Urban Politics and Democratisation in Russia (Basees Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies)

Local Politics and Democratization in Russia

This comprehensive study of local politics in Russia shows that the key reforms of local government, and the struggle to forge viable grass-roots democracies, have been inextricably linked to the wider struggle for power between the regions and the Kremlin, and to the specific nature of Russia’s highly politicized and negotiated form of asymmetrical federalism. During the Yeltsin era all attempts to create a universal and uniform system of local self-government in the Federation were a failure. Under the protection of their constitutions and charters, and the extraconstitutional rights and powers granted to them in special bilateral treaties, regional leaders, particularly in Russia’s 21 ethnic republics, were able to instigate highly authoritarian regimes and to thwart the implementation of key local government reforms. Thus, by the end of the Yeltsin era the number of municipalities, their type, status and powers, varied tremendously from region to region. Putin’s local government reforms also need to be viewed as an integral component of his wider centralizing political agenda, and his assault on the principles and practices of federalism. With the instigation of his ‘dictatorship of law’ and ‘power vertical’, Putin has thwarted the development of grass-roots democracy and overseen the creation of local ‘electoral authoritarian’ regimes. Putin’s new system of local self-government marks a victory for the proponents of the ‘statist concept’ of local self-government over those who championed the ‘societal concept’, codified in Article 12 of the Russian Constitution. Overall, this book is an important resource for anyone seeking to understand politics in contemporary Russia. Cameron Ross is a Reader in Politics in the College of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Dundee. He has published widely in the field of Russian politics, particularly in the areas of regional and local level politics. His most recent books are: Regional Politics in Russia (Manchester University Press, 2002), Federalism and Democratisation in Russia (MUP, 2003) and Russian Politics under Putin (MUP, 2004).

BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies Series editor:

Richard Sakwa Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent Editorial Committee:

Julian Cooper Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham

Terry Cox Department of Central and East European Studies, University of Glasgow

Rosalind Marsh Department of European Studies and Modern Languages, University of Bath

David Moon Department of History, University of Durham

Hilary Pilkington Department of Sociology, University of Warwick

Stephen White Department of Politics, University of Glasgow Founding Editorial Committee Member:

George Blazyca Centre for Contemporary European Studies, University of Paisley

This series is published on behalf of BASEES (the British Association for Slavonic and East European Studies). The series comprises original, high-quality, researchlevel work by both new and established scholars on all aspects of Russian, Soviet, post-Soviet and East European Studies in humanities and social science subjects. 1 Ukraine’s Foreign and Security Policy, 1991–2000 Roman Wolczuk

6 Dostoevsky and the Idea of Russianness Sarah Hudspith

2 Political Parties in the Russian Regions Derek S. Hutcheson

7 Performing Russia – Folk Revival and Russian Identity Laura J. Olson

3 Local Communities and PostCommunist Transformation Edited by Simon Smith

8 Russian Transformations Edited by Leo McCann

4 Repression and Resistance in Communist Europe J.C. Sharman 5 Political Elites and the New Russia Anton Steen

9 Soviet Music and Society under Lenin and Stalin The Baton and Sickle Edited by Neil Edmunds 10 State Building in Ukraine The Ukranian parliament, 1990–2003 Sarah Whitmore

11 Defending Human Rights in Russia Sergei Kovalyov, dissident and human rights commissioner, 1969–2003 Emma Gilligan 12 Small-Town Russia Postcommunist livelihoods and identities A portrait of the intelligentsia in Achit, Bednodemyanovsk and Zubtsov, 1999–2000 Anne White 13 Russian Society and the Orthodox Church Religion in Russia after communism Zoe Knox 14 Russian Literary Culture in the Camera Age The word as image Stephen Hutchings

20 Katyn and the Soviet Massacre of 1940 Truth, justice and memory George Sanford 21 Conscience, Dissent and Reform in Soviet Russia Philip Boobbyer 22 The Limits of Russian Democratisation Emergency powers and states of emergency Alexander N. Domrin 23 The Dilemmas of Destalinisation A social and cultural history of reform in the Khrushchev era Edited by Polly Jones 24 News Media and Power in Russia Olessia Koltsova

15 Between Stalin and Hitler Class war and race war on the Dvina, 1940–46 Geoffrey Swain

25 Post-Soviet Civil Society Democratization in Russia and the Baltic States Anders Uhlin

16 Literature in Post-Communist Russia and Eastern Europe The Russian, Czech and Slovak fiction of the changes 1988–98 Rajendra A. Chitnis

26 The Collapse of Communist Power in Poland Jacqueline Hayden

17 Soviet Dissent and Russia’s Transition to Democracy Dissident legacies Robert Horvath 18 Russian and Soviet Film Adaptations of Literature, 1900–2001 Screening the word Edited by Stephen Hutchings and Anat Vernitski 19 Russia as a Great Power Dimensions of security under Putin Edited by Jakob Hedenskog, Vilhelm Konnander, Bertil Nygren, Ingmar Oldberg and Christer Pursiainen

27 Television, Democracy and Elections in Russia Sarah Oates 28 Russian Constitutionalism Historical and contemporary development Andrey N. Medushevsky 29 Late Stalinist Russia Society between reconstruction and reinvention Edited by Juliane Fürst 30 The Transformation of Urban Space in Post-Soviet Russia Konstantin Axenov, Isolde Brade and Evgenij Bondarchuk

31 Western Intellectuals and the Soviet Union, 1920–40 From red square to the left bank Ludmila Stern 32 The Germans of the Soviet Union Irina Mukhina 33 Re-constructing the Post-Soviet Industrial Region The Donbas in transition Edited by Adam Swain 34 Chechnya – Russia’s “War on Terror” John Russell 35 The New Right in the New Europe Czech transformation and right-wing politics, 1989–2006 Seán Hanley 36 Democracy and Myth in Russia and Eastern Europe Edited by Alexander Wöll and Harald Wydra 37 Energy Dependency, Politics and Corruption in the Former Soviet Union Russia’s power, oligarchs’ profits and Ukraine’s missing energy policy, 1995–2006 Margarita M. Balmaceda

41 The Demise of the Soviet Communist Party Atsushi Ogushi 42 Russian Policy towards China and Japan The El’tsin and Putin periods Natasha Kuhrt 43 Soviet Karelia Politics, planning and terror in Stalin’s Russia, 1920–1939 Nick Baron 44 Reinventing Poland Economic and political transformation and evolving national identity Edited by Martin Myant and Terry Cox 45 The Russian Revolution in Retreat, 1920–24 Soviet workers and the new communist elite Simon Pirani 46 Democratisation and Gender in Contemporary Russia Suvi Salmenniemi 47 Narrating Post/Communism Colonial discourse and Europe’s borderline civilization Nataša Kovaˇcevi´c

38 Peopling the Russian Periphery Borderland colonization in Eurasian history Edited by Nicholas B Breyfogle, Abby Schrader and Willard Sunderland

48 Globalization and the State in Central and Eastern Europe The politics of foreign direct investment Jan Drahokoupil

39 Russian Legal Culture Before and After Communism Criminal justice, politics and the public sphere Frances Nethercott

49 Local Politics and Democratization in Russia Cameron Ross

40 Political and Social Thought in PostCommunist Russia Axel Kaehne

Local Politics and Democratization in Russia

Cameron Ross

First published 2009 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2008. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2009 Cameron Ross All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN 0-203-89145-7 Master e-book ISBN ISBN 10: 0-415-33654-6 (hbk) ISBN 10: 0-203-89145-7 (ebk) ISBN 13: 978-0-415-33654-3 (hbk) ISBN 13: 978-0-203-89145-2 (ebk)

Contents

List of appendices, figures, tables and boxes Abbreviations Acknowledgements

1 Introduction

x xiii xiv

1

The importance of local government 1 Federalism and local self-government 2 Defining democracy 3 Local democracy 5 Decentralization and subsidiarity 6 From local government to local governance 7 The statist and societal concepts of local self-government in Russia 9 Outline of the study 9

2 Russian federalism and local politics

11

Federalism and federations 11 Federalism in Russia 12 The distribution of powers: federal, regional and local 15 Local self-government in Russia 16 Putin’s radical assault on the principles of federalism and democracy 20 Conclusion 25

3 Local government in the USSR Local councils (‘sovety’) 29 Local executive committees (‘ispol’komy’) 29 Local soviets and state enterprises 32 Local budget revenues 34

28

viii

Contents The 1971 legislation on local government 35 The Gorbachev reforms of the late-1980s 38 The April 1990 and July 1991 laws on local self-government 42

4 Local government reform under Yeltsin

47

Parliament versus president 47 The Russian Constitution of December 1993 49 The 1995 Law on local self-government 50 Functions and competences of local self-governments 52 Local political institutions 58 Regional variations in the implementation of the 1995 Law 58

5 Local government reform and Putin’s power vertical

68

Principal features of the 2003 Law 69 Problems of implementing the 2003 Law 77 Conclusion 80

6 Fiscal federalism and local budget revenues

82

Fiscal federalism and local finance 82 The tax system and tax revenues 87 Measuring fiscal centralization/decentralization 95 The impact of the 2003 Law and tax legislation on local budget revenues 104

7 Fiscal federalism and local budget expenditures

106

Key areas of municipal expenditure 107 Distribution of expenditure between federal, regional and local budgets 108 Expenditure on unfunded mandates 111 The public utilities reform and the monetization of benefits 115 Local expenditure and enterprise divestiture 116 Regional and local socio-economic asymmetries 119 The socio-economic crisis of small cities 127

8 Local elections and parties

131

Municipal elections under Yeltsin 1995–8 131 Municipal elections under Putin 2004–5 146 Key factors explaining Russia’s weakly institutionalized party system 160 Party and electoral reforms under Putin 165

Contents ix

9 Local and regional executives

169

Local executives and local councils 169 The powers and responsibilities of local executives 171 The 2003 Law, local executives and councils 172 Mayors versus governors 175

10 ‘Electoral authoritarianism’ and Putin’s electoral vertical

184

Putin’s ‘electoral vertical’ 184 The manipulation and falsification of local elections 187 Politicization and control of electoral commissions 194 Conclusion 196

11 Conclusion

199

Financial autonomy 200 Support for local self-governance 201 Parties, elections and local democracy 201 The appointment of governors and mayors 202

Appendix 5.1 Notes Bibliography Index

204 210 251 268

List of appendices, figures, tables and boxes

Appendix 5.1 Powers and functions of settlements, municipal districts and city districts, Articles 14–6 of the 2003 Law

205

Figures 5.1 The administrative division of the Russian Federation 9.2 Methods of electing heads of municipalities

68 173

Tables 3.1 Communist Party and Komsomol membership of city councils and their executive committees, elected 1982 4.1 Selected functions by tier of government in Western Europe 4.2 Functions of local government in the Russian Federation 5.1 Enumerated responsibilities of the levels of local government 6.1 Normative deductions from the basic shared (regulated taxes) in the budgets of cities 1997–2001 6.2 Tax sharing rates between federal, regional and local budgets (shown as a fraction of 100 per cent revenue collections for VAT and income taxes; and as effective collection rates – for profit tax) 6.3 Taxes and fees in Russia 2005 6.4 Classification of local government revenue sources 2001 6.5 Estimation of changes in tax income between levels of the budget system 1998–2000 and 2001–5 (per cent) according to the Russian Federation Programme of Budget Federalism 2001–5 6.6 Distribution of taxes between budgets of various levels according to provisions of the Budget Code 2005 6.7 Distribution of taxes to municipalities 2006 6.8 Share of local taxes by type of municipality (per cent) 2006

31 53 54 72 87

89 91 93

94 95 96 96

List of appendices, figures, tables and boxes xi 6.9 Distribution of revenues between levels of the budget system: percentage of the Consolidated Budget of the Russian Federation 6.10 Distribution of revenues between levels of the Russian budget system (excluding transfers): percentage of GDP 6.11 Local revenue growth (decline) rates 1997–2002 6.12 Variations in income receipts from taxes in the Republic of Tatarstan 2004–5 for all levels of the budget system of the Russian Federation (billion roubles) 6.13 Municipal budget revenues by source 1996–2002 (per cent) 6.14 Mean share of local revenues in 74 regions 2001 (per cent) 6.15 Structure of the income of local budgets in the regions of the Volga Federal District 2004 (per cent) 6.16 Structure of the income of local budgets (billion roubles) 2006 7.1 Structure of expenditure in local budgets in the Russian Federation 1996–2002 (per cent) 7.2 Expenditures of local budgets 2006 7.3 Local government expenditures in the consolidated national budget 7.4 Distribution of expenditure between regional and local budgets 1996–2001 (per cent) 7.5 Expenditure by type of municipality 2006 (planned) 7.6 Unfunded mandates in the Russian Federation 7.7 Rent and utility payment benefits and housing allowances (Perm’ City) 1999 7.8 The monetization of benefits in the regions 7.9 The financing of divested social assets (per cent share by source) 7.10 The cost of financing divested social assets by selected city/region 1997 7.11 Economic statistics of federal subjects 2003 7.12 Per capita consolidated expenditures in the federal subjects 1998 (in roubles) 7.13 Subjects of the Federation with the most and least debts 2006 7.14 Share of cities and districts with deficits above the Russian average 1999 7.15 Novgorod 1998: Expenditure needs and own revenues of municipalities (in million roubles) 7.16 Structure of local budget deficits in the Russian Federation 2006 7.17 Share of subsidies in municipal budgets 2006 7.18 Ten regions with the largest share of their populations living in monoprofile cities in the Russian Federation 7.19 Share of monoprofile cities by size of city 7.20 Public services provision by firms (percentage of firms) 8.1 Variation in turnout by type of election: selected cities 8.2 Heads of municipalities elected 1995–8 8.3 Municipal councils elected 1995–8

97 98 98

98 100 101 103 104 108 108 109 110 111 113 115 116 118 118 120 122 123 124 125 126 126 128 128 129 133 134 140

xii

List of appendices, figures, tables and boxes

8.4 Regions in which no deputies or heads of local administrations were nominated by a political association or bloc 1995–8 municipal elections 8.5 Party saturation of local councils (per cent) 8.6 Average turnout in Russian local elections 2004–5 (per cent) 8.7 Electoral turnout in 20 municipal raions of Penza Oblast 2003–5 8.8 Turnout (average per cent) and votes against all (average per cent) in municipal elections in Saratov and Tula regions 2005 8.9 Average share of ‘votes against all’ in subjects of the Federation 1995–2003 (per cent) 8.10 Social composition of deputies and heads of local councils elected 2004–5 8.11 Party membership of local councils and heads of local administrations/municipalities 1995–8 and 2004–5 8.12 Party membership of municipal councils and heads of municipal administrations December 2005 (type of municipality, number of members and (per cent) 9.1 Number of deputies in councils of settlements and city districts

144 145 148 149 151 153 156 156

157 174

Boxes 2.1 The constitutional provisions of local self-government 4.1 Powers granted to municipalities (Article 6 of the 1995 Law) 4.2 Classification of regions according to the organization of the system of organs of local self-administration 1998 9.1 Powers granted to the mayor of Chelyabinsk as codified in the city charter

17 57 63 170

Abbreviations

AO APR CDSP CDPSP CPRF CPSU GDP GRP IEWS LDPR NDR NPR NPSR PR RF RFE/RL RPL RPP RSFSR SPS UR USSR

Autonomous Okrug/Oblast Agrarian Party of Russia The Current Digest of the Soviet Press The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press Communist Party of the Russian Federation Communist Party of the Soviet Union Gross Domestic Product Gross Regional Product Institute of East West Studies Liberal Democratic Party of Russia Our Home is Russia People’s Party of Russia National Patriotic Union of Russia Proportional Representation Russian Federation Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Russian Party of Life Russian Party of Pensioners Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic Union of Right Forces United Russia Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the publishers for granting me permission to include some materials from the following studies: Cameron Ross, ‘Federalism and electoral authoritarianism under Putin’, Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, Vol. 13, No. 3, Summer 2005. Cameron Ross, ‘Local government reform in the Russian Federation: a tortuous and twisted path’, Local Government Studies, Vol. 32, No. 5, November 2006. http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713673447~db=all Cameron Ross, ‘Municipal government in the Russian Federation and Putin’s ‘electoral vertical’’, Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, Vol. 15, No. 2, Spring 2007. Cameron Ross, ‘From party and state domination to Putin’s power vertical: the subjugation of mayors in communist and post-communist Russia’, in John Garrard (ed.), Heads of the Local State: Mayors, Provosts and Burgomasters Since 1800, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007.

1

Introduction

On 16 September 2003 a new law, ‘On the General Principles of Organizing LocalSelf Government in the Russian Federation’ (hereafter, the 2003 Law)1 was ratified by the Russian parliament (the State Duma), which led to a doubling of the number of municipalities (from 11,957 to 24,208) by December 2005.2 The first major round of elections to these new municipalities took place over the period 2004–5, and by December 2005, 198,815 deputies and 13,655 heads of local administrations had been duly elected.3 In addition, the creation of the new municipalities required the recruitment and training of hundreds of thousands of administrative personnel. It is somewhat surprising, given the vast numbers of citizens who are now engaged in grass-roots politics, that the study of local self-government in Russia has been somewhat neglected. While there have been a plethora of scholarly works devoted to regional politics, there have been far fewer books devoted to municipal politics, and even fewer that deal with both politics and finance.4 In Russia the study of local government has been dominated by legalistic studies, which focus on the formal rights and powers of municipalities.5 In this study I provide an account of local government reforms from Gorbachev to Putin, and I examine local level politics and finance.

The importance of local government As Porter and Young rightly stress: The many challenges of post Soviet Russian state building and political transition are not limited to national institutions in Moscow. Two tasks critical to the overall political and social success of contemporary Russia include strengthening the reach of the state through effective local administration and empowering local governments with sufficient autonomy and capacity to address local concerns.6 Moreover, for many scholars the development of local level democracy is an essential if not a sufficient condition for the consolidation of democracy at the national level. As Pratchett argues, ‘from Tocqueville onwards, there has been a strong normative argument within political theory that local self-government

2

Introduction

is a fundamental component of broader democratic structures and practices’.7 By serving as a ‘school of democracy’ and a ‘training ground’ for national level politicians, local government ‘provides the foundation for strong national democratic institutions and practices’.8 As Sisk notes: Around the world there is a new appreciation that local governance is much more than city administration that collects taxes and delivers essential services such as basic education, clean water, sewers, transportation, or housing. Instead, local democracy is rightly seen as the very foundation of a higher quality and more enduring democracy. Local governance is the level of democracy in which the citizen has the most effective opportunity to participate actively and directly in decisions made for all of society. A vigorous and effective local democracy is the underlying basis for a healthy and strong national-level democracy.9 In a similar vein Hahn argues, it is hard to imagine a successful transition to democracy taking place only at the national level. Indeed, it seems more reasonable to argue that the democratization of national political institutions without corresponding changes taking place locally would be a prescription for political instability.10 Finally, for Peter John, local democracy: offers citizens the potential to exercise their freedom and to express their local identities in a manner that is different from and complementary to higher tiers of government. Locally elected governments offer the benefits of diversity; provide a supply of public goods that reflect the preferences of those who live in local jurisdictions; and can ensure that higher levels of government express a plurality of territorial and functional interests.11

Federalism and local self-government As I shall demonstrate in this study, the development of local government and the struggle to form viable local democracies have been inextricably tied to the development of federalism in Russia and the wider struggle for power between Russia’s 89 federal subjects (regions, republics and autonomies) and the Kremlin.12 The structures and powers (both formal and informal) of local governments in postcommunist Russia vary significantly across the Federation. These variations spring primarily from the development of high levels of constitutional, socio-economic and political asymmetry, which developed, in Russia’s federal subjects during the Yeltsin era (1991–9). During this period we witnessed the creation of a highly politicized ‘contract form’ of federalism, which granted some federal subjects (the ethnic republics) far greater powers than others (the territorially defined federal subjects), and, in particular, allowed the ethnic republics to shape their own political institutions, including their local governments.

Introduction

3

The three major laws that have been adopted on local self-government in the post-communist era (in 1991,13 1995,14 and 200315) have been intimately linked to this wider power struggle between the centre and the periphery, and to the specific nature of Russia’s highly politicized and negotiated form of federalism. At times local government has been used as a mere ‘pawn’ by the federal government in its attempt to gain greater power over the federal subjects. Many regional administrations, on the other hand, have also sought to subjugate or limit the powers of local self-governments, as part of their power-struggles with the centre.

Defining democracy In order to assess the prospects for the development of a viable form of democracy in Russia’s localities we need to define what we mean by this highly contested concept. As Diamond notes, David Collier and Steven Levitsky have uncovered over ‘550 subtypes of democracy’.16 For Diamond and Morlino, at a minimum democracy requires: 1 2 3 4

universal, adult suffrage recurring, free, competitive, and fair elections more than one serious political party alternative sources of information.

If elections are to be truly meaningful, free and fair, there must be some degree of civil and political freedom beyond the electoral arena so that citizens can articulate and organize around their political beliefs and interests.17 Robert Dahl lists the following eight ‘institutional guarantees’ that citizens must enjoy before a country can be classified as a democracy: 1 2 3 4 5a 5b 6 7 8

freedom to form and join organizations freedom of expression right to vote eligibility for public office right of political leaders to compete for support right of political leaders to compete for votes alternative sources of information free and fair elections institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference.18

Diamond also stresses the importance of contestation in free and fair elections but, in his definition of ‘liberal democracy’, he places much greater emphasis on the provision of civil and political liberties. His definition of ‘liberal democracy’ is both broader and stricter than Dahl’s more ‘minimalist’ definition of ‘electoral democracy’. While Dahl and other minimalists, such as Schumpeter and Huntington, ‘acknowledge the need for minimal levels of civil freedom, in order

4

Introduction

for competition and participation to be meaningful, they do not devote much attention to the basic freedoms involved, nor do they attempt to incorporate them into actual measures of democracy.’19 For Diamond there are nine essential attributes of a ‘liberal democracy’: 1

2

3

4

5

6

7 8

9

Real power lies – in fact as well as in constitutional theory – with elected officials and their appointees, rather than with unaccountable internal actors (e.g. the military) or foreign powers. Executive power is constrained constitutionally and held accountable by other government institutions (such as an independent judiciary, parliament, ombudsman and auditor general). Not only are electoral outcomes uncertain, with a significant opposition vote and presumption of party alternation in government over time, but no group that adheres to constitutional principles is denied the right to form a party and contest elections (even if electoral thresholds and other rules prevent smaller parties from winning representation in parliament). Cultural, ethnic, religious, and other minority groups, as well as traditionally disadvantaged or unempowered majorities, are not prohibited (legally or in practice) from expressing their interests in the political process, and from using their language and culture. Beyond parties and intermittent elections, citizens have multiple ongoing channels and means for the expression and representation of their interests and values, including a diverse array of autonomous associations, movement and groups that they are free to form and join. In addition to associational freedom and pluralism, there exist alternative sources of information, including independent media, to which citizens have (politically) unfettered access. Individuals have substantial freedom of belief, opinion, discussion, speech, publication, assembly, demonstration and petition. Citizens are politically equal under the law (even though they are invariably unequal in their political resources), and the above-mentioned individual group liberties are effectively protected by an independent, impartial judiciary, whose decisions are enforced and respected by other centres of power. The rule of law protects citizens from unjustified detention, exile, terror, torture, and undue interference in their personal lives not only by the state but also by organized antistate forces.20

Likewise for Schedler, ‘elections are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for modern democracy’. Moreover, ‘while liberal democracies go beyond the electoral minimum, electoral democracies do not. They manage to get elections right but fail to institutionalize other vital dimensions of democratic constitutionalism, such as the rule of law, political accountability, bureaucratic integrity, and public deliberation.’21 Fareed Zakaria alerts us to another important distinction – that between liberal and illiberal democracies. Following Diamond, Zakaria argues that, ‘liberal

Introduction

5

democracies’ are polities ‘marked not only by free and fair elections, but also by the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion and property’.22 ‘Illiberal democracies’ by contrast are ‘Democratically elected regimes, often ones that have been reelected or reaffirmed through referenda … [which] … routinely [ignore] constitutional limits on their power and [deprive] their citizens of basic rights and freedoms.’23 For Zakaria, a key feature of any liberal democratic state is respect for the rule of law. Przeworski, in a similar manner stresses that ‘the decisive step toward democracy is the devolution of power from a group of people to a set of rules’.24

Local democracy For Soos and Zentai, ‘two additional dimensions’ must be taken into account when it comes to defining local democracy. The first comes from the local nature of the subject of analysis. A distinctive feature of local governments is their autonomy, i.e. their freedom from the direct involvement of external forces. If local administrative units have no legal, political and financial autonomy, the term ‘local (self-) government loses its meaning. The degree of autonomy is a crucial element in the assessment of local democracy.’25 For Sisk answers to the following questions are vital when it comes to assessing local government autonomy: 1

2 3

4

Authority: Does the municipal structure make policy and take major decisions, or does it mostly implement policy debated and created at a larger level, such as in a national or provincial (or in federal systems, state) parliament? Financial capacity: What is the all-important pattern of revenue flow and fiscal authority? Who controls the budget? Capacity for policy implementation: Does the structure and exercise of local authority create political space for civil society organizations and all major players on an issue to have an assured role in local decision-making processes? Devolution to the appropriate level: To what extent is power within a municipal structure devolved to the forum at which it is best exercised, such as decentralization of decision-making to wards, community groups, or special panels?26

The second dimension according to Soos and Zentai is that ‘a viable democracy requires a certain level of effectiveness’. As Stoker notes: Openness and deliberation are to be valued but they lose their lustre in a system that lacks the capacity for effective action. Good local governance requires the capacity to act. Effective bureaucracy and professional expertise will continue to be central to good local governance.27

6

Introduction

Consequently, policy performance is a crucial dimension of local democracy assessment. To summarize, local democracy for Soos and Zentai ‘is conceptualized as a local government that is autonomous, effective, open, and representative, surrounded by a civil society in the framework of guaranteed political rights’.28

Decentralization and subsidiarity A major emphasis in the academic literature on local government are the benefits of decentralization. As Danielian notes: a modern democratic state cannot provide efficient public administration of economic and social processes unless it guarantees the existence of local selfgovernment. These processes are too complicated and diverse to be governed from a single centre of power. Decentralization of decision-making results in a more efficient Public Administration.29 The benefits of decentralization and subsidiarity are codified in the European Charter of Local Self-Government, which states that ‘decision-making for public policies should, wherever possible be exercised by those authorities which are closest to the citizen’.30 Moreover, according to a concept paper of the United Nations Human Settlement Programme: Responsibility for service provision should be allocated on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity, that is, the closest appropriate level consistent with efficient and cost-effective delivery of services. This will maximize the potential for inclusion of the citizenry in the process of urban governance. Decentralization and local democracy should improve the responsiveness of policies and initiatives to the priorities of the citizens. Cities should be empowered with sufficient resources and autonomy to meet their responsibilities.31 In a seminal study, Rosenbaum lists the following benefits of decentralization: 1

2

3

4

it serves to fragment and disperse political power … [such that] no single unit, branch or actor … [is] allowed to exercise all aspects of power and decision making within a government, serves to create additional civic space. By generating more centers of power, there are inevitably more venues in which civil society organizations – interest groups, business associations, labor unions, the media, etc. – can develop and find sustenance, helps to create opportunities for the emergence of opposition political groups and, in particular, create resources for opposition political parties …, creates numerous training grounds for the development of democratic skills and practices,

Introduction 5 6 7 8

7

provides more options for individual citizens seeking a positive response from government, provides for diversity in response to popular demands, provides the citizenry with a greater sense of political efficacy, and provides much greater opportunities for meaningful and responsive economic development.32

Moreover, as Timofeev notes, it is important to make a distinction between the following three forms of decentralization: deconcentration, delegation and devolution. Through deconcentration, the central government gives some autonomy to its local offices that are appointed by, and are accountable to, the higher hierarchy. Under delegation, locally elected government bodies assume new responsibilities subject to strict regulations by upper-level government. The process of devolution establishes complete autonomy of locally elected government bodies in their exclusive spheres of responsibility.33 Often the distribution of powers to local governments is a process of deconcentration rather than delegation or devolution. Thus, it is vitally important to ‘clearly distinguish, from the outset, between truly decentralizing decision-making powers (autonomy) to regional and local governments and using local governments for the deconcentration of functions from the federal and regional government levels’.34 As I shall demonstrate, Putin has deconcentrated a number of policy areas to regional administrations now that he has gained control over the appointment of regional governors (see Chapter 2).

From local government to local governance More recently, scholars of local politics have sought to stress the distinction between local government and local governance. As Sisk notes: There is a growing awareness that elected authorities and professional municipal administrators cannot tackle social problems and economic imperatives without an extensive, structured role for non-governmental actors in civil society. Civil society groups, businesses and unions, professional associations, churches, charitable groups, and community-based organizations – now work more closely than ever with governments … . New emphasis is being placed on the broader concept of governance – involving citizens and the many organizations of civil society in the pursuit of the public good, not just on the official processes of government.35 For John, Governance is a flexible pattern of public decision-making based on loose networks of individuals … . Governance implies that these networks are more

8

Introduction open, complex and potentially unstable than hitherto and that bargaining and the building of trust form more of the story of political life than the standard operating procedures of bureaucracies, the closed nature of party government and the hidden power of local elites. In particular, governance indicates there are stronger and new networks between government and non-government actors.36

This new stress on governance has arisen out of the steady erosion in the legitimacy of representative democracy, particularly at the local level, where turnout at elections has been falling precipitously all across the world, leading some political scientists to proclaim that there is ‘a crisis of local democracy’. For Stoker, representative democracy ‘has become a mechanism for granting legitimacy to decision-takers rather than a strong mechanism for governmental accountability to citizens’.37 Furthermore, as Sisk notes: Many believe that the balance has tilted too much in the direction of representative over direct democracy and adversarial versus more collaborative forms of decision making. The focus on elections and sharp differences between policy platforms among politicians has created a distance between citizens and public officials and created heightened divisions among social groups. The consequence is that the average citizen becomes apathetic and withdraws from political life.38 In the light of these more negative aspects, scholars and practitioners of local politics have warned that we must be careful not to romanticize the role of local government. Smaller communities are not necessarily more democratic than national governments; indeed, ‘they can be stifling or disabling in reinforcing relationships of subordination and narrow parochialism’.39 Moreover, as I shall demonstrate in this study, local autonomy does not necessarily mean more democracy. Corruption, and collusion between politicians and businessmen, is often more prevalent at the local level than at the nation level. As Dowley warns us: The scholarly community bears a responsibility to find out when and how decentralization contributes to more effective, transparent, representative government, and when it leads to much worse outcomes, such as increased corruption, clientelism, growing regional inequalities or ethnic conflict.40 Furthermore, local officials and governments may more easily be ‘captured’ by business elites. Thus, for John: To find out who governs it is not enough to identify the political leaders and the prominent public sector organizations because these people and bodies do not operate on their own … . Researchers need to look beyond the formally constituted organizations … [to] members of the local elites who operate in long-term relationships with each other.41

Introduction

9

Local business and political elites may coalesce to defend their joint interests in what Clarence Stone has termed an ‘urban regime’.42 Moreover, just as the development of local democracy can enhance the development of democracy nationwide, authoritarianism at the local level can also feed and nourish authoritarian regimes at the national level.

The statist and societal concepts of local self-government in Russia Throughout Russian history two diametrically opposite concepts of local government have been fiercely debated – the statist and the societal. In ‘statist theory’: local government takes on the administration of particular state functions. There is no independent activity by the organs of local self-government: there is merely a de-concentration of power wherein the central power retains ultimate control but assigns specific duties to these bodies. Thus, local selfgovernment exists as administrative tentacles of the central state, and serves to implement state policies.42 In the ‘societal theory’ of local government, which stresses the self-governing nature, there is a separation of state and local government, a belief that ‘society’s interests … should be distinguished from the interests of the state’.43 As Campbell notes: The opposition between the centralized ‘state theory’ and the decentralized ‘society theory’ has been central to each phase of reform of Russian subnational government since the early nineteenth century.44 The Russian Constitution, which was ratified in 1993, appeared to signal a victory for the societal concept, as local self-governments were defined in Article 12 as non-state bodies (see Chapter 2). However, in practice during the Yeltsin presidency (as discussed in Chapters 2 and 4) the regions adopted a dual system of ‘local government’ (guided by the statist concept) and ‘local self-government’ (employing the societal concept). Since President Putin came to power in 2000 there has been a concerted effort to bring local self-government back into the state and to make it part of the president’s ‘power vertical’ (see Chapter 5).

Outline of the study In chapter 2, I discuss the troubled development of federalism in Russia from Yeltsin to Putin, and the problems of delineating the powers of the federal centre, the regions and local governments. Authoritarian leaders (particularly in the 21 ethnic republics) have been able to use federalism as a pretext to install dictatorial regimes, and to claim sovereignty and control over their territories and natural resources. Yeltsin’s highly politicized and ‘contract’ form of federalism also sanctioned the regional subjugation of the powers of local governments, and gross violations of

10

Introduction

Article 12 of the 1993 Russian Constitution and the 1995 Law. Under Putin, we have witnessed a concerted effort to tame the regions and to recentralize power in the Kremlin. Under the pretext of preserving the unity of the state and defeating terrorism, the Putin regime has led an assault on the key principles of federalism and democracy. Chapter 3 examines the communist party’s domination of local government in the late Soviet period and Gorbachev’s failed attempts to reform the system. In Chapter 4, I analyze the tortured and twisted path of local self-government reforms under Yeltsin, and the power of regional elites to thwart the implementation of the 1995 Law. In Chapter 5, I examine Putin’s attempt to create a universal and uniform system of local self-government and to reassert the statist concept of local self-governance with the adoption of the 2003 Law. Chapters 6 and 7 provide a detailed examination of the fiscal capacity and financial autonomy of local governments from Yeltsin to Putin. In Chapter 8, I turn to an analysis of local parties and elections, while Chapter 9 deals with local executives, and the struggle for power between mayors and governors. In Chapter 10, I assess the prospects for the development of a viable local democracy in Russia in the face of Putin’s and the Kremlin’s blatant manipulation of elections and attempts to create what I term an ‘electoral vertical’. Throughout the study, I relate the reforms of the structures and powers of local government, and the problems of creating a viable local democracy, to the complex struggle for power, which has been played out between the centre and the periphery under Yeltsin and Putin. The following three key questions are addressed in the study: 1 2

3

To what degree are local self-governments in Russia politically and economically autonomous? What has been the impact of Russia’s highly asymmetrical and negotiated form of federalism on the development of local self-government and local democracy? What are the prospects for the creation of viable democracies at the municipal level?

2

Russian federalism and local politics

As Sisk notes: The rich array of national, regional, cultural, and community settings establishes various contexts in which local government takes place. The role of local governance in a large country’s federal system, for example, may be remarkably different from the role played by local authorities in small highly centralized countries … . Municipalities differ significantly – often within a single country or setting – on the degree of devolution and the types of governing responsibilities exercised at the local level.1 In December 1993, Russia ratified its first post-communist constitution which, in Article 1, proclaimed that it was ‘a democratic federative rule of law state with a republican form of government’.2 In this chapter, I provide an examination of the Russian federal system and the constitutional distribution of powers between, central, regional and local bodies of power.

Federalism and federations For Elazar, ‘the simplest possible definition’ of federalism is ‘self rule plus shared rule’.3 According to Watts, in federations: 1) neither the federal nor the constituent units of government are constitutionally subordinate to the other, i.e., each has sovereign powers derived from the constitution rather than another level of government; 2) each is empowered to deal directly with its citizens in the exercise of legislative, executive and taxing powers and 3) each is directly elected by its citizens.4 In addition, scholars of federalism have put forward the following structural prerequisites that states must meet before they can be classified as federations:5 1

The existence of at least two tiers of government, both tiers of which have a formal constitutional distribution of legislative, executive and judicial powers and fiscal autonomy.

12

Russian federalism and local politics

2

Some form of voluntary covenant or contract among the components – normally a written constitution (not unilaterally amendable and requiring for amendment the consent of a significant proportion of the constituent units). Mechanisms to channel the participation of the federated units in decisionmaking processes at the federal level. This usually involves the creation of a bicameral legislature in which one chamber represents the people at large and the other the component units of the federation. Some kind of institutional arbiter, or umpire, usually a supreme court or a constitutional court to settle disputes between the different levels of government. Mechanisms to facilitate intergovernmental collaboration in those areas where governmental powers are shared or inevitably overlap.6

3

4

5

Moreover, as Elazar stresses, ‘the structure of federalism is meaningful only in polities whose processes of government reflect the federal principle’.7 Here, we need to add a cultural dimension to the five structural definitions provided above. As Watts notes, ‘a recognition of the supremacy of the constitution over all orders of government and a political culture emphasizing the fundamental importance of respect for constitutionality are therefore prerequisites for the effective operation of a federation.’8

Federalism in Russia Federations may be mono-national or multi-national. Following Kymlica’s definition a multi-national state refers to countries that ‘contain more than one national group which see themselves as distinct societies and demand various forms of autonomy or self-government to ensure their survival as distinct societies’.9 Belgium, Canada, Spain, Russia, Malaysia, Cyprus and India are examples of multi-national federations that encompass or attempt to encompass more than one national group.10 With a population of 142 million citizens incorporating some 172 nationalities and an area covering 170 million square kilometres, Russia is one of the largest and most ethnically diverse multi-national federations in the world. The 1993 Constitution listed 89 federal subjects comprising 32 ethnically defined subjects (21 republics, 10 Autonomous Okrugs and 1 Autonomous Oblast) and 57 territorially based subjects (49 Oblasts, 6 Krais and the cities of Moscow and St Petersburg). Asymmetry The Russian Federation is also highly asymmetrical. The federal subjects vary widely in the size of their territories, ethnic composition and populations. Thus, for example, the territory of the republic of Sakha-Yakutiya is 388 times greater in size than that of the Republic of North Osetiya-Alaniya. The population of Moscow in 2002 (8.539 million) was 474 times greater than that of the sparsely populated Yevenk Autonomous Oblast (18,000).

Russian federalism and local politics 13 There are also vast differences in the socio-economic status of the federal subjects. A majority of Russia’s ethnic republics are highly dependent on financial support from the federal budget. Thus, for example, financial subsidies comprised 87.7 per cent of Ingushetiya’s budget revenues in 2002, and 82.5 per cent in 2003. Federal transfers in 2003 comprised 80 per cent of budget revenues in the republics of Dagestan and Tyva, while they made up 70 to 80 per cent of the revenues of the republics of Kabardino-Balkariya, Karachaeva-Cherkessiya and North OsetiyaAlaniya. In the republic of Altai they comprised 60 per cent, and in Adygeya, Buryatiya, Kalmykiya and Marii El between 50 and 60 per cent.11 Such high levels of inequality between regions are particularly worrying in multi-national federations, where the unequal distribution of resources can quickly take on an ethnic dimension, exacerbating tensions between ethnic groups. However, the economic dependence of the ethnic republics on the federal budget has also been an important factor in calming down secessionist demands. There are also sharp variations in the revenues of municipal budgets. As Kurlyandskaya notes, ‘In some regions the ratio between the per capita revenues of the richest and the poorest municipalities exceeds 1:100.’12 I discuss regional and local level economic asymmetries in more detail in Chapter 7. The Russian Federation is also constitutionally asymmetrical. While Article 5(4) of the Russian Constitution declares that all subjects of the Federation are equal, in fact the ethnic republics were granted far greater powers than the territorially defined subjects. Socio-economic and constitutional asymmetry in turn generates political asymmetry. Thus, for example, rich ‘donor subjects’ (regions that pay more taxes to the federal budget than they receive back) have been more successful in carving out higher levels of political autonomy than the impoverished ‘recipient regions’ that depend on federal transfers from the centre for their economic survival. There were eight donor regions in 1997, 13 in 1999, 19 in 2001 and 21 in 2006.13 The Federation Treaty and the Russian Constitution During the period that has become known as ‘the parade of sovereignties’ (1991–3) there were real worries that the Russian Federation would follow the fate of the USSR and fall apart. The creation of a federal state based on the dual principles of ethnicity and territory was therefore seen by many members of the political elite as the only way to prevent the disintegration of the state. In March 1992 Yeltsin, fearful of the break-up of the Federation, signed a Federation Treaty, which conceded major powers to the ethnic republics.14 In the Treaty, the republics were recognized as sovereign states and they were granted independent powers over taxation and ownership of their land and natural resources. In addition, the republics were to have their own constitutions, supreme courts and presidents. In contrast, the territorially based regions were given none of the above rights and their chief executives (governors) were to be directly appointed by the President. Tatarstan and Chechnya both refused to sign the Federal Treaty, and in November 1992 Tatarstan adopted its own rival Constitution, which declared that ‘it was a

14

Russian federalism and local politics

sovereign state, and a subject of international law, associated with the Russian Federation on the basis of a treaty and the mutual delegation of powers’. Chechnya, which declared its independence as early as November 1991, proclaimed that it was an independent sovereign state and a full and equal member of the world community of states. The Federation Treaty had been signed at a time when Yeltsin was weak and appeared to be losing his struggle for power with the Russian parliament. Yeltsin’s victory over parliament in October 1993 turned the tables and Yeltsin then sought to take back in December 1993 what he had been forced to give up in March 1992. The Constitution stripped the republics of their rights of sovereignty and secession. Thus, Article 4(1) states that ‘the sovereignty of the Russian Federation extends to the whole of its territory’ and Article 4(3) declares that ‘the Russian Federation ensures the integrity and inviolability of its territory’. Further articles guarantee the supremacy of the Federal Constitution. Thus, Article 4(2) states that ‘the constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws are paramount throughout the territory of the federation’ and Article 15(1) declares that ‘the Constitution has supreme legal force, is direct acting and applies throughout the territory of the Federation. Laws and other legal enactments adopted in the Federation must not contradict the Constitution.’15 However, Yeltsin’s victory was not as clear-cut as it would appear. First of all, many of the provisions of the Constitution are actually very vague or ambiguous, while others are contradictory. Of particular concern is the confusion that has been left over the current status of the Federal Treaty. Article 11 of the Constitution states that the distribution of powers between the federal government and federal subjects is to be determined by both the Constitution and the Federal Treaty. Second, there is the question of whether turnout at the referendum in December 1993 was actually over 50 per cent. It is now argued by many scholars that turnout was much lower than the official 54.8 per cent, and this has substantially weakened the legitimacy of the Constitution. Third, there is the question of how much support the Constitution received in the ethnic republics. An essential attribute of any democratic federation is the voluntary membership of its subjects. In 42 of the 89 republics and regions the Constitution failed to be ratified either because turnout was too low or the majority of citizens voted against it. Fourth, a number of republics had ratified their own constitutions before the December 1993 Federal Constitution, and they claimed that their constitutions took precedence over the Russian Constitution. Nationalist leaders in the republics could henceforth legitimately argue that the Russian Constitution was not valid in their territories. Authoritarian leaders were able to use federalism as a pretext to install dictatorial regimes, and to claim sovereignty and control over their territories and natural resources. Yeltsin had won a pyrrhic victory. By 1996, the Federal Government reported that 19 of the 21 republican constitutions were in breach of the Federal Constitution. Those constitutions (Chuvashiya, Sakha-Yakutiya, Chechnya, Tatarstan and Tyva) ratified between the signing of the Federal Treaty in March 1992 and the ratification of the Russian Constitution on 12 December 1993 were the most confederal, including as they did declarations of sovereignty, rights of secession

Russian federalism and local politics 15 and citizenship. As noted above, Tatarstan declared that it was an associate member of the Russian Federation. Only Chechnya went so far as to declare its complete secession, and in 1994 and 1999, Russian troops had to be sent into the Republic to restore federal control.16

The distribution of powers: federal, regional and local Federal and regional powers Article 71 grants the federal government exclusive powers over a broad range of national policies (including the national economy, federal budget, federal taxes and duties, foreign and defence affairs), and Article 72 lists a number of powers that are to be shared between the federal authorities and the federal subjects. No exclusive powers were delegated to the federal subjects. Instead, the subjects are granted only ‘residual powers’ (Article 73), that is, powers over those relatively few policy areas not provided for in Articles 71 and 72. Another important article in the Constitution is Article 78, which allows the centre to transfer ‘the implementation of some of its powers’ to the federal subjects and vice versa. This article was used by the Yeltsin regime to promote the development of bilateralism and ‘contract federalism’, which is discussed below. Constitutional powers of local self-government For Elazar: federalism orders civil societies, their politics and territories, in at least four ways: 1) by establishing a certain kind of constitutional and legal framework for them; 2) by encouraging certain geographical patterns within them; 3) by influencing their political culture basis; and 4) by shaping the political behaviour of their residents or citizens.17 Each of these points he argues, help to ‘shape the patterns of urbanization and urban politics in distinctive ways’.18 Denters and Rose argue that one of the major differences ‘between unitary and federal systems is that in federal systems the role of the national government vis-à-vis local government tends to be more limited’.19 Likewise, Mike Goldsmith notes that ‘in Federal systems, the position of the central government is generally quite weak in the intergovernmental relationship, whereas in unitary systems the central government looms large in the affairs of most localities’.20 For Smith the major difference between unitary and federal systems is that ‘in federalism the structure of these relations cannot be changed without adhering to a constitutional procedure involving the local governments in the decision. In unitary systems, changes can be made by a simple legislative act or government policy.’21 Elazar also argues that local governments in federal systems are able to capture more powers than those in unitary systems. Local governments in the USA, he

16

Russian federalism and local politics

argues, ‘gained a substantial measure of entrenched political power because they [were] able to capitalize on the spirit of noncentralization – the spirit of federalism, if you will in their day-to-day operations and in their bargaining with other governments’.22

Local self-government in Russia The specific powers of local self-governments are outlined in Articles 130–3 of the Russian Constitution (see Figure 2.1). Kourliandskaya et al., summarize these key powers, as follows: 1 2 3 4

5

6

Local communities possess autonomy in addressing issues of local importance. Local self-government may follow a diversity of organizational models. Regional authorities must take into account the preferences of the local communities when determining the boundaries of local government jurisdictions. Local governments possess financial autonomy (albeit limited), with discretion over the management of municipal property and the implementation of local budgets. Adequate funding is guaranteed for the performance of additional state functions delegated to the local governments by the decision of federal or regional state authorities. Local governments will be reimbursed for the costs of implementing federal mandates.23

One of the most controversial articles in the Russian Constitution is Article 12, which declares that ‘In the Russian Federation local self-government is recognized and guaranteed. Within the limits of its powers local self-government is independent. Bodies of local self-government do not form part of the system of bodies of state power.’ As Wollmann and Butusova note, Article 12 was hailed by liberal jurists in Russia ‘as finally recognizing (and legitimating) the local selfgovernment level as standing distinct and autonomous from the sphere and domain of the state and possessing a non-state, societal quality’.24 Thus, Article 12 was supported by those who supported the societal concept of local self-government. In addition, it was championed by an influential group of federal politicians, ‘including the Deputy Prime Minister, Sergei Shakhrai, who apparently saw local self-government as an instrument for limiting the excessive independence of regional leaders, particularly in the ethnic republics’.25 Conservative jurists and those who supported the statist concept of local government criticized Article 12 for its ‘artificial distinction of two power channels’ and its ‘fostering an overly wide claim of local autonomy’.26 This debate over the societal and statist concepts of local government has a long history in Russia. A similar debate raged around the status of the zemstvos (local government bodies created in 1864). As Porter and Young note:

Russian federalism and local politics 17 Article 3 (2) The people exercise their authority directly and also through bodies of state power and bodies of local self-government. Article 12 In the Russian Federation local self-government is recognized and guaranteed. Within the limits of its powers local self-government is independent. Bodies of local self-government do not form part of the system of bodies of state power. Article 130 (1) Local self-government in the Russian Federation ensures that the population autonomously resolves questions of local importance and the ownership, utilization and disposal of municipal property. (2) Local self-government is exercised by citizens by means of referendums, elections and other forms of direct expression of will and through elected and other bodies of local self-government. Article 131 (1) Local self-government in urban and rural settlements and other territories is exercised with due consideration for historical and other local traditions. The structure of local-self government bodies is autonomously determined by the population. (2) Changes to the borders of territories where local self-government is exercised are permitted with due consideration for the opinion of the population of the relevant territories. Article 132 (1) Bodies of local self-government autonomously manage municipal property; formulate, approve and implement the local budget; levy local taxes and duties; implement the protection of public order; and also resolve other questions of local importance. (2) Individual state powers can be vested in bodies of local self-government by law, with the transfer of the material and financial resources necessary to exercise them. The exercise of delegated powers is monitorable by the state. Article 133 Local self-government in the Russian Federation is guaranteed by the right to judicial protection, compensation for additional expenditure arising as a result of decisions adopted by bodies of state power, and the prohibition of the restriction of the rights of local self-government established by the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws.

Box 2.1 The Constitutional Provisions of Local-Self-Government Source: ‘The Russian Federation Constitution’, in Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, London and New York: Routledge, 1996, pp. 395–429.

The chief architect of the zemstvo statute, Interior minister, P. A. Valuev … was a proponent of the state theory of self-government … . However many of the nobles who stood for election subscribed to a different theory of local

18

Russian federalism and local politics self-government. These men drew distinctions between state affairs and local interests and thought that society’s interests could and should be distinguished from the interests of the state. From the perspective of this societal theory of local self-government, the zemstva should be an independent institution standing outside of the governmental apparatus.27

As Campbell notes, in post-communist Russia the societal theory of local selfgovernment: in both its liberal and traditionalist forms, became attached to the communal or settlement approach to local government structure – the idea that all settlements, however small, have the right to elect their own mayors and councillors and be constituted as municipalities in the full sense.28 The state theory of local self-government in sharp contrast favoured the ‘territorial principle’ under which ‘rural municipalities could be based on districts rather than individual settlements’.29 However, the independence granted to local self-government in Article 12 has never been put into practice. In Russia’s quasi-federal system, regional elites have been able to subjugate local level bodies with impunity. In many of the ethnic republics (e.g. Adygeya, Bashkortostan, Dagestan, Kalmykiya, Komi, North Osetiya-Alaniya, Sakha-Yakutiya, Tatarstan) the chief executives have been able to carve out personal fiefdoms and to instigate highly authoritarian regimes. Local governments have been directly subordinated to republican administrations, and heads of municipalities have been directly appointed by republican presidents (see Chapters 4 and 9).30 The provisions of Article 12 are also in any case somewhat contradicted by Article 132(2) of the Constitution, which states that ‘Individual state powers can be vested in bodies of local self-government by law, with the transfer of the material and financial resources necessary to exercise them.’ City governments, in particular, have been overloaded by these obligatory state duties, which both regional and federal bodies pass down to them, and over which, they have considerable monitoring powers. Problems of coordinating the implementation of joint powers Article 72(1) states that the establishment of the general principles for the organization of a system of bodies of state power and local-self government ‘fall within the joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the components of the Russian Federation’. Article 76(2), which defines the legislative framework for regulating questions of joint jurisdiction, stresses that laws of local government are established in correspondence with federal and regional laws. Federal and regional legislation may not infringe or limit the constitutional rights of local self-governments. As Leskin observes:

Russian federalism and local politics 19 Over 60 per cent of federal laws regulating relations in such areas as the economy, natural resource management, and social development require coordination of actions of federal and regional governments to deal with concrete issues. And every twentieth federal law specifies instances when consultations must also be held with local governments.31 In addition, ‘more than 80 per cent of laws of the subjects of the federation provide for some form of interaction between governments of the subjects and local government’.32 However, there are virtually no legal procedures to regulate such cooperation. The lack of such mechanisms leads to the establishment of informal relations that are ineffective and far from perfect from a legal point of view. This in turn, does not allow for the timely resolution of a host of urgent financial, economic, and social problems, and creates an environment conducive to red tape and corruption.33 In order to address these issues, a special commission was set up by President Putin in 2001. It was charged with clarifying the powers of federal, regional and local governments (see discussion below). Bilateral treaties Over the period 1994–8, 46 bilateral treaties were signed between the federal government and subjects of the Federation, granting the local signatories a whole host of political and economic privileges. The vast majority of these treaties (42 of the 46) also contained provisions that violated the Russian Constitution. In many instances, the bilateral treaties actually legitimized those extra-constitutional powers that the republics had unilaterally proclaimed in their republican constitutions. Special and often secretive agreements attached to the bilateral treaties granted the republics the right to appoint federal officials in their territories, conduct their own independent relations with foreign states, set up their own national banks, and create their own political and administrative organs. In many cases, the bilateral treaties sanctioned the regional subjugation of the powers of local governments and gross violations of Article 12.34 In June 1999, the Russian parliament adopted a law to regulate the treaties that reiterated the fact that all new treaties had to conform to the Federal Constitution.35 However, the law came too late to make any impact, as no new treaties were forthcoming after the last bilateral treaty was signed with Moscow Oblast in June 1998. By the mid-1990s political power had passed from the centre to the regions, and regional politics was firmly under the control of regional elites. As the Ministry of Justice reported, of the 44,000 regional acts adopted over the period 1995–7, almost half were in violation of the Russian Constitution and federal legislation.36 Thus, on the eve of Putin’s accession to the presidency, there were major

20

Russian federalism and local politics

variations across the Federation in the structures, functions and powers of local governments. More often than not, it was regional elites who had the final say over which powers would be delegated to municipalities. Indeed, the degree of political and economic asymmetry at the local level was even higher than in the regions.

Putin’s radical assault on the principles of federalism and democracy By the end of the Yeltsin era, constitutional federalism had been replaced by a highly politicized form of ‘contract’ federalism. ‘The result’, as Campbell stresses, ‘was not decentralization but “autonomization” … whereby the state was held together by a loose parade of treaties bargained between the centre and the individual regions.’37 As Sakwa notes, a ‘distinctive type of segmented regionalism emerged as Russia in effect fragmented along the lines of the 89 regions, with the federal authorities in effect becoming a ninetieth.’38 In May 2000, Vladimir Putin was inaugurated as President and he immediately initiated a series of radical reforms, the primary aims of which were to create a unified economic, legal and security space across the Federation. Over the last seven years, we have witnessed a concerted attack on the powers of the regions and localities, and a recentralization of economic and political power in the hands of the Kremlin.39 Through the instigation of what he terms a ‘dictatorship of law’, Putin has sought to reign in the anarchic and feudal powers of the regions, and to bring an end to the ‘negotiated federalism’ of the Yeltsin era. Most of the bilateral treaties have now been rescinded, and regional legislation is gradually being brought into line with the Constitution. The ex-officio membership of regional chief executives in the Federation Council has also been ended. Regional chiefs are now subject to daily oversight from Putin’s Presidential envoys in the seven new federal ‘super-districts’. In 2000, Putin was also granted powers to dismiss regional governors and assemblies if they adopted legislation that violated the Russian Constitution or federal laws. In turn, the heads of federal subjects were given similar powers to dismiss heads of local administrations.40 Presidential appointment of governors The scope and pace of Putin’s reforms were intensified after the Beslan hostage crisis of September 2004, which Putin has used as an excuse to clamp down on federalism and democracy. Putin enacted a number of new amendments and laws on Russia’s party and electoral systems, including the right of the President to directly appoint regional governors and republican presidents. According to new legislation adopted by the Duma on 11 December 2004, regional assemblies were charged with the task of giving approval to the President’s nominees.41 If a legislature twice declines to confirm the President’s nominee, the President has the right to disband the assembly and to appoint an acting regional head to serve until a new legislature is elected. The President also has the right to dismiss regional heads for failure to fulfil their duties, or if they lose the President’s confidence.42 To date, Putin has used his power of dismissal only rarely. On 9 March 2005, the

Russian federalism and local politics 21 Governor of the Koryak AO, Vladimir Loginov, was the first to be dismissed, ostensibly over an energy crisis in the region.43 Putin argued that these reforms were necessary ‘to ensure the unity of the country, the strengthening of state structures and confidence in the authorities, and the creation of an effective system of internal security’.44 Other supporters of the direct appointment of regional executives, such as the Chair of the Duma’s Constitutional Legislation Committee, Vladimr Pligin (a member of United Russia), argued that it will strengthen the power vertical, and they defended its legality by citing Article 77 of the Russian Constitution, which calls for ‘a unified system of executive power in the Russian Federation’.45 Opponents argue that it will destroy the country’s constitutionally mandated federative structure and replace it with a unitary state. Thus, for example, Vladimir Ryzhkov, who was one of the few independent deputies left in the Duma in 2004, declared: The President is asking us to violate three constitutional principles at one go: the principle of democracy, by depriving citizens of their right to elect their own leaders; the principle of federalism since appointment from above has nothing to do with the principles of a federation; and the principle of a lawbased state, since the President is proposing that we ignore the Constitution, the laws, and the decisions of the Constitutional Court.46 In an open letter to Constitutional Court chair Valerii Zorkin, Ryzhkov listed ten articles of the Russian Constitution that he believes are violated by Putin’s proposals: Articles 1, 3, 5, 10, 11, 32, 71, 72, 73 and 77).47 It is not surprising that a majority of Russia’s regional governors publicly embraced Putin’s proposals: many of them were coming to the end of their terms in office, and others were so unpopular with their electorates that they had been able to stay in power only by resorting to electoral fraud and corruption. Those 30 or so governors who stood on United Russia’s Party List for the 2003 Duma elections, and those who brought home the votes for Putin in the 2004 Presidential elections, no doubt hoped to be rewarded with further terms in office. Moreover, since the adoption of the new legislation on appointing governors came into operation in January 2005, regional governors and republic presidents have been rushing to join United Russia. At the party’s 7th Congress, held in December 2006 it was stated that 68 regional heads were members of United Russia.48 In utilizing his new powers, Putin to date has tended to reappoint incumbent governors. As Coalson notes, ‘the pattern of gubernatorial appointments has clearly shown that the reform was not intended to replace ineffective governors who had come to power by manipulating a flawed electoral system’.49 Of the 53 regions that had passed through the new appointment system by April 2007, Putin had reappointed 36 incumbents and there were just 17 new appointments.50 Many of those who have been reappointed have already been in power for over a decade. Thus, for example, ‘Konstantin Titov the Governor of Samara Oblast, the President of Tatarstan, Mintimer Shaimiev, and the governors of Khansy-Mansiskii AO Okrug, and the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, Alexander Filiponko and Nikolai

22

Russian federalism and local politics

Volkov’ have held office since 1991. On completion of their new terms, these governors will have served for 18 or 19 years.51 Nor has Putin been averse to reappoint unpopular or autocratic leaders. Thus, for example, Putin reappointed Murtaza Rakhimov, the President of Bashkortostan, who has been accused of human rights violations, corruption and electoral fraud.52 Direct appointment of mayors In his September 2004 speech, Putin also called for governors to be given a greater role in the formation of local organs of power.53 Recently, there have been calls for governors to be given the right to directly appoint the mayors of their capital cities. As Coalson notes, public support for such a policy has come from a number of high-ranking politicians, such as Lyubov Sliska, the First Deputy Chair of the Duma (and a member of United Russia); Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Deputy Chair of the Duma (head of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia); and Vladislav Surkov, Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration. However, other key politicians, such as Boris Gryzlov, Chair of the Duma (Head of United Russia), have declared their opposition to such a policy.54 Critics argue that the elimination of mayoral elections would also require changes to the Russian Constitution. As noted above, Article 32(2) of the Russian Constitution states that ‘Citizens of the Russian Federation shall have the right to be elected to bodies of state governance and organs of local self-government.’55 Furthermore, as noted above, Article 130(2) declares that ‘local self-government shall be exercised by the citizens through referendums, elections, and forms of expression of their will, through elected and other bodies of local self-government’, and Article 131(1) states that ‘the structure of bodies of local self-government shall be determined by the population independently’.56 The appointment of mayors would also violate the ‘European Charter of Local Self-Government’ to which Russia is a signatory. Article 3.2 of the Charter stipulates that rights in the field of local self-government must be exercised by democratically constituted authorities.57 If this policy goes ahead, the president will appoint the regional governors and the governors will appoint the mayors of their capital cities, thus extending Putin’s power vertical from the Kremlin to the cities. (This issue is discussed further in Chapter 9.) Delineation of powers: federal, regional and local In July 2001, Putin set up a commission chaired by Kozak (the Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration) that was charged with drawing up new proposals on the distribution of powers between federal, regional and local governments. Two key laws were produced as a result of the commission’s work: the July 2003 Law ‘On Amending the Federal Law, “On the Fundamental Principles of the Organization of Legislative (Representative) and Executive Bodies of State Power of the Subjects of the Russian Federation”’ (hereafter, July 2003 Law), and the 2003 Law. As Leskin notes, the adoption of these laws ‘necessitated a revision of the basic provisions of

Russian federalism and local politics 23 155 previously adopted federal laws (including the Budget and Tax Codes of the Russian Federation) and termination of forty-two federal laws’. Moreover, ‘the provisions of several thousand laws passed by subjects of the Russian Federation had to be amended.’58 A key result of this legislation was the: Introduction of an exhaustive list of forty-one powers (issues, areas of regulation) granted to governments of the subjects of the Russian Federation and related matters that come under the joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the subjects of the Russian Federation (Article 72 of the Russian Constitution), as well as an exhaustive list of issues of local significance for municipalities of every type (communities, municipal regions, and city districts).59 Federal intervention Under Putin, the federal government has also been given new rights of federal intervention. Thus, for example, regions with budget deficits exceeding 30 per cent of their income are subject to direct administrative control by the federal government. In addition, the 2003 Law gives governors and republican presidents similar rights to take control of municipalities and to dismiss their chief executives (see Chapter 5). While intervention may be justified in cases of administrative malpractice, there is always the worry that ‘federal and regional bodies will use these new rights to penalize politically disobedient municipalities’.60 Harmonization of legislation By 2000, the number of normative legal acts adopted by the regions and republics exceeded 300,000, approximately one-quarter of which violated federal laws.61 One of Putin’s first policy initiatives was to call for regional and local legislation to be brought into line with the Constitution and federal laws. Over the period 2000–3, ‘local procurators disputed about 10,000 illegal acts, of which over 8,000 were harmonized with federal legislation’.62 Of particular intensity was the campaign to bring regional and local normative acts on various aspects of local government up to par with federal legislation. Thus, already in mid-2001, in his report to the Russian President (‘On Violations of Federal Legislation Concerning Local Self-Government’), the Procurator General of the Russian Federation noted ‘that governments of regions and republics infringe on the competence of local governments, illegally delegate to local bodies their powers as well as powers of the federal government, and promulgate laws that contradict federal legislation’.63 In particular, it was stressed that, regional administrations ‘illegally assumed jurisdiction over local issues, disposed of local budget revenues, and included in the budgets of subjects of the federation, revenues generated through selling and renting municipal property’.64 By 2003: over 55,000 normative acts of municipal entities (including their charters) were harmonized with federal legislation. Of this number, almost 13,000

24

Russian federalism and local politics were harmonized on the basis of representations of procurators, about 39,000 on the basis of protests by public procurators, and some 3,000 on the basis of applications to the courts.65

In a number of cases, the harmonization of laws has had a positive impact on the development of democracy. Thus, for example, as Hahn demonstrates, ‘In many regions, especially in the national republics, regional chief executives were forced to give up their power to appoint city and district administrative heads after courts upheld prosecutor’s protests that this practices was unconstitutional.’66 Nonetheless, despite these achievements many republics continue to adopt legislation that violates federal laws, and the constitutional powers of local governments continue to be infringed. To a large degree, decisions over which powers are granted to a specific region or local body of power remain highly politicized, and depend on the political and economic status of the region in question. In December 2001, 72 per cent of Bashkortostan’s laws still violated federal norms, a figure that was actually higher than it was at the beginning of Putin’s reforms in May 2000. The Tatarstan leadership has also steadfastly refused to renounce the republic’s sovereignty. Article 1 of the republic’s revised constitution, which was adopted in April 2002, continues to uphold the 1994 bilateral treaty with Moscow, even though it contradicts both the federal and republican constitutions in several places. The constitution also reiterates the republic’s citizenship rights. Moreover, in 2007 Tatarstan ratified a new bilateral treaty with Moscow, which grants it considerable autonomous powers, many of which continue to contradict the Russian Constitution and federal law. The merger of federal subjects New legislation was adopted in 2001 to promote the merger of federal subjects. As Chebankova notes, five such mergers involving six regions had taken place by March 2007, reducing the number of federal subjects from 89 to 83. These mergers ‘have been imposed by the federal centre top-down often against the background of ethnic resistance, and mostly in accordance with the interests of ruling elites’.67 Thus, for example, ‘The refusal of governors Alexy Barinov and Vladimir Loginov of Yamalo-Nenetsk and Koryak Autonomous Okrugs respectively to support the merger of their regions with neighbouring territories led … to their dismissal’ and the subsequent launch of criminal proceedings against them.68 There are real fears that these mergers will lead to the ‘gubernization’ of Russia, and that the remaining ethnic republics and autonomies will be swallowed up by the territorially defined regions. There is also evidence that Putin’s merger policy has sharpened ethnic tensions across the Federation, ‘opening up a Pandora’s box of ethnic and territorial disputes’.69 Although there has been consensus over the merger of Komi-Permyak Autonomous Oblast with Perm Oblast, and also the merger of Taimyr and Yevenk autonomous oblasts with Krasnoyarsk Krai,70 there has been much more opposition from ethnic Adygs to the proposed unification of Adygeya with Krasnodar Krai. Ethnic conflicts have also suffered over the

Russian federalism and local politics 25 redrawing of municipal boundaries in conformity with the new provisions of the 2003 Law (see Chapter 5).71 Deconcentration of powers to governors According to Heinemann-Grüder, the Kozak reforms have led to a more ‘unified’, ‘systematized’ but also ‘centralized’ system of intergovernmental relations. Whereas the federal government was granted approximately ‘700 areas of responsibility’, the regions retained just 50.72 However, at a meeting of the State Council in July 2005, Putin promised that that 114 powers of the federal government were to be given back to the federal subjects, in the areas of: forestry, water resources, environmental protection, veterinary services, licensing, protection of historical and cultural monuments, education, science, land use and housing legislation, including the governors’ rights to supervise the heads of the power ministries, Ministry of Interior, Emergencies, and Justice (although not security bodies or the procuracy) in their respective regions.73 In his speech to the Federal Assembly in April 2007, Putin reported that in 2006 ‘important powers in the areas of urban development, forestry management, land and water relations, wildlife protection, and employment’74 had been transferred to the jurisdiction of regional authorities. Many commentators hailed these moves as an indication that Putin was reversing his centralizing policies in favour of a new programme of devolution. However, such developments should more rightly be viewed as a process of deconcentration of duties rather than a devolution of powers. As Clark notes, ‘Decentralization occurs when local governments have both resources and the authority to use these resources. Deconcentration indicates that resources are devolved to the localities from the centre but their use is still under central direction.’75 For Rosenbaum, ‘real decentralization involves the devolution of both responsibilities and resources to relatively independent and autonomous subnational authorities that are accountable not to any central national leadership of the country but to the citizens of the region and/or community’.76 Now that Putin appoints the regional and republican heads of government, he is quite happy to return administrative control over these policy areas to the regional administrations.

Conclusion In his Address to the Federal Assembly in March 2007, Putin declared that: greater powers for regional and local authorities constitute one of the main criteria for measuring a society’s degree of political culture and development. Decentralization of state power in Russia is now at a higher point today than at any other time in our country’s history.77

26

Russian federalism and local politics

However, the actual record of his regime tells a very different story. For many observers, far from promoting decentralization, Putin is recreating all the trappings of a fully-fledged authoritarian and unitary state. The President’s initial reorganization of the Federation Council, his usurpation of unilateral powers to dismiss regional assemblies and chief executives, and his creation of seven unelected supergovernors, have all been major set-backs for Russian federalism, as have been his more recent centralizing policy initiatives, initiated in the aftermath of the Beslan hostage tragedy. Governors no longer have the right to sit in the upper chamber of the Federal Assembly, which violates one of the key prerequisites for a federation, namely what Preston King calls ‘the legislative entrenchment’ of federal subjects in central decision-making.78 Putin has created a much more compliant and passive upper chamber, which is no longer able to act as a forum for the representation of regional interests. In December 2006, 112 of the 178 members of the Federation Council were members of United Russia. These changes, as Zubkov notes, ‘signaled the decline of the upper chamber as an authoritative representative body capable of voicing concerns, attitudes and interests of regions first hand and of lobbying for them effectively’.79 As Slider notes: Putin’s new system, if carried to its logical conclusion, would eliminate all elections for executive posts below that of Russian president, including those not just for governors, but also for mayors and other municipal leaders. Putin would appoint governors, and governors would appoint mayors and lowerlevel officials. Ultimately, the result would be a system under which the only elections would be for president, the Duma, regional legislatures, and municipal councils.80 Federalism and democratization While acknowledging that not all federal states are democratic, scholars of federalism nonetheless stress the positive relationship between federalism and democracy. As Watts notes: Significant characteristics of federal processes include a strong predisposition to democracy since they presume the voluntary consent of citizens in the constituent units, non-centralization as a principle expressed through multiple centres of political decision making, open political bargaining as a major feature of the way in which decisions are arrived at, the operation of checks and balances to avoid the concentration of political power, and a respect for constitutionalism since each order of government derives its authority from the constitution.81 For Kempton: At a minimum, by institutionalizing competing groups of political elites

Russian federalism and local politics 27 and dividing power between them, federalism makes tyranny more difficult. But even more than this, federalism admits the legitimacy of conflicting interests and commits all sides to peaceful accommodation. In short, it accepts pluralism and breeds tolerance for diverse interests that are core requirements for the sustenance of democracy. It also creates a second level for citizen participation in governance.82 However, as I have argued elsewhere, the Russian Federation’s unique blend of constitutional, socio-economic and political asymmetry, far from promoting democracy, has bolstered authoritarian regimes in the regions.83 Federalism and democracy in Russia have been thwarted by the weakness of Russia’s civic culture and the lack of a federal and democratic tradition. High levels of regional autonomy, particularly in the ethnic republics have led local elites to embrace dictatorship rather than democracy. Moreover, in federations, in contrast to unitary states, regional autonomy is not only devolved but also constitutionally guaranteed. But Putin’s reforms have been driving the state towards the reinstitution of Sovietstyle principles of hierarchy and centralized administrative control from Moscow. As Elazar stresses: Noncentralization ensures that no matter how certain powers may be shared by the general and constituent governments at any particular time, the authority to participate in exercising them cannot be taken away from either without their mutual consent.84 Behind the formal veneer of democracy and constitutionalism, federal and political relations in Russia are dominated by informal, clientelistic and extra-constitutional practices (see Chapter 10). Under Putin, we have witnessed the creation of a political system that is ‘federalist in form [but] unitary in content’85 and, the statist concept of local self-government is once again the dominant principle governing central–local relations.

3

Local government in the USSR

Local democracy in the USSR was a sham. Before Gorbachev’s radical overhaul of the Soviet political system in the late 1980s, local governments (‘local soviets’)1 were firmly under the diktat of party and state bodies. As Campbell notes: ‘The system was designed to ensure party control whilst maintaining a democratic façade.’2 Moreover, while the USSR was, in theory, a federation, in practice it was a highly centralized system, which operated under a vertical chain of administrative command. As Smith notes, while the soviets were viewed: by early Bolshevik theorists as the political institution through which the local community would participate in the running of its affairs (as captured in the Bolshevik slogan, ‘All power to the Soviets’), such a system quickly became contrary to the requirements of the Stalinist State, which needed a highly centralized system and an obedient urban citizenry in order to plan and execute the country’s transformation into a powerful urban-industrial machine.3 The Soviet administrative hierarchy, as Campbell notes: consisted of three parallel hierarchies: the representatives of legislative councils (soviets), the executive organs (which were nominally subordinate to the soviets at each level), and the communist party. At each administrative level (union, republic, province, city, district, and so on) there was a soviet, an executive committee and a party organization.4 The work of the executive committees was guided by the principle of ‘democratic centralism’, whereby all organs of state power and state administration formed a single system and operated on the basis of subordinating lower organs to leadership and control by higher organs. This was significantly reinforced by the principle of ‘dual subordination’, whereby, according to Article 150 of the 1977 USSR Constitution, each executive committee was directly accountable both to the council electing it and to higher executive and administrative bodies.5 Both principles of Soviet administration were deliberately designed to ensure high levels of centralization of decision-making within Soviet bureaucracies.6 Moreover, as Reynolds observes:

Local government in the USSR 29 Soviet concepts of state structure explicitly rejected a need for strict legal separation between the authorities and jurisdictions of various levels of state power, as it also rejected concepts of the separation of powers. Such divisions were, according to theory, necessary only in bourgeois states in which the bodies of government did not represent all of the people. By contrast, the Soviet socialist state was said to be the one in which all of the bodies of the state worked cooperatively as representatives of all of the people – a single, organic whole that was often discussed in the legal literature in terms appropriate for a living creature.7

Local councils (‘sovety’) In 1982, 2.3 million deputies were elected to 52,000 local councils (at regional, city and district levels). At city level, 252,335 deputies were elected to 2,059 councils averaging 137 deputies per assembly.8 According to Article 95 of the USSR Constitution, deputies were ‘elected on the basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage by secret ballot’. Elections for city councils took place every two and a half years. However, up until 1990 only the Communist Party could contest these elections, and there were no competing candidates.9 The Party selected the single candidate who stood unopposed in each constituency. As Smith notes: ‘Because citizens had a duty to vote and well over 90 per cent of the local electorate regularly turned out to do so … local election day itself was little more than a ritualized occasion for registering the supposed unity of the party-state and its citizenry.’10

Local executive committees (‘ispol’komy’) At each hierarchical level, the chairs and members of the executive committees were, in theory, elected by, and accountable to, the councils. Thus, according to Article 150 of the 1977 USSR Constitution: ‘Executive committees of local Soviets of People’s Deputies shall be directly accountable both to the council that elected them and to their executive administrative body.’11 But, the councils’ rights to elect their executive committees was also a sham. The party’s powers of appointment (nomenklatura) over all key posts meant that, in practice, city executive committees were nominated by party officials at the regional (oblast) level (or higher), and then rubber stamped by deputies of the city council. Moreover, as Hahn notes: Over the years, the deputies’ authority had been largely reduced to ritualistic ratification of decisions already prepared in advance by members of the state and party professional – the apparat. Virtually all decisions were taken unanimously and what deputy participation did take place was carefully choreographed by the organizational-instructional department of the executive committee.12 Members of the executive ‘decided when to convene sessions of the soviets and which issues to introduce; they prepared the reports and the draft legislation; they

30

Local government in the USSR

established the list of speakers and even edited their speeches.’13 The executive committees also played a key role ‘in the choice of candidates for deputy, and in the formation of the bodies of the soviets’.14 As Gorbachev noted in a speech to the 19th CPSU Party Conference in 1988: I sat on ispolkoms for many years – for nine years as First Secretary of the Stavropol’ Regional Party Committee – and before that, being a city party (gorkom) secretary, I sat on the city soviet. So I know from the inside what it is like. The ispolkom schedules sessions. It determines the agenda. It does not matter whether a particular question is necessary or whether it is knocking on the door: the ispolkom raises it when it is convenient for it to do so. The entire apparatus is under the ispolkom, and the executive administrations are under the ispolkom.15 The ability of the deputies to bring the executive to account was also weakened by the fact that an overwhelming majority of them were only part-time politicians who had to combine their employment activities with their duties as deputies. Moreover, the local councils met in session only four times a year, each session lasting no longer than a day at the most. The councils were also very large and unwieldy organizations. Many of the city councils had over 100 members, while in Moscow and St Petersburg there were 400–500 deputies. The dominance of the councils by their executive bodies was graphically illustrated by a report in Izvestiya, which noted that voting typically followed the following pattern: ‘All those in favour? Please lower your hands. Opposed? None. Abstentions? None. Adopted unanimously.’16 Executive committees and local councils were themselves dominated by party bodies at every level. Thus, while in theory the executive committee alone had the constitutional right ‘to make decisions … binding on all enterprises, institutions and organizations located within a given territory, as well as officials and citizens’,17 in practice the top position, for instance in a city, was held not by the chair of the city executive committee, but rather by the first party secretary of the city party committee (gorkom). Moreover, while party bodies were theoretically meant to provide only ideological guidance, and were expressly prohibited from directly interfering in the work of local councils, in practice party substitution (podmena) of local soviets was widespread. Thus, for example, ‘more than half of the questions and proposals examined by the Moscow city party committee in 1985 … were within the purview of the city soviet.’18 Heads of local administrations were given their orders not only from higherlevel state bodies but also by party officials at the local level and above. Not uncommonly, party officials would bypass the heads of local executive committees and give their orders directly to lower level local government officials. Thus, as a Communist Party Central Committee Resolution warned in 1971: In the practice of the district and city Party committees, there are still a good many instances of petty tutelage over the soviets and usurpation of their

Local government in the USSR 31 functions, as well as the adoption of Party decisions on questions that fall wholly within the jurisdiction of the soviets.19 This domination of party and state bodies over local administrations was clearly stated in the Thesis of the 19th Party Conference adopted in 1988: As a result of certain distortions, the rights and powers of representative organs have been curtailed and unwarranted tutelage of them by party committees persists. In many cases, ministries and departments go over their heads in resolving questions of economic and social development. Ispolkoms and their apparatus often usurp the functions of the soviets, leaving deputies merely to sanction questions, which in fact have been decided in advance.20 The party also made extensive use of its considerable powers of appointment (nomenklatura). Regional party organizations, for example, would play leading roles in appointing and dismissing key members of city administrations, including the chairs of executive committees. As Table 3.1 shows, the Communist Party and its youth-wing, the Komsomol, dominated city councils and their executive committees. There were also interlocking career structures for party and state functionaries, with officials regularly moving from one administrative hierarchy to another. Thus, for example, in their study of 12 cities, Yermolaeva and Khristoforova found that more than 40 per cent of members of ispolkomy had previously worked in the party apparat, and more than 33 per cent in Komsomol and Trade Union organs. In their turn, many chairs of ispolkomy comprised the basic reserve for the posts of first party secretary of city and district (raion) party committee.21 In addition, a number of key individuals held dual membership in the top party and soviet organs. Thus, for example, heads of city executive committees would usually be members of city party committees. Likewise, the first secretaries of city party committees would normally also be members of city executive committees. Such dual membership of party and state bodies allowed the party to exercise direct control over the work of the executive committees. In addition ‘the departments of a local party secretariat corresponded to the various departments in the ispolkom, allowing the party to observe and supervise the day-to-day work of the soviets.’22 The ceremonial and symbolic role of chief executives as the personal embodiment Table 3.1 Communist Party and Komsomol membership of city councils and their executive committees, elected in 1982 Members

City Councils (%)

Executive Committees (%)

Party

46.3

89.4

Komsomol Total

23.7 70.0

6.0 95.4

Source: Cameron Ross, Local Government in the Soviet Union. London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1987, p. 32.

32

Local government in the USSR

of their localities was weak or non-existent during the Soviet era. Top party and state officials were deliberately moved from one region to another in order to prevent them from ‘going native’. Chairs of city executive committees had little personal bonds of solidarity and loyalty with their cities. Leaders of local party and state bodies were viewed by their citizens more as enforcers of central power than defenders of local interests, and there was widespread citizen distrust of all state and public bodies.

Local soviets and state enterprises According to Article 146 of the 1977 Constitution: Local Soviets of People’s Deputies shall direct state, economic, social and cultural development within their territory; endorse plans for economic and social development and the local budget; exercise general guidance over state bodies, enterprises, institutions, and organizations subordinate to them; ensure observance of the laws, maintenance of law and order, and protection of citizens’ rights; and help strengthen the country’s defence capacity.23 Moreover, Article 147 states that: Within their powers, local Soviets of People’s Deputies shall ensure the comprehensive, all-round economic and social development of their areas; exercise control over the observance of legislation by enterprises, institutions, and organizations subordinate to higher authorities and located in their area; and coordinate and supervise their activity as regards land use, nature conservations, building, employment of manpower, production of consumer goods; and social, cultural, communal, and other services and amenities for the public.24 Article 148 declares that the decisions of local soviets ‘shall be binding on all enterprises, institutions, and organizations located in their areas and on officials and citizens’.25 However, despite these impressive constitutional powers, local executive committees were no match for the directors of the factories situated on their territories. In particular, those factories that were directly subordinate to powerful ministries in Moscow were given carte blanche to develop their enterprises as they pleased. In the triangular relationship between party committees, local governments and enterprises, as Morton observes: ‘The party has the political power, the city has the legal power, but the enterprises often are mightier because they have the economic and financial clout.’26 The power relations between party officials and enterprise directors is well illustrated in a Russian novel (V. Dudinstev, Ne Khlebom Edinym), where the director of a large factory boasts to his wife that he has nothing to fear from the local first party secretary of the district party committee: ‘He is afraid to fight, for he would not be able to take me on. His district is a poor one … all its

Local government in the USSR 33 27

economic base is in my hands.’ Although formally it was the chair of the city executive committee who was considered to be the most powerful individual, in actual practice it was the first party secretary, or at times the director of the most powerful enterprise, who had the dominant voice in local decision-making. Local party and local government bodies often could not stand up to the heads of ministries in Moscow, whose prime concern was the expansion of their industrial empires and the fulfilment of national economic plans.28 Enterprises not only provided employment but also a host of other services and amenities, such as the provision of housing, clinics, kindergartens, recreation facilities and other important elements of the city infrastructure. In the mid-1970s ministries ‘still accounted for 70 per cent of all appropriations for housing construction, 65 per cent for building kindergartens and day cay centres, and 30 per cent for constructing hospitals and clinics.’29 As Whitefield notes, ‘Government policy from as early as the mid-1940s, formally favoured the transfer of housing in the state sector to the hands of a single master, the local soviet.’ However, ‘in the USSR in 1985, of the 72 per cent of housing in the state sector, ministries owned 46 per cent compared with only 26 per cent owned by the local soviets. In the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic] as a whole, 43.9 per cent of housing was in ministerial hands.’30 By 1991: some thirty-two million workers lived in enterprise-owned housing, thirty million used enterprise-owned polyclinics and hospitals, ten million used such cultural and sports facilities, five million of their children were schooled in enterprise-owned kindergartens, and 1.5 million of their children went to recreation camps owned by enterprises.31 The powers of enterprises were greatest in what Morton classified as ‘the enterprise city’, which was a company-town writ large. Here, ‘one or several factories belonging to industrial ministries’ provided the finance for all municipal services and ‘the city executive and its departments served primarily as the administrative arms of the enterprises’. City budgets in these cities were ‘directly dependent on enterprises’.32 In most cases, directors of enterprises, and particularly those belonging to the all-Union Ministries in Moscow, had little concern for the overall welfare of the cities in which they were located. Indeed, most Soviet cities were planned to meet the interests of their enterprises rather than their citizens. Factory directors of large companies would take their orders directly from Moscow ministerial bosses rather than city governments. Gorbachev stressed the massive powers of the state bureaucracy in his opening speech to the nineteenth CPSU Party Conference in 1988. During the Brezhnev period (1964–82), he noted: The administrative apparatus proliferated to almost 100 union ministries and departments and 800 republican ones, and in effect began dictating its will with regard to both the economy and to policy. It was the departments and other administrative structures that had the responsibility of executing the decisions

34

Local government in the USSR that had been made. It was their action or inaction that determined what should happen or not happen. The soviets and in many respects the party bodies, found themselves unable to control the pressure of departmental interests.33

State enterprises and local budgets The industrial base of a city (i.e. the number and type of enterprises) was also very important for its economic well-being. As Belopukhov points out: The size of appropriations for the development of the municipal economy and the volume of services offered in a given city depend not on the population or the level of development of the region’s productive forces but only on the level of development of the industrial production facilities within the jurisdiction of the city executive committees.34 In each city there were many enterprises of different administrative subordination. In any one area there were wide variations in the number of enterprises subordinate to local governments, and those under the jurisdiction of higher administrative levels. For instance in a large city there were enterprises of All-Union, UnionRepublic, Republic, oblast and city subordination. There were also differences in their type and size; in resources (i.e. manpower, land and raw materials) and in the taxes they paid into the local budget. Cities with many enterprises under their jurisdiction and a strong industrial base had good independent sources of income and thus better opportunities to provide their inhabitants with social and cultural facilities; but cities with a large number of enterprises of higher subordination and a poor local industrial base, consequently had a much poorer independent income base. Thus, many local councils had to rely on the goodwill of enterprises of higher subordination for funds to provide their citizens with social and cultural amenities. Here we need to stress the importance of ‘off-budget’ funds. These are funds that were channelled not through the state budget, but rather through the ministries and enterprises in the form of social and cultural funds, incentive funds and others, for the construction of housing, polyclinics, kindergartens, clubs, and so on. Thus, while in 1965, 66 per cent of investment flowed through the state budget, this had dropped to only 40.8 per cent in 1976, with the remainder of the funds distributed through the ministerial channel. The importance of off-budget funds is clearly illustrated, for example, in the city of Bratsk, where the annual budget in the 1970s totalled approximately 21 million roubles, while enterprises in the city regularly spent five times that amount on capital construction and municipal services.35

Local budget revenues The basic income structure of local soviets in the USSR consisted of two major parts: secured income and regulated income. ‘Secured income’ was primarily made up of the profits of those enterprises that were under the local councils’ direct

Local government in the USSR 35 subordination, as well as other local taxes and duties. Local governments had a good deal of local control over these payments and some incentives to increase this income source. ‘Regulated income’ by contrast consisted of federal revenues handed down to cities as a percentage of those taxes collected in their territories. Turnover taxes and income tax, as well as (in some republics) profits of enterprises of republic subordination, made up the basic sources of these centralized sums. In 1977, the regulated income of cities in the USSR comprised 75.2 per cent of total revenues (including grants and sources from higher budgets). In cities of regional subordination the figure reached 77.1 per cent, while for districts (raiony) it was even higher at 88.1 per cent.36 However, there were tremendous variations across the Union in the levels of the secured income, and the most important variable explaining such variations was the industrial base of the cities. Thus, for example, variations in the secured income of local budgets ranged from as low as 7.9 per cent in Yakutsk to 67.5 per cent in Moscow City.37 These wide variations in the economic base of local governments are still prevalent today (see Chapters 6 and 7).

The 1971 legislation on local government A major problem for local governments was the problem of harmonizing branch and territorial planning. Local governments found it almost impossible to inject horizontal planning into the vertically dominated system. It was often an impossible task for local governments to coordinate and control the work of the scores of factories in their territories. As Taubman notes: Local institutions – industrial, soviet, Party – have different stakes in urban development. Higher authorities have their own stakes as well. The result is competition within an overall hierarchical framework. The result … is that city planning is a political process in which many municipal planners can effectively influence neither the non-city sector nor, as is often the case, their own.38 Moreover: severe compartmentalization and extreme centralization accentuate competition; attached to separate subhierarchies, soviet and non-soviet agencies have a minimum of formal contact. Even when the two want to coordinate planning, the budget-plan drafting process makes it difficult for them to do so.39 In 1971, a number of key Resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee and the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers were adopted that granted city executives new rights of control over the work of the enterprises situated on their territories.40 City administrations were now called upon to ‘coordinate and control’, within the bounds of their competence, the work of all enterprises and organizations regardless of their departmental subordination ‘in the areas of housing, social and

36

Local government in the USSR

cultural facilities, health, education, public amenities and other services to the population’.41 The legislation also called for the transfer of the enterprises’ housing stock to the jurisdiction of the soviets, and granted them the right to act as the principal client for all housing construction in their cities. The legislation marked the realization by the leadership of the need to introduce horizontal planning into the system in order to provide a more rational and balanced distribution of resources across the country. The 1971 legislation also granted local governments fairly explicit rights over the utilization of land. Article 7(2) of the Presidium decree enabled them to examine: ‘plans for the siting, development and specialization of enterprises of local industry, everyday services, trade and public catering and of organizations and institutions of culture, public education and public health of higher subordination’.42 Furthermore, the article stated that with regard to enterprises of higher subordination, plans for the expansion and construction of new enterprises had to be placed before the local governments for their consideration and proposals. Article 7(14) gave local administrations the right to grant and withdraw ‘the use of tracts of land’ and to exercise supervision ‘over the utilization of land’.43 However, the 1971 legislation failed to live up to its expectations, and many of the rights given to cities in 1971 were never implemented. The main reason for this was that the local administrations were unable to employ sanctions against enterprises and organizations on whom they relied for a significant part of their revenues; and they had few economic sanctions at their disposal. Neither the party nor state bodies could control the activities of the enterprises in their territories, which led to the unplanned growth of cities and to major discrepancies in the provisions of housing and other public amenities within cities. There was also a chronic duplication and wastage of local resources as each enterprise pursued its own selfish interests with little or no concern for the overall development of the cities in which they were situated. The dispersal of funds through hundreds of ministries and thousands of enterprises accelerated the uncoordinated growth of cities and placed an intolerable burden on the local administrations to provide their new inhabitants with the necessary communal facilities and local infrastructure. As Morton notes: Ministries and plants literally tore cities to pieces. Each one attempting by all means fair and foul to build ‘its own’ housing right next to the plant, create at any price ‘its own’ private workers’ community near the plant with ‘its own’ water supply, sewerage, steam plant…in short to do everything for itself and give nothing to the city.44 The basic task of the administrations was to try to coordinate and control the activities of these various enterprises and to plan for the integrated development of their territories as a whole. In general, however, the enterprises were concerned only with fulfilling their production plans and keeping their own workforce happy, and not with the well-being of workers outside their factory gates. Moreover, the lack of coordination between various branches of the economy and the separation

Local government in the USSR 37 of the planning of industrial zones and the communal sector rendered these rights useless. For example, as the chairman of Surgut City Executive Committee complained: It is common knowledge that no department has the right to build on a city’s territory without the permission of the soviet executive committee. Unfortunately, this rule is still broken frequently. The petroleum and construction workers of Surgut and Nizhnevartovsk, by-passing the Soviets are putting up production installations in future housing tracts.45 The unplanned development of enterprises was clearly seen in the inadequacies of General Plans. These were long-term plans for construction in cities covering 25–30 years, usually worked out by the Committee for Civil Construction attached to Gosstroi USSR. Thus, for example, in Volgograd 79 new enterprises not envisaged in the General Plan of the city were sited there. Unlike residential buildings, which were planned by the State Committee for Civil Construction and Architecture, and the Union-Republic State Construction Committee, production facilities were the province of 700 institutes under dozens of ministries and departments.46 The lack of coordination of construction in Saratov was so bad that, ‘it reminded one of a layer cake. Industrial buildings alternated with houses’.47 The reason for this was that: ‘in erecting its enterprises each of the ministries was only concerned with its own interests, creating a “city within a city”.’48 The basic problem, according to Libkind, was that: the composition and spatial organization of the industrial zones’ were not taken into account when urban ensembles were created. The city executive committee, having no uniform planning documents for such zones, was ‘compelled to agree to the piecemeal siting of enterprises … giving rise to a patchwork arrangement.49 Of the chief architects and their staffs, whose function it was to conduct the implementation of the general plans, they ‘could not influence the pace and quality of industrial build-up. Their authority extended only to the factory gates.’50 The expansion of enterprises placed greater demands on the city for housing, labour, energy, water and other raw materials. Often no account was taken of the new expenditure imposed on a city for such increases in supplies of water lines, sewage pipes, electricity, gas and heating installations, and for the great outlays on road and street maintenance and other parts of the infrastructure. Enterprises seeking to expand their facilities in cities often promised to help with the provision of such social and culture buildings and networks, only to break these promises once they had completed the initial outlay on the production facilities. Thus, local administrations had little success in their attempt to control land use. Departments anxious to save money sited their enterprises in large cities where they could plug into existing utility lines (water, sewage, electricity and transport). Local governments, dependent on those enterprises for funds, soon found that they were

38

Local government in the USSR

paying out large sums for these additional services, making null and void the revenues they had hoped to gain. Writing about the powerlessness of local governments in Tyumen’ Oblast, a reporter from Pravda observed that, while the local administrations cannot cope with departmental narrow-mindedness, the Party agencies have to a greater extent taken on the role of coordinators, ‘but even they have neither the authority nor the capability to solve large-scale inter-branch problems’.51 While they may appeal to their superiors, the slowness of the bureaucratic system allows the ministries and, through them, the enterprises to dominate the development of local economies.52

The Gorbachev reforms of the late-1980s In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev was elected head of the Communist Party, with a mandate to lead the USSR out of its economic and political stagnation. Much of the impetus for the reform of local government initially sprung from Gorbachev’s policies of economic decentralization, which by 1990–1 had turned into demands for political decentralization and outright secession by an ever-growing number of ethnic republics. In the summer of 1990, Russia made its historical declaration of sovereignty, spurring many of the other ethnic republics to follow suit. Competitive elections in 1989 for a new national parliament (the Congress of People’s Deputies) and then in 1990 for republican and local parliaments resulted in a dramatic loss of power for the Communist Party. The repeal of Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution in April 1990 also spurred on the development of grass-roots political movements, and opposition parties were able contest and capture control of local councils throughout the Union. Gorbachev’s primary aims were to decentralize power from the ministries in Moscow and give enterprises greater rights and responsibilities over their own affairs. However, Gorbachev soon realized that restructuring the economy would be impossible without political reforms. In order to meet the challenge of hardline party officials and state bureaucrats, who saw his economic reforms as a fundamental assault on their powers and privileges, Gorbachev called for a radical decentralization and transfer of economic power from the ministries in Moscow to the enterprises, coupled with a shift of power from the party to the state. As Hahn notes, Gorbachev’s reforms were primarily intended ‘to shift the existing imbalance of power away from the party and … executive branch in favour of the soviets, both nationally and locally’.53 Gorbachev was highly critical of the rigid centralization of the Soviet administrative system, declaring at the 19th Party Conference in 1988, that ‘democratic centralism’ had long ago lost any vestiges of democracy and in practice was better described as ‘bureaucratic centralism’.54 In his opening speech to the 19th Party Conference in 1988, Gorbachev put forward a set of policies that set the stage for a radical programme of decentralization and democratization of both party and state bodies: ‘Life is setting before us in all its urgency the task of resurrecting the plenipotentiary authority of the soviets of peoples’ deputies, and we cannot get

Local government in the USSR 39 away with half measures here. We must have a comprehensive approach to the problem and find a radical solution to it … . Not a single state, economic, or social question can be solved by bypassing the soviets. The party’s policy – economic, social, national – must be conducted first and foremost via the soviets of people’s deputies as the organs of people’s power.’55 Furthermore, the Thesis to the 19th Party Conference stated that: ‘The main direction of the democratization of our society and state is to fully restore the role and powers of soviets of people’s deputies as sovereign organs of popular representation.’56 In addition to competitive elections, Gorbachev called for the terms of the local soviets to be doubled to five years. Provision was also to be made, for the first time, for the release of ‘a percentage of deputies from their official or production duties for their work in the soviets’ and ‘the glasnost (openness) of the activity of the soviets’ was to be ‘expanded as much as possible’ so that sessions would henceforth be ‘freely accessible to citizens and representatives of the mass media’.57 For the first time, there was to be a real separation of powers between the executive and legislative bodies. With the exception of the chairs of executive committees, members of the executive could no longer be elected deputies of local assemblies. As Gorbachev noted at the 19th Party Congress, when administrators are also deputies ‘they meet and give themselves instructions, seeing to it that these instructions are as weak and as few as possible’.58 Moreover, the conference also endorsed Gorbachev’s recommendations that ‘at sessions during which executive committees are elected and at which heads of departments and administrations are confirmed, the nomination of alternative candidates, secret ballots, competition, and other democratic procedures should be the rule.’59 Gorbachev also called for the creation of new smaller presidia to be made up of deputies elected from the councils.60 These smaller bodies, which would sit in continuous session, would be able to act as a much more powerful legislative check on local administrations. In a number of cases, local councils even went so far as to abolish their executive committees and transfer their powers to the presidia.61 However, Gorbachev also advised that local party secretaries should be elected as chairmen of the presidia. The chairs would: head the soviet and its presidium, and properly organize the work of the soviet sessions and permanent deputy commissions and thus influence all matters, and keep under daily control the activities of the ispolkomy and its services. The main thing which will be demanded of the chairman is to be the generator of ideas, to constantly provide the necessary impetus for the entire work of the soviet and its deputies.62 As Porter and Young note, ‘in short, Gorbachev proposed to strengthen local soviets by strengthening the party’s leadership’. Although, party secretaries would also now be subject ‘to direct public pressure and public ballots … when they wore their alternative hat as chairman of the presidium’.63

40

Local government in the USSR

Gorbachev’s call for multi-candidate elections to national and local bodies can be seen as an attempt to flush out intransigent opponents of his reform agenda, and to gain the support of the rank and file members of the party and state. As Hahn notes: ‘the choice of the soviets as the focus of political reform makes sense if one bears in mind that it is within the administration of government from top to bottom that bureaucratic resistance to perestroika is rooted’.64 One of the amendments made to the Soviet Constitution (Article 91) was a limit to the number of terms for which deputies could be re-elected: ‘The previous absence of any limit had given members of the bureaucracy the Soviet equivalent of life tenure.’65 The transfer of power from the party to the state was also ‘clearly intended to weaken the central party apparatus.66 Indeed, as Hahn argues: [in] placing reform of government at the top of the agenda, Gorbachev and his colleagues were moved not so much by commitment to democracy, at least in the short run, as by the wish to replace those members of the state bureaucracy and party apparatus who oppose perestroika with those who favour it.67 As Theen notes: ‘Having evidently concluded that the CPSU had lost its role as the political vanguard of society and its living link with the masses’, Gorbachev, in the summer of 1989, transferred a substantial part of the decision-making power of the supreme party organs to the USSR Supreme Soviet. Addressing a Central Committee Conference of party leaders in July 1989, he declared the shift of power from the party to the soviets to be ‘non-negotiable’. ‘The old practice of party diktat over the soviets at every level’, he said, ‘is completely obsolete’, and ‘unacceptable’. ‘Certain comrades’, he noted, ‘seem to regard the transfer of power to the soviets as virtually the end of the universe. But if this is the end, comrades, it is only the end of a deformed universe.’68 New economic powers Local governments were also granted new economic powers. Thus, as Gorbachev in his opening speech to the 19th Party Conference stressed: The soviets must have solid sources for their incomes, based on long-term norms, including income from all enterprises located in their territories, and they must accumulate the means to implement large-scale tasks. They must also have the capability they need to take in money from the people with the aim of solving questions of social, cultural and consumer development, which are general for the inhabitants of this or that town, raion or settlement. The handover to the jurisdiction of local soviets of enterprises whose output is connected with satisfying the people’s demands must be intensified, as must giving them the possibility of placing orders with enterprises subordinate to higher organizations.69 Moreover, there was to be an end to party interference in the work of state and

Local government in the USSR 41 economic bodies, as Gorbachev made clear at the conference, ‘we must exclude the passing of resolutions of party committees containing direct instructions to state and economic bodies and public organizations’,70 and joint resolutions of party committees and executive committees were to cease. The reform of local elections In a pilot scheme conducted in 1987, some raiony were allowed to field more than one candidate per seat in local elections. ‘Altogether 26,000 candidates competed for 4,700 councillor seats in the pilot raions, which made up about 5 per cent of the total number of raions.’71 Important amendments to the Russian Constitution were also adopted on 27 October 1989. Members of executive committees were to be limited to two terms in office, and were no longer permitted to combine their work in the executive with membership of the local councils. Local assemblies were also to be much smaller in size.72 These changes were also reflected in the Law, ‘About the Elections of People’s Deputies of Local Soviets of Peoples’ Deputies of the RSFSR’, of 27 October 1989.73 The new law called for a separation of executive and legislative powers. Deputies were to be elected for five-year terms in open competitive elections. However, it was not until 1990, with the repeal of Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution, that multi-party elections were permitted. As Hahn notes, the ‘introduction of competitive elections at the local level struck at the Achilles’ heel of the “soviet” system, because it ended party control over the political-recruitment and nomination process.’74 Local elections held in March 1990: unleashed an unprecedented political groundswell from the grass roots that would remould the country profoundly. On the republican and regional levels new political elites were swept into the soviets and were prepared to fight for more autonomy, or in some cases (as in the Baltics) for becoming completely independent from the Soviet Union.75 As Porter and Young stress: ‘while many local constituencies were heavily manipulated by the local nomenklatura, particularly in rural areas, urban centres returned larger numbers of often radical, often unpredictable, certainly anti-establishment deputies’.76 In elections to Moscow City Council, ‘Democratic Russia candidates captured a total of 281 seats or more than 60 per cent of those elected’,77 while in Leningrad the Popular Front won two-thirds of the seats on the city council. There was a radicalization of deputies, ‘who now demanded the upper hand over their executives, ignored and attacked local party committees, and launched attacks against large enterprises’.78 By August 1990, panic had set in among conservatives in the party apparatus, as is revealed by a Pravda editorial on the party and soviets. The article began with the familiar Gorbachev line:

42

Local government in the USSR Perestroika has put on the agenda the creation of a new democratic mechanism of interaction based on separating the functions of society’s political vanguard [the CPSU], on the one hand, and power and administration, which are being transferred to the soviets, on the other. The party formulates policy and implements it via the soviets. And this applies not just to the CPSU Central Committee, the Supreme Soviet, and the USSR Council of Ministers, but also to the union republic communist party central committees, and krai, oblast, city and raion soviets.79

But the editorial then went on to state that communist deputies were still subject to party discipline and had a dual responsibility to both party and state. They have a right to express their opinion on the problem being discussed, but when a decision has been made, they must carry it out. Their duty is to adopt the same stance as the Central Committee on questions arising from the party’s political strategy and from the decisions of party organs at the corresponding level and to pursue and implement the party line in the soviet.80 At a session of the CPSU Central Committee in October 1990, one of the delegates, V. S. Lipitskii, complained that the party was no longer the key decision-making body. Local soviets, he argued, were now formulating policy: We now have no real channels for influencing the choice made by our parliamentarians, since because of the peculiar features of our historical situation, in many places, including the centre, the councils are not so much multi-party as non-party. Deputies there do not represent political parties but are elected to the soviets thanks to their personal qualities and feel responsibility only to the voters. I think our party effectively finds itself in the position of constructive opposition.81

The April 1990 and July 1991 laws on local self-government On 9 April 1990, after months of fierce debate, a new law on local self-government was adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet (‘On General Principles of Local SelfGovernment and Local Economy in the USSR’).82 This was the first law in the USSR to use the term ‘local self-government’. As Kourliandskaya et al. note, the law established: legal guarantees that local authorities were autonomous, independent and elected by popular vote; it codified the competence of local soviets and it provided norms for the transfer of communal property to local soviets and the revenue sources of local soviets, including fixed shares of federal tax revenues, and a list of own taxes, levies and duties to be introduced at the discretion of the local soviets.83

Local government in the USSR 43 These were important victories for the advocates of local government, but as Porter and Young note: the hopes that local politicians had entertained for a radical new law which would finally empower local governments were not realized. Instead, the law expressed timidity towards the emergence of local government autonomy, and a proclativity towards maintaining much of the foundation of the Soviet legacy towards local government.84 In rather ambiguous and foggy language, the Law abolished the practice of dual subordination of the executive committees (to their local councils and higher organs of executive power), which was a radical step in the course of dismantling the previous hierarchical system of administration. However, this was to be short lived as on 10 October 1990 the Law, ‘On the Inter-Relations of Soviets of People’s Deputies and their Executive Organs in the Period of Conducting Economic Reforms’,85 effectively restored the status quo and the subordination of local bodies of power to those above them in the Soviet hierarchy. Thus, the vertical hierarchy of power remained intact. Moreover, while deputies to local councils were to be popularly elected, the heads of administration were to be appointed from above. Direct elections for heads of local administrations (mayors) were, however, allowed to take place in the cities of Moscow and Leningrad on June 12 1991. In these, the first-ever popular elections, Anatoly Sobchak was elected Mayor of Leningrad and Yury Popov was elected mayor of Moscow. Both candidates were elected to power on reformist platforms. The RSFSR Law of 6 July 1991 The first law of the Russian Republic on local self-government (No. 1550-I, ‘On Local Self-Government in the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic’) (hereafter, the 1991 Law) was ratified on 6 July 1991.86 As Young and Porter note: The most relevant contribution of the law was the conceptual framework for local self-government. Rather than local organs functioning as agents of state power, the new law promoted local autonomy by establishing a clear distinction between state authority (limited to federal and regional bodies) and local self-government. Proponents of the law considered this measure a foundation for both democratic development and effective local administration. Directly elected mayors would help establish this autonomy, and were thus a fundamental component of the new reform. Yet in practice, these local organs were forced to assume a schizophrenic role as agents of state power and organs of local self-government.87 Article 1 of the Law stipulates:

44

Local government in the USSR Local (territorial) self-government in the RSFSR is a system for the organization of the activity of citizens for the independent resolution (on their own responsibility) of questions of local significance, proceeding from the interests of the population and from its historical, ethnic, and other special characteristics, on the basis of the Constitution of the RSFSR and the laws of the RSFSR and the constitutions and laws of republics within the composition of the RSFSR.88

Local self-government was to be ‘exercised within the boundaries of raions, cities, raions within a city, settlements, villages, and rural population points (Article 2.2).89 Wollmann notes the following positive features of the 1991 Law: 1) Local self government was guaranteed through the ‘general competence clause’ which promised the right of the local population to decide (all) ‘matters of local significance’, 2) the principle of local self-government was applied to ‘districts, towns, town-districts, villages and rural settlements’ (Article 2, Section 2). The districts were explicitly recognized as local self government units, while the regions were no longer considered to be among the local authorities, 3) by assigning long lists of different tasks to the towns, rural localities, and districts, the new law for the first time abandoned the ‘Russian doll principle’, which until that time had been part and parcel of the centralized state.90 The 1991 Law granted local government a significant number of democratic rights. Thus, according to Article 2.1, local self-government was to be ‘exercised by the population through … local councils, corresponding bodies of management – the local administration, local referendums, assemblies of citizens, and other territorial forms of direct democracy, and also bodies of territorial social self-government of the population’.91 Article 6.1 declared that: Citizens shall be guaranteed the entire plenitude of rights to participate in local self-government. No restrictions of any kind on the rights of citizens shall be permitted on the basis of political conviction, racial or ethnic affiliation, social origin, gender, social position, property, language, or attitude toward religion.92 According to Article 11: The council of a raion, city, raion within a city, settlement, or village, shall be elected for a term of five years by secret ballot by citizens residing on the territory – on the basis of a universal, equal and direct electoral right.93

Local government in the USSR 45 Likewise heads of local administrations were to be elected for ‘a period of five years by universal equal and direct elections with secret ballot (Article 30)’.94 The chairs of the local assemblies were to be elected from the deputies to the assemblies by secret ballot. Moreover, while heads of the local administrations were granted the right to veto the legislative acts of the councils, their veto could be overturned by a simple majority of the deputies, who were also granted new rights to express a vote of no confidence in heads of local administrations.95 However, as Gel’man stresses, ‘when it came to local government competence and autonomy’, once again ‘the rudiments of the old Soviet hierarchical system were retained with the right of higher soviets and administrations to abolish the laws of lower bodies (although the lower bodies had the right of appeal these revocations)’.96 Furthermore, the harmonization of the 1991 law with other legislative acts, particularly the Law on the Tax System in the Russian Federation (27 December 1991) eventually diluted the effect of the 1991 Law, limiting the autonomy of local authorities over local revenues. But the 1991 Law, in any case, was never fully realized in practice, as the reform of local government was overtaken by the dramatic events of the August 1991 coup, and the subsequent collapse of the USSR in December. The struggle over the implementation of the law became embroiled and subsumed in the wider political conflict between the union republics and the USSR government. In the wake of the failed coup, the Russian parliament on 1 November 1991 reluctantly agreed to give special powers to Yeltsin, including the right to rule by decree and to appoint and dismiss regional heads of administration. Regional heads were in turn granted similar powers of appointment over the heads of local administrations (with the exception of chiefs of cities of regional subordination, which were directly elected by the President).97 Thus, we had the creation of what is known as ‘the power vertical’ (ispolnitel’naya vertikal). As Babichev notes: ‘such powers of appointment directly contradicted the spirit of the 1991 Law and its proclamation concerning the subordination and accountability of local administrations and their chiefs to their local councils and citizens’.98 In practice, the head of a local administration was now first and foremost a representative of the state in the territory of the local council. On 1 January 1992, a new independent Russian state was created. The first constitutional declaration of the independence of local self-government from the state in post-communist Russia was made in the constitutional reform of 21 April 1992. Deputies to the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet adopted amendments made to the 1978 RSFSR Constitution. Thus, according to Chapter 1, Article 85, there were just two levels of state power, federal and regional. Article 85(2) stated that ‘Local Soviets of Peoples’ Deputies in raions, cities, city districts, settlements – are part of the system of local self-governance’ (emphasis mine), while Article 85(1) noted that ‘representative assemblies of republics, krais, oblasts, autonomous oblasts, autonomous okrugs, and the cities of Moscow and St Petersburg formed a system of representative organs of state power in the Russian Federation’ (emphasis mine).99 These amendments created a dual system of ‘local government’ and ‘local self-government’ in Russia, and paved the way for development of

46

Local government in the USSR

substantial regional variations in the scope and powers of these two forms of local governance in the Yeltsin era (see Chapter 4). Elections for the heads of regional executives, which originally had been scheduled for November 1991, were at first postponed until December 1992 and subsequently for yet another two years (or even longer in some regions). Thus, as Koveshnikov notes: The legal basis of the Russian state at the end of 1991–beginning of 1992 was contradictory. It was based on laws, which were established in the USSR, and laws of the RSFSR when it was part of the Soviet Union. Two contradictory principles existed at this time – on the one hand there was a presidency, a federation, the principle of the separation of powers and the accountability of the state before the people. On the other hand the old system of a strict hierarchy of executive power still operated without any responsibility for its decisions.100 As will be seen in Chapter 4, the powers and status of local self-government also became embroiled in the wider struggle for power between the Russian presidency and the Russian parliament, which eventually led to Yeltsin’s forcible dissolution of the parliament and the soviets in October 1993.

4

Local government reform under Yeltsin

The new Russian Federation, emerging from the ashes of the USSR in January 1992, was immediately beset with multiple political, economic and social problems. The Yeltsin leadership was faced with the daunting task of simultaneously reforming both polity and economy, and there were great fears that the hardships inevitably accompanying economic reform would turn the population against the government. Moreover, after centuries of Tsarist autocracy and seven decades of Communist rule, civil society was weak and inchoate. As Theen notes, although Russia’s history: both Imperial and Soviet is not completely devoid of elements of participatory government, for the most part the regions of Russia were administered not governed – let alone self-governed. In its historical evolution, the Russian Empire moved inexorably towards centralization and bureaucratization.1 With the exception of the Zemstvo system, which provided only a limited form of local representation in the period 1864–1917, Russia had no experience of local self-government.2 During the communist era (1917–91) local government, as discussed in Chapter 3, was part of a highly centralized, authoritarian, and hierarchical system of state administration, which was dominated at every level by the Communist Party. Moreover, as Gel’man notes: In the late Soviet period, informal ties penetrated all levels of government and served as a survival kit in the everyday life of Soviet citizens. Such ties defended ordinary people from the arbitrary state, but they also contributed to a vicious circle of cynicism, clientelism, and corruption … . Thus, both the state and societal prerequisites for local autonomy and local democracy in late-Soviet Russia were limited.3

Parliament versus president In the period from the failed coup of August 1991 to the storming of the White House in October 1993, there was a fierce struggle between the parliament and president. Each side sought to impose their own draft constitution on the country.

48

Local government reform under Yeltsin

The deadlock ended only in October 1993, when Yeltsin sent in the army to close down the Russian parliament and eject the rebel parliamentarians. In the aftermath of what are now known as the ‘October Days’, Yeltsin vilified the local soviets for supporting the national level parliamentarians. In a television address on 7 October 1993, he stated: I especially want to talk about the Soviets. In each of them there are deputies who support the reforms, but regardless of this, the position of the majority of them after September 21 in effect constituted a deliberate justification of all actions taken by the former Supreme Soviet. Moreover, they provoked it and pushed it toward violence, hinting in every way that they would support it. I have no doubt that if the rebels had won, the majority of Soviets would have expressed support for them.4 And in a later passage he stressed: I will say in no uncertain terms that the majority of bodies of Soviet power bear direct responsibility for the extreme aggravation of the situation in Moscow. The system of soviets displayed complete disregard for the security of the state and its citizens, and so the soviets themselves wrote the final chapter of their political life.5 Yeltsin ended his television address with a demand that the soviets be disbanded: ‘I believe that the soviets that took an irreconcilable position should make the dignified and courageous decision to dissolve themselves and leave the stage peacefully and decently, without upheavals and scandals. This is demanded by life itself.’6 In the course of the next three months, a series of presidential resolutions were enacted that abolished local councils and transferred their powers to local administrations. Thus, for example, the Presidential Decree of 9 October 1993, ‘On the Reform of Representative Organs of Power and Organs of Local Self-Government in the Russian Federation’,7 established that the functions of district and settlement level councils were to be taken over by their executive administrations (this was not operative in the ethnic republics). The Presidential Decree of 26 October 1993, ‘On the Reform of Local Self-Government in the Russian Federation’, brought a similar halt to the activities of raion and city councils.8 New elections to much smaller assemblies (with a membership of between 15 and 50 deputies) and weaker bodies of local power were to take place in early 1994.9 Thus, over the period from October 1993 to Spring 1994, local government executives would be given free rein to rule their territories without any legislative check on their activities. Furthermore, local executive bodies were to be appointed rather than elected, and their powers over the newly elected assemblies were to be enhanced. Thus, according to the Presidential Decree of 26 October 1993, it was obligatory to hold elections for heads of administrations only in city and rural settlements where the population numbered less than 50,000. Heads of administrations in municipalities

Local government reform under Yeltsin 49 with over 50,000 inhabitants were to be directly appointed by regional governors and republican presidents.10 The Presidential Decree, ‘On Guaranteeing Local Self-Governance in the Russian Federation’, which was adopted on 22 December 1993, granted further powers to local executives.11 While this decree had the positive feature of outlining procedures for codifying and legalizing municipal property, the most important questions concerning the ratification of local budgets, expenditure and taxation could only now be adopted with the approval of heads of local administrations.12 The decree also granted the heads of administrations the right to chair sessions of local assemblies. Such powers had been prohibited in the 1991 Law, which declared that ‘the head and officials of a local administration may not be deputies’ (Article 92.1).13 Local councils were also deprived of the right (granted in 1991) to veto the acts of the heads of administrations or to express a vote of no confidence in the executive. Across the country regional administrations began the process of dismantling local assemblies. Thus, for example, in Leningrad Oblast, in correspondence with regional legislation adopted on 18 January 1994, district councils and lower level representative bodies (volosty), were abolished. As a result, the 281 local councils with 9,021 deputies in the region on 1 October 1993 had fallen to 59 councils with 319 deputies by the beginning of 1995. In addition, the heads of district and city administrations were appointed and dismissed by the regional governor. This Leningrad pattern of local government was duplicated across the Federation.14 In the absence of any effective check on their activities, local officials began to act ‘as if they were permanent bosses immune to elections, and many used their offices for personal enrichment and nepotism’, some ‘handed out land plots for building summer cottages, leased property, and organized local enterprises and trade’.15 Local level corruption relating to the privatization of state property and enterprise divestiture was also rife.

The Russian Constitution of December 1993 As Tishkov notes: in 1993, Russia’s federal powers, almost simultaneously, made two decisions that seemed to be aimed in opposite directions: one to dismantle local authorities and another to create them. In October, the federal government dissolved the Soviets … . Then, in December, the government passed the Constitution, which defined the organization and functions of local self-government.16 Crucially, the Constitution does not provide an exhaustive or closed list of the competences of local governments. Article 132(1) simply notes that: ‘Bodies of local self-government autonomously manage municipal property, formulate, approve and implement the local budget, levy local taxes and duties, implement the protection of public order and also resolve other questions of local importance.’ What exactly is meant by ‘other questions of local importance’ was to be left to future legislation.

50

Local government reform under Yeltsin

As noted in Chapter 3, according to Article 72(1), the general principles of organization of local government came under the joint jurisdiction of the federal government and subjects of the Federation. Article 76(2) defines the legislative framework for regulating those areas of joint jurisdiction. However, faced with massive resistance from the regions and republics, the federal government found it exceedingly difficult to implement local government reforms in line with the new provisions of the Constitution. Many regions simply dragged their feet or ignored the Constitution altogether. Thus, for example, on 10 June 1994 the State Duma adopted a resolution about bringing regional laws on local government into line with the Constitution and federal laws.17 It appealed to the president to bring a halt to the actions of those regional executives who had abolished the elections of local councils, taken over their functions, and directly appointed the heads of local administrations.18 In 1994, the State Duma’s Committee, ‘On Questions of Local Self-Government’, listed the following regional infringements of the Constitution and federal laws: 1 2

3 4 5

6

The formation of new municipalities without consideration of the opinions of the local population (an infringement of Article 131.2). The prohibition of citizens living in city and rural settlements of the right to elect organs of local self-government (infringements of Articles 3.2, 32.2 and 130. Citizens living in settlements with a population below 5,000 were not granted the right to form local self-governments (infringement of Article 131.1). Local councils in many regions were directly appointed by governors rather than by popular elections (infringement of Articles 3.2, 32.2 and 130). Powers over the use and distribution of municipal property, including newly privatized property, were transferred to the jurisdiction of appointed chiefs of administrations (infringement of Article 130.1). Organs of local self-governance in some regions lost the right to independently ratify and implement their own budgets (infringement of Article 132.1); some municipal settlements were placed under the direct subordination of organs of state power (infringement of Articles 12 and 132).19

A further damning report by the Prosecutor’s office in 1995 noted that ‘corruption, economic turmoil, and high levels of crime were endemic in the localities’.20 Reaction to these developments soon led to a major national debate over the rights and powers of local self-government, and eventually to the adoption of a new law on local government, which was adopted in August 1995.

The 1995 Law on local self-government On 28 August 1995, Federal Law No. 154 ‘On General Principles of Organizing Local Self-Government in the Russian Federation’ (hereafter, 1995 Law) was signed by the president.21 According to Kirkow, five different versions of the Law were prepared and sent to the regions for discussion.22 The Law, which was

Local government reform under Yeltsin 51 adopted by the Duma on 12 August 1995, was a compromise between the version put forward by Igor Murav’ev (a member of the New Regional Policy faction in the Duma) and his supporters, and a presidential draft, which had been prepared by the Ministry of Nationalities and Regional Policy.23 There was a fierce struggle in the Federation Council over the ratification of the Law. Regional leaders sought to thwart its implementation, and it had to overcome two vetoes by members of the Federation Council before it was finally ratified. One of the reasons why the president supported the Law was that Russia was at the time seeking membership of the Council of Europe. Yeltsin was keen to show that his administration was promoting the development of local democratic institutions, which complied with international norms and standards. Russia also signed the European Charter on Local Self-Government in 1996, and the Charter was ratified by the Russian parliament in 1998.24 As Slider observes, the 1995 Law: created for the first time the foundations for autonomous institutions of local government and gave local authorities wide ranging powers, including independent tax and budgetary authority, control over municipal property, and the right to make decisions in areas of competence that were binding on all organizations or enterprises that were located within its territory.25 The law defined a municipality as, ‘the primary unit of local governance, as any populated territory (city, town, township, or any combination of these on a contiguous territory) which is self-governed and possess municipal property, a budget, and an elected local government body’.26 According to the new legislation local self-governments were to be ‘established at a variety of territorial levels from districts (raions) to towns or villages, irrespective of population size’, taking into account ‘local political, cultural, ethnic, geographic, historical and other peculiarities’.27 Moreover, the 1995 Law stated that: No settlement, regardless of its population, shall be deprived of the right to establish local self-government. Municipal territories shall be defined by agreement with the local community. Municipal borders shall not be changed without local community agreement. The local community shall independently decide the issues of establishing, transforming, consolidating and abolishing the municipality (Article 13).28 The result was ‘a great diversity in territorial forms of municipalities: separate settlement (urban and rural); rural districts; raions; double layer local government organizations (raion and intra-raion municipalities, city and intra-city municipalities).29 As Martinez-Vazquez, Timofeev, and Boex observe: The majority of the regional governments in Russia established municipal settlements exclusively at the first (higher) tier of local governments (that is, at the level of subregional cities and raions). In 15 regions, municipal settlements

52

Local government reform under Yeltsin were established only at the second (lower) local government tier (towns, townships, and rural districts). In the rest of the regions, municipal settlements were established at both the first and second tiers of local government, resulting in a system of local government in which some municipal settlements are subordinate to others.30

The independence granted to local self-government in Article 12 of the Constitution is further developed in Article 17 of the 1995 Law, which forbids organs of state power to independently create organs of local government or to appoint their personnel. Article 14 also prohibits organs of state power and their personnel to carry out the functions of local government, and Article 1 notes that the personnel of local self-government are excluded from the category of ‘civil servants’. Article 44 gives legal protection to the decisions of local government bodies and their personnel, which may be overturned only by the courts.31 As Kirkow notes, the 1995 Law ‘defined its economic basis to comprise municipal property, local finances and state property in local management’.32 However: loopholes in the federal legislation on municipal property and privatization left considerable scope for legal abuse, arbitrary rule and corruption by higher officials and the executive branch at the local level, which turned out to be a serious impediment to market reform.33 Budgets and local finance are discussed in Chapters 6 and 7.

Functions and competences of local self-governments As Sisk notes: Central to any meaning of local democratic governance is the concept of local self-government and administration closest to the people. The essential notion is that inhabitants of a given area have the right and responsibility to make decisions on those issues that affect them most directly and on which they can make decisions.34 In Western Europe, as Peter John shows in Table 4.1 there is a broad set of functions carried out by local governments across the region. Thus: Local government tends to provide the public goods, such as parks, but varies to the extent it provides private goods or welfare services. In general, local government in the northern system tends to provide the welfare services whereas regional or central governments provide them in the south.35 As demonstrated in Table 4.2, Russian local government was granted significant powers over the provision of welfare services similar to municipalities in the northern European camp. Thus, for example, in the fields of education and health, the

Local government reform under Yeltsin 53 Table 4.1 Selected functions by tier of government in Western Europe Education

Housing

Health/ Welfare Refuse Hospitals

Leisure

Fire

Belgium

PM

RM

PM

MP

M

RMP

M

Denmark

C

CM

C

CM

M

SCM

M

Finland

M

M

M

SM

M

M

SRM

France

N(DM)

M

S

MD

M

SDM

M

Germany

SM

SM

C

SM

M

SM

M

Greece

N

N

N

NM

M

NM

N

Ireland

N

CB

N

N

CM

M

CM

Italy

P

Netherlands M

PM

R

RPM

PM

RPM

M

PM

PM

M

M

PM

M

Norway

CM

M

C

M

M

M

M

Portugal

N

N

N

N

M

M

M

Spain

PM

M

SRM

RM

PM

NRPM

NRM

Sweden

M

M

C

M

M

MC

M

Switzerland UK

CAM (CM)

M M

CAM N

M NC

M CM

CAM CM

CA CM

C=country; CA=canton; D=department; M=municipal; N=national; P=provincial; R=regional; S=state; ( ) indicates local control but highly constrained Source: Peter John, Local Governance in Western Europe, London: Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, Sage, 2001, p. 36.

local authorities were given responsibility in the 1995 Law ‘for building, repairing and maintaining educational and public health establishments, remunerating staff in those establishments, purchasing textbooks and teaching materials and equipment, providing meals in educational and hospital establishments, purchasing medicines, establishing operating regulations’.36 As noted in Chapter 2, Article 71(2) declares that the establishment of the general principles for the organization of bodies of local-self government ‘fall within the joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the components of the Russian Federation’. Article 4 of the 1995 Law outlines those rights granted to federal bodies, which included powers to: 1 2 3 4 5 6

ensure that regional legislation on local self-government conforms with federal laws and the Russian Constitution regulate the transfer of federal property to municipalities delegate state functions to municipalities, alongside the necessary financial resources establish minimum state social standards regulate the financial relations between regional and municipal budgets adopt federal programmes for the development of local government

Table 4.2 Functions of local government in the Russian Federation Federal budget Regional budget Local budget Education Pre-school

X

Primary

X

Secondary

X

Technical

X

X

Higher Social Policy

X

X

Retirement homes

X

X

Home-nursing service for the aged and disabled

X

Special services for the homeless, crises families, etc.

X

Social housing

X

Subsidies and benefits

X

Health service and sports preventative medicine

X

X

Hospitals

X

X

X

Polyclinics

X

X

X

Sports facilities Culture and leisure

X

Theatres

X

X

X

Museums

X

X

X

Libraries

X

Parks

X

Clubs and culture and leisure centres Public utilities

X

Water supply

X

Sewage

X

Electricity

X

Gas

X

Central heating

X

Refuse collection

X

Refuse disposal

X

Cemeteries

X

Street cleaning

X

Housing utilities subsidies Environment

X

Environmental protection

X

X

X

Local government reform under Yeltsin 55 Federal budget Regional budget Local budget Traffic and transport Roads

X

X

Public lighting

X X

Public transport Urban development

X

Town planning

X X

Local economic development

X

Tourism Administration

X

X

Authoritative functions

X

X

X

Other state administrative functions

X

X

X

Local police

X

X

Fire brigade Civil defence

X

X

X

Source: Armen Danielian, ‘Local government in Russia: reinforcing fiscal autonomy’, in Kenneth Davey (ed.), Fiscal Autonomy and Efficiency: Reforms in the Former Soviet Union, Budapest: Local Government Institute, Open Society Institute, 2002, pp. 93–4.

7 regulate and defend the rights of citizens in their exercise of local self-governance 8 establish and guarantee the electoral rights of citizens with regard to local elections 9 guarantee the legal powers of local self-governments 10 carry out investigations to ensure the legality of the activities of local selfgovernments and their personnel 11 regulate and establish the responsibilities of local self-governments and local government personnel for any infringements of the law 12 regulate municipal services.37 Article 5 lists the following key issues that came under the jurisdiction of the federal subjects. As can be seen, many of the powers granted to the federal subjects overlap with those of the federal government: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

procedures for determining the territorial boundaries of municipalities procedures for holding municipal elections procedures for the registration of municipal charters procedures for the transfer of property to municipalities regulation of the fiscal relations between the region and its municipalities and the equalization of the fiscal capacity of municipalities delegation of certain state powers to local government bodies and the transfer of the financial resources necessary to support their execution municipal services and other issues.38

56

Local government reform under Yeltsin

The powers of local-self governments are provided in Article 6, which lists 30 areas of local competence (see Figure 4.1). Liborakina groups the 30 functions into the following categories: 1 2

3

General issues (e.g. the possession, use and disposal of municipal property; the making adoption and implementation of local budgets). Issues related to the provision of services to the population (e.g. organization, maintenance and development of municipal pre-school, secondary and professional education institutions; social support and the creation of new jobs). Issues associated with the ‘physical appearance’ of settlements (e.g. regulation of planning and development of municipal territories, municipal road building, maintenance of local roads, etc.).39

However, the 1995 Law tends to use ‘rather vague terms such as “organization”, “development”, and “ensuring”, which makes it impossible to determine the scope of municipal bodies’ prerogatives with any precision’.40 Thus, for example, ‘questions of local importance’ are defined are those concerning the ‘direct satisfaction of the living conditions of the population of the municipality’ (Article 1.1). Local governments were also obliged to guarantee their citizens ‘minimum social standards’ but there was no one to determine exactly what was meant by such a phrase. As Kirkow notes: Although the new law on local self-government had a special provision for tax assignments to cover the ‘necessary minimum expenses’ for local authorities and local shares of federal and regional taxes to meet ‘minimum state social standards’, it was left open how this was to achieved and members of the government did not have a united position.41 Moreover, as Kurlyandskaya stresses: ‘It is not rights and responsibilities for the provision of public services that are assigned, but the responsibilities for the maintenance of social infrastructure facilities.’42 Thus, where there are no municipal institutions, there are no expenditures. So, for example, situated in the township of Solnechnodolsk in Stavropol’ Krai: is an electric power company, which generates substantial revenues for the local budget. However, there are practically no government service institutions in the township, and its people go to schools and medical centres in the neighbouring municipality, which has the appropriate social infrastructure in place. Having no public service providers within its jurisdiction, Solnechnodolsk municipal administration bears no responsibility for the financial costs of the health and education of its citizenry.43

• Adoption and amendment in statutes of the municipal entity and control of their observance. • Possession, usage and disposal of municipal property. • Local finances, formation, approval and performance of the local budget, imposing local taxes and duties, solving other financial issues of local importance. • Integral social and economic development of the municipalities. • Maintenance and disposition of municipal residential and non-residential housing. • Organization, maintenance and development of municipal primary, secondary and technical schools. • Organization, upkeep and development of municipal health institutions and sanitation. • Maintenance of public order, organization and upkeep of municipal public order institutions, control over their activities. • Urban planning. • Executing control over land use within the territory of the municipality (irrespective of land ownership and land function). • Control over the use of water resources and minerals of local significance. • Organization, maintenance and development of municipal electricity, gas, central heating, water supply facilities and sewage. • Organization of fuel deliveries to the citizens and municipal institutions. • Municipal roads construction and maintenance of roads of local significance. • Improvement of landscape and planting. • Organization of refuse disposal. • Organization of undertaker services and maintenance of burial places. • Organization and maintenance of municipal archives. • Organization of public transport and the provision of tele-communication services. • Creating normal conditions for retail trade, public catering and consumer services. • Creating conditions for the normal functioning of municipal culture and leisure institutions. • Safeguarding municipal culture and historical memorials. • Organization and maintenance of municipal information service. • Creating conditions for the normal functioning of municipal mass media institutions. • Creating conditions for the normal organization of public performances. • Providing conditions for the development of sports and physical culture. • Providing social support and promoting employment programmes. • Participating in environmental protection actions in the territory of the municipality. • Organization and maintenance of municipal fire service.

Box 4.1 Powers granted to municipalities (Article 6 of the 1995 Law) Source: Armen Danielian, ‘Local government in Russia: reinforcing fiscal autonomy’, in Kenneth Davey (ed.), Fiscal Autonomy and Efficiency: Reforms in the Former Soviet Union, Budapest: Local Government Institute, Open Society Institute, 2002, p. 92.

58

Local government reform under Yeltsin

Local political institutions Article 72 of the Russian Constitution grants the Russian Federal Government and federal subjects joint jurisdiction in establishing the ‘general principles’ for the organization of local government. The 1995 Law gives substantial powers to the regions to ‘establish the legal framework for local administrations, including their powers, procedures for establishment, terms of office, organization of activities, names of bodies, officials and elected persons of local self-government’.44 The specific rights and powers of municipal bodies are laid down in municipal charters. According to the 1995 Law, five basic types of local self-government were permitted: 1 2 3 4

5

A local legislature and a generally elected local administration head (mayor), the latter also presiding over the local legislature. A local legislature and a mayor elected by the legislature. A local legislature headed by a person who had no right to make decisions on his own, and a hired head of the local administration. A local legislature and a local administration formed out of the legislature’s members, who combine representative and executive functions; in this case, the head of the legislature is also the head of the local administration. A local community assembly (skhod) and local government head (occurs in small rural settlements).45

Political institutions are discussed in more detail in Chapter 9.

Regional variations in the implementation of the 1995 Law Putting the 1995 Law into action was intricately linked with the wider power struggle between the centre and the federal subjects. Yeltsin’s reliance on regional leaders to ‘bring home the votes’ in the Duma elections of 1995, and the Presidential elections of 1996, led to a situation whereby the heads of the federal subjects, particularly in the ethnic republics, were able to carve out independent political fiefdoms. Yeltsin also turned a blind eye to the instigation of highly authoritarian regimes, and the creation of unconstitutional political institutions and practices. The regional leaders, in their turn, sought to block the implementation of the 1995 Law, and particularly the section on the popular election of heads of local administrations. They naturally wanted to retain their powers of appointment over mayors, which Yeltsin had granted them in 1991. Many of the governors were also ‘opposed to the legislative recognition of districts (raiony) as a level of local selfgovernment (with elected councils and elected heads of administrations)’.46 As Kourliandskaya et al. stress: The majority of regions benefited from the federalization of their relationships with the centre, but were reluctant to relinquish power over subregional territories. They preferred paternalistic relations with the local governments to decentralization; rather than employ their newly assigned methods of control,

Local government reform under Yeltsin 59 legislative initiative and law enforcement, they opted to reinstate the vertical axis of executive power.47 Opposition to the 1995 Law had an economic as well as a political basis. As Mitrokhin notes: ‘The regional bosses, not without reason, saw local selfgovernment as a force taking away from them large segments of their powers and finances, that is the very things they themselves had just wrested from the federal centre.’48 As Tarasenko argues: the reasons why the local self-government law [was] openly sabotaged [were] fundamentally related to economic and property interests, the areas where the law on local self-government posed a threat to regional leaders. It is interesting that the law is opposed by all those who were recently city mayors and are now governors. They say, ‘Hey what is this? They’re going to divide up property without me?’49 If they could not block the passage of the 1995 Law outright, then regional leaders were determined to do all they could to minimize its impact. In Ivanovo Oblast, as Kirkow notes, they tried ‘to marginalize the functions and powers of local governments, conceding at best a formal system of parallel structures but fiercely opposing any surrender of finances and property’.50 As noted in Chapter 2, over the period 1994–8, 46 bilateral treaties were signed between Yeltsin and the regions, creating a highly asymmetrical Federation. Yeltsin had been forced to give up his powers of appointment of regional leaders in the autumn of 1995, and regional governors were able to capitalize on the fact that they were directly elected by their citizens. Governors and republic presidents also used their exofficio membership in the Federation Council to block the passage of any legislation that threatened their powers and privileges. As Slider notes: ‘Every law that was prepared by the Duma committee on local self-government from 1996–9, with the exception of one on municipal property, was rejected by the upper house.’51 In his annual address to the Federal Assembly on 6 March 1997, Yeltsin noted that: ‘in several subjects of the federation the activities of local self-government were hampered or even paralyzed, because of the lack of an adequate legal base and the direct opposition of regional powers’.52 By the summer of 1997 no laws had been adopted on local self-government in the republics of Adygeya, Altai, Ingushetiya, Komi, Sakha-Yakutiya, Chechnya; the regions of Bryansk, Vladimir, Irkutsk, Kemerovo; the city of St Petersburg, and Koryak, Chukotka and Yevenk autonomous okrugs.53 Moreover, there were no laws on municipal elections in Adygeya, Ingushetiya, Komi, Sakha-Yakutiya, Tyva, Udmurtiya, Chechnya, Moscow, St Petersburg, Koryak AO, Chukotka AO and Yevenk AO.54 Furthermore, charters of local self-governments were still to be ratified in 5,544 (41.4 per cent) municipalities.55 In order to gain the support of local governments in his struggle with regional governors, in 1997 Yeltsin initiated a new law on local finances to beef up the financial independence of the municipalities, and to strengthen their powers vis-à-

60

Local government reform under Yeltsin

vis the regions. However, the 1997 Law56 was never fully put into practice or the regions were able to create their own regional versions of the law, which allowed them to ‘bestow financial largesse on local governments of their choosing’.57 Caught between functioning as local agents delivering regional and federal services and working in quasi self-governing institutions accountable to the local population, local officials experienced increased expectations at the same time as their capacity to deliver public services had diminished.58 In May 1997, Yeltsin set up a new Council for Local Self Government under the presidency,59 and on 11 June he adopted yet another decree on the reform of local self-government, which called for the implementation of the 1995 Law to be speeded up.60 Stressing the ‘importance of the development of local selfgovernment … in effecting social and economic changes, including housing and municipal-services reform’, Yeltsin decreed: 1

2

3 4

5

6

That active efforts to promote the formation and development of local self-government in the Russian Federation shall be a priority in the activity of the Russian Federation President and the Russian Federation Government, That the main emphasis of state policy in the realm of local and selfgovernment in 1997–8 shall be: To complete the establishment of a legal foundation that supports the development of local self-government, To foster the conditions needed to form the financial and economic foundation of local self-government …, That the Russian Federation government shall make arrangements for gathering and analyzing information on the progress of efforts to reform local self government, with the aim of accelerating the reform; provide methodological assistance to the bodies of state power of the Russian Federation members and to bodies of local self-government in dealing with issues pertaining to the reform of local self-government; Prepare by July 15, 1997, proposals on a procedure for assigning parcels of land to municipal ownership, That the Russian Federation President’s authorized representatives in the regions must react promptly to violations of Russian Federation Legislation on local self-government, That the Russian Federation Prosecutor General must step up the oversight of the compliance of regional legislation on local self-government with federal laws.61

However, by the end of 1997 there were still only 76 regional laws on local selfgovernment. Moreover, a study of 68 of these laws, which was carried out by the Ministry of Justice, found that only four were fully in correspondence with the Constitution and federal laws.62

Local government reform under Yeltsin 61 Kourliandskaya et al. provide the following long list of regional infringements of the 1995 Law: 1

2

3 4 5

6 7

Restrictions on electoral rights: These include: a the introduction of voter and candidate qualifications for residence, age and property, in contradiction of federal legislation; b the authority of the regional government to discharge heads of local selfgovernment. Restrictions on local self-government autonomy in matters outside regional competence. These may include: a establishing an exhaustive list of municipalities that may be set up in the region; b regulating the structure and operation of bodies of local selfgovernment; c setting restrictions on the disposal of municipal property; d limiting local options in formulating and executing local budgets. Delegation of local government powers to regional state administrations. Delegation of state administration responsibilities of local government bodies without the requisite financial support. Removal of entire territories from the scope of legislation on local selfgovernment, for instance, establishing ‘regional districts’, as in Saratov Oblast. Changing the territorial boundaries of local self-governments without regard for public opinion. Making one municipal entity subordinate to another, primarily in financial matters.63

One of the key factors that helps to explain the widespread infringements of the 1995 Law is the fact that, as Ryzhenkov stresses, one-third of federal subjects had already adopted their own laws on local self-government before the 1995 Law was ratified.64 Some, such as the republics of Marii El and Tyva had even adopted their legislation before the ratification of the Russian Constitution in 1993, while others (Moscow, Astrakhan, Tver’, Omsk, Khabarovsk Krai) adopted their statutes over the period December 1993 to February 1994, a time when there were no legislative assemblies operating at local level.65 As discussed in Chapter 2, many federal subjects claimed that their constitutions and laws took precedence over federal laws, or they justified their actions by referring to special provisions in their bilateral treaties that granted them the right to set up their own political institutions. The constitutions of the majority of ethnic republics codified the dual system of ‘local government’ and ‘local self-government’ which, as noted in Chapter 3, was sanctioned through amendments to the 1978 RSFSR Constitution in April 1992. Thus, for example, in the majority of ethnic republics there were two levels of local government: ‘state bodies’ in the districts and cities of republic significance, and ‘public bodies’ in lower level cities and settlements. Only the public bodies were defined as being local self-governments, independent of the state.

62

Local government reform under Yeltsin

In some regions and republics there were even moves by state bodies to take direct control of the lower level local self-governments, and to turn these into organs of state power (Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Adygeya, Kalmykiya, Udmurtiya, Komi, Moscow, Leningrad, Kurgan oblast and others).66 As a result of such developments, there was a sharp decline in the number of municipalities over the period 1994–8: a fall from 29,291 to 12,575. The number of district municipalities fell from 1,852 to 1,455, and cities from 1,058 to 619. As Pashentsev notes: the greatest changes came at the lower levels, in the settlements (which dropped from 6,269 to 2,066) and rural councils (23,976 to 9,771), which were prolific in the pre-1993 period. Overall, the number of settlement and rural municipalities were reduced by a factor of 2.5 times, and they were abolished altogether in 38 subjects of the federation – their functions being transferred to the district (raion) level.67 Figure 4.2 shows the wide variations in local government structures, which existed in 1998. Kourliandskaya et al. outline three different groups of regions with regard to the implementation of the 1995 Law. ‘Those who had a constructive response and adopted legislation in line with the Constitution and the 1995 law (Leningrad, Tyumen’, Vologda, Astrakhan, Irkutsk, Voronezh, Nizhni Novgorod, Saratov, Pskov and Kaluga oblasts, and Khanti-Mansiiski AO.’ A second group: where self-government is either non-existent or confined to the level of small townships and deprived of any legal basis. Issues assigned to local self-governments by federal legislation are instead handled by territorial branches of regional state administrations in cities and raions (Republics of Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, Udmurtiya, Komi, Ingushetiya, KarachaevaCherkessiya, Kalmykiya, Sakha, Khakasiya and Tyva; Kursk Oblast, Novosibirsk Oblast, and the Jewish Autonomous Oblast). Finally, a third group consisted of, regions that viewed ‘local self-government as an inescapable evil. Although they refrain from committing any outright violations of federal legislation, they employ numerous delaying tactics to slow the process down. Local government bodies were not formed in these jurisdictions until 1997.’68 However, it was those federal subjects that were granted the most autonomy, namely, the ethnic republics, that restricted the development of local selfgovernment in their territories to the greatest extent. Below I examine a number of the most ‘infamous’ cases of regional subjugation of local government in the ethnic republics during the Yeltsin period.

Local government reform under Yeltsin 63 1 Subjects preserve the system of organs of local self-administration at the level of raions (districts), cities, settlements and rural settlements Amur, Astrakhan, Bryansk, Chelyabinsk, Kurgan, Magadan, Nizhegorod, Orel, Orenburg, Tambov, Tyumen, and Voronezh Oblasts; Republics of KabardinoBalkariya and Mordoviya; Khabarovsk and Krasnoyarsk Krais, 2 Subjects preserve the system of organs of local self-administration at the level of cities, settlements and rural settlements, and transform organs of local selfadministration into organs of state power at the raion level Kursk, Novosibirsk and Penza Oblasts; Republics of Kalmykiya and KarachaiCherkessiya; Stavropol’ Krai; Yevenk Autonomous Oblast. 3 Subjects preserve the system of organs of local self-administration at the level of settlements and rural settlements and transform organs of local selfadministration at the level of raions and cities into organs of state power Republics of Adygeya, Bashkortostan and Tatarstan. 4 Subjects preserve the system of organs of local self-administration at the level of raions and cities and abolish organs of local self-administration at the level of settlements and rural settlements Arkhangel’sk, Belgorod, Ivanovo, Kaliningrad, Kaluga, Kirov, Leningrad, Murmansk, Novgorod, Omsk, Perm’, Pskov, Rostov, Ryazan’, Sakhalinsk, Samara, Saratov, Smolensk, Sverdlovsk, Tomsk, Tula, Ul’yanovsk, Volgograd, Vologda and Yaroslavl’ Oblasts; Republics of Buryatiya, Chuvashiya, Dagestan, Kareliya, Marii-El, Tyva and Udmurtiya; Altai and Krasnodar Krais; Primorskii Krai; Chutkotka Autonomous Okrug.

Box 4.2 Classification of regions according to the organization of the system of organs of local self-administration 1998 Source: Vitalii Pashenetsev, Organizatsiya Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossiiskikh Regionakh: Tsifry i Tipy, in Sergei Ryzhenkov and Nikolai Vinnik (eds), Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossii, Moscow: IGPI, 1998, pp. 29–30.

Republic of Udmurtiya In April 1996, the Udmurtiya State Council, at the initiative of its chairman, Alexandr Volkov, adopted a law replacing the republic’s organs of local self-government with local government bodies directly subordinated to the republican leadership. Only Anatoly Saltykov, the mayor of the capital city of Izhevsk dared to publicly challenge this law. For his pains Saltykov was put under surveillance by the republic’s security forces, and he and a number of his colleagues in the city administration were subjected to audits of their personal bank accounts, ‘blackmail and intimidation’.69 Eventually, Volkov simply dismissed Saltykov and replaced him with one of his appointees. Appeals from the Russian parliament to refer the matter to the Prosecutor’s office came to no avail. Thus, ‘before long Izhevsk had two mayors, the democratically elected Saltykov and the personal appointment of Volkov’.70

64

Local government reform under Yeltsin

On 25 July 1996, President Yeltsin sent a request to the Constitutional Court asking it to check the legality of Udmurtiya’s law and the constitutional status of local government at the level of cities, raions and districts within cities. In response, the presidents of 15 republics (Adygeya, Altai, Bashkortostan, Buryatiya, Ingushetiya, Kalmykiya, Karachaeva-Cherkessiya, Komi, Marii-El, Mordoviya, North Osetiya-Alaniya, Tatarstan, Tyva, Udmurtiya, Khakasiya) sent an open letter to Yeltsin in support of Volkov. As Mitrokhin notes: ‘The basic thrust of the appeal was that members of the Russian Federation have the right to decide for themselves the form in which local self-government is to exist on their territory.’71 The decision of the Constitutional Court, which was proclaimed on 24 January 1997, was highly ambiguous. On the one side, the court sided with Yeltsin and declared Udmurtiya’s attempts to abolish local self-government as unconstitutional. However, as Gel’man observes, the court ‘also declared that it was the right of subjects of the federation to create parallel organs of local state power in the capital cities and districts of federal subjects.’72 Tishkov notes: That compromise was intended to address the complicated situation in which mayors of regional capitals found themselves outside the system of state power, according to the strict interpretation of the new laws on local selfgovernment. As these regional capitals are vital for the economy and politics of the entire territory, many saw a need to limit the total independence of the capitals’ self-government.73 (See Chapter 9.) But the ambivalence of the court’s ruling, and especially its confirmation of the right of federal subjects to form their state institutions, allowed the Udmurtiya government to defend its actions and ignore Yeltsin’s demands for the reinstatement of local self-government in the republic. Republic of Tatarstan The decision of the Constitutional Court on Udmurtiya was interpreted by the other republics as a green light to proceed with their own reforms of local self-government. Thus, for example, the Tatarstan leadership interpreted the court’s ruling as legitimizing the abolition of local self-government in the larger municipalities. Local self-government was confined to small towns, settlements, rural districts and neighbourhoods in the major cities, while ‘the 11 major cities and 43 administrative districts [were] excluded from forming local self-governments and [were] instead administered by local organs of state power’.74 The heads of the executive organs in these cities and districts were appointed by the President of the Republic. Such provisions directly contradict the 1995 Law, which states in Article 12, part 1, item 3: ‘The population of an urban or rural settlement, irrespective of its size, cannot be denied the right to exercise local self-government.’75 Writing in 2002, Abdrakhmanov observed:

Local government reform under Yeltsin 65 the president of Tatarstan has concentrated colossal power in his hands: He controls his appointed administration heads – who are chairmen of the local Soviets and also parliamentary deputies – and through them the local selfgovernments. Not one important decision in Tatarstan’s economic and political life is passed without the will of President Shaimiev.76 Republic of Komi According to Yurii Shabaev, the Komi Republic ‘has a long history of blocking the development of local government’.77 The 1994 Komi Constitution grants the president powers to appoint local government leaders, and local councils in the republic have a purely symbolic role. The Constitutional Court in its resolution of 15 January 1998 declared that the provisions in Article 92 of the Republic Constitution, which restricted the formation of local self-government to cities and districts of republic status, was an infringement of the rights of citizens to create municipalities in lower level districts and settlements. The court also underlined the fact that it is not permitted to subordinate one municipality to another. However, in defence of his powers, President Yury Spiridonov ‘argued that the powersharing treaty between his republic and the Kremlin gave the Republic the right to determine its political institutions independently’ and he continued to defy the court in new legislation adopted in 1998 and 2000.78 The Republic of Bashkortostan In Bashkortostan, as Gabdrafikov and Enikeev note: The rigid vertical line of power does not allow for real local self-government. The republic’s legislation limits local self-government to villages and townships. The President appoints and dismisses mayors of cities and heads of rural and district administrations who also act as chairs of the cities and district councils.79 In 1998, President Rakhimov justified the appointment of local officials in terms later used by Putin: to impose a new relationship between centre and regions, and to create a strict vertical chain of authority. The popular election of mayors and raion executives, he warned, would lead to ‘disorder and anarchy’; ‘we are not ready for democracy since the main thing for us is discipline and order. A drunk or someone even worse could be elected a local leader.’80 The Republic of North Osetiya-Alaniya In 1998, three years after the adoption of the 1995 Law, North Osetiya-Alaniya finally adopted its own law on local self-government. In its initial version, ‘Item 2 of Article 18 provided that the head of the municipal administration was to be elected by the population living on the municipal territory.’ However, President

66

Local government reform under Yeltsin

Dzasokhov was able to push through amendments to the law strengthening the ‘power vertical’. The article was rewritten to read: The heads of municipalities in Vladikavkaz and in the rural districts of North Osetiya-Alaniya are appointed by the republic’s president out of the deputies of the representative assemblies of those municipalities. The president … has a right to dismiss the heads of the municipalities.81 This provision violated Article 16(2) of the 1995 Law, which states: ‘The head of a municipality is elected by the citizens living on its territory on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot or by the organ of the local self government.’ Moreover, according to Article 17(3), ‘the formation of local self-government organs and the appointment of self-government officials by state bodies or officials’ are prohibited.82 However, the president appoints: the heads of local administration in Vladikavkaz and other towns and districts: six of the President’s appointed heads of municipalities were chosen from deputies to the Republic’s Parliament and two from among the deputies of the district assemblies. And all of them kept their seats in the representative bodies.83 The head of Vladikavkaz’s City Administration, Mikhail Shatalov, even held three posts: Mayor of Vladikavkaz, Deputy of the Republican Parliament, and Chair of the Vladikavkaz City Duma. The 1998 Law was adopted after the Constitutional Court had made its historic decisions on the status of local self-government in Udmurtiya and Komi. Thus, the ‘legislators knew that their law was considered unconstitutional when they adopted it’.84 Only after President Putin came to power in 2000 did Dzasokhov make moves to bring republican legislation into line with federal law. By the beginning of the Putin era, the status and powers of local governments varied considerably across the Federation. Thus, for example, by 2003: Regional laws on local self-government had only been adopted in 86 of Russia’s 89 federal subjects; on municipal service, in 64 regions; on ratifying local charters (in 73 regions); on municipal elections, the status of elected officials, and the procedures for their recall (79 regions); on the financialeconomic basis of local-self government (20 regions); and on the rights of citizens to participate in local self-government in just 15 regions.85 There were also many infringements of the 1995 law at the municipal level. In 1997, as Lankina notes: the Prosecution office informed the State Duma that there had been over 70,000 violations of the law by local governments. The following infringements of the law were the most widespread: illegal licensing and taxation; illegal

Local government reform under Yeltsin 67 imposition of financial penalties; and interferences with the economic activities of enterprises.86 In 2000, Vladimir Putin was elected president and, as noted in Chapter 2, within a matter of a few months he launched a vigorous campaign to bring regional and local legislation into line with the Constitution and federal laws. In 2003, Putin championed a new law on local self-government, which, as discussed in Chapter 5, has reasserted the statist concept of local government, and the victory of ‘local government’ over ‘local self-government’.

5

Local government reform and Putin’s power vertical

In 2002, the Kozak Commission drafted a new law, ‘On the Principles of Organizing Local-Self Government in the Russian Federation’, which was ratified by the Duma on 16 September 2003 and signed by the president on 6 October.1 The 2003 Law was originally scheduled to come into force on 1 January 2006 but, in October 2005, the Duma passed legislation postponing full implementation until 2009; that is, until after the completion of the 2007–8 cycles of parliamentary and presidential elections. In contrast to the 1995 Law, the 2003 Law seeks to establish a more structured and uniform system of local government throughout the Federation. Article 10.1 proclaims: ‘Local self-governance shall be implemented in the entire territory of the Russian Federation in urban and rural settlements, municipal raions, urban districts and internal territories of cities of federal importance.’2 It calls for the creation of a two-tiered system, comprising upper level ‘municipal districts’ and their constituent ‘settlements’ (city and rural). There is also a third type of municipality, the ‘city district’ (city okrug), which stands outside the jurisdiction of the municipal districts (see Figure 5.1). As noted in Chapter 1, the number of municipalities more than doubled from 11,957 in 2003 to 24,208 in December 2005.3 There was a particularly large rise in the number of city settlements, which increased almost fourfold from 461 to 1,756. Of the 12,251 new municipalities, there are 10,700 rural settlements, 1,295 city settlements, 238 municipal districts and 18 city okrugs (districts). Federal centre Regional Level Local Level City Districts

Municipal Districts Settlements

Figure 5.1 The administrative division of the Russian Federation Source: Laura Solanko and Merja Tekoniemi, ‘To Recentralise or Decentralise – Some Recent Trends in Russian Fiscal Federalism’, BOFIT Online, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition, Research Paper No. 5, 2005, p. 11, http://www.bof.fi/bofit_en/tutkimus/tutkimusjulkaisut/online/2005/ bon0505.htm (Accessed 9 August 2007).

Local government reform and Putin’s power vertical 69 In some regions, there was a very sharp rise in the overall numbers of municipalities. For example, in the Chuvash Republic they rose from 26 to 317,4 Altai Krai (87 to 809), Tomsk (23 to 217), Novosibirsk (62 to 490) and Omsk (33 to 424). In the republics of Chechnya and Ingushetiya, and in Moscow and St Petersburg, new municipalities have still to be formed. Elections to the new municipalities were held over the period 2004–5, and by December 2005, a vast army of 119,358 deputies and 8,664 heads of administrations had been duly elected. Local elections are discussed in Chapter 8. The creation of the new municipalities will also require the recruitment of hundreds of thousands of new personnel. As Liborakina points out: It is planned to more than double the current numbers of local administrators from 55,000 to 1.4 million, and such a sharp rise will lead to an increase in local expenditures in this area from ‘48 billion roubles to 120 billion roubles’ (at 2002 prices).5 The total cost of implementing the 2003 Law has been estimated to be in the order of some 300 billion roubles.6

Principal features of the 2003 Law According to Vladimir Mokryi, Chair of the Duma’s Committee on Local SelfGovernment, and one of the chief architects of the reforms, the 2003 Law has three key aims. First, to create a uniform pattern of local self-government across the Federation. Second, to clearly delineate the powers and duties of each level of government, and to grant each the financial and administrative resources necessary to carry out their duties. Third, to ensure an equitable distribution of income within the municipal districts and federal subjects.7 For Rodio and Stockling, the 2003 Law has the following positive features: a

b c d e f

a rationalized local-authority system with a very clear distinction in powers between the three types of local authority (municipal districts, settlements, city districts), a clear distinction between inherent functions and delegated functions, the creation of favourable conditions for the exercise of local selfgovernment, greater accountability of elected bodies for performing functions of local importance, a larger role for representative bodies, more active community involvement in local affairs.8

Moreover, local government, it is argued, has been brought closer to the people, as a municipality now needs to have a population of only 1000 to gain the status of a settlement. The 2003 Law also provides new forums, such as public hearings, citizens’

70

Local government reform and Putin’s power vertical

gatherings, and citizens’ conferences (Articles 22–6).9 According to Article 27.3, at the very lowest levels (e.g. a group of residential buildings), bodies of territorial public self-governance (TOS) may also be formed. Other commentators have been far less charitable about the 2003 Law and its impact on local government autonomy. For Smirnyagin: ‘The law goes into such detail in restructuring the activity of local self-governments that it becomes obvious: the very concept of local self-governance is alien to the law’s authors and the deputies who voted for it.’10 Furthermore, according to Liborakina, the new legislation demonstrates ‘a clear tendency towards the “governmentalization” of local self-government’.11 In a similar vein, Evans and Gel’man argue that the Kozak Commission compromised the independence of local self-government by defining it as ‘public power’ (publichnaya vlast).12 Thus, although Article 34.4 reaffirms that ‘bodies of local self-government shall not be a part of the system of bodies of state power’, it also goes on to stress that ‘bodies of state power and state officials’, in certain circumstances, ‘may participate in the formation of local self-governments’, and ‘the appointment and release of local officials’. The term ‘public authority’ is, as Liborakina stressed: A relic of Soviet era mentality when local authorities waited for guidance ‘from the top’ before they made any decisions. The biggest barrier to recognizing local self-government as a form of public self-organization is a suspicion that the public is incapable of regulating its own life and activities independently, without official control and coercion. The rational is as follows: For local selfgovernment to have real power and leverage, it should be identified with the authorities. If local self-government is perceived as an institution formed and run by the public, it will remain powerless. This logic prevailed.13 For Kosareva et al., the ‘statist’ concept of local self-government is now predominant: The architects of self-governance reform did not envision the division of powers as a dynamic process but saw it as a defined, static result to be achieved by force of will and set down in law. Self-government from this perspective is a dependent institution granted certain powers and resources from above, and reform is merely an attempt to establish a third level of centrally controlled state authority.14 Equally for Lankina: the Kozak reform’s etatization of local government, whereby it will now perform mostly state functions, implies that the central state, and not just the regions, will have power mechanisms of political control over the localities. Although local government continues to be legally separate from the state, aspects of the Kozak reform suggest the fusion of local government into a centralized power vertical.15

Local government reform and Putin’s power vertical 71 The powers and competences of municipalities In comparison to the 1995 Law, the 2003 Law includes an exhaustive and binding list of local competences to be addressed by local self-government, and it is much more prescriptive than the 1995 law. Different functions are allocated to each type of municipality. The powers of settlements are set out in Article 14, those of municipal districts in Article 15, and city districts in Article 16 (see Table 5.1 and Appendix 5.1). It is true that Articles 14–6 provide local governments with many more functions and finances, but the majority of these new powers are in fact mandatory duties that are to be financed from on high. Far from gaining greater autonomy, local governments are more likely to be bogged down by these delegated duties, and they are now subject to far greater levels of control and oversight from federal and regional administrations. For Campbell, the main innovation of the 2003 Law: was to create a new hybrid unit, the municipal raion (district), a territorial unit that would permit greater economies of scale, whilst allowing the (settlementbased) municipalities to survive. The municipal districts would be primarily responsible for inter-municipal functions and those functions for which economies of scale played a larger role, for example health, education, highways. The municipal district would thus be at the same time an intermunicipal body and a municipality in its own right.16 However as Young and Wilson argue, one of the drawbacks of the law: is that there is little room for local government to grow in meaningful ways. The old laws, with broad, open-ended language reflected optimism towards the future of local government as one of the foundations of a new political system. The new law is, perhaps, a reflection of the miniscule returns of that optimism. In fact, it is reasonable to assume that local governments will actually do less than their enumerated responsibilities. Local governments possess the right to negotiate transfers of authority to other levels of government, and early indications are that such transfers will flow upwards.17 The viability of small settlements As noted above, the law determined that 1,000 residents were sufficient for a community to be deemed a municipal entity. However, as Glazychev (Head of the Public Chamber Commission on Regional Development and Local SelfGovernment) notes: for a community to truly achieve autonomy it has to be able to support housing and municipal services and cover other expenditures – to pay for street lighting, repair the roads, maintain its own fire department and medical

Table 5.1 Enumerated responsibilities of the levels of local government Competencies of rural and urban settlements Responsibilities common to all levels (Articles 14–6)

Enumerated responsibilities not shared with other levels of local government except by agreement

1 Budgets 2 Local taxes 3 Municipal property 4 Local roads 5 Public transit 6 Emergency services 7 Municipal archives 8 Cemeteries and mortuary services 9 Regulation of communications, public catering and domestic services 10 Libraries 1 Utilities, housing, water 2 Public housing 3 Fire services 4 Heritage and culture, including maintenance of monuments 5 Leisure services 6 Garbage disposal 7 Green belts 8 Land use 9 Lighting

Competencies of municipal raiony

Competencies of city okrugs

1 Public order, policing 2 Paramedical and health services (polyclinics and hospitals) 3 Waste management: domestic and industrial waste 4 Equalization of social security benefits 5 Utilities (electric, gas) 6 Preservation of regional resources 7 Environmental regulations, except over organs of federal control 8 Public education, including day cares 9 Guardianship and trusteeship

1 All utilities (electric, gas, heating, water) 2 Public housing 3 Public order, policing 4 Fire services 5 Preservation of municipal resources 6 Environmental regulations, except over organs of federal control 7 Public education 8 Paramedical and health services (polyclinics and hospitals) 9 Heritage and culture 10 Leisure services 11 Guradianship and trusteeship 12 Garbage disposal and domestic waste management 13 Land use and registration 14 Street maintenance, naming and numbering

Source: John F. Young and Gary N. Wilson, ‘The view from blow: local government and Putin’s reforms’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 59, No. 7, 2007, p. 1079.

Local government reform and Putin’s power vertical 73 services, etc., thus experts argue that a municipal entity needs at least 30,000 residents living in a compact area.18 Thus, for example, the settlement of Uglerodny, which was formerly attached to the town of Gulkovo has been: left without an ambulance, the settlement’s polyclinic is operating without doctors, the physical therapy facility has been stripped of its equipment by the Gulkovo health department, facilities in Gulkovo do not accept patients from the settlement, and not everyone can wait for the emergency squad to get here from Krasny Sulin.19 In the first two months of 2006, the budget revenue of Uglerodny was a paltry 1,000 roubles, which was ‘not even enough to pay for the street lighting’. Moreover, as Glazychev notes: ‘Sparse population and remoteness of settlements are highly typical for Russia. Yet Article 13 of the 2003 Law rules out the unification of a municipal district and a city district.’20 Thus, for example: the city of Murom has 132,000 residents while the Murom municipal district has 16,000. The consequences for the district budget are obvious, but requests by the district administration to merge with the city have been rejected on the basis of the law!21 There are also many villages and settlements that lack the basic infrastructure and resources necessary to create viable settlements. Glazychev, argues that subjecting these settlements ‘to a one-model-fits-all policy’ is unacceptable. Such matters, he argues should be decided ‘by the residents through referendums that are mandatory, not merely permitted, as they are in the current version of the law’.22 The creation of city districts (city okrugs) Article 11.2, which lays out the criteria for the formation of city districts, leaves a great deal of room for regional discretion. It simply states: The status of a city okrug may be granted to a city settlement … subject to availability of social, transportation and other infrastructure enabling the local self-government of the city settlement to address independently the local issues of a city okrug, as well as to perform selected state powers.23 Of the 1,601 cities in Russia in 2005, only 505 received the status of a ‘city district’, while the remainder saw a drop in their status.24 By April 2007, about 100 cities had lost their independence and were downgraded to the status of a city settlement.25 According to the 2003 Law, cities with a population of several hundred thousand that do not gain ‘district status’ will ‘have the same rights as settlements of a few hundred residents’.26 Thus, for example, the City of Angarsk (Irkutsk Oblast),

74

Local government reform and Putin’s power vertical

which has a population of 245,000, ‘makes up 96 per cent of the total population of the Angarsk Municipal District and 98 per cent of the Municipal District’s tax potential’.27 As a result of the reforms, two parallel administrations now coexist within the Municipal District; the city settlement and the municipal raion, ‘each with practically identical objects of municipal administration but separate tax bases and staff’.28 As Glazychev notes, if a regional administration decides to downgrade a city, it ‘keeps only 10 per cent of the income tax collected on its territory rather than 30 per cent’.29 Not surprisingly, many cities have rebelled against their new ‘settlement status’.30 Thus, for example, as Dmitry Babich notes: ‘after making several calculations, experts in the information and analysis department of Rybinsk’s municipal government discovered that the town could receive 2.3 times more tax revenue if it became a [city] district.’31 To this end, 60,000 signatures were collected in support of a referendum on the status of the city. On 4 September 2005, the overwhelming majority of the citizens of Rybinsk (over 95 per cent of participants) voted in favour of granting the city ‘district status’.32 The referendum went ahead only after overcoming fierce opposition from regional and federal authorities. The Governor of Yaroslavl’, Anatoly Lisitsyn, branded those citizens who initiated the call for the referendum, ‘a handful of political adventurers’.33 As Babich notes: First the regional authorities tried to declare the referendum illegal, then an attempt was made to hold the vote in July, when many of the town’s residents were in the countryside, making it more difficult to achieve the 50 per cent participation required for the vote to be legal. But the activists insisted on September 4.34 Natalya Spitsyna (head of the press department of the city administration) explains: It is understandable why the regional administration in Yaroslavl’ did not want us to become a fully-fledged town … . First, a larger share of local taxes would go to Yaroslavl’ instead of staying in Rybinsk. Second, if voters are out of touch with their self-government bodies, it is easier for the state authorities to rule them. There is no competition.35 Yevgeny Sdvizhkov, Mayor of Ryabinsk, and Sergei Mironov, Speaker of the Federation Council both gave their support to the campaign. But in July, Mayor Sdvizhkov was arrested on what were clearly trumped up charges of bribery, and he spent over a month in jail. However, as noted above, the referendum finally went ahead as planned, and the citizens of Rybinsk were victorious.36 However, in the future, if mayors are appointed by governors and governors are appointed by the president, it will be much more unlikely that citizens will be able to stand up to the regional authorities (see Chapter 9).

Local government reform and Putin’s power vertical 75 Regional powers over municipalities The 2003 Law states numerous instances when regional governments can take over the functions of local self-governments, and impeach the heads of municipalities. Thus, for example, according to Article 75, local governments may be temporarily taken over by regional governments for a period of up to one year if they run up debts exceeding 30 per cent of their ‘own’ budget revenues. Article 74.1 states that heads of local administrations may be impeached if they adopt measures ‘giving rise to violations of human and citizens’ rights and freedoms’ or that present a threat ‘to the unity and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation’, or to the ‘national security of the Federation and its military efficiency’. Article 74.2 further provides for the impeachment of heads of municipalities if they fail (within a period of two months) to rescind legal acts that have been declared by a local court order to have infringed the Constitution of the Russian Federation or federal or regional laws.37 As Lankina notes: ‘It is not difficult to image how the regional authorities may use any of these provisions to penalize politically disobedient municipalities.’38 Local councils and executives The 2003 Law is also much more prescriptive than the 1995 Law in setting out the structures and powers of local councils and administrations (Articles 34–9). Such norms conflict with Article 131 of the Constitution, which states that the structure of local self-government bodies shall be determined by local communities independently. As Lankina notes, The regions will also now have significant influence on the appointment of key local executives and control over their decision-making. Aside from the possibility of having a popularly elected mayor, the law provides for an additional figure, a head of local administration appointed by contract following a competitive selection process.39 Moreover: While the head of local administration on the settlement level is to be appointed by a selection commission approved by the settlement council, the commissions on the municipal raion and city district levels are to be approved by both the respective municipal raion and city district councils and the regional legislature. In these cases, the regional legislature makes its appointment at the recommendation of the governor.40 The election/appointment of heads of local administrations is discussed in more detail in Chapter 9. The 2003 Law also allows for the indirect election of deputies to municipal districts. Thus, for example, in Stavropol’ Krai the councils of municipal districts

76

Local government reform and Putin’s power vertical

are made up of the ex-officio heads of settlement administrations plus two deputies from each settlement council.41 This provision conflicts with Article 130 of the Russian Constitution, which states that local self-government ‘shall be exercised by citizens through a referendum, election, or other forms of direct expression of the will of the people, through elected and other bodies of local self-government.’42 Moreover, the same rate of representation from the settlements applies whether they are city settlements of 100,000 inhabitants or rural settlements of 1000 inhabitants.43 The horizontal integration of municipalities In the 1990s, horizontal relations between municipalities were conducted on a voluntary basis and, in 1998, the Russian Congress of Municipalities was created to promote and defend the interests of local governments. However, according to the 2003 Law, municipalities are now required to set up bodies of intra-municipal cooperation. According to Article 66 of the 2003 Law, municipal councils are to be formed in each federal subject, while Article 67 calls for the formation of an AllUnion Congress of Municipalities. According to Anderi Zamotaev, a chief adviser in the presidential administration: ‘All municipal entities must join the council … . Because while the creation of the councils may be technically voluntary, it is in fact mandatory for all municipal entities.44 Moreover, as the Deputy Minister for Regional Development, Vitaly Shipov states: ‘If municipal entities are unwilling to join the Council, they will eventually have to join it “voluntarily” at the request of the prosecutor, and the heads of those municipalities will be held accountable for this.’45 It would appear that what is being created here is a form of ‘state corporatism’, whereby local governments are to be forcefully incorporated into regional and federal level associations. These new horizontal bodies appear to have been set up to channel commands downwards from the centre to the localities rather than to facilitate the promotion and defence of local interests at the centre. Local budgets and finance Municipal leaders have also failed in their quest to improve their financial independence. As Liborakina notes: ‘laws granting powers to local authorities become meaningless when real financial power is not included’.46 While the new law calls for financial clarity and a clear demarcation of local powers and finances, as expressed in the slogan ‘our assignments our funding!’, in reality it reduces the financial autonomy of local governments, increases the degree of regional and federal controls, and does not adequately address the widespread problem of deficit budgets. According to forecasts made by the Institute of Urban Economics: centralization will cause a 31–43 per cent reduction in local self-government’s spending authority, and a reduction of its share in the total local budget expenditures to 50–61 per cent as opposed to the current 89 per cent. At the same time, the proportion of spending authority delegated to local self-

Local government reform and Putin’s power vertical 77 government by the state may increase to 39–49 per cent, as opposed to 11 per cent today.47 One positive development is the commitment in the 2003 Law to bring an end to ‘unfunded mandates’. Up until Putin’s reforms of 2004 there were 236 groups of residents that were entitled to over 150 different social benefits.48 Overall, regional and local governments were capable of funding just 30–5 per cent of these mandates out of their own budgets (see Chapter 7). Article 19.5 brings an end to this process with its declaration that all federal and regional programmes will be funded with federal and regional subventions. Another welcome innovation is the move to setting tax sharing rates on a long-term basis.49 More controversial is the policy of equalization of revenues with the transfer of funds from richer to poorer municipalities (‘negative transfers’). As Evans and Gel’man note, this policy has been criticized ‘as potentially detracting from the stimulation of economic development in those cities that serve as engines of economic growth, and erecting more administrative barriers to the creation of new businesses’50 (see Chapter 6).

Problems of implementing the 2003 Law Putting the 2003 Law into practice across the Federation has been an immense task. As noted above, over 12,000 new municipalities have been formed, each with its own charter, budget and local administration. In addition, thousands of elections to the new municipalities have had to be organized and financed, and municipal property transferred to new jurisdictions.51 As Young and Wilson note: The increase in the number of municipalities will undoubtedly stretch the administrative capacity of local governments across the country. Without considerable investments in training, human capital and infrastructure, including equipment and other fixed assets, these new autonomous local governments may only exist on paper.52 Furthermore: In the smaller settlements, which already lack capacity and infrastructure and will likely continue to do so in the short to medium term, some officials have already indicated that they will be unable to cope with local responsibilities and will simply delegate responsibilities to a higher level of government (i.e., to the municipal raiony).53 The original timetable for implementation of the 2003 Law was, as follows: 1 2

By 1 March 2005: the borders of the new municipalities were to be established and their legal status codified in regional legislation. By 31 March 2005: the number of representative bodies, their tenure and powers was to be codified.

78

Local government reform and Putin’s power vertical

3

By 30 April 2005: the method of electing the heads of the new municipal administrations, their tenure and powers were to be codified. By 1 November 2005: elections were to be conducted for the new councils and heads of administrations.

4

However, on 12 October 2005, Putin signed a law delaying the implementation of the reforms until 1 January 2009. In effect, there is to be a three-year transition period before the Law comes fully into force. The date by which elections must be completed was changed from 1 November 2005 to 1 December 2007. Implementation of new financial regulations stipulated in the Budget and Tax Codes were also postponed until 2009.54 Thus, just as the 1995 Law fell foul of the 1995–6 round of elections and was postponed until December 1996, so, too, the 2003 Law has been derailed by the 2007–8 electoral cycle. For Vladimir Mokryi, the amendments, were to be welcomed as they ‘would enable regions to regulate the amount of authority being transferred to the localities, deal with budget issues, divide property and train personnel without panic’.55 However, far from making the situation better, the postponement of the 2003 Law has created ‘a morass of complications and legal confusion for both local and federal officials’.56 This is due to the fact that 160 federal laws that were to take effect in 2006 are closely linked with the 2003 Law, as are the Tax, Housing, Urban Development and Budget Codes. As Kosareva et al., stress: ‘delaying the reform has effectively annulled the results of the elections. In many regions, local councils are still waiting for regional parliaments to adopt the necessary legislation which will allow them to function.’57 For Starodubrovskaya, the following problems in implementing the law were soon uncovered: 1

2

3

4

5

Insufficient legal backing for the reform – thus, the Russian Federation Government did not approve, within the timelines specified in the transitory provisions of [the 2003 Law], the procedure for redistributing property between the Russian Federation, subjects of the Russian Federation, and municipal formations, as well as the procedure for dividing municipal property between municipal raions, settlements and city okrugs; incorrect distribution of sources of revenues between different levels of authority, which makes it impossible to provide adequate financial backing to municipal formations, so as to enable them to solve problems of local importance; the deficit of qualified cadres, as well as of material and financial backing for the solutions to problems of local importance in newly created rural settlements; the risks associated with the parallel implementation of municipal reform and other reforms – tax reform (in the part pertaining to the land tax), housing reform, etc.; the lack of preparedness of some institutional mechanisms referred to in [the 2003 Law] – for example, the absence of registration of municipal property, incompleteness of land reform, lack of preparedness of tax

Local government reform and Putin’s power vertical 79 agencies to work with the municipalities at the level of settlements, etc.58 Moreover, as Ragozina notes: ‘any system which leaves it up to the subjects of the federation to decide what powers to endow to local self-government in the transition period is bound to lead to conflict’.59 During the three-year transition period it is the subjects of the Federation that are to decide when, where, and how the 2003 Law is to be implemented and, not surprisingly, many regions have used such rights to prevent the law from being implemented. An analysis of the implementation of the 2003 Law shows that, as of February 2006, 46 federal subjects had adopted legislative acts: These 46 subjects may be further divided into three groups: 1 2 3

13 which provided the new municipalities with the full range of powers, a second group of 11 that transferred all or most of the powers of settlements to municipal districts, and a third group of 22 which only partially decentralized powers to the settlements.60

Across the Federation there have been fierce battles over defining new municipal boundaries, codifying municipal property, forming settlement budgets and ratifying municipal charters. A study of 140 cities in 60 subjects of the Federation, carried out by the Institute of Urban Economics in 2005, also revealed numerous discrepancies between the rights granted to municipalities by regional laws and the reality of local power relations on the ground. Thus, for example, many regional administrations have ignored the provisions of Article 131 of the Russian Constitution, which declares that: ‘Local self-government in urban and rural settlements and other territories is exercised with due consideration for historical and other local traditions. The structure of local-self government bodies is autonomously determined by the population’ (Item 1), and ‘changes to the borders of territories where local selfgovernment is exercised are permitted with due consideration for the opinion of the population of the relevant territories’ (Item 2). They have also violated those provisions of the 2003 Law (Article 12) that declare: ‘procedures for dividing or amalgamating settlements, or changing the status of a city settlement, can only be decided after considering the opinion of the local population in a referendum’.61 Failure to hold referendums on the drawing up of new territorial boundaries that cut across ethnic communities has led to widespread citizen protests in a number of ethnic republics.62 In violation of the 2003 Law, which clearly states that one municipality may not be subordinate to another, a number of regions have set up local government systems where local settlements are dominated by their municipal districts. Moreover, municipalities have often been given little time to examine and approve the draft charters drawn up by regional administrations. As Young and Wilson note:

80

Local government reform and Putin’s power vertical In some regions, there have been reports of regional officials putting pressure on urban and rural settlements to unconditionally transfer most of the powers to the municipal raiony … . The most common procedure is for a proposal to be made at the regional level, and then introduced for public approval. The time allotted for public discussion is noticeably short, and some local councils have only few days to examine the model charters introduced by the regional administration.63

Moreover, by the summer of 2006, not a single question of local significance had been transferred to new settlements in Astrakhan, Magadan and Sakhalin regions. Budget transfers in these regions flowed directly to the municipal districts bypassing the settlements. Thus, the settlements have been unable to carry out the new duties and powers granted to them by the 2003 Law.64 In Ul’yanovsk Region, the reform of local self-government has been only partially implemented because of a lack of funds to support it. Only three municipal districts have been granted full budgetary powers. Likewise, in 2006, lack of funds forced the Saratov Regional Administration to take back under its control 24 powers of local significance that had been devolved to the municipal raions.65

Conclusion Undoubtedly, there is some sincerity in Putin’s calls for greater clarity in the responsibilities and accountability of local officials, and in his determination to bring an end to the practice of unfunded federal mandates. It is clear that Putin wants to rationalize the financial system at the local level and increase the economic efficiency of local administrations. But to achieve these ends, Putin has chosen not to decentralize power down to the grass roots, but instead opted for a policy of re-centralization of power under federal and regional governments. Putin’s local government reforms seek to subordinate local governments to federal and regional authorities rather than making them accountable to their local electorates. As Vladimir Gel’man notes: ‘in no other policy area in Russian politics is the contrast between declarations of local autonomy and local democracy on the one hand, and the realities of impoverished municipalities and overwhelming “political machines”, on the other, so sharp.’66 Although the 2003 Law reiterates the Russian Constitution’s key provision that local self-government is not part of the system of state power (Article 34.4), it is clear that in practice this new legislation will not only lead to less autonomy for local government bodies but it will also directly subordinate local governments to regional and federal bodies. Local bodies may now be granted more functions and duties, and, in some cases, more finances to carry out these new duties, but they have been given far less political and economic autonomy. As Lankina notes: [this] excessive regulation of local democratic procedure is also at odds with one of the main principles on which the logic of decentralization rests, namely, allowing for and encouraging diversity and initiative … [in the 2003

Local government reform and Putin’s power vertical 81 Law] there is an extensive stress on ‘norms’, and ‘regulations’, and almost no mention of such key pillars of local governance as ‘variation’, ‘local specificity’, or ‘diversity’.67 The 2003 Law has also left mayors at the mercy of regional governors. As Malyakin stresses, the president’s federal reforms have instigated ‘the construction of a rigid vertical of power in which regional law conforms to federal law, the president enforces federal standards on the governors through the federal districts, and the governors in turn control local government through the municipal districts.’68 Furthermore, Putin’s latest policy initiative to grant governors the power to directly appoint mayors, which is discussed in Chapter 9, clearly violates Article 32 of the Russian Constitution and represents a direct assault on the principles of democratic self-government. Vladimir Leskin notes the following contradictions between the concept of local self-government outlined in the 2003 Law and the reality of local governance in Russia today: 1

2

3

4

The contradiction between the provision of the Constitution of the Russian Federation that bodies of local self-government are technically not part of the system of state power and the actual fulfilment by these bodies of social and other commitments and obligations towards citizens that should be performed exclusively by the state, The contradiction between the fact that all bodies of local government are granted the same rights and powers and the real needs for such rights and powers that municipalities of different types may have (for example, a city with a population of one million versus a rural settlement), The contradiction between the range of functions conferred upon bodies of local government by federal and regional legislation and the actual resources (finances, material, organisational and human) made available to them to perform these functions, The contradiction between the theoretical notion of local self-government as the ultimate embodiment of the idea of people’s power and the actual indifference on the part of the population towards any practical implementation of this idea.69

As discussed in Chapters 8–10, Putin’s ‘power vertical’ has now been extended from the regions to the grass roots, and the development of local level democracy has been severely compromised. Moreover, as discussed in the next two chapters, the financial capacity and economic autonomy of local governments have also been severely curtailed. The vast majority of Russia’s municipalities have to operate with deficit budgets, and the vast majority have to rely on grants from regional and federal bodies in order to provide their citizens with the most basic public services.

6

Fiscal federalism and local budget revenues

This chapter examines fiscal federalism and local revenues. Chapter 7 analyses local government expenditures and municipal debts. As Pratchett notes: financial autonomy (the right to raise revenue and set spending priorities independently of central government) lies at the heart of competing ideological commitments to local autonomy… legal, political and organizational autonomy is meaningless without the resources to realize the benefits of such autonomy.1 Article 132(1) of the Russian Constitution proclaims that: ‘Bodies of local selfgovernment autonomously manage municipal property, formulate, approve and implement the local budget, levy local taxes and duties, implement the protection of public order and also resolve other questions of local importance.’2 However, as noted in Chapter 5 and as will be demonstrated below, in practice, the budget process is highly centralized and, since the adoption of the 2003 Law, the percentage of local governments’ ‘own revenues’ has substantially declined. Federal and regional governments exercise considerable controls over local revenues and expenditures.

Fiscal federalism and local finance According to Hanson et al., fiscal federalism requires that: 1 2 3 4

the responsibilities of each level of government should be clearly delineated, subnational governments should have the means for primary control over economic matters within their jurisdiction, the budgets of subnational governments should be substantially independent of those at higher levels, transfers between levels should be based on stable, transparent, publicdomain formulae.3

Fiscal federalism and local budget revenues 83 As I shall demonstrate, the Russian Federation is still very far away from implementing these principles. In a major comparative study of local government finances in Russia and China, Zhuravskaya demonstrates that intergovernmental financial relations can either be ‘market-preserving’, or ‘market-hampering’.4 The theory of ‘market-preserving federalism’ stresses the importance of fiscal and political incentives for economic growth. The ‘structure of revenue sharing between regional and local governments affects governments’ incentives to foster business growth and to provide public goods efficiently.’5 The main underlying principles of ‘market-preserving’ federalism are: 1 2

3

4 5

6

Equality of all regions in their budget relations with the federal centre and of all localities in their relations with regional centres; Independence of budgets of different tiers that includes: own sources of income for each level, fixed legislation, the right to decide on own composition of expenditures; impossibility of taxing away additional revenues by the upper level of government; the right to be compensated for additional mandatory expenditures; the right to give any tax breaks that would affect only own sources of revenue; Legally established (fixed and transparent) distribution of expenditure responsibilities and sources of revenue between different levels of government; Correspondence of the expenditure responsibilities at every level of government with own revenues; Any redistribution of financial resources between the subjects of the federation or localities in one region, or financial aid to another level of government should follow objective criteria, be transparent and have a long-term legal basis, i.e., not subject to bargaining; All disputes about tax revenues or budgetary processes should be solved according to law-based standards.6

According to Zhuravskaya, the fiscal reforms of the early 1980s and 1994 in China induced a strong positive relationship between local revenue and local economic prosperity, thereby providing local officials with real incentives to foster prosperity and economic growth. Russia, in sharp contrast, has a ‘market-hampering’ system of fiscal relations. Thus, for example: Any change in a local government’s own revenues is almost entirely offset by an opposite change in shared revenues. Local governments are unable to benefit from an increase in the local tax base, and therefore lack a revenue incentive to expand the tax base.7 The Russian system also provides ‘perverse incentives for subnational governments to either hide locally mobilized revenue sources in extra budgetary funds, or to simply reduce their efforts to mobilize revenues locally’.8 Moreover, as

84

Fiscal federalism and local budget revenues

Kourliandskaya et al. note: ‘soft budget constraints permit local authorities to retain inefficient public facilities, overstaffed budget organizations and inefficient technologies for public service provision’.9 Local governments that experience a drop in their budget revenues know that they will be bailed out by regional administrations. As Zhuravskaya concludes: the Russian system of inter-governmental relations’ gives officials at all levels incentives to engage in poor tax collection, encourages the rebellion of the regions against the federal centre, and the localities against the regions, promotes the misuse and squandering of funds and, an unhealthy reliance on the part of the localities on federal transfers and subsidies.10 Formal and informal aspects In addition to the formal income and expenditure flows between federal, subnational and municipal budgets that are distributed through the tax system, there are a wide range of other forms of fiscal transfers: subventions, credits and off-budget funds. Non-budget’ (or off-budget) funds are one such informal channel through which the regions, and to a lesser degree the municipalities, have been able to carve out some local autonomy. But unlike formal budgetary issues, the spending part of non-budgetary funds is not controlled by the federal treasury. This opens the way for bureaucratic manipulation of these financial sources, and provides grounds for local-level corruption, which is widespread in Russia.11 As Orttung and Reddaway observe, during the Yeltsin era: A large amount of money was channelled through off-budget funds that were a black hole even for the experts. Many officials at the federal and regional levels preferred to keep the system opaque so that they could more easily hide the various flows from other officials and the public.12 As was the case in the communist era, local administrations have also relied on local deals with the major enterprises situated on their territories for the provision of social services and the maintenance of the local infrastructure.13 In return, these enterprises can expect to be rewarded with special ‘tax privileges, debt restructuring, and protection from bankruptcy or competition’.14 In those cities where one company dominates the economy, local officials will be that much more dependent on the goodwill of the management to fund the city’s infrastructure and the communal service sector (see Chapter 7). As Kurlyandskaya stresses: At the same time local governors concentrate enormous amounts of informal power through their negotiations to increase their own financial plan. A local tzar can blackmail local companies threatening to switch off the water, gas, and or electricity supplies. He[/she] may also accumulate non-tax revenues from off-budget funds and use them independently with almost no accountability. He[/she] can also suggest that a company provide direct services to local

Fiscal federalism and local budget revenues 85 government instead of being registered as a tax payer. The result, Russia’s existing budgetary system grants local governments informal power over formal, as formal power is miserably limited by the federal regulations on local budgetary rights.15 Jounda notes that the ‘privatization of policy making’, or ‘state capture’, is widespread at the regional and local levels. Here, large enterprises ‘are able to exact influence over the enactment of laws and policies through the provision of private benefits to public officials’.16 Privatization of industry has also increased the opportunity for regional and subregional local government heads to engage in bilateral deals with enterprise directors, and it has put a great deal of regional and municipal economic policy out of the hands of the federal government in Moscow. Collusion between business groups and local politicians is common practice in Russia, and many of these deals are negotiated behind closed doors. Regional and local administrations own shares in local enterprises, and many have their own authorized commercial banks to conduct their financial affairs. Local entrepreneurs are also able to defend and promote their interests through their membership of local councils and regional assemblies (see Chapter 8). In her study of over 800 regional officials, Stoner-Weiss showed that: ‘politicians and enterprise insiders used their independence from Moscow to stall and reverse reforms, and to maintain local firms as sources of rents for both politicians and managers’.17 Moreover, as Putin stated in his speech to the Congress of Municipalities in 2007: the monopolization of local markets, red tape and bribes paid to local officials for each authorization and signature have become insurmountable barriers to the development of entrepreneurship. As before, these conditions prevent local budgets from receiving necessary revenues and, in turn, prevent us from creating decent living conditions for our citizens.18 Political factors Another important factor is the highly unstable nature of the revenue base of municipalities and the politicization of the budget process. ‘Lack of clarity in the division of revenue and expenditure responsibilities leads to constant bargaining’ between the centre and the regions and, between regions and municipalities (see data below).19 As noted in Chapter 2, 46 bilateral deals signed between the regions and the centre granted special economic privileges to a number of federal subjects. In addition, political criteria dominated the system of fiscal transfers, with loyal regions and many of the ethnic republics receiving a larger slice of the economic pie than regions politically opposed to Yeltsin. As Bikalova notes, the bilateral treaties included: more than 200 separate agreements … in various spheres of activity, including financial matters. Eleven of them directly concerned the central government’s

86

Fiscal federalism and local budget revenues differentiation among federation members with respect to intergovernmental relations and taxation. Many of these agreements have only codified existing situations in intergovernmental budget relations, but others have created fiscal disparities and contradictions in the central government’s attitudes towards the governments of different federation members.20

Regional dominance of municipal budgets Regions in turn have the dominant voice in determining the amount of money allocated to municipal budgets. As Desai et al. point out, there ‘are wide opportunities for regions to decide almost unilaterally on specific budget sharing arrangements with municipalities’.21 Lavrov et al., note that: ‘a typical Russian region will have one or two strong cities or districts that supply the vast majority of tax revenue, while most of the remaining districts, usually without any sort of real tax base, are financed primarily by the regional budget.’22 According to Zhuravskaya: ‘the portions of shared taxes and the amounts of transfers are not determined on the basis of a fixed formula, and vary both over time and across localities within a single region.’23 Regions have the powers to decide: 1 2 3 4 5

The degree of fiscal equalization between the localities that will take place within the region. The extent to which the maintenance of infrastructure in more developed local areas will be supported. The degree to which tax sharing and transfers will stimulate or dampen local incentives for revenue mobilization. The relative stability, predictability, and adequacy of revenues received by the localities. The extent to which localities can meet their assigned responsibilities for provision of services to the public.24

Intra-regional budgeting often is based on subjective factors, depending on the personal or political relations between the regions and municipalities. Regions may experiment with more or less centralized schemes depending on their political preferences, specifics of economic structure, and social and geographical features. Regional disparities and discretion imply that incentive problems within Russia’s regions (i.e., in region-city relations) are even more severe than those at the national level (centre-region).25 Table 6.1 shows the wide variations in the shares of taxes allocated to the cities of Saratov, Perm, Petrazavodsk and Pskov over the period 1997–2001.

Fiscal federalism and local budget revenues 87 Table 6.1 Normative deductions from the basic shared (regulated taxes) in the budgets

of cities 1997–2001 Year/City VAT 1997 1998 1999 2000 Excise (alcohol) 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Income tax 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Profits tax 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Sales tax 1999 2000 2001

Saratov

Perm

Petrozavodsk

Pskov

3.7 3.9 7.3 5.2

40.0 26.0 22.4 50.0

20.0 10.0 12.0 7.0

12.5 – 10.2 10.0

25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 –

50.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 50.0 50.0

30.0 30.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 –

50.0 – 10.0 7.9 5.0 –

85.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 54.0 –

100.0 100.0 50.0 50.0 42.4 40.0

50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 42.0 –

90.0 – 85.0 80.0 75.6 –

1.0 5.0 3.5 3.0 4.0 –

5.9 2.0 10.0 44.0 37.6 31.0

9.0 7.0 50.0 50.0 5.0 –

25.0 – 25.0 43.0 60.0 –

60 60 60

60 60 60

60 60 60

60.0 60.0 60.0

Source: Vladimir Gel’man, ‘Reforma mestnoi vlasti v Rossii: sravnitel’naya perspektiva’, in V. Gel’man, S. Ryzhenkov, E. Belokurova, N. Borisova, Avtonomiya ili Kontrol’?: Reforma Mestnoi Vlasti v Gorodakh Rossii, 1991–2001, St Petersburg, Mosow: Letnii Sad, 2002, p. 327.

The tax system and tax revenues As Young notes, both the Russian Constitution and the 1995 Law sought to bolster the finances of local self-governments.26 After the proclamation of a presidential decree in December 1993 (‘On Forming the Republican Budgets of the

88

Fiscal federalism and local budget revenues

Russian Federation and Relations with the Budgets of the Subjects of the Russian Federation’) local governments were given even greater freedoms to introduce their own local taxes. Regional and local authorities actively used this right to impose taxes independently. Thus, for example, in the period from April to June 1994 over 70 regional and local taxes and fees were introduced in addition to those envisaged in the federal law. Regional and local authorities often introduced a multitude of small taxes, which were very difficult to administer. The 1997 Federal Law As Timofeev notes, the September 1997 Law ‘On Financial Foundations of Local Self-Governments’ (hereafter 1997 Law) ‘attempted to bring some structure to the regional-local sector by introducing a requirement that regional governments should, on average, meet some minimum sharing rates for the major taxes with local governments.’27 According to Kourliandskaya et al.: In drafting the law, federal advocates of local self-government were primarily seeking to ensure the financial sovereignty of their protégés, large cities whose mayors wield political clout. They proposed a draft law requiring that every local budget be assigned the same fixed rate of shared federal taxes. But since the tax base is distributed unevenly across municipalities, assigning uniform shares to all municipalities would only have perpetuated the existing inequality, leaving regional governments to carry out fiscal equalisation at their own discretion and from their own sources.28 Furthermore: The new law was premised on secured rights of local governments to receive transfers from federal and regional budgets, on established minimum revenue guarantees, on the right for local governments to retain any year-end surplus, and on a legal right to compensation for any local expenditures or decreased revenues mandated by federal or regional laws.29 Article 9 of the Law ‘provided unified procedures for sharing taxes and equalization transfers with municipalities’.30 No longer would local leaders be forced to go cap in hand to the regions or federal government to beg for local budget funds. According to the Law: minimum proportions of federal taxes were assigned to municipalities, including: at least 50 per cent of the income tax; at least 5 per cent of the profit tax; at least 10 per cent of the VAT; at least 5 per cent of excise taxes on alcohol, vodka and alcoholic beverages, and at least 10 per cent of excise taxes on a number of other products liable to excise taxes.31 In addition, Article 7 of the Law ‘required that a minimum of 10 per cent of the

Fiscal federalism and local budget revenues 89 Table 6.2 Tax sharing rates between federal, regional and local budgets (shown as a fraction of 100 per cent revenue collections for VAT and Income taxes; and as effective collection rates – for profit tax) Taxes

Budget level

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

VAT

Federal Regional Local Federal Regional Local Federal Regional Local

75.0 15.0 10.0 13.0 17.0 5.0 0.0 50.0 50.0

75.0 15.0 10.0 11.0 14.0 5.0 5.0* 45.0* 50.0

85.0 15.0 0.0 11.0 14.0 5.0 16.0 34.0 50.0

100.0 0.0 0.0 11.0 14.0 5.0 8.0 92.0 0.0

100.0 0.0 0.0 7.5 14.5 2.0 0.0 100.0 0.0

Profit tax

Income tax

* By estimation. In 1999, the income tax rates varied from 13 to 35 per cent, with 3 per cent of tax rate assigned to the federal budget, so not less than 27 per cent of collected revenues going to regional budgets. Source: Chernyavsky, Review of the Municipal Finance Development in Russia in 1992–2002, Moscow: Institute of Urban Economics, 2003, p. 11.

revenues from the privatization of public property located within municipalities should flow to local budgets, and it provided for the formation of funds for financial support to municipalities.’32 At the same time, municipalities and regions lost their right to introduce local taxes other than those stipulated in federal budget legislation. The 1997 Law was adopted only after ‘fierce opposition from the regional governors who used their membership of the Federation Council to veto the legislation’.33 As discussed in Chapter 4, Yeltsin sought to use this law as an economic lever against the regions. However, in implementing the Law, regional governments were able to manipulate its provisions to their own advantage. As Young notes, the law failed to provide stability of revenues: ‘Most regions calculated normative allotments as an average percentage throughout the region. Thus, one municipality could receive 8 per cent share of a particular tax and another municipality only 2 per cent.’34 From the August 1998 fiscal crisis to the 2005 budget programme As Timofeev observes: ‘after the August 1998 financial crisis the necessity to boost government revenues prompted a piecemeal introduction of the long debated Budget and Tax Codes’. The new Tax Code of August 1998 ‘provided regional governments with new tax instruments but at the same time eliminated most of the local governments own taxes’.35 Article 15 of the Code provided municipal governments with just five types of local tax payments: land tax; personal income tax; tax on advertising; death and gift tax, and local license fees.36 The introduction of the 2001 Tax code, adopted not long after Putin was elected

90

Fiscal federalism and local budget revenues

president, led to an even greater centralization of tax revenues. As Table 6.2 shows, local governments lost all revenue from VAT in 2000, and from Income Tax in 2001, and they were granted a lower percentage of profit taxes in 2002 (down from 5 to 2 per cent). In addition, as Timofeev points out, local governments lost the right ‘to levy the Housing Maintenance Tax (which made up for 14 per cent of the revenues of local budgets in 1999). As compensation, local governments gained the right to introduce a ‘piggy back’ corporate income tax of up to a maximum of 5 per cent.’37 The Russian Federation budgetary development programme 2001–05 As part of Putin’s overhaul of the federal system a major new programme of budgetary federalism was adopted in August 2001.38 Paralleling the Kozak Commission’s work in the legal and political arena, the new Budgetary Development Programme set forth principles for the delineation of expenditure responsibilities between all levels of government, and provided guidelines for their future redistribution. Amendments to the tax and budget codes were designed to clarify the allocation of taxes to each level of administration: federal, regional and local. Vladimir Leskin argues that it was this major overhaul of the budget and tax systems that eventually led to calls for the adoption of a new law on local self-government. Moreover, he argues that it was the demands of the fiscal federal system that ultimately determined the powers granted to local government in the 2003 Law: Events of recent years show convincingly that it is the specific regularities and natural laws of development of budgetary relations that have been increasingly shaping and influencing the essence and character of the country’s federal structure, rather than vice versa.39 Leskin also argues that, as a result of these developments, Russia has neither a ‘cooperative’ nor a ‘coordinated’ form of federalism: ‘It seems that Russia has made its own contribution by developing a new model – federalism of a predominantly “budgetary” nature. This model provides for the dominant role of the rules of centralized redistribution of budget flows’.40 Centralization of the tax system One of the most important centralizing factors is the structure of the Russian tax system, ‘in which the majority of taxes are federal, and it is the federal centre that decides on the introduction/abolition of regional and local taxes’.41 It is the federal government that ‘establishes what revenue sources may be available to regional and local governments, defines the tax base and rate for most taxes yielding revenue to subnational governments and determines sharing rates when taxes will be shared’.42 The federal government has the power to unilaterally ‘levy/cancel regional or local taxes, change the tax rates, grant tax breaks for those taxes and

Fiscal federalism and local budget revenues 91 Table 6.3 Taxes and fees in Russia 2005 Tax/fee

Level that Determines imposes the tax the tax base

Determines the tax rate

Receives the tax revenues

VAT

Federal

Federal

Federal

Federal 100%

Excises

Federal

Federal

Federal

Federal, regional

Profit tax

Federal

Federal

Federal*

Federal, regional

Income tax

Federal

Federal

Federal

Regional, local

Unified social tax

Federal

Federal

Federal

Federal + federal and territorial social funds

Taxes and payments on the use of natural resources

Federal

Federal

Federal

Federal, regional

Water tax

Federal

Federal

Federal

Federal 100%

Payments of the use of wild animals and biological water resources

Federal

Federal

Federal

Federal, regional

State fees

Federal

Federal

Federal

Federal, regional, local Regional 100%

Inheritance and gift tax Federal

Federal

Federal

Enterprise property tax Regional

Federal

Regional†

Regional 100%

†

Regional 100%

Gambling tax

Regional

Federal

Regional

Transport tax

Regional

Federal

Regional†

Regional 100%

Land tax

Regional

Federal

Local 100%

Tax on property of physical persons

Regional

Federal

Regional and local‡ Local§

* † ‡ §

Local 100%

Federal centre determines the rate and the upper level of the tax in the regions Regions determine the rate within the federally set limits Tax base is determined from the average tax rate set by law Localities determine the rate within federally set limits

Source: Laura Solanko and Merja Tekoniemi, ‘To Recentralise or Decentralise – Some Recent Trends in Russian Fiscal Federalism’, BOFIT Online, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition, Research Paper, No. 5, 2005, p. 17, http://www.bof.fi/bofit_en/tutkimus/tutkimusjulkaisut/online/2005/ bon0505.htm (Accessed 9 August 2007).

even concentrate a share of revenues from those taxes in higher budgets (e.g., land tax)’43 (see Table 6.3). Centralization of local taxes Martinez-Vazquez et al. measure the degree of discretion of local governments in Russia by ranking all revenues resources into the following categories:

92

Fiscal federalism and local budget revenues a b c d e f g

Subnational authority sets the tax rate and tax base, Subnational authority sets the tax rate only, Subnational authority sets the tax base only, Higher authority sets the rate and base of the subnational tax, Tax-sharing arrangements fix the revenue-split in legislation for an extended period but this may be unilaterally changed by higher authority, Revenue-split is determined by the higher authority as part of the annual budget process, Intergovernmental grants are determined by the higher authority as part of the annual budget process.44

Under this classification, ‘subnational authorities have some control over the revenue resources in categories (a)–(d). In the remaining categories, local discretion is very limited or nonexistent.’45 In addition, the authors define two further types of discretion: ‘Type 1 stands for discretion to introduce a tax instrument, while Type 0 stands for the absence of this type of discretion.’46 As Table 6.4 shows, ‘most of the discretionary revenue items reported by local governments in 2001 belong to either category (b) or category (e)’.47 Moreover, ‘for most of the revenues sources over which local governments have some control, the discretion is limited to setting the rates for the predetermined taxable bases’. Only ‘the holiday resort fee’ is classified as ‘category a’, which allows local governments to ‘choose the taxable base’.48 Tax-sharing revenues Table 6.5 compares the percentages of tax-sharing revenues (federal, regional and local) for the period 1998–2000 and plans for 2001–5. In almost every category considered, there is a centralization of tax revenues in the 2001–5 period. Thus, for example, the share of tax revenues for mining of coal and minerals in local budgets was set to drop from 28.8 per cent to 10 per cent; excise duties were planned to fall from 9.5 per cent to 0 per cent; ‘other duties’ (29.7 per cent to 0 per cent); personal income (52.4 per cent to 50 per cent); inheritance and gift (62.6 per cent to 0 per cent); transport (4.4 per cent to 0 per cent); property and land (45.2 per cent to 0 per cent); income from aggregate earnings (57.2 per cent to 0 per cent); advertising (31.1 per cent to 0 per cent). Local taxes Table 6.6 shows the distribution of taxes in the new municipalities created in line with the 2003 Law (as stipulated in the 2005 Budget Code). As can be seen, local governments are now left with only two local taxes: the ‘Land tax’ and the ‘Personal property tax’. Table 6.7 shows how these and the other shared taxes are allocated according to the type of municipality (city districts, municipal raions, settlements). The Budget Code (Article 61) provides the rates for the above taxes, which

Fiscal federalism and local budget revenues 93 Table 6.4 Classification of local government revenue sources 2001 Revenue item

Type

Holiday resort fee Tax on profit (income) of enterprises and organizations decreed for local budgets Tax on profit of foreign legal entities decreed for local budgets Tax on profit of exchanges, broker agencies, credit and insurance companies; tax on profit from middleman operations and transactions decreed for local budgets Other license/registration fees decreed for local budgets Other taxes/fees on goods/services Individual property tax Land tax Earmarked charges on individuals, enterprises, institutions and organizations for the upkeep of police force, landscaping, supporting educational institutions and other purposes Advertisement tax Housing and utilities tax Other local taxes and charges Revenue from public property ownership and uses Administrative payments Fines and sanctions Revenues from foreign trade Other non-tax revenues License for retail trade in alcohol Alcohol production license fee decreed for local budgets Sales tax Enterprise assets tax decreed for local budgets Estate and gift tax Levies on subsoil users State duty

a, 1 b, 0 b, 0 b, 0 b, 1 b, 1 b, 0 b, 0 b, 1 b, 1 b, 1 b, 1 b, 1 b, 1 b, 1 b, 1 a, 1 d, 1 e, 0 e, 0 e, 0 e, 0 e, 0 e, 0

Source: Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, Andrey Timofeev and Jameson Boex, Reforming Regional-Local Finance in Russia, Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2006, p. 90.

differ according to the level of municipality (settlement, municipal raion, city district).49 Thus, as Table 6.7 shows, settlements are allocated 100 per cent of land tax, 100 per cent of personal property tax, 10 per cent of income tax, and 30 per cent of the single agricultural tax. Municipal raions receive 100 per cent of land tax, 100 per cent of property tax, 20 per cent of personal income tax, 90 per cent of the single tax on imputed income, 30 per cent of the single unified agricultural tax, and 100 per cent of legal duties. City districts are allocated 100 per cent of property tax, 100 per cent of land tax, 30 per cent of income tax, 90 per cent of the single tax on imputed income, 60 per cent of the single agricultural tax, and 100 per cent of state duties. By far the largest source of tax revenue is the property tax, which comprised 84.0 per cent of the total tax income of municipalities in 2006.50 As can be seen in Table 6.8, the largest share of income, property tax and land tax went to the city districts, while the municipal raions had the largest share of the unified agricultural tax.

60.5 100.0 100.0 22.3 100.0 50.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 31.4 0.0 0.0 20.4 15.1 97.0 0.0 19.5 0.0

23.8 0.0 0.0 48.9 0.0 40.5 70.3 46.6 37.4 54.3 95.6 40.0 31.4 70.2 1.8 54.8 23.3 68.9

15.6 0.0 0.0 28.8 0.0 9.5 29.7 52.4 62.6 14.3 4.4 60.0 48.3 14.7 1.1 45.2 57.2 31.1

Local 61.1 100.0 100.0 80.0 100.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Subject of RF (Consolidated) 38.9 0.0 0.0 20.0 0.0 50.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 70.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 21.1 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 50.0 100.00 50.0 100.0 55.0 100.0 40.0 50.0 50.0 80.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Regional

17.8 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 15.0 0.0 60.0 50.0 50.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Local

Federal

Region

Federal

Subjects of RF (Consolidated) 39.5 0.0 0.0 77.7 0.0 50.0 100.0 99.0 100.0 68.6 100.0 100.0 79.6 84.9 3.0 100.0 80.5 100.0

As a result of realizing the programme of budget federalism 2001–5

According to legislation in operation 1998–2000

Source: E.V. Bushmin (chair of the Budget Committee of the Federation Council). Report presented to the Council of Europe, Congress of Local and Regional Authorities Conference on Russian Local Government and Finance, St Petersburg, 23–4 April 2002, p. 8, http://www.coe.int (Accessed 8 November 2003).

Total income from taxes Customs Value Added Tax Mining of cvoal and minerals Excise duties (oil, gas, petrol, automobiles Excise duties alcohol Other duties Personal income Inheritance and gift Enterprises profits Transport Sales Other natural resources Environmental tax Gambling Property and land Income from aggregate earnings Advertising

Tax

Table 6.5 Estimation of changes in tax income between levels of the budget system 1998–2000 and 2001–5 (per cent) according to the Russian Federation Programme of Budget Federalism 2001–5

Fiscal federalism and local budget revenues 95 Table 6.6 Distribution of taxes between budgets of various levels according to provisions of the Budget Code 2005 Tax

Federal Regional City Municipal Settlements budgets budgets Okrugs Raions

Federal taxes Tax on enterprise profits (rate 24 per cent) VAT Personal income

6.5

17.5

0.0

0.0

0.0

100.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

70.0

30.0

20.0

10.0

100.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

50.0

50.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

Excises on alcoholic products

0.0

100.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

NDPI* on hydrocarbons (oil)

95.0

5.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

Inheritance and gift Excises on spirit

NDPI on other minerals

0.0

100.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

100.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

Duties on livestock

0.0

100.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

Uniform tax (simplified)

0.0

90.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

Unified tax (‘na vmenennyi nalog’)

0.0

0.0

90.0

90.0

0.0

Water tax

Unified agricultural tax

0.0

30.0

60.0

30.0

30.0

20.0

40.0

40.0

40.0

0.0

Business Property tax

0.0

100.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

Gambling

0.0

100.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

Transport

0.0

100.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0 0.0

0.0 0.9

100.0 100.0

0.0 0.0

100.0 100.0

Environmental Regional taxes

Local taxes Land tax Personal Property tax * National Resource Tax Source: A. S. Votinova and P. V. Panov, ‘Dinamika Regional’noi Politiki po Voprosam Mezhbyudzhetnykh Otnoshenii v Permskoi Oblasti v Nachale 2000 godov’, Politicheskii Almanakh Prikam’ya, Perm’, Vol. 6, 2006, p. 289.

Measuring fiscal centralization/decentralization As Danielian notes, intergovernmental fiscal relations in Russia under Yeltsin were characterized by two major tendencies: ‘decentralization of expenditure obligations’ and ‘centralization of revenue sources’.51 Since President Putin came to power in 2000 these trends have gained pace, and we have witnessed a radical redistribution of budget revenues in favour of the federal government and federal subjects.

96

Fiscal federalism and local budget revenues

Table 6.7 Distribution of taxes to municipalities 2006 City and rural Settlements Municipal Raions

City districts

Land tax – 100 per cent

Land tax – 100 per cent

Land tax – 100 per cent

Personal property tax – 100 per cent

Personal property Tax – 100 per cent

Personal property tax – 100 per cent

Personal income tax – 10 per cent

Personal income tax – 20 per Personal income tax – 30 per cent cent

Single agricultural tax – 30 per cent

Single agricultural tax – 30 per cent

Single agricultural tax – 60 per cent

Federal single tax on imputed Federal single tax on imputed income – 90 per cent income – 90 per cent State duties – 100 per cent State duties – 100 per cent Source: ‘Stremlenie ot absolyuta’, Expert Ural, No. 39(256), 2006, p. 1, http://www.expert.ru/schemes/ ural/2006/39/document146179/ (no author cited) (Accessed September 2007).

Table 6.8 Share of local taxes by type of municipality (per cent) 2006 Type of tax

City districts

Municipal Raions

Settlements

Total

Income

59.5

36.4

4.1

100.0

Property

61.4

18.2

20.4

100.0

Unified agricultural tax Land tax

9.1 63.0

60.6 20.4

30.3 16.6

100.0 100.0

Source: ‘Informatsiya o Rezul’takh Monitoringa Mestnykh Byudgetov Rossiiskoi Federatsii po Sostoyaniyu na 1 Oktyabrya 2006 goda’, Russian Federation Ministry of Finance, 2006, p. 7, http:// www.minfin.ru (Accessed 12 February 2007).

Lavrov et al., in their study of fiscal federalism, provide two key measures of fiscal decentralization: ‘the share of the subnational budgets in consolidated revenue and expenditures, and the degree to which subnational budgets consist of revenue raised on their territories’.52 Let us test these two criteria with particular reference to municipal budgets. Criterion 1: The share of local revenues in the Consolidated Budget of the Russian Federation Turning to a discussion of the percentage of municipal tax revenues in the Consolidated Budget of the Russian Federation, Table 6.9 shows that in 1998 the system was relatively decentralized with just 43.1 per cent of tax revenues going to the federal budget and 56.9 per cent to the consolidated regional and local budgets. Within the consolidated regional budgets, tax revenues were allocated between the regional and local levels in the following proportions: 28.1 (regional); 28.8 (municipal). However, in 2001, just one year after Putin took over the presidency, there was a sharp rise of over 13 percentage points in the tax revenues going to the federal budget, and the figures were now almost the reverse of 1998, with

Fiscal federalism and local budget revenues 97 Table 6.9 Distribution of revenues between levels of the budget system: percentage of the Consolidated Budget of the Russian Federation. Year

Federal

Consolidated regional

Regional

Municipal

1998

43.1

56.9

28.1

28.8

2001

56.5

43.5

23.1

20.4

2003 2005

58.7 56.2

41.3 43.8

28.5 32.1

12.8 11.6

Source: Data for 1998–2003: M. A. Vasil’ev, Yu. Kirillov and I. A. Kokin, Reforma Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Shkemakh i Tablitsakh, Obninsk: Obninsk Instityt Munitsipal’novo Upravleniya, 2004, p. 23; figures for 2005: Sergei Turnov, ‘Mezhbyudgetnye otnosheniya v svete Rossiiskoi modeli Federalizma’, in Rafael Khakimov (ed.), Politiko-Pravovye Resursy Federalizma v Rossii, Kazan: Kazan Institute of Federalism, 2006, p. 353.

56.5 per cent allocated to the federal budget and 43.5 per cent to the consolidated regional budgets. Regional budgets share of tax revenues fell by five per cent, while that of municipalities dropped by 8.4 per cent to 20.4 per cent. In 2003, there was a further steep decline in the share of municipal revenues, which made up just 12.8 per cent of the revenues of the Consolidated Budget of the Russian Federation. By 2005, the ratio was 56.2 per cent (federal), 32.1 per cent (regional) and just 11.6 per cent (local). International practice suggests that a ‘reasonable distribution of budget funds between the three levels of power (federal, regional and local) should fluctuate around the following ratio: 50:25:25’.53 The Russian Federation falls far short of this target. An even more dramatic picture emerges if we measure the share of revenues as a percentage of GDP. As Table 6.10 shows, over the period 1996–2002 the municipal share of consolidated budget revenues as a percentage of GDP fell from 10.2 per cent to 6.5 per cent, while for regional budgets it rose from 4.9 to 8.3 per cent, and for the federal budget from 10.8 to 13.5 per cent. Moreover, as Table 6.11 shows, municipal revenues fell by 23.3 per cent over the period 1996–2002. As Chenyavsky and Vartapetov note, while the decline in 1998 was due to the August financial crisis, the fall in revenues in 1999 ‘was mostly caused by the shift of revenues from local to regional budgets’.54 MartinezVazquez et al. note: At the peak of decentralization in 1996, only 25 per cent of consolidated government tax collections were directly allocated to local governments despite the fact that local governments accounted for 34 per cent of consolidated government expenditures. By 2001, after five years of recentralizations, these figures had dropped to 14 per cent and 24 per cent, respectively. Thus, tax revenues assigned to local governments, both from own-source and shared revenue sources, cover slightly more than half of their expenditures.55 Table 6.12 shows the tax receipts in the republic of Tatarstan in the period 2004–5. As can be seen in 2005, there was a significant rise in the share of federal taxes centralized in the federal budget, which rose from 50.6 per cent in 2004 to 59.7 per

98

Fiscal federalism and local budget revenues

cent in 2005. At the same time, there was a sharp drop in the percentage of taxes to the local budget, which fell from 13.8 per cent in 2004 to 7.6 per cent. As the chair of the Public Chamber’s Committee on Local-Self Government, Vyacheslav Glazychev notes: Today the proportion of distribution of tax revenues is 60 per cent to the centre, 40 per cent to the regions … . A rational proportion is the other way round: 40 Table 6.10 Distribution of revenues between levels of the Russian budget system (excluding transfers): percentage of GDP Year/budget level

Federal budget

Regional budgets

Local budgets

1996

10.8

4.9

10.2

1997

10.8

6.6

10.9

1998

9.7

6.3

8.75

1999

11.3

7.1

6.8

2000

14.6

8.7

6.4

2001 2002

15.1 13.5

7.8 8.3

6.5 6.5

Source: Andrei Chernyavsky and Karen Vartapetov, ‘Municipal finance reform and local selfgovernance in Russia’, Post-Communist Economies, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2004, p. 254.

Table 6.11 Local revenue growth (decline) rates 1997–2002 1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

Local revenue growth rate (1996=100) 112.2

83.1

70.1

70.2

73.5

76.7

Source: Andrei Chernyavsky and Karen Vartapetov, ‘Municipal finance reform and local selfgovernance in Russia’, Post-Communist Economies, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2004, p. 254.

Table 6.12 Variations in income receipts from taxes in the Republic of Tatarstan 2004–5 for all levels of the budget system of the Russian Federation (billion roubles) Taxes in various levels of budget system

2004

%

2005

%

Total taxes (billion roubles)

94,104.5

100.0

140,791.3

100.0

Federal budget

47,587.7

50.6

84,038.4

59.7

Consolidated budget of Republic of Tatarstan

46,516.8

49.4

56,752.9

40.3

Republic budget

29,394.8

31.2

43,331.0

30.8

Local budgets Grants

12,956.1 4,165.9

13.8 4.4

10,667.8 2,754.1

7.6 1.9

Including

Of these:

Source: Vadim Khomenko, ‘Differentsiatsiya v ekonomicheskom i sotsial’nom razvitii regionov Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, in Rafael Khakimov (ed.), Politiko-Pravovye Resursy Federalizma v Rossii, Kazan: Kazan Institute of Federalism, 2006, p. 291.

Fiscal federalism and local budget revenues 99 to the centre, 60 to the regions. My opinion is that today we need a different system: 40-40-20. Part of the tax revenues – ideally 40 or at least 20 per cent should be collected directly by the municipalities.56 However, he concludes: ‘The sad story is that governors, big business, intellectual and other major interest groups have some kind of political representation or lobbying groups, while the municipalities have no voice.’57 Criterion 2: The degree to which subnational budgets consist of revenue raised on their territories As Kourliandskaya et al. note, there are five types of municipal budget revenues: 1 2 3 4 5

local taxes and fees; permanently assigned taxes and fees; shared tax revenues (at rates decided annually); non-tax revenues; grants from higher-level budgets which include: transfers, subsidies, subventions, and mutual settlements.58

Non-tax revenues include: federal transfers, ‘revenues raised from privatising assets, the leasing of municipal assets, borrowing, receipts from local lotteries, a share of the profits of municipal enterprises …, subsidies’, and payments for municipal services. In addition, local authorities may receive payment, for the exploitation of natural resources on their territories.59 As discussed in Chapter 7, the municipalization of property has turned some local governments into large property owners. Approximately 40 per cent of public property belongs to municipalities. However, as Danielian concludes, municipal property in Russia is ‘more moneyconsuming than money-producing’.60 Own, assigned and regulated revenues Revenues can be further subdivided into: ‘own source revenues’ (both tax and non-tax), which are granted on a permanent basis and over which local governments have the most discretion;61 ‘assigned revenue’, which refers to ‘legislated long term entitlements to (a share of) the yield from tax instruments over which local officials have no discretion’;62 and ‘regulated (shared) revenues’, which are the shares of federal and regional taxes assigned to local budgets for the forthcoming financial year or on a long-term basis (no less than three years) as a means of fiscal equalization.63 Chernyavsky notes that: ‘the ratio between a municipality’s “own revenues” to its total revenues, is a good indicator of its fiscal autonomy. The higher the share of “own source” subnational revenues, the greater the level of decentralization.’64 As can be seen in the data presented below, the Russian Federation has one of the most centralized budget systems in the world. Thus, for example, as is shown in

100

Fiscal federalism and local budget revenues

Table 6.13, ‘own revenues’ fell from 24.9 per cent in 1998 to 18.7 per cent of total revenues in 2002, with a sharp fall in 2000–1, which was largely a result of the centralizing tax reforms of the Putin regime and the enactment of the second part of the Russian Tax Code.65 Such low levels of ‘own revenues’ in municipal budgets ‘encourages large-scale distribution and redistribution processes among levels of public government’.66 Over the period 1996–2002 the share of transfers from federal and regional levels, after falling to 26.7 per cent, rose to 40.5 per cent in 2002. As Leskin notes: ‘the growing share of subventions from the budgets of higher governments in the revenues of regional and local budgets drastically reduces the independence of regional and local authorities to select areas where budget funds should be spent.’67 See discussion of expenditure in Chapter 7. Table 6.14 shows data for own source, assigned, regulated revenues and grants in 74 regions of Russia in 2001. As can be seen, there are wide variations in the mean share of own source revenues in municipal budgets, ranging from lows of just 1.3 per cent in Yevenk AO and 2.4 per cent in Dagestan, to 35.8 per cent in the city of St Petersburg and 38.4 per cent in Leningrad Oblast. Assigned revenues varied from 1.8 per cent in Jewish AO to 38.8 per cent in St Petersburg. Grants varied from 15.7 per cent in resource-rich Khansy-Mansiskii AO to 92.1 per cent in rural Dagestan, while regulated revenues varied from 3.0 per cent in St Petersburg and 4.4 in Dagestan to 45.8 per cent in Sverdlovsk. The percentages of own source revenues in Russia are much lower than for many other countries. Thus, for example, as Martinez-Vazquez and Boex demonstrate: in New Zealand these made up 89 per cent, Sweden (82 per cent), France (71 per cent), Finland (67 per cent), USA (62 per cent), Spain (57 per cent), Germany (55 per cent), Austria and Poland (50 per cent).68 Table 6.13 Municipal budget revenues by source 1996–2002 (per cent) Revenues/years

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

Tax revenues, including:

59.5

60.5

63.6

69.4

68.2

61.2

53.5

7.1

7.5

7.9

6.8

5.3

0.0

0.0

Profit tax

11.5

9.3

9.1

14.6

13.5

16.7

10.9

Personal income tax

16.95

18.2

18.4

16.6

16.8

21.1

23.3

9.2

8.9

10.0

7.8

6.2

6.7

7.1

Sales tax

–

–

2.8

2.9

2.8

2.5

Local taxes (excluding individual property tax, but including land tax)

N/a

N/a

13.4

14.9

5.1

3.1

VAT

Property taxes

Non-tax revenues

0.02 11.2

2.4

2.2

3.7

3.6

3.5

4.3

6.0

Intergovenmental transfers 37.8 Share of ‘own revenues’ –

37.3 –

32.5 24.92

26.7 27.6

28.3 27.5

34.2 18.9

40.5 18.7

Source: A. V. Chernyavsky, Review of the Municipal Finance Development in Russia in 1992–2002, Analytical Report, Moscow: Institute of Urban Economics, 2003, pp. 19–20.

Table 6.14 Mean share of local revenues in 74 regions 2001 (per cent)

Republic of Bashkortostan Republic of Buryatiya Republic of Dagestan Kabardino-Balkar Republic Republic of Kalmykiya Republic of Kareliya Republic of Komi Republic of Mari El Republic of Mordovia Republic of North Osetiya-Alaniya Republic of Tatarstan Republic of Tyva Udmurt Republic Ingush Republic Chuvash Republic Krasnodar Krai Krasnoyarsk Krai Primorskii Krai Khabarovsk Krai Amur Oblast Arkhangel’sk Oblast Astrakhan Oblast Bryansk Oblast Vladimir Oblast Volgograd Oblast Vologda Oblast Voronezh Oblast Nizhny Novgorod Oblast Irkutsk Oblast Kaliningrad Oblast Tver’ Oblast Kaluga Oblast Kamchatka Oblast Kemerovo Oblast Kirov Oblast Kostroma Oblast Samara Oblast

Own source

Assigned

Regulated

12.7 7.7 2.7 7.2 10.7 11.8 12.9 12.9 13.2 7.6 19.9 1.2 11.0 2.7 5.8 28.9 11.1 11.8 10.2 7.2 13.6 16.0 17.5 17.6 11.6 17.9 21.0 17.3 10.6 10.9 9.0 10.9 5.0 10.2 13.6 14.4 16.6

11.1 7.3 0.8 2.8 7.2 9.3 11.7 4.6 11.9 3.0 11.4 1.4 19.1 2.2 7.4 6.6 4.8 6.5 9.3 6.0 3.3 8.1 7.4 7.7 9.8 5.3 6.9 4.5 8.2 5.1 5.9 4.1 3.5 5.0 6.3 8.0 17.3

12.1 10.7 4.4 33.4 13.2 31.6 27.2 22.0 21.1 28.6 15.3 7.9 22.4 14.9 10.0 27.6 15.5 18.2 23.8 22.0 32.4 26.5 18.8 21.4 25.6 30.5 25.0 18.1 43.5 32.3 26.8 32.7 11.9 23.3 21.6 28.6 27.3

Grants 64.1 74.3 92.1 56.7 68.9 47.4 48.2 60.6 53.8 60.9 53.5 89.5 47.6 80.2 76.8 36.9 68.7 63.5 56.7 64.8 50.6 49.4 56.4 53.4 53.1 46.3 47.2 60.1 37.7 51.6 58.3 52.4 79.6 61.5 58.6 49.1 38.9 (continued )

Own source Kurgan Oblast Leningrad Oblast

Assigned

Regulated

Grants

6.5

6.3

17.4

69.8

38.4

9.3

18.0

34.3

Lipetsk Oblast

17.4

10.7

25.9

46.0

Magadan Oblast

14.8

10.7

28.7

45.7

Moscow Oblast

27.9

12.4

28.7

31.0

Murmansk Oblast

9.7

7.8

37.2

45.3

Novgorod Oblast

9.2

5.5

36.6

48.8

Novosibirsk Oblast

12.3

9.2

21.8

56.7

Omsk Oblast

11.7

8.0

13.7

66.6

Orenburg Oblast

13.6

18.1

26.4

41.8

Orel Oblast

8.1

4.2

29.5

58.2

Penza Oblast

8.6

3.2

17.7

70.5

Perm Oblast

15.1

13.5

24.1

47.3

Pskov Oblast

19.3

8.4

25.7

46.7

Rostov Oblast

17.4

3.1

21.4

58.2

Ryazan Oblast

13.4

7.1

27.2

52.3

Saratov Oblast

14.3

16.6

28.2

40.9

Sakhalin Oblast

15.3

8.9

27.6

48.2

Sverdlovsk Oblast

15.8

9.2

45.8

29.2

Smolensk Oblast

12.0

8.3

34.8

44.9

Tambov Oblast

11.6

6.2

8.4

73.8

Tomsk Oblast

13.5

14.3

13.8

58.5

7.9

4.5

20.9

66.7

Tyumen Oblast

10.3

6.5

12.4

70.9

Ulyanovsk Oblast

10.4

7.3

29.8

52.5

Chelyabinsk Oblast

17.1

12.0

22.1

48.9

Chita Oblast

11.6

8.5

12.6

67.3

City of St Petersburg

35.8

38.5

3.0

22.8

Republic of Adygeya

12.4

4.5

15.8

67.3

6.6

1.8

10.6

81.1

Tula Oblast

Jewish AO Karachaeva-Cherkassiya Republic Republic of Khakasiya Komi-Perm AO Koryak AO Khansy-Mansiskii AO Yevenk AO Yamala Nenetskii AO

3.5

2.8

13.2

80.6

13.7

6.4

14.9

65.1

6.8

2.5

6.2

84.5

8.3

6.8

17.3

67.7

20.1

26.4

37.7

15.7

1.3

6.7

13.2

78.9

12.3

17.8

28.2

41.8

Source: Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, Andrey Timofeev and Jameson Boex, Reforming Regional-Local Finance in Russia, Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2006, pp. 97–8.

Fiscal federalism and local budget revenues 103 As can be seen in Table 6.15, the percentage of ‘own tax income’ in the municipal budgets of regions in Volga Federal District in 2004 did not exceed 5 per cent, and in one region comprised just 1 per cent of total tax revenues. Subventions and grants As noted in Chapter 5, the 2003 Law calls for regions to ensure that there is an equalization of revenues across the different tiers of local government. This reliance on subsidies and grants from above has severely limited the financial autonomy of local governments, and it provides little incentives for local governments to seek new local sources of revenues. Thus, for example, according to a study of 77 federal subjects by the Ministry of Finance in 2006, the total income of municipal budgets comprised 994.6 milliard roubles. Income from taxes comprised 29.7 per cent of the total income, non-tax income comprised just 8.4 per cent. By far the largest component of local revenues was subventions from the federal and regional compensation funds (29.8 per cent) and other inter-budget transfers (27.5 per cent), which together made up 57.3 per cent of total revenues.69 Table 6.16 shows that the largest share of income in city districts comes from taxes (37.9 per cent), while non-tax income comprises just 12.3 per cent. Transfers and revenues from the compensation fund make up a total of 45 per cent. For municipal raions, by far the greatest proportion of their income comes from transfers Table 6.15 Structure of the income of local budgets in the regions of the Volga Federal District 2004 (per cent) Subject of Russian Federation

Taxes as a percentage of Share of local Allocations from the total income of local taxes (%) federal and budgets regional taxes (%)

Republic of Bashkortostan 53

1

52

Republic of Marii El

30

2

28

Republic of Mordoviya

64

2

62

Republic of Tatarstan

37

5

32

Chuvash Republic

32

2

30

Kirov Oblast

33

2

31

Nizhegorod Oblast

59

2

57

Orenburg Oblast

66

4

62

Udmurt Republic

53

4

49

Perm Oblast

49

3

46

Samara Oblast

70

4

66

Saratov Oblast Ul’yanov Oblast

52 58

3 5

49 53

Source: Vadim Khomenko, ‘Differentsiatsiya v ekonomicheskom i sotsial’nom razvitii regionov Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, in Rafael Khakimov (ed.), Politiko-Pravovye Resursy Federalizma v Rossii, Kazan: Kazan Institute of Federalism, 2006, p. 291.

104

Fiscal federalism and local budget revenues

Table 6.16 Structure of the income of local budgets 2006 (billion roubles) Type of income

Tax

City Okrugs

Municipal Raions

City and rural settlements

Roubles %

Roubles

Roubles %

%

181.1

37.9

99.7

21.7

13.4

22.9

58.5

12.3

23.4

5.1

5.4

9.2

239.6

50.2

123.1

26.8

18.8

32.1

96.9

20.3

150.0

32.7

30.0

51.3

Compensation fund

117.9

24.7

168.0

36.6

8.0

13.7

Other income Total

22.8 477.2

4.8 100.0

17.8 458.9

3.9 100.0

1.7 58.5

2.9 100.0

Non-tax Total tax and non-tax Inter-budget transfers (not including compensation fund)

Source: ‘Informatsiya o Rezul’takh Monitoringa Mestnykh Byudgetov Rossiiskoi Federatsii po Sostoyaniyu na 1 Oktyabrya 2006 goda’, Russian Federation Ministry of Finance, 2006, p. 4, http:// www.minfin.ru (Accessed 12 February 2007).

and subventions from the compensation fund (69.3 per cent), while income from taxes makes up 21.7 per cent and non-tax income comprises 5.1 per cent.70 For city and rural settlements, 65 per cent of their income comes from transfers and the compensation fund; taxes make up 22.9 per cent and non-tax income is 9.2 per cent. Overall, 61.1 per cent of all tax income accrues to city districts, 33.9 per cent to municipal raions and just 4.6 per cent to settlement budgets.

The impact of the 2003 Law and tax legislation on local budget revenues According to Glazychev, as a result of the 2003 Law, municipalities have been ‘left with a tiny fraction of their previous tax revenues’, and local self-government has been turned ‘into a decoration … . The system of tax revenue distribution is such that all of them have to beg for the money necessary to perform even the minimum of their responsibilities under the law. This is the best form of control.’71 Thus, for example, in 2006 there was not a single municipality in the Volga Federal District that did not depend on grants from the regional budget for its economic survival. In the city of Velikii Luky, the sum of 1.8 billion roubles was collected in taxes in 2005 but the city budget was able to keep only 222.9 million. The mayor of the city (Lyudmila Golubeva) reported that the city had to sell off some of its municipal property in order to meet its most pressing expenditures.72 The vast majority of raions and municipal settlements of the Vologda region experienced a financial crisis just one year after the municipal elections in June 2005, and they all had to turn to the regional administration to bail them out. In the Vologda Municipal Raion, an average of 52.5 per cent of the revenues of the municipal settlements came in the form of grants from the regional administration (with variations of between 19.3 per cent and 86.4 per cent). In other parts of

Fiscal federalism and local budget revenues 105 the region the situation was even worse: for example, the chair of the Vologda Regional Assembly, Nikolai Tikhomirov, declared that raions in the eastern part of the Oblast could independently raise only 5–10 per cent of their budgets.73 According to the Association of Cities, Settlements and Rural Councils of Kaluga Region, the amount of funds allocated to municipalities in 2006 was two to five times less (according to the type of municipality) than in 2005.74 In many cases, regional administrations do not distribute shared taxes to localities. Thus, for example, in clear violation of the 2003 Law, Orenburg Region adopted legislation in December 2005 mandating that 80 per cent of the land tax collected in the municipalities was to be transferred back to the regional budget.75 According to tax legislation, the City of Yekaterinburg in 2006 was entitled to receive 1.3 billion roubles from the land tax. However, in the end the regional administration allocated only 750 million roubles. In 2006, it was predicted there would be a budget deficit of 8.2 per cent, up from 3.6 per cent in 2005.76 According to Sergei Balakhanov, mayor of the City of Zhigulev, ‘the influence of the regional powers is far greater now than it was several years ago. A situation that is in sharp contradiction to the aims of the [local government] reforms.’77 The mismatch between revenues and expenditures has led to a situation whereby, in 2006, only 2 per cent of local budgets in the Russian Federation were balanced, and the average debt (without considering revenues from federal and regional grants) was 50 per cent.78 In Russia, as this chapter has demonstrated, both the financial capacity and the budget autonomy of local governments are extremely low. As Leskin notes: a huge inconsistency has emerged at this level of government between the scope of legislated issues of local significance and powers delegated to local government by the state on the one hand, and the amount of resources provided to bodies of local government to perform these functions and duties on the other.79 Moreover, impoverished municipalities that rely on federal aid and regional grants to meet their local expenditure obligations are hardly in a position to develop strong independent political institutions (see Chapters 8–10). In the next chapter, the discussion turns to municipal expenditures, and the mismatch between income and expenditure, which has led to a situation whereby a majority of municipalities now suffer from chronic budget deficits.

7

Fiscal federalism and local budget expenditures

The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in its Economic Survey of Russia in 2000, noted that: ‘ambiguity in expenditure assignments has plagued the development of fiscal federalist relations in Russia’.1 In particular, there has been a lack of clarity over those areas, such as education, health and social policy, that come under the joint jurisdiction of the regions and the federal government. As Kurlyandskaya notes: Prior to the recent reforms that changed the assignment of responsibilities across governments of different levels in the Russian Federation, regional governments were free to determine almost all aspects of their fiscal relations with constituent localities. The ratio of local to regional budget expenditures varied in different regions from 15:85 to 85:15. The lack of clear delimitation of expenditure responsibilities between regional and local governments led to continuous disputes over who – what level of government – was responsible for delivering this or that service and who should provide the funding.2 The Kozak Commission has attempted to provide a much clearer delineation of expenditure responsibilities and functions between federal, regional and local bodies of power. In particular, there has been an attempt to deal with the problem of overlapping jurisdictions (between federal/regional and regional/ local governments) by providing a much more comprehensive list of the budget responsibilities for each level of government. Thiessen argues that changes enacted in accordance with the recommendations of the Kozak Commission have produced four main types of improvements: 1

2

responsibility for assignments were clarified, particularly concerning the relations between the federal, on the one hand, and regional and local governments, on the other; a distinction between “delegated” and “own” responsibilities was made with the implication that the government level that is delegating must provide sufficient financing shown in the budgets (of the central and regional governments);

Fiscal federalism and local budget expenditures 107 3 4

unfunded expenditure mandates were abolished; and some important expenditure responsibilities were reassigned.3

Thiessen also notes that the ‘new order of assignments includes an exclusive list of own responsibilities of regional and local governments and adheres closely to the subsidiary principle’. Thus, for example, a number of responsibilities that previously came under the jurisdiction of federal government (‘wage regulation in the public sector, fire protect, social benefits to the disabled, allowances to families with children, pre-school education, specialized and general health-care, and subsidies to agriculture’), were devolved to regional and local governments.4 Equally, many expenditures which came under the jurisdiction of regional and local governments were ‘assigned to the central level; higher education, R and D in health-care and expensive health treatment, fundamental research, army recruiting, benefits for federal government officials, subsidies to private enterprises with the exception of expenditure, and social benefits to veterans and to Chernobyl victims.’5 Another major benefit that will come into operation when the 2003 Law is fully implemented is that local governments will be ‘required to spend money on a “function” or a public service rather than on an “institution”’.6 Previously, as discussed in Chapter 4, the functions of local self-governments were dependent on which facilities were owned by the municipality. However, many of the above benefits are undermined by the fact that, according to the 2003 Law, federal and regional governments have the right to delegate obligatory expenditure duties to local governments. In addition, as noted in Chapter 6, the highest share of local budget revenues come from grants and subventions, which are subject to tight controls by federal and regional administrations. In addition, as discussed below, local governments have the right to delegate expenditure functions to each other, and to date this has mainly taken the form of settlement budgets delegating some of their expenditure responsibilities to higherlevel municipal districts and city districts.

Key areas of municipal expenditure As Table 7.1 shows, three items dominated municipal expenditure over the period 1996–2002: education, housing and communal services, and health and fitness. In 2002, these three areas of expenditure made up 68.2 per cent of total expenditure. Education was the largest item comprising just over one-third of total expenditures (33.2 per cent), followed by housing and municipal services (19.5 per cent), and health and fitness (15.5 per cent). There was a steady decline in local expenditures for housing and communal services as a result of ‘progress in transferring the burden of housing costs to the general population’ (see below).7 Lower down the scale was spending on branches of the local economy, which made up 9.9 per cent of total expenditures, and social policy, which comprised 7.6 per cent. The planned expenditure of local budgets in 2006 was 1,458.7 billion roubles, which exceeded their planned income by 56.3 billion roubles.8 As Table 7.2 shows the same three areas (education, housing and health and sport) dominated

108

Fiscal federalism and local budget expenditures

Table 7.1 Structure of expenditure in local budgets in the Russian Federation 1996–2002 (per cent) Expenditure items/years

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

Expenditure total

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Local administration

3.3

4.3

5.3

5.7

6.0

6.5

6.7

Branches of the economy*

8.3

6.6

7.0

6.3

5.7

10.5

9.9

Housing and communal services

26.6

27.0

30.3

27.4

28.9

24.6

19.5

Education

33.2

25.6

26.2

28.1

28.1

28.0

28.0

Culture, arts and cinema

2.1

2.1

2.3

2.5

2.8

2.6

3.0

Public health and fitness

14.5

14.5

5.0

15.8

16.0

14.9

15.5

Social policy Other expenditures

7.2 12.4

6.3 13.0

5.7 8.6

5.5 8.7

4.8 7.8

6.5 6.4

7.6 4.6

* Manufacturing, power production, construction, farming, transport, roads and communications Source: A. V. Chernyavsky, Review of the Municipal Finance Development in Russia in 1992–2002, Analytical Report, Moscow: Institute For Urban Economics, 2003, p. 30.

Table 7.2 Expenditures of local budgets 2006 Local budgets expenditure/items Administration

% 9.1

Housing

17.0

Education

36.5

Culture

4.0

Heath and sport

13.5

Social policy Other

9.1 10.8

Source: Russian Federation Ministry of Finance, ‘Informatsiya o rezultatakh monitoringa mestnykh byudgetov Rossiiskoi Federatsii po sostoyaniyu na 1 Oktyabrya 2006 goda’, p. 14, website of Ministry of Finance, http://www.minfin.ru (Accessed 12 November 2006).

the expenditure of local governments in 2006. Once again education came first comprising 36.5 per cent of total expenditure, followed by housing (17 per cent), and health and sport (13.5 per cent).

Distribution of expenditure between federal, regional and local budgets As Rosenbaum notes, an examination of the levels of subnational expenditures provides an excellent barometer of the ‘connection between economic development and the strength of sub-national governance’: In the economically highly developed European and North American countries in excess of 40 per cent (as high as 70 per cent in Sweden) of all governmental

Fiscal federalism and local budget expenditures 109 spending takes place at the sub-national or the local level, while in the economically less developed parts of the world that figure is typically in the order of 3 to 20 per cent.9 As Table 7.3 demonstrates, only Denmark (in 1995) outranked Russia in terms of having a larger share of local budget expenditure in the consolidated national budget. However, when it comes to the level of discretion that local governments have over such expenditures, we find a different story. As Young notes, the bulk of expenditure has traditionally been ‘determined by standards and norms set by federal and regional governments’, and ‘local governments administer what are essentially federal or regional programmes’.10 Moreover, as Timofeev notes: ‘in 2001 for the first time since 1993, central government expenditures exceeded subnational expenditures’.11 Overall, as Table 7.3 demonstrates, the share of local budgetary expenditure in the consolidated budget of the Russian Federation fell by 10 per cent from 37.6 per cent to 26.7 per cent over the period 1995–2001. Table 7.4 demonstrates that the share of local budget expenditures in total regional expenditures on housing and communal services rose over the period 1996–9 from 85.0 to 90.5 per cent, before falling to 88.5 per cent in 2001. As Chernyavsky notes, these high levels of expenditure on housing over the period 1996–9 were largely the result of the divestiture of enterprise housing to Table 7.3 Local government expenditures’ in the consolidated national budget Country

Year

Share of local budgetary expenditure in the consolidated national budget

Russia

1995

37.6

1997

31.7

1998

29.8

1999

27.5

2001

26.7

USA

1998

22.0

Brazil

1994

10.0

Bulgaria

1996

11.6

Czech Republic

1995

20.9

Denmark

1995

44.0

The Netherlands

1995

23.57

Norway

1995

31.6

Poland

1996

19.48

Great Britain France

1998 1998

22.0 17.0

Source: A. V. Chernyavsky, Review of the Municipal Finance Development in Russia in 1992–2002, Analytical Report, Moscow: Institute For Urban Economics, 2003, p. 27.

110

Fiscal federalism and local budget expenditures

Table 7.4 Distribution of expenditure between regional and local budgets 1996–2001 (per cent) Expendituresectors/years

1996

1997

1998

Regions

Local

Regions

Local

Regions

Local

Housing and communal services

15.0

85.0

12.0

88.0

10.1

89.9

Education

11.9

88.1

13.0

87.0

13.8

86.2

Culture and arts

28.8

71.2

29.9

70.1

31.6

68.4

Public health and fitness

25.7

74.3

27.8

72.2

32.0

68.0

Social assistance

30.0

70.0

34.8

65.2

42.0

58.0

Expenditure sectors/years 1999 Regions Housing and communal services Education

2000

2001

Local

Regions

Local

Regions

Local

9.5

90.5

13.1

86.9

11.5

88.5

15.0

85.0

15.9

84.1

18.2

81.8

Culture and arts

35.1

64.9

31.9

68.1

33.9

66.1

Public health and fitness Social assistance

32.9 42.8

67.1 57.2

35.8 52.0

64.2 48.0

37.2 52.1

62.7 47.9

Source: A. V. Chernyavsky, Review of the Municipal Finance Development in Russia in 1992–2002, Analytical Report, Moscow: Institute For Urban Economics, 2003, p. 35.

municipalities, which is discussed below.12 The slight fall in local expenditures on housing in 2000 and 2001 was related to ‘implementation of the federal programme of housing sector reform, which in particular aimed at increasing citizens’ role in financing housing and communal services costs’. From 1998, individual users had to pay 50 per cent of the cost of housing services, 60 per cent in 1999, 80 per cent in 2001, and 100 per cent from 2003.13 The share of local expenditures on education, and on heath and fitness, also declined steadily over the period. For education, the drop was from 88.1 per cent to 81.8 per cent, and for health and fitness, from 74.3 per cent to 62.7 per cent. The share of local spending on cultural and the arts fell from 71.2 per cent in 1996 to 64.9 per cent in 1999, and then rose temporarily in 2000 to 68.1 per cent before falling again to 66.1 per cent in 2001. Municipal expenditures on social assistance also declined throughout the period, from 70 per cent in 1996 to 47.9 per cent in 2001. Expenditure responsibilities of the new municipalities The 2003 Law assigns separate expenditure responsibilities for each type of municipality (city district, municipal raion and settlement). However, it also allows for some of these responsibilities to be delegated from one tier of municipality to

Fiscal federalism and local budget expenditures 111 Table 7.5 Expenditure by type of municipality 2006 (planned) City okrug

Municipal raion

City and rural settlements

Administration

43.9

39.4

16.7

Housing

61.3

29.6

9.1

Education

45.9

52.4

1.7

Culture

34.8

46.8

18.4

Heath and sport

62.9

36.1

1.0

Social policy Other

51.6 28.5

47.5 45.7

0.9 25.7

Source: Russian Federation Ministry of Finance, ‘Informatsiya o rezultatakh monitoringa mestnykh byudgetov Rossiiskoi Federatsii po sostoyaniyu na 1 Oktyabrya 2006 goda’, p. 15, website of Ministry of Finance, http://www.minfin.ru (Accessed 12 November 2006).

another. As noted in Chapter 5, in practice, this has led to a centralization process within the different types of local budget, as settlements have delegated some of their functions upwards to municipal raions or city okrugs. Table 7.5 shows that the bulk of expenditures are concentrated in city districts, followed by municipal raions, and some way behind, the settlements.

Expenditure on unfunded mandates One of the main expenditure burdens of local governments is ‘unfunded mandates’. As Orttung and Reddaway note: ‘The mid-nineties can be seen as a period when federal officials cynically sought to offload social programmes onto lower levels of government, but without surrendering the powers that would enable them to raise the money to finance the programmes.’14 Article 132(2) of the Russian Constitution states that: ‘Individual state powers can be vested in bodies of local self-government by law, with the transfer of the material and financial resources necessary to exercise them. The exercise of delegated powers is monitorable by the state,’ and Article 133 adds that local governments are entitled to ‘compensation for additional expenditure arising as a result of decisions adopted by bodies of state power’. But these provisions have not been adhered to, and local budgets have been put under severe strain by the imposition of unfunded federal mandates, which, by 2000 were ‘prescribed in over 150 federal legislative acts’.15 As noted in Chapter 5, up until Putin’s 2004 monetarization reforms there were 236 groups of residents entitled to over 150 different social benefits.16 As a result, over 40 per cent of the country’s population enjoyed benefits in rent and utility payments on the basis of federal, regional and local laws. As Danielian notes, most of these unfunded mandates: were associated with the provision of various social benefits to a wide range of categories, including: allowances for housing fees; allowances for utilities fees (gas, electricity, water supply, etc.); discount on home telephone installation

112

Fiscal federalism and local budget expenditures and subscription; free travel on public transport; free or preferential prices for the provision of medicine.17

Up until 1992, there were nine categories of the population that were entitled to reduced rent and communal charges: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

The heroes of the USSR; individuals awarded the Glory Order; the Great Patriotic War veterans; the Great Patriotic War invalids; family members of the Great Patriotic War veterans and invalids; individuals awarded the Badge – ‘Honorary Blood Donors of the USSR’; qualified specialists working in rural areas; individuals exposed to the radioactive particles as a result of working at the Chernobyl Atomic Station breakdown; retired military servicemen and their families.18

Over the period 1992–9, six additional laws were passed that extended rent benefits to 18 more categories of the population: ‘38 categories received benefits in respect to free travel on urban transportation and 21 categories received benefits in respect of medicines’.19 In 1999, ‘the total size of the 25 largest mandates comprised 60 per cent of the total expenditure of the consolidated budgets of the regions, and expenditure on fulfilling all of the unfunded mandates made up 170 per cent.’20 Regional and local governments were capable of funding just 30–5 per cent of federal mandates out of their own budgets. Although the 1998 Budget Code, which came into force in 2000, banned unfunded mandates, an examination conducted by the Leontief Centre (St Petersburg) in 2000 showed that the number of types of social privileges created by the federal authorities still exceeded 150 and applied to 236 categories of the population. These covered approximately 100 million people, or 70 per cent of the total population. The total cost of these mandates was estimated at more than 15 per cent of GDP and it exceeded the budget tenfold.21 As Yurova notes: The bloated benefit system was a drain on the federal budget and left it opaque. Some claimants sought several benefits at once and it was unclear which department had to make the required payments. For example, some WWII veterans, apart from their service allowance, could also receive benefits as disabled pensioners and labour veterans. They received money from three departments as a result.22 In many cases the problem of unfunded mandates arose out of the irresponsible actions of members of the State Duma, who continued to adopt social welfare legislation without providing the necessary funds to implement these worthy causes. In 1996, housing and utilities benefits were widened to include judges of

Fiscal federalism and local budget expenditures 113 the constitutional court, the supreme court and the supreme arbitration court and their staffs, while only 20 per cent of the allocated funds reached the really poor.23 In 1998, the application of these rules was extended to two more categories: all judges, prosecutors and their staff members. As a report from the Institute of Urban Economics in Moscow noted: ‘While it is obvious that physicians and teachers are much worse off than customs officers and procurators, additional assistance goes to the latter.’24 As Table 7.6 demonstrates, 39.4 per cent of the population were granted privileges from just five federal laws. The total cost of implementing these mandates in 1999 was 18.9 per cent of the revenues of the consolidated Russian Federation budget, but just over one-third of the necessary funds were actually allocated to the regional and subregional budgets for their implementation. As Danielian notes: some laws give the responsibility of providing benefits to more than one level of government. Thus, for example, funding of the Federal Law on War Veterans (1995) is assigned to the federal and regional budgets, while the Table 7.6 Unfunded mandates in the Russian Federation Laws

Eligible per 1999 Finance cent of total requirements population (per cent of consolidated budgetary revenues)

1999 Funds actually allocated (per cent of financial requirements)

2000 Finance requirements (per cent of consolidated budgetary revenues)

On state allowances for 20.7 households with children 1995

3.5

n/a

3.4

On veterans 1995

6.1

31.9

6.3

On social protection of 5.1 disabled and aged residents in the RF 1995

2.5

29.9

2.8

Legislation on social protection of victims of Chernobyl catastrophe

0.6

0.1

38.3

0.1

Legislation on social protection of specific groups of civil servants (judges, prosecutors staff, militia, servicemen, etc.)

2.7

1.8

12.6

1.6

Other Total

15.7* 39.41

4.9* 18.9

39.9* 35.0

4.5* 18.8

16.4

* Estimated figures Source: Alexei Novikov, Alexander Kovalenko, Felix Ejgel, Alexei Rodionov, Mikhail Galkin and Maria Garadzha, ‘An impact of unfunded federal mandates on Russian municipalities: equity, equality and pluralism implications,’ in Nadezhda B. Kosareva and Raymond J. Struyk (eds), Urban Management Reform in Russia, 1998–2000, Moscow: The Institute For Urban Economics, 2001, p. 43.

114

Fiscal federalism and local budget expenditures Federal Law on the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression (1994) is funded jointly by regional and local governments.25

While both levels of government have tried to pass responsibility for funding such mandates to each other, it is local government that has borne the brunt of legal action for non-fulfilment of these social benefits. In some very rare cases, municipal heads have successfully sued regional governments to recoup expenditure on such mandates. Thus, for example, in 1996 the mayor of the City of Koryazh (Arkhangel’sk Oblast), Alexander Malchikin, successfully sued the regional administration to win back the funds to pay for the city’s expenditure on child benefits.26 Transport According to the Institute of Urban Economics, 39,802,000 residents, or nearly 27 per cent of the Russian population, were entitled to free transport or reduced fares, which cost 36.9 billion roubles, in 1999. The majority of free travel was granted in the Law ‘On Veterans’, which benefited some 24,866,000 (58.8 per cent of the total number of free travellers). In the cities of Saratov, Derzhinsk and Khabarovsk, 75 to 85 per cent of passengers were entitled to free travel!27 Rent and utilities In 1999, benefits in rent and utility payments were extended to 44.2 million persons, or 30.3 per cent of the country’s population.28 Again, the greatest number of benefits was created by the Veterans Law: ‘In 1999 the beneficiaries under this law numbered 24 million or 54.24 per cent of the total number of persons who had benefits in rent and utility payments.’29 The second largest group consisted of persons in selected professional categories, such as customs officers, policemen, public prosecutors, military servicemen and judges, which numbered some 6.3 million. In 1999, in the Republic of Ingushetiya, 468,857 citizens (out of a total population of 488,200) did not pay any rent or paid at a discount rate.30 In sum, ‘the total expenditures of housing and communal enterprises incurred by the payment benefits in 1999 equalled 12,244,700 roubles, including: labour veterans – 4.378 million roubles, military servicemen – 1.856 million roubles, disabled adults and children – 1.695 million roubles.’31 In addition, local and regional authorities have introduced their own benefits. As a rule, these benefits were extended to ‘honorary citizens’. More recently, some regions (Tomsk, Novgorod) have awarded benefits to veterans of the war in Chechnya. As Novikov et al. note, ‘The existing system does a poor job targeting benefits to the needy.’32 Thus, for example, as can be seen from Table 7.7, Perm City Government ‘spends 14 times more for the payment of benefits than for housing allowances’.33 Moreover, ‘the number of participants in the housing allowance programme is much smaller than the number of persons receiving benefits in rent

Fiscal federalism and local budget expenditures 115 Table 7.7 Rent and utility payment benefits and housing allowances (Perm’ City) 1999 Households receiving housing allowances (data for December 1999), households/month

13,309

Percentage of total households

5.44

City budget expenditures for the subsidies, thousand roubles/year

3,131.7

Recipients of benefits in rent and utility payments, persons/month

333,275

Percentage of the total population City budget expenditures for the benefits, thousand roubles/year

32.5 44,156

Source: Nadezhda B. Kosareva and Raymond J. Struyk (eds), Urban Management Reform in Russia, 1998–2000, Moscow: The Institute For Urban Economics, 2001, p. 57.

and utility payments. This means that the city provides stronger support to far from needy households.’34 As scholars from the Institute of Urban Economics in Moscow have stressed, ‘the amount of assistance should depend on household income rather than profession or social category’.35 In 2001, the federal government created a special compensation fund of 33 billion roubles to help meet the costs of implementing unfunded mandates.36 Changes to the budget code in 2000 also provided new possibilities to suspend budget decisions that did not provide the necessary funding for their implementation. Thus, in 2001, 87 normative-legal acts entailing spending totalling 520.9 billion roubles were suspended; in 2002, 120 acts with a total cost of 380 billion roubles; and, in 2003, 97 laws with a cost of 1368.7 billion roubles.37 Finally, as noted in Chapter 5, one of positive aspects of the 2003 Law was the new ruling that stipulates federal and regional mandates can no longer be passed down to the localities without the accompanying funds necessary to implement them. However, as also noted the full implementation of the 2003 Law has been postponed until 2009, and there are still many instances of local governments being burdened with unfunded mandates today.

The public utilities reform and the monetization of benefits On 1 January 2005, a federal law ‘On Monetization’ came into force, replacing benefits-in-kind with cash payments.38 The federal budget earmarked 200 billion roubles for the programme. According to Boris Gryzlov, speaker of the State Duma, the primary aim of the new benefit law was to provide targeted social aid to claimants. But as Kurlyandskaya notes: ‘When all the state’s social obligations were tallied up, it became clear that the budget could only fund half of all the benefits guaranteed by federal law.’39 Responsibility for funding the reforms was thus divided between the regions and the federal government. The federal government was charged ‘with subsidizing 14 million people, mostly the disabled war veterans and Chernobyl clean-up-workers. The remaining 19 million, mostly labour veterans and former home-front workers, were now the responsibility of regional agencies.’40 However, in response to massive public demonstrations against the reforms, the

116

Fiscal federalism and local budget expenditures

Table 7.8 The monetization of benefits in the regions 1 Veterans (number of regions)

2 Workers on the home front (number of regions)

3 Citizens who suffered from political repression (number of regions)

19

23

22

Part of the privileges are 59 benefits in kind All privileges are 2 monetized

32

56

24

2

All privileges remain benefits in kind

A. Aleksandrova and E. Kovalenko, ‘Monetizatsiya l’got: regional’nye deistviya’, Finansy, No. 7, 2005, p. 20.

federal government in 2004 appeared to give in to the protesters, and many regions followed suit and scrapped their monetization policies.41 Thus, for example, a study of the implementation of the reforms in 76 regions carried out by the Institute For Urban Economics in the summer of 2005 found that there were considerable variations in the extent to which the Law had been implemented across the Federation. According to Aleksandrova and Kovalenko, 90 per cent of regions maintained benefits in kind for housing and the communal economy; 80 per cent of regions for solid fuel; 47 per cent of regions for free dentistry; nearly half of the regions for medicines; 31 per cent of regions for free transport.42 Moreover, just under 20 per cent of the regions surveyed noted that they were planning to introduce new payments in kind.43 As can be seen in Table 7.8, only two regions declared that all of their benefits in kind had been monetized (for categories 1 and 3), while 24 regions had monetized all category 2 benefits. Moreover, all privileges remained as ‘benefits in kind’ in 19 regions (for category 1), in 23 regions (category 2) and 22 regions (category 3). The mass protests had had an effect, particularly in those regions where local elections were due to take place. Mayors and regional governors were not prepared to implement such an economically divisive and unpopular policy, especially if local elections were on the horizon.

Local expenditure and enterprise divestiture Another heavy expenditure burden for local governments has been the costs associated with enterprise divestiture. As noted in Chapter 3, there has been a long tradition in Russia of enterprises providing housing and utilities for their workers. Thus, for example: In 1994 a third of firms with fewer than 500 employees provided housing while all enterprises with more than 10,000 employees did so. In the beginning of the 1990s some 70 per cent of large and medium-sized enterprises offered medical services while over 75 per cent of large, and 50 per cent of medium-

Fiscal federalism and local budget expenditures 117 sized enterprises provided day care … . Up to 50 per cent of those who used these social services were not employees of the enterprises in question. Thus firms financed the municipal social infrastructure.44 In the post-communist period, we have witnessed moves by many enterprises to get rid of these burdensome responsibilities, particularly those facilities that were in disrepair. Over the period 1993–7 there was a rapid programme of enterprise divestiture: 80 per cent of enterprise houses, 76 per cent of kindergartens, 82 per cent of medical establishments, 84 per cent of sports facilities, 75 per cent of summer camps, 70 per cent of sanatoriums, were transferred to municipal property. As a result, ‘the municipal stock of social purpose facilities increased 65 per cent, and in some cities, dozens of times.’45 A major study of 404 companies in 2003 found that over 90 per cent still provided at least one municipal service. However, the study also found that there has been a general switch ‘from holding assets, to other forms of support such as direct subsidies to employees’.46 The average company in the sample had by 2003 divested 75 per cent of its housing stock and 86 per cent of its day-care capacity.47 In a repeat of what took place during the Soviet era, many municipal governments were forced to take over badly repaired and dilapidated housing stock and other social assets, even when they did not have sufficient funds to maintain these assets. Funds from the federal budget, which were meant to accompany such transfers, were often delayed or did not materialize at all.48 In some cases, as Martinez-Vazquez et al. note: a bankrupt enterprise disrupted the maintenance of its social assets; while at the same time the municipality where the enterprise was located refused to assume the responsibility for the abandoned social facilities. In some cases these types of behaviour led to the closing of facilities that could no longer be afforded (lacking federal or indirect subsidies), such as day-care centres. In many others, infrastructrure – such as housing and clinics – was led to deteriorate, leading to poor quality of services and a much higher bill for the maintenance and replacement of the infrastructure.49 As Healey et al. note, a study of enterprises in just 12 regions (Bryansk, Vladimir, Vologda, Kurgan, Lipetsk, Novgorod, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Penza, Tula oblasts, Stavropol Krai, and the Yamalo-Nenetskii AO) showed that the cost of maintaining their non-divested assets was US$600–700 million, and that the cost for all of the enterprises in the Russia Federation was estimated to be about US$4.5 billion.50 Moreover, the transfers cost municipal governments 15–16 billion roubles per year to maintain, a massive sum comprising 16.4 per cent of the total expenditure of the consolidated budget of the Russian Federation – ‘that is every six roubles of budget resources went to pay for the maintenance of the transferred stock’.51 Municipal assets can be funded by four methods: ‘by local budgets, by the federal budget, through shared funding agreements with enterprises, and through user charges assessed to individuals’.52 In practice, the financing of social services

118

Fiscal federalism and local budget expenditures

Table 7.9 The financing of divested social assets (per cent share by source) Yamalo-NenetskAO Local budgets Federal budget (including special subsidies) Enterprises Population (user charges) Total

VladimirOblast

73

24

8

37

6

19

13 100

20 100

Source: Nigel M. Healey, Vladimir Leksin and Aleksandr Shvetsov, ‘The municipalization of enterprise-owned “social assets” in Russia’, Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 3, 1999, p. 273.

Table 7.10 The cost of financing divested social assets by selected city/region 1997 % of local tax revenue

% of federal budget financial assistance

Moscow

0.7

0.6

Yamalo-Nenetskii AO

3.8

3.7

Bashkortostan Republic

4.1

4.0

Lipetsk

5.0

4.9

Kransoyarsk Krai

5.4

5.2

Khansy-Mansiskii AO

5.8

5.6

St Petersburg

5.8

5.6

Nizhny Novgorod

7.0

6.4

Kaliningrad

7.3

6.7

Kalmykiya Republic

128.8

42.9

Ust-Ordynsk Buryatskii AO

132.6

38.1

Dagestan Republic

137.5

30.5

Kostroma

179.1

75.4

Koryak AO Ingush Republic

242.6 250.0

77.3 53.4

Source: Nigel M. Healey, Vladimir Leksin and Aleksandr Shvetsov, ‘The municipalization of enterprise-owned “social assets” in Russia’, Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 3, 1999, p. 274.

transferred from enterprises has varied considerably. In 1997, for example, the Yamalo-Nenetskii AO had to fund 73 per cent of the cost of its inherited social assets from local budgets, while Vladimir oblast benefited from federal transfers equal to 37 per cent of the additional cost, so that only 24 per cent had to be raised from local coppers (see Table 7.9). As Table 7.10 demonstrates, there were considerable variations in the cost of financing divested social assets in 15 cities/regions in 1997, ranging from 0.7 per cent of local tax revenues in Moscow, to 250 per cent in the Ingush Republic. A major source of income to fund the divested assets was the 1.5 per cent local Turnover Tax introduced in 1995–6. Up until its abolition in 2000, Turnover Tax

Fiscal federalism and local budget expenditures 119 ‘provided a mechanism allowing municipalities to receive additional funding after transfer with no mediation by regional or federal governments’.53 After the abolition of this tax, municipalities have had to rely on federal subsidies or they could try and strike deals with enterprises for the ‘joint financing of transferred assets’.54

Regional and local socio-economic asymmetries Regional asymmetries As noted in Chapter 2, there are vast differences across the Federation in the economic status of federal subjects (see Table 7.11). Despite the official policy, pursued for many years, of evening out the level of social, economic and cultural developments in the various regions, there are very great differences among them in terms of the level of production and consumption. Thus, if in Germany and the USA the difference between the budget resources of the most developed and least developed regions is 8–8.5 times, in Russia it varies 75 times. As Kourliandskaya notes, the 2002 income per capita in Russia’s richest region (Khansy-Mansiskii AO) was 50 times that of the poorest region (Agin-Buryatskii AO).55 As Table 7.11 shows, the 2003 volume of per capita Gross Regional Product (GRP) in Russia’s regions varied by a factor of 63 times (10 in Ingushetiya and 633 in Yamalo-Nenetskii AO). The share of regional taxes in the consolidated budget of the Russian Federation varied from a low of 0.01 per cent in Ust’Ordin Buryatskii AO to a high of 18.4 per cent in Moscow. Khansy-Mansiskii AO received 87,170,672 roubles in taxes, while Komi-Permyak AO received just 160,323 roubles. As Podporina notes, in 2003, ‘66 per cent of Russia’s tax potential of the federal budget, and 60 per cent of the consolidated budget came from 14 regions’, while ‘the portion contributed by the 12 least well developed regions was 1.1 per cent of the federal budget and 0.7 per cent of the consolidated budgets’.56 Moreover, the regions that have provided most tax revenues to the consolidated budget have remained fairly constant – namely, ‘Moscow, St Petersburg, Moscow Oblast, Samara, Sverdlovsk, Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, Krasnoyarsk, Yamalo-Nenetskii AO, and Kansy-Mansiskii AO’.57 As Table 7.12 shows, there were also wide variations in the per capita regional expenditures in 1998. In housing, the maximum per capita expenditure of 4,284.9 roubles (Yevenk AO) was 33 times the minimum per capita expenditure (129.5 roubles) in Komi-Perm’ AO, and 6 times the expenditure mean for all federal subjects. In education, the maximum of 3,161.6 roubles in Taimyr AO was 11 times that of per capita expenditure in the Ingush Republic (276.6 roubles) and 4 times that of the mean. In health, the maximum in Khansy-Mansiskii AO (2,052.9 roubles) was 14 times that of the Republic of Dagestan (142.0 roubles) and 4.5 times that of the mean. In his 2006 Report to the Presidium of the State Council, President Putin noted that regional per capita expenditure on education varied by a factor of more than 5 times, for health more than 6 times, and social security, 15 times.58

Table 7.11 Economic statistics of federal subjects 2003 Federal subject

Adygeya Republic Aginskii-Buryatskii Autonomous Okrug Altai Krai Altai Republic Amur Oblast Arkhangel’sk Oblast Astrakhan Oblast Bashkortostan Republic Belgorod Oblast Bryansk Oblast Buryatiya Republic Chechen Republic Chelyabinsk Oblast Chita Oblast Chukotkskii Autonomous Okrug Chuvashskaya Republic Dagestan Republic Ingushetiya Republic Irkutsk Oblast Ivanovo Oblast Kabardino-Balkarskaya Republic Kaliningrad Oblast Kalmikiya Republic Kaluga Oblast Kamchatka Oblast Karachaevo-Cherkesskaya Republic Kareliya Republic Kemerovo Oblast Khabarovsk Krai Khakasiya Republic Khanty-Mansiskii Autonomous Okrug Kirov Oblast Komi Republic

Per capita Gross Regional Product

Share of regional taxes in consolidated budget of Russian Federation (%)

Taxes allocated to local budgets (all budgets at subregional level) (thousands of roubles)

22.83 27.73

0.06 0.09

551,478 435,401

34.91 38.22 61.24 64.55 54.21 68.34 52.67 35.69 47.99 – 64.46 50.01 357.62 38.45 21.08 10.14 71.23 31.87 30.04 54.05 32.80 51.89 75.53 27.22

0.38 0.07 0.31 0.43 0.34 2.20 0.64 0.33 0.23 0.11 1.64 0.33 0.58 0.34 0.17 0.02 0.98 0.22 0.07 0.39 0.26 0.37 0.20 0.07

5,153,090 540,560 3,450,877 5,073,713 3,163,171 14,744,038 5,471,715 3,134,191 2,302,368 878,000 14,037,773 3,977,793 2,530,038 2,351,107 1,468,619 197,789 11,375,063 2,531,279 941,350 3,303,316 1,295,046 2,461,747 1,989,743 536,849

67.81 59.67 85.88 53.86 522.39

0.23 1.61 0.84 0.17 16.01

2,224,185 10,974,663 6,935,376 2,072,841 87,170,672

42.17

0.38

3,366,203

112.91

1.23

2,579,089

Federal subject

Komi-Permyatskii Autonomous Okrug Koryakskii Autonomous Okrug Kostroma Oblast Krasnodar Krai Krasnoyarsk Krai Kurgan Oblast Kursk Oblast Leningrad Oblast Lipetsk Oblast Magadan Oblast Marii-El Rebublic Mordoviya Republic Moscow City Moscow Oblast Murmansk Oblast Nenetskii Autonomous Okrug Nizhegorod Oblast North Osetiya-Alaniya Republic Novgorod Oblast Novosibirsk Oblast Omsk Oblast Orel Oblast Orenburg Oblast Penza Oblast Perm’ Oblast Primorskii Krai Pskov Oblast Rostov Oblast Ryazan’ Oblast Sakha-Yakutiya Republic Sakhalin Oblast Samara Oblast Saratov Oblast Smolensk Oblast

Per capita Gross Regional Product

Share of regional taxes in consolidated budget of Russian Federation (%)

23.06

0.02

178.52 45.43 54.02 96.26 38.76 49.02 79.76 81.72 128.88 34.05 42.15 234.94 67.51 92.79 603.81 63.93 29.62 57.24 62.86 61.06 54.03 57.90 34.23 86.22 60.47 40.54 42.02 54.89 140.30 125.34 85.43 49.67 50.08

0.03 0.21 1.77 2.13 0.18 0.37 1.13 0.76 0.11 0.14 0.99 18.48 3.37 0.54 0.41 1.43 0.10 0.19 1.00 1.17 0.31 1.39 0.34 1.68 0.80 0.17 0.99 0.47 0.87 0.46 2.13 0.83 0.28

Taxes allocated to local budgets (all budgets at subregional level) (thousands of roubles) 160,323 183,113 2,009,460 17,150,423 24,384,946 1,709,773 1,066,651 4,149,654 7,257,410 2,551,712 1,113,741 3,848,137 467,163 28,163,695 6,350,566 716,025 12,583,211 1,105,533 2,859,762 9,202,112 4,190,082 2,037,651 9,077,325 3,378,245 12,046,187 6,723,278 2,292,330 7,186,459 3,818,413 6,983,722 3,526,746 15,040,005 6,787,122 2,491,959 (continued )

Federal subject

Per capita Gross Regional Product

Share of regional taxes in consolidated budget of Russian Federation (%)

Taxes allocated to local budgets (all budgets at subregional level) (thousands of roubles)

Stavropol’ Krai

40.40

0.64

4,631,305

St Petersburg City

94.22

3.26

934,020

Sverdlovsk Oblast

70.55

2.23

20,364,389

Taimyrskii Autonomous Okrug

75.26

0.11

705,737

Tambov Oblast

43.89

0.24

1,025,895

Tatarstan Republic

84.57

2.82

12,956,081

Tomsk Oblast

99.67

1.10

4,395,581

Tula Oblast

47.01

0.41

4,263,944

Tver’ Oblast

51.35

0.45

4,309,483 18,625,112

Tyumen’ Oblast

81.12

1.50

Tyva Republic

27.01

0.04

567,046

Udmurtskaya Republic

62.66

0.90

5,394,065

Ul’yanovsk Oblast

42.76

0.32

2,665,403

Ust’-Ordynskii Buryatskii Autonomous Okrug

31.12

0.01

166,536

Vladimir Oblast

44.57

0.43

4,671,182

Volgograd Oblast

51.42

0.91

9,108,351

Vologda Oblast

90.92

0.98

7,440,634

Voronezh Oblast

44.64

0.53

5,074,965

633.46

5.54

15,182,967

77.35

0.79

9,040,289

Yevenkiskii Autonomous Okrug 106.17 Yevreiskaya Autonomous Oblast 45.28

0.19 0.04

738,672 533,027

Yamalo-Nenetskii Autonomous Okrug Yaroslavl’ Oblast

Source: Tatiana Danieliants and Yulia Potanina, ‘User Charges: Case of Russia’, 2003, pp. 13–14, http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/NISPAcee/UNPAN017763.pdf (Accessed, 20 April 2005).

Table 7.12 Per capita consolidated expenditures in the federal subjects 1998 (in roubles) Expenditure

Housing and utilities

Education

Health

Total expenditures

Mean

714.1

732.8

455.3

3448.6

Max Min

4284.9 129.5

3161.6 276.6

2052.9 142.0

27692.3 1129.4

Source: Russian Federation Fiscal Reform Project, ‘Implementation Report: Government Finance and Intergovernmental Relations in the Vladimir Region’, Georgia: Georgia State University, and Moscow: Centre For Fiscal Policy, 1999, p. 32.

Fiscal federalism and local budget expenditures 123 As Podpodina notes, new tax laws in 2005 decreased the revenues of the subjects of the Federation by 54.3 billion roubles and increased their expenditures by 304.6 billion roubles. As a result many regions have deficit budgets. Table 7.13 shows those regions with the highest and lowest debts. Local level asymmetries In 1999, the per capita expenditure of municipal budgets grew by 76 per cent compared to 1996, and comprised 3,000 roubles. However, as Shvetsov notes, there were sharp regional variations. Thus, for example, the highest level of per capita municipal expenditure was to be found in Yamala-Nenetskii AO (23,000 roubles), just under eight times higher than the Russian average. In Ingushetiya, the figure was only 800 roubles, 3.7 times lower than the Russian Federation average, and 29 times less than in the Yamala-Nenetskii AO.59 In 2001, local government spending in the Republic of Sakha-Yakutiya accounted for 0.2 per cent of total regional-local expenditures, in contrast to Krasnoyarsk Krai, where local government spending was 80 per cent.60 The municipalities of the Far East had the highest levels of per capita expenditures at an average of 7,600 roubles, which was 2.6 times the average for the Russian Federation. This was followed by local governments in Western Siberia (4,700 roubles) and municipalities in the European North (3,600). Close to the average were the regions of the Urals (2,840) and Eastern Siberia (2,700). The lowest per capita expenditures were to be found in the regions of the Northern Caucasus (an average of 1,700), Volga (1,400), Central Black Earth (1,700) and the Central Economic Region (1,700).61 Table 7.13 Subjects of the Federation with the most and least debts 2006 Subjects of the Russian Federation with the largest debts)

% of Subjects of the Russian Federation income with the least debts

% of income

Khabarovsk Krai

71.3

Republic of Khakasiya

1.0

Omsk Oblast

65.2

Republic of Adygeya

1.2

Republic of Tatarstan

50.1

Tyumen Oblast

2.9

Voronezh Oblast

49.1

Chelyabinsk Oblast

3.1

Irkutsk Oblast

42.2

Karachaevo-Cherkesskaya Republic 3.3

Moscow Oblast

29.6

Penza Oblast

Kemerovo Oblast

24.3

Stavropol’skii Krai

3.4 4.9

Sverdlovsk Oblast

22.9

Ivanovskaya Oblast

6.1

Krasnoyarsk Krai Murmansk Oblast

22.4 17.6

Orel Oblast Kaluga Oblast

9.5 10.1

Source: Informatsiya, ‘Informatsiya o Rezul’takh Monitoringa Mestnykh Byudgetov Rossiiskoi Federatsii po Sostoyaniyu na 1 Oktyabrya 2006 goda’, p. 21. Russian Federation Ministry of Finance, 2006, http://www.minfin.ru (Accessed 12 February 2007).

124

Fiscal federalism and local budget expenditures

Table 7.14 Share of cities and districts with deficits above the Russian average 1999 Cities and districts

Percentage

Cities and districts

Percentage

Eastern Siberia

(11%)

North Caucuses

(21%)

Urals

(41%)

North West and Povolzhe

(48%)

Far East

(77%)

European North

(71%)

Central Black Earth Western Siberia

(59%) (56.4%)

Volga-Vyatskom

(55%)

Source: Compiled by the author from data presented in A. N. Shvetsov, Ekonomicheskie Resursy Munitsipal’novo Razvitiya: Finansy, Imushchestvo, Zemlya, Moscow: URSS, 2002, p. 16.

Local budget deficits Federal mandates and the extra costs associated with enterprise divestiture have crippled local budgets and led to a situation whereby the vast majority of local level budgets are in deficit.62 Thus, for example, over the period 1991–2000 there was a sharp reduction in the share of the income of local budgets in the consolidated budget of the Russian Federation from 28 to 22 per cent. At the same time, the share of expenditure for local budgets did not fall below 28 per cent, and in some years was 32 per cent. Thus, the gap between income and expenditure was 10 percentage points. In 1999, the gap was 7 per cent.63 However, the relationship between expenditure and income was the reverse at the federal and regional levels (49 expenditure/51 income at the federal, and 22 /27 at the regional level), leaving the entire negative imbalance concentrated at the level of local government.64 In 1996, 68.5 per cent of local budgets were in deficit, but this had fallen to 50.1 per cent in 1999. If we examine cities alone, in 1999, 47.7 per cent were in deficit – and for districts (raiony) the figure was 51 per cent. In 1997, 73.4 per cent of city budgets and 77.2 per cent of raion budgets had deficits.65 Shvetsov also compared deficit budgets in seven groups of cities of varying sizes: (1) 0–25,000; (2) 25–50,000; (3) 50–100,000; (4) 100–250,000; (5) 250–500,000; (6) 500–1 million, and (7) cities with over one million inhabitants. The largest number of cities with deficits was to be found in groups 2 (190 cities) and 3 (160 cities). While there was no direct correlation between city size and deficits, the largest differences were found between those cities with populations of over 1 million (where 70 per cent had deficits) and cities of 25–50,000 (where 35 per cent had deficits).66 The share of cities and raions with deficit budgets above the Russian Federation average in the 11 economic regions of Russia varied from 11 per cent in Eastern Siberia to 77 per cent in the Far East (see Table 7.14). The sharpest deficits were to be found in the local budgets of the raions and cities of Volga region, which had average deficits of over 21 per cent, while the lowest in the country were in the North Caucuses, where the average was just 3 per cent.67 Table 7.15 shows that every municipality in Novgorod region did not have enough funds to implement its expenditure programme in 1998. With a total expenditure bill of 1,047,762 million roubles, the region had revenues of 407,447 million roubles, which was a shortfall of 798,684 million roubles. There were also

Fiscal federalism and local budget expenditures 125 Table 7.15 Novgorod 1998: Expenditure needs and own revenues of municipalities (in million roubles) Expenditure Own needs for revenues performing own responsibilities

Own revenues adjusted for tax effort

Difference between expenditure needs and own revenues adjusted for tax effort

Batetsky raion

10,369

1,314

1,092

9,278

Valdaysky raion

45,009

8,739

6,988

38,021

Volotovsky raion

9,871

1,191

1,640

8,230

Dem’ansky raion

25,959

3,910

3,653

22,306

Krestetsky raion

23,533

8,922

5,161

18,372

Lubytinsky raion

18,943

3,680

3,821

15,122

Malovyshersky raion

31,944

4,227

4,143

27,801

8,788

985

1,155

7,633

Marevsky raion Moshensky raion

15,171

1,470

1,992

13,179

Novgorodsky raion

81,174

14,472

16,618

64,556

Okulovsky raion

48,130

8,788

10,918

37,212

Parfinsky raion

24,948

5,651

9,622

15,326

Pestovsky raion

35,315

4,884

6,341

28,974

Poddorsky raion

8,753

883

1,499

7,254

Soletsky raion

29,658

3,718

3,833

25,825

Khvoininsky raion

26,661

6,567

4,271

22,389

Kholmsky raion

12,275

1,874

1,704

10,571

Chudovsky raion

39,004

15,563

14,726

24,278

Shimsky raion

19,634

2,979

2,738

16,896

Borovichy

113,864

34,468

35,817

78,047

Novgorod

333,134

257,572

250,770

82,363

85,626 1,047,762

19,826 411,683

18,944 407,447

66,682 798,684

Stararya Russa TOTAL

Source: Final Report, ‘Government Finance and Intergovernmental Relations in the Novgorod Region’, Executive Summary, July 1999. Russian Federation Fiscal Reform Project, Georgia: Georgia State University, and Moscow: Centre For Fiscal Policy, p. 90.

major economic variations within the region – with the difference between income and expenditure comprising 82,363,000 roubles in Novgorod City and 7,254,000 roubles in Poddorsky Raion. Local budget debts in the new municipalities On 1 October 2006, the debt of municipal budgets amounted to 108 billion roubles, or 28 per cent of the total income of municipal budgets. A study carried out by the Ministry of Finance of 77 regions in 2006 found that 35 per cent of municipal

126

Fiscal federalism and local budget expenditures

Table 7.16 Structure of local budget deficits in the Russian Federation 2006 % of municipal raions

% of city districts

% of city settlements

% of rural settlements

Surplus

59

67

29

43

Deficit Balanced

37 4

33 0

27 44

19 38

Source: ‘Informatsiya o Rezul’takh Monitoringa Mestnykh Byudgetov Rossiiskoi Federatsii po Sostoyaniyu na 1 Oktyabrya 2006 goda’, Russian Federation Ministry of Finance, 2006, p. 17, http:// www.minfin.ru (Accessed 12 February 2007).

Table 7.17 Share of subsidies in municipal budgets 2006 Share of subsidies in income of local budget

Municipal raions

City districts

City settlements

Rural settlements

Up to 5 %

3.8%

17.1%

7.5%

6.6%

From 5–10 %

5.2%

11.4%

6.9%

5.1%

From 10–20 %

19.5%

24.3%

12.6%

4.9%

From 20–50 % From 50–100 %

31.3% 39.5%

20.5% 18.1%

36.3% 30.5%

15.2% 55.9%

Source: ‘Informatsiya o Rezul’takh Monitoringa Mestnykh Byudgetov Rossiiskoi Federatsii po Sostoyaniyu na 1 Oktyabrya 2006 goda’, 2006, p. 11, Russian Federation Ministry of Finance, http:// www.minfin.ru (Accessed 12 February 2007).

budgets had balanced budgets, 43 per cent had a surplus and 22 per cent were in deficit. As Table 7.16 shows, 37 per cent of municipal raions; 33 per cent of city districts, 27 per cent of city settlements, and 19 per cent of rural settlements were in deficit. Moreover, 55.9 per cent of rural settlements, 39.5 per cent of municipal raions, 30.5 per cent of city settlements and 18.1 per cent of city districts were subsidized to the tune of 50–100 per cent (see Table 7.17). Municipal deficits have taken on a political dimension since the adoption of the 2003 Law. Thus, for example, as noted in Chapter 5, any municipality that incurs a debt equal to one-third of its budget revenues may now be taken over and managed directly by the regional administration. As Wollmann and Gritsenko note, this has created a budgetary ‘vicious cycle’ whereby: Federal and regional authorities have been eager to shift expenditure-intensive responsibilities (infrastructural, social policy etc.) to the local authorities whilst failing to live up to their obligations that the transfer of such tasks should go hand in hand with the transfer of the necessary ‘material and financial resources’. Thus, the local authorities find themselves in a budgetary trap, which all but forces them to drive up their budgetary deficits. This, however, conjures up the spectre of a ‘top down’ intervention under Article 75.68

Fiscal federalism and local budget expenditures 127

The socio-economic crisis of small cities In 2003, there were 1,098 cities in Russia with a total population of 105,080,900 inhabitants, including: two mega cities (Moscow and St Petersburg) whose share of the urban population constituted 12.3 per cent; seven cities with a population of over one million (9.0 per cent of urban population); 21 cities with a population of 500,000–1 million (13.7 per cent of urban population); 132 cities with a population between 100,000 and 500,000 (27.5 per cent of urban population); 936 small cities with a population less than 100,000 (37.5 per cent of the urban population).69 The majority of subsidized budgets are concentrated in small cities, which are home to over one-third of the Russian population. As Domnysheva notes, such cities in 2000 were on average ‘15 per cent to 20 per cent behind the major cities in levels of social infrastructure development. The housing there [was] of poor quality, lacking even the most basic of comforts.’70 Moreover, in: 24 small Russian cities and 352 towns there was a lack of running water; 47 cities and 776 towns had no sewerage systems, and 71 cities and 376 towns had no gas lines … the number of jobs in these cities had dropped dramatically, major housing construction was at a standstill, and chronic non-payment’s had shrunk the population’s real cash income. People had nowhere to work and nothing to eat.71 The average rate of unemployment in small cities in 1999 was 40 per cent, and ranged from 20 to 60 per cent. Those who found employment, however, did not always fare much better than the unemployed, as wages were extremely low (on average two and more times less than the minimum subsistence level), and they were subject to chronic delays in their payment. The condition of the housing supply and communal services in the majority of these cities was classified as ‘catastrophic’ by the Moscow Institute For Urban Economics.72 In more than 50 per cent of small cities the death rate in 2000 was almost double the birth rate. Moreover, throughout the 1990s there was a steady outward migration of the population of these cities, leaving behind pensioners, youth and the less well qualified. The inhabitants of these cities also suffered from serious social problems and economic deprivation. In addition to the lack of housing and services, alcoholism, drug addition and crime were rife.73 Monoprofile cities Chapter 3 noted the massive power of state enterprises in Soviet ‘one company towns’. Today, many of these ‘monoprofile cities’ have fallen into decline. A city is classified as monoprofile if: 1

The number of workers in one enterprise numbers over 5,000, and the workers plus members of their families make up over 50 per cent of the population of the local community.

128

Fiscal federalism and local budget expenditures

Table 7.18 Ten regions with the largest share of their populations living in monoprofile cities in the Russian Federation Region

Share of population Number of monoprofile cities residing in with population monoprofile cities over 5,000

Size of population living in monoprofile cities (thousands)

Chukotka AO Lipetsk Oblast Tyumen’ Oblast Republic of Khakasiya Republic of Komi Leningrad Oblast Volgograd Oblast Arkhangel’sk Oblast Stavropol’ Krai Sverdlovsk Oblast

93.9 65.3 61.5 54.5 50.8 50.3 50.3 44.2 44.0 42.6

27.8 498.7 1406.6 188.7 301.7 523.5 416.3 388.3 605.1 1582.2

3 2 19 4 6 16 6 6 9 33

Source: A.V. Malovetskii, Gorod i Predpriyatiya, Moscow: URSS, 2002, p. 47.

Table 7.19 Share of monoprofile cities by size of city Type of city

Number of cities

Number of monoprofile Share of monoprofile cities cities in each group (%)

Small Medium Large

752 174 165

347 78 42

46 45 25

Source: Sotsial’no-Ekonomicheskoe Razvitie Malykh Gorodov Rossii, Moscow: Institute For Urban Economics, 2003, p. 12 (no author cited).

2

If over 30 per cent of the income of the city budget is made up of income from one to three companies.

As Table 7.18 shows, over half the population of Chukotka, Lipetsk, Tyumen, Khakasiya, Komi, Leningrad and Volgograd live in monoprofile cities. In Sverdlovsk region, there are 33 such cities with a total population of 1,582,200. As can be seen in Table 7.19, 46 per cent of Russia’s small cities are also monoprofile cities.74 Local regimes: business and politics As Zimin notes: Confronted by state failure, private companies have, in many cases, been forced to provide informal support to municipalities, in addition to paying regular taxes … . This situation has led to informal private-municipal ‘tax

Fiscal federalism and local budget expenditures 129 Table 7.20 Public services provision by firms (percentage of firms) District

Producing heat

Producing electricity

Giving support to road construction

Central North West South Volga Urals Siberia Far East Total

75.4 80.9 91.3 75.4 71.4 62.5 77.8 75.7

4.2 10.6 0.0 1.6 4.8 2.5 0.0 4.5

16.8 20.4 38.5 25.0 36.2 23.5 38.5 24.0

Source: M. Svedburg, J. Ono, and O. Mosina (eds), Unleashing the Potential: Growth and Investment in Russia’s Regions, Stockholm: Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, 2006, p. 14.

optimization’ alliances, whereby the companies have minimized tax payments through formal channels, but have provided informal in-kind support to municipalities in the form of such services as water supply, district heating, and housing maintenance.75 A survey of 100 large Russian companies shows that they spent an average of $US1000 per employee in 2003 (or 2 per cent of their gross revenues) on such ‘social investments’.76 As Table 7.20 shows, a large proportion of enterprises continue to provide their municipalities with a wide range of essential public services (e.g. heat, electricity and road construction). In addition, municipalities will often provide ‘special perquisites to companies, such as reduced rents, favourable privatization terms, lucrative contracts, and various protectionist measures’.77 However, in some cases this economic assistance comes at the cost of politicians losing their ability to rule their cities. Thus, for example, as Zimin notes, the company ‘Karel’skiy Okatysh’ (a subsidiary of the giant steel company, ‘Severstal’) has for the last 15 years been the most powerful actor in the city of Kostomuksha, ‘capable of controlling both local legislative and executive branches of power’.78 Kostomukhsha’s mayor, Mikhail Yurinov, had served previously as the Director of personnel in Karel’skiy Okatysh, while the chair of the Municipal Council, Vyacheslav Shapoval, is the company’s Director of Real Estate and Social Affairs.79 According to Zimin, big business also dominates municipal councils in the City of Olenegorsk (Murmansk); the Karelian cities of Kondopoga, Segezha, Nadvoisty and Vartsila.80 Local government financial autonomy is thus squeezed vertically from federal and regional bodies and horizontally from local business. Economic dependence leads inevitably to political dependence. As Sisk rightly observes: the flow of revenue and patterns of taxation and spending – fiscal policy – are integrally linked to the fostering and promotion of local democracy. Without

130

Fiscal federalism and local budget expenditures adequate resources – either generated at the source by local government or passed down from the provincial or central government – local democracy cannot thrive.81

In the following chapters, I turn to an examination of local political institutions and the problems of creating viable democracies in Russia’s impoverished and economically dependent municipalities.

8

Local elections and parties

In this chapter, I analyse two major rounds of municipal elections that took place over the periods 1995–8 and 2004–5. These are the election rounds for which we have the most detailed (if still incomplete) information, as published by the Russian Central Electoral Commission.1 They were also the first major rounds of elections to the new bodies of local self-government created after the adoption of the 1995 and 2003 laws on local self-government, respectively.

Municipal elections under Yeltsin 1995–8 As was discussed in Chapter 4, many regions did everything they could to thwart the implementation of the 1995 Law, and they were very slow to ratify local charters and to draw up new legislation to codify the rights and powers of local governments. Across the Federation there were wide variations in regional legislation on elections and parties. These variations in local-level political institutions were largely the result of Yeltsin’s highly politicized form of ‘negotiated federalism’, whereby different regions were granted different powers, and the ethnic republics, in particular, were able to carve out significant levels of political autonomy. In November 1996, a federal law was adopted on elections (‘On Guaranteeing the Constitutional Rights of Citizens to Elect and Be Elected to the Organs of Local Self Government of the Russian Federation’).2 As Kourliandskaya et al. note, this law: essentially constituted federal intervention in the affairs of those regions that failed to comply with the federal legislation. Where regional administrations did nothing to organize local elections, the right to convene elections was assigned to the courts. Rules governing the conduct of local elections were outlined in a separate annex to the law.3 Elections were to take place before 1 January 1997. In addition, in the autumn of 1997, the federal law, ‘On Electoral Rights and Referenda’ was adopted to guarantee citizens the right to hold local elections even in the absence of regional laws.4 However, by June 1997, 41.4 per cent of municipalities still had not adopted local charters, and in many regions there were still no regional laws on elections.5

132

Local elections and parties

Moreover, where regional election and party laws were adopted, they often violated the Russian Constitution and federal norms. In a number of regions, elections took place only after the direct intervention of the courts (Republic of Tyva, the City of St Petersburg, Bryansk and Kursk oblasts, and the Koryak Autonomous Okrug).6 Elections of heads of local administrations Article 16(2) of the 1995 Law states that: ‘The head of a municipality is elected by the citizens living on its territory on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot or by the organ of local self-government.’7 In the elections that took place over the period 1995–8, approximately two-thirds of heads of local administrations were directly elected by popular mandate, and one-third were elected indirectly by members of their councils.8 Article 17(3) of the 1995 Law expressly forbids ‘the formation of local self-government organs and the appointment of self-government officials by state bodies or officials’.9 However, in 16 federal subjects, all (or almost all) the local administrative heads were nominated by regional governors and their appointment was ‘rubber stamped’ by local councils (in all the municipalities of Altai Krai; Chuvashiya, Kabardino-Balkariya and Mordoviya republics; the regions of Novosibirsk, Orel, Penza, Saratov, Smolensk, Agin-Buryat; and the Nenetsk AO; and in approximately half of the municipalities in Amur, Ivanovo, Nizhni Novgorod, Orenburg, and Tomsk regions).10 Up until the adoption of the 2003 Law, Russian legislation permitted the directly elected heads of local administrations to also hold the posts of chairs of municipal councils. In 1998, approximately two-thirds (64.67 per cent) of local administrative heads combined their administrative posts with such chairs.11 Tenure Federal legislation stipulated that the tenure of office of heads of local municipalities was four years and 82.7 per cent of municipalities complied with this norm. However, in six regions it was two years, and in seven regions five years.12 Electoral system In Russia, the vast majority of municipal elections for posts of heads of administration adopted the first past the post plurality electoral system, with second round run-offs for the top two candidates. In 11 regions, the winning candidates had to receive an absolute majority of the votes.13 Candidates There were over 26,000 candidates for the 8,229 posts of chief of administration, an average of 3.15 candidates for each post. The largest numbers of candidates (5–7) were found in the Republic of Tyva, Krasnoyarsk Krai, and Vladimir, Irkutsk, Kaliningrad, Kamchatka, Leningrad, Murmansk and Sakhalin regions.14

Local elections and parties 133 Turnout in elections for heads of local administrations There were considerable regional variations in the minimum turnout required by law for elections to be valid. The official minimum turnout of 25 per cent was adhered to in just 63 of Russia’s 89 regions (in nine regions the threshold was as high as 50 per cent; in two regions 30 per cent; and in one region, 35 per cent). In a clear violation of federal legislation, no minimum turnout was stipulated for local elections in nine regions.15 The percentage of turnout varies first by level, type and geographic location. Thus, for example, turnout is usually much higher in presidential elections than in regional elections, and turnout in regional elections, in turn, is usually higher than in local elections. Second, the turnout rate also depends on the type of elected office. Elections for representative bodies at all levels are usually lower than for elections to executive bodies (see Table 8.1). Third, it depends on the geographic location of the municipality. Citizens, it would appear, are more easily mobilized (or coerced) by local officials to turn out and vote in the rural areas than they are in cities (see Chapter 10). Thus, for example, in the February 1996 municipal elections in Pskov Oblast, 67 per cent of the rural population participated while, in the cities, turnout was just 28 per cent.16 Social composition of heads of administrations Of those administrative heads elected in the period 1995–8, 49.43 per cent came from posts in state and municipal administrations, and 14.66 per cent previously held leadership posts in public and private enterprises and organizations. Over half (55.3 per cent) had higher or incomplete higher education. The vast majority (77.5 per cent), were 30–50 years of age, while just 2.81 per cent were under 30, and approximately one-fifth were over 50. Just one-fifth of the heads of municipal administrations were female.17 (See Table 8.2.) Party affiliation is discussed in a separate section below.

Table 8.1 Variation in turnout by type of election: selected cities City

Presidential elections

Gubernatorial elections Mayoral elections

Belgorod

73

62

40

Kirov

70

51

38

Pskov

71

45

34

Rostov-on-Don

72

39

34

Samara Tver’

69 70

42 67

40 38

Source: Boris Ovchinnikov, ‘Munitsipal’nye vybory: tendentsii i zakonomernosti’, in Sergei Ryzhenkov and Nikolai Vinnik (eds), Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossii, Moscow: MONF, 1998, p. 58.

Table 8.2 Heads of municipalities elected 1995–8 Federal subjects

Republics Adygeya Altai Buryatiya Dagestan Ingushetiya KabardinoBalkariya Kalmykiya KarachaevoCherkesskaya Kareliya Komi Marii El Mordoviya Sakha North OsetiyaAlaniya Tatarstan Tyva Udmurtiya Khakasiya Chechnya Chuvash Krais Altai Krasnodar Krasnoyarsk Primorsk Stavropol’ Khabarovsk Oblasts Amur Arkhangel’ Astrakhan Belgorod Bryansk

Total number of heads

Female Higher or incomplete higher education

Nominated State and by electoral municipal associations employees and blocks 38 8 11 307

Leaders of enterprises and organizations

55 11 23 725

4 1 1 13

46 11 23 430

2 0 0 0

2 2 12 297

– 132

– 13

– 102

– 0

– 81

– 11

116 81

21 8

86 67

0 0

38 27

48 31

19 18 17 470 35 116

1 1 112 3 13

19 20 17 284 34 76

0 0 0 0 0 0

12 17 11 282 31 50

7 2 5 65 4 16

928 21 30 104

402 3 2 26

38 20 30 71

0 1 0 0

14 19 2

26

1

24

0

12

27 4 8 4 – 1

764 48 574 35 304 224

164 1 121 1 58 92

457 48 391 34 226 100

5 6 29 0 6 1

530 25 347 19 175 90

51 10 35 13 35 19

339 26 154 22 482

130

148 21 99 22 248

0 0 0 2 123

158 14 98 17 387

33 8 13 5 33

–

–

31 107

–

–

–

Federal subjects

Vladimir Volgograd Vologda Voronezh Ivanovo Irkutsk Kaliningrad Kaluga Kamchatka Kemerovo Kirov Kostroma Kurgan Kursk Leningrad Lipetsk Magadan Moscow Murmansk Nizhegorod Novgorod Novosibirsk Omsk Orenburg Orel Penza Perm’ Pskov Rostov Ryazan’ Samara Saratov Sakhalin Sverdlovsk Smolensk Tambov

Total number of heads 74 39 28 547 26 37 22 49 10 55 45 31 459 511 29 323 61 73 23 594 20 454 33 578 267 406 48 28 55 29 37 41 19 71 27 352

Female Higher or incomplete higher education 8 57 1 39 28 86 493 1 25 3 36 1 22 4 49 1 10 12 40 40 3 29 142 300 151 297 1 22 100 127 22 26 4 71 2 20 138 276 20 77 276 33 50 302 77 169 97 220 2 48 2 28 55 28 37 1 41 18 1 66 21 92 172

Nominated State and by electoral municipal associations employees and blocks 0 52 0 19 1 16 63 276 2 23 0 17 0 12 0 7 1 6 6 34 2 19 0 2 0 250 1 373 1 18 0 165 0 32 3 62 1 15 0 368 0 16 4 167 4 16 0 372 41 16 1 314 0 23 1 5 39 1 3 0 26 0 15 0 11 1 45 3 13 21 70

Leaders of enterprises and organizations 15 10 168 3 17 10 14 3 17 14 4 26 28 3 37 15 11 4 44 3 77 15 18 176 13 18 2 15 3 11 7 7 22 5 99 (continued )

136

Local elections and parties

Federal subjects

Tver’

Total number of heads

Female Higher or incomplete higher education

43

Tomsk 20 Tula 26 Tyumen’ 306 Ul’yanovsk 24 Chelyabinsk 325 Chita 32 Yaroslavl’ 19 Moscow – St Petersburg 111 Autonomous Okrugs/ Oblast Yevreiskaya 8 Autonomous oblast Agin-Buryat 42 Komi7 Permyak Koryak 33 Nenets 21 Taimyr 4 Ust’-Ordina 6 Buryat Khansy-Mansi 22 Chukotka 9 Yevenk 27 Yamalo13 Nenets Total 12498

2

Nominated State and by electoral municipal associations employees and blocks

Leaders of enterprises and organizations

42

1

28

11

0 2 0 0 0 0 1 – 8

14 21 232 21 249 17

5

18 23 148 23 230 27 18 – 54

6 5 14 1 28 9 8 – 10

2

5

0

4

6 1

29 7

0 0

21 7

6

13 12

19 12 4 6

1 0 0 0

13 12 3 5

2 2 1

22 8 15 13

0 0 0 0

4 8 19 12

15 1 5 1

7217

351

6178

1832

1 65 1 72 1 1 –

2532

– 5

Source: P. A. Goryunov, N. A. Kulyasova, V. A. Malyshev, S. Yu. Nesterov, V. G. Simnik, E. V. Shloma and S. N. Shusharin, Formirovanie organov mestnovo samupravlenie v Rossiiskoi Federatsii 1995–8: Elektoral’naya statistika, Moscow: Tsentral’naya Izbiratel’naya Komissiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii, ‘Ves’ Mir’, 1999, pp. 189–91. Data on the Republic of Bashkortostan and the city of Moscow are absent. There were no organs of local self-government in Ingushetiya.

Elections to local councils According to federal legislation, local councils ‘are elected by universal, equal and direct suffrage in secret ballots’. In the Soviet period, the number of deputies

Local elections and parties 137 varied from an average of 50 in rural and settlement councils to 75 in raions and 200–500 in cities.18 The 1996 Federal Law, ‘About Guaranteeing the Constitutional Right of Citizens to Elect and Be Elected to Organs of Local Self-Government’, mandated that local councils were to have a much smaller membership of between 7 and 50 deputies, depending on population size.19 However, the provisions of this law were simply ignored by many regional and local administrations. The actual number of deputies elected to local councils over the period 1995–8 varied from just two deputies in the Verkh-Ozerinskoe Village Council, Altai Krai (population of 599), to 70 in the Municipal Council of Vyborg District, Leningrad Oblast (population of 139,171).20 In many cases, particularly at the settlement and raion levels, local councils were far too small to be effective, and only 5 per cent of deputies were employed full-time, a factor which undoubtedly weakened their ability to scrutinize the work of the executive and to hold administrative heads to account.21 Tenure of local councils In the majority of councils, the tenure was four years. However, in the Republic of Tatarstan, Stavropol’ Krai, and Tver’ Oblast, it was five years. In some regions, the tenure for municipal settlements was just two years (for some of the municipalities in the Republic of Mordoviya, Primorskii Krai, and Vladimir, Irkutsk, Kamchatka, Pskov and Tver’ oblasts, and Koryak AO).22 In the Republic of Adygeya the tenure of all municipalities was one year. Election systems for local councils The most common electoral system employed was the single-member plurality system, which was adopted by 69.13 per cent of municipalities. In 30.79 per cent of municipalities, elections were conducted employing a multi-member plurality system. Proportional representation was used to elect just 0.08 per cent of deputies: 93 deputies were elected in 16 of the 574 municipalities of Krasnoyarsk Krai, including 17 of the 35 mandates in Krasnoyarsk City Council.23 Density of representation For Sirsk: a critical factor to assess is the number of councillors as a ratio to the votingage population in electoral districts. Local government systems have the opportunity to minimize that ratio (offering more representatives for fewer people). That is, representation is enhanced with the lowest possible density of representation.24 In the 1995–8 municipal elections, there were wide variations in the density of representation, which varied from a ratio of 4 in the Tsei Rural Settlement

138

Local elections and parties

(Republic of North Osetiya-Alaniya), where there were seven mandates and 25 electors, to 51 in Omsk City Council (17 mandates and 866,969 electors). In 7.5 per cent of elections to local councils there were 50 or less electors for each mandate; in 70.4 per cent of councils (between 51 and 500); in 20.3 per cent of councils (from 501 to 5,000); and in 1.6 per cent (more than 5,000).25 Candidates for local councils The number of candidates who stood for seats in the elections to local councils was much lower than in the elections for heads of administrations. A total of 239,027 candidates competed for 112,117 seats – an average of just 2.1 candidates per seat.26 Overall, as would be expected, competition was more vibrant in the larger urban municipalities and lowest in the rural and city settlements. The highest number of candidates, an average of 4–5, registered for elections in Voronezh, Murmansk Oblasts and Yamalo-Nenetsk AO. In sharp contrast, in 21 federal subjects there was an average of less than two candidates per seat, and many of the elections, particularly in the rural areas, were uncontested.27 Turnout in local council elections As with elections for heads of administrations, there were wide variations in regional compliance with electoral norms: 62 regions complied with the federal minimum turnout norm of 25 per cent (in two regions it was set at 30 per cent, in two regions 33 per cent, and in six regions 50 per cent). In 12 regions, in violation of federal legislation, no minimum level was stipulated. Turnout for local councils was lower than for local heads of administrations, averaging 45–55 per cent in the cities, and 70–80 per cent in rural constituencies.28 In a number of regions, local elections had to be declared invalid as turnout was below the minimum threshold. Thus, for example: in St Petersburg the city spent 18 billion roubles ($3 million) organizing elections for the 111 new local councils in September 1998. But even after the elections were extended for an additional day, only about one-third of the districts were able to achieve the required minimum turnout of 25 per cent. Average turnout for the city was 12 per cent for the first day and only climbed to 18 per cent with the extension.29 Social composition of local councils Of the deputies elected to the councils, 30.8 per cent were female. However, in some regions female representation was over 50 per cent: Republic of Tyva (55.62 per cent), Krasnoyarsk Krai (52.54 per cent), Magadan Region (55.56 per cent), Tambov Region (67.45 per cent) and the Koryak AO (58.15 per cent). In other regions, it was less than 10 per cent: Republic of Dagestan (3.26 per cent) and Republic of Khakasiya (0.43 per cent).30 On average, 46.61 per cent of the elected

Local elections and parties 139 deputies had higher or incomplete higher education. However, in some areas the figure was over 85 per cent: Republic of Buryatiya, Volgograd, Kaliningrad, Moscow, Murmansk, Omsk, Ryazan, Samara, Tambov, Tomsk, and Ul’yanovsk. In the Republic of Tatarstan, the figure was very low: just 7.0. The majority of deputies (70 per cent) were between 30–50 years of age, 7.57 per cent were under 30, and 22.65 per cent were over 50. In the republic of Tatarstan, a majority of deputies (50.55 per cent) were over the age of 50 (see Table 8.3).31 Parties in Russia’s regions and municipalities 1995–8 A major problem in building democracy in Russia is the weakness of parties and the party system; clientelism, not party politics, dominates regional and local politics. As Mainwairing and Scully observe, democracy tends to thrive ‘when party systems have been institutionalized’.32 Where parties are not institutionalized, ‘democratic politics is more erratic, establishing legitimacy is more difficult, and governing is more complicated … . Powerful economic elites tend to have privileged access to policy makers … patrimonial practices often prevail, and legislatures tend to be weakly developed.’33 Parties in regional elections In my study of regional gubernatorial elections held over the period 1995–7, I found that just 18.8 per cent of the candidates belonged to a political party, while just 10 (14.3 per cent) of the 70 chief executives elected had a party affiliation. In regional assembly elections, of the 3,481 deputies elected to 83 of Russia’s 89 republics and regions, in post as of January 1998, only 18.4 per cent were members of political parties.34 In 17 regional assemblies there was no party representation at all, and in only five assemblies did party members comprise a majority of the deputies corps. No single party held a majority of the seats in any of Russia’s 89 regional assemblies, and there were only ten chairs of assemblies with a party affiliation. Of the 635 deputies with a party affiliation in January 1998, by far the largest number (279 deputies or 44.0 per cent) belonged to the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), which won seats in 42 regions. However, overall the communist’s 279 seats made up only 8.0 per cent of the total. All of the other political parties had a minimal presence, none comprising even as much as 1 per cent of the total number of deputies. Thus, for example, the Agrarian Party of Russia (APR) won a mere 28 seats in seven assemblies; the National Patriotic Union of Russia (NPSR), 26 seats in three assemblies; Yabloko, 22 seats in eight assemblies; Our Home is Russia (NDR), 18 seats in 12 assemblies; and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), 15 seats in just six assemblies.35 Parties in municipal elections Parties played an even more minor role in municipal elections. As Kourliandskaya et al. note:

Table 8.3 Municipal councils elected 1995–8 Female Higher or % of deputies State and Federal subjects Total municipal number deputies incomplete nominated by electoral employees higher of education associations deputies and blocks

Leaders of enterprises institutions and organizations

Republics Adygeya

397

123

168

2.27

59

81

Altai

207

41

154

0.00

107

122

Buryatiya

341

81

292

0.00

108

155

Dagestan

5146

168

2964

0.00

1053

749

Ingushetiya

–

–

–

–

–

–

KabardinoBalkariya

1410

238

1008

0.63

239

340

Kalmykiya

830

251

393

0.00

109

378

KarachaevoCherkesskaya

614

117

257

1.59

76

189

Kareliya

413

121

350

10.95

5

72

Komi

413

136

291

0.00

25

165

Marii El

438

103

328

1.82

32

170

Mordoviya

5478

2032

2354

0.00

838

784

Sakha-Yakutiya

523

95

371

0.00

91

191

North OsetiyaAlaniya

1055

140

395

0.00

58

152

Tatarstan

6937

2034

487

0.00

Tyva

329

183

169

1.02

73

–

125 72

Udmurtiya

864

155

663

8.88

47

311

Khakasiya

698

3

251

0.00

13

97

Chechnya

–

–

–

–

–

–

Chuvash

571

110

443

3.28

76

283

6670

2467

2817

3.45

266

1213

995

190

821

18.32

67

489

2299

1208

667

0.00

4

365

334

112

274

1.10

19

135

Krais Altai Krasnodar Krasnoyarsk Primorsk Stavropol’

1856

559

976

3.55

70

461

Khabarovsk

1838

890

538

0.82

101

256

2287

874

864

0.04

269

226

Oblasts Amur Arkhangel’

599

207

403

5.55

47

215

Astrakhan

1245

554

632

3.55

65

209

Federal subjects Total Female Higher or % of deputies State and number deputies incomplete nominated municipal of higher by electoral employees deputies education associations and blocks

Leaders of enterprises institutions and organizations

Belgorod

378

51

320

7.89

50

194

Bryansk

4352

1524

1312

3.52

87

572

Vladimir

859

315

553

2.42

62

318

Volgograd

517

125

457

12.52

65

269

Vologda

482

128

346

3.92

62

228

Voronezh

4295

1356

3267

0.00

31

2953

506

158

377

7.91

40

222

Irkutsk

350

94

282

3.64

12

190

Kaliningrad

329

48

286

0.00

152

89

Kaluga

332

120

253

18.26

30

101

Kamchatka

134

45

89

7.04

8

37

Kemerovo

608

202

393

39.64

66

237

Kirov

981

311

651

6.92

41

407

Ivanovo

Kostroma

401

118

268

4.70

104

142

Kurgan

2722

1091

1036

0.04

302

421

Kursk

3618

1563

1181

0.58

91

502

Leningrad

696

213

542

9.77

79

276

3197

1193

1081

1.09

96

657

Magadan

369

205

70

0.00

9

36

Moscow

1160

261

1028

8.91

134

605

Lipetsk

Murmansk

270

104

240

4.44

38

92

Nizhegorod

5634

1776

2329

0.66

604

1433

Novgorod Novosibirsk Omsk

181

52

136

0.00

–

106

4170

1725

1180

0.50

271

645

405

92

358

49

167

4974

1573

1791

0.74

55

640

Orel

2629

921

1185

5.44

212

609

Penza

2906

916

1270

1.58

329

530

Perm’

729

221

527

8.11

52

314

Pskov

358

108

256

22.28

–

208

Rostov

932

160

758

2.65

146

556

Ryazan’

475

82

411

11.09

128

228

Samara

421

75

414

11.64

53

192

Saratov

533

57

479

9.57

95

Orenburg

10.0

331 (continued )

Federal subjects Total Female Higher or % of deputies State and number deputies incomplete nominated municipal of higher by electoral employees deputies education associations and blocks Sakhalin Sverdlovsk Smolensk

Leaders of enterprises institutions and organizations

168

64

121

4.09

16

62

1128

291

838

9.41

101

512

324

48

258

22.39

33

216

3279

980

1480

6.27

237

793

Tver’

708

224

486

5.07

39

382

Tomsk

224

40

191

6.25

48

140

Tambov

Tula

384

105

285

4.95

7

233

2240

891

1125

1.03

26

412

Ul’yanovsk

259

50

224

3.09

7

226

Chelyabinsk

Tyumen’

3097

964

1460

0.93

287

595

Chita

539

204

413

0.00

65

339

Yaroslavl’

393

129

251

4.53

–

193

–

–

–

–

–

–

1525

595

998

26.61

139

587

Yevreiskaya Autonomous oblast

64

18

33

18.75

6

28

Agin-Buryat

340

124

177

0.00

32

53

98

36

55

0.00

11

15

Koryak

227

132

61

0.00

7

40

Nenets

158

67

54

0.00

36

45

Taimyr

23

10

15

0.00

19

5

Ust’-Ordina Buryat

61

7

48

0.00

22

34

Moscow St Petersburg Autonomous Okrugs/Oblast

Komi-Permyak

Khansy-Mansi

244

66

202

0.00

4

153

Chukotka

75

21

48

1.33

–

28

Yevenk

46

14

14

0.00

11

9

Yamalo-Nenets 142 36 Total 111446 34327

110 51943

0.00 3.00

11 8347

70 27147

Source: P. A. Goryunov, N. A. Kulyasova, V. A. Malyshev, S. Yu. Nesterov, V. G. Simnik, E. V. Shloma and S. N. Shusharin, Formirovanie organov mestnovo samupravlenie v Rossiiskoi Federatsii 1995–98: Elektoral’naya statistika, Moscow: Tsentral’naya Izbiratel’naya Komissiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii, ‘Ves’ Mir’, 1999, pp. 58–61. Data on the Republic of Bashkortostan and the city of Moscow are absent. There were no organs of local self-government in Ingushetiya.

Local elections and parties 143 regional and federal parties are not usually represented at the municipal level, nor are most non-governmental organizations. Debate over local policy issues occurs between the local administration and the regional authorities, rather than between the local administration and political parties or local interest groups.36 Thus, for example, in the elections held over the period 1995–8, just 3.6 per cent of the 26,000 candidates for posts as heads of administration were nominated by political parties (electoral associations and electoral blocs) and just 4.27 per cent of the 8,229 elected chiefs were party members (see Table 8.2).37 The highest levels of party saturation were in the municipalities of Orel Oblast, where 73.2 per cent of heads of administrations were nominated by political parties and electoral blocs, followed by the following regions: Tambov (38.89 per cent), Smolensk (30 per cent), Bryansk (25.2 per cent), Voronezh (21 per cent), Krasnodar (12.50 per cent), Ivanovo (11.76 per cent), and Kemerovo (11.11 per cent).38 However, in sharp contrast, none of the elected heads of local administrations were nominated by a political party in 48 of Russia’s 89 regions! (See Table 8.4.) In elections to local councils, only 6.84 per cent of candidates were nominated by political parties, and, of the 111,446 elected deputies, just 3.0 per cent (3,381) had a party affiliation (see Table 8.3).39 Moreover, in 24 federal subjects none of the deputies elected to local councils had a party affiliation (see Table 8.4).40 The levels of party saturation in Russian local councils are much lower than in Europe. Table 8.5 shows data on the party saturation of local councils in 11 European countries, including a number of states which were part of the former Soviet bloc. As can be seen, party saturation of local councils varied between a low of 34.7 per cent in Hungary to a high of 96.7 per cent in Denmark. It is also important to note that these figures for party affiliation refer to figures for the umbrella term ‘electoral associations’, which included, in addition to political parties, a host of political movements and civic organizations. Party representation in many municipalities was higher than the above data would suggest. It was quite common for candidates to reveal their party affiliation only after the conclusion of the elections. Such concealment of one’s party affiliation shows that for most candidates party membership in 1995–8 was seen as more of a liability than an asset. It was clearly an advantage to stand as an independent candidate in the 1995–8 local council elections, where 48.48 per cent of independents won seats, while just 20.71 per cent of those nominated by parties were successful.41 Rather than governors and mayors joining parties in order to promote their election prospects, it was more often the case that parties were forced to turn to executive bodies to help bring home the votes. Regional governors and mayors (particularly of capital cities) often control electoral finances, the local media, courts and electoral commissions (see Chapter 10). Moreover, in the 1990s many governors also had their own regional ‘parties’ and ‘blocs’. In the absence of political parties, many local councils have been dominated by state and municipal employees, and local entrepreneurs. Thus, for example, while just 7.5 per cent overall of the total number of deputies had been employed as state

Table 8.4 Regions in which no deputies or heads of local administrations were nominated by a political association or bloc in the 1995–8 municipal elections Regions in which none of the elected deputies were officially nominated by electoral associations and blocs

Regions in which none of the heads of local administrations were officially nominated by electoral associations and blocs

Republics Altai Buryatiya Dagestan Kalmykiya Komi Mordoviya Sakha-Yakutiya North Osetiya-Alaniya Tatarstan Khakasiya

Republics Altai Buryatiya Dagestan Kabardino-Balkariya Kalmykiya Karachaeva-Cherkessiya Kareliya Komi Mari El Mordoviya Sakha-Yakutiya North Osetiya-Alaniya Tatarstan Khakasiya Udmurtiya Krais Primorskii

Oblasts Voronezh Kaliningrad Magadan Novgorod Chita

Oblasts Magadan Amur Arkhangel’sk Astrakhan Vladimir Volgograd Kaliningrad Kaluga Korstroma Kurgan Lipetsk Magadan Nizhegorod Novgorod Orenburg Perm Samara Saratov Sakhalin Tomsk Tyumen Ul’yanovsk Chita

Autonomous Okrugs/Oblasts Angin-Buryatsk Komi-Permyak Koryak

Autonomous Okrugs/Oblasts Yevreiiskii Agin-Buryat Komi-Permyak

Local elections and parties 145

Regions in which none of the elected deputies were officially nominated by electoral associations and blocs

Regions in which none of the heads of local administrations were officially nominated by electoral associations and blocs

Autonomous Okrugs/Oblasts Nenents Taimyr Ust’-Ordin Buryatskii Khansy-Mansiskii Yevenk Yamalo-Nenetsk AO

Autonomous Okrugs/Oblasts Koryak Nenents Taimyr Ust’-Ordin Buryatskii Chukotka Khansy-Mansiskii Yevenk Yamalo-Nenetsk

Source: P. A. Goryunov, N. A. Kulyasova, V. A. Malyshev, S. Yu. Nesterov, V. G. Simnik, E. V. Shloma and S. N. Shusharin, Formirovanie Organov Mestnovo Samupravlenie v Rossiiskoi Federatsii 1995–98: Elektoral’naya Statistika, Moscow: Tsentral’naya Izbiratel’naya Komissiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii, ‘Ves’ Mir’, 1999, pp. 31, 58–61, 189–91.

Table 8.5 Party Saturation of Local Councils (per cent) European Union countries Country %

Year

Central Eastern countries Country %

Year

United Kingdom

1997

Bulgaria

2002

90.4

86.4

Ireland

90.4

1997

Estonia

49.4

2002

Germany

90.0

1997

Slovakia

44.9

2002

Sweden

94.6

1998

Poland

34.9

2003

Denmark Finland

96.7 93.2

1997 1996

Hungary Netherlands

34.7 75.0

2002 1994

Source: Pawel Swianiewicz and Adam Mielczarek, ‘Parties and political culture in Central and Eastern European local governments’, in Gabor Soos and Violetta Zentai (eds), Faces of Local Democracy: Comparative Papers from Central and Eastern Europe, Budapest: Local Government Public Service Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute, 2005, p. 25.

and municipal civil servants, the figure was much higher in some regions: in Taimyr AO (82.61 per cent), Altai (51.69 per cent), Kaliningrad Oblast (46.20 per cent), the Republic of Buryatiya (31.6 per cent), Kostroma Oblast (25.9 per cent).42 (See Table 8.4.) As Lankina notes, it has been quite common for senior members of the education and medical establishment, who are appointed by the local executives, to hold posts as deputies. Thus, for example, representatives from the education and medical professions made up 64 per cent of the local councils ‘in Pskov, 53 per cent in Kirov, 52 per cent in Ryazan, and 61 per cent in Samara’.43 Overall, 24.6 per cent of the deputies to local councils were leaders of enterprises and organization of various forms of ownership (see Table 8.4). However, again in some regions the figure was much higher. Thus, for example, leaders of enterprises and organizations comprised 86.49 per cent of the membership of local councils in Ul’yanovsk Region; in Voronezh Oblast (68.75 per cent), Smolensk Oblast

146

Local elections and parties

(66.67 per cent), Volgograd (52 per cent), Krasnodar Oblast (49 per cent).44 In 1998, representatives of large business concerns won 20 of 30 seats in the Izhevsk City Council: The new members of the legislature controlled two of the largest banks in the city, all the private television stations, 90 per cent of private newspapers, two thirds of the market for oil products, all three large construction companies, and the two trading companies … . Among the winners was the Chairman of ‘Udmurtneft’, which extracts eighty per cent of the oil in the region. No political party member was elected.45

Municipal elections under Putin 2004–5 As a result of the 2003 Law, the number of municipalities have more than doubled in size from 12,000 to 24,210. The number of rural settlements rose from 9,192 to 19,904, and the number of city settlements increased by almost four times from 461 to 1,745. There were 1,801 newly formed municipal districts and 522 newly created city districts. There were also 236 ‘inner-municipal areas’ in the two ‘cities of federal status’, Moscow and St Petersburg.46 The first major round of elections to the new municipalities took place over the period March 2004–December 2005, with 57 regions conducting local elections in the month of October 2005. In total, elections were held in 19,266 municipalities (for both old and new). During this election cycle 198,815 deputies were elected to local councils (including 119,358 to the newly formed councils) and 13,655 heads of municipalities were elected (including 8,644 in newly formed municipalities).47 Electoral systems Given Putin’s drive to bring regional legislation into line with federal laws, it is interesting to note that regional legislation on municipal elections remains highly varied. In some regions we have laws that codify both regional and municipal elections in one document, while in other regions there are separate laws for municipal and regional elections and referenda. The number of election laws in the regions now run into the several hundreds.48 In 2005, the Central Electoral Commission produced a Draft Model Law on elections that proposed all future municipal elections should adopt a mixed electoral system with a high level of proportionality.49 As Kynev notes, according to the Draft: If the total number of deputies is not more than 22 then 19 are to be elected by party list PR [proportional representation] and only three by a majoritarian system. If the number of deputies is 23–25 then independents may number up to 5. If there are 26 and more deputies then the number of single mandate or multi-mandate seats can only number one-fifth of the total number of deputies. i.e. 5.50

Local elections and parties 147 However, the Draft Model Law was not published in time for the 2004–5 round of municipal elections, where a first past the post majoritarian electoral system was by far the most common. A mixed, majoritarian/PR system was adopted in only 50 council elections in seven regions (Kransnoyarsk Krai, Volgograd, Nizhegorod, Tomsk, Tula, Sakhalin and Chita oblasts).51 Only one municipality, the City of Volzhsk (Volgograd Region), adopted a fully proportional party list system. As discussed in Chapter 5, the 2003 Law allows for the indirect election of deputies to municipal districts. Thus, for example, in Stavropol’ Krai the councils of municipal districts are made up of the ex-officio heads of each settlement administration situated within their jurisdiction, plus two deputies from each of their settlement councils.52 This provision conflicts with Article 130 of the Russian Constitution, which states that local self-government ‘shall be exercised by citizens through a referendum, election, or other forms of direct expression of the will of the people, through elected and other bodies of local self-government’.53 The 2003 Law also continues the practice, first established in the 1995 Law, of allowing heads of municipalities in ‘municipal districts’ and ‘city districts’ to be elected, either indirectly from members of their local assemblies, or directly by their citizens. In December 2005, 15,178 heads of municipalities had been directly elected and 9,004 were elected by their local assemblies (see Chapter 9).54 A dearth of candidates Given the massive number of elections that were conducted over the period 2004–5, it is not surprising that in many regions officials found it difficult to persuade people to stand as candidates. As Lankina notes: In many areas, particularly in the countryside, the locals’ lack of interest in voting or running for local positions has been a great source of concern, even panic, for regional officials and electoral commission members keen on demonstrating that the reform is going smoothly.55 A total of 283,811 candidates competed for the 198,815 seats in local councils, which was less than two candidates per seat (an average of 1.42). For the 13,655 posts of heads of municipalities there were 37,715 candidates, an average of 2.76 candidates.56 In Tatarstan, 80 per cent of all candidates ran unopposed,57 as was the case in many of the rural settlements in Arkhangel’sk Oblast, the Republic of Yakutiya, and the Ust’-Ordynskii Buryatskii Autonomous Okrug.58 As in 1995–8, more candidates stood in elections for executive bodies. Thus, for example, in Ryazan Oblast there was an average of 1.5 candidates competing for the seats in local councils and 3.0 for the posts of heads of municipalities: in Arkhangel’sk Oblast, 1.7 and 3.4, respectively; and in Volgograd, 2.0 and 3.0, respectively. In Saratov, where there was an average of 1.8 candidates for council elections, no deputies were elected in 10 districts, either because of a dearth of candidates, very low turnout, or the category ‘against all’ received the highest number of votes.59

148

Local elections and parties

Table 8.6 Average turnout in Russian local elections 2004–5 (per cent) Average turnout (%)

Local councils

Heads of municipalities

Rural settlements

56.4

54.8

City settlements

40.63

41.86

Municipal raions City districts

50.46 38.45

51.65 41.75

Source: L. F. Dem’yanchenko (ed.), Reforma Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Itogi Munitsipal’nykh Vyborov v 2004–2005 Godakh, Moscow: Tsentral’naya Izbiratel’naya Komissiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 2006, p. 8.

In Arkhangel’sk Oblast, five days after the beginning of the election campaign there were still only 16 candidates registered for the 202 posts of heads of municipalities, and 481 candidates for the 1,861 local council seats. In Plesetskii and Nyndomskii raions, no candidates had come forward at all! It would appear that the heads of district administrations in the region were not enthusiastic about creating new bodies to challenge their powers, and they had done very little to encourage citizens to participate in the elections.60 In the Repubilc of Sakha-Yakutiya, just 199 candidates had come forward by the end of August to contest the elections for the 4,462 local council seats. In Vladimir Region, ‘in 96 out of 127 localities, just weeks before the elections, not a single person found the job of mayor worth competing for’.61 In Rostov Oblast, 7,795 candidates put their names forward for 4,273 council seats (1.8 candidates per seat), while 1,640 candidates competed for the 408 posts of head of municipality (4.0 per post).62 In the run-up to the election campaign, the Rostov Regional Assembly adopted legislation making it much easier for candidates to register. Thus, for example, in those districts where the local population numbered less than 10,000, special arrangements were made allowing candidates to register without having to submit a list of signatures, or pay an electoral deposit. In districts with less than 5,000 inhabitants, candidates were not obliged to provide information about their income and property. Moreover, in an even more radical move, the regional administration approved uncontested elections in city and rural settlements. By holding these uncontested elections, which took place in 15.8 per cent of electoral districts, the region undoubtedly saved millions of roubles, which it would otherwise have had to spend in conducting repeat elections. However, such a cynical policy could hardly be called a positive step forward as far as the development of grass-roots democracy is concerned.63 Turnout and votes against all A minimum turnout requirement of just 20 per cent, compared to the previous norm of 25 per cent, was required to validate the elections. As Table 8.6 shows, turnout varied from a low of 38.5 per cent in city districts to a high of 56.5 per cent in the elections for deputies of rural settlements. Turnout data showed a similar pattern of electoral participation as that found in the 1995–8 round of municipal elections;

Local elections and parties 149 Table 8.7 Electoral turnout in 20 municipal raions of Penza Oblast 2003–5 City or raion

Elections to State Presidential Elections to organs of local Duma 2003 elections 2004 self-government 2003–5

Zheleznodorozhnyi

50.6

58.4

27.2

Leninskii

54.3

60.6

27.1

Oktyabr’skii

52.2

58.4

25.3

Pervomaiskii

58.8

59.3

29.2

City Zarechnyi

58.4

59.3

36.7

City Kamenka

46.1

51.6

24.8

City Kuznetsk

50.7

53.2

36.6

City Serdobsk

47.0

52.3

34.3

Bashmakovskii

61.69

66.9

40.0

Bednodem’yanovskii

62.2

71.4

43.9

Bekovskii

67.6

81.1

72.9

Belinskii

63.0

71.0

41.0

Bessonovskii

47.9

61.9

32.9

Vadinskii

63.3

80.2

49.6

Gorodishchenskii

54.1

65.38

37.3

Zemetchinskii

59.60

73.4

46.4

Issinskii

70.2

75.6

48.2

Kamenskii

66.7

79.5

52.1

Kameshkirskii Kolyshleiskii

77.6 63.4

84.7 71.0

58.0 43.7

Source: N. M. Taktarov, ‘Analiz aktivnosti izbiratelei na vyborakh 1999–&2005’, Penza Oblast Electoral Commission, pp. 1–2. See Penza Electoral Commission, http://www.penza.izbirkom.ru (Accessed 7 September 2007).

namely higher turnout levels in the rural areas than in the cities, and higher levels for executive bodies than for elections to local councils. Turnout was also much lower for local-level elections than regional- and national-level elections. Thus, for example, as Table 8.7 shows, turnout for the 2004–5 municipal elections in the Penza Region was considerably lower than elections to the State Duma in 2003, which in turn was lower than turnout for the 2004 presidential elections. Managed elections In some instances, there were very high levels of turnout; much higher than the Russian average, which suggests that these were ‘managed elections’, i.e. elections that have been manipulated and controlled by the regional and/or local administrations. Thus, for example, average turnout for rural settlements councils

150

Local elections and parties

was 97.44 per cent in Bashkortostan, 81.6 per cent in Sakha, 84.6 per cent in Chukotka AO, 81.2 per cent in Orenburg, 80.1 per cent in Agin-Buryat AO.64 In Tatarstan, there was an average turnout of 87.6 per cent, but in some districts (Atninski and Apastovski) it reached 99 per cent! – figures that remind us of the manufactured turnout rates of the Soviet era.65 As Table 8.8 demonstrates, there was considerable variation in turnout levels across the municipal raions of Saratov Region, ranging from an average of 27.5 per cent in the City of Engels to 78.4 per cent in the Tatishchevskii rural settlement. In the Tula Region, average turnout varied from a low of 15.81 in the city of Efremov (below the 20 per cent minimum) to a high of just 38.99 in Kamenskii raion. Votes against all It should be stressed that low turnout in many cases may not simply reflect the apathy of the electorate, but also one or all of the following: 1 2 3

the belief that the elections are corrupt the belief there is no meaningful choice of candidates or parties the belief that local governments have no real or effective powers.

Here, the percentage of votes cast ‘against all’ candidates is an important additional indicator of the level of political dissatisfaction among the electorate. Indeed, the ‘vote against all’ can be considered an excellent barometer of the integrity of elections. Where it is unusually high, it is usually for a reason – Russian citizens are showing their disapproval in the only way permitted. Table 8.9 shows the average share of the vote against all at the regional level for different categories of election. As can be seen, the vote against all in many regions reached double figures. The highest figure of all was in the elections for the Governor of Saratov, where the average share of votes cast ‘against all’ was 20.2 per cent in the elections of March 2000. Protest voting in municipal elections In the municipal elections conducted in 2004–5, an average of 18.8 per cent of participants cast their votes against all. However, in many municipalities the figure was much higher and, in some cases, new elections had to be called because the vote against all received the highest support.66 In Saratov Oblast, the level of such protest voting varied between a low of 2.5 per cent in Ivanteevsk raion to 17 per cent in Balakovsk raion. In Tula Oblast, there were higher levels of such protest votes, which ranged from 10.27 per cent in Kamenskii raion to a high of 22.5 per cent in the city of Kimov (see Table 8.8). Where there are low levels of turnout combined with high percentages of votes against all, the legitimacy of the election is brought into question. Thus, for example, in Balakovsk raion (Saratov Region) there was a relatively low turnout of 36.86 and a relatively high percentage of protest votes of 17 per cent. In Tula,

Table 8.8 Turnout (average per cent) and votes against all (average per cent) in municipal elections in Saratov and Tula regions 2005 Saratov Region

Saratov Saratov votes Tula Region turnout against all

Tula Tula votes turnout against all

Aleksandro-Gaiskii

66.06

6.29

Aleksinskii raion

36.15

13.36

Arkadatskii

64.36

5.73

City Aleksin

34.24

13.15

Atkarskii

47.05

9.08

Belevskii raion

34.39

11.41

Bazarno Karabulakskii

77.77

3.80

Bogordintskii Raion

27.37

13.89

Balakovskii

36.86

16.92

City Bogorodinsk

22.95

15.07

Balashovskii

32.34

12.26

Venevskii Raion

25.42

14.94

Baltaiskii

68.58

9.99

Yefremovskii Raion

22.19

12.47

Vol’skii

42.89

9.40

City Efremov

15.81

17.4

Voskresenskii

64.10

7.44

Kamenskii Raion

38.99

10.27

Dergachevskii

62.22

5.10

Kimovskii Raion

30.74

14.98

Dukhovnitskii

78.34

5.66

City Kimov

21.57

22.5

Ekaterinovskii

49.01

5.73

Kireevskii Raion

27.76

16.92

Ershovskii

56.51

7.76

Novomoskovskii Raion

25.74

14.71

Ivanteevskii

73.02

2.51

City Novomoskovsk 23.34

13.71

Kalininskii

52.14

8.48

Plavskii raion

32.73

17.35

Krasnoarmeiskii

38.27

9.06

Suvorovskii Raion

27.99

12.27

Krasnokutskii

50.27

6.23

Uzlovskoi Raion

20.11

11.96

Krasnopartizanskii

61.05

3.38

City Uzlovaya

16.13

13.61

Lysogorskii

63.96

3.65

Shchekinskii Raion

31.07

17.55

Marksovskii

39.75

7.47

City Shchekino

28.55

11.3

Yasnogorskii Raion

27.73

18.57

Novoburasskii

63.26

5.90

Novouzenskii

73.05

9.58

Ozinskii

53.22

5.51

Perelyubskii

55.19

6.49

Petrovskii

35.44

10.12

Piterskii

72.85

5.76

Pugachevskii

39.55

5.76

Rovenskii

52.17

7.04

Romanovskii

62.79

4.03

Rtishcheveskii

37.08

7.51

Samoilovskii

61.01

4.59

Saratovskii

61.00

4.70

Sovetskii

36.29

9.02

Tatishchevskii

78.74

4.46 (continued)

152

Local elections and parties

Saratov Region

Saratov Saratov votes Tula Region turnout against all

Turkovskii

63.00

Fedorovskii

56.53

6.39

Khvalynskii

54.10

10.74

Engel’skii Saratov Oblast

27.55 45.93

11.35 8.52

Tula Tula votes turnout against all

5.46

Source: For data on Saratov see ‘Svodnaya Statistika po Vydvizheniyu i registratsii kandidatov na vyborakh deputatov predstavitel’nykh organov pervovo sozyva vo vnov’ obrazovannykh munitsipal’nykh obrazovaniyakh Saratovskoi Oblasti, 9 Oktryabrya 2005 goda’, p. 15. See also the Saratov Oblast electoral commision website (http://www.saratov.izbirkom.ru/informacia_1) (Accessed 9 August 2007). For data on the municipal elections in Tula (30 October 2005) see the Tula Oblast electoral commission website (http://www.izbirkom.ru/way/929936.htm) (Accessed 9 August 2007).

in almost every district there were low turnout rates combined with sizeable percentages of protest. In the city of Kimov, there was a turnout of just 21.57 per cent combined with a protest vote of 22.5 per cent (see Table 8.8). Similarly, where turnout was high, protest voting was generally low. Thus, for example, in Piterskii Municipal Raion in Saratov, turnout was 72.85 per cent and the votes against all was 5.76 per cent. Social composition of deputies and heads of local councils As Table 8.10 shows, the vast majority of heads of municipalities (70.4 per cent) were male; 58.3 per cent were aged 31–50 years, and 37.8 per cent were over 50. Less than two per cent were under the age 30, while 67.5 per cent had completed a degree in higher education. Of the 198,815 deputies, just over half (53 per cent) were male. Just 5.35 per cent were below the age of 30, while the largest group (65.4 per cent) were aged 31–50. Under half (46.8 per cent) had completed a degree in higher education.67 No comprehensive data was provided on the occupational status of deputies and heads of municipalities. Party membership of municipal councils and heads of local administrations 2004–5 In the territory of the Russia Federation in 2004, 1,538 regional and 5,328 local branches of political parties were registered. In the 2004–5 round of municipal elections, the most active parties were United Russia (UR), the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) and Motherland (Rodina). Also taking part to a lesser degree were the regional branches of the Russian Party of Pensioners (RPP), the Russian Party of Life (RPL), the Agrarian Party of Russia (APR), Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces (SPS). In addition, there were a host of other minor parties that fielded less than 1 per cent of the total number of candidates.

Table 8.9 Average share of ‘votes against all’ in subjects of the Federation 1995–2003 (per cent) Name of region

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Adygeya

1.27

6.57

1.05

3.43

1.68

4.58

1.17

3.9

7.23

1.25

Agin-Buryatiya AO

2.7

2.36

1.26

2.04

0.86

1.71

0.6

1.11

1.8

4.03

Altai Krai

2.26

6.13

1.34

4.96

2.31

6.91

1.05

3.73

8.59

5.95

Altai Republic

3.75

8.05

1.6

3.79

3.41

5.71

1.2

2.83

5.87

2.72

Amur

3.04

9.79

2.14

5.44

3.24 14

1.42

5.13 12.03 10.3

Arkhangel’sk

3.46 12.66

1.97

7.46

3.87 13.69

2.1

5.73 14.93 12.17

Astrakhan

2.26

6.08

1.38

4.42

2.6

7.17

1.1

4.79

6.62

5.96

Bashkortostan

2.25

7.19

1.41

3.64

1.88

8.47

1

2.78

8.56

2.39

Belgorod

2.16

9.27

1.25

4.09

2.85 10.8

1.54

5.50

9.2

9.99

Bryansk

2.07

6.38

1.28

3.44

2.83

9.06

1.19

4.42

7.5

6.90

Buryatiya

3.15 13.52

1.4

3.7

2.5

8.34

1.26

3.29

9.32

2.17

Chechnya

1.75

–

2.2

3.0

–

–

2.25

0.82

1.61

–

Chelyabinsk

2.79

7.84

1.36

5.3

3.46

8.34

1.86

5.35 11.26

3.92

Chita

2.82

9.04

2.1

5.33

2.68 10.14

1.33

3.57 10.3

5.59

Chukotka

5.3

9.89

2.61

6.03

3.82 13.13

1.84

4.24

8.79

3.65

Chuvashiya

1.9

5.9

1.1

3.34

2.25

6.23

1.03

3.46

7.19

2.95

Dagestan

0.54

0.78

0.54

0.83

0.41

7.96

0.21

0.45 15.31

Yevenk

5.21 18.39

1.85

5.1

4.83

3.96

1.81

4.93 18.85 11.15

Ingushetiya

2.71

0.87

1.91

3.3

0.33

1.41

0.61

1.53

5.07

0.41

Irkutsk

2.91 12.69

1.68

6.29

2.83 10.76

1.7

4.41 11.69

7.26

Ivanovo

3.19

8.61

1.62

6.91

4.33 10.93

1.88

6.17 16.68

8.16

Jewish

4.56 17.01

2.44

5.76

3.71 14.89

1.8

4.59 10.06

3.63

KabardinoBalkariya

0.96

4.73

0.75

1.95

0.92

5.18

0.6

1.34

3.26

0.79

Kaliningrad

3.4

12.46

1.45

6.14

3.08

8.18

1.5

5.76 14.69

7.21

Kalmykiya

1.89

3.91

0.91

1.98

2.53

7.05

0.95

4.62

3.44

2.57

Kaluga

2.49

6.77

1.52

4.98

3.3

10.18

1.87

5.19 14.05

9.88

Kamchatka

4.33

9.22

2.29

7.98

5.16 15.18

2.35

5.44 10.02 11.67

KarachaevaCherkessiya

1.01

3.13

0.76

2.4

1.88

4.25

1.01

2.2

3.35

Kareliya

3.76 10.2

1.94

6.6

4.24 12.77

1.83

5.66

9.62 10.75

Kemerovo

2.07

9.85

1.64

5.86

2.89

0.97

4.05 11.24

3.23

Khabarovsk

4.5

12.08

2.2

6.54

4.28 10.7

2.79

5.88 14.55

4.28

Khakassiya

3.16

5.5

1.64

4.79

2.45

9.36

1.4

4.19 11.52

5.48

1.36

4.57

3.34

8.95

1.79

6.43 16.84

5.94

Khansy-Mansiskii 3.71 16.89

8.93

10

–

8.61

(continued)

Name of region

1

2

3

4

5

Kirov

2.75

9.65

2.01

6.78

Komi

3.75 10.67

1.84

6.59

Komi-Permyak

5.57 11.32

2.07

Koryak

6.89 16.13

2.9

Kostroma

2.84 10.04

Krasnodar

1.92

Krasnoyarsk Kurgan

2.96

Kursk

1.75

6

7

8

3.32 11.6

1.3

3.55 13.28 10.23

3.07 13.03

1.62

5.81 19.19

3.39

4.52

6.16

1.09

3.33

7.51 17.85

6.16

3.77

6.22

1.39

4.31

9.8

3.46

1.58

6.64

3.14 11.69

1.46

4.26

9.4

13.27

6.77

1.21

3.81

2.34

9.87

1.22

4.38 13.7

6.86

3.44 14.35

1.76

5.65

5.76 17.72

2.33

7.08 17.25

4.99

8.64

2.09

5.41

2.89 11.73

1.37

3.82 16.79

8.87

1.31

3.47

2.89

7.42

1.01

4.9

Leningrad

3.31 13.37

1.69

5.69

3.55 12.76

1.51

3.84 14.64

7.75

Lipetsk

2.26 10.29

1.5

4.05

3.64 12.8

1.71

5.82 15.7

13.38

Magadan

4.44

8.38

2.43

8.22

2.54

9.26

1.49

5.26

7.44

8.89

Marii El

2.98 10.32

1.93

5.18

3.59

5.77

1.77

6.14 11.52

4.04

Mordoviya

1.15

7.06

0.91

2.99

1.46

9.59

0.82

1.58

5.59

2.19

Moscow City

2.9

12.74

1.45

4.13

4.04 15.56

5.93

6.37 19.54

7.20

Moscow Oblast

3.14 11.78

1.74

5.08

4.39 16.07

3.73

6.11 18.9

9.73

Murmansk

4.13 12.39

1.99

7.36

4.03 13.64

1.96

5.33 14.39

4.77

Nenets

6.48

8.99

3.48

8.39

6

7.18

2.28

6.30

7.56

3.54

Nizhnii Novgorod 2.79

9.58

1.73

4.88

4.59 12.23

1.88

5.69 13.79

8.17

North OsetiyaAlan

1.63

4

1.1

2.35

1.76

6.62

0.8

2.01

5.54

2.35

Novgorod

3.22 11.9

1.69

6.15

2.82

6.9

1.42

4.18

7.23

5.59

Novosibirsk

3.39 11.63

1.71

6.28

3.71

9.9

1.66

5.94 16.17

5.35

Omsk

4.33 11.77

2.06

5.14

3.91 12.12

2

4.24 12.19

8.79

Orel

2.16

8.65

1.57

3.83

2.98 15.24

1.43

4.75 18.32

3.83

Orenburg

1.98 10.27

1.25

4.2

2.23

9.42

0.81

3.9

11.63

9.02

Penza

2.09

7.36

1.43

4.59

3.17 10.53

1.35

3.88

9.75

5.95

Perm’

3.89 11.07

1.77

4.56

4.41 11.89

1.8

6.98 15.71

3.47

Primore

3.79

9.78

2.26

7.4

3.51 16.05

1.91

5.44 13.9

8.01

Pskov

2.77

5.64

1.43

5.87

2.93 10.1

1.05

4.01

6.20

Rostov

1.88

8.26

1.05

4.25

2.5

1.5

4.45 13.26 12.68

Ryazan’

2.58

6.7

1.62

4.92

3.82 12.57

1.77

5.26 12.46

7.26

Sakha

5.37 10.12

1.67

4.07

3.38

6.16

1.72

5.18 10.11

7.71

Sakhalin

3.76

8.97

2.11

6.84

4.45 14.82

2.22

5.62 13.31

8.39

Samara

2.68

7.2

1.61

4.51

3.11 11.29

1.18

4.78 11.74

4.46

Saratov

2.38

7.92

1.67

4.86

3.37 12.13

1.59

4.25

Smolensk

2.58

9.07

1.42

4.78

3.22 10.97

1.4

4.34 13.34

9.30

St Petersburg

2.97 11.72

1.11

4.73

4.06 14.02

2.43

3.79 13.9

10.97

13.03

9

11.7

8.32

10 9.54

8.45 12.26

9.06 20.21

Local elections and parties 155 Name of region

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Stavropol’

1.81

6.66

1.2

4.2

3.22

7.87

1.32

4.81 11.13

6.13

Sverdlovsk

3.51 12.76

1.38

4.39

3.99 17.98

1.63

4.65 14.25

9.36

Taimyr

6.48 10.41

2.03

6.06

6.18 17.06

1.74

5.76 19.8

3.00

Tambov

2.27

9.52

1.36

3.7

3

11.33

1.19

5.59 13.12 11.18

Tatarstan

3.36

9.56

1.61

3.64

2.28 10.78

1.04

4.39 10.52

2.84

Tomsk

3.12

5.71

1.61

6.05

3.56

8.04

1.66

5.53 11.33

7.92

Tula

2.74

9.73

1.51

5.37

4.57 15.45

2.16

6.57 14.15

8.00

Tyva

3.7

3.26

1

2.1

1.65

0.92

1.70

3.81

2.61

Tver’

2.74 11.14

1.76

5.49

3.24 14.5

1.5

3.93 13.58

4.87

Tyumen

3.01

8.41

1.77

4.96

2.87 10.9

1.39

3.25 16.86

5.26

Udmurtiya

3.26

8.97

1.99

5.42

2.61 10.91

1.26

5.02 14.2

9.48

Ulyanovsk

1.96

8.43

1.47

4.64

2.95 11.83

1.18

5.91 16.27

3.86

Ust’-Ordynsk

2.68

5.57

1.37

2.7

1.6

3.29

0.55

2.30

5.20

Vladimir

2.66 12.99

1.62

5.64

3.85 11.65

1.86

5.19 15.22 11.20

Volgograd

1.78

7.9

1.38

4.55

2.58 10.78

1.31

4.4

16.63

5.47

Vologda

3.8

9.7

2.18

6.82

3.79 14.53

1.23

3.62 14.09

3.29

Voronezh

2.74

9.07

1.42

4.58

3.34 12.18

1.4

4.40 11.23

5.47

Yamalo-Nenets Yaroslavl’

3.35 11.92 3.75 12.18

1.43 1.62

4.73 7.18

4.05 16.26 3.72 8.56

1.76 1.75

5.5 10.3 4.90 12.55

7.86 7.24

3.39

9

2.62

10

Source: A. S. Akhremenko, ‘Golosovanie “protiv vsekh” v 1995–2003: rezul’taty empiricheskovo issledovaniya’, Rossiya i Sovremennym Mir, Vol 2, No. 43, 2004, pp. 100–3. Key: 1 Duma 1995, 2 Duma 1995 single mandate (average), 3 President 1996 first round, 4 President 1996 second round, 5 Duma 1999, 6 Duma 1999 single mandate (average), 7 President 2000, 8 Duma 2003, 9 Duma 2003 single mandate (average), 10 vote against all at elections for chief executives (Gubernators) 20003 (in N. V. Anokhina and E. Yu. Meleshkina, ‘Golosovanie “protiv vsekh” na regional’nykh vyborakh’, in Rossiya i Sovremennym Mir, Vol. 2, No. 43, 2004, pp. 83–5).

However, in 2005, only 17 per cent of candidates to local councils and 8.9 per cent of those standing for the post of head of a municipality were members of a political party.68 Moreover, of the 198,815 elected deputies, just 18.6 per cent were party members; of the 13,655 elected municipal heads, only one-fifth (20.2 per cent) had a party affiliation.69 As can be seen from Table 8.11, this is a significant improvement from 1998 when, as noted above, just 3.0 per cent of the members of local councils and 4.2 per cent of heads of local administrations were party members. However, it is still very low in comparative terms. Party competition was particularly low in the elections for city and rural settlements. Thus, for example, in elections held in Khabarovsk Krai on 3 April 2005 for the heads of 217 city and rural settlement councils, 7,000 of the 7,006 candidates were independents!70

156

Local elections and parties

Table 8.10 Social composition of deputies and heads of municipalities elected 2004–5 Statistical data Gender

Municipal councils Number %

Heads of municipalities Number %

Female Male Age 30 and under 31–40 41–50 51–60 over 60 Education Higher Inc/higher

93595 105383 10576 48096 82244 48979 7758 93144 5525

47.0 53.0 5.3 24.1 41.3 24.6 3.8 46.8 2.7

4181 9913 258 1986 6254 4993 340 9525 322

29.6 70.4 1.8 14.0 44.3 35.4 2.4 67.5 2.2

96409

48.4

4186

29.7

Middle

Source: ‘Vypiska iz protokola zasedeniya Tsentral’noi Izbiratel’noi Komissii Rossiiskoi Federatstii ot 29 Dekabrya 2005 goda No. 164-1-4, “Ob Itogakh Munitsipal’nykh Vyborov v Khode Reformy Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii v 2004–05 godakh”’, Vestnik Tsental’noi Izbiratel’noi Komissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, No. 2(193), 2006 (no author cited), p. 260. Data as of 1 December 2005. Does not include data for Chechnya and Ingushetiya.

Table 8.11 Party membership of local councils and heads of administrations/ municipalities 1995–8 and 2004–5 Local elections 1995–8 Local elections 2004–5 Councils Admin. Councils Municipal heads heads % of candidates nominated by a party 6.4 % of party candidates who were elected 3.0

3.6 4.2

17.0 18.6

8.9 20.2

Source: P. A. Goryunov, N. A. Kulyasova, V. A. Malyshev, S. Yu. Nesterov, V. G. Simnik, E. V. Shloma and S. N. Shusharin, Formirovanie Organov Mestnovo Samupravlenie v Rossiiskoi Federatsii 1995–98: Elektoral’naya Statistika, Moscow: Tsentral’naya Izbiratel’naya Komissiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii, ‘Ves’ Mir’, 1999, pp. 31 and 156; Vestnik Tsentral’noi Izbiratel’noi Komissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, No. 2(193), 2006, p. 260.

The dominance of United Russia Where parties did compete, United Russia was by far the most active and successful. Thus, for example, in the elections for local councils, United Russia won 15.2 per cent of the seats in rural settlements, 17 per cent in city settlements, 15.4 per cent in municipal raions, and 17.5 per cent in city districts. In elections for heads of municipalities, the percentage of votes for United Russia were: 16.7 per cent in rural settlements, 20.1 per cent in city settlements, 20.8 per cent in municipal raions, and 21.0 per cent in city districts. As can be seen, the communists (CPRF) came a very distant second, with figures ranging from 0.6 per cent in elections for heads of municipalities in city districts to just 4.24 per cent of the seats in municipal raions. All the other parties had a token representation of less than 1 per cent. (See Table 8.12.)

1410 (0.9)

187 (0.1)

126 (0.08)

15 (0.01)

11 (0.007) 1385 (0.9)

CPRF

LDPR

Rodina

Yabloko

SPS

3 (0.015) 116 (0.5)

1 (0.005)

93 (0.4)

102 (0.5)

16 (0.21) 10 (0.1) 154 (2.1)

11 (0.05) 311 (1.4)

47 (0.6)

44 (0.6)

200 (2.7)

1287 (17.5)

7322

9 (0.04)

93 (0.4)

79 (0.3)

918 (4.24)

3340 (15.4)

21637

1 (0.008) 76 (0.6)

1 (0.008)

3 (0.02)

34 (0.2)

285 (2.4)

1950 (16.7)

11626

0 (0.0) 7 (0.5)

0 (0.0)

2 (0.1)

18 (1.5)

24 (2.0)

236 (20.1)

1172

0 (0.0) 16 (1.6)

0 (0.0)

1 (0.1)

12 (1.2)

26 (2.6)

205 (20.8)

982

1 (0.3) 2 (0.6)

0 (0.0)

0 (0.0)

6 (1.9)

2 (0.6)

66 (21.0)

314

Municipal City Rural settlements City settlements Municipal raions City districts raions districts Heads of Heads of Heads of Heads of Councils Councils municipalities municipalities municipalities. municipalities

Source: Vestnik Tsentral’noi Izbiratel’noi Komissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, No. 2(193), 2006, p. 260. Does not include data for Chechnya and Ingushetiya.

CPRF = Communist Party of the Russian Federation LDPR = Liberal Democratic Party of Russia SPS = Union of Right Forces Percentages added by author

Others

3380 (17.0)

22629 (15.2)

United Russia

507 (2.5)

19776

City settlements Councils

Total no. of deputies 148708

Rural settlements Councils

Table 8.12 Party membership of municipal councils and heads of municipalities December 2005 (type of municipality, number of members and per cent)

158

Local elections and parties

In Tver’ Region, 94 per cent of all party nominated candidates for local councils and executive heads were nominated by United Russia;71 in Saratov Oblast the figure was 87 per cent. In Kareliya, United Russia dominated the elections, contesting 80 per cent of the seats in local councils and 75 per cent of the contests for the posts of heads of municipalities. In second place, far behind, was the LDPR, which took part in just 2.5 per cent of the elections; and in third place were the communists (CPRF) with a negligible number of candidates. United Russia swept the board, winning 76 per cent of the council seats and 62 per cent of the posts of heads of municipalities. The local press noted that there was ‘widespread use of administrative resources by the regional administration in support of United Russia’.72 In Volgograd Region, United Russia nominated 2,000 candidates for local council elections, while the communists, the main opposition party in the region, could muster only 359, the LDPR 112, Rodina 184, and the Agrarian Party of Russia 144.73 In Ryazan’ region, over 5,000 candidates stood in the September 2005 local elections: 21.7 per cent (187) stood on a party ticket in the elections for municipal heads. United Russia fielded 17 per cent of the total number of candidates, but 78.6 per cent (147) of those candidates who stood on a party ticket. Just 2.78 per cent of all candidates (24) were from the LDPR, while 1.68 per cent (16) were members of Motherland (Rodina). Moreover, of the 1,015 candidates standing in the local council elections in Ryazan’, 23.9 per cent (858) were from United Russia, but this comprised 85.5 per cent of the party nominated candidates. Only 2.28 per cent (97) were nominated by the LDPR, and a further 0.2 per cent (9) by SPS.74 As with the elections in Kareliya, there was widespread criticism of the conduct of the elections, with all of the opposition parties to United Russia (SPS, Motherland and LDPR) claiming that there had been unprecedented pressure from the authorities in support of the candidates from United Russia. In Leningrad Oblast, 16.3 per cent of the 2,239 deputies elected to city and rural settlements in 2005 were members of political parties, and 63.8 per cent of those with a party affiliation were members of United Russia; 13.6 per cent belonged to the CPRF, 7.6 per cent to Rodina, 7. 1 per cent to LDPR, and 1.3 per cent to RPP.75 However, it is important to note that many of the parties declared that their actual electoral support was much higher than the above figures would suggest. Many of the so-called ‘independent candidates’, it was claimed by party leaders, were in fact members of political parties or ‘party supporters’. Thus, according to United Russia, the party had the support of over 1,000 of the 2,729 deputies elected to local councils in Ryazan’ Oblast, and 150 of the 285 municipal heads.76 Many party members, as in 1995–8, clearly thought they would have better chances of winning if they stood officially as independents (self-nominated candidates) and kept their party affiliation secret. According to official data, only three parties (United Russia, CPRF and LDPR) took part in the local elections held in Arkhangel’sk Oblast on 2 October 2005, and less than one per cent of the total number of candidates were nominated by

Local elections and parties 159 77

parties. However, United Russia later declared that, of the 1,035 candidates for local councils, 806 were party members and, of the 153 candidates for heads of municipalities, 122 were ‘supporters’ of United Russia. For the communists, the figures were 30 deputies, and 5 heads of municipalities, and for the LDPR 7 deputies. In addition, Motherland, which ‘officially’ had no candidates standing in the election, ended up having 14 deputies and 8 heads of municipalities who later declared their support for the party.78 In the Udmurtiya Republic, participation of parties was much higher than the Russian average. Thus, of the 5,584 candidates competing in municipal elections just under a third (1,823) had a party affiliation. Candidates from United Russia dominated the elections, fielding 29.1 per cent of the total number of candidates, which comprised 89.2 per cent of those candidates standing on a party platform. The LDPR fielded 165 candidates (3 per cent of the total number of candidates); the CPRF, just 14 candidates; Rodina, 11 candidates; and People’s Will, 6 candidates.79 In Rostov Oblast, 285 (17.3 per cent) of the candidates for heads of municipalities were members of political parties: 257 (15.6 per cent) were members of United Russia, 26 (1.58 per cent) came from the CPRF, and there were just two candidates from the LDPR. After the completion of the registration process, 1,426 candidates entered the elections and of these 14.6 per cent were members of United Russia. Only four other party-nominated candidates completed the registration process, and all four were from the CPRF. All 209 of United Russia’s candidates who stood for posts as heads of municipalities were victorious, and 304 of the 408 elected heads, were incumbents. In the elections for local councils in Rostov, political parties nominated 28.2 per cent of the candidates (2,200). Once again, United Russia easily dominated the field with 25.2 per cent (1,969 candidates), the CPRF was a long way behind with just 2.71 per cent (212), while there were a total of only 19 candidates from the LDPR. In addition, 9 other candidates were nominated from various public associations and blocs. Of those elected, 33.2 per cent of the deputies were from United Russia. Just 1.6 per cent were members of the CPRF and 0.14 per cent were members of the LDPR. In Tatarstan, opposition candidates were threatened with ‘criminal investigations and other forms of harassment’ if they did not withdraw their names from the ballots.80 This may help to explain the fact that 97 per cent of candidates (approximately 5,000) came from United Russia and its close ally ‘Tatarstan – a New Century’, while the number of opposition candidates numbered only 300 (3 per cent).81 These two ‘parties of power’ won over 70 per cent of the votes. The remaining parties together (including, the CPRF, LDPR and SPS) received less than 1 per cent of the votes. Candidates from the democratic opposition, supported by the public associations ‘Equality and Legality’ and ‘Our City’ failed to win a single seat. Moreover, all, but one, of the district heads, who had previously been appointed by the republican president, won re-election.82

160

Local elections and parties

Party membership in capital cities In elections for the mayors of large cities, particularly administrative capitals, there was much more genuine public interest and many fierce electoral campaigns. Thus, for example, in Volgograd, where several localities opted for a mixed majority and party-list system, eight parties contested the local elections.83 In Izhevsk, the capital city of Udmurtiya, 223 candidates contested the 42 seats for the city council in the elections of 16 October 2005. Party saturation of the mayors of capital cities is also much higher than the average, as is their membership of United Russia. Thus, for example, a study of the biographies of 70 mayors of capital cities (in post as of March 2007) shows that 62 were members of a political party and, of these, 59 were members of United Russia, two were members of ‘A Just Russia’, and one was a member of the ‘People’s Will’.84 Party representation was also much higher in the very few municipalities that used a mixed electoral system. Thus, for example, in elections for Tomsk City District Council, 11 parties participated in the elections and 6 of these are represented in the new council.85 In Tula Region, United Russia won 79 of the 211 seats in the local council elections. The CPRF was second with 44 seats, followed by Rodina with 39 and the LDPR with 9. The Russian People’s Party (NPR) won a total of 18, the Agrarian Party of Russia 11, and the Union of Right Forces 8. In the City of Volzhk, as noted above, all of the deputies were elected by proportional representation.

Key factors explaining Russia’s weakly institutionalized party system Scholars of Russian politics have stressed the following key factors as major determinants of Russia’s weak party system: 1 2 3 4 5 6

The weakness of civil society and the legacy of an authoritarian political culture. The absence in the early years of the transition of strong and stable political and economic cleavages around which nationwide parties could coalesce. High levels of party fragmentation and electoral volatility. Russia’s choice of a presidential rather than a parliamentary system. The specific nature of Russia’s electoral system. The difficulties of creating strong nation-wide parties in the largest multiethnic federation in the world.

Each of these points will be considered in more detail. 1 The weakness of civil society and the legacy of an authoritarian political culture As Dawisha notes, ‘a strong civil society is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a strong party system, and it is difficult to find examples where party systems have been established in states with weak civic cultures.’86 Over 70 years of communist

Local elections and parties 161 rule has left an authoritarian legacy, a very weak and inchoate civil society, and massive citizen distrust in political institutions. Party underdevelopment, as Azarova notes: has its roots in the Russian communist and early post-communist history. Social atomization as a consequence of communist rule prevented the rise of interest politics [and] the legacies of patrimonial communism undermined political parties by supporting personalistic and clientelistic networks.87 In the Soviet Union, as McFaul notes, there was: a virtual destruction of the space between the individual and the state, the space that in non-communist states is occupied by institutions of civil society – social networks, private business, public associations, clubs, church groups, labour unions, and so forth.88 Not surprisingly, given Russia’s authoritarian history, most citizens today still tend to distrust political institutions. Only 5 per cent of citizens polled in 2005 expressed confidence in parties, compared to 47 per cent for the president, 41 per cent for the church, and 31 per cent for the army.89 This may explain why so many candidates in the local elections sought to disguise their party membership. Moreover, party identification is also extremely low in Russia. In a survey conducted in the first half of 2005, White found that just over 1 per cent of the adult population were members of a political party, and just under 20 per cent declared support for a political party.90 These figures are much lower than in the United Kingdom, where 86 per cent of adults ‘had some form of partisan identification’; and in the USA, where approximately 92 per cent of adults ‘identified with either of the two main parties’.91 2 Social cleavages The first years of Russia’s reforms witnessed the formation of a multitude of parties, which had very shallow roots in civil society. Many parties were based around personal cliques and personalities rather than policies. The traditional social and economic cleavages to be found in western capitalist states are only slowly beginning to take shape in post-communist Russia. Thus, for example, we have witnessed a proliferation of right of centre political parties, which were founded long before there was any sizeable property owning bourgeoisie to support them. Only recently have we seen the beginnings of the formation of an independent middle class of private entrepreneurs. In 1995, the political orientation of those parties that passed the five per cent threshold in the Duma did include a left wing, represented by the communists, a centre-left (Yabloko), a centre (Our Home is Russia), a right (Russia’s Democratic Choice) and an ultra-right (supposedly, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia).92 But, this was short lived. Since the 1999 elections, programmatic parties have been

162

Local elections and parties

on the decline in the parliament, and we have seen a sharp rise in the number of votes going to the so-called ‘parties of power’. In 2003, two key liberal democratic parties – Yabloko (left of centre) and the Union of Right Forces (right of centre) – failed to cross the five per cent barrier, while the Communist Party suffered a humiliating drop in its electoral support. In their place, Putin’s new ‘party of power’, United Russia, swept the board, capturing two-thirds of the Duma’s seats. 3 Party fragmentation and electoral volatility As Golosov has aptly demonstrated, Russia’s party system can be characterized as ‘excessively fragmented and excessively volatile’.93 For Gel’man, Russia’s party system in the 1990s exhibited the following unique features: First, Russia’s party system was greatly fragmented, because all segments of Russia’s electoral market were over-supplied. Second, the extremely volatile electoral support demonstrated great uncertainty in voter demands, which created opportunities for establishing new parties during every election cycle. Third, non-partisan politicians who possessed resources other than party support (mainly backed by regional and/or sectoral interest groups) also played a major role in national and, especially, sub-national electoral politics.94 In Russia’s first parliamentary election in 1993, 13 parties and electoral blocs participated, in 1995 there were 43, in 1999 (26) and in 2003 (23). As Golosov notes, the number of ‘effective parties’ competing for party list seats in the 1993, 1995 and 1999 Duma elections, ‘7.6, 10.7 and 6.8 respectively’, was very high in comparative perspective.95 Moreover, electoral volatility in Russia is extremely high. Thus, for example, as Golosov observes, the ‘average electoral volatility in 131 elections held in western European countries between 1960 and 1989 was 8.4’, while in Russia it was ‘56.4 in 1993–5, and 45.4 in 1995–99’.96 Understandably, where such large numbers of parties compete, and there are many new parties in each race, voters will find it very difficult to tell parties apart. Indeed, only two parties – the CPRF and the LDPR – have successfully crossed the five per cent threshold in the party list vote in all four Duma elections. Over half the parties competing in the 2003 Duma elections were competing for the first time. As White notes: To put this another way, all of the parties or movements that contested the 1993 party list elections, taken together won no more than 32 per cent of the party list vote in 2003 (only five of the original 13 appeared on the ballot paper). Conversely, parties or blocs that had not contested a single previous election won nearly two-thirds (63 per cent) of the party list vote in 2003.97 Golosov in his study of regional parties also makes the important the point that while parties are present in the regions their services ‘remain out of demand’. Candidates for executive posts and seats in regional assemblies, as was noted above,

Local elections and parties 163 simply do not need a party affiliation to be successful, and there ‘are numerous and easily available alternatives to the services parties can offer’.98 Administrative resources, social capital, and ‘high status in key political hierarchies and/or superior financial resources substitute for party affiliations’.99 Moreover, ‘What is different about Russia is that exactly those categories of people who possess superior electoral resources use them to skip party affiliation.’100 Likewise, Hale stresses that parties are not the only institutions present in a polity that can help candidates win elections. Hale also emphasizes the dominance of ‘party substitutes’ in Russia, the most important of which are ‘the powerful political machines of provincial governors … and politicized financial-industrial groups’.101 Hale shows that ‘party substitutes’ have consistently won out over parties, particularly at the regional level. Thus, he concludes: To address the fundamental question of why political systems become party systems, therefore, requires explaining why parties gain the advantage over the best available party substitutes. In so doing, it is less appropriate to ask, ‘what benefits do parties provide to candidates or voters?’ than ‘what benefits do parties provide to candidates and voters better than available party substitutes do?102 For Gel’man, the ‘fragmentation and instability’ of the party system in the 1990s ‘created major roadblocks to the formation of an efficient party system. Political parties failed to link elites and masses, represent society’s interests, perform on the level of decision-making, and provide government accountability.’103 However, this earlier fragmentation of the party system in the 1990s has now been superseded at all levels by the dominance of United Russia, which commands a constitutional majority in the Duma, and is the strongest force in the regions and municipalities. As Gel’man concludes, ‘hyper-fragmentation and high volatility … have now been replaced by trends towards a monopoly of the ruling elite’.104 4 Party cohesion is much more difficult to achieve in presidential systems than in parliamentary regimes As Mainwaring notes; Choices of political institutions matter. Institutions create incentives and disincentives for political actors, shape actors’ identities, establish the context in which policy-making occurs, and can help or hinder in the construction of democratic regimes. And among all the choices regarding institutions, none is more important than the system of government: presidential, semipresidential, parliamentary or some hybrid.105 Russia’s choice of a hybrid presidential–parliamentary system at the national level has further weakened the development of strong cohesive parties. As Dawisha writes: ‘Presidentialism by focusing on the election of a single individual to an all

164

Local elections and parties

powerful post, diminishes the influence of the party system.’106 For LyukhterkhandtMikhaleva: Presidentialism has an negative impact on the development of political parties for in order to win the Presidency parties are forced to abandon any ideological orientations in order to try and win votes from as wide a constituency as possible.107 In contrast, ‘parliamentary systems require the formation of disciplined parties and coalitions in order to keep the executive in power’.108 Where the parliament is weak, as in Russia, then there is also a tendency for parties to decline in importance. Why should the electorate bother voting or taking part in politics if all the power lies with the presidency? Yeltsin repeatedly spoke out against joining any party, stating that his constituency was the Russian people, and likewise, Putin has steadfastly refused to join United Russia, although everyone knows that he is the real leader of the party. We have also continued to see very weak links between the membership of the government and parties in the parliament. The prime minister and government are both nominated by the president, and to date only a few ministers have been chosen from the ranks of the Duma deputies. Similarly, regional governors and city mayors have no incentives to promote the development of strong parties and local assemblies that can challenge their powers. 5 Russia’s choice of electoral system Sartori has described the electoral system as the most specific manipulative instrument of politics.109 As Sisk notes: the choice of a particular system of translating votes to public positions entails decisions – and sometimes trade-offs – over certain values such as stable government, clear election outcomes, representation, accountability, links to constituencies, the importance of political parties, and the degree of voter choice among alternative candidates and parties.110 Different electoral systems also benefit certain groups. Thus, for example, ‘First past the post systems tend to favour the incumbent powers whilst proportional representation systems allow for a more diverse set of representation.’ 111 Russia’s choice of electoral system has impacted on party building. In the Duma elections (until December 2007), a mixed electoral system was in operation. Half the members were elected by PR using a party list system (with a five per cent threshold), and half by a first past the post system, in single member districts. The five per cent threshold was designed to reduce the number of small or frivolous parties that would win seats in the parliament. The party list system also influences the number of parties that have been created. Many party activists who considered that they were not placed high enough on their parties’ lists simply formed their own parties and put themselves top of the new lists.

Local elections and parties 165 The effect of the electoral system on party building in Russia’s regions and municipalities is borne out by the data on party saturation, which is much higher in those assemblies that were elected according to some form of proportionality. Incumbent governors and mayors benefited from the majoritarian electoral system, which produced fragmented, weak and partyless assemblies, and the absence of an effective political opposition.112 However, from July 2003 regional councils have been obliged to elect at least one-half of their members by PR in a party list system, and from 2007 elections to the State Duma will be fully proportional. According to Putin: the old system of single-electoral districts did not stop influential regional organizations from pushing through their ‘own’ candidates, making use of the administrative resources at their disposal. Practice shows that the proportional system gives the opposition greater opportunities to expand its representation in the legislative assemblies … . In the three years since the system has been used at the regional level, the number of party factions in local parliaments has increased almost four-fold. Today they account for almost two-thirds of all members of the regional parliaments.113 However, as discussed below, other radical changes to party and electoral legislation adopted over the period 2004–6 would suggest that the primary aims of this legislation is to ensure the dominance of United Russia at the national, regional and local levels. 6 Russian federalism has impacted negatively on the development of national parties Russia’s highly asymmetrical federalism has made it very difficult for parties to create strong unified vertical structures, and party fragmentation has in turn intensified regional and local divisions within the state. Only United Russia and the Communist Party can be said to have anything approaching a coherent national party structure, and party discipline is also very low or non-existent. Throughout the Federation we can also witness a bewildering array of electoral coalitions, with different regional branches of the same federal party striking up agreements with different parties in different regions and putting forward a plethora of differing electoral platforms. The sheer size of the Russian Federation and its ethnic divergence also makes it extremely difficult to constitute a genuinely national party covering the whole country. Moreover, as discussed below, new legislation banning regional parties is a clear violation of federal principles.

Party and electoral reforms under Putin In June 2001, a new ‘Law on Political Parties’ (hereafter the 2001 Law) was ratified by the Duma.114 According to the Law, before a party could be registered it was obliged to have a minimum of 10,000 members with branches in over half of the 89

166

Local elections and parties

subjects of the Federation, and there had to be a minimum of 100 members in each of the regional branches. The 2001 Law also contained provisions for the state funding of parties. Those parties that received more than three per cent of the total party list vote in elections to the State Duma were to receive 0.2 roubles for each vote cast in their favour.115 Putin’s post-Beslan reforms In a highly complex serious of manoeuvres in the wake of the Beslan hostage crisis of September 2004, Putin cynically pushed through a number of key amendments to election and party legislation that have dealt a serious blow to the development of grass-roots democracy in Russia. A new version of the 2001 Law was ratified in December 2004,116 with further amendments in December 2005,117 and a new version of the 2002 Federal Law, ‘On Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights and the Rights of Citizens of the Russian Federation to Participate in a Referendum’, was ratified on 21 July 2005.118 Important amendments on election and party laws were also enacted in 2006.119 In addition, Putin adopted a very restrictive law on non-governmental organizations in December 2004. According to the chair of the Central Electoral Commission, Alexander Veshnyakov, the main aim of the amendments, was ‘to stimulate the development of political parties, strengthen their role and raise their responsibility in the electoral process’.120 However, while PR will undoubtedly provide new opportunities for national parties to gain seats at the regional level, Putin’s electoral and party reforms have, as demonstrated below, made it much more difficult for small parties and independent candidates to contest elections; and regional parties are prohibited from competing altogether. The main provisions of Putin’s new legislation on elections and parties are as follows: 1

2

3

According to the latest version of the Law ‘On Political Parties’, from 1 January 2006, parties must have not less than 50,000 members (the original 2001 Law was 10,000) in order to register for elections. Parties are also required to have regional branches, each with a minimum of 500 members (previously 100 members) in over half of the federal subjects, and the number of members of other regional branches must number not less than 250 members (previously 50). Moreover, only parties that have been registered for one year prior to an election can register for that election.121 There is now a total ban on electoral blocs. Formerly, on 4 June 2003, election blocs were restricted to a maximum of two or three political parties, then in further amendments it was declared that, after the December 2003 Duma elections, they were to be banned altogether. Having earlier benefited from being able to form an electoral alliance, United Russia has now denied the same rights to other parties.122 As noted above, regional councils have been obliged from July 2003 to elect at least one half of their members by PR in a party list electoral system. While

Local elections and parties 167

4

5

this could be seen as a positive move that will encourage the development of parties at the regional and local levels, viewed alongside the other changes discussed over the period 2004–6, it is more likely to simply increase United Russia’s domination of regional legislatures. In 2005, the electoral threshold was raised from five to seven per cent, another factor that will make it more difficult for small parties to win seats, and independents will no longer be able to contest regional elections.123 These developments place great importance on the openness of parties and their internal democracy, which in most cases is very poor. Moreover, if the new mixed electoral system for municipal elections discussed above is adopted nationwide, with only three to five mandates reserved for independents, ‘it will deprive the majority of citizens of the right to be elected as they can no longer be self-nominated’.124 Over the period December 2003–March 2006 elections took place for seats in 52 regional assemblies. United Russia gained the largest number of seats in 47 regional assemblies (with an absolute majority in 12) and they gained second place in five regions.125 In December 2006, a total of 1,960 deputies of regional assemblies were members of United Russia.126 The weakness of Russian federalism is graphically illustrated by the fact that the Law ‘On Parties’ also prohibits regional parties from competing in elections. Such a ban is clearly designed to prevent regional governors and presidents from building local political machines that would be powerful enough to mount a challenge to United Russia. This is especially important now that (since January 2005) regional legislatures have been charged with approving Putin’s nominees for regional chief executives. Moreover, according to a further amendment to the legislation governing the presidential appointment of governors that was adopted in July 2005, the party that wins the most party list seats in a regional legislature has the right to nominate the candidate for the post of regional governor. It is perhaps no coincidence that this new ruling coincides with United Russia’s newly acquired electoral success in the regions. The percentage of signatures that an individual or party needs to gather in order to contest an election has been set by federal legislation as ‘no greater than two per cent’ of the number of electors, up from one per cent in previous legislation, and the number of invalid signatures that are permitted has been lowered. Up until 2005, registration for elections could be refused if 25 per cent of a candidate’s signatures were declared invalid. This has now been reduced to 10 per cent for regional and local elections and five per cent for federal elections. The verification of nomination signatures has been subject to widespread abuse by regional and local administrations, with scores of opposition candidates being ousted from election campaigns (see Chapter 10). The deposit required for candidates and parties to register for elections has also been increased. Moreover, parties that have party list seats in the Duma (currently CPRF, LDPR, Motherland, United Russia) do not need to gather signatures or pay a deposit in order to register for elections, and the amount of state funding to these parties has also been substantially increased.

168 6

7

Local elections and parties In July 2005 (according to Federal Law No. 93, 21 July 2005), the maximum share of state officials and members of political parties that were permitted to serve in electoral commissions was increased from one-third to one-half.127 Parties with party list seats in the State Duma also have a privileged position vis-à-vis their nomination of members of electoral commissions. This has led to a situation whereby supporters of United Russia now dominate the electoral commissions at all levels. Under Putin, we have witnessed the development of a new ‘power vertical’ of electoral commission, with higher-level commissions now granted the right to appoint heads of lower-level commissions. Thus, for example, the Russian Federation Central Electoral Commission has the right to appoint the chairs of regional commissions. These changes, it has been argued by members of the Central Electoral Commission, were motivated by the need to create regional and local commissions that would be independent of the regional and local powers. Under Yeltsin, control over regional electoral commissions was captured by regional governors, and municipal commissions, in turn, were under the tight control of regional commissions. The situation is now much more complex, especially given the fact that Putin has the power to nominate and dismiss regional executives (see Chapter 2). In July 2006, the Duma adopted legislation removing the vote against all category from ballots. No longer will citizens have the opportunity to show their disapproval of the election system by voting against all candidates. In a similar vein, from January 2007, minimum turnout requirements have been abolished. However, as Oreshkin notes, citizens have already begun to fight back by spoiling their ballot papers, which is now the only method they have left to voice their protests. Thus, for example: instead of the normal average of about 1 per cent wasted ballots, in regional and local elections in the Komi Republic in March 2007, 6.1 per cent of the ballots were spoiled; in the city of Velikhiye Luky 8.9 per cent were wasted, whilst in electoral district No. 158 of the Pskov Region, the figure for spoilt ballot papers was 31 per cent!128

In conclusion, as Stykow notes: [Putin’s] goal is to create a coherent and controllable intermediary space between the state and its citizens. This strategy which is best documented in the civil society arena, but also extends to interest groups in the broadest sense, now is being extended to the party system, where only a limited diversity is becoming institutionalized.129 In Chapter 9, I discuss the power of local executives and the struggle between mayors and governors. As I demonstrate, the weakness of political parties in Russian local councils has allowed local executives to rule their local communities with little or no legislative check on their activities.

9

Local and regional executives

As was discussed in Chapter 4, the specific rights and powers of municipal bodies are laid down in municipal charters. As Kourliandskaya et al. note, on 1 September 2000 there were 12,261 municipalities registered in Russia, of which 11,691 had elected councils. In approximately 7,000 municipalities, the mayors were directly elected by the citizenry. In just over 3,600 municipalities, ‘the mayor combined the post of head of the local administration and chair of the local assembly’. In 4,519 municipalities, local heads were indirectly elected ‘from among local council members, including nominees proposed by the regional governors’, and finally, ‘in eighty-nine municipalities in five regions, the head of the local government was hired by local councils on a contractual basis’.1

Local executives and local councils Governors’ control over local charters In theory, local charters are ratified by their local councils in conformity with regional laws. However, local charters also have to be approved and ratified in regional assemblies, and this has allowed regional governors to gain control over their ratification. A vitally important factor here is that under Yeltsin the heads of local administrations were permitted to hold seats in regional assemblies. Thus, for example, in elections conducted over the period 1995–7, 332 heads of city and district administrations won seats in 45 regional assemblies.2 By packing their often weak and politically fragmented assemblies with local executive heads, regional governors were able to control and dominate the legislative agenda of the regional assemblies. In Bashkortostan, 73 of 74 heads of district administrations were members of the Upper House of the Republican Parliament.3 In Tatarstan in 1999, 60 of the 130 members elected to the republican parliament (the State Council) held full-time posts in the state apparatus, including 57 heads or deputy heads of district administrations.4 In 1996, just under two-thirds of the deputies to the Saratov Regional Assembly combined their legislative mandates with executive posts in local administrations. The mayors were nominated by the governor and rubber stamped by the local councils. As Kourliandskaya et al. note: ‘Not once have council members voted against candidates proposed by the Governor.’5

1 Guarantees the implementation of federal and other legal acts on the territory of the city. 2 Represents the city of Chelyabinsk and organs of self-administration in international relations, and signs treaties and agreements. 3 Convenes and leads sessions of the city council (Duma) and signs decisions of the council and other documents. 4 Reports to the assembly about the state of affairs in the territory of the city. 5 Coordinates the activities of the deputies and standing commissions of the city council; assists members of the commissions in carrying out their powers. 6 Adopts measures to provide for open and transparent government. 7 Guarantees and establishes the procedures for carrying out referendums and elections. 8 Establishes the structures of the city administration: housing and communal services; transport; communications; development of enterprises and small business; trade; health; education; culture, fitness and sport; city planning and architecture; social security; law and order; administration of municipal property; economic planning, budget and finance; land use and environmental protection; labour and employment; youth affairs; civil defence. 9 Draws up and places before the city council the draft plans for the complex development of the city. 10 Organizes the complex economic and social development of the city and ensures the implementation of the budget in correspondence with the decisions of the city Duma. 11 Takes the prime responsibility for managing the city budget, finance and credits. Opens and closes the administration’s bank accounts, signs and approves financial documents. 12 Establishes stabilization and development funds and distributes grants to the city’s urban districts. 13 Adopts resolutions and orders, and has the right to rescind legal acts of subordinate organs of the city administration. 14 Draws up plans and confirms the staffing for city and district administrations. Adopts resolutions on the structure of the city administration. Appoints and dismisses administrative personnel, chiefs of district and settlement administrations in agreement with the city council. Appoints and dismisses leaders of municipal enterprises and organizations. 15 Organizes the work of the administration in dealing with citizens’ appeals and requests. 16 Takes charge of civil defence during emergencies. 17 Presents to the population of the city and the city assembly a yearly report about the activities of the city administration. 18 Defends and promotes the interests of the population and organs of the city administration in courts and organs of state power. 19 Makes the necessary provision for the implementation of legislation adopted by the city assembly in accordance with the city charter. Within the areas of his/her competence adopts resolutions and orders.

Box 9.1 Powers granted to the mayor of Chelyabinsk as codified in the city charter Source: E. M. Koveshnikov, Munitsipal’noe Pravo, Moscow: Norma, 2002, pp. 144–7.

Local and regional executives 171 However, in 2002, the constitutional court adopted a resolution prohibiting executive heads in Tatarstan from holding seats in the republic’s parliament.6 ‘Article 70.2 of Tatarstan’s amended Constitution, forbids deputies of the Republic’s Parliament (the State Council) from holding any other federal, regional, municipal, or local legislative, executive, or judicial office.’7 A number of other regions have amended their charters and constitutions to comply with the court’s ruling. Thus, for example, as Hahn notes, Kursk Region adopted a new charter in September 2001 ‘that banned local administrative heads from taking seats in the Oblast Assembly’.8 In February 2002, a court in Pskov Region banned district administration heads from holding seats in its regional assembly, and in September 2002 Novgorod Oblast amended its charter to disallow municipal administrative heads, who made up half of the regional assembly, from holding seats in the region’s legislature.9 However, many other regions have simply ignored the constitutional court’s ruling and have continued to pack their assemblies with local executives.

The powers and responsibilities of local executives Before the adoption of the 2003 Law, most cities followed what is known as the ‘strong mayor/weak council’ model. Under this model, popularly elected mayors were also chairs of local councils. Thus, the charter of the City of Chelyabinsk stated that the mayor had the status of a deputy, was the chair of the City Council (Duma), and Head of the City Executive.10 Other examples of large municipalities where the mayors chaired their local councils included the cities of Izhevsk, Orenburg, Orsk, Irkutsk, Bratsk, Astrakhan, Belgorod, Kostroma, Kurgan, Rostovon-Don, Samara, Stavropol’ and Khabarovsk.11 In these cities, mayors had the right to organize the work of the councils, preside over their sessions, sign and promulgate acts adopted by the councils, and veto the decisions of the councils. The councils, in turn, could only overturn the veto of the mayors with the support of two-thirds of their deputies, a task that was extremely difficult to achieve in councils where, as demonstrated in Chapter 8, parties were very weak or even nonexistent. The 1991 Law had been more generous to the deputies, allowing them to overturn executive vetos with a simple majority. A list of the extensive powers granted to the Mayor of Chelyabinsk is provided in Box 9.1. The ‘weak mayor/strong council’ was a much less common pattern, encountered mainly in rural areas.12 Here, the mayor was chosen by members of the local councils and was accountable to them. This differs from the more common practice, whereby governors nominate candidates who are then simply rubber stamped by the local council, and both the council and executive are effectively under the control of the regional administration.

172

Local and regional executives

The 2003 Law, local executives and councils Heads of municipalities/mayors Article 36 of the 2003 Law lists the following powers of heads of municipalities. They: 1

2

3 4

represent the municipality in relations with local self-governments or other municipalities, state authorities, citizens and organizations, act in the name of the municipality without a power of attorney sign and promulgate regulatory legal acts adopted by the representative body of the municipality in the procedures established by the charter of the municipality issue legal acts within his or her competence may call an emergency meeting of the representative body of the municipality.13

Methods of electing heads of municipalities/administrations The 2003 Law allows heads of municipalities (in raions and city okrugs) to be indirectly elected from members of their local councils or directly elected by their citizens. However, it calls for a separation of executive and legislative powers. Heads of local administrations are no longer allowed to also hold posts as chairs of local councils. This means in effect that there will be two heads of a municipality – the chair of the local council (who may be elected directly or indirectly from the council) and, in those municipalities where there are indirect elections, an ‘executive manager’ (head of administration) to be hired by a special selection committee (see Figure 9.2). According to the original provisions of the 2003 Law, one-third of the members of the panels charged with appointing the new executive managers were to be chosen by regional administrations (Article 37.5) and the others by the local councils. However, in an amendment to the 2003 Law adopted in April 2005, the percentage of representatives from regional administrations was raised to 50 per cent, thereby significantly enhancing regional control over the appointment process.14 This new dual system has the potential to generate conflict between the heads of municipalities and the appointed managers, especially in those municipalities where the latter are nominees of the regional governors (see Figure 9.2). There have been numerous complaints by local politicians that they have been pressurized into adopting the indirect method of electing their council heads. According to the Ministry of Regional Development, by July 2005, 36 of Russia’s 88 federal subjects had changed to the indirect system. However, in numerous municipalities (e.g. in Kaluga, Kostroma, Perm, Vladimir and Leningrad oblasts) citizens appealed to the local courts to have direct elections reinstated. Thus, for example, in January 2005 deputies of the city assembly of Obninsk (Kaluga Region) adopted a decision to cancel the direct election of the mayor. This was

Local and regional executives 173 Chief of municipality may be directly elected

or

indirectly elected from the local council

Either chairs the local council

or heads the local administration

chairs the local council

The chair of local council is elected by the deputies

The head of the local administration is appointed by contract

Figure 9. 2 Methods of electing heads of municipalities Source: E. V. Akhmadulin (ed.), Reforma Mestnovo Samoupravleniya i Vybory: Materialy Dlya Lektsii i Besed, Rostov-on-Don: Central Electoral Commission, 2004, p. 25, http://www.izbirkom.rostov.ru (Accessed 9 September 2007).

despite the fact that a decision on the introduction of direct elections had already been decided by a local referendum in 1995. The city court on 8 February 2005 declared that the cancellation of direct elections was illegal, however the Kaluga regional court on 14 March revoked the decision of the city court.15 In Saratov Oblast, the local charter originally granted members of the municipal district councils the right to reject the governor’s nominations and put forward their own candidates. However, this was later deleted from the regional charter and, in the elections that took place in December 2006, all of the heads of the district councils in the city of Saratov were nominated by the governor, as was the mayor. As these examples illustrate, the indirect method of election is preferred by many governors because it is much more open to manipulation and control than are popular elections. It is much easier for regional executives to gain control over local councils than to control local electorates. Local councils and executives According to the 2003 Law (Article 40(2)), the tenure of local councils is two to five years. In practice, the vast majority are elected for four-year terms. Settlement and city district councils are rather small, numbering between 7 and 35 members, depending on the size of their populations (see Table 9.1). Municipal raions must have a minimum of 15 members. Moreover, only 10 per cent of deputies are permitted to work full-time. This means that in cities with 30,000–500,000 inhabitants there will be only two full-time deputies, and in those with over 500,000 inhabitants, just three.16 Moreover, local councils are obliged to hold only a minimum of four sessions a year. According to Article 40.6, deputies of local councils may not hold executive

174

Local and regional executives

Table 9.1 Number of deputies in councils of settlements and city districts Size of population Less than 1,000

Number of deputies 7

1–10,000

10

10,000–30,000

15

30,000–100,000

20

100,000–500,000 More than 500,000

25 35

Source: Article 35(6) of the 2003 Law. See V. I. Shkatulla (ed.), Komentarii k Federal’nomu Zakonu, ‘Ob Obshchikh Printsipakh Organizatsii Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii’ (Postateinyi), Moscow: Yustitsinform, 2006.

posts in the state or municipal service. Officially, local councils have the following exclusive powers (Article 35(10)): 1 2 3 4 5 6

7 8 9

Adoption of the municipal charter, introduction of amendments and additions thereto. Approval of the local budget and the report on its performance. Imposition, introduction and cancellation of local taxes and duties in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation on taxes and duties. Adoption of municipal development plans and programmes, approval of progress reports. Introduction of procedures for management and disposition of municipal properties. Determination of the procedure for adopting decisions on creating, restructuring and liquidating municipal enterprises and institutions, as well as setting the tariffs for services of municipal enterprises and institutions. Determination of the procedures for the municipality’s participation in intermunicipal organizations. Determination of the procedures for material, technical and organizational support of the activities of local self-governments. Control over the executive organs of local self-governments and local officials in exercising their powers over questions of ‘local significance’.17

In addition, local councils have the right to call a local referendum (Article 22(3)), approve any changes in the boundaries of the territory of the municipality (Articles 12, 13 and 24(5)), name the date for municipal elections (Article 23(2)), elect heads of the municipal administrations (Article 36(2)), participate in the appointment of ‘city managers’ (Article 37(6)), and ratify the structure of local administrations (Article 37(8)).18 Article 35(9) of the 2003 Law states that local councils have the right to control the activities of local executives in those matters that come under local jurisdiction. Moreover, Article 36(5) states that ‘the head of a municipality shall

Local and regional executives 175 be answerable to, and shall report to, the residents and the representative body of the municipality’.19 However, local councils have not been able to put these powers into practice. As noted above, the vast majority of deputies work part-time, and councils are obliged to hold sessions only four times a year. Deputies no longer have the right to express a vote of no confidence in their chief executives, nor do they have the right to suspend the edicts of local administrations, even when such acts contradict local charters and local legislation. Moreover, as in 1995, legislation adopted by local councils can be vetoed by the heads of administrations, and executive vetoes can be overturned only by a vote of two-thirds of the deputies (Article 35(13)).20 As discussed in the next section, heads of local administrations have traditionally been more fearful of the vertical controls that come from the regional governors than the poor horizontal controls emanating from their weak and politically fragmented councils.

Mayors versus governors During the early 1990s, mayors of many of Russia’s capital cities were able to carve out considerable areas of local autonomy, and during the Yeltsin era they were often able to act as an effective countervailing power to the regional governors. As Domnysheva notes: ‘The interests of mayors, who are primarily concerned about their own city, rarely coincide with the broader views of governors who are responsible for their entire region.’21 As a result, when things go wrong ‘governors blame everything on mayors and mayors blame everything on governors’.22 Wollmann observes that regional leaders ‘tend to be ardent decentralizes whilst dealing with central government’, but ‘adamant centralizes in relation to local organs’.23 Often the primary reason for such conflicts are economic: ‘the unwillingness of regional leaders to share the instruments of powers such as property, taxes and other financial resources as well as decision-making authority in areas of business and economics’.24 In many regions during the early to mid-1990s there was a fierce struggle over the ownership of municipal property, and disputes between cities and regions as to who had legal ownership over the newly privatized enterprises. Conflict between cities and regions also intensified after the first round of democratic elections in 1994–8, as witnessed by a sharp increase in law suits and appeals to the courts from city mayors and regional governors. Almost a third of all applications submitted to the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation dealt with conflict between mayors and governors.25 Moreover, as Slider notes: Governors and republic presidents defended regional interests versus localities through the Federation Council by repeatedly vetoing draft laws on local government finance and through their influence on the formation of the federal budget. Mayors complained that they were excluded from the trilateral (Government–Duma–Federation Council) negotiations that took place over these measures and as a result became victims of compromises made by others.26

176

Local and regional executives

Hostility between governors and mayors was also encouraged by the Yeltsin administration, which adopted a policy of divide and rule in the regions. After the 1996 presidential elections, Anatolii Chubais, Head of the Presidential Administration, appealed to Russia’s mayors to join the federal government in their struggle with the governor’s lobby. ‘Yeltsin’s appointment of Krasnoyarsk Mayor Petr Pimashkov to the Presidential Council on Local Government was a clear signal that the Kremlin [sought] to use him to check the power of newly elected Krasnoyarsk Governor Aleksandr Lebed.’27 As discussed in Chapter 6, the Federal Government adopted a new Law, ‘On Financing Local Self-Government’, in 1997, which sought to give local governments greater financial independence from the regions. In 1999, the State Duma ratified a Law, ‘On the General Principles of Assigning Specific Government Functions to Organs of Local Self-Government’ that would have established specific federal budgetary allocations for cities, bypassing the regions. However, not surprisingly, the Federation Council vetoed the Law. As Young concludes: ‘The overall impact of the governors’ success in these budgetary wars served to further weaken and demoralize many local administrations.’28 Capital cities Battles between governors and mayors of regional capitals have been particularly intense. Financial resources tend to be concentrated in the largest cities and in administrative centres of subjects of the Federation. According to Russian law, corporate taxes are paid at an enterprise’s place of registration. Capital cities of regions are thus major centres for the ‘accumulation of tax revenues, rent payments and most other kinds of payment’.29 Indeed, in 1999 the budget of the capital city in 23 regions was larger than the regional budget (excluding the city).30 Not surprisingly, mayors seek to keep these taxes to help fund hard-pressed municipal services. According to Paretskaya: One of the main aims of the April 1996 Udumurtiya law abolishing local selfgovernment and dismissing local executives was to deprive local institutions of municipal property and independent budgets and to make them subject to republican control.31 (See Chapter 4.) Udmurtiya at that time had about 200 industrial enterprises, the majority of which were located in the republican capital Izhevsk and a few other large cities. The struggle over local government reform was closely connected with the battle to control the spoils of privatization, and also part of a bid by the republic’s leadership to take control of the funds going to Izhevsk.32 Gel’man stresses that intense competition is most liable to be found in federal subjects ‘in which a high proportion of regional resources (economy, finance, population) is concentrated in the regional centre and in which a local electoral system has been introduced with direct election of the mayor’.33 In contrast, ‘a relatively weak regional capital and the choice of an electoral system able to be

Local and regional executives 177 more heavily controlled by the governor are the basis for a monocentric system’.34 Anne Le Huérou also notes the importance of the size and power of regional capitals. Writing about the city of Omsk, she stresses that: conflict became especially dramatic, because no other city in the region can be a counter-weight to the capital, economically or politically: half of the region’s population lives in the city of Omsk, and in other urban centres the population does not exceed 25,000. Conflicts between the city and oblast’ were once fought along ideological lines and over the spoils of privatization. They are now fought over property and over the budgetary and fiscal resources needed by each territorial entity to develop economically and socially.35 Similarly, in Sverdlovsk, there was a fierce struggle between the governor, Eduard Rossel, and the mayor of Yekaterinburg, Arkady Chernetsky. As Campbell notes, the conflict was intensified by the ‘pattern of concentrated urbanization … . Ekaterinburg, the regional capital, accounts for 1,266,000 population out of a total of 4,612,000 in Sverdlovsk region (the next largest city in the region has only 390,000) and well over half the commercial income’.36 By contrast, in Tambov and Chelyabinsk, where there are a number of equal sized cities, ‘there has been much less urban-regional conflict’.37 Mendras notes that it was ‘cities with a population of several tens of thousands’ that were ‘most capable of developing their autonomy from the governors’.38 She demonstrates, that such cities benefited from being few in number, and from being situated relatively far from their regional capitals.39 Thus, for example, she notes that the towns of Klintsy and Novozybkov in Bryansk Oblast were able to form a counterweight to the ruling circles in the City of Bryansk, 190 miles away.40 Electoral factors also help explain conflicts between mayors and governors. As Slider notes, mayors and governors serve different electorates: ‘Rural voters, who in the Russian context have tended to be among the most hostile to reform and turn out to vote in the highest numbers, [have] sometimes been decisive in electing regional executives and legislatures.’41 Thus, for example, the struggle between the mayor of the city of Krasnoyarsk and the governor of Krasnoyarsk region was intensified by the fact that the governor won much of his support from rural voters, while a majority of those in the capital city voted against him. According to Sergeev, mayors tend to be more pro-market and to favour more radical economic and political reforms than do governors, who are more often positioned on the left, or ‘national patriot’ end of the political spectrum.42 However, there have also been instances, such as in Samara, where the governor (Titov) positioned himself as a social democrat and a westerniser, while the mayor (Limanksii) positioned himself on the left.43 More recently, we have witnessed some mayors attempting to carve out some political autonomy by throwing their weight behind the new Kremlin-inspired party, ‘A Just Russia’. However, conflict between mayors and governors often transcends party or political ideology. Thus, as Turovsky notes, there was a serious conflict between Mashkovets, the governor of Kamchatka, and Golenishchev, the

178

Local and regional executives

mayor of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatka, even though they were respectively the first and second secretaries of the regional branch of the CPRF.44 Conflict has been particularly intense in those regions where mayors have been the main opponents of the governors in gubernatorial elections. As Smirnyagin notes, there was a sharp increase in the number of mayors competing in gubernatorial elections in the period 1997 and 1998. Thus, for example, whereas only two mayors (Abakan’s, Bulakin, and Volgograd’s, Chekhov) participated in the 45 gubernatorial elections that took place immediately after the 1996 presidential elections, ‘in the elections that took place in 1997 and especially 1998, mayors of capital cities not only became more active but won nearly every race they entered against sitting governors’.45 For example, at this time we witnessed victories by Trutnev in Perm, Tolokonskii in Novgorod, and Katanandov in Kareliya.46 Governors and mayors also formed their own political machines to fight local elections. Thus, for example, Governor Eduard Rossel of Sverdlovsk had his own political movement in the region (the ‘Transformation of the Urals’) and his own newspaper Oblastnaya Gazeta. Likewise, the Mayor Chernetsky of Yekaterinburg headed his own political movement (‘Our Home-Our City’) and controlled a newspaper of the same name.47 In Pskov region, the regional newspaper, Pskovskaia Pravda, was controlled by the governor, while the city newspaper, Novosti Pskova, backed the mayor.48 In Omsk, the media was divided into two camps ‘half for the city’ and ‘half for the region’.49 The media war in the region ‘reached a peak during the March 1998 elections, with city newspapers running violent headlines against entrepreneurs close to the regional administration’.50 In the Smolensk gubernatorial elections of 1998, as Mendras notes: two rival clans formed, little by little behind two of the candidates: the incumbent, Anatoly Glushenkov and the mayor of Smolensk, Aleksandr Prokhorov … . Each of the camps had the support of administrative structures, regional deputies, political movements, informal groups, industrialists, and bankers and press organizations, and each developed its own charity activities.51 New areas of conflict between mayors and governors have arisen with the implementation of the 2003 Law. Many regions have sought to prevent rival mayors from gaining city status and there have also been battles over the choice of electoral system. Thus, for example, the struggle over the method of electing the mayor of Voronezh was a major element in the fierce conflict that erupted between the governor (Vladimir Kulakov) and the mayor (Boris Skrynnikov). The arrest and harassment of mayors under Putin As discussed in Chapter 2, one of the key changes to power relations within the regions is the fact that Putin now has the power to directly appoint regional governors. This has led to a situation whereby the appointed governors are increasingly viewed as part of Putin’s ‘power vertical’ – as representatives of the

Local and regional executives 179 centre in the regions rather than champions of the regions in the centre. As Abelsky notes, this has led to new tensions, whereby ‘the appointed governors beholden to the Kremlin are often at odds with popularly elected city leaders, whose intentions and interests are inconsistent with the imperatives of a vertically-integrated power structure.’52 In recent years we have witnessed a concerted campaign of intimidation and harassment of mayors by regional authorities, which would appear to be sanctioned by the Kremlin. As Marina Yakutova notes: ‘With the aid of law enforcement and judicial systems, the state has been selectively, yet consistently, persecuting municipal leaders.’53 Thus, for example, in Krasnodar Region, over 30 mayors were forced from office during 2002–4 after being falsely accused of corruption.54 Abelsky provides the following list of mayors who have been ousted from power pending the results of criminal charges brought against them at the behest of their regional governors: in 2006, the mayors of Pyatigorsk (Igor Tarasova), Kandalaksha (Alexander Vikhorev), Tomsk (Aleksandr Makarov), Arkhangel’sk (Aleksandr Donskoi), Svetlogorsk (Oleg Vernikovsky); in 2007, the mayors of Vladivostok (Vladimir Nikolayev), Krasnoarmeisk (Mikhail Bulgakov), Togliatti (Nikolai Utkin), Rybinsk (Yevgeny Sdvizhkov), Volgograd (Yevgeny Ishchenko), Chernyakhovsk (Andrei Vinogradov).55 To these we can now add the more recent cases of the mayors of Ol’khonskii Raion, Irkutsk Oblast (Nikolai Motoshkin),56 and Khansy-Mansiskii AO (Valeri Sudeikin).57 Investigations have also begun ‘against the mayors of Blagoveshchensk, Kostroma, Ryazan, Novodvinsk, Noyabrsk, Veliky Novgorod, and Yekaterinburg’.58 It is also becoming dangerous to hold the post of mayor. Thus, for example, over the period 2006–7, ‘mishaps, murders or assassination attempts’ were made on the lives of the mayors of Sochi, Shakhty, Minusinsk, Dzerzhinsky, and Ozersk.59 Undoubtedly, there is widespread corruption at the local level. However, in many cases it is clear that the charges brought against the above mayors have been politically motivated. Thus, for example, the mayor of Arkhangel’sk, Aleksandr Donskoi, was accused in February 2007 of ‘faking a university diploma, using it to obtain a second higher education, using budget funds to pay for his son’s bodyguards, and authorizing a company to build a shopping centre without government clearance’.60 Donskoi has stated publicly that he is being persecuted because of his intention to stand for office in the 2008 presidential elections: I declared in October that I would run for President … after this, criminal cases were opened. What’s more, I was made to understand that these criminal cases are connected to my declaration that I planned to run. The people who commissioned these criminal cases are federal officials, together with the Governor of the Arakhangel’sk Oblast.61 Mayor Yevgeny Ishchenko of Volgograd was sentenced to one year in prison in June 2007 on charges of possessing ammunition and engaging in illegal business activities. He was freed in the courtroom since he had already spent more than one year in detention. Ishchenko had repeatedly clashed with the local branch

180

Local and regional executives

of United Russia and the regional governor. Arrests of members of Ishchenko’s administration have gained pace. In January 2007, Pavel Karev, the former chair of Volgograd City Council ‘was sentenced to three years in prison for taking a bribe of $11,400 in connection with reducing land-rent payments for a business’. He was the sixth member of Ishchenko’s team to be arrested.62 For Petrov, there are three key reasons for these attacks on mayors: 1 2

3

the significant curtailment of the role and influence of mayors as a result of municipal government reforms … the post-Beslan reforms, and in particular President Vladimir Putin’s decision that governors should be appointed rather than elected. As governors are now within the vertical structure of executive power and functioning as appointed officials, mayors represent a certain counterbalance to their authority – a fact that is not particularly welcome for the Kremlin … the struggle developing over property ownership in regional centres.63

Ragozina also notes that at the heart of many of these disputes is conflict over the ownership of land. ‘What is at stake,’ she stresses, ‘are considerable financial resources and influence, as municipal administrations find themselves sitting atop enviable chunks of real estate, and their property management is increasingly being contested by governors and other officials.’64 Furthermore, as Lankina notes: The Kremlin might also be interested in keeping local governments in a state of dependence on governors, at least until after the important round of parliamentary and presidential elections in 2007–8. Russian campaign strategists want pliable local governments as a weapon in their arsenals, and in many regions, the governors rely on municipalities to mobilize local voters for pro-Kremlin political campaigns and even engage in ballot stuffing.65 Governors’ powers to appoint mayors One way of solving the problem of troublesome mayors would be to directly integrate them into Putin’s power vertical. Thus, not surprisingly, over the last few years there has been a vigorous debate within the Russian political establishment over the question of granting regional leaders the power to appoint the mayors of large cities and particularly regional capitals.66 In November 2006, the governor of Sverdlovsk, Aleksandr Levin, stated that: sooner or later mayors would be chosen in the same way as governors. Governors would nominate candidates for mayors in local representative organs, deputies would vote on their choice. If we build a power vertical it should not be interrupted at the level of the governors. It should penetrate all structures – from the president to the heads of rural settlements.67

Local and regional executives 181 The governor of Kurgan Oblast, Oleg Bogomolov, has also called for the mayors of large cities to be nominated by governors and approved by city councils.68 The governors of Sverdlovsk (Eduard Rossel’) and Nizhegorod (Valerii Shantsev) have also come out publicly in support for such a policy. As discussed in Chapter 2, the appointment of mayors has also found support and opposition from within the top ranks of United Russia. The authors of an amendment to the 2003 Law – Vladimir Mokry, Vladimir Zhidkikh and Aleksei Ogonok, all members of the United Russia faction in the Duma – proposed giving Federation members the right to decide for themselves whether to implement local self-government (in regional capitals) at the city level or only at the level of city districts. Choosing the second option would mean that capital cities would be run by officials appointed by the governors. Critics of the proposed amendments argue that the elimination of mayoral elections would require changes to the Russian Constitution. As discussed in Chapter 2, Article 32.2 of the Russian Constitution states that ‘Citizens of the Russian Federation shall have the right to be elected to bodies of state governance and organs of local self-government’. Furthermore, Article 130.2 declares that ‘local self-government shall be exercised by the citizens through referendums, elections, and forms of expression of their will, through elected and other bodies of local self-government’, and Article 131.1 states that ‘the structure of bodies of local self-government shall be determined by the population independently’.69 The appointment of mayors would also violate the ‘European Charter of Local SelfGovernment’ to which Russia is a signatory. Article 3.2 of that charter stipulates that rights in the field of local self-government must be exercised by democratically constituted authorities.70 At a meeting of the All-Russia Intermunicipal Forum in Novosibirsk in November 2006, 50 mayors of Siberian cities sent a joint appeal against the appointment of mayors to the State Duma and Federation Council. Aleksandr Sokolov, Mayor of Khabarovsk, noted that ‘a vertical chain of command is, of course, not a bad thing, but then one needs to stop dreaming of initiatives on the part of the public, of possibilities for self-government, and of engaging everyone in active constructive endeavours.’71 According to the Mayor Arkady Chernetsky of Yekaterinburg: The Regional Administration would be hopeless at taking over the management of water, heat and energy for the citizens of the municipality. For the last 15 years not one kopeck has been spent by the Regional budget on this vital area of the municipal economy. Each year we bring in over 1 billion roubles from off-budget funds to supply the energy needs of the population. If the construction of roads was passed to the Region in the course of one year not one single kilometre would be constructed. The Regional authorities simply do not have the local knowledge necessary to settle these questions.72 However, it would appear that the direct appointment of mayors by regional governors has been put on hold until after the 2007–8 round of parliamentary

182

Local and regional executives

and presidential elections. At a session of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe, which took place in Moscow in November 2006, top United Russia officials spoke out against the direct appointment of mayors. At the meeting, Igor Shuvalov stated: ‘I consider such a reform an attempt to curtail municipal power. The law contains pressures on municipal authorities not present in any other country.’73 Shuvalov’s position in turn has been supported by the First Deputy Chair of the Russian Government, Dmitry Medvedev. While the appointment of mayors may now be on the back burner, this has not prevented other initiatives from being aired which, if adopted, would significantly weaken the mayors’ abilities to govern their territories. Thus, for example, in April 2006 members of United Russia put forward new proposals that would allow governors to take control of their regional capitals without having to seek a court order (as mandated in the 2003 Law).74 The initiative for this new law comes from Putin’s chief of staff, Sergei Sobyanin.75 According to these proposals, mayors will be robbed of powers to administer: the organization of the supply of heat, natural gas, electricity and water; removal and disposal of household waste; construction and maintenance of roads and bridges; transportation services; establishment of the rules of land use and development; and supervision of land use.76 Other proposals now being considered include plans to create intra-city territories in regional capitals, which would entail moving some of the functions of local self-governments to the regional administrations.77 The mayor of Yekaterinburg, in response to the above proposals, argues that abolishing local self-government at the level of the city would lead to administrative and economic chaos. According to Chernetsky: ‘the majority of functions of local authorities can only be realized at the city or settlement level – transport, education, engineering cannot be separated off into different city raions’.78 Such a policy, he argued, ‘would also require the creation of massive number of duplicating structures significantly increasing the number of bureaucrats’.79 In the opinion of Novosibirk mayor, Vladimir Gorodetsky (Head of the Association of Siberian and Far East Cities), ‘the deputies’ proposals take into account neither the economic specifics nor the managerial mechanisms for the running of major cities’, and should they be enacted, ‘the integral city-management mechanism that has been developed over a period of years would be destroyed … . They are proposing to destroy the most effective of the institutions of local self-government!’80 Another local government official declared that United Russia’s proposals appear ‘to be an effort to abolish mayoral elections de facto without formally abandoning them’.81 Likewise, Vladimir Miroshnik (chair of the Committee on State Building and Local Government of Kemerovo City Council) pleaded: ‘If you want to get rid of local government and transfer power to the regional and federal levels, then you should say so directly. Instead, now we have some kind of game – it seems to be local government, but the content is completely different.82 Finally, Leonid Roketskii, head of the Federation Council’s Committee on Local

Local and regional executives 183 Self-Government, warned that, if adopted, ‘this amendment will take us back to the Soviet system’ where ‘local self-government … was part of the vertical chain of command – subordinate to the district and city party committees’.83 A discussion of mayors and governors is continued in the next chapter, where the widespread manipulation and falsification of elections by regional and local executives is examined.

10 ‘Electoral authoritarianism’ and Putin’s ‘electoral vertical’

As noted in the introduction, there is a general assumption that greater levels of decentralization and local autonomy will inevitably lead to higher levels of democracy. However, as Pratchett argues, there is a complex relationship between autonomy and democracy.1 More autonomy does not automatically translate into more democracy. As Rosenbaum observes: Given some measure of independence and autonomy, people can behave very well and very poorly, very tolerantly and very intolerantly, very honourably and very dishonourably. Just as opening up more venues for individual action creates more possibilities for people to behave well, it also provides more possibilities for them to behave poorly.2 For Soos and Zentai: Simplified accounts of local democracy-building have been undermined by instances of local power elites with great autonomy to privatize public assets being caught in improper deals, paralyzing in-fights in elected bodies, and lack of transparency in decision-making justified by democratic elections.3 As I shall demonstrate below, local elites in Russia have more often used their powers of autonomy to instigate authoritarian regimes than to promote the development of grass-roots democracy. Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere, the greater the degree of autonomy given to a federal subject in Russia, the greater the degree of authoritarianism we find in the localities.4 It is in the ethnic republics where we find most violations of federal laws and the most authoritarian regimes.

Putin’s ‘electoral vertical’ When Putin first came to power in 2000, many scholars of Russian politics were willing to give him the benefit of the doubt, believing that his federal reforms were a necessary counterweight to the anarchy and chaos of the Yeltsin years. However, as recent scholarship has demonstrated, the tide of scholarly opinion has now turned against Putin, and there is now little faith left in his democratic credentials.5

‘Electoral authoritarianism’ and Putin’s ‘electoral vertical’ 185 Below I argue that the question now needing to be addressed is not so much ‘What kind of democracy exists in Russia?’, but rather, ‘What kind of authoritarian regime has now been instigated?’ I argue that Schedler’s concept of ‘electoral authoritarianism’ best captures the reality of Russian politics under Putin. As noted in Chapter 1, there are many competing definitions of democracy, ranging from the minimalist concept of ‘electoral democracy’, which focuses almost exclusively on the provision of ‘free and fair elections’, to the much broader concept of ‘liberal democracy’, which requires the institution of other ‘vital dimensions of democratic constitutionalism such as the rule of law, political accountability, bureaucratic integrity and public deliberation’.6 However, as Schedler notes, some regimes may conduct elections and tolerate some pluralism and competition, ‘but at the same time violate minimal democratic norms so severely and systematically that it makes no sense to classify them as democratic’.7 These regimes do not represent limited, deficient or distorted forms of democracy but rather are examples of what Schedler calls ‘electoral autocracies’, which ‘neither practice democracy nor resort regularly to naked repression’.8 By organizing periodic elections leaders: try to obtain at least a semblance of democratic legitimacy, hoping to satisfy external and well as internal actors. At the same time, by placing those elections under tight authoritarian controls they try to cement their continued hold on power. Their dream is to reap the fruits of electoral legitimacy without running the risk of democratic uncertainty.9 In sum, as Schedler concludes, electoral democracies ‘comply with minimal democratic norms’ while electoral authoritarian regimes do not.10 I would argue that the Russian Federation is now best classified as an ‘electoral authoritarian’ regime and that Putin’s centrally sponsored authoritarianism is now replacing the indigenous authoritarianism that flourished in the regions under Yeltsin. Slowly but surely, the administrative resources of the centre are winning out over the administrative resources of the regions, especially now that Putin appoints the regional governors. In place of the governors’ control over the regional power ministries, courts and electoral commissions, which was common during the Yeltsin era, we are now witnessing centralized control over these bodies, and the direct and open interference of the presidential administration in regional assembly elections. In turn, in many regions, regional governors have gained control over municipal elections. As Gel’man stresses: while the first regional elections held in the early 1990s were an important step on the path to democratizing political life in the regions, in the beginning of this decade we are witnessing movement in the other direction, a ‘dedemocratization’ of Russian political life. The formal elections are nothing more than a smoke screen for uncompetitive voting, hiding the informal practice in which leaders are simply appointed, as happened during the Soviet era.11

186

‘Electoral authoritarianism’ and Putin’s ‘electoral vertical’

Moreover, as Petrov concludes: ‘the fate of elections in Russia is more and more often decided not at the polling stations, but in Kremlin offices, courtrooms, and election commission headquarters’.12 For Alexander Lukin, ‘electoral clanism’ rather than electoral democracy dominates the political landscape in Russia. Here, ‘elections are not a means of selecting public officials according to law … rather they are merely the means of settling disputes among post-totalitarian clans that generally operate outside the law.’13 Officials at the federal level have taken up the cry of regional dictators such as Rakhimov in Bashkortostan and Shaimiev in Tatarstan: ‘It is not so important how the votes are cast but rather how they are counted’! What Pribylovskii calls ‘Bashkir Electoral Technology’ is one of the favourite methods employed by the Putin administration to manipulate elections. Here, opposition candidates are prevented from competing by decisions of regional and local electoral commissions and courts, or they are expelled from the elections during the campaign itself. In some cases, compromising materials may be collected by the security forces to ‘persuade’ incumbent governors to voluntarily withdraw from the elections (see below).14 Vladimir Ryzhkov stresses: We are the only country where the practice of withdrawing candidates from elections numbers in the thousands … . This is unprecedented – except for totalitarian or authoritarian system where parties are denied participation in elections because of petty bureaucratic practices. Unfortunately such bureaucratic control is on the increase – interfering in the development of parties, impeding the activities of parties, impeding the normal financial activities of parties and especially those in the opposition. As a result citizens have in effect been removed from the running of the state by one electoral law after another.15 As O’Donnell notes, in democracies: accountability runs not only vertically, making elected officials answerable to the ballot box, but also horizontally, across a network of relatively autonomous powers that can call into question, and eventually punish, improper ways of discharging the responsibilities of a given official.16 But in Putin’s Russia, state officials engaged in electoral manipulation and fraud often have the Kremlin’s blessing. As Petrov stresses: using courts and izbirkoms (election commissions) in favour of the ruling candidate is not new. What is new is that the Kremlin is able to exert influence on electoral outcomes by manipulating court decisions. Now that the centre – instead of the regional authorities controls the courts, courts are ruling in favour of the centre, and their decisions are final.17 Bashkir Electoral Technology (BET) takes its name from the illegal and corrupt practices of President Rakhimov of Bashkortostan, who was one of the first regional

‘Electoral authoritarianism’ and Putin’s ‘electoral vertical’ 187 leaders to successfully employ these methods. Following Putin’s ascent to power, BET has been used extensively by the Presidential Administration. For example, ‘in the first two years of Putin’s presidency political figures not to the liking of the president in the regions of Kaluga, Kursk, Kransnodar, Primorskii Krai, Sakha, North Osetiya and Ingushetiya were removed from the political stage.’18 As Pribylovsky notes, in 2000–2 BET was adopted in elections for the governors of: Saratov (March 2000), Khansy-Mansiskii AO (March 2000), Kursk (October 2000), Primorskii Krai (June 2001), Komi-Perm AO (December 2000), Nizhni Novgorod (July 2001), and Rostov (September 2001); the presidents of SakhaYakutiya (December 2001–January 2002), North Osetiya-Alaniya (January 2002), Ingushetiya (April 2002); mayors of Nizhnii Novgorod (September 2002), Kyzyl (October 2002).19 In 2003–4, refusals to register candidates and the withdrawal of candidates from elections was implemented in elections: to the State Assembly of Bashkortostan (March 2003), the Mayor of Novosibirsk (March 2003), the Legislative Assembly of Rostov Oblast (March 2003), Mayor of Norilsk (April 2003), City Duma of Vladivodstok (July 2003), Chief Administrator of Omsk Oblast (August–September 2003), President of Chechnya (September–October 2003), the Chief Administrator of Kirov Oblast (December 2003), and also in the elections for the Governor of Krasnodar Krai (March 2004), the Mayor of Vladivostok (July 2004), and for the new President of Chechnya (August 2004).20 Besides this, Prybilovskii notes that a softer form of BET was also used in St Petersburg in the elections of Matvienko as governor (September–October 2003). Here the incumbent, Governor Vladimir Yakovlev, was bribed with the post of Deputy Prime Minister before the elections to ensure that a candidate favourable to the president would be appointed. A similar act took place in the repeat elections for the mayor of Noryabr’sk (January–February 2004) and in the elections for the governor of Voronezh Oblast (March 2004) – in both these cases the potential winners both voluntary withdrew their candidatures.21 Finally, as Corwin notes, in gubernatorial elections in Bryansk, Pskov and Volgograd in November and December 2004, it was, ‘the courts’ rather than political parties that played the most significant role with the main opposition candidates to United Russia ‘disqualified shortly before the ballot’.22

The manipulation and falsification of local elections As Sisk observes: ‘The right to vote in free and fair elections and to hold those in office accountable is an essential, if not a sufficient condition for the development of a consolidated democracy.’23 For Schedler, following Dahl: ‘The democratic

188

‘Electoral authoritarianism’ and Putin’s ‘electoral vertical’

ideal requires that all citizens enjoy unimpaired opportunities to formulate their political preferences, to signify them to one another, and to have them weighed equally in public decision making.’23 Article 23.1 of the 2003 Law states that municipal elections are conducted ‘on the basis of universal, equal and direct votes by secret ballot’. However, as demonstrated below, municipal elections in Russia are still a long way off from meeting such criteria. Manipulation and falsification of elections is now widely practiced throughout the Federation. Elections in many of Russia’s regions are now largely ‘decorative’, with no real contestation and no level playing field. As Schedler notes: Rulers may devise discriminatory electoral rules, exclude opposition parties and candidates from entering the electoral arena, infringe upon their political rights and civil liberties, restrict their access to mass media and campaign finance, impose formal or informal suffrage restrictions on their supporters, coerce or corrupt them into deserting the opposition camp, or simply redistribute votes and seats through electoral fraud.25 Below, I show that all of these practices of electoral authoritarianism have been employed in the Russian Federation. Moscow municipal elections During the 2004–5 municipal elections there were countless instances of opposition candidates and parties being ousted from elections because of socalled infringements in their nomination documents. Thus, for example, as Buzin demonstrates, in the Moscow municipal elections of March 2004, 1,100 out of 4,500 candidates were refused registration! Registration was often denied simply because individuals signed their name or wrote the date in the wrong columns of their nomination papers. One candidate was even refused because he wrote the words, ‘self-nomination’ instead of ‘independent candidate’.26 As Buzin stresses, these absurd decisions of local electoral commissions were later backed up by higher-level courts. There have also been cases of outright falsification of election results in those few districts where opposition candidates could not be squeezed out at the registration stage. One common method employed here was to move votes from the column, ‘votes against all’ and give these to candidates of United Russia.27 As Buzin concludes: It is necessary to stress that in many of Moscow’s polling stations (there are 3200 in Moscow) there were no skilled observers. The impudence from which the falsifiers were covered from the rear by the Moscow Prosecutors’ Office, and in some cases the courts, allows us to assume, that the falsification of elections were conducted on a massive scale.28

‘Electoral authoritarianism’ and Putin’s ‘electoral vertical’ 189 Elections to Klimov City Council In elections to Klimov City Council in September 2005, 33 of the 77 candidates were denied registration mainly because of supposed infringements in their list of nomination signatures. None of the ousted candidates were members of United Russia. Opposition candidates accused the mayor of the city, Andrey Men’shov, the governor, Boris Gromov, and members of United Russia of putting pressure on the city’s electoral commission to oust the candidates from the race. The decision of Klimov Electoral Commission were also supported by the Moscow Regional Electoral Commission. However, after extensive media coverage and local protests, the Russian Central Electoral Commission in January 2006 requested the Klimov City Court to revoke the powers of the City Electoral Commission. However, the City Court refused to satisfy this demand. The Russian Federal Central Electoral Commission then made an appeal to the Moscow Oblast Court, which eventually was successful. On April 25, Klimov City Court passed an unprecedented decision cancelling the results of the elections. As Kynev notes: ‘Owing to the resolute position of the Central Electoral Commission this case had a national resonance, however in many other municipalities where no less serious infringements have taken place, such appeals have fallen on deaf ears.’29 St Petersburg municipal elections In the March 2004 elections for the Akademicheskoe Municipal Council in the Kalinin district of St Petersburg, the Union of Right Forces (SPS) and Yabloko candidates won eight and 14 seats respectively in electoral district No. 52. However, shortly after the elections the municipal electoral commission declared the results invalid because students from the local military academy had participated in the elections. However, both Yabloko and SPS had actually asked for these students to be prohibited from voting. However, in the Petrograd district the courts declared that such students were entitled to vote. In this district, United Russia won a majority of the seats. As the St Petersburg Times reported: ‘The City Prosecutor’s office could not answer the question about how two courts could issue contradictory judgments about the eligibility of students of military academies to vote.’30 These anomalies were sanctioned by the St Petersburg election commission, the Federal Electoral Commission and the City Prosecutor’s Office; in other words by the very bodies that were set up to protect the electoral rights of citizens and parties. Another favoured method of manipulating the vote is to persuade members of the electorate to vote ahead of schedule. Often these early voters are enticed to the polls with promises of gifts, money or the provision of local services. Thus, for example, in the elections for the Svetlanov Municipal Council in St Petersburg in December 2004, United Russia received 90 per cent of the votes during pre-schedule voting while Yabloko won only 10 per cent. However, on the official polling day Yabloko received 20–70 per cent (in the different polling stations), while United Russia won just 10 per cent. According to Mikhail Amosov (Yabloko), the municipal elections commissions were in effect, ‘buying votes by attracting elderly residents to local housing committees by offering [them] free consultations on the replacement of

190

‘Electoral authoritarianism’ and Putin’s ‘electoral vertical’

benefits-in-kind with cash payments, or giving away free internet access cards.’31 According to Dorutina, head of the St Petersburg League of Voters: ‘officials, whether they are in city or municipal election commissions, are receptive to what President Vladimir Putin says and try to be in line with his opinion rather than following the law and the Constitution.’32 The percentage of the electorate who voted ahead of schedule was also very high in the elections held for local councils in Moscow on 16 May 2004. Thus, for example, in district number 5 in Strogino, 41 per cent of those who voted did so before the official polling day. In six of eight polling stations in Academiya District, over half of the participants voted ahead of schedule. The law states that citizens have the right to vote ahead of schedule provided they present to the local authorities valid reasons as to why they cannot attend the polling stations on the official election day. Thus, the voter is obliged to complete an application and to specify in it the reasons for requesting the right to such a vote. Because of the numerous abuses of this right, pre-schedule voting was banned for federal elections in 1999 and, in Federal Law No. 67 of 12 June 2002, it was banned for regional elections,33 leaving it in place for municipal elections only. However, in Federal Law No. 93 of 21 July 2005, it was reinstated for regional elections.34 Pre-schedule voting is now one of the main methods used by United Russia and regional governors to manipulate and falsify elections. Voting using portable ballot box As Oreshkin notes, in local and regional elections in the Orel Region in March 2007, 14.6 per cent of the electors voted outside the electoral district, that is, by means of portable ballot boxes. Previously it was just a couple of per cent. Portable ballot boxes, which members of the electoral commission take round to voter’s homes, have now become a key method for falsifying voting results. It was using such ballot boxes that on 11 March more than 30 per cent of the electorate in Orel District (Orel Region) voted. United Russia won 53 per cent of the votes here, while the average figure for the party in the region as a whole was 39 per cent. The Pskov region was also distinguished by a large number of citizens voting from home – 20.1 per cent. In the Nevelsk District of the Pskov Region, 49.5 per cent voted from home. As Oreshkin notes, ‘A clear pattern is observable: wherever over 30 per cent vote from home, the turnout is 15 per cent higher than average for the region, and United Russia receives 10 per cent above the average result.’35 Elections for the Volzhsk City Council Yet another ploy of the regional authorities is to put pressure on elected deputies to change their party allegiance. Thus, for example, in the city of Volzhsk (Volgograd Oblast), which, as noted in Chapter 8 was the sole municipality to employ a pure party list system in the 2005 municipal elections, there was a surprise victory for LDPR, which won 21.5 per cent of the votes. United Russia was pushed into second place with 18.5 per cent. The CPRF came in third with 17.7 per cent, and

‘Electoral authoritarianism’ and Putin’s ‘electoral vertical’ 191 Motherland was fourth with 12.8 per cent. However, in a bizarre sequel, which took place at the first session of the city council, almost all of the members of the LDPR faction ‘requested’ that they be transferred to the United Russia faction. Clearly, they had been pressurized into taking such action by members of United Russia and the regional administration.36 Local elections in the Republic of Dagestan Oreshkin points out that in 783 electoral districts in Dagestan, where a total of 395,000 people voted in the 11 March 2007 regional and local elections, there was not a single invalid ballot paper. Not one single voter made a mistake and spoiled his ballot paper. Furthermore, in 124 of these districts, United Russia won 100 per cent of the votes, in 36 districts there was a 100 per cent turnout, and all of them, without exception, voted for United Russia. Moreover: ‘in one electoral district, United Russia won 100 per cent of the votes in the republican ballot, but only 7 per cent in the municipal ballot’.37 One of the reasons why the minimum turnout norm was abolished is that regional leaders have often had to resort to falsifying the figures to validate the elections. Thus, for example, in local elections in the city of Hasavyrut (Dagestan Republic): Turnout by two o’clock was approximately the same in all districts – between 34.99 and 35.18 per cent. And notably, the turnout in all 26 districts changed in step: by 4 p.m. it fluctuated between 61.98 and 62.41 per cent, while two hours later it was 77.98–78.03 per cent.38 These figures were clearly fabricated in line with the wishes of the Republican leadership. In other cases, regional leaders have actually tried to lower the level of electoral turnout. As Veshnyakov notes: suppose some force that has political, administrative and financial clout sees that high turnout in an election won’t be to its benefit: If the turnout is 15 per cent success is guaranteed, but if it is 35 per cent, the desired outcome won’t materialise. Certain segments of the population can be induced to stay away from the polls. In Sverdlovsk Oblast this past autumn [2006], a campaign was launched in the media saying that if pensioners went on strike and didn’t vote, their pensions would be tripled.39 Local elections in Tatarstan Farukshin states: ‘Those who have a real understanding of power in Tatarstan will understand that all of the local government structures will be moulded with the help of administrative resources and their cadres.’40 The Tatarstan leadership was concerned that turnout would not be high enough to validate the local elections

192

‘Electoral authoritarianism’ and Putin’s ‘electoral vertical’

in the Republic in 2005. However, citizen participation in the elections averaged 62 per cent across the republic, and just under 40 per cent in Kazan.41 As noted in Chapter 8, there were unusually high levels (up to 99 per cent) of electoral participation in some of the rural districts. Not surprisingly, these ridiculously high turnout levels were not achieved without some form of coercion from the republican leadership. As Sharafutdinova notes: ‘Officials exerted considerable pressure to achieve such numbers. Directors of publicly financed institutions, such as hospitals and schools, and industrial managers used their influence among employees to mobilize voters.’42 Also as noted in Chapter 8, opposition candidates were threatened with criminal investigations and other forms of harassment if they did not withdraw their names from the ballots. Local council elections in Perm Sometimes elections in Russia have a comic tragic element. Thus, for example, a common feature of regional and local elections is the registration of ‘candidate doubles’: a ploy used to scuttle the electoral chances of opponents by fielding candidates with the same names. Thus, for example, in the Perm City Council elections of December 2006 there were no less than seven pairs of ‘doubles’ who successfully registered for the election.43 Manipulation of elections of heads of local administrations/municipalities There have also been numerous cases of candidates standing for the posts of heads of local administrations/municipalities being expelled from elections. In 2004–6, refusals to register such candidates, or their enforced withdrawal from elections, were implemented in Vladivostok (July 2004), Volgograd (2004), Pskov (2004) and Perm (March 2006), to name but a few.44 Viktor Cherepkov actually ran for mayor or other office twenty-seven times in the city of Vladivostok, but in every case he was either removed by the regional [governor] Nazdratenko, or the elections were overturned. The region’s courts and election commission were firmly under the governor’s control.45 In 2004, there was an attempt on Cherepkov’s life. Election of the mayor of Saratov In Saratov Region, there was a blatant attempt by Governor Yurii Aksyatov to overturn the December 2000 election of Aleksei Saurin as mayor of the city of Balakovo. Saurin had successfully changed the method of electing the mayor of the city from the indirect method (by members of the city council) to the direct method (popular mandate). Under the old system Aksyatov had been able to control the city council ‘though a mixture of bribery and threats’.46 Saurin realized that he would have a better chance of victory in a popular election. The conflict between the mayor and the governor had begun when Saurin claimed that Ayatskov had falsified the March 2000 gubernatorial elections. As Yeliseeva notes: ‘In the wake of Saurin’s accusations, the Oblast authorities shut

‘Electoral authoritarianism’ and Putin’s ‘electoral vertical’ 193 off heat and electricity to Balakovo … and they did everything they could to drive a wedge between Saurin and Balakovo’s enterprise directors’.47 However, Saurin still managed to win 74 per cent of the vote in the second round of the mayoral elections, which were held on 14 January 2001. But the Regional Electoral Commission, which was under the control of Ayatskov, simply nullified the results of the election and set a date for new elections to take place on 8 April. Even after this, Ayatskov was not satisfied and he ‘forced the Balakovo City Council to elect a Mayor from its ranks’ before new mayoral elections could be held. The city council elected Valentin Timofeev. Thus, the city was left with two mayors.48 Election of mayor of Omsk On 18 March 2001, citizens of the city of Omsk elected Yevgeny Belov as mayor. Belov, who at this time was general director of the private company, ‘Omsk Energy’, was elected with the backing of Leonid Polezhaev, the governor of Omsk, who financially backed the campaign and put to good use his monopoly over the broadcast media. The elections had been called after Polezhaev forced the former mayor, Valery Roshchupkin, to resign. Although Belov received 58.2 per cent of the vote, turnout was very low, just 29 per cent, and 23 per cent of the electorate voted against all candidates.49 Polezhaev also ensured that all of the serious contenders to Belov would be expelled from the elections. As Pavel Shagiakhmetov notes, this ‘Omsk model of local government, essentially puts the city administration under the control of the governor.’50 Election of the mayor of Perm’ In some cases, compromising materials may be collected by the security forces to ‘persuade’ incumbents to voluntarily withdraw from electoral campaigns.51 Thus, for example, on the eve of the Perm’ mayoral elections of March 2006, the United Russia candidate, Igor Shubin, a deputy of the Perm’ Regional Assembly, was appointed as acting mayor so that he could tap into the administrative resources of the city. Shubin was supported by the governor of Perm’. His chief opponent, Vladimir Plotnikov, who had previously spent time in prison, was ousted from the campaign by the city electoral commission on highly dubious grounds concerning the authenticity of his registration documents. One of the participants, General Utrobin (Deputy Head of the Perm’ Regional Administration of Internal Affairs), was a bogus candidate. His task was to mobilize the security structures against Plotnikov and have him expelled from the election. Utrobin won just 1.2 per cent of the votes.52 After his ousting from the elections, Plotnikov called upon the citizens of Perm’ to show their support for his candidacy by voting ‘against all’ the candidates. Shubin finally won the election in the second round of the contest with 37.13 per cent of the vote. However, no less than 25.2 per cent of the electorate showed their disfavour at the way the elections had been run by voting ‘against all’ the candidates.53

194

‘Electoral authoritarianism’ and Putin’s ‘electoral vertical’

Election of the mayor of Orel In the March 2006 elections for the mayor of the city of Orel, everyone expected that the candidate from United Russia, Paul Merkulov, who was deputy-governor of the region would win easily. However, the winner was a local businessman, Aleksandr Kasyanov, who was a member of the Communist Party. Kasyanov received 29 per cent of the votes compared to Merkulov’s 25.8 per cent; 17.8 per cent of the electorate voted ‘against all candidates’.54 The result was a cruel blow to the governor of the region, Egor Stroev. However, it took over two days for the votes to be counted, as there was an absence of reports from 21 electoral districts, and, when it finally became clear that Kasyanov had won, there was an attempt by the regional administration to have the elections declared null and void. It was only after supporters of Kasyanov picketed the election commission headquarters that the head of the electoral commission, Tatyana Adrianova, agreed that the results should stand, a decision that was made seemingly against the wishes of the regional prosecutor. During the election campaign there were scores of complaints by opposition candidates that electoral laws had been violated, and that attempts had been made to spoil some of the ballot papers in favour of Kasyanov. The deputy-governor was also able to tap into the ‘administrative resources’ of the region to bolster his faltering campaign. In some electoral districts, up to 30 per cent of the participants voted in pre-schedule elections, and the overwhelming majority of these votes, not surprisingly, went to Merkulov.55 Election for the mayor of Kineshma In Ivanovo Oblast, the Kineshma City Court passed a judgement about the falsification of elections for the mayor of the city. The chair of the Oblast Election Commission reported that, on the evening of 13 March 2006, 26,000 electoral bulletins and official stamps were stolen. The former mayor of Kineshma,Yurii Vakhotin, who was one of the candidates for the post of head of the city administration, was blamed for the theft and sentenced to four years in prison. Side by side in court with Vakhotin were his former deputy Zolin, Deputy Head of the City Department of Internal Affairs, and three members of his apparat, who all received prison sentences of between two and three and a half years. It is difficult to know if a crime really took place or if this was another case of a trumped up charge by the regional administration, as discussed in Chapter 9.

Politicization and control of electoral commissions One of the major problems as far as electoral democracy is concerned is the fact that electoral commissions in Russia are highly politicized and financially dependent on the state. Thus, as the former chair of the Central Election Commission, Ivanenko, observed in 2005:

‘Electoral authoritarianism’ and Putin’s ‘electoral vertical’ 195 In our country the electoral commissions themselves are entirely within the complement of the system of executive power. In the Soviet period, there were also elections, people came to the polls, took ballots and marched along a clear straight line, without deviating to the right or left. And we are returning to this now.56 A hierarchy of commissions As noted in Chapter 8, there is a hierarchical system of electoral commissions that runs from the Central Electoral Commission at the top via the electoral commissions of the federal subjects down to territorial, municipal and local electoral commissions at the bottom. At every level, the commissions depend on the state administration for their finance, and their membership is controlled by the executive. Thus, for example, five of the 15 members of the Central Electoral Commission are nominated by the President, five by the Duma and five by the Federation Council. However, now that Putin has the power to appoint the regional governors and they make up one-half of the members of the Federal Council, and now that members of United Russia dominate the State Duma, the President can easily control the membership of the Central Electoral Commission. Similarly, Putin is able to control the membership of regional election commissions, half of whom are nominated by Putin’s appointed governors, and half by regional legislatures, a majority of which are now also dominated by United Russia. Moreover, the chairs of the regional commission are appointed by the Central Electoral Commission. In addition, members of higher-level commissions (at every level) are also members of lower level commissions. Each municipal electoral commission is also obliged to include in its membership at least two members of higher-level commissions. Regional electoral commissions, in turn, play a major role in forming and financing territorial, municipal and local commissions. As noted in Chapter 8, in July 2005 the maximum number of state officials and members of political parties permitted to serve in electoral commissions was increased from one-third to one-half.57 However, only those parties that have party list seats in the State Duma are permitted to nominate members for posts in regional electoral commissions. Municipal electoral commissions comprise five to 11 full voting members, one-half of whom are nominated by local councils and the other by heads of local administrations. Parties with party lists seats in the Duma or regional assemblies, or with seats in local councils, have the right to nominate members of local commissions.58 However, it is not always possible for representatives of all the main parties to be members of municipal electoral commissions, as many councils have no party members or only members from United Russia. Thus, for example, in the elections to rural and city settlements in 2004–5, 25 per cent of the voting members of the electoral commissions were members of political parties, and this figure rose to 42 per cent in the electoral commissions of municipal districts and city districts.59 Members of United Russia had the largest number of representatives, comprising 40.3 per cent (of the total number of party members) in rural and city settlements

196

‘Electoral authoritarianism’ and Putin’s ‘electoral vertical’

commissions. Members of the CPRF were second (with 25 per cent), LDPR (14 per cent), Rodina (3.7 per cent). Yabloko and SPS both had approximately 3 per cent.60 It should also be stressed that it is common practice for senior employees of regional and municipal administrations to be appointed chairs of electoral commissions, and many of the rank and file members of the commissions are employed by local administrations. It is also common practice for all of the members of a particular polling station to be drawn from the same workplace, with the manager of the workplace appointed as the chair of the commission. There are even cases when members of such commissions are supervised by managers from their workplace who are not officially members of the commissions.61

Conclusion As Sisk, notes, in a democracy: 1

2 3

4

Voters must be able to trust elected officials to carry out their campaign promises and believe that they will engage in open, corruption-free governance. They must trust that if they lose this election, they will have a fair opportunity to win the next one (the concept of alternation in power). Minority communities must trust that even if they do not win a majority of seats in the city council, for example, their interests will not be neglected and they will not be subjected to systematic disadvantage, given their minority group status. All actors in local elections must trust that the administration of the poll is free and fair and that the will of the voters will prevail.62

The fact that most deputies work part-time, that many work for the executive branch of government, and that parties are non-existent or very weak, have all conspired to give regional executives a free reign to govern their regions as they see fit. In most regions there is no effective democratic opposition to challenge the authority of the executive branch. As Fish notes: Russian elections are riddled with too much fraud and coercion to call them free … falsification, coercion, and the arbitrary disqualification of candidates in elections, as well as constriction of communicative interaction and associational life, have prevented democracy from taking hold. They have kept control of politics out of the hands of the electorate as a whole and vested it in a slim stratum of officials who control and manipulate the process for their own ends.63 On 27 July 2006, the Duma adopted a new ‘Law on Combating Extremist Activity’, which gives the government new powers to ban parties from elections if any of their members are charged with extremist activities. Even Alexander Veshnyakov,

‘Electoral authoritarianism’ and Putin’s ‘electoral vertical’ 197 who at the time was the chair of the Central Electoral Commission, has spoken out against this Law. In an interview conducted in the summer of 2006, he warned: ‘I will mention that attempts are now being made to modify legislation in order to get more ways to cut out disliked candidates using administrative resources’; and, he continued: What frightens me is that if these amendments are adopted, we will have elections without choice, as it was in fact in Soviet times … . It is simply a different ideology of elections where everything must be regulated and in that way no candidate the government does not like will be permitted to participate in an election. It resembles Soviet times.64 Veshnyakov also spoke openly of ‘several cases in which local or regional election officials in the Russian Federation falsified results, only to receive small fines or have criminal investigations closed without prosecution or conviction’; and he went on to argue that ‘inappropriate light punishments discredit the authorities and give the opposition serious arguments for discrediting elections in Russia’. He concluded, by calling on ‘prosecutors and courts to toughen the criminal and administrative penalties for violating election laws’.65 In 2007, Veshnyakov was fired from his post as head of the Central Electoral Commission and replaced by one of Putin’s protégés, Vladimir Churov. The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance uses the following questions as a checklist to analyze the integrity of a given election: 1 2

3

4

5

Will of the people. Do local elections indicate that the will of the people has been expressed and the authority of governance approved as legitimate? Possiblity of alternation. Does the election allow for the possibility of alternation in winning political coalitions? That is, does the opposition party have a real chance of winning? Confidence-building. Does the election build confidence in the political system, namely that the leaders are exercising public power in pursuit of the common good? Educated choices. Do the elections provide voters and candidates an opportunity to clearly define the issues and to make choices among solutions to community problems? Do the elections help educate citizens on the critical issues before the community? Level playing field. Is the playing field among the candidates and parties a level one? That is, does any given candidate have an inherent advantage?66

The answer to all of these questions, as far as Russian local elections are concerned, would have to be a resounding no. Regional and local elections in Russia are rapidly turning into ‘elections without choice’, particularly in those regions where the chief executives have been appointed by Putin and they are members of United Russia. Here, there

198

‘Electoral authoritarianism’ and Putin’s ‘electoral vertical’

is no meaningful separation of legislative, executive and judicial power, and the distinction between the United Russia party organization and the regional administration is blurred. What may be termed Putin’s ‘electoral vertical’ has now been extended from the regions to the municipalities, and Schedler’s model of ‘electoral authoritarianism’ has firmly taken root in Russia’s localities. The current system of local politics in Russia closely matches the ‘dominantpower politics’ model posited by Thomas Carothers. As he notes: countries with this syndrome have limited but still real political space, some political contestation by opposition groups, and at least most of the basic institutional forms of democracy. Yet one political grouping – whether it is a movement, a party, an extended family, or a single leader – dominates the system in such a way that there appears to be little prospect for alternation of power in the foreseeable future … . The state’s assets – that is to say, the state as a source of money, jobs, public information (via state media), and police power – are gradually put in the direct service of the ruling party.67 In sum, prospects for the development of grass-roots democracy in Russia now look very bleak. The statist concept of local self-governance has won over the societal concept, and any hope that Russia’s democratic revival could be initiated from the grass roots have now been brought to a halt by Putin’s centralizing agenda.

Conclusion

As I have demonstrated throughout this study, the struggle to reform local selfgovernment in Russia has been part and parcel of the wider struggle for power that has been waged between the centre and the federal subjects. During the Yeltsin era, the heads of Russia’s federal subjects, particularly in the 21 ethnic republics, were given carte blanche to develop their own political institutions, including those of ‘local government’ and ‘local self-government’. Under the protection of their constitutions and charters, and the extra-constitutional rights and powers granted to them in their bilateral treaties, republican and regional elites have been able to subjugate local level bodies with impunity. The quasi-independence granted to local self-governments in Article 12 of the Russian Constitution was never fully put into practice. In many of the ethnic republics (e.g. Adygeya, Bashkortostan, Dagestan, Kalmykiya, Komi, North Osetiya-Alaniya, Sakha, Tatarstan), the chief executives have been able to carve out personal fiefdoms and to instigate highly authoritarian regimes. Local governments have also been directly subordinated to republican administrations, and heads of municipalities have been directly appointed by republican presidents. Regional governors and republican presidents were also able to use their ex-officio membership of the Federation Council to veto or scuttle any legislation that challenged their de facto powers, including those aimed at devolving more powers to local self-governments. By the mid-1990s, there were even greater levels of political and constitutional asymmetry at the local level than at the regional and republican levels. The number of municipalities, their type, status and powers, varied tremendously from region to region. However, it was in those federal subjects that were ceded the greatest amount of political autonomy – the ethnic republics – where local self-governments were subjugated to the greatest extent, and local democracy was most fully suppressed. Attempts to reform local government in 1990, 1991 and 1995 all became embroiled in the wider power struggle between the federal subjects and the federal authorities. As Gel’man notes: ‘the centre tried to weaken regional governments by forcing them to share their powers with local government, while regions tried to resist these attempts by restricting the authority of local government.’1 During the Yeltsin era, the regions and republics were able to thwart the

200

Conclusion

development of local government and local democracy, and all attempts to create a universal and uniform system of local self-government in the Federation were a failure. Indeed, in the wake of the ratification of the 1995 Law, a dual system of local governance was created, whereby institutions of ‘local government’ were created at the city and district levels (and remained part of the regional administrative hierarchy), while institutions of ‘local self-government’ (in theory, independent of the state) were relegated to the lower levels of the administrative hierarchy (in townships, rural and urban settlements, villages, etc.). Putin’s local government reforms also need to be viewed as an integral component of his wider centralizing political agenda, and his assault on the principles and practices of federalism. Putin’s new system of local self-government marks a victory for the proponents of the ‘statist concept’ of local self-government over those who championed the ‘societal concept’, codified in Article 12 of the Russian Constitution. The new definition of local self-government as a form of ‘public power’ is, in reality, an abandonment of the key constitutional principle of the separation of local government from the state. Moreover, the adoption of the 2003 Law has led to the ‘governmentalization’ of local self-government, and opened the path for the full integration of local self-government into Putin’s ‘power vertical’ when the law is fully implemented in 2009. It also heralds the victory of ‘local government’ over ‘local self-government’. The 2003 Law is also a classic example of the age-old Russian tradition of reforming local government ‘from above’. However, as Levinson warns: You cannot plant and grow self-government as you would vegetables. You cannot set an objective of having a perfect self-government by a certain date – uniform, carefully trimmed, and financially aligned; the challenge is to let it grow gradually and allow diversity … state authorities should not be allowed to order it about or build it into their chain of command.2

Financial autonomy The financial dependence of municipalities on regional and federal governments has fundamentally weakened their political autonomy. As demonstrated in Chapters 6 and 7, municipal governments have suffered from chronic under-funding and a serious mismatch between their revenues and expenditures. The tax system in Russia is highly centralized and the percentage of local governments’ ‘own revenues’ as a percentage of their total incomes has fallen sharply during the Putin era. Unfunded mandates, the expenses associated with enterprise divestiture and, more recently, Putin’s monetization of benefits, have bankrupted most municipalities. The vast majority of local budgets are in deficit and local governments have to rely on federal and regional grants to meet their expenditure obligations. In the most depressed one-company towns and other small cities, the standard of living of the population has fallen precipitously. Many impoverished small cities have had to turn to the private sector to help them deliver essential services to their communities. The triangular relationship between enterprise director, party first

Conclusion

201

secretary and city mayor that developed during the communist era has now been replaced by a new configuration of power elites comprising governors, heads of local administrations and the directors of private companies.

Support for local self-governance A fundamental problem with the attempts to reform local government is the fact that it is not in the interest of regional and federal elites to give up their powers and privileges. As Yakutova notes: a developed system of local self-governance is … a threat to the stability of the current regime; it is a school of true democracy and, thus an effective mechanism of controlling powers that be. A majority of state officials would not find such ‘control from below’ convenient, which is why regional elites, as well as many federal functionaries, are not interested in the development of local communities, the popularization of local leaders and the success of local self governments as democratic institutions in Russia’s state system.3 Moreover, local self-government has found little support from the Russian population. Russia’s citizens … do not consider local governments as ‘their own’ and do not see municipal property as the property of all residents. Local governments are perceived as just another level of official bureaucracy that needs to be fed and is incapable of efficiently solving the public’s problems.4

Parties, elections and local democracy A key feature of Russia’s transition has been the chronic weakness of political parties, particularly at the regional and local levels. As was demonstrated in Chapter 8, party saturation of local government has been extremely low throughout the post-communist period. While there has been some improvement in the percentage of candidates who stood on a party ticket in municipal elections in 2004–5 compared to those held in 1995–8, parties continue to play a minor role in the vast majority of municipalities. New legislation adopted by Putin in the wake of the Beslan hostage crisis has made it much more difficult for small parties and independents to compete in elections, and regional parties have been banned altogether. If the new mixed electoral system for municipal elections, which was discussed in Chapter 8, is adopted nationwide, there will be only be three to five mandates reserved for independents in municipal councils. The absence of strong nationwide institutionalized parties has intensified the clientalistic and corporatist nature of politics in Russia, and thwarted the development of local democracy. Russia’s small, part-time, weak and politically fragmented local councils have been unable to provide an effective opposition to executive power.

202

Conclusion

For Sisk: Voters must be able to trust elected officials to carry out their campaign promises and believe that they will engage in open, corruption-free governance. Candidates must trust that if they lose this election, they will have a fair opportunity to win the next one … . Minority communities must trust that even if they do not win a majority of seats in the city council, for example, their interests will not be neglected and they will not be subjected to systematic disadvantage, given their minority group status. All actors in local elections must trust that the administration of the poll is free and fair and that the will of the voters will prevail.5 However, as demonstrated in Chapter 10, elections in Russia are far from free and fair, and the manipulation and falsification of local elections is commonplace. What may be termed an ‘electoral vertical’ has been created to ensure that Putin’s ‘party of power’ (United Russia) controls all the levers of power.

The appointment of governors and mayors While the mayors of capital cities were able to provide an important check on the powers of regional governors in the Yeltsin era, under Putin we have witnessed the creation of a more rigid power vertical. Governors are now directly appointed by the president, and there are moves a foot to give governors similar power of appointment over mayors. Moreover, the 2003 Law already gives regional governors the dominant voice in the appointment of executive managers. As noted in Chapter 9, this new dual system has the potential to generate conflict between heads of the local councils and the appointed managers, especially in those municipalities where the latter are nominees of the regional governors. In an address to the Federal Assembly in April 2005, Putin stated that he regarded ‘the development of Russia as a free and democratic state as our main political and ideological task’.6 However, the actual record of his regime tells a different story. For many observers, Putin is recreating all the trappings of a fullyfledged authoritarian state. The president’s initial reorganization of the Federation Council, his usurpation of unilateral powers to dismiss regional assemblies and chief executives, and his creation of seven unelected super-governors were all major set-backs for Russian federalism, and his more recent centralizing policy initiatives, initiated in the aftermath of the Beslan hostage tragedy, are further steps towards the development of an authoritarian unitary state. Putin’s former ‘stealth authoritarianism’ is now clearly visible for all to see.7 As noted in the introduction, ‘a vigorous and effective local democracy is the underlying basis for a healthy and strong national-level democracy’.8 Scholars of local government have also stressed the importance of local autonomy and effectiveness as key prerequisites for local democracy. However, as shown in this study, autonomy is not necessarily synonymous with democracy. Regional and local elites have more readily guided the country

Conclusion

203

towards authoritarianism than democracy, and it has been those elites with the most autonomy that have created the most authoritarian regimes and that have subjugated local self-government to the greatest degree. As Tishkov notes: A deep rift between declared reality and practice exists in Russia. The system described by the laws, charters, decisions, polls, etc. differs greatly from everyday practice, which is based on informal links, rigid dependence, personal or corporate interests, etc. In effect, many of the political, ideological and cultural prerequisites of local self-government are absent in today’s Russia. And in many of its regions, there are no normal conditions for the functioning of any local authorities whatsoever.9 Neither federal nor regional elites are committed to the democratic ‘rules of the game’, and the conduct of local elections has now fallen well below the minimum requirements of even an ‘electoral democracy’. In conclusion, ‘electoral authoritarianism’ is now entrenched at the regional and local levels, and local democracy in Russia is far from Soos and Zentai’s ideal of local government ‘that is autonomous, effective, open, and representative, surrounded by a civil society in the framework of guaranteed political rights’.10 The ‘statist concept’ of local self-government has once again come to the fore, and municipalities are now viewed as little more than ‘reception rooms for the vertical of power’.11

Appendix 5.1

Powers and Functions of Settlements, Municipal Districts and City Districts, Articles 14–6 of the 2003 Law

Article 14: Local issues of a settlement 1

Local issues of a settlement shall be: 1 Formation, approval, performance of the settlement budget and control of the latter. 2 Imposition, amendment and cancellation of local taxes and fines. 3 Ownership, use and disposal of municipal property of the settlement. 4 Electricity, heating, gas and water supply, wastewater collection, provision of fuel to the households within the boundaries of the settlement. 5 Maintenance and construction of roads, bridges and other transportation engineering facilities within the boundaries of communities of the settlement, with exception of the roads, bridges and other transportation engineering facilities of federal and regional significance. 6 Provision of housing to low-income residents of the settlement who are in need of improving their housing conditions, in accordance with housing legislature, organization of construction and maintenance of municipal housing stock, creating conditions for housing construction. 7 Creating conditions for the delivery of transportation services to the residents and organizing public transportation services within the boundaries of the settlement. 8 Participation in the preventing and liquidating of the consequences of emergencies within the boundaries of the settlements. 9 Primary fire-safety measures within the boundaries of the communities of the settlement. 10 Creating conditions for the delivery of communication services, public catering, trading and everyday services to the residents. 11 Organizing library services for residents. 12 Creating conditions for the delivery of the services of culture and entertainment facilities to the residents. 13 Protection and preservation of cultural heritage (historic and cultural

Appendix 205

2

monuments) of local (municipal) significance in the territory of the settlement. 14 Creating conditions for the mass development of fitness and sport activities. 15 Landscaping of recreational areas for residents of the settlement. 16 Assistance in establishing guardianship and trusteeship for residents of the settlement who are in need thereof, in accordance with federal law. 17 Forming archives of the settlement. 18 Organizing collection and removal of household waste and trash. 19 Landscaping and greenery-planting in the territory of the settlement, use and preservation of city forests located within the boundaries of the communities of the settlement. 20 Town planning, zoning of the territory of the settlement, establishing the rules of land use and development for the territory of the settlement, withdrawal of land plots (including withdrawal by means of purchase) within the boundaries of settlements for municipal needs, land control of proper land use with regard to the lands of the settlement. 21 Street lighting, installation of street signs and numbers. 22 Organizing burial services and maintenance of burial sites. Local self-governments in settlements shall have the right to decide on other issues outside the scope of competence of other municipalities, state authorities and not excluded from their competence by the federal laws and laws of the Subjects of the Russian Federation, subject to availability of their own material and financial resources only (with exception of subventions and grants provided from the federal budget and the budget of the Subject of the Russian Federation).

Article 15: Local issues of a municipal raion 1

Local issues of a municipal raion shall be: 1 Formation, approval, performance of the municipal raion budget and control of the latter. 2 Imposition, amendment and cancellation of local taxes and fines of the municipal raion. 3 Ownership, use and disposal of municipal property of the municipal raion. 4 Organizing electricity and gas supply to the settlements within the boundaries of municipal raion. 5 Construction and maintenance of automobile roads connecting the settlements, bridges and other transportation engineering facilities outside the boundaries of settlements but within the boundaries of the municipal raion, with exception of the roads, bridges and other transportation facilities of federal and regional significance. 6 Creating conditions for the delivery of public transportation services and organizing public transportation services between the settlements of the municipal raion.

206

2

3

Appendix 7 Participation in the preventing and liquidating of the consequences of emergencies in the territory of the municipal raion. 8 Organizing protection of public order in the territory of the municipal raion by municipal police. 9 Organizing inter-settlement environmental safety activities. 10 Organizing and exercising environmental surveillance over industrial and social facilities in the territory of the municipal raion, except facilities subject to environmental surveillance by the federal authorities. 11 Organizing the provision of free public education, including: primary, basic, secondary (full) general education under basic secondary education programmes, with exception of funding responsibilities that fall into the competence of state authorities of the Subjects of the Russian Federation; organizing the provision of extra-curriculum education services and free public preschool education in the territory of municipal raion, as well as organizing children recreation during school vacations. 12 Organizing the delivery of emergency medical services (except those with the use of ambulance aviation), inpatient and outpatient primary medical care services, health services for pregnant women, and obstetric care. 13 Guardianship and trusteeship. 14 Organizing utilization and recycling of household and industrial waste. 15 Zoning of the territory of unincorporated territories, withdrawal of land plots (including withdrawal by means of purchase) in unincorporated lands for municipal needs, exercising land control over the use of lands of unincorporated territories, keeping the cadastre of land use and town planning documentation. 16 Collection and maintenance of municipal archive, including safekeeping of the archives of settlements. 17 Maintenance of inter-settlement burial sites in municipal raion, organization of burial services. 18 Creating conditions for providing the settlements of the municipal raion with communication, public catering, trade and other everyday services. 19 Organization of library services for settlements (provision of library collector services). 20 Equalization of the budget capacity of settlements included in the municipal raion, at the expense of the budget funds of the municipal raion. Local self-governments of municipal raions shall have the entire powers of a local self-government of a settlement with respect to unincorporated territories in rural communities that are not municipalities pursuant to Sub item 9 of Item 1 of Article 11 of the present federal law, including the powers of local selfgovernment of a settlement related to imposition, amendment and cancellation of local taxes and charges in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation on taxes and charges. Local self-governments of municipal raions shall have the right to decide on other issues outside the scope of competence of other municipalities, state authorities and not excluded from their competence by the federal laws and

Appendix 207

4

laws of the Subjects of the Russian Federation, subject to availability of their own material and financial resources only (with exception of subventions and grants provided from the federal budget and the budget of the Subject of the Russian Federation). Local self-governments in individual settlements within a municipal raions shall have the right to sign agreements with the local self-government of the municipal raion on the conveyance of a portion of their powers at the expense of subventions provided by the budgets of these settlements to the budget of the municipal raion. Local self-government of a municipal raion shall have the right to sign agreements with the local self-governments of individual settlements within the municipal raion on conveyance of a portion of the powers of the municipal raion to the settlements at the expense of the funds provided by the budget of the municipal raion to the budgets of appropriate settlements. The said agreements shall contain the effective term, grounds and procedures for terminating the agreement, including ahead of term termination, as well as procedures for determining the annual volume of subventions to be provided for the performance of the said powers, as well as financial penalties for failure to fulfil the said agreements.

Article 16: Local issues of a city district 1

Local issues of an urban district shall be: 1 Formation, approval, performance of the urban district budget and control of the latter. 2 Imposition, amendment and cancellation of local taxes and charges of the urban district. 3 Ownership, use and disposal of municipal property of the urban district. 4 Electricity, heating, gas and water supply, wastewater collection, provision of fuel to the households within the boundaries of the urban district. 5 Maintenance and construction of roads, bridges and other transportation engineering facilities within the boundaries of the urban district, with exception of the roads, bridges and other transportation engineering facilities of federal and regional significance. 6 Provision of housing to low-income residents of the urban district who are in need of improving their housing conditions, in accordance with housing legislature, organization of construction and maintenance of municipal housing stock, creating conditions for housing construction. 7 Creating conditions for the delivery of transportation services to the residents and organizing public transportation services within the boundaries of the urban district. 8 Participation in the preventing and liquidating of the consequences of emergencies within the boundaries of the urban district. 9 Organizing protection of public order in the territory of the urban district by municipal police.

208

2

Appendix 10 Primary fire-safety measures within the boundaries of the urban district. 11 Organizing environmental safety activities within the boundaries of the urban district. 12 Organizing and exercising environmental surveillance over industrial and social facilities in the territory of the urban district, except facilities subject to environmental surveillance by the federal authorities. 13 Organizing the provision of free public education, including: primary, basic, secondary (full) general education under basic secondary education programmes, with exception of funding responsibilities that fall into the competence of state authorities of the Subjects of the Russian Federation; organizing the provision of extra-curriculum education services and free public preschool education in the territory of urban district, as well as organizing children recreation during school vacations. 14 Organizing the delivery of emergency medical services (except those with the use of ambulance aviation), inpatient and outpatient primary medical care services, health services for pregnant women, and obstetric care in the territory of the urban district. 15 Creating conditions for the delivery of communication services, public catering, trading and everyday services to the residents of the urban district. 16 Organizing library services to the residents. 17 Creating conditions for the delivery of the services of culture and entertainment facilities to the residents. 18 Protection and preservation of cultural heritage (historic and cultural monuments) of local (municipal) significance in the territory of the urban district. 19 Creating conditions for the mass development of fitness activities in the territory of the urban district. 20 Landscaping of recreational areas for the residents. 21 Guardianship and trusteeship. 22 Collection and maintenance of municipal archive. 23 Organizing undertaker’s services and maintaining cemeteries. 24 Organizing collection, removal, utilization and recycling of household and industrial waste. 25 Landscaping and greenery-planting, use and preservation of city forests located within the territory of the urban district. 26 Town planning, zoning of the territory, establishing rules of land use and development in the territory of the urban district, withdrawal of land plots (including withdrawal by means of purchase) for municipal needs, exercising land control over the proper use of the urban district land, keeping the cadastre of land and town planning documents. 27 Street lighting, installation of street signs. Local self-government of an urban district shall have the right to decide on other issues outside the scope of competence of other municipalities, state authorities and not excluded from their competence by the federal laws and

Appendix 209 laws of the Subjects of the Russian Federation, subject to availability of their own material and financial resources only (with exception of subventions and grants provided by the federal budget and the budget of the Subject of the Russian Federation). Source: Federal Law, No. 131, 6 October 2003, ‘Ob Obshchikh Printsipakh Organizatsii Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, in V. I. Shkatulla (ed.), Komentarii k Federal’nomu Zakonu, ‘Ob Obshchikh Printsipakh Organizatsii Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii’ (Postateinyi), Moscow: Yustitsinform, 2006.

Notes

1 Introduction 1 Federal Law, No. 131, 6 October 2003, ‘Ob Obshchikh Printsipakh Organizatsii Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, in Shkatulla, V. I. (ed.), Komentarii k Federal’nomu Zakonu, ‘Ob Obshchikh Printsipakh Organizatsii Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii’ (Postateinyi), Moscow: Yustitsinform, 2006. 2 See ‘Zapiska ob itogakh munitsipal’nykh vyborov v khode reformy mestnovo samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii v 2004–5 godakh’, Vestnik Tsentral’noi Izbiratel’noi Komissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Vol. 2, No. 193, 2006, p. 11. 3 Dem’yanchenko, L. F. (ed.), Reforma Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Itogi Munitsipal’nykh Vyborov v 2004–2005 Godakh, Moscow: Tsentral’naya Izbiratel’naya Komissiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 2006, p. 8. 4 See T. H. Friedgut and J. W. Hahn (eds), Local Power and Post-Soviet Politics, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994; John Gibson and Philip Hanson, Transformation from Below, Local Power and the Political Economy of Post-Communist Transitions, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1996; Sergei Ryzhenkov and Nikolai Vinnik (eds), Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossii, Moscow: MONF, 1998, V. Gel’man, S. Ryzhenkov, E. Belokurova, N. Borisova, Avtonomiya ili Kontrol’?: Reforma Mestnoi Vlasti v Gorodakh Rossii, 1991–2001, St Petersburg, Moscow: Letnii Sad, 2002; Galina Kourliandskaya, Yelena Nikolayenko and Natalia Golovanova, ‘Local government in the Russian Federation: developing new rules in the old environment’, in Victor Popa and Igor Munteanu (eds), Local Government in Eastern Europe, in the Caucasus and Central Asia, Budapest: Local Government and Public Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute, 2001; G. M. Lyukhterkhandt-Mikhaleva and S. I. Ryzhenkov (eds), TsentrRegion-Mestnoe Samoupravlenie, St Petersburg, Moscow: IGPI, Letnii Sad, 2001; Alfred B. Evans and Vladimir Gel’man (eds), The Politics of Local Government in Russia, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004. Tomila V. Lankina, Governing the Locals: Local Self-Government and Ethnic Mobilization in Russia, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Plymouth UK: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004. See also the following articles and chapters: Adrian Campbell, ‘Regional power in the Russian Federation’ and ‘Power and structure in Nizhnii Novgorod, St Petersburg and Moscow’, in Andrew Coulson (ed.), Local Government in Eastern Europe: Establishing Democracy at the Grassroots, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1995;

Notes 211

5

6

7 8 9

10

Peter Kirkow, ‘Local government in Russia: awakening from slumber?, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 49, No. 1, 1997; Galina Luchterhandt, ‘Politics in the Russian Province: Revda and Kinel’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 49, No. 1, 1997; John F. Young, ‘At the bottom of the heap: local self-government and regional politics in the Russian Federation’, in Peter J. Stavrakis, Joan DeBardeleben, Larry Black (eds), Beyond the Monolith: The Emergence of Regionalism in Post-Soviet Russia, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997; Valery Tishkov, ‘Local self-government versus local state administration: Russia’s hybrid experience’, in V. Tishkov and E. Filippova (eds), Local Governance and Minority Empowerment in the CIS, Budapest: Local Government Public Service Initiative, Open Society Institute, 2002; Tomila Lankina, ‘President Putin’s local government reforms’ in Peter Reddaway and Robert W. Orttung, The Dynamics of Russian Politics: Putin’s Reform of FederalRegional Relations, Vol. II, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005; Cameron Ross, ‘Local government reform in the Russian Federation: a tortuous and twisted path’, Local Government Studies, Vol. 32, No. 5, November 2006. Special Issue: Local Government in Central and Eastern Europe, Guest editors: Andrew Coulson and Adrian Campbell; Cameron Ross, ‘From party and state domination to Putin’s power vertical: the subjugation of mayors in communist and post-communist Russia’, in John Garrard (ed.), Heads of the Local State: Mayors, Provosts and Burgomasters Since 1800, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007; Cameron Ross, ‘Municipal government in the Russian Federation and Putin’s ‘electoral vertical’’, Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, Vol. 15, No. 2, Spring 2007; John F. Young and Gary N. Wilson, ‘The view from below: local government and Putin’s reforms’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 59, No. 7, November 2007. See for example, I. V. Vydrin and A. N. Kokotov, Munitsipal’noe Pravo Rossii, Moscow: Norma, 2001; E. M. Koveshnikov, Gosudarstvo i Mestnoe Samoupravlenie v Rossii: Teoretiko-Pravovye Osnovy Vzaimodeistviya, Moscow: Norma, 2002; E. M. Koveshnikov, Munitsipal’noe Pravo, Moscow: Norma, 2002; N. S. Bondar’, V. I. Avseenko and S. N. Bocharov, Munitsipal’noe Pravo Rossiiskoi Federtatsii, Moscow: Yuniti-Dana, 2002; I. E. Danilina, Munitsipal’noe Pravo v Voprosakh i Otvetakh, Moscow: Prospekt, 2004; A, V. Ivanchenko, Konstitutsionnye i Zakonodatel’nye Osnovy Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Moscow: Yurisprudentsiya, 2004; Yu. A. Dmitriev (ed.), Munitsipal’noe Pravo, Moscow: Eksmo, 2005. Thomas E. Porter and John F. Young, Local Self-Government and the State in Modern Russia, The Donald W. Treadgold Papers in Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies, No. 28, May 2001, Washington D.C.: The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, 2001, p. 7. Lawrence Pratchett, ‘Local autonomy, local democracy and the “new localism”’, Political Studies, Vol. 52, Issue 2, 2004, p. 358. Ibid., p. 359. Timothy D. Sisk (ed.), Democracy at the Local Level: The International IDEA Handbook on Participation, Representation, Conflict, Management and Governance, Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2001, p. 1. Jeffrey W. Hahn (ed.), Regional Russia in Transition, Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 2001, p. 6.

212

Notes

11 Peter John, Local Governance in Western Europe, London, Thousand Oaks, New Deli: Sage, 2001, p. 2. 12 By 1 July 2007, the number of regions had fallen to 84 as a result of President Putin’s policy of merging federal subjects (see Chapter 2). 13 Law of the RSFSR, 6 July 1991 (No. 1550–1), ‘O Mestnom Samoupravlenii v RSFSR,’ translated in Statutes and Decisions: The Laws of the USSR and Its Successor States, Vol. 41, No. 3, 2005, pp. 7–92. 14 Federal Law, No. 154, 28 August 1995, ‘Ob Obshchikh Printsipakh Organizatsii Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, No. 35, 1995, St. 3506. 15 Federal Law, No. 131, 6 October 2003, ‘Ob Obshchikh Printsipakh Organizatsii Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, op. cit. 16 Larry Diamond, ‘Is the third wave over?’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 3, 1996, p. 21. 17 Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino, ‘The quality of democracy: an overview’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2004, p. 21. 18 R. A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971, p. 3; cited in G. Sorensen, Democracy and Democratisation, Boulder: Westview Press, 1993, p. 12. 19 Diamond, op. cit., p. 21. 20 Ibid., pp. 23–4. 21 Andreas Schedler, ‘Elections without democracy, the menu of manipulation’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2002, p. 37. 22 Fareed Zakaria, ‘The rise of illiberal democracy’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 6, 1997, p. 23; cited in Richard Sakwa, ‘Politics in Russia’, in Stephen White, Zvi Gitelman and Richard Sakwa (eds), Developments in Russian Politics: 6, Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 10. 23 Ibid. 24 Adam Przeworski, Sustainable Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 14. 25 Gabor Soos and Violetta Zentai, ‘Introduction’, in G. Soos and V. Zentai, Faces of Local Democracy: Comparative Papers from Central and Eastern Europe, Budapest: Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute, 2005, p. 5. 26 Sisk, op. cit. p. 38. 27 Stoker, Gerry, ‘Local government in the twenty-first century’, in Sisk, op. cit., pp. 23–24. 28 Soos and Zentai, op. cit., p. 5. 29 Armen Danielian, ‘Local government in Russia: reinforcing fiscal autonomy’, in Kenneth Davey (ed.), Fiscal Autonomy and Efficiency: Reforms in the Former Soviet Union, Budapest: Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute, 2002, p. 89. 30 Cited in Pratchett, op. cit., p. 360. 31 ‘The global campaign on urban governance, concept paper’, United Nations Human Settlement Programme, Washington D.C.: UN-Habitat, 2nd ed., 2002, p. 2. 32 Allan Rosenbaum, ‘Democracy, governance and decentralisation’, in E. H. Valsan (ed.), Democracy, Decentralization and Development, Brussels: IASIA, 1999, pp. 7–12.

Notes 213 33 Andrey Timofeev, Determinants of Decentralisation Within Russian Regions, Budapest: Local Government and Public Services Initiative, Open Society Institute, 2003, p. 14. 34 Jorge Martinez-Vasquez, Andrey Timofeev and Jameson Boex, Reforming RegionalLocal Finance in Russia, Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2006, p. 15. 35 Sisk, op. cit., p. 2. 36 John, op. cit., p. 9. 37 Gerry Stoker, ‘Redefining local democracy’, in Lawrence Pratchett and David Wilson (eds), Local Democracy and Local Government, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996, p. 196. 38 Sisk, op. cit., p. 14. 39 Gerry Stoker, ‘Theorising democracy and local government’, in D. King and G. Stoker (eds), Rethinking Local Democracy, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1996, p. 24. 40 K. M. Dowley, ‘Local government transparency in East Central Europe’, in Local Government Studies, Vol. 32, No. 5, 2006, p. 660. Special Issue: Local Government in Central and Eastern Europe, Guest editors: Andrew Coulson and Adrian Campbell. 41 John, op. cit., p. 41. 42 Clarence Stone, Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946–1988, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1989. 43 Porter and Young, op. cit., p. 9. 44 Ibid. 45 Adrian Campbell ‘State versus society?: local government and the reconstruction of the Russian state,’ Local Government Studies, Vol. 32, No. 5, 2006, p. 160. 2 Russian federalism and local politics 1 Timothy D. Sisk (ed.), Democracy at the Local Level: The International IDEA Handbook on Participation, Representation, Conflict, Management and Governance, Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2001, pp. 37–8. 2 See the translation of the 1993 Russian Constitution in Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, London and New York: Routledge, 2nd ed., 2002, pp. 395–429. 3 Daniel J. Elazar, Exploring Federalism, Tuscaloosa and London: The University of Alabama Press, 1987, p. 12; cited in Daniel. R. Kempton and Terry D. Clark (eds), Unity or Separation: Centre-Periphery Relations in the Former Soviet Union, Westport, Connecticut, London: Praeger, 2002, p. 19. 4 Ronald L. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University, 2nd ed., 1999, p. 14. 5 Elazar, Exploring Federalism, op. cit.; Danial Elazar, Federal Systems of the World: A Handbook of Federal, Confederal and Autonomy Arrangements, Harlow: Longman, 1991; Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1999; Ferran Requejo, ‘National pluralism and federalism: four potential scenarios for Spanish plurinational democracy’, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2001, pp.305–27; Watts, op. cit. 6 See Cameron Ross, Federalism and Democratisation in Russia, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002. Kempton also adds five ‘beneficial conditions for the maintenance of federalism’: 1 symmetry among the components, 2 decentralised

214

7 8 9

10 11 12

13 14

15 16 17 18 19

20

21

22 23

24

25

Notes federal political parties, 3 a noncentralised bureaucracy, 4 democracy and 5 economic coordination. See D. Kempton, ‘Russian federalism: continuing myth or political salvation’, Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2001, pp. 220–36. Elazar, Exploring Federalism, op. cit., p. 67. Watts, Comparing Federal, op. cit., p. 99. Ronald L. Watts, ‘Multinational federations in comparative perspective’, in Michael Burgess and John Pinder (eds), Multinational Federations, London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis, 2007, p. 227. Ibid. R. F. Turovsky, Politicheskaya Regionalistika, Moscow: GU VSHE, 2006, p. 556. In Mordoviya it was 40–50 per cent, and Chuvashiya 35–40 per cent. Galina Kurlyandskaya, ‘Intergovernmental Transfers in Russia’, Moscow: Centre for Fiscal Studies, July 2005, p. 32, http://www.logincee.org/libdoc/20061218_ {442167D6-D366-4426-B1BC-7DC040D3F1AF}.doc (Accessed 12 August 2006). Turovsky, op. cit., p. 564. There were actually three federal treaties, with separate agreements for the republics, the autonomies and the regions. The treaties were ratified by the Sixth Session of the Russian Congress of People’s Deputies on 10 April 1992. See translation of the Russian Constitution in Sakwa, 2002, op. cit. For a more extensive discussion of these points, see, Ross, Federalism and Democratisation, op. cit. Elazar, Exploring Federalism, op. cit., p. 187. Ibid. Bas Denters and Lawrence E. Rose, ‘Local governance in the third millennium’, in Denters and Rose (eds), Comparing Local Governance: Trends and Developments, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 10. Mike Goldsmith, ‘A new intergovernmentalism?’, in Bas Denters and Lawrence E. Rose (eds), Comparing Local Governance: Trends and Development, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 230. B. C. Smith, Decentralization: The Territorial Dimension of the State, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1985, p. 12; cited in Clark, ‘Studying local politics in the former Soviet Union’, in Kempton and Clark, op. cit., p. 222. Elazar, Exploring Federalism, op. cit., pp. 187–8. Galina Kourliandskaya, Yelena Nikolayenko and Natalia Golovanova, ‘Local government in the Russian Federation: developing new rules in the old environment,’ in Victor Popa and Igor Munteanu (eds), Local Government in Eastern Europe, in the Caucasus and Central Asia, Budapest: Local Government Public Service Initiative, Open Society Institute, 2001, p. 172. Hellmut Wollmann and Natasha Butusova, ‘Local self-government in Russia: precarious trajectory between power and law’, in Harald Baldersheim, Michal Illner and Hellmut Wollmann (eds), Local Democracy in Post-Communist Europe, Wiesbaden: Opladen, Leske and Budrich, Urban Research International Series 2, 2003, p. 13. Valery Tishkov ‘Local self-government versus local state administration: Russia’s hybrid experience’, in V. Tishkov and E. Filippova (eds), Local Governance and

Notes 215

26 27 28

29 30

31

32 33 34

35

36 37 38 39 40 41

42 43 44 45 46

Minority Empowerment in the CIS, Budapest: Local Government Public Service Initiative, Open Society Institute, 2002, p. 10. Wollmann and Butosova, op. cit., p. 13. Porter and Young, op. cit., pp. 8–9. Adrian Campbell, ‘State versus society? Local government and the reconstruction of the Russian state’, Local Government Studies, Vol. 32, No. 5, 2006, p. 661. Special Issue: Local Government in Central and Eastern Europe, Guest editors: Andrew Coulson and Adrian Campbell. Ibid. See Ross, Federalism and Democratisation, op. cit. and Cameron Ross, ‘Federalism and electoral authoritarianism under Putin’, Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of PostSoviet Democratization, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2005, pp. 347–72. Vladimir Leskin, ‘The new Russian federalism’, in Peter H. Solomon, Jr (ed.), The Dynamics of ‘Real Federalism’: Law, Economic Development and Indigenous Communities in Russia and Canada, Toronto: Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Toronto, 2004, p. 70. Ibid. Ibid. For excellent studies of Russia’s bilateral treaties, see Matthew Crosston, Shadow Separatism: Implications for Democratic Consolidation, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004; and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, Resisting the State: Reform and Retrenchment in PostSoviet Russia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. ‘O Printsipakh i Poryadke Razgranicheniya Predmetov Vedeniya i Polnomochii Mezhdu Organami Gosudarstvennoi Vlasti Rossiiskoi Federatsii i Organami Gosudarstvennoi Vlasti Sub’ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, adopted by the State Duma, 4 June 1999 and ratified by the President on 24 June 1999, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 30 June 1999, p. 3. Izvestiya, 4 March 1997, p. 4. Campbell, op. cit., p. 663. Richard Sakwa, Putin: Russia’s Choice, London and New York: Routledge, 2nd ed., 2008, p. 187. In the course of reorganizing the Presidential Administration under Putin, the Department For Questions of Local Self-Governance was abolished. With the exception of the mayors of the capital cities of the federation's subjects. This was an amendment to the Federal Law, No. 184, 6 October 1999, ‘Ob Obshchikh Printzipakh Organizatsii Zakonodatel’nykh (Predstavitel’nykh) i Ispolnitel’nykh Organov Gosudarstvennoi Vlasti Sub’ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, 11 December 2003. Published in Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, No. 27, 2003, St. 2709. Robert Coalson, ‘How will the governors be appointed?’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (hereafter, RFE/RL), Russian Political Weekly, Vol. 4, No. 43, 5 November 2004, p. 1. Roemer Lemaitre, ‘The roll back of democracy in Russia after Beslan’, Review of Central and East European Law, Vol. 31, 2006, p. 376. Julie A. Corwin, ‘Why are so many elected leaders in Russia ready to give up on elections?’, Russian Political Weekly, Vol. 4, No. 36, 16 September 2004, p. 1. Coalson, ‘How will the governors be appointed?’, op. cit., p. 1. Ibid.

216

Notes

47 Ibid. 48 Anna Zakatnova, ‘Without rivals – United Russia holds congress in Yekaterinburg’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 4 December 2006, p. 1; translated in the Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press (hereafter, CDPSP), Vol. 58, No. 49, 2006, p. 2. 49 Robert Coalson, ‘Putin takes control of the status quo through gubernatorial appointments’, RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 9, No. 109, Part 1, 9 June 2005, p. 1. 50 Vlad Ivanenko, ‘Regional governors unclear on how to stay in power’, Russia Profile, Vol. IV, No. 3, 2007, p. 11. 51 Elena Chebankova, ‘Putin’s struggle for federalism: structures, operation and the commitment problem’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 59, No. 2, 2007, p. 294. 52 Rakhimov was nominated on 5 October 2006 for another five-year term in office. 53 Darrell Slider, ‘Putin and the election of regional governors’, in Cameron Ross and Adrian Campbell, Federalism and Local Politics in Russia, London and New York: Routledge, forthcoming, 2008. 54 Robert Coalson, ‘Mayoral elections: democracy’s last stand’, RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly, Vol. 5, No. 9, 2005, p. 2. 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid. 57 See ‘Russian mayors a matter for concern in the Council of Europe’s Congress of Local and Regional Authorities’, Strasbourg, Council of Europe Press Division, 22 March 2005, p. 1. 58 Vladimir Leskin, ‘Federal statehood in Russia: legislation and conflict resolution’ in Peter H. Solomon, Jr (ed.), Recrafting Federalism in Russia and Canada: Power, Budgets and Indigenous Governance, Toronto: Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Toronto, 2005, p. 39. 59 Ibid, pp. 39–40. 60 Tomila Lankina, ‘The Kozak commission’s local government reforms’, paper presented to the 36th Conference of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Boston, USA, December 2004, p. 23. 61 M. I. Vil’chek, ‘O kliuchevikh problemakh stanovleniya instituta polnomochnykh predstavitelei prezidenta RF’, in Polpredy Prezidenta: Problemy Stanovleniya Novovo Instituta, Moscow: Nauchnye Doklady, No. 3, MGU, 2001, p. 20. 62 Leskin, ‘The new Russian federalism’, op. cit., p. 57. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid., p. 58. 65 Ibid. 66 Gordon M. Hahn, ‘The impact of Putin’s federative reforms on democratization in Russia,’ Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2003, pp. 125–6. 67 Elena Chebankova, ‘Implications of Putin’s regional and demographic policies on the evolution of inter-ethnic relations in Russia’, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, Vol. 8, No. 4, 2007, p. 442. 68 Ibid., p. 444. 69 Paul Goble, ‘Putin’s regionalisation plan sparks territorial disputes’, RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 9, No. 62, Part 1, 2005, p. 1. 70 Ibid.

Notes 217 71 The legislative process is now underway for the formation of a new enlarged federal subject, Krasnoyarsk Krai, to come into being by 31 December 2007. 72 Milena V. Gligich-Zolotareva, Pravovye Osnovy Federalizma, Moskva: Yurist, 2006, p. 213 – as cited by Andreas Heinemann-Grüder in Ross and Campbell (eds.), Federalism and Local Politics, op. cit. 73 Laura Belin, ‘Putin returns some powers to governors’, RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 9, No. 127, Part 1, 2005, p. 1. 74 Vladimr Putin, ‘Annual Address to the Federal Assembly’, 26 April 2007, p. 2, http://www. president.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2007/04/26/1209_type70029_1254 (Accessed 1 May 2007). 75 Kempton and Clark, op. cit., pp. 221–2. 76 Allan Rosenbaum, ‘Democracy, governance and decentralisation’, in E. H. Valsan (ed.), Democracy, Decentralization and Development, Brussels: IASIA, 1999, p. 7. 77 http://www.president.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2007/04/26/1209_type70029 _1254, p. 2 (Accessed 1 May 2007). 78 P. King, ‘Federation and representation’, in M. Burgess and A-G. Gagnon (eds), Comparative Federalism and Federation, New York, London: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1993, p. 93. 79 Constantin I. Zubkov, ‘Russian Federalism today: “strong federation” or twilight of the federalist choice?’, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2005, p. 297. Special Issue: ‘Eurasia and the Wider World’, edited by Richard Sakwa. 80 Slider, op. cit. If extended to mayors, this would violate the provisions of the European convention on local government to which Russia has agreed to adhere. 81 Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, op. cit., p. 14. 82 Kempton, Unity or Separation, op. cit., p. 17. 83 See Ross, Federalism and Democratization, op. cit. 84 Elazar, Exploring Federalism, op. cit., p. 166. 85 Slider, op. cit. 3 Local government in the USSR 1 The term ‘local soviets’ can refer either to local governments in general or more specifically to the legislative bodies at the local level (local councils). 2 Adrian Campbell, ‘City government in Russia’, in J. Gibson and P. Hanson (eds), Transformation from Below: Local Power and the Political Economy of PostCommunist Transitions, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996, p. 41. 3 Graham Smith, The Post-Soviet States: Mapping The Politics of Transition, London, Sydney, Auckland: Arnold, 1999, p. 112. 4 Adrian Campbell, ‘Regional power in the Russian Federation’, in Andrew Coulson (ed.), Local Government in Eastern Europe: Establishing Democracy at the Grassroots, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1995, p. 149. 5 For a translation of the USSR Constitution of 1977, see David Lane, Politics and Society in the USSR, London: Martin Robertson, 1978, pp. 553–84. 6 See William Taubman, Governing Soviet Cities: Bureaucratic Politics and Urban Development in the USSR, New York, Washington, London: Prager, 1973.

218

Notes

7 Sarah J. Reynolds, ‘Editor’s introduction, school for democracy? the evolution of local government in the Russian Federation (1)’, Statutes and Decisions: The Laws of the USSR and Its Successor States, Vol. 41, No. 3, 2005, pp. 3–4. 8 E. M. Jacobs, ‘Introduction’, in E. M. Jacobs (ed.), Soviet Local Politics and Government, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983, p. 9. 9 In the local elections that took place in 1987 there were some pilot regions where more than one candidate competed for seats in local councils. 10 Smith, The Post-Soviet States, op. cit., p. 113. 11 Lane, op. cit., p. 581. 12 Jeffrey Hahn, ‘Developments in local soviet politics’, in A. J. Rieber and A. Z. Rubenstein (eds), Perestroika at the Crossroads, Armonk, New York, London: M. E. Sharpe, 1991, pp. 76–7. 13 N. G. Starovoitov, ‘Sessii sovetov: teoriia, praktika, problemy’; cited in Hahn, ‘Developments in’, op. cit., p. 85. 14 Ibid. 15 Baruch Hazan, Gorbachev’s Gamble: The 19th All-Union Party Conference, Boulder, San Fransisco and London: Westview, 1990, p. 260. 16 Thomas E. Porter and John F. Young, Local Self-Government and the State in Modern Russia, The Donald W. Treadgold Papers in Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies, No. 28, 2001. Washington D.C.: The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, 2001, p. 63. 17 Law of the USSR, 25 June 1980, ‘Ob Osnovnykh Polnomochiyakh Kraevykh, Oblastnykh Sovetov Narodnykh Deputatov’, Pravda, 26 June 1980, p. 2. 18 Porter and Young, op. cit., p. 61. 19 Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 12 March 1971, ‘O Merakh po Dal’neishemu Uluchsheniyu Raboty Raionnykh i Gorodskikh Sovetov Deputatov Trudyashchikhsya’, Pravda, 14 March 1971, p. 1. 20 Hazan, op. cit., p. 88. 21 Cameron Ross, Local Government in the Soviet Union, London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1987, pp. 40–1. 22 Porter and Young, op. cit., p. 61. 23 Lane, op. cit., p. 581. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26 Henry W. Morton, ‘The contemporary Soviet city’, in Henry W. Morton and Robert C. Stuart (eds), The Contemporary Soviet City, Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1984, p. 21. 27 Cited in Jerry. F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, How the Soviet Union is Governed, Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1979, p. 506. 28 See Ross, Local Government, op. cit. 29 Morton, op. cit., p. 16. 30 Stephen Whitefield, Industrial Power and the Soviet State, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993, p. 146. 31 Nigel M. Healey, Vladimir Leksin and Aleksandr Shvetsov, ‘The municipalization of enterprise-owned “social assets” in Russia’, Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 3, 1999, p. 266.

Notes 219 32 Morton, op. cit., p. 21. 33 Hazan, op. cit., pp. 121–2. 34 Yu. Belopukhov, ‘Ustanovlenie Khozrashchetnykh Vzaimootnoshenii Mezhdu Otraslevymi i Territorial’nymi Organami’, Planovoe Khozyaistvo, April 1974; translated in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press (hereafter CDSP), Vol. 26, No. 30, 1974, p. 17; cited in Ross, Local Government, op. cit., p. 81. 35 Ibid., p. 63. 36 Ibid., pp. 76–8. 37 Ibid., p. 78. 38 William Taubman, op. cit., p. 18. 39 Ibid. 40 See Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU, 12 March 1971, ‘O Merakh po Dal’neishemu Uluchsheniyu Raboty Raionnykh i Gorodskikh Sovetov Deputatov Trudyashchiksya’, Pravda, 14 March 1971, pp. 1–2; translated in the CDSP, Vol. 23, No. 11, 1971, pp. 1–5 (hereafter, 1971 Central Committee Decree); Resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers, 19 March 1971, ‘O Merakh po Ukrepleniyu Material’no-Finansovoi Bazy Ispolkomov Raionnykh i Gorodskikh Sovetov Deputatov Trudyashchiksya’, Pravda, 20 March 1971, p. 1; translated in CDSP, Vol. 23, No. 11, 1971, p. 5 (hereafter, 1971 Council of Ministers Decree); Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 19 March 1971, ‘Ob Osnovnykh Pravakh i Obyazannostyakh Gorodskikh i Raionnykh v Gorodakh Sovetov Deputatov Trudyashchikhsya’ (hereafter, March 1971 Presidium Decree); translated in the CDSP, Vol. 23, No. 13, 1971, pp. 27– 30, 38; Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 28 November 1971, ‘Ob Osnovnykh Pravakh i Obyazannostyakh Gorodskikh i Raionnykh v Gorodakh Sovetov Narodnykh Deputatov’; translated in CDSP, Vol. 23, No. 13, 1971, pp. 27–30, 38 (hereafter November 1971 Presidium Decree). 41 1971 Central Committee Decree, op. cit., pp. 2–3. 42 March 1971 Presidium Decree, op. cit., p. 27. 43 Ibid. 44 Morton, op. cit., p. 16. 45 V. Beshkil’tsev, ‘Kak Stroit na Severe’, Izvestiya, 14 February 1974, p. 2; translated in the CDSP, Vol. 26, No. 7, 1974, p. 13. 46 Ross, Local Government, op. cit., p. 125. 47 A. Libkind, ‘Arkhitektura zavodskoi zony’, Pravda, 5 August 1975; translated in CDSP, Vol. 27, No. 31, 1975, p. 8. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 S. Vtorushin and V. Sevastyanov, ‘Tyumen: vtoroi etap. – 3. chtoby idti dal’she’, Pravda, 17 May 1979, p. 2; translated in CDSP, Vol. 31, No. 20, 1979, p. 8. 52 Ross, Local Government, op. cit., p. 130. 53 Hahn, op. cit., p. 78. 54 Hazan, op. cit., p. 146. 55 Ibid., p127. 56 Ibid., p. 88.

220 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68

69 70 71

72 73 74 75

76 77 78 79

80 81 82 83 84

Notes Ibid. Ibid., p. 86. Hahn, p. 86. Ibid., p. 87. ‘Ryazanskaya meriya’, Izvestiya, 18 January 1991; cited in Yu. A. Dmitriev (ed.), Munitsipal’noe Pravo, Moscow: Eksmo, 2005, p. 1100. Porter and Young, op. cit., pp. 67–8. Ibid, p. 68. J. W. Hahn, ‘Power to the Soviets?’, Problems of Communism, Vol. 38, 1989, p. 35. Hahn, ‘Developments in’, op. cit., p. 86. Hahn, ‘Power to the Soviets’, op. cit., p. 25. Ibid, p. 35. R. H. W. Theen, ‘Russia at the grassroots: reform at the local and regional levels’, in I. J. Kim and J. S. Zacek (eds), Establishing Democratic Rule, St Paul: Paragon House, 1993, p. 65. Hazan, op. cit., p. 127. Ibid., p. 152. Galina Kourliandskaya, Yelena Nikolayenko and Natalia Golovanova, ‘Local government in the Russian federation: developing new rules in the old environment,’ in Victor Popa and Igor Munteanu (eds), Local Government in Eastern Europe, in the Caucasus and Central Asia, Budapest: Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute, 2001, p. 169. I. V. Vydrin and A. N. Kokotov, Munitsipal’noe pravo Rossii, Moscow, NormaINFRA, 2001, p. 107. ‘O Vyborakh Narodnykh Deputatov Mestnykh Sovetov Narodnykh Deputatov RSFSR’, VVS RSFSR, 1989, No. 44, St. 1306. Jeffrey W. Hahn (ed.), Regional Russia in Transition, Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 2001, p. 8. Hellmut Wollmann, ‘Institution building of local self-government in Russia: between legal design and power politics’, in Alfred B. Evans and Vladimir Gel’man (eds), The Politics of Local Government in Russia, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004, p. 106. Porter and Young, op. cit., p. 72. Hahn, ‘Developments in local’, op. cit., p. 83. Porter and Young, op. cit., p. 73. Pravda editorial, ‘The party and the soviets’, Pravda, 8 August 1989, p. 1; cited in Cameron Ross, ‘Party-state relations’, in Eugene Huskey (ed.), Executive Power and Soviet Politics, Armonk, New York, London, England: M. E. Sharpe, 1992, p. 68. Ibid. Speech by V. S. Lipitskii at a session of CPSU Central Committeee, 8 October 1990, Pravda, 10 October, 1990, p. 38; cited in Ross, ‘Party-state relations’, op. cit., p. 71. ‘Ob Obshchikh Nachalakh Mestnovo Samoupravleniya i Mestnovo Khozyaistva v SSSR’, Novye zakony SSSR, Vyp. 1, 1990, pp. 91–106. Kourliandskaya, Nikolayenko and Golovanova, op. cit., p. 179. Porter and Young, op. cit., p. 71.

Notes 221 85 Law of the RSFSR, ‘O Vzaimootnosheniyakh Sovetov Narodnykh Deputatov i Ispolnitel’nykh Organov v Period Provedeniya Ekonomicheskoi Reformy’, 10 October 1990, VSND RSFSR i VS RSFSR, No. 19, 1990. 86 Law of the RSFSR, 6 July 1991 (No. 1550-1), ‘O Mestnom Samoupravlenii v RSFSR,’ translated in Statutes and Decisions: The Laws of the USSR and Its Successor States, Vol. 41, No. 3, 2005, pp. 7–92. 87 John F. Young and Gary N. Wilson, ‘The view from below: local government and Putin’s reforms’, Europea-Asia Studies, Vol. 59, No. 7, pp. 1073–4. 88 Reynolds, op. cit., p. 7. 89 Ibid., p. 8. 90 Wollmann, op. cit., p. 108. 91 Reynolds, op. cit., pp. 7–8. 92 Ibid., op. cit., p. 9. 93 Ibid., p. 12. 94 Ibid. 95 See Articles 18 and 24, Ibid., pp. 17, 29. 96 Vladimir Gel’man, ‘Obshcherossiskaya politika i reforma mestnoi vlasti: institutsional’noe stroitel’stvo perekhodnovo perioda’, in V. Gel’man, S. Ryzhnekov, E. Belokupova, N. Borisova, Avtonomiya ili Kontrol’? Reform Mestnoi Vlasti v Gorodakh Rossii 1991–2001, St Petersburg, Moscow: Letnii Sad, 2002, p. 58. 97 See Resolution of the 5th Session of the RSFSR Congress of People’s Deputies, 1 November 1991, ‘Ob Organizatsii Ispolnitel’noi Vlasti v Period Radikal’noi Ekonomicheskoi Reforma’, VSND RSFSR i VS RSFSR, No. 51, 1991, St. 3010. See also Gel’man, ‘Obshcherossiskaya Politika’, op. cit., p. 60. 98 Igor’ Viktorovich Babichev, ‘Mestnoe samoupravlenie v postsovetskoi Rossii: nekotoryeitogi i prognozy’, in A. V. Ivanchenko (ed.), Konstitutsionnye i Zakonodatel’nye Osnovy Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federtatsii, Moscow: Yurisprudentsiya, 2004, p. 181. 99 E. M. Koveshnikov, Gosudarstvo i Mestnoe Samoupravlenie v Rossii: TeoretikoPravovye Osnovy Vzaimodeistviya, Moscow: Norma, 2002, pp. 132–3. 100 Ibid., p. 125. 4 Local government reform under Yeltsin 1 R. H. W. Theen, ‘Russia at the grassroots: reform at the local and regional levels’, in I. J. Kim and J. S. Zacek (eds), Establishing Democratic Rule, St Paul: Paragon House, 1993, p. 54. 2 Ibid. 3 Vladimir Gel’man, ‘Introduction: the politics of local government in Russia: a framework for analysis’, in Alfred B. Evans Jr and Vladimir Gel’man (eds), The Politics of Local Government in Russia, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Oxford, Rowman and Littlefield, 2004, p. 4. 4 ‘Address by the President of the Russian Federation to the Citizens of Russia’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 7 October 1993, pp. 1–2; translated in CDPSP, Vol. XLV, No. 40, 1993, p. 21.

222

Notes

5 Ibid., p. 22. 6 Ibid. 7 Presidential Decree, No. 1617, 9 October 1993, ‘O reforme predstavitel’nykh organov, vlasti i organov mestnovo samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, Rossiiskaya gazeta, 12 October 1993, p. 1. 8 Presidential Decree, No. 1760, 29 October 1993, ‘O Reforme Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, Rossiiskaya gazeta, p. 4. 9 Ibid. 10 Hellmut Wollmann, ‘Institutional building of local self-government in Russia: between legal design and power politics’, in Evans and Gel’man, op. cit., p. 111. 11 Presidential Decree, No. 2265, 22 December 1993, ‘O Garantiyakh Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 25 December 1993, p. 1. See N. S. Bondar, V. I. Avseenko and S. N. Bocharov (eds), Munitsipal’noe Pravo, Moscow: Yuniti-Dana, 2nd ed., 2002, p. 119. 12 I. V. Babichev, ‘Mestnoe samoupravlenie v postsovetskoi Rossii: nekotorye itogi i prognozy’, in A. V. Ivanchenko (ed.), Konstitutsionnye i Zakonodatel’nye Osnovy Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Moscow: Yurisprudentsiya, 2004, p. 182. 13 Ibid., p. 183. 14 Yu. A. Dmitriev (ed.), Munitsipal’noe Pravo, Moscow: Eksmo, 2005, p. 73. 15 Valery Tishkov, ‘Local self-government versus local state administration: Russia’s hybrid experience’, in V. Tishkov and E. Filippova (eds), Local Governance and Minority Empowerment in the CIS, Budapest: Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute, 2002, p. 9. 16 Ibid. 17 Resolution of the Russian Federation State Duma, No. 68-I, 10 June 1994, ‘Ob Obespechenii Konstitutsionnykh Prav Naseleniya na Mestnoe Samoupravlenie v Normativnykh Pravovykh Aktakh Sub’ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, Vedomosti Federal’novo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federtsii, No, 6, 1994, St. 284; cited in Dmitriev, op. cit., p. 76. 18 Ibid., pp. 75–6. 19 Ibid., pp. 76–7. 20 Peter Kirkow, ‘Local self-government in Russia: awakening from slumber?’, EuropeAsia Studies, Vol. 49, No. 1, 1997, p. 48. 21 Federal Law, No. 154, 28 August 1995, ‘Ob Obshchikh Printsipakh Organizatsii Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, No. 35, 1995, St. 3506. 22 Peter Kirkow, Russia’s Provinces: Authoritarian Transformation Versus Local Autonomy, Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998, p. 60. 23 On 15 March 1995 there was a fierce debate. The president’s draft received 102 votes and that of Murav’ev 259. In the second reading, there was a compromise between the two drafts. The Law was finally adopted in its third reading on 16 June 1995. See Vladimir Gel’man, ‘Obshcherossiskaya Politika’, in V. Gel’man, S. Ryzhenkov, E. Belokurova, N. Borisova, Avtonomiya ili Kontrol’?: Reforma Mestnoi Vlasti v Gorodakh Rossii, 1991–2001, St Petersburg, Moscow: Letnii Sad, 2002 op. cit., p. 75.

Notes 223 24 The ‘European Charter on Local Self-Government’ of 15 October 1985 was ratified by the State Duma on 11 April 1998. 25 Darrell Slider, ‘Governors versus mayors: the regional dimension of Russian local government’, in Evans and Gel’man, op. cit., p. 147. 26 Galina Kourliandskaya, Yelena Nikolayenko and Natalia Golovanova, ‘Local government in the Russian Federation: developing new rules in the old environment,’ in Victor Popa and Igor Munteanu (eds), Local Government in Eastern Europe, in the Caucasus and Central Asia, Budapest: Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute, 2001, p. 172. 27 Ibid., p. 173. 28 Armen Danelian, ‘Local government reform in Russia: reinforcing fiscal autonomy’, in Kenneth Davey (ed.), Fiscal Autonomy and Efficiency: Reforms in the Former Soviet Union, Budapest: Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute, 2002, p. 91. 29 Ibid. 30 Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, Andrey Timofeev and Jameson Boex, Reforming RegionalLocal Finance in Russia, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2006, p. 17. 31 I. A. Umnova-Konyukhova, ‘O konstitutsionno-pravovoi osnove razdeleniya gosudarstvennoi vlasti mezhdu federatsiei, ee subj’ektami i mestnym samoupravleniem’, in G. M. Lyukhterkhandt-Mikhaleva and S. I. Ryzhenkov (eds), Tsentr-Region-Mestnoe Samoupravlenie, St Petersburg, Moscow: IGPI, Letnii Sad, 2001, p. 40. 32 Kirkow, ‘Local self-government’, op. cit., p. 53. 33 Ibid., pp. 53–4. 34 Timothy D. Sisk (ed.), Democracy at the Local Level: The International IDEA Handbook on Participation, Representation, Conflict, Management and Governance, Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2001, pp. 11–12. 35 Peter John, Local Governance in Western Europe, London, Thousand Oaks, New Dehli: Sage, 2001, p. 37. 36 Report, ‘Structure and Operation of Local and Regional Democracy: Russian Federation,’ adopted by the Steering Committee on Local and Regional Democracy (CDLR), December 1999, Strasbourg, Council of Europe Publishing, 2000, p. 18. 37 Article 4 lists 18 powers in total. 38 Kourliandskaya, Nikolayenko and Golovanova, op. cit., p. 175. 39 Marina Liborakina, ‘Local Government Reform in Russia: Current Status’, 2003, p. 4. Institute of Urban Economics, http://www.urbaneconomics.ru (Accessed 10 January 2004). 40 ‘Structure and Operation of Local’, op, cit., p. 18. 41 Kirkow, ‘Local self-government’, op. cit., p. 51. 42 Galina Kurlyandskaya, ‘Reform of Federative Relations and Policy: Local-Self Government in the Russian Federation: Fiscal Aspects’, Moscow, Centre for Fiscal Policy, 2004, p. 22. 43 Ibid. 44 Kourliandskaya, Nikolayenko and Golovanova, op. cit., p. 186. 45 Armen Danielian,‘Local government in Russia: reinforcing fiscal autonomy’, in

224

46

47 48 49

50 51 52 53

54 55 56

57 58 59 60

61

62

63 64

Notes Kenneth Davey (ed.), Fiscal Autonomy and Efficiency: Reforms in the Former Soviet Union, Budapest: Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute, 2002, p. 91. Hellmut Wollmann and Natasha Butusova, ‘Local self-government in Russia: precarious trajectory between power and law’, in Harald Baldersheim, Michal Illner and Hellmut Wollmann (eds), Local Democracy in Post-Communist Europe, Urban Research International Series 2, Wiesbaden: Opladen, Leske and Budrich, 2003, p. 14. Kourliandskaya, Nikolayenko and Golovanova, op. cit., p. 171. Sergei Mitrokhin, ‘It’s a rare governor who doesn’t dream of becoming a Khan’, Obshchaya gazeta, No. 44, p. 8; translated in CDPSP, Vol. 43, 1996, p. 5. Mikhail Leontyev, ‘Interview with Vasily Tarasenko, chair of the Federation Council’s Committee for Federation Affairs, the Federal Treaty and regional policy’, Sevodnya, 9 August 1995, p. 5; translated in CDPSP, Vol. XLVII, No. 32, 1995, p. 18. Kirkow, ‘Local self-government’, op. cit., p. 48. Slider, op. cit., p. 153. Boris Yeltsin, Radio Address, 6 June 1997, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 7 March 1997, p. 3; translated in CDPSP, Vol. XLIX, No. 23, 9 July 1997, 1–4, p. 2. ‘Mestnoe samoupravlenie v Rossiiskoi Federatsii: sostoyanie, osobennosti formirovaniya, problemy’, Vestnik Tsentral’noi Izbiratel’noi Komissii, Vol. 46, No. 4, 1997, pp. 81–5. Ibid. Dmitriev, op. cit., p. 80. Federal Law, No. 126, 25 September 1997, ‘O Finansovykh Osnovakh Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, in L. I. Brychev (ed.), Predmet Vedeniya i Polnomochiya Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Sbornik Federal’novo Zakonodatel’stvo, Moscow: Yurid. Lit., 2001, pp. 195–204. John F. Young and Gary N. Wilson, ‘The view from below: local government and Putin’s reforms’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 59, No. 7, 2007, p. 1074. Ibid., p. 1075. Decree of the Russian Federation President, No. 531, 29 May 1997, Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1997, No. 22, St. 2571. Decree of the Russian Federation President, No. 568, 11 June 1997, ‘Ob Osnovnykh Napravleniyakh Reformy Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1997, No. 22, St. 2571. ‘Decree of the Russian Federation President: On Basic Guidelines for the Reform of Local Self-Government in the Russian Federation’, Rossiiskaya gazeta, 17 June 1997, p. 4; translated in CDPSP, Vol. XLIX, No. 24, 1997, pp. 12–13. Sergei Ryzhenkov, ‘Organy gosudarstvennoi vlasti v reforme mestnovo samoupravleniya v Rossii’, in K. Matsuzato (ed.), Tret’e Zveno Gosudarstvennovo Stroitel’stva Rossii, Occasional Papers on Changes in the Slavic-Eurasian World, No. 73, Sapporo: Slavic Research Centre, Hokkaido University, 1998, p. 130. Kourliandskaya, Nikolayenko and Golovanova, op cit., p. 177. Ryzhenkov, ‘Organy gosudarstvennoi vlasti’, op. cit., p. 142. The republics: Adygeya, 31 March 1994; Bashkortostan, 20 December 1994; Kareliya, 20 January 1994; Komi, 11 March 1994; Mordoviya, 9 September 1994; North Osetiya-Alaniya, 24 January

Notes 225

65

66

67

68 69 70 71 72 73 74

75 76 77 78

79

80 81 82 83 84 85

1995 (provisional statute); Tatarstan, 30 November 1994; Udmurtiya, 27 January 1994; Khakasiya, 19 October 1994. Oblasts: Belgorod, 5 May 1995; Vladimir, 11 November 1994 (provisional statute); Volgograd, 20 February 1995; Voronezh, 28 December 1994; Vologda, 5 September 1994, Novosibirsk, 15 September 1994 (provisional); Orel, 5 January 1994 (provisional); Saratov, December 1994; Tambov, 23 June 1995; Yaroslavl’, 26 June 1994; Sverdlovsk, 5 April 1995; Yevenk AO, 28 December 1994. Republics: Buryatiya, 5 September 1995; Kabardino-Balkariya, 18 October 1995. Krais: Krasnodar Krai, 22 November 1995; Stavropol’ Krai, 30 November 1995 (provisional). Oblasts: Kalinigrad, 23 November 1995; Kamchatka, 13 November 1995; Perm, 23 November 1995; Samara, 26 September 1995; Chelyabinsk, 28 September 1995; Pskov, 14 September 1995; Tyumen, 29 November 1995. See Ryzhenkov, op. cit. I. A. Umnova-Konyukhova, ‘O konstitutsionno-pravovoi osnove razdeleniya gosudarstvennoi vlasti mezhdu federatsiei, ee sub’ektami i mestnym samoupravleniem’, in G. Lyukhterkhandt-Mikhaleva and S. I. Ryzhenkov (eds), Tsentr-Regiony-Mestnoe Samouprvavlenie, St Petersburg, Moscow: IGPI, Letnii Sad, 2002, p. 43. Vitalii Pashenetsev, ‘Organizatsiya mestnovo samoupravleniya v Rossiiskikh regionakh: tsifry i tipy’, in Sergei Ryzhenkov and Nikolai Vinnik (eds), Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossii, Moscow: MONF, 1998, p. 28. Kourliandskaya, Nikolayenko and Golovanova, op. cit., p. 176. Mitrokhin, op. cit., p. 5. Ibid. Ibid. Gel’man, ‘Obshcherossiiskaya politika’, op. cit., p. 82. Tishkov, op. cit., p. 12. Rafik Abdrakhmanov, ‘Local self-government in the Republic of Tatarstan’, in V. Tishkov and E. Filippova (eds), Local Government and Minority Empowerment in the CIS, Budapest: Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute, 2002, p. 99. Ibid. Ibid. Yurii Shabaev, ‘Battle over local government continues in Komi’, IEWS, Russian Regional Report, Vol. 6, No. 13, 2001, pp. 8–9. ‘Komi president refuses to obey Constitutional Court ruling on local government’, Institute of East West Studies (hereafter, IEWS), Russian Regional Report, Vol. 3, No. 5, p. 5. Ildar Gabdrafikov and Aidar Enikeev, ‘Old elite and soviet style system in new Bashkortostan stifle representative democracy’, in Tishkov and Fillipova, op. cit., p. 115. Slider, op. cit., p. 156. Alexander Dzadziyev and Ruslan Dzidzoyev, ‘Are minorities left out? state power and local self-government in North Ossetiya’, in Tishkov and Filippova, op. cit., p. 80. Ibid. Ibid., p. 81. Ibid. Babichev, op. cit., p. 186.

226

Notes

86 Tomila V. Lankina, Governing the Locals: Local Self-Government and Ethnic Mobilization in Russia, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Plymouth UK: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004, p. 157. 5 Local government reform and Putin’s power vertical 1 Federal Law, No. 131, 6 October 2003, ‘Ob Obshchikh Printsipakh Organizatsii Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, in V. I. Shkatulla (ed.), Komentarii K Federal’nomu Zakonu, ‘Ob Obshchikh Printsipakh Organizatsii Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii’ (Postateinyi), Moscow: Yustitsinform, 2006. 2 Ibid. 3 See ‘Zapiska ob itogakh munitsipal’nykh vyborov v khode reformy mestnovo samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii v 2004–5 godakh’, Vestnik Tsentral’noi Izbiratel’noi Komissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Vol. 2, No. 193, 2006, p. 11. 4 Including 5 city districts, 21 municipal districts, 7 city settlements, and 284 rural settlements. D. M. Shabunin, ‘Chuvashskaya Respublika v 2005 goda’, p. 30. Moscow Carnegie Centre, http://www.carnegie.ru (Accessed 25 September 2005). 5 M. I. Liborakina, Problemy i Perspecktivy Mestnovo Samoupravleniya: Nezavisimaya Ekspertiza Reformy, Moscow: Institute of Urban Studies, 2003, p. 180. 6 Evgenii Senyshin, ‘Stremlenie ot absolyuta’, interview with Vyacheslav Glazychev, Expert Ural, No. 39, 23 October 2006, p. 1, http://www.expert.ru/printissues/ ural/2006/39/interview_glazychev/print (Accessed 10 October 2007). 7 Nikolai Myakinnik, ‘Mestnoe ne znachit “negosudarstvennoe”: samoupravlenie – istochik initsiativy i aktivnosti’, interview with Vladimir Mokryi, Chair of the State Duma Committee for Local Self-Governance, Sotial’noe Partnerstvo, Vol. 2, No. 29, 2006, p. 2. 8 Guido Rodio and Hans Ulrich Stockling, ‘Local and Regional Democracy in the Russian Federation’, Report from the 11th Session, Council of Europe Congress on Local Self-Government, Strasbourg, 25–27 May 2004, p. 1. 9 Elena Gritsenko, ‘A new stage of local self-government reform in Russia and the German experience’, Kazan Federalist, Vol. 8, No. 4, 2003, p. 4. 10 Leonid Smirnyagin, ‘Trudnoe budushchee Rossiiskikh gorodov’, Pro et Contra, No. 1(35), 2007; cited in Marina Yakutova, ‘Getting engaged’, Russia Profile, Issue 8, Vol. IV, 2007, p. 39. 11 M. I. Liborakina, ‘We need a law for a free people’, NGO Newsletter, Legislative Process in the State Duma, Issue 55, Short Version (special), 23 April 2003, p. 7. 12 Evans and Gel’man, ‘Conclusion: towards a new politics of local government in Russia’ in, Alfred B. Evans and Vladimir Gel’man (eds), The Politics of Local Government in Russia, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004, p. 276. 13 Liborakina, op. cit., p. 5. 14 Nadezhda Kosareva, Marina Liborakina and Lyudmila Ragozina, ‘A reform that won’t wait’, The Moscow Times, 26 July 2005, p. 10. 15 Tomila V. Lankina, Governing the Locals: Local Self-Government and Ethnic Mobilization in Russia, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Plymouth UK: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004, pp. 161–2.

Notes 227 16 Adrian Campbell, ‘State versus society? local government and the reconstruction of the Russian state’, Local Government Studies, Vol. 32, No. 5, 2006, p. 668. Special Issue: Local Government in Central and Eastern Europe, Guest editors: Andrew Coulson and Adrian Campbell. 17 John F. Young and Gary N. Wilson, ‘The view from below: local government and Putin’s reforms’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 59, No. 7, 2007, p. 1080. 18 Vyacheslav Glazychev, ‘Self-government at the local level’, Kommersant, 28 September 2006, p. 8; translated in CDPSP, Vol. 58, No. 40, 2006, p. 7. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid., p. 8. 23 See text of 2003 Law in Shkatulla, op. cit. 24 Aleksandr Puzanov and Lyudmila Ragozina, ‘Otchuzhdenie mestnoi vlasti’, Pro et Contra, No. 1(35), 2007, p. 75. 25 German Vetrov and Dmitrii Lantsev, ‘Problemy i perspektivy kompleksnovo sotsial’noekonomicheskovo razvitiya munitsipal’nykh obrazovanii Rossii’, Gosudarstvennaya Vlast’ i Mestnoe Samoupravlenie, 22 April 2007, p. 1. www.urbaneconomics.ru/ publications.php?folder_id=103&mat_id=863&from (Accessed 10 June 2007). 26 Liborakina, op. cit., p. 8. 27 Puzanov and Ragozina, op. cit., p. 75. 28 Ibid. 29 Andrei Zolotov Jr, ‘Building horizontally’, interview with Vyacheslav Glazychev, Russia Profile, Issue 8, Vol. IV, 2007, p. 32. 30 Ibid. 31 Dmitry Babich, ‘Taking charge of their future’, Russia Profile, Issue 8, Vol. IV, 2007, p. 25. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid., p. 26. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 See text of the 2003 Law in Shkatulla, op. cit. 38 Tomila Lankina, ‘President Putin’s local government reforms’ in Robert W. Orttung and Peter Reddaway, The Dynamics of Russian Politics: Putin’s Reform of FederalRegional Relations, Vol. II, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 160–1. 39 Ibid, p. 160. 40 Ibid, p. 160. 41 ‘Analiticheskaya zapiska o nekotorykh voprosakh praktiki organizatsii munitsipal’nykh vyborov v khode reformy mestnovo samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, Vestnik Tsentral’noi Izbiratel’noi Komissii Rossiiskoi Federtatsii, No. 6(185), 2005, p. 11. 42 Liborakina, op. cit., p. 6. 43 Ibid.

228

Notes

44 Nataliya Gorodetskaya, ‘Kremlin is finalizing municipal chain of command’, Kommersant, 3 February 2006, p. 4. 45 Ibid. 46 Liborakina, op. cit., p. 5. 47 Ibid., p. 7. 48 A. V. Malovetskii, Gorod i Predpriyatiya: Usloviya Sovmestnovo Razvitiya, Moscow, URSS, 2002, p. 69. 49 Liborakina, op. cit., p. 6. 50 Evans and Gel’man, op. cit., p. 279. 51 A. A. Veshnyakov, ‘Address of Chairman of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation to the Users of the Web Site of the Central Electoral Commission of The Russian Federation’, July 2006, http://www.cikrf.ru (Accessed 8 September 2006). 52 John F. Young and Gary N. Wilson, ‘The view from below: local government and Putin’s reforms’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 59, No. 7, 2007, p. 1082. 53 Ibid. 54 Natalya Gorodetskaya, ‘Municipal reform postponed for three years’, Kommersant, 22 September 2005, p. 4; translated in CDPSP, Vol. 57, No. 38, 2005, p. 8. 55 Ibid. 56 Natalya Gorodetskaya, ‘President’s staff acts to postpone municipal reform’, Kommersant, 19 September 2005, p. 3; translated in CDPSP, Vol. 57, No. 38, 2005, p. 7. 57 Kosareva, Liborakina and Ragozina, op. cit., p. 3. 58 I. Starodubrovskaya, ‘Introduction’, in H. Kitchen, A. Khrustaliov, T. Letunova, N. Mironova, M. Slavgorodskaya and I. Starodubrovskaya, Monitoring of the Implementation of Municipal Reform, Moscow: IET, 2006, pp. 9–10. 59 Lyudmila Ragozina, ‘Nadelenie organov mestnovo samoupravleniya vnov’ obrazovannykh poselenii polnomochyami po resheniyu voprosov mestnovo znacheniya v perekhodnyi period’, 2006, p. 1. Institute of Urban Economics, http://www.urban economics.ru (Accessed 20 July 2006). 60 Ibid. 61 Lyudmila Ragozina, ‘Monitoring realizatsii Federal’novo zakona, “Ob obshchikh printsipakh organizatsii mestnovo samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii” v 2005 gody’, Institute of Urban Economics, pp. 7–8, http://www.urbaneconomics.ru (Accessed 20 July 2006). 62 Thus, for example, citizens in Kabardino-Balkariya demanded the right to independently draw up the boundaries of their historic territories after two settlements (Balkarskie sela Khasan’ya and Belaya Rechka) were annexed to the City of Nal’chika. In Karachaevo-Cherkessii, groups of Abkhaz protested against the new administrativeterritorial divisions in the republic and demanded the formation of a National Abkhaz District. 63 Young and Wilson, op. cit., p. 1083. 64 Ragozina, ‘Nadelenie organov mestnovo’, op. cit., p. 1. 65 Ol’ga Popova, ‘Revolyutsii trebuyutsya sponsory’, Expert Volga, No. 24, 2006, p. 2, http://www.expert.ru/printissues/volga/2006/24/reforma_mestnogo_samoupravleniya/ (Accessed 10 October 2007).

Notes 229 66 Vladimir Gel’man, ‘in search of local autonomy: the politics of big cities in Russia’s transition’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Vol. 27, 2003, p. 49. 67 Lankina, ‘President Putin’s’, op. cit., p. 166. 68 I. Malyakin, ‘Putin against the regions: round two’, Russia and Eurasia Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2002, p. 4. 69 Vladimir Leskin, ‘The new Russian federalism’, in Peter H. Solomon, Jr (ed.), The Dynamics of ‘Real Federalism’: Law, Economic Development and Indigenous Communities in Russia and Canada, Toronto, Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Toronto, 2004, p. 65. 6 Fiscal federalism and local budget revenues 1 Lawrence Pratchett, ‘Local autonomy, local democracy and the “new localism”’, Political Studies, Vol. 52, Issue 2, 2004, pp. 364–5. 2 See text of the Russian Constitution in Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, London and New York: Routledge, 2nd ed., 1996. 3 P. Hanson, S. Artobolevskiy, O. Kouznetsova and D. Sutherland, ‘Federal government responses to regional economic change’, in P. Hanson and M. Bradshaw (eds), Regional Economic Change in Russia, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2000, p. 113. 4 Yekaterina V. Zhuravskaya, ‘Incentives to Provide Local Public Goods: Fiscal Federalism, Russian Style’, Research Paper, Russian European Centre for Economic Policy and Stockholm Institute for Transition Economics, 2000, pp. 3–4, http://www. eerc.ru/details/download.aspx?file_id=3831 (Accessed 9 August 2003). 5 Ibid., p. 2. 6 Katherina V. Zhuravskaya, ‘Inter-governmental relations in Russia’, Russian Economic Trends, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1999, p. 44. 7 Zhuravskaya, ‘Incentives’, op. cit., p. 1. 8 Era Dabla-Norris, Jorge Martinez-Vasquez and John Norregaard, ‘Fiscal Decentralisation in Russia: Economic Performance and Reform Issues’, Paper presented to the International Monetary Fund Conference On Post-Election Strategy, Moscow, 5–7 April 2000, p. 3, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/2000/ invest/pdf/norris.pdf (Accessed 6 June 2007). 9 Galina Kourliandskaya, Yelena Nikolayenko and Natalia Golovanova, ‘Local government in the Russian Federation: developing new rules in the old environment,’ in Victor Popa and Igor Munteanu (eds), Local Government in Eastern Europe, in the Caucasus and Central Asia, Budapest: Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute, 2001, p. 207. 10 Zhuravskaya, ‘Inter-governmental relations’, op. cit., p. 46. 11 A. G. Makushkin, Federal Budget and the Regions: A Case Study of Fiscal Flows, Moscow: Dialogue-MSU, 1999, p. 5. 12 Robert W. Orttung ‘Key Issues in the evolution of the Federal Okrugs and centreregional relations under Putin’, in Peter Reddaway and Robert W. Orttung (eds), The Dynamics of Russian Politics: Putin’s Reform of Federal-Regional Relations, Vol I, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield 2004, p. 96.

230

Notes

13 See Cameron Ross, Local Government in the Soviet Union, London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1987. 14 A. M. Lavrov, J. Litwack and D. Sutherland, Fiscal Federalist Relations in Russia: A Case for Subnational Autonomy, OECD, 2001, p. 14. 15 Galina Kurlyandskaya, ‘Budgetary Pluralism of Russian authorities’, Discussion Paper No. 17, Budapest: Local Government and Public Services Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute, 2001, p. 26. 16 Nikolai Jounda, ‘Evolution of Local Development Policymaking in Russia: From Administrative Planning to Public Policy’, Research Paper, Budapest: Centre for Policy Studies, Central European University, 2004, p. 19. 17 Stoner-Weiss as quoted in Raj M. Desai, Lev M. Freinkman and Itzhak Goldberg, ‘Fiscal Federalism and Regional Growth: Evidence from the Russian Federation in the 1990s’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3138, September 2003, p. 6. 18 Vladimir Putin, ‘Speech to the National Congress of Municipalities of the Russian Federation Regions’, Johnson’s Russia List, 23 October 2007, p. 3. 19 Zhuravskaya, ‘Intergovernmental Relations’, op. cit., p. 46. 20 Nadezhda Bikalova, ‘Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Russia’, Finance Development, September 2001, p. 4. 21 Desai, Freinkman and Goldberg, op. cit., p. 3. 22 Lavrov, Litwack and Sutherland, op. cit., p. 9. 23 Zhuravskaya, ‘Incentives’, op. cit., p. 11. 24 Russian Federation Fiscal Reform Project: Final Report, ‘Government Finance and Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in the Novgorod Region’, Moscow: Centre for Fiscal Policy, July 1999, pp. 57–8, http://www.cfp.ru (Accessed 9 March 2003). 25 Desai, Freinkman and Goldberg, op. cit., p. 3. 26 John F. Young, ‘Local budgets and intergovernental finance in the Russian Federation’, in Alfred B. Evans and Vladimir Gel’man (eds), The Politics of Local Government in Russia, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004, p. 131. 27 Andrey Timofeev, Determinants of Decentralisation Within Russian Regions, Budapest: Local Government and Public Services Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute, 2003, p. 11. 28 Kourliandskaya, Nikolayenko and Golovanova, op. cit., p. 174. 29 Young, ‘Local Budgets’, op. cit., p. 131. 30 A.V. Chernyavsky, Review of the Municipal Finance Development in Russia in 1992–2002, Analytical Report, Moscow: Institute of Urban Economics, 2003, p. 16, http://www.urbaneconomics.ru (Accessed 27 May 2004). 31 1997 Federal Law ‘O finansovykh osnovakh mestnovo samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, in L.I. Brycheva (ed.), Predmety Vedeniya i Pol’nomochiya Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Sbornik Federal’novo Zakonodatel’stva, Moscow, Yuridicheskaya Literatura, 2002, pp. 195–2005. 32 Chernyavsky, op cit., p. 16. 33 Kourliandskaya, Nikolayenko and Golovanova, op. cit., p. 174. 34 Young, op. cit., p. 132. 35 Timofeev, op. cit., p. 11.

Notes 231 36 1997 Federal Law, in Brycheva, op. cit. 37 Timofeev, op. cit., p. 12. 38 Resolution of the Russian Federation Government, No. 584, 15 August 2001, ‘Programma Razvitiya Byudgetnovo Federalizma v Rossiiskoi Federatsii na Period do 2005 g’. 39 Vladimir Leskin, ‘The new Russian federalism’, in Peter H. Solomon, Jr (ed.), The Dynamics of ‘Real Federalism’: Law, Economic Development and Indigenous Communities in Russia and Canada, Toronto: Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Toronto, 2004, p. 63. 40 Ibid. 41 Andrei Chernyavsky and Karen Vartapetov, ‘Muncipal finance reform and local selfgovernance in Russia’, Post-Communist Economies, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2004, p. 262. 42 Russian Federation Fiscal Reform Project. Final Report: ‘Government Finance and Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in the Novgorod Region’, Moscow: Centre for Fiscal Policy, July 1999, p. 9, http://www.cfp.ru (Accessed 9 March 2003). 43 Galina Kurlyandskaya, ‘Reform of Federative Relations and Local-Self Government in the Russian Federation: Fiscal Aspects’, Moscow: Centre for Fiscal Policy, 2004, p. 20, http://www.cfp.ru (Accessed 23 April 2005). 44 Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, Andrey Timofeev and Jameson Boex, Reforming RegionalLocal Finance in Russia, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, p. 89. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 49 Byudzhetnyi Kodeks Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Ofitsial’nyi Tekst, Moscow: Yurait, 2007, pp. 46–8. 50 ‘Informatsiya o Rezul’takh Monitoringa Mestnykh Byudgetov Rossiiskoi Federtatsii po Sostoyaniyu na 1 Oktyabrya 2006 goda’, Russian Federation Ministry of Finance, 2006, p. 6, http://www.minfin.ru (Accessed 12 November 2006). 51 Armen Danielian, ‘Local government in Russia: reinforcing fiscal autonomy’, in Kenneth Davey (ed.), Fiscal Autonomy and Efficiency: Reforms in the Former Soviet Union, Budapest: Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute, 2002, p. 89. 52 Lavrov, Litwack and Sutherland, op. cit., p. 9. 53 Chernyavsky, op. cit., p. 5. 54 Chernyavsky and Vartapetov, op. cit., p. 254. 55 Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, Andrey Timofeev and Jameson Boex, op. cit., p. 85. 56 Andrei Zolotov, ‘Building horizontally’, interview with Vyacheslav Glazychev, Russia Profile, Issue 8, Vol. IV, 2007, p. 34. 57 Ibid. 58 Kourliandskaya, Nikolayenko and Golovanova, op. cit., p. 203. 59 Report of Steering Committee on Local and Regional Democracy (CDLR), ‘Structure and Operation of Local and Regional Democracy: Russian Federation’, Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2000, p. 21. 60 Danielian, op. cit., p. 111. 61 Natalia Golovanova, Financial Foundations of Local Self-government in Russia:

232

62 63 64 65 66 67

68 69

70 71 72

73

74

75 76

77 78 79

Notes Problems and Prospects, Moscow: Centre for Fiscal Policy, 2003, p. 3, http://pdc. ceu.hu/archive/00001586/ (Accessed 20 October 2004). Martinez-Vazquez, Timofeev and Boex, op. cit., p. 91. Danielian, op. cit., p. 97. Chernyavsky, op. cit., p. 21. Martinez-Vasquez, Timofeev and Boex, op. cit. provide a figure of 14 per cent in 2001. Danielian, op. cit., p. 95. Vladimir Leskin, ‘Federal statehood in Russia: legislation and conflict resolution’, in Peter H. Solomon, Jr., Recrafting Federalism in Russia and Canada: Power, Budgets and Indigenous Governance, Toronto: Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Toronto, 2005, p. 45. Martinez-Vazquez, Timofeev and Boex, op. cit., p. 93. Ministry of Finance, Russian Federation, ‘Informatsiya o rezul’tatakh monitoringa mestnykh byudgetov Rossiiskoi Federtatsii po sostoyaniyu na 1 Oktyabrya 2006 goda’, Centre for Fiscal Policy, Moscow, 2006, p. 3, http://www.cfp.ru (Accessed 12 November 2006). Ibid., p. 4. Zolotov, op. cit., p. 32. Nikolai Silaev, ‘Kak byt’ c merami i den’gami’, Expert, No 30, 21 August 2006, p. 2, http://www.expert.ru/printissue/expert/2006/30/problemy_mestnogo_samoupravleni (Accessed 24 October 2007). Anton Shirikov, ‘Restrukturizatsiya shansov’, Expert, No. 21, 2006, p. 2, http:// www.expert.ru/printissues/northwest/2006/21/lider_reformy_msu/print (Accessed 24 October 2007). Evgenii Senyshin, ‘Stremlenie ot absolyuta’, interview with Vyacheslav Glazychev, Expert Ural, No. 39, 2006, p. 2, http://www.expert.ru/printissues/ural/2006/39/ interview_glazychev/print (Accessed 24 November 2007). Ibid. Viktor Belimov and Irina Perechneva, ‘Vseobshchii disbalans’, Expert Ural, No. 3, 2006, p. 2, http//www.expert.ru/ural/2006/03/vseobshii_disbalans/print (Accessed 24 October 2006). Ol’ga Popova, ‘Revolyutsii trebuyutsya sponsory’, Expert Volga, No. 24, 2006, p. 2. Shirikov, op. cit., p. 2. Leskin, ‘The new Russian federalism’, op. cit., pp. 68–9.

7 Fiscal federalism and local budget expenditures 1 Economic Surveys: Russian Federation, OECD, 2000, p. 25. 2 Galina Kurlyandskaya, ‘Intergovernmental Transfers in Russia’, Moscow, Centre for Fiscal Studies, July 2005, p. 34, http://www.logincee.org/libdoc/20061218_ {442167D6-D366-4426-B1BC-7DC040D3F1AF}.doc (Accessed 12 August 2006). 3 Ulrich Thiessen, ‘Fiscal federalism in Russia: theory, comparison, evaluations’, PostSoviet Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 3, 2006, p. 214.

Notes 233 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid., pp. 214–15. 6 Galina Kurlyandskaya, ‘Reform of Federative Relations and Local-Self Government in the Russian Federation: Fiscal Aspects’, Moscow, Centre for Fiscal Studies, 2004, p. 35, http://www.cfp.ru (Accessed 23 April 2005). 7 Laura Solanko and Merja Tekoniemi, ‘To Recentralise or Decentralise – Some Recent Trends in Russian Fiscal Federalism’, BOFIT Online, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economics in Transition, Research Paper, No. 5, 2005, p. 19, http://www.bof.fi/bofit_ en/tutkimus/tutkimusjulkaisut/online/2005/bon0505.htm (Accessed 9 August 2007). 8 Russian Federation Ministry of Finance, ‘Informatsiya o rezultatakh monitoringa mestnykh byudgetov Rossiiskoi Federatsii po sostoyaniyu na 1 Oktyabrya 2006 goda’, p. 13, website of Ministry of Finance, http://www.minfin.ru (Accessed 12 November 2006). 9 Allan Rosenbaum, ‘Democracy, governance and decentralisation’, in E. H. Valsan (ed.), Democracy, Decentralization and Development, Brussels: IASIA, 1999, p. 12. 10 John F. Young, ‘Local budgets and intergovernental finance in the Russian Federation’, in Alfred B. Evans and Vladimir Gel’man (eds), The Politics of Local Government in Russia, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004, p. 134. 11 Andrey Timofeev, Determinants of Decentralisation Within Russian Regions, Budapest: Local Government and Public Services Institute, Open Society Institute, 2003, p. 13. 12 A. V. Chernyavsky, Review of the Municipal Finance Development in Russia in 1992–2002, Analytical Report, Moscow: Institute of Urban Economics, 2003, p. 35, http://www.urbaneconomics.ru (Accessed 27 May 2004). 13 Ibid., p. 30. 14 Robert W. Orttung, ‘Key issues in the evolution of the Federal Okrugs and centreregional relations under Putin’, in Peter Reddaway and Robert W. Orttung (eds), The Dynamics of Russian Politics: Putin’s Reform of Federal-Regional Relations: Vol. 1, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004, p. 96. 15 Galina Kourliandskaya, Yelena Nikolayenko and Natalia Golovanova, ‘Local government in the Russian Federation: developing new rules in the old environment,’ in Victor Popa and Igor Munteanu (eds), Local Government in Eastern Europe, in the Caucasus and Central Asia, Budapest: Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute, 2001, p. 201. 16 V. Malovetskii, Gorod i Predpriyatiya: Usloviya Sovmestnovo Razvitiya, Moscow: URSS, 2002, p. 69. 17 Armen Danielian, ‘Local government in Russia: reinforcing fiscal autonomy’, in Kenneth Davey (ed.), Fiscal Autonomy and Efficiency: Reforms in the Former Soviet Union, Budapest: Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute, 2002, p. 100. 18 Danielian, op. cit., p. 100. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Nikolai Jounda, ‘Evolution of Local Development Policymaking in Russia: From Administrative Planning to Public Policy’, Research Paper, Budapest, Centre for Policy Studies, Central European University, 2004, p. 12.

234

Notes

22 Yana Yurova, ‘Why is benefit reform unpopular’, RIA Novosti, 19 January 2005, p. 1; reproduced in Johnson’s Russia List, No. 9021, 2005, p. 1. 23 ‘Overview of Legislation on Housing and the Utility Sector in the Russian Federation’, Moscow: Istitute of Urban Economics, 3 December 2003, p. 10 (no author cited), http:// www.urbaneconomics.ru/eng/publications.php?folder_id=19&mat_id=15&from= fp&page_id=120 (Accessed 7 March 2005). 24 Ibid. 25 Danielian, op. cit., p. 100. 26 Leonid Smirnyagin, ‘Mayors against governors’, East West Institute, Russian Regional Report, Vol. 4, No. 9, 1999, p. 19. 27 Alexei Novikov, Alexander Kovalenko, Felix Ejgel, Alexei Rodionov, Mikhail Galkin and Maria Garadzha, ‘An impact of unfunded federal mandates on Russian municipalities: equity, equality and pluralism implications,’ in Nadezhda B. Kosareva and Raymond J. Struyk (eds), Urban Management Reform in Russia, 1998–2000, Moscow: The Institute of Urban Economics, 2001, pp. 51–2. 28 Ibid., p. 55. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid., p. 56. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid., p. 57. 34 Ibid., p. 54. 35 Ibid. 36 Nadezhda Bikalova, ‘Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations’, Finance Development, September 2001, p. 32. 37 Munitsipal’naya Politika, Informatsionnyi Byulleten’ Rossiiskoi Demokraticheskoi Partii ‘YABLOKO’, Vol. 44, No. 3–4, 2003, p. 16 (no author cited). 38 Federal Law, No. 122, 22 August 2004, ‘O Monetizatzii’. 39 Galina Kurlyandskaya, ‘Cash benefits put regions in fiscal bind’, Moscow Times, 9 February 2005, p. 1. Russian Centre For Fiscal Studies, http://english.fpcenter.ru/ themes/english/materials-index.asp?folder=1525&foundid=2795 (Accessed 10 March 2006). 40 Yurova, op. cit., p. 2. 41 Ibid. 42 A. Aleksandrova and E. Kovalenko, ‘Monetizatsiya l’got: regional’nye deistviya’, Finansy, No. 7, 2005, p. 20. 43 Ibid. 44 Tuuli Juurikkala and Olga Lazareva, ‘Lobbying at the local level: social assets in Russian Firms’, Bank of Finland, BOFIT Institute for Economics in Transition and Centre for Economic and Financial Research, Moscow, 9 February 2006, p. 4, http:// www.ssrn.com/abstract=896908 (Accessed 8 March 2007). 45 A. V. Malovetskii, Gorod i Predpriyatiya, 2002, p. 38. 46 Juurikkala and Lazareva, op. cit., p. 5. 47 Ibid, p. 6. 48 Nigel M. Healey, Vladimir Leksin and Aleksandr Svetsov, ‘The municipalization of

Notes 235

49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56

57 58

59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68

69

70 71 72

73

enterprise-owned “social assets” in Russia’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 1999, Vol. 15, No. 3, p. 270. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, Andrey Timofeev and Jameson Boex, Reforming RegionalLocal Finance in Russia, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2006, p. 60. Nigel M. Healey, Vladimir Leksin and Aleksandr Shvetsov, ‘The municipalization of enterprise-owned “social assets” in Russia’, Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 3, 1999, p. 270. Malovetskii, op. cit., p. 39. Healey, Leksin and Shvetsov, op. cit., p. 273. Ibid. Juurikkala and Lazareva, op. cit., p. 5. Kurlyandskaya, Reform of Federative Relations, op. cit., p. 25. Irina Podporina, ‘Financial and economic problems of improving budgetary relations in the Russian Federation’, in Peter H. Solomon (ed.), Recrafting Federalism in Russia and Canada: Power, Budgets and Indigenous Governance, Toronto: Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Toronto, 2005, p. 64. Ibid., pp. 64–5. Sergei Trunov, ‘Mezhbyuzhetnye otnosheniya v svete Rossiiskoi modeli federaliszma’, in Rafael Khakimov (ed.), Politiko-Privovye Resursy Federalizma v Rossii, Kazan: Kazan Institute of Federalism, 2006, p. 351. A. N. Shvetsov, Ekonomicheskie Resursy Munitsipal’novo Razvitiya: Finansy, Imushchestvo, Zemlya, Moscow: URSS, 2002, pp. 19–20. Timofeev, op. cit., p. 2. A. N. Shvetsov, ‘Sistemnye preobrazovaniya mestnykh byudzhetov’, Voprosy Ekonomiki, No. 8, 2001, p. 4. Ibid., p. 15. Shvetsov, Ekonomicheskie Resursy, op. cit., p. 13. Ibid., p. 13. Ibid., p. 15. Ibid., p. 17. Ibid., p. 16. Hellmut Wollmann and Elena Gritsenko, ‘Local self-government in Russia: between decentralization and recentralization’, in Cameron Ross and Adrian Campbell (eds), Federalism and Local Politics in Russia, London and New York: Routledge, forthcoming, 2008). O. B. Podvintsev, ‘Raznoobrazie malykh gorodov v kontekste raznoobraziya Rossiiskikh regionakh,’ in S. V. Neganov (ed.), Takaya Raznaya Rossiya: Politicheskie Protsessyi Mestnye Soobshchestva v Malykh Gorodakh, Perm: Perm Institute of Philosophy and Law, 2007, pp. 6–7. Yelizaveta Domnysheva, ‘Federation council talks about small cities’, Noviye Izvestia, 22 April 2000, p. 2; translated in CDPSP, Vol. 52, No. 17, 2000, pp. 15–16. Ibid., p. 16. Sotsial’no-Ekonomicheskoe Razvitie Malykh Gorodov Rossii, Moscow: Institute of Urban Economics, 2003, p. 17, http://www.urbaneconomics.ru (Accessed 7 August 2004). Ibid.

236

Notes

74 In this table the total of 1091 cities differs from the figure of 1098 provided by Podvintsev, as noted above, in ‘Raznoobrazie malykh gorodov’, op. cit. 75 Dmity Zimin, ‘The role of big business in local development’, Eurasian Geography and Economics, Vol. 48, No. 3, 2007, p. 361. 76 Ibid., p. 362. 77 Ibid., footnote 9, p. 361. 78 Ibid., p. 367. 79 Ibid. 80 Unpublished data provided to the author by Dmitry Zimin. 81 Timothy D. Sisk, Democracy at the Local Level: The International IDEA Handbook on Paticipation, Representation, Conflict Management and Governance, Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2001, p. 47. 8 Local elections and parties 1 For the 1995–8 round of elections see P. A. Goryunov, N. A. Kulyasova, V. A. Malyshev, S. Yu. Nesterov, V. G. Simnik, E. V. Shloma and S. N. Shusharin, Formirovanie organov mestnovo samupravlenie v Rossiiskoi Federatsii 1995–8: Elektoral’naya statistika, Moscow: Tsentral’naya Izbiratel’naya Komissiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii, ‘Ves’ Mir’, 1999; ‘Mestnoe samoupravlenie v Rossiiskoi Federatsii: sostoyanie, osobennosti formirovaniya, problemy’, Vestnik Izbiratel’noi Komissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, No. 4(46), 1997, pp. 74–109 (no author cited). For the 2004–5 round see ‘Analiticheskaya zapiska o nekotorykh voprosakh praktiki organizatsii munitsipal’nykh vyborov v khode reformy mestnovo samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, Vestnik Tsentral’noi Izbiratel’noi Komissii Rossiiskoi Federtatsii, No. 6(185), 2005; ‘Vypiska iz Protokola Zasedeniya Tsentral’noi Izbiratel’noi Komissii Rossiiskoi Federatstii ot 29 Dekabrya 2005 goda No. 164-1-4, “Ob Itogakh Munitsipal’nykh Vyborov v Khode Reformy Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii v 2004-05 godakh”’, Vestnik Tsental’noi Izbiratel’noi Komissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, No. 2(193), 2006 (no author cited); L. F. Dem’yanchenko (ed.), Reforma Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Itogi Munitsipal’nykh Vyborov v 2004–2005 Godakh, Moscow: Tsentral’naya Izbiratel’naya Komissiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 2006. 2 Federal Law, No. 138, 26 November 1996, ‘Ob obespechenii konstitutsionnykh prav grazhdan Rossiiskoi Federatsii izbirat’ i byt’ izbrannymi v organy mestnovo samoupravleniya’, Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1996, No. 49, St. 5497. 3 Galina Kourliandskaya, Yelena Nikolayenko and Natalia Golovanova, ‘Local government in the Russian Federation: developing new rules in the old environment,’ in Victor Popa and Igor Munteanu (eds), Local Government in Eastern Europe, in the Caucasus and Central Asia, Budapest, Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute, 2001, p. 33. 4 Ibid. 5 Yu. A. Dmitriev (ed.), Munitsipal’noe Pravo, Moscow: Eksmo, 2005, p. 80. 6 Ibid., p. 81. 7 Federal Law, No. 154, 28 August 1995, ‘Ob Obshchikh Printsipakh Organizatsii

Notes 237

8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

17 18 19

20 21 22 23 24

25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33

Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, No. 35, 1995, St. 3506. Goryunov, Kulyasova et al., op. cit., p. 160. In a tiny number of cases (1.61 per cent), the head of the administration was a hired manager appointed by the local assembly on a contractual basis. Federal Law, No. 154, 28 August 1995, op. cit. ‘Mestnoe samoupravlenie v Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, op. cit., p. 76. Goryunov, Kulyasova, et al., op. cit., p. 155. Ibid., p. 77. A. V. Ivanchenko, A. A. Veshnyakov, V. I. Vasil’ev and V. I. Lysenko (eds), Vybory v Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Moscow: VELTI, 1998, p. 124. Goryunov, Kulyasova, et al., op. cit., pp. 155–6. Ivanchenko, Veshnyakov, Vasil’ev and Lysenko, op. cit, p. 124. Boris Ovchinnikov, ‘Munitsipal’nye vybory: tendentsii i zakonomernosti’, in Sergei Ryzhenkov and Nikolai Vinnik (eds), Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossii, Moscow: MONF, 1998, p. 59. Goryunov, Kulyasova, et al., op. cit., p. 156. There were up to 400 deputies in the St Petersburg City Council and 500 in the Moscow City Council. Federal Law, No. 138, 26 November 2006, ‘Ob obespechenii konstitutsionnykh prav grazhdan Rossiiskoi Federatsii izbitat’ i byt’ izbrannykh v organov mestnovo samoupravleniya’, Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1996, No. 49. St. 5497. A minimum number of 50 deputies for municipalities with populations of more than 500,000; 30 for those with populations between 200,000 and 500,000; 20 for those with a populations of 50–200,000, and 10 for those with populations 10–50,000. Municipalities with populations lower than 10,000 – 7 deputies. Goryunov, Kulyasova, et al., op. cit., p. 30. Ibid., p. 32. In other regions, there were higher levels of full-time workers: in the Republic of Tatarstan, 26.76 per cent, and in Nenetskii AO, 22.15 per cent. ‘Mestnoe samoupravlenie v Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, p. 75. Goryunov, Kulyasova et al., op. cit., p. 39. Timothy D. Sisk (ed.), Democracy at the Local Level: The International IDEA Handbook on Participation, Representation, Conflict, Management and Governance, Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2001, p. 127. Goryunov, Kulyasova et al., op. cit., p. 30. Ibid., p. 34. Ibid., pp. 34–5. ‘Mestnoe samoupravlenie v Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, op. cit., p. 76. Daniel Tsyagankov, ‘Low turnout marks St Petersburg local elections’, IEWS Russian Regional Report, Vol. 3, No. 6, 1998, pp. 11–12. Goryunov, Kulyasova, et al., op. cit., p. 32. Ibid. Scott Mainwairing and Timothy R Scully (eds), Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995, p. 27. Ibid., pp. 21–2.

238

Notes

34 A. I. Tur and A. S. Novikov, ‘O soveshchanii predstavitelei izbiratel’nykh komissii sub’ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, Vestnik Tsentralnaya Izbiratel’naya Komissiya, No. 6(120), 2001, p. 60. 35 See Ross, Federalism and Democratisation in Post-Communist Russia, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003. See also, Derek S. Hutcheson, Political Parties in the Russian Regions, London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003; Grigorii V. Golosov, Political Parties in the Regions of Russia: Democracy Unclaimed, Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner, 2004; Byron Moraski, Elections by Design: Parties and Patronage in Russia’s Regions, DeKalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 2006; Henry E. Hale, Why Not Parties in Russia? Democracy, Federalism and the State, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 36 Kourliandskaya, Nikolayenko and Golovanova, op. cit., p. 180. 37 Goryunov, Kulyasova, et al., op. cit., pp. 155–6. 38 Ibid., p. 156. 39 Ibid., p. 31. 40 Ibid. 41 In elections for heads of administrations, party nominated candidates fared better, with 37.2 per cent winning posts, while 31.2 per cent of non-affiliated candidates were successful. See Goryunov, Kulyasova et al., op. cit., pp. 35, 156. 42 Ibid., pp. 31–2. 43 Tomila V. Lankina, Governing the Locals: Local Self-Government and Ethnic Mobilization in Russia, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Plymouth UK: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004, p. 156. 44 Goryunov, Kulyasova et al., op. cit., p. 31. 45 ‘Mayor, businessmen win local elections in Izhevsk’, Russian Regional Report, Vol. 3, No. 16, 1998, p. 2. 46 Data as of October 2006. Cited by Hellmut Wollmann and Elena Gritsenko, ‘Local self-government in Russia: between decentralization and recentralization’, in Cameron Ross and Adrian Campbell, Federalism and Local Politics in Russia, London and New York: Routledge, forthcoming 2008. 47 Demyanchenko, op. cit., p. 8. In the month of October 2005, municipal elections were held in 57 subjects of the Federation. 48 A. V. Ivanchenko and A.E. Lyubarev, A.V. Kynev, E. E. Skosarenko, A. A Sergeev, V. G. Akaevich and V. I. Krivtsov, ‘Korektirovka Izbiratel’novo Zakonodatel’stva v 2006 godu’, Byulleten’ Natsional’novo Tsetra Monitoringa Demokraticheskikh Protsedur, No. 2, February 2007, p. 15. 49 See Vestnik Tsentral’noi Izbiratel’noi Komissi Rossiiskoi Federatsii, No. 4(157), 2004. 50 Aleksandr Kynev, ‘Total’naya Proportsionalizatsiya’, 2006, p. 1, http://www.vibory. ru (Accessed 9 August 2006). 51 Dem’yanchenko, op. cit., p. 379. 52 ‘Analiticheskaya zapiska’, op. cit., p. 11. 53 M. I. Liborakina, ‘We need a law for a free people’, NGO Newsletter, Legislative Process in the State Duma, Issue 55, Short Version (special), 23 April 2003, p. 6. 54 Demyanchenko, op. cit., p. 51. These total figures for all municpalities are different from the numbers elected as heads of administrations in the period 2004–5.

Notes 239 55 Tomila Lankina, ‘New system weakens municipalities’, Russian Regional Report, Vol. 10, No. 17, 2005, p. 1. 56 Indirect elections for heads of administration took place in just under half of the municipalities (6,000). In the elections for heads of administrations there were run-off elections for the top two candidates, if none of the candidates received over 50 per cent of the votes in the first round. 57 Contests in the major cities of Kazan and Naberezhnye Chelny were more competitive. See Gulnaz Sharafutdinova, ‘Municipal elections in Tatarstan: old wine in new bottles?’, Russian Regional Report, Vol. 10, No. 18, 2005, p. 4. 58 L. G. Ragozina, ‘Monitoring Realizatsii Federal’novo Zakona, “Ob Obshchikh Pritsipakh Organizatsii Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii” v 2005 godu.’, Institute of Urban Economic, p. 5, http://www.urbaneconomic.ru (Accessed 20 July 2006). 59 For Ryazan see, Vladimir Avdonin, ‘Ryazanskaya Oblast’ v 2005 g.’, Carnegie Moscow Centre, p. 36, http://monitoring.carnegie.ru/2005/12/ryazan/avdoninvladimir-ryazanskaya-oblast-v-2005-g/ (Accessed 28 January 2006). See also the websites of the electoral commissions of Ryazan (http://www.ryazan.izbirkom. ru), Arkhangel’sk (http://www.arkhangelsk.izbirkom.ru),Volgograd (http://www. volgograd.izbirkom.ru) and Saratov oblasts (http://www.saratov.izbirkom.ru). 60 Natal’ya Senchukova, ‘Aktivnee vsevo golosovali v nebol’shikh selakh’, Vestnik Izbiratel’noi Komissii Arkhanglel’skoi Oblasti, No. 2(12), 2005, p. 11, http://www. arkhangelsk.izbirkom.ru (Accessed 9 June 2007). 61 Regnum, 25 August 2005, cited in Tomila Lankin, ‘New system weakens municipalities’, Russian Regional Report, Vol. 10, No. 17, 2005, p. 1. 62 S. V. Yusov, ‘Realizatsiya pervovo etapa reformy mestnovo samoupravleniya na territorii Rostovskoi oblasti’, in Vybory Organov Mestnovo Samoupravleniya Gorodskikh i Sel’skikh Poselenii Munitsipal’nykh Raionov Rostovskoi Oblasti, Sentyabr’–Oktyabr’ 2005 goda, Rostov-on-Don: IAITS, ‘Mestnaya Vlast’, 2006, p. 7. In Rostov Oblast, elections were held in September and October 2005 for 408 new municipalities (390 rural settlements and 18 city settlements). Turnout was an average of 47.5 per cent. A total of 407 administrative heads and 4270 deputies were elected, and 1488 deputies were elected in multi-mandate elections (34.8 per cent of the total number of mandates). 63 Ibid. 64 Demyanchenko, op. cit., pp. 312–29. 65 Sharafutdinova, op. cit., p. 4. For an excellent study of ‘managed elections’ in Tatarstan, see Valentin V. Mikhailov, Respublika Tatarstan: Demokratiya ili Suvernitet?, Moskva, PML, Instituta Afrika RAN, 2004; and ‘Regional elections and democratization in Russia’, in Cameron Ross (ed.), Russian Politics under Putin, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2004. 66 Demyanchenko, op. cit., p. 388. 67 Ibid., p. 8. 68 Ibid., p. 10. 69 Calculated by the author from data presented in Dem’yanchenko, ibid., pp. 8, 10, 248–311, 376–7.

240

Notes

70 V. I. Fadeev, N. I. Rautkina, N. M. Mironov, Munitsipal’nye Vybory v Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Moscow: Norma, 2006, p. 324. 71 M. V. Titov, ‘Ob itogakh munitsipal’nykh vyborov samoupravleniya v tverskoi oblasti v 2004–05 godakh’, in Dem’yanchenko, op. cit., p. 457. 72 http://www.karel.izbirkom.ru/way/9030659.html (Accessed July 2007). 73 See G. S. Shaikhullin and D. N. Kud, ‘Munitsipal’naya mnogopartiinost’, in Dem’yachenko, op. cit., p. 436. However, of the 563 candidates from the CPRF, 269 won seats. Moreover, the CPRF in this traditionally left region won a majority of seats in 24 municipalities: Gorodishchensk raion, 11 of 20 seats; Danilovsk, 11 of 26; Dubovsk, 10 of 15; Elansk, 16 of 22; Novoanninsk, 8 of 15; and Sredneakhtubinsk, 9 of 15. Of the 34 elected heads of municipal raion administrations, 17 were supported by the KPRF. Of the 443 communist candidates for the post of heads of rural and city settlements 271 were victorious. As a whole more than 60 per cent of the electorate voted for parties of the left – Communists, Agrarians and Rodina (Motherland). 74 V. S. Avdonin, ‘Etapy reform mestnovo samoupravleniya v Ryazanskoi oblasti’, in G. V. Vittkemper, G. Ya. Kozlov and V. S. Avdonin (eds), Munitsipal’nye i Regional’nye Protsessy v Usloviyakh Globalizatsii i Evropeizatsii, Moscow: Universitet Knizhnyi Dom, 2006, p. 409. 75 ‘Svedeniya o kolichestve izbrannykh deputatov na vyborakh predstavitel’nykh organov gorodskikh i sel’skikh poselenii munitsipal’nykh raionov Leningrad oblasti 9 Oktyabrya 2005 goda, vydvinutykh politicheskimi partiyami.’ See website of electoral commission of Leningrad Oblast, http://www.leningrad.izbirkom.ru (Accessed 9 June 2007). 76 Avdonin, ‘Ryazanskaya oblast’, op. cit., p. 27. 77 A. G. Yashkov, ‘Sistema izbiratel’nykh komissii, obespechivavshikh podgotovku i provedenie Vyborov organov mestnovo samoupravleniya vnov’ obrazovannykh munitsipal’nykh obrazovanii Arkhangelskoi oblasti’, in Dem’yanchenko, op. cit., pp. 406, 408. 78 Kseniya Dymova, ‘Partiinoe predstavitel’stvo v munitsipalnykh poseleniyakh’, in Vestnik Izbiritel’noi Arkhangel’skoi Oblasti, No. 2(12), 2005, p. 22. 79 V. A. Ponomarev, ‘O Praktike raboty izbiratel’nykh komissii Udmurtskoi Respubliki po podgotovke i provedeniyu munitsipal’nykh vyborov v 2005’, in Dem’yanchenko, op. cit., p. 402. 80 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 6 October 2005. Quoted in Tomila Lankina, ‘Local government reform: new system weakens municipalities’, Russian Regional Report, Vol. 10, No. 17, 2005, p. 3. 81 S. A. Sergeev, ‘Respublika Tatarstan v 2005 g.’, Moscow Carnegie Centre, p. 24, http://monitoring.carnegie.ru/2005/12/tatarstan/sergeev-sergej-respublika-tatarstan-v2005-g/ (Accessed 26 August 2006). 82 Sharafutdinova, op. cit., p. 1. 83 Lankina, ‘New system’, op. cit., p. 3. 84 Study carried out by the author with materials presented by Rostislav Turovsky of the School of Higher Economics, Moscow. 85 Fadeev, Rautkina, Mironov, op. cit., pp. 317–18. 86 K. Dawisha, ‘Democratisation and political participation: research concepts and

Notes 241

87

88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106

107

108 109 110

111 112 113

methodologies’, in K. Dawisha and B. Parrot (eds), The Consolidation of Democracy in East-Central Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 55. Aitalina Azarova, ‘How electoral systems affect democratic accountability in Russian regions’, Research Paper of the Central European University, Budapest, Hungary, 2004, p. 1. Michael McFaul, Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2002, p. 111. Stephen White, ‘Russians and their party system’, Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2006, p. 9. Ibid., pp. 12 and 14. Stephen White, ‘Political parties’, in Mike Bowker and Cameron Ross (eds), Russia After the Cold War, Harlow: Longman: 1999, pp. 82–3. Many argue that the LDPR is a bogus right-wing party. Indeed, it could also be considered another ‘party of power’ as it tends to vote in line with United Russia. Golosov, op. cit., p. 53. Vladimir Gel’man, ‘The transformation of Russia’s party system’, Russian Analytical Digest, No. 19, 17 April 2007, p. 12. Golosov, op. cit., p. 46. Ibid., p. 48. White, ‘Russians and their party system’, op. cit., p. 13. Golosov, op. cit., p. 4. Ibid., p. 156. Ibid., p. 155. Hale, op cit., p. 19. Ibid., p. 20. Gel’man, ‘The transformation’, op. cit., p. 14. Ibid., p. 12. Scott Mainwaring, ‘Presidentialism, multipartism and democracy’, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 26, No. 2, 1993, pp. 198–228. K. Dawisha, ‘Democratisation and political participation: research concepts and methodologies’, in K. Dawisha and B. Parrot (eds.), The Consolidation of Democracy in East-Central Europe, Cambridge: CUP, 1997, p. 56. G. Lyukherkhandt-Mikhaleva, ‘Izbiratel’nyi protsess i partii v rossiiskikh regionakh’, in G. Lyukherkhandt-Mikhaleva and Sergei Ryzhenkov (eds), Vybory i Partii v Regionakh Rossii, Moscow: St Petersburg, IGPI, 2000, p. 145. Dawisha, op. cit., p. 56. Cited in R. G. Moser, ‘The impact of parliamentary electoral systems in Russia’, PostSoviet Affairs, Vol. 13 No. 3, 1997, p. 284. Timothy D. Sisk (ed.), Democracy at the Local Level: The International IDEA Handbook on Participation, Representation, Conflict, Management and Governance, Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2001, p. 123. Ibid. Julie Corwin, RFE/RL Russian Federation Report, Vol. 24, No. 3, 2001, p. 1. Vladimr Putin, ‘Annual Address to the Federal Assembly’, 26 April 2007, p. 2, http://

242

114

115 116

117

118

119

120

121 122 123

124 125 126

Notes www.president.kremlin,ru/eng/text/speeches/2007/04/26/1209_type70029_1254 (Accessed 1 May 2007). Federal Law, No. 95, 11 July 2001, ‘O Politicheskikh Partiyakh’, Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, No. 29, 16 July, 2001, St. 2950. Also published in Rossiskaya gazeta, 14 July 2001. Edwin Bacon, ‘Russia’s law on political parties’, in Cameron Ross (ed.), Russian Politics Under Putin, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004, p. 43. Federal Law, No. 168, 20 December 2004, ‘O vnesenii izmeneni v Federal’nyi zakon “O Politicheskikh Partiyakh”’, Rossiiskaya gazeta, 24 December 2004. See online version at http://www.rg.ru/2004/12/24/partii.html (Accessed 7 June 2007). Federal Law, No. 202, 31 December 2005, ‘O vnesenii izmenenii v stat’yu 18 Federal’novo zakona, “Ob obshchikh printispakh organizatsii zakonodatel’nykh (predstavitel’nykh) i ispolnitel’nykh organov gosudarstvennoi vlasti sub’ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii” i Federal’nyi zakon, “O Politicheskikh Partiyakh”’, Rossiiskaya gazeta, 31 December 2005. See online version at http://www.rg.ru/zakon/2005/12/31. html (Accessed 7 June 2007). Federal Law, No. 93, 21 July 2005, ‘O vnesenii izmenenii v zakonodatel’nye akty Rossiiskoi Federatsii, “O vyborakh i Referendymakh i inye Zakondatel’nye akty Rossiiskii Federatsii”’, Rossiiskaya gazeta, 6 August 2005. See http://www.rg.ru/ zakon/2005/08/06html (Accessed 7 June 2007). For an excellent dicussion of the new legislation, see A. S. Avtonomov, A. Yu. Buzin, A.V. Ivanchenko, V. I. Krivtsov, A.V. Kynev and A. E. Lyubarev, Rossiiskie Vybory v Kontektste Mezhdunarodnykh Izbiratel’nykh Standartov, Moscow: Nezavisimaya Institut Vyborov, 2006, http://www.vibory.ru (Accessed 9 July 2006). ‘Address of A. A. Veshnyakov, Chairman of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation, to the Users of the Web Site of the CEC of Russia’, Central Electoral Commission, October 2005, p. 1, http://www.cikrf.ru (Accessed 10 December 2005). Federal Law, No. 168, December 2004, ‘O vnesenii izmeneni’. Lev Levison, ‘Political Monetization’, NGO Newsletter, Legislative Process in the State Duma, Issue 87, Short Version, May–June 2005, p. 1. Regional councils were previously free to choose their own electoral thresholds up to a maximum of seven per cent. The Federal Law, No. 93, of 21 July 2005 limited the barrier to seven per cent. In line with the new legislation, Moscow Oblast and Samara raised their electoral thresholds from four to seven per cent; Ingushetiya Kerealiya, Komi, Tyva, Chuvashiya, Primorskii Krai, Astrakhan, Kurgan, Lipetsk, Murmansk, Novgorod, Orel, Pskov, Sverdlovsk, Tver’, Tomsk, Tyumen, Chita and the Yevreiskii AO raised their barriers from five to seven per cent. Saratov raised its barrier from four to five per cent. In 2006, the republics of Dagestan and Kalmykiya, and Moscow City, lowered their barriers from 10 per cent to seven per cent. See A. V. Ivanchenko and A. E. Lyubarev, Rossiiskie Vybory ot Perestroiki do Suverennoi Democratii, Moscow: Aspekt Press, 2006, p. 17. Kynev, ‘Total’naya Proportsionalizatsiya’, op. cit., p. 1. Ivanchenko and Lyubarev, Rossiiskie Vybory, op. cit., p. 181. Anna Zakatnova, ‘Without rivals – United Russia holds congress in Yekaterinburg’,

Notes 243 Rossiiskaya gazeta, 4 December 2006, p. 1; translated in CDPSP, Vol. 58, No. 49, 2006, p. 2. 127 Avtonomov, Buzin, Ivanchenko, Krivtsov, Kynev and Lyubarev, op. cit., p. 43. See also resolution of the Central Electoral Commission of the Russian Federation, 24 May 2006 (No. 176/1131-4), ‘Metodicheskie Rekomendatsii O Poryadke Formirovaniya Territorial’nykh Izbiratel’nykh Komissii Izbiratel’nykh Komissii Munitsipal’nykh Obrazovanii, Okruzhnykh i Uchastkovikh Izbiratel’nikh Komissii’, Vestnik Tsentral’noi Izbiratel’noi Komissii, No. 6(197), 2006, p. 7. 128 Dmitry Kamyshev and Viktor Khamraev, interview with Dmitrii Oreshkin, head of ‘Merkator analytical group’, in ‘Opinions and Comments’ section of the vibory.ru website, p. 2, http://en.pravonavibor.ru/commnets/65.php (Accessed 14 July 2007). 129 Petra Stykow, ‘Russia at the crossroads? the realignment of the party system’, Russian Analytical Digest, No. 19, 17 April 2007, p. 3. 9 Local and regional executives 1 Galina Kourliandskaya, Yelena Nikolayenko and Natalia Golovanova, ‘Local government in the Russian Federation: developing new rules in the old environment,’ in Victor Popa and Igor Munteanu (eds), Local Government in Eastern Europe, in the Caucasus and Central Asia, Budapest: Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute, 2001, p. 197. 2 Cameron Ross, Federalism and Democratization in Russia, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002, p. 147. 3 J. Kahn, ‘A Federal Façade: Problems in the Development of Russian Federalism’, D.Phil. Thesis, University of Oxford, Oxford, 1999, p. 253. 4 M. Kh. Farukshin, ‘Izbiratel’noe zakonodatel’stvo i vybory v Tatarstane: opyt regional’novo pravovovo separatizma’, in V. V. Mikhailov, V. A. Bazhanov and M. Kh. Farukshin (eds), Osobaya Zona: Vybory v Tatarstane, Ul’yanovsk: Mezhdunarodnoi Pravozashchitnoi Assamblei, 2000, p. 12. 5 Kourliandskaya, Nikolayenko and Golovanova, op. cit., p. 186. 6 Gordon M. Hahn, ‘The impact of Putin’s federative reforms on democratization in Russia’, Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2003, p. 118–19. See Article 12.1 of amended version of the 1999 Federal Law, ‘On the General Principles of the Organisation of Legislative and Executive Organs of State Power of the Subjects of the Russian Federation’, which was signed into law by the president on 7 May 2002. 7 Ibid., p. 119. 8 Ibid., p. 120. 9 Ibid., p. 120. 10 E. M. Koveshnikov, Munitsipal’noe Pravo, Moscow: Norma, 2002, pp. 144–7. 11 A. Kouznetsov, A. Shanin and G. Vetrov, ‘Conflict of interest in Russian local government: challenges for new legislation’, in Babara Kudrycka (ed.), Combating Conflict of Interest in Local Government in the CEE Countries, Budapest: Local Government Public Service Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute, 2004, p. 258. 12 Kourliandskaya, Nikolayenko and Golovanova, op. cit., p. 186. 13 See text of the 2003 Law in V. I. Shkatulla (ed.), Komentarii k Federal’nomu Zakonu,

244

14

15

16

17 18 19 20 21

22 23

24 25

26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33

Notes ‘Ob Obshchikh Printsipakh Organizatsii Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii’ (Postateinyi), Moscow: Yustitsinform, 2006. Federal Law, No. 34, 18 April 2005, ‘O Vnesenii Izmenenii v Stat’yu 85 Federal’novo zakona “Ob Obshchikh Printsipakh Organizatsii Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatstii”’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 21 April 2005, http://www.rg.ru/ zakon/2005/04/21.html (Accessed 7 July 2006). A. S. Avtonomov, A. Yu. Buzin, A.V. Ivanchenko, V. I. Krivtsov, A.V. Kynev and A. E. Lyubarev, Rossiiskie Vybory v Kontektste Mezhdunarodnykh Izbiratel’nykh Standartov, Moscow: Nezavisimaya Institut Vyborov, 2006, p. 26, http://www.vibory. ru (Accessed 9 July 2006). Lev Levison, ‘Lawmaking in the State Duma in June 2003’, NGO Newsletter: Legislative Process in the State Duma. Human Rights Analysis, Issue 61 (Short Version), 29 July 2003, p. 8. Shkatulla, op. cit. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Yelizaveta Domnysheva, ‘Congres of municpalities – the kremlin’s long awaited child’, Novie Izvestiya, 20 June 1998, p. 2; translated in CDPSP, Vol. 50, No. 25, 1998, p. 11. Besik Pipia, ‘Divide and rule’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 3 March 1998, p. 10; translated in CDPSP, Vol. 50, No. 9, 1998, p. 15. Hellmut Wollmann, ‘Institutional building of local self-government in Russia: between legal design and power politics’, in Alfred B. Evans and Vladimir Gel’man (eds), The Politics of Local Government in Russia, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004, p. 110. Ibid. Vladimir Leskin, ‘Federal statehood in Russia: legislation and conflict resolution’, in Peter H. Solomon, Jr (ed.), Recrafting Federalism in Russia and Canada: Power, Budgets and Indigenous Governance, Centre for Russian and East European Studies, Univesity of Toronto, 2005, p. 53. Darrell Slider, ‘Governors versus mayors: the regional dimension of Russian local government’, in Evans and Gel’man, op. cit., p. 155. ‘Kremlin seeks weapon against Lebed’, IEWS, Russian Regional Report, Vol. 3, No. 22, 1997 p. 2 (no author cited). Slider, op. cit., p. 156. Pipia, op. cit., p. 15. Leonid Smirnyagin, ‘Mayor against governors’, IEWS, Russian Regional Report, Vol. 4, No. 9, 1999, p. 18. Anna Paretskaya, ‘Udmurt conflict had economic basis’, OMRI, Russian Regional Report, Vol. 2, No. 11, 1997, p. 2. Ibid. Vladimir Gel’man, Sergei Ryzhenkov and Michael Brie, Making and Breaking Democratic Transitions, The Comparative Politics of Russia’s Regions, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003, p. 69.

Notes 245 34 Ibid. 35 Anne Le Huérou, ‘Elites in Omsk’, Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 4, 1999, pp. 370–1. 36 Adrian Campbell, ‘State versus society?: local government and the reconstruction of the Russian state,’ Local Government Studies, Vol. 32, No. 5, 2006, p. 160., pp. 663–4. 37 Ibid. 38 Marie Mendras, ‘How regional elites perserve their power’, Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 4, 1999, p. 324. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 41 Slider, op. cit., p. 154. 42 Ibid. 43 S. A. Sergeev, Politicheskaya Oppozitsiya v Sovremennoi Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Federal’nyi i regional’nyi Aspekty, Kazan: Kazan State University, 2004. 44 Rostislav F. Turovskii, Politicheskaya Regionalistika, Moscow: GU VSHE, 2006, p. 652. 45 Smirnyagin, op. cit., p. 18. 46 Turovskii, op. cit., p. 653. 47 Sergei Pushkarev, ‘The conflict between the Sverdlovsk governor and Yekaterinburg mayor’, IEWS, Russian Regional Report, Vol. 3, No. 27, 17 July 1998, p. 5. 48 Slider, op. cit., p. 161. 49 Le Huérou, op. cit., p. 371. 50 Ibid. 51 Mendras, op. cit., p. 333. 52 Paul Abelsky, ‘Mayors of convenience: being a member of Russia’s local elite has become a risky proposition’, Russia Profile, Issue 8, Vol. IV, 2007, p. 30. 53 Marina Yakutova, ‘Russians still mostly uninterested in local government issues’, Russia Profile, Issue 8, Vol. IV, 2007, p. 40. 54 Russian Regional Report, Vol. 9, No. 15, 2004, p. 1. 55 Abelsky, op. cit., p. 29. 56 Alexandr Popov, ‘Podozrevaemyi vzyatochnik’, Expert, 17 October 2007, p. 1, http:// www.expert.ru/news/2007/10/17/vzjatka/print (Accessed 26 October 2007). 57 Aleksandr Popov, ‘Zhil’e ot mera’, Expert, 10 October 2007, p. 1, http://www.expert. ru/articles/2007/10/10/jugra/print (Accessed 26 October 2007). 58 Abelsky, op. cit., p. 29. 59 Ibid. 60 Claire Bigg, ‘Russia: mayors in the crosshairs as power vertical gains force’, RFE/RL Newsline, 21 June 2007, p. 2. 61 Ibid. 62 RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 11, No. 4, Part 1, 2007, p. 3. 63 Nikolai Petrov, ‘Open season on mayors’, Moscow Times, 13 April 2007, p. 4. 64 Cited in Abelsky, op. cit., p. 29. 65 Tomila Lankina, ‘Local government reform: new system weakens municipalities’, IEWS, Russian Regional Report, Vol. 10, No. 17, 2005, p. 4. 66 In 2000, Putin failed in his quest to persuade the Duma to adopt legislation granting

246

67 68 69 70

71 72

73 74 75 76 77 78

79 80 81 82 83

Notes regional leaders the powers of appointment over mayors of cities that have a population of 50,000 and over. Aleksei Makarkin, ‘Mery: bor’ba za nezavisimost’, Pro et Contra, No. 1(35), 2007, p. 28. Ibid. Robert Coalson, ‘Mayoral elections: democracy’s last stand’, RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly, Vol. 5, No. 9, 2005, p. 2. See ‘Russian mayors a matter for concern in the Council of Europe’s Congress of Local and Regional Authorities’, Strasbourg, Council of Europe Press Division, 22 March 2005. Ibid. Evgenii Senyshin, ‘Stremlenie ot absolyuta’, Expert Ural, No. 39, 23 October 2006, p. 4, http://www.expert.ru/printissue/ural/2006/39/interview_glazychev/print (Accessed 26 October 2007). Valery Vyzhutovich, ‘Power without money’, Rossiskaya gazeta, 17 November 2006, p. 3; translated in CDPSP, Vol. 58, No. 46, 2006, p. 6. Natalya Gorodetskaya and Viktor Khamrayev, ‘Kremlin takes the cities’, Kommersant, 4 April 2006, pp. 1–3; translated in CDPSP, Vol. 58, No. 14, 2006, pp. 4–5. Ibid., p. 5. Ibid. Vladimir Gel’man, ‘Ot mestnovo samoupravleniya k verticali vlasti’, Pro et Contra, No. 1(35), 2007, p. 16. Polina Dobrolyubova and Natalya Gorodetskaya, ‘Siberian mayors don’t want to be appointed’, Kommersant, 13 November 2006, p. 3; translated in CDPSP, Vol. 58, No. 46, 2006, p. 5. Ibid. Ibid. Dmitry Vinogradov, ‘Mayors seek to protect power from governors’, Russian Regional Report, 28 April 2006, p. 3. Ibid. N. Gorodetskaya and V. Khamrayev, op. cit., p. 5.

10 ‘Electoral authoritarianism’ and Putin’s ‘electoral vertical’ 1 Lawrence Pratchett, ‘Local autonomy, local democracy and the “new localism”’, Political Studies, Vol. 52, 2004, p. 373. 2 Allan Rosenbaum, ‘Democracy, Governance and Decentralisation’, in E. H. Valsan (ed.), Democracy, Decentralization and Development, Brussels: IASIA, 1999, p. 12. 3 Gabor Soos and Violetta Zentai, ‘Introduction’, in G. Soos and V. Zentai, Faces of Local Democracy: Comparative Papers from Central and Eastern Europe, Budapest: Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute, 2005, p. 4. 4 Cameron Ross, Federalism and Democratization in Russia, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002. 5 See Cameron Ross, ‘Federalism and electoral authoritarianism under Putin’,

Notes 247

6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

14 15

16 17 18 19

20 21 22 23

24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

Demokratizatsia: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2005, pp. 347–72. Andreas Schedler, ‘Elections without democracy: the menu of manipulation’, Journal of Democracy: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, Vol. 13. No. 2, 2002, p. 38. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Vladimir Gel’man, ‘Democratic gains reversed in regional elections from Moscow to Sakha’, IEWS, Russian Regional Report, Vol. 7, No. 5, 2002, p. 5. Nikolai Petrov, ‘Regional elections under Putin and prospects for Russian electoral democracy’, Ponars Policy Memo, No. 287, 2003, p. 2. Alexander Lukin, ‘Electoral democracy or electoral clanism? Russian democratization and theories of transition’, Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1999, p 108. Petrov, ‘Regional elections’, op. cit., p. 2. Vladimir Ryzhkov, ‘Illyuziya Vybora’, Paper delivered to the Nauchno-Prakticheskaya Konferentsiya: ‘Novye Zakonodatel’nye Aspekti i Problemy Rossiskikh Vyborov’, 6 June 2006, p. 12, http://www.vybory.ru (Accessed 10 November 2006). G. O’Donnell, ‘Delegative democracy’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1994, p. 61. Petrov, ‘Regional elections’, op. cit., p. 1. Ibid. Vladimir Pribylovskii, ‘Upravlyaemye vybory: degradatsiya vyborov’, in Vladimir Pribylovskii (ed.), Rossiya Putina: Istoriya Bolezni, Moscow: Tsentr Panorama, 2004, p. 8. Ibid., pp. 8–9. Ibid., p. 8. Julie A. Corwin, ‘If You Can’t Beat Them, Disqualify Them’, RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly, Vol. 4, No. 47, 9 December 2004, p. 1. Timothy D. Sisk (ed.), Democracy at the Local Level: The International IDEA Handbook on Participation, Representation, Conflict, Management and Governance, Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2001, p. 115. Schedler, ‘Elections without democracy’, op. cit., p. 40. Andreas Schedler (ed.), Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition, Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner, 2006, p. 3. A. Yu. Buzin, Moskovskie Munitsipal’nye Vybory 2004 goda: Istoriya Fal’sifikatsii, Moscow: RDP ‘Yabloko’, 2005, p. 41. Ibid. Ibid. Aleksandr Kynev, ‘Munitzipal’nye vybory po novym pravilam’, Pro et Contra, No. 1(35), 2007, p. 40. Staff writer, ‘Falsification of results of Yabloko: city elections skewed for United Russia’, St Petersburg Times, 1 October 2004, p. 1. Staff writer, ‘Rigged city elections: model for kremlin’, St Petersburg Times, 29 April 2005, p. 1.

248

Notes

32 Ibid. 33 Federal Law, No. 67, 12 June 2002, ‘Ob Osnovnykh Garantiyakh Izbiratel’nykh Prav i Prava na Uchastie v Referendume Grazhdan Rossiiskoi Federtatsii’, Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, No. 24, 2002, St. 2253. 34 Federal Law, No. 93, 21 July 2005, ‘O vnesenii izmenenii v zakonodatel’nye akty Rossiiskoi Federatsii, “O vyborakh i Referendymakh i inye Zakondatel’nye akty Rossiiskii Federatsii”’, Rossiiskaya gazeta, 6 August 2005, http://www.rg.ru/ zakon/2005/08/06html (Accessed 7 June 2007). 35 Dmitry Kamyshev and Viktor Khamraev, interview with Dmitrii Oreshkin, head of ‘Merkator Analytical Group’, p. 3, http://www.en.pravonavibor.ru/comments/65.php (Accessed 20 July 2007). 36 I. I. Kurilla, ‘Volgogradskaya Oblast’ v 2005’, p. 27, http://monitoring.carnegie. ru/2005/12/volgograd/kurilla-ivan-volgogradskaya-oblast-v-2005-g/ (Accessed 9 November 2006). 37 Kamyshev and Khamraev, op. cit., p. 3. 38 Ibid., p. 2. 39 Interview with Aleksandr Veshnyakov conducted by Natalya Kostenko, ‘Veshnyakov Fears Organized Effort to Discredit Elections’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 30 November 2006, pp. 1, 4; translated in CDPSP, Vol. 58, No. 48, 2006, p. 13. 40 Gulnaz Sharafutdinova, ‘Municipal elections in Tatarstan: old wine in new bottles?’, IEWS, Russian Regional Report, Vol. 10, No. 19, 2005, p. 4. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. 43 ‘Razdvoenie Lichnostei’, Business Class (Perm), No. 4(69), 2006, p. 1, no author cited. 44 Petrov, ‘Regional elections’, pp. 8–9. 45 Darrell Slider, ‘Governors versus mayors: the regional dimension of Russian local government’, in Alfred B. Evans and Vladimir Gel’man (eds), The Politics of Local Government in Russia, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004, p. 158. 46 Yelena Yeliseeva, ‘Ayatskov makes a mockery of Saratov local government’, IEWS, Russian Regional Report, Vol. 6, No. 6, 12 February 2001, p. 12. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid., pp. 12–13. 49 Pavel Shagiakhmetov, ‘Omsk elects new mayor’, IEWS, Russia Regional Report, Vol. 16, No. 12, 2001, p. 4. 50 Ibid., p. 5. 51 Petrov, ‘Regional elections’, op. cit., p. 2. 52 A. Yu. Buzin and A.E. Lyubarev ‘Administrativnyi resurs na vyborakh glavy goroda Perm 12 March 2006 goda’, http://www.votas.ru (Accessed 10 August 2006). 53 Ibid., p. 5. 54 ‘Orel City elects Aleksandr Kasyanov’, 14 March 2006, p. 1, http://www.regions.ru/ news/1959206/ (Accessed 10 February 2007). 55 Ibid., p. 2. 56 Aleksey Levchenko, ‘Russian elections official Ivanchenko on potential for election

Notes 249

57

58

59

60

61 62 63 64 65

66 67

fraud’, Gazeta Ru, 8 July 2005, reprinted in Johnson’s Russia List, No. 9196, 10 July 2005, p. 12. See A. S. Avtonomov, A. Yu. Buzin, A.V. Ivanchenko, V. I. Krivtsov, A.V. Kynev and A. E. Lyubarev, Rossiiskie Vybory v Kontektste Mezhdunarodnykh Izbiratel’nykh Standartov, Moscow: Nezavisimaya Institut Vyborov, 2006, p. 44, http://www.vibory. ru (Accessed 9 July 2006). See Articles 22–4 of Federal Law No. 67, 12 June 2002, ‘Ob Osnovnykh Garantiyakh Izbiratel’nykh Prav i Prava na Uchastie v Referendume Grazhdan Rossiiskoi Federatstii’ with amendments of 30 December 2006 (Federal Law No. 274) published in, A. A. Veshnyakov (ed.), Nauchno-Prakticheskii Kommentarii k Federal’nomu Zakonu,‘Ob osnovnykh garantiyakh izbiratel’nykh prav i prava na uchastie v referendume grazhdan Rossiiskoi Federatstii’, Moskva: Tsentral’naya Izbiratel’naya Komissiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 2007, pp. 260–85. L. F. Dem’yanchenko (ed.), Reforma Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Itogi Munitsipal’nykh Vyborov v 2004–2005 Godakh, Moskva: Tsentral’naya Izbiratel’naya Komissiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 2006, pp. 9–10. Calculated by the author from, ‘Zapiska ob itogakh munitsipal’nykh vyborov v khode reformy mestnovo samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii v 2004–2005 godakh’, Vestnik Tsentral’noi Izbiratel’noi Komissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, No. 2(193), 2006, pp. 21–60. A. S. Avtonomov, A. Yu. Buzin, A.V. Ivanchenko, V. I. Krivtsov, A.V. Kynev and A. E. Lyubarev, op. cit., p. 43. Sisk, op. cit., p. 116. M. Steven Fish, Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 28. Natalya Kostlenko, ‘Why electoral commission head Veshnyakov opposes election law amendements’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 21 July 2006, p. 1. Laura Belin, ‘Election commission chairman calls for crackdown on election fraud’, Kommersant-Daily, 1 July 2005, as reported in RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 9, No. 125, 1 July 2005, p. 3. Sisk, Democracy at the Local Level, op. cit., pp. 120–1. Thomas Carothers, ‘The end of the transition paradigm’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2002, pp. 11–12.

Conclusion 1 Vladimir Gel’man, ‘Federal policies toward local government in Russia: the process of institution building’, in Alfred B. Evans and Vladimir Gel’man (eds), The Politics of Local Government in Russia, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004, p. 89. 2 Lev Levinson, ‘Lawmaking in the State Duma in June 2003’, NGO Newsletter, Legislative Process in the State Duma, Issue 61, Short Version, June 2003, pp. 9–10. 3 Marina Yakutova, ‘Getting engaged’, Russia Profile, Issue 8, Volume IV, October 2007, p. 39. 4 Ibid.

250

Notes

5 Timothy D. Sisk (ed.), Democracy at the Local Level: The International IDEA Handbook on Participation, Representation, Conflict, Management and Governance, Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2001, pp. 115–16. 6 Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, ‘Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation’, 15 April 2005, RTR Russia TV, Moscow, reproduced in Johnson’s Russia List, No. 9130, 25 April 2005, p. 1. 7 See Gordon M. Hahn’s excellent study, ‘Managed democracy? building stealth authoritarianism in St Petersburg’, Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2004, pp. 195–232. 8 Sisk, op. cit., p. 1. 9 Valery Tishkov, ‘Local self-government versus local state administration: Russia’s hybrid experience’ in V. Tishkov and E. Filippova (eds), Local Governance and Minority Empowerment in the CIS, Budapest: Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute, 2002, p. 19. 10 Gabor Soos and Violetta Zentai, ‘Introduction’, in G. Soos and V. Zentai, Faces of Local Democracy: Comparative Papers from Central and Eastern Europe, Budapest: Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute, 2005, p. 5. 11 Paul Abelsky, ‘In the reception room’, Russia Profile, Issue 8, Vol. IV, October 2007, p. 23.

Bibliography

Abdrakhmanov, Rafik, ‘Local Self-Government in the Republic of Tatarstan’, in V. Tishkov and E. Filippova (eds), Local Government and Minority Empowerment in the CIS, Budapest: Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute, 2002. Abelsky, Paul, ‘In the reception room’, Russia Profile, Issue 8, Vol. IV, October 2007. Abelsky, Paul, ‘Mayors of convenience: being a member of Russia’s local elite has become a risky proposition’, Russia Profile, Issue 8, Vol. IV, October 2007. Aleksandrova, A. and E. Kovalenko, ‘Monetizatsiya l’got: regional’nye deistviya’, Finansy, No 7, 2005. ‘Analiticheskaya zapiska o nekotorykh voprosakh praktiki organizatsii munitsipal’nykh vyborov v khode reformy mestnovo samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, Vestnik Tsentral’noi Izbiratel’noi Komissii Rossiiskoi Federtatsii, No. 6(185), 2005. Avdonin, Vladimir S., ‘Ryazanskaya Oblast’ v 2005 g.’, Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Centre, 2005, http://monitoring.carnegie.ru/2005/12/ryazan/avdonin-vladimir-ryazanskayaoblast-v-2005-g/ (Accessed 28 January 2006). Avdonin, Vladimir. S., ‘Etapy reform mestnovo samoupravleniya v Ryazanskoi oblasti’, in G. V. Vittkemper, G. Ya. Kozlov and V. S. Avdonin (eds), Munitsipal’nye i Regional’nye Protsessy v Usloviyakh Globalizatsii i Evropeizatsii, Moscow: Universitet Knizhnyi Dom, 2006. Avtonomov, A. S., A. Yu. Buzin, A.V. Ivanchenko, V. I. Krivtsov, A.V. Kynev and A. E. Lyubarev, Rossiiskie Vybory v Kontektste Mezhdunarodnykh Izbiratel’nykh Standartov, Moscow: Nezavisimaya Institut Vyborov, 2006. Azarova, Aitalina, ‘How electoral systems affect democratic accountability in Russian regions’, Research Paper of the Central European University, Budapest, Hungary, 2004. Babich, Dmitry, ‘Taking charge of their future’, Russia Profile, Issue 8, Vol. IV, October 2007. Babichev, Igor’ Viktorovich, ‘Mestnoe samoupravlenie v postsovetskoi Rossii: nekotorye itogi i prognozy’, in A.V. Ivanchenko (ed.), Konstitutsionnye i Zakonodatel’nye Osnovy Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federtatsii, Moscow: Yurisprudentsiya, 2004. Bacon, Edwin, ‘Russia’s law on political parties’, in Cameron Ross (ed.), Russian Politics Under Putin, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004. Baldersheim, Harald, Michal Illner and Hellmut Wollmann (eds), Local Democracy in Post-Communist Europe, Wiesbaden: Opladen, Leske and Budrich, Urban Research International Series 2, 2003. Belimov, Viktor and Irina Perechneva, ‘Vseobshchii disbalans’, Expert Ural, No. 3, 23 January 2006, p. 2, www.expert.ru/ural/2006/03/vseobshii_disbalans/print (Accessed 24 October 2006). Belin, Laura, ‘Election commission chairman calls for crackdown on election fraud’,

252

Bibliography

Kommersant-Daily, 1 July 2005, as reported in RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 9, No. 125, 1 July 2005. Belin, Laura, ‘Putin returns some powers to governors’, RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 9, No. 127, Part 1, 8 July 2005. Belopukhov, Yu., ‘Ustanovlenie Khozrashchetnykh Vzaimootnoshenii Mezhdu Otraslevymi i Territorial’nymi Organami’, Planovoe Khozyaistvo, April 1974; translated in CDSP, Vol. 26, No. 30, 1974. Beshkil’tsev, V., ‘Kak Stroit na Severe’, Izvestiya, 14 February 1974, p. 2. Translated in the CDSP, Vol. 26, No. 7, 1974, p. 13. Bigg, Claire, ‘Russia: mayors in the crosshairs as power vertical gains force’, RFE/RL Newsline, 21 June 2007. Bikalova, Nadezhda, ‘Intergovernmental fiscal relations in Russia’, Finance Development, September 2001. Bondar’, N. S., V. I. Avseenko and S. N. Bocharov, Munitsipal’noe Pravo Rossiiskoi Federtatsii, Moscow: Yuniti-Dana, 2nd ed., 2002. Brychev, L. I. (ed.), Predmet Vedeniya i Polnomochiya Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Sbornik Federal’novo Zakonodatel’stvo, Moscow: Yurid. Lit., 2001. Burgess, M. and A-G. Gagnon (eds), Comparative Federalism and Federation, New York, London: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1993. Buzin, A. Yu., Moskovskie Munitsipal’nye Vybory 2004 goda: Istoriya Fal’sifikatsii, Moscow: RDP ‘Yabloko’, 2005. Buzin, A. Yu. and A. E. Lyubarev, ‘Administrativnyi resurs na vyborakh glavy goroda Perm 12 March 2006 goda’, http://www.votas.ru (Accessed 10 August 2006). Byudzhetnyi Kodeks Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Ofitsial’nyi Tekst, Moscow: Yurait, 2007. Campbell, Adrian, ‘Regional power in the Russian Federation’ and ‘Power and structure in Nizhnii Novgorod, St Petersburg and Moscow’, in Andrew Coulson (ed.), Local Government in Eastern Europe: Establishing Democracy at the Grassroots, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1995. Campbell, Adrian, ‘City government in Russia’, in J. Gibson and P. Hanson (eds), Transformation from Below: Local Power and the Political Economy of Post-Communist Transitions, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996. Campbell, Adrian, ‘State versus society? local government and the reconstruction of the Russian state’, Local Government Studies, Vol. 32, No. 5, November 2006. Special Issue: Local Government in Central and Eastern Europe: Guest editors: Andrew Coulson and Adrian Campbell. Carothers, Thomas, ‘The end of the transition paradigm’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 1, January 2002. Chebankova, Elena ‘Implications of Putin’s regional and demographic policies on the evolution of inter-ethnic relations in Russia’, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, Vol. 8, No. 4, 2007. Chebankova, Elena, ‘Putin’s struggle for federalism: structures, operation and the commitment problem’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 59, No. 2, March 2007. Chernyavsky, A.V., Review of the Municipal Finance Development in Russia in 1992– 2002, Analytical Report, Moscow: Institute of Urban Economics, 2003, http://www. urbaneconomics.ru (Accessed 27 May 2004). Chernyavsky, Andrei and Karen Vartapetov, ‘Municipal finance reform and local selfgovernance in Russia’, Post-Communist Economies, Vol. 16, No. 3, September 2004. Coalson, Robert, ‘How will the governors be appointed?’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Russian Political Weekly, Vol. 4, No. 43, 5 November 2004. Coalson, Robert, ‘Mayoral elections: democracy’s last stand’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Russian Political Weekly, Vol. 5, No. 9, 4 March 2005. Coalson, Robert, ‘Putin takes control of the status quo through gubernatorial appointments’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline, Vol. 9, No. 109, Part 1, 9 June 2005.

Bibliography 253 Corwin, Julie A., ‘If You Can’t Beat Them, Disqualify Them’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Russian Political Weekly, Vol. 4, No. 47, 9 December 2004, p. 1. Corwin, Julie, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Russian Federation Report, Vol. 24, No. 3, 8 August 2001. Corwin, Julie A., ‘Why are so many elected leaders in Russia ready to give up on elections?’, Russian Political Weekly, Vol. 4, No. 36, 16 September 2004. Coulson, Andrew (ed.), Local Government in Eastern Europe: Establishing Democracy at the Grassroots, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1995. Crosston, Matthew, Shadow Separatism: Implications for Democratic Consolidation, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004. Dabla-Norris, Era, Jorge Martinez-Vasquez and John Norregaard, ‘Fiscal Decentralisation in Russia: Economic Performance and Reform Issues’, Paper presented to the International Monetary Fund Conference, On Post-Election Strategy, Moscow, 5–7 April 2000. http:// www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/2000/invest/pdf/norris.pdf (Accessed 6 June 2007). Dahl, R. A., Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971. Danelian, Armen, ‘Local government reform in Russia: reinforcing fiscal autonomy’, in I. E. Danilina, Munitsipal’noe Pravo v Voprosakh i Otvetakh, Moscow: Prospekt, 2004. Davey, Kenneth (ed.), Fiscal Autonomy and Efficiency: Reforms in the Former Soviet Union, Budapest: Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute, 2002. Dawisha, K., ‘Democratisation and political participation: research concepts and methodologies’, in K. Dawisha and B. Parrot (eds), The Consolidation of Democracy in East-Central Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Dem’yanchenko, L. F. (ed.), Reforma Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Itogi Munitsipal’nykh Vyborov v 2004–2005 Godakh, Moscow: Tsentral’naya Izbiratel’naya Komissiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 2006. Denters, Bas and Lawrence E. Rose, ‘Local governance in the third millennium’, in Bas Denters and Lawrence E. Rose (eds), Comparing Local Governance: Trends and Developments, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. Desai, Raj M., Lev M. Freinkman and Itzhak Goldberg, ‘Fiscal Federalism and Regional Growth: Evidence from the Russian Federation in the 1990s’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3138, September 2003. Diamond, Larry, ‘Is the third wave over?’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 3, 1996. Diamond, Larry and Leonardo Morlino, ‘The quality of democracy: an overview’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 15, No. 4, October 2004. Dmitriev, Yu. A. (ed.), Munitsipal’noe Pravo, Moscow: Eksmo, 2005. Dobrolyubova, Polina and Natalya Gorodetskaya, ‘Siberian mayors don’t want to be appointed’, Kommersant, 13 November 2006, p. 3; translated in CDPSP, Vol. 58, No. 46, 2006. Domnysheva, Yelizaveta, ‘Congres of municpalities – the kremlin’s long awaited child’, Novie Izvestiya, 20 June 1998, p. 2; translated in CDPSP, Vol. 50, No. 25, 1998. Domnysheva, Yelizaveta, ‘Federation council talks about small cities’, Noviye Izvestia, 22 April 2000, p. 2; translated in CDPSP, Vol. 52, No. 17, 2000. Dowley, K. M., ‘Local government transparency in East Central Europe’, in Local Government Studies, Vol. 32, No. 5, November 2006. Dymova, Kseniya, ‘Partiinoe predstavitel’stvo v munitsipalnykh poseleniyakh’, in Vestnik Izbiritel’noi Arkhangel’skoi Oblasti, No. 2(12), 2005. Dzadziyev, Alexander and Ruslan Dzidzoyev, ‘Are minorities left out? state power and local self-government in North Ossetiya’, in V. Tishkov and E. Filippova (eds), Local Governance and Minority Empowerment in the CIS, Budapest: Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute, 2002.

254

Bibliography

Economic Surveys: Russian Federation, OECD, 2000 (no author cited). Elazar, Daniel J., Exploring Federalism, Tuscaloosa and London: The University of Alabama Press, 1987. Elazar, Daniel J., Federal Systems of the World: A Handbook of Federal, Confederal and Autonomy Arrangements, Harlow: Longman, 1991. Evans, Alfred B. Jr and Vladimir Gel’man (eds), The Politics of Local Government in Russia, Boulder: New York, Toronto, Oxford, Rowman and Littlefield, 2004. Fadeev, V. I., N. I. Rautkina and N. M. Mironov, Munitsipal’nye Vybory v Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Moscow: Norma, 2006. Farukshin, M. Kh., ‘Izbiratel’noe zakonodatel’stvo i vybory v Tatarstane: opyt regional’novo pravovovo separatizma’, in V. V. Mikhailov, V. A. Bazhanov and M. Kh. Farukshin (eds), Osobaya Zona: Vybory v Tatarstane, Ul’yanovsk: Mezhdunarodnoi Pravozashchitnoi Assamblei, 2000. Fish, M. Steven, Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Friedgut, T. H. and J. W. Hahn (eds), Local Power and Post-Soviet Politics, Armonk New York, London, England: M. E. Sharpe, 1994. Gel’man, V., S. Ryzhenkov, E. Belokurova and N. Borisova, Avtonomiya ili Kontrol’?: Reforma Mestnoi Vlasti v Gorodakh Rossii, 1991–2001, St Petersburg, Moscow: Letnii Sad, 2002. Gel’man, Vladimir, ‘Democratic gains reversed in regional elections from Moscow to Sakha’, IEWS, Russian Regional Report, Vol. 7, No. 5, 6 February 2002. Gel’man, Vladimir, ‘Obshcherossiskaya politika i reforma mestnoi vlasti: institutsional’noe stroitel’stvo perekhodnovo perioda’, in V. Gel’man, S. Ryzhnekov, E. Belokupova and N. Borisova, Avtonomiya ili Kontrol’? Reform Mestnoi Vlasti v Gorodakh Rossii 1991–2001, St Petersburg, Moscow: Letnii Sad, 2002. Gel’man, Vladimir, ‘In search of local autonomy: the politics of big cities in Russia’s Transition’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Vol. 27, 1 March 2003. Gel’man, Vladimir, Sergei Ryzhenkov and Michael Brie, Making and Breaking Democratic Transitions: The Comparative Politics of Russia’s Regions, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003. Gel’man, Vladimir, ‘Federal policies toward local government in Russia: the process of institution building’, in Alfred B. Evans and Vladimir Gel’man (eds), The Politics of Local Government in Russia, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004. Gel’man, Vladimir, ‘Ot mestnovo samoupravleniya k verticali vlasti’, Pro et Contra, No. 1(35), January–February 2007. Gel’man, Vladimir, ‘The transformation of Russia’s party system’, Russian Analytical Digest, No. 19, 17 April 2007. Gibson, John and Philip Hanson (eds), Transformation from Below, Local Power and the Political Economy of Post-Communist Transitions, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1996. Glazychev, Vyacheslav, ‘Self-government at the local level’, Kommersant, 28 September 2006; translated in CDPSP, Vol. 58, No. 40, 2006. Gligich-Zolotareva, Milena V., Pravovye Osnovy Federalizma, Moskva: Yurist, 2006. The Global Campaign On Urban Governance, Concept Paper, United Nations Human Settlement Programme, Washington D.C.: UN-Habitat, 2nd ed., 2002 (no author cited). Goble, Paul, ‘Putin’s regionalisation plan sparks territorial disputes’, Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty Newsline, Vol. 9, No. 62, Part 1, 4 April 2005. Goldsmith, Mike, ‘A new intergovernmentalism?’, in Bas Denters and Lawrence E. Rose (eds), Comparing Local Governance: Trends and Development, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. Golosov, Grigorii V., Political Parties in the Regions of Russia: Democracy Unclaimed, Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner, 2004.

Bibliography 255 Golovanova, Natalia, Financial Foundations of Local Self-government in Russia: Problems and Prospects, Moscow: Centre for Fiscal Policy, 2003, http://pdc.ceu.hu/ archive/00001586/ (Accessed 20 October 2004). Gorodetskaya, Natalya, ‘Municipal reform postponed for three years’, Kommersant, 22 September 2005, p. 4; translated in CDPSP, Vol. 57, No. 38, 2005. Gorodetskaya, Natalya ‘President’s staff acts to postpone municipal reform’, Kommersant, 19 September 2005, p. 3; translated in CDPSP, Vol. 57, No. 38, 2005. Gorodetskaya, Natalya, ‘Kremlin is finalizing municipal chain of command’, Kommersant, 3 February 2006, p. 4. Gorodetskaya, Natalya and Viktor Khamrayev, ‘Kremlin takes the cities’, Kommersant, 4 April 2006, pp. 1–3; translated in CDPSP, Vol. 58, No. 14, 2006. Goryunov, P. A., N. A. Kulyasova, V. A. Malyshev, S. Yu. Nesterov, V. G. Simnik, E. V. Shloma and S. N. Shusharin, Formirovanie organov mestnovo samupravlenie v Rossiiskoi Federatsii 1995–8: Elektoral’naya statistika, Moscow: Tsentral’naya Izbiratel’naya Komissiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii, ‘Ves’ Mir’, 1999. Gritsenko, Elena, ‘A new stage of local self-government reform in Russia and the German experience’, Kazan Federalist, Vol. 8, No. 4, Autumn 2003. Hahn, Gordon M., ‘The impact of Putin’s federative reforms on democratization in Russia,’ Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2003. Hahn, Gordon M., ‘Managed democracy? building stealth authoritarianism in St Petersburg’, Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, Vol. 12, No. 2, Spring 2004. Hahn, Jeffrey W., ‘Power to the Soviets?’, Problems of Communism, Vol. 38, January– February 1989. Hahn, Jeffrey W., ‘Developments in local soviet politics’, in A. J. Rieber and A. Z. Rubenstein (eds), Perestroika at the Crossroads, Armonk, New York, London: M. E. Sharpe, 1991. Hahn (ed.), Jeffrey W., Regional Russia in Transition, Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 2001. Hale, Henry E., Why Not Parties in Russia? Democracy, Federalism and the State, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Hanson, P., S. Artobolevskiy, O. Kouznetsova and D. Sutherland, ‘Federal government responses to regional economic change’, in P. Hanson and M. Bradshaw (eds), Regional Economic Change in Russia, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2000. Hazan, Baruch, Gorbachev’s Gamble: The 19th All-Union Party Conference, Boulder, San Fransisco, and London: Westview, 1990. Healey, Nigel M., Vladimir Leksin and Aleksandr Shvetsov, ‘The municipalization of enterprise-owned “social assets” in Russia’, Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 3, 1999. Hough, Jerry. F. and Merle Fainsod, How the Soviet Union is Governed, Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1979. Huskey, Eugene (ed.), Executive Power and Soviet Politics, Armonk, New York, London, England: M. E. Sharpe, 1992. Hutcheson, Derek S., Political Parties in the Russian Regions, London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. Ivanchenko, A. V., A. A. Veshnyakov, V.I. Vasil’ev and V. I. Lysenko (eds), Vybory v Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Moscow: Velti, 1998. Ivanchenko, A. V., Konstitutsionnye i Zakonodatel’nye Osnovy Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Moscow: Yurisprudentsiya, 2004. Ivanchenko, A. V. and A. E. Lyubarev, Rossiiskie Vybory ot Perestroiki do Suverennoi Democratii, Moscow: Aspekt Press, 2006. Ivanchenko, A. V., A.E. Lyubarev, A.V. Kynev, E. E. Skosarenko, A. A Sergeev, V. G. Akaevich and V. I. Krivtsov, ‘Korektirovka Izbiratel’novo Zakonodatel’stva v 2006 godu’, Byulleten’ Natsional’novo Tsetra Monitoringa Demokraticheskikh Protsedur, No. 2, February 2007.

256

Bibliography

Ivanenko, Vladimir, ‘Regional governors unclear on how to stay in power’, Russia Profile, Vol. IV, No. 3, April 2007. Jacobs, E. M., ‘Introduction’, in E. M. Jacobs (ed.), Soviet Local Politics and Government, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983. John, Peter, Local Governance in Western Europe, London, Thousand Oaks, New Deli: Sage, 2001. Jounda, Nikolai, ‘Evolution of Local Development Policymaking in Russia: From Administrative Planning to Public Policy’, Research Paper, Budapest: Centre for Policy Studies, Central European University, 2004. Juurikkala, Tuuli and Olga Lazareva, ‘Lobbying at the local level: social assets in Russian Firms’, Bank of Finland, BOFIT Institute for Economics in Transition and Centre for Economic and Financial Research, Moscow, 9 February 2006. http://www.ssrn.com/ abstract=896908 (Accessed 8 March 2007). Kahn, J., A Federal Façade: Problems in the Development of Russian Federalism, D.Phil. Thesis, Oxford: University of Oxford, 1999. Kamyshev, Dmitry, and Khamraev, Viktor, interview with Dmitrii Oreshkin, head of ‘Merkator Analytical Group’, http://www.en.pravonavibor.ru/comments/65.php (Accessed 20 July 2007). Kempton, D. R., ‘Russian federalism: continuing myth or political salvation’, Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, Vol. 9, No. 2, Spring 2001. Kempton, Daniel R. and Terry D. Clark (eds), Unity or Separation: Centre-Periphery Relations in the Former Soviet Union, Westport, Connecticut, London: Praeger, 2002. Kim, I. J. and J. S. Zacek (eds), Establishing Democratic Rule, St Paul: Paragon House, 1993. King, P., ‘Federation and representation’, in M. Burgess and A-G. Gagnon (eds), Comparative Federalism and Federation, New York, London: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1993. Kirkow, Peter, ‘Local self-government in Russia: awakening from slumber?’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 49, No. 1, 1997. Kirkow, Peter, Russia’s Provinces: Authoritarian Transformation Versus Local Autonomy, Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998. Kitchen, H., A. Khrustaliov, T. Letunova, N. Mironova, M. Slavgorodskaya and I. Starodubrovskaya, Monitoring of the Implementation of Municipal Reform, Moscow: IET, 2006. ‘Komi president refuses to obey Constitutional Court ruling on local government’, Institute of East West Studies, Russian Regional Report, Vol. 3, No. 5. Kosareva, Nadezhda, Marina Liborakina and Lyudmila Ragozina, ‘A reform that won’t wait’, The Moscow Times, 26 July 2005. Kostenko, Natalya, ‘Veshnyakov Fears Organized Effort to Discredit Elections’, Interview with Aleksandr Veshnyakov, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 30 November 2006, pp. 1, 4; translated in CDPSP, Vol. 58, No. 48, 2006, p. 13. Kostlenko, Natalya, ‘Why electoral commission head Veshnyakov opposes election law amendements’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 21 July 2006. Kourliandskaya, Galina, Yelena Nikolayenko and Natalia Golovanova, ‘Local government in the Russian Federation: developing new rules in the old environment,’ in Victor Popa and Igor Munteanu (eds), Local Government in Eastern Europe, in the Caucasus and Central Asia, Budapest: Local Government and Public Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute, 2001. Kouznetsov, A., A. Shanin and G. Vetrov, ‘Conflict of interest in Russian local government: challenges for new legislation’, in Babara Kudrycka (ed.), Combating Conflict of Interest in Local Government in the CEE Countries, Budapest: Local Government Public Service Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute, 2004. Koveshnikov, E. M., Gosudarstvo i Mestnoe Samoupravlenie v Rossii: Teoretiko-Pravovye Osnovy Vzaimodeistviya, Mosow: Norma, 2002. Koveshnikov, E. M., Munitsipal’noe Pravo, Moscow: Norma, 2002.

Bibliography 257 Kurilla, I. I., ‘Volgogradskaya Oblast’ v 2005’, http://monitoring.carnegie.ru/2005/12/ volgograd/kurilla-ivan-volgogradskaya-oblast-v 2005-g/ (Accessed 9 November 2006). Kurlyandskaya, Galina, ‘Budgetary Pluralism of Russian Authorities’, Discussion Paper No. 17, Budapest: Local Government and Public Services Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute, 2001. Kurlyandskaya, Galina, ‘Reform of Federative Relations and Policy: Local-Self Government in the Russian Federation: Fiscal Aspects’, Moscow: Centre for Fiscal Policy, 2004, http://www.cfp.ru (Accessed 23 April 2005). Kurlyandskaya, Galina, ‘Cash benefits put regions in fiscal bind’, Moscow Times, 9 February 2005, http://english.fpcenter.ru/themes/english/materials-index. asp?folder=1525&foundid=2795 (Accessed 10 March 2006). Kurlyandskaya, Galina, ‘Intergovernmental Transfers in Russia’, Moscow: Centre for Fiscal Studies, July 2005, http://www.logincee.org/libdoc/20061218_{442167D6-D366-4426B1BC-7DC040D3F1AF}.doc (Accessed 12 August 2006). Kynev, Aleksandr, ‘Total’naya Proportsionalizatsiya’, 2006, p. 1, http://www.vibory.ru (Accessed 9 August 2006). Kynev, Aleksandr, ‘Munitzipal’nye vybory po novym pravilam’, Pro et Contra, No. 1(35), January–February 2007. Lane, David, Politics and Society in the USSR, London: Martin Robertson, 1978. Lankina, Tomila V., Governing the Locals: Local Self-Government and Ethnic Mobilization in Russia, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Plymouth UK: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004. Lankina, Tomila, ‘President Putin’s local government reforms’ in Peter Reddaway and Robert W. Orttung, The Dynamics of Russian Politics: Putin’s Reform of FederalRegional Relations, Vol. II, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield 2005. Lankina, Tomila, ‘The Kozak Commission’s Local Government Reforms’, Paper presented to the 36th Conference of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Boston, USA, December 2004. Lankina, Tomila, ‘New system weakens municipalities’, Russian Regional Report, Vol. 10, No. 17, 18 October 2005. Lavrov, A. M., J. Litwack and D. Sutherland, Fiscal Federalist Relations in Russia: A Case for Subnational Autonomy, OECD, 2001. Le Huérou, Anne, ‘Elites in Omsk’, Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 4, 1999. Lemaitre, Roemer, ‘The roll back of democracy in Russia after Beslan’, Review of Central and East European Law, Vol. 31, 2006. Leontyev, Mikhail, ‘Interview with Vasily Tarasenko, chair of the Federation Council’s Committee for Federation Affairs, the Federal Treaty and regional policy’, Sevodnya, 9 August1995, p. 5; translated in CDPSP Vol. XLVII, No. 32, 1995. Leskin, Vladimir, ‘The new Russian federalism’, in Peter H. Solomon, Jr (ed.), The Dynamics of ‘Real Federalism’: Law, Economic Development and Indigenous Communities in Russia and Canada, Toronto: Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Toronto, 2004. Leskin, Vladimir, ‘Federal statehood in Russia: legislation and conflict resolution’ in Peter H. Solomon, Jr (ed.), Recrafting Federalism in Russia and Canada: Power, Budgets and Indigenous Governance, Toronto: Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Toronto, 2005. Levchenko, Aleksey, ‘Russian elections official Ivanchenko on potential for election fraud’, Gazeta Ru, 8 July 2005, reprinted in Johnson’s Russia List, No. 9196, 10 July 2005. Levinson, Lev, ‘Lawmaking in the State Duma in June 2003’, NGO Newsletter, Legislative Process in the State Duma, Issue 61, Short Version, June 2003. Levinson, Lev, ‘Political Monetization’, NGO Newsletter, Legislative Process in the State Duma, Issue 87, Short Version, May–June 2005.

258

Bibliography

Libkind, A., ‘Arkhitektura zavodskoi zony’, Pravda, 5 August, 1975; translated in CDSP, Vol. 27, No. 31, 1975. Liborakina, M. I., Problemy i Perspecktivy Mestnovo Samoupravleniya: Nezavisimaya Ekspertiza Reformy, Moscow: Institute of Urban Studies, 2003. Liborakina, M. I., ‘We need a law for a free people’, NGO Newsletter, Legislative Process in the State Duma, Issue 55, Short Version (special), April 23, 2003. Liborakina, Marina, ‘Local Government Reform in Russia: Current Status’, Moscow, Institute of Urban Economics, 2003, http://www.urbaneconomics.ru (Accessed 10 January 2004). Lijphart, Arend, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1999. Luchterhandt, Galina, ‘Politics in the Russian Province: Revda and Kinel’’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 49, No. 1, 1997. Lukin, Alexander, ‘Electoral democracy or electoral clanism? Russian democratization and theories of transition’, Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1999. Lyukhterkhandt-Mikhaleva, G., ‘Izbiratel’nyi protsess i partii v rossiiskikh regionakh’, in G. Lyukhterkhandt-Mikhaleva and Sergei Ryzhenkov (eds), Vybory i Partii v Regionakh Rossii, Moscow: St Petersburg, IGPI, 2000. Lyukhterkhandt-Mikhaleva, G. M. and S. I. Ryzhenkov (eds), Tsentr-Region-Mestnoe Samoupravlenie, St Petersburg, Moscow: IGPI, Letnii Sad, 2001. Mainwaring, Scot, ‘Presidentialism, multipartism and democracy’, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 26, No. 2, July 1993. Mainwairing, Scott and Timothy R Scully (eds), Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995. Makarkin, Aleksei, ‘Mery: bor’ba za nezavisimost’, Pro et Contra, No. 1(35), January– February 2007. Makushkin, A. G., Federal Budget and the Regions: A Case Study of Fiscal Flows, Moscow: Dialogue-MSU, 1999. Malovetskii, A. V., Gorod i Predpriyatiya: Usloviya Sovmestnovo Razvitiya, Moscow: URSS, 2002. Malyakin, I., ‘Putin against the regions: round two’, Russia and Eurasia Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, 18 June 2002. Martinez-Vasquez, Jorge, Andrey Timofeev and Jameson Boex, Reforming Regional-Local Finance in Russia, Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2006. ‘Mayor, businessmen win local elections in Izhevsk’, IEWS, Russian Regional Report, Vol. 3, No. 16, 1998, p. 2. (no author cited). McFaul, Michael, Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, Vol. 10, No. 2, Spring 2002. Mendras, Marie, ‘How regional elites preserve their power’, Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 4, 1999. ‘Mestnoe samoupravlenie v Rossiiskoi Federatsii: sostoyanie, osobennosti formirovaniya, problemy’, Vestnik Izbiratel’noi Komissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, No. 4 (46), 1997, pp. 74–109 (no author cited). Mikhailov, Valentin V., ‘Regional elections and democratization in Russia’, in Cameron Ross (ed.), Russian Politics Under Putin, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2004. Mikhailov, Valentin V., Respublika Tatarstan: Demokratiya ili Suvernitet?, Moskva: PML, Instituta Afrika RAN, 2004. Ministry of Finance, Russian Federation, ‘Informatsiya o rezul’tatakh monitoringa mestnykh byudgetov Rossiiskoi Federtatsii po sostoyaniyu na 1 Oktyabrya 2006 goda’, Centre for Fiscal Policy, Moscow, 2006. http://www.cfp.ru (Accessed 12 November 2006). Mitrokhin, Sergei, ‘It’s a rare governor who doesn’t dream of becoming a Khan’, Obshchaya gazeta, No, 44, 6–13 November; translated in CDPSP, Vol. 43, 1996.

Bibliography 259 Mitchek, Beth, ‘Restructuring Russian Urban Budgets: 1991–95’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 49, No. 6, 1997, pp. 989–1015. Moraski, Byron, Elections by Design: Parties and Patronage in Russia’s Regions, DeKalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 2006. Morton, Henry W., ‘The contemporary Soviet city’, in Henry W. Morton and Robert C. Stuart (eds), The Contemporary Soviet City, Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1984. Moser, R. G., ‘The impact of parliamentary electoral systems in Russia’, Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1997. Munitsipal’naya Politika, Informatsionnyi Byulleten’ Rossiiskoi Demokraticheskoi Partii ‘YABLOKO’, Vol. 44, No. 3–4, 2003 (no author cited). Myakinnik, Nikolai, ‘Mestnoe ne znachit “negosudarstvennoe”: samoupravlenie – istochik initsiativy i aktivnosti’, interview with Vladimir Mokryi, Chair of the State Duma Committee for Local-Self Governance, Sotial’noe Partnerstvo, Vol. 2, No. 29, 2006. Novikov, Alexei, Alexander Kovalenko, Felix Ejgel, Alexei Rodionov, Mikhail Galkin and Maria Garadzha, ‘An impact of unfunded federal mandates on Russian municipalities: equity, equality and pluralism implications,’ in Nadezhda B. Kosareva and Raymond J. Struyk (eds), Urban Management Reform in Russia 1998–2000, Moscow: The Institute of Urban Economics, 2001. O’Donnell, G., ‘Delegative democracy’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 5, No. 1, January 1994. ‘Orel City elects Aleksandr Kasyanov’, 14 March 2006, p. 1, http://www.regions.ru/ news/1959206/ (Accessed 10 February 2007). Orttung, Robert W. and Peter Reddaway (eds), The Dynamics of Russian Politics: Putin’s Reform of Federal-Regional Relations: Vol. 1, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004. Orttung, Robert W. and Peter Reddaway (eds), The Dynamics of Russian Politics: Putin’s Reform of Federal-Regional Relations, Vol. II, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield 2005. Ovchinnikov, Boris, ‘Munitsipal’nye vybory: tendentsii i zakonomernosti’, in Sergei Ryzhenkov and Nikolai Vinnik (eds), Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossii, Moscow: MONF, 1998. ‘Overview of Legislation on Housing and the Utility Sector in the Russian Federation’, Moscow: Istitute of Urban Economics, 3 December 2003, p. 10 (no author cited), (Accessed 7 March 2005). Paretskaya, Anna, ‘Udmurt conflict had economic basis’, OMRI, Russian Regional Report, Vol. 2, No. 11, 20 March 1997. Pashenetsev, Vitalii, ‘Organizatsiya mestnovo samoupravleniya v Rossiiskikh regionakh: tsifry i tipy’, in Sergei Ryzhenkov and Nikolai Vinnik (eds), Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossii, Moscow: MONF, 1998. Petrov, Nikolai, ‘Regional elections under Putin and prospects for Russian electoral democracy’, Ponars Policy Memo, No. 287, February 2003. Petrov, Nikolai, ‘Open season on mayors’, Moscow Times, 13 April 2007. Pipia, Besik, ‘Divide and rule’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 3 March 1998; translated in CDPSP, Vol. 50, No. 9, 1998. Podporina, Irina, ‘Financial and economic problems of improving budgetary relations in the Russian Federation’, in Peter H. Solomon (ed.), Recrafting Federalism in Russia and Canada: Power, Budgets and Indigenous Governance, Toronto: Centre for Russian and East European Studies, Toronto: University of Toronto, 2005. Podvintsev, O. B., ‘Raznoobrazie malykh gorodov v kontekste raznoobraziya Rossiiskikh regionakh’, in S. V. Neganov (ed.), Takaya Raznaya Rossiya: Politicheskie Protsessyi Mestnye Soobshchestva v Malykh Gorodakh, Perm: Perm Institute of Philosophy and Law, 2007.

260

Bibliography

Popa, Victor and Igor Munteanu (eds), Local Government in Eastern Europe, in the Caucasus and Central Asia, Budapest: Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute, 2001. Popov, Alexandr, ‘Podozrevaemyi vzyatochnik’, Expert, 17 October 2007, http://www. expert.ru/news/2007/10/17/vzjatka/print (Accessed 26 October 2007). Popov, Aleksandr, ‘Zhil’e ot mera’, Expert, 10 October 2007, http://www.expert.ru/ articles/2007/10/10/jugra/print (Accessed 26 October 2007). Popova, Ol’ga, ‘Revolyutsii trebuyutsya sponsory’, Expert Volga, No. 24, 2 October 2006, http://www.expert.ru/printissues/volga/2006/24/reforma_mestnogo_samoupravleniya/ (Accessed 10 October 2007). Porter, Thomas E. and John F. Young, Local Self-Government and the State in Modern Russia, The Donald W. Treadgold Papers in Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies, No. 28, May 2001, Washington D.C.: The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, 2001. Pratchett, Lawrence, ‘Local autonomy, local democracy and the “new localism”’, Political Studies, Vol. 52, Issue 2, 2004. Pribylovskii, Vladimir, ‘Upravlyaemye vybory: degradatsiya vyborov’, in Vladimir Pribylovskii (ed.), Rossiya Putina: Istoriya Bolezni, Moscow: Tsentr Panorama, 2004. Przeworski, Adam, Sustainable Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. Pushkarev, Sergei, ‘The conflict between the Sverdlovsk governor and Yekaterinburg mayor’, IEWS, Russian Regional Report, 17 July 1998. Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich, ‘Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation’, 15 April 2005, RTR Russia TV, Moscow, reproduced in Johnson’s Russia List, No. 9130, 25 April 2005. Putin, Vladimr, ‘Annual Address to the Federal Assembly’, 26 April 2007, p. 2, http://www. president.kremlin,ru/eng/text/speeches/2007/04/26/1209_type70029_1254 (Accessed 1 May 2007). Putin, Vladimir, ‘Speech to the National Congress of Municipalities of the Russian Federation Regions’, Johnson’s Russia List, 23 October 2007. Puzanov, Aleksandr and Lyudmila Ragozina, ‘Otchuzhdenie mestnoi vlasti’, Pro et Contra, No. 1(35), January–February 2007. Ragozina, Lyudmila, ‘Monitoring realizatsii Federal’novo zakona, “Ob obshchikh printsipakh organizatsii mestnovo samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii” v 2005 gody’, Institute of Urban Economics website http://www.urbaneconomics.ru (Accessed 20 July 2006). Ragozina, Lyudmila, ‘Nadelenie organov mestnovo samoupravleniya vnov’ obrazovannykh poselenii polnomochyami po resheniyu voprosov mestnovo znacheniya v perekhodnyi period’, 2006, Institute of Urban Economics website, http://www.urbaneconomics.ru (Accessed 20 July 2006). Report, ‘Structure and Operation of Local and Regional Democracy: Russian Federation,’ adopted by the Steering Committee on Local and Regional Democracy (CDLR), December 1999, Strasbourg, Council of Europe Publishing, 2000. Requejo, Ferran, ‘National pluralism and federalism: four potential scenarios for Spanish plurinational democracy’, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2001. Reynolds, Sarah J., ‘Editor’s introduction, school for democracy? the evolution of local government in the Russian Federation (1)’, Statutes and Decisions: The Laws of the USSR and Its Successor States, Vol. 41, No. 3, May–June 2005. Rieber, A. J. and A. Z. Rubenstein (eds), Perestroika at the Crossroads, Armonk, New York, London: M. E. Sharpe, 1991. Rodio, Guido and Hans Ulrich Stockling, ‘Local and Regional Democracy in the Russian Federation’, Report from the 11th Session, Council of Europe Congress on Local-Self Government, Strasbourg, 25–27 May 2004.

Bibliography 261 Rosenbaum, Allan, ‘Democracy, governance and decentralisation.’, in E. H. Valsan (ed.), Democracy, Decentralization and Development, Brussels: IASIA, 1999. Ross, Cameron, Local Government in the Soviet Union, London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1987. Ross, Cameron, ‘Party-state relations’, in Eugene Huskey (ed.), Executive Power and Soviet Politics, Armonk, New York, London, England: M. E. Sharpe, 1992. Ross, Cameron, Federalism and Democratisation in Russia, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002. Ross, Cameron, ‘Federalism and electoral authoritarianism under Putin’, Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, Vol. 13, No. 3, Summer 2005. Ross, Cameron, ‘Local government reform in the Russian Federation: a tortuous and twisted path’, Local Government Studies, Vol. 32, No. 5, November 2006. Special Issue: Local Government in Central and Eastern Europe, Guest editors: Andrew Coulson and Adrian Campbell. Ross, Cameron, ‘From party and state domination to Putin’s power vertical: the subjugation of mayors in communist and post-communist Russia’, in John Garrard (ed.), Heads of the Local State: Mayors, Provosts and Burgomasters Since 1800, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007. Ross, Cameron, ‘Municipal government in the Russian Federation and Putin’s ‘electoral vertical’’, Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, Vol. 15, No. 2, Spring 2007. Ross, Cameron and Adrian Campbell, Federalism and Local Politics in Russia, London and New York: Routledge, forthcoming 2008. Russian Federation Fiscal Reform Project: Final Report, ‘Government Finance and Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in the Novgorod Region’, Moscow: Centre for Fiscal Policy, July 1999, pp. 57–8, http://www.cfp.ru (Accessed 9 March 2003). Ryzhenkov, Sergei and Nikolai Vinnik (eds), Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossii, Moscow: MONF, 1998. Ryzhenkov, Sergei, ‘Organy gosudarstvennoi vlasti v reforme mestnovo samoupravleniya v Rossii’, in K. Matsuzato (ed.), Tret’e Zveno Gosudarstvennovo Stroitel’stva Rossii, Occasional Papers on Changes in the Slavic-Eurasian World, No. 73, Sapporo: Slavic Research Centre, Hokkaido University 1998. Ryzhkov, Vladimir, ‘Illyuziya Vybora’, Paper delivered to the Nauchno-Prakticheskaya Konferentsiya: ‘Novye Zakonodatel’nye Aspekti i Problemy Rossiskikh Vyborov’, 6 June 2006, http://www.vybory.ru (Accessed 10 November 2006). Sakwa, Richard, Russian Politics and Society, London and New York: Routledge, 2nd ed., 2002. Sakwa, Richard, ‘Politics in Russia’, in Stephen White, Zvi Gitelman and Richard Sakwa (eds), Developments in Russian Politics: 6, Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. Sakwa, Richard, Putin: Russia’s Choice, London and New York: Routledge, 2nd ed., 2008. Schedler, Andreas, ‘Elections without democracy, the menu of manipulation’, Journal of Democracy: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, Vol. 13, No 2, April 2002. Schedler, Andreas (ed.), Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition, Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner, 2006. Senchukova, Natal’ya, ‘Aktivnee vsevo golosovali v nebol’shikh selakh’, Vestnik Izbiratel’noi Komissii Arkhanglel’skoi Oblasti, No 2(12), 2005, http://www.arkhangelsk. izbirkom.ru (Accessed 9 June 2007). Senyshin, Evgenii, ‘Stremlenie ot absolyuta’, interview with Vyacheslav Glazychev, Expert Ural, No. 39, 23 October 2006, http://www.expert.ru/printissues/ural/2006/39/ interview_glazychev/print (Accessed 10 October 2007). Sergeev, S. A., Politicheskaya Oppozitsiya v Sovremennoi Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Federal’nyi i regional’nyi Aspekty, Kazan: Kazan State University, 2004.

262

Bibliography

Sergeev, S. A., ‘Respublika Tatarstan v 2005 g.’, Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Centre, 2005, http://monitoring.carnegie.ru/2005/12/tatarstan/sergeev-sergej-respublika-tatarstan-v2005-g/ (Accessed 26 August 2006). Shabaev, Yurii, ‘Battle over local government continues in Komi’, IEWS Russian Regional Report, Vol. 6, No. 13, 11 April 2000. Shabunin, D. M., ‘Chuvashskaya Respublika v 2005 goda’, Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Centre. Shagiakhmetov, Pavel, ‘Omsk elects new mayor’, IEWS Russia Regional Report, Vol. 16, No. 12, 2 April, 2001. Sharafutdinova, Gulnaz, ‘Municipal elections in Tatarstan: old wine in new bottles?’, Russian Regional Report, Vol. 10, No. 18, 3 November 2005. Shirikov, Anton, ‘Restrukturizatsiya shansov’, Expert, No. 21, 5 July 2006. Shkatulla, V. I. (ed.), Komentarii K Federal’nomu Zakonu, ‘Ob Obshchikh Printsipakh Organizatsii Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii’ (Postateinyi), Moscow: Yustitsinform, 2006. Shvetsov, A. N., Ekonomicheskie Resursy Munitsipal’novo Razvitiya: Finansy, Imushchestvo, Zemlya, Moscow: URSS, 2002. Shvetsov, A. N., ‘Sistemnye preobrazovaniya mestnykh byudzhetov’, Voprosy Ekonomiki, No. 8, 2001, p. 4. Silaev, Nikolai ‘Kak byt’ c merami i den’gami’, Expert, No 30, 21 August 2006, p. 2, http://www.expert.ru/printissue/expert/2006/30/problemy_mestnogo_samoupravleni (Accessed 24 October 2007). Sisk, Timothy D. (ed.), Democracy at the Local Level: The International IDEA Handbook on Participation, Representation, Conflict, Management and Governance, Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2001. Slider, Darrell, ‘Governors versus mayors: the regional dimension of Russian local government’, in Alfred B. Evans and Vladimir Gel’man (eds), The Politics of Local Government in Russia, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004. Slider, Darrell, ‘Putin and the election of regional governors’, in Cameron Ross and Adrian Campbell, Federalism and Local Politics in Russia, London and New York: Routledge, forthcoming, 2008. Smirnyagin, Leonid, ‘Mayors against governors’, East West Institute, Russian Regional Report, Vol. 4, No. 9, 11 March 1999. Smirnyagin, Leonid, ‘Trudnoe budushchee Rossiiskikh gorodov’, Pro et Contra, No. 1(35), January–February 2007; cited in Marina Yakutova, ‘Getting engaged’, Russia Profile, Issue 8, Vol. IV, October 2007. Smith, B. C., Decentralization: The Territorial Dimension of the State, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1985. Smith, Graham, The Post-Soviet States: Mapping The Politics of Transition, London, Sydney, Auckland: Arnold, 1999. Solanko, Laura and Merja Tekoniemi, ‘To Recentralise or Decentralise – Some Recent Trends in Russian Fiscal Federalism’, BOFIT Online, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition, Research Paper No. 5, 2005. Solomon, Peter H. Jr (ed.), The Dynamics of ‘Real Federalism’: Law, Economic Development and Indigenous Communities in Russia and Canada, Toronto: Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Toronto, 2004. Solomon, Peter H. Jr (ed.), Recrafting Federalism in Russia and Canada: Power, Budgets and Indigenous Governance, Toronto: Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Toronto, 2005. Soos, Gabor and Violetta Zentai, ‘Introduction’, in G. Soos and V. Zentai, Faces of Local Democracy: Comparative Papers from Central and Eastern Europe, Budapest: Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute, 2005. Sorensen, G., Democracy and Democratisation, Boulder: Westview Press, 1993.

Bibliography 263 Sotsial’no-Ekonomicheskoe Razvitie Malykh Gorodov Rossii, Moscow: Institute of Urban Economics, 2003, p. 17, http://www.urbaneconomics.ru (Accessed 7 August 2004). Staff writer, ‘Falsification of results of Yabloko: city elections skewed for United Russia’, St Petersburg Times, 1 October 2004, p. 1. Staff writer, ‘Rigged city elections: model for Kremlin’, St Petersburg Times, 29 April 2005, p. 1. Starodubrovskaya, I., ‘Introduction’, in H. Kitchen, A. Khrustaliov, T. Letunova, N. Mironova, M. Slavgorodskaya and I. Starodubrovskaya, Monitoring of the Implementation of Municipal Reform, Moscow: IET, 2006. Stoker, Gerry, ‘Redefining local democracy’, in Lawrence Pratchett and David Wilson (eds), Local Democracy and Local Government, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996. Stoker, Gerry, ‘Theorising democracy and local government’, in D. King and G. Stoker (eds), Rethinking Local Democracy, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1996. Stoker, Gerry, ‘Local government in the twenty-first century’, in Timothy D. Sisk (ed.), Democracy at the Local Level: The International IDEA Handbook on Participation, Representation, Conflict, Management and Governance, Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2001, pp. 23–4. Stone, Clarence, Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946–1988, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1989. Stoner-Weiss, Kathryn, Local Heroes: The Political Economy of Russian Regional Governance, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997. Stoner-Weiss, Kathryn, Resisting the State: Reform and Retrenchment in Post-Soviet Russia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Stykow, Petra, ‘Russia at the crossroads? the realignment of the party system’, Russian Analytical Digest, No. 19, 17 April 2007. Taubman, William, Governing Soviet Cities: Bureaucratic Politics and Urban Development in the USSR, New York, Washington, London: Prager, 1973. Theen, R. H. W., ‘Russia at the grassroots: reform at the local and regional levels’, in I. J. Kim and J. S. Zacek (eds), Establishing Democratic Rule, St Paul: Paragon House, 1993. Thiessen, Ulrich, ‘Fiscal federalism in Russia: theory, comparison, evaluations’, Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 3, 2006. Timofeev, Andrey, Determinants of Decentralisation Within Russian Regions, Budapest: Local Government and Public Services Initiative, Open Society Institute, 2003. Tishkov, Valery, ‘Local self-government versus local state administration: Russia’s hybrid experience’ in V. Tishkov and E. Filippova (eds), Local Governance and Minority Empowerment in the CIS, Budapest: Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute, 2002. Trunov, Sergei, ‘Mezhbyuzhetnye otnosheniya v svete Rossiiskoi modeli federaliszma’, in Rafael Khakimov (ed.), Politiko-Privovye Resursy Federalizma v Rossii, Kazan: Kazan Institute of Federalism, 2006. Tsyagankov, Daniel, ‘Low turnout marks St Petersburg local elections’, IEWS Russian Regional Report, Vol. 3, No. 6, 12 February 1998. Tur, A. I. and A. S. Novikov, ‘O soveshchanii predstavitelei izbiratel’nykh komissii sub’ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, Vestnik Tsentralnaya Izbiratel’naya Komissiya, No. 6(120), 2001. Turovsky, Rostislav F., Politicheskaya Regionalistika, Moscow: GU VSHE, 2006. Umnova-Konyukhova, I. A., ‘O konstitutsionno-pravovoi osnove razdeleniya gosudarstvennoi vlasti mezhdu federatsiei, ee subj’ektami i mestnym samoupravleniem’, in G. M. Lyukhterkhandt-Mikhaleva and S. I. Ryzhenkov (eds), Tsentr-Region-Mestnoe Samoupravlenie, St Petersburg, Moscow: IGPI, Letnii Sad, 2001. Valsan, E. H. (ed.), Democracy, Decentralization and Development, Brussels: IASIA, 1999. Veshnyakov, A. A., ‘Address of Chairman of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation to the Users of the Web Site of the Central Electoral Commission

264

Bibliography

of The Russian Federation’, July 2006, http://www.cikrf.ru (Accessed 8 September 2006). Veshnyakov, A. A. (ed.), Nauchno-Prakticheskii Kommentarii k Federal’nomu Zakonu,‘Ob osnovnykh garantiyakh izbiratel’nykh prav i prava na uchastie v referendume grazhdan Rossiiskoi Federatstii’, Moskva: Tsentral’naya Izbiratel’naya Komissiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 2007. Vetrov, German and Dmitrii Lantsev, ‘Problemy i perspektivy kompleksnovo sotsial’noekonomicheskovo razvitiya munitsipal’nykh obrazovanii Rossii’, Gosudarstvennaya Vlast’ i Mestnoe Samoupravlenie, 22 April 2007. Vil’chek, M. I., ‘O kliuchevikh problemakh stanovleniya instituta polnomochnykh predstavitelei prezidenta RF’, in Polpredy Prezidenta: Problemy Stanovleniya Novovo Instituta, Moscow: Nauchnye Doklady, No. 3, MGU, January 2001. Vinogradov, Dmitry, ‘Mayors seek to protect power from governors’, Russian Regional Report, 28 April 2006. Vtorushin, S. and V. Sevastyanov, ‘Tyumen: vtoroi etap – 3. chtoby idti dal’she’, Pravda, 17 May 1979, p. 2; translated in CDSP, Vol. 31, No. 20, 1979. Vydrin, I. V. and A. N. Kokotov, Munitsipal’noe Pravo Rossii, Moscow: Norma, 2001. ‘Vypiska iz Protokola Zasedeniya Tsentral’noi Izbiratel’noi Komissii Rossiiskoi Federatstii ot 29 Dekabrya 2005 goda No. 164-1-4, “Ob Itogakh Munitsipal’nykh Vyborov v Khode Reformy Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii v 2004 05 godakh”’, Vestnik Tsental’noi Izbiratel’noi Komissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, No. 2 (193), 2006 (no author cited). Vyzhutovich, Valery, ‘Power without money’, Rossiskaya Gazeta, 17 November 2006; translated in CDPSP, Vol. 58, No. 46, 2006. Watts, Ronald L., Comparing Federal Systems, Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University, 2nd ed., 1999. Watts, Ronald L., ‘Multinational federations in comparative perspective’, in Michael Burgess and John Pinder (eds), Multinational Federations, London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis, 2007. White, Stephen, ‘Political parties’, in Mike Bowker and Cameron Ross (eds), Russia After the Cold War, Harlow: Longman: 1999. White, Stephen, ‘Russians and their party system’, Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of PostSoviet Democratization, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2006. Whitefield, Stephen, Industrial Power and the Soviet State, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993. Wollmann, Hellmut and Natasha Butusova, ‘Local self-government in Russia: precarious trajectory between power and law’, in Harald Baldersheim, Michal Illner and Hellmut Wollmann (eds), Local Democracy in Post-Communist Europe, Wiesbaden: Opladen, Leske and Budrich, Urban Research International Series 2, 2003. Wollmann, Hellmut, ‘Institution building of local self-government in Russia: between legal design and power politics’, in Alfred B. Evans and Vladimir Gel’man (eds), The Politics of Local Government in Russia, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004. Wollmann, Hellmut and Elena Gritsenko, ‘Local self-government in Russia: between decentralization and recentralization’, in Cameron Ross and Adrian Campbell (eds), Federalism and Local Politics in Russia, London and New York: Routledge, forthcoming, 2008. Yakutova, Marina, ‘Getting engaged’, Russia Profile, Issue 8, Vol. IV, October 2007. Yakutova, Marina, ‘Russians still mostly uninterested in local government issues’, Russia Profile, Issue 8, Vol. IV, October 2007. Yeliseeva, Yelena, ‘Ayatskov makes a mockery of Saratov local government’, IEWS Russian Regional Report, 12 February 2001. Yeltsin, Boris, ‘Address by the President of the Russian Federation to the Citizens of Russia’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 7 October 1993, pp. 1–2; translated in CDPSP, Vol XLV, No. 40, 1993.

Bibliography 265 Yeltsin, Boris, Radio Address, 6 June 1997, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 7 March 1997, p. 3; translated in CDPSP, Vol. XLIX, No. 23, 9 July 1997, pp. 1–4. Young, John F., ‘At the bottom of the heap: local self-government and regional politics in the Russian Federation’, in Peter J. Stavrakis, Joan DeBardeleben and Larry Black (eds), Beyond the Monolith: The Emergence of Regionalism in Post-Soviet Russia, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997. Young, John F., ‘Local budgets and intergovernental finance in the Russian Federation’, in Alfred B. Evans and Vladimir Gel’man (eds), The Politics of Local Government in Russia, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004. Young, John F., and Gary N. Wilson, ‘The view from below: local government and Putin’s reforms’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 59, No. 7, November 2007. Yurova, Yana, ‘Why is benefit reform unpopular’, RIA Novosti, 19 January 2005, p. 1; reproduced in Johnson’s Russia List, No. 9021, January 2005. Yusov, S. V., ‘Realizatsiya pervovo etapa reformy mestnovo samoupravleniya na territorii Rostovskoi oblasti’, in Vybory Organov Mestnovo Samoupravleniya Gorodskikh i Sel’skikh Poselenii Munitsipal’nykh Raionov Rostovskoi Oblasti, Sentyabr’–Oktyabr’ 2005 goda, Rostov-on-Don: IAITS, ‘Mestnaya Vlast’, 2006. Zakaria, Fareed, ‘The rise of illiberal democracy’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 6, 1997. Zakatnova, Anna, ‘Without rivals – United Russia holds congress in Yekaterinburg’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 4 December 2006; translated in CDPSP, Vol. 58, No. 49, 2006. ‘Zapiska ob itogakh munitsipal’nykh vyborov v khode reformy mestnovo samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii v 2004–5 godakh’, Vestnik Tsentral’noi Izbiratel’noi Komissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Vol. 2, No. 193, 2006. Zhuravskaya, Katherina V., ‘Inter-governmental relations in Russia’, Russian Economic Trends, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1999. Zhuravskaya, Yekaterina V., ‘Incentives to Provide Local Public Goods: Fiscal Federalism, Russian Style’, Research Paper, Russian European Centre for Economic Policy and Stockholm Institute for Transition Economics, October 2000, http://www.eerc.ru/details/ download.aspx?file_id=3831 (Accessed 9 August 2003). Zimin, Dmity, ‘The role of big business in local development’, Eurasian Geography and Economics, Vol. 48, No. 3, May–June 2007. Zolotov, Andrei Jr, ‘Building horizontally’, interview with Vyacheslav Glazychev, Russia Profile, Issue 8, Vol. IV, October 2007. Zubkov, Constantin I., ‘Russian Federalism today: “strong federation” or twilight of the federalist choice?’, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2005. Special Issue: ‘Eurasia and the Wider World’, edited by Richard Sakwa.

Decrees Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 19 March 1971, ‘Ob Osnovnykh Pravakh i Obyazannostyakh Gorodskikh i Raionnykh v Gorodakh Sovetov Deputatov Trudyashchikhsya’. Translated in the CDSP, Vol. 23, No. 13, 1971, pp. 27–30. Decree of the Russian Federation President, No. 1617, 9 October 1993, ‘O Reforme Predstavitel’nykh Organov, Vlasti i Organov Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, Rossiiskaya gazeta, 12 October 1993, p. 1. Decree of the Russian Federation President, No. 568, 11 June 1997, ‘Ob Osnovnykh Napravleniyakh Reformy Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1997, No. 22, St. 2571.

Federal Laws Federal Law of the RSFSR, 27 October 1989, ‘O Vyborakh Narodnykh Deputatov Mestnykh Sovetov Narodnykh Deputatov RSFSR’, VVS RSFSR, 1989, No. 44, St. 1306.

266

Bibliography

Federal Law of the RSFSR, 9 April 1990, ‘Ob Obshchikh Nachalakh Mestnovo Samoupravleniya i Mestnovo Khozyaistva v SSSR’, Novye zakony SSSR, Vyp. 1, 1990, pp. 91–106. Federal Law of the RSFSR, 10 October 1990, ‘O Vzaimootnosheniyakh Sovetov Narodnykh Deputatov i Ispolnitel’nykh Organov v Period Provedeniya Ekonomicheskoi Reformy’, VSND RSFSR i VS RSFSR, No. 19, 1990. Federal Law of the RSFSR, 6 July 1991 (No. 1550-1), ‘O Mestnom Samoupravlenii v RSFSR,’ translated in, Statutes and Decisions: The Laws of the USSR and Its Successor States, Vol. 41, No. 3, 2005, pp. 7–92. Federal Law of the Russian Federation, No. 154, 28 August 1995, ‘Ob Obshchikh Printsipakh Organizatsii Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, No. 35, 1995, St. 3506. Federal Law of the Russian Federation, No. 138, 26 November 1996, ‘Ob obespechenii konstitutsionnykh prav grazhdan Rossiiskoi Federatsii izbirat’ i byt’ izbrannymi v organy mestnovo samoupravleniya’, Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1996, No. 49, St. 5497. Federal Law, No. 95, 11 July 2001, ‘O Politicheskikh Partiyakh’, Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, No. 29, 16 July, 2001, St. 2950. Federal Law, No. 67, 12 June 2002, ‘Ob Osnovnykh Garantiyakh Izbiratel’nykh Prav i Prava na Uchastie v Referendume Grazhdan Rossiiskoi Federtatsii’, Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, No. 24, 2002, St. 2253. Federal Law of the Russian Federation, No. 131, 6 October 2003, ‘Ob Obshchikh Printsipakh Organizatsii Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, in V. I. Shkatulla (ed.), Komentarii k Federal’nomu Zakonu,‘Ob Obshchikh Printsipakh Organizatsii Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii’ (Postateinyi), Moscow: Yustitsinform, 2006. Federal Law, No. 34, 18 April 2005, ‘O Vnesenii Izmenenii v Stat’yu 85 Federal’novo zakona “Ob Obshchikh Printsipakh Organizatsii Mestnovo Samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatstii’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 21 April 2005, http://www.rg.ru/zakon/2005/04/21. html (Accessed 7 July 2006). Federal Law, No. 93, 21 July 2005, ‘O vnesenii izmenenii v zakonodatel’nye akty Rossiiskoi Federatsii, “O vyborakh i Referendymakh i inye Zakondatel’nye akty Rossiiskii Federatsii”’, Rossiiskaya gazeta, 6 August 2005, http://www.rg.ru/zakon/2005/08/06html (Accessed 7 June 2007). Federal Law, No. 202, 31 December 2005, ‘O Vnesenii Izmenenii v Stat’yu 18 Federal’novo zakona, “Ob Obshchikh Printispakh Organizatsii Zakonodatel’nykh (predstavitel’nykh) i Ispolnitel’nykh Organov Gosudarstvennoi Vlasti Sub’ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii” i Federal’nyi Zakon, “O Politicheskikh Partiyakh”’, Rossiiskaya gazeta, 31December 2005. See online version at http://www.rg.ru/zakon/2005/12/31.html (Accessed 7 June 2007). Federal Law, No. 138, 26 November 2006, ‘Ob obespechenii konstitutsionnykh prav grazhdan Rossiisko Federatsii izbitat’ i byt’ izbrannykh v organov mestnovo samoupravleniya’, Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 2006, No. 49. St. 5497. Law of the USSR, 25 June 1980, ‘Ob Osnovnykh Polnomochiyakh Kraevykh, Oblastnykh Sovetov Narodnykh Deputatov’, Pravda, 26 June 1980.

Resolutions Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU, 12 March 1971, ‘O Merakh po Dal’neishemu Uluchsheniyu Raboty Raionnykh i Gorodskikh Sovetov Deputatov Trudyashchiksya’, Pravda, 14 March 1971, pp. 1–2; translated in the CDSP, Vol. 23, No. 11, 1971, pp. 1–5. Resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers, 19 March 1971, ‘O Merakh po Ukrepleniyu Material’no-Finansovoi Bazy Ispolkomov Raionnykh i Gorodskikh Sovetov Deputatov

Bibliography 267 Trudyashchiksya’, Pravda, 20 March 1971, p. 1. Translated in CDSP, Vol. 23, No. 11, 1971, p 5. Resolution of the 5th Session of the RSFSR Congress of People’s Deputies, 1 November 1991, ‘Ob Organizatsii Ispolnitel’noi Vlasti v Period Radikal’noi Ekonomicheskoi Reforma’, VSND RSFSR i VS RSFSR, No. 51, 1991, St. 3010. Resolution of the Russian Federation State Duma, No. 68-I, 10 June 1994, ‘Ob Obespechenii Konstitutsionnykh Prav Naseleniya na Mestnoe Samoupravlenie v Normativnykh Pravovykh Aktakh Sub’ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, Vedomosti Federal’novo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federtsii, No, 6, 1994, St.284. Resolution of the Russian Federation Government, No. 584, 15 August 2001, ‘Programma Razvitiya Byudgetnovo Federalizma v Rossiiskoi Federatsii na Period do 2005 g’. Russian Federation Fiscal Reform Project. Final Report: ‘Government Finance and Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in the Novgorod Region’, Moscow: Center for Fiscal Policy, July 1999, p. 9, http://www.cfp.ru (Accessed 9 March 2003).

Index

asymmetry 2, 12–13, 20, 27, 119–24, 199 autonomy: financial 82, 84, 175, 184, 200–1; local 8, 16, 43, 47, 80 Bashkir Electoral Technology 186–7 Beslan hostage tragedy 20, 26, 166, 180, 201–2 bilateral treaties 19–20, 59, 61, 85, 199 Boex, Jameson 51, 100 budgets 13, 16, 23, 33–5, 49, 50, 53, 56, 61, 72, 76–7, 79, 82–6, 88–105; deficit 81, 105; off-budget funds 34, 84, 181; 1997 law 60, 88–9; regional dominance of 86 Buzin A. Yu. 188 Campbell, Adrian 9, 18, 20, 28, 71, 177 Carothers, Thomas 198 centralization 20, 28, 35, 47, 80; fiscal 76, 111; measuring levels of 95–9; of taxes 90–5, 97; Chebankova, Elena 24 Chernyavsky, A.V. 99, 109 China 83 cities 6, 12, 22, 31, 32–7, 43–4, 45, 51, 61–2, 65, 68; districts (okrugs) 73–4; monoprofile 127–8; one-company 84, 127, 200; small 127–8, 200 Clark, Terry D. 25 Coalson, Robert 21, 22 Collier, David 3 Corwin, Julie A. 187 Dahl, R. A. 3, 4, 187 Dawisha, K. 160, 163 decentralization 5–8, 20, 25–6, 80, 184; fiscal 58, 95–9; under Gorbachev 38 deconcentration 7, 25 delegation 7

democracy 1–2, 8–9, 10, 68, 129, 139, 185–6, 198; decentralization and 184; definitions of 3–6, 196; direct 44; electoral 185, 186, 194; federalism and 26–7; liberal 185; limited 185; local 5–6, 28, 38, 40, 47, 80–1, 130, 148, 184, 199–203; Putin attack on 20, 166, 198, 202; in parties 167 democratic centralism 28, 38 Denters, Bas 15 Desai, Raj M. 86 devolution 7, 25 distribution of powers 7, 11, 14–15, 22 Diamond, Larry 3, 4, 5 dominant power politics 198 Dowley, K. M. 8 dual subordination 28, 43 Elazar, Daniel J. 11, 12, 15, 16, 27 elections: candidates 29–30, 39, 41, 43, 132, 138–9; dearth of candidates 147– 8; dominance of United Russia 156–60; party members in 143, 152–6; to new municipalities 1, 146; laws on 41, 59, 63, 131, 165–6; managed 149–50; registration of candidates 167, 188–9; turnout 8, 14, 133, 138, 147–52, 168, 190–2, 193; voting ahead of schedule 189–90 see manipulation of elections electoral authoritarianism: Schedler’s theory of 185, 188 electoral commissions 143, 186, 188; centralization of 168, 185, 195; control by regional governors 168, 185; domination by United Russia 68, 195–6; electoral system 132, 137, 147, 176, 178, 201; Draft Model Law on 146; and parties 160, 164–7

Index 269 electoral threshold 133, 138, 161–2, 164, 167 electoral vertical 10, 184–5, 198, 202; electoral volatility 160, 162–3 enterprises: divestiture of assets 49, 109– 10, 116–19, 124, 200; public service provision 33, 116–17, 128–30; relations with local councils 32–8, 128–30 Evans, Alfred B. 70, 77 expenditure 17, 37, 49, 56, 69, 71, 84–5, 88, 90, 95, 97, 104–5; centralization of 76; distribution of 108–10; key areas of 107–8; Kozak Commission and 106; 2003 law and 126; of new municipalities 110–11 Federalism 9–10, 165, 167, 202; asymmetrical 12–13; budgetary 90; contract 15, 20, 131; definition of 11–12; and democratization 14, 26–7; and federal intervention 23; fiscal 8–4, 96; harmonization of legislation 23–4; and local self-government 2–3, 15–16, 200; multi-national 12; under Putin 20, 22–3, 25–6; under Yeltsin 13–15 Federation Treaty 13–14 Fish, Steven M. 196 Gel’man, Vladimir 45, 47, 64, 70, 77, 80, 162, 163, 176, 185, 199 Glazychev, Vyacheslav 71, 73, 74, 98, 104 Goldsmith, Mike 15 Golosov, Grigorii V. 162–3 Gorbachev, Mikhail 30, 33, 38, 39, 40, 41 governors: 13, 26; deconcentration of power to 25; presidential appointment of 20–22; powers to appoint mayors 22, 180–3; rights of federal intervention 23 Gritsenko, Elena 126 Hahn, J. W. 2, 29, 38, 40, 41 Hahn, G. M. 24, 171 Hale, Henry E. 163 Hanson, P. 82 heads of administrations: appointment of 22, 26, 63–7, 75, 132; election of, see elections; governors’ right to appoint 22, 180–3; harassment of 178–80; mayors versus governors 175–8; methods of election of 172–3; power and competence of 170–1 Heinemann-Grüder, Andreas 25 John, Peter 2, 7, 8, 52 Jounda, Nikolai 85

Kempton, Daniel R 26 Kirkow, Peter 50, 52, 56, 59 Kosareva, Nadezhda 70, 78 Kourliandskaya, Galina 16, 42, 58, 61, 62, 84, 88, 99, 119, 131, 139, 169, see Kurlyandskaya Kozak, Dmitrii: 22, 25, 70; Kozak Commission 22, 68, 70, 90, 106 Kurlyandskaya, Galina 13, 56, 84, 106, 115, see Kourliandskaya Kynev, A. V. 146, 189 Lankina, Tomila V. 66, 70, 75, 80, 145, 147, 180 Lavrov, A. M. 86, 96 Le Huérou, Anne 177 Leskin, Vladimir 18, 22, 81, 90, 100, 105 Liborakina, Marina I. 56, 69, 70, 76, local charters 66, 131, 169, 175 local councils 28–30, 41, 43–4, 173–5; dissolution of 48–9; domination by communist party 30–2; election of, see elections; and enterprises 32–8; local governance 2, 5, 7–9 local executive committees in the USSR: 28–30, 41, 43–4; domination by CPSU 30–2; and enterprises 32–8; legislation of 1971 35–8 local self-government: constitutional powers of 16–19, 49–50, 58; European Charter of 6, 22, 51, 181; functions and competences of 52–7, 59, 69–72; Gorbachev reforms of 38–42; number of municipalities 1, 62, 68–9, 146; political institutions of 58, see heads of administrations, and local councils and local executive committees in the USSR; Soviet laws on 42–6; Yeltsin dissolution of 48–9; statist and societal concepts of 9, 16–18, 27, 67, 70, 198–200, 203 Lukin, Alexander 186 Mainwaring, Scott 139 manipulation of elections: 10, 187–8; Dagestan 191; Kineshma 194; Klimov 189; Moscow 188; Omsk 193; Orel 194; Perm’ 193; Saratov 192–3; St. Petersburg 189–90; Tatarstan 191–2; Volzhsk 190–1 Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge 51, 91, 97, 100, 117 mayors see heads of administrations McFaul, Michael 161

270

Index

Mendras, Marie 177, 178, merger of federal subjects 24–25 Mitrokhin, Sergei 59, 64 Mokryi, Vladimir 69, 78 monetization of benefits 115–16, 200 Morton, Henry W. 32, 33, 36 municipal debts/deficits 75, 82, 123–6 O’Donnell, G. 186 Oreshkin, Dmitrii 168, 190 Orttung, R 84, 111 parties: dominance of United Russia 156– 60, electoral system and 160, 164–7; participation in elections 139–45, 152, 155–6; fragmentation of 162–3; reforms under Putin 165–8; substitutes 163; weak institutionalization 160–5, see also elections and electoral volatility Petrov, Nikolai 180, 186 Podporina, Irina 119 Porter, Thomas E. 1, 16, 39, 41, 43 Pratchett, Lawrence 1, 82, 184 Pribylovskii, Vladimir, 186 Przeworski, Adam, 5 public power 70, 200 Ragozina, Lyudmila 79, 180, Reddaway, Peter 84, 111 revenues 13, 23, 34–6, 42, 83–5; assigned 99–103; centralization of 90–5, 96–9, see also taxes; grants 103–4; impact of 2003 law on 75, 77, 104–5; non-tax 99; own 82, 99–103; regional domination of 75, 86–7; regulated 99–103; share in consolidated budget of Russian Federation 96–9; subsidies 13; subventions 103–4; types of 99–104; 1997 Law and 88–9; 2005 Budget Programme and 89–90 Reynolds, Sarah J. 28 Rodio, Guido 69 Rose, Lawrence E. 15 Rosenbaum, Allan 16, 25, 108, 184 Ryzhenkov, Sergei 61 Ryzhkov, Vladimir 21, 186 Sakwa, Richard 20, Schedler, Andreas 4, 185, 187, 188, 198 Scully, Timothy R. 139 Smirnyagin, Leonid 70, 178 socio-economic variations: local 123–4; regional 119–23

Shvetsov, A. N. 123, 124, Sisk, Timothy D. 2, 5, 7, 8, 11, 52, 129, 164, 187, 196, 202 Slider, Darrell 26, 51, 59, 175, 177 Smith, Graham, 28, 29 Soos, Gabor 5, 6, 184, 2003 state capture 85 Stockling, Hans Ulrich 69 Stoker, Gerry 5, 8 Stoner-Weiss, Kathryn 85 Stykow, Petra 168 subsidiarity 6 Taubman, William 35 tax code 23, 78, 89, 100 tax system: 45, 84, 87–88; and 2005 Budget Programme 89–90; centralization of 90–95, 96–9; local taxes 88–90, 92, 96, 103–4 Theen, R. H. W 40, 47 Thiessen, Ulrich 106, 107 Timofeev, Andrey 7, 51, 88, 89, 90, 109 Tishkov, Valery 49, 64, 203 Turovsky, Rostislav F. 177 unfunded mandates 77, 111–15, 200, 272 United Russia: 21, 22, 26, 152, 162, 163, 164, 165–7; and appointment of mayors 181–2; dominance of electoral commissions 168, 194–6 see electoral commissions; membership of local councils and executives 156–60; membership of regional assemblies 167 Veshnyakov, A. A. 166, 191, 196, 197 votes against all: in municipal elections 150–2; in regional elections 153–5 Watts, Ronald L. 11, 12, 26 White, Stephen 161, 162 Whitefield, Stephen 33 Wilson, Gary N. 71, 77, 79 Wollmann, Hellmut 16, 44, 126, 175 Young, John F. 1, 16, 39, 41, 43, 71, 77, 79, 87, 89, 109, 176 Zakaria, Fareed 5 zemstvos 16–17, 47 Zentai, Violetta 5, 6, 184, 203