks and other large cooling plants. • Research on the significance of topography for the risk-radius around roads.

BREAKTHROUGH IN PROTECTIVE CHEMICAL WARFARE CLOTHING6 Protective masks and clothing designed to block deadly chemical nerve agents are non-porous, thus making the wearing of such suits very stifling, specially in warmer climates. Scientists in the US are working on creating ‘breathable’ fabrics. These fabrics will work on the principle used in the making of the high-performance ‘Gore-Tex’ used in wet and cold conditions for some time. Researchers at the US Army Soldier Centre Natick, Massachusetts, are also working on samples of ‘breathable’ fabrics that can block ‘mustard gas’ and ‘Sarin’. According to Heidi Schreuder-Gibson, leader of the research team, a full protective suit against chemical warfare should be ready within 10 years. The key to this breakthrough is a new fabric that has extremely thin fibres—hundreds of times finer than a human hair. These will be

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spun from plastic polymers, chains of repeating chemicals similar to nylon. The threads are not woven but are laid down in a mat of tangled layers, producing fabrics with numerous microscopically small holes. These holes will allow water vapours to pass through while blocking liquids, particles and forced air. This process is a basic shift from ‘fabrics and textiles to membranes’. Thus, a ‘breathable’ fabric will become an effective barrier against chemicals because chemical molecules in a gas do not march in disciplined, orderly lines. They break rank and swirl around in various directions. This disorderly motion gives them a greater chance of striking one of the fibres in the non-woven web and sticking to it, thus preventing deadly chemical molecules from penetrating the fabric. This, however, does not guarantee protection. Some gas could work its way through the fabric, because the fibres could become saturated with molecules. The researchers, however, plan that the polymer fibres carry chemical catalysts to help break down the nerve agents into harmless products. The proposed ability of the fabric to ‘decontaminate’ itself has earned it the name ‘Head-to-Toe OdorEaters’. The thickness of the fibres that makes the protective membrane is critical because the thinner the fibre, the more effective is the fine mesh of fibres in catching and deactivating an incoming molecule of nerve gas. Against this, a thicker fabric soon gets overwhelmed by chemical molecules. All this has been possible by reviving the 70-year-old process of ‘electrospinning’, where a polymer drop is blasted with electricity to make plastic thread. This process was given up in the past due to heavy production costs. However, a decade back, Darrell Reneker, a polymer scientist at the University of Akron, Ohio, decided to reinvestigate the process of making finer fibres of a few millionths of a millimetre across. The process of electrospinning works because electricity overwhelms the surface tension that holds a drop of liquid together. Since the drop wants more surface area, it becomes unstable and under the right conditions, this unstable surface becomes an expanding polymer jet that follows a tightly looping spiral path. It can become up to 100,000 times longer within a very limited space. The fast-moving liquid jet can be pointed at almost anything, including the human body. The resultant polymer mat that builds up can be shaped to match the exact body contours for a perfect fitting ‘breathable’ protective suit. The obvious advantage is no fatigue and loss of efficiency in handling sophisticated equipment and weapons.

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CWC: ARTICLE VI, THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY AND TERRORISM7 Article VI of the CWC deals with ‘Activities not Prohibited Under this Convention’. This article, along with the annex on implementation and verification, gives out a comprehensive regime for monitoring the chemical industry by the Organisation for the Prohibition of CW (OPCW) through declaration and on-site inspections on a routine basis. The CWC is based on two essential strands: ‘destruction’ of all existing CW; and, future ‘prevention of CW production’. Initially, during the 1970s and 1980s, the negotiators of the convention were concerned with the ‘destruction’, in Articles IV and V. It is only towards the later part of this period that attention shifted to future ‘prevention of CW production’. Article VI was an attempt to reign in the commercial chemical industries, lest they indulged in production of chemical weapons by default, neglect or by getting around the provisions of the CWC. Article VI, paragraph 2, requires each state party to adopt the measures necessary to ensure that toxic chemicals and their precursors are only developed, produced, otherwise acquired, retained, transferred, or used within its territory, or in any other place under its jurisdiction or control for purposes not prohibited under the convention. Paragraphs 3–9 of Article VI stipulate the regime of declarations, verification through data monitoring and on-site inspections, and other measures applying to facilities and activities of states parties in relation to activities not prohibited under the convention. These provisions have to be seen in conjunction with other provisions discussed in this context. All this demonstrates that there should be no doubt at all as to the authority of the OPCW to engage in the struggle against terrorism. The full implementation of these already existing requirements by all members states would contribute substantially as follows: • Denying terrorists access to chemicals that could be used as CW. • Deterring the potential supply of knowledge, equipment and chemicals to terrorists. • Ensuring that any involvement with CW could, and would, be effectively prosecuted.

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• Increasing the effectiveness of legal action against terrorists involved in activities prohibited to states parties under the convention, no matter where the terrorists are found, and irrespective of where the illegal activities have been conducted.8 Further, paragraph 2 of Article VI requires states parties to subject certain chemicals, facilities related to such chemicals and other facilities as specified in the convention’s Verification Annex to inspections. This exercise had a two-fold aim. First, to assist the states parties to fulfill their undertakings and second, to ascertain that they complied with the laid-down obligations. However, the verification by the OPCW goes beyond the undertakings of the state parties. The verification results must permit an assessment of whether a state party is, in general, complying with its undertaking as contained in this paragraph. Only then, will the exercise by states parties of the right proclaimed in paragraph 1 of Article VI fulfill the requirements of that article. It also contains the legal basis for the rights and obligations of the OPCW and the states parties under the regimes included in Parts VI to IX of the Verification Annex. Parts VII, VIII and IX of the Verification Annex deal with chemicals and facilities found mainly in the civil chemical industry and are, therefore, often referred to as containing the industry verification regimes. In contrast, Part VI of the Verification Annex deals with the verification of facilities producing Schedule I Chemicals, i.e., with many of the chemical agents that have been developed as CW and some of their precursors. As a result of its apparent relationship with chemical weapons, Part VI had been developed earlier, together with the provisions concerning CW and CW production facilities contained in Articles IV and V. In addition to verification requirements and procedures, Part VI contains important prohibitions and restrictions on production facilities, aggregate quantities, transfers, etc. Its verification regime states these facilities shall be subject to ‘systematic verification through on-site inspections and monitoring with on-site instruments.’ This ensures that the intensity of verification of allowed Schedule 1 facilities is at the same fundamental level as it is for CW and CW production facilities, which are to be destroyed. However, the ultimate elaboration of the provisions of Part VI fell short of such rigid requirements and the Verification Annex states that the number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of inspections for a particular facility shall be based on assessment of the risk posed to the object and purpose of the convention, according to guidelines to be approved by the OPCW Conference of the states parties.

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For Parts VI through IX of the Verification Annex, one can ask which chemical shall be verified under which regime? Two factors were at issue here: The risk that a chemical and/or a facility related to it poses to the object and purpose of the convention (i.e., how acute is the danger of diversion for the purpose of prohibited weapons or of the facility being converted into a CW production facility?) and which verification measures are practically feasible given, for instance, the quantities involved? It is important to emphasise that there is no necessary relationship between the inclusion of a chemical in Schedules 1, 2 or 3 and the ‘risk’ which may be attributed to it. In exchange for a pragmatic decision on the assignment of a given chemical to a given regime, the regimes themselves were drafted to ensure flexibility where the frequency and intensity of inspection activities was concerned. Thus, a higher degree of risk posed by a given chemical and a given facility could be responded to by more effective verification, than in cases involving a lower degree of risk. Another important conceptual issue is whether the verification of industrial facilities should be driven by their potential to be abused for CW purposes, or by their actual activities. At the same time, the issue of the potential of chemical production facilities to manufacture scheduled chemicals or chemicals not for permitted purposes was resolved through the inclusion of Part IX in the Verification Annex. This combines two different approaches: the opening up of almost the entire organic chemical industry for inspection by including plant sites with annual production of more than 200 t of unscheduled discrete organic chemicals; and, the inclusion of plant sites with annual production of more than 30 t of discrete organic chemicals, containing phosphorus, sulphur or fluorine—a category of chemicals related to those posing a particular threat to the object and purpose of the convention and whose facilities might include equipment that could also enable them to manufacture ‘Schedule 1’ chemicals. The discussion of issues in the context of Article VI also had repercussions for the verification mechanism required. Negotiators in the Conference on Disarmament perceived that verification would require a high level of professional skills on the part of those charged with its conduct. Together with these professional skills, the verification mechanisms were designed to ensure objectivity and independence. This implied that the specific form of verification should be determined by an institutional structure yet to be established. At this point, there was growing agreement that an independent international organisation should be established, with verification as its central mandate.

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The Government-Industry Conference convened in 1989 in Canberra, Australia, was an impressive demonstration of the support of representatives of the chemical industry for the convention. Industry supporters, including national and regional trade organisations, worked actively to win over those who still had reservations. They drew parallels between the military dangers from chemistry and the environmental dangers stemming from the chemical industry, which they viewed as issues of the global industry’s ‘responsible care’ code of conduct. The chemical industry showed its political weight some months later, when the US chemical industry contributed decisively to halting further activities within its own country’s binary CW programme. In this way, one fundamental precondition for the successful completion of CW negotiations was fulfilled. Dr Walter Krutzsch feels that the momentum established between 1989 and 1992 did not carry over into the Preparatory Commission, which was established after the convention was signed in Paris in January 1993. In the intervening four years, before the treaty entered into force in April 1997, the Preparatory Commission’s work on providing guidance often resulted in attempts to rewrite the convention. As a consequence, since the CWC took force, operational guidance has limited some of its key provisions. Now that more than three years have elapsed since the convention took force, its provisions should be tested against the results it has achieved. The question is how reliable are the verification results with regard to the undertaking of states parties under paragraph 2 of Article VI? The convention states, in Part II of the Verification Annex, that inspectors and the papers and correspondence, including records of the inspection team, shall be accorded inviolability pursuant to Articles 29 and 30 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961. Yet, by means of references to the Confidentiality Annex, the inspectors have, at the request of the states parties, been required to provide copies of the pages in their inspection notebooks. This procedure clearly undermines the independent nature of the inspections, and is certainly not reconcilable with inviolability. To the infringement of certain key provisions of the convention, such as those on inspector notebook inviolability and limitations on access to facilities and records, one may add restrictions on sampling and analysis, including, but not limited to, the demand to undertake on-site analysis using blinded software. Other provisions inculde the prohibition by individual states parties on the removal of samples from their territory for independent analysis at OPCW designated laboratories; state party interference in the inspection team’s health

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and safety decisions. Lastly, the attempts by some states parties to require final inspection reports, completed at OPCW headquarters to simply mirror the statements prepared by the inspection teams as preliminary findings, without any serious consideration being given to precedents, defying interpretations of the convention! These infringements have had negative effects on the implementation of Article VI. They represent a step back from the convention that came into force in 1997 and certainly do not reflect what parliaments ratified and what the chemical industry believed it was supporting during the Conference on Disarmament negotiations. This is because many provisions have not been applied in accordance with the convention. A whole series of modifications has been introduced in a manner, which is inconsistent with Article XV. Behind the provisions of the CWC, a series of procedures that are alien to it have been developed, which has watered down the entire verification concept. All this creates ample incentives for patterns of behaviour never foreseen by the negotiators and without justification in the provisions of the treaty. Trustful cooperation, the alpha and omega of the convention, is being replaced by hide-and-seek games. What then is the answer? Dr Walter Krutzsch suggests that first and foremost, the truth about the real situation must be stated openly by, and discussed between, state parties. This alone will mobilise support and readiness to change the current course of events. As with each and every system, information is indispensable for feedback. Without real information, the OPCW cannot respond appropriately. Under the guise of confidentiality, information about compliance has been withheld from governments, parliaments and the public. States parties and their delegations in The Hague and elsewhere should stop using confidentiality as a cover for imposing strictures on the implementation of the treaty at chemical industry sites. This was done contrary to the provision of the OPCW Policy on Confidentiality in Part III, paragraph 12, which prohibits confidentiality from being used to conceal non-compliance. This policy paper was adopted by the Conference of the States Parties itself. Ad hoc attempts to impose restrictions during inspections create an uneven playing field for states parties. States parties should insist on guaranteeing as much independence as reasonably possible for inspection teams. What is needed is a single methodology for evaluating inspection results to such a level of objectivity that the danger of subjectivity influencing reports and conclusions is eliminated. Only facts that support or disprove the inspection hypothesis should be subject to evaluation and that too only when

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they are collated through a genuinely independent inspection activity. States parties should focus on preparing conference decisions which ensure such independence. Many faults would be remedied if the CWC’s provisions were not further inhibited and distorted by inconsistent regulations in both the Secretariat and the individual states parties. It often would suffice simply to withdraw such regulations and to restore the convention’s provisions. If this is achieved, the real work of the states parties in guiding the evolution of the convention could begin, taking into account the experience gained during inspections and changing situations. This is crucial in the case of Article VI, where the industry is continuously changing its products and its modes of operation. Consider, for example, the issue of the biological/biochemical synthesis of scheduled and/or toxic chemicals. During the Conference on Disarmament (CD) negotiations 20 years ago, the production of chemicals relevant to the CWC by these means seemed a remote possibility. Now, with the expanding applications of genetic engineering and the availability of organisms which can operate in extreme environments imitating those found in chemical manufacturing plants, the situation is changing rapidly. This should be a focus of the conference and the Council. This is one example of how the political organs of the convention can display their potential for unifying political positions through open discussion and fully reported decision making. Procedures should identify the authors of a proposal and its supporters, as well as those disagreeing and their arguments. If the process becomes open and transparent, it will not elicit irresponsible behaviour, but will instead encourage national governments to initiate moves to make things better. Representatives of the chemical industry should be given a role in this process of implementing and adapting the convention to changing conditions. This role should be at least as effective as during the negotiating phase. The industry had actively and positively supported a robust convention during the CD negotiations. The Scientific Advisory Board should be further encouraged to offer its assessments and proposals on the basis of complete and accurate information. Finally, the role of non-governmental organisations should be significantly enhanced. Among other things, they should be granted greatly improved access to the deliberations and decisions of the political organs of the OPCW, as well as to working documents and information material relating to their concerns. They should also be granted the right to make submissions of their own.

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THE WORLD BEYOND THE CWC: OSAMA BIN LADEN’S AL-QAEDA AND THEIR ACCESS TO WMD There is a world beyond those countries that are part of the CWC and here we are not discussing the 29 countries that have not ratified the CWC. This is the world of crime and terrorism about which little is known. The famous US TV network CBS probed this world and visited North West Frontier Province (NWFP) in North-west Pakistan through an enterprising TV crew. They produced a programme of about 15 minutes called The Merchants of Mass Destruction. The film-makers are George Crilo and Neeraj Kheminni. Their account takes the viewer to Nawashahr, set in the Middle Ages where every third person is carrying a weapon. According to the presenter, ‘No authority can really know what is going on here’. The contact man is the son of a retired Pakistani army general simply called Malik. On a query, the following list of items is produced for sale: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Zirconium 45 per cent—2 mt (metric tonnes). Ta 205, 20–25 per cent, Nb 15–20 per cent SN. Cadmium Metal Cd 99.98 per cent. Ammonium Pererehenate NH 4 Re O4. High Purity Tellurium 5n6n. Yltrium 99.83 per cent Plates 30* 120 Min. Scandium 99.99 per cent—3 kg. Isotope Osmium 187 Purity 99.99 per cent. Rubadium 99.99 per cent—124 kg pack. Tin Slag Container 2.5 per cent TA 205. GA 5n.3000 Plastic Tubes 100 GM. Zirconia Powder 99.99 per cent. Press Approx 5 per cent Water Content Average mt. TA 205—99.99 per cent 100 kg. DY.TM.Gd LU. ER Y HO Ce—500K. Cobalt Grade A 99.96 Purity Chips drums, 3 Containers. Isotope Osmium 187 Purity 99.99 per cent. Selinium 74 Non-active Isotope–0.3. Lithium Metal Purity 99.93 per cent, 3200. Platinium Rendels 999.5—496 kg. Cesium Metal 99.99 per cent and Cesium. Sulphate, Cesium Chloride etc.—100 kg.

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• • • • • • • • • •

Mercury 99.99 per cent R—15000 kg. High Purity SB 5n 6n—200 kg. Indium Metal Min 99.99 per cent Purity 2N. TA 205 Powder 99.99 per cent Purity 3N. Tantalum Target 99.99 per cent Purity 63. Red Mercury Oxide Powder. Rhodium Powder 99.95 per cent—3 mt. Mercury Differing Quantities—300 kg. Strontium Metal 99.95 per cent Purity 1 mt. Barium Metal 99 per cent—2 mt.

This list may not say much to a lay person, but it does indicate that all these items had no business to be at Nawashahr. The list also establishes the credibility of the BW and CW ampoules shown later in the video. It also lends credibility to the story of the route taken by these items from Russia to Ukraine to Nawashahr via Tajikistan (shown in the video). The BW and CW ampoules shown were heat-sealed and according to Dr Bill Patrick, who had run the US BW programme, as well as his Russian counterpart Dr Ken Halloway, these represented a very important element of the BW and CW. They had Cyrillic inscriptions on them (Russian script), confirming their origin. According to the experts on the subject, the substance of the larger vial possibly had snake venom or mustard gas while the smaller vial possibly contained a kit to test the presence of chemical agents. The CW agents were moved from the former Soviet Union’s stockpile in Ukraine and Tajikistan, and then from there to the markets in Afghanistan. The more harrowing news was that such items were all over in Pakistan. The story shows the fabled Grand Trunk highway and Mohammed Afridi, a tribal chieftain, reputed drug lord and editor of the first newspaper that brought out the news of Osama bin Laden acquiring WMD. Malik’s brother Jamal, who is a graduate from the University of California, is also shown. It is revealed during the conversation that the laws of Pakistan were restricted to the road alone, 5 ft off the road it was all no man’s land, a tribal area. Some papers (in English and some in the Arabic script) shown in the video appear to be connected with WMD, particularly nuclear and chemical weapons. There are drawings of anthrax balloons, with planes shooting them down. Professor Pervez, a MIT graduate, is shown revealing the chilling fact that Osama bin Laden is very popular with many nuclear scientists. Bashir-ud-Din Mahmud, a key Pakistan nuclear scientist, has held meetings with bin Laden and these are all mentioned in the video.

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There are shots of the coffin of four journalists, amongst them one Spaniard and one Italian girl, who filed a story in The New York Times about vials of Sarin gas in the al-Qaeda training camp near Jallalabad and about their visit to an Afghan area where they had seen a laboratory with 30 boxes of Sarin gas with Russian writing on them. Most probably these journalists were killed because of their having found out all this, claims Bill Clifford, a former US intelligence officer who also served for eight years in the Council of Senate Foreign Relations Committee. During the operations in Afghanistan, the special US forces also found labs, materials and manuals on WMD that have been sent to the US for analysis, claims the video. This video, aired in December 2001, clearly establishes the nexus between states with WMD, and terrorists and this makes the danger extremely serious. It also highlights various areas that we have to be worried about in our quest for WMD security.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CW DOCTRINE IN THE US AND THE LESSONS LEARNT On 30 July 1982, the US Chemical Corps released TRADOC Pamphlet 525-20, US Army Operational Concept for Individual and Collective Measures for Chemical, Biological and Radiological (CBR) Defence. This concept stressed a three-tiered approach of contaminating avoidance, protection and decontamination. The bywords became ‘defence’, ‘deterrence’ and ‘retaliation’.9 The US ‘national policy of responding to enemy use of CB weapons has shifted over the years from one extreme to the other; from retaliation using similar CB weapons to massive conventional retaliation to (most recently) nuclear retaliation’.10 General Shalkasvili in his testimony to the US Senate Committee in 1994 said about the US policy: ‘Protective capability together with capability to retaliate with overwhelming force’. The US Chemical School has projected a Chemical Vision 2010— intended to leverage new concepts of Army Vision 2010 and Joint Vision 2010—which captures these ideas in four principles. These include:

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• sensing the battle space to provide a current NBC situation awareness (using recon systems and automatic early warning and standoff detectors); • shaping the battle space to provide commanders with a clear understanding of the current NBC threat (using an integrated NBC battle management software system linking the detection system); • shielding the force (medical pretreatments, CB monitors, protective ensembles, and collective protection systems); and, • sustaining the force (using decontamination systems and medical CB defence treatments). This vision captures the potential of the DoD CB defence programme; the challenge is to educate the warfighters to understand and implement this concept throughout the military.11 Having a doctrine is one thing, but putting that concept into practise in our context with our means and way of waging warfare is quite another. Similarly, many believe that after 9/11 the US government has suddenly woken up to the threat of WMD. Whereas the truth is that in June 1995, President Bill Clinton executed Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD 39), stating the administration’s new policy on counter-terrorism. This directive gave the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) new responsibilities to coordinate federal assets in response to chemical and biological terrorism. The FBI was to lead the federal response during crisis management, ideally a period upto the intentional release of a CB agent (primarily a law enforcement role). FEMA was to have led the consequence management phase, which was seen as the recovery and restoration after the incident.12 It thus becomes clear that organisations by themselves cannot ensure a correct response when the occasion arises. It also clarifies how, because of the forward planning and preparation in this regard, the US was able to handle the 9/11 crisis. Finally, the predominant thought of the US strategic establishment has been somewhat validated by the post-September 11 events in Afghanistan. Albert J. Mauroni prophetically voiced his views on these events, as strategic bombing will never be the solution to stopping the proliferation of CB weapons. No matter how many smart munitions, cruise missiles, or B-2 bombers the US has to throw at the

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enemy, there is always the chance that the adversary of the future will use CB weapons to eliminate the high technology edge our ground troops have. They can produce these weapons in deep underground bunkers (or like caves in Afghanistan) and in commercial laboratories built next to hospitals and schools. They use these weapons not because they are the ‘poor man’s atomic bombs’ but rather because US forces remain vulnerable to their effects, and the US public is so fearful and ignorant of these weapons.13

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India is one of the 145 countries that have agreed to give effect to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, and to provide for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. India signed the convention in Paris on 14 January 1993.14 Only 52 countries out of 145 have passed the national legislation required by the convention, while 29 countries have yet to ratify the CWC. It is noteworthy that only four countries, i.e., India, Republic of Korea, USA and the former USSR, declared that they do possess CW and undertook to destroy these according to the Article IV, which states that each State Party shall destroy all chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1 pursuant to the Verification Annex and in accordance with the agreed rate and sequence of destruction (hereinafter referred to as ‘order of destruction’). Such destruction shall begin not later than two years after this Convention enters into force and shall finish not later than 10 years after this. A State Party is precluded from destroying such chemical weapons at a faster rate.15 India did start to destroy its chemical weapons in 1999 and had destroyed the mandated 20 per cent chemical weapons by the end of 2001. The fact that there are only four countries who have declared possession of CW and that not all of them have destroyed 20 per cent of their CW stocks suggests that we need to have defensive measures in place in the event of a CW attack.

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India enacted ‘The Chemical Weapons Convention Act, 2000’ on 28 August 2000. However, the rules to implement the Chemical Weapons Convention Act have not yet been formulated. The National Authority of India on Chemical Weapons Convention (Cabinet Secretariat) is presently working on framing these rules. It appears there would be five distinct ministries involved in the implementation of the rules: the Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilisers (Department of Chemicals), as the ministry dealing with the chemical industries; the Ministry of Home Affairs for enforcement of the rules and looking after disaster management; the Ministry of Environment and Forests for looking after man-made disasters, including chemicals; the Ministry of Defence (Defence Research and Development Organisation) as the user ministry involved in the destruction of the chemical weapons; and lastly, the Ministry of External Affairs, for dealing with the issues arising out of CWC implementation. It is thus obvious that unless we have an integrated approach, there is the likelihood of a fragmented view of the whole process. We could end up making rules that cannot be implemented, and worst, legislate conditions which the chemical industry may find difficult to enforce. It is these areas at the organisational boundaries that are exploited by non-state actors for acquisition of chemicals for terrorist activities. Only a seamless organisation encompassing all activities can handle all issues involved. The National Crisis Management Committee (NCMC) functions under the Cabinet Secretary, with various secretaries as members and with no one from the civil defence or the armed forces. The Central Committee has executive functionaries at the level of a joint secretary. It also has ADGMO (A) from the army, inspector generals (IGs) from the Border Security Force (BSF) and Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF). However, during the first quarter of 2002, the responsibility for disaster management was given to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), instead of the Agriculture Ministry. Presently, the MHA has not yet finalised the new organisation but essentially it is looking at setting up a ‘Disaster Management Board’, headed by the home minister, with other relevant ministers as members, and a ‘Disaster Management Council’, headed by the home secretary with all relevant secretaries as members. The MHA is looking at a multidisciplinary force comprising people from all relevant disciplines, including Defence R&D Organisation (DRDO) scientists, to form the nucleus for disaster management of all kinds, including nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC). Initially, out of a recommended force of about 15 such composite companies only two will be raised due to

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financial constraints. This force will be independent of the armed forces with regard to equipment, including protective suits required during a chemical disaster. In the wake of the Bhopal gas tragedy, a High Power Committee (HPC) on disaster management was set up under the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). The HPC is responsible for developing an overall strategy for improving preparedness and formulating mitigation measures to minimise the effect of disasters on the country’s people, property and environment. The Integrated Crisis Management Plan (ICMP)16 for the Ministry of Environment and Forest has been prepared by ERM India Private Limited, a member of the Environment Resources Management Group of Companies (the company has disclaimed responsibility to the client in respect of matters outside the scope of the report). The report is based on the ‘trigger mechanism approach’. However, the ICMP, prepared on 22 January 2001, is only an input and not an implementable plan. Somehow, there appears to be a general lack of appreciation of our strengths and weaknesses. It is felt that instead of creating new organisations for every crisis, the existing structures should be strengthened and streamlined. Based on this basic premise and our experience of disasters, the measures recommended are given ahead.

RECOMMENDATIONS It is clear from the earlier discussion that the CWC notwithstanding, the threat from CW is very real from both state and the non-state actors. The civil population needs to be protected against these threats. We will need to develop CW agent detectors, shelters for collective protection, medicines to recover from the CW agents, and decontaminants to eliminate the effects of the CW agents. It should not be difficult, now that we have the means to monitor SO2 and NO2 levels in the environment, on a routine basis in order to keep a check on the pollution level. The security forces, in general, and the armed forces, in particular, will need to build expertise in CW and have specialised ‘early warning’, ‘detection’ and ‘protection’ equipment. Medicine will be needed to recover from the CW agents and decontaminants required to eliminate the effect of CW agents. The armed forces will need the capability to withstand and fight through the chemically contaminated battlefield,

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both for their personnel and equipment. The protective equipment, specially for users of specialised equipment and weapons, should be so designed that the high-tech edge is not lost due to the wearing of cumbersome protective gear. Our constant endeavour in this area should be to meet future developments in the field of more advanced binary and other later versions of CW. We need to revitalise the DRDO where the officer strength has dwindled by 29 per cent, i.e., against a sanctioned strength of 7,555 scientists, currently there are only 5,121 scientists.17 Their efforts in the area of providing early warning, detection and protective gear must be speeded up to cut down our dependency on foreign procurement. Whereas ships and aircraft have CW protection, the problems lie mostly with the army. With about two decades of effort, there is enough expertise within the army to fight in a CW environment. We must work on a robust family of equipment. The protective suits should be based on the likely battle scenario of a lower agent challenge of 2–3 g/m2, to keep them lighter and cause less heat stress than the ‘worst-case scenario US approach’ based on 10 g of nerve agent per m2 of ground (near ground zero of chemical artillery barrage).18 There is an obvious trade off between operational effectiveness and safety. We should give priority to the former and accept the safety levels as compared to other activities in the operations. Though assertions are made after every disaster,19 specially after 9/11, at the ground level we have allowed the ‘Civil Defence’ apparatus to become extremely weak despite the well laid-out Civil Defence Act, 1968, and Civil Defence Rules, 1968, which provide details down to the last person in the organisation. The structure of civil defence should be strengthened, specially communications and manpower with linkages to the armed forces, as originally envisioned. It should be considered whether the personnel of the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF)20 should not be utilised for civil defence, especially because of the proposed privatisation of public sector undertakings (PSUs) for which it was raised. There is otherwise danger of the CISF being sucked into the ever-increasing demand for security forces. The armed forces must be forced to provide officers to head this vital organisation, as also provide officers at the lower levels, as was prevalent till 1983 when most of the rules and guidelines were framed. This will allow seamless interaction with the armed forces, so vital for ‘reararea security’ during war and heightened insurgency situations. It will also make it easier to get support from the armed forces during WMD incidents through industrial accidents or terrorist attacks.

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A review committee has looked at the various aspects of strengthening the CD. Some of their recommendations are as follows: • Civil defence training for IAS and IPS probationers that was discontinued since 1985 should be revived. • Civil defence should be included in the conference of the chief ministers, chief secretaries and home secretaries, and, civil defence preparedness reviewed everywhere. • Sections 4 and 5 of the Civil Defence Act should be amended to make it obligatory for all states to raise their Civil Defence Corps. The director-general, Civil Defence, must be allowed to direct the activities of the controllers in the states by amending the Section 4 (2) of the Civil Defence Act.21 After the Kargil War, a group of secretaries from the ministries of home affairs, defence and finance, headed by the MHA, was asked to suggest a mechanism to fight situations of high tension, lesser than war, without involving the provisions of the Union War Book (UWB). Now, the MHA is trying to cobble together a Disaster Management Board and Disaster Management Council at the ministerial and secretarial level, hoping for universal compliance. This may elude them due to lack of institutional sanctions implicit in the UWB for such an arrangement. The UWB clearly lays down, in the very first paragraph, that since it is meant for the prosecution of war, its provisions can be suitably modified to meet lesser contingencies. We, therefore, should not go for new, untidy arrangements, but instead strengthen the provisions and guidelines of the UWB to meet all NBC disaster contingencies. We need to invoke the provisions of the UWB since it has been issued on the orders of the cabinet secretary and has the requisite authority to garner support from all ministries, states and union territories (UTs). Based on the statutory requirement given in the UWB every state, UT, ministry and its department have their respective ‘War Books’. All these War Books contain instructions, procedures and guidelines as applicable to every concerned department, institution and organisation individually based on the respective division of responsibility as given in the UWB. There is, thus, a very well established set of interwoven instructions available in the country to meet all contingencies, including war, which is expected to be known to all. The last time these provisions were invoked was during Operation Parakram. However, the political controversy that surrounded the exercise perhaps put the UWB procedure itself into question. Maybe

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people want to shy away from their responsibilities as given in the UWB, which are very exacting. The provisions of the ‘Homeland Defence’ and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as applied in the US post 9/11, need to be studied and their applicability analysed to make the UWB more up-to-date. We should ensure that the future National Crisis Management Committee (NCMC) structure takes into account these provisions to ensure WMD security. The National Cadet Corps (NCC) is a 120,000 strong organisation, with a presence in almost all districts in the country, with over 13,000 armed forces personnel in its organisation. The presence of over 12,000 teachers or Associated NCC officers (called ANOs) who are trained at the Officers Training School (OTS), Kamptee, Women’s Officer Training School (WOTS), Gwalior, and the Civil Defence College, Nagpur, is a tremendous resource that should be made use of in WMD disaster management. It may not be well known that NCC cadets are trained in first aid, signal communications and fire fighting, apart from other basic military training, including firing. All these skills have been made use of in various national-level disasters. Since the WMD threat needs to be countered on many fronts, a close coordination is required between the executive actions, information and media management. Information is the biggest weapon in the hands of the non-state actors. How an issue is projected can almost decide the way it will be dealt with, both nationally and internationally. Post 9/11, the crucial role of the media at the time of a WMD attack and thereafter has been established. Information, regionally and internationally, can forewarn everyone concerned. Historically, once any country reaches a high nuclear technological level, it normally does not rely on CW. However, tactical opportunities are seldom ignored by sworn adversaries, specially in view of the information that has become available. Accordingly, we should selectively invest in CW reconnaissance, early warning (EW), detection, protection, and medical care to recover from the CW agents and decontaminants to eliminate their effects. We cannot act differently in a harsh world where countries have not even declared their stocks of CW. There is a provision in the CWC of ‘the extreme national interest’ which presupposes that we should retain the ability to retaliate in kind, if required. We all know about the CW retaliation by the US in Vietnam and the worse consideration of a possible nuclear response that was made public through the ‘Nixon tapes’.22 The nuclear weapon alternative, in our context, can spell total disaster. It is possibly not very well known that the Nazis produced some 1,200 t of nerve gas

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in the Second World War, but never used it because they believed that Britain and the US were also aware of the technology.23

NOTES

1. 2.

3.

4. 5. 6. 7.

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

17. 18. 19. 20.

See Gas Warfare: The Chemical Weapon, It’s Use and Protection Against It (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1942). See Anthony H. Cordesman, ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East’ (London: Brassey, 1991). See the notes and references in Part II, ‘Current Trends in the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, p. 184. The technology of proliferation is described well by Lois R. Ember, ‘Worldwide Spread of Chemical Arms Receiving Increased Attention’, C&N, April 14, 1988, pp. 8–16. Cordesman, op. cit. (note 2), pp. 186–87. See FOA, ‘Protection Against Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons’, by the Swedish Defence Research Establishment. David Adam, ‘Protecting Against Chemical Warfare’, The Times of India, September 6, 2001. Adapted from Dr Walter Krutzsch, ‘Article VI of the CWC: Past, Present and Future’, in the CBW Conventions Bulletin, Quarterly Journal of the Harvard Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation, No. 50, December 2000. See ‘Introduction by the Director-General’, in ‘The OPCW and the Global Struggle against Terrorism’ at http://www.opcw.org/resp/html/struggle.html. Albert J. Mauroni, America’s Struggle with Chemical–Biological Warfare (Praeger Publishers, 2000), pp. 11, 80 and 137. Ibid., Chapter 2, ‘The Chemical Corps Enters the Cold War,’ p. 4. Ibid., p. 260. Ibid., p. 238. Ibid., p. 248. The Gazette of India Extraordinary, No. 421, New Delhi, Monday, August 28, 2000/Bhadra 6, 1922. Ibid, p. 24, para 6. See ‘Development of Integrated Crisis Management Plan’, January 2001, Final Report, Ministry of Environment and Forests (ERM). Prepared by ERM India Pvt. Ltd., 2nd floor, 3 Palam Marg, Vasant Vihar, New Delhi-110057. See ‘DRDO Maange More,’ The Hindustan Times, December 31, 2001. Mauroni, op. cit. (note 9), pp. 113–14. See ‘Home Guards being Trained for War’, The Hindustan Times, January 6, 2002. See ‘CISF Role has Changed with Disinvestments’, The Times of India, March 7, 2002.

246 M B.S. MALIK 21.

22.

23.

Report of the Committee on the ‘Role of the Police in Disaster Management—A Paradigm Shift from Post-Disaster Reconstruction and Relief to Pre-disaster Proactive Approach’, Annual DsGP/IsG Conference 2001, held under the chairmanship of Dr T.N. Mishra, DG, CRPF. See ‘Nixon Considered Nukes For Vietnam’, on http://www.enigmous.com/ index.php? category = history. Part of the 500 hours of tapes was also reported by the Indian print media. John J Fialka, ‘Fighting Dirty’, The Wall Street Journal, September 15, 1988.

CHAPTER

10 Protection against Biological and Toxin Warfare Raja Menon

C

ould India become a victim of biological warfare and, if so, who or what are the likely targets? The term biological warfare naturally lends credence to the belief that biological agents would be used as yet another weapon. If so, then the primary targets would be the military and in a roundabout way, the civilian population. The latter would be targeted in the same way that aerial bombardment seeks to kill civilians in the hope of shortening a war. The study group (convened at the USI to study the implications of using biological and chemical agents) concluded quite otherwise—biological agents are not the preferred method of waging war by any professional military force in the world. Yet, the huge stocks of biological agents stockpiled during the Cold War were, in fact, meant to be delivered by the military. Would the opposing military have been the targets? Hardly likely. Although no literature exists to prove that the military on both sides would have targeted civilian population centres, the study group concluded that the implicit nature of bio-agents would have enforced a strategy of anti-civilian use. The relatively denser nature of cities vis-à-vis the dispersed dispositions of troops and the

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massive ratio of city populations to the armed forces would have virtually enforced the use of bio-agents against population centres rather than military targets. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) addresses only this threat and was structured around the threat posed by state actors as part of the Cold War. Now that the Cold War is over, states have to reassess the biological warfare threat for themselves. States like India, which are under threat from other state actors will still have to rely on either some form of bilateral deterrence against bio-warfare, or rely on the efficiency of the Biological and Toxin Warfare (BTW) regime to remove the state actor from the spectrum of threats. In many other cases, states have to rely on the particular nature of their terrain or climate to conclude that bio-agents are not a military threat. For instance, in the mountainous areas of the north or in the desert plains of Rajasthan, the use of bio-agents is more or less ruled out, owing to the uneven terrain, temperature, wind conditions and the dispersal of troops. Therefore, although the circumstances for India are quite different from that of the United States, the study group has concluded that the emphasis placed by the US think tanks on the bio-agent threat to its population is replicated in India in all its aspects. In other words, in India too, the threat of bio-agents, if at all, will be against the civil population. The attractiveness of using bioweapons against the civilian population stems from five factors:1 • It is possible to hire people with biotech knowledge from the biotechnology or pharmacological industry without any security surveillance. • Some professional groups could be motivated by greed. • The quantity of pathogens required to effect large casualties are small in volume and weight. A biotech weapon can pass through most, if not all, security and customs barriers. • Delivery does not require sophisticated means, except in the case of aerosols. This is one of the reasons why a rapid aerosol attack against the military is not feasible. On the contrary, introducing bio-agents in food and water is relatively easy. • There are no known defensive technologies that can be deployed. The introduction of pathogens in the body becomes apparent only when the incubation period is over. The Indian society’s response to a biological toxin (BT) attack as opposed to a national outbreak of disease would vary depending on whether the outbreak of disease was natural or unnatural. Even after

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the outbreak, it would be normal to imagine that the cause was a food or water-borne pathogen. The entry of law enforcement or a state-armed response would thus occur only much later. Such an outbreak would initially be tackled by the health authorities only. Thus, there is a clandestine nature to a terrorist bio-agent attack. It has been suggested, for instance, that a crop duster mounted on a vehicle or aircraft could deliver bio-agents in the same way that the military could. Such methods would however remove the clandestine nature of the attack and make emergency medical response that much faster. In India, where the population density is high, biological attacks have the ability to produce large numbers of casualties. In case of an attack, since the pathogen would have been introduced at about the same time, doctors would be simultaneously confronted with a large number of cases. The numbers would then peak very rapidly, as in the case of anthrax, or continue for about two months, as in the case of brucellosis.2 At this stage, vaccination could begin, but is unlikely to be of much use, except to prevent secondary infections. It is, therefore, most unlikely that in average Indian conditions, an epidemic or a pandemic can be prevented. In theory, the foremost civil defence measure necessary at this stage is to identify a ‘hazardous area’. Once this area has been identified, emergency measures could be instituted, the primary action being the protection of health care officials working there and the unaffected population. It would, of course, be necessary to isolate this area and that would include preventing people from exiting it. Such a step in India would certainly cause a major law and order problem, since there would be no law to prevent people from leaving any disaster-struck area. We are, therefore, immediately confronted with a problem that is probably still unresolved in other countries too and that is a legal framework for embarking upon emergency action in a designated area.

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It is possible to look at the theoretical problems associated with a medical emergency in a designated area in the same way as it is done, for instance, in the US, before that theoretical framework is married to local conditions, with specific Indian factors vectored in. The theoretical framework may be considered under the following seven heads:

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A LEGISLATION TO OVERCOME LEGAL OBSTACLES TO A MAJOR RESPONSE BY THE STATE AND CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS IN A DESIGNATED AREA Today, a legal provision exists to declare an area as disaster struck. In India, this stems from a legacy of national calamities, and declaring an area as disaster struck has implications for holding in abeyance the repayment of crop loans, agricultural loans and other dues to the state, and enabling the district authorities to claim an extrabudgetary allowance for repairs to roads, communications, etc. Additional legislation to remove the anomaly between health being a state subject and not a central one would probably be needed, unless the deliberate introduction of a pathogen is considered to be an act of war. If such a legal assumption is possible, a number of things fall into place, including the declaration of emergency in a designated area and the abrogation of fundamental rights and the supercession of the powers of the state by the centre. Certainly, a clear decision of responsibility will have to be made between what is considered an epidemic arising from natural causes and an act of war by terrorists.3

A CHAIN OF COMMAND OR A COORDINATING CENTRE TO DEAL WITH THE AFTERMATH OF A BIO-AGENT ATTACK This has to be unique to Indian conditions. At the district level, there is little doubt that the District Collector (DC), or at best the Commissioner will be the coordinating authority. He would have to coordinate the departments normally subordinate to him like the health, engineering and the police departments. In addition, he must be given charge of all additional assets at his disposal like the armed forces, central paramilitary forces and central health units. At the district level, many organisational aspects automatically fall into place, but bio-agent attacks are much more likely to occur in the cities. The municipal authorities are notoriously inefficient in India, and the question who should coordinate does come up. The uneven record of municipalities is clear to everyone. The plague scare in

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Surat was well handled, whereas the earthquake catastrophes in Bhuj, Ahmedabad and Latur were initially handled with varying shades of incompetence, until national and world opinion began to focus on these towns. Since health is a state subject, it should be possible for the state authorities to replace incompetent officials as a possible step, or change the command and control aspects in a flexible manner to suit the situation. However, it would be impossible to put in place any disaster management scheme unless municipal authorities have been briefed about the work involved in handling a biological toxin (BT) attack.4

DEMARCATE CLEAR AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY TO PARTICIPATING DEPARTMENTS If, for instance, the armed forces are to participate in the consequence management of a BT attack, the duties of the services column should be planned well in advance. While these columns are well-versed in the management of national calamities, managing a BT attack is substantially different. Do these personnel need to be inoculated before being deployed, are they involved in the disposal of bodies, are they authorised to turn away infected people fleeing the affected areas, these are all issues that need to be resolved in peacetime.

ESTABLISH LIAISONS DURING PEACETIME This is an aspect that has to some extent been learnt in India. In some states, regular army–civil coordination meetings do occur, particularly after the oil spills off Bombay High and the refinery fire in Vishakhapatnam. Many armed forces commands maintain disaster management files, but none to date have any directive to deal with the consequences of a BT attack. This again raises the question of who should give the directive from the centre, so that the authorities in the states and the commands begin to create schemes to deal with BT attacks. It seems logical to assume that if the directive from the centre has not gone to the civil and armed forces authorities, there is doubt in New Delhi as to who is responsible centrally for the consequence management of a BT attack on India’s population.

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DEVELOP A ‘SURGE’ CAPABILITY IN MEDICAL COVER FOR PREVENTION AND TREATMENT OF BT CASUALTIES There is little doubt that the medical facilities of any city, town or district would be overwhelmed by the size of casualties caused by a BT attack. One way of creating a surge capability would be to use the neighbouring districts and cities. More importantly, the surge capacity will come from the central government, of which the armed forces will form the largest component. Of course, one way would be to use the army to move in mobile field hospitals and for the navy to deploy hospital ships if the attack occurs near the coast. But, if the lessons of Bhuj and Ahmedabad are of any relevance, one of the largest sources of a surge in medical effort would be international agencies. When the amount of aid from such agencies is large, it is necessary to provide a matching local support effort in terms of accommodation, tents, water, transport, etc.

TRAINING It seems to state the obvious that training is necessary. However, the problem with starting the training process is in identifying those who need to be trained and retaining their relevance to the war against BT action. The level of training required is not high and is comparable to that given to paramedics and ambulance personnel, with a special emphasis on treating those affected by illnesses like botulinum and anthrax poisoning. Many others would need training only to protect themselves against the disease or to carry out normal duties involving traffic control, dealing with crowds, etc.

CREATE NEW EQUIPMENT DEPOTS RELATED TO LARGE POPULATION CENTRES THAT FACE A HIGHER THREAT Quite obviously, Delhi is a large metropolis that could be said to face a high threat. Delhi, however, is fortunate in that it has the National Institute of Communicable Diseases (NICD) located there. But a large population centre such as Mumbai would definitely need some nearby equipment depot. It would make sense to locate the

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equipment depot with the army’s sub-area commander, whose responsibility includes the safety of his city.

UPGRADE THE TECHNOLOGY COUNTRYWIDE IN THE WAR AGAINST BT AGENTS The repository of this technology is the NICD. However (and this has been pointed out earlier also), a BT attack will manifest itself only through the normal health practitioner and his pathological laboratory. Most of these laboratories can identify only bacteria, but not viruses and toxins. The latter two are the most likely weapons of the future. Similarly, the diseases that will be caused in the event of a BT attack are seen and treated so rarely that expertise and skill in their cure are barely present in the normal medical profession. Most medical practitioners are too busy on a day-to-day basis to even attend some kind of periodic training camp to study the treatment of illnesses they may never see. Thus, there is a motivational problem here with regard to the general medical practitioner. For this reason, dedicated BT warfare medical specialists would probably have to be central or state government employees or doctors in the armed forces.

THE EXISTING PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEM RELEVANT TO BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WARFARE (BTW) Health in India is a state subject. Since the casualties caused by BT agents would first be tackled by the existing public medical health system, it is necessary to look at this set-up as it may not be familiar to most people. Every district has a government hospital and in some cases hospitals exist at every sub-divisional level. There has not been a decentralising of medical supplies owing to the unreliability of electricity supply for government refrigeration. The central government medical stores have depots at Mumbai Chennai, Kolkata, Karnal, Hyderabad5 and Guwahati, and this is a fairly well-distributed network. Ahmedabad has central relief stores for natural disasters. A great deal of the country’s medical infrastructure goes towards birth control, immunization and child survival, and prevention of food

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adulteration. The central hierarchy of the Ministry of Health as far as public health is concerned can be seen in Figure 10.1. Ministry of Health National Institute of Communicable Diseases (NICD)

National Surveillance Programme for Communicable Diseases

National Warehouse (Ahmedabad) Stores Relief items

Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR)

Central Bureau of Health Intelligence (BHI) Figure 10.1 Central Hierarchy of the Ministry of Health

The objective of the National Surveillance Programme (NSP), managed by the NICD, is the rapid detection and treatment of communicable diseases. Statistically, its greatest achievement so far is that it has a community programme of participation spread out over 45 districts in 18 states and union territories. The NICD has also begun work in setting up some kind of multidisciplinary Rapid Reaction Teams at the district level. The NICD has put forward a proposal to cover 100 districts, but the budget for this at present is too small to implement it. Although the idea of a rapid reaction team is commendable, the programme suffers from a lack of positive leadership at the district level.6 The Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) is relevant to this study only because it is the apex body in the country that develops strategies for conducting bio-medical research. It directly controls 21 research institutions in six regional centres. In the field of communicable diseases, it conducts research into the treatment of tuberculosis, leprosy, malaria, and AIDS. It also has a special programme in the National Institute of Cholera for surveillance of emerging diarrhoeal pathogens. This institute could do considerable work in the field of developing antidotes against BT agents, considering that so many of the agents produce severe diarrhoea. It is not possible to grasp the extent of ICMR’s countrywide reach, until one understands that many of its 21 research institutes do parallel work on the same diseases, such as tuberculosis, leprosy, cholera, etc.

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The Central Bureau of Health Intelligence (CBHI) is not in reality what the name suggests. It provides no intelligence of the outbreak or possible outbreak of communicable diseases. It publishes annual statistics of diseases countrywide and this can be a useful tool for the planning ICMR’s future strategy. It, however, provides no worthwhile inputs to the NICD on the early containment of unknown pathogens. The NICD is the key technical organisation in the country’s efforts to combat BT agents. Its charter as given to it by the government is as follows: • To advise the government on all matters concerning communicable diseases. • To conduct research into communicable diseases. • To establish technical guidelines, training manuals and diagnostic kits for the early detection of communicable diseases (CDs). • To assist all states in conducting field investigations. • To store and supply vaccines considered necessary for impending diseases. • To conduct quality control of biological agents, insecticides and blood. • To investigate the outbreak of diseases.

THE NICD The NICD was originally set up to upgrade the technological level of combating communicable diseases. It has had great success against diseases such as small pox, cholera, yaws and Guinea worm infestation. Some centres of the NICD regularly come into contact with both anthrax poisoning and plague, and it is quite likely that their expertise in detecting diseases of this nature is very high. In an average year, the NICD conducts about 70–100 courses on such subjects as prevention and cure of dengue, malaria, Guinea worm infestations, sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) and training for rapid reaction teams.

THE LINKING OF THE NATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AND DEFENDING AGAINST BT AGENTS As a country subject to constant floods, drought and occasional earthquakes, India has put in place a decentralised disaster management

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scheme over the years. These schemes are also to be run by the states since floods and famine are also state subjects. The medical organisation has been dealt with in some detail in the preceding paragraphs. At the apex of all medical disaster management in India is the Directorate General of Health Services, under the Ministry of Health. Also, In India, the WHO funded a health disaster management programme under which a number of initiatives were launched. These included:7 • A hospital contingency plan at the Jawaharlal Institute of Post Graduate Medical Education. • A health sector preparedness programme for West Bengal and the north-east conducted by the All India Institute of Public Hygiene and Public Health, Kolkata. • The Central Health Education Bureau prepared documentation on preventive health measures for use in disaster management. • A training programme on disaster management conducted by the Administrative Staff College of India. • A workshop on disaster management conducted by the Sardar Patel Institute of Public Administration, Ahmedabad. • A workshop on the response to chemical hazards conducted by the National Environmental Engineering and Research Institute.

CIVIL DEFENCE The civil defence organisation in India is a legacy of World War II, when it was set up along with its counterpart in the UK to help save lives during the Blitz, minimising damage to property and maintaining industrial production during the war. Today, the director-general, civil defence, is a police officer and works in the home ministry. The civil defence organisation is held together by a small number of paid employees, who on their own cannot do anything and instead depend on volunteers during emergencies. The present strength of the civil defence volunteers in India is 452,0008 and they are spread over 162 cities and towns. The training institution of this organisation is the National Civil Defence College, Nagpur, which is also under the MHA. So far, volunteers have been called up during most of the worse cyclones and earthquakes. However, they have little knowledge about handling a large medical emergency like a BT attack. More importantly, in the event of such an attack they have no equipment to protect themselves with and thus cannot be deployed in a contaminated area. This organisation could provide the manpower to

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back expert teams from the NICD, if given proper training and kept updated. It would appear that the emphasis of the work of the home guards could profitably be shifted from having anything to do with bomb damage to the more likely threats that are faced by India’s population centres.

HOME GUARDS The home guards are meant to be an auxiliary police force, comprising volunteers, and can be called upon to assist the state governments to fight fires, cyclones and earthquakes. The period for which a volunteer is retained is three years and he is given preference in recruitment to lower paid jobs in the bureaucracy. Although 574,000 home guards are authorised, a smaller number is enrolled. Indian citizens between the ages of 10–50 years are eligible, though this does not include females. Home guards are organised into battalions in the border areas, where they work in support of the armed forces. Since a home guard is paid a daily allowance when retainted, the government has a stronger hold on his reporting for duty. For this reason, it would be a good idea to incorporate the home guards into the first echelon of disaster management in the case of a BT attack.

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Both these organisations normally play an important part while responding to a disaster. The police network of infrastructure and communication is countrywide and the paramilitary forces when deployed in aid of the civil power, function under the state police. Since both organisations report eventually to the home ministry, it would make sense for the paramilitary forces to produce one or two specialised units trained in dealing with a BT attack.

ARMED FORCES Today, it is only the armed forces who are actively studying the problems of tackling a BT attack on the civil population. The interest of the armed forces initially stemmed from the need to protect themselves from the use of BT agents by an enemy state. As this possibility recedes, the knowledge and expertise accumulated by the armed

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forces will increasingly become available for protecting the civil population. When looking at what the uniformed services can do, one cannot but be impressed by the size of the forces available. The CRPF, BSF and other paramilitary forces can muster almost 400 battalions and their numbers are a source of trained disciplined manpower for managing a BT attack. Ideally, the uniformed services would function in two ways. The first would be to deploy specialised BT warfare units that have all the equipment and training to deal with the consequences of a BT attack. The second is to deploy protected personnel of the uniformed services in their own capacity for crowd control, maintaining barriers, deploying field hospitals, evacuating casualties and generally rescuing a stricken population. The possibility of providing specialised units trained to deal with BT consequence management is dealt with later.

THE EXISTING SYSTEM FOR DISASTER MANAGEMENT The policy-level decisions in case of a BT attack on the population are provided by the prime minister, acting through the cabinet secretary. The organisation charged with combating disaster management is the home secretary and under him is the National Disaster Management Control Room (NDMCR). The NDMCR has, in the past, particularly after the Orissa floods and the Gujarat earthquake, issued some well thought out policy papers. The administrative response that the central government gives is divided into primary and secondary relief functions, the reasons for which are not clear. Under the primary relief measures, the central government deals with providing early warning, transport for people and distribution of essential commodities, medicines and vaccines, restoring communication links and providing finance. Under the secondary relief measures, it provides relief through the military, making contingency plans for crop and cattle preservation, providing drinking water and coordinating the work of state agencies and NGOs. The Government of India has a contingency action plan for dealing with national disasters, but has none for tackling a BT attack. So far, the model agency in the central government was the Department of Agriculture and Cooperations (DAC). Either the agriculture secretary, or a designated secretary is appointed the Central

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Relief Commissioner (CRC), but most of his work and experience so far has been based on India’s historical droughts and floods. This organisation which has been shifted to the home ministry will now have to be refurbished to deal with WMD attacks. During calamities the CRC operates from the emergency operational centre, otherwise called the control room. The control room functions round the clock, coordinating all the relief measures. The national contingency plan names a couple of committees to deal with disasters. They are as follows: • The Cabinet Committee. This committee consists of a certain number of secretaries, who are nominated by the cabinet secretary depending on the nature of the calamity. Up to now, the secretary of this committee was the agricultural secretary. • The National Crisis Management Committee (NCMC). This committee has been set up with a wide charter as can be seen from its composition. They include the cabinet secretary, the secretary to the PM, secretaries of home, defence and agriculture, and the director of the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). • Crisis Management Group. This is perhaps the most important committee to deal with national disasters, as it is a working committee and is headed by the CRC. The members are senior bureaucrats from all the ministries affected. The importance of this committee is that it meets when there is no crisis, to review preparedness in case of future crises.

CHEMICAL ACCIDENTS Owing to the occurrence of the Bhopal gas tragedy, the country has some kind of a system on the lines of the above for chemical disasters. The lead agency for this is the Ministry of Environments and Forests, which acts under the clauses of the Environment Protection Act, 1986, and the latest Chemical Accidents Rules, 1996. Under the definition of this Act, the accident rules cover only unintended or ‘fortuitous’ occurrences and, therefore, presumably the effects of deliberate chemical warfare are not covered. A central crisis group also exists for chemical accidents. However, the major difference between this crisis group and the national disaster management system is that the chemical crisis management system is supposed to periodically publish a list of experts who are required to assist in times of crises,

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and therefore provide good advice to the government. This crisis group is also not involved in injuries arising from an act of war or from radioactivity.

THE NATIONAL CENTRE

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DISASTER MANAGEMENT

This centre was set up in 1995 by the Ministry of Agriculture, with a 13-member faculty in many disciplines, such as behavioural science, social development, computer science, etc. The centre conducts about 30 programmes for both government employees and NGOs. The most impressive part of the centre is its library with over 180,000 books. The National Disaster Management Plan is essentially made by the centre and the success of the plan is largely dependent on government support to marshal interdisciplinary support. At present, the centre does not deal with bio-weapon disaster and this is symptomatic of the absence of coordination at the ministerial level. It would make eminent sense to put the National Institute of Communicable Diseases (NICD) and the National Centre for Disaster Management (NCDM) together to formulate a consequence management plan for BT weapons, and this is strongly recommended later in this chapter.

REORIENTING EXISTING DISASTER MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS

OF AN

‘INCIDENT’

It is interesting to see how the initial response to the Bhopal gas tragedy, though well meaning and extensive, missed the causes of the illness completely. It cannot be overstressed how a similar happening is feared in the case of BT incidents. In Bhopal, the gas, methyl issocyanate (MIC), escaped from a 33 m high tower and rapidly settled upon the ground because of either its density or due to temperature inversion. The only act performed by the company denoting an emergency was to sound the siren. This caused all the people around the factory to run towards it, to put out what they thought was a fire, resulting in thousands more inhaling the gas due to their increased proximity. No information was forthcoming from the company, which allegedly tried to suppress information to reduce its culpability. The

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government’s response was heavy-footed. They closed down the factory and arrested five officers. Environmental experts and chemical industrial experts had to be flown in from New Delhi. As stated in No Place to Run, ‘there was no help coming to the thousands who fled their homes that morning.… In the first hours, there was complete confusion’.9 People were not sure what was making them ill. Instead of taking the people into confidence about the gas leak, they announced that vegetables be washed and water, boiled. Finally, the action plan of the Government of Madhya Pradesh was approved by the Government of India in 1990. The point is that the first lot of doctors had no clue what they were dealing with. All symptoms were treated separately, quite naturally. Eye drops were given for the eyes, steroids to combat inflammation, antibiotics for secondary infection, antacids for the stomach and oxygen for those who couldn’t breath. These treatments only touched the periphery of the illness whose cause had not been established by them.

ACTIVE EXAMPLE OF BIOLOGICAL DEFENCE IN PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY It is interesting to see how the UK, which also has a parliamentary democracy, deals with biological defence. The succeeding paragraphs give a brief outline of this country’s response. • Appoint a director of chemical and biological weapons policy. The state needs to work in three separate areas. The first is to advise the government if there is a need for a state-to-state response to the use of BT weapons against the people. The second is to provide technical backing to the national disaster management plan. The third is to lay down the priorities in this area, particularly in the manufacture of equipment, antidotes, etc. • Nominate a laboratory to work specifically on BT defence. In the UK, there is a separate defence laboratory at Porton Down, which treats the country’s Ministry of Defence (MOD) as a customer and charges for the work that it does. The MOD has given Porton Down the task of looking into what is possible in the next 10 years. • The Directorate liases with the MOD and the Ministry of External Affairs in laying down state policy regarding defences against a BT attack.

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• Develop a BW detection kit, an inhaler with the widest range of antidotes and protective clothing for rescue personnel. • Provide technical expertise for a nuclear, biological and chemical regiment to be deployed anywhere in the UK or abroad.10

EXPERIENCE OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS RELEVANCE TO INDIA The country allegedly most affected by the BT threat has taken the view that whatever BT threat exists to the country affects the civilian population more than the armed forces. The armed forces are primarily affected when BT weapons are used against them as part of an assymmetric warfare strategy against foreign interventions. It would, therefore, be valuable to look at the experience of the US and emulate the lessons that are worth learning from there. The steps taken by the US are as follows: • The United States President has issued a presidential directive PDD 62 and 63 to deal with catastrophic terrorism and this effort will be coordinated by a National Coordinator for Internal Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counterterrorism. A similar appointment in India would come under the home secretary, but there is no acknowledgement here that the home ministry is the coordinating ministry. It would be possible to designate either the home or defence ministries for this, in which case a separate biological and chemical warfare coordinator would need to be appointed. Keeping this responsibility with the PMO under a non-specialist civilian untrained in biological and chemical warfare is the worst way to begin. • A school and centre for counter-terrorism has been set up in the US, which will deal with biological toxin (BT) and chemical (C) warfare and cyber-terrorism. This initiative can well be replicated in India. • A National Terrorism Intelligence Centre has been set up with an operating committee, which includes the directors of the CIA and the FBI, the deputy secretary for defence, deputy NSA and the Deputy Attorney General. Our crisis management group is the one body most similar to its counterpart in the US, and provided it meets often enough and has a permanent staff no augmentation is required.

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• In the US, one army technical escort unit and one marine unit has been formed11 to detect and fight BT and C agents, and treat radiation sicknesses. In India, there are enough bomb disposal squads, so the basic principle has been understood, but the army now needs to raise an anti BT and C battalion for use in civil disasters. An initiative could come from the army itself. • The US government has published one handbook for medical practitioners treating civilian casualties, and one military manual of defence against BT and C warfare. Similarly, the first should be produced by the NICD and be made available to the public, while the latter should be produced by the Integrated Defence Staff. • A protective suit is standard issue to the US armed forces. This can be done by the DRDO as well as the NICD. It would be useful for both these institutions to produce such suits and have the state governments buy them. • Stockpiling of Vaccines. This is also the policy in India, but it is not clear who is responsible for defining minimum stock levels and how the stocks would be turned around. Presumably, this is the task of the Directorate Gentral of Health Services (DGHS). • Creating new devices for easier diagnosing of BT agents and genetically modified agents. The US navy has developed a device which can identify all known pathogens if present in a liquid in 30 minutes,12 solving the issue of time criticality. Apart from this device, others may be necessary and a list of such devices for development needs to be issued; but that can only be done when a director for BT and C warfare is positioned. • In the US a special command, equivalent to the Joint Services Command, to deal with chemical and bio-terrorism threats has been instituted. In India, though we cannot set up a separate command, but something bigger than a directorate could be established to do the technical, hands-on-work at the services headquarters. • The US will be taking measures to upgrade the public health system to tackle bio-terrorism and this will be done through three programmes. The first will attempt to reduce the time taken for rapid detection. This is sought to be achieved by circulating briefing material to doctors and pathologists. The second programme is the national drugs and prophylactic stockpile. A provision for this step already exists in India. The third is to improve or upgrade laboratory diagnosis to enable more rapid diagnosis. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in the US will develop a kit for 150 rare diseases. It might

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be possible for the NICD to do the same, but it may also be possible for it to obtain a sample of such a diagnostic kit from the US or the UK. In India, the problems are more basic. Most laboratories can detect only bacteria and not viruses or toxins. This may not be easy to correct, since most laboratories in India don’t meet the necessary safety standards to store viruses and toxins. Many laboratories outsource microbiology and are, therefore, ill-equipped. However, this may not be an entirely bad thing since fewer laboratories doing microbiology can be dealt with more comfortably by the NICD. There is at present no communication or alert system between medical practitioners. The internet is an ideal vehicle for this and it would be practical if the NICD and the ICMR launched an initiative to interconnect all pathology labs through e-mail. The ICMR could look once again at the standards of the lab personnel to detect rare pathogens, not commonly encountered, and see whether these need to be revised. Finally, a better diagnostic kit for the rarer diseases must be available at many more diagnostic centres. • In the US, some generalised threat assessments have been made. The first is that in the next five years, aerosol dispersal of biological pathogens may not occur owing to the poorer technological base of the terrorists to solve the problems of effective formulation and overcoming electrostatic attraction, preventing efficient dispersal through aerosols. In the next five to 10 years, mutated viruses and engineered proteins may become available, but these can only be produced with the funding available to a nation state. Presumably, the technological levels of our threats are a bit lower but this needs to be defined by the BT and C coordinator.

SOME MORE INDIAN INITIATIVES The Indian work on preventing bio-terrorism has, as stated earlier, to begin with effective legislation. Authorities who work in this area must have the necessary legal backing and the countrymen must know, for instance, what the banned substances are, the possession or trafficking of which is outlawed.13 Since the early symptoms of any disease do not indicate that there has been any BT attack, the initiative may well slip away if action is not taken early enough. The national plan must bear this fact in mind more than any other.

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Deaths from anthrax, for instance, occur in geometric progression, based on twice the Day One figure, if vaccination is delayed. A beginning should be made in India by convening a conference with carefully allocated subjects to be covered by specialists in aerobiology, biotechnology, bio-processing, general medicine, meteorology, molecular biology, phytology, toxicology, veterinary medicine and virology. A base document needs to be put together which will guide future policy planners. Both the US and the UK are beginning to speak openly about the large number of measures being taken to protect the civilian population. Both countries have added that they are doing this deliberately to announce to the terrorists that they are prepared to face them and take the war to the next step. This attitude, they presume, will be a deterrent. In addition, the US openly, and the UK less openly, have spoken or implied their determination to use nuclear weapons in retaliation against a state-sponsored biological pathogen attack. This threat would not deter non-state actors and hence the earlier strategy of showing that they are ready with civil defence measures. A comparable strategy can be hammered out by the National Security Council (NSC) or the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB). The new Indian initiative to form the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) in the MHA is a good move. This initiative could go very far if it openly and transparently co-opted all the expertise that exists in the country, and published its work so that corrective measures could be suggested. It would be a great mistake for this organisation to work in secret, as the deterrent value of the actions taken by the government are then lost. In the final analysis, anything the NEMA could do would only be a defensive measure, to be proclaimed along with the determination of the state to use counterproliferation strategies against a state supporting WMD terrorism.

NOTES

1. Congressional testimony by Raymond Zhinkas, as published by the Monterey Institute of International Studies, 20 October 1999, Centre for Nonproliferation Studies. 2. Abram Beneson (Ed.), US Army Field Manual FM8-33: Control of Communicable Diseases (Washington: Department of the Army, 1991), p. 18.

266 M RAJA MENON 3. See Schedules 7 and 8 of the Constitution of India. 4. Charles L. Mercier, ‘Terrorists, WMD and the US Army Reserve,’ Parameters, Autumn 1997, pp. 98–118. 5. Disaster Relief Plan, New Delhi, USAID, March 1998, p. 15. 6. See the Annual Report of the NICD, a DGHS publication, p. 10. 7. Activities under the Ministry of Health in India 1998, p. 533. 8. R.K. Jasbir Singh, Indian Defence Yearbook 1998–99 (Dehradun: Natraj, 1998), p. 393. 9. Anil Agarwal et al., No place to Run: Local Realities and Global Issues of the Bhopal Disaster (New Market, Tennessee: Highlander Center and the Society for Participatory Research in Asia, May 1985). 10. Paul Taylor, ‘Our Jobs: Chemical and Biological Defence,’ RUSI Journal, January 2000. 11. Jonathen Tucker, ‘Chemical and Biological Terrorism,’ Current History, April 2000. 12. Laurie Garret, ‘The Nightmare of Terrorism,’ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 1, p. 82. 13. The best international initiative to prevent cross-border proliferation of WMD agents remains the PSI, with its supplementary scheme: Security of Major Ports and Monitoring the Border Controls. Indian acceptance of the scheme is unfortunately hampered by what is seen as ‘accepting’ Pakistani proliferation.

ABOUT

THE

THE

EDITOR

AND

CONTRIBUTORS

EDITOR

Rear Admiral Raja Menon retired in 1994 as Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Operations). A submarine specialist, he pioneered the development of the new submarine arm of the Indian Navy, and was therefore exposed at an early stage to policy, finance and strategy. He was a member of the Arun Singh Committee to restructure the national defence set-up in India, as also a member of the Defence University Committee. Admiral Menon is visiting lecturer at all institutes of higher study of the Indian armed forces and was instrumental in organizing the first nuclear management course for Indian service officers. He is a consultant to the Indian Net Assessment Directorate. With two M.Sc degrees in Defence Studies, Admiral Menon writes regularly for journals and newspapers in India and abroad. His publications include Maritime Strategy and Continental Wars (1988), A Nuclear Strategy for India (2000), and The Indian Navy: A Photo Essay (2000). Married to a well-known painter, the Menons have two grown up sons. Admiral Menon is a keen sailor, golfer, vintage car owner and weekend farmer.

THE CONTRIBUTORS Arundhati Ghose is currently Member, Union Public Service Commission; Member, Academic Council, Jawaharlal Nehru University; and member of the United Service Institution of India, Executive Council of Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses and the Executive Council of India Pugwash Society. Ms Ghose joined the

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Indian Foreign Service in 1963, and has worked in various capacities: as Ambassador, Republic of Korea; Ambassador and Permanent Representative to UNESCO, Paris; Ambassador, India, Egypt; and Ambassador, Permanent Representative of India to the UN Offices in Geneva, and the Conference of Disarmament. B.S. Malik retired as Lieutenant General from the army. In his long and distinguished career, Lt. Gen. Malik has held several important posts including Chiefs of Staff Western Command; Joint Secretary (Military) and Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee; Director at the AHQ—military operations; and military attache in the UK, where he dealt with various aspects of WMD. While at the Royal College of Defence Studies (UK) he had the opportunity to study the workings of NATO from close quarters. He commanded 3/5 Gorkhas on the LOC and a brigade on the LAC. Lt. Gen. Malik is also recipient of the PVSM and the AVSM. M.S. Mamik a naval aviation specialist, retired as Air Commodore. He is currently the Vice President of an export company. Commodore Mamik has an MBA in Finance and Ph.D from Madras University. He headed the Strategic and Doctrine Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval Staff, and was also head of the Joint Operations Divisions in the Army Training Command. Commodore Mamik is an alumnus of the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu. He has authored several training pamphlets while in the navy. Pran Krishan Pahwa was commissioned into the army in 1959, and retired as Lieutenant General. During his service he held several important command and staff appointments, the last being as directorgeneral of Air Defence Artillery in 1996. A keen student of military affairs, Lt. Gen. Pahwa has authored the book Command and Control of Indian Nuclear Forces. He writes regularly for newspapers and magazines and is currently Senior Editorial Adviser to a defence publication house. Matin Zuberi is former Chairman, Centre of International Politics, Organisation, and Disarmament Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University and Senior Associate Member of St. Antony’s College, Oxford. Professor Zuberi has also been Senior Adviser to the Indian Delegation at the Silver Jubilee Session of the United Nations General Assembly; member of the Indian delegation to the UN Conference on Disarmament and Development; and member of the

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National Security Advisory Board in 1990–91, 1998–99 and 2000–01. He participated in preparing the Draft Indian Nuclear Doctrine, is a contributor to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, and has written extensively on arms control and disarmament, nuclear strategy, nuclear history, and the interface between science, technology and politics.

INDEX

ABM Treaty, 184 Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens (ACDP), 58 Afridi, Mohammed, 236 Agreed Framework, of Washington and Pyongyang, 159–61 Ahmad, Nazir, 171 Ahmad, Qazi Hussain, 176–77 Al Atheer Materials Center, 152–53, Albright, Madeleine, 150, 161 al-Qaeda, 172-73; access to WMD, 235–37 America’s Struggle with Chemical–Biological Warfare, 37 Amir, Ayaz, 177 Anti-Missile Defences (AMD), 69 Armitage, Richard, 171 Arzamas-16 laboratory, 131–32, 146 Aspin, Les, 151 Asymmetric warfare, 8 Atomic Energy Act, 185 ‘Atoms for Peace’ programme, 85 Australia Group (AG), 119–20, 122–25, 202–05, 209, 212–15, 218–19; new CBW export control guidelines, 218–19 Avrorin, Yevgeni, 131 BT agents, national disaster management system and, 255–56 BT casualties, surge capability in medical cover for prevention and treatment of, 252 Babayan, Boris A., 132 Badawi, Abdullah, 175

Bailey, Kathleen, 145 Baker, James, 131 Beg, Aslam, 176 Bermudez, Joseph, 173 Betts, Richards K., 44 Bhutto, Benazir, 172, 174, 177 Binary agents, 37 Binding, Rudolph, 31 Bio-agents, threat of, 248, 250–51, 253 Biological agents, effectiveness of, 47–59 Biological and Toxin Warfare (BTW), 8, 11–12, 15, 32, 50, 52, 110–15, 117–19, 123, 200, 205, 208–9, 214–15, 236; implications and options for India’s security interests, 198–215; India’s negotiating positions/options, 209–10; protection against, 247–65, areas of responsibility to participating departments for, 251, chain of command/ coordinating centre to deal aftermath of, 250–51, disaster management system and, 258–64, Indian initiatives against, 264–65, legislation to overcome legal obstacles for, 250, liaisons during peacetime, 251, measures against at policy-making level, 249–53, public health system relevance to, 253–58, surge capability in medical cover for, 252, training for, 252,

INDEX M 271 US experience relevance to India, 262–64; protocol, 202, 209; status of, 213–15 Biological Toxin (BT) and Chemical (C) agents, 8–9 Biological Weapons (BW) 111–13; Australia Group Export Control List of, 54–58; classification of agents of, 48, 53–54; lethality of, 52; warning guidelines, 58–59 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) 79, 184, 248 Bio-terrorism, measures to combat, 214 Blister gases, 36 Blix, Hans, 94, 155–56, 158 Body functions regulation and peptides, 51–52 Bolton, John, 205–6, 208 Border Security Force (BSF), India, 15, 17, 240, 258 Bosch, Miguel Marian, 142 British Nuclear Fuels, 130 Bush, George, 154, 158, 161–62, 164–65, 169, 171, 177, 182–83, 205 Bustani, Jose, 200–202 CW Review Commission, 39 Carter, Jimmy, 32, 91 Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), 201 Central Board of Revenue, 15 Central Bureau of Health Intelligence (CBHI), 255 Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), 15, 242 Central Military Commission, 68 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), India, 240, 258 Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 263 Chechen rebels, 27 Chelyabinsk-70 laboratory, 131–32 Chemical accidents, 259–60 Chemical Accidents Rules, 1996, 259 Chemical Agents (CA), blood agents, 34; characteristics of, 36–39; choking agents, 34; development

of, 34–35; effectiveness of, 30–45; nerve agents, 35; protection against, 225–45 chemical and biological weapons (CBW), 203 chemical and biological weapons regimes, Australia Group, 119–20, 122–25; BTWC, 117–19; CWC, 114–17; export control groups, 119–20; Geneva Protocol, 121–22; origin of, 110–14 chemical, biological and radiological (CBR), defence measures, 40 Chemical industry, and terrorism, 229–34 Chemical Warfare (CW), 8, 11, 15, 30–45, 47; attacks, 33–34; characteristics of agents of, 36–39; clothing, 227–28; development of agents for, 34–35, 44–45; effectiveness of, 44–45; equipment development, 40–41; essential issues, 41–42; history of, 30–34; terrorism, 43–45; use of, 31; weaponisation and military views, 39–40 Chemical warfare training, research in, 225–27 Chemical Weapons (CW), 230–32, 236; doctrine, 237–39; proliferation of, 10; scientific developments in, 226; terrorism, 211–12 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), 10–11, 37, 76, 110–16, 226; Article VI, 229-34; conditions on, 216-17; implications and option for India’s security interest, 198–215; India and, 239–41; status of, 211–13 Chemical Weapons Convention Act, 2000, 240 Cheney, Dick, 155, 211 Cherneyshev, Alexander K., 131 Chernobyl accident, 138 Chohan, Yasin, 171 Choking gases, 36 Choon Sun Lee, 161

272 M INDEX Churchill, 84 Civil defence, 256–57 Civil Defence Act, 1968, 242–43 Civil Defence College, Nagpur, 244 Civil Defence Rules, 1968, 242 Clifford, Bill, 237 Clinton, Bill, 159–61, 174, 238 Clinton, William J., 217 Coast Guard, 15 Cohen, Steve, 101 Combined Arms in a Nuclear/ Chemical Environment (CANE) exercise, 39–40 Commission on Human Rights, 206 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 68, 113–15, 137, 141, 143–46, 184,199 Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), 111–12 Conference on Disarmament, 233–34 Confidence building measures (CBMs), 23, 28, 117, 208 Convention on Chemical Weapons (CWC), 115–17, 119, 123–24, 184 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material of 1980, 139 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, see, Convention on Biological and Toxin Weapons (BTWC) Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and use of Chemical Weapons and on Other Destruction, see, Convention on Chemical Weapons (CWC) Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) measurers, 16 Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCOM), 120 Corfu Summit of the European Union, 141 Council of Foreign Relations, 141

Council of Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 237 Cray, Seymour R., 132 Crilo, George, 235 Crisis Management Group, 259 Cut Hole and Sink them (CHASE) operation, 31 Defence Counter-proliferation Initiative, 151 Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) India, 240, 242, 263 Deng Xiaoping, 135 Dhanapala, Jayantha, 143 Dillon, Garry, 153–54 Dimitriev, Vladimir B., 130 Disarmament Diplomacy, 218–19 Disaster Management Board, 240, 243 Disaster Management Council, 240, 243 Disaster Management System, 258–64 Dowty, Alan, 112 Dulles, John Foster, 85 Dupuy, T.N., 38 ERM India Private Limited, 241 Earthquake emergency rehabilitation programme (EERP), 17 Ehsan ul-Haq, 176 Einhorn, Robert, 173 Eklund, Sivgard, 87, 152 ElBaradei, Mohamed, 155–56, 158, 162 Electronic Warfare (EW), 45 Environment Protection Act, 1986, 259 Environment Resources Management Group of Companies, 241 Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre (ENTC), 168 European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) safeguards, 86 Export Control Groups, 119–20 Export of Goods (Control) Order, 1992, Australia, 54 Falkernath, Richard, 44 Farooq, Mohammad, 171, 175

INDEX M 273 Fatalist at War, 31 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 238, 262 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 238, 244 Feith, Douglas, 211 Fissile material, 146–50; cut-off, 148–50 Flawin, Christopher, 101 Fleischer, Ari, 154 Ford, President, 90 Foster, William C., 83 Frum, David, 154 G-8 Global Partnership Programme, 202 Galluci, Robert, 132 General Atomic, 132 Geneva Convention of 1926, 214 Geneva Protocol of 1925, 31–32, 110–11, 121–22 Genome Project, 47, 49–50 Ghose, Arundhati, 110, 198 Gilinsky, Victor, 159 Ginsburg, Vitaly, 132 Global nuclear stockpiles, 179–80 Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network, 208 Global Partners Venture, 133 Global Public Health Intelligence Network, 208 Griffin, Peter, 179 Gulf War of 1991, 112, 118, 153–57, 171 Habinger, Eugene, 181 Halloway, Ken, 236 Hayat, Faisal Saleh, 175 Head-to-Toe Odor-Eaters, 228 Hecker, Siegfried, 132, 165 Hertsgaard, Mark, 101, 103 Hezbollah terrorist group, 169 High National Security Council, Iran, 170 Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), 133–34, 136, 146–47, 149, 161, 172, 182, 185 Home Guards, 257 Hoodbhoy, Pervez, 172

Hosokawa, 140 Hussain, Rifaat, 172 Hussein, Chaudhry Shujaat, 176 Hussein, Saddam, 153–55, 157 Hutton, Lord, 155 IAEA Protocol on Additional Safeguards Agreements, 113 IRA bombing, in London, 9 Inderfurth, Karl, 173 India, CWC status in, 239–41; impact of CWC/BTWC developments on security interests of, 209–10; negotiating positions/options, 209–10; protection against biological and toxin warfare in, 247–65; recommendation for protection against chemical agents in, 241–45 Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR), 15, 17, 254–55, 264 Indian Disaster Resource Network (IDRN), 17 Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention Programme, 133 Inkimets, Vladimir, 146 Integrated Crisis Management Plan (ICMP), 241 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), 181 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Vienna, 79–80, 85–88, 90, 92–95, 97–99, 129, 135–36, 139–40, 142, 146–48, 152–60, 162–63, 165, 168–71 International Chetek Corporation of Moscow, 130 International Court of Justice, 144 International Plutonium Management Group, 147 International Science and Technology Centre, Moscow, 132 Iran, gas centrifuge enrichment, 166–68; heavy water reactor, 168–69; IAEA’s findings, 169; international pressure and its impact on, 169–70; laser

274 M INDEX enrichment, 168; secret quest for nuclear weapons, 167–70 Iraq, disarmament of, 152 Islam Ul Haq, 171 Jane’s Yearbooks, 64 Japanese Atomic Energy Commission, 146 Jenkins, Brian, 43 Jo Myong Rok, 160 Kapitza, Peter, 132 Kapitza, Sergei, 132 Karamat, Jihangir, 176–77 Kargil War, 243 Kawaguchi, Yoriko, 161 Kelley, James, 161 Kelly, David, 155 Khan, Abdul Qadeer, 134, 171, 173–78 Khan, Makhdoom Ali, 176 Khan Research Laboratories (KRL), 171, 173–74 Kheminni, Neeraj, 235 Kidder, Ray, 131 Kidwai, Khalid, 175–76 Kim Dae Jung, 160 Kim Jong II, 161, 163 Kim Yong Nam, 163–64 Kishing, Hiroyuki, 140 Klerk, Frederick de, 95–96 Koizumi, 161 Krutzsch, Walter, 232–33 Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy, 132 Laden, Osama bin, 235 Lashkar Ab’ad laboratory, 168 Lebed, Alexander, 24 Levin, Carl, 182 Lewis, John W., 164 Littoral Warfare, 7–8 Livermore laboratory, 132, 145 London Club, 90–91, 98 Los Alamos laboratory, 131–32, 145 Low Enriched Uranium (LEU), 133 Maastricht Treaty of 1991, 82 Mahmood, Bashiruddin, 172, 236

Majid, Abdul, 172 Malik, B.S., 30, 225 Mamik, M.S., 63 Mandelbaum, Michael, 141 Manhattan Project, 84 Mark, Carson, 26 Markov, Georgi, 48 Masood, Talat, 173 Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 134 Materials Protection, Control and Accounting Programme, 133 Mauroni, Albert J., 37, 42 Menon, Raja, 7, 47, 247 Merchants of Mass Destruction, 235 Meselson, Matthew, 44 Metropolitan Medical Response System, 15 Milhollin, Gary, 164 Missile Technology Control Review (MTCR), 96, 185; guidelines, 136 Molnar, Lazlo, 165 Monterey Institute of International Studies, 201 Mueller, John, 44–45 Mueller, Karl, 44–45 Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicle (MIRV), 69 Mumbai Disaster Relief Scheme, 15 Musharraf, Pervez, 171, 173–74, 176–78 Muslim League, 176 Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, 176 Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) doctrine, 65 Myrdal, Alva, 82 NPT Review and Extension Conference, 137, 141–43 Nabil al-Rawi, 157 National Authority of India on Chemical Weapons Convention, 240 National Cadet Corps (NCC), 244 National Centre for Disaster Management (NCDM), 260 National Civil Defence College, Nagpur, 256

INDEX M 275 National Command Authority (NCA), Pakistan, 174 National Coordinator for Internal Security Infrastructure Protection and Counter terrorism, 262 National Crisis Management Committee (NCMC), 240, 244, 259 National Disaster Knowledge Network (NANADISK), 17 National Disaster Management Control Room (NDMCR), 258 National Disaster Management System, 255–56 National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), 265 National Ignition Facility, 145 National Institute of Cholera, 254 National Institute of Communicable Diseases (NICD), 15–17, 252–55, 257, 260, 263–64 National Laboratory Network Plan, 15 National Security Advisor (NSA), 14, 16 National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), 265 National Security Council (NSC), 68, 265 National Surveillance Programme (NSP), 254 National Terrorism Intelligence Centre, 262 Natural Resources Defence Council of USA, 26 Nayyar, A.H., 172 Neft, Thomas, 134 Nehrt, Lee C., 100 Nerve gases, 36 Nevada Nuclear Test Site, 183 New York Times, 237 Nichols, John, 132 Nishimura, Shingo, 141 Nitikin, Vladimir I., 131 No First Use doctrine, 67 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 82, 150, 204 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 32, 80–82, 119

North Korea, nuclear blackmail by, 158–65; status in NPT, 165 North Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO), 159–60 Nuclear Cities Initiative, 133 Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, 92–93 Nuclear materials, availability of, 24–25 Nuclear non-proliferation regime, 79–105, after war of 1991, 153–57; after war of 2003, 157–58; Belarus and, 96–97; China and, 135–37; collapse of Soviet Union, 130–34; commercial competition and safeguards, 84–88 counter-proliferation, 151; cut-off in fissile materials, 148–50; deterring states problems, 150; disarmament of Iraq, 152; epicenter of nuclear proliferation, 171–81; fissile materials, 146–50; Gulf War of 1991 and, 93–95; in crisis, 129–85; intensified commercial competition, 88–89; Iran’s secret quest for nuclear weapons, 166–71; Japan and, 137–41; Kazakhstan and, 96–97; London Club, 90-91; multipolar civilian nuclear technological order, 83–84; NPT Articles I & II, 81–83; North Korean nuclear blackmail, 158–65; nuclear fuel cycle evaluation, 92–93; nuclear power plants export, 100; nuclear-related dual-use equipment and materials related technology, 102–5; nuclear suppliers group list, 102–5; nuclear testing and, 145–46; Pakistan and, 134–35, 171–78; recommendations on, 183–85; resumption of nuclear testing, 183; South Africa dismantles nuclear weapons and, 95–96; status of North Korea in NPT, 165; technology controls, 97–99;

276 M INDEX treaty, 141–45; US domestic orders and cancellations of nuclear power plants, 101; US market growth and decline in nuclear plants, 100–101; US Nuclear Non-proliferation Act of 1978, 91–92; US nuclear posture review, 181–82; US reactor exports, 101–2; Urkraine and, 96-97 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NTP), 21, 79–82, 93-99, 129, 135–37, 141–44, 146, 149–51, 158, 162–63, 179–80, 182, 184, 198–200, 210; Articles I and II of, 81–82; Gulf-War of 1991 and, 93–95; safeguards, 87, 88 Nuclear plants, 27 Nuclear power plants, exports of, 100; US market growth and decline, 100–101; US reactor exports profile, 101–2 Nuclear proliferation, epicenter of, 171–80 Nuclear risk reduction and confidence building measures, 23 Nuclear stockpiles, 179–80 Nuclear Suppliers Group, 96, 98; list of nuclear related dual use equipment materials and related technology, 102–5 Nuclear terrorism, 23–28, 70–74; available nuclear materials, 24–25; contingencies, 72; credibility of threat, 27–28; growth factors, 70; measures to respond to, 73–74; nuclear plants, 27; recommendations for, 72–73; response to, 70–72 use of nuclear weapons, 25–26; use of radioactive materials, 26–27 Nuclear terrorist threat, credibility of, 27–28 Nuclear testing, 145–46; resumption of, 183 Nuclear threats, calibration of, 64–65; credibility of, 68–69; evolutionary dynamics, 64; factors relevant to, 65–68, all azimuth direction and

duality of threat axis, 66, control, 68, disarmament, 68, doctrine, 67–68, geography, 67, geometry, 66–67, meteorology, 67, misperception and miscalculation, 66, non-relevance of parity and, 65, political weapon-use not guaranteed, 65–66, strategic stability and, 65; formal and non-formal, 63–74; state to state threats, 64–65; terrorism, 70–74, contingencies, 72, factors for growth, 70, measures to respond to, 73–74, recommendations for, 72–73, response, 70–72 Nuclear Weapon (NW), 13, 113; no-first-use doctrine, 211; use of, 25–26 Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), 113 Nunn-Lugar Act of 1992, 201 Nzo, Alfred, 142 O’Leary, Hazel, 142 Office of Technical Assessment (OTA), 10 Officers Training School (OTS), Kamptee, 244 Operation Desert Fox, 154 Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), 115–16, 199–204, 211–13, 215, 229–30, 233–34 Pahwa, Pran Krishan, 21 Pakistan, epicenter of nuclear proliferation, 171–78 Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission, 99, 172 Pandemonium, 146–48 Parliamentary democracy, biological defence in, 261–62 Patrick, Bill, 236 Perle, Richard, 211 Perry, William, 159 Pfirter, Rogelio, 199, 202 Pilat, Joseph F., 43 Plutonium, 146–48

INDEX M 277 Powell, Colin, 163, 173 Pre-NPT safeguards, 86–87 Pritchard, John, 165 Proliferation security initiative (PSI), 16 Protective chemical warfare clothing, 227–28 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, see, Geneva Protocol Psycho-chemical gases, 36 Public Health Response to Biological and Chemical Weapons, 208 Public health system, linkage between national disaster management system and defending against BT agents, 255–56; NICD, 255; relevant to BTW, 253–58 Putin, 182 Radioactive materials, use of, 26–27 Reagan, 33 Reneker, Darrell, 228 Ribicoff, Abraham A., 89 Rice, Condoleezza, 155 Roh Moo Hyun, 162–64 Roosevelt, 84 Rowhani, Hassan, 170 Rumsfeld, Donald, 155, 157, 181, 184, 211 Rusk, Dean, 81 Russian Academy of Sciences, 146 Russian Physics Society, 132 SALT – I, 147 SALT –II, 147 START – I, 147 START – II, 147 Sandia laboratory, 145 Schreuder-Gibson, Heidi, 227 Science Based Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programme (SBSMP), 145 Senate Appropriations Committee, 157 Shalkasvili, 237

Sharif, Nawaz, 173–74 Shinrikyo, Aum, 43–44 Sino-American Agreement (1994), 136 South Africa, dismantling of nuclear weapons by, 95–96 State sponsored terrorism, 9 Stern, Jessica, 45 Strauss, Lewis, 85 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBMs), 181 Sun Microsystems Inc., 132 Swedish Defence Research Establishment (FOA), 226–27 Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRV), 226 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-20, 237 Tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs), 39 Taylor, Ted, 27, 145 Tear gases, 37 Technical Advisory Committee (TAC), 16 Tehran Nuclear Research Centre (TNRC), 168 Terrorism, and chemical industry, 229–34 Theilmann, Greg, 155 Time, 157 Tokamak experiments, 132 Toth, Tibor, 206–08 Toylhardat, Adolfo, 142 Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), 32 Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Centre, 152, 156–57 Two-Plus-Four Agreement, 82 UN Conference on Illicit Trade in Small Arms, 199 UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), 155, 199 US Army Operational Concept for Individual and Collective Measures for Chemical, Biological and Radiological Defence, 237

278 M INDEX US Army Soldier Centre Natick, Massachusetts, 227 US Atomic Energy Commission, 89 US Chemical Corps, 237 US Co-operative Threat Reduction Programme, 133 US Enrichment Corporation, 134 US Nuclear Non-proliferation Act of 1978, 91–92 US Nuclear Posture Review, 181–82 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 159 US Senate Armed Services Committee, 182 US-sponsored Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), 213 Ultra-light Aerial Vehicle (UAV), 12 Union War Book (UWB), 243–44 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 17 United Nations Security Council, 153 United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), 48–49, 118, 153, 213 United Services Institute of India, New Delhi, 9 Uranium, 146–48 VX gases, 37 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 232 Vomiting gases, 36-37 Waheed, Abdul, 177 Waitt, Alden, 225 Warsaw Pact, 90 Washington Post, 177

Wassenaar Arrangement, 119–20 Weaponisation, military view of, 39–40 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), 244, 259; access to, 235–37; CW terrorism and, 43–45; categories of, 10, 112; control measures, 22–23; lethality of, 38; norm against use of, 211; nuclear dimension, 21–28; nuclear terrorism, 23–28, 70–74; origin of, 110–14; powers, 113; recommendations of study on, 14–16; significance of study on, 9; terrorism, 214; threats of, 63–74, 238; US national strategy to combat, 113 Westinghouse Electric Co., 130 Weston, Michael, 144 Woerner, Manfred, 80 Wolfowitz, Paul, 158 Women’s Officer Training School (WOTS), Gwalior, 244 World Bank, 17 World Energy Conference, 92 World Health Organization (WHO), 16, 117, 208–09, 256 World Health Organization (WTO), 48 World Trade Center (WTC), 9, 44 Yeltsin, 118 Zafar, S.M., 176 Zangger, Claude, 90 Zangger Committee, 90, 98, 135–36 Zuberi, Matin, 129