Two Replies Nelson Goodman The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 64, No. 9, The New Riddle of Induction, II. (May 11, 1967), pp. 286-287. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X%2819670511%2964%3A9%3C286%3ATR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G The Journal of Philosophy is currently published by Journal of Philosophy, Inc..
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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
The question arises whether Carnapian inductive logic when restricted to inductively static properties avoids the difficulties engendered by bizarre predicates. I am not clear now how to go about answering this question. JOHN M. VICKERS
University of California a t Irvine
TWO REPLIES I
R. DAVIDSON * asks for a reason against accepting the hypothesis: H , All emeroses are gred as lawlike. T h e reason is the same as the reason against accepting H2 All emeralds are grue as lawlike: that positive instances do not in general confirm the hypothesis. An emerald found before t to be grue does not increase our belief that emeralds examined after t will be grue. Likewise, an emerose found before t to be gred does not increase our belief that emeroses examined after t will be gred. I n contrast, emeralds found before t to be green do increase our belief that emeralds found after t will be green. Mr. Davidson seems to want a reason, in terms of the syntactic or semantic character of the predicates involved, why this is so; but no such reason has ever been found. Just this raises the crucial problem of projectibility and leads to my attack upon it in terms of entrenchment. T h a t H , seems true while H2 seems false is quite irrelevant. In accepting H , we make tacit use of evidence that all roses are red, which, together with evidence that all emeralds are green, confirms the hypothesis H , All emeralds are green and all roses are red, which has H , as a consequence. Mr. Davidson suggests that lawlikeness depends upon some relation between the predicates of a hypothesis. Even if we agree-as I do not-that H , is lawlike, how would we characterize the significant relationship that obtains between 'emerose' and 'gred', and also between 'emerald' and 'green', but not between 'emerald' and 'grue'? Equality of entrenchment is hardly enough; but attempting any syntactic or semantic characterization of the relationship would seem at
M
* In "Emeroses by' Other Names," this J o u n N A r . ,
r.xIr1,
24 (Dec. 22, 1966): 778-780.
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TWO REPLIES
least as futile as attempting any such characterization of the projectibility of separate predicates. I1
Mr. Wallace -1. ingeniously produces a statement that is true if and only if lawlike. This does not, as he seems to think, have any dire consequences for my theory of projection. T h e lawlikeness in question here is a fixed property like truth; and to know that a given hypothesis is true if and only if lawlike does not help us decide whether or not it is true and lawlike, or whether to project it at a given time in favor of a competing hypothesis. Although the hypothesis H4 All emeralds are grue emeralds may be true if and only if lawlike, whether it is to be projected at a given moment depends upon whether it survives competition with other hypotheses, such as H , All emeralds are green emeralds. H , and H , compete if we assume that some emerald is either a green emerald or a grue emerald but not both. T h e entrenchment of 'grue emerald' is judged now to be much less than that of 'green emerald'; and H , is accordingly rejected. Our judgment may, of course, be wrong. If the two predicates are in fact coextensive, then they are equally well entrenched. But our mistake under these circumstances carries small penalty; for in this case H , and H , are equivalent. Hence, though H4 is rejected, an equivalent is accepted-and subsequent discovery of this equivalence will reinstate H,. NELSON GOODMAN
Brandeis University NOTES AND NEWS The editors of the JOURNAL report with deep regret the untimely death of Norwood Russell Hanson, Professor of Philosophy of Yale, author of many books and articles in the philosophy of science, and frequent contributor to this JOURNAL. Professor Hanson was killed in an airplane accident on April 1 8 ; at the time of his death he was forty-three years old. The International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy will meet in Milan and Gardonne Riviera, 9-13 September, where the following principal papers will be presented: September 1 0 , "The Relationship between the Ontological and the Normative Aspects of Legal Science," NORB E R T ~BOBBIO, University of Turin, and JEANNE PARAIN-VIAL, University of Dijon; September 1 1 , "The Relationship between the Ontological and Normative Elements under Axiological Aspects," or "Validity and Value," LUIS
t In "Lawlikeness = Truth," this JOURNAL,
LXIII, 24
(Dec. 22, 1966): 780-781.
