Weapons of Desperation - German Frogmen and Midget Submarines of World War II

WEAPONS OF DESPERATION German Frogmen and Midget Submarines of the Second World War

Lawrence Paterson

C H AT H A M PUBLISHI l ' G LONDON

Copyright CI Lawrence Paterson 2006 First publ ished in Great Britain in 2006 by Chatham Publishing Lionel Leventhal Ltd, Park House, 1 Russell Gardens, Lond on NW1 1 9NN

Contents

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Paterson, Lawrence

Weapons of desperation : German frogmen and midget submarines of World War II I. Underwater demolition teams - Germany - History 2. World War, 1939- 1945 - Commando operations - Germany 3. World War, 1939-1 945 - Naval operatio ns, German 4, World War, 1939-1945 - Naval ope rations - Submari ne 5, Midget submarines - Germany l.1itle 940,5'45 1'0943 ISBN-13: 978 186 1762795 ISBN·lO: 1861 762798

Ack nowledge ments Glossary Co m parative Rank Tab le

form or by any means, electron ic o r mechan ical, includin g phot ocopying, recording, or any info rmation sto rage and retrieval system, with out prior permission in writing of both

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the copyright owner and the above publisher. The right of Lawrence Paterson to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. Designed and Typeset br Servis Filmserting Ltd, Manchester Printed and bound in Great Britain b)' CPO (Wales), Ebbw Vale

IX XI

Introduction

2 All rights reserved, No part of this publication mar be reproduced or tra nsmitted in an y

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Th e Ideal Defence: German developm ent of the Small Bartl e Unit co ncept Bapti sm of Fire: Anzio T he K-Verbiinde in Ital y: Linsens and Sto rm Boat s Bartles o ff Normandy: Attacks agai nst D-Day shipping River Assa ult: German frogmen in action The Southern Front: Th e K-Verbiinde in the Me diterranean New Weapon ry: Hecht an d Seehund Th e Neth erland s: Battles in the Scheidt Twilight of the Go ds: 194 5 M idgets and Co mma ndos: Final o pera tio ns in The Mediterr anean and Adr iatic seas Co nvent ional War: Seehunds in the Th am es Estuary To East and West: K-Verbiinde river attacks No rway, the Fina l Cita del: Th e K-Verbiinde in Scandinavia

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26 35 68 92

112 126 153 174 185 2 15

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Appendix Endno tes Bibliograph y In dex

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Acknowledgements

As always this book could not have been wrinen without the help, support and enco uragement of man y peopl e. I would like to especially thank Sarah, Megz, James and Ernie of the Paterson Clan. Also special thanks to Audr ey 'Mumbles' Paterson and Don 'M r Mumbles', Ray and Phylly Paterson . My gratitude also goes to Grah am ' Course I'm a Brummie' Jinks, Frank Bang, Gordon (Captain Ahab ) Wadsworth, Rob Halford, Glen Tipton, Ken Downing, Ian Hill, Scott Travi s, Lionel Leventhal, Rob Gardiner and all the staff at Chatham! Greenhill, Maurice Laarrnan and his wonderful archiv e of information that he readil y shared for this project, Denni s Feary and his inexhaustible supply of printed paper, Teduardo Savas, Chokehold, Jiirgen Weber and the U-Bootk ameradschaft Miinchen, Cozy Powell (RIP), Eddie Na ughton, Mik e, Sheila, Mitch and Claire French, jo Lawler and Mike Hockin at the excellent Explosion! Mu seum of Naval Firepowe r, Gosport, and Maggie ' Mine's a Haggis' Bidmead and Martin 'Mine's a Sporran' Tow ell. Retrospectively I would also like to thank Bob Hackert and his co-a utho rs of the excellent http;llww w.com binedfleet.com lsensllikan.htm website for their help with informa tio n regarding Japanese naval deployment and develop ment . From the ranks of the Kriegsmarine and Allied navies there are man y veterans and their families that have helped with time and pat ience as I have tried to piece together th is an d other sto ries. Of the man y people who have put up with my endless enquiries I would especially like to ment ion No rbert Keller, Helmut Deppm eier, Jiir gen and Esther Oesten, Eugen Herold , Ludw ig and Inge Sto ll, Gerhard and Traudl Buske, Erich Schedler, Norman Ackro yd, Hans-Rudolf and Frau Rosing, Georg and Fra u Hogel, Georg and Frau Seitz, HansJo achim and Fra u Krug, Gesa Suhren, Hanne Suhren, Herb ert and VII

ACKNOWL EDG EM EN T S

Frau Waldschmidt, Karl and Annie Waldeck, Hans-Peter and Frau Carlsen and Volkmaar Konig. If there is anybody that I have not included in this list and should have, then please rest assured that it is an unintentional oversight and I hope that you will forgive me.

Glossary

Abwehr - German Military Intelligenc e Service. BYMS - British Motor Minesweepers: US-built ' Yard' class Motor Minesweepers (YMS) in British service (B). Chariot - British two-man ' human torpedo' with det achable explosive warhead. FdS - Fuhrer der Sclme/lboote; S-Boat commander. FdU - Fiihrer der Unterse eb oote; regional U-boat commander. Ing. - lngenieur; Engineer (German) . Inserted after rank, eg Leutnant (Ing.). Kampfschwimmer - frogm an (German). KdK - Kommando der Kleinkampfverbiind e; Germ an Sma ll Battl e Units Command. Kriegsmarine - German Nav y. KvB - Kleinkampfverbiinde; German Small Battle Units. LCG - Landing Craft Gun. LCF - Landing Craft Flak. LST - Landing Ship Tank. MA - Marin e Arti/lerie; Germ an naval art illery. MEK - Marin e Einsatz Kommando; Marine Service Units, generally relating to frogmen. MGB - Motor Gun Boat. MMS - Motor Min esweeper. MTB - Motor Torpedo Boat. MTM - M otoscafo da Turism o M odi{icato; Italian one-man expl osive motorboat. OKM - Oberkommando der Marin e; German Naval Command. OKW - Oberkommando der Wehrmacht; German Military Forces Command. RSHA - Reichssicherheithaupamt; th e Reich Security Department. VIII

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GLOSSARY

S-Boat - Schnellboot; German motor torpedo boat. SD - Sicherheitdienst; the SS Securit y Police. SKL - Seekriegsleitung; Nava l War Staff. SLC - Siluro a lenta corsa; Italian 'Chariot'. SMA - Italian two-man torpedo boa ts. Stab - Staff (German). TVA - Torpedouersuchsansalt; Torpedo Research Department.

Comparative Rank Table

German (Abbreviatio n) Grossadmiral Admiral

Yizeadmiral (VA) Konteradmiral (KA) Kapitan ZlIr See (Kapt.z.S.) Fregattenkapitan (F.K.) Koruetten kapitdn (K.K.) Kapitdnleutnant (Kaptlt.) Oberleu tnant zur See (Ob lt.z.S.) Leutnant zlIr See (L.z.S.) Oberfiihnrich

Fdhnrich Stabsoberst euermann Obermaschinist (Omasch)

Bootsmann Oberbootsmannsmaat

Bootsmannsmaat -M aat (trade inserted as prefix ) Maschinenobergefr eiter Funkobergefreiter Matrosenobergefreiter Maschinengefreiter Matrosengefreiter

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British! American Adm iral of the FleetIFleet Admiral Admiral Vice Admiral Rear Admiral Captain Commander Commander Lieutenant Commander Lieutenant Sub-Lieurenant/Lieutnant (jg) Senior Mid shipman M idsh ipman Senior Quartermaster! Warrant Quartermaster Senior Ma chini stlWarrant Machinist Boatswain Boatswain's Mate Coxswain Petty Officer Leading Seaman Machinist Leading Seaman Telegraphist Leading Seaman Able Seaman Machinist Able Seaman

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Introduction

Th e small glinting canopy could be clearl y seen by the crew of th e British ship that slowly approached. Inside, the hun ched figure of a man wa s vaguely visible as his sma ll craft float ed on the Mediterranean swell. Th ere was no movement from th e curious craft or its occupant as it was caught and held with gra ppling hooks, pulled alongside th e Royal Navy ship for boarding and exa mina tion. Eventually th e fogged Plexiglas was separated from the craft's torpedo-like hull and the dead bod y of the Neger pilot removed from his cra mped and cold tomb. Th e first of Germany's Kleinkamp fuerbiinde (Small Battl e Units) had gone into action - the tragic corpse of this young German one of th e results. Germ an y's Small Battl e Units combined an unu sual pleth or a of formations and weap on s, some of the latter well co nstructed and of superior design, others almost ad hoc in their crea tion. Inspired by Italian and British success in the use of sma ll submersible weapons th e Kriegsmarine was by comparison very lat e to develop th em for their own use. Indeed th ey did not see action unt il April 1944 by which time Germ an militar y fort unes were already wan ing dr am at ically. As we sha ll see, even the manner in wh ich they were committe d to combat differed enormously fro m the role assigned such un its by other navies. The Kleinkampfuerbande prov ided an umbrella for operations involv ing human torpedoes, one and tw o-man midget submarines, explosive motorboats and frogman commandos. It was also the only Germ an naval branch to include men fro m the Army, Navy and Waffen SS with in its ranks. Researching the sto ry of th e Kleinkamp fuerbande is a difficult task of assembling snippets of info rmation fro m official docum entat ion , personal recollect ions and dr arnati sed 'true' sto ries by writers of naval history wh o opt to novelise their subject. T his latter trait is by no XIII

INTRO DUCTION

INTRODUCTION

means to be sneered at as it brings often dry sta tistical histo ries to life and allows readers to 'feel' more what the experience was like. However it can also drow n the actual facts of the matter in a sea of romantic prose. I have not dealt at length with the separate Abwehr and Waffen SS commando units that at times were almos t composite parts of the Kleinka mpfuerbande. By focussing on the Kriegsmarine's Small Battle Units I would hope to be a ble to achieve a grea ter focus than if the book were to study the myriad special forces available to the German military that embarked on maritime missions. Likewise I have not dwelt extensively on the machinery employed, least of all the many plann ed devices that were never built beyond the testing stage. These have been covered elsewhere in many excellent boo ks - I thoroughly recommend Eberha rd Rossler's The U-Boat for a detailed look at such equipment. As always I perceive the sto ry of the K-Yerbdnde as not only a study of military tactics and rationa le but also, more importantly, a story of predo minantly young men caught in the maelstro m of war. I will never forget the emotion on the face of a Seehund coxswain during a meeting of the Miinchen U-Boo tka me radschaft in December 200 4. As the now aged man spo ke to the assembled veterans he was expressing thanks that the Association of Seehund Fahrer had been officially recognised within the Ll-boat Veterans' organisation. Th e men of the K-Yerbiinde - those that served in hum an torpedoes, explosive motorboats, midget subma rines or as com mando troops deserve, in my view, greater recognition of their service. Courage is not measured by success necessarily, nor even by the national idea ls that a flag may represent , but more by the individual's ability to perform his tasks und er extreme pressure that, thank fully, most readers and I have not and will never experience. On a more technical note I must inform the reader that I have used the original German terms for the names of the midget submarines and human torpedoes that follow. However, I have not used the correct Germa n spelling for plurals of their correct names, instead I have used an 'Anglo-German' combination. Therefore, in the interest of clarity, I have included th is brief description of the singular and plural below : Singular Neger Mard er Biber

Molch Hecht Seehund Linsen

Molchs (correct German plural - Molche) Hechts (correct German plura l- Hechte) Seehunds (correct German plural- Seehunde) Linsens (correct German plural - Linsen)

Plural Negers (correct German plural - Neger) Marders (correct German plural - Ma rder) Bibers (correct German plural- Biber)

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CHAP TE R ONE

The Ideal Defence German development ofthe Small Battle Unit concept

The Kriegsmarine was a late starte r in the concept of small naval battl e units. Th e idea of highly mob ile self-contained strike forces was almo st as old as naval history itself, but during th e Second World War its potential was dramatically demonstrated on th e night of 18 December 194 1. During that ca lm and humid evening in Alexandria harbour, th ree Italian SLCs (Siluro a lenta corsa, or, 'slow runn ing torpedo' ) had penetrated the British defensive harbour screen after laun ching from the submarine Scire. The SLCs (known as Maiali or ' Pigs' to their pilots) were the first operationa l 'human to rpedo', each carrying two frogmen rider s and armed with a detachable nosecone containing 300kg of high explosive. Two of the three vehicles reached their targets whereupon the four frogmen silently detached the explosive charges and fixed them to the keels of the battleships HM S Q ueen Elizabeth (with Admir al Cunningham aboard) and Valiant. As th ey attempted to escap e, a ll six frog men were captu red, the group's commanding officer, Count Luigi de la Pene, and his co- pilot taken for interrogat ion ab oard Valiant as the fuses slowly burned below them. Divulging no information, the two Italian s were imprisoned deep in th e bowel s of the battleship unt il de la Pene judged that enough time had passed to prevent British inte rference with the charges and notified Ca ptain M organ th at with in five minutes, his ship would be sun k. Th e pr isoners were taken from their cells and were on deck when violent explosions shook the two capita l ships. Badl y holed th ey both settled into the silt of Alexand ria harbou r. Fortunately for the Royal Navy, the ships had developed no list and with a visible show of 'business as usual' aboa rd, still a ppea red to be active. With all six raiders ca ptu red, the Italian Navy remained igno rant of their sudden dominance in servicea ble naval power within the Med iterranean. It had on ly been five days since HM S Ark Royal had

W EAP O N S O F D ESP ER ATION

been torpedoed an d sun k by U-8 1 and within a week HM S Barham would also fa ll prey to U-33 1. Co upled with the Italian success, there remained littl e by way of major surface units availa ble to the Royal Navy. However, by the time the Ital ian s gras ped th at success had been achiev ed, the opportunity to capitalise on it had passed. The Italian Decim a Mas ( 10th MTB Flotilla - M.A.S. an abbreviation for Motoscafi A rma ti Siluranti - Mot oscafi A nti Sommergibili ) were the so le perpetrators of Axis sma ll battle unit operations within the Mediterranean between August 1940 and th e Italian armistice in September 1943 . Co mma nded by Prince junio Valerio Borghese, th e flotilla co mprised units of SLCs, frogmen, explos ive motorboats and midget su bma rines with wh ich they mounted audac ious and frequentl y successful commando raids aga inst th e British. ' Although the SLC wa s not the only weapon in Ital y's midget arsenal, explosive motor boats also having alre ad y made their presence felt with successful attacks on British warsh ips, it wa s the human torpedo that particularly captured imag inations elsewhere. Originally env isaged by the Italian s for use in clandestine attacks on enemy harbours such as Alexandria, Valerta and Gibralt ar, five planned operations had already failed before de la Pene's success. However, the Royal N avy were suitably impressed and formed th eir own group th e Und er Wat er Work ing Party (UWWP) - to study th e idea. In less than a year th eir own versio n of the SLC, named the 'Chariot' by the British, was in service and plan s were made to attac k th e German battleship Tirpitz in Tro ndheimsfjord, Norway. Event ually, this operation failed as the tw o Chariots towed by trawler to within range of the German behemoth brok e free from their host and sank before th ey could be deployed. H ow ever, elsewhere in Palermo and Tripoli, Italian and German shipping respectively were successfu lly attacked and sunk. With the ca pture of the 'Cha riot eers' th eir m odus ope randi wa s revealed to the Germa ns, Admiral Don irz pay ing particular attention to th eir use. The success o f th e Chariots, combined with other British comma ndo raids in Nort h Africa and Europe, includi ng the successful attack on Saint Nazai re in March 1942, led him to desire his own naval commando force, as related in his memoirs: I expressed the wish that (in February 1943) Konteradmiral Heye should be released from his present duties and placed at my disposal. I wanted him to become, as I put it, 'the Mountbarren of the German Navy'. In the British Navy Admiral Lord Louis Mountbarten had under him the commandos and the units and means for the execution of smaller,

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TH E IDEAL DE FENC E

individual naval enterprises. Hitherto no such forces or means had existed in the German Navy. Among them were frogmen, as they were called .. . the midget submarines, the one-man torpedoes, explosive motorboats and similar weapon s, which, given the chance, could often at small cost in men and material score very considerable successes. Thus the Kleinkampfverbande (K-Verbiinde) were born, although it would be a year before they were committed to action, by which time Germany had been firmly pushed onto the defen sive. To benefit from japanese experience in th e field of midget naval weaponry, staff at OKM asked for details of the j apanese two-man midget submarine, th e Ko-Hyoteki, instructin g the German Naval Attache in Tokyo, Konteradmiral Wenneker, to obtain th e necessary information. On 3 April Wenneker in company with the Italian Naval Attache were allowed to visit Kure where th ey inspected a Type A KoHyoteki. Thi s type had been involved in raids on Pearl Harbor, later also attacking Sydney Harbour and Diego Suarez. Wenneker went to the meeting armed with forty -eight qu estions to which OKM desired responses, though many ultimately remained unanswered as the japanese military, like that of Nazi Germany, guarded their technological secrets somewhat jealously. Wenn eker reported his findings to Berlin, though nothing came of his despatch until much later in the year. In actuality the original theoretical concept of the K- Verbiinde was more akin to the British Commando service than th e naval organisation it became. Though the Germans were in the idea l position to learn from th e experiences of their two major allies, Italy and j apan, in their use of midget weapons, they failed to fully capitalise on thi s. A genuine commando service equipped with midgets would have been presented with a plethora of targets aga inst British anchorages in th e early years of the war. Indeed, if Gunther Prien could sneak a Type VIIB U-boat into Scapa Flow, then on e wonders what a carefully planned midget attack along the lines of the subsequent British assault on the Tirpitz could have achieved. The Germans' first operational unit wa s named Emsat z-Abteilung Heiligenbafen under the co mmand of a resourceful and imaginative Kriegsmarine officer, K.K. Hans Bartel s. Bartel s - former commander of the minesweeper Ml and chief of the Vorpostenfl ottille (Patro l Boat Flotillas) for Norway immediately aft er the country's capitulation was already a popular and famous member of the Wehrmacht. In 1941 he authored a book (or at least was attributed one written by

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WEAPONS OF D ESP ER ATI O N

THE IDEAL DEFENCE

a pro paganda ministry representative) titled ' Tige rflagge heiss uo r' that followe d his orwegian expe rience from the year before where he had won the Knight's Cross. During th e 1940 invas ion of Scandinavia Bartels ha d captured a orwegian destro yer and an enti re torpedo boa t fl ot illa. He later designed his own minesweeper, orde ring eleven to be built and then asking Grossadmiral Raeder to pay for them - an act that led to his tr ansfer to the destroyer 2 34 where he wa s enco urage d to reacq uaint himself with co rrec t naval protocol. After his destroyer service he was tr ansferr ed back to Norway where, th rou gh a combination o f reso urcefulness, imagination and ingenui ty, he had co nstructe d a powerful coas ta l defence system in a matter of months. During this period he had worked on the idea of stretching his meagre resources by using midget su bma rines, develop ing plans for prototype models . During 1942 he had submitted a memoran dum on the subject, stati ng that Germany wou ld prob abl y require large numbers of such midget weapons to prot ect th e th ousands of miles of coas tline that the Reich occupied. His 'early wa rni ngs' remained unheeded unt il Donitz appoi nted Konteradmiral He ye to head the constructio n of the K-Verbal/de. By ea rly 194 3 Bartels had been promoted to Koruettenkapitdn and threw himself wholeheartedly into th e task of creating a 's pecial forces uni t'. T he unit origina lly co mprise d two co mpa nies, Bartels head ing one and the ot her commanded by a nother unusual officer, Kapitdnleutn ant der Reserve M ichael Oplade n a memb er of th e Abwehr - the German military inte lligence service . T he A bwehr had come into being in 1921 and by 1943 it had developed into a large intelligence organisation with thr ee distinct gro ups: Abreilung I, concerne d with espionage an d the co llectio n of intelligence; Abreilung II, co ntrolling special units and sa botage missio ns; an d Abteilung III dealing with co unte r-espionage. Each of these sectio ns had Arm y, Navy and Air-Force sub-sections and it was the Nava l section of Abt eilun g " th at would hold such relevan ce to the development of Heye's K-Yerbande and Heye regard ed Opl ad en as 'es pecia lly suitabl e' a longside Bartels.! Bartels' an d Opladen's combined unit that co mprised both army and navy men never really progressed past the stage of early tr aining, its envisioned ro le of commando raids alo ng the English coas t an d within the Mediterranean soon dissipating as Germany's milita ry star wa ned. Nevertheless, Bartels held an almost unlimi ted powe r to seek o ut and comma ndeer men for the unit, prima rily those with foreign language skills. O pladen on the other han d brou ght his Abwehr knowledge and

contacts into th e mix, also acting as military instructor of the recrui ts, teaching th em th e meth ods employed by British Commandos. Under th e umbrella of Marineoberkol1ll1lando Ost, Barte ls' Einsatz -A bteilung H eiligenhafen contin ued its embryonic training unt il sho rtly being dissolved up on the expansion of Do nitz's vision of th e K-Yerbande and entrance into th e story of Bartels' new commander. This man was Knight 's Cross hold er Hellmuth Heye, a ca reer naval officer, though one who appears not to have been so steeped in tradition th at he wa s prevented from seeing th e value of sma ll battl e units.

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The war situation in the winter of 1943/44 compelled us to go on the defensive. I already held the view that there were better operational prospects for numbers of small ships and weapons than for large units. Moreover, there had been differences of opinion between the German Admiralty and myself as to the conduct of the war at sea.J Gradu ated from th e Class of 19 /4 (VIII), amongst his mo re recent posts he had comma nded the heavy cruiser Admiral Hip per and held senior sta ff position s includ ing th at of Admiral Co mmanding th e Black Sea region . In Febru ar y 1943 when Donirz's order arrived, he was Chief of Staff to MarinegTllppenkol1ll1lando No rd and the Flottenko m ma ndo itself. It was for th is reason that Don irz's personnel chief persuaded him th at Heye co uld not as yet be spared for the task of raising the sma ll battl e unit s. Instead Yizeadmiral Eberhard Weichold, who had had practical ex perience of working wit h the Italian admiralty as liaison officer, was at first entrusted to the task of raising the units. Aged fiftyth ree, Weichold was a veteran naval officer having graduated from the Class of 1911 and beginning 1939 as part of the Fleet Command Staff dealing with the question of wa rfare agai nst merchant shippi ng. His remit was qu ite broad : to develop and bu ild sma ll submersi bles for single-usc mission s; to develop severa l different kind s of sma ll torpedo ca rriers, including sma ll boats mod elled on th e Italian explosive motorboat; to continue to train naval co mma ndos along th e lines of British troop s, ca pa ble of attac king enemy ha rbours in hostile ter ritory. Th us the initial co ncen tra tio n on ground-based commando operations had alread y wide ned consi derably, the focus clea rly moving to light naval uni ts. H owever, Weichold appears to have sta lled at the th eoret ical stage an d he proved relatively ineffectual in actua l un it development. Thus, after the loss of the Scharnhors t in an ill-conc eived and bad ly execu ted ope ration in December 1943 Donirz decided th ere was now little practical wo rk for Heye to be occupied

WEAPONS O F D ESP ERA TION

with and he was transferred to command the fledgling K- Yerbande, the unit given this official designation on 20 April 1944. While the theory of developing weapons for th e use of the K- Yerbdnde, particularl y the latter submersible units, was rapidly growing in pace, fresh inspiration had struck in the form of crippling explosion s beneath th e keel of the battleship Tirpit z on 22 September 1943 . There, six British X-Craft had attacked the sheltered anchorage that hosted Germany's largest remaining battleship. Two of the XCraft had aborted en route; the remaining four slipp ed their tows from their larg er submarine transports and carried on towards Altafjord where the Tirpitz lay. The first that th e Germans knew of the attack on their capital ship was a little after 07.30hrs when X7 was spotted outside the defensive torpedo netting after already having laid her charges. Swiftly realising th e nature of th e threat posed by the attacking midgets the Tirpitz's captain ordered his crew to begin pulling in her starboard cable to swing the bows awa y from where he correctly guessed charges had been laid . However, although this did indeed lessen the impact of both charges left by X6 and one of those from X 7 it did nothing to diminish blast from the last successfully laid charge from X7 that rested directly beneath the ship's engine room. When it exploded it lifted the ship 's stern nearly 6ft and caus ed 500 tons of water to enter th e flooded compartment. The main engines were disabled and the after turrets put out of action, one man killed and forty wounded. It had been a surgically precise attack that rendered th e giant battleship inoperative. However, non e of the X-Craft surv ived the mission though several crewmen were captured. The success of the raid was a devastating blow to the Kriegsmarine in Norway. Ultimately it led to the ship's demise as it was moved from Altafjord to Tromso Fjord for repairs. There she lay within British bomber ran ge and thirty-two Lancaster bombers carrying massive Tallboy bombs attacked her on 12 November 1944. Three direct hits tore open her hull and cau sed the hulk to roll over into the dark wat er, taking 971 men to their deaths. However, before these events, the Kriegsmarine devoted considerable energy to recovering the lost X-Craft beneath the damaged Tirpitz. They would soon form the design basis of the first German midget submarine - the Hecht . Th e idea of a midget submersible that was capabl e of carrying a large mine as payload had taken root in German military thinking. According to the author Ca jus Bekker in his colourful account of K- Yerbande operations published less than ten year s after the war, on the night of 17 January 1944 Kaptlt, Opladen summoned two of the K- Yerbiinde's original volunteers from the 3rd Schne/lbootsflotti/le, 6

T ilE ID EAL D E F EN C E

Fdhnrichen Pettke and Potthast (the appa rently insepara ble du o known as the 'two Ps' within th e K-Verbande) to a heavily guarded hut on th e coa st of Liibeck Bay. T here the two young officer candida tes saw their first glimpse of their future as the y studied the remains of the salvaged X-Craft, soo n und ergoing a series o f trials, the key for German technicians to unlock the secrets to the successful midget submarine design. However a second ca pture by the Kriegsmarine provi ded yet further inspiration for a fresh midget subma rine design. Th e Royal Navy had develop ed th e Welman - a single-pilot craft capable of deploying a 560lb charge against its tar get, but origi na lly envisioned for th e beach reconnaissanc e role. Crews for th e Welman were genera lly drawn from 02 Co mma ndo Royal Mar ines (Special Boat Service) unt il Combined Operations commander General Sir Robin Laycock, who had taken over from Mountbatten, decided th at the Welman was unsuita ble for their purposes and returned th e cra ft to the Royal Navy. Admiral Sir Lionel Wells, Flag Officer co mma nding O rkn ey and Shetla nds, thought th ey might be useful for attac ks on German shipping in Norway, and so men of the 30th MTB Flotill a, Royal Norwegian Navy, launched the first attac k using four Welmans ( W45- W48) on 2 1 November 194 3 (O peration Barbar a) against th e floating dock at Bergen and shipping in th e area. However, the mission wa s an abject failure, W46 enco untering a net and being forced to th e surface, where she was spotted by a Germa n patrol craft. Its pilot was ca ptured along with his cra ft. Alerted by the ca ptu re, German defences foiled th e rema ining three Welmans th at wer e event ually aba ndo ned and scuttled, the ir pilots managing to evade ca pture and in due course return to th e UK after being recovered by MTB.4 Th e ca ptured pilot survived the war in a prison ca mp and, as we shall see later, his Weiman (W46) pro vided design inspirat ion for a new German midget - the Biber. With th e groundwork firmly in place for th e for ma tion o f th e K- Yerhdnde, wea ponry was a high pr ior ity by the end of 1943. It is hardly surprising that the formation from scratch of a new force and

the establishment of entirely new weapons in the fifth year of war presented extraordinary difficulties. As speed was essential, there was no question of lengthy test and trials. At my suggestion the C-in-C gave me considerable powers which enabled me to short-circuit tedious bureaucratic procedure and to have direct contact with all departments of the Naval Staff and - especially important - with industrial concerns . . . Among industrialists I found much understand ing and support, since the more far-sighted of them realised the futility of continuing the existing

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WEA PONS OF DES PE RA TION THE I D EA L D E F EN C E

programm e of wars hip construction . .. Engineers and workm en alike showed great interest in the problems, and gave me the utmost help. ' As early as two years previo usly th e development of sma ll U-boat s of between 70 an.d ~ 20 tons displ acement were being act ively cha mpioned by Dr H einrich Drager of Lub eck 's Drager Werk e. On 1 Oct ob er 19.41 he pr esented a .memo rand um putting forward a series of design s using closed-cycle diesel a nd more standardise d diesel-electric dri ve units'.His co nstruc tion techni q ues were am bitious, stress ing th e inad eq uac ies of acce pted ,:ars~ip co nstruc tion meth od s and opting instead f~r th e mass-produeuon -lme a pproach used in armo ure d vehicle and air craft manufacture. Thus hull elements co uld be produced and fitted together at a later date :- pr es.aging the event ua l use of th is technique by Type XX I U-boat bu ilders m th e clos ing stages of th e war. With th e s~all size~ u~ its easi ly tr an sported by rail, road o r wat erway he envislo~ed th eir tim e-con suming int erior work co uld be co nt inued in any aval ~a~le area.s safe fro m enemy air attack, independ ent of th e highl y spec ialised shipbuilding yar ds. Ind eed. his schedule allowed 14 to 20 days for pr essu re hull 'ce ll' cons~ructlon, 30 days fo r th e inte rior fitt ing and a furth er 30 for th e weldmg together of th e hull cells into a finished subma rine . H owever, at th at stage of th e wa r th e sect iona l co nstruc tio n o f U-boats _ of wh.at ever .s ize - did not sit well w ith higher echelons of th e Krzegsmarme a nd th eir ship building advise rs and th e idea wa s shelved as unwo rkabl e. But Drager was undeterred and continu ed to promote th e development of sma ll 23 - to 25-to n U-boats that co uld be ca rr ied to an o pera tiona l area by other vessels as we ll as a 1DO-ton vessel for sUrface,attacks at n.ight -: a form of submers ible MTB - and a 'to rpedosha ped U-boa t WIth high subme rged spee d. Iron icall y, design s fo r both vessels were alrea dy in test with th e Walter U-boar and th e Enge lma nn H igh -Speed boat, but neither pro ved successful. Dra g.er's ideas we re never allowed to bear fruit, Rudol f Blohm (Co uncillo r of Sta te) go ing so far as to officially reject his design on 22 Janua ry 194 2, stating that it was co nside red inad equate: fo: ? pera tio na l purposes because, carryi ng only two torpedoes, it has minimal armame nt and because in adverse weath er conditions, heavy seas do not allow small vessels to be used adeq uately in opera tions." But with in two years th e na ture of Ge rma ny's war had chan ged irrev-

oca bl~ and purely defensive wea po ns th at co uld be quickl y manufac tu red m th e face of increasingly severe Allied bombing of ind ustrial

plants were desp eratel y req uired. The midget subma rine proj ect was accelera ted under th e a uspices of H eye's co m ma nd; eve n Jap an ese ad vice was finall y acce pted fro m such experts as submarine specialist Lieutenant Co mmande r Hideo Tom on aga, inventor of th e a utoma tic depth sta biliser. This in itself illust rated so me of th e fresh urgency attached to th e idea of K-Yerbande weap onry as more often th an not, the excha nge of mil itary and ind ustria l ideas between Ja pan a nd Ge rma ny, supposedly gua ra nteed by th e Axis agreeme nt, fell vict im to inherent racial prejud ices and were ign o red. Up on th e dissolution of Bartels' and O plade n's units and th eir incorporati on with in He ye's command, Bartels began th e co nstruc tio n of a mid get subma rine service as head of th e training gro und Blaukoppel in Liibeck , future tra inin g cent re for Biber pilots. His prototype Biber (Beave r), named 'Ada m', was first launched at th e Flender shipyard in Liibeck - wh ere it promptly sa nk. Unde terred, work co nti nued o n th is and o ther models o f midgets a nd human torpedoes. Opladen o n th e other hand at first was a ppo inte d Fl (Ge ne ra l Operations O fficer ) to H eye at Timme ndo rfer Stra nd . H is funct ion was to develop o pera tiona l plan s for th e new service, utili sing his Abwehr background to th e fullest th ou gh by July 1944 Kaptlt, Thomsen , an ex perie nced Schnellboot an d Torpedoboot officer, had repl aced him due to lack of naval background and pract ical kn owl edge . Opladen w as mo ved to a sphe re of opera tions far mo re suited to his talents and from Jul y he held a pseud o-int elligence position as fo reig n political ad viso r to H eye, mon itoring all ove rseas developmen ts likely to imp act th e K-Yerbande. Heye fostered a str ict sense of camaraderie within th e K-Yerbdnde with little attention paid to the stiff forma lity of Kriegsmarine regulations and traditions. Rank badges were ra rely worn and there was informal ity throughout th e service th at helped imbu e it with a sense of belon ging to an elite un it. Th e o rgan isat ion grew rapidly, event ually becom ing a lab yrinth ine structure co ntai ning man y respected vetera ns of th e Kriegsmarine. Imm ediatel y beneath Heye in the K-Verbiinde cha in of co mma nd was Knight's Cross hold er Fritz Frauen heim, an ex-If- boa t captain and com mander of La Spezia's 29 th U-Flotilla. Enco urage d by the o bvio us energy and visio n of Heye and Frauenh eim 's partnership, Donitz also appo inte d severa l notabl e veter ans of th e U-boat and minesweeping services to th e posts of Group co mmanders for th e K-Verbiinde's submersible units. H an s Bartels was cemente d in his ro le as head of Lehrk ommando 250 respo nsible fo r Biber training. H ermann Rasch, ex-comma nder of th e successf ul

8 9

WEA PONS OF DES P E RAT ION

U-10 6, was placed in comma nd of Seehund units in Lehrkommand o 300 though later, in Februa ry 1945, superseded by one of th e two most highly deco rated members of the Kriegsmarine, F.K. Albrecht Brand i. Kaptlt. Heinz Franke, ex-U-262, commanded the Neger, Mard er and Molch unit s as head of Lehrkom mandos 350 an d 400, later superseded in th is post by Kaptlt. Horst Kessler, ex-comma nder of U-985. Specialists in different fields were recru ited for the K- Verbiinde's other unit s. Schnellboot veteran Kaptlt. Ulrich Kolbe was given cha rge of Lehrk ommand o 200 and its Linsen boat s, ably suppo rted by a former destr oyer and torpedo boat officer, Kaptl r. Helmut Bastian . Th ese veteran s wo uld provide the experience and also a sense of legitimacy to the fledgling service, though ultim at ely it had been decided tha t the U-boa t arm co uld not spare men for th e rank s of the K-Verbiinde. Instead recru its we re to be dr awn from volunteers origina ting from all branches of th e Wehrmacht and Waffen SS. Eventua lly, as we sha ll see, events meant that th e emba rgo placed on recrui ting Ll-boar men was relaxed at the end of 1944. However, there remained rules th at wo uld not allow U-boa t co mmande rs to volunteer as K-Verbiinde pilot s or crew. Th ere co uld be seen to be th ree distinct branches of th e K-Verbiinde. Th e first wou ld comprise exp losive surface craft and assa ult boat s of a type already ope rated by th e Italian Decima Mas in the Mediterr anean. Th e second group were Kampfschtuim mer - frog men capable of raiding enemy harbours and ships. This style of warfare had already been develop ed for use in the Second World War by the Abu/ehr, th ough with littl e success thus far. Th e last branch co mprised the actua l human to rpedoes and midget submarines ca pable of delivering either a mine or G7e torpedo warhead into actio n agai nst th e enemy. It was an enginee r at the Torpedouersuchsansalt (TVA; Torpedo Research Depart ment ) in Eckernfo rde th at event ua lly put forwa rd the first design th at su ited requ irement s and conformed to th e necessary rap id co nst ruction speed . Naval Construct ion Advisor Richard M ohr ex po unded his idea du ring a discussion headed by the TVA co mmand ing officer KA Rud olf Ju nker on 2 1 Decem ber 1943. Th e theory was simple. A single G7e electric to rpedo was to have its wa rhea d removed and rud iment ary co ntro ls fitted in a compa rtment bar ely abl e to fit a single pilot. T hen another active torpedo was to be slung beneath th e ca rrier, sailed to striking range and released. The carrier would approac h enemy targets, line up his sho t using th is most basic o f sighting mechanisms and release the underslung to rpedo by pull ing a small switch lever, whi ch would finish the job. Once depl oyed, the 10

T HE ID EA L D E F E N C E

pilot could return to friendl y sho res where th e carrier ,,:as s~uttled . A single-shot weapon o f very little cost and development tim e, Its possibilities if used in lar ge numbers against massed shipping seemed enormo us and Mohr was encouraged to enthusiasticall y develop his proposal. In fact as Don itz co rrectly sum med th e matter up: 'We requ ire four years to complete a battleship .. . but only four days to prepar e ten one-man torpe does.' 7 . On 18 January 1944, Hitler ap proved th e construction of fifty mid get subma rines of both min e-carrying and torpedo carrying capabilities and also th e one-man to rpedo designed by Mohr, whi ch th e minutes o f th e meetin g betw een Donitz and H itler noted were 'to be used particularl y as a defence weapon in case of enemy landings' due to its rather basic co nstructio n. It wa s indeed a rud imentary device, capable of only a modest 4 kn ot s under power from th e AEG electric motor and its 110-volt battery. Displacing 2.7 tons of water, th e weap on wo uld be ca pable o f a range o f 30 nau tical miles. Trials began at th e TVA in Eckernforde under the watchful eye of M ohr and his sma ll con struction team as well as K-Verbii nde Chief o f Staff Frau enh eim. Oblr.z.S. Johann Otto Krieg, ex co mma nde r of U8 1, wa s purloined from his post by Donitz to und ert ake the tes~ing of th e first prototype despite th e ban on U-boat commande rs enter ing th e K-Verbiinde. U-81 had famously sunk HM S Ark Royal in 1941 wh ile Krieg had been first officer to Oblt.z.S. Fritz Gu ggenb erger. Ho~ever, after Guggenberger's departure and Krieg's successio n to ca ptai n, the veteran Type VIIC had been sunk by Allied bombing in Pola on 4 January 1944. T hus Krieg was a free agent by Don irz's sta nda rds and on th e eve of his planned marriage he was summo ned by th e Grossadmiral to Berlin and person ally charged to immediatel y begin trials. Jo ining him were th e tw o Fiihnrichen Pettke and Potthast. Th e three men threw th emselves eagerly into th e task ahead, Krieg becom ing in th e process th e first co mmande r of th e K-Verbiinde's inaugur al unit: 36 1 K-Flotill a. Th e first formative barracks for th e K-Verbiinde were esta blished at Timmendor fersrrand in Liibeck Bay, nestled within a spruce forest on the bank s of the River Trav e. Th e variou s bases th at were to follow for the use of the K-Verbiinde over subsequent months were all codena med with the suffix 'kopper, mean ing paddock or enclos ure. Thus Timmendorferstrand, the headquarters of th e K-Verbiinde becam e known as Strandkoppel. It was also at this stage th at the first format ive MEKs (Ma rineEinsatz-Kommandos , or, Special N aval Commandos) were also formed , 11

WEA PONS OF DES I'E RATION

T HE I D EA L DEFENC E

each comprising an officer and twenty -two men, fifteen vehicles, trailers and equipment. The absorption of Abwehr men and units had pro vided th is already estab lished orga nisatio nal level for the K-Yerbdnde to utilise. Com mand of MEK60 was given to Lt Prinzhorn, MEK65 to Lt Richert and MEK7 1 to Lt Walters. Th ey wo uld become cadres for units that undertook some of the K-Yerbande's most difficult opera tions. The human torpedo trials meanwhile had rapidly gathered pace an d it was du ring th is intensive period of testing that th e one-man torpedo received its new name of Neger -litera lly 'nigger' and meant as a play on the inventor's name Mo hr, which in tu rn litera lly meant 'Moor' (of Moor ish origin). T he wea pon was simple; a manned to rpedo with a simp le joystick control. Using this the torpedo cou ld be steered to port or starboard and have the inclination altered slightly, grea ter manoeuvrability afforded by extended control surfaces operated by simple external pull rods in place of the standard G7e stern fins. Thi s would be the 'carrier weapon' and 7cm benea th it was slung another G7e electr ic to rpedo with its 279kg wa rhead. Initially Krieg took th e first Neger into the cold Baltic waters without any shielding dome, merely a rubberised canva s 'spra y skirt' pro tecting him from the harsh sea and wind. T his was swiftly found to be bordering on impossible and a Plexiglas dome - in fact a nose gunner dome from th e Dorn ier aircraft factory in Friedrichshafen - was fitted. As well as protecting the pilot , along the bottom of the cano py were gradua ted marks with which the pilot aligned a short rod welded to the nose of his carrier to rpedo to provi de a rough aiming device. However, the Plexiglas in turn proved pro blematic for the pilot 's air supply. Tests were carried out with the th ree pioneer pilots that showed that the avai lable air inside the tor pedo would allow seven hours at 4 kno ts before the pilot risked suffocation. T houg h this was possible, and certainly allowed tri als to contin ue, it wou ld be awkward in operational circ umstances and potentially lethal to the pilot. Wh ile th e intensive trials continued, the first bat ch of forty volunteer pilots (including the two Ps) wa s assembli ng at Eckernforde (Blal/ko ppel). Drawn from all branches of the Wehrmacht and the WaHen 55 they had alrea dy und ergon e gruelling comma ndo-s tyle tra ining at Heiligenhafen (eastern Kiel Bay) un der the command of Kap tlt. (Sonderfiihrer) Michael Opladen. However, th ough the volunteers were physica lly fit and willing to join th e new service, th ey possessed little, if any, sea manship skills . Again O pladen took charge of their instr uction in basic navigat ion and to rpedo shoo ting. With Krieg's initial trials co mpleted and the rud iment ar y meth od of 12

13

WEAPONS OF D ESP ERATION

Neger operation for the Negers fully understood by Krieg and the two midshipmen, the time swiftl y arrived for the prospective pilots to also begin their hands-on training. As soon as they had mastered the basics, Krieg swiftly moved them on to night operations, in which conditions they would eventually go into action. The training was not without its price. At least one man was killed when the live torpedo failed to disengage from the carrier during a practice attack on a moored ship. Unable to release th e canopy from th e inside the pilot was helpless as his speeding vessel grated along the ship's keel, killing him instantly. As the training had progressed Mohr finally managed to find suitable breathing apparatus for the young pilots. Once again Mohr's team had looked to the aircraft industry and equ ipped Krieg with potash cartridges and breathing equ ipment borrowed from Luftwaffe fighter pilots. Though battery storage space had to be sacrificed in order to fit the equipment, it was a necessary compromise. As the pilots increased in confidence and skill, there still remained one problem. The Neger was unabl e to dive and the Plexiglas dome remained above water all the time, moonlight reflecting on the shiny surface and potentially betraying the attacker. A brief attempt at fitting a diving cell that could be flooded and allow the Neger to submerge was initially unsuccessful. Not onl y did it and the accompanying com pressed air tank required to blow the cell free of water tak e valuable battery storage room , but also the trim was impossible to maintain result ing in the torpedo burying itself nose first into the seabed. It was a persistent problem that for the moment seemed insoluble. Three weeks had passed since Krieg had received his orders from Donirz, by which time the Negers were ready for action. Heye visited the men of the pioneering flotilla and confirmed their readiness for action as they had been requested for urgent service. Allied troops had been inching northward alon g the Italian penin sula after land ing on the mainland during September 194 3, though their progress was slow and painful in the face of a skilful defence from Feldmarschal Albert 14

T HE ID EA L D E F EN C E

Kesselring. Genera l Mark Clark , in overa ll comman d of the US Fifth Army, opted for a fresh assa ult behind the formidable defences of the Gustav Line which Kesselring's men held with such tenaci ty," Clark reasoned that a fresh beachhead would force the German defenders to withdraw from their defensive position s and could even directl y threat en Rome. Thus the attempt to bypass th e Gustav Line led to another amphibious land ing, this one mad e by the Allied VI Cor ps und er Ma jor General j ohn Lucas just sou th of Rome at Anzio in j anuary 1944. However, once aga in Kesselring man aged to contain the enemy thr eat after Lucas hesitated at pushing his troops immedia tely off the beaches and towards an und efended Rome. During the six days of inactivity that followed th e landing Kesselring rushed wh atever forces he could throw together into the area, qu ickly man aging to esta blish a virt ual ring of steel around the Allied beachh ead . The 1. Fallschirmiager Korps, comprised of cadres from the 3. Panzer Grenadier Division and the 'Hermann Gori ng' Panzer Division, moved rapidly into position , gradually being joined by ot her for matio ns drawn away from the already stag na nt fro nt to the south. When the Allies event ually moved they were repulsed and forced into wh at tran spired to be four months of grinding bloody stalemate. As Kesselring hammered Anzio with the heaviest firepower he could muster, the Luftwaffe began the first of severa l successful attacks with Henschel guided missiles agai nst Allied shipping. In tu rn, Don irz was determ ined to assist the effort at sea. Th e safety of th eir sea born e supply route to the Anzio beachh ead was one of the main concerns of Allied planners. Beginning on 28 januar y, six Landing Ships Tank had begun to leave Naples each da y. Their cargo totalled 1,500 tons of vital supplies distributed among fifty preloaded tru cks. Once at the Anzio beachhead the trucks were driv en off th e huge transports and moved directly to front-line positions with ammunition, fuel, and rations for the Allied troop s. These in turn were replaced aboa rd th e LSTs by the fifty trucks th at had mad e the voyage the previou s day. Additionally, fifteen smaller vessels ar rived eac h week, and every ten da ys four massive Liberty ships delivered heavier equipment. T his wa s the potential Achilles Heel to the Allied invasion force, an artery that Donitz hoped to sever. Traditional U-boats were pro ved largely ineffectual aga inst the invasion fleet th at was effectively shielded by prowling destroyers. It was the turn of the specialists - the K-Verbiinde wa s going into action.

15

BAPT IS M OF F I RE

Heye's visit on 16 March provided the stamp of approval for the 36 I K-Flotilla to become operational. Accompanying Heye on his tour of inspection were Marinestabsarzt Professor Dr Orzechowski (Pharmacist for the Marinek ommando Ostsee) and Marinestabsarzt Dr Arnim Wandel (Medical officer of the Mari ne Einsatzabteilung H eiligenh afens. Wandel had been present during the training of the Neger pilots, able to become fully acq uainted with the stresses and demand s made upon the young rnen.? The two medical officers were also on hand during Heye's visit to solve the potentially unique pro blems caused by long hours of solitary confinement within the cram ped craft during operational use. T heir answe r was the provision to the human torpedo service of a dru g cocktai l called DIX, tabl ets that were co nsidered free of serious and adverse side effects but which wo uld provide chemical stimulus to the men. It com prised 5mg of Eukodal, a narcotic similar to morphine and codeine, wit h the known adverse effects of euphoria and dysphoria, 5mg of Cocaine 5 and 3mg of Pervitin, a meth amphetamin e known now to cause euphoria, dysphor ia, severe social disabilities, person ality cha nges and psychosis . Five hundred tablets of DIX - co ntai ning th ree highly addictive substa nces - were provided to the huma n torpedo bra nch of the K- Yerbdnde. After more extensive use it was found th at follow ing any heavy physical activity the recipient experienced eup horia, but after approximately one to three days extre me exhaustion would occu r.to T he Negers received last-min ute trim adjus tment to compensa te for the difference between Balt ic and Tyrrhenian Sea's specific grav ity of seawater. T he var iatio n in salinity wo uld ca use the Nege r to either ride high or sink: in the case of the Tyrrhenia n Sea there

was a higher level of sa linity that would cause the Neger to rise above the surface. A single machin e was placed in a tank at Eckernforde to which was added sto re-bo ught salt unt il a ro ugh match was considere d to have been reac hed. T he satisfactory adjustment to its trim was then und ertaken on all the unit's other machines by the addition of small internal ballast weight s. By 6 April 1944, Krieg's men (designated M EK175 for this operation) were ent rained alo ng with their forty Negers co ncealed und er heavy ca nvas, bound for Rigano Sull'Arno 20 km so utheast of Florence on the Arn o River. I I From there onwards the rail system wa s unworkable as a result of Allied bombing and Italian partisan operations so the roa ds were the on ly other option. After unloading in the sma ll town there was a delay of ten days of chafing inactivity as suita ble heavy vehicles and trai lers were procured, the torpedoes eventua lly transferr ed for the remainder of their journey to trailers drawn by Sdkfz 9 heavy arti llery tra ctors. On the night of 13 Apr il Krieg's unit had arrived at their destin ation , co ncealed in a pine forest so uth of Rome at the sma ll village of Pratica di Mare so uthwest of Pomezia and midway betwee n th e ancient Roman port of Ostia Antica and the busy fishing harbour at Anzio. Only 5km from the front line, the fores t fringed a sma ll roa d that led to the low scrubby coastline that was some 33 km from the Allied invasion sup port fleet massed at Nettuno. T hree of Krieg's valua ble Negers had slipped from th eir tran sports and been destroyed in transit, th ough there still remained a formidable st rike force of th irty-seven machines. Immediatel y Krieg an d his officers set about reconnoit ring the nearb y coastline for a suitable launching spot. However, th is too prov ed to be probl ematic. Not only were there no suita ble harbours wh ich could be used but also the sea bed off the Italian coastline generally sloped very gra dua lly, mea ning that the Negers would need to be manhandled dozens of metr es offshore before there was any hope of them having sufficient depth to float free. The arduous task of launching the weap on s was already a logistical nightmare for Krieg; 500 Fallschi rmjdger of a nearby training un it soon to be attac hed to 4. Pallschirmiiiger Division , would be pressed into service, provi ding the necessar y man powe r requ ired for th e tas k of manhandling the 5-ton Negers. Eventually Krieg and his men decided th at the coa stlin e near Tor vaianica would indeed allow a successful launch. Literally at the end of the roa d lead ing from Prat ica di Mare itself to th e sea,

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C H A PTE R T W O

Baptism of Fire A nzio

W EAPON S OF D ESP ER ATI O N

BAPTI S M OF FIRE

the deserted resort area of Torvaianica, which had in happier times hosted wealthy Romans during their summer holida ys, now lay abandoned as the tide of war ebbed toward it. Th e Italian coastline that runs from Ostia to Capo d'Anzio is a sweeping expanse of gradually sloping sand , the beach itself slowly rising to low sand dunes topped with sporadic patches of often-dense scru b thickets. However, despite the slight incline above the sea, once in the water the seabed at Torvaianica shelved rapidl y enough to allow room beneath the weap ons at a range of onl y 30m fro m the shore. With at least 18 nautical miles from th ere to the Allied anchorage at Nettuno, the Neger's max imum ran ge of 48 miles allowed distance in hand in which to man oeuvre for attac k before needing to break away and head for the neare st German-held coastline. There the pilot would scuttle his carrier torpedo and abandon it before coming ashore. The co-ordination of the attac k was determined by Kapitan zur See Paul Friedrich Diiwel, released from his position on Admiral Staff for Nordmeer and acting as Einsatz leiter (iir I -Mann Torpedos Nettuno, giving the necessary rank and credentials for the groundbreaking operation. The role of the Einsatzleiter (director of operations) in K-Verbiinde operations was multi-faceted, responsibl e for: supervising mission preparation and prov iding support and encouragement for both flotilla commanders and crews; assisting in negotiations between the K- Verbiinde Flotilla commander and local army and air force units in regard to transport and supply requirements; liaising between Kdo-Stab and Flotilla Commander, particularly to supply the local commander with all relevant tactical inform ation available and to exert 'a moderating influence on the very young and often inexperienced Flotilla Comrnander.P Additionally, the Einsatzleiter exercised overall control of all operati ons in his area and could veto suggestions and plans made by flotilla commanders. Needless to say this required great strength of character and a forceful personality to accomplish these roles, often placing the Einsatzleiter on the 'outside' of the younger flotilla officers, who correspondingly often - though not always - held a certa in degree of antipathy toward their older and more reticent seniors. Between them Diiwel and Krieg decided to mount the attack on the night of 20121 April in the period of the new moon, the total darkness allowing complete stealth to be used by the attacking human torpedoes. In addition, the Abwehr's Brandenburg com mando unit planned to mount raids off the Pontine Islands using

two units of its newly develop ed explosive motorboats. Thus there were still several da ys for the K- Verbiinde men to read y them selves for their impending mission , the distant sound of artillery fire from the front lines a reminder of the perils th at awaited them. They moved under cover of darkness from the shelter of their pine forest to the abandoned holiday houses that act ua lly fringed th e beginning of the dunes. There the Germa ns found accommodation for both themselves and their torpedoes, the latter still covered with their heavy canv as shro uds. Krieg's plan called for the thirty-seven machines to form into three attacking groups. Obl t.z.S. Leopold Koch, an ex-U-boat man and holder of the Iron Cross First Class, would lead the first. The 25 -year-old Koch had served as First Watch O fficer aboard U-97 before commanding the Type VIlCs U-258 and U-382, handing over command of the latter in November 1943 and subsequently transferring to the fledgling K- Verbiinde. 13 Koch would lead his group of Negers around the Ca po d'Anzio an d into Nettuno Bay in search of tar gets. Th e second gro up - and largest of the three led by L.z.S. Seibicke would harry whatever shipping could be found offshore in the Anzio roa dstead while O ber(iihnrich Karl Heinz Potthast would tak e five Negers to hunt in Anzio harbour itself. Reports were continuously upd ated by local Wehrmacht outposts as to the coming and going of Allied shipping to the Anzio beachhead and it was esta blished that there were usually at least four freighters in harbour unloading troops and ammunition. Arrangements were made with army units holding the seaward flank of the German line to ignite a large bon fire in o rder to provide a reference point for the return ing Negers as to the wherea bouts of safe landfall - the battle at Anzio unpredictable in its position of the actual front line and the coas tline virtua lly featureless from the sea. Also, a flak unit was ordered to fire starshells tow ard Nettuno every twenty minutes to illuminate possi ble targets for the attackers. Though the rang e would actu ally pro ve too great to achieve this purpose, the artillery fire provided a handy directional indicator for the Neger pilots. As luck would have it, early on the morn ing of 20 April an Allied convoy was sighted approaching the beachh ead and as dusk fell Krieg began his operat ion, though th e Brand enburger's explosive motorboat sort ie was cancelled at the last moment by the Kriegsmarine regional sta ff due to the small number of available

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WEAP ONS O F DES PE RATI ON

BAPTIS M OF F IR E

boats and th eir crews' inexp erience. The press-ganged paratroopers were assembl ed and th e hea vy Negers on th eir two-wheeled launching chariots prepared for sea . Th e pilot s climbed into the tin y cockpits, th eir dom es bolted into place and th e basic handling controls tested ready for actio n. Each Neger wa s then manhand led to th e wat er 's edge down one o f six pre-laid runwa ys made of coconut matting stiffened with hemp and wire. There th e sweating paratroopers eased th em int o th e sea . The prob lems bega n almos t imme diately. T ho ugh the thi ck matting prevented th e wh eels bogging down in th e sand, th ey stopped not far below the tidem ark and th ere several of th e unwieldy burdens sank ax le deep int o th e sand, th e soldiers un ab le to move th e Negers far eno ugh off th e beach so th at th e weight of th e torpedoes dragged th em headl on g int o deeper water. Attempts to mov e some of th ose th at had becom e stranded failed and several were tipp ed on their side in an effort to free th em from the quagmire. H ow ever, once th e 5-to n mach ine had ro lled on its side it becam e hop elessly stuck in th e glutino us sand, th e pilot having to be freed and pulled out of his useless weapon. The carefully-laid matting began to beco me inte rtw ined aro und stra ining axles as men tried to heave the Negers backwards and forwards into the sea and soon severa l were abando ned and lying uselessly in th e lapping wa ter where th ey were destro yed th e next morning. In th e hours th at followed fourteen Negers wer e aba ndoned at th e lau nching point an d later blown up, th e remai ning tw enty-three head ing qu ietl y into th e night and th eir first co mbat patrol. Each pilot was equi pped with a sma ll wrist co mpass th ou gh th ey proved of extre mely limit ed use. T hus th eir cras h-co urse in celestial navigation guided th em slowly toward th eir target areas, th e dome of th e human to rpedo too low in th e wa ter to remain in anything but extremely close co ntac t wit h accompanying Negers or th e distant coastline. By th e time the Negers had reached th eir target areas dawn would be lighten ing th e Italian sky - aiding navigation but renderin g th em vulnera ble to detection. To add to th e assa ult, during th e night Luftwaffe aircra ft mad e three separa te antipersonnel attacks agai nst Allied forces asho re, co ntinued at dawn by low-level Focke Wulf FwI 90 bomb ing raid s, all designed to distr act the enemy and wea r down their vigilance by con stant alarms. The Neger 's commi tme nt to action was suppose d to tak e the Allied navies by surprise, th ough this was not totally th e case. Warnings th at th e Ger mans had been plann ing midget submarine

attac ks had co me to th e British from 'Dolphin' nava l Enigma decrypt s during Decemb er 194 3. T hese decrypt ed Enigma messages had revea led th at X-Craft lost in th e attack on th e batt leship Tirpitz had been sa lvaged and wor kable Germa n midget un its develop ed . The th reat having been ident ified , further Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe Enigma decrypt s gave good wa rn ing of th e Germa n human torpedo attacks on 20 April. Allied nava l inte lligence in Naples wa s alerted on tha t day to th e fact that reports had been received of ' two-ma n to rpedoes' having arrived at Fium icino for commitment agai nst Anzio shipping." A specia l sta te of a lert was ordered (codena med 'Widea wa ke') and maximum patroll ing levels reached, with sporadic depth cha rges dro pped on the per iph eries of th e Allied naval co rdo n to dissuad e any potential attackers. uss PC591 rad ioed the first co ntact repo rts with th e K-Verbiinde wh ile on ' H' pat rol (the ' How' patrol line listed as running from a po int bearing 267 0 at a ran ge of 5 .4 miles to one bearing 240 0 at 8.7 miles). T he American cra ft had been at Genera l Q ua rters du e to th e almos t consta nt Luftwaffe presence and repo rted surface radar contact 9 miles northwest of th e Anzio light, th ou gh no target was identi fied desp ite th e expendit ure of many sta r shells hunting for th e intruder. A br ief burst of 20mm fire was directed at a suspected enemy th at th en turned away inside th e pat rol craft's turning circle. To further co nfound Lieutena nt J L Clark and his crew, a mysteriou s und erwat er explosio n rock ed PC591 fro m dead astern at 03.07hrs. T ho ugh its ca use remained unide ntified it gave rise to speculatio n of a foiled torpedo attack. Clark spent th e rest of th e night chasi ng sha do wy ra dar contacts tha t appea red to be con stantly moving across his ship's line of tr avel, other sta tio na ry ta rgets occasiona lly tran spirin g to be channel marker bu oys. However, th e alar m had been raised and immediate reinforcement of th e Allied pa trol lines was ordered as the Germa n attack began to d velop. A definite sighting was finally repo rted at 07.25 hrs when a looko ut on PC55 8, engage d on ' P' patrol, sighted a 'circling torpedo on th e sur face' at a ra nge of 3,000 yar ds, rapi dly identified as a hum an to rpedo with th e Plexiglas dome an d a portion of its tail visible. Gunfire from 40mm and 20 mm ca nno n was brou ght to bear on th e novel enemy, com bined wi th two depth charges as th e patrol craft roared past its target. With in twe nty -five minutes after th e first sighting th e to rpedo was sunk an d an unha rme d Oberfiihnrich Walt er Schulz rescued.

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WEA PONS OF D ESl ' ER ATI O N

It wasn't long before PC558 enco unte red the enemy again as the Neger attack gain ed momentum, anot her American patrol vessel, PC62 6 joining PC558 as the latter mad e conta ct with its second Neger. The two Americans made bold attacks with cannon fire and depth charges, severa l 20mm ro unds being seen to enter the Plexiglas dom e. On ce agai n the Neger disappeared beneath the disturbed sea, its pilot emerging seconds later and plucked from the water. Hans Figel, who wo re no distinguishing rank insignia (later listed in Allied intelligence reports as an ' Apprentice Shipwright' ) was exh au sted and had to be lifted aboa rd th e American ship , where he wa s cared for by the crew before being handed over to senior British officers. Lieut enant E B Ha rvey's PC626 co ntinued to pat rol , frequently dropping depth cha rges as 'Wi dea wa ke' remained in force throughout the night and follow ing day. At I0.03hrs the American engaged another Neger, forci ng it to the surface with depth charges and sinking it and its pilot with sustai ned gunfire. However, their next definite sighting of a Neger pilot was not until 07 .00hrs on 23 April, two da ys afte r the attack, wh en another Germ an was found floating in the water. Harvey's crew pulled Geo rg Ho ff from the sea, though th is time he was less fort unate th an the other rescued Neger pilots, dead as he was lifted aboa rd. He was buried at sea and his personal effects later turned over to the autho rities in Naples. As Harvey had been attacking his second Neger, another American patrol craft mad e th e last of the day's confirmed sinkings, the after action report paint ing a vivid picture of the confused melee off Anzio. At 0945 . . . uss SC651 received radio instructions from Lt. Nocco, the Escort Sweeper representative aboard LST358, to proceed immediately to the assistance of the PC558 who had just sunk a midget submarine or human torpedo five miles nort hwest of Cape d'Anzio light in position 41 30'N and 12 0' 30" E. Just after passing Cape d'Anzio abeam the lookout spotted a round object in the water on our starboard bow, distance 4,000 yards. At first glance this object had no resemblance to a submarine or torpedo, but we went to general quarters to be prepared and also to get the men topside because we were leaving the swept channel and entering a suspected minefield ... After closing to 2,000 yards we could discern a wake trailing out behind this dome shaped 0

03

22

BAPTIS M OF F I RE

object and a rudd er above the surface about 15 feet aft of the dome . .. At this point he was about 4,000 yards from the anchorage and was heading directly for a cluster of two Liberty ships and a hospital ship in the anchorage area. We altered course to bring the object on our bow to clear any possible stern tube (we were then under the impression that the object was a small submar ine). As he was extremely close to our shipping, we decided to ram and ran up flank speed. We also ordered all depth charges and projectors set for 50 feet. After closing on a collision course down to 500 yards, we decided that the object was a human tor pedo and that it would be foolish to ram ... At 400 yards we opened fire with our 40mm and port 20mm and when we were abeam of him at a range of about 75 feet, fi red the port K-gun. The charge failed to explode and although we thought we had scored several hits with the 20mm, the tor pedo was still proceeding to the anchorage. IS In his report the American ca pta in, J W Bar r, recalled tha t it was wh ile read ing an Office of Nava/Intelligence Weekly article entitled 'Italian Naval Assault Units' that he had first heard of the human torpedo . Armed with this recollectio n he decided not to ram the enemy vessel lest it deton ate the wa rhead and destroy his own ship. Th e first attac k had failed to stop the Neger and SC651 passed its target's starboa rd flank, circled to starboa rd and ran in again with the 40mm and starboard 20mm opening fire. Onc e aga in a depth charge was released that failed to deton ate. The 40mm and 20mm had registered several hits on this run and the torpedo dived abruptly. We turned hard left and began a sound search, but soon saw an object bob up dead ahead. We assumed it to be the torpedo and opened fire again with the 40mm . As we closed, the object began waving its ar ms and we knew it was the operato r.16 After expending a total of twen ty 40mm and ninety-five 20mm rounds during th e attack, Barr ordered fire ceased and speed reduced as SC651 nosed alongside the German, wh o was hoisted from the wa ter. It was a badly shocked GUnther Kuschk e who was dragged from the sea, his woollen outer garments and olive-green naval uni form peeled off and replaced by a dry blanket. Kuschk e was given coffee and cigarettes wh ile the American Executive O fficer, Ensign H C Tee dressed a sho ulder wound sustained fro m the gunfire. Qu estion s about the nature of his craft wer e an swered 23

WEAPONS OF DESPERAT ION

BAPTISM OF F IRE

by the simple 'I don 't wa nt to talk , I am a German soldier' from the 23-year-old pilot wh o was shortly afterward transferred aboard the escort destroyer uss Frederick C Davis for more thorou gh interrogation. 17 In total ten Nege rs reac hed their target areas where they claime d to have achieved at least some success. The gro up that reac hed Ne ttuno Bay found no targets worthy of engagement, some pilot s firing their torpedoes landwards in the hope that some thing wo uld be in the way. Another Neger of this group, piloted by Matrose Horst Berger, headed seaward eventually finding a darkened ship that was furio usly weaving and turning. He later claime d to have fired his torpedo and hit the zigzagging patrol vessel or corvette , the flash of the exp losion showing a gun mounted forward of the superstructure. If so, this was truly a remarkable feat as the Neger's wea pons sight allowed sma ll margin for error against a stationary target, let alo ne one engaged in evasive manoeuvri ng. A second pilot , Obe rfiihnrich Herm an n Vo igt, also reported a ship hit and badly damaged at a range of 400m . T hree of the five Negers bound for Anzio harbour crept slowly past sentries on the concre te harbour mole and fired their to rpedoes at the crowded Allied shipping, claiming to have witn essed deton ation among a gro up of small craft clustered at the quay. The return of the surviving German human torpedoes to friendly terr itory proved just as dramatic and nerve wracking as their outward journey. Thoughts inevitably turned to the limited endurance of their carrier torpedoes as they searched in vain for the burni ng hut that wo uld mark the fron t line of friendly troops. Of the twenty- three Negers that launched the attack, ten failed to return. One of these ten, piloted by Fdhnrich Pettke, was beached behind enemy lines though Pettke managed to evade capture and reached German positions unscathed . Of those lost, the Germans recovered a single body. The Neger had reached friendly lines but hit the bottom and became buried in the thick sand before its pilot cou ld escape the small cockpit . He was found suffocated inside his Neger the following day by German troops. T he operation was consi dere d a success with two ships definitely hit and possibly more from the co nfusion wit hin Anzio harbou r. T he Allies for their part co nfirmed at least four attackers sunk by their pat ro ls and another was hed ashore on the beach four an d a half miles to the north of Anzio, its pilot ca ptured by Amer ican troops. Three torpedoes were also was hed ashore having failed to

deton ate. However, the wish ap peared to have become the fat her of fact. No hits or damage was ever confirmed by the Allies that coul d definitely be attributed to the Neger attack. To ma ke matters worse for the Kriegsmarine, an intact Neger was later discovered by the Allies slowly circling with its pilot dead in the cockpit, overcome by lack of oxygen, the Neger's motor no t yet havi ng exhausted its battery. The capture disp layed the primitive new weapon and removed whatever element of surprise the Germans co uld have hoped to maintain. The K-Verbiinde had at last seen action, but results were, at best, disappointing. T here were new Negers and the improved diveable Marder ready for operational deployment in Germany after the end of Krieg's maiden mission, but the decision was made to return MEK175 to the Fatherlan d as their secrecy had already been compromised by the capture of the intact vessel and in order to pass on their expe rience to the next batch of recruits. As it tra nspired, it would not be long before they would be needed again to counter an invasion the scale of which had never before been seen.

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TH E K-VERB AND E IN ITALY

Though the Neger attack against Anzio-Nett uno could rightly be considered the first operatio n mou nted by the K-Verbiinde, there had been German invo lvement alread y in the use of Italian explosive motorboats since September 1943. For three years beginning in August 1940, Axis naval small battl e unit opera tions wit hin the Mediterranean had remained the uninterrupted domain of the Italian Decima Mas flotilla. On 8 September 194 3 Italy signed an uncon dit ional surren der with the Allies, the fascist lead er Benito M ussolini arrested and incarcerated in an alpine hotel at Gran Sasso that, somewhat ironi cally, had been ordered built as part of M ussolin i's desire to raise th e physical fitness of his nation. There then followed the spectacular rescue mission by SScommando Otto Skorzen y and a select gro up of paratroopers of the deposed dictator Mussolini. Freed from his exile, the dictator - a mere shadow of his former self and more a puppet for Hitler's ambitio ns than ever before - formed the fascist Repubblica Sociala Italiana (RSI) for those of his people that remained loyal. The RSl's small navy would have little effect on th e remaini ng years of the Second World War and by German order th e only nava l vessels allowed to carry the Italian fascist flag were those of the Decima Mas which in actuality comprised the bulk of the Italian fascist navy anyway. At the surrender of th e Italian government Prince Borghese's Decima Mas was barely opera tiona l tho ugh still situa ted both at its training gro unds at Sesto Ca lende on Lake Magg iore and the front-line bases of La Spezia and Livorno. By the time of Italy's capitulatio n the unit had acco unted for fort y-eight enemy ships sunk or badly damaged (totalling 450,596 tons) in raid s using the variety of weapons at its disposal, the fact that these ships had been

with in the heavily defended harbours of Suda Bay, Gibraltar, Alexandria and Algiers making the Italians' achievements even more spectac ular. The majority of Borghese's men opted to rema in loyal to the Axis cause, on ly a sma ll nu mber deserting to join pro Allied parti san units. The morning following the Armistice, Borghese gathered all those naval personnel loyal to him and the RSI within La Spezia's Decima Mas barracks whereupon he commun icat ed his allegiance to the German forces before trave lling further th ro ughout Ita ly recruiting soldiers.' ! On 19 September Kaptlt. Mantey, the Kriegsmarine liaison to the Decima Mas, was given instructions to restore the unit to operational readin ess, in partic ular its cadre of two -man torpedo boats and one-man explosive motorboats as the Allied land ings at Salerno had found only a skeletal Kriegsmarin e presence to oppose it. Mantey's major concern were the two- man assa ult boats (MTSMA - Mo toscafo da Turismo Silurante Modificato A/largato, or, 'Modified and Enlarged Tourism Torped o Motorboat') that the Italian formation used, armed with one 45cm torpedo, two 70kg depth charges and small arms for the crew. There was another craft, the MTM (Motoscafo da Turismo Modificato) that mo re closely resembled the Linsen, a single pilot steering his craft toward enemy shipping and abandon ing it at a range of 300m to leap to safety with a small inflatable raft. Th ere was no remote contro l capability, tho ugh the warhead detonation work ed on the same principle of sinking alongside the tar get vessel and activated by a time fuse. The concept of the Sprengboo t (explosive motorboat) was not limited to the Second World War. Both Italian and Germa n forces had used them durin g the First World War with varying degrees of success. During the next war, wher e Germany and Italy th is time found themselves allied, the Italians again led the way. They used explosive motorboats in action within the Mediterranean , the cruiser HM S York being severely damaged in Crete's Suda Bay by an attack by one such un it in March 1941. M ant ey's rebuilding of the Decima Mas from September 194 3 onward proceeded very slowly, due in large part to some disaffection within the Decima Mas and also indu stria l unrest in the centres th at pro vided the assault boats and their necessary equipment. It was not until December 1943 that the first assault boa ts becam e ready for use. Nevertheless, due to the fragile state of the Decima Mas's morale, the Marineoberkommando ltalien recom mended that a separate German unit be formed to utilise th e few

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C HAPTE R T HREE

The 1(-Verbiinde in Italy Linsens and Storm Boats

WEA PONS O F D ES P ERATI O N

T HE K- VERB A N D E I N IT A LY

available assa ult boat s, as well as a Germa n cadre being incorporated into the Italian fl otilla. During Decemb er 194 3 th is mixed unit of Italian and German crewed assa ult boat s launched its first raid at sea aga inst Allied MTBs and subma rines off the Liguri an Coast, but with no success. Mu ssolini's orde r for the ar rest of Prince Borghese on 16 January 1944, threat ened the flot illa's very existence of the Decima Mas as its men demon str at ed their allegiance to their nominal commander and refused to obey orde rs. Swift German intervention resulted in Borghese's reinstatement, the reasons for his initial arrest deemed tr ivial by the Kriegsma rine. Furt her pat rols were laun ched - again with no success - an d on 22 January wh en Allied troops landed at Anzio three servicea ble assa ult boats so rt ied, though without achieving any definite results despite tan gling with enemy gunboats and destroyers. T his un easy Ital ian -Germ an co nco rd cont in ued through sporadic engagements aga inst enemy shipping, with decidedly mixed results. With greate r pressure from Berlin to bring Decima Mas to heel, 1,765 Germa n personnel were tr an sferred to th e flotilla whi ch was reorgani sed into three d istinct units: assa ult boats and Maiale SLCs, S-boa ts, and sa bote ur un its (still co ntro lled by the Abwehr at thi s stage) . Fur thermore, Admiral Heye, who wa s rapidly bu ild ing th e K- Verbiinde by thi s stage, requ ested that 75 per cent of assa ult boat deli ver ies from April onwards be allocated to Ge rma n use and that Ital ian tr ainees should be withdr awn from th e school at Sesto Ca lende to mak e room for his men. Needless to say, th e Ital ian s were insulted by thi s proposal and there followe d numerous sq ua b bles ove r th e division of available assault boats betw een the Axis partners. In one instance Itali an s seized a n ent ire shipme nt of boat s, th e Ge rmans enlisting th e aid of poli ce, securi ty forces and th e military to reco ver thei r sha re o f th em . On the Ger ma n side of the Axis alliance, the pion eering unit o f explosive mot orboat s was in fact not a part o f the Kriegsmarine. Th e Abwehr intelligence service had developed the idea of a small vessel for sabotage diver delivery in river operations. In time the Brandenbu rg Regiment , the Wehrmacht's special forces unit that combined Abwehr elements with more sta nda rd militar y personnel, esta blished the first form at ion of such cra ft which were also provided with the du al capability of explosive warh eads within the boat itself closely mod elled on the Italian concept.

Th e nucl eus of the Brandenburg Regimen t's Kustenjdger Abteilung began to for m in Spring 194 2, wit h an eye to predom inantly river-based opera tio ns. Men of the Regiment 'SLight Pion eer Co mpany underwent basic naval training in Swinemiin de, the first elements of the Kiistenjdger Abteilung seeing service in sma ll unit actions with the A frika Korps d uring 1942, others in the Crimea and other areas of the southern USSR. It wa s under the lead ership of Oberleutnant Kuhlmann that the unit's First Co mpany began to ex periment wit h exp losive mo torboat s at the end of 1942. T hey assiste d in the design and co nstruc tion of the craft and began train ing on the ca lm surface of Lak e Co nstance, the unit based at Langenargen. Iro nically it was this very training that wo uld rend er them a lmost immediately ineffective wh en co mmitted to act ion. Th e sma ll Linsens ent ra ined from Germ an y for Italy on 24 Mar ch 1944, first due to be committed by the Brandenburgers into action at Anzio in support of the Neger attac k launched in April 1944 , thou gh this deployment was cancelled. Th ey were finally used on 1 J uly when they were laun ched fro m La Spezia into the Gulf di Genova where they were found to be almos t useless in the ro ugher conditions found at sea as opposed to an inland lak e. T he light spruce hulls mad e them virtually beyond th e handling cap ab ilities of the inexpe rienced pilots and the brief sort ie rap idly becam e a fiasco without even meet ing the enemy. Heye, not un justifiabl y, demanded that naval operations be left to the Kriegsmarine and ap pea led to O KW to back his view. Ultim atel y they did just that , and the Bra nde nburg men were given a cho ice to mak e, as illustrat ed by the recollection of Erns t Ertel's of his service in the Linsens.

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I myself began my successful service on 19 December 1944 in the Scheldt, later in the legendary Linsen Flotilla under Kaptlt. Bastian, serving as Rottenfiihrer . . . unt il 18/19 April 1945 and the last explosive boat operation in the Thames. In 1942 I .. . went to Swinemiinde and the sailing ship Go rch Fock as part of the seaman detachment of the Brandenburgers. The Light Pioneer Company was raised, with me in it, under Haupt mann Kriegsheim, and sent to the Black Sea . .. With 50 Caucasian comrades we return ed to Langenargen/Bodensee, where under our unforgettabl e commander Rittmstr. Konr ad ('Co nny') von Liepzig the KJA (Kiistenjiiger-Abteill/ng 800) was formed. Our 4th (Heavy) Company was esta blished with small 'torpedo carrier', codenamed Linsen .. . The tactical plan was for these

W EAPON S O F D ESP ERAT ION

boats to be used in the framework of coastal operations against military obstacles such as bridges etc. The inventor of this boat was our Major Golbach (later a Kriegsmarine Koruettenkapitdn t who had already experimented with remote-control method s during the First World War. The first operation in April 1944 against AnziolNettuno we hoped would be very successful as defence against the invasion. But it wasn't. The Kriegsm arine, under Admiral Heye, considered themselves to be in command of all naval operations and that such operations were only allowed with their permission! Thus it later came to a unique choice, that we little ' Kiistenjiiger-Lord s' could choose to return to the Kiistenjager A bteilung with our admirable 'Conny' or go with Admiral Heye and his Kommando der Kleinkampfverbiinde and head for service on the invasion front in the boats. I had been with the Linsens of the l.Sprengboot unit during construction, testing on the Bodensee and wanted now to also take a shot, so I decided to remain with the boats as a pilot. Thus we became part of the existing frogmen, huma n to rpedoes, midget submarines of the existing K-Yerbande as an integrated explosive motorboat flot illa .. . One often heard at that time the expression 'Suicide Squad' given to our service, I fi nd this title unjustified. We had these hard assignments but no more and no less than comra des in other services!

T HE K-VE R BANDE I N IT A LY

D DD g~o ] ~ 0

Linsen

Th e K-Yerbiinde training unit Lehrkommando 200 developed from the skeleton of the former Kii sten jdger Abteilung Linsen element. T he Kriegsmarine took a major portion of the Bran denburg detac hment, part of its training staff - who subsequently were transferred to the Kriegsmarine - and at least a dozen Linsen exp losive boats and their crews. Th e boats were tested in Liibeck Bay where their deficiencies were soo n highlighted. Nevertheless, the need for them at the frontline in Normandy had become desperate by this stage an d it was not long before they were again sent to the front line after having had larger fuel tanks fitted as part of a general overhaul. Th e absorption of th is Linsen unit was not the first surface craft forma tion of the K-Yerbande. Admiral Heye had despat ched Kaprlt. Heinz Schomburg (ex- U-56 1 and Heye's head of naval recrui tment ) to the Mediterranean in February 1944. T here, Heye charged Scho mburg with su rveying the exis ting Italian light naval forces and bu ilding a German training organisa tio n based upon similar lines. Scho mburg reac hed Italy on 22 February 1944 accompa nied by Oberleutnant Harting as Admi nistrative Officer.

Almost immediat ely they established in the to wn of Cas tellerro the first head qu arters of K- Ye rbiinde Ko m mando Stab Sud, thou gh it was known as Einsatz und A usbildungs Stab Siid (Service and Training Staff South) at that point. Simultaneously the Germa ns esta blishe d a school that was later redesigna ted Lehrkommando 600 at Sesto Calende on the same premises that were used by Decima Mas , the German con tingent commanded by L.z.S. Bloo menkamp. Th e separate headquarters and trai ning aspects of th is base were quantified by the former retaining the title Lehrkommando 600, the latter being renum bered 60 1. During May Oblt.z.S. Frenzmeyer replaced Bloomenkamp who moved on to command a second tra ining centre that Schomburg esta blished at Stresa, this in turn named Lehrkommando 602. Transport for Einsatz und A usbildungs Stab Sud was pro vided in May 1944 when an established motorised co lumn, designa ted Kraft fab reinsatzzug Siid , was placed under its command. The column comprised requisitioned Italian vehicles, including about sixty Fiat and Lancia trucks ranging from 2.5 to 6 tons, eighty trailers, twelve private cars an d an unspecified number of motorcycles. Its commander, Leutnant Briiggemann, occupied a headquarters at Sesto Ca lende and was also responsible for all maintenance for units of Einsatz und Ausbildungs Stab Sud, a tas k that wo uld later mean

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WEAPONS OF DESPERAT ION

TilE K-VERBANDE IN ITALY

catering for the transport req uirements for four assa ult boa t flotillas, Lehrkommando 700 and a German Maiale group. The remai ning units that lat er served beneath the umbrella of Einsatz un d Ausbildungs Stab Sud were already moto rised and considere d selfsuffic ient . In addition to opera tional movement Briiggemann's transport co lumn also collected new explosive motorboats from facto ries and delivered them to Lake Maggiore for testing, before moving them onwa rd to the flotilla to wh ich they were alloca ted. In October 1944 , Briiggemann 's unit was co mbined with the Abnahme kommando at Sesto Ca lende, th is new bod y rename d Grup pe Nac hschub and wo rking under the direction of the newlyrena med Kom mando Stab Siid. Briiggemann remained in command unti l Ma rch 1945 when K.K.(Ing) Herbert Burckhardt of the KYerbande's Q uartermaster Staff replaced him. By th e beginning of August 1944 the Decima Mas was in a state of complete disarray and the mixe d German and Italian assault boa ts missions that had been ca rried o ut du ring the preced ing months had met with little success. On 23 May the flotilla had come co mpletely und er Germa n opera tio nal co nt ro l and sho rtly afte rwa rd Borghese resigned his co mmand of the unit. Thi s signalled a complete collapse of morale and on 2 August the ava ilable Ital ian boat s split into factio ns, severa l go ing ove r to the Italian partisan s. Follow ing Heye's urging an d the ag reeme nt of the Italian fascist hierarch y, the few remaining active and relia ble factions were incorporated completely into the K-Yerbande and Heye's dom inan ce over Mediter ranean specia l forces was co mplete. On 9 August, wit h fierce battles raging off Normandy, Heye ordered every avai lable K-Yerbiinde unit to be used in Fran ce and so the assa ult boat un its in Italy were mad e ready to entrai n. However, Allied land ings in so uthern Fra nce forestalled the redirecti on of this fight ing strength and fresh orders for th e use o f the K-Yerbdnde in the Mediterran ean were soon issued. Germ an manned S-boa ts were mo ved towards the new battlefront and the assault boat headquarters relocat ed to Monaco wh ere they awaited their new Ger man co mma nder. At the end of August K.K. Hau n arrived from Germany to tak e charge of the first detachment of SMA and MTM boats strictly for the use of the K-Yerhdnde, his forma tion named Einsatzstab Haun , Th e unit's genesis was on 22 August 194 4 at Sesto Ca lende when Hau n and approxi mately 100 German personnel fro m Lehrkommand o 600 began training alongs ide fifty Italian s. Half of the

twenty avai lable MTM boats, of which only two or three were o f the SMA type, were used by the Italian elemen t, the remainder handled by the Germans who constituted Einsatzstab Haun, On 22 Augus t 1944 the combined German and Italian flotilla moved to Villefranche using trucks of Briiggemann's transport co lumn. From there the flotilla undertook four missions agains t ship ping in the area of Nice. On the night of 25 August an SM A co mma nded by Sottot enente Siccola of the Italian component claimed a cruiser sunk, wh ile the K- Yerbiinde man L.z.S. Kind sank an Allied gunboat. Two nights lat er an explosive MTM piloted by Bootsmaat Gru nwa ld claimed to have sun k what he describe d as a small naval auxiliary. There are no Allied records of these successes. The sole recorded German casualty during these missions was the loss of L.z.S. Bloomenkamp - the ex-commander of Lehrkommando 60 1 who died of wounds received, though ano ther man had come close to joining the casualty list during an engagement on the night of 27/28 August. T he last of eight assa ult boats despatched to attack enemy MGBs, the you ng German pilot of the two-man boa t had engaged an enemy vessel at too close a range to use a torpedo, opting instead to fire a Pan zerfaust. He had been abo ut to use the small rocket agains t his tw isting target when the weapon misfired. His copilot, seeing the pro blem, immedia tely snatched a grena de but, while thro wing it as har d as he cou ld, lost his balance and fell overboard. T he assaul t boat then took heavy fire and burst into flames, the pilot extinguishing the blaze and heading back to base, his companion ta king th ree hours to swim back to Villefranche . By German reckoning it had been a successful deployment of the K-Yerbiinde unit. On the penu ltimate day of Augus t the flotilla moved to San Remo where Kaptlt. Wilhelm Ullrich assumed command on 5 September. Th e unit was hencefort h known as 6 11 K-Flotilla. Hau n himself transferred to Istria where he later too k cha rge of what was to become known as ' VI K-Division ', locat ed at O picina and established in September 1944 under the control of Adri ati c Naval Command to pro vide the link between themselves and region al KYerbiinde operations. That same September, the headqua rte rs staff of Einsatz und Ausbildungs Stab Siid moved to Meina on Lake Maggiore that bordered Switzerland. As 61 1 K-Flotilla rested an d recuperated from its first operatio nal use, K.K. H ugo Gerdts who had previously been the Liaiso n O fficer between Heye's Kommando der K-Yerbiinde an d Decima Mas at Genova was appointed to the pos t of Einsatz leiter of 6 11

32

33

WEAPON S OF D ESP ERATI O N

K-Flot illa, later exercising the role of operations director for all KYerbiinde units stationed along the Ligurian Coast. Somewhat strangely, Gerdts also exercis ed dir ect control over four large MAS boats at Imperia though they were considered inoperative due to their high petrol consumption. On 1 September 1944 Kaptlr, Ullrich visited Dresden with eight members of his 611 K-Flotilla. There they attend ed a mass demonstration of the Hitler jugend, attended by Donitz who prai sed the work of th e Kriegsmarine to the eager field of potential recruits. Reichsjugendleiter Artur Axmann, head of the Nazi youth organisation, then bestowed the title 'H itler jugend' on Ullrich's flotilla in the name of the Fuhrer. From that moment onward the mem bership of the flotilla was to be drawn, theoretically, so lely from the fertile recr uiting-ground of the Hitler jugend, an armband similar to that worn by men of th e 12th SS Panzer Division inscribed with the title being issued to all of its members, though ironically for security reason s they were never worn.

34

CHAPTER FOUR

Battles off Normandy Attacks against D-Day shipping

The long awaited Allied hammer-blow fell on Normandy's sweeping coastline on 6 June 1944. There the 'second front ' - a somewhat ironic term considering the bloody battles in Italy that had been raging since 1943 - was opened against the Atlantic Wall and Germany's days as master of Europe were numbered. All of the K-Yerbiinde units to be deployed to France came under the jurisdiction of K.z.S. Friedrich Bohme who had been designated as Chief of Kommando Stab West during June. Bohme had had an interesting career, volunteering for the navy in 1916 and holding the appointment of instructor of heavy anti-aircraft weaponry at the Kriegsmarine artillery school in Swinemiinde when war with Poland broke out on 1 September 1939. Given command of the destroyer Anton Schmidt that same month , he took part in the invasion of Norway in April 1940 . In the course of the battle for Narvik his destroyer was torpedoed and sunk and Bohrne, like hundreds of his comrades, found themselves ashore taking part in the fierce battle on land, Bohrne acting as supply officer. After the German triumph in the Arctic port he was appointed Seek ommandant Narvik, before reverting to command of the destroyer 223 in August 1940. In May 1942 he served a year as naval liaison to Luftflotte 5 in Oslo, then tran sferring back to Swinemiinde as commander of the artillery school at which he had been during 1939. On 2 Jun e 1944 Bohme was posted to limmendorfer Strand to join the K-Yerbiinde, appointed director of operati ons for 36 1, 362 and 363 K-Flotillas. As such he became operational commander of the K-Yerbiinde in the Seine Bay, his headquarters situated in Villerssur-Mer, 10km west of Trou ville. The first units of the K-Yerbande began arriving on the French Channel coast during the latter half of June as fighting raged amongst the bocage of Normand y. Attemp ted

35

WEA PONS OF DES PE RATION

BAT T L ES OFF NOR MAND Y

inte rve ntion by co nventiona l Il-boars of th e Allied invasion fleet had resulted in spec tacu lar failure as th e near-o bsolete Type VIl Cs succum bed to th e saturati ng effect of Allied naval a nd air power. W ith his Svboars, to rpedo boats and dest ro yers similarly doomed Don irz turned to the only other wea po ns in his dw indling a rsena l th at may be a ble to have an effect, th ou gh he appea red to not have th e sa me dubi ou s faith th at his co mma nde r in chief possessed:

th e co nvoy below. It was du ring one such attac k on 30 June th at Krieg him self was serio usly wo unded, his place taken as flotill a lead er by Fdhnrich Potthast who co mpensa ted for his lack of ra nk with ex perience a boa rd th e Negers. Twelve Waffen 55 voluntee rs a lso augmente d th e unit; men from O tto Sko rzeny's newly formed 55-jagdverbande o f hardened adventurers.l? Ind eed th e K-Yerbiinde remains th e only Kriegsmarine un it to have admitted 55 memb ers kn owi ngly into its ranks. However, th is knowledge was not ope n to all. In J une 1944 Bohrn e discovered this for th e first time as is evide nced in his POW inte rrogatio n a fter the wa r's end:

'Admiral Donirz mentioned . . . difficulties when reporting to Hitler on 29 Jun e 1944. At that time the Negers . .. were due shortly to begin operations on the invasion front. 'We shall be able to start operations with the first explosive motorboats soon as well,' Donitz said. 'But all these weapons are natu rally very dependent on the weather.' Hitler was obviously unperturb ed by this reservation. His hopes were high. 'Of course,' he declared, 't he enemy wars hips - particularly the battleships - must be attacked, just as the merchant ships are. Just imagine it: if England were to lose six to eight battl eships in the Seine estuary, the strategic consequences would be enormous.' Donirz looked at Hitler, aghast. Did he really believe you could sink battleships with one-man torpedoes? And six or eight of them!"

The presence of SSmen amongst the fighting personnel of K-Yerbdnde units first came to light in june 1944 when Bohrne accompanied a party of eight men to Berlin to receive decorations. Dur ing the proceedings Skorzeny appeared and admitted that four of the men were members of the SS. Bohrne was subsequent ly informed by Admira l Heye that an arrangement had been made between himself and Skorzeny in May 1944 whereby K-Yerbande would absorb SS men under sentence who would be willing to underta ke suicidal actions (Totaleinsatz) on a voluntary basis as a form of probation. The flotillas in KdK subsequently received a number of SSmen from the Lehrkommandos without knowing their real origin.U

Th e arriva l in No rma ndy of the sixty Nege rs th at comprised 36 1 K-Flotill a was accomplished by tran sport on an increasi ngly beleaguered railway system. With frequ ent ta rgeting by Allied bombers much of the journey was made by road in ninety-tw o trucks fro m Rud olstadr in Th iiringen, via Paris, and finally reaching Normandy where the first th irty Negers arrived at Tro uville on the early afternoon of 28 June. Fro m th ere they were mo ved to their opera tiona l base at Villers, th e cumberso me trailers and th eir cargo hidd en amidst the trees of Favro l Wood while the pilots were acco mmo da ted in a nearby Norman chateau. Du ring transit by roa d th e tra ilers and tru cks had their naval licence plates blacked out, the carried equipment covered and ca mo uflaged. Any ident ifying flotilla emblems were removed and th e Kriegsmarine men excha nged their uniforms for standard Wehrmacht army uniforms. A second batch o f Nege rs arrived at the forest on 6 Jul y after reaching their temp or ary base at Pont l' Evequ e th e previou s da y. H owev er, th eir journey - like th eir predecessor s' - had been frequently disrupted by Allied fighter-bombers who exe rcised a lmos t complete dominance of the skies over France. Little movement co uld be atte mpted by daylight lest the swarms of sharp-eyed pilot s discovered th em and strafed

It is unclear how man y 5S men served in the K-Yerbdnde and to which units they were definitely attac hed. At least twelve Waffen 55 men are known to have joined 36 1 K-Flotilla, eight each in 362 and 363, six in 611, eight in M EK 80 and ten in Lehrkommando 700 . Wheth er the 55 volunteers were trul y of a prob ationary natu re or rather moti vated by th e high esprit de corps that mark ed Skorzeny's unit can only be surmised, certa inly the above text suggests the former, while knowl edge of th e 55 comma ndo unit's actions during the war reflects the latter. H ow ever, th e Neger was no t the only part of th e K-Yerbdnde to be deployed. A single Biber had also been shipped fro m Kiel via Aachen, Par is and Rou en for an attac k aga inst British-held brid ges on th e Cae n Cana l and Orne River. As we sha ll see later the prop osed mission was a borted befor e th e Biber could be deployed. As in Italy, it was th e Linsen tha t would be first deployed in actio n. After th e ab sorption o f the Bra nd en bur g Regiment's Kiistenjager battalion into the Kriegsmarine following their disapp ointing performance in ex plosive moto rboats off Anzio, th e initia l cadre of the KYerbdnde's Lehrkomm ando 200 had been esta blished in June 1944 on

36

37

W EAPO N S OF D ESP ERATION

BATTLES O F F NO R M ANDY

the south bank of the River Trave betw een Liibeck and Tra vemiinde. Named ' Blaukoppel' the base hosted Kaptlt. Kolbe who commanded the tra ining unit for the prospective Linsen pilots and crew. Among the fifty permanent sta ff of the Lehrkommando (at least twen ty of them ex-Brandenbur gers) was Obit. Tadd ey, a wireless expert, his experience crucial for the operation of the remote-controlled explosive Linsen. A small ancillary Linsen training centre was also established on Lake Miirirz, named ' Griink oppel' and comprising around 100 men and six Linsens. While the initial batch of Linsens used by the K- Yerbdnde was of Brandenburger or igin, the Kriegsm arine had swiftly set about design ing and constructing their own boats in a crash-building programme. Th e theory behind the units' structu re and op erat ion was simple. Each Linsen combat unit (called a Rotte) wo uld comprise a control vessel and two explosive craft (the gro up con trolled by the gro up leader, or Rottenfiihrer ). Th e control boat carried th ree men, a pilot and two rad iomen, on e each to control the remotely-operated explosive boats. These carried a single pilot who would bailout of the craft when it was set on th e correct path and be (hopefully) picked up by the control boat afterward. The Linsens built for the K-Verbande measur ed 5.75m in length (25cm longer than the Brand enburg design) with a beam of 1.75m (Scm slimmer). Th e height of the craft measured only 80cm making it a small radar profile at best. Th e total displacement was a maximum of 1.85 tons. Beneath the engine cover amidships was a 3.6-litre, 95-horsepower Ford V8 ' Otto' engine that could push the boat at a speed up to a maximum rated 33 knots, thou gh the 100 nautical mile radiu s of action was calculated for 15 knots. Two 5-litre contai ners held enough fluid to lay a smokescreen in action as the explosive boats hurtl ed towards their enemy car rying a charge of 30Q-400kg of explosives in the stern. Fitted around the bow of each explosive boat was a metal framework that was held lScm awa y from the gunwale by spiral springs. If a pressure exceeding 80kg was exerted on these springs the metal framework would be forced against the gunwale closing a circuit that ignited a small charge in the bow. Blowing the bow off, this would enable the craft to sink while also starti ng a delay fuse to the main cha rge in the stern that was preset to between two and seven seconds. In theory this allowed the remains of the boat to sink beside the target ship where its subsequent detonation wo uld cause the maximum damage. In practice the thre e-boat unit would approach the enemy using stealth, until the explosive boats were close enough to begin their

attack run. At the appropriate moment the two explosive boats would be accelerated to maximum speed and begin their attack. Th e pilots would make whatever adjustments were necessary before tu rning on two navigat ion lights visible only from astern, switching the contro ls to rad io-control and throwing themselves overboard. In the contro l boat the radio operato r used a small box that he cradled on his knee to control the now -pilotl ess explosive craft. Th ere were six settings for the lever: sta rboard, port, stop engine, start engine, slow ahead and accelerate. The final co ntro l was a firing switch. Th e radio control equipment was much the same as th at which had been developed by the Army for use in the ' Goliath' remo te-control demolition char ge carrier. By keeping the two navigat ion light s - one green tow ard s the bow and a red stern light - in a vertica l co lumn, the operator knew that the boat was heading in a straight line towar ds the intended target. Produ ction of the improve d Linsen began at the end of May 1944 in Kon igsberg's Empacher & Kalisch boa t builders, soo n farmed out to firms throughout Germa ny. Kaptlt. Ulrich Kolbe's Lehrkommando 200 despatched Linsens of Obit. Helmut Plikat's 2 11 K-Flotilla from Germany on the day of the invasion, the unit arrivin g at Bolbec east of Le Ha vre on 19 Jun e accompanied on their maiden posting by Kolbe himself. Th e entire flotilla numbered around 250 men, including the support sta ff commanded by flotilla engineer Lt (lng.) Max Becker. T he pilots were quartered in a luxurious villa that belonged to the Roth schild family at Molitor. Th e cutting edge of the unit numbered twenty-four Linsens, though the accompanying communicatio ns, arm aments, transport and other logistical units (including a small flak detachment ) considerab ly swelled its rank s. From Molitor they moved du ring the ensuing two days forward to Honfleur, which would be their operat ional base and from where they initiated operat ions. Th e German K-Yerbande faced a well-prepared and dauntingly massive enemy that was ready to face the novel German weapons all across the invasion front, as evidenced in this US Na vy appreciat ion of Allied naval dispositions and the foe they faced:

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39

Enemy naval forces within the Channel consisted of an indeterminate number of human tor pedoes, self-exploding pilotless surface craft, sea mines to be laid by aircraft, and .. . 195 miscellaneous vessels. To repel these enemy forces, the Task Force Commanders established an area screen . . . Manning the area screen required a careful phasing in the use of vessels. Until Allied forces arrived in the assault

WEA PONS OF D ESP ER ATI O N

area, there was no screen. On arrival, a proportion of the escorts and patrol vessels took up screening patrols. Still later, other vessels, which had completed their initial tasks of boat contro l, close fire support, or some other job, took over patrol dut ies, while a proportion of the escorts returned to the UK in company with the convoys. B. Eastern Task Force . . . [that bore the brunt of K-Verbal/de attacks]. The system of defence employed in the eastern area was the following: constant patrols to seaward by corvettes, tra wlers and sometimes destroyers were carried out. Every 24 hours one division of four destroyers was detailed as duty division for the entire area while two other destroyers were detailed as guard for areas 0 and J. By day, these destroyers performed such other tasks as were assigned, but they were subject to call in case an atta ck threatened. By night they were posted as directed by Captain (Patro ls). In neither case did they actively patrol up and down the defence line. The plan was that Captain Pat rols would vector them against enemy forces, whose presence was discovered by radar or other means. During the hours of darkness or low visibility, this defence was augmented by a line of minesweepers anchored 5 cables apart along a defence line parallel to the shore and six miles to seaward. This defence line was continued down the eastern flank by a line called the 'Trout' line, composed of LCGs and LCFs, anchored 1 cable apart. The duty of the minesweepers and Land ing Craft on this defence line was to prevent all enemy ships and craft from entering the British Assault Area, to illuminate the outer areas when ordered and to counter attack any submarine detected. Two or three divisions of MTBs were stationed, stopped but under way, to the No rtheastwa rd of the N.E. portion of the defence line; two or three sub-divisions of destroyers were stationed on patrol, to the north of the western half of the area, and sometimes to the northw ard of the MTBs; other light forces were stationed close inside the defence line, to act as reinforcements or as 'po uncers' , BYMs and MM s were anchored as mine spotters, originally in the approach channels, but later in the lateral swept channel esta blished within the area. These defences were augmented by a smoke screen laid by specially fitted craft at dawn, dusk, and as required. The enemy's day activity was limited to one long-range torpedo attac k, by to rpedo boats from Le Havre, at 04.50 on D-Day . . . By night the enemy's attac k was more determined. O n four occasions he operated torpedo boats, and on eight occasions E and R-boat s, in the eastern Task Force area. On every occasion except one these forces were intercepted and forced to retire. In no case was any success

40

BATTLES OFF N ORM A ND Y

obtained by enemy. The line LCG and LCF, anchored on the eastern flank took a heavy toll of the human tor pedoes which attac ked in July . . .22 Th e Allies had also gained a huge advantage over the K-Yerbande wh en during M ay 1944 they had penetr at ed the Enigma code net in use by Heye's service. Named Eichendorf], an d codena med ' Bonito' by the Allies, the Enigma net had been instigated in M arch 1944 and wa s used unt il the end of the war. Th ou gh first brok en by th e Allies du ring May it was not until J uly 1944 that it was considered mastered by Allied cryptan alysts. The sole saving grace for Heye was that he and his commanders ra rely menti on ed specific areas or tim ings in the ir reports. Non ethel ess it was a severe hand icap , th ough one of which th ey were oblivious. On th e evening of 25 Jun e the Linsens were readied for their first mission. Eight control and nine explosive boats were towe d to sea by R-Boote of the 4. R-Flotilla (2. Sicherungsdiuisioni. These motor minesweepers had been based in Boulogne-sur-Mer since the fall of France in 1940, their strength gradua lly eroded by years of insidious mine war fare and the sudden onslaught of Allied power in the prelude to D-Day. H owever, the remaining captai ns and crew were familiar with the local waters and several were pressed into service as towing vessels for the sma ll Linsens. Unfortunat ely for German plan s, the pilots of the explosive boats were not so skilled and as R4 6 eased from port with its tow, bad handl ing by th e Linsen opera to r ca used the little craft to veer wildly wh ile running alongside the minesweeper, nudging the large craft's hull with eno ugh force to close th e detonat ion circuit and ex plode it. Both were lost in th e blast as well as a furt her two control Linsens and one explosive Linsen. As the explosions buffeted th e remainder many fouled their towl ines and in the increasing con fusion the operation was scrubbed, the R-Boote and their cha rges returning to Honfleur the following morning. Two furth er atte mpted attacks were laun ched during Ju ne th ough they too ended in confused failure. Accidental rammings by th e inexperienced Linsen op erators - resulting in severa l sinkings and much damage, as well as defective weaponry saw both attempts turn into fiascos until on 30 June Bohme reported to Donitz that the remain ing Linsens of 211 K-Flotill a were no longer servicea ble. Th eir planned deployment was postponed and instead the hum an to rpedoes brou ght forward into action. Thi s time th ere was to be no repeat of the probl emat ic launching suffered at Anzio, Two companies of Wehrmacht pioneers were 41

WEAPONS OF DE SPE RATION

com ma ndeered and they prepared the landing site by first of all clearing a wide strip of the tangled coastal defences erected by the Germans and clearing a track along two sandspirs tha t were almost completely dry at low water. From these promontories two wooden slipways were also prepared to provide a firm base on which to wheel the human to rpedoes into the water. To avoid the unwelcome attention of the RAF the runways were covered in camouflage netting. The German radio listening service (B-Dienst ) ha d detected news of Allied convoys headed to Sword Beach, protected by the so-called 'Trout Line' of modified landing craft on 5 July and the Neger pilots lau nched their weapons into the Englis h Channel for the first time that night, twenty-six of them were wheeled along the prepa red tracks and into the cold water of the English Channel under Bohme's watchful eye. Conditions were ideal after days of squalls; the nigh t was clear and an ebb tide took the Negers ou t to sea headi ng into Seine Bay in search of targets, while ho urs later the flood tide sho uld aid their return . T hough two of th e torpedoes a bo rted their missio n due to trou ble wit h their moto rs th e rema ining Nege rs pressed home their attack, resul tin g in wildly ent husias tic success reports. Walter Ger ho ld - a former clerk - wa s amo ng th e wa ve of attack ing Negers, I saw the first ship shortly before two and I made it out to be a destroyer. So I estimated it at 1,200 to 1,500 metres away. As I went past I saw the second destroyer. Then I went past five destroyers on the port side. We had received a command to shoot between 4 and 5 o'clock and I was in quite a favourable position. I launched the torpedo. It jumped about two or three times out of the water. You had to measure the time with a stopwatch so that you could work out the running time. I was sweating loads and was quite nervous when the explosion came. So then I set off on my way back. I saw three destroyers following me. I cleared the windscreen and looked back at them with a pocket mirror. I thought to myself, 'Ah .. . now he's listening' so I switched off my motor. Then he came up to my port side and stopped and I lay still also. Then they got the searchlights out and searched the sea. But we all had a towel on board so I put the towel over my head and made myself as small as possible inside. I put my trust in God and said to myself- 'you'll make it'. I've tormented myself for years. In the small hours of the morning I've thought about how many people must have gone down with that ship; how many mothers had lost their sons, how many wives had lost their husbands and how many children their fathers .. . it really

42

BAT T L ES OFF NO R MANDY

bothered me and I've thought abo ut it a lot. It moves me still today. I lost my own father as well in that war.23 At 03 .04 hrs Ger ho ld fired his torpedo at the tempting target. After forty seconds he registered a powerful detonation as his torpedo struck home. Do dging the ensuing storm of enemy ships racing to the scene Ger ho ld eventually made landfall near Honfleur where he was pulled from the water by Wehrmacht troops after scuttling his car rier torpedo. The Allies captured two other pilots when their Negers were detected an d sunk. In fact it had been the British destroyer HMS Trollope that Gerhold had hit. The destroyer had been loaned from the US Navy (who had designated it DE566) on 10 January 1944 as part of th e Lend-Lease Agreement. Generally attributed to an S-boat attack, Trollope was damaged so severely th at she was written off as a total loss, towe d away and later broken up in Scotla nd. Potthast himself, lead ing the attack, suffered catas trophic failure in his underslung torpedo when it develop ed a leak that added so much weight to th e weap on th at it threatened to pull his carrier torpedo und erwater. Jetti soning the useless torpedo his carrier was also dam aged and began to leak , forcing him to aba ndo n his Neger. Eventually he pulled himself ashore west of the Orne estuary and was taken back to the flotilla's base by local Ger man troops. Ob servers deployed by Bohrne along the coastline repo rted a number of large explosions to sea and much gunfire and by next morning ten Negers had been lost. H owever, between the remaining pilots th ey claimed to have sunk an Aurora class cru iser (Gerho ld's target HMS Trollope), two destroyers, one mercha nt ship of approximately 7,000 tons and two LSTs (one of them claimed by Matrosengefreiter Horst Berger who had also claimed a patro l boat sunk off Anzio) totalling 2,000 tons. They also claime d damage inflicted on another cruiser, destroyer, two LSTs and a pair of steamers. The results appeared to have more than justified the human torpedoes' deployment. However, the reality was slightly less overwhelming , Three shi ps had indeed been destroyed, HMS Trollope and the British minesweepers H MS Cato and Magic. Of the two minesweepers HMS Magic was th e first to be hit as she lay 10 miles fro m Ouis tre ham. Many of the crew were sleeping wh en at 03.55 hrs (British time) the torpedo ex ploded against the hull an d the minesweeper rapidly san k with tw enty-five men still aboard. A little less than an ho ur lat er H MS Cato suffered th e same fat e, also sinking rap idly and tak ing one officer and 43

W EAPON S O F D ESP ER ATIO N

twenty-five seamen to th e sea bed with her. Mercifully for the Allied shipping clu stered off th e British beachhead, th ey were the only confirmed successes for th e K-Yerbande pilots. Nonetheless th e Wehrmacht's propaganda machine went into overdrive at th e image of an ex-clerk destroying what wa s believed by the Seekriegsleitung (SKL; N aval War Staff) to have been a cruiser using such a rudimentary weapon. Donitz co ncurred and Gerhold became the first K-Yerbande man to be awarded the Knight's Cross on 6 July. Two days lat er his flotilla commander was similarly rewarded, his Knight's C ross bestowed fo r his rol e as chief of the 361 K-F1otilla. A second attack wa s rapidly planned for the follo w ing night when twenty-on e Negers were launched aga inst enemy shipping in the same area. From thi s desperat e raid no German human torpedoes returned, several reportedl y atta cked by Allied aircraft, prompting Hitler to enquire of the Lllftwaffe on 9 Jul y wh ether the y co uld aid returning Neger pilots by laying smo kescree ns. However, Potthast lived to later recount his tale in Ca jus Bekker 's book K-M en: I was one of the last to be launched and I remember the 'gro und crew' comin g up and tapping on the dome of my Neger to wish me goo d luck. Th e laun ching went perfectly; soon I was heading for the enemy ships. At about 3a m I sighted the first line of pat rol vessels, wh ich passed me not mor e than three hundred yards away, but I had no intention of wasting my torpedo on them. Half an hour lat er I heard the first depthcharge explosions and some gunfire. Perhaps a fellow Neger had been spotted in th e moo nlight, for the British were on the alert . Th e depth charges were to o distant to affect me, but I sto pped my motor for fifteen minut es to await developm ent s. A convoy of merchant ships was passing to port of me, too distant for an attac k; anyhow I was determined to bag a warship. I went on and towa rds 4am sighted a 'Hunt' class destr oyer, but she turned away wh en no more than five hundred yards distant. Th e sea was freshening slightly; I was thankful that the five hours already spent in the Neger had not exhausted me. Soon I sighted severa l warships crossing my cou rse. Th ey appeared to be in qu arter line formati on , and I steered to attac k the rear ship, wh ich seemed larger than the others and had evidently slowed down to permit redeployment of her escorts. Was rapidly closing in on th is ship; wh en the range was a bare thre e hundred yards I pulled the firing lever, then turn ed the Neger hard around. It seemed ages before an explosion rent the air, and in that mom ent my Neger was almost hurl ed out of the water. A sheet of flame

44

BAT TL ES O F F NO R M A N D Y

shot upwards from the stricken ship. Almost at once I was enveloped in thick smoke and I lost all sense of direction .I" Interc eptions of garbled ene my radi o traffic led th e Ge rmans to claim a single un identifi ed cru iser sunk. In act ua lity Potthast had hit and fatally damaged th e Polish cru iser ORP Dragon , w hile at least two other Negers had sunk minesw eeper HMS Pylades. Foll owing th e enormou s blast th at devastat ed th e Pol ish cru iser an elated Potthast was un abl e to na vigate his small ma ch ine with an y certainty. There were no stars to guide him and his inexact co mpass wa s of littl e use in th e darkness of th e N eger coc kpit. After nearl y an hour he noticed th e sun dawning behind him so he rever sed his co urse, real ising th at he had been sa iling furth er away from his home port. H e success fully eluded seve ra l enemy war ships, th ou gh fati gue was taking its toll . I must have been dozing when a shar p metallic blow brought me to my senses. Turning my head I saw a corvette [sic) not a hund red yards off. Instinctively I tried to duck as th e bullets rained on the Neger, shattering the dom e and brin ging the motor to a sto p. Blood was pouring down my arm and I collapsed." Acting more on instinct th an anything else Potthast managed to free himself from his stric ken N eger, wh ich plunged to the bottom. Floating barely consciou s in th e water Potthast w as ca ught by a Briti sh boathook from th e deck o f his attac ker, th e min esweeper HM S Orestes , and he wa s haul ed fro m th e w at er and his in juries tr eated. He soon learnt th at anothe r sing le Neger pilot, a severely-w o unded Obergefreiter, had been rescu ed by th e ene my - th ou gh he did not reali se that th ey two were th e o nly survi vors o f th e seco nd Normandy attack by the K-Yerbdnde. Potthast's target, th e '0 ' class cru iser Dragon , had seen meritoriou s service since commissio ning in August 191 8. Briefly seeing action in the First World War as part of th e 5th Light Cru iser Squadron, Dragon served during th e inter-war period in American , Chinese, Mediterran ean and Caribbea n wat ers before redu cing to reserve o n 16 July 1937. In September 1939 th e ship wa s with Home Fleet's 7th Cruiser Squ adron, transferr ed first to th e M edit erran ean and then to South Atlantic Command, wh ere she ca ptured th e Vichy French mer chantman Touareg off the Co ngo in August 1940. During th e Dakar op eration of September 1940 she had been unsuccessfull y attacked by the Vichy French subma rine Persee and was stationed at Singa po re on escort duties, serving with the China Force from th e beginning of 194 2

45

W EAPO N S OF D ESP ERATION

BATTL ES OFF NOR MAN D Y

until February of that year and the fall of the British bastion. After car rying out strikes from Batavia at the end of Februar y, Dragon sailed for Colombo on 28 February and joined the Eastern Fleet, where she was attached to the Slow Division. After her return to the Home Fleet in Britain she joined the 10th Cruiser Squadron until paid off in December 1942. It was then, while sitt ing in the Cammell-Laird dockyard that Dragon was transferred to the Polish Navy who took control of the ship on 15 January 194 3. Despite her new Polish masters the ship's name remained unchan ged. Th eir wish to rename her LWDW was politically embarrassing to the British who se Russian ally occup ied the Polish city, thus she continued to sail as ORP Dragon . Brief service in Russian convoy duties was followed by attachment to 2nd Cruiser Squadron for part of the D-Day support off Sword Beach (Force B) in June 1944 . Dragon shelled batteri es at Calleville-sur-Orn e, Trouville, Houlgate and Caen as well as German armoured format ions during the invasion until the early hours of 8 Jun e when Potthast's torpedo struck amidships, abrea st of Q magazine. Th e impact caused a sympathetic detonation of the stored ammunition. Though many casualti es were suffered during the explosions and resulting fires, the ship remained afloat. She was soon declared a constructive total loss, however, and was subsequently towed to and beached at the Gooseberry harbour as part of the breakwater that sheltered the fragile beachhead . While it can be ascertained with certa inty that Potthast had been responsible for the sinking of the cruiser, the second successful torpedoing that night has only recentl y been confirmed as sunk by human torpedo. HMS Pylades had been in almost con stant service off the Normandy coast since the initial landings on 6 Jun e 1944. The battle against German minelaying continued as German sea and air units periodically replenished already thick fields. Two explosions relatively close together shook Pylades in the early hours of 8 July, the minesweeper sinking in minutes. Her commander listed the cause of the explosions as having str uck a pair of German mines, but debate has long continued as to whether they were in fact caused by the Neger attack. During 2004 a BBC film crew filmed French diver Yves Marchaland and an English television presenter as they dived the wreck of the Pylades which now lies almost upside-down in 34m of water. Conditions were less than favourable and eventually an ROV took over the task of filming the wreck in order to deduce the cause of her demise. Though the stern section of Pylades had been mangled by the force of the blasts, Ministry of Defence dam age assessment expert David Manley was able to compare the difference in damage patterns

caused by mines and torpedo strikes. Influence mines such as the type deployed by the Wehrmach t off Norm and y leave a characteristic crimping pattern on the hull of target ships after exploding beneath them. Th e explosion of a torp edo did not give this signature and the Pylades bore no such distortion on her ruptured and corroding hull. Indeed she had been the victim of two torpedo stri kes, the first struck the ship and incapacitated her, the second hitt ing and blowin g a large hole in the hull, sending the minesweeper und er and leaving dozens of shocked British sailors floundering in the No rmandy swell. Both Neger pilots remain anonymous to this da y, lost in the course of events. For Bohrne it had seemed a costly exercise. T hough he was aware that a crui ser may have been sunk, not a single Neger returned. Five pilots had been captured by the British, the remaind er destroyed by surface gunnery and aircraft of the RAF and Free French. A single und am aged Neger had also washed asho re to be recovered by the enemy. Non etheless the Neger pilots' exploits, in particular that of Walter Gerh old , perh aps served to enco urage men to ente r the ran ks of the K- Yerbiinde, thou gh not necessaril y into the hum an torpedoes. Wern er Schulz, a Seehund engineer, recalled a conversatio n amongst new K- Yerbdnde personnel in 1944 that showed that propaganda could not disguise the perilous nature of the hum an torpedoes desp ite the lure of glory:

46

47

'I have heard ' an Obermaschinist told us - he introduced himself later as Kurt Keil from Uelzen - 'that in the English Channel one-man torpedoes have grounded a Polish steamer and sunk an English destroyer. One pilot, an O berfdhnrich, has even won the Knight's Cross. It was announced in a Wehrmacht report .' 'That makes sense' confirmed O berfunkmaat Papke. 'I heard it on the wireless.' 'The one-man tor pedoes are nevertheless pure suicide squads. They are not even proper sailors. There every Tom, Dick and Harry arrives, sits down inside the Eel [torpedo], presses on a button and bang, either they hit or they don't.'26 Nonetheless a further assault was planned for the night of 20 July pending reinforcement for the flotilla from Germany. Thi s time the sole success was the destruction of the destro yer H MS Isis seven miles north of Arromanches, often inco rrectly attributed to Germa n mines. Th e 1,370 -ton ship was hit amidships on the starboa rd side, this explosion swiftly followed by two more on the port side, blowing such a large hole that she heeled violentl y to port and sank in minutes.

WEAPON S O F D ESP ER ATIO N

Though now tre ated as little more than a footnote in history, the loss of Isis left onl y twenty survivors. A glimpse of their experience in the cold Channel waters can be gleaned from the following account written by one of the twenty, Ken Davies: I came aboard Isis some nine or ten days before she was mined [sic] and not only witnessed the bombarding of German shore positions but also took part in the excitement of depth-charging a suspected Ll-boar. I remember noth ing of either event. It appears that the sights and sounds of the mine explosion and its aftermath induced some sort of mental block. I nevertheless stand by my recollections of the mining [sic] itself and of my time on the Carley Float and subsequent rescue by the American Coast Guard cutter. I was on deck when the ship hit the mine. Shortly after this explosion there was a second, which I assumed was that of the boiler. On both occasions I was thrown to the deck. On seeing the for'ard hatch falling away, I began to release one of the Carley Floats. Ther e must have been a dozen or more men just standing by the port rail obviously in shock and doing nothing to help themselves. They only came to life when the float hit the water. Naturally they were the first on. The emotional strain of our situation was soon demonstrated. On my raft one young fellow's mind went - he kept talking to his mother whilst refusing to give up the paddle he was clutching. Another was wearing a Duffel coat and a polo-necked jumper. He was asked to give up his coat to cover a fellow who was wear ing only a singlet and appeared to be badly scalded or burnt . Duffel coat refused. Someone suggested taking the coat off him but wiser heads said that a struggle would have us all in the water and if that happened some would not make it back to the float. I remember the speed with which men died. The fellow next to me said he was feeling warm at last. Th is I knew was a sign of hypothermia. I tried to keep him awa ke by talking to him, but failed. It seemed no time at all before he was as stiff as a board and we tipped him over the side. Just as the sun was abo ut to disappear, we saw the silhouettes of two ships. They wouldn 't have been much more than a mile away. Duffel coat stood up to shout and wave. Whether he stumbled or was given a nudge, I don't know, but he ended up in the water. I don't know if he got back on board or not, but then I didn 't look for him; it was at this time that a man I was told was the ship's R.P.C. and I were fixing lifebelt lights onto a paddle. Eventually the American Coast Guard cutter spotted us and nosed between our float and another, not realising that the two were roped 48

BATTLE S O FF NORMANDY

together. This had the effect of turnin g our float onto its starboard side. We had to quickly jump across to the cutter. I was second to jump and was terrified I would mistime my jump and end up in the water. In the event all went well and I was taken below and put in a bunk with white sheersf" In Germany the shortcomings of the Neger human torp edo were becom ing immediatel y obvious. Thu s an improved and slightly larger model was designed and manufactur ed as a replacement. Th is new model - named the Marder - incorporated a pressure chamber immediately behind the pilot 's seat, carrying 200k gs of compressed air and a 30-litre flooding tank in the nose that add ed 65cm to the length of th e weapon, which now measured 803m. Th e increased size raised th e displacement of the Marder to 3m3 as opposed to the 2.7m 3 of the Neger. With lOkgs of compressed air used in theory for every surfacing, the Marder could thu s submerge up to twen ty times before exhausting the air suppl y. A furth er oxygen supply was also fitted to the Marder, 200kgs of oxygen mixture connected to the pilot via a rubber tube. Released by a valve, it passed over a purifying agent while impure air was ejected by means of a small jet. Like the Neger pilots' main breathing equipment, the fighter pilot 's mask and air bottl es were also still carried for backup use. Other refinements included th e ability to secure the hinged Plexiglas dom e fro m inside the Marder, an iron traversable ring fixed inside the manhole, which could be turned in a spiral motion by use of a special key. Once turned the ring pressed firmly again st another ring fastened to the bottom of the cupo la, squashing a rubber joint between them and ensuring wat er-tightness. Thi s was considered vastly preferable to the Neger's design in wh ich the dom e wa s removed completely, and which could on ly be done fro m th e outside. A sma ll depth gauge marked off to 30m wa s provided, as well as a spirit level on the left hand side of th e cockpit graduated from + 15° to - 15° to provide guidanc e for the pilot in th e featurel ess surroundings of green seawater. In practice th e pilots were tra ined to dive and surface at an angle around 7 to 8°. Gauges indicating the pressure inside the pressure chamber, oxygen contai ner and cockpit were also included in the tiny cockpit. Interestingly, man y Marders incor porated Italian parts, at least th e stern motor compart ment being manufactured in Italy and supplied complete with Italian engraved markings for the adjustment screws. Of course, these adju stm ents were redundant as the pilot exercised complete contro l over the navigation and attitude of the weapon.

49

W EAPON S O F D ESP ERATIO N

BATTLE S OF F NORMANDY

T here were reinforcements already ell route to France by the time of the loss of the 361 K-Flotilla Negers. Sister unit 363 K-F1ot illa had completed three weeks of train ing during the early part of Jul y before travelling to Saalburg near Rudo lstadt and drawing sixry human torpedoe s from the Torpedoarsenal Mitte. Th is arsenal was the cent ral issuing depot for the hum an torpedoes, th eir batte ries and pressur e chambers fully charged there befor e despatch. All necessary equipment for the pilots was also sto red and issued fro m th ere. Th e young pilot s en joyed a short recreational stay in Paris before they arrived at Villers at the beginn ing of August. Th ere they also joined the newly-arrived men of 362 K-Flotilla whose experience thu s far mirrored their own. After already suffering heav y losses, of whom many had been taken prisoner, a fresh directive was given to the new Neger crews that com prised a simple code to be used in th e event o f capture. By thi s method th e Kriegsmarine could be notifi ed of th e result s of th eir mission . In a letter written from the POW camp and delivered via th e Red Cross the pilot was to use th e first letter of th e third line to indicat e the target attacked: K wo uld mean crui ser (Kreitzer); Z a destroyer (Ze rsto rer); B an escort ship (Bewacher); S an MTB iSchnellboo ti; L a landing cra ft il.a ndungsboott; T a transport (Trallsportschiff) and N wo uld denote no target at all (N ichts). T he first letter on the fifth line wou ld the n specify the result of th e attack: V mean ing sunk (versenkt); T denoted torpedoed itorpedierti and B indic at ing that th e target had been damaged (beschiidigt). It was 362 K-Flotilla 's Marders that first to ok th eir place immediatel y in the front line, transferr ed to their jump ing-off area at Villerssur-Mer on 2 August and launching th eir attac k that same night . Th ey comprised a portion of a larger attacking force, joining the Nege rs of 361 K-Flotilla, fifty-eight hum an torpedoes deployed in to ta l. In co njunction with them, sixteen control and twenty-eight exp losive Linsens from Houlgate's 211 K-Flot illa were also ear marked for th e operation. As well as these forces th e Germans inten ded to divert atten tion from the K- Yerbande by use of a Lufturat]« attac k and S-Boat sortie from Le Havre by units of 2. S-Bootf/otti//e as well as the planned deployment o f th e Dack el (Dachshund) torpedo for the first time. The Dackel (T llld) torpedo had been developed as a coas ta l-defence weapon, improvised from th e standard G7e electr ic torpedo. It wa s designed to give an exceptionally long ran ge for use against targets such as concentrated invasion shipping where weap on speed was not important. Equipped with the Lage unabhiingiger Torpedo (LUT) pattern-running appara tus that allowed a torpedo to be fired from an y

ang le and run a desired course, the Dackel was able to cover 57km at 9 knots whi le carrying its 620lb warhead into action. Th e LUT gear installed had been slightl y modified to allow a stra ight run of 34,6 00m before embarking on th e first of what could be a max imum of 2,650 long pattern legs. Enlarged to 36ft by the addition of an empty battery chamber immediately behind th e warhead, into wh ich was fitted com pressed air bottles th at could pro vide eno ugh air for th e operation of depth gear and steerage during over three hours of tr avel, the weapon could be fired from S-Boats or rafts thu s negatin g th e costly and timeconsuming exerci se of con structing laun ch bunkers. It was estima ted that if Dackels were fired fro m the entrance to Le Havre they could reach th e Allied disembarkation area off the Orne River and their bombardment sta tion off Co urseulles, 29km and 37 km distant respectively. Allowed to run their pattern s und er cover of darkness, Marinegruppellkommando West exp ected great result s despite protesta tions fro m Schnellbootfiihrer th at with th e low profile provided by S-boats, any possible targe ts at 29km distance would be beyond the visible horizon. He also co rrectly pointed out that original plans to launch at twiligh t - giving the entire night in which to ru n - were unt enable due to Allied fighter-bo mbers. T he S-boats wo uld be forced to depart at night under cove r of darkn ess. He further reckoned th at the only possible met hod of firing was thus by compass bearing, using two waypoints to triangulate an d obtain a true bear ing of possible targets, transmitting thi s information to th e S-boats by radio. He also feared that inaccurate firing data, faulty running and the effect of stro ng tid al mo vement on the slow running torpedoes might wash one ashore thereby revealing the LUT gear to th e Allies. He was, however, overruled. As events transpired, the new weap on was never destined to play its part in th e operation of 2/3 August. In th e wake of heavy bombing the necessar y loadin g gear was put out of action and th e torpedo es rema ined ashore. On schedule, the diver sionary force of S-boa ts from Le Havre slipped from harbour. Several times tha t night th ey skirmished with what they took to be thr ee British MTBs, S167 being dam aged in a collision and S1 68 and S1 81 hit by enem y fire. All the remain ing boat s reported splinter and machine gun dam age, though ther e were no serious losses. Th e Luftwaffe was scheduled to operate over the clustered shipping off Sword Beach between midnight and 02.00hrs on 3rd August. An hour later the K- Yerbdnde would begin their attack. However, as the opera tio n was launched there were severe dela ys in takin g to the wa ter, par ticularly with the human torpedoes, whi le four contro l Linsens and eight

50

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W EAPON S OF DE SP ERATION

explosive boat s never put to sea at all. Of those that sailed, only seventeen Negers and ten control Linsens returned, claiming a substantial total ofenemy shipping sunk after suffering heavy defensive fire and consta nt hara ssment from the air from Spitfires of 132 Squadron as dawn brok e. Th e human torpedoes claimed two destroyers, two corvettes, one 1O,OOO-ton cruiser or troop transpott and one merchant ship estimated at 3,000 to ns sunk. Like his comrade Gerhold, 24 -year-old Oberfernschreibm eister Herbert Berrer of 36 1 K-Flotilla was awarded the Knight's Cross on 5 August for what was recorded as his part in the sinking of a 10,000-ton freighter and previously sinking another enem y ship during the attac k at Anzio. With two Knight's Crosses awarded and requ iring urgent replenishment of their depleted rank s, the Neger pilots of 361 KFlotilla were returned to Germany, headed to Suhrendorfl Eckernforde (' Dorfkoppei') where they were issued with the improved Marder and later transferred onward to Denmark on 30 September. The nature of the human torpedo as an effective weapon has often led to them being characterised as a suicide weapon, aki n to the Japanese ' Kaiten' which trul y was a human torpedo with no separate warh ead capable of detachment. Tho ugh we have alread y mentioned the small number of SS men for whom assignment to the K- Verbiinde app eared to have been of a probationary and perhap s even suicidal nature, in general usage it was clearly untrue of the Neger and Marder. How ever, the fighting ardour of the young volunteers also hints at a near suicida l attitu de, as evidenced in the SKL Diary entry regarding th is operation . Three office rs of the Marder Flotilla as well as one cadet officer, one NCO and five men announced shortly before the start that they would make contact with the enemy and completely destroy any worthwhil e targets, regardless of their radius of action and question of getting back. These men did not return from the operation." In turn th e Linsens, who had lost one officer and eight men, claim ed one transport, one freighter with a 'lattice mast' and an LCf sunk. Th is optimistic appraisal of results once more caused a storm of ent husiasm amongst the units that reached all the way to Berlin. However, seven of the returning control Linsens (Kom mando /insen) also reported having to discharge one Ladungs/ins e each during th e run in to the target, the explosive boats lost as a result of 'technical failure '.29 Between th em, the Linsens and Negers reckon ed to have destroyed between 40 ,000 and 50 ,000 tons of enemy shipping, their attack leading onshore ob server s to report:

52

BATTLE S OFF NORM A NDY

'Seven explosions some of them with high jets of flame and large mushrooms of smoke and another succession of loud explosions ... dur ing the hours 02.30 and 06.00.'30 In fact they had definitely sunk o nly three ships. T he first of the sinkings, the ' H unt' class destroyer HMS Q uom, had had an eventful career thus far during the war, striking mines twice and being on e of five destroyers that inte rcepted the Ger ma n ra ider Kom et in the English Channel during 1942. In June 1944 Q uo m was an escort for personnel con voys during Operation Neptune until hit and sunk during the K- Verbiinde attack , the violence of th e explosion almos t rending the hull in tw o. Four officers a nd 126 rat ings were lost. Already having been torped oed twice while serving in the Mediterranean earlier in the war, Christopher Yorston . . . was up in the gunnery tower when Quam was hit. 'Within seconds I was in the water, looking up at the ship split in half,' he said. 'If I had been in a cruiser, where the gun tur ret is completely sealed, I'd have been a goner. I grabbed hold of the first thing in the water, a lump of wood, and a converted trawler picked me up. It's the luck of the draw.'!' Norman Ackroyd was another survivor from IIM S Quam . Part of the No .3 gun crew on the quarterdeck, he remembers no ment ion of the Small German Battle Units that eventua lly destroyed his ship: No , we were not warned before about explosive motorboats or the human torped o but if we had I doubt at the time if it would have caused much more than passing interest, after all we were using weapons of a similar natur e. One unusual event before we sailed that night was that we were warn ed that it was a punishable offence not to wear a lifebelt at sea (very few of us did). We were also ordered to check our Iifebelts and if it was found to be faulty to draw a new one from the sto res. I found that mine would not inflate and drew a new one but it must have been damaged when I left the ship, as it would not inflate when I was in the water. Thinking about this afterwards it must have been considered at the time that we would be taking part in a very dangerous mission the following morn ing. The ship had been part of the beachhead defence force for some nights before, on the night of August 3rd we sailed as normal just before dusk . . . accompanied by an American radar ship and we were

53

W EAP O N S O F D ESP ER ATIO N

informed over the tannoy that at dawn we were going in close to Le Havre in ord er to bombard the E-boat pens. The American ship was to control the shelling. Just before midnight however there was a massive explosion amidships and I understand she had been hit in the boiler rooms, broke in two, and sank in a few minutes. I personally was blown overboard by the blast and found myself in the water fully dressed. A large number of my shipmates must have gone down with the ship but there were quite a lot of us in the water. The American ship left the scene at full speed which caused a lot of resentment at the time but it was explained to us later that if she had stayed she would possibly have sustained the same fate as Quam . I personally did not see the American ship depart at speed but I was told of this by others when we survivors wondered why we had not been picked out of the water by them. Just after Qua m was sunk there was quite a lot of us in the water but by morning when we were picked up only a few were left. 130 lads lost their lives that night out of a crew of just under 150. We were informed after that the ship had been sunk by a German human torp edo . .. and that the German pilot had been picked up by another of our destro yers of the defence force. We were also told that we had run into a number of these torp edoes which were being carried into the beachhead by the tide but as a result of the Qua m being sunk the alarm had been raised and the other torpedoes had been dealt wirh."

BATTLES O F F NO RMA ND Y

M arder

Th e two other confirmed sinkings were that of the 545 -ton 'Isles' class minesweeping trawler HMT Gairsay engaged in clearing the dense German minefields, hit by a Linsen, and L CG 764 rammed by two Linsens simultaneo usly. The LCG (Landing Craft Gun ) was an example of the ' Ma rk 4 Landin g Craft Tank' that had been converted to pro vide close insho re fire support during amphibious landings. Carrying a crew of aro und fifty, includ ing a sizeable Royal Marine detachment, th ese cra ft carried two 4.7in gun s mounted facing forward with one superimposed to fire over the other on a reinforced deck over the tank well, with large quantities of ammunition above the waterline as well as thre e 20mm cannons. Further to these three ships, thre e others had been so severely damaged th at the y were event ually wr itten off. The transport SS Fort Lac la Rouge on bareboat charter to Brita in's Ministry of Transport from the US M aritime Commission and the Liberty ship SS Samlong were both con sidered structural losses. Fort Lac la Rouge had been one of the vessels constructed in an accelerated building programme instigated due to th e heavy losses suffered by th e Allied Merchant

service in th e wa r's ea rly months. Ships were commissioned from Cana da and th e United Sta tes for man agement by British Shipping Co mpa nies, the nam es of those built in Ca nada all prefixed ' Fo rt' a long with their sister ships the ' Parks' and th e U.S. bu ilt ' Oceans'. Hit and badl y dam aged, Fort Lac fa Rouge was beached at Oui str eham , after wh ich her ca rgo was discharged. Tow ed to Car diff and then Newp ort for survey, the freighter was event ua lly mo ved to the River Torrid ge where she was laid up until broken up in 1949. Likewise SS Sam long was so badl y da mage d th at it was towed to Blackwat er River and laid up as a structura l loss. Th e last of th is unfortunate trio was ano ther warship, the ageing cruiser HM S Durban. Th e largest warship victim of th e K-Yerbande attac k, this cru iser had served in the Royal Navy since 192 1, one of its most notabl e assignments alongside the destroyers HM S Jup iter and Stro ngho ld when they had provided the esco rt for th e last co nvoy o f evacuees from Singa pore bound for Batavia before the bastion fell to the Japanese in 194 2. As th e K-Yerbande retired to lick their wounds and prepare for another attac k, the delayed Dackel were put into act ion in th e early morning hours of 6 and 7 August, launched by S-boa ts from th e Le Havre approach buoy: six boats (S 174, S 176, S 177 o f 2 S-Flotilla, S 97 . S 132 and S 135 o f 6 S-Flot illa ) firing between 01.36hrs and 02.34hrs on th e first night, thre e boats between 02. 26hrs and 02. 50hrs on th e second. Th e Linsens so rtied once more on th e night of 9 August, twelv e cont ro l and sixteen explosive boat s departing the Dives estu ary in thre e sepa rate gro ups to attac k shipping off Sword Beach . Four of th e co ntro l boats failed to return from the attack, whi ch wa s timed to coincide with Dackel torpedoe s laun ched berween 03 .59hrs and 04 .20hrs by three S-boa ts. Th e survivors cla imed one destroyer, one escort vessel, one LST and six merchant ships hit. Again, th e results were ent husiastically greeted by Germa n naval comma nd and on 12 August Ltn (V) Alfred Vettner, Gro up leader of 211 K-Flotilla was also awarded the Knight 's Cross .

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O ur gro up [4 Rotten] went with Ltn Alfred Venner . . . from Trouville for service agains t the Allied invasion fleet. The Linsens, with the pilots in them, were pushed over the beach on their carriages and into the sea wh ere they floated free and for med up. The course was laid in and the jo urney begun . First th e co mmand boat then explosive boa ts num ber one an d num ber two. The sea was quiet an d th e moon shone in the sky... . After a short time the enemy shone searc hlights high over our heads in our direc tion. I was the command boa t lead er and behind me sat both remote controls for the explosive boats. We remai ned lying quietly after disengagi ng the engines unt il the enemy fired star shells an d then we increase d speed. After we acq uired the tar get we gave th e pilot of number one boat the signa l to go faster and the Linsen sprang forward in th e water. We sped behind the explosive boats also at full speed. Th e remo te control too k over steeri ng only on the final shot at the target. I, as pilot of the command boat, had the task of picking the ot her pilots up out of the water. It wasn't long befo re I sighted him and pulled him, with his help, onto our forward deck. I no ticed by a sudden flash at the Linsen, that the enemy had been hit. But now I had to concentra te completely on my task and save my comrades. An enormo us explosion told us of our success. Then it was the turn of ta rget number tw o, but this time our luck ran out. Th e escorts sho t at us with every barrel an d th e second boat was sun k. Also it took some time to search for the second Linsen pilot in the water, but we did find him and dragged him on deck too. We had success with nea rly every one of the exp losive boats. But on the rerum we were attacked by Allied fighter-bombers and lost a command boat with all of its passengers.P The seas off N ormandy remained perilous for th e Allied fleet as Dack el were deplo yed agai n o n th e nights of 10 Aug ust (three S-boats launch ing ten to rpedoes) a nd 14 August (two S-boa ts launching eight to rpedoes). During this period th e cruiser HMS Frobisher, th e freighter l ddesleigb , the Algerine class mi nesweeper HMS Vestal as we ll as th e minesweeper repair ship H M S Albatros (a 4,800-ton ex-sea plane ca rrier) were all damaged . A lbatros was hit fo rwa rd, over 100 cas ualties suffered in th e blast and decla red a write-off, th ough later placed in reserve a nd recommissioned as a min esweep er hulk.34 HMS Frobisher had been part of Bombarding Force D covering la nd ings on Sword Beach during D-D ay, before being damaged by a bo mb hit an d later assigned as depot ship for the Mulbe rry H arbo ur B at Arromanches. Leslie Finlay remembered the Frobisher being hit in an article published in The Newcastle Evening Chronicle 60 years later.

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I was below and it was 7.30 in the morning and I had just made the tea, it was D-Day +9 or 10, so I'd just made the tea and there was such a bang. And one of the first th ings you do is you wa nt to get to the top. I think I was the only one hurt, because the teap ot fell on my foo t. Out of 800 I was the only one hurr." H owever, th e va lue of the Dack el in co mbat a ppea red to be minimal, even to o pti mistic German nava l staff. The Fuhrer der Schnellboote (FdS) ra ised serious do u bts with SKL as to the reliability of reported sinkings, presen ting th e following on 16 August: ' . .. [a) survey of the Dackel emp loyment sector from the 4th to the 11th August, which enclose d six opera tio ns off Le Havre with a total of 76 to rpedoes. FdS believes only the sight and detector sets of two specially equipped direc tion finder stations to be reliab le as far as observations were possible during night and in the twilight, when judging the observations of effect. The same applies to the observatio n post of Operational Staff Bohrne. In rerum observations of the nava l and army coastal batteries were regar ded as unreliable and expelled, just so, observation fro m the Luftwaffe stations. Also flying reconn aissance is not reliable as they very often take firing ships' ar tillery for deton at ion s. Th e FdS, witho ut pron oun cing a final sentence to the value of Dackel operations, is therefore sceptical to the majority of reported observed successes, as real observations from the sinking of ships were not at hand and especially as the radio monitoring up to now made no reports about torpedoing, averages, sinkings, etc. 36 O nce agai n th e remaining Nege r pilot s were sent int o ac tion o n the night of 15 Augu st. Their target was th e concentra tion of Allied shipping off th e Dives estua ry an d fifty-three N egers from 363 K-Flotill a were earma rked for th e attack (six had become unser vicea ble du e to damage in tran sit from Germa ny). H owever, a trocious weather co nditions of thunderstorms a nd hea vy rain - combined with inexperienced lau nching parties - virt ua lly foiled the attack before it had begu n. O nly eleven cra ft were lau nched, seven of these retu rni ng prematurely du e to th e bad co nd itio ns. T he remaining four valia ntly stuck to th eir plan a nd claim ed a munitions ship hit and sunk. Five of th e N eger s were lost at th e launch ing site. T he last ro ll of th e d ice for th e Neger crews of 363 K-Flotilla ca me the following night when forty-two set sail from Villers-sur-Mer, T heir deplo yment was to be match ed by other Kriegsmarine units involved in torpedo operations in the so uth of th e Seine Bay, committed to the

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waters off Dungeness and also minin g th e sea off North Foreland. Onl y sixteen Neger s would return, th e rema inder falling victim to depth charges, surface defensive fire and air attack. Mat rosengefreiter Wolfgang Hoffmann was one of the fort unate few to survive. He had patrolled th e Seine estua ry in search of targets until nearl y full light th e following da y. Finding nothing, H offmann was about to fire his torpedo at a bar ge to wh ich was teth ered a barra ge balloon when he sighted an Allied speedboa t headin g across his path at high speed. Attempting what was a doubtful shot at best, Hoffmann released his torpedo but , unsurprisingly, missed the speeding cra ft. He then headed for hom e; hugging the coastline until at ab out 1O.OOhrs he was sighted by Allied fight ers and attacked. Hoffm ann qu ickly cut the power on his Neger and the torpedo sank by the stern so that it was nearl y verti cal, the youn g pilot hopin g that it wo uld either resemble a buo y or look like it was alread y sinking. Not fooled by his subterfuge, th e fighters continued to attac k, one bullet hitting the Plexiglas cupola, splintering it and allowing some water to enter. Hoffmann restarted the mo tor and regained horizontal trim, firing a distr ess flar e through the shatte red canopy, after wh ich the aircraft sto pped th eir att ack and banked away from him. It had been a lucky escape and some two hours lat er Hoffmann was able to stagger ashore once aga in on the Germ an -held coas tline. Seven Neger pilots were captured dur ing the mission, another mortally wounded and tak en with an intact machine by the support cra ft LCS251 as he sat dying at the controls. T he Neger was soon returned to Portsmouth for investigat ion . Th e German pilots claimed to have sunk one destroyer and one freight er as well as the prob able destruction of another destroyer. In actuality a single small land ing craft, LCFl l , and the small 757-ton barrage balloon vessel HMS Fratto n were sunk, the latter with twenty-nine of its crew. Two tor pedoes also impacted against the ancient French battleship Courbet, th ough th is had already been deliberately sunk as a Goo seberr y blockship. A hit was also registered on the 5,20 5-ton transport ship Idd esleigh though this too had already been beached followin g dam age susta ined from a Dackel hit six nights previously.The return course of the surviving Negers revealed the dire situation of the German frontlin e in Normandy: they were ordered to make for Le Havre as the position at Villers was no longer tenable. Bohrne and his sta ff would also relocat e to Le Havre on 18 August, shortly afterward moving onwards to Amiens. It was the end of the Neger's deplo yment in western Fra nce. The original conc ept of the midget service weaponry had been to use a

rotating selection of weapon types; once th e Allies had learnt to counter one, a new type could be despatched . However, th e Neger wa s clearly no secret to th e Allies and obvi ously vulnerable due to th eir inability to dive. Thus their tenure in the frontlin e could no longer be justified and they wer e soon withdrawn entirely fro m combat, replaced by the Marder. Th e Linsens too were no longer nov el to th e enemy, consequently on 18 Augu st both 363 and 2 11 K-Flotillas wer e also withdrawn from th e coa st. The Negers of 363 K-F1otilla relocated to St Arm and Tournai in Belgium and the Linsens to Strasbourg in preparation for shipment to the south of France where a fresh Allied invasion, ' O peration Dragoon', had begun on 15 August. The last Negers passed over the Seine on 20 August as a fresh batch of sixty M arder hum an torpedoes Oblt.z.S, Peter Berger's 364 K-Flotill a - arrived in Le Ha vre from Reims in Germany. They too were directed to Tournai to aw ait possible redep loyment to the south of France though naval planners wer e acutely aware that the y faced severe transportation probl ems between Belgium and the French Med iterran ean coast. ' ? Sho rtly th ereafte r OKM ordered the transfer of both 363 and 36 4 K-Flot illas to the Mediterranean. There they would pass fro m Bohme's command into the localised control of Kommando Stab Italien and be made ready for action against the Allied forces of Operation Dragoon . However, before their relocation th e maul ed rema ins of both 36 2 and 363 K-Flotillas returned to Suhrendorf via Amiens, Tourna i and then Lubeck, to take charge of the impro ved M ard er design, even thi s movement order proving to be problematic in an increasingl y hostile occupied count ry. As well as the omnipresent threat of air attack, other forc es had risen against th e Wehrma cht troops, Me chanikermaat Dienemann being killed by French partisan s during the road journey. The now veteran pilots of the K-Verbiinde flotillas had by this time adopted a tr adition of the U-boar service. Men of 362 K-Flotilla now sported silver sea horses on their cap s as a flotilla emblem , the pilot s of 363 wearing a small silver shark, its tail adorned with a red stripe for each successful mission. Between them they had ama ssed considerable awards for valour, the K-Verbiinde no longer labouring und er th e image of an untried service, but now revelling in the brief flar e of propaganda attention. Once in Germany, 363 K-Flotilla 's comm ander L.z.S. Wetterich, who had been wounded in action off the Normandy coa st, was invalided out of active service and remain ed at Suhrendorf to oversee future tr aining, replac ed by L.z.S. Munch as nominal flotilla

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chief while Wetterich retained his title as Senior Officer. Th e flotill a received sixty Ma rders, these split into six gro ups of ten for the purposes of training, each gro up commanded by a man of at least Fiihn rich rank . As esta blished in the Neger units, the flotilla wo uld tota l approximately 110 men, though many of the logistical branches were only attac hed during combat and were shared with oth er human tor pedo units. Th e flot illa composit ion comprised sixty pilots, sixty tru ck dr ivers to haul the Mar ders into position from the nearest railhead where th ey had been taken by railroad flat car, plus fifteen to twenty engineers and up to th irty-five headquarters staff and administra tive personn el. Tournai became the new conce ntra tio n point for K-Verbiinde forces with the despat ch of 26 1 K-Flotilla's twenty-five Biber one-man subma rines fro m Germa ny for the Belgian town on 2 1 August. A flotill a of M olchs was also due to arrive there fro m the Fatherland eight days later, but last min ute ap preciatio n of th e lack of possible launch sites for th is latter subma rine diverted them to the south of Fra nce and M editerran ean operations. The Biber and M olch designs were the first of what could be rightfully called midget subma rines to be committed to the front line by OKW. T he Biber (Beaver) was the brainchild of K.K. H ans Barte ls, developed by Lubeck's Flenderwe rke and modelled closely on the British Weiman craft that had been captured at Bergen on 22 Nove mbe r 1943 . T he progress on delivering a wo rking submersi ble was remar ka bly rapi d given that negot iat ions between th e builders and Bartels began on 4 Februa ry 1944 and within six weeks they had a protot ype ready for testing - the so-called 'Bunreboo t', named after Flenderwer ke Directo r Bunte, th ough known more widely as 'Adam' . Visibly different to the eventual finished Biber design, Adam measured 7m long with a beam and dr aught of 96cm each. Displacing three tons of water the sma ll boat could dive to 25m, running for two and a quarter ho urs at six knots. Th is speed almost matched her surface capability of 7 knot s, th ough the craft's endurance was rated at 91 nau tical miles for surface travel using a petrol engine. Follow ing the unexp ected sinking du ring the first atte mpted 'Ada m' trial, further tests und ertak en in the Trave River on 29 M ay proved highly successful and an immedia te series of twe nty-four cra ft were or dered, with severa l slight refinements th at led to the final Biber mode l. T he submar ine was not witho ut its faults th ough, th e most pro minent being th e use of petrol engine power rather th an diesel for surface travel. Heye expressed extreme misgivings abo ut the use of petrol and its subseque nt risk of carbon -mo noxi de poison ing of th e

opera to r and exp losio n fro m an accum ulation of highly-combu stible fumes fro m the engine. H owever, the designers and officers of Marinegruppenkommando N ord respo nsible for th e tria ls expressed no such misgivings. Th eir ra tio na le was that while there was an acute shortage of suitably-sized diesel engines, there were an almost unlimited supply of petrol engines tha t could fit the subma rine's purpose and th ey were almost silent into the bargain. Heye's fears were overruled and the Biber wen t into immediate production at both Flenderwerke and the Italian Ansaldo- Werke, furth er lab our on the hulls later farmed out to Ulrn's Klockn er-Humboldt-Deut z an d other man ufacturing companies. Thus the th ree sectio ns were built in three disti nct geogra phic locat ion s and later assem bled, almost as envisioned by Drage r years before. Th e specia lly constructed trailers used to transpo rt th e finished sub mari nes were made by a firm in Ha lle and it wa s th is asset of transportability th at the K-Verbiinde rate d highl y. It wa s even suggested to use th is portabil ity to its most extreme by tra nsporti ng a Biber by Bv222 flying boat to Egypt. There the airc raft wo uld land either on the Grea t Bitter Lakes or th e Suez Ca na l an d the Biber released to find an d to rpedo a ship so as to block the strategically vital wat erw ay. Fortuna tely for the pilot of th is submarine, the far-fetched plan was aba ndo ned as un worka ble. Costing 29, 000 Reichsmarks each to produ ce, the final Biber model displaced 3.645 tons of water, the length having been increased to 9.035m, th e beam to 1.57 m with tor pedoes and the draught remained the same as 'Adam's'. Two torpedoes of near zero specific gravity comprised the Biber's usual armament, th e to rpedoes having to have neutral buoyancy lest they swamp the small parent craft with their weight and also obliterate any chance of keeping trim on d ischarge. T his reduction of weight was achieved by the removal of half the battery from the weap on, accepting the loss of speed that th is reduction wou ld incur. Thus the TIIIb (Marder to rpedoes) and TIIIc (Biber, Seehund and other midget submari ne torpedoes) were capa ble of only 5,000m at 17.5 knots. Th e Biber's two wea pons were slung from an overhead rail, one on either side of the boat at the top of a scalloped cavity. T hey were laun ched with compressed air store d at 200 Bar in five steel bottl es, the high-pressure air also being used for blow ing ballast tanks. As well as the torpedo, the Biber was capab le of carrying mines on its twin racks. Genera lly the mines used were the Mag net-A k ustis ch-Druck (MA D) combined magnetic-acoustic-pressure triggered weapon. This was sma ller than the standa rd midget torpedo, measuring between 5 and 5.5m in length , though having the same diameter. Set to exp lode by

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a ship of over 6,000 ton s displacement passing overhea d, the trigger relied on a ll thr ee mechani sms to explode the warhead. Th e mines were heavier than torpedoes, therefore the rwo hemispherical ends of the weapon comprised of float chambers to offset this negative buoyancy. Correspondingly Bibers were subjected to a slight heeling to one side if a torpedo was carried on the opposite rail. When the mine was released, a spring-loaded lever held in place on either end of the mounting rail was also released, springing upward and piercing the float chambers though on discharge the mine had the disturbing habit of rising to the surface due to the slightly positive buoyancy, genera lly remainin g there for about three minutes unt il eno ugh water had flooded the holed compartments to make it sink once again. Perhaps more alarmingly th e Biber also had a tendency to surface after releasing the mine, the weapon's centre of gravity lying slightly to stern of the Biber's, causing the boa t to be in turn slightly bow heavy when load ed. Upon release, unless the operato r was exceptionally skilled, the genera l counterbalancing action of the freed submarine would lift the bow too rapidl y to be sto pped. Nevertheless, th is was not necessaril y a fatal design flaw. Th e Biber's tru e Achilles Heel rema ined, as Heye had feared, its petro l engine and the result ant accumulation with in the small craft of toxic and highly flammable fumes. A 2.5-litre, 32hp Opel-Blitz petrol tru ck engine pro vided th is main propulsion , the 225 Iitres of petrol carried in the sma ll craft's tank giving a surfaced ran ge of 100 nautical miles at 6.5 knots. Exha ust from the engine was vent ed outboard via a pipe th at ran fro m the engine compa rt ment to a sma ll enclosure aft of the conning to wer. For submerged travel th e Biber was provided with thr ee battery trou ghs (Type 13 T21O) carrying four batteries in total (rwo of twenty-six cells and two of rwelve cells) and a 13hp electric torpedo motor turned the 47cm diameter prop eller, providing 8.6 nau tical miles at 5.3 knots plus a furth er 8 nautical miles at 2.5 knots. Th e diving depth had been slightly decreased to 20m becau se the ba lance of size and weight had meant a corresponding use of 3mm sheet steel for the pressure hull. Intern ally, the three-sectioned hull (bolted togeth er with rubber flanges between the joins) was strengthened by flat bar frame ribs spaced abo ut 25c m apa rt. Th e flanges themselves were sometimes prone to leak ing and Biber pilots were instructed to dive th eir boats for rwo hours to check the sea ls before they would be released for combat duty. On e Biber veter an , Heinz Hubeler, later recounted th at he had mad e man y such dives, dropping to the seabed and read ing a book until an alarm clock that he had taken for the pu rpose indicat ed that his rwo hours were over."

The relative weakness of this segmented hull was exacerba ted by th e rwin-scalloped indenta tio ns that allowed streamlined stowage of the to rpedoes but lessened dept h charge resistance. Two heavy-duty lifting lugs were fitted to the upper hull fore and aft to enable moving by crane. Another lug was welded to the stern for tow ing something behind th e small submari ne, while yet another was fi tted forwa rd to enable the vessel to be towed to its operational area. However,experiments at using Linsens to tow the Biber resulted in failure as the small motorboat s could not develop sufficient power, while S-boats were also unsuitable as they crea ted too much wake for the Biber. T hus this task would fall to the overworked minesweepers of the R-Flot illas sta tioned in the combat zone. T hese were by no means ideal, especially those highly manoeuvrable craft fi tted with the directional Voigt-Schneider prop ellers, but they were the best that cou ld be provided for the K-Verbiinde. T he small co nning tower in which the pilot's head naturally was positioned was made of a luminium alloy cas ting bolt ed on to an ova l aperture in the hull. Six recta ngular ports - one aft, one forwa rd and two others each side - provided armo ured-glass windows for the ope rato r to view his world around him. A circ ular hinged hatchway above was held in place by a sing le interna l clip, a no ther windo w in it providing upwa rd view for the pilot as well. Expec ta tio ns were high as th e first completed Bibers began to be issued for train ing of th eir prospective crew. However, the Biber was not an easy craft to handl e. Two circular wheels, one slightly smalle r in diameter than the other but both tu rn ing on the same axis immediat ely in front of the pilot , contro lled a wood en rudder and single wooden hydropl ane. It was und oubtedly a complicated and highly skilled manoeuvre to handl e the hydroplan e and rudd er sim ultaneously while at the same time o bserving th e compass, depth gauge and periscope, an d perhap s even using the bilge pump as well. Correspondi ngly the Biber moved almos t entirely surfaced, a freeboard of about 60c m show ing when at normal tr im, submerging only when it was a bsolutely necessa ry. Com pensa ting an d tr imming tank s had been dispensed with and solid ba llast was sto wed during pre paratio n for ope ra tio na l use. Whil e at sea, weight and trimming cha nges co uld only be acco mplished dynamically or by partial flooding of the diving tan ks situa ted fore and aft, both tank s free flooding with sma ll vents in the to p. Thi s in turn mad e it nearl y imposs ible to rema in at periscope depth meaning that to rpedo attacks also had to be conducted surfac ed, though the Biber was theor etically capable of submerged firing. Pilots perfected the art

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of lying silently on the bottom in shallow water whil e awa iting an opportune moment to surface and attack wh atever ta rgets wer e at hand, though often when tanks were blown the Biber had an uncomfortable habit of shooting rapidly to the surface rather than making a stealthy appearance. The periscope itself represented another problem . Du e to the space con straints within the tiny aluminium conning tower th e periscope wa s onl y capable of being directed forward, providing vision up to 40° to the left and to th e right. The windows provided in the tower frequently became iced during the winter months rendering them useless; the pilot virtually blind other than what wa s visible through the periscope. Distance wa s difficult to estimate through th e periscope, though it wa s fitted with cross-hair s, thu s the whole op eration wa s on e of 'point and shoot', th e torpedoes running at a little over 3m below the surface. If the forward windows were a ble to be used, a ring and cross hair sight was fitted near th e tower that could be lined up with a bead fixed to the bow for surface firing. Navigation wa s aided by a proj ector compass, th e magnets for which were hou sed at the top of a sealed bronze alloy tube some 75cm in length, rigidly fixed to the forward end of the conning tower immediately in front of the periscope, passing through th e tower ceiling to extend some 45cm above the craft. Behind the periscope wa s the boat 's air intake. Originally only 30cm above th e conning tower, this wa s increased to a metre, all three masts joined togeth er by metal bracing. Like the subsequent Seehund design, air wa s drawn in and circulated through the pilot compa rt ment before reachin g the engine, therefore acting as a source of fresh air for both the machinery and crewma n. Once closed down for action the pilot wa s left a single oxygen bottle for breathing from, approximately thirty-six hours of air available. Instruction for the Biber crew s was undertaken at Blauhoppel near Schlutup opposite Liibeck's Flenderwerft shipyard where the boats' segments were primarily assembled . The camp of wooden huts wa s relatively isolated, three-quarters o f a mile from the near est tr amlin e. Reckoned to require eight weeks of training, the first batch of pilots were rushed through in three, ready to follow Bartels into their first op erational assignment. During their schooling the pro spective pilots were often brought in to familiari se themselves with Bibers still in repair or con struction in the shipyard workshops - almo st a microcosm of the Baubelrung undertaken by Ll-boat crews. Th e men were next despatched to the depot ship Deneb that lay in Liibeck Bay, the Bibers in use restin g either nearby in the water or hou sed in ba rges off Travemiinde. Those

who swiftly displayed a flair for the sma ll submarines were tasked with instructing their flotilla mates whil e Bartels remained supervisor at Blaukoppel as Senior Officer, assisted by his small staff that comprised an Adjutant, Oblt.dR Mitbau er, Senior Engineering Officer, O bit. (Ing) Endler, Staff Officer, LdR Sreputtat, Torpedo Officer, Lt(lng) Preussner, and Chief Instructors, Oblt.z.S. Bollmeier, L.z.S. Bollmann , L.z.S. Kirschner, L.z.S. Dose and O berfiihnrich Breske. The first three Bibers were delivered to Blauk oppel in May 1944, and were taken over by the eager recruits o f 261 K-Flotilla . T he following month saw six more completed, th e number event ually rising to a production high of 117 Bibers completed in September." Each of the eventual ten planned Biber flotillas were supposed to con sist of th irty boats and their pilots apiec e, supporte d by an ancillary staff of nearly 200 men . As an example o f the or ganisati on of th ese co mba t units, th e headquarters sta ff for 261 K-Flotilla as it head ed for operation s in Fran ce comprised:

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Senior Officer: Kaptlt. (M A) Wolters (replacing Bartels wh o rem ain ed in Liibeck ) Engineering Officer: L.(lng. ) Schwendler Torpedo Officer: Obit. (T) Dobat c.P.O. (N avigation ): Obersteur. Kram er Medical Officer: O berassistentarzst Borch er An unnam ed mine specialist officer and sho re personnel numberin g nearly 100 were under the command of Stab sob erfeldwebel Schmidt. After bein g put onto an operational footing in Augu st, Kaptlt, Wolters' flotilla of Bibers faced a daunting journey from Rial/k oppel to th e front-line base allocated in France. As th ey neared the enemy th e large trucks towing the canvas-draped Bibers on their tr ailers ca me under increas ing pressure from air harassment as well as becom ing aware of the proximity of several enemy armoured formations as th e Wehrmacht's western front cru mbled rap idly. Days after th e Bibers dep arted Germany, a fresh Linsen flotill a wa s also despatched, bound for Fecarnp. However, the military situa tion on th e ground had so changed by 30 Augu st that th e Linsen unit was halted in Brussels whil e OKM debated the wisdom o f deploying them against British co nvoy traffi c off Boulogne or Ca lais. As th e situa tion worsened, the y were eventually completely withdrawn and sent via Ghent to Miinchen-Gladbach in th e Rh ineland before po ssible tr an sfer to th e south of France. Their luck had deserted th em th ou gh as they clashed with British armoured units at th e sta rt o f th eir new roa d

WEAPON S OF D ESPE RATION

journey, taking heavy cas ualties and losing severa l Linsens. T he mauled remains were transferred back to Lubeck for refitting before plann ed redeployment to the south of Fran ce. As events tran spired it was to Groningen - west of the Germa n border in Th e Netherla nds _ that the flotilla would eventua lly be sent on 23 Oc to ber. Wolters' Biber unit at Tournai had in the meantime been transferred to Fecarnp harbou r on 29 August having also suffered losses on the way - th is time to enemy aircraft. They were to be immediately laun ched against Allied shipping in the Seine Bay, but difficulties in getti ng them into the sea caused a postponement of 24 hou rs. By the night of 30 August, twenty-two of them had been placed in the water but due to the destruction of port facilities, damage to several Bibers and the loss of many personnel thro ugh the persistent air attacks only fourteen were able to actually sail between 21.30 and 23.30hrs. After nearly nine hours of stro ng winds and heavy seas twelve retu rned witho ut reaching their target area, the remaining two, piloted by L.z.S. Dose and Funkmaat Bosch, claiming to have sunk a Liberty Ship and a large merchant ship between them before they too successfully returned to harbour. In action the Biber pilot s were subjected to the same trying co ndition s that the pilots of the hum an torpedoes had been . As most Biber sorties wo uld last fro m one to two days - and subsequent Seehund sorties some times as many as ten days - Germa n midget crewmen received a specia l, low-bulk or 'k linker-free' diet. Once und er way they were instructed that du ring the first 24 hours they must use food tablets and thereafter energy tablets - including the DIX amphetami ne cockta il- which wou ld keep them going for ano ther 24 hours. If they were reluctant to use DIX, which many men were once the side effects became kn ow n, man y ate 'Schoka-Kola' a type of choco late th at co mprised 52 .5 per cent cocoa, 0.2 per cent caffeine and th e balance sugar. To compo und their discom fort many Biber pilots suffered from seasickness and owi ng to the inherent danger of wa ter ente ring when the hatch was opened, vomi ted instead into the bilge. This in itself was unpl easant eno ugh, though it was also something that had to be carefully mon ito red by the pilots, as one of the initial sympto ms of carbon mon oxide po isoning is na usea an d vomiting. After this single costly exercise the Bibers at Fecarnp were withdra wn to Miinchen-Glad bach. Travelling by road they once again suffered heavy casua lties along the way as Allied gro und-attack aircra ft con trolled the skies by day. As the German convoys raced for safety, Allied pursuit caught traces of the K-Yerbande units left behind on the French roads. Among them was Royal Marine Pat rick Dalzel-]ob, an experi-

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BATTLES O F F NO RMAND Y

Bib er enced commando who had work ed for Com bined Operations since 1942 and ironically had taken part in training aboa rd the Welman midget submarine. In 1943 he had been transferred to 30 Assault Unit a specialised gro up of Marines and naval officers that raced alongside more ort hodo x combat units at the fro nt-line, tasked with finding men and equipment from Germany's naval secret weapo ns programm e, gathering all available intelligence regard ing the Kriegsma rine. On 2 Septem ber, Pat rick arrived in Fecarnp to learn fro m liberated locals th at the last eight Bibers had only recentl y departed on their long, low trailers concealed und er can vas and towe d by heavy tru cks. Pat rick and his men managed to trace the submarines to Abbeville, and event ually discovered one on the Amiens-Bapa ume roa d, abando ned after suffering severe dam age from Allied aircraft attack: It was almost an anti-climax after such a long search; there it was, off the side of the road where the towing lorry must have left it - a midget submarine, itself intact, on a burnt -out trailer. It was indeed much more like a miniature of a normal submarine than were the British Welmans with which I was already familiar, and it carr ied two twenty-one-inch torpedoes instead of the Weiman's delayed-action nose charge. Given the right circumstances and a skilful pilot, it could no doubt be a formidable weapon .t? Th e captured Biber, its interior ravaged by fire possibly ignited by th e attack or in an attempt by its crew to destr oy its contro ls, was tr an sported back to Portsmouth where it und erw ent careful inspection. In th e meantime Kommando Stab West, K.z.S. Friedrich Bohme and his staff, had also departed for the same destinati on as the retr eat ing Biber unit on 1 September, marking the end of K-Yerbiinde West 's presence in France.

67

RI V ER ASS AU LT

Alongside the development of the Linsen, the emergence of Kriegsmarine Kampfschwimmer (frogmen) is another aspect of the KVerbiinde development intertwined with units of the Brandenburgers. This time there was additional inter-service cross-pollination with the amalgamation of men from the Waffen SS and Sicherheitdienst (SO - SS Security Police) as well as A bwehr personnel. Frogman delivery of explosives was an idea that the German Armed Forces first used in 1915 during the First World War. The original German frogman unit that formed at this time was the 2nd Reserve Pioneer Company of Stettiner Pionierbattai//on 2. Trained in the Rhine River near Mainz they first went into action on 17 August 1915 against Russian guardships near Kown o. Successfully disablin g the Russian target it was also to be the last time that the Kaiser's frogmen were used during that conflict. Once again the Italians provided fresh inspiration for German Kampfschwimmer, the Decima Mas having used them to great effect already in the Mediterranean. The Abwehr immediately seized on this idea and formed its own marit ime sabotage tro ops, one of the first and the most successful of whom was Friedrich Hummel who took part in Italian raids on Gibraltar and Seville harb our s. Hummel remains one of the German armed forces most colourful characters. His backgro und had involved years in the German merchant navy aboard the sailing vessel Passat that had visited Chile, South Africa, japan and China amongst other destinations. He had joined the Krim inalp olizei in Alto na, Hamburg, eventually transferrin g to the dreaded SO and promoted to Hauptsturmfiihrer in 1942 . Hummel had also been involved in A bwehr intelligence work in Poland on the eve of the war and in Madr id between 1942 and 1944. Th e A bwehr began to form small units, Mar ine-Einsatz-Kommandos (MEK), that would under-

take tasks such as reconnaissance missions, bridge demolition, mine laying and so on. The fi rst such MEKs to be esta blished by the Abwehr were the MAR EI and MARKO in Hamburg, which later served as templates for the Kriegsm arine when Heye's K- Verbiinde took over responsibility for the maritime commando service. The Germans possessed a genuine advantage when develop ing the theory of military divers. While j acques Cousteau, a Vichy French naval office r, is credited with the creation of the aqualung, it was noted Austrian diving pioneer Hans Hass who developed the first modern rebreather, ideal for military use as it left no tell-tale bubble exhaust. The unit originated from the Drager firm's 1912-patented Ll-boat escape apparatus. The company cont inued to work on an evolution of this basic design until june 1942 when Drager patented a recognisable rebrearher with the air contai ned within a back-mounted bag. Th is is the device th at Hans Hass used dur ing his Aegean expedition in the summer of 1942. Ha ss had alread y excited the naut ical world when he shot an underwater film 'Pirsh linter Wasser' ('Sta lking beneath the sea') in the course of a 1939 diving expedition with two friends, fellowAustrian Alfred von Wurzian and j org Bohler. Their journey encompassed visits to Curacao and Bonaire, the trio being forced to return to Vienna via the United States after the outbreak of war. In 1942 Hass plann ed another expedition, though its locat ion was constrained by wartime and thu s took place in the Aegean Sea. It was there that Hass tested the new ' Drager-Gegenlunge' oxygen rebreather. Though limited to a depth of approx imately 20 m due to the risk of oxygen toxicity, it was the perfect app aratu s for military purposes. Hass and Alfred von Wurzian demonstrated the pioneering equipment to the Kriegsmarine commander of the Aegean, VA Erich Forste, and his Chief Of Staff K.K. Roth e-Roth from the mole in Piraeus Harb our on 11 july 1942. Oddly, despite the success of this breathing apparatus, the Kriegsmarine were slow to grasp its potential. Von Wurzian persevered, even attempting to get officers of the Army Pioneers interested in developing his frogman ideas, but to no avail. It was not until he began talkin g to representatives of the Abwehr's Ails/and Abteilung II , responsible for sabotage, that he found more enthusiastic listeners though the A bweh r already possessed five specialists in ship sabotage - including Hummel. Von Wurzian was also fortunate to meet a man who shared his vision of militar y frogmen within the Brandenburgers. Gefreiter Richard Reimann became his assistant, helping to develop oth er tools of their fledgling trade such as suita ble compasses and depth gauges. In

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CHAP TER FIV E

River Assault German frogmen in action

W EAPONS OF DESPERATION

RIV ER AS SA UL T

spring 1943 the two men were again asked to demonstrate the potential of the underwater fighter in Berlin, using the Olympic swimming baths before an audience of Germ an and Italian officers. After the successful exercise Von Wurzian and Reimann found themselves invited to join the training unit s of the Italian Decima Mas, which the y did the follow ing May. Until September 1943 the two men worked alongside their Italian counterp arts, training under the command of the outstanding athlete Tenente di vascello (Lieutenant Commander) Eugen Wolk and learning the Decima Mas's techniques. Born of mixed German-Russian parentage in Cernogov in the Ukraine, Wolk had returned to Germany with his family during the Bolshevik revolution of 191 7, where they found themselve s less than welcome in a Germany teeter ing on the brink of wartime defeat. Moving onwards to Constantinople and then Rome, with his father's encouragement Wolk enrolled in the na val academy at Livorno. The academy's director, Angelo Bellon i, was one of Italy's leading expens on diving and involved in tr aining th e Decima Mas 's divers (known as 'Gamma men') and correspondingly nurtured Wolk's enthusiasm for the subject of frogman operations. Von Wurzian became a de facto member of the Abwehr while in Italy and eagerly began training. He and Reimann were in Rom e when the unconditional surrender of Italy to the Allies was announced on 8 September, the German pair deciding to escape what they believed would be incarceration by the Italian authorities. Travelling on foot by night they reached German lines and discovered that Wolk and the bulk of the Decima Mas had also remained loyal to the fascist government. Th ey would train together once more, this time in Valdagno, northeast of Verona, using the swimming pool already in existence as part of a sporting complex owned by the Manzotti textile manufacturing plant. Wolk and Von Wurzian first arrived in the small town in th e foothills of the Italian Alps on 2 January 1944, Wolk accompanied by eighty Italian frogmen and his deputy, Luigi Ferraro. Ferraro was one of a successful Italian demolition team that had sunk Allied shipping on operations from the Turkish harbours at Alexandretta (now Iskenderun) and Mersina (now Mersin). Von Wurz ian in turn was accompanied by Reimann and thirty German recruits for the soon-to be-established Lehrkommando 700. This unit provided th e most com plicated training structure to be seen within th e K- Verbiinde, combining several different services within the German armed forces and intelligence apparatus. It was established at the end of March

1944 and remained based alongside the Decima Ma s trainees at the swimming baths at Valdagno. With th e formation of the K-Verbiind e came th e 'E insatz und Ausbildung Sud' under Kaptlt, Heinz Schomburg th at was already involved in form ing Linsen unit s with in th e Mediterranean theatre. Schomburg made a brief attempt to gain complete auto no mo us control of th e Valdagno swimming bath s for th e K- Verbiinde but encountered obstructions almost immediately from both th e Abwehr and also the SS who had becom e interested in th e development of th e Kampfscbwimmer service. Nevertheless, the th irt y Germa n recruits th at were tr ain ing with Von Wurzian wer e subsequently tr ansferr ed en masse to th e K- Verbiinde and thu s becam e Kriegsmarin e personnel. In addition to these men and th e Decima Mas, there were fifteen Abwehr person nel, commanded by Hauptmann Neitzer, and ten SS men also training alongside the Kriegsmarine personnel. One of th e prim ar y reason s that Wolk encouraged such wid e German interest was in order to obtain a greater recognition and source of supply for his school, which was largely ignored by the existing Italian naval hierarch y. Regardless of his motivation, the results justified his efforts and three German service branch es becam e enmeshed alongside th e Italian s within the training facilities. However, with Heye's ascendancy in cont ro lling naval Special Forces ca me th e crystalli sing of German service boundaries in Valdagno follow ed by the K-Verbiinde's accession to overall command of the Germ an contingent du ring April. Von Wurz ian promptly resigned his Abwehr post immediately upon the form ation of Lehrkommando 700 and becam e an official member of the KVerbiinde. Prior to April 1944 Wolk and Von Wur zian had tr ain ed the Germans of all three services jointl y, but after th e formation of the Lehrkommando, Wolk henceforth tr ained th e Itali an swimmers separately, the tw o nationalitie s being kept strictly segregated during their time spent in Valda gno . After the absorption of the school into th e KVerbiinde, Oblt.z.S. Sowa was placed in charge, displacing the Abwehr's Neitzer who had acted as 'careta ker' director, though he remained on th e premi ses to oversee Von Wurzian 's continuing separate training of the fifteen Abwehr men. Th e relat ionship between Sowa and Neitzer soon soured and Sowa was tran sferred to Heiligenhafen, his place tak en by the redoubtabl e Hauptmann Friedrich Hummel of th e A bwe hr, wh o also promptly resigned from th e intelligence service and was enlisted as a Kapitdnleutnant into th e K- Verbiind e.

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WEAPONS OF DES PE RATION

T he Vald agno training centre covered the initial schoo ling of the KYerbiinde recruits, another centre soon opened in M ay 1944 on the island of San Giorgio in Venice Lagoon for mor e adva nced skills, the headquarters for Lehrk ommando 700 tra nsferring to Venice also short ly afterwa rd. As the diving arm of the K-Yerbande grew the subsidiary cent res were renumbered: Vald agno as Lehrkom mand o 704 and San Giorgio Lehr kommando 70 1. Space had becom e rath er limited in Vald agno by this stage and a further training centre was opene d at Bavar ia's Bad Tolz in the swimming baths at the SS [unkerschule. T his new bra nch of the K-Yerbande tree was nam ed Lehrkommand o 702 . T he Venetian setti ng for Lehrkommando 70 1 was an ideal one in whic h the men could train. T he isle of San Giorgio in Alga is situa ted withi n th e Lower Lagoon in th e pro ximity of the Isle of Trezze and Isle of San Angelo della Polvere. Bened ict ine monks had founded the first mon astery an d built a church co nsec ra ted to Saint George during the eleventh century on the sma ll island, wh ich lay in a stra tegic centra l position betw een dry land and th e city of Venice. In 171 7 fire dest ro yed the mo nas tery and church, the island subseq uently used first as a pri son and th en from 1806 a powd er magazine for the Italian milita ry. The IS, I 13m 2 ro ughly qua drangular islan d wa s surroun ded by an imposi ng outside wa ll, pierced by one sma ll harbour on its northwestern face. By the time o f Lehrkommando 701's arrival th e island possessed an Ital ian AA un it th at comprised four obso lete 7.6cm Vickers Arms trong 1914 pattern guns, one 2c m Oe rlikon and three 2cm Bredas commanded by a Germa n art illery ma n, Leutnant Kummer. T here th e K-Verbiinde men trained both on land and in th e wat er. In the Venice Lagoon they pract ised attacking two old ships moor ed for th at purpose, the freighter Tampico an d the ta nker IIIiria. Recruits were trained in the necessary tasks th at would be faced by com mandos incl uding navigat ion, unarmed comba t and sta mina - the divers being dumped at sea and ordere d to swim back to their island base am idst the curre nts th at swirled around th e man y sma ll islands. In fact much info rmation had been gleaned for the Germans by captured orders for British comma ndos land ed at Dieppe including handbook moves straig ht from their adversaries' trainin g ma nua ls. It was not long before O blt.z.S . Folsch had been placed in charge of Vald agn o's Lehrkomma ndo 704 an d Von Wu rzian was prom oted to Leutnant and posted as Chief Instructo r to San Giorgio. T he Germa n frogmen were not adverse to playing pr anks on their Italian allies as well, stea ling a rowi ng boat fro m th e nearby Italian 72

R I V ER ASSAULT

arsenal and also atte mpting to stea l a motor torpedo boat, though they were driven away by nervou s sent ries firing into th e darkn ess after them . Th e lightness of such mo ments helped to disg uise the deadl y nature of th e lesson s learnt and also co ntinued to foster the sense of elite th at the Kampfschwimmer were imb ued with . However, alongside the cama ra derie, hard training and horsepl ay, the spect re of dea th th at followed such dan gerous work as th at of th e frogman saboteur clai med at least tw o lives. O n 20 June 1944 Yerwa ltu ngsmaa t and profession al swi mmer Wern er Bullin was killed in a tr ain ing accident, followed on 3 1 August 1944 by par atroop er O bergefreiter H erb ert Klamt . By J une 1944 the divers had begun to be organised into uni ts. T he MEK MA RKO that had been inherited by the K- Verbiinde fro m the Hamburg Abwehr was renam ed M EK20 in April 1944 and placed initia lly und er the comma nd of Sonderfiihrer KaptltdR Mic hae l Oplade n, lat er tran sferred to Obit. (MA) Brocker as O pladen retired to the KYerbiinde Sta ff. M EK60 und er the command of O blt.MAdR Han sFriedrich Prinzhorn, M EK6S und er Oblt.z.S.dR Karl -Ernst Richert , M EK71 und er O blt.MAdR Horst Walters an d M EK80 commanded by KaptltMA Dr Wald emar Krumhaar were also read y by June. Each un it comprised one officer and tw enty-tw o men spread betw een fifteen trucks that wo uld ca rry their personal and opera tiona l equipment. In actio n Germa n frog men wore a rubber suit of ap proxima tely 3mm th ickn ess th at was elasticised at the wrist and ankles and had a tightfitting neck seal. Beneath thi s he wo re a long thick kn itt ed woollen suit that in tu rn was pull ed on over an extra layer of woollen undergarments. Th e rub ber layer co mprised trou sers with built-in boo ts and a separate jacket, pulled on and the ends of both segments ro lled together and scaled with a th ick rubber belt. This airtight 'dry -suit' was then covered by a canvas outer suit that acted as camouflage, p u lle~ ti? ht abo ut the bod y by lace ad justm ents. A hood - and often the application of black face paint - finished th e clothing. Th e breathing appa ratus was worn on the diver 's chest and he was trained to swim on his back toward the tar get, using his mouthpiece and nose clips only whe n necessa ry. Wh at ever natural buoyancy the trapped air wit hin the suit and its woollen layers affo rded was offset by the requ ired lead weights, wo rn around the diver's wa ist. T he Ge rma n frogme n were armed with several varieties of sabotage weapons for use against shi ppi ng targets. Sa bo t~ge Mi ne I c?nsisred of a circ ular rubber float with charge and firing mec hanism mounted wi thin its centre. The float was to be inflated w hen positio ned beneath the hull of a ship, th e ai r hold ing th e charge in place 73

WEAPONS OF DES PE RATION

unti l detonat ion. Sabotage Mine II was a torpedo-shaped mine, co nstructed in four bolted-toge ther sections . This was attac hed to a ship's keel by a simple clam p, the firing mechanism activated by water motion when the ship got underway. Sabotage Mine III was similar to the last type. Approximately 33cm long, of elliptical cross-section and with slightly con vex ends, rubber buoyancy cha mbers co uld be affixed to the mine's bod y wh ich aga in was clamped onto a ship's keel. As well as the motion detonator, a clockwork timing mechanism was contained within the fuse at the forward end. Allied reports indicated that ofte n the clamps were boob y-trap ped so that the mine detonated if an attempt was made to unscrew it from the targe t vessel. Additi onally, arming and firing mechanisms were fined in bot h ends of the mine so tha t the weapon co uld be fired whether the vessel was proc eeding forwa rd or astern. For attacks on bridges and caissons and such ta rgets, the K-Verbiinde utilised cylindrical charges known as Mllni Pak ete and N yr Pak ete, containing respectively 600 kg and 1,600 kg of high exp losive. Fined with a timer based on the Italian ten-hour model, the weapon could only be defused by the keep ring being unscrewed. In addition, a modified GS Mine was used aga inst bridge target s. Two buoyancy chambers were fitted at either end of the torpedo-shaped weap on enabling the mine to be float ed down a river by divers and attached to the intended target. Th e timers used could be set for any length of time up to six days, though hourl y settings were considered more accura te. In an attac k against the Nijmegen bridge, the timer was set for four hou rs." The first use of K-Verbiinde frogmen came during Ju ne 1944 when divers were assigned the task of destroying rwo bridges 6km northeast of Caen; the Pont de Ran ville over the Orn e Canal (Canal de Caen) and Pont d'Heron ville th at spa nned the Orne River, the two waterways running parallel with each oth er. Situated at the eastern extremity of the Allied Normandy landin g zones, the bridges had been deemed as vital targets for the invaders in order to secure the left flank of the British Sword Beach. To the east of the river and canal is the Breville highland, which overloo ked the British force's approach to the strategically impo rta nt city of Caen . Therefore, Allied plan ners had decided tha t the heights must be captured, the bridges required to be left intact so that paratroopers cou ld be supplied and reinfo rced once they had captured this high area. The river bridge is now famo us as Pegasus Bridge, seized by an audacio us British glider-borne assault in the early hours of 6 June. Th ough the area soo n boasted bailey bridges 74

RI V ER AS SAU LT

to augment the rwo hard-won spans, they were considered of prime importa nce as targets, able to take more weight than their more makeshift counte rparts. Because of the importance of their first operation, the attacking force included Friedrich Hummel and von Wurzian - though the latter was excluded from actually entering combat and was kept in an advisory role. They and ten frogmen were despatched in three Lancia tru cks from Venice to the German held area near Caen. However, on the road berween Dijon and Paris one of the tru cks was involved in a collision that injured four of the divers includin g Hummel, the wounded men being taken to a nearb y field hospital and therefore unabl e to continue with the planned operation . Furt her along their path , berween Paris and Caen the last rwo vehicles nar rowl y avoide d the attentions of prowling RAF aircraft, hiding in th ick roa dside woo ds before the Allied fighter-bomb ers were ab le to arrack. The six remaining Kampfschioimmer and von Wurzian arrive d in Caen with out furt her incident and immedia tely set about organisi ng their attack. They met with Oblt.MAdR Hans-Friedrich Prinzhorn , leader of M EK60 and Einsatz leiter for the forthcoming mission as part of Heye's Staff from Mar inegrllppenk ommando Sad. Th e divers were split into rwo gro ups of thr ee men each. Th e first, comprising Feldwebel Karl-Heinz Kayser, Funk maat Heinz Bretschneider and O bergefreiter Richard Reimann, would transport one cylindrica l charge to their target bridge over the Orne Ca nal. Th e second gro up, of Ob lr.z.S, Sowa, Oberfiihnrich Albert Lindner and Fdhnrich Ullrich 'Uli' Schulz (an ex-h uman to rpedo pilot ), would carry an identical charge against the bridge over th e Orne River, the canal and river bridges some 400m apart. Both gro ups were briefed to pass under the newly constructed bailey bridges and carry their attack forwa rd against the bridges that had cost so much British and German blood on the morning of D-Day itself. While the arrack was carried out both Prinzhorn and von Wurzian plann ed to remain on the bank of the Orne River, waiting near the spot where the divers were to return. On the afternoon of 22 June th e rwo 1,600kg heavy to rpedo charges were prepared for actio n on the riverb ank , but a brief flurry of British artillery fire scattered th e group of men working around th e torpedoes, save for the to rpedo mechani c respo nsible for their smooth operation who doggedly remained workin g on the exp losives as shells landed nearby. Within minutes of the barrage ending he activated the fuses, set to blow at 05.30hrs . Built and tested at Kieler Werft they were designed to have eno ugh flot ation to rest

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RI VER ASSAULT

approxima tely half a met re below th e wa ter surface where d ivers co uld eas ily manoeuvre th em into position . H owever, with th e decreased density of fres h ove r sa lt water, th e tw o cha rges promptly sank into th e th ick silt of th e riverbed th e moment th ey were launched. A mak esh ift so lutio n was found after Prin zhorn sent his men racing to obtain empty petro l cans, whic h we re th en tied together with rope, the heavy to rpedo slung between th em and resting on th e extra buoyancy. The first group led by Kayser entered the canal wa ter as night fell. T hough less than a kilometre from the front line th ey faced an arduo us swim of 12km to their target and th e same to return. Kayser and Bretschn eider to ok the lead , each pulling one side of th e torpedo aga inst the light cur rent that they faced on the outwa rd journey. Reiman n too k the rear pos itio n, guiding the to rpedo and providing directiona l steerage to the unwieldy device. His tr anspired to be a nightmarish task as the rear petrol cans lost air allowing the stern of the torpedo to sink into the canal until it dragged once again in the silt. Reimann was constantly forced to submerge and lift th e weapon, in the end resting the heavy torpedo on his straining sho ulder as th ey inched up the cana l with Reimann stumbling on foot through the th ick silt.

Eventually, amidst the dying echoes of a German artillery bombardment of that sa me bridge, their target materialised befor e th em and the fatig ued men quietly attac hed their charge to cent ra l pilings by embedd ing anchors into the river bottom th at was thankfully mo re solid sand and gravel than silt. Once their weapon was positioned abo ut a metre off the bottom, the timer already ticki ng steadily, the three men gently finned in the now cu rren tless water towards th e safety of the German lines as day break gradually crep t into the eastern sky. They staye d togeth er for the return, Reimann particularly exha usted by th e difficult outward journey. Th eir mission wa s successful as th e timer activated its charge slightly befo re its plan ned tim e, destro ying wh at the Germans believed to be the main Orne Canal bridge. The second mission was also successful and no less dram at ic. Th e group made their way downstream towards their target in the Orne River aided by the cu rrent on their outward journey, Schulz and Sowa

at the torpedo's head and Lindner pushing its tail. They had managed only a few hun dred metres, still visible to their shore party when Sowa began to complain of sore feet, his fins apparent ly ca using him grea t distress. Sowa immediately broke away and swa m for the bank as the support personnel ran tow ard s him. Enco uraged to return to his co mrades, Sowa's nerve bro ke com pletely and he began to weep whi le clinging to terra finna. Despite this unforeseen set back the two remaining men still with the torpedo and its ticking cloc k decided to press on. T he pair managed to nego tia te a wooden barrier that lay across the river and soon afterward sighted what th ey believed was their primary target. Affixing th e weap on to th e riverbed th ey were dismayed to find the current too strong for th eir return, making littl e headway aga inst it and threat ened by the noise mad e as th ey finned harder and harder, frequently br eak ing th e still surface o f the water. Faced with little option th ey allowed themselves to drift slightly with the current, past th eir bridge an d sought shelter on the riverbank - though th e pit they chose was swiftly found to have once been an Allied lat rine. With dawn breaking, th ey had no choice but to rem ain where they we re and at 05.30hrs a huge explosion herald ed success, the pair remaining within th eir stinking hiding place until night fell on 23 June. Faced with th e same river cur rent th ey mad e a difficult decision - to leave the river on its far ba nk, cross the 400m to the ca nal and swim back along its placid wa ters . Despite the obvious peril, their triumph was absolute and the two exhausted men were wa rmly received when they finally mad e lan dfall in German territory. H owever, Sowa was not amongst th e men th at greeted th em. Ashamed of his brea kdown he had waited anxiously for news o f his co mra des. Wh en th ey failed to retu rn th at night or th e following day he took it up on himself to enter the river and search for them. With British sentries alerted by th e ex plosions to th e possible danger of sa boteurs he was seen and taken prisoner after being wou nded in a brief bu rst of gunfire. This baptismal raid had been successful- but no t completely. As the first grou p had returned an d were deb riefed by Prinzhorn on th e riverban k it beca me apparent th at th e plann ed target area and where the to rp edo had actua lly been placed did not match. Due to what several historian s hav e described as an 'incorrect sketch' o f the tar get a rea, it appea rs th at the wrong br idge was mined. Th ere were ap pa ren tly two bridges to negotiat e before arriving at the one now called 'Pegasus Bridge'. Predictably, the same held true for th e two surviving men of th e second gro up, th e nearby Pon t d'Hero nville still sta nding after the weapon 's detonarion. P Neve rt heless, the K-Verbiinde had proved

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77

Then close ahead we sighted the first bridge, the one we were due to pass under. Visibility was poo r; we heard wha t seemed a sentry's footsteps on the wooden bridge. As a precaution we dived, passing under the bridge submerged . With the ropes we kept down the buoyant nose of the mine, while Reimann rested the tail on his shoulder."

W EAPON S O F D ESP ERATIO N

R I V ER AS SA ULT

themselves equa l to the ta sk of commando raid s. One man had been lost out of six and two bridges had been successfully destroyed. Th ere was little time to rest upon their newly-acquired laurels. From the beginnin g of the Allied landings in Normandy to th e event ua l collapse of th e Germ an front in France the K-Yerbande frogm en would und ertake twenty-four missions, th e majority of them successful. Amon gst the frogmen's achievements were the destruction of lock gates on the Orne by eight men led by th e ex-SS man Obermaat Orlowski during Jul y and the sabotage of captured Germ an guns on 26 August by Prinzhorn and seven of his men. Earlier th at month advancing British troops had captured th e 15cm U45 coastal guns of a battery at Vasouy that were originally designed to protect the mouth of th e River Seine. Manned by men of MAA266, the guns and ammunition were abandoned without being disabled as British forces approached. Situat ed as they were between Honfleur and Trouville, the gun s were perfectly placed within their concrete bunkers to bombard Germanheld Le H avr e, onl y 7km away across the Seine river mouth. Prinzhorn and his men, led by an art illeryman familiar with the site, approached th e formidable emplacement aboard two commandeered co ntro l Linsens and were able to land successfully less th an 100m from the first bunkers. Th e artill ery was situated above a bank that fringed th e heavily-min ed beach and Prinzhorn's assa ult party crept silently to their ob jectives, planting explosives in the gun barrels themselves and slipping through th e narrow gap between gun and concrete to place other charges amongst th e stored ammunition. Each bunker lacked an individual gua rd and th e raid ers were abl e to destroy the guns without chall enge by th e few British sentries th at tr amped slowly aro und th e site and without loss to themselves. However, all was not well within th e ranks of Lehrkommando 700. In June 1944 H eye had placed the medical officer M stArzt Dr Arnim Wandel in overa ll charge of th e Kamp fschwimmer branch of th e KYerband e, replacing th e colourful Friedri ch Hummel. At first Wandel faced problems in winning the acceptance o f th e fro gmen under his comma nd, Hummel being held in high regard du e to his ob viou s experience in und erwater sabotage. Wandel on the other hand had served not as a sa boteur but as a U-boat medical officer aboard U-129 during 1941 before holding staff positions in the 26 th and 11th Ll-Florillas. Betw een April and Ju ne 1944 he had been attached to th e Einsatz lind Ausbildun gs Stab Siid where he reported on th e super b sta te of th e training facilities and men at Vald agno and on th e Venetian island of San Giorgio. Reporting back to Hey e on his findin gs, the Admiral wa s

impressed enough by th e young officer to appoint him as co mma nder of Lehrkommando 700 - despite th e Geneva Co nvention for bidding medical officers to comma nd combat units. Wandel was lat er described as an 'extre mely hard work er' but completely lackin g in both th e requisite techn ical knowl edge and gras p of th e over all ta ctical situa tio ns faced by his men. Furtherm ore, many felt th at Wandel lacked th e necessary driv e and ruthlessness to forwa rd th e ambitions of th e frogmen of Lehrkommando 700. On th e other hand, th ese were skills that Hummel - and ind eed th e SS co mma ndo leader Otto Sko rzeny himself - possessed in abunda nce. Th ere remains some confusion as to th e reasoning behind thi s unu sual personnel cha nge. Bohrne later told Allied interrogators th at he met Hummel in Paris on 10 August 1944 and th e latter cla imed to still be in charge of Lehrkommando 700, Wandel merely acting as a 'ca reta ker' senior officer in his a bsence. Th ere is every likelih ood that Hummel wa s actually remov ed from th e post by Heye as he strove to elimina te the insidiou s and invasive presence of th e A bwehr within his service . As we sha ll see he would soon also do th e same with th e SS men within th e KYerbande, attempting to regain co mplete co ntro l o f the service rather th an have th e K-Yerbiinde divided by such anim osity and inter-service rivalr y th at elements within th e T hird Reich appa rently th rived on. With this uneasy tension affecting th e Lehrkommando, Otto Sko rzeny paid Vald agno a visit on 30 June, later also touring San Giorgio with Wandel. Th e pot enti al of what he saw must have impressed the SS comma ndo wh o also tested th e diving equipment himself in the Venice Lagoon. H e had already managed to convince H eye to accept SS men under disciplin ary sente nces into th e KYerbdnde and later the following month he despatched SS Untersturm[uhrer Walter Schreiber to be his SS represent at ive at Valdag no, a liaison officer betw een Himmler's orga nisation and th e K-Yerbande. However, at the front there was little time for the frogmen of the KYerbande to co ncern th emselves with the intern al wrangling of their service headquarters. Th e last mission of August 1944 for MEK 60 and MEK65 was und ertaken in support of the Bibers of 26 1 K-Flotilla. After th eir disastrou s committa l to action on 30 August the Bibers were withdrawn and Prinzhorn's men were tasked with destroying an y abandoned machin es and th eir torpedoes as the rest of the Bibers retreated from Normand y. Th e MEKs were the last Kriegsmarine troops to leave the port of Fecarnp , their own withdrawal to Ghent fraught with prob lems due once agai n to Allied air superiority and the Wehrmacht's demolit ion of man y water crossings and roa ds. Th e unit s were hur riedly

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79

WEAPONS OF DESPERATION

moved on from Ghent on 3 September to Schouten near Antwerp and from there also pushed on to Utrecht due to enemy spearhead forma tions facing across Belgium. The MEKs were scheduled for transfer to Denmark for rearming and reinforcement but the Marinebefehlshaber Niederland (Flag Officer Commanding the Netherlands), VA Gustav Kleikamp, demanded their retention for use around Antwerp. They correspondingly remained in Utrecht, reinforced by thirty officers and men from MEK 40 on 11 September and supplied with three Linsens, three Marders and demolition mines for future use. An original group of eleven frogmen from Sesto Calende that were due to also join them were delayed, replaced by ten frogmen from Liibeck instead, the men having recently transferred from Venice to the German port. On 8 September, K.z.S. Bohme was appointed as commander of all K-Flotillas and MEKs in the Scheidt area. His brief was to employ his forces when opportunities presented themselves; his first task allocated by OKW being the destruction of the Kruisschans and Royer locks on the Scheidt in what would become 'Operation Bruno'. During the rapid fall of Antwerp to British armoured forces on 4 September the speed with which the advanced elements of the 11th Armoured Division had entered the city had completely surprised the German defenders. British troops, helped in no small part by Belgian resistance members, arrived to find the lock gates that controlled the rise and fall of the tide within the harbour basin largely undamaged, the Kriegsmarine Harbour Commander (Hafenkommandant Anttoerpeni, EK. Joachim Syskowitz, being killed in a brief skirmish as he attempted to carry out the planned destruction of the lock and dockside equipment." The port of Antwerp was, and still is, one of Europe's great harbours, but it is not a natural one. Its expansive docks were dug to the northwest of the city centre, their first use recorded during medieval times . Though it rests some way inland on the River ScheIdt it remains a tidal harbour and so the first canal lock was constructed in the port at the beginning of the twentieth century. The Royers Lock was 30m in length and 7m wide and allowed for the first time the round-clock usage of the port. As shipping grew in size new locks were required to allow access by the larger vessels and so in 1928 the Kruisschans Lock was added to the harbour entrance alongside its predecessor. Unable to deny the Allies the port of Antwerp, Bohme was instructed to investigate the viability of sabotaging the lock in order to render the harbour inoperative.

80

ABOVE : Ame rican troops inspect the remains of a Neger washed ashore ncar the Anzio beachhead. The clement of s urprise w ith its novel wea ponry was soon lo st hy the K-Vcrhandc.

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ABOVE: The two Knight's Cross winners of the 36 1 K-F1otilla with their flotilla

commander. Gberfernschreilnneister Herbert Berrer (left) was awarded the decoration on 5 August 1944 and is accom panied after the ceremony here by Oberleutnant zu, See Leopo ld Koc h (midd le) the unit commander and SchreiberolJergefreiter Walter Gerhold (right) who had won his KC on 6 July 1944. RIGHT: German propaganda reported Gerhold's award after his sinking of an enemy 'cruiser' . Much was made in the German press of the effect that a single man could have on a large enemy warship .

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The main improvement feat ured in the M a rder wa s th e ability to dive . O n th e left hand edge o f th e ca no py wa s a sma ll d ive bubble to sho w th e pilot the incl ination o f his mach ine. ABOVE:

l. EFT : You ng pilot s suc h as th ese typified th e K-Verha nd e's human torped o servi ce, of te n fresh from th e ferti le recruiting gro unds o f th e Hitl er Youth mov em ent.

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A IU>V[: The Linscn explos ive motorbo at is unvei led to variou s military a nd Nazi Pa rty officials. Among the audience is a Ja pa nese na val officer. Luftwa ffe General Adol f Galland and Albert Speer. the hea d of Germany's a rma ments industr y.

A Bibcr submcrges during a tcst run. Thi s st ill was taken from Germ an wart ime nc ws rec l.

ABOVE : Leutnant Alfred Vetter is co ngratula ted hy Grussadm iral Karl Donirz a fter his a ward of th e Knight 's Cross on 12 Aug ust 1944 fo r service a s commander o f the 2 1 I K-F1otilla in its act ion s o ff No rma ndy.

An OV I'.: A Biber is wheeled into the wat er by hand for pra ctice. Th e torpedo visib le is a dumm y weapon used for exerci ses an d desig nated as such by its red and white st riped inert warhead.

The coc kpit of t he Biber. T his exam ple was recent ly restored a nd remains the o nly worki ng exam ple of its kind in the wo rld at Gos port's Royal Na vy Submarine Mu seu m. AnoV E:

t.rr r : A Biber is prepared for reload ing of its torpedoes. Th is st ill was tak en from German wart ime news reel as was the follow ing photo.

ABovr : Th e Biber prototype 'Ada m' is readied for a test run .

ABOVf. : View through the small hatch looking down at a Biber pilot. Their accommodation was cramped; their death rate alarmingly high.

A liibcr pilor clears icc from his conni ng rower. Thick wint er ice was a prob lem for the Bibe rs, many lost to dat nnge ca used hy thi ck floes.

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RIGHT: Th e torpedoes are held in place a board a trailer while the Biher is manoeu vred into position to receive them.

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Rl'"dy as the British destroyer attempts to capture it.

Bihers in harbour in Th e Nethe rlands being held in place hy their 'g round -crew'.

ABOVE: A Biher found hy Ro yal Marine Co mmandos of 30 Assa ult Unit 011 the Arniens-Bapaume roa d in September 1944. It had been damaged hy air attac k and aba ndon ed by the retreating Germans.

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Ready pre pa res to take Biber 90 in tow. the pilot dead at his controls.

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Alasc!Ji11('mJbt'rg''fn'ita Ior be rr Keller pho tograp hed ab oard a 'snow- Li nscn ' in Januar y 194 5 a t Ga nse rndorf near Vienn a w hen he was serving with 2 17 Kd-Iorilla o n th e E.l stern Fro nt . The word 'Ku chcn ' was th e name o f Keller 's sect ion leader

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