US-Indian Strategic Cooperation into the 21st Century: More than Words (Asian Security Studies)

US–INDIAN STRATEGIC COOPERATION INTO THE 21 ST CENTURY

This book traces the origins, evolution, and the current state of Indo-US strategic cooperation. It shows that during the Cold War, owing to opposing grand strategies, the two states frequently found themselves at odds. With the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, Indo-US security cooperation started in a fitful fashion. In recent years, however, it has acquired considerable ballast and the armed forces of the two states have participated in exercises on land, sea, and air and have carried out joint humanitarian missions. Drawing on new information and with contributions from both academics and policymakers, this wide-ranging volume analyses the strategic convergence of these two states while explaining why important differences do remain. These notably include questions pertaining to the future of India’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, US–Pakistan ties and India’s links with Iran. The contributors to this volume thus explore in a novel light the areas of cooperation and discord in this merging relationship and offer suggestions for expanding the scope and dimensions of future collaboration. This volume will be of great interest to students of South Asian Politics, Asian Security, US foreign policy, and Security Studies in general. Sumit Ganguly is professor of Political Science and Director of the India Studies Program at Indiana University in Bloomington, where he holds the Rabindranath Tagore Chair in Indian Cultures and Civilizations. He is a specialist on regional security issues in South Asia and is the author, co-author, or editor of some 12 books on the region. Brian Shoup received his PhD in Political Science from Indiana University in 2005. His research interests focus on ethno-nationalist politics and conflict. Andrew Scobell is Associate Research Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. He is a specialist on Asian political and military affairs.

ASIAN SECURITY STUDIES Edited by Sumit Ganguly Indiana University, Bloomington Andrew Scobell US Army College

Few regions of the world are fraught with as many security questions as Asia. Within this region it is possible to study great power rivalries, irredentist conflicts, nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation, secessionist movements, ethnoreligious conflicts, and inter-state wars. This new book series will publish the best possible scholarship on the security issues affecting the region, and will include detailed empirical studies, theoretically oriented case studies and policy-relevant analyses as well as more general works. CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS Alternate paths to global power Marc Lanteigne CHINA’S RISING SEA POWER The PLA navy’s submarine challenge Peter Howarth IF CHINA ATTACKS TAIWAN Military strategy, politics and economics Steve Tsang (ed.) CHINESE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS The transformation of the People’s Liberation Army Nan Li (ed.) THE CHINESE ARMY TODAY Tradition and transformation for the 21st century Dennis J. Blasko TAIWAN’S SECURITY History and prospects Bernard D. Cole

RELIGION AND CONFLICT IN SOUTH AND SOUTH EAST ASIA Disrupting violence Linell E. Cady and Sheldon W. Simon (eds) POLITICAL ISLAM AND VIOLENCE IN INDONESIA Zachary Abuza US–INDIAN STRATEGIC COOPERATION INTO THE 21 ST CENTURY More than words Sumit Ganguly, Brian Shoup, and Andrew Scobell

US–INDIAN STRATEGIC COOPERATION INTO THE 21 ST CENTURY More than words

Edited by Sumit Ganguly, Brian Shoup, and Andrew Scobell

First published 2006 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2007. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” © 2006 Sumit Ganguly, Brian Shoup, and Andrew Scobell, selection and editorial matter; individual chapters, the contributors All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data US-Indian strategic cooperation into the 21st century : more than words / edited by Sumit Ganguly, Brian Shoup, and Andrew Scobell. p. cm. — (Asian security studies) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. United States—Foreign relations—India. 2. India—Foreign relations— United States. 3. United States—Military relations—India. 4. India— Military relations—United States. 5. India—Strategic aspects. 6. Geopolitics—India. I. Ganguly, Sumit. II. Shoup, Brian. III. Scobell, Andrew. IV. Title: United States-Indian strategic cooperation into the 21st century. V. Series. E183.8.I4U7 2006 327.7305409'045—dc22 ISBN 0-203-94674-X Master e-book ISBN

ISBN10: 0–415–70215–1 (hbk) ISBN10: 0–415–70216–X (pbk) ISBN10: 0–203–08743–7 (ebk) ISBN13: 978–0–415–70215–7 (hbk) ISBN13: 978–0–415–70216–4 (pbk) ISBN13: 978–0–203–08743–5 (ebk)

2006009572

CONTENTS

Notes on contributors Acknowledgments

ix xiv 1

1 Introduction BRIAN SHOUP AND SUMIT GANGULY

2 Are we present at the creation?: alliance theory and the Indo-US strategic convergence

11

DEVIN T. HAGERTY

3 Incompatible objectives and shortsighted policies: US strategies toward India

38

ARTHUR RUBINOFF

4 An overview of Indo-US strategic cooperation: a rollercoaster of a relationship

61

DIPANKAR BANERJEE

5 Indo-US defense and military relations: from “estrangement” to “strategic partnership”

82

V.P. MALIK

6 US–India military-to-military interaction: in the context of the larger relationship

113

JOHN H. GILL

7 Prospects for US–India counterterrorism cooperation: an American view POLLY NAYAK

vii

131

CONTENTS

8 Indo-US counterterrorism cooperation: past, present, and future

154

BAHUKUTUMBI RAMAN

9 Limited cooperation between limited allies: India’s strategic programs and India–US strategic trade

173

VARUN SAHNI

10 The future of Indo-US cooperation in multilateral and bilateral peacekeeping operations

192

SHANTONU CHOUDHRY

11 US army’s new peace operations era

207

WILLIAM FLAVIN

Index

221

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CONTRIBUTORS

Dipankar Banerjee was Director of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi. His areas of interest include Disarmament and Security Sector Reforms. He speaks English, Hindi, Bengali, and Nepali. His latest publications comprise of Emerging Challenges in UN Peacekeeping Operations—An Indo-Japanese Dialogue (Co Editor 2005); “SAARC in the 20th Year: Meeting the Challenges of a New Era” (Chapter in Dev Raj Dahal, Nischal Nath Pandey eds New Life Within SAARC—IFA/FES, Nepal, 2005); Jammu & Kashmir—Charting a Future (Co Editor, 2005); Rethinking Security: UN and the New threats (New Delhi, India Research Press, 2005) (Editor); “Nepal— Where Do We Go From Here?,” IPCS Issue Brief April 30, 2005; EU–India Relations: Beginning a New Era (New Delhi: KAF and IPCS, 2005) (Editor); Trilateral Security Dialogue: India, China and Germany (New Delhi: KAF and IPCS, 2004) (Co Editor). Brian Shoup received his Phd from Indiana University. He specializes in institutions and conflict, nationalism, and ethnic violence. His current research explores how different electoral and economic institutions can minimize violence in plural societies. Shantonu Choudhry born in December 1944 in India, PVSM, AVSM, VSM retired as The Vice Chief of Indian Army on December 31, 2004. In his career spanning more than forty-one years as an officer on active service he has held varied command, staff, and instructional appointments. The more important amongst these have been the Commands of one of the largest Counter Insurgency Force (Division size) in Kashmir, a Corps in Punjab and the Army Training and Doctrine Command, and Directorate General of Military Intelligence before assuming duties of The Vice Chief in January 2003. He has been the Director in Military Operations Directorate and an Instructor in the Defence Services Staff College in Wellington, India. He has been an active participant in numerous national and international seminars on Defence related issues. Widely traveled and read, he is a keen angler. Married to Prita, the General Officer has two children, both married.

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William Flavin is the Professor of Multinational Dimensions of Stability Operations at the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, located at the US Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Before this assignment, he was a senior foreign affairs analyst with Booz Allen and Hamilton. From 1995 to 1999, he was a Colonel in the US Army serving as the Deputy Director of Special Operations for the Supreme Allied Commander Europe at the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe. Professor Flavin has been one of the key authors for FM 3-07 Stability Operations and Support Operations and FM 3-07.31 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Peace Operations. His most recent publications are “Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success,” in Parameters Autumn 2003 and Afghanistan: Observations on Civil Military Operations During the First Year of Operation Enduring Freedom, US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, March 24, 2004. Previously, he served in conventional and special operations units in South East Asia, Africa, and the Middle East as well as Europe. He had experience dealing with interagency and civil military issues on Unified Command Staff of USCINCCENT, the Departmental Staff, DA DCSOPS, and the Secretary of Defense Staff, OSD SOLIC. Sumit Ganguly holds the Rabindranath Tagore Chair in Indian Cultures and Civilizations at Indiana University in Bloomington. He has previously been on the faculty of James Madison College of Michigan State University, Hunter College of the City University of New York and the University of Texas at Austin. He has also taught at Columbia University in New York City. He has also been a Fellow and a Guest Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC and a Visiting Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. His research and writing focused on South Asia has been supported by grants from the Asia Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, and the W. Alton Jones Foundation. Professor Ganguly is the author, editor, or co-editor of some 12 books on South Asia. His latest book (with Devin Hagerty), Fearful Symmetry: India and Pakistan Under the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons, was jointly published by Oxford University Press (New Delhi) and the University of Washington Press, Seattle in 2005. John H. Gill (Jack) is an associate professer on the faculty of the Near East–South Asia Center. A retired US Army South Asia Foreign Area Officer, he was assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency as the Assistant Defense Intelligence Officer for South Asia from 1998–2001, including the 1999 Kargil crisis. During his time at the NESA Center, he has also served as Special Assistant for India/Pakistan to the Joint Staff J-5 and as Military Advisor to Ambassador James Dobbins, the US envoy to the Afghan opposition forces (2001–02). From August 2003 to January 2004, he served in Islamabad as the CJTF-180 liaison officer to the Pakistan Army. He has been following South Asia issues from the intelligence and policy perspectives since x

CONTRIBUTORS

the mid-1980s in positions with the Joint Staff (J-5), the US Pacific Command staff (J-5), and a previous tour at DIA. He planned and participated in the first two US–India Defense Policy Group meetings and various military-to-military events with India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. His earlier tours of duty include tactical and operational assignments in Germany. His publications on South Asia include an Atlas of the 1971 India–Pakistan War and chapters on current Indian and Pakistani political-military affairs in Strategic Asia 2003–04. Col Gill is currently working on a chapter on military operations during the Kargil conflict. He is also an internationally recognized military historian and has authored several books and numerous papers on the Napoleonic era. Devin T. Hagerty is an associate professor of political science at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County. He was previously a senior lecturer in government and international relations at the University of Sydney in Australia. Hagerty was awarded a PhD by the University of Pennsylvania, an MALD by the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and a BA by Rutgers University. He is the author of The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia (MIT Press, 1998), as well as (with Sumit Ganguly) Fearful Symmetry: Indo-Pakistani Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons (Oxford University Press and the University of Washington Press, 2005). His edited volume, South Asia in World Politics, was published in early 2005 by Rowman and Littlefield. Hagerty is also the founding managing editor of Asian Security, a Taylor and Francis journal that debuted in February 2005. V.P. Malik was Chief of the Army Staff of the Indian Army from October 1, 1997 to September 30, 2000. Concurrently, he was also the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee of India from January 01, 1999 to September 30, 2000. As Army Chief and Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee, he planned, coordinated, and oversaw execution of Operation Vijay to successfully defeat Pakistan’s attempted intrusion in Kargil Sector in 1999. His tenure saw substantial enhancement of civil-military coordination in the government of India, and military diplomacy efforts as part of India’s international relations. A graduate from the Defense Services Staff College and Madras University, General Malik is an alumnus of the National Defense College, New Delhi. He has authored several papers on defense planning and security issues and addressed many national and international seminars, civil and military institutions, universities, and industrial organizations. Since retirement, he keeps himself engaged by spreading awareness and sharing his views on India’s national security challenges and international relations. He was a member of the National Security Advisory Board for two years. Currently, he is President of the ORF Institute of Security Studies, Honorary Advisor to the Centre for Policy Research, and an independent director on the board of some well-known private sector companies. His book Kargil: From surprise to victory (Harper Collins, India) was released in April 2006. xi

CONTRIBUTORS

Polly (Mary) Nayak—now a consultant for diverse private sector and government clients—was the US intelligence community’s senior expert and manager on South Asia before her retirement in 2002. In that capacity, she shaped intelligence and crisis support to the White House and Congress; her rank was equivalent to that of a two-star general. Over the past two years, Ms Nayak has written and consulted on issues ranging from terrorism to nuclear policy, political stability, and foreign relations, with a special emphasis on South Asia. Her latest articles include US Security Policy in South Asia Since 9/11— Challenges and Implications for the Future (Occasional Paper, Asia-Pacific Center for Strategic Studies, Honolulu, February 2005) and a paper about US intelligence performance on the Indian nuclear tests of 1998. She has begun work on a book on US policy in South Asia. Ms Nayak has lectured frequently, for example at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Georgetown, the US Army Eisenhower Series on National Security, American University, Wesleyan University (Connecticut), the Foreign Service Institute, Washington College, the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, and Thunderbird. Earlier in Ms Nayak’s career, she worked on Africa and Latin America and regularly briefed senior US Cabinet members. Ms Nayak’s earlier career included several years on an Indian corporate team negotiating international “turn-key” projects, staff work for a US organization that was resettling Middle Eastern refugees, and academic research. Ms Nayak earned an AB degree from Harvard University and an MA from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and did graduate work at MIT. She has fluent French and Spanish, and rusty Hindustani. Bahukutumbi Raman worked as sub-editor in the “Indian Express” from 1957 to 1961; in the Madhya Pradesh Police from 1962 to 1967; in the Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India, New Delhi, from 1967 to 1968; and in the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, from 1968 to August 31,1994, when he retired as Additional Secretary after having headed the counter-terrorism division of the R&AW from 1988 to 1994. He served as a member of the Government of India’s Special Task Force for the Revamping of the Intelligence Apparatus in 2000 and as a member of the Government of India’s National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) from July, 2000, to December, 2002. He is currently Director of the Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai, and was Distinguished Fellow in the Observer Research Foundation (ORF), New Delhi. He looked after its branch in Chennai and co-ordinated the activities of its International Terrorism Watch Programme. He is the author of two books: Intelligence— Past, Present and Future; and A Terrorist State As A Frontline Ally—both published in 2001 by the Lancer Publications of New Delhi. He writes regularly on security-related issues and is a guest lecturer on terrorism and intelligence-related issues at the National Police Academy, Hyderabad, the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington, Tamil Nadu, the Army War

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CONTRIBUTORS

College, Mhow, Madhya Pradesh, and the National Defence College, New Delhi. He is Honorary Editorial Consultant to the “Indian Defence Review,” published by the Lancer Publications of New Delhi. He was a member of the Working Group on Terrorism and Trans-National Crime of the Committee on Security Co-operation Asia Pacific (CSCAP) in 2002. Arthur Rubinoff is currently Professor of Political Science and South Asian Studies at the University of Toronto, where he has taught since 1972. He holds a PhD from the University of Chicago and is the author of six books, including The Construction of a Political Community: Identity and Integration in Goa (Sage, 1998). He has written more than fifty articles for such journals as Asian Affairs, Asian Survey, and Pacific Affairs. Professor Rubinoff has received grants from the Ford Foundation, the Fulbright Foundation, the Shastri Indo-Canadian Institute, the Smithsonian Institution, the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, and most recently the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for a three year project on “Identity and Difference in India.” Currently he is writing a monograph on “The Role of Congress in U.S. South Asia Policy.” Varun Sahni is Professor in International Politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi. He is also the Editor of South Asian Survey, an academic journal on the region published by Sage. He lectures regularly to foreign diplomats and officer trainees of the Indian Foreign Service at the Foreign Service Institute in New Delhi. Professor Sahni was educated at St Stephen’s College, Delhi and at JNU, before going to New College, Oxford in 1986 as an Inlaks Scholar. From 1989 to 1992 he was Junior Research Fellow in Politics and Junior Dean at Lincoln College, Oxford. During his years at Oxford he taught Latin American Politics and wrote a doctoral dissertation on the Argentine Navy. On his return to India in 1992, Dr Sahni was a Resident Fellow of the Rajiv Gandhi Institute for Contemporary Studies, New Delhi and Reader in Latin American Politics at Goa University before joining the faculty at JNU in 1995. Professor Sahni has held visiting fellowships/professorships at Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico (1997), CIDE, Mexico City (1997–99) and the National Defense University, Washington, DC (2003), the last of which was under the Fulbright Military Academies Initiative. He has been “Personalité d’Avenir” at the French Foreign Ministry (1995) and a Member of Mexico’s Sistema Nacional de Investigadores (1999–2002). Andrew Scobell is Associate Research Professor in the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Dickinson College. He earned a PhD in political science from Columbia University. Scobell’s research focuses on political and military affairs in the Asia-Pacific Region. He is the author of China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March (Cambridge University Press, 2003).

xiii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The editors wish to express their deepest appreciation to Professor Douglas Lovelace of the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Without their generous financial and intellectual support this volume would not have been possible. We also wish to thank the staff of the India Studies Program at Indiana University, Bloomington. The editors also wish to express their appreciation to William Finan of Current History, Peter Scoblic of The New Republic, Harrison Wagner of the Department of Government at the University of Texas at Austin, and Linda Wrigley of the World Policy Journal for their thoughtful and incisive comments on the initial drafts of these manuscripts. The editors and authors, however, bear sole responsibility for all errors of fact and interpretation.

xiv

1 INTRODUCTION Brian Shoup and Sumit Ganguly

Strategic relations between the United States and India, historically beset by mutual animosity and mistrust, are in the midst of significant improvement. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s visit to India in March, 2005 typified the changing temper of dialogue between the two states. Despite the Bush administration’s decision to sell F-16 aircraft to Pakistan, a move that prompted intense outcry from New Delhi in the 1990s, India’s response was more reflective of annoyance than rage. In many respects, the India–US relationship is evolving in response to the changing role of India as a regional power (and potential counterweight to China), the growth of India’s economy and its attendant impact on US interests in such varied realms as energy policy planning and foreign trade, and Washington’s interest in continued stability in the subcontinent in light of its stated objectives in the war on terrorism. The existence of consistencies in Washington’s and New Delhi’s geopolitical interests, while a clearly necessary condition for future cooperation, does not guarantee that relations will remain sanguine. There remain significant, albeit surmountable, differences between the two states, particularly in regard to India’s disinclination to support the US mission in Iraq and its desire to develop energy links with Iran, and US concerns about India’s reluctance to conform to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); agreements, it should be noted, that India never agreed to sign in the first place. Nevertheless, developments such as the Next Steps in the Strategic Partnership (NSSP), a bilateral program announced in 2004, portend a future relationship built on the recognition of mutual interests. This volume explores these mutual interests, as well as persistent disjunctures, with a focus on long-term prospects for strategic cooperation. Are we witnessing the convergence of grand strategies between two countries with a history of tenuous security links, or does the current atmosphere of cooperation merely reflect contemporary conveniences with little hope of long-term sustainability? The contributors examine this question in the context of a number of realms of present and future cooperation.

1

BRIAN SHOUP AND SUMIT GANGULY

The Cold War era Under Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s then prime minister and the key architect of its foreign policy, New Delhi pursued a Cold War era strategy based on the principle of non-alignment. In theory, the posture of non-alignment was intended to imply that India would pursue its own interests, free from domination by either the United States and its allies or the Soviet Union and the communist bloc. By extension, the policy also included a sharp focus on issues relevant to the recently de-colonized states that were rapidly emerging following the end of the Second World War. New Delhi, by virtue of its sheer size and its status as a global role model in ending British colonial rule, assumed the mantle of leadership for much of the developing world. As such, Indian foreign policy was aimed at advancing issues like global economic redistribution and the peaceful resolution of disputes. Far from being a wholly neutral policy, non-alignment was simply intended to grant states the capacity to make foreign policy decisions outside of the constraints imposed by the two superpowers. In practice, however, India’s foreign policy was far from neutral in regards to Cold War considerations. Nehru himself was inclined to support the Soviet Union owing to Moscow’s repeated statements against colonial rule. Despite Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, Nehru and his immediate successors openly collaborated with the USSR on a wide range of issues. Certainly, Soviet support for India’s strategy of industrialization as import-substitution played a significant role in bolstering this relationship. By the 1970s the Soviets emerged as New Delhi’s principal arms supplier and could generally depend on Indian support vis-à-vis Washington’s grand strategy of containment. Common misgivings about China also helped cement this relationship.1 Only briefly, following the 1962 Sino-India War, was there a brief period of cooperation between India and the United States and this quickly evaporated as incongruities between the two states re-emerged.2 In particular, Washington’s persistent support to Pakistan hindered the development of cordial relations with New Delhi. US support to Pakistan, manifest in both arms sales and ambivalence toward India’s position on the issue of Kashmir, placed a considerable obstacle in the way of cooperation that persists to this day. The upshot of India’s non-aligned status was that Washington and New Delhi would maintain, at best, chilly relations for the better course of 50 years. Only with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the subsequent loss of both its raison d’etre and access to weaponry, did non-alignment diminish as a viable foreign policy strategy. Further, faced with the consequences of a half-century of gross economic mismanagement, Indian leaders increasingly recognized that the country could no longer maintain a system predicated on import-substitution, licentious rent-seeking by bureaucrats, and a casual dismissal of the price mechanism. Despite its status as leader of the developing world, Indian officials had roundly failed in their efforts to increase growth and improve the standard of living for literally tens of millions of people. Technological achievements notwithstanding, New Delhi’s economic policies could scarcely be said to provide a sound model for the poor states of Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

2

INTRODUCTION

Further, by the early 1990s India was facing an unprecedented financial crisis owing to the rise in oil prices following the Gulf War, the repatriation of thousands of workers from the Gulf states and the loss of their substantial remittances, and onerous debt obligations. Given the choice between short-term loans and increased debt that would only see India through for a few more years on one hand, and a radical reorientation of economic policies on the other, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and his Finance Minister, Manmohan Singh, chose to pursue a new course based on increasing economic competitiveness, reducing bureaucratic regulations and corruption, and improving foreign investment through significant tariff reductions. While the near-term implications of this strategy are difficult to glean, there is no doubt that India’s recent economic growth, consistently in excess of 6 percent, is indicative of the wisdom of their choice. It is in this new environment of global geo-strategic change and economic reorganization that the first seeds of Indo-US cooperation have been sown. During the Clinton administration, both countries signed the Agreed Minute on Defense Cooperation a tentative framework outlining future military-to-military cooperation. This initial step, while representing a sea-change in Indo-US relations, was plagued by both New Delhi’s perception that Washington was overly obsessed with the Kashmir issue and by US concerns about India’s nuclear weapons program. Both concerns had merit. India’s decision in 1998 to test nuclear weapons brought a swift response from the United States in the form of economic sanctions. Despite the cessation of military-to-military cooperation, these sanctions did provide an opportunity for meaningful discussion on the nuclear issue. US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh led these high level talks, resulting in a significant recognition by Washington that its policy of “rolling back” India’s nuclear arsenal was not a viable strategy. In its place, the United States sought to ensure that New Delhi would adhere to principles of nonproliferation by not providing nuclear technology to other states. More significantly, the dialogue represented the first discussion between the two countries that was based on a perception of mutual equality. It is from this dialogue that much of the current optimism springs, particularly in the critical areas of high technology trade and military-to-military cooperation.

Indo-US relations in the post-9/11 world The terror attacks of September 11, 2001 led to a new US strategy based on the pre-emptive elimination of suspected terror havens, including the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Ostensibly, India was well placed to serve as a close ally to the United States India’s experiences with terrorism, including the heinous attacks by the Jaish-e-Mohammad and the Lashkar-i-Taiba in December 2001, gave it a natural understanding of the challenges inherent in anti-terror tactics. For its part, India immediately offered Washington logistical cooperation and access to intelligence. The United States, however, proved reluctant to take advantage of India’s offer and cast its lot, as it had so often in the past, with Pakistan and the regime

3

BRIAN SHOUP AND SUMIT GANGULY

of General Pervez Musharraf. Fearful of Islamabad’s conspiratorial accusations and the attendant loss of a critical regional ally, the Bush administration declined Indian assistance. The Bush administration’s decision to cooperate closely with Musharraf, widely regarded in India as a sponsor of terrorism, was met with considerable dismay by policy-makers in New Delhi. As was so often the case during the Cold War, particularly during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan’s geographic position astride the politically volatile regions of Central Asia gave it a natural advantage when dealing with Washington. Christened a “major non-NATO ally” in 2004, Pakistan once again finds itself in the United States’ good graces, despite the fact that few states did more to precipitate the spread of radical political Islam in Central Asia, and particularly Afghanistan, than Pakistan and its military leadership.3 This is an irony not lost on leaders in New Delhi. Despite India’s deep misgivings about the Pakistan–US relationship, it is increasingly clear that New Delhi sees value in the long-term strategic links it is forging with Washington. Indeed, a consistent theme running through the chapters of this volume is that India is taking proactive steps to “dehyphenate” itself from Pakistan, a reality increasingly acknowledged by the Bush administration. Washington’s willingness to rescind the sanctions imposed in 1998 and to maintain and increase military-to-military cooperation, as well as high technology trade linkages, suggest that the Pakistan–US relationship is best viewed as a necessary reality in the context of broader US regional objectives.

Areas for cooperation The emerging “strategic partnership” between the United States and India is based on a shared respect for democracy and concerns about the threat of global terrorism as well as mutual unease about he long-term implications of the rise of China in Asia and beyond. At the same time, despite mutual interest in these areas, the authors in this volume note that recent improvements in Indo-US relations have largely been based on defense policy cooperation. This is not a trivial matter as meaningful bilateral relations must have a sound footing in defense related issues. Indeed, General Ved Malik and John Gill detail the expanding scope of military-to-military cooperation in their respective chapters, with a particular focus on the extent to which the improving defense relationship can pave the way for bilateral cooperation in other realms. Since 1991, when Lt. General Claude Kicklighter proposed a series of joint military exercises, Indian and US forces have coordinated on a number of training efforts, and in March of 2005 the Bush administration announced its willingness to move forward on a proposal to sell India advanced fighter aircraft and even potentially allow joint production of F-18 and F-16 aircraft. Nevertheless, wide ranging political initiatives and critical advances in bilateral trade have yet to wholly materialize. A critical area of future focus lies in the area of high technology trade, particularly in those technologies that advance India’s interests in energy security, 4

INTRODUCTION

aerospace, and nuclear safety. Trade in the realm of these dual-use technologies is a key component of India’s long-term strategy of economic and political development and is likely to be the fulcrum about which future relations will turn. To coin the phrase used by Varun Sahni in this volume, the dual-use technology issue will likely become the “litmus test” by which healthy bilateral relations will be measured. That said, the issue of making these technologies available to India is not without its detractors. In July 2005 the Bush administration reached an accord which promises to relax key legal provisions that had prevented the sale of civilian nuclear technology to India. Critics of this move argued that such a decision weakens global non-proliferation regimes by rewarding countries that openly pursue nuclear technology and would encourage proliferation by known nuclear suppliers like China and Russia.4 It is no secret that India longs to join the world’s nuclear club, a status New Delhi sees as critical to achieving its aspirations as a global power. In India’s defense, it was never a signatory to the NPT, consistently arguing that the treaty was biased. Indeed, critics of the NPT can point to the failure of existing nuclear powers to adhere to the spirit of Article Six of the treaty which stipulates that nuclear states make good faith efforts to phase out their arsenals. Moreover, there are scant few observers who would suggest that India’s reluctance to sign on to the NPT is a consequence of some secret desire to distribute nuclear technologies. Rather, India’s nuclear programs must be analyzed as both a consequence of its own broader regional security interests, particularly as they pertain to China, and also as a result of its burgeoning energy needs. Both of these dynamics are worthy of study in their own turn. An argument made by several contributors to this volume is that only by allowing India into the community of nuclear states can global non-proliferation objectives truly be realized. To its credit, New Delhi has expressed a willingness to separate out its military programs and subject its civilian nuclear facilities to full-scope IAEA safeguards, despite its status as a non-NPT signatory. According to this line of reasoning, the Bush administration, by easing legal restrictions on the acquisition of dual-use technology, is actually enhancing the sanctity of nonproliferation objectives by incorporating a state that has clearly crossed a threshold in regards to its nuclear status. Moreover, India’s legitimate security needs, coupled with its adamant refusal to share nuclear technologies with “rogue” states like Iran and Libya, stand in stark contrast to Pakistan, another state that has refused to sign the NPT. Unlike India, Pakistan has been exposed as a proliferator without peer. A.Q. Khan’s veritable nuclear bazaar provided technology to a number of states that are NPT signatories, a demonstration of Islamabad’s cavalier attitude toward the spread of nuclear capability.5 A second, and equally critical, factor driving India’s nuclear programs is its evergrowing need for energy. As this volume goes to press, India announced a quarterly growth mark of 8 percent. India’s rapid rate of economic expansion requires an attendant increase in energy availability. This need for energy reserves is a powerful motivator behind New Delhi’s close relations with Iran, a state 5

BRIAN SHOUP AND SUMIT GANGULY

whose vast reserves of oil and natural gas are viewed as a viable source of power for India’s growing economy. As of 2004, nuclear reactors accounted for less than 3 percent of India’s total energy consumption.6 According to this line of reasoning, the United States’ long-term interests are best served by enhancing New Delhi’s energy self-sufficiency through the transfer of peaceful nuclear technology. Critically, the July agreement between the United States and India formally binds the hands of New Delhi by securing a commitment to conform to international norms pertaining to non-proliferation.

Barriers to partnership: three’s a crowd? Several authors in this volume note that India–US relations, despite obvious improvements, still have a number of obstacles to address. Initially, India’s left parties, who comprise an important source of support to the current government, are suspicious of the US intentions in South Asia and are reluctant to abandon their vision of a loose coalition of mid-range powers to act as a potential counterweight to American geopolitical dominance. While this camp’s influence is relatively small in comparison to its stature during the Cold War era, it remains disproportionately influential among many in India’s policy elite.7 Again, the key factor underlying suspicions remains the United States’ close relationship with Pakistan. Many Indians view Washington’s tolerance of the Musharraf regime as blatantly hypocritical in light of the United States stated interests in combating international terrorism. Given Pakistan’s role in sponsoring violent attacks in Kashmir as well as other parts of India via the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI-D), Islamabad’s relaxed attitudes toward terror organizations such as the Lashkar-i-Taiba, and the Pakistani government’s role in establishing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the Bush administration’s decision to name Musharraf’s regime a major ally in 2004 was especially galling. B. Raman highlights the Indian perception of the Pakistan–US relationship in his chapter, emphasizing these frustrations in light of the December 2001 attacks on the Indian parliament; an attack widely believed to have been carried out by members of Lashkar-i-Taiba with ISI-D approval. As with most variables affecting Indo-US strategic relations, the issue of Pakistan is complex. Indian policy-makers have clearly accepted, albeit reluctantly, that US objectives necessitate a permissive tolerance of Pakistan’s malfeasance, at least in the short-term. Moreover, the Bush administration’s willingness to provide some sort of quid-pro-quo to New Delhi, particularly in the areas of technology trade and arms sales, no doubt help to lessen the potential for acrimony. Nevertheless, this issue points to a larger problem confronting the emerging strategic partnership and one that the authors in this volume universally agree upon. Specifically, India’s political and economic maturation necessitates that it be detached from Pakistan in the geopolitical calculus of the United States. This need to “de-hyphenate” India and Pakistan is essential to India’s wider goals of achieving the status of a global power. 6

INTRODUCTION

By virtually any measure, India has outpaced Pakistan and its future growth is clearly constrained to the extent that policy decisions by US lawmakers have been unable to keep up with the ever-widening gap between New Delhi and Islamabad. India has demonstrated a commitment to economic liberalization that has sparked unprecedented economic growth, is rapidly emerging as a high technology hub with a well-trained workforce in the IT sectors, and has abandoned its commitment to non-alignment and its attendant paradoxes. Pakistan, in contrast, is in danger of becoming a failed state and, US aid notwithstanding, is scarcely capable of servicing its crippling external debts.8 Suffice to say, it is illogical to view India and Pakistan as peers, a factor that Indian leaders are keen to impress upon policy-makers in the United States. As noted, Indian policy-makers have held back their rancor at Washington’s coddling of the Musharraf regime, recognizing that the United States’ near-term interests in the war on terrorism must override its misgivings about Islamabad’s role in exporting radical Islam. This, in itself, is a significant advance in bilateral relations, made all the more remarkable by repeated US claims that it recognizes India’s growing role as a global player. Further, Washington’s increasing reluctance to turn a blind eye to Pakistani claims on Kashmir are reflective of a growing sense of this independence. As Devin Hagerty notes in the subsequent chapter, the Bush administration has continued the Clinton policy of stressing that it is only India and Pakistan that can resolve the Kashmir issue. These developments, if they evolve, can lay the foundation for a future South Asia policy based on dealing with India and Pakistan on their own terms, spelling an end to historic patterns that viewed India and Pakistan as zero-sum competitors. This, perhaps as much as any other factor, is the largest obstacle that the contributors to this volume see as the most pressing issue confronting Indo-US relations.

Plan of the book This volume proceeds in three main sections. The first section provides an overarching assessment of Indo-US relations with a particular focus on the evolution of contemporary bilateral relations. Devin Hagerty examines the emerging strategic relationship in the context of both India’s regional security concerns and the United States’ shorter-term interests. Building on conventional definitions of formal alliances from the international relations literature, he argues convincingly that the growing relationship between Washington and New Delhi, while certainly impressive, does not constitute an alliance but rather is best viewed as an “evolving entente.” This definition, while clearly not as sanguine as an alliance, holds true to the reality of Indo-US relations as they are presently situated; constrained by the shadowy nature of international terrorism, India and the United States’ share a mutually recognized enemy. Given entente’s inherently more fluid structure and suitability to both states recognized objectives, Hagerty suggests that near-term Indo-US relations are unlikely to evolve into a full-fledged alliance, 7

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barring a major shift in the geopolitical landscape of Asia. Hagerty, nevertheless, is optimistic about the future of the bilateral relationship. Arthur Rubinoff argues that Indo-US relations, despite their clear improvement, are founded on mutually incompatible assessments of interest and are unlikely to move beyond decades of mistrust and suspicion. Tracing the United States’ role in South Asia since the Second World War, Rubinoff notes that US policy has persistently misunderstood Indian domestic constraints as well as New Delhi’s legitimate security concerns, particularly as they pertain to Pakistan. Far from being signs of a healthy partnership, current trends are more reflective of a misguided attempt on the part of US policy-makers to have it both ways by maintaining links with both India and Pakistan despite the mutually exclusive character of these states’ political objectives. Given this reality, Indo-US cooperation faces a formidable challenge. Major General Dipankar Banerjee finds a middle ground between these two perspectives. While wholly cognizant of incompatibilities in Indian and US strategic objectives, he recognizes the significant progress made in bilateral relations, particularly in terms of military-to-military cooperation. Banerjee is dismissive of pithy phrases used to capture the emergent strategic relationship, arguing that the complexities of Indo-US relations are too significant to be adequately defined so easily. Instead, he lays out a long-term agenda that defines India’s geo-strategic goals and the extent to which the United States can help to achieve them. These goals include India’s permanent membership in the UN Security Council and accommodation in the global nuclear club. The second section focuses on the current state of military-to-military cooperation. Clearly, this has been the strongest area of the Indo-US relationship. General Ved Malik highlights the uneven development of Indo-US defense ties over the last few decades and examines its underlying causes. In addition to providing an exhaustive overview of the interaction between the two defense establishments, including an extensive focus on joint military exercises, he also examines some of the major difficulties that beset the relationship, particularly the 1998 nuclear tests. Malik argues that the extensive Jaswant Singh-Strobe Talbott dialogue paved the way for a fundamental transformation of the Indo-US political relationship, a relationship which has been built upon by the Bush administration. Consistent with Malik’s analysis, John Gill highlights the interconnection between defense ties and other aspects of bilateral relations. Arguing that healthy bilateral ties cannot be separated from vibrant defense linkages, Gill focuses on the need to move Indo-US relations into broader realms. Cognizant of Indian concerns about the US’ relationship with Pakistan, Gill also provides an important rejoinder to those who suggest that the United States is indifferent toward Indian domestic politics. Such assessments are, in fact, a double-edged sword. Clearly the United States can benefit from a greater sensitivity to India’s concerns about the Musharraf regime and the United States’ support. Nevertheless, India must be aware of US domestic constraints and the perceived need to maintain its links 8

INTRODUCTION

with Pakistan, particularly in light of broader US objectives in Afghanistan. At root, this objective is best achieved by embedding defense relations in a larger context of bilateral cooperation that encompasses economic and political ties as well as military-to-military cooperation. Polly Nayak expands on the American view of the Indo-US strategic relationship, with a particular focus on counter-terrorism. Nayak points out a series of opportunities and inconsistencies between Indian and US perceptions of counter-terror operations. Specifically, where the United States sees international terror groups as prime threat, India is presently more concerned with domestic insurgent groups and its neighborhood. Further, India takes a dim view of unilateral actions in combating terror, preferring instead to operate in a multilateral context. The United States, in contrast, is unlikely to eschew its option to use pre-emptive force in the war on terror, perhaps favoring the types of entente-style relationships so clearly described by Hagerty. It is precisely this unilateral approach, and the attendant policy contradictions it breeds, that B. Raman critiques. Despite mutual recognition of the threat of global terror following both states’ tragic experiences in 2001, Raman notes that US policies toward Pakistan continue to bedevil bilateral cooperation in counterterror operations. Washington’s willingness to acknowledge Pakistani involvement in terrorism only when it serves its interests will continue to be a thorn in the side of bilateral relations. The final section of the volume addresses key areas of future strategic cooperation. Varun Sahni focuses on the critical area of high technology strategic trade. As previously noted, India’s requirements as a vibrant and growing economy, as well as its interests in aerospace development, defense, and energy independence, are intimately tied to its future access to dual-use technology. The Bush administration’s recent decision to make some of these technologies available is a meaningful step, but Sahni argues that for bilateral relations to move forward it is critical that the United States make good on its stated intentions in the NSSP. The delinking of India’s missile and space technology programs from current export controls and increased cooperation in the area of civilian nuclear safeguard technology is a good first step. High technology trade is clearly among the most important steps to ensuring cordial relations. However, an extant measure of bilateral cooperation is Indo-US participation in multilateral peacekeeping operations. General Shantonu Choudhry sees future peacekeeping operations as a vastly more complex enterprise requiring mutual cooperation to address the root sources of conflict, including intra-state violence involving communal actors, transnational criminal activity, international terrorism, the spread of infectious disease, environmental degradation, and widescale human rights abuses. Choudhry argues that efforts to improve interoperability of Indian and US forces to address these key challenges would go a long way toward forging the types of bonds other contributors have sought out. William Flavin reinforces many of Choudhry’s arguments, particularly as they pertain to evolving threats to global order. Flavin highlights the United States, 9

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military’s impressive track record of peace operations since the Second World War, yet acknowledges the opportunities for mutual benefit that might be gleaned from closer collaboration with India’s armed forces. As both he and Choudhry point out, the extensive experiences of both militaries in confronting myriad obstacles to world security present a perfect environment within which to test India and the United States’ emerging strategic partnership.

Notes 1 Robert Horn. 1982. Soviet-Indian Relations: Issues and Influence. New York: Praeger. 2 See, for example, Sumit Ganguly. 2003. “India’s Foreign Policy Grows Up.” World Policy Journal. Winter 2003/2004. 3 Ahmed Rashid. 2001. Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press. 4 See Sumit Ganguly. 2005. “Giving India a Pass.” August 17, 2005, available at www. foreignaffairs.org 5 See Sumit Ganguly. 2005. “America and India at a Turning Point.” Current History March, 2005. 6 US Energy Information Agency. India: Country Analysis Brief. Available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/india.html 7 Sumit Ganguly. 2003. “The Start of a Beautiful Friendship: The United States and India.” World Policy Journal. Spring 2003. 8 See Owen Bennett Jones. 2003. Pakistan: Eye of the Storm. New Haven: Yale University Press and Stephen Cohen. 2004. The Idea of Pakistan. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

10

2 ARE WE PRESENT AT THE CREATION? Alliance theory and the Indo-US strategic convergence Devin T. Hagerty

In the last few years, American government officials, scholars, and defense analysts have arrived at a near-consensus on two elements of South Asian security affairs: first, that India is rising rapidly toward great power status; and, second, that New Delhi and Washington are developing an increasingly close “strategic partnership.”1 In American national security circles, India is widely viewed to be achieving, at long last, its potential for global influence.2 To make this case, experts draw attention to India’s robust democracy, its fast-growing economy, its information-technology prowess, and its geo-strategic position astride the sea lanes connecting two volatile regions of vital interest to the United States—the Middle East and East Asia. With the Cold War long past, with India’s emergence as a nuclear weapon state implicitly accepted as a fact of international life, and with India and the United States both fighting the scourge of jihadism in South Asia, the two countries are often described as sharing a host of “common strategic interests.”3 US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s recent remarks are representative; during her March 2005 visit to India, Rice declared that “India is emerging as not just a regional power but as a global power.” The US relationship with India, she said, has been “transformed in recent years from one that had great potential into one that is really now realizing that potential.” “With India,” Rice maintained, “we clearly have a broader and deeper relationship than we’ve ever had.”4 Beneath the surface of this official bonhomie, doubts remain about the ultimate potential of Indo-US relations. While US officials tout the benefits of “our natural alliance as the world’s strongest and largest democracies,”5 their rhetoric masks lingering differences in substance and outlook that have historically frayed ties between New Delhi and Washington. Perhaps most important in this context is the United States’ dependence on Pakistan as an ally in the global war on terrorism, which—for Indian leaders—is all-too reminiscent of the periodic US enlistment of Pakistan as a frontline state in the Cold War grand strategy of containing the Soviet Union. Notwithstanding optimistic talk of “de-hyphenating” Washington’s bilateral links with New Delhi and Islamabad (i.e. viewing each 11

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relationship strictly on its own terms, instead of evaluating policies toward each state according to how they will affect the other relationship), segments of the Indian polity reflexively view the benefits that accrue to Pakistan as an ally of the United States—including generous military assistance—to be detrimental to Indian interests. Although Washington has become more of an honest broker in South Asian security affairs since the Cold War’s end, its 2004 designation of Pakistan as a “major non-NATO ally” and its 2005 decision to sell additional F-16s to Pakistan have rekindled Indian doubts about relying too heavily on the United States. This is so despite the fact that Washington has apparently offered the same status and weapon system to New Delhi.6 In this paper, I examine the complex and dynamic Indo-US relationship. My analysis is framed by alliance theory,7 a body of international relations scholarship that has been depicted, curiously, as both “enormous”8 and “one of the most underdeveloped areas in the theory of international relations.”9 I attempt to answer two fundamental questions. First, what is the exact nature of the Indo-US relationship several years into its pronounced warming trend? Second, what are the prospects for a further deepening of the relationship, perhaps even the eventual formation of a full-blown alliance between Washington and New Delhi? While embedding these questions in the theory of alliances may seem to some analysts an esoteric endeavor, the historically delicate interaction between New Delhi and Washington suggests that it may be wise at this point in time to define precisely what the relationship is and where it is heading. As with any partnership, this is a formula for maintaining shared expectations and, thus, stability, while minimizing the potential for future frustration and disappointment. India and the United States have experienced at least one period of strategic convergence—after the Sino-Indian war of 1962—that soured partly because of ambiguity, mistrust, and conflicting expectations. Unlike busy government officials, scholars have the luxury—perhaps even the responsibility—of taking the long view, of stepping back and surveying the broader sweep of world affairs; as they do so, theory can be a useful tool for raising questions, focusing one’s research attention, gaining analytical traction, and extracting trend lines out of the minute data points of day-to-day international politics.10 My assessment of the Indo-US relationship unfolds in the following way. In the next section, I discuss how international relations scholars have conceptualized alliances between states. I then adopt a working definition of alliances for the purposes of my analysis, and distinguish it from several cognate concepts in the international relations literature. In the paper’s third and fourth sections, I situate recent Indo-US security relations within the conceptual framework offered by alliance theory. After a brief history of the recent convergence of Indian and US interests, I argue that the Indo-US relationship today is best described as an evolving entente, rather than an alliance. Then I assay the areas of potential divergence in contemporary Indian and US national security thinking and forecast the evolving nature of the Indo-US relations in years to come. I argue that in the absence of an appreciably more compelling mutual security threat—such as 12

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the emergence of a zealously fundamentalist Islamic regime in Pakistan or a heightened posture of regional aggression on the part of China—India and the United States will continue to nurture and deepen their entente, but will not take steps to form a conventional alliance.

Alliances and other international alignments Alliances and their kin play a fundamental role in the theory and practice of international relations.11 Indeed, they are a “universal component of relations between political units, irrespective of time or place.”12 As Arnold Wolfers puts it: “wherever in recorded history a system of multiple sovereignty has existed, some of the sovereign units when involved in conflicts with others have entered into alliances.”13 To this, Robert E. Osgood adds that “every state must have an alliance policy, even if its purpose is only to avoid alliances.”14 Ironically, the very ubiquity of alliances in the practice of international relations has contributed to substantial conceptual ambiguity in the theory of international relations. At the broader end of the semantic spectrum, Stephen Walt defines an alliance as “a formal or informal relationship of security cooperation between two or more sovereign states.”15 By this standard, the United States has alliances with scores of countries, by virtue of their regular collaboration in joint military exercises and other mutual defense activities. At the more narrow end of the definitional spectrum, Wolfers writes: “in the technical language of statesmen and scholars the term ‘alliance’ signifies a promise of mutual military assistance between two or more sovereign states.” According to Wolfers, the term connotes that “peculiarly far-reaching commitment contained in military pacts by which a nation formally promises to join another in fighting a common enemy.” From this perspective, “the outstanding asset of an alliance is the military assistance expected in case of need and its deterrent effect on the enemy, even preceding any armed conflict.”16 Wolfers’ terminology implies that Washington today has alliances with some 25–30 countries. It characterizes, for example, the joint commitment at the core of history’s most institutionalized alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), but would omit many other contemporary agreements known popularly as alliances.17 For the purposes of this paper, I adopt Bruce M. Russett’s “fairly limited” definition: an alliance is “a formal agreement among a limited number of countries concerning the conditions under which they will or will not employ military force.”18 Glenn H. Snyder, who utilizes a formulation practically identical to Russett’s, fleshes out the main elements of this middleground conceptualization: alliances are formal agreements; they are concluded by states; they involve collaboration in military matters; and they have an “other” orientation—that is, they are “aimed at states outside their own membership (my emphasis).”19 This definition is less general than Walt’s, in that it excludes “informal or implicit military constellations.” At the same time, it is less specific than the Wolfers formula in two respects: first, it does not “require an alliance to make a specific 13

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identification of the threatening country”; and, second, it does not require the alliance members proactively to have identified the precise nature of their proposed military collaboration.20

Alliances are international social institutions Of the many scholars who have grappled with defining the concept of an alliance surprisingly few have made the simple observation that alliances are international social institutions.21 This is probably due to a certain degree of turf-consciousness among analysts working within the realist and liberal institutionalist schools of international relations theory: “alliances” have traditionally been the preserve of realism, while institutionalists have taken a proprietary interest in “institutions.” But both camps freely acknowledge the institutional nature of alliances. Institutionalist Robert O. Keohane writes that “alliances are institutions: they involve rules prescribing roles for participants.”22 And, in the words of realist John J. Mearsheimer, “realists recognize that great powers sometimes find institutions—especially alliances—useful for maintaining or even increasing their share of world power.”23 An institution, for Mearsheimer, is “a set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each other.”24 Where realists and institutionalists part company is in their assessment of the independent causal importance of alliances qua institutions. Mearsheimer summarizes this difference: “Realists maintain that institutions are basically a reflection of the distribution of power in the world. They are based on the self-interested calculations of the great powers, and they have no independent effect on state behavior.” In contrast, institutionalists argue that “institutions can alter state preferences and therefore change state behavior. Institutions can discourage states from calculating self-interest on the basis of how every move affects their relative power positions. Institutions are independent variables.”25

What alliances are not Semantic precision derives not only from the process of positive definition, but also from a parallel process of negative definition; that is to say, we know what something is partly by understanding what it is not. Scholarship on collaboration between states yields several concepts that in certain respects resemble alliances, but which are actually quite different. Alignment “Alignment” is a relative term that refers to the degree of amity between states in the international arena. Two states are closely aligned if their interests tend to overlap and their policies with respect to particular issues are often congruent. Alignment is a “broader and more fundamental” term than alliance. It concerns the “expectations of states about whether they will be supported or opposed by other states in future 14

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interactions.”26 To give an example, the United States and Saudi Arabia are aligned on many issues that arise in the international relations of the Middle East. Washington and Riyadh often find that their interests coincide, although occasionally they do not. But the United States and Saudi Arabia are not alliance partners in the sense defined above. They do not have a formal agreement to collaborate militarily, although they do have a mutual expectation of support in the event that common interests—for example, an unimpeded flow of oil—are threatened. As Snyder argues, “formal alliances are simply one of the behavioral means to create or strengthen alignments. Thus, alliances are a subset of alignments—those that arise from or are formalized by an explicit agreement, usually in the form of a treaty.”27 Ententes Another form of alignment is the entente. Although it has fallen out of fashion in recent years, the term “entente” was traditionally used to denote a particular kind of close alignment that fell short of a full-blown alliance. Robert A. Kann calls the entente “the classical case of a flexible agreement of cooperation between two sovereign powers.”28 “In an entente,” writes Russett, states “pledge themselves to consult and/or cooperate on political matters.”29 Compared to alliances, ententes are relatively informal; they are generally not expressed in treaties or other agreements of similar international-legal standing. Entente partners thus retain greater flexibility than alliance partners when it comes to determining the appropriate degree of support to lend one another. As Kann puts it, the entente is “by intent far more loosely defined” than the alliance, is a “far less conspicuous form of association,” and often entails “no definite commitments.”30 Furthermore, because ententes are primarily mechanisms of political cooperation, they may—depending on the circumstances—lack the explicit military dimension inherent in alliances. Support for one’s entente partner could extend to military cooperation, but it might also be limited to close diplomatic consultation and moral support. More precisely, while alliances tend to be focused explicitly on particular, well-defined military threats, ententes are alignments geared toward preparing for a wide range of possibilities, which might include joint combat operations, but also non-combat military-to-military cooperation such as peacekeeping operations and humanitarian missions. From this perspective, as I will argue below, the relationship between the United States and India today is best characterized as an entente. Ad hoc coalitions Another form of alignment is the ad hoc coalition, which is a temporary marriage of convenience formed by two or more states to deal with the emergence of a specific issue or threat. In an article on burden-sharing in the 1990–91 Persian Gulf war coalition against Iraq, Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger conflate the concepts of ad hoc coalitions and alliances, calling the US-led alignment the “first major post-cold war alliance.” They further claim that 15

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“the end of bipolarity promises more ad hoc coalitions, which will widen opportunities for research on alliance burden-sharing” beyond NATO.31 This unfortunately elastic use of the concept of an alliance expands it to the point where it is perilously close to losing its analytical usefulness. An alliance is a formal institution that anticipates the potential necessity of military collaboration and provides the cooperative framework within which that collaboration unfolds on a proactive basis. When countries come together to address the sudden emergence of a specific threat, such as the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait in 1990, they move into closer alignment but have not formed an alliance. Indeed, the words “ad hoc” in “ad hoc coalition” are suggestive of the fact that this sort of alignment does not represent formalized institutional behavior. We should reserve the concept of an alliance for just such behavior.

Alliances and collective security Alliances are a form of collective defense, which is properly treated as distinct from the notion of collective security. States align themselves in collective defense arrangements like alliances in order to give formal expression to their potential military collaboration vis-à-vis certain other actors—whether or not those other actors are publicly identified. In contrast, collective security agreements lack this “other” orientation; they are non-exclusive groupings of states “directed against any and every country everywhere that commits an act of aggression, allies and friends included.”32 The most significant implication of this distinction is that alliances allow for greater peacetime military cooperation than do collective security groupings.33 Alliances can identify threats, devise strategies to counter them, plan military operations, forward-deploy armed forces, conduct joint exercises, promote interoperability of forces, and send deterrent signals to potential adversaries. States joined in collective security arrangements can cooperate politically in peacetime, but meaningful military collaboration is difficult without well-defined adversaries, threats, and contingencies. Another good reason to distinguish between alliances and collective security agreements is the tendency of states in alliances to clothe themselves in the rhetoric of collective security. The term “collective security” is often used in public diplomatic pronouncements to characterize “good” alliances, that is, those that are on “our” side, “defending” against those “revisionist” actors that would threaten international “order.” As Inis Claude notes, “considerable ideological advantage is presumed to result from the embellishment of alliances with the morally attractive verbiage of collective security.”34 That being the case, scholars should be attentive to the distinction between these two concepts.

The Indo-US strategic convergence Although the improvement in Indo-US relations is sometimes characterized as having begun only recently, the upward trajectory actually began in 1979.35 The 16

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transformation has hardly been linear, but from a long-term perspective the last twenty-five years have witnessed a gradual convergence in US and Indian grandstrategic thinking. In retrospect, the friction between Washington and New Delhi in the aftermath of India’s May 1998 nuclear explosive tests was the one major hiccup in this trend line between the mid-1980s and today. The Cold War and beyond 36 Indo-US relations, which had been chilly for most of the Cold War, began to change almost imperceptibly with the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in December 1979. Although the Indian government refused publicly to condemn Moscow’s brutalization of Afghanistan, Indian leaders were privately and acutely distressed by their ally’s behavior-and they quietly conveyed their discontent to the Kremlin. How could New Delhi sustain its position as a champion of Third World interests while its superpower patron was systematically devastating a small neighboring country? Also, as the information technology revolution gained momentum, Indian planners came to believe that their economic relations with the stagnating Soviet Union were of declining utility. New Delhi wanted to develop its economy in electronics, computer software, and telecommunications, areas where Washington could be much more useful than Moscow. India began to explore new cooperation with the United States in the early-to-mid 1980s, especially after Rajiv Gandhi succeeded his mother, Indira Gandhi, as prime minister in late 1984. Rajiv was a former airline pilot, enamored of high technology and instinctively responsive to the developmental possibilities of economic liberalization. With the staunchly anti-Communist Reagan Administration eager to isolate the Soviet Union, US officials had their own incentives to pursue warmer ties with New Delhi. The first significant breakthrough was a May 1985 Memorandum of Understanding in science and technology that removed India from the US list of “diversion-risk” countries, paving the way for increased investment and technology transfer. That summer also witnessed a state visit to the United States by Rajiv Gandhi and his wife, Sonia, during an ambitious nationwide series of cultural events known as the “Festival of India.” Indo-US relations had begun to emerge from their Cold War torpor. The Indo-US rapprochement accelerated, albeit slowly, in the early 1990s. The international system was fundamentally transformed between 1989 and 1991. The toppling of the Berlin Wall, the “velvet revolutions” in Eastern Europe, the reunification of Germany, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union were successive geopolitical earthquakes whose global aftershocks rumble even today. Every state in the world faced the necessity of adapting to the end of bipolarity and the emergence of a new, unipolar international order. This transition was all the more challenging for New Delhi, because it came at a time when India itself was undergoing its own social, economic, and political transformations.37 For the first four decades after Independence, the Indian economy had been organized along socialist lines, with the government favoring policies intended to distribute 17

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India’s scarce wealth evenly, rather than policies that might achieve higher growth rates but result in widening economic disparities. This meant that the Indian economy would require strong centralized planning, a large public sector in most basic industries, and tight government control over the private sector. Industry was protected by high tariff walls that over the years prevented Indian manufactured goods from attaining sufficient quality to be competitive on world markets. Foreign investment in and ownership of Indian companies was strictly regulated. So tight was the government’s control of private economic activity that it earned the disparaging moniker “license raj” or “permit raj” (“raj” means “rule” in Hindi). With equal measures of sadness and derision, many economists prior to the 1990s came to refer to the “Hindu rate of growth,” an appreciable but plodding—by developing country standards—3 percent per year. Although the Congress party government of Rajiv Gandhi had begun to make some liberalizing reforms in the late 1980s, it took a severe balance of payments crisis in 1991 to convince New Delhi that the Indian economy required drastic restructuring. Since then, successive governments headed by both major parties, the Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), have liberalized foreign investment and foreign exchange rules, substantially lowered tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade, overhauled India’s fiscal and monetary policies, and significantly reformed the country’s financial sector. India’s overall economic performance has distinctly improved in the last decade, with average growth rates roughly double those of the pre-reform era.38 Historians will likely remember the 1990s as the decade when the so-called Nehruvian consensus—based on secularism, socialism, and nonalignment—breathed its last.

The Clinton years India’s economic reforms necessitated a further deepening of its ties with the United States, a goal that dovetailed nicely with US President Bill Clinton’s economics-driven grand strategy of “engagement and enlargement,” as well as with the increasing political clout of a growing and prosperous Indo-American community in the United States. When Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao visited Washington in 1994, strong emphasis was laid on expanding Indo-US economic relations.39 Rao’s trip was followed in 1995 by the beginnings of tentative military collaboration, outlined in an “Agreed Minute on Defense Relations,” which established an institutional framework that continues to structure Indo-US military ties today. Most significant, the Agreed Minute created a bilateral Defense Policy Group, as well as Executive Steering Groups between the Indian and US uniformed services. The period from 1995 to 1998 brought joint naval exercises, an air force pilot exchange program, and cooperative military training, as US International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding for India doubled.40 However, despite these expanding links, the overall political relationship continued to be undermined by what Indian leaders viewed as Washington’s excessive preoccupation with the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir and India’s nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programs.41 18

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The Nuclear Hiccup The Indo-US convergence was abruptly interrupted by India’s May 1998 nuclear tests. President Clinton’s initial reaction was simultaneously emotional and hypocritical: “To think that you have to manifest your greatness by behavior that recalls the very worst events of the 20th century on the edge of the 21st century, when everybody else is trying to leave the nuclear age behind, is just wrong.”42 Of course, because both India and Pakistan had been de facto nuclear weapon states for many years, their 1998 tests hardly changed the immediate material situation. Symbolically, however, they ushered in a new phase of US concern about the possibility of nuclear war in South Asia. As required by US law, the Indian and Pakistani nuclear explosions mandated a broad package of sanctions against New Delhi and Islamabad, including the termination of all aid other than humanitarian and food assistance.43 Although US non-proliferation laws dictated a suspension of most militaryto-military contacts, the nuclear tests spawned a sustained high-level engagement between the United States and India, led by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh.44 Over time, the Clinton Administration adapted itself to the reality that India’s great-power aspirations included becoming a full-fledged nuclear weapon state. While Washington did not condone New Delhi’s nuclear decisions, one effect of the Talbott-Singh dialogue was to alter US policy itself—from the goal of rolling back India’s nuclear program to one of containing it.45 India’s 1998 nuclear explosive tests were a blessing in disguise for long-term Indo-US relations. They destroyed forever the illusion that New Delhi could somehow be coaxed out of pursuing the ultimate currency of great-power status. That was never in the cards, but the United States’ persistence in pursuing “non-proliferation” vis-à-vis India had tainted every other part of the relationship. Once the tests exploded the illusion, Washington and New Delhi could get on with the important task of relating to one another on a more equal footing. As one analyst has written of the Talbott-Singh dialogue, “it was the most intensive bilateral engagement between the two countries in fifty years. Never before had the two nations had such detailed discussions at the high political level over such a long period of time.”46

De-hypenation The perception—and the reality—of Indo-US strategic convergence during the second Clinton term was also driven by India’s “separation” from Pakistan, a “de-hyphenation” process that evolved not as a matter of US policy, but willynilly as a consequence of comparative Indian and Pakistani actions. Washington’s interest in an enhanced relationship with New Delhi coincided with Pakistan’s continuing fall from grace in the United States’ estimation, a downward trajectory that had been evident since 1990.47 In 1999, Islamabad launched the ill-fated Kargil initiative, a blatantly provocative incursion into Indian-held Kashmir that 19

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sparked a decisive military response by New Delhi, a forceful diplomatic intervention by Washington, and utter humiliation for Islamabad.48 Later that year, the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was overthrown by Army chief Pervez Musharraf, marking an ignominious end to Pakistan’s decade-long attempt at democracy. These events were contextualized by Pakistan’s ongoing support for the anti-Indian insurgency in Kashmir, its patronage of the retrograde Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and increasingly credible rumors that Pakistan was leaking nuclear weapons-related materials to North Korea.49 In sum, at the turn of the century, it was India, not Pakistan, that looked attractive as a potential partner for the United States in Asian security affairs. As the Clinton Administration entered its final year in office, Washington was in simple damage-control mode with respect to Islamabad. Pakistan was for all intents and purposes a rogue state, although it was officially spared that opprobrium. In contrast, India was a vibrant democracy, a responsible nuclear custodian, and a country that fought, rather than supported, terrorism. Clinton’s second foreign policy team was sincerely dedicated to a vigorous strategic engagement with India. Despite what many Pakistanis assume, this was not a zero-sum matter of Washington “choosing” New Delhi over Islamabad. Rather, it was that Pakistan was descending into the geopolitical mire and had no compensating strategic value, while India offered much more to the United States. The dramatic separation between India and Pakistan was vividly illustrated during President Clinton’s long-anticipated trip to South Asia in March 2000. After five days of substantive warmth in India, the President spent all of five hours in Pakistan. In New Delhi, Clinton and his host, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, trumpeted their “resolve to create a closer and qualitatively new relationship between the United States and India,” one based on a “common interest in and complementary responsibility for ensuring regional peace and international security.”50 On Kashmir, Clinton recognized the bedrock reality of the Indian position: the two disputants themselves should resolve the conflict, as per the Simla agreement of 1972. Significantly, the President made no mention of Kashmir in his well-received address to the Indian Parliament, while days later on Pakistani television he exhorted Islamabad to eschew a military solution to the dispute, saying “we cannot and will not mediate or resolve the dispute in Kashmir. Only you and India can do that through dialogue.”51

The Bush years The new Bush Administration’s South Asia policy hardly deviated from President Clinton’s. Indeed, if anything, President Bush’s national security team wanted to intensify the regional policy it inherited. Even before Bush was inaugurated, his advisers talked about how to transform the Indo-US relationship “on the enduring foundation of shared democratic values and congruent vital national interests.” As one influential participant has recalled, in January 2001, “knowing that Prime Minister Vajpayee believed that the United States and India were natural allies, we 20

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developed a roadmap . . . to accomplish the strategic invigoration of the bilateral relationship” that was subsequently approved by the President.52 India’s fast-growing economy, its booming information-technology sector, and its position as a relatively stable, democratic, nuclear power in a volatile region argued for deepening Indo-US ties.53 Not only that, but some senior Bush Administration officials perceived that New Delhi could provide a useful counterweight to Beijing’s growing influence in Asia,54 a view that was strengthened by the April 2001 Hainan spy plane incident—the President’s first foreign policy test.55 Driven by these considerations, the Bush team’s policy review of the South Asian nuclear sanctions resolved—just prior to the September 11 al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon—to lift the remaining penalties against India.56 September 11 and beyond The September 11 attacks produced both challenges and opportunities for the evolving Indo-US partnership. Building on the steady improvement of relations generated by the Talbott-Singh talks, India immediately offered its full backing for US counterterrorism operations in South Asia—including access to air bases, aircraft refueling and maintenance support, overflight rights, intelligence cooperation, and port facilities for US warships.57 When the United States demurred, given its dependence on Pakistan as a staging area for operations in Afghanistan, as well as Islamabad’s sensitivities with respect to India, New Delhi grumbled but astutely did not lose sight of the larger stakes in the Indo-US strategic convergence.58 President Bush waived the 1998 nuclear sanctions against India and reduced the Entity List, which prohibited Americans from “doing business with certain Indian companies,” from more than 150 entities to fewer than 20.59 Then, during a November 2001 Bush–Vajpayee meeting, the two heads of government agreed to “greatly expand . . . cooperation on a wide range of issues, including counterterrorism, regional security, space and scientific collaboration, civilian nuclear safety, and broadened economic ties.” In December 2001, the Indo-US Defense Policy Group resumed its meetings for the first time since 1998.60 By 2002, the strategic convergence between Washington and New Delhi had fully resumed its momentum. The first major official statement of US grand strategy since September 11, 2001 called India “a growing world power with which we have common strategic interests.” The National Security Strategy of the United States of America further noted that: The United States has undertaken a transformation in its bilateral relationship with India based on a conviction that US interests require a strong relationship with India. We are the two largest democracies, committed to political freedom protected by representative government. India is moving toward greater economic freedom as well. We have a common interest in the free flow of commerce, including through the vital sea lanes of the Indian Ocean. Finally, we share an interest in fighting terrorism and in creating a strategically stable Asia.61 21

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Areas of cooperation In the last few years, guided by regular, high-level meetings of the Defense Policy Group, the individual military services’ Executive Steering Groups, and the Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism—Indo-US strategic cooperation has blossomed. The deepest (or at least the most public) engagement has occurred in the area of military-to-military relations: The greatest achievements . . . have been in the area of bilateral exercises, personnel exchanges, high level and unit visits, military education and training, and officer and unit exchanges. The objective of these multifarious activities has been to increase mutual familiarity between the armed forces on both sides in order to advance the goal of interoperability, which is essential if the two militaries have to “combine arms” in peace and stability missions at some point in the future.62 Since early 2002, India and the United States have conducted “numerous joint military exercises involving all military branches.”63 These have included exercises in maritime interdiction, maritime search-and-rescue, naval aviation, anti-submarine warfare, air combat, air lift support, logistics transport, airborne assault, mountain warfare, close-quarter combat, jungle warfare, special forces operations, and peacekeeping operations.64 Counterterrorist activities are a second significant area of ongoing cooperation between New Delhi and Washington, although details are hard to come by in the open-source literature. The two governments agree that one of the chief threats to their security is global jihadism.65 Indo-US cooperation in this area has focused on law enforcement, intelligence-sharing, and the disruption of terrorist financing. According to one source, “the FBI and Customs Service have intensified beyond recognition their cooperative activities with Indian colleagues to investigate terrorism, major crimes, money laundering, smuggling, and customs violations.”66 Arms sales are a third area of cooperation between the United States and India. India’s most significant purchase to date has been a $190 million deal for 12 AN-TPQ/37 “Firefinder” counter-battery radar sets. New Delhi in recent years has also purchased GE-404 engines for its Light Combat Aircraft and electronic ground sensors to detect infiltration in Kashmir. India is in the process of buying $29 million worth of counterterrorism equipment for its special forces, as well as deep submersible rescue capabilities. In addition, India has expressed an interest in the F-16 fighter-bomber, the C130J transport aircraft, the P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft, the US-Israeli Phalcon airborne early warning system, electronic warfare systems, aircraft self-protection systems, and the Patriot PAC-3 missile defense system or the Israeli Arrow 2 anti-ballistic missile system (which, as a jointly developed system, would require US approval).67 A fourth area of at least potential cooperation is missile defense. By defending Washington’s withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty, India in 2001 22

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gave its tacit approval to the Bush Administration’s plans to deploy a National Missile Defense system. After the Indo-US Defense Policy Group met in December of that year, it issued a statement alluding to “the contribution that missile defenses could make to enhance strategic stability and to discourage the proliferation of ballistic missiles with weapons of mass destruction.”68 In 2002, the BJP government announced that it would cooperate with the US in missile defense research and development. New Delhi’s announcement was followed in 2003 by a simulated joint missile defense exercise, held by the Defense Policy Group. According to one source, though, momentum in missile defense cooperation stalled after the Congress party government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh took power in mid-2004. This account maintains that US Defense Policy Group “representatives told their Indian counterparts that New Delhi must be more supportive of US missile defense plans if India wishes to improve ties with the United States; failure to do so, they added, could jeopardize India–US technology cooperation and possible US arms sales to India.69 Next steps in strategic partnership In 2003, the perception began to grow among observers of the Indo-US relationship that the momentum of the strategic convergence was slowing. Partly, this was due to the buildup of US armed forces in the Middle East and the April invasion of Iraq, which had diverted the military from peacetime activities such as joint exercises. But the inertia was also attributed to what one analyst has termed “a continuing reluctance on the part of the United States to license high-leverage military technologies for fear of undermining regional stability . . . combined with New Delhi’s worries about Washington’s reliability as a dependable supplier.”70 While India has long viewed unfettered access to high-technology US weapons and dual-use items to be the litmus test of the Indo-US strategic partnership, Washington continued to be hamstrung in this regard by its dependence on Islamabad in the war on terrorism. US officials feared that if the United States was viewed by the Pakistani public as favoring India with advanced weapon systems and other technologies, support for President Musharraf would decline, thus eroding the joint US-Pakistani effort to root out al-Qaeda and Taliban forces on both sides of the Pakistan–Afghanistan frontier. Worst-case scenarios had Musharraf falling from power or being assassinated, with potentially grave consequences for the war on terrorism. In order to reinvigorate Indo-US relations, New Delhi and Washington committed themselves in January 2004 to a process known as “Next Steps in Strategic Partnership” (NSSP). The NSSP is essentially a phased effort to ease restrictions on India’s access to US technology in four areas: dual-use items, civilian nuclear applications, civilian space cooperation, and ballistic missile defense. The first phase of the NSSP, completed in September 2004, removed the Indian Space and Research Organization (ISRO) headquarters from the US Entity List, abolished licensing requirements for “low-level dual use items” exported to 23

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ISRO subsidiaries, and granted a “presumption of approval” for exports of “all dual use items not controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group for use in the ‘balance of plant’ activities at nuclear facilities subject to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.” During their first meeting, on September 21, 2004, President Bush and Prime Minister Singh “stated that bilateral relations had never been as close as they are at present.”71 Similar views were repeated surrounding US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s brief trip to South Asia in March 2005. As a prominent Indian commentator noted, “we have done more business with the Bush administration in the last four years than we have done with America over the past 40 years.”72 Although news that Washington would resume F-16 sales to Islamabad drew obligatory expressions of disappointment from New Delhi, Indian political elites generally reacted serenely. The Bush Administration’s announcement concerning the F-16s for Pakistan was accompanied by a green light for US firms to “provide India the next generation of sophisticated, multirole combat aircraft, including upgraded F-16 and F-18 warplanes, as well as develop broader cooperation in military command and control, early-warning detection, and missile defense systems.”73 A week later, in a carefully planned Times of India op-ed piece, US Ambassador David Mulford wrote: “It is now official. It is the policy of the United States to help India to become a major world power in the 21st century.” Mulford also noted that Washington and New Delhi would soon launch an expanded “senior level Strategic Dialogue,” one that would “move much deeper into engagement on India’s defense requirements, including discussion of co-production and addressing India’s concern about the United States as a reliable supplier.”74 Said Prime Minister Singh, “India needs help from the world community, including the United States, to emerge as a global power. It is a fact that they want the strategic relationship to grow in depth. We have to find out . . . what they have in mind.”75

Analysis: the evolving Indo-US entente The quality of Indo-US relations has improved enormously over the last twenty— even ten—years. In 1985, Washington and New Delhi were on opposing sides in the Cold War. Its professions of non-alignment notwithstanding, India’s links with the Soviet Union were broad and deep. Meanwhile, Moscow’s war in Afghanistan was at its height, with the United States and Pakistan closely allied in their effort to help the Afghan resistance defeat the Soviets. Ten years later, the Cold War was over, and the Soviet Union was no more, but Indo-US ties were still strained, with Washington badgering New Delhi on non-proliferation and annoying Indians with its equivocal stand on the Kashmir dispute. Today, the United States has accepted—if implicitly—the reality of India’s nuclear program, much in the same way that it does Israel’s. On Kashmir, Washington has repeatedly expressed its support for the Simla Agreement. Perhaps most important, the United States has significantly eased its restrictions on transfers to India of sophisticated weapon systems and dual-use technologies. On virtually every important issue of 24

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the day in the Asia-Pacific, New Delhi and Washington are considerably closer to amity than enmity. Changes in capabilities beget changes in attitudes. Together, changes in capabilities and attitudes beget changes in alignments. Over time, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the advent of unipolarity, and China’s steady rise to power have forced a reappraisal of grand strategy in India and the United States. New Delhi concluded from the global realignments of the 1990s that it must cast aside its nuclear ambivalence and fully embrace its status as a nuclear weapon state. As India’s power has grown, its diplomacy has matured, and its rhetoric has moderated. New Delhi’s responses to foreign policy challenges exhibit a confident, measured tone that was missing even five years ago. In turn, despite paying lip service to a global norm of nuclear non-proliferation (which it soft-pedals when it comes to close friends such as Israel) the United States has grown to respect a newly confident India—more so today than at any time since 1947. The magnitude of this US perception-shift is evident in the National Intelligence Council’s late 2004 forecast of global trends over the next fifteen years: The likely emergence of China and India as new major players—similar to the rise of Germany in the 19th century and the United States in the early 20th century—will transform the geopolitical landscape, with impacts potentially as dramatic as those of the previous two centuries. . . . The[se] “arriviste” powers—China [and] India . . . could usher in a new set of international alignments, potentially marking a definitive break with some of the post-World War II institutions and practices. . . . how China and India exercise their growing power and whether they relate cooperatively or competitively to other powers in the international system are key uncertainties.76 After fifteen years of unipolarity, we can begin to see the emerging outlines of the new alignments that lie ahead. In the Asia-Pacific region, international relations are increasingly structured by the triangular interaction between the United States, China, and India. In terms of size, as indicated in Table 2.1, these countries’ economies rank first, second, and fourth in the world, respectively. As for military spending (Table 2.2), India ranks number 9, far below the United States and China at numbers one and two. India, though, vaults ahead of every other Asian state by virtue of its increasingly robust nuclear weapon and ballistic missile capabilities. Japan’s economic size and military spending might otherwise qualify it as an Asian great power, but its lack of nuclear weapons, its continuing strategic dependence on the United States, and its constitutional restrictions on the use of force give it less great-power status than its relative military spending and economic size would suggest. Qualitatively, relations along each leg of the United States–India–China triangle are relatively harmonious. Washington, Beijing, and New Delhi sincerely desire good relations with the other two governments. In addition to the Indo-US 25

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Table 2.1 Gross domestic product (purchasingpower-parity method), 2004 estimates Economy

Dollars (trillions)

World United States China Japan India Germany United Kingdom France Italy Brazil Russia

55.5 11.75 7.26 3.75 3.32 2.36 1.78 1.74 1.61 1.49 1.41

Source: CIA World Fact Book, 2005.

Table 2.2 Military spending, latest year available Country

Dollars (billions)

United States China Japan France United Kingdom Germany Italy Saudi Arabia India Australia

(2003) 371 (2004) 67.5 (2004) 45.8 (2003) 45.2 (2003) 42.8 (2003) 35.1 (2003) 28.2 (2002) 18 (2004) 17 (2004) 16.7

Source: CIA World Fact Book, 2005.

convergence described in detail above, Sino-Indian ties have been gradually warming since 1988, and they continue their gradual upward trajectory, even though conflicting boundary claims remain formally unreconciled.77 Furthermore, because of their sensitivities to internal secessionist threats— particularly in Kashmir and Xinjiang, India and China are as committed to the war against jihadi terrorism as the United States. At the same time, India and the United States have carved out a relationship with one another whose warmth is not matched along the other two legs of this Asia–Pacific strategic triangle.78 Alliance theory helps us to understand why. Of all the conceptual possibilities outlined in the second section of this paper—collective security institution, ad hoc coalition, entente, alliance—the Indo-US relationship is best described as an 26

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entente. It is not an alliance, primarily because there exists no formal agreement between Washington and New Delhi “concerning the conditions under which they will or will not employ military force.”79 India and the United States share a similar strategic vision for Asia–Pacific stability, and they collaborate, politically and militarily, in preparing for a wide variety of regional contingencies. However, their partnership is by design “more loosely defined” than an alliance, is a “less conspicuous form of association,” and entails “no definite commitments.”80 Most significantly, New Delhi and Washington have not publicly identified China as a mutual military threat, for fear of creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. Absent such forthrightness, it is exceedingly difficult to devise joint military strategies, plan joint combat operations, conduct joint combat exercises, promote interoperability of weapon systems, and send definitive deterrent signals to Beijing. Although India and the United States do not portray China as a threat, they clearly view it as a potential threat. As Jonah Blank has argued, New Delhi and Washington “share a convergence of interests in seeing that China does not become a ‘non status quo power’ or try to ‘radically alter’ the balance of power in Asia.”81 This is what the US National Security Strategy means when it talks about the mutual Indo-US desire for a “strategically stable Asia.” Historically, the United States and India have had cool relations, but they have never viewed each other as direct strategic adversaries. On the other hand, India and China share a long and contested border and have fought a war with one another. China over the years has pursued a policy of strategic encirclement vis-à-vis India, the most menacing aspect of which was the transfer of nuclear weapon and ballistic missile technology to India’s adversary, Pakistan. India is enhancing its own power relative to China by linking itself to the strength of the United States. In doing so, New Delhi also increases its influence over US policy, particularly as it concerns Pakistan and China. For its part, the United States views China as considerably more threatening than India, and is therefore pursuing its own strategy of helping India to become a “major world power.”82 Although structural considerations are important, the matter of why India and the United States view China as more threatening than either views the other requires an examination of domestic factors as well. Most obviously, in the realm of common identities, the United States and India are democracies, while China continues to be a Communist state in theory and an authoritarian one in practice. Perhaps equally important, though, is that Washington and New Delhi increasingly see themselves as partners in the global “establishment,” as status quo rather than revisionist states. Establishment states today are free-market, liberal democracies that do not support terrorism or transfer nuclear weapon or ballistic missile capabilities to other states. India and the United States fall into this category, while China does not. China’s economy is liberalizing, but its political system remains dictatorial. And, despite China’s de jure status as a member of the global non-proliferation regime, it has provided nuclear weapon design information and ballistic missiles to aspiring proliferants such as Pakistan and Iran. 27

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Past lessons have also influenced the Indo-US strategic convergence. The most formative historical experience for India in this regard was, of course, the 1962 Sino-Indian war. New Delhi learned the hard way that while being a truly non-aligned, strategic free agent is perhaps ideologically satisfying, borders cannot be defended by rhetoric that is unsupported by strength. Rhetoric notwithstanding, for most of the period since 1962, India has followed what is most accurately described as a form of “tilted non-alignment,” in which it seeks great-power security insurance against China. The United States briefly played this role in the earlyto mid-1960s. In the late 1960s, and especially with the Indo-Soviet treaty of 1971, Moscow became New Delhi’s main security partner. This paper has chronicled the gradual resumption of that role by the United States following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Why not an alliance? Washington and New Delhi have chosen entente over alliance for reasons that have to do with both international and domestic imperatives. Generally speaking, the contemporary international security environment is less conducive to the formation of formal military pacts than was the twentieth century. Security threats today are at the same time more diffused and less connected with states. The global jihadi insurgency that both India and the United States identify as the chief challenge to their security is a transnational, underground movement. Rather than being a stationary, easily-defined and—targeted adversary, it takes on different manifestations in different places at different times. Such a fluid threat profile requires that states maintain a greater degree of flexibility in their alignment policies. Because ententes are more flexible institutions to meet more diverse threats, the United States—with interests in every part of the world—can be expected to rely more on them as mechanisms of security cooperation. Indeed, ententes can be seen as an institutional parallel to the ongoing transformation of the US military services into leaner, quicker, more portable fighting forces. This proclivity on the part of the US aligns remarkably well with India’s views on security collaboration. New Delhi’s incentives are mixed. On the one hand, India’s strategic culture is such that it prefers to avoid formal alignment with external actors; “strategic autonomy” has been a rallying cry since its Independence. On the other, India has a keen desire to achieve great-power status and feels that its moment is at hand. Its entente with the United States offers India economic growth and development, enhanced international prestige, and a modicum of psychological protection against China. The entente also avoids some of the potential negative baggage that would be sparked by a more formal alliance commitment: domestic political costs associated with residual anti-American sentiment of the Indian left, a perceived compromise of India’s cherished sovereign independence, and a strategically irritated and perhaps more aggressive China. As a bonus, New Delhi also gets increased leverage over US policy toward Pakistan.

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The future of the Indo-US entente Barring the emergence of a radically altered South Asian security environment, New Delhi and Washington are likely to intensify their evolving entente, but not to transform it into a full-blown alliance. Two such disruptions are possible but not probable. The first would be a revolution in Pakistan that brings to power a zealously jihadist regime. Were such a government fully to embrace terrorism as state policy, we would likely see increasingly intense, more formal military collaboration between Washington and New Delhi. The second remote possibility is a dramatically heightened posture of regional aggression on the part of China, which would almost certainly push the United States and India into a more conventional alliance involving joint war scenario-development, weapon-system interoperability, planning for combat operations, and peacetime combat exercises. Again, though, these are unlikely disruptions. More probable is the continued, gradual development of a progressively closer entente. In this endeavor, both sides should take the long view of their relationship. Given the difficult history of Indo-US relations, the changes described in this paper have been enormous. Even the closest alliances hit bumps in the road where partners disagree—sometimes vehemently—on particular issues. Crucial to the health of the Indo-US entente will be a willingness to disagree in such a way that the immediate disgruntlement does not contaminate the entire relationship. The remainder of this paper identifies areas of possible discord in future Indo-US relations; acknowledging, understanding, and working through these potential trouble spots will help to ensure that past frustrations and disappointments are not repeated.

Pakistan For Washington and New Delhi, the US relationship with Pakistan will continue to be a major challenge. Complete de-hyphenation of the India-Pakistan relationship will never happen. US debates over bilateral policies toward India and Pakistan cannot be considered in a vacuum; they will—and should—weigh ramifications across the border. That having been said, recent events have shown that the bad old days of zero-sum thinking are gone forever. One need only recall the days of Pakistan’s isolation in the 1990s to realize that an amicable US bond with Pakistan is in India’s interest, because it makes Islamabad more responsive to US influence. Judging by the fairly mild reaction to Washington’s new sales of F-16s to Islamabad, the Indian government realizes this. The main area of potential discord regarding Pakistan is India’s disenchantment with Washington’s inability to bring about a cessation of cross-LOC infiltration in Kashmir. All sides need a dose of realism on this score. Some infiltration will continue, and it is doubtful whether the United States can do much more to pressure Islamabad to halt it, at least without undermining Pakistan’s political stability. The good news, according to official Indian estimates, is that infiltration rates in December 2004 were down

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some 60 percent from the previous year, and that New Delhi has announced the first substantial drawdown of its forces in Kashmir since the early 1990s.83 UN Security Council A second area of potential discord between New Delhi and Washington involves India’s aspirations for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council. Indian leaders have long pursued this objective as a vital element in their quest to have India recognized as a global, not regional, great power. In response, Washington has been noncommittal, generally supporting the idea of Security Council reform— possibly including expansion—without embracing any particular plan.84 Within the United Nations itself, more focused attention on the issue of Security Council reform has given rise to an intense diplomatic conflict, as countries seeking permanent seats jockey for position, and opponents try to sabotage their candidacies.85 In late 2004, the UN’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change proposed two models of Security Council enlargement, both of which would expand the Council to 24 members. While “Model A” would create six additional permanent seats, the new members would not enjoy the veto power currently wielded by the five permanent members.86 The Secretary-General has urged quick action on reform, but expressed no preference for any specific plan.87 India will naturally enjoin its entente partner, the United States, to support New Delhi’s inclusion in any new grouping of permanent Security Council members, and Washington will have to tread carefully in whatever position it ultimately embraces, so as not to offend Indian sensibilities. Technology and arms sales A third critical area is technology transfer and sales of sophisticated weaponry, which official India clearly sees as crucial to moving the Indo-US entente forward. In this regard, the United States is viewed as a fickle, and perhaps unreliable, partner.88 No doubt, both sides will adapt only sluggishly to a new transfer regime, Washington because of a thicket of US laws and international commitments that bind it, and New Delhi because of a procurement system that one analyst describes as “Byzantine.”89 Again, however, we should take the long view. Seven years ago, India was subject to a US sanctions regime that allowed only the most basic forms of assistance to go forward. Today, India is on the brink of access to a wide range of sophisticated weaponry, military command-and-control systems, earlywarning capabilities, and missile defense technology. The national security communities in both India and the United States should avoid placing too high a premium on some sort of breakthrough deal. In the first place, just because technology transfer is allowable does not necessarily mean that every potential deal is a good idea.90 Second, defining the quality of the relationship in such narrow terms is a recipe for disappointment if particular sales do not go through. We should not lose sight of the fact that, as the US ambassador to New Delhi puts it, 30

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“there is no fundamental conflict or disagreement between the United States and India on any important regional or global issue.”91 Interoperability of forces Last, achieving progressively greater degrees of military interoperability will be difficult. Joint exercises in the areas of counterterrorism, peacekeeping, humanitarian activities, maritime interdiction, and the like have been highly successful in breaking down the walls that long existed between the Indian and US armed forces. While similar exercises between the two countries’ military services will continue to develop their familiarity with one another’s officer corps, doctrines, and day-to-day practices, India’s resources will not permit the extension of interoperability very far into the combat realm. After all, even long-time US ally Australia—with a defense budget roughly the same as India’s—has chronic troubles maintaining sufficient qualitative parity with the United States to conduct joint combat operations.92 It may be the case, though, that combat interoperability will not be a central element in the Indo-US entente. Indian officials have indicated that New Delhi will be reluctant to participate in any joint military operations where specific Indian interests are not immediately at stake, a parameter that makes it hard to envision scenarios where the two sides engage in joint combat operations. Again, both countries would be wise to remember that these are early days for Indo-US relations. Over time, evolving strategic challenges will dictate the types of military-to-military cooperation that are useful.

Notes 1 Condoleezza Rice, interview with Shirvaj Prasad of NDTV, New Delhi, March 16, 2005, available at http://usinfo.state.gov 2 For an example, see United States National Intelligence Council, Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project, NIC 2004-13 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, December 2004). 3 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington: The White House, September 17, 2002). 4 “Remarks of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice en Route to India,” March 15, 2005, and “Remarks by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Indian Foreign Minister Natwar Singh,” March 16, 2005, available at http://usinfo.state.gov. See also Robert O. Blake, Jr, “US-India Relations: The Making of a Comprehensive Relationship,” address at the Army War College, Indore, India, August 23, 2004, available at http://www.state.gov/p/sa/rls/rm/35686; and Robert D. Blackwill, “The Future of USIndia Relations,” address to the Confederation of Indian Industry, New Delhi, July 17, 2003, available at http://www.state.gov/p/sa/rls/rm/22615. Non-official treatments of recent Indo-US relations include Ashley Tellis, “South Asian Seesaw: A New US Policy on the Subcontinent,” policy brief no. 38 (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 2005); Deepa Ollapally, “US-India Relations: Ties that Bind?” Sigur Center Asia papers no. 22 (Washington: George Washington University, 2005); Sumit Ganguly, “America and India at a Turning Point,” Current History no. 104 (March 2005): 120–24; Amit Gupta, The US-India Relationship: Strategic Partnership

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5 6 7

8 9 10 11

12 13 14 15 16 17

or Complementary Interests? (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, February 2005); Mohan Malik, High Hopes: India’s Response to US Security Policies (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, March 2003); and Sumit Ganguly, “The Start of a Beautiful Friendship? The United States and India,” World Policy Journal 20, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 25–30. Christina Rocca, “The United States and India: Moving Forward in Global Partnership,” remarks to the Confederation of Indian Industry, New Delhi, September 11, 2003, available at http://www.state.gov/p/sa/rls/rm/23987 “Report: India Weighs Buying US Warplanes,” Associated Press, March 27, 2005; and Sridhar Krishnaswami, “Our Ties With India, Pakistan Different: US,” The Hindu, March 25, 2005. Alliance theory focuses not only on alliances per se, but on the entire range of international cooperative forms, including collective-security institutions, ad hoc coalitions, ententes, and alliances. The distinctions between these types of alignment will be discussed below. Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 6. Glenn H. Snyder, “Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut,” Journal of International Affairs 44, no. 1 (Summer 1990): 103. Another good reason to seek conceptual clarity is the proliferation of “strategic partnerships” around the world today. Useful surveys of the alliance theory literature include Patricia A. Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004); John M. Owen IV, “When Do Ideologies Produce Alliances? The Holy Roman Empire, 1517–1555,” International Studies Quarterly 49, no. 1 (March 2005): 73–99; Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997): 1–39; Randall L. Schweller, “New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, Not Refuting, Waltz’s Balancing Proposition,” American Political Science Review 91, no. 4 (December 1997): 928; Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” International Organization 44, no. 2 (Spring 1990): 137–68; Roger V. Dingman, “Theories of, and Approaches to, Alliance Politics,” in Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren (New York: Free Press, 1979), 247–48; Paul Schroeder, “Alliances, 1815–1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management,” in Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems, ed. Klaus Knorr (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1976), 227–62; and Philip M. Burgess and David W. Moore, “Inter-Nation Alliances: An Inventory and Appraisal of Propositions,” in Political Science Annual, ed. J.A. Robinson (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972), 339–83. Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies (New York: Wiley, 1973), 2. Arnold Wolfers, “Alliances,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. David L. Sills (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 269. Robert E. Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968). Walt, Origins of Alliances, 1. Wolfers, “Alliances,” 268–69. See also Owen, “When Do Ideologies Produce Alliances?” 74. In between the Walt and Wolfers conceptions are a variety of others. See, for example, Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration, 4; Charles W. Kegley, Jr, and Gregory A. Raymond, When Trust Breaks Down: Alliance Norms and World Politics (Columbia, MO: University of South Carolina Press, 1990), 52–53; George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), 69–70; Hans J. Morgenthau, “Alliances in Theory

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18 19

20 21

22 23 24

25

26 27 28 29

30 31

and Practice,” in Alliance Policy in the Cold War, ed. Arnold Wolfers (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1959), 184–212; Dan Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 58–59; and Bruce M. Russett, “An Empirical Typology of International Military Alliances,” Midwest Journal of Political Science 15, no. 2 (May 1971): 262. Russett, “Empirical Typology,” 262. Snyder, Alliance Politics, 4. My only significant refinement is to add nonstate actors such as terrorist groups to the universe of potential adversaries, so as to better reflect the nature of contemporary international security affairs. For the purposes of this discussion, where theorists refer to “states” as adversaries, their insights can be said to include the more generic “actors.” Russett, “Empirical Typology,” 262. Oran Young defines social institutions as “identifiable practices consisting of recognized roles linked by clusters of rules or conventions governing relations among the occupants of those roles.” International institutions, he argues, are “social institutions governing the activities of the members of international society.” Oran R. Young, International Cooperation (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 5, 6. Also see Arthur A. Stein, Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990). Robert O. Keohane, “Alliances, Threats, and the Uses of Neorealism,” International Security 13, no. 1 (Summer 1988): 169–76. John J. Mearsheimer, “A Realist Reply,” International Security 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995), 82. John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994–95): 7. Realist Stephen M. Walt also treats alliances as a subset of institutions; see Stephen M. Walt, “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,” Survival 39, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 157. Mearsheimer, “False Promise,” 7. On this point, see also Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, “Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO,” Security Studies 3, no. 1 (Autumn 1993): 7; Robert Jervis, “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate,” International Security 24, no. 1 (Summer 1999): 53–55; and Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security 25, no. 1 (Summer 2000): 18, 21, 26. Classical realists tend to be more flexible on this point than their neorealist counterparts. George Liska, for example, depicts alliances as “constitutional structures,” albeit “not fully developed” ones. He writes, “In their internal life, alliances move beyond the condition of anarchy; but as corporate actors, alliances approach the pole of anarchy in their external relations. . . . [A]lliances are not only intermediate forms between constitution and anarchy, but also mixed forms.” Liska, Nations in Alliance, 69–70. For other discussions of alliances as institutions, see John S. Duffield, “International Regimes and Alliance Behavior: Explaining NATO Conventional Force Levels,” International Organization 46, no. 4 (Autumn 1992): 819–55; and Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, “The Promise of Collective Security,” International Security 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 52–61. Snyder, Alliance Politics, 6. Ibid. Robert A. Kann, “Alliances versus Ententes,” World Politics 28, no. 4 (July 1976): 611. Russett, “Empirical Typology of International Military Alliances,” p. 266. Confusingly, Russett categorizes ententes as a certain type of alliance, despite the fact that his definition of ententes is substantially broader than the definition of alliances he presents in the same piece (see p. 6, above). I treat ententes and alliances as distinct concepts. Kann, “Alliances Versus Ententes,” pp. 611, 616, 615. Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger, “Burden-sharing in the Persian Gulf War,” International Organization, Vol. 48, no. 1 (Winter 1994), p. 39.

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32 Arnold Wolfers, “Collective Defense versus Collective Security,” in Wolfers ed., Alliance Policy in the Cold War, p. 52. See also Walt, “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,” p. 158. 33 G.F. Hudson, “Collective Security and Military Alliances,” in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, eds, Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966), p. 177. 34 Inis Claude, Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962), pp. 115–16. Also see Julian R. Friedman, “Alliance in International Politics,” in Julian R. Friedman, Christopher Bladen, and Steven Rosen, eds., Alliance in International Politics (Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 1970), pp. 14–15. 35 For an overview of this warming period, see C. Christine Fair, The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004), pp. 67–76. 36 This section draws liberally from Devin T. Hagerty and Herbert G. Hagerty, “India’s Foreign Relations,” in Devin T. Hagerty, ed. South Asia in World Politics (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), pp. 11–48. 37 See Francine R. Frankel, Zoya Hasan, Rajeev Bhargava, and Balveer Arora, eds, Transforming India: Social and Political Dynamics of Democracy (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000). 38 Hagerty and Hagerty, “India’s Foreign Relations,” pp. 34–36. In the same volume, see Anupam Srivastava, “Globalization and Economic Liberalization,” pp. 257–80. 39 K. Alan Kronstadt, India–US Relations (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 23, 2005), p. 2. 40 Fair, Counterterror Coalitions, pp. 70–71. 41 Dennis Kux, “A Remarkable Turnaround: US-India Relations,” Foreign Service Journal, October 2002, pp. 18–23. Indians were particularly incensed by Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Robin Raphel’s 1993 comment that the United States had never recognized the accession of Kashmir to India. 42 Brian Knowlton, “US Penalties on India Get Scant Support,” International Herald Tribune, May 14, 1998. 43 For a complete list of the penalties, see Dianne E. Rennack, India and Pakistan: Current US Economic Sanctions (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, October 12, 2001), p. 2. Between July 1998 and October 1999, a number of US laws were passed that gave the President authority to waive some of these sanctions. 44 Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and The Bomb (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2004). As Talbott recalls, “we met fourteen times at ten locations in seven countries on three continents” (pp. 3–4). 45 K. Alan Kronstadt, Pakistan–US Relations (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, October 28, 2002). Specifically, the new policy urged India (and Pakistan) to do five things: sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; halt the production of fissile material and engage in the negotiations for a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty; refrain from deploying fully assembled, operational nuclear weapons; stop testing nuclear-capable ballistic missiles; and resist exporting nuclear materials or technologies. 46 C. Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 94. 47 Devin T. Hagerty, “The United States-Pakistan Entente: Third Time’s a Charm?” in Craig Baxter, ed., Pakistan on the Brink: Politics, Economics, and Society (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2004), pp. 1–19. 48 Sumit Ganguly and Devin T. Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: Indo-Pakistani Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 143–66. 49 Stephen Fidler, “Suspicions Deepen over Islamabad Connection,” Financial Times, November 1, 2002.

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50 Fair, Counterterror Coalitions, p. 75. 51 Robert Wirsing, “Kashmir in the Terrorist Shadow,” Asian Affairs (London) vol. 33, Pt. 1 (February 2002), p. 97. In July 1999, at the end of the Kargil crisis, Clinton had referred to the “sanctity” of the Line of Control (LOC) in Kashmir. Six months later, in what represented a significant, if implicit, US recognition of New Delhi’s concerns about Pakistani support for cross-LOC and cross-border terrorism, the United States and India formed a Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism. See “US-India Counterterrorism Joint Working Group,” press statement by State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher, Washington, DC, July 18, 2002 (http://www.state.gov/r/ pa/prs/ps/2002/11922.htm). 52 Blackwill, “Future of US-India Relations.” In a significant departure from previous Indian foreign policy rhetoric, Vajpayee had used the term “natural allies” in a September 1998 speech at the Asia Society in New York. “India, USA, and the World: Let Us Work Together to Solve the Political-Economic Y2K Problem,” remarks by Indian Prime Minister Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee (http://www.asiasociety.org/ speeches/vajpayee.html). 53 See Edward Luce and Stephen Fidler, “A Fine Line,” Financial Times, June 1, 2001, and James C. Clad, “An Unexpected Chance to Get Down to Fundamentals,” in A New Equation: US Policy toward India and Pakistan after September 11, Working Paper no. 27, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Global Policy Program, Washington, DC, May 2002. 54 For an analysis of the new Administration’s perspective on India, see Dennis Kux, “India’s Fine Balance,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, no. 3 (May–June 2002), pp. 94–95. 55 On April 1, 2001, a Chinese F-8 fighter jet collided with a US EP-3 reconnaissance plane over the South China Sea. The US aircraft made an emergency landing on China’s Hainan Island, igniting an intense 11-day diplomatic row between Washington and Beijing. 56 Lewis A. Dunn, “Balancing Nuclear Security and Nonproliferation in South Asia,” in A New Equation, p. 23; Fair, Counterterror Coalitions, p. 76. 57 Mohan Malik, High Hopes: India’s Response to US Security Policies, p. 3–3. See also, Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon, pp. xi–xii. 58 Samina Ahmed, “The United States and Terrorism in Southwest Asia,” International Security, Vol. 26, no. 3 (Winter 2001/02), p. 88. 59 “The United States, India and Asian Security,” presentation by US Ambassador Robert D. Blackwill to the Institute for Defense Analyses 5th Asian Security Conference, New Delhi, January 27, 2003 (http://usinfo.state.gov). 60 Kronstadt, India-US Relations, p. 2. 61 National Security Strategy of the United States of America. 62 Ashley J. Tellis, “Seeking Breakthroughs,” Force, October 2004, p. 8. 63 Kronstadt, India-US Relations, p. 9. 64 Blackwill, “Future of US-India Relations”; Tellis, “Seeking Breakthroughs”; Blake, “US-India Relations”; Ashley Tellis, “Natural Born Partners,” Force, August 2004, pp. 10–11; Kronstadt, India-US Relations. 65 For the official Indian perspective, see “India-US Partnership,” address by Indian Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, February 4, 2003 (www.carnegieendowment.org/events/index.cfm). 66 Blackwill, “Future of US-India Relations.” 67 Blake, “US-India Relations;” Kronstadt, India-US Relations, pp. 1, 9–10; Tellis, “Seeking Breakthroughs,” p. 8; Richard Bitzinger, Asia-Pacific Missile Defense Cooperation and the United States 2004–2005: A Mixed Bag (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, February 2005), pp. 5–6. 68 Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon, pp. 95–96, 24. 69 Bitzinger, Asia-Pacific Missile Defense Cooperation, pp. 5–6.

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70 Tellis, “Seeking Breakthroughs,” p. 8. 71 “India-US Relations: A General Overview,” Embassy of India, Washington, DC (www.indianembassy.org—accessed March 18, 2005). 72 Amelia Gentleman, “Rice Makes New Delhi Her First Asia Stop,” International Herald Tribune, March 16, 2005. 73 Peter Baker, “Bush: US to Sell F-16s to Pakistan,” Washington Post, March 25, 2005. 74 David C. Mulford, “US-India Relationship to Reach New Heights,” Times of India, March 31, 2005. 75 Patrick Goodenough, “US Aims to Help India Become ‘Major World Power’,” CNSNews.com, April 1, 2005. 76 Mapping the Global Future (www.foia.cia.gov/2020/2020.pdf), p. 47. These uncertainties lie at the core of the most enduring questions of international relations theorizing. As Arthur Stein writes, “most basically, nations choose between cooperation and conflict, and such decisions underlie the entire range of international relations, from alliances to war. When, how, and why they choose between them, and with what consequences, thus constitute the primary foci of the study of international politics.” Why Nations Cooperate, pp. 3–4. Will the new great powers pursue balancing or bandwagoning strategies vis-à-vis the unipolar superpower and one another? What about the superpower’s response? Which of the new great powers will it fear more, and why? How will it meet the challenges posed to its dominance? For a superb theoretical and historical treatment of the rise and fall of great powers, see Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 77 In April 2005, during a visit to India by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, Beijing and New Delhi agreed to form their own “strategic partnership” and pledged to address “differences over their 2,175-mile border” via “peaceful and friendly consultations.” John Lancaster, “India, China Hoping to ‘Reshape the World Order’ Together,” Washington Post, April 12, 2005. Also see “India & China: Rivals or Partners?” South Asia Monitor (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 5, 2005). 78 In response to a late 2004 request by China to open a “strategic dialogue” with the United States, the Bush Administration responded affirmatively in March. However, “the administration has chosen to call the meetings a ‘global dialogue’ because, officials say, the phrase ‘strategic dialogue’ is reserved for close US allies.” Glenn Kessler, “US, China Agree to Regular Talks,” Washington Post, April 8, 2005. In the Sino-Indian “strategic partnership,” the anticipated cooperation falls well short of the technology-transfer and military-to-military dimensions of the Indo-US entente. See Lancaster, “India, China.” State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said on April 12, 2005 that Washington has “good relations with China, very good relations with India.” Daily Press Briefing, Washington, DC (www.state.gov/r/prs/dpb/2005). 79 Russett, “Empirical Typology of International Military Alliances,” p. 262. 80 Kann, “Alliances Versus Ententes,” pp. 611, 616, 615. 81 “Bridging US-India: A Defense Perspective,” panel discussion, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, December 9, 2003 (http://chennai. usconsulate.gov/wwwhpr031216a). 82 Mulford, “US-India Relationship to Reach New Heights.” 83 K. Alan Kronstadt, Terrorism in South Asia (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, December 13, 2004), pp. 4–5. 84 Remarks of US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Indian Foreign Minister Natwar Singh, US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, Washington, DC, April 14, 2005 (http://usinfo.state.gov). 85 Peter Heinlein, “Diplomatic Showdown Looms Over UN Security Council Reform,” Voice of America, April 13, 2005 (http://voanews.com/english/2005-04-13).

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86 “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility,” Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (A/59/565), United Nations, December 1, 2004, pp. 66–69 (http://www.globalpolicy.org/reform/initiatives/panels/high/1202report.pdf) “Model B” would create no new permanent seats on the Security Council. 87 “In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All,” Report of the Secretary-General (A/59/2005), United Nations, March 21, 2005, pp. 42–43 (http://www.globalpolicy.org/reform/initiatives/annan/2005/followupreport.pdf). 88 Kronstadt, India-US Relations, p. 10. 89 Tellis, “Seeking Breakthroughs,” p. 8. 90 Jonah Blank, in “Bridging US-India: A Defense Perspective.” 91 Mulford, “US-India Relationship to Reach New Heights.” 92 Rod Lyon and William T. Tow, “The Future of the US-Australian Security Relationship,” Asian Security, Vol. 1, no. 1 (January 2005), pp. 25–52.

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3 INCOMPATIBLE OBJECTIVES AND SHORTSIGHTED POLICIES US strategies toward India Arthur Rubinoff

The domestic context of Indo-American relations Compared with other areas of the world, India, with one of the world’s largest populations, most powerful military establishments, and most dynamic economies, has been neglected by Washington1—perhaps because until the 1980s only a few thousand people of Indian origin resided in the United States.2 Until relatively recently, Indians in the United States were denied citizenship and subjected to restrictive immigration quotas and racial discrimination. As Harold Isaacs suggested, India was little more than a “scratch on our mind,” since interaction prior to the Second World War—except for missionary activity—with the entity that would become India was much less intense than that with other Asian states, such as China and Japan.3 Political and economic relations were sporadic. This lack of contact was responsible for uninformed perceptions of India and Indians formulated and transmitted by Christian missionaries that had profound and lasting implications for American foreign policy. Images of India in the United States were highly derogatory and were reinforced by school textbooks, the media, and academic writings. As a consequence, public opinion surveys have consistently documented that most Americans have misconceptions about India and Indians.4 A, 1979 academic survey, indicated that scholars continued to perceive South Asian countries as exclusively backward societies, neglecting the foreign trade and industrial economies of the region.5 The Asia Society, in a review of some 300 American textbooks, found that the presentation of India was the most negative of all Asian countries,6 while the State Department found that the American media focused on disease, death, and illiteracy more for India than for any other place.7 The same negative impressions were held by decisionmakers who produced policy on the basis of outdated stereotypes that portrayed India “as poverty-stricken and helpless.”8 During the 1971 Bangladesh crisis, it seems apparent that President Richard Nixon’s policy of tilting toward Pakistan “was influenced by his 38

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long-standing dislike for India and the Indians.”9 A similar sentiment is attributed to President Lyndon Johnson, who “regarded Indians as weak and indecisive.”10 John Lewis, a former senior official with the US Agency for International Development who had been posted in New Delhi in the mid-1960s, described “a number of key players in the White House, the State Department, and Congress to be ab intio, anti-Indian.”11 As a result, South Asia was either marginalized or ignored by the American government. Relations with a region that was defined by insurmountable difficulties and accounted for less than one percent of US trade had a low priority for Washington.12 Hence, the area was treated in a residual fashion by both the executive and legislative branches. Until 1991, when a separate bureau was finally created, South Asia was included as part of the Near East in the State Department (as it still is in the Central Intelligence Agency and on the National Security Council), and it was handled by a deputy assistant secretary four levels removed from the secretary of state. In the Department of Defense, responsibility for South Asia is divided: India is attached to the Pacific Command, while Pakistan is the responsibility of the Central Command.13 The legislative scene has been even more diffuse, with activities pertaining to South Asia occurring primarily at the level of congressional committees—especially during the foreign aid appropriations process or as amendments to non-germane legislation. The Senate—which has tended to ignore the region—followed the State Department model, while the House of Representatives paired the area either with the Near East (where it was overshadowed by Arab–Israeli matters) or with the Asia–Pacific region (where it was diminished by issues concerning China, Japan, and the Vietnam War). As a result, policy was made without structural or long-term direction by the leadership, providing opportunities for marginals—representatives such as Wally Herger (R-Calif.) and Robert Dornan (R-Calif.), known as the “India bashers”— to aggravate relations. Successive administrations viewed South Asia as a problem area and dealt with it in terms of functional issues such as foreign aid, nuclear proliferation, and human rights concerns rather than on a bilateral or regional basis. The tendency toward neglect of India and South Asia had implications for US policy. Perceptions—including indifference, hostility, resentment, and disdain— have until recently been as important as security interests in shaping US policy toward South Asia.14 Despite the perceived democratic systems of both countries, except for a brief period when the Sino-Indian border war coincided with the Cuban missile crisis, divergent interests characterized bilateral relations.15 New Delhi seldom sided with Washington on such issues as the Korean War, the Hungarian crisis of 1956, the conflict in Vietnam, and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan during the 1980s. Washington’s ties with New Delhi were complicated by US–Soviet concerns and Indo-Pakistani rivalry. While the Americans failed to comprehend India’s pre-occupation with Pakistan, India could not understand the American obsession with containing communism. Pakistan was viewed by Washington as a strategic partner and an important bridge to the Muslim 39

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world. Reluctantly provided American foreign aid bred resentment rather than gratitude from the Indians and caused the United States to question the benefit of extending assistance to a country that remained neutral in Washington’s struggle with global communism. The conflicted relationship was described as “the cold peace,”16 and the two countries were depicted as “comrades at odds.”17 This article analyzes the contentious course of bilateral relations between the United States and India. Global issues have repeatedly trumped bilateral and regional concerns, beginning with Washington’s attitude toward the Indian independence movement, when the US objectives of defeating fascism clashed with a disdain for British colonialism. America’s diffuse decisionmaking process often produced contradictory and incompatible strategic objectives toward South Asia, including a desire to have good relations with both successor states on the subcontinent in order to prevent a repetition of the spread of Chinese communism in Asia; the implementation of a policy of containment in the mid-1950s that included Pakistan in the American alliance system without regard for the implications that course had on relations with India; the attempt in the late 1950s and early 1960s to promote a democratic India as a competitor to communist China; the neglect of the subcontinent in the 1970s until Pakistan became a front-line state in the campaign against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, even though support for Islamabad conflicted with Washington’s goal of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons; and the advancement of human rights throughout the region, which often undermined supporters of the post-1991 US endorsement of the liberalization of the Indian economy that followed the demise of the Soviet Union. Ironically, the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in 1998 compelled Washington to pay attention to the subcontinent. This development was reinforced by the growth of the affluent Indo-American community, which has helped transform bilateral relations by providing New Delhi with a domestic base of support in the United States. Since the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, military operations in Afghanistan have led the United States to attempt to have good relations with both India and Pakistan. Whether or not such a strategy is possible is the major outstanding issue in bilateral relations. Even though the United States is now publicly committed to accepting India as a major power, New Delhi—in light of the historical record and mutual distrust—is skeptical of American intentions. The current controversy linking Washington’s assistance to India’s energy program to New Delhi’s condemnation of Iran’s nuclear program illustrates the incompatible objectives and shortsighted policies of American strategy toward New Delhi.

The contentious course of bilateral relations Robert Dahl observed that preferences about a policy in Washington tend to be “persistent, consistent, and shared.”18 The most compelling factor in Washington’s relations with New Delhi is the perception that India was on 40

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the wrong side of the two most important conflicts of the second half of the twentieth century: the Second World War and the Cold War.19 Although there is little institutional memory in Washington, these perceptions persisted in both the Department of State and on Capitol Hill and constitute the legacy of bilateral ties. The dilemma of the Second World War From the beginning, American objectives in South Asia were often incompatible. As Gary Hess documented, the Indian independence movement placed US officials in a predicament that “challenged American idealism, political wisdom, and diplomatic skill.”20 In defining its policy toward Indian nationalism, the United States was forced to choose between supporting its principal wartime partner, the United Kingdom, and aiding an independence movement that refused to participate in the Second World War unless it obtained freedom from that ally. Americans were less aware of the contribution made by millions of Indian troops to the allied war effort than they were of the Quit India campaign of the Indian National Congress to end British rule on the subcontinent at a time when Asia was being invaded by Japan. Sympathetic to the anticolonialism espoused by the Indian National Congress, Washington nevertheless found it difficult to interfere in the policy of an ally that was under attack by a common enemy. Although President Franklin Roosevelt and State Department officials believed that Indian independence was consistent with America’s anti-imperial values and the war aims espoused by the Atlantic Charter, when their attempt to mediate the transfer of power was “wrathfully received” by British prime minister Winston Churchill, they ceased advocating self-rule.21 As a consequence, Indian nationalists were dissatisfied with the pressure Washington put on London to accelerate Indian independence.22 The United States, as the paramount world power, became associated with imperialism in India.23 Pakistan’s role in America’s containment policy and resulting regional instability In the late 1940s, American objectives in South Asia were once again twofold: weaning the remaining colonial possessions out of the British orbit—as evidenced by Washington’s policy in the Middle East—and preventing them from falling into the communist sphere, as had happened with China. As communal violence erupted in India, Washington feared “widespread chaos similar to that now confronting China” would further upset the Asian balance of power. The State Department believed that US interests would best be served “by the early establishment of an Indian federal union in which all elements of the population, including particularly Muslims, have ample scope for their legitimate political and economic aspirations.”24 When partition became inevitable, American policy was to “wish both sides well separately.”25 Washington was not impressed with Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s ability to control communal violence, and his 41

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alleged hostility to free enterprise led to a growing mutual estrangement.26 Nehru had early on been viewed as anti-American27 and “clearly pro-Russian,”28 a characterization that was reinforced by India’s failure to condemn communist aggression in Korea and Hungary.29 It was clear that US–Indian relations were deteriorating, while ties with Pakistan were improving. The Kashmir dispute had become a litmus test for New Delhi, and Korea was in the same category for Washington. Each side disappointed the other on these issues. Washington, hoping to prevent a destabilizing war on the subcontinent, refused to condemn what New Delhi regarded as aggression by Pakistan when it sent invading forces into the disputed Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. American neutrality, following a British lead on what it regarded as a vital issue, was resented in New Delhi,30 just as India’s refusal to condemn North Korean aggression was not appreciated in the United States. Indian neutrality was seen by Washington as “a major obstacle to US efforts to rally and unite the free nations of Asia in the struggle against Soviet world domination.”31 In the 1950s the United States had three military objectives in India: (a) the prevention of Soviet encroachment and the denial of resources to the Sino-Soviet bloc, (b) the maintenance of internal security and regional stability, and (c) the peaceful resolution of the Kashmir dispute.32 Although India was clearly seen as the dominant state on the subcontinent, Pakistan was viewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the only state with strategic value in the region,33 and as a necessary balancer34 and “more reliable” partner that “goes along with us on all but trusteeship and racial questions.”35 In addition, Pakistan had the advantage of being linked to the Muslim countries of the Middle East in the projected Northern Tier alliance system,”36 although Washington was apprehensive that the formation of an Islamic bloc organized to promote religion rather than economic development was “inimical to US interests.”37 American antipathy toward India was to some extent tempered during the ambassadorship of Chester Bowles in the last years of the Truman administration, but bilateral rancor resurfaced during the stewardship of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Years before he served in the Eisenhower cabinet, where he proclaimed neutralism to be immoral,38 Dulles had expressed his belief that Russian communism exercised a strong influence on the Indian government.39 Although he saw South Asia as a major battleground of the Cold War, Dulles’s “pactomania” brought Pakistan into both the Baghdad treaty and the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization without regard to the consequences for US–Indian relations.40 It has been said that nothing exasperated India so much since the attainment of independence as the inclusion of its archenemy Pakistan in the American security system.41 In reality, the Americans chased the insecure Pakistanis until Karachi snared Washington.42 As Senator J.W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) predicted, Dulles’s bringing Pakistan into the American alliance system was 42

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counterproductive to American objectives, in that it forced India to purchase Soviet arms to counter the Pakistani buildup.43 Similarly, Dulles’s statements referring to the colony of Goa as being an integral part of Portugal44 provided the Soviets with an opening in their campaign to win support in India. Promoting India as a democratic counterweight to China Despite setbacks like the American criticism of the Indian invasion of Goa,45 bilateral relations improved throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s as Sino-Indian ties deteriorated. This was the period of the greatest US involvement and interest in South Asia, when both humanitarian and security concerns worked to India’s advantage. In the view of the State Department, “South Asia became a testing ground for the free world. In this area will be determined whether nations can surmount tremendous economic and social problems, can achieve farreaching changes in their entire pattern of life without resorting to the totalitarian system of communism.”46 To this end, India became the leading recipient of American assistance during the period 1954–64, when US aid to India totaled $10 billion. Relations approached the point of alliance during the Sino-Indian border war, which Washington connected with the concurrent Cuban missile crisis. A bipartisan coalition supporting enhanced bilateral relations was forged in Congress during this period by John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.), a senator and former ambassador to India. Ironically, the improvement of US–Indian relations resulted in a deterioration of the US–Pakistani connection, driving Rawalpindi to seek closer ties with China. The American attempt to promote India as a democratic alternative to communist China did not always go smoothly. Congressional conservatives were reluctant to provide assistance to India, a country they viewed as seldom siding with the United States on Cold War issues. The annual appropriations debates, beginning with the wheat loan agreement of 1951 that was followed by a $53 million package of direct assistance, involved a plethora of congressional committees, including agriculture, foreign affairs, rules, and most important, appropriations. They provided venues for criticism of a country whose policies were seen as conflicting with American interests—especially India’s reluctance to brand China as an aggressor in the Korean war. The bitter comments that were made in the course of the acrimonious debates occasioned a spate of criticisms of New Delhi that undermined any goodwill the aid might have otherwise produced. After jeopardizing foreign assistance in 1962, the next year Congress reneged on a $500 million public-sector steel plant at Bokaro in the state of Bihar that was to be a showcase of Western aid. The Indian reaction to the American denouement was the cancellation of an agreement to share radio transmitters with the Voice of America. The Bokaro incident was a portent of things to come, as President Johnson, angry at Indian criticism of American policy in Vietnam, kept assistance on a short tether47 and forced India into a humiliating 36.5 percent currency devaluation.48 43

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The turn toward China In some respects the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, which resulted in an arms embargo on the region, was a turning point in Washington’s dealings with the subcontinent. For the first time, regional considerations began to prevail over a Cold War calculus. As a congressional report noted, “Since that time, United States military policy toward the area has followed a checkered and perplexing and uneven outcome.”49 Although India and Pakistan were to be treated identically, “the embargo,” as Stephen Cohen pointed out, initially “had an uneven impact, because Pakistan had been almost totally dependent upon the US for her weapons, while India’s military had British, French, and indigenous equipment.”50 It turned out the regional calculation was short-lived and worked against India, as a result of the US thaw in its relations with China. The American tilt toward Pakistan that followed India’s intervention in the 1971 Bangladesh war of independence demonstrated the dichotomy of executive–legislative views. According to Henry Kissinger, “India basked in Congressional warmth and was subject to Presidential indifference [while] Pakistan’s situation was exactly the reverse.”51 Washington’s tilt toward Rawalpindi was pronounced by the Nixon administration to be an effort to preserve the territorial integrity of Pakistan, but it was seen more accurately in congressional eyes as a tilt toward China.52 Legislators such as Cornelius Gallagher (D-N.Y.), the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, and Senator Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) deplored Pakistan’s oppression in East Bengal and praised India’s restraint while absorbing millions of refugees. A divided Nixon administration, however, ultimately viewed the conflict in geostrategic terms, even if it meant that relations with New Delhi were a casualty. According to Kissinger, the United States sent a naval force to protect Pakistan and threaten India because Rawalpindi had been a conduit to the opening of relations with China, while New Delhi’s recent friendship treaty with Moscow extended Soviet influence in the region.53 The intervention caused lasting resentment in India. Washington held Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, Nehru’s daughter, whom American policymakers believed had a visceral antipathy for the United States, in great contempt54 for her stands on the American involvement in Vietnam and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Disengagement As a consequence, in the 1970s chairmen such as Otto Passman (D-La.) and Clarence Long (D-Md.) assured that the House Appropriations Subcommittees only grudgingly provided aid to a country that seldom agreed with American positions on global issues, while liberals such as Jonathan Bingham (D-N. Y.) began to feel that foreign aid caused a corresponding reduction of domestic programs. After Vietnam, Congress suffered from “foreign aid fatigue,”55 as both liberals and conservatives perceived that American assistance to India had 44

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produced resentment rather than benefits. In any event, American interests in the 1970s were seen as limited in South Asia,56 a region that attracted less than one percent of US overseas investment but contained “seemingly unsolvable problems.”57 The American attitude was best described by Ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan as “benign neglect.” Moynihan, as ambassador, reduced the size of the US diplomatic establishment in India, negotiated an agreement to forgive the significant sums the United States owned in blocked accounts in payment for food aid provided to India under Public Law 480, and generally presided over American disengagement in the region.58 India also incurred the wrath of members of Congress for its detonation of a nuclear device in May 1974 and the suppression of human rights during Prime Minister Gandhi’s imposition of a State of Emergency, which ran from June 1975 through March 1977.59 Clement Zablocki (D-Wisc.), the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, expressed apprehension that India would give the Soviet Union a naval base but oppose the construction of the US installation at Diego Garcia.60 Moreover, India had alienated many of its ardent early congressional supporters such as Emmanuel Celler (D-N.Y.) and Jacob Javits (R-N.Y.) by its overt antipathy toward Israel. New Delhi’s policies toward western Asia were designed to neutralize Arab support for Pakistan over the Kashmir issue and to placate India’s significant Muslim population, the second largest in the world after Indonesia’s, but they had adverse consequences for bilateral relations with the United States. Nuclear nonproliferation and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan Similarly, in the 1980s, many of India’s friends in Congress felt compelled to advance the cause of nuclear nonproliferation and human rights at the expense of bilateral ties with New Delhi. Ever since India’s 1974 nuclear detonation, that country’s possession of nuclear weapons was the dominant issue in bilateral relations with the United States. To some extent South Asia has been “a testing ground”61 of the global aspects of nonproliferation. US policy after 1974 used sanctions in the form of threats to cut off foreign aid and reliable supplies of nuclear materials if international safeguards were violated. Successive administrations have offered India incentives, while Congress has provided the sanctions.62 In 1974 the Ford administration withheld fuel shipments to the Tarapur civilian nuclear installation until it could determine that American materials had not been used in the Indian detonation. In a move that embarrassed the administration, Congress in July 1974 instructed the US representative to the International Development Association not to vote for loans to countries that exploded nuclear weapons but had not signed the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)—a provision that applied exclusively to India. When Prime Minister Morarji Desai, of the short-lived Janata government, promised that India would not develop nuclear weapons or conduct further tests, Congress in April 1977 repealed the prohibition, and aid to India resumed. 45

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In the early years of the Jimmy Carter presidency, concern about nuclear proliferation peaked in both the executive branch and on Capitol Hill. Congress passed legislation in 1976 stipulating that countries that do not have nuclear weapons but that import material to develop bombs and refuse to put their nuclear installations under international safeguards are not entitled to American assistance. The administration refused to sell 110 A-7 attack aircraft to Islamabad, and it encouraged France to cancel the sale of a nuclear-fuel reprocessing system to Pakistan. Congress passed the Symington and Glenn Amendments, sections 669 and 670 of the Foreign Assistance Acts of 1976 and 1977, which respectively, prohibited aid or arms sales to countries that deliver or receive nuclear-enrichment equipment or technology and do not accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. As a result of evidence that Pakistan—which had just had a military coup—was engaged in such activities, US assistance to that country was terminated for the third time in April 1979. The climate in Washington changed later that year with the Iran hostage episode and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. It provided Pakistan with yet another opportunity to court American assistance at the expense of US–India ties, as global security issues once more overrode regional considerations. Pakistan was portrayed by Representative Charles Wilson (D-TX.) and other lawmakers on the House Appropriations Committee as a front-line state sheltering 2.5 million Afghan refugees.63 India, by contrast, was depicted as being one of the “persistently anti-United States members in the United Nations,” endorsing pro-Soviet positions on Cuba, Kampuchea, Nicaragua, and especially Afghanistan. Some Democrats who had voted to cut off funding for the Nicaraguan contras demonstrated their anticommunist credentials by joining Republicans such as William Broomfield (R-Mich.), William Goodling (R-Penn.), and Dan Burton (D-Ind.), who regularly attempted to punish India over the Afghan issue. Because it needed Pakistan’s assistance to supply the Afghan guerrillas, Washington turned a blind eye to Islamabad’s clandestine development of nuclear weapons. A decision to sell F-16 planes to Pakistan was viewed by New Delhi as providing its rival with a potential nuclear delivery system. In the meantime, President Carter, believing that a 1963 American commitment was at stake, approved export licenses for two fuel shipments and spare parts for India’s Tarapur reactor. He did so even though the Nuclear Regulatory Commission claimed that India did not meet the criteria set forth by the 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act. The decision pitted the commitment that members of Congress had to nonproliferation against the importance they attached to relations with India. At the time, opponents of proliferation were stronger in the House, which rejected Carter’s decision. The Senate, the most important venue, sustained the president’s decision by the narrow vote of 48 to 46. In 1982, the Reagan administration helped negotiate an end to the Tarapur dispute by getting the French to assume the obligation to supply fuel. A year later, Secretary of State George Shultz promised that the United States would be the supplier of last resort. 46

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A Senate effort to overturn Shultz’s commitment was thwarted in conference by Representative Stephen Solarz (D-N.Y.). Solarz also weakened an amendment by Senator Rudolph Boschwitz (R-Minn.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, that would have prohibited the sale of nuclear material to India and South Africa. Since 1981, Pakistan has been the target of a dwindling number of opponents to nuclear proliferation, as the Indian program was described as “dormant.” That year the Reagan administration proposed weakening the 1976 Symington Amendment in order to permit the approval of a $3.2 billion aid package for Islamabad. The proposal was described as a way of enabling Pakistan to meet its security needs with conventional weapons and thus obviate the need for it to embark on a nuclear weapons program. Congress declined to weaken the Symington Amendment at that time but instead granted Pakistan a six-year exemption in the interest of national security.64 In 1984, Senators Alan Cranston (D-Calif.) and John Glenn (D-Ohio.) persuaded the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to adopt an amendment to the foreign aid bill making assistance conditional on “Presidential certification that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device, and is not acquiring, overtly or covertly, technology, material or equipment for a nuclear explosive device.” Although President Ronald Reagan succeeded in having the decision reversed by a 9–8 vote, the committee put a warning to Pakistan in the bill. Reagan used his authority under Public Law 97-113, signed in December 1981, to waive the application of the Symington Amendment in the case of Pakistan as long as Soviet forces were stationed in Afghanistan. After an incident in which a Pakistani citizen was arrested in Houston trying to export electronic switches that trigger nuclear bombs, Congress in 1985 passed the Pressler Amendment (section 620E of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961), requiring annual presidential certification that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device. The amendment stipulated that American assistance to Pakistan would immediately be cut off if the President found that Islamabad had attempted to acquire American material for making nuclear weapons illegally. When press reports, including claims from Pakistani scientists and officials, and independent evidence indicated that Islamabad’s bomb was near completion, some in Congress, such as Senator Glenn, the chairman of the Senate Government Operations Committee, attempted to terminate the administration’s six-year $4.02 billion aid package to Pakistan. Working through a Senate Appropriations subcommittee that was dominated by its chair, Robert Kasten (R-Wisc.), and his predecessor, Daniel Inouye (D-Hi.), lobbyists for the Pakistani embassy succeeded in cutting off all aid to India until foreign assistance to Islamabad was restored. The ability of Pakistan to induce Congress to temporarily cut off aid to India in 1987, when its own funding was in jeopardy for embarking on a nuclear weapons program, was testimony to the strength Islamabad had on Capitol Hill and the lack of influence New Delhi had at the time in Washington.65 Hence, although New Delhi’s economic and strategic importance had increased, 47

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knowledge and concern about India in the US Congress had declined.66 The episode demonstrated that Pakistani assistance to the Afghan rebels overrode congressional concern about that country’s clandestine nuclear activities. It also revealed a latent hostility toward India in Washington that could be tapped by New Delhi’s opponents and supporters of Pakistan. Because of its Cold War alliances with the United States, Pakistan had been exempt from the same impediments that marked US–Indian relations, such as the abuse of human rights, hostility toward Israel, and especially unhappiness over nuclear proliferation—even though, unlike New Delhi, it was a major proliferator. As a result, the Indian government understandably felt that a double standard applied regarding US policies toward the subcontinent. Despite cosmetic gestures like the 1985 “Festival of India” held in the United States, US–Indian relations in the 1980s were characterized as “poor.”67 Predictions that they were “likely to remain so for a long time”68 were based on the assumption that as India conducted itself as a global rather than merely a regional power, its interests were increasingly likely to come into conflict with those of the United States. Under Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, India became “the world’s largest arms importer”69 and intervened militarily in Sri Lanka and the Maldives. These developments caused a controversial Pentagon planning document to assert that the United States “should discourage Indian hegemonic aspirations” over the other states in South Asia and the Indian Ocean.70

The slow normalization of relations The end of the Cold War and the winding down of the conflict in Afghanistan, however, resulted in a dramatic deterioration of US–Pakistani ties and a corresponding improvement in Washington’s relations with New Delhi that made possible the transfer of previously embargoed technologies.71 In October 1990, President George H.W. Bush refused to certify that Pakistan did “not possess a nuclear explosive device,” and Congress responded by invoking the Pressler Amendment of 1985, suspending aid to that country. Upon restoration, future assistance to Islamabad was to be cut by more than half, from $564 million to $208 million a year. As a stern warning to Pakistan at the behest of Senator Glenn, Congress inserted the Nuclear Prevention Act of 1994 into the Foreign Relations Authorization legislation (PL 103-236), which called for mandatory presidential sanctions against any country that conducted nuclear tests.72 By contrast, with a non-Congress Party government in power in New Delhi after Rajiv Gandhi’s November 1989 electoral defeat, and after Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s undemocratic removal from power in Pakistan, prospects for better Indo-American relations were enhanced. India, however, as one of the principal architects of nonalignment, was never comfortable with the notion of a unipolar world. Nevertheless, after the minority Janata Dal government of V.P. Singh attempted to straddle the fence during the 1991 conflict in Iraq, his successor, Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar, courageously allowed American military aircraft to refuel 48

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en route to the Middle East—an act that jeopardized his own government’s continuation in office. As a consequence, efforts to replicate the 1987 cut in assistance to India if foreign aid were not restored to Pakistan were unsuccessful in 1992. In fact Indo-American relations, while always uneven, had been improving for over a decade, enabling the United States to become New Delhi’s leading trading partner and foreign investor. The growing commercial relationship was jeopardized by the 1989 decision to include India, along with Japan and Brazil, in the “Super 301” provisions of the 1988 Omnibus Trade Act. Although India refused to relent on its refusal to open up its insurance and investment markets to American firms, the Bush administration removed India from the list in June 1990, following New Delhi’s decision to allow Pepsico into the Indian market. In the face of a foreign-exchange crisis that followed the Persian Gulf War, the Congress Party government headed by Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, which took office in June 1991, abandoned that party’s reliance on the discredited Soviet economic model and its traditional hostility toward the United States.73 Finance Minister Manmohan Singh recognized that substantial American investment and massive assistance from aid consortiums like the International Monetary Fund were critical to the success of its new economic policy. Another obstacle to improved relations was removed by India’s decision to normalize ties with Israel. In a significant policy departure that was a signal to the United States in November 1991, India voted to repeal the United Nations resolution equating Zionism with racism, which it had co-sponsored in 1975, and in January of 1992 New Delhi established full diplomatic ties with Tel Aviv.74 Indian politicians from all noncommunist parties felt that, with the end of the Cold War, a consensus for a positive relationship with the United States had been established. Bilateral hostility toward India was so entrenched, however, that Washington was slow to adjust to these changing international circumstances. This hostility toward India lingered in Washington as late as the passage of the Brown Amendment in 1995. It was anticipated that the newly elected Clinton administration, which was pledged to support democratic regimes and encourage American investment abroad, would build on the solid foundation established by its predecessor and further improve bilateral ties. India, as one of the few established democracies in Asia and the second most populous country in the world, felt it was a candidate for positive attention from Washington. Yet the United States reduced its foreign aid appropriations by 20 percent, reneged on the delivery of promised cryogenic rocket engines, and began renewing certain types of commercial sales to Pakistan that Congress believed the Pressler Amendment prohibited. Other parts of the Clinton agenda, such as stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and promoting human rights in regions affected by civil wars—especially the suppression of the Sikh rebellion in the Punjab and the uprising in Kashmir, where half a million troops were fighting Islamic militants—worked against the improvement of relations. Both liberals and conservatives, for different reasons, have been critical of the way India has dealt with these and other secessionist movements. 49

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The contradictory agenda of the Clinton administration,75 in which some diplomats praised the direction of Rao’s economic and foreign policies while others, such as Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, pressured India to sign the NPT, was aggravated by a diplomatic vacuum at the embassy in New Delhi caused by the failure to name an ambassador for sixteen months after the departure of Thomas Pickering in March 1993. In the absence of an ambassador in New Delhi or attention by the secretary of state or the President, Robin Raphel, the assistant secretary in the newly created South Asia Bureau of the State Department, assumed the prominent role in American relations with India. She became a lightning rod in Indo-American relations in April 1994 by suggesting that the United States had reconsidered its historic position on the 1947 accession of Kashmir. Raphel also led the Pentagon’s campaign to dilute the Pressler Amendment, so that 71 paid-for F-16 aircraft could be delivered and the restored government of Benazir Bhutto could thereby be bolstered. After a debate remarkable for its strident anti-India character, in which New Delhi was berated for being an ally of the Soviet Union years after that country had dissolved, Congress passed the Brown Amendment, which diluted sanctions so that more arms could be sold to Pakistan. In effect, this amendment legitimated Islamabad’s surreptitious nuclear program. The manner in which the Brown Amendment was passed as part of a compromise amendment to a foreign operations bill and not as an independent issue was illustrative of the way in which Congress deals with the South Asian region. The selling of arms to Pakistan undermined the free-enterprise economy that the United States desired to see established in India. It once again forced New Delhi to divert scarce resources to the military sector, accelerate development of its short-range Prithvi and medium-range Agni missile-delivery systems, and led to renewed calls for a nuclear option. That option was exercised in May 1998 when the newly elected government led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which had long been committed to a military nuclear program, conducted a series of explosions on May 11 and 13 at the Pokharan test site. The tests, which were predictably followed by detonations by Pakistan on May 28, posed a direct challenge to the Clinton administration’s nuclear nonproliferation policy. The misleading assurances given to Bill Richardson, the US ambassador to the United Nations, that India would not test and the public jubilation that India’s leaders displayed following the tests provoked widespread indignation in Washington. The fact that the administration learned of the tests from the media, rather than from its own intelligence community, caused it additional embarrassment. Pursuant to the provisions of the Symington Amendment of 1976, the Nuclear Proliferation Act (the so-called Glenn Amendment) of 1977, and Glenn’s Nuclear Proliferation Act of 1994 (which called for punitive measures against countries that tested nuclear weapons), President Clinton signed an order that enacted sweeping sanctions against the two South Asian countries.

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The emergence of ethnic politics Yet by the end of 1999, “in a stunning retreat from Capitol Hill’s decades-long reliance on punitive measures to block the spread of weapons of mass destruction,”76 Congress, in response to pressure from agricultural lobbies that had substantial sales in Pakistan, and from the aircraft industry, which had significant contracts with India, took the initiative in the form of an amendment to an omnibus appropriations bill (the India–Pakistan Relief Bill of 1998, more commonly called the Brownback Amendment). It gave the President the authority to waive most sanctions against India and Pakistan, including those under the Glenn, Pressler, and Symington Amendments. In October 1999, Congress, as part of the defense appropriations bill (Brownback II), gave the President the authority to make the waiver permanent. After the detonation of nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, President Bill Clinton, who had concentrated on other priorities, such as the Balkans, could no longer neglect the South Asian region. For the first time there was an attempt to structure the Indo-American relationship independent of Indo-Russian or Indo-Pakistani concerns. Deputy Secretary of State Talbott began the longest bilateral dialogue in history, meeting with Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh fourteen times to ensure that the two countries could manage their relationship in the twenty-first century.77 To cement the growing ties, in March 2000 Clinton became the fourth US president—and the first since Carter in 1978—to visit India. The highlight of the trip was a “Vision Statement” that regularized high-level bilateral contacts. A reciprocal visit to Washington six months later by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee established a mechanism to coordinate growing economic, cultural, and scientific ties. Although the Clinton administration had sacrificed its commitment to nonproliferation to better relations with India and Pakistan, its unprecedented close contacts with both countries enabled the White House to defuse the subsequent Kargil crisis of 1999 (engendered by an unprovoked Pakistani advance into a remote part of Kashmir) and prevent it from escalating into a nuclear conflict. A military coup in Islamabad, which occurred coterminous with India’s thirteenth general elections in October of that year, also worked to India’s advantage in Washington. The failure of the BJP government to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty faded as an issue when the Republican-controlled Senate also rejected the US ratification of that treaty. Ironically, India has benefited from the defeat and retirement of nonproliferation advocates who were its friends in the US Senate, such as Senators Larry Pressler (R-S.D.) and Glenn, and a loss of appetite for sanctions by Republicans sensitive to the business community. In a Republican-controlled Congress, agricultural exports have a higher priority than nuclear issues. Moreover, American legislators have finally realized that India’s economic liberalization can yield domestic dividends. Its hundreds of millions of consumers have “attracted the attention of

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both Wall Street and Main Street.”78 Legislators who once avoided the region now regularly visit the commercial centers of Mumbai (Bombay) and Bangalore (India’s “Silicon Valley”), as well as the capital, New Delhi. Pepsico and General Electric, which have major investments in India, have, along with the US–India Business Council and the India Interest Group lobby, become influential advocates for New Delhi in Washington. So too have the over 1.7 million Indian–Americans—up from 387,000 in 1980—who reside in the United States. They have become a bridge between the two countries.79 Although their influence is diluted by supporters of Khalistani and Kashmiri separatists and by the Pakistani–American community (which is one-tenth the size of the Indian-American population), it is becoming more politically active. The educational achievement and economic status of this upwardly mobile community has succeeded in changing the perception of Indians in the United States. Indian-Americans have a median income considerably higher than the average American: $60,093, compared to the national average of $38,885.80 The Indian-American community, which includes 200,000 millionaires,81 has a higher per capita income and a larger percentage of its workforce (46 percent) holding a managerial or professional position than any other US ethnic group except Japanese-Americans. It has an especially high representation of doctors, engineers, scientists, architects, and computer technologists. Under the circumstances, both Republicans and Democrats have attempted to mobilize the community’s resources. Members of Congress see little downside to this effort and have many reasons to be attentive to the community’s concerns. The growing influence of the Indian-American community is reflected in the strength of the Caucus of India and Indian Americans in the House of Representatives, which claims 163 members, making it the largest country-based caucus on Capitol Hill in the 108th Congress (2003–05). The caucus was founded after India’s champion, Representative Solarz, left Congress in 1993 by Frank Pallone (D-N.J.), whose district has a significant population of IndianAmericans, and Bill McCollum (R-Fla.), who was critical of Pakistan’s record on narcotics and terrorism. The positions of the bipartisan caucus on South Asian matters and related concerns, such as immigration, family reunification, and civil rights issues, must now be taken into account by an administration that regards the caucus’s numbers as a mixed blessing and as a threat to executive control of foreign policy. Although my research indicates that its strength and accomplishments are exaggerated, it has for the first time provided India with an institutional base of support on Capitol Hill by enlisting floor speakers, lining up votes, and placing material in the Congressional Record. The example of the House caucus was not lost on the Senate. In March 2004, a thirty-five-member “Friends of India” group was formed in the Senate in cooperation with the Indian embassy in Washington—the first such country-focused grouping in the history of that chamber, and a development made easier by the departure of legislators with a broader agenda than ethnic politics, such as Senators Moynihan and Glenn. The net result of these diverse developments has been a remarkable turnaround in congressional 52

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attitudes toward India and US–Indian ties. As I observed elsewhere, “The transformation of congressional attitudes from indifference or deep-seated hostility to their current positive state on Capitol Hill confirms the necessity for a foreign country to have a domestic base of support in the American political system if it intends to be influential in Washington.”82

The re-emergence of security issues Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, DC, ethnic politics have taken a back seat to security issues. During the first seven months of the Bush administration, Secretary of State Colin Powell was spending as much time in South Asia as in the Middle East. Although the region generally gets noticed only if there is a crisis, South Asia had been a focus of the Bush administration even before the United States launched its campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan a month after the attacks. In a reversal of historical practice, South Asia was one of the few regions in which the new administration had policy and personnel in place soon after assuming office. Hence, South Asia was virtually the only place where the Clinton administration’s policies were not abandoned by its successor. The normalization of relations with India continued unabated, and there was talk by Powell of partnership and a natural alliance with New Delhi.83 One faction of the Republican Party wanted to use India to contain China and gain New Delhi’s support for a missile-defense system that would be employed against Beijing, leading to speculation about the reason Robert Blackwill, a China expert, was appointed by President Bush to be ambassador to New Delhi. The need for a grand coalition against terrorism caused the United States to again consider relations with India and Pakistan in a broader context—instead of on the promised bilateral basis. As a consequence, the major area in which bilateral relations between the United States and India have been enhanced has been military cooperation. The Pentagon—once a champion of Pakistan—now lobbies for better relations with both countries. Economic ties, on the other hand, have been disappointing. Bilateral trade with India in 2000 totaled only $14 billion—more than $100 billion dollars less than that with China. Political ties were damaged by the February–March 2002 communal violence against Muslims in Gujarat. Sensitive to the persecution of minorities, the US Congress in 1998 passed the Religious Freedom Act, whereby the US Commission on International Religious Freedom reports on violations that could lead to sanctions against any government that violates the religious freedom of its citizens. This commission’s reports, which are based on annual State Department submissions, provided additional ammunition to opponents of India, as they have contained accusations that Christians were persecuted after the BJP came to power in 1998. Since the war on terrorism was launched in 2001, the United States has attempted to bolster both India and Pakistan simultaneously. It is providing a $3 billion economic and military assistance package to be dispersed for Pakistan 53

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between 2005 and 2009. At the same time, Washington has agreed to expand cooperation with India on civilian nuclear activities, civilian space programs, and technology trade.84 During her visit to the subcontinent in March 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice went further, expressing a willingness to discuss such highly contentious security, energy, and economic issues as India’s quest for a seat on the United Nations Security Council, alternatives to the proposed IndoPakistani-Iranian gas pipeline for the securing of energy resources for India, and the stimulation of the moribund Indo-US bilateral trade. This was followed by a “new framework for the US–India defence relationship for the next 10 years,” signed by Defence Minister Pranab Mukerjee and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in June 2005. It provides for increased technology transfers, as well as collaboration in research and development and coproduction of weapons systems.85 Ironically, now that the United States recognizes a regional imperative in a nuclearized South Asia, India considers itself a global rather than a regional power. The United States remains a status quo nation, while India, which has never been comfortable with a world dominated by Washington, is in many ways a revisionist state. The test of the Indo-American relationship will be how the United States accommodates India’s ambitions.86 In reaffirming its support of regional security for its longtime ally Pakistan and in promising to advance India as a global power, the United States is walking a tightrope that risks generating an arms race in South Asia.87 Paradoxically, Islamabad has benefited more than New Delhi has in Washington from the war on terrorism, even though its intelligence service created the Taliban that made Afghanistan a sanctuary for Al Qaeda. Pakistan, once again viewed by Washington as a front-line state and a bridge to the Central Asian republics, is taking full advantage of what could be a temporary opportunity for leverage—even though its human rights record stands as a stark contradiction to the Bush administration’s campaign to promote democracy in Islamic countries. President Pervez Musharraf has become so indispensable to the American war effort “that you can’t say anything bad about him in Washington,” even though he reneged on his promise to relinquish power after three years.88 By March 2003, all remaining sanctions imposed against Islamabad after the October 1999 coup were waived by executive order, even though it has been established that Pakistan, through its leading nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan, assisted North Korea, Iran, and Libya with their missile and nuclear programs. The Indians see a double standard in the war against terrorism, for a number of reasons. New Delhi was restrained by Washington from striking Pakistan-based terrorists who attacked the Kashmiri assembly in Srinagar in October 2001 and the parliament in New Delhi two months later, because such actions would have diverted Islamabad’s resources from the Afghan border and undermine the campaign against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Indian officials, such as former defense minister George Fernandes, are “unhappy” that Washington has overlooked Pakistan’s connection with terrorism directed at India.89 Indeed, 54

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successive American administrations have ignored the connection between the Taliban and terrorism in Kashmir.90 For its part, the Bush administration knows that it can no longer avoid confronting the Kashmir problem but, involved in two quagmires in the Middle East—the Arab-Israeli dispute and the conflict in Iraq—it has no desire to take on another conundrum in South Asia. In order to defuse the ongoing nuclear brinkmanship, Washington is highly supportive of the road map for peace negotiated by India and Pakistan over Kashmir, but remains leery of any cooperation between the two South Asian states that involves Iran.

The legacy of mistrust Even though the image of India in the United States has been dramatically and positively transformed, the delicate nature of bilateral relations is constrained by a residual pattern of ambiguity and mistrust.91 Such factors as ethnic politics and lobbying by business interests appear merely to assure that India is given consideration, instead of being ignored or punished by Washington. Misperceptions still impede Indo-US ties. That Washington could encourage India to support its Iraq fiasco indicates that the United States still does not appreciate the constraints of India’s domestic politics and discrete national interests. This reality is further illustrated by policy differences toward Iran and the controversy surrounding the outsourcing of American jobs to India. That the Bush administration would overlook the A.Q. Khan scandal and elevate Pakistan to the status of a “non-NATO ally” immediately after the US secretary of state had visited New Delhi reveals a lack of sensitivity to Indian concerns. That a year later Washington would—in typical Orwellian fashion—sell embargoed F-16 planes (a strategic weapon) to Islamabad and claim that doing so advantages India in the war on terrorism indicates that the envisioned strategic partnership has yet to be attained. As former foreign minister Jaswant Singh suggested, the record of bilateral relations between the United States and India reveals an insufficient correspondence between promise and delivery.92 In a major strategic confidence-building measure announced on July 18, 2005 during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Washington, the United States removed all restrictions on selling nuclear material to India for peaceful purposes provided New Delhi, which has not signed the nonproliferation treaty (NPT), agrees to International Atomic Energy Agency inspections and nonproliferation safeguards.93 The agreement to cooperate in the nuclear sphere reverses 35 years of American nonproliferation policy and requires amending existing domestic laws, such as the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as well as the acquiesce of other members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.94 While critics in India denounced the deal as a sellout that would “constrain India’s ability to credibly deter” China,95 not surprisingly it and the agreement announced during President George W. Bush’s March 2006 visit to New Delhi incurred the wrath of nonproliferation advocates in the United States who claimed the proposal contravened the administration’s own threat priorities,96 and was unenforceable without the agreement of the other nuclear powers.97 55

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Similarly, since the cooperation of Congress to implement the measure is required, the administration made a tactical error in not briefing key legislators in advance. As a result congressmen normally well-disposed toward India, such as Tom Lantos (D-CA), the ranking Democrat on the House International Relations Committee, joined non-proliferators in linking the proposal to India’s support of international curbs on Iran.98 As a consequence the United States convinced India to vote to censure Iran at the September 24, 2005 meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency board of governors in Vienna99—an action that jeopardized Tehran’s supply of energy to New Delhi and evoked charges from some of the Congress Party’s coalition partners that it was capitulating to America.100 The current controversy linking energy assistance to the condemnation of Iran’s nuclear program illustrates Washington’s incompatible objectives and shortsighted strategic policies toward India.

Notes 1 Baldav Raj Nayar, “Treat India Seriously,” Foreign Policy, no. 18 (Spring 1975): 133–54. 2 See Karen Isaksen Leonard, The South Asian Americans (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1997), for details. 3 Harold R. Isaacs, Scratches on Our Minds (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1980), xxxiii. 4 See William Watts, The United States and Asia: Changing Attitudes and Policies (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1982). 5 “National Target for South Asia Specialists,” report to the National Council for Foreign Languages and International Studies, 1979, 18. 6 Asia Society, Asia and American Textbooks (New York: Asia Society, 1976). 7 Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs, US Department of State, United States–Indian Cultural Relations (Washington, DC: US Department of State, 1982). 8 John W. Mellor, India as a Rising Middle Power (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1979), 359. 9 Christopher Van Hoellen, “The Tilt Policy Revisited; Nixon–Kissinger Geopolitics and South Asia,” Asian Survey 20, no. 4 (April 1980): 341. 10 James Warner Bjorkman, “Public Law 480 and the Policies of Self-Help and Short-Tether: Indo-American Relations, 1965–68,” in The Regional Imperative: US Foreign Policy towards South Asian States, ed. Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph (Atlantic Highlands, GA: Humanities Press, 1980), 234. 11 John P. Lewis, India’s Political Economy, Governance and Reform (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995), 87. 12 See Myron Weiner, “Critical Choices for India and America,” in Southern Asia: The Politics of Poverty and Peace, ed. Donald C. Hellmann (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1976), 65. 13 A New Foreign Policy toward India and Pakistan, report of an Independent Task Force (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1997), 45. 14 Sulochana Raghavan Glazer and Nathan Glazer, eds, Conflicting Images: India and the United States (Glenn Dale, MD: Riverdale, 1990), 4. 15 Dennis Kux, Estranged Democracies: India and the United States, 1941–1991 (New Delhi: Sage, 1993). 16 H.W. Brands, India and the United States: The Cold Peace (Boston, MA: Twayne, 1990). 17 Andrew J. Rotter, Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947–1964 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000).

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18 Robert Dahl, Congress and Foreign Policy (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1950), 15. 19 A. Guy Hope, America and Swaraj (Washington: Public Affairs, 1968), 49. 20 Gary R. Hess, America Encounters India, 1941–47 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Universtiy Press, 1971), 2. 21 Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York: Harper and Bros. 1950), 512. 22 See M.S. Venkataramani and B.K. Shrivastava, Quit India: The American Response to the 1942 Struggle (New Delhi: Vikas, 1979). 23 Consul General Howard Donovan to Secretary of State James Byrne, “Indian Political Situation and Indian Attitude towards the United States,” January 18, 1946, document no. 845.001-1846, National Archives, Washington, DC. 24 “Recommendation That This Government Take Action to Prevent Further Deterioration in the Indian Political Situation,” November 26, 1946, document no. 845.00/11-2646, National Archives, Washington, DC. 25 “Grady to Secretary of State,” August 13, 1947, document no. 845.008-1247, National Archives, Washington, DC. 26 “Counselor Howard Donovan to Secretary of State,” September 23, 1947, document no. 845.00/9-2347, National Archives, Washington, DC. 27 “Memo from George C. McGhee to Secretary of State Dean Acheson,” November 3, 1950, document no. 611.91/11-350, National Archives, Washington, DC. 28 “Grady to Secretary of State,” August 13, 1947, document no. 845.008-1247, National Archives, Washington, DC. 29 Office of Intelligence Research, US Department of State, “Nehru’s Attitudes toward Communism, the Soviet Union, and Communist China,” Intelligence report no. 6269, July 24, 1953. 30 See Reeta Chowdhari Tremblay, “Indo-US Relations and the Kashmir Issue,” in India and the United States in a Changing World, ed. Ashok Kapur, Y.K. Malik, Harold A. Gould, and Arthur G. Rubinoff (New Delhi: Sage, 2002), 499–532. 31 See Office of Intelligence Research, US Department of State, “India’s Political and Economic Position in the East-West Conflict,” OIR report no. 5526, May 15, 1951, 1. 32 “Plans for US Military Action in India,” Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) memo, March 31, 1958. 33 “Appraisal of United States National Interests in South Asia,” JCS 1992, March 3, 1949. 34 “Possible US Action in South Asia,” September 9, 1949, document no. 845.00/0-949, box 8076, National Archives, Washington, DC. 35 Paul H. Ailling wrote Ambassador Grady, “Pakistan goes along with on all but trusteeship or racial questions.” See Discussion with Ambassador Grady, December 26, 1947, document no. 845.00/12-2647, National Archives, Washington, DC. 36 “Possible US Action in South Asia.” 37 “Pakistan Pretensions to Moslem Leadership,” April 11, 1952, document no. 750.41, National Archives, Washington, DC. 38 John Foster Dulles, “The Cost of Peace,” US Department of State Bulletin 34 (June 18, 1956), 1000. 39 “Influence of Soviets upon India is Denied,” New York Times, January 21, 1947, 11. 40 Robert J. McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 222. 41 Norman D. Palmer, South Asia and United States Policy (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), 18. 42 Pakistan had been making overtures for assistance since 1947. “Records of the Military Advisory to the Office of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs,” February 1950. 43 Quoted in McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, 173.

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44 “Excerpts from Transcript of Secretary Dulles’ News Conference,” US Department of State Bulletin 32 (December 19, 1955), 1007. 45 See Arthur G. Rubinoff, India’s Use of Force in Goa (Bombay, India: Popular Prakashan, 1971). 46 US Department of State, The Subcontinent of South Asia, Near and Middle Eastern series no. 41 (Washington: Department of State, 1959), 6. 47 James Warner Bjorkman, “Public Law 480 and the Policies of Self-Help and ShortTether: Indo-American Relations, 1965–68,” 231. 48 Francine Frankel, India’s Political Economy, 1947–77 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978), 298. 49 Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, The United States and South Asia, 93d Cong. 1st session, May 26, 1973, 15. Hereafter cited as The United States and South Asia. 50 Stephen P. Cohen, “South Asia and US Military Policy,” in Rudolph and Rudolph, The Regional Imperative, 108. 51 Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1979), 848. 52 The United States and South Asia, 20. 53 Kissinger, White House Years, chap. 21. 54 See J. Mohan Malik, “Zhou, Mao, and Nixon’s 1972 Conversations on India,” Issues & Studies 38, no. 3 (September 2002): 192–94, which makes excellent use of the National Security Archives documents available online at http://www.gwu.edu/ ~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/ch-40.pdf 55 The United States and South Asia, 20. 56 Francis R. Valeo, South Asia: Report on Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan to the Majority Leader, transmitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1976), 13. 57 Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings: United States Interests and Policies toward South Asia, 93rd Cong. 1st session, March 12, 15, 20, and 27, 1973, vi. 58 Representative Lester Wolf pronounced these actions as “Moynihan’s fait accompli.” See Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings: The Persian Gulf, 1974: Money, Politics, Arms, and Power, 93rd Cong., 2nd session, July 30, 1974, and August 5, 7, and 12, 1974, 138. 59 Subcommittee on International Organizations, US House of Representatives Committee on International Relations, Hearings: Human Rights in India, 94th Cong., 2nd session, June 23, 28, and 29, 1976, and September 16 and 23, 1976. 60 Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Development, US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings: The Indian Ocean: Political and Strategic Future, 92nd Cong., 1st session, July 20, 22, 27, and 28, 1971, 13. 61 Norman D. Palmer, The United States and India (New York: Praeger, 1984), 216. 62 Peter D. Galbraith, “Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Whose Business?” in Glazer and Glazer, Conflicting Images, 72. 63 See George Crile, Charlie Wilson’s War (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003). Wilson is now a lobbyist for Pakistan. 64 See Richard P. Cronin, “Congress and Arms Sales and Security Assistance to Pakistan,” in US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, Congress and Foreign Policy 1981 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1982), 103–14. 65 See Arthur G. Rubinoff, “Congressional Attitudes toward India,” in The Hope and the Reality: US-Indian Relations from Roosevelt to Reagan, ed. Harold A. Gould and Sumit Ganguly (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992), 155–78.

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66 According to a senior analyst with the Congressional Research Service, only 5–10 percent of members of Congress had an interest in India. Interview, Washington, DC, April 15, 1986. 67 US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, “Resolution of Disapproval Pertaining to the Shipment of Nuclear Fuel to India,” Hearings and Markup Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 96th Cong., 2nd session, July 26 and 27, 1980, and September 10, 1980, 61. 68 Ibid. 69 Lloyd I. Rudolph, “The Faltering Novitiate: Rajiv at Home and Abroad in 1988,” in India Briefing 1989, ed. Marshall M. Bouton and Philip Oldenburg (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989), 20. 70 Patrick E. Tyler, “US Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals,” New York Times, March 8, 1992, 1; and “Excerpts from Pentagon’s Plan: Preventing the Emergence of a New Rival,” Ibid., 14. 71 Raju G.C. Thomas, “US Transfers of ‘Dual-Use’ Technologies to India,” Asian Survey 30, no. 9 (September 1990): 824–45. 72 Randy Rydell, “Giving Nonproliferation Norms Teeth: Sanctions and the NPPA,” Nonproliferation Review 6 (Winter 1999): 1–19. 73 See C. Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Viking, 2003). 74 See Arthur G. Rubinoff, “India’s Normalization of Relations with Israel,” Asian Survey 35, no. 5 (May 1995): 487–505. 75 See Arthur G. Rubinoff, “Missed Opportunities and Contradictory Policies: Indo-American Relations in the Clinton-Rao Years,” Pacific Affairs 69, no. 4 (Winter 1996–97): 499–517. 76 Robert M. Hathaway, “Confrontation and Retreat: The US Congress and the South Asian Nuclear Tests,” Arms Control Today 30, no. 1 (January–February 2000): 9. 77 See Strobe Talbott, Engaging India (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2004). 78 Robert Hathaway, “Unfinished Passage: India, Indian Americans, and the US Congress,” Washington Quarterly 24, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 26. 79 See Arthur G. Rubinoff, “The Diaspora as a Factor in US-Indian Relations,” Asian Affairs 32, no. 3 (Fall 2005): 169–87. 80 Amy Waldman, “India Harvests Fruits of a Disapora,” New York Times, January 12, 2003, 4. 81 Ganesh S. Lakshman, “US Is Largest Wealth Market for Indians,” Yahoo! India News, May 15, 2003, available at http/in.news.yahoo.com/030515/43/24aog.html 82 Arthur G. Rubinoff, “Changing Perceptions of India in the US Congress,” Asian Affairs 28, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 57. 83 “Transcript of Joint Press Conference by External Affairs Minister Shri Jaswant Singh and US Secretary of State Mr. Colin Powell,” October 17, 2001, http://meaindia.nic.in/ event.2001/09/11events/01htm 84 US Department of State, “United States–India Joint Statement on Next Steps in Strategic Partnership,” September 17, 2004. 85 Available at Rahul Datta, “India-US ink defence co-op pact,” http://www. dailypioneer.com/30/06/05 86 On this point see Baldev Raj Nayar and T. V. Paul, India and the World Order: Searching for Major-Power Status (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 87 See Ashley J. Tellis, “South Asian Seesaw: A New US Policy on the Subcontinent,” Carnegie Endowment policy brief no. 38 (May 2005), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, 4. 88 Interview, US Department of State, Washington, DC, April 2, 2002. 89 Rediff.com, January 9, 2002.

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90 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars (New York: Penguin, 2004), 264. 91 See Robert M. Hathaway, “The US-India Courtship: From Clinton to Bush,” Journal of Strategic Studies 25, no. 4 (December 2002): 6–31; and Deepa Ollapally, “Ties That Bind,” India Abroad, April 15, 2005, 13. 92 Aziz Haniffa, “NSSP has no credibility, says Jaswant Singh,” India Abroad, June 10, 2005, 8. 93 Steven R. Weisman, “US to Broaden India’s Access to Nuclear-Power Technology,” New York Times, July 19, 2005, A1. 94 Teresita Schaffer, “India and the United States: Turning a Corner,” South Asia Monitor, no. 85, August 1, 2005 (Washington: Center for International Studies). 95 Brahma Chellaney, “A questionable nuclear deal,” India Abroad, August 5, 2005, 16. 96 George Perkovich, “Faulty Promises, The US-India Nuclear Deal,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Outlook, September 2005, 3. 97 Henry Sokolski, “The India Syndrome: US nuclear non-proliferation melts down,” The Weekly Standard, August 1, 2005. 98 Aziz Haniffa, “US lawmakers slam India’s stand on Iran,” India Abroad, September 16, 2005, 10; and Aziz Haniffa, “US concerned nuke deal may go bust,” India Abroad, September 30, 2005, 8. 99 Aziz Haniffa, “ ‘Gentle persuasion’ changed India’s mind,” India Abroad, October 7, 2005, 8. 100 Sheela Dutt, “India’s vote will be billed to America,” India Abroad, October 7, 2005, 12.

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4 AN OVERVIEW OF INDO-US STRATEGIC COOPERATION A rollercoaster of a relationship Major General Dipankar Banerjee (Retired)

Introduction India’s relations with the United States have been described variously as “estranged democracies”1 and “distanced powers”2 by Americans. Indians have tended to describe it, perhaps a bit more positively, as “distanced democracies,”3 “engaged democracies”4 and finally as “natural allies.”5 Another common refrain often articulated from India, describes the United States as the oldest and most powerful democracy and itself as the largest.6 The expectation from both sides appears to have been that “democracy” will somehow transcend national interests and security imperatives and shape the relationship.7 Reality suggests that relations between two large and distant countries, with their enormous internal diversity and external interests, are far too complex to be captured accurately by catchy phrases. More often, these are defined by the realities of the global order and security imperatives of both nations. Understandably, relations between India and the United States have varied widely over the last sixty-five years and adopted a rollercoaster character with many ups and downs and highs and lows. In recent years India–US relations has transformed into what both sides claim to be a strategic partnership. Even as both countries move towards that desirable goal, it is useful to recall that divergences in perceptions and policies have varied widely over the years. The proceeding overview will attempt to provide a glimpse of its evolution. At the end of the Second World War the United States emerged as the undisputed leader of the free world. Its lead in almost every area of consequence would remain unchallenged for decades. All its possible peers were largely destroyed by the War and indeed needed Washington’s help to revive themselves. The United States did not just dominate the emerging world order, but had the unique opportunity to shape it by laying out its contours and establishing the international institutions that would determine its future. Within a few years 61

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of the War’s end, the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc emerged as the only group that could conceivably challenge this order, but only in a limited military sense. The overarching US doctrine that came to be adopted was to “contain” the Soviet Empire, a policy that would end in victory some forty five years later.8 For India, the immediate concerns were different. It was to emerge from colonialism and external domination as an independent entity. It had first to fully assert its independence, in which it only succeeded partially as the nation itself was split asunder, into India and Pakistan consigning the region to internal conflict for decades. India’s identity and nationalism had to be developed anew based on its own values and heritage and its territories needed to be consolidated. Over and above these concerns, a modern state had to be created almost from the beginning with all its attendant institutions.9 To achieve these immediate goals, India needed a peaceful external environment, uncomplicated by the rivalries of the global power struggle. New Delhi needed to craft a policy that would provide it a meaningful and autonomous role in a future world, in keeping with its own size, potential and aspiration. In accordance with these needs, it chose a policy of “non-alignment.” The term itself was much misunderstood in the world, and particularly in the United States. India, perhaps justifiably, never fully explained its position, leading many in the west to ask, “non-aligned against what; good and evil?” What Nehru had in mind was a policy that would enable India to take independent positions on international issues without being tied down by alliances and ideological constraints. The central theme was not to get drawn in to military entanglements with major powers.10 He also hoped this would open up the possibility for India to adopt a position of some leadership of the emerging world. Many practical difficulties emerged, which impeded the implementation of this policy over the years. Over time, other countries also decided to remain “non-aligned.” On global issues, non-alignment often meant aligning against the west. Overall this policy precluded the possibility of a military relationship with any country or grouping.11 This policy, and differences in world view, would be a major barrier to an Indo-US military relationship throughout the Cold War.

Relations in the early years Indo-US diplomatic relations go back to the presidency of George Washington when Benjamin Joy was appointed to the position of US Consul in Calcutta, the then Indian capital, in 1792.12 Nothing of note happened until April 1941, when Girija Shankar Bajpai was appointed the first Agent General of India in Washington DC and Thomas Wilson shifted as US Commissioner from Calcutta to New Delhi.13 By August of that year, President Roosevelt would question Churchill’s imperial policies in India. He understood that a successful pursuit of the war against the Axis powers required India’s willing support and cooperation. He eventually bowed, however, to Churchill’s wider international experience, particularly on matters in Asia. Nevertheless, Roosevelt’s support for Indian independence and concern about continuing British rule left a favorable impression on Indians. 62

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Churchill’s refusal to contemplate a serious change in British imperial policy compelled the Indian National Congress to launch the Quit India movement in 1942. The Congress leaders believed that only an India that was promised freedom after the war could voluntarily join the war against fascism. Instead, the British responded by incarcerating most senior Congress political leaders. In spite of this, India’s participation in the Second World War was remarkable by any standards. Over two and a half million soldiers, each a volunteer, fought with Allied armies in many of the major theaters of the global conflict. This contribution was particularly salient in the Burma front, without which the outcome would have been considerably less certain. In addition to the roughly half-million soldiers from India and the British Commonwealth in this theater, the Allied forces were joined by troops representing the Nationalist Chinese, many Africans and, by the war’s end, some 250,000 US soldiers. This enormous US troop contribution was easily its largest military-to-military relationship in South Asia to date. US forces provided the bulk of logistics support, flew substantial numbers of air sorties across uncharted routes in rickety aircraft, and ensured that the Kuomingtang forces remained in the war against Japan in China. General Joe Stilwell, the Ledo Road, the flights across the Himalayan Hump, and the glider sorties in Burma supporting the Chindits, are romantic interludes of a bygone era.14 Yet, they also endure in military folklore and regimental histories. In addition, there was also the enormous Brooklyn air conditioning plant near Kolkata, the largest in Asia at the time, that stored and supplied food to all Allied forces in the East.15 The numerous airstrips and airfields constructed in northeast India during that era still remain as a testimony to this unique endeavour.16 It might have been expected that this state of relations would continue after Indian independence. Instead the Cold War intervened. India was partitioned and a separate state, Pakistan, came into existence in 1947. The Great Game (thwarting and intercepting the Russian expansion in Asia) would be replaced by “containing” the Soviet Union during the entire Cold War and would determine British and US global policies for the next four decades. Here, Pakistan would always feature more prominently. The impact of this policy was immediately felt in the case of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). When India took the case to the United Nations in 1948 with the expectation that Pakistani aggression would quickly be recognized and steps taken to vacate the state of Pakistani forces, it was confronted with the realities of emerging geo-politics. Washington and London assessed that Pakistan was strategically more important, was the more martial regime, and possessed a higher potential defense usefulness, thereby making it a better ally. Additionally, its location closer to the Soviet empire endowed it with a special geo-strategic advantage. The West could not ignore the potential benefits provided by Pakistan. These factors translated into support of Pakistan at the United Nations on the J&K issue and would later compel the United States to name it as a preferred strategic partner. This policy was led by the British following the traditions of Sir Olaf Caroe and 63

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others, but the US embraced it willingly.17 This view of Pakistan’s strategic importance and military potential would dominate US policies toward South Asia for a long time. An attempt at forging military ties between India and the United States was made soon after Indian independence in the late 1940s. This played out in Washington DC and was initiated by the Indian Defense Attaches, first Colonel Brij Mohan Kaul and later Brigadier Dilip Chaudhuri.18 Kaul requested the US Defense Secretary, Louis Johnson, to sell forty three B-25 bombers and a wide range of weaponry to New Delhi. Chaudhuri followed up these discussions with a request for tank ammunition. Had these requests been approved by the US administration, it may have established an arms supply channel with India and may have led to a major military relationship. In any event, the proposals proved premature and relations with India were restricted to sharing limited and low grade military information. The considered view of the US government was that India was not a region of strategic interest to the United States.19 Nevertheless a modest beginning was made at this time. The United States was still the first country to provide military aid to India after its independence. It approved the sale of 200 Sherman tanks worth $19 million,20 although it rejected another request for 200 fighter aircraft worth $150 million and questioned justification for making such a defense expenditure when India was taking huge development aid from the United States.21 Later, rebuffing Pakistan’s claim that any arms supply would alter the military balance in the region, the US government supplied 54 C-119 Fairchild military transport aircraft to India.22 The next brief historic interlude in India–US military exchange was the role played by Indian forces in the repatriation of prisoners of war in Korea in 1953. A five nation Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) was set-up with India as the Chair. With two other member countries, one from each bloc, India’s position as the neutral member in the Commission would be vital. In the highly charged atmosphere of the Korean War, Indian forces came under enormous pressure. The actual task of prisoner repatriation was carried out by a six thousand strong Indian contingent under General Thimayya.23 Over 20,000 Chinese and North Korean prisoners refused to return to Communism. About 359 UN prisoners, including 336 South Koreans, refused to return to their countries. The conduct of the Indian contingent earned universal respect and admiration. Ambassador Arthur Dean of the United States expressed his “tremendous appreciation” for Thimayya and the Indian contingent for “a most amazing job in extremely difficult circumstances.”24

Containment strategy and US Cold War alliance with Pakistan The Korean War hastened the implementation of the US containment strategy. Western powers sought to surround the Communist bloc and needed allies in Asia.25 India had made it clear by this point that it was not available. Pakistan’s 64

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participation was vital and it required no persuasion. Notwithstanding Pakistan’s martial law regime, or perhaps because of it, Karachi was the obvious choice. Besides, the tall, handsome and articulate Ayub Khan with his clipped Sandhurst accent, made a much better impression on John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State.26 Military officers in command of the nation, with their no nonsense approach and traditional northwest frontier hospitality going far beyond protocol, captivated the Americans, then as now. By 1953 the decision was made to provide Pakistan massive military assistance.27 An aide memoire was signed in October 1954 under which Washington agreed to a comprehensive military aid program for Pakistan. Under this agreement, Pakistan received modern artillery, Patton tanks, howitzers, transports and other state-of-the-art military equipment. The air force received modern F-86 jet fighters and B-57 bombers. US military teams improved Pakistan’s military training. Large numbers of Pakistani officers went to the United States for training in mechanised warfare. Prominent Americans such as Vice President Richard Nixon and Senate Majority Leader William Knowland wanted to build up Pakistan as a counter weight to India.28 The United States benefited from this relationship in a major way. In 1959 it was granted a ten-year lease to set up a “communications facility” near Peshawar, the capital of the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan. This was in fact one of a chain of electronic intelligence gathering stations that the United States set up to spy on the Soviet Union. Pakistan also agreed that the CIA could use Peshawar airport for flights over the Soviet Union by its U2 spy planes. The military aid meant to help build Pakistan as a bulwark against southward expansion of the Soviet Union would in fact strengthen its armed forces, specifically against India.29 Anyone who looked at the map or was familiar with recent history would have realized that Pakistan’s strategic interests lay entirely in countering India and this military capability would hardly be used against China. Indians may be excused if they felt that this step by the United States was deliberate. The sophisticated weapons introduced in the subcontinent under this deal could not be matched by India in the short term. Even for limited balance New Delhi would have to turn elsewhere. It was in mid 1961 that Defense Minister Krishna Menon persuaded Nehru to buy the MiG-21 aircraft from the Soviet Union. This was offered on such generous terms that neither Great Britain, nor France nor the United States could come up with a comparable offer even if they wanted to match it. Thus began a long and enduring Indo-Soviet arms relationship. The actual delivery of the aircraft would take some years.30 The very strong Indian reaction to the emergent Pakistan-US military alliance was perhaps not anticipated in Washington. In any case, by now India’s image in the United States had plummeted and New Delhi’s concerns were not a factor in US decision making. The psychological impact of this alliance would, however, last many years, casting a shadow on the perception of the United States as a country not favorably disposed toward India. 65

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Indo-US relations remained frozen in a state of suspended hostility until 1962. India led the Afro-Asian summit at Bandung, Indonesia in 1955 and, along with Egypt’s Nasser and Yugoslavia’s Tito, Nehru would form the non-aligned movement. Eisenhower’s Presidential visit in 1956 did little to break the deadlock. Indo-US relations reached its second lowest point ever, during this decade. The Goa episode came as a surprise to the United States and the world. A small Portuguese port on the west coast of India, Goa was a colonial anachronism. In December 1961 the Indian Army quickly overran the colony with little bloodshed. The diplomatic fall-out, however, was greater. Kennedy was surprised and shocked that Nehru, during a recent visit, did not even mention this possibility. In any case, the visit itself was a failure. Nehru had perhaps seldom been as lackluster and created a poor impression in Washington and on Kennedy in particular.31 International condemnation of the Goa episode was high, as the world did not quite expect that when its own interests were involved, New Delhi would not be constrained by the niceties of non-violence that it preached to others.32

Chinese aggression and US support The story of Chinese aggression on India in Oct–Nov 1962 is long and complex and need not be retold here. What is important is that it led to a remarkable turnaround in Indo-US relations. The attack surprised and shocked the Indian leadership. What need not have come as a surprise was the debacle in the battlefield. A total of two Indian infantry divisions, or less than ten per cent of the Indian combat force, faced a well acclimatized and thoroughly prepared PLA. These were the same divisions that had conquered Tibet a decade earlier. The Indian forces were totally unprepared, badly deployed, under-equipped and even without proper clothes.33 One of the two divisions that encountered the Chinese was routed in battle and other forces, despite fighting rather well, encountered little success. The defeat was total in terms of India’s political standing and its foreign policy. What is notable was the dramatic shift in Indian policy and the generous military and political support that India received from the United States and the West. None of India’s non-aligned partners provided help and few showed any sympathy. Moscow actually temporarily halted the MiG program, siding instead with its socialist brother.34 In contrast, the United States came through with substantial help. It also sent the aircraft carrier Enterprise from Hawaii to the Bay of Bengal to demonstrate this support. Due to various reasons, however, the ultimate quantity of aid was not as high as initially expected in India and did not, therefore, have a lasting impact. The supplies were restricted to light arms, automatic weapons, winter clothing and communication equipment sufficient for little more than one infantry division. More importantly, the help came quickly and without strings attached.35 Much larger amounts of aid were sought. Nehru asked for several squadrons of fighter aircraft and two squadrons of B-47 bombers. Curiously, under US advice, Nehru was deterred from using the Indian air force. Though small no doubt, it 66

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could still be expected to decisively interdict the PLA advance from the many air strips in eastern India. By comparison, even though China had a larger inventory of aircraft, these were old and would be able to carry very limited pay loads while operating from high altitude airfields in Tibet.36 A considerably larger arms package of US $373 million was apparently worked out by November 1963 in Washington by Ambassador Chester Bowles and was to have been signed by President Kennedy on November 26, 1963. An assassin’s bullet would prematurely end the life of the young President days before this could happen.37 Lyndon Johnson and India’s differing views on the Vietnam War would then preclude the possibility of any close relationship between the two countries. Nevertheless, tentative, inconclusive and limited though this engagement ultimately proved to be, this was without question a high point of Indo-US defense cooperation.

The Bangladesh War in 1971 and after In less than a decade, Indo-US relations would plumb its lowest depths. There is even less need for recounting details of the Bangladesh War. Another martial law regime in Pakistan would make the mistake of conducting free elections in the country on the basis of adult franchise, but would be unable to honour the people’s verdict. The Pakistan Army unleashed a blood bath on, March 25, 1971 in Dhaka, East Pakistan. In time this led to a mass exodus of up to ten million people to India, which constituted an unacceptable level of aggression. The world, as always, looked the other way. Military operations were inevitable. Pakistan even provided the excuse in the form of a preliminary air strike on December 3, 1971. The result was a dramatic victory for Indian forces in the east, though not quite fore ordained. Under President Nixon and Henry Kissinger, the United States tilted heavily against India and did their best to forestall this. The same USS Enterprise sailed once again from Hawaii to the Bay of Bengal, but this time with a menacing message. Few knew then of Kissinger’s secret visit to China in mid-1971 facilitated by Pakistan and the deep debt he thus owed to Islamabad. This was without doubt the lowest point in Indo-US relations. The USS Enterprise is called to duty even to this day in seminars and talk fests by Indian interlocutors as conclusive evidence of US perfidy toward India. Bangladesh was born as an independent nation in December 1971. Despite this development, Pakistan retained the same strategic significance to the West, and particularly to the United States, as before. Within a decade the long awaited Soviet aggression on Afghanistan actually came about. It proved to be a colossal mistake by Moscow that would ultimately lead to its disintegration. It would also provide the United States the opportunity to inflict the battle of a thousand cuts through its proxy, yet another martial law regime in Pakistan. During much of the 1970s and 1980s India and the United States would remain on opposite sides of an intensifying Cold War. Some positive developments in Indo-US security relations took place during the visits to the United States of Prime Ministers Indira Gandhi in 1982 67

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and Rajiv Gandhi in 1985. During Mrs Gandhi’s visit a science and technology cooperation initiative was launched.38 The MOU was signed in December 1984 during Rajiv Gandhi’s premiership.39 Though this arrangement promised a lot and was the most important event in technological cooperation to that point, ultimately it did not live up to its promise.

The end of the Cold War and the Kicklighter-Rodrigues initiative The Cold War ended suddenly and the Soviet Union rapidly passed into history. Its impact was traumatic in India and particularly on its armed forces. Some 70 percent of aircraft and their parts and a high portion of other military hardware were sourced from the USSR. Not only did New Delhi require a new source for military hardware, but reliance on the Soviet Union for a whole range of diplomatic support would no longer be possible. The global order would be recast and old ideological impulses reordered. India had to adapt to this reality. It became quite clear that in this era of unipolarity there would now be no basis for an overt anti-US posture, long a staple of socialists of all hues among the political and bureaucratic elite of India.40 The “hidden hand,” the code word for the CIA, could also not be invoked any longer for all the ills within. Fortunately, it also coincided with a new political order in India. Rajiv Gandhi’s youthful leadership appeared to provide a break from the past. There also emerged tentative steps to free the economy.41 There was suddenly an air of optimism in India and growing confidence in New Delhi. Three persons in particular reflected this view in high official circles in Delhi and were often entrusted to articulate this to visiting dignitaries from around the world, particularly to Americans. They were; Dr V.S. Arunachalam, the Scientific Adviser to the Defense Minister and head of the Defense Research and Developmental Organization; Sam Pitroda the non-resident Indian telecommunications entrepreneur from the United States and appointed technology Czar by Rajiv Gandhi; and, surprisingly, General Sunit Francis Rodrigues, first as the Vice Chief and then as the Chief of the Army Staff.42 It was at a dinner in November 1990 at the US Ambassador’s residence in Delhi that Rodrigues challenged Lieutenant General Kicklighter, on his second visit to India from the Pacific Command in Hawaii, to come out with a package of military-to-military cooperation.43 Kicklighter returned in April 1991 with a comprehensive “cooperation plan” which he handed over to Rodrigues.44 This included “proposals for a common strategic vision” and “a framework for future army to army expanded relations.”45 Indeed this was the beginning of structured military-to-military cooperation between the two countries. Other developments took place during this period that would impact and shape mutual security relations. The Soviet Army had withdrawn from Afghanistan. Rajiv Gandhi visited China in December 1988 initiating a substantive improvement of relations with Beijing. The People’s Republic, much like India, had 68

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recently initiated a number of policy changes and, even though the Tiananmen incident isolated it for a while, its eventual rise was apparent. Myanmar went into another and more rigid phase of military rule. Pakistan declared itself nuclear weapon capable in early 1987. In August 1990 Saddam Hussain attacked Kuwait and in November India agreed to refuel US aircraft moving to West Asia from the Pacific. The refuelling was done at Pune airfield which was an air force asset.46 By 1990 the Cold War had ended with total victory for the United States. Operations Desert Storm and Desert Strike the next year would demonstrate US military dominance. A number of other developments took place simultaneously in Indo-US relations. In July 1989 Shri K.C. Pant visited the United States, the first by a Defense Minister in twenty-five years. He went with a delegation that included all three Vice Chiefs of Staff of the Indian armed forces, the defense secretary and the scientific adviser. While in the United States he announced that a semi-official strategic dialogue would take place between the Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi and the Institute of National Strategic Studies, National Defence University, Washington, DC. A series of strategic dialogues, first held at Washington in September 1989 and convened semi-annually thereafter, would take the process of consultation and discussion further.47 These meetings were the near equivalent of Track 2 dialogues, with the difference that over half the participants were senior government officials attending in their personal capacities. They were unencumbered by official restraints and able to articulate their views fairly freely and frankly and feel out the other side’s interests and concerns. Participants included ambassadors, senior military officers, civilian members of government from the foreign and defense ministries, and leading strategic experts. The second round of strategic dialogue took place in November 1990 at the National Defense Academy in Khadakvasla, India, the tri-service equivalent of the West Point military academy. It was perhaps also the most successful round of talks.48 The meeting was attended by a number of US officials, including the US Ambassador to India, William Clark. The Indian side was represented by the Chairman Chiefs of Staff, senior officials from the Ministry of Defense and External Affairs, and senior strategic analysts. Attendees discussed the global strategic environment and issues of security and strategic concerns to both countries in a constructive and positive manner. Dr Henry Rowen, the Assistant Secretary of Defense, gave an excellent assessment of the situation in Kuwait. Dr Al Bernstein, the Director of the INSS and the co-sponsor of the conference, noted that he “felt like someone who had been witnessing the beginning of a kind of family reconciliation after a long period of estrangement.”49 That summed up very well the beginning of a new phase in strategic relationship. The next meeting was held in July 1992 at the Airlie House in Virginia, just outside Washington. This conference was a positive and successful meeting. Assistant Under-Secretary of State Teresita Schaeffer led the US delegation, which consisted of officials from the Departments of State and Defense as well as senior analysts from major think tanks. The Indian delegation was led by 69

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Defense Secretary N.N. Vohra and the Indian Ambassador Abid Hussain. Rear Admiral Sushil Kumar, later the Chief of the Navy and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in India, announced the initiation of the Malabar series of joint naval exercises off the west coast of India in the autumn of 1992, much to the surprise of Indian participants. This was the first time such joint exercises would be undertaken by the Indian armed forces with the United States in a long while.50 The next meeting was held in Jaipur in 1994 and was less successful. It did seem that the novelty of this exercise was perhaps beginning to wear off and each side was repeating the issues and hoping for a break-through where perhaps none was possible. The level of participation was lower. The United States did not have an ambassador in India for over six months during this period. The US delegation was led by the Vice President of the National Defense University. Academic participation was higher and there were fewer policy makers. The Soviet Union had recently disintegrated and although a session was held on Central Asia, but the impact of the break up of the USSR was surprisingly not discussed. The overall contribution of this process in shaping the strategic relationship was nevertheless significant and its impact was felt the very next year. Taking the Kicklighter-Rodrigues process forward, the US Defense Secretary William Perry visited India in January 1995. Prior to the official meeting, he attended a breakfast meeting hosted by the IDSA.51 Later Perry signed with his counterpart in India, Shri Mallikarjun, the Minister of State for Defense, an “agreed minute” outlining defense cooperation.52 Under this agreement, a Defense Policy Group and a Joint Technology Group were established, which provided for greater interaction between civilians, scientists and the militaries of both sides.53 Everything seemed to be in place for a steady improvement in strategic relations when there was a change in the government in India. The right wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) came to power through elections in March 1998 and within weeks exercised the nuclear weapons option. Five nuclear tests were conducted in the Rajasthan desert in western India invoking immediate sanctions and strong condemnations from the United States. Pakistan responded with a similar number of tests within a fortnight. For a time it seemed that India had invited the wrath of the world, more particularly of the west, for having undermined the global nonproliferation agenda. That India had not violated any agreement that it had signed or broken any international laws, but merely attempted to safeguard its own national interests in a manner that it considered appropriate, seemed to escape the United States. There was no change, however, in Indian attitudes toward relations with the United States. In a now famous letter, Vajpayee explained to the US President the rationale for the tests, which the US establishment promptly leaked to the media it pointed clearly to China as the principal security concern. Barely four months later, Prime Minister Vajpayee would declare in a speech at New York that India and the United States were “natural allies.”54 The change of government had in fact introduced a new dimension in India’s foreign policy. The Nehru legacy had finally ended. This was the first non-Congress 70

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government in India that was to last a reasonable period.55 A new set of leaders, unencumbered by the past and not carrying the baggage of history, reflected more fully the aspirations of an emerging India. The Cold War had ended and Russia under Yeltsin seemed to be teetering on the edge. The Soviet crutch for India had vanished and the world was now truly unipolar. The BJP could now shape Indian foreign policy in its own light and this it proceeded to do. The new Defense Minister pointedly called China its potential number one threat. It was this change in policy that would now make it possible for a new engagement of the United States.56 The Kargil crisis intervened in May 1999 and led to a paradigm shift in the conception of the US of the question of Kashmir. Pakistan’s blatant violation of the Line of Control (LoC) in J&K was strongly criticized by Washington. It held Islamabad responsible for nuclear brinkmanship and demanded restoration of the status quo and the sanctity of the LoC. This extraordinary support to India in the Kargil crisis was the first time that Washington backed India on Kashmir.57 All this was fine and the strategic relationship seemed to be on course. Yet, according to an Indian participant in the Khadakvasla strategic dialogue in 1990, something more was needed to provide an impetus to this relationship. According to him, what was needed was an event such as the Nixon visit to China that subsequently galvanized Sino-US relations to something akin to a love affair.58 This was provided by President William Jefferson Clinton’s visit to India in March 2000. He spent five days in India visiting Delhi, Agra, Jaipur, Hyderabad, and Mumbai, only half a day in Bangladesh and a few hours in Pakistan. The visit was remarkably successful. His address to a joint session of Parliament had all members enthralled and throwing decorum to the wind they were clamouring to shake hands with Clinton. Never before had a foreign visitor so charmed an Indian audience. It was almost like a British Imperial visit of a hundred years ago. It set the tone for increased strategic cooperation, though nothing concrete was actually achieved during the visit. In eight months Vajpayee would reciprocate through another successful state visit. Such frequency of state visits was quite unimaginable till only recently. It is time to reflect briefly why Indo-US relations had remained so conflict prone in the past and what was different now.

Dissonances of the past and their impact Ashley Tellis has identified four areas of dissonance that has prevented India and the United States from sharing a common world view and hence fostering strategic cooperation.59 According to Tellis, these areas included; a competing perception of the global order; the nature of the Soviet Union, the value of nuclear weapons; and the role of Pakistan.60 The first two are now largely matters of history, though the other two issues merit a brief discussion, for they are likely to be with us for a few more years. That there is a wide difference in the perception of the two countries on the nuclear issue is well recognized. The United States considers nuclear weapons as legitimate for certain countries and even useful as weapons of deterrence. It is 71

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even willing now to consider developing special weapons for specific operational tasks, such as deep bunker bursting. Yet, it is strongly against others possessing it. India could never accept this position as it was against both the principle of equity and its own national interests. Therefore, it had kept all its options open on nuclear weapons and had never acceded to any non-proliferation treaty. Since the Chinese nuclear test in 1964 and Pakistan’s initiation of its nuclear weapons program in 1972, it was the most important strategic issue facing India. When the Cold War ended and all other irritants largely vanished, nuclear proliferation remained the only issue between India and the United States. For much of the 1990’s it seemed to dominate the official discourse between the two countries. This may have been understandable given Washington’s proliferation concerns. After all the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty had held and prevented the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries. The regime with all its warts seemed to be the only disarmament agenda that had very wide international support. Having agreed on this treaty, it was unlikely that a major modification to it now would be possible. India naturally had different views. The treaty did not address India’s security concerns. China was a nuclear weapon power and improving its defense capability, including modernizing its nuclear arsenal. There were strong signals that Pakistan would soon acquire nuclear weapons, and by early 1987 it seemed that Islamabad had developed the essential capability with the active help and support of China. Also, Indian strategic analysts and government officials would frequently allude to Washington’s omission to adhere to the NPT in terms of its commitment to nuclear weapons elimination. Again, Indians would refer to US neglect to prevent Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program through the 1980s when it was an ally in the war in Afghanistan. It seems in hind sight that no substantive effort was made by either side to understand each other’s concerns and evolve a program of cooperation going beyond these differences. In a curious irony of history, the nuclear weapons issue would later become almost the single policy agenda that would bring India and the United States together. It was, after all, the strategic dialogue between Jaswant Singh and Strobe Talbott following India’s nuclear tests in 1998 that led to the first serious strategic engagement between the two countries.61 It was from this dialogue that the concept of “strategic partnership” between the two countries finally evolved. The Singh–Talbott talks remained inconclusive and neither side prevailed over the other. The US objectives of getting India to sign the NPT as a non-nuclear power, or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), or even to declare the parameters of its nuclear weapons capability and doctrine were not achieved. There was only an assurance from the Prime Minister that India will not undertake nuclear tests in future and that India would attempt to develop a political consensus within the country to sign the CTBT. Neither were any of India’s objectives achieved. It did not receive official recognition of its nuclear weapon capability and was not admitted to the nuclear weapons club. Nor was India provided nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Nevertheless, the sanctions that 72

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were imposed initially by the United States were removed one by one until all were withdrawn after 9/11. The other issue was the question of Pakistan. From independence to the Clinton visit in 2000, US policies toward South Asia was always considered a zero sum game with India and Pakistan having to be balanced against each other. This was curious, especially when one considers that Pakistan was allowed to openly flout all proliferation norms that the United States professed to hold in such high esteem. Whether it was to allow Saudi Arabia to use Pakistan for acquiring CSS-2 strategic missiles from China, acquiring clandestinely from Beijing the design of the bomb it had used in its fourth nuclear weapons test, or to turn a blind eye to the nuclear super market operation of Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, the United States was undeniably permissive in its relations with successive regimes in Islamabad. It is inconceivable that US intelligence was not aware of at least the outlines if not the details of each of these activities. Yet, it did nothing to prevent them or to punish Pakistan for these gross violations. The current state of close cooperation between the United States and Pakistan in the war against terror should perhaps be de-linked from earlier developments. It is quite possible that this is more akin to short term tactical cooperation between a country which is the principal victim of terrorism and a state which is its major perpetrator. Any reasonable analysis of the future of anti-terror war is likely to conclude that the final battle between the forces of terror and the free world is likely to be fought in areas in or near to Pakistan and against forces that are currently located nearby. A point that has constantly surprised and bemused Indian analysts is the United States inability to distinguish between terrorists that operate to the west of Pakistan, and who are considered evil versus those who operate to its east, who are somehow considered more benign. Nevertheless, both groups’ ideology, organization and support base remain the same. The story of Kashmiri terrorism has somehow become befuddled in these differing perceptions.62

Next steps in strategic partnership In January 2004 President Bush and Prime Minister Vajpayee announced a path breaking new way forward in strategic partnership. On September 17, the Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran and US Secretary of Commerce Kenneth Juster signed the agreement. Termed as the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP), this agreement envisages cooperation between the United States and India over a quartet of issues; civilian nuclear energy, civilian space programs, high technology trade, and missile defense. This agreement will allow India greater access to US high technology in exchange for instituting world class export control measures to prevent their unlawful dissimulation. These technologies can also not be diverted toward India’s strategic programs. It does not ask India to give up its nuclear weapons capability or to sign any non-proliferation agreement. In that sense this is indeed revolutionary. The United States is no longer seeking, as it has so often in the past, to raise the bar ever higher to prevent technology exchange to satisfy its 73

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non-proliferation policies. No Democratic administration succeeded in finding a way out, but the Bush Administration has shown a revolutionary new way, even when India did not come to the Administration’s aid by providing troops for Iraq.63 These were precisely the issues on which India has been seeking cooperation from the United States for a long time. The present opportunity is most promising. There have been a few critical comments in the Indian media, but this criticism is short sighted, impractical and a bit foolish. India has been asking for cooperation specifically in these areas and when the US administration is ready and willing to come forth and deliver, to look this opportunity in the eye and reject it will make no sense. Of course it would have been ideal if these measures had absolutely no restrictions, or if it had simultaneously recognized India’s nuclear status. Regrettably these are not realistic short term possibilities and will have to await a further dramatic improvement in Indo-US relations. The point is that, even as it stands, there are very significant advantages for both nations. India in particular will benefit in critical areas of high technology for its conventional military and energy requirements and at no cost in practical terms. For the United States it will be a clear demonstration of its commitment to India. US high technology firms will be allowed to develop synergy with India and its arms industry will be unshackled from sales to one of the largest arms markets in the world.

Challenges ahead India–US strategic relations are indeed poised at a historic plateau. Recent engagement in strategic issues has demonstrated diversity and breadth, closeness and commonality of purpose. It is also imbued with mutual respect. Both defense forces have conclusively proved their competence and earned the respect of the other. The Bush administration has demonstrated its willingness to engage India on its own terms and independent of other concerns. Yet, there are still challenges to overcome. The relationship will need to be nurtured with care over some more years before it matures. Let us identify possible critical areas ahead. Indian internal politics It can be argued that the Congress party has never been an automatic supporter of the West and had always had a socialist tendency built into its party ideology. This historic tendency persists even as its economic policies are entirely pragmatic. The present Congress government in Delhi is heavily dependent on left party support and under some pressure from their demands. It may also be argued that the Party had not fully imbibed the consequences of globalization that the BJP was forced to negotiate over the years. Yet, there is clearly no chance of moving away from the policies set out by the previous government, particularly in foreign affairs, where there has indeed been continuity. But, will we observe fresh initiatives or new support? Some questions will linger and time will only tell the depth of Congress government support to the process. Quite clearly an immediate 74

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challenge for India is to develop a bipartisan consensus and also evolve policies based on its own perception of national interests. The visit to the United States by Manmohan Singh in July 2005 is likely to provide some answers. New geo-strategic realities While the Cold War is over and the Soviet Union is gone, dissonances over foreign policy between India and the United States have not entirely dissipated. An immediate issue concerns Indian relations with Iran. While the United States would prefer India not to have any connection with Teheran, for New Delhi it is not only a close neighbor but also a major source of its energy requirements. Iran is a vital part of India’s West Asia policy and an entry point to Central Asia. Merely a dialogue between India and the United States on meeting India’s energy needs will hardly be sufficient counter poise. India–China–US trilateral relationships India–China–US trilateral relationships will be a key determinant affecting bilateral relationships as well. It will remain a major challenge for all three countries to ensure that the triangle remains equilateral with politics, economics and security concerns balancing each other. How will this actually manifest as concrete policy? Each component must be addressed and China is deeply intermingled with both nations through trade and commerce. All have a vital stake in maintaining a balance in this relationship. Pakistan Today the United States treats Pakistan and India as separate actors important to it for different reasons. This is to be encouraged. There is no pressure on either side over non-proliferation or Kashmir, except for both to develop a cooperative framework. It appears that there is a vested interest among all parties that IndiaPakistan relations improve. Will this continue and be sustained leading to genuine and substantive cooperation? If it were to be so a major irritant in Indo-US relations will be set aside. Lack of an arms supply relationship Realistically, a true strategic relationship cannot develop in a state of limited arms and technology trade. Once again, this is an area where we see change. The US offer to sell F-16 and F-18 combat aircraft and the advanced Patriot air defense systems seem to open up this possibility. Nevertheless, it will need to match India’s expectations of reliability of supply, availability of the latest weaponry packages, technology transfer, reasonable cost and permission to manufacture in country. Overall there is always a political angle over all large weapon purchase agreements. The next few years will probably show where we are heading. 75

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Non-proliferation agenda A big challenge will be to accommodate India’s genuine need for strategic security through nuclear arms and the non-proliferation agenda. While the NSSP’s evasion of the issue is to be welcomed as a possible way out for improved technology cooperation, a permanent resolution of this issue is desirable. It is equally in US interests to ensure that India remains a player in sustaining non-proliferation regimes rather than be kept outside them. India’s role in the world The US has offered to help India develop as an emerging power in the twenty-first century. This will require sustained cooperation in a number of different areas. Perhaps nothing will demonstrate this more effectively than US support for India’s Permanent Membership to the Security Council. This is not a concession that India is seeking but is nevertheless a legitimate aspiration for a country with well over a billion people who have made a substantial contribution to international peace and security. It will also help generate political support within India toward the United States and its causes that will enable sustained cooperation in the global arena. On the other hand, if there is US opposition it will have the potential to do irreparable harm to bilateral relations.

Support to the US on the global war on terrorism A true strategic partnership will also call for substantive cooperation by India on issues of vital concern to the United States, specifically the fight against global terror, the Iraq situation, and dealing with issues of proliferation, particularly among possible “rogue” states. India should cooperate with the United States to try and find ways to address each of these areas. While none of these issues should prove insurmountable, India’s legitimate interests must be taken into account.

Conclusion India–US relations have been a true rollercoaster affair, adhering to the ups and downs of the international strategic environment and each country’s changing interests and concerns. The Cold War was a defining era as both countries interests were ostensibly incompatible. The United States was, of course, eminently successful. India can take pride in standing up to international pressures in a turbulent and often hostile era while remaining focused on state building. It is now ready to truly enter the world scene in the fullest sense of the term and both contribute to that process and benefit from it. Where are mutual relations headed? Right now India–US relations may be said to have hit a peak. One challenge may be to simply maintain the status quo. An even greater challenge will be to 76

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take it to a higher stage. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s first official visit to the subcontinent in March 2005 was a landmark event. It is likely to set the trend for relations between the two countries in the second term of the Bush administration. It should also pave the way for an official visit by the President of the US to India in early 2006; a time when much can be achieved. Two issues remain high on the agenda of Indian policymakers. First, New Delhi desires India’s accommodation in the nuclear club. In maintaining the credibility of the regime, and indeed to strengthen it further, India’s position needs to be recognized within it. This will not be easy to achieve as we are familiar with the non-proliferation treaty and its provisions. But, a treaty after all cannot be rigid and frozen forever. It must accommodate changing conditions and serve the best interests that it was originally intended to secure. Surely means can be found to get around the hurdles. The second issue is the larger question of the global order and India’s role in it. By all accounts, there is little doubt that India will become a major global player in the next 20–30 years. What sort of a role should India have? While it is clear what India wants to achieve, it is also important that the world allows the means for its achievement. This can be possible only when India’s role is recognized by accepting its membership of the United Nations Security Council as a permanent member. What should India contribute to the global processes that the United States holds dear and which serves India’s interests as well? As the most populous democracy and also as a member of the developing world, India has much to contribute to help bring democracy to the rest of the world. Its example and engagement in the global democracy movement should make a major impact. Finally, how can India constructively contribute to global peace and security. India can best do this by joining the United States in countering the forces of extremism and intolerance that manifests itself in mindless terrorist violence. India needs to partner with the United States in this global struggle, but more specifically in Asia. This is a challenge to which it must rise without delay.

Notes 1 Dennis Kux, India and the United States: Estranged Democracies (Washington, DC, National Defence University Press, Fort Lesley McNair, 1993). 2 Stephen P. Cohen, India: Emerging Power (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 269. 3 R.S. Khare, “Two Disengaged Cultures, Two Distant Democracies: Anthropolgical Notes on Indian and American Political Ethos,” in Ashok Kapur, Y.K. Malik, Harold A. Gould, Arthur Rubinoff eds, India and the United States in a Changing World (New Delhi, Sage Publications, 2002), pp. 245–96. 4 Kanti Bajpai and Amitabh Mattoo, Engaged Democracies: India US Relations in the 21st Century (New Delhi, Har-Anand Publications Pvt Ltd, 2000). 5 Sunanda K. Datta-Ray, Waiting for America: India and the US in the New Millennium (India, Harper Collins, 2002), p. 161, ascribes this statement to Lt General Sunit Francis Rodrigues, the then Vice Chief of the Army Staff in November 1990. Rodrigues would go on to be the next Chief of Army Staff. Subsequently, this phrase was used by other Indians, including Prime Minister Vajpayee in 1998.

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6 Among other definitions of this relationship are; Satu Limaye’s “unfriendly friends,” in Satu Limaye, US-India Relations—The pursuit of Accommodation (Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1993), p. 5. Harold A. Gould and Sumit Ganguly describes US-Indian Relations from Roosevelt to Reagan as “The Hope and the Reality” (Oxford & IBH Publishing Co Pvt Ltd, New Delhi, 1993). 7 Till recently this phrase would have failed to resonate in the US. Until the George W. Bush era, propagating democracy abroad was never a high political agenda in American policy. 8 George F. Kennan, The Long Telegram February 22, 1946 (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Vol. VI). 9 In a sense India’s experience was the reverse of Europe’s unification. The sheer magnitude of this task is seldom appreciated. India’s diversity; in language, ethnicity, religion or political order in 1947 was perhaps greater than Europe’s in each case. Yet, unlike Europe, Delhi began with unification and proceeded to consolidate it. Europe undertook unification in several deliberate stages spread over decades. 10 C. Raja Mohan in Crossing the Rubicon—The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy (New Delhi, Viking, 2003), p. xi. 11 In particular the United States suspected India of providing at least naval bases to the Soviet Union or at least dedicated facilities. The eastern naval base at Vishakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh, was the prime suspect. Throughout the Cold War the Indian Armed Forces links with the west, though limited overall, was always greater than with the Soviet Union. Connections with Commonwealth armed forces were particularly strong and lasted several years after independence. 12 Gary Hess, America Encounters India, 1941–1947 (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins, 1971), pp. 5–6. Calcutta was renamed as Kolkata, a more traditional Bengali name, in the 1990s. 13 Bajpai and Mattoo, Engaged Democracies, p. 159. 14 In 1975 serving in Arunachal Pradesh at 15,000 ft in the Himalayas, the author recovered the wreckage of one such Dakota aircraft, with the memorabilia of the US crew that perished with it. 15 This plant was decommissioned in 1949–50 by my father, recently returned from the United States with a MSc degree in Engineering with a minor in air conditioning and refrigeration. 16 Some of these airfields desultorily used till recently are likely to be revived now, sixty years later, to sustain increased civil air traffic in the region. 17 For an analysis of post-colonial policy in J&K from recently declassified British official documents, see C. Dasgupta, War and Diplomacy in Kashmir 1947 (New Delhi, Sage, 2002). 18 Kaul was highly connected politically, among the very few Indian military officers of that era. 19 Datta-Ray, Waiting for America, pp. 16–18. 20 Dinesh Kumar, “Defense in Indo-US Relations,” Strategic Analysis, Vol. 20, no. 5, August 1997, p. 751. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 Thimayya was to be later the Chief of the Indian Army prior to the Chinese invasion till 1961. On retirement from the army he would head the UN Forces at Cyprus. 24 Dennis Kux, Estranged Democracies, pp. 102–03. 25 Datta-Ray in Waiting for America, pp. 18–19, cites an earlier meeting in 1951 in Nuwara Eliya, Sri Lanka, where referring to Nehru’s “virulent and widespread anti-Westernism,” US diplomats in the region recommended arming Pakistan. 26 Dutta-Ray, Waiting for America, p. 348, refers to a story by Walter Lippman as to how Dulles wanted “some real fighting men” in the SEATO and according to him the Pakistani Army with its Gorkha soldiers were the best. When reminded that the

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27 28 29

30 31 32 33

34 35 36

37 38 39 40

41

42

Gorkhas were not in the Pakistan army, he said, “they may not be Pakistanis, but they are Muslims.” Gorkhas are Hindu soldiers from Nepal who have traditionally served in the Indian and British Armies since 1815. Kux, Estranged Democracies, pp. 105–15. Ibid, p. 110. There was a clause in the Treaty that the arms supplied were to be used only against the communist threat. But as was argued in India and proved right later, there were no effective ways that guns, tanks or aircraft would face only one direction. Field Marshal Ayub Khan’s military gamble in 1965 against India was possible entirely because of the military capability allowed by this relationship. The Indo-Soviet Arms deal predates both the 1962 aggression by China as well as the subsequent failure of a substantive arms relationship with the United States in the mid 1960s. Kux, Estranged Democracies, pp. 195–98. For a concise analysis on the impact of Goa operations on Indo-US relations, see Kux, Estranged Democracies, pp. 196–200. Krishna Menon, the Defense Minister, prevailed over Nehru and even prevented any defensive plans to be developed at all against China. He was entirely convinced that Beijing will never actually attack India. The possibility that it could perhaps be otherwise was not to be entertained at all in his Ministry. Kux, Estranged Democracies, pp. 201–08. This despite the fact that a Sino-Soviet split had actually come about as early as 1957 over Moscow’s denial of nuclear weapons technology to China. Kux, Estranged Democracies, pp. 201–17. This would remain a mystery and another failure of Indian defense decision making of that war. Apparently Chester Bowles advised Nehru against using the air force, warning him of China’s possible reprisals on Indian cities. Nehru listened to this advice and rejected the recommendations of his own air force officers. George K. Tanham and Mary Agmon, The Indian Air Force—Trends and Prospects (New Delhi, Vision Books, 1995), p. 45. Kux, Estranged Democracies, p. 17. Ibid, pp. 390–95. Ibid, p. 401. India too experienced its own version of the Vietnam syndrome during the 1960s to 1980s; “Yankee Go Home—but take me with you.” While senior political leaders and top bureaucrats ensured that they castigated the United States in their public speeches and policy recommendations, simultaneously they would seek for their kith and kin privileged entry to the United States. This was facilitated of course by changes in US immigration policies in 1965. Few who emigrated to the United States then returned to India. This started the first generation of Indian immigrants to the United States, which by the 1990s would make a major impact there. From 2002 Indians emerged at the top of the list in university admissions in the United States outnumbering the Chinese. India had missed the bus in the late 1970’s by which point socialist market economics had been thoroughly discredited around the world. Many socialist countries were giving up their ideological fixations, liberalizing their economies, and globalizing. China and Sri Lanka were probably the most prominent examples around India. New Delhi, however, experienced a turbulent domestic political phase with the imposition of Emergency by Indira Gandhi in 1975. No change in course would be possible at the time. Rajiv Gandhi attempted some economic reforms in the mid 1980s. But, comprehensive changes could only be introduced when a balance of payments crisis struck India in 1991. I was privileged to hear each on several occasions. Extremely articulate, urbane, and sophisticated their presentations relied on Indian history and mythology, pride in India and based on the fact that there was already an Indian middle class of two to three

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43 44

45 46

47

48

49 50 51

52 53 54

55

hundred million. The last was a bit of hogwash, but made excellent copy. Some investors from abroad succumbed, in the process losing some tens of millions of dollars of investments in India. The country was not yet open for business and had nothing “to sell.” Each of them also projected India as an emerging scientific, technological and military power, in a world which would inevitably be multi-polar. This pre dates reality by some decades, but was very appealing even then. This was also the period when Paul Kennedy’s book The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500–2000 (London, Harper Collins, 1990) projected a scenario of “an imperial over stretch” of US power and its early eclipse. An idea that had great appeal then in Asia. Dutta-Ray, Waiting for America, p. 161. Rodrigues had taken over as the Army Chief by then. He was aggressively nationalistic. His appeal lay in the fact he was the first senior military officer to venture in to policy outside the military and spoke with conviction and clarity. He is presently the Governor of Punjab since 2004. Ibid, pp. 181–82. Pune was about 120 kms east of Mumbai (Bombay), the airfield then was seldom used by civil aircraft. Some aircraft refuelled at Mumbai as well. This was discovered accidentally in 1991 by the media and the subsequent adverse publicity led to its discontinuation. Kux, Estranged Democracies, p. 440. The first round was not a success. It was led from India by Ambassador Shankar Bajpayee (Retired recently then from Washington, DC and formerly Ambassador also of China and Pakistan) and included senior strategic experts from India. The Institute of National Strategic Studies, of the National Defense University, Washington, DC treated it in a routine manner with lower level participation. I was fortunate to attend most of these meetings and helped organise those in India. In November 1990 the Academy was in its winter vacation and the conference was held in excellent ambience. On most occasions each side also arranged to record the discussions in the form of a book which ensured that the discussions had wider circulation. Jasjit Singh ed. Indo-US Relations in a Changing World—Proceedings of the Indo-US Strategic Symposium (New Delhi, Lancer Publishers Private Ltd, 1992), p. 438. The previous one was an air exercise in 1963 after the Chinese aggression. A small group of senior officials of both sides attended the meeting at the Maurya Sheraton Hotel in which I was present. Even as breakfast was actually partaken, a serious exchange of views took place. It was obvious that Secretary Perry had come determined to move the Indo-US strategic relations a few notches higher. Indians were happy to note the very positive note that he struck at the meeting. On September 1, that year I met Secretary Perry again at Honolulu, Hawaii on the 50th anniversary of the Victory over Japan Day, when defence ministers and military chiefs from all countries of the Asia–Pacific were present, but no body else from India. During a meeting with him he mentioned how satisfied he was with his January visit to India and its positive outcome. The official title of the document is Agreed Minute of Defence Relations of 1995. The Prime Minister, Shri Narasimha Rao then held charge of the defence portfolio. Dutta-Ray, Waiting for America, p. 247. “India, US and the World: Let Us Work Together to Solve the Political-Economic Y2K Problem,” Prime Minister Vajpayee’s speech at the Asia Society, New York, September 28, 1998, in Ministry of External Affairs, Foreign Relations of India: Select Statements, May 1998–March 2000 (New Delhi, Ministry of External Affairs, 2000) pp. 57–69. For three brief periods earlier, in 1977–80, 1989–91 and 1996–97, non-Congress governments were formed in the Centre, but these consisted of weak coalitions. The right wing Bharatiya Janata Party in 1998, even though still a minority, had a distinctly different policy orientation and sufficient numbers to directly shape policy.

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56 A comprehensive account of this change in India’s foreign policy is captured best by Mohan in Crossing the Rubicon. 57 Ibid, pp. 96–103. 58 Jasjit Singh ed. Indo-US Relations in a Changing World, p. 431. 59 For a very competent analysis of respective world views, see Steven Hoffman, “Indo-US Strategic Worldviews” in Ashok Kapur et al. eds, India and the United States in a Changing World, pp. 216–44. 60 Ashley Tellis, “Seeking Breakthroughs,” Force, October 2004, New Delhi, pp. 8–9. 61 Strobe Talbott, Engaging India—Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb (New Delhi, Viking, 2004). Strobe Talbott was the Deputy Secretary of State and Jaswant Singh was for most part the Foreign Minister. 62 It must be admitted, however, that Ambassador Blackwill with his close and personal observation of Kashmiri terrorism, was perhaps the sole voice arguing against this distinction. He made this point strongly during his many visits to the province of J&K and in other statements. 63 Ashley Tellis, “Lost Tango in Washington,” Times of India, November 15, 2004, New Delhi, p. 8.

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5 INDO-US DEFENSE AND MILITARY RELATIONS From “estrangement” to “strategic partnership” V.P. Malik

Introduction Indo-US bilateral relations have witnessed several highs and lows in the past five decades. Relations began on a good note when India became independent and both countries had certain sympathy for each other. But it did not translate into lasting good relations. Despite common interests and shared perspectives, bilateral relations remained rancorous for much of the Cold War period. The beginning of the twenty-first century has seen a remarkable turnabout. The end of the Cold War, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the opening of India’s economy, globalization, the revolution in information and communication technologies, India’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, the war on terror, and finally, the specter of a rising Asia in which India will play a major role, has set a new stage for the relationship to take off on a more robust note. Military relations cannot be separated from overall defense relations. This paper reflects on the strengths and fragilities of Indo-US defense and military relations over the past half century, and attempts to assess what the future course can be. The paper is in two parts. In the first part, the history of Indo-US defense and military relations from the Cold War period onwards is analyzed and assessed. As defense relations tend to be more sensitive to political and strategic environments than any other, this analysis and assessment is based on an overview of the major strategic shifts in Indo-US relations. The second part of the paper covers the scope and future prospects of security relationship. This has been projected on the basis of emerging Indo-US strategic relations in the post 9/11 environments, India’s strategic priority, its new military doctrine, and its equipment/technology requirements.

Part 1: historic analysis and assessment India and the United States have had and continue to have very different perceptions of the global order, determined in part by their position in the international 82

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system. During the Cold War, the pressure of strategic imperatives often widened the disjuncture between the hope and the reality resulting in rancorous Indo-US relations. The United States support to Pakistan on the Jammu and Kashmir dispute in the United Nations in 1948–49 and initiation of military support to Pakistan in 1954, cast an irrevocable shadow on the relationship. The United States wanted to enlist as many states as possible in its war against communism, often in a formal strategic relationship. India viewed the logic of American alliances as directly contravening its own interests. India was convinced that American military support had encouraged Pakistan to wage war against it in 1965. This happened again during Indo-Pak war in 1971, when the US gave warnings to India and sent the USS Enterprise of its 7th Fleet into the Bay of Bengal. The United States perceived India’s policy of non-alignment as sanctimonious and considered its neutrality far from neutral, citing examples of its silence over the Soviet invasion of Hungary and Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Modest beginnings in India–US defense ties The United States was the first one to give military aid to India after it became independent. It approved the sale of 200 Sherman tanks worth $19 million1, although it rejected another request for 200 fighter aircraft worth $150 mn and questioned the justification for making such defense expenditure when India was taking huge development aid from the US.2 Later, rebuffing Pakistan’s claim that any arms supply would alter the military balance in the region, the US Government supplied 54 C-119 Fairchild military transport aircraft to India.3 In a short reconciliation period after the Sino-Indian border war in 1962, the United States responded positively once again and gave more defense aid to India. This assistance came in the form of small arms, ammunition and communication systems for mountain warfare. Thereafter, the defense component in Indo-US relations remained minimal until the mid-1980s.4

Post-Cold War “cooperative engagement” The kicklighter proposals and military cooperation The end of the Cold War eased the pressure on the Indo-US relationship. After being on the backburner for years, Indo-US defense and military ties were given a fillip in 1991 after the visit to India by Lieutenant-General Claude M. Kicklighter, Commander-in-Chief, US Army Pacific Command. The Kicklighter proposals, as they came to be called, contributed in no small part to a major change in bilateral relations. These proposals included service-to-service exchanges and expansion of a defense cooperation framework. Executive Steering Groups (ESGs) were established in both countries to intensify military-to-military cooperation. An Army ESG was set up in January 1992, 83

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followed by formation of Navy and Air Force ESG in March 1992 and August 1993 respectively. The Army ESG was co-chaired by the Indian Vice Chief of Army Staff and the C-in-C of the USARPAC; the Navy by the Indian Deputy Chief of Naval Staff and the Commander of US Seventh Fleet; and the Air Force ESG headed by the Indian Vice Chief of Air Staff and the C-in-C of US Pacific Air Force. These initiatives became possible primarily because India’s strategic dependence on the Soviet Union was no longer possible and the United States stopped perceiving it to be a Soviet ally. The Kicklighter proposals also enabled the first ever Indo-US military-to-military level exercises, keeping in with US policy of “cooperative engagement” with militaries of friendly countries. In February 1992, Indian and US Army and Air Force paratroopers held their first joint training exercise codenamed Teak Iroquois. A second exercise followed in October 1993. The two Navies held the joint exercises Malabar-I in May 1992, Malabar-II in 1995, and Malabar-III in 1996.5 The first exercise was introductory and exploratory in nature. Malabar-II and Malabar-III were three-dimensional, involving maritime reconnaissance aircraft, surface ships and submarines. The US Navy used nuclear-powered submarines and the P-3C Orion maritime patrol and attack aircraft. A similar exercise, Balance Iroquois, was held between Indian Para Commandos and US Special Forces in June 1995 near Paonta Sahib in India. The second round was conducted in Madhya Pradesh in March/April, 1997. The Marine Special Forces also conducted joint exercises, named Flash Iroquois, in September 1994 and September 1996. Both sides openly remarked that these joint military exercises should continue on a regular basis.

Agreed Minutes of Defense Relations of 1995 In January 1995, the US Defense Secretary William Perry’s visit to India created another benchmark in Indo-US defense ties. Perry and Indian Minister of State for Defense, Mallikarjun, signed the Agreed Minutes of Defense Relations, an updated version of the 1984 MoU, aimed at strengthening as well as expanding defense cooperation to meet requirements of the new post-Cold War world. Under the Agreed Minutes, bilateral defense cooperation was envisaged at different levels: discussions at the ministerial level, a joint policy group of senior level officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Indian Ministry of Defense (MOD); defense research and production cooperation; and service-toservice level interactions. The OSD-MOD meetings included representatives from the Indian Ministry of External Affairs and the US State Department. The defense research and production issues were facilitated through a Joint Technical Group (JTG) In follow-up measures, it was agreed to set up the Defense Policy Group (DPG) as an inter-governmental body between the two ministries of defense to (a) review issues of joint concerns such as post-Cold war security planning and policy

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perspectives on both sides, (b) provide policy guidance to the joint technical group supporting cooperation in defense research and production, (c) resolve policy issues raised by the service-to-service steering groups, and (d) promote senior level civilian exchanges and joint seminars between the two sides on defense and security issues. In the meetings that followed, several strategic issues were identified by the two sides: stability of the West, Central and South West Asian states, oil security in the Gulf, future internal dynamics in China, South East Asia, the Indian Ocean area, and international terrorism.6 However, despite the signing of these Agreed Minutes, there were differences in the perceptions on the agreement between the two countries. Perry stressed the fact that sale of arms or transfer of technology or even joint technology development was not part of the Agreed Minute. There was simply an agreement to strengthen bilateral cooperation gradually, particularly in the field of defense research and production. Secondly, no arms/technology transfer would be done at the expense of Pakistan. Pakistan remained a significant factor in any US dealings with India. After signing of the Agreed Minutes, the US Central Command (CENTCOM), which structurally had not been included in the Indo-US military liaison, expressed interest in India’s high-altitude warfare expertise such as the operations in the Siachin Glacier, a sensitive war zone between India and Pakistan. It was politically inconceivable within India then to let CENTCOM officials, who dealt with Pakistan and not India, to visit Siachin Glacier and the Indian government rejected this proposal. There were other political level setbacks. The Indian government withdrew its earlier support to CTBT and ultimately rejected the Treaty in 1996.Despite these setbacks, military-to-military interactions as well as some arms transfers continued in the late 1990s. In 1996, US Army expressed interest in participating in Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) and High Altitude Warfare courses in India. Some US Army officers, for the first time, attended an LIC course in India. US Army officers also took part in the Junior Command Course at the College of Combat, the Engineer Commanders’ Course, and a Commandos Course. In 1995, the IAF and the USAF exchanged combat pilot instructors at their respective Air Force Academies, another first in Indo-US defense relations. The two armies began exchanging medical officers for short-term courses. In 1997, the United States sold some Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) for use by the Indian Air Force strike aircraft. The two Navies signed a Letter of Agreement (LOA) for Submarine Rescue Facility, upon which India made an initial payment of $500,000 to the United States in April 1997. Under the agreement, the Indian Navy used the US-made Chukkar Pilotless Target Aircraft (PTA).7 In the mid1990s, there was a gradual increase in International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds allocation; from $350,000 in 1996 to $400,000 in 1997 and $475,000 in 1998. The actual amount for 1998 was $725,000, with the United States having set aside $250,000 under the Extended Relations Program. It should

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also be noted that Pakistan, after the Pressler Amendment was invoked in 1990, was not a recipient of IMET funds.

India’s nuclear tests and US sanctions On May 11–13, 1998, India blasted its way out of nuclear ambiguity and caused a major setback to the US non-proliferation policies. The US reaction was immediate and severe. On May 13, 1998, President Clinton signed the Presidential Determination No. 98-22, a memorandum for the Secretary of State, in accordance with section 102 (b) (1) of the Arms Export Control Act, imposing economic sanctions on India. Section 102 of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended (Glenn Amendment8), prohibits a variety of assistance and commercial transactions between the United States and any other country if the President determines that the country (a non-nuclear weapon state), detonated a nuclear device.9 Under President’s written determination, the following were affected:10 ●

●

● ●

●

●

●

Termination of US assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961: food or other agricultural commodities except for humanitarian assistance; Termination of US government sales of defense articles, defense services, design and construction services, and licenses for exportation of US Munitions List items; Termination of foreign military financing under the Arms Export Control Act; Denial of any credit, credit guarantee, or other financial assistance by any department, agency, or instrumentality of the US government, excluding those related to humanitarian assistance or congressional oversight of intelligence activities; Opposition to the extension of any loan or financial or technical assistance by any international financial institution (IFI), in accordance with section 701 of the International Financial Institutions Act; Prohibition on any US bank from making loans or providing credit to the governments of India or Pakistan, excluding loans or credits to purchase food, or other agricultural commodities; Prohibition on exports of “specific goods and technology,” excluding food, agricultural commodities, or items related to congressional oversight of intelligence activities, in accordance with section 6 of the Export Administration Act of 1979, relating to foreign policy controls.11

Many of these sanctions were removed through Congress–Executive decisions between 1998–2000, as follows: ●

On July 14, 1998, the House of Representatives voted to lift some sanctions related to agricultural credits and on July 16, 1998 Congress passed “The India-Pakistan Relief Act of 1998,”12 sponsored by Senator Sam Brownback (also known as the Brownback I). Brownback I allowed the President to 86

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●

●

●

waive the application of sanctions provided in sections 101 and 102 of the Arms Export Control Act, with the exception of (B), (C), and (G) of section 102 pertaining to military assistance, arms sales, and sensitive technologies exports. On October 21, 1998, the Congress authorized removal of sanctions against India and Pakistan in the Brownback amendment to the FY99 Omnibus Appropriations Act (HR 4328).13 The bill gave President the authority to waive most of the sanctions and resume finance and other assistance programs up to one year. In November 1998, President Clinton, exercising his waiver authority vested under Brownback I, restored some non-military aid programs in India and lifted restrictions on the activities of US banks in India. Another amendment in October 1999 waived sanctions on environmental programs and other activities. But it maintained sanctions on programs affected by (a) Prohibition of Foreign Assistance Act (FAA)-funded activities (b) Prohibition of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) (c) Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and (d) Prohibition of licenses for export of items on the US Munitions List, certain dual-use exports, and for certain end-users. The amendment also gave President the authority to prune the list of Indian entities placed under restriction.

India’s decision to test nuclear weapons in the interest of its national security and the United States reaction to this perceived nuclear proliferation caused a setback to Indo-US defense cooperation. The previous slate of cooperation was wiped clean. Once again, bilateral relations were marked by mistrust and lack of confidence between the two political establishments. Mutual mistrust, however, lasted only two years and cooperation was revived with much greater vigor thereafter.

The Democrats “strategy of engagement” Jaswant Singh-Strobe Talbott strategic dialogue Despite the imposition of sanctions, the United States decided to adopt a “strategy of engagement” rather than that of “isolation.”14 Several officials, including former US Ambassador to India Frank Wisner, stressed on the need to co-opt India despite India’s nuclear tests. He stated that the United States must learn to live with, as well as work with, a nuclear India. Having gone nuclear, there would be no ambiguity on India’s nuclear policy, and the related issues could now be dealt with in a direct manner. The “strategy of engagement” materialized in a bilateral strategic dialogue between US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Indian Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh in June 1998. By February 1999, around mid-way into the talks, the United States felt that it had achieved a fair degree of success, making India agree to sign the CTBT as well as be a party to the FMCT 87

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negotiations. Nevertheless, barriers still remained. The Indian government could not secure political support within the country to sign the CTBT; the opposition arguing that the CTBT was an unequal treaty and that the P-5 countries had not yet pledged a future date for universal disarmament. On the FMCT, the Indian position was close to the United States position. It would sign a treaty which leaves stocks of fissile material accumulated up to some specified date in the future. Such a position would allow India to use its stock to develop a minimum deterrent. After some discussions, Talbott gave up the idea of India and Pakistan “quantifying” what they considered as a minimum, credible nuclear deterrent. This apparently was one of the most important strategic objectives for the United States “Strategic Restraint Regime in South Asia.”15 The United States also felt satisfied with India’s excellent record on export controls. And finally, from the United States’ point of view, bilateral relations between India and Pakistan had improved after the Lahore Declaration in February 1999. This stance of US administration came through visibly during the Kargil war when it refused to buy any false arguments from Pakistan and instead put pressure on it to vacate the illegally occupied territory. The success achieved in the strategic dialogue culminated in President Clinton’s visit to India in March 2000. Fourteen rounds of dialogue, held between June 1998 and September 2000, helped India and the United States to develop a perspective on issues that were crucial to each other. In fact, for the first time, the United States was willing to listen to India and its security concerns, including the strategic reasons that compelled India to go nuclear and the issue of Sino-Pak nuclear and missile cooperation. The bilateral strategic dialogue was critical in advancing Indo-US relations beyond the ephemeral cooperation that characterized the previous five decades and marked the beginning of a gradual change in the basic paradigm of the relationship. The two sides seemed eager to find ways to accommodate each other’s concerns by acknowledging common strategic interests and principles. The United States appeared willing to move beyond the narrow agenda of nuclear nonproliferation, encompassing economic, strategic, and political interactions with South Asia.16 While the United States was not prepared to formally concede that India and Pakistan were nuclear weapons powers, there emerged a clear acknowledgment that a “roll back” of the nuclear programs was not feasible. Talbott tried to get a commitment from Jaswant Singh that India should agree to “make itself part of the solution” to the global issue of nuclear nonproliferation and become a party to CTBT. However, in his last meeting with Talbott, Jaswant Singh expressed his inability to convince the Indian government to sign the CTBT. By then, George Bush, who was leading in the 2000 presidential race, had already articulated his desire to revise nonproliferation regimes such as CTBT. The US National Security Strategy, 2000 staked out the path for future Indo-US cooperation. The document stated, “The United States has undertaken a transformation in its bilateral relationship with India based on a conviction that US interests require a strong relationship with India. We are the two largest democracies, 88

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committed to political freedom protected by representative government. India is moving toward greater economic freedom as well. We have a common interest in the free flow of commerce, including through the vital sea-lanes of the Indian Ocean. Finally, we share an interest in fighting terrorism and in creating a strategically stable Asia.” In November 2000, the author, as Army Chief and Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee of India, visited the Pentagon and the State Department in Washington DC and later attended the Chiefs of Defense Staff Conference in Hawaii, at the invitation of the United States. This visit enabled a fresh start for Indo-US military cooperation.

The republicans “strategic partnership” For India, the advent of the Bush administration in January 2001 was a positive event. The new administration was more than willing to advance the steps taken by the Clinton Administration in its second term. During the campaign, George Bush made pro-India statements; “Often overlooked in our strategic calculations is that great land that rests at the south of Eurasia. This coming century will see democratic India’s arrival as a force in the world. . . . we should establish more trade and investment with India as it opens to the world. And we should work with the Indian government, ensuring it is a force for stability in Asia.”17 Bush’s advisors also made clear their stand on China: to move away from Clinton’s “strategic partnership” to categorizing China as a “strategic competitor.” US National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, in an article in the Foreign Affairs, argued that India and the United States could join together in maintaining an Asian balance.18 Three months after the Bush administration took office, India’s Defense and Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh visited Washington where he met with Condoleezza Rice. During the visit, President Bush “accidentally” dropped in and spoke to Singh for more than half an hour on the situation in Asia and other issues. Singh also met with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and expressed keen interest in strengthening bilateral defense ties.

Post September 11 changes in US policies India’s swift response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and its unconditional support for the war on terrorism galvanized the change in Indo-US military relations. The US government removed all remaining sanctions on India and Pakistan under Presidential Directive No. 2001-28. On September 22, 2001, the President certified to Congress that the application to India and Pakistan of the sanctions and prohibitions contained in sub-paragraphs (B), (C), and (G) of section 102 (b) (2) of the Arms Export Control Act would not be in the national security interests of the United States. This did not cover sanctions imposed under the Atomic Energy Act, prohibiting US nuclear fuel and reactor transfers to India, which had not accepted IAEA inspections on all its 89

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nuclear facilities (full-scope safeguards).19 Also, the Entity List, which had contained about 150 firms, was trimmed down to 16 firms. A few months earlier, much to the surprise of the international community and India’s own strategic community, Jaswant Singh endorsed the National Missile Defense program unveiled by the Bush Administration in May 2001. Many political leaders and strategists felt that this was premature, as the government had not fully analyzed the strategic implications of this program, or the implications of the endorsement in its relations with China and other neighbors. When the United States launched the war against global terrorism, India was among the first few countries to offer assistance. During Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, the Indian Navy took up the important mission of escorting and protecting high value shipping through the Straits of Malacca. This contribution freed US Naval ships to focus on other global commitments and, by allowing transiting US Naval ships to use Indian ports for rest and refueling, India enabled logistical flexibility to US Navy to conduct its trans-oceanic operations. Allowing over-flight for US Air Force aircraft was another contribution by India that saved countless operational hours. All these steps led to the revival of the DPG and other military-to-military interactions and gave a new impetus to their military ties. The long debate on the signing of General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), which was proving to be a hurdle in some aspects of military cooperation, also came to an end. India and the United States signed GSOMIA in January 2002, essentially guaranteeing that they would protect any classified information/technology shared between them. Signing of GSOMIA gave India greater access to US military establishments and some dual-use technologies. It also paved the way for the sale of US weapons to India.20 Almost immediately, US government cleared export licenses for 20 weapon systems.21 India and the United States by February 2002, decided to revive the Malabar series of joint naval exercises that had been suspended after India conducted the Pokharan nuclear tests. The Naval ESG decided to intensify cooperation by including search and rescue exercises to help vessels in distress in the Indian Ocean, the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea. The ESG also agreed on sharing intelligence to fight terrorism. The official statement released at the end of the three-day talks stated that the two sides agreed to deepen their interactions and focus on three issues: ensuring the protection of sea-lanes; anti-piracy; and maritime security.22 The Army ESG also held meetings in New Delhi on widening the scope of the bilateral relations. These ESG meetings resulted in the immediate revival and increasing scope of joint military exercises to promote greater understanding and inter operability between the Services of the two nations. (See Annexure.) India signed in April 2002, an arms deal with the US enabling the sale of twelve Raytheon Systems AN/TPQ-37 (V) 3 Firefinder artillery-locating radar systems worth $146 mn.23 A subsequent sale included GE F404-GE-F2J3 engines and advanced avionics for India’s indigenous LCA project.24 Yet another major deal, still under negotiation, has been for the acquisition of P-3 Orion 90

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Naval reconnaissance planes. US officials describe the plan as a “3C-plus”-plan, meaning that the version of the plane to be sold to India would be equipped with the latest avionics, sensors, and computerized command, control, and weapons systems. India also showed interest in buying $29 mn worth of equipment for its Special Forces to enhance their counterterrorism capabilities.25 The progress of joint military training and other programs gave impetus to further defense cooperation. In November 2002, a High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG) was established with two primary objectives: first, the facilitating and promotion of high-technology trade on a whole range of categories including information technology, biotechnology, nano technology, and defense technology; and second, confidence building measures for additional strategic trade. This second component of the HTCG works to increase trade between India and the United States in sophisticated goods and technology, while continuing to pursue issues such as WMD proliferation.26

Non-participation of Indian defense forces in Iraq After the US and the coalition forces, in 2003, attacked and captured Iraq, there were expectations in US circles that India would contribute to coalition forces in Iraq. When India declined to send troops to Iraq, due to lack of political consensus within the country and for other reasons, there was considerable disappointment in the United States. Despite the disappointment, the Bush administration was understanding and appreciative of India’s domestic constraints and there were no ostensible adverse impacts on Indo-US defense ties. Nevertheless, the disjuncture demonstrated that India’s domestic political constraints might produce outcomes that run counter to US expectations. Without adequate understanding of such political factors in the two nations, there will always be a danger of a derailment of defense ties.

Next Steps in Strategic Partnership and other high technology issues Another important development in Indo-US defense relations took place in January, 2004 with the announcement of the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP).27 The NSSP emerged as a consequence of a November, 2001 meeting in which both parties agreed to cooperate with respect to civilian nuclear and space technology. The NSSP initiative included, expanded engagement on nuclear regulatory and safety issues, missile defense, cooperation in peaceful uses of space technology, and steps to create an appropriate environment for successful high technology commerce.28 Further, the initiative sought to improve cooperation on the “triad” issues of civilian space technology, dual-use high technology trade, and dialogue on missile defense.29 As a consequence of its focus on high-technology trade, the NSSP has commercial as well as political impacts. Significantly, the suspension of certain 91

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regulations pertaining to international technology control regimes and arm control measures, critical given India’s status as a nuclear state, enables high technology transfers beneficial to both countries’ economies. More importantly, technology transfers must conform to US laws.30 Politically, the initiative is constrained by the understanding that any technology transfer must not fundamentally change the balance of power between India and Pakistan.31 Efforts to combat proliferation of WMDs, perhaps the most substantial concern related to the NSSP, are to be undertaken by strengthening related laws, regulations and procedures, through the enforcement of stricter export controls, and by measures to increase bilateral/ multilateral cooperation. India and the United States, on September 17, 2004, signed a High Technology Trade Agreement. This agreement marked the conclusion of Phase 1 of the implementation of the NSSP.32 The agreement implies only cosmetic changes to the technology transfer policies of the United States and requires India to take strong “measures to address proliferation concerns and also to ensure compliance with US export controls.”33 The guiding principles of the initial phase require that such a strategic partnership will be consistent with US domestic laws and national and foreign policy objectives, including observance of international laws.34 Essentially, the High Technology Trade Agreement implies “presumption of approval” for dual-use items that are not controlled for proliferation reasons.35 In September 2004, President Bush and India’s new Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh welcomed the agreement, which also entailed removal of the Headquarters of Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) from the Entity List.36 Along with the lifting of controls, the Agreement would ease export-licensing policies and thus widen the scope of bilateral ties.37 The ISRO buys high-technology goods worth $25 mn from US companies each year, thus making the initiative particularly popular with US businesses.38 The joint declaration by President Bush and Prime Minister Singh made it clear that there was to be no change in the further development of Indo-US defense relations. However, the NSSP has not been without its critics, those who had high expectations about Indo-US cooperation saw the agreement as a glass half-full. While the agreement provided a framework for dialogue, it did not remove several significant restrictions on Indo-US high technology cooperation. Critics pointed out that India was still on a list of sensitive countries facing technology export restrictions. In this respect, it had not even been accorded the status of China. So far, the NSSP falls short of achieving what India wants: formal admission to the nuclear club. Those who saw the NSSP as marking a qualitative shift in Indo-US relations pointed out that India was the only nuclear power outside of the formal system of US alliances that had been brought under an NSSP-style framework. It allowed the United States to engage India without openly accepting its status as a fullfledged nuclear power and it had allowed India to chip away at restrictions and sanctions. Talks on Phase-II of the NSSP were held on October 21, 2004 when the US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, Christina Rocca, visited India. 92

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India reported “substantial progress” in four areas: biotechnology, nano technology, advanced information technology, and defense technology.39 The second meeting of the India-US Cyber Security Forum was held in Washington, DC in November 2004 where the two sides agreed to collaborate in combating cyber-crime, enhancing cyber security research and development, improving information assurance and defense cooperation, standards and software assurance, and cyber incident management and response.40 On the agenda of hi-tech trade, Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran and US Under Secretary of Commerce Kenneth Juster also met in November 2004, to discuss “practical steps” to remove barriers in hi-tech trade.41 The US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s visit to India in December 2004 evoked mixed reactions. India made some progress in its negotiations for the procurement of a deep-sea submergence rescue vessel (DSRV) to retrieve distressed submarines42 and discussed purchase of Patriot missiles. India expressed interest in acquiring the advanced PAC-3 version of the Patriot missile system, although the United States seemed willing to give the older PAC-1 version.43 India also articulated its deep concern over the proposed sale of F-16 fighter aircraft and P3-Orion maritime reconnaissance planes to Pakistan. Indian officials made it clear that this sale could have adverse impacts on positive sentiments and goodwill for the United States in India. Rumsfeld stated that he understood Indian concerns but that the United States did not see relations with India and Pakistan as a zero-sum game.44

Tsunami disaster management On December 26, 2004, in the wake of the tsunami disaster and the subsequent humanitarian catastrophe, India and the United States geared up for an unprecedented military cooperation in the Indian Ocean.45 Indian and US Armed Forces, along with those of Japan and Australia, responded quickly by unveiling a multilateral disaster management effort. This effort, although cancelled soon after, showed that Indo-US military relations had matured to a level where the two countries’ might no longer be constrained by bureaucratic formalities, thereby allowing rapid decision-making on issues of critical mutual importance. Among the strategic implications of disaster management efforts in the tsunami-affected areas were: ●

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India’s refusal of aid from abroad reflected its self-confidence and power. Its swift action showed that India was a strong, independent global player. Its offers of help improved it’s standing with neighbors, and also re-established its image as a regional leader. It served to reaffirm India’s “Look East” policy and strengthen its ties with Southeast Asia. For the first time, Indian and US forces coordinated humanitarian work in the Indian Ocean region. Growing military-to-military contacts between the two countries over the past several years—a centerpiece of new Indo-US relationship—made it possible for the two states to play a leading and coordinated role in relief. 93

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Indo-US cooperation during the period also showed that latent suspicions of American initiatives in the region, that until recently preoccupied India’s foreign policy, is declining rapidly. About 40,000 military personnel from more than a dozen nations participated in aid operations around the Indian Ocean. Close working relationships among the armed forces of a number of countries during relief work opened further possibilities of cooperative security in the region.

Defense and military relations are always sensitive to political and strategic shifts. Major changes in US perceptions on India have come about with the United States recognition of India’s importance in the region as well as in the international scene. Although the Clinton administration took bold steps in changing the nature and scope of Indo-US relations, particularly by moving away from the traditional nonproliferation prism to include economic, political, and strategic interests, it was the Bush administration that made it a reality. The Bush administration, in addition to putting some pressure on Pakistan to stop terrorism across the LoC, took positive steps in removing sanctions and renewed military ties with India. Nevertheless, despite limited arms and technology transfers from the United States, it is important to note that transfers did not take place easily with India, in sharp contrast to the United States experience with Pakistan. There were persistent internal wranglings between various agencies—Departments of Defense, Commerce, State, Energy, and the National Security Agency, as well as defense industries. DoD officials often maintained that the State Department still had a Cold War framework in its policies toward South Asia. State Department officials often argued that any arms transfers to India, in particular missile defense systems, would adversely impact the military balance of the region, in addition to a possible breach of the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).46 Although there has been a general agreement about the need to engage India in a focused manner, an understanding among various American agencies as to how to best achieve this goal appears to be lacking. Hence, bureaucratic initiative and allocation of funds remains a problem. A 2003 Pentagon Report, “Indo-US Military Relationship: Expectations and Perceptions47,” highlights some of these issues. First, the report makes plain the “persistent/deep-seated distrust” that exists in bilateral relations despite regular joint naval exercises and training, intelligence cooperation on terrorism and narcotics.48 Further, the report added that the two sides did not understand and appreciate each other’s way of functioning.49 The report noted that “no common vision or programmatic guidelines inform the way different US military organizations identify priorities or build engagement plans with India, leading to confusion, inconsistency, and occasionally, contradictions among those DoD elements entrusted with building a military-military relationship.”50 The Indian complaint has generally been that the United States is not a reliable partner on account of its strategic ties with Pakistan and lacks long-term strategic commitments or assurances to India. In regard to India’s reservations about buying weapons from the United States due the fear of future sanctions,

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Former US Ambassador Robert Blackwill admitted that the US could not ensure an “uninterrupted supply of spare parts and customer support for defense equipment over 30 years, as that would necessitate constitutional changes.”51 The Indian Government feels that the Indo-US defense ties lack adequate trust. Addressing a conference at the Aero-India 2005 Show, India’s Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee said that India is keen on US equipment and on “diversifying” its equipment suppliers, but US laws leave buyers of American equipment sanctions-prone. India is to be reasonably assured its defense equipment won’t be affected by “sanctions.” He further stated, “Defense cooperation is a long term thing. Dependability of source of supply is critical.”52 Ultimately, Indo-US defense relations remain affected by the following dynamics: ●

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Different perceptions of the world order, determined in part by respective national position in the international system. India recognizes US pre-eminence in the global strategic architecture but also recognizes the pressing need for developing a cooperative multi-polar world order. Fears of US indifference to Pakistan, China and other South Asia-related security concerns of India. There is a continuing apprehension in New Delhi about the persistent issue of Indo-Pak hyphenation and the perception that the United States is strategically closer to Pakistan, than it is to India. Also, the United States tends to ignore Chinese security challenges to India and the uncomfortably close nature of Sino-Pak strategic relations. The United States’ nuclear nonproliferation objectives, to which it remains extremely sensitive. There is considerable scope for convergence and mutual cooperation in this field provided the United States accepts the reality of India as a nuclear nation. Indian apprehension of the United States’ tendency to apply its extensive and complex Congressional laws and international obligations regimes to deny or stop military assistance. India’s reservations on buying weapons, defense equipment and technology from the United States due the fears of future sanctions and lack of assurance of uninterrupted supply of spare parts and customer support. Continuing misperceptions and lack of confidence in the mind of bureaucrats in the United States and political leaders in India. Formal strategic partnership with the United States comes at a price: either direct military presence or a strategic incorporation of the country into the United States’ objectives.

Part 2: scope and future prospects New cooperative security environment Since the end of the cold war, the global and regional strategic environment has seen significant paradigm changes in the concept of security and use of

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military power. There are three main reasons for these changes. First, there have been rapid advances made in science and technology, particularly in the field of information technology. Second, globalization, multilateralism, and regionalism are replacing bilateral international relations and a straitjacketed concept of sovereignty. Third, in an expanded conception of security, there is now a greater focus on peace, development and cooperative security. Security challenges now include not only the traditional defense-related threats, but also the societal, political, economic, technological, and environmental dimensions. Of course, these changes are being understood better, and more easily, by liberal and stable democratic nations than nations ruled or dominated by the military, or quasi-democratic countries. Ever since US military action in Iraq, the debate on uni-lateralism versus multi-lateralism has also intensified. There is increasing realization in the world, including in the United States, that there is no alternative to multi-lateralism to prevent conflicts or for conflict resolution. The liberalists’ concept of cooperative security has gathered momentum. This concept is founded on two arguments. First, new security challenges are diverse and multi-dimensional, such as terrorism, economic under-development, security of resources such as energy and water, illegal migrations, human rights abuses, piracy, drug trafficking and gun running, and environmental degradation. Second, the management of these issues cannot rely on unilateral or even bi-lateral measures but requires multi-lateral conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace enforcement efforts. In this changed strategic environment, initiatives for cooperative security have to be taken by more powerful, stable and influential nations, particularly those having similar ideals and values. This is where the United States and Indian militaries have a tremendous potential for cooperation, at the regional and global levels. They would need to be prepared for this elongated spectrum of conflict and security. They would require greater versatility, flexibility and inter-operability, and the ability to synergize with other institutions in the enlarged security matrix. Such a partnership would seek to advance joint interests in a stable, democratic and prosperous world free from terrorism and the threats of weapons of mass destruction, gunrunning, drugs and human trafficking, while maintaining a balance of power in the region and the world.

A new framework for expanding the Indo-US defense relationship On June 29, 2005, when the Indian Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee visited the United States, he signed a new framework for expanding the Indo-US defense relationship for the next 10 years (details of the framework are given in the Annexure). This replaced the Agreed Minutes of Defense Relations of January 1995, signed by then US Defense Secretary William Perry and Indian Minister of State for Defense Mallikarjun. The new framework is the first post-Pokharan II agreement on defense between India and the US and charts a new course in defense ties based on shared political objectives. It seeks to remove mutual suspicion that has dominated Indo-US relations in the past and replaces it with an active agenda for 96

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military cooperation. It sheds the cautious Cold War mindset towards bold initiatives in order to address current political realities and threats and heralds a new era in Indo-US defense relations. The new relationship is expected to be an element of the broader India-US strategic partnership. It needs to be noted, however, that on his return, Pranab Mukherjee faced considerable flak from the Left parties in India, which are supporting the United Progressive Alliance Government and have worked out a common minimum program with it. In view of their protest we may expect to see an initially slow implementation of this new framework.

India’s strategic priority and transformed Indo-US relations India’s major strategic priority has been and shall continue to be the socio economic development of its billion people. Its democratic system must address the domestic agenda first and fulfill its peoples’ immediate needs and aspirations. The central goal in relations with other countries is to address potential adversarial relations through political and diplomatic efforts and to rely on cooperative engagement as the primary instrument of strategy. However, that does not mean that India will compromise on its national interests, political autonomy, or territorial integrity. In that context, it will not ignore the military capabilities of its neighbors, especially those with whom there are persisting disputes. Historically, Indian strategic culture does not accept armed conflict readily. In dealing with any potential conflict situation, it tends to follow a restrained, consensual approach, both at domestic and international levels. Being a true democracy like the United States, such domestic consensus is essential. Thus, the primary effort rests on trying to shape the security environment toward cooperative peace rather than plan on the basis of inevitable armed conflict. And yet, having suffered colonialism for centuries, there is an undeniable sensitivity and abhorrence for any possible foreign intervention in its national affairs. So far as Indo-US relations are concerned, it must be understood that there are left-wing and right-wing members of India’s Parliament who are highly suspicious of US intentions and economic globalization. As Ashley Tellis has rightly stated “India and the United States have large populations with diverse ideologies and interests—and the means to express them politically. Both are also large and proud nations that cherish their strategic autonomy, which includes the right to choose both the friends one keeps and the policies one follows.”53 The paradoxical view of the United States in India is not only a consequence of the changes in bilateral relations over the past five decades but also of continued suspicions of American policies toward Pakistan and its perceived behavior in international politics. Washington’s decision to declare Pakistan a major non-NATO ally within weeks of the confirmation of news reports that Pakistan’s scientists had leaked nuclear technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea is perceived as emblematic of myopic US short-term interests. Similarly, there is a widespread feeling that Washington is not sufficiently sensitive to Indian security 97

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concerns or its aspirations of being a great power. Despite such apprehensions, there is support to engage the United States in a strong, meaningful, and pragmatic partnership. The belief that there exists a long-term strategic convergence between the two countries is widespread. US support for India’s position during the 1999 Kargil conflict, and the hugely successful visit of President Clinton in 2000, dramatically increased the appeal of the United States, even within traditionally anti-American sections of Indian society. As a result, despite several strategic differences, Cold War estrangement has changed to engagement, even in the area of defense relations, a once-taboo subject. Despite several non-trivial issues, India’s relationship with the United States in 2005 appears to be more secure than it has ever been in the last 50 years. As the 2004 Chairman’s Report of an Independent Task Force on South Asia (sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Asia Society), points out: Democratic India, with its political stability and a decade of steady economic advance, has the potential for a long-term political and security partnership and substantially expanded trade and economic relations with the United States. Unlike during the Cold War years, Indian and US interests broadly coincide. The medium-term political challenge is to complete the transition from past estrangement through constructive engagement on to a genuine partnership.

New US initiative on Indo-US relations It now appears that such a major policy decision has been made by the United States. This is reflected in the latest March 2005 strategic initiatives of the Bush administration toward India. First, the Bush administration is positively disposed toward supplying India with advanced military equipment, including allowing Lockheed Martin and Boeing to sell F-16s and F-18s and to consider co-production of these platforms in India. The Administration has also indicated that it will support Indian requests for other transformative systems in areas such as command and control, early warning, and missile defense. Second, it has promised high-level strategic dialogue on India’s energy security issues, including nuclear safety cooperation and ways of integrating India into the global nuclear regime for access to safeguarded nuclear fuel and advanced nuclear reactors, high technology trade, future defense cooperation, spacerelated collaboration, as well as, regional issues pertaining to security in and around South Asia. The existing economic dialogue will aim at increasing US–Indian trade and creating new constituencies in the United States having a stake in India’s growing power and prosperity. As per Ashley Tellis, “Washington (now) has clearly placed its biggest bets on New Delhi, expecting that transformed bilateral relations would aid India in a manner that would ultimately advance America’s own global interests with respect to defeating terrorism, arresting further proliferation, and preserving a stable balance of power in Asia over the long term.”54

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However, as Ashley Tellis also accepts, a great deal will depend on how and when this initiative is translated into concrete US policy changes. In the recent past, many people have suggested greater prospects of Indo-US strategic cooperation in the context of a “rising China.” This aspect requires strategic clarity, at least the Indian point of view. Indeed, it is China that is identified by many in India as the most likely source of insecurity and the potential threat to Indian interests in the long-term future. The principle strategic rationale for the construction of a credible and effective Indian nuclear weapon posture is to provide a hedge in the event of a belligerent China in an uncertain anarchic world. None take the idea of India-China collusion against the United States, nor is there any support for an Indian role in any US-led containment of China. Many, however, believe that the United States would slowly begin to rely on India as a key balancer in Asia. For India, keeping in view its socio economic strategic priority, an environment of peace is a pre-condition to pursue human development at an ever-increasing pace. India’s interests, therefore, require a cooperative relationship with China. Keeping in view its past experience and in preparation for any possible reversal in the relationship, Indian policy is to accord high priority to cooperative relations and maintain peace and tranquility on the borders in accordance with bilateral agreements. At the same time, India will take prudent precautions for any possible reversal in the temper of relations. The policy is guided by the principle of “cooperate and insure.” Keeping in mind the differences in national and strategic interests for the foreseeable future, Indo-US defense and military relations will at best remain a strategic partnership—not alliance—wherever there is a convergence of views and substantial domestic consensus in both countries. The phrase “natural allies” obviously refers to the fundamental principles of the United States and India: large and functioning democracies committed to political and economic freedom. We cannot expect this “natural” partnership to be open ended, or capable of rising to the level of a defense alliance of the kind that USA has with many countries in Europe, Asia, and Africa, or with Australia. Such high expectations can only cause disappointment, as evidenced by tensions over the United States presence in Iraq. According to Ashley Tellis, Given its size, history, and ambitions, India will always march to the beat of its own drummer . . . a strong and independent India represents a strategic asset, even when it remains only a partner and not a formal ally. . . . Consequently, transformed ties that enhance the prospect for consistent “strategic coordination” between Washington and New Delhi serve U.S. interests just as well as any recognized alliance. . . . (This) quest for strategic independence, even as both seek closer bilateral ties, could delay, divert, and at times dash the best plans laid out by foreign policy strategists.55

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The Indian military doctrine The Indian military doctrine takes into account prevailing strategic realities, envisaged future threats and challenges, its government’s defense policy, and its considerable past experience. The doctrine aims at preparation for a full spectrum of conflict ranging from a conventional war with or without involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD), sub-conventional war, and non-combat operations. The conventional war scenario includes full scale to limited war scenarios, of which the latter is considered more likely. The sub-conventional war scenario, where India’s military has considerable experience, includes border skirmishes, proxy war, counter terrorism, insurgencies, and irregular war. Non-combat operations include aid to civil authorities for maintenance of law and order, disaster relief, humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations. Compared to US military, Indian military has much less experience in warfare with high technology equipment and weapon systems. But it has invaluable operational experience in all types of terrain, dealing with sub-conventional wars, conflict in ethnically diverse environments, and in peacekeeping in different parts of the world.

Scope for future military relations Rapid developments in Indo-US military-to-military relations have been the most visible aspect of the transformed bilateral relationship since 2000. This is evident from the growing frequency and scope of bilateral exercises, seminars, personnel exchanges, high level and unit visits, officer and unit exchanges, as well as discussions on military technology sales and cooperation. As noted already, both countries have now come to agree that a robust US–India defense relationship can play an important role in contributing to peace and stability in Southern Asia. The United States objective in giving this relationship a new focus was made clear when Admiral Dennis Blair (former Commander of US Pacific Command, with whom the author worked closely on this subject in 1999–2000) declared, “We believe that a robust US–India defense relationship, of a kind that is unprecedented in our bilateral history, can play an important part in contributing to peace, security, and freedom in Asia. We will develop our relationship with India on the basis of India’s emergence as a rising global power.” The scope of the relationship has now moved far beyond the Agreed Minutes of Defense Relations of 1995. The two militaries have started working together, forging links in different aspects of military operations and doctrine. The objective is simple: greater understanding of each other’s systems and methodologies will make it easier for them to work together when the need arises. Apart from professional development of personnel, the joint operations help mutual understanding of doctrines, which in the long term enables both militaries to work together for common strategic goals. There has been a substantial increase in the IMET programs too. The budget for this program was increased to $1 million in 2002, allowing thirty-seven Indian 100

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officers to attend training courses at military facilities in the United States. In 2004, the budget was increased to $1.2 million. During this period, military officers from both countries participated in over fifty-eight military related conferences. All defense services are engaging in an ever-broadening array of military exercises, many of which have increasing joint inter-service aspects. The new initiative, if and when implemented, will further increase the scope and engagement of military exchanges and exercises. It would require substantial increases in the IMET programs and regular exchanges of information between military schools in both countries on military doctrines, operating procedures and rules of engagement. It may then be useful to have agreements/protocols to publish and disseminate such information to trainees in both countries. The key to any joint military missions in the future will be inter-operability. Ongoing Indo-US military cooperation must aim at developing the ability to operate jointly under the UN Charter as well as to jointly combat terrorism. To achieve this, various training events should focus on aspects of inter-operability including (a) Communications, (b) Concepts and doctrine including peace-enforcement and peacekeeping, (c) Command and control structure, (d) Logistics/transportation capability including integration of airlift capability, and (e) Intelligence sharing. For the purpose of better understanding of each other’s doctrines, concepts, rules of engagement in different contingencies, and general inter-operability, it is desirable that both countries exchange military instructors in some of their important military institutions. By 2010, the level of joint exercises should be progressively enhanced to brigade level. Currently, Indo-US military commanders and unit cooperation is restricted to US Pacific Command (PACOM). As India’s strategic interests are not restricted to the Asia Pacific but also extend to areas in West and Central Asia, there is a need for military-to-military interaction and joint training events to include US Central Command (CENTCOM). In addition, interaction with the Pentagon needs to be institutionalized. As a hopeful portent of future cooperation, a Brigadier General from the Pentagon attended the last ESG meeting. Many in the Indian military community hope that this will become a permanent feature of bilateral military relations. Looking at the future strategic environment, one might argue that a stage has now reached where the United States should give consultative access to the Indian military, not only to PACOM, but also to CENTCOM. It should also be possible to post a number of military instructors at each other’s training establishments, including the Staff Colleges.

Military sales and technology As noted by the recent US offer to manufacture and sell F-16 and F-18 fighter aircraft in India, there are growing signs that US military sales to India will increase in the future. Significantly, US officials have been favorably disposed to the sale of P3-C Orion maritime reconnaissance aircraft. These aircraft are likely 101

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to be equipped with features like integrated tactical picture consoles, and real-time image transfer systems with network-centric warfare (NCW) capabilities.56 Some of the deals under negotiation on the FMS route are: ●

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Upgrade kits for the Indian Navy’s submarines, which will include new combat management systems (CMS) and EW suites. These are to replace the existing systems, all of which were sourced from the United States in early 1980s. Procurement of light transportable radars (LTRs) for the IAF. The first few LTRs would be imported off-the-shelf. The state-owned Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL), under a transfer of technology (ToT) agreement, would assemble the remaining units. Procurement of three B-737 “Head of State” aircraft for the VIP Transport Squadron of the IAF. Each aircraft would include advance warning and security systems. Joint venture to develop GPS-guided 120 mm mortar and 155 mm field artillery and 76 mm and 100 mm naval artillery ammunition.57

Some projects under medium-term consideration by India and the United States are: ●

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Procurement of turbofans to power the Air Force and Naval variants of the “Tejas” Light Combat Aircraft. A joint R&D effort between US Defense Department and India’s Defense Research & Development Organisation (DRDO) to develop and deploy NCW-based battle management systems for Brigade-level integrated land combat formations.58 Procurement of ship-borne multi-purpose helicopters to replace the Navy’s existing Sea King machines.

There are a few long-term projects that are being explored to expand Indo-US defense cooperation. These include: ●

●

Joint development between India’s ISRO and the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) for the next generation National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS).59 Co-development of a two-tonnes ocean reconnaissance satellite equipped with a synthetic aperture radar, and its ground-based data processing stations by ISRO and Boeing Aerospace and Defense to monitor naval movements in the Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal. The same team could develop and deploy a cluster of navigation satellites in geo-stationary orbits, which will provide differential GPS guidance within a South Asian footprint for civil and military customers in the sub-continent. Co-development of a limited missile defense (LMD) system by the DRDO and a group of US companies. The proposed LMD system for India would provide a four-stage, instead of the normal two-stage, anti-ballistic missile shield.60 102

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In the foreseeable future, Indo-US defense collaboration will necessarily be restricted to select items that are more sophisticated than what Russia offers. In those items, the United States and India would need to forge ahead in joint research, design and development, and manufacture of weapon systems. It would be in the national interest of both countries to waive regulations, as early as possible, that stand in the way of greater high-tech cooperation.

Conclusion India and the United States have witnessed significant improvements in the quality of bilateral relations following the Cold War. These improvements are based on current geopolitical realities and a growing appreciation in both states for the convergence of key strategic interests. New Delhi needs US assistance in to achieve the political, economic, technological, and security goals necessary for achieving global power status. India’s growing geopolitical importance, the role it can play in counterterrorism and counter-proliferation activities, its potential strategic utility, and its importance for global energy stability and environmental protection is increasingly recognized by US policymakers. Washington appears to be willing to give this assistance expecting that the investment would ultimately advance America’s global interests and preserve a stable balance of power in Asia over the long term. As both nations seek closer bilateral ties, they are conscious that there need be no compromise on India’s quest for strategic independence. Indo-Pak hyphenation by the United States, a sensitive strategic issue, has been overcome by the new US approach that is guided by the intrinsic importance of Pakistan and India to long-term US interests. This new US initiative, it is hoped, will be translated into concrete policy changes soon. Such transformed Indo-US ties will then have tremendous potential for increased defense and military cooperation. Indo-US defense and military-to-military cooperation has been strong61, particularly since 2000. Indications are that it will be further strengthened and intensified in the coming years. The scope and prospects are bright. In a recently released paper, People, Progress and Partnership: The Transformation of Indo-US Relations, the objectives of Indo-US defense ties have been described thusly: The aim of the burgeoning bilateral defense ties is to develop capabilities and confidence, jointly confront multilateral security issues, such as the protection of energy supplies and sea lanes, conduct peacekeeping and combat terrorism. . . . Clearly, the development of inter-operable procedures, communications, and doctrines is only possible through familiarization, understanding and confidence building, focusing on areas of mutual interest and enhancing the professional development of personnel.62 The Bush administration has underlined its intention to pursue its relationship with New Delhi on the basis of an acknowledgement of India’s rising global 103

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status. As such, the future of bilateral defense and military relationships will serve as a critical indicator of this acknowledgment.

Annexure: Indo–US joint exercises Air force led exercises Ex “Cope India-02”: The Joint Air Force air transport exercise was conducted at AF Stn Agra Oct. 21–26, 02. Participating forces comprised five C-130 ac, the Contingency Response Squadron (CRS) and 145—air/ground crew of USAF. Indian forces comprised two IL-76 and eight AN-32 along with the Army elements. The objectives of the exercise were to demonstrate mutual loading and unloading procedures, expeditionary airfield op procedures, equipment capability and para dropping of personnel and cargo. Ex “Cooperative Cope Thunder-03” (CCT-03): This multi-lateral exercise was conducted in Alaska Jun. 05–20, 03. The IAF participation in CCT-03 comprised one IL-76 and 31 crew/observers. IAF also participated in the executive level observer program, which provided an opportunity to interact with observers from other countries and witness conduct of multilateral operations from close quarters. This was the first ever participation by an IAF aircraft in a multilateral exercise. Ex “Cope India-04”: It was a dissimilar air combat training exercise (DACT) held at AF Stn Gwalior, India Feb. 15–27, 04. IAF participation comprised of MIG-21 Bison, MIG-29, Mirage-2000 and Su-30K. The USAF participated with F-15C and KC-10 tanker aircraft. Exercise “Cooperative Cope Thunder 04-1”: IAF participated in Exercise “Cooperative Cope Thunder 04-1” (Ex “CCT-04-1”) at Alaska, USA Jul. 15–30, 04. Its participation for the exercise comprised six Jaguars, two IL-78, two IL-76 and a team each of Igla and FAC. Two hundred personnel were deployed for the exercise. Beside India and the United States, the other countries that participated in Ex “CCT 04-1” are Malaysia, Japan, Mongolia, Canada, Italy, and the United Kingdom. Army led exercises Ex “Balance Iroquis 02-1”: The exercise was conducted at AF Stn Agra May 07–27, 02 with the US Special Forces. Three MC-130H, four AN-32 and an IL-76 aircraft participated in the exercise. The objective of the exercise was to develop interoperability. Ex “Geronimo Thrust 02-1”: Ex Geronimo Thrust 01-1 was a platoon level airborne exercise with US Army, conducted Sep. 28–Oct. 11, 02 at Fort Richardson, Alaska. Air Force participation included four observers and one IL-76 with crew for transporting the Indian contingent. Chinook helicopter and C-130 of USAF participated in the exercise. The exercise aim was to enhance

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cooperation between US Army Pacific (USARPAC) and the Indian Armed Forces to develop common tactics, techniques and procedures for conduct of joint airborne operations. Ex “Vajra Prahar 03-1”: Ex “Vajra Prahar 03-1” a joint combined exercise, was conducted at India’s Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School, Vairengte and surrounding areas Apr. 07–28, 03.The exercise was conducted with US Special Operation Command Pacific (SOCPAC). The exercise involved conduct of joint heliborne and airborne unconventional exercise in jungle terrain with the aim of enhancing interoperability between the Special Forces. The Indian participation included 02 An-32 and 07 MI-17 of IAF and a team of Ex 21 Para (SF) of the Indian Army. The United States participation comprised of twenty-one troops and civil affairs element. Ex Vector Balance Iroquois (Special Forces) 03-2: The exercise was held from Jun. 17–Jul. 11, 03 at Guam. Ex “Vajra Prahar 03-3”: The Special Forces joint combined exercise in HAA operations was conducted at Leh Sep. 05–25, 03. The aim of the exercise was to conduct special operation in high altitude, which included airborne operation and small unit tactics in mountains. The IAF participation comprised one AN-32 for Para drop. Ex “Yudh Abhyas 04-1”: This was a joint exercise with US Army Pacific (USARPAC) held in Variangte and general areas of Kumbhigram Mar. 25–Apr. 17, 04. It was to practice low intensity conflict operations in jungle terrain. Participation from Indian side was 4  MI-17 helicopters along with Army elements. US side participation with Infantry Platoon and SF detachment. However, the MI-17 helicopters could not undertake flying operations, as the US side was not trained for the slithering/SHBO. AN-32 were utilized to provide airlift to the US troops from Kolkata to Silchar and back. Ex “Yudh Abhyas 04-2”: The exercise “Yudh Abhyas 04-2,” Infantry Field and Live Fire Exercise was conducted in Hawaii July 12–31, 04. Participation from Indian side was a platoon of 20 PUNJAB and US participation comprised of 100th Battalion and 442 Infantry Regiment (US Army Reserve) Ex Balance Iroquois 04-4/Ex Vajra Prahar 04-1 (Special Forces): Unconventional Warfare, small unit tactics & Airborne exercise including civil military operation was conducted in Hawaii Aug. 09–Sep. 05, 04. The Indian participation included—Squad Para and Para Special Forces while from US; Special Forces & Civil Affairs Detachment and one C-130 participated. Navy led exercise Indo-US Naval Special Forces Exercise: It was conducted Mar. 17–26, 04 at Ganapatiphule (Distt—Ratnagiri). IAF participated with 2  AN-32 and 1  MI-8 helicopters. The scope of the exercise encompassed Combat Free Fall and Duck Drop in tandem with Water Para Jump.

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HQ integrated defense staff led exercise Indo-US Command Post Exercise “Tempest Express-07”: This is an exercise on Multinational Force (MNF) Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). It was held in August 04 and was coordinated by HQ IDS in Delhi. Peacekeeping operations Multilateral peacekeeping operations exercise in Bangladesh in February 2002. US–India Army Peacekeeping CPX “Shantipath,” driven by latest computer wargaming simulation was held at United Services Institution, New Delhi. It involved the United States, India and 11 other countries, with over 150 participants. The co-hosted exercise was designed to familiarize participants with techniques for conducting peacekeeping operations in a multi-lateral environment. The exercise involved battalion staffs from Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and the United States and police and staff officers from Madagascar, Mauritius, Fiji, Mongolia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, and Tonga. To enhance peacekeeping:●

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India received Rs 3.6 crore ($800,000) in EIPC funds for the next five years on training and equipment, supporting US sponsored seminars. India to co-host US sponsored peacekeeping operations exercises and host Pacific Armies Management Seminar. Joint military conferences

May–July 2003: US Military Academy, West Point exchange with Indian Military Academy, Dehradun. June 2003: High altitude medical subjects, Experts’ meeting in Kashmir. July–August 2003: Intelligence subjects. Experts’ meeting in Washington, DC and Goa. On invitation, the Head of India’s new Defense Intelligence Agency travelled to the United States to understand the working of military intelligence at the national level. Pacific Air Forces safety, security forces, medical officers, and logistics experts have begun a relationship with the Indian Air Force to help the latter improve readiness and safety programs. USAF restarted its instructor pilot exchange program participation in India.

Exercises planned in the next two years Air force led exercises Exercise “Cope India-05”: The exercise is planned in Nov. 05. The proposed USAF participation would comprise 12 multi-role fighters air crafts (F-16), AAR aircrafts and one E3. IAF participation would be similar to that for “Cope India-04.” 106

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Exercise “Cooperative Cope Thunder-05”: IAF will be participating in this exercise only as an observer. An invitation has been received for an Executive level observer. In addition, two working level observers are likely to participate. Exercise “Red Flag-06”: The IAF has proposed for holding a bilateral exercise “Red Flag 06” at Nellis AFB, USA with AF Weapon School in September–October 06. The proposal was discussed during the Tenth AF ESG meeting in March 05 and both sides are working towards resolution of issues for IAF participation in 2006–07 timeframe. Army led exercises Ex Shatrujeet: Joint exercise between Indian Army (two platoons) and US Marines at Camp Pendleton, California is planned in June–July 05. Ex Yudh Abhyas 05-1: Planned to be held in Mizoram in Sep. 05. Ex Yudh Abhyas 05-2: Planned to be held in Alaska in Sep. 05.

New framework for the US–INDIA defense relationship the defense framework Signed on 28 June, 2005 in Washington DC by Minister of Defense of India, Pranab Mukherjee and Secretary of Defense of the United States, Donald Rumsfeld 1

2

3

The United States and India have entered a new era. We are transforming our relationship to reflect our common principles and shared national interests. As the world’s two largest democracies, the United States and India agree on the vital importance of political and economic freedom, democratic institutions, the rule of law, security, and opportunity around the world. The leaders of our two countries are building a US–India strategic partnership in pursuit of these principles and interests. Ten years ago, in January 1995, the Agreed Minute on Defense Relations between the United States and India was signed. Since then, changes in the international security environment have challenged our countries in ways unforeseen ten years ago. The US–India defense relationship has advanced in a short time to unprecedented levels of cooperation unimaginable in 1995. Today, we agree on a new framework that builds on past successes, seizes new opportunities, and charts a course for US–India defense relationship for the next ten years. This defense relationship will support, and will be an element of, the broader US–India strategic partnership. The US–India defense relationship derives from a common belief in freedom, democracy, and the rule of law, and seeks to advance shared security interests. These interests include: maintaining security and stability; defeating terrorism and violent religious extremism; preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and associated materials, data, and technologies; and protecting the free flow of commerce via land, air and sea lanes. 107

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4

5

6

In pursuit of this shared vision of an expanded and deeper US–India strategic relationship, our defense establishments shall: (A) conduct joint and combined exercises and exchanges; (B) collaborate in multinational operations when it is in their common interest; (C) strengthen the capabilities of our militaries to promote security and defeat terrorism; (D) expand interaction with other nations in ways that promote regional and global peace and stability; (E) enhance capabilities to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; (F) in the context of our strategic relationship, expand two-way defense trade between our countries. The United States and India will work to conclude defense transactions, not solely as ends in and of themselves, but as a means to strengthen our countries’ security, reinforce our strategic partnership, achieve greater interaction between our armed forces, and build greater understanding between our defense establishments; (G) in the context of defense trade and a framework of technology security safeguards, increase opportunities for technology transfer, collaboration, co-production, and research and development; (H) expand collaboration relating to missile defense; (I) strengthen the abilities of our militaries to respond quickly to disaster situations, including in combined operations; (J) assist in building worldwide capacity to conduct successful peacekeeping operations, with a focus on enabling other countries to field trained, capable forces for these operations; (K) conduct exchanges on defense strategy and defense transformation; (L) increase exchanges of intelligence; and (M) continue strategiclevel discussions by senior leadership from US Department of Defense and India’s Ministry of Defence, in which the two sides exchange perspectives on international security issues of common interest, with the aim of increasing mutual understanding, promoting shared objectives, and developing common approaches. The Defense Policy Group shall continue to serve as the primary mechanism to guide US–India strategic defense relationship. The Defense Policy Group will make appropriate adjustments to the structure and frequency of its meetings and of its subgroups, when agreed to by the Defense Policy Group co-chairs, to ensure that it remains an effective mechanism to advance US–India defense cooperation. In recognition of the growing breadth and depth of the US–India strategic defense relationship, we hereby establish the Defense Procurement and Production Group and institute a Joint Working Group for mid-year review of work overseen by the Defense Policy Group—The Defense Procurement and Production Group will oversee defense trade, as well as prospects for co-production and technology collaboration, broadening the scope of its predecessor subgroup the Security Cooperation Group.—The Defense Joint Working Group will be subordinate to the Defense Policy Group and will meet at least once per year to perform a midyear review of work overseen by the Defense Policy Group and its subgroups (the Defense Procurement and Production Group, the Joint Technical Group, the Military Cooperation 108

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7

Group, and the Senior Technology Security Group), and to prepare issues for the annual meeting of the Defense Policy Group. The Defense Policy Group and its subgroups will rely upon this Framework for guidance on the principles and objectives of US–India strategic relationship, and will strive to achieve those objectives.

Signed in Arlington, Virginia, USA, on June 28, 2005, in two copies in English, each being equally authentic. Secretary of Defense Minister of Defence FOR AND ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA

Notes 1 Dinesh Kumar, “Defense in Indo-US Relations,” Strategic Analysis, 20, 5 (August 1997), p. 751. 2 The US Congress had approved $190 mn food aid. For more details, see, Kumar, “Defense in Indo-US Relations,” p. 751. 3 Ibid. 4 In the mid-1960s, the US tried to get India under its umbrella, including through defense deals, for which the then US Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara and Indian Defense Minister Y.B. Chavan signed an agreement on June 6, 1965. However, the heightened Cold War politics and India’s refusal to join the US-led groupings, took the agreement nowhere. See, Swaran Singh, “Indo-US Defense Ties,” Indian Defense Review, 10, 1 (1995), p. 29. 5 “Sea, Land, Air: The Military relationship is growing at a flattering pace,” Force, (October 2004), p. 36. 6 “New Dimensions in India-US Co-operation,” The Naval Review, 83, 4 (January 1995), p. 323. 7 Kumar, “Defense in Indo-US Relations,” p. 791. 8 The Glenn Amendment refers to an amendment to the Arms Export Control Act (Section 102). Under the Glenn Amendment, if the President determines that a nonnuclear weapon state (as defined in article IX (3) of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) detonates a nuclear explosive device or receives a nuclear explosive device, certain sanctions do apply. See, Glenn Amendment: Fact Sheet, Bureau of South Asian Affairs, US Department of State, Washington, DC (September 2000), available at www.state.gov 9 Barbara Leitch LePoer, India’s Nuclear Tests and US Response, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service Report, Updated May 21, 1998). 10 Section 102 (b) (4) (A) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, authorized the President to delay the imposition of these sanctions for 30 days. The US Administration had this in mind when it approached the government of India after the first day’s detonations and averred that sanctions can be avoided if the government disavowed any future testing. However, this was thwarted when India conducted two more tests on May 13, 1998. Section 102 (b) (4) and (5) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, lays out a procedure to give the President further authority to waive the sanctions whole or in part. This procedure is however applicable only if the President had invoked the 30-day delay. Section 102 (b) does not otherwise state a standard to be met

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11

12 13 14 15 16

17 18 19

20 21 22 23 24 25

by India to have the sanctions lifted, nor a means by which the sanctions would be suspended or terminated. See Barbara Leitch LePoer, Pakistan-US Relations, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service Report, Updated November 24, 1998). Also see, India-Pakistan Sanctions Legislation Fact Sheet, (June 11, 2001), at www.clw.org/control/ indopaksanctions.html. For nuclear and missile-related items and entities of concern, the Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) of the Department of Commerce will deny all export and re-export applications for dual-use items controlled for nuclear or missile proliferation reasons under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to all end users in India and Pakistan; and BXA will publishes a list of Indian and Pakistan government and private entities involved in nuclear and missile activities, and all exports and re-exports subject to the EAR will be prohibited to listed entities. Similarly, for National Security-related items and Military Entities, and also for Dual-Use items, the BXA would administer the necessary restrictions. The Arms Control Reporter 1998, (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, 1998) and India–Pakistan Sanctions Legislation Fact Sheet, (June 11, 2001), at www.clw.org/control/indopaksanctions.html The Arms Control Reporter. See, Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb (New Delhi, Penguin, 2004), p. 81. See “8th Round of US–India, US–Pakistan Talks on Security, Nonproliferation Draws Praise, Criticism from S. Asian Media,” (February 11, 1999), at http://www.fas.org/ news/india/1999/wwwh9f11.htm#SA C. Raja Mohan, “Beyond the Nuclear Agenda,” The Hindu, (January 26, 1999) and Afzal Mahmood, “New US Approach to South Asia,” Dawn, (February 2, 1999), both as reproduced in “8th Round of US–India, US–Pakistan Talks on Security, Nonproliferation Draws Praise, Criticism from S. Asian Media.” George W. Bush, “A Distinctly American Internationalism,” Speech at the Reagan Library, November 19, 1999, at www.georgewbush.com/News.asp?FormModeSP (downloaded December 20, 2000). Condoleezza Rice, “Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2000, at www.foreignaffairs.org/20000101fessay5/condoleezza-rice/ campaign-2000-promoting-the-national-interest.html?modeprint These sanctions have been in effect since 1978, when the provision was made part of the US law. This rule about nuclear trade was adopted by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which includes Russia. There were talks earlier about Russia planning to supply the Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS) with nuclear fuel (the United States used to originally supply with the fuel for the plant, but refused after the Atomic Energy Act came into being), though there were no decisions on it. See Ravi Tomar, “India-US Relations in a Changing Strategic Environment,” Research Paper no. 20 2001–2002, June 25, 2002, at http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rp/ 2001–02/02rp20.htm#major “Indo-US Strategic Ties on the Upswing,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (March 2003), p. 42 “Indo-US naval exercises to be revived,” Tribune, February 7, 2002, at http://www. tribuneindia.com/2002/20020207/main6.htm Ashley J. Tellis, ‘Seeking Breakthroughs: The Meandering US–India relationship Needs a Fresh Impetus,’ Force, October 2004, p. 8; “India signs ‘historic’ US arms deal”, April 18, 2002, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1937313.stm Tellis, “Seeking Breakthroughs.” Prasun K. Sengupta, “With Open Arms: An Overview of Future India–US Weapons Procurement Trends,” Force (October 2004), p. 24.

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26 Pravin Sawhney and Ghazala Wahab, “Indo-US Strategic Relations: Unequal Music,” Force (October 2004), p. 13. 27 US Ambassador David C Mulford, in an interview to Force, highlighted the significance of NSSP, stating that India is the only country in the world with which the US has such an initiative under very difficult circumstances, that is, US’ obligations under various international obligations as well as its own export control regulations. See, “India is the only country with which the US has Next Steps in Strategic Partnership initiative,” Force (October 2004), p. 33. 28 Robert O Blake, Jr., Charge d’Affaires, “US-India Relations: The Making of a Comprehensive Relationship,” presentation at the Army War College, Indore, India, August 23, 2004, available at www.state.gov/p/sa/rls/rm/35686.htm 29 Sawhney and Wahab, “Indo-US Strategic Relations: Unequal Music.” 30 Even while the US wanted to strengthen its cooperation with India on high-tech and dual-use items, it had to fight several challenges under various international treaty obligations, like the NSG, which the US established after India’s 1974 nuclear tests. See, Daniel Sneider, “Bush-Singh Meeting Hints at Tech Sales Boost; US and India Moving Toward Strategic Partnership,” San Jose Mercury News, September 23, 2004, at www.indianembassy.org/US_Media/2004/Sept/SJ.htm 31 Sawhney and Wahab, “Indo-US Strategic Relations: Unequal Music.” 32 Embassy of India, “Joint Press Statement: Next Steps in Strategic Partnership between India and the United States,” September 17, 2004, at www.indianembassy.org/ press_release/2004/sep/17.htm. See also, R Ramachandran, “India, US & Trade in Technology,” The Hindu, September 27, 2004, at www.thehindu.com/2004/09/27/ stories/2004092702961000.htm 33 John E Carbaugh, Jr., “New High-Tech Accord Seen as Giving Another Boost to US–India Strategic Relationship,” January 29, 2004, at www.usindiafriendship.net/ viewpoints/carbaugh18.htm 34 Ramachandran, “India, US & Trade in Technology.” 35 Ibid. 36 See, “Joint Statement between the United States of America and India,” September 21, 2004, at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040921–12.html 37 “Bush-Singh Move to Expand US–India Defense Ties,” September 23, 2004, at http://pakobserver.net/200409/23/news/topstories12.asp 38 “India, US Make ‘Substantial Progress’ in High-Tech Talks,” Dow Jones Newswires, October 21, 2004, at www.indianembassy.org/US_Media/2004/Oct/DOW.htm 39 Ibid. 40 “United States and India Launch New Phase of Cyber Security Cooperation,” November 10, 2004, at www.state.gov 41 “India, US Discuss Steps to Reduce Barriers to Hi-tech Trade,” Indian Express, November 20, 2004, at www.indianexpress.com/news/world/20041120–0.html 42 “India-US Military Ties to get Stronger: Rumsfeld,” Deccan Herald, December 10, 2004, at http://www.deccanherald.com/deccanherald/dec102004/i1.asp 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid. 45 C. Raja Mohan, “In Tsunami Diplomacy, Indo-US Unity Creates New Waves,” The Indian Express, December 31, 2004. 46 “Indo-US Strategic Ties on the Upswing,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (March 2003), p. 43. 47 The analysis in the report was produced on the basis of interviews with 2 senior US and Indian military officers and defense officials. Of the 26 Indian military interviewees, all of whom were one star officers and above, 10 were serving and 16 were retired personnel. Of the 42 US respondents, 23 of 24 military personnel were on active duty while 15 others were senior civil servants. See, “Deep-seated Distrust Mars

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48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58

59

60 61

62

US Relations with India,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (April 2003), p. 34. See also, “Sea, Land, Air: The Military Relationship is Growing at a Flattering Pace,” Force, (October 2004), p. 37. “Deep-seated Distrust Mars US Relations with India.” “Sea, Land, Air: The Military Relationship is Growing at a Flattering Pace.” “Deep-seated Distrust Mars US Relations with India.” Ibid. Hindustan Times (Bangalore), February 9, 2005, p. 7. Ashley J. Tellis, South Asian Seesaw: A New US Policy on the Subcontinent, Policy Brief No. 38, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (May 2005), p. 3. Ibid. Ibid. Sengupta, “With Open Arms.” Ibid. This, according to Army sources, will enhance combat power through a seamless integration of strategic and tactical networks by networking the real-time intelligencegathering apparatus, decision-makers and the battlespace commanders to ensure the optimum deployment of soldiers and equipment. Ibid. A network of NPOESS satellites in polar-orbit would provide rapid distribution of global and regional environmental imagery, meteorological, climatic, terrestrial, oceanic, and solar-geophysical data, thus adding in the timely prediction of cyclones, support disaster management efforts, and benefit the development and management of agriculture, fisheries, maritime industries, and other economic sectors. Ibid. Ibid. Military-to-military relationship has grown rather smoothly as there are no treaty and legal obligations unlike the NSSP that worked through US export control laws and international regimes. See, “India is the only country with which the US has Next Steps in Strategic Partnership initiative.” “Sea, Land, Air: The Military relationship is growing at a flattering pace.”

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6 US–INDIA MILITARY-TO-MILITARY INTERACTION In the context of the larger relationship John H. Gill*

The United States and India, having overcome many of the inhibitions associated with the Cold War, currently enjoy an unprecedented level of military-to-military cooperation. Indeed, military ties have developed into one of the most important and robust aspects of the US–India bilateral relationship and have often spearheaded the dramatic improvements in relations that the two nations have witnessed since the end of the Cold War. The two sides now must determine how they can sustain productive growth in their defense interactions and cope with the issues that their military relationship may raise. Each country has key interests that can be promoted through sustained enhancement of their growing military relationship, and many of these interests are shared by both capitals. Yet militaryto-military ties can truly prosper only within the context of the larger bilateral relationship. Although interactions between the two armed forces are an integral part of any normal country-to-country relationship and, in the US–India case, have often spurred improvements in other areas, they cannot bear the principal burden of bilateral ties. Instead, they must be merged into the structure of the overall relationship. This is especially true in the case of these two great democracies, both of whom value the subordination of military services to civilian authority and hope to serve as worthy models for other countries. At the same time, US–India military ties must be nurtured, not neglected. Despite the satisfying growth over the past decade, the relationship remains hampered by pertinacious obstacles, vulnerable to shocks, and susceptible to erosion if taken for granted. Without appropriate attention, this promising relationship could devolve into irrelevance or stagnation, frustrating rather than bolstering a burgeoning US–India strategic partnership. In the hopes of contributing to better understanding and thereby avoiding such negative outcomes, this chapter will examine where the relationship has been, where it might go, and what might constrain its continued evolution.

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Interests and benefits From an American perspective, the first two points to note are (1) that US armed forces have much to gain from deepened and expanded relations with their Indian counterparts, and (2) that improved military-to-military interaction directly supports US national interests in India, in South Asia, and more broadly, from the Middle East through Asia and across the globe. At the bilateral level, military ties are an integral component of mature relations, part of the menu of interactions with any significant friendly power. In some cases, military activities will be independent, that is focused on specific military goals, but in others they will mesh directly with other bilateral programs, such as the missile-defense aspects of the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership initiative launched by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in January 2004 and now incorporated in the Defense Framework Agreement signed in June 2005.1 In all cases, the military aspects must be embedded in the wider bilateral relationship. At the regional level, good military-to-military ties can contribute to US interests in combating terrorism, fostering regional stability, limiting the proliferation of missile technology and weapons of mass destruction, securing sea lines of communication through the Indian Ocean, rebuilding Afghanistan, and countering the spread of narcotics. Similarly, enhanced US–Indian military cooperation supports humanitarian operations and peacekeeping actions in the regions adjacent to South Asia (especially the Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia) and on the global stage. The excellent working relationship that quickly developed between American and Indian forces during tsunami relief operations in late 2004 was founded on the slow accretion of bilateral military interaction and offers a prime example of what the two militaries can accomplish in support of mutual interests. As demonstrated by collaborative efforts over the past decade, some of the benefits from expanded cooperation will be tangible and will manifest themselves in the near term. Joint US–Indian naval patrols in the Strait of Malacca during 2002 and coordination of policies regarding the vicious Maoist insurgency in Nepal stand out as two examples of recent interactions in which US and Indian militaries have played an important role in developing and implementing national policy with nearterm impact. Many of the most important outcomes of greater military engagement, however, will be intangible, difficult to quantify, and less evident over the short term. Yet they will be just as important as the more visible, measurable achievements—perhaps more so. Sustained and increasingly sophisticated interaction, for instance, will foster understanding of one another’s policies and perspectives, helping reduce suspicion, promoting habits of cooperation, and creating channels of communication between individuals and institutions that will lay the foundation for consultation and possible collaboration in future crises. Carefully constructed over time, robust military-to-military ties will open manifold opportunities for the armed forces of both countries, such as allowing senior US commanders to contact Indian counterparts in time-sensitive situations or reducing the preparations needed before responding to a natural disaster. The significance of these outcomes argues

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for consistent, patient adherence to a long-term vision of US–India military ties even in those cases where the results are intangible or difficult to measure. The challenge is to pursue the critical prerequisite steps through governmental bureaucracies even when they do not conform to business-model metrics. Even in situations where military forces play a supporting role, a solid record of sustained military-to-military cooperation will contribute to the achievement of common goals. In assisting Nepal’s climb back to stability, for example, US armed forces are supporting players, but military sales, training, and education are and will continue to be important features of US policy in that troubled country. Given India’s vital national security concerns vis-à-vis Nepal, the US–India military dialogue can help provide venues to exchange views, coordinate approaches, and explain policies as part of a mature strategic relationship between two major international actors. Similarly, the Indian military does not have a large role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, but assisting in the rebuilding of that country is an important element of India’s regional policy, and New Delhi has committed considerable resources in support of the international effort there. Given the prominence of the US military in Afghanistan, familiarity with Indian capabilities, strategic concerns, and governmental functioning will help US commanders as they integrate Indian assistance (in police training, for example) into larger US and multilateral programs.2 Counterterrorism and counternarcotics are other arenas in which conventional military forces often have a supporting rather than a leading role, but where their input in policy formulation and implementation is crucial and where improved US–India military relations can make a significant positive contribution toward attaining important security objectives.3

Impressive achievements thus far US–India military relations have grown dramatically since the mid-1990s. Starting, from the American perspective, with a set of proposals offered by Lt General Claude Kicklighter, the commander of US Army Pacific, in 1991 and formalized by the “Agreed Minute on Defense Cooperation” in January 1995, interactions slowly expanded in frequency, depth, and scope until the Indian nuclear tests in May 1998. Initial activities centered on naval exercises and the training of special forces. These activities were preferred because they either were held offshore (the naval exercises) or were small in scale (as with the special forces training) and thus were unlikely to draw much opposition from what one American scholar calls “reflexive anti-American political constituencies” in India.4 The navy-to-navy exercises, called the “Malabar” series, were especially notable because they covered almost every aspect of naval warfare and included submarines and maritime patrol aircraft from both countries as well as surface ships. A highly successful exchange of instructor pilots and the establishment of sister squadrons between the two air forces, as well as a wealth of workshops, courses, symposia, and visits, set the stage for further development. One of the

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most important features of the burgeoning relationship was structural: the creation of “Executive Steering Groups” (ESGs) for each service, headed by senior officers with expert knowledge and the authority to commit time and resources to future activities. The 1995 “Agreed Minute” placed these ESGs under a “Defense Policy Group” co-chaired by senior defense civilians and including representatives from the US State Department and the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, giving the appropriate governmental agencies visibility of and approval over military-to-military events. The two sides were on the verge of moving to a new level in bilateral military interaction among all services during 1998, when the Indian nuclear tests triggered a set of stringent US sanctions. Even in the wake of the Indian tests, however, the United States endeavored to retain as much of the military-to-military relationship as possible.5 As a result of initiatives taken from 1994 through 1998, there was a foundation, however thin, from which programs could be relaunched when US sanctions were lifted in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. One of Washington’s top priorities after 9/11 was the re-establishment of a full range of military ties to India, and senior defense delegations from the two sides met in New Delhi as early as December 2001 to pick up the threads from 1998 and chart a new path of revived cooperation. Since then, the relationship has expanded rapidly to include numerous high-level visits, exercises, training exchanges, and a nascent program of military sales. Many of these activities are truly unprecedented. The deployment of Indian Air Force fighters to Alaska for Exercise “Cooperative Cope Thunder” in the summer of 2004, for example, was the first time that Indian combat aircraft had ever landed on foreign soil during peacetime. It followed a similarly pathbreaking exercise featuring the deployment of US Air Force F-15 fighters to India earlier in the year. Training in low-intensity conflict in the jungles of northeastern India by US Army personnel and the increasing sophistication of the navy-to-navy “Malabar” training exercises (now an annual event) are other samples from the growing menu of interactions between the ground and sea services of both countries. To build on the achievements of the past and chart the future for the next decade, India and the United States signed a new “Defense Framework” agreement during Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee’s June 2005 visit to Washington. Mischaracterized as a “pact” in some press reporting, the framework is actually a timely and practical update to the 1995 “Agreed Minute” providing a workable outline for future defense cooperation “as an element of the broader U.S.–India strategic partnership.”6 This growth reflects the increasing US commitment to strengthening ties with India in all areas, as begun during the Clinton administration and accelerated with the advent of the Bush administration in 2001. One of the tenets of the US national security strategy adumbrated in September 2002 is “a transformation of [the] bilateral relationship with India based on a conviction that U.S. interests require a strong relationship with India.”7 Cooperative bilateral activities accumulated steadily over the following two years, but a series of senior visits during the first half of 2005 boosted the pace and profile of interaction, with Secretary of State 116

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Condoleezza Rice commenting “I think we can accelerate the relationship, take it to another level” during her March stop in India. Similar statements and sentiments characterized the Washington visits of her Indian counterpart, Minister of External Affairs Natwar Singh, in April and Indian Defense Minister Mukherjee in June.8 President Bush and Prime Minister Singh reiterated the commitment to a transformed relationship during the latter’s July 2005 trip to Washington as they launched bold new cooperative initiatives in space, civil nuclear energy and dual-use technology.9 US officials called Singh’s trip “one of the most important visits of the year because the President and Prime Minister were able to agree on a new global partnership,” and cited India as “one of our most important partners worldwide.” President Bush’s 2006 visit to India represents a further advance10 From the military perspective, three features of these senior-level visits and associated policy announcements were especially significant. First, Washington expressed its intent “to help India become a major world power in the 21st century.” “We understand fully the implications, including the military implications, of that statement,” a senior administration official told the press on March 25, 2005. Rice had presented unprecedented offers of military hardware during her meetings in New Delhi, including the possible sale of F-16 or FA-18 fighter aircraft, and “the U.S. is ready to discuss even more fundamental issues of defense transformation with India, including transformative systems in areas such as command and control, early warning and missile defense”, said a U.S. official, elaborating, “I think you’ll appreciate the significance.”11 Second, India’s reaction to the announcement of renewed US transfers of F-16s to Pakistan was “uncharacteristically muted.” Indian officials had made their concerns unmistakably clear, but Washington had discussed the decision with New Delhi at the highest levels (including a phone call from President Bush to Prime Minister Singh), and with the United States having “clearly placed its bets on New Delhi,” the F-16 announcement did not create a crisis or a break in the relationship, as it almost certainly would have done had it occurred several years earlier.12 The careful handling of this sensitive issue by both sides demonstrates their mutual commitment to the “strategic partnership” and their determination to push ahead despite periodic disagreements. Third, both sides are committed for the long haul. In Congressional testimony, for instance, Under Secretary R. Nicholas Burns has referred to a joint U.S.–India strategic vision that “transcends even today’s most pressing concerns” as a foundation for future development “as the political and economic focus of the global system shifts inevitably eastward to Asia.”13

Obstacles in history and perceptions Despite this commitment, the impressive achievements of the past decade and the inherent immediate and long-term benefits of US–India military-to-military agenda, the relationship has been dogged by significant challenges. Several of these are likely to persist as important irritants or roadblocks for the foreseeable 117

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future and thus require concerted attention if the relationship is to continue to prosper. In the first place, military activities occur within the embrace of the overall US–India interaction, that is, within the historical context of the larger relationship. Unfortunately, the history of that relationship has often been negative and contentious, characterized more by friction and mistrust than by cooperation, especially during the Cold War. As former Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott has noted recent improvements have added considerable “ballast” to the relationship, but the historical foundation for enhanced bilateral military cooperation remains slender, and favorable changes over the past five years have not entirely erased the legacy of an often prickly past.14 Most important in considering military-to-military relations is the historical view many Indians harbor of the United States as a fickle strategic partner and an “unreliable” supplier of military hardware. Indians are particularly troubled by what they see as a frequent American bias in favor of Pakistan over the past fifty years (such as the March 2004 decision to designate Pakistan a “major non-NATO ally”) and inequitable treatment of India as compared to China.15 Americans, on the other hand, frequently see their Indian interlocutors as mired in the past, unable to move beyond events that occurred when the current American players were still in high school. These views are all open to interpretation and discussion. The point is not that Americans must accept the Indian perspective on history, but that Americans must be aware of India’s historical concerns and attitudes in moving beyond the past and crafting a new stage in military relations for the twenty-first century. Put another way, there is a need to continue writing the “new history” of the relationship, a drafting task in which US and Indian militaries must participate equally. A second obstacle is what one American commentator has termed US recognition of India’s view of the “strategic environment,” that is, India’s perception of its security interests not only on its immediate periphery but beyond South Asia to the east and west.16 New Delhi sees vital national interests to its west for a host of cogent reasons. From a commercial standpoint, almost all of the oil needed to fuel the Indian economy comes from the Persian Gulf, a critical concern as India attempts to build on the economic successes of the past decade. The economy also benefits from remittances provided by some three million Indian nationals working in the Middle East. As home to one of the world’s largest Muslim populations, India must be sensitive to Islamic issues that can resonate among its 150 million Muslim citizens, while at the same time monitoring and countering the threat of religious extremism. Additionally, India has long enjoyed cordial relations with most governments in the Middle East, especially those of Iran and Iraq, a situation that has not inhibited it from developing a burgeoning defense relationship with Israel. Central Asia beyond Afghanistan is another area in which India has significant economic prospects as well as worrisome security concerns. Looking east, India has important commercial, cultural, and security interests in Southeast Asia and has expended considerable effort to strengthen its ties with the members 118

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of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and Japan. China looms large in Indian strategic thinking, not only as a gigantic and militarily powerful northern neighbor, but also as a growing commercial and diplomatic partner, as a rival for influence and economic access in Southeast Asia, and as a developmental yardstick against which India measures its own progress. The March 2005 visit of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao to India and the resulting joint statement highlighted the importance that both sides attach to this relationship. Given these vital Indian national interests beyond the relatively narrow confines of South Asia, US military would benefit from increased dialogue with New Delhi on security issues in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. As demonstrated by the successful naval escort program in 2002, India can provide practical assistance in Indian Ocean security. This is an area of cooperation ripe for further development. Furthermore, a comprehensive strategic dialogue with India on security in these neighboring regions would enrich American views and demonstrate a US commitment to take India seriously as a global partner. Iran’s current role and future evolution in the international system could be an especially fruitful area of discussion. Although Washington and New Delhi have disagreements on policy towards Tehran, in most respects US and Indian interests in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and China converge, offering a rich menu of critical topics for discussion and potential collaboration. Terrorism, religious extremism, Israeli–Palestinian issues, and energy security are only a few of the critical areas in which US and Indian interests largely coincide.17 Although the respective defense establishments may not be the lead agencies in all of these areas, security equities are clearly key policy elements for both New Delhi and Washington. Within South Asia, the question of US relations with Pakistan poses special challenges for military-to-military interactions with India. Many Indians see a persistent American fixation on “the hyphen” of India–Pakistan dynamics—that is, they believe that US government is unable or unwilling to think about India outside of the India–Pakistan construct. They would like to project the India–Pakistan relationship as increasingly secondary and local while promoting their country’s far larger national security concerns and its increasing capability to play a major role at the global level. The provision of American arms to Pakistan is especially disturbing to New Delhi, with F-16s heading the list of problematic weapons systems.18 Americans, on the other hand, often feel that their Indian counterparts place too much emphasis on Pakistan as a factor in US–India relations and overlook crucial US interests in Pakistan. Washington, faced with the extraordinary challenge of trying to expand friendly ties with two rivals, has made a concerted effort to “de-link” India and Pakistan and, to the degree possible, build bilateral relations with each “on its own merits.” Rice tackled this issue head-on during her March 2005 New Delhi trip: “We’ve tried very hard, as a matter of fact, to make the point that this is not a hyphenated relationship, the India–Pakistan relationship; this is a relationship with India.”19 Although neither India nor Pakistan can be considered in hermetically sealed isolation, the 119

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Bush administration, like its predecessor, has recognized India’s status as a “growing world power with which we have common strategic interests” in official documents and public statements, as well as in the deepening relationship in the defense and other realms.20 The United States cannot and will not jettison Pakistan, nor is it in India’s interest that America do so. As Prime Minister Singh stated in a September 2004 interview, “We recognize, I think, the circumstances in which the United States has had to strengthen its relationship with Pakistan . . . but we do not feel that that should be a barrier or a bar to development of our own relationship.”21 Indeed, both the United States and India have a common interest in Pakistan’s stability, prosperity, moderation, and progress toward democracy. A forward-looking US–India dialogue on Pakistan could make a major contribution to setting Pakistan on a more hopeful trajectory.22 China’s rise and its changing role in Asia and on the world stage should be another topic on the US–India agenda. Discussion of Beijing’s interests and goals, however, does not and should not suggest a US–India condominium aimed against China. India would reject such an approach and it would run counter to American interests vis-à-vis China on the larger Asian scene. American scholar Teresita Schaffer summed up the situation by observing that “strong Indo–U.S. relations do not imply hostility towards China, and an effective U.S.–China relationship does not suggest animosity towards India.”23 Washington must consider Beijing in crafting its expanded partnership with New Delhi, and Americans must understand India’s desire to be treated on a par with China, but China should be a source of useful discourse rather than an impediment in the US–India bilateral defense interaction. Indeed, as Schaffer commented, good relations between Washington and New Delhi can promote a “virtuous cycle” in the United States–India–China triangle by encouraging Beijing to play a constructive role in South Asia.24

Organizational obstacles The organizations of the United States and Indian defense hierarchies charged with fostering the bilateral relationship represent a third hindrance to greater cooperation. To expand its strategic dialogue with India into the regions beyond South Asia, for example, US military will have to exercise a degree of bureaucratic flexibility and high-level leadership. At present, the US Unified Command Plan uses the India–Pakistan border to divide military responsibility between Central Command and Pacific Command, with India falling within the latter’s charter. The merits of this arrangement can be debated endlessly, but it is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. As these commands are the principal vehicles for implementing military-to-military programs in the US system, however, the current division complicates any effort to incorporate India in Middle East or Persian Gulf security discussions. There is no “hidden agenda” at work on the US side, but coordination across command boundaries is always difficult, and the present case is particularly daunting because Central Command is absorbed in 120

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conducting active operations in Iraq and Afghanistan while trying to maintain and expand military-to-military engagement plans with the many important countries in its area of responsibility. The United States has made some effort to address this lacuna by initiating Joint Staff talks at the national level and by inviting Indians to the Near East–South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, where comprehensive programs tackle issues across the entire arc from North Africa to South Asia. (Similarly, Pakistanis attend courses at the Asia-Pacific Center for Strategic Studies.) Nevertheless, additional focus is needed to incorporate India into strategic dialogue and cooperation that extend into areas of mutual interest well beyond South Asia. Another problem in the US system is the Byzantine bureaucracy surrounding foreign military sales. Indians understandably find this process opaque and frustrating, inducing delays in even simple requests that can stretch out for months or longer. Given the importance of technology and equipment to the Indian agenda for defense relations, this bureaucracy is one of the most formidable impediments to rapid expansion of the relationship. On the other hand, the sometimes perplexing organization of the specific US policy offices that deal with India is not a major problem. Although some US structures locate India in the office that also handles Middle East issues (as in the Department of Defense) and others place it in the branch dedicated to Asia (as on the Joint Staff), this dispersion has only a minor effect on bilateral interaction because the respective officials and staff officers usually coalesce into an informal policy and analysis subcommunity that often works very efficiently in developing and executing policy. Of much greater concern is the tendency for India (and the rest of the countries of South Asia) to become lost in the bureaucratic maze because it has to compete for attention with China, Japan, Korea, and a number of treaty allies in Asia-oriented offices, as well as with Iraq, Iran, and Israeli–Palestinian issues in those offices whose ambit also includes the Middles East.25 As a result, relations with India do not always get the sustained, dedicated focus from senior decisionmakers that is required if US goals are to be accomplished. Pentagon policy officials whose spans of responsibility include the Middle East, for example, will find that myriad bilateral meetings with America’s many friends and allies in North Africa, the Levant, and the Persian Gulf crowd their calendars, challenging their ability to devote adequate time and attention to India, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other South Asian countries. This phenomenon highlights the critical importance of “routinized” interaction and the construction of durable military-to-military institutions in which both sides can cooperate on common goals within general policy guidelines without constantly engaging senior-level leadership. From the American perspective, bureaucratic structure has also been an obstacle on the Indian side. Given their limited roles in the Indian governing establishment, the Ministry of Defence and the armed services have not traditionally had a large foreign policy function. Moreover, until the opening of US–India defense engagement in the 1990s, India had never had a bilateral defense relationship of the type the United States has developed with dozens of 121

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friendly and allied countries across the globe. The Indian link with the Soviet Union was centered on hardware, technical training, and logistical support; it did not encompass the broad array of exercises, exchanges, discussions, and military sales that the United States considers part of a normal defense relationship. Thus there is an organizational asymmetry between the two sides, with no Indian counterparts to the policy offices and staff sections specifically designed to conduct interaction with foreign militaries that are found in the US Department of Defense, the Joint Staff, the headquarters of the military services, and the Combatant Commands. This structure poses a capacity challenge on the Indian side that can impede progress and delay potentially productive cooperation. Among other things, this means that Americans have to calculate how much cooperation the Indian structure can manage at any one time, and that excellent short-notice opportunities can be lost because the Indian side is not staffed to cope with manifold activities without extended lead time. Other organizational asymmetries are less problematic. India has no direct counterpart to the US Marine Corps or to America’s joint special operating forces as embodied in the US Special Operations Command; high-level joint headquarters are not as integral to the Indian military hierarchy as they are in the American system; and India has only recently created an equivalent to the Joint Staff in its Integrated Defence Staff (whose role and authority are still evolving). These asymmetries add substantially to the coordination and planning burden required of any bilateral activity (such as deciding how to engage multiple Indian services in order to take advantage of a US Marine Corps unit passing through the Indian Ocean). Such challenges can be and have been overcome with imaginative staff work, but they are not inconsiderable; they can impose additional preparation time and require persistent attention even when they are focused on training or exercises that address the highest priorities on the Indian agenda (such as exchange programs between each side’s special forces). It is neither the goal nor the role of the United States to determine India’s military structure or the degree of “jointness” among its three services, but both sides need to recognize and accommodate these organizational asymmetries in order to maximize the enormous potential in the military-to-military relationship.

The content of the relationship An additional “asymmetry” is more problematic: divergence between the Indian and American assumptions about the content of a military-to-military relationship. For many in New Delhi, accustomed to a hardware supply relationship with the Soviet Union and skeptical of US reliability as a supplier over the long term, the litmus tests of defense ties is material: technology transfer and hardware. These elements of the Indian armed forces and foreign policy bureaucracy see the provision of significant modern equipment in the near term as “proof ” of the value of the military-to-military relationship as well as evidence that the United States is serious about building and sustaining a long-term program with India. 122

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Moreover, many in New Delhi perceive an American reticence to sell arms to India, a democratic state, which contrasts starkly in their minds with what they perceive as US flexibility in providing arms to India’s autocratic neighbors, China and Pakistan. The American paradigm, however, envisages a broad spectrum of interactions that includes, but is not founded upon, military sales or high-technology research-and-development projects.26 All too often the result of this asymmetry has been mutual frustration. The comments of an Indian Ministry of Defence official after a bilateral meeting in November 2004 are representative of what many Indians think: “The United States offered us everything we do not require, but they have denied whatever important weaponry we requested.”27 The relationship is too important to founder on this obstacle, but it could, and both sides need to cooperate to avoid such an outcome.28 The sale of Raytheon AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder radar systems to India has been a major milestone, but it is only the first step in what should be a sustained and mutually beneficial program, ensuring that “the political disconnect that hampered American defense sales to India” remains “a thing of the past,” as the US embassy’s Deputy Chief of Mission in India, Robert Blake, told an Indian Army audience in August 2004.29 Senior Indian officials remain concerned, however, and Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee reminded observers during a visit to the Aero-India aviation show in January 2005 that, “for us, the two main criteria are dependence as a source of supply and transfer of technology.”30 American scholar Ashley Tellis summed up the situation by remarking, “Unfortunately, there is still no galvanizing example of a major defense procurement deal to inspire confidence on both sides.”31 For India, this implies patience and reasonable expectations, while the United States must exhibit greater flexibility and determination to press forward expeditiously on some of India’s prominent requests. The United States should also endeavor to interpose as few objections as possible to transfers of US-origin material to India from third parties. As Schaffer has noted, “simply restoring the old pattern will not suffice.”32 Fortunately, this old pattern may be changing. The offers carried by Rice in March 2005 included F-16 and FA-18 multi-role fighters to add to the P-3 Orion maritime surveillance aircraft already under consideration for sale to India. India has also expressed interest in C-130J transports. Of particular note is the possibility of co-production in India should New Delhi select one of the fighter options. The “command and control, early warning, and missile defense” systems mentioned earlier “may not be as glamorous as combat aircraft,” in the words of a senior US official, but they are central to military modernization. Washington’s readiness to discuss such transfers represents a major shift from the past and could pave the way to a new future.33 The June 2005 “Defense Framework” specifically contains important promises of two-way defense trade, technology transfer and collaboration in co-production, research and development that could lead to new levels of cooperation in this key dimension of military-to-military interaction. The challenge will be, as one American observer remarked, to translate this openness “into concrete policy changes that produce fresh material 123

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gains for New Delhi,” and careful attention by the senior leadership on both sides will be required to see these pledges blossom into reality.34 Finally, it must be remembered that both countries are democracies and that each government must therefore operate in an often-challenging domestic political environment. Americans may justifiably ask for Indian indulgence in dealing with the intricacies of internal struggles between the White House and Capitol Hill, but US officials must be equally conscious of New Delhi’s domestic situation. In the past, for example, Indians looking across their western border have rightly argued that the United States readily heeds the domestic constraints claimed by authoritarian governments in Islamabad while ignoring the compulsions inherent in India’s democracy. Coalition governments are likely to be the norm in India’s parliamentary democracy for the foreseeable future, so senior Indian leaders will be sensitive to events that can be portrayed as foreign policy failures or miscalculations by their domestic opponents. Potential problem areas for the ruling party include military-to-military activities as shown by the complaints and anxieties raised after the signature of the Defense Framework. Although most of these activities are considered routine by audiences in the US Congress and among the broader American public, they can become lightning rods in India. The failure to acquire a high-profile item of hardware or technology, for example, or the appearance of sacrificing India’s foreign policy autonomy in some way can create frictions inside the ruling coalition or can be used by opposition parties to attack the government for staking too much on relations with the United States. In pursuing its security goals with India, then, the United States could attain greater stability and predictability in the military-to-military relationship by developing a better understanding of and sensitivity to the domestic Indian political climate. This does not mean shifting with every change of the political winds in the turbulent Indian democracy or allowing the potential for some protest to stymie every prospective endeavor, but it does mean factoring these considerations into plans for a solid and mutually beneficial defense relationship.

Prospects The immediate challenge for both parties, then, is overcoming these problems to attain the full promise of the United States–India defense relationship. Some conceptual guidelines must be established to guide specific measures to be taken to promote bilateral collaboration. In the first place, the relationship will take time to reach its potential. This implies a long-term investment of resources and steady, persistent policy attention, probably supplemented by periodic high-level events to keep the process focused and vigorous. In its most favorable incarnation, this enhanced military-to-military interaction would be located within the framework of increased and sustained US government policy emphasis on South Asia in general and India in particular. Second, the engagement must be as broad as possible within the civilian and military dimensions of the US defense establishment. Given the enormous size of both the American and the Indian militaries 124

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(the Indian Army, for example, is approximately twice the size of US Army) and their respective civilian hierarchies, time and a robust record of interactions across the entire spectrum of military services, functions, and ranks are needed to develop the level of familiarity required for effective US–India military cooperation within South Asia or elsewhere around the globe. Sending a small handful of American officers to Indian staff and defense colleges every year or bringing two dozen Indians to counterpart schools in the United States is essential, but limited measures such as these only begin to scratch the surface of the relationship’s possibilities. Third, as part of the “broadening” guideline, the United States should explore new venues for interaction. These include looking both east and west for opportunities to incorporate Indians in bilateral and, as often as possible, in multilateral activities with other friends and allies. Some beginnings have been made in Southeast Asia, but there are certainly mutually beneficial options to the west as well. Indian flexibility will be critical in this regard, as New Delhi will have to adjust its traditional reluctance to participate in multilateral activities outside of a United Nations umbrella.35 Fourth, both sides must exert themselves to manage expectations over this extended period as relations evolve. Exaggerated hopes could lead to exaggerated disappointments that would serve neither Washington’s nor New Delhi’s interests. Finally, it is important to keep in mind that this relationship is a two-way street—in other words, a process of mutual interaction. This means that the US side, as part of the process of carefully constructing a network of long-term bonds, must occasionally undertake activities that are high on the Indian agenda but may not directly serve an immediate US goal. The United States need not accept every Indian initiative and should, wherever feasible, craft mutually beneficial events, but small investments in this direction can go a long way toward satisfying Indian requirements and can thereby contribute to strengthening ties over the long haul. Interactions with the Indian military can take many forms that address US defense equities in enhancing structures for bilateral cooperation, building interoperability to increase Indian capacity in supporting missions of mutual interest, expanding regional familiarization among US personnel, and providing substantive training vehicles for American forces. The specific areas for expanded military-to-military cooperation are numerous and the two sides have already taken steps to explore many of them. The Malabar naval exercises, air force combat training in India and in the United States, the array of special forces counterterrorism exchanges, and army exercises in small-unit tactics and peacekeeping scenarios represent only a small sample of the growing list of substantive, sophisticated US–India interactions. Broadly speaking, however, the topics include items such as counterterrorism, counternarcotics, peacekeeping, and disaster response, as well as strategic dialogue. Furthermore, in looking for training partners outside of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United States will find few to compare with India in terms of size, capability, and professionalism. The differences in experiences and institutional cultures will challenge both sides and enrich the training environment. 125

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In the maritime arena, for example, the security of the Indian Ocean heads the list, especially operations to combat terrorism, piracy, and weapons smuggling on the high seas and along parts of the Indian Ocean littoral. Because maritime forces (navies and coast guards) have a major role to play in coping with environmental issues, a menu of conferences, training events, and exercises in reacting to environmental catastrophes could be beneficial to both sides and might provide a practical venue for multi-lateral cooperation in the Bay of Bengal or the Arabian Sea (such as a conference on environmental security in the Arabian Sea involving India, the Maldives, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and select Persian Gulf states). Navies and air forces would gain from exchanges on issues pertaining to, for example, the support of peacekeeping and humanitarian missions to increase the efficiency of these services in emergencies. India has a long record of achievement in disaster assistance and can be expected to play an ever-growing role in the Indian Ocean basin (as it did in its rapid response to the December 2004 tsunami). Indian and American ground forces (army and Marines on the US side) have undertaken several peacekeeping and disaster-assistance exchanges; they have also engaged in productive counterterrorism training, but there is much to be gained in exercises focused on tactics, techniques, and procedures for traditional military operations as well. If both sides can mute the occasional “not invented here” attitude (“What could they possibly teach us?”), they will find many areas of fruitful interaction. India has extensive experience in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in all environments and routinely deploys large-scale forces in desert and jungle terrain.36 Similarly, India’s expertise in high-altitude military operations (matched only by Pakistan’s) could help US troops better prepare to tackle combat and extended deployments in mountainous regions. More prosaic topics could include the American experience in joint operations, military education (especially with Indian interest in the creation of a national defense university), manpower issues, and the complex bundle of questions associated with integrating the actions of military forces, government agencies, and nongovernmental organizations in peacekeeping and national reconstruction. These issues will grow in importance for India as it seeks to modernize its armed forces and defense structure over the coming years. Additionally, the United States could benefit from the Indian experience of forming and maintaining an effective multi-ethnic army from its heterogeneous population. The Indian example will not transfer directly, but could inform American efforts to create new armies in complex, multi-ethnic societies such as Afghanistan.37 Washington could push the vexing issue of defense hardware and technology out of the doldrums by adopting a recommendation made by several American commentators: select a high-profile system and escort it carefully through the foreign military sales labyrinth on an expedited schedule.38 Following the bold announcements associated with Rice’s trip and the promise inherent in the Defense Framework, the prospective sale of P-3 Orions, C-130J transports, or F-16/FA-18 fighters might serve as a vehicle to promote this approach. Despite India’s signing 126

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of the delay-plagued General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) in January 2003, this would be no minor administrative endeavor. Success, however, could help to instill more responsiveness in the American bureaucracy so that future Indian requests could be treated with an expectation of approval. Both sides can also look for other imaginative opportunities. The centers and schools that are part of US Army’s training and education system, for example, might be useful avenues, for these institutions have an important role in systems development and in the integration of military hardware with doctrine and force structure. Regardless of the weapons system or training program under consideration, the entire sales process will need an initial boost and persistent follow-up from senior-level American leadership to move ahead and address legitimate Indian concerns.

Concluding observations The United States and India have made tremendous advances in reinvigorating and expanding defense relations in the relatively short period since late 2001—a time factor often overlooked by observers on both sides who expect more from the accelerating relationship. Top Indian and American leaders have repeatedly attested to the significance of defense ties, while defense officials and military personnel have infused the interaction with substance and, generally, a spirit of cooperation. These efforts comport well with the mutual drive to establish what a senior American official described as a “productive and sustainable strategic partnership” and represent the initial steps toward realizing Prime Minister Singh’s comment that “the best is yet to come.”39 Achievements and self-evident significance notwithstanding, the relationship, in Tellis’s words, “is still fragile and needs a lot of tending” lest it lapse into benign neglect “as an oddity many degrees removed from the core geopolitical interests of the two countries.”40 Another American, a former senior defense official, remarked in 2004 that both governments are “too focused on the downside risks rather than the upside opportunities.”41 Moving defense ties beyond narrow visions hobbled by the past to a new level appropriate to the twenty-first century will require patience, hard work, and compromise from both sides. Senior American leaders will have to supply the impetus and consistent commitment to strengthen and, more important, to sustain a true partnership with India. The Indian side must also demonstrate flexibility and commitment to constructing and maintaining a durable relationship over the long term consistent with its aim of “managing the transformations in the international situation.”42 For both countries, however, defense interaction must be embedded within the overall web of bilateral ties, a critical, integral component, but not the driving force, of the larger relationship. Solidly established and carefully nurtured, US–India defense relations will prove an invaluable asset to New Delhi and Washington as they face common threats such as terrorism and common opportunities such as Asia’s rise to strategic and economic prominence on the global stage. 127

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Notes * The view expressed in this chapter are solely those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the United States government. 1 “United States–India Joint Statement on Next Steps in Strategic Partnership,” September 17, 2004, available at www.state.gov. For an Indian view, see Anil Padmanabhan, “Positioned for the Glidepath,” India Today, February 2, 2004, pp. 33–35. 2 Saurabh Shukla, “In Aid of Friendship,” India Today, March 7, 2005, pp. 28–29. 3 American scholar C. Christine Fair avers that India will have substantial value as a counterterrorism partner because (1) New Delhi, with its broad security perspective, recognizes that the United States is essential to realizing its regional and global ambitions, and (2) India and America, as democracies, share the conviction that “instability and transnational threats represent major threats to their security.” C. Christine Fair, The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2004), p. 6. 4 Sumit Ganguly, “America and India at a Turning Point,” Current History, March 2005, pp. 120–24. 5 The history of US–India defense relations is covered in detail in Col. Russell V. Olson, “Indo-U.S. Military Cooperation,” thesis submitted to the National Defence College, New Delhi, 1993; and Col. Steven B. Sboto, “India and U.S. Military Cooperation and Collaboration: Problems, Prospects, and Implications,” thesis submitted to the National Defence College, New Delhi, 2001. Chaired by P.R. Chari, the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in New Delhi offers a thoughtful and thorough assessment of the bilateral relationship in India–U.S. Relations: Promoting Synergy (New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 2003). 6 The text of the Defense Framework is available on the US Embassy website: http://india.usembassy.gov 7 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002). 8 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, interview with Raj Chengappa of India Today, March 16, 2005, available at www.state.gov 9 Joint Statement Between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, July 18, 2005, at www.state.gov 10 Press Briefing on the President’s Meeting with Prime Minister Singh of India, R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs; Mike Green, Senior Director for Asian Affairs at the NSC, July 18, 2005, available at www.state.gov 11 “Background Briefing by Administration Officials on U.S.–South Asia Relations,” March 25, 2005, available at www.state.gov 12 Both quotes from a trenchant policy piece by Ashley J. Tellis, “South Asian Seesaw: A New U.S. Policy on the Subcontinent,” policy brief no. 38 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 2005). 13 R. Nicholas Burns, “The U.S. and India: An Emerging Entente?,” testimony to the House International Relations Committee, September 8, 2005, at www.state.gov. 14 Raj Chengappa and Anil Padmanabhan, “Roll Out the Red Carpet,” India Today, November 15, 2004, pp. 21–23. 15 “U.S. Step Draws Indian Complaint,” New York Times, March 21, 2004; and Anil Padmanabhan, “Double Jeopardy,” India Today, April 12, 2004, pp. 24–25. 16 See Juli A. MacDonald’s seminal study, Indo-U.S. Military Relationship: Expectations and Perceptions (Falls Church, VA: Booz Allen Hamilton, 2002), p. xix. Rahul Bedi offers an Indian perspective on MacDonald’s analysis in “Weighed Down by History,” Frontline 20: 10 (May 10–23, 2003), available at http://www.frontlineonnet.com/ fl2010/stories/20030523001405100.htm

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17 Prime Minister Singh referred to “a mutuality of interests and a complementarity of objectives” between the United States and India in a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, September 24, 2004, available at www.pmindia.nic.in 18 “Remarks of MEA Spokesperson on the Visit of U.S. Secretary of Defense, Mr. Donald Rumsfeld,” New Delhi, December 9, 2004, available at www.indianembassy.org The standard Indian response to such US actions was summarized in 2003 when a Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson noted, “Our position has been that in the past, [the] supply of offensive equipment to Pakistan by the U.S. has created problems in the region as [that equipment] has only been used against us.” See “India Opposes US Supply of F-16s to Pak,” The Times of India, June 19, 2003. 19 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, interview with Shivraj Prasad of NDTV, March 16, 2005, available at www.state.gov 20 Assistant Secretary of State Christina Rocca, “The United States and India: Moving Forward in Global Partnership,” speech to the Confederation of Indian Industry, September 11, 2003, available at www.state.gov 21 Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, interview with Charlie Rose, September 21, 2004, available at www.pmindia.nic.in 22 Former deputy secretary of state Strobe Talbott comments that both the Clinton and Bush administrations have believed that “treating Pakistan as an enemy and a lost cause would only drive it further and faster in the direction of behaving like one.” See Strobe Talbott, Engaging India (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), p. 213. 23 Teresita Schaffer, “Building a New Partnership with India,” Washington Quarterly, Spring 2002, p. 41. She uses the felicitous phrase “selective partnership” to describe the likely character of future US–India relations (p. 32). See also Teresita Schaffer, “Rising India and U.S. Policy Options in Asia” (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2002), p. 29. 24 Schaffer, “Building a New Partnership with India,” p. 41. 25 See Talbott, Engaging India, p. 209. 26 Emblematic of the diverging views is a 1984 bilateral memorandum of understanding and several subsequent agreements that led to the supply of US engines for Indian fighter jets, among other projects. For most Indians, this was a military-to-military event, but few Americans would regard it as such; from the American perspective, it was primarily a commercial deal (albeit for military hardware), not an interaction involving or closely related to the two nations’ armed forces. 27 Vivek Raghuvanshi, “U.S. Weapons Offer Disappoints Indian Officials,” Defense News, November 18–24, 2004. 28 Indian commentator A. Das offers typically skeptical language in stating that the single issue of Pakistani support to militants in India “has the potential to overshadow all other positive developments and opportunities.” See A. Das, review of Teresita Schaffer, “Building a New Partnership with India,” in Bharat Rakshak Monitor 5: 4 (January–February 2003), available at http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ ISSUE5-4/nandv.html 29 Robert O. Blake, “U.S.–India Relations: The Making of a Comprehensive Relationship,” speech to the Indian Army War College, August 23, 2004, available at www.state.gov. See also Ambassador David C. Mulford, “From Strategic to Comprehensive,” guest column, Hindustan Times, June 6, 2004. 30 Quoted in Sandeep Unnithan, “First Jet Engine Laugh,” India Today, February 28, 2005, pp. 20–21. 31 Ashley J. Tellis, “Seeking Breakthroughs: The Meandering U.S.–India Relationship Needs Fresh Impetus,” Force, October 2004, pp. 8–9. 32 Schaffer, “Building a New Partnership with India,” p. 39. 33 “Background Briefing by Administration Officials.”

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34 Tellis, “South Asian Seesaw,” May 2005. 35 See suggestions along these lines in Cdr. Gurpeet S. Khurana, “Safeguarding the Malacca Straits,” Sahara Times (New Delhi), January 1, 2005. 36 India’s experience in combating terrorists and insurgents in urban terrain, for instance, is discussed in C. Christine Fair, Urban Battlefields of South Asia (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2004). 37 I am indebted to Stephen P. Cohen of the Brookings Institution for this idea. 38 As suggested by Claudio Lilienfeld in “Defense Cooperation: Where Are We Today?” lecture at conference on “U.S.–India Bilateral Cooperation: Taking Stock and Moving Forward,” Sigur Center for Asian Studies, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, Washington, DC, April 1, 2004. 39 Undersecretary of Commerce Kenneth I. Juster, “A New Strategic Partnership for the US and India,” Asian Wall Street Journal, October 1, 2004; and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, “Remarks by the President and Prime Minister Singh of India,” September 21, 2004, available at www.whitehouse.gov 40 Tellis, “Seeking Breakthroughs.” 41 Former assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs Franklin Kramer, “Toward a Mature Defense Relationship: Limits, Possibilities, and Lessons,” lecture at conference on “U.S.–India Bilateral Cooperation: Taking Stock and Moving Forward.” 42 Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, speech to the All-India Congress Committee, New Delhi, August 21, 2004, available at www.pmindia.nic.in

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7 PROSPECTS FOR US–INDIA COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION An American view Polly Nayak*

The United States and India have cooperated on counterterrorism for years and doubtless will continue to do so. This essay examines the pattern of this cooperation to date, its likely scope in the years ahead, and some hypothetical scenarios that could re-shape that future.1 A particular challenge for open-source research on bilateral counterterrorism ties, including the spadework for this article, is that such partnerships are conducted with discretion and sometimes secrecy, even when other ties between the governments in question are widely discussed and debated. This discretion reflects the nature of counterterrorism itself. The public face of the issue is the declared national counterterrorism policy—a product of overlapping domestic politics, leadership, and threat perceptions, internal security arrangements, and foreign and defense policies and ties. Counterterrorism liaison relations are a different matter. Viewed as a sub-set of operational capabilities, these ties are protected as part of the “sources and methods” involved in identifying, monitoring, and apprehending terrorists. In addition, counterterrorism cooperation often piggybacks quietly on existing law enforcement, military, or intelligence relations that carry their own confidentiality requirements. In any case, the fact that bilateral counterterrorism cooperation operates “below the radar” affords cooperating professionals some flexibility in jointly confronting terrorist challenges, as well as insulation from the ups and downs of bilateral diplomacy, domestic political maneuvering, and public opinion. Although conducted quietly for most of its history, US–Indian counterterrorism cooperation has left a sufficient public record over the past fifteen years to permit some analysis. While this cooperation persisted even during some times of high tension in the overall bilateral relationship, the scope and tone of counterterrorism relations have been a function of the events and trends shaping

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US–Indian ties writ large. This chapter analyzes the counterterrorism partnership in relation to those broader trends. The first section examines the pre-1998 roots of the formal counterterrorism partnership that was finally launched in January 2000. The second looks at the period from 1998, when India’s nuclear tests triggered US sanctions, until the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, referred to in this paper as “9/11.” The third section discusses the changes to the bilateral partnership resulting from 9/11. The fourth assesses the likely future of US–Indian counterterrorism ties and identifies some developments that might dramatically increase or decrease cooperation in this area.

Pre-1998 roots of the counterterrorism partnership The formal launch of the US–India Joint Counter Terrorism Working Group in January 2000 marked the transformation of a previously obscure partnership into a lead element of the haltingly expanding bilateral relationship. Then as now, counterterrorism was assumed to be easier and less contentious than other potential areas of security cooperation. The working group was to have been initiated two years earlier. In 1997, the Clinton Administration had decided on a new India-focused South Asia policy emphasizing economic ties and de-emphasizing nuclear proliferation concerns. At the maiden meeting of the new “strategic dialogue” between senior US and senior Indian officials in December 1997, counterterrorism was high on the list of issues to pursue in an expanded relationship. Progress on the new bilateral agenda, however, was interrupted by the 1998 tests and imposition of US sanctions. The inauguration of the joint counterterrorism working group in early 2000 signaled President Clinton’s resolve to get bilateral ties back on track and sanctions lifted, as well as a general desire to raise the profile of international counterterrorism cooperation in the face of a growing terrorist threat. New Delhi, too, welcomed the official launch of the joint working group as evidence of renewed engagement with Washington, as well as a channel for engaging US officials regularly on India’s terrorism concerns, specifically Pakistan. At the strategic dialogue meetings of 1997, Foreign Secretary K. Raghunath had underscored India’s concerns about cross-border terrorism; Prime Minister Inder Kumar Gujral highlighted Pakistan-sponsored terrorism as the cause of Indo-Pakistani tensions. The tone of the meetings cheered some Indian observers. Political commentator Raja Mohan, for example, described comments by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Thomas Pickering as “mark[ing] a new American sensitivity to the profound impact terrorism has had on India’s security in the last decade and a half. India has welcomed the new American approach and wants more follow-up action.”2 The first follow-up finally occurred two years later. As an arena in which to build US–Indian ties after decades of bilateral tension, counterterrorism seemed particularly promising in the late 1990s for three reasons. First, years of de facto bilateral cooperation on specific terrorism issues 132

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had built up a reservoir of good will. Second, terrorism was an issue important to both governments. Each had long supported the expansion of international counterterrorism mechanisms. For example, in 1994 then-Commerce Minister Pranab Mukherjee pressed for a new UN counterterrorism convention,3 and in 1995 both India’s Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha and President Bill Clinton urged the UN to spearhead a push against global terrorism.4 Third, the issue of counterterrorism was relatively free of the “baggage” associated with US nuclear nonproliferation policy toward South Asia, although the sanctions imposed on India in 1998 did limit US security assistance. The sections below briefly examine each of these three initial bases for expanding bilateral counterterrorism relations.

History of de facto cooperation As the two sides formalized and expanded existing counterterrorism ties, the good will already accumulated by low-profile day-to-day official cooperation on terrorism proved to be the strongest of the three advantages. During the 1980s and early 1990s, India had sought and received US cooperation on Sikh terrorism, then its premier challenge. While welcoming the conclusion of a US–Indian extradition treaty in 1997 as a landmark in bilateral counterterrorism relations, India’s then-Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Salim Sherwani, emphasized that the treaty merely formalized a tradition of “surprisingly good” de facto cooperation with the United States, including the extradition of several Sikh militants wanted for violent acts in India.5 Foreign Ministry Joint Secretary Alok Prasad noted that the accord—which followed similar agreements with Canada and the United Kingdom—would facilitate the deportation of criminals sought by either country and send a strong message to terrorists.6 Indian officials also welcomed a new law signed by President Clinton in 1996 that barred fund-raising in the United States by named terrorist groups, including the Indian Sikh separatist Babbar Khalsa and Khalistan Liberation Front. The law, of course, also encompassed terrorist fundraising from other diaspora communities in the United States. The 1996 law did not wholly reassure Indian officials. An unidentified Indian diplomat in Washington told the Los Angeles Times that terrorism “aimed from the United States” remained a problem for India and cited as an example the Council of Khalistan, which functioned as a lobbying group in Washington but whose founders were wanted by India for their role in blowing up an Air India flight over the Atlantic in 1985. Implicitly agreeing, US counterterrorism experts observed that concerns about stifling legitimate fund-raising activities had blunted the implementation of such US legislation in the past.7 In the mid-1990s, US counterterrorism officials similarly sought and received assistance from Indian counterparts following the abduction in early July 1995 of two American tourists by Al Faran militants in Kashmir. A German, a Norwegian, and two Britons also were kidnapped several days later. Al Faran threatened to kill the hostages unless India released jailed Kashmir separatists. One of the Americans subsequently escaped, but the Norwegian was beheaded as a warning 133

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to the Indian Government.8 In November 1996, a year after negotiations between Indian officials and Al Faran broke down, the US State Department announced that the Government of India and state authorities were developing a rewards program for information leading to the location of the hostages, complementing the work of a Government of India investigative team.9 The US Ambassador to Pakistan announced a parallel rewards program there. In 1997, the chief of India’s elite Black Cat commando forces reportedly consulted with visiting US, British, and German counterterrorism experts on the search for the hostages10 amid unconfirmed reports that they had been killed.11 Their fate was never ascertained, but the issue faded from the bilateral agenda. US–Indian counterterrorism cooperation weathered a tiff in 1997 between Washington and New Delhi over alleged unauthorized meetings between a senior Indian intelligence officer and American intelligence officials. The squabble seemed to have little practical effect on the relationship in part because it was so low key and expectations on both sides, so modest. New Delhi expelled two US intelligence representatives from the US Embassy; Washington countered by demanding the withdrawal of two Indian intelligence officers from consulates in the United States. The episode blew over despite warnings by an unnamed senior US diplomat—reported by India Today—that the expulsion of the Americans would “impair” information sharing on counterterrorism; the reporter concluded that “no diplomatic feathers were ruffled in New Delhi’s South Block” by the tit-for-tat US demand.12 The professionalism both sides brought to ad hoc US–Indian counterterrorism cooperation clearly was a plus in an up-and-down bilateral relationship. It could not, however, reduce fundamental differences between the US and Indian perspectives on terrorism that still complicate the relationship and limit operational ties.

Shared emphasis on terrorism—but conflicting threat perceptions While terrorism was and is important to both the United States and India, their divergent preoccupations and threat perceptions have put them at odds repeatedly; the relationship has been burdened by parochial expectations on both sides. India has been disappointed with the US approach to Pakistan, while Washington has been unhappy with India’s attitude toward “rogue states” such as Iran and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Each side has suspected bias in information received from the other regarding its terrorism nemeses. New Delhi’s preoccupations For India, terrorism has been largely a homeland security issue. This domestic focus is evident in the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2002 (POTA), which

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identifies terrorists as persons intending to “threaten the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of India or to strike terror in the people or any section of the people.” POTA’s definition of terrorists covers individuals belonging to banned organizations or involved in raising funds for terrorist groups, and terrorism includes virtually any type of attack on a wide variety of targets, including Indian government property.13 India’s neighbors have figured prominently in its terrorism concerns. By the late 1990s, India had faced violence linked to ethnic, ideological, and religious insurgencies in its northeast and to Sikh separatism in Punjab state,14 the 16-yearold Kashmir autonomy movement,15 and Naxalite rebellions in the south and east.16 The second and third of these had attracted cross-border support from Pakistan.17 In recent years, New Delhi has pressed Burma, Bhutan, and Bangladesh18 to deny sanctuary and weapons shipments to militants from India’s northeast and has accused Islamabad of meddling there, as well. Thus, New Delhi’s worries about state-supported terrorism have focused on the surrounding states—above all, Pakistan. Indian observers have long monitored official US views on terrorism for evidence of progress toward adopting New Delhi’s optic on Islamabad. They have been frustrated by what they saw as inconsistencies and backsliding in public statements and in the State Department’s annual Patterns of Global Terrorism (PGT) concerning Pakistan’s terrorist threat to India. ●

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In 1997, for example, India praised as a recognition of ground realities in South Asia the State Department’s announcement that it was adding to its list of terrorist organizations the Harkat-Ul-Ansar (HuA), a Pakistan-linked organization with reported ties to the Al-Faran militant group that abducted the Western tourists in Kashmir in 1995. An Indian foreign ministry spokesman emphasized India’s hope that the United States would soon recognize the “true nature” of other such organizations operating in Jammu and Kashmir.19 In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the Indian press lauded the newly published PGT for 2000 for reporting that Pakistan provided bases for anti-American terrorists as well as for militant groups active in Indian-held Kashmir, such as the Harakat ul-Mujahideen.20 An Economic Times of India editorial, however, found the PGT of 2002 disappointing from the Indian perspective because it failed to make “even a veiled suggestion that the Pakistani establishment may in any way be abetting the terrorists,” yet lauded Islamabad’s counterterrorism efforts. The article faulted the United States for not letting “the principle of opposition to all forms of terrorism override its immediate objectives.”21 In 2004, Indian counterterrorism expert Ajay Sahni, editor of the South Asia Intelligence Review, was outraged by what he saw as the newly published 2003 PGT’s soft-pedaling of Pakistan’s role in regional terrorism.22

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Washington’s focus In contrast to India, US senior officials viewed terrorism before 9/11 mainly as a threat to US interests abroad. The investigation of the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center in New York by Islamist terrorists uncovered plots for multiple bombings and assassinations there, highlighting the threat to homeland security. Some US counterterrorism experts, notably Bruce Hoffman, turned their attention to the shifts under way from secular to religiously based terrorism, from state-supported terrorist groups with traditional structures to networks, and from targeting Americans abroad to targeting them in the United States.23 The US counterterrorism community’s all-out effort to foil “millenium” attacks on the United States in December 1999–January 2000 reflected the new concern about the homeland, but subsequent attacks on Khobar Towers and on the Cole refocused official American attention on the overseas threat. In Washington’s global but US-centric view of terrorist threats, Pakistan appeared less important and more benign than to India. Moreover, American officials had their own yardstick for Pakistani cooperation on counterterrorism, to New Delhi’s irritation. In 1991, citing Pakistani support for violence by Kashmiri separatists, New Delhi officially asked Washington to declare Pakistan a state sponsor of international terrorism.24 India must have taken heart, however briefly, when Director of Central Intelligence Woolsey stated in April 1993 that United States was on the brink of listing Pakistan (along with Sudan) as a state sponsor of terrorism for supporting both Muslim militants associated with Kashmir and Sikh separatists in Punjab against the Indian Government. State Department officials, however, reportedly opposed listing Pakistan, arguing that this would isolate and drive it into the arms of radical anti-western states.25 When US officials announced Washington’s decision later in 1993 not to list Pakistan, they cited Islamabad’s responsiveness to US concerns about the Kashmir militants; its promise to “flush out” militant organizations to which it admitted only providing moral support; and its cooperation with US officials in apprehending Mir Aimal Kansi—a Pakistani later executed in the United States for slaying several CIA employees outside the agency’s headquarters. In addition, the Nawaz Sharif administration reportedly replaced the director of its leading intelligence service, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID), in response to US concerns about his role.26 Washington also was pleased both with Pakistan’s cooperation on the extradition to the United States of Ramzi Youssuf in 1995 after his indictment for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and with the joint investigation of the murder of four US oil executives in Karachi in 1998.27 Thus, Pakistan characteristically ended up on the US terrorism watch list, not on the list of state sponsors. US–Indian differences on militant terrorism have been reflected in their divergent approaches to Indo-Pakistani tensions. ●

New Delhi generally has insisted that Islamabad end militant infiltrations across the Line of Control in Kashmir before the two countries can talk peace. 136

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Washington has seen Pakistan’s hand in the Kashmiri militancy as part of a tit-for-tat pattern between India and Pakistan since partition in 1947—hence, a result of regional tensions.

Consequently, Washington has repeatedly prescribed the reduction of Indo-Pakistani tensions as a means to ending terrorism against India, as well as averting the risk of general war between nuclear powers. In 1993, for example, Principal Deputy Assistant John Malott identified regional security and counterterrorism as two of the top priorities for US South Asian policy.28 The Clinton Administration planned to conduct parallel dialogues on Indo-Pakistani tensions and terrorism with India and with Pakistan, Malott said. Reflecting similar assumptions, the Bush Administration adopted the same approach after militants linked to Pakistan attacked India’s Parliament in New Delhi in December 2001, sparking a massive Indian military deployment to the border. If India has found the US approach to Pakistan unpalatable, New Delhi’s agnosticism on Iran’s and Iraq’s support for international terrorism has rankled US officials. While Washington shunned both Iran and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq as state sponsors of terrorism, India maintained cordial relations with each as part of its complex multilateralist post-Cold War foreign policy.29 In 1993, when DCI James Woolsey was describing the Iran-backed Hezbollah organization— based in Lebanon—as the greatest threat to US and other Western interests,30 New Delhi was expanding ties to Tehran, driven largely by India’s expanding appetite for energy and trade.31 US observers worried about the potential transfer of sensitive advanced Indian technologies to Iran by means of scientific exchanges. In 2004 and 2005, revived tensions between Washington and Tehran over Iran’s nuclear program showed signs of complicating US–Indian relations again. Indian commentators were alarmed by rumors from Washington of possible US military action against Iran. Washington opposed a proposed Iran–Pakistan–India gas line, viewed by some Indian and Pakistani officials as a confidence-building measure between their two countries, as well as a solution to their energy needs. In mid-March 2005, an unnamed Bush Administration source reportedly stated that “. . . the last thing we would want to see is Iran getting more revenue to fund its nuclear weapons program.”32 In an indirect response to US objections to the pipeline, Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran politely challenged the international community to help India tap nuclear energy for its growth, despite past disagreements on nuclear issues.33 Beginning in late summer 2005, dismay about India’s ties to Iran complicated the US congressional debate on a proposed US–Indian civil nuclear cooperation agreement designed to address India’s energy concerns. India initially balked at US pressure to join the United States and Europe in pressing Iran to give up its nuclear program, just as Administration officials were seeking waivers of international nonproliferation guidelines on the grounds that India is a responsible nuclear state.34 137

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US and Indian threat perceptions also have diverged on Iraq. Washington viewed Iraq as an instigator of terrorism against the United States and its allies as well as a threat to stability in the Middle East; many Indians disapproved of US attack on Iraq after it invaded Kuwait in 1991, although New Delhi permitted US military aircraft to refuel in India during the Gulf War.35 Similarly, many in India saw the 2003 Iraq war as a peculiarly US mission, not a response to threats posed by Iraq. Senior Indian officials pointedly cited terrorism at home, which they blamed on US counterterrorism ally Pakistan, as the reason for declining to send troops to aid the US-led campaign in Iraq.36 New Delhi’s relatively charitable view of Iraq’s role in global terrorism may have stemmed partly from Baghdad’s offer of counterterrorism assistance to New Delhi at a crucial time, much as Islamabad had won Washington’s gratitude in the past. At a conference in July 2003, former Additional Secretary and counterterrorism veteran B. Raman reportedly endorsed India’s decision not to send troops to join US forces in Iraq because, following bombings in Mumbai in the early 1990s, Saddam Hussein’s government alone offered to help India track down the responsible terrorists.37 Thus, while both the United States and India pushed for tighter international controls on terrorism in the 1990s and since, their reasons for doing so differed importantly. ●

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Washington has sought through international cooperation to isolate “rogue” nations and to end passive support by states around the world for terrorist groups, to raise the costs to these groups of doing business, and to deny them the use of territory.38 For India, de-legitimating terrorist tactics regardless of their cause has meant, in effect, denying Pakistan’s rationale that it supported freedom fighters who were trying to throw off the yoke of Indian oppression in Kashmir. India’s concern was reflected in the argument made by an Indian representative at UN in 1998 in favor of a new convention on terrorism with no “conditionalities such as subjecting extradition requests to the domestic law of the requested state.”39

Mutual misperceptions and suspicions Prejudices on both sides made it difficult for senior Indian officials to discuss with American counterparts, let alone narrow, these differences on counterterrorism. B. Raman noted in 1997 that the United States had a tendency to underestimate India’s capabilities and reliability and to project “superpower” arrogance in the relationship, while Indian officials suffered from an “obsessive urge” to be critical of the United States and to deny it credit where credit was due. A residual chill on both sides from the Cold War era contributed to these problems. “We, rightly, criticise the Americans for not declaring Pakistan a state sponsoring 138

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international terrorism, but we do not have the generosity to acknowledge the US assistance in counter-terrorism,” Raman wrote.40 New Delhi’s suspicion of US intentions in the region also constrained Washington’s counterterrorism cooperation with India’s smaller neighbors in the mid-1990s. Sri Lankan officials, for example, worried about New Delhi’s opposition to the US provision of counterterrorism training and satellite imagery assistance sought by Colombo, although they ultimately accepted the US help.41 In July 1996, an unnamed Sri Lankan official told India Abroad that relations with India had improved significantly under President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s administration because it had abandoned the pro-West policies of the previous United National Party (UNP) government. The UNP, the official said, had failed to grasp the true import of “dynamic neutralism.” Relations with India had faltered when Western and Israeli military advisers were brought in to help fight the “Tamil Tiger” insurgents, he claimed, whereas Kumaratunga and her Foreign Minister had revived Sri Lankan–Indian ties based on “mutual and continuous recognition of each other’s sensitivities and needs.”42 Thus, by the late 1990s, differences in foreign policy perspectives still fettered US–Indian counterterrorism cooperation, despite shared concerns about terrorist groups and regional stability. It would take outside events to provide new impetus for the relationship.

May 1998–September 10, 2001: impeded by sanctions In 1998, just as global and regional developments were starting to narrow the gap between US and Indian terrorism threat perceptions, India’s nuclear tests and their diplomatic fallout again dampened prospects for counterterrorism cooperation. Several factors contributed to the partial convergence of Indian and US views. Al Qaida’s leaders had publicly declared both India and the United States to be enemies of Islam and, hence, targets for attack by true Muslims. Other developments included Washington’s growing perception of Afghanistan as a font of anti-US international terrorism and frustration with Islamabad’s refusal to end support for the Taliban, despite its close ties to Al Qaida. In addition, it seemed possible that international terrorist activity would spread to India. The classified US indictment of Bin Ladin in 1998 following the investigation of the US Embassy bombings in East Africa reportedly named groups believed to be operating under Al Qaida’s umbrella in India, among other countries.43 By precluding military sales and cooperation for a time and freezing the annual bilateral defense dialogue, the congressionally mandated US sanctions imposed on India after the tests closed some avenues of counterterrorism cooperation. The sanctions postponed proposed joint exercises and temporarily foreclosed US sales of military items such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and night vision equipment that were sought by India for its counterterrorism units.44 The suspension of US–Indian Defense Policy Group (DPG) meetings held up the planned formalization of the counterterrorism relationship. Jointly headed by India’s 139

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defense secretary and the US assistant secretary of defense for international security, the DPG represented the two sides’ defense interests in US–Indian working groups on counterterrorism and peacekeeping. Thus, in late 2001, as sanctions were about to be lifted, senior officials in the Bush Administration and their Indian counterparts busily planned the December DPG meeting that would pave the way for expanded counterterrorism cooperation.45 US sanctions appear also to have helped spur India’s counterterrorism partnership with, as well as arms purchases from, Israel. In August 2001, Israel’s Jerusalem Post—quoting Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor—described broad-gauge counterterrorism cooperation between New Delhi and Tel Aviv, encompassing law enforcement, military, and intelligence ties. The two governments reportedly began discussing a joint Indo-Israeli working group on cross border terrorism in 2000; the group was officially launched in 2002. Prime Minister Shimon Peres’ high-visibility visit to India in early 2001 reportedly followed that of an Israeli counterterrorism team that included military intelligence specialists and senior police commanders. The Israeli group—led by Eli Katzir of the Counter-Terrorism Combat Unit in the Prime Minister’s Office—was said to have visited Kashmir and other troubled areas to help assess India’s security needs.46 At least as important as US sanctions in driving India’s partnership with Israel were their parallel terrorism concerns, similar threat perceptions, and compatible approaches to counterterrorism. Both governments were focused on homeland security; each faced attacks launched from disputed territories; both confronted hostile neighbors. The Jane’s report quoted an Indian official as saying: “We’ve told the Israelis that we’re prepared to help safeguard their interests in the region. The source of our mutual nuclear threat is the same”—presumably a reference to militant political Islam.47 The two countries reportedly later discussed possible joint exercises; “their [the Israelis’] experience in counter-terrorism methods can be invaluable to us,” India’s then-Defense Minister, George Fernandes, remarked publicly in September 2003.48 Israel’s relationship with India is second only to that with the United States, the chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, Yuval Steinitz, told a United Press International reporter in 2003.49 India’s perceived convergence of interests with Israel also fueled joint lobbying efforts in Washington, some of them brokered by the American Jewish Committee. Israel has sought India’s help in influencing US policy on Israel; India has sought the US Jewish Community’s support in opposing US military sales to Pakistan.50 Thus, although the imposition of US sanctions encouraged counterterrorism cooperation with Israel along with broader security ties, the removal of those sanctions did not slow the growth of that relationship. Some officials in each country have urged the expansion of US–Israeli–Indian cooperation; others have been skeptical. Commenting in September 2003 on the feasibility of a three-way “axis,” India’s then-Defense Minister, George Fernandes said, “When one of the

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countries in this axis (the US) has close links with Pakistan, which is the foremost country sponsoring terrorism, the axis does not seem feasible.”51

Post-9/11: widening—but not deepening—counterterrorism cooperation The 9/11 attacks—after initially diverting Washington from establishing the intended “strategic partnership”52 with India—ultimately spurred counterterrorism relations. Indian officials, having offered virtually unqualified assistance to the United States, appeared at first to feel slighted by the US decision to make Pakistan the mainspring for the US response to the 9/11 attacks. For a time, Washington’s drive to link up with Pakistan on counterterrorism seemed to be replacing nonproliferation as an obstacle to US–Indian cooperation. Common US and Indian concerns about security and “Islamist terrorism,” however, prevailed under both the Hindu nationalist-led government of the day and the Congress Party-Leftist coalition that succeeded it in May 2004, underscoring the broadbased political support in India for bilateral counterterrorism ties. Most important from New Delhi’s vantage point, as a result of 9/11 Washington finally moved closer to India’s view of Kashmir militants as international terrorists—a diplomatic triumph for India. ●

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In an October 2001 interview, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage cited Washington’s recent imposition of sanctions against the Jaish-eMuhamad as evidence that US concerns with terrorism in the region went “beyond Afghanistan.”53 Statements in November 2001 by senior US officials seemed to repudiate any distinction between terrorists and freedom fighters; India had been working hard to impress on Washington the links between Kashmir militants supported by Pakistan and international terrorist groups like Al Qaida. Indian officials particularly welcomed the US designation of the Pakistan-based Lashkar-eTaiba (LeT) and Jaish-e Muhamad as terrorist organizations a few days before a planned visit to the United States of then-Prime Minister Vajpayee.54 After militants with ties to Pakistan attacked India’s Parliament in December 2001, Indian officials charged Washington with practicing a double standard on terrorism. In response, Washington began describing militant violence against Indian targets as part of global terrorism, to Pakistan’s chagrin.55 In 2003, eleven young Muslims in the Washington area were charged with belonging to LeT, which had been linked to multiple terrorist attacks on Indian targets.56 In late September 2003, at the end of the Bush–Vajpayee talks on the fringes of the UNGA, Condoleezza Rice reportedly told journalists that the President had talked with Musharraf about the “need to stop cross-border terrorism in Kashmir”57—precisely the formulation sought by New Delhi.

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These developments reduced one longtime obstacle to closer US–Indian counterterrorism cooperation: New Delhi’s frustration with Washington’s perceived indifference to India’s terrorism concerns.

Partnering on new areas The pace of US–Indian counterterrorism meetings and the scope of bilateral cooperation have increased significantly since 9/11. The initial focus on international terrorism expanded to include narcoterrorism, Afghanistan, and the Taliban.58 As then-Ambassador Robert Blackwill described the relationship in 2003:59 With respect to intelligence exchange and law enforcement, together we are going hard after the bad guys. The FBI and US Customs Service have intensified beyond recognition their cooperative activities with Indian colleagues to investigate terrorism, major crimes, money laundering, smuggling and customs violations. We regularly share information to detect and counter potential terrorist attacks, and strengthen our respective homeland security. In October 2001, we signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, that we hope will soon come into force, to counter criminal activities more effectively. In April 2002, a US-India cybersecurity forum was launched to boost our bilateral cooperation in this domain. Blackwill also noted growing bilateral counternarcotics cooperation. India’s reconstruction and development activities in Afghanistan since 2002 have drawn praise from Washington but also have exposed Indian nationals to terrorist attacks by Taliban and Al Qaida elements.60 The slow but steady expansion of US–India security relations since 2001 has added other dimensions to the bilateral counterterrorism relationship.61 The lifting of US sanctions allowed the United States to offer India equipment to help apprehend militants crossing the Line of Control in Kashmir. Joint counterterrorism and counterinsurgency exercises have raised at least the possibility of future joint operations. US Army troops took part with Indian troops in jungle warfare exercises in India’s northeast and Guam in 2003 and 2004; in summer 2004, a senior-level US Army delegation visited the India’s 15 Corps Battle School (CBS) near Srinagar with an eye to adopting its training techniques on anti-militancy and unconventional operations for US troops heading to Iraq.62 Counterterrorism elements have been incorporated into joint naval exercises,63 and the two sides have broadened their cooperation on aviation as well as maritime security.

Perceived gains from cooperation Both US and Indian observers have acknowledged concrete gains from the growing US–Indian counterterrorism relationship. For example, bilateral cooperation has influenced the way India organizes against terrorism, according to B. Raman; the 142

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two sides also have exchanged training materials and methods.64 Raman lauded an Indo-US Workshop on the use of science and technology in counterterrorism, held in Goa in India in January, 2004 as an instance of information sharing with clear payoffs, notably in interrupting clandestine terrorist financial networks.65 Information exchanged by the US and Indian officials reportedly has proved vital to their respective pursuits. ●

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An unnamed Indian official claimed in October 2001 that India’s external intelligence service, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), had provided critical information to US officials, including the cell phone number of terrorist Omar Sheikh, according to India’s Daily Excelsior newspaper.66 The United States has contributed intelligence on growing Maoist activities in India and on efforts by Maoist groups worldwide to forge a grand alliance. Indian police sources noted in 2004 that the US decision to put some of these Indian groups on a watch list would help prevent them from seeking external support.67

Persistent obstacles Despite these gains and the benefits for bilateral ties of inducting a new generation of officials on both sides into cooperative ventures, the counterterrorism relationship continues to suffer from some familiar ailments. These include differing views of and equities in emerging regional problems, as well as mistrust on the Indian side. Differences on Nepal and Bangladesh Washington and New Delhi’s shared concerns about maintaining stability in South Asia have spurred information sharing on terrorist bases and training camps in Nepal and Bangladesh, according to the US-published Armed Forces Journal,68 but the two sides sometimes have disagreed on the implications of such information. This has been true even on Nepal, where US and Indian officials have generally seen eye to eye on the nature of the problem. In 2004 and early 2005, both worried about the rapid spread of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal and the suspension of democracy, despite some differences over the advisability of cutting off counterterrrorism aid after the King ousted the elected government early in 2005. Moreover, US officials typically have deferred to Indian policy preferences on Nepal, recognizing New Delhi’s greater stake in the outcome.69 Nevertheless, according to one Indian report, in fall 2004 Indian officials feared that US advisers were encouraging Nepal’s King to use military force against Maoist insurgents rather than negotiating. Indian security personnel reportedly searched a Bulgarian aircraft chartered by the State Department to deliver a US diplomatic consignment of arms and ammunition to Nepal’s counterterrorism police when the plane refueled in Ahmedabad. New Delhi was said to be 143

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embarrassed by press reports on the detention of the aircraft but still nettled by US involvement in India’s zone of influence.70 Disagreements between Washington and New Delhi over the situation in Bangladesh at times appear more fundamental. The US side has been cautiously reexamining its longtime view of Bangladesh as a moderate and friendly, if politically chaotic, ally. Following discussions with Indian counterparts in late August 2004 on the fringes of the sixth Indo-US Working Group meeting on Counterterrorism, US Coordinator for Counterterrorism Cofer Black reportedly asserted that Washington was trying to determine both whether Bangladesh is itself at risk and whether it is a potential platform to “project terrorism internationally.” Rearticulating the US position in May 2005 following talks with Bangladeshi leaders, Christina Rocca, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, underlined Washington’s faith that Dacca remained “a voice for moderation” but also its expectation that “all terrorists are prosecuted wherever they are-whether they are in Bangladesh or elsewhere. . . . Essentially in Bangladesh, we will certainly encourage the government to go after those who would undermine the long tradition of tolerance, moderation and peace. . . . These elements are not only threat of the United States but also other countries where they are active,” she told reporters.71 In contrast, unnamed Indian officials have variously declared Bangladesh to be hostile to India, or “in denial” about its emerging role as a “hub for international terrorism,” and a sanctuary for terrorists.72 Friction between New Delhi and Dacca rose sharply after the return to power in 2001 of Prime Minister Khaleda Zia at the helm of a coalition government that includes the militant Jamaat Islami for the first time.73 Asked about these differences in perception between US and Indian counterterrorism experts, Black remarked: “We’re not on the same sheet of music with the Indians on this. . . . ”74 In 2006, differences between the US and Indian perspectives on Bangladesh seemed to narrow as Bangladesh stepped up counterterrorism efforts against militants and New Delhi and Dacca sought to mend fences diplomatically.75 Unease about partnering with the United States on counterterrorism In addition to these substantive disagreements, some Indian officials reportedly are uncomfortable with or resistant to working more closely with US counterparts on terrorism. Some worry that the US has withheld from India information on Al Qaeda operatives suspected of having ties to Kashmir militants to avoid the political costs of sharing intelligence that was collected in Pakistan with host government assistance, according to Praveen Swami of The Hindu. A senior Indian official reportedly complained that much of what India received from the United States was “vague in the extreme and almost never of operational use.”76 144

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Other Indian officials worry that American officials are exploiting the counterterrorism partnership in India to collect information on India; the reported defection to the United States of a senior Indian intelligence officer has sharpened their concerns.77 One Indian newspaper, citing recently declassified National Security Agency documents, published an article titled “Beware, Uncle Sam’s Watching You.”78 Finally, some Indian officials remain sensitive to the possibility that they are being patronized. Ambassador David Mulford’s offer to the chief ministers of Assam and Nagaland of help from the FBI to apprehend the perpetrators of bombings in fall 2004 drew a prickly response from the Special Secretary in the Indian home ministry, according to India Abroad: “Thank you very much for the offer, but we have the expertise to deal with such incidents.” Other Indian officials variously criticized Mulford for departing from established channels or for making an intelligence matter public. Mulford’s letters reportedly also raised some suspicions among Indian officials about the reasons for US interest in the northeast and concerns that FBI assistance to the troubled states might encourage “jihadis” to target India.79 A former Joint Intelligence Committee Chairman, on the other hand— dissenting from what he termed the “MEA [Ministry of External Affairs] view of the nonaligned era”—recommended that India consider the offer. Agreeing, former intelligence officer B. Raman noted that the FBI has the most comprehensive database on explosives worldwide, according to the same article.80

The future: some near-term probabilities and long-term possibilities Modest prospects for the short run As we have seen, US–Indian counterterrorism cooperation has proved no easier than other areas of bilateral security relations. Like most counterterrorism relationships, that between US and Indian officials has worked best when it was both discreet and discrete. The above analysis of post-9/11 working relations suggests that this cooperation remains bounded by perceived differences in national interests, as well as mistrust among some officials. While regular contact among counterterrorism officials probably will increase their mutual comfort over time, it will remain easier for the two sides to agree on tactical agendas than on strategic missions, given their foreign policy differences. India’s strong preference for multilateral intervention and nervousness about US intentions and policies make joint US–Indian military operations against terrorism elsewhere in the world unlikely in the near term. India probably will remain especially opposed to any US counterterrorism activities that would entail the presence of American special forces on Indian borders, let alone on Indian territory. Worried that the United States will crowd India in its back yard, some Indians have raised concerns that the presence of the US navy in the Indian Ocean might become permanent and limit Indian naval options in India’s home region. 145

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India’s security consciousness as well as its pride was evident in its refusal to let western troops help with tsunami relief on the stricken Andaman Islands. US–Indian counterterrorism cooperation also may be limited by growing differences in focus. India likely will remain preoccupied for at least the next decade with terrorism generated by home-grown separatist or ideologically-based groups like those in the northeast, not by Islamist militants. The fact that these groups use neighboring countries for sanctuary will make India’s relations with those governments a priority for years to come. India’s two main Maoist rebel groups—which have ties to the burgeoning Nepalese insurgency—have recently joined forces to oppose the Indian government all the way from the borders with Nepal down into southern India. Thus, the distinction between insurgency and terrorism as security challenges to India is likely to blur further in coming years. India’s wider international aspirations also may limit the scope of future counterterrorism cooperation with the United States. India “aspires to achieve a greater strategic autonomy for itself after emerging as a major economic player,” Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, said in March 2005 at a discussion on Indo-US relations reported by The Hindu. “The current assumption is that India’s ambitions will mesh in with U.S. objectives,” but India, in fact, aspired to a larger strategic space in the world and still preferred a more “balanced world order among the major players.”81 Saran’s comments suggest two important limits to future counterterrorism cooperation: ●

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First, India itself is likely to be one of the major players that will seek to balance—sometimes neutralize—the US superpower role in global affairs. Second, India will continue to prefer multilateral decision making and cooperation.

New Delhi’s preference for multilateral over bilateral cooperative arrangements wherever possible will incline it to work through the United Nations and various Asian counterterrorism groups. In the short term, there is little prospect for the sort of regional counterterrorism effort in South Asia that has developed in neighboring Southeast Asia. While the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has adopted a counterterrorism protocol similar to that of the United Nations, trust among South Asia nations is particularly low on terrorismrelated issues. Indo-Pakistani tensions also have stymied SAARC-based efforts to expand cooperation in numerous areas. Institutional changes on both sides Some new possibilities for US–Indian counterterrorism cooperation may emerge from reforms under way in both US and Indian counterterrorism establishments to improve capabilities and internal coordination. In the United States, these changes include creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the 146

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reorganization of the Intelligence Community to close gaps in US counterterrorism capabilities abroad and at home. India’s new military doctrine—which covers diverse categories of conflict including sub-conventional war, civil/revolutionary war, low-intensity conflict operations/proxy war, insurgency, no-war-no-peace and non-combat operations— presumably will affect counterterrorism cooperation with the US military, as well as the domestic division of labor.82 The appointment in 2005 of a key player in the development of the new doctrine, General Joginder Jaswant Singh, as Army Chief, underscored India’s intention of focusing on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. The General—who earlier served as brigade commander in Jammu and Kashmir—was expected to give priority to developing elite special forces similar to the US Rangers and SEALS, the British Special Air Service, and Israel’s Sayeret Matkal.83

An expanded role for non-government organizations and think tanks? While counterterrorism is typically the province of government, expanded efforts involving former officials might make a unique contribution to bridging between US and Indian perspectives on terrorism and defining new middle ground. Think tanks and academic institutions could foster candid exchanges on the lessons of past counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaigns waged by both sides, similar to discussions sponsored by these institutions among former US, Indian, and Pakistani officials on a variety of topics. A recent study conducted by the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) in New Delhi, for example, reportedly extrapolated lessons from the US counterinsurgency in Iraq for India’s new military doctrine, which accords a greater role for special forces in countering domestic violence.84

Some longer-term scenarios for a different future What could dramatically change prospects for US–Indian counterterrorism cooperation in either direction five to ten years from now? A few examples of potential “tectonic” shifts follow.

Changes in the “shape” of terrorism The nature and geography of terrorist activity may change, despite—or perhaps in response to—the two countries’ counterterrorism efforts. From the vantage point of the early 1980s, after all, it seemed likely that leftwing terrorist groups such as the Red Brigades in Italy and Shiite groups modeled on Hizbollah would dominate the terrorist scene for decades to come; some Indians during that period saw Sikh terrorism as a semi-permanent threat. 147

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New patterns of terrorism could again alter US and Indian threat perceptions and thus change the incentives for bilateral cooperation—for example. ●

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A major surge of terrorism in the Western Hemisphere—perhaps linked to a group such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC)—could draw Washington’s attention away from South Asia and the Middle East, particularly if US interests were primary targets. Alternatively, existing international terrorist cells could open up a new front in the United States, or home-grown environmental terrorists could step up their campaigns. India’s emergence as a major playground for international Islamist terrorists—with or without cooperation from Indian Muslims—could provide new incentives for New Delhi to collaborate with the United States, as well as with Israel, Europe, and a host of Middle Eastern and Asian governments. New evidence of a global Maoist resurgence also might drive New Delhi closer to Washington. Consider, for example, the imminent prospect of a Maoist rebel victory in Nepal, coupled with the spread of Naxalism in India beyond the eastern and central states and evidence of links to like-minded organizations in the United States, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. Concerned that rampant disorder and instability might provide fresh openings for meddling by Pakistan or China. India might consider joint US–Indian operations along the border with Nepal under these circumstances. Major terrorist attacks against US interests that proved to have been orchestrated by Al Qaida or by local groups based in Pakistan could upset Washington’s relations with Islamabad; some Indian officials might see such a development as opening more space for US–Indian cooperation. Changing South Asian regional dynamics

Peace between India and Pakistan could help open up new spaces for both US–Indian cooperation and for intra-regional South Asian counterterrorism efforts. Enduring détente between India and Pakistan might help clear the way for South Asian joint institutions akin to those currently operating elsewhere in Asia— the South-East Asia Regional Centre for Counterterrorism (SEARCCT) at Kuala Lumpur and the newly created Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Counterterrorism Task Force, for example.85 In addition to providing another forum for US–Indian cooperation, such structures might allow Washington to play a role in South Asian regional counterterrorism without exciting Indian anxieties.

Notes * The views expressed here are not necessarily those of the author’s former employees, the US Government. 1 Definitions of terrorism vary even within the US Government. We have chosen the widely-used definition that is contained in Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d) and cited in the State Department’s Patterns of Global

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Terrorism, 2002—recognizing that it omits any mention of attacks on infrastructure that are intended to harm civilians indirectly, let alone of cyberterrorism. ●

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2 3 4

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

“The term ‘terrorism’ means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” “The term ‘international terrorism’ means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country.” “The term ‘terrorist group’ means any group practicing, or that has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism.”

A footnote in the 2002 PGT adds: “For purposes of this definition, the term ‘noncombatant’ is interpreted to include, in addition to civilians, military personnel who at the time of the incident are unarmed and/or not on duty.” The report adds that attacks on military installations or armed personnel at sites where no state of military hostilities exists are considered acts of terrorism. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, US Department of State Publication 11038 ( Washington, DC: State Department, April 2003), p. xiii. Available online at www.state.gov/documents/ organization/20177.pdf C. Raja Mohan, “India, U.S. Agree on Need to Combat Terrorism,” The Hindu, October 19, 1997, p. 1. Nirmal Mitra, “Call for a Convention Against Terrorism,” India Abroad, October 7, 1994, p. 18. Thalif Deen, “United Nations: U.N. to Launch Global War Against Terrorism,” IPSInter Press Service (online), July 31, 1996. President Clinton reportedly pressed for a global “no sanctuary pledge” against organized criminals, terrorists, drug traffickers, and smugglers and a new counterterrorism pact that would close gaps in existing anti-terrorism treaties and shut down grey arms markets. “India, US to Sign Extradition Treaty,” Agence France Presse online, June 20, 1997. “India, United States to Sign Extradition Treaty,” Associated Press Worldstream, June 20, 1997. Ben Barber, “Terrorism Law Pulls Purse Strings,” Washington Times, May 26, 1996, p. A-1. John-Thor Dahlburg (Associated Press), “Kashmiris Behead Hostage, May Kill 4 Other Westerners,” Chicago Sun-Times, August 14, 1995, p. 20. Aziz Haniffa, “U.S. Reward for Information on Hostages,” India Abroad, November 29, 1996, p. 20. “Timetable of Captive Misery for Hostage Britons,” The Press Association Limited (online), July 3, 1997, p. 3. “Western Hostages Probably Killed, Says Top Indian Security Official,” Associated Press (online), November 27, 1998. Charu Lata Joshi, “Indo-US Relations: One Step Backward,” India Today, April 15, 1997, p. 73. “The Prevention of Terrorism, 2002,” Act No. 15 of 2002, online at: www.satp.org/ satporgtp/countries/india/document/actandordinances/POTA.htm#1 By the early 1980s, some militant Sikhs in India—with enthusiastic support from the diaspora in North America and Europe—were demanding a sovereign Sikh state of Khalistan. The separatist movement reflected economic frustration among Sikhs who had not benefited from the “green revolution” in the linguistically defined but Sikhmajority state of Punjab. Other factors included thwarted demands for more devolution of power from the national government and Sikh religious revivalism. By the mid1990s, a protracted Indian government crackdown and divide-and-rule tactics had largely taken the wind out of the movement’s sails. See, for example, Meredith Weiss,

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“The Khalistan Movement in Punjab,” June 25, 2002, online at www.yale.edu/ycias/ globalization/punjab.pdf 15 The violent separatist movement in Kashmir erupted in 1989 in Jammu and Kashmir, whose accession to India in India has been disputed by Pakistan since their partition that year. Spurs for Kashmiri separatism included local frustration over the central government’s abrogation of democratic political processes, high unemployment, growing Hindu-Muslim tensions, and repression by police and military personnel. Beginning in the early 1990s, militants who infiltrated Indian-held Kashmir from Pakistancontrolled Azad Kashmir with official Pakistani support assumed a prominent role in fighting Indian troops there. Islamabad continues to claim that it has provided only morale and political support to homegrown Kashmiri separatists, but some Pakistani officials have acknowledged Pakistan’s sponsorship of foreign militants opposing Indian rule. See, for example, Karl Vick and Kamran Khan, “Pakistani Ambivalence Frustrates Hope for Kashmir Peace,” Washington Post, June 29, 2002. p. A-18. For a brief comment by a former US official on Pakistan’s deployment of militants along with Pakistan Army regulars during the 1999 Kargil conflict, see Bruce Riedel, American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House (Philadelphia, PA: Center for the Advanced Study of India, 2002), pp. 1–2, online at www. sas.upenn.edu/ casi. For excellent historical analyses of Kashmiri separatism and its implications, see Sumit Ganguly’s The Crisis in Kashmir, (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997), and Robert G. Wirsing, India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute:On Regional Conflict and Its Resolution (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), pp. 113–32. 16 The following description of Naxalism in 2002 comes from Suba Chandran and Mallika Joseph, “India: The Naxalite Movement,” Searching for Peace in Central and South Asia, European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 2002, online at www.conflictprevention.net/page.php?id40&formid73&actionshow&surveyid44: In India, the term “Naxalite” refers to a variety of revolutionary rural struggles. The Naxalite movement shuns participation in electoral politics and attacks the landed classes directly in a bid to liberate entire territories from feudal and capitalist exploitation. Although it has an ideological following all over the country, it is mainly restricted to three states: Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand, and Bihar. The Naxalite movement, which started in the late 1960s, has undergone numerous splits due to ideological and personal reasons. The efforts taken by the various state governments have contained the movement but “liberated zones” continue to exist. The Naxalites operate in areas that on one hand have very low levels of income and very low human development indicators, and on the other hand suffer from extreme forms of economic and social polarization. The state governments, rather than addressing the security needs of the landless laborers most affected by the violence or providing protection to villagers at risk, have approached it as a law-and-order problem. Civil-society sympathy for the Naxalites’ cause and concern about the repression by police and the private armies of landlords (the so-called senas) is mixed, with misgivings about the more extremist tendencies within the Naxalite movement. As of early 2005, Naxalite activity had spread to thirteen Indian states; the two main Naxalite organizations had merged into one, with a single command-and-control structure; and these organizations appeared to be coordinating with the increasingly powerful Maoist insurgency in Nepal. See, for example, Elizabeth Baldwin-Jones, “Naxalite Clash Set to Escalate Into Fringe States,” Lloyd’s List International (online), Issue #58813, December 20, 2004, p. 12.

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17 Aziz Haniffa, “U.S. Terror Report Cites Pakistan,” India Abroad, May 20, 1994, p. 18, and Ruth Sinai, “U.S. Close to Adding Pakistan, Sudan to Terrorism List,” Associated Press (online), April 21, 1993. 18 See, for example, Ajay Kaul, “Burma Said Ready to Launch ‘Bhutan-style’ Operation Against Indian Insurgents,” PTI News Agency, New Delhi, in English 0516 gmt October 31, 2004, via BBC Worldwide Monitoring online, October 31, 2004. 19 “India Hails U.S. Action Against Harkat,” The Hindu, October 10, 1997, p. 1. 20 See, for example, Girish Kuber, “Pakistan’s Terrorist Haven: US State Department,” Economic Times of India, October 22, 2001. 21 “US Doublespeak,” Economic Times of India, March 3, 2003. 22 Ajay Sahni, “Misleading Patterns,” The Hindu, July 13, 2004. 23 Robin Wright, “New Breed of Terrorist Worries US Officials,” Los Angeles Times, June 27, 1993, p. A-16. 24 B. Raman, “India, Pakistan Chided But Spared,” Business Line, Financial Times Asia Intelligence Wire, May 9, 2001. 25 Sinai, “U.S. Close to Adding Pakistan, Sudan to Terrorism List.” 26 R. Jeffrey Smith and Thomas W. Lippman, “Pakistan Avoids U.S. Listing as Nation Supporting Terrorism,” Washington Post, July 15, 1993, p. A-28. 27 Owais Tohid, “Pakistan Says Americans’ Murder Bid to Sabotage Albright Visit,” Agence France-Presse (English) online, November 13, 1997 19:44 GMT. 28 Murali Ranganathan, “US for Building New Relationship with India,” Ethnic NewsWatch, News-India Times (online), June 18, 1993, p. 2. Malott also cited nonproliferation, access to high technology and human rights as other top priorities for US relations with South Asia. 29 For a fuller treatment of India’s evolving post-Cold War foreign policy see Stephen P. Cohen, India: Emerging Power (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), pp. 198–313; for a look at differences between India’s and the US’ security policies, see Polly Nayak, US Security Policy in South Asia Since 9/11—Challenges and Implications for the Future, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies Occasional Paper, February 2005, pp. 10–12. 30 Sinai, “U.S. Close to Adding Pakistan, Sudan to Terrorism List.” 31 Tarun Basu, “Confluence of Interests Seen in Ties with Teheran,” India Abroad, March 7, 1997, p. 17. 32 Aziz Haniffa, “Rice India-Bound, Warning in Pipeline,” India Abroad, March 18, 2005, pp. A-1 and A-4f. 33 Amit Baruah, “India Aspires for Greater Strategic Autonomy: Saran,” The Hindu, March 18, 2005. 34 See, for example, Steven R. Weisman, “India Balks at Confronting Iran, Straining Its Friendship with US,” New York Times, September 15, 2005, p. 10. 35 Mushahid Hussain, “South Asia: Forging Ties That Were Unthinkable a Few Years Ago,” IPS-Inter Press Service/Global Information Network (online), December 11, 1991. The unpopularity of the Gulf war in India also reflected the dislocation of Indian expatriates and loss of remittances from expatriate workers there. 36 “No Troops to Iraq, Says Fernandes,” Economic Times of India (online), September 24, 2003. 37 Ashish Kumar Sen, “Decision on Troops to Iraq Called a Missed Opportunity,” Ethnic Newswatch India-West, July 25, 2003, p. 26. 38 See Daniel L. Byman, Confronting Passive Sponsors of Terrorism, Saban Center Analysis Paper, Number 4 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, February 1, 2005). 39 Thalif Deen, “Politics: U.N. Divided Over Definition of Terrorism,” IPS-Inter Press Service/Global Information Network, November 19, 1997. 40 “Indo-US Relations: The Guarded Courtship,” Business Line, September 25, 1997, p. 8. In his editorial, B. Raman stated: “Among the negative behavioural traits, can be

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41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61

cited the obsessive urge of Indians—be it politicians, bureaucrats, journalists or other elite—to be critical of the US, justified or otherwise merely to be seen as standing up to what they perceive as ‘arrogant Americans.’ This trait is reflected in our reluctance to give credit to the Americans when and where it is due—for instance in helping us deal with the food scarcity in the 1950s and with terrorism in recent years.” Sugeeswara Sendadhira, “Top U.S. Military Official Visits Colombo,” India Abroad, December 6, 1996, p. 14. Sugeeswara Senadhira, “More Security Cooperation With Lanka,” India Abroad, November 8, 1996, p. 18. John J. Goldman and Ronald J. Ostrow, “U.S. Indicts Terror Suspect Bin Laden,” Los Angeles Times, November 5, 1998, p. A-1. “USA Clears Export of Military Wares,” The Tribune (online), December 5, 2001. Josy Joseph, “India, US Warm Up on Defense Ties,” India Abroad, July 27, 2001, p. 11. Douglas Davis, “Jane’s: Israel Aids India vs Islamic Militants,” Jerusalem Post, August 17, 2001, p. 13-A. Ibid. “No Troops To Iraq, Says Fernandes,” Economic Times of India (online), September 24, 2003. Joshua Brilliant, “Why India and Israel Joined Forces,” United Press International (online), September 7, 2003. Aziz Haniffa, “No Going Back on India-Israel Ties: Sen,” India Abroad, September 10, 2004, p. 14. “No Troops to Iraq, Says Fernandes,” Economic Times of India (online), September 24, 2003. Scott Baldauf, “India Rises as Strategic U.S. Ally,” Christian Science Monitor, January 26, 2004, p. 6; Ken Dalecki, “U.S.–India Relations Show Warming Trend,” Kiplinger Business Forecasts (online), July 9, 2001. “We Won’t Play the Triangular Game: U.S.” The Hindu (online), October 22, 2001. Sridhar Krishnaswami, “U.S. Brands Lashkar, Jaish as Terrorist Outfits,”The Hindu (online), November 4, 2001. Polly Nayak, Reducing Collateral Damage to Indo-Pakistani Relations from the War on Terrorism, Brookings Policy Brief #107 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, September 2002). “Suspect in ‘Virginia Jihad’ Enters Plea,” Associated Press State and Local Wire, September 22, 2003; Mary Beth Sheridan, “Judge Convicts Three in ‘Va. Jihad’ Case; U.S. Linked Defendants to Terrorists,” Washington Post, March 5, 2004, p. A-1. Jyoti Malhotra, “Security Begins at Home, PM Tells Bush,” Indian Express, September 26, 2003. C. Christine Fair, The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Project Air Force: 2004), p. 78. Robert D. Blackwill, Ambassador to India, “The Future of US-India Relations,” Luncheon Address Hosted by the Confederation of Indian Industry (New Delhi, India), July 17, 2003, on Department of State internet site, www.state.gov/p/sa/rls/rm/ 22615.htm B. Raman, “Countering Taliban’s Threats to Indians: International Terrorism Monitor—Paper No.5,” South Asia Analysis Group Paper no. 1783, May 1, 2006 on the internet at www.saag.org/papers18/paper1783.html Polly Nayak, US Security Policy in South Asia Since 9/11—Challenges and Implications for the Future, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies Occasional Paper (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, February 2005). See also Polly Nayak, “U.S. Counter-Terrorism and Security Cooperation with Pakistan and India,” The Monitor, Center for International Trade and Security University of Georgia, June 2003, pp. 9–15, on the internet at http://www.uga.edu/cits/documents/pdf/ monitor/monitor_su_2003.pdf

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62 See “Indian US Troops Begin Joint Counter-Insurgency Drills,” BBC Monitoring International Reports (online), March 30, 2004; Wasbir Hussain, “India, U.S. Forces Hold Jungle Warfare Exercises in India’s Northeast,” Associated Press Worldstream, March 26, 2004; and Siddhartha D. Kashyap, “US Army Takes CT Tips from India,” Times of India, July 30, 2004. 63 Pamela D’Mello, “Indian, U.S. Navies Begin Joint Exercises off India’s Western Coast,” Associated Press Worldstream, October 5, 2004. 64 B. Raman, “Counter-Terrorism: The Indian Experience,” South Asia Analysis Group (Chennai, India), No. 649, April 1, 2003, p. 1, on internet at www.saag.org/papers7/ paper649.html 65 B. Raman, “Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism,” South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No. 983, 21 April 2004, online at www.saag.org/papers10/paper983.html 66 B.K. Lal, “FBI, CIA Benefit from RAW’s Inputs,” Daily Excelsior (India) online, October 18, 2001, on the internet at www.dailyexcelsior.com/01oct18/news.htm#7 67 T. Sunil Reddy, “How CIA Tugged PW to Terror List,” Times of India (online), May 5, 2004. 68 R.P. Khanna and Lalit Sethi, “Different Hemispheres, Common Foe: Fighting Terrorism Strengthens US-India Ties,” Armed Forces Journal (Army Times Publishing Company, USA), December 1, 2004, p. 37. 69 Private comment by senior US policymaker to the author in Washington DC on March 10, 2005. 70 Praful Bidwai, South Asia: US and India—“Unequal Allies, Uneasy Partners Commentary,” IPS-Inter Press Service (online), October 4, 2004. 71 “US encouarges [sic] Bangladesh to Go After Terrorists,” United News of Bangladesh (online), May 12, 2005. 72 R.P. Khanna and Lalit Sethi, “Different Hemispheres, Common Foe: Fighting Terrorism Strengthens US-India Ties,” Armed Forces Journal (Army Times Publishing Company, USA), p. 37. 73 “The Bothersome Little People Next Door,” The Economist (US Edition online), November 6, 2004. 74 Ajay Sahni, “Misleading Patterns,” The Hindu, July 13, 2004. 75 Bangladesh Prime Minister in India to Improve Ties, Voice of America News (on the internet), March 21, 2006. 76 Praveen Swami, “Why Was the Terror Intelligence Withheld?” The Hindu, August 20, 2004. 77 Praveen Swami, “Open Doors for Mole Recruitment,” The Hindu, June 14, 2004. 78 Man Mohan, “Beware: Uncle Sam’s Watching You,” Times of India (online), August 24, 2004. 79 Sheela Bhatt, “Ambassador Mulford’s Offer of FBI Help Stirs Controversy,” India Abroad, October 14, 2004, p. 25. 80 Ibid. 81 Amit Baruah, “India Aspires for Greater Strategic Autonomy: Saran,” The Hindu, March 18, 2005. 82 Harbaksh Singh Nanda, “Analysis: Flaws Seen in India Military Doctrine,” United Press International (online), December 16, 2004. 83 John C.K. Daly and Martin Sieff, “Terror Fighter Takes over Indian Army,” UPI Intelligence Watch online, February 1, 2005. 84 Harbaksh Singh Nanda, “Analysis: Flaws Seen in India Military Doctrine,” United Press International (online), December 16, 2004. 85 B. Raman, Terrorism In S.E.Asia—India’s Concerns, South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No. 980, April 19, 2004, online at www.saag.org/papers10/paper980.html

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8 INDO-US COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION Past, present, and future Bahukutumbi Raman

I would like to describe India and America as “the Twin Towers of Democracy.” The terrorists may have destroyed the steel and concrete structures of the (WTC) World Trade Centre, but they can never harm the structures and the spirit of our two democracies. (Mr L.K. Advani, Indian Home Minister, at Washington DC on January 9, 2002)

Introduction Cooperation among the intelligence agencies of the Allied powers contributed considerably to their victory in the Second World War. After the war, international communism and externally-supported Communist insurgencies came to be perceived as both subversive and as a threat to national security by many countries. The intelligence agencies of Western democracies and of the so-called non-aligned world joined forces to meet this threat. The United Kingdom took the lead in this direction and persuaded the other members of the Commonwealth to constitute, under its leadership, a Security Liaison Network (SLN) to strengthen their counterinsurgency capability. After Independence, India, under the thenPrime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, joined the SLN without reservation. The SLN members shared intelligence, insights, assessments, and expertise. This was done through the Security Liaison Officers (SLOs) posted in each country’s diplomatic mission under the cover of diplomats. The SLOs came from the intelligence agencies or the police. The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) set up a similar intelligence and security liaison network with many countries in Asia. While those set up under the auspices of regional military cooperation organizations such as the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CTO) operated multilaterally like the Commonwealth’s SLN, others,, such as the CIA’s liaison mechanism with Indian intelligence, functioned bilaterally. 154

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India perceived the USSR and other Communist states in East Europe as its valued friends, but viewed international Communism propagated by Moscow as a threat to its democracy and national security. Its leadership of the non-aligned world did not hinder covert cooperation with the US and the British intelligence agencies in countering this threat. Overt non-alignment between the East (Europe) and the West at the State level and covert alignment with the West at the intelligence level became its policy. As India’s border tension with China grew in the 1950s, this intelligence cooperation, particularly with the United States and the United Kingdom, was expanded to cover political and military developments in China. India’s request for similar cooperation vis-à-vis Pakistan, however, was firmly rebuffed by Western intelligence agencies. The West made it clear to India that any intelligence collection expertise or technical intelligence equipment shared with it should be used exclusively for covering China. Whenever Western intelligence agencies suspected India of diverting the equipment to spy on Pakistan, New Delhi was threatened with an immediate withdrawal of technical aid. To overcome this, India devised an effective network with the intelligence agencies of the USSR and other East European countries for intelligence-sharing on Pakistan. International terrorism emerged as a major threat to the security and stability of many countries after the 1967 Arab–Israel war. As a result, the intelligence cooperation network expanded to include counterterrorism. After the post-1989 collapse of the USSR and the other Communist states of East Europe, and after Deng Xiaopeng-led China gave up its policy of exporting revolution, cooperation in counter-subversion withered away. Before 9/11, intelligence cooperation in counterterrorism was not as satisfactory as the earlier cooperation in counter-subversion. Intelligence agencies of different countries had no difficulty in agreeing on what constituted communist subversion, but a similar convergence of views on what constituted terrorism eluded them. Subjective and political factors came in the way of effective cooperation. Among these factors were differing perceptions of terrorists and freedom fighters, competing definitions of domestic and international terrorism, divergent national interests, and differing opinions as to what political activities could be construed as “state-sponsored” terrorism. The role of some members of the Indian diaspora community also inhibits strategic cooperation. The relationship between some Sikh terrorist groups and co-religionists in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, for example, manifested itself in financial and logistic support that, while opposed by New Delhi, was very difficult for Western politicians to address given the political clout that Indian immigrant communities wield. Similarly, migrants from Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK), popularly known as Mirpuris, constitute influential sections of the voters in some electoral constituencies of the United Kingdom. They lobbied—sometimes successfully— against the United Kingdom extending any assistance to India in dealing with terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. 155

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The over-legalistic approach to counterterrorism measures followed by many Western countries was another factor inhibiting Western assistance to India in counterterrorism, particularly for stopping the flow of funds from persons of Indian origin in the West to terrorist organizations in India. Efforts by Indian security agencies to freeze bank accounts belonging to terror organizations have been impeded by Western agencies constrained by legal frameworks requiring a continuous chain of evidence that link suspected accounts with terror groups. Following the 9/11 terror attacks, the Western agencies that previously hindered Indian efforts to freeze suspected accounts immediately relaxed legal restrictions and froze a large number of accounts with only scant supporting evidence. US agencies, in particular, adopted an overly legalistic approach when the victims of terror attacks were the nationals of other countries, only to immediately shift policy when its own citizens became the target of organized terror. The US government’s policy change away from legalism was most strongly manifest in the freezing of large numbers of bank accounts and the detention of hundreds of suspects in prison camps such as Guantanamo Bay without due process. This over-legalistic approach also came in the way of effective mutual legal assistance in matters such as arrest, extradition and deportation of those wanted for acts of terrorism in India. Indian requests for action against suspected terrorists were often dismissed as being based on evidence collected during illegal interrogations. India’s close relations with the USSR, Cuba, Yugoslavia, and other Communist countries also came in the way of effective cooperation with the United States on issues pertaining to counterterrorism. While Western countries were prepared to overlook this when assisting India in counter-subversion programs against international communism, they were not prepared to do so with respect to counterterrorism. India’s close relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its reluctance to condemn what the West perceived as the PLO’s acts of terrorism did little to assuage Western suspicions. India was perceived by the West as following a double standard owing to its readiness to condemn terrorism when the victims were its own people and its reluctance to do so when the victims were citizens of Israel. India’s policies relating to Afghanistan in the 1980s were interpreted by the West, particularly by the United States, as amounting to support for the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the pro-Moscow government of the late President Najibullah further discouraging assistance to India in the field of counterterrorism. US officials also tended to ignore Pakistan’s sponsorship of terrorism against India because of Islamabad’s closeness to the West and its role as a frontline ally in the proxy war against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. The United States’ acceptance of the Pakistani depiction of Jammu and Kashmir as a disputed territory led to a reluctance to accept Indian arguments that the acts of violence by different groups in the State amounted to terrorism. The United States was inclined to support Pakistan’s contention that what was going on in Jammu and Kashmir was a freedom struggle and not terrorism. Until 1995, Washington tended to disagree with India’s depiction of the Kashmiri militant groups as 156

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terrorist organizations. Only after the kidnapping of a group of six American and other Western tourists by the Harkat-ul-Ansar (HUA) under the name Al Faran in 1995 did the United States change its view.

The past: 1981–2000 The beginning of Indo-US cooperation in counterterrorism can be traced to 1981 when some Sikh organizations, acting in the cause of an independent Khalistan in Punjab, started engaging in terror acts, including the hijacking of aircraft. Some of these organizations, such as the Babbar Khalsa, the Dal Khalsa, and the International Sikh Youth Federation, had an active clandestine presence not only in Punjab, but also in the United States, Canada, and West Europe. The fact that almost all the hijacked aircraft were forced to fly to Lahore, Pakistan, created fears in the minds of the US authorities that if such activities were not controlled, they could exacerbate the tensions between New Delhi and Islamabad. While refraining from criticizing Pakistan for the activities of the Sikh terrorists from its territory, the United States started showing greater sensitivity to the problems faced by India in dealing with these terrorists. This cooperation passed through four stages. In the first stage (1981–85), cooperation was confined to the training of Indian intelligence officers in the United States in subjects such as anti-hijacking and hostage negotiation techniques. There was no exchange of intelligence. In the second stage (1985–91), exchanges of intelligence began with US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reporting the discovery of a plot to assassinate Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi during a June, 1985 visit to the United States. That same month, Canadian members of the Babbar Khalsa successfully destroyed the Kanishka aircraft of Air India off the Irish coast, resulting in the deaths of 329 people, many of them Canadian citizens of Indian heritage. The premature ignition of an explosive device prevented a similar attack from destroying an aircraft departing Tokyo’s Narita airport. The intelligence shared by the United States during this period related to the activities of the Khalistani terrorists based in West Europe and North America. No intelligence was provided on the activities of groups based in Pakistan. The third period (1991–95) saw further improvement in counterterrorism cooperation. There were three reasons for this. The first was the kidnapping of Liviu Radu, a Romanian diplomat posted in New Delhi, by Khalistani terrorists in 1991 in order to secure the release of some terrorists who were detained in Indian jails. The incident received little publicity in the West; the BBC and the CNN practically ignored it. Nevertheless, US intelligence officials were deeply concerned after Washington and New Delhi simultaneously intercepted a telephone conversation between a Khalistani terrorist based in Lahore and another in Frankfurt in which the former advised the latter to order the release of Radu and to kidnap an American in order to get more publicity for their cause. This created an alarm in the Western countries, particularly in the United States. 157

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The second reason was an attack on a group of Israeli tourists in Jammu and Kashmir in 1992 by domestic Kashmiri terrorists. One Israeli was killed and another was taken hostage and subsequently released. This incident, which took place before the US presidential election campaign, received widespread notice not only in Israel, but also in the Jewish communities of the West and led to pressure from Jewish groups to show greater sensitivity to the problems faced by India from terrorism. The third reason for improved Indo-US cooperation was the series of explosions directed at economic targets in Mumbai (Bombay) in March, 1993. The explosions were organized by the mafia group headed by Dawood Ibrahim, then based in Dubai and presently in Karachi, at the behest of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI-D). The ISI-D trained the perpetrators and provided them with explosives, timers, hand-grenades, automatic rifles, and ammunition. The Indian government invited counterterrorism experts from the United Kingdom, the United States, and Austria to visit Mumbai and provide insights on the attacks based on evidence recovered by Indian law enforcement. British experts identified the AK series rifles and ammunition as manufactured in China. The Austrians identified the hand-grenades as made in a Pakistani factory with equipment and technology supplied by Austria. US forensic experts identified the timer recovered as made in the United States and as part of a consignment supplied to Pakistan during the Afghan war of the 1980s. British and Austrian experts had no objection to Indian investigators using their conclusions in the trial against the accused. The US experts, however, ruled out the use of their findings in the trial. They also did not return the timer, which they had taken to the United States for forensic examination. US officials later claimed it had been destroyed by mistake. Despite the improvement in intelligence-sharing during this period, it is important to note that such improvements emerged largely as a response to terrorism in Punjab. The United States no longer had any problem in characterizing what was happening in Punjab as terrorism. An important reason for this was the fact that the so-called Khalistani terrorists indulged in acts such as plane hijackings and bombings of aircraft, actions that were universally viewed as acts of terrorism. Further, the Khalistani movement increasingly moved beyond the subcontinent to other parts of the globe, as evidenced by the attempt to kill the Indian Ambassador to Romania at Bucharest in 1991. Such actions made it difficult for Western governments to characterize the Khalistani terrorist problem as simply being an issue for the Indian government to deal with. The United States was still reluctant to characterize violence in Jammu and Kashmir as terrorism. A major reason for this was that unlike the Sikh terrorists, who indulged in acts of terrorism in Indian as well as foreign territory, the Kashmiri terrorists avoided acts of terrorism in foreign territory, barring two incidents. The first of these incidents took place in 1971 when two terrorists of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) hijacked an Indian Airlines aircraft to Lahore and blew it up at the airport after asking the passengers and the crew to 158

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vacate the plane. The second incident took place in 1983, when terrorists of the JKLF kidnapped and murdered an Indian diplomat posted in Birmingham, United Kingdom, when the Indian government rejected their demand for the release of one of their leaders who was in jail awaiting execution. In addition to their general reluctance to engage in terrorism in foreign territory, the Kashmiri terrorists had also taken care not to indulge in violent acts against civil aviation. This ended in December, 1999 when a group of terrorists belonging to a Pakistani jihadi organization called the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) hiijacked an Indian Airlines plane after it had taken off from the Kathmandu airport and took it to Kandahar in Afghanistan. They released the plane and its passengers only after the Indian government conceded their demand for the release of some terrorists detained in Jammu and Kashmir. The list of released prisoners included Omar Sheikh, a Pakistani from London who was to subsequently play an active role in the kidnapping and murder of Daniel Pearl, a US journalist employed by the Wall Street Journal, in early 2002. As a result of the ambivalence in the US attitude to what India perceived as terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir from US intelligence agencies during this period. Until late 1991, bilateral counterterrorism cooperation was restricted to exchanges of intelligence and provision of counterterrorism training facilities to Indian officials. Exchanges of analyses and assessments and periodic brainstorming sessions between Indian and American counterterrorism analysts were not part of the emerging cooperation. In 1985, at the insistence of Prime Minster Rajiv Gandhi and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, the intelligence agencies of India and the United Kingdom initiated bi-annual meetings for the exchange of analyses and assessments. In 1991, the CIA accepted a proposal from the RAW, India’s external intelligence agency, for similar meetings between the counterterrorism analysts of the two countries once a year, alternately in Washington, DC and New Delhi. This was inaugurated at New Delhi in January, 1992. The fourth period of cooperation (1995–2000) saw a sharp decline in terrorism in Punjab. Since 1995, the main area of concern for India’s intelligence agencies with regard to foreign terrorism has been violence perpetrated by Pakistani jihadi organizations such as the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), the Harkat-ul-Jihad-alIslami (HUJI), the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM). The first three of these organizations came into existence during the Afghan war of the 1980s in order to combat Soviet troops. The JEM emerged in 2000 as a consequence of a split in the HUM. Since 1994, Pakistan’s ISI-D has been mainly relying on these organizations for its proxy war against India in Jammu and Kashmir and other parts of India. These organizations are often led by Pakistani nationals and their cadres are mainly Pakistanis. Of these, the HUM, previously known as the Harkat-ul-Ansar (HUA), is a founding member of Osama bin Laden’s International Islamic Front (IIF) for Jihad against the Crusaders and the Jewish People formed in February, 1998. The other three joined the IIF subsequently. All the four are pan-Islamic 159

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organizations that support bin Laden’s objective of forming regional Islamic Caliphates. In accordance with this goal, they want to “liberate” the Muslims of not only Jammu and Kashmir, but also of other parts of India. The movement of Pakistani sponsored terrorists into Jammu and Kashmir became a matter of concern for US intelligence agencies after the July, 1995, kidnapping of six Western tourists-two Americans, two Britons, one Norwegian and one German—in Jammu and Kashmir by terrorists of the HUA operating under the name Al Faran. One American managed to escape; however the Norwegian hostage was killed. The fate of the remaining hostages is unknown, but they are also believed to have been killed. This incident, perhaps more than any other, made US intelligence agencies reassess their views on the status of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. US officials subsequently became more amenable to cooperating with Indian agencies for monitoring the activities of Pakistani jihadi organizations. In October 1997, the US State Department designated the HUA, since known as the HUM, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) under a 1996 US law. This brought the organization under the joint focus of the intelligence agencies of the United States and India. That same month, the US State Department also declared the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of Sri Lanka an FTO, thereby bringing it too under the joint focus of the two countries. Following the HUM’s December, 1999 Kathmandu hijacking, India once again reiterated its demand that the Clinton Administration declare Pakistan a state sponsor of international terrorism. While disagreeing with the Indian demand, the Clinton Administration proposed the setting-up of a Joint Working Group (JWG) on counterterrorism. This idea was conveyed to Jaswant Singh, India’s Minister for External Affairs, by US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott when the two met at London on January 19, 2000. Since then, the JWG has met twice a year (with the notable exception of 2001 when the two countries met only once) at New Delhi and Washington, DC Initially, the objective of the JWG was to work jointly to bring to justice the hijackers of the aircraft. The JWG charter has subsequently been expanded to cover the entire gamut of counterterrorism cooperation between the agencies and departments of the two countries having responsibilities relating to counterterrorism.

The present: since 2000 Counterterrorism cooperation between the intelligence agencies of the two countries, which was kept a closely-guarded and deniable secret for nearly twenty years, was brought out of the closet in January, 2000. The two countries publicly acknowledged such cooperation and made public their intention to strengthen it. A joint statement issued at the end of the Jaswant Singh-Strobe Talbott meeting at London said that the two sides “agreed to work together to ensure that the perpetrators of the hijacking of IC-814 are brought to justice as part of their joint efforts to combat international terrorism.” 160

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Another joint statement entitled “A Vision for the 21st Century” issued by Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and US President Bill Clinton at New Delhi on March 21, 2000 stated that the two leaders consider combating international terrorism as one of the most important global challenges. They expressed satisfaction at the establishment of the Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism and its productive first meeting in February 2000. They agree that the Joint Working Group should continue to meet regularly and become an effective mechanism for the two countries to share information and intensify their cooperation in combating terrorism. As a result of these initiatives, there have been many qualitative changes in the counterterrorism cooperation mechanism since 2000 as compared to the period between 1981 and 2000. Among the more important of these changes are, first, whereas the knowledge of interstate cooperation was officially confined to the intelligence agencies and the heads of government of the two countries before 2000, this knowledge has since become public and the details of the mechanism are widely known in the policy-making establishments of the two countries. However, knowledge of the sensitive details of cooperation such as the intelligence, analyses, and assessments exchanged, and provision of training facilities are still confined to the intelligence and counterterrorism agencies of the two countries. Second, before 2000, India’s RAW and the United States’ CIA used to act as the nodal points for cooperation and played the leadership role in facilitating exchanges. Since 2000, India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and the US State Department have fulfilled these roles at the policy level and their officers lead the respective delegations to the JWG meetings. In terms of substantive implementation of intelligence exchanges and for facilitating follow-up action, however, the RAW and the CIA still play important leadership roles. Third, before 2000, the mechanism for the exchange of intelligence, analyses, and assessments was largely informal to ensure secrecy. Secrecy was and is, even now, considered important not only to protect the identities of sources and operational mechanics, but also for sparing the political leadership of any embarrassment in the case of material leaks. Prior to 2000, intelligence was often exchanged at secret one-on-one meetings of specially designated officers. The JWG mechanism in use since January, 2000, has introduced a formal tier to the cooperation, with formal agendas, recording of minutes, and formal exchanges of memos on follow-up action. The present mechanism thus has two tiers; the formal tier at the level of the JWG for deciding policies and identifying areas of cooperation, and the informal tier between the intelligence agencies for the actual sharing of intelligence and operational cooperation. The JWG provides a multi-disciplinary approach to counterterrorism cooperation and reviews periodically the progress of the cooperation. The following 161

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enumeration of the more important decisions taken at the JWG meetings since its first meeting in February, 2000, gives an idea of the kinds of tasks performed by it: ●

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Broadening exchange of information and assessments on the international and regional terrorist situation; Strengthening intelligence and investigative cooperation; Qualitative up-gradation and expansion of anti-terrorism training programs for Indian law enforcement officials; Signing of a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty; Launching of a bilateral Cyber Security Forum, with a wide-ranging program of action to address the questions of cyber-terrorism and information security; Initiating military-to-military cooperation on counterterrorism to supplement the initiatives of the India-US Defense Policy Group in this area; Joint measures for multilateral initiatives on terrorism, including for the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1373; Initiating dialogue and cooperation in homeland/internal security, terrorist financing, forensic science, transportation security, and border management; Discussions on concrete steps to detect and counter the activities of individual terrorists and organizations of concern to the two countries; Initiating discussions between the US Technology Support Working Group and its Indian counterpart on India’s needs of counterterrorism equipment and technology tools for enhancing border management; Indian acceptance of the US offer to further expand the training program, covering preventive, protective and consequence management capabilities in both conventional and WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) terrorism; Cooperation in civil aviation security; A joint survey on the scope of the Anti-terrorism Training Assistance Program available to India. Acceptance by India of an US offer to share experience and expertise for strengthening counterterrorism institutional structures in India. Acceptance by India of another US offer for a seminar on ways of countering chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorist threats. This seminar was reportedly held in the second half of 2001 in India.

While much of the groundwork for strengthening institutional cooperation in counterterrorism had already been done before the 9/11 attacks in the United States, the terrorist strikes of 2001 led to two important new initiatives. The first was the establishment of the US-India Cyber Security Forum, which held its first meeting at New Delhi in April, 2002, and the second at Washington DC in November, 2004. Whereas the JWG consists exclusively of governmental experts in various aspects of counterterrorism with no involvement of non-governmental experts, the Cyber Security Forum brings together both government and industry 162

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representatives from each country to identify areas for collaboration such as combating cyber-crime, cyber security research and development, information assurance and defense cooperation, standards and software assurance, and cyber incident management and response. Underlining the significance of this initiative in counterterrorism cooperation, a press statement issued in November, 2004, at the end of the second meeting of the Forum said: Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman, in prepared remarks, stated that the US-India Cyber Security Forum “holds great promise for future cooperation” Indian Head of Delegation, National Security Council Secretariat Joint Secretary Arvind Gupta, delivering a statement to the Forum on behalf of J.N. Dixit, India’s (then) National Security Advisor, stated that “securing cyberspace will remain one of the biggest challenges facing the international community for years to come and this Cyber Security Forum has emerged as an important bilateral mechanism to address such issues”. The statement added: The first meeting of the US-India Cyber Security Forum was held in New Delhi in April 2002 in recognition of the increasing interdependency between India and the United States in the information technology arena. Cooperation between the United States and India is of growing importance as US government and corporations utilize information technology companies in India at a rate of about $9 billion annually. “As this trend increases, it is crucial that our governments and private industry work together to ensure an environment for secure transactions, networks, and software development,” said US State Department Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr., the US Head of Delegation. During the conference, the United States and India reaffirmed their commitment to cooperation on securing cyberspace by establishing five joint working groups and identifying action plans for each. Future efforts will include workshops in New Delhi and Washington and scientific exchanges. Representatives of private industry similarly identified areas to strengthen cooperation. The second new post-9/11 initiative was to expand the scope of the India-US Defense Policy Group (DPG), set up during the Clinton Administration to cover military-to-military cooperation in counterterrorism. A joint statement issued in December, 2001, at the end of the third meeting of the DPG held in New Delhi said: A strengthened bilateral relationship will assist both countries to counter threats such as the spread of weapons of mass destruction, international 163

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terrorism, narcotics trafficking and piracy. The two sides exchanged views on the global campaign against international terrorism. They emphasized that the military operation against the Taliban and the Al-Qaida network in Afghanistan is an important step in the global war against terrorism and its sponsors everywhere in the world. They expressed satisfaction at the cooperation between the two countries in the ongoing campaign in Afghanistan. Noting that both India and the United States have been targets of terrorism, the two sides agreed to add a new emphasis in their defense cooperation on counter- terrorism initiatives, including expanding mutual support in this area. An important outcome of this initiative is cooperation between the navies of the two countries against piracy and maritime terrorism and the provision of Indian naval escorts for US ships transiting the Malacca Strait. The two countries have mutual concerns over the threat posed to their energy security and external trade by maritime terrorism and have been cooperating in this regard bilaterally as well as through the Working Group on Maritime Security of the Council on Security Cooperation Asia Pacific (CSCAP), of which both are members. Following 9/11, the leaders of the two countries issued a number of policy statements, jointly and individually, on the scope of counterterrorism cooperation. Two of these need to be highlighted. A joint statement issued on November 9, 2001, following a visit by Prime Minister Vajpayee to Washington for talks with President Bush said: Since September 11, the people of the United States and India have been united as never before in the fight against terrorism. The two leaders noted that both countries are targets of terrorism, as seen in the barbaric attacks on 11th September in the United States and on 1st October in Kashmir. They agreed that terrorism threatens not only the security of India and the United States, but also our efforts to build freedom, democracy and international security and stability around the world. As leaders of the two largest multi-cultural democracies, they emphasized that those who equate terrorism with any religion are as wrong as those who invoke its name to commit, support or justify terrorist acts. The statement added: They affirmed that the current campaign against the Al Qaeda network and the Taliban in Afghanistan is an important step in a global war against terrorism and its sponsors everywhere in the world. They recognized that the international community will have to wage a long and multi-faceted struggle against terrorism, with patience, determination, and unwavering focus. They emphasized that there is only one choice and only one outcome: terrorism must be fought and it shall be defeated. 164

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Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Bush agreed that success in this endeavor would depend heavily on building international cooperation and securing the unambiguous commitment of all nations to share information and intelligence on terrorists and deny them support, sustenance and safe havens. The two leaders agreed to consult regularly on the future of Afghanistan. They welcomed the measures outlined in the UNSCR 1373 and called on all nations to ratify and implement existing UN Conventions on counter-terrorism. They expressed support for India’s draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism and urged the resolution of outstanding issues to enable its adoption by the UNGA (UN General Assembly). The leaders of the two countries expressed satisfaction with the progress made in India-US cooperation on counter-terrorism, including the Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism established in January 2000. They reaffirmed their personal commitment, and that of their two countries, to intensify bilateral cooperation as a critical element in the global effort against terrorism. They also announced the establishment of a Joint Cyber-Terrorism Initiative. Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Bush agreed that developments in Afghanistan have a direct impact on its entire neighborhood. They emphasized that the Taliban and the Al Qaeda network have turned Afghanistan into a centre of terrorism, extremism and drug trafficking and have brought immense suffering to the Afghan people. They agreed that a peaceful, progressive and prosperous Afghanistan requires a broad-based government, representing all ethnic and religious groups, friendly with all countries in the neighborhood and beyond, as well as sizeable and sustained international assistance for Afghanistan’s economic reconstruction and development. The two leaders committed themselves to work together, and in partnership with other countries and international organizations to achieve these goals. Addressing the Asia Society at New York on September 22, 2003, Mr Vajpayee said: Continued terrorist attacks around the world remind us that the global war against terrorism, which commenced after the tragedy of 9/11, is far from over. Our long-term strategy to combat it should have four broad elements: One, a concert of democracies acting in cohesion. A threat against one should be seen as a threat against all. Two, consistency of approach in demanding from all countries, the same high standards in combating terrorism. Three, continuity of resolve, and clarity of purpose. We should not be drawn into the grey zone of conflicting policy objectives, which condone ambiguous positions on terrorism. Four, to win the war against terror, we have to win the war of ideas. We have to 165

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expand the constituency of democracy by promoting the ideals of freedom, democracy, rule of law and tolerance, which are our defining strengths. The post cold war age has also seen a significant proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. Today, the threat of their falling into terrorists’ hands looms large. The existing regimes for non-proliferation rigorously audit the performance of responsible states, but do not touch the proliferators. An honest reappraisal is required. The jihadi terrorist attack on the Legislative Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir at Srinagar on October 1, 2001, and on the Indian Parliament at New Delhi on December 13, 2001, brought about a significant change in the US attitude to Indian complaints since the 1980s that much of the terrorism in Indian territory, whether by the so-called Khalistani terrorists in Punjab or by the jihadi terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir and elsewhere in Indian territory, was sponsored by Pakistan’s military-intelligence establishment. Except for a short period between January and July, 1993, when the Clinton Administration placed Pakistan on a so-called watch list of suspected State-sponsors of International Terrorism and then removed it from that list on grounds of lack of evidence, the US attitude prior to late 2001 was to dismiss Indian complaints against Pakistan as lacking in evidence or based on inadmissible evidence extracted during police interrogation possibly using torture. There were even occasions when Indian counterterrorism experts felt that their American counter-parts, at the insistence of the State Department, had gone out of their way to see that no harm came to Pakistan as a result of Indian complaints against it. A typical example relates to the recovery of an unused timer of US origin from the scene of the explosions in Mumbai (Bombay) in March, 1993. US counterterrorism experts, who had visited the spot at the invitation of the Indian Government, wanted to take the timer to the United States for forensic examination. The Indian authorities agreed to it. After the examination, US authorities gave an unsigned note to their Indian counterparts that the timer had been manufactured in the United States and was part of a consignment given to Pakistan’s Army during the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s. However, they ruled out the use of their report in the trial against the accused. They also did not return the timer and contended that it had mistakenly been destroyed by their forensic authorities. When Indian authorities pointed out that the conclusions of their forensic experts proved the involvement of the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment in the Mumbai explosions, US officials disagreed and contended that since there were many instances of the leakage of arms and ammunition from the Pakistan military’s stocks to the smugglers’ market, terrorists might have procured the timers from the latter and not necessarily from the military-intelligence establishment. Based on these experiences, Indian experts have consistently worried that the United States will find ways to minimize the punitive consequences of Pakistan’s 166

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sponsorship of terrorism. This feeling has been strengthened by the recent revelations relating to the nuclear supermarket run by A.Q. Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist, and some of his colleagues. Details of the activities of the network, as published even in the Pakistani media, clearly show that it was not a rogue operation by one man with a small number of accomplices without the knowledge of the military-intelligence establishment. Instead of acting against Pakistan for its contribution to nuclear proliferation, the US response has been concentrated against those who sought to acquire nuclear technologies. The United States, for its own reasons, has chosen to accept the charade enacted by President Pervez Musharraf, acting as if the whole affair was a rogue operation of a single individual committed without the knowledge of Pakistan’s government. India has indirectly benefited from the US counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan. The cruise missile strikes on the training camps in Afghanistan ordered by President Clinton in 1998 destroyed not only some of the camps of Al Qaeda, but also a camp of the HUM. Similarly, US air strikes in Afghanistan following 9/11 caused many casualties in the ranks of the HUM, the JEM, HUJI, and the LET. India has reasons to be gratified over some of the actions taken by the United States following 9/11 and especially after the attack on the Indian Parliament in December, 2001. The United States took steps such as the designation of the LET and the JEM as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and of Dawood Ibrahim as an international terrorist, the acceptance of India’s contention that while crossborder infiltration of terrorists has declined since January, 2004, the jihadi terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan remains intact, and the diplomatic pressure exerted on Musharraf to act against the terrorist infrastructure. At the same time, India has reasons to be concerned over what is perceived by many in India as the US tolerance of the double game being played by Musharraf. While acting vigorously against the terrorist infrastructure of Al Qaeda in Pakistani territory, particularly in South Waziristan, which poses a threat to American lives, he has refrained from similar action against the terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory directed against India. Periodic open admonitions by US leaders and officials on the need to act against this infrastructure have not had any effect on him. So long as he feels confident that there would be no adverse consequences arising from his inaction against this infrastructure, Musharraf is unlikely to change his present policy. India also faces terrorist threats from jihadi and ethnic terrorist groups operating in its northeast from sanctuaries in Bangladesh. Many of these groups operate with the complicit support of Bangladeshi authorities and with the cooperation of the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment. Part of the proAl Qaeda jihadi terrorist infrastructure, which was based in Pakistan and Afghanistan in the past, has since shifted to Bangladesh after the United States started its operations in Afghanistan in October, 2001. The HUJI, in particular, has increased its activities in Bangladesh. Many pro-Taliban jihadi groups have come into existence in Bangladesh in recent years. It is time for the US–India 167

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counterterrorism cooperation mechanisms to take note of what is going on in Bangladesh and take appropriate action to stop this.

The future Bilateral Indo-US counterterrorism cooperation has eight components. I assign rough grade to these individual components based on a scale of 1 to 10 (with 1 being poor and 10 being excellent): ●

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●

● ● ●

● ●

Mutual Training Assistance for strengthening each other’s counterterrorism capabilities—8. Joint action in multilateral fora in matters such as action against terrorist funding, for the effective implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions on the subject etc.—7. Cooperation in specialized fields such as cyber security, aviation security, maritime counter-terrorism, consequence management in case of WMD terrorism, etc.—7. Exchange of intelligence, analyses and assessments—6. Mutual Legal Assistance—6. Individual and joint action to neutralize terrorists and terrorist organizations posing a threat to each other’s security—5. Action against State-sponsors of terrorism—3. Joint operations for the collection of intelligence and follow-up action on the intelligence collected—Difficult to grade for want of data.

However objective one might wish to be, subjective assessments cannot be excluded. These subjective concerns include disagreements about whether political violence is perpetrated by terrorists or freedom fighters, or whether government aid to such individuals constitutes state-sponsored terror or legitimate assistance to a strategic ally. Such subjective elements will most likely always come in the way of effective cooperation. Nevertheless, the aim of the two countries should be to further strengthen cooperation in those areas where subjective elements do not intrude, or, at the very least, to minimize the negative impact of subjective differences. Effective counterterrorism cooperation depends on convergences of threat perceptions, of national concerns, and of national interests. How do the United States and India continue to expand the areas of convergence and reduce areas of divergence? That is the question the policy-makers in the two countries should keep addressing. The terrorist strikes of 9/11 have brought home to all of us the importance of bilateral, as well as multilateral, cooperation in counterterrorism. The need for greater attention to counterterrorism and greater networking and cooperation at the bilateral, regional, and international levels is now widely accepted. There is now a shared emphasis on the need for a comprehensive counterterrorism policy 168

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that deals with international terrorism and its linkages with transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, money laundering, illegal arms trafficking, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Any new comprehensive counterterrorism policy calls for a common commitment to meet the cross-border threats posed by international terrorism. The aim of regional organizations is now projected not only as free trade, but also as free and secure trade. India has already been associated with many of the various multilateral cooperation mechanisms, governmental as well as non-governmental, which have come into being under the auspices of the ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Since 9/11, the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organization, of which India is not a member despite its growing economic power, has expanded its charter to include counterterrorism too in view of the likely impact of terrorism in the region on its economic stability and progress. Amongst the initiatives already taken by it in this regard are the setting-up of a Counterterrorism Task Force, the launching of an Energy Security Initiative and a Cyber Security Strategy. Even if there is no scope for the expansion of the membership of the APEC at present to include India as a full member, ways have to be found for associating India with its counterterrorism mechanisms. The USA can play a leadership role in facilitating the association of India with such regional mechanisms.

Conclusion Despite India’s dissatisfaction over repeated US failure since 1981 to call Pakistan to account for its sponsorship of terrorism, a consensus has developed since the terrorist strikes of 9/11 that Indo-US cooperation in counterterrorism as developed since 1981 should be sustained and further developed. This consensus is less the result of conscious deliberation and more the result of mutual concerns following the traumatic experiences of September and December of 2001. Even Indian Communists no longer question the advisability of Indo-US cooperation in counterterrorism as was seen during the recent annual congress of the Communist Party of India (Marxist). The congress witnessed criticism of India’s security cooperation with Israel as developed during the Vajpayee government. However, similar criticisms were not made with respect to the on-going cooperation with the United States. While the Indo-US cooperation in counterterrorism is thus based on a national consensus and will continue whichever party is in power in New Delhi, the US’ counterterrorism cooperation with Pakistan is not based on such a political consensus. It is largely the result of the calculations of one individual, namely, Pervez Musharraf. The United States cannot, therefore, be certain that this cooperation will continue in the same measure should Musharraf be deposed. Large sections of Pakistan, particularly religious parties, have been opposed to this cooperation. 169

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During George Bush’s second term the United States will have three main national security objectives. First, the United States will seek to win the so-called war against international terrorism. It has only been partly won and the remaining battles in this war will prove more difficult to attain victory than military victories in Afghanistan. Second, the United States will seek to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and will promote regime change in Tehran, though not necessarily through military means as was done in Iraq. Third, the United States will continue its policy of de-nuclearizing North Korea. For achieving the first two objectives, the cooperation of Pakistan will be vital. The United States has been the primary beneficiary of its counterterrorism cooperation with Pakistan while Islamabad has received comparatively fewer benefits. Its dependence on Pakistan will continue to be vital for preventing another 9/11-type attack in the US homeland. In contrast, India has benefited far more than Washington from counterterrorism cooperation with the United States, however, limited such cooperation might be. This benefit is manifest in the form of training facilities for Indian counterterrorism experts, the destruction of the Afghan training camps of the Pakistani jihadi organizations, and the freezing of the funds of many of these organizations by Pakistan under US pressure. US cooperation with India has not been as vital for the pursuit of Washington’s interests as has its cooperation with Pakistan. This is largely because there has been no act of jihadi terrorism mounted against the United States from Indian territory after the kidnapping of American tourists by the Al Faran in Jammu and Kashmir in 1995. In contrast, practically all the post-1992 jihadi terrorist strikes against US nationals and interests have been planned and mounted from Pakistani–Afghan territory. In the light of this, it is inevitable that where there is a conflict of interests between American counterterrorism policy requirements vis-à-vis Islamabad and those vis-à-vis New Delhi, the requirements relating to Pakistan would have primacy and would receive priority over those relating to India. It is, therefore, likely that Indo-US cooperation in counterterrorism would not have much scope for any spectacular advance against the terrorism of today. India should, therefore, focus on counterterrorism cooperation with the United States in meeting the likely threats from the terrorism of tomorrow and not the terrorism of today. The terrorism of tomorrow will have four components; maritime terrorism; Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) terrorism; cyber terrorism; and terrorism affecting energy security. Future counterterrorism strategies to deal with these new components will require strong naval power, brain power, and a high degree of skills relating to information technology (IT). India has all of these attributes in much greater measure than any other Asian country. It also has ample experience in countering, often successfully, terrorism of various hues. These assets, if further developed and used intelligently, could make India a valuable partner of the United States in countering the terrorism of tomorrow and 170

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bring value to current cooperation. There is another aspect relating to counterterrorism, which has not received adequate attention in India. This is the likely emergence of a homeland security industrial complex, comparable to the military industrial complex of the United States, which held sway during the Cold War and contributed in some measure to US economic prosperity. As the war against terrorism is likely to continue in the short and medium terms, the technological requirements of homeland security will continue to assume increasing importance, with a corresponding increase in investments in research and development in this sector and for the creation of facilities for the production of the required equipment. The United States and India could mutually benefit by joining hands in the research, development, and production of homeland security technologies. How might India and the United States jointly play the leadership role in developing counterterrorism strategies for meeting the terrorism of tomorrow and in promoting the joint research, development, and production of homeland security technologies and equipment? This is a question which should engage the attention of the counterterrorism experts of the two countries. Significant forward movement in this area could help to overcome the problems that currently bedevil Indo-US cooperation. Future cooperation is likely to have its share of problems, as evidenced last year by the discovery by Indian counter-intelligence officials that the CIA had penetrated the RAW by allegedly recruiting one of its middle-level officers, Rabinder Singh, as an agent. Prior to his arrest, the CIA allegedly helped him escape from India, via Kathmandu, and flee to the United States by issuing him an American passport under a different name. This was a gross violation of the unwritten code of conduct governing liaison relations between cooperating intelligence agencies, which lays down that the officers posted in the host capital for liaison purposes would not misuse their presence in the host capital for penetrating the intelligence agencies which are cooperating with their US counter-parts. Such problems are an occupational hazard when dealing with a country such as the United States which does not hesitate to break the rules of the game when it is considered necessary in US national interests.

Non-governmental initiatives An important outcome of 9/11 has been the coming together of a group of former intelligence and counterterrorism officials of India, the United States and Israel to act as a group of eminent professionals in order to promote greater counterterrorism cooperation amongst their respective countries. The initiative was taken by the Washington DC-based Jewish Institute For National Security Affairs (JINSA) and the group has already held three meetings and made appropriate recommendations. The governments of the three countries should encourage such non-governmental initiatives and be responsive to their recommendations. 171

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References 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

http://meaindia.nic.in/parliament/ls/2000/03/q3126.htm http://www.indianembassy.org/indusrel/jwg_terrorism_september_26_2000.html http://www.indianembassy.org/indusrel/2001/ind_us_js_nov_9_01.htm http://www.indianembassy.org/indusrel/2001/jdwg_dec_04_01.htm http://www.indianembassy.org/indusrel/2001/jwg_jun27_01.htm http://www.indianembassy.org/press_release/2002/jan/22.htm http://www.indianembassy.org/press_release/2002/jul/12.htm http://www.indianembassy.org/pm/vajpayee/pm_sept_22_03.htm http://www.indianembassy.org/press_release/2004/Nov/6.htm http://www.jinsa.org/articles/articles.html/function/view/categoryid/1723/documentid/ 2442/history/3,2359,2166,147,1723,2442 11 http://www.jinsa.org/articles/articles.html/function/view/categoryid/1949/documentid/ 2258/history/3,2360,1947,1949,2258

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9 LIMITED COOPERATION BETWEEN LIMITED ALLIES India’s strategic programs and India-US strategic trade Varun Sahni

The visit of US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to India in March 2005 generated a tsunami of sound bites. If we were to be guided by the rhetoric alone, US-India relations in the economic, energy, and security domains are being fundamentally transformed, perhaps irreversibly. According to Rice, the two countries “are becoming in many ways important global partners as well as regional partners.”1 On more than one occasion, the visiting dignitary insisted that “India is emerging as not just a regional power but as a global power”2 and that it was now a major factor “in the international economy, in international politics, taking on more and more global responsibilities.”3 A few days after Rice’s visit, a senior US official, in an anonymous interview with Agence FrancePresse, stated that it was the “goal” of the United States “to help India become a major world power in the 21st century,” adding that the United States understood fully “the implications, including military implications, of that statement.”4 David C. Mulford, the US ambassador to India, confirmed that the anonymous interview did indeed represent official US policy and that the US-India bilateral relationship would be transformed “into a true strategic partnership.”5 Mulford added, “We want to develop habits of cooperation and a level of confidence that characterizes US relations with our closest friends and allies.”6 For every one of these American statements, an Indian expression of optimism about the future of the bilateral relationship can readily be located. Should we therefore take these statements at face value? Compared to the virtually nonexistent history of US-India security cooperation, any change in the status quo that has the potential of enhancing the bilateral security relationship could be hailed as a “breakthrough.” It is therefore important that we devise a sensible yardstick against which we can measure relative change in this broad issue-area. Two strategic programs (civilian nuclear and civilian space) and strategic trade (high-technology trade in “dual-use” technologies, that is, those that can be used 173

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for either civilian or military purposes) are easily the three thorniest areas in US-India security cooperation; together they form the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) between the two countries. This chapter will critically analyse the NSSP and assess its potential in building security cooperation between India and the United States. The chapter is divided into two principal sections, each focusing on a distinct facet of the NSSP. The first section analyses and narrates the vicissitudes of US-India high-technology trade links, specifically the issue of dual-use technology, in the broader context of bilateral security cooperation. This section argues that a fundamental asymmetry exists in American and Indian perceptions with regard to strategic trade. Although India considers this issue-area to be the main measuring rod for calculating forward movement on bilateral security cooperation, this same issue-area is, in the United States, the most constrained and therefore the area in which US negotiators are least likely to make concessions of substance. The second section will focus on India’s civilian nuclear and space programs and make three arguments—conceptual, organizational, and capability-related—suggesting that, although there is little scope for bilateral security cooperation in civilian nuclear technology, there exist concrete possibilities for US-India cooperation in civilian space technology. Prior to assessing the NSSP, it will be useful to lay out a comparative canvas by briefly visiting two other issue-areas pertaining to bilateral security cooperation wherein change has been visible and on occasion dramatic: joint military exercises and military sales. Since 2002, the Indian and American armed forces have held a number of joint exercises. Initially of an unprecedented and symbolic nature, these joint exercises have rapidly acquired a routine and substantive quality. Among the more significant have been ●

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Exercise Balance Iroquois 2002, involving the Indian Army’s parachute brigade and US special forces, in May 2002 at Agra; Exercise Yudh Abhyas (a war exercise), a ten-day joint military exercise at the Indian Army’s Counter-Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School (CIJWS) at Vairangte, in May 2002; Exercise Geronimo Thrust 2002, a joint mountain-warfare exercise in Alaska, in September–October 2002; Exercise Malabar 2002, a week-long series of joint naval exercises off India’s southwestern coast in the Arabian Sea, involving a guided-missile cruiser, a destroyer, P-3C maritime patrol aircraft, and 750 personnel of the US Navy, in September–October 2002; Exercise Cope India 2002, a bilateral air-transport exercise involving 300 Indian Air Force (IAF) and 150 US Air Force (USAF) personnel, in October 2002 at Agra; Exercise Cooperative Cope Thunder 2003, a multinational air exercise in Alaska in June 2003 involving air forces from the United States, Japan, 174

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South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, India, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, with observers from numerous other countries in the Asia– Pacific region and around the world; the IAF contributed an IL-76 strategic airlift aircraft; a two-week joint exercise involving US and Indian special forces near the India–China border, in September 2003; Exercise Malabar 2003, involving an American nuclear submarine, a missile destroyer, and a missile cruiser, in October 2003; Exercise Cope India 2004, a dissimilar air-combat training exercise involving USAF F-15C and IAF Jaguar, MiG-21, Mirage 2000, and SU-30 K aircraft, in February 2004 at Gwalior; Exercise Cooperative Cope Thunder 2004, involving six Jaguar deeppenetration strike aircraft, two IL-76 heavy-duty air transporters, two new IL-78 tanker aircraft, and 197 IAF personnel, in July 2004 in Alaska; and Exercise Malabar 2004, involving a US guided-missile cruiser, a guidedmissile frigate, an attack submarine, and P-3C maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft, in October 2004.

In comparison to these multiple joint military exercises, forward movement in the area of US arms sales to India has not been quite as marked. Nevertheless, even in this area of bilateral security cooperation, change has been in the air since 2002. In 2002–03, India purchased a dozen Firefinder counter-battery radar sets. India has equipped its special forces with counterterrorism equipment procured from the United States and is also sourcing electronic sensors for border management from American firms. Aircraft self-protection systems for the IAF’s VIP transport squadron and the US–Israeli Phalcon airborne early-warning system are among other Indian acquisitions since 2004. Future Indian arms purchases from the United States could include the P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft, Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) anti-missile systems,7 and C-130J transport aircraft. Lockheed Martin has offered to set up production lines in India for F-16 air-superiority fighter aircraft and C-130J transports and has invited India to join its global Joint Strike Fighter project, launched in October 2004.8 The US government has granted export licenses to Lockheed Martin for selling P-3 Orion and C-130J aircraft to India.9 Nevertheless, some reticence on the part of the United States to sell arms to India remains, as can be seen in the American veto of the proposed Indian purchase of the Arrow anti-missile system from Israel.10 Compared to the progress in joint military exercises and arms sales, forward movement on NSSP issues has been slow and hesitant. Indeed, if we were to locate the various issues pertaining to US-India security cooperation along a spectrum ranging from dynamic change to stasis, joint military exercises would be at the dynamic end, the NSSP at the static end, and arms sales somewhere in the middle of the spectrum. A thorough review of the various facets of the NSSP is therefore urgently needed. 175

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India-US strategic trade: new shoes, small steps, plodding pace Steps in the direction of increased bilateral strategic trade—that is, trade in dual-use items, especially in the civilian nuclear and civilian space areas—have been few and far between and have, in any case, not had a significant impact on the ground so far. The United States, it may be recalled, had placed controls on the export of dual-use technologies to India since the early 1980s.11 These exports controls were substantially strengthened by the US sanctions on India after India’s May 1998 nuclear tests.12 The Clinton administration immediately imposed on India a series of sanctions mandated by the Glenn Amendment: stopping all aid—inclusive of economic development assistance—under the Foreign Assistance Act and all loans from American banks to Indian government entities; and suspending foreign military sales under the Arms Export Control Act, credits and credit guarantees by the US government, and loans from international financial institutions. The sanctions also prohibited exports of dual-use nuclear or missile items to India. Specifically, nearly 200 Indian entities were put on the US export-control Entity List maintained by the Bureau of Export Administration (BXA, now called the Bureau of Industry and Security) within the US Department of Commerce. These included the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and its subordinate entities; several Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) entities including nuclear reactors, reprocessing plants, and mining operations; subordinate entities of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), and several Indian public- and private-sector companies. Exports to these Indian entities required licenses that were decided on a case-by-case basis, in many cases with a “presumption of denial.” Yet much of the sanctions paraphernalia began to crumble even before it could be fully operationalized. In July 1998, the US Congress passed legislation granting India and Pakistan a one-year exemption from the Glenn Amendment for the purchase of US agricultural commodities. In October 1998, the India–Pakistan Relief Act of 1998 (Brownback I), gave the US president the authority to waive, for a period of one year, Glenn, Symington, and Pressler Amendment sanctions against India and Pakistan, except for sanctions on military assistance, dual-use exports, and military sales. In June 1999, Brownback II gave the President permanent authority to waive sanctions, following which the Clinton administration permitted the Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and the Trade and Development Agency to restore their operations in India in October 1999. In December 1999, fifty-one Indian entities were removed from the Entity List maintained by the BXA. Thus, there was a growing sense in influential quarters in the United States that export controls vis-à-vis India after 1998 were way too broad—in fact, were counterproductive. For instance, section 9001(d) of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2000 stated, [It] is the sense of Congress that the broad application of export controls to nearly 300 Indian and Pakistani entities is inconsistent with the 176

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specific national security interests of the United States and that this list needs refinement. . . . [Export] controls should be applied only to those Indian and Pakistani entities that make direct and material contributions to weapons of mass destruction and missile programs and only to those items that can contribute to such programs.13 In April 2001, Representatives Ed Royce (R-Calif.) and Jim McDermott (D-Wash.) introduced a bill to remove all remaining sanctions on India and Pakistan. On September 22, 2001, President George W. Bush signed an executive order lifting economic and military sanctions imposed on India and Pakistan for nuclear testing. In October 2001, the US Department of Commerce drastically cut down the number of Indian entities on the Entity List from approximately 200 to just 16.14 Although most the post-1998 sanctions have been lifted, US controls on dualuse exports to India remain. A large number of Indian entities continue to remain on the US Commerce Department’s Entity List, including, ● ●

Bharat Dynamics Limited The following subordinate entities of DRDO: – – – –

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The following DAE entities: – – – –

–

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the Armament Research and Development Establishment the Defence Research and Development Laboratory (DRDL) the Missile Research and Development Complex the Solid State Physics Laboratory.

the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR) Indian Rare Earths nuclear reactors (including power plants) not under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, full reprocessing and enrichment facilities, heavy water production facilities, and their collocated ammonia plants nuclear reactors (including power plants) subject to IAEA safeguards: – Tarapur (TAPS 1 & 2) – Rajasthan (RAPS 1 & 2).

The following subordinate entities of the ISRO: – – – – – – –

the ISRO Telemetry, Tracking, and Command Network the ISRO Inertial Systems Unit, at Thiruvananthapuram the Liquid Propulsion Systems Centre the Solid Propellant Space Booster Plant the Space Applications Centre at Ahmedabad the Sriharikota Space Centre the Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre, at Thiruvananthapuram.15 177

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Meanwhile, there are over 400 items on the Commerce Control List. The combined effect of the Entity List and the Commerce Control List has been to hinder the growth of India’s civilian nuclear and space programs as well as the information-technology sector of the economy. Thus, India continues to have good reasons to have both lists whittled down substantially. Since 2001, India has put significant diplomatic and political pressure on the United States to ease restrictions on the export of dual-use technology, and also to increase bilateral cooperation in the areas of space technology and civilian nuclear technology. In the jargon of US-India relations, these three issues came to be known as the “trinity,” to which missile defense was sometimes added to form a “quartet” of issues. India has projected access to dual-use technology as a “litmus test” of the quality of the bilateral relationship with the United States, the “touchstone” of a new strategic relationship aimed at building a “long-term strategic partnership.”16 While not putting the matter quite so strongly, US officials, too, have recognized, in the words of Undersecretary of Commerce Kenneth I. Juster, that a “vibrant high technology trade relationship is a key component . . . for fundamentally transforming US-India relations.”17 The United States has argued, however, that India exaggerates the deleterious impact of US export controls on bilateral trade. In fiscal year 2002, for instance, India exported goods valued at $11.8 billion to the United States and imported $4.1 billion of goods from the United States. Of this amount, only $38 million worth of transactions were subject to export-licensing requirements, with export licenses being denied for trade worth a mere $11 million.18 On the other hand, India insists—in the words of former foreign secretary Kanwal Sibal, who played a leading role in negotiations with the United States over this issue—that while “a broad category of controlled goods and technologies are now available easily to most importers in India . . . there are critical areas, not necessarily in value terms, in which [the bilateral] relationship has remained a prisoner of the past.”19 This radically new process of cooperation can be traced back to November 2001, when President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee agreed to promote bilateral high-technology commerce as part of a fundamental transformation in US–India relations. Soon after, the US–India Defense Policy Group (DPG), moribund since 1998, was revived; its third meeting was held in New Delhi on December 3–4, 2001. Less than six months later, the DPG met again, this time in Washington, DC, on May 20–23, 2002. On the dual-use trade front, however, not much happened after the Bush–Vajpayee meeting until November 2002, when the two governments agreed to establish an India–US High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG) comprising senior officials of the relevant departments and ministries of the two countries.20 On February 5, 2003, Sibal and Juster signed a “Statement of Principles for US-India High Technology Commerce.”21 Several features in this statement are noteworthy. Both governments, while noting the “immense untapped potential for India-US high technology commerce,” also underlined that they “attach the highest importance

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to preventing the proliferation of sensitive goods and technologies.” India recognized the importance that the United States attaches “to a supportive regulatory and institutional environment in India” and agreed to cooperate with the United States “in verifying Indian end users and end uses.” The United States, for its part, recognized the importance that India attaches to “the widest possible access to US dual-use goods and technologies and to efficiency, continuity, stability, and transparency in the export license application process.” To this end, the United States undertook to “identify and review licensing processes and policies for exports to India of [controlled] goods and technologies.” After its glacially slow start—an entire year passed between the Bush– Vajpayee meeting and the setting up of the HTCG—the bilateral technology-trade issue has moved forward. On July 2, 2003, the inaugural meeting of the HTCG was held in Washington, DC. The focus of this meeting was on creating conditions for furthering trade in strategic goods and technologies by changing policies and regulations to strengthen controls on the possible diversion of sensitive items. Ahead of the first HTCG meeting, the US Department of Commerce organized a one-day “Financing Innovation Forum” for high-technology industries with specific focus on information technology, defense technologies, biotechnology, and nanotechnology.22 The event was cosponsored by the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, the Confederation of Indian Industry, the National Association of Software and Service Companies, and the US–India Business Council. The second industry meeting of the HTCG on November 19, 2003, in Bangalore, also cosponsored by the same four organizations, was dubbed the “Forum on Advancing Synergy in Technologies.” This industry forum came up with the completely unexpected and, in the current context, rather unrealistic suggestion of US-India “co-development and co-production of next generation technologies” in the defense sector.23 The DPG met again in Washington on August 6–7, 2003, and in New Delhi on June 1, 2004. Apart from these DPG meetings, the bilateral Military Cooperation Group (coordinating military exercises and exchanges), Security Cooperation Group (coordinating sales and licensing), and Joint Technical Group (coordinating research and development) have continued to meet frequently. In October 2003, in the face of Indian attempts to push the pace on dual-use trade, Secretary of State Colin Powell coined the evocative phrase “glide path” to suggest that an agreement between the two countries on the “trinity” issues, while still subject to negotiation, would be reached in the near future.24 A few months later, the “glide path” morphed into the NSSP. On January 13, 2004, Bush and Vajpayee issued identical statements that gave a fresh impetus to the US-India “strategic partnership.” In their respective statements, both leaders made a pointed reference to civilian nuclear activities (“nuclear regulatory and safety issues”), civilian space programs (“peaceful uses of space technology”), and high-technology trade, as well as to an expanded dialogue on missile defense.25

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The visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to the United States in September 2004 marked the end of phase 1 of the NSSP. This phase saw forward movement in two areas: ●

●

The gradual de-linking of India’s missile and space programs in US exportcontrol policy. Removing the ISRO headquarters from the US Commerce Department’s Entity List was an important though symbolic step. Furthermore, although seven ISRO subordinate entities remain on the Entity List, licensing requirements were removed for low-level dual-use items (EAR99/XXX99) exported to these entities.26 The latter step is certainly more substantive than the removal of the ISRO headquarters from the Entity List, since it is expected to reduce by approximately 75–85 percent the number of applications for export that must be made by ISRO subordinate entities, and to reduce by approximately 20–25 percent the total number of applications necessary for the export of dual-use items to India.27 Increased bilateral cooperation in the civilian nuclear area, specifically with regard to exporting items to power plants in safeguarded Indian nuclear facilities. All dual-use items not controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), if intended for export to the “balance of plant” portion of an Indian nuclear facility subject to IAEA safeguards, would now enjoy a “presumption of approval” licensing policy.28

How do we begin to assess the changes in bilateral strategic trade since 2001? Is it reasonable for us to expect that phase 2 of the NSSP will take forward “the gradual process of lifting sanctions and smoothening the flow of sensitive, dual-use technology,” to use the words of an Indian analyst?29 The answers to these questions depend on whether we are predisposed to see the cup as halfempty or half-full. If one opts to be hard-nosed about the matter, one could say that the United States is giving up absolutely nothing when it gives “presumption of approval” status to export-license applications relating to “balance of plant” dual-use items not controlled by the NSG. That this may be because the United States has little or no wiggle room in the matter is a different, though related, issue. This, in a manner, sums up the problem with the entire high-technology trade area in India-US security relations: from an Indian perspective, there appears to be no real concession on the part of the United States. While he was in India, Juster publicly stated that “we fully understand and fully appreciate the importance to India of trade in sensitive technologies and the potential benefits to India from such trade.”30 A year and a half later, Juster characterized the NSSP “as a means to put in place a system that over time will allow more high technology transfers,” adding that, while far from perfect, the NSSP was “the best means for engagement and mutually beneficial trade” between the two countries.31 From an Indian perspective, it often seems that the United States is perfectly aware that strategic trade with India can take place only within very constricted boundaries, 180

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and that it is therefore trying to compensate or distract India with a great deal of activity in other areas of bilateral security cooperation, such as joint military exercises and arms sales. The problem is that joint military exercises, with American forces training on Indian soil, marks a huge concession for India in terms of its traditions, even though the United States may not view the matter in these terms. The reverse, it must be noted, is not true, since the United States has a long history of hosting forces from friendly countries on its territory for multinational military exercises. Thus, the concessions are asymmetrical: a big concession by India would not be viewed as such by the United States, and vice versa. For most Indian analysts and policymakers, trade in strategic dual-use technologies is the big American concession that is needed to firmly and irreversibly cement bilateral security cooperation. Juli MacDonald, an analyst at the consulting company Booz Allen Hamilton, has pointed out that the US–India relationship is “plagued by differing perceptions of threats and expectations.”32 Based on interviews she conducted with more than eighty defense officials and government policymakers in both countries for a study sponsored by the US Defense Department, MacDonald reported that Indian respondents desired a relationship built on “equality,” viewing technology transfer as the “engine of the relationship.”33 According to her, “technology transfer is the ‘acid test’ of US commitment, it demonstrates US confidence and trust in the relationship, it confirms the US understanding of India as a strategic partner, and it signals that India is a friend and we treat India as a friend.” At least she has not missed the obvious: that India and the United States are seeking different gains out of bilateral security cooperation, and therefore have distinct benchmarks with which they assess the state of mutual relations.

India’s strategic programs: problems with nuclear, possibilities with space Most policymakers and analysts associated with the issues surrounding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have tended, sometimes unreflectively, to club together nuclear issues and those related to missiles or space-launch vehicles. Admittedly, there are often good reasons to treat nuclear weapons and missile programs as two facets of a singular problem, or as distinct data points along the same continuum. History would suggest that successful acquisitions of nuclear and missile capabilities do indeed go hand in hand, as do the efforts of so-called rogue states to acquire these capabilities. Nevertheless, it would be analytically useful and politically helpful to separate these two issue areas in the US-India bilateral context: while real cooperation in the civilian nuclear area remains a mirage in the desert, space research could emerge as a fertile field for US-India cooperation. This argument for distinguishing the civilian nuclear area from civil space pivots around three arguments, relating, respectively, to capability, conceptual aspects, and organizational aspects. 181

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Technology dependence versus commercial viability India’s civilian nuclear program appears to have reached a capability plateau and would therefore benefit hugely from an infusion of technology from outside. The Indian space program, in contrast, is not technology dependent, inasmuch as it already possesses certain critical capabilities. In the space area, the issue is principally one of commercial viability: opening up the US satellite market to Indian space-launch vehicles. India currently has 14 nuclear reactor units at 6 sites—Tarapur, Rawatbhata, Kalpakkam, Narora, Kakrapar, and Kaiga—with a combined generating capacity of 2,720 megawatts of electricity (MWe). In 2003, these reactors generated 2.5 gigawatts of electricity (GWe), thereby providing 3.3 percent of India’s total electricity needs (110 GWe) that year. The Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. (NPCIL) has ambitious plans to boost output to 20,000 MWe by 2020, or 7–10 percent of India’s total energy-generating capacity. Plans to have eight new reactors in operation by 2008, including two Russian-designed 1,000-MWe VVER units (light-water pressurized reactors, identified by the Russian acronym), with a ninth plant (the Kalpakkam prototype fast-breeder reactor) expected to come online in 2010.34 Why characterize the problem of India’s civilian nuclear sector as one of capability? As Table 9.1 indicates, India’s fourteen nuclear reactors currently under operation—the two boiling water reactors built by General Electric at Tarapur, the two Candu pressurized heavy-water reactors (PHWRs) at Rawatbhata, and the ten PHWRs at Rawatbhata, Narora, Kaiga, and Kalpakkam—are all small, with none having a net generating capacity of more than 202 MWe. This is quite clearly an uneconomical way in which to proceed, and is a path of diminishing returns if the ambitious target of 250 GWe, or 25 percent of India’s power, is to be reached by 2050. Admittedly, plant efficiency seems to have improved significantly over the last decade: the capacity factors of India’s nuclear power plants increased from 60 percent—among the world’s lowest—in 1995 to 85 percent in 2001–02.35 Nevertheless, the only way forward for the Indian civilian nuclear sector is to import technology. It is therefore not surprising that India has turned to Russia to supply two pressurized light-water reactors, with a net generating capacity of 953 MWe each, at Kudankulam (of course under full IAEA safeguards).36 In sum, India’s technology dependence in the civilian nuclear area arises because it has not been able to surmount the 202 MWe plateau through indigenous effort. This could, of course, change if India is able to successfully pursue its plans to construct four 220 MWe PHWRs, ten 700 MWe PHWRs, three 500 MWe FBRs and six 1000 MWe VVERs between 2010–20.37 In contrast to the civilian nuclear realm, India’s space-launch sector faces no capability plateau. ISRO has a stable of rockets with differing capabilities for different purposes: the Augmented Space Launch Vehicle, with a payload capacity of 150 kg; the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV), with a payload capacity of 1,000 kg for placing satellites in polar, sun-synchronous orbits; and the

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Table 9.1 India’s nuclear power reactors, operating, under construction, and planned Reactor

Type

Fuel

Operating Tarapur 1

BWR

light water, LEU & MOX light water, LEU heavy water, natural U heavy water, natural U heavy water, natural U heavy water, natural U heavy water, natural U heavy water, natural U heavy water, natural U heavy water, natural U heavy water, natural U heavy water, natural U heavy water, natural U heavy water, natural U

Tarapur 2 Rawatbhata 1 Rawatbhata 2 Kalpakkam 1 Kalpakkam 2 Narora 1 Narora 2 Kakrapar 1 Kakrapar 2 Kaiga 1 Rawatbhata 3 Kaiga 2 Rawatbhata 4 Total operating (14) Under construction Tarapur 3 & 4 Kaiga 3 & 4 Rawatbhata 5 & 6 Kudankulam 1 & 2 Kalpakkam PFBR Total under construction (9) Planned Rawatbhata 7 & 8

BWR PHWR PHWR PHWR PHWR PHWR PHWR PHWR PHWR PHWR PHWR PHWR PHWR

Mwe net (each)

PHWR PHWR PHWR VVER (PWR) FBR

heavy water, natural U heavy water, natural U heavy water, natural U light water, LEU

PHWR

heavy water, natural U

mixed oxide

Completion/ target year

Subject to IAEA safeguards

150

1969

Yes

150 90 187 155 155 202 202 170 202 202 202 202 202 2,503

1969 1972 1980 1984 1986 1991 1992 1993 1995 1999 1999 2000 2000

Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No No No No No

2006–07 2007 2007–08 2007–08

No No No Yes

2010

No

?

No

490 202 202 953 470 3,618

450

Sources: “Nuclear Power in India,” February 2005, available at www.world-nuclear.org (accessed March 7, 2005); and www.ceip.org (accessed March 8, 2005). Notes BWR  boiling water reactor; FBR  fast breeder reactor; LEU  low-enriched uranium; MOX  mixed natural uranium and plutonium oxide fuel; natural U  natural uranium; PHWR  pressurized heavy-water reactor; PWR  light-water pressurized reactor; VVER  light-water pressurized reactor.

Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) with a payload capacity of 2,000 kg for placing satellites in geostationary orbits. ISRO is reportedly developing the GSLV 3, which would have a payload capacity of 4,000 kg.38 Thus, the problem for India’s space-launch sector is not one of technological dependence. Instead, it is the fact that US sanctions are a huge impediment to the program’s attaining commercial viability; they deny ISRO access to a lucrative satellite-launch market by prohibiting American and other western companies from using Indian launchers for their satellites.

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Nevertheless, the possibility of US–India cooperation in the space sector exists. At the India–US Conference on Space Science, Applications, and Commerce, held in Bangalore on June 21–25, 2004, several areas for enhanced cooperation in civil space activities were identified. These areas included Earth observation, satellite communications, and satellite navigation, which in the view of conference participants presented “promising opportunities for business development . . . through positive collaborative business ventures serving national and global markets.”39 Thus, at the level of capabilities there is a basic difference between India’s civilian nuclear and space programs: although the nuclear program needs technology from outside and can get that technology only from Russia or France, the space program can leverage its technology to increase the possibility of bilateral cooperation with the United States. Normative stasis versus dynamic interest bargaining This second argument for distinguishing between civilian nuclear issues and space-technology issues is built around conceptual differences between those areas. India is not a member of the entire web of interlocking treaties, arrangements, and suppliers groups that makes up the multilateral nonproliferation architecture: the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group, the Zangger Committee, the NSG, and the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Technologies. There is a significant difference, however, between the nuclear and missile issue-areas. The nuclear issue-area, civilian and military, is located within a normative framework that stigmatizes both India and its programs. The fundamental problem with a normative approach to nonproliferation is that it divides states in the international system into the “gatekeepers” and those who have been “excluded at the gate.” The normative approach works so long as none of the excluded states have both the capability and the will to buck the system. This approach is next to useless, however, in dealing with successful “gate crashers.” The central dilemma for normative nonproliferation remains: How does one deal with an excluded state that is now within the gates, short of accepting that it, too, is now a gatekeeper? Although exclusionary regimes also exist in the space-launch-vehicle/missile issue-area, they are still largely ad hoc arrangements. The MTCR, as an exclusive club, is explicitly non-universal and legally nonbinding and is therefore quite correctly regarded by target states such as India as an insulting nuisance. Nor is the efficacy of the MTCR universally accepted. Indeed, the inefficacy of global multilateral missile nonproliferation measures can be seen in the missile launches by North Korea and Iran in 1998, or indeed the steady march of India and Pakistan—the explicit targets of the MTCR—toward missile acquisition. Some analysts suggest that the MTCR has, for instance, hampered India’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program; others are far more dubious about its ability to significantly impede missile acquisition by a state such as India. The fact 184

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that clear violations of the MTCR—China’s missile and missile-technology transfers to Pakistan, for instance—have gone unchallenged makes this particular missile nonproliferation “regime” even more suspect in India’s eyes. The Russian-proposed Global Control System (GCS), particularly its transparency aspect and its intention to institutionalize transparency, would probably be far more acceptable than the MTCR to India; its nonproliferation part probably would be less so. Likewise, the Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC) would probably pass muster with New Delhi only partially. Transparency measures in the HCoC, such as annual declarations of missile policies, annual information about missile launches, and the exchange of prelaunch notification should not pose much of a problem for New Delhi. The stumbling block in the GCS, the HCoC, and the United Nations (UN) Panel of Governmental Experts is the dilemma of dual-use technology: how to impede missile programs without simultaneously punishing space-launch-vehicle programs. Furthermore, unlike in the nuclear area, India does have a big unilateral initiative to offer the United States in the missile area, which is to desist from developing and producing an ICBM, even though it already has the capability to make one. Some analysts have suggested—perhaps optimistically—that India could develop the Surya ICBM within two years of taking the decision to do so, because India does have the technology to develop an ICBM with a two-stage solid propulsion system that is akin to its PSLV. There have been reports that Surya-1, with an expected range of 8,000 km, would be tested in 2005 and would enter service in 2008, and that Surya-2, with an expected range of 12,000 km, is being planned.40 These reports, however, are not credible. In November 1989, an Indian minister allegedly made a statement acknowledging that India was developing a 5,000 km range Surya missile, a claim that was subsequently denied by Indian officials.41 Thus, all the indicators suggest that the Surya program is currently being kept in abeyance, a decision that would make perfect sense in the context of India’s desire for greater security cooperation with the United States. It would therefore appear that the bilateral route to resolving the issue of dual-use technology in the case of India will be far more effective than the efforts of global multilateral regimes. Even more important, while nuclear issues are embedded in a non-negotiable normative framework where the only concession (“give”) available for a country like India would be to “give up” its weapons program, interest bargaining is possible and viable in the missile/space issue-area. Civil-military osmosis versus credible internal firewalls The third and final argument relates to organizational issues. A significant challenge for India is to “separate its civilian and military establishments so that technology does not leak from the former to the latter.”42 Indeed, India’s most important commitment in the Sibal and Juster “Statement of Principles” relates precisely to “authorized transfers of dual-use goods and technologies controlled for missile technology and nuclear proliferation reasons.”43 In order to facilitate dual-use exports to its civilian space and civilian nuclear energy entities, India has undertaken to 185

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“consider a mutually satisfactory system of assurances regarding end use, diversion, transfers and retransfers within and outside India, re-export, and, where necessary, physical protection and access to the controlled items by third parties.” From the US perspective, the emphasis in this principle is clearly on the words “transfers and retransfers within . . . India.” The omnipresent overlap between civilian and military research and development in India has been a matter of persistent concern to the United States. As Indrani Bagchi put it, for the United States, “India is just not the world’s most trusted system with its overlapping civilian and military research system.”44 Similar concerns have been voiced in other quarters as well. A Pakistani scholar caustically pointed out “the unavoidable physical fact that hardware, technology and production infrastructure for [satellite-launch vehicles] are interchangeable with those of ballistic missiles.”45 Thus, this issue will almost certainly emerge as the sine qua non for bilateral security cooperation with the United States. In the nuclear area, insulating the civilian and military programs is an extremely difficult task, particularly because a single agency, the DAE, is ultimately responsible for both programs. The DAE institutes and production centers that could be considered to have a dual-use character include all of its most important subordinate entities: the BARC in Trombay; the IGCAR in Kalpakkam; the Centre for Advanced Technology in Indore; the Variable Energy Cyclotron Centre in Kolkata; the Nuclear Fuel Complex in Hyderabad; Indian Rare Earths Ltd. in Trombay; and the Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics in Kolkata.46 Apart from Indian Rare Earths, the DAE also contains the following public-sector companies: the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd., the Electronics Corporation of India Ltd., Bharatiya Nabhikiya Vidyut Nigam Ltd., and the Uranium Corporation of India Ltd. It is extremely difficult, verging on the impossible, to identify where India’s civilian nuclear program ends and its weapons program begins. Osmosis between civilian nuclear and military nuclear is inevitable. In the missile/space area, in sharp contrast, it is organizationally much easier to separate the civilian and military programs, not least because they are run by two different institutions, the ISRO and the DRDO, respectively. The DRDO and its subordinate entities, such as Bharat Dynamics Ltd., the DRDL, and the Defence Metallurgical Research Laboratory, remain on the US Commerce Department’s Entity List because of their role not only in India’s missile program but also in the nuclear weapons program. While seven subordinate entities of ISRO also remain on the Entity List, it would be possible to take them off the list by convincingly insulating India’s space program from its missile program. Thus, erecting credible internal firewalls between India’s missile and space programs is organizationally feasible, and a price that India should be willing to pay. With regard to missile proliferation, the close institutional and interpersonal links between the ISRO and the DRDO—the “contamination” of the ISRO by the DRDO,47 to use the American characterization of the issue—makes the use of the ISRO to launch American satellites impossible. The standard reaction in India to the ISRO-DRDO connection thus far has been either to trivialize the issue, or to assert that the “sanitization” of the ISRO from the DRDO is neither feasible 186

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nor enforceable. A typical Indian response is to argue, “Science runs in families, and uncles and nieces will talk to each other.” Nevertheless, the possibility of technology trade with the world’s premier technology-producing country, not least for India’s large science and technology establishment itself, is a huge inducement to change Indian perspectives on the issue over time. It is therefore highly likely that India will in due course install credible firewalls to insulate its space-launch program from its missile program. A different but related aspect linked to the “sanitization” of the ISRO relates to the future launches of India’s military satellites and dual-use satellites, the latter being satellites that could have a military function. In 2001, for instance, the ISRO launched a one-meter, high-resolution Technology Experiment Satellite that could have had a military function. In October 2003 India launched Resourcesat-1, a satellite with dual-use capabilities. India is currently negotiating an agreement with Russia to launch as many as nine Glonass navigation satellites, which would be commercially available to both military and civilian users. India has also offered to launch the Israeli Osek-5 military remote-sensing satellite.48 This problem of overlap can be overcome, however, perhaps through the creation of a separate agency for the launch of satellites with military applications. The attempt made here to characterize the civilian nuclear area (in contrast with the civilian space area) as being inherently impervious to bilateral US-India cooperation would be regarded by some analysts as being wrong-headed and outdated by events. Indeed, one of the most significant outcomes of the Rice visit was the US proposal to initiate a high-level energy dialogue with India “to include energy security, expanding cooperation on civil nuclear energy, clean energy and nuclear safety issues.”49 There is reason to be cautious about this development, however, regardless of how pregnant with possibilities it might appear to be at first glance: the issue linkage that the United States is explicitly seeking to construct in this regard. The United States has been quite candid in admitting that it would like to wean India away from a possible gas-pipeline project that would connect Iranian supplies to the Indian market via Pakistan, by proposing in its place a dialogue on the civilian nuclear sector that would presumably lead to a new technology relationship between the two countries. Rice stated this with commendable clarity: [We] have communicated to the Indian government our concerns about gas pipeline cooperation between Iran and India. . . . We do need to look at the broader question of how India meets its energy needs over the next decades in what is a rapidly growing economy. . . . [We] believe that a broad energy dialogue should be launched with India. . . . I would hope that we could also explore new ways that new technologies can help us over the next decades to meet what are undoubtedly going to be burgeoning energy needs.50 The issue linkage inherent in Rice’s statement places limits on what India can expect out of the energy dialogue. Given India’s growing economy and 187

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modernizing society, energy security has become one of its core challenges, one that will claim considerable amounts of diplomatic energy and policy attention over the next two decades. It should be clear that India’s energy options are no longer stacked in “either-or” terms: India needs multiple sources of energy, and it needs to search for these sources of energy with frenetic urgency. One can safely predict that all feasible options—building gas pipelines, constructing nuclear reactors, diversifying oil supplies, exploring renewable energy options, and revisiting coal-fired thermal power stations—will be considered by India and, if found feasible, made operational. Thus, India is unlikely to eschew the Iran pipeline in an effort to strike a bargain on civilian nuclear energy with the United States in the proposed energy dialogue; both the Iran–Pakistan–India gas pipeline and civilian nuclear reactors are grist to the Indian energy policy mill.

Conclusion: limited cooperation between limited allies In March 2000, Vajpayee had signaled a new beginning in bilateral relations with his statement that India and the United States had the “potential to become natural allies.”51 Five years later, this potential remains largely unfulfilled in the politico-strategic realm. That this is the case is perhaps not all that surprising. Although both countries derive their strength from being democracies, and are therefore on the right side of history, the interests of an emerging power and that of a hegemonic power are likely to be incompatible in the medium-to-long term. India and the United States can therefore cooperate most easily and readily on short-term issues, as they did in disaster management after the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004. They are, therefore, limited allies.52 This chapter suggests that there are perhaps “natural” limits operating on bilateral security cooperation between the “natural” allies, and that much of the promise inherent in the NSSP will never see the light of day. High-technology trade will become an integral part of the relationship, but access to certain dual-use technologies will continue to be denied to India. Nuclear stasis will go hand-in-hand with significant forward movement in the space sector. Nevertheless, the symbolic importance of the NSSP should not be denied, nor should the habit of routine bilateral consultation on security matters be trivialized. India’s emergence as a state with system-shaping potential depends in part on its not appearing on American radarscopes as a foe. The NSSP ensures that even if India and the United States do not become full-fledged allies, they will certainly never become enemies.

Notes 1 Condoleezza Rice, “Interview with Shivraj Prasad of NDTV,” New Delhi, March 16, 2005, available at www.state.gov (accessed June 7, 2005). 2 Condoleezza Rice, “Remarks en Route to India,” Washington, DC, March 15, 2005, available at www.state.gov (accessed June 7, 2005).

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3 Condoleezza Rice, “Remarks with Indian Foreign Minister Natwar Singh,” Hyderabad House, New Delhi, March 16, 2005, available at www.state.gov (accessed June 7, 2005). 4 “US Unveils Plans to Make India ‘Major World Power’,” Agence France-Presse, March 25, 2005, available at www.afp.com (accessed March 30, 2005). 5 David C. Mulford, “US-India Relationship to Reach New Heights,” New Delhi, March 31, 2005, available at newdelhi.usembassy.gov (accessed June 17, 2005). 6 Ibid. 7 Shishir Gupta, “Pentagon Team on the Way for Missile Defence Briefing: Patriot: More than Two Years after New Delhi’s First Request, Bush Admn Gives Go-Ahead,” Indian Express, February 16, 2005, available at www.indianexpress.com (accessed February 20, 2005). 8 “India Offered F-16 Fighter Deal,” BBC News, February 3, 2005, available at news.bbc.co.uk (accessed March 12, 2005). 9 “US Firm, India May Co-produce F-16s,” Dawn, February 13, 2005, available at www.dawn.com (accessed March 12, 2005). 10 www.wisconsinproject.org (accessed March 7, 2005). See also K. Alan Kronstadt, “India-US Relations,” CRS Issue Brief for Congress (Washington: Congressional Research Service, November 4, 2004), CRS-10. 11 The Symington Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, adopted by the US Congress in 1976, prohibits American economic and military assistance to any country delivering or receiving nuclear-enrichment equipment, material, or technology not safeguarded by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Glenn Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, adopted by the US Congress in 1977, prohibits US assistance to any non-nuclear weapon state (as defined by the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty) that conducts a nuclear explosion. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Act (1978) prohibits the export of nuclear technology to non-nuclear weapon states unless the recipient state accepts full IAEA safeguards. These three laws were key to preventing “dual-use” trade between India and the United States. 12 A useful timeline on India–Pakistan sanctions legislation can be accessed at www.clw.org 13 Title IX of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2000 (Public Law 106-79 [H.R. 2561]), Waiver of Certain Sanctions against India and Pakistan, available at www.mac.doc.gov/sanctions/waiver-publaw.106-79.htm (accessed March 13, 2005). 14 www.wisconsinproject.org (accessed March 7, 2005). 15 US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Export Administration Regulations, “The Entity List: Entities of Proliferation Concern Listed in Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 of the Export Administration Regulations,” March 10, 2005, pp. 4–6, available at www.bxa.doc.gov and www.access.gpo.gov (accessed March 14, 2005). 16 Indrani Bagchi, “Indo-US Relations High on Tech,” India Today on the Net, November 24, 2003, available at www.freerepublic.com (accessed December 9, 2003). 17 Kenneth I. Juster, “Stimulating High-Technology Cooperation with India,” address to the annual meeting of the US-India Business Council, New York, June 2, 2003, available at mumbai.usconsulate.gov (accessed December 9, 2003). 18 Ibid. 19 Address by Kanwal Sibal, foreign secretary, government of India, at a meeting sponsored by the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, New Delhi, November 20, 2003, available at www.ficci.com (accessed December 9, 2003). 20 “India–US Joint Statement on High Technology Commerce,” New Delhi, November 13, 2002, available at www.indianembassy.org (accessed December 9, 2003). 21 “Statement of Principles for US–India High Technology Commerce,” Washington, February 5, 2003, available at www.bxa.gov (accessed November 20, 2003).

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22 www.ciionline.org (accessed December 9, 2003). 23 “US for Collaboration with India in Defence Sector,” available at servlet.indiainfo.com (accessed December 9, 2003). 24 Kronstadt, “India–US Relations,” CRS-10. 25 Newdelhi.usembassy.gov and www.indianembassy.org (accessed March 4, 2005). 26 This refers to dual-use items that are not particularly important in the military sphere. The EAR99 classification indicates that a particular item is subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), but is not listed with a specific Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) on the Commerce Control List (CCL). Although the EAR99 classification identifies an item as low-level dual-use, authorization for shipment is not guaranteed and depends upon the nature of the transaction. 27 www.globalsecurity.org (accessed March 4, 2005). 28 “India–US Relations: A General Overview,” available at www.indianembassy.org (accessed March 12, 2005). “Balance of plant” refers to the parts of a nuclear power plant other than the nuclear reactor—the turbines, controllers, and power distribution needed for power generation. See US Department of Commerce, “The Entity List.” 29 Jyoti Malhotra, “US Delinks Missile Programmes, Opens Tech Tap for India,” Indian Express, September 27, 2004, available at www.indianexpress.com (accessed February 7, 2005). 30 Kenneth I. Juster, “US–India Relations and High-Technology Trade,” address to the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, New Delhi, November 20, 2003, available at www.indianembassy.org (accessed March 7, 2005). 31 “Policy Council on India Meeting: Understanding the ‘Next Steps in Strategic Partnership’,” (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 26, 2004), 2–3, available at www.csis.org (accessed March 7, 2005). 32 Anthony Kujawa, “Convergence of Interests Leading to Closer US–India Security Ties: Study Says Indians View Tech Transfer as ‘Acid Test’ of US Commitment,” December 15, 2003, available at chennai.usconsulate.gov (accessed March 12, 2005). 33 Net Assessment Office of the Secretary of Defense, Indo-US Military Relationship: Expectations and Perceptions (Washington: Department of Defense, October 2002). 34 “Nuclear Power in India,” February 2005, available at www.world-nuclear.org (accessed March 7, 2005). 35 Ibid. 36 www.eia.doe.gov (accessed March 7, 2005). 37 “Nuclear Power in India.” 38 “India: Launch Capabilities,” available at cns.miis.edu (accessed March 5, 2005). 39 Usembassy.state.gov (accessed March 9, 2005). 40 www.missilethreat.com (accessed March 7, 2005). 41 “India: Ballistic Missile Update, 2000,” The Risk Report 6, no. 5 (September–October 2000), available at www.wisconsinproject.org (accessed March 8, 2005). 42 “Indo-US Strategic Partnership: The Politics of Hi-Tech,” Business World, August 2004, available at www.businessworldindia.com (accessed March 2, 2005). 43 “India–US Joint Statement on High Technology Commerce,” New Delhi, November 13, 2002, available at www.indianembassy.org (accessed December 9, 2003). 44 Bagchi, “Indo-US Relations High on Tech.” 45 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, “Missile Proliferation and Export Control in South Asia: MTCR and Beyond,” South Asian Survey 11, no. 2 (July–December 2004): 245. 46 “Overview: India Special Weapons Facilities,” available at www.globalsecurity.org (accesssed March 7, 2005). 47 Bagchi, “Indo-US Relations High on Tech.” 48 Cns.miis.edu (accessed March 5, 2005). 49 Mulford, “US-India Relationship to Reach New Heights.”

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50 Rice, “Remarks with Indian Foreign Minister Natwar Singh.” 51 “Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s Statement after the Address by the US President William J. Clinton to the two Houses of Parliament,” New Delhi, March 22, 2000, available at www.indianembassy.org (accessed March 10, 2005). 52 This subdued assessment could, of course, be overturned in the coming years if the problem of power imbalances in the Asia-Pacific becomes a live issue. If that were to happen, the two countries would likely discover a strong identity of interest in maintaining the status quo in the Asia-Pacific.

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10 THE FUTURE OF INDO-US COOPERATION IN MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS Shantonu Choudhry

Introduction In the post Cold War period the world has more or less become unipolar with the United States as the only super power. India is a large country with a population in excess of one billion, a healthy and rapidly growing economy, a high level of technological aptitude, and a large professional defense force. The United States and India are the world’s two largest democracies and have been the most pressing champions for democratic reform. To examine the future of Indo-US cooperation in multilateral or bilateral peacekeeping operations, it is necessary to scan, albeit briefly, the political and defense relationship between the two states since politics would dictate the level of cooperation and defense forces would, more often than not, be the lead agency in executing peacekeeping operations. With that, it is imperative to examine the direction of Indo-US defense ties, a relationship that has sometimes been compared to a plane on the tarmac—it must either take off or remain stranded. Political differences have frequently frustrated the more optimistic observers of Indo-US relations. Using the term “estrangement” to characterize India-US relations during the first fifty years, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan noted that the term “nicely captures the sense on both sides that affection has not been returned, or has somehow lapsed, or has found new outlets.”1 The conduct of nuclear tests and the announcement of a program of weaponization by India in May 1998 led to yet another low point in the relationship. The United States joined hands with2 China to rally the world against India and to call for a roll-back of its nuclear program.3 Post Pokhran-II, since US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott engaged the then external affairs minister Jaswant Singh, the bilateral relationship shows signs of marked improvement. The visit to India by President Bill Clinton in March 2000 can be described as a turning point in India-US relations. This visit, the first by a US President to India in almost 22 years, indicated the priority accorded to the largest democracy in the world and a potentially important economic partner. Since 2000, 192

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the United States and India have embarked on a strategic relationship culminating in the 2004 announcement of the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP). As India and the United States increase defense cooperation in what has been described as a “measured but robust manner,” peacekeeping operations have emerged as an area where both countries can look forward to greater cooperation. India has always supported traditional peacekeeping operations, albeit under the United Nations’ flag. Changing realties, however, have ushered in an era of pragmatism where traditionally ephemeral collaborative efforts must evolve into more sustainable partnerships for achieving common goals. Today India and the United States share a broad consensus on terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and a common desire for political and economic stability in their strategic neighborhoods. The possibility of conjoined peace operations between India and the United States are looking more likely, though it is critical to view the emergence of such cooperation in the larger contexts of bilateral political relationships, national interests, and defense force relationships.

Range and scope of defense relationship For much of India’s independent history, relations between Washington and New Delhi have been marked by a perception of policy ambiguity on both sides. The Indian government was initially supportive of US Missile defense initiatives, however it did not agree with, or commit itself to, US policies pertaining to Iraq, Iran, and counterterrorism strategy in Pakistan. Similarly, the United States could not fully engage with India and agree to technology transfer out of fear of offending Pakistan, its ally and a frontline state in its war on terror. While politics, domestic, and international, will always drive the relationship, security ties, and military cooperation can provide policy-makers with options. Whereas US relations with Pakistan, due to their support for counterterrorism operations, can be understood, New Delhi seeks US recognition of India’s key position in Asia and is keen on a long-term strategic partnership. Both countries have recognized that closer Indo-US relations could be an important and positive factor in global affairs in the twenty-first century, especially after 9/11. While any ruling government in India will try and fend off perceptions of an American tilt by pursuing an “independent” foreign policy, while at the same time keeping in mind the broader convergence of democratic values, they are likely to prevent any anti-American sentiments from emerging within the coalition and sabotaging the growing economic, technological, and military cooperation. Some observers suggest that there is hesitancy and reticence on part of the Indian side to discuss substantial issues related to a strategic engagement. This position hails from the persistence of a strong lobby that continues to allude to the sentimentalities of the Cold War and Nonalignment. Given India’s vibrant democracy, such competing perspectives must be tolerated, even if they no longer reflect the position of most Indian citizens and policy-makers. One of the ways to advance the Indo-US relationship would be to draw up a “roadmap” that schedules areas and levels of 193

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cooperation. This would allow various intra-government agencies and the armed forces to make their own plans and derive maximum benefit from an exchange of technology, doctrines, and operating procedures. Despite having a high-level superstructure for defense cooperation, in the form of the Defense Policy Group (DPG), India and the United States still have not been able to devise a coherent policy that supports their much-vaunted “strategic convergence.” The precise nature and extent of Indo-US military ties has been a cause for concern amongst proponents of the theory of “natural allies.” The progress made under the Next Step in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) agreement will be a crucial indicator of the direction of Indo-US defense cooperation. It is in that context that the entire gamut of security ties, in the subcontinent and beyond, need to be re-evaluated both in Washington and Delhi. In the recently concluded DPG meeting both sides issued public statements hailing the outcome of the talks. One area where both sides concurred was on the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA), which defines and formalizes the logistical relationship between the armed forces of the two countries. This allows the United States to pay for logistics and other services being provided at Indian bases. In fact, defense cooperation in such areas like Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) and joint training and exercises could be incorporated as a part of the NSSP agreement and could intensify the level of cooperation between the two governments.

Global threats and challenges Prior to any meaningful consideration of the future cooperation between the United States and India on peacekeeping operations, it is important to envision global threats and challenges. The “High Level Panel,” convened by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, has enunciated a vision on the probable global threats and challenges facing the international community in the future.4 The panel addressed a wide array of security issues, including interstate rivalry and the use of force, intra-state violence, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and organized crime, poverty, disease, and environmental degradation. The panel presented a challenge for finding a common vision to guide a collective response. The subsequent report sub-divided threats in six clusters: ● ●

● ● ● ●

War between states. Violence within states, including civil wars, large-scale human rights abuses and genocide. Poverty, infectious disease, and environmental degradation. Nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological weapons. Terrorism. Transnational organized crime.

Challenges in the twenty-first century are likely to be oriented toward conflicts within states, and also increasingly involve non-state actors, such as 194

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terrorists or national liberation movements. As the international community struggled to find ways to deal with the new complexities of conflict, the attack on the World Trade Centre (WTC) in Spetember of 2001 has amended the paradigm of threats and challenges to global peace. Security concerns vary from region to region, from state to state, and from situation to situation. In Africa, internal conflicts are further aggravated by abundance of illegal weapons, and increasing use of child combatants, including girls, who are often fed drugs. In a conflict environment like this, war economies continue to grow and thrive on willing protagonists who clamor for easy money, which is, sadly, more attractive than the return of peace. To add to the misery of the African continent, the spread of HIV/AIDS has created a level of insecurity seriously hampering progress of sustainable development, health, education, the eradication of poverty, the promotion of human rights, and good governance. The United States National Intelligence Council (NIC) on January 13, 2005 released the 2020 project report. Although the report identifies the release of a WMD-particularly a major bio-terrorist attack—as the greatest danger to global security, it does not over emphasise on “war on terrorism.” Indeed, a terrorist threat using WMDs certainly looms large over the horizon. Economic globalization—defined here as growing inter-connectedness reflected in the expanded flows of information, technology, capital, and goods-is the only emerging “megatrend” named in the report. It is unequivocally stated that globalization will be “. . . force so ubiquitous that it will substantially shape all the other major trends in the world of 2020.” In a global geo-strategic view, called the Pentagon’s New Map5, the world has been classified into “the functioning core,” the “non-integrating gap” and the “seam” states. Wars would occur in the gap because the people there lack inter-connectivity with the global economy and because most of the nations there are either led by tyrants or are, to varying degrees, failed states. In either case, these countries are viewed as potential launching pads for terrorists. Non-state non-civil actors such as organized criminal groups and terrorists will continue to pose a constant challenge to the security of nations and international organizations. Organized crime is growing in influence and scope as criminal groups become increasingly entrenched in the international economy as demand for, and profits from, the illicit transportation of people, arms, drugs, and contraband multiplies. International criminal organizations will increase in number and influence as they become more adept at manipulating and challenging local and national governments and international organizations and consolidating their power bases.6 The growth of transnational criminal organizations will be aggravated by advances in communications and transportation technologies, a decrease in governmental controls over the international flow of goods, services and money, and the projected rates of unemployment in developing countries. Most international organized crime groups are also involved in fraud, cargo theft, the acquisition and sale of chemicals for both drug production and weapons of mass destruction, and extortion. The decline in importance of state borders to international business has the negative effect of facilitating the free movement of 195

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organized crime operations across national borders and will continue to enable crime groups to exert their power globally.7 Maritime security in the wake of energy security concerns has become a major focus of international attention and will continue to do so in future. The global economy remains dependent and vulnerable to the circulation of oil and is particularly vulnerable over its chokepoints. Maritime petroleum circulation involves six major chokepoints Strait of Hormuz, Strait of Malacca, Bab el-Mandab, Suez Canal, Bosporus and Panama Canal. These maritime routes are critical not merely for their role in international energy trade, but also for every other facet of global commerce. In recent years, the threat of terrorism has raised additional concerns over maritime circulation.8 Strategic passages can be mined, blocked by sinking ships, or pirated. Two of these strategic passages are of extremely high importance: Hormuz and Malacca. Given their important role in international political economy, it is vital that the world community consider whether maritime security should be part of international peace operations. While the costs of such collaborative security arrangements is no doubt high, so to are the benefits derived in terms of international economic security. The most prominent issues will be terrorism (often combined with trans-border crime), proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, shortages in energy supply (oil, gas, water), political and religious extremism, poverty, environmental degradation, rapid growth and migration of population, urbanization, disease prevention, growing global income disparities, massive violations of human rights, failed states, corruption, international narcotics trade, and the growth of HIV/AIDS. Most disturbingly, the majority of these security concerns do not recognize international borders. With total breakdown of government institutions, defunct judiciary and, in the absence of law and order in some states private security forces seem to replace professional armies. “The armed men no longer wore uniform; there were no fault lines, no separations between civil and military, state and private, and war and peace.”9 Threat to international peace and security now go far beyond waging aggressive war. These threats now extend to poverty, infectious diseases and environmental degradation; war and violence within the states; the spread and possible use of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons; and transnational organised crimes. The threats are from non-state actors as well as states, and to human security as well as state security.10 As the UN special advisor on Gender Issues and the Advancement of Women puts it in a message given during the seminar on “Challenges of Peace Operations: into the 21st Century” held in Cornwallis, Given the concept of security had expanded to include human dimensions, peace and security were no longer solely military concepts. Poverty alleviation, human development, protection of the environment, 196

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promotion of human rights of women and men were now included in these concepts. Today’s challenges of peacekeeping were not only to end hostilities and re build communities, but also to deal with the problems that led to the conflict. It is clear that lack of this broader view of peacekeeping and peace building provides a breeding ground for the continuation of conflict and instability.11

The gamut of peace operations Although the response of peacekeepers to these new challenges must go far beyond traditional understandings of collaborative peacekeeping, their role continues to be referred as “peacekeeping” as it relates to maintenance of international peace and security in light of new challenges. At the same time, however, as peacekeepers are likely to be expected to perform wide ranging roles and may have to resort to force more aggressively both in self-defense and to bring back derailed peace processes, the term peacekeeping may appear misleading. According to Major General Inderjit Rikhye, the term “peace operations” is more appropriate to cover the widening scope of such operations and should be adopted for professional usage.12 Presently the peace operations are an umbrella term that includes activities such as conflict prevention, conflict mitigation, peace making, peacekeeping, and peace building by establishing the basic conditions for human development. Peace operations and the enforcement of human rights are, or ought to be, instances of international law enforcement that promote human emancipation. A number of characteristics of contemporary peace operations exist, including: ●

●

●

Peace operations often require deployment into both inter-state and intrastate conflicts; Peace operations are conducted in every phase of conflict spectrum, from prevention to post-conflict reconstruction. Peace operations are dependent on close cooperation among civilian police and military organizations drawn from the international community, with parties to the conflict and war-affected populations;

Coming to the subject of peace operations in the global context, the past decade has seen fundamental changes in peacekeeping doctrine and practice. These reflect responses to changes in configurations of violent conflict and to evolving definitions of “peace.” Peace is no longer seen as the cessation of hostilities or the absence of war. It is now increasingly understood as a steady state of sustainable development and institution building in which the root causes of violence are addressed. Traditional concepts of peacekeeping were premised on the so-called holy trinity of consent, impartiality and the minimum use of force. Their principal purpose was to assist in the creation and maintenance of conditions conducive to long-term conflict resolution efforts by the parties themselves, in the period between a ceasefire and a political settlement. From earlier mandates of 197

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“inter-positioning” between conflicting parties, peacekeepers now find themselves increasingly positioned in and among hostile parties, and tasked with diverse responsibilities. The lessons of the 1990’s converge in the current need for operational clarity in peacekeeping rationale and scope. All phases of conflict— prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict reconstruction—now shape the assumptions actors bring to bear on their technical mandates. Peacekeeping operations are today deployed in areas of intra-state conflict and civil wars involving many armed factions and ready supplies of weapons and ammunition. This development has made the environment in which UN peacekeeping forces operate highly dangerous. Not surprisingly, several areas of the peacekeeping field have been affected by these developments and require increased collaboration. These areas include the following: ●

●

●

●

First, there is the area of logistics and the new challenge to integrate civilian and military operations in the field. Cooperation between these different parts of the peacekeeping operation is essential for promoting unity of purpose within the mission. Second, there is the problem of establishing an efficient command and control system in the field. This is a consequence of the growing tendency of national governments to intervene directly in the chain of command in peacekeeping operations. Apparently, in pursuance of their national interests, nations communicate direct orders to their contingent commanders, shortcircuiting the established UN chain of command and causing severe problems in the missions. The formal command status of the UN Force Commander in the field has in several crises been more apparent than real, as was the case in both the former Yugoslavia and Somalia. A third issue to be addressed in this context is the inadequate training of many of the participating contingents in UN peacekeeping operations. It is especially in the three areas of logistics, communications, and engineering that specialized units and personnel are missing. The lack of specialized personnel to carry out early movement and control functions also constitutes a major problem today. Finally, there is a tactical lack of mobility to support operations. This is well illustrated by the events in Mozambique in 1994, when the contract for eight MI-8 heavy transport helicopters expired. Although the New York headquarters knew about the problem, existing regulations prevented a rapid solution which almost derailed the entire demobilization schedule in the country. In addition, when the United Nations eventually did hire some new helicopters, these turned out to be unsuitable for the operation.

International security and the United Nations Security and the United Nations, the organization responsible for international peace and security, are traditionally and inextricably linked. Therefore, it is 198

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inevitable that the security challenges of the twenty-first century will have an impact on the conduct of future peace operations. Further, security changes also have raised questions on the basic framework of the UN Charter, especially the relevance of the basic principles of peacekeeping and rules governing the use of force. The central role of the United Nations in maintenance of international peace and security has started to re-emerge with stronger affirmation of the international community to “wage peace” before a war starts. Therefore, in order to arrest growing concerns about the ability of the United Nations in handling complex situations, UN peace operations have gradually undergone some structural changes. Key challenges in peacekeeping missions include not only the cessation of hostilities, but also the rebuilding communities and a focus on structured conflict prevention by addressing underlying problems. Clearly, obvious lacunae exist in the UN system as far as the management of international peace is concerned. These lacunae gave rise to the coalitions of the willing in Afghanistan and Iraq led by the United States and in Solomon Islands led by Australia. There are increased responsibilities being undertaken by regional organisations such as the EU in Democratic Rebuplic of Congo (DRC) and Economic Community of West African States MONITORING GROUP (ECOMOG) in West Africa and ad hoc coalitions like RAMSI in South Pacific. The privatization of security simultaneously is another salient trend. The importance of non-state actors in the entire gamut of peace operations—from being causative factors in inciting and being a catalyst in conflictual scenarios, to amelioration of problems of mankind— cannot be understated. There are multiple actors within states—rival groups, warring factions, splinter groups, and paramilitary and regular forces—as well as from outside. Their agenda might include economic, political, national, and strategic interests. In addition, due to the changing nature of peacekeeping operations there is a distinct shift from participation of only military forces to multifaceted participation by civil police, civilians, NGOs, humanitarian agencies, religious groups, gender specialists, media, legal experts, and election monitors. Here, it is important to note that since the United Nations lacks the wherewithal, military intervention, when it is found inevitable, should be always authorized by the Security Council and undertaken by Multi-National Forces (MNF). History bears testimony to the fact that the United Nations is not cut out to embark on ambitious projects like the recent military intervention in Afghanistan, which was, nevertheless, wholeheartedly approved by the Security Council. The US-led war on global terrorism may also necessitate military intervention or peace operations in future. Once again, the United Nations will do well to rely on MNFs and regional arrangements to conduct such operations, contingent upon Security Council approval. Contemporary geopolitical complexities are substantially different from those of the Cold War era and the diversity of global political actors has similarly changed. The makers of the UN Charter could not have fathomed the menace of terrorism and criminal organizations, a kind of warfare that the United Nations is even today unable to effectively combat. New aspects of the threat, including the rise of a global terrorist network and the potential for terrorist use of nuclear or biological weapons, 199

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need new responses. The United Nations also has problems with financing its activities, a dilemma with direct bearing on peacekeeping operations. In order to solve this problem, it might be necessary to think of new ways of financing the operations and find new contributors. The lack of any independent enforcement capability with the United Nations has meant that operations take place on a decentralized basis, entrusted to actors willing to take them on, typically under regional arrangements or ad hoc coalitions of willing states. Though lacking a predefined force structure and not directly sanctioned by the Security Council, it has been suggested that even “coalitions of the willing,” like those currently led by the United States, could work under UN command and control. In Operation Desert Storm, the coalition that liberated Kuwait formally operated under the aegis of Resolution 678.

Multilateralism in peace operations The absence of an effective collective/multilateral security system constitutes in itself a major threat. This goes beyond the shortcomings of the institutions of the United Nations. States, as the constituent parts of the international system, fall short in their management of this system. Policy responses to inherently global issues are formulated from a national perspective. Cross-border problems receive answers that often emphasize borders, resulting in sub-optimal solutions, if they generate any solutions at all. The multilateral system needs a renewed commitment by states to play by rules and to work together to counter global challenges. A stronger financial base for the multilateral system would be a concrete expression of this commitment.13 The case of ad hoc coalition is indeed cumbersome. Nations that form ad hoc coalitions identify themselves as concerned members of the international community to prevent or halt instances of deadly conflict. Unity of command typically is achieved in these coalitions through the vesting of overall command in a leader and the core of his staff most likely comes from the state contributing the most troops. Likeminded nations often possess interoperable equipment, easing logistical problems, and many will have already conducted bilateral and multilateral military exercises. The resulting shared knowledge of operating doctrine and procedures of coalition partners aids in mission planning and execution. Almost without exception, ad hoc coalitions are initiated and supported by the great powers, primarily the United States, thus ensuring material and financial support. Costs and tasks are shared among the coalition partners, thereby easing the financial burden and obviating the need for expensive and potentially controversial unilateral action. With these formulations it is necessary to address the likelihood of Indo-US cooperation in peace operations, both multilaterally and bilaterally.

India and peace operations Ideologically, India supports the traditional peacekeeping under the current framework. However, India considers other peacekeeping activities as relevant in 200

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the context of changing realities. India supports the UN view stressing the necessity of rooting out the causes of conflicts and the need to deploy the tools of preventive diplomacy to prevent conflicts from escalating beyond acceptable limits. India has generally supported the regionalization of peacekeeping, undertaken within the norms of the United Nations. India’s track record for contributing to UN peacekeeping is substantial. (See Appendix attached.) From the 60 Para Field Ambulance operating at Pyongyang, North Korea in December 1950, to sustaining 39 casualties in Gaza Strip in May 1967, to providing protection to the Chinese Engineer Company in Cambodia in May 1993, Indian performance has been spectacular. Some countries in India’s neighborhood have the potential for large-scale disturbances and possible outbreak of civil violence. Such instability would have serious impacts on India’s national security and would threaten India’s core national interests. In such a scenario, peace operations, either as a preventive measure or as enforcement measure, might become necessary. Given India’s status as a democracy, there exist obvious constraints in an era of coalition politics. The need to politically manage events and build a broad consensus of policies becomes mandatory. By virtue of India’s historic commitments to international peace, the operational capacities and modus operandi of Indian forces, and New Delhi’s faith in the UN system, successive Indian governments have tended to be favorably viewed in the community of nations. Historically, this has irked US leaders critical of India’s hesitancy to participate in multilateral military coalitions without a UN mandate. In fact it is this very factor, faith in the international order built up painstakingly over the decades, that has enabled India to be “acceptable” to the widest cross section of the globe, particularly among developing nations. Domestically, there exists a broad consensus within India on US military operations in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, New Delhi’s participation was not sought, primarily due to US reliance on Pakistan in the conflict. This brings up the underlying theme that India, in future, may support multinational coalitions or even a bilateral arrangement provided that the purpose of cooperative action is consistent with Indian national interests and security concerns. This certainly does not open the floodgates of future participation, but Indian leaders are indeed pragmatic enough to follow the trends of the future. India can bring a wide plethora of instrumentalities and unique experience to bear on future peacekeeping missions. To build domestic political support, however, the articulation of purpose and an analysis of the impact and payoffs toward India’s national interests will be paramount.

Indo-US cooperation in peace operations It is in this context it is necessary to examine the India’s perceptions of the United States role in peace operations globally. Indeed, it is felt that the United States commits itself in peace enforcement and peace support operations rather than traditional peacekeeping. This policy facilitates US involvement and interest in only a select few UN commitments. This is most evident in policies toward Africa, 201

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where, following its problems in Somalia, the United States has been desirous of allowing Africa to deal with its own problems and only provide assistance for capacity building. There is also a dichotomy in undertaking peace operations suo moto or as a coalition, and seeking UN support later. These so-called hybrid operations seek UN support only at the peace building stage after the situation stabilizes. Being the preeminent power in the world, US troops serving under other countries’ military commanders is a controversial issue and tends to draw little popular support within the United States. Invariably, the United States undertakes the responsibilities of the lead nation in multinational operations aimed at safeguarding US strategic interests, regardless of UN approval. Indian leaders are conscious of the United States need to undertake multinational operations to protect its national interests. This realization manifested itself in a considerable domestic split in India pertaining to participation in the war on Iraq as a substantial part of the Indian populace was in favor of participation. Given closer defense ties between Washington and New Delhi, peacekeeping operations have emerged as an area where both countries can look forward to greater cooperation. In India, changing ground realties have ushered in an era of pragmatism, where collaborative efforts are seen as a means of forming sustainable partnerships suitable for achieving common goals. India and the United States have a broad consensus on terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and both desire political and economic stability in their strategic neighborhoods. India and the United States have also expanded the gamut of peace operations bilaterally by engaging each other to protect and ensure safety of the sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean region. Indo-US peacekeeping operations are a natural consequence of close defense cooperation, with joint training exercises aimed at achieving intraoperability and mutual confidence. As we continue to explore the range of peacekeeping, it is noteworthy that most peace operations are increasingly falling under the ambit of peace enforcement operations defined by Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Fundamentally there are but a few issues where Indian perceptions vary from that of the United States. Nevertheless, the troublesome issue of US troops being under UN command remains. While the United States insists on retaining its own command and control structure, logically the largest force commander should retain control to ensure optimum coordination. As a first step, Indo-US collaboration should address these systemic problems in order to develop a strategic framework for future cooperation. Accordingly, possible areas in which India and the United States could cooperate on peacekeeping are: ●

● ●

Conflict prevention, peace enforcement, peace support, and humanitarian intervention operations by a multinational coalition, duly authorized by the United Nations. Capacity building in the Asia–Pacific Region. Formulation of peacekeeping doctrines and concepts, and broad precepts of intelligence sharing. 202

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● ●

● ●

● ●

●

Cooperation in peace building activities and establishing rule of law for sustainable peace. Cooperation in training and education of civilian police and paramilitary forces. Cooperation in the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities programme and Global Peace Operations Initiative program. Exchange of intelligence and cooperation in actual operations. Jointly target terrorists using criminal groups to move money, men, and materials around the globe. Tackle jointly a framework to have a “Standby Force” with equipment. Ensure that joint training for UN Peacekeeping is institutionalized under Centre for UN Peacekeeping (CUNPK). Jointly evolve a mechanism under the JWG to ensure immediate reaction to crises.

There is little historic evidence suggesting the likelihood of Indian participation in multinational coalition and bilateral peace operations not mandated by the UN Security Council. However, the possibilities of future cooperation cannot be ignored. The likelihood of an Indian intervention in the South Asian neighborhood to ameliorate human suffering is also well within the realm of possibility. An Indian initiative in this regard, with US bilateral support and encouragement, may prove to be an important area of discussion. Similarly, bilateral or multilateral collaboration under the aegis of the “right to protect” is possible in regions traditionally detached from both US and Indian political concerns, such as Africa. Cooperation in an Iraq-type operation, one without a UN Security Council mandate and broad international opposition, is likely to prove problematic and politically unstable. At the same time, it might be possible to attain broad consensus in the Indian polity for a “hybrid” operation that obtains Security Council support following intervention. Both the US and Indian Armed Forces are highly professional, belonging to two vibrant democratic nations with a very healthy respect for each others competence. There should, therefore, be regular interaction between the Pentagon and Service HQ in Delhi to address different contingencies and scenarios. Such interactions could cover peace enforcement across the whole spectrum of conflict, including the use of the WMDs. Similar operations to safeguard SLOCs, though not traditionally under the ambit of peace operations, will contribute to global peace and security. These issues can be discussed at the political level to enable rapid and cogent reaction in a collaborative effort. There are obvious differences in the execution levels of operations, particularly the perception that US forces have a tendency to use excessive military strength in peace operations. Given its experience with insurgent movements, the Indian military employs diverse levels of military strength contingent on specific circumstances. There are also differences on deployments, especially as it pertains to excessive reliance on “force protection” by the United States. Those issues at operational levels can be well managed. 203

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Indo-US cooperation in post-conflict operations If a stable peace is based on four pillars-security, social and economic well being, justice and reconciliation, and governance and participation—then to achieve all these post-conflict objectives is indeed a Herculean task. A rapid and decisive conventional victory does not guarantee peaceful post-conflict stabilization, as has been witnessed in both Iraq and Afghanistan. A secure environment is necessary precondition for successful nation building, and combat operations and stabilization and reconstruction operations must be planned concurrently. The United Nations has excellent experience in post-conflict operations, with focus on attaining political-military objectives to successfully implement the peace strategy. The possibilities of Indo-US cooperation in post-conflict operations are endless. Being democracies, establishment and management of democratic institutions comes naturally to both nations. In India it is well understood that what the armed forces say or do in a post-conflict environment is as important as what they do during conflict. It is argued that in light of the experiences learned by the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan, conjoined efforts can be made to work on different niche capabilities and tailored organizations with requisite core competencies when undertaking post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction. Both the Indian polity and the Indian Security Forces have developed the right temperament and expertise in this sphere. Accordingly, the existing framework of the Indo-US Joint Working Group on Peacekeeping needs to graduate to next step; consideration of scenarios under which the two nations could collaborate, both multilaterally and bilaterally, with suitable military and civil structures.

Conclusion Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, following his meeting with President Bush last fall, remarked that the “best is yet to come” in terms of the Indo-US relationship. In fact, increasing cooperation with India, particularly defense cooperation, has transformed the nature of the US-India bilateral relationship. There are important issues both countries need to address as they proceed with the task of improving bilateral relations. It is essential, however, to recognize the fact that a resurgent India, more confident and self assured than any time before, is today conducting its foreign policy on the basis of a pragmatic assessment of its national interests. India is discovering that it pays to be pragmatic in foreign policy making and to liberalize its economy. There is in India a determination to look to the future and move the country down the path of economic growth, prosperity, and great power status. There is also recognition that this goal cannot be attained without a close relationship with the United States. The present approach of friendship and partnership with the United States is rooted in India’s national interests as well as a desire for global peace. India’s close and successful cooperation in providing Tsunami relief was vivid evidence of how far its defense relationship with the United States has progressed and portends great possibilities for future joint efforts to address common regional security and humanitarian contingencies. 204

Appendix Indian participation in UN PKOs Ser. No. Mission

Country & duration

Indian contribution

UNNNRC UNMIC UNEFI UNOGIL ONUC

Korea (1950–53) Indo-China (1954) Egypt–Israel (1956) Lebanon (1958) Congo (1960–64)

6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

UNSF UNYOM UNFICYP DOMREP UNIFIL UNIIMOG UNAVEM-I UNTAG UNIKOM ONUCA UNAVEM-II ONUSAL UNAMIC UNPROFOR UNTAC

West Iran (1962) Yemen (1963) Cyprus (1964) Dominica (1965) Lebanon (1998 till date) Iran–Iraq (1988) Angola (1989) Namibia (1989) Kuwait/Iraq (1991) Nicaragua (1989) Angola (1991) El Salvador (1991) Cambodia (1991) Former Yugoslavia (1992) Cambodia (1992–93)

21 22

UNOSOM-II UNOMOZ

Somalia (1992–94) Mozambique (1992)

23 24

UNOMIL UNMLT/ UNSGRC UNAMIR

Liberia (1993) Cambodia (1993)

Bde Gp & Chairman 6,000 Chariman/Vice Chairman 7,000 11 Bns & FC 12,000 MOs 20 Two Bde Gps & 12,000 Regional Cdr, SRSG UNMOs & FC 12 FC & MIL OBS 25 FCs 03 MA 01 Bn Gp & SOs 5,716 ACMO & UNMOs 06 UNMOs 08 FC & SO 02 COS & 7 UNMOs per year 66 UNMOs 05 COS & UNMOs 09 UNMOs 04 UNMOs 06 FC & SO 02 Bns/Fd Amb/Sos 1,700 and UNMOs Bde Gp & SOs 7,000 Engr/HQ/LGS Coy, 600 SO & UNMOs UNMOs 17 UNMOs 13

1 2 3 4 5

25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39

Rwanda (1994–96)

Bn, Engr & Sig Coy/COS/SO/UNMO UNAMIH Haiti (1993) Civil Police UNAMEV III Angola (1995–97) Bn Gp, Engr Coy/SO & UNMOs/DFC UNMIBH Bosnia–Herzegovina Engr Offr, Demining (1997) Gp, Civil Police UNOMSIL Sierra–Leone (1998) CMO, UNMO. Med Team MONUA Angola (1997–99) Mech Coy, Sos & UNMOs UNAMSIL Sierra–Leone (1999–2001) FC. Sect Cdr & Tps UNAMIK Kosvo (2000 till date) Civil Police UNMEE Ethiopia–Eritrea (2001 till date) Tps, UNMOs & Sos MONUC Democratic Republic of Inf Bde Gp/UNMOs, Congo (1999 till date) Level III, Hospital UNMA Angola (2002) Los UNGCI Iraq (2000 till date) GD Cdr ONUCI Ivory Coast (March 2004 Sos & UNMOs onwards) UNOB Burundi (June 2004 onwards) Sos & UNMOs UNAMIS Sudan (July 2004 onwards) Sos & UNMOs Total

No. of troops

1,000 50 2,000 135 31 330 4,765 540 5,293 3,322 02 02 13 08 03 69,709

Note * India has participated in thirty-nine UN missions (including three police missions) with 69,709 personnel.

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Indian contribution as on January 31, 05

1 MONTUC 2 ONUB 3 UNAMSIL 4 UNFICYP 5 UNIFIL 6 UNMEE 7 UNMIK 8 UNOCI Total

TPS

MILOBS

Total

2,553 04 5 CIV POL 4 CIV POL 649 1,546 334 CIVPOL 04

36 05 – – – 08

2,589(InclAF contingent) 09 05 04 649 1,554 334 10 5,154

06

Notes 1 Dennis Kux, India and the United States: Estranged Democracies, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1993, p. XVIII. 2 Text of Sino-U.S. Joint Presidential statement on South Asia at http://www. china-embassy.org/eng/7098.html 3 http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9906/16/india.pakistan.02/index.html#1. 4 UN Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, December 2004. 5 Barnett Thomas, The Pentagon’s New Map, C-SPAN Washington, (United States), 2004. 6 Dr Kimberley Thachuk, International Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking, paper presented at the Transnational Issues Conference, October 14–15, 1998 Washington, DC: National Defense University. p. 1. 7 Ibid. 8 Richardson, M., A Time Bomb for Global Trade: Maritime-related Terrorism in an Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction. 2004. The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Singapore, accessed at http://www.iseas.edu.sg /viewpoint/ mricsumfeb04.pdf on February 22, 2005. 9 M. Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Environment (London, UK: Polity Press, 1999), pp. 2–3. 10 UN Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secured World: Our Shared Responsibility, 2004. 11 “Changing Concept of Security,” in the concluding report of Challenges or Peace Operations: into the 21st Century (Stockholm: Elenders Gotab, 2002), p. 43. 12 Major General Inder Rikhye, The Politics and Practice of United Nations Peacekeeping: Past, Present and Future (Toronto: Brown Book, 2000), p. 92. 13 A Fork in the Road? Conversations on the Work of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, International Peace Academy Report, available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sga857.doc.htm

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11 US ARMY’S NEW PEACE OPERATIONS ERA William Flavin

The US Army has been conducting peace operations under various names throughout most of its history. From earliest Colonial times through Reconstruction after the Civil War, through the Indian wars, the occupations of the Philippines, Cuba, China, and Central America at the beginning of the twentieth century, and the postconflict situations after the Second World War, the Army has enforced civil rights; disarmed, demobilized, and separated factions; stabilized and overseen the formation of governments; established educational reform; assisted in humanitarian relief; and provided a safe and secure environment so that orderly society could be established. Army officers have operated governments and conducted nation-building in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines following the war with Spain in 1899 and in Germany and Japan following the Second World War. In all this time, the Army as an institution never embraced these tasks as a core mission. The combined effects of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, the involvement of US Army in peace operations in the Balkans in 1995, and the Army’s operations in support of the postconflict peace operations in Iraq since 2003 have forced change, however.1 This chapter will examine the nature of that change, explore how the Army and the joint forces are responding to the demands of peace operations, and discuss future trends and challenges.

Beginnings With the signing of the United Nations (UN) Charter on June 25, 1945, in San Francisco, Senator Arthur Vandenberg (R-Mich.) asserted it to be a “new Emancipation Proclamation for the World . . . man’s best chance for a better, a safer and a happier world.”2 This safer and happier world, however, would depend on the will of the member nations to make the sacrifices necessary to support the organization both financially and militarily. This military commitment included providing forces, under Article 43, to the Security Council “on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements . . . necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.”3 207

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Soon political reality intruded. Although the US administration, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, supported the use of US military forces for UN operations, opposition grew between the Senate and the executive branch over war powers. A minority of powerful senators objected to giving the president full authority to commit US forces without Senate approval. The enabling legislation that incorporated the UN Charter into US law reflected this tension by constraining the president to seek Senate approval before negotiating agreements with the UN to make US forces available.4 Other nations’ self interests also served to weaken the intent of Article 43. Moscow, during force negotiations, placed constraints on troop numbers, basing, and duration of commitment. This, coupled with Moscow’s actions in its sphere of influence, as highlighted by Premier Joseph Stalin’s February 9, 1946, speech in Moscow, in which he stated that a peaceful world order was impossible because of capitalist-imperialist monopoly, sounded the end of a UN on-call force to secure peace. Faced with the prospect of the UN’s not having the military force necessary, the US Congress amended the enabling legislation in 1949 to authorize the president to deploy up to 1,000 troops under UN control without congressional approval.5 Initially, the United States contributed significant forces in support of UN operations, as with the troops supplied under the Operational Command of the United Nations in support of the 1948 Truce Commission for Palestine and later for the 1949 UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). However, the Soviet Union, suspecting that the United States and the United Kingdom were shaping the situation in Palestine toward Western interests, objected to the organization and the selection of participants in it. Thus, a long string of Soviet resistance and vetoes of Security Council resolutions prevented the United Nations from fulfilling its primary purpose. From 1946 to 1955 alone, the Soviet Union vetoed 75 of 77 resolutions in support of their national interests.6 For the next forty years, this bilateral competition between the United States and the Soviet Union overshadowed the UN’s use of military force. US support to UN peacekeeping missions was frozen by the partisan domestic politics that predominated during the Cold War. The US military’s initial enthusiasm for peace operations quickly waned, and the institution focused on major combat. Although the US Army placed peacekeeping at the bottom of the list of its missions, a limited number of Army personnel continued to support UN missions. Over these years, the United States has participated continuously in “blue helmet” operations, often alongside Indian forces. This association started in Korea in the 1950s, continued through the Somalia and Balkan operations in the 1990s, and exists today in operations in Kosovo, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. The Army’s traditional aversion to complex stability operations increased with the end of Vietnam War in 1973, when it shifted its focus away from those uncomfortable conflicts back to conventional war. Peace operations and other missions deemed “low intensity” or “less than war” were relegated to the backwaters. The Army eliminated most of this type of instruction from its schools and centers and 208

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focused on rebuilding itself into the world-class conventional force that would later be showcased in the invasion of Iraq in 1991. The doctrine that did exist reflected the counterinsurgency-era theory and fundamentals. The only document that even used the term “peacekeeping” was the Army’s 1969 field manual (FM) titled The Infantry Battalion, but it provided no discussion on any fundamentals other than mentioning that peacekeeping was an operation that an infantry battalion could be called upon to perform. Nevertheless, intellectual inquiry into peace operations persisted in Army schools. In 1971–75, students at the US Army Command and General Staff College studied and wrote about peacekeeping. Maj. Charles Raymond’s graduate thesis in 1974 provided one of the basic documents in the development of the Army’s future doctrine. He developed a set of fundamentals based on the work done by the Australian British Canadian American Standardization Group (ABCA), an organization chartered in 1947 to maintain and extend the cooperation, interoperability, and standardization achieved during the Second World War. In 1970, the ABCA met to consider the future security challenges for 1981–90. The attendees believed that peacekeeping would be a key concern and developed a concept for success. This was the first attempt to develop a multinational concept for the conduct of peace operations. Raymond’s work would not find its way into Army doctrine for another twenty years.7 The first US handbook on tactics, techniques, and procedures was developed in response to the continuing requirement for US military officers to support UNTSO. It was an individual, rather than any institution, who recognized a need and did something about it. Maj. James Connors of the US Air Force, who had just returned from duty with UNTSO, wrote this handbook in 1985 while a student at the Air Force’s Air Command and Staff College. The book was later adopted by the Department of the Army as the standard to support this one mission but was not expanded into an overarching doctrine. The Army published its first doctrine on peace operations in 1990, after seven years of study and debate: FM 100-20, titled Low Intensity Conflict. It defined all peace operations as peacekeeping under Chapter 6 of the UN Charter, under which units deploy with the full consent of all sides and force can be used only for self-defense. The principles of peacekeeping operations in this field manual were based on Raymond’s 1974 work and on the 1989 publication of the Army–Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict (CLIC), Peacekeeping Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. In this latter document, the author, Lt. Col. Charles Ayers, used the term “conditions that must be present” rather than principles. Senior military leaders would debate for years whether peace operations should have “principles,” “imperatives,” “fundamentals,” or just “conditions.” The underlying issue, however, was the nature of peace operations: did peace operations stand alone as a separate condition or were they part of a continuum of war-fighting covered by the principles of war? The fall of the Berlin Wall and the involvement of the US Army in the Balkans forced a reassessment.8 209

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Fall of the wall The evaporation of the Cold War constraints with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, a shift in US political attitudes, and the success of several UN and UNsanctioned operations—including Operation Desert Storm in Iraq in 1991, the UN Iraq–Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), the UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), the UN Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I), the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia, the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), and the UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA)—encouraged member nations to support an ambitious agenda extending UN peace operations to several complex crises. In UN operations in Cambodia, Haiti, the Balkans, and Somalia, US troops served alongside Indian forces.9 In 1991, Gen. Gordon Sullivan became the chief of staff of the US Army. He believed that Operation Provide Comfort, the relief operation for the Kurds in Iraq that was carried out under UN Security Council Resolution 688, represented the future much more than did Operation Desert Storm. He directed the rewrite of the Army’s capstone field manual, FM 100-5, titled Operations, to include an entire chapter on military operations other than war. For the first time, in its capstone manual, the Army acknowledged this complex and dangerous environment by identifying two types of peace operations, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement, in which force must be used to ensure peace and stability.10 In 1994, the Army chief of staff, as a result of the Somalia operation and an afteraction review of the US Army operation in Rwanda, asked the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to write a capstone manual on peacekeeping. Lt. Col. John Clarke and Richard Rinaldo, in coordination with the Combined Arms Center at Ft. Leavenworth and the CLIC, wrote FM 100-23, titled Peace Operations. The initial draft of this field manual was a descendant of the doctrine work started at Leavenworth in 1973 and developed by the CLIC. Other countries’ doctrines were consulted, especially those of the United Kingdom. TRADOC approved the overarching term “peace operations,” divided into three “activities”: peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and support to diplomacy. The last of these terms included peace building, peacemaking, and preventive diplomacy. This framework followed the thinking emanating from the United Nations, particularly as outlined in the 1992 report by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, and the emerging doctrine within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). These “activities,” however, were not considered as a continuum that would allow a unit to move freely from one to the other. They were considered distinct and separate states, which “take place under vastly different circumstances.”11 This peace operations doctrine was nested inside of the Army’s war-fighting ethos; success in peace operations was seen to depend on the ability of the commander to exercise situational dominance in order to avoid “inadvertently slipping from one type of peace operation to another.”

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The joint doctrine used by the military’s unified commands, however, was not consistent with the newly developed Army doctrine. The Department of the Army team that had written the initial joint manual on peace operations had focused only on traditional peacekeeping to the exclusion of all other forms of peace operations, thus neglecting UN, international, and previous Army publications. The team that wrote FM 100-23 was not involved in the development of the joint doctrine. This discontinuity between joint doctrine and Army doctrine has continued. In 1995, unified commands felt that the joint doctrine did not provide them with sufficient guidance. To address this need, the Joint Warfighting Center at Ft. Monroe, assisted by the Peacekeeping Institute at the US Army War College, published the Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations. This was not a doctrinal manual but contained doctrinal material in addition to inputs from the field. This manual was consistent with Army doctrine but expanded the horizon by discussing complex contingencies. It discussed the dynamic nature of peace operations and the fact that end states were not static but were a “moving target” that continued to be refined throughout an operation.12

The Balkans Starting in December 1995, US Army operations in support of NATO in the Balkans challenged the institution to address complex peace operations. In 1999, the US Institute of Peace conducted a conference with senior commanders after their deployment in the Balkans to determine how prepared they had been to face a peace operation. The report concluded, The U.S. Army is a doctrine-driven institution. In Bosnia, U.S. Army doctrines were largely inadequate in an environment that forced American commanders to wrestle with the political, diplomatic, and military demands of stability operations. Almost from the inception of the Implementation Force (IFOR) operation, U.S. commanders found themselves in uncharted territory. Describing this challenge, Maj. Gen. William Nash noted that this was an “inner ear problem.” Having trained for thirty years to read a battlefield, Nash observed that the general officers were now asked to read a “peace field.” Stabilization Force (SFOR) Commander Gen. Eric K. Shinseki posited that he had to confront a “cultural bias.” Army doctrine-based training prepared him for warfighting and leadership at all levels, but “there wasn’t a clear doctrine for stability operations. We are developing it, using the Bosnia experience, to define a doctrine for large stability operations. But it is this absence of a doctrine for a doctrine-based institution that you walk into in this environment. There you are in a kind of roll-your-own situation.”13

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FM 100-23 and the Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook on Peace Operations had been published but not incorporated into the core doctrine of the service. At the level of tactics, techniques, and procedures, the US Army’s doctrine and training on peace operations lagged behind that of several other nations. Soldiers deployed to Bosnia and to Kosovo with publications from other nations, from academic institutions, and from the Internet in their pockets. Recognizing the need for doctrine and training, the Army initiated a doctrine development and training response to prepare its forces for complex peace operations. Previously, many in the Army had looked on peace operations as something that the blue-helmeted UN troops would do while the US force concentrated on war-fighting. Yet in the Balkans, US forces were expected to perform peace operations such as separating forces, establishing checkpoints, verifying compliance with the Dayton peace agreement, manning observation points, and conducting presence patrols. The Army also found itself engaged in peacebuilding tasks such as disarmament and demobilization, supporting elections, establishing rule of law, assisting in civil governance, supporting displaced civilian returns, and rebuilding infrastructure. The Army doctrine had relegated peacebuilding to a lesser supporting category, and “nation-building” had become a concept to avoid based on the Army’s previous experiences in Vietnam and Central America. In 2001, the Army published an updated capstone doctrine manual, FM 3-0, titled Operations, which for the first time described a spectrum of operations that placed stability operations on an equal footing with war-fighting. It stated, Army doctrine addresses the range of full spectrum operations across the spectrum of conflict. Army commanders at all echelons may combine different types of operations simultaneously and sequentially to accomplish missions in war and military operations other than war (MOOTW). For each mission, the Joint Force Commander (JFC) and Army component commander determine the emphasis Army forces place on each type of operation. Offensive and defensive operations normally dominate military operations in war and some small-scale contingencies (SSC). Stability operations and support operations predominate in MOOTW that include certain SSCs and peacetime military engagement (PME). . . . As missions change from promoting peace to deterring war and from resolving conflict to war itself, the combinations of and transitions between these operations require skillful assessment, planning, preparation, and execution. Operations designed to accomplish more than one strategic purpose may be executed simultaneously, sequentially, or both. For example, within a combatant commander’s Area of Responsibility (AOR), one force may be executing large-scale offensive operations while another is conducting stability operations. Within the combat zone, Army forces may conduct stability operations and support operations as well as combat operations.14 212

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Although this doctrine still placed operations in distinct boxes, the Army had come a long way toward embracing the concept of the three-block war advocated by Marine Corps Gen. Charles Krulak in 1999. He asserted that a marine must be able to conduct humanitarian assistance, traditional peacekeeping, and traditional war-fighting simultaneously three blocks apart.15 FM 3-07, titled Stability and Support Operations and published in 2003, supported the new capstone manual and replaced the 1994 FM 100-23, Peace Operations. It integrated the NATO doctrine for peace operations and crisis response and focused on key areas such as negotiations, refugees, intelligence, information operations, and civil law and order. Later that year, the Air Land Sea Application Center published a multiservice manual focused on tactics, techniques, and procedures to guide the individual soldier and marine. This manual, FM 3-07.31, titled Multi-Service TTP for Peace Operations and published in October 2003, capitalized on the lessons learned from Bosnia and Kosovo. These manuals described peace operations as multiagency operations in which the military is a supporting player. FM 3-07 states that The military objective in all these operations is to create the conditions for other political, economic, and humanitarian peace building activities to achieve the political objective stated in the mandate and to transition from involvement. Building consensus among the parties is critical and allows the force to lower its operational profile to one more akin to (PKO) peacekeeping operations.16 In 1997, Sweden initiated its international “Challenges of Peace Operations into the 21st Century,” a consortium consisting of 55 countries and over 250 organizations. India and the United States were among the initial participants. As part of its goal to “foster and encourage a culture of cross-professional cooperation and partnership,” the United Services Institute of India, the United States Institute for Peace, and the United States Peacekeeping Institute collaborated on several doctrinal workshops in 2000 that led to the development of several initiatives.17 When it became apparent that the US Army would be supporting peace operations for the foreseeable future, it developed a training concept to sustain the rotation of forces into the Balkans. The Army decided not to establish a dedicated training center that focused on peace operations, as other nations had, but rather to use existing training facilities and concepts. The philosophy was that a unit continues to train on its standard war-fighting mission until alerted for a stability operations mission. That unit will then conduct focused training on the stability mission, culminating in a mission readiness exercise supported by a major collective training center. While situation dependent, active component units are normally allotted three to four months for preparation, while reserve component units (Army Reserve and Army National Guard) are given approximately eighteen months because of their limited regular training time (2 to 2.5 days a month, and 2 weeks, usually during the summer months). 213

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In 2001 Lt. General William Steele, the commanding general of the Combined Arms Center (CAC), conducted a study that concluded that 84 percent of all common training tasks were relevant to stability and support operations. The remaining 16 percent of the stability tasks at the company level that units needed to focus on prior to deployment included negotiations, civil disturbance, presence operations, and processing intelligence in accordance with rules of law.18 The commander and staffs are responsible for gathering the appropriate information and training their unit with the assistance of the chain of command and the Army Training System. They must consult the existing resources of doctrine; modified tables of organization and equipment; standing operating procedures; tactics, techniques, and procedures; mission training plans; and the joint and Army Task List to develop this focused training program. Based on the Battle Focus Training Concept, the commander will develop mission-essential tasks for peace operations that include those focused tasks identified by the CAC. Additionally, the Combined Arms Training Centers would replicate the environment in the Balkans to include role players, dealing with the media, conducting civil-military operations, dealing with civil unrest, and working with nongovernmental organizations. While deployed the commander is expected to continue the training and to maintain traditional war-fighting tasks so that, upon redeployment, the unit can shift to those collective combat tasks that may have atrophied during deployment. This training philosophy has been in place for over eight years and continues to prepare soldiers and marines for these complex environments. For ten years now, a majority of the US Army leaders, in both active and reserve components and especially in the National Guard, have had experience in peace operations in the Balkans. Like Northern Ireland did for the United Kingdom’s military forces, the Balkans allowed the Army’s senior and junior leaders the opportunity to mature and experience complex peace operations. These leaders then brought this experience to Afghanistan and Iraq.

Iraq While the Balkans awakened the US Army to the nature of peace operations, postconflict Iraq has required the Army and the US government to address the reality of peace building. Although both the Brahimi report on UN peace operations in 2002 and the secretary-general’s High Level Panel Report in 2004 emphasized that “post conflict peace building” was of “vital concern” and that security and development were inextricably linked, the US government did not embrace the concept of nationbuilding. The US Army de-emphasized peace building in its doctrine and training while conducting those tasks as part of its deployments to Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. The scope and difficulty of the situation in Iraq, however, has served as a catalyst for the Army and the government in general to reconsider peace building by reassessing doctrine, examining Army and governmental capabilities, establishing a new State Department office, and conducting focus studies.19 214

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The US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, along with the Joint Warfare Center, are rewriting the Joint Doctrine for Peace Operations, JP 3-0.7.3, to include a chapter on peace building. This chapter will establish the potential tasks and responsibilities between the military and civil element across the seven sectors of peace building. The draft manual presents a summary of its underlying concept: Peace building provides the reconstruction and societal rehabilitation that offers hope to resolve conflict. Peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations are transitory measures that establish the conditions that enable peace building to succeed. Peace building promotes reconciliation, strengthens and rebuilds civil infrastructures and institutions, builds confidence and supports economic reconstruction to prevent a return to conflict. Although these tasks are at times called “post conflict reconstruction actions,” in a peace operation some levels of instability will exist concurrently with the peace building. The responsibility for peace building resides ultimately with the host nation and the civil sector but the military force may have a supporting yet essential role. Because the military and civil efforts are inextricably linked, harmony and synchronization are imperative. Peace building usually begins while peace enforcement or peacekeeping operations are underway and continues after they are concluded. However, peace building operations can be conducted independently and proactively. . . . The goal of Peace building is to prevent a return to conflict, or when possible, prevent an impending conflict. The major responsibility for Peace Building is with the civil sector. However, early in the Peace Operation, when critical and immediate tasks normally carried out by civilian organizations temporarily exceed their capabilities, the military should perform those tasks or cooperate to insure that those tasks are accomplished. In these situations, the Peace Operations Force provides immediate relief and helps to create a sustainable infrastructure. Peace Building consists of the following seven mission sectors: Security; Humanitarian Assistance; Rule of Law/Order and Public Security; Governance, Civil Administration, and Civil Society; Infrastructure, and Economic Restoration and Development; Public Diplomacy and Information Operations; and Human Rights and Social Reconciliation. Military support to each of these sectors differs.20 Starting in 2003, many institutions began to focus their research efforts on peace building. These institutions used the terms “stabilization” and “reconstruction” or “nation building” rather than “peace building.” In 2004, the Defense Science Board’s summer study focused on stabilization and reconstruction operations in the context of the challenges of Iraq. The study concluded that the key to success was better management and greater capacity. The Center for Strategic 215

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and International Studies established a center for postconflict reconstruction to provide recommendations to policymakers and thereby to enable US forces to succeed in their mission and exit from peace operations in a timely manner. The Rand Cooperation conducted focused research into nation building and in 2003 published America’s Role in Nation-Building from Germany to Iraq. The US Institute of Peace has developed several projects on rule of law, postconflict reconstruction, and peace and stability operations. In 2005 the chief of staff of the Army created a stability-operations focus area and an irregular-warfare focus area. These efforts are designed to increase the Army’s capabilities to plan and conduct stability operations in a joint, interagency, and multinational context. These focus areas will identify ongoing actions, recommend future initiatives, and determine the training and leader-development proficiencies the Army will need.21 In the face of a difficult peace-building effort in Iraq, interagency senior policy makers, supported by the Defense Science Board report, recognized that the US government must improve its capacities for stabilization and reconstruction and that the State Department should assume a leadership role in advancing these aims. On August 5, 2004, the secretary of state announced the creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). This office’s purpose is to enhance the government’s institutional capacity to respond to crises involving failed, failing, and postconflict states and complex emergencies. By National Security Council agreement, this office will coordinate US planning and response activities across federal agencies and report directly to the secretary of state.22

Future initiatives Many military initiatives in the area of peace and stability operations lend themselves to expanded cooperation between the United States and India. These initiatives are in the areas of doctrine and concepts, training and education, and simulations and exercises. The United Kingdom has recently revised its basic operational doctrine and its guidelines for peace-support operations. The focus of this British publication is the promotion of the “one doctrine” concept that applies to the use of military power. This doctrine postulates that the traditional concepts of peace and war no longer hold; instead there is a “wide variety of continually evolving conditions which exist between states.” The military must have the flexibility to respond to those evolving conditions. This means looking beyond the concept that places operations in impermeable boxes such as peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and peace-building to consider a comprehensive, integrated governmental approach to solving these complex challenges. As this British doctrine states, “distinct compartmentalization and categorization is difficult and unhelpful—over exact labeling does not aid understanding of such a complex issue.”23 216

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The conceptual work of the US Joint Forces Command is moving in the same direction. In January 2005, the secretary of defense approved a joint operating concept for stability operations that describes the challenges that the United States and its coalition partners expect to face in 2015 and proposes solutions to these challenges while identifying the capabilities required to implement the proposed solutions. This is the first time that an overarching concept has addressed stability operations on an equal footing with combat operations. This document broadly describes how future joint forces will be expected to operate across the range of military operations in support of strategic objectives. It applies to operations around the globe and envisions joint operations conducted alongside coalition military partners and other governmental and nongovernmental agencies. It recognizes that joint forces will increasingly face nonmilitary threats. The US military has historically addressed “adversaries” as combat forces and developed its capabilities accordingly. Future adversaries, however, may not organize or engage US forces as traditional military organizations; instead they may exist more as “networks” that generate their own social and political power as needed to achieve their aims. Whereas traditional militaries may focus on battlefield victories, these adversaries’ goals may be to simply sustain ideas and their organizations until they win a level of political or social legitimacy. Contending with such adversaries will require success beyond the battlefield, to include other instruments of national power. They pose unique operational challenges, may not have obvious centers of gravity, and will require military forces to operate differently to resolve conflict and crisis.24 In the future, joint forces will have to act from multiple directions in multiple domains concurrently to address these threats. Similar to the comprehensive approach of the United Kingdom, US military and civil leaders will have to develop increased flexibility. This concept should provide the basis for doctrine development and experimentation. With the significant rise of the threat of insurgents and spoilers in Iraq, the commander of the CAC in November 2004 directed that the Concepts and Development Directory publish an interim manual on counter insurgency. Collaboration between India and the United States in the area of spoilers and insurgents can prove most beneficial to this effort. Brig. Bikram Singh, who was an International Fellow at the US Army War College in 2004, added to the debate by publishing a study of his experiences in Kashmir addressing asymmetric warfare.25 India and the United States have collaborated in the past under the auspices of the Challenges to International Peacekeeping project discussed above. This project can provide a basis for an expanded dialogue in the development of concepts and doctrine. The Military Planning Augmentation Team project, under the auspices of the US Pacific Command, provides another opportunity not only to develop doctrine and concepts but also to explore training, education, and exercise opportunities. Additionally, it can be a forum to explore opportunities offered by the Global 217

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Peace Operations Initiative of the G8 group of highly industrialized countries to build international peace-operations capacity.26 The United States should establish a continuing dialogue with India on the issue of peace building, which has been identified in the emerging US doctrine as a key issue and is one of the key initiatives of the UN secretary-general, as identified in the High-Level Panel and the UN Millennium Project. Both countries should consider their collective experiences to seek ways to advance the vision of the secretary-general.27

Conclusion Now that the US Army as an institution has begun to shift its focus toward peace and stability operations and is considering making this a core US military mission, much work remains to ensure that the Army is capable of accomplishing that mission. The emerging concepts must be transformed quickly into useful doctrine, for Army forces are engaged today in complex peace operations. The Joint operating concepts developed between the United Kingdom and the US Department of Defense, along with several other studies, have identified the centrality of a comprehensive intergovernmental and international approach to stability operations. The initiative started in the Department of State is a step forward, but the process of making integrated government a reality needs to accelerate. The US government and the Army need to overcome their aversion to “nation building” and embrace peace-building. The institutions need to focus on the proper roles and functions of the various parts of the government, nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and the host nation. Over the past few years the Army, operating as part of joint forces, and the US government have come a long way toward developing a holistic approach to peace and stability operations. It is now time to make that idea a reality. One way to do so is to collaborate with other nations, such as India, and to gain understanding from their struggles with similar issues. In such a cooperative atmosphere, greater understanding is possible along with accelerated progress toward addressing the complex nature of tomorrow’s crisis.

Notes 1 Robert M. Cassidy, Peacekeeping in the Abyss (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), 1–1; and Walter Edward Kretchik, “Peering through the Mist: Doctrine as a Guide for U.S. Army Operations 1775–2000,” PhD diss., University of Kansas, 2001, pp. 255–67. 2 “Vandenberg Urges Faith in Charter,” New York Times, July 13, 1945, p. 20. 3 Charter of the United Nations, chap. 7, Art. 43 (San Francisco, CA: June 25, 1945). 4 James Reston, “Senators Debate Use of U.S. Troops for World Peace,” New York Times, July 11, 1945, p. 1; and United Nations Participation Act, public law 79–264, December 20, 1945. 5 Frederick H. Fleitz, Jr, Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 26.

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6 United Nations Department of Public Information, The Blue Helmets: A Review of the United Nations Peace-keeping, Third Edition (New York: United Nations Reproduction Section, 1996), 13–20; Mona Ghali, “United Nations Truce Supervision Organization: 1948 to the Present,” in The Evolution of U.N. Peacekeeping (New York: St. Martin’s, 1993), 88–90. Foreign and Commonwealth Office London, Table of Vetoed Draft Resolutions in the United Nations Security Council 1946–2002 (London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, July 2003), 3. 7 Charles W. Raymond, “A Military Perspective of International Peacekeeping: The Nature and Characteristics of Peace Operations and Review and Evaluation of Some Peacekeeping Concepts and Doctrine,” M.M.A.S. thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1975; Low-Intensity Conflict Selected Readings FC 100-39 (Fort Leavenworth: USACGSC, 1984), presents the background on the early doctrinal developments. 8 Lt Col Ann E. Story, Peace Support Operations: A Concept Whose Time Has Come (Langley: Army–Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, April 2, 1993), 1–4, 20–24. 9 Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe, and Roger A. Coate, The United Nations and Changing World Politics (Boulder: Westview, 1997), 65. 10 Kretchik, “Peering through the Mist,” 223–26. 11 Department of the Army, Peace Operations, Field Manual FM 100–23 (Washington: Department of the Army, December 1994), 12–13. 12 Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations (Ft. Monroe, Virginia: Joint Warfighting Center, February 28, 1995), 1, 11. 13 Howard Johnson and John Davis, Training U.S. Army Officers for Peace Operations: Lessons from Bosnia (Washington: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1999), 2. 14 Department of the Army, Operations, Field Manual 3-0 (Washington: Department of the Army, June 14, 2001), 1–47, 1–49. 15 General Charles Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War,” Marine Magazine, January 1999, available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ usmc/strategic_corporal, accessed March 8, 2003. 16 Department of the Army, Stability Operations and Support Operations, Field Manual FM 3–07 (Washington: Department of the Army, February 2003), 4–12. 17 Lt Col Daniel Miltenberger, ed., Challenges of Peacekeeping and Peace Support into the Twenty-First Century: The Doctrinal Dimension, report of a conference held in support of the challenges project (Carlisle Barracks, DA: U.S. Peacekeeping Institute, May 2000). 18 Bob Banning, “Maneuver Platoon and Company Stability and Support Operations (SASO) Study,” briefing slides, Combined Arms Training Center, Ft. Leavenworth, Kans., March 28, 2001. 19 Lakhdar Brahimi, “Report of the Panel on Peace Operations” (New York: United Nations, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/ docs/summary, accessed March 10, 2005; and Anand Panyarachu, Report of the Secretary General High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change (New York: United Nations, 2004), viii, ix. 20 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations, Draft, Joint Pub 3-07.3 (Washington, DC: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 2004), chap. 4. 21 Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, December 2004), v; Center for Strategic and International Studies, The PCR Brief, 5 October 2004, available at http://www.csis.org, accessed March 10, 2005; Rand Corporation, America’s Role in Nation-Building from Germany to Iraq,

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22

23

24 25 26 27

available at http://www.rand.org/hot_topics/ afghanistan, accessed March 10, 2005; U.S. Institute of Peace studies, available at http://www.usip.org, accessed March 10, 2005; and Command and General Staff College, “IPR to CG, TRADOC,” briefing slides, U.S. Army War College VTC, Carlisle Baracks, PA: March 9, 2005. Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction, U.S. Department of State, briefing slides, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA: August 10, 2004; and Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction, U.S. Department of State, fact paper, available at http://www.state.gov/s/crs/, accessed March 14, 2005. Ministry of Defense, Joint Operations, Joint Doctrine Pub 01 (Swindon: Joint Doctrine and Concepts Center, March 2004), 1–6. Ministry of Defense, The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations, Joint Warfare Publication 3–50 (Swindon: Joint Doctrine and Concepts Center, June 2004), 1–8. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations Concepts, Draft (Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 9, 2005), 11. Brig. Bikram Singh, Touchstones for the Military Leadership Engaged in Asymmetric Warfare (Carlisle: U.S. Army Peackeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 2004). Military Planning Augmentation Team, see http://www2.apan-info.net/mpat/. Kofi Annan, “In Larger Freedom: Decision Time at the UN,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 3 (May/June 2005): 63–74.

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INDEX

9/11 attacks see September 11 attacks Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) 194 ad hoc coalitions 15–16, 200 Afghanistan: India’s role in reconstruction 115; Soviet invasion 17, 24, 40, 46, 67, 156; US counterterrorism operations in 167 Agreed Minute on Defense Cooperation (1995) 3, 18, 84–86, 96, 100, 107, 115, 116 alignments 14–15 alliances 12, 13, 28, 32 n.7; and collective security 16; definition and scope 13–14; international social institutions 14 Annan, Kofi 194 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty: US withdrawal 22 Armitage, Richard 141 Arms Export Control Act (US) 86, 87, 89, 109 n.8, n.10, 176 arms sales 94–95; Israel to India 140; US bureaucratic system 121; US lack of supply to India 75; US to India 22, 64, 85, 90–91, 101–03, 122–23, 175; US to Pakistan 1, 12, 24, 50 army’s (US) peacekeeping operations 207, 208–9, 218; Balkans 211–14; doctrine 209, 210–11; future initiatives 216–18; Iraq 214–16; manuals 209, 210, 212–13, 215 Arunachalam, V.S. 68 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 148, 169 Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (US) 55, 89 Australian British Canadian American Standardization Group (ABCA) 209 Babbar Khalsa 133, 157 Bagchi, Indrani 186 Baghdad treaty 42 Bajpai, Girija Shankar 62, 80 n.47 Bangladesh: Indo-US counterterrorism activities in 144; jihadi terrorist activities 167–68; war of independence (1971) 44, 67–68

Bennett, Andrew 15–16 Bernstein, Al 69 Bharat Dynamics Limited 177 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 18, 23, 50, 51, 70–71, 74, 80 n.55; accusations of religious intolerance 53 Bhutto, Benazir 48 Bingham, Jonathan 44 bin Laden, Osama 139, 159–160 Black, Cofer 144 Blackwill, Robert 53, 81 n.62, 95, 142 Blair, Dennis 100 Blake, Robert 123 Blank, Jonah 27 Bloomfield, Lincoln P., Jr. 163 Bokaro steel plant (India) 43 Boschwitz, Rudolph 47 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros 210 Bowles, Chester 42, 67 Broomfield, William 46 Brown Amendment (1995) (US) 49, 50 Brownback, Sam 86 Brownback Amendment 51, 86–87, 176 Burns, R. Nicholas 117 Burton, Dan 46 Bush, George H.W. 48 Bush, George W. 53, 73, 88, 92, 114, 117, 141, 170, 177, 178, 204; meeting with Manmohan Singh (2004) 24; meeting with Atal Bihari Vajpayee (2001) 21, 164–65 Caroe, Sir Olaf 63 Carter, Jimmy 46, 51; approval of export licenses for nuclear fuel shipment 46 Celler, Emmanuel 45 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 154, 159, 161, 171 Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) 154 Chandrashekhar 48–49 Chavan, Y.B. 109 n.4

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INDEX China: emerging power 25; potential threat 27, 99; topic on Indo-US agenda 120 Churchill, Winston 41, 62, 63 Clark, William 69 Claude, Inis 16 Clinton, Bill (William) 18, 35 n.51, 50, 51, 132, 133, 161; engagement and enlargement strategy 18; trip to India (2000) 20, 51, 71, 88, 98, 192; reaction to 1998 Indian nuclear tests 19, 86; restoration of non-military aid to India 87 collective security 16 Commerce Control List 177, 189 n.26 commercial relations, Indo-US 51–52 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 1, 51, 72, 85, 87, 88 confidence-building measures 55 Congress Party (India) 18, 49, 74 Connors, James 209 containment policy, US: Pakistan’s role 41–43, 64–66 cooperative security 94, 96 Cooper, John Sherman 43 Council of Khalistan 133 counterterrorism cooperation 155–56; components 168; discretionary nature 131; over-legalistic approach of Western nations 156; see also war on terrorism counterterrorism cooperation, Indo-Israeli 140 counterterrorism cooperation, Indo-US 9, 21, 22, 128 n.3, 131–32, 145, 168–71; 1998–2001 139–41, 160–2; de facto cooperation 133–34; differences on Nepal and Bangladesh 143–44; India’s uneasiness about US 144–45, 166–67; institutional changes 146–47; mutual misperceptions 138–39; new areas 142; non-governmental initiatives 171; perceived gains 142–3; post-9/11 141–42, 162–68; pre-1998 132–33, 157–60; prospects 145–46 Cranston, Alan 47 Dahl, Robert 40 Dal Khalsa 157 Dean, Arthur 64 Defense Framework Agreement (2005) 96–97, 114, 116, 123; text 107–09 Defense Policy Group (DPG) 18, 22, 23, 70, 90, 108–09, 116, 139–40, 179, 194; establishment 84–85; expansion of scope 163–64; revival 178; defense relations, Indo-US see military relations, Indo-US Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) (India) 68, 102, 176, 177; DRDO-ISRO connection 186–87 Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) (India) 176, 177, 186 Desai, Morarji 45

Dixit, J.N. 163 domestic politics 124; US indifference to Indian 8–9 Dornan, Robert 39 dual-use technology see high technology; high technology trade, Indo-US Dulles, John Foster 42–43, 65, 78 n.26 economic globalization 195 economic growth, Indian 7 economic reforms, Indian 18 Eisenhower, Dwight 66 energy security, Indian 5–6, 187–88 ententes 15, 26–27 Entity List 176, 177–78; reduction 21, 23, 90, 180 ethnic politics 52–53 evolving entente 7, 9, 12, 24–28; future of Indo-US 29–31 Executive Steering Groups (ESGs) 18, 22, 83–84, 90, 116 export control policy, US 176–77, 178; de-linking of India’s missile and space programs in 180 extradition treaty 133 F-16 aircraft: sale to Pakistan 1, 12, 24, 46, 55, 117, 119; see also arms sales Al Faran 135; abduction of tourists (1995) 133–34, 160, 170 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (US) 142, 145, 157 Fernandes, George 54, 140–41 financial crisis, Indian: early 1990s 3 Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) 87, 88 foreign aid, US: 1980s 47; “foreign aid fatigue” 44–45; India (1951) 43; India (1990s) 49, 87; nuclear nonproliferation and 45–46; suspension to Pakistan (1979) 46; suspension to Pakistan (1990) 48 Foreign Assistance Acts (US) 46, 47, 86, 176 foreign policy, Indian: Cold War era 2–3; post–Second World War 62; towards Israel 45, 49 foreign policy, US: neglect of South Asia and its implications 39–40; post–Second World War 61–62; South Asia policy, after 1965 Indo-Pakistani war 44; South Asia policy, Bush years 20–21, 53; South Asia policy, Clinton years 18–20, 49–50, 51 Friends of India 52 Fulbright, J.W. 42 Gallagher, Cornelius 44 Gandhi, Indira 17, 44, 45, 79 n.41; US visit (1982) 67–68 Gandhi, Rajiv 17, 18, 48, 68, 79 n.41, 157, 159

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INDEX gas pipeline: Iran–Pakistan–India 54, 137, 187–88 General Electric 52, 182 General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) 90, 127 Glenn, John 47, 48, 51, 52 Glenn Amendment (1977) (US) 46, 50, 51, 86, 109 n.8, 176, 189 n.11 Global Control System (GCS) 185 Goa issue 43, 66 Goodling, William 46 Grossman, Marc 163 Gujral, Inder Kumar 132 Gupta, Arvind 163 Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC) 185 Hainan spy plane incident (2001) 21 Harkat-ul-Ansar (HuA) 135, 159, 160 Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) 159, 167 Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) 159, 167 Herger, Wally 39 Hess, Gary 41 high-altitude military operations 85, 126 high (dual-use) technology 190 n.26; separation of civilian and military establishments 185–88 High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG) 91, 178, 179 high technology trade, Indo-US 4–5, 9, 92, 111 n.30, 174, 176, 178–79; constricted boundaries 180–81 High Technology Trade Agreement (2004) 92 Hoffman, Bruce 136 Hussain, Abid 70 Hussein, Saddam 69, 134 Ibrahim, Dawood 158, 167 India: American stereotypes of 38–39; aspirations for Security Council permanent seat 30, 76; growing power status 11, 76; internal politics 74–75; perception of its security interests 118–19; post–Second World War 62; strategic priority 97 India–China–US trilateral relationships 25–26, 75, 120 Indian–Americans 38, 52–53, 79 n.40 Indian Ocean security 119, 126 Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) 23, 92, 102, 176, 177, 180, 182–83; DRDO-ISRO connection 186–87 India–Pakistan Relief Bill of 1998 (US) see Brownback Amendment Indo-Soviet relations 2, 122 Indo-US relations 61, 76–77, 82, 103, 173–74; areas for cooperation 4–6, 22–24; Bush years 20–21, 53–55; challenges ahead 74–76; Clinton years 18–20, 49–50, 51;

Cold War era 2, 17–18, 63–68; common strategic interests 11; contentious course 8, 40–41, 82–83; dilemma of Second World War 41, 62–63; evolution of contemporary relations 1, 7–9; exact nature 12–13; legacy of mistrust 55–56; new US initiative 98; not alliance relationship 28; obstacles 6–7; period of disengagement 44–45; post-9/11 3–4, 21; promotion of India as alternative to China 43; prospects for further deepening 12; slow normalization 48–50; strategic convergence 16–21, 61, 98; and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 17, 24, 40, 46, 67 Inouye, Daniel 47 insurgency: Maoist 143–44, 146, 148; Pakistani 20 intelligence cooperation 154–55 intelligence cooperation, Indo-UK 158, 159 intelligence cooperation, Indo-US 157; mechanism of exchange since 2000 161 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) 184, 185 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 56; safeguards 24, 46, 89, 177, 189 n.11 International Islamic Front (IIF) 159 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 49 international security issues 194–97; and United Nations 198–200 International Sikh Youth Federation 157 international social institutions 14; definition 33 n.21 Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) (Pakistan) 6, 136, 158 Iran: India’s strategic interests in 5–6, 137; US concerns about India’s relations with 137–38 Iraq: non-participation of Indian defense forces 91; US concerns about India’s relations with 138 Isaacs, Harold 38 Islamist terrorism 140, 141; see also terrorism; terrorist groups Israel: consequences of Indian policy towards 45; normalization of Indian relations towards 49; terrorist attack on Israeli tourists in Kashmir 158 Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) 3, 141, 159, 167 Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) 158–59 Javits, Jacob 45 Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA) 171 Johnson, Louis 64 Johnson, Lyndon 39, 43, 67

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INDEX joint air force exercises, Indo-US: Cooperative Cope Thunder 03 104, 116; Cooperative Cope Thunder 04-1 104; Cooperative Cope Thunder 05 107; Cope India-02 104; Cope India-04 104; Cope India-05 106; Red Flag-06 107 Joint Counterterrorism Working Group 22, 35 n.51, 161; establishment 132, 160; tasks 162 joint military conferences, Indo-US 106 joint military exercises, Australia-US 31 joint military exercises, Indo-US 8, 174–75, 181; 1990s 84; area of potential discord 31; Balance Iroquois 02-1 104; Balance Iroquois 04-4 105; Bush years 22; Geronimo Thrust 02-1 104–05; Shatrujeet 107; Vajra Prahar 03-1 105; Vajra Prahar 03-3 105; Vector Balance Iroquois 03-2 105; Yudh Abhyas 04-1 105; joint military training, Indo-US 85, 91, 100–01, 125 joint naval exercises, Indo-US 105, 115; 1995–98 18; Malabar series 70, 84, 90, 115, 116, 125 Joy, Benjamin 62 Juster, Kenneth 73, 93, 178, 180, 185 Kaan, Robert A. 15 Kansi, Mir Aimal 136 Kargil crisis (1999) 19–20, 51, 71 Kashmir issue 29–30, 150 n.15; Cold War era 63–64; terrorism 54, 55, 141, 156–57, 158–59, 160, 166; terrorist attacks on Israeli tourists 158; US support for Simla Agreement 20, 24 Kasten, Robert 47 Katzir, Eli 140 Kaul, Brij Mohan 64 Kennedy, John F. 66, 67 Keohane, Robert O. 14 Khalistani movement 147, 149 n.14, 157, 158 Khalistan Liberation Front 133 Khan, Abdul Qadeer 5, 54, 55, 73, 167 Khan, Ayub 65, 79 n.29 Kicklighter, Claude 4, 68, 83, 115 Kicklighter-Rodrigues initiative 68–71, 80 n.51, 83–84 Kissinger, Henry 44, 67 Krulak, Charles 213 Kumar, Sushil 70 Kumaratunga, Chandrika 139 Lakshar-i-Taiba 3, 6, 141, 159, 167 Lantos, Tom 56 Left parties, Indian 97; approval of Indo-US counterterrorism cooperation 169; suspicions of US intentions 6 Lepgold, Joseph 15–16

Lewis, John 39 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 160 Long, Clarence 44 McCollum, Bill 52 McDermott, Jim 177 MacDonald, Juli 181 McNamara, Robert S. 109 n.4 Mallikarjun 70, 84 Malott, John 137 Maoist insurgency 143–44, 146, 148 maritime security 196 Mearsheimer, John J. 14 Menon, V.K. Krishna 65, 79 n.33 military aid, US: India 66–67, 83; Pakistan 65 military doctrine, Indian 100 Military Planning Augmentation Team project 217–18 military relations, Indo-US 3, 4, 8, 18, 103–04, 113, 127, 192–93; Bush years 22, 53, 89; challenges 117–20; influencing factors 95; interests and benefits 114–15, 193–94; Kicklighter-Rodrigues initiative 68–71, 80 n.51, 83–84; lack of adequate trust 94–95; late 1940s 64; modest beginnings 83; new US initiative 98; organizational asymmetries 122; organizational obstacles 120–22; post-9/11 89–91, 116; scope for future relations 100–01, 124–27; strategic partnership 99 military relations, Pakistan-US: Cold War era 65 Mirpuris 155 missile defense programs 22–23, 184–85; separation of civilian and military programs 186 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) 94, 184–85 Moynihan, Daniel Patrick 45, 52, 192 Mukerjee, Pranab 54, 96, 97, 107, 116, 117, 123, 133 Mulford, David 24, 111 n.27, 145, 173 multilateralism 96, 200 Mumbai (Bombay) blasts (1993) 158, 166 Musharaff, Pervez 4, 20, 23, 54, 141, 167, 169 Najibullah, Mohammad 156 Nash, William 211 Nasser, Gamal Abdel 66 National Missile Defense program (2001) (US) 23, 90 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) (US) 102 naxalism 135, 148, 150 n.16 Nehru, Jawaharlal 41–42, 62, 66, 79 n.33, 154; collaboration with USSR 2 Nepal: Maoist insurgency 143–44

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INDEX Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) 64 Next Steps in the Strategic Partnership (NSSP) 1, 9, 23–24, 73–74, 91–93, 111 n.27, 114, 174, 180, 188, 193, 194; slow development 175 Nixon, Richard 38–39, 44, 67; China visit 71 non-alignment 2, 62, 66 Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) 45, 72, 109 n.8; India’s reluctance to sign 1, 5, 55 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 13, 16, 125, 210, 211 nuclear fuel: supply to India 45, 46–47, 89–90 nuclear nonproliferation: dominant issue in Indo-US relations 45–46, 55–56, 71–73, 76 Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. (NPCIL) 182 Nuclear Prevention Act of 1994 (US) 48 nuclear programs, Indian 174, 181, 183; critical drivers 5–6; separation of civilian and military programs 186; technology dependence 182 Nuclear Proliferation Act of 1994 (US) see Glenn Amendment nuclear tests: US response to India’s 1998 tests 3, 19, 50, 70, 86–87 Omnibus Trade Act (1988) (US): “Super 301” provisions 49 organized crime 195–96 Osgood, Robert E. 13 Pakistan: benefits from war on terrorism 54; dispersal of nuclear capability 5; role in US containment policy 41–43; on US terrorism watch list 136, 166 Pakistani–Americans 52 Pakistan–US relations: Cold War alliance 41–43, 64–66; deterioration 48; double standards 47–48; end of Clinton administration 20; impact on Indo-US relations 29–30, 73; Indian perceptions and concerns 6, 9, 11–12, 94, 119; “major non-NATO ally” 4, 6, 12, 55, 97, 118 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 156 Pallone, Frank 52 Pant, K.C. 69 Passman, Otto 44 Patterns of Global Terrorism (PGT) 135 peacekeeping operations 196–97; and India 200–01, 205–06; Indo-US cooperation 9, 106, 201–03; Indo-US cooperation in post-conflict operations 204; multilateralism 200; US army 207, 208–09, 218; US army doctrine 209, 210–11; US army in Iraq 214–16; US army in the Balkans 211–14; US army manuals 209, 210, 212–13, 215; US army’s future initiatives 216–18

Pearl, Daniel 159 Pepsico 49, 52 Peres, Shimon 140 Perry, William 70, 80 n.51, 84, 96 Pickering, Thomas 50, 132 Pitroda, Sam 68 Powell, Colin 53, 179 Prasad, Alok 133 Pressler, Larry 51 Pressler Amendment (1985) (US) 47, 48, 49, 51, 86; campaign to dilute 50 Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2002 (POTA) (India) 134–5 prisoners of war (POWs): repatriation of Korean POWs 64 Al Qaeda 21, 23, 54, 139, 144, 148, 164, 165, 167 Radu, Liviu 157 Raghunath, K. 132 Raman, B. 138–39, 142–43, 145, 151 n.40 Rao, P.V. Narasimha 3, 18, 49, 50, 133 Raphael, Robin 50 Raymond, Charles 209 Reagan, Ronald 47 Red Brigade 147 Religious Freedom Act (1998) (US) 53 Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) (India) 143, 159, 161; CIA infiltration 171 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) 148 Rice, Condoleezza 1, 11, 24, 54, 77, 89, 116–17, 119, 123, 125, 141, 173, 187 Richardson, Bill 50 Rikhye, Inderjit 196 Rocca, Christina 92, 144 Rodrigues, Sunit Francis 68, 80 n.44; see also Kicklighter-Rodrigues initiative Roosevelt, Franklin 41, 62 Rowen, Henry 69 Royce, Ed 177 Rumsfeld, Donald 54, 89, 93, 107 Russett, Bruce M. 13, 15 Sahni, Ajay 135 sanctions 45, 50, 89; on India 86–87, 139–41 Saran, Shyam 73, 93, 137, 146 Saudi Arabia–US relations 15 Schaffer, Teresita 69, 120, 123 security issues see international security issues Security Liaison Network (SLN) 154 September 11 attacks 136, 168, 195; see also terrorism; terrorist groups Sharif, Nawaz 20, 136 Sheik, Omar 143, 159 Sherwani, Salim 133 Shiite groups 147

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INDEX Shinseki, Eric K. 211 Shultz, George 46–47 Sibal, Kanwal 178, 185 Sikh terrorism 133, 147, 157, 158, 159 Singh, Bikram 217 Singh, Jaswant 55, 89, 90, 160 Singh, Joginder Jaswant 147 Singh, Manmohan 3, 24, 49, 92, 117, 120, 127, 128 n.17; US visit (2004) 180; US visit (2005) 55, 75, 204 Singh, Natwar 117 Singh, Rabinder 171 Singh, V.P. 48 Singh-Talbott dialogue 3, 8, 19, 51, 72, 87–89, 192 Sino-Indian relations 26, 36 n.77, 68 Sino-Indian war (1962) 66; lessons for India 28; turnaround in Indo-US relations 66–67 Snyder, Glenn H. 13, 15 Solarz, Stephen 47, 52 South Asia: US policy 73; US policy, after 1965 Indo-Pakistani war 44; US policy, Bush years 20–21, 53; US policy, Clinton years 18–20, 49–50, 51; US policy, Cold War era 39–40, 42–43 South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 146 South-East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) 42, 78 n.26, 154 South-East Asia Regional Centre for Counterterrorism (SEARCCT) 148 space cooperation, Indo-US 184 space launch sector, Indian 182–83; commercial viability 183 Sri Lankan–Indian relations 139 Steele, William 214 Steinitz, Yuval 140 Stilwell, Joe 63 Sullivan, Gordon 210 Swami, Praveen 144 Symington Amendment (1976) (US) 46, 47, 50, 51, 176, 189 n.11 Symington, Stuart 44 Talbott, Strobe 50, 118, 129 n.22, 160; see also Singh-Talbott dialogue Taliban 3, 6, 20, 23, 54, 55, 139, 142, 164, 165 Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS) (India) 177, 182; fuel supply 45, 46–47, 110 n.19 technology transfer, Indo-US 4–5, 9, 92, 111 n.30; area of potential discord 30–31, 122–23; increased 54; Indo-US memorandum of understanding (1984) 17, 68

Tellis, Ashley 71, 97, 98, 99, 123, 127 terrorism 96, 195; attack on Indian parliament 6, 54, 137, 141, 167; changes in nature and geography 147–48; definitions 148 n.1; Indian legislation against 134–35; India’s concerns 132; Islamist 140, 141; Pakistan’s terrorist threat to India 135, 156; US focus 136–38 terrorist groups: fund raising barred in US 133; Kashmiri 158–59; pan-Islamic organizations 159–60; Sikh 133, 147, 157, 158 Thatcher, Margaret 159 Thimayya, K.S. 64, 78 n.23 Tito 66 tsunami disaster management 93–94, 114, 146 Unger, Danny 15–16 United Nations (UN): and international security 198–200, 207 United Nations (UN) Security Council: Indian aspirations for permanent seat 30, 76 United States (US): alliances 13; indifference towards Indian domestic politics 8–9; National Security Strategy, 2000 21, 27, 88–89 US-India Cyber Security Forum 93, 162–63 US International Military Education and Training (IMET) 18, 100–01 Vajpayee, Atal Bihari 20, 70, 73, 114, 141, 161, 164, 178, 188; US visit (2000) 51, 71, 164–65 Vandenberg, Arthur 207 Vohra, N.N. 70 Voice of America 43 Walt, Stephen 13 war on terrorism 53, 165–66; double standards 54–55, 73; India’s support to US 76, 90; Pakistani gains from 54; see also counterterrorism cooperation Washington, George 62 weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 195 Wen Jiabao 36 n.77, 119 Wilson, Charles 46 Wilson, Thomas 62 Wisner, Frank 87 Wolfers, Arnold 13 Woolsey, James 136 Youssuf, Ramzi 136 Zablocki, Clement 45 Zia, Khaleda 144

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