Turning Points - Actual and Alternate Histories: The Reagan Era from the Iran Crisis to Kosovo

T U R N I N G P O I N T S — A C T U A L A N D A LT E R N A T E H I S T O R I E S

The Reagan Era from the Iran Crisis to Kosovo

Other titles in ABC-CLIO’s T U R N I N G P O I N T S — A C T U A L A N D A LT E R N A T E H I S T O R I E S

series

Native America from Prehistory to First Contact Colonial America from Settlement to the Revolution Manifest Destiny and the Expansion of America A House Divided during the Civil War Era America in Revolt during the 1960s and 1970s

Books in the Turning Points—Actual and Alternate Histories series ask the question What would have happened if . . . ? In a unique editorial format, each book examines a specific period in American history, presents the real, or actual, history, and then offers an alternate history— speculations from historical experts on what might have happened had the course of history turned. If a particular event had turned out differently, history from that turning point forward could be affected. Important outcomes frequently hinge on an individual decision, an accidental encounter, a turn in the weather, the spread of a disease, or a missed piece of information. Such events stimulate our imagination, accentuating the role of luck, chance, and individual decision or character at particular moments in time. The examination of such key turning points is one of the reasons that the study of history is so fascinating. For the student, examining alternate histories springing from turning points and exploring, What would have happened if . . . ? gives insight into many of the questions at the heart of our civilization today.

TURNING POINTS— A C T U A L A N D A LT E R N A T E H I S T O R I E S

The Reagan Era from the Iran Crisis to Kosovo Rodney P. Carlisle and J. Geoffrey Golson, Editors

Santa Barbara, California Denver, Colorado Oxford, England

Copyright 2008 by ABC-CLIO, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The Reagan era from the Iran crisis to Kosovo / Rodney P. Carlisle and J. Geoffrey Golson, editors. p. cm.—(Turning points—actual and alternate histories) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-85109-885-9 (hard copy : alk. paper) ISBN 978-1-85109-886-6 (ebook) 1. United States—Politics and government—1981-1989. 2. United States— Politics and government—1989-1993. 3. Reagan, Ronald. 4. Bush, George, 1924- 5. United States—Foreign relations—1981-1989. 6. United States— Foreign relations—1989-1993. 7. Imaginary histories. I. Carlisle, Rodney P. II. Golson, J. Geoffrey. E876.R394 2008 973.927—dc22 2007016501 11 10 09 08 07

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

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Contents

Contributors xi Introduction xiii

1

The 1980 Election 1 TURNING POINT

What if Jimmy Carter had been more successful in his first term and was reelected in 1980 to a second term? Introduction 1 Turning Point 7 Actual History 8 Alternate History 16 Discussion Questions 20 Bibliography and Further Reading 21

2

Reaganomics 23 TURNING POINT

What if support for supply-side economics had not developed and stagflation had led to a depression in the 1980s? Introduction 23 Turning Point 28 Actual History 32 Alternate History 36 Discussion Questions 40 Bibliography and Further Reading 41

3

Euromissiles 43 TURNING POINT

What if the Soviets had overreacted to U.S. installation of new missiles in Europe? Introduction 43 Turning Point 50

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Actual History 51 Alternate History 55 Discussion Questions 58 Bibliography and Further Reading 58

4

Shooting of the President 61 TURNING POINT

What if Reagan had died from his bullet wound and George H. W. Bush had become president? Introduction 61 Turning Point 63 Actual History 67 Alternate History 72 Discussion Questions 75 Bibliography and Further Reading 76

5

“Tear Down This Wall, Mr. Gorbachev” 77 TURNING POINT

What if Soviet politics had stopped Gorbachev’s reforms and Soviet troops had reinforced hard-line regimes? Introduction 77 Turning Point 85 Actual History 90 Alternate History 96 Discussion Questions 101 Bibliography and Further Reading 102

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The Gorbachev Coup 103 TURNING POINT

What if the anti-Gorbachev hard-liners had led a successful coup in the Soviet Union? Introduction 103 Turning Point 108 Actual History 110 Alternate History 116 Discussion Questions 122 Bibliography and Further Reading 123

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Iran-Contra Affair 125 TURNING POINT

What if Oliver North had succeeded in his arms-hostages deal and used funds for an anti-Castro coup in Cuba? Introduction 125 Turning Point 132 Actual History 133 Alternate History 138

CO N T E N T S

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Discussion Questions 143 Bibliography and Further Reading 143

8

Roe v. Wade 145 TURNING POINT

What if Reagan had appointed Supreme Court justices who had unraveled parts of Roe v. Wade? Introduction 145 Turning Point 152 Actual History 154 Alternate History 157 Discussion Questions 161 Bibliography and Further Reading 162

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George H. W. Bush 163 TURNING POINT

What if George H. W. Bush had been reelected in 1992 and a second Iraq war had been fought in the 1990s? Introduction 163 Turning Point 169 Actual History 171 Alternate History 176 Discussion Questions 178 Bibliography and Further Reading 179

10

The Persian Gulf War 181 TURNING POINT

What if Israel had attacked in retaliation for Scuds launched by the Iraqis? Would the Arabs have withdrawn from the Coalition? Introduction 181 Turning Point 185 Actual History 189 Alternate History 194 Discussion Questions 198 Bibliography and Further Reading 199

11

Kosovo 201 TURNING POINT

What if Russia had reacted to the U.S./NATO alliance by coming to Serbia’s aid? Introduction 201 Turning Point 211 Actual History 213 Alternate History 214 Discussion Questions 217 Bibliography and Further Reading 217

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Appendix I Remarks at the Brandenburg Gate 219 Appendix II Iran-Contra: The Underlying Facts 225 Chronology of the Reagan Era 237 Resources 245 Index 249

Contributors

Chapter 1 • The 1980 Election Bill Kte’pi Independent Scholar

Chapter 7 • Iran-Contra Affair Lawrence E. Cline American Military University

Chapter 2 • Reaganomics Wade K. Ewing University of Pittsburgh

Chapter 8 • Roe v. Wade Heather A. Beasley University of Colorado at Boulder

Chapter 3 • Euromissiles Robert N. Stacy Independent Scholar

Chapter 9 • George H. W. Bush Heather A. Beasley University of Colorado at Boulder

Chapter 4 • Shooting of the President Elizabeth A. Kramer Independent Scholar

Chapter 10 • The Persian Gulf War Robert N. Stacy Independent Scholar

Chapter 5 • “Tear Down This Wall, Mr. Gorbachev” Elizabeth Purdy Independent Scholar

Chapter 11 • Kosovo Robert N. Stacy Independent Scholar

Chapter 6 • The Gorbachev Coup Joseph C. Santora Independent Scholar

Introduction

I . . . regard the chief utility of all historical and sociological investigations to be to admonish us of the alternative possibilities of history. —Oscar Jaszi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy There is nothing new about counterfactual inference. Historians have been doing it for at least two thousand years. —Philip Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics The question, What would have happened if . . . ? is asked all the time as historians, students, and readers of history examine past events. If some event had turned out differently, the whole course of history from that particular turning point forward could have been affected, we are often reminded. Important outcomes frequently hinge on an individual decision, an accidental encounter, a missed piece of information. Such events stimulate our imagination, accentuating the role of luck, chance, and individual decision or character at particular moments in time. The examination of such key hinge points is one of the reasons that the study of history is so fascinating. “Alternate history” has become a fictional genre, similar to science fiction, in that it proposes other worlds, spun off from the one we live in, derived from some key hinge point in the past. Harry Turtledove, among others, has produced novels along these lines. Turtledove has written a widely sold sequence of books that follow an alternate past from “counterfactual” Confederate victory at the battle of Antietam, resulting in the rise of the Confederate States of America as a separate nation, with consequences well into the twentieth century. Alternate or counterfactual history is more than a form of imaginative speculation or engaging entertainment, however. Historians are able to highlight the significance of an event they examine by pointing to the consequences of the event. When many significant consequences flow from a single event, the alternate history question is implicit—the consequences would have been different, and a strange and different history would have flowed from that time forward if the specific event in question had turned out differently. Those events that would have made the

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most dramatic or drastic alternate set of consequences are clearly among the most important; thus key battles in wars are often studied in great detail, but not only for their own sake. The importance of such battles as Gettysburg and Antietam is not simply military. Instead, those battles and others are significant because such deep consequences flowed from their outcomes. The same could be said of General Erich Ludendorff’s offensive in 1918—had it been successful, the Allies might have been defeated in World War I, and the map of Europe and the rest of the twentieth century would have been very different from the way they actually turned out. Similarly, if for some reason, the nuclear weapons used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 had failed, the outcome of World War II could have been very different, perhaps with a greater role for the Soviet Union in the dissolution of the Japanese Empire. Others have argued that had the bombs not been used, Japan would have been defeated quite promptly even without them. Every key event raises similar issues. What might the world have been like if Christopher Columbus and his sailors had failed to return from their voyage in 1492? What if Hernán Cortés and Francisco Pizarro had been soundly defeated in their attempts to defeat the Aztecs and the Inca Empire? What if John Wilkes Booth had failed in his assassination attempt on Abraham Lincoln? What sort of world would we live in if any of the other famous victims of assassination had survived, such as John F. Kennedy, Martin Luther King, Jr., or Malcolm X? For the student, examining alternate histories springing from multiple turning points and exploring What would have happened if . . . , gives insight into many of the questions at the heart of history. What was the role of specific individuals, and how did their exercise of free will and choice at a moment in time affect later events? On the other hand, to what extent are the actions of individuals irrelevant to the larger outcomes? That is, in any particular period of history, were certain underlying forces at work that would have led to the same result, no matter what the individual did? Do underlying structures, and deeper causes, such as economic conditions, technological progress, climate, natural resources, and diseases, force events into a mold that individuals have always been powerless to alter? The classic contest of free will and determinism is constantly at work in history, and an examination of pivotal turning points is key to understanding the balance between deep determining forces and the role of individuals. Frequently, it seems, no matter what individuals tried to do to affect the course of events, the events flowed onward in their same course; in other cases, however, a single small mistake or different personal decision seems to have affected events and altered the course of history. Close study of specific events and how they might have otherwise turned out can illuminate this challenging and recurrent issue. Of course, when reviewing What would have happened if . . . , it is important to realize exactly what in fact really did happen. So in every chapter presented in this series, we are careful to explain first what actually happened, before turning to a possible alternative set of events that could have happened, and the consequences through later history that might have flowed from an alternate development at a particular turning point. By looking at a wide variety of such alternatives, we see how much

INTRODUCTION

of history is contingent, and we gain greater insight into its specific events and developments. Alternate histories would have flowed had there been different outcomes of a great variety of events, many of them far less famous than the outstanding battles, and the lives and deaths of explorers, conquerors, statesmen, and political leaders. Seemingly obscure or little-recognized events in the past, such as legislative decisions, court cases, small military engagements, and even the lives of obscure minor officials, preachers, writers, and private citizens, frequently played a crucial part in shaping the flow of events. It is clear that if any of the great leaders of the world had died as infants, the events in which they participated would have been altered; but we tend to forget that millions of minor players and less famous people take actions in their daily lives in events such as battles, elections, legislative and judicial decisions, sermons, speeches, and published statements that have sometimes altered the course of history. Alternate histories are known as “counterfactuals,” that is, events that did not in fact happen. Some counterfactuals are more plausible than others. A few historians have argued that all counterfactuals are absurd and should not be studied or considered. However, any historical work that goes beyond simply presenting a narrative or chronological list of what happened, and begins to explore causes through the use of such terms as “influenced,” “precipitated,” or “led to,” is in fact implying some counterfactual sequences. A historian, in describing one event as having consequences, is by implication suggesting the counterfactual that if the event had not occurred, the consequences would have been different. If history is to be more than a chronicle or simple listing of what happened and is to present “lessons” about statecraft, society, technology development, diplomacy, the flow of ideas, military affairs, and economic policy, it must explore how causes led to consequences. Only by the study of such relationships can future leaders, military officers, business people and bankers, legislators and judges, and perhaps most important, voters in democratic nations gain any knowledge of how to conduct their affairs. To derive the lessons of history, one has to ask what the important causes were, the important hinge events that made a difference. And once that question is asked, counterfactuals are implied. Thus the defenders of the approach suggest that counterfactual reasoning is a prerequisite to learning lessons from history. Even many historians who resolutely avoid talking about “what might have been” are implying that what in fact happened was important because the alternative, counterfactual event did not happen. Two scholars who have studied counterfactuals in depth, Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, in an edited collection of articles, Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics (Princeton University Press, 1996), have concluded that counterfactual reasoning can serve several quite different purposes in the study of history. They define these types of counterfactual work: 1. Case-study counterfactuals that “highlight moments of indeterminacy” in history by showing how things might have turned out differently at such hinge points because of individual free choices. These studies tend to focus on the uniqueness of specific events.

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2. “Nomothetic” counterfactuals that focus on underlying deterministic laws or processes, examining key events to show how likely or unlikely it was for events to have turned out differently. The purpose of this type of study is to test how powerful an underlying law or process is by imagining alternative situations or decisions. 3. A combination of types one and two above, blending the test of theory or underlying law approach with the unique event approach. 4. “Mental stimulation” counterfactuals that highlight underlying assumptions most people have by showing how causes that most people believe are inconsequential could have major effects, and other causes that most people believe are very important might have little or no effect in changing the course of history. The reader will recognize aspects of each of these different models in the accounts that follow. Moreover, the reader can find the contrasts between actual history and alternate history quite puzzling and thought provoking, as they are intended to be. As readers study the cases, they may want to keep asking questions such as these: What was the key hinge point on which the author focused? Is the altered key event a plausible change—something that could easily have happened? Was the change “minimal” in the sense that only one or a few turning point events had to turn out differently than they in fact did? Did the alternate outcome seem to develop in a realistic way; that is, does the alternate sequence of events seem to be one that would be likely once the precipitating change took place? How plausible is the alternate long-term outcome or consequence that the author suggested? Was the changed key event a matter of an individual person’s choice, a matter of accident, or a change in some broader social or technological development? Does the counterfactual story help us make judgments about the actual quality of leadership displayed in fact at the time? That is, did key actors in real history act more or less wisely in fact than they did in the counterfactual account? Does the outcome of the episode suggest that, despite the role of chance and individual choice, certain powerful forces shaped history in similar directions, in both the factual and counterfactual account? Does the account make me think differently about what was important in history? Does the counterfactual story challenge any assumptions I had before I read it? Remember, however, that what really happened is the object of historical study. We examine the counterfactual, alternate histories to get a better understanding of the forces and people that were at work in what really did occur. These counterfactual stories will make you think about history in ways that you have never encountered before; but when you have explored them, you should be able to go back to the real events with fresh questions in mind.

INTRODUCTION

Introduction to The Reagan Era Volume In this volume of the series, we see how counterfactual and alternative history can help us understand the events of the 1980s and 1990s. During this period, the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union reached a new pitch of intensity, and then, rather quickly through the late 1980s, diminished. Quite suddenly, it seemed, the world changed. After years of negotiations and efforts to control nuclear weapons, the United States and the Soviet Union entered into a series of nuclear disarmament treaties and began to destroy a large fraction of their nuclear arsenals. Through mutually agreed inspection schemes, each side was able to verify that the other side was conforming to the agreements. The threat of nuclear warfare between the two superpowers diminished, and then appeared to vanish altogether. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union itself broke up into fifteen constituent republics, four of them retaining some fraction of the former nuclear arsenal: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Russia continued to retain a smaller number of nuclear weapons and to work on arms reduction, while the other three willingly abandoned the weapons and the expense of maintaining them. By 1990, it appeared that a “new world order” was emerging, with the United States as the world’s only superpower. The United Nations would help oversee troublesome regions in the world. However, several of those trouble spots soon began to indicate the sorts of crises that the post–Cold War world would encounter. With Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and then with genocide and ethnic cleansing sweeping the republics of the former Yugoslavia, it appeared that the new world order was hardly orderly. Instead, with rogue states like Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Serbia; failed states like Somalia and Afghanistan; and groups of terrorists independent of any state control pursuing a variety of agendas, the shape of the future began to emerge. Within the United States, President Reagan faced an attempted assassination, which left him wounded. The nation marveled at his good spirits during his recovery but soon realized that the era of assassination of leaders that had dominated the 1960s—with the deaths of John Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, and Martin Luther King, Jr.—had not ended. The nation’s course and destiny could be altered at any moment by a deranged individual or a group of dedicated conspirators who succeeded in carrying out a criminal act. President Reagan’s second term was marred by the Iran-Contra scandal; investigation of this episode revealed that elements of the administration had conducted a secret deal to raise funds and to purchase weapons to oppose the pro-communist regime in Nicaragua. This secret support for the contra-revolutionaries was in direct violation of congressional restrictions. President Reagan’s successor, George Herbert Walker Bush, oversaw the reaction of the United States to the Iraq invasion of Kuwait. In the Persian Gulf War, the United States acted as part of a multinational coalition, supported by several European Allies as well as several Muslim and Arab states. Acting under the authority of the United Nations Security Council, Operation Desert Storm proceeded to evict the army of Iraq from Kuwait, and then to accept the surrender of the Iraqi forces. A stringent peace was imposed on Iraq, in which that country would not be able to operate fixed-wing aircraft over either its northern, Kurdish region or the Shia-populated southern third of the country. In addition, Saddam

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Hussein accepted visits by United Nations weapons inspectors to ensure that his programs to produce weapons of mass destruction, including poison gas and nuclear weapons, were brought to an end. With those provisions, the ground was set for future difficulties that would come early in the next century. As we look at the actual history of these events, we can see the importance of numerous individuals, their decisions, and the role of chance in history if we imagine different scenarios at each of a variety of Turning Points. During the last years of the Cold War, the two superpowers could very easily have unleashed a nuclear holocaust if an accident had occurred. The slight change of the angle of a wild gunshot could have proven fatal to President Reagan. If the Iran-Contra exchange had succeeded rather than being revealed, it might have emboldened the administration to attempt an overthrow of the communist regime in Cuba. Had George Herbert Walker Bush been elected to a second term, the Persian Gulf War might have been followed by a longer and more difficult Iraq war in the mid-1990s rather than in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Each of these “might have beens” would have had long-range consequences that would have changed the world. Speculating about the alternatives and the counterfactuals through this period of the recent past suggests the importance of the role of the individual in shaping history. At the same time, some of the outcomes suggested here show that if we are to unravel the twisted lessons of history, we must recognize that long-range and underlying causes are also crucial. While Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev appeared to reshape the world’s destiny, they had to deal with the momentum of events that had created the Cold War. Although individual players like Oliver North, a leader in the Iran-Contra operation, and John Hinckley, Jr., Reagan’s attempted assassin, also tried to shape events, the world was moving in a certain direction and might very well have continued to do so, whether or not they succeeded in their separate plots. WARNING! You are probably used to reading a book of history to find out what happened. We offer this book with a major warning. In this volume, the reader will see what actually happened, and that part of history is always designated ACTUAL HISTORY. However, the last part of each chapter presents a history that never happened, and that is presented as the ALTERNATE HISTORY. To be sure it is clear that the ALTERNATE HISTORY is an account of what would have happened differently if a TURNING POINT had turned out differently than it really did, the ALTERNATE HISTORY is always presented against a gray background, like these lines. The ALTERNATE HISTORY is what might have happened, what could have happened, and perhaps what would have happened, if the TURNING POINT had gone a little differently. Think about this alternate history, and why it would have been different. But don’t think that it represents the way things actually happened!

INTRODUCTION

Each chapter is also accompanied by informative sidebars, and a few discussion questions that take off from the ACTUAL HISTORY and the ALTERNATE HISTORY that allow readers to think through and argue the different sides of the issues that are raised here. We also want to warn readers that some may be surprised to discover that history, when viewed in this light, suddenly becomes so fascinating that they may never want to stop learning about it! Rodney Carlisle

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The 1980 Election

What if Jimmy Carter had been more successful in his first term and was reelected in 1980 to a second term?

INTRODUCTION The 1980 presidential election was a turning point in both American politics and the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Cold War had persisted since the end of World War II, reached its apex with the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, and aside from the proxy war of the conflict in Vietnam, had subsided for most of the late 1960s and 1970s, the time of détente. The Democratic incumbent Jimmy Carter was the first president to serve a full term after the Watergate scandal that had led to President Richard Nixon’s resignation, and his loss to neoconservative Ronald Reagan signaled a new era in both domestic and international politics as well as the national economy. Carter was the classic example of an “outsider” candidate, a conservative southern Democrat—a Dixiecrat in all but his opposition to segregation. Although he had appeased segregationists in his 1970 Georgia gubernatorial campaign by refusing to condemn Alabama governor George Wallace and talked about states’ rights (“states’ rights” was often a coded phrase for the right of states to retain segregation), he decried the practice of segregation in his inaugural speech. At a time when most Deep South politicians would have considered it political suicide to do so, Carter declared that the age of discrimination and segregation was dead, and that neither would have any place in Georgia thenceforth. His conservatism in other respects won him much support: he was fiscally conservative especially when it came to government spending on public works and other leftover New Deal policies, calling them “pork barrel” expenses, ways for politicians to line the pockets of their supporters. He was a staunchly religious Christian whose sister Ruth was a well-known evangelical. Carter served only one term as governor before running for president, and his election was an astonishing testament to the public’s desire for an outsider untainted by Washington, D.C., given the brevity of his public life and his lack of federal-level credentials or experience. He was not

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CHAPTER 1

The 1980 Election

KEY CONCEPT

Neoconservative

The term neoconservative has been around for much of the twentieth century, but when used now it generally refers to a strain of American conservative thought that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s and came to power in the 1980s and 1990s. Neoconservatism was a movement away from traditional American conservatism in two principal ways: first, unlike the older conservativism (or paleoconservativism), neoconservatism is not isolationist or protectionist. Instead it seeks to establish national security through international action: a stable world is a safe world for America, and a safe world for America is a democratic free-market world. Rather than working with any government, as long as trade is healthy and communism is opposed, neoconservatives encourage real, functioning, American-style democracy and free markets around the world. Neoconservatives oppose communism and the Islamic fundamentalism of

the Middle East, tending to view world affairs in World War II terms: enemy leaders are described as potential Hitlers who need to be stopped before they bloom into full villainy, and the specter of the postwar spread of Eastern European communism is often invoked. While the worldview indicated by the references to “evil” made by Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush is not universal to all neoconservatives, it is an example of neoconservative thinking. Second, neoconservatism is more friendly to social programs than traditional conservatism or the extreme anti-welfare sentiments of libertarianism. In the 1960s through the 1980s especially, many neoconservatives were Democrats—either operating within their own party (paleoliberals who, like Carter, were opposed to the changes the New Deal Era had wrought on American liberalism) or moving to the Republican Party, like many of Reagan’s supporters and indeed Reagan himself. A number of neoconservatives in the 1980s

naive, though; a savvy politician, he rarely misrepresented himself in his presidential campaign but knew which element to emphasize at any given time. He was up front about his religious beliefs, even when they earned him mild ridicule, and was a clear alternative to the likable but suspect incumbent Gerald Ford, who had pardoned Nixon and finished out Nixon’s term. Carter’s win was by a narrow margin, but he was the first candidate from the Deep South to be elected since General Zachary Taylor in 1848—before the Civil War and Reconstruction, before the civil rights movement and integration. The new president inherited a floundering economy that had already suffered an energy crisis in 1973 and saw inflation rise to double digits as unemployment soared. His appointee Paul Volcker, chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, would eventually succeed in bringing inflation down from historic highs, but it was a slow process. In the meantime, the Carter administration saw more short-term gains in foreign policy. Carter continued Nixon’s work in building friendly relations with the People’s Republic of China, and he put human rights at the forefront of his agenda, condemning abuses around the world. The Republican Party and much of the American public opposed his signing of the treaty that gave control of the Panama Canal to Panama, but the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) were much more popular, resulting in treaties that reduced nuclear warheads in both American and Soviet arsenals. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979—motivated in part, many feared, by the desire for Middle Eastern oil—Carter promised that no outside force

Carter reelected in 1980? 3

KEY CONCEPT

Neoconservative (Continued)

were swayed by Reagan’s Cold War policies but still embraced the domestic programs of the Democratic Party. Essentially, neoconservatism is so focused on foreign policy and international affairs that individual neoconservatives can conceivably hold any number of beliefs about domestic policies. Emerging in 1997, the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) is now the best-known neoconservative institution and synonymous in many minds with the movement. The PNAC is a nonprofit organization devoted to establishing American global leadership through greater military spending, more hands-on involvement in global affairs, a new space-based branch of the armed forces, and other such initiatives. Members include Donald Rumsfeld; Dick Cheney; former ambassador to the UN, the late Jeane Kirkpatrick; and many members of President George W. Bush’s cabinet.The PNAC has been criticized for the chauvinism inherent to its goals: one cannot propose

that American-style government is best for the world without implying that American-style government is better than other governments. But in essence it has much in common with both leftand right-wing movements of the past and simply phrases its goals in terms of the desire for a safe America rather than more specifically an America safe from foreign interference (as the nineteenthcentury statesmen would have said) or communist infiltration (as many twentieth century thinkers saw it). The current neoconservatives can be traced back directly to Carter, the conservative Democrat; and Reagan, the new-style Republican with bipartisan appeal. Of course the influences are older than that, but today’s neoconservatives originated in an era discovering that conflict in the Middle East could affect the world more than communism in Southeast Asia, one that took for granted the notion that the United States would thenceforth have a hand in international affairs.

July 15, 1976: Jimmy Carter (left) and Walter Mondale at the Democratic National Convention. (Library of Congress)

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The 1980 Election

IN CONTEXT

The 1973 Oil Crisis

During the Yom Kippur War, the OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) members, as well as Egypt and Syria, refused to ship oil to nations allied with Israel—the United States and much of Western Europe. OPEC included most of the Middle East’s oil-producing countries, as well as Venezuela, Nigeria, and Indonesia. At a time when inflation was already problematic and American oil consumption had doubled since the previous generation, the price of oil quadrupled over the course of a year. The embargo caused vast shortages, as public buildings closed to save on heating oil, thermostats in government buildings were locked in place, large American cars were replaced by compact Japanese models, and gas rationing went into effect. In an attempt to reduce the long lines of

motorists waiting for gasoline, drivers of cars with odd-numbered license plates could buy gas only on odd-numbered days; even-numbered license plates could buy on even-numbered days. Thousands of gallons of gasoline were consumed simply by idling cars waiting to be filled. Conservation became a national watchword. The national speed limit of fifty-five miles per hour was instituted because this was determined to be the most energy-efficient speed. Daylight saving time was altered to save on lighting costs, though this resulted in public school hours beginning before sunrise in the winter in the northern parts of the country. American auto manufacturers introduced cars designed to meet new federal requirements. More attention was paid to the possibility

would be allowed to control the Persian Gulf and instituted a boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow, forbidding any American from participating. The greatest accomplishment of the Carter administration was the Camp David Accords. Affairs in the Middle East had been particularly hostile since the Yom Kippur War of 1973, during which a group of Arab nations led by Syria and Egypt launched a surprise attack on Israel on Yom Kippur, the Jewish day of atonement, advancing on territory Israel had seized in the Six Day War of 1967. Jordan and Iraq were also prominently involved, and Algeria, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia all provided troops or equipment. The attack led to a more militarily focused Israel, better able to defend itself and more willing to strike first. In 1978, Carter invited Egyptian president Anwar Sadat and Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin to Camp David, the presidential retreat in Maryland, for secret peace talks. After twelve days, an agreement was signed in which the United States agreed to provide subsidies to both governments; they, in turn, agreed to various conditions to ensure a peaceful relationship. These conditions pertained to such things as passage through the Suez Canal and authority over the Sinai peninsula and the Gaza Strip. The agreement made Sadat unpopular with other Arab nations, but it demonstrated that Israel was willing to negotiate and that the United States could be instrumental in mediating such negotiations. Previously the popular Arab perception had been that Israel was inflexible and that the United States was unwavering in its support of Israel. Between the peace accords and Carter’s friendly relationship with the Shah of Iran—who, though losing some of his Western support, was perhaps the closest the Middle East had to a proAmerican leader—affairs in the Middle East seemed like they had at least the potential for improvement.

Carter reelected in 1980? 5

IN CONTEXT

The 1973 Oil Crisis (Continued)

of oil alternatives, though this attention essentially died off during the apparently prosperous era of the 1980s. By then, though, natural gas and nuclear power had reduced some of the demand for oil, but neither of these affected gas consumption by automobiles. Despite its initial appeal, solar power never caught on to the extent its promoters expected. The economy suffered for the remainder of the 1970s, with inflation continuing to skyrocket and few solutions working until Paul Volcker’s Federal Reserve policies began to pay off in the early 1980s. Alternate sources of oil and non-oil energy contributed to a decline in OPEC’s power, as various nations increased their oil production to meet demand, more American and Canadian sources were found, and the exploitation of Soviet oil

began. The embargo caused the poorest OPEC nations to suffer as much as the nations that were subject to it as they had no way to prepare for the lack of oil sales. Ultimately, the 1973 oil crisis demonstrated the power of the Middle East to affect world events despite the region’s lack of technological or military advantages. The American government considered overthrows and invasions, taking the oil by force, but these solutions were rejected as inappropriate or impractical. This new threat of the Middle East— an economic threat in the midst of the détente that had calmed the world’s fears of nuclear threats— would continue to shape foreign policy to the present day, and the interest of Western world in Middle Eastern affairs would have repercussions again and again.

One of the last major world events of Carter’s presidency was the Iranian Revolution. Although the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, had been an American ally for decades—the Allies had helped him come to power during World War II to replace his father, who was friendly with Adolf Hitler—the United States made no effort to intervene when he was overthrown in 1979. The Shah had abolished Iran’s political parties and ruled with the help of a secret police force, which assisted in countering support the Soviets lent to Iranian communists; however, the Shah had also advocated a number of reforms during his reign, including a redistribution of resources that made many more Iranians landowners, more rights for women and workers, and improvements to education and literacy that also required clergy to pass an exam proving their competence. Many of these reforms had earned him the enmity of Islamic fundamentalists not only in his own country but across the Middle East. More and more, even as Western rulers distanced themselves from the Shah because of his dictatorial policies, his enemies portrayed him as a puppet of the Christian West, and after the Iranian military stopped an anti-Shah protest with extreme force (killing hundreds) in late 1978, antiestablishment sentiment soared. The prime minister of Iran asked the Shah to leave willingly and let the exiled Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini return after fifteen years of exile. Khomeini was an Islamic fundamentalist who had fiercely opposed the Shah’s reforms; after his return to Iran, he rejected the prime minister’s request to establish a constitutional government. Instead he overthrew the remainder of the Shah’s administration and installed his own theocratic rule. The Shah—dying of cancer—sought political asylum in the United States, where Carter’s policy of nonintervention had been formed both by his own disapproval of the Shah’s human rights abuses and the state department’s recommendation that

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any replacement for the Shah would be an improvement from an American perspective. The Iranian Revolution led directly to the energy crisis of 1979. Postrevolution Iran was in disarray and exported less oil than before, and even with other OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) members increasing production, supply was lower and prices higher. Panic set in as people feared that the oil crisis of 1973 might be repeated or worsened; prices skyrocketed, rising in the United States from roughly $15 a barrel to nearly $40, a peak that would not be exceeded until 2006. Lines again formed at gas pumps, and rationing was proposed. Carter had solar panels installed in the White House (which Reagan ordered removed as soon as he took office). The new Iranian government demanded that the Shah be returned to Iran to stand trial for crimes against the people. He eventually left the United States after his medical treatment was finished, but before that happened, Iranian students stormed the American embassy in Tehran and took sixty-six American hostages. Women and African Americans were released after less than a month, but the rest were held for 444 days. Two rescue attempts failed, and the hostage crisis, like the energy crisis and the economy in general, was a critical point in the 1980 presidential election. Presidential candidate Reagan asked the American public if they were better off now than four years ago; the implication was that the country had been better off in 1976 before Carter won the office.

Men bowing in prayer at an Iran Hostage Crisis student demonstration, Washington, D.C., November 30, 1979. (Library of Congress)

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Carter’s opposition in the 1980 election was California Republican governor Ronald Reagan. A former actor who had reported on the communist or “suspicious” activities of his fellow actors in the 1950s, the governor was also a savvy and well-read economist and, like Carter, a staunch Christian. He had nearly won the 1976 Republican nomination and established much of his support then. A neoconservative who attracted backing from many of the right-leaning Democrats, he promised to do away with “big government” and stimulate an economic revival while taking a hard stand against communism and the policies of détente that he believed had left the country—perhaps the Western world—too vulnerable to Soviet attack. Carter tried campaigning by shifting his focus to the right, reinstalling the draft when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and détente came to an end—but Reagan already had the support of conservatives in both parties. The Iran hostage crisis persisted throughout the 1980 campaign, as did the oil crisis. The Reagan campaign—managed by William Casey, whom Reagan would later appoint as the new director of the Central Intelligence Agency—has been accused of letting the hostage crisis last until after the election had been won. (It seemed too coincidental that the hostages were released on Reagan’s inauguration.) But another explanation proposes that Iran’s fear of Reagan’s “trigger happy” reputation encouraged them to negotiate rather than face disproportionate reprisals. The hostage crisis was a public embarrassment, especially once rescue attempts failed, and the Ayatollah railed against the United States—popularizing the term “Great Satan” in reference to the country—without actually giving his approval to the hostage takers. The Shah died in 1980, a few months before Iraq invaded Iran and Carter lost the election, and Carter negotiated a release for the hostages by signing an accord pledging that the United States would not interfere with Iranian internal affairs. The hostages were released in 1981, twenty minutes before Reagan’s inauguration, and Carter was the one who met them—his first act as the former president. The 1980 election signaled more than just a change of presidents; it was a shifting of opinion across the country and the Western world. Margaret Thatcher had been elected prime minister of the United Kingdom in 1979 on a platform much like Reagan’s: smaller government, economic growth, and a return to a prominent, decisive role in global affairs. In the United States, the Republican Party gained control of the Senate. While this rightward movement had been coming for a long time—it was instrumental in the elections of Nixon and Carter—the oil and hostage crises had combined with the weakness of the Democratic Party to do serious damage to the public faith in the Democrats and liberal policies in general. Some historians might even argue that Carter’s deprecation of many New Deal–era policies as symptoms of a bloated government only encouraged his supporters to move on to still more conservative politicians, abandoning not simply the left-leaning segments of the Democratic Party but the party itself.

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Further, the hostage crisis was an evocative shift, showing contradictory American foreign policy toward the Middle East—even under the same administration. While the Shah was one of the few American allies in the region, the administration distanced itself from him in his time of need, even when it had worked with more extreme leaders like Anwar Sadat. The Iran-Iraq War began with Iraq’s attack on Iran, encouraged by Carter because of the hostage crisis—later, both Iraq and Iran would be funded and armed by the American government. From the 1970s onward, this ambiguous and poorly defined relationship—one rarely subject to the same level of scrutiny and public discussion as relationships with the Soviet Union and other communist countries—has proven problematic, perhaps contributing to some of the violence in the region.

ACTUAL HISTORY Ronald Reagan won his election easily. Thanks to the Iranian Revolution, the end of Carter’s term saw America in a much worse position both domestically and internationally than it had been when he took office, and as a well-known actor before he was governor, Reagan had nearly as much “outsider” status as the incumbent. He soon became one of the most popular presidents in history and was certainly one of the strongest and most charismatic. George H. W. Bush, who had dismissed Reagan’s economic plans as “voodoo economics” while vying for the Republican Party presidential nomination for the 1980 election, eventually became his running mate and vice president. Reagan’s economics were supplyside economics: an approach that prescribes increasing production in the belief that increased supply will lead to increased demand. His across-theboard tax cuts encouraged investment, which had slowed in the 1970s. Reagan quickly established himself as a president concerned with economics. His first acts were to eliminate oil price controls and fire air traffic controllers, whose union was striking illegally. Soon after, he initiated his promised tax cuts and cuts to domestic program funding, vastly increased defense spending, and called for a reform of Social Security. Although Reagan had railed against big government, he had no qualms with big spending, and the national debt soared to unheard-of heights as the United States borrowed to cover a rapidly increasing budget deficit caused by the lack of federal revenue. In foreign affairs, Reagan took a strong stand against communism and the Soviet Union. His speeches from this era are justly famous: standing in front of the Berlin Wall in 1987, he addressed a demand to the Soviet premier to tear down the wall; he referred to the Soviet attack on a Korean passenger plane as barbaric, inhuman, and brutal; and speaking to a group of evangelical Christians in 1983, he called the Soviet Union an evil empire. The Reagan administration cast the communist/capitalist divide as a moral one and invoked the notion of evil frequently in its depictions of its enemy, a rhetorical approach rare for decades of American history but one that would be revived in George W. Bush’s twenty-first-century foreign policies. Reagan saw the Soviet Union as on the brink of economic ruin, and his rapid escalation of arms and defense spending were aimed

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Ronald Reagan giving his acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention in July, 1980. (Ronald Reagan Presidential Library)

in part to force the Soviets to overspend in order to keep up. He instituted the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), sometimes nicknamed “Star Wars,” an antimissile defense system that would have included components in space. One of the goals of SDI was to enable the United States to initiate a first strike by eliminating retaliatory missiles—thus upsetting the balance of MAD (mutually assured destruction) that had prevailed for so long, whereby neither side could afford to engage in a nuclear war because both sides were sure to suffer catastrophic losses. Reagan so strongly supported anticommunist movements and governments that the policy came to be known as the Reagan Doctrine. The United States allied with almost any guerrilla group combating a communist government or government resisting communist movements, perhaps the most famous example of which tied into the Iran-Contra Affair. In 1983, thirty hostages including six Americans were taken by Hezbollah, a Lebanese terrorist group. The Reagan administration sold arms to Iran, which needed them in its war against Iraq, in the hopes that Iran could influence the Islamist group to release the hostages; they were transferred indirectly, through Israel as an intermediary. Two years later, military aide Oliver North proposed making the sales directly, with a high markup, and using the profit to fund the Contras, a guerrilla group at war with the left-wing government of Nicaragua (the Sandinistas, who had previously been supported by the Carter administration). All of this was in violation of unofficial policy as well as federal law.

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KEY CONCEPT

MAD and “Star Wars”

The basic unit of nuclear war is the missile; planedeployed bombs are too easily intercepted and have not been a significant part of nuclear strategy since the initial strikes on Hiroshima and Nagasaki that ended World War II in the Pacific. Following World War II, Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) were developed by the United States with the help of Nazi scientists extricated from Germany by a still-classified military and intelligence program called Operation Paperclip. IRBMs could be placed in countries near the Soviet Union and, in the event of a war, deployed to strike the Soviets. But in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the United States developed Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), pushed largely by the need to keep up with the Soviets. The USSR had to develop such missiles because the Russians had no allied territories close enough to the United States for IRBMs to be effective; although IRBMs could strike some U.S. targets because of the proximity of the northeastern corner of the Soviet Union to Alaska, Washington, D.C., and other strategic targets would still be well out of their range. The development of ICBMs that could strike accurately from across the world—and of nuclear submarines that could be stationed in areas that would survive the first strike and ensure retaliation—drove the Cold War into a state of mutually assured destruction (MAD). Although it sounds now almost like a piece of satire, the principle of MAD is not only very simple, but it was for several decades very compelling: as described by Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, MAD exists when one side possesses such capacity

to retaliate after a nuclear strike that such an initial strike is discouraged. Neither side can strike without retaliation; when neither side can survive, nuclear war is not winnable. While MAD therefore theoretically prevented nuclear war, it also required both sides to maintain (and in practice, escalate) their capabilities, demanding almost as much attention as an actual war would have required. When MAD exists, it is difficult for offensive improvements to change the status quo. But defense improvements—defenses that can ensure the survival of a retaliatory strike, or multiple strikes, or an indefinite number of strikes—upset the balance. Ground-based missile defense systems were explored early on, and the Soviet Union used some to protect Moscow. But Reagan, even before he was elected president, envisioned a spacebased missile defense system, one that was itself out of range of missile attacks but which could deflect such attacks while they were en route from their departure point in the Soviet Union to the United States. Imagine a pistol duel at close-range: it is against the interest of both parties to start the duel because of the likelihood that both duelists will die regardless of their respective skill. Now imagine that one duelist, and only one, has a bulletproof vest—or a full suit of body armor. Reagan envisioned a nuclear war that was winnable, and this concept understandably made people nervous on both sides of the Cold War. MAD had been a necessary precondition for détente, but as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan showed, MAD’s prevention

When the truth of the Iran-Contra affair came to light in 1986, several officials resigned or were fired, including North. Reagan never admitted to knowledge of anything other than the arms sale—denying that the sales were part of a hostages deal. The Tower Commission established by Congress to investigate the matter strongly criticized Reagan for letting so much go on without his knowledge but was unable to determine whether his ignorance was genuine. Vice President Bush was affirmed to have been aware of the arrangements, though this did not harm his subsequent presidential campaign and he pardoned many of those involved when he took office.

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KEY CONCEPT

MAD and “Star Wars” (Continued)

of nuclear war did not ensure peace between the two sides, nor did it limit the non-nuclear ways in which the nations could clash. Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, nicknamed “Star Wars” because of its space-based systems and lasers, received a good deal of ridicule in the press because in the mid-1980s when even personal computers were uncommon (the recently

released Macintosh cost as much as a small car and could do less than a cell phone today) the idea of using lasers and satellites in a war seemed needlessly science fictional. But the idea was powerful and at worst would have been expensive. Though SDI was never implemented, aspects of it were adopted for programs put forth by the Bush and Clinton administrations.

President Reagan tells the nation about the Strategic Defense Initiative from the Oval Office in 1983. (Ronald Reagan Presidential Library)

As with Nixon’s Watergate scandal, “what did the president know, and when did he know it” became a question of public concern—but unlike Nixon, Reagan’s reputation remained intact after his approval rating suffered a temporary drop, and public faith in the office of the president seemed largely unchanged. The press—often accused of being complicit in maintaining Reagan’s popularity and failing to ask him the probing questions some issues merited—dubbed him the “Teflon president,” one to whom charges would not stick. He seemed able to survive anything and come out smiling. Meanwhile, the International Court of Justice ruled that the United States was in violation of international law in its support

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The Reagans (left) and Bushes watch the nomination votes at the 1984 Republican National Convention from their hotel room in Dallas, Texas. (Ronald Reagan Presidential Library)

of the Contras on multiple counts of unlawful intervention, use of force, and breach of treaty. The United States refused to recognize the jurisdiction of the court and refused to pay reparations. The Reagan era is sometimes considered to include also the single term as president of his vice president, George H. W. Bush, a term marked principally by the end of the Cold War and the Gulf War in the Middle East. Reagan is widely credited with the former, since the economic problems of the Soviet Union—and later, its constituent member states— seemed to validate his prediction that the nation was on the brink of economic ruin. Mikhail Gorbachev, a reformist elected to the premiership by the Soviet politburo in 1985, reacted to this impending ruin with changes that pushed the Soviet Union closer to a free-market system. With productivity at an alarming low point and a growing number of communist allies entitled to the financial assistance provided by previous administrations, Gorbachev had little choice but to begin work immediately to try to improve the country’s economic situation. His glasnost policy took effect right away; the word means “openness,” and in this case it included not simply the freedoms of speech and the press but a transparency of government that made the bureaucracy visible and answerable to the public. His economic reforms, the policy of perestroika (“restructuring”), began in 1987. Perestroika was a significant and controversial shift away from communism: private ownership of businesses in previously governmentcontrolled industries was now encouraged, as were joint ventures with

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foreign business interests, both of which opened up foreign trade to an extent unheard of in decades. Only two years later, Eastern European communism began its collapse in what is now called the Autumn of Nations: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania all saw reformist revolutions. Several Soviet states sought or declared independence from the union, and the Berlin Wall came down in 1989. In 1991, after a short-lived coup by hard-line communists, the Soviet Union dissolved into its fifteen member states. The Cold War was officially over. Communism itself, though, still thrived—in North Korea and North Vietnam, in Cuba, and most prominently (at least in terms of populations) in China, where in 1989 the government responded to a series of protests in and around Beijing’s Tiananmen Square by allegedly killing approximately 1,000 civilians and injuring thousands more. The protests involved two distinct types of dissatisfied Chinese: those who looked to the Soviet Union as an example and believed that China’s recent political reforms had not gone far enough, and those who looked to the days of Mao Zedong and believed they had gone too far. The hard-line reaction to the pro-reform demonstrators showed that although China was liberating its economy, it was not allowing any progress politically. In 1990, in the midst of the collapse of communism, the next threat was already making itself known. Iraq invaded the small, oil-rich nation of Kuwait, a Western ally and former British protectorate. Iraq had in fact previously tried to annex Kuwait in the 1960s after the smaller nation declared its independence from Britain, but the British military had stopped them. By 1990, Iraq was willing to risk military reprisals because of the expense of the Iran-Iraq War fought during Reagan’s terms (another sense in which Bush’s presidency may be seen as the inertia or followthrough of Reagan’s). The oil crises of the 1970s were a recent memory, and Kuwait’s oil production was significant to the Western economy. The United Nations Security Council, at the request of the United States and the United Kingdom, set a deadline for Iraq’s withdrawal and declared war when it was ignored. The war, fought by a coalition of two dozen nations and including more than five hundred thousand American troops, took less than two months. While the war was controversial in the United States, far more damaging to Bush’s approval rating was his decision to leave Saddam Hussein and his regime in charge of Iraq, feeling that to remove the dictator would leave the United States with the unwieldy and complicated task of administering Iraq during a transition period. Many felt that the war, justified or not, was left incomplete, even unwon, and the next election reflected this: Governor Bill Clinton, Carter-like in his outsider governor status but far more liberal, won the 1992 election and was reelected in 1996, presiding over the 1990s as surely as Reagan had over the 1980s, though he faced a contentious Congress in doing so. Clinton was the youngest president since John F. Kennedy and a popular moderate Democrat, one of the so-called New Democrats who wanted to move the party closer to the center after the overwhelming success of the Reagan elections had convinced others that the party needed to embrace conservatism. His focus was primarily domestic policy— announcing, for instance, that he would allow gays to enter the military.

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His ambitious and hopeful plan for a national health care system, the goal of which was to provide medical care for all American citizens, was defeated by a strong campaign by the Republican Party and the insurance industry. Any hope of its revival was squashed in the 1994 midterm elections, when a new wave of neoconservative Republicans gained a total of fifty-four seats in the House of Representatives, creating the first Republican majority since 1954. The new speaker of the House was Newt Gingrich, a Georgia Republican who co-wrote with Representative Dick Armey the Contract with America (CWA), which had been introduced six weeks before the elections and turned the congressional elections into a national concern, reducing the importance of local issues for the time being. The CWA spelled out specific actions the Republican Party promised to take if granted the majority, with all the Republican candidates and all but two of the Republican congressmen pledging to vote as a bloc on the bills the CWA outlined. Most of the CWA bills died in the Senate, were vetoed by Clinton, or suffered substantial alteration before passing into law, but the issues they dealt with demonstrate the concerns of the Republican Party during the Clinton years: a balanced budget amendment and line-item veto; law and order; welfare reform, including a two- to five-year limit on assistance and the denial of assistance to unwed mothers under eighteen; legal reforms that included limits to corporate liability and punishments for frivolous lawsuits; and a strengthening of parents’ power in their children’s lives, relative to the power of the education system (school voucher proposals fall under this general category while also addressing bipartisan concerns with education reform). Right-wing movements continued to strengthen in the United States. Rush Limbaugh’s radio show was the most visible example of a growing sentiment in the right wing that seemed to suggest most government was bad government. This so-called Republican Revolution—which also saw George W. Bush, son of former President George H. W. Bush, elected governor of Texas—culminated in a government shutdown in early 1996, when Republicans (who lacked the votes to override a presidential veto) refused to submit a revised budget, forcing parts of the federal government to temporarily suspend operations for lack of funding. The shutdown did not last long, and the right-leaning tide was not sufficient to forestall Clinton’s reelection later in the year. During the Clinton years, the economy experienced the longest period of growth in history, in part because of reduced defense spending following the collapse of the Soviet Union and in large part because of Clinton’s focus on deficit reduction. His original plans called for a spending reduction in the hundreds of billions of dollars and a tax increase for the very wealthiest tax bracket, but the Republican Congress fought him on both issues. Even with the necessary compromises, though—and perhaps with Republican welfare reform helping on some fronts—Clinton’s reforms had their desired effect: inflation and unemployment dropped to pre-1960s levels, and more than 22 million jobs were created. Clinton also proposed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), inspired by the agreements of the European

Carter reelected in 1980? 15

Economic Community. NAFTA removed tariffs and similar restrictions among the North American countries (the United States, Canada, and Mexico). His foreign policy, meanwhile, was concerned principally with peacekeeping endeavors in Bosnia and Herzegovina (formerly part of Yugoslavia) and the province of Kosovo in the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, where tensions between Serbs and ethnic Albanians led to the killing of thousands, maybe hundreds of thousands, of Albanians by invading Serb forces. The U.S.-led attacks, in conjunction with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), on Serbia were not approved by the United Nations, an exception in an era when the United States otherwise worked closely enough with the United Nations to prompt American right-wing complaints. The groundswell of conservative fervor was enough to bolster the 2000 presidential campaign of George W. Bush in an election close enough that it was decided in the Supreme Court, amid numerous reports of ballot tampering and sheer incompetence in the tallies, primarily in Florida. With Florida’s twenty-five electoral votes, Bush won the election by five electoral votes, with half a million fewer popular votes than his opponent, Clinton’s vice president Al Gore. Persistent issues pertaining to the election process and calls for electoral reform were the highlight of the first eight months of Bush’s presidency, as the economy lost the steam built up in the 1990s and the technology-related boom began to subside. On September 11, 2001, terrorists associated with the al Qaeda network of extreme Muslim militants hijacked four airplanes. One was crashed in southern Pennsylvania, probably because of the intervention of passengers. One was flown into the Pentagon. The remaining two destroyed the World Trade Center in New York City, the second time in less than a decade that that building had been attacked by Middle Eastern terrorists. The War on Terror that resulted included the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security and the passing of the USA Patriot Act, both of which have been criticized. The United States invaded Afghanistan less than a month later, removing from power the Taliban who had sheltered al Qaeda but failing to eliminate the network itself or find the most important individuals responsible for the attacks. A few short months later, Bush declared that an “axis of evil” existed, three nations that supported terrorists and sought to develop or otherwise acquire weapons of mass destruction (such as nuclear weapons and various biological and chemical weapons): Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. An invasion of Iraq followed, over the protest of the United Nations Security Council; though most Americans at the time believed that Iraq was culpable in the 9/11 attacks, it was later confirmed that there was no connection between Iraq and 9/11. This time, Saddam Hussein was removed from power, and his sons Qusay and Uday were killed. But as President George H.W. Bush had feared during the first Gulf War, the United States became embroiled in a war against insurgents and sectarian terrorists that lasted years after the Hussein government was toppled.

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ALTERNATE HISTORY Every president-elect owes his victory to two kinds of votes: the ones cast for him and the ones cast against the other candidate. While there are many issues that determine voters’ preferences, two clear trends persisted in the 1980 election: votes against Carter because of the oil crisis (both indirectly and because of the effect it had on the economy) and the hostage crisis, and votes for Reagan’s fiscal and foreign policies. Those two are very closely linked: Reagan focused very precisely on the faults of Carter’s administration and the ills facing the country during it. And the two biggest signs of those ills were caused by the Iranian Revolution, which Carter could have prevented. What if he had? In ignoring the Shah’s plight, Carter relied not on old interventionist policies but on two key sources of advice: his own personal dislike of the Shah’s human rights abuses and the State Department’s shortsighted prediction that any change in the regime would be a good one. What if he had instead used the Shah’s vulnerability as leverage and decided to continue to deal with a known quantity rather than risk an unknown? It was potentially the perfect opportunity to reshape Iran and its future, and to build a stronger ally in the Middle East, which the 1973 oil crisis had shown would be helpful, even necessary, for a stable American economy (indeed, the U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia has been an important part of the nation’s foreign relations). Aid in the form of money and arms, and a diplomatic “big stick”— strategic sword-rattling to discourage potential Iranian revolutionaries—could have been exchanged for guarantees from the Shah to step up his reforms. The secret police could have been dissolved, or more likely reformed, and free elections could have been scheduled for the 1980s. The Shah fell because he alienated both the conservative religious factions and the liberal Western-thinking factions in his country, leaving him with little room for allies. A stronger American alliance, while driving an even bigger wedge between the Iranian government and men like the Ayatollah Khomeini, would have better satisfied the liberals. Oil production still would have fallen because of internal turmoil, but not to such extent as it did, and the other OPEC nations would have been able to make up the difference; prices would have risen enough to be worrisome but would have stabilized within a matter of months. With no Iranian Revolution, the Shah would not have needed to take asylum in the United States, and no hostages would have been taken; with no true oil crisis, the American people would not have gone to the polls in November 1980 reminded of the 1973 energy crisis. When the Shah died, the United States would have supported his legal heir, Reza Cyrus Pahlavi, a student at the University of Southern California. The twenty-year-old Pahlavi was a vocal proponent of human rights, and he would have promoted the possibility of reestablishing a constitutional monarchy. Carter would have won reelection by a narrow margin, aided by the hope of a powerful Middle Eastern alliance, though Republicans still would have taken the Senate. The

Carter reelected in 1980? 17

first two years of Carter’s second term would have been promising— the economy would have taken a turn for the better, and although relations with the Soviet Union would have been poor since the invasion of Afghanistan, the new Shah of Iran would have scheduled free elections for the office of the prime minister. The new Shah would also have redefined the role of monarch and would have assembled a group of civic and liberal religious leaders to consult on a constitution. On election day 1983, though, an Islamic fundamentalist group associated with the Ayatollah Khomeini and supported by key figures in the Iranian military would have stormed the polling places and various government offices, including the American embassy. Pahlavi would have been killed in his home, with several of his advisers and his prime minister. The Ayatollah Khomeini would not have simply been installed as leader, but he would have been declared the legally elected ruler, as his people would have seized the voting results. Fighting would have continued for much of the rest of the year, and the Carter administration would have backed an Iraqi invasion of Iran in February 1984. The resulting oil crisis would have reignited the smoldering embers of stagflation, the combination of soaring inflation and stagnant growth that had marked much of the 1970s. A deep recession would have set in as Vice President Walter Mondale and George H. W. Bush would have secured the Democratic and Republican nominations (respectively) for the 1984 presidential election. Bush’s accusations of Carter’s appeasement of Middle Easterners and his vice president’s culpability in the current turmoil, along with his calls for strong measures against the Soviets and promise of a solution to the nation’s economic woes, would have helped him win the election handily. Mondale would have suffered from a general lack of charisma and his association with a presidency perceived as at best friendly and competent, at worst damaging and fiscally dangerous. A Yale-educated fiscally moderate neoconservative, Bush’s economic plans would not have been as drastic as Reagan’s had been. He would have promised to lower taxes and would have reduced the funding for many government programs, from foreign aid and special interest subsidies to public works programs. However, he also would have rejected the notion of a balanced-budget amendment, declaring that the government must be “weaned” of its addictions to spending before it could be simply cut off. His moderate policies would have been slow to have visible effect but would have eventually curtailed the recession. Bush’s foreign policy would have been much more aggressive than Carter’s. Under Bush’s two terms, the United States would have invaded Panama, Nicaragua, and Iraq, each time seeking to depose a leader who had at one point been an American ally—a point that would have been brought up repeatedly by the Democratic Party. The Gulf War would have been the largest of these military operations, big enough that there would have been—if only briefly—murmurs of a draft revival, should the war suddenly explode into the rest of the Middle East. Though anti-American sentiment would have been strong, the war would have been successfully contained in Iraq, in part

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because of Bush’s decision to allow Saddam Hussein to remain in power. The Soviet Union, meanwhile, would have begun its collapse—and in its desperation, it would have violently crushed anticommunist movements in Poland and Hungary, the second of which would have led to a UN action backed by the United States. Relying mainly on embargoes and sanctions to force the Soviets from Hungary, the confrontation would still have been ongoing when Bush left office and Democrat Richard Gephardt would have replaced him as president. A moderate Democrat and social conservative, Gephardt would have supported much of Bush’s early economic policy but would have opposed him on foreign policy. In the aftermath of a Middle East war and the threat of more problems with the Soviet Union, the economy would still have been recessionary; its recovery would have slowed in Bush’s second term. Gephardt’s campaign promises would have pertained mostly to the economy and the containment of foreign turmoil, but the dissolution of the Soviet Union would have consumed much of his presidency. With the advent of Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev and his liberal policies, Cold War confrontation would have been subdued. Gephardt and Gorbachev would have signed two disarmament treaties and negotiated the destruction of the Berlin Wall, and in 1995 Gorbachev would have been peacefully removed from power by a radical communist faction. The Soviet Union would have broken into its constituent nations, most of which would quickly have converted to free-market states—Russia itself would have remained communist until 2002, the last formerly Soviet state to make the change to democracy. Gephardt would have initiated few of the social reforms he had hoped to introduce, but the economy would have started to regain some of its health as the computer and telecommunications industries blossomed and markets were opened up in Eastern Europe. The late 1990s would have been marked by a rash of terrorist incidents by Muslim extremists, most of them against the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Western world in general, but communist die-hard groups would have attacked as well, setting off bombs in London and taking five American tourists hostage in Moscow for a fortnight. In the 1996 presidential election, Ross Perot would have been elected the first third-party candidate since the dominance of the Republican and Democratic parties began, thanks to the public’s dissatisfaction with the economic failures of the Democratic Party, the perception of the Republican candidates as “Washington insiders” (Republican candidate Senator Robert Dole had been Gerald Ford’s running mate twenty years earlier), and Perot’s upbeat appeal. Perot would have dealt quickly with the nation’s oil problems, pushing through legislation that would have required from all cars sold or registered in the United States a level of fuel efficiency the industry would have claimed was unreasonable. The debate over efficiency standards would have become very public: anything but political, Perot would have been very clear about his belief that the bill was unfairly opposed by big industry, and his remarks would have verged

Carter reelected in 1980? 19

on the libelous. The White House would have run through three press secretaries in its first one hundred days, during which time Perot would have instituted an emergency gas tax as an executive action, as a way to reduce the deficit, and he would have promised tax incentives to anyone buying a 1999 car (the first year the new automobiles would have been subject to the new efficiency standards). As the millennium approached, Perot would have called for a new constitutional convention—pointing out that the Constitution was written before most of the aspects of modern American life and government existed, and that while its basic principles were sound, it was undoubtedly not what the founding fathers would have conceived of had they lived in the year 2000. Perot’s constitutional convention would have had no specific authority; it would have been intended more as a think tank, a way to encourage a rhetoric of principles rather than the sound-bite-driven politics Perot so abhorred. Though erratic, President Perot would have been popular. He would have opposed the relocation of American industries to Mexico and the interventionist policies of the last few decades in actual history. Alienating many neoconservatives who otherwise liked his ability to break down the two-party system, Perot would have called for a return to isolationism, summed up in the phrase: govern America and let the world govern itself. Military spending would have been gradually reduced or appropriated for other uses, and Perot would repeatedly have declared that a defense budget should be exactly that: a budget for an adequate defense, not an offense and not the provision of troops to other countries, whether those countries are free market or not. This would have been the primary point on which he would have been opposed in the 2000 election by both party candidates, but he would have won with a slight majority. (Third-party candidates would not have fared so well at the legislative level—no third-party senator would have won election, and only a handful of third-party representatives would have been elected.) The return to isolationism could have been too late. Terrorist activity would have continued to mount, and both the Middle East and the formerly Soviet communists would have harbored grudges against American interference of the past several decades. In 2003, a coalition of Islamic fundamentalists (mostly Iranian) and Azerbaijani communists could have detonated bombs in U.S. federal buildings in Houston and Dallas, believed to be symbols of the “cowboy America” they were protesting. An associated attack plan on the Strategic Petroleum Reserve would have been exposed and prevented. Despite his boisterous speeches on the matter, Perot would have seemed flummoxed as to how to react—objecting to every plan put forward without developing one of his own, and contradicting himself several times in the first few weeks after the attacks. His plan to hunt down and bring to justice the individuals responsible would not have seemed fruitful, since so many of them died in the attack, and he would have rejected outright the suggestion of many Republicans to strike back at Iran. The Iranian War would have begun in the middle of 2005, though it would have seemed inevitable long before that and would

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have played a role in Republican senator John McCain’s election. The last straw would have come when the Ayatollah would have granted asylum to the non-Iranian terrorists involved in the attacks, essentially goading the United States into action. In accordance with UN rulings, the United States would have given Iran six months to turn the terrorists over, and on the eve of the last day would have launched an air strike on Tehran. Iraq, Syria, and Egypt would have joined Iran’s side, with other Middle Eastern nations and Islamic groups offering assistance of one form or another. Israel and the United Kingdom would have joined the United States, which would have had the approval of the United Nations. Russian leaders would have implied that they were considering coming to Iran’s aid, but never would have done so. Oil production would have plummeted as prices skyrocketed, fed by panic and opportunistic price hikes both abroad and domestically. Terrorist attacks would have continued on American embassies and citizens abroad, with bombings, kidnappings, and attempts in the Middle East, North Africa, Turkey, Greece, and France. The most severe would have been the shooting down of an American passenger plane by an Eastern European communist group using abandoned or stolen Soviet ordnance, and the kidnapping of twenty-seven Americans at the embassy in Greece. Though the Greek government would have condemned the kidnapping and lent its help in a rescue attempt, most of the kidnappers would have escaped with eleven of the hostages, making it safely to Egypt where they would have continued to demand that the United States withdraw from Iran. Former presidents Perot and Carter both would have made diplomatic overtures, the latter on behalf of the United Nations. Perot would have proposed a redrawn map of the Middle East with a Jerusalem that would have been resettled in twelve-year shifts, like a timeshare. By the mid-2000s, the war in Iran would have threatened to expand, as both sides would have characterized it as more of an ideological war than one between nations, even a proxy war between Christianity and Islam, ignoring the fact that many Muslims opposed the extremist regimes of leaders like the Ayatollah, and many Christians supported systems other than that of the United States. Oil prices and the popularity of large vehicles and trucks would have contributed to a deep recession, while electric and hybrid automobiles would have been two or three decades behind the design curve, remaining too expensive for the average consumer. Bill Kte’pi

Discussion Questions 1. In the alternate scenario presented in this chapter, independent Ross Perot wins the 1996 presidential election. Do you think that Perot would have drawn more support from Democrats or from Republicans?

Carter reelected in 1980? 21

2. What issues do you think would be the focus of a constitutional convention called to rewrite the U.S. constitution? 3. If Jimmy Carter had been elected to a second term, as suggested as the outcome of the 1980 election in this chapter, how would his policies have resembled those of Ronald Reagan who was in fact elected? How would his policies have differed? 4. In the alternate scenario discussed in this chapter, different presidents occupy the White House from those who in fact were there through the two and a half decades following the election of 1980. What fundamental aspects of international affairs remain the same as in actual history, and what aspects turn out differently? 5. This chapter demonstrates some of the reasons the greatest international crises faced by the United States have changed from the threat of communism to the threat posed by extreme Islamists. Are there any policies adopted by the actual or alternate American leaders in this chapter that might have ameliorated the latter threat? Could the actual President Jimmy Carter or the alternate President Ross Perot have adopted policies that would have avoided extreme Islamist hostility to the United States?

Bibliography and Further Reading Berman, Larry, ed. Looking Back on the Reagan Presidency. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990. Busch, Andrew E. Reagan’s Victory: The Presidential Election of 1980 and the Rise of the Right. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005. Campagna, Anthony S. The Economy in the Reagan Years: The Economic Consequences of the Reagan Administrations. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1994. Collins, Robert M. More: The Politics of Economic Growth in Postwar America. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Denton, Robert E., Jr. Primetime Presidency of Ronald Reagan: The Era of the Television Presidency. New York: Praeger, 1988. Fitzgerald, Frances. Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars, and the End of the Cold War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000. Germond, Jack W., and Jules Witcouver. Blue Smoke and Mirrors: How Reagan Won and Why Carter Lost the Election of 1980. New York: Viking, 2001. Gilder, George. Wealth and Poverty. New York: ICS Press, 1993. Glad, Betty, and Chris J. Dolan. Striking First: The Preventive War Doctrine and the Reshaping of U.S. Foreign Policy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. Haynes, Johnson. Sleepwalking through History: America in the Reagan Years. New York: W.W. Norton, 2003. Hayward, Steven F. The Age of Reagan, 1964–1980: The Fall of the Old Liberal Order. New York: Prima, 2001.

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Lettow, Paul. Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. New York: Random House, 2006. Salamon, Lester M., and Michael S. Lund, eds. The Reagan Presidency and the Governing of America. New York: University Press of America, 1987. Troy, Gil. Morning in America: How Ronald Reagan Invented the 1980s. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).

Reaganomics

What if support for supply-side economics had not developed and stagflation had led to a depression in the 1980s?

INTRODUCTION The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 was a turning point in American economic recovery as it was the official adoption of the radical economic policy set forth by the new president Ronald Reagan. This policy, known as Reaganomics, diverged drastically from the conventional wisdom of the Jimmy Carter administration and that of previous administrations. After the 1980 election, President Reagan believed that he had been chosen by the American people to return the country to the path of growth and prosperity that had lagged during the previous administration. In the 1970s the United States was hit hard by multiple economic problems that taken together almost strangled the government’s ability to keep the country afloat economically. Observers speculated at the time that the nation’s inability to cope with economic problems spelled the demise of the free-market system. Time magazine even had a cover story entitled “Can Capitalism Survive?” The causes of this skepticism were based on two internal factors and a single major factor abroad, namely slow economic growth, inflation, and the oil crisis. Internally, what was known as “stagflation”—a period of slow economic growth and relatively high unemployment—occurred in the late 1970s. In other words, this was a time of economic stagnation (zerogrowth) accompanied by a rise in prices known as inflation. In 1980, inflation was at 12.5 percent meaning that the price of goods and services would double about every eight years. Also, the unemployment rate was at 7.5 percent and mortgage rates were around 15 percent. In reality, this meant that the average American family was making less than at any time since World War II, according to Andrew E. Busch in “Ronald Reagan and Economic Policy,” a chapter in Paul Kengor and Peter Schwiezer’s The Reagan Presidency: Assessing the Man and His Legacy. Another huge factor contributing to the downward spiral of the U.S. economy was the oil market of the late 1970s. World oil prices rose dramatically, further fueling the sharp rise of inflation in all developed countries.

2

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KEY CONCEPT

Trickle-Down Economics

Prior to the election of 1980, the accepted model for economic growth had been focused primarily on managing and distributing wealth by the federal government as a check against corporate corruption and exploitation. After Reagan’s time in office, the policy of allowing the private sector and individuals to manage capital was the accepted paradigm. The key tenet of supply-side economics is that reduction in taxes will spur investment. Several economic ideas were taken into account when the Reagan administration adopted its fiscal policy. The most important of these was emphasis on the supply side of the market economy. In any market economy, there are two ways to improve economic performance. The accepted method for presidents before Reagan had been focused on the demand side. This was done with

much regulation of the money supply and a myriad of government programs designed to ensure that aggregate demand would increase through moving the capital from one sector to another. Focusing on the supply side, the theory of trickle-down economics states that by loosening restrictions on the money supply and interference in market factors, the free market will reward proper market behavior and punish poor performance. In other words, when the government steps out of the economy and puts more money in the hands of consumers, they will spend it on goods and services that are valuable to them. Companies that have more money will invest it in innovation and new technologies that allow them to compete for a greater percentage of the market share.

With slow economic growth, the effects were multiplied. The world oil market was increasingly controlled by OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) as that cartel sought to raise prices for crude oil by reducing global supply. For the United States, this occurrence would not have been as painful had the Shah of Iran not been overthrown by hardline Islamists in the 1979 revolution. Those in power, including the Ayatollah Khomeini, viewed the Americans as a mortal enemy and refused to continue supplying the cheap oil that still drives the U.S. economy today. In any American city, the hardship of long lines of cars at filling stations was not quickly forgotten by the voting public. Drastic increases in the price of goods and services forced many Americans to make hard choices. When the election of 1980 came, many Americans were fed up with the policies of President Carter and were looking for change. The personification of this change was to come in the form of California governor Ronald Wilson Reagan. A fiscal conservative and staunch anticommunist, Reagan had the “everyman” qualities that Carter lacked. Furthermore, he was known to be a good listener and was reputed to be able to see alternative points of view. While it is easy to dismiss Reagan as an actor and politician, it is important to note that he was not a simple man. He received a degree in economics in 1932 from Eureka College long before the policies that contributed to stagflation gained popularity. His plan to rebuild the American economy was fourfold: tax cuts; reducing the growth of government spending; deregulation; and slow, stable growth of the money supply. To accomplish these tasks, Reagan had to call on his most important trait: optimism.

Depression of the 1980s? 25

KEY CONCEPT

Trickle-Down Economics (Continued)

The other marked difference between conventional wisdom prior to Reagan and post-Reagan is that rather than viewing the economy as finite in size, the free market has unlimited potential for growth. So rather than government being involved in the moving of pieces of the economic pie from one sector to another, there is the potential for every sector to grow when the government is less involved in the economy. The “trickle-down” theory draws much of its praise and criticism from the belief that lessening the tax burden on those in the top income bracket will spur consumption and investment.The belief is that when wealthy people have more disposable income they will do three different things with it: spend it, save it, or invest it. If they spend their money, they are increasing the demand in the industrial and service sectors of the economy, thus

creating more jobs. If they save it, they fuel the banking and housing sectors by increasing the amount of money banks have to lend and lowering interest rates. If they invest their money, then companies have more money to spend on new technologies and expansion, creating more jobs and increasing the demand for skilled workers. In the trickle-down theory, an increase in the top of the economy spurs improvement in the lives of everyone below. Wealth moves from sector to sector and class to class. Those who oppose using this method claim that the rich get richer and the poor get poorer because the government has less money to spend on social programs that better the lives of the poor. Proponents of this theory respond by saying that by increasing growth in the economy, barriers to entry become lower and more jobs become available across the board.

While previous economic recovery plans like the New Deal under Franklin Roosevelt called on redistribution of economic resources to bring the economy on track, Reagan’s plan chose to go in a new and radical direction. Rather than trying to move wealth from one economic sector to another, his goal was to increase the size of the economic pie. It was Reagan’s contention that the real ability of the American economy to recover lay not in the hands of the government but in the economic drivers of industry. This focus on the supply-side of the money pool was to be given a name: Reaganomics. Another name given to this approach was “trickle-down” economics. The basic tenet of this strategy is that government needed to take a hands-off approach to how the economy generates wealth and allow those with the means to spend their money by reinvesting in the economy. For example, the head of a company or a corporation receives a tax break and is left with a greater net income. Now that this individual or company has more money, it will either be spent or invested, stimulating growth of the economy as a whole. As the economy expands, the tax base will itself grow, soon increasing tax revenue for the government. Thus by growing the supply of money rather than by controlling the demand for goods, the economy as a whole benefits. Because of the emphasis on money supply, the policy became known as “supply side” economics. If Reagan’s strategy were to succeed, the tax rates of those individuals and businesses that had the most money to reinvest in the economy had to be lowered. However, while allowing for more money to be in the hands of the American taxpayer, the government has to exercise a strong monetary policy to curb inflation. This was done by Federal Reserve Chairman Paul

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Volcker and his policies. Chairman Volcker exercised strict control of the money supply to counteract double-digit inflation. His policy of tightening the money supply while hiking interest rates placed stress on the short-term economic recovery—and even caused a recession in 1982— but it worked, and the program is still in use today. Prior to the 1980 election, the Internal Revenue Service had fourteen tax brackets, with the upper-level income earners paying up to 70 percent of their income to the government, according to Andrew E. Busch. Reagan’s plan was twofold: simplify the tax code and reduce the overall burden placed on individuals and companies by the federal government. To bring Congress on board, the implementation would have to be gradual. By 1983, Reagan had established a 25 percent decrease in the tax burdens of all Americans. Consistent with his supply-side theory, the top income bracket was reduced from 91 percent to 50 percent. The set goal of the Reagan administration in the first months in office was to restore the American economy to its previous strengths and to explore means to improve the ability of capitalism to revitalize the American workforce. Another area that Reagan wanted to improve was the ability of individuals to handle their retirement without being solely dependent on the Social Security system. To spur investment, Reagan set about instituting new tax cuts aimed specifically at investment in the future and increasing corporate growth incentives. One of the greatest impacts on the individual investor created during the early stages of the Reagan presidency can be seen today by every

President Reagan and his staff in the Oval Office celebrate the passage of federal-tax legislation. From left to right: Richard Williamson, Elizabeth Dole, Dennis Thomas, Don Regan, Ann McLaughlin, Ed Meese, Vice President George Bush, Karna Small, David Gergen, and President Reagan. (Ronald Reagan Presidential Library)

Depression of the 1980s? 27

full-time employee across America. Prior to the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 there was no such thing as an Individual Retirement Account (IRA). It was Reagan’s Internal Revenue Service that ruled in 1981 that employees’ income could be tax-free if matched by employers and put into private retirement accounts, thus leading to the explosion of 401(k) plans, according to Andrew E. Busch. Today, these kinds of investments hold a large portion of individual stock investment by private individuals. All of Reagan’s economic policies were geared toward a final goal: expansion of the free-market economy system as a bulwark against communism. The rapid recovery of the U.S. economy was comprehensively geared toward allowing for the kind of defense spending Reagan would become famous for. However, it was Reagan’s emphasis on defense spending that also hampered his attempts at cutting domestic expenditures. While his defense budget skyrocketed during the 1980s, it would not have been possible had not Congress agreed to all his attempts at limiting “discretionary” spending (e.g., Social Security, Medicare). Through the vessel of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA), the Reagan administration accomplished several goals. Tax cuts across the board were the set goal of the administration in the hope of increasing the size of the economic pie through looser restrictions on government control of the money supply. In short, it was the view of the Reagan administration that money was spent more efficiently by companies and individuals than by the federal government. Also in this landmark legislation were several brand-new tax initiatives. Prior to the passage of the ERTA, there had been no real fiscal benefit for married couples. This provision applied directly to Reagan’s conservative base and garnered support of members from both sides of the congressional aisle. The new idea of individual fiscal responsibility and a “hands-off” approach to monetary decisions appealed not only to Republicans but also to many Democrats who in later years would be labeled “Reagan Democrats” because of the amount of support they gave the president’s economic policies. Not since the New Deal had such a sweeping change been proposed by the executive branch and quickly imposed by the legislative branch. Reaganomics was a true turning point in history as it completely revised the fiscal position of the federal government and forced changes to decades-old policies. These policies were not merely adopted and forgotten by later administrations; they became the benchmark by which all other economic policies were judged. Once American taxpayers became accustomed to having a smaller amount of their earnings taken by the federal government, reversing the trend has become nearly impossible. Originally viewed as a term of derision, Reaganomics became the standard by which all administrations were to be judged. Although there are today detractors who view this policy with contempt, the naysayers tend to be drowned out by those who have grown accustomed to government playing a smaller role in managing the economy. Regardless, this policy has maintained a special status as the proper technique to pull the U.S. economy out of recession and encourage growth. However important the impact of Reaganomics on the country, it was overshadowed by other world events during Reagan’s tenure. While the path toward recovery had been set on the domestic front, the Cold War against

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IN CONTEXT

Reaganomics

A Unique Time

Reagan’s economic policy occurred at a unique time in world history. After the oil crisis of the 1970s, it became readily apparent that a country with an isolationist economy could not compete on the world stage. In essence, this was the catalyst that made globalization a reality.At the same time Reaganomics was becoming the economic policy of the United States, the United Kingdom had elected its first woman prime minster, Margaret Thatcher. Thatcher was a conservative and believed in many of the same ideals that Reagan held dear, particularly in regard to deregulation and using economics to break the Cold War stalemate that had existed between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet Union under Leonid Brezhnev had invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and for the first time

the United States had the opportunity to repay the Soviets for supporting the North Vietnamese a decade before. With the death of Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov took over as premier and relations with the United States worsened.The Soviet economy at the time was ripe for economic warfare by outside sources and a stronger American economy would make that a possibility. Elsewhere in the world, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat was assassinated on October 6, 1981, by members of the Muslim Brotherhood during a military parade in Cairo. In Iran, the Shi’ite revolution had sparked much fear in the Muslim world. This fear and a belief that the Iranian military had been weakened by the Islamist purge drove Saddam Hussein to invade Iran in September of

the Soviets played in the forefront of the international stage. The internal economic policies were simply a means to fight the Soviets as part of an overall economic battle to oppose the institution that Reagan called the evil empire. The Soviet Union—still at that time a viable enemy—maintained a threatening posture throughout the Reagan years. During that period, the notion of global thermonuclear war loomed large in the stalemate between the superpowers and the minds of citizens throughout the world. The passage of the Economic Recovery Tax Act (H.R. 4242) by the 97th Congress was a watershed in economic recovery for American citizens.

This act qualifies as a turning point in history for several reasons. Most important, this bill—the legislative form of Reaganomics—managed to undo several decades of fiscal policy, making it one of the more important pieces of legislation in the last fifty years. When Congress presented the bill to Reagan to sign into law, the U.S. government was taking a huge step toward eliminating restrictions on the U.S. money supply and the die was cast for all future tax legislation. When Reagan was inaugurated, he found himself with a small Republican majority in the Senate, but a sizable Democratic majority in the House of Representatives. Therefore, to put forth his plan for economic recovery, he would have to appeal to the opposition party. Through shrewd deal making and his charismatic nature, he managed to woo just enough Democratic members that the first stages of his plan could be implemented early in the 97th congressional session. He was helped

Depression of the 1980s? 29

IN CONTEXT

A Unique Time (Continued)

1980. These actions forced both the Carter and Reagan administrations—and every administration since—to deal with problems in the Arab world. The time period of 1973 through 1985 was one of the most unstable periods of the Cold War. Brushfire wars were being fought via proxy on behalf of the superpowers throughout the globe. China had broken with the Soviet Union and began slowly to move toward capitalist reforms that continue today. Israel had fought two wars with its Arab neighbors—first against Egypt and Syria in 1973 and later in Lebanon against Palestinian factions. In this environment, Reagan came to office with a desire to influence global affairs and pursue a policy of staunch anticommunism.

To accomplish his goals, Reagan realized that the United States needed a strong economy to support his total transformation and buildup of the U.S. military. He needed a large volume of revenue to support costly programs while maintaining his internal policy of economic reinvigoration. Reagan was forced to address much more than just an internal recession. On his inauguration, the United States suffered from a loss of prestige on the global stage from Vietnam and the Iran hostage crisis. The economies of many superpowers were stagnant and inflation was rampant from Moscow to London. If the United States and its allies were to recover, they would have to work together under strong leadership to resolve their problems and emerge from the Cold War victorious.

strongly by a breed of Democrats whose support was to gain them the name of “Reagan Democrats.” This term is still used today to describe social liberal members who hold a strong conservative economic position. The bipartisan nature of support for the ERTA is noteworthy as well. Not only was this bill groundbreaking, but the fact that it was presented

President Reagan and House Speaker Tip O’Neill discussing the budget in the Oval Office. (Ronald Reagan Presidential Library)

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ANOTHER VIE W

Economic Debate

To this day, there are still economists who differ in their view of the role that Reaganomics played in the recovery of the American economy in the early 1980s.The most contentious point is the Laffer Curve. The Laffer Curve was developed by economist Arthur Laffer to show that at two distinct levels (say 20 percent and 80 percent) the maximal level of revenue collected by the government in taxes is the same. Opponents to this idea dubbed it the “Laughter Curve.” Keynesian economists point out that the tax cuts originating under Reagan were responsible for creating a huge budget deficit and argue that the same occurred under President George W. Bush. Other opponents of Reaganomics point out that the average growth rate of the American econ-

omy under Reagan was 2.1 percent per year, which is not a stellar record when compared to the growth achieved under other presidents, but it still does not leave his record near the bottom of the pack. Critics are also quick to point out that the country suffered another recession in 1982 during the first year that the Economic Recovery Tax Act took effect. Other opponents view many of the programs instituted under Reagan as inevitable consequences of the actions taken by President Jimmy Carter prior to the election of 1980. Many of the deregulation actions Reagan became famous for, including the breakup of the Bell system, were initiated under Carter. Reagan’s greatest critics are those who believe the only way to stimulate and maintain growth in

by a Democratic sponsor to a Republican president flies in the face of conventional wisdom. This showed the appeal that Reagan had to members on both sides of the aisle when it came to economics. Prior to this event, many Democrats had traditionally supported a strong federal hold on tax revenue. After the introduction of this legislation there was a break in the party that remains today. Traditional progressive Democrats now had to deal with a popular president from the other party and dissension within their ranks among fiscal conservatives. Reagan cannot be completely credited with this break because many of Carter’s deregulation policies started the change; then, Reagan’s policy brought more members from the opposition into step with administration views. However, with large bipartisan support came the responsibility to stay the economic course at the expense of some of his proposed entitlement program cuts. Beyond the sweeping wording of this legislation was the most famous of provisions, the Kemp-Roth tax cuts. Prior to this act, the tax rate for the highest bracket of Americans had been 70 percent. Immediately after passage, the highest bracket dropped to 50 percent. With the Kemp-Roth cuts, over a three-year period beginning in 1982, individual withholding would be drawn down first at 5 percent, then 10 percent, and an additional 10 percent in 1984. These cuts were pure Reaganomics as those with more money had less fiscal responsibility to the federal government and greater incentive for investment. The second part of these cuts was a large reduction in the capital gains tax, providing further incentive for those with means to invest in the American economy. Not only were those of privilege aided by the tax cuts but every level of the income tax brackets received a total reduction in payments of 25 percent. Individuals, corporations, and married couples received a huge break in their tax burdens when the Economic Recovery Tax Act was

Depression of the 1980s? 31

ANOTHER VIE W

Economic Debate (Continued)

the economy is to balance the budget. Under Reagan, the federal deficit grew to record numbers and a huge tenet of the Clinton reform was to implement reforms aimed at reducing the deficit accumulated under Reagan. The irony was that to reverse the economic position where Reagan had placed the country, both George H. W. Bush and Clinton needed to raise taxes and cut the defense budget to move the balance of payments away from deficit. The primary reason the deficit was so large under Reagan was that to get Congress to approve his beloved budgets, he was forced to agree not to cut social programs. Though Reagan did not cut social service programs, it was not because of lack of will to do so.

Very few new social service initiatives were implemented during his administration, and if he could have gotten away with it, he would have cut billions of dollars earmarked for America’s poor. Critics of his domestic policy state that of all Reagan’s policy concerns, the poor were at the bottom of the list. Reagan’s record with the lower classes was not stellar during both of his terms. The 1980s saw the country faced with several epidemics; AIDS, crack, hunger, and homelessness all were extensively seen in areas of urban poor. Reagan’s critics maintain that he did very little to address these problems and even proposed at one time cutting federal funding for school lunches.

signed into law only two months after being introduced. Married couples were given relief when filing their taxes jointly that has been called the “marriage incentive.” The number and scope of fiscal issues dealt with by this piece of legislation are immense. Along with the individual tax cuts and increases in deductions, there is a groundbreaking provision that calls for the adjustment of all tax figures to be tied to the Consumer Price Index. This meant that any deduction that was enacted would now be adjusted for cost of living and inflation. This commonsense policy was never tried at such a scale and has since saved taxpayers thousands of dollars and will continue doing so in the future. This legislation managed a large number of changes that have been adopted as standard policy today but were not in existence prior to its passage. The best example of the impact of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 on the American economy is that each president since Reagan has been judged on his tax record by the Reagan standard. The accepted practice for economic growth has been tax cuts and less government interference in the marketplace. While the implementation of the ERTA was a turning point in the history of the American taxpayer on its own, when combined with the Tax Reform Act of 1986, genuine tax relief was granted to every American. Without the first piece of legislation and its sweeping changes, the foundation for meaningful change would not have occurred. The tax burden of each American dropped under the Reagan administration and an era of new prosperity was discovered by many American families. The middle class in the United States—the backbone of economic prosperity—found themselves earning and having at their disposal more money than under any administration since the postwar period. During Reagan’s time in office, every American saw his or her income rise in real fiscal terms. While detractors have said that those of greater means received greater benefit, the truth is that all taxpayers prospered by

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President Reagan signing the Tax Reform Act of 1986 with members of Congress and White House staff. (Ronald Reagan Presidential Library)

having more money in their pockets. The theory that tax cuts spur growth was proven in the economic reaction to the Reagan tax cuts, but not without a fair share of tribulation. Many have opposed the idea that cutting government revenue can improve the lot of the average citizen, but when the principle is balanced with fiscal responsibility, history has proven the theory to be not only sound, but essential to the economic health of the nation.

ACTUAL HISTORY Reagan’s economic policy was the instrument of change necessary at the time to return the American economy to prosperity. Using the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 as the catalyst, the Reagan administration set forth a policy of using tax cuts to stimulate the economy into growth. During a recession, this tactic managed to make drastic changes to the standards of living for each American. The revision of how the federal government addressed taxation internally allowed for much to be accomplished abroad. In many ways the Reagan administration was perceived as adopting the exact opposite position of Carter. Under Reagan, defense budgets grew to levels never before seen by the American public. The sheer scope and number of programs initiated by Reagan’s defense department were

Depression of the 1980s? 33

overwhelming. One example of the defense buildup was the B-1 Bomber program. The B-1 was cut by the Carter administration because of large cost overruns. Reagan immediately reinstated the program, not because the aircraft was a particularly great investment but because he knew that for every program funded by the U.S. Department of Defense, the Soviets would have to counter by spending money to develop a countermeasure. Reagan’s policy of defense buildup included not only conventional and nuclear weapons but also the Strategic Defense Initiative, a plan to develop several systems that could intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). This SDI or “Star Wars” program was initially a muchheralded research program. Even so, establishing a system that would reduce the threat to the United States posed by Soviet ICBMs held the promise of putting the Soviets in a far more vulnerable position. SDI, it seemed, might threaten the delicate balance called mutually assured destruction (dubbed MAD), in which neither superpower was in a position to attack the other because of fear of retaliation. If the Soviets could not retaliate because of a strong American antimissile defense through new SDI systems, some feared Reagan’s policy would actually destabilize the dangerous balance. Others believed it would make nuclear weapons obsolete. As it developed, Reagan’s policy probably helped Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev argue with his own leadership for a stand-down in all nuclear weaponry. By the end of Reagan’s second term, it seemed that his willingness to spend funds on new and future weapons systems had paid off in bringing the Soviets to the bargaining table and agreeing to nuclear weapons limitation treaties.

The B-1B Lancer, part of the vast Department of Defense buildup during the Reagan administration. (U.S. Air Force)

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Reagan’s strongly anticommunist foreign policy led his administration into a serious blunder, however. Fearing that the Marxist regime of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua represented a threat to other nations in the hemisphere, Reagan sought to support the counterrevolutionary groups known as Contras that sought to overthrow the Sandinistas. However, the U.S. Congress made it clear that it would not support the use of government funds to provide military aid to the Contras. The clandestine support for the Contras developed under the aegis of the National Security Council and headed by Marine Colonel Oliver North eventually came to light. Channeling funds from private sources, from foreign governments, and eventually from the undercover sale of antiaircraft missiles to the Iranian government, tens of millions of dollars were routed to the Contras in defiance of the congressional ruling. When information about the IranContra funding arrangements surfaced, it seemed to many that Reagan and his advisers had gone too far. While Reagan’s policies toward the Soviet Union were generally regarded as his greatest foreign policy triumphs, the scandal surrounding the undercover Iran-Contra operation became his greatest debacle on the international scene. By contrast, although his economic policies were controversial and his emphasis on supply-side economics aroused the ire of Democrats who had been raised to believe that business had to be regulated and controlled rather than allowed a free hand, Reagan’s domestic policies won far more popular admiration and bipartisan political support than did his strongly anticommunist foreign policy. Even so, the benefits of Reaganomics did not become immediately apparent. During Reagan’s first term, the economy was on a rather bumpy path toward recovery. A recession early in 1982 drove critics to immediately decry that Reagan was leading the country down a path of ruin. Even his own daughter Patricia became a vocal critic of his foreign and domestic policies during his first term. Reagan made it known that he was not a fan of government social programs and drew criticism from his opponents for a desire to remove federal funding for school lunch programs. But however rocky his first term, growth in the economy, combined with a renewed national self-confidence, allowed Reagan and his running mate George H.W. Bush to easily defeat Democratic contenders Walter Mondale and Geraldine Ferraro. Prior to the election, Reagan took a gamble on reversing his position on free trade to come to the aid of the great American motorcycle company Harley-Davidson. One of his more visible domestic coups was the rescue of this company via implementation of a rather un-Reaganesque tariff and quota on the importation of foreign motorcycles. This action— more than any other during his tenure—solidified Reagan’s legacy as a friend of the American worker. Even though he opposed strong unions, the decision to rescue Harley-Davidson made sense to Reagan as it was the last surviving American motorcycle company and a symbol of American pride. Had Reagan not implemented this change, the company would have been bankrupt within two years and several thousand Americans would have been out of work. After winning the election by one of the largest electoral landslides in American history, Reagan was invigorated into pushing his tax reform agenda even further. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 picked up where the

Depression of the 1980s? 35

Economic Recovery Tax Act left off. While further reducing the number of tax brackets, this legislation also lowered the top income tax rate from 50 percent to 28 percent making the change during his tenure a swing of almost 50 percent for top income earners. Another action implemented by this legislation was an increase of the tax rate for the lowest bracket from 11 percent to 15 percent. This was the first time in American history that the higher rate had dropped while the lower rate had risen and it drew much criticism from Reagan’s opponents. To reduce criticism for this policy, Reagan accepted implementation of the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit to promote home ownership by lowincome families. Reagan’s successor, George H.W. Bush, was not known for many domestic policy shifts away from those of Reagan. His presidency was one of concentration on foreign policy and weighing any domestic consideration against possible foreign impact. With this in mind, the Bush administration opened negotiations with Canada (and later Mexico) for the landmark North American Free Trade Agreement. This agreement— signed into law by President Bill Clinton—was aimed at the removal of all tariffs between the three countries within North America. NAFTA became a huge point of contention during the 1992 election as Bush’s opponent H. Ross Perot (Independent) claimed that the removal of barriers between countries would mean the loss of thousands of American jobs to Mexico. Another domestic setback that caused Bush to fail to be reelected happened in 1990 when he raised taxes to address the growing budget deficit. This was a problem for Bush as he had claimed at the 1988 Republican Convention that he would not propose new taxes. When he raised taxes, many conservatives within the Republican Party felt betrayed by their president. It was this perceived betrayal that cost him dearly in the polls when he ran for reelection against H. Ross Perot and Arkansas governor William Jefferson Clinton. Few presidents have entered office during an economy that was ripe for record expansion. According to an official Clinton-Gore website, “the White House,” maintained by the National Archives, during the Clinton years the American economy grew by record numbers, averaging 4 percent growth per year (as compared to 2.8 percent under Reagan). Clinton ran a campaign of opposites to incumbent candidate Bush. Rather than focusing on international concerns, Clinton promised to focus his administration’s efforts entirely on improving the quality of life for low- and middle-income American families. To accomplish this, Clinton was determined to reduce defense spending and roll back the 1986 Reagan tax cuts. Clinton established a remarkable record during his two terms in office. According to “the White House,” the poverty rate, which stood near 15 percent in 1993, had dropped to below 12 percent by 1999. By 2000, homeownership rates set a record high at 67.7 percent. Most important, the Clinton administration managed to run a surplus on the federal budget by $237 billion in 2000. It was these successes and his personable nature that allowed Clinton and Vice President Al Gore to win a close election against Republican candidates Senator Bob Dole and his running mate Jack Kemp. However, his focus mainly on domestic concerns and a number of scandals during Clinton’s presidency hurt Vice

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President Al Gore when he ran against Texas Governor George Walker Bush in the 2000 election. Although George W. Bush was known as a foreign policy president, he managed several important and controversial domestic reforms. One of the more conservative actions that his administration passed was the 2003 ban on partial-birth abortion. In many ways this legislation was aimed at shoring up support from his Christian conservative base and served as a controversial domestic issue during his time in office. Another action aimed toward his conservative base was a proposal for federal funding of faith-based initiatives such as church-run outreach programs and soup kitchens. Few presidents have managed to have such a polarizing effect on American politics as the second Bush. His economic focus has been almost entirely on tax cuts—one of the largest in American history—yet the creation of such agencies as the Department of Homeland Security placed a tremendous economic strain on the American economy. Prior to his election in 2000, the federal government was running a huge budget surplus. Subsequently, the federal deficit ballooned to levels not seen since Reagan’s defense buildup. Even with his rampant spending, the economy managed to steadily recover from the strong recession of 2001 and the after-effects of the drop in the stock market.

ALTERNATE HISTORY Many radical changes in the economic well-being of Americans can be traced to a single policy set forth by an administration. Any successful policy implementation in American politics can be attributed to three factors: person, moment, and mechanism. During the Great Depression, the policy set forth by the Roosevelt administration was the New Deal, a systematic restructuring of the demand side of the U.S. economy. Roosevelt had the foresight to break from the conventional “hands-off” approach to internal finance and found the right support necessary to put the country back to work. The Reagan administration brought forth the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, a systematic restructuring of the supply side of the U.S. economy and had the bipartisan support to break once again from conventional wisdom and place fiscal responsibility back in the hands of the individual taxpayer. Several factors needed to be in place for the policy of supply-side economics to be adopted as standard practice by the United States. There are three scenarios that could have plausibly happened to reduce or eliminate the reality of the Reagan tax cuts and the economic recovery of the 1980s. Each of these scenarios makes for an interesting alternative to what actually occurred. 1. Had Reagan lost the Republican nomination to George H. W. Bush—who dubbed this policy “voodoo economics”—the tax revolutions of 1981 and 1986 probably would never have occurred. Bush, a staunch partisan, could never have garnered the support of the Democrats for any of his economic policies to the extent that Reagan did. He also could not have brought the country out

Depression of the 1980s? 37

2.

3.

of the recession he would have inherited from the Carter administration. Had Carter won reelection in 1980, he would have been able to continue his deregulation campaign, but without opening up the money supply to market factors, the country would not have gained economic recovery as quickly as it did under Reagan. It is entirely possible that with stagflation continuing well into the 1980s, the nation would have experienced another Great Depression, as serious in its magnitude as that of the 1930s. Carter also suffered from a serious lack of faith in his policies by allies and enemies alike. While his efforts on the international stage to promote a peaceful agenda were successful at first, his administration’s ineffective action against the Iranian hostage takers in 1979 dealt a serious blow to faith in the resolve of the United States to deal decisively with its enemies. Following another turning point in the Reagan administration, had assassin John Hinckley, Jr., succeeded in killing Reagan on March 30, 1981, the Reagan economic policy would not have been implemented at all. The Economic Reform Tax Act was not proposed until June 1981 and the initial tax cuts that spurred the first signs of economic growth would have never been implemented. With Bush in office, the second round of tax cuts that provided for the bulk of the Reagan economic growth would have never occurred in 1986.

What if Reagan had lost in the Republican primaries? Had George H. W. Bush won the Republican nomination after Reagan suffered more than just a defeat in the Iowa caucuses, he would have had a hardfought campaign against the incumbent Jimmy Carter. Bush, playing on the international position and his record as both a World War II naval hero and his service as the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, would have prevailed to become the fortieth president of the United States. His first priority in office would have been to evaluate the failures of the Carter administration and distance himself from those failures by any means necessary. Due to his close position with the Saudi royal family, he could have persuaded them to break all ties with OPEC and become another U.S. client state like Iran had been prior to the fall of the Shah. With a steady supply of cheap Saudi oil, domestic production would have floundered and incentives for future exploitation would not have existed. The Saudis would have continued to help the U.S. fight a proxy war against the Soviets in Afghanistan in exchange for more high-technology military hardware and preferential treatment on the world stage. Saudi Arabia would also have advocated a greater role for the United States not only in defending the kingdom, but also in expanding the aid program to Iraq to allow it to crush Iran. The Saudis would have pushed for this primarily out of fear that a strong Shi’ite regime in Tehran could serve to eventually destabilize the kingdom. The United

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States would have accepted this because without cheap Saudi oil and no domestic production, the economy could not have handled the shock of another oil client state falling. With this plan in place, Saddam Hussein could have crushed the Iranian Army within a matter of months rather than fighting to the stalemate that weakened his regime. A strong Iraq in control of the Iranian oil fields would then have had the power to seriously influence the struggle between the superpowers. If Saddam wished, he could have become a Soviet client state again and could have emerged strong enough to threaten or invade both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. If he had wished to play smart, he would have invaded Kuwait and had the Soviets force the United States to acquiesce to his demands. Iraq could then have directly threatened Israel and the United States would have been powerless to stop them, as the Saudis would have insisted that to keep the oil flowing, the United States must follow their worldview and allow the Palestinians to take back their land from the Israelis. Also, the stronger Soviet economy—spurred by cheap Iraqi/Kuwaiti/Iranian oil—would have been in a better position to threaten the NATO allies of the United States in Europe. The increased tension between the superpowers and a stronger Soviet economy would have exacerbated the Cold War. Without a weakened Soviet economy, the prosperity that the United States enjoyed after the Soviet collapse would not have happened. Bush would have maintained the pressure on the Soviets, but the economic warfare that occurred under Reagan would not have been as large a threat. With no major recovery in the domestic economy and no great prestige boost abroad, Bush would have found himself losing reelection to either Walter Mondale or Jimmy Carter in 1984. What would have happened if Carter had won? Had Carter not mishandled the Shah of Iran or the hostage crisis, he would have had a chance at reelection. While Reagan was charismatic, Carter was his own worst enemy during the actual election of 1980. In many circles, those who voted for Reagan were merely voting against Carter. This occurs when an incumbent has a large policy disaster and alienates independent or undecided voters. Without a major policy disaster or a “sticking point” for an opponent to attack during the debates, the incumbent always has a much better chance than a challenger, even with a slow economy. With Carter in the White House for a second term, he would have had the opportunity to correct several of his previous failures. Taking a hard line on Iran, Carter might have demanded that the United Nations perpetually sanction the Islamic Republic. He might even have gone as far as to blockade the Strait of Hormuz to force the Iranians to publicly apologize for taking the American embassy and holding U.S. citizens for 444 days. With the restoration of U.S. prestige after a showdown with Iran, Carter would have increased his efforts to restore the economy. President Carter would have continued on the path of deregulation that he adopted during his first term. Focusing on the telecommunications industry, he would have removed the long-established “Bell

Depression of the 1980s? 39

System” in favor of establishing several regional competitors. It is doubtful that he would have taken the hard-line stance against the PATCO (Air Traffic Controllers Union) strikers that Reagan did. Though he started work on deregulation of banking, he might not have continued to the extent that Reagan did unless he had received majority support from the American public. Another domestic front that Carter would have worked hard to improve would have been health care. With the emergence of AIDS (acquired immune deficiency syndrome), Carter would have drastically increased federal funding to provide for improved health care and research for those afflicted. If the American people had approved this decision by a large majority, the Carter administration would have moved toward expanding federal health care programs aimed at prevention and treatment of this and other health problems affecting Americans. One very distinct area in which the second Carter administration would have differed from Reagan is a point of contention even today. Under Reagan in actual history, the federal budget deficit swelled to proportions never seen before. Though the national debt was 26 percent during Carter’s first term, shrewd budget cuts, particularly in programs such as the B-1 Bomber, would have made it virtually impossible for the debt level to rise to 41 percent in 1989. Last, the area that would be most noticeable today for each American is that Carter would not have abolished the U.S. Metric Board established under Gerald Ford. Carter, a fan of the international system of measurement, would have allowed the board to finalize its exploration and implementation of the metric system in the United States. Students today would not know distances in inches, feet, yards, and miles. Instead they would concentrate only on centimeters, meters, and kilometers or “klicks.” With a second Carter Administration in office, the chances of a Democrat winning the 1984 election were good—as was shown when Reagan’s vice president won in 1988—but Reagan could also have tried one last time for a run at the White House. Bush would also have tried to be elected on a platform of free trade and military reconstruction. However, without Reagan and his 1981 Congress, there is very little chance that the Economic Recovery Tax Act could have made as large an impact as it did in actual history. If a great depression such as that of the 1930s had developed under a second Carter administration, it is possible that the Democratic party would have lost not only the presidency in 1984 but control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate as well. What if Reagan had died from an assassin’s bullet? When a president is assassinated early, the vice president and the nation feel a certain form of nostalgia for that person and the legacy he wished to leave. Being sworn in as the forty-first president on April 1, 1981, George Herbert Walker Bush would have pledged to continue on the path that the late chief executive had set for the nation. President Bush would have consulted with the Reagan cabinet and chosen his secretary of state, General Alexander M. Haig, to be his vice president. He would

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have replaced Haig with Richard Cheney, a popular Washington insider. Along with a cabinet reorganization, Bush would have used the memory of the slain president to urge Congress to pass tax reform legislation that offered a flat tax reduction but was reliant on a balanced budget. In the event that revenues fell below expenditures, he would have had the right to temporarily or permanently repeal those cuts. Members of the legacy cabinet would have persuaded Bush to pursue the economic and covert warfare against the Soviets that Reagan envisioned. However, Bush would have demanded that after the initial implementation of his predecessor’s policies, his cabinet would need to support him in other unique initiatives. Expanding his policy of confronting the Soviets using covert means, he would have expanded the special operations forces of the military and increased the budget of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Bush-Haig administration would have become rapidly closed off to the public and reminiscent of the “hidden-hand” presidency of Eisenhower. When an overzealous NSC (National Security Council) staffer by the name of Oliver North would become involved selling arms to Iran to fund the Contra rebels of Nicaragua, the public would react strongly to the accusations that Bush had something to do with the affair. Congress would have quickly launched an investigation that would have found that not only did the president know about and support the program, but that Vice President Haig had colluded directly with the Contras to ensure that they were receiving the weapons they needed. Congress also would have found Haig guilty of interfering in a federal investigation when he ordered North to destroy records in attempts to spare the president. Both President Bush and Vice President Haig might have been impeached if their Nicaraguan policies had included any actions that could be regarded as “high crimes or misdemeanors.” Haig, North, and CIA director William Casey might have been imprisoned for perjury, while Congress would have appointed the speaker of the house to finish the rest of Bush’s term. Faith in the office of the presidency would have been shattered due to a scandal that would have made Watergate look like a misunderstanding. The Republican Party would have forever been damaged in the eyes of American voters as two impeachments in a decade would have been called on Republican presidents. Each of the outlined scenarios deal primarily with the domestic front and show that without Reagan in office in 1981, the policy of Reaganomics would not have occurred. They also illustrate what could have happened if the country had been placed in the hands of leaders who were not ready to make the necessary changes at the time. Wade K. Ewing

Discussion Questions 1. In the scenarios presented in this chapter, which one is more likely to have produced economic outcomes similar to those of actual history?

Depression of the 1980s? 41

2. Do you believe that the poorest members of society benefit from a supply-side approach to economic regulation? Is supply-side or trickle-down economics simply a scheme to favor the wealthy? 3. If Carter had been elected to a second term, how would his economic policies have resembled those of Reagan and how would they have differed? 4. How would Bush have changed the threat posed by Islamists had he been elected instead of Reagan in the 1980 elections? What would have been the fate of Israel? 5. The New Deal addressed the nation’s economic crisis by increasing government regulation and government spending. Would such a policy have been advisable in the 1980s?

Bibliography and Further Reading Anderson, Martin. Revolution. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988. Carrol, James D. et al. Supply-Side Management in the Reagan Administration. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, November/ December 1985. D’Souza, Dinesh. Ronald Reagan: How an Ordinary Man Became an Extraordinary Leader. New York: Free Press, 1999. Eisenbach, Jeffery A., and James C. Miller III. “Reagan’s Economic Policy Legacy.” Washington Times (August 8, 2004). Kengor, Paul. The Crusader: Ronald Reagan and the Fall of Communism. New York: Regan Books, 2006. Kengor, Paul, and Peter Schwiezer. The Reagan Presidency: Assessing the Man and His Legacy. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005. Meese, Edwin III. With Reagan: The Inside Story. Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 1992. Modigliani, Franco. “Reagan’s Economic Policies: A Critique.” Oxford Economic Papers 40 (1988): 397–426. National Archives, “The White House,” http://clinton5.nara.gov/ WH/Accomplishments/eightyears–03.html (accessed November 2006). Niskanen, William A., and Stephen Moore. “Supply Tax Cuts and the Truth about the Reagan Economic Record,” CATO Institute Policy Analysis, No. 261. Salamon, Lester M., and Michael S. Lund, eds. The Reagan Presidency and the Governing of America. New York: University Press of America, 1987. Schwiezer, Peter. Victory: The Reagan Administration’s Secret Strategy That Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union. Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1996. Taylor, John B. “Changes in American Economic Policy in the 1980s: Watershed or Pendulum Swing?” Journal of Economic Literature 33, no. 2 (June 1995): 777–784.

Euromissiles

What if the Soviets had overreacted to U.S. installation of new missiles in Europe?

INTRODUCTION From the beginning of the Cold War in 1945 until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the degree of intensity and hostility of the war was never at a constant pitch. There were periods when the United States and the Soviet Union enjoyed fairly warm relations. Other times, it appeared as though the world would suffer the consequences of a nuclear war. The Berlin crisis of 1961 and Cuban missile crisis of 1962 are well-known instances when war could have broken out. At the beginning of the 1970s, however, these danger points seemed to be a thing of the past. Despite the Vietnam War, relations between the superpowers were good and there was the development of diplomatic and commercial ties between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. This détente encouraged the optimism that despite all differences, West and East could live together peacefully. But the era of accommodation and good will did not last. In the late 1970s and into the early 1980s, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union became so cold, so hostile, that there was great fear on the part of some that a war could break out between the two countries. A nuclear war might have occurred in late 1983, the result of generally deteriorating relations and misunderstanding about the intent behind military and diplomatic actions. The fear and hostility that characterized this period were the result of several factors. Basic distrust between the two sides provided ample opportunity for misunderstanding and for relations to cool. Also, there were events, sometimes inspired by North American Treaty Organization (NATO) actions, sometimes Soviet-inspired, that increased tensions. At the same time, events that neither side controlled could affect how the two countries saw each other and how they interacted. No single event, by itself, would have led to confrontation, but taken together, they combined to create an atmosphere and set of circumstances during which one side could have fatally misinterpreted the other.

3

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In the Middle East and Central Asia much had happened since 1970 to change the balance of power. After the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, Egypt moved away from the sponsorship of the Soviet Union. Instead of relying on the Soviet Union, the government of Anwar Sadat established increasingly warm ties with the United States. In the mid-1970s the U.S. Army had sent units to assist the Egyptians in clearing obstructions in the Suez Canal. This westward reorientation of Egypt and Israel’s continued good relations with the United States decreased the influence that the Soviet Union had enjoyed in that region through the 1950s and 1960s. The 1978 Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt cemented the better relations, increased American credibility in the region, and served to basically freeze the Soviets out. In the next year, however, America’s close twenty-five-year relationship with Iran came to a dramatic halt. The Shah of Iran was overthrown in February 1979 and forced to leave the country. Iran now became an Islamic Republic; an important part of its foreign policy was an unmistakable hostility toward the United States. By the end of the year, the American embassy and its staff had been seized and were held as hostages. On Christmas Day, 1979, another event not far from Iran significantly increased tensions. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on the pretext of protecting the pro-Soviet Afghan government. With this action the Soviets entered a ten-year war that would come to resemble America’s involvement in Vietnam a few years earlier. Anti-Soviet Afghan forces, supplied and assisted by the United States, would continually oppose the invaders until their eventual withdrawal in 1989. In 1979, however, the most immediate result was a series of actions by President Jimmy Carter. First, he placed a moratorium on all technology and grain sales to the Soviet Union. Then, he stopped the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks scheduled between the two governments. Finally, he announced a boycott of the upcoming Summer Olympics to be held in Moscow. On the basis of only these events in the region, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were quite cold. However, other events also contributed to the heightened level of tension. In Europe the increasing number of missiles on the continent significantly stirred the potential for conflict. In 1977 the Soviet Union began stationing intermediate-range missiles, designated as SS–20s, that could launch nuclear warheads against targets throughout Western Europe. A treaty concerning these intermediate weapons had been negotiated and signed in 1979 but that agreement did not elimA Pershing II missile similar to the weapons inate the weapons entirely. In that same year the the United States deployed in Europe in 1979. United States completed its first deployment of (U.S. Army)

A Soviet overreaction? 45

IN CONTEXT

Euromissiles

Euromissile is a term that must be used, or at least read, with some care. In 1972 the Daimler-Benz Aerospace Company of Germany and Aerospatial of France combined to develop and manufacture anti-tank and ground-to-air missiles. These are not the Euromissiles that created so much concern in the 1970s and 1980s. Those missiles were the Soviet SS–20 and the American Pershing II and Cruise Tomahawk missiles that were initially deployed in the late 1970s and continued to be a presence in Europe until the last were removed and destroyed in the 1990s. The installation and stationing of these missiles was not the first time that nuclear weapons had been in Europe. The Americans had started deploying nuclear weapons in the 1950s as part of their defensive plans in the event of a combined Soviet/Warsaw Pact assault. The means of delivery included artillery, aircraft carrying bombs, and missiles. The Pershings themselves had been in Europe since 1965. Those that were being sent to Europe now, the Pershing IIs, were a substantially improved version with much greater accuracy and greater

range. Despite many protests throughout Western Europe, there was substantial support for their presence. In large part they signified continued American interest in defending Europe (a premise that was not always consistently believed by many Europeans). The Pershing II missile was capable of delivering a thermonuclear warhead that could deliver the explosive force of 5,000 to 50,000 tons of TNT. It could hit a target from 1,000 to 11,000 miles away. Pershing IIs fired from Western Europe could reach Moscow in about six minutes. Whatever warning the Soviets received that these missiles had been launched would not have reached them in time to counter the attack. The Soviet equivalent, the SS–20 could launch up to three separate warheads, each one with the explosive power of 250,000 tons of TNT. These missiles had a range of 2,700 miles and were deployed in bases in the Soviet Union. The longer range of these missiles made it possible for them to destroy targets throughout Western Europe.

Pershing II and Cruise missiles, the “Euromissiles,” in Europe, with plans for even greater numbers in the near future. Conventional ground, naval, and air forces for both sides remained facing each other from the Arctic Circle to the Mediterranean, maintaining a high state of readiness. There were other areas of contention. From the mid-1970s and into the 1980s the Soviets, with some assistance from their Cuban allies, promoted communist regimes in Latin America and Africa. Depending on the situation and place, they could be supporting an existing government or attempting to overthrow one. Both the United States and the Soviet Union actively assisted their followers in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, and Angola in Africa and El Salvador and Nicaragua in Latin America. None of these arenas of conflict were critical by themselves but did contribute to the overall sense of disquiet, hostility, and tension. In 1980, the political and diplomatic situation changed with the election of Ronald Reagan as president of the United States. An integral part of Reagan’s campaign for the presidency included speeches against arms control and any form of détente with the Soviet Union. His election and the initiation of his foreign policy escalated the rhetoric and aggressive actions on both sides. Added to this new atmosphere was the well-publicized beginning of the largest-ever peacetime buildup of the American military. Another factor that did not defuse any tension was that Reagan, most unusually for a new U.S. president, did not contact the Soviets or make any attempts to open communications with them for most of his

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ANOTHER VIE W

Ghosts of 1941

Adolf Hitler launched his surprise invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. For two years, the Soviet Union and Germany had been allies. Together they devised a nonaggression pact pledging that they would not fight each other. Germany would receive food and oil from the Soviets, and after the invasion of Poland in September 1939, both nations would divide that defeated country between them. In addition, the Soviet Union would be allowed to assume control of what had been three independent Baltic republics: Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. Their division of Eastern Europe was followed the next year by the German conquests of France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway. The British Army on the continent, fighting to assist its Allies, was forced back to Britain in June 1940. During that summer and into the fall, only the planes of the Royal Air Force seemed to be keeping the Germans from invading across the English Channel. That invasion was not to be, however, and Hitler then looked back toward the east. It was his intent to conquer this territory—and actually always had been. After conquering the terrain, he intended to eliminate large portions of the population, subject the rest to slavery, and populate the region with Germans who he said needed Lebensraum, “living room.” On June 22, 1942, after months of preparation and a buildup of more than three million men, the order was given. The Germans, with later help from

Hungary, Italy, Romania, and other countries, invaded the Soviet Union. The shock was complete: most of the Soviet air force was eliminated in the first days. Their planes, parked out in the open on runways, were easily destroyed on the ground. Soviet army units were surrounded, cut off, and forced to surrender. The Soviets then began the long retreat that would not end until the Germans were nearly inside Moscow. The war would be fought over almost four years, ending only when the Soviet Army succeeded in capturing Berlin, after the nation had lost between twenty-five and thirty million of its people, both military and civilian. How could such an attack and one that should have been so obvious by its massive preparations have been such a surprise? The answer is that Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, despite many warnings from his agents in Europe and Japan, refused to acknowledge the possibility. Simply put, he did not want to believe that the Germans would attack and so forbade all discussion of the subject. His country paid dearly for this error. The effects of that war haunted all who had lived through it, and that included all of the Soviet senior leadership in 1983. They were afraid of being surprised; they did not trust any nation (in this case the United States) that they thought could harm them. They wanted to maintain control over Eastern Europe at least partly because that land would provide a defensive cushion to slow down any repetition of the German invasion.

first year in office. Finally, near the end of the year there was an agreement to start up talks on the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty. At the end of 1981, concurrent with Reagan’s first communications with the Soviets, there was a crisis in Poland. For more than a year, the labor union, Solidarity, had been forcing the Polish government to make democratic concessions. This activity bothered the Soviet leadership, remembering a similar situation in Czechoslovakia in 1968. At that time, the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact members, including Poland, had invaded Czechoslovakia and forced a change in both government policy and personnel. Thirteen years later, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev was putting considerable pressure on the Polish leadership to respond to the situation. Faced with what he later claimed was a choice between Soviet intervention and imposing strict internal controls, General Wojciech

A Soviet overreaction? 47

ANOTHER VIE W

Ghosts of 1941 (Continued)

While the Soviet Union aggressively pursued its worldwide policy through diplomatic, economic, and military means, there was always this element of fear in all its calculations. The surprise of the German attack in 1941 and its consequences of casualties in the millions never left the collective memory of Soviet people. When analyzing a

government or other institution, its past experiences should be considered in guessing about future intentions. At the same time, during this analysis it is good to keep in mind that sometimes seemingly contradictory or irrational impulses (aggression and fear) can co-exist and can cause a serious chain of events.

Soviet Red Army soldiers in 1941: The events of World War II never left the collective memory of the Soviet people. (Library of Congress)

Jaruzelski took control of the Polish government and outlawed Solidarity. On December 13, 1981, he established martial law in Poland with a serious abridgement of civil rights. In the United States, both the state and defense departments watched these developments carefully. As events unfolded in 1982, nothing occurred to improve the situation. In the latter part of that year Brezhnev died. His successor was the head of the Committee for State Security (KGB, state police and intelligence services), Yuri Andropov. As director of the KGB since 1967, Andropov had an in-depth knowledge of the world surrounding the Soviet Union. Andropov sincerely believed and actually stated that the United States was behaving aggressively and was preparing for a nuclear war. His belief was based in large part on the materials that the KGB gathered and sent to Moscow for analysis, but his personal history was a factor as

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The Flight of KAL 007

On September 1, 1983, a commercial airliner, Korean Airlines flight 007 was on its way to Seoul, Korea, from Anchorage, Alaska. During the flight, the pilots went off course and entered Soviet airspace, actually only a few miles from Soviet military installations. The Soviet Air Force sent fighters to intercept the plane. The aircraft, a Boeing 747 with 240 passengers and twenty-nine crew members was shot down and crashed into the sea, and all those on board were killed. The Soviets later claimed that the pilot had fired a warning shot and that there had been efforts to contact the pilots. The response was immediate. Reagan condemned the Soviets for a crime against humanity. The Soviets, once they admitted to shooting down the aircraft, maintained that they had intercepted an intelligence mission and were justified in what they had done. They withheld information (including the black box recorder that was finally turned over in 1992 by Russian Federation President, Boris Yeltsin) that would have clarified that the airliner was genuinely lost. How could this incident have happened? Was it a completely isolated incident or was there a larger context? From 1981 on, the U.S. military had embarked on a very active program of testing Soviet reactions to different types of interaction.

Flights of bombers might be sent toward the North Pole only to turn around when they had been spotted on Soviet radar. U.S. fighter aircraft would fly missions close to the border of the Warsaw Pact in Europe or toward locations on the Soviet Union’s Pacific coast. Of course, and perhaps most significantly for Flight KAL 007, the U.S. Air Force would fly its electronic and signal intelligence aircraft near Soviet airspace. Perhaps the largest effort of this kind occurred in summer 1981 when a NATO fleet managed to sail through the Greenland-IcelandUnited Kingdom Gap undetected and station itself off the coast of the Soviet Union, to be discovered by Soviet long-range reconnaissance aircraft. The Soviets suddenly found a potentially hostile fleet off its shores (with a task force that included an aircraft carrier) and they had no idea how the ships had arrived there. Two years later, a similar naval exercise was conducted by the U.S. Seventh Fleet less than five hundred miles from Soviet Pacific installations. Aircraft from the U.S. Air Force performed extensive intelligence-gathering tasks and planes from aircraft carriers flew simulated combat missions. There can be no doubt that when Flight 007 wandered unknowingly into the wrong place, the local Soviet commanders had these U.S. missions in mind.

well. Andropov, born in 1914, was, like many of his generation, profoundly affected by the surprise German invasion of 1941. As head of the KGB, he did everything he could to prevent such a catastrophe from occurring again. He was diligent at intelligence work but was well known for his willingness to use force to impose compliance. He had been sent to Hungary after its unsuccessful uprising in 1956 and had gained a reputation for ruthlessness in punishing those involved in the rebellion. Andropov instituted a program that combined the general intelligence capabilities of the KGB with those of the GRU (military intelligence) under a program named RYAN, an acronym based on the Russian term for “Nuclear War.” Its intent was to confirm Andropov’s belief that the Americans were deliberately trying to start a war. The Soviet military also shared this view, partly from fear of repeating the events of 1941 and perhaps in part to ensure that their annual defense budgets stayed at a high level. The events of 1983 came at a rapid pace and none gave any reason to believe that the likelihood of war was decreasing. On March 23, 1983, at

A Soviet overreaction? 49

a relatively small gathering, Reagan gave a speech characterizing the Soviet Union as an “evil empire.” A few days later he announced that the United States would launch its Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), also known as “Star Wars.” The objective was that this system, operating from both the ground and space, would provide a defensive capability by destroying Russian missiles after they were launched toward the United States. In September of that year, a Korean civilian airliner, KAL Flight 007, was shot down by Soviet fighters when it wandered over Soviet air space. All 269 crew and passengers were killed. The destruction of this plane inspired a worldwide outcry against the Soviet Union. Despite the claims that it was done in self-defense (and apparently it was that concern, coupled with errors in communications, that prompted the attack), relations worsened between the United States and the Soviet Union. Within days after KAL 007’s destruction, the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate passed the annual military appropriations bill. Ominously, it included a provision to begin work on bringing nerve gas back into the American inventory of weapons, after an absence of fifteen years. This portion of the bill was accompanied by a huge appropriation, smaller than Reagan had requested but considerably larger than any requested or approved during Jimmy Carter’s administration. The appropriation also included the addition of ninety-five new Pershing II missiles, probably for deployment in Europe. Later that month, Andropov issued a declaration stating that further good relations with the United States would be impossible. The pace of events in the next month, October, did not slacken. On October 23, 241 Americans in Lebanon were killed when their Marine barracks was hit by a suicide bomber. Two days later, on October 25, the United States invaded the Caribbean island country of Grenada. In a bloody coup d’etat, the government there had been replaced by a pro-Fidel Castro, Marxist leadership, which the U.S. administration viewed as unacceptable in America’s “backyard.” The rationale for the invasion was the concern for approximately one thousand Americans who were attending the medical school on Grenada. The invasion was successful, the students were secured, and the Marxist government was overthrown. In addition to those two events, it was well known that the Americans intended to deploy more Pershing II missiles to bases in Europe by the end of the year. Increasing the stock of these weapons that could reach Moscow within six minutes of being launched, combined with the events of the past three to four years, created a great deal of tension with the Soviets. One example of sanity in the paranoia was September 26, 1983, when the Russian early warning system “detected” U.S. missiles heading toward the Soviet Union. Stanislav Petrov, who was an officer in the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces and was a duty officer in charge of the system, averted a potential nuclear war by refusing to believe that the United States would launch an attack. In January 2006, he was honored for his actions at the United Nations. However, the defining moment in history came in November 1983: the United States and its NATO allies began an annual war game that looked to many Soviet officials like an event precipitating a nuclear war.

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The Reagans view caskets of the victims of the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, at Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland. (Ronald Reagan Presidential Library)

It was not enough that NATO and the Warsaw Pact stationed forces in Europe. Both sides had to be sure that if “the balloon went up,” that is, if a war started, all command and control systems would work as needed. Soldiers in the field had to know where to go, what to do, and how to do it. At the same time, their commanders had to understand what was happening on the battlefield and to convey instructions in a timely fashion. For that reason both sides conducted exercises at every level, testing equipment, tactics, unit readiness, supply, and communications. At the end of every year, the United States and its NATO allies conducted a specific command and communications exercise code named Able Archer. Although it was held every year, in 1983 the Able Archer exercise contained some significant changes. First, the American secretary of defense and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were going to participate (rather than have these roles assumed by lower-level officers as was usually the case). Second, both President Reagan and Vice President George H. W. Bush would participate, though very briefly. Third, there were some changes to the tactical and operational scenarios that would be played out in this grand-scale war game. One drill would simulate the complete release of nuclear weapons against the Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces. The

A Soviet overreaction? 51

exercise was scheduled to begin on November 2 and would continue until November 11. In the past, Soviet intelligence services (principally but not exclusively the KGB) had known about this exercise as they knew about it this year. This year, however, tensions between both sides had risen appreciably (this was, after all, only two months after the destruction of KAL 007). The KGB got its information from a variety of sources. Some was from their agents; some was based on intercepts of message traffic. Even if they could not decipher all messages, the message frequency, periods of radio silence, and changing of codes could be interpreted as signals that an attack was about to begin. The extent of traffic would give them some idea of the magnitude of what was going on. In addition, just before the exercise, the United States made the decision to not include Reagan and Bush. Their initial inclusion had rung alarm bells for the Soviets; their nonparticipation now made the Soviets even more nervous. Behind all this was the fact that NATO Euromissiles (the Pershings and Cruise missiles) were already deployed in substantial numbers in Europe and more were on the way. On one side, one could argue that the Americans would not attack until the latest batch was deployed, but the speed of events and the coldness of relations between the superpowers made anything seem possible. On the night of November 8–9, the KGB received messages that, combined with their previous analysis, led them to misinterpret the exercise and assume that American troops were actually on alert. Some, they thought, were mobilized to move out immediately. There seemed to be three possible reasons for this sudden, heightened activity. Because the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon had been bombed the previous month, it was possible that U.S. troops were deploying there. The second alternative was that it might be a regular American exercise. The third alternative was that the Americans and their NATO allies were preparing for an actual war against the Soviet Union. As far as it is possible to know, this information was not conveyed directly to the Soviet leadership, yet the KGB went into action. Its special warning program, RYAN (which had begun when Andropov was head of KGB), dramatically increased its activity to determine whether an attack was imminent. Eventually, the Soviets realized that it was only the annual exercise and that if U.S. troops were mobilizing, it was probably to reinforce the Marines stationed in Lebanon. NATO intelligence reported that tactical fighter-bomber units in East Germany and Poland had been put on alert as had several Soviet/Warsaw Pact bases to prevent surprise attack. There has been, however, no direct confirmation of those reports, even more than twenty years after the event. Neither the Soviet civilian command (the Politburo) nor the military command had been provided information that a NATO attack was imminent. That could have happened, however, and a series of decisions based on misunderstanding and fear might have resulted in a very different set of events from those that eventually occurred.

ACTUAL HISTORY A few weeks after Able Archer 83 the American leaders found out how close to war they might have come. Reagan was apparently shocked to

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find that the Soviets had believed that the United States and its NATO allies were actually preparing to execute a first strike. He was advised when he first received this news that the reports were exaggerated concerning the Soviet response. These reports were later confirmed and both Reagan and his advisers began to see the extent of the Soviet assumptions that would lead to those conclusions. As a result, Reagan began the initiatives that would lead to a reduction of weapons on the European continent. His efforts began in a speech he gave in January 1984 that continued to stress the need for American strength but backed away from the “evil empire” rhetoric of the preceding year. On February 9, 1984, Andropov died, having been secretary general of the Communist Party and ruler of the Soviet Union for only fifteen months. Only a few candidates were being discussed by Western analysts as a successor. One of these was fifty-two-year-old Mikhail Gorbachev who had been a protégé of Andropov. This was not to be his time although he would not have long to wait. Andropov’s successor turned out to be Konstantin Chernenko, the most senior member of the Communist Party Secretariat. Chernenko was seventy-two years old and in ill health. Within thirteen months of assuming leadership of the Soviet Union, he had died of emphysema and heart problems. He was not an active proponent of talks with the United States, but he had not continued exactly as Andropov had done, allowing a greater degree of diplomatic conversations with the United States. Gorbachev was selected to become general secretary of the Party within a few hours of Chernenko’s death. A new era in the tone, content, and frequency of discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union, particularly on the subject of missiles, would now begin. Some dialogue began between the two nations concerning the reopening of arms talks, but it was generally realized that little would be accomplished or even discussed until after the American presidential election in November. Not long after Reagan was elected to a second term, however, the conversations and series of proposals began. On November 24, 1984, Reagan announced that the United States and the Soviet Union would begin the Nuclear and Space Talks (known as NST). Less than two months later the American secretary of state and his Soviet counterpart agreed to reopen talks about the Euromissiles as a part of the NST discussions. In April 1985 Gorbachev stated that he would temporarily halt the deployment of the Soviet SS–20 missiles and that the moratorium would be permanent if the Americans agreed to do the same thing. In November 1985 Reagan and Gorbachev met at their first summit in Geneva, Switzerland. This series of talks did not go particularly well. However, it is important to remember that Reagan had not held discussions with Gorbachev’s two predecessors. That, combined with the generally warmer tone in relations, meant that even if Geneva was inconclusive, at least both sides were talking. Reagan still believed in dealing with the Soviets from a position of strength but was showing interest, by a series of proposals and counterproposals, in maintaining a dialogue on the subject of disarmament. Gorbachev, for his part, was not exhibiting the hostility and suspicion that had been an important feature of Andropov’s leadership.

A Soviet overreaction? 53

President Reagan and Soviet general secretary Gorbachev at the first summit in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1985. (Ronald Reagan Presidential Library)

The year 1986 opened with Gorbachev announcing a plan to put into effect total nuclear disarmament that would be complete by 2000. That proposal also included a subproposal to eliminate all the Euromissiles on both sides. An American offer in the next month contained Reagan’s suggestion to eliminate the American Pershing II missiles and Soviet SS–20s from Europe and from Asia. For the next few months, negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union continued. In April the nuclear power plant at Chernobyl in the Soviet Union was the scene of a serious accident. It has been suggested by historians that the nuclear accident had the effect of increasing the sense of urgency in the negotiations. If things could go so terribly wrong at a facility where nuclear power was used for peaceful purposes, the consequences of a nuclear war seemed less abstract, more concrete. In October 1986 another summit was held, this time at Reykjavik, Iceland. In several respects, especially at first, this meeting was deemed a disappointment. There was not even a date set for another summit to follow. However, both Reagan and Gorbachev were, within a few days, stating that this latest meeting was only one of a series of ongoing discussions. In a few weeks further discussions on arms control and other subjects took place. And the meeting between the two leaders had not been without positive results. There was an agreement that both sides would eventually remove all their intermediate range missiles (the Pershings and SS–20s) and the Soviet Union would keep only one hundred in Asia,

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with the Americans keeping the same number in the United States. There was still, however, the SDI (Star Wars) program. Gorbachev had tied any major disarmament agreement with the demand for freezing SDI. If he continued with that as a condition and the Americans continued their SDI program, there would be no major agreements in the future. That problem went away, however, when Gorbachev formally stated in February 1987 that he would no longer link missile agreements with the discontinuation of SDI by the United States. By December of that year, Gorbachev and Reagan signed the INF Treaty. By the provisions of this treaty all ground-launched missiles and cruise missiles with a range of 300 to 3,400 miles would be removed from Europe by 1991. The end result was that more than two thousand five hundred missiles would be taken out of Europe and that all deployment of these types of missiles would be halted worldwide. The Senate of the United States ratified that treaty in May 1988. By itself, the INF treaty would have marked an important milestone in the Cold War, both a symbolic and practical measure of the improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations and an effort to make the world safer. These events did not occur in a vacuum, however, as the Cold War took a turn that would bring about its sudden end. In 1988, the Soviet Union began to pull its soldiers out of Afghanistan, beginning to conclude the war that had begun nine years before. By the next year they were gone. At the same time the Soviets were lessening their support of their allies in Africa. The beginning of 1989 was marked by the first partially free elections in Poland, with the result that the formerly banned Solidarity won a large segment of the available seats in the legislature. Polish sovereignty, even on a limited basis, which had been Brezhnev’s nightmare six years before, was now becoming a reality. All through Eastern Europe in 1989 and 1990, the remaining nations that had been controlled by the Soviet Union exercised their independence by putting noncommunist regimes in power: Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Romania, and Bulgaria. On the night of November 8–9, 1989, exactly six years to the day after the Able Archer exercise—which could have at started a war—the Berlin Wall came down. Symbolically, at least, this was the end of the Cold War, and the destruction of missiles by both sides that continued into the 1990s marked the real end of the possibility of a war starting because of their presence. By 1990, there was no longer an East Germany. Germany, divided since the end of World War II, was once again a united nation. By late September 1990 the last of the American missiles in Europe had been removed. The next year the United States unilaterally withdrew its tactical nuclear weapons, shipping them back home to be destroyed. The withdrawal of weapons of various types began at this time and the numbers of these weapons were substantially decreased. In 1992, the United States had completed its tactical nuclear weapon withdrawals. The Soviet Union ceased to exist in 1991 but the disarmament process continued as the United States signed treaties with the new nations (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan) to continue the provisions of the INF treaty. Into the twenty-first century, in one sense, because there are fewer nuclear weapons the world is safer. In another sense, the situation may be more dangerous. With more countries (India and Pakistan) in possession

A Soviet overreaction? 55

of nuclear weapons and others (Iran and North Korea) getting very close to having them, the question of delivery systems and the number of weapons available are less important. In the age of terrorism, the means of delivery of a nuclear weapon may not be missiles at all; the weapons may be brought to a place by land or sea transport and then detonated.

ALTERNATE HISTORY An individual action can begin a chain of occurrences that lead to a great result, either for good or ill. Other times, a single decision can prevent a series of events with greater consequences than might be guessed at because of that single small decision. In the first half of 1983, a Soviet officer monitored the screen of an early warning system and saw what appeared to be five Minutemen missiles heading for Moscow. Although he notified his superiors, he believed that it was a signal anomaly and not a real attack. He reasoned that if what the screen showed had been genuine, more signals would have appeared than the five he saw. No alert was called or missiles launched in retaliation. There was no war that day. What if the Soviets had assumed that Able Archer was not a routine scheduled command post exercise but preparation for a preemptive strike against the Soviet Union? In November 1983, Yuri Andropov was very ill; he would be dead in less than six months. His pessimistic and suspicious nature, the result of his tenure as head of the KGB, may have increased as illness took its toll. He might have assumed that a NATO attack was about to happen. It is certain that during his short term of power he was not, like Brezhnev before him, ignored at the lower levels. He was a handson leader and demanded and got attention and obedience. Whatever he decided would have been carried out. If he had been alerted to what the KGB suspected was preparation for an attack, a possibility that it was then investigating with great urgency, he might have decided to take decisive action. Calling his military commanders from his sickroom at the Kremlin, he could have authorized a full preemptive strike against NATO. Alternatively, the principal military and naval commanders, fearing that events were slipping out of control because of Andropov’s illness, might have decided, as a group, to launch the attack themselves. As we know, according to NATO intelligence estimates, at least one group of tactical fighter-bombers with nuclear weapons may have been put on combat alert. In this decision to go to war, the alert would have been given to all air units. And mobilization would not have stopped there. Warsaw Pact doctrine was based on the premise that the Soviets would launch the first strike against NATO. The doctrine called for a massive nuclear strike that would destroy American, British, and German units stationed along the border with East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Not only would the planes have flown to their assigned targets but the SS–20s and other missiles throughout Eastern Europe would have been launched.

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In an alternate history, the Airborne Warning and Command System (AWACS) planes would be crucial in a confrontation with the Soviet Union. (NATO)

This series of attacks would have seriously damaged NATO ground troops guarding the mountain passes as well as striking other important military and political targets. Further, these strikes would have prevented the French and NATO national armies from deploying to assist. Then, Soviet ground troops with some Warsaw Pact support would advance. The Soviets did not totally trust the populations of the Warsaw Pact nations and used their armies as a means to keep peace within the borders; the main attack would have been by the Soviets. From the south the Soviet Central Group of Forces out of Czechoslovakia and 8th Guards Tank Army in Germany would have advanced through the Goettingen, Fulda, Grabfeld, Hof, and Cham Gaps against combined American and German forces. Concurrently, in the north, the 3d Shock Army and the 2d Guards Tank Army would have attacked British and German forces across the North German plain. Using airborne troops as advance parties at selected objectives, they would neutralize any resistance they encountered. If everything went according to plan, there would be no substantial enemy forces left. The Soviets could roll on unopposed to the Atlantic Ocean. That plan overlooked, however, the problem all military commanders face—what the military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, called “friction.” Friction simply means that as events occur and instructions are given, things can, and do, go wrong. It takes more time and effort to accomplish your objectives than you anticipated or you think it should. The Soviets would have encountered a great deal of friction.

A Soviet overreaction? 57

First, their conventional and nuclear air strikes would not have eliminated all NATO ground troops. There would probably have been substantial pockets of resistance. The terrain they defended would have been heavily damaged, making the ground easily defensible. The preemptive air and missile strikes would have damaged roads, bridges, and other parts of the infrastructure. Although the Soviet Army prided itself on its mobility, this damage would have compromised its ability to move and to resupply itself. There would have been other problems. While hitting Central Europe without warning, there might well have been enough time for NATO naval units in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean to take protective measures and then engage Soviet naval units in those waters. American and Italian troops stationed in northern Italy (where some Pershing IIs were deployed) might have launched some strikes to “decapitate” (that is, eliminate command centers) of some of the advancing Soviet troops. If the Soviets assumed they could restrict the war to Europe, they might have found that their attack would bring about an American response beyond their immediate calculations. Faced with the loss of Europe and the probable death of many Americans (the combined number of American military and their dependents in Europe was approximately half a million) and the belief that a final war of survival was at hand, Reagan might well have authorized the launch of intercontinental missiles to attack the Soviet Union itself. Concurrent with that assault would have been the aggressive hunting of Soviet submarines off the coast of the United States. From being apparently victorious, the Soviets might have found their position within a day or two of the initial attack to be untenable. They would have enjoyed massive numerical superiority in ground troops. In all likelihood, however, they would have found enough Americans, British, and West Germans effectively defending a wasteland to prohibit a quiet occupation. Additionally, after the United States had attacked the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons, the ability of the Soviet military command and control system would have been diminished, if not destroyed outright. There might have been no one in Moscow to give orders to the generals in the field. And even if that were not the case, some of the Pershing II missiles, those American Euromissiles opposed by the Soviets and many civilians in Western Europe, would have hit their targets despite the first attack. Thus, with no one to give orders from Moscow and no high command headquarters based in East Germany to receive them, the Soviets could have found themselves grinding to a permanent halt. Traditionally, Soviet military doctrine did not place any emphasis on taking personal initiative. Without orders, the troops could very well have stayed in place. What would happen next? With a stalemate in Europe and the United States moving airborne, armored, and infantry overseas to reinforce what was left, the Soviets might have tried to negotiate a truce. That truce could have led to a subsequent pullback of Soviet forces to their starting positions.

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Although most of the conflict would have occurred in Europe and the Soviet Union, it is likely that the United States would have suffered casualties in some of its cities. Washington, D.C., New York, and Chicago would certainly have been hit as well as, perhaps, some cities located near missile and air bases. Europe and its civilization would have been ruined, not to be rebuilt for generations, perhaps never. The land would have been poisoned, the surviving population suffering from radiation sickness, medical disorders, and famine. While there would not necessarily have been the onset of a nuclear winter, the climate would probably have been severely affected. And in all of this, the one major power to be unscathed, the People’s Republic of China would begin to recalculate its new position in the world. Robert N. Stacy

Discussion Questions 1. What do the events of the late 1970s and early 1980s tell you about the uses of history in analysis and decision making? 2. What happened in and to the Soviet Union during World War II that would form the basis for some of that nation’s assumptions in making decisions? 3. In reviewing the events of the 1970s and the early 1980s, do you think there is a particular point when both sides could have mended their relationship? 4. MAD (mutual assured destruction) is the concept of two sides having enough destructive power to completely eliminate their opponent while ensuring their own destruction. Is this useful as a means of keeping peace between two sides? What if one side gains a slight edge despite the fact that it would be eliminated anyway? Is this a good analogy with the Soviet fear of Euromissiles or was there another factor at work? 5. The United States policy was to never promise that it would not strike first. In light of the events of 1983, coupled with the increased deployment of missiles that year, was this a good policy?

Bibliography and Further Reading Cowley, Robert. The Cold War: A Military History. New York: Random House, 2005. Daalder, Ivo H. The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response: NATO Strategy and Theater Nuclear Forces since 1967. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991. Dean, Jonathan. Watershed in Europe: Dismantling the East-West Military Confrontation. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987.

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FitzGerald, Frances. Way out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars, and the End of the Cold War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000. Faringdon, Hugh. Strategic Geography: NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and the Superpowers. New York: Routledge, 1989. Freedman, Lawrence. The Cold War: A Military History. London: Cassell, 2001. Gaddis, John Lewis. The Cold War: A New History. New York: Penguin Press, 2005. Garrity, Patrick J. The INF Treaty: Past, Present, and Future. Los Alamos: The Center, 1988. Gordievsky, Oleg. KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev. New York: HarperCollins, 1990. Herf, Jeffrey. War by Other Means: Soviet Power, West German Resistance, and the Battle of the Euromissiles. New York: Free Press, 1991. Hersh, Seymour M. “The Target Is Destroyed”: What Really Happened to Flight 007 and What America Knew about It. New York: Random House, 1986. Holden, Gerard. The Warsaw Pact: Soviet Security and Bloc Politics. New York: Blackwell, 1989. Murphy, David E. What Stalin Knew: The Enigma of Barbarossa. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005. White, Andrew. Symbols of War: Pershing II and Cruise Missiles in Europe. London: Merlin Press/European Nuclear Disarmament, 1983.

Shooting of the President

What if Reagan had died from his bullet wound and George H.W. Bush had become president?

INTRODUCTION Born February 6, 1911, in the small town of Tampico, Illinois, Ronald Wilson Reagan grew up in relatively poor circumstances. He went on to become a movie star, president of the Screen Actors Guild, governor of California, and finally, one of America’s most popular presidents. In 1926, Reagan became a lifeguard, and over a seven-year period, reportedly saved seventy-seven lives. He attended Eureka College in northern California from 1928 to 1932, as the Depression settled into the United States. He studied economics and sociology, played on the football team, and acted in school plays. Reagan worked his way into radio before breaking into film following a 1937 screen test; his first role was, appropriately enough, as a radio announcer. Between the late 1930s and 1964, Reagan starred in fifty-three films. (While he was president, these could not be shown on broadcast television, due to regulations concerning equal airtime.) On January 26, 1940, Reagan married his first wife, actress Jane Wyman, and had two children, Michael, and Maureen. Reagan was drafted into the U.S. Army in 1942 and served in World War II, but near-sightedness kept him from the battle fronts. He was assigned to the Motion Picture Army Unit in Culver City, California, where he made training and propaganda films. From 1947 to 1952, and from 1959 to 1960, Reagan was president of the Screen Actors Guild (SAG), the actors’ union. He was a Democrat then. A major influence occurred in 1946 when he mediated a dispute between two unions. One of them, the Conference of Studio Unions, was led by suspected communist Herb Sorrell. Reagan was against Sorrell and acquired a lifelong stance against communists from dealing with him. His role in this union dispute also established his reputation as a strong anticommunist. During his first year as president of the Screen Actors Guild, he showed far-right tendencies, joining Senator Joseph McCarthy’s hunt for communists. Reagan appeared as a sympathetic witness before the House Un-American Activities Committee and vowed to

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keep communists out of acting. Many actors were blacklisted or kept from employment as a direct result of this committee’s actions. Wyman divorced Reagan in 1948, alleging mental cruelty—though at the time, that was one of the few “legitimate” grounds for a divorce in California and the charge was usually understood to be technical rather than actual grounds for dissolving the marriage. Rumors suggested Jane Wyman was having an affair with a co-star. In 1947, she had lost a premature daughter. Reagan’s politics are also said to have played a role in the divorce. Nancy Davis came to Reagan for help when her name had wrongly appeared on a list of communist sympathizers, and she became his second wife and lifelong partner. Reagan proposed to Davis on Christmas Day, 1951, and they married on March 4, 1952 (William Holden, a prominent actor, was the best man). Much later in life, Reagan said that he could not imagine life without Davis. They had two children together, Patricia Ann and Ronald Prescott. Reagan toured the country as a television host, becoming a spokesman for conservatism, his views over time shifting further and further from their democratic beginning. This lost him his job of eight years in 1962; he had been hosting the General Electric Theater television show and was accused of using his position as a political soapbox. By 1964, Reagan was supporting conservative presidential candidate Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater. In a speech given promoting Goldwater, he attacked “big government.” This was a milestone in Reagan’s political career. In 1966 Reagan was elected governor of California by a margin of one million votes, and was reelected in 1970. After his second term in 1974, he campaigned for the presidency, but lost in the primaries. Then came several events that would help set the tone for the Reagan presidency. In 1978 in Iran, Islamic fundamentalist Ayatollah Khomeini took power from the U.S.-backed regime. On November 4, 1979, Iranian militants seized and occupied the U.S. embassy in Tehran, taking sixty-six Americans hostage. On July 19, 1979, Nicaraguan president Anastasio Somoza was overthrown. Cuba backed the Sandinista Marxist-Leninist regime that followed. On December 29, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Later that month when Reagan visited NORAD (North American Air Defense Command headquarters), he was told that the only defense the United States had against nuclear attack was the threat of retaliation, under the policy known as mutually assured destruction (MAD). All these events had a later bearing on the formulation of Reagan’s presidential policy. On February 26, 1980, Reagan won the New Hampshire presidential primary with 51 percent of the seven-way vote. He accepted the Republican nomination on July 17 and ran against incumbent Democrat Jimmy Carter. Reagan blamed Carter for high interest rates, inflation, and unemployment, and perhaps most damagingly, the Iran hostage crisis. On October 28, the two presidential candidates debated, and Reagan came away with a nine-point lead. On November 4, Reagan won the presidential election with a landslide of forty-four states. Republicans won control of the Senate for the first time in sixteen years. By 1980 Reagan had established the popularity that would launch him to not just one but two terms as president. He earned the nickname “The Great Communicator” for his eloquence and humor in public

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ANOTHER VIE W

The Economy

In viewing the final outcome of Reagan’s economic program, also known as Reaganomics, the $3 trillion national debt it caused would not be cut until Clinton became president, though during much of Reagan’s term the economy boomed—yet the stock market also did crash. Reagan had claimed that wealth would “trickle down” to the poor. This never quite happened. Though unemployment fell 50 percent by 1988, America lost much of its base in manufacturing and high-end blue-collar jobs. Overall, some economists would say, Reaganomics hurt the poor and widened the economic gap between classes. Another possible view was that Reagan’s economic plan, which at one time before becoming

Reagan’s running mate George H. W. Bush termed “voodoo economics,” was quite successful in context. Most of the time during the administration, the economic picture was very optimistic. Manufacturing jobs may have left anyway, as cheaper markets developed overseas and high technology began to make its way in the economy. Later defense spending cuts that allowed the deficit to be slashed under Clinton may have been possible only because there was no longer a Cold War to worry about. Spending on defense under Reagan, along with a reform-ready Gorbachev, was arguably a large part of what forced the Soviet system to go under.

speeches. Many Americans voted for him, even those who did not entirely agree with his positions; some of these came to be known as Reagan Democrats. His running mate was former Texas congressman, United Nations ambassador, and CIA director George H. W. Bush. The day after the election, the New York Stock Exchange went up sharply, especially the defense, oil, and technology industry stocks. On January 20, 1981, Reagan took office as the fortieth president of the United States. That day, the fifty-two remaining hostages held at the U.S. embassy in Teheran were released, 444 days after their capture. Reagan’s first formal act as president on January 29 was to sign legislation making that day “A Day of Thanksgiving to Honor Our Safely Returned Hostages.” In February, Reagan called for $41.4 billion in budget cuts, mostly from social welfare programs targeted at the poor, the disabled, and the elderly. He also called for 30 percent to be cut from taxes over the next three years, and an increase for defense spending. He promised not to cut Social Security, a program long regarded as “sacred.” Reagan’s economic program required twenty-six House Democrats to pass it, even with 100 percent Republican support. Reagan dedicated much time lobbying for his economic program, meeting with 467 legislators and calling many more by phone. By March, the president enjoyed a two-thirds public approval rating on this part of his agenda.

On March 30, 1981, at 2:25 P.M., President Ronald Reagan, in office just sixty-nine days, was shot by John Hinckley, Jr., a mentally ill man attempting to impress actress Jodie Foster. Reagan had been addressing a

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President Reagan waves to a crowd immediately before being shot in an assassination attempt at the Washington Hilton Hotel on March 30, 1981. (Ronald Reagan Presidential Library)

conference of the AFL-CIO’s Building Construction Trades Department at the Washington, D.C., Hilton hotel. He waved to a small crowd as he exited the side entrance. Then the shots began. According to Richard Reeves in The President’s Been Shot, Reagan called out, “What the hell’s that?” to Secret Service agent-in-charge, Jerry Parr. Parr was already tackling Reagan to the ground to protect him. Agent Ray Shaddick pushed both Reagan and Parr onto the floor of the presidential limousine. Parr yelled for the car to take off, and Agent Drew Unrue, the driver, floored the accelerator. First thinking it was from the tackling, Reagan was in great pain. He asked Parr to get off him, told him he thought he had broken a rib. Parr shouted for the driver to take them to the White House, saying “Rawhide is returning,” according to Reeves. (“Rawhide” was the Secret Service codename for the president.) As they sat up, Parr checked for blood. The fifth bullet fired had ricocheted off the car and struck Reagan under his left arm. He coughed, and pink foam formed on his lips, indicating a lung wound. Parr shouted for them to get to George Washington University Hospital, some five blocks away. They arrived within ten minutes of the shooting. Reagan managed to get out of the limousine and walk, though just a few feet inside he collapsed. Parr and Unrue carried him to a trauma bay. Three others were wounded: Secret Service agent Timothy J. McCarthy, police officer Thomas Delahanty, and most grievously, Press Secretary James Brady, at that moment lying in a pool of blood outside the hotel.

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Chaos outside the Washington Hilton Hotel after the assassination attempt. James Brady and police officer Thomas Delahanty lie wounded on the ground. (Ronald Reagan Presidential Library)

Doctors had to cut off Reagan’s clothes to find the wound. They knew he was shot, but not where. Reagan complained of shortness of breath. The bullet had hit a rib, gone through his lung, and stopped less than an inch from his heart. He passed out when his systolic blood pressure hit 78, his normal range being 140. Catheters were inserted in an attempt to drain blood and reinflate the lung. For a moment, they lost his pulse. Reagan came to consciousness and said to the nurse, “Who’s holding my hand? Does Nancy know about us?” according to Reeves. When Nancy arrived minutes later, Reagan said, “Honey, I forgot to duck.” Jocularity aside, the president’s condition was critical. The doctors thought he might bleed to death. Fifty-nine minutes after being shot, he was wheeled into surgery. The bullet had not exited. The president was dying. Transfusions were all that kept him alive. A press release fifteen minutes earlier gave his condition as stable. According to Reeves, Reagan opened his eyes to say to the surgeon: “I hope you’re a Republican.” Joseph Giordiano, chief of George Washington’s trauma unit and not a Republican, said, “Mr. President, we’re all Republicans today.” Secretary of State Alexander Haig and all the other highest government officials were getting their information from television, like the rest of America. Haig said, incorrectly, that he was in charge, as Vice President Bush was not in the White House. Bush was officially in charge with the president incapacitated; as vice president he was next in line, followed by the speaker of the House, and president pro tem of the Senate.

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Secretary of State Alexander Haig speaking to the press about President Reagan’s condition in the White House press room. (Ronald Reagan Presidential Library)

President Reagan with Mrs. Reagan inside George Washington Hospital four days after the shooting. (Ronald Reagan Presidential Library)

At 6:20 P.M., the surgery was over. Within minutes, Bush was back in the White House. By 7:30 P.M., Reagan was awake. At 8:00, he received morphine for chest pain. He asked why Hinckley shot him. Pain kept him up that night. He was taken off the respirator and his endotracheal tube removed. Claims were made that so long as he rested, he could perform his duties. Three days later, still in pain and not entirely out of danger, Reagan was signing legislation. On April 2, he developed a fever of 102, needing his lung cleared of blood and mucus. The fever dropped, and stronger antibiotics were used to prevent pneumonia. World politics went on. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev appeared at a Czech Communist Party Congress, an unusual move, and Soviet tanks sat on the border of Poland. Lech Walesa, the new democratic Polish premier, gave speeches. The White House put on a strong face, even as Reagan sat up in bed, and, according to one nurse, watched cartoons. On April 4, on hearing that his friend Jim Brady

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and the other men were improving, Reagan joked to his son, Ron, about getting together four bedpans and having a reunion. By April 7, the president’s chest X-rays were improving. He was still feverish, not eating well, and heavily medicated on April 11. Public reports said he was in great shape. Difficulties did not stop him from leaving the hospital on schedule that day. Nancy and their daughter Patti helped walk him out. He collapsed into a chair back at the White House, but told those along the way out of the hospital that he was “great,” according to Reeves. But what if Reagan had not survived his wounds?

ACTUAL HISTORY On April 29, 1981, Reagan made his first public appearance since the shooting, on live television, in a cheering joint session of Congress. Some forty Democrats gave Reagan a standing ovation. Reagan, keeping an upbeat image, was more faithful to his policies than ever. Convinced he was alive for a reason, Reagan believed that reason was to crush communism, according to a former speechwriter. By the end of January 1984, Reagan formally announced his reelection plans. A February poll on his foreign policy ratings showed 38 percent approval, 49 percent disapproval. On July 19, 1984, Walter Mondale accepted the Democratic nomination for president with the first female vice presidential nominee, Geraldine Ferraro, as running mate. Later that summer, Reagan committed a snafu that cost him seven points of his lead, when, thinking the microphone was off, he jokingly announced that the bombing of Russia would proceed in five minutes. In a Louisville, Kentucky, debate with Mondale, Reagan’s age became an issue and he lost the debate. In the second debate between Reagan and Mondale, Reagan answered the age question with an effective quip. “I will not make age an issue of this campaign. I am not going to exploit, for political purposes, my opponent’s youth and inexperience,” according to William A. DeGregorio in The Complete Book of U.S. Presidents. Reagan won reelection in 1984 by the biggest landslide in American history. Mondale carried only his home state of Minnesota and Washington, D.C. Reagan received 525 of 538 electoral votes, 59 percent of the popular vote, and the votes of one-quarter of registered Democrats. On January 20, 1985, at the age of seventy-three, Reagan, the oldest president in U.S. history, was sworn in for his second term. February’s Gallup Poll showed a 62 percent approval rating. Reagan gave his farewell address January 11, 1989, and George Herbert Walker Bush was inaugurated as president on January 20. Reagan flew off into the California sunset with Nancy, his approval rating the highest since Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s. Queen Elizabeth II awarded him an honorary knighthood. In November 1992, Democratic candidate Bill Clinton defeated Bush, winning with only 43 percent of the vote. Independent candidate Ross Perot took 19 percent. Clinton went on to serve two terms, dealing with a Republican majority in the House of Representatives after the 1994 elections. Then Republican George W. Bush was elected to two terms.

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International Politics

The Bitburg Affair: In November 1984 German Chancellor Helmut Kohl visited Washington, D.C., and suggested that Reagan visit a German cemetery. On May 5, 1985, Reagan visited Bergen-Belsen concentration camp and Bitburg Cemetery. This was intended to honor Holocaust and World War II victims, and to celebrate growing ties between the United States and West Germany. Bitburg, however, contains graves of Nazi Waffen SS soldiers, making Reagan’s presence highly controversial. Grenada: On October 25, 1983, a Marxist coup on the island nation of Grenada in the Caribbean led to military intervention, alleged to be on behalf of trapped medical students. Approximately 5,000 U.S. troops invaded the island nation, communist leaders were arrested, and the regime was replaced with a noncommunist government. China: On April 26, 1984, Reagan visited China. At a banquet in his honor given by President Li Xiannian, Reagan spoke in Chinese about mutual respect and benefit. Reagan left still supporting an independent Taiwan, an ongoing sore spot

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between the nations. Pro-democracy student protests in the spring of 1989 were held in Tiananmen Square in the nation’s capital. The communist Chinese government declared martial law,and police met the demonstrations of the students with deadly force. This caused nearly a decade-long freeze of U.S.-Chinese relations. Palestine and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO): In 1970, the PLO was expelled from Jordan by King Hussein’s armies. The PLO had been using the nation as a base for Israeli border clashes. PLO attacks then continued from Lebanon. In 1981, a cease-fire between Israel and the PLO was negotiated by U.S. Special Emissary to the Middle East Phillip C.Habib.The cease-fire was broken in 1982 when Shlomo Argov, Israel’s ambassador to Great Britain, was shot by the Abu Nidal splinter group, which had broken with the PLO in 1970. On June 6, Israel invaded Lebanon, quickly heading to Beirut. Again, the United States brokered peace. Palestinian fighters were to have safe passage to

In the field of foreign affairs, Reagan’s firm policy toward the Soviet Union appeared to his supporters to be his greatest success. Critics found the Iran-Contra scandal his greatest failure. Both these developments sprang from Reagan’s unwavering conviction that communism represented a threat to freedom and to the American way of life. October 1981 saw antinuclear demonstrations in England and Germany. The next month, Reagan announced the deployment of Pershing II intermediate-range missiles to Europe, saying he would cancel the deployment only if the Soviets dismantled all intermediate range weapons aimed at Western Europe. On June 13, 1982, a peaceful nuclear freeze demonstration drew nearly one million people to New York City’s Central Park. Soviet premier Leonid Brezhnev accused the United States of an arms buildup that could result in global thermonuclear war. Not two weeks later, Brezhnev died and Yuri Andropov replaced him. In a March 1983 speech before the National Association of Evangelicals, Reagan called the Soviet Union the focus of evil in the modern world. The Soviet News Agency, TASS, responded the next day, saying that Reagan was full of bellicose, lunatic anticommunism. Reagan gave a national speech in which his Space Defense Initiative, or SDI, was proposed. This was a system meant to intercept and destroy incoming nuclear missiles and he called on U.S. scientists to help render nuclear weapons obsolete. Both the cost

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IN CONTEXT

International Politics (Continued)

Tunisia and other Arab nations. Israel agreed, and 800 U.S. Marines were sent to keep peace, oversee the evacuation, and guarantee safety to civilians and refugees. Reagan announced that a Palestinian state would not be supported as an independent entity but that a formal association between Palestine and Jordan would. With Reagan trying to broker more deals, the Israelis came to an agreement with the Lebanese government in April 1983. Israel and Syria were to withdraw troops, but Syria refused. Israel withdrew its troops from the Shouf Mountains, overlooking the Beirut airport.Druze Muslims used the mountains to shell U.S. forces. U.S. ships returned fire. More unrest, casualties, and violence followed. On April 18, 1983, the U.S. embassy in Beirut was bombed, killing 63. On October 23, a Beirut bombing killed 58 French military personnel and 241 American Marines. Hezbollah, the Lebanon-based Shi’ite Muslim “Party of God,” was likely involved. On February 6, 1984, the United States withdrew from Lebanon and called on Syria to do likewise, and to cease fire. Syria did not withdraw from Lebanon until 2005.

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Libya: In June 1985, TWA Flight 847 left Athens, Greece, was hijacked and forced to fly to Beirut and then Algiers. Most of those on board were released, but thirty-nine were kept in Lebanon for seventeen days. U.S. Navy diver Robert Dean Stethem was murdered and cast out onto the tarmac; others were cruelly treated.The terrorists were Libyan, their leader Muammar al-Qaddafi. In December 1985, the Israeli airline ticket counters in Rome, Italy, and Vienna, Austria, were bombed. Libya was again involved. Reagan cut economic ties with Libya. A West German nightclub was bombed, killing 130, including an American soldier. In April 1986, Reagan ordered an air attack on Tripoli, Libya’s capital. Qaddafi’s headquarters was hit, and his 15-month-old daughter was killed. On December 21, 1988, Pan Am Flight 103 was blown up by what was later determined to be Libyan terrorists over Lockerbie, Scotland. Eleven people on the ground and all 259 aboard the plane died. By 2003, Libya had renounced terrorism and set up a multibillion-dollar fund to compensate the families of the victims of Flight 103.

and even the feasibility of such a project were questioned. The Soviets feared a whole new direction to the arms race. Andropov wrote Reagan to suggest elimination of the nuclear threat. Reagan replied politely, suggesting U.S. and Soviet negotiators talk in Geneva, Switzerland. The atmosphere for a renewal of détente was not quite right, however. In September 1983 Andropov accused Reagan of risking war by trying to turn ideological battles into military ones. In an October address, Reagan blamed the world’s problems on the Soviets. That fall, The Day After aired on television, and Reagan was among the 100 million viewers of the film—an arguably inaccurate but nonetheless terrifying portrayal of the day after a nuclear war. Meanwhile, the first Pershing II missiles were deployed in West Germany and the Soviet Union broke off the Geneva talks on Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF). January 1984 saw Reagan make a softer speech, calling for a return to European arms talks, both nuclear in Geneva and conventional in Vienna, Austria. On February 9, hardliner Yuri Andropov died and Konstantin Chernenko succeeded him. In January 1985 Reagan announced a surprise meeting with Chernenko, but within two months, Chernenko also died. Reform-minded Mikhail Gorbachev replaced him and in September 1986 Reagan announced a summit in Iceland with Gorbachev that began in Reykjavik on October 20. Gorbachev proposed across-the-board nuclear

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weapon cuts, and Reagan agreed until given the condition that SDI would have to stop in the lab. Reagan left the summit believing it a failure. Then, against all contrary advice, including that of his national security advisers, Reagan demanded that Gorbachev tear down the Berlin Wall in 1987: There is one sign that the Soviets can make that would be unmistakable, that would advance dramatically the cause of freedom and peace. General Secretary Gorbachev, if you seek peace, if you seek prosperity for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, if you seek liberalization, come here to this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate. Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall! (From Ronald Reagan’s speech before the Brandenburg Gate, West Berlin, June 12, 1987) Within days, the CIA reported that Gorbachev was talking with his advisers about doing just that as a good faith gesture. On December 8, 1987, Gorbachev attended a summit in Washington, D.C. There, he and Reagan signed the INF treaty, eliminating 4 percent of the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. Although conservatives were critical, this was the first treaty to provide for both destruction and on-site monitoring of such weapons. Gorbachev’s interest in reforms and further negotiations with the United States did not end there. On May 29, 1988, the Moscow Summit began; it was quite friendly, in spite of overzealous and somewhat brutal crowd control by the Soviet secret police, as the Reagan motorcade was greeted by cheering citizens who came too close. Reagan addressed Moscow State University students, speaking of reform. The Cold War was thawing. On December 7, 1988, Reagan and Gorbachev had their last meeting during his presidency. George H. W. Bush, the U.S. president-elect and his top aides joined Reagan and Gorbachev for lunch in New York. In April 1989, Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union would become a democracy. In November, the Berlin Wall was opened. Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania, formerly Soviet Eastern Bloc nations, also became democracies. The Soviet Union formally dissolved December 31, 1991. Supporters of Reagan liked to believe that his policy toward the Soviets contributed to that collapse, although internal weaknesses and Gorbachev’s steps in the direction of loosening control had clearly hastened the Soviet Union’s demise and contributed to the ending of its domination of the satellite nations. The other major foreign policy issue of Reagan’s presidency was the Iran-Contra scandal. The scandal surrounded revelations of two related undercover operations. On one side, members of the Reagan administration sought ways to obtain funds that could be channeled to the anti-Sandinista forces in Nicaragua, known as “Contras.” The Democraticcontrolled House of Representatives, however, strictly opposed the use of funds for intervening in the internal affairs of Nicaragua or for attempting to overthrow the legally elected left-wing government there. Operating outside the scrutiny of Congress, members of the Reagan administration raised funds and channeled them to the Contras. One of the sources for those funds was the clandestine sale of arms to Iran. Another aspect of the operation was that in exchange for the purchase of arms, the Iranians were to exert pressure on Iranian-backed terrorists in Lebanon who had

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captured and held American hostages, with the goal of getting the hostages released. Revelations of the arms for hostages deal came first, and only later did the public learn that funds from the operation had been used to support the Contras in Nicaragua. In December 1983, Congress had passed the Boland amendment to the 1984 budget, forbidding direct military aid to the Contras by any U.S. intelligence agency. Members of the Reagan administration recognized that the National Security Council was not an intelligence agency and thus was not technically covered by the wording of the Boland amendment. So National Security Council staff member Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North began arranging several methods of routing funds from foreign sources and from private contributors to the anti-Sandinista forces. One source for the funds was to be the sale of Hawk antiaircraft missiles to Iran, also arranged by NSC staff member North. On November 3, 1986, the beginning of revelations about the IranContra operation occurred, as the Lebanese magazine Al Shiraa reported U.S. arms sales to Iran. The Iranian government confirmed the story. Ten days later, Reagan denied a deal involving arms for hostages, admitting only to having sent a few odds, ends, and defensive weapons. He repeated that the United States would not give in to terrorist demands. Polls showed Americans did not believe him. Attorney General Edwin Meese was asked to conduct an inquiry into the arms-for-hostages affair. Meese’s investigators only then discovered the Iran-Contra connection, while searching North’s office. An April 4, 1986, memo from John Poindexter had an amount to be sent to the Contras from Iran weapon sales. North had spent the night before Meese’s investigators visited his office shredding documents. Three days later, Meese told Reagan that some of the money from Iran had gone to the Contras. He said that Reagan was visibly surprised and shaken. Congress saw the events as a direct violation of the Boland amendment that could possibly mean impeachment. The episode also left Reagan looking as if he had broken his pledge never to negotiate with terrorists as his administration had used clandestine funds in buying back hostages from terrorists. Poindexter resigned and North was fired. Meese announced to the press that between $10 and $30 million in profits from sales of U.S. arms to Iran had gone to Contra rebels’ Swiss bank accounts. On December 1, Reagan appointed the Tower Commission to review Iran-Contra. The next day, Reagan’s approval polls showed a drop from 67 percent to 46 percent. Lawrence Walsh, an independent counsel, was appointed to investigate Iran-Contra. Ultimately, Poindexter and North were blamed. The scandal intensified when North’s shredding of official White House documents was disclosed. Both were later indicted. In 1989, a document was released that showed both George H. W. Bush and Reagan knew about Iran-Contra. The question of whether the Reagan administration violated the Boland amendment was never fully answered, in spite of 1987 hearings, when Reagan’s testimony was inconsistent. The Tower Commission delivered its report to Reagan. The president could not be linked to the diverted funds. The commission concluded that Reagan, confused and unaware, had allowed himself to be misled, and charged him with failure to adequately supervise those involved. His approval rating dropped to 42 percent.

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Reagan unwillingly fired Chief of Staff Donald Regan, bowing to pressure by Nancy and advisers. Howard Baker took the post. Furious, Regan found out he had been fired from a CNN television news broadcast. The president’s approval ratings rose to 51 percent when he admitted mistakes leading to the unintentional trade of arms for hostages. Considering facts that have come to light since, Reagan may genuinely not have recalled the affair at the time of the investigations. Questioned in 1992 during the ongoing Iran-Contra trial, Reagan could not recall facts and even had difficulty naming the secretary of state. In spite of the entire scandal Reagan came out as popular as ever. He earned the moniker “the Teflon President.” Despite the complexity of the issues involved, Reagan opponents regarded the Iran-Contra scandals as proof of Reagan’s incompetence. Similarly, despite the complexity of the reasons behind the breakup of the Soviet Union and the ending of the Cold War, Reagan supporters liked to credit him with causing those events. Reagan’s last battle came with the onset of Alzheimer’s disease. In 1993, suffering bouts of confusion and forgetfulness, Reagan was tested at the Mayo Clinic and diagnosed with Alzheimer’s. In 1994, the president’s condition was made public. The Reagan family formed an institute to study and treat Alzheimer’s. Reagan said: “I now begin a journey that will lead me into the sunset of my life. I know that for America, there will always be a bright new dawn ahead” (Ronald Reagan, Letter to the American People, November 5, 1994). Reagan knew what Alzheimer’s would do. His mother had suffered similarly. Ronald Wilson Reagan died on June 5, 2004, in Bel Air, California, at the age of ninety-three. Nancy remained by his side until the end.

ALTERNATE HISTORY On March 30, 1981, at 2:25 in the afternoon, Reagan could have died when shot by John Hinckley, Jr. George H. W. Bush, the vice president, could have become the president of the United States. From the outset, Bush would have lacked Reagan’s popularity. Even as the nation mourned, he would have been tested both domestically and abroad. He might have met mass antinuclear demonstrations in a somewhat lukewarm fashion, and the détente of previous administrations would have continued with the Soviets more or less unabated. Pershing II missiles could have ultimately been deployed to western Europe. When written by Andropov about the growing nuclear threat, he might have sent emissaries, but probably would have changed little. Defense spending would have increased, as would have spending on intelligence, and the economy would have continued to limp along in recession. Bush would have cut various programs that benefited the poor and aged, and spent much of his time looking toward foreign policy, the part of his administration that could have garnered the most favorable polling results. During the remainder of his term, the economy might not have seen a significant shift. Several key pieces of Bush

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legislation might have involved greater funding and staffing for the CIA. On October 25, 1983, the Marxist coup would have occurred in Grenada. Bush’s handling might have been more diplomatic than Reagan’s invasion in actual history. The tiny island nation could have again changed leadership quickly, and it would possibly have become known that Bush left behind CIA advisers and monetary support. The same might have held true with arms deals to Iran and money to Contra rebels in Nicaragua. The CIA would likely have been very busy. Bush might have seen the brokering of several Palestinian-Israeli ceasefires. In September 1982, it could have been discovered that an attempt was to be made on the life of president-elect Bashir Gemayel of Lebanon. The attempt could have been thwarted by intelligence leaked to the CIA. Palestinian-Israeli meetings could have been held for several months before an agreement might have been reached. Bush could have backed military intervention over Syrian In an alternate history, Democrat Walter Mondale refusal to withdraw from Lebanon. Solutions would have won the presidency in 1984. (Library of might have been reached through counterinCongress) telligence methods and the withdrawal ultimately forced. In March 1984, terrorist attempts to kidnap CIA agent William Buckley in Lebanon might have met with a rude surprise, as U.S. operatives could have been tipped off, leaving a Special Forces strike team waiting. A large number of terrorist cells could have been thus revealed, and hundreds of suspected terrorists questioned based on intelligence gathered from the captures. In 1984, the economy, growing unrest over nuclear-arms escalation in Europe, and discontent with socially conservative stances could have cost Bush the election, with Walter Mondale becoming president and Geraldine Ferraro becoming the first female vice president. Mondale would have supported deficit reduction, the ERA (Equal Rights Amendment), and a nuclear freeze. With both the House and Senate probably in firm Democratic control, legislation could easily have passed cutting defense spending; Mondale could ultimately have accomplished the nuclear freeze and probably eased tensions with the Soviets. He also could have encouraged small business incentives, raised the minimum wage, and generally concentrated on reforms to unions and the treatment of migrant workers. He likely would have raised taxes only slightly and would have accomplished a number of reforms. Based on his background, his foreign policy would likely have been strongly diplomatic.

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Mondale probably would have met with Andropov over arms reductions, possibly resulting in a nuclear freeze on both sides. Further lessening of hostilities would have resulted. After the deaths of Andropov and Chernenko, both he and Ferraro would have met with Gorbachev at a variety of summits. Mondale could have gotten along well with Gorbachev, as both may have discussed reforms that would benefit society as a whole and the further lessening of nuclear arms. They might have arrived at an even more sweeping treaty than the actual one, resulting in a lessening of the nuclear buildup, mutual monitoring, and more meetings. On April 26, 1986, the Chernobyl disaster would have occurred. Mondale would have been likely to offer aid, and after a few days of possibly tense considerations, Gorbachev might have accepted. Half a billion U.S. dollars and a large scientific team could have followed, both to ensure the sealing of the Chernobyl site for containing the radiation, and to reform and improve other Soviet nuclear plants, under a possible Peaceful Nuclear Purposes Treaty. The disaster, along with decades of arms spending, would have taken their toll on the Soviet economy. It was likely time for further reforms, and Gorbachev would have been the one to make them. The lessening of tensions with the West would have helped. More diplomacy would have followed, with various economic and humanitarian exchanges. The U.S. economy could have been faring far better, and toward the end of Mondale’s second term, talks could have occurred about opening up new markets along with the divide between East and West, starting in Berlin. Mondale also would have put funding into AIDS and supported the Brady Gun Control Bill. Mondale would have served two terms until 1992. Vice President Ferraro would have been prepped by the Democratic Party to run in 1992, but possible illegal activities by her husband that may or may not have involved her probably would have made it unlikely that she could have won the national election. She could have stepped aside, and Democrat Bill Clinton would have become the next president. Clinton would have followed the earlier path taken with the Soviets, Gorbachev’s reforms would have continued, and for the first time ever, the citizens of the Soviet Union could have been allowed to vote in a nationwide election, with Gorbachev, the president-elect, announcing that the country would become a democracy. The Berlin Wall would have been opened and Lech Walesa would have been elected president of Poland. Before long, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania, formerly Soviet Eastern Bloc nations, also would have became democracies. Gorbachev would have dissolved the Soviet Union, and in 1992, he would have won the Nobel Peace Prize. In actual history, the Clinton years were a time of great prosperity and the longest economic expansion on record. It is likely that the years would have played out similarly in this alternate history. By the middle of Clinton’s first term, not only could the deficit have been over, but a surplus already begun. Clinton would have continued affirmative action with reforms, assisted women and minorities with small business incentives, and worked to end racial profiling. He also would

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have made the first openly gay appointments to various offices, just as he actually did. Clinton’s stance would not have been completely liberal, and he would likely still have put more police on the streets of America, supported tough anti-crime laws, and worked with Mexico to combat drug smuggling. Although he stringently would have opposed illegal immigration, he would have supported legal immigrants and their needs. By 1998, there could have been 22 million new jobs, with the lowest unemployment since 1960s, much as occurred during his actual presidency. He would have sought worldwide treaties on global warming, supported former Soviet democratic reforms, and continued dealing, though firmly, with the human rights situation in China, while being a major proponent of international trade. Clinton would probably have pushed for more funding for terrorism defense, cut the size of the military while preserving quality, and could likely have said that there was not a single Russian nuclear weapon aimed at the United States. Also, in what could have been a far more Democratically favorable climate, with both House and Senate in his party’s control, Clinton could have managed to put into place universal health care and begun an enormous focus on AIDS, continuing Mondale’s stance on such issues and mirroring actual history. After Clinton, the Democratic hold could very well have continued to predominate, with Al Gore becoming president. The power of Reagan’s popularity, and what it gained the Republican Party, cannot be underestimated. Elizabeth A. Kramer

Discussion Questions 1. In the scenario presented in this chapter, arms race and communist domination of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe come to an end as they did in actual history. If Walter Mondale had been elected president in 1984 and had served two full terms, how would the ending of the Cold War have been affected? Do you think that the international outcomes would have been the same as in actual history even if there had been different leadership in the United States? 2. How do you think Democratic President Mondale would have reacted to the takeover of Nicaragua by a pro-communist leadership? Would the Mondale administration have supported the anti-Ortega Contras? 3. If Mondale had not supported the defense buildup initiated under Carter and continued even more heavily during Reagan’s first term, would such a decrease in defense spending by the United States have had an effect on the Soviet Union? Would a reduced defense budget by the Soviets have tended to allow the Soviet Union to be preserved longer, and prevented its breakup into constituent republics?

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4. If the Mondale administration had shifted spending from defense expenditures to social programs in the 1980s, what social effects do you think would have occurred? 5. If the Mondale administration had rolled back the tax cuts imposed by the Reagan administration, how would that have affected the economy? What social effects might have flowed from such a change in taxation policy?

Bibliography and Further Reading Deaver, Michael K. Nancy: A Portrait of My Years with Nancy Reagan. New York: HarperCollins, 2004. DeGregorio, William A. The Complete Book of U.S. Presidents. Fort Lee, NJ: Barricade Books, 2005. Eisen, Armand. Ronald Reagan: A Remarkable Life. Kansas City: Andrews McMeel, 2002. Gaddis, John Lewis. We Now Know, Rethinking Cold War History. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Noonan, Peggy. “The Time 100, Ronald Reagan,” www.time.com/time/time100/ leaders/profile/reagan.html (accessed February 2006). Reagan, Michael. In the Words of Ronald Reagan: The Wit, Wisdom, and Eternal Optimism of America’s 40th President. Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, 2004. Reagan, Ronald. American Life: The Autobiography. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990. Reeves, Richard. The President’s Been Shot: What Really Happened to Ronald Reagan. Pleasantville, NY: Reader’s Digest, 2005. Robinson, Peter. How Ronald Reagan Changed My Life. New York: HarperCollins, 1983.

“Tear Down This Wall, Mr. Gorbachev”

What if Soviet politics had stopped Gorbachev’s reforms and Soviet troops had reinforced hard-line regimes?

INTRODUCTION Mikhail Gorbachev became the general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) on March 11, 1985. At the Central Committee plenum on January 27, 1987, Gorbachev introduced reforms that were ultimately instituted over the course of the next five years during what became known as the “Moscow Spring.” Bundled together under the umbrella term “perestroika,” Gorbachev’s reforms included arms reduction and a verbal commitment to world peace. At the same time that Gorbachev was instituting perestroika in the Soviet Union, the United States was suffering from the after-effects of Ronald Reagan’s economic reforms. Reaganomics had led to uncontrolled unemployment (6.20 percent) and inflation (3.65 percent) as well as to a deficit that was approaching $167 billion by the summer of 1987 when Reagan headed for Venice, Italy, to attend the annual meeting of the Group of Seven where global economic policies were to be established. The worsening of the American financial situation in conjunction with the disillusionment that had accompanied the news of the president’s alleged involvement in the Iran-Contra scandal had greatly damaged his prestige with European leaders who believed Reagan had contributed to their own financial woes and who were not impressed by the second-term president’s lame-duck status. While in Europe, Reagan visited Germany, where on June 12, 1987, in a broadcast heard throughout North America and Europe, including East Berlin, he spoke directly to the people of Germany, insisting that there was only one Berlin in the eyes of the rest of the world. Speaking in front of the Brandenburg Gate, Reagan referred to the Berlin Wall as a “scar” that was a blight on the cause of freedom. In typical Reagan rhetoric, the president charged Mikhail Gorbachev with proving that he was committed to world peace by opening the gate to freedom. While Gorbachev did not accept Reagan’s challenge and did not at that time express any interest in ceding East Germany, the fall of communism and

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Mikhail Gorbachev

Many of the same factors that shaped the Soviet Union were significant influences on the political orientation of Mikhail Gorbachev. The boy who grew up to change the political landscape of the entire world was born in the Stavropol region of Caucasus, an area known for its tolerance of diverse cultures, customs, and religions. He came from a home with few conveniences. During the Ukrainian famine of 1932–33 that was engineered by Joseph Stalin’s brutal political policies, three members of Gorbachev’s father’s family died of starvation, along with half his village. The Ukrainian famine in which some five million people died has been compared

to the Jewish Holocaust of Nazi Germany. During Stalin’s political purges, both of Gorbachev’s grandfathers were arrested on false charges.Too young to fight in World War II, young Gorbachev faced constant hunger during the German occupation. Despite his limited circumstances, Gorbachev was able to attend Moscow University where he studied law, which was not a high-status occupation in the Soviet Union. At university, Gorbachev was exposed to a number of radicals who questioned the party line. After leaving school, Gorbachev returned to Stavropol and began rising up the ranks of the local communist party.

the rise of nationalism set off a chain of events that led to the opening of the Berlin Wall at midnight on November 9, 1989. In Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World, published in the United States in 1987, Gorbachev defined perestroika as the acceleration of social and economic policies designed to affect all spheres of life in the Soviet Union. Some 90 percent of the Soviet people supported

President Reagan giving a speech at the Berlin Wall, Brandenburg Gate, Federal Republic of Germany. (Ronald Reagan Presidential Library)

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Mikhail Gorbachev (Continued)

Developing an expertise in agriculture, Gorbachev traveled widely for the party and was exposed to Western influences. By 1981, he had become the youngest member of the Politburo, the policymaking body of the Communist Party. In 1985 after the sudden death of Konstantin Chernenko, Gorbachev was named general secretary of the Communist Party. By 1993, Gorbachev had renounced both communism and socialism and acknowledged that if he had remained in power he would have continued his reforms by leading the country away from totalitarianism and toward democracy. Gorbachev subsequently accepted a position as

chair of Green Cross International and became an active environmentalist. By the twenty-first century, Gorbachev’s reputation had been restored within Russia. Public opinion polls taken on the twentieth anniversary of perestroika revealed that large majorities of Russians expressed support for Gorbachev’s reforms, including the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the precipitation of the end of the Cold War, the fall of the Iron Curtain, and the restoration of civil liberties. Support for Gorbachev himself remains highest among those with higher levels of education and lowest among those who continue to decry the loss of state-provided services.

perestroika in its early days; however, when the economy continued to flounder, support dropped drastically. Alexander Yakovlev is considered to be the architect of perestroika. In 1972, Yakovlev was diplomatically exiled to Canada where he served as the Soviet ambassador. He and Gorbachev met in 1983 when Gorbachev visited Canada in his role as Soviet Agricultural Minister. The two men later told how they had hatched the idea of perestroika while walking on the farm of Canadian Agricultural Minister Eugene Whelan. During this private conversation, Gorbachev and Yakovlev acknowledged to one another that the Soviet economic system was on the verge of collapse and set about designing reforms that would produce drastic change. After becoming general secretary, Gorbachev named Yakovlev to the Politburo and assigned him a major role in developing perestroika. Gorbachev’s new economic reforms involved a move toward a free market with an increase in private ownership of small businesses. Perestroika also ushered in more liberal political views and an unprecedented amount of local government control. Throughout his tenure of office, Gorbachev was criticized for not having a clear vision of how he intended to accomplish the goals of perestroika. Although it is generally agreed that Gorbachev remained conservative, he was also accused of failing to stick to a particular point on the political spectrum. As Gorbachev’s reforms progressed, he was increasingly stymied by hard-liners who favored a return to totalitarianism and was repeatedly challenged by reformers and soft-liners who believed his reforms did not go far enough. Gorbachev identified six major goals for perestroika: raising the standard of living, solving the housing shortage, increasing the availability of foodstuffs, improving the quality of commodities, further developing public health services, and enhancing the quality of secondary and higher education. Throughout the Western world, perestroika was hailed with approval, albeit with some skepticism over whether it could and would succeed. Despite concentrated interest in the Soviet Union throughout the

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ANOTHER VIE W

Gorbachev Could Have Saved the Soviet Union

Some scholars have posited that if Boris Yeltsin had been elected chair of the Communist Party Soviet Union (CPSU) and if Gorbachev had designated Yeltsin his heir apparent, the union would never have been dissolved. At various points along the way, Gorbachev and Yeltsin could have identified common goals and cooperated in accomplishing them. Because they were not willing to do this, the Soviet Union no longer exists. Because Yeltsin wholeheartedly rejected the Union Treaty initiated by Gorbachev, he prevented the Soviet Union from reinventing itself as a loose confederation of republics, capable of working together for common political and economic goals. Ironically, if Gorbachev had listened to Nikolai Ryzhkov rather than to Yegor Ligachev, he would never have assisted Yeltsin in his rise to power.

Without Gorbachev’s early support, Yeltsin would not have been in a position to wrest popular support from Gorbachev who was in line to be the hero after the failed coup. Paradoxically,Yeltsin who was the individual most responsible for advocating separatism later regretted the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev believed that glasnost was an essential element of economic and political reform in the Soviet Union. He might have been able to institute this program without the devastating impacts on the Soviet system if he had truly understood the phenomenon of nationalism that followed the advent of his reforms. By recognizing the extent and widespread support for nationalism once it was raised, Gorbachev would have been wise to restructure the Soviet system early in his

five years of Gorbachev’s tenure, most of the world was taken by surprise when the superpower imploded in 1991. In retrospect, it seems impossible that any other social leader could have brought about such drastic changes in the Soviet Union without inciting revolution. Gorbachev was the first Soviet leader to have been born after the Russian Revolution of 1917, which overthrew the Russian monarchy. Unlike leaders preceding him, Gorbachev was too young to have been assigned blame for the party’s role in the purges of Joseph Stalin in the 1930s that had led to mass executions and expulsion of friends and foes alike. Large numbers of Ukrainians were starved when Stalin deemed they were an unnecessary drain on the system. Because of his comparative youth and his exposure to Western and radical elements at college and on his travels as an agricultural expert, Gorbachev’s approach to leadership was to move toward broad economic and social reforms without wholly rejecting socialism and the MarxistLeninism doctrine, which formed the underpinning of Soviet ideology. However, by 1998, Marxist-Leninism would be discarded in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev recognized that the economic as well as the political stability of the world was dependent on the prevention of nuclear war. Ironically, his new thinking was reshaping Soviet politics at the same time that the reactionary politics of Reagan were geared toward accelerating the American nuclear weapons program. American conservatives have been quick to claim that the fall of communism was a result of Reagan’s acceleration of the arms race in response to his view of the Soviet Union as the “Evil Empire” and to his demand for Gorbachev to tear down the Berlin Wall. Conservatives are particularly proud of Reagan’s multibillion-dollar “Star Wars” program, which ironically never proved workable, as an instrument in precipitating the Soviet

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Gorbachev Could Have Saved the Soviet Union (Continued)

reform programs in such a way that the republics might have concluded that the benefits of membership in the Union outweighed absolute independence. If mutually satisfying economic alliances had been created without the republics feeling exploited and overwhelmed, Gorbachev might have been able to muster public support for a loose confederation of sovereign states such as that proposed under the Union Treaty, thus preserving the Soviet Union through a new identity. Even if the Baltic states had refused to join, as was likely, Gorbachev could have attempted to forge strong economic ties with those countries without trampling on their political rights. Since a major portion of the responsibility for the dissolution of the Soviet Union was assigned to

the greedy nomenklatura who fattened their purses at the expense of the Soviet people, Gorbachev could have circumvented the ultimate course of events by ridding the Soviet Union of the top-heavy bureaucracy and abolishing special privileges for remaining bureaucrats. Monies diverted from the nomenklatura could then have been directed toward growing the economy and improving the standard of living within the Soviet Union. Such bold actions would have appealed to the people and convinced the Soviet population that Gorbachev was committed to the welfare of the masses. If Gorbachev had never lost popular support, the aftermath of the August Coup would have produced a different scenario with the public rallying behind the Soviet rather than the Russian president.

downfall. Liberals and most Soviet scholars insist that the death blow to communism was struck by Soviet leaders who understood the need for change from within the system. For several decades after Stalin’s purges, the Soviet Union was relatively stable economically. By 1985, however, the country was on a downward slide and had been running a deficit since 1976. Thus, Gorbachev inherited a country in financial crisis. Throughout the economic situation, the nomenklatura, members of the state bureaucracy, continued to expand their personal wealth and enjoy special privileges. Gorbachev’s ultimate solution was to institute so-called shock therapy to the economic system, but the therapy failed to stem the downward spiral. Gorbachev’s early reforms were geared toward growing the economy, improving technology, and increasing efficiency in government and among the workforce. He consolidated a number of existing ministries and reduced staffs. When this reorganization proved unworkable because of bureaucratic resistance, the reforms were abandoned. Government restructuring also included making the part-time Supreme Soviet a fulltime legislative body and creating a popularly elected Congress of People’s Deputies. In 1989, the first post-perestroika election was held with secret ballots and political campaigning. Gorbachev also attacked the problem of endemic alcoholism that was creating major health and genetic problems. The anti-alcohol campaign involved cutting the production of alcohol in half and constricting purchase of alcoholic products through closing shops and limiting the sale of alcohol to the hours between 2 P.M. and 7 P.M. The drinking age was raised to twenty-one, and large fines and dismissals were imposed for drinking on the job. Widespread resistance followed, and Gorbachev subsequently admitted that it was a mistake to take on this issue that had troubled Soviet leaders for decades so early in his administration.

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IN CONTEXT 1898 1917 1918 1921 1922 1927 1945 1953 1955 1964 1979 1985

1986 1987

1988

1989 1990

1991

“Tear Down This Wall, Mr. Gorbachev”

Chronology of Significant Historical Events in Russian History

Forerunner of the Communist Party founded in Minsk Russian Revolution Civil war breaks out in Russia, continuing until 1922 Vladimir Lenin leads Communist Party until 1924 Lenin’s New Economic Policy (NEP) initiated Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) created Joseph Stalin assumes control of party, remaining in power until 1953 End of World War II leads to expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence Nikita Khrushchev assumes control of party Warsaw Pact signed Khrushchev ousted by party hard-liners Leonid Brezhnev leads Communist Party until 1982 Soviet forces invade Afghanistan Gorbachev elected general secretary upon death of Konstantin Chernenko Moratorium on nuclear arms testing unilaterally announced for August 6 Renewal of Warsaw Pact for 20 years Gorbachev introduces perestroika and glasnost Reports of disaster at Chernobyl nuclear reactor surface Jamming of Western radio stations discontinued Public acknowledgment of Stalin’s crimes leads to reassessment of Soviet history and cancellation of secondary school history exams Ban on medium-range nuclear weapons signed Congress of People’s Deputies established Announcement of withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan Eastern European countries given greater autonomy Time magazine names Mikhail Gorbachev the Man of the Year State Environmental Protection Agency established Elections held for Congress of People’s Deputies Berlin Wall opened Eastern Europe begins throwing off communism German reunification Gorbachev elected first president of Soviet Union Gorbachev wins Nobel Peace Prize August Coup Christmas recognized as official holiday in parts of Soviet Union Gorbachev resigns on December 25 Soviet Union officially dissolved

In retrospect, Gorbachev recognized that severely limiting the sale of alcohol led to the manufacture of unsafe, uncontrolled home brews, just as it had done in the United States decades earlier. The ill-fated attempt to deal with the social problem of alcoholism further served to accelerate the economic downturn as the government lost the 12 percent of its budget that had come from alcohol products, and the population suffered extensively from the destruction of vineyards. Another major element of Gorbachev’s reforms was designed to end the system of government corruption that had led to what was known as

Soviet reforms stopped? 83

“unearned income.” Under this system, bribery, extortion, speculation, and other such illegal practices were viewed as legitimate job benefits for bureaucrats. Ironically, corruption continued to flourish and actually increased after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. One of the most significant planks of Gorbachev’s reforms was “glasnost.” Commonly defined as “openness,” the word glasnost literally means “voicedness.” Gorbachev firmly believed that economic prosperity was dependent on an informed public and an unhampered media. Glasnost ended several decades of state censorship and allowed Western radio broadcasts to reach Soviet citizens. Forbidden literature such as Boris Pasternak’s Dr. Zhivago (1957) was made available to the Soviet public. New art forms that ripped apart the myths of Soviet society were also released, including Tengiz Abuladze’s 1987 film Repentance, which offered a harsh condemnation of Stalin, and Vasily Belov’s book The Last Day, which detailed the horrors faced by Soviet peasants during the early days of collective farming. Soviet media were allowed to criticize and question government and party actions and immediately began accusing officials of corruption, cronyism, patronage, nepotism, and bureaucratic departmentalism. The Soviet media suggested that even those officials who were not involved in such practices were guilty of protecting those who were. Although Lenin was still Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s domestic policies considered beyond reproach, Stalin and his polieventually led to the breakup of the Soviet Union. cies were harshly criticized. (Ronald Reagan Presidential Library) The Gorbachev administration also offered its own criticisms, admitting that Stalin’s crimes were unconscionable and blasting Leonid Brezhnev by denouncing his “sham” accomplishments. Ultimately, all public commemorations of Brezhnev were removed, and his corrupt son-in-law, Yuri Churbanov, was sentenced to a twelve-year prison term. Gorbachev also opened up secret files and declassified scores of documents. A number of notable dissidents were released from prison or were returned from exile, subsequently exercising considerable influence on the development of public opinion. Gorbachev’s glasnost incited greater political awareness among the public, which ultimately led to increasing nationalism, mass protests and demonstrations, and an explosion in grassroots organizations designed to protect the rights of individuals and groups. The recognition of civil liberties under Gorbachev led to an acceptance of freedom of conscience and to the reopening of churches, synagogues, and mosques in the Soviet Union. Despite its successes, glasnost ultimately proved to be a key factor in bringing about the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In early 1991, the

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Former Soviet Leaders

Throughout most of the history of the Soviet Union, the Communist Party was all powerful. Article 6 of the Soviet constitution solidified the party position by banning all other political parties and mandating a role for the party in all aspects of Soviet life. Because Soviet society was closed, the party was largely successful in indoctrinating the Soviet people into a tacit acceptance of socialist doctrine. In 1903, the Russian Social Democratic Party split into the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. Vladimir Lenin became the leader of the Bolsheviks, which was ultimately absorbed into the Communist Party. Lenin redefined Marxism into what became known as Marxist-Leninism, advocating worldwide revolution as a means of overturning capitalism.

While not discounting the idea of revolution, Marx had favored the theory that capitalism would destroy itself as the proletariat (working class) rose up against the abuses and injustices of the bourgeoisie (property owners). Between 1927 and 1939, Communist Party leader Joseph Stalin removed anyone from power who could conceivably stand in his way. The result was that large numbers of Bolsheviks who had fought in the Russian Revolution were killed or exiled, along with high-ranking communist officials. After World War II, former members of the Czech resistance and those who had volunteered to fight in the Spanish-American War were also executed because their very survival was viewed as suspicious.

fledgling nationalist movement in the Soviet republics appeared doomed as Soviet troops were sent to the Baltic republics and warnings were issued to the presidents of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia to forestall efforts to protect individuals who refused to report for military service, thus severely reducing Soviet military strength. In Lithuania, soldiers attacked separatist strongholds, firing blanks and smashing windows. Gorbachev distanced himself from the melee by refusing to talk with Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis. By the end of the confrontation, seven people were dead and at least seventy were wounded. Troops were also ordered to Georgia, Armenia, Moldavia, and western Ukraine. (On April 9, 1989, demonstrators in Georgia had been attacked by Red Army soldiers in Tbilisi’s central square during a rally; twenty citizens had been killed and many injured.) Although the West tended to be wholeheartedly supportive of Gorbachev’s reforms, the Soviet population was soon disillusioned. What was known as “wild privatization” led to decreased production as businesses were bought and abandoned. By 1989, both industrial and agricultural production had declined considerably, with production of 64 of 155 monitored goods dropping. Shortages of newsprint, electricity, basic medicines, and iron further threatened the economy and alienated the public. Particularly irksome were the shortages of bread and potatoes, the major staples in the Soviet diet, and tobacco. Problems from the shortages were enhanced by bottlenecks at railroads and seaports where freighted goods remained for weeks or months. The situation grew worse after July 1990 when Gorbachev announced that prices on consumer goods would be raised at designated intervals, precipitating a gradual tripling of the price of bread. These scheduled price increases led to hoarding of goods, which in turn led to the requirement that only Muscovites could shop in Moscow. Residents were asked to present ID cards when shopping. In

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Former Soviet Leaders (Continued)

Other groups that became victims of Stalin’s purges were landlords, clergy, peasants, and certain ethnic groups. The NKVD, the precursor of the KGB, began its role of global espionage, which led to the theft of technological secrets from other world powers, including the design of the hydrogen bomb. After Stalin died in 1953,the Soviet Union entered a period of modernization, fueled in great part by the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev. Ultimately, Khrushchev paved the waved for perestroika by initiating a series of economic reforms to grow the Soviet economy and bring the country up to ever-changing global technological standards. Unlike Gorbachev, Khrushchev used authoritarian means to smooth the way for his reforms. Khrushchev was successfully ousted from office in a coup initiated by hard-liners.

Leonid Brezhnev succeeded Khrushchev as general secretary in 1964. Although he admitted that there was great need for new policies in an economy in which Soviets were paying two or three times Western prices for basic goods, Brezhnev was unable to turn the Soviet economy around. His administration was marked by widespread corruption and by an out-of-control bureaucracy in which the nomenklatura drove chauffeured limousines, shopped at special stores, and vacationed in palatial homes at government expense. Under Brezhnev, the Soviet Union lagged in technological advancement, ranking behind the United States, Japan, and Taiwan. Soviet imports of nonfood items were ten times that of exports, and foreign debt soared.

response, the republics refused to ship their quota of specified goods to other areas within the Soviet Union and chose not to meet financial quotas specified in the Soviet budget. By early 1991 as retail prices rose by 300 percent and the Gross National Product dropped 10 percent, two-thirds of the population was announcing that they would never have supported perestroika if they had foreseen its consequences. With approval ratings plummeting, Gorbachev acknowledged a number of mistakes, including the failure to drastically reform the Communist Party, refusing to decentralize the Soviet Union, not providing sufficient autonomy to forestall the rise of nationalism in the republics, and not feeding sufficient consumer goods to the public to prevent widespread consumer dissatisfaction.

For hard-liners who blamed Gorbachev for rising nationalism, the fall of the Berlin Wall proved to be the turning point that motivated them to fight the Soviet leader openly and initiate the August Coup (in which hard-liners attempted to oust Gorbachev), which set off a chain of events that ultimately led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. After World War II, Germany had been divided to prevent the belligerent nation that had initiated both world wars from being in a position to start a third world war. The capital city Berlin had also been divided, with the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union each taking over a section of the city. Once order was restored, West Berlin was returned to Germany. However, East Germany fell under the long arm of the Soviet Union.

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The August Coup

Within the Soviet Union, the turning point for Gorbachev came in 1991 with what became known as the August Coup when friends and members of his own administration joined with committed communist hard-liners in an attempt to force him into declaring a state of emergency and resigning from office. In August 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev, his wife Raisa, his daughter Irina, his son-in-law Anatol, and various personal and household staff were residing in the president’s vacation home in Foros in the Crimean Peninsula. Gorbachev planned to return to Moscow on August 19 as the signing of the Union Treaty, which was designed to grant greater autonomy to the republics, was scheduled for August 20. To Gorbachev, the Union Treaty was his last hope of preventing whole-scale secession of the republics. Beginning on Sunday, August 18, a period of four days changed the history of the Soviet Union and the entire world. During that time, a cadre of hard-liners and other conservatives imprisoned Gorbachev, his family, and household and personal staff in the presidential compound. Around 5 P.M. on August 18, a group of Soviet officials arrived uninvited at the compound. Their unannounced arrival was against Soviet protocol and was seen as disrespectful to Gorbachev both as president and as party leader.

The invaders included some of Gorbachev’s closest friends and advisers: Vice President Gennady Yanaev, KGB Chief Vladimir Kiuchkov, Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov, Minister of Internal Affairs Boris Pugo, Prime Minister Valentin Pavolv, National Defense Council Deputy Chief Oleg Baklanov, Chairman of the Peasant Union Vasily Stardubtsev, and President of State Enterprises and Industrial Groups Aleksandr Tiziakov. The men informed Gorbachev that they represented the State Committee for the State of Emergency. The thirty-two members of Gorbachev’s personal bodyguards remained loyal to the president throughout the ordeal. Ironically, on a rigged-up radio, the group managed to receive broadcasts from the BBC, Radio Liberty, and Voice of America. They learned that Gorbachev was allegedly too ill to perform his duties. Eventually, Gorbachev’s daughter and son-in-law helped him put together a videotape containing details of the coup that was smuggled to the outside world even though the conspirators had cut or blocked all lines of communication and had sealed the highway from Sevastopol to Yalta.To further enhance the plotters’ position, three warships hovered offshore. The plotters had put their plans into effect outside the compound also. In Moscow, troops gathered as tanks and armored personnel carriers

In most of the Soviet republics, reform movements were made up of dissidents who rejected totalitarianism and its restraints on personal liberties. These dissidents were not only instrumental in maintaining ongoing opposition to totalitarian tactics but were also heavily involved in building new economic and political systems after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In East Germany, however, the intelligentsia was largely prosocialist and sought reforms within the existing system. Ultimately, the East German intelligentsia was left out of the reunification reform process. The East German communist party reinvented itself as the Party of Democratic Socialism. By the time the Berlin Wall was destroyed, the party boasted assets of around $2 billion. After informants told the German government that at least $70 million of those assets had been funneled to European accounts belonging to the Soviet Union, officials raided party offices around the country. Party leaders insisted that the remittances had taken place before reunification and were legitimate payments earmarked for education and training.

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The August Coup (Continued)

(APCs) moved into the city. Subsequently, Moscow and Leningrad were placed under martial law. In anticipation of major resistance, troops also mustered in the Baltic republics. Coming into his own as the voice of reason to the West as well as to the Russian people, Boris Yeltsin, the newly elected president of Russia, announced that the seizure of power was unconstitutional. Yeltsin led the people in mass demonstrations that prevented the hard-liners from seizing control of government buildings. The wave of patriotism brought between 130,000 and 300,000 to the Palace Square and from 70,000 to 150,000 to the Russian White House. Large numbers of the military chose to join the protesters, announcing that their loyalties lay with Russia rather than with the plotters. By Wednesday, the number of ships around the presidential compound had increased to sixteen. However, around 3 P.M., the prisoners learned that Soviet television was reporting that claims of Gorbachev’s ill health were manufactured and were predicting the imminent arrival of a team from Moscow to release the president and his family and staff. For the first time, the prisoners learned of the extent of the mass demonstrations and chaos in Moscow, Leningrad, and other large cities. Within two hours, a convoy of limousines arrived and quickly dispersed the guards who met them with guns drawn. Gorbachev rejected all attempts

at conciliation from a cadre of coup supporters who also arrived at the compound and refused to take part in their outlandish claim that he was a conspirator in the coup. August 22 was designated a Day of Freedom, and tens of thousands marched to Red Square as Moscow celebrated the people’s victory over the hard-liners. Most of the plotters were arrested. A number of suicides among party officials followed the failure of the August Coup. Some suicides were directly related to the failure of socialism as an ideology. Others were among those who had supported the conspirators. Still others were among the corrupt and those who had turned a blind eye to full-scale corruption and who feared a day of reckoning. Among the latter group was the highest ranking financial officer in the party, Nickolai Kruchina, who jumped from a seventh floor balcony of his luxury apartment in Moscow on August 26. Raisa Gorbachev suffered a health crisis during the incarceration, and Gorbachev’s daughter Irina suffered mental anguish. Mikhail Gorbachev emerged relatively unscathed from the experience, although he subsequently admitted that the hardest element of the coup was that it had been engineered in large part by individuals he had trusted. The events surrounding the coup changed the Russian population, including its massive military, and Gorbachev returned to a new Russia.

Despite Reagan’s demand to tear down the wall, neither Gorbachev nor East German officials were initially eager to reject socialism or to distance themselves from the Soviet Union. Even West Germany saw the reunification of the two Germanys as highly unlikely. However, tens of thousands of East Germans felt differently. To prevent its citizens from escaping to West Germany, the East German government had built the twenty-eight-mile long Berlin Wall in August 1961. Made of barbed wire and concrete, the wall rose to almost twelve feet at some points. For decades, freedom-seeking East Germans had sought ways to leave the country despite the restrictions imposed by the wall. Keeping dissatisfied East Germans within the country became more difficult after an independent Hungary opened its borders, providing access to West Germany via Austria. In the first six months of 1989, 44,263 refugees left East Germany by this route. Tens of thousands of others escaped to Czechoslovakia or to West German refugee camps in Budapest, Prague, and East Berlin. Bowing to the inevitable, at the stroke

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KEY CONCEPT

Dissidents

Soviet dissidents were individuals who disagreed with particular elements in the implementation of Soviet ideology and who were willing to speak out against them. Because totalitarianism brooked no dissent, dissidents were generally exiled to remote areas such as Siberia. Even in exile, dissidents played an essential role in questioning communism. Under glasnost, political prisoners were released. Many of them returned to their homes and took an active role in Gorbachev’s reforms. Of all the dissidents who were expelled from the Soviet Union, perhaps the best known was physicist Andrei Sakharov, the architect of the Soviet thermonuclear bomb. By 1966, although employed by the Soviet government, Sakharov had become a human rights activist, taking part in a one-minute silent protest in Pushkin Square. The following year,

Sakharov initiated a letter-writing campaign to Soviet leader Leonid Brezhvev championing the cause of all Soviet dissidents. In response, Sakharov’s salary was cut almost in half, and he was removed from the installation, Moscow’s “atomic city.” In 1968, Sakharov expressed complete dissatisfaction with the Soviet system and published Reflections on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom. He was exiled to Gorky in 1979. In 1975, Sakharov was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize but was not allowed to leave the Soviet Union to collect it. Under Gorbachev’s perestroika, Sakharov returned to Moscow and became a leader of the democratic opposition and a member of the popularly elected Congress of People’s Deputies. He had a heart attack and died in 1989.

of midnight on November 9, 1990, East German officials opened the Berlin Wall, and thousands of Germans flowed together from either side with tears and jubilation. Celebrants took up hammers and chisels and began chipping away at the wall. Members of the East German Cabinet and Politburo subsequently resigned, and East Germany began the slow process of instituting a liberalized political system fueled by a market economy. By early 1990, Gorbachev had reversed his position on East Germany, acknowledging that reunification was becoming increasingly likely. The move was partially motivated by promises of German financial aid to help to shore up the failing Soviet economy. Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, however, warned that the Soviet Union was not yet ready to concede its influence in Germany. Even if Gorbachev had not been supportive of German unification, he was unwilling to use military force to protect Soviet interests. To hard-liners, this was further proof of Gorbachev’s weakness and of the failures of perestroika. With qualified support from Gorbachev, East German Foreign Minister Hans Modrow expressed support for a reunified Germany. He advocated a gradual process by which the two countries could become one. When Modrow and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl began negotiating a reunification agreement, Kohl totally rejected Modrow’s stipulation that a reunified Germany would withdraw from NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). Meanwhile, the George H. W. Bush administration refrained from actively supporting reunification, believing the United States would be better served by gradual reunification accomplished over a period of years. The United States was directly affected by

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Today a landmark shows where the Berlin Wall once stood. (Shutterstock)

the changing situation in Germany because of American military bases located in Germany and the presence of American nuclear weapons positioned to protect West Germany from communist invasion during the Cold War. The end of communism in Germany signaled an end to Soviet-initiated tactics that included a state-controlled economy, secret police, state censorship, one-party politics, and severe limitations on civil liberties. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, 380,000 Soviet troops were withdrawn from East Germany. The move was accomplished with a high price tag since Germany agreed to remit more than $15 billion to Moscow in return for assuming ownership of bases and reimbursing Russia for costs directly related to transporting and reintegrating troops. It soon became apparent that the costs would be much higher because Germany was left with extensive environmental problems at the Russian military bases that included oil spills, abandoned machinery and equipment, and chemical and radioactive wastes. German leader Helmut Kohl paid a heavy price for spearheading the reunification process, and he was defeated in the 1998 election by Gerhard Schröder of the Social Democratic Party who promised to deal with Germany’s continuing problem of high unemployment (10.6 percent in 1998). Kohl and other members of the Christian Democratic Party became involved in a campaign finance scandal in 1999, admitting that they had accepted millions of dollars in violation of German campaign laws.

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Celebrations of a reunited Germany were tempered with concern about the impact of an expanded number of East German immigrants on the West German economy. Reunification brought forth a plethora of economic problems as the West German economy sought to absorb the more backward East German economy. Although Germany has the fifth largest economy in the world, reunification has resulted in a growth rate that places Germany at the bottom of all countries in the euro zone. By 2006, opinion polls showed that around one-fifth of the German public longed for the days before the wall came down. Despite the influx of more than a billion euros a year to shore up the East German economy, unemployment in the former Soviet part of the country averages 20 percent, with one job available for every fourteen residents. Economic growth within the reunited Germany continues to be slow in response to the restructuring process that involves modernizing the existing system while introducing new technologies. As in many other developed nations, improved health in Germany has created an aging population for whom social security remittances outstrip payments made by current workers. Even while struggling to meet the economic standards of the European Union (EU), Germany is coping with a deficit greater than the 3 percent allowed by the EU. Germany also continues to face problems associated with allowing East Germans to maintain a sense of their own identity, including an endorsement of socialism and the possibility of a separate language, while encouraging a united country.

ACTUAL HISTORY When Russian revolutionaries overthrew the Russian monarchy in 1917, they gained control of a vast empire with a wealth of resources. Bolshevism soon evolved from a doctrine of revolution to a form of socialism based on the ideas of German economist and political theorist Karl Marx, who designed his political system in response to the rampant inequalities and injustices of capitalism brought on by advancing industrialization. At the time the Communist Party imploded in the Soviet Union in 1991, 15 million rank-and-file Soviets claimed party membership. The Party boasted 300,000 apparatchiks (party loyalists) and for decades had controlled virtually every aspect of life. Physical trappings were extensive, including 5,254 administrative buildings, 3,583 newspapers, and some two dozen resorts and sanatoriums. Assets were estimated at 4.5 billion rubles. Most of the Western world was caught by surprise when the Soviet Union dissolved, even though a wealth of data had indicated groundbreaking changes in the Soviet Union over a period of years. Gorbachev’s reforms had been studied in great detail. Both the U.S. Congress and the State Department had copious files on the changes, and the New York Times and Washington Post regularly reported on massive Soviet shifts that included increasing urbanization, growing Muslim populations in Central Asian republics, and major improvements in social and health indicators. Soviet watchers point to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the declaration of independence by Lithuania in 1990 as major influences on the renewed activism of Soviet hard-liners.

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Predictably, as Gorbachev’s reforms had become more liberal, the hard-liners had turned against him, precipitating the very thing they were trying to avoid: total dissolution of the Soviet Union. This dissatisfaction that led to the August Coup gave Russian President Boris Yeltsin the power that he had lacked before. As long as Gorbachev was in control of the state and the party, Yeltsin, who had publicly renounced his membership in the Communist Party, had limited power. However, the coup provided Yeltsin with the support of the people, and he became the key factor in precipitating the independence of Russia. While Gorbachev was out of the public eye, Yeltsin stepped forward to rally the military in support of democracy in the face of totalitarian tactics. The result was that Yeltsin was seen as a positive leader even as Gorbachev was perceived as being unable to control his own advisers and the government. Yeltsin’s popularity had begun to soar as Gorbachev’s approval ratings plummeted. In March 1991, some 200,000 people marched on the Kremlin carrying posters with Yeltsin’s face demanding the resignation of Gorbachev. The protest was in response to the referendum initiated by Gorbachev asking the people to express their opinions on whether the Soviet Union should continue as a republic of equal sovereign states. Detractors argued that a vote in favor of the referendum would, according to the prophetic prediction of the state newspaper Pravda, erase the Soviet Union from all world maps. In June 1991, the election of Yeltsin as president of Russia (Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic), carrying 57 percent of the vote, proved to be a watershed in the events that led to the eventual breakup of the Soviet Union. In November, Yeltsin outlawed the Communist Party from Russia, the birthplace of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the euphoria that followed the collapse of the Communist Party and the dissolution of the Soviet Union did not last. Having become well aware of Western lifestyles since glasnost, the citizens of the various republics believed they would soon be able to afford items that were seen as luxuries in the Soviet Union but accepted as necessities in the West. When economic collapse instead of prosperity followed independence, many people continued to blame Gorbachev although he had resigned four months after the failed coup. In Russia, a number of advisers demanded that the government resume its former authoritarian position. Indeed, by 1996, a somewhat rejuvenated Russian Communist Party had begun calling for the resurrection of the Soviet Union. In the Baltic States, the scenario was far different. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, along with Georgia, Armenia, and Moldova, had already summarily refused to take part in the Gorbachev-initiated referendum on the issue of establishing a new union. The referendum had been intended as a vote of confidence in Gorbachev and was designed to bolster support for the proposed Union Treaty. On August 20, the day of the scheduled signing of the treaty, the Soviet Union was in crisis as the events of the August Coup unfolded. The negation of the need for the Union Treaty after the failure of the August Coup and the reunification of Germany led to independence for all the former Soviet republics. Ultimately, the fifteen post-Soviet sovereign republics were Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia,

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Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine. In addition, with the breakup of Yugoslavia and the emergence of noncommunist governments in the satellite nations, the so-called satellites or Iron Curtain countries became quite independent, with various degrees of democratization. These included Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. Yugoslavia, a federation that had taken a politically independent course from the Soviet Union while remaining communist, broke up into constituent republics, including Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia, and Macedonia. Serbia, including Kosovo and Montenegro, continued to be called Yugoslavia. While the Soviet Union might have been able to withstand German reunification and the secession of the Baltic states, the system could not withstand the blows struck by declarations of independence in Russia and Ukraine, issued on August 24, 1991. As Yeltsin seized public attention in Russia, Leonid Kravchuk renounced the party and became the president of Ukraine. In addition to its significance as the second largest Soviet republic, Ukraine was the home of an arsenal of nuclear weapons. After independence, Kravchuk and Yeltsin joined with Belorussia (now Belarus) in a commonwealth of states that negated any necessity for a central government in Moscow or for a continued political role for Gorbachev. Subsequently, eight other former Soviet republics joined the commonwealth. Old alliances were severed or resumed as the dissolution of the Soviet Union also resulted in the breakup of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. The reunification of the two Germanys had been peaceful, as had the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia that transformed the federation into two sovereign nations, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. In Yugoslavia, however, the picture was far different as ethnic, religious, and linguistic divisions led to ethnic wars that caused the deaths of some 4.5 million individuals and drove millions of others from their homes. Yeltsin served two terms as president of Russia, but the hero who had played a key role in felling one of the world’s superpowers was unable to lead his country to economic stability or to end the widespread corruption that linked both government and business to organized crime. In December 1999, Vladimir Putin was named acting president of Russia and was duly elected to the presidency in May 2000, thereafter using that office to follow an itinerary of reformist politics on his own terms. Russia holds a distinct place among the former Soviet republics because it replaced the Soviet government on the United Nations Security Council and in various international organizations, and was the only former Soviet republic to retain a major nuclear arsenal. The fact that Russia assumed Soviet debts was a factor in its initial economic crisis. In 2005, with a per capita income of $11,000, Russia ranked eighty-fourth in the world in Gross Domestic Product per capita income. While the legacy of glasnost continues to exist in Russian under Putin, the state exercises considerable control over the media. Putin has attempted to restore order from the chaos he inherited from Yeltsin, who sold state resources to so-called oligarchs, as the Russian economy continued to crumble. Putin’s reforms have included reining in local government leaders, restoring the strength of security forces, and exercising bureaucratic discipline.

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Russian President Vladimir Putin (right) greeting NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson in the Kremlin in 2003. (NATO)

The post-independence road to political and economic stability has been varied among the former Soviet satellite republics. In addition to the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia and ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, the rate and methods of democratization have been dependent in large part on the situation in the republics before the breakup. In Hungary, for instance, where economic liberalization began in 1968, multiparty elections were held in 1990. Successful transformation to a market economy coupled with political reforms has allowed Hungary to join both NATO (1999) and the European Union (2004). At the other end of the economic spectrum, according to the CIA World Factbook, Tajikistan has a per capita income of only $1,200 and a poverty rate of 64 percent. The country weathered five years of civil war before receiving international aid after the war in Afghanistan focused worldwide attention on its situation. Many scholars believe that true democracy will continue to elude the less-developed republics. In some areas, former communists have regained power in various guises, and armed insurgents frequently challenge democratically elected officials. The process of privatization has also been mixed in the various republics. Several republics issued coupon books of varying worth with which citizens could purchase state property. In the Czech Republic, for instance, coupon books were valued at $37. In Romania, coupons valued at $320 were distributed free to citizens. Russia’s coupon program was largely unsuccessful, with the value of coupon books dropping from $20

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to $2. Overall, privatization within many republics lags, and investors have been reluctant to spend money in areas that are politically as well as economically unstable. Corruption and organized crime have also deterred investors and hampered international aid. Because post-Soviet borders were arbitrarily drawn by a committee in 1992, a number of countries have been involved in bitter border disputes with one another since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. For instance, Russia and Ukraine both laid claim to the Crimea, and Russia and Georgia continued to do battle over areas in the shared Caucasus Mountains. Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have disputed at least 140 points of their common border. Another ongoing bone of contention is how Russian minorities are treated in areas where nationalism has pushed their interests to the back burner. Tensions are also simmering within some of the republics. Such is the case in Chechnya, which is located in the Caucasus Mountains. In Chechnya, separatists are campaigning for the right to be independent of Russia. By 2005, the countries that had made up the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) had begun exhibiting vastly different economic profiles. The most successful countries tended to be the East European nations that had resumed close ties with the West. Nowhere was this phenomenon more evident than in the former East Germany. The reunification of the two Germanys, however, also had a downside as it raised the standard of living for East Germans by placing enormous economic burdens on West Germans. Per capita incomes range from a low of $1,200 in largely agricultural Tajikistan to a high of $21,000 in highly developed Slovenia. GDP (Gross Domestic Product) growth rates vary from a low of 2 percent in Kyrgyzstan to 26.4 percent in the oil-producing nation of Azerbaijan, with Belarus and the Czech Republic representing median growth at 5.5 and 6.0 percent, respectively, according to the CIA World Factbook. Initially, the countries with the most backward economies exhibited the highest growth rates as they began to develop market economies. Between 2000 and 2003, economic growth was steadiest in the former Yugoslav republics, followed by Albania, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. On the other hand, Belarus and Ukraine exhibited only 2.0 and 2.4 percent GDP growth rates, respectively. High inflation and unemployment rates have plagued the economies of many of the republics, with official inflation rates ranging from the zero boasted by Macedonia to the 13.5 percent acknowledged by Ukraine, according to the CIA World Factbook. Unemployment figures are misleading in some countries, such as Moldova where a fourth of the workforce labors abroad while the government claims a 7.8 unemployment rate; and in countries such as Russia, Belarus, and Uzbekistan, underemployment is a serious problem. According to the International Labor Organization, Ukraine’s unemployment rate is roughly three times the figure acknowledged by the government. Some observers have predicted that most former Soviet republics will not catch up economically with the more developed nations until well into the twenty-first century. Many individuals have suffered greatly from the withdrawal of government services. The current poverty rates among the nineteen countries that provide information range from a low 8.6 percent in prosperous

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Hungary to 80 percent in economically devastated Moldova, according to the CIA World Factbook. A number of former Soviet republics were quick to express their eagerness to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Western security alliance created after World War II. Choosing not to guarantee military protection in politically unstable countries, NATO created the Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace to provide the republics with assistance in moving toward democracy and market-based economies. In 2006, after a process of meeting NATO membership standards in economics, military and social issues, ten former Soviet republics were members of NATO: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Perhaps the most lasting impact of the Soviet Union is the massive environmental degradation created throughout the area; it has produced environmental problems that will haunt individual countries for decades to come. Much of the damage was caused by the irresponsible behavior of the Soviet military, which polluted land, water, and air. Existing problems were compounded when the military pulled out during the dissolution of the union. After looting military bases, Soviet forces abandoned unwanted equipment and machinery. Major environmental problems have also arisen from the cleanup at Chernobyl and at nuclear power plants in the Baltics, in mines in West Bohemia, and in areas of extensive chemical pollution in Slovakia and Bulgaria. Pollution is also a major issue in many waterways, including the Aral Sea, the Danube, the Oder, the Vistula, and the Volga. Continuing the pessimistic portrait painted by most scholars who study the transition countries, most agree that transforming a totalitarian regime into a democracy is likely to be successful over decades rather than years. These scholars insist that stable institutions must be in place before democracy and capitalism can be sufficiently supported. In the meantime, impatient populations, aided by reactionary politicians, may push fledging democracies toward totalitarian systems that may ultimately be no more supportive of the public interest than communism proved to be. If this scenario occurs in some of the former Soviet republics, the entire cycle may begin again as citizens demand that their governments solve ongoing problems through authoritarian measures. Despite the failure of his economic policies, Gorbachev was successful in dismantling the Communist Party and in dealing the death blow to totalitarianism throughout the Soviet Union. Internationally, his reputation has been compared to that of Winston Churchill, the British prime minister who spearheaded the battle against Adolf Hitler during World War II. Since Franklin Roosevelt was hampered by an isolationist Congress, Churchill bore the brunt of decision making in World War II until the United States entered the war in December 1941 after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Churchill was credited with wiping out fascism in Europe and with saving the world for democracy. Gorbachev has been credited with ridding the world of communism and with ending the arms race with its constant threat of worldwide destruction.

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ALTERNATE HISTORY If the Berlin Wall had remained intact, Soviet hard-liners might never have been motivated to act on their desire to remove Gorbachev from office. If they had been victorious in the August Coup of 1991, the entire history of the world would have been different, but nowhere would life have been more different than in the Soviet Union. After the hard-liners had experienced a period of liberalism, they would have pulled even further to the right after the coup, becoming increasingly authoritarian. Once the Communist Party had been restored to full power, a Stalin-like purge would likely have rid the country of all reformers. Leaders of the reform movement, particularly Gorbachev and Yeltsin, would probably have been executed, imprisoned, or exiled. The hard-liners would have dedicated themselves to reinstating completely free education and other social services and to undoing what was seen as the major “failures” of perestroika: rising inflation, unemployment, and racial and national discrimination. In the past, reforms instituted by Soviet leaders were generally overturned by their successors, as was the case with the reforms of the Nikita Khrushchev era. Consequently, the likelihood is that all elements of perestroika and glasnost would have faded into history, remaining active only in the minds of the intelligentsia who would probably have been returned to exile along with younger members of the group who had grown to maturity during the Gorbachev era. As a communist superpower, the Soviet Union would have continued to solidify its global position through an expanded nuclear arsenal. With the Soviet Union determined to continue the arms race, the United States and other nations of the West would have had no other option but to continue to build up their own arsenals, focusing technological research on the destruction of human life rather than on the preservation and increased comfort of life as has generally been the focus of other kinds of research. Since most scholars and other Soviet watchers agree that perestroika would have been impossible without the leadership of Gorbachev, it is likely that the entire history of the Soviet Union would have been different if someone else had been in that position. Likewise, if someone outside the party leadership had suggested the sorts of reforms that Gorbachev instituted, the powerful Politburo would never have allowed the individual to remain in power. Because party officials recognized Gorbachev’s loyalty to the Soviet system and to socialism as a worldview, they reluctantly endorsed perestroika. As a result of what would be seen as mistaken judgment, party officials would, therefore, be extremely diligent in choosing future leaders of the party and would shy away from charismatic, forward-thinking leaders. Instead, they would favor reactionary hard-liners for all leadership positions. If Gorbachev had followed the pattern set by Khrushchev and initiated reforms while keeping the reins of control tightly in his own hands, neither the central government nor the republics would have been in a position to question or resist changes that resulted from the implementation of perestroika. The single change that might have

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prevented the dissolution of the Soviet Union would have been for Gorbachev never to have introduced glasnost, which created an unfettered and critical media that in turn fostered a public ready to revolt. Without glasnost, the actions of Soviet leaders would have remained free of public reproach, and Gorbachev would have been able to force the people to comply with his reforms. An uninformed public would have trusted the Soviet government to act in their best interests. Aware of what Gorbachev could have done differently, the hard-liners would have been determined to avoid those same mistakes. With dissidents again in exile or strictly limited in their contact with the outside world and with a tightly censored media, the hardliners would have been able to control ongoing influences on public opinion. All forms of Western media would have been banned from the Soviet Union. However, since the people had been exposed to liberalizing forces, the hard-liners would have been forced to resort to Stalin-like tactics to stamp out all dissent and terrorize the population into submission. It would be extremely important for the In an alternate history, the philosophy of Vladimir new government to attempt to resurrect the Lenin would be resurrected to preserve the Soviet reputations of early leaders discredited by Union. (Library of Congress) the Gorbachev administration, particularly that of Vladimir Lenin, the father of Soviet political thought. Therefore, an extensive propaganda campaign would have been conducted to extol the virtues of Marxist-Leninism and to convince the Soviet people how much better off they were under the new authoritarian government than they had been under perestroika. It would be essential to resume anti-Western, especially anti-American, propaganda that played up the greed and immorality of capitalism. Care would also be taken to reinstate the “us versus them” mentality that pervaded the Cold War. Since popular resistance had been a major factor in putting down the August Coup, mass demonstrations in any form would have been forbidden under the more authoritarian government, and workers would have lost their right to strike. Members of the army who had chosen to remain loyal to the cause of an independent Russia rather than to the hard-liners would have been executed to discourage future mutinies and to punish those viewed as traitors. If any of the reformers who had joined in the plot against Gorbachev had objected to the new tactics, they would also have been eliminated. In the revitalized Soviet military, discipline would have been swift and harsh, with military might again deployed regularly in the republics to make sure they paid homage to the central power. Likewise, a revitalized KGB (intelligence services) would have returned

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to its earlier role of putting down dissent within the Soviet Union and in furthering the interests of the motherland by engaging in espionage in other countries. Efforts to gain state secrets would have been particularly strong in the United States, Great Britain, and France. With private property again abolished in the Soviet Union, the state would have been able to instigate traditional communist means of controlling production through state-owned businesses and collective farming. Without glasnost, the Western influence would have been far removed from the average Soviet citizen, and the widespread dissatisfaction with current standards of living would have been avoided. After the implosion of the Soviet Union, hyperinflation contributed to rising unemployment rates, and scores of individuals lost their life savings, facing economic despair with the withdrawal of free social services. Such services would have been restored under the new regime, and those who bemoaned their loss would have been given the opportunity to compare their lives under perestroika and under the new government. Before the breakup of the Soviet Union, one in every twenty-five people lived in poverty. Today the poverty rate is one in five according to the World Bank. A victorious coup would have given the hard-liners the authority to alleviate poverty through mandated jobs and available social services and to resume the pre-Gorbachev practice of choosing to release only data that enhanced Soviet interests. A victory by the hard-liners would have stopped the secessionist movement in its tracks and prevented the reunification of Germany. Thus, the Soviet Union would have been strengthened rather than imploding. An intact Soviet Union would have, therefore, prevented the breakup of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. A number of scholars believe that under such a scenario, West Germany would have become one of the world’s major economic powers. Without East Germany draining the economy, West Germany would not be facing the economic problems that accompanied reunification. However, if the wall were still in place, both East and West Germany would be living in the presence of nuclear weapons and the constant threat of total destruction. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the overall GDP in all former Soviet republics has reached only 65 percent of the prebreakup GDP. This point was reached as the republics struggled to build market economies for which many of them were ill prepared. As the economies in a number of republics were already in serious trouble in 1991, a rejuvenated Soviet government would have exercised tight controls on the economies of all republics. Privatization would have been reversed as property ownership reverted back to the state. Production levels in industry and agriculture would have been predetermined by Moscow as they had been before perestroika, and quotas would have been reinstated, requiring all republics to export specific materials to other areas within the Soviet Union. Exports outside the Soviet bloc would have been strictly monitored by the central government in Moscow. The tax burden in each republic would have increased as each sought to pay the taxes established by party officials. Life within most of the republics would be vastly different under the new Soviet regime. For instance, if Yugoslavia had not dissolved

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along with the Soviet bloc, the bitter ethnic conflicts that occurred in areas such as Kosovo would never have taken place. Consequently, there would have been no call for United Nations peacekeeping forces or for involvement by the European Union, the United States, and NATO. Despite the best efforts of the central government, resistance to Soviet policies would have continued in the Baltic states; resistors would simply go “underground” to avoid direct confrontations with the Soviets. Ethnic conflicts in Georgia and between the Armenians and the Azerbaijani and between the Moldovans and the Tajikistani would also have been quickly stamped out by the Soviet military apparatus. Future uprisings would have been handled in the same way, reinforcing the power of the central government. Within the satellite republics, various movements would also have been forced to work underground or to operate without political power. With its long history of foreign conquest that produced strong resistance movements, Poland was the first of the Soviet republics to form a noncommunist government. If the hard-liners had regained control and prevented the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it is highly unlikely that the Solidarity movement would have garnered enough power to win the elections in 1990 that gave them control of both the presidency and the Polish parliament. Because resistance has been ingrained in Poland throughout its history, Moscow would have been particularly harsh in stamping out any moves toward sovereignty. With the hard-liners in control, it is unlikely that the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia would have occurred, and the Czech Republic and Slovakia would not exist as distinct sovereign nations today. In 1968, anti-Soviet demonstrations and efforts to liberalize the communist party in Czechoslovakia led to harsh reprisals from Moscow that included the presence of Warsaw Pact troops in Czechoslovakia. With this in mind, Czechoslovakia like Poland would have been designated for harsh measures to prevent a resurgence of organized resistance. Although it is highly unlikely that a rejuvenated authoritarian Soviet system would be able to wipe out all corruption in Russia where it has been endemic, the communist government would have been brutal in eliminating the Mafia if it had managed to get a toehold. The Party would have shut down the crime rings specializing in drugs, prostitution, arms smuggling, and money laundering, and would have been particularly diligent in stamping out illegal sales of uranium and plutonium. The situation in Hungary provides an excellent example of the aftermath of instituting a post-reform government. After former communists running on a reform program won in the 1994 elections, reforms were relegated to the back burner. Since 2004, however, Hungary has advanced economically, with 80 percent of enterprises in private hands. In 2005, Hungary exhibited a GDP growth rate of 4.1 percent. If Hungary were still under the control of Moscow, the Hungarian economy would in large part still be dependent on the dictates of the central government.

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It could be argued that the former Soviet republics that have not advanced as far under market economies would have the most to gain under reinstituted Soviet rule. The 80 percent poverty rate of Moldova, for instance, would be somewhat mitigated by the restoration of state services. The per capita incomes of Tajikistan, Moldova, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Uzbekistan, all of which are under $2,000, would likely rise if state production resumed. Within all republics, volunteer groups would have been tightly controlled. Consequently, grassroots organizations would lack sufficient power to pressure communist governments into finding solutions to ongoing social problems. This result would be particularly devastating to the environmental movement, which has been instrumental in improving the lives and health of residents of the former Soviet republics. Joint efforts to solve transnational problems would be controlled by Moscow. Such a requirement would make it more difficult for the republics to deal with issues such as the pollution of the Baltic Sea, where untreated human waste, toxic materials, and the dumping of various metals have created health problems that cross borders into Western European nations. If Eastern European nations were still under the control of Moscow, they would not have cleaned up their individual environments to meet the standards mandated by the European Union. In Afghanistan, anticommunist forces were under the control of a coalition of Islamic forces and Afghani warlords that provided an environment ripe for the emergence of organizations such as the Taliban and al Qaeda. If Soviet troops had not been pulled out of Afghanistan in 1988, al Qaeda would not have been able to use the country as a power base to foster the anti-American feeling that led to the September 11, 2001, attacks. As a result, the nearly 3,000 people who died that day might never have lost their lives, and counterterrorism with its enormous physical and mental costs and threats to civil liberties would not have become the top priority of governments around the world. It follows that if the 9/11 attacks and the war in Iraq had never occurred, it is highly unlikely that George W. Bush would have been reelected in 2004 given the mood of the country at the time of the election. The hard-liners in the Soviet Union would have reassessed the situation in Afghanistan and possibly sent in their own troops to stamp out undesirable elements. Osama bin Ladin emigrated to Afghanistan in 1998 after being exiled from Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden would not have been able to amass such an extensive power base in Afghanistan with Soviet military forces a ubiquitous presence in the country. Without bin Ladin’s money financing Muslim extremists in Afghanistan, the terrorist camps might never have been able to flourish. Consequently, al Qaeda might not have become the major enemy of the West. If bin Laden had emigrated to an Afghanistan controlled by the Soviets, Moscow would likely have committed additional troops to driving him out. If bin Laden had emigrated to any country other than Afghanistan, he would have had a more difficult time finding a

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fertile environment that allowed him to act on his hatred of the nonMuslim world. If the attacks of September 11 had never happened, the United States would have never sent troops to Afghanistan in retaliation. Present-day Afghanistan would likely be under Soviet control. Alternately, if the Taliban and al Qaeda had managed to garner enough support to attack other countries opposed to their interest, they might have planned a terrorist attack on Moscow and Leningrad (which would not have returned to its former name of St. Petersburg) rather than on Washington, D.C., and New York City. Relations with the global community would have quickly deteriorated under the new Soviet system, which would have reverted either to totalitarianism or to something fairly close as loyalties to MarxistLeninism were reaffirmed. Any global partnerships that had been created during the Gorbachev era would have been abandoned. The Europe of today would be vastly different with Eastern Europe returned to communist control. All Eastern European nations would be outside the European Union, creating distinctly different economic and political environments for the continent. Without improving living standards to meet the requirements established for membership in the European Union, Eastern European nations would continue to lag behind the West in quality-of-life issues such as life expectancy and infant mortality rates. Without poverty reduction programs mandated by the EU, the lives of the poorest Eastern Europeans would become increasingly more desperate even as bureaucrats continued to expand their wealth. International organizations would also exhibit a good deal more conflict among members. Since the central government rather than an independent Russia would be sitting on the Security Council of the United Nations, the Soviet Union would revert to its former position of pitting itself against the nations of the West on most significant decisions. The Cold War would again detract the world’s attention from solving other problems such as counterterrorism and quality-of-life issues. Elizabeth Purdy

Discussion Questions 1. How would life in the Soviet Union be different today if glasnost and perestroika had never been implemented, or if the hard-liners had wiped out all traces of these reforms? 2. How would the global orientation of the world be different today if the Berlin Wall remained in place and the hard-liners had succeeded in ousting Mikhail Gorbachev during the August Coup and reinstating communism? 3. Would the former Soviet socialist republics be more politically and economically viable today if the Soviet Union had not collapsed? How do you explain your answer?

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4. Assuming the Cold War would have been resumed if hard-liners had retaken control of the Soviet Union, how would this continuation have affected the politics and economy of the United States? 5. In what ways do you think Mikhail Gorbachev would have acted differently if he had known that his reforms would bring about the downfall of the Soviet Union? 6. Looking at each of the satellite countries, what would be the conditions in each if the Soviet Union had remained intact, under hard-line communist government? Consider the different situations in Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Albania, and Bulgaria. If Yugoslavia had not dissolved into separate republics, do you think it would have continued to follow an independent socialist path, separate from that of the Soviet Union?

Bibliography and Further Reading Brown, Archie. The Gorbachev Factor. New York: Oxford, 1996. Breslauer, George W. Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. CIA. The World Factbook. www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index. html (accessed August 2006). Gorbachev, Mikhail. The August Coup: The Truth and the Lessons. London: HarperCollins, 1991. Graubard, Stephen R., ed. Exit from Communism. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1993. Green, Barbara B. The Dynamics of Russian Politics: A Short History. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1994. Kemp, Walter A. Nationalism and Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. New York: St. Martin’s, 1999. Seliktar, Ofira, Politics, Paradigms, and Intelligence Failures: Why so Few Predicted the Collapse of the Soviet Union. Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 2004. Smith, Hedrick. The New Russians. New York: Random House, 1991. Shlapentokh, Vladimir. A Normal Totalitarian Society: How the Soviet Union Functioned and How It Collapsed. Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 2001. Shlapentokh, Vladimi, and Eric Shiraev. Fears in Post-Communist Societies: A Comparative Perspective. New York: Palgrave, 2002. Strayer, Robert W. Why Did the Soviet Union Collapse? Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1998. White, Stephen. After Gorbachev. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

The Gorbachev Coup

What if the anti-Gorbachev hard-liners had led a successful coup in the Soviet Union?

INTRODUCTION Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, a former resident of Privolnoye near Stavropol in southern Russia, was an intellectually gifted and politically adroit member of the Communist Party who, over the years, made a meteoric rise through the Soviet bureaucracy. On March 11, 1985, the day after the death of seventy-two-year-old chronically ill Secretary General Konstantin Chernenko, a youthful fifty-four-year-old Gorbachev was elected secretary general of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) becoming the ideological leader of the Soviet Union, a federation of fifteen republics, which included five major regions: the Baltic Republics (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), the Caucasian Republics (Kazakh, Kirghiz, Tajik, Turkmen, and Uzbek); the Central Asia Republics (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia); Russia; and the west (Belorussia, Moldavia, and the Ukraine). Once in office, Gorbachev immediately set out to initiate strategic reforms for the Soviet Union. Unlike former Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s rule by centralized control, Gorbachev favored a more decentralized structure. And yet, despite his progressive view, Gorbachev possessed a schizophrenic view about the Soviet Union. On the one hand, he wanted the Soviet people to enjoy freedom that economic, social, and political reforms brought with them; but he also sought to follow some traditional Soviet political philosophies. To support his reform agenda for the Soviet Union, Gorbachev leaned heavily on two twin towers: glasnost (openness), and perestroika (restructuring), two words that became forever synonymous with his tenure in office. For some historians, glasnost was Gorbachev’s desire to seek truth in an atmosphere where mendacities had been associated with Soviet history. On the other hand, Soviet expert Stephen Kotkin, in his book Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse 1970–2000, has viewed perestroika as a result of “a deeply felt urge to make socialism live up to its promises, to reinvigorate the (communist) party and return to the imagined ideas of

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KEY CONCEPT

Perestroika and Glasnost

Perestroika is economic, political, and social restructuring. Gorbachev sought to improve worker productivity, which had declined in the output of petroleum as a result of problems associated with alcoholism among workers. Site visits by Gorbachev to petroleum production fields led to a slight increase in petroleum output. In addition, Gorbachev initiated a host of reforms as he sought to transform the Soviet economy. He instituted decentralized decision making with regard to economic supply and demand, as he reduced the autonomy of Gosplan, the state planning commission. He also sought to privatize state industrial enterprises. Unfortunately, Gorbachev’s attempt to reform the economy met with disaster and helped bring about chaos in the economy.

Glasnost or openness was Gorbachev’s policy to engage the Soviet people in discussions about past and present Soviet events. The media, especially the liberal press, began to publicize brutality and corruption connected to the Soviet regimes of Joseph Stalin and Leonid Brezhnev and resulted in the rewriting of Soviet history. The media took the opportunity to report on events often concealed by the government. Perhaps the best-known example of glasnost was in connection with the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in northern Ukraine on April 26, 1986.The effects of the disaster were made known worldwide. Chernobyl proved to be a breaking point in glasnost, and from that point on the media began reporting on other critical incidents in the Soviet Union.

(the) October (revolution), that shaped both the decision to launch perestroika and, even more importantly, the specific form it took.” Gorbachev was determined to integrate his reforms into the very fabric of Soviet society. For him, glasnost and perestroika had the potential to move the Soviet Union into modern times, but many nomenklatura or Soviet elite party members (approved by the Politburo or Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee) strongly opposed any attempts to reform the existing structure. Brian Moynihan, in The Russian Century: A History of the Last Hundred Years, has suggested that such reform policies were viewed as “a dangerous weapon,” as they resulted in a loss of power and prestige for these high-ranking party members. Gorbachev’s first attempt at reform took place in 1985, when he placed a ban on the sale of alcohol. Worker alcoholism had seriously impacted worker productivity. In 1986, Gorbachev undertook other reform initiatives. On February 11, he allowed Anatoli Shcharansky, a dissident and Jewish activist, to be released to the West in a spy exchange. He also allowed Shcharansky and his wife to leave Russia for the state of Israel. About two months later, on April 26, one of the worst nuclear disasters in history occurred at Chernobyl in Ukraine. Despite Gorbachev’s slow response to this crisis, the Chernobyl incident served as a way to advance glasnost. The press was able to publish details of the disaster through its media coverage. Glasnost was more than political rhetoric. In fact, it allowed the media to act more quickly and openly about disasters, such as offering specific details of the August 31 sinking of the Admiral Nakhimov, a Soviet ocean liner in the Black Sea. During September, Gorbachev continued to hammer away at any obstacle that prevented glasnost from becoming a reality. In a televised speech in Krasnodar, Russia, he took a bold step. He named several

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Communist Party members whom he felt were antiglasnost because glasnost threatened their power and privilege in the social and political system. In early October, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze was able to negotiate a two-day meeting between Gorbachev and U.S. President Ronald Reagan for October 10 and 11, in Reykjavik, Iceland, in part as a way of defusing the situation that resulted from the August 1986 arrest in Moscow of Nicholas Daniloff, a U.S. News & World Report Moscow correspondent, who was charged with spying for the United States. At the Reykjavik Summit, the two world leaders discussed many global issues including the possible elimination of the countries’ nuclear weapons. Although the summit ended without a signed agreement between the two leaders, it laid the foundation for future discussions on arms reductions and better relations between the superpowers. On December 16, Gorbachev took another bold step toward reform. He allowed Andrei Sakharov, human rights activist, 1975 Nobel Peace Prize winner, and nuclear physicist, and his wife, Elena Bonner, to return to Moscow. These two leading dissidents had been sent in exile to remote Gorky, Russia, for denouncing the Christmas Eve 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Despite Gorbachev’s efforts, some reformers were still dissatisfied and called for more drastic changes. In January 1987, Gorbachev sought to promote demokratizatsiya, or a democratic component in politics. His idea of demokratizatsiya centered on adding multiple candidates for elections, but not multiple political parties. Such political candidates had the ability to revive the party with

President Ronald Reagan and Soviet general secretary Mikhail Gorbachev (left) meet at Hofdi House during the Reykjavik Summit in Iceland on October 1, 1986. (Ronald Reagan Presidential Library)

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new players to support his new reforms. Under perestroika, he also allowed for some privatization in manufacturing. In late May 1987, a major international embarrassment gave Gorbachev the political capital to transform the leadership of the Soviet military. West German teenager Mathias Rust humiliated the Soviet defense system when he entered Soviet airspace undetected and landed his singleengine Cessna 172B plane on Red Square near the Kremlin in Moscow. The Rust incident clearly showed a major flaw in the Soviet defense system that made the Soviet Union possibly vulnerable to an attack by another major world power. As a result of this disturbing incident, just two days after the Rust landing, Gorbachev initiated military reform, replacing his minister of defense and some 2,000 others individuals who disagreed with his policies of glasnost and perestroika. He also reduced the size of the military. At the same time, however, another figure was beginning to emerge. In late 1987, Boris Yeltsin, a Siberian and party leader of Sverdlovsk, Russia, had been elected the first secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on Christmas Eve, 1985. Yeltsin began his quest for power and became one of Gorbachev’s major antagonists. At a Central Committee plenum on October 21, Yeltsin criticized Gorbachev and requested that he be relieved of his duties as first secretary of the Moscow party. Some three weeks later, on November 11, Gorbachev returned the favor when he denounced Yeltsin publicly at a Moscow Party Committee meeting. Despite this political fencing, one week later, Yeltsin became first deputy chairman of the State Committee on Construction. In January 1988, Gorbachev was still the “darling” of the West. On January 4, 1988, his picture graced the cover of Time magazine as its “1987 Man of the Year.” At home, he continued to press for sweeping reforms in the Soviet Union. A few months later, he decided to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan; troop withdrawal began in mid-May. In late June, Gorbachev called for the creation of a presidential position to lead the Soviet Union and for a new parliament (Congress of People’s Deputies). Some three months later, on October 1, he was elected chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Gorbachev’s election was not the only major change occurring within the Soviet Union at this time; there was another significant change. In midNovember, Estonia became the first Soviet satellite republic to declare its independence from the Soviet Union. Early 1989 brought major changes in Soviet foreign policy. In the first two weeks of February, the Soviets withdrew from two long-standing military engagements. In early February, the Soviet military pulled out of Czechoslovakia, after more than a twenty-year presence that resulted from the Prague Spring of 1968, a period of liberalization and reform. And then, in mid-February, the Soviets withdrew their final military forces from the costly ten-year protracted war in Afghanistan. March 1989 was another major milestone in Soviet history. It brought the Soviet Union’s first multicandidate election. Yeltsin, Gorbachev’s nemesis, was elected to the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR from Moscow by receiving 90 percent of the vote. Bolstered by such support Yeltsin desired additional political power.

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A few months later, on May 25, Gorbachev was elected president (the chairman of the Supreme Soviet) of the USSR. Over the next seven months, a series of events unfolded—the Berlin Wall separating East and West Germany came down, and the Czechoslovakian people elected Vaclav Havel, a dissident and intellectual, as their first noncommunist president in many years. These events foreshadowed changing events in the Soviet Union. In January 1990, Time magazine again honored Gorbachev. He was named the magazine’s “Man of the Decade” (1980s) for his sweeping reforms in the Soviet Union. Yet despite his latest honor on the world stage, the early months of the 1990s began with a series of political, social, and economic setbacks for the Soviet Union. On February 25, massive demonstrations in support of democracy were staged across the Soviet Union. An estimated 100,000 people assembled in Moscow alone. Two weeks later, on March 11, Lithuania became the second Baltic State and Soviet satellite to declare its independence from the Soviet Union, electing a noncommunist president, Vytautas Landsbergis. A strong spirit of nationalism was awakening within the Soviet satellite republics. On March 15, 1990, Gorbachev was reelected president of the Soviet Union at the Third Congress of People’s Deputies. He continued his call for economic reform, but fearing social disorder among the people, he aborted his plan for a market economy. In late May 1990, Yeltsin, the ever-present thorn in Gorbachev’s side, continued his ascent to the top leadership position in Russia. He was elected chairman of the Ruling Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR). Yeltsin was now the president of Russia, while Gorbachev was the president of the Soviet Union. A few months later in mid-July, Yeltsin, encouraged by his newfound political power, withdrew from the Communist Party at the 28th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Despite any subtle struggle for power between them, on August 1, 1990, Gorbachev and Yeltsin were able to reach agreement on a common approach to economic reform. Perhaps Gorbachev believed that the Soviet empire was slowly beginning to unravel, or perhaps he believed that only through economic reform could he forestall Yeltsin’s mounting power. The winter of 1990 placed Gorbachev between a rock and a hard place. The conservatives did not find him conservative enough, and the reformers did not consider him enough of a reformer. His attempt to take a centrist position—somewhere in the middle of these polarized factions—unfortunately met with serious disaster, as he failed to satisfy either group adequately. As a result of economic reforms, a rise in the Soviet republics’ nationalism, and his inability to control certain governmental situations, the Soviet Union had begun to fall apart. Ironically, the very change (perestroika) that Gorbachev sought to introduce within the Soviet Union was becoming the instrument of its collapse. Winning the 1990 Nobel Prize for Peace in October 1990 had to be a moving experience for Gorbachev. But unfortunately for him, this stirring moment was followed by a gloomy December 31 New Year’s address to the Soviet people. He called 1990 one of the most difficult years in Soviet history and reinforced his utmost desire to preserve the Soviet Union.

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In early 1991, Yeltsin sponsored a rally in Moscow to announce his plans to accelerate reform and to create a new independent Russia. Yeltsin rallied thousands of people to hear his plans. He was systematically building a tremendous amount of political capital with the Russian people, and as a result, on July 12, Yeltsin became the first democratically elected president of the Russian republic. The uncontrollable winds of change were blowing throughout the Soviet Union.

Historically, August has been an important month for Soviet hard-liners. They derailed the joyous feelings of the Prague Spring reform and liberalization created by communist party leader Alexander Dubcek in August 1968, when the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies invaded Czechoslovakia to squash the reform movement. They replaced the good feelings of reform with a return to “normalization.” Almost twenty-three years later to the day, a parallel situation emerged in the Soviet Union. On August 18, 1991, Soviet hard-liners launched a coup d’état against Soviet Secretary General Gorbachev. Calling themselves the State Committee for State Emergencies, eight Soviet hard-liners, unsympathetically known as the “Gang of 8,” sought to remove Gorbachev from power through a coup. The Gang of 8—Oleg Baklanov (deputy head of the Security Council), Vladimir Kryuchkov (head of KGB), Valentin Pavlov (Soviet prime minister), Boris Pugo (minister of interior), Vasily Stardubtsev (head of the Peasants’ Union), Aleksandr Tiziakov (a leading representative of state industry), Dmitri Yazov (minister of defense) and Gennady Yanaev (vice president of the USSR)—was committed to preserving the old ways by turning back the clock on Gorbachev’s reform initiatives. Walter Laqueur, writing in The New Republic, advanced the notion that the plotters believed Gorbachev’s reform policies and experiments had failed and that his removal from office would restore order to “prevent general chaos and economic ruin.” Their actions were precipitated by the Union Treaty, scheduled to be signed two days later—a treaty that would give the Soviet satellite republics more autonomy. For them, it was time to take immediate action to preserve the empire. The following account briefly chronicles the coup events of late August 1991: on August 18, while Gorbachev and his family were vacationing at their dacha (summer or vacation home) in Foros, Crimea, a popular resort on the Black Sea, several high-ranking Soviet officials, including some directly appointed by Gorbachev, made an unexpected visit to him late in the day. They asked that he resign his presidency, which he adamantly refused to do. The day after their unsuccessful visit to Foros, on August 19, 1991, the plotters held him and his family incommunicado at his dacha. They held a press conference in Moscow to inform the Soviet people and the world that Gorbachev was too ill to carry out the duties and responsibilities of the presidency. Through TASS, the Soviet news agency, the hard-liners

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ANOTHER VIE W

Gorbachev’s “Death”

In alternate history, the premature death of Gorbachev could have been a turning point in history. On July 12, 1991, Yeltsin became the first democratically elected president of the Russian republic. His election came five weeks prior to the scheduled hard-liners’ coup. From his perch as the president of Russia, he had sufficient power and support from the people and the military to declare Russia’s independence from the Soviet Union.

With Gorbachev dead in alternate history, Yeltsin would have hastened his call for dissolving the Soviet Union, which would have led to the independence of those Soviet satellite countries still part of the USSR. As well, he would have purged the top leadership of the Soviet political party. With the Russian military firmly behind him, he would have begun to enact his reform policies.

declared that all demonstrations and/or strikes were considered illegal activities and now the state controlled the media. Further, to maintain continuity in government, Yanaev, the vice president, and a coup plotter, had assumed the role of acting president of the Soviet Union. On April 19, their coup was well under way, supported by Soviet troops as well as Soviet tanks that had rolled into Moscow. On that day Yeltsin, who had been one of Gorbachev’s chief antagonists over the years, now became the chief protagonist for Gorbachev and the Russian people. Yeltsin barricaded himself in the Russian White House (Parliament) and called for national strikes and for Gorbachev’s reinstatement as president of the Soviet Union. He then left the parliament building, took to the streets of Moscow, and in bold theatric fashion, leapt onto a Soviet Taman Guard T-72 tank. Yeltsin was supported by some 20,000 coup demonstrators, a number that swelled to 100,000 later in the day. In an attempt to persuade the Soviet troops, who were ready to fire into the massive anticoup crowd, to join his side, Yeltsin declared the coup illegal. By the end of the day, many of the troops had made an about-face—they joined Yeltsin and protected him, the protesters, and the parliament. On day two of the coup, August 20, 1991, mass demonstrations took place in two major Russian cities. More than 150,000 Russians had voiced their opposition to the coup in Moscow, and some 250,000 people expressed similar opposition in Leningrad. To disperse the crowds at night, the plotters imposed a curfew in Moscow, but few protesters heeded it. By 1:00 P.M. on day 3, August 21, 1991, without significant military support, the short-lived coup was over as quickly as it started. The military refused to attack the protesters and the plotters lost their spirit. They had no support to spur them on and the coup simply fizzled out. Two plotters supposedly left the country while two others sought forgiveness from Gorbachev, who was still residing at his Foros dacha. Unfortunately for them, their pleas fell on deaf ears. Gorbachev had the plotters arrested. Minister of Interior Pugo committed suicide rather than be taken into custody. The next day, August 22, Gorbachev returned to Moscow from Foros, not on his plane, but, interestingly enough, on Yeltsin’s Russian presidential plane, and he resumed his duties as secretary general.

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The coup failed because the plotters lacked support from the Soviet people, from the Central Committee, from the Soviet military, and from the KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti), the Committee for State Security—the Soviet secret service. Some military leaders supported the coup, but they were unwilling to become cold-blooded killers of their own people. Gorbachev, in The August Coup, stated that the plotters failed to understand the new breed of people for whom perestroika had created a “new way of life,” nor did they understand the significance of the relationship between the Soviet Union and the West, which condemned the plotters’ actions. In essence, the plotters completely miscalculated the situation and their bungling actions invalidated any chances of a successful coup. Yeltsin’s “heroic” leadership, coupled with the self-destructive nature of the plotters and the unwavering support of thousands of Russians, ultimately defeated the hard-liners.

ACTUAL HISTORY Immediately after the failed coup, political and economic changes unraveled swiftly in the Soviet Union. On the day after the coup was over, August 23, 1991, Yeltsin, who gained a tremendous amount of political currency for his role in the resistance, insisted that Gorbachev read a transcript of the Council of Ministers’ meeting five days earlier that stated that he, Yeltsin, was not among the conspirators. The next day, August 24, Gorbachev suspended all activities of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Five days later, Gorbachev dissolved the Soviet secret service agency—the KGB. Sensing the Soviet Union was now a toothless, declawed bear, eight more Soviet satellites defected from the Soviet Union and declared their independence. Despite the current state of affairs, Gorbachev, in a television interview on September 1, 1991 (recounted in The August Coup), emphatically declared, “I am not now going to submit my resignation. It would be an immoral act, even if other aspects are not taken into consideration. I will not allow myself, as a person and as a citizen, to quit now at this most difficult stage when decisions have to be taken which will determine whether the course that we set out on in 1985 will be preserved. Therefore I will not submit my resignation.” Were these the remarks of a leader still hard at work reforming the Soviet Union, or were these remarks simply the final nail in its coffin? During the first three weeks in September, three more Soviet Union satellites defected—leaving only Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan connected to the Soviet Union. On December 8, 1991, the presidents of Belarus (formerly Belorussia), Russia, and Ukraine met secretly and signed the Belovezh Agreement in Minsk, Belarus, which abolished the Soviet Union and formed the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), an economic federation of equally sovereign independent nations. The signers of the agreement invited all former Soviet republics and other countries to join them as long as they shared the views of this commonwealth. Outraged by this, Gorbachev called their actions dangerous and illegal, but despite

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his protests, the expansion of the commonwealth was unstoppable at this point. On December 12, 1991, Kazakhstan was the fifteenth and last Soviet republic to declare its independence from the empire. Five days later, on December 17, Gorbachev and Yeltsin agreed to dissolve the Soviet Union by New Year’s Day 1992. On Christmas Day, slightly more than four months after the attempted coup to oust him as president of the Soviet Union, a position he had held since October 1, 1988, the inevitable happened—Gorbachev resigned. He was the first and last president of the Soviet Union, a position abolished with his resignation. This final act officially dissolved the Soviet Union. In January 1992, Russia had a fresh start in world affairs. It replaced the former Soviet Union at the United Nations (UN). If Gorbachev took a series of stutter steps integrating his reforms into the Soviet Union, Yeltsin was much more sure-footed about implementing his reforms for Russia. Unfortunately, the Russian economy had serious problems. The elimination of price controls caused increased prices, escalated inflation, and depleted bank accounts and pensions of Russian citizens. These economic hardships spread to the business and government sectors. To combat such resentment, Yeltsin went on the offensive. Over the next seven months, he peppered his speeches with the necessity for reform strategies to address the country’s economic mess. During the first few months of 1993, Yeltsin continued selling economic reforms. At the end of March, a vote to impeach him barely fell short. A month later, he and his economic reform policies emerged victorious. In mid-September, Yeltsin dissolved the Congress of People’s Deputies and the Supreme Soviet; however, he threatened the use of military support to prevent any potential violence connected with its dissolution. Yeltsin’s 1993 and 1994 economic reform mantra was promoted in his speeches. For him, privatization was a mechanism to ensure “capitalism,” but more important, it was a vehicle to gain political support for the mid1996 presidential election. But in October 1994, the Russian economy went into a tailspin as its ruble lost nearly one-fourth of its value, which created serious stress on the Russian economy. Mid-December 1994 brought another serious problem. The southern republic of Chechnya sought independence from Russia. In an attempt to smash its bid for independence, Russian troops entered Chechnya and met with stiff resistance from Chechen insurgents. Soon, a RussianChechen war was in full bloom and it cost the Russians dearly—not only in the loss of military personnel but also in severe drains on the failing Russian economy. In early 1995, Yeltsin reshuffled his top staff. Unfortunately, his economic reform policies created a wealthy class of oligarchs, a small faction of people who held large amounts of money and who controlled key sectors of the Russian economy. About a year later, Yeltsin reshuffled government personnel again to deal with the economic crisis. The deputy prime minister resigned, and Yeltsin asked other officials to resign. Because he could not bear to leave the country with a troubled economy, he announced his intention to seek another term in office. In late March, Russia negotiated a $10 billion loan with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to help relieve some of its economic problems.

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A Soviet 50-ruble banknote from 1991. By 1994, the Russian ruble had lost one-fourth of its value. (Shutterstock)

The June 1996 Russian presidential election ended without a clear choice. Yeltsin failed to receive a majority endorsement, and he was forced into a run-off election with Gennady Zvuganov, head of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. Yeltsin handily won reelection in July, and over the next two months, he reshaped his cabinet. Toward the latter part of the year, Yeltsin needed heart bypass surgery and was absent from public view for several months. In January 1997, Yeltsin became seriously ill with pneumonia. Some Russian communists in parliament seized this opportunity to impeach him, but they failed. With his health vastly improved some months later, Yeltsin wielded his political cudgel, and no cabinet member escaped its wrath. In some cases, Yeltsin seemed to be simply playing musical chairs, as he replaced one prime minister with another. The political fallout and the repositioning of governmental officials continued intermittently for the rest of the year. Despite these administrative problems, Yeltsin had some good reasons to rejoice. The Russian-Chechen War ended in May, and an economic recovery seemed possible for late 1997. Yeltsin’s joy ended prematurely in early 1998. The economy was again in trouble. In March, Yeltsin purged his economic staff once more. Despite his actions, the Russian economy plummeted to a new low in late August. The Russian ruble lost 75 percent of its value, and this situation created economic and political turmoil. To bolster his economic policies, Yeltsin nominated a new prime minister, but in a test of wills, the Russian parliament rejected this candidate. In September, the parliament approved

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KEY CONCEPT

Chechnya

Chechen history reflects a long tradition of resistance to outside domination by Russians, even after their mountain region was annexed by the Russian Empire in 1859. In the years following the Russian Revolution of 1917, Chechens clashed with both sides in the civil war. The Soviets established the Chechen Autonomous Oblast and the region had nominal autonomy within the Soviet Union.During the 1930s,under Joseph Stalin, the Soviets tried to stamp out Chechen religious practices and to force people into collective farms. During World War II, Stalin blamed the Chechen and Ingush peoples for collaborating with the Nazis and began wholesale deportations. The autonomous republic was abolished until 1957, and the former inhabitants began to return. In 1991, as the Soviet Union was collapsing, Chechen general Dzhokhar Dudayev let a coup that overthrew the communist government. He won a clear victory in the October 1991 elections, and Chechnya declared its full independence. The Russians refused to accept the declaration, and Chechnya did not receive any international recognition. In December 1994, Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin started a military invasion of Chechnya to suppress the independence movement. The Russians set up a puppet government, but Chechen troops went into the mountains and

refused to surrender. Dudayev himself was killed by the Russians in April 1996. In May 1996, a cease-fire was worked out, but it did not hold. By the summer of 1996, more than 40,000 people had been killed, while hundreds of thousands of Chechens had become refugees in Russia. Despite efforts of some Chechen leaders to work out a formal treaty, rebel commanders continued their fight, and the region saw the emergence of war lords and anarchy in the late 1990s. Chechen terrorist bombings in Moscow and elsewhere in Russia by 1999 led the Russians to begin a series of air strikes and a reinvasion of Chechnya by Russian troops. By early 2000, the capital city, already in shambles was nearly completely destroyed, while fighting continued in the mountains. The conflict continued, with the Russians describing the war in Chechnya as an antiterrorist operation, and emphasizing the fact that Chechen rebels received outside support from Islamic radicals with ties to al Qaeda. An attack by forty-one Chechen guerillas on a theater in Moscow in October 2002 seemed to confirm that characterization. The Chechen terrorist attack on a school in the Russian republic of North Ossetia, in which more than 330 people were killed, including children, also confirmed the degeneration of the movement for independence into a bitter struggle by outlaw bands.

Yeltsin’s nominee—foreign minister Yevgeny Primakov—as prime minister. By this point both the Russian economy and Yeltsin’s presidency were headed for serious trouble. In October 1998, Yeltsin gave Primakov the charge to ignite the economy, to gain greater support from the West, and to end any efforts by parliament to impeach him. Unfortunately for Primakov, his successes in these matters led to his downfall. In May 1999, Yeltsin fired the increasingly popular Primakov, whom he viewed as a possible political threat to his presidency. He installed Interior Minister Sergei Stepashin as prime minister. Yeltsin regained power over the parliament by threatening its members with possible force, and the impeachment efforts ended. Yeltsin and the parliament had other troubles. After several years of peace in Chechnya, the quiet summer of 1999 was interrupted with a second Chechen war. In August, Yeltsin fired Stepashin after only three months in office, replacing him with Vladimir Putin, a former agent of the KGB and the head of the Federal Security Service (FSS)—the successor agency to the KGB—and the former deputy mayor of St. Petersburg. Yeltsin also

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endorsed Putin as his presidential successor. On December 31, 1999, after eight years in office, Yeltsin unexpectedly announced his resignation as president of Russia. Some historians suggest that at the heart of his resignation was a cunning plan to ensure personal immunity from any corruption, once he left office. Putin’s presidency ensured that immunity for Yeltsin. On January 1, 2000, Putin, the recently appointed prime minister, became acting president and repaid his political debt to Yeltsin by granting him lifetime immunity from prosecution for corruption. In accordance with the Russian constitution, three months later, a special presidential election was held for a permanent successor. During his initial three months in office, prior to the presidential election, Putin slowly distanced himself from Yeltsin and his policies as he sought to consolidate power. In February 2000, Russian troops captured Grozny, the capital of Chechnya. This prize gave Putin a military and political triumph, and set the stage for his election as president in March. Putin faced many challenges as president. He had to curb the various power bases that had operated relatively unchecked during the latter part of Yeltsin’s second presidential term. Putin believed that if he was to restore Russia to its place of prominence in the world, he had to replace internal turmoil by seizing centralized control. August 2000 brought several major disasters to Russia. First, a series of explosions, allegedly caused by terrorists, rocked Pushkin Square, Moscow, and killed many city residents. A few days later, the atomic submarine K-141 Kursk sank in the Barents Sea in the Arctic Ocean during naval exercises. All 118 sailors on board died as Russia lacked the equipment necessary to save the sailors from imminent death. Third, a major fire struck the Ostankino television tower in Moscow, the second tallest structure in the world, killing four people and disabling television and radio communications. In October, Putin had a plan to regain control of the media. By November, he devised a way to reduce the size of the military within three years, and by the end of the year, Russia had a new national anthem. To develop better economic and political relations throughout the world, Putin made visits to India, Japan, Turkey, and several European countries. By the end of his first year in office, he had some cause to rejoice. His popularity was at 60 percent; economic growth had increased by 8 percent, a missile reduction plan was in place, and a new income tax code had been enacted. In 2001, Putin continued to consolidate power from various internal factions. He sought consolidation through changes in domestic policy (for example, judicial and pension reform) and through the appointment of his followers in key government positions. He slowly but surely shed any Yeltsin appointees. In addition to his internal actions, he sought to expand his sphere of influence internationally. Putin was visibly upset with the United States after it initiated modifications to the 1972 AntiBallistic Missile (ABM) Agreement. In February 2001, the Russian relationship with the United States turned icy when FBI agent Robert Hanssen was discovered to have been spying for Russia for many years. Only after a June meeting with President George W. Bush did the icy relationship between the two countries thaw slightly. Putin’s support of the

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United States post-September 11, 2001, and his strong position against terrorism helped to mend Russian-American relationships. The year ended upbeat: Russia experienced a 5 percent increase in economic growth, a 20 percent increase in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and a phenomenonal 77 percent increase in the Russian Trading System (RTS) Stock Exchange. In early 2002, Putin had gained considerable political power. He had removed some communists from their leadership positions on parliamentary committees, but he was less successful in his efforts to rein in the military, the oligarchs, the governors, and the security service. A May 2002 Bush-Putin Summit in Moscow resulted in a treaty to reduce nuclear weapons over the next decade; but the early 2002 summer lull was followed by two tragic August incidences: 140 people were killed in a military helicopter crash in Chechnya, and several Moscow residential buildings were destroyed. Then, in late October Chechen terrorists seized the Nord-Ost Theater in Moscow and held 800 hostages. The next day, Russian Special Forces took control of the situation; after they released poisonous gas into the theater 120 hostages and all the terrorists were killed. In 2003, Putin sought more political power. In a speech to the Federal Assembly, Putin resurrected some of the old ghosts that haunted most Russians (for example, a weak economy, rigid bureaucracy, and international problems) and a top-ranking official of YUKOS, Russia’s largest oil company, was charged in a murder and embezzling scandal. In early 2004, Putin encountered tension with the European Union (EU) as a result of Russian policies in Chechnya and civil rights. But despite a difficult first term in office, Putin was reelected Russian president in March by more than 70 percent of the voters. Some observers speculated the election process was less than democratic. At this time, the Russia economy started to rebound: a 25 percent increase in wages, a 12 percent increase in disposable income, and an 8 percent drop in unemployment. However, these strong economic data were offset by some disturbing news about the general health of the Russian people: about 40 percent of Russian citizens were frequently sick, approximately 33 percent were chronically sick, and there was an increase in tuberculosis and a dramatic increase in HIV/AIDS. August 2004 was indeed trying for Russia. Terrorism and the war in Chechnya were the key culprits. On September 1, heavily armed insurgents seized a Russian school in Beslan, Russia, near Chechnya and took as hostages some 1,200 children, parents, and teachers. When the siege ended a few days later, military action had led to the deaths of more than 300 hostages (including some 170 children) and 31 terrorists. In January 2005, Putin was determined to become a more active player in world affairs. He worked more closely with the European Union and the United States to curb terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime. Putin attempted to establish a presence in the Middle East by forging a trade relationship with Syria and Iran. At home, in St. Petersburg, a “Gray Revolution” was taking place over a new pension system. Pensioners were visibly upset with the new policy of more financial, but fewer nonfinancial (for example, free transit passes) benefits. In addition, military leaders and soldiers sought salary increases. Both calls for financial increases burdened the Russian economy.

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In February 2005, Putin hosted Palestinian National Authority President Mahmoud Abbas in Moscow and expressed his support for the creation of a Palestinian state. Later in the month, Putin met with George W. Bush in Slovakia to attempt to improve the strained relationship between the two countries. But despite his emergence on the international scene, in early March 2005, the G-7 (Group of Seven), seven of the world’s wealthiest governments, rejected Russia’s request for membership in the group. Simply put, the leaders of the G-7 viewed the Russian economy as too small for inclusion as a member; and some members quietly raised concerns about Russia’s lack of progress toward democratic reform. At a Russian Security Council session Putin presented his views on the state of the union. In particular, his remarks were concerned with the decline of the Russian population base, the exodus of its mathematicians and scientists, and liberal immigration policies. To bolster the economy, Putin agreed to increase delivery of energy to China, to sell nuclear fuel to Iran, and to enhance its relationship with the European Union. Putin also visited Kiev, Ukraine, to mend political fences over Russia’s attempt to influence the outcome of the recent Ukrainian presidential election. Putin continued his hand at international affairs. In May, he met with George W. Bush at his dacha to discuss world affairs, the Iranian situation, and the Middle East. He also met with Asian leaders to discuss trade issues. However, within several months, world tension had ratcheted up over the Russian-Iranian nuclear program. To bolster support of its sagging defense industry, Russia sold arms to any nation with enough money to pay for them; yet this action could not sustain the Russian defense industry. In conclusion, after the attempted coup to overthrow Gorbachev in August 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed, as its satellite republics announced their independence. Russia elected a president, replaced the Soviet Union at the United Nations, had an economy that teetered on collapse, had its first elected president resign prematurely, experienced widespread internal corruption, and created a class of wealthy oligarchs. Putin, Russia’s acting president, was elected to the presidency twice. The country experienced major acts of terrorism, was engaged in two wars in Chechyna, and had a seesaw relationship with the United States. It established trade relationships with rogue nations in the Middle East, imprisoned wealthy Russian political opposition members, and encountered major social and health issues affecting its citizens. Finally, it rejected reform movements and attempted to gain a place of prominence in world affairs.

ALTERNATE HISTORY Many geopolitical and economic changes have occurred throughout the world since the August 1991 coup to oust Gorbachev from power and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Some of these changes have been positive and some have been negative. For example, several former Soviet countries have become more democratic. Some countries

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have ousted repressive regimes. On the other hand, some countries (Afghanistan) have become a breeding ground for terrorists, while other countries remain in the clutches of repressive dictatorial leaders. To what degree would international and domestic affairs have changed for the better or the worse had the Soviet hard-liners been successful in their coup to remove Gorbachev? The following alternate history offers a view of the world had the hard-liners succeeded in their coup. The first order of business for the hardliners would have been to take every feasible precaution to eliminate Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and their families from the scene permanently. In all likelihood, Gorbachev and Yeltsin would have become missing in action. There would have been several possible scenarios: they would have been sent to one of the infamous Soviet Gulags; they would have turned up dead as a result of a tragic automobile or airplane accident; or they would have committed suicide en mass in shame for their crimes against the state and their bodies would have been discovered complete with a suicide note. Any of those rigged scenarios would have been their fate. With Gorbachev and Yeltsin out of the picture, the next step for the hardliners would have been to strike a deal with the major players within Soviet military and KGB hierarchy. With these major factions of power firmly behind them, the hardliners would have announced a change in status for Gennady Yanaev, the acting president, to permanent leader of the Soviet Union under the guise of maintaining the status quo. As president of the Soviet Union, Yanaev’s first act would have been to win the “hearts and minds” of the Soviet people to ensure total victory for the hard-liners. This task would have been easily accomplished by attending to the basic needs of the people, that is, by supplying them with the necessities: food, fuel, and decent housing stock. Moreover, the Soviet Union would have returned to a five-year planned economy. The hard-liners would have told the people that the communism system would replace any forms of socialism and democracy, restoring sufficient basic supplies to everyone. They would have reinforced their views through the state-controlled media, stressing that the Soviet Union would have been better off without reform initiatives instituted by Gorbachev, and that a return to a strong communist way of life would clearly signal the return of the Soviet Union as a world power. As a result of hardliner rhetoric broadcast continuously in the media and through organizers, they would have restored a sense of nostalgia and calm to Moscow within the month. Glasnost and the liberal press would have been totally repressed as centralized media control would now be under a communist state media czar. Furthermore, to prevent any possible future plots by political dissidents, the KGB would have efficiently and effectively dealt with them either through disappearances or exile. The new Soviet Order would have been restored through the revival of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Under the leadership of President Gennady Yanaev, the free enterprise system would no longer be welcomed in the Soviet Union, entrepreneurship would have been outlawed, and the state would have taken full control of factors of production.

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The Kremlin in Moscow: In an alternate history, the central government would have reasserted its control of the Soviet Union. (Shutterstock)

With nuclear missiles trained west toward Europe, Western European countries would have taken a position of noninvolvement in internal Soviet affairs. And while the United States to a large degree, and the United Nations to a lesser degree, would have raised some serious concerns about rights and democracy, their protests and cries in various public forums and venues about democracy would have fallen on deaf ears. There would be no reversal of fortune for the Soviet people. Yanaev and the other hard-liners would have let it be known that antinuclear proliferation treaties were null and void. In a matter of a few months the Cold War would have resumed. It is possible that the gap separating the Soviet Union and the West—the United States, in particular—would have widened considerably. The proliferation of nuclear arms in the Soviet Union would have caused the United States to reallocate a major portion of its fiscal budget to the military to match any Soviet arms buildup. With the United States reallocating billions of dollars to the military, there is a distinct possibility that special interest groups such as the peace, nuclear freeze, and social groups within the United States would have organized mass demonstrations, offering stiff resistance to any increase in the military budget at the expense of reducing spending on domestic social programs. One way the United States would have sought to lessen Soviet power would have been an appeal to key Western countries such as the United Kingdom to immediately slap economic sanctions on the Soviet Union, including any economic development loans through the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

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With the West scurrying around to counter the Soviet Union’s possible military aggression, in early January 1992, the Soviet military machine would have conducted simultaneous land invasions in Estonia and Lithuania, the two former Soviet republics that declared their independence from the Soviet Union just prior to the successful Gorbachev coup. To facilitate the invasions, the KGB would have engaged in covert actions to “eliminate” the newly elected Estonian and Lithuanian presidents, and working behind the scenes, they would have replaced all pro-Western leaders with pro-Soviet sympathizers whose fealty and whose economic, political, and social survival would always tilt directly toward Moscow. The Soviet military invasion of these two countries would have sent a very clear message to other Soviet republics teetering on the edge of declaring their independence from the Soviet Union. The Soviet military would have positioned sufficient military force close enough to strike at these countries within twenty-four hours and thereby prevent any possible withdrawal from the Soviet Union. Unlike its fate under Gorbachev’s watch, the Soviet Union would indeed hold together. Besides the military, the KGB would have infiltrated these Soviet republics to place surveillance on local leaders and political dissidents, to expose subversives, and to threaten them with abduction and free passage to Siberian gulags. Dissidents, unwilling to surrender themselves to the newly instituted autocratic control, would have been forced to retreat deep underground, or they would have left their respective countries, if they could, to seek safe haven in the West as political refugees. To further force satellite republics to submit to its will, Soviet leadership would have cut off all energy sources (oil and natural gas) to energy-dependent countries in the dead of winter. While the leaders of the Soviet Union would have taken this hardline position to preserve themselves and their way of life, the United States would have begun a concerted effort to undermine Soviet expansion through the clandestine branch of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). It would have sponsored exile regimes through covert funding, CIA penetration, and the mass arming and training of underground resistance groups. It would have used Radio Free Europe to spread the word about Soviet domination reminiscent of Cold War days and it would have offered suggestions about the various ways to resist puppet regimes in Soviet republics. At the very least, the United States would have made every effort to create a stalemate in the region. The Soviet KGB would have taken its own initiatives to reverse the stalemate. It would have made initial contact with other communist nations—for example, Cuba and North Korea—to create another set of problems for the United States, reminiscent of the Cuban missile crisis of the early 1960s. In fact, the Soviets would have become a white knight for Cuba, thereby threatening America in its own backyard. President Yanaev would have extended an olive branch to Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein to counter the West even further. Yanaev would have decelerated energy production, thereby starving portions of Europe of energy such as natural gas, and threatened the possible use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Soviet-Iraqi alliance would have also possibly drawn another wild card—Iran—into the

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mix, despite the fact that Iraq and Iran had been mortal enemies. Both these nations would have believed that the United States would have posed a greater threat to them than they would have posed to each other. By the end of 1995, the Soviet Union, Iraq, and Iran would have formed the Soviet-Iraqi-Iranian (SII) Alliance. The first major alliance action would have been to immediately manipulate the price of petroleum. Through their covert secret agencies, they would have also tampered with petroleum production in Venezuela, South America, and Nigeria, Africa, by creating uprisings against the current governments in power and by raising anti-American sentiments and demonstrations. Russia and its oil partners would have tried to create an economic crisis in the West. To frustrate the SII Alliance in its attempt to destabilize oil markets, the United States, in exchange for its continued commitment to protect Saudi Arabia and other “friendly” Middle Eastern countries against a possible military invasion by the SII Alliance, would have created a U.S.-Middle Eastern Alliance by joining forces with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Thus, the United States would have had access to an ample supply of petroleum. However, within a few short years, by 1998, Saudi Arabia, the single largest producer of crude oil in the world, would encounter “Hubbert’s Peak” effect, which holds that the world supply of oil will begin to diminish once peak production has been reached. In essence, Saudi Arabia would have begun running out of oil, and the SII alliance would have taken advantage of the situation by further destabilizing world markets while it increased the price of petroleum to tighten the noose around the neck of Western countries. It is quite possible that by mid-1999, the hard-liners would have stretched the Soviet economy so thin that it would have reached a breaking point. Internal fighting would have broken out between Yanaev and the other coup hard-liners that would have resulted in a major split between them. The Soviet economy would have been near collapse because of the endless funding of military and covert activities at the expense of basic goods and services for the Soviet people; thus, there would be clamoring for more benefits and for new leadership. The political cleavage among the hard-liners and the mounting economic problems would have resulted in another coup attempt. By early 2000, the Russian people would have welcomed a military figure to contain any political, economic, and social upheavals in the country. Another distinct possibility would have been the development of a Muslim brotherhood between the minority Muslim ethnics in countries such as Chechnya, whom the Soviets might have attempted to eliminate through “ethnic cleansing,” and Middle Eastern countries such as Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE); these could have provided financial aid to assist insurgent uprisings. In an ironic twist, the United States, more fearful of the possibility of a nuclear attack from the Soviet Union, would have lent its support to the MuslimSoviet struggle through the formation of a U.S.-Muslim Alliance. This alliance would have included major Middle Eastern countries such as

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Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Jordan, thereby negating any potential threat from radical Muslim splinter groups. In other words, with more moderate Muslim leadership throughout the Middle East, Muslim hard-line fanatics would have been unable to push their cause and spread their fanaticism to other countries. At best, radical groups would have been isolated without a base of operations; there would have been no al Qaeda. Despite its strategic alliance with Middle Eastern countries, to reduce its dependence on petroleum, the United States would have begun four major initiatives. First, it would have begun to tap the Strategic Petroleum Reserves, the emergency supply of crude stored underground along the coast of the Gulf of Mexico. Second, it would have begun to ration gasoline for nonessential use; third, it would have begun to dismiss opposition from ecology groups about burning fossil fuel, claiming that it was in the national interest; and finally, it would have begun drilling the oil shale deposits in eastern Utah, western Colorado, and southern Wyoming despite protests from hardcore environmental groups. After sitting on the sidelines for some eight years, China might have invaded Taiwan, the Republic of China (ROC). With the West in turmoil over oil shortages, China could have invaded the ROC with no military resistance from the United States and other Western European countries. Overnight China would have installed a regional governor

The city of Taipei, Taiwan, which might have been invaded by China in an alternate history based on a successful Soviet coup. (Shutterstock)

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in Taipei, who would report directly to Beijing. Now both Hong Kong and Taiwan would have been under mainland China’s control. In 2000, moderate Muslims leaders throughout the Middle East would have acted in unison to remove the Taliban from Afghanistan. The harvesting of opium poppies and heroin trafficking would have created millions of dependent drug users in the moderate Muslim countries. Moreover, it would have been likely that the suicide attack on the twin towers would have not happened in New York City on September 11, 2001. In an attempt to maintain stability in the region, moderate Muslims would have been working cooperatively through their respective security agencies to warn the United States about any Muslim terrorist cells that would have planned an attack on Western countries. The strategic decision to invade Iraq, on March 20, 2003, while on many U.S. military planners’ agenda, would have been shelved despite any discussions of possible weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Supported by U.S. covert funding to pro-democratic underground groups, a groundswell would have taken place in both Iraq and Iran to overthrow Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein and the Iranian ayatollahs. World tension would be high because of the constant saber rattling for a nuclear war by the Soviet Union. But despite the rhetoric of nuclear wars, the 2004 U.S. presidential election would most likely have had a different outcome. Without the 9/11 terrorism and the American public’s outrage, President George W. Bush would have lost the election to a more liberal, non-neoconservative democratic presidential candidate, Senator John Kerry. With the election of Kerry, U.S. domestic policy would have seen a major shift in focus—more taxes and spending on domestic issues and a drastic reduction in the U.S. military budget. Joseph C. Santora

Discussion Questions 1. What do you think was the major reason for the failure, in actual history, of the coup attempt against Gorbachev? Would the coup have succeeded if the plotters had executed Gorbachev rather than holding him at his dacha? 2. If the hard-liners had succeeded in their coup, what measures could they have taken to restore the Soviet economy? Do you think they would have continued the effort to transform the economy into a freemarket one, or would they have attempted to restore a state-planned model? 3. What effect would a reinvigorated and aggressive Soviet Union in the 1990s have had upon U.S. domestic politics? Do you believe that George H. W. Bush would have succeeded in the election of 1992, rather than Bill Clinton? 4. If the Soviet Union had backed the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, what effect would that have had when Saddam decided to occupy Kuwait?

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5. Do you think that the hard-line coup plotters would have been more likely to remove Boris Yeltsin from power or to cooperate with him?

Bibliography and Further Reading Breslauer, George W. “Evaluating Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders.” In Archie Brown and Lilia Shevtsova, eds., Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Putin: Political Leadership in Russia’s Transition. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001, pp. 45–66. Brown, Archie. The Gorbachev Factor. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1997. Brown, Archie, and Lilia Shevtsova, eds. Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Putin: Political Leadership in Russia’s Transition. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001. Cohen, Ariel, “From Yeltsin to Putin.” Policy Review (April/May 2000). Goldman, Marshall I. “Putin and the Oligarchs” Foreign Affairs (November/December 2004). Gorbachev, Mikhail. The August Coup: The Truth and the Lessons. New York: HarperCollins, 1991. Gorbachev, Mikhail. Gorbachev: On My Country and the World. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. Gorbachev, Mikhail, and Zdenek Mlynar. Conversations with Gorbachev on Perestroika, the Prague Spring, and the Crossroads of Socialism. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002. Graham, Thomas E., Jr. Russia’s Decline and Uncertain Recovery. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002. Kaiser, Robert G. Why Gorbachev Happened: His Triumphs and His Failures. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991. Kotkin, Stephen. Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse 1970–2000. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. Kotkin, Stephen. “Trashcanistan.” The New Republic (April 15, 2002). Laqueur, Walter. “The Empire Strikes Out.” The New Republic (September 16 and 23, 1991). Moynihan, Brian. The Russian Century: A History of the Last Hundred Years. New York: Random House, 1994. Shevtsova, Lilia. Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Putin: Political Leadership in Russia’s Transition. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001. Shevtsova, Lilia. Putin’s Russia. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005. Shleifer, Andrei, and Daniel Treisman. “A Normal Country.” Foreign Affairs (March–April, 2004). White, Stephen. After Gorbachev. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Iran-Contra Affair

7

What if Oliver North had succeeded in his arms-hostages deal and used funds for an anti-Castro coup in Cuba?

INTRODUCTION The Iran-Contra affair represented one of the most significant conflicts between a U.S. presidential administration and Congress in the twentieth century. Ultimately, it involved multiple investigations, court convictions, presidential pardons, and political cover-ups. The genesis of the Iran-Contra Affair was the seizure of power in Nicaragua in 1979 by the Sandinistas, a Marxist group supported by Cuba. The overthrow of the previous dictatorship was widely supported by the Nicaraguan people. The Sandinistas initially ruled through a fiveperson directorate. Three members were moderate, including Violeta Chamorro, the widow of a widely respected editor who had been assassinated by the previous government. Shortly afterward, however, the moderates were ousted from the government, and the two radical members—most significantly Daniel Ortega—assumed complete power. The Sandinistas also seized control of television and radio stations and began censorship of the major newspapers. Although having promised to hold national elections, once in power the Sandinistas refused to permit them for a considerable period. Once the regime was firmly in power, it did hold somewhat controlled elections in November 1984 in which Ortega had no problem in winning the presidency. In October 1985, Ortega declared a state of emergency under which most civil rights were suspended. Although the previous regime was dictatorial and extremely corrupt, and it is fair to say that most Nicaraguans were very happy to see it go, the prospects of another communist regime in Latin America was viewed with horror by the incoming Ronald Reagan administration in 1981. Reagan had already emphasized his opposition to the Sandinista government during the 1980 presidential campaign. The U.S. government’s attitude was even further hardened when the new Sandinista government permitted Cuba to ship weapons through Nicaragua to Marxist rebels in El Salvador. The Sandinistas also signed a number of security agreements

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CHAPTER 7

U.S. Power

IN CONTEXT

up, and restricted Soviet access to high-technology equipment. The second area was in nuclear weapons. What had been a standard policy for many years: mutually assured destruction or MAD, in which each side was held hostage to each other’s nuclear stockpile, began to be reexamined by Reagan’s group of nuclear strategists.The most significant proposal in the nuclear realm made by Reagan was the Strategic Defense Initiative, dubbed “Star Wars” by opponents to the plan. The intention was to develop a system that could destroy incoming nuclear missiles before they could impact in the United States. The practicality of this concept— which is still being tested and now deployed in limited areas—is subject to considerable debate, but its proposal significantly changed the nuclear equation. The final major area was in support of anticommunist movements around the world. This included covert equipment and training support of the

The Reagan administration entered office with a clear goal of increasing U.S. power in the world. After a period in which Nicaragua had fallen to communism (at least from Reagan’s viewpoint); the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, Iran, had been seized by Iranian students and the embassy personnel held as hostages; the Soviets had invaded Afghanistan; and other setbacks to U.S. international interests had seemed to become almost routine, Reagan enunciated a policy of America “standing tall.” This was a key plank of his election campaign, and once in office he tried to implement this philosophy. Much of the administration’s attention was devoted to the Soviet Union. U.S. officials emphasized that at the very least, they were intent on stopping further Soviet advances. At best, they wanted to roll back Soviet gains. There were three areas in which the United States was to confront the Soviet Union. The first was economic. The United States sharply increased defense spending, with the expectation that Moscow could not keep

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A map of Central America shows the strategic location of Nicaragua in relation to its neighbors and the United States. (Frontier Maps)

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IN CONTEXT

U.S. Power (Continued)

resistance movement to the Soviets in Afghanistan and the Contras in Nicaragua. Less dramatically, the United States also provided funding and diplomatic backing for the Solidarity movement in Poland. On the other side of the equation, U.S. troops provided assistance for governments facing insurgencies,most notably in El Salvador.The United States also invaded the island of Grenada in 1983 to remove a communist government that had seized power in a coup. Although there were many factors, both internal and external, involved, by the end of Reagan’s eight years in office, the control of Moscow over Eastern Europe clearly was in sharp decline.By the end of the presidency of George H. W. Bush, the Soviet Union itself had collapsed.Whether this implosion of Soviet power was due more to Reagan’s assertive policies than to inherently internal problems remains subject to considerable debate, but many credit Reagan with “having won the Cold War.” Beyond the anticommunist campaign, the administration found itself very involved in the Middle East.The civil war in Lebanon was a particularly difficult issue for the United States. The seizing

of Western hostages and the impact of the war on the overall Middle Eastern peace process forced the United States to pay attention to the deteriorating situation in Lebanon. Unfortunately, the results were bloody. The U.S. embassy in Beirut was bombed. Later, U.S. Marines were sent to Lebanon as a part of a multinational peacekeeping force. On October 23, 1983, their barracks in Beirut were hit by a suicide bomber, and 241 marines were killed. Shortly after, the remaining marines were withdrawn from Lebanon. The long Iran-Iraq War also caused diplomatic problems for the United States.Neither country’s government was to the U.S. government’s liking. The Reagan administration vacillated in its support, leaning toward both Iran and Iraq as the fortunes of war changed.Overall, though, the United States tended to support Iraq more than Iran,especially after a series of Iraqi defeats that indicated the possibility of an Iranian military victory. In the end, the Iran-Iraq War ended with both countries essentially in the same position as when they started, although both suffered immense casualties and damage to their economies.

with the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries, and invited Cuban advisers to work in Nicaragua. Once in office, Reagan ordered further U.S. government activities against the Sandinistas, including covert CIA activities. He also stressed that the United States supported the emerging anti-Sandinista insurgent group, the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance, better known as the Contras. The initial core of the Contras was former members of the Nicaraguan National Guard, a force not known for its democratic credentials. In fairness, however, as time went on, the membership of the Contras became significantly broader, including some heroes of the resistance to the previous regime who had also become disillusioned with the Sandinista regime. The Republican administration’s goals toward Nicaragua ran into almost immediate opposition from the Democratic-controlled Congress. The battle between the two branches soon centered around money. The administration tried to gain significant funding to support the Contras. Congress generally fought to reduce the amount of money requested by the executive branch. The main tools used by the congressional opponents of the Contras were the so-called Boland Amendments. The first, passed in 1982, prohibited the Central Intelligence Agency from spending any money to overthrow the government of Nicaragua. This conflict between the two branches of government continued throughout the Reagan presidency.

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KEY CONCEPT •

Terms Defined

Boland Amendments: The Boland Amendments, sponsored by Democratic congressman Edward P. Boland, were the congressional measures passed to limit U.S. activities in Nicaragua. The first Boland Amendment, passed in December 1982, read: “None of the funds provided in the Act may be used by the Central Intelligence Agency or the Department of Defense to furnish military equipment, military training or advice, or other support for military activities, to any group or individual, not part of a country’s armed forces, for the purpose of overthrowing the government of Nicaragua or provoking a military exchange between Nicaragua and Honduras.” The second Boland Amendment, passed in October 1984, was a bit more expansive: “During fiscal year 1985, no funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be

•

obligated or expended for the purpose of ... supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual.” Contras: The Contras were a CIA-backed guerrilla group that fought against the Sandinista government. The movement initially was almost exclusively made up of former members of the Nicaraguan National Guard of the ousted Somoza regime.With U.S. prodding, the Contras expanded their membership base (including some former Sandinistas who had become disenchanted with the regime), but the various leaders and their followers continued to have problems cooperating with each other. Overall, the Contras steadily improved the effectiveness of their guerrilla operations but never really represented a major threat to the Sandinista government.

The battle over money reached its first crisis in December 1983. Congress capped U.S. spending for the Contras at $24 million, a figure that the administration felt would starve the movement of basic resources. National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane suggested the possibility of encouraging other countries to contribute to the Contras. There was already some precedent for this: in 1983, the CIA and Defense Department, in an operation code-named Tipped Kettle, received $10 million of Palestine Liberation Organization weapons and ammunition that the Israeli Defense Forces had seized in Lebanon. All these munitions, with a second batch in summer 1984, were shipped to the Contras. The South African government initially indicated interest in providing support. As a CIA officer arrived in South Africa, however, word was leaked back home that the CIA had mined harbors in Nicaragua. The political fallout resulted in the United States dropping any efforts with South Africa. In May 1984, Saudi Arabia agreed to give $1 million a month to the Contras, a sum that later was doubled. McFarlane put one of his assistants in the National Security Council, Marine Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, in charge of getting the Saudi funds to the Contras. North provided the number of a secure Cayman Islands bank account (where financial controls were minimal) and the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States began passing the money to that account. From that point, North would play a pivotal role in the Iran-Contra affair.

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KEY CONCEPT

Terms Defined (Continued)

The “Enterprise”: When Oliver North set up the system for covert support for the Contras, it was nicknamed the “Enterprise.”This system tried to cover all aspects of raising funds, moving the money, purchasing weapons and supplies, and delivering this equipment, including by use of covert aerial resupply. National Security Council: The National Security Council (NSC) normally has served as a body for processing reports and coordinating foreign policy for the office of the president. Iran-Contra represented a sharp departure from the NSC’s normal procedures of coordination rather than field operations. The NSC should not be confused with the National Security Agency, which is the primary communications intelligence and security agency of the United States. Sandinistas: The Sandinistas were a socialist and Marxist group that overthrew the Somoza regime in 1979. The Somoza family had ruled Nicaragua as a dictatorship since 1937.The Somoza govern-

ments were very corrupt and ruled through intimidation and brutality. In response, activists formed the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in 1961, named after an almost legendary guerrilla leader of the 1930s, Augusto Sandino. Although the FSLN did not have much success initially, many moderates became so disgusted with the Somoza regime that they were willing to temporarily join forces to remove Somoza. After the alliance between the FSLN and other groups ousted the regime, the Sandinistas began political maneuvers that left them in almost complete control. By the end of the 1980s, the Sandinistas felt sufficiently confident in their power base that they agreed to hold open elections. This was an ill-advised gamble, and the Sandinistas lost the elections to a candidate backed with U.S. political and economic support. Since then, the Sandinistas have remained in the political process, and Daniel Ortega was elected president of Nicaragua in 2006.

The Saudi support was a closely held secret in the administration. Initially, apparently only McFarlane, Reagan, Vice President George H. W. Bush, and North knew the details of the thirdcountry funding for the Contras. Even within cabinet meetings that discussed the situation of the Contras, the foreign financial support was kept from the cabinet secretaries. The situation grew even more complicated in October 1984, when Congress passed even further restrictions, prohibiting both the CIA and the defense department from providing financial support to the Contras. In an effort to skirt these restrictions, the administration moved its support structure for the Contras to the National Security Council (NSC). The administration made the (later) claim that since the NSC was not connected to either the CIA or the defense department, it technically was obeying the will of Congress. The NSC received CIA intelligence that it then would pass to the Contras and became deeply involved in fund transfers for the group. It also began to establish a network of “private” citizens—many of whom were former military or CIA—to assist in buying weapons and providing logistics support.

Oliver North in 2004 as a correspondent for Fox News during the Iraq War. (U.S. Army)

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North and the NSC quickly tried to expand U.S. support systems. They sent retired Army Major General John Singlaub to meet with Korean officials to request money and convinced the Saudis to double their contributions. North also coordinated support for private fund-raisers in their efforts to solicit donations for the Contras. A private group called the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty was formed, and North gave frequent briefings to potential contributors, along with offering photo opportunities for contributors with the president. In the more official realm, they also supported diplomatic efforts to increase support from countries neighboring Nicaragua. As part of the latter effort, the NSC worked closely with a number of ambassadors and CIA officials in the area. Solicitations of donations from other countries’ governments continued steadily. In mid-1985, Taiwan donated $2 million after talks with North. Other approaches were made to China, South Korea, Singapore, Chile, Venezuela, Central American countries, Britain, and Brunei. The deal with Brunei turned into a fiasco. Assistant Secretary of State Elliot Abrams met with the Brunei foreign minister in London. The foreign minister agreed to provide $10 million, and Abrams provided him with the number of the Swiss bank account that was being used by the NSC for Contra funding. Unfortunately, Fawn Hall, North’s secretary, apparently had transposed two numbers on the index card with the bank account number that had been provided to Abrams. As a result, the money was wired to the wrong account. Retired Air Force Major General Richard Secord, who worked closely with North, also established a “private” aerial resupply system with its own aircraft, pilots, and warehouses for use for covert air drops inside Nicaragua. These aircraft were based in Honduras (until later banned), Costa Rica, and the Ilopango Salvadoran Air Force air base in El Salvador. Costa Rica proved to be a problem when Costa Rican president Oscar Arias threatened to close down a “private” airstrip in the country and to publicize its connection with both the U.S. government and the Contras. Although the United States temporarily muted the Costa Rican government, on September 24, 1986, the Costa Rican minister of public security, Hernan Garron, announced the “discovery” and seizure of the airfield. The United States claimed that all the operations of the airfield were run by private individuals, but few seemed convinced. Between April and October 1986, aircraft flew more than ninety missions in the north and south of Nicaragua. The planes delivered several hundred thousand pounds of weapons, ammunition, food, and other cargo to the Contras. A number of flights, however, had to be aborted due to mechanical difficulties, and the flight crews frequently complained about the operating conditions of their airplanes. The situation got particularly complicated when Congress authorized funding for humanitarian aid to the Contras under the Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office of the State Department. In many cases, the same aircraft and supply warehouses were used for both the legal shipments and the covert air operations. Also, the administration continued to push Congress for formal funding. By the summer of 1986, Reagan had convinced congressional leaders to at least consider an appropriation of $100 million for the Contras. Secord’s business partner was Albert Hakim, an expatriate Iranian. Hakim set up a series of dummy companies and a network of bank

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accounts. Front companies included Lake Resources, Udall Corporation, Energy Resources International, Hyde Park, and Amalgamated Commercial Enterprises. This maze of companies and accounts became nicknamed “The Enterprise” by Secord and “Project Democracy” by North. The picture was even further blurred with the addition of other bank accounts and companies involved with supporting the Contras. These included GeoMiliTech Consultants Corporation, headed by retired Major General Singlaub, which purchased weapons in Eastern Europe. Ultimately, most of the deals flowed through bank accounts established by Adolfo Calero, initially political chief of the main Contra group, the Nicaraguan Democratic Force, and one of the three-man directorate of the United Nicaraguan Opposition. Among his other dealings, Calero provided North with hundreds of thousands of dollars in unsigned traveler’s checks to be used as a slush fund, some of which North used for personal expenses. Hakim also provided a trust fund for North’s children. The arms network of the Enterprise operated in the shadier areas of the weapons business. The initial purchase of Chinese-made weapons was from dealers in Canada and Portugal. Later buys were made in Portugal, Poland, and other countries in Europe. Any major shipment of military weapons requires what are called end-user certificates. This document indicates that purchases are being made by a national government and the weapons are exclusively for that country’s security forces. Clearly, such documentation could not be used for the Contras. As a result, North had to obtain false end-user certificates from Guatemala. Shipment of the weapons was by two small cargo ships, the Erria and the Iceland Saga, owned by the Enterprise. The second half of what became the Iran-Contra Affair took place halfway across the world. Lebanon was in the midst of a violent civil war. One of the primary players was the Iranian-backed Hezbollah (“Party of God”). Hostage taking was a common tactic, and Hezbollah was very active in seizing hostages. This group held several Americans who had been working in Lebanon. Of particular concern, William Buckley, the CIA station chief in Beirut, was abducted by Islamic Jihad, a Hezbollahallied group, in March 1984. Reagan was particularly concerned with getting Buckley’s release, and privately made it one of his major priorities. Since Iran clearly had close connections with Hezbollah, the United States placed that country on its list of states supporting terrorism. As such, the United States refused to have formal dealings with Iran and imposed on it a series of sanctions, especially on weapons. All this occurred while Iran was in a vicious war with Iraq, in which the Iranians had huge losses of men and materiel. These losses suggested a possible approach to the hostage issue among several members of the U.S. administration. They argued that it might be possible to provide some needed weapons to Iran in exchange for the release of the hostages and secondarily, for improved relations with Iran. Although both the secretary of defense and secretary of state argued against this idea, eventually Reagan approved the concept. Note that this violated the Arms Export Control Act, which requires both presidential authorization and notification to Congress for arms sales to certain countries.. Initially, the Israelis were the actual providers of the weapons. On August 20, 1985, the Israelis delivered one hundred TOW antitank missiles

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to Iran with the understanding that four hostages would be released. However, no releases occurred. Another shipment was made in September, and Benjamin Weir, a Presbyterian minister, was set free. The next phase involved Iranian requests for HAWK surface-to-air missiles. This process involved North as a middleman. Essentially, the deal made was to deliver a series of HAWK shipments, with each shipment resulting in the release of a specified number of hostages. The plan was to provide 120 HAWKs in return for five American and one French hostage. The initial shipment of HAWKs turned into a fiasco. The aircraft flying from Israel did not receive proper clearances and was consistently refused overflight and landing rights. When the shipment finally arrived in Iran, the missiles were not the type wanted by the Iranians, and in some ways what was worse from the Iranian perspective, they still bore Israeli markings. As a result, the U.S. officials involved with the weapons transfers decided that they would ship the weapons directly rather than use the Israelis as go-betweens. U.S. efforts proved to be equally unsatisfactory. In total, the United States and Israel provided 2,004 TOW antitank missiles, eighteen HAWK surface-to-air missiles (all but one was returned as unsatisfactory by the Iranians), a quantity of HAWK spare parts, and a number of intelligence reports to Iran. In return, three hostages were released, but two others were seized while the process was ongoing. Several persons involved with what became known as the “arms for hostages” program were of questionable background, especially an Iranian named Manucher Ghorbanifar, who ran an import-export business in Paris and who seemed to be mistrusted by all sides. The CIA in fact had put out a so-called burn notice on him, which warned all governmental officials not to have dealings with him. Despite this, he was the key go-between in many of the negotiations. The other curious aspect of the talks with Iran was that figures from the Enterprise, despite being in theory private businessmen, in effect began to represent the U.S. government in talks with the Iranians. The funding issues surrounding the weapons shipments to Iran soon began to overlap with the Contra support. In November 1985, the Enterprise had $800,000 remaining from the $1-million Israeli deposit for the initial HAWK shipments. When the Israelis expressed no desire for the return of the money, North decided that the money could be shifted to the Contra supply operations. When TOW shipments started, North charged the Iranians $10,000 per missile, while reimbursing the defense department the actual cost of $3,700 per missile. The profits were diverted to the Enterprise for Contra funding. Needless to say, when the Iranians discovered the markup that the Enterprise was charging them, they expressed considerable displeasure.

Two separate but related incidents represented the turning point in the Iran-Contra affair. The first happened on October 5, 1986. An Enterprisecontrolled C-123 transport aircraft loaded with military supplies for the

Coup in Cuba? 133

Contras was shot down over southern Nicaragua. The plane had a threeman crew, pilot William Cooper, copilot Buzz Sawyer, and cargo “kicker” Eugene Hasenfus. Cooper and Sawyer were killed in the crash. Hasenfus, the only crew member wearing a parachute, bailed out and was immediately captured by Sandinista soldiers. U.S. government officials quickly began putting out a cover story for the aircraft. They denied that the United States had any official connection with the air supply effort, arguing that the airplane had been contracted by the Contras. When this seemed not to work, the official story became that U.S. private donors had paid for the effort. Persons conducting covert operations are trained to remove any incriminating documents before they go on a mission. Whether because of a lack of training or carelessness, the flight crew did not follow these procedures. The Sandinistas found an ID card on Cooper’s body from the former (and well-known) CIA proprietary air service, Southern Air Transport. Hasenfus carried an ID card issued by the Salvadoran air force stating that he was an adviser to the “Grupo U.S.A.” in El Salvador. It should be noted that the shoot-down of the plane occurred as a congressional conference committee was reconciling the $100 million for the Contras that had been requested by Reagan. The second issue was fallout from a May 1986 conference in Tehran, Iran. A U.S. delegation including National Security Adviser McFarlane, North, and one Israeli representative traveled to Iran using fake Irish passports and on a disguised Israeli aircraft. Onboard their aircraft was one pallet of HAWK missile parts. Although they expected substantive discussions with senior Iranian officials, only lower-level officials would meet with them. The group remained in Tehran for three and a half days, but basically accomplished nothing. As they left, North told McFarlane that the effort was not entirely wasted, since funds from the weapons sales were being used for Contra support. This apparently was the first that McFarlane had heard about this, and he reportedly was stunned. The abortive meeting may simply have entered classified files as a historical footnote, especially given its lack of achievement. On November 3, 1986, the Lebanese magazine Al Shiraa broke the story of the trip. The Islamic Jihad also announced that it had released an American hostage based on “overtures” from the United States. The next day, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the Iranian parliament speaker, confirmed in a speech that the visit had occurred, together with details. Exactly why the Iranians chose to release this information when they did is unclear, but it probably was due to internal political struggles within the regime and perhaps anger at being overcharged for the weapons shipped to them. Whatever the reason, the leak created a firestorm.

ACTUAL HISTORY Almost immediately after the crash of the plane in Nicaragua, members of the Enterprise began damage control. In cooperation with the CIA, all the remaining aircraft were flown to a remote airfield. A large pit was dug, the airplanes were pushed into it, and blown up. The crews then burned

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the remaining wreckage—which reportedly burned for days—and then buried all of it. Beyond the destruction of potential evidence, many historians say the administration began a political cover-up. U.S. officials convinced Contra officials to claim that the aircraft belonged to them and that there was no U.S. government connection. They also argued that even if Americans were involved—which clearly was the case with the capture of Hasenfus—they worked for a private company run by Singlaub. It did not help the administration’s case when Singlaub denounced this assertion as a lie. In October 1986, officials also testified before Congress that the government was not involved in resupplying the Contras. Specifically, CIA officials stated that the CIA was not involved in resupply missions. Although North and the NSC clearly had the lead role in these operations, the CIA also was very much involved in support. A similar effort was made not to reveal the dealings with the Iranians. Secretary of State George Shultz argued privately that the arms for hostage arrangements should be publicly acknowledged—although it is not clear that he was aware of their extent—but the administration decided to follow the advice of National Security Adviser John Poindexter (who had served as McFarlane’s deputy from 1983 to December 1985, when he took over McFarlane’s position). Poindexter argued against disclosure. The administration’s initial position was that its officials were not dealing with terrorists—technically true, but Iran had been officially declared by the state department a state supporter of terrorism—and that everything that had been done complied with all laws. Reagan also declared in a press conference that the United States had had nothing to do with other countries shipping weapons to Iran. Since the Israeli role in arms shipments had already been partially disclosed, Reagan had to quickly backtrack on his statement. As the various claims and counterclaims began to swirl within the administration, fissures began appearing. Poindexter and CIA Director William Casey developed a chronology of events that was clearly erroneous. Once Secretary of State Shultz saw the direction that key officials were taking, he threatened to resign. In an effort to try to reconcile the internal divisions and to try to find out what actually had happened, Attorney General Edwin Meese launched an internal investigation. Although criticized for procedural problems and for its clear motivation of protecting the president, his investigation revealed one key piece of information. His aides discovered a memo in North’s files stating that funds from the arms sales to Iran were being diverted to the Contras. Once this memo was uncovered, Meese was concerned that the merging of the two operations could ultimately lead to the impeachment of Reagan. On November 25, Reagan publicly outlined the broad outlines of the Iran-Contra affair in a critical press conference. Reagan stated that he was not fully informed of the activities and dodged culpability. He then announced that North was being relieved of his duties and that Poindexter had asked to be relieved. As some details of what had happened began emerging, a series of investigations started. On November 26, Reagan established a Special

Coup in Cuba? 135

Review Board that became known as the Tower Commission. Its members included Senator John Tower, Edmund Muskie, and Brent Scowcroft. Attorney General Meese also started a criminal investigation of funding diversions. Additionally, the House and Senate established a joint committee, the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition and the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran. In many ways, the major outcome of the committee’s hearings was to make Oliver North a hero in the eyes of many. Although he admitted to many violations of the law, his testimony came across as that of an officer who was devoted to his duty. He was telegenic in his uniform bedecked with ribbons and he generally appeared to be sincere in his beliefs. All of this was magnified by the generally poor performance of his congressional questioners. A more significant and broader investigation was conducted by Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh. On December 4, 1986, Attorney General Meese requested that an independent counsel be appointed, and Walsh was selected by a three-judge panel. Walsh was a member of the Republican Party and had previously been a federal judge and deputy attorney general. He began his work by convening a grand jury on January 28, 1987, to secure indictments against suspects. As is typical with many complicated legal proceedings, Walsh began with the less-important players. He offered plea bargains to two minor

President Ronald Reagan meeting with the Tower Commission in the Oval Office. From left to right: John Tower, Edmund Muskie, Brent Scowcroft, Peter Wallison, Clark McFadden, Charles Brower, Rhett Dawson, David Abshire, and Reagan. (Ronald Reagan Presidential Library)

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ANOTHER VIE W

In Favor of the Administration

The conventional historical view of the Iran-Contra affair is that members of the Reagan administration willfully violated the law in a single-minded pursuit of their ill-advised goals. Deliberately evading the will of Congress, administration officials acted as “cowboys,” conducting operations that worked against the public interest. Beyond the figures such as North, McFarlane, and Poindexter, other senior officials compounded the offenses by trying to cover up the illegal activities. This may have extended as high as President Reagan and Vice President Bush. Administration officials certainly lied to Congress and remained largely uncooperative during all the investigations. Some defenders of what went on in Iran-Contra marshal some arguments in favor of the administration. First, although the Boland Amendments prohibited any support to the Contras, it did not provide any punishments for violating their proscriptions. As such, they served mostly to indicate

the will of Congress. With a Democratic Congress and a Republican administration, the Boland Amendments could be viewed as a political struggle rather than optimal policy. The second defense posited for Iran-Contra is that there are significant difficulties if Congress gets too deeply involved in covert operations. Covert operations must by their very nature be very limited in the number of persons who know their details so as to avoid compromise. In general, the more people who know about covert operations, the greater are the chances that there will be leaks. Congress typically has not been known for its airtight protection of classified information. Protecting highly sensitive operations that involve people’s lives may require bending the rules, including the prospects of giving Congress false or misleading information. Connected with this is the broader issue of who should make foreign policy.This has been an almost continuous debate in American politics. Although

people in Iran-Contra. By pleading guilty with minimal punishment—a $50 fine and two years’ probation—the two defendants agreed to testify against others. Walsh also got a misdemeanor plea from Robert McFarlane. On March 16, 1988, Walsh indicted North, Poindexter, Secord, and Hakim (Secord’s business partner) on twenty-three criminal counts, including conspiracy, obstruction of Congress, destruction of government documents, fraud against the U.S. government, and theft of government property. Although Walsh wanted to try all his “big” defendants together, the judge in the case ruled that they required separate trials. North was tried first on twelve charges. He was found guilty on three: falsifying chronologies about Iran-Contra, destroying evidence, and accepting an illegal gratuity. He was acquitted on the other charges. Walsh immediately ran into a problem with the conviction, however. North had been granted immunity for his congressional testimony. Although Walsh tried to “immunize” his case from North’s prior testimony, an appeals court ruled that the case was tainted by the public statements that North had made. As a result, North’s conviction was overturned. Poindexter, who was convicted on five felony charges, faced a similar outcome, with his conviction overturned on appeal on the same grounds. The legal scorecard for Iran-Contra was not pleasant for the prosecutors, who spent at least $50 million and devoted several years to the cases, with the final report released in January 1994. Elliot Abrams, the assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, pleaded guilty to two counts

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ANOTHER VIE W

In Favor of the Administration (Continued)

the “book answer” is that the executive branch makes and implements foreign policy and the legislative branch provides the funding required for implementing the policies, it has rarely been that clean. The Boland Amendments are an example of the complications. Although technically only dealing with the funding issues, they essentially blocked the administration from supporting the Contras, a key foreign policy goal of the administration. In regard to the arms-for-hostage activities, some have argued that despite mistakes made in implementation, the underlying goals were laudable. Certainly, trying to free hostages who were being held in poor conditions—and two of whom were tortured and killed—was the primary focus (at least initially), together with the more generic goal of gaining some access to potential Iranian moderates. Any talks with the Iranians would be extraordinarily sensitive and would almost certainly collapse given any form of publicity. Although contradicting official U.S. policy, these

talks probably would have more chance of success as long as outsiders did not suspect they were going on. The final issue for many supporters of the IranContra defendants had less to do with the actual initial activities and more to do with the extended investigations that followed. Independent Counsel Walsh’s investigation went on through three presidential administrations. Walsh’s opponents (overwhelmingly Republican) argued that his indictments and prosecutions essentially became an exercise in futility, consuming not only taxpayers’ funding but also nearly bankrupting the defendants. Also, some charged that Walsh affected the outcome of the 1992 Bush reelection campaign against Bill Clinton with his release of documents shortly before election day suggesting that Bush may have known more as vice president about Iran-Contra than he had admitted. Although Walsh vehemently denied that this was his intention, it appeared to have had some impact.

of withholding information from Congress, and he was sentenced to probation and community service. Robert McFarlane also pleaded guilty to withholding information. Two CIA officials were found guilty of withholding information and perjury. All received presidential pardons from George H. W. Bush on December 24, 1992. Beyond the domestic implications of the Iran-Contra affair, complications continued both with Iran and Nicaragua. Hezbollah continued to seize hostages in Lebanon. William Buckley, the CIA station in Beirut and the focus for many of the administration’s concerns, had in fact been tortured to death by his kidnappers before the arms deals started. Terry Waite, a British envoy from the Anglican Church, who traveled to Lebanon to negotiate a hostage release was himself abducted in 1987. In August 1987, an American journalist, Charles Glass, managed to escape his abductors after sixty-two days of captivity. In February 1988, Lieutenant Colonel William Higgins, a U.S. Marine Corps officer serving with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Lebanon, was seized. After being tortured, he was executed by hanging; his kidnappers publicly released a video of his murder. Beginning in early 1990, Hezbollah and other groups began releasing foreign hostages, with the last survivors returned in December 1991. In Nicaragua, small-scale Contra operations continued. In March 1988, the Contras and Sandinistas held face-to-face talks that resulted in a temporary cease-fire. The Sandinista government took a major gamble in February 1990. Feeling confident of its support among the workers

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and peasants, it agreed to internationally supervised open elections. The opposition party was the National Opposition Union (UNO). The United States provided both financial and significant political support to the UNO, and tacitly made it clear that future U.S. assistance to Nicaragua would depend on the Sandinistas leaving power. After a very active political campaign, the Sandinistas were stunned when UNO won a majority in the National Assembly. The head of the UNO, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro was elected president. After assuming office, she reduced the strength of the government forces and supervised demobilization of the Contras. Chamorro made one early decision that created a crisis. She retained Humberto Ortega, Daniel Ortega’s brother, as the chief of the army. This angered many Contra supporters and caused some Contra forces to re-arm. The situation escalated in 1993 as some Contras seized thirtyeight hostages in an effort to drive Ortega to resign. Sandinista supporters then kidnapped the Nicaraguan vice president and thirty-two others. Both groups of hostages were released by August 1993, and Chamorro promised to remove Ortega. Although the immediate crisis was averted, Nicaragua continued to have serious economic difficulties, and there was a huge political gap between Sandinista supporters and Contra supporters. Daniel Ortega ran again for president in 1996, but lost to Jose Arnoldo Aleman Lacayo, a conservative candidate. In the 2001 elections, another conservative defeated Ortega once again. A fresh political crisis emerged in 2004–2005 when President Enrique Bolanos’s Geyer brought corruption and embezzlement charges against Aleman, his predecessor. Members of Bolanos’s own party in the National Assembly formed an alliance with the Sandinistas in an attempt to force Bolanos’s resignation. At the very least, his opponents tried to limit his powers through a series of constitutional amendments. In October 2005, Bolanos and Ortega reached an agreement in which the amendments would take effect in 2007 after Bolanos has left office. The National Assembly agreed to this compromise.

ALTERNATE HISTORY If the Contra resupply aircraft had not been shot down and the diversion of funds from weapons sales to Iran had not been made public, the Reagan administration’s efforts to keep the Contras in business might well have turned out very differently. Most directly, the administration had convinced Congress to at least consider seriously the resumption of aid to the Contras. It was probable, if not guaranteed, that Congress would have provided up to $100 million for the Contras. If the persons running the Contra operation had had access to this money, the profits from the arms sales and contributions from other countries would still have remained available for use in secret bank accounts. What might have been done with these secret funds? One possibility would have been to go to the source of what the Reagan administration

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viewed as the root cause of instability in Central America: Fidel Castro’s regime in Cuba. This is how the situation might have played itself out. Florida had many anti-Castro Cuban émigrés. Some were veterans of the earlier Bay of Pigs operation, captured by Cuban forces and then released after the United States provided bulldozers and other supplies to the Cuban government. Others had been taught since they were children to hate the Castro regime. These émigrés would have provided an ideal recruiting pool to use against Cuba. Some in fact already belonged to groups sworn to bring Castro down by whatever means necessary. A number of them had gotten into trouble with local law enforcement services in Florida for conducting paramilitary training in the state, using military-style weapons and training in guerrilla tactics. Shortly after Congress approved the funding for the Contras, Admiral Poindexter could have proposed to the White House that the Cuban émigrés be freshly organized for anti-Castro operations. Both the secretary of state and secretary of defense would have objected, concerned about the possibility of diplomatic and military fallout, but the director of Central Intelligence would have pushed hard for the plan. Among his arguments would have been that Castro’s removal had been a long-standing goal of U.S. administrations dating back to the Kennedy presidency and that if the plan were successful, Reagan would receive considerable political credit. After listening to the competing arguments, Reagan could have decided to approve the program and could have signed a secret Presidential Finding authorizing it. Since the U.S. involvement would have to be covert—that is, an operation for which the U.S. government could deny (however implausibly) involvement—the administration would have decided to rely on the CIA with coordination through the National Security Council, since the NSC was already deeply involved in Central America. This decision would have been made easier by the military commanders’ reluctance to provide troops for this type of operation. Although the generals certainly would have followed orders if given by the president, they always could find ways of slowing things down through bureaucratic inertia and burying programs in paperwork. As a result, the military services basically would have been cut out of the planning and execution of the operation to remove Castro. The Enterprise had more than $7 million in its private bank accounts. Since it had had problems with the Honduran government in the past with the training camps in Honduras, North and his contacts in the CIA would have decided to establish private camps in Panama to train their Cuban recruits. Both North and Poindexter would have traveled to Panama City to meet with General Manuel Noriega, the ruler of the country. Noriega was already viewed by many in the U.S. government as very suspect due to his known brutality, corruption, and involvement in the drug trade. Nevertheless, he had proven to be useful as a conduit for intelligence information and as a go-between for various shady dealings in Latin America. During their visit, Poindexter and North would have assured Noriega that if he was willing to look the other way if small camps were set up, he would gain both quiet diplomatic credit and some additional funding for his government. After

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some heated debate, Noriega would have agreed to allow some “private” camps to be established in the Panamanian jungle. In the meantime, CIA case officers in Miami would have quietly begun spreading the word that there might be opportunities for those Cubans who were interested in moving from anti-Castro rhetoric to action. Working through the émigré groups, the CIA officers would have received several hundred expressions of interest. After weeding out those who were too old or appeared to be too unstable, they would have selected 150 Cubans judged suitable for further training. The CIA also would have selected ten of the most senior and most credible antiCastro exiles to be the political and strategic leaders of the revived independence movement. The CIA would have moved the Cubans to Panama in small groups. Once in the camps, they would have been trained by CIA officers and other former Special Forces personnel who would have been hired after their service as contractors for the Cuban mission. The emphasis of the training would have been on guerrilla operations. The instructors would have been told they had no more than six months to finish the training program. Planners for the operation would have studied the lessons learned from the much earlier Bay of Pigs fiasco. They would have concluded that any similar conventional invasion-type operation was almost certainly doomed to failure. A three-pronged strategy would have been developed. The first portion would have been an intensified psychological operations campaign against the Cuban government. This campaign would have been created to emphasize the authoritarian nature of the government and to press the idea that there was an internal insurgency developing among disaffected Cubans. The second prong of the strategy would have been to infiltrate most of the Cubans being trained in Panama into Cuba, so that they could begin guerrilla operations to make the psychological operations campaign appear truthful. The third element of the plan would have been the most critical. The CIA would have intensified its contacts with several Cuban governmental officials who were unhappy with Castro. The CIA would have offered them $500,000 each, along with resettlement to the United States in return for detailed information on Castro’s movements and activities. The CIA also would have selected a small team of the most promising Cuban recruits in Panama to be specially trained as a hit team against Castro. After Castro’s assassination, the leadership selected by the CIA would have planned to institute an interim government in Cuba. Even before launching operations, the plan would have begun experiencing problems. The ten Cubans selected as the senior leaders would have started political feuding over their relative power in a new Cuban government. Other members of the training camps would have split according to their allegiances to the various leaders. Soon, the U.S. trainers in the camps would have spent much time trying to minimize the tensions—at times, breaking out in physical violence—among the Cuban factions. Several Cubans would have demanded to leave the camps and return to Miami. Fearing a major security problem if they

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were to go to the press, the CIA trainers would have spent considerable time and effort in convincing them to stay in training. The internal problems among the exiles would have caused the operation to be postponed several times. Finally, after eleven months, the trainers would have notified Washington, D.C., that they were ready to start launching teams into Cuba. In an effort to maintain security, each ten-man team would have been inserted in a different location along the coast and on a different date with a common linkup point in the mountains. The fifteenth team—the hit team against Castro—would have been handled completely separately, with its own insertion point and a separate rendezvous with CIA assets in Havana. Two of the teams would have been provided light mobile AM radio broadcast systems and prepackaged propaganda material to broadcast messages to the Cuban public, and all teams would have been given propaganda flyers that they could distribute. All the psychological operations material would have been written so that the teams could claim to be native Cubans who had grown disillusioned with the Castro regime. Three weeks before the first team insertion, CIA-controlled radio stations broadcasting into Cuba would have begun reporting a series of stories involving the increasing unhappiness of the Cuban people with Castro and that unconfirmed reports suggested the emergence of an internal guerrilla movement against the Cuban government. These reports would have included fictitious biographies of fake local leaders of the guerrillas. They also would have included accounts of firefights between the guerrillas and the Cuban security forces; these fictitious battles would have taken place far from the actual insertion and linkup points of the teams being deployed. The first team to be inserted would have been the group targeting Castro, since its mission was viewed as being the most critical. It would have arrived safely and been hidden by sympathizers in the outskirts of Havana. After it reported its safe arrival, the other teams would have begun to be ferried across to Cuba in small boats. The first three teams would have managed to land safely and have moved up into the mountains. The fourth team would have been detected by a Cuban coastal patrol as it was offloading, and after an intense firefight, its members would have been killed before leaving the beach. Immediately afterward, the Cuban military and security forces would have been placed on maximum alert. In an alternate history, Iran-Contra would have led to Despite this, the next two teams would have actions against Cuban leader Fidel Castro, shown landed undetected, but the following two here in the United States in 1959. (Library of teams would have been discovered, one on the Congress)

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beach and the other as it was moving inland. Both teams would have been destroyed. A follow-on team also would have arrived safely. The next team would have been quickly spotted and surrounded by Cuban forces. In what was possibly the worst outcome possible from the U.S. viewpoint, this team would have surrendered rather than fight. After some quick and brutal interrogation by Cuban intelligence, several team members would have publicly confessed that they were part of a U.S. covert operation. The Cuban government would have begun broadcasting their confessions internationally. The U.S. government would have immediately denied any connection with the guerrillas, but would have had little luck in convincing the world of its claims. Since the operation would have seemed to be going sour, the remaining teams would have been ordered to pull back and not to land. The U.S. operational planners then would have had a stroke of unexpected luck. Fidel Castro would have announced that he was going to personally take command of the security forces operating against the remaining guerrilla groups. The Cuban government officials who were on the CIA payroll would have been able to get word to the team hiding out in Havana about Castro’s intentions and the route out of the city that he was going to take. Members of the team would have been smuggled out of the city and would have set up positions about six kilometers outside Havana. As the convoy of four vehicles including Castro’s Jeep would have rounded a bend in the road, the team would have launched its ambush. Castro and most members of the convoy would have been killed quickly, and the hit team would have withdrawn. The immediate objectives of the operation would have been met. The problem, however, would have been that the longer-term goals were far from being satisfied. On hearing of the death of Castro, his brother Raul—who was in charge of Cuban security and in many ways even more hardcore than Fidel—would have assumed power. He would have carefully ensured that he had the support of the key Cuban military and intelligence officials before announcing Fidel’s death. Although the shock would have been intense among the Cuban public, Raul would have promised continuity in the government and that the Cuban revolutionary goals would actually be intensified in honor of his brother. Raul would have kept his promise. He would have cracked down on any potential internal opposition within Cuba, arresting and in many cases executing suspected opponents of the regime. Security forces would have tracked down the few CIA-supported guerrillas in the mountains and either killed them on the spot or given them show trials followed by public executions. Since he had little trouble in convincing his own people and other Latin American governments of U.S. complicity in Fidel’s death, Raul would have used the opportunity for launching increased revolutionary operations in the Central American region. Direct and indirect Cuban support for the Nicaraguan government and insurgent movements in El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Colombia would have increased dramatically, and Havana would

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have begun helping nascent guerrilla movements in virtually all other Latin American countries. The United States would have begun finding itself with significantly increased security problems in the region, with several countries falling to Cuban-backed groups. Ultimately, the regional map would have become much more hostile to U.S. goals. Lawrence E. Cline

Discussion Questions 1. Do you think that the United States is justified in attempting to overthrow or destabilize regimes that are actively hostile to American interests? 2. The Iran-Contra funding was in direct violation of congressional action in the Boland Amendment. Why do you think Congress prohibited the funding of such clandestine operations? 3. If the United States had never supported the Contras in Nicaragua and a stable pro-communist regime had emerged there, do you think that communist regimes would have developed in other Latin American countries? 4. In the alternate history presented in this chapter, the success of the Contra actions led to a successful attempt to assassinate Fidel Castro in Cuba. Yet the ultimate goal of overturning the communist regime in Cuba failed in the alternate history. What factors in this alternate history allow the regime to persist? What does this failure suggest about the wisdom of attempting regime change by clandestine groups? 5. Why do you think the National Security Council team headed by Oliver North raised funding for the Contras by selling weapons to Iran rather than using directly appropriated funds?

Bibliography and Further Reading Coughlin, Con. Hostage: The Complete Story of the Lebanon Captives. New York: Warner Books, 1993. Dickey, Christopher. With the Contras: A Reporter in the Wilds of Nicaragua. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987. Draper, Theodore. A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affairs. New York: Hill & Wang, 1991. Inouye, Daniel K., and Lee H. Hamilton, eds. Iran-Contra Affair: Report of the Congressional Committees. Three Rivers, MI: Three Rivers Press, 1988. Kornbluh, Peter, and Malcolm Byrne, eds. The Iran-Contra Scandal: The Declassified History (The National Security Archive Document). New York: New Press, 1993. North, Oliver L., and William Novak. Under Fire: An American Story. Springfield, MO: 21st Century Press, 1991.

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Segey, Samuel. The Iranian Triangle: The Untold Story of Israel’s Role in the Iran-Contra Affair. New York: Free Press, 1988. Tower, John, et al. The Tower Commission Report. New York: Random House, 1987. Walker, Thomas W. Nicaragua. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2003. Walsh, Lawrence E. Firewall: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover-Up. New York: W.W. Norton, 1998. Walsh, Lawrence E. Iran-Contra: The Final Report. New York: Free Press, 1994. Wroe, Ann. Lives, Lies, and the Iran-Contra Affair. New York: I. B. Tauris, 1992.

Roe v. Wade

8

What if Reagan had appointed Supreme Court justices who had unraveled parts of Roe v. Wade?

INTRODUCTION Perhaps no single social issue draws as much political attention in the United States as abortion. Ever since the beginning of the women’s movement in the 1960s, abortion has been a focal point in almost every state and national election. Candidates for many political and judicial offices must define their positions in relation to abortion law. Many voters choose a candidate because of his or her stance on this single issue. The role that the U.S. government should play in creating and enforcing abortion laws has been in contention for decades. Prior to the 1970s, abortion was generally considered a state issue. State legislatures made laws regarding abortion, and state courts tried cases related to those laws. The federal government avoided the creation of abortion legislation, viewing the issue as one suitable for the states to control. The inequities between state laws meant that in a few states, it was possible for a woman seeking an abortion during her first trimester to find a legal abortion provider. In most states, though, it was impossible for a woman to get a legal abortion at any point in a pregnancy unless the pregnancy jeopardized her life. Many women in these states turned to illegal providers, who were willing to perform abortions while charging high fees. Without legal oversight, women suffering complications from such abortions found it hard to get medical treatment or to sue for malpractice. Poor women suffered even more from these restrictive laws. Without the money to pay for illegal abortions, they were left to continue their unwanted pregnancies or to try to induce their own miscarriages. As women gained political and economic power in the 1960s and 1970s, the issue of abortion became a national focus. Women’s liberation groups across the country began to seek ways to challenge state laws regulating abortion procedures in the federal court system. This chapter will discuss eight U.S. Supreme Court cases related to abortion, focusing on the best-known case, Roe v. Wade. For over a century, Texas state law banned abortions except when procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of

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KEY CONCEPT

The “Viability” Debate

When does human life begin? Some possible answers: • • •

• •

Life begins at conception, when the sperm fertilizes the egg to form a zygote. Life begins at implantation, when the zygote attaches to the wall of the mother’s uterus. Life begins at quickening (around 18 weeks), when the movement of the fetus within the mother’s uterus can be distinguished. Life begins at viability, when a fetus can survive outside the uterus. Life begins at birth, when a fetus becomes a child.

Until the late nineteenth century, Christian religions taught that life began at quickening. Now, most Christian denominations teach that life begins at conception. Islamic teaching also indicates that life begins at conception. Islamic law preserves an ethical distinction for abortions that are medically necessary to preserve the mother’s life. Judaism teaches that a fetus does not become a person until birth, but that fetuses are very special because of their potential for human life. All pregnant Jewish women considering abortions are encouraged to consult a rabbi for advice. Generally, conservative branches of Judaism discourage abortions except to preserve the mother’s life, while branches that are more liberal allow for abortions under a variety of conditions. The major world religions do not agree on when human life begins.

New technologies developed by scientists are changing our ideas about the beginning point of human life. As medical techniques advance, it becomes possible for very young human beings to survive outside the mother’s uterus. Thus, the point of viability is much earlier in pregnancy than it was even twenty years ago. In 2006, a baby born in the United States with access to quality medical care, who weighs at least one pound at the time of birth, has about a 50 percent chance of survival, according to kidshealth.org. A baby who weighs at least two pounds has more than a 90 percent chance. Today, babies born as early as twenty-two weeks after conception are able to survive premature delivery. In Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth (1976), the Supreme Court took the following position on the viability debate: It is not the proper function of the legislature or the courts to place viability, which essentially is a medical concept, at a specific point in the gestation period. The time when viability is achieved may vary with each pregnancy, and the determination of whether a particular fetus is viable is, and must be, a matter for the judgment of the responsible attending physician. The ethical questions surrounding abortion grow more complex as the point of viability moves earlier in pregnancy. If life begins at twentytwo weeks, should it be legal for women to have

the mother. In March 1970, a pregnant waitress brought a class-action lawsuit against the state. Because she did not want her real name known, she used the name “Jane Roe.” Roe could not seek an abortion in Texas legally because her life was not in danger. She could not afford to travel to get one somewhere else. Her attorneys argued that the Texas abortion laws infringed on her right to privacy and were unconstitutional. Roe’s lawyers sued the District Attorney of Dallas County, Henry Wade. The case was appealed through the federal court system until it came before the Supreme Court three years later. The Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade on January 22, 1973. A 7–2 majority ruled in favor of Roe and struck down the Texas abortion laws. The court’s ruling includes both a majority opinion, which explains the reasoning behind the decision, and a dissenting opinion, which describes the reasoning of the justices in the minority. For Roe, Justice Harry Blackmun wrote the opinion for the majority. Justice Rehnquist wrote the

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KEY CONCEPT

The “Viability” Debate (Continued)

abortions after that point in pregnancy? Under what conditions should it be legal? As scientists develop new technologies to preserve life, politicians

will write and pass new laws about the beginning of life and the legality of abortion, and those laws will be tested in the U.S. court system.

Disagreement over the point at which life begins is at the heart of the abortion debate. (Shutterstock)

dissenting opinion. Both opinions refer to many other court rulings related to the abortion issue. These other rulings are important because U.S. law is based on the idea of precedent. “Precedent” means that past court decisions form the basis for future decisions. Precedents aid in forming the law so that the same types of cases do not need to be tried repeatedly. To understand the controversy surrounding Roe v. Wade, it is helpful to review the opinions in detail. The majority opinion begins with a historical overview of cultural attitudes toward abortion, from ancient Greece to the present. Generally, throughout Western history, abortion was not considered criminal as long as it occurred before the point of viability. “Viability” in this context means the time the child can survive outside the mother’s uterus. U.S. law is rooted in the English legal system. Thus, the Supreme Court also reviewed English legal history in its ruling. Until the early nineteenth century, there was no English criminal law regarding abortion.

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In England, a fetus was not considered a living being until quickening. “Quickening,” or movement in the mother’s womb, can usually be felt for the first time between the sixteenth and eighteenth weeks of pregnancy. An 1803 law made abortion after quickening a felony, but this law was struck down in 1837. In 1929, abortion after quickening was again made a felony, with a provision that it was not criminal if performed for the purpose only of preserving the life of the mother. No U.S. laws were passed regarding abortion until the mid-nineteenth century. In 1821, Connecticut passed a law making abortion after quickening a felony. In 1828, New York passed a stricter law that served as a model for other states. The New York law made abortion after quickening a felony, and abortion before quickening a misdemeanor. The New York law also included an exemption when necessary to preserve the health of the mother. This distinction between early-term and later-term abortions was preserved for several decades. Early-term abortions received much lighter penalties. By the mid-twentieth century, state laws had become much stricter. The distinction of quickening gradually disappeared. By the 1950s, about two-thirds of states banned abortion at any point in pregnancy except specifically to preserve the mother’s life. Do pregnant women have a right to privacy that includes control over their bodies’ ability to reproduce? The judges found that the right to privacy is not spelled out in the Constitution. Instead, it is indirectly stated in several amendments including the Fourteenth Amendment. They ruled that the right to privacy does encompass a woman’s decision about whether to terminate her pregnancy. However, the judges agreed that legal precedent showed a pregnant woman’s right to privacy is not absolute (Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113. 1973, Section VIII): Most of these courts have agreed that the right of privacy, however based, is broad enough to cover the abortion decision; that the right, nonetheless, is not absolute and is subject to some limitations; and that at some point the state interests as to protection of health, medical standards, and prenatal life, become dominant. We agree with this approach. In considering when the state may intervene, the judges refused to decide when life begins. They stated, according to Roe v. Wade: “When those trained in . . . medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man’s knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.” The judges agreed that the state begins to take a compelling interest in the fetus at the point of viability. They defined viability as approximately the end of the first trimester. Prior to this time, the judges found that women and their doctors should be able to make decisions regarding abortion without legal regulation. After the first trimester, the judges found that the state, according to Roe v. Wade, “may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.” This decision still left a lot of power to individual states to regulate abortion. The Supreme Court’s ruling said the Texas statutes in question were unconstitutional and overturned them. As a result of Roe, no state

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can make abortion illegal during the first trimester. In addition, all state laws must include an exemption at all stages of pregnancy for cases when abortion preserves the mother’s health or life. However, the ruling left all states free to pass new laws regarding abortion. The ruling does not specify what is legal regarding parental consent or spousal notification. It does not prevent laws restricting second- and third-trimester abortions. Contrary to popular thought, Roe does not legalize abortion for all U.S. women everywhere, at any point in a pregnancy, without any restrictions. The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Rehnquist, takes issue with the majority ruling for several reasons. Rehnquist does not agree with the majority decision’s application of the right to privacy. He notes that many states had laws regulating abortion prior to the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, and that these abortion laws were not struck down at that time. He also argues that the entire Texas law should not have been struck down, but rather that it should be found “invalid as applied to a particular plaintiff.” Rehnquist saw Roe as a case where the ruling should have applied only to Roe herself, rather than to all Texas women. Rehnquist argues that the majority is practicing judicial legislation, or making laws rather than administering them. His dissenting arguments are still the most common criticisms of this court ruling today. The Supreme Court considered another case on abortion issues, Doe v. Bolton, at the same time, also issuing a ruling in January 1973. This case concerned restrictions on abortion in the state of Georgia. The Court ruled the law unconstitutional because it placed undue restrictions on a physician’s right to practice, as well as patient rights. The specific conditions in

A bilingual sign in front of a church describes the pro-life viewpoint. (Shutterstock)

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KEY CONCEPT

Summaries of Important Supreme Court Rulings

Roe v. Wade (1973): Texas law made abortion illegal except in cases when the mother’s life was at risk. The Supreme Court ruled this law unconstitutional and made abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy legal within the United States. Doe v. Bolton (1973): The Court ruling threw out Georgia statutes that were unnecessarily restrictive on doctors performing abortions. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth (1976): This ruling threw out Missouri’s spousal and parental consent requirements. Bellotti v. Baird (1979): The Supreme Court ruling overturned parental consent requirements in the state of Massachusetts. Akron v. Akron (1983):The minority dissent in this case introduced Justice O’Connor’s idea of “undue burden” as a replacement for Roe’s trimester framework.

Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (1989): The Court ruled that states may refuse to use public funding and public facilities for abortion procedures not necessary to save the mother’s life. Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992): This decision reversed several earlier rulings. It replaced Roe’s trimester framework with the standard of “undue burden.” It upheld Pennsylvania laws requiring informed consent, parental consent, and a twenty-four hour waiting period prior to obtaining an abortion. The Court overturned Pennsylvania’s spousal notification requirement. Stenberg v. Carhart (2000): The Supreme Court overturned Nebraska’s law against “partial-birth,” or dilation and extraction, abortions because its language was vague and it contained no exception for the health of the mother.

the Georgia law were that abortions could be performed only on Georgia residents; that abortions could be performed only at accredited hospitals; that a hospital committee had to approve each abortion; and that two licensed physicians had to examine and confirm the need for each abortion in addition to the performing physician. The court ruled that no other medical procedure required committee assent and multiple confirmed diagnoses by law, so requiring them for abortions was legally invalid. The Court struck down the residency requirement, suggesting that Georgia hospitals were obligated to provide services to anyone entering the state who sought medical services. The ruling also struck down the accreditation requirement, since accreditation of a particular hospital was unrelated to abortion as a medical or surgical procedure. The Georgia law also specified that abortions could be performed only in cases when the mother’s life or health was endangered, when the pregnancy was the result of rape or incest, or when the fetus would have a significant mental or physical defect. The Roe v. Wade ruling stated this section of the law was unconstitutional. From the moment the Roe and Doe rulings became public, Roe v. Wade’s legal consequences created a political firestorm. A number of state laws immediately became invalid due to Roe, in addition to the Texas statutes. State legislatures quickly became battlegrounds where new laws were hotly debated. Pro-life organizations such as the National Right to Life Committee (NRLC) formed to advocate state and federal laws restricting abortion’s availability. On the pro-choice side, groups such as the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League (NARAL) and the National Organization of Women (NOW) fought against new abortion restrictions. Both pro-choice and pro-life groups became involved at all

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IN CONTEXT

Comparing U.S. Abortion Policy to Other Countries’ Laws

In the United States, abortion law is a hotly debated issue, and laws vary from state to state. In China and Canada, abortion is legal at any point in a woman’s pregnancy. In most Western European countries, including France, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, and Italy, abortions are legal in the first twelve to eighteen weeks of pregnancy without regard to the mother’s reason. In some countries, such as England and India, abortions are legal “on socioeconomic grounds.” That means the laws allow consideration of a woman’s economic resources, her age, her mar-

ital status, and the number of her living children in determining whether an abortion should be legal. Throughout much of the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa, abortion is illegal except when necessary to save the mother’s life. In a few countries, including Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran, abortion is illegal under all circumstances. Putting U.S. laws into an international context shows that our current laws are similar to, or stricter than, those in other firstworld countries. U.S. abortion laws tend to be less restrictive than in many third-world countries.

levels of politics, from local to national, to influence elections and presidential appointments. The Supreme Court heard several more cases related to abortion issues in the 1970s, including Planned Parenthood v. Danforth (1976), which threw out Missouri’s spousal and parental consent requirements. Regarding spousal consent, the Court ruled that since the woman bears the physical burden of the pregnancy, her interests prevail over her spouse’s interests in the continuation of the pregnancy. Danforth also overturned a requirement for parental consent. In Bellotti v. Baird II (1979), the Court debated the parental consent issue in detail and overturned parental consent requirements in the state of Massachusetts. The Court ruling, according to the decision, stated: “a female’s constitutional right to an abortion in the first trimester does not depend upon her calendar age.” In 1980, when Ronald Reagan was elected, he vowed to use the issue of abortion as a “litmus test” to select nominees for federal judges. A litmus test is a single question asked of candidates for a position; the answer determines whether the asker supports that candidate. Reagan had the opportunity to nominate three judges for seats on the Supreme Court during his eight years in office. The Senate confirmed all three of his nominees: Sandra Day O’Connor (1981), Antonin Scalia (1986), and Anthony Kennedy (1988). In City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health (1983), the Supreme Court’s ruling stated that a law requiring a twenty-fourPro-choice demonstrators at the Democratic National hour waiting period before receiving an abortion Convention in 1976. (Library of Congress)

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was unconstitutional. The Court also found that specifying the information a woman must receive from her physician regarding abortion, before she could receive one, was unconstitutional. The Court preferred to leave the specific requirements for informed consent to the judgment of physicians and other medical staff. Akron v. Akron was Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s first ruling related to abortion, and she was in the minority. In her written dissent, she focused on the problems of applying Roe v. Wade’s trimester framework. Because medical knowledge keeps advancing, she argued, the point of viability keeps moving, and thus it is not a reliable legal standard for courts to apply in considering restrictions on abortion. Instead, she suggested a standard of undue burden. “Undue burden” means that any restriction on abortion should be challenged based on the hardships it places on women seeking abortions instead of on how much time has passed since a pregnancy began.

In 1989, the Supreme Court considered Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. This case challenged a Missouri law that defined human life as beginning at conception. The law required physicians to perform viability tests on the fetuses of pregnant women seeking abortions after twenty weeks into a pregnancy. (The same law elsewhere prohibits the abortion of viable unborn children.) It prohibited public employees and publicly funded facilities from performing abortions not necessary to save the mother’s life. Lower courts declared this Missouri law unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed those rulings and said the restrictions were legal. As in Roe, they did not rule on the definition of life’s beginning point. They also refused to rule on the issue of denying public funding, accepting Missouri’s argument that the law restricted people who allocate public funds, not physicians or patients who may choose between public and private practices. This opinion marked the beginning of the Supreme Court’s shift toward support for increased state restrictions on abortion. It is worth noting that the ruling of the court in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services was unanimous. The ruling did not fully overturn Roe v. Wade, but Justice Scalia did call for Roe to be overturned in his concurring opinion. The Court, in this ruling, echoed at the state level a decision that had already been made at the federal level. In 1979, Congress passed the Hyde Amendment, which prohibited using federal funds for abortions. By 1993, the Hyde law was relaxed slightly to allow federal funding of medically necessary abortions, or in cases of rape or incest. By sharply restricting federal funds for abortions, Congress put the economic burden on states to provide assistance for poor women seeking abortions. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services allowed the states to refuse such assistance.

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ANOTHER VIE W

Statistical Consequences of Legalized Abortion?

Economists such as Steven D. Levitt have drawn controversial yet convincing connections between the legalization of abortion in the 1970s and the significant drop in the U.S. violent crime rate in the 1990s. Levitt, in the Journal of Economic Perspectives, refers to numerous studies demonstrating that children born to mothers denied an abortion were “more likely to be involved in crime, even when controlling for the income, age, education, and health of the mother.” If Levitt’s contention is correct and abortions were made illegal in the majority of states, economic models would indicate the likelihood of increased crime in those states approximately twenty years later. Statistical patterns do not make it any more likely that any given person will commit a crime. However, data analysis can indicate trends within large social groups that may require attention. According to the U.S. Justice Department’s Bureau of Justice Statistics, during the years 1990–2004, approximately 90 percent of prison inmates were male, and blacks were five times as likely as whites and twice as likely as Hispanics to be in jail. In addition to gender and race, age and socioeconomic class also play a role. Most violent crimes are committed by males between the ages of twelve and twenty-nine. Those living in poverty are much more likely to be both the victims of crime and to be criminal offenders. In 2003, people from families with an annual income of $7,500 or less were twice as likely to be crime victims as people from families with an income of $35,000 or higher. When these statistics are set side-by-side with statistics from the Guttmacher Institute describing

women seeking abortions, patterns begin to appear.Women seeking abortions are most likely to be nonwhite, poor, and unmarried. Thus, any children they bear will share their poverty and ethnicity, two indicators that make them statistically more likely to commit violent crimes as teenagers. However, can predictions be made based on statistics such as these? Making predictions based on statistical data can lead to huge problems. In the case of the statistics above, for example, it can lead to racial discrimination. One of the biggest dangers in understanding statistics is mistaking a correlation for a cause. For example, if a study demonstrates that “more criminals are brown-eyed than blueeyed,” that result does not mean that having brown eyes causes a person to commit a crime. Likewise, the statistics above do not mean that being poor, or being from a certain ethnic group, makes people commit crimes. They suggest that poverty and ethnicity are related to several other risk factors that increase the likelihood of criminal behavior. Rather than making predictions about future criminals, such statistics are far more useful in making decisions about who might benefit most from assistance.With their limited resources, charities and nonprofit organizations want to know how they can use their money to help the most people in the most effective ways. The statistics cited above suggest that to reduce the number of women seeking abortions, it might be most effective to provide free contraception to single nonwhite women living in poverty. These studies suggest little about ways to keep people from committing violent crimes, except to raise families out of extreme poverty.

In ruling that states could decide not to allot public funds, public employees, or public resources to the performance of abortions, the court took steps toward making abortions harder to obtain. The Court ruled that the government has no obligation to pay for the exercise of constitutional rights. The effect of the ruling was to place responsibility on the individual for finding private means to obtain an abortion rather than on the state government to provide those means. In practice, this ruling meant that fewer physicians in fewer locations were legally allowed to perform abortions. By 2000, 97 percent of Missouri counties had no abortion provider, and there were only six abortion providers left in the state.

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ACTUAL HISTORY With three new Reagan-appointed justices on the Supreme Court, the shift toward more conservative interpretation of the law was inevitable. The Court revisited the central concepts of Roe v. Wade again in 1992, just a few years after Anthony Kennedy began his service on the Court. In the case Planned Parenthood of Southeast Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court upheld the “essential holding” of Roe but permitted further restrictions on abortion. Several of the court’s earlier rulings were reversed by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, and the trimester framework of Roe was replaced by O’Connor’s “undue burden” standard. The Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982 contained five provisions that restricted legal abortion, and the Court examined each one in depth. When it came before the Supreme Court in 1992, a narrow 5–4 majority ruled that four of the five provisions were constitutional. In defining certain restrictions on abortion as unreasonable, this ruling replaced the trimester framework of Roe with the standard of “undue burden.” Three of the five provisions concern controversial restrictions on abortion and are worth examining in detail. Provision 3205 imposed a twenty-four-hour waiting period on women seeking abortions, and also set requirements for informed consent. This provision meant that a Pennsylvania woman seeking an abortion must receive “truthful and nonmisleading” information regarding the abortion procedure, its risks, the effects on the fetus, and the risks related to carrying the pregnancy to term. She must then wait twentyfour hours before receiving the abortion. The court upheld this provision. They ruled that providing accurate information to a woman in order for her to make an informed choice about terminating her pregnancy did not represent a substantial obstacle to obtaining an abortion. Even if the information provided clearly pointed to a preference for natural childbirth over abortion, the judges ruled that the state could provide such information because of its interests in protecting the lives of the unborn. They also ruled that the twenty-four-hour waiting period was not a substantial obstacle, even though it was likely to add to the cost of obtaining an abortion. This conclusion directly reversed the Court’s earlier decision in Akron v. Akron. Provision 3206 required consent from at least one parent for a minor seeking an abortion, with the possibility of a judicial bypass when such consent was unavailable. (A judicial bypass is a procedure in which a court can stand in for the parent or guardian of a minor.) The Supreme Court upheld this restriction as well, citing a number of past cases. Their reasoning was that “a state has a strong and legitimate interest in the welfare of its young citizens, whose immaturity, inexperience, and lack of judgment may sometimes impair their ability to exercise their rights wisely. A requirement of parental consent to abortion, like myriad other restrictions placed upon minors in other contexts, is reasonably designed to further this important and legitimate state interest,” according to the decision. This section of the decision directly contradicts earlier rulings stating that most minors are mature and competent enough to make their own

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decisions regarding abortion, such as Akron v. Akron. The justices in the majority on this ruling presented a more restrictive view of the rights of minors. They emphasized instead the rights of parents and the courts. Provision 3209 required any married woman seeking an abortion to sign a document indicating that she had notified her husband first. The provision contained a list of exceptions when the woman would not be required to sign. If her husband was not the father, if he could not be found after diligent effort, if the pregnancy was the result of sexual assault, or if the woman feared bodily injury if she notified her husband, the requirement was waived. Medical emergency also made notification unnecessary. The Supreme Court, in considering this provision, examined the husband’s interests in an abortion decision. They noted that the Pennsylvania provision did not require spousal consent—that is, the husband did not have to approve the woman’s decision. However, they ruled that the provision was unconstitutional, because they found that adult women have the maturity to make decisions regarding abortion on their own. The Court’s ruling in Planned Parenthood v. Casey indicates much about the changing composition of the Supreme Court from the 1970s to the late 1980s. All three Reagan-appointed justices were in the majority on this ruling, which was far more conservative than other rulings of the past two decades. The Planned Parenthood v. Casey ruling made it legal for states to restrict access to abortions in several ways, even before the point of viability. Both related political movements saw this ruling as a serious loss. Pro-life supporters wanted Roe to be overturned completely, and prochoice supporters were deeply concerned about the increased restrictions and their effects on Missouri women. The Court would not hear another case related to abortion until 2000, when it considered Stenberg v. Carhart. This 5–4 ruling narrowly threw out a Nebraska law outlawing “partial-birth abortion.” The law was intended to make a specific second-term abortion procedure, dilation and extraction (D&X), illegal except in cases where the mother’s life was threatened. The Court ruling found the Nebraska law too broad as written, because it could possibly be considered to apply to dilation and evacuation (D&E), a much more common abortion procedure used earlier in pregnancy. In addition, the law did not contain an exception for the mother’s health, which the court ruled to be an “undue burden” on women seeking abortions. Stenberg v. Carhart is of note because it took into account the relative safety of various kinds of abortion procedures. The majority opinion in the decision states, “The State fails to demonstrate that banning D&X without a health exception may not create significant health risks for women, because the record shows that significant medical authority supports the proposition that in some circumstances, D&X would be the safest procedure.” Justice O’Connor, in her concurring opinion, points out that Kansas, Utah, and Montana (and 26 other states) already had laws that successfully outlawed the majority of D&X procedures except when a woman’s life or health is at stake. Justices Breyer, O’Connor, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg formed the majority in the Stenberg ruling. Justices Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and Chief Justice Rehnquist were in the minority, and each wrote a separate

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The U.S. Supreme Court, where the Roe v. Wade decision and other abortion-related cases have been decided. (Shutterstock)

dissent. Scalia’s dissent specifically attacks the “undue burden” standard for placing abortion regulation in the hands of nine “unelected lawyers” who could “overcome the judgment of 30 state legislatures.” Kennedy’s dissent focuses on the various interpretations of the Nebraska statutes. He argues that the statutes’ wording should be applied in its narrowest sense and only to the D&X procedure, and that the laws should thus be allowed to stand. Thomas’s dissent argues that outlawing a specific abortion procedure does not constitute an “undue burden” to women seeking abortion when other legal procedures may be as safe. Rehnquist simply dissents once more from the Casey ruling and joins the other dissenting justices in their opinions. Rehnquist’s death in 2005, and O’Connor’s retirement in 2006, brought two new justices onto the Court. Supreme Court justices are nominated by the president and then brought before the Senate for approval. John Roberts was nominated to the Court by President George W. Bush, and the Senate approved Roberts as chief justice in September 2005. Samuel Alito was also nominated by Bush and approved by the Senate in January 2006. Both Roberts and Alito have a history indicating they take a conservative stance toward the abortion issue, favoring greater restrictions on abortion. During their Senate confirmation hearings, though, both men refused to discuss the issue of abortion as a topic sure to come before the Court to decide. Future cases will indicate how these two judges will shift the balance of power on the Court, and shape American legal history.

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ALTERNATE HISTORY In 1989, if Justices O’Connor and Kennedy had concurred with Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court could have completely overturned Roe v. Wade. In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, Scalia openly called for the complete overturning of Roe. Rehnquist, White, and Kennedy pointed to the failings of Roe’s rigid trimester framework in determining when an abortion should be legal. Justice O’Connor also found Roe’s trimester structure a problem, although for different reasons from those of the first four judges. In short, a majority of the Court disagreed with sections of the Roe ruling, and eventually threw out its trimester framework in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. What if the Supreme Court had overturned Roe completely in 1989? Roe v. Wade made existing laws invalid in many states. If the ruling had been overturned, many of these laws would go back into effect. In roughly thirty states, abortion would be illegal except in cases when it is necessary to preserve the mother’s life. (Twenty states already have laws protecting access to abortions under various circumstances.) Each state legislature with existing laws about abortion would revisit the issue, and the likely result would be laws placing different restrictions on abortion in each state. Some state legislatures have already envisioned a scenario where Roe is overturned and have put laws into place protecting access to abortions before the point of viability, including Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, and Washington. Another eight states have passed laws making abortion illegal, and these will take effect immediately if Roe is overturned. One extreme alternate-history scenario might paint a picture of thousands of U.S. women who would die from illegal, unsafe abortions if Roe were reversed. Another alternate-history scenario might propose a happier, more loving society in which all life was respected because of the outlawing of abortion. These scenarios are not grounded in legal history or in political reality. Abortion would not cease to be a contentious issue if Roe were overturned. Women of all ages and socioeconomic backgrounds would still seek abortions, even if these procedures were made illegal. Legal abortions would not instantly become unavailable to all U.S. women, either. The most likely alternate-history scenario simply intensifies what has already occurred with the increased restrictions the court has upheld in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services and Planned Parenthood v. Casey. Women who can afford interstate travel, forty-eight-hour waiting periods, and private doctors would still have access to safe, legal abortions in states that allow them. Middle-class and wealthy women would be able to afford the costs of an abortion, including the cost of travel to a state where abortion was legal. Urban women would also maintain their current access advantages, as abortion clinics are generally located in major population centers. The women who would most likely be unable to get an abortion would be women just like the original Jane Roe: poor and rural women unable to afford interstate travel or private doctors. In states such as North Dakota and Mississippi, each with only one clinic that performs legal abortions as of 2006, cost and

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access barriers to abortion are already significant for poor women. The overturning of Roe would do little to alter their situations. Imagine if the Supreme Court had completely overturned Roe in 1989, in the Casey ruling. Such a reversal would have sent the abortion issue to the top of the legislative agenda in all fifty states. Open debates on abortion restrictions across the country would have brought the social issues surrounding sex, pregnancy, and parenthood onto front pages nationwide. Politicians would have had to deal with intense pressure from all sides in shaping and reshaping abortion legislation. In hearing testimony from various perspectives, the legislatures would also have confronted issues such as poverty, abuse, limited access to contraception and sex education, and the high costs of adequate child care and health care. Related policies might have been created to address some of these social issues. Each state legislature would have worked its way toward a different set of laws. Some states might have put abortion laws directly to the voters in ballot initiatives. Since abortion laws would be likely to vary from state to state, the issue could have been forced to the federal level for further debate and lawmaking. This issue would have continued to polarize the United States for the decade or more it would probably take to reform state and national abortion policies. Under these circumstances, several types of organizations would have formed to lobby for funding and new legislation. Some organizations might raise and provide financial assistance to women seeking abortions. For example, a nonprofit might raise funds for poor women to travel to states where abortions are legal. Other groups would have formed in states with restrictive laws, to lobby for legislative change. A third type of organization might work toward federal legislation mandating access to legal abortion before the point of viability. Other people would organize on the opposing side of these issues. Their groups would lobby to keep restrictions in place at the federal and state levels, and to outlaw interstate travel in order to procure abortions. Still other organizations might have formed to lobby for increased access to low- or no-cost contraception, and for sex education classes including accurate information on contraception in public schools. Groups with all of these purposes already exist, and would probably continue their work if Roe were overturned. If Roe were overturned, the number of women in the U.S. workforce would likely decrease, and the number of families on welfare would increase. If most abortions were made illegal, women already living in (or close to) poverty would be required to carry unwanted pregnancies to term. Some percentage of childless women who currently work in low-income jobs would become mothers, leave the workforce, and become dependent on government support instead of being able to work. Child care would absorb too large a part of their full-time paychecks to make it possible for them to work. Thus, the population in need of welfare support would increase. There are statistics to back this scenario, from a 2004 House of Representatives committee report: In 2002, 24 percent of all American families with children were headed by single mothers. Approximately

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one-third of these families lived in poverty. In 2002, the minimum wage was $5.15 an hour. Given forty-hour workweeks, income before taxes thus equaled $10,300 per year. The average cost of daycare for a preschool child, in a licensed center, in the United States in 2002 was approximately $6,000 per year. Thus, licensed daycare for one child took more than 50 percent of the annual income of a single mother working for minimum wage. Because licensed daycare centers cost more than they can afford, single mothers often rely instead on family members or other unlicensed providers to care for their young children while they work. Still, since the money they earn while working does not cover their basic living expenses, single mothers in poverty are likely to leave the workforce entirely to care for their children. Under current guidelines, the federal and state governments provide funding to help cover the childcare expenses of working women on welfare. Thus, making abortion illegal might well increase taxes, since state and federal governments would be asked to provide financial support to a greater number of single-mother families. Another potential outcome would be the ratification of new federal legislation. If the abortion issue came before Congress, new legislation might pass that would either legalize or outlaw abortions until the point of viability, or define some other standard that would create a clear line between legal and illegal abortion. Laws would be created to define which women could have access to abortion, and under what conditions. Should minors have to obtain parental consent before obtaining an abortion? Should wives have to notify their husbands, or get their permission, before getting an abortion? Should women be allowed to obtain abortions after the point of viability? Should exceptions to laws be included, in order to save the mother’s life, or preserve her health? What role would the courts play in deciding who may be excepted? These questions would be extremely difficult to resolve. Each person’s stance on abortion is moral and ethical as well as practical, and answers to these questions relate to a person’s most deeply held beliefs. Some side effects of an abortion debate in Congress would be positive, no matter what the outcome. If public debate eventually resulted in legislation in Congress, large amounts of money and effort would be freed to focus on other critical social issues. It might even become possible for a national conversation to take place that would focus on reducing the number of unwanted pregnancies through education and increased access to contraception. However, given that a resolution would have to be passed by Congress, signed by the president, and upheld by the Supreme Court, it is unlikely that such a contentious issue will ever be permanently resolved. Abortion has been defined since the 1970s as a women’s issue and has absorbed much of the attention of politically active women on both sides of the debate. No coherent “women’s movement” currently forms a political voting bloc. Women were almost equally likely to vote Democrat or Republican in the last two elections, indicating that gender is no determinant of political stance. While many women’s groups with varying political aims exist and thrive, it has been difficult for

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In an alternate history, parents would demand more child-care options and government services to support a growth in the birth rate. (Shutterstock)

most of them to find the resources, staff, and support to generate a national movement to accomplish a single political goal. Such groups also represent only a fraction of the U.S. female population. Many U.S. women do not vote in state or national elections. In the 2004 elections, less than half of eligible U.S. citizens voted, and even this was a record election turnout. As a result of voter apathy, and of politically active women’s focus on the abortion debate, many political issues related to pregnancy, childbirth, and parenting have been pushed aside. If Roe were overturned and federal abortion laws were ratified, new “voting blocs” of people with common interests might form. One key group to consider is the number of working parents in the United States. In 2003, 32 percent of American households were single-parent or two-parent families with children under eighteen. In those households, 70.5 percent of mothers worked outside the home, and 95.6 percent of fathers worked outside the home. Making abortion illegal in the majority of states would be likely to cause a sudden, statistically significant increase in the U.S. birth rate. The number of working parents would also increase. These parents would have good reasons to form a political movement demanding affordable child care options and more government support to cover child care expenses. If the majority of state governments will require most women to carry their pregnancies to term, the question arises as to the government’s obligations in caring for those children. Regardless

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of their political positions on abortion, working parents could agree on the need for high-quality, affordable early childhood care. Rather than being ghettoized as a women’s issue, parents could form a political group demanding that the government address early childhood care as an area worthy of new state and federal legislation and funding. Another political subgroup of Americans wants the government to avoid regulating what they consider private issues and personal rights. These citizens believe the government should serve only basic functions that do not encompass regulation of abortion. They also see parenting as a personal choice and unwanted pregnancies as a problem based largely on a lack of personal responsibility. From this perspective, they see no reason the government should subsidize families’ child care expenses. While they might support private organizations in providing sex education and contraception, they are likely to form a political opposition to a parenting movement that demands increased governmental support. The two hypothetical groups above suggest just a few ways the political terrain might shift if abortion became a legislative issue. New state and federal laws regarding abortion would likely be tested in the court system, meaning that cases will once again make their way to the Supreme Court for hearing. There is no clear resolution that solves the problems surrounding the abortion issue. Whether or not Roe is overturned, the passion and fervor surrounding the abortion debate on all sides make it unlikely that a permanent resolution will be found. Heather A. Beasley

Discussion Questions 1. Opponents of abortion see Roe v. Wade as a decision that allowed the taking of human life without due process, and they structure their arguments as assertions of the right to life. How did the Supreme Court decision take this line of argument into consideration? 2. Do you think that the reduction in the violent crime rate some fifteen years after the legalization of abortion indicates that there is a connection between the two? Do you believe that making abortions even more available and inexpensive will tend to reduce the future crime rate? 3. What do you think the consequences would be if the current or future Court were to overturn Roe v. Wade and support state laws outlawing abortion? 4. If the decision about whether to have an abortion is an intensely personal one and reflects a woman’s own personal religious and social beliefs, how can it be argued that a state law prohibiting abortion is not a case of state interference with freedom of religion? 5. In what ways would American society be different if the Roe v. Wade ruling had never been made in the first place?

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Bibliography and Further Reading Balkin, Jack M., ed. What Roe v. Wade Should Have Said: The Nation’s Top Legal Experts Rewrite America’s Most Controversial Decision. New York: New York University Press. 2005. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. Abortion Policies: A Global Review. New York: United Nations, 2003. FindLaw for Legal Professionals. http://www.findlaw.com/casecode/ supreme.html. Cited March 2006. Full opinions of all Supreme Court cases cited in this chapter including: Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113. (1973); Doe v. Bolton. 410 U.S. 179. (1973); Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth. 428 U.S. 52. (1976); Bellotti v. Baird. 428 U.S. 132. (1976); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health. 462 U.S. 416. (1983); Bellotti v. Baird II (1979); Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. 492 U.S. 490. (1989); Planned Parenthood of SE Pennsylvania v. Casey. 505 U.S. 833. (1992); Stenberg, Attorney General of Nebraska, v. Carhart. No. 99–830. (2000). Levitt, Steven P. “Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990’s: Four Factors That Explain the Decline and Six That Do Not.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 18, no.1 (2004): 163–190. Levitt, Steven P., and Stephen J. Dubner. Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden Side of Everything. New York: HarperCollins, 2005. Press, Eyal. “My Father’s Abortion War.” New York Times, January 22, 2006. Excerpt from Absolute Convictions: My Father, a City and the Conflict That Divided America. New York: Holt, 2006. United States. Bureau of the Census. “America’s Family and Living Arrangements: 2003.” Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2004. United States. Department of Justice. Bureau of Justice Statistics. “Criminal Victimization in the United States: Statistical Tables 2003.” (July 2005). United States. Federal Election Commission. “Federal Elections 2004: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives.” (2005). United States. House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee. Publication 108–6: 2004 Green Book. http://waysandmeans.house.gov/ Documents.asp?section=813 (accessed March 2006).

George H. W. Bush

9

What if George H. W. Bush had been reelected in 1992 and a second Iraq war had been fought in the 1990s?

INTRODUCTION George Herbert Walker Bush brought to office a unique combination of political experience from domestic and international affairs. His record as a navy lieutenant and fighter pilot in World War II gave him strong credentials on military issues. After the war, Bush attended Yale University and graduated with a degree in economics. Prior to his service as vice president under Ronald Reagan, Bush served as a congressman from Texas, as the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, and as director of the Central Intelligence Agency. After eight years in the office of vice president, Bush ran for president in 1988. Bush chose Senator Dan Quayle from Indiana as his vice-presidential running mate. Bush’s opponent was Democratic candidate Michael Dukakis, whom he trailed by a large margin in public polls until August 1988. At the Republican National Convention in New Orleans, Bush gave a speech calling for a kinder and gentler country that helped changed the course of the November elections. He made a campaign promise not to raise taxes, and described diverse local organizations as the thousand “points of light” that formed a nation of communities. After the convention, Bush’s ratings increased sharply. Bush won the election, and took office on January 20, 1989. He was the forty-first president of the United States. In his first term, the primary domestic challenges he faced were an environmental crisis, a stagnating economy, and a rising budget deficit. Just after Bush took office, the Exxon Valdez oil spill occurred off the Alaskan coast in March 1989. Millions of gallons of oil leaked into Prince Edward Sound, permanently affecting the ecosystem and killing thousands of animals. Cleanup efforts over the next four years cost the Exxon corporation more than $2 billion. Exxon was eventually fined $5 billion in damages. Also in 1989, the savings and loan crisis came to a peak. The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) was the federal organization in charge of insuring money deposited in savings and loan associations (S&Ls). The FSLIC was run by the U.S. government. Savings and loan

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institutions are similar to banks in many ways, but they did not have the same types of governing laws in the 1980s. Between 1986 and 1989, the FSLIC had to shut down almost 300 S&Ls because they took on too much debt. The S&Ls tried to make money by offering loans at high interest rates to people who financed risky ventures. When the ventures fell through and investors went bankrupt, the banks lost money. By 1990, more than a thousand S&Ls closed, and Congress voted to abolish the FSLIC. Insider trading and various forms of fraud caused huge financial problems as the S&Ls closed their doors. The savings and loan crisis contributed to the economic recession that began in 1990. Because the U.S. government had insured the deposits through the FSLIC, the government had to repay customers and take on the debt when the S&Ls closed. Rough estimates of the cost to the government were $153 billion. The federal budget deficit is the yearly Official portrait, taken in 1989, of George Herbert Walker Bush, the forty-first president of the United amount by which federal spending exceeds fedStates. (Library of Congress) eral revenues. In 1992, the deficit hit a record level of $290 billion, due in part to the savings and loan crisis. The federal government’s budget is closely related to the deficit. If the deficit rises, the whole country is affected because the government must borrow money to cover its spending. Money that the United States has borrowed to cover its expenses is called the national debt. In 1991, the national debt was more than $3 billion. There are three main ways to reduce the deficit. The first is through growth in the national economy, so the government can collect tax revenues from more individuals and corporations. The second is through tax increases, to increase the amount of taxes collected from individuals and corporations. The third is through control of government spending in the form of budget cuts. A government cannot force economic growth to happen because it depends largely on the success of American businesses. Tax increases are unpopular with citizens, who do not wish to pay more of their incomes to the government. Control of government spending is unpopular with politicians, who find it hard to win reelection when they cut budgets of programs that serve voters in their states and local communities. There are tough choices to make no matter how a budget deficit is reduced. Both the national debt and the budget deficit grew over the years of Bush’s presidency. This made the national economy a hot topic in the 1992 presidential elections. Although economic and environmental crises occurred during Bush’s presidency, there were also important successes. In 1990, Bush approved the Americans with Disabilities Act, a significant step forward in civil rights legislation for people with physical and mental disabilities. It greatly improved access to public transportation and buildings, mandated employment protections, and improved educational opportunities for the

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disabled. Bush was a Republican, but the House and Senate were controlled by a Democratic majority during his term in office. This gridlock kept other significant legislation from passing. The “war on drugs” had begun during Reagan’s presidency and continued during Bush’s term. The biggest victory during this time was in December 1989. Bush ordered troops into Panama to overthrow the ruler, General Manuel Noriega. Noriega was brought to the United States, and after a trial, he was convicted of cocaine trafficking and racketeering. At his trial, it became public that the United States had actually employed Noriega as a CIA agent for many years until 1986. Noriega was involved in the Iran-Contra scandal of the 1980s. There were speculations that the United States overthrew his government in part because he refused to assist the Nicaraguan Contras in their fight against Nicaragua’s communist government. Regardless of U.S. motivaThe inauguration of George H. W. Bush in tions, Noriega’s removal from power put a key Washington, D.C., on January 20, 1989. (George Bush international drug smuggler behind bars. Presidential Library) During the four years Bush was in office, there were two openings on the Supreme Court. Bush nominated two men who went on to become Supreme Court judges: David Souter and Clarence Thomas. Souter’s nomination was popular and passed easily through the Senate with a vote of 90 to 9. The nomination of Clarence Thomas was far more controversial. One of his former employees, Anita Hill, accused him of sexual harassment during the hearings. Despite this controversy, Thomas was confirmed by the Senate in a 52 to 48 vote. He has since become one of the Supreme Court’s most conservative justices. Foreign policy was bright with possibility at the beginning of Bush’s term in office. By the late 1980s, the Cold War with the Soviet Union was almost over. In November 1989, the Berlin Wall fell, marking an end to the world’s most visible dividing line between capitalist and communist countries. With the end of the Cold War approaching, it became possible to consider major cuts in defense spending. In April 1990, Bush sent Congress a plan to reduce the size of the U.S. armed forces by thirty thousand to reduce spending on defense. This plan was defeated, but significant troop reductions did occur over the next decade. Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) in July 1991, ending five decades of nuclear weapons buildup between the two nations. The Soviets declared an end to Communist Party rule in August 1991, when a government coup against Gorbachev was put down with the help of Russian president Boris Yeltsin. By December, the Soviet Union had dissolved into fifteen separate nation-states. After almost fifty years of tension, the United States could leave the Cold War in the past. However, new threats to world peace and democracy were quick to emerge. A number of the world’s nations were governed by dictators in

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the early 1990s. These dictatorships represented a threat to Americanstyle democracy, precisely because they survived through repression of their citizens. Human rights violations, including genocide, drew the world’s attention to one of these dictatorships: the rule of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Iraq, as a nation-state, was created by the treaties that ended World War I. It remained a British mandate until 1930. The geographical boundaries of the country contained three distinct demographic groups: Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds. Sunnis and Shias belong to two different branches of Islam; Kurds are an ethnic rather than a religion-based group. The primary difference between Sunni and Shia Muslims is in their beliefs about the proper leaders of Islam. Sunni Muslims are a majority population across the Middle East, and they believe the first four of Mohammed’s successors were all legitimate leaders of Islam. The four successors were called “caliphs, which means “leader of the community of Islam.” The caliphs and their heirs ruled the Ottoman Empire until the end of World War I. At the end of the war, the Ottoman Empire was divided up, and the Caliphate was abolished by the Republic of Turkey. Shia Muslims believe that only one of these four successors, Ali, was the rightful leader of Islam. The Shia have their own mosques, religious leaders, and interpretations of the Muslim faith as a result. Iraq’s head of state in the 1990s was President Saddam Hussein. He became president of Iraq in 1979 and retained power until the Iraq War in 2003. Hussein’s government, the Baath party, consisted primarily of Sunni Muslims. Sunnis were a minority among Iraqi citizens. Although they were roughly 20 percent of the population of Iraq, they held most government offices and political power within the country. Hussein wanted Iraq to become the leader of the Arab nations, and he put a secular government and a Western-style court system in place. He reduced the power of the tribal courts to administer Sharia, the traditional Islamic law, by leaving only personal-injury cases to those courts. Hussein’s People’s Army served as the military arm of the ruling party. The Department of General Intelligence, or Mukhabarat, served as Hussein’s police force and contained a secret service unit. The Mukhabarat were responsible for several international assassinations and assassination attempts, and for repression of opposition to Hussein’s government. Shia Muslims opposed Hussein’s attempts to make Iraq a secular state. As a result, Shia Muslims were persecuted under Hussein’s rule, using methods including torture, kidnappings, and mass killings. Shia clerics were arrested and murdered, as were their followers. An even more persecuted minority were the Kurds. The Kurdish people are one of the largest ethnic groups in the world without a state, numbering more than 25 million people. They inhabit parts of Turkey and Syria, northern Iran, and northern Iraq. The Kurds are an ethnic rather than a religious group. The majority who practice a religion are Sunni Muslims. In 1988, at least 180,000 Kurds were killed by the Iraqi army in a military operation known as “Al-Anfal” (The Spoils). Men between the ages of fifteen and seventy were targeted with chemical weapons including mustard gas and nerve agents. More than one thousand two hundred Kurdish villages were destroyed, and hundreds of thousands of refugees were driven over the borders of Iraq into neighboring countries.

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President and Mrs. Bush greet troops and have Thanksgiving dinner with the First Division Marine Command Post in Saudi Arabia on November 22, 1990. (George Bush Presidential Library)

Kuwait is a small neighboring country of Iraq, located across its southeastern border. The country of Kuwait contains valuable oil reserves that are its primary economic resource. In 1989, Kuwait increased its oil exports significantly, lowering the world price of oil per barrel and agitating other OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) countries whose economies depended on oil revenues. After diplomatic communications between Iraq and Kuwait broke down over oil prices, Iraq threatened and finally took military action. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait began on August 2, 1990. Iraqi troops crossed Kuwaiti borders and the Iraqi government proclaimed the annexation of Kuwait as its nineteenth province. The United Nations (UN) Security Council immediately condemned the invasion of Kuwait and demanded Iraq’s immediate and unconditional withdrawal. The UN also passed comprehensive sanctions against Iraq. Sanctions meant that no United Nations member would participate in importing or exporting any type of goods with Iraq, not including supplies intended strictly for medical purposes and, in humanitarian circumstances, food. The exact meaning of “sanctions” was under considerable debate. On January 16, 1991, Bush approved the launch of U.S. military air strikes against the nation of Iraq as part of a coordinated effort by the United Nations to put an end to the occupation of Kuwait. This military offensive was called “Operation Desert Storm,” and it was successful in little more than a month of coordinated attacks. (The war as a whole was commonly known as the “Gulf War.”)

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KEY CONCEPT

Sanctions

As defined by Article 41 of the United Nations charter, “sanctions” are “measures not involving the use of armed force in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.” This broad category includes several types of measures. The most common sanctions are economic restrictions on a country’s imports and exports. For example, in 1990, UN Resolution 661 put economic sanctions in place against Iraq. All participating countries completely stopped exporting goods to Iraq, or importing goods from Iraq,“except for medical supplies, foodstuffs, and other items of humanitarian need.”

Sanctions may be unilateral, when one country bans trade with another, or multilateral, when many nations participate in banning trade with a particular country. Resolution 661 was an example of multilateral sanctions. Other types of sanctions include financial sanctions, which may freeze a country’s assets in international banks, and diplomatic sanctions, which restrict the travel of diplomatic personnel. The idea behind sanctions is that affecting a country economically may make political change happen without the use of military force.

As the United States began aerial attacks, Iraqi forces in Kuwait began to execute a plan to destroy Kuwait’s oil production capabilities. They set more than 750 oil wells on fire across the country, and released millions of gallons of oil into the Persian Gulf waters. The environmental consequences of this action were condemned internationally. On February 27, 1991, Bush declared victory and an end to the military operation. Because coalition forces ceased fighting, the Republican Guard of the Iraqi army escaped with tanks into northern Iraq. This elite military fighting force was able to ensure the continuation of Hussein’s regime in the coming months. During and after Operation Desert Storm, the United States encouraged Kurdish forces in northern Iraq and Shia forces in the south to attempt to overthrow Hussein’s government. Bush explicitly encouraged them in a speech on February 15, 1991. On March 3, Shia militia from southern Iraq began an uprising in the province of Basra. The uprising spread across the south and came to the edge of Baghdad, where Shia rebel leaders begged coalition troops for support. The United States believed the Shia were backed by Iran. The coalition refused to aid the Shia rebellion, even allowing Iraqi troops to travel into southern Iraq. There, Hussein’s troops leveled Shia cities, bombed sacred shrines, and killed an unconfirmed number of civilians estimated at 100,000 people within the next seven months. A Kurdish uprising in the north began almost at the same time, also without coalition assistance. The Kurdish forces were quickly crushed by the remnants of the Republican Guard. When the Kurdish uprising collapsed, almost two million Kurds fled to Turkey and Iran in order to avoid retribution killings. The UN was forced to intervene. A security no-fly zone was created in northern Iraq, and it was policed by UN troops for approximately three months in order to ensure the Kurdish refugees a safe return to their homes. After that time, UN military presence retreated to a base in southern Turkey to intervene in Iraq as needed.

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KEY CONCEPT

Sanctions (Continued)

In practice, U.S. economic sanctions have had varying success in changing the course of other countries’ political actions. Economic sanctions against Cuba, Iraq, and Iran have not been successful in causing those governments to change their structures or their policies. By contrast, economic sanctions did play an important role in ending apartheid in South Africa. Targeted sanctions against specific companies within China have also deterred that country in recent years from exporting certain types of military equipment to Iran. Two groups within the United States have pushed for an end to economic sanctions. Business interests oppose sanctions because they lose

valuable export markets as a result. Human rights activists also oppose economic sanctions, because they often hurt civilians by restricting their access to food and other necessities. Even limited sanctions may have unforeseen results. In Iraq, it was determined that the UN “oil-for-food” program (OFFP) resulted in economic support of Hussein’s government. Hussein chose businesses to receive contracts as part of the OFFP. His government paid these businesses to intercept deliveries of food and medicine. The businesses passed the deliveries to Hussein’s government, which resold them to other countries at a profit rather than distributing them as humanitarian aid.

Operation Desert Storm resulted in a pullout of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. On April 3, 1991, the United Nations passed Resolution 687. This resolution set forth the specific terms for a formal cease-fire between UN and Iraqi troops. It established the United Nations-Iraq Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), which was set up to monitor the political situation in Iraq. It also created the United Nations Special Commission on Weapons (UNSCOM) to deter Iraq’s future acquisition of chemical and biological weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. UNSCOM inspectors would be involved throughout the next decade in the relationship between the UN and Iraq. At first, their access to weapons facilities for inspection purposes was close to resolution guidelines. By 1996, though, Iraqi officials began denying or delaying access to select facilities during UNSCOM inspections. By 1998, Iraq completely denied access to the inspectors.

In deciding on the extent of U.S. involvement in the Gulf War, Bush was faced with difficult choices. He was fully aware of the atrocities Hussein’s Baath ruling party was committing against Shia and Kurds. The U.S. government had made promises to Shia and Kurdish leaders that they would support the overthrow of Hussein in return for abandonment of support for the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. However, to overthrow Hussein, a loosely committed coalition of nations would have to invade Iraq and fight a ground war. Such a war would be expensive in both monetary terms and the number of American lives lost. Bush’s secretary of defense, Dick Cheney, concluded in 1991 that it would be a mistake to pursue such action.

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President George H. W. Bush (in the white shirt) meets with Secretary Richard Cheney (right) upon his return from Saudi Arabia. Also present are Secretary James Baker, Governor John H. Sununu, and General Brent Snowcroft. (George Bush Presidential Library)

Even with the United Nations coalition intact, Bush concluded that the costs of such a war were more than the United States could afford. The coalition was fragile and had competing interests that might have pulled it apart in a longer ground war. Ultimately, Bush chose to pull the vast majority of U.S. troops out of the region of Iraq once the sovereignty of Kuwait was reestablished. This choice avoided a complex and expensive ground war, although it also created new enemies for the United States abroad. The Gulf War was a prime example of the new style of American warfare. It depended highly on technological weapons such as guided missiles and less on sheer numbers of troops. Because of this shift from human power to weapon power, the size of the U.S. active military was reduced significantly over the next decade. Money that was formerly spent on troops was then used instead to develop precision weapons and other technologies that could precisely destroy targets and reduce troop casualties. After a war like the Gulf War that was waged largely from a distance, it made sense to officials for the United States to move toward a smaller, better-trained military force. After succeeding in the liberation of Kuwait, Bush’s popularity soared at home for a brief time. By 1992, however, the country’s satisfaction with the Bush presidency had fallen sharply. Bush had campaigned with the promise “Read my lips: No new taxes.” Due to the rising deficit, acrossthe-board federal tax increases took effect after congressional legislation passed in 1990. Democrats found Bush an easy target during the

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campaign season because he had gone back on his 1988 campaign promise and signed the tax increases into law. The United States still faced a staggering deficit by the 1992 election year. An economic recession and the loss of manufacturing-sector jobs due to global outsourcing led to increased unemployment rates. The 1992 elections were unusual in recent U.S. history because there were three major candidates. Bush ran for reelection on the Republican ticket. Democratic candidate Bill Clinton ran a campaign sharply focused on reducing the deficit, containing rising health care costs, and addressing other domestic issues. Independent candidate Ross Perot was a Texas billionaire executive who was deeply concerned about the two-party system’s ability to deal with economic issues. Perot funded his campaign outside the party system with his own money, and won almost 19 percent of the popular vote. In spite of the three-way race, Clinton won the election. He was reelected for a second term in 1996. The turning point occurs with Bush’s decision not to support the Shia and Kurdish rebellions. If, in 1991, the U.S. government had decided to back the rebel forces, a very different historical outcome might have resulted.

ACTUAL HISTORY From 1992 to 2001, concerns about Iraq faded into the background of U.S. politics. At first, UN inspectors were able to gain admittance to most of the facilities they were required to inspect according to the terms of the Gulf War cease-fire. The UN also established an oil-for-food program, enabling Iraq to sell oil despite continued economic sanctions in return for humanitarian aid. While corruption in this program was later demonstrated, relatively little attention was paid to Iraq during the Bill Clinton era. The United States focused foreign policy on improving trade relations with its neighbors and with China, and on solving conflicts in hotspots such as Northern Ireland through diplomatic means. During this time, the government did little to address genocides caused by civil wars in nations such as Rwanda and Somalia, sending no more than token troops to provide limited aid. Civil wars in the former Yugoslavia drew more attention during Clinton’s first term. U.S. troops participated in military strikes on Kosovo to stop Bosnian Serbs in their genocide against ethnic Albanians, despite UN disapproval. American foreign policy during this era might be described as “limited engagement” with nations that did not present direct threats to the United States. As Clinton was limited to two terms in office, the 2000 elections brought two new presidential candidates to the nation’s political arena. Clinton’s vice president, Al Gore, won the Democratic nomination. George H. W. Bush’s son, George W. Bush, was the Republican presidential candidate. The campaign season was brutal and long, as the country seemed polarized between the candidates. On election day, this division translated into unclear results. The election was simply too close to call. Gore won the popular vote, but the Electoral College system made it

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possible to be elected president even without winning the popular vote. A recount began in Florida, where 537 votes separated the candidates. Controversy erupted as numerous cases of voter fraud and ballot irregularities arose. The recount effort in Florida demanded more time than legal deadlines allowed, and court cases began to determine whether those deadlines should be extended. The Supreme Court ruled 5 to 4 that there was not enough time to develop a unified standard for recount policy and that all recounts had to cease. George W. Bush was awarded Florida based on the initial vote count, which meant that he won the Electoral College vote and thus the presidency. George W. Bush had only a few months in office as a honeymoon period before the U.S. faced tragedy. After September 11, 2001, the United States faced a new kind of threat. U.S. civilians were targeted by members of an international terrorist network known as al Qaeda. The World Trade Center and the Pentagon were hit by hijacked jetliners. A fourth hijacked aircraft crashed in the fields of Pennsylvania after the passengers attacked the hijackers. Approximately 2,973 innocent people died in these terrorist acts. Many new policies restricted citizens’ freedoms in attempts to increase their safety. New security measures were introduced in airports, subways, seaports, and other transportation hubs. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security was created to aid in preparation for natural and terrorist disasters. The USA Patriot Act was passed. This controversial piece of legislation strengthened criminal laws against terrorists and increased government surveillance powers over U.S. citizens. New international concerns emerged regarding weapons materials and stockpiles. The United States began military actions in Afghanistan in October 2001 with the goal of dismantling the terrorist-supporting Taliban regime and seeking out al Qaeda members. The Taliban had provided safe haven and financial support for al Qaeda members. Al Qaeda’s leader, Osama bin Laden, was supposed to be hiding in the mountains between Afghanistan and Pakistan. U.S. and British forces were quick to oust the Taliban government from power, and the UN appointed Hamid Karzai leader of an interim transitional government. He was elected the first president of Afghanistan in 2004. While in urban areas the Taliban were largely defeated, fighting in rural Afghanistan continued. By 2002, the United States faced a war on a second front: Iraq. Selected intelligence reports raised concerns about Iraq’s acquisition of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. This second war was harder to sell to the American public. U.S. military goals in Afghanistan were clear and directly related to the events of 9/11. The links between 9/11 and Iraq were fragile by comparison. While some intelligence seemed to indicate that Iraq was pursuing a nuclear program, other intelligence reports suggested the Iraqi weapons stockpiles had been destroyed after the 1991 Gulf War and that Iraq had not succeeded in pursuing nuclear weapons. There were no clear links between Saddam Hussein’s regime and al Qaeda before 2002, but the Bush government feared that Iraq would aid terrorist operations against the United States if it could. Based on these suspicions, Bush went to the United Nations and asked that military actions be taken to enforce UN resolutions against Iraq dating from the original cease-fire.

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Because the United States had abandoned the Shia and Kurdish rebellions at the end of Operation Desert Storm, it lost the support and trust of a significant segment of the Iraqi people even before the second war began. In abandoning the military uprisings within Iraq, the United States left Shia and Kurds vulnerable to retribution killings by Hussein’s government. The suppression of the Shia and Kurdish rebellions in 1991 ended in a death total estimated in the hundreds of thousands. These human rights atrocities and other violations indicate how soon the terms of the peace treaty were broken by Hussein. By 1999, Hussein refused to let UNSCOM inspectors into Iraq to examine facilities previously used for weapons production and stockpiling. The United Nations issued a series of resolutions against Iraq instituting sanctions for refusal of inspections. However, the UN could not come to an agreement on the use of military force to enforce those resolutions. The second war against Iraq began as part of George W. Bush’s War on Terror. In his 2002 State of the Union speech, Bush identified three nations as part of an axis of evil that harbored terrorist regimes: North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. Bush eventually outlined a rationale for going to war against Iraq that pointed to its violations of sixteen separate United Nations resolutions. He feared that without UN inspections, Iraq might have been able to build or purchase nuclear weapons. Recent military history already showed that Iraq had once owned large stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons. While the majority of these stockpiles were destroyed after the Gulf War ended in 1991, Bush believed that they could have been rebuilt in the years since UN inspections of Iraq had been derailed. Four reasons were given by Bush to take action against Iraq in a speech given to the United Nations General Assembly in September 2002: Iraq’s violation of the UN resolutions passed after the Gulf War; Iraq’s continued development of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons; human rights violations of the Iraqi government against the Iraqi people; and Iraq’s support of terrorist organizations. Support for these contentions was given in many speeches and documents. Much of the intelligence used to support the idea that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction was eventually proven false. No links between Saddam Hussein’s government and al Qaeda before the Iraq War have been proved, and investigations have concluded that Iraq played no role in the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, the truth of the first and third reasons remains well documented, and the extent of the human rights violations committed by Hussein became even clearer after the invasion. Shortly after Bush’s speech to the UN, Iraq’s foreign minister hand-delivered a letter to the UN promising to allow the return of UN weapons inspectors to Iraq without conditions. The United States dismissed this letter as a ploy to block serious Security Council action. Other members of the Security Council received it more optimistically, as a first step toward compliance with the weapons inspection resolutions. Nations that sat on the United Nations Security Council would eventually have to decide whether to commit UN troops to military action against Iraq. In October 2002, the U.S. Congress authorized the use of force against Iraq. This raised the stakes among the Security Council members as it became clear that the United States was likely to take military action with or without UN support.

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In November 2002, the Security Council passed Resolution 1441. This resolution set a timetable for Hussein’s government to comply with UN resolutions and warned of serious consequences if Iraq chose not to comply. As deadlines passed without Iraq’s compliance, the Security Council had to vote on whether to use UN force against Iraq. France, Russia, and China indicated that they would not support the use of military force against Iraq until more time for meeting all the requirements of weapons inspections had passed. Gridlocked, the Security Council in the end took no action. While Bush’s government developed pro-war policies, an anti-war movement spread around the globe. Anti-war protests were held between October 2002 and March 2003 in many major cities, involving hundreds of thousands of protesters at some of the largest rallies. On February 15, 2003, millions participated in anti-war protests in more than 800 cities around the world. Despite the size and scope of public opposition to the imminent invasion, the Bush administration was not deterred in pursuing a war against Iraq. On March 17, 2003, Bush gave Hussein forty-eight hours to step down from power, take his family, and leave the country of Iraq. When that demand was not met, on March 19, the Iraq War began. The United States was unable to negotiate United Nations support for this offensive. Several other nations on the Security Council did not approve of the use of military force to enforce the UN resolutions regarding Iraq. As a result, a much smaller coalition of nations joined in this military effort than in 1991. This coalition featured U.S. troops as the primary military units. Other main contributors of military force were Great Britain, South Korea, and Australia. Many nations across the world were sharply opposed to the U.S. offensive and believed the United States wanted to take control of Iraqi oil reserves and their associated revenues rather than to liberate Iraq. Despite this international opposition, the U.S.-led coalition of nations opened an air and ground offensive that was stunning in its speed and range. On March 21, the bombardment of various Iraqi military targets began. By April 14, the coalition declared victory in Iraq. But the toughest part of the mission still lay ahead. While the U.S. goal was to shift military operations from a theater of war to preservation of the peace, several factors prevented a smooth transition to a self-governed Iraq. First, Saddam Hussein had disappeared. He was not captured until December 2003, and the resulting uncertainty created a sense of unfinished business that lingered around coalition efforts. Second, the religious conflicts that had long simmered between Shia and Sunni Muslims soon emerged into violent struggle across several provinces over the shape of the new government. Third, the continued presence of U.S. troops in Iraq threatened the stability and credibility of the emerging Iraqi government. Fourth, the balance of world opinion put pressure on coalition countries to pull their troops out of Iraq as insurgency activities increased. Perhaps the most significant factor affecting the postwar situation in Iraq was the size and skill level of the U.S. armed forces. Troop reductions had begun under George H. W. Bush and continued during Clinton’s presidency. In 1990, there were approximately two million active-duty

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ANOTHER VIE W

What if This History Were Written by the Iraqis?

A Latin proverb suggests that history is written by the victor. The field of historiography is the study of history itself. Who writes histories, and why? What are the “goals” of history? How are events reinterpreted over time? These are just a few of the questions historiographers ask. In order to avoid history written solely by the victors, historiographers may study multiple perspectives on the events surrounding a war in an attempt to encourage a richer and more complete understanding. While an American-centered view of the motivations and events surrounding both Gulf Wars has been presented elsewhere in this chapter, studying the statements of Iraqi political leaders provides a view of the war from the perspective of the “losers.” The events of the first Gulf War are now subject to reinterpretation since the United States returned to war in Iraq. The history surrounding this event has yet to be completed, and thus the study of the first war is still in progress. A 1996 BBC and PBS documentary, aired on Frontline, interviewed several key political figures in the aftermath of the first Gulf War. One of those interviewed was Tariq Aziz, the foreign minister of Iraq. In the interview, Aziz provides a very different view of the historical events surrounding the first Gulf War. According to Aziz, Kuwait had increased oil exports sharply in the summer of 1990, thereby

decreasing the price of oil. Iraq needed the oil revenues to rebuild the country after the long Iran-Iraq war, so Hussein warned Kuwait that it was about to cause the economic collapse of an ally.The Kuwaitis continued their increased rate of export despite threats from Iraq, and the Iraqi leadership blamed the United States. Rather than aggravating the United States into attacks on Iraqi soil, Aziz claims that the takeover of Kuwait was intended to move the battleground outside their home country. Aziz’s perspective on the U.S. role in the Gulf War is decidedly different from the view of American and British officials who were interviewed concerning their roles in the war. It also differs significantly from the perspective of other Iraqi officials. As historians research these primary sources side by side, they demonstrate the impossibility of writing a “complete” history. Even high-ranking officers within the same nation’s government have very different ideas about that government’s motivations and long-term strategies. Historians may record oral interviews with a variety of perspectives on an event, then set those perspectives side by side on a website, television program, or textbook page. The goal is to get students of history to view a complex political situation from more than one viewpoint, rather than to present a “true” or “correct” version of history.

military personnel. By 2004, that number had fallen to 1.39 million. Since the United States was fighting wars on two fronts, in Afghanistan and Iraq, military resources were greatly stretched. Active-duty personnel were required to serve back-to-back tours of duty, and reserve personnel have been utilized multiple times. Even after qualifications for enlisting in the armed forces were lowered, military recruitment levels continued to fall in 2005. Conflicting viewpoints at the highest levels of the armed forces suggest that more ground troops were needed in Iraq to stop the insurgency in its infancy. Without such a presence, the insurgency spread and there was no clear plan for its defeat. By September 2006, American support for the Iraq War had fallen to 35 percent. At the 1991 Soref Symposium, Dick Cheney was asked about the choice to end the Gulf War rather than fighting at that time to overthrow Hussein’s government. In his speech, Cheney raised questions about trying to keep the peace in postwar Iraq if Hussein was overthrown. These questions, as reported by

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Peter W. Galbraith in the Washington Post, would come back to haunt him during his vice presidency under George W. Bush: Once we’d done that and we’d gotten rid of Saddam Hussein and his government, then we’d have had to put another government in its place. What kind of government? Should it be a Sunni government or Shi’ite [Shia] government or a Kurdish government or Ba’athist regime? Or maybe we want to bring in some of the Islamic fundamentalists? How long would we have had to stay in Baghdad to keep that government in place? What would happen to the government once U.S. forces withdrew? How many casualties should the United States accept in that effort to try to create clarity and stability in a situation that is inherently unstable? The last question hung in the air as U.S. casualties in Iraq continued to mount. On September 22, 2006, the number of Americans killed in Iraq surpassed the number of people killed on 9/11.

ALTERNATE HISTORY If, in 1991, George H. W. Bush’s government had decided to back the Shia and Kurdish rebel forces, a very different historical outcome might have resulted. Given the enormous numbers of postwar civilian casualties in the failed rebellions and their aftermath, it is interesting to imagine a war with a different endpoint that would have created a different Iraq. If the ground war in Iraq had continued even a few more days, coalition troops would have eliminated greater numbers of the Republican Guard and taken out more of the Iraqi army’s military capacity. This would have opened the doors to Shia and Kurdish success in overthrowing Hussein’s government. While a war in Baghdad would undoubtedly have meant street-to-street fighting and increased numbers of military casualties, the fall of Hussein’s government would have been inevitable. The vast majority of Iraqi citizens would have supported the opportunity for a change in government. Also, the large number of nations participating in the first Gulf War coalition would have made a continued war a truly international effort if the coalition could have been sustained. By delaying the overthrow of Hussein’s government into the next decade, the United States made several major tactical errors. First, the betrayal of the Shia and Kurdish rebellions lost the United States valuable allies within the country of Iraq. It also caused a loss of trust that would haunt the postwar attempts at reconstruction beginning in 2003. Many thousands of anti-Hussein supporters were killed in the failed uprisings. Most of these were military-age men who would have been valuable allies in the later Iraq War. Second, it allowed Iraq time to rebuild its military capacities and weapons stores. Third, the cease-fire left most of Iraq’s infrastructure intact. All these insights are possible in hindsight, but it is important to look at the political situation George H. W. Bush was in when he made

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the choice to declare victory instead of pushing for the overthrow of the Iraqi government. Operation Desert Storm was expensive, and the U.S. budget deficit was spiraling out of control. While the initial offensive to push Iraq out of Kuwait was politically popular, a long ground war within Iraq would not have been as popular at home. The philosophical problems of overthrowing another government are also important to consider. If the United States invaded Iraq to overthrow Hussein, what reasons could it use to justify the overthrow? If Hussein, why not Fidel Castro in Cuba, or dictatorships elsewhere in the world? The United States risked becoming a world policeman with such a choice, a responsibility that the U.S. government did not want and could not afford. Also, the United Nations mandate was only to restore sovereignty to Kuwait, not to overthrow the Iraqi government. If the United States had continued the war into Iraq in 1991, it would have faced a battle for UN support. Imagine that the coalition forces held together, and the UN had supported an invasion of Iraq in 1991. Supported by Shia forces in the south and Kurdish forces in the north, such a military effort would have been quickly successful in overthrowing Saddam’s government. (This is a fair statement since it took a much smaller coalition less than a month to overthrow Hussein’s government a decade later.) What might Iraq look like now, as a result? Several positive outcomes can be imagined. First, a 1991 overthrow would have been a victory achieved by the Iraqi people with the assistance of an international coalition. Thus, international support for the new government would have been higher than it was after the Iraq War. Second, almost 200,000 Iraqis (killed after the failed rebellions) would have been alive and willing to participate in reconstruction efforts. More military-age Shia and Kurds able to work in the security and building industries could have created a faster, more secure reconstruction effort. With more Iraqis willing and able to train for such positions, there could have been a quick timetable for withdrawing the majority of coalition troops and moving to Iraqi selfgovernance. Third, any insurgency efforts might have been quashed more quickly if the military presence on the ground had been larger as it would have been in 1991. The Iraqi army had been routed by coalition troops in the earlier offensive. A ground war would have further demolished Iraqi forces and further reduced the number of people likely to participate in postwar insurgent activities. What would the downsides have been of a In an alternate history, U.S. troops and coalition forces 1991 invasion? Hussein’s forces might have would have toppled the Saddam Hussein government in 1991 rather than a decade later. (U.S. Air Force)

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used chemical or biological weapons against coalition forces. No one knew then what his weapons stores contained, although CIA intelligence indicated chemical weapons factories in Iraq in 1990. Nations within the UN coalition had different economic and political relationships with Iraq. Some nations might have dropped out of the coalition if an attempt was made to remove the standing government of an Arab state. The largest problem is the same one that emerged roughly a year after the 2003 invasion: the risk of civil war within Iraq without a stable government. Iraq was a nation created by treaty, with state boundaries that tied three very different peoples together, that had been under a dictator’s rule for more than a decade. Many of the challenges that George W. Bush’s administration faced in establishing democracy in Iraq might have faced his father’s administration a decade earlier if the Gulf War had taken a different course. One of the most logical outcomes of the insurgent and civil strife in Iraq could be the splitting of Iraq into three separate states. With Iraq sliding toward civil war between the Sunni and Shia, in 1991, the George H. W. Bush administration and the United Nations might have agreed that a split of Iraq was the only course of action. Thus there would have been by the mid-1990s a Kurdish Iraq, a Sunni Iraq, and a Shia Iraq. How history could have further changed with such a 1991 outcome would have been related to the events of 9/11. The United States, led by President George W. Bush, would not have had the need to invade Iraq in 2003, and all military efforts would have been focused on Afghanistan and the capture of bin Laden. It is one of the prerogatives of creating alternate history to suggest better outcomes than the present: in this alternate history the United States would still have the goodwill of the world that it experienced after 9/11, and it would have successfully brought bin Laden and his associates to justice by 2002. Heather A. Beasley

Discussion Questions 1. What factors make it seem likely that Iraq will become a loose federation of three separate ethnic states, or three completely separate sovereign states? What factors suggest it will remain united? 2. Since the 1990–1991 action against Iraq by the United Nations was based on expelling Iraq from Kuwait rather than defeating the Hussein regime, do you think it likely that the Arab states in the coalition that expelled Iraq from Kuwait would have agreed to move on to Baghdad in support of the Shia and Kurds? What factors would have made it unlikely? What factors would have worked in favor of Arab support for such a strategic move? 3. Do you think that it would have been easier or more difficult to establish peace and order in Iraq in 1991 than it has proven to be in the period 2003–2006?

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4. Hussein refused to allow UNSCOM inspectors to verify his lack of weapons of mass destruction. Since no such weapons have been found since the invasion by U.S. and British troops, why do you think Hussein refused to allow the inspectors access in 2001 and 2002? 5. What factors might have convinced George H. W. Bush to support the Kurds and Shia in their resistance to Hussein in 1991? What factors do you think in fact led to the decision not to support their resistance?

Bibliography and Further Reading Angstrom, Jan. “Puzzles and Propositions of the Iraq War.” In J. Hallenberg and H. Karlsson, eds., The Iraq War: European Perspectives on Politics, Strategy and Operations. London: Routledge, 2005. Associated Press. “War Casualties Pass 9/11 Death Toll.” (September 22, 2006). Aziz, Tariq, and Wafic el Sammarai. Interviews. “PBS Frontline: The Gulf War.”www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/ (accessed January 9, 1996). Curry, Timothy, and Lynn Shibut. “The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth and Consequences.” FDIC Banking Review, www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/2000dec/brv13n2_2.pdf (accessed December 2000). Galbraith, Peter W. “The Ghosts of 1991.” Washington Post (April 2, 2003). Koppel, Andrea, et al. “Iraq Agrees to Weapons Inspections.” CNN News.http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/09/16/iraq.un.letter/ (accessed September 17, 2002). O’Leary, Carole. “The Kurds of Iraq: Recent History, Future Prospects.” Middle East Review of International Affairs (December 2002). Paulson, Michael. “History of U.S. Sanctions Shows Most Haven’t Worked.” SeattlePost-Intelligencer (May 11, 1999). Priest, Dana, and Ann Scott Tyson. “Bin Laden Trail ‘Stone Cold.’” Washington Post (September 10, 2006). United Nations. Security Council. U.N. Resolution 661. www.un.org/Docs/scres/1991/scres91.htm (accessed August 6, 1990). Woodward, Bob. State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006.

The Persian Gulf War

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What if Israel had attacked in retaliation for Scuds launched by the Iraqis? Would the Arabs have withdrawn from the Coalition?

INTRODUCTION The Middle East may be the most complex and volatile area on earth. First, it contains the holiest ground of three major religions: Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. In some cases two or all three claim the same spot as their own. If no other factors were involved, this religious significance alone would make the Middle East a contested region. There are other, more material, factors as well. It is, in some places, a region of incredible wealth, based principally on the presence of oil. Some locations are near trade routes, which has made them important in a different way. The potential for wealth and control of communications and travel routes has drawn the interest of the outside world to the Middle East for centuries, especially during the ages of exploration and commercial exploitation. In the twentieth century the conflict of ideologies between the East and West (the Cold War) increased both outside interest and the potential for conflict. But even before that, the rise of nationalism following the collapse of empires after 1918 began a process that in many ways affected and even led to the Gulf War of 1990–1991. Looking at the Persian Gulf War in the larger context of the breakup of the Ottoman Empire more than seventy years before helps us to better understand some of the regional antagonisms. These relationships, in turn, affected much of the decision making that occurred in 1990 and 1991. In 1915 the Ottoman Empire entered World War I on the side of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Like those other defeated empires, it saw much of its territory carved up and distributed among the winners after the conflict ended. The empire’s boundaries were drawn back to what is now Turkey. Saudi Arabia became an independent kingdom. Palestine and the area designated as Transjordan were placed under a British administration called a mandate that was answerable to the League of Nations. Under a similar mandate France administered Syria and Lebanon. Finally, the three Ottoman provinces of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul that made up an area generally referred to as Mesopotamia became

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a British mandate collectively renamed Iraq. The idea of the mandates was that nations such as Britain and France would assume responsibility of former colonies. Under instruction, these mandatory territories would eventually become independent countries. Ruling mandates was not easy. The mandatory powers were required to rule these regions but not exploit them for their resources as might be the case with colonies they owned outright. They had to keep order (in regions where the populations were exhibiting a great deal of independence) and train a judiciary, civil service, police, and military. They were required to report regularly on their progress to the League of Nations. It was, in all cases, a difficult job at the outset. As the years progressed into the 1920s and 1930s it became worse. One reason for this increased difficulty was that the mandates had created nations where none had existed before. It was difficult to create a Syrian or Iraqi identity when people had always pictured their world in terms of clans or tribes. To persuade groups of different ethnic and religious groups to live peacefully together was nearly impossible. In Iraq, Shi’ites, Sunnis, Kurds, and groups of ethnic Assyrian Christians did not get along. There were sporadic outbreaks of violence, in one instance leading to massacres of Christians in Iraq. In Palestine, the tension between the native Arabs and the growing minority of Jews moving to this region to establish their own homeland grew in the years before World War II. After the war, a Jewish homeland, Israel, was established there. The creation of this new state in 1948, the displacement of the Palestinians, and the immediate enmity of the neighboring Arab states resulted in the first of what would be several wars for Israel’s survival. Winning its first war in 1948 and emerging as victor in successive wars in 1956, 1967, and 1973, Israel developed a professional armed forces and a tough policy. That self-reliance and military preparedness was considered necessary to keep its enemies from achieving their stated goal: destroying the Jewish state. There were changes, however, that would make the situation more complicated. Shortly after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Egypt began to distance itself from its sponsor and supplier, the Soviet Union. Concurrently, the Egyptians began to cultivate better relations with the United States. That made it easier for the United States to negotiate the 1978 Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel. Not all developments were so favorable at the end of the 1970s, however. In the same year as the Camp David Accords, the dictatorship of Iraq was toppled and a new one established under the leadership of Saddam Hussein. In the next year, the Shah of Iran was overthrown and a new Islamic republic established. Part of the new government’s program was the destruction of Israel. These two new governments, Iran and Iraq, would soon be at war with each other but they could agree on one point: Israel must be destroyed. Israel’s relationship with the United States remained strong although its relations with European nations, principally France, worsened. France had been a major seller of weaponry to Israel but by the 1970s had decreased its arms sales and was even building a nuclear power plant for the Iraqis and selling uranium for them to enrich. In 1980 the Iranians and Iraqis began a war that would last until 1988. In addition to conducting his external war Saddam Hussein was eliminating any possibility of internal opposition. His means included using poisonous gas against

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Kurdish villages in northern Iraq. His willingness to use these types of weapons against his own population, the widespread use of Scud missiles against the Iranians, and his otherwise ruthless conduct of that war provided much food for thought for the Israelis and any other country in the immediate vicinity. And from the late 1970s on, there was also the nuclear reactor near Baghdad and its possible use as a weapons factory. After the end of the Iran-Iraq war in the second half of 1988, Saddam Hussein began to demonstrate increased interest in his neighbor to the south, Kuwait. Apparently by the end of 1989 or the very beginning of 1990, he made the decision that he would annex Kuwait and make it part of Iraq. At first, his approach was one of complaints and veiled threats. In May 1990, Hussein accused Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates of waging economic war on Iraq by increasing their oil production quotas, thereby cutting into Iraq’s market. Two months later, in July, he claimed that Kuwait was stealing oil from Iraqi oilfields on the Iraq-Kuwait

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Sharing the Burden

One remarkable aspect of the Persian Gulf War was that it was fought by a large, varied, and highly integrated coalition. Under the auspices of the United Nations, the United States was in every practical sense the leader. Yet the United States did not furnish all the military forces nor did it pay most of the bill or anything close to it. Substantial portions of the military arrayed against Iraq came from other nations. In addition to American soldiers, sailors, and airmen, the United Kingdom, Argentina, Spain, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Portugal, and Senegal sent military units. In addition to those, however, and the main reason the response of Israel to attacks was so important, was

the contribution by Muslim nations. Syria contributed 70,000 troops, of which 20,000 were in Saudi Arabia with the remainder patrolling Iraq’s western border. Saudi Arabia mobilized 45,000 of its soldiers. Egypt provided 35,000 troops as well as aircraft. A force of 17,000 from the Gulf States, principally Kuwaiti exiles, was on the lines as well. Smaller contributions of troops were from Bangladesh with 6,000, Morocco with 1,500, and 5,000 from Pakistan. Aid to the coalition took some indirect but equally important forms. The Syrians were instrumental in discouraging Arab terrorists at the time who might have provided a significant distraction. The final financial cost of the conflict was $61 billion. Of this, the United States paid only $7.4 billion. Other nations paid substantially more,

border. Within a week of that claim, Iraqi military forces moved toward the south, and on August 2, 1990, they invaded Kuwait. The United Nations (UN) immediately condemned this invasion and demanded that Iraq withdraw. Within a few days, the UN would impose a trade embargo on Iraq. The Iraqi response was to annex Kuwait officially as its nineteenth province and station its army along the Saudi border. Saudi Arabia asked the United States for military assistance and within days the first American troops were in that country. By the next month additional American forces were on the way to Saudi Arabia accompanied by 10,000 French and British troops. Throughout this building-up process, the United States succeeded in getting support from the Arab nations as well as its European allies. The Arab League, of which Iraq was a member, condemned the annexation of Kuwait and gave American diplomats promises of financial and military support to help the coalition drive the Iraqi forces out of Kuwait. In mid-December the United Nations set a deadline of January 15, 1991, by which time Iraq had to withdraw completely from Kuwait. On January 17, after Iraq had rejected all demands, Operation Desert Storm began at 3 A.M., Baghdad time, with an air assault. As the military assault began, perhaps the overriding concern, other than actually defeating Iraq, was to hold the coalition together. Although Israel was not a member of the coalition, the Iraqis had declared that Israel would be a target in any conflict. The Americans feared that if the Israelis were hit by Iraqi missiles and then retaliated—or worse, launched a preemptive strike against the Iraqis—the coalition could dissolve immediately. The Arab nations that were supporting the coalition financially and militarily might very well drop out if Israel launched any attacks. As

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Sharing the Burden (Continued)

especially the Arab states in the immediate gulf region. Kuwait, the nation over which the war was being fought, eventually paid out $16 billion. Saudi Arabia, which stood in Iraq’s path, contributed $16.8 billion, and the United Arab Emirates gave $4.1 billion. Germany, Japan, and South Korea gave sizable contributions. Retaliatory force by the Israelis in the wake of Scud attacks would not have affected the contributions by non-Muslim nations. In the case of Kuwait, given that the survival of that nation was at stake, its contribution would have been unaffected in all probability. On the other hand, despite the danger from Iraq, Saudi contributions as well as those from the United Arab Emirates might have been seriously decreased. It is very reasonable to assume that with the population of Egypt and Pakistan in full cry for Saddam and against Israel, troops from

those countries would have been pulled back totally or so far from the front as to be useless in the campaign. Syrian President Assad did not have much concern for popular opinion in his country, and he would not have withdrawn because the Syrian people were against involvement. Seeing his enemy Israel striking his other enemy Iraq, however, would have caused him to reconsider Syrian presence. The image of an Arab leader like Assad working with Israel is something he would have wanted to avoid. The credibility of the United Nations campaign, led by the United States, rested in large part on Arab support. Thus, the concern with military and financial support disappearing as the result of Israeli retaliation was a major concern to the Bush administration, one that did not subside until the successful conclusion of the war.

much as they feared and hated Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, they would not join with Israel in any assault on another Arab state. How could Israel be protected from missile attacks (possibly with chemical weapons) without putting the coalition in a position to suddenly lose most or all of its support from Arab and other Islamic nations? The night after the war started, Iraqi-modified Scud missiles first landed in Tel Aviv and Haifa. The concerns about what Israel might do were no longer hypothetical. Whatever course of action the Israeli government followed would significantly affect the conduct of the war.

The anti-Iraq coalition, painstakingly built by American diplomacy, was based partly on new relationships that would have been unthinkable just a couple of years before. One reason this unique coalition could come into being was the end of the Cold War. The change in East European governments and changes within the Soviet Union since 1989 had made it possible for Warsaw Pact military units to participate with members of NATO. Although the Soviet Union did not participate militarily, and to some degree disagreed with the coalition’s diplomatic conditions on Iraq, it did nothing to oppose the coalition. Another element that made this such a unique alliance was the involvement of several Arab nations. Some had either long-standing ties with the United States (such as Saudi Arabia) or relationships that were relatively recent (such as Egypt). Others were bound to the United States by events

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Israeli Attack, 1981

The concern that Israel could launch a reactive or even a preemptive attack on the Iraqis was not merely speculative but solidly based on recent history. Israel had never stated that it would never attack first and based a great deal of its deterrence on that premise. The 1967 Arab-Israeli war began with Israeli air forces attacking Arab aircraft on the ground as the first stroke of the war. More to the point, in the context of conflict with Iraq, was the air strike that Israel had launched against an Iraqi nuclear plant just a few miles from Baghdad. The target had been the Osirak nuclear reactor, designed and built by the French for the Iraqi government during the 1970s. Completed in 1977, the plant and the potential work that could be done there was of increasing concern to Iraq’s neighbors. The Osirak reactor was not of a type that was commonly used by nations just beginning to develop a

nuclear capability for peaceful purposes. It was capable of creating plutonium to be used in nuclear weapons. The reactor, its stores of radioactive material, and all activities were monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency. It was recognized, however, that there were not enough monitors or safeguards to ensure that the Iraqis were not creating nuclear weapons. Israel saw that it would be a target for any nuclear weapons developed by Iraq, an assumption later confirmed by Israeli intelligence services. As the 1980s dawned, however, Israel was not the only nation to be interested in the reactor. In 1980, Iran and Iraq began their eight-year war. Very early on, the Iranians identified the reactor as a necessary target. In September 1980, two Iranian aircraft flew into Iraq to destroy the reactor, failing to do much beyond minimal damage. The

that had occurred only a few years before. One such case was Kuwait, whose oil tankers were reflagged as American ships during the Iran-Iraq war. In this way they were entitled to the protection of the American Navy against any attacks that either side in that war might make. There was also the presence of Syria in this coalition, a nation whose relationship with the United States was not good. In large part this was because Syria had long been an enemy of Israel and was associated with terrorist organizations through the Middle East. Thus, many of the nations involved were bound, more or less, by a degree of opposition to Saddam Hussein. At the same time, they did not necessarily trust one another, and some had deep reservations about other members of the alliance. In the center of this situation was one nation, bound by a long tradition to the United States, which was not a member of the coalition: Israel. The United States was the first nation to formally recognize the Israeli state in 1948; there had been a deep, supportive relationship between the two from the beginning. The Dwight Eisenhower administration was marked by a distancing between the two nations, but since the arrival of Kennedy in 1961, the alliance between the two had remained very strong. The United States had sold weapons to Israel including tanks, aircraft, and antiaircraft missiles for many years (although it is interesting that some of these such as the Hawk missiles were also sold to Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia). In 1973 the United States shipped weapons and vehicles from its stockpiles in Europe to help make up losses that Israel had suffered in the first days of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. In the years since, both nations had exchanged information and, among other things, the Israelis had provided the United States with information about the

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Israeli Attack, 1981 (Continued)

Iraqis acknowledged that the attack had been made but then stated that the Iranians had never been the objective of any sort of nuclear attack.The statement went on to say that the weapons were being developed exclusively to destroy Israel. On June 7 the following year an Israeli air group of fourteen aircraft (F–15s and F–16s) flew from a base in the Sinai Peninsula. They entered Jordan’s, then Saudi Arabia’s airspace and flew on into Iraq where they arrived at their target at 5:30 in the afternoon. The attack was successful and the reactor was so seriously damaged that it could no longer be used without significant repairs. The French stated that they would assist reconstructing the plant but within three years reneged on that agreement.Nonetheless, the Iraqi nuclear weapons program would continue as a high-priority program. Left with a less efficient means of enriching uranium, Iraq would employ thousands in the attempt to build nuclear weapons.

The Israeli attack was condemned in the United Nations with even Israel’s long-time ally, the United States, joining in. In addition to international criticism, there was lively debate within Israel itself as to whether the attack had been necessary. The government always maintained that the attack had been necessary to ensure Israel’s security. In 1990 and 1991 it was recognized that the Iraqis were devoting substantial resources toward developing nuclear weapons and had threatened to use chemical weapons against Israel. This fact, coupled with Israel’s demonstrated technical capacity and will to defend itself, provided evidence to give American leaders and planners concern about Israeli plans. If they had had any doubts about Israel’s possible responses, all they had to do was think back to the Israeli air strike of almost ten years before.

probability of the Shah of Iran’s overthrow in 1979. From another perspective, however, the closeness between the two countries had undermined American relations with several Arab countries. For members of the coalition, regardless of their views toward Israel, there was the question of what would happen once Iraqi bombs and missiles began to fall into Israel. What would happen if Iraq made good on its threat, made in April 1990 (and repeated by Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz), to use chemical weapons against Israel? These threats were made for two principal reasons. First, the destruction of Israel was a longstanding aim of Iraq, as well as many Arab nations. Second, given Israel’s history of either striking first or retaliating in force, if it attacked Iraq, this activity would essentially make Israel a fighting member of the coalition. That would have been unacceptable to many of the Islamic nations participating in the coalition and Saddam Hussein saw that as a way either to completely fracture the coalition or to damage its unity. Of course, Iraq, having been attacked by Israel in 1981, felt confident that the Israelis would attack if provoked and apparently counted on that happening. The missiles continued to fall after January 18. There was still the grave concern that more than conventional warheads would fall and the Israelis debated what they should do. Prime Minister Itzhak Shamir, usually very aggressive, was holding back. Members of his cabinet including Moishe Arens (the minister of defense) and Ariel Sharon pressed very strongly for an immediate retaliation. Some in the Israeli government disavowed using their own nuclear weapons while hoping that the Americans would use tactical nuclear weapons against Iraq. In analyzing the decision that was eventually made, the Israeli government had to

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weigh several factors, both for and against striking either before the missiles were fired or immediately afterward. In terms of arguments for attacking, Israel’s credibility as a nation capable of defending itself while surrounded by enemies had been an important factor in its self-image and its survival. It had taken the offensive in 1956 and 1967. Although struck first in 1973, it had recovered quickly and defeated its attackers. Since that time it had launched incursions into southern Lebanon to protect its borders and had flown into Iraq to destroy a nuclear power plant. Israel’s willingness and ability to attack was a major deterrent to the countries surrounding it. Another argument for attacking was the potential deadliness of the Iraqi threat. In addition to the threats made by Saddam and his history of using chemical weapons, the CIA announced in the fall of 1990 that Iraq had significant quantities of chemical weapons. Knowing his willingness to use these weapons and the apparent evidence that he had them, it might truly be a question of Israel’s survival to attack first or certainly in retaliation. Finally, the Arab reaction, while publicly predictable, might not be as severe as feared. Egypt’s president Hosni Mubarak had stated that Israel had the right to defend itself if attacked. Even Syria took the stand that Israel should be able to strike back. These statements, which emphasized appropriate and proportional retaliation, signaled a possible softening of attitudes toward Israel. Thus the damage to the coalition’s cohesion might be minimal. There were, however, many arguments against a first strike or even retaliation. First, no Arab nation, whether a member of the coalition or not, was going to give Israel permission to fly over its airspace. At the same time, the United States stated that it would not provide the Israelis with the Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) codes nor military clearance through coalition-controlled airspace. Second, despite some statements by Arab nations, their willingness to stay in the coalition was in doubt if the Israelis attacked. Even though Syria had said Israel had a right to defend itself, that country had also made clear that it would switch sides and defend any state attacked by Israel. There was also, despite Mubarak’s announcements, some movement that Egypt should not participate in any offensive against Iraq, a feeling inside Egypt that the country had not done well by participating in the coalition. Egypt seemed to have gotten little for its participation other than forgiveness for some of its debts from Western countries. Eventually Mubarak had to tone down any comments that could be interpreted as pro-Israeli as almost every one of the opposition parties in Egypt was quite vocal in its opposition to Egyptian participation in the coalition. Third, there was worry that attacking through Jordan would bring another belligerent, this one supporting Iraq, into the war. The population in Jordan (with a high percentage of displaced Palestinians) was extremely supportive of Iraq and was very happy about Iraqi Scud missiles falling into Israel. If there was a violation of airspace or a ground invasion, the scope of the war would expand with bad consequences for the coalition both diplomatically and militarily.

Israel attacks in retaliation? 189

Fourth, a sizable portion of the Israeli population opposed retaliation, a fact that Bush sometimes used in his discussions with Israeli leaders about options for defending Israel. Fifth, there was the concern that an Israeli attack could create severe problems for the Americans both in prosecuting the war and in maintaining the financial support they were receiving from coalition members. If the Israelis did anything to jeopardize the American position it could severely and permanently damage American-Israeli relations. Given the amount of economic assistance the Americans had provided over the years and would continue to provide as long as Israel cooperated, that was not a small factor. Would the dubious benefits to Israel of attacking without even finding and damaging the targets be worth alienating America? As a concrete example, very shortly after the war, on February 26, 1991, members of the U.S. Senate expressed deep concern that the Arabs and other allies would not honor their commitments to pay the amounts they had pledged to the coalition. These nations eventually did pay, but they might not have done so if Israel had retaliated against Iraq. Because the United States eventually paid only a little more than 10 percent of the total cost of the operation, having to pick up the total bill would have affected American relations with Israel. The Israeli government stated that the extent of the threat and the way the United States responded would make the difference in how they decided to respond. In the background the Israelis must have been weighing the advantages of not retaliating (as long as no nuclear or chemical weapons were fired). That part of the decision-making process cannot be ruled out. In the end, as we know, the Israelis, despite their public stance and pressure on Washington, did not retaliate. The question is, when did the turning point occur? Because the Israelis did not go forward with military action, it may well be that they made the decision not to retaliate before the first missiles started to fall. The rhetoric about retaliation may have been for show or at least to impart their great sense of urgency to the Americans. Not only the majority of the Israeli public but probably the leaders realized that despite Israel’s ability to claim that once again it needed no one to defend it, the diplomatic and financial damage of doing so would have been great. It may be that the turning point was something the Americans were unaware of, hinging on a decision that had already been made. The members of the alliance may have been waiting for Israel to make a decision publicly when in fact the determination had been made long before. One lesson in this is that even when nations have been allies for many years it is always possible and even probable that a layer of misunderstanding between them still exists. Further, even between trusted allies there is always a bit of deception or a bit of holding information back. That was probably the case with both sides in this instance.

ACTUAL HISTORY On January 24, 1991, the Israeli Cabinet issued a statement that it would not retaliate for the Iraqi attacks. While this statement was no doubt reassuring, we now know that at no time did the United States assume that

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declaration to be irreversible. As late as February 13, Scuds were still hitting Tel Aviv and the Israeli government was still putting pressure on the United States to allow it to attack in return. The speed with which the United States took measures to protect Israel from Scud attacks signifies the importance of the threat to Israel and that country’s possible reaction. Forty-eight Patriot (anti-Scud missile) launchers were immediately sent to Israel. Israel had already agreed to purchase these systems but in the past had always maintained a policy that it would not accept help from the military of other nations. After some debate, an exception was granted in this instance because the Israeli Defense Force had not yet completed its training on the Patriot system. American soldiers would man the Patriot batteries until the Israelis completed their training and could assume this role. In addition, the United States deployed 132 launchers in Saudi Arabia and sent two launchers to Turkey, as did the Dutch. In all, 158 Patriot missiles were fired from Saudi Arabia and Israel to counter Iraq’s missile offensive. The use of the Patriot missiles—in fact, their presence alone— helped to significantly defuse the situation, leading the Israelis to be less strident in their threats to retaliate. The effect of these missiles was, as it later turned out, more apparent than real, but at the time their presence was all that was really needed. During the Gulf War, the Patriot was assigned to shoot down incoming Iraqi Scud or Al-Hussein missiles launched at Israel and Saudi Arabia. The U.S. Army claimed an initial success rate of 80 percent in Saudi

A Patriot missile launcher positioned in Saudi Arabia. The effectiveness of the Patriot missile was debated during the Persian Gulf War. (NATO)

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Arabia and 50 percent in Israel in bringing down Iraqi missiles with the Patriots. Those claims were scaled back to 70 and 40 percent. Later estimates placed the success rate even lower, at approximately 10 percent. In all, the Iraqis fired eighty-eight scuds. Forty-two of these were fired at Israel. Reactive measures were not the only part of America’s efforts to protect Israel. Significant portions of the air war and part of the ground effort went into attempts to stop these attacks before they began. All through the rest of January and into February, the coalition conducted the “Great Scud Hunt.” Many missions were flown looking for mobile launchers or what were believed to be fixed launching sites in western Iraq. The American A–10 Warthogs and B–52s became part of the effort, reflecting that both tactical and strategic air assets were actively engaged in this mission. American Special Forces and their British equivalent, the Special Air Services (SAS), conducted raids in Iraq searching for the sites. No one, including the Israelis, believed that all of the Iraqi Scud launchers could be found and destroyed. As it turned out, none were ever discovered and hit. But the commitment of the coalition to defend Israel had its effect. In addition, the United States took other measures. A secured communications link between the Pentagon and the Israeli defense forces was established. This communication system allowed the United States and the Israelis to pass information back and forth quickly as well as to help convey early warning based on satellite data that the Israelis could not access directly. America sent very senior officials from both the defense and state departments to keep Israelis informed, to continue pressing for a no-retaliation policy, and to reassure them that everything possible was being done. At the same time, the United States pledged that it would provide assistance to repair the damage caused by the Scud attacks. Throughout this time, the Scuds kept falling in both Israel and Saudi Arabia. On January 22, a day in which coalition attempts to search for Scud sites were hampered by heavy cloud cover, a Scud missile hit Tel Aviv killing three people and injuring ninety-six. A few days later seven Scuds were fired. It was claimed that they had been intercepted by the Patriots but a great deal of debris landed. The assumption was that the proximity blasts of the Patriots were responsible for this, but later evidence showed that the Patriots probably did not bring the missiles down; the Scuds had actually disintegrated while in flight over their targets. A couple of days later, in his daily briefing, American general Norman Schwarzkopf stated that the coalition had achieved air supremacy and was significantly reducing the Scud threat. Certainly, even though the attacks were continuing, the efforts from both the Patriot batteries and the air and ground searches were having the effect of calming the Israelis. And these efforts were large. By the nineteenth day of the war, February 3, the Allies had sent 40,000 missions against Iraq. This number was 10,000 missions more than had been flown against Japan in the last fourteen months of World War II. In addition, U.S. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney warned that additional measures, retaliatory strikes of even greater severity, would be taken if the Iraqis used either nuclear or chemical weapons. Nonetheless, Scuds continued to land inside Israel as February progressed. Near the middle of the month, Defense Minister Moishe Arens

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Scud versus Patriot

The Scud missiles that became such a political and psychological (though not necessarily a military) factor were really based on very old technology, going back to World War II. First fielded in 1955, Scuds were based on the German V–2 missiles launched against London in 1944 and 1945. The original intent of these missiles was to allow the Soviet Union to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in the event of a war in Europe.The basic range was up to 180 miles although the versions modified and used by the Iraqis in the Persian Gulf War had a range of up to 500 miles. Scuds were produced and deployed and to this day continue to be in service in great numbers. According to some estimates as many as 10,000 were manufactured with at least half of them still in service in the late 1990s. The Scud was not only designed and used as a landbased missile but was also used for a time in Soviet submarines. Scuds were first used in combat by the Egyptians during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. A few years later both sides used them in the Iran-Iraq war. The Scuds fired by the Iraqis were not the original missiles produced by the Soviet Union but were

heavily modified to provide greater range.The tradeoff of greater reach was a smaller warhead and modifications to provide additional fuel tanks. This change in its configuration with the added fuel capacity added range but caused the missile to break up in flight, reducing accuracy. If, however, it was to be used as a terror weapon against civilian populations in urban areas, with or without chemical weapons, the accuracy issue was secondary. Further, the fact that it would break up in flight tended to confuse the Patriot radar and control software. In contrast, the Patriot was the result of much newer technology. Designed in the 1970s to destroy enemy aircraft, manufacturing of Patriots was begun in 1980. The range was less than fifty miles and its flight time, based, of course, on the target’s location was from nine seconds to approximately three and a half minutes. The Patriot was a system and not simply a missile. Like all air defense artillery weapons, it was operated by units known as batteries. A Patriot battery could have up to sixteen launchers, each firing four missiles. These missiles were packed at the factory; after they were fired, a new pack could be

spoke with Bush and told him that great pressure was being placed on Israel to respond directly to the attacks. Bush thanked him for the restraint but would not make any concessions. While Bush was extremely grateful that Israel was staying out of this fight, he also knew that Arens’s claims of pressure were exaggerated. A recent opinion poll had shown that the majority of the Israeli population understood the larger issues and did not want their country to retaliate. It is also worth noting that it was the minister of defense and not the prime minister, Shimon Peres, who was making these requests. Thus, while the Israeli government was making frequent requests, these were not being voiced at the highest level. Finally, on February 23, the long-awaited ground campaign opened. Within three days the coalition forces had liberated Kuwait City and Bush declared that the conflict was over. The First Gulf War was not over. The declared objective of freeing Kuwait had been accomplished. In all of that time, the coalition had operated effectively and with unity. Restrictions were placed on Iraq to ensure that it could not manufacture either nuclear or chemical weapons. In addition, oil sales by Iraq were limited so as to provide only food and medicine for the civilian population although a large amount of this money was diverted to military and weapons research purposes.

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placed on the mobile launcher. In addition to the missiles and their launchers, the battery operated a radar antenna to identify targets and a command station with computers to track the target and aim the missile. Finally, a mobile power plant supplied all the power needed to operate the battery. The performance of the Patriots, while hailed at first, was later subjected to closer analysis and evaluation and basically found wanting.There were several reasons for the poor performance. Among these, and perhaps most important, the Patriot was not designed as an anti-missile defense system. Its mission was to destroy enemy aircraft, providing air defense on the battlefield. Aircraft, which might travel at twice the speed of sound (approximately 1,200 miles per hour), were considerably slower than the Scuds the Patriots were called on to defend against. The Patriot attacked by means of a conventional device exploding near the target, with the fragments and the shock waves destroying the target.The problem here was that a missile flying at ten times the speed of sound could often outrun the

Patriot’s blast. Combining this factor with modified Iraqi Scuds disintegrating diminished the likelihood of a clean hit. According to one source the Patriot missiles that were fired probably knocked out only 10 percent of their intended targets. These problems were identified after the First Gulf War. When U.S. forces went to Iraq in 2003, the Patriot had been changed so that its warhead would directly hit the target Scud rather than exploding close by. Other improvements beyond that single missile system have been made as well. From the Israeli perspective, the IDF now has an anti-ballistic missile, the Chets (“Arrow”). This weapon had not gone into production during the First Gulf War but is in the current inventory. The Chets, which the United States funded, is supposed to be specifically designed for anti-ballistic missile defense and is better than the improved Patriot. In the second Gulf War, the Iraqis did not fire any missiles at Israel and, as we now know, if they had there would have been only conventional warheads to employ against the Israelis.

President Bush welcomes home U.S. troops in 1991 and singles out two pilots for recognition: Capt. Dale Cormier and Lt.“Neck” Dodson. (George Bush Presidential Library)

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Israel asked for and got billions in aid from the United States, which it would not have been able to acquire so easily or in such great amounts if it had retaliated against Iraq, causing problems for the coalition. No-fly zones were imposed in the northern and southern extremities of Iraq to help safeguard the civilian population there. While this was effective in protecting the Kurds in the north, it was not so successful in protecting the Shi’ites in the south from Saddam Hussein. When the second Gulf War began in 2003, the United States had not forgotten about the Scud attacks of twelve years before. As the threat of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was part of the rationale for this war, there was an assumption that these might be used against Israel. The United States, which had shared intelligence to some extent with the Israelis in the first war, now granted even more access as part of the operations for the new invasion. This information support included instantaneous downloads of American satellite data to centers that controlled the new Israeli Chets anti-ballistic missile systems. General Tommy Franks, commander of the campaign, had also organized a special command that would focus on looking for, finding, and destroying Scud launchers. These units were actually based in western Iraq so as to decrease their reaction time. With substantial numbers and the latest electronic equipment (including unmanned surveillance aircraft) they indicated America’s intention to protect Israel. President George W. Bush and members of his administration, in addition to these efforts, made frequent contact with the Israeli government to reassure them that they were doing everything that could be done and that, once again, it would be in Israel’s best interest to remain uninvolved. The Second Gulf War ended with no Scuds being fired and with the removal of Saddam Hussein in 2003.

ALTERNATE HISTORY The Israelis could have exercised several options. We know what Israel opted to do in the end: to avoid retaliation and rely upon the coalition, principally the United States, to provide its defense from Iraqi missiles. What else might it have done? There could have been a full ground attack on Iraq, major air assaults with conventional or nuclear weapons, an Israeli missile attack, or relatively small-scale ground and air raids on Scud sites. We can double the number of these options as each could have been executed preemptively or in response to an Iraqi attack. Each option would have its own specific set of outcomes. In the end, however, the final, major effect would probably have been the same: a significant disintegration of the coalition against Iraq. The Israeli Defense Forces began drafting a plan for a major land assault on Iraq. In its preliminary stages (and the plan never went further than that in actual history) airborne forces would have been dropped in eastern Jordan. Supported by the air force, these units would have seized ground (what ground was not decided on before planning was stopped) and held until the units were joined by tanks crossing the River Jordan and moving east. They would then have either threatened

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the Iraqi border or, more likely, invaded Iraq from the west. Jordan’s weak air force and army would not have been perceived as a major threat to either Israeli forces or their lines of supply. Still, there would have been difficulties. If Iraq did not have major forces on the Iraqi-Jordanian border, what would the Israelis have done? They might have gone on their own version of the Great Scud Hunt, but without satellite imagery, they would have had little success. Unless there were substantial Iraqi forces for them to engage, there would be no battles in that area. They would not have had either the forces in strength or the logistical support to advance very far into Iraq. They could very well have become an army in enemy territory, without a clear-cut offensive mission. Even though Jordanian armed forces were weaker than the Israelis, the Israelis would have eventually operated on an extended supply line that was getting longer. It would not have taken a great deal to disrupt that line, though not totally destroy it. The Israelis would have had to detach a significant portion of their front-line soldiers to guard their lines of communication. While Jordan at this time favored Iraq, it was not actively engaged against Israel, making it very close to being neutral. The very act of invasion would have created a new immediate enemy for Israel and inflamed Arab public opinion everywhere. President Mubarak of Egypt would have found it increasingly difficult to justify Egypt’s involvement with the Egyptian public’s support for Iraq increasing every day. The invasion could have forced him to begin to withdraw his forces or disengage them to some extent. Syria could have gone from securing Iraq’s western border for the coalition to dropping out. Syria’s next move could have been to move its forces to attack the Golan Heights, banking on a diminished Israeli force to cover this area that had been a point of contention since 1967. Syria, as the home and supporter of several terrorist organizations, might have used this opportunity to assist these organizations or at least stop hindering them as it did in the war. Weighed against all of this is the question of what Israel would have gained. The invasion would have required the largest mobilization since 1973. The military, economic, social, and political stresses would have had a major effect on Israeli life and politics. Whatever it might have gained would also have to be balanced against the increased enmity of the Arab world, probably destroying much of the goodwill acquired since the Camp David Accords of 1978. Finally, and perhaps most important, an Israeli invasion would have made the immediate job of the coalition, what remained of it, more difficult. Such an action could very well have alienated the United States, which had been a staunch ally of Israel since the Kennedy administration. Whether this attack was preemptive or reactionary might have made some difference in its reception, but it would have been a small difference nonetheless. Air strikes might have been one alternative to a major ground attack. Again, these could have been preemptive or retaliatory and, depending on the target and larger strategic intent, used varying levels of force. Before the coalition began its air war on January 17, 1991, the Israelis either might have assumed that Iraq’s earlier explicit threat to

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use chemical weapons against Israel (or the earlier threat to use nuclear weapons), coupled with Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz’s threat to attack would justify a first strike. There would have been several problems here whether it was a first strike or retaliation for the first attacks on January 18. Israeli intelligence, unlike coalition intelligence, relied on aerial photographs from their aircraft. Their ability to get photographs inside Iraq would have been hindered by the amount of air traffic in that region (Israeli planes could have been shot down mistakenly by the coalition, or purposely shot down by Jordanians or Syrians). The coalition relied on satellite images providing much better intelligence and giving them a better chance of finding targets. The Israelis would have committed an act of war regardless of whether they found Scud launchers. In reviewing this option it is good to remember that the coalition never found even one mobile launcher. After the war, some Israeli Air Force officers stated that they thought any Israeli strikes would have accomplished little of value. An attack by Israel’s Jericho missiles might have been launched at targets within Iraq. Because the Israelis still would not have had the intelligence to go after the Scud sites, they might have struck at larger, immobile targets that they would have known about from their earlier intelligence. Jerichos were intermediate range missiles having much in common with the U.S. Pershing missiles that were even then being dismantled in Europe. Such an attack might have concentrated on command and control centers, not to directly stop the missiles but to destroy Iraqi communications. This option would have been easier to implement in that it was not an incursion by either manned aircraft or a ground force. Used as a retaliatory measure, it might have been the least damaging action from the Arabs’ point of view. It still would have created problems for coalition unity, however, because any type of retaliation would have alienated Arab populations that were already against Israel. The most likely form of attack might have been combined airborne troops and small groups of fighters providing ground support. In this scenario, commandos, perhaps augmented by the regular airborne units, might have been dropped into the western Iraqi desert. Their mission would have been to find and destroy the mobile launchers. From the Israeli point of view, such an operation would be relatively inexpensive; the forces, which were specially trained, might have had some luck in finding the targets and these troops could be easily extracted. Small-scale in scope and surgical in nature, these attacks would still have created several problems. First, they would have required violating Jordanian and Saudi airspace (or even Syrian, depending upon the route taken). Further, they would have involved the placement of ground troops within an Arab country (never mind how small the size of the force or how the other Arab nations felt about Iraq). Again, we must consider how successful the Israelis would have been without intelligence about the mobile launchers. One factor common to all scenarios (except the use of missiles) is that the United States stated it would not give the Israelis the IFF

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(Identification Friend or Foe) codes allowing them to enter the air space. The United States was adamant on that point but had determined that if the Israelis made any sort of incursion, a corridor would be opened into which no non-Israeli planes would fly. The Israelis were not told about this last plan. In looking over the options open to Israel we have seen that in addition to having particular difficulties surrounding their execution or their immediate results, they all could have had the potential to seriously disrupt the coalition’s political base and its ability to wage war. Interestingly, both Egypt and Syria had stated that Israel should be allowed to defend itself if attacked. The degree to which they would have stuck to that conviction is uncertain. The sequence of events might have gone as follows. After the Israeli attacks (which would probably have been largely unsuccessful in finding and destroying targets), massive anti-Israeli demonstrations would have occurred in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Syria (these last being instigated by the Syrian government). Smaller demonstrations would likely have occurred in Bangladesh and Morocco. To salvage the situation as much as possible, Mubarak would have ordered Egyptian units to move westward so they could protect the holy cities of Medina and Mecca and not be part of the attacking coalition force. Pakistani soldiers would have been withdrawn on the orders of their government. Moroccan and Bangladeshi troops would have stayed but their governments would have asked to place them away from the front lines to perform support missions. Saudi troops would have stayed in place but the King would have been very concerned about the domestic situation and just how much military support he could count on at home. The Syrians would have left the area. Jordan’s army would have been placed on alert and would have attacked any ground forces within Jordan itself and might have moved into the West Bank in retaliation for Israel’s actions. Palestinians who made up a sizable portion of the Jordanian population would have encouraged their contacts within Israel’s borders to resume their terror attacks. If there were no Israeli units in Jordan, elements of the Jordanian army would possibly have moved near the West Bank, poised to invade and take back the land lost to Israel in 1967. Whether they would have been able to do this is open to question, but the threat would have required that the Israelis station a greater number of troops there. American and coalition plans in the region would now have to be coordinated with Israel’s activities. In allocating air resources, Israel would have required some air support because, like it or not, Israel would now have been a full-fledged combatant and would have had to be assisted. What remained of the coalition would have certainly liberated Kuwait but financial and political aspects would have changed. The key concept of burden sharing that had characterized the coalition would now have been abandoned by several of the participants. The United States would probably have had to pay out a great deal more than it did had the Israelis launched their attack. A direct casualty would have been America’s subsidies to Israel, perhaps not on

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an appreciable level if the attacks had been retaliatory but certainly severe if Israel had struck first. Subsequent American use of bases in the region would likely have been curtailed. Now that Iraq was defeated, the Saudi government would probably have wanted the Americans out as soon as possible in order to curb popular discontent. That action would directly have affected the imposition of no-fly zones in southern Iraq. At the same time, to avoid problems with the opposition in its country, the Turkish government would probably have done the same, despite the fact that Turkey and Israel enjoyed fairly cordial relations. Thus, the northern no-fly zone would not have come into existence. Without constant monitoring, Saddam Hussein would have been able to act without many of the restrictions that bound him in the 1990s. He could have taken reprisals among the northern Kurdish population that would not have a coalition air force to protect it. Sanctions against Iraq would not have been as strong, and with fewer restrictions on Iraq’s oil money, Saddam could have successfully developed weapons of mass destruction to be used on another occasion and most certainly against Israel. The Persian Gulf War would have still ended successfully for the coalition on a military level, but the political situation would have been worse. The opening years of the twenty-first century might have actually seen an Iraq possessing nuclear and chemical weapons and prepared to use them. Robert N. Stacy

Discussion Questions 1. The German military theorist Clausewitz wrote that war is the continuation of a nation’s policy by other means. In other words, military action is an extension of diplomacy and other means. How well does that statement apply to this war from the perspective of the United States, the coalition, or Israel? Does it apply to Iraq as well? 2. How valid was the argument that the Israelis could do nothing more about the missile sites than what the coalition was already doing? 3. Would attacking the sites have been worth the risk in the long run for Israel? Why? What would have been gained? 4. Weigh the actions, outcomes, and consequences of the Israeli decision if Israel had retaliated militarily. What would have been Israel’s overall strategic and diplomatic position with the Americans if it had attacked without finding and destroying any Scuds? Would that result have been different if it had found and destroyed any targets? 5. Actions can have both real and symbolic results. What would have been the symbolic results of an Israeli attack on Iraqi missile sites? What would have been the real results? 6. Define the difference between preemptive and reactive attacks. Aside from what the practical results might have been in finding targets, what difference would each type of attack have made in Israeli-American relations and how would these differ from what actually happened?

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Bibliography and Further Reading Carlisle, Rodney. Persian Gulf War. New York: Facts on File, 2003. Claire, Rodger William. Raid on the Sun inside Israel’s Secret Campaign that Denied Saddam the Bomb. New York: Broadway Books, 2004. Dunnigan, James F. From Shield to Storm: High-Tech Weapons, Military Strategy, and Coalition Warfare in the Persian Gulf. New York: Morrow, 1992. Finlan, Alastair. The Gulf War 1991. New York: Osprey, 2003. Freedman, Lawrence. The Gulf Conflict, 1990–1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993. Fromkin, David. A Peace to End All Peace: Creating the Modern Middle East, 1914–1922.London: A. Deutsch, 1989. Gordon, Michael R. The Generals’ War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf. Boston: Little, Brown, 1995. Katz, Sam. Israeli Defense Forces since 1973. New York: Osprey, 1993. Lewis, George N. Casualties and Damage from Scud Attacks in the 1991 Gulf War. Cambridge, MA: Defense and Arms Control Studies Program, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1993. Leyden, Andrew. Gulf War Debriefing Book: An after Action Report. Grants Pass, OR: Hellgate Press, 1997. Murray, Williamson. The Iraq War: A Military History. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003. Pollack, Kenneth M. Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2002. Samuel, Charles. Missiles, Masks and Miracles. Baltimore: Leviathan Press, 2000. Sherman, A. J. Mandate Days: British Lives in Palestine, 1918–1948. London: Thames and Hudson, 1997. Van Creveld, Martin L. The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Force. New York: Public Affairs, 2002. Zaloga, Steven. Scud Ballistic Missile and Launch Systems 1955–2005. New York: Osprey, 2006.

Kosovo

What if Russia had reacted to the U.S./NATO alliance by coming to Serbia’s aid?

INTRODUCTION As part of the legacy of the Ronald Reagan era, the nation of Yugoslavia dramatically broke into several parts, beginning a drawn-out period of violence based on national, ethnic, and religious differences. In the 1990s many Americans, and others around the world, came to hear of one Balkan region, Kosovo, for the first time. It became the site of the latest in a string of civil and ethnic wars in what had been the nation of Yugoslavia. In this case, it drew the world’s attention fairly early. With that attention came a degree of participation and intervention by several countries to prevent the same kind of slaughter that had happened in Bosnia and that had horrified the world a few years before. In this instance, however, intervention, led by the United States and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), involved a more substantial military commitment. It was the second time in NATO’s history that it had actually fought a conflict, the first having been four years earlier in Bosnia. That military intervention, however, also opened up the possibility of conflict between U.S. and NATO forces and Russia, the successor state to the Soviet Union. To understand what happened in Kosovo in 1999, a brief survey of the history of that part of the Balkans is useful. It is a long and complicated story but one in which events of long ago direct the present perspective, affecting the decision-making process and what each side saw as a satisfactory outcome. As the Cold War came to an end in the last year of the second Reagan administration, there were signs that the alliances and confederations that had made up the communist bloc nations would soon dissolve. The Warsaw Pact, the mutual defense treaty that bound the nations of Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria to the Soviet Union, was abrogated in June 1991. The Soviet Union itself dissolved into fifteen separate republics late in 1991. And Yugoslavia, the fragile federal republic on the eastern side of the Adriatic Sea, across from Italy, also began breaking up in 1991.

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NATO in the Balkans

The common wisdom is that the history, the politics, and the cultures of the Balkans region are extremely complex. At the same time, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has had relationships and interactions in the region that have been equally complex and which are continually developing. NATO was formed in 1949 as an alliance that would shield western Europe from a possible Soviet attack. The original members included the United States, Britain, France, Italy, Denmark, Belgium, Holland, and Norway. Within three years of its founding, NATO accepted two Balkan nations, Greece and Turkey. Although these two nations pledged to protect each other and the other NATO members from aggression, they were close to a state of war themselves. As might be expected of two nations that shared the Balkan peninsula, there was substantial animosity between the two dating back to the days of the Ottoman Empire, when Turkey had ruled Greece. At the same time, there were large Greek settlements on the Turkish coast, and Greek and

Turkish settlements on the island of Cyprus were often in conflict. A war in the 1920s had resulted in forced mass evacuations of the Greek population in Turkey, and the after-effects continued to resonate for many years. In the 1960s and 1970s, the two nations were so close to war that President Lyndon Johnson felt compelled to put pressure on Turkey to back down from its potential standoff with the Greeks. On the other hand, with the exception of Yugoslavia, the remaining Balkan countries were, at one time at least, members of the Warsaw Pact, NATO’s opposition. These Warsaw Pact members were Bulgaria, Romania, and Albania. The first two were members for the entire lifetime of the alliance. Albania was a member from 1955 until 1967 when it left but still remained a communist nation. Yugoslavia was the sole exception, the only Balkan nation to not belong to any alliance. Although Tito’s regime was communist, he had separated himself from the Soviet Union and did not participate in the alliance but instead pursued a

When the republics of Slovenia and Croatia seceded from Yugoslavia in 1991, their decision led to their being attacked by the largely Serbiancontrolled Yugoslav military. That same year, another former state, BosniaHerzegovina, became the scene of a three-way civil war that would last until 1995. That conflict, fought by Serbs, Croatians, and Bosnian Muslims was partly based on whether Yugoslav sovereignty (with an implicit Serb domination) should be maintained. Another contributing factor was the collection of ethnic tensions going back hundreds of years. These tensions and hatreds had also formed the background of fighting in World War II when Yugoslavs had not only fought against the Germans and Italians but against each other as well. Grudges for acts of terror in the 1940s were still fresh enough to provide additional impetus to violence in the 1990s. The common thread through all of this fighting was that many of the issues revolved around wars of conquest and religion that had started in the Middle Ages. These historical events of long ago were interpreted differently by three different groups with different religions (Catholic, Orthodox, and Muslim) and three very different pasts. Each had had its own unique historical experience. One group, the Serbs, had had a significant kingdom (Serbia) while the others (Bosnians, Albanians in Kosovo, Croatians) had usually lived in dependencies. All, however, had all been influenced by the presence of the Muslim Turks of the Ottoman Empire,

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socialist path, while leading other nations in a professed nonalignment group. With the demise of several governments in Eastern Europe and the removal of Soviet control, a series of events began that resulted in NATO’s peacekeeping involvement in the Balkans and NATO’s expansion. Eventually the expanded NATO would include several Balkan nations that had formerly belonged to the Warsaw Pact. Weeks before the 1999 air war against Serbia took place, three former members of the Warsaw Pact joined NATO. These nations were Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic. They were not Balkan nations but they had been members of the Warsaw Pact and their joining NATO was a significant sign of how things were changing in Europe. Five years later, more nations joined including the Balkan nations of Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania. In the years since 1989, NATO’s mission has changed. The original threat that NATO’s members planned to counteract was a massive conventional invasion or a nuclear war initiated by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations. Now the threat is terrorism. The new membership pushed NATO’s

center of gravity further east and its location makes it easier for the United States and other NATO forces to deploy to the Middle East more rapidly. In 2003 as the United States was preparing for its war with Iraq, there was dissension within NATO about whether to support the American invasion. The older members, with the exception of Britain, did not support the war but the new members and those that would join the following year did. This new balance in NATO, with new members coming from an area that only fifteen years earlier had been regarded as a potential enemy, showed a complete turnaround in the balance. When American Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld referred to the NATO members that did not support the United States as the Old Europe and the new nations in the alliance, including the Balkan partners, as the New Europe, he alluded to this new situation. As of 2006, there were plans to add three new Balkan nations to the alliance: Albania, Macedonia, and Croatia. Montenegro, which as late as 1999 had been part of the remaining entity that still called itself Yugoslavia, had declared its independence in 2006 and expressed interest in joining the alliance.

who at one time or another controlled all of the Balkan peninsula. Historical experience was viewed and interpreted into sets of national myths, often based on legend or deliberate fabrication, and these beliefs, seemingly as old as the land itself, materially affected modern day events. What also became very significant was that two outside parties, Russia on the one hand and the United States and NATO on the other, could have been drawn into a conflict there. That conflict would also have been due partly to events going back to the late 1300s. Like the events that occurred in the Balkans in 1914 that led to World War I (the assassination in Sarajevo of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand), a localized conflict here could have started a much wider war eighty-five years later. The fighting in the Balkans and the intervention by the United States and NATO and Russians shows how decision making and the implementation of policy can be affected not only by current developments but also by the past. Yugoslavia presents perhaps the most complicated and extreme situation of different ethnic groups being governed by one government. At the time that it broke up in the 1990s, Yugoslavia comprised six separate republics with two other large areas designated as autonomous provinces. Slovenia was a Catholic region with ties to Austria through the old days of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which lasted until the end of World War I

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A map of the Balkan region before the breakup of Yugoslavia into Serbia and Montenegro. Kosovo would be in the southern portion of Yugoslavia on this map. (Frontier Maps)

in 1918. The main language was Slovenian although many there knew German as well. To the south was Croatia, also Catholic, also with ties going back to Austria-Hungary and Italy. The Croatian language was very close to Serbian, different mostly in that it used the Latin alphabet while the Serbs used the Cyrillic alphabet. East of Croatia was Serbia, a region that had been an independent kingdom in the Middle Ages only to be vanquished, it was claimed, on a

Russia comes to Serbia’s aid? 205

battlefield in what would become the disputed region of Kosovo in the 1990s. Serbia gradually assumed independence in the nineteenth century and by the beginning of the twentieth century had become a formidable participant in Balkan politics, opposing both the Turks (Ottomans) in the south and the Austro-Hungarians to the north and west. Serbs practiced the Eastern Orthodox religion and used an alphabet that was nearly identical to the Russian alphabet; Serbia and Russia shared what some termed a “little brother–big brother” relationship. West of Serbia and south of Croatia was Bosnia. The Ottomans had settled for a long time in this area and most of the population was Muslim. Although sometimes referred to as “Turks” by the Croats and Serbs, Bosnians were Slavs and spoke a form of Serbo-Croatian now formally labeled Bosnian. What alphabet they used depended on whether they lived closer to Croatia or Serbia. South of Bosnia was Montenegro, a small mountainous area whose people used the Serbian alphabet and also practiced the Orthodox religion. They had managed to keep a degree of independence from the Turks; by the early twentieth century they were independent, although maintaining a close relationship with Serbia. The sixth and last of the republics of Yugoslavia was Macedonia. Bordering Greece, Macedonians followed the Orthodox religion and spoke a language that used a Cyrillic alphabet but was different from Serbian. Finally, Yugoslavia had two areas designated provinces that did not have the same degree of political power as the republics. One of these was Vojvodina, located north of Serbia and bordering Hungary. Its population spoke Serbian or Croatian, with many also speaking Hungarian, as a large percentage of them were ethnic Hungarians. The second province was Kosovo, bordered internally by Montenegro, Serbia, and Macedonia and externally by Albania. As could be expected of a region that had been the scene of kingdoms expanding and contracting and empires advancing and retreating, Kosovo (or Kosova as the ethnic Albanians called it) contained Serbs and Macedonians and an extremely large majority of Albanians. Although Kosovo was claimed to be part of medieval Serbia, it was also claimed to be the native land and original territory of the Albanians. In addition to a fairly stationary Albanian population, this ethnic group was reinforced in the late 1940s when many Albanians fled across the border to escape the new hard-core communist government of Stalinist Enver Hoxha. Albanians principally spoke Albanian and, like the Bosnians to the north, were mostly Muslim. People in this province were known as Kosovars, a title usually prefaced with the adjective “Serb” or “Albanian.” When Yugoslavia was created in 1918 in the wake of World War I, this cobbled-together mixture at first labeled itself the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. There were problems from the start, however. The Slovenians and the Croatians and some of the Bosnian Muslims had been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. That meant that during World War I, a substantial number of the male population of those republics, as well as of Vojvodina, had fought against the Kingdom of Serbia, which was now the political center of the new nation. Although there was some general agreement that there should be one Slavic nation, the fact that many of these citizens had fought against each other for four years complicated matters considerably. At times the Croats

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refused to participate in government processes, never formally seceding, but demonstrating a reluctance to participate. In 1929, the government, like many others in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s, became more authoritarian and changed its name. From that point on it was known as the Land of the Southern Slavs, Yugoslavia. World War II began in 1939 and in slightly less than two years, the Germans and Italians invaded Yugoslavia. The country was now split into separate entities; part of Slovenia was annexed into Austria, which was now part of Germany. Croatia became a separate country and as part of the Axis powers, assisted in combat against Serbs and resistance leader Josip Broz Tito’s communist partisans. Tito would go on to lead Yugoslavia, holding the disparate factions together from 1943 to 1980. During the war Muslim and Croatians committed atrocities against Serbs, actions that would provide part of the rationale for Serb atrocities committed in the 1990s. With the end of the war, the kingdom no longer existed and was replaced by a communist government led by Tito. Ethnic harmony was imposed, sometimes roughly on the now reunited Yugoslavia. Beginning with Tito’s death in 1980, however, there was an at-first gradual, then rapid unraveling of the Yugoslav state. The fragile economy began to show serious problems. Then, without Tito’s presence to stifle both independent thought and ethnic identification, fracture lines began to form in the once solid-appearing state. By the time conflict began to appear in Kosovo in the mid-1990s, the precedent had been set for a fight to the death with no negotiation unless it was forced on all sides from outsiders. Kosovo is either Serbian or Albanian. Which version one accepts depends on the stories and myths, mixed with just enough history to make the choice believable. Kosovo was part of the Serbian kingdom in the late Middle Ages. At that time Serbia was considered by many in Europe, especially by itself, to be the great bastion of defense against the Muslims of the Ottoman Empire. It was, in the minds of many, standing between Christian Europe and Islam. Although that assumption has been disputed by current Albanian nationalists, many historians now believe that the vast majority of the population of Kosovo at this time was Serbian, and not Albanian. It was not just a matter of possession that explains the Serb preoccupation with this area. It was the scene of one of the most important incidents in Serbia’s history. A battle was fought there on June 28, 1389, at a place known as the Field of Blackbirds, Kosovo Polje. Here the Serbs under their King, Lazar, fought the Ottomans. Lazar was killed in this battle, which has been in recent times commemorated as a defeat of the Serbs by the Ottomans. Thus, instead of defining their glory in terms of a victory, the Serbs have commemorated this defeat as a moment of glory for their nation. While the myth has become very compelling among Serb nationalists, it probably did not happen that way. Although the battle was definitely not a victory for the Serbs, it probably was not a catastrophic defeat. The end of the battle was perhaps more like a draw, and the Ottomans would need another hundred years to completely subdue Serbia and continue their slow, steady advance. By 1689 the Ottomans were near the gates of the city of Vienna. Although not a major defeat with immediate results, Kosovo Polje became established as

Russia comes to Serbia’s aid? 207

Serbia’s moment of glory. That one legend had it that Lazar had made a choice between a victory in the field and earthly glory, or a defeat with ever-lasting life in heaven; this seemed to give the myth additional weight. For their part, the Albanians have claimed this land as their own, considering Kosovo to be their national homeland. Through the centuries since the medieval era, it has become predominantly Albanian in population with large elements of ethnic Albanians spilling over into Macedonia and Serbia Albania. Many Albanians fled into Kosovo immediately after World War II to escape the newly communist government of Albania, becoming Yugoslav citizens and adding to the Albanian majority. When World War II ended, Serbs made up about 30 percent of the population. By the late 1980s, the Serbian population in Kosovo was only 10 percent of the total. The movement of Serbs fleeing from the fighting in Bosnia, as part of a resettlement program in the early to mid-1990s, added a small percentage but did little to affect the population imbalance. Despite their historical or mythological claims, the Serbs were definitely not in a position to claim ownership of the land, and they did not have a sizable portion of the province’s population. In the late 1980s some analysts noted that Serbia seemed to be reaching for control over the entire country. Although they were the largest ethnic group in Yugoslavia (8 million), they were still a minority in a country that numbered 23.5 million. Their sense of historical destiny and prior dominance in certain aspects of politics and the army caused varying degrees of concern in the other parts of the country. In Kosovo, that anxiety was perhaps most acute—and with good reason. In 1981, many of the rights that had been granted to Kosovo as an autonomous province were reduced and its status of subordination to Serbia was increased. The domination of Kosovo by Serbia was becoming more apparent and gradually affected all aspects of life for ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. In June 1989, the president of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, went to Kosovo Polje to celebrate the six hundredth anniversary of the battle there. In a speech, he made clear his belief that Serbians would do everything in their power not to be subordinated to any group. A few days later, he granted an interview in which he said that he had no political ambitions and did not intend to create a Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia. What he was masking, what would become very obvious to the world in the 1990s, was that Serbian dominance was exactly what he sought. Later that year Milosevic began to strip Kosovo of it rights of autonomy that had been guaranteed in the 1974 constitution. In that same year, the police and the army were brought in to keep order in what was being seen as an increasingly angry Kosovo. The Kosovo response was not long in coming. In a 1991 referendum, ethnic Albanian leaders declared their independence from Serbia. Milosevic’s response was equally swift—the autonomous government of Kosovo (what remained of it) was dissolved and all government was to emanate from Serbia. In the first part of the decade, other events in the Balkans would take center stage, although a group of Albanians had declared that Kosovo was seceding from Yugoslavia in 1991. The army and police stationed there managed to keep things quiet while Croatia, Slovenia, and BosniaHerzegovina had seceded and were now fighting for their independence.

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Air Policing and Air Control

Since World War I when airplanes became a true weapon of war, they have been promoted as a solution to major military problems. How do you maintain control over large areas in a way that is fast, effective, and, above all, cheap? After the end of the war, colonial powers such as Britain, France, and Italy found that their empires were at their greatest extent ever. At the same time, they had all finished a war that had not only been financially costly but had come very close to eliminating an entire generation. Even with their increased responsibilities they did not possess the money, the popular support, or the political will to field large armies to maintain control over their colonies. Eventually, in all of the cases, the nations decided to use their new air forces to patrol wide areas and view what was going on. If problems with the native population arose, airplanes would allow colonial forces to react quickly, if necessary, using machine guns, bombs, or poison gas, all delivered quickly and efficiently from the air. The air strike might then be followed up by a small number of ground troops transported by either armored car or by air.The next visitor would be a colonial officer, also arriving by air, who would extract a formal promise of good behavior from the population before flying back to his headquarters, often hundreds of miles away. The British started using this method in 1919 in eastern Africa (Somaliland), Afghanistan, and later in Mesopotamia (Iraq) and Palestine. The French used aircraft to patrol and punish in Syria and Morocco from the 1920s on. The Italians, who had originally pioneered the use of aircraft in this way, did the same in their colonies in Libya and East Africa.

The most immediate result was that the governing powers could now exert control over wider spans than had ever been possible in the old colonial wars. And this new methodology, usually referred to as air policing, was much cheaper. There was, however, another side to this approach, one that was not so advantageous. Although control could extend the eyes of the colonial authorities, not having so many people actually on the ground did not give them a full picture of what was going on locally, or of having a sense of “ground truth,” as administrators, officials, and analysts would call it eighty years later. At the same time, the lack of faceto-face contact removed the natives from the colonial authorities and diminished the rapport between both sides that would have made effective governance possible. In World War II, the value of airpower and air control became realized. Although a nation could not succeed without it, it also became apparent that a war could not be won without ground troops to advance and actually hold the territory. In a conventional war, this ability to control territory with ground forces was essential. In the years after World War II, this truth was observed and understood by many military leaders, but not by all. Air forces are usually successful advocates of their systems, despite the historical evidence that there are real limits to what they can accomplish. And it is not just the use of fighter or bomber aircraft to deliver ordnance from the air that has limitations on the outcome of a battle or campaign. In Vietnam, the U.S. Marines marched from one objective to another rather than using helicopters. These ground advances were more difficult and took

The tempo of events heightened when the ethnic cleansing and massacres started to occur in Bosnia in 1992. So it remained until the Dayton peace accords were signed in 1995. The year after, however, an organization known as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) came into being and began its own small war against the Yugoslav army and police and the Serb minority, in some cases driving these Serbs from their homes. Events escalated early in 1998 and before the end of that year more than 1,500 Kosovar Albanians were dead and more than 400,000 were

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KEY CONCEPT

Air Policing and Air Control (Continued)

more time, but on the ground the Marines could understand what was going on more easily than their Army colleagues who more frequently used helicopters to facilitate troop movements. The use of air power has been an important part of the decisions about determining what military objectives are and the best way to implement policy. Air control was successful in creating and

maintaining no-fly zones to protect the Kurds in northern Iraq in the 1990s and in establishing a buffer zone between Iraq and Kuwait. In the Balkans, however, the situation was very different.There was more going on at ground level and what was happening was very complex. Even as a threat, air power was perhaps not as successful as NATO hoped it would be.

A B-52H Stratofortress of the 2nd Air Expeditionary Group, Royal Air Force Fairford, England, heads toward a target in Kosovo. (U.S. Air Force)

forced to flee their homes, creating a huge refugee problem. The areas under some sort of KLA control were attacked by the Yugoslav army and, as had happened in Bosnia, many civilians were executed by the soldiers. By May, there was some movement toward talks to reach an agreement between Ibrahim Rugova, a Kosovar Albanian leader, and Slobodan Milosevic, but talks soon broke down. The KLA began to succeed in taking control of more of Kosovo until the summer when it was forced to give up many of its gains under pressure of Serb attacks. The Serbs continued their assaults, killing many civilians until September of that year

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A NATO Council meeting on October 27, 1998, to discuss the growing Kosovo crisis. (NATO)

when the United Nations Security Council called for a cease-fire and for talks between the two sides to begin. The following month, NATO authorized air strikes against Serbian military units in Kosovo unless they withdrew. Milosevic ordered a partial withdrawal and until the end of the year there was at least some sort of truce. NATO did not have an explicit mandate from the UN Security Council to use force against the Serbs, as there was substantial opposition: many Russians perceived NATO’s involvement as illegal and saw NATO as a tool of U.S. foreign policy. By December and January, however, Serb attacks on both the KLA and civilians resulted in more than one hundred Albanians dead. In response to the escalating violence NATO demanded that both parties talk or face the possibility of NATO aircraft attacking ground targets. With this encouragement from the outside, Albanians and Serbs met in a French château named Rambouillet. These talks did not go well from the start. Although an agreement was reached that called for a force of NATO troops to perform peacekeeping duties in Kosovo, the Serbs refused to sign the agreement. On March 22, the Serbs began using their artillery to fire on the Albanians in the city of Pristina. The talks, of course, were suspended and, to no one’s surprise, the Serbian Parliament denounced any plans for a NATO occupation of Kosovo. Milosevic refused to consider Kosovo’s independence or the entry of NATO troops to maintain peace and stability. That was on March 23, 1999. The next day NATO’s air forces began Operation Allied Force, a large air campaign that lasted until June and which struck civilian and military targets in Serbia and military targets (Serb troops and installations) in Kosovo. NATO leaders had estimated that within three to four days, after

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KEY CONCEPT

UN Peacekeeping

The term United Nations originally designated a military alliance, the Allies who, from 1939 to 1945 fought to defeat Japan and Nazi Germany. One of the alliance’s stated goals was to become the basis for a world organization to preserve and maintain peace, replacing the old League of Nations. The UN finally came into being as that organization in San Francisco in 1945. Within three years, the UN would assume a duty implied in its charter but never explicitly spelled out. It would send and supply armed forces not to fight but to prevent fighting. Thus, in 1948, the first UN peacekeeping force was deployed in the Middle East to decrease the likelihood of conflict after the first Arab-Israeli war. Peacekeeping means that soldiers, and sometimes civilians, from UN member states deploy to an area where there is actual or potential conflict. They essentially place themselves between the two sides. In these situations, both sides have to request the support so that fighting will not occur and humanitarian aid can be delivered.

Since the first deployment, more than fifty peacekeeping operations have been performed by the UN. The first started in the Middle East as a result of the wars between Israel and the Arab nations in 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973. Other instances have included deployments in Africa in the early 1960s, along the border between Pakistan and India, and on the island of Cyprus to separate the Turkish and Greek communities. In 1988, the UN was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for its peacekeeping activities. Peacekeeper activity was especially crucial in the Balkans, first in Bosnia where the force deployed there was designated the UN Protective Force (UNPROFOR) and later the Security Force (SFOR) and the Kosovo Force (KFOR). The objectives of KFOR, which includes both NATO and non-NATO participation but is led by NATO, are to establish and maintain a secure environment in Kosovo, including public safety and order.

the air assault alone, with no invasion or activity by ground troops, the Serbs would surrender. Despite their optimism about the effectiveness of air power alone, the campaign took seventy-eight days to accomplish NATO’s goal. NATO eventually did get an agreement from the Serbs on June 9, 1999. On June 10, 1999. Yugoslavia began to withdraw its forces and the NATO ground troops began to enter Kosovo from Macedonia to the south and Albania in the west. This peacekeeping Kosovo Force, designated as KFOR, expected to enter the region and begin its operations unhindered by the Serbs or anyone else. Instead, they were met with a surprise that could have resulted in conflict between the NATO allies and Russia.

When the air war had ended and KFOR, which was really a NATO operation although in cooperation with the United Nations, began to plan its movement into Kosovo, some within the Russian government saw this as the opportunity to make up for lost prestige and respect. If Russian troops could enter Kosovo and prevent NATO troops from entering what the “little brother” Serbs considered their own, they would send the message that although Russia might have lost the Cold War, it was still a power to be reckoned with.

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Russia and Serbia had had long-standing cultural and diplomatic ties. As fellow slavs and Christians, Russians had supported Serbian independence from the Ottomans in the nineteenth century. As the pan-South Slav movement began in Croatia and Bosnia, both under Austro-Hungarian rule, and in Macedonia, under Ottoman Rule, Russia again provided support. When pan-Slav assassins murdered the Austrian Archduke in 1914, Russia offered support to Serbia, launching World War I. With Russia again supporting Serbia in the 1990s, it seemed that the alignments of earlier eras might once again surface, possibly escalating into an unexpected showdown between Russia and the NATO allies. Stationed in Bosnia as part of the United Nations Security Force (SFOR) Peacekeepers, Russian airborne commandos moved from there on June 11 and directly to Belgrade, the Serbian capital. The Russians stated at that time that they would not move into Kosovo. To A NATO paratrooper jumping during a war exercise of the surprise of NATO, that was, however, coalition forces in the Balkan region. (NATO) exactly what the Russians did on the next day. They went to Pristina, the capital of Kosovo and occupied the Slatina airport there. The Serbs, especially the Serb minority in Kosovo, were very happy about this. Later on June 12, the NATO troops in Macedonia started to move across into Kosovo. British units advanced, accompanied by air support, stopping close to the Russians now occupying the airport. The situation in Kosovo was now at an impasse. NATO troops were not the only organized military force in Kosovo. Although no overtly hostile intention has been signaled, the fact that the Russians were there without warning, without a clear mission statement, and without anyone in the West knowing who had ordered this deployment created a great deal of tension. There was no indication of whether more Russian troops were on the way. In the old days of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, it would have been an easy matter to move Pact and Soviet troops in from Bulgaria and Hungary. Now, with those nations independent and one of them currently a NATO member, they were prepared to deny the Russians permission to cross their airspace to reinforce the first airborne units on the ground. Ultimately, this prohibition of flying-over is exactly what happened. In this way, there was some effort to prevent Russian reinforcements, but the denial of airspace could have added to an already tense situation. Both sides kept their distance. The Russians went about their maintenance and preparation as though the British peacekeepers were not even there. An American reconnaissance drone circled above, tracking Russian activities. The scene was set for the possibility of a confrontation between NATO and Russia.

Russia comes to Serbia’s aid? 213

ACTUAL HISTORY The unexpected appearance of Russian troops at Slatina airport offered several unpleasant possibilities, the most dramatic of which was a confrontation either between ground forces in Kosovo or in the air, as the Russians could have disputed access to Hungarian or Bulgarian airspace. The gravest danger seemed, to some, that there was no way to understand why the Russians had acted as they did, who had ordered the movement, or what the objectives were. The possibility of a coup or realignment of political power was another unknown. Diplomatic exchanges began immediately. U.S. President Bill Clinton had personal discussions with Russian President Boris Yeltsin in an attempt to find out what was going on, what the Russians wanted, and what the possible courses of action might be. Clinton was not able to get a clear answer at first and it took some effort to determine that the move had been made by Yeltsin himself without anything more than minimal consultations with members of his government. Many of his cabinet ministers were as surprised by this turn of events as the Western powers were. A great deal of political commentary in Western newspapers and among analysts in Western governments focused on what was happening and why. Yeltsin had been in poor health and although his government was to a large extent pro-Western, it still lacked a great deal of stability. To some, the recent events were similar to the attempted coup against Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991. That coup had been defeated, largely by Yeltsin himself, but the possibility of some drastic change in government was not discounted, especially by members of his government, such as Vladimir Putin, who would eventually become president of Russia. Negotiations began soon after the Russians arrived in Kosovo. In the meantime, NATO continued to send troops in from Albania and Macedonia. At the same time NATO was entering the region, Yugoslav, that is primarily Serbian, troops were withdrawing; by June 20 they were all gone. Albanian Kosovars were returning as well to their homes. By the middle of July over 600,000 people were resettled in their former homes. The negotiations were unusual in some respects. Russia conducted its discussions directly with the United States, not the NATO alliance. Further, the talks were conducted as a three-way exchange with Finland acting as a negotiating and facilitating party. By June 18, a preliminary agreement was reached in which KFOR would include Russian troops, approximately 3,000. By July 7, additional Russian troops, now granted clearance to cross Bulgarian and Hungarian airspace, arrived in Kosovo to work within the French, German, and American zones. Thus, Russia had shown itself to be a power to be considered, a protector of other Slavs, and a constructive member of the community of nations. The relief in NATO was substantial. There was no such good feeling in Moscow, despite this new level of participation. Russia’s lower house of Parliament, the Duma, voted to recommend to Yeltsin that he fire the minister who had conducted the negotiations with the Americans. The feeling was that Russia under Yeltsin had once again sold out to the West.

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Now that the negotiations were finished and the Russians had been given their opportunity to work within the KFOR framework, the peacekeeping operations began, not only to protect the structure of a future state of Kosovo but to also ensure the rights and safety of the Serb minority, which no longer had the Yugoslav army or police to protect it. It was this specific mission that the Russians claimed they had come to do, although most of the remaining Serbs began to leave Kosovo to resettle in Serbia. Eventually KFOR included troops from several NATO and non-NATO nations and numbered almost 50,000. The Russians finally left Kosovo in March 2003. In 2006, KFOR, although operating at a much lower level of fewer than 20,000 troops, remained in Kosovo. The time of departure was not yet determined. The area was still unstable and the specific details of its political future had not been determined. Earlier that year a resolution by the peacekeeping powers emphasized that whatever final course of action might be taken, Kosovo would not be divided in any way nor would it become absorbed into another country (meaning neither Albania nor Serbia). The collapse of the federation of Yugoslavia resulted in thousands of refugees seeking shelter from murder, rape, and destruction of their homes and farms. Serbs as well as Croats and Bosnians had to relocate. In Kosovo, Serbs fled from ethnic Albanians who sought to dominate the province.

ALTERNATE HISTORY The events that followed the air war and the implementation of KFOR as a means to protect the population, provide stability, and eventually lead to a permanent political solution seem to be the logical result of nations acting reasonably to correct a nearly disastrous situation. That ending was not preordained, however, and things might have gone very differently. The problem is that nations do not always act in a rational manner, using enlightened self-interest to guide their policies. Just as the situation in Yugoslavia, especially Kosovo, was influenced by emotional perceptions of what had happened in the past, some of the outside actors had their own particular influences that might not always have been based in logic but were compelling nonetheless. Serbia’s strongest ally was Russia. It is important to remember that in the years since the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, the Soviet Union had ceased to exist. Several member states of the Soviet Union, such as Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia were now independent nations. Soviet troops had been withdrawn from Europe and there were many who believed that the demise of the Soviet Union had been a serious, demoralizing defeat. Whatever its flaws were, and there were many, the existence of the Soviet Union had been a source of pride for many people. Its defeat in the Cold War and the erosion of the state and decline of the military were all part of a pattern in which the once-respected Soviet Union was now the lightly regarded Russia.

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The picture of Russia’s decline was seen by many to be represented by the sometimes clownish antics of Boris Yeltsin, concessions made to the West, and the rise of private enterprise that seemed to be just a notch or two above organized crime. Among military men, the sense of disgust and alienation was perhaps most pronounced and they represented a potential source of danger to Yeltsin’s somewhat shaky government. As the events in Serbia and Kosovo played out, it occurred to several individuals that military action might help to restore Russia’s pride and prestige. The manner in which the Russians inserted themselves to prevent the NATO/KFOR deployment might have gone in this way: In the middle of June, the military along with help and support and leadership from the current secretary of the National Security Council, a former secret police official named Vladimir Putin, would have decided to make their move. The original group they would have sent into Kosovo would have been a highly specialized and experienced but relatively small unit. Its arrival from Bosnia to Belgrade to Kosovo would have secured the Slatina airport. Then an airborne division would have been moved from the Moscow Military District. If necessary, Hungarian or Bulgarian airspace would have been violated. The Russians would have calculated that although there would be a firestorm of diplomatic protests, neither nation would have begun a shooting war over this issue. Further, in their calculations, NATO would not have responded militarily over this action, although there might have been some serious diplomatic repercussions. The sense of loss and resentment following the Cold War could have been so acute that most of the leaders in this Russian group would be thinking of acting without examining all the consequences. Yeltsin, although enraged at this move without his approval, would have been powerless to stop it as the military, having been supported and assisted by Putin, now would have backed Putin’s claims to national leadership. Orders would have been given to advance into Kosovo and prevent the NATO forces from entering the area. Russian jet fighters would have flown missions to provide close air support, but would not have been drawn into a conflict. Thus, the Serbs, with support from their “big brothers,” the Russians would have reoccupied Kosovo. The Russians, who had entered World War I on Serbia’s behalf in 1914, would have once again mobilized to help the Serbs eighty-five years later. Unimpeded, the Serbs could then have launched a wide-scale, unimpeded ethnic cleansing, killing Albanian Kosovars and forcing these remnants of the population into Macedonia or Albania. The resulting humanitarian crisis would have been catastrophic. Other possible results could have been Serbian attempts to reopen the conflict in Bosnia. With its airspace over Belgrade and Kosovo covered, the remains of the Serbian air force, supported by elements of the army, might have attempted to detach “their” part of Bosnia. This action would have reopened that conflict, put the SFOR at risk, and probably have created a temporary alliance between the Muslims and Croats. The NATO alliance, on the other hand, might have started to fracture under this pressure. It would have been caught in a position that forced it to make a commitment to protect the Kosovars and yet

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not have been able to enforce its will for fear of starting a conflict with Russia. NATO would have been pretty much stalemated. In addition, some members, such as Italy and Greece, would have opposed the aerial bombing (the Italian government would have allowed the United States to use Italian bases but the population would have been greatly opposed to this action). Another variable in what could have happened is the participation of Boris Yeltsin. In actual history, he ordered the original Russian occupation of the airbase. He might have ordered the actions just described either voluntarily or under pressure, or he might have been removed by a coup whose members would then have carried out the increased Russian incursions into Kosovo. If Yeltsin had been pushed out, his removal and the elevation of Putin would probably have been ratified by a “special election” to preserve the picture that Russia was still a democracy. The Russian army now would have felt that it was on it way back and would have strongly supported Putin. His triumph might have been followed by a prosecution of the war against separatists in Chechnya that was even more aggressive than actually happened. That, coupled with a renewed Russian attempt to regain more complete control over Central Asia, might have destabilized the situation, especially at a time when Muslim Nationalists and terrorist organizations were becoming more active. Although a shooting war would not have taken place, the Cold War would have made a return. The United States and NATO would have lost support from some of the original members but there now would have been participation from new NATO members in the years following the Kosovo showdown: Romania, Bulgaria, the Baltic nations, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, as well as Slovenia, Bosnia, and Croatia. The United States, feeling isolated by the implosion of its NATO mission in Kosovo and facing a resurgent Russia, would have welcomed the support from this new quarter. In still another scenario, an actual shooting war might have broken out between some or all of the NATO forces and the Russian troops at Pristina. For a few days in June 1999, that is exactly what commentators and policy makers feared could happen. Although leaders on both sides recognized the danger and would certainly have worked to de-escalate the situation, once gunfire broke out between the two sides, it would have been difficult to step back and restore calm. In a dreadful re-play of the events of 1914, each side might have accused the other of duplicity and using the episode as an excuse. Had Russian and NATO troops begun firing on each other, or had their aircraft engaged in dogfights, the long-feared World War III between a Russian-led coalition and an American-led coalition would possibly have begun. Such a war could have broadened out to include air strikes against NATO or Russian strategic targets such as air and naval bases, or it might have been limited to a few engagements in the Balkans. In either case, the step over the brink into a NATO-Russian war would have completely changed international relations in the beginning decade of the twenty-first century. Robert N. Stacy

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Discussion Questions 1. Tito’s regime in Yugoslavia managed to suppress both individual political expression and different ethnic identities. To what extent do you think this policy was responsible for the violence of the 1990s? How could this have been better managed? 2. Using the interventions of the Western nations in the former Yugoslavia as an example, how does a thorough knowledge of the past help to plan for the future? What specific items of history would have been important for NATO planners in 1999? 3. Several nations in the Balkans were, until the end of the Cold War, potential opponents of NATO. Now, several of them are either actual or potential NATO members. Based on your evaluation of Balkan politics, what advantages would there be in their joining NATO? What disadvantages? 4. Based on the example of Kosovo, what do you think are the essential points of any plan to effectively operate a peacekeeping force so that it achieves it goals of peace and stability?

Bibliography and Further Reading Badsey, Stephen, and Paul Latawski, eds. Britain, NATO, and the Lessons of the Balkan Conflicts, 1991–1999. New York: Frank Cass, 2004. Bieber, Florian, and Zidas Daskalovski, eds. Understanding the War in Kosovo. New York: Frank Cass, 2003. Clark, Wesley K. Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat. New York: Public Affairs, 2001. Cox, Sebastian, and Peter Gray. Air Power History: Turning Points from Kitty Hawk to Kosovo. New York: Frank Cass, 2002. Haave, Christopher E., and Phil M. Haun, eds. A–10s over Kosovo: The Victory of Airpower over a Fielded Army as Told by Those Airmen Who Fought in Operation Allied Force. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2003. Judah, Tim. Kosovo: War and Revenge. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002. Kaufman, Joyce P. NATO and the Former Yugoslavia: Crisis, Conflict, and the Atlantic Alliance. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002. Latawski, Paul C. The Kosovo Crisis and the Evolution of Post–Cold War European Security. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2003. Macqueen, Norrie. Peacekeeping and the International System. London: Routledge, 2006. Malcolm, Noel. Kosovo: A Short History. New York: New York University Press, 1999. Norris, John. Collision Course: NATO, Russia, and Kosovo. London: Praeger, 2005. Odom, William E. The Collapse of the Soviet Military. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998. Thompson, Mark. A Paper House: The Ending of Yugoslavia. New York: Pantheon, 1992.

Appendix I

Remarks at the Brandenburg Gate President Ronald Reagan’s June 12, 1987, Speech in West Berlin, Germany

This speech was delivered to the people of West Berlin, yet it was also audible on the east side of the Berlin wall. Widely regarded as Ronald Reagan’s triumphal moment in his effort to bring an end to the Cold War, the speech at the Brandenburg Gate reflected Reagan’s challenge to the Soviet Union to bring an end to its control over the satellite nations of Eastern Europe. —Rodney Carlisle Thank you very much. Chancellor Kohl, Governing Mayor Diepgen, ladies and gentlemen: Twenty-four years ago, President John F. Kennedy visited Berlin, speaking to the people of this city and the world at the City Hall. Well, since then two other presidents have come, each in his turn, to Berlin. And today I, myself, make my second visit to your city. We come to Berlin, we American presidents, because it’s our duty to speak, in this place, of freedom. But I must confess, we’re drawn here by other things as well: by the feeling of history in this city, more than five hundred years older than our own nation; by the beauty of the Grunewald and the Tiergarten; most of all, by your courage and determination. Perhaps the composer Paul Lincke understood something about American presidents. You see, like so many presidents before me, I come here today because wherever I go, whatever I do: Ich hab noch einen Koffer in Berlin. [I still have a suitcase in Berlin.] Our gathering today is being broadcast throughout Western Europe and North America. I understand that it is being seen and heard as well in the East. To those listening throughout Eastern Europe, a special word: Although I cannot be with you, I address my remarks to you just as surely as to those standing here before me. For I join you, as I join your fellow countrymen in the West, in this firm, this unalterable belief: Es gibt nur ein Berlin. [There is only one Berlin.] Behind me stands a wall that encircles the free sectors of this city, part of a vast system of barriers that divides the entire continent of Europe.

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From the Baltic, south, those barriers cut across Germany in a gash of barbed wire, concrete, dog runs, and guard towers. Farther south, there may be no visible, no obvious wall. But there remain armed guards and checkpoints all the same—still a restriction on the right to travel, still an instrument to impose upon ordinary men and women the will of a totalitarian state. Yet it is here in Berlin where the wall emerges most clearly; here, cutting across your city, where the news photo and the television screen have imprinted this brutal division of a continent upon the mind of the world. Standing before the Brandenburg Gate, every man is a German, separated from his fellow men. Every man is a Berliner, forced to look upon a scar. President von Weizsacker has said, “The German question is open as long as the Brandenburg Gate is closed.” Today I say: As long as the gate is closed, as long as this scar of a wall is permitted to stand, it is not the German question alone that remains open, but the question of freedom for all mankind. Yet I do not come here to lament. For I find in Berlin a message of hope, even in the shadow of this wall, a message of triumph. In this season of spring in 1945, the people of Berlin emerged from their air-raid shelters to find devastation. Thousands of miles away, the people of the United States reached out to help. And in 1947 Secretary of State—as you’ve been told—George Marshall announced the creation of what would become known as the Marshall Plan. Speaking precisely 40 years ago this month, he said: “Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos.” In the Reichstag a few moments ago, I saw a display commemorating this 40th anniversary of the Marshall Plan. I was struck by the sign on a burnt-out, gutted structure that was being rebuilt. I understand that Berliners of my own generation can remember seeing signs like it dotted throughout the western sectors of the city. The sign read simply: “The Marshall Plan is helping here to strengthen the free world.” A strong, free world in the West, that dream became real. Japan rose from ruin to become an economic giant. Italy, France, Belgium—virtually every nation in Western Europe saw political and economic rebirth; the European Community was founded. In West Germany and here in Berlin, there took place an economic miracle, the Wirtschaftswunder. Adenauer, Erhard, Reuter, and other leaders understood the practical importance of liberty—that just as truth can flourish only when the journalist is given freedom of speech, so prosperity can come about only when the farmer and businessman enjoy economic freedom. The German leaders reduced tariffs, expanded free trade, lowered taxes. From 1950 to 1960 alone, the standard of living in West Germany and Berlin doubled. Where four decades ago there was rubble, today in West Berlin there is the greatest industrial output of any city in Germany—busy office blocks, fine homes and apartments, proud avenues, and the spreading lawns of parkland. Where a city’s culture seemed to have been destroyed, today there are two great universities, orchestras and an opera, countless theaters, and museums. Where there was want, today there’s abundance—food, clothing, automobiles—the wonderful goods of the

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Ku’damm. From devastation, from utter ruin, you Berliners have, in freedom, rebuilt a city that once again ranks as one of the greatest on earth. The Soviets may have had other plans. But my friends, there were a few things the Soviets didn’t count on—Berliner Herz, Berliner Humor, ja, und Berliner Schnauze. [Berliner heart, Berliner humor, yes, and a Berliner Schnauze (snout or nose).] In the 1950s, Khrushchev predicted: “We will bury you.” But in the West today, we see a free world that has achieved a level of prosperity and well-being unprecedented in all human history. In the Communist world, we see failure, technological backwardness, declining standards of health, even want of the most basic kind—too little food. Even today, the Soviet Union still cannot feed itself. After these four decades, then, there stands before the entire world one great and inescapable conclusion: Freedom leads to prosperity. Freedom replaces the ancient hatreds among the nations with comity and peace. Freedom is the victor. And now the Soviets themselves may, in a limited way, be coming to understand the importance of freedom. We hear much from Moscow about a new policy of reform and openness. Some political prisoners have been released. Certain foreign news broadcasts are no longer being jammed. Some economic enterprises have been permitted to operate with greater freedom from state control. Are these the beginnings of profound changes in the Soviet state? Or are they token gestures, intended to raise false hopes in the West, or to strengthen the Soviet system without changing it? We welcome change and openness; for we believe that freedom and security go together, that the advance of human liberty can only strengthen the cause of world peace. There is one sign the Soviets can make that would be unmistakable, that would advance dramatically the cause of freedom and peace. General Secretary Gorbachev, if you seek peace, if you seek prosperity for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, if you seek liberalization: Come here to this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall! I understand the fear of war and the pain of division that afflict this continent—and I pledge to you my country’s efforts to help overcome these burdens. To be sure, we in the West must resist Soviet expansion. So we must maintain defenses of unassailable strength. Yet we seek peace; so we must strive to reduce arms on both sides. Beginning 10 years ago, the Soviets challenged the Western alliance with a grave new threat, hundreds of new and more deadly SS-20 nuclear missiles, capable of striking every capital in Europe. The Western alliance responded by committing itself to a counter-deployment unless the Soviets agreed to negotiate a better solution; namely, the elimination of such weapons on both sides. For many months, the Soviets refused to bargain in earnestness. As the alliance, in turn, prepared to go forward with its counter-deployment, there were difficult days—days of protests like those during my 1982 visit to this city—and the Soviets later walked away from the table. But through it all, the alliance held firm. And I invite those who protested then—I invite those who protest today—to mark this fact: Because we remained strong, the Soviets came back to the table. And

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because we remained strong, today we have within reach the possibility, not merely of limiting the growth of arms, but of eliminating, for the first time, an entire class of nuclear weapons from the face of the earth. As I speak, NATO ministers are meeting in Iceland to review the progress of our proposals for eliminating these weapons. At the talks in Geneva, we have also proposed deep cuts in strategic offensive weapons. And the Western allies have likewise made far-reaching proposals to reduce the danger of conventional war and to place a total ban on chemical weapons. While we pursue these arms reductions, I pledge to you that we will maintain the capacity to deter Soviet aggression at any level at which it might occur. And in cooperation with many of our allies, the United States is pursuing the Strategic Defense Initiative—research to base deterrence not on the threat of offensive retaliation, but on defenses that truly defend; on systems, in short, that will not target populations, but shield them. By these means we seek to increase the safety of Europe and all the world. But we must remember a crucial fact: East and West do not mistrust each other because we are armed; we are armed because we mistrust each other. And our differences are not about weapons but about liberty. When President Kennedy spoke at the City Hall those 24 years ago, freedom was encircled, Berlin was under siege. And today, despite all the pressures upon this city, Berlin stands secure in its liberty. And freedom itself is transforming the globe. In the Philippines, in South and Central America, democracy has been given a rebirth. Throughout the Pacific, free markets are working miracle after miracle of economic growth. In the industrialized nations, a technological revolution is taking place—a revolution marked by rapid, dramatic advances in computers and telecommunications. In Europe, only one nation and those it controls refuse to join the community of freedom. Yet in this age of redoubled economic growth, of information and innovation, the Soviet Union faces a choice: It must make fundamental changes, or it will become obsolete. Today thus represents a moment of hope. We in the West stand ready to cooperate with the East to promote true openness, to break down barriers that separate people, to create a safe, freer world. And surely there is no better place than Berlin, the meeting place of East and West, to make a start. Free people of Berlin: Today, as in the past, the United States stands for the strict observance and full implementation of all parts of the Four Power Agreement of 1971. Let us use this occasion, the 750th anniversary of this city, to usher in a new era, to seek a still fuller, richer life for the Berlin of the future. Together, let us maintain and develop the ties between the Federal Republic and the Western sectors of Berlin, which is permitted by the 1971 agreement. And I invite Mr. Gorbachev: Let us work to bring the Eastern and Western parts of the city closer together, so that all the inhabitants of all Berlin can enjoy the benefits that come with life in one of the great cities of the world. To open Berlin still further to all Europe, East and West, let us expand the vital air access to this city, finding ways of making commercial air service to Berlin more convenient, more comfortable, and more economical.

APPENDIX I

We look to the day when West Berlin can become one of the chief aviation hubs in all central Europe. With our French and British partners, the United States is prepared to help bring international meetings to Berlin. It would be only fitting for Berlin to serve as the site of United Nations meetings, or world conferences on human rights and arms control or other issues that call for international cooperation. There is no better way to establish hope for the future than to enlighten young minds, and we would be honored to sponsor summer youth exchanges, cultural events, and other programs for young Berliners from the East. Our French and British friends, I’m certain, will do the same. And it’s my hope that an authority can be found in East Berlin to sponsor visits from young people of the Western sectors. One final proposal, one close to my heart: Sport represents a source of enjoyment and ennoblement, and you may have noted that the Republic of Korea—South Korea—has offered to permit certain events of the 1988 Olympics to take place in the North. International sports competitions of all kinds could take place in both parts of this city. And what better way to demonstrate to the world the openness of this city than to offer in some future year to hold the Olympic games here in Berlin, East and West? In these four decades, as I have said, you Berliners have built a great city. You’ve done so in spite of threats—the Soviet attempts to impose the East-mark, the blockade. Today the city thrives in spite of the challenges implicit in the very presence of this wall. What keeps you here? Certainly there’s a great deal to be said for your fortitude, for your defiant courage. But I believe there’s something deeper, something that involves Berlin’s whole look and feel and way of life—not mere sentiment. No one could live long in Berlin without being completely disabused of illusions. Something instead, that has seen the difficulties of life in Berlin but chose to accept them, that continues to build this good and proud city in contrast to a surrounding totalitarian presence that refuses to release human energies or aspirations. Something that speaks with a powerful voice of affirmation, that says yes to this city, yes to the future, yes to freedom. In a word, I would submit that what keeps you in Berlin is love— love both profound and abiding. Perhaps this gets to the root of the matter, to the most fundamental distinction of all between East and West. The totalitarian world produces backwardness because it does such violence to the spirit, thwarting the human impulse to create, to enjoy, to worship. The totalitarian world finds even symbols of love and of worship an affront. Years ago, before the East Germans began rebuilding their churches, they erected a secular structure: the television tower at Alexander Platz. Virtually ever since, the authorities have been working to correct what they view as the tower’s one major flaw, treating the glass sphere at the top with paints and chemicals of every kind. Yet even today when the sun strikes that sphere—that sphere that towers over all Berlin—the light makes the sign of the cross. There in Berlin, like the city itself, symbols of love, symbols of worship, cannot be suppressed. As I looked out a moment ago from the Reichstag, that embodiment of German unity, I noticed words crudely spray-painted upon the wall, perhaps by a young Berliner: “This wall will fall. Beliefs become reality.”

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Yes, across Europe, this wall will fall. For it cannot withstand faith; it cannot withstand truth. The wall cannot withstand freedom. And I would like, before I close, to say one word. I have read, and I have been questioned since I’ve been here about certain demonstrations against my coming. And I would like to say just one thing, and to those who demonstrate so. I wonder if they have ever asked themselves that if they should have the kind of government they apparently seek, no one would ever be able to do what they’re doing again. Thank you and God bless you all.

Appendix II

Iran-Contra: The Underlying Facts

In this extract from the Executive Summary of the Report of the Independent Counsel on the Iran-Contra scandal, the Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh reviewed the evolution of the policy of the Reagan Administration toward the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. Although Congress had passed legislation (the Boland Amendment) prohibiting the government from assisting the “Contra” rebels attempting to overthrow the left-wing Sandinistas, officials in the administration sought ways to get around the law. Working with other governments and with privately raised funds, Colonel Oliver North channeled resources to the Contras. All the efforts outlined in this portion of the executive summary skirted the law; they were later followed by more directly illegal efforts that involved the sale of missiles to Iran in exchange for promises to arrange the release of terrorist-held American hostages in Lebanon. —Rodney Carlisle

The Contras Independent Counsel’s investigation produced a vast record of U.S. Government involvement with the Nicaraguan Contras during a prohibition on military aid from October 1984 to October 1986. The Office of Independent Counsel (OIC) focused its inquiry on possible criminal activity—ranging from violations of the Boland Amendment prohibition on aid to conspiracy to violate the tax laws—in Administration efforts to assist the military and paramilitary operations of the Contras. The investigation also centered on what officials knew about that assistance and what they offered when questioned about it. No effort was made to create a complete historical record of U.S. activities in the region, or even of American ties to the Contras. Independent Counsel’s look at the “Contra” side of Iran-Contra quickly focused on critical episodes for American policy in Central America. A discussion of some of these episodes is useful for understanding the prosecutions brought or declined by Independent Counsel.

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The Reagan Administration’s Contra Policy President Reagan was an early and vigorous opponent of the Sandinista regime that seized power in Nicaragua in 1979. As a presidential candidate, Reagan advocated cutting all aid to the Nicaraguan government; as President, Reagan stepped up American activities against the Sandinistas and embraced their opponents, known as the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance or ‘‘Contras.’’ Reagan’s posture towards the Sandinista government was highly controversial. The opponents of the Administration’s anti-Sandinista policies convinced a majority of the Democratic-controlled U.S. House of Representatives to view the Contras with extreme skepticism. Their efforts resulted in passage in late 1982 of an amendment introduced by Representative Edward P. Boland to the Fiscal Year 1983 Defense Appropriations bill. This first of a series of ‘‘Boland Amendments’’ prohibited the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the principal conduit of covert American support to the Contras, from spending any money ‘‘for the purpose of overthrowing the government of Nicaragua.’’ Controversy over Contra policy continued past enactment of the first Boland Amendment. The Reagan Administration pushed hard for more money for the Contras, while House Democrats threatened to cut off such support altogether. In early December 1983, a compromise was reached: Contra funding for FY 1984 was capped at $24 million—an amount significantly lower than what the Administration had wanted—with the possibility that the Administration could approach the Congress for supplemental funds later. The December 1983 cap on Contra aid guaranteed a crisis in the Administration’s Contra program the following year. As early as February 1984, Reagan’s national security adviser, Robert C. McFarlane, had suggested to other Administration officials that one way to fund the Contras would be to encourage other countries to contribute support. CIA Director William J. Casey agreed with the idea, and recommended several countries that had been or could be approached. By May 1984, McFarlane had convinced one of these countries, Saudi Arabia, to contribute $1 million per month to the Contra cause. McFarlane instructed his trusted assistant on the National Security Council (NSC) staff, Lt. Col. Oliver L. North, to arrange for a covert bank account to move the Saudi funds into Contra hands. The Saudi contributions came just as it was clear that Congress would not increase direct American support for the Contras. Disclosures in April 1984 that the CIA had secretly mined Nicaraguan harbors had wrecked the Administration’s chances to persuade the Congress to lift its $24 million Contra-aid cap. According to McFarlane, an undaunted President Reagan instructed McFarlane—who in turn told North—that the NSC staff had to keep the Contras alive ‘‘body and soul.’’ The NSC staff’s efforts to assist the Contras in the wake of Congress’s withdrawal of funding took many forms. Initially it meant extending its earlier initiative to increase third-country contributions to the Contras. Casey and McFarlane broached the subject of such funding at a June 25, 1984, meeting of the National Security Planning Group (NSPG), consisting of the President, Vice President Bush, Casey, McFarlane, Secretary of

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State George Shultz, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, United Nations Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. John Vessey, and presidential adviser Edwin Meese III. Shultz warned that any approach to a third country could be viewed as an “impeachable offense,” and convinced the group that it needed a legal opinion from Attorney General William French Smith. McFarlane agreed and told the group not to approach any foreign country until the opinion was delivered. McFarlane said nothing about what he already had obtained from the Saudis.

The Funding Cut-Off North’s role in assisting the Contras grew as Congress inched closer toward cutting all assistance to the Contras. By early August, the House of Representatives had passed the toughest restrictions on Contra aid yet, restrictions that became law in October 1984. This iteration of the Boland Amendment provided in pertinent part: During fiscal year 1985, no funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual. To comply with the law, both the CIA and the Defense Department withdrew large numbers of personnel from Central America—leaving a void that North was to fill. Anticipating Boland, and hoping to mend fences with critics in the Congress, CIA Director Casey reorganized the leadership of the CIA’s Operations Directorate that had been responsible for the Contra war. Out was the flamboyant chief of the Latin American Division of the Operations Directorate, Duane R. “Dewey” Clarridge; in came Alan D. Fiers, Jr., who was made chief of the Central American Task Force (CATF) within the Latin American Division. It did not take Fiers long, however, to learn who had taken the reins on Contra activities: North. “[W]ork with him,” Clarridge reportedly told Fiers. As the CIA’s deputy director for operations, Clair E. George, told Fiers in early November 1984, Casey had promised the President that he would take care of the Contras. Any denial of operational activity by North would be just for show. With the bulk of their funds now coming via the NSC staff instead of the CIA, the Contras increasingly turned to the NSC for advice and assistance. The point man for this assistance was North. McFarlane enjoined North from getting involved in direct fund-raising for the Contras, but approved of North’s increasing contacts with them, warning North only to exercise “absolute stealth” in his meetings. North became familiar not only with the Contra leadership, but with the CIA’s assets and resources in Central America—all with the apparent approval and encouragement of CIA Director Casey. According to North, with CIA money down to a trickle by the summer of 1984, Casey was all too willing to ‘‘hand off’’ the CIA’s Contra operations to North. North also turned to Americans outside the Government to assist him with the Contras. In the summer of 1984, on Casey’s recommendation,

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North reached out to retired U.S. Air Force Maj. Gen. Richard V. Secord and asked him to help Contra leader Adolfo Calero buy arms with his new Saudi money. Secord soon became an arms broker for the Contras. North also convinced an employee of Gray & Company, Robert Owen, to meet regularly with Calero and other Contra leaders to learn of their needs, deliver valuable intelligence to them, and supply them with money raised by North. By early 1985, North and his operatives were working several angles on behalf of the Contras. North obtained tactical and other intelligence from the CIA and passed it to Contra military commanders. Secord was probing the international arms markets for the Contras and purchasing weapons for them. North also made it known that he was the ‘‘man to see’’ about money for the Contras. When one congressman questioned the propriety of the CIA funding Contra leaders, who in turn were lobbying Congress for increased Contra aid, North proposed to Fiers and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Craig Johnstone that he line up private funding. Fiers rejected the idea on grounds that it would cause Congress only to question the new source of funds. North was able to claim that he had private funds because he was lending a hand to various large- and small-scale efforts to raise money for the Contras. Having learned from CIA Operations Director George, for example, that the South Koreans were interested in contributing funds to the Contras, North arranged for Contra solicitor retired Army Maj. Gen. John K. Singlaub to meet with South Korean officials in the United States. Saudi Arabia, whose contributions North earlier had arranged to transfer to the Contras, doubled its monthly contribution in February 1985. Beginning in April 1985, North aided the efforts of two private fund-raisers, Carl Channell and Richard R. Miller, by arranging for speakers to potential contributors, presenting his own briefings, and encouraging use of the White House as a stage prop for Channell and Miller’s pitch—including arranging private chats and photo opportunities with the President. North also worked with McFarlane on efforts to use foreign aid as leverage with a number of Central American countries—particularly Honduras, the site of most of the Contra encampments—to get them to support the Contras more strongly. In February 1985, the President approved a McFarlane-North plan to assure the Honduran government of expedited economic, military, and intelligence support if it agreed to allow Contra bases to remain in Honduras and permit weapons to be shipped to them. Vice President Bush traveled to Honduras the next month, underscoring with Honduran President Roberto Suazo the need for Contra support and signaling what the United States would be willing to do in return. The Hondurans caught on to the linkage quickly. When President Reagan called Suazo in April 1985 to implore him to release a shipment of Contra ammunition, Suazo reminded President Reagan that a high-level Honduran delegation shortly would be in Washington to discuss a $15 million aid package.

A Southern Front By the spring of 1985 it became clear that Congress would not rescue the Contras any time soon. The House defeated a $14 million supplemental

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aid package in March, leaving the Contras to rely on North and his associates. Calero found himself surrounded not only with recommended arms brokers like Secord—who by June 1985 had arranged several large arms shipments—but also willing broker/contribution solicitors like Singlaub. There also were arms merchants like Ron Martin, a Miamibased dealer who had been accused of consorting with drug-runners. While the NSC staff helped Saudi Arabian and other funds reach the Contras, Calero had been deciding how most of the money would be spent. By May 1985, North realized that he and Secord were facing increasing competition for Calero’s attention—and that Contra arms purchases were getting out of their control. While he and Secord were grappling with disorganized Contra procurement, North and other members of the Restricted Interagency Group on Central America (the RIG) had concluded that the Contras had to step up pressure on the Sandinista regime. The RIG’s chief strategic decision, reached in the summer of 1985, was to open a ‘‘southern front’’ in the Nicaraguan war. Up to then, the bulk of the Contra forces—and the focus of American efforts to influence and support them—lay along Nicaragua’s northern border with Honduras. The concentration of these forces made them an easy target for the Sandinistas and tested the tolerance of the Honduran government. North, Fiers, and others in the RIG concluded by mid-1985 that one way to relieve Contra forces in the north and to escalate the war would be to inspire opposition forces along Nicaragua’s southern border to go on the offensive. Up to then, the anti-Sandinista groups in the south were splintered. A flamboyant but mercurial leader named Eden Pastora had attempted to rally them in 1984, but the CIA had since concluded that Pastora was not inclined to drive his forces into the heart of Nicaragua. The RIG decided by the summer of 1985 that it had to get opposition forces out of Costa Rica and into Nicaragua, where they could do some good for the Contra cause.

A Full-Service Enterprise North took bold steps in late June 1985 to solve the problems he perceived with Contra weapons procurement, while laying the foundation for a system that could supply both the northern and southern fronts. North convened a meeting on June 28, 1985, in Miami with Secord; Thomas Clines, a former CIA officer who by then was acting as Secord’s overseas arms buyer; Raphael Quintero, another former CIA officer who had been acting as Secord’s ‘‘man on the scene’’ in Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica; Calero; and Contra military commander Enrique Bermudez. The men met through the night, during which North announced that he would suspend his cash payments to Calero: Henceforth, Secord would arrange for all weapons purchases and deliveries. North also stressed to Calero and Bermudez, whose ties were closest to Contra forces in the north, that they had to work with him and Secord—including sharing precious supplies— to build a viable southern front. Secord later described the June 1985 Miami meeting as a ‘‘watershed’’ event for him and his involvement with the Contras. North convinced Secord to take charge of a covert air-delivery system, one that would

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mirror earlier CIA efforts to arm the Contras. Thus, in addition to his activities as an arms purchaser and supplier, Secord began hiring airplane crews, acquiring or leasing aircraft, arranging for warehouses in Central America, and gaining landing rights in the region. While Secord proceeded with setting up a full-service ‘‘Enterprise,’’ North continued to work within the RIG and elsewhere to implement his enhanced Contra operation. These stepped-up efforts coincided with a significant reorganization of the State Department’s Central American officers, which saw Elliott Abrams become assistant secretary for interAmerican affairs; William Walker take over as Abrams’ deputy; and the reassignments of Edwin G. Corr and Lewis A. Tambs as U.S. ambassadors to El Salvador and Costa Rica, respectively. Both Corr and Tambs were informed of the RIG’s decision to ‘‘open’’ the southern front, a decision that was a particularly critical one for Tambs. Costa Rican cooperation was deemed essential to the southern front, including establishment of an airstrip in northern Costa Rica that would facilitate supply drops to Contra forces. Tambs was charged with convincing the Costa Rican government to agree with the new American effort, while the chief of the CIA’s station in San Jose, Joseph Fernandez, was responsible for working out many of the operational aspects of the RIG’s plan. By August 1985, the Costa Ricans had approved the effort—a decision that coincided with promises of covert payments to a project headed by the Costa Rican president—and Tambs and Fernandez were working on sites for the airstrip.

The Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office (NHAO) Barred by Boland from directly or indirectly supporting the Contras’ military and paramilitary activities, the CIA endeavored to do all it could in Central America in the way of non-paramilitary activities, both in direct support of the Contras and in an effort to undermine the Sandinista regime. When faced with a roadblock in Congress, Casey and Fiers would turn to the designated Contra trouble-shooter, North. Congress explicitly had cut funding to a specific non-paramilitary project against the Sandinistas, for example, in July 1985. Notwithstanding grudging promises to the congressional intelligence committees that they would comply with the ban, Casey and Fiers turned to North for substitute funding. They also encouraged other CIA assets to divert funds to the project, an arrangement that continued for at least nine months before being halted. Notwithstanding Congress’s decision to withdraw funds from certain CIA projects, the Administration overall was slowly convincing members of Congress to resume direct aid to the Contras. In August 1985, Congress approved $27 million in humanitarian aid to the Contras, with the proviso that the State Department—not the CIA or the Defense Department—administer the aid. President Reagan quickly established the Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office (NHAO) within the State Department and ordered NHAO to get supplies moving south. Passage of NHAO aid gave the U.S. Government, acting principally through the CIA, new leverage in dealing with the Contras—particularly those on the southern front. The process of gearing up NHAO’s logistical

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and intelligence-gathering activities—a daunting task for a department that had little experience in logistics or air deliveries—would also give North the opportunity to insert people into NHAO who had been working covertly with him and Secord on Contra resupply.

“Bud McFarlane Just Perjured Himself for Me. God Bless Him.” North’s efforts to assist the Contras did not escape the attention of others in the Administration, or the press. By August 1985, more and more accounts had appeared in the media alleging that North had been giving military advice to the Contras and had been behind logistical support for them. On August 16, Representative Michael Barnes, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, wrote to McFarlane asking whether the NSC staff had provided ‘‘tactical influence’’ on Contra military operations, were ‘‘facilitating contacts for prospective financial donors,’’ or were involved in ‘‘otherwise organizing and coordinating rebel efforts.’’ The chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), Representative Lee H. Hamilton, dispatched a similar letter to McFarlane shortly after the Barnes inquiry. Before responding to Barnes and Hamilton’s letters, McFarlane ordered a search of the NSC’s records for memoranda that bore on Contra activities. The search, limited by NSC staff to Freedom of Information Act standards, resulted in identification of several ‘‘problem documents,’’ memoranda written by North that suggested there was truth to the allegations of North’s tactical support and fund-raising activities. McFarlane and North agreed that the documents could be so interpreted and pondered whether they should be altered. Ultimately, McFarlane decided not to bring the documents to Congress’s attention, and instead decided to lie about North’s activities in a series of letters to Barnes and Hamilton in September-October 1985. North soon told Fiers, ‘‘Bud McFarlane just perjured himself for me—God bless him.’’

NHAO By Day, Private Benefactors By Night Press allegations and questions from Congress did not hamper North in expanding resupply operations. In September 1985, on the recommendation of Col. James Steele, the commander of the U.S. Military Group in El Salvador, North wrote to Felix Rodriguez, an ex-CIA operative who had gone to El Salvador to fight communist guerrillas, and asked Rodriguez to help him win approval from the Salvadoran Air Force to use its air base at Ilopango for Contra-resupply activities. Rodriguez successfully persuaded Salvadoran Air Force General Juan Rafael Bustillo to grant North and his people entry to the base—guaranteeing North a strategic position from which to launch air operations to both the north and the south. Trouble with the Honduran government in October 1985 gave North the chance to infiltrate NHAO and, in the words of Fiers, “piggyback” the activities of his Enterprise onto the fledgling humanitarian program. As early as September 1985, North urged the director of NHAO, Ambassador Robert Duemling, to hire North’s Contra courier Owen as an

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‘‘on the scene’’ Central American specialist for NHAO. Duemling ignored the advice. On October 10, however, the first air delivery to Central America by NHAO arrived in Honduras, carrying a television news crew. Attempting to hide their support for the Contras, the Hondurans banned further U.S. flights—a move that, for the moment, prevented NHAO aid from reaching Contra troops. North seized on the Honduran fiasco to convince the RIG that Owen would not have let it happen. The RIG prevailed on an embarrassed Duemling to hire Owen shortly thereafter, giving North a key operative within NHAO and providing Owen with a cover for his trips to Central America for North. The Honduran ban created an additional problem for NHAO that worked to North’s advantage: how to get aid into Honduras. In separate trips, North, Fiers, and newly appointed National Security Adviser John Poindexter traveled to Tegucigalpa to talk to the Hondurans, to no avail. It was not until late December 1985 that the Hondurans agreed to allow NHAO flights to resume, on the condition that they not come directly from the United States. North proposed to the RIG that Ilopango air base—the same airport North had envisioned as a point for private resupply—be used to ‘‘trans-ship’’ NHAO supplies from the United States to El Salvador, and then on to Honduras. Government officials including North and Fiers traveled to the region in late December to gain Honduran and Salvadoran approval for the plan, with the help in El Salvador of North’s man, Rodriguez. By early 1986, large pieces of NHAO and what was known in official circles as the ‘‘private benefactors’’ operation were virtually indistinguishable. Owen was reporting on Contra needs for both. Rodriguez was coordinating shipments at Ilopango for both entities. Butler buildings erected at Ilopango by NHAO were being used to store equipment for both entities. And both entities were using the flying services of Richard Gadd, a retired U.S. Air Force lieutenant colonel who had been working with Secord on air-delivery operations since August 1985. The stage was set for Gadd’s air crews to be, in Fiers’ words, ‘‘NHAO by day, private benefactors by night,’’ marking a rare occasion that a U.S. Government program unwittingly provided cover to a private covert operation.

Leaning Forward The new year brought hope to many in the Administration that Congress was not far from lifting the Boland restrictions altogether and allowing direct support for Contra military activities to resume. Congress had allowed NHAO to consult with the CIA on setting up a secure delivery system and had loosened Boland in late 1985 to permit the CIA to provide communications support and training to the Contras. President Reagan instructed his advisers to propose an ambitious $100 million Contra-aid program. Some in the Administration hoped that aid would be on its way as early as April 1986. Confidence that official aid would soon resume encouraged Fiers and another CIA officer, James Adkins, to take steps that took each of them into dangerous territory. Fiers met with Gadd twice during February 1986 to learn more about Gadd’s operations, hoping that his experience would prove helpful in re-establishing a CIA covert lethal resupply network.

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Adkins for his part ordered CIA pilots to ferry lethal and non-lethal supplies to Contras in southern Honduras, using CIA helicopters. Though he clearly violated Boland, Adkins was encouraged by signs from Washington that Boland would not be around for long. The immediate need for funds and fund-raising did not cease with the new year. North and Abrams continued to give briefings and provide other assistance to groups of contributors gathered by Channell and Miller. President Reagan continued to drop by some of these sessions and grant private meetings and photo opportunities. Money raised by Channell and Miller fed the Enterprise, as did funds from the Saudis and diverted proceeds from covert sales of arms to Iran. They became all the more important when the House unexpectedly defeated President Reagan’s $100 million Contra-aid package in March 1986.

The Cover Unravels North’s use of a NHAO cover for private-benefactor lethal-resupply operations did not fool other U.S. officials for long. As early as late January 1986, Fiers began receiving intelligence from CIA personnel in Central America that Rodriguez was asserting himself in both NHAO and privatebenefactor activities. Tensions between Rodriguez and CIA personnel became apparent to not only Fiers, but to State Department personnel as well. Reports that Rodriguez was involved in the crash of a private-benefactor aircraft on a highway in El Salvador and that he was coordinating this with North over unsecured telephone lines ultimately prompted Fiers, at the insistence of CIA Operations Director George, to tell a senior CIA officer in the region to stay far away from the matter. At the same time Fiers was warning his personnel in Central America away from the private benefactors, he candidly admitted to at least one senior officer there that more flights under North’s control would be coming. While Fiers did not understand in early 1986 just how complex North’s network was in Central America—including its secure, National Security Agency-supplied, KL-43 communications devices linking North, Secord, Gadd, Steele, Quintero, and Fernandez—Fiers knew that it could provide lethal assistance, and that North had a key role in it. When Contra forces in the north could not make a promised air drop of lethal supplies to their fellows in the south in April 1986, Fiers joined a plan secretly engineered by North and Fernandez to use the Enterprise instead. The Enterprise successfully delivered an L-100 aircraft full of materiel to the southern front on April 9, 1986, sealing a major effort by Fernandez and other CIA officers to wean pro-active, dissident commanders away from Pastora and keep them on the field of battle. . . .

More Lies As North was trying to bridge the gap in Contra aid until official funds were resumed, his activities were the subject of a second wave of media speculation and congressional inquiry. Newspaper and television accounts of North’s involvement with Contra resupply coincided with the House’s June 1986 debate on Contra aid. Earlier, Representative Ron Coleman introduced a Resolution of Inquiry directing the President to

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provide information and documents to the House about NSC staff contacts with (1) private persons or foreign governments involved in Contra resupply; (2) any Contra, involving Contra military activities; and (3) Robert Owen, Maj. Gen. Singlaub, and an American expatriate living in Costa Rica, John Hull. Coleman’s resolution prompted the chairmen of the House Intelligence and Foreign Affairs committees to request comments from the President. Poindexter replied on behalf of the President and knowingly repeated McFarlane’s earlier lie that NSC staff ‘‘were in compliance with both the spirit and letter’’ of the Boland Amendments. . . . The Enterprise was pushing ahead on an accelerated schedule of deliveries in August and September 1986. Crews were making more sorties into both northern and southern Nicaragua, some during daylight hours. San Jose station chief Fernandez, who was in direct contact with Quintero, ordered CIA personnel to relay drop zone and other information to Contra forces on the Southern Front, as well as report news of deliveries. Events besides the imminent renewal of U.S. aid and the drawing down of the Enterprise’s supplies for the Contras were forcing North to wrap up his Central American operations. On September 25, 1986, a Costa Rican official disclosed the existence of the Enterprise’s airstrip in northern Costa Rica and publicly linked it to Contra resupply and an Enterprise shell corporation, Udall Resources, Inc. North scrambled to draft false press guidance with Abrams and Fiers, and assured Poindexter that he was doing his best to ‘‘keep USG fingerprints off this’’—including dissolving Udall and covering its tracks.

The Hasenfus Shoot-Down Unbeknownst to Enterprise crews at Ilopango, the accelerated resupply missions had alerted the Sandinistas to the private benefactors’ air routes to drop sites in southern Nicaragua. Having repositioned radar and antiaircraft units in the area, it was only a matter of time before an Enterprise plane was shot down by the Nicaraguans. Such was the case on October 5, 1986, when an Enterprise C-123K loaded with lethal supplies and carrying three Americans was brought down by Sandinista ground fire. Of the crew, only one survived, an American named Eugene Hasenfus. The Sandinistas combed the wreckage of the flight and recovered scores of documents linking it to NHAO and numerous Americans working at Ilopango air base. While in Sandinista custody, Hasenfus said that he was working for the CIA, and that two CIA officers—including a ‘‘Max Gomez,’’ the local alias for Rodriguez—had been in charge of food, lodging, and other services for the operation’s pilots and crews. Within days, North had directed his Enterprise to clear out of Ilopango—planes and all—and had begun to destroy ledgers detailing his disbursements to the Contras. The Hasenfus flight was the Enterprise’s last.

The End of Boland The crash of the Enterprise C-123K could not have come at a worse time for the Administration. The President’s $100 million Contra-aid package

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was inching toward final approval, and opponents were quick to latch on to Hasenfus’s claims that he had been part of an illegal CIA operation. Speaking to the public and Congress, Administration officials—including Fiers, George and Abrams—insisted truthfully that Hasenfus and his companions did not work for the CIA. They falsely denied knowing other facts, however: who ‘‘Max Gomez’’ was, who the private benefactors were, and whether any U.S. Government officials were involved. The Administration’s statements worked. Congress released the Contra funds on October 17, 1986. North had kept the Contras alive, ‘‘body and soul,’’ despite the Boland cut-off, and the rest of the Administration had convinced the Congress that it had complied with the law. It took the November 1986 disclosures of the Iran arms sales to pry the lid off North’s Contra activities once and for all. It took an independent counsel six years to ensure that concerted efforts to deny knowledge of North’s Contra activities—described in the rest of this report—met with a similar fate.

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Chronology of the Reagan Era

1911

Ronald Wilson Reagan is born on February 6 in an apartment above a bank in Tampico, Illinois.

1926–1932

As a lifeguard, Reagan reportedly saves a total of seventy-seven lives, a number he was fond of repeating in his later runs for political office.

1947

Reagan is elected president of the Screen Actors Guild. He would be instrumental in purging the Hollywood community of suspected communists.

1964

Reagan changes his registered political affiliation from Democrat to Republican, later claiming that he did not leave the Democratic Party; the party left him.

1966

Reagan uses his political connections nurtured during his days as president of the Screen Actors Guild to mount a successful campaign for the governorship of California. Running on a platform promising to reduce wasteful government spending and to restore order at the University of California, Berkeley, campus, he defeats two-term incumbent Pat Brown by a million-vote margin on November 8.

1967

Student demonstrators stage a protest rally at the California State Capitol building in response to Governor Reagan’s proposal to cut public funding for the University of California.

1968

Governor Reagan announces his bid for the presidency. He would receive votes from 182 delegates at the Republican National Convention on August 8, placing third behind Nelson Rockefeller and the eventually elected Richard Nixon.

1976

Former California Governor Ronald Reagan receives votes from 47.4 percent of the delegates at the Republican National Convention on August 19. Former peanut farmer and Georgia governor, Jimmy Carter, becomes the first candidate from the Deep South to win a presidential election since Zachary Taylor in 1848. Carter would later face Reagan as an incumbent in the 1980 elections.

1978

Reagan publicly expresses opposition to the Briggs Initiative, a state referendum that would lead to banning homosexual public school teachers in California. The referendum was defeated.

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1979

The system of monarchy that had persisted in Iran since the sixteenth century ends as Shah Pahlavi is overthrown and flees to Egypt on January 16. Ayatollah Khomeini is installed as the supreme leader of the new Islamic Republic. The Iran Hostage Crisis begins on November 4. Angered over the U.S. failure to extradite the deposed Shah Mohammed Pahlavi back to Iran following his exile, university students in the Iranian capital of Tehran storm the country’s American embassy, seizing sixty-six hostages. The regime of Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Debayle is overthrown by a Marxist group calling itself the Sandinistas. The group establishes a communist government that gains support from both Cuba and the Soviet Union, creating fear in Washington of communist subversion.

1980

In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States announces it will boycott the 1980 Summer Olympics, held in the Russian capital of Moscow; fifty other nations follow suit. In the U.S. senatorial elections, Republicans gain twelve seats and establish a fifty-three to forty-six majority in the Senate, signaling the nation’s shift toward more conservative solutions to the country’s problems.

1981

A mere twenty minutes before Ronald Reagan is inaugurated as the fortieth president of the United States on January 20, the 444-day long Iranian hostage crisis ends, as the hostages are released. As he enters office, Ronald Reagan orders all solar panels installed by the previous occupant of the White House, Jimmy Carter, to be removed. A mere sixty-nine days into his term as president, Reagan is shot by John Hinckley, Jr., as he exits the Hilton Hotel in Washington, D.C., on March 30. Reagan experiences a swift recovery and returns to his presidential duties in three days. President Reagan lays out his economic agenda to Congress as he takes office facing the highest rate of inflation in the country since 1947. He requests $41.4 billion in federal budget reductions, asking that the cuts mainly be made from social welfare programs. Additionally, Reagan recommends substantial increases in defense spending and a 30 percent tax cut. Polls are released indicating that Reagan’s economic proposals enjoy support from two-thirds of Americans. All but twenty-six Democratic members of the House vote against Reagan’s economic package, but he receives 100 percent support from the Republican Party and his proposals, compiled in the bill known as Graham-Latta II, are passed. Fulfilling his 1980 campaign pledge to appoint the first woman to the Supreme Court, Reagan nominates Sandra Day O’Connor, a member of the Arizona Court of Appeals, to replace the retiring Potter Stewart as associate justice. O’Connor’s nomination is confirmed by the Senate by a vote of 99–0 on September 21. Reagan forces an end to a strike of air traffic controllers when he personally fires a majority of them. Reagan publicly expresses the need for the United States to support resistance groups in Latin American communist countries. Unemployment in the United States reaches a six-year high.

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Reagan upholds his campaign promise to not alter the nation’s Social Security program by flatly refusing bipartisan congressional efforts to freeze Social Security cost of living increases. Antinuclear demonstrations occur in Great Britain and Germany following the deployment of Pershing II missiles. 1981–1989

The Reagan administration appropriates $5.7 billion for research into HIV and the AIDS virus.

1982

The number of unemployed people in the United States rises to nine million. Nearly one million people gather in New York City’s Central Park to call for an end to nuclear arms increases. John Hinckley, Jr., is deemed too mentally incompetent to face criminal charges for the attempted assassination of President Reagan and is indefinitely committed to a mental hospital. Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev declares in a speech that the U.S. arms buildup threatens the stability of the world and risks nuclear war. In response to the attempted assassination of Israeli Ambassador to the United Kingdom Shlomo Argov, Israel begins a war against Lebanon on June 6, with the goal of occupying the entire southern portion of the Middle Eastern country.

1983

Speaking before a group of evangelical Christians on March 8, Reagan refers to the Soviet Union as an “evil empire” for, among other things, its atheistic policies. On June 15, in the case of City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, a controversial law requiring a twenty-four-hour waiting period for an abortion is ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. On September 1, the Korean civilian airliner KAL 007 is shot down by Soviet jets after accidentally wandering into Soviet airspace. All 269 passengers and crew aboard the flight, including U.S. Congressman Lawrence McDonald, die in the crash. The Soviet Union later claimed that it was unaware the aircraft was civilian. In response, U.S. President Reagan takes a moral stand, claiming that the act was a crime against humanity. On October 23 in Lebanon, two suicide bombers detonate explosives in a barracks housing French and U.S. soldiers: 241 American servicemen, including 220 Marines, are killed. Beginning on October 25, the United States invades the small Caribbean island nation of Grenada following a revolution after which a pro-Fidel Castro government was installed. Defending their actions, U.S. officials point to the fact that one thousand American medical students were on the island at the time the decision to invade was made. During congressional testimony, Secretary of State George Shultz takes an aggressive stance against communism when he says action must be taken against the Nicaraguan communists. Reagan proposes his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in response to a growing nuclear arms buildup by the Soviet Union. The scientifically questionable SDI program involved developing lasers designed to shoot

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down approaching intercontinental ballistic missiles in the event of a nuclear attack. Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrinyn claims that the SDI program will open a new phase in the arms race. President Reagan’s approval rating falls to 35 percent as the nation approaches a dreary winter during which the number of unemployed people in the U.S. rises to 11 million. Reagan vows to stay the course economically when urged by advisers and the public to either raise taxes or cut defense spending as a means of reducing the federal budget deficit. By springtime, the nation begins a growth period of ninety-three consecutive months, the longest to date in peacetime in the history of the United States. President Reagan’s interior secretary James Watt is forced to resign following a racially controversial statement referencing his staff. As the Cold War intensifies, the Soviet state-run news agency Tass proclaims President Reagan to be a man of “bellicose lunatic anti-communism.” 1983–1993

Congress appropriates a total of $44 billion for President Reagan’s proposed Strategic Defense Initiative program.

1984

William Buckley, station chief of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in Beirut, Lebanon, is abducted and held captive by the terrorist group Islamic Jihad on March 16. Democratic presidential candidate Walter Mondale supports the nomination of the first female vice presidential nominee, Geraldine Ferraro. The move is cynically regarded by some as a shallow attempt to set a historical precedent during an election when the choice of a Democratic running mate is arbitrary due to Reagan’s overwhelming popularity. At a debate between Reagan and challenger Walter Mondale on October 21, incumbent Ronald Reagan counters claims that he is too old to begin a second term as president by humorously turning the tables on Mondale and saying he will not exploit Mondale’s youth and inexperience. On November 4, Reagan is elected to a second term as president in what is considered to be one of the biggest landslides in U.S. election history. Reagan won races in all but two states, receiving 525 of 538 electoral votes and 59 percent of the popular vote. Reagan becomes the first president to invite an openly homosexual couple to spend the night in the White House. Saudi Arabia agrees in a closely guarded deal with high ranking U.S. officials to pay $1 million a month to fund the Contras, a resistance group opposing the existing regime in communist Nicaragua. The Soviet Union announces it will boycott the upcoming Summer Olympics Games in Los Angeles, California. The Sandinistas in Nicaragua decisively win an open election, the first since they came to power in 1979. Congress passes a bill prohibiting the CIA and defense department from providing financial support to the Contras, a resistance group opposing the existing regime in communist Nicaragua. Iran is formally designated by the U.S. State Department as a state sponsor of terrorism.

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1985

241

At the age of seventy-three, Ronald Reagan is inaugurated as the oldest president in U.S. history on January 20. On March 11, Mikhail Gorbachev is appointed secretary general of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union a day after the death of secretary general Konstanin Chernenko. Gorbachev’s tenure would be defined by the application of two concepts: glasnost (openness), and perestroika (restructuring). On January 28, the Space Shuttle Challenger disintegrates shortly after launch and its seven crew members aboard are killed. Among those dead is Christa McAuliffe, who was selected to be the first schoolteacher to go into space. President Reagan’s annual State of the Union speech was scheduled to be held the night of the accident but was postponed. Instead, Reagan chose to address the nation from the Oval Office. On September 24, Costa Rica reveals that one of its airstrips had been illegally commandeered by U.S. officials and used to fund resistance groups in Nicaragua. The United States responds by saying the airstrip is owned by private individuals. Former law professor Antonin Scalia is nominated by President Reagan to fill the vacancy left by the elevation of William Rehnquist, who became chief justice of the Supreme Court. After the Senate confirmed him by a vote of 98–0, Scalia became the first Italian-American to serve on the Supreme Court, his term beginning on September 26. Eighteen years after his assassination, Martin Luther King, Jr., is officially honored on November 2 through the establishment of Martin Luther King Day as a national holiday. Reagan, along with North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms, initially questioned whether King was important enough to be honored with a national holiday, relenting only when Congress passes the King Day Bill by an overwhelming majority. The Lebanese magazine Ash-Shiraa publishes a report on November 3 stating that U.S. officials had visited Iran with the goal of exchanging arms for American hostages. Iranian parliament speaker Ali Hashemi Rafsanjani promptly confirms the visit. President Reagan holds a televised press conference on November 25 in which he denies culpability in the Iran-Contra Affair, stating that he was not fully aware of the activities surrounding the scandal. During a summit, President Ronald Reagan and Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev pledge to reduce their respective countries’ nuclear arms arsenal by 50 percent. U.S. News and World Report correspondent Nicholas Daniloff is arrested in the Russian capital of Moscow on suspicion of spying for the United States. Congress passes the Tax Reform Act, lowering the tax rate for top income earners from 50 to 28 percent while simultaneously raising the tax rate for bottom income earners from 11 to 15 percent. It is the first time in U.S. history that a tax bill simultaneously increases tax rates for the poor and decreases them for the rich. President Reagan announces that the continued controversy surrounding National Security Adviser John Poindexter and Lieutenant Colonel Oliver

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North over their involvement in the Iran-Contra Affair has left him no choice but to ask for their resignations. The U.S. federal budget deficit rises to $143,600,000,000. President Reagan vows to veto any bill that might include tax increases. A New York Times poll is released showing that President Reagan’s approval rating dropped from 67 percent to 46 percent in one month due to public skepticism regarding the Iran-Contra Affair. The Tower Commission, the investigatory body created to determine responsibility in the Iran-Contra Affair, concludes in a report released on February 26 that President Reagan allowed himself to be misled by his advisers over details surrounding the Iran-Contra Affair but is not technically culpable. 1987

Serious flaws in the Soviet defense system are exposed on May 28 when German teenager Mathias Rust pilots a single-engine plane from Finland to the Russian capital of Moscow, landing near the Red Square. President Reagan travels to West Berlin, Germany. Standing before the Berlin Wall on June 12, he calls on Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to tear down the wall. The U.S. federal budget deficit rises to $167,000,000,000, in what critics of the Reagan administration say is a direct result of heavy increases in defense spending combined with unnecessary tax reductions. President Reagan signs the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement with Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. The agreement served as a precursor for the establishment of NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) in 1994. During a nationally televised address from the Oval Office, President Reagan addresses the Iran-Contra Affair, admitting it was a mistake. His approval rating rebounds to 47 percent.

1988

Supreme Court Associate Justice Lewis Powell announces his retirement. President Reagan first nominates former Solicitor General Robert Bork to fulfill the vacancy, but he is seen as too conservative to be an effective judge and is not confirmed by the Senate. Harvard law professor Douglas Ginsburg is then nominated, but quickly withdraws amid allegations of marijuana use. Finally, Reagan nominates Court of Appeals member Anthony Kennedy, who is confirmed unanimously by the Senate 97–0 and takes his seat on February 18. For his commitment to reforms to the Soviet system and desire to reduce nuclear weapons stockpiles, Time magazine names Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev its Man of the Year. Congress passes the Civil Liberties Act, granting monetary compensation to Japanese Americans who had been interned in concentration camps following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. Each internee is given approximately $20,000.

1989

President Reagan leaves office with the highest approval rating since Franklin D. Roosevelt, the thirty-second president of the United States. The last remaining Soviet troops are pulled out of Afghanistan, ending a costly ten-year war that resulted in over 15,000 Soviet casualties.

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243

Following the war’s conclusion, the various political groups in Afghanistan that had joined forces to ward off the Soviet aggressors become disunited, allowing the Taliban to take control of a seriously unstable country. On March 24, the Exxon-Valdez oil tanker in Prince William Sound off the coast of Alaska spills an estimated 10.8 million gallons of oil. The Exxon Corporation was later forced to pay $5,000,000,000 in punitive damages. Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 in response to the incident. As part of the “war on drugs” that began with the Reagan administration, President George H. W. Bush orders the invasion of Panama to oust General Manuel Noriega from power. Noriega was later extradited to the United States, where he was convicted of cocaine trafficking. From April to June, approximately 1,000 Chinese dissidents die as officials instigate a crackdown in and around the area of Tiananmen Square in the capital of Beijing. Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North is sentenced to a suspended three-year prison term on May 4 for his involvement in the Iran-Contra Affair. The conviction is overturned on a technicality two weeks later. 1990

Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev is named “Man of the Decade” by Time magazine. Reversing a decade-long trend of military buildup, President George H. W. Bush requests Congress to reduce overall troop strength of the U.S. armed forces by 30,000 men. The request is subsequently denied. On April 7, Reagan’s National Security Adviser John Poindexter is convicted on multiple felony counts of conspiracy, obstruction of justice, and perjury for his role in the Iran-Contra scandal. Poindexter’s conviction was later overturned on a technicality. In free and internationally monitored elections in Nicaragua, the Marxist Sandinistas are voted out of power.

1991

Boris Yeltsin receives 57 percent of the popular vote in Russia’s first multicandidate presidential election since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and is named president of the Russian Federation on July 10. The August Coup occurs in the Soviet Union. While Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev is vacationing with his family, a group of communist hard-liners calling themselves the State Emergency Committee announce that Gorbachev is too ill to carry on his duties as president. Gennady Yanayev is named acting president. Boris Yeltsin, long a foe of Gorbachev, barricades himself in the Russian Parliament building in a symbolic defiant gesture against the coup. Gorbachev is returned to power within a few days’ time. Operation Desert Storm is launched on August 2 by U.S. and coalition forces to liberate the Middle Eastern country of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. It lasts less than thirty days and results in a little more than a few hundred casualties for U.S. forces. African American judge Clarence Thomas is confirmed on October 15 as an associate justice of the Supreme Court in one of the closest confirmation votes in history, 52–48.

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Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev declares the dissolution of the Soviet Union, as the superpower splits into fifteen separate nations. 1992

The U.S. federal budget deficit reaches a record high of $290,000,000,000. Running against George H. W. Bush and third-party candidate Ross Perot, Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton, is elected president with 43 percent of the vote, becoming the youngest president elected since John F. Kennedy in 1961.

1992–2000

The U.S. economy experiences unparalleled growth during the administration of Bill Clinton, mainly due to defense spending reductions following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

1993

Mounting suspicion over the coincidental timing of Ronald Reagan’s presidential inauguration and the end of the Iranian Hostage Crisis leads the U.S. House of Representatives to launch a formal investigation, which concludes that there was no credible evidence that any Reagan administration officials delayed the release of the hostages.

1994

The Republican Party gains a total of fifty-four seats in elections for the House of Representatives, creating the first Republican majority in nearly forty years. On November 5, eighty-three-year-old Ronald Reagan announces to the public that he has been diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease. Reagan’s health would continue to deteriorate.

1999

The Gallup organization releases its list of the twenty most admired people of the twentieth century, based on opinions from the American public. Reagan is ranked at number 15 between Nelson Mandela and Henry Ford.

2003

The aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan is commissioned by the U.S. Navy on July 12.

2004

Ronald Reagan dies at his home in Bel-Air, California, on June 5. His age of ninety-three makes him the longest-lived president in American history.

Resources

Books Anderson, Martin. Revolution: The Reagan Legacy. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1991. Andrew, Christopher M. For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush. New York: HarperCollins, 1995. Arkin, William M., and Richard W. Fieldhouse. Nuclear Battlefields: Global Links in the Arms Race. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1985. Barrett, Lawrence I. Gambling with History: Ronald Reagan in the White House. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1983. Bell, Terrell. The Thirteenth Man: A Reagan Cabinet Memoir. New York: Free Press, 1988.

Carlton, David, and Carlo Schaerf, eds. The Dynamics of the Arms Race. New York: Wiley, 1975. Chomsky, Noam. Towards a New Cold War: Essays on the Current Crisis and How We Got There. New York: Pantheon Books, 1982. Clemens, Walter C., Jr. The Arms Race and SinoSoviet Relations. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, 1968. Craven, John Piña. The Silent War: The Cold War Battle beneath the Sea. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. Deaver, Michael, and Mickey Herskowitz. Behind the Scenes. New York: William Morrow, 1987.

Bender, David L. The Arms Race: Opposing Viewpoints. St. Paul, MN: Greenhaven Press, 1985.

Drinan, Robert F. Beyond the Nuclear Freeze. New York: Seabury Press, 1983.

Berman, Larry, ed. Looking Back on the Reagan Presidency. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990.

FitzGerald, Frances. Way out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars, and the End of the Cold War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000.

Beukel, Erik. American Perceptions of the Soviet Union as a Nuclear Adversary: From Kennedy to Bush. London: J. Spiers, 1989.

Fitzwater, Marlin. Call the Briefing! Bush and Reagan, Sam and Helen, a Decade with Presidents and the Press. New York: Times Books, 1995.

Blumenthal, Sidney, and Thomas Byrne Edsall, eds. The Reagan Legacy. New York: Pantheon Books, 1988. Boyarsky, Bill. Ronald Reagan: His Life and Rise to the Presidency. New York: Random House, 1981. Bundy, McGeorge. Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years. New York: Random House, 1988. Caldicott, Helen. Missile Envy: The Arms Race and Nuclear War. New York: Bantam Books, 1986. Cannon, Lou. President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991.

Gay, William, and Michael Pearson. The Nuclear Arms Race. Chicago: American Library Association, 1987. Germond, Jack W., and Jules Whitcover. Blue Smoke and Mirrors: How Reagan Won and Why Carter Lost the Election of 1980. New York: Viking Press, 1981. Gervasi, Tom. Arsenal of Democracy II: American Military Power in the 1980s and the Origins of the New Cold War, with a Survey of American Weapons and Arms Exports, the Export of American Weapons. New York: Grove Press, 1981.

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Haig, Alexander M. Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy. New York: Macmillan, 1984. Halliday, Fred. The Making of the Second Cold War. London: Verso, 1983. Hannaford, Peter. The Reagans: A Political Portrait. New York: Coward-McCann, 1983. Herken, Gregg. The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945–1950. New York: Knopf, 1980. Hoffmann, Stanley. Dead Ends: American Foreign Policy in the New Cold War. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1983. Hoffmann, Stanley. Primacy or World Order: American Foreign Policy since the Cold War. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978. Holloway, David. Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939–1956. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994. Holloway, David. The Soviet Union and the Arms Race. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984. Johnson, Haynes. Sleepwalking through History: America in the Reagan Years. New York: W.W. Norton, 1991. Kirkpatrick, Jeane. The Reagan Phenomenon and Other Speeches on Foreign Policy. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1983. Ledeen, Michael A. Perilous Statecraft: An Insider’s Account of the Iran-Contra Affair. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1988. Lehman, John F. Command of the Seas. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1988. Matlock, Jack P. Autopsy of an Empire: The American Ambassador’s Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union. New York: Random House, 1995. Mayer, Jane, and Doyle McManus. Landslide: The Unmaking of the President, 1984–1988. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1988.

in the 1950s. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987. Menges, Constantine. Inside the National Security Council: The True Story of the Making and Unmaking of Reagan’s Foreign Policy. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991. Miller, Lynn H. and Ronald W. Pruessen, eds. Reflections on the Cold War: A Quarter Century of American Foreign Policy. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1974. Myrdal, Alva Reimer. The Game of Disarmament: How the United States and Russia Run the Arms Race. New York: Pantheon Books, 1982. Navias, Martin S. Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Third World. London: Brassey’s, 1990. Nincic, Miroslav. The Arms Race: The Political Economy of Military Growth. New York: Praeger, 1982. Niskanen, William A. Reaganomics: An Insider’s Account of the Policies and the People. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. Noonan, Peggy. What I Saw at the Revolution: A Political Life in the Reagan Era. New York; Random House, 1990. North, Oliver, with William Novak. Under Fire: An American Story. New York: HarperCollins, 1991. Oberdorfer, Don. From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983–1991. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998. Powell, Colin, with Joseph E. Persico. My American Journey. New York: Random House, 1995. Public Papers of the Presidents: Ronald Reagan, 1981–1989 (15 volumes) Washington, DC: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration; U.S. Government Printing Office. Reagan, Maureen. First Father, First Daughter: A Memoir. Boston: Little, Brown, 1989.

McFarlane, Robert, with Zofia Smardz. Special Trust. New York: Cadell & Davies, 1994.

Reagan, Michael, with Joe Hyams. On the Outside Looking in. New York: Kensington, 1988.

McMahan, Jeff. Reagan and the World: Imperial Policy in the New Cold War. New York: Monthly Review, 1985.

Reagan, Nancy, with William Novak. My Turn: The Memoirs of Nancy Reagan. New York: Random House, 1989.

Meese, Edwin, With Reagan: The Inside Story. Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 1992.

Reagan, Ronald. A Time for Choosing: The Speeches of Ronald Reagan 1961–1982. Edited by Alfred Balitzer. Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 1983.

Melanson, Richard A. American Foreign Policy since the Vietnam War: The Search for Consensus from Nixon to Clinton. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2000. Melanson, Richard A., and David Mayers, eds. Reevaluating Eisenhower: American Foreign Policy

Reagan, Ronald. President Reagan’s Quotations. Edited by Clark Cassell. Washington, DC: Braddock Publications, 1984.

RESOURCES

Reagan, Ronald. Ronald Reagan Talks to America. Old Greenwich, CT: Devin Adair, 1983. Reagan, Ronald. Ronald Reagan: The Wisdom and Humor of the Great Communicator. Edited by Frederick J. Ryan, Jr. San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1995. Reagan, Ronald. Sincerely, Ronald Reagan. Edited by Helene Von Damm. New York: Berkley Books, 1980. Reagan, Ronald. The Quotable Ronald Reagan: The Common Sense and Straight Talk of Former California Governor Ronald Reagan. Edited by Joseph R. Holmes. San Diego: JPJ and Associates, 1975. Reagan, Ronald. The Reagan Wit. Edited by Bill Adler and Bill Adler, Jr. Aurora, IL: Caroline House, 1981. Rhodes, Richard. Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995. Roberts, Chalmers McGeagh. The Nuclear Years: The Arms Race and Arms Control, 1945–70. New York: Praeger, 1970. Scheer, Robert. America after Nixon: The Politics of the New World Order. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974. Schieffer, Bob, and Gary Paul Gates. The Acting President. New York: E.P. Dutton, 1989. Schroeer, Dietrich, and David Hafemeister, editors. Nuclear Arms Technologies in the 1990s. New York: American Institute of Physics, 1988. Schweizer, Peter. Victory: The Reagan Administration’s Secret Strategy that Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994. Seaborg, Glenn Theodore. Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982. Shultz, George P. Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993. Siracusa, Joseph M., ed. The American Diplomatic Revolution: A Documentary History of the Cold War, 1941–1947. Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1977. Speakes, Larry, and Robert Pack. Speaking Out. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1988. Stein, Jonathan B. From H-Bomb to Star Wars: The Politics of Strategic Decision Making. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1984.

247

Stockman, David A. The Triumph of Politics: Why the Reagan Revolution Failed. New York: Harper and Row, 1986. Tammen, Ronald L. MIRV and the Arms Race: An Interpretation of Defense Strategy. New York: Praeger, 1973. Thompson, Edward Palmer. Beyond the Cold War: A New Approach to the Arms Race and Nuclear Annihilation. New York: Pantheon Books, 1982. United Nations. Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and Military Expenditures. New York: United Nations, 1983. Varas, Augusto. Militarization and the International Arms Race in Latin America. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985. Weinberger, Caspar. Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon. New York: Warner Books, 1990. Wills, Garry. Reagan’s America: Innocents at Home. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1987. Winik, Jay. On the Brink: The Dramatic, Behind-theScenes Saga of the Reagan Era and the Men and Women Who Won the Cold War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.

Periodicals American Economic Association Quarterly—American Economic Association Brown Journal of World Affairs—Brown University Press Current History—Current History, Inc. International Security—MIT Press Jane’s International Defense Review—Jane’s Information Group Jane’s Soviet Intelligence Review—Jane’s Information Group Military Review—Combined Arms Center Policy Review—Hoover Institution Political Research Quarterly—University of Utah Political Science Quarterly—Academy of Political Science Public Opinion Quarterly—University of Chicago Press Review of International Studies—Cambridge University Press Review of Politics—Notre Dame University World Politics—Princeton University

248

RESOURCES

Internet http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv—George Washington University National Security Archive http://www.ronaldreaganweb.com—Ronald Reagan general information http://www.whitehouse.gov/history/presidents— Official White House website http://www.presidentreagan.info—Reagan homepage

http://www.indepthinfo.com/iraq—The Gulf War http://www.cryan.com/war—Desert Storm I: 1900–1991 http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/index. html—PBS Gulf War Special http://www.gulfvets.org—American Gulf War veterans http://www.politicalresources.net—Online political science resources

Index

Abbas, Mahmoud, 116 Able Archer exercise, 50, 51, 54 Abortion, in alternate histories, 157–161 cases reviewed by U.S. Supreme Court, 145–156 Hyde Amendment related to, 152 indications for, 145, 150 international laws and practices of, 151 national focus on, 145, 159–160 partial-birth procedures of, 150, 155 as right to privacy issue, 148, 149 state regulation/laws on, 36, 146, 148–149 twenty-four hour waiting period requirements with, 154 viability/life begins debate in, 146–147, 148–149, 158 See also Pregnancy Abrams, Elliot, role in Iran-Contra affair, 130, 136–137, 230, 233, 234, 235 Abu Nidal, 68 Abuladze, Tengiz, 83 Acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), 39, 75, 115 Adkins, James, 232–233 Admiral Nakhimov, sinking of, 104 Aerospatial of France, 45 Afghanistan, in alternate histories, 100 Soviet invasion of, 2, 7, 10, 17, 28, 37, 44, 62, 105, 126, 127

Taliban regime in, 15, 100, 101, 172 terrorist activities in, 117 U.S. military actions in, 15, 172 withdrawal of Soviet troops from, 54, 79, 106 Africa, Soviet-supported governments in, 45 Air policing/air control, 208–209 Air traffic controllers, 8, 39 Airborne Warning and Command System (AWACS), 56 Akron v. Akron, 150, 151–152, 154 Al-Qaeda, September 11, 2001 attacks by, 172 terrorist network of, 15, 100, 101 Albania, as Balkan republic, 202, 203, 205 economic growth in, 94 noncommunist government in, 92 Algeria, troops/equipment in Yom Kippur War, 4 Alito, Samuel, 156 Alternate history, case-study counterfactuals in, xv defined, xiii–xvi identifying underlying structures/causes in, xiv, xv long-term consequences of, xvi mental stimulation counterfactuals in, xvi nomothetic counterfactuals in, xvi

role of free will and determinism in, xiv types/models of, xv–xvi Amalgamated Commercial Enterprises, 131 American-style government, 3 Americans with Disabilities Act, 164–165 Andropov, Yuri, as director of KGB, 47, 48, 54 as Soviet leader, 28, 47–48, 49, 54, 68, 69 death of, 52, 69, 74 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Agreement, 114 Antietam, consequences of battle of, xiv Antimissile defense system, 9, 10 Apparatchiks, 90 Arab-Israeli War, 44, 186, 192 Aral Sea, 95 Arens, Moishe, 187, 192 Argov, Shlomo, 68 Arias, Oscar, 130 Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse (Kotkin), 103 Armenia, sovereign republic of, 91 Armey, Dick, 14 Arms Export Control Act, 131 “Arms for hostages,” 125–132, 137 Assad, Hafez al-, 185 Assyrian Christians, 182 August Coup, in alternate histories, 96–101, 116–122 against Gorbachev, 81, 82, 85, 86–87, 91, 96, 108–109, 165 The August Coup: The Truth and the Lessons (Gorbachev), 110

250

INDEX

Autumn of Nations, 13 Axis of evil, 15, 173 Azerbaijan, in alternate histories, 19 economic growth in, 94 sovereign republic of, 91 Aziz, Tariq, 175, 187, 196 Aztecs, empire of, xiv B-1 bomber, 33, 39 Baker, Howard, 72 Baklanov, Oleg, 86, 108 Balkans, NATO peacekeeping involvement in, 201–214 Warsaw Pact members in, 202 Barnes, Michael, 231 Bay of Pigs, 139, 140 Begin, Menachem, 4 Belarus, disarmament treaties signed by, 54 economic growth in, 94, 110 nuclear arsenal of, xvii republic of, 91, 92 Belkin, Aaron, xv Bellotti v. Baird, 150, 151 Belov, Vasily, 83 Belovezh Agreement, 110 Bergen-Belsen concentration camp, 68 Berlin Wall, in alternate histories, 18, 74, 96 construction of, 87 fall of, 13, 43, 54, 85, 88, 89, 90, 107, 165, 214 Reagan’s speech in front of, 8, 70, 77–78, 219–224 Bermudez, Enrique, 229 Bin Laden, Osama, in alternate histories, 100–101 terrorist network of, 172, 178 Bitburg Affair, 68 Bitburg Cemetery, 68 Blackmun, Harry, 148 Boland, Edward P., 128, 226 Boland Amendments, role in Iran-Contra Affair, 71, 127, 128, 136–137, 225–235 Bolanos Geyer, Enrique, 138 Bolsheviks, 84, 90 Bonner, Elena, 105 Booth, John Wilkes, xiv Bosnia, as Balkan republic, 92, 201, 205, 208 ethnic cleansing in, 15 Bosnia-Herzegovina, 202, 207 Brady, James, 64, 67

Brady Gun Control Bill, 74 Brandenburg Gate, Reagan’s speech at, 77, 219–224 Breyer, Stephen, 155 Brezhnev, Leonid, response to shooting of Reagan, 66 Sakharov’s letters to, 88 as Soviet leader, 68, 83, 85, 104 Soviet troops sent to Poland by, 46–47, 54 death of, 28, 47, 68 Brunei, 130 Buckley, William, 73, 131, 137 Bulgaria, economic reforms in, 13 environmental problems in, 95 as NATO member, 95 noncommunist governments in, 54, 70, 92 in Warsaw Pact, 201 Busch, Andrew E., 23, 26, 27 Bush, George H. W., in alternate histories, xvii, xviii, 17, 37, 39, 72, 100, 176–178 defense policies/spending of, 165, 174 domestic policies of, 35, 163 economic policies of, 17, 164–165, 170–171 education of, 17, 163 environmental policies of, 164–165 foreign policy of, 8, 17, 35, 165 on German reunification, 88–89 knowledge of Iran-Contra deal, 10, 71, 129, 137 military service of, 163 “points of light” goals of, 163 political career of, 17, 163 presidential election of, xvii, 67, 70 on Reagan’s economic policies, 8, 36 reelection campaign of, 171 tax policies of, 30, 31 on U.S. role in Persian Gulf War, xvii, 13, 167–168, 169–170, 171, 172, 173, 175 as vice president, 8, 12, 26, 34, 63, 65, 66 Bush, George W., in alternate histories, 122 domestic reforms by, 36 economic policies of, 36

foreign policy of, 36 as governor of Texas, 14, 36 military actions in War on Terror, 15, 173 presidential election of, 36, 171–172 relationship/meetings with Putin, 115, 116 response to 9/11 terrorist attacks, 15 Bustillo, Juan Rafael, 231 Calero, Adolfo, 131, 228, 229 Camp David Accords, 4, 44, 182, 195 Carter, Jimmy, in alternate histories, 38 Camp David Accords signing by, 4 on discrimination and segregation issues, 1 Dixiecrat campaign issues of, 1 economic policies of, 2, 23, 24, 30 as governor of Georgia, 1 political career of, 1, 2 response to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 44 Tehran hostage crisis during administration of, 7, 38, 62, 63 Carter, Ruth, 1 Case-study counterfactuals, xv Casey, William, 7, 40, 134, 226, 227, 230 Castro, Fidel, in alternate histories, 139, 140–142 Castro, Raul, 142 Caucasus Mountain, 94 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in alternate histories, 119, 139–142 budget of, 40 director(s) of, 7, 37, 63, 163 role in Iran-Contra affair, 127, 133, 134, 226–235 Chamorro, Violeta Barrios de, 125, 138 Channell, Carl, 228, 233 Chechen Autonomous Oblast, 113 Chechnya, insurgent fighting in, 94, 111, 112, 113 terrorist attacks by guerillas from, 113, 114, 115 Cheney, Richard, in alternate histories, 40 as member of PNAC, 3

INDEX

as Secretary of Defense, 169, 191 views on Gulf War, 175, 191 Chernenko, Konstantin, as Soviet leader, 52, 69 death of, 69, 74, 79, 103 Chernobyl, nuclear accident in, 53, 74, 95, 104 Chets, anti-ballistic missile system, 193, 194 China, People’s Republic of, in alternate histories, 121–122 communist government in, 13 relationships with U.S., 2, 43 Soviet relationships with, 29 Tiananmen Square protests in, 13, 68 Churbanov, Yuri, 83 Churchill, Winston, 95 CIA World Factbook, 93, 94, 95 City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 150, 151–152, 154 Clarridge, Duane R., 227 Clausewitz, Carl von, 56 Clines, Thomas, 229 Clinton, William J., in alternate histories, 74 defense policies/spending by, 14, 174 domestic policies of, 35 economic policies of, 14, 74–75 education policies of, 14 foreign policy of, 15, 171 military troop reductions under, 174 NAFTA signed in by, 35 national health care policies of, 14 presidential campaign of, 67, 171–172 on Russian troops in Kosovo, 213 tax policies of, 31 welfare reform by, 14 Cold War, beginning of, 43 Cuban missile crisis during, 1, 43 events leading to end of, 12, 54, 79 intensity/impact of, xvii, 1 MAD principles during, 9, 10, 33, 62, 126 milestones in, 54 nuclear threat during, xvii, 9, 10, 43–44, 54 Soviet reaction to U.S. Euromissile installations, 43–44

Coleman, Ron, 233, 234 Columbus, Christopher, xiv Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 110 Communism, collapse in Soviet Union, 13, 91, 95, 110 Reagan Doctrine on, 8, 9, 34, 61, 125–126 Communist Party, in alternate histories, 117 of Czechoslovakia, 66 history of, 84 outlawed by Yeltsin, 91 of Soviet Union, 52, 77, 80, 90, 91, 103, 106 The Complete Book of U.S. Presidents (DeGregorio), 67 Conference of Studies Unions, 61 Conservatism, 2 Consumer Price Index, 31 Contract with America (CWA), 14 Contras, foreign funding of, 125–138 guerilla activities in Nicaragua, 9, 12, 34, 70–71, 127, 128 as Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance, 127 Cooper, William, 133 Cormier, Dale, 193 Corr, Edwin, 230 Cortés, Hernán, xiv Counterfactual history, defined, xiii, xv, xvi types/models of, xv–xvi See also Alternate history Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics (Tetlock and Belkin, Eds.), xv Crimean Peninsula, 86, 108 Croatia, as Balkan republic, 92, 202, 203, 204–205, 206 Cruise Tomahawk missiles, 45, 49, 51 Cuba, Cold War missile crisis in, 1, 43 communist government in, 13 support of Sandinistas in Nicaragua, 125 Czech Republic, as NATO member, 95 noncommunist governments in, 92 privatization in, 93 Czechoslovakia, in alternate histories, 56, 99 economic reforms in, 13 noncommunist governments in, 54, 70, 107

251

Velvet Revolution in, 92, 99 in Warsaw Pact, 201 withdrawal of Soviet troops from, 106 Daimler-Benz Aerospace Company, 45 Daniloff, Nicholas, 105 Danube River, 95 Davis, Nancy, marriage to Reagan, 62 The Day After (1983), 69 Daylight savings time, 4 Dayton Peace Accords, 208 DeGregorio, William A., 67 Delahanty, Thomas, 64 Demokratizatsiya, 105–106 Dr. Zhivago (Pasternak), 83 Dodson, “Neck,” 193 Doe v. Bolton, 149–150 Dole, Elizabeth, 26 Dole, Robert, 18, 35 Druze Muslims, 69 Dubcek, Alexander, 108 Dudayev, Dzhokhar, 113 Duemling, Robert, 231–232 Dukakis, Michael, 163 East Germany, in alternate histories, 98 Communist Party in, 86 economic reforms in, 13 noncommunist governments in, 54 Party of Democratic Socialism in, 86 refugees from, 87 in Warsaw Pact, 201 Eastern Europe, in alternate histories, 18, 101 collapse of communism of, 13 Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA), Reagan’s goals with, 23, 29, 30, 31, 32, 35, 36, 39 Economics, alternate histories of, 36–40 inflation trends in, 25–26 privatization in, 84, 93–94 redistribution of resources in, 25 shock therapy to, 81 “stagflation” period in, 23 supply-side, 8, 23–36 trickle-down theory of, 24–25, 63 Egypt, Soviet-sponsored government in, 44, 182 in war with Israel, 4, 29 Eisenhower, Dwight, 186

252

INDEX

El Salvador, Marxist rebels in, 125, 127 Elizabeth II, 67 End-user certificates, 131 Energy, daylight savings time related to, 4 oil crises in U.S., 2, 4, 5, 16, 24 Energy Resources International, 131 Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), 73 Erria, 131 Eruomissiles, in alternate histories, 55–58 Soviet response to U.S. installation of, 43–55 Estonia, in alternate histories, 119 independence of, 46, 91, 106 nationalist movement in, 84 as NATO member, 95 Ethnic cleansing, in former Yugoslavia, xvii, 202–207 European Economic Community, 15 European Union (EU), 90, 93, 115 Exxon Valdez, 163 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 15 Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), 163–164 Ferdinand, Franz, 203, 212 Fernandez, Joseph, 230, 233, 234 Ferraro, Geraldine, 34, 67, 73, 74 Field of Blackbirds, 206 Fiers, Alan D., Jr., role in IranContra Affair, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234 Florida, anti-Castro émigrés in, 139 2000 election recount in, 15, 172 Ford, Gerald, in alternate histories, 18 presidency of, 2 U.S. Metric Board established by, 39 Foster, Jodie, 63 Fourteenth Amendment, 148, 149 France, in alternate histories, 20 Franks, Tommy, 194 Friction, military theory of, 56–57 Frontline, 175 G-7/Group of Seven, 77, 116 Gadd, Richard, 232, 233

Galbraith, Peter W., 176 Gang of 8, 108 Garron, Hernan, 130 Gemayel, Bashir, 73 General Electric Theater, 62 Genocide, in former Yugoslavia, xvii, 202–207 GeoMiliTech Consultants Corporation, 131 George, Clair E., 227, 228, 233, 234 Georgia, republic of, 91, 94 Georgia, state law on abortions in, 149–150 Gephart, Richard, 18 Gergen, David, 26 Germany, in alternate histories, 98 Christian Democratic Party in, 89 reunification of, 54, 85, 87, 90, 94 Social Democratic Party in, 89 Gettysburg, consequences of battle of, xiv Ghorbanifar, Manucher, 132 Gingrich, Newt, 14 Ginsberg, Ruth Bader, 155 Giordiano, Joseph, 65 Glasnost, in alternate histories, 97 Gorbachev’s reforms of, 12, 80, 83–84, 103, 104, 105–106 Glass, Charles, 137 Globalization, 28 Goldwater, Barry, 62 Gorbachev, Mikhail, as Agricultural Minister, 79, 80 in alternate histories, 18, 80–81, 96–101, 109, 116–122 August Coup against, 85, 86–87, 91, 108–109 childhood and education of, 78 defense policies of, 33 demokratizatsiya politics of, 105–106 dismantling of Soviet Communist Party, 95, 110 economic reforms promoted by, 79, 80, 81, 84, 106, 107–108 as general secretary of Soviet Communist Party, 77, 79, 103 glasnost reforms of, 12, 80, 83, 91, 103, 104, 105–106 as Nobel Prize for Peace recipient, 107

nuclear defense system of, 53 perestroika reforms of, 12–13, 77, 79, 80–81, 103, 104, 106 political career of, 52, 77, 78–79, 103, 106 Reagan’s Berlin Wall challenge to, 77–78 resignation of, 111 summits with Reagan, 52–54, 69–70, 105 Time honors of, 106, 107 Gorbachev, Raisa, 86, 87 Gore, Al, in alternate histories, 75 presidential campaign of, 15, 35, 171 as vice president, 35 Gosplan, 104 Gray Revolution, 115 Great Depression, 36, 61 Greece, in alternate histories, 20 as NATO member, 202 Green Cross International, 79 Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap, 48 Grenada, U.S. invasion of, 49, 68, 73, 127 GRU (military intelligence), 48 Gulf War, first, 181–194 second, 173, 174, 175, 194 See also Persian Gulf War Guttmacher Institute, 153 Habib, Phillip C., 68 Haig, Alexander, 39–40, 65 Hakim, Albert, 130–131, 136 Hall, Fawn, 130 Hamilton, Lee H., 231 Hanssen, Robert, 114 Harley-Davidson, 34 Hasenfus, Eugene, 133, 134, 234 Havel, Vaclav, 107 HAWK surface-to-air missiles, 71, 132, 133, 186 Herzegovina, ethnic cleansing in, 15 Hezbollah, hostages taken by, 9, 131, 137 as Shiite Muslim “Party of God,” 69 Higgins, William, 137 Hill, Anita, 165 Hinckley, John, Jr., xviii, 37, 63, 66, 72 Hinge events/hinge points, xv, xvi Hiroshima, nuclear strike on, xiv, 10 Historiography, 175

INDEX

History, goals in studies of, xiv, xv Hitler, Adolf, 5, 46, 95 Holden, William, 62 Homeland Security, Department of, 15, 36, 172 Hoxha, Enver, 205 Hubbert’s Peak, 120 Human rights, abuses of, 2, 7, 16, 75, 88, 105, 166, 173 Hungary, in alternate histories, 18, 99 economic reforms in, 13, 95 as NATO member, 93, 95 noncommunist governments in, 54, 70, 92 in Warsaw Pact, 201 Hussein, King of Jordan, 68 Hussein, Qusay, 15 Hussein, Saddam, in alternate histories, 38, 119, 122, 176, 177, 198 capture of, 174 genocide operations ordered by, 166–167 human rights abuses by, 166–167, 173, 182–183 invasion of Iran, 28–29 regime/dictatorship of Iraq, 13, 15, 18, 166, 182 weapons of mass destruction programs of, xvii, 15, 169, 172, 173 Hussein, Uday, 15 Hyde Amendment, 152 Hyde Park, 131 Iceland Saga, 131 Identification Friend or Foe (IFF), 188, 197 Ilopango Salvadoran Air Force, 130, 232 Immigration, 75 Inca, empire of, xiv India, nuclear weapons program in, 54 Individual Retirement Account (IRA), 27 Inflation, 25–26 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), 10, 33 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF), 46, 54, 69, 70 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs), 10 Internal Revenue Service (IRS), 26, 27 International Atomic Energy Agency, 186 International Court of Justice, 11 International Labor Organization, 94

International Monetary Fund (IMF), 111, 118 Iran, in alternate histories, 19 American hostages held in Tehran, 6, 7, 44, 62, 63 arm sales to, xvii, xviii, 9–12, 125–138, 165, 225–235 as axis of evil, xvii, 173 connections with Hezbollah, 131 Iraqi invasion of, 7, 8 as Islamic Republic, 38, 44 nuclear weapons program in, 15, 54 overthrow of Shah, 4, 5 Shiite populations in, 28, 37 Iran-Contra Affair, in alternate histories, 138–143 breaking story and disclosure of, 133–137 “The Enterprise” in, 129, 131, 230 evidence destroyed during, 133–134, 136 House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran investigation of, 135 impact on Reagan’s reputation, 9–12, 79 participants in, xvii, xviii, 9–12, 34, 40, 68, 70–72, 125–138, 165, 225–235 as “Project Democracy,” 131 Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition investigation of, 135 summary by Office of Independent Counsel, 225–235 supporters/defenders of, 136–137 Tower Commission investigation of, 134–137 Iran-Iraq War, 7, 8, 13, 127, 182, 183, 186 Iranian Revolution, 5, 6, 7, 8, 16, 17 Iraq, acquisition of weapons of mass destruction in, 15, 169, 172, 173 in alternate histories, 20, 38, 119–120 Baath Party in, 166, 169 demographic groups in, 166 economic sanctions against, 167–169

253

human rights abuses in, 166, 167, 168, 172, 173 invasion of Kuwait, xvii, 13, 167–168, 170, 183–184 in Iran-Iraq War, 7, 8, 13, 17, 127, 182, 183, 186 Kurdish populations in, xvii, 166, 168, 169, 171, 173, 174, 176, 177, 182, 194 Mukhabarat/General Intelligence in, 166 nuclear weapons development in, 186–187 People’s Army in, 166 Republican Guard of, 168 Shia populations in, xvii, 166, 168, 169, 171, 173, 174, 176, 177, 178, 182, 194 Sunni populations in, 166, 174, 178, 182 troops/equipment in Yom Kippur War, 4 U.S. military actions in, 15, 166–175, 184–185 Iraq War, 173, 174, 175 Iron Curtain, 79, 92 Islam, fundamentalist groups in, 4, 5, 17, 19 See also Muslim populations Islamic Jihad, 131 Islamic Republic, 38, 44 Isolationism, 19, 28 Israel, allies of, 4 in alternate histories, 20, 38, 194–198 battles with Arab neighbors, 4, 29, 44, 182 establishment as Jewish homeland, 182 no-retaliation policy in Persian Gulf War, 181–194 in Six Day War, 4 weapons transfer in IranContra deal, 131–132, 134 in Yom Kippur War, 4 Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), 128, 190, 193, 194 Japan, alternate history of World War II outcome, xiv Jaruzelski, Wojciech, 46–47 Jericho missiles, 196 Johnson, Lyndon B., 202 Johnstone, Craig, 228 Jordan, in alternate histories, 121 troops/equipment in Yom Kippur War, 4 Journal of Economic Perspective, 153

254

INDEX

KAL Flight 007, 48, 49, 51 Kansas, abortion laws of, 155 Karzai, Hamid, 172 Kazakhstan, disarmament treaties signed by, 54 independence of, 92, 111 nuclear arsenal of, xvii Kemp, Jack, 35 Kemp-Roth tax cuts, 30 Kengor, Paul, 23 Kennedy, Anthony, 151, 152, 155, 156, 157 Kennedy, John F., xiv, xvii, 13, 186 Kennedy, Robert, xvii Kerry, John, 122 KGB (Committee for State Security), 47–48, 51, 110 Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah, in alternate histories, 16, 17, 20 exile of, 5 regime/rule of Iran, 5, 24, 62 during Tehran hostage crisis, 7 Khrushchev, Nikita, Soviet reforms in rule of, 85, 96, 103 King, Martin Luther, Jr., xiv, xvii Kirkpatrick, Jeane, 3, 227 Kiuchkov, Vladimir, 86 Kohl, Helmut, 68, 88, 89 Korean Airlines Flight 007, 8, 48, 49, 51 Kosovo, Albanian claims to, 207 in alternate histories, 214–216 Field of Blackbirds battle site in, 206 history of disputed region in Yugoslavia, 201, 205–207 NATO military air strikes in, 171, 210 republic of, 92 Serbian claims to region of, 206, 207, 209–211 Kosovo Force (KFOR), 211, 213, 214 Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), 208, 209, 210 Kosovo Polje, 206–207 Kotkin, Stephen, 103 Kravchuk, Leonid, 92 Kruchina, Nikolai, 87 Kryuchkov, Vladimir, 108 Kurdish populations, Hussein’s treatment of, xvii, 166, 168, 169, 171, 173, 174, 176, 177, 183, 194 Kursk, sinking of, 114

Kuwait, in alternate histories, 38, 120, 121 Iraqi invasion of, xvii, 13, 167–168, 170, 183–184 oil resources in, 167 troops/equipment in Yom Kippur War, 4 Kyrgyzstan, economic growth in, 94, 100 republic of, 92, 94 Lacayo, Jose Arnoldo Aleman, 138 Laffer, Arthur, 30 Laffer Curve, 30 Lake Resources, 131 Landsbergis, Vytautas, 84, 107 Laqueur, Walter, 108 The Last Day (Belov), 83 Latin America, in alternate histories, 138–143 Soviet-supported governments in, 45 Latvia, nationalist movement in, 84 as NATO member, 95 as republic, 46, 92 Lazar, King, 206, 207 League of Nations, 181, 182, 211 Lebanon, civil war in, 127 colonial rule of, 181, 182 Israeli invasion of, 68, 69, 188 Shiite populations in, 69 suicide attacks on U.S. Marine barracks, 49, 51, 127 U.S. embassy bombed in, 69 Lenin, Vladimir, in alternate histories, 97 as Soviet leader, 84 Levitt, Steven D., 153 Li Xiannian, 68 Libya, terrorists activities of, 69 troops/equipment in Yom Kippur War, 4 Ligachev, Yegor, 80 Limbaugh, Rush, 14 Lincoln, Abraham, assassination of, xiv Lithuania, in alternate histories, 119 independence of, 46, 90, 92, 107 nationalist movement in, 84 as NATO member, 95 Lockerbie, Scotland, 69 Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, 35 Ludendorff, Erich, xiv

Macedonia, as Balkan republic, 92, 203, 205 economic growth in, 94 Malcolm X, assassination of, xiv Mao Zedong, 13 Marriage incentive, 31 Martin, Ron, 229 Marx, Karl, 84, 90 Marxist-Leninism, 80, 82, 84, 97, 101 Massachusetts, abortion laws of, 151 McCain, John, 20 McCarthy, Joseph, 61 McCarthy, Timothy J., 64 McFarlane, Robert, role in IranContra Affair, 128, 129, 133, 134, 136, 137, 226, 227, 228, 231, 234 McLaughlin, Ann, 26 McNamara, Robert, 10 Meese, Edwin, 26, 71, 134, 135, 227 Mensheviks, 84 Mental stimulation counterfactuals, xvi Metric system, 39 Middle East, American foreign policy toward, 8 history colonial division and rule of, 181–182 oil resources in, 181 religious significance of region of, 181 See also specific country Miller, Richard, 228, 233 Milosevic, Slobodan, 207, 209, 210 Missouri, abortion laws of, 151, 152, 153 Modrow, Hans, 88 Moldova, economic growth in, 94, 95, 100 sovereign republic of, 92 Mondale, Walter, in alternate histories, 17, 38, 73–74, 75 as presidential candidate, 34, 67 as vice president, 3 Montana, abortion laws of, 155 Montenegro, as Balkan republic, 92, 203, 205 Morocco, troops/equipment in Yom Kippur War, 4 Moscow, Summer Olympics in, 44 terrorist attacks in, 18, 113, 114, 115 See also Russia; Soviet Union

INDEX

Moscow City Committee, 106 Moscow Spring, 77 Moscow Summit, 70 Moynihan, Brian, 104 Mubarak, Hosni, 188, 195, 197 Muskie, Edmund, 135 Muslim Brotherhood, 28 Muslim populations, Druze Muslims in, 69 extremist groups in, 15, 18, 19 fundamentalist groups in, 4, 5, 17, 19 Shia groups in, 166, 168, 169, 171, 173, 174, 176, 177, 178 Sunni, 166, 174, 178 Mutually assured destruction (MAD), balance of, 9, 10 Cold War principles of, 33, 62, 126 Nagasaki, nuclear strike on, xiv, 10 National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League (NARAL), 150 National Association of Evangelicals, 68 National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty, 130 National Opposition Union (UNO), 138 National Organization of Women (NOW), 150 National Rights to Life Committee (NRLC), 150 National security, neoconservative approach to, 2 National Security Agency, 129 National Security Council (NSC), in alternate histories, 40, 139 role in Iran-Contra Affair, 34, 71, 128, 129, 130, 226 Nebraska, abortion laws of, 155, 156 Neoconservatism, defined, 2–3 foreign policies of, 2–3 Nerve gas, 49 New Deal, 2, 25, 27 The New Republic, 108 New world order, xvii New York Times, 90 Nicaragua, National Guard of, 127, 128 role in Iran-Contra Affair, xvii, 9–12, 70–72, 79, 125–138, 165, 225–235

Sandinista regime in, 9, 34, 40, 62, 70–71, 125, 137–138, 226 Nicaraguan Democratic Opposition, 131 Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance, 127 Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office (NHAO), 130, 230–231, 232, 233 Nixon, Richard M., Ford’s pardon of, 2 resignation of, 1 role in Watergate scandal, 1, 11 NKVD, Soviet espionage unit, 85 Nomenklatura, 81, 85, 104 Nomothetic counterfactuals, xvi Noriega, Manuel, 139–140, 165 North, Oliver, role in Iran-Contra affair, xviii, 9–10, 34, 40, 71, 128, 129, 130, 132, 134, 135, 136, 139, 226–235 North Africa, in alternate histories, 20 North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), 62 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 14–15, 35 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), actions during Cold War, 43 air strikes on Kosovo, 15, 171, 210 in alternate histories, 54–57, 214–216 Cooperation Council in, 95 members of, 88, 93, 95, 202 military intervention in Bosnia by, 201 mission of, 203 Partnership for Peace in, 95 stalemate with Warsaw Pact, 28 war games of, 50, 51 North Korea, as axis of evil, xvii, 173 communist government in, 13 nuclear weapons program in, 15, 54 North Vietnam, communist government in, 13 Nuclear and Space Talks (NST), 52 Nuclear weapons, Cold War threat of, xvii, 9, 10, 43–44, 125–126 disarmament treaties for, xvii, 46, 54 MAD principles of, 9, 10, 33, 62, 126

255

missiles as basic unit of, 10 See also specific country O’Connor, Sandra Day, 150, 151, 152, 155, 156, 157 Oder River, 95 Oil, in alternate histories, 17–20, 20, 120–121 gas tax related to, 19 Hubbert’s Peak in, 120 sources of, 4, 5, 16 U.S. energy crisis with, 2, 4–5, 13, 16, 24 world markets of, 23–24 See also specific country Oil for food program (OFFP), 169, 171 O’Neill, Tip, 29 Operation Allied Force, 210 Operation Desert Storm, xvii, 167, 168, 169, 173, 177 Operation Paperclip, 10 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), in alternate histories, 16 members of, 6, 167 oil market controls of, 2, 4–5, 6, 16, 24 role during Yom Kippur War, 4 Saudi ties with, 37 Ortega, Daniel, 125, 129, 138 Ortega, Humberto, 138 Owen, Robert, 228, 231, 232 Pahlavi, Mohammed Reza, 5, 6, 7, 8 Pahlavi, Reza Cyrus, 16, 17 Pakistan, nuclear weapons program in, 54 Paleoconservatism, 2 Palestine, colonial rule of, 181, 182 Palestinian fighters expelled from Jordan, 68–69 troops/equipment in Yom Kippur War, 4 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 68–69, 128 Pan Am Flight 103, 69 Panama Canal, 2 Parr, Jerry, 64 Party of Democratic Socialism, 86 Pasternak, Boris, 83 Pastora, Eden, 229, 233 PATCO (Air Traffic Controllers Union), 39 Patriot Act, 15, 172 Patriot missiles, 190, 191, 192–193

256

INDEX

Pavlov, Valentin, 86, 108 Pennsylvania, abortion laws of, 154, 155 Pentagon, terrorist attack on, 15, 172 Perestroika, in alternate histories, 96 Gorbachev’s reforms of, 12–13, 77, 79, 103, 104, 106 Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World (Gorbachev), 78 Perot, H. Ross, in alternate histories, 18–19, 20 as Independent presidential candidate, 35, 67, 171 Pershing II missiles, U.S. installation in Europe, 45, 49, 53, 57, 68, 69, 72 Pershing missiles, 45, 51, 196 Persian Gulf War, in alternate histories, 17 multinational coalition forces in, xvii, xviii, 184–185 role of Arab support in, 185–186 U.S. military actions in, 12, 167–168, 170, 171, 172, 173, 175 Petrov, Stanislav, 49 Pizarro, Francisco, xiv Planned Parenthood of Southeast Pennsylvania v. Casey, 150, 154, 155, 156, 157 Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 146, 150, 151 Poindexter, John, role in IranContra Affair, 71, 134, 136, 139, 232, 234 Poland, in alternate histories, 18, 99 economic reforms in, 13 independence of, 54 as NATO member, 95 noncommunist government in, 70, 92 Solidarity movement in, 46–47, 127 in Warsaw Pact, 201 Pork barrel expenses, 1 Prague Spring, 106, 108 Pravda, 91 Pregnancy, in alternate histories of abortion legislation, 157–161 termination issues in Roe v. Wade, 145–156 viability/life begins debate in, 146–147, 148–149, 158 See also Abortion

Presidential Finding, 139 The President’s Been Shot (Reeves), 64 Primakov, Yevgeny, 113 Prince Edward Sound, 163 “Project Democracy,” 131 Pugo, Boris, 86, 108, 109 Putin, Vladimir, in alternate histories, 215, 216 economic reforms of, 114–115 government reforms of, 114 as head of Federal Security Service (FSS), 113 international efforts of, 114, 115, 116 political career and power of, 113–114, 115 as president of Russia, 91, 114 relationship with U.S., 114, 115, 116 Al-Qaddafi, Muammar, 69 Quayle, Dan, 163 Quintero, Raphael, 229, 233 Radio Free Europe, 119 Rafsanjani, Ali Akbar Hashemi, 133 Rambouillet, Albanian and Serbian meeting in, 210 Reagan, Maureen, 61 Reagan, Michael, 61 Reagan, Nancy, 62, 65, 66 Reagan, Patricia, 34, 62, 66 Reagan, Ronald, on abortion issues, 151 acting career of, 61–62 Alzheimer’s diagnosis of, 72 anticommunist policies of, 8, 9, 34, 61, 125–126 assassination attempt on, xvii, 37, 39–40, 63–72 Berlin Wall challenge to Gorbachev by, 70, 77–78, 219–224 as California governor, 7, 24, 61 childhood of, 61 defense policies/spending by, 8, 10, 27, 32–34, 49 economic policies of, 7, 8, 23–36, 63, 77 education of, 24, 61 foreign policy of, 8 knowledge of Iran-Contra deal, 70–72, 134–137 military service of, 61 political career of, 8, 61, 62

presidential campaign of, 1, 7, 8–15, 62 reelection of, 34, 67 role in end of Cold War, 12 social service programs of, 31, 34, 63 Soviet rhetoric of, 2, 8 speeches of, 8, 77–78, 219–224 summits with Gorbachev, 52–54, 69–70, 105 tax policies of, 8, 24–36 as “Teflon President,” 72 as “The Great Communicator,” 62–63 war on drugs programs by, 165 death of, 72 Reagan, Ronald Prescott, 62, 67 Reagan Democrats, 27, 29, 63 Reagan Doctrine, 9 The Reagan Presidency: Assessing the Man and His Legacy (Kengor and Schwiezer), 23 Reaganomics, 23–36, 63, 77 Recession, 26, 32 Reeves, Richard, 64, 65 Reflections on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom (Sakharov), 88 Regan, Donald, 26, 72 Rehnquist, William H., 146, 149, 155, 156, 157 Repentance (1987), 83 Republican Revolution, 14 Retirement, Reagan’s policies/goals of, 26 Reykjavik summit, 53, 105 Right wing movements, 14 Roberts, John, 156 Robertson, Lord, as NATO Security General, 93 Rodriguez, Felix, 231, 232, 233, 234 Roe, Jane, 146 Roe v. Wade, 145–156 Romania, economic reforms in, 13 as NATO member, 95 noncommunist governments in, 54, 70, 92 privatization in, 93 in Warsaw Pact, 201 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 25, 36, 67, 95 Rugova, Ibrahim, 209 Ruling Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR), 107

INDEX

Rumsfeld, Donald, 3, 203 Russia, chronology of historic events in, 82 economic reforms in, 110, 111, 112–113 Federal Security Service (FSS) in, 113 Gray Revolution in, 115 nuclear weapons program of, xvii, 116 privatization in, 93 as Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, 91 terrorist attacks in, 113, 114, 115 troops in Kosovo, 211–214 See also Soviet Union The Russian Century: A History of the Last Hundred Years (Moynihan), 104 Russian Revolution, 84, 113 Russian Social Democratic Party, 84 Russian Strategic Rocket Forces, 49 Russian Trading System (RTS), 115 Rust, Mathias, 106 Rwanda, 171 RYAN, Russian intelligence program, 48, 51 Ryzhkov, Nikolai, 80 Sadat, Anwar, assassination of, 28 in Camp David Accords, 4 relationships with U.S., 8, 44 Sakharov, Andrei, as Nobel Prize for Peace recipient, 88, 105 as Soviet dissident, 88, 105 Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), 129 Sandinistas, regime in Nicaragua, 9, 34, 40, 62, 70–71, 125, 129, 137–138 See also Iran-Contra Affair Sandino, Augusto, 129 Saudi Arabia, in alternate histories, 38, 121 funding of Contra activities, 128, 130 Iraqi Scud attacks on, 191 royal family of, 37 troops/equipment in Yom Kippur War, 4 U.S. relationships with, 16 Savings and loan associations (S&Ls), 163–164

Sawyer, Buzz, 133 Scalia, Antonin, 151, 152, 155, 156, 157 Schröder, Gerhard, 89 Schwarzkopf, Norman, 191 Schwiezer, Peter, 23 Scowcroft, Brent, 135 Screen Actors Guild (SAG), 61 Scud missiles, 183, 185, 188, 190, 192–193 Secord, Richard, role in IranContra Affair, 130, 131, 136, 228, 229–230, 233 September 11, 2001, in alternate histories, 100, 122 terrorist attacks in U.S., 15, 100, 172 Serbia, as Balkan republic, xvii, 202, 204–205 claims to Kosovo region, 206, 207, 209–211 independence of, 92 NATO air strikes on, 15, 171, 210 Shaddick, Ray, 64 Shah of Iran, in alternate histories, 38 overthrow of, 4, 16, 24, 44, 182, 187 reforms during rule of, 4, 5 death of, 16 Shamir, Itzhak, 187 Sharon, Ariel, 187 Shcharansky, Anatoli, 104 Shevardnadze, Eduard, 88, 105 Al Shiraa, 71, 133 Shultz, George, 134, 227 Siberia, 88 Singlaub, John, 130, 131, 134, 228, 233 Slovakia, environmental problems in, 95 as NATO member, 95 noncommunist governments in, 92 Slovenia, as Balkan republic, 92, 202, 203, 206 economic growth in, 94 as NATO member, 95 Small, Karna, 26 Smith, William French, 227 Social Security, Reagan’s policies on, 8 Socialism, 87 Solar power, 5, 6 Solidarity, 46, 47, 54, 127 Somalia, xvii, 171

257

Somoza, Anastasio, 62, 129 Soref Symposium, 175 Sorrell, Herb, 61 Souter, David, 155, 165 South Africa, 169 Southern Air Transport, 133 Soviet Union, alcoholism in populations of, 81–82, 104 in alternate histories, 18, 96–101, 116–122 apparatchiks in, 90 arms talks with U.S., 52 August Coup in, 81, 82, 85, 86–87 Baltic Republics of, 103 Caucasian Republics in, 103 Central Asia Republics in, 103 Chernobyl nuclear accident in, 53, 74, 95, 104 chronology of historic events in, 82 Committee for State Security (KGB), 47–48, 51, 110 Communist Party of, 52, 77, 80, 90, 103, 106 Congress of People’s Deputies in, 81, 88, 106, 107, 111 constituent republics of, xvii, 103 corruption in government of, 82–83 disarmament treaties signed by, xvii dissidents in, 88–89, 119 dissolution and collapse of, xvii, 13, 18, 70, 80, 85, 90, 98, 111, 165, 201 environmental problems in, 95, 100 GRU (military intelligence) in, 48 historic impact of German invasion on, 46–47 invasion of Afghanistan, 2, 7, 10, 17, 28, 37, 44, 62, 105, 126, 127 market system reforms in, 12–13 missile defense system of, 10, 44–55 NKVD espionage unit in, 85 nomenklatura in, 81, 85, 104 nuclear missile defense system of, 10, 44–55 oil resources in, 5 rate of poverty, 98 Ruling Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) of, 107

258

INDEX

RYAN program of, 48, 51 shooting down KAL 007, 8, 48, 49, 51 shortages experienced in, 84–85 TASS News Agency of, 68, 108 as USSR, 94 Space Defense Initiative (SDI), 68, 70 Special Air Services (SAS), 191 Special Forces, 191 SS-20s missiles, 44, 45, 52, 53 “Stagflation,” 23 Stalin, Josef, dealing with Chechen insurgents, 113 famine engineered by, 78 purges ordered by, 80, 81, 84, 85 regime of, 46, 83, 104 “Star Wars” defense program, 9, 10, 11, 33, 49, 54, 80, 126 Staroduubtsev, Vasilii, 86, 108 Steele, James, 231, 233 Stenberg v. Carhart, 150, 155 Stepashin, Sergei, 113 Stethem, Robert Dean, 69 Stevens, John Paul, 155 Strait of Hormuz, 38 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), 2, 44 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), 165 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 9, 10, 11, 33, 49, 54, 126 Strategic Petroleum Reserve, 19, 121 Suazo, Roberto, 228 Suez Canal, 4, 44 Supply-side economics, in alternate histories, 36–40 Reagan’s policies of, 8, 23–36 Syria, in alternate histories, 20 colonial rule of, 181, 182 terrorist organizations in, 186, 195 troops in Lebanon, 69, 73 in war with Israel, 4, 29 Taiwan, in alternate histories, 121 Tajikistan, economic growth in, 93, 94, 100 sovereign republic of, 92 Taliban, regime in Afghanistan, 15, 100, 101, 122, 172 Tambs, Lewis, 230 TASS Soviet News Agency, 68, 108

Tax Reform Act of 1986, 31, 32, 34–35 Taxes, Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA), 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 35, 36, 39 Kemp-Roth tax cuts, 30 Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, 35 marriage incentive in, 31 Reagan’s policies of, 25–36 tax brackets in, 26, 30, 35 Tax Reform Act of 1986 in, 31, 32, 34–35 Taylor, Zachary, 2 Terrorists/terrorism, airline hijackings by, 69 in alternate histories, 18, 19, 73, 122 attacks/bombings in Moscow, 113, 114, 115 attacks in Lebanon, 127 Chechen attacks of, 113, 114, 115 Libyan attacks of, 69 nuclear weapons threat in, 54 September 11, 2001 attacks in U.S., 15, 100, 172 Tetlock, Philip E., xv Texas, abortion laws in, 146 Thatcher, Margaret, 7, 28 Thomas, Clarence, 155, 156, 165 Thomas, Dennis, 26 Tiananmen Square, 13, 68 Time, 23, 106, 107 Tipped Kettle, 128 Tito, Josip Broz, 202, 206 Tiziakov, Aleksandr, 86, 108 TOW antitank missiles, 132, 133 Tower, John, 135 Tower Commission, 10, 71, 134–137 Transjordan, 181 Trickle-down economics, 24–25, 63 Tunisia, troops/equipment in Yom Kippur War, 4 Turkey, in alternate histories, 20 as NATO member, 202 Turkmenistan, 92 Turtledove, Harry, xiii TWA Flight 817, 69 Udall Corporation, 131, 234 Ukraine, disarmament treaties signed by, 54 economic growth in, 94 nuclear arsenal of, xvii sovereign republic of, 92

Stalin’s engineered famine in region of, 78, 80 UN Protective Force (UNPROFOR), 211 Union Treaty, 81, 86, 108 United Arab Emirates (UAE), 120, 121, 183 United Kingdom, in alternate histories, 20 coalition forces in Persian Gulf War, 184, 191 United Nations, oil for food program (OFFP) in Iraq, 169, 171 peacekeeping activities of, 211 Security Force (SFOR), 211, 212 Truce Supervision Organization, 137 United Nations General Assembly, 173 United Nations-Iraq Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), 169 United Nations Security Council, xvii, 13, 91, 101, 167, 173–174, 210 United Nations Special Commission on Weapons (UNSCOM), 169, 173 United Nicaraguan Opposition, 131 United States, aid to Israel, 186, 189, 194 American hostages in Tehran crisis, 6, 7, 44, 62, 63 boycott of Summer Olympics in Moscow, 44 Department of Defense, 33 Department of Homeland Security in, 15, 36, 172 Federal Reserve Board, 2, 5, 25–26 funding of anti-Soviet Afghani forces, 44 Justice Department, 153 new world order role of, xvii nuclear disarmament treaties of, xvii in Persian Gulf War, xvii, 181–194 Social Security system of, 26 State Department of, 130 terrorist attacks on, 15, 19, 100, 172 Un-American Activities Committee, 61–62 United States Air Force, 48 United States Army, Motion Pictures Army Unit, 61

INDEX

United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment to, 148, 149 United States Marines, 69, 127 United States Navy, diver murdered by terrorists, 69 Seventh Fleet, 48 United States Supreme Court, abortion cases reviewed by, 145–156 Unrue, Drew, 64 U.S. Metric Board, 39 U.S. News & World Report, 105 USA Patriot Act, 15, 172 Utah, abortion laws of, 155 Uzbekistan, economic growth in, 100 republic of, 92, 94 Velvet Revolution, 92, 99 Vessey, John, 227 Viability, beginning of life debate in, 146–147, 148–149, 158 Vietnam War, 1, 29, 43 Virganskaya, Irina Mihailova, 86 Vistula River, 95 Vojvodina, 205 Volcker, Paul, 2, 5, 25–26 Volga River, 95 “Voodoo economics,” 8, 36

Wade, Henry, 146 Waite, Terry, 137 Walesa, Lech, 66, 74 Walker, William, 230 Wallace, George, 1 Walsh, Lawrence, investigation of Iran-Contra Affair, 71, 135–136, 137, 225 War on Terror, 15, 173 Warsaw Pact, as mutual defense treaty, 201 Soviet Cold War roles in, 28, 45, 48, 50, 51, 54, 56, 99, 108, 127, 185, 202, 203 Washington Post, 90, 176 Watergate scandal, 1, 11, 40 Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 119, 122, 169 Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 150, 152, 157 Weinberger, Caspar, 227 Weir, Benjamin, 132 Whelan, Eugene, 79 White, Byron, 157 Wild privatization, 84 Williamson, Richard, 26 World Trade Center, terrorist attacks on, 15, 172 World War I, alternate histories of, xiv Wyman, Jane, 61, 62

259

Yakovlev, Alexander, 79 Yanaev, Gennadii, 86, 108, 109, 117, 119, 120 Yazov, Dmitrii, 86, 108 Yeltsin, Boris, in alternate histories, 80, 96, 117–118, 215, 216 economic reforms of, 111–112 health issues of, 112 movement of troops into Kosovo, 212–214 political career of, 106, 107 resignation of, 114 role during August Coup, 109, 110 as Russian Federation president, 48, 87, 91, 108, 109, 215 Yom Kippur War, 4 Yugoslavia, in alternate histories, 98–99 breakup of, xvii, 15, 91, 92, 201 history of ethnic tensions in, 202–207 YUKOS, 115 Zvuganov, Gennady, 112