Vulnerable Cities:: Realities, Innovations and Strategies (cSUR-UT Series: Library for Sustainable Urban Regeneration)

cSUR-UT Series: Library for Sustainable Urban Regeneration Volume 8 Series Editor: Shinichiro Ohgaki, Tokyo, Japan

cSUR-UT Series: Library for Sustainable Urban Regeneration By the process of urban development in the 20th century, characterized by suburban expansion and urban redevelopment, many huge and sophisticated complexes of urban structures have been erected in developed countries. However, with conventional technologies focused on the construction of structures, it has become difficult to keep urban spaces adaptable to environmental constraints and economic, social and cultural changes. In other words, it has become difficult for conventional technologies to meet social demands for the upgrading of social capital in a sustainable manner and for the regeneration of attractive urban space that is not only safe and highly efficient but also conscious of historical, cultural and local identities to guarantee a high quality of life for all. Therefore, what is needed now is the creation of a new discipline that is able to reorganize the existing social capital and the technologies to implement it. For this purpose, there is a need to go beyond the boundaries of conventional technologies of construction and structural design and to integrate the following technologies: (1) Technology concerned with environmental and risk management (2) Technology of conservation and regeneration with due consideration to the local characteristics of existing structures including historical and cultural resources (3) Technologies of communication, consensus building, plan making and space management to coordinate and integrate the individual activities initiated by various actors of society Up to now, architecture, civil engineering, and urban engineering in their respective fields have, while dealing with different time-space scales and structures, accumulated cutting-edge knowledge and contributed to the formation of favorable urban spaces. In the past, when emphasis was put on developing new residential areas and constructing new structures, development and advancement of such specialized disciplines were found to be the most effective. However, current problems confronting urban development can be highlighted by the fact that a set of optimum solutions drawn from the best practices of each discipline is not necessarily the best solution. This is especially true where there are relationships of trade-offs among such issues as human risk and environmental load. In this way, the integration of the above three disciplines is strongly called for. In order to create new integrated knowledge for sustainable urban regeneration, the Center for Sustainable Urban Regeneration (cSUR), The University of Tokyo, was established in 2003 as a core organization of one of the 21st Century Centers of Excellence Programs funded by the Ministry of Education and Science, Japan, and cSUR has coordinated international research alliances and collaboratively engages with common issues of sustainable urban regeneration. The cSUR series are edited and published to present the achievements of our collaborative research and new integrated approaches toward sustainable urban regeneration. Editorial board of the cSUR series Chair: Department of Urban Engineering, The University of Tokyo Prof. Shinichiro Ohgaki Members: Prof. Keisuke Hanaki Department of Urban Engineering, The University of Tokyo Prof. Yuzo Sakamoto Department of Architecture, The University of Tokyo Prof. Yozo Fujino Department of Civil Engineering, The University of Tokyo Prof. Hiroshi Naito Department of Civil Engineering, The University of Tokyo Prof. Hitoshi Ieda Department of Civil Engineering, The University of Tokyo Prof. Takeshi Ito Department of Architecture, The University of Tokyo Prof. Shuichi Matsumura Department of Architecture, The University of Tokyo Assoc. Prof. Takafumi Noguchi Department of Architecture, The University of Tokyo Prof. Atsuyuki Okabe Department of Urban Engineering, The University of Tokyo Assoc. Prof. Yukio Sadahiro Department of Urban Engineering, The University of Tokyo Director: Prof. Junichiro Okata Department of Urban Engineering, The University of Tokyo

T. Kidokoro, J. Okata, S. Matsumura, N. Shima (Eds.)

Vulnerable Cities: Realities, Innovations and Strategies

Tetsuo Kidokoro, Ph.D. Associate Professor Department of Urban Engineering The University of Tokyo 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku Tokyo 113-8656, Japan

Junichiro Okata, Ph.D. Professor & Secretary General Center for Sustainable Urban Regeneration The University of Tokyo 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku Tokyo 113-8656, Japan

Shuichi Matsumura, Ph.D. Professor Department of Architecture The University of Tokyo 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku Tokyo 113-8656, Japan

Norihisa Shima Assistant Professor Department of Civil Engineering The University of Tokyo 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku Tokyo 113-8656, Japan

Cover photo: Kabul, Afghanistan; © Tetsuo Kidokoro

ISSN 1865-8504 ISBN 978-4-431-78148-6

e-ISBN 978-4-431-78149-3

Library of Congress Control Number: 2008923166 © 2008 to the complete printed work by Springer, except as noted. Individual authors or their assignees retain rights to their respective contributions; reproduced by permission. This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in other ways, and storage in data banks. The use of registered names, trademarks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. Springer is a part of Springer Science+Business Media springer.com Printed in Japan Typesetting: Camera-ready by the editors and authors Printing and binding: Hicom, Japan Printed on acid-free paper

Preface

The Center for Sustainable Urban Regeneration, the University of Tokyo (cSUR) has undertaken research on the improvement of vulnerable urban space with a focus on community-based approaches. The objective of the research is to examine present situations of vulnerable urban space as well as post-disaster rehabilitation processes. Indeed, a third of the world’s urban population are reported to live in substandard informal settlements. These substandard settlements are vulnerable, physically, socially and economically. There is, therefore, a growing awareness that an integrated approach is needed in order to improve such vulnerable urban areas. The International Workshop on Improving Vulnerable Urban Space: Making Community Work was held in order to make a comparative study of Asia and Latin America on 1–3 March 2007. The commonalities as well as differences of selected case cities were discussed intensely and many useful insights and ideas were expressed during the workshop. All contributors to this book presented their papers in the workshops and expanded their initial analysis and ideas based on the deliberations in the workshops and the following correspondence among the participants. This book has combined empirical and comparative analysis on improvement of vulnerable urban space and post-disaster rehabilitation in Asian and Latin American countries. We hope that the discussions conceived in this book will serve as a useful and thoughtful resource for researchers, practitioners and students and those who are working on alleviating the vulnerability of urban space. Tetsuo Kidokoro Acknowledgments We would like to thank all of the contributors to this book, as well as those who directly or indirectly participated in the comparative case studies for their contributions to the final results of the projects. We would like to give special thanks to Ann Tomoko Yamamoto for her dedicated work as an English editor of this book.

Contents

Preface

v

Tetsuo Kidokoro

List of Contributors

xi

Part I. Introduction 1. Community-based Approach for Improving Vulnerable Urban Space………………………………………………………3 Tetsuo Kidokoro 2. The Vulnerable City: Coping with Disasters……………….15 Banasopit Mekvichai 3. Promotion of Seismic Retrofitting for Existing Low Earthquake Resistant Structures: The Most Important Issue for Earthquake Disaster Reduction……………………………..29 Kimiro Meguro

Part II. Improvement of Urban Vulnerability 4. Growing Vulnerability Crisis “Will Slums Ever Reduce or Improve?”: A Case from India………………………………77 Vijay Neekhra 5. Identifying Housing Conditions in Bogota, Colombia: A Strategy to Deal with Risks…………………………………105 Francesco Ambrosi Filardi

viii

6. Methodology for Intervention in Vulnerable Settlements in Medellin, Colombia: Urban Destructuralization in Relation to the Topography of the Territory………………………….119 Juan Ricardo Mejía B. 7. From Wood Huts to Buildings of Seven Floors: An Analysis of the Process of Housing Production in the Slum of Rocinha in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, over a Fifty-Year Period…………...141 Gerônimo Leitão 8. The Incremental Improvement of the Area Densely Built-up with Old Wooden Houses in Tokyo…………………………169 Hitoshi Nakamura 9. Thailand Urban Environmental Management: Case of Environmental Infrastructure and Housing Provision in Bangkok Metropolitan Region………………………………………...187 Vilas Nitivattananon and Chalika Noonin

Part III. Management of Natural Disasters 10. Seismic Vulnerability of Peruvian Houses: Current Issues and Solution Attempts……………………………………...211 Paola Mayorca 11. Improving Vulnerable Urban Space in Postdisaster in Yogyakarta and Central Java, Indonesia: Participatory and Comprehensive Approach……………………………………….225 Suprayoga Hadi 12. Community Empowerment Program on the Revitalization of Kotagede Heritage District, Indonesia Post Earthquake….241 Laretna T. Adishakti 13. A Review of the 921 Post-earthquake Community Rehabilitation of the Urban Disaster Area in Taiwan….………….257 Kuang-Hui Peng and Yao-Chi Kuo

ix

14. Earthquake as a Fact of Istanbul: Risk-based Strategy and an Action Plan for the Vulnerable Zeytinburnu Area……275 Aye Sema Kubat, Engin Eyübolu, Özhan Ertekin and Frat Sari 15. Structural Viewpoint……………………………………….299 Mikio Koshihara 16. Vulnerability to Earthquake Disaster and Countermeasures in Tokyo……………………………………………………...317 Takaaki Kato

List of Contributors

Laretna T. Adishakti

Gerônimo Leitão

Lecturer & Researcher Center for Heritage Conservation Department of Architecture and Planning Gadjah Mada University [email protected]

Professor Adjunto School of Architecture and Urbanism Fluminense Federal University [email protected]

Francesco Ambrosi Filardi Vicegerent Social Interest Housing Group Popular Housing Fund (Bogotá City) [email protected]

Özhan Ertekin Research Assistant Department of City and Regional Planning Istanbul Technical University [email protected]

Engin Eyübolu Lecturer & Researcher Department and City and Regional Planning Istanbul Technical University [email protected]

Suprayoga Hadi Director Regional Development II National Development Planning Agency [email protected]

Takaaki Kato Assistant Professor Department of Urban Engineering The University of Tokyo [email protected]

Tetsuo Kidokoro Associate Professor Department of Urban Engineering The University of Tokyo [email protected]

Mikio Koshihara Associate Professor Institute of Industrial Science The University of Tokyo [email protected]

Aye Sema Kubat Professor Department of City and Regional Planning Istanbul Technical University [email protected]

Yao-Chi Kuo Ex-Executive Director The 921 Earthquake Post-Disaster Recovery Commission [email protected]

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Shuichi Matsumura

Vilas Nitivattananon

Professor Department of Architecture The University of Tokyo [email protected]

Assistant Professor School of Environment Resources and Development Asian Institute of Technology [email protected]

Paola Mayorca Research Associate Institute of Industrial Science The University of Tokyo [email protected]

Chalika Noonin Sanitary Technician Department of Environment Bangkok Metropolitan Administration [email protected]

Kimiro Meguro Professor Institute of Industrial Science The University of Tokyo [email protected]

Juan Ricardo Mejía B. Director of Research Group - Integral Improvement of Settlements Faculty of Architecture Bolivariana Papal University [email protected]

Banasopit Mekvichai Deputy Governor Bangkok Metropolitan Administration [email protected]

Hitoshi Nakamura Project Assistant Professor Center for Sustainable Urban Regeneration The University of Tokyo [email protected]

Vijay Neekhra Ph.D. Candidate Department of Urban Engineering The University of Tokyo [email protected]

Junichiro Okata Professor & Secretary General Center for Sustainable Urban Regeneration The University of Tokyo [email protected]

Kuang-Hui Peng Professor & Dean Graduate Institute of Architecture and Urban Design National Taipei University of Technology [email protected]

Frat Sari Project Responsible on Urban Planning YEM - Building Information Centre (Istanbul, Tuekey) [email protected]

Norihisa Shima Assistant Professor Department of Civil Engineering The University of Tokyo [email protected]

Part I INTRODUCTION

1. Community-based Approach for Improving Vulnerable Urban Space

Tetsuo Kidokoro

1.1 Introduction According to the statistics of UNHABITAT, about one billion people, onethird of the world’s 3.2-billion urban population, live in substandard informal settlements as of 2005, and this population is increasing by 2.2% annually (Fig. 1-1). The improvement of urban slum areas is one of the critical issues in the 21st century. As much as 40% of the population are estimated to live in substandard informal settlements in Manila. Even in Bangkok, which has achieved remarkable economic growth, the resident population in slum areas is estimated to exceed one million, and the number has not decreased.

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These substandard informal settlements are definitely the most vulnerable areas in the city (Fig. 1-2). Many of them are developed informally without applying formal planning procedures. Residents have often occupied the underused land without formal land rights. They are often under the threat of eviction. Those underused places are a city’s most vulnerable areas in terms of natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes and fires, and temporary building structures are quite weak once hit by disaster. They are generally poor communities, and are thus economically vulnerable. Slum areas lack basic infrastructure such as water supply, sewage, drainage and solid waste collection, and thus health risks are particularly high (Fig. 1-3 and 1-4). Physical -

vulnerability to natural disaster lack of basic infrastructure health risks

Social -

threat of eviction inadequate access to social/public service loss of cultural diversity

Economic -

inadequate opportunity to materialize potential capability (access to education/training, labor market, financial resources, etc.)

Fig. 1-2. Vulnerability of informal settlements

Fig. 1-3. Slum in Bangkok, Thailand. Children’s play area; full of disposed garbage, which causes serious health risks.

Fig. 1-4. Informal settlements, Kabul, Afghanistan. Vulnerable urban space

1. Community-based Approach for Improving Vulnerable Urban Space

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1.2 From Public Supply to Self-help Housing In the early 1970s, improvement of slum areas where the urban poverty class is concentrated became an important issue in many developing countries, and efforts were made to provide housing for the urban poverty class through establishing housing corporations. It became immediately clear, however, that it is not at all possible to provide housing at rents payable by the urban poor, and that such a public housing strategy is possible only through vast government subsidies. Further, public housing with low rents due to subsidies became a profit opportunity for a very limited number of lucky people, and the tenants were soon replaced by people in the middleincome class, which also became a big problem (Fig. 1-5). On the other hand, self-help-type housing (occupying land without official rights, build a house through self-help efforts, without taking official procedures, such as acquisition of a building permit, and start living) in slum areas in developing countries came to attract attention as a form of housing, under the influence of advocacy planning in the 1960s. In such a trend, the World Bank, which has influential power in policy making in developing countries, started housing sector financing for the urban poor. As a result, in the late 1970s and thereafter, self-help-type housing became the mainstream concept.

Fig. 1-5. Sites and services: Innovative, but not replicable. The government provided sites and basic services in suburban areas to make the land affordable to the poor. But it became difficult to publicly supply enough land for the rapidly increasing population; thus it was generally not replicable, except for some model projects.

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1.3 From Self-help Housing to Urban Management In the process of slum improvement projects (minimum living environment improvement projects, such as establishment of water supply and drain conduits, and simple pavement of passages, in existing slum areas), which have been conducted with the Word Bank’s financial help in many developing countries, the importance and effectiveness of establishing a basic infrastructure in respective areas according to needs, through community participation methods, under support of government and NGOs, became clear. A well-known example is KIP (Kampung Improvement Program), which has been widely implemented in many cities in Indonesia. In KIP, in residential districts with poor living infrastructure that spontaneously developed in existing urban areas, pavement of alleys, drainage, public toilets, etc., are established and improved through the involvement of residents in construction works and with technical and financial support from government agencies. KIP has successfully shown that it is possible to incrementally implement improvement of informally developed areas at the city scale through the involvement of residents, if there is a political will. Similar slum up-grading projects have been conducted in many cities in developing countries with financial support from international aid agencies such the World Bank, with a certain level of success (Fig. 1-6 and 1-7). On the other hand, there is much criticism that government leadership has become stronger, and resident participation has been reduced to a shell, after project scale rapidly expanded. Based on such experiences, it

Fig. 1-6. Improved slum, Manila, Philippines. Importantly, the provision of basic infrastructure in slum areas by the government with the involvement of residents stimulates investment in housing by residents themselves, because residents feel the threat of eviction is gone.

Fig. 1-7. Improved slum, Bankok, Thailand. A strong sense of community is an important asset for slum communities, and building capacity of the community in the process of implementing physical improvement projects is a key to the sustainable improvement of vulnerable urban slums.

1. Community-based Approach for Improving Vulnerable Urban Space

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gradually became recognized, in the 1980s and thereafter, that improvement of slum areas based on the idea of self-help requires improvement of various institutional frameworks, such as the regularization of land use rights and enhancement of efficiency of public projects related to water supply, electricity, housing, etc. In countries that achieved considerable economic growth under economic globalization, such as Thailand, private housing developers grew, and developed housing became attainable for those with upper lower-level incomes. It became recognized that strengthening urban management to appropriately form such a private housing market, which means improvement, etc., of the land system and the home financing system, is an important subject. Under expansion of such recognition, the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (HABITAT) and the World Bank presented an ‘enabling strategy’ in the late 1980s. The strategy was based on the idea that government should enable the private sector, NGOs, resident organizations, etc., to provide housing and improve the housing environment, instead of directly providing housing, which means government should engage in establishing necessary conditions and strengthen its capacity in urban management (Fig. 1-8).

Fig. 1-8. Low-cost housing, Manila, Philippines. The deregulation of building codes, zoning ordinances as well as the provision of housing finance have to some extent enabled social enterprises to provide affordable low-cost housing to lower middle-income people in Manila since the 1990s. Initial investment is lowered as much as possible and buyers furnish houses after they start living, in self-help style.

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Tetsuo Kidokoro

1.4 From Urban Management to Community Management Though the basic urban management approach itself may not be wrong, there are lots of difficulties ahead. In particular, it was proved that the improvement of the land management system certainly takes time and need enormous efforts for government to rouse itself and tackle the issues, because it often necessitates fundamental reforms that affect the basis of the country. Although institutional improvement is important, it becomes effective only with enhancement of communities’ capabilities to develop themselves; and further, that it is important to connect institutional improvement to communities’ capabilities to develop themselves. Nowadays, there is a growing consensus that in order to improve slum areas, it is essential to conduct community-based projects through collaboration with the voluntary sector such as community-based organizations (CBOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Conceptually, community-based slum improvement projects can be classified into three types: empowerment approach, community development approach and community management (Fig. 1-9). The empowerment approach will be effective when representative community organizations are not generated or the governments are not positive about the improvement of slum areas. In these cases, intermediary NGOs or other organizations support the organization of community-based groups to conduct community-based activities. Through these activities, it is expected that community-based organizations possibly acquire the capacity to improve their areas themselves and to negotiate with the government to respond to their voices. Capacity of community (leadership, organization, representation, social network, financial sustainability)

Community Management Approach

Community Involvement Approach

Empowerment Approach

Level of the capacity of the government (Efficiency, Transparency, Responsiveness, Participation)

Fig. 1-9. Community-based formalization process

1. Community-based Approach for Improving Vulnerable Urban Space

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A good example of the empowerment approach is the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP), implemented in the Orangi district, in Karachi, Pakistan. In this project, residents themselves construct low-cost sewage and drainage facilities through low-cost technology development. The OPP, an NGO, conducts community organization support activities through organizing residents lane by lane, and eventually organizing representative community organizations through the federations of lane neighborhood organizations. The motivation for residents is that the self-help construction of sewage in the lane in front of their houses dramatically improves the physical environment, but it requires collaboration with other lane neighborhood organizations, simply because they need to be connected to make sewage effective (Fig. 1-10 and 1-11). In the case of Orangi, people themselves promoted the establishment of necessary infrastructure under the support of an NGO. An important point here is that the OPP supported the formation of a neighborhood organization, and strengthened it, by using a specific goal (construction of sewage) as means, instead of simply promoting construction of sewage/drainage facilities with resident participation, in an informally developed area where representative community organizations had not been formed. In other words, improvement of the physical environment was just a means, and the goal was to improve the social environment. It is also noted that formation of representative community organizations strengthened their voices to the city government, which started to support OPP through connecting the sewage in Orangi to the city drainage systems. By using the OPP as a model, projects in many developing country cities are being promoted, mainly by NGOs, to connect improvement of the community’s physical environment with improvement of the social

Fig. 1-10. Orangi Pilot Project, Karachi, Pakistan (Photo by Maki Morikawa). People themselves plan, finance and construct simple sewers on the basis of neighborhood organizations created lane by lane.

Fig. 1-11. Orangi Pilot Project, Karachi, Pakistan (Photo by Maki Morikawa). OPP, an NPO, provides technical as well as organizational support to residents’ neighborhood organizations.

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Tetsuo Kidokoro

environment, that is, the formation of social networks among residents. The community development approach refers to styles such as conducting slum improvement projects in areas where a certain kind of representative community organizations exists. In these cases, capacity building of community organizations as well as the efficient and equitable conduct of slum improvement projects will be pursued largely by the supporting government agencies. Notably, successful cases are often conducted in collaboration with intermediary NGOs, who coordinate the needs and specific conditions of communities and the intentions and limitations of the government agencies. A good example is KIP, mentioned above. The community management approach is a more advanced model in terms of community initiative. The government devolves necessary power and financial capability for community-based organizations to conduct improvement projects. On that basis, improvement projects are conducted and managed under the initiative of community-based organizations in collaboration with relevant government agencies and intermediary NGOs. Most importantly, continuous improvement projects should be conducted towards the overall improvement of the community’s quality of life. Of course, these approaches should be understood as ideal types. Actual slum improvement projects are conducted through combinations of these different approaches, and there are few cases in which only one of the three approached is dominantly observed. In the San Antonio community, which is a slum community in Manila, Philippines, waste-recycling activity is conducted on a large scale as voluntary activity by a community organization (Fig. 1-12 and 1-13). Initially, the activity was started by an NGO called SPM (Save the Pasig River Movement). SPM supported organizing a resident organization in charge of recycling activity

Fig. 1-12. San Antonio, Manila, Philippines (Photo by Maiko Nishi). Community-based waste collection and recycling in a slum community can become sustainable as a community-based social enterprise.

Fig. 1-13. San Antonio, Manila, Philippines (Photo by Maiko Nishi). Partnership with supportive local governments is essential to link the community activity with the city service.

1. Community-based Approach for Improving Vulnerable Urban Space

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through discovering leaders from various existing volunteer activities, implementing community development training for leaders, etc., and it also played an important role in starting recycling activities through providing technical support for recycling methods, contributing temporary storage for recycling goods, and coordinating with the local government for waste collection that is done alongside recycling (Nishi and Kidokoro et al. (2000)). It is noted that collecting wastes and recycling not only considerably improve the physical environment, but also generate income for those who participate in waste collection. Thus, waste collection can become a kind of community-based social enterprise so that recycling can become a sustainable activity in San Antonio. Since the late 1990s, micro finance, as well as networking and partnership, have emerged as important aspects of poverty issues. A well-known example of micro finance is the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. The Grameen Bank, established in 1976, gives out small loans without collateral to poor women in rural areas. A small group, consisting of five people, is formed under close instruction by staff, and the entire group has joint responsibility for the loan. Members use small loans for income generating activities, and it has been shown that they can successfully repay loans. Presently, the Bank has expanded to entire rural areas in Bangladesh, and has grown to provide loans to 2.3 million poor women. Using the Grameen Bank as a successful model, micro finance for the urban poor has expanded as effective empowerment means since the 1990s. A well-known successful example of micro finance in the urban residential field is the Community Mortgage Program (CMP) of the Philippines. The CMP, started in 1989, is a system in which the government loans money to slum area residents for land acquisition, basic infrastructure provision such as water supply/drainage facilities, and housing construction, for a long term (15 years) at low interest with subsidy from the government. As a characteristic feature, NGOs or the local governments give support for the formation of community organizations and clerical procedures. Loans are given to community organizations. During the first two years, a community organization, instead of an individual, retains rights to the land, and has responsibility for repaying the loan, and thereafter land rights are transferred to individuals. The average repayment rate is reported to be as high as 90% or more, particularly when NGOs are loan originators. This reflects the fact that NGOs conduct various activities to support building the capacity of community organizations, not just clerical work to provide loans to the community. Using CMP as a precedent, in Thailand the Urban Community Development Office (UCDO: currently reorganized as the Community Organizations Development Institute (CODI)) started as a partnership-type project by government and NGOs and representatives of CBOs. The UCDO

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was established in 1992 under the National Housing Authority (NHA), a government agency in charge of providing housing to low- and middleincome people, through funds from the Thai government (US$50 million). It merged with Rural Community Development in 2000 and was renamed CODI (Community Organization Development Institute). Its board of directors, which is a decision-making body, is a partnership-type organization independent from the government, consists of related government agencies, NGOs, professionals and representatives of CBOs, from an equal standpoint. Using its funds, the CODI provides loans to community-based saving groups that they help to organize in low-income communities according to the Cooperative Law. Then, the saving groups provide loans to the respective group members. Though the CODI provides loans at lower interest than the market rate, the community-based saving groups give out loans to respective group members at a level similar to the market rate. The split of interest rates are kept by the community-based saving groups, and the funds can be used for community projects, thus creating a system for the community to be financially capable. When the CODI provides a loan to a saving group, a project to be financed is decided based on both parties’ agreement. Eligible projects are not limited to housing or basic infrastructure improvement activities in communities, but can also include incomegenerating activities. The CODI not only implements micro finance but also provides support so that communities can develop themselves, such as organizing saving groups, support for networking among these groups, training programs, etc. According to the CODI report, about half of the poor urban communities (1,271 communities) had been benefited as of 2005.

1.5 Conclusion This chapter overviews improvement projects in substandard informal settlements of cities and introduces specific examples. As shown by these examples, a shift to community-initiative-type approaches is a major trend, and the importance of the following elements have become widely recognized: the role of NGOs to support such projects; networking among government, NGOs, CBOs, etc., as an institutional system to enable community-based projects; and partnership-type organizations independent from government agencies. Huge investment is generally needed for conventional urban infrastructure development projects such as water supply, sewage, waste management, and flood protection. Of course, these are of-

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ten not affordable for the urban poor, and thus low-income informal settlements are not covered. Structural reinforcement measures to increase the preparedness for natural disaster such as earthquakes and floods are also often not the first priority for low-income people. As discussed above, the progress of the community-based approach is key, and requires capacity building both at the community and local government levels as well as partnership-building among different levels of governments, NGOs, CBOs and the private sector.

References Abbot, J. (1996) “Sharing the City: Community Participation in Urban Development”, in Arrossi, S. et al. (eds) Funding Community Initiatives, Earthscan Hamdi N. and Goethert R. (1997) Action Planning For Cities: A Guide to Community Practice, Willey Kidokoro, T. (2004) “Formation of Sustainable Urban Development Strategy in Asia” in Sasaki, T. (ed) Nature and Human Communities, Springer Kidokoro, T. (2000) “Roles of ODA at the Intersection of Urban Environment Improvement and Poverty Alleviation”, JBIC Review, Special Issue: Infrastructure for Development in the 21st Century Kidokoro, T., Nguyen, T.A. and Tran, M.A. (2007) “Improving Spatial Planning Systems and Development Control Mechanisms Towards Sustainable Urban Development in Asian Cities” (Proceeding of 4th Urban Research Symposium, 14-16, May 2007, World Bank, Washington DC) Sanoff, A. (2000) Community Participation Methods in Design and Planning, JohnWiley & Sons Schubeler, S. (1996) Participation and Partnership in Urban Infrastructure Management (Urban Management Programme Policy Paper 19, the World Bank) Nishi, M., Kidokoro, T. and Onishi, T. (2000) “A study on community-based recycling activities in a slum community in Manila, Philippines”, Papers on City Planning, 35 (in Japanese)

2. The Vulnerable City: Coping with Disasters

Banasopit Mekvichai

2.1 Introduction When we look at the question of vulnerable cities and how they cope with disasters, we need to look at three closely linked issues: (1) the rapid urbanization throughout the world, and in particular in developing countries, (2) the impact of these fast-growing cities on the environment, and (3) how major environmental changes, in particular global warming, affects our cities. It is important to know then what we can do, or try to do, to ameliorate at least some of the causes of disasters. It is also critical for those who look after our cities to be aware of the potential disasters, and to be well prepared to cope with those types of disasters that are more likely to occur in their cities. For this article, I first discuss a few issues concerning the vulnerability of cities to natural and man-made disasters in general. This is followed with a discussion of what city administrations can do to prepare for disasters. Finally, I look at what the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration does to help mitigate disasters, with specific discussion of measures to control Bangkok’s perennial problem of flooding.

2.2 The Urbanization of the World The rate of urbanization in recent years is astounding. As can be seen in Fig. 2-1, about 50 years ago, only three out of ten people in the world lived in cities. Most of these were in the developed countries. Now about 50% of the world’s population lives in cities, and by 2030 it is expected that six out of ten people will live in cities. Most of the new urban growth is in the less developed and least developed countries.

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Banasopit Mekvichai 90.0% 80.0% 70.0% 60.0% 50.0% 40.0% 30.0% 20.0% 10.0% 0.0%

1950

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

World

29.8% 31.7% 33.7% 35.5% 36.8% 37.9% 39.6% 41.5% 43.5% 45.3% 47.2% 49.3% 51.5% 53.7% 55.9% 58.1% 60.2%

More Developed

54.9% 58.0% 61.4% 64.6% 67.7% 70.0% 71.5% 72.7% 73.7% 74.6% 75.4% 76.3% 77.4% 78.6% 79.9% 81.3% 82.6%

Less Developed

17.8% 19.6% 21.6% 23.6% 25.1% 26.8% 29.3% 32.1% 35.0% 37.7% 40.4% 43.1% 45.9% 48.6% 51.3% 53.9% 56.4%

Least Developed

7.4%

8.4%

9.5%

11.1% 12.9% 14.7% 17.3% 19.0% 20.8% 23.1% 25.6% 28.4% 31.4% 34.5% 37.6% 40.7% 43.7%

Fig. 2-1. Rate of world urbanization, 1950 to 2030 (2005 to 2030 estimates) (Source: United Nations Population Division)

9,000,000,000

8,000,000,000

7,000,000,000

6,000,000,000

5,000,000,000

Total population Urban population Rural population

4,000,000,000

3,000,000,000

2,000,000,000

1,000,000,000

0 1950

1955 1960

1965

1970

1975 1980

1985

1990 1995

2000

2005 2010 2015

2020 2025

2030

Fig. 2-2. World population: total population, urban population, and rural population, 1950 to 2030 (2005 to 2030 estimates) (Source: United Nations Population Division)

What does this mean? For the first time in world history, more people now live in cities than in villages (Fig. 2-2). Nearly all the future human population growth will be in cities. This is through a combination of people moving from the countryside into the cities, and the growth of population within the cities themselves. Most of this urban growth will also be concentrated in megacities --- cities of five million people or more.

2. The Vulnerable City: Coping with Disasters

17

Fig. 2-3. Megacities of the world, by size, in 2000 (Source: Department of Geography, University of Cologne)

Fig. 2-4. Megacities of the world, by size, in 2015 (Source: Department Geography, University of Cologne)

Fig. 2-3 and 2-4 show the number and size of the megacities of the world in 2000 and the expected number and size of megacities in 2015, respectively. In 1950, only nine cities had five million residents or more. Only two were in Asia: Tokyo (then the second largest city after New York) and Shanghai. Four were in Europe, two in the US, and one (Buenos Aires) in Latin America. By 2000, Europe added only two more megacities, and the US added but one, while Asia added 17 new megacities. By 2015, the total number of megacities in Asia Europe is expected to remain at six, while North America will have just four. Asia, in contrast, is expected to have 34, and Latin America nine, including the second largest megalopolis, Mexico City.

18

Banasopit Mekvichai

2.3 Vulnerability to Disasters This growth of highly concentrated urban areas has crucial implications for the vulnerability of the cities and their residents. To begin with, the concentration of population means that when a disaster does strike these sites, it will affect many more people. Flooding, earthquakes, and extreme storms do not of course specifically target cities, but they will have much greater impact on human life and property when they hit large settlements rather than the fairly dispersed and less populated rural areas. Cities, though, are often built on sites vulnerable to particular natural disasters. Port cities along coasts in the tropics and subtropics are exposed to tropical storms. Many other cities built along rivers, for water supply or also for defense, are now susceptible to floods. How these fast-growing cities expand can leave them even more vulnerable to disasters. Older cities nestled in valleys have newer settlements built up along hillsides. Slum housing on hillsides, such as the shantytowns perched on the slopes around Rio de Janeiro, are especially susceptible to land and mudslides. The high concentration of population and of built area makes these cities prone as well to man-made disasters such as fires and toxic spills. 2.3.1 Megacities and the Environment Although megacities take up only 2% of the Earth’s land surface, they account for 60% of human water use. The world’s biggest cities use 75% of all the electricity. With most motor transport in and around cities, and most industries in and around cities, nearly 80% of all human produced carbon emissions come from cities. Thus megacities make the biggest contributions to climate change, in a strange way contributing to their own increased vulnerability to natural disasters, as global warming leads to more frequent and powerful tropical storms and to greater extremes of rainfall and drought and of course higher temperatures. With their appetite for water, the huge amounts of liquid and solid waste produced, and the pollution from factories and motor vehicles, the large cities of the world create the conditions that make them so unhealthy and ever more at risk to man-made disasters.

2. The Vulnerable City: Coping with Disasters

19

2.3.2 Preparing for Disaster Cities administrators and managers must be aware of and seek ways to mitigate the different types of natural disasters that can affect their communities. Cities in Japan and Indonesia, and elsewhere along the Pacific Ring of Fire must be particularly concerned with earthquakes. Earthquakes cannot of course be prevented: but the disastrous effects can be mitigated through improved building construction and effective disaster management. With earthquakes there sometimes come tsunamis: coastal communities prone to tsunamis must have effective evacuation and relief procedures. Nature’s fury is often seen in powerful storms: hurricanes and typhoons, tornadoes, sandstorms, windstorms, heavy rain and floods, and severe snow, ice, and sleet storms. Then there are landslides and mudslides, sinkholes, fires (some from natural causes, most from humans) and the manmade disasters of toxic spills and pollution. There was even river so polluted, the Cuyahoga River passing through Cleveland, Ohio, that the oils and effluent floating on top of it caught fire several times since the 1930s, the most recent and famous fire on June 22, 1969. Fortunately for city managers and administrators, not every city will face each type of disaster. Otherwise human, financial, and material resources would be stretched too thinly. Tokyo must be well prepared for earthquakes and an occasional typhoon, but not so much for severe winter weather and nor for tornadoes. Bangkok must be concerned mostly with rain, tropical storms and flooding, and with the usual urban problems of fire, accidents, and pollution. Still, Bangkok’s administrators should not ignore the possibility --- no matter how slight --- of earthquakes, at least in the construction of public works and buildings. How can city administrators deal with disasters? There are four main types of activities depending on the stage of disaster: mitigation and preparedness before disasters occur, response to the disaster, and recovery from the disaster. Mitigation measures should include: -

-

City planning to identify vulnerable parts of the city, to assure any development of the vulnerable areas will be done is such a way as to reduce the risk of disaster, and to make sure that rescue operations can easily reach all parts of the city. Building codes that reduce the risks of disasters, such as designs for buildings to tolerate certain magnitudes of earthquakes, to reduce the risk of fire, and to avoid obstructing water or flood drainage.

20

Banasopit Mekvichai -

-

Insurance --- both public and private --- that will provide the financial resources to rebuild after a disaster. Laws and regulations to help prevent man-made disasters, to reduce the risk of natural disasters, and to protect citizens from the effects of these disasters. The creation and maintenance of disaster rescue units. The development of coordinated disaster management.

Preparedness involves: -

-

-

Installing warning systems so people can avoid or take shelter from the impending disaster. Structural adjustments to buildings and to public works that are found to be vulnerable. Stockpiling supplies, such as food and other materials that would be needed if disaster strikes. Resource inventory, to make sure sufficient supplies and materials are available for an adequate response Enforcing laws and regulations, in particular by means of o Building and landuse permits, and o Building and landuse inspections. Monitoring conditions: whether it is monitoring the potential disasters (such as pending floods in Bangkok) or monitoring the levels of preparedness. Emergency drills, so the rescue units are well prepared and city residents are aware of what they need to do. Public education to help city residents understand what might occur when various types of disasters strike and what they should do to reduce the risks to their person and property.

Disaster response needs to have both: -

Immediate and effective rescue operations, and Provision of resources to residents affected by the disaster.

Finally, after the disaster has passed, recovery efforts are needed. These should be: -

Restoration of facilities and services, and Reconstruction of the community if it was damaged or destroyed by the disaster.

2. The Vulnerable City: Coping with Disasters

21

2.4 The Case of Flooding in Bangkok As with any other large city, Bangkok faces a variety of natural and manmade disasters, among them fires, accidents, and buildings collapsing from land subsidence or poor construction. The one natural disaster that occurs regularly, and that requires constant disaster management planning and implementation, is flooding. Floods in Bangkok are unavoidable. The city was built on a flood plain. It was a swampland before being settled. A system of natural and manmade canals during the first 180 years after its founding in 1782 not only provided the main means of transportation, but also helped to drain the floodwaters. And they gave Bangkok its nickname among Westerners as the ‘Venice of the East.’ For nearly two centuries, Bangkok residents lived with or at least tolerated the floods: they traveled by boat, many in the first decades of the city lived in houseboats, and later people lived in houses that were built to withstand floodwaters. Only after the 1950s and 1960s, when many canals were filled in to build roads, and people began to depend upon land rather than water transportation, that flooding became more of a problem for the city residents. The rapid expansion of Bangkok in recent decades has contributed in several ways to the problems of flooding. As seen in Fig. 2-5, the expansion of Bangkok from 1900 until the 1950s was in a fairly concentrated

Fig. 2-5. Expansion of Bangkok, 1900-1989 (Source: Kraas (1995))

22

Banasopit Mekvichai

and limited area. Since then, the city has sprawled in all directions, though most extensively to the north and east and southeast. The two decades since have seen even more extensive urban sprawl in all directions, particularly along the major transportation arteries to the north, southeast, and west. All of this new construction further converts what had been floodplains and natural drainage systems into built areas. It is not surprising, then, that many of Bangkok’s problems are water related. Aside from the problem of flooding, Bangkok suffers from land subsidence, mainly caused by the extraction of ground water. This has slowed considerably, with strict regulations controlling ground water use. However, as parts of the city sink, they become more susceptible to flooding. Bangkok’s flood risk is greatest during September to November of each year, when three phenomena combine to raise the water levels: 1. Rising water levels in the Chao Phraya River from increased runoff from rains in Thailand’s northern provinces. Almost all of the northern hills and much of the central region drains into the Chao Phraya and its tributaries.Heavy rains and floods in North Thailand in September and October eventually reach Bangkok in a month or so later. 2. High tides pushing seawater up the Chao Phraya, and raising the level of the river into Bangkok. The higher sea level slows the amount of water that can flow out of the river, forcing the waters up and sometimes over the embankments. 3. Heavy rains at the end of the monsoon season. Even under the best of conditions, it takes time to drain some of the heaviest rains. Bangkok is now able to handle a river flow of 3,000 m3/sec, along with drainage of rainfall of 60 mm per hour, with dykes built along the riverbanks at a height of 2.5 m above sea level. Of course when it rains more than 60 mm in an hour, as is often the case in heavy monsoon downpours, it will take time to drain; and when water flows from the north at a rate over 3,000 m3/sec, there is a clear risk of the river flowing over its embankments. What does the city administration do to deal with these specific, yet expected, vulnerabilities? The city has taken a multi-pronged approach. At the recommendation of His Majesty the King, the city and neighboring provinces have introduced the ‘Monkey Cheeks’ network: a system of water retention fens and reservoirs. Currently able to hold 12.8 million m3 of water, additional sites are to be added this coming year that will hold another 1.8 million m3. The city has also developed an extensive system of water polders on both sides of the river.

2. The Vulnerable City: Coping with Disasters

23

To keep the river from overflowing, the city is building 86 km of flood embankments (77 km completed as of early 2007) along the river and major canals. A wall of flood dikes have been built to protect the much of the city, while extensive drainage canals are used to drain areas in the eastern parts of the city outside the flood dikes. The Bangkok Metropolitan Administration and the Royal Irrigation Department jointly manage this effort. To help drain the city from heavy rains, a system of pumping stations have been set up along the river and major canals, and a network of drainage canals are also being built. Floodgates help keep excessive water out of the canals, allowing some capacity for drainage even when Bangkok faces higher water levels. Regular inspections of the facilities and of vulnerable areas, and regular monitoring of all the related conditions (river flow, rainfall, tides) make sure the system works as planned. The past year, 2006, saw some of the highest waters from the North, combined with very heavy rains and very high tides. Fortunately, the preparation and the concerted efforts of the city administration, other government agencies, and help from people in provinces just north of the city helped to prevent the extensive flooding that could have been a serious disaster for the city. Special thanks must be given to the people of Ayutthaya and Ang Thong Provinces who sacrificed their farmland to serve as additional water retention areas for the excessive river flow (nearly 5,000 m3/sec), and to the staff of the Water Drainage Department of the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration who worked unceasingly through day and night building temporary embankments to further raise the river banks, manning the pumps and watergates, to prevent the river from overflowing and to keep the city drained after heavy rains. A few low lying areas along the inner part of the city, as well as many places outside the flood dikes, did end up getting flooded. For these places, the city had to carry out its rescue activities. Food and other supplies, and in particular fresh drinking water and dry blankets and clothing, were distributed to residents in these areas. Once the waters drained, the city worked with the communities in their recovery. Preparations for the next wet season began months before the first rains. Canals were dredged and cleared, the drainage system cleaned, and the drainage facilities inspected and kept in good working order.

24

Banasopit Mekvichai

2.5 Lessons Learned What are some of the lessons learned from the floods of 2006? We found that it was the man-made environment that tends to cause the most problems. The completion and opening of Bangkok’s new international airport to the southwest of the city is an excellent example. The airport has its own flood protection and drainage system to keep the runways dry. This obstructed what had been some important drainage passages for the eastern suburbs of the city, thus exacerbating the floods in these areas. We also know that preparation is absolutely necessary. All the equipment and the personnel must be ready to face the potential disasters when they come. Higher embankments must be put up before the increased river flow. Water levels in canals must be reduced before heavy rains. Canals and drainage pipes must be cleaned and cleared well before the first rains come. Monitoring is crucial. This allows for advance action, to solve problems before they occur or become even more serious, and to send manpower and resources to where they are needed most. Finally, cooperation is essential. The Bangkok Metropolitan Administration works with the Royal Irrigation Department, the Interior Ministry, neighboring provinces, and many others to make sure its flood and drainage system work effectively. Convenient or Inconvenient?

The flooding and drainage problems of Bangkok will likely worsen in coming years, as global warming leads to higher sea levels and more extremes in weather. Our conveniences are now becoming, as former Vice President Al Gore so rightly puts it, inconvenient. Global warming is an inconvenient truth, because it is our conveniences, those things that make our lives and especially our urban lives so comfortable: cars, electricity, air conditioning and heating, all contribute to the carbon emissions that are warming our planet. What can we expect from our polluting the earth? -

Rising oceans, with many coastal areas under water. Bangkok is one of the cities that is most vulnerable. More frequent and more powerful storms. More extreme weather: heavier rains, more flooding The more extreme weather will also lead to more drought and increasing temperatures, contributing to greater fire risk, and to greater health risks.

2. The Vulnerable City: Coping with Disasters

25

What is needed of course is a significant reduction in our production of greenhouse gases. To do this, we need to change our approach to development. It cannot be simply a matter of rapid industrialization and economic growth. Development ethics are needed to balance the environment with our needs. Sustainable development must be realized. Thailand has turned away from the goal of economic growth to greater social equity and now, as its target for the 10th National Economic and Social Development Plan, to attaining sufficiency economy. Based on Buddhist teachings, sufficiency economy presents a ‘middle path’ or moderation in production and consumption, depending as much as possible on what can be produced locally. The City Must Change Its Role

Cities need to stop being destructive consumers of resources. Instead they should start being productive regenerators of the environment through green measures: more public transportation, more green area, reduced use of electricity, ‘cleaner’ factories, and more use of local resources and production. Most of the participants at this symposium are from the academic community. What can academics do to help reduce our vulnerability to disasters? Their most important role is to provide tools to help combat vulnerability. They can help to identify vulnerable spaces, conditions, and activities; and help to understand and explain the vulnerabilities. They can help plan to prevent or to control or to respond to different types of disasters or vulnerabilities. They can help plan activities and procedures for rescue, relief, and recovery. And they can help develop tools and methods for monitoring and analysis. What should city managers and administrators, and city residents, do? We know what to expect: there will be fire, earthquakes, tsunami, floods, storms, and accidents. We cannot avoid them. But we can plan for disasters. With planning and preparation, some disasters might be prevented, others can be protected against, and those that cannot be prevented or protected against might have their impact reduced. And just as critical, we should be ready to provide rescue, relief, and recovery whenever disasters do occur. We as individuals need to act collectively at all levels: community, city, nation, and world. To do so, we need to ‘Act Locally, Think Globally.’ Our individual actions, multiplied at the community, city, national, and world levels, can have major and lasting impacts. Each person reducing electric consumption, each person driving less, each person using more local goods that do not need to be shipped from afar. Individually and collec-

26

Banasopit Mekvichai

tively, we need to reduce the bad aspects of our lives, our activities that harm the environment, and we need to increase those aspects and activities that either do less harm or can in fact help the environment. Remember: the world’s population continues to grow. All the new population growth is in cities. Soon six of ten people will live in cities. Most of them will live in megacities. Population is in and of itself not the problem, but how we act and how we live now is a problem. How we act and live in the future will either increase or decrease our vulnerability.

Appendix

2. The Vulnerable City: Coping with Disasters

Fig. 2-A2. Flood in Bangkok

зјѠкѝѧэ

эѩкдѠкёјъўѥієҖѥъѨѷ 2 Ѱјѣ дѠкёѤь 1 іѠ. эѩкѯіѪѠьлѼѥзјѠкѯюіє

щ ді ььм ѫк ј Ѡк

к 12. ьмјѠэѩ кеҖѥк і.ё.эѫімѤшіѳнѕѥді щь ѫк 13. ді эѩкѯѝѪѠчѼѥ 14. эѩкюѬьоѨѯєьшҙѳъѕ (эѩкѐіѤѷк) 15 эѩкѯѠдєѤѕ 16. эѩкѝњьѝѕѥє 17.юізјѣѯњѠк эѩкѲьдієъўѥііѥэъѨѷ 11 іѠ.

ёҕк

щь ьћ іѨь зіѧ ьъ іҙ

зјѠкэ ѥкьѥ

зј Ѡкѝ Ѽѥѱі к

зј Ѡкў јњк Ѱ

ієѕҙ

18. 19. 20.

щь шіѥ ьэѥк ьѥ ч -

ћэѫі Ѩ

эѩкѝѨдѤь эѩкеҖѥкѱікѯіѨѕьѰѠьѯьдоҙ

ѰдҖєјѧкзјѠкєўѥнѤѕ-зјѠк ѝьѥєнѤѕ (ѲьёѪь Ѹ ъѨѷ дъє.) Total

No щььѯ ъёѥіѤд ќҙ

зјѠкѝѼѥѱік

зјѠк нјюіѣъ ѥь

Ѡҕѥњѳъѕ

щььѝѫеѫєњѧъ

Pond

эѩкєѣеѥєѯъћѰјѣэѩкѝѣѰд щььэ кѥєѝѥєѯчѪ Ѡь ѯешзјѠк ѥкьѥ шіѥч щььѯъё ѥіѤдќҙ ѝѥєњѥ 2 эѩкѲьѝьѥєўјњк 2 ѯешъњѨ њѤхьѥ 3. эѩкѝњьјѫєёѧьѨ ѯешюъѫєњѤь 1.

4.

ҙ

ѱн

щьь јѥчдіѣэѤк

щььњ ѰдҖњ Ѥчдѧѷк

1

зј Ѡк ѯч

зјѠкюіѣѯњћэѫіѨієѕҙ н щььѠҕѠььѫ

эѩкўєѬҕэҖѥьѯћіудѧл ѯеш эѥкѰз Total

зј Ѡк чҕѥь

зјѠкеѫьіѥн њѧьѧлмѤѕ

іц ўд

10.

зјѠкѰѝь Ѱѝэ зј ѯь Ѡкь ѪѷѠк з ѯе і ш

зјѠкёі ѣѠкзҙѯлҖ ѥ ѳнѕѥьѫн ѧш

15 іѣ Ѡкё зј к ь ѱе

є

зјѠк ѝѥєѧш ѝііё

эѩкшѥѯдшѫ

зј ѳн Ѡ к ѕѥ ёі ьѫн ѣѠ ѧш кзҙѯ лҖѥ

зјѠкѝѥєњѥ

ѧ ьъі ҙ щььь њє

3

њѧъ

щьью ѬҐѯ ёіѥѕ лҖѥѝєѧк

эѩкдѫҕєзјѠкѰѝь Ѱѝэ эѩкѝьѥєдѠјҙђіщѳђ

9.

щь ьѯ ѝѤє нѪѷѠє ёѤь ыҙ

щь ёў ь јѱѕ ыѧь

зјѠкюі

зј Ѡк юіѣ ѯюіє нѥді

щь ьњ іѤкѝѧш ѧѓѥњ чѨ

щььюіѣ нѥ нѪѷь

д Ѳў рҕ ѥкд Ѡ зј Ѡкэ

2 іѥ є щь ьё іѣ

щ ді ььѯл ѫк іѧр

щььдѥрльѥ ѓѧѯќд

ѧл уд щь ьѯћі ќ

дн Ѥѕ щь ьѯѠ

щь ьѝ ѫеѫє

7. 8.

щььіҕњє ёѤхьѥ

4

эѩкёіѣіѥє 9 эѩкёѧэѬјњѤхьѥ эѩкјѼѥёѤкёњѕ эѩкъікдіѣѯъѨѕє

11.

13 є

3. 4. 5. 6.

щььѝѫњѧьъ њкћҙ

ѝь

ѫеѫєњѧъ щььѝ

In 2008, 5 location of 1,862,000m3 will be founded. Ѡкѝ зј

5

6

ѠкѰ зј э Ѱѝ

щььіҕєѯдјҖѥ

20 ьѥє

Ѥѕ

зјѠк ѯѝьѲь ѝѥє зјѠкѰѝ ь Ѱѝэ

ъѕ ѝіѨѳ 2) щььѯѥѓѧэѥј (ѝѫе ўк ѼѥѰ єз 3) ьіѥ ѥј щь ѥѓѧэ (ѝѫе

7

зіѧьъіҙ щььћіѨь

Ѥѕ дн

9 16

5

ѧѻ Ѥѝч ѝњ

ўѥн

щььё іѣіѥ 3

ѥ іѣн ью щь Ѳл ќсіҙ іҕњєььіѥ щ ѧћ Ѡѫъ

ѫе ьѝ щь

кє

12 щььё іѣіѥ 4

3

щьь јѥч ёіҖ ѥњ

зјѠклѤѷь

зјѠкѝьѥєѳн ѕ

Ѡ зј

2

ҕѠк Ѡкн зј іѨѕҙ ььъ

єьшіѨ

щььѯ ћіќу дѧл

є2 іѣіѥ ьё щь

10

4

щььіѥ эѬіцѣ ќсіҙ

ѝ Ѡк зј ѕ ѳн

4

кд Ѡд ьҖѠ ѕ

зјѠк ѣьѠк чѥњз

зјѠкіѥн

ьѯѠ щь

зјѠкэѥкоѪѷѠ зј ѯѝь Ѡкѝѥє

з д і јѠк ѫкѯд я ќ чѫк є

іҖѥњ зјѠкјѥчё

щььёѫъыєцфј ѝѥѕ 2

Ѥх ьѥ ъњѨњ зјѠк

щььёѫъыєцфј ѝѥѕ 4

щььёѫъыєцфј ѝѥѕ 5

ліѧр ѓѥќѨѯ зјѠк

эѩкѝњьјѫєёѧьѨ

зјѠк ўьѤк эѥкѯнѪѠд

5

щььѯёніѯдќє

3

зј Ѡк эѥ

щьь іѤнчѥѓѧѯќд

щѳђ ъѥкі шҖ ѝѥѕѲ іѤр ҙ ьл щь ѧъњкћ ѝь

щььшјѧѷкнѤь --ьзі ьзі нѤѕћіѨ

2

14

щь ью іѣн ѥѠѫъ зј ѧћ ѠкѰ лк іҖѠ ь

2

1

8

к з ді јѠк њѕ эѥ

зјѠкєўѥѝњѤѝчѧѻ

щьь Ѡѧь іѥ є ъ іѥ

17

ћҙ

эѩкўьѠкэѠь эѩкєѤддѣѝѤь

щььѠѕѬҕњѧъ ѕѥ

11

з эѥ јѠк кѯе ь

Ѥхьѥ

щь њѥь ькѥє њк

эѤњ ѥк

щь ёў ь јѱѕ ыѧь

ѯќд щььдѥрльѥ ѓѧ

іҙ

зјѠк ѠҖѠ є щььэ ьҖѠѕ ѥкдіњѕ -ѳъ зј - ѳъі Ѡкэ ѥкд Ѡд ьҖѠ ѕ

кѲўрҕ зјѠкэѥ

Ѡкэ зј

щьььѧєѧші Ѳўєҕ

ъ њѨњ зјѠк

ыѧѯэћ

ьъҙ ѧњѥь щььш

зјѠк эѥкш јѥч

щььі Ѥшьѥ

19 18

щььѰ њѤхьѣ лҖк

Capacity (mil m3)

Pond

зјѠкўдњѥ ѝѥѕјҕѥк

1. 2.

зјѠкѝѧэѝѨѷ

ѧњѥ ьш щь ьъ ҙ ь

к

No

щььјѼѥјѬд дѥ

щььюіѣнѥ ѝѼѥіѥр

зјѠк эѥкэ ѤњъѠ

зјѠкўдњѥѝѥѕ јҕѥк

зјѠкѝѧэѝѥє

1

ѣюѥ

-

є іѣѠѫч Ѡ кё зј

іѣё ѧєј

зјѠкўд

зјѠкѝѠк

Fig. 2-A3. Vulnerable area, Bangkok

щььэѥкэѤњъѠк эѥкзѬњѤч

зј Ѡ кё

27

5,000,000 261,600 10,875 48,000 200,000 81,000 148,000 107,000 5,500 94,000 68,000 12,800 22,750 78,000 3,500 228,000 288,000 40,000 8,400 6,000,000 12,705,425 Capacity (mil m3) 150,000

12,000 200,000 1,500,000 1,862,000

Fig. 2-A4. Royal Initiated Water Retention Projects (Monkey Cheeks) (Source: Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA))

3. Promotion of Seismic Retrofitting for Existing Low Earthquake Resistant Structures: The Most Important Issue for Earthquake Disaster Reduction

Kimiro Meguro

3.1 Introduction Much attention has been paid recently to a scandal involving faulty designed and constructed apartments in Japan. This situation is highly regrettable and it is needless to say that it is important to take measures to prevent the recurrence of these problems. These circumstances have put the public’s attention on the issue of structural seismic resistance. In Japan, besides the faulty apartments in the news recently, there are many existing buildings that were designed and constructed following the former structure code, and do not have enough strength as required by the current code. These structures are called pre-code revision weak structures. They are widely spread throughout the country and used for apartments, offices and hotels, etc. The number of these structures is approximately 1.5 million, which is 10,000 times more than faulty apartments. If we consider wooden houses, the most typical residential houses in Japan and more vulnerable, the number of pre-code revision weak houses is over 10 million and the situation is even worse. Imagine what would happen when an earthquake occurs. Obviously not only the faulty apartments will be affected, but other many pre-code revision weak structures will also be damaged. Seismic reinforcement of such structures is urgently needed for earthquake disaster reduction. In Japan, the seismic design code has been revised several times after earthquake disasters. As a result, it has been reported that the structures designed, constructed, and maintained according to the “new standard,” which was enforced in 1981, sustained little damage under earthquakes

30

Kimiro Meguro

such as the 1995 Kobe Earthquake (Meguro (2003a)). The standard was reviewed again in 2000 and stronger structures have been built. However, the largest problem in Japan is the many buildings which were built before the “new standard,” that is existing pre-code revision structures (including buildings which were built after the “new standard” but do not have enough seismic resistance due to improper construction/maintenance), that are expected to cause great damage when the next earthquake hits. In order to reduce the damage immediately after an earthquake, the only way is to identify the weak structures and promote their reinforcement/replacement. However, this policy has not been promoted successfully, especially for general residences. What is the reason for this? In this article, I will introduce my new idea on the system for promoting reinforcement/replacement of weak structures, considering current seismic conditions and the number of existing pre-code revision weak structures in Japan. This scheme is fundamental for sustainable urban regeneration and the development of a sounder urban environment.

3.2 Slow Progress of Seismic Retrofitting

3.2.1 Seismic Retrofitting Importance Recent earthquakes, including the 1995 Kobe Earthquake, have taught us many lessons, the most important of which is that it is absolutely necessary to retrofit existing pre-code revision weak structures. Fig. 3-1 shows the disaster management cycle. Among the seven countermeasures, the major

3. Promotion of Seismic Retrofitting

31

ones are Disaster Mitigation, Preparedness/Disaster Response and Recovery and Reconstruction Strategies. Mitigation makes an effort not to connect the Hazard, a physical phenomenon, to disaster, a negative impact on society, through taking optimal measures beforehand. Preparedness/Disaster Response prevents wide spread impact after the hazard occurs. Recovery/Reconstruction Strategy minimizes the negative influence due to the hazard by quick recovery and reconstruction. Among these major countermeasures, Disaster Mitigation is essential to reduce human and property losses immediately after the earthquake. In the case of the Kobe Earthquake, 250,000 buildings and houses were completely collapsed or partially destroyed, and mainly because of this damage 5,500 people were killed (Nishimura et al. (1995)) and problems occurred involving fire (Meguro (2003b)), temporary housing, waste disposal, victims’ mental suffering, lonely death, economic decline, various problems during reconstruction, etc. These problems might have been smaller or even prevented by reducing the structural damage. Japan is now facing a period of high seismic activity, and it is estimated that within 30 to 50 years, earthquakes with magnitude 8 or more will occur 4 to 5 times, and M7 class (same as the 1995 Kobe Earthquake, and the expected Tokyo earthquake level), 40 to 50 times. Total damage will be 2 million completely collapsed and/or burned out structures, meaning that 3.5 to 4 million families will loose their homes. Although the Japanese government has set the goal to complete 90% of the retrofitting of existing pre-code revision weak structures within 10 years, under the present conditions, the goal will be difficult to achieve. How can we create a good environment to promote seismic retrofitting? 3.2.2 Why Does Seismic Retrofitting Not Progress? Many people, including specialists, believe that the economic situation of residents and insufficient support from the government are the main reasons for the slow progress of seismic retrofitting in Japan. However, I think that there are some other and more fundamental issues. The standard cost of retrofitting a wooden house is 15,000yen/m2, which is about 1.5 million yen per house. Lately, even cheaper options have been made available. According to the statistics --- although there is some controversy in these numbers --- 400,000 to 700,000 households spent between 4 and 7 million yen on reforms every year in Japan. If retrofitting is carried out while reforming, the costs drastically decrease. Consider the cost of a car, which is similar to or even much more than retrofit costs. People buy a car without considering that it is expensive and also pay the

32

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compulsory and optional insurance premiums. The reason why they are eager to spend money on insurance is because they can imagine a tragic car accident. Even in high income districts, you can see luxurious cars parked in what are clearly pre-code revision weak houses. How can this be explained? I think that the most important issues for promoting seismic retrofitting is the improvement of “Disaster Imagination” capacity and the preparation of “technology” and “policy”. Let me focus later on the “Disaster Imagination.” As mentioned earlier, there are over 10 million existing pre-code revision weak structures, even considering only wooden houses. Therefore, “technology” must be cheap enough to promote seismic reinforcement but expensive enough to encourage businesses, which pursue profits, to get involved. When solving a problem, it is important to consider a solution which benefits all stakeholders. In addition, it is necessary to prepare an environment with reliable information which enables the client to understand the effect of the reinforcement. This means that evaluation methods to assess the seismic strength before and after the reinforcement, both from blueprints and insitu, are necessary. When evaluating strength, it is important to take into account the structure usage because the positions of rooms with heavy weight such as a study room with lots of books or a bathroom, which generate eccentric loads, affect the seismic resistance of the whole structure. ͆Policies” must give strong incentives to house owners and simultaneously consider the uncertainty of the “technology” cost and reliability. Is it right not to strengthen your house and just wait for the large support that you will get from the government when your house is destroyed by an earthquake? If we consider the current conditions, the number of weak structures and seismic activity in Japan, and the extent of the estimated earthquake damage, it is financially impossible for the government to pay for the “seismic reinforcement supporting policy,” which is a public assistance, and the “support for the victims after the earthquake,” which is currently being revised to simplify the procedures, extends limitation of use, and increase the amount of compensation. In addition, this kind of support generates secondary problems. For instance, the former encourages dishonest businesses to get involved whereas the latter discourages house owners to strengthen. In the long run, both are insufficient to contribute to Japan’s disaster reduction and do not use the government money wisely. A system like this is a result of the poor “disaster imagination” capacity of politicians and bureaucrats. In order to solve the above mentioned problems, I have proposed the “Meguro set” for promoting seismic reinforcement, which consists of three

3. Promotion of Seismic Retrofitting

33

elements: New “Public assistance,” “Mutual assistance,” and “Self assistance.” With this system, which I will introduce in detail later, we can drastically reduce expenditures by both citizens and the government, and the damage caused by future earthquakes. If we reinforce/replace weak structures by ourselves before the event, we can get enough financial support to build a new house in case that house is damaged by shaking or fire during a future earthquake. House makers can start a new business model in which if their constructed house is collapsed in the future by an earthquake, they can guarantee that they reconstruct or repair a house without any charge. Based on my study results, several of these proposals are currently being implemented. I am not suggesting that we should leave the weaker citizens behind. However, considering Japan’s critical situation, I hope that you can understand that it is impossible to support such weaker citizens unless many people can improve their own disaster resilience capacity to reduce future damage by methods such as the “Meguro set.”

3.3 A True Lesson Learnt from Recent Earthquake Disasters According to the medical examiner’s investigation of the Kobe Earthquake (Table 3-1 and 3-2), 87% of the victims were killed in their houses and apartments. The majority were over 60 years old. This was because of their physical weakness and because most of their houses were old. In addition, due to the former, many of them lived and slept in the first floor, which collapsed. Also, a great number of youngsters (between 20 and 25 years old) were killed, too (Fig. 3-2). Most of them were university students or young workers from outside of Kobe City, who lived in weak apartments, which collapsed too. There were cases in which company’s dormitories for singles were destroyed. Youngsters living in weak apartments are common in many other cities in Japan. This situation will cause many deaths among the young, who are supposed to support the next generation. 83.3% of the victims were killed by structural damage such as suffocation or crash, and 10% of them were affected directly and indirectly by furniture overturning. Most of the remaining (15.4/16.7=92%) were found in the fire scene, but the majority were killed because they were buried under collapsed structures and could not escape from fire. 92% of the victims presumably died within 14 minutes immediately after the earthquake. This shows that the main reason for the considerable number of deaths was not problems with early communication to the Prime Ministry, or the late

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Table 3-2. Time of casualties due to the Kobe Earthquake (in Kobe City) (Source: Nishimura et al. (1995)) Time of death Jan 17

-6:00 -9:00 -12:00 -23:59 Unidentified

Jan 18 Jan 19 Jan 20 Jan 21 Jan 22 Jan 24 Jan 25 Jan 26 Jan 27 Jan 28 Feb 4 No record Total number

Number of casualties Total number By medical examiners By ordinary doctors 2,221 2,221 (91.9%) 719 719 (58.2%) 2,940 (80.5%) 16 2,237 (92.6%) 58 777 (62.9%) 3,014 (82.6%) 47 2,284 (94.5%) 61 838 (67.9%) 3,122 (85.5%) 12 2,296 (95.0%) 212 1,050 (85.0%) 3,346 (91.6%) 110 2,406 (99.6%) 84 1,134 (91.8%) 3,540 (97.0%) 5 2,411 (99.8%) 62 1,196 (96.8%) 3,607 (98.8%) 2,411 (99.8%) 13 1,209 (97.9%) 3,620 (99.2%) 2 2,413 (99.9%) 8 1,217 (98.5%) 3,630 (99.4%) 1 2,414 (99.9%) 6 1,223 (99.0%) 9,637 (99.6%) 1 2,415 (100.0%) 1 1,224 (99.1%) 3,639 (99.7%) 2,415 (100.0%) 1 1,225 (99.2%) 3,640 (99.7%) 1 2,416 (100.0%) 1 1,226 (99.3%) 3,642 (99.8%) 2,416 (100.0%) 2 1.228 (99.4%) 3,644 (99.8%) 2,416 (100.0%) 1 1,229 (99.5%) 3,645 (99.8%) 2,416 (100.0%) 1 1,230 (99.6%) 3,646 (99.9%) 2,416 (100.0%) 1 1,231 (99.7%) 3,646 (99.9%) 2,416 (100.0%) 4 1,235 (100.0%) 3,651 (100.0%) 2,460 1,235 3,651

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(by Hyogo Medical Examiners)

400

Many aged people were killed and at the same time….

Female Male Unidentified

300 200

100 Unidentified

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䠌 / 䠑

10 / 15

20 / 25

30 / 35

40 / 45

50 / 55

60 / 65

70 / 75

80 / 85

90 / 95

Age

Fig. 3-2. Age distribution of casualties due to the 1995 Kobe Earthquake (in Kobe City)

arrival of fire fighters or Self Defense Forces (SDF), or the lack of food and water, but the weakness of the structures. The most important lesson from the Kobe Earthquake is that immediate collapse of the weak structures causing many deaths was the main reason for the entire damage, even during the reconstruction period. The Niigata Chuetsu Earthquake occurred on October 23, 2004 and caused relatively little damage in spite of the strong shake, because the seismic resistance of the houses in the area was high. Although the ground motion due to the Niigata Chuetsu Earthquake was very strong, similar or more than the Kobe Earthquake ground motion, the number of completely destroyed structures in the areas with Japan Meteorological Agency seismic intensity (JMA) 6+ or 7 was much smaller in the former compared with the latter. The destroyed structures were mainly old and had a store or a garage in the first floor, which created a soft story. Houses in regions with cold weather and heavy snowfalls in winter tend to have thick columns and beams, strong foundations, small windows resulting in high wall density, light roof made of steel plates, and are little affected by termite attacks. As a result, they had good seismic resistance. Therefore, in the case of the Niigata Chuetsu Earthquake, the main problem was not the structural damage, but rather the victims’ mental sufferings. Neither the Kobe nor the Niigata Chuetsu Earthquake caused tsunamis, but if a Tokai, Tonankai or Nankai earthquake occurs, a tsunami may occur. The Great Sumatra Earthquake and Indian Ocean Tsunami on December 26, 2004 terrified the world. As a result, tsunami awareness has been raised and some measures are being taken. This is extremely important, but we must not forget the problem of little seismic resistance, because no

Kimiro Meguro

(number of fire the outbreak until 7:00am/100,000 households)

Rate of immediate fire outbreak

36

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of completely destroyed structures

Fig. 3-3. No collapse, no fire! (Source: The Fire Defense Agency HP)

matter how much we prepare an evacuation route, it is of no use if people are killed by structure collapse. The same is true for fire. High seismic resistance will reduce the probability of fire outbreak (Fig. 3-3) and fire spreading. This is because structure collapse causes various problems such as concentrating human resources in rescue operations, difficulty in extinguishing fire under collapse structures, and access blockade by destroyed structures which hinders early actions to extinguish fires (Meguro (2003b)). Table 3-1 shows, during the Kobe Earthquake, approximately 15.4% of the total death toll was found in the fire scene. This is a sum of “burnt to death” which accounts for 12.2%, and “highly-charred body” which accounts for 3.2%. The latter is a dead body burnt so much that medical examiners cannot judge whether the body was burnt before or after death. On the other hand, the 12.2% who were “burnt to death” are known to have been burnt while they were still alive. Then, the question is, why they could not escape? The answer is clear. Most of them (except for a few of them who were caught by fires while searching for something or some other reasons) were buried under the destroyed structures and could not escape. I do not mean that there were no problems in fire extinguishing activities, but if the structures had not collapsed, they could have escaped and survived. That is, the structural problem was primary also for the victims killed by fire. From the above facts, the victims killed by the structure collapse (including overturning furniture) accounted for 95.5% (=83.3+12.2) of the total deaths. We tend to describe “emergency food and water” issues when arguing

3. Promotion of Seismic Retrofitting

㻡㻟

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Time of earthquake occurrence: 5:46am Total number of fires in Kobe city: 109

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37

time

Fig. 3-4. Fire outbreak in Kobe city on the day of the earthquake (1/17/1995) (Source: Kobe City Fire Department)

about disaster mitigation. However, statistics show that “weakening, frozen to death” only accounts for 0.2% of the casualties. Besides, these people were buried under collapsed structures and could not have food/water and died. We can see that here too, there is a problem of weak structures. When talking about the spreading of fire in the Kobe Earthquake, some people say, “It is a pity that hydrants didn’t work. If they had worked, we could have saved more lives.” But this is wrong. Specialists think differently. In the case of the Kobe Earthquake, we are absolutely sure that it would have been impossible to change the situation even if hydrants worked sufficiently. Why? Kobe is a city with 1.5 million citizens, and under normal conditions there are around 2 fires everyday. An official firefighter can handle 4 or 5 fires (of course, it depends on the fire scale) at the same time. With the help of local fire parties, it is possible to handle more. However, in the case of the Kobe Earthquake, more than 100 fires occurred in one day. Especially in the first 14 minutes, 53 fires occurred within Kobe City (Fig. 3-4). Some people may say, “Then, we should prepare enough official fire stations to handle 50 or 100 fires.” But, this is impossible. Who can afford to have such a fire fighting system for a fire that occurs once in 50 or 100 years? We must find another way. As shown in Fig. 3-5, we know how to handle fire according to its scale. Citizens are very effective in putting out a fire smaller than 3m2. For a fire spreading from 100m2 to 300m2 (about the size of 1-2 houses), fire fighters are more suitable. For a fire in a larger scale, it is a matter of fire resistance of the structure and urban planning. The fire occurring immediately after an earthquake is small, so citizens’ reactions are important. At ordinary times, fire officers can afford to extinguish such small fires, but after an earthquake, it is impossible for them to extinguish them all. It is at this time when citizens’ power is

38

Kimiro Meguro Cause of fire spread 䕺Priority on life saving 䕺Fire outbreak due to collapsed structures 䕺Road obstruction by destroyed structures 䕺Low disaster mitigation awareness

Investment effect

Put out by citizens

Extinguishing devices Fire resistant materials inside the building

Fire department response Initial extinguishing by the fire department Fire resistant structure City planning measures Urban planning measures

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Fire extent, scale

Fig. 3-5. Limitations and combination of fire prevention measures (Kenjio Hono, retouched)

needed, but in case of the Kobe Earthquake, it did not work. There are four reasons for this, three of them due to structure collapse. First, many structures collapsed, burying people and therefore citizens had to put priority to rescue operations. Rescue is also an important role of citizens, who saved more than 3 times as many buried people as fire officers and SDF. However, prioritizing rescue was one of the reasons to postpone the extinguishing of fire. Second, fires broken out under the collapsed structures are difficult for a layman to extinguish. Third, many structures collapsed, obstructing roads so that no one could get close to the scene of fire. The fourth reason is that citizens failed to put out fires at early stages since they thought fire officers would extinguish them, as in a normal situation. Only this factor might be changed by education, but the rest are due to structural problems.

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3.4 The Effect of Seismic Resistance on Fire Outbreak and Spreading

3.4.1 The Great Kanto Earthquake and Fire The biggest earthquake disaster in Japan is The Great Kanto Earthquake (M7.9) that occurred on 11:58am, September 1, 1923. While the epicenter was located northwest of Sagami Gulf, the earthquake affected the whole Kanto region, Shizuoka, and Yamanashi Prefectures (total 10 prefectures). 105,000 people were killed or went missing, 447,000 houses were burnt down, 254,000 houses were completely or partially destroyed and the total amount of damage was 6.5 billion yen, over 40% of GDP at the time. In former Tokyo City, located in Tokyo downtown, many fires occurred simultaneously after the earthquake and spread through the city, burning for more than 43 hours. In the end, 43% of the city was burnt (Fig. 3-6 and 3-7). Since this was the worst fire disaster ever, many organizations have investigated the fire cause and the fire spreading timeline. According to these investigations, contemporary specialists came up with lessons (Imamura (1925)); (Ogata (1925)); (Nakamura (1925); (Inoue (1925)), as shown in Fig. 3-8, such as: preparation of sufficient fire defenses and shelters, improvement of fire resistance of houses, and so on. These produced the fire-focused disaster mitigation system used in later earthquake disasters in Japan.

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After 1 hour

After 3 hours

After 6 hours

After 12 hours

After 24 hours

After 36 hours

Fig. 3-7. Fire spreading due to the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake

x Akigaki Imamura: Earthquake disaster mitigation investigation manager “What impressed me most in this earthquake disaster was the fire resistance of houses.”

x Iichiro Ogata: Metropolitan Police Department Fire Fighting Section Leader “Importance of urban reconstruction and sufficient fire fighting”

x Seiji Nakamura: Earthquake Disaster Mitigation Investigation Conference “Fire is more dreadful than earthquake. Preparation for disaster mitigation is of most importance.” x Kazuyuki Inoue: Metropolitan Department Security Section Architectural Section “Besides waterworks, preparation of wells, reservoir, parks, and wide area for evacuation is necessary.” Fig. 3-8. Lessons from the Great Kanto Earthquake

The specialists in those days, standing in front of the burnt out areas, must have felt as shown in the figures, but I can not agree with them. This is because their statements are only based on the results and do not sufficiently consider that the essential method to solve a problem is analyzing the cause/effect relation.

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3.4.2 Are the Great Kanto and the Kobe Earthquakes Different? What I have mentioned before might suggest that the Great Kanto Earthquake was a matter of fire and the Kobe Earthquake was a matter of existing pre-code revision weak structures. But is this understanding right? In short, I believe that “the lessons we learned from the two earthquakes are the same. Both of them were a matter of existing unqualified structures.” Fire is an important issue. But in order to prevent fire, it is essential to improve seismic resistance. I will elaborate this based on substantial data. Our study group focused on the difference of wooden house damage between burnt areas and not-burnt areas in former Tokyo city (The Metropolitan Police Department Architectural Section Security Section (1923)), and tried a detailed analysis of the relationship between fire spreading and structure collapse. First, we prepared an investigation report, data map and social environmental data of those days and put them all on a Geographic Information System (GIS) database for quantitative analysis. The GIS data consists of spreading fire layer, fire outbreak point layer, structure collapse layer, and so on. The first two were made based on the nine fire dynamic maps (Nakamura (1925)) prepared by Seiji Nakamura. Also, we made the structure collapse layer by adding the intensity data estimated by Takemura (2003) for 1,400 address polygon data of former Tokyo city. Takemura (2003) estimated the seismic intensity from various damage data based on the collapse ratio of wooden houses as shown in Fig. 3-9. This intensity distribution matched structure collapse distribution. Intensity

Rate of completely destroyed wooden structures: Y

+ + Outbreak point of spreading fire Extinguished immediately

Fig. 3-9. Seismic intensity distribution and fire outbreak point distribution during the Great Kanto Earthquake. Takemura estimated the seismic intensity distribution from the rate of completely destroyed wooden structures. Therefore, intensity distribution can be considered as structure damage distribution.

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3.4.3 The Analysis over Spreading Fire and Structure Collapse The result of the analysis of the fire outbreak point and structure collapse (seismic intensity distribution) relation is shown in Fig. 3-10 and 3-11. These figures show that areas with large structure collapse have a larger number of fire outbreak points, and that in such areas it is more likely to have fire spreading. On the other hand, areas with little structure collapse not only have a smaller number of outbreak points but also have high probability of extinguishing fire at early stages. The reason for this difference is that in areas with large structure collapse, it is necessary to put priority on rescuing buried people, and is difficult to extinguish fire in such areas because roads are obstructed by destroyed structures which hamper fire extinguishing activities. Fig. 3-11 shows that the structure collapse is responsible for the

 

 

   

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3. Promotion of Seismic Retrofitting

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increasing fire in the high intensity area. Improving seismic resistance and reducing structure collapse is equivalent to reducing the shaking intensity level from 6~7 to 5. That is, seismic reinforcement not only reduces the number of fire outbreaks but also increases the probability to promptly

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Kimiro Meguro

extinguish fire (Fig. 3-12) This shows that fires breaking in high intensity areas, or areas with large structure collapse, are more likely to lead to big fires. Fires leading to larger fire, though they originally outbreak in small intensity areas, progress later, according to Fig. 3-13. These fires spread because they were not extinguished at an early stage since everyone was busy coping with the fires in the large intensity areas. 3.4.4 Comparison between Great Kanto and Kobe Earthquakes Fig. 3-14 and 3-15 show the comparison between the fire spreading in the Great Kanto and Kobe Earthquakes, respectively. Similarly as with the Great Kanto Earthquake, in the case of the Kobe Earthquake, the ratio of collapsed structures and immediate fire outbreaks has a strong correlation. In both cases, the number of fires is especially large in areas where intensity level is 7. Fig. 3-15 shows that the tendency of fire spreading occurrence rate per area for each seismic intensity is similar. The difference observed in the number of fires/hectare is due to the difference in earthquake time occurrence (Great Kanto: 11:58am, Kobe: 5:46am), which affected the use of fire such as cooking.

3. Promotion of Seismic Retrofitting

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45

㻣 㻢㻗

㻢㻙 㻡㻗

㻜 㻡㻙㼡㼚㼗㼚㼛㼣㼚

Fig. 3-15. The relationship between fire outbreak point and intensity: Comparison of the Great Kanto Earthquake and the Kobe Earthquake

3.4.5 A Trial Calculation of the Changes of Fire by Improving Seismic Resistance

㻾㼍㼠㼑㻌㼛㼒㻌㼏㼛㼙㼜㼘㼑㼠㼑㼘㼥㻌㼐㼑㼟㼠㼞㼛㼥㼑㼐㻌㼟㼠㼞㼡㼏㼠㼡㼞㼑㼟

In order to evaluate the influence of seismic resistance on fire spreading, I tried a simulation assuming that the structures were stronger during the Great Kanto Earthquake. That is, I supposed that the seismic resistance of the former Tokyo city was the same as: (1) structures built during 19721981 in Kobe, and (2) structures built during 1982-1994 (after the “new standard”) in Kobe, and then calculated the changes in the fire situation. Concretely, I made a damage function (Fig. 3-16) of the collapsed wooden

㻶㻹㻭 㻝

㻜㻚㻤 㻜㻚㻢

㻡㻙

㻡㻗

㻢㻙

㻢㻗

㻣

㼀㼔㼑㻌㻳㼞㼑㼍㼠㻌㻷㼍㼚㼠㼛㻌㻱㼍㼞㼠㼔㼝㼡㼍㼗㼑

㻝㻥㻣㻞㻙㻤㻝 㻝㻥㻤㻞㻙㻥㻠

㻜㻚㻠

&DVH

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&DVH

㻜 㻠

㻠㻚㻡

㻡

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㻹㼑㼍㼟㼡㼞㼑㼐㻌㼕㼚㼠㼑㼚㼟㼕㼠㼥

㻢

㻢㻚㻡

㻣

Fig. 3-16. The relationship between structure strength today and at the time of the Great Kanto Earthquake

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Table 3-3. The effect of seismic reinforcement on fire spreading reduction Fire spread Immediately extin- Completely Not deguished destroyed stroyed The Great Kanto Eatquake 53 45 31 1972-81 55 21 32** Code revision 57 7 33** ** Not including the effect of fire extinguishing action

Total 76 53 40

houses based on the damage function of the collapsed wooden house during the Great Kanto and Kobe Earthquakes (Yamaguchi and Yamazaki (1999)); (Kobe Earthquake Investigation Report (1998)), and assumed that the ratio of structure collapse, fire spreading source, and fire source extinguished immediately were the same as those of the Great Kanto Earthquake, and calculated the fire situation. Table 3-3 shows the result. You can see that if the seismic resistance is high, the amount of fire spreading due to structure collapse will decrease considerably. However, since the number of destroyed structures decreases and the number of safe structures increases due to the seismic reinforcement, the number of fires spreading from safe structures increases a little as a result. But this is inaccurate. The reason for this result is that in the calculation we did not consider the effect of preventing fire spreading by fire extinguishing activities because we lacked data of fire fighters and citizens. In reality, if the number of destroyed structures decreases, people will put priority on fire extinguishing rather than rescue activities, and, therefore, though the number of fires from safe structures may increase, most of them would be small and possible to extinguish promptly.

3.5 Seismic Activity in Japan Japan is now facing a period of high seismic activity, and it is estimated that within 30 to 50 years, an earthquake with magnitude 8 or more will occur 4 to 5 times, M7 class (same as the 1995 Kobe earthquake or expected Tokyo earthquake level), 40 to 50 times (Fig. 3-17). Total damage will be 2 million completely collapsed and/or burned out structures, meaning that 3.5 to 4 million families will lose their homes. Although the Japanese government has set the goal to complete 90% of the retrofitting of existing pre-code revision weak structures within 10 years, under the present conditions, it will be difficult to achieve this goal. How can we create a good environment to promote seismic retrofitting?

3. Promotion of Seismic Retrofitting

Recently occurred event

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will be a little shorter than usual. If you add 50 years, half of 100 years, it becomes 1995, when the Kobe Earthquake occurred. After that earthquake, some people said that Kansai will be safe for a while since the distortion energy was released, but this is inaccurate. The probability of earthquake occurrence is higher and, in fact, the Tottori Seibu Earthquake occurred after the Kobe Earthquake. It is expected that several M7 class earthquakes will occur in the Kansai area from now on, especially in Shiga, Kyoto, Osaka and Nara. The Central Disaster Management Council also expected that the Tokyo Metropolitan Earthquake will occur with a probability of 70% within 30 years. How much will the estimated damage by these earthquakes be? The Central Disaster Management Council has reported the estimated damage. If the “earthquake brothers” occur simultaneously, 40 million people (which is 1/3 of Japan’s total population) will be exposed to a shaking intensity 5 or more, nealy 30,000 people will be killed (Fig. 3-18), and 1 million structures will be completely destroyed or burnt down. In the case of the Metropolitan Earthquake, 80,000 to 90,000 structures will be completely destroyed or burnt down. Economic damage will be, in the worst case, 80 trillion yen for Nankai through earthquakes, 110 trillion yen for the Tokyo Metropolitan Earthquake, 200 trillion yen in total. The damage changes according to the season and time, and specialists’ estimates are different, but my total estimation including some damage which is not discusses by the Council and some other earthquakes such as Kansai Inland earthquakes and Miyagi-Oki Earthquake, is more than 300 trillion yen. The damage of the Great Kanto Earthquake (M7.9, 1923) was

Population: 37,000,000 Casualty: 28,300

Fig. 3-18. The distribution of intensity of Tokai, Tonankai and Nankai earthquakes. Total number of people living in the area with JMA’s intensity scale 5 or more is 37 million. Death toll estimated is 28,300.

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105,000 deaths and missing people, 447,000 burnt down houses, 254,000 completely or partially destroyed structures, and the total amount of damage was over 40% of GDP in those days (equivalent to 200 trillion yen today). The estimated damage of 300 trillion yen within the next 30 years is equivalent to an average of 10 trillion yen every year, which equals the amount of damage in the case of the Kobe Earthquake.

3.6 How to Promote Seismic Reinforcement Based on my experiences of seeing many earthquake disasters around the world, I strongly insist that the fundamental of disaster protection is to increase the number of people who can concretely imagine the changing situation when a disaster occurs. Efficient disaster mitigation requires “ability to imagine the changing situation during the disaster,” “understanding of current issues,” and “judgment and response ability to take proper actions at each point of time.”(Meguro (2003a)) It is impossible to prepare for a situation which you cannot imagine. The problem of disaster mitigation we have today is that the various stakeholders in society, namely politicians, government, scholars, engineers, mass media and citizens, lack the ability to imagine the disaster situation, and as a result ideal measures to take before/during/after the disaster do not take shape. In order to improve this imagination ability, it is important to understand the main problems by singling out the problems that you may face in the disaster changing situation, considering conditions such as season, weather, day and time of the event occurrence. Doing this highlights the importance of preparation and improves the total disaster mitigation ability including damage deterrent. As mentioned earlier, in areas with chances of frequent earthquake occurrence, like Japan, the most important problem is the promotion of seismic reinforcement/replacement of existing low earthquake resistant structures. But even over 10 years after the Kobe Earthquake, this is not progressing. In order to promote seismic reinforcement of existing precode revision weak structures, appropriate “Technology” and “Policy” must be prepared as discussed in Section 3.2.

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3.7 ͆Public Assistance,” “Mutual Assistance” and “Self Assistance” for Disaster Mitigation In disaster mitigation, “Public Assistance,” “Mutual Assistance” and “Self Assistance” are important. However, among them “Self Assistance” is fundamental and “Public Assistance” and “Mutual Assistance” must be conceived so that they trigger “Self Assistance.” Otherwise, they will not lead to disaster reduction and may even deter it. The most important action of “Self Assistance” is seismic reinforcement/replacement by the house owner. In order to put these into practice, I propose the following systems called “new incentive system by the government (Public Assistance),” “mutual assistance system for those who have finished seismic reinforcement (Mutual Assistance)” and “new earthquake insurance for earthquake damage not caused by ground shaking (Self Assistance).” With these 3 systems, which I call the “Meguro Set,” it is possible to provide enough money for a new house for those who live in houses with sufficient seismic resistance or who have finished seismic reinforcement before the event, but in spite of this effort had their houses collapsed or burnt down by the earthquake. 3.7.1 Meguro’s “Public Assistance” System In Japan, self-reconstruction is the principle for recovery from natural disasters. But actually, victims receive various official supports. In the case of the Kobe Earthquake, over 10 million yen were used per household with completely or partially destroyed houses for rubble cleaning, temporary dwelling, apartment reconstruction and so on. Of course, this money was used for victims support. But most of the money would have not been needed if the structures would not have collapsed, and, this public money could have been spared. So, I am proposing a “new incentive system by the government (Public Assistance).” For those who live in houses with sufficient seismic resistance and those who have finished seismic reinforcement in advance, the government will give preferential treatment after the earthquake depending on the damage level. If this system is to be put into practice, the number of destroyed structures will decrease. As a result, the government can afford 10 million yen to 15 million yen for each completely destroyed house (3 million yen for those partially destroyed), and still the total expense will be much smaller. The current government seismic reinforcement promoting policy with public funds is not realistic considering the large number of existing pre-

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code revision weak structures. Reinforcing all of them before the earthquake would cost hundreds of billion yen per prefecture. Even if the number of structures to retrofit is limited, this system lacks a controlling mechanism to prevent dishonest builders from getting involved in the seismic reinforcement business. Furthermore, in regions where local governments have relatively high subsidies, citizens often postpone seismic reinforcement until their income decreases and they become eligible for higher subsidies, or construction businesses take advantage of the system and charge considerably more for the reinforcement work. In my proposal, the government does not need to spare an enormous sum of money before the event. In addition, it considerably reduces earthquake damage and expenditures of both the government and citizens, resulting in good use of taxes. A system for checking the seismic resistance is also introduced to contribute to sustainable quality control of structures as social stock. Eventually dishonest builders are removed from the market and responsible businesses are brought into the region, contributing to its activation. In this system, it is possible to use “reverse mortgage.” The results of the investigation of the households who cannot reinforce due to economic reasons showed that, in many cases, they just do not have cash right now, but they do own a house, the land and life insurance. We could let such people borrow money for seismic reinforcement using their land or insurance as collateral. If monthly payments are difficult, the government may provide support. The repayment can be done in a lump sum when the house owner dies. By doing this, citizens’ lives will be protected and the government’s expense for earthquake mitigation can be considerably reduced. Citizens can reduce damage, and, if their houses are damaged, they can receive sufficient support from the government. 3.7.2 Meguro’s “Mutual Assistance” System I am proposing a “Mutual Assistance” system, which is a nationwide mutual association for those who have finished seismic reinforcement. Generally, seismic intensity that may cause damage to seismic reinforced houses and ones built following new code is JMA scale 6 or more, and the ratio of damaged structures under such intensity is a few percent (Fig. 3-19). However, such high structures are rare. Even if the expected earthquake occurs, only a few percent of all the structures in Japan will be exposed to intensity level of 6 or more (Fig. 3-20). Therefore, the probability of the seismic reinforced structures being damaged is much less than 1%. So, there will

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be some few hundred households who will support 1 completely destroyed and 2 to 3 partially destroyed houses.

JMA intensity 7

Damage rate

㼕㼚㼠㼑㼚㼟㼕㼠㼥䠓

㼞㼑㼕㼚㼒㼛㼞㼏㼑㼙㼑㼚㼠

Fig. 3-19. Fragility function for wooden houses

The whole country ඲ᅜ䛻䛚䛡䜛๭ྜ

JMA 䠦㻹䠝 䠦䠝䠩 Intensity 㟈ᗘ㝵 㻵㼚㼠㼑㼚㼟㼕㼠㼥 䡚䠐 䠑䠉 䠑䠇 䠒䠉 䠒䠇 䠓

5.4%3.3% 2.6% 87.5% 1.1% 48,171km2 䠄12.5䠂䠅 Area 㠃✚

73.3%

10.1% 11.6% 8.8%

䠒௨ୖ䛷䛿 䠓䠂௨ୗ 7.9% 75.5% 3.7% 2.5% 0.2% 6,953,746㼡㼚㼕㼠㼟 Ჷ 䠄24.5䠂䠅

2.4% 3.7% 0.2% 33,798,867㼜㼑㼛㼜㼘㼑 ே 䠄26.7䠂䠅 Population ேཱྀ Number of wooden houses ᮌ㐀ᘓ⠏≀Ჷᩘ

Ratio of the houses exposed to intensity level 6 or more is less than 7%

Fig. 3-20. Area supposed to be exposed to the Tokai and Nankai Earthquake occurring simultaneously

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3.7.3 Meguro’s “Self Assistance” System Finally, I would like to introduce the “Self Assistance” system of my proposal, or “new earthquake insurance.” The probability that seismic reinforced structures collapse is extremely low. In addition, with the “Public Assistance” and the “Mutual Assistance” system that I introduced above, it is possible to receive 20 million yen to 30 million yen, which is sufficient to build a new house if the house collapses. It may be concluded that there is no need to rely on earthquake insurance; however, the problem is fire after earthquake. The “new earthquake insurance” covers structures with sufficient seismic resistance which are damaged by fire after the earthquake. That is, it is an insurance for houses which endured the shake but were burnt down. In the case of the Kobe Earthquake, though the influence of wind was small, 250,000 structures were completely or partially destroyed, 390,000 were slightly damaged by shake, and around 7,500 structures were burnt down. The damage caused by fire was much smaller than that of the shake. Seismic reinforcement will reduce the fire damage even more due to the decline of fire outbreak and the improvement of fire extinguishing activities. In my calculation, the number of structures to be compensated will be

Tokai + Tonankai + Nankai

premium/household/year (10,000 yen)

present premium

ಖ㝤ᩱ䛜⌧⾜䛾 㻼㼞㼑㼙㼕㼡㼙㻌㼞㼑㼐㼡㼏㼑㼟㻌㼠㼛㻌㻝㻌㻑 1 䠂⛬ᗘ䛻䛺䜛

Exceeds the limit of present insurance

new premium (before 1961)

new premium (before 1981)

Insurance/household (10,000 yen)

Fig. 3-22. The effect of the new earthquake insurance

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decreased to a small percentage (about 1%) if damage due to shaking is not considered. That means the insurance premium may decrease from 100,000 yen/year to 1,000 yen/year (Fig. 3-22). This will make earthquake insurance cheaper and remove the existing compensation limit, which is 50% of fire insurance.

3.8 Understandings to be Changed As mentioned in Section 3.2, the standard cost for seismic reinforcement of an average-sized wooden house is about 1.5 million yen/house, which is equivalent to, or less than, the cost of a car. You can protect your family and property with this amount of money. When buying a car, everyone joins both compulsory and optional insurances, which cost more than seismic retrofitting, because they can imagine tragic accidents. Unfortunately, their ability to understand the importance of seismic reinforcement is poor. In the case of car insurance, the economic ratio or (expected compensation/investment) is smaller than 1, that is the money paid for insurance is more than the compensation obtained if the insurance is activated. However, in the case of the effect of retrofitting, the current seismic activities in Japan, or the long-term earthquake prediction information, shows that in many areas, the economic ratio (expected decrease of cost needed after future earthquake/retrofit cost) is 5 to 15 times (Meguro (2007a)) In areas with high seismic activity like Japan, it is necessary to prepare a system for mitigating damage through citizens’ efforts before the event and preparing sufficient resources to support those who become victims in spite of their efforts. A system that supports victims because they are just pitiful, but with no self-effort before the event, does not work financially and does not reduce damage. We should learn a lesson about such systems from Turkey, which is recurrently suffering from earthquake disasters causing large life and economic losses. In Turkey, around 18,000 people were killed due to collapse of weak structures during the earthquake in 1999. In spite of this, seismic reinforcement is not progressing, mainly because of one improper system. Although they have a seismic structural code, because of the poor implementation system for the code, there are many weak houses and buildings in the country. The improper system, which hinders the promotion of seismic retrofit of weak structures, consists of the national government constructing new houses and giving them for free to the owners of all collapsed houses after an earthquake. According to a recent study on the seismic activity at the North Anatolia fault, the occurrence of an earthquake that will

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hit Istanbul, the largest city in Turkey, is just a matter of time. The damage estimated is around 30% of the country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (This ratio of Japanese GDP corresponds to 150 trillion yen). Besides this huge damage, 4% to 5% of GDP money (20 to 25 trillion yen) is needed to reconstruct collapsed houses. These numbers show that it will be practically impossible for the Turkish government to implement this system and to support earthquake victims. Nevertheless, the existence of this system discourages Turkish citizens from retrofitting their homes, and as a result expected damage is increasing. Recently, the Turkish government has finally recognized the problem and is considering creating earthquake insurance, which will only be available for seismic resistant structures.

3.9 Now Is the Time for a Change Japan is now in the same direction as Turkey. A system by which the government supports some part of the reconstruction of destroyed households, called “victims’ life recovery support policy,” came into existence. Although I am not denying the need for a system to support earthquake victims, I believe that the current one must be revised. The current system may cause more damage and increase of public money use because there is no preferential treatment for those who made an effort to retrofit their homes, thus eliminating the incentive for “Self Assistance.” The present system provides 3 million yen for completely destroyed houses, which is insufficient for reconstruction. In the case of the Kobe Earthquake, over 10 million yen was spent to support one victim family, including all costs for demolishing the collapsed house, preparation of open space for temporary shelter, construction of shelter, demolition of shelter, construction of apartment buildings for victims, compensation, etc.. Will such a system work in Japan, where the estimated damage is huge? What I have repeatedly pointed out, even before the Niigata Chuetsu Earthquake, is that from now on people will have support by this system. Imagine the following scenarios, which I do not wish to happen but which I believe are very likely to occur. An earthquake hits, some 100,000 structures are completely destroyed, and there are not enough resources to support all the victims. In this situation, people will finally understand that a system that does not encourage “Self Assistance” is fundamentally flawed because damage is not reduced and the available resources are not enough. Another scenario is that in which fewer damaged structures require support. The press will surely ask the victims about the government compensation system, and they will most likely say that it has saved them (at this

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point, these people are consumers of tax payers’ money). The press will continue asking whether they have any demand or request. Then, they will say that the 3 million yen is good but not enough, that they would want more. What will the press, society, or politicians do regarding this? Only a few people have enough understanding of the present seismic conditions and the earthquake disaster mechanism to stand for the tax payers’ position. Unfortunately, it is likely that public opinion will encourage increasing support. Arguing about these matters with victims around you or changing public opinion is virtually impossible.

3.10 Risk Management/Disaster Management Information Station The “Risk Management/Disaster Management Information Station” is an innovative system which systematically integrates a common platform with: 1.Simulation module (S-module), 2.Data Archiving module (DAmodule), 3.e-Learning module (eL-module), and 4.Web3D-GIS module. 1. S-module is a system for creating the disaster information and standardizing the information so that it is used more efficiently. S-module is a universal disaster environment simulator combining various numerical analysis models. It aims at simulating earthquake ground motion, structural behavior, evacuation behavior, and the economic situation after an earthquake, and so on. 2. DA-module is a system for efficiently storing and administrating disaster information. It includes reports on past disaster investigations, newspaper articles, books as well as the data created with the Smodule. In addition, as accuracy of the latter improves and characteristics of the area change (inputted in Web-GIS-module), the DAmodule is dynamically and interactively updated. 3. eL-module is a learning system from the learner’s side, and a data obtaining system from the system administrator’s side. It is an interface for presenting information obtained through the S-module and the DA-module data to users, as well as to grasp the users’ consciousness level. 4. Web-GIS-module is a spatial and temporal urban information database of the target area, using a Web-GIS environment, which contains data of citizens and area characteristics and their variations in time. The main elements of each module are:

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For 1: Collapse Simulation of Wooden Structures due to Earthquakes and Simulation of the Effect of Retrofitting (Yanagada and Meguro (2005)), Simulation of the Efficiency of Furniture Overturning Protection Devices during Earthquake (Meguro (2006a)), Collapse Simulation of Buildings due to Earthquakes (Meguro and Hatem (2000)); (Meguro and Hatem (2000)), Collapse Simulation of Viaducts due to Earthquakes (Ito and Meguro (2005)), Simulation of Behavior of Passengers in Railroad Vehicles due to Earthquakes (Okamoto and Meguro (2005)), Simulation of Evacuation Behavior during a Tsunami and Simulation of the Effect of Evacuation Guidance (Oda and Meguro (2005)), Simulation of Evacuation Behavior in Underground Space due to Disasters and Simulation of the Effect of Evacuation Guidance (Meguro (2005a)), Simulation of Evacuation Behavior in High Rise Buildings due to Disasters and Simulation of the Effect of Evacuation Guidance (Oda and Meguro (2005)), Disaster Imagination Method (Meguro Method (Meguro (2006b)), Meguro-Maki (Meguro (2006c)), Disaster Response Simulation (Disaster Mitigation Next Generation Manual (Kondo and Meguro (2001); (Kondo et al. (2001)), Simulation of the Situation Before, During and After Implementing a Retrofitting Promotion System (Meguro (2003a); (Yoshimura and Meguro (2003)), Economic Situation Simulation, and so on. For 2: Lessons and records from the Kobe Earthquake, news articles related to the World Trade Center terrorist attack, disaster investigation reports and articles of past disasters, analysis of risk areas, and damage estimation results are put into the database. Also, “The Great Kanto Earthquake Photo Library,” in which you can compare past and present pictures of damaged areas, is included. For 3: We prepared a touch panel which is an easy interface for children and the elderly who have no special computer knowledge. In addition, we made an interface making use of a 3D Virtual Reality terminal in order to experience virtual disaster. For 4: We used 3D-GIS data of each structure in the urban area, such as Tokyo’s 23 districts (Meguro (2006c)) as a common platform. The combination of simulation models and databases of various physical and social phenomena by this system not only collects and adjusts examples of past risk management, but also allows simulating hazardous situations occurring at different times, natural conditions, disaster prevention abilities of the area, and social conditions, so as to store and update the results as “imaginary disaster examples.” Mass distribution and utilization of these “imaginary disaster examples” as textbooks helps

3. Promotion of Seismic Retrofitting S-module

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DA-module Web-GIS-module

eL-module

Fig. 3-23. Risk/Disaster Management Information (Earthquake Disaster Version). Visualizing the disaster phenomena and the effect of responses, adjusting the facts and lessons of past disasters, and preparing effective environment for studying will improve the imagination ability of many people. In addition, improved understanding and response ability based on suitable imagination will make an environment which reduces the damage of urban disaster. This system will (1) simulate, (2) stock, (3) distribute the disaster mitigation information and (4) integrate them on 3D urban GIS space as a platform.

complement the deficiency of actual disaster situation examples, and improves public’s disaster imagination ability. In addition, in case a disaster has actually occurred, this system can support crisis decision making by predicting the situation in the near future based on the physical and social conditions. This system functions ordinarily as a “risk management/disaster management education supporting” system and extraordinarily, during an emergency, as a “risk management/disaster management supporting” system. It improves the users’ ability to imagine a disaster, understand the present situation and what measures to take, as well as to evaluate quantitatively the effect of the measures taken, thus, contributing to improvement the total disaster management ability. Let me introduce some of the sub systems from the “Risk Management/Disaster Management Information Station” which are related to seismic reinforcement in the next sections.

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3.11 “Meguro Method” and “Meguro-Maki” In order to easily improve the disaster imagination ability, I have designed a training method called “Meguro Method”(Meguro (2006b)) and a simplified tool of this method called “Meguro-Maki” (Meguro (2006c)) ͆Meguro Method” uses a table as shown in Fig. 3-24. When thinking of the actions of a day, think about the surrounding situation, seismic resistance of the house, furniture arrangement, actions and locations of your family members, and so on. In addition, suppose that traffic is paralyzed and estimate the time you need to move around on foot. Then, assume that an earthquake occurs in various situations such as different seasons, weather, days, and, write down the things that you think would happen to you and the actions that you should take as time passes. Most people cannot imagine the situation and cannot write anything. That means that they cannot implement good countermeasures.

Earthquake

咆咇咈咋 12 咆咇 咆咇咈咋 3 1030咆咇咊1030᫬᫬᫬᫬ ᫬咆咇咈㐌㐌 呌呌呌呌 咆咇咈咊 10 ⛊⛊⛊ศศศศศ㛫㛫㛫㛫 㛫᪥᪥᪥㛫㛫 ᭶᭶᭶᭶ ᖺᖺᖺᖺᖺ 卮卮卮卮卮卮卮卮卮卮卮卮卮卮卮卮 卮卮卮卮卮卮卮卮卮卮卮

Typical daily life activity a b c d e f g h i j 0䠖00 㻭㻝 㻭㻝䡄 㻭㻝 sleeping 㻭㻝㼍 3䠖00 㻭㻞 䞉 6䠖00rising 䞉 commuting㻭㼚 Business 9䠖00 㻮㻝㼑 㻮㻝 In AM 㻮㻝

k l

m n o p q r s t u v w x y z z’

Your typical daily life activity

12䠖00lunch

㻮㻞 Business㻮㻟 15䠖00 in PM 䞉 䞉 00 18䠖commuting 㻼㻝 䞉 䞉 21䠖00 䞉 㻼㼚 24 00

second

Week/month

minute 㻮㻟㼎 㻮㻟

㻮㻟䛥

hour

㻼㻝㼑 㻼㻝

day

year

㻼㻝㼛 㻼㻝

䠖

Fig. 3-24. Chart used in “Meguro Method.” “Meguro Method” consists of image training of the disaster situation using a chart in which the vertical axis is the actions of daily life and the horizontal axis is time since the event. When thinking of actions, you should consider the environment of your house and office, seismic strength of the building, arrangement of furniture, and your family’s actions. You should also estimate the time it will take to return home from your office on foot in case the traffic paralyzes. In addition, decide the season, weather, day and time so that you can imagine the actual situation and the actions to take as time passes when the earthquake hits. The aim is to prepare an environment of concrete disaster mitigation responses by understanding the situation which changes by various conditions such as weather and time, and preparations you take.

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3.11.1 Understanding Various Aspects as an Individual The most important point of “Meguro Method” is to carefully think about your own lifestyle. This is the difference between “Meguro Method” and previous TV programs, lessons, reports and tools which generally considered other people’s concerns. Through “Meguro Method,” you realize the various roles you play in your life, such as “information provider/information receiver,” “caregiver/in need of care,” etc. For example, a young housewife who thought she would be “protected” realizes that she must “protect” her children if an earthquake occurs when she is alone with them. A disaster management staff member realizes that his or her time as a staff member is only 20% of his or her whole time (work 8 hours a day, 5 days a week), so there is higher probability that he himself or herself will become a victim, and that he or she will have to move as an individual when disaster occurs. “Meguro-Maki” is a time-along-disaster-story making tool aimed at 㻵㼙㼍㼓㼕㼚㼑㻌㼥㼛㼡㼞㻌㼟㼕㼠㼡㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㼍㼒㼠㼑㼞㻌㼐㼕㼟㼍㼟㼠㼑㼞㻘㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㼙㼍㼗㼑㻌㼍㻌㼟㼠㼛㼞㼥㻌㼛㼒㻌㼥㼛㼡㼞㼟㼑㼘㼒

㼃㼞㼕㼠㼑㻌㼕㼚㻌㼥㼛㼡㼞㻌 㼟㼕㼠㼡㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㼣㼔㼑㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌 㼐㼕㼟㼍㼟㼠㼑㼞㻌㼛㼏㼏㼡㼞㼟䚷

㻲㼕㼤㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼠㼥㼜㼑㻌 䚷䚷䚷 㼛㼒㻌㼐㼕㼟㼍㼟㼠㼑㼞䚷 㻱㼍㼞㼠㼔㻙 㼝㼡㼍㼗㼑

㻹㼑㼓㼡㼞㼛㻙 㻹㼍㼗㼕 㻚㻿㼡㼚㻚

㻝㻌 㼙㼕㼚㻚

㼥㼛㼡㼞㻌 㼟㼕㼠㼡㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚

㻳㼍㼠㼔㼑㼞㻌 㼍㼚㼐 㼟㼡㼞㼞㼛㼡㼚㼐㻌 㼣㼕㼚㼠㼑㼞 㼒 㼍㼕㼞 㼎㼍㼎㼕㼑㼟 㼃㼑’㼞㼑㻌 㼜㼘㼍㼥㼕㼚㼓㻌 㻯㼍㼘㼘㻌 㼚㼡㼞 㼣㼕㼠㼔㻌 㼎㼍㼎㼕㼑㼟㻚 㼎㼥㻌 㼙㼛㼎 䠄 㼀㼑㼍㼏㼔㼑㼞㼟㻦㻌 㻞 㻮㻭㻮㻵㻱㻿 㼜㼔㼛㼚㼑 ኱ 㻭㻮㻱㻚㻌 㻹㼍㼞㼕㼗㼛 㻜㻙㻝㻌 㼥㼑㼍㼞㼟㻌 㼛㼘㼐㻌 ே 㻺㼡㼞㼟㼑㼞㼥㻙 㻭㻰㼁㻸㼀㻿 㼜㼍㼞㼑㼚㼠 㼎㼍㼎㼕㼑㼟㻦㻌 㻢䠅 㼣㼛㼞㼗㼑㼞

㻯㻻㻺㻰㻵㼀㻵㻻㻺㻿 㼃㻱㻭㻙 㼀㻴㻱㻾

㻿㻱㻭㻿㻻㻺

㼀㻵㻹㻱 㼃㻾㻵㼀㻱㻾厑

㻿㼑㼠㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼏㼛㼚㼐㼕㼠㼕㼛㼚

㻰㻭㼀㻱

㻱㼍㼞㼠㼔㼝㼡㼍㼗㼑㻌 㻻㼏㼏㼡㼞 㻢㻙㼛㼐㼐 㟈ᗘ䠒ᙉ 㻝㻜㻌 㼟㼑㼏㻚

㻿㻱㻵㻿㻹㻵㻯㻌 㻵㻺㼀㻱㻺㻿㻵㼀㼅

㼠㼑㼍㼏㼔㼑㼞

Fig. 3-25. An example of “Meguro-maki.” “Meguro-maki” is a simplified “Meguro Method” for use in nursery schools, kindergartens, elementary schools and families through writing a disaster situation story. In the process of writing “Meguro-maki,” you will gain understanding of the situation and identify various problems. In addition, by comparing your “Meguro-maki” with others, you can find various misunderstandings and difficulties of communication. Disaster mitigation starts with discussions and examining such things. It is important to think about ways to achieve a happy ending for your story. What is needed to change the story? The importance of preparation becomes clear, and response ability improves. “Meguro-maki” enables both individuals and communities to improve disaster mitigation capabilities, and is effective to do in the new school term and after you move.

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being used in kindergartens, elementary schools, home, and so on. It looks like a maki-mono, an ancient Japanese “book” made of rolled paper, and that is why it is called “Meguro-Maki” (Fig. 3-25). Through the process of making stories using “Meguro-Maki,” you can understand the present situation and come up with various problems. By comparing “Meguro-Maki” written by others, you can discover your misunderstandings. Examine and think together how to make a happy ending story. What action is needed before and after the event to change the story? It helps to understand the importance of preparation and improves the ability of individuals and the community to take countermeasures. It is encouraged to do this exercise at the beginning of a semester/season or after moving. 3.11.2 Understanding that Ordinary People Can Easily Become Disaster Handicapped and Imagining the Story after Your Own Death Many people take for granted that they will be safe and healthy during an emergency. Fill out the “Meguro Method” table supposing you get injured or lose your glasses when an earthquake occurs while you are sleeping. You will soon realize that you can easily become disaster handicapped. Without understanding this possibility, you can not realize the problems you may face. However, if you can understand this, you will realize that it is efficient to jointly carry out disaster mitigation and welfare. How about the case when you die? In “Meguro Method,” you will think about the situation after you die: how your close ones will feel, live, and so on. This will help you to recognize that you are supported by many people, you should not be killed and should take care of yourself. With this feeling, you will begin thinking and taking measures for disaster prevention spontaneously. 3.11.3 Efficient Use of Time before the Earthquake Occurrence Previous disaster mitigation education, such as “do A, do B, don’t do C,” is not effective. What we should do now is improve disaster imagination ability. There is more time before the earthquake than immediately after the earthquake. Those who have disaster imagination ability can make use of the time before the earthquake occurrence to prepare and take measures (Fig. 3-24 and 3-26) that will help reduce damage. Preparation for what to do in the few seconds before the earthquake, a period of time that is now available thanks to the Earthquake Early Warning, is also needed.

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Up to the time of the earthquake, you have to prepare to reduce the problems that you will face when an earthquake strikes. When it actually hits, you can act to mitigate impact that you will face based on your disaster imagination with read condition. This is how you reduce total damage. Tools like “Meguro Method” and “Meguro-Maki” show the importance of preparation, such as seismic reinforcement/replacement of existing precode revision structures. Earthquake ᆅ㟈䛾Ⓨ⏕

10 咊 咈 咇 咆 咋 呌 ᖺ ᖺᖺᖺᖺ ᭶ 卮 卮卮卮卮 卮

12 咋 咈 咇 咆 咈咇咆 咇 咆 呌 呌 呌 㐌 㐌 咈 咇 咆 ᫬ ᫬ ᫬ ᫬ ᫬ 30 10 咊 咇 咆 30 10 3 ᭶᭶᭶ 㛫 㛫 ᪥ ᪥᪥ 㛫 㛫 㛫 㛫 㛫 ศศ ศศ ศ ⛊ ⛊ ⛊ 卮卮卮 卮 卮 卮 卮卮 卮 卮 卮 卮 卮 卮卮 卮卮 卮 卮 卮 卮

䛒 䛔 䛖 䛘 䛚 䛛 䛝 䛟 䛡䛣 䛥 䛧 䛩 䛫䛭 䛯 䛱 䛴 䛶 䛸 䛺 䛻 䛼䛽䛾 䛿䜂

day day

month/week month/week

Industry/Company/User

12 咋 咈 咇 咆 ᫬᫬᫬ ᫬ ᪥ 㛫㛫㛫 㛫 卮 卮卮卮 卮 Typical daily life activity

0䠖00 3䠖00

㻭㻝 sleeping

咆 ᫬ 30 10 咊 咇 咆 30 10 3 㛫ศ ศ ศ ศ ศ ⛊ ⛊ ⛊ 卮卮 卮 卮 卮 卮 卮 卮 卮

minute minute 㻮㻝䛛 hour hour

second second

㻮㻞

䞉 䞉 18䠖00commuting㻼㻝 䞉 䞉 21䠖00 䞉 㻼㼚

Earthquake

Your typical daily life activity

In AM

㻮㻟 15䠖00 Business in PM

second second

㻭㻝䛟

㻭㻝䛒

9䠖00 Business㻮㻝 lunch

hour hour

䛒 䛔 䛖 䛘 䛚 䛛䛝 䛟 䛡䛣 䛥 䛧 䛩 䛫 䛭

㻭㻞 䞉 6䠖00 rising 䞉 㻭㼚 commuting

12䠖00

minute minute

㻮㻟䛔

㻮㻟䛥

㻼㻝䛚

Day/Season/Weather

year year

24䠖00

Fig. 3-26. How to make use of the time before the earthquake (above: long time span, below: time provided by Earthquake Early Warning)

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3.12 3D Hazard Map of Your City It is important that citizens know about the area in which they live in order to promote seismic retrofitting. Knowing the risks of structure collapse or fire and location of shelters are required to take good measures. Area hazard maps provide such basic information. For example, in Tokyo, probability of “structure collapse” or “fire” and “evacuation conditions” are evaluated in every district, ranked in 5 levels, and inputted in a map. However, this map is difficult for citizens to understand. Therefore, we made a 3D area hazard map with a touch panel interface, which is easy to understand and can be used by everyone, including children and the elderly (Fig. 327). By selecting your address, the area’s risk level will be displayed in different colors and the evacuation route to the nearest evacuation center will be shown. Showing the risk level at a structure unit level by 3D map improves citizens’ awareness. As a result, disaster mitigation ability of the area is expected to improve (Meguro et al (2003)). We also developed a system that shows past and present pictures of the areas which were damaged in the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923 (Fig. 328). After 80 years, the Great Kanto Earthquake is just an historical event separated from the lives of citizens who are now living in the same places. With this system we aimed at preparing an environment in which citizens ☜ㄆ䛧䛯ఫᡤ䜢㑅䜆䛣䛸䛜䛷䛝䜎䛩 You can select your address below.

㑅ᢥ䛧䛯ᆅᇦ䛛䜙᭱ᐤ䛾㑊㞴ᡤ䜎䛷䛾⤒㊰䛸㊥ 㞳䜢ᆅᅗୖ䛻♧䛩䚹 Shortest path from user’s selected area to evacuation space is shown on the map with its distance.

ᆅᇦ䛾ᆅ㟈༴㝤ᗘ䜢ⅆ⅏ᘏ↝䛾༴㝤ᛶ䛛䜙ホ ౯䛧䛯䜒䛾(┿ୖ䛻㏆䛔఩⨨䛛䜙䛾═䜑) Vulnerable rank in terms of fire spreading potential of the area.(View from just above the area)

Fig. 3-27. 3D hazard map of your city. By choosing the area, the evacuation route and risk level are shown. This system enables each citizen to understand the risks and problems.

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Fig. 3-28. The 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake Photo Library showing the same location in 1923 and now

permanently consider past earthquake disasters, and considered them as their own problem.

3.13 Behavior of Houses during an Earthquake and Simulation of the Effect of Reinforcement I stored data from past shaking-table tests in the “Risk /Disaster Management Information Station” to give an idea on how you would feel in the face of a collapsing structure. However, these tests were not carried out on people’s actual houses, so the level of involvement is still sometimes low. I have developed a system which shows the dynamic behavior of your own house during an earthquake using 3D-EDEM (3D-Extended Distinct Element Method), an analysis method which was developed in my research group. 3D-EDEM is a numerical method capable of analyzing the behavior of continuous and non-continuous bodies. The accuracy of the analysis at the material level (Fig. 3-29) and structural level (Fig. 3-30) was verified. The house behavior is shown to the owners. Fig. 3-31 and 3-32 show one result example. The difference of the house behavior during the earthquake before and after the seismic reinforcement is obvious. Seeing the effect of seismic reinforcement in their own house has greatly changed people’s mind (Yanagida and Meguro (2005)).

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load Ⲵ㔜䠄䡇㻺㻕

㻞㻜

㍈⤌ ㍈⤌ Frame

㻝㻡

ゎᯒ ᐇ㦂

experiment

㻝㻜 㻡 㻜 㻞㻜

load 䡇㻺㻕 Ⲵ㔜䠄

➽஺䛔 Brace

analysis

㻜

㻜㻚㻜㻞

㻜㻚㻜㻠

㻜㻚㻜㻢

㻜 㻜㻚㻜㻤

㻝㻡

㻜㻚㻜㻠

㻜㻚㻜㻢

㻜㻚㻜㻤

Plaster board ▼⭯䝪䞊䝗

㻝㻜

Mortar wall 䝰䝹䝍䝹እቨ

㻡 㻜

㻜㻚㻜㻞

㻜

㻜㻚㻜㻞 㻜㻚㻜㻠 㻜㻚㻜㻢 ᒙ㛫ኚᙧゅ㻔㼞㼍㼐㻕 Story drift (rad)

㻜 㻜㻚㻜㻤

㻜㻚㻜㻞 㻜㻚㻜㻠 㻜㻚㻜㻢 ᒙ㛫ኚᙧゅ㻔㼞㼍㼐㻕 Story drift (rad)

㻜㻚㻜㻤

Fig. 3-29. The accuracy of analysis of 3D-EDEM method at material level

Fig. 3-30. The accuracy of analysis of 3D-EDEM method at structure level (Above: shaking table test, below: simulation)

3. Promotion of Seismic Retrofitting ᐇఫᏯ䜈䛾ᒎ㛤

Before retrofitting ⿵ᙉ๓

༡ഃ䛾 ቨ䛜୙㊊ ᮌ㐀䠎㝵ᘓ ᘓ⠏ᖺ䠗1960ᖺ

Wooden, 2-story, ᒇ᰿䠖㔜䛔 built in 1960 Heavy⪏㟈デ᩿Ⅼ roof Seismic resistance ⿵ᙉ๓䠖0.25 Before: 0.25䠄ಽቯ༴㝤䛒䜚䠅 (dangerous) After: 1.24 (safe) ⿵ᙉᚋ䠖1.24

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໭

After retrofitting ⿵ᙉᚋ

➽஺䛔䛸 ྜᯈ䛷⿵ᙉ

䠄ಽቯ༴㝤䛿ᑡ䛺䛔䠅

Before retrofitting ⿵ᙉ๓

After ⿵ᙉᚋ retrofitting

Fig. 3-31. Seismic risk of your house (before and after retrofitting)

 VHF

 VHF

 VHF

 VHF

(a) Before retrofitting

(䠾) After retrofitting

Fig. 3-32. Behavior of your house (comparing (a) before retrofitting and (b) after retrofitting). Input motion is the Kobe Earthquake ground motion

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3.14 Behavior of Furniture inside the Room during an Earthquake In addition to promoting seismic retrofitting of structures, it is important to take care of your room conditions, furniture layout and attachments. What I introduce in this section is a simulator which shows the behavior of furniture related conditions such as layout and furniture overturning protection devices, using 3D-EDEM (Fig. 3-33). Using this system, people can understand furniture dynamic behavior during an earthquake and the effects of overturning protection devices on the behavior. This simulator is expected to improve citizens’ awareness of disaster mitigation and promote the use of furniture overturning protection devices so that the damage inside the house is reduced. I expect these citizens to also start thinking about seismic reinforcement.

(a) Simulation system flowchart

(b) An example of simulation Fig. 3-33. Simulation dynamic behavior of furniture during earthquakes

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3.15 Simulation of Economic Effect of Seismic Reinforcement The systems I have introduced so far will promote understanding of the situation of your room, house and city during an earthquake. However, by realizing the economic benefits of seismic reinforcement, the probability of carrying it out will be even higher. Here, I would like to introduce a system for evaluating the economic effect of seismic reinforcement, based on the long-term earthquake prediction information. Earthquake prediction consists of scale, location, and time occurrence prediction. We already have highly precise methods for estimating scale and location. Although short-term time prediction is still elusive, long-term prediction, in the order of 10 years, can be done with acceptable accuracy. I think that this long-term earthquake prediction information is effective to promote seismic reinforcement. Even if the time of earthquake occurrence is unknown, it is possible to estimate the seismic intensity level of the area from the epicenter location and ground conditions (Fig. 3-34). With this information and the seismic resistance of structures, it is possible to statistically estimate house damage as shown in Fig. 3-35. By showing such data to house owners, many people will change their minds (Meguro et al (2003)).

㻭㼜㼜㼘㼥㼕㼚㼓㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼜㼞㼛㼜㼛㼟㼑㼐㻌㼙㼑㼠㼔㼛㼐㻌㼠㼛㻌㻿㼔㼕㼦㼡㼛㼗㼍 㟼ᒸ┴ୗ䛾ఫᏯ䜈䛾ᥦ᱌ᡭἲ䛾㐺⏝ 㟼ᒸ┴ୗ䛾ఫᏯ䜈䛾ᥦ᱌ᡭἲ䛾㐺⏝ 4୎┠ 䐠㟼ᒸᕷᮏ㏻ 䐠 㻿㼔㼕㼦㼡㼛㼗㼍㻌㼏㼕㼠㼥 㻼㻳㼂㻩㻟㻜㼗㼕㼚㼑 㻼㻳㼂㻟㻜㼗㼕㼚㼑

㻹㼠㻚㻌㻲㼡㼖㼕 ᐩኈᒣ

䐟㻲㼡㼗㼡㼞㼛㼕 㼏㼕㼠㼥 䐟⿄஭ᕷୗ⏫ 㻼㻳㼂㻡㻜㼗㼕㼚㼑 㻼㻳㼂㻩㻡㻜㼗㼕㼚㼑 0-20 㻺㼡㼙㼍㼦㼡㻌㼜㼛㼞㼠 ἟ὠ  20-25 25-30 30-35 35-50 50-77 㻔㼗㼕㼚㼑㻕

Fig. 3-34. Ground motion distribution estimated in case expected Tokai Earthquake

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Probability of earthquake occurrence (%)

㻱㼒㼒㼑㼏㼠㻌㼛㼒㻌㼞㼑㼠㼞㼛㼒㼕㼠㼠㼕㼚㼓 ✀䚻䛾ఫᏯ䜈䛾⪏㟈⿵ᙉ䛾㈝⏝ᑐຠᯝ

㻝㻜㻜

㻝㻠㻚㻠

㻝㻥㻢㻜

㻡㻜

䐟㻲㼡㼗㼡㼞㼛㼕 㼏㼕㼠㼥 㻼㻳㼂㻩㻡㻜㼗㼕㼚㼑

㻝㻥㻤㻡 㻢㻚㻞㻤



㻝㻚㻤㻜

 

㻜 㻝㻜㻜



㻡㻚㻥㻢

㻝㻚㻢㻡

㻝㻥㻢㻜

㻡㻜 㻜

㻠㻚㻝㻞



㻝㻥㻤㻡 㻞㻚㻡㻢

㻜



㻝㻡

䐠㻿㼔㼕㼦㼡㼛㼗㼍㻌㼏㼕㼠㼥 㻼㻳㼂㻩㻟㻜㼗㼕㼚㼑

㻜㻚㻣㻞 㻟㻜 㻜

㻝㻡

㻟㻜

year

Fig. 3-35. Retrofitting cost-effectiveness (for house owner’s easy understanding)

3.16 Conclusions The principal problem of earthquake disaster mitigation in Japan, now facing a period of high seismic activity, is seismic retrofitting/replacement of existing low earthquake resistant structures, such as mainly pre-coderevision structures. In order to promote this, “improvement of disaster imagination,” “suitable technology” and “suitable social system” are needed. In this text, I have only introduced the first and third due to space limitations. Discussion on the second issue may be found in other reports. Recently, I have been publishing many books about disaster mitigation for popular use, especially picture books and comics for children and women (Fig. 3-36). They play an important role in disaster mitigation and therefore it is important to change their minds. From the rapid economic growth period to recent times, we have been increasing residential areas which are developed by cutting mountains hills or filling valleys and assuming concentration of population in urban area. This has created many residential areas with poor soil conditions. And in these

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Fig. 3-36. Books about earthquakes published for children (above) and general audience (below). The picture book on the top left is written in both English and Japanese explaining the importance of retrofitting. Beaver is the main character and it is aimed at changing the mind of mothers. Second to left: disaster mitigation hand book (Civil Engineering Society (2006)) aimed at nursery schools, elementary schools and families, containing the “Meguro-maki.” Second to right: picture book (Nagoya, Y. (comic), Kunisaki, N. (story), Meguro, K. (supervision) (2006)) for elementary school earthquake disaster mitigation education. Top right: comic book (Fukuda, I. (pictures), Kunisaki, N. (story), Meguro, K. (supervision) (2006)) for elementary school which is helpful to imagine the earthquake situation. Bottom left (Meguro (supervision) (2006)) explains the “preposterous common sense” of earthquakes, aimed at correct understanding of earthquakes. Second to left: shows potential earthquake risk maps in Tokyo and explains the problems in daily life (Meguro (2005b)). Second to right: explains many problems of current earthquake disaster countermeasures in Japan (Meguro 2007b)). Bottom right: explains the earthquake early warning system, which started operation on October 1, 2007 (Meguro, K. and Fujinawa, Y. (supervision) (2007)).

areas, we have been constructing houses with average life spans of 26 to 27 years, although it takes more than 30 years to pay for them. I think this is the main reason why the Japanese living style does not look as wealthy as other countries in spite of similar high incomes. In Europe and America, house costs are being cut down by constructing high quality structures that last for long periods and change owners. Japan is now facing declining birthrate with increasing elderly proportion and decreasing population. It is estimated that the number of inhabitants will decrease by 10 million by 2035. By 2055, 40% of the population will be elderly and total population will be smaller than 90 million, a 30 million decrease from today’s numbers. This means that many of the exist-

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ing houses and residential areas will be unnecessary, so we can select only good soil condition areas. It will be possible to construct 100-year life span high quality houses on those good areas. By changing owners of the house, costs can be reduced and an incentive will emerge to maintain such high quality houses. The essence of what I have discussed so far may be summarized as follows: “construct a good quality house in a good place, maintain it well, and use for a long time.” This is the way to ensure the quality of residences as a social stock, and, as a result, mitigate earthquake disaster and make Japanese life wealthier. It is wasteful and socially unacceptable to live in a house that deteriorates even before payment has been finished. The essential solution is ensuring a fine space for residences and increasing open spaces considering active faulting and flooding as well as good soil condition. I truly wish that everyone will understand the importance of disaster imagination ability and that the various systems I have introduced in this text book will spread and improve the total disaster mitigation ability of individuals, society and the whole country. Seismic retrofitting of low earthquake resistant structures as well as a sound urban regeneration is the only way to reduce damage by earthquake in the future.

References Civil Engineering Society (2006) Don’t get Defeated by an Earthquake!: Disaster Mitigation Handbook for Kindergarten, Elementary and Home: Disaster Mitigation Manual for Children’s Life Security, Gakushu Research Com. (in Japanese) Fukuda, I. (pictures), Kunisaki, N. (story), Meguro, K. (supervision) (2006) A Picture Book for Earthquakes: What Shall I do?, Popura Com. (in Japanese) Hatem, T.D. and Meguro, K. (2000) “Applied Element Method for Dynamic Large Deformation Analysis of Structures”, Structural Eng./Earthquake Eng. (JSCE), 17(2) Imamura, A. (1925) “The Great Kanto Earthquake Investigation Report”, Earthquake Disaster Mitigation Investigation Conference Report, 100 (in Japanese) Inoue, K. (1925) “Teito Great Fire Journal”, Earthquake Disaster Mitigation Investigation Conference Report, 100 (in Japanese) Ito, D. and Meguro, K. (2005) “3D Simulation of Collapse Behavior of Elevated Bridge by Applied Element Method” (60th Civil Engineering Society Annual Academic Meeting, 1-230, Civil Engineering Society) (in Japanese) Kobe Earthquake Investigation Report (1998) “Kobe Earthquake Investigation Report Editorial Conference”, Kobe Earthquake Investigation Report, 4 (in Japanese)

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Kondo, S. and Meguro, K. (2001) “A Proposal of the Next Generation Disaster Mitigation Manual for Contributing to Total Disaster Mitigation Ability” (56th Civil Engineering Society Annual Academic Meeting) (in Japanese) Kondo, S., Hamada, S. and Meguro, K. (2001) “A Proposal of the Next Generation Manual Which Enables the Total Disaster Mitigation Response”, 26th Earthquake Engineering Research Presentation Conference Meeting Monographs (in Japanese) Meguro, K. and Hatem, T.D. (2000) “Applied Element Method for Structural Analysis: Theory and Application for Linear Materials”, Structural Eng./Earthquake Eng. (JSCE), 17(1) Meguro, K. (2003a) “A Practical Approach to Earthquake Disaster”, science (Special Issue: Earthquake Disaster and Risk Management), 73(9) (in Japanese) Meguro, K. (2003b) “The Effect of Seismic Reinforcement for Fire Extinguishing Activity after the Earthquake”, Fire Disaster Mitigation, 5 (summer number) (in Japanese) Meguro, K., Yoshimura, M., Takase, Y., Goh, B. and Sone, A. (2003) “Development of Integrated Information System for Total Disaster Management”, Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on New Technologies for Urban Safety of Mega Cities in Asia Meguro, K. (2005a) “Security Design and Disaster Mitigation Response of Urban Space from the Point of View of Evacuation Security of Users”, 54th NCTAM monographs (in Japanese) Meguro, K. (2005b) Survival Map for the Great Earthquake in Tokyo, Junpo-sha Com. (in Japanese) Meguro, K. (2006a) “Visualizing the Mystery, Visualizing the Furniture Behavior during Earthquake”, Architectural Journal, 1541 (in Japanese) Meguro, K. (2006b) “For Earthquake Disaster Mitigation”, Natural Disaster and Manmade Disaster (Seibutsu Research Com.) (in Japanese) Meguro, K. (2006c) “Practice of Disaster Mitigation Work Shop: Try MeguroMaki and Improve Disaster Mitigation Ability, Don’t get Defeated by an Earthquake!”, Disaster Mitigation Handbook for Kindergarten, Elementary and Home: Disaster Mitigation Manual for Children’s Life Security (in Japanese) Meguro, K. (supervision) (2006d) The Great Earthquake, Don’t Die!, Asucom (in Japanese) Meguro, K. (2007a) “The Opening Article: Imagination Training for Promoting Seismic Reinforcement”, Fire Disaster Mitigation, 21 (summer number) (in Japanese) Meguro, K. (2007b) A Wrong Earthquake Disaster Countermeasures, Junpo-sha Com. (in Japanese) Meguro, K. and Fujinawa, Y. (supervision) (2007) Earthquake Early Warning, Tokyo-horei Shuppan Com. (in Japanese) Nagoya, Y. (comic), Kunisaki, N. (story), Meguro, K. (supervision) (2006) An Earthquake Occurred in My Town:Earthquake Disaster Simulation Comic, Popura Com. (in Japanese)

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Nakamura, S. (1925) “The Great Tokyo Fire due to The Great Kanto Earthquake”, Earthquake Disaster Mitigation Investigation Conference Report, 100 (in Japanese) Nishimura, A., Iziri, I. and Ueno, Y. (1995) <Special Issue> Collective Disaster Emergency: From Postmortem Inspection (Emergency Medical Science (separate volume), Health publish (in Japanese) Oda, K. and Meguro, K. (2004) “Evacuation Behavior Simulation in High Buildings” (59th Civil Engineering Society Annual Academic Meeting, 1-802, Civil Engineering Society) (in Japanese) Oda, K. and Meguro, K. (2005) “Development of Evacuation Behavior Simulation Model of Tsunami Disaster” (60th Civil Engineering Society Annual Academic Meeting, 2-178, Civil Engineering Society) (in Japanese) Ogata, I. (1925) “The Great Tokyo Fire due to The Great Kanto Earthquake”, Earthquake Disaster Mitigation Investigation Conference Report, 100 (in Japanese) Okamoto, A. and Meguro, K. (2005) “Research of Risk Evaluation in Railway Vehiclesb by Ellipse Distinct Element Method”, (60th Civil Engineering Society Annual Academic Meeting, 1-220, Civil Engineering Society) (in Japanese) Seo, M. (story), Fujita, K. (pictures), Meguro, K. (supervision) (2004) Let’s Talk About an Earthquake (picture book), Jiyu-Kokumin Com. (in Japanese) Takemura, M. (2003) “Intensity Distribution Map and Ground Surface Structure of in Center of Tokyo due to The Great Kanto Earthquake in 1923”, Japan Earthquake Engineering Conference Monographs, 3(1) (in Japanese) The Metropolitan Police Department Architectural Section Security Section (1923) Wodden Structure Damage Distribution Map (in Japanese) Yamaguchi, N. and Yamazaki, F. (1999) “The Intensity Estimation by Structural Damage Ratio in Kobe Earthquake in 1995”, Civil Engineering Society Monographs, 612(I-46) (in Japanese) Yanagida, M. and Meguro, K. (2005) “Construction of Dynamic Behavior Simulator of Wooden Structures in Earthquake” (60th Civil Engineering Society Annual Academic Meeting, 1-196, Civil Engineering Society) (in Japanese) Yoshimura, M. and Meguro, K. (2003) “About Seismic Reinforcement Promotion of Existing Pre-Code Revision Structures using Long Term Earthquake Prediction”, Civil Engineering Monographs (in Japanese)

Part II IMPROVEMENT OF URBAN VULNERABILITY

4. Growing Vulnerability Crisis “Will Slums Ever Reduce or Improve?”: A Case from India

Vijay Neekhra

4.1 Introduction The 21st century is expected to witness not only sustained population growth but also more urbanization. Within a generation, it has been estimated that the majority of the developing world’s population will live in urban areas, and that the number of urban residents in developing countries will double, increasing by over two billion inhabitants (World Bank (2000)). India is no exception. Some 50% of the population, or around 600 million people, may be residents in urban areas by 2020. These figures suggest that we need to know more about the process of urban development and its effect on urban residents’ lives, especially the impact of urbanization on poverty and slums. Although urban centers present real opportunities for poor people, they also create and feed the conditions within which poverty spreads. On the negative sides, if not planned in better way, it leads to rural-urban migration as people seek new employment and livelihood opportunities in urban centers. Many poor people, however, have not benefited from these opportunities. Current statistics suggest that poverty in urban areas is rising, and that the number of poor people in urban areas in some countries is now increasing at a faster rate than in rural areas. It is estimated that up to 60% of the urban population in some developing countries is poor (UNCHS (1996)); the figure for India is around 40% (NIUA (1998)). The sheer scale of the challenge in India is to reduce poverty and slums in the country, as majority of urban centers are unable or unwilling to address these conditions. Economic vibrancy of large urban centers in offering diverse employment opportunities and means of livelihood is the chief cause of migration and formation of vulnerable urban spaces in the form of slums in megaci-

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ties. Rural migrants are attracted to the urban areas for economic reasons regardless of the fact that physical infrastructure in terms of housing, drinking water supply, drainage etc. is not adequate in the cities. Cities have been the hubs of economic growth. However, planned urbanization has been marred to an extent by the excessive demand for basic amenities resulting in deterioration in the physical environment. The quality of life has thus suffered due to continuing influx of migrants and, consequently, the widening gap between demand and supply of essential services and other infrastructure in these areas. Low profile jobs, high rents and housing problems forcing the poor to settle for informal solutions result in mushrooming of slums and squatter settlements. The problem of urban slums has at some point confronted almost all the major cities throughout the developing world and various policies have been attempted. Indian cities have not been an exception. During the postcolonial period, particularly in the 1950s and 1960s, the issue of slums in developing countries emerged as an important area for urban research and policies (Pugh (1997)). As a result, various slum strategies were implemented to (at least) mitigate the socio-economic, physical and health well being of slums and their residents. During the tolerance period in the 1950s and 1960s, urban authorities in developing nations turned a ‘blind eye’ to slums and focused on public housing (Farvacque and McAuslan (1992)); (Rakodi (2001)). Slums were considered ‘relics of traditional villages’ in the process of being absorbed by the new urban planning scheme inherited from Western societies --- with little consideration of local and cultural realities (Gaskell (1990)); (Njoh (2003)). This period failed in allocating housing to slum dwellers. In fact, the main beneficiaries of formal public and planned housing schemes were civil servants and middle- and upper-income earners (Fekade (2000)). In the 1970s, most governments in developing nations opted for direct and centralized (state) intervention, executed through World Bank instigated programs such as the site and service scheme. This particular scheme advocated the clearance of centrally located slums and their relocation to newly serviced plots often outside the existing urbanized areas. This policy was driven by affordability and cost-recovery strategies (van der Linden (1986)). The implementation of the site and service scheme was heavily criticized, especially its demolition and eviction components. In some cases evicted slum dwellers were relocated to other parts of the city. In many other instances, slum dwellers were left in ‘limbo’ without alternative housing and land arrangements or compensation (Butcher (1986)). During the 1980s, the upgrading strategies emphasized the improvement of communal infrastructure and services within the established slums (Banes et al. (2000)). In particular, the upgrading projects targeted the im-

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provement of basic services (e.g. sewage, water, sanitary, garbage collection, electricity) and infrastructure (e.g. road, market, healthcare and education centers) that were lacking or decaying in slum areas (Pugh (2000)). The upgrading program aimed to achieve three main goals: affordability, cost recovery and replicability. There were some instances of success in India, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico, Costa Rica, Peru, Indonesia, etc. as mentioned by researchers and reports (Abelson (1996)); (World Bank (1994)); (Santiago (1987)); (Kessides (1997)); (World Bank (1995)); (World Bank (2003)). However, despite these specific successes, upgrading programs failed to meet expectations. Generally, they were criticized at four main levels: failed financial commitment, negative socio-economic impacts, insecurity of tenure and the non-replicability of ‘best practices’ (Brennan (1993)); (Amis (2001)); (Durand-Lasserve (1996)); (Sehgal (1998)); (Werlin (1999)). During the 1990s, the security of tenure and enabling approach was promoted (World Bank (1993)). The enabling approach advocated seven major points: development of housing financing systems, targeting of subsidies, encouraging property rights (including security of tenure), improving infrastructure, auditing and removing barriers, restructuring building industries and reforming institutions (Pugh (2001)). Apart from a few successes in general, it failed to address major issues. First, this policy advantages land grabbers and informal ‘conquistadors,’ rather than those who reside there. So, when regulation does occur, the slumlords (who do not necessarily live in the settlement) will resell or rent the land to city dwellers, eventually at a higher price because the land value has increased with the security (Payne (2004)). Therefore, slum settlers who failed to claim their land rights, or who were renting, will seek another site to develop or create slum-like settlements (Fernandes (1999)). This strategy also failed in providing any long-term solution to the expansion of emerging and future slums. It seems as discussed above, sociologists, economists, environmentalists and town planners have perceived slums and problems of slum dwellers from their own point of view. But there is no denying the fact that slums have become an integral part of the phenomenon of urbanization and are, in a way, manifestations of overall socioeconomic policies and planning in the states and in the country. But this should not discount the fact that the slum dwellers have been contributing significantly to the economy of the city by being a source of affordable labor supply for production both in the formal and informal sectors of economy. Comprehensive information on slums is essential for formulation of an effective and coordinated policy for their improvement/rehabilitation as they have not received due attention in urban planning and have remained an area of neglect. Piecemeal ef-

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forts in the past, specifically in case of India, have brought about some improvement in the lives of slum dwellers, but this is not enough. A lot more is required to be done to improve the quality of life in slums. The following paragraphs will be an attempt to give an overview of vulnerable spaces, i.e. slums and poverty level in India. The chapter will give an overview of slums in India and in megacities. Later, the chapter discusses the programs related to slum improvement and highlights the lack of sustainable and effective approaches for slum improvement and control that finally leads to growing vulnerability crisis in the nation.

4.2 Poverty in India Although India’s economy is one of the world’s fastest growing, with a GDP growth rate of 9.2% (2005) (World Development Indicators database, 2007), it is in the top 20 of the world’s countries, it is still a poor country. Its GNI per capita in 2006 is $880 (World Ranking-161) and PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) is $3,800 (World Ranking-145) (World Development Indicators database); (World Bank (2007)), placing it far below the comparable developing nations {Brazil: GNI- $8,800(rank-91), PPP-$4730 (rank-92); Russian Federation: GNI- $11,620 (rank-78), PPP-$5,780 (rank79); China: GNI-$7730 (rank-102), PPP-$2,010 (rank-29)} in the world and is just above the least developing nations. The low per capita income reflects the poverty level and large slum population in India. In India, total population increased to about 21.30% in 1991-2001, whereas urban population grew by 31.36% during the same period. According to the NSSO (55th Round) 30-day Recall period, 23.62 (67.1 million) % of India’s urban population is living below the poverty line. The number of urban poor living below the poverty line is 67 million (Table 41). Table 4-1. The poor and their ratio in India (Source: Planning Commission (2003)) Year 1973-1974 1977-1978 1983 1987-1988 1993-1994 1999-2000

Poverty ratio Rural Urban 56.4 49.0 53.1 45.2 45.7 40.8 39.1 38.2 37.3 32.4 27.1 23.6

Combine 54.9 51.3 44.5 38.9 36.0 26.1

No. of poor (million) Rural Urban 261.3 60.0 264.3 64.6 252.0 70.9 231.9 75.2 244.0 76.3 193.2 67.1

Combine 321.3 328.9 322.9 307.1 320.3 260.3

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Analysis shows that poverty reduction has been uneven between the states[1] (Tenth Five Year Plan, India). The most important point about the inter-state variation in poverty is that it shows no correlation with per capita income or other development indicators levels of industrial and infrastructure development, etc. in urban areas during the nineties. It may be seen that the dynamics of development in the urban areas of the states during the past two decades has been such that rapid economic growth has not led to a corresponding decline in poverty and finally it led to growth of the slum population in the country, from 25 million slum population in 1981 to 60 million in 2001 (NSSO (2002)). In fact the poverty ratio in urban areas is 23.6 (Table 4-1), corresponding with the slum population ratio in 640 cities i.e. 23.1, thus establishing a very close relationship between poverty level and slum population in the nation.

4.3 Definition of Slum The concept of slums and their definition vary considerably across the depending upon the socio-economic conditions or local perceptions prevailing in the society. There are regional differences in the names by which these slums are known in India. In Delhi, slums are commonly called jhuggi-jhonpari, whereas in Mumbai jhopadpatti or chawls are the names for slums. It is ahatas in Kanpur, bustees in Kolkata, cheris in Chennai and keris in Bangalore. But physical characteristics in most of these slums are essentially the same. They are usually a cluster of hutments with dilapidated and infirm structures having common toilet facilities, suffering from lack of basic amenities, inadequate arrangement for drainage and for disposal of solid wastes and garbage. These inadequacies make the living conditions in slums extremely sub optimal, unhygienic and results in usually higher incidence of air and water borne diseases for the dwellers. For the Census of India 2001, following definitions of slums have been adopted:

1. All specified areas in a town or city notified as ‘Slum’ by state, UT Administration or Local Government under any Act including a ‘Slum Act.’ 2. All areas recognized as ‘slum’ by state, union territory administration or local government, housing and slum boards, which may have not been formally notified as slum under any act. 3. A compact area of at least 300-person population or about 60-70 households of poorly built congested tenements, in unhygienic environment usually with inadequate infrastructure and lacking in proper sanitary and drinking water facilities.

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4.4 Slums and Urbanization in India India is a part of the global trend towards increasing urbanization. As per the Census of India, 2001, 27.8% of India’s population (285 million) live in urban areas and 72.2% live in rural areas. Though percentage decadal growth (1991-2001) of population in rural and urban areas during the decade is 17.9 and 31.2% respectively, in absolute number the net addition of population in rural areas (113 million) during 1991-2001 is much higher as compared to urban areas (67 million) (Table 4-2). Though rapid urbanization is welcomed for its positive effects, it has also imposed increasing pressures on the level of services in the urban centers and attracted a high migration to big cities from rural and small cities, finally resulting into the formation of slum settlements in the cities. As per the 2001 Census, a total of 42.6 million people living in 8.2 million households are living in slums of 640 cities/towns spread across 26 states and union territories. The slum population constitutes 23.1 % of the population of the 640 cities/towns reporting slums. Among the states (refer Table 4-2. Rural and urban population (in millions) growth in India (Source: National Institute of Urban Affairs (NIUA) (2001)) Year

Total pop.

Rural pop.

1981 1991 2001

682.9 846.4 1027.4

523.5 628.8 742.0

% Rural pop. 76.7% 74.3% 72.2%

Urban pop. 159.4 217.6 285.4

% Urban pop 23.3% 25.7% 27.8%

Fig. 4-1. Location of States in India (Source: Census of India (2001))

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Fig. 4-1 for location of states in India), Andhra Pradesh has the largest number of cities and towns (77) reporting slum population, followed by Uttar Pradesh (69), Tamil Nadu (63), Maharashtra (61), West Bengal (59), Madhya Pradesh (43) and Gujarat (41). On the other hand, in seven states/union territories, namely, Jammu and Kashmir, Chandigarh, Tripura, Meghalaya, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Pondicherry and Goa, slums have been reported from less than six towns each. In the remaining states/union territories, the number ranges from six in Uttaranchal to 35 in Karnataka. Fig. 4-3 shows spatial distribution of towns in India having slum population more than 100,000 (1 lakh) in 2001. Slums in the 61 towns of Maharashtra account for 11.2 million people, which is more than one-fourth of the total slum population in the country (Fig. 4-2). This is followed by Andhra Pradesh (5.2 million), Uttar Pradesh (4.4 million), WestBengal (4.1 million) and Tamil Nadu (2.9 million). In fact, these five states account for about two-thirds (65.3%) of the total slum population of the country. Among other states/union territories, in terms of percentage of slum population to the total population of cities/towns reporting slums, Meghalaya has the highest proportion (65.0%), followed by Maharashtra (33.3%), Haryana (33.1%), Andhra Pradesh (32.2%) and Chhattisgarh (31.4%). In Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh, more than 20% of the urban population

Others Tamil Nadu

8%

Punjab

Haryana

3%

3%

Delhi 5%

7%

Rajasthan

Karnataka

3%

3%

Uttar Pradesh 10%

Andhra Pradesh West Bengal

12%

10% Madhya Pradesh 6% Maharashtra

Gujarat

26%

4%

Fig. 4-2. Distribution of slums in different states (Source: Census of India (2001))

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Fig. 4-3. Cities with slum populations exceeding 100,000 people (Source: Census of India (2001))

lives in slums. Kerala (2.0%) has the lowest proportion of urban population living in slums, with Goa (8.3%) and Assam (6.0%) being the only other states with less than 10% of the urban population living in slums.

4.5 Slums in Megacities in India A total of 42.6 million people live in slums of 640 cities spread across the different states and union territories in India. Table 4-3 gives an overview of the distribution of slum population in various sizes of cities. The large urban cities are centers of economic growth and contribute significantly to the GDP of the country. It has been reported that approximately 42% (17.6 (with a population exceeding one million). Rapid and concentrated growth million) of the total slum population in India is living in the megacities of these cities in the post-independence period resulted in regional

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Table 4-3. City population and slum population (Source: Census of India (2001)) City pop㧚 Slum pop. 4 M+ 11.0 M 2-4 M 3.76 M 1-2 M 2.88 M .5 – 1 M 5.81 M .1- .5 M 13.9 M .05 - .1 M 5.1 M TOTAL 42.6 M

Slum pop. share % 26% 8.80% 6.80% 13.70% 32.70% 12.00% 100%

Slum pop. per city 2.20 0.47 0.21 0.14 0.04 0.02 0.07

Table 4-4. Slum Population in Megacities (million plus) (Source: Census of India (2001)) City

Total citySlum population Pop.

Greater Mumbai Delhi Kolkata Chennai Meerut Faridabad Hyderabad Surat Other Million Plus cities TOTAL

12.0 9.9 4.6 4.3 1.1 1.1 3.6 2.4 34.4 73.3

6.5 1.9 1.5 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 5.0 17.7

Slum Pop. Percentage of City Pop. 54.1% 18.7% 32.5% 18.9% 44.1% 46.5% 17.2% 20.9% 14.4% 24.1%

inequalities that resulted the poor’s migration to these mega centers from small urban centers, especially rural areas, in search of job and livelihood. This along with various other factors resulted in the emergence and growth of slum and squatter settlements, characterized by overcrowding and lack of sanitation and basic infrastructure. On analyzing the megacities situation in the nation, it is in megacities (one million plus cities) where about 41.6% (17.7 million) of the total slum population in the country resides. In absolute numbers, Greater Mumbai has the highest slum population of around 6.5 million, followed by Delhi (1.9 million) and Kolkata (1.5 million) (Table 4-4). The slum areas of Surat, Hyderabad, Chennai and Nagpur have more than half-a-million population each. The concentration of slum population in the large cities is evident from the fact that the Greater Mumbai Municipal Corporation alone accounts for about one-seventh (15.2%) of the total slum population of the

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country and more than one-third (36.6%) of the total slum population of the million-plus cities. Four Municipal Corporations, namely, Greater Mumbai, Kolkata, Delhi and Chennai together account for 25% of the total slum population of the country and around 60% of the total slum population of the million-plus cities. However, slums can be found in every major city of India. Refer to Fig. 4-3 for the location of cities with more than 100,000 slum population. 4.5.1 Caste and Slums In the past, Indian people were classified into castes based on occupational status. With the passage of time, despite the occupational change of a citizen, unfortunately, his/her caste didn’t changed. The same caste system exists today, and scheduled caste (SC) and scheduled tribes (ST) are the two most socio-economically backward castes in India. In spite of special government policies and efforts, the majority of the SC and ST are still living below the poverty line. The majority of the slum dwellers in megacities belong to these castes. Delhi and Mumbai have a combined population of these castes of 0.48 million and 0.44 million respectively. In most of the megacities, the population of the SC and ST exceeds 100,000. In the cities like Nashik, Bangalore, Nagpur, Chennai, Bhopal, more than 30% of the total slum dwellers belongs to these two caste categories (Table 4-5). Table 4-5. Scheduled Caste (SC) and Scheduled Tribe (ST) population (in millions) in slums of million-plus cities (Source: Census of India (2001)) City

SC pop.

Nashik Nagpur Bangalore Bhopal Chennai Jaipur Pune Delhi Meerut Kanpur Hyderabad Surat Faridabad Greater Mumbai Kolkata

0.04 0.15 0.14 0.04 0.27 0.09 0.13 0.48 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.03 0.06 0.39 0.09

Total ST pop. 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 NST 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 NST 0.06 0.00

SC+ST pop. 0.06 0.26 0.15 0.04 0.27 0.11 0.13 0.48 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.44 0.10

Total slum % pop. SC+ST pop. 0.14 43.9% 0.74 35.1% 0.43 34.1% 0.13 33.3% 0.82 33.1% 0.37 30.0% 0.49 26.5% 1.85 26.1% 0.47 23.6% 0.37 23.1% 0.63 15.8% 0.51 13.0% 0.49 11.8% 6.48 6.8% 1.49 6.4%

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Fig. 4-4. Percentage of child population in slums in million-plus cities (Source: Census of India (2001))

4.5.2 Child Population in the Slums In the majority of the cities a large percentage of the child population is living in unhygienic and unhealthy conditions, exposed to environmental and social hazards. More than six million children are living in slums nationwide, and they constitute 16.4% of the total child population of the urban areas. In other words, every sixth urban child in the country in the age group 0-6 is a slum dweller. Around 2.5 million children aged 0-6 are living in the slum areas of the megacities, which constitutes 27.3% of the total child population of these cities. In Greater Mumbai alone there are 0.86 million slum dwelling children aged 0-6, and another 0.3 million in Delhi and 0.15 million in Kolkata (Fig. 4-4). More than half the child population of Greater Mumbai (62.8%) and Faridabad (50.6%) are living in slum areas, and just below half in Meerut (48.5%) and Kolkata (38.3%). Such a situation raises the question what will be fate of the city be, when the majority of the next generation is living in such deprivation? 4.5.3 Employment in Slums Nationwide about one-third of the slum dwellers have work, which is close to the urban work participation rate (WPR) of 32.3%. Male WPR is high in the megacities, suggestive of excessive male migration for employment. But despite relatively high employment rates, especially in slum areas, the slum dwellers still live in poverty. The reason is that most of them have a

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low literacy level and few technical skills, and so end up in low wage jobs. The low wage jobs include daily labor, domestic help, sweepers, dish cleaners, rickshaw/cart pullers, hawkers, etc. Despite the recognition that slums dwellers are the service providers to non-slum citizens and support them in their daily life, still no effective attempt has been made to improve their quality of life. This issue is discussed next.

4.6 Living Conditions and Infrastructure Status in Slums The following paragraphs will give an overview of the living conditions of slums in India. The analysis below reveals that a majority of slum dwellers are still deprived of basic services. However, the major reasons for such status will be discussed in later paragraphs, which deal with the programs for slum improvement nationwide. 4.6.1 Ownership of Slum Land At the all-India level, about 36% of the notified slums were on private land and 64% on public land. The corresponding estimates for the non-notified slums were very similar, that is, 35% were situated on the private land and 63% on public land. Almost all the slums in urban Orissa and Rajasthan were built on public land. This is also true for the non-notified slums in Punjab and Delhi. On the other hand, all the notified slums in Jammu and authorities. Other public authorities like state governments held the ownership of about 25% of the land (Fig. 4-5). The majority of slums are on public land owned by % notified slums & land ownership

% of non-notified slums & land ownership

not know n 1%

not know n 2%

private 36% private 35% public 63%

public 63%

Fig. 4-5. Land ownership in slums in India (Source: National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) (2002))

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government, giving an impression that development projects may be easy to implement; however, this is not the case. The situation is too complex, as land is owned by various departments and agencies within the government framework. For any improvement work, consensus and permission, which is too complex and consumes a lot of time, is required from various departments prior to implementing the program on a specific patch of land. In most cases, due to this complex process and various reasons (such as over ambitious land allocated for another use), development program could not take off. As a result, these land parcels are kept unutilized and vacant, thus providing an opportunity for majority of dwellers to settle down on these vacant public or local government land parcels. The weak management, control of urban land, and over ambitious landuse plan are other major reasons for the formation of slums. 4.6.2 Housing Conditions/Structure The type of structure was classified into three categories, viz., pucca[2], semi-pucca and kutcha[3]. It may be mentioned here that similar information was also collected in the 49th round (1993). The results reveal that improvements in respect to type of slum housing structure have been pronounced during the period from 1993 to 2002. The percentage of slums that had majority of pucca houses, were 30 in 1993, which climbed to 47 in 2002. Again, the said percentage is further higher in the case of notified slums. In about 65% of notified slums and 30% of non-notified slums, the majority of households were living in pucca structures. The variation in the distribution of slums by structures is quite significant across the states. % of notified slums by structure of houses Serviceabl e Katcha 5%

Semi Pucca 30%

Unservicea ble Katch 1%

Pucca 64%

% of non-notified slums by structure of houses Unservice able Katch 10%

Serviceabl e Katcha 20%

Pucca 30%

Semi Pucca 40%

Fig. 4-6. Housing structure in slums (Source: National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) (2002))

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In some states like Delhi, Gujarat, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh and Maharastra, the proportion of slums with the majority of houses built with pucca materials were very high. On the other hand, urban slums of Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Orissa, and Jammu and Kashmir were far behind and the majority of slum houses were either semi-pucca or kutcha (Fig. 4-6). Despite improvement compared to 1993, still 53% of the slum population are living in poor housing. The condition is much worse in non-notified slums. Often tenure rights are considered as a major reason for low investment by dwellers in improving the quality of housing. However, this doesn’t seem to be completely true in the case of India, as the same is observed in many cities. Despite having tenure rights, still the majority of slum dwellers are living in poor housing; however, some have also improved their housing conditions. Another major drawback of poor housing is the ‘Rent Control Law’ in India that often discourages landowners from investing in housing. For example in Mumbai, this has been one the major reasons of poor housing and the mass of slum population (Bertaud et al (2003)). 4.6.3 Major Source of Drinking Water Supply of safe drinking water to all has been one of the commitments in several five-year plans. In 1993 (NSS 49th round survey), about 8% of the urban slums in the country reported ‘well’ and ‘other source’ as the major source of drinking water and the situation did not change much over the period of nearly ten years since then. However, a larger number of slums than in 1993 had the privilege of having drinking water from tap (83%

% of notified slums by source of drinking water

% of non-notified slums by source of drinking water Others 5%

Well 2% Handpump 10%

Others 4%

Well 2%

Handpump 22%

Tap 84%

Tap 71%

Fig. 4-7. Source of drinking water in slums (Source: National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) (2002))

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for notified slums and 70% for non-notified slums). State-wise variations is being observed and the situation in slums in the states like Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Uttar Pradesh and Punjab were much below the national level, where they solely or mainly depended on the sources other than the ‘tap’ (Fig. 4-7). No doubt the status of drinking water is comparatively better than other basic services, but it is doubtful if dwellers are getting enough water supply at convenient timings from conveniently located sources. In general it has been observed that a dweller has to devote almost two to three hours daily in fetching water. 4.6.4 Availability of Toilet/Latrine Facilities In the case of toilet (latrine) facilities, over time the conditions have improved significantly in the slums and the percentage of slums not having any latrine facility dropped sharply from 54% in 1993 to 17% for notified slums and to 51% for non-notified slums in 2002. However, considering the mass of the slum population in the nation, a valiant effort is still required to provide toilets to all. Worst is the case of Orissa (state of India) where none of the slums had any latrine facility, even in 2002. (Fig. 4-8). Non-notified slums are still being neglected and not considered under development program (as discussed in the analysis of policies/programs) where approximately 51% of the population lacks any toilet facilities. Are they not human beings, or do they differ from other notified slum dwellers?

% of notified slums with types of toilets

% of non-notified slums with types of toilets

None 17% Flush 35%

Other 6% None 50% Service 9% Pit 2%

Flush 66%

Other 3%

Pit 7% Service 5%

Fig. 4-8. Toilet dependency in slums in India (Source: National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) (2002))

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4.6.5 Roads within Slums and Approach Roads to Slums The structure of the roads/lanes/paths within the slums reveals that about 71% of the notified slums and 37% of the non-notified slums reported having pucca roads within the slums. The corresponding number was 47% in 1993 --- showing a development during the intervening period. This aside, the proportion of slums with pucca approach road/lane/constructed paths to the slum was observed to be 86% for the notified slums and 67% for the non-notified slums, as compared to 74% in 1993 (49th round). The urban slums in many states, viz., Rajasthan, Punjab, Bihar and Orissa, were deprived of this facility. 4.6.6 Availability of Electricity As per the National Sample Survey Organization Report 486, electricity connection in the slums may be of different types, viz. for household use, streetlights, or both. In case of some slums, street lighting was available only in some locations inside or at the boundary of the slums. Such slums were also considered as having electricity connection. It was found that almost all the urban slums were electrified. In fact, electricity connection was not available only in 1% of the notified slums and about 16% of the non-notified slums. Note that in 1993, about 75% of slums had electricity (Fig. 4-9). However, the report does not mention the legality of the electricity connection, as in general it has been observed that the majority of slum dwellers have an illegal connection that is loose, faulty and dangerous and is one of the major causes of fire outbreaks in the slums. % of notified slums with types of None roads in slums

% of non-notified slums with types of roads in slums

Street Only 4%

None 16%

1%

HH & Street 53%

Street Only 6%

HH only 11% HH & Street 84%

HH only 25%

Fig. 4-9. Electricity status in slums in India (Source: National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) (2002))

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4.6.7 Sewerage System and Drainage Facility As the 49th round survey shown in 1993, there was underground sewerage system in 17% of the urban slums and there was no drainage facility in 30% of slums. In 2002, the underground sewerage system did improved and about 30% and 15% of the notified and non-notified slums respectively were estimated to have underground sewerage systems. But still 15% and 44% respectively reported the non-existence of drainage systems in the slums, stating non-development in this sector. In some states, these facilities were practically absent if ‘open’ drains were ignored.

4.7 Poverty Alleviation and Slum Improvement Programs Government urban poverty alleviation initiatives can be summarized and termed in three ‘waves’ (Ramanthan (2005)). Housing was the first wave that started in the 1950s and still continues to be a priority. Social welfare programs constitute the second wave that started with the Urban Community Development program in 1958 and became more popular in the 1960s and 1970s. Credit and employment programs started in 1977 with the extension of the differential rate of interest scheme to the urban poor and became increasingly popular in the 1990s. None of these waves has stopped flowing. All three types of schemes continue to coexist today and are briefly overviewed below: 4.7.1 The Housing Wave x Subsidized Industrial Housing Scheme (SIHS) started in 1952. Provided subsidy on house construction cost to industrial workers with the cooperation of their employers, who were also encouraged to build townships and construct housingfor their workers.  x Since all urban poor could not be covered by the SIHS, a separate housing scheme was started for the Economically Weaker Section (EWS) in the same year, and Low Income Group Housing Scheme (LIGHS) was started in 1954.  x In 1956, the government introduced the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Programme in six major cities. It could be called more of a beautification programme for the cities where slums were cleared instead of improvement.. The perception of slums and their inhabitants was that they bred unwanted elements. The government activated its power of eminent domain by introducing the Land Acquisition and

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x

x

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Development Scheme (LADS) in 1959 to legitimize clearance of slums, among other reasons. In 1986, the Twenty Point Programme (20PP was primarily a rural program with small urban components) started a trend of merging housing schemes with other schemes like education, sanitation, and water supply in larger programs. The Nehru Rozgar Yojana–Scheme for employment through Housing and Shelter Upgradation (NRY-SHASU (1989)), Prime Minister’s Integrated Urban Poverty Eradication Programme (PMI-UPEP (1995)), National Slum Development Programme (NSDP (1996)), and Valmiki Ambedkar Malin Basti Awas Yojana (VAMBAY (2001)) followed this trend by having a housing component among other objectives. Soon after International Year of Shelter for the Homeless (IYSH) in 1987, the UN adopted the Global Shelter Strategy (GSS) in November 1988. This strategy urged governments of all nations to prepare a detailed national housing policy. The Ministry of Urban Development (MoUD) prepared a draft policy that was discussed at the Urban Development and Housing Minister’s Conference in October 1990, endorsed by the state governments and the Parliament to be finalized and adopted in August 1994 as the National Housing Policy (NHP). The earlier housing policy of 1988 aimed at providing ‘adequate’ shelter to all, as compared to this policy that aimed at providing ‘access’ to shelter for all. It recognized the shortfall in government efforts to provide housing and thus invited the private sector to actively participate in facilitating access to housing through various fiscal and other incentives. This policy was further modified and presented in 1998. The new policy treats housing on par with infrastructure. It introduces a National Shelter Fund to be set up for housing the urban poor and a Risk Fund to cover risks in financing the rural and urban poor. It recognizes the needs of single and working women with regard to housing. Currently, all housing related policies are aligned with the 1998 National Housing and Habitat Policy (NHHP)

4.7.2 The Welfare Wave The initiation of the Urban Basic Services (UBS) program in 1986 was a major step towards change in the perception of urban poverty. From being viewed as a single sector problem of housing, urban poverty began to be perceived as a multi-sector problem. At the behest of the National Commission on Urbanisation (NCU (1988)), this program was revised and

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launched as Urban Basic Services for the Poor (UBSP) with three main objectives: 1. Effective achievement of social sector goals by introducing innovations to be cost effective. 2. Community organization, mobilization and empowerment. 3. Convergence of all urban poverty programs like EIUS, Nehru Rozgar Yojana, and Low Cost Sanitation (LCS) through sustainable support systems. 4.7.3 The Credit Wave x The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) expanded the coverage of its Differential Rate of Interest (DRI) scheme to include the urban poor. As part of this scheme, commercial banks were expected to advance 0.33% of their total advances as subsidized credit on easy terms to the urban poor. Women were declared as beneficiaries for an income generating scheme of the Urban Community Development program in 1958. x The economic contribution of women and their role as income generators is recognized only in 1986 in programs like Support to Training and Employment Programme for Women (STEP) or the Urban Basic Services program. x This was then followed by the Report of the National Commission for Self-Employed Women and Women in the Informal Sector (1988), Nehru Rozgar (employment) Yojana (Scheme/program) (1989), Urban Basic Services for the Poor (UBSP), Prime Minister’s Rozgar (employment) Yojana (PMRY (1993)), Prime Minister’s Integrated Urban Poverty Eradication Programme (PMI-UPEP (1995)), National Slum Development Programme (NSDP (1996)), and Swarna Jayanti Shahari Rozgar Yojana (SJSRY (1997)).

4.8 Programs towards Slum Improvement As per the discussion above, the majority of programs focused on employment and poverty eradication. However, since 1986 onwards attention was given to slum improvement, and in 1996 a specific program was drafted towards slum improvement. The following paragraphs will analyze the two major programs/policies that deal with slum dwellers in India, and conclude that the programs need to be more effective and sustainable if slums are really to be improved or controlled at a national level.

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4.8.1 The National Slum Development Program (NSDP)

The National Slum Development Program (NSDP) was launched in 1996. Annually, the program provides about Rs. 300 crores in assistance. The objective of NSDP is to provide adequate and satisfactory water supply, sanitation, education facilities, health care, housing and environmental improvement through the creation of sustainable support systems. Though the scheme is ‘slum-sensitive’ and targets funds to those states with the most pressing slum clusters, but it is highly subsidized without much or any contribution from beneficiaries. The one of major drawbacks of NSDP is that it does not target illegal slums or non-notified slums in cities. The non-notified slums settlements as per the National Sample Survey Organization (NSS) 58th Round Report, 2002 are 25,000, as compared to notified slums which are approximately 27,000 settlements. This means in actuality, the NSDP program is targeting only 50% of the slum settlements. Under this program, until 2004 approximately Rs. 2475 corers has been released for the development of slums. The investment did not correspond to slum population and varies per year in the nation. The investment seems to be on an ad-hoc basis that reflects the lack of systematic approach for any slum improvement (Fig. 410). Considering the 42.6-million slum population (in actuality it may be more, as these figures are from 640 cities in India), it comes to an investment of approximately Rs.[4] 580 per slum dweller for development purposes. This amount has been disbursed over eight years, meaning Rs. 72 per slum dweller per year has been invested for development purposes (Fig. 4-11). The actual amount per slum dweller is much less, as the funds also include administrative and others expenditures. With the government’s limited financial resources, such a low level of investment will not be able to tackle the problems of 42 million slum dwellers. Actually, whatever efforts are made using the government’s limited resources to reduce the slum population or development slums is nullified by the rapid growth of slum population. As a program is also highly subsidized (free land, free basic amenities etc), it raises questions about its sustainability and replicablity. It is therefore required to look for some other sustainable approaches that may benefit all. A financial contribution approach, i.e. contributions from beneficiaries, local governments and the private sector need to be mobilized.

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㪠㫅㫍㪼 㫊㫋㫄 㪼 㫅㫋㩷㩿㪙 㫌 㪻㪾㪼㫋㪀㩷㫀㫅 㩷㫄 㫀㫃㫃㫀㫆㫅 㩷㪬 㪪㩻

㪪㫃㫌㫄 㩷㪧㫆 㫇㫌㫃㪸㫋㫀㫆㫅 㩷㫀㫅㩷㪤 㫀㫃㫃㫀㫆㫅 㫊

㪬㪪㩻㩷㩿㪈㪬㪪㩻㪄㩷㪩㫊㪅㪌㪇㪀

Fig. 4-10. Investment and slum population growth in India (Source: Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation, Town and Country Planning Organisation (TCPO) (1996)) 㪉㪅㪇㪇 㪈㪅㪏㪇 㪈㪅㪍㪇 㪈㪅㪋㪇 㪈㪅㪉㪇 㪈㪅㪇㪇

㪇㪋㪄㪄㪇㪌

㪇㪊㪄㪄㪇㪋

㪇㪉㪄㪄㪇㪊

㪇㪈㪄㪄㪇㪉

㪇㪇㪄㪄㪇㪈

㪐㪐㪄㪄㪇㪇

㪐㪏㪄㪄㪐㪐

㪐㪎㪄㪄㪐㪏

㪐㪍㪄㪄㪐㪎

㪇㪅㪏㪇 㪇㪅㪍㪇 㪇㪅㪋㪇 㪇㪅㪉㪇 㪇㪅㪇㪇

㪰㪼㪸㫉㩷

Fig. 4-11. Investment per slum dweller (Source: Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation)

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Constraints and Recommendations

x Technical: NSDP is infrastructure-oriented, which leads to alienation of individuals and poor community participation. The scheme has a spatial concept, but does not correctly identify the urban poor. Non-notified, that is, illegal slums, are not included, and there is insufficient technical staffing. There is a need to develop an accurate database for slums with agreed ‘slum indicators,’ and develop a fair policy for improvement and de-notification of slums. x Managerial and Institutional: There is limited technical, managerial and financial capacity, and too many schemes overburden urban local bodies. There is confusion between implementing ministries, and a lack of effective monitoring. It is required to develop comprehensive micro/macro slum plans at local levels and improve governance and transparency of decision making, and establish effective inter-agency coordination for all urban poor schemes. x Financial: Cost recovery as conceived is not happening, and there is inadequate financial management and infrequent audits. The gaps in funding cause frustrations in active urban local bodies, and allocations do not match requirements. There is a need to introduce a concept of user charges for quality services and schemes for cost recovery need to be an integral part of project design. The loan/grant component must be adjusted to the status of slums, and in no case should there be less than 30% contribution from the worst slums or poorest dwellers. 4.8.2 Valmiki Ambedkar Awas Yojana (VAMBAY) Valmiki Ambedkar Awas Yojana (VAMBAY), initiated in 2001, was designed to address housing deficits for the urban poor. It provides about Rs. 300 crores[5] of annual assistance to designated state agencies, who then determine beneficiaries and monitor implementation. This is a centrally sponsored scheme with a matching contribution from state government, though in general for housing purposes, beneficiaries are expected to contribute approximately 10% of the total cost. However, this contribution is also very limited and in most cases due to lack of administrative will and negligence, this meager contribution is never made. One of the drawbacks of the VAMBAY program is that it is also meant for notified slums only. Though this program is based on the matching funds, still it is highly subsidized as 50% is granted as a subsidy to the beneficiaries plus land is also provided by the state government. With limited financial resources and such a high subsidy, it is nearly impossible to target the country’s 42-

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million slum population. This scheme also targets notified slums only, thus neglecting a majority of slum dwellers living in non-notified slums. As per the NSS 58th Report in 2002, out of the total houses, approximately four million of the houses in slums (notified and non-notified slums) are either semi-pucca or kutcha and need immediate improvement. From 2001 through 2006 approximately 0.44 million dwelling units were targeted under the VAMBAY scheme, i.e. approximately 0.1 million targets per year (Table 4-6). With this target rate, and assuming that there will not be any rise in the slum population, which is unlikely to happen, it will take more than 35 additional years to improve the condition of the dwelling units. Apart from the issues mentioned above, the non-utilization of allocated resources by state government is another major factor of slow progress. States like Punjab and Bihar did not utilize funds as allocated during 200206 for housing improvement (Fig. 4-12). Such meager efforts and noninitiative approaches will backlash the hopes of any slum improvement in the nation. Table 4-6. Subsidies for housing (VAMBAY) (Source: Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation) Subsidy released (Rs. in Lakhs*1)) 6867.4 19329.3 23518.0 26935.7 16713.4 93363.7

Year 01-02 02-03 03-04 04-05 05-06 Total

No. of DUs targeted for construction/upgradation 25280 105444 108172 112143 91330 442369

1) 1 Lakh = 100,000, 1US$= Rs. 43 (approx)

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㪊㪇㪇㪇 㪉㪌㪇㪇 㪉㪇㪇㪇 㪈㪌㪇㪇 㪈㪇㪇㪇 㪌㪇㪇 㪇 㪙㫀㪿㪸㫉㩷 㪘㫃㫃㫆㫋㪼㪻㩷㪇㪉㪄㪇㪍

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Fig. 4-12. Non utilization of funds by States (VAMBAY) (Source: Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation)

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Recently a study conducted to evaluate programs for the poor and slums based on five parameters, i.e. target, efficiency, transparency, administrative simplicity and sustainability, gave a the lowest rating to NSDP and VAMBAY as compared to other programs nationwide (Buckley et al (2007)).

4.9 Conclusion Approximately 23% of the urban population (640 cities) live in slum areas, of which 42% live in million-plus cities. This higher concentration of slum population in the large urban centers reflects the possible outcome of regional disparity among the various regions. 9.8 million persons over age seven (3.8 million males and 6 million females) are illiterate, giving literacy rates of 80.7% for males and 64.4% for females. This is indicative of the types of human resources in the slums. However, if a formal education of 10 to 12 years is considered the standard for literacy, or say reasonable education, than very small numbers will fall into this group. Another characteristic of the slum population is that the proportion of the Scheduled Castes population is quite high in the slums and reflects the negative effect of the caste system, as Scheduled Castes and Schedule Tribes are considered to be the most backward caste in India. There are over six million children (0-6 age group) living in the nation’s slums in unhealthy hygienic conditions, which are not conducive for their growth and development. The scenario of children in the large metropolitan cities of Greater Mumbai, Delhi and Kolkata is that every second or third child in the city is a slum dweller. With such a scenario, it is nearly to impossible to achieve a target of becoming a developed nation by 2020, as stated in the national document Vision 2020. The infrastructure status in the slums reflects comparatively a slightly better situation as compared with 1993. However, the results still seem unsatisfactory, as the majority of slums lack access to basic amenities. Though a majority of the slums have access to safe water sources, still it is doubtful whether access is enough, as it has been observed that lot of effort and time is consumed in fetching water from these sources. Women and children suffer in the majority of the cases. Toilet facilities are still very severe, as the majority of slum dwellers employ open defecation, or are still dependent on the evil practice of hand collection of human waste (scavengers). Most of the slums report having access to electricity, but the method of tapping electricity is doubtful as in general illegal tapping (free) from major electric lines passing along the slums is a common practice.

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Drainage conditions are also poor in the majority of slums. Housing conditions are also non-habitable, as the majority of the housing structures are non-pucca, or in other words are not able to meet minimum structural requirements. However, the conditions of notified slums are found to be much better as compared to non-notified slums, which reflects the consideration for improvement once slums are notified. Non-notified slums are still not recognized, and are often ignored for improvement/development by major programs. Another critical aspect is land management, as the majority of slums exist on vacant government (central, state or local government) land, reflecting weak administration and land management. In general, the non-utilization of these vacant lands and weak management provides free spaces and promotes poor migrants to establish themselves at no cost. With such a huge mass of population reported living in slums in India, there is an urgent need to reconsider our approach toward these slum settlements. As discussed, the majority live in megacities, which calls for a better and more effective approach. Large numbers of dwellers are still deprived of minimum basic services and are living without access to safe water, sanitation, housing and other amenities, especially the dwellers living in non-notified slums. The past polices/programs and approaches as discussed above were not able to provide a complete solution to this gigantic problem. To add to it, the programs did not focus on non-notified slums, which are significant in numbers and need to be addressed. The programs for slum improvement were non-effective and are non-sustainable, as these programs are highly subsidized and were only able to target a very limited number of slums. With limited financial resources, there is a need to look for better approaches. Public and private sector participation in slum improvement programs, along with contributions from beneficiaries, will assist in combating and improving the dwellers’ lives. This will take away some burden from government and may be able to resolve the mammoth issue of slums in a developing nation like India.

Notes [1] [2]

India is divided into various regions comprising 28 States and 7 Union Territories (Ref. Fig. 4-1). A pucca structure was one having walls and roofs made of “survey, cement, concrete, oven burnt bricks, hollow cement/ash bricks, stone, stone blocks, jack boards (cement plastered reeds), iron, zinc or other metal sheets, timber, tiles, slate, corrugated iron, asbestos cement sheet, veneer, plywood, artificial wood of synthetic material and poly vinyl chloride (PVC) material.

102 [3] [4] [5]

Vijay Neekhra A structure having walls and roof made of non-pucca materials like unburned bricks, bamboo, mud, grass, leaves, reeds, thatch, etc. Indian Currency denoted as Rupees (Rs) 1US$= Rs. 43 (approximately) 1 Crore =10 million and 1 Lakh = 100,000

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Payne, G. (2004) “Land tenure and property rights: an introduction”, Habitat International, 28(2) Planning Commission (2003) Report of the Steering Committee on Urban Development, Urban Housing and Urban Poverty for the Tenth Five Year Plan (2002-2007) Pugh, C. (1997) “Poverty and progress? Reflections on housing and urban policies in developing countries, 1976-96”, Urban Studies, 34(10) Pugh, C. (2000) “Sustainability of squatter settlements” in Pugh, C. Sustainable cities in developing countries. Earthscan Pugh, C. (2001) “The theory and practice of housing sector development for developing countries”, Housing Studies, 16 (4) Rakodi, C. (2001) “Forget planning, put politics first? Priorities for urban management in developing countries”, International Journal of Earth Observation and Geoinformation, 3 Ramesh, R. (2005) Urban Poverty Alleviation (National Conference, Srinagar, India) Robert, B.M., Mahavir, S. and Jerry, K. (2007) “Strategizing Slum Improvement in India: A Method to Monitor and Refocus Slum Development Programs”, Global Urban Development, 3(1) Santiago, A.M. (1987) “San Martin de Porres: a case study of squatter settlement upgrading in Metro Manila”, Regional Development Dialogue, 8(4) Sehgal, R.L. (ed) (1998) Slum upgradation. Emerging issue and policy implementation's. Bookwell Publications Town and Country Planning Organisation (TCPO) (1996) A Compendium on Indian Slums 1996 United Nations Center for Human Settlements (UNCHS) (1996) An Urbanizing World: Global Report on Human Settlements 1996, Oxford University Press van der Linden, J. (1986) The sites and services approach reviewed. Gower Publishing Co. Werlin, H. (1999) “Slum Upgrading Myth”, Urban Studies, 36(9) World Bank (1993) Housing: Enabling Market to Work World Bank (1994) Twenty years of lending for urban development, 1972-92 Report No 13117 World Bank (1995) Indonesia: impact evaluation report: enhancing the quality of life in urban Indonesia: the legacy of Kampung Improvement Program Report 4747-IND World Bank (2000) World Development Report World Bank (2003) Slum upgrading and participation: Lessons from Latin America Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation, http://mhupa.gov.in/programs/upa/nsdp/vambay.htm (Accessed in 2007)

5. Identifying Housing Conditions in Bogota, Colombia: A Strategy to Deal with Risks

Francesco Ambrosi Filardi

5.1 Location, Population and Political-Administrative Organization The Special District of Bogota, capital of the Republic of Colombia, was founded in 1538 and is located in the western branch of the Andean range of mountains, on a plateau 2,600 m above sea level. Bogota's total area amounts to 201,966 ha (8% of the whole Savannah of Bogota), 23.4% of which is urban territory with 6,763,325 inhabitants that represent 16.3% of Colombia's total population, according to the 2005 official census. Since the 1993 census, the population has grown 37%. A significant part of this growth is due to the gradual and persistent arrival of new forcefully displaced people from rural areas. These people see in the capital city the possibility of finding a better standard of living. In the forthcoming 20 years an increase of 4,500,000 million inhabitants has been estimated in the Savannah of Bogota. About 2,500,000 of them will settle down in Bogota. Furthermore, most of these people will not have enough economic means to survive and, therefore, will occupy marginal areas of the city. Administratively speaking, the city is divided into 20 localities. Each one of them is run by a local mayor, appointed by the main city mayor, and counts with a popularly elected local council. Only one of these localities is exclusively rural.

5.2 Urban Growth In 1919, Bogota occupied 892 ha, with a density ratio of 149 people/ha. Today, the urban territory comprises 47,269 ha with 143 people/ha.

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Fig. 5-1. Occupation in 1990

Bogota grew from 56 ha per year in the first 40 years of the 1900s to 581 ha per year in the last decade of the 20th century. Thus, land in Colombia's capital city has suffered an irrational occupation, privileging individual decisions as opposed to official urban planning. The use of land for commerce, services, and industry has displaced people to both relegated and privileged outskirts of the city. Problems linked to urban marginalization are reflected in an uneven distribution of income and a rapidly growing density of the urban population. These problems are worsened by the system's own restrictions to guarantee access to land, housing, and employment. Therefore, 18% of the urban land (8,500 ha) has been developed illegally, and 1,415 neighborhoods have 415,000 lots at various and often unfinished stages of construction. As a result of this illegal urbanization and spontaneous growth, about 134,000 families do not hold any title of land ownership and around 14,000 families have settled themselves in high-risk areas. Furthermore, popular sectors have become physically and spatially segregated, as they have found difficulties to access and connect with urban services. In addition, this sector of society has had to spend more time and pay higher costs for transportation to their working places than people who occupy officially recognized sectors of the city. Moreover, there is a notorious lack of

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public spaces for recreation, green areas, and public infrastructure such as schools, health centers, nurseries, etc. In short, all these pitfalls can be translated as follows: -

Lack of public utility services Indicators of a very low standard of living. Long and cumbersome processes of legalization to become part of the officially recognized city and its infrastructure. Settlement of urban developments in high-risk areas. Harm to strategic ecosystems. Generation of risks out of inappropriate procedures in urbanization processes.

Additionally, the increasing construction of housing in these spontaneously developed neighborhoods has had, and still carries, negative effects, first of all, on the stability of such houses, and second, on urban regulations of territorial organization. The city intends to implement such regulations in the following cases: -

Residential sectors in constant process of consolidation. Construction processes out of formal technical parameters. Tendency to irrational density. Increasingly vulnerable housing to seismic activity. Higher fiscal and budgetary vulnerability of the city.

Since the 1970s and 1980s, the city took large-scale actions such as the Integrated Program of Urban Development in the Western Section of Bogota (IPUDWSB) and Bolivar Citadel neighborhood. With resources mainly gained from foreign credits, these programs were carried out in peripheral territories, recognizing the problems of marginalization and social segregation.

5.3 The Territorial Organization Plan (TOP) “...The TOP recognizes and understands two simultaneous conditions of urban quality in the built city. The planned, organized, and efficient city on the one hand, and the spontaneous, disarticulated, and underequipped city on the other, became the Administrative Department of District Planning's (ADDP) pivotal point reflection in Bogota as such Department proposed the Territorial Organization Plan (TOP). Such plan held as a hypothesis that the positive effects generated by the efficient city should permeate and change the precarious conditions of the

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informal city when the initiatives and efforts of citizens and their organizations were put into effect...”[1] When TOP recognized this reality, it established the following: -

Citizens' participation processes. Opportunities to reach consensus through joining efforts and unifying wills. Construction of public spaces and infrastructure as the basis of a collective project. Creation of a well balanced, just, and efficient city. Planning processes at different scales to develop the city and take care of it.

In the year 2000, after some programs had been implemented in order to solve the problems and seek comprehensive improvement of marginal sectors of the city, TOP adopted a polycentric model for Bogota. This model intended to shorten distances for access to jobs and services. It also sought an organized growth of the periphery, and the densification of residential areas in the northern and southern ends of the city. TOP then establishes projects in the medium and long run, as well as procedural norms regarding (1) patrimony, (2) housing, (3) urban restoration, (4) ecologically efficient production, and (5) structuring programs such as housing and strategic operations. Specifically, for the housing program, TOP establishes the following objectives to guarantee attention to demand and to quantitative and qualitative urban housing deficit for the poorest population: -

Facilitate good quality for urban land. Propose alternative markets. Carry out the comprehensive improvement program. Run a Living Policy from the District.

and in it, to run the collateral program of improvement. This subprogram seeks inclusion, efficiency and productivity as part of its major objectives. Such objectives are achieved through urban programs such as those of Comprehensive Improvement of Neighborhoods, and Identification and Improvement of Housing and Resettlement. Thus, vulnerable and peripheral areas can obtain the expected standard of living for the city. All of the above was possible thanks to three fundamental State Laws: (1) The Urban Reform Law 9 from 1989, (2) the Law 152 from 1994 through which the Development Plan's Organic Law was established, and (3) especially the Law 388 from 1997, known as the territorial organization law, through which municipalities have been demanded to enact their

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respective Territorial Organization Plans. In Bogota, particularly, this measure is enforced through Decree 190 from 200, successively modified by Decree 469 from 2003. Since Bogota has recognized its own problems in marginalized neighborhoods, the last four administrative periods of mayors in office (13 years) have permanently invested funds in the improvement of such territories. Thus, substantial steps have been taken to learn how to face problems: From the territorially marked solutions given in the 1970s and 1980s, Bogota moved to define the areas where it would implement its actions. In TOP, these areas were identified as Units of Zonal Planning or UZP's of Comprehensive Improvement, where the various entities from the district need to prioritize and coordinate action plans. The number of improvements has kept growing in the last few years. For example, the city has moved from programs to public policies; from counter-marginalization of neighborhoods to the Comprehensive Improvement Plan (CIP); from individual assistance in every lot to largescale real estate operations; from neighborhood assistance to Comprehensive Urban Operations, related to Zonal Planning; from Uncoordinated Institutional Actions to Coordinated Policies in various sectors of the territory. All of the above is encompassed within an action framework that seeks to accomplish the following objectives: -

To reduce vulnerability To provide assistance in the built city. To regenerate a propitious habitat. To maintain the city's sustainability.

Fig. 5-2. Actions, policies, programs and projects by TOP

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The actions, policies, programs, and projects that TOP establishes can be summarized in Fig. 5-2. A quite representative example of a scheduled growth can be found in New Usme Urban Operation. It is part of the Territorial Organization Plan as a strategic and comprehensive urban operation. It is important for the following reasons: 1. It aims at a definite construction of a city borderline in the southwestern side of Bogota. Such an urban boundary would serve as a transition point to obtain a new and not concentrated pattern of territorial occupation. Thus, illegal urbanization would be halted, and farmers, as well as areas with a special ecological value for the supply and regulation of water in the region and other environmental services, would be protected.[2] 2. This objective should be accomplished in one of the areas of the city that is most vulnerable to illegal urbanization. Thus, the main strategy intends to improve the design of operational mechanisms to tackle and solve once and for all the actions promoted by pirate developers. The strategy also recognizes the logic under which the popular city functions so that better living conditions and social cohesion are achieved. The incidence of this strategy would not be as great in the district's budget as it would be in that of the programs of legalization and neighborhood improvement. 3. It comprises improving regional road networks (with Orinoquia and Venezuela) and promoting the localization of industrial, agricultural, and services activities in order to generate employment along with housing supply. 4. Lastly, the operation has already been conceived, and it is being developed by the district's administration as a pilot model to apply in a comprehensive way the land-management instruments to which the Law 388 from 1997 refers. The pilot model would help qualify urbanization practices of public and private actors in the region, demonstrating that the same urban operations may generate resources to provide infrastructure, public services, and public spaces by reallocating generated added values. The main element of the operation lies in the application of a number of planning and managing instruments which guarantee that the urban projects themselves become responsible for the costs of land, road infrastructure, public services and spaces, as well as local urban costs, charging land owners, public or private investors, or both, as a retribution for having assigned to the land its respective urban use according to the law. In this way, urbanization processes will significantly reduce its pressures upon

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Fig. 5-3. Landuse plan (New Usme Urban Operation)

public budgets, and the land market will be increasingly regulated. As a result, the real estate and construction businesses will be more seriously involved in these urban projects. In the particular case of New Usme Operation, focused on priority lowincome housing supply and its basic complementary public services, the strategy gets ahead of the illegal urbanization through public investment in road networks and utility services[3] in order to avoid future overcharges such as the ones that occurred in programs such as the Comprehensive Improvement of Neighborhoods, and to obtain land for housing programs, in exchange of such investments and the allocation of land for urban development, especially urbanized lots for better housing. Thus, an important transformation is being proposed for urbanization processes. The state strengthens its role as a regulator of the land market while controlling in an effective way the illegal supply of pirate urban developers. The state can accomplish these conditions when offering competitive urbanized land, both in price and quality, optimizing public investments in infrastructure as a key ingredient of social policy on housing. As a result, people can attain a sense of belonging and build community with better living conditions. On the other hand, through its operational strategies, TOP seeks to connect “…urban actions, instruments of urban management, economic interventions, and social measures in special areas of the city. These areas are considered essential to consolidate in the short, medium, and long run the organization strategy….In addition, their purpose is to channel investment

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resources so that they can be included in the respective executive program of each administration.”[4] In this way, for instance, in the Macro-Project of the Tunjuelo River, measures to be taken in ecological circuits are defined in detail, as well as the projects to repair and construct the local road network -especially in the Corridors of Local Mobility-, the identification of public infrastructure systems, and the measures taken in the central points that identify such portions of territory, complying to TOP mandatory regulations.

5.4 The Comprehensive Improvement of Neighborhoods Program The Comprehensive Improvement of Neighborhoods Program works at two levels: one social, and the other one territorial. In turn, these two fronts are tackled under two linked strategies. First, the strategy of civil participation aims to increase the social capital, the democratic awareness, and the capacity of collective involvement in people's own processes. The second strategy, of inter-institutional and strengthening of local measures, promotes the improvement of already-built houses in order to take care of the qualitative deficit related to structural conditions, infrastructural deficiencies, family one-room overcrowding, and poor housing and living conditions. The program defines the following objectives: -

Urban organization Improvement of physical, environmental, and legal deficiencies. 㨚Inhabitants' accessibility to the urban standard of living defined for the entire city.

Likewise, the District's Planning Department (DPD) adopts by decree the model of urban structure and regulations for the 28 Units of Comprehensive Improvement of Zonal Planning. Furthermore, the DPD defines strategies of housing and urban planning, institutional coordination and operation, participation, prevention, and control. At the same time, the entities in charge of operational actions in each program are assigned. For example, the institutional function of the Popular Housing Fund is to develop, coordinate, and manage urban projects that would improve the living conditions of the population from the informal city, and is in charge of the following projects: - Re-settlement of the population intends (1) to assist the population that inhabits high risk areas identified by the Board of Emergency Prevention and Assistance, (2) to safeguard their lives, and (3) to

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Fig. 5-4. Houses without complying with construction regulations (Source: Caja de Vivienda)

-

strengthen the district's measures to prevent and control the growth of illegal developments. Legal documentation of land ownership in legal developments. In addition to complying with urban obligations, it will allow to move forward safely and efficiently in the improvement of urban life standards for popular sectors of society. Improvement of housing conditions in order to develop permanent processes of technical assistance to the population on the living and constructive quality of housing. Thus, people's right to enjoy a decent life and shelter would be guaranteed.

The houses that were built in Bogota without complying with construction regulations were first identified in 2001.[5] The design of technical procedures facilitated the characterization and standardization of structural solutions for houses built up to two floors with a light roof.[6] To start with, it was recognized that whatever was built by the people without governmental support required a specific set of regulations. Hands are put on the mitigation of housing vulnerability, trying to update precariously built houses to the Colombian code of anti-seismic constructions from a technical point of view, following procedures and studies that begin assessing the level of vulnerability of houses and figuring out how to reduce such vulnerability gradually[7]. Initiatives arise from these procedures and technical proposals in order to establish applicable norms in which the identifi-

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cation of perilous houses as part of the strategies of risk management in the city, keeping in mind the following priority[8]: -

To protect the life and the patrimony of the most vulnerable population and reduce the fiscal risk of the city if a seismic event may occur[9].

Aside from this, other measures are also taken in order to improve the living conditions of inhabitants that acknowledge the social incidence of housing. To fulfil these objectives, a normative and institutional framework was designed in order to (1) assist families technically and socially in their constructive process; (2) develop methodologies to diagnose and determine technical solutions; (3) create training and wide-spread communication processes for the population that would become the recipient of institutionalized and safe construction practices. A fundamental part of the project used systems of information that allowed establishing proper conditions of already built lands. Building conditions were identified at four levels: empty territories, territories with some type of construction, territories with one-floor and light roof construction, with solid roof, with walls up to a second floor, with light roof, and so on and so forth up to the identification of territories with five slabs. This information is geo-referenced in more than 500,000 private lots and, depending on such conditions, we are designing technical alternatives to gradually reduce housing vulnerability. These technical alternatives depend on the conditions of each house; however, a unique methodology of assessment and diagnosis was created. In addition solutions for structural elements were unified to reduce housing vulnerability. GIS allows one to plan interventions by sectioning out the territory with cross information about -

threat zones micro-zoning capacity to afford assistance in networks of public utility services, mobility, public space, and infrastructure.

Furthermore, GIS facilitates the incorporation of planning practices in order not only to take actions on the land itself, but also to widen the range of action of technical assistance at higher levels such as blocks, neighborhoods, or bigger areas, allowing as a result: -

to re-adjust territories to take better advantage of potential building conditions according to regulations.

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To incorporate state agents in order to establish real estate projects with inhabitants, thus facilitating the consolidation of houses in a safer and more efficient way. The poorest population would, therefore, profit itself from urban rents. To reduce pressures over rural areas by generating opportunities and consolidation policies in the areas that the population itself constructs.

Another aspect of the project is focused on the development of a construction standard to recognize this reality, taking as a starting point people's right to allege that whatever is built by themselves cannot be considered vulnerable only because it does not follow the parameters of formal construction --- construction standards that are being developed with the support of the seismic national commission. Thanks to this process of housing identification it has been possible to realize the real scope of the problem, prioritizing assistance in houses up to two floors with light roofs, which represent approximately 44.61% of such housing. Then assistance would focus on two-floor constructions with roofed slab, representing 24.15%. The idea is to improve at least 70% of the existing houses.

Fig. 5-7. Level of consolidation of comprehensive urban operations related to zonal planning

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Complying with Architectonical Conditions - Light, Ventilation, Quality of spaces: Depend on area and minimum side of patio Complying with Urban Conditions - Minimum area of private land: Meets 94.98% of conditions - Minimum side of private land: Meets 96.59% of conditions - Minimum area of patio: Meets 31.53% of conditions - Minimum area of private land: Meets 94.98% of conditions - Minimum side of patio: Meets 22.69% of conditions - Uses: Housing 86.35% Complying with Structural Conditions - Vertical structure: Meets 2.61% - Diaphragm: Meets 2.61% - Level of vulnerability: Low 8.86%, medium 22.16%, medium low 0.28%, medium high 8.03%, high 39.98%, very high 1.39% Fig. 5-8. Goals for the present period in office (2004-2008)

The public administration is making efforts to invest in these houses. Insufficient resources have been the only great limitation. Thus, the objectives in mind have not been enough to solve the problem quickly. For the present period in office (2004-2008), the goal is to assist 10,000 houses. This situation is worrisome because the level at which houses in popular sectors are consolidated grows progressively. Along with the availability of utility services and infrastructure, the delay in housing intervention does not allow owners to make rapid and economically viable changes to their dwellings. The actions that the administration has taken recognize the architectural (i.e., light, ventilation, quality of spaces, etc.) state of housing in the first place, but they also recognize the acceptance of urban laws (i.e., minimum area of land, minimum side lengths, and minimum length of internal patios, cantilever, etc.) and the observance of structural regulations: vertical structure, diaphragm, and their level of vulnerability. Due to these conditions, adjustments to the existing norms have had to be made in order to facilitate housing interventions to gradually reduce risks before natural threats (floods, seismic activity, avalanches, etc.) to recognize the legal status of houses. The structural actions that have been taken recognize in the first place the criteria of technical and social assistance to the community depending on the conditions and level of vulnerability of each house. The assistance determines (1) how to reduce risks gradually, (2) the costs of interventions and how to finance them, and (3) the duration of such financial and techni-

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cal assistance. Priority is given to empty lots, to empty houses, and to twofloored houses with light roofs. The other types of housing (two-floors and slab-roof or more) have only received normative guidelines and instruments to facilitate legalization. The community has also been trained and instructed as to how to ask for and receive financial aid and technical assistance in order to improve housing conditions. A lot still has to be done. This is a process in which, unfortunately, the informal development of housing keeps growing without being able to stop it despite all the policies and instruments of land management that the administration has given to the economically depressed sectors of society.We must continue forward, defining new housing standards. From a structural point of view, 'acceptable' levels of vulnerability and anti-seismic standards ought to be defined. From the urban and architectural point of view, we need to be prone to implement the new regulations and establish new parameters to be able to recognize the reality of popular developments. All these normative actions need to be revised to make some city rights effective.

Notes [1]

[2]

[3]

[4] [5] [6]

[7] [8]

Workshop on Urban Procedures in Peripheral areas. Bogota, DC, 2001. Memoirs. Clemencia Escallon, vice director of ADDP's Regional Expansion and Organization. T.O.P.'s initial calculations on population for this zone, about 500,000 inhabitants, have been reduced to a maximum of 300,000. The expansion land has been reduced from 1,000 ha to 794 ha. In the case of illegal occupations, owners do not tend to assume charges on urbanization processes. For example, owners do not give back the illegally occupied land for public use, nor do they invest in infrastructure even though they are legally obliged to do it. Clause No. 25 from Decree 190 from 2004. T.O.P. compiled. This project began as part of a program of international cooperation between the European Union and Bogota's main mayor office. These houses are identified with a special code: "E" in the Colombian code of anti-seismic constructions, called NSR/98 allows masons with no technical supervision, to construct houses up to two floors high with a light roof. The Manual of 1-and 2 Floor House Mending from the Colombian Association of Seismic Engineering was used. The identification of land is an objective of the Development Plan of the present city administration.

118 [9]

Francesco Ambrosi Filardi El decreto 624 de 2006, establece las competencias, alcances objetivos y componentes del proyecto de mejoramiento de condiciones de vivienda. Las metas asociadas a este proyecto forman parte de un Proyecto financiado por el BIRF, para disminuir la vulnerabilidad fiscal del Estado frente a eventos naturales.

6. Methodology for Intervention in Vulnerable Settlements in Medellin, Colombia: Urban Destructuralization in Relation to the Topography of the Territory

Juan Ricardo Mejía B.

6.1 Elements of the Analysis of Urban Destructuralization Urban destructuralization may be approached from various aspects, of which we are interested in analyzing the physical, social, environmental and economic aspects. At the same time we intend to extract measurable variables of each aspect that would allow us to establish a scientific basis for characterizing this phenomenon in any territory. Post earthquake, a revitalization program of the Kotagede Heritage District, has been initiated by Pusaka Jogja Bangkit! (Jogja Heritage Revival!). Collaborative parties consist of the Jogja Heritage Society, the Center for Heritage Conservation, the Department of Architecture and Planning at Gadjah Mada University, the Indonesian Network for Heritage Conservation, ICOMOS Indonesia, and other supporting institutions including the local community. This program focuses on building the local economy through strengthening both tangible and intangible heritage for economic and sustainable development. x Measurable variables The urban physical destructuralization (Dp) is given in the analysis and classification of the topography (Tp), on which the vulnerability and the planning index (Ip, medium or, low), represented in part by a morphological pattern (Mp) (patron). Dp = Tp + Ip Mp

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6.1.1 Physical Aspect In analyzing a territory on the basis of the inadequacy of the infrastructure or its topography, it can be seen that the ease of construction in the flatter areas leads to the evolution of the city in these flat areas, leaving the hilly areas and depressions as residues of the development. These residual areas are very susceptible to spontaneous settlement, giving rise to massive slum areas. 6.1.2 Social Aspect The processes of violence or economic needs force the displacement of people from the rural to urban areas or within the urban area itself. Together with the emerging necessity of settlements, economic needs and also the psychological impacts cause groups to settle in the lower planned areas or the residual space of the formal city. For the purposes of this investigation, these spaces are referred to as abrupt topographical areas. x Measurable variables The social destructuralization (Ds) is reflected in the displacement phenomena (d) summing a number of factors such as ethnic groups (Et), the topographical classification (Tp), and a planning index of medium or low (Ip), which gives an indication of how the mixed social structures in the marginal environment were formed, and which are not consistent with the processes of evolution within the city. Ds = d + Et + Tp + Ip

6.1.3 Environmental Aspect We can speak about two aspects, the deterioration of the flora and fauna ecosystems and the marginality context itself. The first aspect deals with the problem of the environmental load that the natural system is exposed to as a result of the lack of planning of human settlements. Specifically in the case of rivers and ravines, an unstructured social dynamic system without internal control processes - in contrast with the intact natural ecosystem undergoes a progressive degeneration in terms of mutual impacts and alters the function, thereby giving rise to many problems. The meeting of these two dynamic systems, the social and the natural, in the abrupt topographic areas without the minimum of planning, produces a marginal environment understood as a lack of integration of the normal collective processes of the formal planned city.

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x Measurable variables The environmental urban destructuralization (De) is equal to the sum of the natural ecosystem (En), the social system (Ss) and the level of planning, indicating the origins of the progressive degeneration of both systems associated with the problems that are created in the process of the meeting of both. Da = En + Ss

6.1.4 Economical Aspect Destructuralization can be understood by looking at the isolation of the social system from the dynamic commercial activities and formal jobs, caused many times by factors such as the lack of education and training, the long distances from the peripheral areas to the center, and social stigma, among others. x Measurable variables The economic urban destructuralization (De) is related to the quantity of business (money) together with the types of work (formal or informal) and the unemployment rate in the marginal community (low possibility of finding a job due to social factors).

Fig. 6-1. Analysis of Urban Destructuralization

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All the proposed equations attempt to give a mark for focusing on the areas of urban destructuralization and establish a system of measurement.

6.2 Methodology for the Systematization of the Destructuralization Components The complex processes presented by any real phenomenon require a constant interaction of a diverse nature of elements, which makes it impossible to treat it from one study or area of knowledge. As a result, the interdisciplinary approach plays an important role as a tool for understanding such processes. In the first instance, the case of the complex phenomenon of urban destructuralization requires coordinating the efforts of diverse disciplines in order to understand the processes and later formulate tools for treating them. It becomes necessary to generate a methodology that allows the understanding and treatment of such complexity in a systematic manner. Since this phenomenon is generally associated with very extensive areas within the city, the methodology in the first instance focuses on the definition of such phenomenon in smaller areas, called 'urban micro systems' that are easier to manage in a study, and allows the formulation of models that can be applied in other zones with similar characteristics and problems.

6.2.1 Stages in Methodology The methodology consists of: 1. Delineation of the study area (urban micro system) 2. Identification and classification of the different components. 3. Quantification and qualification of the components. 4. Identification of relations between the components for analysis and later the definition of hypothesis and action plans. 5. Definition of action plans for the study area. 6. For each plan, the formulation of standards and models necessary to get an adequate balance between the components. Items 2, 3, 4, and 5 are the base for the collection of information on each discipline. In contrast, item 6 requires the interaction of the action plans suggested by the different disciplines to obtain an intervention model.

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6.3 Urban Destructuralization in Northeastern Medellin Northeastern Medellin is chosen as a pilot area for applying the methodology because of the existence of abrupt topography comprising river basins and hills with high slopes and clayey soils. In addition, within the historical process of the formation of the neighborhoods, many processes of rural-city migration caused by factors related to economy and violence can be seen. This resulted in a conglomeration of unplanned settlements, which over the passage of time have consolidated and achieved a certain level of planning. Although the areas of river basins and hills constitute residual areas of such planned developments, these also suffer later from the processes of settlement aggravated by its topographical condition, and difficult accessibility defined by the limited access to the normal development processes and evolution of the city. You can get a clear view of this in the topographically abrupt areas, where the environmental impacts (deterioration in the environmental axes, contamination of water resources) are accentuated, and the physical destructuralization can be seen (overcrowding in the slum areas caused by the absence of planning). The specific case of the La Herrera River Basin is a good example since is has high indices of marginality, over population, low economic resources, inadequate sewage and garbage disposal systems and unstable soils. It is also chosen because of its large extension, variety of the relief, and the interest demonstrated in recent years by the administration through a series of important civil works, including the massive metro cable transport system.

Fig. 6-2. Northeastern Medellin

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6.4 Urban Destructuralization in Northeastern Medellin Following the process, it is necessary to delineate an area that allows for a more detailed and deeper understanding of the components that appear with the phenomenon of destructuralization. For this there are two criteria: -

Ways perpendicular to the environmental axis that generally are not interrupted. Streets on the borders whose form results from meeting with the break in topography.

In applying these criteria to the northeastern zone, it is possible to define the limits and the number of urban micro systems that form part of this zone, giving rise to a new reference of the possible system that would allow for the restructuring and improvement of living conditions in this region. In La Herrera ravine it is necessary to select an area that would allow the development of the greatest number of components and variables. The area chosen is the urban micro system, bounded by 107th and 110th Streets and 46th and 47th Avenues. The selection of this micro system is based on physical topography associated with the maximum break, and also has direct relation to the possible development of the Andalucia Station of the metro cable transport system, which gives it a very strategic character.

Fig. 6-3. Quantification and qualification of elements in Northeastern Medellin

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6.4.1 Components of the Urban Micro System Once the study area is selected, the components of the urban micro system can be identified. - Linear housing - Isolated constructions - Consolidated blocks - Topography - Roads and sidewalks - Commercial infrastructure - Equipment - Inhabitants - Employment - River Basins - Arts and Offices - Flora and fauna species - Vehicular and pedestrian streams The same components of the urban micro system (UMS) can be found in other UMS of the zone, with similar conditions in all the analyzed levels. It is possible to foresee the high levels of marginality and problems of the zone, as well as the opportunity - once a model is developed for UMS for it to be adopted for other situations in the zone. Beside this, it gives a clear understanding of the potential urban structuring system in northeastern Medellin based on the environmental axis, connected to the integrated improvement processes.

Fig. 6-4. Elements of the microsystem and delimitation in the study area

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6.4.2 Classification Criteria In order to get a precise definition of the conceptual and physical level of the UMS, some classification criteria are defined that allow analysis of areas with the same parameters in order to clearly identify relevant characteristics, their differences, and potential. For this reason, such criteria can be studied based on quantitative and qualitative characteristics. Consolidation levels

Here, the quantity and general conditions of existing housing within the UMS are identified and defined, with a view to deciding on the most adequate strategies for treating these components. In this way, we define these criteria as the following components: -

Consolidated housing Border housing Row or linear housing and Non-consolidated housing

Free space

This criterion is defined from the physical component as the types of spaces existing in the interior of the UMS that are different from the built up spaces. (Possible available spaces for closed housing or public spaces). In this way we define these criteria as comprising the following: -

River basin space Closed interior blocks Open interior blocks Building space Lots

Mobility

This comprises of the identification, classification and quantification of the mobility systems, understood as the road network, streets and sidewalks of the UMS. It also analyzes the degree of continuity or discontinuity of the network. The following classes of roads and streets are identified: -

Border Roads Dead end and end roads Interrupted streets Footpaths, sidewalks and steps (interiors)

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Topography

This comprises the analysis of the graphics of the surface topography in the UMS, quantifying aspects such as depths and opening of gorges, slopes and heights. Also, it analyzes specific aspects of the soil, such as soil types, risks associated with the type of soil, bearing capacity of the soil, suitability for cultivation and reforestation, etc. Four schemes of topographical relief are established, which are used as the basis for analyzing the housing situation in terms of quantity and location, the most appropriate form of action in such zones, and the suitability for the establishment of a project in various schemes. These schemes are: -

Topography of crests or summits Topography of valleys Topography of inclinations Topography for sightseeing

Services

It is also necessary to know the type of services that support the UMS, as much in the interior as in its surroundings. Once the quantity and variety of services and the degree of articulation between them are known, it is possible to find out the degree of coverage of such services and gain a little understanding of the deficiencies confronting the diversity that these can offer in supporting an environment in the optimum manner. In identifying the large quantity of services that exist in the northeastern region, it can be seen that although there isn't quantitative deficit, the small variety of services offered suggests it is critical to provide other services of a cultural, ludic and recreational character. Also, the lack of articulation between the services is evident, due in a large part to the interruptions in the roads caused by the broken topography. However, these breaks, approximately 40% located in the interior, present a great opportunity for generating important systems of connectivity and articulation between such services through the axes that form the valleys of the basins. We define then the following equipment according to the represented services: -

Sports Education Health Institution Culture Religion Commerce

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Fig. 6-5. Consolidation levels in the study area

Fig. 6-6. Free space in the study area

Fig. 6-7. Mobility in the study area

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Fig. 6-8. Topography in the study area

6.4.3 Diagnosis of UMS La Herrera The elements are analyzed through a relation matrix, in which, for each relation, the following three components are established: 1. Description 2. Database 3. Morphologic pattern Based on the analysis, the diagnostics for each element are established.

Fig. 6-9. Relation analysis between the elements

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Consolidation Level

It is necessary to establish some housing growth limits towards the interior of the river basin because of the high risk and the damage produced inside the natural system. Beside this, it is necessary to recover these areas as part of the public space to get equilibrium in the conditions of the environment of this territory. Also, it can be concluded that it is necessary to define the existing blocks in such a way that the deterioration that is generated at the borders caused by the abrupt topographic change does not continue to accentuate the phenomenon of unplanned marginal settlements and unstructured urbanization. Free Space

It is necessary to recover the river basin as a vital component of the environment of these housing developments and as a part of the environmental system formed by the river basins of the northeastern region of the city. Also, the interiors of the blocks are resources that could be developed in the most appropriate manner, preserving always the memories that they represent to the inhabitants based on the concept of neighborhood systems. Mobility

The transportation network in the zone exhibits an imbalance between pedestrians and cars. In some zones, there is imminent danger to pedestrians due to the small size of the sidewalks or their absence altogether. In some streets without vehicular traffic there is under utilization of the public space, resulting in the unnecessary asphalting of less than 5% of the total surface. Some improvements have been made to the footpaths, but there are still many problems related to sewage and connection of the network. Topography

According to the criteria for classification, the microsystem presents two large canyons with depths between 26 m and 28 m, with slopes varying between 40 and 70%. The topography is formed by 7 cresta and 4 terraces, the importance of which lies in the fact that these spaces form the great majority of marginal settlements within the urban microsystem. The soil in the stream bed is composed of strata of dunite and amphibole, which are associated with the steep slopes in certain sectors and establishe these settlements as a high risk area.

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Services

In terms of services, the microsystem is well supported due to the amount of services and equipment within and surrounding the area, although there is a large deficit in complementary services such as childcare centers, cultural and recreational centers, workshops etc., which these communities require to strengthen their social networks. Access to services is made difficult, as most are not functioning or are at an inconvenient distance, which limits their use.

6.4.4 Defining the Hypotheses Defining the hypotheses is the result of quantifying, qualifying and correlating the diversity of elements found within the urban microsystem. The hypothetical projects for each situation are based on the relationships as defined and the diagnosis made. Because the morphological patterns are repetitive structures in all the microsystems, defining one framework related to one of these becomes a projection process which can be replicated.

Fig. 6-10. Plan definition for the study area

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Action Plan 1

To generate complementary activities within the urban microsystem through small or large endowments of equipment. -

Studies of the established housing in the terraced topographical zones to evaluate their possible relocation. Studies of the needs for complementary activities for the inhabitants of the urban microsystem and its surrounding neighborhoods to determine if the necessity for a new infrastructure of equipment.

Action Plan 2

Starting with the streets on the crests, to structure, organize and create a continual flow of attention to the existing homes and possible projects. -

A general study of the variables which act upon the streets on the hillcrests such as kinds of mobilization, the physical and spatial characterization of the specific area, and questions related to employment and business.

Action Plan 3

To create new pathways following the elevation and connecting to existing pathways in order to facilitate longitudinal movement (crossing the stream). Action Plan 4

To create a system for containment which would restrict occupation and the building of new homes on the inner side of the stream bed, at the same time generating an alternate walkway for pedestrians which would permit movement over the stream. -

Studies of the established housing in topographical zones (valley) V to ascertain the possibility of their relocation. Studies of slopes to define which mechanisms can be brought into use for a system of containment (steps, sidewalks, dikes, etc.)

Action Plan 5 -

To use the existing terraces in the consolidated homes as a medium for redensifying the neighborhood. To generate a new housing system on the edges of the city blocks following the topography and using the interiors of the city blocks as

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Fig. 6-11. Definition of the project subsystems for the study area

-

-

spaces for access and production. Through the system of containment of housing and public space, to generate small housing systems which will create new dynamics in the crossing of the stream and will allow for new markets and housing. To finish the consolidation of the streets along the hillcrests by defining housing units which will allow for generating businesses on the ground floors and offer greater access to services and equipages available on the terraced areas.

6.4.5 Pilot Project for Recomposition for the Ends of City Blocks After carrying out an exhaustive review of the diverse elements located within the microsystem and identifying the existing relationships as well as possible hypotheses and feasible plans, we then look to the application of Plan 5, which has as its goal the resolution of existing needs related to housing. At this point we are interested in resolving the housing system at the edges in order to change the terminations of the existing city blocks where they meet abrupt topography.

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Fig. 6-12. Development of the plan and laws formulation

The system to change or reform the street endings is structurally based on four important concepts: -

-

Restructuring the natural system using methods that allow for evaluation all of the internal components and definition of the strategies necessary to regulate both conditions and activities within the system. The major problem caused by human settlements on stream banks is the deterioration of the natural system of flora and fauna, which then rebounds on the inhabitants. By analyzing the slopes, areas for carrying out different activities can be chosen. In this way the social system around the stream can be orderly and integrated positively. Restructuralization of the environmental system through a scheme of sustainability and maintenance, with the principal objective being improvement of conditions in the surrounding area both by recycling resources and opening the possibility for training and/or productive sectors for the community. The basic achievement to be sought here is a joining of new projects with the existing consolidated houses through networks and systems to recycle rainwater and drainage water, taking positive advantage of

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-

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garbage for productive ends and the sale of compost, as well as using biologically created gases and masses for alternative energy sources. Insofar as the community has a tendency toward specific crafts or trades, or requires certain apprenticeships, areas will be established for training and productive activity to generate self-sustaining community cycles. The restructuring of the social system based on a plan for regeneration and consolidation of the marginalized part of the community, to be developed through recognition of the individual and tied to the process of the architectural urban project. The occupation of edifices for housing shall be defined from slabs as lots at certain heights, with characteristics similar to those of ground level terrain to be used for progressive occupancy according to the needs of the inhabitants. Restructuring of the physical system shall be established from the point of conformation of an end or border construction as a support for different activities relating to production, commerce, education and housing, as well as giving shape to the block's continuity of streets or roadways. Building development will be based on four components: the modules for housing, businesses or offices, terraces, and the interior street, which shall complete the configuration of the restructuring of the final edge of the streets and make buildings a link between nature and the human social system.

Housing Modules

The housing modules arise from a process which begins in what we have called lots at certain heights. Management of this type will allow for the progressive occupation of the slabs or 'terrains,' to which the construction techniques of the module will be adapted, based as they are on two general criteria: firstly, that the construction in itself be light weight and changeable, meaning that at a given moment some parts of the module may change, either in terms of materials or placement, and secondly, that a large percentage of the materials used for unions or joining and interior divisions may also be produced through recycling processes. In this way, we also seek to involve the dynamics of the community economy in both the construction materials and in the process of producing these materials. The areas for each module are of 25 m2, 37.5 m2 and 50 m2, in accordance with the growth process of the families and the average home size seen in the sector. In terms of spaces, one part includes bedrooms and living areas while the other part is made up of service areas and balconies; in

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Fig. 6-13. Housing module

the latter area there are sub-modules for services in the form of compartments which provide the basic service areas of bathrooms, laundry and kitchen which can be acquired by the inhabitant to be adapted to the housing module according to need. The facades will be established through a structural matrix to which will be added panels either for joinings or for windows, which can be modified or acquired as required in time. The possibility of changing a module through a change of materials and format generates numerous spatial possibilities which can be adapted for different types of inhabitant. Commerce

Located at the lowest level of the building, these businesses are in direct relation to the streambed and the stream, in the interest of attracting formal activities. One of the greater problems affecting maintenance of the streambeds has been the perception, at the cultural level, of these waters - within the marginalized neighborhoods, streams have always been understood as a system to evacuate residue and rubble because there has been no infrastructure for these purposes and very little in the area of garbage disposal by those related enterprises.

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The new paradigm is to understand these environmental axes, apart from their condition as natural reservoirs, as a new place for socializing and amusement for the communities which have found shelter therein, to generate awareness and the mechanisms which would allow the community to understand how to make the best use of the streams. Thus, business ventures introduce a new social dynamic complemented by methods and strategies to further good maintenance in the surroundings of the stream. At the same, time new formal businesses make up part of the proposed chain of production for the building, a chain which particularly seeks to generate cycles of self-sustainability in the community through products generated by the community itself which may then be sold at the same place and in doing so may establish a way to become part of the economic processes of the city proper. Terraces

In the neighborhoods built on the slopes, the terraces have always constituted a characteristic element in their construction traditions. They are an extension of the house, but while they are an 'almost' finished element, there always exists the possibility that they may grow or change over time. The terrace is the grandmother's flower garden, the children's play area, the place where the laundry is hung up to dry. It represents future air for the children and it is also like a tower from which one can observe the rest of the city from one's own viewpoint.

Fig. 6-14. Commerce and terraces

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Due to these social factors, we must think again about terraces as an important constituent in the buildings on the edges of the stream borders. Unlike the tradition, terraces establish the growth limits for a home through activities and uses to which it is put, activities which favor its appropriation by part of the inhabitants of the building. The terrace becomes a new collective public space for the enjoyment and relaxation of all the community members involved and is closely linked to access paths and building circulation to avoid its appropriation by a small group of persons, and on the contrary is always open to the members of the renewed social group. Therefore, terraces constitute an architectural potential for the new housing and for the relationship of the surroundings with the landscape, as well as offering a solution to the great lack of public spaces in these places. The interior street

Physically the interior street arises as an answer to the need to define a system for moving about which is interrupted by broken topography. The houses on the banks, like a destructured organism, have a strong relationship with the interrupted streets because of the broken topography. This is why they are part of the plans to determine and define the systems for mobility, conforming the city block as a finishing point in accordance with its shape. The lack of infrastructure and access to a diversity of public services is behind the proposal that the inner street provide for a series of activities

Fig. 6-15. The interior street

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through coordinating and designing spaces for sales and informal commerce, aware as we are of the great value these spaces for the economy of these neighborhoods. These interior streets also represent pedestrian mobility, the system through which people can have easy access to different parts of the building, as well as training areas, workshops, production areas and areas for community living.

References Alexander, C. (1980) A pattern language. Gustavo Gili Conferencia Asentamientos Humanos Habitat II (1996) Plan de Acción Mundial, Estambul Fritjof, C. (2001) La Trama de la vida,Una nueva perspectiva de los sistemas vivos. Anagrama Habraken, N.J. (1980) El diseño de soportes. Gustavo Gili. Harold, M.E. (2001) La relación cultura naturaleza en la arquitectura occidental. Universidad del Valle. Hough, M. (1998) Naturaleza y ciudad. Planificación urbana y procesos ecológicos. Gustavo Gili Toro, G., Ricardo, J., Yepes, R. and Luis, E. (1986) Fundamentos de medicina y siquiatría. CIB Uribe, M. and Augusto, I.E. (1978) Notas elementales sobre el enfoque sistémico. Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana.

7. From Wood Huts to Buildings of Seven Floors: An Analysis of the Process of Housing Production in the Slum of Rocinha in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, over a Fifty-Year Period

Gerônimo Leitão

7.1 Introduction This work is the result of the current reflections of our professional and academic activities. Over the last 20 years, we have been working in several slum dwellers communities located in the metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro, developing urbanization projects dealing with social dwelling units and community facilities. Accompanying the poorest population on a daily basis, we concluded that the study of the process of housing production in those communities, promoting the analysis of the actions of the different involved agents, could contribute to a better characterization of the dynamics of production of the built environment in the slums in Rio de Janeiro. In order to develop that work we chose the slum of Rocinha, located in the south area of the city of Rio. Besides the particular characteristics that it presents, Rocinha was chosen for the development of our research due, also, to the fact that we worked there for five years, between 1985 and 1989. During that period, we participated in the implantation of XXVII Região Administrativa/Rocinha, and we acted in the coordination of the different municipal organs that rendered services in that community, which allowed us to actively participate in the daily lives of the inhabitants. Ever since, we have been maintaining regular contact with the technicians of that administrative area, as well as with community leaders of the different associations, thanks to the development of our doctorate research the educational activities in the School of Architecture and Urbanism of the Fluminense Federal University (Universidade Federal Fluminense).

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In this paper we present a brief analysis of the evolution of the process of housing production in Rocinha during the period between the mid 1930s --- when occupation of the area began --- and the end of the 1990s --- when many point to the community as the largest slum in Latin America. We intend to demonstrate in this study that the practices of the production of space in the slum were transformed during this period, as also were the products generated by those practices. In that sense, we intend to demonstrate the following: -

-

-

-

-

From a predominantly residential space, Rocinha developed into more and more complex space, when considering the use and occupation of the land. The constructive patterns of housing were also modified: precarious constructions of wood are now side by side with buildings of concrete and bricks with six floors. Changes in the process of housing construction occurred: there are still houses built exclusively by the residing family, but, more and more, contracted workers build inside the slum for clients that pay them. During the past two decades, the formation of an expressive informal real estate market in the slum has been observed - a market that both resembles and differs from that practiced in the official city. Finally, starting from the end of the 1970s, the occurrence of a growing internal social differentiation in the occupation of the space in the slum can be observed.

In the first part of this work, we highlighted the expressive character of the informal production of housing in Third World countries, particularly in Latin America and Brazil. Still in that part, we present a brief history of the expansion of the slums in the city of Rio de Janeiro from the end of the 19th century to the beginning of the 21st century, pointing to the significant morphologic transformations that happened during this period, when the slums went from being a ‘precarious and temporary home of the migrants newcomers’ to becoming a city with its own rules and norms of spatial organization. The description and analysis of the different stages of the process of the occupation of Rocinha, starting from the mid 1920s, constitute the second part of our work. This focuses also on the role of public authority in this process of habitat production. This part still presents the forms of housing production in Rocinha from the time when precarious wood huts prevailed to the present, when buildings of four, five and even six floors are common in the local landscape.

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In conclusion, we present a synthesis of the subjects covered previously regarding the transformations that happened in the process of housing production in Rocinha and the challenge represented by the attempt of extending town planning’s norms and building laws of the so-called ‘official city’ to the slums --- norms that seem to oppose the peculiar characteristics of the production of the habitat in these informal areas. We also call attention to the relevant role that new agents --- who started to act in the slums from the beginning of the 1990s --- can play in overcoming this challenge, which consists of reconciling the peculiarity of the manners of housing production in the slum with the maintenance of minimum patterns of satisfactory habitability and sustainable urban development. With this work, we intend to contribute to a better understanding of the logic that orders the spatial structure of the slums --- a structure seemingly chaotic, but that possesses its own order (surprising in several aspects). We believe that the relevance of this study is associated, also, to the expression that the slums assumed, in recent decades, in the process of urbanization of the great cities of the Third World --- and, in particular, of Brazil.

7.2 A Brief Overview of Informal Housing in Latin America and Brazil The report The Challenge of the Slums, published in October 2003 by the Program of Human Establishments of the United Nations Organization (UN-Habitat), points out that one-sixth of the world’s population lives in slums --- approximately 924 million inhabitants. In agreement with the executive director of that entity, Anna Tibaijuka, there are estimates that in 2050 the world population will be nine billion people, with six billion of them living in the cities. In their estimates, Tibaijuka highlights that 38% of that urban population will be living at slums, “if we don't do some radical thing to solve that problem.” The report elaborated by UN-Habitat reveals, also, that in the beginning of the 21st century, of the 527 million inhabitants from Latin America and the Caribbean, 127.567 million live in slums. Twenty years before the report The Challenge of the Slums, other UN studies pointed out that about 50% of the existent houses in the great Latin American cities were produced by self-construction mechanisms or through mutual help. Those constructions use the most varied materials, including waste from consumption in urban areas, existent natural resources (used materials, wood, zinc, bricks, cardboard), and even industrialized materials such as ceramic bricks, concrete blocks and prefabricated flagstones. Built outside of the legal building norms, those houses are often

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located in areas inappropriate for occupation and almost always their residents do not legally own the land they occupy. In 1988, a report published by the International Bank of Development already pointed that 127 million Latin Americans would be living in the cities and their peripheries between the years 1985 and 2000 (Bolay, Kulhock, Cruz, Meira and Bolivar (1996)). According to that document, about half of the houses necessary to meet to that demand would be generated by informal means, while the remaining 50% would be produced by the formal private sector (25%) and public sector (25%). In that picture, the formal production of housing is unable to meet the growing needs of the poorest part of the population, so, to these people --- the most affected by this situation --- informality remains as the only alternative. Bolay, Kulhock, Cruz, Meira and Bolivar (1996) affirm that the Latin American informal settlements present growth rates bigger than the urban population in general, configuring a dual situation that gave rise to the expression ‘legal city-illegal city,’ coined by Hardoy and Satterthricarte (1989) --- a situation that can be observed in cities such as Caracas, La Paz and Mexico City, where the informal neighborhoods camp represent 40% to 50% of the population. In Lima, in Peru --- just to mention a significant example of the relevance of informal housing production in Latin American countries --- Soto (1986) reveals “that of the total of houses...in 1982, 42.6% belonged to informal establishments, 49.2% to formal neighborhoods and the remaining 8.2% to slums located inside of those neighborhoods,” which means “that, in the capital, for each ten formal houses there are nine informal.” Soto calls attention for the fact that in the Peruvian capital, there are districts that are almost totally informal, while others are mostly informal. In 1982, continues that author, 47% of the population of Lima occupied informal establishments, 45.7% inhabited the formal neighborhoods and 7.3% lived in slums. In Brazil, similar to what has happened in other developing countries, the expression assumed by the informal production of housing is one of the consequences of a picture of social exclusion and spatial segregation, characteristics of the intense urbanization process the country has experienced (Fernandes (2003)). In the Brazilian case, Fernandes (2003) points that urban illegal/informality “stopped being the exception and started to be the rule, the phenomenon is structural and structures the processes of production of the city.” It is also necessary to highlight the significant role carried out by that form of housing production during Brazilian “late capitalism” in relation to the accumulation of capital, as in the reproduction of the workforce (Bonduki and Rolnik (1978)). Smolka highlights, however, that, although the poor population is responsible for the production of informal housing, “the magnitude and the

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persistence of the informality cannot be explained only by the poverty” (2003). In agreement with that author, in spite of a “high correlation” existing between poverty and informality, it is observed, in the informal establishments, the presence of segments of the population that, although having resources for the acquisition of land or a house, “they still cannot be able to pay the minimum price requested at the formal market” (2003). For Gordilho of Souza (2000), the land property and the execution of the town planning’s norms constitute the central subjects of the informal and illegal urban occupation in the great Brazilian cities, once these establishments arose and consolidated for “spontaneous processes, to the margin of the town planning’s norms and of established constructions codes and law.” Already in 1980, almost 80% of the slums were concentrated in metropolitan areas - according to census data --- so, in Brazil, slums are an urban problem and, above all, metropolitan, reveals Pasternak Taschner (1998). That number would be reduced for 71.64% in 1991 with the appearance of slums in smaller cities. In the beginning of the 1990s, that author affirms that “the growth of slums is big: if, in 1980, IBGE computed the existence of 480.595 houses in slum --- 1.89% of the Brazilian houses --, in 1991, the percentage arose for 3.28% of the Brazilians houses, with more than 1.14 million located in slums” (1998). In 2001, Brazilian Municipal District’s Profile, published by Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics), revealed that 1,542 municipal districts had slums --- 28% of the Brazilian municipal districts. According to that document, “all of the municipal districts with more than 500,000 inhabitants informed to have slums and cortiços (houses in degraded properties in the central area), percentile that falls for 12% in the smallest, with up to 5,000 residents” (Taschner (2003)). At the end of 20th century, Brazil had a total of 3,905 slums, 717 more than registered in the 1991 census (Taschner (2003)). In agreement with the 2000 census data, “Great São Paulo presents the largest concentration of slums of Brazil: just the cities of São Paulo, Guarulhos, Osasco and Diadem possessed, in the year 2000, 938 slums --- about a fourth of the country,” reveals Taschner (2003). On the other hand, Rio de Janeiro is in second place in the list of Brazilian municipal districts in terms of the number of slum dwellers communities. In agreement with the Research of Municipal Basic Information of the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, begun in 2001 and concluded in November 2003, in the state of Rio de Janeiro, 1,269 slums are distributed in 48 of the 92 municipal districts. The municipal district of Rio de Janeiro possesses the largest number of houses registered in informal establishments (283,306 homes), followed by the municipal districts of Niterói (50,020), São Gonçalo (29,500), Duque de Caxias (28,617) and Macaé (8,000).

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7.3 Rocinha: An Emblematic Slum of the City of Rio de Janeiro

In the last 20 years, few cities in the state of Rio de Janeiro grew so much, proportionally, as this one: its population practically tripled. The great majority of the new residents came from the northeast of the country. They are from Ceará, Paraíba, Pernambuco, Alagoas, people from all parts of that area of the country. People say that if residents of the city are not from the northeast, they are sons or grandchildren of those who came to try their luck in Rio de Janeiro and decided to stay. As in any other city of the state of Rio de Janeiro, you can find people that live with larger incomes, and others who are poorer. This cannot just be verified in the appearance of streets and of buildings. It can be observed, also, in the residents’ own words: when somebody says they live in this or in that place, they are giving much more information than only an address. The diversified and numerous stores --- more than 1,500 establishments --- are a reason for pride among the residents, when they affirm that, more and more, it is not necessary to leave the city for other places in search of something they need buy. People even say that each month several new commercial establishments open their doors. Almost all of these shops are run by their own proprietor, although there is news in the media that reveals the interest of major organizations to set up there too. Many of these small companies got access in recent years to special lines of financing, which contributed to stimulate the growth of the businesses. New opportunities for businesses appear everyday, the most recent ones being in tourist activities: the city was recently included in the itinerary of agencies that promote visits that allow foreigners to discover the beauties of the nature, the peculiarities of its urbanism and their residents’ lifestyle. The vitality of commercial activity in this city seems to be smaller than only the construction sector: the impression is that people are always building, such is the number of constructions being built, enlarged and reformed. To face the growing demand for space, the solution found by many of its residents is the vertical growth of the buildings, investing everything they can in the foundations, since the growth process for height depends mainly on them. Maybe a lot of people won’t believe how much is paid and the substantial number of purchase, sale and lease transactions that happen in that city: in one of their neighborhoods, the value of the rent of an apartment, only to mention an example, is the same of a property with similar characteristics in the neighborhoods of Glória, Catete and Flamengo, located in the valued south area of the city of Rio de Janeiro.

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But the people of this city don’t live only for the work: culture and leisure also have a place --- and an important one. It is well known that there aren’t cinemas or a theater there - but this is also a problem for other cities in the state of Rio de Janeiro. However, from the night house --- visited by some of the main Brazilian popular music artists --- to amateur theater groups that often perform in the streets of the city --- alongside singers from the northeast who intone their verses in a fair at the main square and the samba school created in late 1980s, it can be said, without fear of being wrong, that culture is present everywhere. And also, one cannot forget the FM Radio, which was inaugurated some years ago and became one more reason for pride in the local community, as well as the TV cable system that connects the city to whatever happens in the rest of the world. In this city, residents associations have been struggling over the years for the improvement of the conditions of life of the local population. Some are more active and representative than others; however, those entities play, with other non-governmental organizations, an important role in the community’s daily life. But, problems also exist --- and a lot. First of all, there is the question of infrastructure, which most inhabitants consider to be the main problem in the community. There are countless complaints regarding the absence of investment by public authorities in basic sanitation --- not without reason: most of the streets don’t have a sewerage system and the water supply is quite precarious in some places. In spite of the establishment of several private clinics in recent years --- some even sophisticated --- the population demands better public health service. And there’s the violence --- a subject which most residents avoid commenting on with foreigners. The leadership of community associations lament that the city is almost always shown as a violent place, where crimes and murder are part of the daily life. For these leaders, it is not fair that an entire community of hard-working people must have such a reputation due to the action of a small group of criminals. Many complain, also, of outrages practiced by policemen. They recognize, with regret, the power that the drug traffic possesses in the city, shown in different manners: from the social welfare provided to poor families to the warranty of maintenance of the safety in the neighborhood, around the points of commercialization of drugs. This ‘city,’ however, doesn’t exist, except for the imagination of many of its residents. In the imagination of thousands of residents, which really exists is a city called Rocinha. Located in the south area of the city of Rio de Janeiro, it is considered by many to be the largest slum in Latin America --- an expression invariably used, mainly by the press, to qualify this enormous slum. For those who live in Rocinha, it is something more than

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that: it is a true city, with several ‘neighborhoods’ that have, each one of them, their own identity. Some of the residents that came from the distant state of Ceará --- and there are many --- like to say, with a mix of pride and exaggeration, that “Rocinha is the second biggest city of Ceará, after Fortaleza (its capital).̍Nor the ‘biggest slum of Latin America,’ nor the ‘second biggest city of Ceará:’ since the late 1980s, Rocinha is another neighborhood of the city of Rio de Janeiro, after a decision by the municipal administration in order to recognize the needed and wanted integration between the formal city and the slum - a destiny certainly not imagined by the Spaniards that planted vegetables in that place 50 years before. Occupying an area of approximately 453,440 m2 in the hillside of Dois Irmãos and Laboriaux hills with a population of approximately 70,000 inhabitants --- according to the 2000 census data --- Rocinha is limited in the lowest part by the Lagoa-Barra (RJ-071) freeway and grows until the highest points, bordering the Gávea Highway. The area occupied by the slum presents a shell form and it is constituted of a plane part that represents the central nucleus, close to the entrance of the Dois Irmãos Tunnel, growing, soon afterwards, over lands of great steepness to the top of the hill. Rocinha has as neighbors the neighborhoods of Gávea and of São Conrado two of the highest income residential areas of Rio de Janeiro. That proximity evidences, especially for the foreign visitor’s glance, the disparities of income distribution in Brazil: it is not necessary to walk much more than a kilometer to go from the ‘hell’ of the precarious huts of wood --- located in risk areas in the hillside, without services of water supply and sewerage --- to the ‘sky’ of the sophisticated stores in one of the most refined shopping centers of Rio de Janeiro, where it is possible to find the most expensive consumer goods. The data presented by the Report of Human Development of Rio de Janeiro --- elaborated by United Nations, in partnership with the Institute of Applied Economical Research (Ipea) and City Hall --- confirm that social polarization: Gávea has second highest IDH (Index of Human Development) of the city, 0.89 on a scale from 0 to 1, while Rocinha has the fourth worst at 0.59. Considering the question of education, half of the population of Gávea has graduated from university, while only 2% of their residents are illiterate. The opposite occurs in Rocinha: 20% of the citizens that live there neither know how to read nor to write, and only 2% had access to academic courses. While the resident of Gávea has, on average, 12 years of study, the resident of Rocinha has only four years. Still in the field of education: in Gávea, only 5% of the children from 7 to 14 years are out of the school; however, in Rocinha, 25% of the children don’t have access to schools.

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In terms of income, the disparity is accentuated as in the case of education: the per capita income of Gávea is 10 times bigger than Rocinha. In Gávea, only 1% of the residents earn less than half minimum wage a month. In Rocinha, that number reaches 41%. In Gávea, the monthly medium income is R$2,042, in Rocinha, just R$214. The children mortality tax in Rocinha is five times higher than in Gávea. The residents of that neighborhood, however, live, on average, 13 more years than those who live in Rocinha. When the discussion is about access to infrastructure for basic sanitation, 99% of the residents of Gávea have access to the official sewerage system, while in Rocinha, 60% of the population lack appropriate sanitary services. However, in the slums it is possible to find areas relatively well provided with infrastructure - water supply, sanitary services, paved roads, public illumination --- as in the case of the Bairro Barcelos (section located in the low part of the hill, close to the access of the Dois Irmãos Tunnel). But it is also possible to find places more recently occupied where the constructions are quite precarious, without any infrastructure and, almost always, located in risk areas. Despite all the problems, in the universe of slums of Rio de Janeiro, Rocinha can be considered a special place, a place ‘where things happen first,’ as a local community leader affirms, highlighting the innovative projects of income generation and social promotion that have begun there.

Fig. 7-1. Rocinha and São Conrado: Two separate worlds --- up to now

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The area occupied by Rocinha originally had rural characteristics. In the mid 1920s, the first registrations point to the existence of a great farm, which partially occupied the place. In that farm, a property of Companhia Castro Guidão, in the highest part of the area, still had a dense forest, remainder of the Atlantic forest. Between 1927 and 1930, the company lotted the farm and started the sale of lots of 270 m2 --- a consequence of the intensification of the process of occupation of the south area of Rio de Janeiro in that period. The first occupants of those lots, implanted along a tortuous beaten dirt road - the current Gávea Highway - were mostly Portuguese immigrants and workers at nearby factories. The bankruptcy of Companhia Castro Guidão, the heirs’ indifference to the destiny of the enterprise, the improvement of the access conditions to the area --- with the paving and illumination of the Gávea Highway --- and, particularly, the rumors that those would be government lands or lands ‘without owners,’ can be considered the decisive factors for the growth of the irregular occupation of Rocinha. The process of occupation of the old rural area began this way, from the foot of the hill, and would extend, over the years, in the direction of the lands at the top, according to unwritten norms, that established limits and procedures for the people that arrived. According to Drummond (1981), around 1940, most of the residents of Rocinha occupied, basically, three different areas: the area at the foot of the hillside, the land strip along the Gávea highway, and the lots located in the road that is to be considered the community’s first street: the Boiadeiro’s Road. Drummond (1981) highlights that during this period, the general conditions of the built environment were quite precarious, and the connection with the rest of the city was made, exclusively, through the Gávea highway --- the Dois Irmãos Tunnel would be built only years later, in the 1970s. From 1950, the slum grew and a transformation process can be observed in the huts of wood and the precarious shelters, located in the areas initially occupied, that began to give way to masonry constructions. During that same period, in other parts of the hillside, new and precarious constructions appeared with characteristics similar to those existent in Rocinha’s first phase of occupation, along the Gávea highway and the streets One, Two, Three and Four, that can be considered as growth vectors of the slum. The first census of Rocinha, accomplished in 1950, points the existence of 4,513 inhabitants in an area that, due to the dispersion of the houses and to the rarefied character of the occupation, presented characteristics that differ from those observed on other carioca slums, which had a higher density of constructions. At the end of the 1950s, in agreement with the report “Human Aspects of the Carioca Slum,” published in 1960 in the newspa-

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per O Estado de São Paulo, Rocinha presented the following characteristics: “Possesses about 30,000 inhabitants and the great majority of its population is constituted of industrial workers, workers of the building sector, employees of the City Hall and oddjobbers.Some constructions are well conserved buildings of two floors. The Church and the facilities of the Center Social Leão XIII are located in a wide block, at the Gávea Highway. The main buildings are located around that area. Rocinha has several biroscas, (small bars) a butcher shop, a bakery and sweet shop, two drugstores and a grocery store.” The report highlights that the water supply is quite precarious, being captured in several dispersed natural fountains, and also a public “waterspout in the top of the hill.” The number of community facilities existing in the slum seem to be enough: at that time, Rocinha had “a police station, a health center, a clinic, an school, a Catholic chapel, a Protestant temple, an Spiritualistic center and recreational clubs.” Fifteen years later, in 1974, a new census --- this time accomplished by the General Office of Public Security --- pointed the presence of 33,790 inhabitants, living in about 7,500 houses. In 1980, the data supplied by the Municipal General Office of Planning indicated that the number of residents in Rocinha had reached a total of 97,945, occupying 19,489 houses. Those numbers represented a growth percentage of, respectively, 190% and 160%, in relation to the data obtained in 1974, which translated into the dizzy process of expansion of the slum after the late 1970s. During that period, the road structure of Rocinha was already configured: few are the roads allow vehicle access, and most of the ones that allow vehicles are located in the Bairro Barcelos, where the streets, with a design regulated by a plan, are 4 m wide. In the community’s highest part, only the 2 Street has a regular width of 3 m, in an extension of 700 meters. Narrow (2m wide maximum), funneled, tortuous alleys compose the remaining road structure. Stairways of different types and executed in several materials - wood, cement, dug earth, cuts in the rock --- can also be found in several areas of the slum, all of them built by the residents with their own resources. Among the factors that significantly contributed to the accelerated expansion of the occupation of Rocinha was the appearance, in the late 1960s of a new border of urban expansion of the city of Rio de Janeiro along the seafront: Barra of Tijuca, whose occupation plan had been conceived by architect Lúcio Costa --- the same architect who created Brasília (Brazil’s capital). Placed halfway, between the south area of the city and Barra of Tijuca, Rocinha would become an alternative way of living for a poorer population that finds, in that new border of urban expansion, more work

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Fig. 7-2. Rocinha in the world (Source: Google Earth)

opportunities, mainly in the services and construction sectors. In 1980, Drummond (1981) tells that the whole space susceptible to occupation in the hillside had been occupied: in the low part, the houses reached a maximum density, while more precarious houses are located in outlying passages of the slum. “The slum,” affirms that author (1981), “is now saturated with inhabitants, limited by the inaccessible scarps of the hillside and by the freeway that links the new neighborhood of São Conrado to the city.” In the beginning of the 1980s, the process of occupying the hillside of Dois Irmãos and Laboriaux hills already reveals the existence of a clear differentiation, revealed by the internal spatial structure of the slum. The

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oldest residents are located in the community’s low part --- the great majority of them living in masonry constructions. These people have what can be considered a satisfactory infrastructure of urban services, with the benefit of proximity to the road that allows access to other neighborhoods of the city (Drummond (1981)). The area occupied above has worse access conditions and its residents live in precarious wood huts, without any infrastructure for basic sanitation. In this place lives the families that arrived recently in Rocinha, and occupied, as Drummond (1981) says, “the last available lands, in the extremity of the existent penetrations, to the foot of the abrupt rock, thirty minutes of walk from the low part of the slum.” The differentiated picture of internal organization of the community would be characterized for presenting several “nuances in the intermediary stages, between the low part and the high part,” that can be expressed by the quality of the constructive pattern of the houses and by the accessibility conditions and the available infrastructure. The opening of the Dois Irmãos Tunnel would also bring expressive implications to the internal differentiation of the community, once it provoked a new dynamics of the spatial structuring, with the displacement of the area once defined as the center of Rocinha --- due to the concentration of services and commercial activities --- initially located along the Gávea Highway, to the low part of the slum, close to new Lagoa-Barra highway. The 1990s saw increases in the expansion of Rocinha: in the community’s different ‘neighborhoods’ vertical growth of the existent houses occurred with the increment of new floors, while other areas, near the original slum, are occupied and form new sections, such as the Vila Cruzado and the Vila Verde. The expansion of Rocinha is closely associated with the internal migration processes in Brazil. It would not be an exaggeration to affirm that this slum is a piece of the northeast in the city of Rio de Janeiro. It was the conclusion obtained after research --- made by a local dweller’s association, the União Pró-Melhoramentos dos Moradores da Rocinha --- at the end of 1987 revealed, according to one of the directors of the entity, that Rocinha is the “capital of the northeast in Rio de Janeiro:” in agreement with the obtained data, in each group of 14 people, eight were from Ceará and three came from of Paraíba. The impressive growth of the population of Rocinha over the past twenty years, however, was not accompanied by actions of urbanization that could allow better living conditions for its residents. Valquiria Rosa, regional administrator of Rocinha from 2001 to 2003, reveals the main interventions accomplished by public authorities in the community during the 1990s. In agreement with the administrator, water supply and sanitary

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infrastructure promoted by the state government between 1992 and 1996 were significant for the improvement of living conditions, although they have not totally solved the relative problems. According to Valquíria Rosa, the repaving the Gávea highway (1995/1996), the main access for the community, and the execution of contention works in the hillside of Dois Irmãos Hill (1993/1994) were the main interventions promoted by the municipal government, besides the services of public area conservation and maintenance of community facilities such as day nurseries and schools. The technicians of the city General Office of Housing, responsible for implementing urbanization projects in slums in the city of Rio de Janeiro, are of the opinion that the solution to the community’s basic sanitation problems is linked to the execution of a macro-project, whose cost will be elevated due to the scale and the number of inhabitants to be assisted. Such a project will necessarily demand the removal and the subsequent building of new houses - preferentially in an area located in the same community, in agreement with the municipal legislation --- of a significant number of families, making still more complex the accomplishment of the necessary urban interventions. In 2004, the Government of the State of Rio de Janeiro promoted, with the cooperation of the Institute of Architects of Brazil, a National ‘Contest of Ideas for the Urbanization of Rocinha,’ and selected a team, coordinated by architect Luis Carlos Toledo, whose project has as its main proposals: -

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complete sanitation infrastructure (water, sewer and pluvial waters) and removal of solid residues; guarantee better accessibility improving the circulation for Gávea Highway, prolonging and enlarging whenever possible other streets in the community, creating parking areas and eliminating the physical barriers that today hinder the pedestrian circulation; establish limits to the horizontal and vertical growth of Rocinha through echo-limits and an appropriate town planning legislation considering local characteristics; adopt a Master Plan of Housing that enables reallocation within their own community for families who have to leave their houses because of urbanization projects or because they are located in risk areas; implant in Rocinha a factory of prefabricated elements of concrete for the production of walls and roofs for the new constructions, and also of drainage stairways and walls of hillside contention; value the culture and strengthen the identity of the people of Rocinha through creating a ‘cultural corridor’ to improve the memory of the neighborhood by maintaining constructions and spaces considered notable;

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implant a cultural infrastructure through the construction of cinemas and theater, cultural centers, small libraries and spaces for the development of the arts, music, dance, etc.; give special treatment to the areas of contact of Rocinha with the nearby neighborhoods of Gávea and, especially of São Conrado, where Rocinha certainly will occupy the role of main trade center and services for the neighborhood; locate in these transition areas between the formal and the informal city facilities of common interest that can attract the populations of Rocinha and nearby neighborhoods; implant in Rocinha a series of urban facilities: two day nurseries, a public market, a hospital unit and a technical school.

The project selected in the National Contest is already being developed, with the support of the federal government. In order to conclude in this characterization of the contemporary Rocinha it is necessary to highlight three relevant aspects of the community. The first is the vitality of commercial activity in the community. According to data from Sebrae and the Trade and Industrial Association of the Neighborhood of Rocinha, in the second part of 1998 there were about 3,000 entrepreneurs and merchants in the community, and 28% of the existent businessmen in Rocinha already had worked there for more than ten years. In agreement with the research accomplished by those entities, 48% of the merchants and small established entrepreneurs in Rocinha earned between R$1,000 (about US$450) and R$3,000 (about US$1,300) a month. Another peculiar characteristic of the commercial activity in a slum like Rocinha is revealed in that research: 97% of the establishments only accepted cash payment. The schedule of operation of those businesses translates another particularity: as many of the activities are undertaken by the residents themselves --- often in the ground floor of their own home --88% of the establishments are open everyday of the week and 37% are open 12 hours a day. Additional data obtained in this research call attention to the informal character of those businesses: only 37% of the companies are legalized, while 54% of the local entrepreneurs do not contribute to social welfare. Almost always in Rocinha, access to resources that could finance the implementation of business is restricted due to the informal character of the activities. Thus, to open a business, 60% of the entrepreneurs used their own savings, while 16% invested resources from FGTS (compensation paid to a dismissed worker). The second aspect to be considered is the appearance of drug trafficking as a relevant agent in the quotidian life of the community. Already in 1980, the report by the State Foundation of Engineering and Environment

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(FEEMA), Characterization of Rocinha, registered the presence of criminality in the community, pointing to the existence of some areas considered dangerous, which visitors should avoid due to the risk of assaults, usually committed by children (defined in the document as “smaller attackers”). That picture, in which the criminality didn’t possess bigger expression, would change in the end of the 1980s. In an interview published in the newspaper Jornal do Brasil on February 7, 1988, Sérgio Ferreira of Silva (‘Bolado’), one of the drug traffic leaders, describes how the expansion of the organized crime in Rocinha occurred: “Before 1980 there were a lot of gangs in Rocinha. A thief could arrive at someone’s house and took the radio, order the person to leave and sleep with their children and his wife. There was not any organization. Then Denis arrived. He fought to organize the traffic that barely started to exist at the slum. He had a higher mind and fought against the thieves who harassed the residents. Today even foreigners can walk on the slum, without problem, making photos, if they want. The residents are making money with that. If we wanted, we could take the cameras and the dollars, but we won’t do that.” In the interview, ‘Bolado’ affirms the relationship of the drug traffic with the residents of Rocinha: “We used the people of here for the traffic, but we also help them. We are all friends. They say that we are thieves, but it is not like this. If we wanted, we would not be here and others would come to harass the people, like in the past...For us, everybody is like an aunt, everybody is like a brother. We take care of people, who deserve respect. We take care as an aunt, a mother or a grandmother would do. In a fight of neighbors, someone will say that is my cousin, because it’ll finish the fight. It doesn't need police, or anything.” The actions of the organized drug traffic in Rocinha motivated, in June of 1988, a great police operation, gathering 200 men of the civil and military police, with the objective to “destroy an autonomous and paramilitary criminal group, that grow for years with the money of the drug traffic in the hills of the city.” That operation resulted in the death of three of the main leaders of the drug traffic in Rocinha and the elimination --- temporary --- of the existent marketing network of drugs. The expression that the drug traffic --- not just in Rocinha, but, also, in other slums in the city of Rio de Janeiro --- has called the attention of the press, which denounces the increase of the criminality with slums being controlled by gangs that keep a kind of ‘social peace.’ This ‘social peace’ comes from the distribution of part the profits obtained from the drug traffic among the residents

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of the slum: it’s not uncommon that drug dealers will pay day nurseries and hospitals for those in need and, in exchange, they will obtain safety and, sometimes, support from people. However, in the end of the 1990s, in agreement with police authorities, Rocinha became a ‘warehouse for the drugs in Rio’ and a ‘point of encounter of bosses of the so-called Red Command’ (a criminal organization that acts in several slums of Rio de Janeiro). In agreement with the Police Group of Repression to Narcotics, the drug traffic would promote the commercialization of, approximately, “R$10 million a week (about US$4.5 million)” and of “about 500 kg of cocaine a month.” Today in Rocinha, the authorities affirm, marijuana and cocaine is stored that will be distributed in the south zone of the city and in Barra of Tijuca (the neighborhoods of higher-income residents). The last aspect to be considered refers to the transformations that happened in the process of housing production in the slum. In the beginning of 1960s, although a diversity of housing typologies could be observed in Rocinha --- showing, in a certain way, spatial differentiation of social classes --- still wood huts prevailed, covered with ceramic or zinc tiles. Few houses had bathroom with appropriate hydro-sanitary facilities. In the end of the 1990s, however, the wood huts practically disappeared in Rocinha, as revealed in the report published by Jornal do Brasil on November 22, 1998: “the wood gave place to the brick, stimulating a trade that, only in Rocinha, moves more than 30 stores of construction materials.” During that decade, the expansion of the slum is registered in research by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) in 1991 that shows the existence of 11,900 houses in Rocinha, 9,445 of them being “houses in subnormal conditions,” while 1,734 are “apartments in subnormal conditions” and 721 families lived in even more precarious conditions. Besides the diversity of housing types, the IBGE information confirms the observations made years before by Rio de Janeiro’s municipal technicians, revealing the expression of the market of lease of properties in Rocinha: it was significant the number of rented properties (2,916), when compared with the total of immobile owned by its resident (8,839). The transformations in the housing morphology in the slum continues and, in the period cited above, buildings of six floors or even more, with structures of concrete and walls of ceramic bricks are common in Rocinha, although precarious wood huts in inappropriate places can still be found. Between those two extremes, there is a diversity of housing typologies one, two, three floors --- that have in common the use of ceramic brick walls and concrete as a structural element that enable future enlargements. The residents’ statements collected in our research describe that process of housing mutation over the past 50 years. In agreement with those state-

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ments, the wood hut was the initial home of most of the interviewees. To make this hut a masonry construction was the main objective, achieved through several strategies: an additional day of work to obtain the necessary resources for the remuneration of skilled construction workers, or self-construction with friends’ eventual support or help from relatives. The process of transforming a wood hut into a masonry construction takes years, which makes Rocinha a permanent construction site. It is a construction site that absorbs autonomous professionals --- bricklayers, carpenters, electricians, etc. --- and even small entrepreneurs who work only in the community. As the construction extends for years --- observed in the great majority of the research cases --- the house where people live and the construction site are the same thing, with serious implications for the residents’ quality of life and comfort. Most of the statements makes reference to the need of creating minimum conditions of habitability to allow people to enter into the house so they won’t have to pay rent anymore --- which will save money for the conclusion of the construction. A previously elaborated project for the house almost always doesn’t exist --- a sketch of what people intend to do in the terrain will be accomplished, considering the existent resources and needs. In the great majority of the research cases, the size of the rooms of the house are not the same as those defined by the current law in the official city. Rare were the interviewees that had access to some technical consulting --- and this consulting was always informal, as reveals one declaration: “the engineer at the place where I work gave me some clues.” However, concern with the ‘safety of the structure’ is an important matter in the residents’ statements: without exception, all the people consider that everything spent in the execution of foundations, pillars and beams will be rewarded in the future with the possibility of building more floors. This is the reason why, almost always, the resident decides to hire an experienced professional to accomplish that fundamental stage of the construction. External covers are uncommon: in the list of the stages of construction, this, almost always, is in last place. Although comprehensible in several aspects, it has a serious implications for the durability of the exposed masonry and, also, in the salubrity of the compartments of the construction, due to the humidity. Increments are made in the houses over time, in agreement with needs and the residents’ possibilities --- what originates as architectural solutions enter into conflict not only with the ‘rationality’ of the existent constructions in the official city, but, also, with the norms that regulate them. The change of use of a construction can happen at any moment, without having to follow the legal formalities demanded in the official city: what today is a living room of a residence, tomorrow can become a small store, for in-

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stance --- if that is considered necessary by the family who lives in the house. It is the ‘freedom of building’ proposed by Turner (1972) --- and, also, the ‘town planning freedom’ as described by Abramo (2000). Although the existence of a diversity of housing typologies is observed in Rocinha, the characteristics of the division of the land in lots and of the topography of the site --- and, also, the pattern of implantation of constructions in the lots --- generate surprising situations. Due to the reduced size of the lots, the buildings occupy practically the totality of the available area, bringing problems of ventilation and illumination once the distances among the constructions have minimum dimensions. The ‘organic solution’ adopted in building houses that accommodate the curves of the hillside levels creates tortuous and uneven alleys. These alleys, besides connecting the main roads penetrating the community (streets 1, 2, 3 and 4), allow access to houses built at different levels in a pattern of high density. Besides the reduced area of the lots, the altered topography of the site where Rocinha is located would demand cuts and onerous systems level the land. Thus, vertical growth, with several floors, is almost the only alternative for the expansion of the constructions. Almost always, the added floor will shelter another family. With demands and possibilities of income differentiated, the final product is a construction that resembles to a mosaic, with a diversity of spaces, coverings and windows. Crowning that construction, the covering slab accomplishes a relevant paper in the quotidian of the residents’ lives: besides representing a possibility of enlargement of the house, it is also the place of children’s and adults’ recreation. It is also the place where people wash and dry the family’s clothes. It is in the slab where the construction material bought is stocked for the works that will be accomplished in the future. In the community, the importance --- even symbolic --- of the covering slab can be observed in this episode: when one of the local community newspapers decided to hold a contest to choose the most beautiful lady, was not the Miss. Rocinha that they were seeking, but the ‘queen of the slab.’ However, the enlargements don’t only happen in the direction of the sky: frequently, the superior floors of the buildings are projected over roads and alleys, creating a type of tunnel that generates, again, problems of ventilation and illumination. Associated with the transformations in the process of housing production, the appearance of an expressive informal real estate market must be highlighted: in 2002, four administrators of properties acted in Rocinha --lease services, purchase and sales of real estate. One of them, Passárgada, administers the properties of 280 customers that owned about 400 rented houses. When the conditions of real estate transactions in the slum are analyzed, the most significant difference from what happens in the official

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city is connected to the land property: almost all of the properties marketed in Passárgada are not legalized. When analyzing the characteristics of that informal real estate market, Abramo (2000) affirms that it constitutes, now, one of the main access mechanisms to the slum. There is empiric evidence that the prices reached by those properties are high, even when compared to the prices of properties in the official city. The proximity of the workplace and the neighborhood relationships inside the slum would be other justifications: when acquiring a property in the slum, reveals Abramo (2000), the family has the “possibility to redefine the composition of their expenses and to guarantee a strategy of residential stability related to the proximity of the work (permanent or sporadic).” The expansion of the informal real estate market can also be attributed to the residential displacements from one sector of the slum to another, motivated by several reasons: the improvement of income, the search of a house with best construction characteristics and better location, or the increase of the rent of the property (Baltrusis (2003)). Discussing the similarities between the commerce of real estate in the official city and the commerce of properties at the slums, Abramo (2000) reveals that the transformations that happened inside the slums, due to investments accomplished in urbanization --- promoted by the residents themselves or the public authorities --- and the improvement of the characteristics of the buildings, resulted in ‘a space valorization,’ promoting an internal dispute for the acquisition of a property in those ‘valuable’ communities. For this author, this dispute would create a real estate market competition, similar to what happens in the formal property market, so, it can be said that the slum is no longer a housing solution for the poorest population, who lack the necessary resources to enter even in that informal housing market.

7.4 Challenges for Sustainable Development in the Slum: Rocinha as an Example In this work, we tried to analyze different aspects of the process of production of houses in the slum of Rocinha over the past 50 years. Through this analysis, it was possible to verify the occurrence of deep transformations in the social-spatial structure of the slum. Over these 50 years, the precarious huts of wood --- they still exist, however in considerably reduced numbers --- gave way to masonry buildings, with five, six and up to seven floors. If, in the past, it was possible, through contacts with relatives and friends, to demarcate one lot and to build a hut, now, to live in Rocinha, it is necessary to pay --- to rent or to

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Fig. 7-3. Views of Rocinha

buy --- even in the places of more difficult access and without infrastructure. As in the 1950s and 1960s, people still build with the support of friends and relatives; however, increasingly self-help construction practices are combined with paid labor. The residential use --- almost predominant in the past --- is shared now by a diversified commercial activity, and also by services until then unimaginable in a slum. Those who lived in Rocinha in the 1960s --- when, here and there, a birosca or a small grocery store attended the most immediate needs of the daily life of their residents --- and, for some reason, had to return to Ceará, returning 40 years later, certainly would be surprised by the vitality and diversity of the local commerce, that, as affirms a resident, “has everything that someone needs.”

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In the past, the water was obtained in sources in the hillside of the hill, and now is distributed by a public net, although, in some places of Rocinha, provisioning is precarious and accomplished by sangrias (irregular connections) done by the residents or, transported in plastic containers. The “Commission of Light” exists only in the oldest residents’ reports: 20 years ago it started the implantation of regular electricity distribution in the community --- it doesn’t mean that clandestine connections don’t exist (“gatos”), particularly in the areas more recently occupied. The sanitation conditions are still precarious, and were even worsened not only due to the extraordinary population growth over the past two decades, but also due to the inexistence of appropriate nets of collection in the whole community. The alleys continue to be narrow and sinuous; however, most of them are paved, almost always, thanks to the residents’ organized action. The conditions of transportation improved: besides the vans and of the motorcycletaxis, regular bus lines connect Rocinha to other neighborhoods in the south area and downtown. However, not all of the transformations that happened in Rocinha can be considered positive for the people who live there. Starting from the mid 1980s, the presence of the drug traffic in the slum gained a growing expression, with actions that interfere significantly in the daily lives of the local population. Some factors contributed to turn Rocinha into the “main warehouse of drugs of the city of Rio de Janeiro,” in agreement with Coordination of Intelligence of the Civil Police. The community’s proximity with the neighborhoods of the south area of the city and Barra of Tijuca --areas that concentrate higher income segments with bigger potential for drug consumption --- could be one factor. Another factor could be the entangled and steep alleys that compose the local road system hinder not only the action of policemen, but, also, ‘invasions’ attempts by rival groups searching to control the points of drug commercialization. Finally, there is the drug dealers’ organized action, which controls the slum through violence or social assistance --- or both. The relationship of Rocinha’s residents with the public authority also has changed a lot over the last twenty years --- and, fortunately, for better. The punctual interventions that had electoral interests --- the so called ‘politics of the waterspout of water’ --- have given way since 1980s to regular actions seeking to enlarge the local public services. However, the special characteristics of the site, the enormous population and the complexity of the problems that must be solved, particularly the sanitary refuse, make the urbanization of Rocinha --- the residents’ main demand --a complex project of high cost, as is recognized by community leadership and public authority representatives. Nevertheless, although insufficient for the local needs, the community facilities established by the public au-

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thorities (schools, community day nurseries, health units) represent, beside other interventions, the recognition by the state that the slum is also a part of the official city --- what was formally expressed by the creation, in the mid 1980s, of the XXVII Administrative Area. The role of the residents’ associative movement should be recognized in this picture of Rocinha’s transformations, as it is responsible for several achievements in order to improve the quality of life in the slum. In the same way, in the 1990s the appearance of non-governmental organizations should be highlighted, due to its relevance in developing several programs for social improvement in the community, with an impact that increasingly can be observed in the daily lives of the slum residents. As well is also the case with other slums in Rio de Janeiro, Rocinha came to stay. It cannot be considered - as it was imagined until the 1960s -- as something transitory, an initial stage in the migrants’ arrival process to the ‘big city.’ According to this perspective, the ephemeral slum would disappear as soon as the economic conditions allowed the incorporation of their residents into urban life. A result of historical fights for social justice, the recognition of the irreversible character of the presence of the slum in the urban scenery, as well as the political determination of promoting the integration of the informal housing into the official city, however, imposes a new challenge to society in the beginning of the 21st century. Regulating the use and occupation of land in the city of Rio de Janeiro is one of the roles of the municipal public authority. As the slums are now recognized as part of the official city, with the implementation of actions that seek to establish the services and existent infrastructure in other neighborhoods, it can be said that the regulation of the norms that guide the production of the built environment should be extended, also, to informal housing. And this is the challenge: is it possible to regulate a process of production of the habitat that sometimes resembles what happens in the official city, but, has, however, different characteristics? The production of houses in the slums presents as a particular characteristic the inexistence of rules as in the official city. Rules exist; however, they are few and are flexible enough to correspond to the needs/possibilities of the dwellers. These rules are not written and are --basically --- agreements with neighbors, with the objective of establishing what one can or cannot do. These agreements try to solve varied subjects. We mention the most frequent: how to solve the destination of the sewer of the house, without harming the houses that are located nearby; how access to neighboring houses is harmed by a new construction; and, lastly, how to avoid that a neighbor’s window will be blocked by a wall that will be raised. Nor are the negotiations always simple. Conflicts exist and they are moderated by the residents associations and, in Rocinha, starting from the

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mid 1980s, by the regional administration. The same regional administration that, from the late 1990s, has tried to establish norms to order the process of housing production in the slum --- and to establish a minimum control of the use and occupation of land. The responsible technicians for the implementation of the special laws cited above have doubts about the effectiveness of the attempt of control of expansion of the slum --- and they are not alone. The understanding and effective actions of fiscalization are key elements in defense of this ordination politics. It is known that the proposed legislation recognizes the particularities of the morphology of the slum and tries to be simple enough so that its understanding does not involve the same difficulties that people have when consulting the code of urban laws of the official city. Therefore, there seems to be a consensus that it is indispensable to assure, through the implementation of those minimum norms of urban order, reasonable conditions of habitability and satisfactory operation of the systems of existent infrastructure --- and of those that will be installed in the future - besides the safety and the stability of new buildings. However, the results reached in this attempt of promoting the control of new constructions in Rocinha are still unsatisfactory, as Andrade (2002) observes. The question remains the same: is it possible to order the process of use and occupation of land in a slum such as Rocinha? Is it possible to regulate the dynamics of housing production that has the ‘freedom of building’ as an essential characteristic? However, given the lack of minimum order to the occupation and land use in the slums, how is it possible to assure that habitability conditions will not become more precarious with the perspective of population growth of those communities --- in the 1990s, the increase of the slum population in the city of Rio de Janeiro was due mainly to the expansion of the existent ones, more than the appearance of new communities. The research that we accomplished in Rocinha reveals the relevance of ‘town planning freedom’ (Abramo (2000)) to the process of housing production. This ‘town planning freedom’ not only allows slabs to be sold, but also enlargements of the home when the needs demand and resources allow. In the same way, the uses of the space --- home, trade, services, small industries --- are defined and modeled starting from the opportunities and their users’ possibilities. It is a picture of production of the habitat, in which, until the present moment, the state does not function in the role of regulator agent of land use and occupation --- for the best and for the worst than that it can be. Regulation, as was already shown in our work, is accomplished by the residents themselves, with successes and mistakes and with all of the possible limitations --- for the good and for the bad --- in respect to habitability conditions. But, it was this ‘town planning liberty’ ---

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where everything, or almost everything, is possible --- that enabled the permanence of the people that live in Rocinha in the city of Rio de Janeiro. Doubts arise also about the subject of the legalization of land property. It is a consensual theme among urban studies specialists: to the population that lives at slums, the legalization of land property would be an instruments to access citizenship. And, no one can deny that the extension of the rights enjoyed by citizens who live in the official city --- for example, access to basic sanitation infrastructure and the legalization of real estate --to people who live in the informal urban places is a historical claim of the organized movements of slum dwellers. In the recent past, this claim was translated into the expression ‘transform the slums into popular neighborhoods.’ However, recent research that in slums, on which urbanization projects were accomplished by the Rio de Janeiro municipal government (Programa Favela/Bairro), reveal that the legalization of land property is far from being considered a priority for dwellers (Cavallieri (2003)). In the current picture of the relationship between the state and slums, there are practically no removal threats as happened in 1960s and 1970s. Besides this, mechanisms were created parallel to the existent ones in the official city, enabling purchase relationships, sale and lease of properties in the slum. In Rocinha, real estate transactions are accomplished and ‘registered’ in the residents associations and by administrators of properties that work in the slum. As we already discussed, the existence of the slums in the urban landscape is no longer denied, as it was in the early 1960s. It is true that its expansion is a source of criticism and concerns. From a conservative perspective, the slum have full responsibility for the environmental degradation observed in certain areas of the municipal district of Rio de Janeiro due to the destruction of forests. From a progressive view, the slum population growth is associated with the inexistence of appropriate public politics of social dwelling. However, the slums will remain in the city of Rio de Janeiro --- and its dwellers seem to know that: only the people threatened with eviction from their houses due to concrete legal actions by the land owners prioritize the legalization of housing property. In slums with consolidated occupation, as in the case of Rocinha, this demand is minimized by the urgency of other problems, such as the construction of basic sanitation networks, community facility implementation, the improvement of the mobility inside the slum, and increased safety for the residents. Some residents’ statements reveal concerns about increasing housing costs, if, some day, the land property were to be regularized: they fear that the legalization of properties implies public authority control over new constructions in the community, besides additional expenses of the

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Urban Territorial Tax (IPTU), even if this tax has a differentiated value compared to the values paid in the rest of the city. It is not our objective, in this work, to approach the specific subject of the legalization of properties in the slum, but to recognize its implication in the process of housing production in those communities. In the final consideration of our work, we intended to focus on the perspectives of solving the problems associated with this expansion --- this concern is in addition to the challenge that we mentioned previously, which directly results in the significant transformations in the social-spatial structure of slums in the city of Rio de Janeiro, particularly over the past three decades. In that sense, it seems relevant to rethink the possible norms of ordering the built environment of the slum, in way to avoid the creation of ‘straitjackets’ that disable practices that assure, in the construction of housing, not just shelter (the house), but, also, work (the birosca), the future projects (the room for the son that married) and, even retirement (income from the rented house) --- usual practices that give answers to the demands and needs of the population that lives at the slum. Recognizing the peculiarity of the spatial structuring of the slum, with its own practices and dynamics, seems to be the first step to avoid control mechanisms of land use and occupation originating from the logic that structures the official city --- as was proposed in the 1980s in pioneering way among us by the architect Carlos Nelson Ferreira dos Santos. It is necessary to define a group of basic constructive norms, which should have as the main objective the warranty of minimum conditions of habitability for the dwellers of slums. These norms - which must be thoroughly discussed and the result of an agreement with the different representative groups of slum dwellers --- can be the next step. Some actions by public authority can enlarge and optimize the practices of the different social agents that participate in the process of housing production in the slum. It is necessary to promote technical consultation programs for people who build, with the active participation of the public university. Another necessary action would be the creation of permanent lines of financing, with low interest rates, in order to enable the acquisition of construction materials to guarantee the improvement of habitat conditions for existent homes and enlargements of others, always according to the new rules that will order the expansion of the slum. A third action would be the establishment of partnerships with non-governmental organizations that already act in the slums, so these organizations could cooperate in the diffusion and fiscalization of regulations and norms that will order the land use and occupation. It should be remembered that these organizations have an expressive role in the slum dwellers’ daily lives and their actions will

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surely contribute to solving the operational difficulties faced by the municipal public authorities. We believe, therefore, that the implementation of actions such as those cited above can contribute to promote a new form of ordering the expansion of slums in the beginning of the 21st century --- now in a coherent way with its particular dynamics of the production of the habitat. These actions can contribute, also, to the assurance of better habitability conditions for the people who live in slums. The research accomplished over the past ten years seems to indicate that the exception is more and more the rule: the expression of the informal city can no longer be ignored. Recognizing the particularities of the dynamics that structure the informal city is indispensable to assure the success of public politics that will guarantee better conditions of life for all the citizens of a society that we want with social justice and democracy.

References Abramo, P. (1997) Mercado Imobiliário na Favela: Características e Impactos do Programa Favela-Bairro (Convênio FINEP / PCRJ / IPPUR-UFRJ. Relatório parcial) Abramo, P. (2003) A Teoria Econômica da Favela in A Cidade da Informalidade: O desafio das cidades latino-americanas. Sette Letras Abreu, M. (1987) Evolução Urbana do Rio de Janeiro. Zahar Abreu, M. and Vaz, L.F. (1998) Sobre as origens da favela (Trabalho apresentado no IV Encontro Nacional da ANPUR, Cópia xerográfica) Andrade, L.S. (2002) Espaço Público e Favelas: Uma análise da dimensão pública dos espaços coletivos não edificados na Rocinha (Tese de Doutorado. Programa de Pós-Graduação em Geografia, UFRJ) Baltrusis, N. (2003) “O Mercado Imobiliário Informal nas favelas de Paraisópolis” in Fernandes, E. and Afsonsin, B. A Lei e a Ilegalidade na Produção do Espaço Urbano. Livraria Del Rey Editora Limitada Cavallieri, F. (1986) Favelas Cariocas: Mudanças na Infra-Estrutura, in 4 Estudos. IPLANRIO Cavallieri, F. (2003) “Favela-Bairro: Integração de Áreas Informais no Rio de Janeiro in A Cidade da Informalidade in Abramo, P. O desafio das cidades latino-americanas. Editora Sette Letras Drummond, D. (1981) Architectes des favelas. Bordas FEEMA - Fundação Estadual de Engenharia do Meio-Ambiente (1980) Relatório de atividades do Projeto de Ecodesenvolvimento (Convênio FINEP / FEEMA, vol. 4, Favela da Rocinha, Série Relatórios Técnicos. agosto/1979 a março/1980)

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Fernandes, E. (2003) “Perspectivas para a renovação das políticas de legalização de favelas no Brasil” in Abramo, P. A Cidade da Informalidade: O desafio das cidades latino-americanas. Sette Letras Hardoy, J. and Satter, D. (1987) La Ciudad Legal e la Ciudad Illegal. Grupo Editor Latinoamericano Melo, M.A.B. (1990) “Estruturação intra-urbana, regimes de acumulação e sistemas financeiros de habitação: Brasil em perspectiva comparada”, Espaço e Debates, 31 Melo, M.A.B (1992) “Acesso à habitação e políticas públicas no Brasil” (Anais do Seminário sobre a questão habitacional no Brasil, promovido pela Universidade Santa Úrsula) Pereira, T.S. (2000) Imaginário Espacial e Discurso: O caso das favelas cariocas e o noticiário dos jornais (Dissertação de Mestrado. Programa de PósGraduação em Geografia da Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro) Santos, C.N.F. (1986) Está na hora de ver as cidades como elas são de verdade. (Cópia Xerox) Santos, C.N.F. (1984) Espaço e Poder: contra as tendências mais fáceis. (Cópia Xerox) Santos, C.N.F. (1981) Movimentos urbanos no Rio de Janeiro. Zahar Santos, C.N.F. (1989) “Assentamentos Urbanos Marginais e Habitação: ações para superar a pobreza”, Revista de Administração Municipal, 190 SMD (1979) Secretaria Municipal de Desenvolvimento Social. Levantamento das favelas do município do Rio de Janeiro. Prefeitura da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro Soto, H. (1986) Economia subterrânea: uma análise da realidade peruana. Editora Globo Souza, A.G. (2000) Limites do Habitar: Segregação e exclusão na configuração urbana contemporânea de Salvador e perspectivas no final do século XX. Editora da Universidade Federal da Bahia Smolka, M. (2003) “Regularização da Ocupação do Solo Urbano: A solução que é parte do problema, o problema que é parte da solução”, in Abramo, P. A Cidade da Informalidade: O desafio das cidades latino-americanas. Livraria Sette Letras Taschner, S.P. (1986) “Favelas: fatos e políticas”, Espaço e Debates, 23 Taschner, S.P. (1997) “Favelas e Cortiços no Brasil: 20 anos de Pesquisas e Políticas” in Cadernos de Pesquisa do LAP - 18 Revista de Estudos sobre Urbanismo, Arquitetura e Preservação, Março/Abril de 1997 Taschner, S.P. (1998) “Tendências Recentes na Política de Desfavelamento Brasileira” (Artigo apresentado no ISA, em Montreal, julho de 1998) Taschner, S.P. (2003) O Brasil e suas Favelas In A Cidade da Informalidade in Abramo, P. O desafio das cidades latino-americanas. Sette Letras Turner, J. (1972) Freedom to build. Collier Macmillan

8. The Incremental Improvement of the Area Densely Built-up with Old Wooden Houses in Tokyo

Hitoshi Nakamura

8.1 Introduction

8.1.1 Purpose The purpose of this chapter is to show the effectiveness and limitation of the community-based approach to the incremental improvement of vulnerable urban space in Tokyo, namely densely built-up wooden housing areas, focusing on two typical cases: Taishido district and Kyojima district. 8.1.2 Areas Densely Built-up with Old Wooden Houses Tokyo started to expand its urbanized areas in the 1920s, led by suburban rapid railway developments. The population of Tokyo region grew from 7.5 million in 1920 to 32 million in 2005. Tokyo has been the largest urban agglomeration in the world. The areas urbanized in the 1920s and 1930s were developed under a very weak planning system established by the 1919 city planning law, without any effective subdivision control. Some areas in suburban Tokyo were developed with well-planned subdivision plans under the landreadjustment system. But the major portion of the areas urbanized in the 1920s and 1930s, that is the inner city area in Tokyo today, was urbanized by accumulation of small developments of individual plot with no official subdivision plan. They were not illegal developments, not slums, but the typical ‘informal’ settlements in Japan.

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Fig. 8-1. Areas densely built-up with old wooden houses in Tokyo (Source: Tokyo Metropolitan Government (1997))

Today an enormous inner city area of Tokyo, about 24,000 ha, is densely built-up with old wooden houses, as shown in Fig. 8-1. There are extremely narrow streets with very weak road networks, as well as insufficient public open spaces and high population density. And there are many old wooden houses which were built before or rebuilt after World War II along the existing pattern. 8.1.3 Problems In the area densely built-up with old wooden houses in Tokyo, about 4.5 million inhabitants now are vulnerable to building collapse and fire spread in the event of a large earthquake, while many inhabitants face multiple economic and social problems. From the viewpoint of vulnerability to earthquake in these areas of Tokyo, three correlated vulnerabilities are officially pointed out by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG), (1) vulnerability to building collapse, (2) vulnerability to fire spread, (3) vulnerability to evacuation from fire spread. Integrating these three vulnerabilities, the TMG showed officially the rank of comprehensive vulnerability to earthquake in Tokyo. The most vulnerable areas are identical with the densely built-up wooden housing areas.

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In order to reduce earthquake vulnerability, there are multiple economic and social problems to be solved in the areas. For example, lack of public space, tiny plots, relatively high population density and high land prices make it difficult to promote public intervention. Long-established and tight-knit communities resist plans to uproot and rebuild their neighborhoods (Sorensen (2002)). There are many elderly people who are reluctant to rebuild the old wooden houses. And complicated land and housing ownership patterns discourage consensus building between tenants and owners.

8.2 The Incremental Improvement Approach Tokyo has developed two levels of improvement approaches to the densely built-up wooden housing areas: large-scale, top-down approach from the 1960s, and small-scale community-based approach from the 1980s (Flüchter (2003)). As for the community-based approach, the so-called ‘slum clearance’ or ‘scrap and build redevelopment’ method is obviously impossible and undesirable to be applied to those large areas. One of the solutions that seem to be effective is a community-based incremental improvement approach. This community-based incremental improvement approach has been usually referred to as one of the major activities of machizukuri in Japan. This term has been used to describe an extremely wide variety of activities during the last 20 years or so. Machizukuri is generally translated as ‘community building’ or ‘town-making,’ but can also be rendered as ‘community development’ with all the more political and social implications of that phrase (Sorensen (2002)). The community-based incremental improvement approach has normally been promoted by the Urban Improvement Program which has evolved since the 1980s with fiscal support by national and local governments. Once the program is officially approved by the governments, a local community association, Machizukuri Council which consists of local people, is established in order to make a machizukuri (community improvement) plan. Under the machizukuri plan, local government controls developments in the area through development review procedure and supports cooperative or individual rebuilding of housing, and improves public spaces including widening of narrow roads and creating pocket parks. The progress of the program deeply depends on the occurrence of rebuilding. The aim of the program is as follows: (1) to enhance durability of housing to earthquake and fire spread by promoting rebuilding from old houses, (2) to provide affordable rental housing by promoting rebuilding from ob-

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solete wooden rental apartments, (3) to provide wider and well connected roads that not only reduce the vulnerability to fire spread and evacuation but also enhance the amenity and livability of the district and promote investment for rebuilding in the district.

8.3 Taishido District Taishido district (Taishido 2 and 3 chome) is one of the most advanced cases of incremental improvement based on community participation. Taishido is one of the disaster prevention high-priority districts designated by the TMG, as shown in Fig. 8-2.

8.3.1 Taishido District Taishido district is located in the eastern part of Setagaya Ward, which lies at the southeastern part of Tokyo. Its area is 35.6 ha and the population is about 6,500 as of 2005. The name of the district comes from the name of a temple established in the beginning of the Edo period (around the 17th century). After the great Kanto earthquake disaster in 1923, farmlands within the district were rapidly urbanized as a detached house residential area. After World War II, a lot of wooden rental apartments were built on

Fig. 8-2. Disaster prevention priority districts in Tokyo (Source: Tokyo Metropolitan Government (2004))

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the sites of detached houses along the existing extremely narrow roads (Fig. 8-3 and 8-4). And very small detached houses had been increasing at the same time. This rapid urbanization made Taishido district to be referred to as one of the typical old wooden housing areas in Tokyo.

Fig. 8-3. Taishido district in 2001

Fig. 8-4. Extremely narrow streets in Taishido

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8.3.2 Machizukuri Council In 1979 a vulnerability survey was carried out by the Setagaya Ward local government (Setagaya LG) and Taishido district was officially designated as a ‘disaster prevention priority district’ in Setagaya Ward. The next year, machizukuri in Taishido started initiated by the Setagaya LG, which insisted on the community-based incremental improvement approach shown in Fig. 8-5. At first the preliminary Machizukuri Council was organized in order to discuss how to organize a formal Machizukuri Council to make a machizukuri plan by the community itself. After two years of discussion, Taishido District Machizukuri Council (TDMC) was officially organized in 1982. The TDMC was organized on the basis of a policy of being open to everybody wishing to join. The initial members of the TDMC consisted of local residents selected from applicants. Anyone living in the district can take part in the activities of the TMDC, and even people living outside the district can attend the meeting as an observer. The TMDC has been held once a month until today.

Fig. 8-5. Concept of the incremental improvement approach (Source: Taishido 2-3 Chome District Machizukuri Twenty-Year Activity Editing Committee (2000))

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8.3.3 Roadside Meeting In 1983 the TDMC set up three working teams in order to make a machizukuri plan. After frequent meetings, the TDMC submitted machizukuri proposals (10 proposals) to the Setagaya LG in 1985. And the Setagaya LG made a draft of the Taishido district machizukuri plan based on the TDMC’s 10 proposals and proposed the draft plan to the TDMC in the same year. However, the plan made by the Setagaya LG included the plan of widening three existing roads to 6 m as main access roads, which had not been included in the TDMC’s 10 proposals. This main access roads plan caused many objections among TDMC’s members, the TDMC decided to set up a ‘roadside meeting’ consisting mainly of people living along the planned roads. In the roadside meeting, a majority of participants rejected widening roads for the reason that a road of 6 m width increased automobile traffic passing through the district and moreover it induced illegal parking. After a two-year discussion with the Setagaya LG, the local people agreed to the plan on the condition that a setback of 3 m on both sides from the middle line of the road was introduced without widening the road itself to 6 m (Fig. 8-6 and 8-7a).

Fig. 8-6. Taishido district machizukuri plan and district plan (Source: Setagaya Ward (2005))

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a

b

Fig. 8-7a, b. Creation of pocket parks in Taishido. a Setback for main access road with the creation of a pocket park. b Tombo (Dragonfly) Park

8.3.4 Park-shop In Taishido district there are many pocket parks which have been created through community participation. The first trial pocket park was Tombo park (Fig. 8-7b). The initial draft plan of this pocket park was made by the Setagaya LG using a purchased lot for the improvement program. It caused many objections among the TDMC members and people living near to the planned site. After many meetings for revising the draft plan, three principles were agreed among the local people and the Setagaya LG, namely hand-made, remaining soil, and self-management. After Tombo park was completed in 1984, 18 pocket parks have been created through the same kind of community participation until today (Fig. 8-8). This way of planning and creating pocket parks based on community workshops has been named ‘park-shop’ by the TDMC. 8.3.5 Karasuyama River Greenway Karasuyama river greenway, renovated in 1990, is a significant achievement, too (Fig. 8-6 and 8-8). The Karasuyama river used to cross the district. During the 1979s, the river was changed to an underdrain covered by a pedestrian way. The TDMC proposed the renovation of the greenway with rebirth of the stream according to 10 proposals in 1985. But people living along the greenway opposed the proposal mainly because they worried about problems of privacy, morals of users, land ownership, road connection, and overflow of steam which evokes the memory of past overflow. After two years of discussions and activities such as visits to advanced cases, inspections of the site and a symposium for

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Fig. 8-8. Achivements of Taishido district machizukuri in 2005 (Source: Taishido 2-3 Chome District Machizukuri Council (2005))

a Fig. 8-9a, b. Renovation of Karasuyama river greenway

b

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children, a consensus was built among the local people and the TDMC. Reflecting this consensus-building process, the TDMC submitted the proposal of the Karasuyama river greenway to the Setagaya LG in 1987. The Setagaya LG accepted this proposal and implemented it, as shown in Fig. 8-9. 8.3.6 Hardware and Software Activities Other activities have been promoted in Taishido, such as purchasing lots for road connections, subsidizing fireproofing of buildings, subsidizing cooperative rebuilding, and installing water tanks in parks. And taking into consideration problems such as increasing small apartments for a single households and advertisement towers on buildings roofs, the TDMC submitted a proposal for designating an official district plan to the local government. It was designated in 1990 (Fig. 8-6). In the district plan, some regulations stricter than the national building standards law were implemented, such as land use restriction for small apartments, minimum lot area, maximum building height, setback for main access roads, advertisement tower restriction and maximum fence height. Not only hardware activities as described above, but also software activities have been promoted in closely relation to hardware activities in the Taishido machizukuri. The software activities include self-management of pocket parks by the community and several social events such as the Taishido Kitsune (Fox) festival.

8.4 Kyojima District Kyojima district (Kyojima 2 and 3 chome) is one of the most typical areas densely built-up with old wooden houses in Tokyo, and an advanced case of the community-based incremental improvement approach. Kyojima is one of the disaster prevention high-priority districts designated by the TMG as shown in Fig. 8-2. 8.4.1 Kyojima District Kyojima district is located in Sumida Ward, which lies at the eastern part of Tokyo in the so-called shitamachi (downtown) area. Its area is 25.5 ha and the population is about 6,500 as of 2005. Its urbanization started from the Meiji period (around 1890), establishing some factories in the

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Fig. 8-10. Kyojima district in 2001

 Fig. 8-11. Prewar wooden row houses in Kyojima

a

b

Fig. 8-12a, b. Streets in Kyojma a Extremely narrow street. b Neighborhood commercial street

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farmlands. After the great Kanto earthquake in 1923, it rapidly urbanized with wooden row houses built without infrastructure such as road networks (Fig. 8-10, 8-11 and 8-12). In the beginning of the Showa period (around 1930), the city planning road (Meiji street) was constructed passing through the northern part of the district and neighborhood commercial streets within the district were developed followed by increasing factories and row houses. During the World War II, Kyojima district was not bombed, miraculously. After the war, many people moved to live in the district and the population increased rapidly. The population density exceeded 500 inhabitants per ha in the 1960s, and over 800 inhabitants per ha in some blocks. The ownership of prewar row houses had been divided into each unit and partial rebuilding on each unit had been increasing. Until today, Kyojima district has been referred to as the most typical area densely built-up with old wooden houses. 8.4.2 Machizukuri Plan During the 1970s, the TMG and the Sumida Ward local government (Sumida LG) started several surveys in Kyojima district. The Sumida LG made a draft improvement plan of Kyojima and a preliminary Machizukuri Council was established in 1980. After the preliminary Machizukuri Council made machizukuri proposals, the Kyojima District Machizukuri Council (KDMC) was officially established. The KDMC examined the machizukuri proposals and decided the framework for the machizukuri plan. In the machizukuri plan framework, the aims were proposed as follows: (1) good living environments suitable for Kyojima, (2) residentialcommercial-industrial mixed land use, (3) prevention of disaster such as earthquake and fire spread, and (4) livable environments with stable population. Planning priorities were proposed as follows: (1) main access road network plan (widening existing roads to 6-8 m, etc.), (2) rebuilding plan (eliminating old obsolete houses, promoting fireproof rebuilding, etc.), and (3) community facility plan (creating pocket parks, etc.). They show clearly a policy that was not for the ‘scrap and build’ approach, but rather for the incremental improvement approach. 8.4.3 Process and Achievements Kyojima district applied to the Model Improvement Project subsidized by the national government. The Sumida LG established the Kyojima Machi-

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zukuri Center and the Sumida Machizukuri Public Cooperation in 1982, and then introduced a special subsidized system in 1985 and 1988 in order to promote the machizukuri plan framework. In 1990 the Kyojima Machizukuri Center was designated as the official office for promoting the Urban Improvement Program. From the viewpoint of improving the physical environment, namely hardware aspects, the achievements of Kojima machizukuri from 1983 to 2005 are as follows (Fig. 8-13, 8-14, 8-15 and 8-16): (1) total length of roads widened is less than 400 m (2) 16 community (public) apartments were built to provide 137 houses and five small factories, and (3) five open spaces, 13 rainwater tanks, five pocket parks and two community facilities have been provided.

Fig. 8-13. Achivements of Kyojima district machizukuri as of 2006 (Source: Kyojima District Machizukuri Council (2006))

a

b

Fig. 8-14a, b. Widening main access roads in Kyojima. a Main access road widened to 8 m. b Main access road planned and not widened (front side)

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 Fig. 8-15. Community apartments built with widening a main access road in Kyojima

 Fig. 8-16. Creation of pocket parks in Kyojima

As for the software activities, the Kyojima festival was started in 1989 and it has been held every year until today. And several kinds of firefighting training among community people have been done repeatedly every year. 8.4.4 Community Apartments The most significant achievement highlighted for the roughly 25 years of Kyojima machizukuri is the building of many community apartments in the district. Community apartments are affordable public housing for people who used to live in houses on sites where roads or community apartments are constructed. It means that people who lost their houses because of the projects can live in the community apartments without losing personal human relations and their own lifestyle. On the other hand, community apartments face many problems. The biggest problem is that the Sumida LG is reluctant to build more community apartments because of the growing fiscal burden for compensating rental costs of low-income residents. The other major problem lies in the

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Fig. 8-17. A model case of inexpensive simple retrofit in Kyojima

system of community apartments itself. Under the regulations of the national government, which bears the major part of construction costs, the community apartments can be made available only for prior and existing residents on the project sites. This inflexibility of entitlement to residence prevents other low-income people in the district from moving into the community apartments, although there are many vacancies now. 8.4.5 Earthquake Resistant Renovation Recently machizukuri which focuses on reducing vulnerability to building collapse has been promoted in Kyojima district. This movement is in reaction to the Sumida LG’s new policy promoting earthquake-resistant machizukuri, in addition to the fireproof machizukuri promoted before. Especially in Kyojima, expert advice for fixing furniture and retrofitting houses, and development of new methods for inexpensive retrofitting had been promoted (Fig. 8-17).

8.5 Concluding Remarks From a comprehensive viewpoint including both hardware and software activities, the Taishido machizukuri showed the importance of processes which change conflicts between local government and community or among local people into creative activities. The Kojima machizukuri shows the importance of community power sustained by people who wish to keep living within a community without losing personal human relations and their own lifestyle. Both cases imply effective ways toward sustainable

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urban regeneration which cannot be realized through large-scale redevelopment projects. From the viewpoint of disaster prevention, however, the achievements of Taishido and Kyojima machizukuri over the past 25 years can by no means be highly evaluated. The core problem is the slowness of the renewal process (Flüchter (2003)). The main problem with the machizukuri approach is that it tends to be very slow, and such gradual improvement runs the risk of leaving crucial improvements incomplete when disaster strikes (Sorensen (2002)). But looking at Taishido and Kyojima in detail, the effectiveness of the incremental improvement approach differs because of the basic characteristics of the district. In Taishido district, the improvement of public space has enhanced the amenities of the district, which has attracted a younger generation and stimulated rebuilding semi-fireproof detached houses with setbacks (Fig. 8-18). It can be pointed out that a gentrification process has moved on within the district. On the other hand, in Kyojima district, the improvement of infrastructure and the development of public housing could promote rebuilding only at peripheral sites of the block. Many obsolete wooden houses still exist inside blocks. Providing public spaces and facilities is not enough to promote investment in rebuilding in Kyojima. In areas like Kyojima, an activity oriented approach is necessary that promotes social activities and local culture, demonstrates that other lifestyles are emerging, and enhances local people’s confidence in the place and community, and thus attracts investments in rebuilding and renovation. From the viewpoint of this activity oriented approach, promoting not only rebuilding but also renovation of old wooden houses is expected to be effective way. The renovation of wooden housing, however, is to be done at least with earthquake resistant repair, retrofit for mitigating vulnerability to earthquakes. From this viewpoint, the recent earthquake resistant machizukuri

 Fig. 8-18. Rebuilding semi-fireproof detached houses with setbacks in Taishido

8. The Incremental Improvement of the Area Densely Built-up

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movement in Kyojima is highly evaluated. But it can be said that earthquake resistant renovation has also many problems, such as renovation cost, especially for the elderly, and consensus building between tenants and owners. It is very important to promote the development of cost effective methods for retrofitting, hopefully concurrently with fireproof renovation.

References Flüchter, W. (2003) “Tokyo before the next earthquake: Agglomeration-related risks, town planning and disaster prevention”, Town Planning Review, 74 (2) Kyojima District Machizukuri Council (Kojima Chiku Machizukuri Kyogikai) (2006) Kyojima District Machizukuri News No.22 (Kyojima Chiku Machizukuri News No.22), Sumida Ward and Machizukuri Center of Sumida Machizukuri Public Cooperation (Sumida Machizukuri Kosha Machizukuri Center) Taishido 2-3 Chome District Machizukuri Twenty Year Activity Editing Committee (Taishido 2-3 Chome Chiku Machizukuri 20 Nen No Ayume Henshu Kaigi) (2000) Taishido 2-3 Chome District Machizukuri: Twenty years of activity (Taishido 2-3 Chome Chiku Machzukuri: 20 nen no ayumi), Taishido 2-3 Chome District Machizukuri Council (Taishido 2-3 Chome Chiku Machzukuri Kyogikai) and Setagaya Ward (Setayaga-ku Setagaya-sogoshisho Machizukuri-ka) Taishido 2-3 Chome District Machizukuri Council (Taishido 2-3 Chome Chiku Machzukuri Kyogikai) (2005) Taishido 2-3 Chome District Machizukuri: Twenty five years of activity (Taishido 2-3 Chome Chiku Machzukuri: 25 nen no ayumi: Ginkonshiki no machizukuri), http://www.setagayatm.or.jp/trust/center/fund/library/taishidou/ayumi25.htm (Accessed in 2007) Tokyo Metropolitan Government (Tokyo-to Toshikeikaku-kyoku) (1997) Improvement program for the areas densely built-up with wooden houses (Mokuzo jutaku misshu chiiki seibi program), Disaster prevention action plan (Bosai toshizkuri suishin keikaku), Tokyo Metropolitan Government (Tokyo-to Toshikeikaku-kyoku) Tokyo Metropolitan Government (Tokyo-to Toshikeikaku-kyoku) (2004) Disaster prevention action plan: Improvement program (Bosai toshizkuri suishin keikaku: Seibi program), Tokyo Metropolitan Government (Tokyo-to Toshikeikaku-kyoku) Setagaya Ward (Setayaga-ku Setagaya -sogoshisho Machizukuri-ka) (2005) Taishido 2-3 chome district: machizukuri plan and district plan (Taishido 2-3 chome chiku: chiku machizukuri keikaku, chiku keikaku), Setagaya Ward (Setayaga-ku Setagaya -sogoshisho Machizukuri-ka) Sorensen, A. (2002) The Making of Urban Japan: Cities and planning from Edo to the twenty-first century. Routledge

9. Thailand Urban Environmental Management: Case of Environmental Infrastructure and Housing Provision in Bangkok Metropolitan Region

Vilas Nitivattananon and Chalika Noonin

9.1 Introduction Dramatic increase in urban growth, both in Bangkok and regional cities of Thailand has been seen over the last two decades. The implications of existing patterns of urban development on the growth indicate that a variety of urgent measures are required to facilitate economic growth and opportunities as well as provide citizens with adequate quality of life. Additional development is required in public infrastructure and housing in both Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR) and other regional cities to meet the growing demand and prevent further destruction of the environment. The urbanization trend is also related to infrastructure investment. As shown in Table 9-1, using transportation and utilities most closely Table 9-1. Infrastructure investment in Thailand (Unit: Baht million) (Source: ADB (1996b)) Sector

Energy Transportation

5th Plan 1982-1986 B mil-% lion

6th Plan 1987-1991 B mil-%t lion

7th Plan 1992-1996 B mil-% lion

8th Plan*1) 1997-2001 B mil-% lion

94,358

46.80

233,822

44.80

446,634

34.40

422.878

53,784

26.70

189,120

36.20

516,381

39.8

1,090,201 56.28

Telecommunications 33,945

Utilities Total 1)

Estimate

21.83

16.80

69,506

13.30

234,078

18.04

194,939

10.06

19,340

9.60

29,420

5.60

100,110

7.72

229,263

11.83

201,427

100.0

521,868

100.0

1,297,203 100.0

1,937,281 100.0

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corresponding to the urban development, an increase is estimated of more than 100% in the 8th plan over the 7th plan. According to Tomuro (2006), the level of urbanization was estimated to have increased from 26.5% to 28.7%, with Bangkok share in the total population declining from 41.4% to 36.2%, but with its share in urban population remaining high at 56.8%. As a consequence of rapid population growth accepting huge migration into the city without proper reserved governmental policy and urban planning for infrastructure and public service such as accommodation and employment insurance system, low-income communities called slum and squatter settlements have been created and have increased rapidly in the city. In 2003, 1,720 slum communities with 1.63 million population, 27.9% of Bangkok’s population, were recorded (BMA (1997), cited in Tomuro (2006)). This paper utilizes data from several sources together with some previous studies recently conducted with the involvement of the authors. It aims at using both the framework and specific cases in order to draw lessons learned in relation to urban regeneration and environmental management in Thailand, for comparison with similar types of cases in Asia, Europe and the US. The next section and sub-sections provide information on the overview of urbanization in Thailand covering policies and plans, roles of stakeholders and partnership practices, followed by a section on environmental issues and framework on the management of environmental infrastructure and housing in the BMR, and then a section on practices and cases in different sectors. The last two sections present key lessons learned in relation to regional planning and local governance with recommendations, followed by conclusions.

9.2 Overview of Urbanization and Environmental Management in Thailand

9.2.1 Policies and Plans The policies relating to urban management in Thailand may be divided into two categories (as given in Fig. 9-1 together with implementing agencies) --- implicit and explicit policies. For example, two significant policies that are being promoted, under implicit policy of competitiveness, are the ‘Kitchen of the World’ program and the plan to make Thailand the health tourism hub of Asia.

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Fig. 9-1. Thailand’s urban policy framework (Source: Webster and Maneepong (2003))

Regarding the progress of decentralizing authority to local government authorities (LGAs), Chornanan (2006) reports that the Decentralization Act of 1999 identifies authority and functions for LGA public service provision, with the plan (effective in 2003) to transfer a total of 245 functions from 57 departments of 15 ministries and one government office. The functions cover six categories: (1) provision of infrastructure, (2) promoting quality of life, (3) organizing communities, social and security, (4) planning and promoting for investment, trade and tourism, (5) administration and conservation of natural resources and environment, and (6) art, culture, tradition and local wisdom. As of January 2006, a total of 180 functions have already been transferred. According to PCD (2000b), the constitution of 1997 also emphasizes more independent and self-developed policy for LGAs, in terms of policy, administration, human resource management, financing and responsibilities. This process of decentralizing authority to LGAs should also clearly identify roles and responsibilities for the provision of public services between central and local governments, according to the Plan and Procedure for the Decentralization Act. The LGAs include BMA and Pattaya City (both are considered as special LGAs), more than 1,000 municipalities, more than 6,700 Tambons or sub-district administration organizations (TAOs), and 76 provincial administration organizations (PAOs). It was

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planned that 35% of total government budget be allocated to LGAs not less than 35% in 2006.

9.2.2 Roles of Governments and Other Stakeholders There are several agencies involved in environmental management in urban areas of Thailand --- both central and local governments. Central government agencies include: -

Department of Local Administration, Ministry of Interior (MOI) Department of Industrial Works, Ministry of Industry (MOInd) Public Works Department, MOI Department of Environmental Quality Promotion, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE) Office of Natural Resources and Environmental Policy and Planning, MONRE Pollution Control Department (PCD), MONRE Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand (IEAT), MOInd National Housing Authority (NHA), Ministry of Social Development and Human Security

LGAs include: BMA, Pattaya City, municipalities, and PAOs. In addition, roles of other stakeholders are briefly described as follows: NGOs include many individual citizens who have become involved in environmental protection projects mainly as a result of seeing the detrimental effects on their own lives (Mekvichai (1992)). NGO activities include seminars on environmental issues, programs and campaigns for on-street air pollution monitoring of vehicles, financial programs for improving environmental infrastructure for low-income urban communities, programs and campaigns to improving water quality, and educational programs to increase citizens’ awareness on urban environmental issues, such as waste disposal and sanitation. For example, as waste generation in Bangkok has increased drastically, local government alone cannot reverse the situation. Consequently, BMA has formulated partnerships on solid waste management, especially waste minimization. Most public utilities such as water supply electricity, railways, telecommunications, and bus transportation have been undertaken by stateowned enterprises. Some of these enterprises have been running the business successfully. However, there are a few enterprises which are facing losses as well as higher costs of services. Several cabinets have realized the need for having public-private partnership policies to reduce the fiscal

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burden, avoid management interference from politics and to improve service efficiencies. Therefore, in 1992, the Act on Private Participation in State Undertaken was enacted. Under this Act, the legal framework was set to allow private-sector participation in the management of state-owned business which worth more than one billion Baht (UNESCAP and IGES (2002)). 9.2.3 Issues Due to rapid population growth in urban areas and lack of effective management, urban areas have been facing several serious environmental problems, particularly cities which are activity centers for sectors such as tourism, industry, etc. The main problems, therefore, are air pollution, wastewater, solid waste, traffic congestion, etc.

9.3 Environmental Issues and Management Framework of Environmental Infrastructure and Services in the BMR

9.3.1 Overview of BMR The most prominent characteristic of the urbanization pattern in Thailand is the overwhelming primacy of Bangkok, where economic activities and employment opportunities are mostly flourishing (NESDB (1991)). Moreover urban development of the capital has outgrown the administrative boundaries of the BMA, and encompasses the neighboring five provinces (Nakorn Pathom, Nonthaburi, Pathum Thani, Samut Prakarn and Samut Sakorn). These provinces and BMA form the BMR. Fig. 9-2 shows land use of BMA and its surrounding. The efficiency of BMR is crucial to national development and international competitiveness of Thailand, since it accounts for approximately 50% of GDP. BMR covers 1.5% of total area of the country. Its population is about 10 million, accounting 16% of the country’s population. Of this, around 70% lives in BMA. This does not include non-registered population, which is estimated to be more than four million (for Bangkok only). The metropolis has important social economic activities, government offices, and cultural, educational, and financial centers and is considered to be the heart of national economy. Over 90% of Thailand’s international trading goods pass through the Bangkok yearly (ADB (1996a)). The population of BMA (and

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Fig. 9-2. Boundary and land use of BMR (Source: BMA)

the other 5 provinces of BMR) are 5.8 (and 4.6) and 6.1 and 5.7 million in 2006 and 2016, respectively (PCD (1996)). Bangkok is situated on the low flat plain of Chao Phraya River, which extends to the Gulf of Thailand. Its total area is 1,568.737 km2. The provision of well-developed infrastructure has enabled the development of Bangkok as the focal center for economic, culture and administrative activities. Thus, Bangkok is regarded as the growth flagship of the Central Region and the whole country. The registered population of Bangkok in 2005 is 5.66 million, which is approximately 9% of the total population of Thailand. However, actual population in Bangkok is probably almost 10 million including those of non-registered population (DOE (2006)). 9.3.2 Environmental Issues and Management Environmental degradation in the BMR is not so much a consequence of urban and industrial growth as it is the very predicable result of failure to enforce the planned land use, to supply urban and environmental infrastructure consistent with the demands of economic growth, and to manage the urban activities with environmental soundness (NESDB (1991)). The most crucial factors are urban land development patterns, provision of urban and environmental infrastructure, and management mechanisms.

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According to PCD (2000b), the problems on the prevention or remedy of the pollution hazards or contamination in PCZs can be summarized as follows: structure of present organizations, preparation of the action plan (covering treatment or rehabilitation, monitoring, study and research, and awareness raising) for prevention and remedy of pollution hazards or contamination, processing of the action plan for prevention and remedy of pollution hazards or contamination, and lack of monitoring and evaluation of progress. Environmental management is considered to be one of many important policies for Bangkok Metropolitan administrators. According to UNEP (2004), the key environmental issues of Bangkok City continue to be air quality, water quality management, solid and hazardous waste management, land subsidence, and noise pollution. The increase in economic activities and growth has contributed significant pressure on land, quality of waste and air, level of noise and status of solid waste generation. Presently, the most critical environmental issue which should be addressed is air pollution, as it is one of the most critical factors affecting the quality of life of residents. Surface water quality is found to be at a critical level in comparison to the national standard. BMA has been constructing wastewater treatment plants in many areas of metropolitan Bangkok; however, the total capacity of wastewater treatment covers only 42% of wastewater discharging in the waterbody. Solid waste management is also another challenging problem in Bangkok City. Due to increasing population, consumption patterns and changing lifestyles with economic growth, solid waste generation has become a major issue in the city. The average solid waste collected per day has doubled during the last 10 years. However, in 2005 BMA adopted the policy to reduce waste generation by 10% from the previous, and this set goal is virtually accomplished. Another issue is environmental vulnerability in the slum community. Major socio-economic conditions in the slum community that awaiting solution in urban environmental management include: poverty, insecurity, poor sanitation and lack of basic services, difficult access and inappropriate location, and lack of social welfare. 9.3.3 Framework and Strategies of Environmental Infrastructure and Services in BMR According to an on-going document (NESDB (2005)), the plan of BMR consists of a total of six strategies as follows: -

Establishment of linkage of economic base and area development of BMR

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Development of growth center of the metropolis for promoting competitiveness capacity Establishment of balance and sustainability in area development Development of towards strong and livable metropolis Administration and management of metropolis development (including focusing on participation of stakeholders and attention to good governance)

Policies and plans relating to the participation and development of Bangkok communities include the following (BMA (2006)): -

-

-

Actions under the Agenda 21 regarding sustainable development, with establishment of a project called Environmental Strengthening of BMA consisting of four themes --- urban environmental management, urban environmental planning, public participation, and capacity strengthening for BMA. BMA Development Plan No. 6 (2001-2006), compatible with the 9th NESDB Plan, with a development target for developing a livable city using the integrated development concept for solving problems in a systematic way with clear participation of all stakeholders. BMA Public Administration Plan (2005-2009), with a total of nine strategies, including good governance of city administration.

The 20-year Bangkok Development Plan (BMA (2005)) includes the vision of Bangkok to “be a metropolis that is livable, with good environment and quality of life; has transportation of high mobility and convenience; has unique art and culture; is the center of economy and knowledge of the country and Southeast Asia; and is the center of service, important social institutions and international organizations.” To achieve the aforementioned vision of the Bangkok Metropolis, seven major development missions are set up. One of them is related to the environment, and aims to increase efficiency in the management of the environment to create a good and sustainable environment of the city (Noonin (2004)). Fig. 9-3 provides a public participation process in developing solid waste disposal facilities proposed in a recent plan. In 1994, a policy to establish an organization to manage and control wastewater titled WMA was launched with an aim to collaborate with the private sector in wastewater management (PCD (1996)). According to PCD (1996), the recommended strategy (of WWM) must be in full accordance with present planning. It must extend to both urban and rural areas and contain definite proposals for implementation over a realistic timeframe. There are distinct financial and environmental benefits to be obtained from larger centralized wastewater management schemes. While

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Fig. 9-3. Public consultation process in solid waste disposal facility development (Source: PCD (2000a))

several localized scheme options for the BMR have been conceived and analyzed, greater focus has been placed on developing centralized options.

9.4 Sectoral Practices and Cases The following provide practices and cases of managing environmental infrastructure and services in the BMR, based on available information and recent studies or projects. 9.4.1 Water Resources and Supply Nationally, access to an improved water supply rose from a low of 10% in 1973 to 98% in 2000. Surveys show that access has reached 98% of households in urban areas and 98.5% in rural areas. Despite these levels of access, many water quality problems remain, particularly microbiological and increasingly due to chemical contamination, affecting both ground and surface water sources (Nitivattananon (2005)).

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In terms of drainage and flood protection, the causes of flooding in the BMR are numerous: flood flow from the north, high sea tide conditions, heavy rainfall in the area, and insufficient capacity of the drainage system (PCD (1996)). Drainage problems in the BMR have been due to the rapid development and urbanization, resulting in the increase of surface runoff volume. Some existing drainage systems have limited conveyance capacity, or in some areas there are no drainage systems. The existing flood control and drainage system are mainly under responsibility of the Royal Irrigation Department (RID), BMA and municipalities. The system can be divided into two main parts as follows (PCD (1996)): East Bank of Chao Phraya River, covering: -

Flood control of the inner areas of BMA Dikes according to Royal Initiate Project Flood control of Nonthaburi province Flood control of Samut Prakarn province Dikes along the bank of Chao Praya River in Pathumthani province Green zone on the east of Royal Initiate Project

West Bank of Chao Praya River, including: -

Flood control of the RID for the west areas of Chao Phraya River Flood control of BMA Flood control of Samut Prakarn province

In the BMR, there are waterworks under the responsibility of Metropolitan Waterworks Authority (MWA), Provincial Waterworks Authority (PWA) and Local Waterworks Authority (LWA). The MWA serves in three provinces: BMA, Nonthaburi and Samut Prakarn, and the rest areas Due to the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Thailand committed to an International Monetary Fund-led bailout program (with the World Bank and Asian Development Bank) which pushed the country to privatize its state-owned enterprises, including Metropolitan Waterworks Authority (MWA) and Provincial Waterworks Authority (PWA). With World Bank funding, a firm was contracted by the finance ministry in December 2000 to draft a national master plan that has three main components: Privatization of the MWA, PWA and the Wastewater Management Organization; establishing an independent regulatory framework; and setting up a water-tariff structure. Privatization of MWA and PWA was initially slated for 2003. In addition, there are over 100 water supply areas with private sector participation. Fig. 9-4. Water supply case (State enterprise and local government, in BMR) (Source: PWA (2005))

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are under PWA and LWA. According to PCD (1996), water consumption rates were estimated at 200-600 and 140-350 l/capita/day for BMA and the other BMR provinces, respectively. Fig. 9-4 presents the case of water supply management in Bangkok with partnership among state enterprises, LGAs and private sector. 9.4.2 Wastewater The following summarize some of the pertinent institutional problems and issues relating to urban drainage and wastewater systems in Thailand (ONEP (1995)): -

-

Lack of a single national sewerage authority for effective management Inadequate monitoring and enforcement programs Inadequate coordination and cooperation among national agencies involved Inadequate capacity and capability of the key national agencies in effective management Local governments lacking real authority and flexibility to adjust their staff, budget allocation, fee collection, and procurement of equipment Local governments inadequately equipped to operate and maintain sophisticated systems Inadequate availability of investment financing

By virtue of the BMA Act (1984), BMA is authorized to provide central wastewater collection and treatment systems within its designated jurisdiction. This jurisdiction retains responsibility for all aspects of wastewater functions; however, it does not extend to the contiguous urban areas that surround the city, nor does it extend to provincial municipalities. At present, BMA has implemented wastewater collection and treatment projects for seven areas in the BMA covering total area of 191.7 km2, with treatment capacity of about 992,000 m3/day (Fig. 9-5). Fig. 9-6 illustrates a case of wastewater management in sub-urban area of Bangkok with the partnership between community and LGAs. Waste generation in Bangkok between 1995 and 2015 was estimated by JICA in 1991. The study forecasted the increasing trend of waste generation year by year. However, the actual waste collection amounts are less than what was expected. The waste generation rate in Bangkok is 1.3 kg/capita/day. BMA attempts to minimize this rate; therefore, the 6th Bangkok Development Plan 2002-2006 sets the target to reduce the waste

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Fig. 9-5. Wastewater Management Areas of BMA (Source: ater Quality Management Division (2006)) Settlement in large cities follows the trend of expanding to suburban areas due to developed infrastructure and lower land prices. Provision of municipal sanitation services, including wastewater treatment system, cannot adequately cover the areas; thus, onsite and/or community centralized wastewater management (WWM) systems are more popular. Currently, discharge from large numbers of suburban housing estates (HEs), the favored urban dwelling in Bangkok Metropolitan Region that depends solely on localized WWM, has created significant pressure on the environment. In response to the related problems, appropriate environmental policy instruments (EPIs) are required and should be designed specifically for the local context. This requires a systemic approach in determining a set of EPIs through the consideration of three dimensions underlying ineffective WWM --- including poor performance aspects, significant factors influencing the performance, and institutional issues. Based on the findings with regard to suburban HE WWM, a set of EPIs were found to be corresponding to all the three dimensions, while other instruments could respond to at least two dimensions. Selected instruments are discussed in detail for each type of EPIs. In order to improve community WWM, the authorities should pay attention to integration of instruments, rather than focusing on only specific ones. Moreover, selecting appropriate instruments may be improved if there are additional relevant dimensions taken into account, such as sustainability. Although conducted in the context of community WWM, this study is expected to be applicable to other sectors with some adjustments. Fig. 9-6. Wastewater case (Community and local government in Nonthaburi) (Source: Sujaritpong and Nitivattananon (2006))

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generation rate to not more than 1 kg/capita/day by 2006 (DOE (2006)). In Bangkok there are five levels in waste recycling involving many actors, as follows: -

-

First level: Waste generators/source (households), prior to collection Second level: Collectors by three different groups: BMA waste collectors, street rag pickers of which there are four kinds: those who walk and collect waste, those who use push-carts, those who ride tricycles vehicles called Saleng, and those who ride motorized vehicles; and dumpsites rag pickers Third level: Buyers (recycling shops or small scale buyers) Fourth level: Traders (wholesale shops or large scale buyers) Fifth level: Processors (manufacturers)

In addition to the case of Bangkok, according to Noonin (2004), the major actors, which play an important role in contributing to waste reduction, are BMA officials, householders, waste collectors, recycled shop, saleng, and manufacturers, as detailed in Fig. 9-7 for the case of solid waste management in Bangkok with partnership of community and LGAs. However, the most important actors that the government should promote to play an important role in waste reduction and recycling are households, to encourage them to separate waste at the source of generation. Source separation recycling must be further promoted from the point of generation, collection and transport in order to enhance recovery. Once waste materials are mixed their value decreases. The process of separating mixed waste into its constituent types and grades of materials is extremely labor intensive. Waste bank is one of the practices that BMA tries to promote for waste minimization in the city. There are many waste banks that have been formulated in both communities and schools. One of the best practices is the Recycling Center of Laksi-Donmuang Network. This network consists of five waste banks from five different communities in the nearby area. The network was initiated in 2001 with the objective of environmental improvement in the community. Afterward, in 2003 waste banks were established in each community. In order to raise the price of recyclable materials, the Recycling Center has been initiated. Recently, there are approximately 400 members of the waste bank and around 1,300 people participate in waste banking activities of this network. The network can help BMA to reduce the waste which otherwise has to be transferred to landfill. Currently, around 30-50 tons/month of recyclable materials are recovered with the help of community members through participating in waste banking, which brings about 2,000-3,000 baht/month

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profit in each community. Thereafter, those profits return to benefit community members and environmental improvement in the community. The waste separation activity traditionally and informally conducted by the government waste collectors has been the most important major contributor to waste recycling in Bangkok. This practice, which has existed for over 30 years, results in a significant amount of income from the sale of recyclables gathered, and also constitutes a major factor in waste reduction, lessening what otherwise would be greater pressure on the city’s existing landfill capacity. The recycling system by the waste collectors is the most important element of the recycling system in the recent SWM. Saleng, waste picker and BMA’s official recycling were 332, 19 and 20 tons/day respectively as shown in the table below. Table. Distribution of recycling amount by different actors in 1999 (Source: PCD (1998) and PCD (2001)) Type Waste colNumber Collected % lected (cap. or veh.) quantity (kg/cap.(veh.) (ton/day) /day Saleng 158.25 2,100 332 42.35 Scavenger 99.65 190 19 2.42 BMA collection 222.58 1,856 413 52.68 worker BMA’s official ----20 2.55 recycling Total 784 100 The recycling system in the metropolis, which recover around 784 tons/day of recyclable material, is lessening what otherwise would be greater pressure on the city’s existing landfill capacity. Moreover, it is an advantage for BMA as the reduction of final disposal expense. An average landfill operation cost is 350 baht/ton; therefore, BMA can save almost 100,000,000 baht/year through the existing recycling system. Hence, the present recycling system plays a very crucial role in SWM in Bangkok Metropolis.Conversely, from the point of view of effectiveness of waste collection service, the waste collectors spend around 23.52% of their working time for waste separation practice. Within total waste collection time, they can actually serve waste collection to cover more households. Therefore, in this particular case the agenda of ecological sustainability has come to contradict the imperatives of good governance in BMA Fig. 9-7. Solid waste case (local government and community in BMA) (Source: Noonin (2004))

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9.4.3 Transportation Bangkok is suffering from many urban environmental problems like other developing countries, such as water pollution, solid waste, congestion and air pollution. Among them air pollution poses a great threat to public health. Motor vehicle is the major source of air pollution and traffic congestion, and the more traffic congestion the more air pollution. The population of Bangkok is now close to 7 million by registered record or about 10 million in terms of daytime population. The population density in the inner areas decreased from 15,270 in 1978 to 11,090 people/km2 in 2000 (from 3.25 to 2.36 million people). In the outer areas of Bangkok, population density increased during the same period 770 to 1,280 people/km2 (from 0.67 to 1.12 million people). It reflects that people now tend to live away from the inner and core city area. Absence of good public transport is causing rapid increase in vehicle growth in Bangkok. According to the Statistical Profile of BMA 2002, the number of vehicles in Bangkok is about 4,464,158. It seems that nearly every citizen has one personally owned vehicle. The transportation mode quantity in Bangkok was 18.48 million person-trip/day, of which mass transit accounts for 9.47 million person-trip/day (51.2%) and private vehicles 9.01 million persontrip/day (48.8%). The government and other organizations recognize this problem and realize its effects on people. They have developed policies, plans and projects to solve traffic congestion in the city area. However, they are giving more attention for improving and expanding the surface-roads (as government always provides facilities for private car users without promoting the public transport mode as much). This approach is not sound for solving the problem because with a good road network, the number of private vehicles rapidly increases in the city area and thereby causes air pollution and congestion. Improved public transport modes help reduce the number of private cars in the city area. Usually people try to choose the transportation mode from which they get maximum satisfaction, as a case in Fig. 9-8. Transportation in Bangkok mainly utilizes land systems, especially roads. The ratio of private vehicles to mass transit is about 53:47 (BMA (2004)). Land transportation covers more than 98% of the total, and includes: -

Road and expressways: a total of approximately 4,700 km in BMR Mass transit: including o Buses: operated by Bangkok Mass Transit Authority o Suburb trains: operated by State Railway of Thailand

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o o

Bangkok Transit System (BTS): with a total of 23.1 km, by Bangkok Mass Transit System Co., Ltd. Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) System: with a total of 20 km, by Mass Rapid Transit Authority

The problems in the BMR relating to urban development and transportation, including traffic, stem mainly from the high growth rate of vehicles, lack of proper planning (city planning, land use policy, road network), and lack of proper road design and maintenance (Surasawadee (2000)). Low satisfaction with the public transport system is a major cause of car use, and is one of the major reasons for traffic congestion in many cities. Bangkok has been quite typical in this respect. In recent years, the public transport system has started to grow; however, car use is still growing. Thus, the need to reduce car use and promote public transport is still very real. With this in view, a study was undertaken to investigate the factors that influence transport users’ modal choice. The aim of this investigation has been to appropriately design use of economic instruments for influencing the modal choice in favour of public transport and restriction of car use. Given the derived nature of transportation demand, it seems reasonable that people are not affected by only the cost or fare of service and their income. The major reason for use is comfort and convenience, and people tend to use the mode that is comfortable and convenient rather than other options. This survey shows that the private car mode is the most comfortable and convenient. With the above finding in mind, it is clear that Bangkok transport users prefer traveling by private car rather than public transport, both for mass transit and mass rapid transit. Due to many reasons such as better convenience and comfort, the comparative cost over the long run is cheaper than other modes (BTS sky train and bus), although using private cars create traffic congestion. If people travel by the bus, they also meet the traffic congestion, and bus service is crowded, dirty, constantly delayed, and lacks air conditioning. These reasons make most Bangkok transport users think that private car is more convenient and comfortable. Also from the findings, it can be concluded that Bangkok users will prefer using mass rapid transit mode over other modes if their route is complete, there is access to every area (specifically in the boundary of Bangkok, because of the new trend of Bangkokian settlements in outer BMTR areas). These findings provide good data, because if the government has a sufficiently large budget to invest in mass rapid transit, it will create a great shift toward mass rapid transport use. This mode is clean energy consuming without air pollution emissions. Fig. 9-8. Transportation case (local government, state enterprise and community in BMR) (Source: Thanaprayochsak et al. (2005))

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In terms of other modes of transportation, there is an issue related to the newly developed airport. According to Green World Foundation (2006), although the development of the Suvarnaphumi Airport had been prioritized as being on the ‘national agenda,’ it seemed to cover only the construction in order to complete it within the set timeframe. Several environmental mitigation measures (included in the approved EIA report) have not been implemented yet --- particularly noise pollution affecting a number of communities, schools and universities. 9.4.4 Housing According to Jongpukdee (2000), there are two types of residential areas in Bangkok: the natural born residential area and the new subdivision The National Housing Authority (NHA) was assigned to supervise the Baan Eua-Aa-Thorn Program (BEP) for low-cost housing. Via the BEP, it is able to provide a total of over 80,000 houses. However, the number of applicants for the houses exceeded 350,000 as of May 2004, indicating that there may be considerable potential for expansion. The Baan Mankong Program (BMP) aims at solving the problem of housing insecurity in Thai cities by creating an opportunity for existing slum communities to participate actively in a local development process whereby their settlements are upgraded, their houses are improved and their tenure is secured through a variety of terms such as long-term lease or cooperative land ownership. The Community Organization Development Institute has been approved by the cabinet to carry out the work for BMP, which in the first year of 2003 includes: 1. 126.6 million Baht to support the implementation of 10 pilot projects. This includes a per-household subsidy which will pay for the development of public infrastructure in the communities, funds to cover the management and administration costs, and subsidy on housebuilding and housing-improvement loans (from commercial banks) so that families in the communities who take loans to improve their houses or construct new ones will pay only 1% annual interest. 2. 20 million Baht to support a participation and organization in 20 pilot cities in order to expand the process around the country, develop guidelines for selecting the communities which will be upgraded during the second year of the BMP, and to set plans for ensuring that the BMP can eventually cover all of the urban poor communities in Thailand. Fig. 9-9. Housing case (central government, state enterprise and private sector in BMR) (Source: Tomuro (2006))

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residential estate neighborhood. National Housing Authority (NHA) is the biggest government agency responsible for housing provision and construction of new settlement. NHA settlements, which rely on the neighborhood concept, mostly accommodate low-income and middle-income people. The Thai government has launched a significant, nationwide program to solve the housing problems of Thailand’s urban poor communities within a period of five years (beginning early 2003), through two major lowincome (or social) housing programs --- Baan Eua-Aa-Thorn Program (BEP) and Baan Mankong Program (BMP), as detailed in Fig. 9-9. 9.4.5 Summary of Cases Based on the cases presented in previous sections, Table 9-2 present a Table 9-2. Summary of the practices and cases Cases Areas Key Stakeholders and Roles Note Water BMR State enterprise: regulation, planning and control Under supply Private sector: investment, expansion, operation MWA and maintenance Municipalities: planning Households, industries: paying for user fees Waste- NonthCommunity: operation and maintenance, paying Under water aburi for user fees housing Private sector: investment estates LGAs: regulation, provision of public services, property tax collection Solid BMA LGA: provision of public services, revenue collec- Under waste tion, planning and control BMA Community: waste collection and separation Private sector: waste collection and recycling, operation Trans- BMR CGA: planning, investment and control Under portation LGAs: planning, and operation several Private sector: investment and operation agencies State enterprise: investment and operation Community: choosing services and paying for user fees Housing BMR CGA: planning, financing and control Under Private sector: construction several State enterprise: implementation and operation agencies Community: paying for services and operation Note: CGA = central government authority, LGA = local government authority

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summary of the cases, which can be used for the analysis of lessons learned in the next section.

9.5 Lessons Learned and Recommendations Based on the information presented in previous sections, the following are lessons learned in relation to regional planning and management. -

-

-

-

Urban regeneration o High growth of core area as related to surrounding areas o Issues related to limited space, high population and demand including creating environmental impacts o Infrastructure and services to serve high demand with reasonable price and affordability Regional organization structure and hierarchy o BMA and BMR have no clear relationship in terms of organizations o Roles of central governments as related to state enterprises and LGAs are key o Problem scale and linkage among areas and sectors need specific and methods of planning and management which may be almost case-by-case Integration of environmental into development and other aspects o Process of planning and implementation to ensure proper and effective integration o Need for environmental unit at appropriate levels for planning and implementation Demand side management o Measures to reduce demand o Allocation of capital budget

In terms of governance and partnership, lessons learned include: -

-

Decentralization process o Capability of LGAs is limited in some public infrastructure and services, requiring proper and adequate support from central government and other stakeholders o Financing mechanism is key to the success o Types of services may require different methods of delivery Partnerships

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o o o o

Public-private partnership in a number of sectors and cases Central-local governments in transportation and water supply Local government-community in solid waste and smallscale wastewater NGOs and others: leading and supporting roles

Sustainable infrastructure and housing development requires a systems approach to identify several elements and their relationships within the system and also to integrate the elements in a holistic way with the use of appropriate sustainability indicators and targets (Nitivattananon (2006)). The following should be considered for future directions. -

Identification of urban development pattern and priorities Use of spatial development strategy Provision of adequate and efficient financing Development of institutional and administrative structure

9.6 Conclusion The information on the framework of urban environmental management in Thailand, including practices and cases of managing environmental infrastructure and housing in the BMR, has indicated that environmental management in BMR is a complicated and challenging task. This is due to high growth and the large area of development involving a large number of stakeholders and several factors. The lessons learned, based on the practices and cases relating to the management of environmental infrastructure and housing in BMR, can be drawn in relation to urban regeneration, regional planning, organization structure and hierarchy, integration of environmental aspects, decentralization, as well as stakeholder participation and partnerships. It is recommended that a systems approach be utilized for the region. This covers integration of several dimensions including vertical and horizontal planning and management, together with different timeframes. Significant participation of stakeholders is a key to ensure sustainable development of the region and hence of the country. The information and cases presented in this paper have demonstrated that different stakeholders may have different roles for different types and/or sectors of urban infrastructure and housing, also subject to the scale of the development and the level of technology involved, as well as the degree of participation from people or users. Large potential for integration

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among sectors and/or areas can be learned from the cases presented. One of the areas for possible effective implementation is to use economic instruments (such as user charges) in association with and addition to the regulatory and voluntary mechanism. It is also recommended to explore some types of tailor-made partnerships based on specific sectors, areas and local conditions including culture in urban environmental infrastructure and housing so that more cases can be shared in the future.

References ADB (1996a) Megacity Management in the Asian and Pacific Region: Policy Issues and Innovative Approaches, Volume Two: City and Country Case Studies ADB (1996b) Urban Infrastructure Finance BMA (2003) Bangkok Sate of Environment 2003 BMA (2004) Basic Data for City Planning (in Thai) BMA (2005) Bangkok Development Plan (2005-2025) towards Livable City (in Thai). BMA (2006) Promoting Community Participation towards Sustainable Livable Bangkok (in Thai). Chornanan, S. (2006) The Understanding of Local Administration (2nd edition), Institute of Public Policy Studies (in Thai) Department of Environment (DOE), BMA (2006) Solid Waste Management in Bangkok 2005 Department of Public Cleansing (DPC), BMA (2003) Annual Report of the Public Cleansing Department 2002 Green World Foundation (2006) Lok Si Kiew Magazine, No. 1, Year 15, MarchApril 2006 (in Thai) Jongpukdee, S. (2000) Towards the Rehabilitation of the Open Space and Footpaths in a Residential Estate: The Case of Khlong Chan Residential Estate, Bangkok, Thailand (Thesis No. UE-00-04, Asian Institute of Technology, Bangkok, Thailand) Kruger Consult (1996) Draft Final Report: Urban Environmental Management in Thailand: A Strategic Planning Approach Mekvichai, B. (1992) Managing Urban Environment in Thailand (UMP-Asia Occasional Paper No. 13, UMP Regional Office for Asia and Pacific) NESDB (1991) National Urban Development Policy Framework, Final Report, Volume 2 NESDB (2005) Public Administration Plan for Development of Bangkok Metropolitan Region (2005-2008) (in Thai). Nitivattananon, V. (2005) “Thailand Water Management: Challenges and Issues” (Paper for presentation at the Forum on World Citizens Assembly on Water, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 27-30 October 2005)

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Nitivattananon, V. (2006) Sustainable Infrastructure Development: Policy Directions (Presentation at the First Policy Forum on Seoul Initiative Network on Green Growth for Promoting Sustainable Infrastructure Development, 6-8 September 2006, Republic of Korea) Noonin, C. (2004) Waste Separation Practices of Government Garbage Collectors in BMA: A Public Policy Dilemma (Thesis No. UE-04-06 , Asian Institute of Technology, Bangkok, Thailand) ONEP (1995) Thailand Sewerage Prioritization Project, Volume 2: Main Report PCD (1996) Bangkok Metropolitan Region Wastewater Management Plan, Main Report PCD (2000a) Feasibility Study for Establishing Solid Waste Disposal Centers in Pollution Control Zones for Bangkok Metropolitan Region and Pattaya City, Main Report PCD (2000b) Monitoring and Evaluation of Pollution Prevention and Control in the Pollution Control Zones, Main Report (in Thai) PWA (Provincial Waterworks Authority) http://www.pwa.co.th/document/performance_water.htm (Accessed in 2007) Surasawadee, C. (2000) Study and Research for Direction and Identification of City Development Policy Framework: Bangkok Metropolitan Region and Traffic problem Solving (in Thai) Sutjaritpong, S. and Nitivattananon, V. (2006) “Determination of Environmental Measures for Community Wastewater Management” (Proceedings of Regional Conference on Urban Water and Sanitation in Southeast Asian Cities, November 22-24, 2006, Lao PDR) Tanaprayochsak, W., Amin, A.T.M.N. and Nitivattananon, V. (2005) “Application of Economic Instruments to Influence People’s Decision in Choice of Transportation Mode for Reducing Growth Rate of Vehicles in Bangkok” (Proceedings of Asian Planning Schools Association Conference (APSA) 2005, Penang, Malaysia, 15-19 September 2005) Tomura, K. (2006) Leadership in Slum Community Development in Bangkok Metropolitan Area, Thailand (Thesis No. UE-06-05, Asian Institute of Technology, Bangkok, Thailand) United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) (2004) Bangkok State of the Environment 2003 UNESCAP and IGES (2002) Kitakyushu Initiative Seminar on Public-Private Partnerships for Urban Water Supply and Wastewater Treatment Water Quality Management Division, BMA (2006) Overview of Wastewater Management of BMA, Department of Drainage and Sewerage (in Thai) Webster, D. and Maneepong, C. (2003) Sub-national Paper on Thailand Urban Policy Framework (Study on Planning for Urban Sustainability (PSUT), Asian Development Bank and NESDB)

Part III MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL DISASTERS

10. Seismic Vulnerability of Peruvian Houses: Current Issues and Solution Attempts

Paola Mayorca

10.1 Introduction Peru is the third largest country in South America with an area of 1.28 million km2 and a population of 28.3 million people as of 2005. Located along the Pacific Rim, it is frequently subjected to earthquakes. On May 31, 1970, 15:23 local time, an earthquake magnitude 7.6-7.8 on the Ritcher scale struck the northern part of the country killing 67,000 people and injuring an additional 150,000. The number of damaged buildings reached almost 200,000, many of them adobe houses. This event, the deadliest in the region, triggered a series of initiatives towards disaster mitigation in the country. In spite of these remarkable efforts, there is still great concern about the seismic vulnerability of the country. In this article, the current Peruvian situation and its challenges are presented.

10.2 Peruvian Housing Situation Fig. 10-1 shows the trend of materials used in Peru over the last 40 years. Predominant construction types in Peru are brick/block masonry and earth construction (adobe and rammed earth or tapial). The increase of brick/block masonry and the decline of earth as construction materials are evident. In spite of this, more than 35% of the population still lives in the latter type of structures. It may seem that the shift from earth construction to brick/block masonry would imply an improvement of the structure seismic performance. However, the quality of the masonry construction is very poor and therefore vulnerability is high. The typical earth constructions in Peru are adobe and "tapial" or

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Fig. 10-3. Confined masonry structures (Source: San Bartolome et al. (2005))

rammed earth. Fig. 10-2 shows typical houses made of these materials. In most of the cases the construction is carried out by the future occupants of the dwellings or local masons with little or no knowledge of basic seismic resistant principles. This situation is aggravated by poor maintenance of the structure and consequent deterioration over time. In terms of masonry houses, the most predominant type is the confined masonry. In these buildings, masonry walls are erected first and reinforced concrete confinements are constructed afterwards (Fig. 10-3). Vertical

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Fig. 10-4. Very old and poorly maintained structures are at imminent collapse in Barrios Altos, Lima. (Source: San Bartolome)

confinements are cast directly against the masonry walls and then horizontal confinements, anchored on the previous ones, are placed together with the slab. This construction sequence produces an integral system of all the involved elements. Several risk analyses have been carried out for the Peruvian capital city, Lima, with a population of about 8 million people, by the National Institute of Civil Defense (INDECI). These studies showed that approximately 28,000 houses, sheltering 75,000 people, are at risk of collapsing at any time. The most dramatic case is that of Barrios Altos in the city downtown (Fig. 10-4). According to a survey carried out by the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (Vivienda (2002)), the housing deficit of the country is approximately 1.23 million units. Considering that the current number of adequate housing units is 4.68 million, it can be concluded that approximately 20% of the demand (5.91 million) is unmet. The housing deficit is both qualitative, i.e. constructed with poor quality materials and lack of basic services such as water and sewage, 74%, and quantitative, i.e. lack of houses, 26%. The situation is clearly dramatic. In an effort to overcome the problem of housing deficit, self construction, i.e. construction by the house owners themselves or untrained masons, has become popular. However, due to the lack of knowledge of good construction practices, the resulting houses are of poor quality.

10.3 Efforts to Reduce Seismic Vulnerability of Adobe Houses Although the problem of poor earthquake resistance is common to brick/block and adobe/tapial houses, only the latter will be addressed here.

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In Peru, research on methodologies to construct seismic resistant adobe houses started in the early 1970s after the catastrophic 1970 earthquake. As a result of these efforts, Peru is one of the few countries in which recommendations for the construction and design of adobe structures were available as early as 1977. At that time, they were part of the Earthquake Resistant Design Code. On 1985, an independent Adobe Building Code was enacted. It was reviewed once in 2000 and is presently being revised again. A comprehensive description of the evolution of adobe building code was done by Torrealva (2005). In the code, provisions for the dimensioning of the structure, formulas for estimating seismic loads, allowable stresses, and others are provided. Also, methodologies for reinforcement of the structures are presented, namely the use of internal cane reinforcement and external wire mesh. Although in the current revision of the code, plastic meshes have not been introduced yet, the revision underway will most likely include this latest development of adobe reinforcement construction. Below, a brief introduction of the existent adobe reinforcement techniques is presented. All of them have been verified through shaking table experiments. 10.3.1 Internal Cane Reinforcement (Tejada (2001)); (SENCICO (1999)) This was one of the first methodologies used to reinforce new adobe houses. It consists of embedding horizontal and vertical canes in adobe walls. Fig. 10-5 shows details of the retrofitting procedure. This method is effective for new constructions as long as the cane is available in enough quantities at a low price. Unfortunately, in practice, there have been many instances in which cane was insufficient to cover the amount necessary to reinforce a large number of structures.

(a) Adobe house

b) "Tapial" house or rammed earth house

Fig. 10-5. Typical details of internal cane reinforced adobe (Source: Peruvian National Building Code (2006))

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10.3.2 Steel Welded wire Mesh (Zegarra et al. (1997)) This method consists of applying strips of 1mm-diameter, 20mm-pitch steel welded wire mesh at critical zones of the structure: corners, door and window lintels, gables, etc. They have the appearance of reinforcing columns and beams. The meshes are attached from both sides of the adobe walls and connected with passing through wires. After installing the meshes, a mortar overlay is provided. Fig. 10-6 shows an example of the application of this method. 10.3.3 Polymer Mesh or Geogrid (Blondet et al. (2006)) This method is similar to the previous one, the main difference being the retrofitting material, which in this case is a polymer mesh. This material is generally used for soil stabilization. The installation process is similar, although in this case the wire connectors are replaced by plastic strings. This mesh has a lower stiffness than the steel welded wire mesh, which makes it somehow a better match for adobe constructions. Covering 50% of the structure surface is enough to guarantee an adequate seismic resistance of the reinforced house.

Fig. 10-6. Steel welded wire mesh reinforcement for adobe houses (Source: SENCICO - Arequipa Office)

Fig. 10-7. Polymer mesh reinforcement for adobe houses (Source: Blondet et al. (2006))

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10.3.4 Protection Mesh (Blondet et al. (2006)) In this case, the material used for retrofitting is the mesh typically found to prevent access to dangerous zones at construction sites or to mark the boundary of skiing tracks at ski resorts. The installation process is similar to the previous one, but 80% of the structure surface needs to be covered. The stiffness and strength of this material is even lower than that of the polymer mesh. Fig. 10-8 shows an adobe model retrofitted with the protection mesh after a shaking table test. 10.3.5 PP-band mesh (Meguro et al. (2005)); (Sathiparan (2005)); (Mayorca (2003)) Although this technique has not been originally developed in Peru, it is an economic alternative to improve the earthquake resistance of adobe houses. An external reinforcing coating in which plastic packing bands (polypropylene bands) are arranged in meshes is used as reinforcement. These bands are inexpensive, durable, strong, tolerate large deformations, and are easy to handle and transport. In this method, the structure is

Fig. 10-8. Protection mesh reinforcement for adobe houses (Source: M. Blondet)

Fig. 10-9. PP-band mesh reinforcement for adobe houses

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Table 10-1. Comparison of adobe reinforcement material prices (Sources: Blondet et al.[1]) Mesh type Welded wire steel mesh Polymer mesh (Tensar BX1100) Protection mesh PP-band mesh 1)

Mesh cost (US$/m2) 1.95 2.00 0.50 0.20*1)

Assuming that the house owner prepares the mesh

entirely covered with meshes. The stiffness and strength of this material are between those of the polymer mesh and the protection mesh. A preliminary cost estimation of the material for construction revealed that the last two options are the most economical. Table 10-1 shows a comparison of the prices of different reinforcement meshes in the Peruvian market. It should be noted that in case of PP-band mesh, the cost of the plastic welder, which is essential for preparing the mesh, is not included because it is assumed that the local government would own and lend it.

10.4 Dissemination of Reinforced Adobe Construction Techniques As shown in the previous section, technical solutions to built earthquake resistant adobe houses are available. In spite of this, the fact is that these recommendations are not followed by the majority of the population. In order to disseminate adobe retrofitting techniques, several initiatives have been undertaken. Here, only two case studies to which the author had the access will be presented. 10.4.1 Construction of House Basic Modules in Reinforced Adobe (Convenio PNUD-SENCICO (2003)) This pilot project was carried out between July 2002 and January 2003. It was possible due to the coordination of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the financing of the Italian Government, the support from the local government for the transportation of materials and tools, and the support of the San Agustin National University (UNSA) for the geotechnical study and socio economic evaluation. In this context, UNDP subscribed an agreement with the National Service for the Normalization and Training for the Construction Industry (SENCICO) to assist on the

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Fig. 10-10. Layout of adobe house basic module (Source: SENCICO - Arequipa Office)

Fig. 10-11. Finished adobe house module (Source: F. Itoh)

house building and training of the beneficiary population. The project's main objective was to train the population affected by the June 23, 2001 earthquake on reinforced adobe construction techniques. In this process, it was expected that houses damaged in that event would be rehabilitated, the vulnerability of adobe buildings reduced, the population trained to make a living by constructing earthquake resistant adobe houses, and as a whole, to improve the quality of life of the rural population. Two types of basic house modules were constructed in five towns in Arequipa, all of them located approximately 3,000 m above sea level. The main difference between them was the roof, in one case a gable roof and in the other a shed roof. Fifteen modules of the first type and 82 modules of the second type were built. Fig. 10-10 shows the architecture of one of the modules. The method used for retrofitting the houses was external steel welded wire mesh.

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Workshops on adobe preparation, footing and plinth construction, wall construction, and light roof construction were carried out. Also, one basic house module was constructed with all the participants in order to practically demonstrate the various construction stages, correct mistakes and clarify doubts. When finished, this module became a real scale example. In total 216 people were trained on different construction procedures related to reinforced adobe construction. A systematic assessment of the impact of this pilot project was not part of this initiative. Therefore, there is no way to assess how the population attitudes changed as a result of this project. 10.4.2 Training and Diffusion of Improved Technology for the Construction of Adobe Houses in Localities of Extreme Poverty Located in Semi-rural Areas of Lima (SENCICO (2005)) This project was carried out with funding from the Japan International Cooperation Agency in collaboration with SENCICO as technical advisor

Fig. 10-12. One-story reinforced adobe module at Pacaran, Lima (Source: F. Itoh)

Fig. 10-13. Prefabricated quincha panel at Pacaran, Lima (Source: F. Itoh)

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and the NGO Alternativa, which was in charge of carrying out the promotion works and organizing the beneficiary population. The objective was to promote a training program for the construction of adobe in semi-rural areas in Lima with improved seismic capacity, sanitation conditions, functionality and durability. The project was carried out in areas of extreme poverty located in Yauyos and Canete, specifically in the districts of Pacaran, Vinac, and Lunahuana. The part of the project related to adobe construction consisted of the construction of two demonstration modules of one and two stories, respectively. The former one was completely built using adobe, whereas in the latter, the first floor was made of adobe and the second floor was made of prefabricated quincha panels (bamboo mesh plastered with mud). The study and selection of the material source for the preparation of the adobes was part of the project. Training courses on how to adequately prepare adobes were carried out. A total of 5,000 full-size adobes and 5,000 halfsize adobes were prepared at both Pacaran and Lunahuana. A booklet explaining how to build with improved adobe was also prepared. The adobe houses were reinforced with internal vertical and horizontal canes and also buttresses/pilasters were provided. These options are convenient for new houses. Fig. 10-12 and 10-13 show the construction site.

10.5 Concluding Remarks As presented in the previous sections, a large share of the Peruvian population lives in vulnerable houses: brick/block masonry and adobe/tapial. Although technologies to build earthquake resistant dwellings are available, still they are not extensively implemented. To overcome this situation, several initiatives of technology diffusion have been carried out. Although these pilot projects have been successful in achieving their short term objectives, i.e. construction of a certain number of good quality houses, training of a certain number of masons, in the long term, the sustainability of these initiatives is questionable. Generally, a systematic assessment of the projects’ impact on the population is not carried out. Several reasons may be pointed out for the lack of progress in improving the quality of house construction in Peru. In the author’s opinion two are most important: the lack of people’s awareness of earthquake disaster and the limited financial resources of the general population. Although immediately after an earthquake the disaster consciousness is relatively high, this effect lasts very little and soon people, worried about satisfying

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other more urgent needs, forget the threat that a seismically vulnerable house represents. Because earthquake recurrence periods are long, it is difficult to keep people’s awareness at a high level. Furthermore, the failure of experts to communicate risk and people’s indifference are to blame for this situation. The lack of financial resources is also responsible for the poor quality of the housing stock. In Peru, almost 25% of the population lives in extreme poverty, i.e. with less than US$1/day and about 50% lives with less than US$2/day. Therefore, no matter how inexpensive a retrofitting methodology is, a government (central or local) sponsored promotion system is a necessary driving force to successfully address the problem of low quality housing. Some interesting promotion schemes have been proposed by Yoshimura and Meguro (2004). The private sector can also be an effective driving force. The housing deficit of the country is very high and in order to overcome it, inexpensive construction methods are necessary to best allocate the limited financial resources. Adobe is a cost-effective construction system which under the adequate conditions can have a good seismic performance. Unfortunately, lately this system has become a symbol of low social status and as a result people prefer to invest the little money they can save on shifting to poor quality brick/block houses rather than improving the quality of their existing adobe structures. In the author’s opinion, revalorizing the adobe system is imperative to reduce the housing deficit.

Notes [1]

Blondet et al (2006) Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Government of Japan and Infrastructure Development Institute, Japan (2006) Interview survey.

References Blondet, M., Torrealva, D., Vargas, J., Velasquez, J. and Tarque, N. (2006) “Seismic Reinforcement of Adobe Houses Using External Polymer Mesh” (Proc. of the 1st European Conference on Earthquake Engineering and Seismology, Geneva, Switzerland (CD-ROM)) Blondet, M., Torrealva, D., Vargas, J. and Velasquez, J. (2006) “Seismic Reinforcement of Adobe Houses Using External Polymer Mesh” (Proc of the 100th Anniversary Earthquake Conference, San Francisco, USA (CD-ROM))

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Convenio PNUD - SENCICO (2003) Construcción de Módulos Básicos de Viviendas en Adobe Reforzado (Construction of House Basic Modules with Reinforced Adobe) Mayorca, P. (2003) Strengthening of Unreinforced Masonry Structures in Earthquake Prone Regions. Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Tokyo Meguro, K., Mayorca, P., Sathiparan, N., Guragain, R. and Nesheli, N. (2005) “Shaking table tests of small scaled masonry models retrofitted with PP-band meshes” (Proc. of the 4th International Symposium on New Technologies for Urban Safety of Megacities in Asia, Singapore) Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Government of Japan and Infrastructure Development Institute, Japan (2006) Preliminary Study on Seismic Retrofitting Methods Diffusion Project in Peru National Institute of Statistics and Informatics - INEI (1961) The 1st National Housing Census National Institute of Statistics and Informatics - INEI (1972) The 2nd National Housing Census National Institute of Statistics and Informatics - INEI (1981) The 3rd National Housing Census National Institute of Statistics and Informatics - INEI (1993) The 4th National Housing Census National Institute of Statistics and Informatics - INEI (2005) The 5th National Housing Census National Institute of Civil Defense, Direction of National Prevention (2001) Vulnerability Analysis and Risk Estimation. Sathiparan, N. (2005) Experimental Study of Retrofit of Masonry Building by PPBand Mesh. Master Degree Thesis, IIS, The University of Tokyo San Bartolome, A., Quiun, D. and Mayorca, P. (2005) “Proposal of a Standard for Seismic Design of Confined Masonry Buildings”, Bulletin of the Earthquake Resistant Structure Research, 38 SENCICO (1999) Norma Tecnica de Construccion E-080 Adobe (Building Code E-080 Adobe) SENCICO (2005) Memoria Anual 2005 (2005 Annual Report) Tejada Schmidt, U. (2001) “Buena Tierra – Apuntes para el diseño y construcción con adobe – Consideraciones Sismorresistentes (Good soil - Notes on adobe design and construction - Earthquake resistant considerations)”, Centro de Investigacion, Documentacion y Accesoria Poblacional Torrealva, D. (2005) “El Desarrollo de las Normas Peruanas de Adobe 1985-2005 (Development of Peruvian Adobe Building Codes 1985-2005)” (First Seminar Earth-Habitat and Technology, Universidad Centro Occidental “Lizandro Alvarado”, Barquisimeto, Venezuela) Vivienda, Ministry of Housing, Construction and Sanitation, Government of Peru (2002) Vivienda para todos (A House for everybody) Vivienda, Ministry of Housing, Construction and Sanitation, Government of Peru (2006) National Building Code Yoshimura, M. and Meguro, K. (2004) “Proposal of Retrofitting Promotion System for Low Earthquake-Resistant Structures in Earthquake Prone Countries”

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(Proc. on 13th World Conference on Earthquake Engineering, Vancouver, Canada) Zegarra L., Quiun D., San Bartolome A., Gisecke A. (1997) “Reforzamiento de Viviendas de Adobe Existentes. 2da Parte: Ensayos Sísmicos de Módulos (Reinforcement of Existing Adobe Houses. 2nd Part: Seismic Tests of Housing Modules)”, Summary of a research project sponsored by CERESIS-GTZPUCP, XI CONIC

Acknowledgements The author would like to thank the Infrastructure Development Institute, Japan, for the opportunity to join the Study Team sent to Peru to explore ways to improve earthquake resistance of houses. Much of the information presented in this article was collected during that field survey. The author would also like to thank SENCICO (Lima, Arequipa, Moquegua/Tacna offices) for kindly sharing their experience in adobe construction technology diffusion projects.

11. Improving Vulnerable Urban Space in Postdisaster in Yogyakarta and Central Java, Indonesia: Participatory and Comprehensive Approach

Suprayoga Hadi

11.1 Introduction

11.1.1 The Disaster The Earthquake disaster on May 27, 2006 at 5:53 AM local time measuring 5.9 on the Richter scale, which lasted 53 seconds, hit not only most areas in all five districts of Yogyakarta Province but also affected a few areas in Central Java Province. Yogyakarta Province, which is located in the southern part of central Java Island, lies on a tectonic and volcanic area. The active Merapi Volcano is on the northern part and in the southern part (Indian Ocean) is a the Sunda plate, which is the subduction zone of the Australian plate. The epicenter of the earthquake was in the Indian Ocean about 33 km south of Bantul District in Yogyakarta Province. History shows that tectonic earthquake disaster has struck Yogyakarta Province more than five times since 1937, which two of which, including earthquake in May 2006, resulted in major devastation. The crossing of plate Australia-Eurosia is a major cause of disasters in this area. The impact of disaster was highly concentrated on the high density built up area in the district of Bantul in Yogyakarta and district of Klaten in Central Java. It implies that the damage heavily impacted housing and private sector building, primary small and micro enterprises located in residential areas. A serious impact on the productive sectors leads to a threat on the deterioration of poverty levels. A comprehensive analysis made by the Damage and Loss Assessment Team estimate the total amount of dam-

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age and losses caused by the earthquake at Rp. 29.1 trillion, or US$3.1 billion. The analysis also estimates that about 30,000 small and medium enterprises have been directly affected by the disaster, resulting in the loss of around 130,000 jobs. As a consequence, the unemployment rate is likely to rise from 7% to around 11%. Therefore, government efforts for rehabilitation and reconstruction not only focus on physical reconstruction but also on the recovery of productive sectors, particularly small and micro enterprises, such as ceramic, small-scale handicrafts, batik, furniture and leather industries. Other disaster threats in Yogyakarta come from the Merapi Mount. In early May 2006 the volcano erupted result in hot lava slides more than 5 km away to the southern and southeastern parts of Merapi. This eruption threatened about 70,000 people surrounding the volcano, and led to the Center of Volcanology and Geological Hazard Mitigation raising the alert level to Level 1, indicating that a major eruption is eminent. 11.1.2 Structure of Paper The structure of paper consists of: 1. Introduction 2. Characteristics Vulnerability in Yogyakarta and Central Java. This chapter describes physical, socio and economic conditions of the affected area and also examines main issues from the analysis of the damage and loss assessment. 3. Policy and Planning for Post-disaster Rehabilitation and Reconstruction. This chapter intends to present the overall approach of governments for rehabilitation and reconstruction, including government’s policy, rehabilitation plan and monitoring, and institutional framework to support the implementation of recovery. 4. Comprehensive Approach for Improving Vulnerable Urban Space. This chapter aims to describe the medium and long-term government policy for improving the vulnerable urban space 5. Conclusion

11.2 Characteristic of Vulnerability in Yogyakarta and Central Java This section aims to illustrate the vulnerable urban space in Yogyakarta and Central Java with regard to social and economic vulnerability, which

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led to high death toll, psychological trauma, significant housing damage, and ruin of livelihoods. 11.2.1 Geography and Demography Yogyakarta Province and Central Java Province are located in the central and southern part of Java Island. With Yogyakarta as its capital city, Yogyakarta Province consists of four districts and one city, while Central Java Province consists of six districts. Population density in Yogyakarta ranks second nationwide and Central Java ranks fourth, while density in the Yogyakarta City ranks third among all urban districts in Indonesia (Table 11-1). As seen in the table below, the severely damaged areas, Bantul, Klaten and Sleman districts, are among the most densely populated areas in both provinces. 11.2.2 Social and Economic Conditions Nominal Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) for DI Yogyakarta Province in 2004 (current price) was Rp. 21.8 trillion, or approximately US$ 2.3 billion, accounting for about 1% of the national GDP. In Yogya karta Province, services and trade jointly made up almost 40% of the regional GDP in 2004, while agriculture accounted for about 17%. Table 11-1. Demographic conditions (Source: Poverty Statistical Data 2004) Province and district Population (100s)

Area (km2)

Yogyakarta Province Bantul Sleman Gunung Kidul Yogyakarta City Kulonprogo Central Java Province Klaten Magelang Boyolali Sukoharjo Wonogiri Purworejo Indonesia

3,133.0 508.0 575.0 1,431.0 33.0 586.0 6,051.4 656.0 1,085.7 1,015.1 466.7 1,793.4 1,034.5 1,981,122.0

3,280.3 823.4 955.2 695.7 419.2 386.8 5,800.0 1,139.2 1,158.1 941.7 838.3 1,010.6 712.1 212,000.0

Density (Inhabitants/km2) 1,047.0 1,620.9 1,661.2 486.2 12,703.0 660.1 958.5 1,736.6 1,066.6 927.7 1,796.4 563.5 688.4 107.0

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Table 11-2 shows the real regional GDP and GDP growth for Yogyakarta Province and the five districts, Central Java Province and district Klaten. There were 117,560 small medium enterprises (SME) in Yogyakarta Province and Klaten district before the disaster. Central Java and Yogyakarta have been known as the centers of production for furniture, ceramics, handicraft and batik. 11.2.3 Damage and Loss Assessment Immediately after the disaster, the government, coordinated by BAPPENAS, prepared the damage and loss assessment (DLA). The assessment was undertaken jointly by BAPPENAS, the provincial and local governments of Yogyakarta, provincial and local governments of Central Java, and international partners, namely the World Bank, the Asian Table 11-2. Real GDP and GDP growth (Source: Statistical Bureau 2005) Province and GRDP (constant Annual growth rate Economic structure (FY 2004 in billion Rp.) district price 2000) (%) 2002/20032003/2004AgricultureServices Trade, res- Total 2004 2003 taurant & (trillion (trillion hotel Rp.) Rp.) Yogyakarta 152.40 165.40 4.60 5.10 3,637.00 4,290.00 4,171.00 21,847.60 Province Bantul 2.93 3.08 4.69 5.04 967.38 610.76 738.74 4,171.38 Sleman 4.60 4.84 5.08 5.25 1,029.82 1,307.56 1,391.73 6,639.51 Yogyakarta 3.99 4.20 4.76 5.05 29.79 1,404.94 1,337.47 5,875.89 Kulonprogo1.34 1.40 4.19 4.52 463.37 375.38 297.98 1,835.82 Central Java 129.20 135.80 5.00 5.10 38,490.00 19,650.00 38,940.00 193,438.00 Province Klaten 3.56 3.74 4.91 4.95 1,161.53 734.68 1,305.25 5,124.91 Indonesia 1,536.00 1,607.00 4.50 4.60 347,600.00 205,200.00390,300.00 2,202,870.00

Table 11-3. Impact of the disaster on SMEs in Yogyakarta and Central Java (Source: Estimates of Joint Assessment Team 2006) Name of affected district

Number of SMEs (predisaster) Bantul 21,306 Klaten 25,000 Yogyakarta City 8,619 Sleman 18,558 Gunung Kidul 21,659 Kulonprogo 22,418 Total 117,560

Affected unites Formal Informal Total

Workers in SMEs Formal Informal

9,588 4,500 776 1,113 650 673 17,299

335,570 157,500 27,150 38,972 22,742 23,539 605,472

5,040 3,360 1,680 1,120 560 560 12,320

14,628 7,860 2,456 2,233 1,210 1,233 29,619

30,160 13,440 6,720 4,480 2,240 2,240 49,280

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Development Bank and the United Nations. As the earthquake struck in the early morning, it trapped many people in their homes and killed almost 5,900 people, injured more than 37,000 people and made hundreds of thousands homeless. Comparing the demographic conditions in Table 11-1 with Table 11-4 shows that Bantul and Klaten districts are the most heavily affected districts with densely populated areas. The damage and loss assessment shows to what extend the disaster affected the local economy development, estimated at Rp. 29.2 trillion, or US$ 3.1 billion. More than 50% of the damage and loss affected the housing sector and 90% affected private ownership. Major findings of the damage and loss assessment show that: 1. Damage to public infrastructure was less than predicted 2. Damage and losses in houses and tertiary infrastructure were significantly high. Houses mostly were privately owned with poor construction. Table 11-4. Housing Damage, Dead Toll and Number of Injured People (Source: Ministry of Public works 2006) District

Number Housing damage of housing (unit) (before Totally Lightly disaster*1) damage damage Yogyakarta Province 703,545 203,138 146,278 Bangul 181,991 148,440 69,905 Sleman 196,965 22,467 32,446 Gunung Kidul 158,570 15,071 17,967 Yogyakarta City 78,079 14,348 16,189 Kulonprogo 87,940 9,143 9,771 Central Java Province 963,333 99,730 104,111 Klaten 280,513 95,892 96,253 Magelang*2 285,401 772 546 Boyolali 219,537 764 2,258 NA 1,529 2,427 Sukoharjo NA 168 309 Wonogiri Purworejo 177,882 376 2,113 NA 3 1 Kebumen NA 85 68 Temanggung NA 141 136 Karanganyar Total 1,666,878 302,868 250,389

Dead toll Injured

4,659 4,121 240 81 195 22 1,057 1,041 10 4 1 1 5,716

1) Number of housing before disaster based on “Podes 2003” 2) Magelang (city and district)

19,401 12,026 3,792 1,086 318 2,179 18,526 18,127 24 300 67 4 4 37,927

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3. Damage in productive sectors was considerably high and led to significant job loss in micro and small enterprise sectors. The damage also severely affected manufacturing, energy, water and sanitation services. 4. Damage in the social sector was significant, such as education facilities, religious buildings and cultural sites. 5. Damage in cross-sector was considerable, mostly publicly owned, such as in the public administration sector, including buildings, equipment, personnel and public records, and in the financial sector.

Fig. 11-1. Number of victims and housing damageFig. .

Table 11-5. Damage and loss assessment (Source: Preliminary Damage and Loss Assessment 2006) Sector

Disaster effect Damage Loss Housing 13.9 1.4 Social sectors 3.9 0.1 Productive sectors 4.3 4.7 Infrastructure 0.4 0.2 Cross-sectoral 0.2 0.1 Total 22.7 6.5 (Trillion Rp.)

Total 15.3 4.0 9.0 0.6 0.3 29.2

Ownership Private Public 15.3 2.1 1.9 8.9 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.2 26.5 2.7

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11.2.4 Impact on Economic Performance As a consequence of physical damage, particularly on productive sectors, the disaster contributed to the deterioration of employment, poverty and hence on the regional economy and local government finances. The damage and loss assessment shows that: 1. Bantul district’s economy is the most affected compared with other districts in Yogayakarta and Central Java. It is expected that the GRDP will decline by 23%, followed by Klaten district (9%) and Kulonprogo (7%). 2. The reduction in economic activity is likely to result in the loss of around 130,000 jobs, which represents about 4% of total preearthquake employment in the affected area. As a consequence, the unemployment rate is expected increase from 7% to 11%.

11.3 Policy and Planning for Post-disaster Rehabilitation and Reconstruction in Yogyakarta This chapter intends to demonstrate the policy action particularly for shortterm planning of post-disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction. It covers: -

Recovery policy and systematic approach; Action plan for rehabilitation and reconstruction; and Institutional framework for post-disaster rehabilitation reconstruction

and

11.3.1 Recovery Policy and Systematic Approach Considering the magnitude of disaster, rehabilitation and reconstruction will take three years beginning immediately after the emergency response stage. Based on and the nature of the destruction, the policy for rehabilitation and reconstruction policy emphasizes: 1. Housing and settlement recovery. This policy is aimed to rebuild and rehabilitate homes based on earthquake resistant standards, better environmental health through proper water and sanitation, and local aspirations and needs. Based on this policy, housing reconstruction is undertaken using the community-based participation approach. The central government, through the Ministry of Public Works, issues ministry regulation guidelines for post-disaster rehabilitation and

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reconstruction of housing in Yogyakarta Province and Central Java Province. This regulation is followed by the standard operation procedure issued individually by the provincial government of DI Yogyakarta and Central Java. Then, the local community, assisted by community development consultants and village facilitators, undertake reconstruction based on the regulations and guidelines. Since housing and settlement recovery is the main priority for rehabilitation and reconstruction, the government puts its effort to provide funding from various sources, such as from the national budget (APBN) and multi-lateral international donors. 2. Public infrastructure recovery. This policy supports recovery of the role of public infrastructure services, which boosts the revitalization of social life and the local economy. So far, infrastructure rehabilitation and reconstruction is mostly undertaken through funds provided by central, provincial and local government agencies. 3. Local economy revitalization. The goal of this policy is to provide support for stimulating local economic activities and income of the community, which leads to lowering the poverty level. Since the majority of the affected people work in small and micro enterprises, the government intends to provide immediate employment opportunities through the provision of central, provincial and local government budgets as well as international donors. The damage and loss assessment shows that the unemployment rate might rise from DLA

ASSESSMENT

NATIONAL ACTION PLAN

PROVINCIAL ACTION PLAN

LOCAL ACTION PLAN

BUDGET ALLOCATION REHAB & RECON

NATIONAL BUDGET & DONORS GRANTS

NATIONAL BUDGET & PROVINCIAL BUDGET

NATIONAL, PROVINCIAL & LOCAL BUDGETS

EXECUTION OF REHAB & RECON

CENTRAL LINE MINISTRIES

PROVINCIAL AGENCIES

LOCAL/ DISTRICTS AGENCIES

ACTION PLANS REHAB & RECON

MONITORING IMPLEMENTATION REHAB & RECON

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION REHAB & REKON

•FINANCE •PHYSICAL •PERFORMANCE

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

CONSISTENCY COORDINATION CONSULTATION CAPACITY

•INPUT •PROCESS •OUTPUT

OUTCOME/ BENEFIT

Fig. 11-2. Reconstruction planning and monitoring process

INDICATORS INPUT PROCESS OUTPUT

IDICATORS EFFICIENCY EFECTIVENESS BENEFIT

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7% to around 11% as a consequence of the disaster. It shows that the services sector, including small and medium enterprises, is hardest hit, and accounts for most of the total job loss (55%). Therefore, the government is facing the challenge of how the recovery could bring building back better. The approach of local economic recovery is particularly undertaken by providing the working capital and equipment, and also by supporting small and micro enterprises with working capital. To support the recovery of livelihoods, international donors are allowed to carry out their programs directly in the community under the supervision and coordination of participating local governments. Government responsibility regarding post-disaster recovery includes not only implementation of rehabilitation and reconstruction, but also monitoring the impact of reconstruction and measuring to the benefit of reconstruction to the community and regional economy in general. The overall rehabilitation and reconstruction process is illustrated in Fig. 11-2. 11.3.2 Action Plan for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction

Need assessment

Following the damage and loss assessment, the central government coordinates preparation of the rehabilitation and rehabilitation action plan.

Damage and

Needs

Action Plan

Estimated

Estimated

ACTION PLAN

Damage &

Recovery Needs

FOR

over POLICY PRIORITY

GROUPED INTO

STRATEGY

3 FOCUSES OF Data

Data

Source

source

from

from

Fig. 11-3. Need assessment and action plan approach

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In the first stage, a need assessment is carried out based on the following process: 1. Pre-disaster baseline data from Statistics Agency and other sources 2. Assessment stages: a. Preparation and preliminary assessment conducted at the national level; o data collection from emergency relief efforts, optimizing information from any possible data centers o updating and verifying data and information regularly b. Field survey and data collection; c. Updating and verifying data. Continuously updating and validating the data as required for further recovery planning o conducted collaboratively by national, provincial and local government agencies with donor assistance o consistent and sustainable coordination and consultation o assistance from experts in rapidly assessing needs and possible impact o role of local governments and community is instrumental in monitoring and verifying the assessment process, through participatory process d. Process 3. Formulation the recovery plan, including financing plan National Action Plan

Prior to implementing the reconstruction process, BAPPENAS provided a National Action Plan for post-disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction, in collaboration with central government agencies, the provincial and local governments of DI Yogyakarta, and the provincial and local governments of Central Java. The implementation of recovery will take three years, up to 2008. The National Action Plan elaborates; 1. National policy and strategy for implementing the recovery process. As mentioned above, the rehabilitation and reconstruction emphasizes housing and settlement recovery, public infrastructure recovery and local economy revitalization; 2. Financing. Considering that rehabilitation and reconstruction should be implemented immediately and requires a huge amount of funds, the government tries to seek funds from various sources, including the central government budget, provincial and local government budgets, grants and loans from international funding, and private/individual funding;

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3. Activity and responsible parties. The action plan details activity to be undertaken and responsible parties, central government agencies, provincial agencies and local government agencies. International donors as well as private sector parties who contribute to reconstruction should be under the supervision and coordination of the government. Based on the National Action Plan, the provincial governments of DI Yogyakarta and provincial government of Central Java prepare their Provincial Action Plan. The total budget estimate based on the National Action Plan is shown in Table 11-7. Table 11-6. Financing scheme for rehabilitation and reconstruction Funded by private/ company/ community

Housing and settlement Public Infrastructure

Economic recovery

Financial stimulation, and regulatory support : economic sector in general

Funded by community/ private with government support Physical rehabilitation

Government Expenditure with support from community

Funded by Government Expenditure

Physical rehabilitation : electricity Water and sanitation telecom

Physical rehabilitation : market-place, government building, cultural heritage, health, education, public facilities

Physical rehabilitation: road, bridge, irrigation

Financial stimulation and regulatory support : SME

(Government expenditure/government support include support from donors) Table 11-7. Budget estimate for rehabilitation and reconstruction Sector

Damage and Losses (Trillion Rp) Housing & Settlement 15.3 Social Sector 4.0 Economic Sector 9.0 Infrastructure 0.6 Cross-Sector 0.3 Total 29.2

Budget Estimation (Trillion Rp) 7.0 2.8 1.3 0.4 0.2 11.7

% of DLA

46% 70% 14% 60% 66% 40%

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11.3.3 Institutional Framework for Post-disaster Rehabilitation and Reconstruction The government of Indonesia adopts two stages of post-disaster recovery: the emergency response phase and the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase. Emergency Response Phase

The emergency response phase was undertaken as soon as the disaster occurred and lasted about one to two months. This phase was led by Bakornas PBP (National Coordinating Board for the Management of Disaster), which mainly provides planning and coordination among central government agencies and provincial and local governments during emergency relief. The Bakornas PBP is chaired by the Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia. Implementation is coordinated by the Satkorlak PB (Provincial Coordinating Unit for the Management of Disaster) at the provincial levels and implemented by Satlak (District/City Implementing Unit) at the district/city levels. During this stage, many donors and stakeholders/NOGs gave contributions for emergency relief coordinated by Satkorlak and Satlak. 11.3.4 Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Stage The rehabilitation and reconstruction stage for post-disaster is carried out following the termination of the emergency response stage. Normally the stage will last two to three years. To accelerate the recovery process, GoI establishes a special agency for the rehabilitation and reconstruction process. For the post-disaster recovery process in Aceh, the GoI adopts a centralized approach, in which the central government establishes the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Board for NAD-Nias (Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi NAD-Nias). Decentralized approach has been adopted for the post-disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction stage in Yogyakarta. For this purpose, the government issued the Presidential Decree no. 9 in 2006 regarding the establishment of a Coordination Team for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Post-disaster in Yogyakarta Province and Central Java Province. The National Coordination Team, which is chaired by the Coordinating Ministry of Economy, plays its role mainly for policy, strategy and action plan for the post-disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction. The National Coordination Team consists of the Steering Committee and the Executing Team.

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The Steering Committee is assisted by the National Technical Team, which has the main role of providing implementation guidelines for policy and strategies, and providing recommendations and solutions for problems and constraints in the implementation of rehabilitation and reconstruction. Unlike the Steering Committee, the National Technical Team is posted in Yogyakarta. The Executing Team is established in DI Yogyakarta Province and Central Java Province, and chaired by the Governor. Based on the Keppres 9/2006, the Executing Team is responsible for providing operational policy and strategy, and preparing the regional action plan. National Technical Team held monthly technical workshop attended by all stakeholders involved in the implementation of rehabilitation and reconstruction, such as some central government agencies, provincial and local government agencies, international donors and other key players. The main issues from the technical workshops are regularly reported to the Chair of National Coordination Team. In monitoring the progress of the recovery process, BAPPENAS together with the executing agencies are assigned to formulate and implement a monitoring and evaluation system for rehabilitation and reconstruction. Monitoring and evaluation of the implementation are aimed to: (1) monitor the flow of funds from various sources to the reconstruction process, (2) measure the progress of the reconstruction efforts and financial disbursements, and (3) measure the socio-economic impact of the reconstruction.

11.4 The Way Forward: Comprehensive Approach for Improving Vulnerable Urban Space After recent experience from various disasters in Yogyakarta and other areas, including earthquake, volcano and tornado, the government is now trying to examine the approach to minimize impact from disaster. In general, the approach for disaster preparedness and risk reduction is both topdown and bottom-up. The top-down approach is facilitated through national policy and regulation, while the bottom-up approach is mainly for the implementation of disaster preparedness. 11.4.1 National Policy and Action for Disaster Risk Reduction Although regulations for disaster management have not been enacted, the national action plan for risk reduction was launched last month. It is devised in response to the increase incidences of natural disasters in the

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country within the last two years, such as the Yogyakarta and Central Java earthquake and the Aceh and Nias Tsunami. The national action plan is a national document specifying platforms, priorities, action plans and mechanisms pertaining to the implementation and institutional basis of disaster management in Indonesia. It elaborates interests and responsibilities of all stakeholders identified through a participatory coordination process and in line with the Hyogo Framework for Action. The purpose of the action is to provide guidelines and information that will facilitate decision makers to pledge commitment to cross-sector and jurisdictional priority programs based on a strong and systematic foundation. Currently, disaster risk mitigation and management has become one of nine priorities for national development as prescribed in the government’s Work Plan (RKP) 2007, enacted through Presidential Regulation No. 9/2006. The disaster risk reduction activities stated in the RKP 2007 are allocated under the Natural Disaster Management Policy through the following programs: 1. Enhancement of natural disaster mitigation and climate forecasting; 2. Spatial planning and natural resource protection zoning, including disaster-prone areas in coastal zones and sea areas. The current spatial plan will be improved by incorporating the risk mitigation policy and management; and 3. Development of a natural disaster management system and early warning system. Key targets in RKP 2007 for disaster mitigation and management are; 1. Completion of emergency response, rehabilitation and reconstruction in regions affected by disasters in 2005 and 2006; 2. Strengthening of the preparedness of institutions and the community in preventing and mitigating the risks of future natural disasters. 11.4.2 Regional Strategic Framework and Building Local Government Capacity At the regional level, the priorities will be addressed in order to: 1. Support the provincial and district/city governments in mainstreaming Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) into annual and middle-term development plans;

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2. Build awareness among executive and legislative branches of the government and other relevant stakeholders on the importance of DRR; 3. Facilitate provincial and district/city in formulating action plans for DRR; 4. 4. Support the provincial and district/city governments in the establishment and institutional building of disaster management institutions at their respective levels and the conduct of capacity building for DRR mainstreaming 5. 5. Facilitate coordination and cooperation among local stakeholders involved for the purposes of setting-up appropriate disaster management institutions. 11.4.3 Community Based Participation for Disaster Preparedness and Risk Reduction To implement disaster preparedness and risk reduction at the local level, the following actions are taken in line with: 1. Disaster preparedness and risk reduction: a. To formulate locally appropriate manuals produced for earthquake resistant construction; b. To develop multi-hazards (volcanoes, floods, landslides and earthquakes) risk assessment maps and community response plans at the community levels. 2. Development of multi-stakeholder Community-based Disaster Risk Reduction (CBDRR) initiatives: a. To develop CBDRR initiatives involving multiple stakeholders; b. To support cooperation and coordination among government, civil society and other relevant stakeholders in developing CBDRR models; c. To formulate joint action plans to build the resilience of the community towards disasters within the CBDRR framework; and d. To provide guidelines for disaster mitigation, promotion of safe construction practices, building codes, guidelines for retrofitting, training for construction workers, and the development of community-based early warning systems.

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11.5 Conclusions Disaster in Yogyakarta occurs due to vulnerable conditions: 1. With an area of 32.5 km2 and more than 80,000 housing units, Yogyakarta has become one of the most densely populated areas, with an average of 2,464 units/ km2. 2. Among the 62,200 houses in Yogyakarta, around 78% already are permanent structures and more than 17,800 housing units are semipermanent or non-permanent structures made of wood or bamboo. 3. Around 22% of housing in Yogyakarta is relatively vulnerable, mostly semi-permanent, and vulnerable to windstorms, and is made of wood, bamboo, and unstable structures. 4. At least nine sub-districts in Yogyakarta have more than 1,000 nonpermanent houses in each sub-district. 5. High population density, exceeding16,098 people/km2, makes Yogyakarta very vulnerable if a big disaster happens. Furthermore, disaster impact is not only due to vulnerable physical conditions, but also social and economic conditions that lead to the expectation of increased poverty levels and the deterioration of welfare following a disaster. Finally, in general, the various disasters have resulted in significant impact in Yogyakarta from the following causes: 1. Natural and man-made hazards, such as environmental degradation and geotechnical hazards; 2. High vulnerability of communities, infrastructure and elements in cities in disaster-prone areas; 3. Low capacity within the local governments and community.

References Bappenas, the Provincial and Local Government of DI Yogyakarta, the Provincial and Local Government of Central Java, and International Partners (2006) Preliminary Damage and Loss Assessment, Yogyakarta and Central Java Natural Disaster Bappenas (2006) Action Plan for Earthquake Post-disaster Rehabilitation and Reconstruction in DI Yogyakarta province and Central Java Province Office of the State Minister for National Development Planning / National Development Planning Agency and National Coordinating Agency for Disaster Management (2006) National Action Plan for Disaster Reduction 2006-2009

12. Community Empowerment Program on the Revitalization of Kotagede Heritage District, Indonesia Post Earthquake

Laretna T. Adishakti

12.1 Introduction Yogyakarta Special Territory (Jogja) in Indonesia has experienced difficult times since the 5.9 Richter earthquake struck on May 27, 2006. At least 6,000 people died, and many more were injured and lost their homes. As a result of this terrible natural disaster, Jogja has lost its unique cultural heritage (both tangible and intangible). This cultural heritage is comprised of the World Heritage Prambanan temple, Yogyakarta Palace area, the inside the Baluwerti fortress, which is well known as the nJeron Beteng area including Tamansari and the Kotagede Historical District. The earthquake also seriously disrupted core activities of local industries such as sterling silver, batik craft, pottery, wood craft, ikad, and other traditional crafts practiced in the southern part of Yogyakarta and Bantul District. Kotagede Heritage District is Jogja's older area with remains of the old Mataram Kingdom. This heritage site is well known for its traditional houses, unique Kalang houses, and kampong of sterling solver craftsmen, and is now seriously endangered. Many traditional houses, which are an embodiment of folk heritage, have been destroyed by the earthquake. Their owners, deprived of the necessary resources, might not be able to restore buildings in their traditional forms. Most craftsmen have lost the necessary resources to continue their work. Therefore, urgent actions are needed in order to safeguard these precious assets (tangible and intangible culture heritage). Later they could have significant potential for the local economy and create an attractive tourist destination. Post earthquake, a revitalization program of the Kotagede Heritage District, has been initiated by Pusaka Jogja Bangkit! (Jogja Heritage Revival!). Collaborative parties consist of the Jogja Heritage Society, the

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Center for Heritage Conservation, the Department of Architecture and Planning at Gadjah Mada University, the Indonesian Network for Heritage Conservation, ICOMOS Indonesia, and other supporting institutions including the local community. This program focuses on building the local economy through strengthening both tangible and intangible heritage for economic and sustainable development.

12.2 Principles of Action and Agenda

12.2.1 Indonesian Charta on Heritage Conservation 2003 (Piagam Pelestarian Pusaka Indonesia 2003) Heritage may exist in the form of setting, and it can be composed of various potential local resources: both abiotic (natural and built up), biotic (flora and fauna) as well as socio-cultural activities. It is stated in the Indonesian Charter for Heritage Conservation 2003, that: 1. The heritage of Indonesia is the legacy of nature, culture, and saujana, the weaving together of the two. Natural heritage is the construct of nature. Manmade heritage is the legacy of thought, emotions, intentions, and works that spring from over 500 ethnic groups in Tanah Air Indonesia, singularly, and together as one nation, and from the interactions with other cultures throughout its history. Saujana heritage is the inextricable unity between nature and manmade heritage in space and time. 2. Cultural heritage includes both tangible and intangible legacies. 3. Heritage, bequeathed from the generations that precede us, is the a vital foundation and initial capital for the development of the Indonesian nation in the future, and for these reasons, must be conserved and passed along to the next generation in good condition, without loss of value, and if possible with an enhanced value, to form heritage for the future. It is stated also in the Indonesian Charter for Heritage Conservation 2003 that heritage conservation is the management of heritage through research, planning, preservation, maintenance, reuse, protection, and/or selected development, to maintain sustainability, harmony, and the capacity to respond to the dynamics of the age to develop a better quality of life. The notion of conservation has moved from being mainly concerned with beautification, to a more holistic approach that is based on participation

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programs, economic analysis and attracting business and cultural activities to the area. In such cases, people who live in this environment are a major component to be considered. It is a vision for various concerned heritage organizations in Indonesia to develop heritage conservation as people's life style. 12.2.2 Paradigm Shift regarding Heritage Management The heritage places and spaces created by ordinary people have been taken into consideration as universal valuable assets over the past several decades. UNESCO highlights this paradigm shift regarding heritage management through classification as Table 12-1 shows. 12.2.3 Paradigm Shift regarding Heritage Management Various international declarations on heritage and risk preparedness have been utilized as guidelines for recovery actions (Table 12-2). Table 12-1. Paradigm shift regarding heritage management (Source: Engelhardt (2006)) OLD Monuments of princes, priests and politicians Abandoned, relic sites Physical components

+ + +

Management by central administration Elite use (for recreation)

+ +

NEW Places and spaces, ordinary people Continuing communities Living tradition and practices Decentralized community development Popular use (for development)

Table 12-2. International declarations on heritage and risk preparedness International dec- Fund laration 1st National Summit on Heritage & Risk Prepareness The Kobe/Tokyo Declaration on Risk Prepareness utk Pusaka Budaya 1997 Declaration of Asisi, 1998

EmerUndergency re- standing spond

 





Collabora- Human R&D tion resources development



  Education & Training

Heritage protection

  







Restration & reconstruct ion

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12.3 The Setting Kotagede located about 6 km to the southeast of Yogyakarta City. Yogyakarta is a palace city built in 1755. The rulers in this Muslim Mataram Kingdom were successors in various courts from the 15th century, namely Pajang, Kotagede, Kerto, Plered, Kartosuro, Surakarta and the devised of Mataram as Surakarta and Yogyakarta. Formerly, during the 8th to the 10th centuries, this region was known as Mataram, but as the site of the First Great Central Javanese Empire which fundamentally followed Buddhist and later Hindus principles. There was a succession of Indian kings, such as the builders of the magnificent Buddhist temple Bodobudur and the Hindus temple Prambanan. Yogyakarta, after the independence of Indonesia in 1945, became the Special Territory of Yogyakarta. The city of Yogyakarta is now known as a student city, major tourist destination, the center for traditional and modern arts, as well as one of the best art centers in the whole of Indonesia. Kotagede, the former capital of the Islamic Mataram Kingdom in the 16th century, means "big city." It represents the Javanese ideal site and its unique characteristics. As a typical city of Java, the urban structure of Kotagede was formerly based on the concept called Catur Gatra Tunggal (four components in one). It means that the center of a Javanese city consist of four components, namely palace, mosque, market and square (alunalun). The palace was surrounded by the wall and the inner moat (Jagang Jero). In the 16th century, Kotagede functioned as a busy and lively center of trade. In this century, the two components of the Javanese city that remain are the Grand Mosque of Mataram (Masjid Agung Mataram) and the market, which is still busy. Several other physical assets are the Mataram Royal Cemetery, Seliran Ancient Pool, Monuments (Clock of Hamengku Buwono VII and Fort Baluwerti), Kalang houses, traditional houses and the townscape (historical buildings, small alleys, and rukunan streets). In terms of biotic assets, Kotagede has various types of historic flora and fauna, for instance banyan trees and other rare trees. The sites of palace and the square are occupied by settlements known as Kampung Alun-alun and Kampung Dalem. Although the remains of the palace and parts of the royal features disappeared long ago, the residential structure still exhibits significant Javenese culture. Those current settlements and urban spaces that are mostly now utilized by present society form a living cultural asset and are famous for their silverworks. Administratively, Kotagede (442.67 ha and 36,303 population as of 2006) belongs to two districts (Yogyakarta Municipality and Bantul Re-

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gency). It consists of five urban villages: Kalurahan Prenggan, Kalurahan Purbayan, Kalurahan Basen, Desa Jagalan and Singosaren. As a religious compound, Kotagede invented the fast-learning method of reading the Koran especially for children. Beyond the well-known image of silver crafts, Kotagede is also a center of Javanese crafts and arts (gold, silver, copper, leather, etc.) and traditional food (kipo, legomoro, etc.). Performing arts include gamelan music groups (karawitan), religious music groups (syalawatan), Javanese poetry reading (mocopat), keroncong music, tingklung wayang puppet, as well as offering ceremonies on special days (caos) and leading an ascetic religious life (tirakatan).

12.4 The Threats Before the earthquake Kotagede already had many problems due to social changes. There are more and more young people do not like living in Kotagede, as it does not meet their the demands regarding space. This brings about the decline of handicraft industries, decreasing interest in cultural activities, and neglect of architectural remains, where many traditional houses are ignored as well. Along with many historic residential areas in Jogja as well as Indonesia, Kotagede has suffered from all kinds of uncontrolled transformations. The deliberate changing of urban spaces, activities, and economic values reveal multiple ways of how the local people misuse their environment. Many historic buildings have been either demolished or transformed according to new inappropriate designs and increasing pressures on Kotagede. Since the May 27, 2006 tectonic earthquake, the condition of Kotagede has been declining steadily. The disaster has damaged the high culture heritage/monuments (adipusaka budaya) as well as ordinary/folk heritage (pusaka rakyat) in Kotagede. Based on rapid assessment of the damage to traditional houses (especially with the Joglo roof style) conducted by Jogja Heritage Revival!, the team estimated damage to 88 of approximately 150 Joglo traditional houses as follows: -

8 houses (9%) are destroyed. 47 houses (54%) are collapsed and inhabitable. 16 houses (18%) partly collapsed (not all habitable) 17 houses (19%) cracked

On the other hand, most of Jogja's heritage, including Kotagede, are just located in Opak Creek, the area that sustained the most damage in the May 27, 2006 earthquake. As the registered history of recurrent tectonic

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Fig. 12-1. Images of damaged folk heritage

Fig. 12-2. Most of Jogja’s heritage sites are located along Opak Creek

earthquakes testifies, earthquakes happen every 50 to 60 years in this region. The previous ones took place in 1867 and 1943. After the earthquake, many traditional houses in Kotagede have been destroyed. Their owners, deprived of necessary resources, might not be able to restore them to their traditional forms. Frustration of these houses owners not being able to restore their houses to their traditional character have raised concerns regarding the loss of these types of houses. Many owners have even sold salvaged valuable parts from their houses and remove them from the housing site. Very simple earthquake proof houses will replace those traditional houses, as the current compensation from the government for housing reconstruction is viewed as not matching the values to restore the damaged to traditional houses. Evidence has been recently found that the utilization of this government compensation has destroyed the form and value of traditional houses due to inappropriate design and reconstruction.

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At the same time, most crafts people have lost the necessary resources to work. In this case, the district not only lost valuable intangible culture heritage but also has experienced sharp decline of the local economy. The townscape has deteriorated, as well as the social economy.

12.5 Actions Two days after the earthquake, the Center for Heritage Conservation, the Department of Architecture and Planning in the Faculty of Engineering at the Universitas Gadjah Mada, and Jogja Heritage Society, in collaboration with many of their colleagues and institutions (Indonesian Heritage Trust, ICOMOS Indonesia and others) decided to set up a special Heritage Post called Pusaka Jogja Bangkit!/PJB! (Jogja Heritage Revival!) dedicated to the people of Jogja and its valuable heritage. The rapid assessment of damaged heritage supported by the World Bank Jakarta, including budget estimate and time schedule for rehabilitation and reconstruction, was carried out two weeks after the earthquake and was released on June 14, 2006. This assessment, which includes an inventory of both tangible and intangible cultural heritage, is also an effort to promote the urgency of reclaiming folk heritage. Further, instead of providing and distributing immediate assistance for humanity, PJB! has formulated comprehensive activity programs aimed at maximum mobilization of people concerned with heritage at local and international levels, including earthquake victims, to work together to rebuild the affected areas. Priorities need to be set in the context of emergency response and recovery actions post earthquake regarding the urgency of lost heritage. The PJB! team set the top priorities as folk tangible and intangible heritage, and wooden and brick traditional construction. Three heritage sites are selected as first priority, and within each site a heritage point of service (Heritage Post) was established, as follows: -

Kotagede Heritage District Imogiri Cultural Heritage Complex of Yogyakarta Palace (Kraton)

A revitalization program for Kotagede Heritage District has been initiated since then. Following is a report covering the quick emergency relief to the long-term recovery program in the revitalization of Kotagede Heritage District.

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12.5.1 Emergency Relief Efforts 1. Heritage Post was formed at Rudi Pesik residence on June 4, 2006 2. Humanitarian relief efforts were undertaken, including distributed food, necessary construction and carpenter tools, first aid kits, and Tshelters in Kotagede. 3. Jogja Heritage Revival! Website: www.jogjaheritage.org was created. 4. Organized collaborative efforts, coordinating activities, fundraising activities, and disaster damage assessment that impact the local, national, and international level: o PJB! submitted the rapid assessment draft to the head of BAPPEDA DIY a week after the earthquake (Saturday, June 1, 2006); o Distributed rapid assessment final report to local, national and international stakeholders, that include local and national level government (after June 14, 2006); o PJB!, through Frances Affandi, president of ICOMOS Indonesia, distributed the rapid assessment final report to ICOMOS International (after June 14, 2006); o President ICOMOS Indonesia met with Global Heritage Fund in Palo Alto, CA, US, in July 2006 and followed this meeting with the visit of GHF to Jogja in September 2006; o Jogja Heritage Society collaborated with Benteng Vredeburg Museum, Atmajaya University Department of Architecture, Duta Wacana University Department of Architecture, YKPN Department of Architecture, Archaeological Center of Yogyakarta Special Province, Balai Pelestarian Peninggalan Purbakala and held a workshop-seminar on the 250 years of the City of Yogyakarta with emphasis on the new ideas of the movement on Jogja heritage revitalization post-earthquake at the Benteng Vredeburg Museum on September 16, 2006. o Participated in coordination meeting with Cultural Ministry and UNESCO post earthquake; o Laretna T. Adishakti presented the current condition, action plan of Jogja heritage revitalization in several countries, including Singapore, Netherland, Korea, and Japan. o Hosted and brainstormed with many international delegations that visited Jogja and Kotagede post earthquake, such as Netherlands government representative, Global Heritage Fund, Kyoto government

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representative, Eisenhower Fellowship Program, JICA, and many institutions from various countries. 5. Studied detail damage assessment and created the database of Kotagede, that was released in July 2006; 6. Organized a meeting with local government leaders in Kotagede heritage district on August 4, 2007 in Omah Duwur, Kotagede, Yogyakarta 12.5.2 Transformation and Restoration on Kotagede Heritage District Revitalization The concept

A comprehensive revitalization program that will unify all the revitalization efforts towards common goals to revitalize tangible and intangible heritage and to restore local economic condition as an essential part of restoring a sustainable environment has been proposed by PJB! x Vision The rebirth of Kotagede Historic District with social, cultural and environmental quality better than it was prior to the earthquake, where the community has the capacity to manage the restored cultural heritage independently and where the restored heritage could give economic and cultural impact back to the community x Mission - Revitalizing tangible and intangible heritage, including gotongroyong tradition owned by the local community, and encouraging participation and leadership. - Developing community awareness and collaborations among many stakeholders in the revitalization activities. - Restoring environmental quality and economic conditions by developing the per-capita income, if possible to raise a higher income pre-earthquake. - Creating unified revitalization efforts by restoring spatial planning and infrastructure of the historic district. - Promoting Kotagede Heritage District as an integral part of the national and international heritage. The major challenges are how to develop the awareness of the local and national government as well as the community and private sector regarding the importance of conservation of the site and its value to the culture and economy. Efforts to maintain public awareness and promote its heritage as

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economic capital are strongly needed. However, a priority needs to be set regarding folk heritage conservation, as there is urgency in the face of losing heritage when the communities do not have resources to restore their houses to the traditional characters due to the high construction cost. Implementation through Community Empowerment Program

A collaborative project of the Universitas Gadjah Mada and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has implemented a Community Empowerment Program to revitalize the Kotagede Heritage District, spanning from July 17, 2006 through March 26, 2007 under the Community Empowerment Program through POSYANIS and Village Revitalization in Bantul District. This program focuses on building the local economy through strengthening both tangible and intangible heritage as having valuable potential for economic and sustainable development. x Details of Project To assist local organization for the heritage district and its community to transform the recovery ideas into revitalization actions and conduct detailed assessment and advocacy on the damaged traditional houses and Kalang houses as well as capacity building in the affected areas. x Purposes - To revive people's livelihoods and welfare in affected areas by community participation through gotong royon tradition and to generate collaboration with local NGOs, concerned foster parents and private sectors nationally and internationally. - To unify the conservation efforts by restoring Kotagede Historic District infrastructure and community design. x Outputs - Increased awareness and sense of belonging regarding the importance of conserving the heritage assets - A complete inventory and documentation of all sub-districts in Kotagede heritage district - Independent local communities to manage their own cultural heritage resources - Improved environmental conditions and infrastructure through community participation - Improved capacity to monitor and implement conservation regulations - Foster parents and investors provide funds for rehabilitation and reconstruction

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x Activities There are six approaches for this program, as follows (1) management and organization, (2) documentation and presentation, (3) promotion, (4) activities planning, (5) building and district design, and (6) economic restructuring. During UGM-JICA CEP in Kotagede, several other Kotagede revitalization activities have also been conducted, namely the 2nd Congress of Indonesian Heritage Trust focusing on Kotagede revitalization, Reconstruction of Folk Heritage supported by government of Netherlands and Total Indonesie, and the 4th International Field School on Asian Heritage: Master Conservation Planning for Kotagede Heritage District. Those activities propose ideas to resolve issues and problems that Kotagede is facing, while strengthening efforts to empower the local community. The results are: 1. Organization and Management. o The establishment of the Heritage District Local Organization on Heritage District Management, or Organisasi Pengelola Kawasan Pusaka (OPKP) Kotagede at nDondongan, Kotagede, August 17, 2006. o A series of intensive training sessions for OPKP have been carried out o Working with OPKP to develop OPKP vision, mission, and working plan 2007, which needs assistance to implement it. o Seed money for OPKP has been granted by the government of Royal Netherlands, and the CEP UGM JICA team needs to control and monitor the utilization of the funds from January 2007 through December 2007. o On January 15, 2007, Jogja Heritage Society submitted a nomination application for Kotagede Heritage District as one of the World Endangered Sites to the World Monument Fund in New York, US. 2. Docummentation and Presentation. o A compilation and preparation of base map and other secondary data have been collected. o Detailed assessment for tangible and intangible heritage and database formulation for sub-district Jagalan have been completed. o Special data on traditional houses for sub-districts Prenggan and Purbayan has been gathered. o The results of this documentation have been transformed into database format.

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o

Series of training sessions for assessors has been conducted along with the inventory program.

3. Promotion. o A series of local, national, and international symposiums, workshops and exhibition as campaign activities have been organized, as follows: ƒ Community dialogues organized on August 18, 2006, September 9, 2006, and February 20, 2007 ƒ National Workshop on Heritage District Post Earthquake in Kotegede, August 19, 2006 ƒ 4th International Field School Symposium and Workshop on Asian Heritage in Kotagede 17 - 25 February 2007 ƒ 3rd International Symposium on Asian Heritage: Kotagede Post Disaster Mitigation, February 21, 2007 ƒ Monthly exhibition in Kotagede or other venues such as Hyatt Regency Hotel and Universitas Gadjah Mada o A logo for the Kotagede heritage district has been introduced o Unified graphic presentations have been prepared for the campaign 4. Activities Planning. o Working with the local community to formulate the adaptive reuse of heritage buildings as well as the events plan. o Brainstorming ideas for activities to reuse traditional houses. o An art and culture program for 2007 has been planned. 5. Building and District Design. o Working with local and POSYANIS for advocacy and restoration of the heritage houses, including the promotion of proper retrofit, rehabilitation and reconstruction of traditional houses. o Education programs and training on basic knowledge for earthquake-resistant design for traditional houses. o Conducting Folk Heritage Rehabilitation and Reconstruction: ƒ The government of Royal Netherlands assisted in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of four traditional houses in Kotagede and provided

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operational funds to the local historic district management organization (OPKP). The four houses are owned by the Koko family, Edi family, Gembong family and Djoko family. ƒ Donation from Better Air Quality Conference participants utilized for the rehabilitation of the rear part of the Koko family's residents as the new OPKP headquarters. ƒ Gadjah Mada University purchased a damaged historic house to be restored and reused as its office of the Center for Heritage Movement Universitas Gadjah Mada in Kotagede, known as Omah UGM (UGM House). ƒ Total Indonesie, a France-based oil company, is working to rehab two traditional houses and reconstruct the old electrical power house as a landmark of Kotagede. o Trainings on earthquake resistance of heritage buildings for local people have been managed. o Jogja Heritage Society and UNESCO prepared a Homeowner's Conservation Manual from February to July 2007. 6. Economic Restructuring. o Mediating fundraising activities by preparation and implementation of the Heritage Foster Parents Program and Heritage Investment Program. Foster parents, such the Dutch government, Total Indonesie (French oil company), Universitas Gadjah Mada, JICA and Better Air Quality Conference in Jogja, provide funds. o Working with the community to prepare budget schemes, economic reconstruction plans, fundraising, and promoting the Foster Parent Program and heritage investment program. Using the scheme of the Heritage Foster Parents Program, those neglected and damaged heritage sites might maintain their original function; however, under the scheme of Heritage Investment Program those heritage sites might be converted and utilized for cultural and economic business. However, both conditions will benefit the local people and develop a better quality environment and townscape. o Creating Heritage Investment Program. France-base tourism investors have expressed interested to reuse

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traditional houses as boutique-hotels while retaining their traditional characteristics. 7. In collaboration with 4th International Field School on Asian Heritage in Kotagede, which included academia, professionals and students from Japan, India, Thailand, Taiwan, Malaysia and Indonesia, a Preliminary Master Conservation Planning has been formulated.

The damage condition post earthquake

Process of reconstruction Fig. 12-2. Reconstruction of Edy's family traditional house supported by the government of Royal Netherlands (Source: Laretna T Adishakti and M. Natsir Gembong)

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12.6 Lessons Learned Drawing from the experiences in Kotagede post earthquake, following are lessons regarding community work on vulnerable urban heritage space and its conservation management. The importance of a community mediator for the revitalization and conservation process

Although the awareness and initiative of the local people regarding community work and heritage conservation for vulnerable urban heritage space were present, there still is the need for support from the outside: 1. To raise local understanding and motivation that their district is not a simple site, but is rich with valuable tangible and intangible heritage, 2. To encourage the sense of belonging to the community regarding their heritage, 3. c. To transform heritage conservation ideas into actions. A professional community mediator for disaster mitigation of heritage conservation will be a new profession in resolving these needs. Building capacity in this new field is crucial. The needs for comprehensive strategy from the mediator in working with the community

This comprehensive strategy has covered: 1. Conducting coordinated collaboration from various parties including public-private partnership engaged in the heritage disaster area 2. Strategically select damaged heritage priorities to be recovered 3. Capability in managing the controlled field operation 4. Organizing networking on new technology, expertise, funding, and other donations 5. Building human resources which are responsive, enthusiastic, militant, and placing them as needed. The need for international community cooperation

Currently, there is some international cooperation for professionals in the case of conservation issues as well as disaster mitigation for cultural heritage. Conservation of heritage district post earthquake faces universal problems; however, transforming the ideas of conservation into actions should be based on the locality in maintaining its historicity and unique-

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ness. The "down to the earth" approach and people-centered development must be understood as keywords to meet these objectives. In this regard, international cooperation among professionals is not enough. The international cooperation among local people from various countries should be encouraged, where they can share and exchange experiences. Effective networking mechanisms should be generated, and professionals as well as interested bodies can act as international community mediators. The Community Empowerment Program in Kotagede needs to be sustainability extended.

Revitalization of Kotegede Heritage District is predicted to be a long-term program (approximately 20 years). The local community still needs assistance to empower themselves and to transform the ideas of recovery into revitalization actions. Therefore, the Community Empowerment Program in Kotagede needs to be sustainability extended.

References Engelhardt, R. (2006) World Heritage regime: trends and realities in the Asia Pacific Region

13. A Review of the 921 Post-earthquake Community Rehabilitation of the Urban Disaster Area in Taiwan

Kuang-Hui Peng and Yao-Chi Kuo

13.1 Introduction Earthquakes can be devastating to economic life, as well as individuals, families and social networks at every level. The total number of people killed by earthquakes in Taiwan in the twentieth century had been ranked 19 among the world’s earthquake-prone countries (Coburn and Spence (2002)). Thus, the experience of community rehabilitation in vulnerable urban areas highly affected by the 921 earthquake in Taiwan might be a good example to be shared with other countries. This paper is motivated by the lessons learned and implications gathered from efforts to relieve, restore and recover from the catastrophe in the aftermath of the 921 earthquake. For the purpose discussing community rehabilitation in vulnerable urban space, this paper aims to review the efforts of community-based rehabilitation in the 921 post-quake urban disaster areas. Specific emphasis is placed on the lessons and implications in planning and executing the 921 earthquake community recovery programs. Taiwan was struck by a destructive earthquake, measuring 7.3 on the Richter scale, on September 21, 1999. The epicenter was at a depth of 8 km underground and 12.5 km southwest of Sun Moon Lake in Nantou Country. It was the most devastating disaster to strike Taiwan in the 20th century (Table 13-1). Particularly the central region of Taiwan, including Taichung City/County, Miaoli County, Changhua County, Nantou County, Chia-I City/County, accounted for 31 towns that were severely damaged by the earthquake. The earthquake and its aftershocks caused the deaths of 2,455, injured 11,305 and 50 went missing; completely destroyed 50,652 housing units, and 53,615 half-crumbled; and destroyed 102 bridges and 37 highways across the affected areas of Taiwan (Kuo (2003)).

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Table 13-1. The 20th century’s most lethal earthquakes in Taiwan year

epicenter

magnitude fatalities

1906 1935 1941 1946 1951 1959 1964 1999

Chia-I Miaoli Chia-I Hsinchu Hualien Pingdong Tainan Nantou

7.1 7.1 7.1 6.5 7.3 6.9 6.5 7.3

1) 2)

1,258 3,276 358 74 68 17 106 2,455

damage level to housing units complete half dadamage*1) mage*2) 6,772 14,218 17,907 36,781 4,520 11,086 1,950 2,084 1,016 582 1,214 1,375 10,502 25,818 50,652 53,615

It likely to be a situation of ‘destruction,’ viz very heavy structural damage, collapse of ground floor or parts of buildings (Coburn and Spence (2002)). It likely to be a situation of ‘substantial to heavy damage,’ viz moderate structural damage, heavy non-structural damage, cracks in column joints of frames at the base and at joints of coupled walls. Spalling of concrete cover, buckling of reinforced rods. Large cracks in partition and infill walls, failure of individual infill panels (Coburn and Spence (2002)).

Fig. 13-1. 921 Post-earthquake disaster area in Taiwan (Source: Based on Central Geological Survey (2000))

The earthquake was essentially caused by an inter-crushing in particular zones between the Chelungpu Fault and the Shuantun Fault (Fig. 13-1). The Chelungpu Fault is about 96 km in length, which made the area near the fault vulnerable. It was estimated about 17,000 ha of land needed a cadastral resurvey resulting from the fault rupture. It was estimated to have

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caused a total economic loss of around 360 billion NT dollars (equivalent to 11.25 billion US dollars) (Kuo (2006a)). After the earthquake, the President issued an Emergency Order and then organized a special 921 Earthquake Post-disaster Recovery Commission in the central government, which essentially was a taskforce. Meanwhile, a branch was established in the disaster area to take charge of the recovery tasks. The Legislative Yuan subsequently approved the provisions of the Temporary Act for Post-921earthquake Reconstruction the following year. The Temporary Act (2000) provided that the central government be required to form a 921 Earthquake Post-disaster Recovery Commission and mainly focus their jobs on negotiation, decision making, promotion, and inspection. The Commission then coordinated ministries and local governments, drew up a special budget for recovery, set up a reconstruction fund, amended the Temporary Act for Post-921earthquake Reconstruction, and created a mechanism for managing the recovery affairs. Except the budget of NT$106.124 billion in 1999 and 2000 added for reconstruction, the central government in 2001 released the general budget of NT$6.235 billion and a supplementary special budget of reconstruction of NT$100 billion. The governmental budget for recovering the post-disaster areas thus counted up to NT$ 212.3 billion in total. By February 2006, an estimated total of 96.67% of the implementation rate accounted for a budget of NT$205.286 billion actually spent for accomplishing the desired purpose. Besides, it was calculated that donations for 921 post-disaster recovery totaled an additional NT$33.9 billion, which was managed by individual organizations (Kuo (2006a)). A multifaceted recovery program has been implemented by the Commission and provided by the Housing Policy and Implementation Program of the 921 Earthquake Recovery Area, which includes programs of urban renewal, repairing, reinforcement, demolition and reconstruction of damaged grouped housing, single housing and temporary housing implementation, rural village reconstruction, aboriginal settlement reconstruction, new community development, mudflows village relocation as Fig. 13-2 illustrates (Kuo (2006b)). In this paper, ‘community rehabilitation’ mainly focuses on physical reconstruction, which refers to those earthquakedamaged urban areas[1] designated for the implementation of reconstruction[2], renovation[3], or maintenance[4] in accordance with the procedures instituted in the urban renewal program and repairing, reinforcing, demolishing and reconstructing damaged communal housing. The ‘urban disaster area’ generally refers to urban area ruined by the 921 earthquake. Moreover, the recovery process can be broadly classified into the immediate relief period[5], the rehabilitation period and the reconstruction period. This

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Urban area / Non-Urban area Non-Urban area

Strategies

/

Actions

/

Programs

Individual Building Reconstruction

single housing and temporary housing Program

Grouped housing repair, reinforcement, & reconstruction at original site

program of repairing, reinforcement, demolition and reconstruction of damaged grouped housing

Revising land use to rural zone or formulating / expanding urban plan

Mudflows Village Relocation

Mudflows Village Relocation Program

Defined as aboriginal settlement reconstruction zone

Aboriginal village reconstruction

Aboriginal Village Reconstruction Program

Defined as rural village reconstruction zone or land readjustment zone

Rural village reconstruction

rural land readjustment

Revising urban plan

Rural Village Reconstruction Program

Renewal / reconstruction New community development

Defined as urban renewal zone

.

land readjustment and expropriation

Defined as mudflows village relocation zone

Defined as rural renewal zone

Urban area

Individual Building Reconstruction (not included in community rehabilitation) Community Rehabilitation (including the grouped housing renewal reconstruction)

921 Post-earthquake Recovery Area

Approachs / Areas /

Renewal and reconstruction land expropriation / urban-land readjustment

New Community Development Program

Urban Renewal Program

(Bold rectangle refers to the focus and research scope of the paper) Fig. 13-2. Multifaceted 921 post-earthquake recovery program in Taiwan (Source: Adapted and modified from Kuo (2006b))

paper is concerned with reviewing community rehabilitation during the rehabilitation and reconstruction periods, which refers to a research scope from the end of the relief period to last a number of years. It has been eight years since the 921 earthquake. Based on a literature review, this paper firstly attempts to note issues of community rehabilitation in the vulnerable urban area. Then it reviews how the damaged communities of the 921 earthquake urban disaster area have been rehabilitated by specific enforcement plans and evaluates the strategies that were applied to the areas. Finally, implications and recommendations will be drawn from experiences and knowledge regarding community rehabilitation.

13.2 Key Issues The physical damage by the 921 earthquake had to be repaired. As a new start, community rehabilitation might be a daunting prospect. Although it was difficult to know where and how to start and to step out toward recovery, community rehabilitation created opportunities to make improvements on the conditions that existed before the earthquake. However, a literature review (Kuo 2006b) illustrates that community rehabilitation of the urban disaster area faced a multitude of issues, as follows.

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13.2.1 Land Utilization and Cadastral Management The 921 earthquake caused massive changes in the boundaries of pieces of land, which resulted in discrepancies between the cadastral map and the actual layout of the land. It was difficult to carry out reconstruction because of these discrepancies. Cadastral map amendment and land resurvey of rehabilitation sites became imperative to adjust land boundaries and cadastres, which had to be made to verify the scope of land ownership so as to make community rehabilitation possible. Missing landowners and varying opinions on jointly owned lands and the rezoning of jointly owned lands made it very difficult to reach an agreement for rehabilitation. In the matter of rehabilitating the original sites where buildings clustered in the community, they might be extensive destroyed. However, pursuant to the Apartment Building Management Regulation and Urban Renewal Act, a resolution to rehabilitate community should be reached by a high percentage of landowners’ agreement, viz a resolution should be passed by the votes at least 3/4 of the meeting quorum comprised of at least 2/3 of the land’s joint-owners having at least 2/3 landownership. Furthermore, the Chelungpu Fault was and is still active, and the vulnerable area nearby the fault is prone to subsequent disasters. Reconstruction should therefore keep the vulnerable area at a certain distance. For those destroyed buildings which were legitimately constructed previously or located in the new construction banned sections of the fault belts, or that could not be rebuilt on the original sites, meant that the urban planning should be up-to-date and amendments should be processed to provide the appropriate zoning for rehabilitation. 13.2.2 Disputes of Housing-safety Inspection and Rehabilitation In an effort to reduce damage caused by the aftershocks of the 921 earthquake, the authorities related to public works, construction and planning within the local governments called together architects, civil engineers, structural engineers and geotechnical engineers to conduct a round of classification of damage to buildings. These damaged buildings were classified and color-coded to determine damage levels including dangerous (red), requires attention (yellow), and safe (green). Furthermore, the central government conducted a series of programs of social relief and resettlement arranged for the victims. However, final decisions on the damaged buildings were made by the townships, which categorized them as completely damaged and half damaged. Unfortunately, subsequent preferential social

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aids were on the basis of the same classification. It becomes a dispute that some of the property owners argued against the final decisions due to the property owners being benefited by the determination. Another dispute was caused by the different expectation of the property owners, including decisions against reconstruction, renovation or maintenance made on their properties due to the lack of dependable technical evaluation standards, differences in psychological cognition and in financial capacities among different property owners. In other words, there was a need to institute a set of impartial and dependable criteria for substantial arbitration both economically and physically

13.2.3 Red-tape of Implementing Rehabilitation Applying for approval involved a great deal of procedures, which delayed the progress of the rehabilitation program. The complicated processes included organizing reconstruction groups, placing a case on file for investigation, drafting the community renewal business plan[6] that should consider the prior situation and specify the planning area for rehabilitation, implementers’[7] detailed plans and map specifications, management methods and the block division, and construction and improvement plans of the public facilities within the area, including layout and design drawings. It also involved renovating or maintaining the reconstruction, repair, and maintenance of the buildings within the areas, the standards of design specifications for improving the facilities, and land use plans of the reconstruction blocks, including the building layout and design specifications, methods of implementation and the relevant shared expenses, removal and settlement plans, financial plans, implementation schedule and so forth. Further matters were applying for building permission, subcontracting and project construction, applying for usage permits, property ownership registration, completion reports of projects, settlement of all financial accounts, and the dismissal of the rehabilitation group. Furthermore according to the Urban Renewal Act, when the government is drafting or revising the community renewal business plans to submit for approval, it should be agreed by more than 60% of the owners of the lands and legal buildings within a renewal unit. [8] The total land area and the total floor area of the legal buildings they own should be more than two thirds. However, the action should be agreed to by more than two thirds of the owners of the lands and legal buildings within a renewal unit, and the total land area and the total floor area of the legal buildings they own should be more than 75% of the total.

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13.2.4 Difficulties in Raising Funds for New Reconstruction and Paying Off Previous Loans A majority of the victims were burdened with great loans before the earthquake. Although their buildings were destroyed by the earthquake, they remained obliged to pay off previous mortgages and a new loan for reconstruction. Moreover, they needed to bear another huge financial burden including the cost of pre-construction operations, such as the demolition of the damaged structures, and the demolition, repair and reconstruction of public facilities such as the retaining wall and slope protections for reconstruction. In short, the fund and load for people who are under the pressure of loan for old and new houses, or who can’t solve the problems regarding property rights, cause them to fail to apply for building licenses or to take a loan. In addition, people who couldn’t offer sufficient guarantees or who had the record of non-performing loans also led to them failing to take a loan.

13.3 Strategies and Programs for Community Rehabilitation There is certainly an urgent need to restore public confidence in any community recovering from a disaster. Above all there is a need for all the groups to be involved in such an emergency, including the government officials, the NGOs and the affected communities themselves. Recovery strategies and programs for rehabilitation have to be met by a large extent of help. The strategies and programs required for the 921 post-earthquake community rehabilitation mainly covered simplifying legal operating procedures, organizing counseling groups, providing regulations for relevant subsidies and loans, and other benefit entitlements as detailed below. 13.3.1 Simplifying Legal Processes In response to the urgent need of rehabilitating housing in the reconstruction sites and to help the victims rebuild their homes, the legal processes and consenting ratios stipulated in the Urban Renewal Act were duly simplified to speed up the process. Thus, when the implementers were now drafting or revising the community renewal business plans to submit for approval, it was that the new levels of agreement should be by more than 50% of lands and legal buildings owners within a renewal unit, and that the total of land area and total floor area of the legal buildings should be

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more than 50%. Thirty days duration for public exhibition and hearing was also reduced to a period of 15 days. However those who already obtained full consents from all the joint-owned land owners and building ownerships entitled to the reconstruction could also now be exempted from holding public exhibitions and hearings. It also provided new incentives for stimulating reconstruction by offering up to 0.5 times the total legal floor area ratio. 13.3.2 Organizing Counseling Services The following services were provided in the affected communities. 1. Establishing counseling groups for professional services: To set up a communal housing reconstruction service group to provide consultation on the overall urban renewal and communal housing reconstruction; to provide a real-estate consulting service and guidance for assisting in the gathering and analysis of problems faced in community reconstruction; and to set up a reconstruction consultation service center for helping the victims to solve their own reconstruction problems. 2. Holding reconstruction seminars, training sessions and demonstrations: Seminars were held to address the procedures required for communal housing reconstruction, to set up and assist the functioning of renewal groups, to implement the procedures required for obtaining approval on the renewal business framework, business plan, the procedures required for ownership transfers, and the requirements and procedures for applying for loans for these purposes. A demonstrative reconstruction project was undertaken to serve as an example for the communal housing reconstruction. 3. Preparing manuals on operating reconstruction: The Urban Regeneration Research and Development Foundation was empowered to produce publications, figures, maps and other relevant document formats and related procedures required for the communal housing reconstruction. The project was unprecedented, thus it had a need to form guidelines to follow on the issue of how to compensate, or deal with ownership transfers for those unwilling or unable to participate in the reconstruction project.

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13.3.3 Qualifications for Subsidy The government had already allocated different budgets at the various administrative levels according to the victims’ reconstruction needs to alleviate their financial burdens. The specific items covered under the subsidy scheme included the urban renewal program and execution costs, building planning and design fees, and design fees for the renewal areas’ public facilities. 13.3.4 Loans Regulations Loans from the Community Reconstruction Fund accounted for NT$1.8 million, which was then designated for each household conducting community reconstruction. For the purpose of relieving the financial burden of the victims who opted for joining in the reconstruction project, the 921 Earthquake Relief Foundation set apart NT$5 billion from public donations to the cause for aiding the reconstruction works. The Commission also coordinated with the Construction and Planning Agency to allocate 3 billion from the Community Reconstruction and Renewal Fund for such loans. This project on the one hand assisted those who opted out of the Community Renewal Program in holding their property ownerships, and on the other provided up to 80% of the loan without interest for those who participated in community reconstruction. Furthermore the government subsidized a total of 70% of the expenditure for repairing and maintaining those essential public facilities of the community, while the residents only shouldered 30% of the cost. The government also paid the total cost for demolishing completely destroyed buildings and underground structures that were owned privately. 13.3.5 New Community Development The government loaned and subsidized the related authorities to develop new communities near the disaster area as a supplement to community rehabilitation. This provided: (1) general housing to resettle those victims previously living on or nearby the fault, in mudflows areas or other vulnerable terrains, and for those living in apartments that were completely destroyed or were impossible to be recovered. Also included were those living on the land reserved for developing public facilities, and living in an area that should be relocated, and (2) affordable housing for social and economic minorities.

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13.4 Evaluation of Community Rehabilitation

13.4.1 Improving Rehabilitation In planning the community rehabilitation after the earthquake, heavily damaged areas needed to be tackled differently from less damaged areas. Rehabilitation strategies for the urban areas were also different from the needs of the countryside. The types of subsidies, incentives and professional consultation provided for those affected by the earthquake were also different. The extent of self-reliance and expectation of living standards will be affected by individuals, families and organizations. Therefore, the handling of devastated reconstruction not only demanded achieving consensus from a considerable number of property owners, it further involved the state authority in maintaining public safety. In matters of the government in terms of upholding civil rights and state authority, the Dispute Mediation Panel for Building Safety Assessment was established for guarding civil rights, and was responsible for facilitating property owners to have meetings, to lower the thresholds required for determining community reconstruction, and to assist with renovation or maintenance in upholding the state authority. In reviewing the strategies and programs of community rehabilitation, there were also some achievements that proved to have served their purposes in delivering the following benefits: 1. Efficient and punctual preparatory work is good for rehabilitation: After the earthquake, some consideration will be given to immediate reconstruction work, but preparations must be made for the long-term recovery. The issue immediately involved in the case was to manage the land cadastres, as mentioned before, which were caused by the fault rupture. It was necessary to prepare an available cadastre map with an updated database as a first basis for rehabilitation and reconstruction. The Land Survey Bureau used precise and advanced equipment to resurvey more than 130,000 pieces of land and digitized to build up a new data system for community reconstruction and properties. This also benefited the acceleration of the review of urban planning. These preparatory actions were helpful for subsequent community rehabilitation. 2. Provide flexible and collateral measures: Those hit by the earthquake were scattered around central Taiwan. Together with the difference in the characteristics and economic capabilities of the people, the

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community rehabilitation and reconstruction program provided various programs that were much help to accelerate the community rehabilitation and reconstruction. Compared with the Hanshin-Awaji Great Earthquake in Japan and the Northridge California Earthquake in the US, there were approximately 0.2 million units of housing stock nearby to or within the disaster areas, and at that time there were more than 1.23 million units of housing stock available around Taiwan when the 921 earthquakes happened. Apart from the government encouraging and subsidizing the victims to move to this housing stock available elsewhere, the government also offered various programs of subsidies to rent or own that accommodation. In the late stage of the reconstruction, there were still people unable to have their home rebuilt, who mostly included financial and aboriginal minorities, and those who were unable to reach agreement for rehabilitation, or were living on a fault belt, and were having difficulties in getting a loan. To solve these problems, the government set up new relevant plans and collateral measures, such as for example the Weakened Minority Settlement Plan in the 921 Postquake Disaster Areas. The government also added NT$3 billions to assist with this type of community rehabilitation. 3. The reconstruction work involved considerable numbers of owners with varying financial means, which meant that it was difficult to reach consensus. By simplifying legal processes and deregulations provided by the amendment of the Urban Renewal Act and the Apartment Building Management Regulations it accelerated the mediating process and the overall reconstruction program. 4. The employment of the transfer of development right (TDR) to include pro- and contra-rebuilding homeowners’ property values, which enabled pro-rebuilding homeowners to participate in the reconstruction programs while those unwilling received fair compensation. 5. Public subsidies and incentives were adopted to accelerate the rehabilitation program. Nonetheless, different areas had different needs. For example, in urbanized areas the floor area rewarded for reconstruction was much desired, but was unsuitable for the countryside where subsidies could more effectively meet the needs. 6. Lack of finance was a common issue, so the government organized financial institution discounted loans, private donations and government budget in offering interest-free loans and credit guarantee scheme as better means of local financing. 7. A dispute mediation panel was also set up, comprised of members from the central government, scholars, experts, and credible civil

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figures for mediating final decisions on damage assessment. It was helpful in settling disputes in determining the way of reconstruction, renovation or maintenance. 8. A subsidizing mechanism for maintenance and renovation was also set up to ensure building safety and alleviate the victims’ financial burdens. In facilitating cases for repair and reinforcement, the related authorities collaborated in selecting planners, devising repair plans and engineering designs, and subsidizing required public facilities that considerably alleviated the victims’ financial pressures. 9. Additional expertise and technical consultation groups were also organized, such as the National Association of Architects and other related technical associations, which were then able to serve the affected communal housing communities. They also rendered technical support to the local and central government execution of hazard assessment for lifting the ban and functioning of the repair and reinforcement mechanism that effectively contributed to the government’s effort in advancing condo-housing reconstruction. 10.A long-lasting foundation was set up for the new communities: Implementation measures for the housing reconstruction were able to take ecology into consideration. The earthquake resistance regulations for buildings were also further revised in terms of the architecture technologies, allowing single housing or communities and linked housing to endure future earthquake impacts. Such earthquake resistance technologies helped to improve the living and dwelling qualities, providing a lasting and solid foundation for life. 13.4.2 Lessons from Rehabilitation The urban disaster area contained a complex linkage of economic activity and activities dependent on an urban infrastructure and services. The physical planning of the community rehabilitation in the area highly damaged by the earthquake also represented a chance to improve and be better off than before. However, the complexities of land ownership, the social networks and emotional relationships of the neighborhood, the rigid legal procedures and institutions, and diverse expectations always made rehabilitation works much more complicated and lengthy. The Commission consolidated all the new policies to set up guidelines, strategies, procedures and budgets for the rehabilitation. In practice, certain aspects remained to be improved, which are listed below.

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1. Coordinating sectoral plans involved in community rehabilitation: Urban community rehabilitation represents higher investments in public facilities and services. The physical urban reconstruction needs to concentrate on repair and reinforcement of urban services as a first priority. Public utilities such as roads, pipes, cables, bridges, sewerages systems, electricity, gas supply lines and many other civil engineering works needed to be integrated and coordinated with the general community rehabilitation. There will be benefits from combining some operations, such as building schools, repairing sewerage system, bridges and housing in the same rehabilitation operation and using similar administrative procedures to use reconstruction grants to a number of sectors. 2. Urban renewal procedures were found to be too complex to meet the urgent need of rebuilding: Community reconstruction via urban renewal was subject to the Temporary Act for Post-921earthquake Reconstruction, and the Urban Renewal Act which required zoning for rebuilding sites as a renewal unit, assembly of renewal groups as implementers, the establishment and review of reconstruction plans as urban renewal business plans and rights transfer plans.[9] This process demands members meetings, public exhibitions, public hearings, and review committee and dispute mediation before actual building on site engineering can take place. The process is rather protracted, requiring no less than eight months, and this is certainly contrary to meeting the victims’ pressing housing needs. 3. The whole process fell short of the intent to improve the quality of public services in the rehabilitation areas: In the urban renewal adopted for reconstruction of linked housing communities, the victims were starved for the pressing needs of rebuilding their housing, and in the meantime they neglected the quality of public facilities. Upgrading living conditions by providing better public facilities, which was required by the Urban Renewal Act, has not been completely realized. 4. In practice the case of housing reconstruction was the most difficult and time consuming among all measures for community rehabilitation from the ruins. Needs involved not only surveys to ascertain the number of unrepairable dwellings, the number of dwellings in need of repair, and the number of homeless people, but also ways to encourage and finance such housing projects. Thus, a mechanism to collect funding channeled via a rebuilding and renewing fund, and the utilization and management of relevant lands and buildings, remained to be strengthened.

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5. To a certain extent, the dispute mediation panel had done well in making its final assessments. Unfortunately, a number of cases illustrated that the difference of ranking for the classification of damaged buildings made by technical consultation groups and the dispute mediation panel came to a stalemate. Where the mechanism of final assessment failed to characterize the basis for determining completely and half-damaged buildings for administrative purposes, it somehow weakened the efforts in settling disputes. 6. The repair planning and engineering subsidized budgets failed to reach individual repairs and reinforcements: Budget subsidies for repair and reinforcement planning and engineering was initiated on September 24, 200l. However, a number of communal housing repair cases that were undertaken on their own received no subsidies. It was criticized that the subsidies were unfair, as these cases were the most proactive in consolidating resident consensus as well as shouldering repair, yet they received no help from the government. 7. The way of developing new communities for settlement of those who had no chance to rebuild at the original site or were the economic minority prompted complaints about time-consuming urban planning which resulted in much delay in arranging for housing replacement. Cases had shown that preparing a new urban plan always requires larger scale area and enormous budget and takes time. It might not be used only as a short-term expedient. In fact, new community development is a lengthy program with construction being done well and jobs carried out thoroughly. Coburn and Spence (2002) believe that an early start and steady progress in the reconstruction is preferable to a late start and fast progress. In the case of community reconstruction, it is more important to put an emphasis on an early start rather than on a rushed job. 8. Despite the fact that we cannot avoid or predict earthquakes with precision, the impact of earthquakes on properties, life and business operations can be projected or minimized through understanding seismic hazards and careful planning. With economic growth and rapid urbanization came high population density in urban areas, resulting in high-rise buildings and complicated structures, deterioration of poverty-stricken neighborhoods, concentrated use of environmentally sensitive areas such as lowlands and weak soil plates, and the indifference of new-immigrant communities --- all of these have worsened the vulnerability of urbanized areas (Peng and Lin (2005)). To protect these urbanized areas from the structural and nonstructural damage of seismic attacks, one of the most important

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measures is to establish a seismic hazard assessment system for urbanized areas in locations such as Taiwan.

13.5 Conclusions Taiwan has experienced community rehabilitation in vulnerable urban space severely affected by the 921 earthquake. The experiences will remain crucial in the future. In short, the rehabilitation from start to completion, from all the groups involved in the emergency including government, voluntary NGOs, private sector, the affected communities themselves and from the difference in opinions among the participants to come to their own general agreement have been put forward. Although the community rehabilitation in the settlements destroyed by the 921 earthquake needs to be treated as a special case, issues arise including policies, strategies, programs of land utilization, cadastral management, financial support, diverse enforcement plans, public services provision, housing settlement, caring for minority and so forth. These have been addressed and evaluated in the previous paragraphs, but it may be worth considering the benefits and lessons from the case. There are some important considerations that affect community rehabilitation planning and the strategies that are likely to be recommended for future thinking. 1. There should be a clear distinction in responsibilities, budget sharing and follow-up mechanisms for the rehabilitation between the central and the local governments: Lack of professionals and manpower made the local governments overly reliant on the central government in terms of budget and techniques. The case suggests that the government needs to have an early start to outline and prepare the needed information and assistance to provide a rehabilitation preparatory framework as part of disaster prevention and recovery policies. Local governments need further training in rescue and recovery from disaster, while the central government needs to establish a standardized rescue and reconstruction mechanism. There should be a clear definition about fundraising and sharing proportions. Moreover, housing reconstruction follow up includes setting up a mechanism for community development and managing such follow ups. 2. The simplified measures for rehabilitation already developed should be put into the rescue and reconstruction mechanism: The simplification of ownership and legal procedures such as the restoration of the original buildings, the handling of land properties,

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urban renewal, applying for building permits, public exhibition and public hearings in urban planning, should be retained and taken into consideration by the permanent post-major-disaster reconstruction mechanism. 3. There will be an opportunity to improve the disaster community by continued efforts of an ongoing renewal mechanism: There are some successful stories in a number of community rehabilitations which can be good examples for promoting the experiences. The simplified urban renewal mechanism and the rehabilitation experience remain to create a new community characteristic. Evidence suggests that the urban renewal program and the repairing, reinforcement, demolition and reconstruction of damaged communal housing programs are preferably welcomed by the applicants, as an estimated around 80% of them applied for such rehabilitation. 4. The new financial contribution can be retained as a diverse program for long-term community rehabilitation: Evidence proves that financial contribution is the external assistance that most effectively helps a family rehabilitate a damaged house. This had been administered as grants and loans in a multifaceted program in Taiwan. Individual or group applicants can apply the favorable items for their best use. 5. Applying new technologies to prevent community damage from natural disasters, reinforcing earthquake resistance functions, and encouraging existed buildings to meet the need: The implications of this study suggest there is a need to amend the architectural regulations on earthquake resistance designs, such as the horizontal acceleration speeds to be expected in the earthquake areas, the vertical earthquake strength and so forth. For those existing buildings lacking such reinforced earthquake resistance functions, the government might be able to subsidize and encourage their gradual replacement by new structures with such earthquake-resistance functions.

Notes [1] ‘Urban area’ officially refers to places that had prepared or been preparing urban plans of the following physical characteristics: (1) the area with City and Town Plans which include the national capital and special municipalities; provincial capitals and provincial cities; the seats of county government and county cities; townships; or other places considered necessary and agreed and designated by the Ministry of the Interior or the Provincial Gov-

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[2]

[3]

[4]

[5] [6]

[7]

[8]

[9]

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ernment. (2) the area with Rural Settlement Plans which include the seats of township administration offices (defined as areas where the population reached 3,000 five years ago and has increased by at least one third since then); areas where the population has reached 3,000 and over half of the employed population is employed by industry or commerce; or other places as designated by the Provincial or County Governments. (3) Special District Plans which are prepared by the provincial government, or special municipal, provincial cities, and county city governments. The Ministry of the Interior can also prepare these if necessary. These areas are specifically formulated for developing industry, controlling conservation or beautiful scenic areas, or other special purposes (Construction and Planning Agency (2004)). ‘Reconstruction’ refers to the demolition of the former buildings within the renewal area, and the resettlement of the tenants, improvement of public facilities within the area, and changing the usage characteristics of the land or its usage density (Construction and Planning Agency (2004)). ‘Renovation’ refers to remodeling, renovating the buildings or to improving equipment within the renewal area, and improvement of the public facilities within the area (Construction and Planning Agency (2004)). ‘Maintenance’ refers to the strengthening of management within the renewal area, improvement of the public facilities within the area, and the ongoing maintenance there in good condition (Construction and Planning Agency (2004)). It is generally lasting a few days. ‘Renewal business plan’ refers to the plan of implementation of reconstruction, renovation, or maintenance within the renewal area (Construction and Planning Agency (2007)). ‘Implementer’ refers to the institution, organization or group implementing urban renewal business in accordance with the regulations instituted in the Urban Renewal Act (Construction and Planning Agency (2007)). ‘Renewal unit’ refers to any division within the renewal area implemented as an individual urban renewal business (Construction and Planning Agency (2007)). ‘Rights transfer plan’ refers to the plan regulating the land owners, legal building owners, ownership’s of other legal rights as implementers of reconstruction area within the renewal unit, that provide lands, buildings, ownership’s of other legal rights or funds, participating or implementing the urban renewal businesses, and who, after the implementation of the urban renewal business plans is completed, the distribution of the renewal buildings and the land partition owned or its royalty according to the right value before the renewal and the proportion of the funds provided.

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References Central Geological Survey (2000) A Report on Geological Survey of 921 Earthquake” (in Chinese) Coburn, A. and Spence, R. (2002) Earthquake Protection, Wiley Construction and Planning Agency (2004) Urban Planning Act Construction and Planning Agency (2007) Urban Renewal Act Kuo, Y.C. (2003) Community Empowerment: Establishing a Sustainable and Excellent Environment (in Chinese) Kuo, Y.C. (2006a) “Critical Points of 921 Earthquake Reconstruction Operations” (International Symposium on the Development Experience of Post-disaster Reconstruction Region and the Memorial Design and Management, Construction and Planning Agency) Kuo, Y.C. (2006b) 921 Earthquake Post-Disaster Housing Reconstruction Review Legislative Yuan, R.O.C. (2000) The Temporary Act for Post-921earthquake Reconstruction (in Chinese). Peng, K.H. and Lin, S.M. (2005) “A Study on the Assessment Criteria and Weight Distribution of Seismic Hazards in the Urbanized Areas of Taiwan”, Journal of Architecture, 53 (in Chinese)

14. Earthquake as a Fact of Istanbul: Risk-based Strategy and an Action Plan for the Vulnerable Zeytinburnu Area

Aye Sema Kubat, Engin Eyübolu, Özhan Ertekin and Frat Sari

14.1 Introduction Definition of vulnerable space encompasses a large range of local conditions. Turkey, and specifically the Istanbul region with its risky domain, holds a remarkable proportion of these unique factors, particularly in terms of earthquakes. Natural hazards, especially earthquakes, cause disasters when they hit large settlements such as metropolitan areas. After the first shock, the damage is counted by deaths and injuries. After a while, the destructive effects of disaster appear on economic assets of the region. Direct losses including damage to buildings and lifelines can cause non-structural or indirect losses as interruption of business activities and services. The economic effects of earthquakes are often crucial when an earthquake hits one of the country’s major cities. Istanbul, as well, is one of the large metropolises that are under the earthquake threat caused by the North Anatolian Fault. Geographical location of Turkey is on the border area where Arabic and African continents meet with Europe and Asia. To the north of Turkey lies an earthquake fault longer than 1,000 km, called the Anatolian Fault Line, which has had serious earthquakes over the centuries. In recent years (1939 and 1992), major earthquakes occurred near the city of Erzincan located in eastern Turkey. During the earthquake of 1939, more than 30,000 people have lost their lives, while in the 1992 earthquake 700 people died. There was also considerable physical damage due to the collapse of buildings and infrastructure. On August 17, 1999, a catastrophic seismic movement occurred near the cities of zmit and Adapazari, which is called the Kocaeli Earthquake. Measuring 7.4, this earthquake caused a tremendous loss of human life as well as material damage. Another earthquake measur-

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ing 7.2 hit the same Anatolian Fault Line on November 12, 1999. More than 1,000 people were killed or injured during this earthquake. “Istanbul, due to its strategic location and historical background as the capital of three empires, has been the heart of national and international economic activities in Turkey. In the beginning of 1950’s, the development of Turkish economy reinforced the dominant economic role of Istanbul in all over the country. In this period, the rapid population growth due to migration from rural part of the country caused rising density and expending urban area. However, the planning processes remained insufficient against this ‘rapid development’ and Istanbul gained a complex and uncontrolled urban pattern. Today, within its 12 million inhabitants, Istanbul is the most populated city in Turkey. Expansion of urban land in Istanbul showed linear development in the southern part of the city, from the eastern side to western side, parallel to NAF. Newly developed sub-centers and industrial areas enabled to change mono-centric structure of Istanbul to polycentric structure” (Kundak (2005)) Despite this development process, which tends to arrange inner-city flows and protects forest land in the northern part of the city, earthquake vulnerability increased in Istanbul. After the Kocaeli and Duzce earthquakes (1999), which occurred in the most industrialized region in Turkey, total economic losses reached about $22 billion, which represents 12% of GDP in 1999 (SED). The probability of seismic hazard for Istanbul has not disappeared with these earthquakes. Several studies indicate that according to the historical seismicity of the region, a major earthquake is expected in the Marmara Sea, which will severely affect Istanbul. Scientists agree on the hypothesis that the center of these powerful seismic movements is shifting towards the western Anatolian Fault Line, and thus directs attention to a possible seismic movement that can hit the city of Istanbul located on the western edge of this fault line. In order to overcome the catastrophe of a possible earthquake, the city of Istanbul needs to prepare a seismic causality prevention/reduction plan, emergency rescue plan and regeneration plan for the affected region for both the short and long term. However, as of today, Istanbul Municipality unfortunately does not have a seismic causality plan. “According to the World Bank Report, houses that have been collapsed or are too heavily damaged to be inhabitable will need to be demolished and rebuilt at an estimated cost of US$20,000/unit (an ordinary house of 100 m 2 ). The damage ratios are given according to the earthquake

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Fig. 14-1. Active fault map of Turkey (Source: MTA 2005)

scenario developed by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and Istanbul Greater Municipality (IGM) in 2002” (Kundak (2005)) The first international scientific study on the North Anatolian Fault focusing on the Marmara Region was published in 1976. Between 1976 and 1999, only 26 new papers were published on the focus area. However, after the occurrence of the 1999 earthquakes in the Marmara Region, the number of papers exceeded 130 (Yaltirak (2006)). Therefore, scientific research, disaster management plans, and risk assessments can be evaluated as ‘before’ and ‘after’ the 1999 earthquake. After the first shock in 1999, studies on hazard, vulnerability and risk were developed. At the same time, both at the local and central levels, some institutional regeneration has been done. Research on hazard assessment started on the preparation of the batimetry map of the Marmara Sea focusing on the segments of the North Anatolian Fault with national and international researchers. These studies were handled by different universities and research institutes and realized between 2000 and 2002. In August 2000 AKOM (Coordination Center for Disasters) was established under Istanbul Greater Municipality. In September 2000, DASK (Insurance against Natural Hazards) was founded. In 2002, two comprehensive studies were released: one was by Istanbul Greater Municipality and Japan International Cooperation Agency, and the other one was by Bogazici University. Both studies include earthquake scenarios and vulnerability level of Istanbul and risky areas. IGM and JICA worked on neighborhood scale and Boaziçi

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University on 500x500 m geo-cells. The results of both studies were similar and they indicated similar areas as high-risk zones. In 2003, Istanbul Greater Municipality, within the contribution of academic staff of four pioneering universities in Turkey (Istanbul Technical University, Bogazici University, Middle East Technical University and Yildiz Technical University) developed the Earthquake Master Plan for Istanbul. In the beginning of 2005, work the Metropolitan Plan of Istanbul started and are still underway. Historically Istanbul was called as ‘a city on seven hills.’ In diaries written by travelers Istanbul was described as one of the most beautiful cities of the world with its unique landscape due to the Bosphorus extending between Asia and Europe. The lakes and the rivers formed among hills also enrich the spectacular view of the city. However, all these aesthetic values are the results of major geographic failure and the fragile structure of the city. Before its founding and during its past, Istanbul experienced several earthquakes which destroyed the city. The archeological remains are the main evidence that Istanbul collapsed several times and the subsequent city was built on the ruins of the former one. In the last 30 to 40 years, Istanbul grew rapidly and reached a population of 12 million people. During this time, illegal or unplanned settlements covered a considerable part of the city. Unfortunately, today, these kinds of settlements are usually located on the soft soil near the North Anatolian Fault. These areas can be described as the zones where the highest hazard meets with highest vulnerability, hence, highest risk.

14.2 Aim The main problem for settlements facing earthquake risks is concentrating on ‘how to do’ questions instead of asking ‘what to do.’ A proper Earthquake Mitigation and Emergency Plan should be an actual process plan that can define all actions with their arrangement, actors, timelines, relations with other actions etc. This indicates that the plan needs to be a multi-disciplinary progressive composition, which could also be flexible for all interventions. The main aim of this paper is to highlight the importance of implementation processes by introducing recent earthquake-based studies for Istanbul. This paper makes the importance of implementation process legible based on recent studies of Istanbul and feedback, including obstacles for application, public participation difficulties, confusion of plans and constitutional paperwork taking time.

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14.3 Earthquake Facts for Turkey and Istanbul Turkey is situated on the Alp-Himalaya mountain zone, which causes high seismic activities in the area. The Eastern Anatolian fault extends between the eastern end point of the North Anatolian Fault and the city of Kahramanmaras. In the Aegean and Central Anatolian regions there are also short but highly active faults, which have caused several earthquakes. The 1,300-km-long North Anatolian Fault system, extending from the east side through the west side of Turkey, has been studied by numerous researchers in order to explore its characteristics (Ambraseys (1970); (Barka (1992)); (Stein et al. (1997); (Papazachos et al. (2002)). The common output of these studies is that the North Anatolian Fault (NAF) can produce major earthquakes with high frequency of occurrence. For instance, while the San Andreas Fault in California, as a close analogue of NAF, produced just two severe earthquakes (M>6.7) in the 20th century, NAF suffered ten such shocks. Moreover, settlements’ physical features situated in the NAF zone increase the interest on this fault. The western extension of NAF passes through the Marmara Region, which is the most industrialized and developed part of the country. Istanbul, the prime city of Turkey, is situated in this region as well. During the 20th century in Turkey, 130 devastating earthquakes occurred, resulting in 80,633 deaths, 54,380 people injured and the destruction of 441,611 housing buildings (Table 14-1). The earthquake that occurred in Erzincan in 1939 with the Mw=7.9 was the most destructive earthquake experienced ever, with 32,962 deaths and 116,720 destroyed buildings. A similar earthquake occurred in Kocaeli in 1999 with the Mw=7.4. The Kocaeli earthquake was felt in the whole Northern Anatolia Region, and its effects extended to about eight provinces surrounding the earthquake epicenter. In the aftermath of this earthquake, another earthquake occurred nearby the affected region with the Mw=7.2 which caused severe losses. The earthquake of August 17, 1999, with a Mw=7.4, affected a very large area from its epicenter Golcuk extending from Tekirdag to Eskisehir. In this earthquake, 11,807,738 people were affected by the intensity of VI, 1,521,558 people by the intensity of VII, 666,936 people by the intensity of VIII, 676,122 people by the intensity of IX and 419,699 people by the intensity of X. 33% of the buildings affected with Io=X, 16% of the buildings affected with Io=IX, 2.28% of the buildings affected with Io=VIII, 0.91% of the buildings affected with Io=VII and 0.04% of the buildings affected with Io=VI were severely damaged or collapsed (Fig. 14-2) (Afet leri Genel Müdürlüü 1999). Just after the earthquake of August 17,

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Table 14-1. Major earthquakes occurred in Turkey in the 20th century (Source: Bagci et al. (1994)) Date

Mw

Io

Place

Death

Injured

Collapsed building

28/04/1903 09/08/1912 13/09/1924 06/05/1930 01/05/1935 19/04/1938 22/09/1939 26/12/1939 20/12/1942 20/06/1943 26/11/1943 01/02/1944 17/08/1949 13/08/1951 18/03/1953 25/04/1957 26/05/1957 06/10/1964 19/08/1966 22/07/1967 26/07/1967 03/19/1968 28/03/1969 28/03/1970 12/05/1971 22/05/1971 06/09/1975 24/11/1976 30/10/1983 13/03/1992 01/10/1995 27/06/1998 17/08/1999

6.7 7.3 6.9 7.2 6.2 6.6 7.1 7.9 7.0 6.6 7.2 7.2 7.0 6.9 7.4 7.1 7.1 7.0 6.9 7.2 6.2 6.5 6.6 7.2 6.2 6.7 6.9 7.2 6.8 6.8 5.9 5.9 7.4

IX ----X --IX IX X-XI IX IX IX-X IX-X IX IX IX IX IX IX IX IX VIII VIII VIII IX VIII VIII VIII IX VIII VIII VIII --IX

Malazgirt Mürefte Pasinler Hakkari Siniri Digor Kirehir Izmir-Dikili Erzincan Niksar-Erbaa Adapazari-Hendek Tosya-Ladik Bolu-Gerede Karliova Kursunlu Yenice-Gnen Fethiye Bolu-Abant Manyas Varto Adapazari P䌬䌭䌲 Amasya-Bartin Alasehir Gediz Burdur Bing 䌬 Lice Çaldiran-Muradiye Erzurum-Kars Erzincan-Tunceli Dinar Adana-Ceyhan Kocaeli

2,626 216 310 2,514 200 149 60 32,962 3,000 336 2,824 3,959 450 52 265 67 52 23 2,394 89 97 29 41 1,086 57 878 2,385 3,480 1,155 653 94 146 15,000

--466 ------------6,300 --------208 336 --100 130 1,489 235 268 231 186 1,260 150 700 3,339 497 1,142 3,850 240 940 32,000

4,500 5,540 4,300 3,000 1,300 3,860 1,235 116,720 32,000 2,240 25,000 20,865 3,000 3,354 9,670 3,100 4,201 5,398 20,007 5,569 1,282 2,073 4,372 9,452 1,389 5,617 8,149 9,552 3,241 6,702 4,909 4,000 50,000

another occurred on November 12 at Duzce with Mw=7.2, which caused the collapse of buildings damaged by the previous earthquake. In this earthquake 329,216 housing units and 48,663 business units were damaged, 18,243 people were killed and 48,901 people were injured (T.C. Babakanlk and Kriz Yönetimi (2000)).

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Fig. 14-2. Intensity map of the 1999 Kocaeli earthquake (Source: Afet Ileri Genel Müdürlügü (1999))

14.4 Recent Studies After the two major earthquakes in Kocaeli in 1999, the public has realized that a probable major earthquake can have catastrophic damage on Istanbul. Authorities have been alarmed and risk-based strategy plans have been started to be prepared immediately. These recent studies regarding Istanbul include: The Study on A Disaster Prevention/Mitigation Basic Plan (JICA), Earthquake Master Plan for Istanbul (EMPI), Zeytinburnu Pilot Project (Sub Study of EMPI) and Urban Transformation Model for Vulnerable Zeytinburnu Area (A Model for Zeytinburnu Pilot Project). These plans, covering various scales and created by various public, academic and private institutions, focus on two major problems, namely prevention of the loss of life and reduction of the vulnerability of urban structure. Zeytinburnu, with its extremely vulnerable urban structure, vital economic importance and with other threats and opportunities, is selected as a pilot study area for the EMPI (Earthquake Master Plan for stanbul).

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14.4.1 The Study on a Disaster Prevention/Mitigation Basic Plan (JICA) The Study on a Disaster Prevention/Mitigation Basic Plan (JICA) is prepared to create and develop seismic microzoning maps which can be used as a framework for the disaster preventing-reducing plan of stanbul, to give advice about damage prevention/mitigation programs based on building durability evaluation and microzoning study, and to help define primary risk-based methods during stanbul’s restructuring period, including landuse plan and earthquake durability rules. After all, with the support of various researchers and institutions and with the help of numerous research studies on the North Anatolian Fault Line, various earthquake scenarios have been created for defining convenient damage calculations for risk-based planning strategies. Database building has been prepared based on the neighborhood-based building surveys. For all types of buildings, damage estimations are categorized as heavily, moderate and partly (Table 14-2).

Fig. 14-3. Earthquake scenarios (Source: JICA (2002))

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Also, the relationship between building damage and life losses is examined in the light of former earthquakes. According to JICA values, loss estimation is 4.629 and heavily injured number is 6.785. Vulnerability estimations: After carrying out building surveys, the seismic index of structures was evaluated for two schools designed by the school building standard. It was found that that these buildings may collapse or be heavily damaged under conditions similar to those of the 1992 Erzincan earthquake. It is assumed that almost all school buildings may have similar earthquake resistance shortcomings. Damage estimations for public facilities were conducted, and it was observed that the estimated damage rate of major public facilities is similar to that of all buildings. The study also found that the possibility of large fires is small because the wooden building coverage area ratio of all quarters stands at less than 10%. Nonetheless, many fires occur immediately after an earthquake, and it can take a firefighting team a long time to reach a fire because of roadblocks caused by debris. Damage to lifelines such as water pipelines, sewage pipelines, gas pipelines, gas service boxes, and electricity cables were also estimated. The possibility of bridge collapse was evaluated for 480 bridges using a Japanese method commonly used for preliminary screening purposes. Based on these evaluations, a prioritized list of necessary detailed bridge inspections was developed. The prioritization of the road network was also evaluated, based on the review of the road network and on the effect of damaged bridges. Road blockages due to collapsed buildings were estimated using the results of the study’s building damage estimation. Briefly, the Study on a Disaster Prevention/Mitigation Basic Plan proposes some precautions, which are categorized according to short, medium Table 14-2. Building damage estimations, models A and C (Source: JICA (2002)) Heavily (7.1%) Model A 51,000 216,000 household 59,000 (8.2%) Model C 268,000 household

Heavily + Moderate 114,000 (16%) 503,000 household 128,000 (18%) 601,000 household

Heavily + Moderate + Partly 252,000 (35%) 1,160,000 household 300,000 (38%) 1,300,000 household

Table 14-3. Life loss estimations, models A and C (Source: JICA (2002)) Dead Injured Model A 73,000 (0.8%) 120,000 (1.4%) Model C 87,000 (1.0%) 135,000 (1.5%)

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and long-term perspectives. Short-term precautions basically consist of strengthening the infrastructure and important buildings, so these can perform their own functions in the course of a disaster. Other precautions, which are to be performed every five to ten years, include redevelopment of densely populated areas, improving the road network, and reviewing current land use to dedicate some open spaces for risk management planning. Rebuilding of institutional structure is also an important issue for efficient and easy implementation during a possible disaster. 14.4.2 Earthquake Master Plan for Istanbul (EMPI (2003)) The Earthquake Master Plan for Istanbul (EMPI) is a collective study prepared with participation of Turkey’s leading universities, namely ITU, METU, YTU and BU, aimed to make the city become safe for a possible earthquake. It is intended to make every single procedure brief and clear, such as planning, creating programs, defining authorities, etc. The most important issues for the success of the plan are introduced as public participation and the constitutional (legal) framework. Thus, the Master Plan is accepted as a social contract, defining responsibilities, decisions and methods among the government, municipalities, private sector, NGOs and the community. EMPI was based on three fundamental principles: -

Plans and projects must not be imposed, but must be determined in a

Fig. 14-4. AKOM – Disaster Coordination Center (Source: EMPI (2003))

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process to generate a medium for collective effort and total mobilization throughout the city; Risk sectors must be determined as basic city-level clusters of interrelated risks; Specific projects within a sector are to be determined by the related ‘stake-holders,’ based on an analysis of ‘risk factors’ in each sector; ‘High-risk areas’ must be identified for immediate special action planning and investment programs.

In other words, the purpose of EMPI is not to retrofit all buildings but to enhance safety and total quality of life in Istanbul. It is presented as an endless process, yet has short and medium-term targets. EMPI not only aims to reduce risks in existing urban environments but to avoid vulnerabilities in the formation of new urban environments. The pilot study of the Earthquake Master Plan for stanbul has been started in Zeytinburnu simultaneously with the master plan, and aimed to spread throughout the urban totality. Table 14-4. Major laws/regulations related to disasters and responsible ministries in Turkey (Source: EMPI (2003)) Name of the Law

Law Number Related Ministry/Institution

Civil Defense Law 7126 Law Related to Precautions and 7269 Aids for Disasters Effect Life in General Regulation for Emergency Re88/12777 sponse Organizations and Planning Principles for Disasters

Min. of Interior Min. of Public Works

Regulation for Management of Prime Ministery Crisis Center General Directorate of Turkish Emergency Management Law of Turkish Atomic Energy

96/8716

Chamber of Ministers, Min. of Interior, Min. of Public Works, Genel Kurmay Bakanl, Related Ministeries, Redcressent Chamber of Ministers

2000/600

Chamber of Ministers

2690

Extraordinary Situation Law Construction/Development Law

2935 3194

Prime Ministery / Institution of Turkish Atomic Energy Chamber of Ministers Min. of Public Works

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14.4.3 Zeytinburnu Pilot Project (ZPP (2005)) According to Earthquake Master Plan for stanbul (EMPI) and Japan International Corporation Agency (JICA) research, within the regeneration, rehabilitation and reinforcement programs which should be implemented in the areas under probable earthquake threat, Zeytinburnu was selected as a pilot project area. The project aims to generate the Applicable Urban Transformation Project Model to make the existing urban structure continuously safer. The settlement is located near the historical peninsula of Istanbul. However, there are some remarkable differences between these two settlements, divided by old city walls. Zeytinburnu, unlike any urbanized area, has developed spontaneously, unplanned and illegally. At first, people migrating to Istanbul selected this area to settle because the government owned the land and with the help of loopholes these people were able to get their houses licensed. Thus, settlement grew rapidly and vulnerability rating increased dramatically in terms of poor building quality, density of population, evacuation threats and open space deficiencies. JICA’s indicators show that 16.6% of the buildings in Zeytinburnu will be ‘seriously damaged’ in case of an earthquake with the magnitude of 7.5. This ratio turned out to be 20% for the first step of the detailed engineering studies. According to these studies, in Zeytinburnu there are 11,859 dwellings housing about 45,000 people that are under risk. In Zeytinburnu, a large number of people are living and working in limited spaces. In some quarters, the average population density increases to 921 people/ha. High building density, on the other hand, is the origin of

Fig. 14-5. Location of Zeytinburnu in Istanbul

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the probable earthquake evacuation problems and accessibility issues in residential areas. There are not enough open spaces except roads and parking lots. The general aim of the Zeytinburnu Pilot Project (ZPP), was to concentrate on minimizing earthquake risks at first. In order to do this, project developers decided to evaluate high-risk regions first, to have safe urban residence against all the disasters and to take precautions for urgent interference, rescue operations, evacuations immediately after disaster. The Alternative Plan Scenarios are produced through evaluating current plans, classic planning approaches and the zoning studies for action plan. Project Stages and Aims

Project Stages And Aims: The Action Plan consists of three main stages including a 20-year action process. In the first and second stages, in a fiveyear period, urgent interventions to prevent and minimize the loss estimation caused by probable earthquake are suggested. In the third stage, to increase the quality of urban life and to bring the identity in the vision of Zeytinburnu, a planning model is created.

Fig. 14-7. Implementation stages (Source: Zeytinburnu Risk Based Strategy & Action Plan (2005))

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As shown in Fig. 14-7, there are three main earthquake strategies: a) elimination of high-risk buildings, b) creating evacuation corridors and, c) proposal of urgent meeting places to be completed as soon as possible in order to mitigate current risks. About 2,000 high-risk buildings identified by the project engineering team will be demolished and rebuilt if necessary. Evacuation corridors are planned to respond to the needs of sheltering and rescue after an earthquake, addressing the entirety of Zeytinburnu, supporting the transportation system integrated with the peripheral road network. Open spaces for urgent gatherings, evacuation and care are selected from the islands that contain high-risk buildings. After these buildings are purchased from their owners and demolished, open spaces would be created. Community centers: The deficiency in the social dimensions of urban transformation projects complicates the operation of projects and credit supply. Thus, establishing community centers are meant to provide faceto-face contact among the community, NGOs, government, and municipalities. In the short term, establishing the community centers and initiating their operation is very important in order to: -

Ensure coordination and communication between community and stakeholders, Provide that the action plans (projects) are made by community and stakeholders together,

Fig. 14-7. Implementation stages (Source: Zeytinburnu Risk Based Strategy & Action Plan (2005))

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Upgrade the skills of all citizens, introduce education programs to strengthen social and economical structure, Arrange education programs about evacuation, rescue, sheltering, etc. in case of a probable disaster.

It is also intended to strengthen the public buildings to prevent and minimize the estimated loss due to a probable earthquake. Gathering the directors of these facilities, such as active parks, fire brigades, medical, religious, security buildings, around the issue of disaster organization is accepted as a vital issue for the maintenance of the project as well as ensuring that the schools and their grounds could be used as rehabilitation, storage and delivery centers. The appropriate facilities, in terms of sufficient capacity, are selected to place the essential equipment for urgent interventions. It is recommended to use the community centers’ infrastructure to organize and educate employees regarding the urgent condition. For a successful implementation process, a deductive approach to the legal structure for the project is also proposed in the Zeytinburnu Pilot Project (Fig. 14-8). During the planning process, not only current and proposal configurations, but also models, strategies, progresses, financial issues, timelines,

Fig. 14-8. Institutional framework (Source: Zeytinburnu Risk Based Strategy and Action Plan (2005))

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constitutional background and multi-disciplinary procedures are evaluated in order to make the model for Zeytinburnu flexible and applicable for other settlements. Urban design principles for Zeytinburnu are adopted from disaster risks and risk-based planning issues. These principles also based on the historical structure of Zeytinburnu. Sector-based or spatial changes and development strategies are created and balanced with social and demographic dynamics. Services proposed are major economic sectors rather than industry. Social infrastructure and urban networks are designed from the perspective of fair social services distribution. Finally, all progress is evaluated with the overall prediction of sustainable and economic structure and the Zeytinburnu Pilot Project Planning Process, which include articulated research, evaluation, processing and finalization processes. This makes the project a process of multi-disciplinary teamwork. However, typically, success of such a project and sub-models including finance, transformation and strategies, depend on the negotiation and participation of the parties involved. 14.4.4 Urban Transformation Model for Vulnerable Zeytinburnu Area (2005) As mentioned before, models of implementation in a plan become very important in order to achieve all the goals mentioned within. Istanbul Greater Municipality, owner of the Zeytinburnu Pilot Project, has worked with various consultants to achieve all these multi-disciplinary goals. In the Zeytinburnu Project, large numbers of people living in high-risk buildings needed to be relocated to mitigate all kinds of earthquake threats. Therefore, a project called the “Necessary Area Determination and Project Development and Implementation Model Preparation for New Settlements regarding Districts of Istanbul Metropolitan Area with a Priority on Zeytinburnu District” has been prepared by the Plan-Art Team (Eyuboglu et al. (2005)). Within the Zeytinburnu Pilot project, variable urban transformation models are applied in order to define progressive transformation on this area. This study proposes a unitary model for area determination and project implementation for prior urban regeneration and new settlement areas focusing on a case study in the Zeytinburnu district. The goal of the study is to conduct research on the potential new settlement areas and to develop an implementation model to be used in urban regeneration projects in the Istanbul Metropolitan Area, prioritizing

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Zeytinburnu district and its neighbors within the context of the Istanbul Earthquake Master Plan and the Istanbul 2023 Vision Strategic Action Plan. Having established the goal, the following are the specific objectives in doing the study: -

-

Economic dimension: Attract investors, increase labor, support the local economy, and enforce the well being of inhabitants. Social dimension: Respond to housing needs, develop infrastructure, and create collective neighborhood appreciation. Environmental dimension: Improve the quality of the environment, minimize the negative impacts of earthquake, and prevent environmental pollution. Cultural dimension: Enhance urban tourism and architecture.

The goals and objectives of the study can be further broken down into the following planning principles: -

To rearrange urban regeneration practices in global scale, To appreciate the changes in urban regeneration approaches as an opportunity, To design new models for the regeneration of urban environment, To put the concept of urban regeneration into practice, To define the diverse characteristics of the city and to benefit from urban regeneration to enforce these characteristics, To encourage regional planning by classifying urban networks, To form a balanced development between urban and rural areas, To encourage individuals and institutions for urban regeneration, To provide the use of economic, social and urban funds, To develop the ‘urban market’ as an instrument for urban regeneration.

Within the context of the comprehensive model developed to be used in the identification of prior urban regeneration areas and further regeneration practices, the study is conducted in following the stages as described below: -

-

The production of comprehensive planning studies and major planning decisions at the Zeytinburnu scale. In the first stage, the spatial data recordings in Zeytinburnu are evaluated and the preliminary area determination for urban regeneration is concluded within the framework of previous analysis and planning studies. The identification of priority regions of Zeytinburnu district for urban regeneration practices – planning. In the second stage, priority

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regions of Zeytinburnu district are identified for urban regeneration practices by evaluating previous preliminary spatial analysis. Prioritizing is achieved in neighborhood scale and neighborhood subregional scale. Sümer, Seyitnizam, Çrpc, Maltepe, and Telsiz districts are identified as first-degree priority regions. The identification of new settlement areas and transfer centers. In the third stage, a location model is identified, and new settlement areas to be used for regeneration are determined in Zeytinburnu district and the neighboring districts. Sixteen new settlement areas, most of which are under public ownership, are identified to be used for regeneration in Zeytinburnu district. Of the total 1,133,149 m2 area, 501,489 m2 is under public ownership, 210,018 m2 under foundation ownership, and 421,642 m2 under private ownership. The number of housing units to be constructed only on public land during the first stage is 5,959 (100 m2/dwelling on average). Of 14,435 total housing units, 7,977 units are constructed in the second stage and 499 in the third stage. When the privately owned land is included in the calculations, the housing units to be constructed total 24,913. The identification of design principles for the rearrangement of urban regeneration areas and new settlement areas. The design principles are identified first in the selected sub-regions of Zeytinburnu district and second in the determined transfer centers according to general planning decisions. In identifying the design principles, the demands and needs of property owners are met and potential opportunities are presented. The application of SWOT analysis and feasibility studies on urban regeneration implementation model. The conclusions achieved in previous stages are evaluated according to social, financial, legal, technical, and management dimensions and presented to local authorities. The identification of legal and economic implementation tools regarding applicability. In this stage, the selected sub-regions in Zeytinburnu district are moved to previously determined transfer centers. The presentation of alternatives to users in the negotiation stage. All evaluations and projects are presented to the public for negotiation. The identification of social, economic and management outputs of urban regeneration model. This is more of a technical stage. The evaluation is done with the contribution of participatory experts. The preparation of the construction model. The construction model is being prepared by the local authorities, but has not been finished yet.

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Fig. 14-9. Proposed transfer centers for urban transformation process (Source: Eyuboglu et al. (2005))

Result of the model -

-

In all the studies carried out in Zeytinburnu district, the data on disaster vulnerability should be of major importance and they should be compatible with previous comprehensive planning decisions. Planning studies to be conducted should not only be limited by reinforcement criteria regarding earthquake risk, but also should involve regulations giving way to let future generations live in a healthy urban environment. Calculations should be done through housing principles for housing units, commercial principles for commercial units and office principles for office units. These assignments should be declared to be given back with appropriate deduction from existing construction

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areas (a ratio of 20-30% is considered suitable) Urban design studies should be conducted together with Clause 18 instructions. According to rough calculations, populations of some neighborhoods are expected to increase whereas others are expected to decrease regarding planning studies in Zeytinburnu district. An extra population of 20,000 to 30,000 is likely to join in total (the existing population is approximately 244,000). With this assumption, the amount of housing units that can potentially be used by the public is 30,000/4=7,500. According to planning decisions, sites within Zeytinburnu district selected as new settlement areas should be examined according to legal status and economic feasibility, and meanwhile agreements with site owners should be made. If the site is under state ownership, exchange procedures should be carried out. Plans should not be approved unless agreements are carried out with site owners of the new settlement areas. The reason is the possibility of these sites to be developed with higher density compared to others due to public interest. Construction model and payment plans should be announced, and required applications and links for credits procedure should be achieved. Construction works in sites which are selected as new settlement areas in Zeytinburnu district should be started following legal status and economic connections. Vulnerable areas regarding resistance to earthquake should be determined as building blocks and implemented in relation to former planning decisions. Necessary campaigns, announcements and legal agreements should be carried for local inhabitants to move to new settlement areas as well as for housing, commercial and office units of different sizes. Agreements should state whether new settlement area residents will temporarily or permanently be living on the site. With this study, since the negative aspects likely to arise after regeneration or rehabilitation activities in the district will be faced by the area residents, the possible economic or social profit is also recommended to be shared among them. That is why it is considered that a study considering movement of inhabitants to a distant area would not be suitable for public interest and thus would not be supported socially.

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14.5 Public Awareness and Precautions for an Earthquake in Istanbul The main objective of the general public in Turkey is to have their own house. Especially for low-income people, this desire leads to construction of low-cost buildings that do not have structural stability. As the population of the family increases, people might even built houses on top of their existing ones without paying attention to its probable outcomes. In Turkish culture, which is still not able to internalize modernization, everything is expected from the government and the general public opinion is that they cannot produce any solutions to their own problems. The insistence of the government as the father figure is still very strong in Turkish culture. In recent years, buildings collapses in the Zeytinburnu area, which happened even without any earthquake, is a very good exemple for these points. Among the precautions in Istanbul for the possible earthquake are; there have been signs posted to distinguish the main emergency arteries as well as priority roads; at some strategic locations parking has been forbidden; some containers have been placed to be used during emergencies and some image posts have been placed. All other precautions mentioned in the extensive reports and the projects have not been realized as of today. It is found that transforming slums is a difficult and a complex job because one must convince people to leave their houses, at least for a limited time, and move somewhere else. Because the precautions mentioned as a must in these reports and plans have been deemed as impossible to realize, the government decided to disseminate the National Earthquake Council. In Turkey, where 90% of the land is located on active fault lines, thousands of human lives are under threat because of the lack of prevention and preparation measures. Still, the government does not pay enough attention to the probability of an earthquake, as indicated by the decision to disseminate the National Earthquake Council. This Council was dedicated to work on decreasing the possible human and physical damage from an earthquake by giving guidance to local authorities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the public. All the decisions taken in a country under the constant threat of earthquakes need to direct the local authorities, NGOs, and the general public to take necessary precautions. To conclude, the current situation in Turkey could be summarized by saying that Turkish government and the general public are not even aware of the amount of destruction and dangers they will be facing in the case of a powerful earthquake, and thus they are not taking any preventive and preparatory steps for emergency times.

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14.6 Conclusion Istanbul is a great example to study earthquake risk as a developed city in a developing country. Rapid population growth, historical heritage, development of unplanned settlements, scarcity of open spaces, heterogeneous distribution of urban facilities, and lack of public awareness are the basic keywords to describe the size of the risk. More than 65% of the city’s dwellings are unlicensed and unprepared for a sizable earthquake, imperiling the lives of the vast majority of Istanbulites – prompting city officials to begin urban transformation plans that will dramatically change the makeup of the city and the lives of millions. With each small shift in the tectonic plates below Istanbul, earthquake experts warn residents about the coming of the ‘big one.’ According to research conducted by the Istanbul Municipality in 2004 there were 85,000 ‘slum’ buildings in the city, which would be the first to tumble in the event of an earthquake. Immediately after the research was conducted, Zeytinburnu, one of the oldest slum house districts of Istanbul, was chosen as the pilot region for urban transformation. In Zeytinburnu 72,000 people live under high risk of earthquake. Also in this area, high-density illegally developed unplanned settlements overlap with unfavorable soil conditions. It is believed that the conditions in slum districts are not favorable to the residents and there is a need to ameliorate the infrastructure. However, the development projects are related to big foreign capital. The aim of these projects is not to ensure better conditions for people, but to do a favor for international big capital and to push the unskilled workers, poor and marginal people from the city centers because the city is growing and there is no place for them in the center, which is increasingly growing more valuable. Although it is obvious that these project issues and actions related to probable earthquake in Istanbul cover many diverse problems, the more important issue is to gain all of these thresholds one by one. In this paper, the local approaches to Istanbul were examined in order to bring a different point of view to the diversity of factors in case of a possible earthquake. The earthquake awareness regarding Istanbul is evaluated based on the examination of various reports prepared by JICA, Greater Municipality of Istanbul and several project groups from different universities in Turkey. It is observed that there has not been any concrete step taken as a result of the reports examined. It is felt that the legal framework for turning these reports into reality is missing in today’s Turkey. The situation and the characteristics of the Zeytinburnu area in Istanbul, Turkey is analyzed and problems of the area have been introduced. The paper also directs attention to the fact that as time passes, the necessity to

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improve vulnerable urban spaces is gaining importance in the public’s eye, especially for areas under constant earthquake threat. Still, even though there are some techniques and policies in addition to various models being prepared for the improvement of vulnerable urban spaces in Turkey, they are mostly kept on paper and none of these projects have become a reality.

References Ambraseys, N.N. (1970) “Some Characteristics Features of the Anatolian Fault Zone”, Tectonophysics, 9 Bac, G., Yatman, A. and Özdemir, S. and Altn, N. (1994) “Türkiye’de Hasar Yapan Depremler”, Deprem Arastirma Bülten, 69 Barka, A.A. (1992) “The North Anatolian Fault Zone”, Annales Tectonicae, VI BU, ITU, METU, YTU (2003) Earthquake Master Plan for stanbul (EMPI) Eyuboglu, E., Ertekin, O., Saraçli, C., Koramaz, K., Gunay, Z. and Ozer, O. (2005) Project for Necessary Area Determination and Project Development and Implementation Model Preparation for New Settlements regarding Districts of Istanbul Metropolitan Area with a Priority on Zeytinburnu District Japan International Corporation Agency (JICA) (2002) The Study on a Disaster Prevention / Mitigation Basic Plan in Istanbul including Seismic Microzonation in the Republic Of Turkey Kundak, S (2005) Economic vulnerability assessment in housing case study: Istanbul Kundak, S and Turkoglu, H.D. (2006) “Evaluation Of Risk Components For The City Of Istanbul” (First European Conference on Earthquake Engineering and Seismology, a joint event of the 13th ECEE & 30th General Assembly of the ESC) Ozcevik, O., Sener, E., Sener, S., Altun, C. and Akcakaya, I. (2003) “Sustainability of Urban Life Quality for Temporary Shelter In Pre&Post Disaster Period” (ITU Faculy of Architecture, Quality of Urban Life - Istanbul) Papazachos, B.C., Savvaidis, A.S., Karakaisis, G.F. and Papazachos, C.B. (2002) “Precursory Accelerating Seismic Crustal Deformation in the Northwestern Anatolian Fault Zone”, Tectonophysics, 6570 Sari, F., Serdarolu, S., Imamoglu, O., Coskun, D., Guney, G., K.Mustafaoglu, M., Kucukkilic, P., Ozturan, Z., Dil, M. and Coskun, O. (2005) Zeytinburnu Risk Based Strategy & Action Plan Sari, F., Serdarolu, S., Imamoglu, O., Coskun, D., Guney, G., K.Mustafaoglu, M., Kucukkilic, P., Ozturan, Z., Dil, M. and Coskun, O. (2004) Zeytinburnu Pilot Project: Risk Analysis Report Stein, R.S., Barka, A.A. and Dieterich, H. (1997) “Progressive Failure on the North Anatolian Fault Since 1939 by Earthquake Stress Triggering”, Geophysical Journal International, 128 T.C. Bayindirlik ve skan Bakanligi and Afet leri Genel Müdürlüü (1999) Gölcük ve 12 Kasim 1999 Düzce Depremleri Tektonik Incelemesi

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T.C. Basbakanlik and Kriz Yönetimi (2000) Depremler 1999 Turkish Daily News, Jan 17 - Fab 23 (2007) Big Earthquake: Already changing Istanbul’s Underground Face Yaltirak, C. (2006) “Marmara Depremi” (The Marmara Earthquake), National Geographic Turkey, April 2006 Maden Tetkik Arama (MTA),http://www.mta.gov.tr (Accessed in 2007)

15. Structural Viewpoint

Mikio Koshihara

15.1 Introduction Japan has a long history of wooden houses. At the same time, Japan is a country of earthquakes. Wooden houses in Japan have suffered great damage caused by strong earthquakes. Recently in the Kobe earthquake, a great number of wooden houses were destroyed and more than 5,000 human lives were lost. This paper presents the overall view of wooden houses, mainly in Japan, concerning their seismic performance.

15.2 History of Damage Due to Earthquakes Many earthquakes have occurred in and around Japan and many typhoons have also attacked the country in the past, some resulting in a great amount of damage to wooden buildings and the loss of many human lives. Table 15-1 shows such disastrous earthquakes and typhoons.  The Nohbi earthquake occurred in the middle of the main island of Japan, was significant with estimated magnitude of 8.0 by the Richter scale. Table 15-1. Major disastrous earthquakes in Japan (after the Meiji revolution) Year 1881 1923 1934 1948 1964 1968 1978 1995 2004

Earthquake and Typhoon Nohbi Earthquake Kanto Earthquake Muroto Typhoon Fukui Earthquake Niigata Earthquake Tokachi-oki Earthquake Miyagiken-oki Earthquake Hyogoken-nambu Earthquake Niigataken-chuetsu Earthquake

Magnitude 8.0 7.9 㧙 7.1 7.5 7.9 7.4 7.2 6.8

Damage 220,000 254,000 93,000 48,000 9,000 4,000 7,000 240,000 17,000

Casualty 7,273 142,000 2,702 3,769 26 52 28 6,433 65

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Most wooden buildings at the time were built with traditional construction method by carpenters. After the earthquake, scientific research on the seismic design of buildings was initiated. The Kanto earthquake followed, and hit the metropolitan area of Japan. The earthquake caused great damage to buildings as well as human lives, and is known as the Great Kanto Earthquake Disaster. The first regulations on seismic design were introduced in Japanese building law after this earthquake: the seismic coefficient of 0.1 was adopted. However, only the following item was added at the time: some bracings should be installed in wooden buildings. Accordingly, most wooden houses were left free from installation of bracings. The Fukui earthquake occurred in a rural district, but many people lost their lives mainly due to the collapse of wooden detached houses. The investigation of the damage showed that the degree of the damage to wooden houses had a strong correlation with wall ratio of the house. The wall ratio is defined as the amount of walls in length to the unit area of the floor. The result was taken into consideration when the new building law was established in 1950. Niigata, Tokachi-oki and Miyagiken-oki earthquakes were significant and resulted in great damage to buildings, especially reinforced concrete structures. Wooden houses also suffered damage, but the damage was not so serious. Japanese wooden houses looked as if they had become strong enough to survive severe earthquakes. However, such an optimistic view was betrayed by the Hyogokennambu Earthquake, known as the Kobe earthquake. About 100,000 buildings including wooden houses were completely destroyed (Fig. 15-1). More than 5,000 people were killed. It is estimated that about 80% of the victims lost their lives because of the collapse of wooden houses. Various investigations and studies have been conducted after the earthquake. Some results were taken into account in the revision process of the building law

1995 Hyogoken-nambu Earth-quake Fig. 15-1. Damage due to earthquakes

2004 Niigataken-chuetsu Earth-quake

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in 1998. After Kobe earthquake, many disastrous earthquakes have occurred.

15.3 Categories of Wooden Houses

15.3.1 Categories and Types There are two categories of wooden houses in Japan, as shown in Table 15-2, and each category has some seismic elements and seismic design method. 15.3.2 Traditional Wooden Buildings The first category, traditional wooden house, includes old townhouses (machiya) and old farmhouses. These buildings have been designed and Table 15-2. Categories of wooden buildings Seismic design method Seismic elements Type of building Traditional woodenTown House Frame (nuki) and house Farm House wall Conventional Shear wall (bracTwo-by-four ing or board) Detached wooden house Prefabricated Frame

Town House (machiya) Fig. 15-2. Traditional wooden houses

Seismic design method Not applied or special analysis Effective Wall Length Method

Working Stress (AlMoment resisting lowable Stress) Deframe, truss, etc. sign Method

Farm House

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built by carpenters using design methods based on their experiences (Fig. 15-2). 15.3.3 Detached Wooden Houses The other category is wooden detached houses for a single family. In Japan there is a stock of about 24.5 million units, and 0.5 million units are newly constructed every year. This category can be divided into four types according to the classification of the construction method (Fig.15-3). Conventional method of construction

The conventional construction method was derived from the traditional construction method. The structural system of both methods has posts and beams. Houses of this type have the largest share (60%) among wooden detached houses. Two-by-four system

The two-by-four system was introduced from North America, where the original system is the most common construction method and is called

Conventional method of construction (under test)

Two-by-four system (under test)

Wooden panel construction (under test)

Moment resisting frame (under construction)

Fig. 15-3. Detached wooden houses

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light-frame construction or platform construction. The name 'two-by-four' came from the sectional size dimensions of the lumber. This structural system consists of walls with nailed boards. Wood panel construction (prefabricated)

This system of light-frame construction prevails throughout the world. There are various systems of prefabricated wooden house, but the most popular system is a panellized one. Walls, roofs and floors are made of wood panels with plywood and its structural system is based on these panel elements. Moment resisting frame and truss

These types of houses are designed by structural engineers. There are great varieties in structural system, moment resisting frames, trusses, wooden shell and so on. In these houses engineered wood, glued laminated wood, LVL, are used as columns and beams.

15.4 Seismic Elements of Wooden Houses

15.4.1 Column and Nuki The structure of traditional wooden houses consists of columns and beams. However, the frame of columns and beams was not a structure strong enough to resist horizontal forces caused by earthquakes. Therefore, nuki was introduced to reinforce the frame in the medieval period, around 1200 AD. Nuki is a horizontal member that penetrates a column and fastened with wedges.

Fig. 15-4. Column and nuki

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Fig. 15-5. Hanging Wall

Mud wall

Bracing

Nailed boards (plywood)

Fig. 15-6. Bearing walls

15.4.2 Hanging Wall Equal to nuki, an important seismic element for traditional wooden houses is the hanging wall. The hanging wall assists the fames to resist horizontal forces. However, the hanging wall should be designed carefully, because this seismic element causes the bending failure of columns. 15.4.3 Bearing Walls (Shear Walls) The most important seismic element in all types of detached wooden houses is shear walls. The shear wall in traditional wooden houses is a mud wall, in conventional construction method is bracings, in two-by-four system is a wall with nailed boards, and in a prefabricated house is panel wall units.

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Fig. 15-7. Moment Resisting Frames

15.4.4 Moment Resisting Frames Seismic horizontal loads are carried by moment resisting frames (Fig. 15-7), trusses and more complicated structural systems.

15.5 Seismic Design Methods for Wooden Buildings

15.5.1 History of Design Methods The provision of seismic design for buildings was introduced in Japanese building law for the first time in 1924, immediately after the great Kanto earthquake. However, detailed design methods for wooden buildings were not introduced until 1950, when the building standard law was established. Since then, the allowable stress design method is applied to ordinary wooden buildings and the effective wall length method is applied to wooden detached small houses. The effective wall length method is still used today for its simplicity. The numerical coefficient values used in this method have changed several times, and the numerical values at present were given in the revision of the building standard law in 2000. The load-carrying capacity method was introduced in the 1980 revision. However, it was rarely used for wooden buildings, because the number of large wooden buildings that should be designed by the method was small.

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The performance based design method was introduced in the building standard law in 1998. This method is called 'Calculation of Response and Limit Strength.' 15.5.2 Effective Wall Length Method The effective wall length method consists of two components, namely the required ratio of wall length and the resistance factor of shear wall. The required ratio of wall length, p, was determined based on the assumption that the weight of each part (roof, wall and floor) was the same as typical wooden houses and design base shear coefficient is 0.2 according to the minimum requirement in the building standard law. The value of the resistance factor of a shear wall, q, was determined based on racking tests. The value represents the allowable strength of the wall. The allowable strength is mainly defined as resistance at story drift of 1/120. The following relationship should be satisfied in seismic design of each wooden house. p˜A҇Ǜ(q˜l) where p : required ratio of wall length (cm/m2, Table 15-3) A : area of the floor (m2) q : resistance factor of each shear wall (Table 15-4) l : real length of shear wall (cm)

In the above expression, p˜A corresponds to the earthquake force and в(q˜l) corresponds to the resistance. In the revision of the building standard law in 2000, two design technique were introduced clearly. One is the design technique for the effect of eccentricity and the other is the design technique for the joint of the top and bottom of columns with walls. In Japan wooden detached houses have been designed by not only structural engineers, but also carpenters. This is why the very simple design method, effective wall length method, is needed. Table 15-3. Required ratio of wall length p (cm/ m2) StorySingle Roof storied Heavy (Clay tile) 15 Light (Metal plate) 11

Two storied Three storied 1st story 2nd story1st story 2nd story3rd story 33 21 50 39 24 29 15 46 34 18

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Table 15-4. Resistance factor of wall q (examples) Type of Wall Mud Wall 15×90 mm 30×90 Bracing 45×90 90×90 Plywood t҈12mm OSB t҈12mm Gypsum board t҈12mm

Resistance Factor 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 3.0 2.5 1.0 1.0

15.5.3 Allowable Stress Design Method The allowable stress design method has been used for bigger buildings, such as schools and offices. Recently this method is used for wooden detached houses as wekk. There are moment resisting frames as seismic elements, but these are not estimated by the effective wall length method. The standard seismic base shear coefficient is 0.2. The stress in the members and joints are checked for long-term and short-term loads. 15.5.4 Load-carrying Capacity Method In the revision of the Building Standard Law in 1980, the load-carrying capacity method (the method to examine the performance against very severe earthquakes) was introduced. The method is based on the approximate relationship between the linear response and the non-linear response. In the approximation the energy of linear response and that of non-linear response are regarded equal. The seismic base shear coefficient for very severe earthquakes is 1.0. The design seismic base shear coefficient could be decreased according to the ductility of the structure. 15.5.5 Performance-based Design Method The performance-based design method (Calculation of Response and Limit Strength), introduced in the recent revision of the Building Standard Law in 1998, is based on the approximate relationship between the linear response and non-linear response, in which the non-linear response is replaced by the equivalent linear response. So far, very few wooden building

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have been designed by this method, because it is not yet popular among structural engineers and the data are not enough for practical use.

15.6 Seismic Evaluation and Reinforcement Method for Wooden Houses

15.6.1 Seismic Problem for Existing Wooden Houses There are 24.5 million wooden detached houses in Japan as of 2003 and 0.5miliion wooden detached houses are built every year. Even in Tokyo, there are 5 million wooden houses. Among these existing houses, it is thought that 10 million houses have poor seismic performance. It was estimated that 90% of houses built before the 1981 revision in the Building Standard Law have poor seismic performance. The houses were called existing ineligible houses. There are two problems for seismic performance of existing wooden houses. One is the change of the Building Standard Law. Seismic design methods for new wooden houses and the numerical values of coefficient have changed several times after disastrous earthquakes (Table 15-5). Thus, from the viewpoint of the stocks, wooden houses are not always designed with present seismic design methods. The other is ageing, such as deterioration and damaged by termites (Fig.15-9). In the 1995 Kobe earthquake, 80% of deaths in the earthquake were caused by damage of old small houses. It is required to make a diagnosis of existing houses, and to reinforce the house as the result of the diagnosis. Many local governments in Japan promote the seismic diagnosis and seismic reinforcement. However, many owners don't intend to request

Fig. 15-8. Wooden houses in Tokyo

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Table 15-5. Changes in the required ratio of wall length

1950 1960 1891 2000

Heavy roof 1st story 2nd story 16 12 24 15 33 21 33 21

Light roof 1st story 2nd story 12 8 21 12 29 15 29 15

Fig. 15-9. Age deterioration

diagnosis and reinforcement for their houses. Many people don't believe the governmental warning that a great earthquake will hit the house in its lifetime. If the possibilities of strong earthquake hits were given in stochastic value, the meaning of value would be vague and unreliable. Elderly people require much effort to settle in a new house. The practice of seismic reinforcement would depend on the philosophy of owners. There are many issues in the promotion of the reinforcement of existing wooden houses. The seismic engineers must present reliable and economic seismic diagnosis and reinforcement methods for existing wooden houses. However, some simplified diagnosis method like the Effective Wall Length Method is required for carpenters and house builder who diagnose houses. On the other hand, the seismic evaluation method of existing wooden house were revised in 2004 and many reinforcement methods are developing. 15.6.2 Seismic Evaluation Method for Wooden House Seismic evaluation method and reinforcement exists as a technique that improves the seismic performance for the stocks of wooden existing houses. This seismic evaluation method was published by the Japan Building Disaster Prevention Association, and was fully revised in 2004. The new building standard law revised in 2000 applies this evaluation method.

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In this method, the performance of ground, foundation and building are separately evaluated, as the ground disaster cannot be avoided by reinforcing the houses. This seismic evaluation method consists of two components, namely required strength and resistance strength. This method is almost the same as the effective wall length method for new houses, but it differs in that the value compared is not length of walls but the strength of walls. The required strength, Qr, is determined as same method as the ‘required ratio of wall length’ when a new wooden house is designed. The resistance strength, Pd, is estimated with strength, P, eccentricity, E, and deterioration, D. The strength, P, is estimated with performance of bearing walls and joint of frame. If there is insufficient joint around the bearing wall, the strength of wall is reduced. Finally the diagnosis point is calculated with resistance strength, Pd, and required strength, Qr, and the seismic performance of the house is judged according to the diagnosis point and Table 15-6. For Buildings Diagnosis Point = Pd (Resistance Strength) / Qr(Required Strength) where Qr: Required Strength Pd: Resistance Strength Pd=P x E x D P: Point about the strength of seismic elements E: Point about eccentricity D: Point about deterioration

15.6.3 Reinforcement Method for Wooden Houses It was estimated that 90% of houses built before the 1981 revision in the building standard law have poor seismic performance. In fact, the diagnosis point of almost all existing wooden detached houses built before 1981 is under 0.7. For these poor seismic performance houses, many techniques Table 15-6. Diagnosis point and judgment Diagnosis Point Over 1.5 1.0-1.5 0.7-1.0 Under 0.7

Judgment Not Collapse Maybe Not Collapse Possible to Collapse In danger of Collapse

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of reinforcement have been developed. Ground

The house standing on a deep alluvium is in danger of liquefaction (Fig. 15-10(1)). However, avoiding liquefaction is very expensive compared to the cost of building a wooden detached house. The house on a cliff or under a cliff is in danger of landslide (Fig. 15-10(2)). In this case it is effective to reinforce the retaining wall. Foundation

In the case of insufficient foundation, such as the absence of reinforced concrete, concrete blocks and stones, there is danger of cracks, corn-type failure and bending failure of foundation in an earthquake (Fig. 15-11(1)). To reinforce the insufficient foundation, reinforce concrete foundation is placing side of existing foundation with shear connectors (Fig. 15-11(2)). Lack of wall

Houses lacking bearing walls have huge damage in an earthquake. These houses must install sufficient bearing wall, bracing and nailed plywood (Fig.15-12). Insufficient joint

The houses with insufficient joint around the bearing walls are greatly damaged in earthquakes, even if there is sufficient length of effective wall. Insufficient joint around the bearing wall decreases the performance of the bearing wall because it cannot resist the tensile force of the column in an earthquake. In this case, column is fastened to ground sill and to beam with metal connectors (Fig. 15-13). Eccentricity

In the wooden detached small house, many bearing walls are arranged in the north part of the house and few bearing walls are placed in the south part of the house for big opening. This causes large eccentricity of the house. In this case, more seismic elements should be arranged in the south part of the house. New seismic elements, steel bracing (Fig. 15-14(2)) and rigid frame can add both higher seismic performance and transparency of walls.

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Deterioration and aging

Wooden buildings cannot avoid aging and deterioration because of the material used, namely wood. The deterioration on the bottom of columns is the same as insufficient joint of column to sill from the viewpoint of structural performance. In this case, the deteriorated elements and the factor should be removed (Fig. 15-15). Others

On the other hand, many reinforcement methods for existing wooden houses are under development. Fig. 15-16 shows some methods of the reinforcement of existing wooden houses.

(1) Liquefaction

(2) Landslide

Fig. 15-10. Damages to ground

>>>

Ending failure of non-reinforced concrete foundation Fig. 15-11. Foundation

Reinforcement of existing foundation

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>>>

Fig. 15-12. Lack of wall

>>>

Fig. 15-13. Insufficient joint around the bearing wall

>>>

Damage caused by eccentricity Fig. 15-14. Eccentricity problem

Steel bracing bearing wall

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>>>

Fig. 15-15. Deterioration

Steel pole

Dumper

Fig. 15-16. Existing house reinforcement method

The performance of these reinforcement methods was verified by fullscale shaking table tests. In 2004 two houses built 30 years ago were removed to the shaking table at E-Defense in Hyogo prefecture. The two houses were built at the same time and using the same methods. One house (right side in Fig. 15-17) is as it is and the other house (left side in Fig. 1517) is reinforced by installing bracing and nailed plywood and fastening the columns to horizontal member. The two test specimens were shaken by the wave observed at JR Takatori Station in the Kobe earthquake. After the test, the non-reinforced house collapsed but the reinforced one did not collapse.

15.7 Revaluation of Traditional Wooden Buildings Traditional wooden housings are not engineered structures, but many of them have survived severe earthquakes. Also, traditional wooden buildings, including shrines and temples, are not only architecture but also

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Fig. 15-17. Shaking table test (Left: reinforced specimen, Right: non-reinforced specimen)

Fig. 15-18. Reinforcement for traditional wooden houses

cultural property. Thus, these should be preserved with reinforcement even if they have poor seismic performance. Now research is being conducted on the structural behavior of such buildings using modern techniques of earthquake engineering. Structural engineers analyzed the performance of traditional wooden buildings using

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a special design method. This design method is very complicated compared with the effective wall length method.

15.8 Conclusions To upgrade the seismic performance of wooden buildings as good stocks, different approaches should be taken according to the category of the building. For detached wooden small houses, some simplified design method is required. However, for traditional wooden houses a more sophisticated method could be used, and this method is not necessarily easy.

References Sakamoto, I. (2001) “Seismic Performance of Wooden Buildings”, IABSE CONFERENCE LAHTI 2001, 85 National Research Institute for Earth Science and Disaster Prevention (2004) Special Project for Earthquake Disaster Mitigation in Urban Areas

Acknowledgements Sections 15.1-15.5 about seismic performance of wooden building and design method refer to the paper, Sakamoto (2001). The author thanks Professor Isao Sakamoto.

16. Vulnerability to Earthquake Disaster and Countermeasures in Tokyo

Takaaki Kato

16.1 Significant Characteristics of 1995 Great HanshinAwaji Earthquake Disaster First, I would like to look back at the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake of 1995. Kobe, a large city located near epicenter the earthquake, suffered huge damage (Fig. 16-1). The disaster caused huge physical damage and killed more than 6,000 people, although Japan is one of the most developed countries in the world. This disaster made a large impact on society in Japan, as is reflected in the earthquake countermeasures below. I summarize the significant characteristics of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake disaster from the viewpoint of urban disaster prevention. The first characteristic is that it was the first urban disaster in which damage from collapsed houses dominated. It had been assumed until then that the typical pattern of urban earthquake disaster in a mega-city would be like the 1923 Kanto Earthquake, in which the dominant damage in was not collapsed houses but rather damage by urban fire-spread. The second

Fig. 16-1. Damage from the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake

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is that building collapse was even more than estimates before the earthquake. What caused this damage? It is not a problem concerning the present seismic building code. The buildings which met the present building code had no damage, or little damage. It was main reason that many inadequate buildings existed. Furthermore, a more fundamental problem was that nonrenewable built-up areas existed. In fact, most damage was concentrated in densely built-up areas. The third is that urban fire-spread damage made a large social impact and the reaction of the public was very serious, although fire damage in Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake was not extensive, and in fact was rather small, because it was not windy: wind velocity was only 4m/s maximum. If the winds were stronger, there would have been more severe damage caused by fire. As I will discuss later, if an earthquake at the same level occurred in Tokyo, the volume of fire damage will be one hundred times as the damage in Kobe. Finally, it is pointed out that the social response to damage in terms of civil engineering construction, lifeline damage, liquefaction, and the other damage was within the scope of estimates.

16.2 Vulnerability to Earthquake Disaster in Tokyo Tokyo has high earthquake hazard. Fig. 16-2 shows the distribution of earthquake probability of seismic intensity (JMA) 6 upper in the next 30 years. The probability in Tokyo is estimated at more than 26%. Just for reference, the probability just before the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake Disaster was less than 10%. Therefore, we can understand that an earthquake in Tokyo is an imminent threat. The Central Disaster Prevention Council, which is the main national organization reported the damage estimation of a Capital inland earthquake in 2005. The history of earthquake occurrence in the Kanto region, which includes Tokyo, shows that an inter-plate earthquake of magnitude 8-class has occurred repeatedly at intervals of a few hundred years (Fig. 16-3). The previous M8-class earthquake was the 1923 Kanto Earthquake; therefore, Tokyo will not experience an M8-class within this century. However, we should focus attention on the adjacent period before the M8-class earthquake. We can understand that an intra-plate earthquake of M7 class, which is the same level as the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, can occur frequently within 100 years before an inter-plate earthquake. Thus, we have to prepare for intra-plate earthquakes of M7 class in the present period. We will experience a few earthquakes in Tokyo in our lifetime. Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG) has taken countermeasures for

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Fig. 16-2. Distribution of earthquake probability of seismic intensity (JMA) 6 upper in the next 30 years

Fig. 16-3. History of earthquake occurrence in the Kanto region

earthquakes. Accurate and detailed damage estimation is essential in consideration of countermeasures. TMG has reported on earthquake damage estimation three times in the last 20 years. These were for both inter-plate and intra-plate earthquakes. The latest estimation was published in 2007. The damage estimation report shows the damage volume, and describes the situation at each district after an earthquake. The main purpose of the damage estimation is to be used for the premise of the disaster prevention and management plan, which the Basic Act on Disaster Prevention requires.

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Fig. 16-4 shows an example of the work flow of the damage estimation. Firstly, a scenario and condition of earthquake occurrence is set: epicenter and magnitude of an earthquake is set; time point and wind conditions, which influence the situation of fire damage, are set. Secondly, various kinds of damage, such as ground shaking, liquefaction, buildings collapse, fire, lifeline damage, and casualties, are calculated based on an engineering model using a huge volume data. Four earthquakes which have different epicenter locations and magnitudes are set as a scenario, and two time points and two wind conditions were set in the TMG estimation in 2005. According to the TMG report, seismic intensity in Tokyo will not exceed JMA Intensity 6 upper, which is lower than the most damaged area in the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake (Fig. 16-4). Special distribution of seismic intensity shows the difference of the ground structure. The east area in Tokyo is comparatively weak. Liquefaction possibility in the area Table 16-1. Earthquake scenario in the TMD report Epicenter

Magnitude

North area in Tokyo Bay M6.9 West area in Tokyo

M7.3*1

Time

Weather condition 5:00 in win- 3m/s*1 ter*1 18:00 in win- 6m/s ter 15m/s*2

1) The same condition as 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake Disaster 2) The same condition as 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake

Fig. 16-4. Estimation of seismic intensity in each earthquake scenario

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is estimated higher as well. Fig. 16-5 shows the distribution of building collapse. We understand that it concentrates in the east of Tokyo. This is the result from the accumulation of vulnerable buildings on comparative

Fig. 16-5. Estimation of building collapse in each earthquake scenario

Fig. 16-6. Estimation of fire damage in each earthquake scenario

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weak ground. Concerning urban fire-spread, huge damage is estimated beyond comparison to the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake. This is due to the huge number of fire break-outs and the existence of large areas vulnerable to fire spread. The number of fire break-outs is estimated to be far more than fire-fighting power, which is considered to have adequate resources for normal situations. In the worst case, it is estimated at more than 1,000 in Tokyo; 500-600 fire break-outs would cause urban spread-fire. This is due to high density of ignitable buildings, and high seismic intensity. On the other hand, vulnerability of urbanized area to fire is influenced by several variables: distribution of buildings structures, building density, road density, and layout of open space. The spatial distribution of fire damage is different from other types of damage, such as building collapse. The highly damaged areas are distributed in a doughnut shape. This area had been built-up without appropriate control under urban planning in the period of economic growth in 1960s. Total fire damage is estimated to extend to as much as 100 times the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake: 100 km2 will be burnt in Tokyo. Table 16-2 shows the summary of damage estimation. We can see that the situation in Tokyo will be different from that of Kobe in the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake. Building collapse will not be as much as the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake with consideration of city size; however, damage by urban fire spread will be huge beyond comparison to the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake. What would cause this difference? I will explain based on output from Kato (2006). The left image in Fig. 16-7 is a map of fire damaged area in Kobe. The colored area in the map shows the actual burnt area in the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake. The right image is a map of the district where the most fire damage is estimated in Tokyo. Each building is categorized by color. A cluster of the same colored buildings is called a “community sharing its fate” and means that all building belongs to a cluster will beburnt down in case that more than one fire breaks out from a cluster. We should notice that the scale of the two maps is the same. There is apparently a severe shortage of roads in Tokyo and the density of houses extremely is high. The fact that the actual urban fire spread in Kobe would be stopped at the wide road as seen in the map shows that Tokyo has even more vulnerability to urban fire than Kobe. According to our study, the burnt probability of this area in Tokyo is estimated nearly 0.8, and theburnt area is estimated at 2 km2. We should pay attention to this significant difference between Kobe and Tokyo. The present characteristic in Tokyo can be said that fire damage will dominate, like the Kanto Earthquake. This fact will be applicable to not only physical damage but casualties.

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Table 16-2. Comparison between the damage estimation in Tokyo and actual damage in the 1995 Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake Damage estimation in Tokyo*1 Actual damage in 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake Disaster

Building collapse Fire damage Complete collapse126,523 310,016 Half collapse 345,654 Complete collapse 104,906 7,483 Half collapse 144,274

1) Maximum number

Fig. 16-7. Comparison of the situation of urbanized area in Kobe and Tokyo aspect from urban fire spread based on urban fire

The image of urban earthquake disaster tends to fix on the damage actualized in the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake. Disaster will be influenced by all the components which constitute a city; therefore, we must have the correct image regarding urban earthquake disaster corresponding the actual situation of the city, without excess reference to the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake. I sum up vulnerability in Tokyo. Directly problems are as follows: -

ground form weakness in the east of Tokyo shortage of roads and open space existence and expansion of densely built-up area high density and expansion of flammable buildings existence of un-renewable built-up area Most of problems would go back to the period of economic growth. urbanization without consideration of hazards imbalance between urbanization speed and infrastructure development

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uncontrolled buildings density

Summing up simply, we can say that Tokyo failed to accumulate urban stock at the period of economic growth. In the upcoming period, we will experience population decline. I think that we should consider this period as a good chance to reduce the risk in the mega-city. Whether the risk in the city will increase or decrease depends on urban planning in the next period.

16.3 Earthquake Disaster Mitigation Plan at the City Level In this section, I will introduce to earthquake mitigation plan at the city level. Tokyo has two kinds of countermeasure aspect from urban planning. One is the evacuation plan to guard citizens’ lives from heat radiation of urban spread fire. Another is the promotion plan to construct a disasterresistant city.

Fig. 16-8. The evacuation plan in Tokyo

Fig. 16-9. The promotion plan to construct a disaster-resistant city

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Fig. 16-8 shows the evacuation plan in Tokyo. This plan prepares some safe refuge sites from urban fire-spread for all citizens. TMG assigns 170 sites as safe refuge at the present. The area of these sites is said to be approximately more than 10 ha. Safety of all the sites from heat radiation was assured with calculations based on an engineering model. Firstly, flammable zones around a candidate refuge site are assumed, the flame height of urban fire at the zones is calculated, and the intensity of heat radiation from flames inside the site is calculated. Moreover, maximum capacity for evacuees is calculated from area which will be less than heat radiation intensity for human to endure. The sphere of evacuees is decided corresponding to the capacity. If all citizens were to evacuate to the specified evacuation site, in theory their lives would be guarded from urban fire spread. Another plan at the city level is the promotion plan to construct a disaster-resistant city (Fig. 16-9). This plan has two points. One is to partition the entire urbanized area to urban fire compartments, which is an area of approximately 80 ha. Another is to mitigate vulnerability inside urban fire compartments. All boundaries of each urban fire compartment are formed by a belt consisting of a wide road and fire-proof buildings by the roadside which will stop urban fire-spread (Fig. 16-10). Inside each compartment, community-based improvements are implemented, such as small open spaces known as pocket parks, collaborative housing renewal, and road improvement to widen roads with less than 4 m width to 6 m or 8 m. According to

Fig. 16-10. Image of urban belt to stop fire-spread, through the boundary of compartments

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Fig. 16-11. Districts with high vulnerability in Tokyo

the Tokyo fire department, approximately 80% of urban belts to stop firespread have been built up at the present; however, they are unevenly distributed. Development has made little progress in the west area in Tokyo. As the main reason, it is pointed out that some roads authorized in city planning have not been constructed yet. Inside compartments, there are also many districts with high vulnerability, shown as colored areas in Fig. 16-11.

16.4 Earthquake Disaster Mitigation Plan at the District Level for Densely Built-up Wooden Housing: Focusing on New Technologies Community-based improvement has been implemented inside compartments with high vulnerability. This topic is explained in detail in the next chapter. In this section, we are concerned with advanced technologies to support community-based improvement planning, which is becoming popular. I will introduce the community-based planning support system for disaster mitigation based on GIS technology. The system has three functions: urban spatial database linked to GIS, vulnerability assessment function or disaster simulator, and user-interface to input an alternative plan or countermeasure. The planning process with the planning support system is shown in Fig. 16-12. In the first phase, we recognize the present problems in the community with a vulnerability assessment function, such as that shown in Fig. 16-13, and then we set a goal

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Fig. 16-12. The planning process with the planning support system

regarding each problem. In the second phase, we consider an alternative with an input-interface, as shown in Fig. 16-14, and then we check the effectiveness aspect from disaster mitigation with the vulnerability assessment function or a simulator. We can reconsider the countermeasures after effectiveness verification, and draw up other alternatives. This cyclic process refines and optimizes the countermeasures. As a result, the countermeasures or plans will be more suitable to the local characteristics of the community. We consider that the system would be used by all participants in planning: planners, administrative officers in charge of planning, and the residents, who would not have GIS skills, and that the system has three roles: to make plans and countermeasures, to share common perceptions of hazard or risk among users, and to communicate with all participants in this process. Fig. 16-15 is an example of an alternative plan to widen two streets and to apply new regulations, according to which all new buildings must be fire-resistant or fire-proof. You can draw a plan like this in less than 10 minutes if you are familiar with it. Fig. 16-16 shows the results to check effectiveness. We can easily understand that the fire damage will be reduced.

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Fig. 16-13. An example of fire-spread simulation for a typical densely built-up area in Tokyo

Fig. 16-14. User-interfaces for consideration

Fig. 16-15. An example of an alternative plan to widen two streets and to apply new regulations, according to which all new buildings must be fire-resistant or fire-proof

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Fig. 16-16. An example of effect verification with fire-spread simulation

The system has been used as a tool for risk communication with residents and residents’ participatory planning workshops, combined with conventional tools such as drawing work and fieldwork. At the present, more than 20 municipalities already use it or will use it soon. This style, which we call vulnerability assessment-based planning, is becoming established in Japan. The effectiveness of this system has already been demonstrated in some cases, especially in risk-communication with residents; however, concerning plan-making, we need to refine know-how for using it to achieve increased effectiveness, such as how to communicate with residents using the system, how to show the residents the effectiveness of an alternative, and how to program workshops using the system. Planners and administrative officers may need to experience and learn more. From the aspect of software technology, we think that this system has been established as applied technology based on GIS; however, we will continue to improve the system through actual cases and strive for technical improvements.

References Kato, T., Yusuf, Y. and Cheng, H., Yamaguchi, M. and Natori, A. (2006) “A Method Applying to any Different Map-Scale for the Integrated Earthquake Fire Risk Evaluation with the Single Building Data and consideration of Fire Break-out Probability”, Journal of Institute of Social Safety Science, 9 (in Japanese)

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Committee for Promotion and Administration of Community-based Planning Support System for Disaster Mitigation, http://www.bousai-pss.jp (Accessed in 2007)