Turkey: Challenges of Continuity and Change (Contemporary Middle East)

Turkey

Turkey is generally perceived as deeply divided between the secular, Westernised elite and the Muslim population, with the latter involved in a constant struggle to resist the modernisation process imposed by the elite. This book argues that Turkey’s history is much more complex than this stereotype allows, where neither the elite nor the public are monoliths existing in total opposition to each other. The authors put issues relevant to Turkey today – such as consolidating democracy, dealing with economic development issues, improving its human rights record and its foreign policy – in an historical context, allowing comparisons with other late developers in the world and reflecting the complexity of Turkish political and socio-economic developments. Turkey also argues that the modernisation process that started in the nineteenth century, with all its elements including secularisation and Westernisation, has taken root. This book provides a concise and accessible introduction to contemporary Turkey from a social science perspective. It will be essential reading for students and researchers of political science, social science and the Middle East, as well as for those with a general interest in Turkey. Meliha Benli Altunıs¸ık is an Associate Professor of International Relations at the Middle East Technical University, Turkey. She was recently a Scholarin-Residence at the Middle East Institute, Washington, USA. Özlem Tür is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Middle East Technical University, Turkey.

The Contemporary Middle East Edited by Professor Anoushiravan Ehteshami Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, University of Durham

For well over a century now the Middle East and North African countries have formed a central plank of the international system. The Contemporary Middle East Series provides the first systematic attempt at studying the key factors of this dynamic, complex and strategically important region. Using an innovative common format – which in each case study provides an easily digestible analysis of the origins of the state, its contemporary politics, economics and international relations – prominent Middle East experts have been brought together to write definitive studies of the MENA region’s key countries. Jordan A Hashemite legacy Beverley Milton-Edwards and Peter Hinchcliffe Syria Revolution from above Raymond Hinnebusch Israel Challenges to identity, democracy and the state Clive Jones and Emma C Murphy Turkey Challenges of continuity and change Meliha Benli Altunıs¸ık and Özlem Tür

Turkey Challenges of continuity and change Meliha Benli Altunıs¸ık and Özlem Tür

First published 2005 by RoutledgeCurzon 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by RoutledgeCurzon 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. "To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge's collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” RoutledgeCurzon is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group © 2005 Meliha Benli Altunıs¸ık and Özlem Tür All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested

ISBN 0-203-64412-3 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-67453-7 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0–415–27420–6 (hbk) ISBN 0–415–28710–3 (pbk)

Contents

List of tables List of abbreviations Chronology Preface and acknowledgements Map

vi vii ix xv xviii

1

From the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic

1

2

Politics in the Turkish Republic

24

3

The Turkish economy

68

4

Turkey in world affairs

88

Conclusion

134

Notes Bibliography Index

140 164 171

Tables

2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4

Result of the 1950 General Election Result of the 1961 General Election Result of the 1965 General Election Result of the 1973 General Election Result of the 1983 General Election Result of the 1987 General Election Result of the 1991 General Election Result of the 1995 General Election Result of the 1999 General Election Basic economic indicators, 1923–1946 Manufacturing industry, 1950–1960 Basic economic indicators, 1950–1980 External orientation of the economy

29 34 35 39 46 48 50 57 62 69 70 76 80

Abbreviations

AKP ANAP AP CFE CHP CKMP CUP DECA DP DSP DTP DYP EC EEC ESDP EU FP GAP GNA HADEP HEP HP MDP MHP MNP MP MSP . MÜSIAD NATO NSC OECD

Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi) Justice Party (Adalet Partisi) Conventional Forces in Europe Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) Republican Peasant’s Nationalist Party (Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi) Committee of Union and Progress (I˙ttihat ve Terakki Fırkası) Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti) Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti) Democratic Turkey Party (Demokratik Türkiye Partisi) True Path Party (Dog˘ ru Yol Partisi) European Community European Economic Community European Security and Defence Policy European Union Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi) Southeast Anatolian Development Project (Güneydog˘u Anadolu Projesi) Grand National Assembly People’s Democracy Party (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi) People’s Labour Party (Halkın Emek Partisi) Populist Party (Halkçı Parti) Nationalist Democracy Party (Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi) Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi) National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi) Nation Party (Millet Partisi) National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi) Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association North Atlantic Treaty Organisation National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu) Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

viii Abbreviations OSCE PKK RDF RP SHP SP SPO TGNA . TI. P TI S TPC TRNC . TÜSIAD UN UNIFCYP US USSR YTP

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Kerkoran Kurdistan) Rapid Deployment Force Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) Social Democrat Populist Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti) Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi) State Planning Organisation (Devlet Planlama Tes¸kilatı) Turkish Grand National Assembly . Turkish Workers Party (Türkiye I¸sçi Partisi) Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (Türk-I˙slam Sentezi) Turkish Petroleum Company Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association United Nations United Nations Interim Force in Cyprus United States of America Union of Soviet Socialist Republics New Turkey Party (Yeni Türkiye Partisi)

Chronology of Turkish modernisation and the Republic of Turkey

1789

April

1808

September

1826

June

Accession to throne of Sultan Selim III who initiated reforms including taxation, land tenure, provincial administration and the military. . Sened-i Ittifak. Disbanding of janissaries, replaced by a new army trained by Europeans.

1839–1876

Tanzimat period, attempts at reorganisation of the Ottoman Empire.

1839

November

Tanzimat Fermanı – royal decree in which most of the reform measures are first proclaimed – is announced.

1856

February

Islahat Fermanı.

1869

January

Nationality Law, which defined citizenship purely on a territorial basis, unconnected with religion, is enacted.

1876–1909

Reign of Abdülhamid II.

1876

First Ottoman constitution is enacted.

December

1877 1878

March Opening of the first Ottoman Parliament (Majlis). February

Closure of the first Parliament by Abdülhamid.

1881

The establishment of Public Debt Administration.

1889

Organisations of Young Turks begin to evolve against the rule of Abdülhamid II.

1908

July

The 1876 constitution is reinstated and the Majlis is opened. The Committee of Union and Progress (the Young Turks come to power).

1909

April

Opposition against the rule of the Young Turks gathers in Istanbul, calling for the restoration of Shari’a.

1914

September

Abolition of the Capitulations.

November

Ottoman Empire joins the Axis powers during the First World War.

x Chronology 1915

March

1916 1918

October December

1919 1920

April May January

March April August 1922

November

1923

1926

July August October March April February November December February

1927 1928 1929 1930

July May April November June

1932 1934

July February

1924 1925

Islamic courts are placed under the jurisdiction of secular Ministry of Justice. S ¸ eyhülislam is removed from the Cabinet. Armistice of Mundros is signed at the end of the First World War. The Entente’s military administration is established in Istanbul. Italian forces land in Antalya on the Mediterranean coast. Greek forces occupy the area around Izmir. Ottoman Parliament adopts the National Pact – decision never to submit to the partition and occupation of Anatolia and eastern Thrace. Britain formally occupies Istanbul. Establishment of the Grand National Assembly in Ankara. Istanbul government signs the Treaty of Sèvres with the Entente powers. Negotiations at Lausanne for a peace treaty after the War of Independence. The Lausanne Treaty is signed. Republican People’s Party is founded. Turkey is declared a Republic. Caliphate is abolished. Islamic law courts are abolished. Sheikh Said rebellion erupts in south-east Anatolia. Reforms in dress are introduced. Gregorian calendar is adopted. A new law making civil marriage compulsory is introduced. Turkey accepts the ceding of Mosul province to Iraq. Law for the encouragement of industry is adopted. Constitutional amendment drops Islam as a state religion. Latin alphabet is adopted for Turkish language. Hatay (Alexandretta) a ‘self-governing entity’ occupied by French troops announces union with Turkey. In July France agrees to cessation to Turkey. Turkey becomes a member of the League of Nations. Turkey signs the Balkan Entente with Greece, Rumania and Yugoslavia.

Chronology xi December 1936

July

1937

July

1938

November

1945

February November January July

1946 1947

1949 1950

August May

1952

February

1954

August

1955

February

1960 1961

May January July October

1962 1963

January September September

1964

November

Women are given the right to vote in national elections and be elected to Parliament. Montreux Convention on the regime of the Turkish Straits is signed. Turkey signs the Sadabad Pact with Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan. . Mustafa Kemal Atatürk passes away. Ismet Inönü becomes the President. Turkey declares war on Germany. Transition to multiparty politics. Democrat Party is formed. First multiparty elections are held. Turkish Development Plan is initiated. Law on trade unions giving workers the right to organise is accepted. Turkey starts receiving aid from the United States as part of the Truman Doctrine. Turkey becomes a member of the Council of Europe. Second multiparty elections are held, bringing the Democrat Party to power. Adnan Menderes becomes Prime Minister. Turkey becomes a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Turkey signs the Balkan Pact with Greece and Yugoslavia. Turkey signs the Baghdad Pact with Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and Britain. Military carries out a coup. Ban on political activity is lifted. New constitution is implemented guaranteeing basic rights and freedoms. . . New elections are held. Ismet Inönü of Republican People’s Party becomes Prime Minister. Workers’ rights are recognised. Five-year development plan is put into effect. Turkey signs the Ankara Agreement with the European Economic Community and becomes an associate member. Süleyman Demirel is elected to the leadership of the Justice Party.

xii Chronology 1965

October

1971 1973

March October

1974

July

1975 1977

March June

December

1978

1980 1980 1982 1983

September November November

1987

April July November

1989

November December

1991

September

October 1993

April

1994

March

Elections to Parliament. Süleyman Demirel becomes Prime Minister. Military intervenes in politics with a memorandum. General election is held. Bülent Ecevit becomes Prime Minister. Turkey intervenes in Cyprus and occupies the north of the island. First Nationalist Front government is formed. General election is held. First, Ecevit becomes the Prime Minister but later Demirel forms the Second Nationalist Front and becomes Prime Minister. The Second Nationalist Front government is terminated. Ecevit forms a government and becomes the Prime Minister again. Turkey, under Ecevit’s premiership, decides to suspend customs union timetable with the European Community for five years. The 24 January Decisions. Military carries out a coup. A new constitution is enacted. General election is held. Turgut Özal becomes Prime Minister. Turkey applies to the European Community for membership. Turkey signs a protocol with Syria that guarantees water flow of 500 cubic metres per second from the Euphrates. General elections are held. Turgut Özal continues as Prime Minister. Turgut Özal becomes President. Yıldırım Akbulut becomes Prime Minister. European Community rejects Turkey’s application for membership. Turkish Parliament passes a bill allowing the government to send troops abroad and receive foreign troops during the Gulf War. General election is held. Süleyman Demirel becomes Prime Minister. Turgut Özal dies. Süleyman Demirel becomes President. Tansu Çiller becomes Prime Minister. The economy is hit by a severe crisis.

Chronology xiii 1995

December

1996

August

1997

February

Military indirectly intervenes in politics, with decisions taken in the National Security Council. Some term this intervention a ‘post-modern coup’.

1998

January

1999

February

Welfare Party is dissolved and Erbakan is banned from politics for five years. The PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan is captured in Nairobi, Kenya. General election is held. Bülent Ecevit becomes Prime Minister. Visit of United States President Bill Clinton to Turkey, during which he declares Turkey to be the US’s ‘strategic partner’.

April November

December

General election is held. Necmettin Erbakan becomes the Prime Minister after a failed attempt by Yılmaz and Çiller to form a government. Military partnership with Israel is announced.

European Union in its Helsinki Summit decides to grant Turkey candidate status. Turkish military wins the war with the PKK.

2001

February August

2002

January February November

2003

August

Economy is hit by a severe crisis. Recep Tayyip Erdog˘an forms the Justice and Development Party. A new Civil Code is enacted. Parliament passes a ‘mini-reform package’, introducing amendments to the penal code and the anti-terrorism law. General election is held. Recep Tayyip Erdog˘an becomes Prime Minister. Parliament passes a series of reforms in harmonisation with the EU.

Preface and acknowledgements

Turkey has several identities, one of which is Middle Eastern. Being strategically and culturally located at a conjuncture point, Turkey represents both similarities and contrasts with Middle Eastern states. While a common historical legacy, cultural and religious ties are important in locating Turkey in the Middle East, its several other characteristics put it into a non-Middle Eastern context, thus making it a very interesting case to study within this series. Unlike most of the Middle Eastern countries, Turkey escaped colonialism. Therefore, the process of consolidating the power of the post-independence state occurred as early as in the 1920s and 1930s. However, the central role of the military-bureaucratic elite in state formation and the expanded role of the state in the development process represent a similarity with most of the Middle East countries in the postindependence period. Despite the shared development effort in the region, none of the regimes in the Middle East went as far as the Turkish secularist model and openly adopted a Westernisation project as Turkey did. Modernisation defined in terms of Westernisation has been of significant importance in Turkish development effort, so is secularism. Turkey, unlike many Middle Eastern states, has been able to establish a working democracy, despite its shortcomings. The aim of this book is to provide a general framework for Turkey, focusing on the developments in politics, economics and international relations of the country, mainly for the general reader. Therefore, in addition to providing general arguments and themes, the book is also rich in details of Turkish domestic and foreign policy. The first chapter focuses on the emergence of Turkey as a modern nation state: the creation of national institutions and identity. This is treated in a historical fashion, with the emphasis on continuity and change since the last century of the Ottoman Empire in particular. In the last two decades there has been a growing debate on the history of the Republic and its ideology. This book argues that the state formation process in Turkey occurred not only in the context of historical tradition and power struggles among contending social groups, but also against a background of economic, political and ideological transformations in the world, and as such represents many similarities with countries going through the same processes at that juncture.

xvi Preface and acknowledgements The second chapter, on politics in the Turkish Republic, chooses to analyse Turkish politics from a perspective that focuses on party politics. Turkish party politics represents a striking continuity albeit marred with periodic crises. Thus on the one hand Turkish politics experienced breakdowns of democracy through military interventions, political corruption and continuing human rights problems, much the same as many developing countries since the Second World War, and yet Turkey has been able to emerge from this pack, together with a handful of countries, in trying to consolidate its democratic institutions, improve its human rights record, and further extend political participation. The third chapter, on the Turkish economy, focuses especially on state strategy for economic development and critical turning points in that strategy. The proliferation of economic actors and Turkey’s increasing integration with the world economy underline Turkish economic history. However, these processes have created conflicts that had implications for domestic politics and increasingly for the country’s foreign policy. Finally, the chapter on Turkey’s international relations identifies general factors, namely geopolitics, identity, and history, that constitute the context of Turkish foreign policy, while at the same time focusing on different phases with their own dynamics. It is argued that as a middle power not only was Turkey very much influenced by developments in the international system, it also exerted its own influence, especially in its adjacent regions. Even in a rapidly changing international context, Turkish foreign policy presented an element of continuity. A very important constant in that respect has been Turkey’s drive to be part of the Western state system, which is defined in terms of membership of the EU. Since the Helsinki Summit that accorded Turkey membership status Turkey has been going through a reform process that is slowly transforming the country’s politics and economics as well. Thus the future of Turkish–EU relations looms large in the future evolution of Turkey’s modernisation project that started in the nineteenth century. Two general perspectives inform the analysis in the book. The first is the dynamic interaction between internal and external contexts. Each chapter makes an effort to establish or at least invoke those links. Second, the book underlines the theme of continuity and change in the politics, economics and international relations of Turkey. In each realm both continuities and changes at times present significant challenges. The extent to which Turkey has been able to face those challenges constitutes an important part of this study. Turkey is such a dynamic country that it is hard to keep up with the pace of developments. In the course of writing the book two major economic crises occurred to make constant revisions inevitable, the sweeping electoral victory of a newly established Justice and Development Party, and significant developments in the external environment, including a war in neighbouring Iraq. And yet this still is a snapshot of the constantly evolving dynamism of Turkish domestic and foreign politics. In writing this book we have benefited greatly from the lively and stimulating debate on Turkey in the last two decades both in Turkey and abroad. We also wish to thank our series editor Anoushiravan Ehteshami for his encouragement, support

Preface and acknowledgements xvii and valuable contributions throughout this process. Our editor Grace McInnes has also been very patient and supportive. We also would like to extend our appreciation to Professors Ays¸ e Ayata and Atila Eralp of the Middle East Technical University and Dietrich Jung of the Danish Institute for International Studies for their insightful and valuable feedback on the manuscript. We are grateful to the Middle East Technical University and the Department of International Relations where we are currently employed. Meliha Benli Altunıs¸ık also appreciates the supportive and friendly atmosphere at the Middle East Institute in Washington DC where she spent her sabbatical thanks to a Fulbright grant. Finally, we would like to thank Salih, Alihan and Jan Wilhelm for their understanding and support through what has been at times a very demanding period for them.

0

kilometres

. Izmir

Istanbul Istanbul

Edirne

300

Antalya

Bursa

U

Cyprus

Konya

T

ANKARA

Adana

R

K

Samsun

Y

S Y R I A

Gaziantep

E

Sivas

Trabzon

Diyarbakır

I R A Q

Erzurum

Kars

1

From the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic

The origins of state formation in Turkey go back to the nineteenth century. During the last century of the Ottoman Empire the emergence of the reformist state in Istanbul and its reforms in the military, political, legal and economic fields amount to the beginnings of modern state formation. A parallel process of Western political and economic penetration into the region affected the implementation of these reforms during that period. These two contradictory processes shaped the political and socio-economic landscape within which the Turkish Republic was founded. There was a significant degree of institutional, ideological and elite continuity between the Ottoman and the Republican periods.1 Institutionally, the Turkish Republic inherited most of the ministries, high courts, public service institutions, civil and military educational institutions of the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire. Ideologically, the debates of the nineteenth-century, which mostly centred on modernisation, affected the debates in the Republican era and most of the main currents that emerged during the reformation period continued to prevail. Finally, the bulk of the elite who established the Turkish state had been part of the Ottoman civil and military bureaucracy. On the other hand, the transition from the Ottoman state to the Turkish Republic also signified a rupture in important ways, as the context had been dramatically altered. The Ottoman reformists wanted to save what was left from the empire and considered modernisation a tool with which to do this. For the Kemalist elite, however, there was nothing to be saved after years of war. Therefore, their task was to build a nation state out of the ashes of the empire in a much smaller territory, and for them modernisation was a goal in itself.

The emergence of the reformist state At the end of the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire, which had emerged in Anatolia around 1300 and, up until the seventeenth century, had held vast lands in West Asia, North Africa and South-east Europe, was facing serious problems. Shifting power relations between Western powers and the Ottoman Empire had led to military defeats and territorial contraction and a consequent increase in European economic and political influence. Important changes were taking place in the Ottoman economy as the world economy came to play an ever larger role.

2 From the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic On the one hand, the empire was gradually losing its position as an intermediary in international trade; on the other hand, parts of the empire were becoming more integrated into the expanding world capitalist economy. The latter developments were slowly transforming the socio-economic landscape in those areas. In a parallel process, the central administration had lost most of its control over the periphery as a result of the increased assertiveness of local notables in the eighteenth century.2 In the meantime the spread of revolutionary ideas from France gave rise to nationalism, first in the Balkan territories, then throughout the empire, and, thus challenged its political unity. All these developments in turn exacerbated the revenue crisis and created a sense of urgency in the central administration that unless improvements were made, the Ottoman state could not survive. The reforms were therefore mainly designed to preserve the unity of the empire in the face of increasing internal and external challenges. Through a series of military, political and social measures the state tried to make itself more efficient. The first attempts to reform the state and state–society relations came from the sultans themselves. In the late eighteenth century Sultan Selim III (1789–1806) started the reform process, especially in the military field. The creation of a new standing army, Nizam-ı Cedid (the New Order), trained by Europeans, was mainly designed to quell the power of the local notables and to increase the military effectiveness of the Ottoman Empire vis-à-vis its external enemies. However, as a result of rebellious opposition from powerful groups, especially from the janissaries, the traditional standing army, the Sultan was deposed and his reforms were reversed. After a brief rule by Mustafa IV, the new Sultan, Mahmud II (1808–39) relaunched the reform programme. Faced with the challenge of powerful notables and nationalist uprisings in the Balkans, in addition to the challenge of his governor in Egypt, Muhammad Ali, the new Sultan had to start his reign by signing a Document of Agreement (Sened-i Ittifak) in 1808 with the powerful local notables to consolidate his rule, despite its being contrary to his centralisation efforts.3 Once firmly in control, however, Mahmud II went further than his predecessor and acted more forcefully in implementing several reform measures. His reforms mainly aimed to consolidate the power of the central government visà-vis significant social forces in society. During this period the iltizam (land tenure) system, which had opened the way for the rise of landlords in some provinces, was abolished. Second, the janissaries, the Ottoman army which served the state well for centuries until it became a source of power against the Palace, were disbanded in 1826, to be replaced by the new army. Finally, the administrative and financial independence of the ulema (clergy) was undermined by several measures, including the adoption of new civil and commercial codes structured like European ones and the increased control of vakıf (religious endowment) revenues. During this period there were also attempts to adopt European forms of organisation in the bureaucracy to increase its efficiency. Institutions for the training of higher officials were established. Together with the reopening of Ottoman embassies in Europe and the launching of the Translation Bureau, these institutions performed a significant role in the training of the next generation of civil servants. Early reform efforts for ‘saving the state’ were based on two elements. The first

From the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic 3 was the acceptance of Western superiority that, the reformists believed, required Turkey to ‘catch up’ with the West by borrowing Western institutions and training, and creating an economic system based on the sanctity of private property. The second was the perception that the increasing power of the periphery relative to the power of the centre that had occurred in the eighteenth century in particular was to be blamed for the decline of the Ottoman Empire’s power, and this perception led to efforts towards centralisation. The most important contribution of the limited reforms of the sultans in the early nineteenth century was to help the establishment of what S.erif Mardin has called ‘the respectability of change’.4 In addition, the opening of new schools contributed to the reform process in the long run, as their graduates became the main source of recruits to the reformist civil and military bureaucracy throughout that century.5 In fact, the first generation of reformers was mainly comprised of the elite central bureaucracy, who had received a higher education either abroad or in the newly established schools. They started a new era known in Ottoman history as the Tanzimat (literally, reorganisation) that extended from 1839 to 1876. Like the reformist sultans before them, these bureaucrats were of the opinion that the re-establishment of a uniform and centralised administration was the key to ‘saving the state’. This meant, first and foremost, the redefinition of centre–periphery relations in the empire. In addition to the recentralisation of government, the first phase of reforms consisted of the modernisation of the army, reorganisation of the bureaucracy, adoption of new laws, reformation of the education system and attempts to strengthen the economy. The primary purpose always remained the reform of the state in order to cope better with internal conflict and external pressure. Most of the reform measures were first proclaimed in royal decrees, the Tanzimat Fermanı, issued in 1839, and the Islahat Fermanı in 1856. These decrees contained the promises of the central administration as regards administrative reforms, the standardisation of conscription and the equality of all the Sultan’s subjects, regardless of their religion. This last aspect was further underlined by the nationality law of 1869, which defined citizenship ‘purely on a territorial basis, unconnected with religion’.6 These reforms were much more extensive than the earlier ones and were also significant in that they showed the increasing influence of the outside world on Ottoman affairs. The decision to open up the Ottoman economy, signified by the signing of the Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Convention of 1838, and the decision to grant extraterritorial protection to Christian subjects of the empire by the European powers were two areas where this influence was easily seen. The earlier reform efforts were implemented to some extent but they could not be carried out completely. As is often the case with such significant transformations they soon encountered obstacles. Those with vested interests in the old system resisted. The Ottoman state was trying to steer a smooth course between European external interests and interference, on the one hand, and the various sorts of domestic opposition, on the other. This complicated the task of reform. In addition there was the problem of increasingly scarce economic resources, which made the implementation of reforms even more difficult. The trade agreements with major

4 From the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic European powers, known as the Capitulations, had turned the Ottoman economy into an open market and the central government’s control over its finances was being rapidly eroded. In order to meet the expenses, the central government resorted to more coercive means of taxation, which contributed to the disruption of the ideological unity of the empire. For the same reason the empire also resorted to foreign borrowing, which eventually led to Ottoman bankruptcy in 1876.7 The external threat of dismemberment of the empire was also creating a negative atmosphere for change and putting the daunting task of preserving the political unity at the forefront of all other aims. Finally, a very important challenge to the reforms originated from a growing sense of duality in the empire. The new ruling elite and its inability to reconcile its interests with those of most of the other groups in the society, coupled with the withdrawal of several social groups (such as the ulema and the sipahi (cavalry)) and institutions as a result of reforms, created a cultural cleavage. In the meantime, increasing signs of foreign intervention brought forward the issues of legitimacy. Therefore the Ottoman reformation process soon faced a dilemma. On the one hand, particularly through the establishment of a modern army and achievement of technological and economic development, the reformists aimed to strengthen the state. On the other hand, the changes the reforms brought in from the West in administration, education and law had the potential to undermine the state by challenging its traditional foundations. This dilemma led to a fascinating debate among the elites and intelligentsia as to how to reconcile these two aspects of reforms. The most important response came from a diverse group of mostly young bureaucrats, the so-called Young Ottomans (or New Ottomans), who basically put forward the conciliatory thesis to tackle the issue of duality that started to exist in the Ottoman Empire with the implementation of reforms. For them what the Ottoman state needed was the incorporation of selected European institutions without totally undermining the traditional basis of the Ottoman political and social system. Therefore, they were not against modernisation per se but to the way the Tanzimat reformers perceived it. According to the Young Ottomans Tanzimat reformers were too conciliatory towards the West, which led them to internalise the West’s perspective of themselves and eventually to adopt policies that discriminated against the Muslims. In particular, the Western powers’ increasing utilisation of Christian merchants in the Ottoman Empire as intermediaries and their success in obtaining certain privileges for them, such as tax exemptions and immunity from Ottoman law, had fuelled the grievances against the Tanzimat reforms. The Young Ottomans were thus quite critical of what they saw as superficial modernisation and bureaucratic absolutism of the Tanzimat reformers and excessive foreign intervention in domestic affairs of the empire. The remedy for them was the establishment of a constitutional monarchy, which was also legitimised through the Islamic notion of mes¸veret (consultation). They also hoped that the institution of popular sovereignty would overcome inter-communal divisions and problems within the empire. A closely related concept was ‘Ottoman patriotism’, expressed in the ideas of vatan (fatherland), which underlined the

From the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic 5 loyalty of Muslims and non-Muslims to a geographically defined concept of fatherland and its ruling dynasty, the Ottomans. Finally, controlled economic liberalism that would open the way for Ottoman bourgeoisie constituted the backbone of their thinking.8 The Young Ottoman ideas for a constitutional monarchy began to find more support within a group of high-level bureaucrats when they saw the increasing autocracy of the Palace. The reflection of the reforms in the political arena was the adoption of a constitution in 1876 and the opening of a first Parliament in 1877. The commission that drafted the constitution witnessed a struggle between the reformists and the conservatives, the latter staunchly trying to safeguard the powers of the Sultan. The result was a compromise. The constitution reflected many of the ideas of the Young Ottomans, while at the same time jealously guarded the ultimate power of the Sultan. Due to a certain wealth requirement for those running for office, provincial notables and nouveaux rich were overly represented in the Parliament, which consisted of an elected chamber of deputies and an appointed senate.9 Even this limited atmosphere of freedom contributed quite significantly to the advancement of freedom of expression in the empire, which was reflected particularly in the publication of a variety of newspapers. In addition the notions of legality, equality and individual rights became part of the political discourse and the concept of Ottoman citizenship emerged. Representatives from different parts of the empire with different ethnic and religious backgrounds coalesced around the notion of Ottomanism. Elite and upper-middle-class provincial representatives from diverse parts of the empire came together for the first time to discuss issues ‘varying from the appropriate official language of the Empire to provincial reorganization, freedom of the press, tax collection, and Westernisation’, and in the course of these discussions ‘blocs not tied to religious and ethnic lines emerged.’10 This era of relative freedom ended rather abruptly when in 1878 Sultan Abdül Hamid II (1876–1909), using the humiliating defeat suffered against Russia as a pretext, suspended the constitution and closed the Parliament. This was the beginning of his 33-year rule during which the power shifted from the Sublime Porte to the Palace and he ruled with an iron fist with the help of the conservative Palace bureaucracy. The new period clearly signalled a change of approach with the end of the constitutional monarchy. The relative freedoms ended and were replaced by a rule that was intolerant of opposition and obsessed with security. The Sultan and the Palace bureaucracy were also inclined to use Islam as a source of legitimacy both in domestic and foreign policy and approached the West in a more cynical manner than had the earlier reformists. This was a response both to the increasing duality in the Ottoman Empire and to the accelerated process of internal dislocation and external defeat. Sultan Abdül Hamid’s Islamism had two objectives. Internally Islam was used to foster unity among Ottoman Muslims so as to prevent further disintegration. Externally the Sultan’s emphasis on his position as Caliph was thought as a rallying force for the Muslims outside the empire to be used as a balance against European interventionism.11

6 From the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic Despite the disruption of the constitutional period, during the Hamidian era reforms continued particularly in the technical and educational fields. This was a reflection of the understanding that Western superiority rested on these two areas. There was a significant rise in government revenues, especially during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The Ottoman economy in general and Ottoman agriculture in particular grew at more moderate rates during these years, owing mainly to the strengthening of the Ottoman state and the austere policies pursued by Istanbul. Finally, during the Abdül Hamid era the empire witnessed the development of the means of communication, through the use of telegraph, railways and steamships, all of which contributed to the expansion of central control. Sultan Abdül Hamid was able to prevent further fragmentation of the empire, and the relative peace that prevailed during most of his reign ‘permitted the various internal processes of change to mature.’12 The conventional historiography of the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire has regarded the Hamidian era as an aberration in, if not a reaction to, the reform process. In recent years, however, studies on this era came to characterise the 33-year rule of Sultan Abdül Hamid II as a continuation of the adaptation and reform process. According to this new characterisation his rule was a response to the ‘legitimacy crisis’ in the Empire that, in tackling that crisis, contributed in a more significant way to the ‘recasting of Ottoman identity’.13 This crisis was due to both the internal dislocations that were referred to above and also intense imperialist rivalries targeting various territories of the empire. The Sultan, therefore, sought to maintain the integrity of the empire like the earlier reformers while at the same time trying to restore some of the social dimensions of the traditional order. His formula was in many ways similar to the ones that were used by the earlier reformers but with some changes. Islam was clearly used more, but more to provide legitimacy to the reforms14 and to consolidate the Sultan’s rule over Muslim subjects, who by that time constituted the clear majority in the empire. On the other hand, especially in his support for the establishment and increasing enrolment in modern schools, ironically he helped to further undermine the traditional order he was trying to uphold. Through such policies Abdül Hamid in fact contributed to the move towards further secularisation and thus ‘conceiving a loyal population as a proto-citizenry’.15 However, Abdül Hamid’s method of rule, which was highly authoritarian, was far less acceptable at the age of transformation in the empire. Such policies moulded the Westernising political reformists into a more radical course. The Young Turk16 movement that emerged during this period was different from the Young Ottomans in many respects. Unlike the latter, the former was no longer just out to save the state, but radically reforming it. Furthermore, again in contrast to the Young Ottomans, the Young Turks were not only ideologues, but they were also activists fighting against what they criticised as the increasing authoritarianism of Abdül Hamid’s rule. Young Turks were at the same time a product of the new education system that the earlier reforms brought. They were very much influenced by the ideas of the French Revolution and the rationalism and positivism of the nineteenth century. The Young Turk movement had members with diverse ethnic

From the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic 7 and religious identities, and thus it is not surprising that the movement was clearly Ottomanist, emphasising Ottoman identity which was molded into a new form to fit into the age of nationalism. Finally, in line with the liberal opposition since the beginning of the Tanzimat period, the movement was openly constitutionalist. They were very much influenced by the international atmosphere created by the introduction of constitutional monarchies in Iran (1905–1906), Japan (1905) and Russia (1905). The Young Turk movement brought together different opposition groups. First there were the students in several modern schools and some civil servants. The core of the movement was the organisation secretly established in June 1889 by a group of students at the Military Medical Academy. Students from other schools and civil servants then joined them. This group later merged with the opposition movement among the exiles in Europe, especially in Paris.17 The result of this merger was the foundation of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) that started to act as an umbrella organisation for the groups protesting against Abdül Hamid’s rule. As for the earlier reformers the main question that the Young Turks were trying to tackle was how to reform the state. Two different answers were given to this question by the Young Turk movement, which led to the emergence of two factions. The first faction led by Ahmed Rıza called for a statist, centralised polity led by the elites. The other faction, led by Prince Sabahaddin, called for a decentralised administration, private entrepreneurship and individualism. The First Young Turk Congress in Paris in 1902 clearly demonstrated the differences. However, all different groups were coming together in their opposition to Abdül Hamid and in their call for a parliamentary regime, a constitution and a rule based on law. The ideas of the Young Turks were also beginning to be influential among the young officers after 1905, especially in the Balkans where the officers established their secret organisation, the Ottoman Freedom Society. The officers, increasingly frustrated with Abdül Hamid’s policies that led to the deterioration of the quality of military equipment and of salaries, believed that these policies ‘towards the army was undermining its strength and reducing its abilities to defend Ottoman territories in Europe’.18 They were increasingly attracted to the CUP because of its ideas and they established formal links with the organisation. Their merger with the CUP further strengthened the movement. The Second Young Turk Congress in Paris in December 1907 became a show ground for the increasing power of the movement. Different factions came together in their criticism of the rule of Abdül Hamid II and called for various ways of harnessing social resistance against absolutism. The period of 1906–1908 demonstrated the power of the Young Turk movement among the local leadership and the populace at large, when various examples of resistance, such as tax revolts, took place.19 The military officers eventually took the lead when the Third Army stationed in Salonica started a revolt in summer 1908 and demanded that Abdül Hamid restore the constitution.20 Increasing unrest eventually compelled the Sultan to reinstate the constitution of 1876 and soon elections for the new Parliament were held which brought the Young Turks to power.21

8 From the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic

The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in power (1908–1918) The CUP period is generally divided into two sub-periods. In the first, between 1908 and 1913, the CUP controlled the government to a large extent but was not completely in power. In the second period between 1913 and the end of World War I the CUP was in complete control of political power. The first phase of the Young Turk period witnessed the growing success of various nationalist separatist movements and the increasing bondage of the state under the tutelage of the Public Debt Administration, which was established to pay Ottoman debt to foreign creditors. Therefore, the immediate concern was to re-establish authority and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman state. At the same time the CUP’s victory had increased hopes and there was a wide range of expectations from the revolution of 1908. An atmosphere of freedom emerged where an extraordinary explosion of publications, political organisations, and expressions of individual and group inspirations took place. The governments during this period embarked on an expansion of primary and educational system and an improvement of the military. The CUP also focused on reforming the state apparatus through which it aimed to streamline the bureaucracy mainly to achieve savings and improve efficiency. The drive towards centralisation that became the blueprint of the nineteenth-century reformers continued unabated during this period.22 Overall the first phase of the CUP period witnessed the expansion of the power of the government and the Parliament at the expense of the Palace. In fact, the sultans, especially after the deposition of Abdül Hamid, remained largely as figureheads. The constitutional regime that was established by the Young Turks confronted a number of internal and external challenges that threatened the new regime. The CUP had offended several key groups through its policies, and these in turn began to organise an opposition. Among them were, in particular, the notables in the countryside who demanded more self-government and the bureaucrats who had lost power as a result of the shrinking of the state. The religious and ethnic minorities, which were more supportive of the liberal faction within the Young Turk movement due to the latter’s call for decentralisation, increased their demands for autonomy. Opposition to the CUP also brought together an interesting coalition of religious conservatives and liberals. The former was reacting to increasing secularisation and loss of power, whereas the latter were disappointed by their loss of power to the centralist faction and what they saw as limited efforts towards political liberalisation. After 1908 revolution the liberals established their own party, the Ahrar Fırkası (the Liberal Union) and mounted a strong political opposition against the government. Eventually the opposition turned into an insurrection by the Istanbul garrison on 13 April 1909. The movement was led by some soldiers and theological students in Istanbul who were calling for ‘the restoration of the ¸seriat’. The Third Army stationed in Macedonia eventually put down the uprising. Abdül Hamid was accused of ‘organising the counterrevolution’, and Parliament decided to remove him from office. He was exiled to Salonica and replaced by his younger brother, who was little more than a figurehead.23 Although

From the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic 9 the new government was able to consolidate its rule through the use of force, the challenges continued to exist. Soon after the coming to power of the CUP, Bulgaria declared itself independent in 1908 and the next day Austria announced the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 1908 Crete announced its decision to unite with Greece in violation of the Treaty of Berlin of 1878. However, the Ottoman state did not have the power or the influence to resist that decision. In the next three years there were rebellions in Yemen, Macedonia and Albania. In 1911–1912 the Ottomans fought against the Italian invasion in Libya, at the end of which they abandoned that province to Italy when they were attacked by a coalition of Balkan states in 1912. The defeat in the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913 was a turning point for the Ottoman state. Not only was the Ottoman defeat by its former subjects considered a great humiliation, it also dashed the expectations about the survival of the empire as it was. As a result of this war the Ottoman state virtually lost all of its European territory. In fact, faced with growing opposition and isolation, the CUP started to use strong means to gain and retain control of the government. Eventually a more radical faction within the CUP known as the Unionists seized power during the Balkan Wars on 23 January 1913. A new period started in the Ottoman Empire, which eventually brought about its demise when a small group within the collective leadership led the Ottoman Empire to join the Central Powers in the First World War. However, before discussing the devastating impact of the war on the empire that brought about its dissolution, it seems necessary to evaluate the contribution of the reformist period to the evolution of the emergence of a modern state.

The emergence of a nation and the debate on identity Nineteenth-century reforms ushered in a new era of profound socio-economic, educational and ideological transformation in the Ottoman Empire. The period witnessed the disintegration of the traditional order, through the mental transition from saving the state to establishing a new order. Among other things this transition required a ‘fundamental recasting of Ottoman identity’24 which would become the basis for the emergence of a proto-modern state. Throughout the reforms several political projects competed in the Ottoman Empire. The crux of the debate revolved around two questions. First, how and to what extent should the Ottoman Empire adopt European ideas and institutions? Second, how could the reformers deal with the difficult transition from a multiethnic, multi-religious pre-modern empire to a modern polity? The most influential ideology of the emerging modern state remained Ottomanism, ‘an uneasy mix of the old ideology (Ottoman culture and Islam) and modern nationalism’.25 It was hoped that Ottomanism would sustain the loyalties of the quite diverse population of the empire to the territory and the Sultan in the age of modern nationalism. As such the ideology remained ambiguous, which gave it some flexibility and room for reinterpretations throughout the reform period. At the beginning of the nineteenth century non-Muslims constituted about 40 per cent of the Ottoman population. Early reform efforts were based on the idea

10 From the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic of Ottomanism that emphasised equal rights for non-Muslims. However, this did not prevent rebellions and unrest in the non-Muslim areas. Furthermore, this idea of Ottomanism was criticised by Muslims who were not happy to lose their privileged positions.26 Young Ottomans, who argued that the state had been so compromising towards Europe and that priority was given to non-Muslims, to some extent capitalised on these feeling among the Muslims at that time. In the meantime in the Balkan Wars the Ottoman Empire lost 25 per cent of its land and one-fifth of its population. In the Berlin Agreement the empire lost its most important Christian provinces while at the same time an increasing number of Muslims from the Balkan provinces migrated to the empire. Rapid loss of nonMuslim territories led to a redefinition of Ottomanism, which aimed to focus on the integration of the Muslim periphery. This project, which became more powerful during the Hamidian era, had both domestic and foreign policy dimensions. Domestically it proposed to emphasise the Islamic aspect of Ottoman identity so as to assure the allegiance of numerous ethnic Muslim groups within the empire. As a foreign policy goal it aimed to get the help of the Islamic people around the world in the Ottoman fight, especially against Pan-Slavism. As such, Pan-Islamism was also a pragmatic ideology that was proposed to deal with the domestic and external challenges that the Ottoman Empire was facing. Abdül Hamid and his supporters accepted the idea of Pan-Islamism and decided to give priority to the Muslim citizens. As Kayalı argues, Abdül Hamid placed a new emphasis on Islam and his personal religious role as caliph. Yet his Islamism neither negated nor superseded Ottomanism. In Hamidian Islamism as well as Ottomanism, as it emerged and underwent transformation since the Tanzimat, the focus of loyalty was the Ottoman sultan. Both ideologies stressed the notion of a ‘fatherland’, the geographic expression of which was the territories under the sultan’s jurisdiction.27 During the Hamidian period the emphasis was to thus strengthen the loyalty of the Muslims, now a clear majority in the empire, and to prevent the ascendance of nationalist ideologies among them. This policy specifically targeted the Arab provinces and aimed to strengthen the loyalty of these provinces to Istanbul. Despite some initial successes, it eventually failed to quell the rise of Arab nationalism. Indeed, the latter part of the nineteenth century witnessed the strengthening of ethnic identities among certain groups in the empire, aided in part by the modernisation process unleashed with the reforms. The CUP came to power in that atmosphere. It has been generally argued that during CUP rule Turkish nationalism, even Pan-Turkism, increasingly became the state ideology, which in turn further alienated the non-Turkish elements. Some recent research, however, has effectively shown that even after the 1911–1913 Balkan Wars, which brought further loss of Christian majority provinces, the CUP seemed to fully remain committed to the idea of Ottomanism. The ideas of Turkish nationalism and Pan-Turkism were largely limited to intellectual debates, especially among Muslim Turkish exiles

From the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic 11 from Russia who stressed the existence of unifying bonds among all speakers of Turkish and developed the latter debate.28 The CUP, in fact, continued to uphold the two elements of Ottomanism. On the one hand, the idea of loyalty to the Ottoman fatherland continued to be stressed. On the other hand, despite the policies of further secularisation, the CUP continued to underline the Islamic aspect of Ottoman identity.

The First World War and its consequences The Ottoman Empire entered the First World War on the side of the Axis powers in November 1914. This was a decision taken by a small number of leaders within the CUP and the war years witnessed their increasing grip over the state. On the domestic front the war provided the new CUP leadership with an opportunity to implement some of their projects and transform society in a radical way through a political and socio-economic reform programme. This programme partly aimed to reform the civilian bureaucracy and the army. Under the strains of the war the CUP continued the modernisation of the army and German officers were invited to further this end. The bureaucracy, on the other hand, was streamlined to increase efficiency and to save money. The CUP also launched a reform in the provincial administration. Their policy was an uneasy mix of centralisation and the strengthening of some provincial groups, especially the landlords. The former demonstrated their desire to increase control of the central government over the provinces, whereas the latter reflected the project of creating a social base for the regime.29 In addition the CUP also aimed to strengthen the allegiance of the provinces by means of different policies as a way to galvanise support for the regime and its war effort.30 The war provided an opportunity for the CUP to get on with its project of creating a ‘national economy’, which was defined as eliminating economic dependence on foreign capital and goods through three sets of policies: protectionism, industrialisation and the creation of a national industrial bourgeoisie with state support and intervention. In 1915 there were only 284 industrial firms which had more than 50 workers. Out of these 284 firms, 148 were in Istanbul, 62 were in Izmir and the rest (74) were mostly scattered around in Western Anatolia. More importantly non-Muslims, and especially foreigners, owned 85 per cent of the capital of these firms. Clearly an industrial bourgeoisie was lacking, and foreigners mostly owned the ones that did exist.31 Right at the beginning of the war the CUP announced its decision to abolish the Capitulations, ‘introduced protectionist tariffs, and adopted measures bringing foreign enterprises under Ottoman jurisdiction and making them subject to Ottoman taxes’.32 In 1914 the Law for the Encouragement of Industry (Tes¸viki Sanayi Kanunu) was passed with the aim of developing national production. In 1915 Muslim businessmen established the Tradesmen Association (Esnaf Cemiyeti) to take the internal market under control. In 1916 Parliament approved a new customs law which increased the duty on imported goods between 30 and 100 per cent. The state attempted to create a domestic market by encouraging

12 From the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic domestic consumption of local products and building infrastructure.33 As a result of these efforts the percentage of Turkish capital increased from 3 per cent in 1913 to 38 per cent in 1918.34 However, this mainly consisted of the mercantile capital largely made possible by the conditions of the war. Again the war was largely to blame for the failure to create an industrial capital base. During the war years the CUP continued with its policies of secularisation of the legal and education systems, both of which led to a further weakening of the position of the ulema. In 1916 S.eyhülislam (the office of the chief mufti) was removed from the cabinet and next year his power was further limited. In 1917 Islamic courts (S.er’iye) were placed under the jurisdiction of a secular Justice Ministry. The CUP even introduced a new family law, which permitted women to initiate a divorce if their husbands committed adultery, violated the terms of the marriage contract or engaged in polygamy without the first wife’s consent. The law thus opened the way for the secularisation of personal status law, an area that had long been left to religious jurisdiction.35 The supervision of religious schools was transferred to the Education Ministry and their curriculum was changed. Similarly the vakıfs (the endowed property) were put under the Ministry of Religious Endowments. The CUP’s project for socio-economic and political reform could not be implemented to its fullest extent mainly due to the war. The greatest pressure was on manpower, as over one million Ottoman soldiers were mobilised for the war effort. On the war front the Ottoman armies were largely defeated except for a few impressive successes. Yet, the endurance of the empire during four years of total warfare was in itself a success, as by that time the empire had been quite weakened. During the war in mid-1915 the first deportations of Armenians from Eastern Anatolia started. The Ottoman government organised these relocations to reduce the likelihood of Armenian insurrections behind the eastern front. Many of the deportations turned into death marches and massacres. It is estimated that between one and one and a half million Armenians perished in 1915–1916.36 The war resulted in the division of the Ottoman Empire and the occupation of its Arab provinces by Britain and France. On 30 October 1918 the Armistice of Mudros was signed. The Armistice allowed the military occupation of the Straits, control by the Entente of all railways and telegraph lines and demobilisation and disarmament of the Ottoman troops, except for small contingents needed to keep law and order. More significantly Article 7 of the Armistice gave any of the Entente powers the right to occupy any part of the Ottoman Empire if it considered its security under threat. The harsh conditions imposed by the Armistice were accepted by the Ottoman Empire and implemented immediately. The only problem concerned Mosul. By the time of the signing of the Armistice the British forces were still about 50 kilometres away from the city. Thus, the Ottoman commander refused to surrender the city after the Armistice on the grounds that the British had not taken the city. However, the British insisted and, when the Ottoman army withdrew as a result of the decision of Istanbul, eventually occupied Mosul on the basis of Article 7 of the Mudros Armistice. This was not the end of the ‘Mosul question’, however, as its status settled was not until 1926.37

From the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic 13 On 8 December 1918 the Ententes military administration was established in Istanbul. In April 1919 Italian troops landed in Antalya on the Mediterranean coast. In addition to the Entente powers that fought against the Ottoman Empire during the First World War, Greece was encouraged by the British to occupy the area around Izmir in May 1919.

The war of independence Soon after the occupation of most parts of the Ottoman Empire and the signing of the Armistice, a resistance movement began to be organised and this eventually turned into a fully fledged national movement. In particular, the Greek invasion of Western Anatolia gave a boost to the national movement.38 The leadership of the movement made great use of the organisational base of the CUP and organised an opposition in the form of local congresses, which eventually led to the convention of national congresses culminated in the establishment of Grand National Assembly (GNA) in Ankara on 23 April 1920. Beginning in 1919, throughout Anatolia and Thrace ‘Associations for the Defence of Rights’ (Müdaafayı Hukuk Cemiyetleri) were established and became instrumental in organising the national resistance movement. In Erzurum, a congress of delegates organised by the Association for the Defence of Rights of Eastern Anatolia, under the national leadership, convened in 1919 and vowed to resist the partition and foreign occupation of Anatolia. Few months later the resolve to fight against occupation and to restore the Sultanate and the Caliphate was reiterated in Sivas when a congress unified the various associations to form the ‘Association for the Defence of Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia’. Mustafa Kemal was elected as the head of the committee that would lead the struggle. The leadership of the war of independence consisted mainly of army officials led by Mustafa Kemal (later given the name Atatürk in 1934), a former Unionist official who build a reputation through his military accomplishments during the First World War.39 This leadership worked closely with a coalition of part of the civil and military bureaucracy and provincial notables. Mustafa Kemal and his associates used Ottoman patriotism and religious symbols to mobilise the population against the occupation forces. In fact, in some provinces religious leaders were quite crucial in organising the ‘Associations for the Defence of the Rights’ (Müdaafayi Hukuk Cemiyetleri). Eventually there were 60 religious leaders represented in the GNA, which itself convened on a Friday, Muslim holy day, with a big religious ceremony. In addition landlords and merchants in the provinces played a significant role in organising opposition to the occupation. Finally, in the east and south-eastern parts the tribal groups mobilised for the war of independence. The last Ottoman Parliament, which was formed after elections in autumn 1919, was yet another sign of the growing strength of the national resistance, as most of the parliamentarians were sympathetic, if not outright supportive, of the nationalist movement. This Parliament adopted the National Pact on 28 January 1920 that vowed never to submit to the partition and foreign occupation of Anatolia and

14 From the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic eastern Thrace and laid down the objectives of the resistance movement. Disturbed by the growing appeal of the resistance movement and the aid provided to it by the government institutions in Istanbul, Britain formally occupied Istanbul on 16 March 1920. A new Ottoman cabinet was formed and Parliament was dissolved in April; some of its members were exiled or jailed. Although an armistice was signed in 1918, there was still no peace agreement between the Entente powers and Turkey until mid-1920. This was mainly due to the intense negotiations among the Entente powers as to how to divide the spoils of the Ottoman Empire. The multiple and sometimes contradictory promises that were made during the secret diplomacy of the war years were especially important in complicating the situation. Furthermore, the collapse of the tsarist regime in Russia, which had claims to Istanbul, and the publication of secret treaties by the Bolsheviks hampered the settlement of the Ottoman question. Eventually the Entente powers came up with a peace agreement, the Treaty of Sèvres, in August 1920 and attempted to impose that treaty on the Ottoman Empire. The Treaty left the Ottoman Empire only the territories in northern Asia Minor with Istanbul as its capital. Eastern Thrace and the area around Izmir were given to Greece. An independent Armenian Republic was created in Eastern Anatolia. The Kingdom of Hijaz was also recognised as independent. Syria and Lebanon became French mandates, and Mesopotamia (Iraq) with Mosul included, southern Syria (now called TransJordan) as well as Palestine became British mandates. France also established a ‘sphere of influence’ in southern Anatolia. Similarly Italy received the south-western part of Asia Minor as a ‘sphere of influence’. Kurdish-populated areas to the north of the province of Mosul were left with the Ottoman Empire, but were to receive autonomy and the right to appeal for independence to the League of Nations within a year. The Dodecanese and Rhodes islands went to Italy, while the remainder of the islands in the Aegean were assigned to Greece. The Straits were internationalised and the adjoining territory demilitarised. The Sultan’s government in Istanbul signed the Treaty on 10 August 1920. Yet the national resistance movement, which had opened the Grand National Assembly in Ankara in April of that year, clearly stated that it would not abide by the Istanbul government’s decision. By that time two things had happened: First, there was a growing nationalist movement in Anatolia and Thrace that would complicate the imposition of the harsh terms of this peace agreement. Second, the Entente powers had neither the will nor the means to impose the Treaty. Thus, again with strong support from Britain in particular, they accepted the offer of the Greek government to fight against the forces of Turkish national resistance so as to make it accept the peace agreement.40 In the meantime, as a reaction to the Istanbul government’s acceptance of the Peace Treaty, the National Assembly in Ankara passed the Basic Organisation Law, declaring that sovereignty belonged to the nation, which was represented by the nationalist assembly in Ankara. The assembly possessed both legislative and executive power and derived its legitimacy from the people.41 Thus a parallel government was created in Ankara.

From the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic 15 On the eastern front the Ankara government signed a peace agreement with Armenia, which was soon to become a Soviet Republic. Then a treaty of friendship with Soviet Russia was signed, settling the international border and providing for Soviet military and financial aid. In the meantime, both Italy and France changed their policies towards the Ankara government.42 Italy withdrew unilaterally in 1921 and in the same year the Ankara Agreement led to the permanent withdrawal of France from Anatolia. Having secured the eastern border the nationalist army rushed to stop Greek advances in the west. Eventually the Greek forces were defeated and pushed out of Anatolia in September 1922. Right before the end of the Greek-Turkish War, an armistice between British forces and the Kemalist government was signed on 11 October 1922. French and Italian troops had already withdrawn from the Straits and now the British agreed to do the same. The success of the war of independence led to the signing of a new peace agreement between the Entente powers and, this time, the Ankara government. The Entente powers initially invited representatives of both the Istanbul government and the leadership of the national resistance movement to negotiations. However, the invitation of the Istanbul government led to uproar in the Parliament in Ankara, which in reaction adopted a motion to abolish the Sultanate. The Ottoman Sultan Mehmet VI Vahdettin went into exile in Malta aboard a British vessel. Abdulmecit, a member of the family, was given the title of Caliph, supreme spiritual leader of . the Muslim world, by the assembly. The Ankara government sent Ismet (Inönü), one of the close associates of Mustafa Kemal, as the head of the delegation to Lausanne. The conference started on 21 November 1922. The negotiations lasted for eight months before they were deadlocked. The parties discussed the issues under three headings: territorial and military, economic and financial, and the position of foreigners and minorities. The territorial problems, except the Mosul question, were resolved early in the conference. The parties agreed to postpone the Mosul question to be discussed at a later meeting with the possibility of referring it to the newly established League of Nations if they failed to solve it then. The conference, however, reached deadlock, especially over the question of economic and judicial concessions in exchange for the abolition of the Capitulations. The Turkish side refused everything, which amounted to infringement of the complete sovereignty of the new Turkish state, especially in the economic field. Agreement was eventually reached. The treaty was signed on 24 July 1923. With the Lausanne Treaty the goals of the National Pact had been largely attained. In addition to Mosul, two questions were especially controversial in the Lausanne Conference: the status of the Straits and economic issues. The Straits zone was internationalised under a commission and demilitarised, except for a garrison of up to 12,000 men in Istanbul.43 The Capitulations had remained abolished, but Turkey had to honour all existing foreign concessions and it was not free to change its customs tariffs until 1929. All wartime reparation claims were renounced and yet the country was to pay two-thirds of the old Ottoman debt, the remainder being divided among the states that had been provinces of the

16 From the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic empire in 1914.44 The Assembly ratified the Peace Treaty on 21 August 1923, albeit not unanimously. The Entente immediately began withdrawing its occupation forces.

The establishment of the Republic of Turkey The leadership of the national liberation movement faced the difficult task of continuing with the transformation into a modern sovereign state and the creation of a sense of nationhood. Mustafa Kemal and his supporters imagined a new state modelled on the basic principles and outlines of the European-style national state. For them this required a cognitive and political negation of the old regime and an establishment of a new one. The Kemalist modernity project consisted of three elements: political/ institutional, economic, and cultural/ideological. Altogether the reforms in all of these areas aimed to bring modernisation, defined as Westernisation, to Turkey. The ultimate goal for the Kemalists was ‘to bring Turkey to the level of contemporary civilisation’ which was represented by Europe.

Political and institutional change Civil order and government were to undergo several transitions after the formation of the National Assembly in 1920. The Assembly, equipped by both the legislative and executive powers, became a crucial part of the state formation process in the early years. However, the first Assembly which was organised during the war of independence was composed of individuals that came together with the aim of getting rid of the occupation, and yet diverged sharply on what should happen next. In fact, after the war was won, these differences of opinion began to surface. Mustafa Kemal and his associates appeared to be the minority in advocating a complete end of the ancien régime. Eventually they were able to have the Assembly dissolve itself in April 1923 and elections were held for a new assembly. The Kemalists won a slim majority in the new Assembly, but enough to steer the country onto a new course after the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty. Although in later years Kemalists dominated the parliament in an increasingly authoritarian regime, the Parliament continued to be a source of political activity. Like the nineteenth-century reformists before them, Mustafa Kemal and his supporters considered a written Constitution to be an important part of their modernisation project. There was an intense debate in the Assembly over the drafting of a new Constitution. The debates unravelled the differences among the nationalist forces. Conservative nationalists were out to revive the old order through the reestablishment of the sultanate. Mustafa Kemal and his supporters, however, aimed to transform the regime altogether. Eventually a new constitution was adopted, establishing the basic institutional form of the state as a republic. Turkey, thus, formally became a republic on 29 October 1923 with Mustafa Kemal its first . president and Ismet (Inönü) the first prime minister. On 3 March 1924 the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) abolished the caliphate, an act that effectively

From the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic 17 ended the ancien régime. All these changes occurred as a result of long and difficult debates in the assembly. The third institutional foundation of the new regime became the party system. The People’s Party (later renamed as the People’s Republican Party, CHP, in 1924) was formed in August 1923 by Mustafa Kemal. Soon a number of deputies from the CHP split to form an opposition party, Progressive People’s Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası), which announced a more liberal programme based on decreasing the role of the state to a minimum and introducing administrative decentralisation. The party programme also called for respect for religious beliefs.45 The power struggle among the political elite reached another level with the revolt of Sheikh Said, Kurdish tribal leader, in 1925. The uprising involved some Kurdish tribes throughout a large area west of Lake Van46 and by November it had been completely put down. However, in the wake of the revolt the president assumed sweeping emergency powers through the adoption of the Law for the Maintenance of Order (Takrir-i Sukun Kanunu) in March 1924. Civilian rule was not restored until March 1929. The opposition Progressive People’s Party was closed down. Special courts called the Independence Tribunals (1925–1927) were established ‘to crush the enemies of state’ and became an instrument by which the government terrorised and eliminated many of its political opponents. Thus the Sheikh Said rebellion became a turning point in the state formation process. The convergence of religious, ethnic and tribal discourse and action in the rebellion realised the worst fears of the Kemalists, as they signified a challenge to their secular, unitary and modern national state project. Furthermore, the deterioration of relations with Britain over the Mosul issue during the same period increased fears and suspicions of possible British support in the rebellion. In any case the regime’s response to the rebellion and its policies afterwards signified the end of the political struggles for the benefit of the military-bureaucratic elite under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal. After the closing of the Progressive People’s Party, single-party rule continued under the CHP, which tried to penetrate the society so as not only to garner support for the regime, but also to transform and control society. In 1930 the decision was made for a closely supervised opposition party, Free Republican Party (Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası), to tap into the feelings of discontent mainly born out of increasing economic problems.47 The party, established by Ataturk’s associates, came out with a liberal economic platform unlike increasingly statist policies of the CHP in those years. However, as a result of its unexpected success, the regime decided to close the party down after about three months. The 1931 congress of the CHP declared the political system to be that of a one-party-state.48

Economic changes At the time of independence the country was devastated as a result of years of war. The first Turkish census in 1927 showed that the population had fallen by about 30 per cent, to around 13.6 million, largely due to wars between 1912 and 1923, migration, famine and epidemics. A very important factor that led to significant

18 From the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic changes in the composition of the population was the decrease in the numbers of the non-Muslim population. In addition to the losses in the Armenian population, between 1918 and 1922 approximately 1.2 million Greeks left, while 600,000 Turks came to Anatolia as a result of the transfer of population agreement between Greece and Turkey.49 Largely due to loss of the non-Muslim population, the country had lost an important part of its economic elite. The rest of the economic elite, which was created by the policies of the central government in the last years of the Ottoman Empire, was still weak. The population had become largely rural and yet the area of cultivated land had shrunk considerably and the loss of livestock was tremendous. The great majority of the urban population was involved in the service industry. The industrial activity was very limited, especially so in terms of geographical distribution. Industry, like trade, was mainly dominated by the minorities and foreigners before the war.50 After the establishment of the republic, developing a market economy, which was considered as an essential part of the European experience, became a major goal of the state elite. In fact at the ˙Izmir Economics Congress in February 1923, which was held with the participation of more than a thousand representatives from all provinces, but largely dominated by Istanbul merchants and big landlords from different parts of the country, the state elite identified industrialisation as the vital part of their economic development strategy. This was going to be realised through support for national and foreign capital. In his speech Mustafa Kemal, however, underlined the importance of economic sovereignty, and ‘welcomed foreign capital so long as it came without political or economic string’.51 The regime laid down the legal-institutional framework for the development of a market economy. The main aim was to achieve industrial development, which was considered as necessary in order to catch up with the West. The regime used several means to promote industrial development. In 1924 ˙Is. Bank, which was funded by private investors and operated by the state, was established to promote industry. The following year, the government created the Turkish Industrial and Mining Bank to ‘provide government capital to develop state industries’. Finally a Law for Encouragement of Industry (Tes¸vik-i Sanayi Kanunu) was adopted in May 1927. Determined to promote native industry, the government set aside free land for privately owned factories and mines and exempted them from taxes on land, property and profit. The government was also required to make purchases from these firms regardless of their products’ quality or cost.52 Although the main economic aim of the new regime was to create an industrial base, the agricultural sector could not be ignored in a country where three-quarters of the population lived in the countryside. The aim was to modernise the agriculture sector and the government adopted policies such as granting loans and credits, with tax exemptions to support mechanisation and increase cultivation. There was more to the agricultural policy than modernisation of this sector, however. The replacement of the tithe (öshür), long a symbol of peasants’ exploitation, by a new tax clearly aimed at cultivating support among the peasants to the new regime and its dramatic reforms, even if it meant effectively cutting state revenues.53

From the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic 19 Just as these were the changes in the political scene, the economic policy of the republic underwent a transformation in the 1930s. There was a clear move from the relatively liberal economic policy of the early years to the era of statism and economic planning between 1930 and 1950. Several factors seem to explain this shift. The immediate reason for increasing state involvement in the economy was the end of Lausanne restrictions on foreign trade and monetary policies. Customs duties were increased immediately to protect nascent Turkish industry and also to balance the foreign trade, especially at a time when Ottoman debt payments started.54 The Central Bank was established in June 1930. This gave the government full control of national monetary policy for the first time. A more important reason for the shift in policy, however, was the fact that the results expected from previous policies were not forthcoming. By 1930 there was some improvement in agriculture, but no meaningful industrialisation was achieved. Instead of industrial development, state support for the private sector had created an import-oriented merchant capitalism. Finally Turkey, like many other exporters of agricultural products, was hard hit by the world economic crisis of 1929–1930.55 Big drops in agricultural prices further worsened the balance of trade. The regime was also worried about the political costs of economic problems coming at a time of significant political, social and cultural transformation. The statist economic policies were implemented through two Five-year Plans. Like the earlier policies, the plans emphasised the importance of industrial development as a major policy aim. However, unlike the previous period, the state would now be the main actor in the industrialisation process, not only through indirect support, but also through ownership, especially in areas where the Turkish private sector was unable or unwilling to invest. The main tool of this new industrialisation policy became import-substitution industrialisation. Despite its shift to a statist economic strategy, the Turkish regime would not turn its back on its overall aim of creating a market economy.56 The regime allowed private enterprise to function in industry and commerce and refrain from launching any radical transformation of the agrarian sector. The industrialisation process and the private sector investment were also supported by limiting workers’ rights, as they were not allowed to organise or strike.

Cultural and ideological transformations The boundaries of Turkey were drawn more or less along the same lines as the pragmatic targets that were set in the National Pact of 1920. Yet the territories now comprising Turkey were in many ways very different from its predecessor, the Ottoman Empire, that covered vast territories even right before the First World War. With the redefinition of boundaries as a result of national resistance, former Ottoman subjects, who were interdependent in many ways, cultural and material, were cut off from each other. On the other hand, by the end of the war the nonMuslim population of the Ottoman Empire had been largely lost. When the republic was proclaimed Muslims accounted for 98 per cent of the population, about 85 per

20 From the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic cent of whom spoke Turkish as their first language.57 In addition, Kurds constitute the next largest group with several other small groups. The state elites engaged in a nationalising project, that is building a state that is legitimised as a state for a nation. They acted on the modern premise of a nation state, which could make a claim to a territory based only on ancestral rights of possession, unlike the empire before it. The state was supposed to be acting in defence of the inalienable heritage and right to freedom of a nation. More importantly there should be a clear rupture with Ottomanism, which itself had been transformed into an ambiguous and flexible term to tackle similar problems that the Ottoman reformers were facing. Yet Mustafa Kemal and his supporters had now seized a moment of opportunity to start with a clean slate and build a modern nation state. In practice, however, this task proved to be much more complicated. At the time of proclaiming the republic Mustafa Kemal and his associates began to think ‘Turkishness’ as a basis of national identity. Nevertheless, they seemed to grapple with, not unlike the earlier reformers, the question of what Turkish national identity would mean. In the following few years the regime oscillated ethnic and generic definitions of Turkishness. Formally Turkish national identity was defined in civic nationalism, as embodied in Article 88 of the 1924 constitution: ‘The people of Turkey, regardless of religion and race, are Turks as regards citizenship.’ In the process, however, the regime increasingly began to operate on the premise of ethnic nationalism.58 The main concern was to create a unitary nation. To this end in addition to the notion of a broadly defined ‘Turkishness’, Ankara in practice also emphasised the importance of a Sunni religious background, despite its strict secularism.59 The Settlement Law (I˙skan Kanunu) of 1934, by resettling tribes and immigrants, was designed as a tool to create a ‘homogenous sense of national identity’.60 History, philology and ethnography were invoked to create a sense of nationhood. A national imaginary was created by several means. The founding of the Turkish Historical Society in April 1930 aimed to reconstruct the common history of the new nation. New history textbooks were written for the national school system to inculcate nationalist beliefs in students. In addition to history, language was another important element of nation building. Adoption of the Latin alphabet for Turkish on 10 November 1928 to replace the Arabic script was a major break with the past. The Turkish Linguistic Society that was set up specifically for the project began to purge non-Turkish grammatical structures and Arabic and Persian vocabulary from the existing language at a rapid rate. In the 1930s the process of linguistic nationalism was extended even further with the arguments for the so-called Sun Language Theory, which asserted that Turkish was the first language and all other languages developed from it. Similar arguments were made in attempting to define the Turkish nation. On the one hand emphasis was put on the Central Asian origins of Turks, with all the myths and imaginary associated with it. On the other hand, it was argued that Turks had been in Anatolia since the beginning as they were the descendants of Sumerians and Hittites. This dual origin of national identity aimed to prove the ancestral rights of Turks to the territory while at the same time catering to the history of migration that was part of the

From the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic 21 experience of some peoples living in this particular territory. However, the regime’s emphasis on Turkish nationalism did not turn into Pan-Turkism. On the contrary those ideas were suppressed and were not adopted.61 Thus Turkish nationalism became an ideological aspect of the state building process. Nevertheless, this increasing emphasis on Turkishness in practice, despite the acceptance of civic nationalism in theory, alienated especially some sectors of the largest minority, the Kurds. Several attempts by this community to resist the new twist in the regime led to more suppression, in particular the implementation of the Settlement Law of 1934 which was aimed at relocating several Kurdish tribes.62 The Basic Organisation Law of 1921 adopted by the National Assembly during the war had called for the creation of locally elected provincial councils, which would be given considerable power in matters of education, health, economy, agriculture, public works and social welfare. This clause of the Basic Law never became a reality. On the contrary the Turkish Republic increasingly became centralised and prioritised its concerns about security and public order. Islam, which was an important part of state legitimacy in the Ottoman Empire, was excluded in the building of a new national identity for the Turkish state by being confined to the private sphere. Continuing on the path that was taken in the nineteenth-century Ottoman reforms, a more drastic secularisation programme was launched between 1924 and 1928. The abolition on 3 March 1924 of the caliphate, the office of the supreme spiritual leader of Sunni Muslims worldwide, represented the first move in the campaign to secularise Turkish society. At the same time, the position of S.eyhülislam (the office of the chief mufti) was dissolved, religious schools were closed, and the administration of all vakıfs was placed in the hands of the prime minister. The Islamic law courts were dismantled by a decree of 8 April 1924. Other secularising measures followed: all Sufi orders and lodges were shut down (1925); a civil code of law, based on Swiss civil law, superseded Islamic law in personal matters (1926); and a constitutional amendment dropped Islam as the state religion (1928). Reforms in dress were introduced in November 1925. The fez, the headgear which was itself introduced by Sultan Mahmut II as part of his reforms, was banned and the wearing of Western-style hats was encouraged. Another law prohibited religious dress outside mosques. In December the Gregorian calendar was adopted. In 1926 a new law made civil marriage compulsory. In December 1934 women were permitted to vote in national elections and to sit in Parliament. The principles of the regime, called the ‘six arrows’ (altı ok), were formulated in the programmeme adopted at the 1931 convention of the Republican People’s Party. They were republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, secularism and revolutionism or reformism. In 1937 the six arrows were incorporated in the constitution as a definition of the character of the Turkish state. Republicanism signified the rupture with the past as it brought the end of the sultanate. Nationalism purported to be the aim of building a new nation state. Secularism had been an essential part of the modernity project and was vigorously implemented after the establishment of the republic. Statism mainly referred to the statist economic policies that the regime increasingly adopted in the 1930s. Populism underlined

22 From the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic one of the main principles of the regime that its sovereignty lay with the people. This was reflected in the National Assembly. Populism also referred to the regime’s characterisation of the Turkish nation as classless. Thus the regime was not thought to be based on any classes, which according to the elite did not exist anyway in Turkish society, but on the Turkish nation. Finally, the regime underlined its commitment to change. However, whether this should occur through reformist or revolutionary means seemed to create a discussion within the governing elite and the party.63 The reforms aimed to secularise and transform Turkish society. They were considered an essential part of the modernity project forged by Mustafa Kemal and his associates. Some of them quite symbolic and were adopted exactly for that reason; they symbolised the break with the past. Ironically, they were very much in line with the earlier attempts at reform during Ottoman times. Like the earlier reformers, Mustafa Kemal and his associates adopted Westernisation as the ultimate goal, and more importantly defined it more or less in similar terms. Again like the Ottoman reforms, an elite, at times using ‘enlightened despotism’, carried out the reforms of the republic. The Ottoman reformers were grappling with the issue of creating a modern state out of an empire which for many centuries had operated on very different principles. Mustafa Kemal and his supporters, however, had the opportunity to start anew, and carried the reforms to another level by creating a modern state based on Turkish nationalism. The republican elites accepted the West as the model. For them the new state had no choice but to follow the Western model, defined by them mainly as nationalism, secularism and the market economy. Republicanism and constitutionalism were considered as a corollary of this model. There was not much emphasis on democracy. For them some time was needed for that. The focus for now had to be transforming society so as to ‘prepare’ it for the road to democracy. This was not an alien idea of those times. After all, the British and French, and ultimately the League of Nations, had justified mandates in those terms. What was different in this case was that the elite was going to do that for their own society. As many scholars of Turkish modern history have argued, this elite was very much influenced by the ideas of positivism, which strengthened their belief in top-down transformation, science, secularism and the importance of order and progress. More importantly positivism helped them to explain the success of the West without resorting to Christianity. On the one hand the sovereignty of the state, lodged in the general will, provided the ideological basis of an emerging state. On the other hand, the consolidation of state power proceeded apace through coercion and cooptation. In any case, what Zürcher calls the ‘pluralistic phase’ of state formation did only last till 1925.64 From then on the regime increasingly became authoritarian towards any opposition forces that questioned its policies and focused more on consolidation of its power. During this period of state and nation building the social and political institutions were completely and continuously transformed by the new legitimising principles of the republic. The Turkish modernity project was a total one; it aimed to transform not only the political and economic life, but also the cultural landscape.65 As such

From the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic 23 it was quite intrusive. The enormity and the speed of the cultural aspects of the project led some scholars to argue that ‘life world and cultural foundations’ of the society were shaken and the ‘bridges that linked elite and mass through the recognition of religion’ were undermined as a result of the republican reforms.66 How were the reforms translated into real life? Although one can try to imagine the possible impact of such a large transformation, unfortunately academically this area largely remains untapped. The examples of open resistance, however, remained limited. Three factors may account for this. First, the importance of the legacy of reform that had started a century ago that progressively culminated in the republican reforms may have played a role. Second, the significance of the national resistance movement and the legitimacy of its leadership could have been a factor. Finally, it may be safe to argue that despite the profound nature of transformations on paper, the translation of these into the real world might have been constantly negotiated and mitigated at the local level.67 More importantly it seems that a state-oriented provincial elite played a key role through interpersonal networks, determining the outcome of the modernisation process.68 Mustafa Kemal and his associates thus opted for a speedy transformation of Turkey through Westernisation, secularisation and social and cultural reforms. In retrospect it is difficult to predict what could have happened if another road had been taken. One thing seems clear enough; the formative years of the Turkish Republic are still present in today’s debates, increasingly so since the 1980s when the state has been challenged through its historical roots by different groups. For many years the conventional historiography told a history of state building in Turkey. In recent years that history has been challenged. Some of the new narratives, however, though from an oppositional perspective, seemed to fall into the trap of the conventional historiography in terms of reproducing the essentialist and monolithic categories of elite and the public (halk) trapped in the time zone of the 1920s and 1930s. In the process the context has disappeared. In fact as anywhere, the state formation process in Turkey has been constituted reflexively in the context of local power struggles among contending elites and global system of states, as well as the world economy. The historical tradition, social formation and the constitution of social groups, world economic conditions, political and ideological transformations constituted that context within which the actors acted upon.

2

Politics in the Turkish Republic

Introduction Turkey, unlike many of its counterparts in the developing world, including the Middle East, has been able to make the transition from a single-party regime to a multi-party one at a relatively early stage of its political history. This process has not been easy and marked by periods of crises. However, since its transition to multi-party politics in 1946, despite military interventions, competitive elections and the peaceful transfer of power following national electoral contests have been the principal characteristic of Turkish politics. In scholarly literature, Turkish politics has often been characterised as party politics.1 Frey, commenting in 1965, wrote: ‘Within the power structure of Turkish society, the political party is the main unofficial link between the government and the larger extra-governmental groups of people. . . .’2 Özbudun recently noted that ‘Turkish politics are still by and large party politics. Most people realise that there is no alternative to political parties. . . .’3 Although they have some weaknesses, political parties in Turkey have displayed a relatively high degree of organisational strength, complexity and continuity.4 The democratic experience in Turkey proved to be difficult to sustain and similar to many developing countries this experience was suspended as a result of three military coups. Unlike many other cases, however, the military regimes in Turkey were short-lived and the transfer of power to civilians took place after just a few years. Nevertheless, the military, perceiving itself as the guardian of the republic, especially its unitary and secular nature, continued to be a significant and, more importantly, an independent actor in Turkish politics.5 Although military coups interrupted the ascendancy of party politics in Turkey political parties revamped themselves vigorously in the aftermath of each interruption. Both the organisational structure and the leadership of the parties continued, although sometimes under different party names. The leadership had also been excluded from official positions for some years, only to come back when their ban was lifted. Moreover, it is to political parties that the newly emerging social movements turned to for organisational support and political voice. When the existing political parties proved insufficient to meet the demands of rising groups and new social developments, a new political party was formed that presented such new concerns in its programme

Politics in the Turkish Republic 25 and discourse. Thus, political parties are seen as legitimate representatives of society in general. The early history of the Turkish Republic was characterised by a radical transformation of the state and society. In the process of its consolidation, the regime became increasingly authoritarian. During this period Turkey turned into a singleparty regime where a symbiotic relationship emerged between the party, the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – CHP) and the state. However, Turkey was able to move out of this mould with the introduction of multi-party politics in 1946 and the coming to power of the opposition party, Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti – DP), in 1950. Transition to the competitive democratic system constituted a turning point in Turkish political history. Until 1960, politics was basically a two-party system with DP in power and CHP in opposition, despite the existence of a number of other political parties in the system. In terms of their ideologies, these two parties could be perceived as the continuation of an ideological rift that first emerged during the CUP period between those who were calling for statist, centralised, strictly secular polity and those calling for a decentralised administration, more emphasis on private entrepreneurship and a less strict version of secularism.6 In 1960, civilian politics was interrupted by a military coup. In 1961 power was delivered back to the civilian forces with a new constitution. By the end of the 1960s, politics moved towards an ideological debate, along the left versus right division. Class politics began to emerge during this period as industrialisation was taking root in the country. In 1971, the military intervened in politics with a memorandum as the political parties proved unable to respond to challenges from different groups. During the 1970s ideological differences deepened. The political system came to a deadlock by the end of the decade. In 1980, the military again intervened in politics, more vigorously than previously, with a new constitution, this time trying to draw a new political framework. From the mid-1980s onwards, identity issues took over the political sphere and gained an ideological dimension in time. The Kurdish issue and political Islam became two important subjects of discussion during this period. Until the mid-1990s, despite societal challenges and occasional deadlocks, political parties were to a large extent successful in incorporating different groups. During the mid-1990s, however, there was a shake-up of the party system. All centrist parties, both on the left and the right, lost a large number of votes in this process. This shake-up of the political parties culminated in the 2002 elections that brought a newly founded Justice and Development Party to power. There was again a return to the two-party system, bringing once more the ‘old divisions’ within a more pronounced identity framework.

The introduction of competitive elections – a turning point in Turkish politics Opposition to the one-party regime began to increase during the Second World War years. Although Turkey remained neutral and did not enter the war till its very end, due to its proximity to the war zones it was negatively affected by it. In

26 Politics in the Turkish Republic addition to the impact of the shortages in the world market, military mobilisation and spending put a further constraint on the already weak economy. To finance the expenses, the government levied additional taxes, like the ‘wealth tax’, ‘soil products tax’ and increased its role in the economy with the ‘National Defence Law’, which gave it full authority to fix prices, demand materials and impose forced labour.7 High inflation and new taxes undermined the support for the CHP-rule. More importantly, through its policies the CHP also alienated its traditional supporters. Throughout the war period, the Anatolian merchants who depended on trading agricultural goods were enriched and incorporated into the ruling circle of the CHP. However, the Istanbul bourgeoisie that had international links and was still mainly composed of minorities was estranged by the wealth tax. Although the wealth tax was levied on all wealthy people, it was mainly the minorities that were most affected by the tax, leading to their suppression and impoverishment. The soil tax and the Law for Village Institutes and Land Giving Policy for Peasants also estranged the big farmers and landowners. Although agricultural production increased during the war years, peasants were negatively affected by the war as a result of new regulations. They were required by the state to sell fixed amounts of products at fixed prices, before production was actually completed. This resulted in the further dissatisfaction of society with CHP rule. In order to gain their support, the CHP government proposed a land reform law which would redistribute land and supply necessary equipment for landless peasants. This, in turn, weakened the support for the CHP from the local notables with large land-holdings in the countryside. This was significant as the local notables and landowners had been the supporters of the CHP rule so far.8 The Land Reform Law was not implemented, and yet it opened an important debate in the Parliament that highlighted the divisions within the CHP. During the debate on land reform in the Parliament, in June 1945 some prominent members of the CHP9 submitted a petition saying that the time had come for the democratisation of political life in Turkey. The petition called for more active parliamentary control over the government, increased individual liberties and . especially more room for opposition. Despite the support of President Inönü for such a proposal, the CHP group in the Parliament rejected it. This resulted in the resignation of. the MPs that supported the petition from the cadres of the CHP. President Inönü was well aware of the growing dissatisfaction with the CHP policies in society and knew that ‘heavy-handed autocracy would not be able . to suppress it indefinitely’.10 Besides, Inönü is noted to have believed in a democratic experience for the betterment of the state, basing his argument on the view that ‘it has always been Atatürk’s aim to see the opposition party in the country’.11 Democratising the political structure would also mean that another component to the Kemalist modernisation project – to make Turkey completely Western with a democratic political structure – would be realised. In addition to these domestic factors, external factors were also important for shaping this decision. The necessity for Turkey to ‘make friends in the West’ against the Soviet demands for the joint control of the Straits drew Turkey closer

Politics in the Turkish Republic 27 to the West. Thus, a working democratic competition in politics was an important component in this attempt. Transition to multi-party politics was also in harmony with the international atmosphere prevalent in the immediate post-war era as the war was seen as a victory of liberal democracies against totalitarian regimes. To adapt to the rapidly changing world Ankara felt the pressure to introduce democratic politics.12 . Despite the reluctance of some in the CHP group in the Parliament, President Inönü declared in a speech on 1 November 1945 that the main shortcoming of the Turkish democratic system was the lack of an opposition party. He announced that the date of the general election was scheduled for 1947. Shortly after the announcement, 24 new parties were formed, most of which tried to reach the rural population by building party branches in all large communities as well as small towns and villages. Most of them emphasised the importance of traditionalist values and Islamic principles in their programmes. They were mainly challenging the secularisation and Westernisation pillars of the Kemalist modernisation project. However, as open attacks on secularism and Kemalist principles were not allowed under the constitution, the parties chose to attack the CHP as the vanguard of secularist principles, while calling for an increased emphasis on Islamic principles in political life.13 A new era was beginning in Turkey with the transition to multi-party politics. Jacob Landau notes this development as ‘perhaps the most momentous decision affecting Turkish domestic politics in the post-Atatürk period’.14 The formation of the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti – DP) on 7 January 1946 under the leadership of Celal Bayar together with the other MPs who opposed the Land Reform Law in Parliament and resigned from the CHP as a result, is a turning point in Turkish politics. Shortly after its foundation, the DP leaders started to enjoy enormous support and were seen as the saviours of the people from the ‘elitist one-party rule’ of the CHP. All the opposition forces ranged against CHP rule gathered around the DP, as this new party had taken on the mission of ‘mobilisation for freedom’ or what the DP members termed ‘the movement against despotism’.15 This was manifested in their election slogan of ‘That’s Enough!’ (Artık Yeter!). DP candidates became highly popular, not as a result of the programme they were advocating, but mainly for being against CHP rule. Their speeches revolved around issues like the high cost of living, lack of freedom and liberties and anti-democratic laws. Being alarmed at the increasing popularity of the opposition, the CHP government decided to hold the elections a year earlier, on 21 July 1946, trying to benefit from the still unorganised party structure of the DP. Despite high support the DP, formed just six months before, could put forward only 273 candidates for the 465 seats in Parliament in the elections and surprisingly had only 62 of its candidates elected. This led to some rumours about fraud and manipulation of the election results. The CHP received 395 of the seats, while six seats were taken by independents.16 Despite winning the elections with a large majority, the CHP was aware of the support that the DP had gathered. By 1947, the Republican People’s Party started to implement some policies advocated by the opposition, like a greater reliance on

28 Politics in the Turkish Republic private capital and a new definition of etatism. The new five-year economic plan that was formulated by former Kadro members in 1946, with an emphasis on state control and etatism, had been amended in 1947 to suit the wishes of the business community. The ‘Turkish Development Plan’ of 1947 emphasised free enterprise, the development of agriculture and agriculturally based industry instead of the heavy industry drive of the earlier periods.17 Economically, there was almost no difference between the programmes of the two parties – the CHP and the DP – after this amendment. The only difference was that the DP wanted to sell state enterprises to the private sector, while the CHP wanted to keep them, in parallel to the private sector. In the social rights sphere, in 1946 the CHP government lifted the ban on organisations with a class base, resulting in the formation of a number of trade unions. In 1947, under a new law, workers were given the right to organise, but at the same time all political activity in the organisations as well as strikes were forbidden by this law. Despite the prohibition of politics, both the CHP and the DP tried to get the support of the trade unions. The DP promised to grant the workers the right to strike in return for their support in the next elections.18 However, this promise was soon forgotten after the party came to power in 1950. The main policy shift in the CHP after the 1946 elections came in response to the increasing opposition from other parties for a more liberal understanding in religious affairs. The DP joined the demands of the Nation Party (Millet Partisi – MP) for a greater role for Islam in public affairs, ‘since Turkey was an Islamic country’, and called for a moderate implementation of the principles of secularism without ‘damaging the religious feelings of the population’. 19 During the CHP Congress in 1947, it was decided that policies about religion and secularism should be reconsidered and more moderate and tolerant policies should be developed. The main idea of this new policy was to see religion as a necessity in daily life and that people need religion like they need food for survival.20 Within this framework, religious education was introduced into primary schools, foreign currency was provided for people making hajj (pilgrimage) and a faculty of theology was founded in Ankara. From 1946 onwards, the Quranic courses were legalised. The religious orders that had been operating secretly since their closure in 1924 had the chance of organising themselves within these Quranic courses. The graduates of these courses were appointed as imam and müftü and they started working as state officials, strengthening their position in the country. By permitting and legalising these courses, the CHP gave the greatest support to its main opposition – the religious-traditional circles.

1950–1960: the Democrat Party years Despite adapting the policies advocated by the opposition, the CHP was not successful in winning the support of the majority of the population. The second multi-party elections held on 14 May 1950 resulted in the victory of the DP. The election results are shown in Table 2.1. When the Democrat Party (DP) won the elections in 1950, the single-party regime ended and a new era in the Turkish democratic experience began. After the

Politics in the Turkish Republic 29 Table 2.1 Result of the 1950 General Election Number of votes

Number of seats

Percentage of votes

Republican People’s Party

3,176,561

69

39.5

Democrat Party

4,241,393

408

52.6

Nation Party

250,414

1

3.1

Independents

383,282

9

4.8

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, State Institute of Statistics, 1999, p. 200. Note: Total number of votes cast: 7,953,055; participation rate in the elections: 89.3 per cent.

elections, Celal Bayar became the President of the country and Adnan Menderes became the Prime Minister. Despite the similarities between the party programmemes of the CHP and the DP before the elections, their main difference stemmed from the composition of the party members and their origins. The CHP, in general, was composed of the military-bureaucratic elite that were removed from or never had local connections and roots.21 In the 1950 Parliament, the proportion of deputies representing their localities, places where they were born, increased to 60 per cent,22 in contrast to the figure of 34 per cent in the 1935 Parliament.23 The DP was organised most effectively in Ankara, Istanbul and Western Anatolia and its MPs were disproportionately merchants, landholders and lawyers.24 This clearly signalled the end of CHP’s alliance with big merchants and landholders. The DP in general brought new social groups that remained outside the political elite that had been in power since the establishment of the Republic. Some of this new elite was part of politics in the past but now by organising themselves within the DP they directly acquired political power. In addition to these groups the victory of the DP was often linked to the appeal of its policies for the masses.25 Behice Boran in her work on Turkish villages in 1940s concluded that as the villages came into closer contact with the towns, the villager felt that his ways were inferior to those of the town and city. 26 Just as these feelings of inferiority were escalating, the election campaigns started. By legitimising Islam and traditional rural values the DP was saying to the rural population that their ways were not inferior.27 The politics of the CHP had already become fragile and its leaders could not manage to relate to the society they were living in, continuing their elitist approach and increasingly losing touch with society. Thus, as state officials, the CHP adopted ‘an utopian vision of positivist social harmony’.28 Against this utopia, the DP managed to formulate a programme that appealed to the masses and took over the power from the CHP. The DP was promising that it would bring services to the peasants; it would take the problems of their everyday life as a legitimate concern for politics; it would debureaucratise Turkey and liberalise religious practices. In C.H. Dodd’s words:

30 Politics in the Turkish Republic The Democrat Party . . . fell foul of the bureaucracy . . . and began to mobilise people . . . in a populist fashion. They made a direct appeal through religion and other symbols, there being no classes or institutions through which to work as intermediaries.29 Until 1950 there was full agreement between the state elites and the political elite. Özbudun names this as the ‘unity of the elite’, formed around the mission of transforming and modernising Turkish society, defined by the Kemalist modernisation project. Under the Kemalist rule, the elite is said to have become accustomed to unchallenged power and the prestige that accompanied it. Thus the CHP was bureaucratised and bureaucratic and political power were fused to create an apparatus to impose the officials’ will on the public.30 When the DP came to power, the ‘unity of the elite’ was broken. Democrats mistrusted the military and the bureaucracy that they inherited from the old regime and devoted their efforts to controlling those circles. As Yapp argues, the new government launched several measures ‘to try to separate the CHP from the state’.31 In 1951 they closed the People’s Houses, nominally agencies of state mobilisation but in practice instruments of CHP propaganda. In 1953 they confiscated all the property of the CHP which was necessary for party activities; the party newspaper, Ulus, was taken over by the state. Adnan Menderes claimed to differentiate between those Kemalist reforms that were accepted by the public as a whole and implemented, and those that were not welcomed by the masses and were leading to resentment among major segments of society. This distinction introduced the questioning of secular reforms and opened the discussion of whether secularism was accepted in society. By bringing the reforms into the realm of public discussion, the DP leadership openly questioned the ‘modernisation project’ as it had been implemented under the CHP. The DP regime had been perceived by its opponents as a party bringing Islam back into politics. However, it was, rather, trying to authenticate the modernisation project and make it more acceptable for the masses that until now had perceived at least some aspects of it as elitist and alien. By opening the secularisation pillar to debate and giving more room for religion, the issues contested by the rural population could be eased and the modernisation project with its capitalist development, nationalism and a loosened version of secularism and Westernisation could continue with increasing support. Thus, an instrumentalist use of Islam became important in this framework. However, as the Islamist circles started to act more assertively within the DP, the party was forced to implement policies to curb their power.32 The propaganda of the Islamist media against the Kemalists had intensified severely, beyond the limits of bringing authenticity to the modernisation project. In the summer of 1951, some measures were taken against the

Politics in the Turkish Republic 31 Islamist media Büyük Dog˘ u and Sebilürre ¸sat, members of the Ticani religious order who attacked Atatürk’s statutes and Republican symbols were arrested and the Law for the Protection of Atatürk was passed. The DP had to take some more measures when the writer of the newspaper Vatan was attacked and wounded in Malatya in 1952 and it was discovered that the Islamist media and groups had organised this crime.33 It was mainly after this event that the Menderes government started to make speeches to the effect that it would not let violence take root in the country. The city congresses of the party were also warned against allowing speeches against the secular order and some MPs were expelled from the ranks of the party. Further, in 1953, a law was enacted prohibiting the use of Islam as a tool for seeking personal and political interest. Hajj (pilgrimage) was stopped in 1956 in order to save foreign exchange.34 The early years of DP rule were characterised by economic boom and growth mainly fuelled by ‘a succession of good harvests and the spur to world economic activity provided by the Korean War’.35 Increasing US aid parallel to the intensity of the Cold War further contributed to this growth. Thus the DP government benefited from the post-war economic boom and unlike the last years of the CHP rule the country entered into a period of prosperity. This contributed to the landslide victory of the DP in the 1954 elections. However, the increasingly liberal environment that came with the DP in the early 1950s began to revert to an ‘authoritarian’ rule as the economy started to show signs of stagnation and spiralling inflation by 1954.36 The DP government increased measures against the opposition by tightening the Press Law, decreasing the power of the opposition parties by amending the electoral law and curtailing the power of the bureaucracy by giving to the executive powers the right to retire civil servants, including the university professors.37 The popular response against such measures was decisively negative. In the municipal elections of 1955, the CHP and the MP boycotted the elections and the electoral turnout remained only 37 per cent. In the end, the DP had to make some adjustments in these amendments and give assurances regarding the democratic nature of the country. Nevertheless, especially after the 1957 elections opposition to the DP rule began to grow. Although the party lost votes, thanks to the election system, this was not reflected in the distribution of seats in the parliament. While the DP got 47.7 per cent of votes and obtained 424 seats, the CHP got 40.82 per cent of votes but could only have 178 seats. This situation led to the accusations that the DP rule had deteriorated into the ‘tyranny of the majority’. University students were especially politicised. The DP’s response was increasingly authoritarian and aimed to silence the opposition. Thus, the DP was not able to carry out its promises of political liberalisation.38 As the economic situation of the country began to deteriorate by the late 1950s, again the instrumental use of Islamic symbols as propaganda increased in the ranks of the DP, and even alliances with some religious orders were openly pursued. Besides, attacks on the Republican People’s Party and Kemalist principles continued in some parts of the media and the DP was seen as the party encouraging such attacks.

32 Politics in the Turkish Republic

The 1960 military coup The DP government was toppled by a military coup on 27 May 1960. A National Unity Committee headed by the chief of land forces, Cemal Gürsel, and composed of 36 officers with different ranks took over. The occurrence of a military coup was very much parallel with developments in the Middle East and elsewhere at that time. What differentiated Turkey from these other cases, however, was the fact that the military returned to its barracks after a civilian committee had prepared a new constitution. This process was not completely smooth as some officers wanted to retain power for a longer term, but they were purged from the army. Among these officers was Alparslan Türkes¸, who later became the leader of the ultra-nationalist party (Republican Peasants’ Nationalist Party). Members of the former government and MPs of the Democrat Party were arrested after the coup. As a result of the trials, 15 members of the DP were given the death sentence, three of which were approved by the National Unity Committee. Adnan Menderes (former Prime Minister), Fatin Rüs¸tü Zorlu (former Minister of Foreign Affairs) and Hasan Polatkan (former Minister of Finance) were hanged in September 1961.39 The legacy of the trials and the execution of the death sentence continued on into the politics of the following decades through other parties which were formed as continuations of the DP. Although this coup had many causes, the attacks on Islam and the Kemalist principles were offered as (one of the) main explanatory factors. However, there is agreement among many researchers that the 1960 coup demonstrated the quest of the military-bureaucratic elite to return to the centre, to revive their diminishing role in the country’s politics. William Hale notes that under the DP regime, the army officers ‘felt robbed of the central role in Turkish political culture that they had traditionally enjoyed’.40 Since Ottoman times the army had played a major role in the political life of the country and this had been sustained under the CHP. However, during the era of DP rule, a policy of ‘debureaucratisation’ was pursued as the government wanted to undermine the power of the CHP by marginalising its traditional supporters. Thus, the official elites lost not only their representation in Parliament and their close links with the political elites but also much of their economic power, prestige and influence in the society. For that reason some scholars considered the coup as a reaction of the official elites – both the military and the civilians – against the decline in their power, prestige and status in society.41 Hale quotes from Kenneth Fidel: The army was not the only group that was hurt. The teachers and the government employees were also pushed aside by these people from the villages. They could no longer afford to live in the good quarters of the town. . . . They could not afford to buy clothing any more. All these people were stripped of the one thing that kept them proud throughout the years – the self-respect and their pride at being the most advanced sector of the population was taken away by the cost of living and the newly rich farmers and merchants.42

Politics in the Turkish Republic 33 Based on some interviews conducted with the cadres carrying out the coup, it is written that ‘the 27 May Revolution (1960 coup) was a rising up of the present generation trained by the revolution of the great Atatürk from those who, during the past ten years, wanted to upset and destroy it out of a thirst for power’.43 The environment after the 1960 coup was relatively more liberal than the past. The new constitution that was enacted by the military rulers in 1961 guaranteed basic rights and freedoms and adopted a more liberal approach to secularism, religion and individual and social rights. Counterbalancing institutions to the national assembly were founded to prevent a power monopoly of any political party. A second chamber called the Senate (Senato) was introduced and the regulation that all legislation had to pass through both chambers was brought into force. An independent constitutional court was introduced, which could check whether the laws were made according to the constitution. Universities and media were guaranteed autonomy under the new system. A full bill of civil liberties was attached to the constitution. Through the constitution, the military carved itself a special place within the politics of the country via the establishment of a National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu – NSC), whose constitutional duty was to advise the government on different policy issues. Composed of the leaders of different military forces and the head of the general staff as well as the related ministers – changing according to the subject under consideration – the role of the NSC increased in time, extending its influence in government policies. In short, the main philosophy behind the constitution was to prevent elected governments from abusing the national will by instituting an authoritarian rule. To this end the new constitution provided a detailed definition of the principles of basic rights and the rule of law and introduced a system of checks and balances.44 For the same end, the new election law introduced the proportional system to replace the majoritarian system.

1961–1971: bringing the ideological dimension into politics On 13 January 1961, the ban on political activity was lifted and an election date was set for 15 October 1961. The Justice Party (Adalet Partisi – AP) and the New Turkey Party (Yeni Türkiye Partisi – YTP) were formed on the right of the political spectrum to channel the votes of the now banned Democrat Party. The Justice Party claimed that it was the continuation of the DP,45 but the YTP offered a similar political claim. Another party that entered the elections was the Republican Peasants’ Nationalist Party (Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi – CKMP).This party was formed in 1948 as the representative of radical nationalist groups. They were entering the elections for the first time in 1961. They followed a ‘populist discourse and became the party of conservative, nationalist, rural middle classes’46 during the 1950s. . . The CHP under the leadership of Ismet Inönü got 36.7 per cent of the votes and came to power after eleven years in opposition. The CHP formed the first government with the AP but this coalition did not work because of differences in

34 Politics in the Turkish Republic Table 2.2 Result of the 1961 General Election Number of votes

Number of seats

Percentage of votes

Justice Party

3,527,435

158

34.8

Republican People’s Party

3,724,752

173

36.7

Republican Peasants’ Nationalist Party

1,415,390

54

14.0

New Turkey Party

1,391,934

65

13.7

81,732

–

0.8

Independents

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, State Institute of Statistics, 1999, p. 200. Note: Total number of votes cast: 10,522,716; participation rate in the elections: 81 per cent.

party programmes and controversy regarding the amnesty of former DP members. . Inönü initiated another coalition government in June 1962, this time with the YTP and CKMP. It was during this government that the first Five-Year Development Programme was put into effect and workers’ rights were recognised. However, the differences between the parties of the coalition again rendered the working of the government inefficient. Issues regarding the five-year plan and the working of ministries caused great controversy between the parties. Thus, the CHP started negotiations for a third coalition government in December 1963, its partners in the second coalition having withdrawn from the government after one such disagreement. This time, the CHP formed a minority government and managed to get support from the YTP in the Parliament. In November 1964, Süleyman Demirel – a young and ambitious politician – was elected to the leadership of the AP, after the death of the head of the party, Ragıp Gümüss¸ pala. Demirel aimed to prove the strength of his leadership and the new dynamism that came to the party with his election. In an attempt to show his power in the Parliament, Demirel spread propaganda that resulted in the rejection . of the 1965 budget of the Inönü government. The government resigned in response to this rejection and four right-wing parties formed a temporary caretaker government that would last for eight months and carry the country to the new elections of 1965. Demirel often repeated that the AP was a mass party ‘which represented the interests of all classes – city dwellers and villagers, workers and employers’. 47 The AP programme gave significant importance to economic growth as a priority. This would require collaboration and harmony among different classes according to the AP; and such a harmony could be achieved by ‘melting particular interests into the nationalist one’.48 Nationalism was seen as a guarantee for the unity of the country and class struggle was clearly rejected. However, class structure was emerging as capitalist industrialisation, despite being under state supervision, was taking root in the country. This would especially be seen in the coming years.

Politics in the Turkish Republic 35 Just as the AP was enjoying the change ushered in by Demirel’s dynamism, there was change in the cadres and ideology of the CHP as well. As early as October 1964, the signs of this change were seen as the party adopted a declaration in its congress entitled ‘Our Ideal of a Progressive Turkey’, written by Turhan Feyziogˇlu and Bülent Ecevit, ‘two intellectual leaders widely regarded as the rising stars of the party’.49 In this declaration emphasis was put on land reform, social justice, social security, economic development, ‘democratic’ etatism, education, secularism, the fine arts, nationalism and youth.50 In order to secure its position and increase its popularity, the CHP leadership adopted a new slogan determining their place in the political spectrum: ‘left of centre’. The AP had attacked this new positioning of the CHP by saying that the party was becoming leftist, on the ‘road to Moscow’ (ortanın solu, Moskova’nın yolu).51 The AP was emphasising ‘the left’ as the basic threat to the unity of the country and was bringing an ideological aspect to politics. Thus, the year 1965 saw the beginning of the ideological dimension in Turkish politics. The change of leadership in the AP and Demirel’s populist discourse led to the victory of this party in the 1965 elections. The election results were as follows: Table 2.3 Result of the 1965 General Election Number of votes

Number of seats

Percentage of votes

Justice Party

4,921,235

240

52.9

Republican People’s Party

2,675,785

134

28.6

Republican Peasants’ Nationalist Party

208,696

11

2.3

Nation Party

582,704

31

6.3

Turkish Workers’ Party

276,101

14

3.0

New Turkey Party

346,514

19

3.7

Independents

296,523

1

3.2

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, State Institute of Statistics, 1999, p. 203. Note: Total number of votes cast: 9,748,678; participation rate in the elections: 71.3 per cent.

The 1965 elections are important first because of the transfer of power once again, from the CHP that still represented the military-bureaucratic elite and support for secularism and Westernisation in adherence to the Kemalist modernisation project, to the AP that represented the traditionalist-liberal forces. Another important aspect of the 1965 elections of a socialist party . was the participation . – Turkish Workers’ Party (Türkiye I¸s çi Partisi – TIP). The 1961 constitution supported associational rights, providing leftists with the opportunity to develop their own organisations. The project of developing an indigenous bourgeoisie had

36 Politics in the Turkish Republic been successful to some extent and started to bear fruit by 1960s. The working class had also been developing and increasing its power in the society by organising in . unions. The TIP was formed as the representative of the leftist groups and the workers and working-class identity in the country in February 1961 by a number of trade unionists. According to the party programme, except for the ownership of major means of production, private property would be supported and certain economic activities would be left to private initiative in a mixed economy framework. Despite its moderate stand, with no mention of socialism or a socialist economy, the party was questioning capitalist development and state-led capitalism, rather . aiming to form a ‘non-capitalist path to development’.52 The TIP contributed to the ideological aspect of politics that developed after 1965, as mentioned above, by forcing other parties to define themselves more clearly in ideological terms. Another party that entered the elections and got 31 seats in Parliament was the Nation Party that represented the Islamist-conservative circles in the society. Founded in 1948, and having previously contested the 1950 elections, the party asserted in its programme that the MP recognised the high importance of belief, morals and traditions in the formation of the social order. Turkey was carried into a political turmoil by the end of the 1960s as society became highly polarised. By the end of the decade, the struggles between the extremist movements on both the right and the left culminated almost in a civil war. The victory of the AP in both the 1965 and 1969 elections showed that there was no problem in gathering a majority in Parliament and the government seemed to be successful with the 7 per cent annual growth rate of the GNP. At that time Turkey was making the transition from merchant capitalism to industrialisation through import substitution strategy. Urbanisation became significant, as well as concepts like social justice in the public sphere. Socio-economic change and the modernisation process in general led to diversification of political demands in society. However, the existing political parties and the political system proved unable to meet these divergent demands. Unlike the previous ones, in the 1969 elections the level of participation was about 60 per cent. The radicalisation of the population, especially the university students, during the 1960s, as well as the Turkish Workers’ Party, made .a great contribution to the development of events. The disagreement within the TIP as to what kind of a strategy should be adopted to attain power led to a confusion among party members and by the end of the decade the operations mounted by the leftist urban guerrilla groups became a part of everyday life in Turkey. The radicalisation of the trade union movement – the . establishment of DISK (Revolutionary Workers’ Organisation) and the increase in trade union activism in general became significant within this framework. The visit of the US 6th fleet to Istanbul in 1967 was met with protests and there was similar student activism elsewhere during the late 1960s. The leftist formations and their radicalisation in turn led to a harsh response from the Turkish right and led to the formation of the ‘Society for the Struggle against Communism’ in 1968. In addition to this organisation that brought together the centre-right, the formation of the radical nationalist groups under Alparslan Türkes¸’s Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi – MHP) (the former Republican Peasants’ Nationalist

Politics in the Turkish Republic 37 Party which had radicalised its ideology during the 1960s and started to be known as the Grey Wolves) added another dimension to the whole picture. These developments soon turned into open conflict between the groups on the left and on the right. Polarisation became a significant reality ‘permeating virtually all important social sectors and even the government itself, including the police’.53 The political system could not tackle the mammoth issues that the country was facing. There was a growing frustration with the existing parties’ capacity to deal with the anarchy that was claiming more and more lives and had created an increasing sense of despair and hopelessness. Besides, on the right the AP had come to be increasingly perceived as the party of the big industrialists and thus insensitive to the demands and problems of small businesses, especially in Anatolia, that could not compete with the new sectors supported by the governments in their drive towards industrialisation. On the other hand, although largely framed as the left by the right-wing parties, the CHP was unable to respond to the demands for social justice, equal opportunity and more democracy. Thus, the political system that was predominantly a ‘two-party democracy’ began to be highly contested by different groups. The necessity of forming new parties to meet these new demands was pressing in this framework. The formation of the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi – MNP) by Necmettin Erbakan on 26 January 1970 coincides with these developments. Islamic groups that had been incorporated in the ranks of the Justice Party until now were to be represented by the MNP and the subsequent parties of Erbakan after this period. The MNP brought an explicit criticism to bear on the secular nature of the republic and presented an alternative ideology to stand against the secular/Western conception of the modernisation project – a politicised version of Islam.

Military intervention of 1971 In June 1970, industrial workers in the Istanbul-Izmit area joined in a massive march to protest against a new law regulating union organisation and collective bargaining. The march soon erupted into a workers’ riot involving over 100,000 demonstrators. This was the largest and most violent workers’ protest in Turkish history.54 Nine months later, the government announced an austerity programme that led to further large political protests from every organised group in society. Urban guerrilla groups launched a campaign of bank robberies and kidnappings to finance their activities. The Demirel government seemed to be paralysed in the face of all these developments. It was neither able to curb the terror in the streets and campuses, nor able to pass any legislation through Parliament. On 12 March 1971, the generals sent a memorandum to the Demirel government, demanding a strong and credible government ‘which will be able to end the anarchy and carry out reforms in a “Kemalist spirit” ’.55 The government was warned that if these demands were not met, the army would exercise its constitutional duty and intervene directly. The Demirel government resigned after the memorandum and a board of technocrats were appointed as the new government of the country. Martial law was

38 Politics in the Turkish Republic declared in eleven provinces. The organisations on the left and right were closed down, and freedom of press was curtailed. This time the army intervened to affect politics without banning the Parliament. The Turkish Workers’ Party and the MNP were closed down after the 1971 military memorandum. On the side of political Islam, after the MNP was banned, another party was formed on 11 October 1972 with a similar agenda called National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi – MSP).56 The MSP entered the general democratic elections in 1973 and got 11.8 per cent of the votes, gaining 48 seats in the Parliament. According to the MSP, there were three main opinions in Turkish political life: the Republican People’s Party represented the ‘leftist opinion’, the Justice Party represented the ‘liberal opinion’ and the National Salvation Party represented the ‘national opinion’ (milli görüs¸).57 Within this categorisation, ideas other than the national opinion were materialist: for the CHP, everything was material; for the AP, everything was money; while for the MSP everything was morality. The CHP and the AP represented the two infidel ideologies, which were doomed eventually to collapse, leaving the Islamist ‘national opinion’ of the MSP dominant.58 The MSP candidates and members were well educated, professionally successful, presumably from the middle or upper middle class and relatively young. Thus, the elite and mass culture had taken on a new dimension during the 1970s and there no longer existed a monolithic elite culture, as it existed after the formation of the republic, represented by the military-bureaucratic elite. With the modernisation and reforms, a ‘counter-elite’ had emerged, mainly from the countryside, bringing their conservative and traditional characteristics and different cultural orientation, different from that of the Kemalist modernisers. Making use of the mass education opportunities and increasing mobility they became the ‘new elite’ with ‘old values’, pointing to a duality in the elite, what Toprak calls an ‘elite–elite gap’.59

The 1973 elections: the rise of the ‘new’ CHP The 1973 elections came at a time when class politics was at an intense stage in the country. This election is significant especially in the sense that it revealed the class structure, reflecting the different class positions in politics, leading some to conclude that Turkish society was becoming a Western type of society divided in line with class differences.60 This feature could, indeed, be seen clearly in the electoral campaign. The AP was advocating the interests of the bourgeoisie and the status quo. By pursuing populist policies and claiming that they were the continuation of the DP, they were also giving the agricultural sector a place in their discourse, encouraging the support of the peasants. The CHP shifted more to the leftist discourse with its ‘left of centre’ slogan and supported the rights of the workers and the recent immigrants to the cities that generally filled the labour class positions and were politically conscious. The CHP designed its election campaign based on the concept of ‘change’. The ‘new’ CHP was promising a ‘new’ order under its ‘new’ leader Bülent Ecevit. Ecevit became . the leader of the CHP in 1972, after an election in the party organisation. Ismet Inönü left his party after this development. The MSP was attacking the present order, asking for votes to

Politics in the Turkish Republic 39 change the status quo in favour of the interests of the petit-bourgeoisie and the small business and tradesmen of Anatolian cities vis-à-vis the rivalry of the big capitalists of Istanbul and Ankara.61 Table 2.4 Result of the 1973 General Election Number of votes

Number of seats

Percentage of votes

3,197,897

149

29.8

Republican Reliance Party

564,343

13

5.3

Republican People’s Party

3,570,583

185

33.3

Democratic Party

1,275,502

45

11.9

362,208

3

3.4

62,377

–

0.6

1,265,771

48

11.8

Turkish Union Party

121,759

1

1.1

Independents

303,218

6

2.8

Justice Party

Nationalist Action Party Nation Party National Salvation Party

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, State Institute of Statistics, 1999, p. 203. Note: Total number of votes cast: 11,223,843; participation rate in the elections: 66.8 per cent.

As shown in the table, the CHP won 185, the AP won 149 and the MSP won 48 seats in the parliament. The ‘left of centre’ discourse delivered positive results for the CHP in this election as it started to represent the urban, working classes. There had been a significant shift in the CHP’s voters’ profile. In the 1950s and early 1960s the main groups voting for the CHP were the military, bureaucracy, state officials and the local notables in the small cities and provinces. Thus, the CHP used to get most of its votes from the least developed regions of the country where the local notables co-operated with the party and channelled the votes of the area they influenced.62 In the 1973 elections, the CHP got most of its support from the highly developed provinces – it got more than 50 per cent of the vote in the largest cities of the country (Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir). The change of leadership for the first time since 1938 gave the party a dynamic outlook and the new ‘left of centre stance’ helped to gather the urban vote under its banner. It is interesting to see that as it entered Parliament, the MSP built a coalition government with the CHP that it had been opposing as ‘anti-Islam’, ‘Western’, ‘immoral’ and ‘infidel’. The two groups that were struggling along the lines of the Western/anti-Western debate that had been going on for at least a century were now coalition partners destined to rule the country together. Despite all the differences in ideology, Ahmad underlined that the two parties shared a series of common points:

40 Politics in the Turkish Republic Both claimed to believe in democracy that guaranteed the fundamental freedoms, a mixed economy, and economic and social development with social justice . . . Both were committed to the protection of tradesmen and artisans and their small enterprises, which produced capitalist goods. Both sought working conditions that were humane and democratic, as well as social security and opposed to the exploitation of the people by ‘big capital’.63 The CHP-MSP coalition faced significant economic policy challenges. The negative impact of the 1973–1974 oil crisis was further strengthened due to Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus in 1974. In addition to its cost to Turkey’s finances, this intervention led to the deterioration of Turkey’s relations with the US and thus significantly curtailed possibilities for economic funding. In line with expectations, the coalition government of the CHP and the MSP could only last nine months. Trusting his domestic popularity due to the Cyprus intervention, Ecevit ended the government and called for an early election. The right-wing parties refused to go along with the idea of a new election and instead in March 1975 a new coalition was formed, between the Justice Party, the National Salvation Party, the Nationalist Action Party and the Republican Trust Party, known as the Nationalist Front (Milliyetçi Cephe) government. The next elections – in 1977 – again resulted in the victory of the CHP. The ‘left of centre’ discourse brought more supporters to the party under the leadership of Ecevit. This was also in line with the increasing levels of immigration to the cities and the increase in the workforce. The vote percentage of the MSP declined from 11.8 to 8.6 per cent in this election, causing a decrease in their seats in Parliament from 48 to 24. Still, the votes of the MSP came mostly from the underdeveloped regions of the country. However, it lost some of its votes to the Nationalist Action Party, which linked strong nationalism with Islamism as its main ideology. It is important to note that the impact of these two parties on the Turkish political scene and the result that ideological polarisation had been far more significant than their electoral successes. Despite its electoral victory, the CHP did not have the majority in Parliament to form the government, thus the Second National Front government was formed which further contributed to ideological polarisation in the country. The government was forced to resign when some eleven MPs from the AP defected to form a new government with the CHP. Thus Ecevit formed a coalition government in January 1978, which also proved to be short-lived, as in the face of the AP’s victory at by-elections in October 1979 the government resigned. In November 1979 Demirel formed a minority government with the backing of the MHP and MSP. A National Unity government between two major parties could not be formed although this was the wish of different segments of the society. The end of the 1970s is represented by economic problems and severe measures in the economy, whose details will be told in the following chapter. Apart from this economic crisis a legitimacy crisis due to changing coalitions and shifting alliances erupted which peaked when Parliament could not elect a President for months. Further, there was a dramatic increase in the level and scope of political

Politics in the Turkish Republic 41 violence that spread to most parts of the country and claimed more than 4,000 lives between 1976 and 1980. Neighbourhoods were divided in a left–right polarisation and each group created what was termed as ‘liberated zones’ (kurtarılmıs¸ bölgeler) for their activities. Street violence became a common theme between the radicals on both sides. Assassinations of prominent intellectuals, professors, journalists and former MPs further contributed to a feeling of terror and led to a declaration of martial law in thirteen provinces. Legitimacy crisis, economic crisis and crisis of the political system were all acting together by the end of the 1970s, feeding into a deadlock in the country. Once again the party politics was unable to respond to these challenges. There were also the beginnings of identity politics in the country at this time, although the ideological divisions overshadowed it. Turkish leftist groups had until then projected a ‘salvation for the Kurdish nation’ through a Marxist revolution, led by the Turkish proletariat. However, during this period the Kurdish groups began to emphasise and define the Kurdish nation as being capable of leading their own proletarian revolution.64 As a result of this development, the number of Kurdish nationalist groups reached at least twelve by the end of the 1970s, leading to increasing awareness of ethnic identities in the country.65 The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (in Kurdish: Partiya Kerkoran Kurdistan – PKK) was formed during this period as well. Proposing a radical reform to form a MarxistLeninist ‘Kurdistan’, where Kurdish peasants and proletariat would have real independence, the militant activities of the PKK remained rather limited until the 1980 coup. However, re-starting its militant activities in 1984, it contributed greatly to locating the Kurdish issue in the heart of Turkish politics for the coming decades. In the case of the heterodox Alevi66 community whose separate identity had been strengthened by migration to the cities, the support for the left was a logical extension of their perception of the right in Turkey. The right was seen through its religious (Sunni) symbols and discourses. In practice, the tension between the Alevi and Sunni communities, under the banner of left versus right, erupted and turned into violent clashes, especially in Central and Eastern Anatolia.67 In December 1978, 111 Alevis were killed in Kahramanmaras¸. A similar event, what was called by the locals the ‘five-day war’, happened in Çorum in July 1980 when radical rightist groups attacked an Alevi neighbourhood. Fifty people were killed in this incident.68 The Demirel government, paralysed over the developments and the intensity of conflict in society, decided to start a major reorientation of Turkey’s economic strategy, with the hope of dealing with at least the economic challenges. The head of the State Planning Organisation, Turgut Özal, was brought into government to launch the new economic policy. The result was the so-called ‘24 of January Decisions’ which initiated a structural adjustment and economic liberalisation programme. Policies such as devaluation, a cut in subsidies and new taxes further contributed to the political protest as the burden of these so-called ‘belt-tightening’ measures fell on those segments of the population that were already suffering. Thus, institutionalised political forces, especially political parties, were unable to

42 Politics in the Turkish Republic deal with mounting social, political and economic challenges. As Sayari notes ‘by 1980, the possibility of another military take-over had become a matter of public discussion as many Turks, including some segments of the civilian political elite, began to express their open or tacit support for a military solution to the escalating crisis’.69

The 1980 coup and the restructuring of Turkish politics and society In an article written some years after the coup Ahmet Evin asked whether the 1980 military intervention would enter the annals of Turkish history as a fundamental turning point with regard to the role of the state in that polity or with the passage of time it would appear . . . as one of those periodic interventions . . . since the transition to multi-party system.70 More than two decades after the coup, the 1980 military intervention does indeed constitute one of the most important turning points in Turkish politics. On the morning of the coup the army issued a statement setting out the reasons for intervention: ‘The aim of the operation is to safeguard the integrity of the country, . . . to re-establish the existence of the state and to eliminate the factors that hinder the smooth working of a democratic order.’71 In order to achieve these aims, the military leaders aimed at a total restructuring of the whole political system and society. They initiated a new framework that would first depoliticise the population and later restructure their ideology, away from the right–left divide. It would decrease the power of the leftist groups (that were seen as responsible for the instability), keep society together and secure the continuation of the Kemalist project in unity. This new framework was designed in line with . . what some. have termed the ‘Turkish-Islamic synthesis’ (Türk-Islam Sentezi – TIS).72 The TIS was implemented as a policy to guide the society with the understanding of ‘national cultural values and principles’, gluing it together. Islam would constitute the main point in this national culture. The Turkish-Islamic synthesis was thus an attempt to ‘bring supposedly shared values to the surface, peel away the “false Western veneer” which was seen as responsible for the ills of the modern society and recognise a national synthesis of fundamental values under the labels of “Turk” and “Islam”’.73 Tapper said that ‘this synthesis aimed at an authoritarian but not an Islamic state where religion was seen as the essence of culture and social control and should thus be fostered in the education system but not be politicised’.74 This ideological bent. would put its stamp on the future of politics in the country. As the idea of the TIS took root, some policies were put into effect to increase its spread in the population. One important development was the implementation of compulsory . religious courses in secondary and high schools. Another visibility of the TIS was in the state discourse. The coup leader, Kenan Evren, was often quoting from the Quran and the hadith in his speeches, underlining the concept of ummah and Islamic unity in society.75

Politics in the Turkish Republic 43 Initiating the Turkish-Islamic synthesis as the state ideology was a deviation from conventional Kemalist reforms and principles and the 1980 coup is important in placing Islam within the state ideology from which it had been absent for . decades. The military leaders initiated the TIS as a legitimate part of the new definition of modernisation in an attempt to secure its continuation, but in time it developed its own dynamics. Islam started to be seen in every aspect of life, beginning to create a real alternative to the existing system and to redefined modernisation, especially from the second half of the 1980s onwards. The role of the 1980 military coup is important in encouraging this policy. Karpat notes that what the West . meant for the Turkish elite had changed at this time with the initiation of the TIS. He comments that: The cultural and political emulation of the West is no longer the axis of ‘modernism’. It is rather economic development, technological advancement and material progress in all its forms . . . Reshaping of the national identity in the light of the Turk’s own cultural and religious ethos has broadened the scope of modernisation in such a way as to relegate the West, without abandoning it, to a secondary position, while giving priority to a new historically rooted socio-cultural Turkish identity.76 If one of the aims of the coup was to restore law and order the other one was to build a political infrastructure that would help the political system to become immune to turbulence.77 During their three-year period in power, the military leaders repeatedly attributed the economic and political chaos of the 1970s to the political party system and the political leaders of the period in general.78 As early as 17 September 1980, five days after the coup, Kenan Evren, the coup leader, was saying: All my trust in the politicians had been rubbed away. If they are all asking their leaders what to do, it means that in practice they will go on doing the same thing. We need people who really believe in us and will stick with us. Let’s give up the idea of forming a government made up of the AP and CHP moderates.79 On 21 September the cabinet of the military regime was formed under the leadership of Bülend Ulusu – a newly retired admiral. The Cabinet was established and was composed of 27 members, six of whom were retired generals and the remainder were either bureaucrats or academics. Careful attention was paid to choosing people with no political background. One of the early issues for the military regime was what to do with the old party leaders who had been detained after the coup and what was to be the fate of the party organisations. Both the MSP’s leader Erbakan and the MHP’s leader Türkes¸ were placed on trial for breaking the law and the constitution. Erbakan was charged and arrested for working against the principle of secularism. Türkes¸ was charged, along with 585 members of his party, with instigating civil war and murdering

44 Politics in the Turkish Republic nearly 600 people between 1974 and 1980.80 Both were released in 1985. The AP leader Demirel and the CHP leader Ecevit were released from custody on 11 October with no evidence found for breaking any regulations or laws. Although at the time of the coup all parties were banned from politics, they were not dissolved until October 1981. In the new constitution enacted by the military regime, the framework necessary to keep the ‘old’ politicians away from post-coup politics was drawn up. According to the new constitution of 1982, the Chairman, general secretaries and other senior members of the former parties would not be able to form, join or hold any relationship with the future parties and would not be able to stand for elections as independent deputies for ten years. Political parties were prohibited from maintaining any sort of ties with associations, unions, foundations, co-operatives and professional organisations. Regarding the electoral system, a national threshold of 10 per cent was put in order to be able to claim parliamentary seats. The role of the National Security Council was underlined and increased with the new constitution, as the five chief commanders of the coup would serve as its members and would advise the Council of Ministers on issues concerning internal and external security. The 1982 constitution was accepted with a 92 per cent ‘yes’ vote in a referendum. The result of the referendum also elected Kenan Evren as the President of the country for a period of seven years. The 1982 Constitution contained important references for the future of the Kurdish issue. The military regime tried to repress all ‘divisive and destructive forces’, especially those on the left including the Kurds. Article 5 of the constitution noted the fundamental task of the Turkish state as the ‘safeguarding of the independence and integrity of the Turkish nation, the indivisibility of the country, the Republic’, making it ‘illegal to express any idea that might be interpreted by the authorities as amounting to a recognition of a separate, Kurdish, ethnic identity’.81 The constitution also stated in Article 26, ‘No language prohibited by the State shall be used in the expression and dissemination of thought’.82 Thus, in October 1983 Law 2932 was accepted, banning the use of the Kurdish language for the dissemination of information. The underlying theme of the 1982 constitution was to decrease the politicisation of the masses and to limit the rights and freedoms that had been introduced by the 1961 constitution. The terror and anarchy of the 1970s were interpreted as a direct result of the previous constitution’s attempt to limit political power and thus weaken the power of the state. The aim of the new constitution, which was even more detailed than the 1961 constitution, was to ‘strengthen the state’. State forces were given more power at the expense of decreasing rights for freedom of organisation, strike and protest. Socially and politically, the state moved back into the centre as the main source of power. Economically, the liberalisation policies continued under the military regime; actually the army secured and gave a push to economic liberalisation and its success in the initial and most crucial stage.

Politics in the Turkish Republic 45

Civilian politics in the post-coup era Although the military decided to delegate power back to the civilian politicians in 1983, with free democratic elections, it still wanted to act as the main arbiter in politics. The election date was announced as 6 November 1983. The military regime imposed special rules to govern the elections. All the parties that were established went through a careful examination and most of them were vetoed by the military regime. The military, aiming to make a fresh start with politicians that adhered to no past party, vetoed. the Social Democracy Party, established by Erdal . Inönü, the son of the late Ismet Inönü, which basically represented the continuation of the CHP. The Great Turkey Party was also vetoed as it represented the continuation of the AP. Later, the True Path Party (Dog˘ru Yol Partisi – DYP) was formed as a substitute for the Great Turkey Party but did not manage to be accepted into the elections of 1983 either. Within this framework, only three parties competed in the elections held on 6 November 1983. The candidate parties were the Nationalist Democracy Party (Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi – MDP) which the generals themselves had founded, the Populist Party (Halkçı Parti – HP) that again the generals had encouraged to channel the leftist votes, and the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi – ANAP) that was given ‘permission’ to enter the elections. According to Tachau, the plan that was envisioned by the military for the 1983 elections resembled a ‘sporting contest’.83 The military’s plan envisioned an antiseptic type of politics that ideally would resemble a gentlemanly sporting contest in which the two teams compete with one another and in which one can win and the other loses. Onlookers (in the form of interest groups and associations) may not even cheer their favoured team although individuals may cast votes periodically. Any team, fan or group of fans that violates the rules may be thrown out of the game.84 The ANAP spoiled the two-party plan of the military that hoped for an MDP victory in the elections and an HP opposition. However, there were no grounds to veto the ANAP’s candidacy for the elections and, thus, a three-party contest evolved. The military-backed MDP received only 23.3 per cent of the votes in the 1983 elections, decreasing the power of the military to play an active and direct role in Turkish politics in the post-1983 period. The ANAP was nicknamed the ‘brainchild of Özal’.85 Turgut Özal often referred to the party as representing a new beginning in Turkish politics, with no antecedents and ‘definitely no roots that extended into the past struggles’.86 Özal picked every candidate before the 1983 elections ‘deliberately and almost alone, seeking a platform that would bring politicians of diverse ideological persuasions under the same roof’.87 Claiming to be representing the Orta Direk (the main pillar of society, a broadened conception of the middle classes, including parts of the working class), Özal repeated that his party was incorporating four different tendencies under its

46 Politics in the Turkish Republic Table 2.5 Result of the 1983 General Election Number of votes

Number of seats

Percentage of votes

Motherland Party

7,833,148

211

45.1

Populist Party

5,285,804

117

30.5

Nationalist Democracy Party

4,036,970

71

23.3

Independents

195,588

–

1.1

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, State Institute of Statistics, 1999, p. 204. Note: Total number of votes cast: 18,238,362; participation rate in the elections: 92.3 per cent.

banner: the liberal right, the traditionalist right (mukaddesatçı sag˘ ), the nationalist right and the democratic left. The party seemed like a coalition of these different tendencies that met in the ANAP as they had nowhere else to go. Ergüder notes that in the 1980s, after a decade of political chaos and terrorism, the population was craving for a centrist position that would incorporate all the elements of the right and pull the anti-system tendencies like the Islamists and the nationalists into the centre.88 The ANAP represented such an alternative. In his election campaign Özal proposed faster integration with the international markets and rational policymaking in the economic sphere. Despite the claims of the ANAP not to be the continuation of any past parties, Nilüfer Göle notes that the ANAP could be considered as both a ‘continuation of the Democrat Party tradition of the 1950s and also a renewal of the conservative liberal legacy, attempting to synthesize market modernism and Muslim identity’.89 After coming to power, Özal was able to pursue virtually absolute rule in the country, without major opposition, since most of the political parties were not represented in Parliament and the restrictions on the political activities of former party leaders still continued. Having charismatic leadership qualities, Özal managed to keep all the different tendencies in the party together and, having been the victor of the 1984 municipal elections as well, there was no power to stop his economic and political activities. The reign of the ANAP continued uninterrupted until the 1991 elections. Taking into consideration the 1982 constitution’s restrictions on leftist organisations, the Turkish-Islamic synthesis continued as the main state ideology during this period. The power of the military was relatively cut under Özal’s rule, as he tried to increase the lead of civilian dominance over the military. Göle notes that the ANAP rule witnessed the transformation of society and the ruling elite from the modernizing elites of the earlier decades that took as their basic mission the secularisation of Turkish politics and the transmission of Western values to that polity and society, to the technocratic elites of the 1980s who

Politics in the Turkish Republic 47 defined their goals less in terms of educating the people than of synthesizing Islamic values and pragmatic rationality.90 The state elite of the post-1980s is placed in contrast to the military bureaucratic elite of the post-Atatürk period as they do not presume that they are an inherently superior group in sole possession of the truth . . . The Atatürkian thought is not regarded as a source of all public policies. It is rather taken as a technique, not a manifesto for all public policies.91 While talking about the 1980s in general, Göle emphasises that ANAP rule had ‘begun dismantling the state by its policies of decentralisation of government, privatisation of the state economic enterprises and the reorientation towards the market economy’.92 This, in turn, encouraged the liberal discourse which was developing with the market economy. Instead of the state or the political elite that were encouraging the pro-private sector policies, it was the entrepreneurs themselves who tried to carve out an economic space independent of the state. It was mainly this development that led to the emergence – on the political and cultural levels – of pragmatic values.93

Emerging new identities in the Turkish political arena By emphasising that his party was representing all the tendencies in the population Özal tried to keep under control the fragmentation of identities and different ethnic and religious groups that were developing during that period. However, as the ban on the former party leaders and members was lifted in 1987, this unity could no longer be kept under the ANAP. There were two factions developing within the ANAP itself. While the liberals were advocating a faster integration with the world economy and the markets, the conservatives in the party were advocating a greater emphasis on the role of Islamic principles. The 1980s witnessed the activities of two significant parties. One of them was the illegal Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) that adopted terrorist means, aiming at the formation of a separate Kurdish state in the south-east of Turkey. As told above, by describing itself as Marxist-Leninist from the beginning, it adopted an anti-imperialist rhetoric, ‘opposing the “Turkish imperialism”, which it argued was prevalent in “Turkish Kurdistan”’.94 The second party was the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi – RP), founded in 1983 to be the continuation of Erbakan’s MSP and the ‘national opinion’. Özal tried to incorporate these two identities, Kurdish and Islamic, in himself and his party. In June 1989 Özal announced that he was partly Kurdish. Such a message was an important step in the recognition of Kurdish identity in the country. Besides, Özal and his brothers were already figures known in Islamic circles. They were, according to many analysts, members of Iskenderpas¸a Congregation of the Naks¸ibendi religious order.95 Korkut Özal,

48 Politics in the Turkish Republic the brother, had been a leading member of the MSP during the 1970s. Despite both identities being represented in Özal himself and his party, both movements – Kurdish and Islamic – were gaining their own dynamism and constituencies in a sense that they could no longer be confined to the centre-right discourse of the ANAP by the end of the 1980s. Under ANAP rule, there was increasing dissatisfaction in society because of the negative impact of the economic liberalisation on the majority of income groups. The lavish lifestyles of the newly rich strata were in sharp contrast with the decreasing purchasing power of the lower income groups under high inflation rates. Despite being banned from politics, the former party members began to make a number of political statements and run some parties behind the scenes. Özal, in a courageous move, decided to accept the challenge and announced a referendum for an amendment in the constitution that would allow the former politicians to take part in party politics. The results of the referendum were slightly in favour of seeing the old leaders on the political scene again.96 After the referendum, Özal announced that the next elections would be held in November 1987 and would surely underline once more the ANAP monopoly in the National Assembly. Table 2.6 Result of the 1987 General Election Number of votes

Number of seats

Percentage of votes

Motherland Party

8,704,335

292

36.4

True Path Party

4,587,062

59

19.2

Social Democrat Populist Party

5,931,000

99

24.8

Democratic Left Party

2,044,576

–

8.6

Welfare Party

1,717,425

–

7.2

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, State Institute of Statistics, 1999. Note: Total number of votes cast: 24,603,541; participation rate in the elections: 93.3 per cent.

As the restrictions on former politicians were lifted, the True Path Party (Dog˘ru Yol Partisi – DYP) entered the elections under the leadership of Süleyman Demirel, winning 19.2 per cent of the votes. The Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti – DSP) entered the elections under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit with a new party structure rather than the old structure of the CHP. The Populist Party that had. entered the 1983 elections previously and the Social Democracy Party under Inönü that was vetoed decided to unite and form the Social Democrat . Populist Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti – SHP), and Erdal I nönü continued . as the leader of the new party. The SHP under Inönü proved to be successful in launching an election campaign based on criticism of the economic policies of the regime, using the symbol of a ‘squeezed lemon’ to show how the majority of the population was suffering under the economic programme.

Politics in the Turkish Republic 49 The monopoly of the ANAP rule terminated after the municipal elections held in March 1989. The 1989 election is important, as the ANAP won only 21.9 per cent of the votes, third in line after the SHP with 28.2 per cent of the votes and Demirel’s DYP with 25.6 per cent. It had become more difficult for the ANAP to claim to be the representative of the four tendencies from that time onwards as the parties both on the left and the right started to challenge it strongly. This all came at a time when the presidency was going to change hands. Kenan Evren who had been serving as the President of the country for seven years was leaving his post and Özal announced his intention to stand for election. Özal was elected President in 1989, leaving the task of leading his party to Yıldırım Akbulut, who was often thought to be following Özal’s instructions. Akbulut served for two years, after which Mesut Yılmaz, representing the liberal, marketoriented segment of the party, challenged his authority. Mesut Yılmaz became the leader of the ANAP after Akbulut. During his period in office as Prime Minister, Özal implemented economic liberalisation policies through the structural adjustment programme. He has been successful to a great extent in integrating the Turkish economy with the global markets and capitalism.97 Although not at the level of his advocacy of promoting economic liberalisation, Özal at times proposed measures for political liberalisation. Civil society occupied an important place in the discourse of his politics and was seen as a dynamic force in maintaining sustainable growth and enhancing the democratic structure of the country. Forces that might act as an impediment for the individual entrepreneur were lifted and what was substituted is termed by Göle as ‘anarchical liberalism: it dismantled traditions, freed individuals, legitimised hedonistic dreams, undermined juristic constraints, heightened aspirations, opened up new markets and destroyed all obstacles in its way’.98 The propagation of private TV channels, radios, publications and different organisations that capitalised on newly developing identities provided an environment conducive to free discussions and the creation of a public opinion. The ‘anarchical liberal’ environment saw the development of environmentalist, gay and lesbian and feminist movements around the country, and a proliferation of different organisations advocating these values. While these groups and debate on these topics were rather confined to the elite circles and upper classes, the Kurdish groups and their counter force, the ultra-nationalists, as well as the Islamist circles, incorporated peripheral forces into the debates and found new venues to advocate their positions and enlarge their support group in this liberal framework.

The Welfare Party in the 1980s As explained in the last section, the 1980 coup had a significant impact on the political representation of Islamic ideas and the establishment of the framework for the advent of the counter-elite under the ANAP rule. The Welfare Party (Refah Partisi – RP), was founded on 19 July 1983, but was not able to enter the 1983 elections. The party emphasised moral development and heavy industry, giving the signal that it was the continuation of the MNP and the MSP.

50 Politics in the Turkish Republic The RP had the opportunity to enter the 1984 municipal elections but it received only 4.4 per cent of all votes, accounting for 778,662 voters, thus decreasing its vote potential to half of what it had during the MSP time. The success of Özal in incorporating the Islamic groups into his party was an important factor contributing to this result. Nonetheless, the RP won control of seventeen municipalities, including two provinces: Van and Urfa, in the east and south-east of the country respectively. In the 1987 general elections, the party received 7.16 per cent of all votes but could not enter Parliament, as it failed to pass the electoral threshold of 10 per cent. But the 1987 elections are important in showing the increase in the votes of the RP that would ultimately lead to its success in these municipal elections. In the 1989 elections, the party won 9.8 per cent of all votes, gaining municipal rule in many city centres and towns.99 This success has been interpreted by many as the RP winning back the votes that it had lent to the ANAP up till then.100 It is interesting that the south-eastern region where ethnically Kurdish voters were the majority saw the higher voting rate for the RP. The reason for this could be explained by the high percentage of religiosity among the Sunni Kurds as well as the changing political context of the country. The RP, as the only party that offered politics questioning the republican ideology, received the votes of those with similar concerns. The Welfare Party in effect represented the only radical alternative to the system at that time.101

The 1991 elections and change in the government The year 1991 is important for Turkish politics both because through the elections the ANAP’s rule was terminated and because it marked the beginning of a new international environment with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of the communist threat. Demirel’s True Path Party (DYP) was the victor of the 1991 general election. Since becoming the head of the party in 1987, Demirel had been working on two

Table 2.7 Result of the 1991 General Election Number of votes

Number of seats

Percentage of votes

Motherland Party

5,862,623

115

24.0

Democratic Left Party

2,624,301

7

10.7

True Path Party

6,600,726

178

27.0

Social Democrat Populist Party

5,066,571

88

20.8

Welfare Party

4,121,355

62

16.9

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, State Institute of Statistics, 1999, p. 204. Note: Total number of votes cast: 25,157,089; participation rate in the elections: 83.9 per cent.

Politics in the Turkish Republic 51 strategies to increase the support for the party. While the first strategy was designed to attack the ANAP’s economic policies’ social dimensions, focusing on the economic hardships of ‘the other Turkey’102 the second strategy, in an attempt to appeal to ‘the first nation’, focused on the market liberalism and greater democracy’.103 Demirel had incorporated ‘new, young, dynamic forces into the party, including Tansu Çiller, who had ties to urban and business elements’104 before the election. . The Social Democrat Populist Party of Inönü had rather a low rate of support mainly due to its election partner the Kurdish People’s Labour Party (Halkın Emek Partisi – HEP). As the HEP could not participate in the elections due to a lack of candidates in every province, they entered the elections in a coalition with the SHP, alienating the Turkish nationalist elements among the SHP supporters. The RP entered the elections in a coalition with the nationalist forces. The election coalition of the RP and the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi – MHP) gained 16.9 per cent of the votes. The RP had a new strategy that emphasised a civilised, Western-looking, city-centred and freedom-seeker image in the country during its election campaign. On the way to becoming a mass party, it was trying to change its image as a rural based, petit-bourgeoisie party organisation. The Vice-President Bahri Zengin said, the RP got locked around the community of the mosque, just like the MSP before it. Yet, there are communities other than the community of the mosque. It is necessary to open the RP to these communities. For this reason change was necessary.105 However, there was a group in the RP which opposed change and the opening up of the party for the masses. The traditionalist group in the party argued that any step towards change and incorporation of ‘others’ into the party would mean a deviation from the party’s pure Islamic character and should therefore be stopped.106 This discussion would mark the beginning of the division in the party between the ‘modernists’ and the ‘traditionalists’. After . the elections, the new government was formed between Demirel’s DYP and Inönü’s SHP and the two parties stayed in power until 1995. Within the Parliament both the Islamic (the Welfare Party) and the Kurdish (the People’s Labour Party that entered to the Parliament on an SHP election coalition) identities were now represented. The government started with a liberal programme ‘promising constitutional change and more academic freedom, freedom of the press, democratisation and respect for human rights’.107 However despite the intentions, only minor amendments could be made in the constitution due to lack of enough . voting power of the two coalition parties. During the DYP-SHP coalition, Inönü made calls for recognition of the Kurdish identity in Turkey. In March 1992, Demirel openly recognised what he called the ‘Kurdish reality’. At the same period, the country was going through a phase in which the clashes between the PKK and the Turkish army had severely intensified and there was virtually a civil war in the south-east of the country.

52 Politics in the Turkish Republic

The Kurdish issue There are different estimates regarding the number of the Kurdish population in Turkey. Turgut Özal said in a speech that there were 12 million Kurds in Turkey.108 Other figures range between 6 and 15 million. In an in-depth analysis, Servet Mutlu estimates the number of the Kurdish population as 7,046 million in 1990, 12.60 per cent of the whole population, increasing from 3,132 million, 9.98 per cent, in 1965.109 Mutlu defines the ‘ethnically Kurdish’ population as those who declared their language as Kurdish (Zaza or Kırmancı dialects) in the 1965 census, the last census in which people were asked about their mother tongue. Taking these figures with the growth rate of the population, Mutlu reaches such a number. However, there are also those in Turkey that feel themselves to be Kurdish, but cannot speak the language. This could also be taken into account when talking about the population issue and would increase the figures above the seven million estimate. The Kurdish groups that had been represented mainly under the leftist organisations during the ideological left–right divide in the pre-1980 period became independent actors in Turkish politics during the 1980s and especially in the 1990s. After the 1980 coup, most of their members had fled abroad, coming back a few years later to launch the country’s bloodiest conflict that was to last for almost two decades. Although an important segment of the Kurdish population increasingly demanded the right to express their ethnic identity,110 having placed a ‘homogenous Turkish nation’ at the centre of the nation-building and modernisation processes, the state denied the existence of a separate Kurdish ethnic group for a long time. Kurds were often referred to as ‘mountain Turks’ and were not accepted as a distinct ethnic group in the country. As Ays¸e Günes¸-Ayata and Sencer Ayata underline, the collective identities of ethnic groups were never recognised in Turkey,111 although individuals had equal rights and opportunities of social mobility in the system as long as they did not emphasise their ethnic identities. In that sense, Kurds would not face discrimination on an individual level in the country. However, this would require them to de-emphasise their distinct, collective ethnic Kurdish identity in the public sphere. As mentioned above, the PKK had been formed in the late 1970s. It used violence before the 1980 coup and as Bozarslan notes, its brutal methods at that time ‘provoked only a widespread antipathy, leading to its isolation among the Kurdish population’.112 However, the legacy of the 1980 coup and the subsequent practices of the military regime during which radical groups, especially the leftist groups (including Kurdish elements), were repressed increased the popularity of the PKK. Thus, the repression of the military regime ‘transformed the marginal PKK into a defender of Kurdish dignity, provoking sympathy for it’.113 It is widely acknowledged that the PKK’s popularity increased as a result of the repressive policies of the state which in turn led to further PKK activities and support and a more severe repression on the side of the state. This vicious circle of violence dominated developments on the issue for a long period. The late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s witnessed some positive developments from the state’s side towards a recognition of Kurdish identity, while

Politics in the Turkish Republic 53 the military measures continued. Kurdish sentiment in the country became more evident by the late 1980s when 55,000 Iraqi Kurds fled into Turkey and raised Kurdish consciousness in the country. Besides, at the same period there was an emerging pro-Kurdish campaign in Europe that was joined by Danielle Mitterand, the wife of the French President.114 Later the Gulf War of 1991 and the developments in northern Iraq became a turning point as they made the Kurdish issue in general an international concern. In the aftermath of the Gulf War half a million Kurdish refugees came to Turkey. The government decided to make new arrangements regarding the language issue and cultural rights. In 1991, a reform package was passed through Parliament that removed a series of articles in the penal code, leading to the release or shortening of sentences of political prisoners and lifted the ban on the use of the Kurdish language in the private sphere.115 However, an Anti-Terror Law was passed in the same year, Article 8 of which forbade propaganda, meetings and demonstrations which adversely affected the indivisible integrity of the territory and the nation. The militant activities of the PKK continued to target not only the Turkish military but almost all elements of the Turkish state including basic public services like electric power and communication lines, factories, irrigation facilities, as well as schools and teachers. The government responded to the PKK’s attacks mainly with military means. The village guard system116 was put into effect, a state of emergency was declared in eight provinces117 and the Law to Fight Terrorism was implemented. The state of emergency was issued in 1987 and it was based on a law that ‘gave civilian governors the right to exercise quasi-martial law powers, including restrictions on the press and removal from the area of the persons whose activities are believed inimical to public order’.118 However, these measures, seen as ‘repression of the state’, increased the popularity of the PKK, making it the major group that represented the Kurdish groups at large. Until 1993, PKK boosted its strength in the south-east region. However, particularly after 1994, fighting against ‘Kurdish terrorism with all means possible’ became the state policy. The beginning of the 1990s also witnessed the formation of a Kurdish Islamic group in the south-east of the country called Hizbullah that operated against the PKK. There was a widespread rumour that the security forces turned a blind eye to Hizbullah’s operations against the PKK militants, if it did not directly support and aid them. As mentioned above, HEP entered the election on an SHP ticket in the 1991 elections. Thirteen elected members of the HEP had spoken Kurdish during the oath-taking ceremony and wore the colours of red, yellow and green that were . associated with the PKK. Once in the Parliament they split from Inönü’s SHP to directly represent the HEP in Parliament. In 1993, when the HEP was closed down, they formed a new party – Democracy Party (Demokrasi Partisi – DEP). During the DEP congress in 1994, PKK flags were displayed and Turkey was presented as an occupying country. Consequently this led the DEP to be closely associated with the PKK. When the leader of the DEP Hatip Dicle declared that ‘everybody in uniform was a target’ after the killing of some young military cadets in Istanbul, a legal and political process started leading to the expulsion of these thirteen

54 Politics in the Turkish Republic members from Parliament and the closure of the DEP.119 Most of these DEP members fled abroad to form a Kurdish parliament in exile in 1995. In the place of the banned DEP, another party People’s Democracy Party (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi – HADEP) was formed which could not stay out of the vicious circle of violence and links with the PKK as its relationship became apparent when, in its second party congress in 1996, the Turkish flag was dropped and the banner of the PKK was raised. Starting from 1994, the measures taken by the Turkish state to fight PKK terror intensified. As mentioned above, implementing ‘all possible measures’ to stop the actions of the PKK became government strategy. In addition to its own security forces and co-operation with the village guards, the state even got involved in mafia-style techniques to stop PKK activities and indirectly protected the Hizbullah activities. In November 1996, a traffic accident in a town in Western Anatolia called Susurluk revealed the relations between the politicians, police and mafia. Involved in the accident were a former head of the Istanbul police, a person charged with murder and an MP from the DYP, travelling in the same car. Abdullah Çatlı, a murder suspect, and the former head of police travelling together raised many questions. The fact that the DYP parliamentarian Sedat Edip Bucak, who was the leader of one of the largest tribes in the south-east that helped the government against the PKK, was travelling with the others also led to concerns. The corruption in the state cadres, as well as rumours about the state using criminals in its fight against the PKK, led to debate about a ‘deep state’ (derin devlet), a web of clandestine relations working outside the rule of law in the country. Thus, the legitimacy of the state and its actions and links came under severe criticism and question. Over 30,000 people died in the conflict. In 3,000 villages, schools were shut, leaving 1.5 million children without education. Around 500 medical centres were closed down, over 3,000 villages were evacuated and three million people have migrated from the region.120 The Kurdish issue became internationalised, especially after the 1991 Gulf War and the developments in northern Iraq. Syrian shelter for the PKK has led to an intensification of the conflict between Syria and Turkey, bringing them almost to the brink of war in 1998.

Increasing polarisation of Turkish politics The sudden death of Özal in 1993 led to a change of leadership in the DYP, from Demirel to Çiller, as.the former had replaced Özal in the Presidential office. After Özal’s death Erdal Inönü announced that he would be resigning from politics, leaving his place to Murat Karayalçın, as the head of the SHP. From 1993 onwards, the coalition continued under the new leadership in both parties. During the 1990s, Turkey was again rolled into political instability. Unlike the ideological polarisation along the left–right divide of the 1960s and 1970s, identity issues, revolving especially around Kurdish and Islamic themes, became prominent during the 1990s. The end of the Cold War and further integration with the globalisation processes led Turkey to a soul-searching as to where the country

Politics in the Turkish Republic 55 belonged in this rapidly changing international context. This debate was reflected on the domestic scene as well and fostered the identity issues already developing in the country. Alternative modernity projects often came into public debate, trying to respond to the increasing demands for representation by different groups whose identities had until now been incorporated in the centre parties and who were confined to the private sphere. The culmination of political, economic and cultural crises with an international dimension again brought Turkey into a situation of instability and deadlock. In this context, different opinions as to the ability of the Kemalist modernisation project (already modified after the 1980 coup) to survive into the coming century began to be heard loudly. In the meanwhile, the role of the military in politics had increased greatly, especially due to its central role in fighting against the PKK terror. The proliferation of identities and the inability of the existing party system to incorporate these identities into the system would contribute to the rise of radical groups – for example Islamists and ultra-nationalists – in the country during this decade. In July 1993 in Sivas, 37 individuals who came to a festival in the city, among them many Alevi poets, intellectuals and musicians, were burnt to death in their hotel ‘mainly as a reaction to Aziz Nesin, a leading overtly atheist intellectual, who promised to translate Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses into Turkish’.121 As the hotel was burning down, a large group chanted and demonstrated outside with slogans calling for Shari’a rule in the country.122 These events once again underlined the polarisation in the country More important than the militant manifestation of polarisation, such events could be read as the representations of the strife deepening in society as emerging identities started to pose a serious challenge to what had now become more difficult to maintain – the Kemalist modernisation project. The centre parties were not able to adapt their policies to the changes in the role of the periphery – its desire to take part in the centre and its increasing legitimate demand for a redefinition of its role in. the society. During the 1990s, by creating a powerful financial base through MÜSIAD,123 the ‘newcomers’ were able to develop their own institutions, from media to business organisations, from bookshops to coffeehouses, from their intellectuals to the political party. They even built up special living quarters for their members, where an Islamic life-style and ways of conduct were strictly followed.124 Bug˘ra names these new developments as a developing societal culture ‘providing its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres’.125 The Islamic groups were successful in gathering support through their organisations, and rejecting the society with their own alternative organisations. The rise of the Welfare Party coincides with the period that the state ideology faced serious challenges and the demands of the periphery were at their peak. 1994 also witnessed a severe economic crisis, whose details will be studied in the chapter on the economy. Economic hardship with spiralling inflation, erosion of the value of the Turkish lira and increasing unemployment further contributed

56 Politics in the Turkish Republic to tension in society and provoked louder demands for solutions to the ongoing crises and alternatives in Turkish politics.

The 1994 municipal elections and the victory of the Welfare Party The 27 March 1994 municipal elections led to the control of most governorates by the RP, putting the stamp of the party on national politics. It also initiated a period of more visible Islamic symbols and ways of life in the public sphere, triggering years of confrontation and tension between secular and Islamic circles in society. The DYP won the majority of the votes in the elections, with 21.4 per cent of all the votes, followed by the ANAP of Mesut Yılmaz with 21 per cent. The RP came third, wining 19.1 per cent of the votes. The SHP was the fourth party, with only 13.6 per cent of the votes.126 During the DYP–SHP coalition, the Republican People’s Party was reopened, this time under the leadership of Deniz Baykal. Seeing that a merger between the SHP and the CHP could potentially win more votes and could have increased their success in the municipal elections, these two parties decided to unite after the municipal elections. The question of which party should take the lead in this merger was discussed for long time and constituted the main debate in the leftist spectrum of the political scene. The merger ultimately happened under the CHP and Baykal became the leader of the new CHP on 9 September 1995. The main victor of the elections was the RP as it managed to hold the municipalities of 28 city centres, the most important of all being Istanbul and Ankara, as well as a total of 338 city and town local municipalities. S¸ evki Yılmaz, an outspoken member of the RP, praised the victory in the municipalities, saying that the first step on the way to power had been taken.127 The results of the 1995 general elections proved Yılmaz right, as the party won enough votes to come to power in a coalition government.

The 1995 elections – the road to Erbakan’s premiership The result of the 24 December 1995 Parliamentary elections once again underlined the increasing popularity of the RP in Turkey. The party won 21.4 per cent of the votes, getting 6,012,450 votes in number, increasing its seats in Parliament from 62 in 1991 to 158 in 1995. The result brought an enthusiastic reaction from Islamic circles, although with some disappointment that they could not be the majority in Parliament, chanting the victory as ‘Good News! Welfare is Coming’ (‘Müjdeler Olsun, Refah Geliyor!’). After the elections, a government was formed between the Motherland Party of Mesut Yılmaz and the True Path Party of Tansu Çiller. This government was short-lived mainly due to disagreement over the covering up corruption allegations against Çiller. The end of this government opened the way for a coalition government of Çiller’s DYP with the RP and the long-awaited Premiership of Erbakan.

Politics in the Turkish Republic 57 Table 2.8 Result of the 1995 General Election Number of votes

Number of seats

Percentage of votes

Motherland Party

5,527,288

132

19.6

Democratic Left Party

4,118,025

76

14.6

True Path Party

5,396,009

135

19.2

Republican People’s Party

3,011,076

49

10.7

Welfare Party

6,012,450

158

21.4

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, State Institute of Statistics, 1999, p. 204. Note: Total number of votes cast: 29,101,469; participation rate in the elections: 85.2 per cent.

The Welfare–True Path coalition government Despite leading a campaign before the 24 December elections based on an anti–WP discourse and claiming to be the guarantor of the republic against rising political Islam (the RP), the True Path Party under Çiller formed a coalition government with the RP within six months of the elections. The RP–DYP (referred here as the Welfare–Path) coalition was formed on 3 January 1996. The DYP leader made speeches emphasising the harmony and common understanding in the government. Çiller commented it is said that working of two parties having different bases of support would be difficult. Parties with the same constituency would lead to harmful competition. I think we will be able to complement each other, find the right way and use the competition for service to our country.128 As soon as the government was formed, populist policies such as an increase in the wages of state officials by 50 per cent129 and a more conservative discourse had taken over the political scene. The change in the discourse of the DYP leader Çiller, who used to represent the image of the ‘Republican Woman’, was reflected in her speeches, for instance: ‘Our aim is not only nationalism. It is to believe and to say one word. We are coming from roots that take the flag and the prayer (ezan) as holy. This is our essence: we are believers and we are nationalists’.130 The increasing presence of Islamic dress and symbols in the public space led to some worries on the side of the military-bureaucratic elite and the secular groups at large. The RP opened debates that questioned the concepts of secularism and democracy in the public arena. Its attempts to increase the number of RP members in state positions, the invitation to some religious order sheiks to the Prime Minister’s residence for the evening meal during Ramadan,131 its attempt to open the way for female state officials to wear headscarves at work, and the frequently

58 Politics in the Turkish Republic repeated project of building a mosque in Taksim Square in Istanbul to demonstrate the completion of the conquest of Istanbul, could all be seen as factors leading to criticisms against this party by the secular groups (the overriding majority of the population) in the country. These issues were brought onto the agenda of the National Security Council by the military members of the Council and five points were cited as leading to particular concern among the military: the mosque in Taksim, the headscarf issue, special Ramadan working hours, the new regulations for collection of the sacrificed sheep leather132 and travelling to hajj (pilgrimage) by land. On the foreign policy scene too, there were some important developments. As the Welfare–Path came to power, one of the first developments was on the partnership with Israel. In February 1996, the Turkish military had agreed on the basic terms of the partnership with Israeli military and the final agreement was signed in August 1996. Prior to its coming to power, one of the milestones of the RP discourse rested on the termination of all relations with Israel and the description of that country as the mother of all the ills in the region and in Turkey. Despite criticism from its constituency and harsh reactions from the Arab countries, Erbakan had approved the agreement. As in the Israeli agreement case, Erbakan continued to implement policies that were contrary to his party discourse during his premiership. One of the most important examples of this was the sacking of military personnel from office due to their relations with the Islamist organisations. The RP and its predecessors had been calling for action against military decisions that prohibited Imam-Hatip graduates from entering into military schools. They also harshly criticised the sacking of personnel for disciplinary reasons from its ranks, especially due to links to Islamic organisations. Despite such a discourse, Erbakan signed the documents that removed from the army such personnel. These actions led many to question what the RP could accomplish in line with its discourse while in power. Despite continuously praising the accomplishments of his party, Erbakan was aware that there was growing discontent within the party regarding the actions of the government. In addition to the ideological controversy over differences between action and discourse, the party was becoming less able to keep together on the one hand the economically disadvantaged segments seeking immediate change in the economic system that would lead to some wealth distribution and on the other hand the Anatolian businessmen that were increasing their wealth. In addition to that they were not able to provide their supporters with a new platform to voice their demands for change and a redefinition of the Kemalist modernisation project. This is understandable to some extent; first because the RP was a coalition partner, not in sole power and able to carry out any policies it wanted. However, even if the RP had the power to change the laws a radical change in the economy would have been difficult due to its own constituency. The country had to remain capitalist as it had already been incorporated into the world economy and large group of supporters of the party, the Anatolian businesses, were an integral part of this integration. Although some points were criticised as to the controversy between action and theory in private meetings, open criticism of Erbakan’s decisions and

Politics in the Turkish Republic 59 actions was impossible within the party mechanism. As the debate about what modernisation meant for the RP was going on, Turkey was on the brink of drastic changes in its politics.

The 28 February process The month of February 1997 witnessed some important developments that would leave their stamp on the future of the country. The Jerusalem Night (Kudüs Gecesi) that was organised by the Sincan municipality of Ankara, under the posters of the leaders of Lebanese Hizbullah and HAMAS, to which the Iranian Ambassador to Turkey had also been invited, served as a catalyst in the events. While the Iranian Ambassador Muhammed Rıza Bagheri called for Shari’a rule in Turkey and declared that ‘we should not be afraid to be called as fundamentalists. The fundamentalists are the most intelligent, most civilised and most believing people’, the governor from the RP was saying that they would ‘inject Shari’a on the secularists by force’.133 The governor, Bekir Yıldız, went on to say that the headscarves were their flag of honour. ‘We would fight for our beliefs, our flag that we are proud of. We have great patience. All the world should know that our patience should not spill over.’134 Against such an open challenge to the secular nature of the republic, the reaction of the military, which presented itself as the guardian of secularism, was as harsh as expected. Faced with the latest developments, the military saw that Islam was not playing the role that was assigned to it under the Turkish-Islamic synthesis. Some military officials were reported in the newspapers as reflecting the general concern in the different ranks of the armed forces: ‘Turkey is being pushed towards disaster. But because of the political interests and calculations, nobody tries to stop this situation’.135 Military tanks were seen on the streets of Sincan on the morning of 4 February 1997, ‘on their way to the Operation arena’. However, the statements of ‘we fixed the unbalanced democracy’ proved that this was not a coincidence.136 It was not only the military that was concerned about the developments, mainly caused by the RP part of the coalition government. Before the events of Sincan, and out of concern with the practices of the RP, a civil initiative, composed of the major syndicates, professional boards and artisans unions, was formed mainly for the promotion of an ‘alternative in the Parliament against the developments targeting the major characteristics of the Republic’.137 This initiative also had the support of the President of Turkey and the President of the Parliament. The RP leadership reacted in a rather dismissive way towards the worries of these circles. Erbakan said that ‘the issue is not secularism, this is the worries of the people who want to use secularism as religion-hostility. These people are only a handful. And they have become fossils.’138 The statements of Mesut Yılmaz, the leader of the ANAP, in this context were striking. He was saying that the country was facing three main dangers. First, the political corruption in the country had reached its peak, second, the principle of rule of law was being defied by the government and third, the RP was posing a threat to the establishment by its policy of filling state cadres with their members

60 Politics in the Turkish Republic and by the radicalisation and militarisation of the RP base.139 The military leaders were also concerned by the organisation of the RP base under the title of ‘private guard’. Almost 50,000 people gathered under this group, which was called the Sakarya Group and which was also responsible for the private guarding of Erbakan. Concerns grew over its resemblance to the pre-Revolution Iranian organisation.140 The 28 February 1997 National Security Council meeting, which was later named and known as the ‘post-modern coup’ and its aftermath as the 28 February Process (28 S¸ ubat Süreci), met in the light of these developments. During the meeting, the military side demanded that certain policies should be implemented immediately against the increasing power of the RP and the spreading of ‘fundamentalist Islam’. These policies included an increase in the time spent in compulsory education from five to eight . years, which would lead to the closure of the secondary school parts of the Imam-Hatip schools, the closing down of the private Quran courses, the implementation of the dress code (prohibiting the wearing of the headscarf for women in public and long beards and religious caps for men) with no exceptions. Necessary regulations were ‘advised’ to the government to prevent the extremist religious groups from trying to divide the country along different religious sectarian lines.141 The proposals led to harsh . responses from the cadres of the RP. The RP Parliamentarian from S ¸ anlıurfa, Ibrahim Çelik stated: . If you try to close down the Imam-Hatip schools under the RP rule, blood will be shed. I want blood to be shed too. Democracy will come by this way and everything in the country will be wonderful. The military has not managed to cope with 3500 PKK members, how will they manage the 6 million Islamists? If they pee against the wind, it will come to their face. I would hit who hits me. I am an Islamist to the very end, I want Shari’a law to come.142 But such criticisms against the military ‘advice’ did not change the result. Erbakan signed the proposals despite some postponement. By signing, he was acting against all the principles of his party and openly accepting the military’s position on the issues. By April, the Chief of Staff announced a change in the National Military and Strategic Concept. The threat perception of the military had been altered; now internal threat (Islamists) was the priority over the external threat. In the briefing held in the military headquarters, it was stated, ‘the separatist (PKK) and religious groups (RP), in unity, are trying to divide the Turkish Republic with their operations. This means the dissolving of the state. Under these circumstances internal threat precedes the external one and becomes a top priority.’143 There were some reactions to the National Security Council decisions and the increasing role of the military in politics. On 11 May 1997, there was a big meeting in Istanbul that was organised by the Islamist circles, to protest against the decisions, especially as regards eight-year compulsory education and consequent closure of Imam-Hatip’s secondary schools and the wearing of the headscarf. ‘Long live Shari’a’ and ‘Arms stretched out against the Quran will be broken’ were the main slogans of the meeting. The presence of the RP Parliamentarians showed

Politics in the Turkish Republic 61 the party’s support for the meeting. ‘Muslims are here, Where are the Seculars?’ was another chant. Secularists were organising anti-Islamist meetings during and after this meeting.144 The tension in the political arena was further increased with these moves. The idea presented here is that the 28 February event should be taken as the open manifestation of the conflict in politics. The clash of the republican-secular ideology, and the Islamic ideology of the RP had taken place in the open, in the public space and the fight was over the occupation of the public space. The presence of people with Islamic dress and mode of conduct had been increasing significantly with the growing presence of members of the Welfare–Path in universities, businesses, media and occupation associations. Now, however, the universities and public offices were declared as places where Islamist dress could not be worn. This should be seen from the perspective of the struggle over who defines public space and who defines identity in Turkish politics. In May 1997 the state attorney opened a case for the closure of the RP based on the allegation that it had become the headquarters action against secularism. As for tension in society was growing, the dissatisfaction of the DYP leader Çiller with the coalition was increasing as well. The leadership of the DYP was already under attack from the liberal wing of the party and the key names of the party were resigning in protest against the policies and statements of the RP part of the coalition. Under such pressure, Çiller asked Erbakan to leave the post of Prime Minister to her. She was proposing what Erbakan termed a ‘transfer in the air’. According to this plan, by changing the roles of the two parties, making Çiller the Prime Minister and Erbakan her Vice-minister, the relations with the military would be soothed and the tension in society normalised. The two parties agreed that Erbakan would resign as Prime Minister, after which they would ask President Demirel to transfer the post to the DYP. However, the plans did not work. Considering the tension in society, after Erbakan had resigned as Prime Minister and returned the duty of government-forming to Demirel, he gave this duty to Mesut Yılmaz of the Motherland Party. As a result of this, in less then a year the RP government was out of power, leaving behind signatures committing the government to eight-year compulsory education, expulsion of Islamist members from the military, and improved relations with Israel, in addition to a radicalising discourse with statements attacking the Kemalist order and the Republic. Mesut Yılmaz formed a government with the DSP of Ecevit and the new Party known as Democratic Turkey Party (Demokratik Türkiye Partisi – DTP) composed of a group of former DYP members who resigned in reaction to the coalition with Erbakan. The new government aimed to fulfil the recommendations of the National Security Council, but this proved difficult as the RP and the DYP continued to oppose the government’s policies. Early elections were announced for April 1999 and this remained a rather short-lived coalition, mainly as a reaction to the Welfare– Path experience in power. The Constitutional Court closed the RP on 16 January 1998 and Erbakan was banned from politics for a period of five years. Even as the closure case was being opened against the party by the state attorney, another party called Virtue Party

62 Politics in the Turkish Republic (Fazilet Partisi –FP) was being formed by the lawyer of Erbakan. In case the RP would be closed, the members would transfer to this party and thus the continuation of Islamist politics in the Parliament could be guaranteed. This was exactly what happened.

The 1999 elections The 1999 elections could be considered as a victory for the DSP, which had become the biggest party in power. The CHP was rather a disappointment, as the party could not pass the electoral threshold and was left out of Parliament. This came as a big surprise, as the party had never been out of Parliament in any elections that it participated in since its formation in 1923. Another surprise was the significant increase in the votes for the Nationalist Action Party, carrying the ultra-nationalist Grey Wolf legacy to power. The capture of the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan played an important role in the rise of the nationalist party’s votes. Abdullah Öcalan had been captured in Nairobi, Kenya on 16 February 1999. Having evidence of his presence and organisational capacity in Syria, the Turkish government mobilised forces to the Syrian border in 1998. The relations between the two countries was normalised only after Öcalan left Syria, first to Russia, then to Italy, and he finally ended up in the Greek Embassy in Nairobi. His capture led not only to a new phase of developments in the Kurdish issue and the PKK, but also boosted nationalist sentiments in the country. The Turkish military had won the war with the PKK by 1999. Table 2.9 Result of the 1999 General Election Number of votes

Number of seats

Percentage of votes

Motherland Party

4,122,929

86

12.69

Democratic Left Party

6,919,670

136

21.29

True Path Party

3,745,417

85

11.53

Republican People’s Party

2,716,094

–

8.36

Virtue Party

4,805,381

111

14.79

Nationalist Action Party

5,606,583

129

17.25

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, State Institute of Statistics, 1999, p. 204. Note: Total number of votes cast: 32,495,217; participation rate in the elections: 87.1 per cent.

The government was formed as a coalition between the DSP of Ecevit, the ANAP of Yılmaz and the MHP of Devlet Bahçeli, who was elected as head of the party after the death of the founding leader of the nationalist movement Alparslan Türkes¸. Although representing the Grey Wolf legacy, with Bahçeli the MHP moved

Politics in the Turkish Republic 63 towards the centre, tuning down the radical discourse of the earlier decades. Bülent Ecevit became the Prime Minister in the new government. An important development right after the elections was the debate on the headscarf issue. Merve Kavakçı was elected to the Parliament from the FP. She had declared before the elections that she would under no condition take her headscarf off. As expected her arrival to the Parliament with her headscarf on 1 May 1999 opened a new debate in Turkey. The secular groups perceived the act as an attempt to ‘abolish the Republic’145 and thought it to be the most dangerous Islamic manifestation in the history of the Republic, since it was carried out by a political party in the Parliament targeting ‘the brain of the state’. 146 Kavakçı’s status as a parliamentarian was cancelled and her Turkish citizenship was terminated on the grounds that she was an American citizen, a fact she had kept secret from the state authorities. As the manifestations of the Islamic character of the Virtue Party continued with the headscarf issue, the party structure began to be criticised by its own members – the reformist group – for not being able to find a new image for itself in the political arena and for being very much under the influence of the Welfare Party experience. The younger, reformist group in the party led by Recep Tayyip Erdog˘ an, the former mayor of Istanbul and Abdullah Gül began to challenge the old guard in an attempt to make the party more appealing for the masses and they even pronounced the need for a pro-system party. In the first congress of the party, in May 2000, Abdullah Gül challenged Recai Kutan, who had become the head of the FP when the RP was closed and Erbakan was banned from politics for five years, for the leadership of the party, representing the reformists against the traditionalists. However, Kutan by winning the support of Erbakan, managed to outbid the reformers and tried to consolidate his rule in the party. On May 1999, the State Prosecutor Vural Savas¸ opened the case for the closure of the FP on the grounds that it had become a centre of anti-secularist activities and that it was the continuation of the banned RP. As the internal opposition in the party was escalating with different statements from different groups, the constitutional court had found Savas¸ correct in his first point but rejected the second one, and the party was closed on 22 June 2001. After this date, the National Opinion movement had been divided into two; while the reformists founded the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdog˘ an the traditionalists formed the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi – SP) under Recai Kutan. The DSP–ANAP–MHP coalition in government ruled until November 2002 when there were early elections. The government worked in harmony on many issues, despite divergence on the ideological level. Abdullah Öcalan’s fate became an important issue debated under this government. He was sentenced to death on 29 June 1999 but despite the nationalist MHP being in power, this death sentence was not carried out. This government elected Ahmet Necdet Sezer, the chief judge of the Constitutional Court as President to replace Süleyman Demirel whose second term in office expired in 2000. President Sezer’s election by the Parliament increased hopes for the strengthening of the rule of law as the country was going

64 Politics in the Turkish Republic through the reform process. The government managed to make amendments in the legal system in accordance with European Union legislation, including, a historic change, the abolition of the death penalty. However, the government’s success was overshadowed by the 2001 economic crisis and the illness of the Prime Minister Ecevit. During the economic crisis, details of which will be told in the following chapter, the value of the Turkish lira was halved overnight and purchasing power declined, making unemployment one of the most important problems of the country. To help solve the economic problems, the government invited Kemal Dervis¸ of the World Bank to direct the economy and made agreements with the IMF. The early elections of 2002 showed that all three parties in power at the time suffered tremendous losses in popularity.

2002 elections and beyond The November 2002 elections are widely referred to as a political earthquake in Turkey. In the elections, only two parties, AKP and CHP, passed the 10 per cent threshold to enter Parliament. This unexpected result left nearly half of those who actually voted unrepresented in Parliament. This further meant that the two parties received a disproportional representation. The AKP with approximately one-third of the votes (34.28 per cent) received approximately two-thirds (363) of the seats. The CHP won 19.39 per cent of the votes and gained 178 seats. Nine independents also entered Parliament. This was Turkey’s first two-party Parliament in over 50 years. The result meant that the AKP could form the country’s first single-party government in a decade. As a result of the 10 per cent threshold, 45 per cent of votes were not represented in Parliament, leading to questions of how democratic the current election system in Turkey is. Members of the previous coalition government suffered devastating results. The DSP of Ecevit that received 22.2 per cent of the votes in 1999 elections got only 1.22 per cent at these elections. The vote percentage of ANAP of Mesut Yılmaz decreased from 13.2 per cent in 1999 to 5.13 per cent. The MHP also faced similar results – a decrease of votes from 18 per cent in 1999 to 8.36 per cent. The DYP of Çiller, although being an opposition party in Parliament before, also could not pass the threshold and was left with 9.54 per cent. The Democratic People’s Party (Demokratik Halk Partisi – DEHAP), which mainly represented the Kurdish votes received 40 per cent of the votes in the south-east of the country, however, was left with 6.22 per cent of the whole vote. This once more underlined that support for politics based on an ethno-Kurdish identity was confined basically to the south-east of the country and remained as a regional issue in Turkish politics. It should also be mentioned here that the SP, as a continuation of the National Opinion movement, received only 2 per cent of the votes. Most leaders of these parties resigned because of the ‘devastating’ results they faced. This would probably not have happened otherwise, with limited inner-party democracies present in these parties. In the election campaigns, the main point that Recep Tayyip Erdog˘an underlined was that they would neither base their politics on Islam, nor use Islam for rhetorical

Politics in the Turkish Republic 65 purposes. ‘Considering the new dynamics of integration with the global system’, Erdog˘ an declared it impossible to implement Shari’a law and an Islamic state in Turkey. They explained the party’s relation to Islam by referring to the Christian Democrat parties of Europe. The AKP programme underlined the necessity of further integration with the European Union and the world market. Its leadership emphasised that they would act as a pro-system party and refrain from confrontation with the secular principle of the state, established institutions and the military-bureaucratic elite. The 2002 elections opened a new era in Turkish politics. Although the result was perceived in some circles (especially the military-bureaucratic elite) as a threat to Republican order and the Kemalist modernisation project, it was seen by many as an opportunity for restructuring a political system that had been struggling with repeated crises in the political, economic and cultural arenas for the last decades. For this reason the outcome was met with optimism from beyond the ranks of the AKP. A large part of public opinion also welcomed the end of the unstable coalition governments. Tayyip Erdog˘an could not enter Parliament and become Prime Minister because he had been banned from politics. In 1997, in a public speech in Siirt he read a poem – Our mosques are our barracks, our domes our helmets, The minarets are our bayonets and our believers our soldiers – after which he was sentenced to ten months of imprisonment and a life-time ban from politics by the National Security Court.147 After the elections, he continued acting as the party leader, outside Parliament. Abdullah Gül, a close associate of Erdog˘an, became the Prime Minister of Turkey. Soon after coming to power, the AKP government changed the law that banned Erdog˘ an from politics. The cancellation of elections in Siirt due to irregularities gave Erdog˘an the chance to enter the by-elections. He was chosen as MP from the city where he read the poem that banned him from politics, and later, in 2003, he became the Prime Minister of Turkey. The initial acts of the AKP government had been closely related to foreign policy issues. The Copenhagen Summit and Turkey’s accession negotiations, the Iraq crisis, and the Cyprus issue were the first challenges waiting for the AKP government. The details of the economic and foreign policy aspects of the new government will be analysed in the following chapters. In its initial period in government the AKP passed several reform packages through Parliament in line with EU harmonisation. In a way, the reforms were seen as getting back the rights and freedoms lost with the 1980 coup and the 1982 Constitution.148 Freedom of organisation and of the press were further extended and all impediments regarding the use of languages other than Turkish were lifted. Education and broadcasting in ‘all languages and dialects used by the Turkish population in daily life’ were freed. The role of the military in civilian life was limited by the reforms. After the change in language policy, many books, videos and journals started to be published and distributed in many languages, including Kurdish. With the reforms, Kurdish identity and cultural rights were also recognised in the country.

66 Politics in the Turkish Republic

Conclusion One of the major themes of Turkish politics has been the consolidation of democracy. Making an early transition to competitive elections, the Turkish democratisation process has faced serious challenges since 1946. The party system, the crux of democratic politics, has been both the strength and the weakness of Turkish politics. With their organisational structures, mobilisational strengths and with the legitimacy they enjoy, political parties represent the only working party system in the Middle East apart from Israel. However, the party system also demonstrated some structural weaknesses. The limited inner party democracy, increasing fragmentation in certain periods and the volatility of the electorate have limited the consolidation of democracy. Turkish politics has been besieged by periods of crises largely due to increasing polarisation in society, especially since the mid-1960s. This polarisation took different forms: while the left–right divide and ideological conflict characterised earlier periods, cleavages over identities dominated politics for the last two decades. In periods when conflict peaked, the military intervened, directly or indirectly. Playing a central role in the reformation process since the nineteenth century and composing the majority of the elite that founded the Republic, the military in the post-independence period defined itself as ‘the protector of the Republic and its values’, thus justifying its interventions. Interestingly, these interventions were seen as legitimate by the majority of the population and the military in each of its interventions was able to establish coalitions with different segments of society.149 Although the role of the military is much more problematised today in Turkey, it still appears as the most trusted institution in opinion polls, far ahead of the political parties. These interventions led to the restructuring of the political and social spheres in their aftermath, in an attempt to secure the continuation of the regime. However, at times it led, ironically, to further fragmentation and polarisation. The interruption of the inner dynamics of the democratic consolidation process prevented democratic institutions from taking root in the society. Although there was a clear continuation of issues from earlier decades, the 1980s and the 1990s are characterised by significant transformations and ruptures. Globalisation had a significant impact on these transformations. With economic liberalisation the role of the state in the economy was redefined. Politically .new actors, with the diversification of civil society like media groups, MÜSIAD and the counter-elite, began to play an active role in politics. The emergence of identity politics as well as alternative, counter-hegemonic modernity projects also characterise the end of the 1990s. The rise of political Islam and Kurdish ethnonationalism brought what was previously confined to the private sphere into the public one. Not being necessarily democratic at all times themselves, these groups helped to foster debate and brought new perspectives into politics. These debates in turn generated stiff resistance from the parts of the military-bureaucratic elite and society which perceived political Islam and Kurdish ethno-nationalism as a threat to the secular and unitary nature of the Republic. At the same time the 1980s

Politics in the Turkish Republic 67 and 1990s witnessed the emergence of global aspect of the democratisation debate in Turkey, especially through Turkish–EU relations, bringing human rights issues and problems of democracy under international scrutiny. The AKP, which was able to establish a single-party majority in the Parliament, faces the challenge of responding to domestic and international demands for further democratisation and going beyond the polarisation that may lead to another deadlock.

3

The Turkish economy

Introduction Turkey is a highly populated country with a significant industrial and agricultural potential. Although the country was devastated during World War I and the war of independence, it came a long way in its economic achievements during the republican period. The elite that founded the state, similar to other late-developers embarked on an ambitious programme for development. Again, in a fashion similar to what occurred in many developing countries at that stage, the state was going to assume the leading role in this process. Thus, Turkey became one of the first countries in the Middle East that followed a state-led, import-substitution industrialisation policy until 1980. With the economic liberalisation measures of 1980, the country adopted the principles of a neo-liberal market economy. Initially, the liberalisation programme was praised as a success story for turning an inwardlooking economy to an outward-looking, export-oriented one. However, by the end of the decade macroeconomic imbalances became significant, leading the country into two severe economic crises during the 1990s. This led some analysts to call the 1990s ‘a lost decade’ for Turkey.1 The roots of the crises are often attributed to the economic liberalisation programme and the timing of certain aspects of it.2 Circles of macroeconomic imbalance, crisis, reform, recovery and again a macroeconomic imbalance seem to mark the characteristic of the last two decades of the Turkish economy.3 Since the economic crisis of 2001, Turkey has adopted an IMF-oriented reform programme to bring the country out of this circle.

The Turkish economy, 1923–1946 Turkey had an agriculture-dominated economy by the end of the Second World War. As can be seen from Table 3.1 below, the share of agriculture in the Gross National Product (GNP) was 46 per cent in 1946, while the share of manufacturing remained 13 per cent. The labour force was predominantly occupied in the agricultural sector (77 per cent), while the share of urban population as a whole remained 18 per cent. The state, through an etatist policy, played an active role in the economy, aiming to attain self-sufficiency. As noted in the first chapter, etatism constituted an

The Turkish economy 69 important aspect of the nation-building process. Although the republic aimed to promote capitalist development by supporting the private sector, by early 1930s the role of the state in the economy had actually increased, mainly as a result of the 1929 world economic crisis. Within this context, ideas supporting a stateled industrialisation drive gained importance. A five-year industrialisation plan was prepared by the early 1930s, to increase the domestic production of basic goods. Textiles, mining, cellulose and chemicals were some of the first sectors in which the state invested. Imports in these sectors constituted 44 per cent of all Turkish imports at the time, and their domestic production would be crucial in decreasing the dependence of the country on foreign goods. This programme began to be implemented in 1934. By 1936, a second five-year industrialisation plan was designed, in which intermediate and investment goods production was given priority. However, it was not implemented because of the Second World War. The etatist policies did not exclude the private sector, but rather encouraged and went hand-in-hand with the national, indigenous capitalist groups. While the state invested in large, expensive projects in intermediate goods, it provided an input for the private sector that mainly manufactured final goods for consumers.4 As shown in Table 3.1, the share of industry and manufacturing increased during the first years of the etatist period, jumping from 9 per cent to 17 per cent. For the same period, a decrease in agriculture is seen. However, the beginning of the Second World War changed this picture as the share of industry declined and agriculture increased. During this period, the economy operated in a highly protected environment with high tariffs and a quota system. Table 3.1 Basic economic indicators, 1923–1946

Population in millions Life expectancy at birth Share of urban population (%) Share of agriculture in labour force % GNP in current US$m GNP per capita in current US$ Share of manufacturing in GNP % Share of agriculture in GNP % Share of total industry including construction in GNP (%)

1923

1929

1939

1946

13 35 16 – 570 43 12 40

14 35 17 80 1,000 70 9 52

17.5 35 18 77 1,600 90 17 39

19 38 18 77 2,450 130 13 46

16

14

22

18

Source: Roger Owen and S ¸ evket Pamuk, A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century, p. 244.

The Turkish economy, 1946–1960 When the Second World War ended and multi-party politics was introduced in Turkey, one of the main debates revolved around the role of the state in the

70 The Turkish economy economy. This discussion resulted in a redefinition of etatism. Within the ‘newetatist understanding’, the government was called in to support the private sector – both its domestic and foreign elements – and to implement any necessary measures to develop the economy.5 Economic development plans and programmes were also proposed in this debate. A development plan was prepared in 1947, which gave priority to transportation, agriculture and energy as well as the rural segments of the society in general. It emphasised that private enterprise was free to work in any sector of the economy and that all economic initiatives apart from mining, energy, iron-steel industry and railways would eventually be transferred to the private sector. However, this development plan was not implemented at that time. When the Democrat Party (DP) came to power in 1950, it took over a balanced economy with high gold and cash reserves. Also, for the first time in the history of the republic, international credit and aid was accruing to the state budget through the Marshall Plan. Advocating the elements of the 1947 development plan, one of the slogans of the DP was to transfer state economic enterprises into private hands. It also promised a right to strike for the workers. Upon coming to power, it loosened state controls on the economy and encouraged the private sector. One of the first statements of the DP’s Minister of Economy and Trade was that the government would take all basic economic decisions in collaboration with the business circles. Private capital accumulation was strongly encouraged and the policy of creating a national bourgeoisie continued as the economic priority of the period. Manufacturing industry consequently increased as will be shown in Table 3.2. Thus, most of the businesses that operate in Turkey today were formed during the 1950s under DP rule.6 The number of private establishments more than doubled during this period, as well as the number of employees working in the private sector. In 1950, the government founded the Industrial Development Bank (Sınai Kalkınma Bankası) to facilitate long-term internal and external credits and technical assistance for the private sector. The infrastructural projects that the government took on also provided an opportunity for private businesses to prosper under state Table 3.2 Manufacturing industry, 1950–1960 Year

Number of establishments (total)

Number of employees (total)

Number of establishments (private sector)

Number of employees (private sector)

1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960

2,618 3,026 3,850 4,610 5,121 5,503

162,859 181,856 217,121 241,578 290,541 295,989

2,515 2,911 3,704 4,443 4,926 5,284

86,826 99,741 139,160 136,058 172,689 168,001

Source: Statistical Indicators 1923–1998, State Institute of Statistics, Republic of Turkey, pp. 286–288.

The Turkish economy 71 contracts. Foreign capital was encouraged and the integration of domestic capital with foreign capital through joint ventures was supported.7 The importation of necessary products and raw materials for the state sector industries was transferred to the private sector during this period, opening up another profitable area for them. Unsurprisingly, rumours of corruption in import documentation and close relations between certain businessmen and politicians became widespread during this period.8 Despite the growth of the private sector, there were strong limitations on industrialisation during the 1950s. The profitability of investing in speculative areas for the private sector had obstructed full-scale industrialisation. Kepenek notes that the service sector became the largest sector in income creation after agriculture during the DP’s rule. Although the Industrial Development Bank provided credits for private businesses they mainly chose to concentrate on short-term investment in the service sector rather than on long-term arduous industrial projects. This found its reflections in the DP’s slogan of ‘a millionaire for each neighbourhood’ (her mahalleye bir milyoner), which was widely contested by the opposition for encouraging solely capital accumulation, not investment.9 The dependence of the private sector on the state and state credits and projects was also another factor that hampered the development of an independent capitalist class, affecting the industrialisation process. Besides the developing private . businesses, the labour force also increased during this period. In 1952 the Türk-I¸s Workers’ Union was founded as an organisation to represent the interests of labour. However, the promised grant of the right to strike of the DP during the election campaign was not delivered and the workers were left with low wages, long working hours and no bargaining power. Boratav notes the increasing importance of another group at that time, what he calls the ‘buffer’ group.10 A growth in the number of people involved in small-scale production and services as well as an unstable lumpenproletariat was seen during this period, increasing steadily in the following years with migration to the cities. Within the economic policy of the DP, although there were policies that encouraged the industrial sector, agriculture constituted the driving force of the economy. This leads some analysts to call the period under consideration here ‘agriculture-led growth’.11 Drawing most of its support from the countryside, the DP government adopted some policy measures that would lead to the economic improvement of the agricultural sector. First, the government implemented the Land Distribution Law of 1946, not for the distribution of large private landholdings as it originally proposed, but for the distribution of state-owned lands. Under this law, communal pastures were transferred to peasants and village co-operatives. This led to the increase in the amount of cultivated land by 55 per cent and also served to increase the numbers of small landowners across Anatolia. Second, the government brought about the rapid mechanisation of agriculture. The Democrat Party used the Marshall Plan aid to finance the import of agricultural machinery and especially tractors. The government also looked for ways of producing agricultural machinery domestically. One of the first joint ventures with a foreign company involved the production of tractors.12 Mechanisation helped

72 The Turkish economy to cultivate larger areas of land and increased productivity in the agricultural sector. The number of tractors increased from 6,000 in May 1950 when the DP came to power, to 25,000 in May 1952.13 The policies of the DP were very much in line with World Bank development perspectives and policy prescriptions. Despite these policies, the weaknesses of the agricultural sector nonetheless became evident, especially after 1953. Moreover, despite mechanisation, other aspects of agricultural production like irrigation did not develop at the same speed. Agriculture continued to rely on dry farming; with the ending of expansion of cultivated land, the stagnation in agriculture began. After the initial successes in manufacturing industry and agricultural expansion by 1954, the economic indicators began to show signs of crisis. This would generally be the trend in the Turkish economy: decades would start with growth and progress; however, a crisis would evolve in mid-decade leading to severe setbacks towards the end of the decade. This could be said for the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s as well. By the mid-1950s, agricultural production declined, prices began to increase and gold and foreign exchange reserves decreased. In the agricultural sector, after three years of high output, the drought of 1954 decreased productivity by 20 per cent. The maintenance of agricultural machinery also began to accumulate problems. Turkey, seen as the main wheat exporter of Europe, began to import wheat in 1954. Decreasing exports, increasing demand for imports, increasing foreign debt and interest burden led to a balance of payments crisis. Inflation increased from 9 per cent in 1954 to 15 per cent in 1958 and the trade gap widened. The government sought foreign aid and credit as a remedy. However, the US government rejected a Turkish demand for a $300 million credit at that time, leading the government to turn to short-term high-interest credits that would increase the burden on the economy further. Despite calls by the IMF for devaluation, deflationist policies, liberalisation of foreign trade and the decrease in the subsidies, the Democrat Party regime chose to implement the National Protection Law (Milli Koruma Kanunu), to control prices and markets, implement import substitution policies and pursue inflationist policies, in a populist fashion.14 The Democrat Party would not accept low incomes for the agricultural sector which constituted two-thirds of its electoral power. This was one of the reasons why it started to implement further subsidies and protective measures for the agricultural sector, which would later cover most sectors of the economy.15 These policies deepened the crisis further. Queues increased in front of the shops, workers’ unions were closed and rumours of corruption followed. Not being able to implement any reforms, in 1958 the government could not pay its foreign debt and carry out foreign trade. In the same year it was obliged to ask for assistance from the IMF and to accept, in return for new credits, some measures of restriction.16 A major devaluation and a stabilisation programme was implemented, which included import liberalisation, changes in export regime, the removal of price controls, and increases in the prices charged by state economic enterprises. With devaluation, the value of the Turkish lira declined from 36 cents to 11 cents.17 While inflation was reduced and the balance of payments picture improved as a result of these measures, the severe recession continued into the following decade. Economic

The Turkish economy 73 problems, coupled with the political crisis by the end of the decade, led to a military coup in 1960.

The Turkish economy in the 1960–1980 period After the crisis of the late 1950s, economy in the post-1960 period had been regulated by five-year development plans. This was confirmed in the newly adopted 1961 constitution, Article 129: ‘economic, social and cultural development is to be carried out within plans; development is to be realised according to this plan.’ The first five-year development plan was initiated in 1962. This plan named the Turkish economy as a mixed economy where state and private sector worked side by side and introduced Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) as the main industrialisation strategy. Both the planned economy and the ISI were in line with trends in the world market at the time. Within the ISI the main industrial goods that had previously been imported would be produced by the domestic market, under the state’s supervision. The state supervised the process, with precautions against external competition, production of basic goods and services, control mechanisms for the distribution of resources, and laws and regulations regarding the working conditions.18 There was, in fact, a division of labour between the state sector and the private sector during this period. The state industries were directed to invest in large-scale intermediate goods industries, while the private companies concentrated on consumer goods that operated under high protection and were more profitable with a large market and relatively easy technology. From food processing and textiles in the 1950s, the emphasis in the private sector shifted towards radios, refrigerators, television sets, cars and other consumer durables.19 Within the ‘early’ stages of ISI, as can be seen in the experiences of other developing countries, there were no problems in production and demand in the market. In 1960, the State Planning Organisation was formed to prepare and initiate the five-year development plans. In the first five-year plan, the main economic target was set as 7 per cent growth rate for the economy. Other macroeconomic figures were also set according to this target. For example an 18.3 per cent investment rate was envisaged to achieve the 7 per cent growth. The plan targeted sectoral growth rates as well. The first five-year plan was implemented during 1963–1967. The second five-year development plan (1968–1973) also targeted a 7 per cent growth rate. However, it differed from the first one in that the principle of a balanced growth of agriculture and industrial sectors was left behind. In the second fiveyear development plan industry was marked as the driving sector of the Turkish economy. Industrialisation was equalled to economic development. The plan also emphasised urbanisation, which was seen as a crucial factor that would support industrialisation. It should also be noted here that with the 1961 constitution, workers were also given the right to form syndicates and strike. During the 1960s, the private sector continued to enlarge and consolidate a foothold in the system. Some analysts have argued that the state and private capital collaborated during the 1960s.20 However, some others see this relationship as the dependence of private capital on the state and the former’s vulnerability to policy

74 The Turkish economy changes.21 Despite the importance given to the private sector during the 1960s, the state acted relatively freely in intervening in the markets and issuing new investment plans whenever it thought it appropriate, regardless of their effects on this sector. In the 1960s, this arbitrary state intervention became a common theme in the economy, consequently leading to a demand from the private sector for a more ‘planned economy’. They demanded that the areas of operation of the state and the private sectors should be clarified for secure investment. In the course of the 1960s, certain business enterprises that were in close co-operation with the politicians had ‘grown very big’ to the detriment of the small businesses that were regarded by the politicians as ‘inefficient and inappropriate for the objective of modernisation’.22 Thus, while the small and medium businesses were rather neglected during this period, economically important, big businesses began to 23 In 1971, institutionalise along the lines of big and diversified holding companies. . the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association (TÜSIAD) was founded by a small group of businessmen to represent the interests of this group.24 At the beginning of the 1970s, workers’ remittances began to constitute an important source of revenue for the state. Remittances that were almost nonexistent in 1963 reached $273 million in 1970 and jumped to $740 million in 1972, almost equal to the value of the country’s exports.25 After years of deficits in the balance of payments, there was a surplus of $47 million in 1972 and $534 million in 1973 thanks to these remittances.26 The governments of the time embarked on an investment drive, increasing the share public sector investment in GNP drastically.27 Between 1950 and 1973, gross domestic product per capita increased by more than 3 per cent annually while the overall average income increased by more than 100 per cent.28 The country achieved important steps in industrialisation, urbanisation and economic growth in general. The agriculture-based economy shifted more towards industry, making it the most dynamic sector of the economy and a major contributor to economic growth. Thus, Turkey was going through what some have termed an ‘industrial revolution’ during this period.29 However, despite good economic performance, income was far from being equally distributed; on the contrary, high levels of income inequalities became an underlying theme of the economy. These inequalities could be seen both between the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors as well as within each sector itself. The unequal distribution of wealth led to widespread poverty in society. In 1973, 38 per cent of all households in Turkey were living in extreme poverty, 56 per cent of which were farmers, 17.6 per cent were unskilled labour, 13 per cent were artisans and 5 per cent were government employees.30 Economic growth was proposed as the main solution to poverty alleviation at the time despite calls from some groups for the prioritising of development over growth strategies.31 Rural to urban migration became important in conditions of such great inequality; by the mid-1970s the number of people migrating to cities each year was around 650,000.32 This was expected to some extent as industrialisation required a larger workforce in the cities: however, migration was triggered by the low income levels of the agricultural sector coupled with the regional disparities, especially a high level of inequality

The Turkish economy 75 in the east and south-east regions. Despite these shortcomings, Turkey managed to make a transition from the low human development category to medium human development during the 1970s, with increased levels of life expectancy and literacy, an increasing number of schools and higher GNP per capita.33 As described above, industrialisation constituted an important strategy during the 1960s and 1970s. However, the energy crisis affected the Turkish economy negatively, as it did in other oil-importing countries elsewhere. Despite the dramatic increases in the price of oil, the government failed to implement policies for saving oil; ironically the use of oil jumped from 10.8 million tons to 17.7 million tons during the crisis period.34 Besides, there were neither cuts in government spending nor adjustments in foreign currency rates. With increases in the prices of imported goods and the inability to export, deficits reached critical levels. The European markets also shrank as a result of the oil crisis, decreasing the demand for the Turkish workforce and immigration and therefore in the medium term this affected the level of remittances accruing to the budget. Inflation rates began to rise steadily. By the mid-1970s, the ISI had also reached its second stage and required more capital and a higher technology. As a result of rising industrial production, the importation of goods and spare parts for domestic production needed to be increased, leading to a further foreign exchange crisis and a production crisis. In order to meet the demand for foreign currency for imports, the government chose to borrow internationally with favourable, low interest rates, which led to more than a tripling of foreign debt in four years.35 In 1975 the World Bank listed Turkey among the countries that were in moratorium regarding their payments. Besides, in the first half of the 1970s a series of unstable coalition governments, the Cyprus intervention and the resultant arms embargo by the United States affected the economy negatively. In 1976 the IMF advised the Turkish government to freeze workers’ wages and implement a serious devaluation. At the time, inflation rose over 50 per cent and foreign payments deficit reached 7 per cent of the GNP. The coalition government began to debate stabilisation packages as a remedy; however, it did not agree on the policies to be implemented. In 1978, the IMF was called in but the two attempts at a standby agreement failed. It was not until June 1979 that a stabilisation programme was put into effect along with devaluation, 1 USD = 47 TL, and a rescheduling and restructuring of foreign debt. But the main reform package that would restructure the whole economy came in January 1980. As the end of the 1970s was approaching, Turkish socio-economic indicators showed a more populated country, with increasing urbanisation. Life expectancy at birth had increased greatly, as had the literacy rates. There was also a dramatic increase in the GNP levels of the country. The continuous decrease in the share of agriculture in the GNP, from 42 per cent in 1950 to 25 per cent by 1980, could be seen during this period. When the effects of industrial development under the ISI are examined regarding income distribution and income proportions, economic growth up until 1977 continued to increase the real incomes of the population in general. However, inflation rates started to rise steadily as well. Under the ISI and the second five-year

76 The Turkish economy Table 3.3 Basic economic indicators, 1950–1980 1950 Population in millions 21 Life expectancy at birth 44 Adult literacy rate (%) 33 Share of urban population (%) 25 Share of agriculture in the labour force (%) 80 GNP in millions of US$ 3.4 GNP per capita in US$ 166 Share of manufacturing in GNP (%) 10 Share of agriculture in GNP (%) 42 Share of total industry in GNP (%) 14

1960

1970

1980

28 50 38 32 75 10 359 12 38 17

36 58 52 39 66 19 539 12 36 17

45 62 69 44 58 70 1,539 13 25 18

Source: Roger Owen and S ¸ evket Pamuk, A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century, 1998.

development plan, industry developed faster than agriculture. However, populist policies towards the agricultural sector continued. Despite increases in industrial production, the agricultural support policies, subsidies and implementation of the lowest price rates for agricultural products made the balance of price relations on an agriculture/industry basis turn in favour of agriculture during the period. The rise in the inflation rate also eroded the value of salaries from the second half of the 1970s onwards. According to Kepenek, inflation was a result of the struggle of different groups for a higher share of the national income. In an inflationary environment producers increased the prices ‘as much as the market allowed’ to increase their profits. The market structure also determined the amount by which the agricultural, industrial and service sectors could increase their income. In this situation the losers in the system would be those that could not increase their income according to market conditions: wage and salary earners.36 Without the power to bargain and strike for increases in income, their position in society deteriorated rapidly during this period. By the end of 1979, the crisis began to affect not only the wage-earning groups but the industrialists as well. Workers’ syndicates were struggling to keep their bargaining power and keep the workers’ wages as high as possible in this highinflation environment. The capital owners were seen as left with no other choice but to break the coalition with the workers, as production was stagnating but the workers’ syndicates were pushing for higher wages. It was by 1979 that capitalists started calling openly for a change in the system, control of the workers’ unions and syndicates and calling on the government to create the ‘secure’ conditions for capital and investment, and this at a time when the country was in a deep political turmoil and instability, almost at the edge of a civil war. Keyder describes the period until the late 1970s as the years of ‘national development’ and the crisis of the ISI by the end of the decade as the ‘bankruptcy of this national development process’.37 Since the formation of the Turkish Republic, the political elite – the military-bureaucracy – had been trying to develop

The Turkish economy 77 the capitalist forces in society, but rather than applying purely liberal policies, the state was always the major actor in determining economic development. Despite some liberal periods, the main strategy was national development which was less divisive, less polarising and more populist. The main aim of creating a bourgeoisie would be achieved within this process as well but it would be encouraged to act in compliance with the state’s development policies. The working class would be kept satisfied with redistributive policies and a ‘classless’ society was to be formulated within this process. As an ideal, national capitalism was to take a classless, corporatist form, under the control of the state elite.38 With the collapse of the ISI policies and the economic crisis that followed, this ‘national developmentalism’ disintegrated and what was witnessed was the ‘bankruptcy of this era’, to use Keyder’s term.

From ISI to export-oriented growth strategy – the 24 January Decisions On 24 January 1980, the government announced a series of policies to remedy the economic deterioration of the country – these were known as the 24 January Decisions. Seeing the ‘bankruptcy’ of the ISI policies and the deteriorating economy, a new set of orthodox policy measures was introduced that aimed to ‘liberalise’ the economy from state dominance, leaving the economic sphere to market forces. The ‘neo-liberal market economy’ debate was introduced to Turkey with these measures. This development coincides with the shift in the international economy and introduction of market economy and neo-liberal policies globally. The ‘24 January Decisions’ aimed at controlling inflation and stabilising the economy by encouraging exports and decreasing state initiative and state enterprise in heavy industry and primary goods. Instead of the ISI policy, now the government promoted an export-oriented growth. The new economic programme included some major elements of reform in the economy such as replacing the overvalued currency with a ‘real value currency’ in order to increase exports, leading to a devaluation of the Turkish lira by 32.7 per cent (1 USD = 70 TL), market forces determining interest rates and prices rather than the state, and ending subsidies on the goods produced by the state sector, which led to an increase in the prices of those goods. Further, it proposed reforming the state economic enterprises and abolishing the policy of unlimited employment in these establishments. Limitations were put on state expenditure with a tax reform accompanying it. The reform package included incentives for foreign investment and the opening up of state-owned enterprises for private domestic and foreign investment.39 The Prime Minister of the period, Süleyman Demirel, talked about the necessity of these measures as follows: Whichever of the countries in the world [was] faced with economic problems like ours, they had to take these measures. That is why we had to implement these policies that we know are not very pleasant, but that will take us out from darkness to bright horizons.40

78 The Turkish economy ‘The 24 January Decisions’ were not solely the innovation of the government but included measures advocated by the IMF and World Bank structural adjustment policies. Owen and Pamuk note that these international bodies saw Turkey as a shining example of the validity of the orthodox stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes they promoted . . . Their support translated into better terms for rescheduling the external debt and the substantial amounts of new resource inflows. As a result foreign exchange constraint disappeared practically overnight and the public sector had less need for inflationary finance at home. These were undoubtedly vital ingredients for the success of the programme.41 During 1980–1984, Turkey received five successive structural adjustment loans from the World Bank, which was a record number. By the end of 1984, cooperation with the World Bank continued with the ‘sectoral adjustment loans’. The scale of resources that had been given to Turkey provided a freedom of action on the side of the policy-makers and secured the government’s autonomy from societal pressures. However, the programme was not immune to criticisms and protests. One of the most important problems of the economy was seen as the inwardlooking, small-scale manufacturing sector that operated on high profit margins; as a remedy, opening up to the competitive international markets was proposed. This . policy had already been supported by TÜSI AD since 1971, its formation. However, . except for the big industrialists of TÜSIAD, the commercial sectors and large companies that operated safely under state protection under the ISI policy had concerns about their future operations and how to adapt to the new system and were opposed to the opening up of market forces. An important item in these policy measures is the limitation on the wages of officials and the cuts in agricultural subsidies. The government implemented policies that limited the income, especially the salaries/wages, in order to decrease internal demand during this period rather than initiating ‘monetary policies’. The need to control wage and salary increases became an important component of the new programme and thus led to concern on the side of the wage/salary earners who were already suffering under the high inflation rate. Against pressing opposition, had the military coup of 12 September 1980 not happened, the success of the programme would have been hampered to a great extent. Under the military regime, it was possible to pursue the policies and not consider the political outcome, as the military did not have the political fear of losing votes or seats in Parliament for the next election. Economically, the military regime continued to pursue stability and austerity measures. The military showed a commitment to carry the Turkish economy from an ISI, inward-looking production pattern to export-oriented growth strategies by appointing Turgut Özal, the architect of the January 1980 economic decisions, as Deputy Prime Minister responsible for economic affairs. The immediate aims of Özal in checking the three-digit inflation rate, ending the shortages in basic consumer goods and improving the foreign trade deficit were relatively successful

The Turkish economy 79 within the first year of military rule when the annual inflation rate dropped from 140 to 35 per cent.42 In the meanwhile, the liberalisation of interest rates triggered the proliferation of banks and bankers that attracted investment by offering high interest rates. However, their inevitable collapse by 1982 led not only to individual tragedies but to a financial crisis. The collapse of small financial firms (famous examples include Kastelli and Meban) was followed by some banks (Odibank, . Istanbul Bankası, Hisarbank, Bag˘ bank and I¸sçi Kredi Bankası), which were confiscated in the meanwhile, costing the state 2.5 per cent of the GNP at the time.43 This also led to the resignation of Turgut Özal, only to come back a year later as the Prime Minister and head of the newly founded Motherland Party that advocated the liberal economic programme. The Motherland Party government that came to power in 1983 continued with the reforms. Both the trade regime and capital inflows and outflows were liberalised by 1984. The degree of tariff protection on imports was reduced by a considerable margin. A liberal regime was also established with regard to foreign direct investment.44 Foreign investment in the pre-1980 period was very limited due to a host of restrictions and bureaucratic constraints. In the course of the 1980s, these restrictions were lifted and a single agency was created in the form of the Foreign Investment Department in the State Planning Organisation to deal with the issue. Furthermore, the Foreign Investment Code was made consistent with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), providing foreign investors with the same incentives and allowances as their domestic counterparts.45 The issue of privatisation entered the agenda of the government in 1984. However, it made rather slow progress, as the first major case of privatisation, involving the sale of half of the public shares in the telecommunications company TELETAS ¸ via the Stock Exchange, occurred as late as February 1988. By 1990, only a few companies had been privatised.46 The Stock Exchange had been founded in Istanbul in 1986. In the beginning it was confined to state borrowing and the sale of some shares in State Economic Enterprises (SEE). It began to play a more active role in the economy after 1989, along with the financial liberalisation and the entry of foreign capital into the markets. One important area of success within the reform programme had been the growth in the export rates. As mentioned above, the 1980 reform programme proposed a policy shift towards export orientation. Thus, export incentives that included tax exemptions and refunds, cheap credits and customs exemptions were proposed to facilitate export growth. Internationally, exports with Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbours increased drastically during the decade, due to oil price increases and the Iran–Iraq War.47 Exports rose sharply from $2.3 billion in 1979 to $8 billion in 1985 and $13 billion in 1990.48 During that decade Turkey ranked first in the rate of export growth in the world.49 As can be seen from Table 3.4, exports had jumped from 2.9 per cent of GNP in 1978–1979 to 11.7 per cent of the GNP in 1984–1985. The change in the composition of exports is also important to note here. While Turkey mainly exported agricultural goods during the pre-1980 period (60 per cent of exports was agricultural goods, 35 per cent was manufactured goods and 5 per cent was mining products), during the post-1980 period the balance

80 The Turkish economy changed and exports were largely in the manufactured goods sector: the share of agricultural goods in exports were 20 per cent, industrial goods jumped to 75 per cent and mining remained the same with 5 per cent.50 Among the manufactured products were textiles, clothing, iron and steel products.51 Table 3.4 External orientation of the economy Year

Imports/GNP

Exports/GNP

Manufacturing exports/GNP

1970–71 1978–79 1984–85 1989–90

5.5 6.5 17.6 14.7

3.3 2.9 11.7 9.7

0.7 1.3 7.7 7.5

Source: Turkey, State Institute of Statistics, Statistical Indicators, 1923–1998.

However, economic liberalisation had its side effects. High unemployment became an important feature of the period and unequal distribution of income had been further strengthened. In the beginning of the 1980s there was a dramatic decline in the rights and power of the workers’ unions as well as a decline in public sector employment. From 1985 onwards, the unemployment rate rose to 7 per cent of the entire workforce, accounting for 1.2 million people; by 1987 the number of unemployed and underemployed not seeking work stood at double that figure. Real wages in proportion to national income declined from 33 per cent in 1979 to 18 per cent in 1985–1986. Government salaries and wages dropped from 9 per cent of GNP in 1980 to 6 per cent in 1985. Official figures show that the share of wages and salaries in the value of State Economic Enterprises (SEE) production declined from 47 per cent in 1979, to 19 per cent in 1986. However, as Waterbury notes, in the public sector it was the civil service (memur) that suffered the greatest absolute and relative declines in salaries: 50 per cent since 1979.52 There is agreement among Turkish economists that the anti-wage policies have not been this severe in any other country, and that the decreases in purchasing power and real incomes of workers and state officials have not been as sharp as they were in Turkey during 1979–1988.53 The agricultural sector also suffered from the new policies. In agriculture, subsidies were either terminated or decreased, price regulations were abolished and farmers and peasants were left unprotected against organised capital. Their share in income distribution had fallen from 23.8 per cent in 1980 to 14 per cent in 1988.54 Corruption became more significant during this period, not only in terms of increasing bribery and nepotism in public offices, but also among the newly founded export-import firms. Claiming false exports or what was known as ‘imaginary exports’ (hayali ihracat) in order to have the export benefits became a common practice. What was more interesting during this period of increasing corruption was the rapid erosion of the values of honesty and the normalisation of

The Turkish economy 81 illegal wealth accumulation. The government turned a blind eye to corruption, and sometimes even seemed to encourage corruption among public officials, as a way of compensating for their low salaries. Despite its negative consequences both in the agricultural sector and for wage/ salary earners, government under Özal managed to continue with liberalisation. Patronage distribution contributed greatly to its continuity. Patronage distribution had been an important aspect of Turkish political life for decades; however, its significance increased during the 1980s as the amount of money available to be distributed increased greatly. Discretionary funds (allocated revenues, for example taxes from alcoholic beverages and exit fees for Turks travelling abroad) and the money accruing from privatisation to the Mass Housing and Public Participation Fund gave the government enough sources to increase patronage distribution. In addition to these sources, additional budgets for government spending were issued and extra-budgetary funds were in use. These funds were under the control of the Prime Minister and the cabinet, with no checks from the Parliament. Overspending through additional budgets was common. In 1989, the difference between the amount authorised for spending and the actual amount that was spent equalled 2.6 per cent of the GNP.55 Waterbury notes that the revenues collected in the Mass Housing and Public Participation Fund and other funds were used for public sector investment projects ‘to control or neutralise strategic blocks or organised labour and white collar employees, to supply key private enterprises and to service geographically dispersed constituencies essential to maintaining the minimal winning coalition – something in the range of 35–40 per cent of the total votes.’56 The initial success of the economic liberalisation programme did not continue into the second half of the decade. Even during the mid-1980s, despite the favourable environment of single-party rule and contained opposition, the Motherland Party did not manage to move ahead with the privatisation of public enterprises, restructuring of social services, opening up of the labour markets – the second stage reforms.57 Furthermore, macroeconomic imbalances were seen again after 1987. Particularly from 1985 onwards, Turkey began to borrow money internationally from merchant banks with high commission on a short-term basis. Increasing overspending and the need to create additional budgets raised the level of indebtedness greatly. Besides, by 1988, Turkey faced severe stagflation – the inflation rate rose to 70.5 per cent, the growth rate of GNP decreased to 1.5 per cent. Shrinking domestic demand helped recovery, but the popularity of the government was low. The return in 1987 of the ‘old politicians’ who were banned from politics after the 1980 coup increased the pressure on the Motherland Party to pursue populist policies. The full liberalisation of financial accounts coincides with this development. The government introduced a new measure, Law No. 32, that fully liberalised all financial markets and lifted all barriers regarding money flows in and out of the country. Thus, it is argued that the reason why the financial markets were liberalised in such a rush, before securing fiscal discipline and controlling inflation, is because the government acted to secure an electoral victory in the next Parliamentary

82 The Turkish economy elections.58 By liberalising financial accounts, short-term economic growth, an increase in employment rates and a decrease in inflation could be achieved. Cleaver notes that this single move ‘represents a watershed in Turkey’s post-1980 neoliberalism in terms of choices it reflected and their impacts on politics, economy and society’.59 The foreign exchange regime had already been liberalised in 1984. Current account convertibility was introduced and citizens had been allowed to keep foreign currency accounts in domestic banks and enter into foreign exchange transactions since that date. In 1989, the Turkish lira was given full convertibility. However, the lifting of restrictions on all transactions in a high-inflation and high public debt economy in 1989 exposed the country ‘to the whims of international capital flows’.60 This liberalisation measure is seen as one of the main causes of economic crises during the 1990s in Turkey. The opening of the economy to short-term foreign capital transactions increased its dependence on speculative capital, leading to high interest rates and over-valued currency. Yeldan notes that this limits the autonomy of the domestic financial markets, hampering its development.61 Kurdas¸, looking back to the 1980–1990 period, goes further by naming the economic policies as ‘suicidal, negligent’ that would ‘absolutely lead to crisis. The problem is not balance of payments. There is a devastation of the whole economy.’62 In addition to this measure, there was a significant increase in the wages and salaries during the 1989–1991 period again for populist purposes in the pre-election period, increasing public expenditure to significant figures. Despite their shortcomings, economic liberalisation and export-oriented growth strategies brought the Turkish economy into a new stage and by the end of the decade Turkey had gone a long way towards integrating with the world economy through trade and foreign investment. One important development towards the end of the 1980s had been the strengthening of the small-scale family businesses that concentrated on the export of manufactured goods in certain Anatolian cities. They were well equipped to adapt to ‘flexible production patterns’ and were actively competing in international markets. They were hailed in the media as success stories and were labelled the ‘Anatolian Tigers’, reflecting the ‘generally shared positive sentiments about their economic potential.’63 Being dynamic, highly computerised and newly equipped, they benefited most from the integration with international markets which accompanied the economic liberalisation policies of the 1980s. This new group of businessmen . founded the Independent. Industrialists and Businessmen Association (Müstakil I ¸sadamları Derneg˘i – MÜSIAD) in 1990. . As different from the TÜSIAD that was basically composed of Istanbul businessmen owning large conglomerates and holdings and based on a European model . of organisation and Western orientation both economically and politically, MÜSIAD 64 brought together . businesses with diversity in size and geographical location. Besides, MÜSIAD adopted an Eastern-looking strategy, in an attempt to increase trade and co-operation with Middle Eastern countries and the Muslim countries of East Asia. They used Islam as an important component of their activities both on domestic and international levels, in sharp contrast with the European model of . . TÜSIAD.65 Thus, MÜSIAD emerged as an important interest group as a result

The Turkish economy 83 of economic liberalisation and export-oriented growth strategies and contributed to the development of identity issues in Turkey by bringing Islamic values and . conduct into the business community. TÜSIAD, on the other hand, strengthened by the economic liberalisation policies, increasingly became an independent force with a secular, Western, democratic outlook. During the 1990s, it tried to shape economic decision-making more actively and also declared independent opinions on crucial issues like the Kurdish issue, democratisation and relations with the EU. In addition to the ‘Anatolian Tigers’, there was also a newly enriched strata emerging by the end of the 1980s, who were the ‘new groups of professionals now able to find highly lucrative employment opportunities especially in the service sector’.66

The Turkish economy – the 1990s and beyond The Turkish economy went through a remarkable shift from import substitution industrialisation and an inward-looking economy to an export-oriented economy and economic liberalisation during the 1980s. The reforms were successful to a great extent, especially until 1987. However, privatisation and bank restructuring did not follow the reform effort into the 1990s. In most emerging markets, a decreasing number of banks and the concentration of assets in fewer banks due to competition and consolidation is an important feature. In Turkey, the picture worked the opposite way. During 1990s, the number of banks increased (from 66 in 1990 to 81 in 1999) and the concentration of assets in the largest banks declined.67 Besides, the role of the state in the economy that was thought to decline in time by leaving its place to market forces remained strongly intact, which was due, in particular, to continuing public sector investment. Despite the decreasing role of the state in financial markets and price regulations, its role in the economy was reorganised and restructured and thus continued strongly in the 1990s. During the 1980–1990 period, inflation rates were at an average of 50–60 per cent. However, interest rates were kept higher than inflation rates in order to stimulate short-term foreign capital flows and limit outward money transfers. This continued into the 1990s, when the interest rate on government debt exceeded the inflation rate. This led to the growth of public debt, carrying the economy into a vicious circle of borrowing for the payment of interest on earlier debt. Most banks and financial institutions made profits by lending money to the state, by buying government securities, on high interest rates on a short-term basis. However, despite its profitability, this also created currency risks for the banks as they bought government securities by borrowing in foreign currencies. As Akyüz and Boratav note, while the interest payments on domestic debt absorbed less than 20 per cent of tax revenues at the end of the 1980s, this figure rose to 75 per cent at the end of the 1990s.68 Thus, by the second half of that decade, interest payments became ‘by far the most important component of fiscal deficits’.69 On the international scene, the economy was affected negatively by the Gulf War, losing markets and being subject to the problems caused by the instability

84 The Turkish economy of its southern neighbours. Turkey had already began to lose European foreign direct investment, as central and European markets opened up with liberalisations. The cost of the Gulf War to Turkey, at least $30 billion, further strained foreign trade.70 Thus, in 1994, the economy collapsed with massive devaluation of the Turkish lira, a three-digit inflation rate and interest rates reaching 150 per cent. Public sector deficits led to a spiralling of inflation and further public debt. With calls from the IMF and the World Bank, the coalition government under Tansu Çiller announced an austerity programme that aimed to decrease wages, curb government expenditures and implement privatisation measures. The impact of the 1994 economic crisis was that the incomes of wage/salary earners were almost halved, and industrial production declined significantly; unemployment became an important problem as well as the negative growth rate attained that year for the first time since the crisis of 1978–1980.71 Banks that were indebted in foreign currency used to buy government securities were also badly affected by the crisis. However, in 1994, a deposit insurance scheme was put into effect to maintain confidence in the banking sector. This scheme exceeded its aim by leading to overconfidence in the banks that entered into the market by offering interest rates higher than what could be sustained. This continued for the following few years, until an inevitable collapse of the banking sector occurred at the beginning of the following decade. With the austerity programme, the economy recovered in the following months. Foreign currency was relatively stabilised, growth rates increased and financial markets were secured. However, the cause of the 1994 economic crisis was not eliminated. Despite decreased deficits in the public sector right after the programme, high inflation, higher interest rates and huge public deficits came back more strongly at the end of the decade. The Customs Union Agreement signed with the European Union which came into effect in 1995 did not bring the expected positive results. The hopes for the arrival of huge foreign direct investment as a result of the agreement failed to materialise. Moreover, imports increased drastically. As Toksöz notes, Turkey remained the only candidate country that entered the Customs Union by lowering the tariffs without the benefits of full membership and the capital transfer to cope with the structural changes. 72 One positive result of the agreement has been the investment drive of the domestic private businesses in order to cope with competition from the EU market, especially in the automotive sector.73 Despite the disappointment over the Customs Union, Turkey continued to conduct approximately 40 per cent of its trade with the EU.74 Germany remained Turkey’s largest trading partner with a 22.3 per cent share of total exports and a 17.9 per cent share of total imports in 1996.75 By the end of 1997, the inflation rate again reached three digits. The government initiated a disinflation programme known as the Staff Monitored Programme, in 1998 in co-operation with the IMF. The increase in the inflation rate stabilised for a while, however, the political uncertainty due to elections and the earthquake that shook the country in 1999 decreased the success of the programme. By December 1999 the coalition government under the premiership of Bülent Ecevit decided to implement another disinflation programme, under the supervision

The Turkish economy 85 of the IMF. The rolling-over of the public debt became a serious issue which necessitated a firmer reform approach in economy. The aim of the new programme was to bring inflation rates down to 20–25 per cent by the end of 2000, and to single digits by 2002 (7 per cent by the end of the period). Kazgan notes that this disinflation programme was also aimed at curbing the high interest rates and therefore the public debt. Privatisation was given priority and through structural adjustment measures the government aimed to reach the target.76 This ambitious plan rested on an ‘exchange rate based disinflation and monetary control by setting up upper limits to net domestic asset position of the Central Bank’.77 The exchange rate would be changed according to pre-set limits, in other words there was a fixed foreign exchange regime that would act as the anchor in the economy. However, as the programme was initiated, rapid decreases could not be achieved in the inflation rate. It remained higher than the 1999 rates in the first and second quarters of the year (66.7 per cent and 59.2 per cent respectively), the same rate was reached with the 1999 rates in the third quarter (48.7 per cent) and in the last quarter it managed to fall beyond 1999 rates (37.7 per cent).78 The high inflation rate meant an over-valuation of the Turkish lira, leading to a growth of the public deficit, and decreasing expectations of recovery. In addition to that the decrease in the interest rate, far below the expected rates, led to drastic capital outflows. In this crisis environment, in November 2000, more than $6 billion in short-term capital fled the country79 leading to a severe liquidity crisis. In the meanwhile, as expected, a banking crisis erupted when one of the private banks was refused foreign credits, leading to a liquidity crisis. Other banks soon followed, when it was understood that most of them were hugely indebted and state banks were under the burden of subsidies which the state paid from their reserves and did not include in state expenditure figures. Besides, they were struggling to receive the return of the credits they provided to some businesses that were in close co-operation with the politicians. The total deficits of the state banks reached around 15 billion dollars.80 In addition to that, in a couple of months the situation of the private banks was revealed: they were no different, with empty reserves, almost robbed by their owners.81 State transferred these eight banks82 to the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu), basically putting them under the control of the treasury.83 When a political rift between President Ahmet Necdet Sezer and Prime Minister Ecevit in a meeting of the National Security Council on 19 February 2001 was reflected on TV channels, the financial markets collapsed. The government abandoned the exchange rate-based disinflation programme and introduced a free-floating exchange rate policy. During January–October 2001, the value of the US dollar increased 135 per cent.84 Kemal Dervis¸ of the World Bank was invited to Turkey as the Minister of Economy, to find a remedy to this deep-running crisis. On May 2001, a new stabilisation programme was proposed that was not very different from the 1999 Staff Monitored Programme in its principles. The socio-economic impact of the crisis had been severe for the population. The economic growth rate for 2001 scored –9.4, compared to 6.3 of 2000. Manufacturing industry shrank by 9 per cent. According to the Ankara Merchants’ Board, the

86 The Turkish economy number of businesses closed during the first five months of 2001 reached 15.317. The unemployment rate reached 11.4 per cent by the end of 2002, leaving 2,636,000 people without jobs.85 The number of unemployed from the banking sector above reached 80,000.86 Most of the so-called Anatolian Tigers also collapsed, decreasing the productivity rate of the country to around 50 per cent. Poverty became such a wide-spread concern that the World Bank provided $500 million in social funds to be used in helping two million families that fell below the poverty line after the crisis. The crisis contributed to the downfall of the government and call for early elections which were to carry the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) to power. The stabilisation programme of May 2001 was implemented under the AKP rule. The programme aims to bring the economy out of the crisis, with a free-floating dollar and market economy principles, with minimum intervention by the state. There are still a couple of points that are raised by the critics of the programme. First, it is criticised for still not addressing the root cause of the problem behind the crises of the 1990s: the financial liberalisation without controls that increased the dependency of the country on short-term capital flows. In addition to that it did not offer specific solutions to the internal debt problem. The programme foresees that income will be generated from exports, tourism and privatisation. The privatisation drive was questioned, however, as the state enterprises that were generating profits were proposed to be sold within this programme, enterprises such as Turkish Airlines, the Turkish Electricity Company (TEAS¸ ), and the Tobacco and Alcohol Monopoly (TEKEL). Besides, the programme is also criticised for not taking the social dimensions of reform into account and not proposing any improvements for the businesses that were already closed and the unemployed. The AKP government is implementing this programme and has managed to get some positive response from the IMF. The inflation level has reached its lowest rates of the decade with 30 per cent and interest rates are on a rapid decline; however results are yet to be seen in the long run.

Conclusion As S¸ evket Pamuk commented on the 80th anniversary of the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the economic performance of the country can be characterised as a ‘half full–half empty glass’.87 On the full side, Turkey, starting from relatively humble beginnings, was able to achieve considerable economic development both during the ISI and the liberalisation periods. Considered as one the emerging markets, Turkey today represents a highly dynamic economy. On the empty side however, the country is marred by periodic crises that hamper further successes. Since 1980 Turkey has consistently embarked on a structural adjustment programme that aims to liberalise and privatise its economy. There seems to be a widespread consensus among the major actors of Turkish politics on the necessity of progressing along this path. Such a policy has also become part of Turkey’s harmonisation efforts with the EU. However, the liberalisation policy has not been without controversy as it has been opposed by different social groups. Thus

The Turkish economy 87 the process has been slowed down and sometimes hampered due to this opposition and structural impediments. Some of the opposition has emerged in response to the implementation of these policies which seemed to lead to unjust distribution of income, poverty, corruption and mismanagement. The challenge that lies in front of Turkey is to combine its economic dynamism and strength with accountable and transparent governance to complete its not so unsuccessful project of achieving economic development.

4

Turkey in world affairs

Turkish foreign policy has been analysed through the lens of a ‘medium-sized power’.1 Due to its geographical location, population size, and capabilities such as the size of its military forces and its economic strength, Turkey is considered to be a pre-eminent power in the regions which surround it. Its historical and cultural heritage as well as the conscious redefinition of its location and identity in the republican period has had significant impact on the regional landscape. The weight of these indicators has changed over time and yet they culminated in making Turkey a regional power. This status also affected Turkey’s relations with the major powers, as it drew the inevitable attention of those powers while providing an opportunity for extracting benefits, material or otherwise. Turkey’s foreign policy has been influenced by many factors. Among those, geopolitics has been the most constant theme in the discussion of Turkey’s ties to the world around it. At the crossroads where the two continents, Europe and Asia, meet through the Straits of Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, the country is placed at a location that overlooks and controls major passageways. After the discovery of oil in the Persian Gulf at the beginning of the twentieth century and earlier in the Caspian region, Turkey’s geopolitical position was further enhanced. This reality meant that Turkey, even if it wanted to, could not stay on the periphery of world politics. The Ottoman Empire, once a major power itself, increasingly became a focal point of rivalry, especially between Russia and Britain in the late eighteenth century. The Treaty of Kücük Kaynarca between Russia and the Ottoman Empire in 1774, which gave Russian merchant ships the right of free passage in the Straits is generally considered the beginning of this rivalry. The Empire was perceived as a buffer zone over which Russia wanted to expand southwards, and Britain fought to contain that expansion. That is how the so-called ‘Eastern Question’ emerged.2 As Bruce Kuniholm argues, ‘a factor further complicating the Eastern Question was the awakening of the declining Ottoman Empire’s subject nationalities’, as ‘ethnic and religious dimensions compounded what was already an economic, legal, political, and strategic problem’.3 This rivalry, which was also partially responsible for keeping the increasingly weakened Ottoman Empire intact for some time, reached its apex after the First World War when the time came to redesign the region in accordance with the new post-war realities. The pattern re-emerged,

Turkey in world affairs 89 however, more forcefully after the Second World War, between the USSR and the US, leaders of the two antagonistic blocs of the Cold War. Turkey was once again became a pawn of the Great Powers, which led the Turkish foreign policy makers to ally the country formally with the Western bloc. During the Cold War years, thus Turkey became crucial for the Western strategy of containing the Soviet Union and acted as a buffer zone between that country and the oil-rich Persian Gulf. The collapse of the Soviet Union seemed to change all that, but once again Turkey’s geography, located in the midst of trouble spots of the Middle East, the Balkans and the Caspian regions and in between the oil-rich Persian Gulf and the Caspian, became a significant factor in Turkish foreign policy. Thus geopolitics made Turkey a centre of attention for the Great Powers. This did not mean, however, that it was a mere subject of this geopolitical game. Turkey, like the Ottoman Empire, attempted to influence this game in turn. It tried to maintain its territorial integrity, independence and room for manoeuvre by different strategies at different times, while at the same time trying to reap the benefits, political and material, of its significant geopolitical position. Clearly, there were times when these strategies worked and others where they failed, but Turkish foreign policy has been deeply affected by geopolitics. A second factor that has been an important element of Turkish foreign policy related to the issues of identity. Undoubtedly, on a much larger scale than geopolitics, identity issues have been defined and redefined all through the way.4 Two interrelated aspects of identity have become influential in Turkish foreign policy. One has been about regional identity, the question of where does Turkey belong. Is it a Middle Eastern state or a Balkan and a European one? Or else is it an Asian country? Or is it all of the above? And of course then, is that possible that Turkey can be all of these at the same time? The issue of regional identity is related to the second aspect of identity, which may be called domestic identity issues, the nature of the Turkish state and society. How has a national identity been created? What does it mean to be a secular state with a Muslim population? How should the Turkish nation be defined in a multi-ethnic society? The origins of some of these issues, in fact, go back to the last century of the Ottoman Empire and they continued to puzzle both the outside and inside observers of Turkey’s foreign policy. The debates about regional identity are factored into domestic politics. On the one hand Turkey has a strong tradition of looking towards the West that started with the nineteenth-century Ottoman reformation period and strengthened with the establishment of the Republic. The founders of the new state were clear about their goals of being part of the Western system of states, even when they were fighting against them, as they came to the conclusion that this was ‘contemporary civilisation’. This goal has contained security, economic, political and cultural elements in it and it has been redefined since then to culminate in the goal of becoming a member of the European Union. Thus to this day the project of Westernisation and being part of the West continues to dominate Turkey’s foreign policy. Clearly it started as a project of the elites, as do all such projects – including the European Union project itself that emerged in Western Europe – but the fact that today about

90 Turkey in world affairs 70 per cent of Turkey’s population supports Turkey’s membership of the EU, despite the turbulence along the way, attests to the ‘indigenousation’ of that project. There have been other projects, rival or complementary, but overall these remained less popular. For instance the Islamist parties for a long time emphasised Turkey’s Islamic identity and argued that Turkey’s foreign policy should be reoriented towards the Middle East in particular and the Islamic world in general in accordance with that identity. The ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi – MHP) on the other hand has always been very interested in what was called ‘outside Turks’ and advocated a foreign policy based on ethnic ties. Admittedly the end of the Cold War complicated the issue for Turkey. Turkey’s regional identity had started to be the subject of a debate in an environment where being a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was no longer enough to be considered in the ‘Western camp’. The rejection of Turkey’s bid for membership in the European Community (EC), as the EU was then called, in December 1989 further underlined this confusion. The emergence of new regions, the Balkans and the Caspian, around Turkey opened up possibilities for new regional identities. Within this context and in the face of shifting regional boundaries Turkey began to identify itself increasingly as a Eurasian country, referring to a large geographical space ranging from the Balkans, through the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, to the Caspian.5 On the other hand, since the 1980s but more so in the 1990s the debate about Turkey’s national identity also intensified as the process of modernisation created its own discontents. The republican ideology started to be challenged by some groups, especially on religious and ethnic grounds. The tension between Western secular and Islamic identities in Turkey seemed to have a bearing especially on the foreign policy of Turkey towards the Middle East and Europe. For instance, when the Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi – RP) came to power as the senior coalition partner in 1997 it used foreign policy, particularly Turkey’s relations with the Islamic countries, as one of the main pillars of its counter-ideology. The secular groups and actors, on the other hand, started to become more critical of Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbours and began to conceive them as a source of two ‘existential problems’ Turkey was facing, namely Kurdish nationalism and political Islam. Although there was also a divergence within both the secular and the Islamist camps, their debate was largely factored into Turkey’s policy choices in the 1990s. In addition to the conflict centred on the role of religion, the Kurdish issue also created a polarisation between Turkish and Kurdish nationalists. Kurdish nationalism, especially as represented by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which began to wage a war against the Turkish state in 1984, presented a challenge to the unitary conception of the Turkish state. This issue became one of the key elements in Turkey’s relations with its Middle Eastern neighbours but also with the EU.6 Some actors in Turkey started to define the Kurdish issue more and more through its external dimensions, i.e. through the support given by some countries to the PKK. Similarly Turkey’s relations with the EU strongly intermingled with the debates in Turkey. On the one hand, the extent and the nature of the transformations required by the EU led to the re-shifting of domestic coalitions, whereas the

Turkey in world affairs 91 domestic debates and struggles had a direct bearing on Turkey’s policy towards the Union. Therefore, Turkey’s foreign policy started to heavily reflect the debates and discussions concerning the nature and transformation of Turkey’s domestic and international identity and its changing geostrategic environment. Third, history has been an important factor in Turkish foreign policy. The importance of the imperial legacy can be discerned in several aspects. The main heir of the Ottoman Empire, which ruled over a vast territory, Turkey is now a middle power. Although the country had come a long way since its establishment in 1923 and it may have even been thought to have more influence in world politics relative to its endowments, making that mental transition seems to have been difficult at times. History had other influences on Turkish foreign policy. Turkey has been considered as the main – may even be the only – heir of the Ottoman Empire by all the peoples and countries in the near vicinity which were at one time part of that Empire. Instead of seeing themselves as the constitutive parts and thus heirs of the Empire, the rise of nationalism and the consequent process of establishing separate states led to a history of resentment, if not outright animosity, against Turkey. Strengthened at times by Turkey’s own reading of the transition from an Empire to the establishment of separate modern states, this negative feeling sometimes hindered the development of close relations between Turkey and its neighbours. In addition, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the war of independence seem to weigh heavily at times in Turkish foreign policy. The traumatic experience of making that difficult transition from an empire to a national state at the height of the Great Power rivalry apparently left its scars.7 The sometimes over-zealous attitude towards issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity and a lingering suspicion of its Western allies despite its goal of becoming a member of their club, for instance, could have been fed by the memory of that past. Although there is a degree of merit in learning from history and it is true that all states to some extent act within historically relevant frameworks, this emphasis on the past can become damaging when and if it prevents Turkey from exploiting the future possibilities and to change according to the changing environment. On the positive side, however, Ottoman history with its state tradition contributed to foreign policy making. Institutional continuity and capability, which was lacking in some of the states in the Third World, contributed positively to foreign policy making. Despite the strong influence of these factors, namely geopolitics, identity and history, that represent the continuities in Turkish foreign policy, the implementation of it changed from one period to another as did the process of foreign policy making. In the early republican era throughout the one-party period a small group of men was largely responsible for foreign policy making. During his lifetime Atatürk was very influential and he left his personal stamp on the foreign policy . of Turkey at that time. After his death Ismet Inönü, who became the President, was at the helm together with the Foreign Ministry. This did not change very much during the Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti – DP) government that came to power after the transition to multi-party politics. During this time, as was the case earlier, foreign policy remained the job of the executive, working closely with the

92 Turkey in world affairs Foreign Ministry bureaucracy. The parliament largely remained out of the process even after the introduction of multi-party politics.8 Although the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – CHP), now in opposition, tried to challenge some of the foreign policy decisions of the DP government, the government did not even consult Parliament in the case of sending troops to the Korean War. The major change in terms of foreign policy making occurred in the 1960s where, increasingly, foreign policy issues and even Turkey’s foreign policy orientation began to be the subject of an intense debate. After the introduction of the 1961 constitution, which was highly liberal in its provisions on civil rights, the media, civil society organisations (especially trade unions and universities), political parties and the public in general became more interested and involved in foreign policy.9 More profound changes in this regard, however, have occurred since the 1990s. The expansion of the actors in foreign policy corresponds with the domestic transformations in Turkey. When the civilianisation process started after the 1980 military coup the then Prime Minister Turgut Özal put his stamp on foreign policy. Having a vision to reshape Turkey’s foreign policy, Özal initiated a bold and a proactive style, which was in accord with the regional and international environment that was going through profound changes. In doing so, however, he sidelined to a large extent the other important actors of the foreign policy making process, namely the bureaucracy, Parliament, and the military. Over a difference of opinion as to what Turkey’s role should be in the Gulf crisis of 1990–1991, the joint chief of staff resigned for the first time in the history of the country. Although the legacy of Özal for Turkish foreign policy is still hotly debated in Turkey, it is clear that on the whole he fitted in with the fluid and constantly shifting times of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Another important development was the increasing weight and involvement of the military in foreign policy since the mid-1990s. The military has been a major player in foreign policy issues throughout Turkey’s history, but its role became more assertive and at times more controversial during this period. Faced with new uncertainties and security challenges, and using the vacuum that was created by political instability, the military became the prime mover in significant foreign policy decisions, such as the alignment with Israel.10 The Foreign Ministry bureaucracy, on the other hand, continued its prominent position in foreign policy making, despite short periods, such as the Özal years, where it was to some extent sidelined. However, its professionalism, knowledge and traditional autonomy from political clientelism accorded the Ministry an institutional power. A new actor in foreign policy making in the 1990s has been the economy bureaucracy, in addition to the Foreign Ministry. When Turkey became integrated into the world economy after the 1980 economic liberalisation programme, the influence of the economy bureaucracy within the foreign policy making process increased due to its power based on its specialised knowledge on economic affairs. The presidency also emerged as a more important actor in foreign policy making during this period. After the death of Atatürk the presidents, mostly retired military

Turkey in world affairs 93 men, were seen as figureheads, and their role in foreign policy largely limited to performing ceremonial functions. This changed in the 1990s, not only due to increased role of the office in the 1982 constitution, but also because of the nature of the presidents themselves. Turgut Özal (1989–1993), who became the first civilian president, continued to use his position largely to steer Turkish foreign policy. He was followed after two terms by a seasoned politician Süleyman Demirel (1993–2000) who also played an active role in Turkish foreign policy and was generally credited for fostering ties through personal relationships with several states as diverse as Bosnia, Azerbaijan and Egypt. The current president, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, who was previously the chief judge at the Constitutional Court, also began to play a role in foreign policy despite the expectations to the contrary due to his inexperience in the area.11 Finally, compared to the earlier period Parliament also increased its role in foreign policy making. This is largely due to the erosion of boundaries between domestic and foreign policy issues and the general democratisation of foreign policy. The constitutional requirement for parliamentary approval to declare war, commit troops abroad and allow foreign troops to use facilities in Turkey was used by Parliament to prevent Turkey’s involvement in the Iraq War. The overturn of the government’s motion to participate and support the US–British war in Iraq on 1 March 2003 was a reflection of concerns many parliamentarians had about the fact that 90 per cent of the public was opposed to the war. In addition to the classical actors of foreign policy making a plethora of other actors began to influence foreign policy. From ethnic lobbies (like the Chechen lobby, the Balkan lobby) to economic lobbies (like Turkish Industrialists . and Businessmen Association – TÜSIAD, the ‘Russian lobby’, Iraqi–Turkish Businessmen Association) to civil society organisations, foreign policy issues are debated on a very large platform today in Turkey. This is in marked contrast with most of the Cold War years during which there was usually a consensus on the general guidelines of the state’s foreign policy, and thus, it often remained outside political debate. There were important exceptions, such as the issue of future of relations with the US and NATO in 1960s and 1970s, but most of the other issues were rarely subject to discussion. In those days the state also dominated the debate through manipulation of the media. With the changes in the field of communications and the availability of multiple channels of information this is more difficult to do today. Due to the unprecedented access that ordinary people began to have to sources of information and knowledge the debate about foreign policy widened. The media and the means by which people communicate proliferated. Up until the early 1990s there was only the state-run television. Today there are more than 250 television channels at the national and local levels.12 Multiple means of communication have made the unilateral control of information and opinion much more difficult than it was before. Although Turkey also faces the problem of monopolisation of media outlets like many Western countries, this proliferation did still contribute to diversity, as in the case of the emergence of the so-called ‘Islamic media’. For instance al-Aqsa intifada or the recent Iraq War was portrayed very differently on Channel 7, which

94 Turkey in world affairs was affiliated with Erbakan’s party, and later associated with the reformist wing and the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP). The situation is similar in the print media. Newspapers used to have one or two columnists specialising in foreign policy issues, known as ‘foreign policy columnists’. Today all columnists write and comment about foreign policy. The availability of the Internet and satellite dishes made it possible for many to follow international developments and make his/her interpretations and reach his/her conclusions. In the recent crisis with the US over the Iraqi War whatever was discussed in the US and whatever was being said about Turkish–US bargaining became news in Turkey. The newspapers mentioned how the cartoons which appeared in some US papers about ‘money grabbing’, ‘carpet merchant’ Turks passed around in Parliament before the vote on 1 March. Again the media images of conflicts in Bosnia and Chechnya had an impact in forming public opinion and the media played a direct role in the Kardak/Imia crisis with Greece. Therefore, the foreign policy making process has been transformed to some extent in the 1990s although the civil and military bureaucracy maintained the continuity in Turkish foreign policy. Similarly the actual implementation of Turkish foreign policy has gone through various stages since the establishment of the Republic. Although the main contours remained the same, it is necessary to focus on the specificities of the evolution of Turkish foreign policy as each stage evolved through its own internal and external dynamics.

1923–1939: state formation and foreign policy The process of state and nation building influenced the foreign policy of the early republican period. The regime was trying to consolidate itself domestically and this was particularly dramatic in Turkey because of the extent of the transformation. The country had also been devastated by years of war. The human losses, combined with the destruction of land and property, had made the goal of economic development a daunting task. Therefore, the need for peace was quite clear; as stated by Atatürk there was a need for ‘peace at home and peace abroad’. In his State of the Nation Speech on 1 November 1928 Atatürk set forth the relationship between the two when he said: ‘It is quite natural and therefore simple to explain the fact that a country which is in the midst of fundamental reforms and development should sincerely desire peace and tranquillity both at home and in the world.’ Yet Turkey could not really isolate itself from international politics and simply focus on internal consolidation, rebuilding and reform. The new Republic continued to attract the attention of the Great Powers due to its strategic location. With the end of the First World War the old international system was torn down and a new world was born. The Ottoman Empire, like the other great empires of the previous international system, was toppled by the war. Among the successor states of the empire, only ‘Turkey succeeded in rebuffing the newly emerging international system, and in fashioning its own destiny’. 13 Yet it was still a difficult struggle, now a diplomatic one, to keep what was gained in the war of independence

Turkey in world affairs 95 and gain the recognition of the Great Powers.14 This could be done through compromise, resistance and diplomatic skill, in which Turkey’s geostrategic advantages were exploited. The Lausanne Conference was crucial in that respect. The Allied powers as victors had agreed to make changes in the previous peace settlement of Sèvres, and yet they insisted on once again imposing mostly their own terms. From their perspective Turkey could have defeated Greece, but Turkey was still the loser in the Great War, whereas Turkey perceived itself to be on an equal footing in the negotiations and determined to guard jealously its hard-won sovereignty. Thus, the negotiations in Lausanne were difficult and at times stalled. Eventually the Lausanne Treaty formally acknowledged Turkey’s sovereignty. After the war Turkey found herself as a neighbour of most of the Great Powers: in the east and north there was the Soviet Union; in the south Britain was the mandate power in Iraq, and France was the mandate power in Syria; in the west Italy controlled the Dodecanese islands in the Aegean Sea. Furthermore, with approaching war, in the 1930s in particular Ankara once again found itself in the midst of rivalry among the major powers. Therefore, while trying to build and consolidate the regime internally, Turkey could not isolate itself from the impact of Great Power politics. On the contrary, throughout this period Turkish foreign policy also aimed at normalising Turkey’s relations with those powers. This was also fuelled by the desire of the new regime to be included in the Western system of states. One major foreign policy issue after independence was to resolve the unfinished business of the Lausanne Conference. Mainly these issues were connected to Turkey’s relations with the Great Powers and thus crucial for the normalisation of those relations. The most important among them was the conflict with Great Britain over Mosul. Turkey did not recognise British occupation of Mosul. The issue dominated the beginnings of the Lausanne Conference but the two sides could not reach a settlement. Eventually the parties moved on to discuss other issues and the Treaty of Lausanne stated that ‘the frontier between Turkey and Iraq shall be laid down in friendly arrangement to be concluded between Turkey and Great Britain within nine months’. Failing that, the issue would be referred to the League of Nations. As a result, the Mosul question continued to dominate Turkey’s relations with Great Britain and even after the Lausanne Treaty only a provisional frontier, the Brussels line, was in place in Turkey’s border with mandated Iraq. For Britain Mosul province was strategically important mainly for its oil reserves.15 It seems that based on the geological studies by European geologists commissioned by the late Ottoman Empire, the Turkish government itself had knowledge of the existence of oil in Mosul province and thus the oil factor may have played a role in Turkish policy as well.16 However, Turkey’s arguments in the Lausanne Conference . were . anchored in other factors: demography, direction of trade and legality. Ismet Inönü, who was the head of the Turkish delegation, argued that two-thirds of the population of Mosul consisted of Kurds and Turks and thus demographically the area was part of Turkey, rather than Iraq which was overwhelmingly Arab. Second, Ankara pointed out that historically Mosul province had been connected economically to the areas to its north, rather than to its south.

96 Turkey in world affairs Finally, for Turkey the fact that the British forces were twelve miles away from the city of Mosul on 30 October 1918 when the Armistice was reached and thus occupied the city after the Armistice undermined the legality of British claims. The head of the British delegation Lord Curzon,17 on the other hand, mainly challenged the demographic figures presented by Turkey and tried to undermine the argument for Turkish–Kurdish brotherhood. In addition, contrary to the Turkish arguments, Britain claimed that the area was commercially connected to its south and its inclusion in Iraq was crucial for the security of Baghdad. After the Lausanne Conference Turkish–British negotiations were held in May 1924 in Istanbul, but no agreement was reached. As a result the issue was referred to the League of Nations. The British overturned Ankara’s proposal that a plebiscite be held to measure views in the province. As a result the League established a three-member commission led by Count Teleki to look into the issue. In September 1925 the commission presented its report to the League Assembly. The report argued that the people in Mosul province wished independence, but it recommended that the territory should be part of Iraq, which in turn should remain a British mandate for 25 years. Turkey was not a member of the League. Initially Ankara refused to recognise the decision, arguing that the League Assembly’s decisions could not be binding. In response the Assembly asked for the opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice, which decided that although in principle Turkey was right, in this specific case the Lausanne Treaty gave the Assembly the power to decide on the issue. Eventually Ankara acted pragmatically and Turkey signed the treaty with Britain in July 1926 and accepted the ceding of Mosul province to Iraq. In return the agreement provided 10 per cent of Iraqi oil revenues to Turkey for 25 years.18 The League’s decision on Mosul created a strong reaction in Turkey both at the government level and among the public.19 The League was also accused of being a tool of the Great Powers. The Sheikh Said rebellion that broke out among certain Kurdish tribes in the Kurdish areas of Turkey during the negotiations had already weakened Turkey’s thesis for Turkish– Kurdish brotherhood. There was a widespread suspicion of British support of the rebellion. Although this further aggravated the resentment towards the decision, it also forced the government to realise the difficulties of pursuing this case. One day after the decision of the League Assembly, Ankara signed a Neutrality and NonAggression Pact with the Soviet Union, which was equally uncomfortable with what it perceived as its exclusion from the European state system by the signing of the Locarno Treaty of 1925. However, despite this reaction in Turkey, eventually the resolution of the Mosul question opened the way for the normalisation of Turkey’s relations not only with Britain but also with France. There were several conflicts with France in the early years of the Republic, such as the extent of the jurisdiction of the Turkish Ministry of Education over the diplomatic mission’s schools and the nationalisation in 1929 of the Adana–Mersin railway operated by the French. The payment of the Ottoman debts, which had not been settled at the Lausanne Conference, also led to a crisis in Franco-Turkish relations.20 Eventually a timetable was accepted as a result of an agreement in 1926. However, when it became difficult for Turkey to pay its debt due to world

Turkey in world affairs 97 depression the relations between the two countries deteriorated. Eventually a more favourable payment agreement for Turkey was signed in April 1933.21 The most significant issue with France, however, was related to the sancak (district) of Iskandarun or Alexandretta (later renamed Hatay, land of the Hittites), which was not settled until 1939. Similar to Mosul, the sancak was occupied by the British forces after the Mudros Armistice. It was later transferred to France in accordance with the secret Sykes–Picot Agreement that was signed during the war. Later the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement of 1921, which gave Alexandretta a ‘special administrative regime’, determined the Turkish–Syrian border. The agreement stipulated that the Turkish inhabitants of this district would enjoy every facility for their cultural development and the Turkish language would have official recognition. This situation was reaffirmed in the Lausanne Treaty. Finally, this status was consolidated by the Franco-Turkish Agreement of May 1926. In the meantime the Turkish community there began to establish close links with Turkey. Along the lines of the one in Turkey, the People’s Party of Hatay (Hatay Halk Fırkası) was formed, and it carried out some of the reforms of Kemalist Turkey, such as adopting the Latin alphabet. During the course of the Syrian Franco-treaty discussions that would give Syria its independence, Turkey asked France to reconsider the inclusion of Alexandretta in Syria. The issue was brought to the League of Nations, which, based on a commission report, decided that Alexandretta should be a self-governing ‘distinct entity’, represented by Syria only in external matters. In the meantime both Britain and France were increasingly accommodating towards Ankara due to their desire to get Turkey on their side against the increasing threat from Germany and Italy. Elections were held in Alexandretta in July under joint Franco-Turkish military control and led to a narrow Turkish majority in the Parliament. In its first session the Parliament proclaimed the independent Republic of Hatay. A year later, on 29 June 1939 it announced union with Turkey. Direct negotiations between Turkey and France ended on 13 July 1939 and France agreed the cessation of Alexandretta to Turkey.22 The differences in the resolution of these two major border disputes involving the two Great Powers can largely be explained to the significance of oil in the case of Mosul. In addition, changes in the international system by the late 1930s that increased Turkey’s geostrategic importance in the eyes of the Great Powers also strengthened Turkey’s hand in the case of the dispute over Alexandretta. Turkey seemed to successfully exploit its geopolitical advantages in the resolution of the issue for its own benefit. The extent to which Turkey was willing to push both the Mosul and Alexandretta issues was in itself significant. The leaders of the new Republic were not revisionists and wanted mainly to keep what they were able to get in terms of territory.23 However, it seems that the realisation of the National Pact, which was adopted by the last Ottoman Parliament in 1920 and was claimed to list the territorial objectives of the nationalist movement, was taken as an important parameter in determining the final boundaries of the state. Another factor which may have contributed to Turkey’s insistence on these issues was the possibility of exploiting inter-Allied conflicts the division of the spoils of the war. This was particularly the

98 Turkey in world affairs case in the Mosul dispute. In fact, the first conflict over Mosul in this respect emerged when Britain occupied and then claimed Mosul as part of Iraq, contrary to the Sykes–Picot Agreement of 1914, which considered the province in France’s ‘sphere of influence’. Eventually the Franco-British dispute was resolved by transferring the Deutsche Bank’s 25 per cent share in the Turkish Petroleum Company24 (TPC) to French interests.25 But this time the US government protested at what it perceived as a breach of its ‘Open Door’ policy, which was calling for equal rights for the Allied powers in the former enemy territory. That dispute was also eventually resolved when Britain agreed to give approximately a quarter of the oil company’s share to the US companies. Therefore, it is safe to argue that Ankara wanted to exploit inter-Allied struggles to further its objectives, and yet this policy failed when those struggles were resolved after the British agreed to give shares in Iraqi oil.26 By contrast, in Alexandretta, where the stakes were not high for the Great Powers, the common perception of threat by Britain and France from Germany and Italy increased Turkey’s chances. In the case of Greece, relations also deteriorated during the 1920s as the two countries were handling the unfinished business of the Lausanne Conference. They had agreed on a transfer of population at the Conference, and yet the implementation of this created several problems. The domestic troubles the two countries were facing at that time further aggravated the problems and eventually led to mistreatment of their respective minorities, very much contrary to the promises both sides had made at the Lausanne Conference. However, pragmatic leadership on both sides, eager to focus on the domestic challenges, acted resolutely to solve the problems. These efforts eventually culminated in the signing of several agreements that opened the way for a rapprochement between Turkey and Greece in the 1930s.27 Another significant border dispute occurred with Iran. The border between the two countries had remained almost unchanged since the 1639 agreement between the Ottoman and Safavid Empires. The last adjustment was made in 1913. In the early 1920s, when the newly established regimes were trying to consolidate their borders, several problems arose mainly due to the tribal movement across the border and attempts by the central governments to settle them by force. However, ‘as both countries had more pressing problems to deal with at the time, their diplomatic efforts bore fruit and the tension was relaxed’ and in April 1926 a Treaty of Friendship and Security was signed.28 Soon another crisis erupted when a Kurdish rebellion, also supported by the Armenian Dashnak Party, broke out in the Ararat (Ag˘rı) region. Turkey’s efforts to suppress the rebellion, especially the cross-border activities of the Turkish army, led to a crisis between Turkey and Iran. Turkey’s criticism of the Iranian government’s lack of co-operation fed into the atmosphere of mistrust. Eventually Turkey was able to suppress the rebellion but in the process invaded the Lesser Ararat region in Iran. Turkey’s insistence on keeping this territory for security reasons was at first resisted by Tehran, but eventually in January 1932 an agreement was signed whereby Iran accepted the cessation of the Lesser Ararat and some other regions to Turkey in exchange for some territory south of the border. The two countries signed another agreement in

Turkey in world affairs 99 1937, which opened the way for the development of close relations between Ankara and Tehran.29 During this period Turkey’s best relationship was with the Soviet Union. Fighting against the Western powers after the First World War, the national independence movement had sought good relations with Moscow. Dealing with its own revolutionary turmoil, and as suspicious as Turkey of the motives of the major powers in Europe, the Soviet Union responded. In the early years of the Republic relations continued to flourish. After the Turkish disappointment over Mosul, a Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality was concluded with the Soviet government on 17 December 1925, which was later to be renewed for longer term. However, by the 1930s good relations with Moscow were no longer the main element of Turkish foreign policy as Ankara’s relations with the Western powers improved considerably.30 Increasingly Turkey strengthened its ties with the West especially with Great Britain as it felt threatened by revisionist Italy, even before the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, because of the proximity of the Dodecanese islands to Anatolia. Later Hitler’s rise to power gave Turkey the impetus to seek defensive alliances with its Western neighbours. One such alliance was the Balkan Entente Pact of 9 February 1934, concluded with Greece, Rumania and Yugoslavia. This was a treaty of mutual defence primarily aimed at safeguarding the members’ territorial integrity against Bulgarian revisionism. Thus the maintenance of ‘territorial order’ in the Balkans was the major aim and it was another sign of the new Turkish states desire to maintain the territorial status quo. Similarly Turkey signed the Sadabad Pact of 1937 with its eastern neighbours, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan. Again the major aim was to guarantee the borders. Both the Balkan Entente and the Sadabad Pact ended with the outbreak of the Second World War. In the spring of 1936 the Turkish government asked for a revision of the regime governing the Straits as laid down by the Lausanne Treaty. The Turkish request was favourably received by states that were anxious to gain an ally against German and Italian expansion. The former signatories of the Lausanne Treaty together with Yugoslavia and Australia met at Montreux, Switzerland. On 20 July 1936, a Convention on the Regime of the Turkish Straits was signed. 31 The Convention abolished the international regime in order to establish Turkish military control. Turkey was authorised to close the Straits to warships of all countries when it was at war or threatened by aggression. Merchant ships were to be allowed free passage during peacetime, and except for countries at war with Turkey, during wartime. Eventually at the insistence of the Soviet Union, the Black Sea powers, principally the Soviet Union, were authorised to send their fleets through the Straits into the Mediterranean in peacetime.32 Therefore, in the 1920s and 1930s Turkish foreign policy focused on state formation issues, such as solving the border disputes permanently, securing territorial control and obtaining international recognition to its sovereignty and independence. The latter was further consolidated when Turkey, after solving its dispute with Great Britain, was finally able to become a member of the League of Nations in 1932.

100 Turkey in world affairs By the 1930s Ankara had resolved most of the unfinished business of Lausanne and was moving towards building a relationship with the Great Powers and its neighbours. During this period Turkey’s policy was pragmatic, but not necessarily inactive as sometimes argued. Grasping the possible consequences and only after being unable to exploit the differences among the Great Powers, Turkey gave up its resistance on the Mosul issue. Turkey was able to obtain a revision of the Straits Convention, gained a satisfactory solution of the Alexandretta dispute, and signed non-aggression and friendship pacts with its neighbours. All this happened not only due to the favourable international conditions, but also because of the strategies used by Ankara. Those strategies included a wide range of means including exploiting the Great Power rivalry, using diplomacy and threatening to use force. Once the goals that were set to ensure the survival of the new country were achieved, Turkey more or less became a status quo power.33 Ankara was also pragmatic and active in normalising its relations with countries it with which had fought a war of survival a few years previously. In addition to developing close relations with Great Britain and France, the normalisation with Greece, which was cultivated by Atatürk and Venizelos, became a prime example of that pragmatism. Ankara’s desire to develop its ties with the Western states was also a corollary of its Westernisation project. On the eve of the Second World War Turkey increasingly found itself in the midst of a struggle between the Great Powers vying for influence. To make matters worse for the regime Mustafa Kemal Atatürk died on 10 November 1938, on the eve of the war.

The Second World War: balancing on a tightrope In the late 1930s Turkey’s concern over Italy’s expansionism, particularly in the Mediterranean, became a major concern and pushed Ankara towards Britain and France. Italian occupation of Albania in April 1939 was significant in that respect. However, the discussions about a treaty of mutual assistance between Turkey and the two major powers proceeded very slowly and the agreement could only be reached after almost a year of bargaining.34 The difficulties arose from cautiousness on the part of Ankara. Militarily a weak country, with a history of, and therefore a sensitivity to, being a pawn of Great. Power . politics, Ankara wanted to cover every blind spot in such an agreement. Ismet Inönü and his advisors were also particularly concerned about being drawn into a war with the Soviet Union.35 Furthermore, Turkey was still in the process of regime consolidation and faced with uncertainties after the death of Atatürk. During the course of the bargaining Ankara continued its efforts to include the Soviet Union in this alliance with no avail. Thus the unexpected announcement of the German–Soviet Non-Aggression Pact in August 1939 in which the two powers carved out mutual areas of interest in Eastern Europe created shockwaves in Ankara and effectively killed its efforts to bring the Soviet Union into an alliance with Britain and France. In a last-ditch effort the Turkish Foreign Minister Saraçog˘ lu went to Moscow on 26 September 1939, before final decisions were

Turkey in world affairs 101 made concerning the treaty of alliance with Britain and France.36 The lack of understanding between the two countries became clear during this visit. In the meantime, Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939, which started the Second World War. This increased the importance of Turkey for Britain and France and led Turkey to bargain harder.37 Eventually on 19 October 1939 the Anglo-FrancoTurkish Treaty of mutual support was signed: With it, the Turks got most of what they wanted. A loan of 16 million in gold and a credit of 25 million pounds for the purchase of military equipment were granted. In a separate protocol attached to the treaty, Turkey was excused from any obligation which could involve her in a war with the Soviet Union.38 After the German–Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, the Soviet Union, more than Germany, became a major worry for Ankara and this affected its policies during the course of the war. In the late spring of 1940, Hitler’s forces invaded France, expelled the British Expeditionary Army from the Continent, and entered Paris. Soon Italy declared war on Britain and France on 10 June 1940, which made the alliance with Turkey . operative. However, Inönü refused to enter the war, invoking Protocol No. 2 of the alliance treaty and arguing that its entrance into war might lead to a war with the Soviet Union. As Deringil argues, the main problem was differences between Britain and Turkey as to how they viewed their alliance: ‘To the Turks it was an insurance policy to be put into practice only in case of a dire need, while for British it was a means of effective action in the Balkans and the Middle East.’39 Turkey’s position began to be complicated by other factors. Alarmed by Turkey’s alliance with Britain and France, Germany began to put pressure on Turkey. In the meantime Germany occupied Greece and Bulgaria sided with Berlin. Disappointed by the quick French surrender and encircled by the Nazi forces, on 18 June 1941 Turkey signed a Non-Aggression Treaty with Germany, which later turned and attacked the Soviet Union. Thus Turkey began to pursue a policy of neutrality in the war despite its former alliance with Britain and France. The 1941 British–Soviet invasion of Iran that. effectively cut the country down the middle further strengthened the resolve of Inönü and his colleagues to stay out of the war and not to be a pawn of Great Power rivalry. Furthermore, even after the Allies gained the ascendancy in the war, Germany continued to be a threat to Turkey, controlling the islands within miles of the Turkish coast. The British continued to put pressure on Turkey throughout the War. Foreign Minister Winston Churchill, in particular, believed. in the significance of Turkish entry into the war. In January 1943 Churchill and Inönü reached an agreement on preparations for the arrival of Allied warplanes. Openly threatened by Germany that the arrival of even a single plane would be a reason for war, Ankara began to play stalling tactics.40 Thus it was a big frustration for London when it failed to bring Turkey in. Ankara’s apprehension about the Soviet .Union, now one of the Allied powers, continued to dominate Turkey’s outlook. Inönü and his advisors even feared collusion between Britain and the Soviet Union to divide up Turkey.

102 Turkey in world affairs . Inönü and his Foreign Minister Numan Menemenciog˘lu started to openly warn the British and the Americans in their meetings with them about possible Soviet postwar designs but failed to persuade them. Eventually Turkey officially declared war in February 1945, when the war was almost over, in order to qualify as a founding member of the United Nations, the new global international organisation that was in the making. As a result of wartime developments British–Turkish relations deteriorated considerably after the war. London accused Ankara of not following through on its promise and talked about repercussions. For Ankara, however, Turkey had emerged from the war having realised its main . aim of staying out of it. Memories of the First World War still being very fresh, Inönü and his colleagues did not want Turkey to be an arena for the Great Powers to settle their scores. They did not want Turkey to share the fate of some other small powers. Britain, on the other hand, saw Turkey as a source of manpower and hoped that it could stall German advances especially in the Balkans and the Middle East.41 As a result of its policies a sense of mistrust derailed Turkey’s relations with the Allied powers, especially Great Britain. Turkey was not at the table when the peace treaties were signed.42 However, Turkey was also spared from the destruction of the. war. As to relations with the Western powers, especially Britain, it seems that Inönü and his colleagues believed that due to its geographic position the Western powers could not afford to alienate Turkey for a lengthy period.43 The events in the immediate post-war period would prove them right.

1945–1960: becoming a member of the Western bloc The Yalta Conference of February 1945 had signalled the beginning of a new relationship between the US and Britain on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other. The rift between the allies of the Second World War became much more pronounced in 1946 and Turkey found itself once again in the midst of this power struggle. Stalin had first brought up the Soviet proposal of revision of the Montreux Convention, which he thought was ‘outmoded’, at the Yalta Conference. Britain and the US agreed in principle.44 Apparently encouraged by what seemed like the complicity of London and Washington, the Soviet government signalled its intent first by announcing that it would not renew the Turkish–Soviet Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression of 1925, on the grounds that it did not reflect the new reality and thus needed serious revision. Turkey responded that it was ready to discuss the issue. Soon Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov presented his country’s demands on Turkey to the Turkish Ambassador to Moscow, Selim Sarper. The Soviet demands of June 1945 were twofold. First, Turkey had to agree to border changes on its eastern frontier with the Soviet Union, which would entail the cessation of the eastern provinces of Kars and Ardahan, both of which, according to Molotov, ‘had been ceded to Turkey at a time of weakness’.45 Second, the Soviet Union wanted to have bases in the Straits for joint control of the waterway. These demands were accompanied by troop movements in Bulgaria and the Caucasus, together

Turkey in world affairs 103 with an intense anti-Turkish campaign in the Soviet press.46 At the Potsdam Conference in the summer of 1945 the question of the Turkish Straits was raised again and the three powers agreed that ‘how to revise the Montreux Convention was to be treated first between the three Potsdam powers and Turkey’.47 After Potsdam, however, the conflicts between Soviet and American interests became more pronounced and the US began to approach the Soviets demands on Turkey from a very different perspective. On 6 March, US President Truman ordered the battleship Missouri to return the body of the late Turkish Ambassador Mehmet Ertegün, who had died in the US in November, to Turkey. It was clear that the arrival of the battleship in Istanbul in April 1947 was meant to be a demonstration of US power in opposing Soviet demands. In August 1946 Moscow sent notes to Turkey, Britain and the US to formally present its proposals for the revision of the regime of the Straits. Accordingly the Soviets argued that the Black Sea powers should only have the right of passage for their warships and proposed joint defence of the Straits with Turkey. By that time the US administration was seeking to prevent Soviet encroachment towards the Middle East. Thus Turkey and Greece, where a left-wing guerrilla movement was fighting against the rightwing dictatorship, became crucially important for that strategy. The response was what came to be known as the Truman Doctrine. On 12 March 1947 US President Harry Truman said that the US must help ‘free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures’ and pledged military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey. The deterioration of Turkey’s relations with the Soviet Union marked an important turning point in the history of the Turkish Republic. Probably for that reason the Soviet demands immediately after the Second World War, particularly their extent and significance, were to become a subject of debate for years to come in Turkey. The availability of the Soviet archives for researchers after the disintegration of the Soviet Union has shed a new light on this issue, and especially as to Soviet motivations. First, the Soviets seemed to have acted because of geostrategic calculations. Moscow thought that the Straits were the key to Soviet security and Soviet control of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean region. Soviet strategists during this period began to develop strategic theories that defined the Soviet Union not only as a Black Sea power but a Mediterranean one as well.48 Thus in a similar fashion to that of Tsarist Russia, the Soviets stressed the extreme strategic importance of the Straits and sought to secure equal administration of the Straits regime. Second, it is also clear that there was a growing perception of ‘ethno-territorial threat to the USSR’,49 referring to the possible influence of Turkey over the large Muslim/Turkic peoples of the Soviet empire. Furthermore, in general by the end of the Second World War it seems that ‘Turkey was viewed as a predominantly unfriendly power which sought to weaken her northern neighbour’. Having such plans for increasing Soviet influence over Turkey, the Stalin regime could have not chosen a better time: Turkey had isolated itself due to its policies during the Second World War. Moscow also attempted to play upon the ‘imperialist rivalries’ between Britain and the US after the war. During that period ‘Soviet

104 Turkey in world affairs diplomats in Washington had reported that the Americans would not support the British in the Middle East because they pursued their own imperialistic ambitions in the region’. However, quite to the contrary, the British and Americans co-operated on this issue and supported Turkey strongly and ‘even began joint-planning for war against the USSR, a fact that (Stalin’s) intelligence services seem to have reported to him’.50 It is safe to argue that the Soviet inclusion of territorial demands, whether put forward just to put pressure on Turkey or not, weakened their position on the issue of revising the Straits regime, which was perceived as understandable earlier by the US and Britain. However, at the Potsdam Conference, in the light of the recent developments in Central Europe, Washington and London were insistent on the importance of respect for Turkey’s territorial integrity. In contrast with the availability of Soviet archives, the lack of access to Turkish archives of the period makes it more difficult to understand Turkey’s motivations. Long suspecting such Soviet designs and uneasy about the Soviet military might, Ankara seems to have thought of its move towards Britain and the US as a counterbalancing policy. This explanation is not sufficient, however. It seems that the Foreign Ministry believed that ‘the most immediate danger to Turkey had been successfully passed by the time of the Truman doctrine’.51 Thus in addition to its concerns about Russia, Ankara may have considered this an opportunity to mend its fences with the Western powers, and perceived it as part of its Westernisation project. Finally, Turkish policy makers may have seen this offer as a way to strengthen Turkey’s weak military. In 1947, the US gave 250 million dollars to Greece and 150 million dollars to Turkey under the Truman Doctrine. Most of the aid to Turkey was military aid,52 and the limited economic aid was mainly used for building roads.53 After the Truman Doctrine the US introduced the Marshall Plan to help with the rebuilding of Europe. Initially there was a reluctance to include Turkey in the Plan as it was directed towards the war-torn countries. However, Turkey launched a campaign to be included in the new mechanism and this did soon happen. Despite its inclusion in the Western bloc under the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, Turkey, like Greece, was not invited to be a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the security pillar of the post-war order as far as the Western bloc was concerned. Once again ‘Ankara wanted to be part of the Atlantic alignment not only to bolster Turkey’s defence, but perhaps even more to express identification with Europe and to tighten the grip on aid’.54 Initially the US’s position was unclear. The US military in particular was reluctant to extend itself rapidly through such an institutional commitment to the Mediterranean region. However, the State Department officials, concerned about the possibility that ‘if the Turks saw they could not get into NATO they [might] change their minds and decide to accommodate the Soviets’,55 were able to get the support of the executive to push for Turkey’s membership in NATO. There was opposition within the alliance as well. Initially, Denmark and Norway opposed this enlargement out of their concerns not to get involved in the Middle East. Then ‘the proposal came under fire from the British who wanted to use it for forcing the Turks under the Middle East Command and the French who wanted to trade their approval

Turkey in world affairs 105 for a NATO naval command’.56 However, eventually NATO members accepted the idea and the invitation was extended to Turkey. By that time Turkey had already fought in the Korean War, with a brigade of 4,500 troops serving under the UN command, and proportionately suffered the highest casualty rates of any UN element engaged in fighting.57 In parallel with Turkey’s membership in NATO in 1952, the US presence in Turkey increased tremendously: ‘The US established electronic monitoring sites, based reconnaissance aircraft, and later deployed intermediate-range ballistic missiles and tactical strike aircraft in Turkey’.58 Ankara was also keen to be part of the non-security institutions that were established by the Western countries. In 1950 Turkey became a member of the Council of Europe. Later it joined the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which was established in 1960. Finally, Turkey’s Western orientation in economic relations also led to an associate membership, through the Ankara Agreement, in the European Economic Community (EEC) in September 1963, which was seen ‘as the economic axis of the Western alliance, supplementing and cementing its unity’.59 Turkey’s close ties with the West was reflected in its relations with neighbouring regions. In the Balkans Ankara signed the Balkan Pact with Greece and Yugoslavia in 1954. Though not a significant pact, it helped the US to have indirect contacts through its allies with Yugoslavia, which had recently moved away from the Soviet line. In addition the Menderes government was particularly eager to become an integral part of Western policy in the Middle East and to show the indispensability of Turkey for Western interest in the region.60 After all, as Harris argues ‘it was the Middle East that formed a major testing ground for the Turkish–American alliance in the first decade of Turkey’s membership in NATO’.61 From 1950 to 1953 Britain and the US undertook negotiations for a defence organisation to be the equivalent of NATO in the Middle East. The first proposal for a Middle East Command in 1951 was rejected by Egypt. Then it was rearranged as the Middle East Defence Organisation. In order to overcome US concerns in that regard, Turkey actively sought participation by Arab countries in such an organisation. However, all these efforts failed. After the Eisenhower Administration came to power in 1953, the new Secretary of State John Foster Dulles developed a new concept that focused on the states immediately south of the Soviet Union – the Northern Tier. The aim was to create a buffer zone to prevent any Soviet encroachment into the Middle East. As a result a multilateral regional security organisation, the Baghdad Pact, was created in 1955.62 Only one Arab country, Iraq, participated in the Pact. Turkey’s efforts to convince other Arab countries continued after 1955. However, the Pact further radicalised and divided the region. Egyptian President Nasser, who was becoming the champion of Arab nationalism and non-alignment, harshly criticised the Pact, and his attacks against the organisation scared even the countries that had excellent relations with the Western bloc, such as Jordan and Lebanon, into staying away.63 Furthermore, many of its critics, especially Egypt, increased its contacts with the Soviet Union in reaction and thus ironically the Pact ended up contributing to the exact thing that it was

106 Turkey in world affairs designed to prevent, increased Soviet influence. On the other hand it further strained Turkey’s relations with major Arab countries.64 Similarly, in line with the policies of its allies Turkey recognised Israel in March 1949 and co-operated with Washington ‘during the events surrounding the Iraqi revolution and the Lebanese crisis in 1958, permitting US troops to use the military base near Adana as a staging point for deployment to Lebanon in the summer of 1958’.65 The Menderes government was also engaged in secret defence and intelligence co-operation with Israel in the same year.66 Thus the main tenet of Turkish foreign policy in the 1950s was to be part of the Western alliance and to prove its strategic importance to its Western allies. To that end Turkey became an important player in the Cold War in the Middle East and pursued policies to foster its relations with its allies, especially the US and Britain.

1960–1980: the quest for a ‘multi-dimensional foreign policy’ In the early 1960s two developments led to a crisis in Turkish–American relations. The US’s removal of its Jupiter missiles from Turkey as a trade-off for Soviet missiles in Cuba resolved the Cuban missile crisis but highly disappointed Turkey.67 The crisis was, first and foremost, a reminder of the immense danger that was ever present in the Cold War; Turkey had come to the brink of being a party to a possible nuclear war. The crisis also led to an erosion of trust in Turkey’s relations with the US. Ankara felt that it was easily dispensable and the fact that the US administration had taken that decision without consulting Turkey68 exposed the inequality that existed in the relationship. Interestingly, from Washington’s perspective the removal of the missiles also ‘signalled a change in Turkey’s strategic position’ and ‘Turkey no longer held the position of extreme importance in the Cold War it had occupied heretofore’.69 This in the longer run affected Washington’s policy, especially on the Cyprus issue. In fact, soon the Cyprus dispute which erupted in the late 1963 became another significant foreign policy issue that weakened Turkey’s alliance with the US. Having been part of the Ottoman Empire since 1571, Cyprus70 was occupied by Britain, which was looking for a naval base in the eastern Mediterranean, in 1878 and officially became its colony in 1925. For London, Cyprus was strategically located, overlooking the Suez Canal and on the route to India. In the Lausanne Peace Treaty Turkey formally recognised the annexation of Cyprus by Great Britain. British colonial rule lasted until 1960, when the island became an independent republic. According to the 1960 census, the population of Cyprus numbered 564,000; about 78 per cent of the people spoke Greek; about 18 per cent, Turkish. The London and Zurich agreements made a compromise beetween the demands of the Greek and Turkish communities through a delicate arrangement and made Greece, Turkey and Britain guarantors of this arrangement. As a result Britain kept its two bases, and both Greece and Turkey sent troops to the island. Greek Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios’ demands in November 1963 to severely limit the political rights of the Turkish Cypriot community by changing

Turkey in world affairs 107 the constitution soon led to violence, especially against that community. Makarios’ proposals were rejected by both the Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish government, which were uneasy about them in the light of the Greek Cypriot leadership’s attempts to keep pushing to unite Cyprus with Greece in the 1950s before independence. Instead of discussing his proposals with the Turkish side, Makarios tried to internationalise the issue and garner support. Turkey responded by first appealing to the United States and the guarantor powers to. help stop the violence. When there was no response on the part of these powers, Inönü government began to signal that it might interfere unilaterally ‘to protect the rights of the Turkish Cypriots’.71 Thus started the Cyprus dispute that has dominated Turkey’s foreign policy until today. The 1963–1964 Cyprus crisis also had a significant impact on the Turkish– American alliance. When the Turkish government threatened to use force in Cyprus as response to the developments there, US President Lyndon Johnson sent a letter . . to Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inönü in which he stated that Turkey could not use US equipment in such an operation, and also warned that if Turkish intervention in the island were to invite a Soviet attack, then NATO was not obliged to defend Turkey.72 The Johnson letter had a tremendous impact on Turkish– American relations. As Harris argues, ‘by calling into question the automatic operation of NATO commitments in regard to Turkey’ President Johnson’s words . ‘struck the sanctity of Turkey’s whole system of alliances’.73 Prime Minister Inönü responded in a long letter in which he conveyed the disappointment the letter had created in Ankara. As a result of these developments the level of co-operation between the US and Turkey changed as Ankara began to put several restrictions on US activity on its soil. Through the Defence Co-operation Agreement of July 1969, the US recognised ultimate Turkish sovereignty over all installations and emphasised their NATO character.74 However, the US–Turkish security relationship was further strained during the mid-1970s when the US imposed an arms embargo in response to Turkish military intervention in Cyprus in 1974.75 Another area of conflict in the 1970s between Turkey and the US lay in Washington’s pressure on Ankara to curb opium production. It was very difficult for popularly elected governments to comply with the US desire, as the peasants were reluctant to shift from a crop that yielded a good income. Disturbed by increasing use of the drug in the US, Washington continued its pressure and eventually succeeded when the caretaker government, which was formed after 1971 military intervention, signed an agreement banning opium cultivation in 1972. The agreement was renewed in 1974 by the Demirel government after the return to democracy. For the critics of US–Turkish relations the opium issue was just another example of Turkish interests sidelined by the interests of a strong ally. Later the Ecevit government’s decision to start cultivation once again deepened the sense of crisis in the alliance. These problems between the two allies were reflected in policies vis-à-vis the Middle East where Turkey became less willing to support the US automatically. In particular, Turkey’s attempt to normalise relations with the Arab world was

108 Turkey in world affairs partially a response to disappointment with Western policies in general. During the Arab–Israeli War of 1967 Turkey did not allow the US to use the bases and facilities in Turkey to help Israel. In the meantime, an agreement was signed in 1969 on US base rights in Turkey which decreased the number of facilities from 26 to 12 and insisted that they be used for NATO contingencies only.76 Again during 1973 Arab–Israeli War, Turkey refused to allow US planes rushing arms to Israel to refuel in its territory. Throughout the Cold War years Turkish officials continued to declare the US and NATO facilities in Turkey not available for non-NATO military actions in the Gulf or elsewhere in the Middle East without prior Turkish approval. On the other hand Ankara launched a deliberate effort to develop its relations with the Soviet bloc and the non-aligned countries. Normalisation of relations with the Soviet Union was a major change in this period. The Soviet Union since the death of Stalin in 1953 had on several occasions been publicly critical of Soviet behaviour in the immediate post-Second World War era. Soviet President Nikolay Podgorny’s characterisation of earlier Soviet demands as ‘inappropriate and incorrect statements’ during his visit to Ankara in January 1965 marked the beginning of normalisation in relations between the two countries.77 Economic cooperation agreements were signed and the Soviets provided considerable economic assistance to Turkey, which was especially crucial in Turkey’s efforts to build heavy industry: ‘By 1978, the Soviet Union was aiding forty-four different development projects in Turkey and by the end of that decade Turkey received more Soviet economic assistance than any other country in the third world except Cuba.’78 This did not, however, mean that Turkey was reorienting its policy. It was still part of the Western alliance and yet making an effort to diversify its foreign policy. The Middle East became the next target of Turkish foreign policy makers’ attempt to engage in ‘multi-dimensional’ foreign policy. Starting in the mid-1960s and especially in the 1970s, Turkey’s policy towards the Middle East shifted slightly. The new policy was characterised by increased support to the Palestinians in the Arab–Israeli conflict and by developing trade relations with the oil-exporting countries, although Turkey was reluctant to get involved in intra-regional disputes. The reasons for the shift in Turkish foreign policy during this period were several. In the late 1950s and early 1960s both alliance systems began to weaken somewhat. In the Western bloc de Gaulle’s France initiated closer relations with Eastern Europe and eventually withdrew from the military wing of NATO. Later in the 1970s this trend was strengthened with German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik. The US involvement in the Vietnam War led to an additional conflict with some of its European allies and diverted attention from the Cold War in Europe. Furthermore, in coming to the brink of a nuclear war with the Cuban missile crisis, the leaders of the blocs, the US and the Soviet Union, themselves seemed to be determined not to be drawn into a war with each other. All these factors combined to loosen the rigid pattern of relationships and resulted in a period of détente which culminated with the signing of the Helsinki Accords of 1975. These developments in the international system increased the room for manoeuvre

Turkey in world affairs 109 for countries like Turkey which could diversify their foreign relations without leaving their blocs. The transformation of Turkish–American relations also played a role in Turkey’s search for a multi-dimensional foreign policy. As mentioned above, the events of the 1960s and 1970s had shown the problems of solely relying on the US for Turkey’s security and economic needs. In the meantime US foreign policy also went through a change after the Nixon Administration came to power in 1968. The Nixon Doctrine limited direct US involvement in the world and instead relied on regional allies for stability and focused on their military build-up. In the Middle East this policy was translated into what was called the twin pillars policy, which designated Iran, the military pillar, and Saudi Arabia, the financial pillar, as the two most important US allies in the region.79 As a result, Turkish–US relations became much more limited. Although the US continued to be a major source of military equipment for Turkey, US military assistance dropped. A more drastic decrease occurred in economic assistance.80 Already weakened ties were further strained by dealing with difficult issues like Cyprus, when the US Congress began to take the initiative against the less interested executive. Domestic transformations in Turkey also had an impact on the country’s foreign policy during this time. Largely thanks to the freedoms brought about by the 1961 constitution, foreign policy issues became part of the public debate and internal struggles in a way unseen before. The debate in the 1960s in fact soon became about Turkey’s whole foreign policy orientation. Criticism of Turkey’s alliance with the US was widespread. The arguments that the alliance with the US was onesided and only served US interests became quite popular among the increasingly vocal civil society institutions.81 The opposition at times turned into violence against the American presence in Turkey. The Cuban missile crisis and the Johnson letter increased anti-American and neutralist sentiment. The value of NATO and the Western alliance was increasingly questioned ‘as the 20th anniversary of NATO approached in 1969, a date when the members could – if they wished – leave this pact’.82 In the 1970s economic reasons also became important as Turkey, an oil-importing country, was very much affected by the 1973–1974 oil crisis. Within that context the development of economic relations with the Middle East in particular became very attractive. However, it was the Cyprus issue more than anything else that affected Turkish foreign policy during this period. After the 1963–1964 crisis, which culminated in the arrival of the UN Peacekeeping Force (UNIFCYP) in 1964, Cyprus had temporarily been on the backburner. However, the issue flared up again when the military junta in Greece masterminded a coup d’état by the Cypriot National Guard to overthrow President Makarios and his government on 15 July 1974. The aim was to realise enosis, the union of the island with Greece. This was unacceptable to Turkish Cypriots and to Turkey, which appealed to Britain as one of the other guarantor states to act together to protect the island’s independence. When this failed, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit ordered the Turkish army to land troops in Cyprus and to occupy the northern part of the island. The UN Security Council called for an immediate cease-fire on 21 July 1974. When

110 Turkey in world affairs the hostilities between the two communities continued after the cease-fire ‘the Turkish troops began another offensive on August 14, bringing about 40 per cent of the island under Turkish control’.83 The developments in the Cyprus problem were reflected in Turkish-Greek relations. Several bilateral problems the two countries had begun to have, such as over how to divide the continental shelf, air control responsibilities in the Aegean Sea and the fortification of the Aegean islands, became irresolvable after the Cyprus problem. Over the years these problems became much more complicated as they intermingled with the domestic politics in both countries. The implications of the Cyprus issue for Turkish foreign policy were huge. As a result of these developments in the 1970s Turkey re-defined its national security, which began to stress that the threat to Turkish national security not only came from the north (the Soviet Union), but also from the West (Greece). The dispute between the two NATO allies strained their relations individually with their allies, mainly the US, which the both sides accused as favouring the other. The disappointment in Ankara over its isolation in the international sphere and the lack of support from its allies in the Western bloc led to discussions about the need for diversification of foreign policy. In fact during the 1960s and 1970s Turkey launched an effort to get support for its cause in the Cyprus issue. The arms embargo also forced Turkey to be self-reliant on the issue of defence. Interestingly, in the 1970s Turkey’s relations with the European Community began to be problematic as a result of economic reasons. Although Ankara signed the implementation agreement, the Additional Protocol, in 1970 to bolster its relations with the European Community, the timetable in the Protocol for the activation of the Customs Union became increasingly debatable. Domestically there was strong opposition coming from the big industrialists in Turkey, dealing with the crisis in the economy mainly due to the oil price increases, on the grounds that ‘the envisioned transition period was too short for achievement of the necessary restructuring of the Turkish industry’.84 The economy bureaucracy, particularly the State Planning Organisation (SPO) was equally critical due to the difficulties the Customs Union would introduce for the country’s import substitution industrialisation strategy. Those who opposed the Customs Union found an ally in Bülent Ecevit’s RPP, which in 1978 decided to suspend the Customs Union timetable for five years.85 Thus, Turkish foreign policy went through some significant changes as a result of the developments both within and without, although its main tenets remained the same. As Karpat argues The basic reaction to all these adverse conditions was to strive to regain freedom of initiative in foreign affairs, to strengthen her bargaining position within and outside the Western alliance, to break the isolation, and to lessen her economic dependence on the West.86

Turkey in world affairs 111

1980–1990: Turkey’s rising strategic importance The 1980s started with profound changes both in and around Turkey. Internationally, with the beginning of the ‘Second Cold War’ Turkey’s threat perceptions started to intensify. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian Islamic Revolution, both in 1979, mainly contributed to this perception and led to closer ties especially between Turkey and the US, which under Ronald Reagan’s presidency had a similar evaluation of those developments. Domestically the 1980 military coup led to further problems with the European Community (EC), while once again bringing Turkey much closer to the US. Therefore, for the first time ‘the West’ was no longer perceived as a unified entity in terms of Turkey’s foreign policy orientation. Turkey’s relations with the EC entered into a new crisis when in 1987 Turkey applied for membership and was rejected in December 1989. Finally, parallel to the launching of its economic liberalisation programme, economic motivations also started to affect Turkey’s policies during this period. The Iran–Iraq War between 1980 and 1988 in particular led to a boom in Turkey’s trade relations with these two countries. Turkish–US strategic co-operation in the 1980s strengthened largely due to the developments in the greater Middle East. In 1979 the events in Iran and Afghanistan in particular refocused Washington’s attention on the Gulf. The fall of the Shah and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan created a sense of US weakness and a fear of instability in a region which has always been regarded as vital to US interests. In January 1980 in his famous State of the Union address President Jimmy Carter announced what came to be called the Carter Doctrine: An attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America. And such an assault will be repelled by the use of any means necessary including military force.87 In line with the Carter Doctrine the US began to implement new policies to enhance its capabilities in the region. To this end the formation of a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) was announced. The Reagan Administration that came to power in 1980 further emphasised the need to expand US military presence in the region. The Secretary of State Alexander Haig introduced a new policy of ‘strategic consensus’. Its aim was to persuade several countries in the region, including Turkey, to co-operate with the US to resist the common ‘Soviet threat’ in the Middle East.88 Therefore, with the advance of the Second Cold War of the 1980s, Pentagon strategists began to perceive Turkey primarily as a potential base for containing the Soviet Union in the greater Middle East, stretching from Afghanistan to the eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore the two countries developed a new interest in offsetting what they considered as a ‘new threat of Islamic fundamentalism’ in the region. Turkey, however, declined to commit formally to the defence of the Persian Gulf by refusing to take part in the RDF; instead it preferred to increase its bilateral

112 Turkey in world affairs ties with Washington. As a sign of increasing co-operation, Ankara and Washington concluded a Defence and Economic Co-operation Agreement (DECA) on 29 March 1980. In the meantime, the military regime in Turkey, established after the September 1980 coup, was happy to see increased US support for Turkey. In fact, during this period while Turkey’s relations with Europe deteriorated, the ties with the US strengthened. Throughout the subsequent period of military rule, US weapons aid increased sharply and Turkey became a pillar of Washington’s strategy to protect American interests in the Middle East. President Carter lifted the embargo against Turkey in 1978 and between 1984 and 1993 the US military transfers to Turkey totalled six billion dollars.89 Although the early 1980s represented the most intimate era of US–Turkish relations since the 1950s, some problems emerged towards the end of 1980s due to the US Congress. The US Congress became much more reluctant to approve military aid and transfers to Turkey and especially began to attach preconditions, such as progress in negotiations on Cyprus, to such requests by the administration. Thus, Ankara found the first five-year implementation of DECA quite unsatisfactory. On 18 December 1985 DECA was renewed for another five years. However, during the discussions in the congressional committees, the preconditions as regards to Cyprus and Armenian issues came to the forefront. Turkey reacted to this development and the agreement was not put into force until 1988.90 The collapse of the Soviet Union against this background led to concerns in Ankara about a further decrease in Turkey’s strategic importance and, thus raised the spectre of additional problems in its relations with the US. In fact, in response to the end of the Cold War US dismantled some of its bases in Turkey. Relations with the EC deteriorated as it reacted strongly to the military coup in Turkey, which occurred at a time when the Community was in the process of becoming more than an economic association. Within that context human rights issues began to dominate EC–Turkish relations. Even after the transition to democracy in Turkey, the policy makers failed to understand the transition in the Community, both political and institutional, and the government of Turgut Özal hastily applied for full EC membership on 14 April 1987.91 Supported by big business, Özal perceived EC membership as an integral part of Turkey’s economic liberalisation policies.92 In the mid-1980s Ankara increasingly started to have problems in its bilateral relations with its two immediate Middle Eastern neighbours, Iraq and Syria. Turkey accused Syria of harbouring the PKK and claimed that Abdullah Öcalan, its leader, was residing in Damascus. On the other hand, Ankara’s relations with both Damascus and Baghdad deteriorated because of Syrian and Iraqi complaints about Turkey’s gigantic water project, the South-east Anatolian Project (known by its Turkish acronym GAP). As part of an effort to tackle economic development issues in south-east Anatolia, Turkey had set up the GAP in the early 1980s to utilise the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. These serious problems, however, at that time seem to be managed to some extent. Syria and Turkey signed a protocol in 1987 in which Turkey guaranteed the flow of 500 cubic metres of water per second into Syria. Relations with Iraq were much more manageable as the latter

Turkey in world affairs 113 relied heavily on Turkey as an outlet for the export of its oil through the Kerkuk–Yumurtalik oil pipeline during its eight-year war with Iran. In fact, during the Iran–Iraq War Turkey developed a policy of ‘active neutrality’, which meant that it continued to have a working relationship with both countries. Through this policy Ankara not only spared itself from the possible spill-over effects of the war, but also increased its importance in the eyes of the US and other governments. Furthermore, Turkey became a significant trade partner and a transit country for Iran and Iraq, and thus Turkey’s trade with these countries boomed. However, efforts to manage the issues of water and the Syrian support of the PKK would become futile in the shifting environment in the post-Cold War era when they came to dominate Turkey’s relations with the Middle East.

1990–2003: the post-Cold War era The fall of the Berlin Wall, the change of the communist regimes in East and Central Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet Union transformed international politics. These changes had an enormous impact on Turkey’s perception of itself and its foreign relations. They meant the disappearance of the well-known parameters of Turkish foreign policy. The newly emerging international environment was fluid and thus full of opportunities but also challenges for countries like Turkey. Turkish policy makers tried to make sense of it all while at the same time having to steer the country through enormous changes that were happening around it. Turkey felt the impact of the changes directly because of its geography. Intense debate among the policy community started as to whether and how Turkey should reorient its foreign policy in response to these changes. One group within the state that was led by the then-President Turgut Özal chose to stress the opportunities, whether in the case of the newly emerging Turkic world or the Gulf War. The other group, which consisted of most of the military and bureaucratic elite and major political parties in the opposition, was still cautious and preferred the traditional line in foreign policy. This debate is still continuing at some level today, although it has been largely transcended by the fact that Turkish foreign policy has been altered to a great extent by the profound changes in the post-Cold War era. This is not to underestimate the continuities, and yet the transformations both around and inside Turkey brought about not only new initiatives and a fresh outlook, but also new insecurities and difficulties. In the meantime the actors who are involved in the foreign policy process broadened during this period. It is generally accepted that the post-Cold War developments presented Turkey with new opportunities but also significant challenges. The concern in Ankara in the late 1980s and early 1990s about the declining strategic importance of Turkey with the end of the bipolar world was soon put aside, as the country found itself in the midst of waves of change. Some analysts began to define Turkey as a ‘pivotal’ state, at the crossroads of the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caspian.93 From a security perspective Turkey was touted as a stable country with close ties to the West, thus perceived to play a positive role in promoting stability and enhancing the West’s influence in these areas. Turkish policy makers also had an eye to the

114 Turkey in world affairs political and economic possibilities that were becoming available, especially in the newly transformed regions of the Balkans and the Caspian. On the other hand, however, the post-Cold war era presented Turkey with significant challenges. In particular, the articulation of systemic changes with domestic transformations in Turkey created new tensions. This was most clear in Turkey’s relations with the Middle East where the domestic challenges of political Islam and Kurdish nationalism intermingled with Turkey’s relations with this region. In addition the mushrooming of ethno-religious conflicts and increasing instability in the adjacent areas created a concern in Ankara that Turkey might also face the danger of instability. The US, especially, appreciated Turkey’s newly emerging position and put a high emphasis on Turkey’s stability. However, although individually many European Union countries also appreciated Turkey’s increasing strategic importance, the EU as a collective body developed a perspective that placed less emphasis on strategic imperatives than on political and social, even cultural, issues in its relations with Turkey. The EU’s decision to put former communist states in Central and Eastern Europe well ahead of Turkey in the enlargement process further strained their relations. Ankara was also uneasy about the uncertainties facing NATO, the Western organisation to which Ankara assigned a huge importance. Despite the problems, however, Turkish–EU relations entered a new era with the EU’s Helsinki Summit decision to grant Turkey candidate status in December 1999. The interaction between domestic and foreign policy issues also increased during this period. The relations with the EU are the clearest example of this. Issues related to Turkey–EU relations are no longer simply foreign policy issues, because they are a part of a project that entails significant transformation of domestic institutions, policies, rules and norms. Similarly the relations with the Middle East have been intermingled with Kurdish issue and political Islam in Turkey more closely since the beginning of the 1990s. Domestic cleavages started to be very much reflected in foreign policy positions and debates, just as foreign policy issues were incorporated into domestic discussions and polarisations. This had happened to some extent in the 1960s and 1970s, when, for different reasons, the left, the ultranationalist right and the religious right had adopted anti-US, anti-NATO, anti-West arguments. Yet the debate became more extended in the 1990s as the issues and the alliances became more complicated. How has Turkey responded to all these challenges and opportunities? Some analysts of Turkish foreign policy have argued that Turkey has responded by becoming more active in its foreign policy since the beginning of the 1990s.94 There are numerous examples of the new Turkish activism, particularly in the Middle East. Turkey’s policies towards Syria, for instance, that culminated in the threat of the use of force in October 1988, its open alignment with Israel, and Ankara’s policies as regards the Gulf War of 1991 and since then towards Iraq (including its relations with the Kurdish leaders in Iraq, military incursions and later permanent military presence) all point to bold initiatives on the part of Turkey. Furthermore, Ankara’s active participation in peacekeeping forces in Somalia,

Turkey in world affairs 115 Bosnia, Kosovo, Albania and Afghanistan, as well as its participation and sometimes leadership in regional initiatives such as the Black Sea Economic Co-operation Organisation, are other examples of such activism. However, this new activism seems to be largely a response to the changing international, regional and domestic environment rather than a drastic policy shift in its own right. As Malik Mufti95 has argued, while Turkey continued to exercise caution in its foreign policy since the end of the Cold War, ‘the passivity of the earlier period is sometimes exaggerated’. For instance, in the 1990s Ankara was largely cautious in its foreign policy towards the Balkans and the Caspian region, whereas Turkey was active in the Mosul and Hatay issues in the early republican period, as well as in the Cyprus intervention in 1974. United States Turkish–American relations entered a new phase after the Gulf War of 1991. Turkey indirectly but actively participated in the US-led war against Iraq. Amidst discussion on the future of Turkey’s strategic importance for the West in general, and for the US in particular after the end of the Cold War, President Turgut Özal used the war to demonstrate Turkey’s significance for US interests in the Middle East. Although domestically Özal’s policy during the war was seen as quite controversial, the US government appreciated it very much. Özal was frequently on the phone with President George Bush and developed a close working relationship with him. The telephone diplomacy with the US, and also with the leaders of all the other states involved, gave Özal an edge in policymaking.96 The eventual policy reflected a compromise between the two sides, although in general Özal succeeded in situating Turkey as an indispensable ally in the eyes of the US administration. Indeed, to a large extent Turkey adopted an assertive stance in the conflict with Baghdad compared with its earlier policies in the region. At the beginning of the crisis, on 6 August 1990, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 661 that imposed a complete economic embargo on Iraq. On 8 August, the Cabinet, chaired by President Özal, convened and decided to close down the oil pipeline stretching from Iraq’s Kirkuk oil fields to the Turkish port of Iskenderun. Özal wanted to go further and dispatch Turkish troops to join the multinational forces in the Gulf. An extraordinary meeting of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA), however, refused to transfer its war powers to the government. Only later, when the war started, the TGNA pass a bill, on 4 September 1991, 250 to 148 in favour, sending troops abroad and receiving foreign troops on Turkish soil and thus granting full authority to the government in all matters except in the declaration of war in accordance with Article 92 of the constitution. . This opened the way to allowing the US. to use Turkish air bases, especially Incirlik. It was the first time since 1958 that Incirlik was used for a nonNATO operation, which signalled the end of Ankara’s long-standing policy in that respect. Turkey also deployed more than 100,000 troops along the border with Iraq, tying down part of the Iraqi military power. In the meantime, over a dispute on the handling of the Gulf crisis, the Defence and Foreign Ministers resigned.

116 Turkey in world affairs More unusual, however, was the resignation of the Chief of Staff over differences of policy with President Özal on Iraq. The Gulf War seemed to re-affirm the Turkish–American strategic understanding in the area. After the war President Özal proclaimed that Turkish–US relations had ‘entered a new era’. This new relationship was called a ‘strategic partnership’, albeit vaguely defined.97 In return for its co-operation in the Gulf War, Turkey received some benefits from the US. One such benefit of the new strategic co-operation was the push given to the Turkish army’s new modernisation programme, which acquired a new urgency because of the Gulf War. In addition, a comprehensive US arms package was prepared after the war.98 However, problems began subsequently when the US was not able to deliver even those weapons which were already paid for, mainly because of congressional opposition. The US government also gave Turkey 3.5 billion dollars’ worth of slightly outmoded US weapons, transferring its surplus material mainly through a cascading programme because of the CFE Treaty. On the economic front, with US support Ankara received aid both from the Gulf countries and the OECD countries, to compensate for revenue losses due to the Gulf crisis, which did not come anywhere near to Turkish expectations. Finally, the US President also pledged to review Turkey’s textile quotas in response to President Özal’s emphasis on increasing trade relations between the two countries.99 However, soon after the war there was a sense in Ankara that Turkey’s losses due to the war and the consequent developments in Iraq far exceeded its gains. Despite uneasiness on this issue, Washington and Ankara continued their seemingly problem-free strategic co-operation in the increasingly unstable regions around Turkey. Turkey and the US also began to co-operate in the Balkans and the Caspian, the two regions that were going through enormous transformations in the post-Cold War era. Turkey opted to act in co-operation with the US in these regions and in return agreed to take regional initiatives. Turkish participation in the peacekeeping actions detailed on pp. 114–15 was instrumental in further strengthening the relationship. The Clinton administration stressed the importance of Turkey as ‘a democratic bridge of stability between the East and the West, between the Islamic world and the non-Islamic world’.100 Washington actively supported Turkey in two of Ankara’s priority foreign policy issues: Turkish membership in the EU and the realisation of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline. Finally, for the first time ever a strong economic component emerged in the relationship. The US Department of Commerce declared Turkey one of the ten ‘Big Emerging Markets’. The Turkish– US trade volume increased considerably and US investors began to invest in the fields of communications, energy and infrastructure. Bill Clinton’s visit to Turkey in November 1999 was the culmination of the increasing co-operation between the two countries in several issues and regions. Clinton officially declared Turkey as the US’s ‘strategic partner’. His speech in Parliament, where he underlined the strategic importance of Turkey to the US while at the same time encouraging Turkey’s efforts to further economic and political reform, got a standing ovation. The relationship was further strengthened when Turkey became the first Muslim

Turkey in world affairs 117 nation to express definite support for the US’s war in Afghanistan and allowed the use of the Incirlik airbase for the logistical support of the US troops. The Ecevit government later assumed the command of the International Security and Assistance Force there for two years, despite the lack of popular support. The co-operation in Iraq policy remained the key for the ‘strategic partnership’. Turkish support became crucial for the US policy of containing Saddam Hussein’s regime. In return the US, mainly because of Ankara’s apprehension about the increasing power of the Iraqi Kurds in northern Iraq under the protection of the US and Britain, allowed Turkish incursions into the area in search of the PKK and in the mid-1990s to establish permanent military contingents. Ironically, however, the Iraqi issue also created serious tensions in the relationship as post-war developments in Iraq increased anxieties in Turkey and led to the development of an element of mistrust in Turkey’s relations with the US. Soon after the end of the Gulf War Turkish policy makers began to perceive the developments in Iraq as problematic from their perspective. Ankara argued that the power vacuum that was created in northern Iraq constituted a safe haven for the PKK to launch its cross-border raids into Turkey. As a result there was a clear increase in the PKK’s activities in Turkey.101 At the same time prospects of Iraq’s disintegration and the establishment of a Kurdish state in Iraq was feared since this would give a new momentum to Kurdish separatism in Turkey. Moreover, Turkey stated its discontent over the economic losses it had to endure due to the unresolved situation in Iraq.102 As a result of these considerations the re-establishment of Iraq’s territorial integrity became the cornerstone of Turkish foreign policy on the Iraqi issue. Although Washington also publicly reiterated its commitment to Iraq’s territorial integrity, its policies towards the Iraqi Kurds and developments on the ground since the Gulf War of 1991 led to divergence between the two countries. Several officials and politicians in Ankara became critical of the US policy in Iraq sometimes publicly sometimes privately. Accusations of Washington ranged from having a secret agenda in Iraq to not having a policy towards Iraq. Either way the strategic partnership was being eroded from inside, despite the appearance of close cooperation on the surface. As a result, throughout the 1990s Washington and Ankara engaged in a complex relationship with regard to Iraq which was characterised by crises and co-operation and intense bargaining during which the two sides played different cards.103 However, the Iraqi issue, the core of the strategic partnership, also embodied seeds of conflict between the two sides. The problems came to the surface when the Bush administration decided to start a war against Iraq and sought Turkey’s support. Washington’s highly comprehensive list of requests created a debate in Turkey as to the level of Turkey’s involvement in the possible war. The ambiguities in the Iraqi issue and US–Turkish relations with respect to Iraq came to the fore in this atmosphere. The newly elected AKP government, already overwhelmed by the economic crisis, the Copenhagen Summit of the EU and the Annan Plan for the resolution of the Cyprus problem, engaged in intense bargaining with the Bush administration.

118 Turkey in world affairs The background of the earlier bargaining between the two countries framed to some extent the latest negotiation process. Turkey’s bargaining position was largely affected by the commitment ‘not to repeat the mistakes of the past’. The belief that Turkey had suffered significant economic losses due to the Gulf War of 1991 led the government to insist on clear commitments and large financial compensation from the US. In addition the Turkish foreign and security elite was anxious about the possible political and security implications of such a war and sought commitments to prevent any unwanted consequences such as the establishment of a Kurdish state. The crisis between the US and Iraq once again heightened Turkey’s anxieties. It also strengthened Washington’s fears that some Turkish action might jeopardise its policy in Iraq. The bargaining was tough and helped to further undermine the trust between the two allies, because of mishandling onn both sides. However, an understanding was reached and the AKP government took that to Parliament for approval. The TGNA voted on 1 March 2003 264 to 250 in favour of the motion but was three votes shy of a constitutionally mandated simple majority, since there were 19 abstentions. One very important factor was the role of public opposition to the war and Turkey’s participation in it. This opposition grew over the course of the negotiations and reached about 90 per cent. The newly established AKP, which got an impressive 35 per cent of votes in its first election, was especially sensitive to such an opposition as its main strength within the body politic lies with public support. The party’s Islamist core, especially, became quite vocal in its critique of the war. Lack of international support for the US also strengthened the hand of those who opposed the war and this complicated Turkey’s position. Finally, the ambiguities of the military and the foreign policy bureaucracy clearly played a role in facilitating Turkey’s reluctance to get involved in the war. The US administration, attitude throughout the negotiation process and its increasing ties with the Kurdish opposition in Iraq were problematic from the Turkish perspective. The exclusion of Turcomans, ethnic Turks in Iraq, from the Iraqi opposition meeting sponsored by Washington in Northern Iraq on 26 February–1 March 2003 only helped to substantiate these concerns. The Turkish Parliament’s rejection of the deal that would allow the US to move 62,000 troops through Turkish territory to open a northern front in the war created a major crisis in Turkish–American relations. Determined to start a war against Iraq and demolish Saddam Hussein’s regime, Washington was forced to change its war plans. Already frustrated by Ankara’s tough bargaining the Bush administration seemed to feel let down by Turkey. At the end of March the Turkish Parliament adopted a new bill, which was passed by 332 votes to 202, that granted over-flight rights to US. This motion clearly left most of the US military requests unfulfilled. Washington was not even permitted to use airbases, including for refuelling. Furthermore the new bill led to another crisis in relations between the two countries as it also authorised the entry of Turkish troops into Iraq if necessary. The decision to allow unilateral incursions alarmed the Bush administration, which openly talked about its concerns related to the intentions of the Turkish army and a complicating possibility of a Kurdish–Turkish war in Iraq. That crisis was resolved when Turkey

Turkey in world affairs 119 gave assurances that it would only intervene in the case of a tide of refugees from Iraq or the establishment of a Kurdish state, both of which was not going to happen anyway, according to the Bush administration. Secretary of State Colin Powell’s visit to Ankara in April 2003 was a successful attempt to heal the rift. Despite some improvement in the relationship, the instability inherent in terms of their positions in Iraq was once again highlighted when eleven Turkish soldiers, part of the Turkish contingent in northern Iraq which was permanently stationed there since the mid1990s, were taken into custody by the US forces in July 2003 over an alleged plot to harm Iraqi Kurdish civilian officials, a claim denied by Turkey. After a weekend of intense negotiations between Ankara and Washington the soldiers were returned. However, the incident created an uproar in Turkey. Turkey’s chief of staff Hilmi Özkök characterised the incident as a major crisis of trust between Turkish and US armed forces and maintained: ‘I don’t think this is US armed forces policy, but I have a great difficulty in seeing it as a local event.’104 After a period of close co-operation Turkey’s relations with the US entered into an era of uncertainty. The future development of these relations to a large extent seemed to depend on a complex matrix of variables, especially on the developments in the Middle East, including but not limited to the developments in Iraq. European Union Since the signing of the Association (Ankara) Agreement in 1964, Turkey’s relationship with the European Union – called the European Economic Community at that time – passed through a very difficult path. In 1987 Turkey applied for membership, which was rejected in December 1989. Worse still, the ‘response to the application was negative in tone, mainly confining itself to the list of Turkey’s shortcomings, without any words of encouragement’.105 In the 1990s after the end of the Cold War Turkey was suddenly faced with the reality that the possibility of membership – if it was ever going to happen – was at least put on the backburner, with the former communist regimes lining up for membership and the EU eager to develop a relationship with them. Under these circumstances the only progress in Turkish–EU relations was the approval of the Customs Union Agreement, which was foreseen by the 1964 Ankara Agreement, in March 1995. The important aspect of this agreement at that time was that from Turkey’s perspective it was considered as another step on Turkey’s road to membership. However, it soon became clear that the EU itself did not perceive the Customs Union as such. Since then it turned out to be a very controversial issue in Turkey, as many began to consider Customs Union, especially without the prospect of full membership, to be economically against Turkey’s interest. Furthermore, some argued that Customs Union also became politically untenable, as EU’s resolution on the Customs Union and its decision to start negotiations with Greek-Cypriot controlled Cyprus were issued same day, thus increasing suspicions that the government might have made a concession on the Cyprus application issue in return for the Customs Union: a claim adamantly denied by the governing coalition government of Tansu Çiller.106

120 Turkey in world affairs Relations hit a new low with the decision of the Luxembourg Summit of 1997 that excluded Turkey from the list of candidate countries and put it in a separate category where ‘Turkey was offered a “European strategy” to bring it closer to the union by intensifying the customs union and financial co-operation, changing its laws, and participating in certain programmes to be decided case by case’.107 The response in Turkey was shock, frustration and anger. Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz announced the end of the political dialogue. There was also a strong reaction to the inclusion of the Republic of Cyprus in the first group of countries with which the EU wanted to open membership negotiations: ‘Ankara hardened its own position on Cyprus problem, emphasising that Cyprus is a primary security concern and re-emphasising its threat to take steps toward further integration between Turkey and the TRNC.’108 Despite what happened in Luxembourg Turkey’s economic relations with the EU continued under the Customs Union. However, political relations were damaged to a large extent. More importantly, the decision mobilised and strengthened those who were opposing Turkey’s membership of the EU in Turkey. At the December 1999 Helsinki Summit of the EU, Turkey’s candidacy for membership was finally confirmed, mainly because of EU policy of not totally alienating Turkey. The EU then offered Ankara a pre-accession strategy designed to support the reforms necessary to prepare Turkey for membership. At the Nice Summit in December 2000, the EU Council approved an Accession Partnership Document (AP) for Turkey where short- and medium-term priorities and intermediate objectives were identified. Turkey is expected to realise these objectives in order to qualify for membership. The AP also set up monitoring mechanisms to evaluate progress. As part of the usual process, in response the Turkish government presented a National Programme for Action in March 2001 where it explained how Ankara intended to meet the objectives of the AP. The Programme, however, generally was found to be vague and evasive on some of the most controversial issues between the EU and Turkey, namely the issue of minorities, the role of the military and the Cyprus question. Soon another crisis erupted in Turkish–EU relations over the issue of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The EU began to move toward creating its own rapid reaction force, focused mainly on peacekeeping, which would require that it be given rights to use certain North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) facilities. Particularly concerned that the EU might use such a force in Cyprus or the Aegean conflicts, for a long time as a NATO member Turkey blocked the NATO–EU deal. Finally the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002 devised a set of conditions acceptable to Greece, Turkey and the US. Turkey agreed to drop its veto on EU co-operation with NATO in return for a commitment that the island of Cyprus, even if it unifies, will remain outside the regional security structure. Turkey has taken several steps to address the issues and to implement its commitments in its relations with the EU in general. In October 2001 Parliament passed a series of reforms, such as reducing police powers of detention and easing curbs on human rights. Turkey also lifted the ban on Kurdish language broadcasts and increased civilian representation on the National Security Council (NSC).

Turkey in world affairs 121 Parliament adopted a new civil code, which entered into force in January 2002, particularly aimed at improving freedom of association and assembly. In February 2002 Parliament passed the so-called mini-reform package that introduced reforms to the penal code and anti-terrorism law. In August 2003 Parliament outlawed the death penalty and allowed instruction in languages other than Turkish to be legal. Although the EU welcomed the fact that these reforms had been enacted into Turkish law, in the run up to the Copenhagen Summit of December 2002, which was going to take decisions on the largest enlargement in the history of the Union, EU officials began to say that they wanted to see the actual implementation of these reforms and also some progress in the Cyprus problem. Expecting a date for the start of the accession negotiations with the EU, Turkey came out only half satisfied with the Copenhagen Summit’s decision to give Turkey ‘a date for a date’, as the EU decided that if Turkey satisfies the Copenhagen criteria it can get a date for accession negotiations in 2004. Several problems remain in Turkey–EU relations. First of all there are economic and institutional difficulties for the EU, mainly due to the size of Turkey and the character of its economy. Turkey’s 70 million population,109 its low per capita income, regional disparities and large agricultural workforce make it especially problematic for the EU to ‘digest’ Turkey. Second, there are problems concerning Turkey’s ability to meet the EU’s Copenhagen criteria, which all candidate countries must satisfy before accession negotiations can start. In this respect the most important obstacle has been the fulfilment of the political aspect of the Copenhagen criteria.110 Although Ankara sometimes accuses EU officials of emphasising the problems rather than the achievements in this area, it is clear that Turkey still has problems in terms of human rights and democracy. Within this context the EU has been particularly sensitive about minority rights, namely the Kurdish issue. The changes in that area in Turkey has been particularly slow for several reasons. Any improvement in the subject was very difficult when the PKK was waging a war against the state, a war which claimed 30,000 lives. But more importantly the changes in minority rights issues require a reshaping of Turkey’s approach to the issue of national identity and citizenship, which is obviously a painful and a controversial process and strongly resisted by some groups and institutions. In addition the EU has been critical of Turkey with respect to the role of the military in politics and human rights issues in general. The EU also perceives Turkey’s position in the midst of unstable regions as a threat to itself and seriously debates extending the boundaries of the Union to the Middle East. In addition the problems in Turkey–Greece relations have become an important factor since Greece’s membership in the EU in 1981. As a member of the Union, Greece has for years exercised a veto in EU’s relations with Turkey and blocked the implementation of several commitments of the Union towards Turkey. In the meantime some analysts have argued that several other members who were equally critical of Turkey’s membership used Greece’s opposition as a convenient cover to hide their own objections.111 More importantly, however, in the last decade Athens successfully incorporated its bilateral relations with Ankara into the EU’s agenda. Thus the resolution of the Cyprus issue and Greek–Turkish

122 Turkey in world affairs problems became a prerequisite for Turkey’s membership. Finally, although this is not often clearly stated, identity issues have been affecting the EU’s attitude towards Turkey: ‘The idea that the European Union cannot admit a Muslim nation to its ranks may still form part of the semi-hidden agenda of many European politicians and have some effect on public opinion.’112 There is an increasing debate within the Union about its identity and this debate has direct implications for Turkey. As clearly shown by the characterisation of Giscard d’Estaing, the president of the Convention that prepared the EU’s constitution, on the eve of the Copenhagen Summit, some in the EU define its identity in religious terms and think that Turkey has no place in it. As to public opinion, the polls show that among ‘all the current candidates, Turkey has the lowest level of support from the European public’ the not only due to concerns about immigration or the cost of enlargement but also because of prejudice and xenophobia, if not outright racism in some cases.113 These difficulties in relations with the EU created a debate in Turkey about the EU membership issue for the first time in the history of the relationship. Some began to seriously question the motivations of the EU and resented the loss of sovereignty in some areas, while others perceived membership of the EU as a remedy to all the problems Turkey is facing. In the meantime beneath all the big discussions and fights a deep and growing integration has already begun to emerge. Economic interdependence has deepened, while adoption of the EU acquis in different fields has begun to transform the institutions, norms and rules in Turkey. Recently, the AKP government hastened the process of reforms by introducing seven legislative packages. In response the revised Accession Partnership prepared by the Commission on 26 March 2003 and adopted by the member states in April was more positive about the pace of reforms. In July 2003 Turkey prepared its revised National Programme to once again elaborate on how it will be meeting the objectives of the Accession Partnership. Relations with Greece and Cyprus One of the most important recent developments in Turkish foreign policy has been the warming of relations between Greece and Turkey since 1998. This happened against a background of a host of crises that occurred in the 1980s and most of the 1990s. The two countries came to the brink of war in 1996 over the sovereignty of the Imia/Kardak islets in the Aegean. Rivalry between the two countries in the Balkans also led to a deterioration of relations. Disturbed by what it saw as the increasing Turkish role in the Balkans and what was termed Turkey’s attempt to create a ‘Muslim arc’ encircling Greece, the Andreas Papandreou government cultivated closer ties with Armenia and Syria in the mid-1990s. This time Ankara argued that Greece was trying to encircle Turkey. Furthermore, Ankara began to accuse Greece of supporting the PKK, the Kurdish separatist organisation fighting a war against Turkey. The end of the Cold War and Turkey’s increasing strategic importance and military might merely heightened the Turkish threat in Greece’s perception.114 Thus Turkish–Greek relations hit a new low in the first part of the 1990s.

Turkey in world affairs 123 However, beginning in 1998 a period détente started. The Foreign Ministers of the two countries, Andreas Papandreou, ironically the son of the late Prime Minister who was the architect of the previous tough policy in Greece, and Ismail Cem, again ironically the Foreign Minister from the party of Bülent Ecevit, known as a hard-liner on Cyprus policy, became crucial in consolidating the process. The contacts between the Foreign Ministers in the course of the NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia during the Kosovo crisis marked the beginning of détente. Subsequent generous government and private Greek and Turkish responses to earthquakes in each other’s countries popularised and thus strengthened the process. The two countries adopted an incremental approach by leaving the discussion of the most controversial issues aside and focusing on communicating on a wide variety of issues such as tourism, environment, culture and business. Most of the agreements on these areas were signed during the visits of Foreign Ministers in 2000, both the first in about 40 years. They also aimed to build trust through confidence-building measures including second-track diplomacy. The positive atmosphere was further strengthened when the Greek government, in contrast to its previous stance on the issue, began to support Turkey’s bid for EU membership. The reason for this rapprochement between the two countries was to be found mainly in changes in the foreign and security policy perspective in Greece brought forward by the Simitis government. The new government decided to put more emphasis on a Europe-oriented foreign policy. Decreasing military spending, which had been skyrocketing in the previous period due to a heightened perception of threat from Turkey, seemed the only logical way for Greece to meet the criteria to be included in the Euro zone, a first and important test case to implement EU-oriented foreign policy. The so-called Abdullah Öcalan affair also eventually contributed to the détente. The leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, was captured by the Turkish security forces in Kenya after being expanded from Syria when that country faced a threat from Turkey that Ankara was ready to use all necessary means, including military force, if Syria continued to harbour him and provide logistical support to the PKK. It was soon became clear that after leaving Syria, Öcalan was taken to Greece twice during his ordeal to find a new sanctuary and eventually was hiding in the Greek embassy in Nairobi. The whole affair was a major embarrassment for the Greek government and led to a deterioration of Turkish–Greek relations. Three Cabinet ministers, including the Foreign Minister Theodore Pangalos, and the intelligence chief were asked to step down. The event proved former accusations by Turkey that Greece was involved in supporting the PKK. However, although the Öcalan affair led to a sharp deterioration in Turkish–Greek relations, paradoxically it also served as an important stimulus to an eventual thaw in the relations as ‘both sides began a quiet dialogue designed to explore ways to improve relations’.115 Finally personal relationships between the two Foreign Ministers contributed to the strengthening of the détente between the two countries. After the elections, Greece showed its eagerness to continue good relations with the AKP by being first to invite its leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan for a visit to Greece. The AKP’s initial attempts to revise the Cyprus policy were welcomed in

124 Turkey in world affairs Athens. During the ministerial meeting of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in Crete in May 2003 Turkey and Greece announced a series of new confidencebuilding measures: namely visits on a regular basis of general staff officers, reciprocal visits between military academies and the establishment of links between military hospitals. These measures are quite significant considering that they involve the militaries of the two countries, one of the hard-liner institutions in Greek–Turkish relations on both sides. Despite this thaw, however, especially two critical divisive issues, territorial waters in the Aegean Sea and the future of Cyprus, remain unresolved. Greece was able to considerably change the dynamics of these issues very successfully in the 1990s by making them part of Turkey’s relations with the EU. The decision of the EU Helsinki Summit, which announced the European Union’s offer of candidate status to Turkey, tackled these issues in very careful terms and thus satisfied Greece. These were that (1) candidate states should ‘make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues. Failing this, they should within a reasonable time bring any pending dispute to the International Court of Justice’, which had already been the Greek position, especially since the changes in the Law of the Sea; and (2) while a ‘political settlement’ on Cyprus would ‘facilitate’ the island’s accession to the EU, ‘if no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the . . . decision on accession will be made without this being a precondition’. By accepting the invitation Turkey was thought to accept these terms.116 The Cyprus issue continued to dominate Turkish foreign policy throughout the 1990s. Although the inter-communal talks between the two Cypriot communities proceeded under UN auspices, as they have been since the beginning of the problem, no solution was reached. In the meantime in 1983, the Turkish Cypriot part of the island had declared itself an independent state – the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) – with Rauf Denktas¸ as its president. The TRNC is recognised only by Turkey. Although the two sides have shifted their positions over the years, they continue to present very different positions as to the future of the island. The Greek Cypriots want a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with broad powers for the central government. Since 1998, the Turkish Cypriots, by contrast, have pressed for a confederation with weak federal powers, based on the recognition of two separate and equal states. Turkey also began to clearly emphasise the strategic importance of the island. Although strategic considerations were always a part of Turkey’s policy, as is the case for other actors such as Greece, Great Britain and the US, before 1997, Turkey put primary emphasis in its Cyprus policy on the protection of the Turkish Cypriot community on the island. Since then, however, Ankara has openly argued that Cyprus was an important element of the security of Anatolia. Cyprus is also increasingly seen as important for the protection of Caspian oil that is expected to flow through the Baku–Ceyhan pipeline.117 Thus Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot government began to prefer the status quo in Cyprus. However, when the EU Summit in Luxembourg decided to begin accession negotiations with Cyprus, the parameters of the conflict were completely transformed. The decision was later reiterated in the Helsinki Summit where the

Turkey in world affairs 125 Union decided that the membership consideration of the Republic of Cyprus represented by the Greek Cypriots will be made regardless of the resolution of the Cyprus problem. Ankara protested, the decision against arguing that it erased any possibility of concession on the part of the Greek Cypriots. In the meantime a last-ditch effort to solve the problem came from UN Secretary General Kofi Annan on 11 November 2002. This was an attempt to reconcile the arguments of both sides, and as such drew criticism and calls for revision from both sides. However, after several attempts to save it, the Annan Plan could not be implemented in the end because of the Turkish Cypriot government’s rejection of it. Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktas¸ and his allies in Turkey were especially critical of the provisions on land and population exchanges. The Turkish side was also not satisfied with the characterisation of the Turkish side as only a ‘constitutive part’ of the envisaged federal state, but insisted on the recognition of full sovereignty of the TRNC, which could then enter into a federal arrangement with the Republic of Cyprus in the south.118 The newly formed AKP government initially criticised Denktas¸ and his supporters in Turkey as the defenders of the status quo and underlined a need for a ‘fresh approach’ to the Cyprus issue with the aim of resolving it shortly. In the meantime, on the Turkish side there appeared a growing political opposition to Denktas¸’s stance, which came to the surface largely because of the fears of being left behind while Greek Cypriots reap the benefits of EU membership. After the collapse of UN-brokered peace talks, as a conciliatory gesture Denktas¸ authorised opening the dividing line for day-trips, and thousands of Greek and Turkish Cypriots crossed the line between north and south in the divided capital of Nicosia/Lefkos¸a. The Middle East Except for a period during the 1950s, the Middle East had occupied a minor position in Turkey’s foreign policy. Even in the 1950s the region became part of the strategic thinking in Turkey not in its own right, but due to Ankara’s desire to increase its strategic value for the West. However, all this changed dramatically in the 1990s and the Middle East became the number one priority for the political and security elite. This was due to the heightened sense of domestic insecurity felt as a result of increasing domestic challenges to the Republican regime concurrent with external uncertainty due to the transformations in the post-Cold War era. In response Ankara developed a new strategic policy vis-à-vis the Middle East based on the redefinition of the threat perception. Ankara argued that the main security threat to Turkey now came from the south. This new policy could no longer be defined only as an extension of Turkey’s relations with the West. As such, Turkey’s policy became more independent of its ties with the West and constructed in a manner that directly built upon the principles of ‘the maintenance of the regime and the territorial integrity of the country’ as defined by the political and military elite. During this period ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ and ‘Kurdish separatism’ were identified as the two main threats to the Turkish state and they were largely defined through their external connections to the Middle East. In particular, the Kurdish

126 Turkey in world affairs question and the PKK determined the contours of this policy. It is safe to argue that Ankara began to perceive and develop its policy towards the Middle East through the prism of the Kurdish issue. The most complex challenge to Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East during this new era has been the situation in Iraq. Ankara on the one hand acted with its Western allies in the war and in the post-war developments in the Iraqi issue. Yet some groups within the state continued to have suspicions about the intentions of its allies with regard to Iraq and even with regard to Turkey. These concerns were also reflected in the debates over the extension of the mandate of Operation Provide Comfort (later renamed Northern Watch in 1997),119 which was labelled by some political groups as the ‘new Sèvres’, referring to the agreement imposed upon the Ottoman Empire after the First World War which sought to divide its territories. Meanwhile, Turkey’s relations with Syria also deteriorated steadily, again mostly due to the Kurdish issue. A negative historical legacy and long-standing disagreements over regional and international policy had already marred Turkish– Syrian relations. However, the changing regional and international landscape in the 1990s led to the emergence of already existing problems between the two countries in a more conflictual way. The existence of mutual distrust did not help to ease these tensions. From Syria’s perspective the dispute over the use of the waters of the Euphrates river was at the centre of the problematic relationship between the two countries. From Turkey’s perspective, on the other hand, relations with this country were tied to Syria’s support to the PKK. Finally, relations with Iran became increasingly problematic in the early 1990s. Turkey accused Iran of interfering in its domestic affairs, especially of training radical Islamist militants allegedly involved in assassinations of pro-secular intellectuals. In return Iran accused Turkey of intervening in its domestic affairs by allowing some members of Mujahedeen Halq, an Iranian opposition group, to remain in Turkey. These tensions culminated in a serious diplomatic crisis when in February 1997 the Iranian ambassador to Ankara was asked to leave the country because of a speech he made during the celebrations of Jerusalem Day organised by the Islamist Welfare Party mayor of the town of Sincan near Ankara. This incident, which occurred during the tenure of the Welfare government, once again demonstrated the extent to which Turkey’s relations with Iran were intermingled with domestic disputes. The military, which had already been quite disturbed by the policies of the government, responded to this incident in a very harsh way. The next morning the army tanks were on a parade in Sincan and the mayor was relieved of his post and taken in for questioning at the State Security Court. In addition, Ankara also from time to time claimed that Iran was supplying the PKK with logistical and financial support and training. On the other hand, Turkey’s cross-border incursions into Iraq disturbed Iran and led to tensions, especially when it was claimed that some Iranian citizens had been hurt.120 One response given by Ankara to the perception of increasing threats coming from its immediate Middle Eastern neighbours was to emphasise the security aspect of Turkish–Israeli relations that had been normalising since the beginning of the 1990s as a result of the Arab–Israeli peace process. Turkey, which had been

Turkey in world affairs 127 reluctant to become involved in open security co-operation with Israel, began to reconsider this policy in the mid-1990s. As a result, Turkey and Israel established close ties in security-related matters and signed two agreements to further their relations in this area.121 A related consideration was the desire of the Turkish military to obtain military hardware and technology from Israel. Turkey, in fact, announced a very ambitious defence expansion and modernisation programme which planned to spend about 150 billion dollars on armaments over 20 to 25 years.122 However, at that time it was becoming more and more difficult to obtain this technology and hardware from its Western allies because of concern over human rights and Ankara’s poor relations with Greece. Israel, on the other hand, had the technology and the arms and unlike the Europeans and the US was ready to share them with Turkey. Finally, the Turkish political elite was quite interested in getting the support of the proIsraeli lobby in the US. This factor had become more important in the post-Cold War era when Turkey was trying to find itself a new place in the emerging order. Furthermore, the increasing role of the US Congress in foreign policy making also made enlisting the support of this lobby especially valuable in order to balance out some ethnic lobbies that were generally working against Turkey. However, after the resolution of its problem with Syria over its support for the PKK in 1998 and after the signing of the Adana agreement, Turkey’s relations with Arab countries in the region improved. Ankara also tried to be active in the resolution of the Palestinian problem, after the al-Aqsa intifada. Relations with Iran also improved after the election of President Khatami. Nevertheless Turkey’s Middle East policy continued to be a hostage to the Kurdish issue, mainly due to the unresolved situation in Iraq. The Balkans The regime change which swept the Balkan countries that were formerly ruled by communist parties was very much welcomed by Turkey. Although Turkey had limited relations with some of the Balkan countries during the Cold War years, the change brought forward new opportunities for Turkish foreign policy. Using historical, cultural and geographic links with the region Turkey began to seek a prominent regional role. The Balkans region was not only a part of the Ottoman Empire for more than 500 years, but it was in many ways the heart of it. As a result of this history approximately 10 million Muslims live in the area. Furthermore, due to the waves of immigration, a considerable part of Turkey’s population has links to the Balkans.123 These links became an important reason for Turkey’s interest in the region in the post-Cold War period. In addition, geographically the Balkans constitute ‘a strategic link between Turkey and Western Europe’ where ‘two and a half million Turkish citizens live . . . and more than half of Turkish foreign trade is conducted’.124 Finally, Turkey took a keen interest in the stability of the region as the spill over effects of any instability had the potential to engulf Turkey as well. Having these interests in mind Turkey sought to enhance its political and economic influence in the Balkans.

128 Turkey in world affairs However, soon the challenges arose. Rising nationalism and ethno-religious conflicts erupted in the region and complicated Turkey’s foreign policy. Ankara disliked the disintegration of existing states along ethnic and/or religious lines not only out of fear of increasing instability and thus possibility of a broader regional conflict, but also because of its own war against the Kurdish separatist PKK. 125 However, at the same time it could not stand by when ethno-religious conflicts, sometimes vicious, were continuing there. Such a policy would have been highly unpopular domestically where there was a genuine interest in the fate of the Muslims and/or ethnic kin. On the other hand, the Ottoman legacy had played out negatively in the case of the Serbs, who invoked and reinterpreted some of that history negatively in their quest for dominance. Furthermore, especially initially, there was clear competition with Greece, which was feeling solidarity with its Orthodox kin and looking at ways to limit Turkey’s influence in the region. However, Ankara established good relations with almost all other Balkan countries and they mostly act together with the US and thus further increase its influence in the region.126 The complexity of the situation became clear in Turkey’s policy during the two major crises in the former Yugoslavia. Ankara ‘strongly advocated keeping Yugoslavia together’ and ‘decided to recognise all breakaway states of the former Yugoslavia’ in February 1992, only after the disintegration of Yugoslavia became a fact and many European states already recognised the new states.127 Yet when the war broke out in Bosnia in 1992 Turkey advocated Western military measures to contain the Serbs and pressed for an end to the UN arms embargo to enable Bosnian Muslims to defend themselves. When finally there was an international action, Turkey contributed ships to the NATO naval force blockading Serbia and Montenegro. In May 1993 F-16s were deployed to support the NATO operation to enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia. A Turkish offer of troops to the UN Protection Force in Bosnia was at first rejected by the UN Security Council because of Ankara’s strong sympathies for the Bosnian Muslims and memories of the Ottoman role in the Balkans. In April 1994, however, after experiencing difficulty in obtaining force commitment, the UN accorded a Turkish deployment of about 1,500 soldiers in spite of the objections by Serbia and Greece. The second major crisis which broke towards the end of that decade, the Kosovo conflict, put Turkey in a more difficult position. Once gain Turkey felt obliged to support the territorial integrity of Serbia against the Albanians in Kosovo who wanted independence, due to its own Kurdish problem. Furthermore, the conflict in Kosovo once again threatened stability in the Balkans, an important element of Turkey’s Balkan policy, especially as it threatened to spill over to neighbouring Macedonia where an Albanian minority lives. Turkey had also developed excellent relations with that country by then. Having these considerations in mind Foreign Minister ˙Ismail Cem visited Belgrade in March 1998 for a failed last-ditch effort to solve the problem without undermining the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia.128 Turkey then complied with the UN sanctions against Serbia and eventually participated in the NATO bombing of that country. After the war Turkey contributed a unit of 1,000 troops to the peacekeeping force,

Turkey in world affairs 129 KFOR, in which its troops are deployed around the Prizren area where the ethnic Turks live. Turkey pursued its interests in the Balkans through multilateral diplomacy and bilateral ties. In dealing with conflicts Ankara used the international forums to make its suggestions and criticisms, preferring to act through the UN and NATO and avoiding unilateral moves.129 On the other hand, Turkey developed its bilateral relations with all the Balkan countries except Serbia, in the political, military and economic fields, although except for Rumania and Bulgaria economic ties remained rather limited. Finally, Turkey became part of the regional co-operation schemes. The South-east Europe Co-operative Initiative, launched in December 1996, aimed to enhance regional co-operation in economic and environmental issues. The South-east Europe Multinational Force, signed in Tirana on 15 May 1998, between Turkey, Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Macedonia, Slovenia and Italy as members and the US as observer, aimed to act as a peacekeeping force in Balkan conflicts. While ‘almost all countries in this region tried to gain Turkey’s support during their troubled transformations’130 Turkey’s influence in the region was tamed to some extent in the atmosphere of relative stability where countries in the region turned their faces towards the EU. This had implications for Turkish–Greek rivalry in the Balkans. As the new Greek government increasingly put aside its perception of threats from the region, it became more able to use its EU membership to expand its influence in the Balkans. Although this new approach also facilitated co-operation with Turkey as well, as is demonstrated by their competition over the location for the South-east Europe Multinational Force’s headquarters, the two countries continued to limit each other’s influence. That particular issue was resolved, however, when the member countries agreed to rotate the headquarters. The Caspian Region and Russia Another region that has opened up for Turkey in the post-Cold War period is the former Soviet republics in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Turkey had religious and ethnic ties with most of the countries in the region, but had been unnaturally cut off from it during the Soviet rule. Thus their emergence as independent states was very much welcomed in Ankara especially in a period when Turkey was having concerns over its place in the emerging international system. Turkey initially approached the region with an unfounded euphoria, based on the ideas of regional leadership.131 Concerned about possible Iranian influence and the emergence of Islamic radicalism in the region, the US government also promoted Turkey as a ‘model’ for these newly established states. Shortly the ‘model’ debate lost its importance when it became clear that neither Islamic rule nor democracy was going to be established soon in these countries. Over time Turkey became much more realistic in its relations with the region. On the one hand, Turkey lacked the financial resources to play the leadership role in the region, on the other hand, having only recently become independent themselves these countries were not looking for another ‘big brother’.132 More

130 Turkey in world affairs importantly Russia came back a few years later and made it clear that it would not allow any other country to dominate this region which it considered its ‘near abroad’. For most of the 1990s Turkey and Russia engaged in competition over influence, which greatly limited the possibilities for Turkey. One of the main regional interests of Ankara in the Caspian region has been its oil resources. In particular, competition for the transformation of the landlocked Eurasian countries’ oil has become the subject of years of struggle involving the regional powers of Turkey, Iran and Russia, the international oil companies, and extra regional actors, like the US, to name but a few. Turkey proposed the Caspian–Mediterranean Oil Pipeline Project in December 1994 to carry the Kazak and Azeri oil through two interconnected pipelines from Tengiz and Baku overland from Turkey to the Ceyhan export terminal on the Mediterranean. The US supported the Turkish proposal. The oil companies, especially, initially opposed to it for economic reasons. Eventually, the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan Oil Consortium under the British Petroleum (BP) oil company was established to invest 1.4 billion dollars for the realisation of the pipeline. Although the return of Iraq to the oil market after the war introduced a challenge to the project, the first oil is expected to flow through the 1,740-km pipeline from the Caspian to the Mediterranean in 2005.133 The eruption of ethnic conflicts in Nagorna-Karabakh, Chechnya and Georgia complicated Turkey’s policy towards the Caucasus. In addition to its concerns about stability on its borders, Ankara was also sensitive to these conflicts because of pressures from the large numbers of citizens of Turkey with ethnic ties to the region. However, as in the case of the Balkans, Ankara ‘chose to exercise caution rather than risk involvement in the ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus that could have brought it into a major conflict with Russia’.134 To deal with the challenges, however, and similar to Turkish policy in the Balkans, Ankara opted to co-operate fully with the United States in the region. Ankara became influential in integrating this region into the Western political, security and economic system. At the same time bilateral relations were also developed not only with the so-called Turkic republics, but also with Georgia. Turkey developed economic and cultural ties with these countries. In the economic sphere in addition to trade, private Turkish companies invested in the region.135 In the cultural sphere: ‘Ankara opened up cultural centres in the Central Asian republics; it established extensive scholarship programmes to allow Central Asian students to study in Turkey; and it expanded its television broadcasts in an effort to extend its cultural influence in Central Asia.’136 Turkey’s relations with the Caspian region became an important element of Turkish–Russian relations as the two countries actively sought to limit each others’ influence in the region. Yet the rivalry in the Caspian constituted just one aspect of this relationship that contained elements of both co-operation and discord. In the Balkans too Russia and Turkey were on opposing sides in terms of their policies towards the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo. Traditional Russian support for the Greek Cypriots in the Cyprus issue led to a crisis with Turkey when Moscow announced its intention of selling S-200 missiles to the Republic of Cyprus in 1998. Relations between the two countries were further damaged by their mutual accusations of

Turkey in world affairs 131 support for ethnic separatist groups. While Turkey accused Russia of supporting the PKK, Russia claimed Turkey’s interference in the Chechen conflict. Despite these problems and divergent perspectives, however, Russia and Turkey established since the mid-1990s what Duygu Sezer has called ‘virtual rapprochement’: a relationship based on co-operation through ‘managed geopolitical rivalry and unique economic co-operation verging on interdependence’ but also marred with mutual distrust and suspicion.137

Conclusion Like other middle powers, the foreign policy behaviour of Turkey has been very much conditioned by the structure of the international system. However, Turkey has not necessarily lacked the ability to choose its own foreign policy initiatives. As a middle power Turkey has at times enjoyed autonomy and bargaining power depending on the issue at hand. In general the foreign policy behaviour of the country has been constrained not only by the systemic context but also by its resources and by the balance of domestic interests. Within this context Turkish foreign policy has gone through different phases. If we summarise the main characteristics of each period we can underline the dynamics of its evolution. The early republican period was characterised by the struggle for survival. Thus the goals of internal reform and construction together with consolidation of the regime took precedence. These concerns forced Turkey to turn inward, but in a neighbourhood that was undergoing significant transformations in the post-First World War period this could not be achieved completely. Settlement of the unfinished business of the Lausanne Peace Treaty required Turkey to constantly negotiate, especially with the two major powers, namely Great Britain and France, that had become neighbours. The quest for recognition by these powers and the consolidation of independence, which was in no way taken for granted, constituted major foreign policy goals. And yet Ankara did not refrain from exploiting Great Power rivalry to further its own interests. It failed to do so in the case of Mosul, whereas positive results were achieved in the case of the Alexandretta/Hatay issue and the revision of the Straits regime through the Montreux Convention, largely owing to the correct reading of the changes in the international system. During the Second World War Turkey became subject to intense pressures from the Great Powers. Yet Ankara was successful in resisting these pressures and thus realising its foreign policy goal of not entering the war unless it was being attacked. As Hale argues, in addition to diplomatic skill, Hitler’s decision to go north rather than south played an important part in the realisation of this goal.138 The period immediately following the Second World War, the new international order characterised by the Cold War between the two superpowers, limited options for middle powers like Turkey, and Ankara entered into a long-term alliance commitment with one of the superpowers. Turkey’s ‘followership’ in this instance was a conscious act, as Ankara accepted the coincidence of interests between itself and the leader of the Western bloc in the Cold War.139 These interests were based

132 Turkey in world affairs on more than military threat perceptions coming from the Soviet Union, and reflected active intellectual and ideational intervention. Such an alliance was seen as a corollary of Turkey’s quest to become part of the Western system of states. With the waning of the Cold War in the 1970s and the parallel decrease in Turkey’s importance for the United States, Turkey was able to diversify its foreign policy. Additionally, Ankara’s desire to pursue a more independent foreign policy was also facilitated by the redefinition of interests stemming from developments in the Cyprus issue. The parallel perception of threat from the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan once again bridged the gap between Turkey and the United States. However, the division within the Western bloc between the US and Europe presented Turkey with challenges in terms of defining its position. Ankara was largely unable to read the changes that were going on in the European Community in terms of the increasing importance of human rights and democracy in the definition of the community’s identity. Still perceiving the community through an economic lens, Turkey applied for membership on the basis of its new credentials in making the shift towards a market economy and was rejected. In the post-Cold War transitional international system Turkey sought to ‘relocate’ itself in international politics – economically, diplomatically and militarily – in the 1980s and 1990s. Transformations in the international system, especially increased fluidity introduced by the ending of the Cold War, provided the context for new activism. Another important factor was the growing foreign policy interests of domestic groups due to the blurring of the boundaries between domestic and foreign policies. Societal groups and lobbies began to push the governments to adopt certain positions in foreign policy issues as diverse as the Bosnian crisis, the Chechnian war, relations with Russia and the European Union. Similarly, public opposition to the Iraq War became an important variable in the calculation of Turkey’s foreign policy options. Thus the proliferation of interest groups from the mid-1980s onwards led to the breakdown of the earlier consensus on foreign policy objectives. Changing international and domestic contexts offered both scope and incentives for activism that were more advanced than at any other period in the past. In the post-Cold War era activism, however, required new capabilities that are beyond the physical attributes.140 Increasingly, factors such as bureaucratic capacity, effective intelligence gathering and communication networks, creativity and coalition-building became important for middle powers who wished to play an active role in international relations. Turkey embarked on a course of diplomatic activism and did take several initiatives. Ankara played the leadership role in the establishment of the Black Sea Co-operation Organisation and launched major initiatives such as the South-eastern European Co-operation Process. Turkey also played the role of facilitator in conflicts ranging from Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia to the Palestinian conflict and conflicts in the Balkans. Ankara has contributed troops, materials and observers to international missions within the framework of the UN, NATO and OSCE, a typical activity for middle powers in the post-Cold War era. Thus Turkey has participated in such missions ranging from Somalia through Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia to Hebron, Georgia, East Timor

Turkey in world affairs 133 and most recently in Afghanistan. Turkey has also acted quite independently especially in the Middle East and developed new policy tools in the case of Iraq, fostered its ties with Israel and put increasing pressure on Syria to achieve its objectives. In an increasingly unipolar system, in addition to working with international organisations Turkey has co-operated very closely with the US in defining its middle power role. Washington relied upon and promoted its partnership with Turkey. That role has been most vividly demonstrated in the prominence of the partnership in the containment of the Saddam regime in Iraq, in the Balkans and in the Caspian regions as well as in the ‘global war against terrorism’. There were severe limitations on Turkey’s post-Cold War middle power activism, however. Despite its increasing economic strength, the Turkish economy proved fragile as it went through serious cycles of crises since 1990s. Yet, more important than economic limitations were Turkey’s own insecurities arising from significant domestic challenges. The Kurdish issue put an enormous strain on Turkey’s capabilities in international relations. In addition to huge human and economic costs, this issue increased Turkey’s vulnerabilities, and at times hijacked its foreign policy. Similarly the intensification of polarisation along Islamic/secular lines undermined the argument for Turkey being a model for Islamic countries. Thus in addition to systemic factors, Turkish foreign policy was largely affected by debates about collective identity. The debate over Turkey’s national and regional identities that started in the 1980s was intensified by rapid changes in international politics. Domestic insecurities not only ‘securitised’ Turkish foreign policy, but also limited activism. The ‘fear of change’ and a strong desire to protect the status quo at times overwhelmed Turkish foreign policy.

Conclusion

Despite the appearance of a rupture, the Turkish Republic was in fact the culmination of the reformation period that started in the late eighteenth century in the Ottoman Empire. Those who established Turkey were themselves the products of the reforms and benefited immensely from the institutional and ideological inheritance of that period. They also drew lessons from the failures of the reforms in saving the state. The Republic was a response to territorial dismemberment and foreign occupation. After the war of independence Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his colleagues were in a uniquely powerful position to make sweeping changes in Turkish society and to form a modern nation state. Yet still the task was immense. The economy of the war-torn country was devastated, and, despite the military victory against Greece, the country was on the losing side of the First World War and thus an object of the designs for a post-war international order. The Turkish modernisation project implemented under these conditions, aimed at building a nation state based on market economy, secularism, and a re-constituted TurcoMuslim identity. Soon the regime became an authoritarian single-party rule owing to the governing elite’s perception of the changing internal and external environment. Domestically the Kurdish Sheikh Said rebellion became a turning point as it underlined the difficulties and challenges to the project of creating a modern secular homogeneous nation state. Internationally ‘world economic conditions and ideological zeitgeist [that] shifted to favour anti-liberal and a state-directed economy’ influenced the regime.1 The literature on state formation recognises the initial relevance of coercive force in the formation of the state but it argues that state powers had to be legitimated by a formally enacted system of law, and the means of state control had to be allocated to a functionally specialised bureaucratic apparatus. Despite periodic crises, to a large extent Turkey has been able to establish a functioning democracy and an institutional capacity since the beginning of multi-party politics. As in the case of many late-developers the nation state building process was initiated from above and yet legitimised more strongly due to the early opening of political and economic space for participation by various actors. There are other unique features of the Turkish experience, especially when compared to other Middle Eastern/Muslim nations. Although many in the Muslim world have grappled with

Conclusion 135 the issue of modernisation at least since the late eighteenth century, Turkish modernisation differed from other experiences by its explicit commitment to the project of ‘cultural modernisation’, in addition to political, economic and technological aspects. Thus Westernisation in all its forms became an open goal and the regime identified the West as the ‘contemporary civilisation’ to which it wanted Turkey to belong. Similarly no other Muslim nation has adopted secularism to the extent that Turkey did. Turkey’s relatively long experience with competitive politics also represents a significant deviation from the regional pattern. For many years conventional studies on Turkey have considered Turkey’s modernisation with its domestic and international dimensions as a success that should be emulated by developing countries, especially Middle Eastern and Islamic countries.2 During this period the main critique of this modernisation in the public space came from the left particularly with regard to its socio-economic aspects.3 In the last two decades, however, there has been an increasing challenge to the Kemalist modernity project on the grounds of its cultural and political features. What was once considered a progressive and successful nation-state building model began to be characterised as a failed authoritarian and elitist one. Multiple factors, domestically and internationally, can account for this change. Turkey entered the 1980s with a deep sense of crisis. Throughout the 1970s the country was torn with social and political unrest coupled with severe economic crisis. The coup in 1980, bringing the military to the politics for a third time with severe restrictive restructuring of the polity, led to a serious re-examination of the main tenets of the regime. The emergence of identity politics in the same period further contributed to the questioning of two main elements of Turkey’s modernisation project: namely its unitary nature and its secularism. Rising Kurdish nationalism challenged the unitary understanding of the Turkish nation. The increasingly vocal and popular Islamic groups, on the other hand, criticised the secular and Western aspects of modernisation. Internationally, transformation in the international system, starting in the late 1980s, forced Turkey to redefine its international and regional identities. Having defined its international posture within a unified West, Turkey now found itself in the process of having to relocate and reconsider its policies and interests in a unipolar but multi-regional context. This search for an identity in the international realm articulated with domestic identity politics. Furthermore, post-modern critique in social sciences in general has influenced both the identity politics and the academic discourse on Turkey. The emergence of critical rethinking of modernisation followed a similar pattern in other parts of the world including the Middle East. This critical debate on modernisation has contributed greatly to Turkish studies. However, some of these critical studies fell into a similar trap as the conventional studies when they took an essentialist and ahistorical approach to understanding modernisation and its consequences. Some studies juxtaposed ‘an elitist, unchanged state’ with static and monolithic categories of ethnic and religious identities. In looking at the emergence of Islamic identity, it was seen as a given and self-contained category, repressed but otherwise unaffected by the practices of the two-century-old process of modernisation and secularisation initiated by the state.

136 Conclusion Similarly, Kurdish identity had also been taken to be unchanging and monolithic and expressed through nationalism since the establishment of the Republic. However, both identities have been redefined over time, not only because of their inner dynamics but also through their interaction with the modernisation project itself. In this study we have tried to present these new debates on Turkish modernisation. What constituted the ‘Kemalist modernisation project’, how its constitutive elements changed over time and what the major challenges to it were in politics, economics and foreign policy spheres make up the main aspects of this book. The main elements of the Kemalist modernisation project that was initiated in the 1920s were the creation of a unitary state based on Turkish nationalism, secularism and Westernisation. This was a nation-building project imposed from above in what was left of the Ottoman Empire, based on a century-old reform and modernisation. In this sense it was a social engineering project that generated its challengers and opponents over time. Based on the European nation-state model it emphasised cultural and ethnic homogeneity. Turkish modernisation achieved some of its important aims while it remained short of answering some critical challenges. On the issue of secularism, one important development had been the growth of grassroots support and its authentication in time. This process transformed Islamist discourse and politics and pulled Islamic politics into the centre, culminating in the emergence of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). On the other hand, at times the implementation of a strict version of secularism – not only the separation of politics from religion but also a severe control of politics over religion – led to the politicisation of this issue and the polarisation of the population along secularist and Islamic lines. On the issue of Westernisation the regime continued its drive to join the Western system of states that culminated in Turkish membership in almost all Western institutions that were established in the post-World War period. Since the association agreement with the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1964, the goal of becoming part of the European integration process increasingly began to signify the goal of Westernisation. In democratisation, which was also perceived as part of Westernisation, Turkey has come a long way, especially when compared with many countries in the developing world. Turkey was able to establish several political parties in a working electoral politics and democracy. However, the process of democratisation in Turkey has also encountered serious problems, namely the military interventions and continuing human rights problems which prevented the consolidation of democracy. The main area in which the Kemalist modernisation project remained less adaptable is in the unitary nature of the Turkish nation. For decades the regime denied even the existence of separate ethnic communities in Turkey. When this notion was challenged, mainly by Kurdish nationalism and especially in the form of the militant PKK, the regime responded with military means as well. Turning this issue into one of security further curtailed any recognition of ethnic identities in the public sphere. Only recently, with the military defeat of the PKK and the

Conclusion 137 capture of its leader in 1998, have the political and cultural aspects of the Kurdish issue come up for discussion, however limited. This debate is closely related to Turkey’s relations with the EU. In the face of these achievements and difficulties, Kemalism, which was never a clear-cut ideology but more of a pragmatic nation and state building project, began to be redefined and reinterpreted in the face of socio-economic, cultural, political and international changes. For example, with the introduction of multiparty politics in 1946, the RPP, the founder of the Republic and the modernisation project, did not refrain from the use of Islamic symbols and references in party discourse and initiated the opening of the Imam Hatip Schools. Similarly, in 1980 the military regime introduced the Turkish-Islamic synthesis into Turkish politics and used Islam to repress the power of the leftist groups. It was the same regime that introduced compulsory religious courses in secondary education. This instrumentalist use of Islam in secular Turkey demonstrated the pragmatist and flexible nature of the regime, and thus ironically contributed to the continuation of the modernisation project. From 1969 onwards religiously oriented parties became part of the political system and participated in elections. Furthermore, since 1950 the centre-right parties have made instrumentalist use of Islam as well as genuine references to it, thus making claims about total exclusivist policies of the regime unsustainable. At the same time, as Bayart argues, a ‘parallel Islam’, with its conservative, reactionary and subversive forms, has developed. Most of the tarikats and movements within this group, however, did not completely reject the republican modernisation project, but yet put a ‘socially conservative interpretation on it’.4 The 1980s and 1990s witnessed a series of transformations and challenges in both the domestic and the foreign sphere. The 1980 military coup constituted a significant break with the past and led to an institutional restructuring of political life. The military regime also supported the economic restructuring that started right before the coup and accelerated the transformation of the economic policy. The process of political and economic transformation continued under civilian rule and yet proved unsustainable, which led to a severe legitimacy crisis in the 1990s. The processes of economic liberalisation were compounded by the decision in 1989 to completely deregulate Turkey’s financial markets. However, Turkey’s new economic strategy has suffered serious problems, including deteriorating macroeconomic performance, worsening income distribution, high inflation and debt. The cycle of crisis starting in 1994 led to the twin financial crises of 2002, characterised as the worst economic crisis since the Second World War. Economic deterioration was paralleled by political impasse. The fragmentation of political ideologies and parties resulted in weak coalition governments that contributed to political instability. The weakening of the centre political parties led to the increasing power of the marginal parties of the past, especially the Islamist and ultra-nationalist ones. Because politics was discredited the fortunes of all political parties became unstable, a trend that reached its peak in the last elections when all the parties, whether in power or in opposition, found themselves under the threshold and thus could not enter Parliament.

138 Conclusion Politics further deteriorated due to two interrelated processes. First, the rise of the power of political Islam and the war between the state and the Kurdish separatist PKK led to polarisations in the society. This polarisation then opened the way for an increasingly visible role and greater involvement of the military in politics. The ‘political autonomy of the military’5 was thus redefined, as the military no longer appeared ‘above politics’ as it had in the past, but in many instances became a party in the increasingly polarised political game. During this period Turkish foreign policy also went through a significant transformation in response to both the domestic and the external challenges. The intermingling of domestic issues with foreign policy complicated the task of redefining Turkey’s place in the post-Cold War environment. In particular, the Kurdish problem influenced foreign relations to an unprecedented extent in the 1990s. Since the 1990s the shifting regional and international environment also presented Turkey with several opportunities and in fact the country’s weight in international politics increased as Ankara was able to use political, economic, and military means to expand its influence. Yet ironically domestic weaknesses increased Turkey’s vulnerabilities and thus undermined its capability to fully exploit these opportunities. Many of the recent writings on Turkey emphasise a notion of crossroads and claim that the country has come to a crossroads both in domestic transformation and in international issues.6 Economic recovery, the future of the AKP government and successful dealing with the non-military aspects of the Kurdish challenge will be critical in that regard. Overall they will contribute to the consolidation of democracy. These issues are closely related to Turkey’s relations with the EU in particular. An important part of the stimuli for Turkish democratisation has come from the Union. Yet at the same time the omnipresent role of the EU in the difficult transformation process has further contributed to the polarisation and conflict in the society as it, together with the mixed signals and sometimes double standards coming from the EU, has heightened the nationalist and sometimes xenophobic feelings in some political actors. On the other hand, Turkey faces other significant challenges in its foreign policy. The increasing transatlantic rift, the problems in Turkish–US relations, the Iraq war and the possible transformations in the Middle East, and developments in the Cyprus issue are likely to force Turkey to reconsider some of its policies. All of these issues of domestic and foreign policy have already created a clear ideological rift between different segments of society and political actors. However, as argued by a seasoned observer of Turkey, Andrew Mango, this rift is not between the ‘Kemalists’ and the ‘liberals’, as sometimes argued. In fact, first of all the meaning of both of these categories is widely interpreted. But more importantly, it is hard to categorise as liberals the bulk of the main challengers to the Kemalist modernisation project, namely the Islamists and the Kurdish nationalists. The principal political struggle inside Turkey is waged between those seeking to maintain the status quo and the reformers. This divide goes beyond ideological divisions and represents a position on the main challenges Turkey is facing today. Material and political interests as well as historical fears and animosities play an

Conclusion 139 important role in the formation of these positions. The result of this struggle may determine the future of the country and its modernisation project. Whether it will be able to evolve as it did in the past and adapt to the changing circumstances holds the key for the future.

Notes

1 From the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic 1 For a strong recent case for the continuity argument see Dietrich Jung (with Wolfango Piccoli) Turkey at the Crossroads: Ottoman Legacies and the Greater Middle East (London: Zed Books, 2001). 2 Albert Hourani, ‘Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables’, in William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers (eds) The Beginnings of Modernisation in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968) pp. 41–68. 3 According to Kemal Karpat the pact was, in fact, a significant step in the process of political modernisation as it signified ‘the differentiation and definition of administrative functions’. The notables legitimised their status through their agreement with the modernising bureaucracy, both ‘in relation to the throne and the people, not on the basis of Islam but of power’. Kemal Karpat, ‘The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789–1908’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 3 (1972) p. 253. 4 Italics in the original text. Serif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1962) p. 171. 5 For the significance of the educational reforms for the nineteenth-century reformation period and secularisation and modernisation see Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1965) especially Chapter 4. 6 Roderic H. Davison, Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774–1923: The Impact of the West (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990) p. 118. 7 The Ottoman Empire received its first loan in 1854, right after the beginning of the Crimean War. In the next 20 years thirteen more such loans were received. Soon, about 60 per cent of the state’s total expenditure was directed towards servicing this debt. This situation led to a bankruptcy and a Public Debt Administration (PDA) was founded to manage that debt. Roger Owen, The Middle East in the World Economy, 1800–1914 (London and New York: Methuen, 1981) pp. 100–121. 8 For the ideas of the Young Ottomans see Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought; Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1961) pp. 132–165. 9 For more on the First Ottoman Parliament, see Karpat, ‘The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789–1908’ pp. 267–270. 10 Hasan Kayalı, Arabs and Young Turks (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999) p. 25.

Notes 141 11 Kemal H. Karpat, The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) p. 308. 12 Ibid. 13 Selim Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876–1909 (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998) p. 166. 14 According to Deringil during this period ‘The ¸seriat . . . became a fluid notion and was used in conjunction with, indeed as the ultimate justification for, change.’ Ibid. p. 168. 15 Ibid. p.171. 16 The Europeans gave the label of Young Turks, which implies a Turkish emphasis, to the movement. However, this labelling was misleading as Kayali argues the movement ‘featured an unprecedented ethnic, religious and geographical diversity’ and thus was ‘more ‘Ottoman’ than its Young Ottoman antecedent’. Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks p. 39. 17 M. S ¸ ükrü Haniog˘lu, The Young Turks in Opposition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) p. 174. 18 William L. Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994) p. 127. 19 Aykut Kansu, The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1997) pp. 26–27 and 73. 20 For the politicisation of the officer corps by 1908 see M. Naim Turfan, Rise of the Young Turks: Politics, the Military and Ottoman Collapse (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000). 21 The ease with which the CUP took power in 1908 led to a debate in the literature as to the nature of the unrest and the social basis of 1908. The traditional perspective considers the coming to power of the CUP as just a change of elites. This perspective has been challenged by Kansu who portrays the event of 1908 as a popular revolution in which political power is taken from the hands of a monarch. 22 However, Kayalı argues that ‘political expediency gradually forced Unionists to compromise with established landed and community interests, especially in those parts of the empire where the Committee’s organisation was rudimentary and semifeudal relationships were strong between urban notables, peasants, and tribes’. Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks p. 210. 23 Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey (London: Routledge, 1993) p. 36. 24 Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876–1909 p. 171. 25 Rifa’t ‘Ali Abou-el-Hajj, Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991) pp. 60–69. 26 Non-Muslims sometimes were not happy about some of the duties such as conscription that equal rights brought, either. 27 Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks p. 31. 28 See, for instance, Kayalı, Arabs and Young Turks pp. 209–210; Karpat, The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State p. 327; Donald Quataert, The Ottoman Empire, 1700–1922 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000) p. 188. 29 Feroz Ahmad argues that the decision ‘to cultivate the landholders’ was based on the fact that ‘land remained the primary factor since it provided the bulk of the state’s revenue’ and ‘it was the only segment of the economy which still remained largely

142 Notes

30 31 32 33 34

35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42

43 44 45 46

47 48 49

50 51

in Muslim and Turkish hands’. As such the policy of promoting the landlords had started even before the CUP rule. Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey p. 28. For such efforts in the Arab provinces, which eventually turned out to be only partially successful, see Kayalı, Arabs and Young Turks. Taner Timur, Türk Devrimi ve Sonrası (Turkish Revolution and After) (Ankara: Imge Yayinlari, 1993) p. 12. Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East p. 141. Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey p. 44. For this argument see Çag˘ler Keyder, ‘Class and State in the Transformation of Modern Turkey’, in Fred Halliday and Hamza Alavi (eds) State Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1988) pp. 191–221. Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East p. 141. Armenians have accused the Ottoman central government of directing the attacks, a claim denied by successive Turkish governments. For more on the Mosul question see Chapter 4, ‘Turkey in World Affairs’. Davison, Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774–1923: The Impact of the West p. 212. However, Mustafa Kemal later estranged from the leadership of the CUP. Erik J. Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1993) p. 141. M.E.Yapp, The Making of the Modern Middle East, 1792–1923, Second Edition (London: Longman, 1987) p. 149. Italy and France were disturbed by the possibility of both a complete British domination in the Near East and an increasing Soviet influence over Ankara. Thus they decided to strengthen their ties with the Ankara government. Dilek Barlas, Etatism and Diplomacy in Turkey: Economic and Foreign Policy Strategies in an Uncertain World, 1929–1939 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1998) p. 120. The Montreux Convention later revised this regime in 1936. The Turkish portion of the debt was finally liquidated in 1948. Eric J. Zürcher, Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic: The Progressive Republican Party 1924–1925 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1991). In the official historiography the Sheikh Said rebellion has been characterised as a religious reactionary opposition. Some recent studies, however, argued it to be a Kurdish nationalist one. It seems that the rebellion had combined three grieviances: tribal reaction to an increasingly intrusive and centralising state; religious reaction to the strict secularisation programme; and proto-nationalist reaction to Turkish nationalism. For recent analysis of the rebellion and its nature see Robert Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and Sheikh Said Rebellion (Texas: University of Texas Press, 1989); Martin van Bruinnessen, Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structure of Kurdistan (London: Zed Books, 1992). Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey p. 59. Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History p. 184. Actually Turkish-speaking Christians were forced to leave while Greek-speaking Muslims came. For the social impact of the population exchange (mübadele) between Turkey and Greece see Onur Yildirim ‘Diplomats and Refugees: Mapping the TurcoGreek Exchange of Populations, 1922–1934’, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, 2002. Yapp, The Making of the Modern Middle East, 1792–1923 p. 148. Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey p. 93.

Notes 143 52 Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol. II: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808–1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977) p. 390. 53 The replacement of the tithe was a crucial decision as at that time it constituted half of the total state income. Timur, Türk Devrimi ve Sonrası (Turkish Revolution and After) p. 80. 54 Z.Y. Hershlag, Turkey: An Economy in Transition (The Hague: Uitgeverij Van Keulen, 1958) p. 21. 55 Similar responses to the world depression took place in many less developed countries. For similar policies in Eastern European and Middle Eastern countries see Barlas, Etatism and Diplomacy in Turkey: Economic and Foreign Policy Strategies in an Uncertain World, 1929–1939, Chapter 1. 56 However, ideas for a non-capitalist way of development were also entertained in the 1930s. A good example was the Kadro movement. See Mustafa Türkes¸ ‘The Ideology of the Kadro (cadre) Movement: A Patriotic Leftist Movement’, in Sylvia Kedourie (ed.) Turkey before and after Atatürk: Internal and External Affairs (London: Frank Cass, 1998) pp. 44–66. 57 The results of the first census in 1927. 58 Kemal Kiris.ci and Gareth Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-state Ethnic Conflict (London: Frank Cass, 1997) pp. 96–103. 59 This seems to be the case especially in immigration and refugee policies of the early republic. Kemal Kirisci, ‘Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices,’ Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 36, No. 3, July 2000: 1–22. Çag˘aptay also argues that while ‘nationality-through-religion’ was the basic principle in naturalisation policies, ‘in policies vis-à-vis its own citizens’ the regime increasingly ‘developed a robust nationalism’ that ‘considered ethnic Turks as first class citizens of the country’. However, ‘neither this ethnicism, nor nationality-through-religion was unique to Turkey’ in the 1930s, other countries especially ‘in East-Central Europe also experienced similar political developments’. Soner Çag˘ aptay, ‘Citizenship Policies in Interwar Turkey’, Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 9, No. 4 (2003) p. 614. 60 Ibid. pp. 2–4. 61 Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol. II: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808–1975 p. 376. 62 However, the Law did not only target the Kurds, but also other minorities and nomadic tribes. See Kirisci and Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey p. 99. 63 Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey pp. 63–64. 64 Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History p. 180. 65 Çag˘lar Keyder, ‘Whither the Project of Modernity? Turkey in the 1990s’, in Res¸at Kasaba and Sibel Bozdog˘an (eds) Rethinking Modernity and National Identity (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1997) p. 38. 66 Serif Mardin, ‘Projects as Methodology: Some Thoughts on Modern Turkish Social Science’, in Res¸at Kasaba and Sibel Bozdog˘an (eds) Rethinking Modernity and National Identity pp. 71–72. 67 An anthropological study conducted in Central Anatolian villages in 1965 found that most of the population remained unaffected by the reform process. Paul Stirling, A Turkish Village (London: Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1965). 68 This was the conclusion of a study conducted on the eastern Black Sea coast based on years of ethnographic fieldwork and archival research. Michael E. Meeker, A

144 Notes Nation of Empire: The Ottoman Legacy of Turkish Modernity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). 2 Politics in the Turkish Republic 1 See Metin Heper, State Tradition in Turkey (North Humberside: Eothen Press, 1985); Frederick Frey, The Turkish Political Elite (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965); Sabri Sayarı, ‘Party Politics in Turkey: Dimensions of Competition and Organisation’, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Columbia University, 1972; Ergun Özbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics – Challenges to Democratic Consolidation (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000); Ergun Özbudun, ‘Turkey: Crisis, Interruptions, and Reequilibrations’, in Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, Seymour Martin Lipset (eds) Politics in Developing Countries (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1990). 2 Frederick Frey, The Turkish Political Elite (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965) p. 301. 3 Ergun Özbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics – Challenges to Democratic Consolidation p. 81. 4 Sabri Sayari, ‘Political Parties, Party Systems, and Economic Reforms: The Turkish Case’, Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. 31, Issue 4 (Winter 1996/1997) p. 30. 5 Ümit Cizre-Sakallıog˘lu, ‘The Anatomy of the Turkish Military’s Political Autonomy’, Comparative Politics (1997) p. 155. 6 See Chapter 1. 7 Erik Zürcher, Turkey – A Modern History p. 207. 8 Roger Owen and S.evket Pamuk, A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century (London: I.B. Tauris 1998) p. 105. 9 They included Adnan Menderes, Celal Bayar, Fuat Köprülü and Refik Koraltan. For the details. of the issue see Emre Kongar, 21. Yüzyılda Türkiye (Turkey in the 21st Century) (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1998) and Kemal Karpat, Türk Demokrasi Tarihi – Sosyal, Ekonomik, Kültürel Temeller . (History of Turkish Democracy – Social, Economic and Cultural Foundations) (Istanbul: Afa Yayıncılık, 1996). 10 William Hale, Turkish Politics and Turkish Military (London: Routledge, 1994) p. 90. 11 Ibid. p. 89. 12 Jacob Landau, Radical Politics in Modern Turkey (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974) p. 1. 13 For the details of the political parties, their Islamic discourses and different characteristics, see Kemal Karpat, Türk Demokrasi Tarihi – Siyasal, Ekonomik, . Kültürel Temeller and Dog˘an Duman, Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye’de I slamcılık . (Islamism in Turkey within the Process of Democracy) (Izmir: Dokuz Eylül Yayınları, 1997). 14 Jacob Landau, Radical Politics in Modern Turkey (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974) p. 1. 15 For details of this argument see Kemal Karpat, Türk Demokrasi Tarihi – Sosyal, Ekonomik, Kültürel Temeller p. 141. 16 Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, State Institute of Statistics, 1999. 17 Erik Zürcher, Turkey – A Modern History pp. 225–226. 18 Ibid. p. 227. 19 Kemal Karpat, Türk Demokrasi Tarihi – Sosyal, Ekonomik, Kültürel Temeller p. 229. 20 Gencay S ¸ aylan, Türkiye’de Islamcı Siyaset (Islamist Politics in Turkey) (Ankara: Verso, 1992) p. 94.

Notes 145 21 Ays¸e Günes¸-Ayata, ‘Roots and Trends of Clientalism in Turkey’, in Luis Roniger and Ays¸e Günes¸-Ayata (eds) Democracy, Clientalism and Civil Society (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994) p. 50. 22 Frank Tachau, ‘Political Leadership in Turkey: Continuity and Change’, in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, State, Democracy and the Military – Turkey in the 1980s (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1988) p. 113. 23 Ibid. 24 Gencay S ¸ aylan, Türkiye’de Islamcı Siyaset p. 94. 25 For an argument for the persistence of political patronage and clientalism in Turkish politcs in general see Jung (with Piccoli) Turkey at the Crossroads p. 100. 26 S ¸ erif Mardin, ‘Centre–Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics’, Daedalus (Winter 1973) p. 184. 27 Ibid. p. 185. 28 Faruk Birtek, ‘Prospects for a New Centre or the Temporary Rise of the Peripheral Asabiyah?’, in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (eds) Politics in the Third Turkish Republic (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994) p. 225. 29 Quoted in Ali Yasar Saribay, ‘The Democrat Party, 1946–1960’, in Metin Heper and Jacob Landau, Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1991) p. 128. 30 Quoted in ibid. p. 128. 31 M.E. Yapp, The Making of the Modern Middle East, 1792–1923 p. 313. 32 Hugh Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent (London: Hurst and Company, 1997) p. 171. 33 Ibid. 34 M.E. Yapp, The Making of the Modern Middle East, 1792–1923 p. 314. 35 Ibid. p. 312. 36 There are studies that link this authoritarian tendency to the lack of a political culture of conducting democratic politics in Turkey. See the work of Ilter Turan for such an approach. Ilter Turan, ‘The Evolution of Political Culture in Turkey’, in Ahmet Evin (ed.) Modern Turkey – Continuity and Change (Opladen: Leske Verlag, 1984) p. 94. 37 Ali Yasar Sarıbay, ‘The Democrat Party, 1946–1960’, in Heper and Landau (eds) Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey p. 129. 38 For details see Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey. 39 Fatin Rüs¸tü Zorlu and Hasan Polatkan were hanged on 16 September 1961; Adnan Menderes was hanged a day later, on 17 September, after a failed suicide attempt. 40 William Hale, Turkish Politics and Turkish Military pp. 98–99. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. p. 99. 43 Quoted in Ergun Özbudun, ‘State Elites and Democratic Political Culture in Turkey’, in Larry Diamond (eds) Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries 1993 p. 257. 44 For more on the 1961 constitution see Emre Kongar, 21. Yüzyılda Türkiye (Turkey in the 21st Century) pp. 248–249. 45 Ergun Özbudun writes that AP was the continuation of the DP and had resurrected itself one year after the 1960 coup thanks to its very effective organisation, all around the country. See Özbudun, The Role of Military in Recent Turkish Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966) p. 7.

146 Notes 46 Tanil Bora and Kemal Can, Devlet, Ocak, Dergah – 12 Eylül’den 1990’lara Ülkücü Hareket, (The Nationalist Movement from 12 September to Present) (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 2000) p. 53. 47 Avner Levi, ‘The Justice Party, 1961–1980’, in Heper and Landau (eds) Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey p. 140. 48 Ibid. 49 Frank Tachau, ‘Political Leadership in Turkey: Continuity and Change’ p. 107. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid. p. 108 52 Kemal Karpat, Türk Demokrasi Tarihi – Sosyal, Ekonomik, Kültürel Temeller p. 160. 53 Frank Tachau, ‘Turkish Political Parties and Elections: Half Century of Multiparty Democracy’, Turkish Studies, Vol. 1, Number 1 (Spring 2000) p. 138. 54 Robert Bianchi, Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984) p. 202. 55 Erik Zürcher, Turkey – A Modern History p. 271. 56 On the National Salvation Party see Jacob Landau, ‘The National Salvation Party in Turkey’, Asian and African Studies 11 (1976) pp. 1–57; Binnaz Toprak, ‘Politisation of Islam in a Secular State: the National Salvation Party in Turkey’, in Said Arjomand (ed.) From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam (London: Macmillan, 1984) pp. 119–133; Türker Alkan, ‘The National Salvation Party in Turkey’, in Metin Heper and Raphel Israeli (eds) Islam and Politics in the Modern Middle East (London: Croom Helm, 1984) pp. 79–102; and Ali Yas¸ar Saribay, Türkiye’de Modernles¸me, Din ve Parti Politikasi: MSP Örnek Olayi (Modernisation, Religion and Party Politics in Turkey – MSP as a Case Study) (Istanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 1985). 57 See the National Salvation Party Programme. 58 Ibid. 59 Binnaz Toprak, ‘The State, Politics and Religion in Turkey’ p. 108. 60 This is a view widely held by many analysts of Turkish politics. For detailed studies see Emre Kongar, Türkiye’nin Toplumsal Yapisi (The Social Structure of Turkey) (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1995) p. 197; Ergun Özbudun and Frank Tachau, ‘Social Change and Electoral Behaviour in Turkey: Toward a “Critical Realignment”?’, International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 4 (1975) pp. 467–468; Frank Tachau, Turkey: The Politics of Authority, Democracy and Development (New York: Praeger, 1984). 61 Emre Kongar, Türkiye’nin Toplumsal Yapısı p. 245. 62 Frank Tachau, ‘Political Leadership in Turkey: Continuity and Change’ p. 108. 63 Feroz Ahmad, ‘The Republican People’s Party, 1945–1980’, in Metin Heper and Jacob Landau (eds) Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey p. 111. 64 Kemal Kiris¸çi and Gareth M. Winrow, The Kurdish Question in Turkey – An Example of a Trans-state Ethnic Conflict p. 110. 65 Ibid. 66 Alevis are part of the Shi’i tradition, mainly living in Central and Eastern Anatolia, comprising around 20 per cent of the population. They are often referred to as combining pre-Islamic Turkic religions and traditions with the Shi’i teachings of Islam. They are mainly secular, to which is often attributed their concern of living under a dominant strictly Sunni regime. For more information on the Alevis see David Shankland, Alevis in Turkey (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003); Elizabeth Özdalga and Tord Olsson, Alevi Identity: Cultural, Religious and Social Perspectives (Stockholm: Swedish Research Institute, 1998).

Notes 147 67 For details see Tevfik Çavdar, Türkiye’nin Demokrasi Tarihi (History of Democracy of Turkey) (Ankara: Imge Kitabevi, Second Edition, 2000) pp. 263–269. 68 For the details of the history leading to the events at Kahramanmaras¸ and Çorum see Tevfik Çavdar, Türkiye’nin Demokrasi Tarihi (History of Turkish Democracy) pp. 264–269. 69 Sabri Sayarı, ‘Politics and Economic Policy Making in Turkey, 1980–1988’, in Tevfik Nas and Mehmet Odekon (eds) Economics and Politics of Turkish Liberalization, (London: Associated University Presses, 1992) p. 28. 70 Ahmet Evin, ‘Changing Patterns of Cleavages Before and After 1980’, in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (eds) State, Democracy and the Military – Turkey in the 1980s p. 201. 71 Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey (Hull: Eothen Press, 1985) p. 131. 72 TIS had firstly been put forward by the ideology of the Hearts of the Enlightened (Aydınlar Ocag˘ı) an organization founded in 1970 by influential people in the business world, universities and politics mainly with the aim of breaking the monopoly of the leftist intellectuals in the political, social and cultural debate in Turkey. The TIS was shaped by the ideas of the leader of the Heart of the Enlightened, Ibrahim Kafesog˘lu, writing on the nature of Turkish culture resting on the double pillars of Turkishness and Islam. During the 1970s, the elements of the TIS idea had been adopted by the MSP of Erbakan and the Nationalist Action Party – the Grey . Wolves – of Türkes¸. Each party emphasised a different aspect of the TIS. Türk-Islam Sentezi became a widely quoted phrase for the ideological position of the military regime during the three years it was in power. For details see Hugh Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent; Gencay S ¸ aylan, Türkiye’de Islamcı Siyaset (Islamist Politics in. Turkey) (Ankara: Verso, 1992); Dog˘an Duman, Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye’de Islamcılık (Islamism in Turkey within the Process of Democracy); Kemal Kiris¸ ci and Gareth M. Winrow, Turkey and the Kurds: An Example of Trans-State Ethnic Conflict; Richard Tapper, Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State (London: I.B. Tauris, 1991). 73 Hugh Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent p. 184. 74 Richard Tapper, Islam in Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State. 75 Tanil Bora and Kemal Can, Devlet, Ocak, Dergah – 12 Eylül’den 1990’lara Ülkücü Hareket (The Nationalist Movement from 12 September to Present) p. 221. 76 Kemal Karpat, ‘Military Interventions: Army–Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and After 1980’, in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (eds) State, Democracy and the Military – Turkey in the 1980s (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988) p. 156. 77 Birol Akgün, ‘Aspects of Party System Development in Turkey’, Turkish Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2001) p. 78. 78 Üstun Ergüder and Richard I. Hofferbert, ‘The 1983 Elections in Turkey: Continuity or Change in Voting Patterns’, in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, State, Democracy and the Military – Turkey in the 1980s p. 81. 79 William Hale, ‘Transition to Civilian Governments in Turkey: The Military Perspective’, in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (eds) State, Democracy and the Military – Turkey in the 1980s p. 167. 80 Ibid. 81 Kemal Kiris¸ çi and Gareth M. Winrow, The Kurdish Question in Turkey – An Example of a Trans-state Ethnic Conflict p. 111. 82 Ibid.

148 Notes 83 Frank Tachau, ‘Turkish Political Parties and Elections: Half a Century of Multiparty Democracy’, Turkish Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 2000) p. 139. 84 Ibid. 85 Ersin Kalaycıog˘ lu, ‘The Motherland Party: The Challenge of Institutionalisation in a Charismatic Leader Party’, Turkish Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring 2002) p. 45. 86 Ibid. 87 Sencer Ayata, ‘Patronage, Party and State: The Politicization of Islam in Turkey’, Middle East Journal, Vol. 50, No. 1 (1996) p. 44. 88 Üstun Ergüder, ‘The Motherland Party, 1983–1989’, in Metin Heper and Jacob Landau (eds) Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey p. 153–154. 89 Nilüfer Göle, ‘Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: the Case of Turkey’, in Augustus Richard Norton (ed.) Civil Society in the Middle East, Vol. 2 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996) p. 30. 90 Nilüfer Göle, ‘Toward an Autonomisation of Politics and Civil Society in Turkey’, in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (eds) Politics in the Third Turkish Republic (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994) p. 213. 91 Metin Heper, ‘State and Society in Turkish Political Experience’, in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (eds) State, Democracy and the Military – Turkey in the 1980s (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988) p. 8. 92 Nilüfer Göle, ‘Toward an Autonomisation of Politics and Civil Society in Turkey’ p. 218. 93 Ibid. 94 Aylin Güney, ‘The People’s Democracy Party’, Turkish Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring 2002) p. 123. 95 For details of and the links between different politicians, especially that of the Virtue Party with the religious orders, see the recent study by Birol Yesˇilada, ‘The Virtue Party’, Turkish Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1, Spring 2002: 71–73. For a detailed study of the religious orders . and their political extensions also see Rus¸en Çakır, Ayet ve Slogan – Türkiye’de Islami Olus¸umlar (Istanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1995). 96 50.27 per cent voted yes to an amendment while 49.76 per cent voted no. This slight victory brought the banned former party leaders back to the political scene. 97 See Chapter 3, on the Turkish economy for details of this discussion. 98 Nilüfer Göle, Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: the Case of Turkey’ p. 33. 99 Konya, Sivas, S ¸ anlıurfa, Van and Kahramanmaras¸ city centres and fifteen other towns. 100 Dog˘an Duman, Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye’de I˙slamcılık p. 104. 101 For details, see Ug˘ ur Akıncı, ‘The Welfare Party’s Municipal Track Record: Evaluating Islamist Municipal Activism in Turkey’, Middle East Journal, Vol. 53, No.1 (Winter 1999). 102 ‘The other Turkey’ had been an important jargon term used for the lower middle classes, after the mid-1980s, and especially in the 1990s. The suffering lower middle classes, small businesses, peasantry, in short the underprivileged periphery was called ‘the other Turkey’ in contrast to the centre and the privileged ‘first nation’ – educated urban groups, who are also commonly referred to as the ‘white Turks’. 103 Ümit Cizre, ‘From Ruler to Pariah: The Life and Times of the True Path Party’, Turkish Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring 2001) pp. 86–87. 104 Ibid. 105 Discussion with Bahri Zengin in Yeni Zemin, No. 1 (1993) p. 29.

Notes 149 106 Rus¸en Çakır, ‘Türk Islamcılarının Politik Krizi’ (The Political Crisis of the Turkish Islamists) Birikim, No. 42 (1992) p. 32. 107 Erik Zürcher, Turkey – A Modern History p. 306. 108 Nicole and Hugh Pope, Turkey Unveiled – Atatürk and After (London: John Murray, 1997) p. 247. 109 Servet Mutlu, ‘Ethnic Kurds in Turkey: A Demographic Study’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4 (November 1996) p. 532. 110 Kemal Kiris¸çi and Gareth M. Winrow, The Kurdish Question in Turkey – An Example of a Trans-state Ethnic Conflict p. 121. 111 Ays¸e Günes¸ Ayata and Sencer Ayata, ‘Ethnicity and Security Problems in Turkey’, in Lenore Martin, New Frontiers in Middle East Security (New York: Palgrave, 1999) p. 131. 112 Hamit Bozarslan, ‘Human Rights and the Kurdish Issue in Turkey: 1984–1999’, Human Rights Review (October–December 2001) p. 46. 113 Ibid. Kiris¸çi and Winrow also agree that a spiral of violence and counter-violence fuelled the growth of Kurdish national consciousness. They quote from Abdülmelih Fırat, the grandson of Sheikh Said and parliamentary deputy, ‘the government’s repressive policies in the eastern parts of the country played a greater role in enhancing Kurdish national consciousness than the propaganda work of the PKK’. See Kemal Kiris¸çi and Gareth M. Winrow, The Kurdish Question in Turkey – An Example of a Trans-state Ethnic Conflict p. 112. 114 Nicole and Hugh Pope, Turkey Unveiled – Atatürk and After p. 261. 115 Ibid. p. 266. 116 This system was initiated in April 1985 and was based on military co-operation with the local population, arming the local farmers and paying them a salary in return for their fight against PKK attacks. 117 These provinces were Siirt, Mardin, Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Bingöl, Elazıg˘, Tunceli and Van. 118 Kemal Kiris.çi and Gareth M. Winrow, The Kurdish Question in Turkey – An Example of a Trans-state Ethnic Conflict p. 128. 119 Ibid. p. 147. 120 These are the figures repeated in many studies. See, for example, Nimet Beriker Atiyas, ‘The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey: Issues, Parties and Prospects’ , Security Dialogue, Vol. 28, No. 4 (1997) p. 439. 121 Nilüfer Göle, ‘Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: the Case of Turkey’ p. 35. 122 For a detailed study. of the events see Emre Kongar, 21. Yüzyılda Türkiye (Turkey in the 21st Century) (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1998) pp. 254–263. 123 The businessmen of Anatolia founded.the Independent Industrialist .and Businessmen Association (Müstakil Sanayici ve I¸sadamları Derneg˘ i – MÜSIAD) in 1990 to . represent their interests as against the TÜSIAD of Istanbul capitalists. 124 For research conducted on the site see Ays¸e Saktanber’s unpublished Ph.D. thesis, ‘Islamic Revitalization in Turkey: An Urban Model of a “Counter Society”, a Case Study’, delivered to the Middle East Technical University, Department of Sociology in 1995. Saktanber makes a survey of 25 families living in this establishment which gives details of their lives, marriage, education and income, focusing mainly on women. She talks about Islamic ways of conduct and symbols and their usage in this quarter of Ankara. 125 Ays¸e Bug˘ra notes that this is the definition given by W. Kymlicka, who uses it mainly for ethnic/national sense of culture. However, she notes the relevance of the term for

150 Notes

126 127

128 129

130 131

132

133 134 135 136 137

138 139 140 141 142 143 144

145 146 147 148 149

the Islamic movement in Turkey, mainly for the RP, ‘as it attempts to establish religion as a cultural basis of a comprehensive reorganisation of social, economic and political life’. See Ays¸e Bug˘ra, ‘Political Islam in Turkey in Historical Context’, in Nes¸ecan Balkan and Sungur Savran (eds) The Politics of Permanent Crisis – Class, Ideology and State in Turkey (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2002) p. 108. Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, State Institute of Statistics, 1999. . S ¸ evki Yılmaz, in a speech in Rize, 1991. See Vural Savas¸, Refah Partisi Iddianamesi ve Mütaalası (The Case of Persecution and Deliberation for the Welfare Party) (Istanbul: Fast Yayıncılık, 1997) p. 21. S¸ amil Tayyar, Refahyol Tutanakları (Records of Welfare-Path) (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 1997) p. 20. The increase reached 70 per cent for the ranks of military personnel, leading to some speculation that this was a policy of the government to silence military opposition to the Islamist elements of the government. Hakan Akpınar, 28 S ¸ ubat – Post-Modern Darbenin Öyküsü (28 February – the Story of a Post-Modern Coup) (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 2001) p. 64. Considering the fact that all religious orders were banned under the Republic, this was perceived as an assault on Republican principles and Kemalist reforms. This was also an indication that the RP regarded these groups as legitimate despite republican laws. According to regulations, the legal right to collect the sheepskin that is sacrificed in the religious holiday is given to the Turkish Aviation Organisation. RP wanted to change this regulation by proposing that individuals must be free to decide to whom they want to donate the skin. Monetarily this was thought to bring a huge income to local Islamist organisations. Cumhuriyet, 2 February 1997. Ibid. Hürriyet, 3 February 1997. Hakan Akpınar, 28 S ¸ ubat – Post-Modern Darbenin Öyküsü p. 178. Kemali Saybas¸ılı, ‘Siyasal Sistem Bunalımı’ (The Crisis of the Political System) in Gencer Özcan (ed.) Onbir Aylık Saltanat (Eleven Months of Sultanate) (Istanbul: Boyut Yayincilik, 1998) p. 90. Cumhuriyet, 5 February 1997. Kemali Saybas¸ılı, ‘Siyasal Sistem Bunalımı’, in Gencer Özcan (ed.) Onbir Aylık Saltanat p. 92. Ibid. Hakan Akpınar, 28 S ¸ ubat – Post-Modern Darbenin Öyküsü p. 209. Ibid. pp. 168–269. Ibid. p. 262. Ays¸e Ayata notes that the RPP was behind the organisation of the anti-Islamist meetings at the time. Ays¸e Ayata, ‘The Republican People’s Party’ , Turkish Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring 2002) p. 118. Oktay Eks¸i, Hürriyet, 2 May 1999. Prof. Dr. Cahit Tanyol, Cumhuriyet, 15 May 1999. However, this did not prevent him from founding the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) in 2001. Radikal, 2 August 2003. For example, after. years of fighting between the leftist and rightist forces, the business organisation TÜSIAD welcomed the 1980 coup. The 28 February process is supported by most of the secular groups.

Notes 151 3 The Turkish economy 1 Erinç Yeldan, ‘On IMF-Directed Disinflation Programme in Turkey: A Programme for Stabilisation and Austerity Or A Recipe for Impoverishment and Financial Chaos?’, www.bilkent.edu.tr/~yeldanbs/Yazilar_uye/yeldanekim01.pdf 2 For a critical analysis of the neo-liberal policies and their impact on the Turkish economy today, see the website of a group of economists who call themselves Independent Social Scientists – Economy Group. http://www.bagimsizsosyalbil imciler.org/iktisatg.htm . The group attributes the crises of 1994, 1999 and 2001 to the legacy of the reforms of 1980s. 3 Erinç Yeldan calls this the vicious circle of ‘instability-crisis- growth-instability’. For details see Erinç Yeldan, Küreselle ¸sme Sürecinde Türkiye Ekonomisi – Bölü ¸süm, Birikim ve Büyüme (Istanbul: Iletis¸im Yayınları, 2001). 4 Roger Owen and S ¸ evket Pamuk, A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century p. 19. 5 Yakup Kepenek, Gelisimi,Üretim Yapısı ve Sorunlarıyla Türkiye Ekonomisi (Development, Production Patterns and Problems of the Turkish Economy) (Ankara: Teori Yayinlari, 1987) p. .81. 6 Ays . ¸e Bug˘ ra, . Devlet ve I¸sadamları (State and the Businessmen) Second Edition, (Istanbul: Iletis¸im . Yayınları, 1997) p. 177. 7 Emre Kongar, Imparatorluktan Günümüze Türkiye’nin Toplumsal. Yapısı (Turkish Societal Structure from Empire to the Present) Ninth Edition (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1995) p. 450. 8 Ibid. p. 460. . 9 Ays¸e Bug˘ ra, Devlet ve I¸sadamları pp. 174–190. 10 Korkut Boratav, Türkiye Iktisat Tarihi 1908–1985 (Turkish Economic History 1908–1985) (Ankara: Gercek Yayınları, 1985). ¸ evket Pamuk, A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth 11 Roger Owen and S Century p. 106. 12 Türk Traktör was founded in co-operation with the USA in Ankara in 1954. 13 Oktay Yenal, Cumhuriyet’in Iktisat Tarihi (Economic History of the Republic) (Istanbul: Homer Kitabevi, 2003) p. 79. 14 Korkut Boratav, Türkiye Iktisat Tarihi p. 78. ¸ evket Pamuk, A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth 15 Roger Owen and S Century p. 108. 16 M.E. Yapp, The Near East Since the First World War (Harlow: Longman, 1996) p. 313. 17 In other words, while 1 USD equalled 2.8 TL before devaluation, 1 USD equalled 9 TL after devaluation. Oktay Yenal, Cumhuriyet’in Iktisat Tarihi p. 84. 18 Korkut Boratav and Ergun Türkcan, Türkiye’de Sanayiles¸menin Yeni Boyutları ve . KI T’ler (New . Prospects of Industrialisation in Turkey and State Economic Enterprises) (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı, Yurt Yayınları, 1994) p. 16. ¸ evket Pamuk, A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth 19 Roger Owen and S Century p. 112. . 20 Çag˘ lar Keyder, Ulusal Kalkınmacılıg˘ın I flası (Bankruptcy of the National Development) (Istanbul:. Metis, 1993) p. 60. 21 Ays¸e Bug˘ ra, Devlet ve I¸sadamlari p. 192. 22 Ays¸e Bug˘ ra, ‘Class, Culture and State: An Analysis of Interest Representation by Two Turkish Business Associations’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 30 (1998) pp. 523–524.

152 Notes 23 Ibid. .p. 524. 24 TÜSIAD was formed especially by those who demanded a more dynamic economic environment for industrialists as opposed to the financial circles and the smallmerchant circles dominant in the Union of Chambers of Commerce (TOB). The . TÜSIAD members were calling for less protectionism and more incentives for industrial development and exports. 25 Oktay Yenal, Cumhuriyet’in Iktisat Tarihi p. 93. 26 Ibid. Gülten Kazgan notes the surplus of 1973 .as $484 million. See Gülten Kazgan, . Tanzimattan 21. Yüzyıla Türkiye Ekonomisi (Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2002) p. 103. 27 Oktay Yenal, Cumhuriyet’in Iktisat Tarihi p. 93. 28 S ¸ evket Pamuk, ‘Kars¸ılas¸tırmalı Açıdan Türkiye’de Iktisadi Büyüme, 1880–2000’ (Economic Growth in Turkey from a Comparative Perspective) in A.H. Köse et al. (eds) Küresel. Düzen – Birikim, Devlet ve Sınıflar (Global Order – Accumulation, State and Class) (Istanbul: Iletis¸im, 2003) p. 393. 29 M.E. Yapp, The Near East Since the First World War p. 309. 30 Ergun Özbudun and Aydın Ulusan, The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Turkey (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1980) p. 11. 31 Economic growth was mainly proposed by the Justice Party as a remedy to poverty, while the Republican People’s Party called for more development including growth ‘as well as nonmaterial objectives like equity, balance, justice and welfare’. For detailed discussion see Ergun Özbudun ‘Income Distribution as an Issue in Turkish Politics’, in Ergun Özbudun and Aydın Ulusan, The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Turkey p. 67–71. 32 Michael N. Danielson and Rus¸en Keles¸, ‘Urbanisation and Income Distribution in Turkey’ in Ergun Özbudun and Aydın Ulusan, The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Turkey p. 271. 33 UNDP, Human Development Report – Turkey, 2001 p. 1. 34 Gülten Kazgan, Tanzimattan 21. Yüzyıla Türkiye Ekonomisi p. 104. 35 Oktay Yenal, Cumhuriyet’in Iktisat Tarihi (Economic History of the Republic) p. 94. 36 Yakup Kepenek, Gelisimi, Uretim Yapisi ve Sorunlariyla Turkiye Ekonomisi (Development, Production Patterns and Problems of the Turkish Economy) p. 567. . 37 For a detailed analysis of the issue see Çag˘ lar Keyder, Ulusal Kalkınmacılıg˘ ın I flası, 1993. 38 Ibid. p. 12. 39 Osman Ulagay, 24 Ocak Deneyimi Üzerine (On the Experience of 24 January) (Istanbul: Hil Yayin, 1983) pp. 15–16. 40 Ibid. p. 14. 41 Roger Owen and S ¸ evket Pamuk, A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century p. 119. 42 Sabri Sayarı, ‘Politics and Economic Policy Making in Turkey, 1980–1988’, in Tevfik Nas and Mehmet Odekon (eds) Economics and Politics of Turkish Liberalization (London: Associated University Presses, . 1992) p. 30. 43 For details of the financial crisis see Izak Atiyas, ‘The Private Sector’s Response to Financial Liberalisation in Turkey: 1980–82’, in Tosun Arıcanlı and Dani Rodrik, The Political Economy of Turkey – Debt, Adjustment and Sustainability (London: Macmillan, 1990) pp. 132–156. 44 Ziya Önis¸, ‘Redemocratisation and Economic Liberalisation in Turkey: The Limits

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45

46 47

48 49 50 51 52

53

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of State Economy’, Studies in International Economic Development, Summer 1992, Vol. 27, No. 2 p. 11. Ziya Önis¸, ‘Political Economy of Turkey in the 1980s – Anatomy of Unorthodox Liberalism’, in Metin Heper (ed.) Strong State and Economic Interest Groups (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1991) p. 30. Ibid. For a discussion of exports to different regions during the 1980s, see Fikret S ¸ enses, ‘An Assessment of the Pattern of Turkish Manufactured Export Growth in the 1980s and Its Prospects’, in Tosun Arıcanlı and Dani Rodrik, The Political Economy of Turkey – Debt, Adjustment and Sustainability (London: Macmillan, 1990) pp. 60–75. Roger Owen and S ¸ evket Pamuk, A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century p. 119. Ziya Önis¸, ‘Political Economy of Turkey in the 1980s – Anatomy of Unorthodox Liberalism’ p. 30. Yakup Kepenek, Gelisimi, Üretim Yapısı ve Sorunlarıyla Türkiye Ekonomisi p. 436. Ziya Önis¸, ‘Political Economy of Turkey in the 1980s – Anatomy of Unorthodox Liberalism’ p. 30. John Waterbury, ‘Export-Led Growth and the Right-Right Coalition in Turkey’, in Tevfik Nas and Mehmet Odekon (eds) Economics and Politics of Turkish Liberalization p. 65. Korkut Boratav and Ergun Türkcan, Türkiye’de Sanayiles¸menin Yeni Boyutları ve . KI T’ler (New . Prospects of Industrialisation in Turkey and State Economic Enterprises) (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı, Yurt Yayınları, 1994) p. 2. See also the study of Süleyman Özmucur, Functional Distribution Of Income, 1948–1991 (Gelirin Fonksiyonel Dagilimi, 1948–1991), Bosphorus University Research Paper, ISS/EC 91–06 (Istanbul: Bosphorus University, 1991). John Waterbury, ‘Export-Led Growth and the Right-Right Coalition in Turkey’ p. 66. Oktay Yenal, Cumhuriyet’in Iktisat Tarihi p. 109. John Waterbury, ‘Export-Led Growth and the Right-Right Coalition in Turkey’ p. 45. For a discussion of the issue see Sabri Sayari, ‘Political Parties, Party Systems and Economic Reforms: The Turkish Case’, Studies in Comparative International Government, Vol. 31, Issue 4 (Winter 1996/1997) pp. 29–46. C. Emre Alper and Ziya Önis¸, ‘Finansal Küreselles¸me, Demokrasi Açıg˘ı ve Yükselen Piyasalarda Yas¸anan Sürekli Krizler: Sermaye Hareketlerinin Liberalles¸mesi Sonrasında Türkiye Deneyimi’, Dog˘u-Batı, Vol. 17 (2001–2002) p. 207. Frances Cleaver, ‘Politics, Society and Financial Liberalisation: Turkey in the 1990s’, Development and Change, Vol. 31, Issue 2 (March 2000) p. 483. Yılmaz Akyüz and Korkut Boratav, ‘The Making of the Turkish Financial Crisis’, paper prepared for a conference on ‘Financialization of the Global Economy’, University of Massachusetts, 2002. Erinç Yeldan, ‘Türkiye Ekonomisinde 2000–2001 Krizinin Yapısal Kaynakları Üzerine’, Dog˘u Batı, No.17: 191. Also see Kemal Kurdas¸, Bitmeyen Gaflet ve Türkiye Ekonomisinin Çöküs¸ü (Ankara: METU Press, 2003). Kemal Kurdas¸, Bitmeyen Gaflet ve Türkiye Ekonomisinin Çöküs¸ü p. x. Ümit Cizre-Sakallıog˘ lu and Erinç Yeldan, ‘Politics, Society and Financial Liberalisation: Turkey in the 1990s’, Development and Change, Vol. 31 (2000) p. 499. Ays.e Bug˘ra, ‘Class, Culture and State: An Analysis of Interest Representation by Two Turkish Business Associations’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 30 (1998) p. 524.

154 Notes 65 Ibid p. 428–532. 66 Ays¸e Bug˘ ra, ‘Political Islam in Turkey in Historical Context’, in Nes¸ecan Balkan and Sungur Savran (eds) The Politics of Permanent Crisis – Class, Ideology and State in Turkey (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2002) p. 120. 67 Mina Toksöz, ‘The Economy – Achievements and Prospects’, in Brian Beeley (ed.) Turkish Transformation – New Century, New Challenges (Cambridgeshire: Eothen Press, 2002) p. 149. 68 Yılmaz Akyüz and Korkut Boratav, ‘The Making of the Turkish Financial Crisis’. 69 Ibid. 70 Mina Toksöz, ‘The Economy – Achievements and Prospects’ p. 144. 71 Sabri Sayarı, ‘Political Parties, Party Systems and Economic Reforms: The Turkish Case’, p 40. 72 Mina Toksöz, ‘The Economy – Achievements and Prospects’ p. 146. 73 Ibid. 74 See European Union and Turkey by the Turkish Directorate of Foreign Trade, 2003. 75 Statistical Indicators 1923–1998, State Institute of Statistics, Ankara, 2001. 76 Gülten Kazgan, Tanzimattan 21. Yüzyıla Türkiye Ekonomisi p. 450. 77 Erinç Yeldan, ‘On IMF-Directed Disinflation Programme in Turkey: A Programme for Stabilisation and Austerity or a Recipe for Impoverishment and Financial Chaos?’. 78 Gülten Kazgan, Tanzimattan 21. Yüzyıla Türkiye Ekonomisi p. 452. 79 Erinç Yeldan, ‘On IMF-Directed Disinflation Programme in Turkey: A Programme for Stabilisation and Austerity or a Recipe for Impoverishment and Financial Chaos?’. 80 Gülten Kazgan, Tanzimattan 21. Yüzyıla Türkiye Ekonomisi p. 456. 81 Most of the owners faced criminal charges and were arrested. 82 Bank Ekspres, Türkbank, Interbank, Egebank, Esbank, Yas¸arbank, Yurtbank, Sümerbank. 83 Savings deposits were under the guarantee of the state since 1994 crisis. The 2000 IMF-guided programme also added bankrupt banks’ external debts to this guarantee. With this banking crisis, the state became responsible for all the debts of these banks, amounting to $7.5–9 billion. 84 Merih Celasun, ‘Gelis¸en Ekonomilerin Dıs¸ Kaynak Kullanımı, Finansal Krizler ve Türkiey Örneg˘ i, 2001’, Dog˘u-Batı, Vol. 17 (2001–2002) p. 176. 85 State Institute of Statistics. . . 86 Gülten Kazgan, Tanzimattan 21. Yüzyıla Türkiye Ekonomisi (Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2002) p. 461. 87 Milliyet, 29 October 2003. 4 Turkey in world affairs 1 William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774–2000 (London: Frank Cass, 2000) and Baskin Oran (ed.) Türk Dıs¸ Politikası: Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar (Turkish Foreign Policy: Events, Documents, Analysis Since the War of Independence) (Ankata: . Iletisim Yayinlari, 2001). 2 For the Eastern Question see, for instance, L. Carl Brown, International Politics and the Middle East: Old Rules, Dangerous Game (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984). 3 Bruce Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey and Greece (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980) p. 6.

Notes 155 4 Although there is an element of constancy in geopolitics, there is also room for reinterpretation as geopolitics involves political interpretations of geography, which may in fact change over time. This was clearly the case for Turkey. 5 The ‘re-emergence of Muslim/Turkish communities from Bosnia to western China’ and concurrent rejection of Turkey’s application for membership to the EC led to the arguments for ‘Neo-Ottomanism’ in the early 1990s. Although some officials, such as Özal and Demirel, initially took up this notion during that period, it was later replaced by a new term ‘Eurasia’. The latter clearly refers to a non-ethnic and nonreligious characterisation that also does not make reference to Ottoman history. For an intellectual argument for Neo-Ottomanism see M. Hakan Yavuz, ‘Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux: The Rise of Neo-Ottomanism’, Critique, No. 2 (Spring 1998). 6 Philip Robins, ‘The Foreign Policy of Turkey’, in Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (eds) The Foreign Policies of Middle East States (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 2002) pp. 317–318. 7 Some analysts described ‘the conviction [in Turkey] that the external world is conspiring to weaken and divide up Turkey’ based on historical memory, ‘Sèvresphobia’. Kemal Kirisci, ‘Turkey’, in Theodore Couloumbis (ed.) The Foreign Policies of the European Union’s Mediterranean States and Applicant Countries in the 1990s: A Comparative Analysis (London: Macmillan, 1997). 8 Kemal Karpat, ‘Introduction’, in Kemal Karpat, Turkey’s Foreign Policy in Transition, 1950–1971 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975) pp. 7–8. 9 Clearly the actual influence of these new actors in foreign policy is another matter. Unfortunately there are no studies exploring that connection. 10 For the increasing role of the military in foreign policy making see Gencer Özcan, ‘The Military and the Making of Foreign Policy in Turkey’, in Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirisci (eds) Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001) pp. 13–30. 11 For instance he was very much part of the debate in the recent discussions about the Turkish support of the US-British war against Iraq. Sezer was insistent on the requirement for ‘international legality’, namely a UN mandate, for Turkey’s participation in the war. 12 According to 1999 figures 95 per cent of homes had a TV set. The average period of viewing TV is around 4.5 hours per day. Daily average sales for newspapers were 3.8 million in 1999. www.mfa.gov.tr/grupc/cj/cje/o.5.htm 13 Robins, ‘The Foreign Policy of Turkey’, in Hinnebusch and Ehteshami (eds) The Foreign Policies of Middle East States p. 312. 14 An interesting example in this respect was the resistance of Britain and France to moving their embassies from Istanbul to the newly established capital of the Turkish Republic, Ankara, until 1926. 15 Although the British government at that time never formally admitted the significance of oil for its Mosul policy, the archives clearly show that the importance of Mosul for Britain was based on its known, but as of then, largely untapped oil resources. See Peter Sluglett, Britain in Iraq: 1914–1932 (London: Ithaca Press, 1976) pp. 103–116; Marian Kent, Oil and Empire: British Policy and Mesopotamian Oil, 1900–1920 (London: Macmillan, 1976) pp. 197–200. 16 Edward Peter Fitzgerald, ‘France’s Middle Eastern Ambitions, the Sykes–Picot Negotiations, and the Oil Fields of Mosul, 1915–1918’, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 66 (December 1994) pp. 700–702.

156 Notes 17 Curzon was a staunch advocate of British control of Mosul province all along. For the debates in the British government on this issue and Curzon’s position see John Fisher, Curzon and the British Imperialism in the Middle East (London: Frank Cass, 1999). 18 There is disagreement in the literature as to the fate of this promise. In several studies it has been argued that soon after the agreement Turkey had abandoned this claim in exchange for £500,000 sterling. However, a recent study based on financial records asserted that Turkey did not abandon this claim. On the contrary, Ankara did receive 10 per cent royalty until 1954, and then dropped the item from the budget as a goodwill gesture during the process of forming the Baghdad Pact with Iraq. In 1958 the item was reinstituted in the budget, yet this time the new nationalist government in Iraq refused to pay it. Nevertheless, the item continued the exist in the budgets up until the mid-1980s, when Prime Minister Turgut Özal once again dropped it as a goodwill gesture as part of his government’s drive to increase commercial relations with the Middle Eastern countries. See Hikmet Ulug˘ bay, Imparatorluk’tan Cumhuriyet’e Petropolitik (Petropolitics: From the Empire to the Republic) (Ankara: Turkish Daily News, 1995) pp. 448–467. 19 Despite its resolution, the so-called ‘Mosul question’ continued to linger in Turkish politics. In particular, the nationalist right always expressed its dissatisfaction with the cessation of the province to Iraq. At the state level these ideas were not taken up. In the last two decades, however, due to increasing concerns over the possibility of trans-boundary influences on the Kurdish issue, Turkey became increasingly sensitive about the developments in that part of Iraq. Ankara was concerned at times during the Iran–Iraq war in the 1980s when Baghdad seemed to be losing its control over the area. Since the Gulf War of 1991 such uneasiness increased enormously as a result of the developments in northern Iraq. Turkey’s increasing interest in the area enhanced concerns among the regional powers about Turkey’s possible intentions as regards to a region it lost unwillingly to Iraq in 1926. 20 Although the paying of Ottoman debts became an issue in relations with other countries as well during this period, it mainly affected relations with France as most of the debt was owed to this country. 21 Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History p. 210. 22 As a response to the agreement, disturbances against France and the government broke out in Syria. Since then Syria has never accepted the secession of the region to Turkey and has continued to show it as part of Syria in its maps. Thus the issue still continues to affect Turkish–Syrian relations up to today. 23 Suna Kili, Kemalism (Istanbul: School of Business Administration and Economy, Robert College, 1969); Aryeh Schumulewitz, ‘Atatürk’s Policy Toward the Great Powers: Principles and Guidelines’, in Uriel Dann (ed.) The Great Powers in the Middle East, 1919–1939 (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1988). 24 Later renamed the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC) after the establishment of Iraq as a separate state. 25 Sluglett, Britain in Iraq: 1914–1932 p. 108. 26 British concern over the inter-Allied struggle and its possible impact on the Mosul question was expressed in a Cabinet Paper written by Winston Churchill in 1922: ‘There is some reason to believe that neither the U.S. nor France would be sorry to see the Turks back in Mosul in a position to give to their nationals the oil concessions which are at present claimed by H.M. Government for the TNPC.’ Ibid. p. 110.

Notes 157 27 The two countries signed a Treaty of Friendship in 1933. 28 Gökhan Çetinsaya, ‘Atatürk Dönemi Türkiye-Iran Iliskileri, 1926–38’, Avrasya Dosyasi Vol. 5, No. 3 (Fall 1999) especially p. 161; Kaveh Bayat, ‘Britain and TurcoIranian Border Dispute: An Assumed Policy,’ www.royalasiaticsociety.org/papers/ Conf 29 According to Bayat: ‘The idea that the Ararat revolt could be utilised to obtain some concessions from the Turks [was] hotly debated among some military and political circles of Iran.’ However, Tehran opted for co-operation with Ankara and tried to show this by appointing ‘Mohammed Ali Faroughi, a highly moderate statesman as its special envoy to Ankara in autumn of 1927 and the arrest of the Armenians’. Ibid. 30 Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History p. 210. 31 After some reluctance, Italy acceded to the Convention in 1937. 32 For the text of the Montreux Convention see J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record, Vol. II (Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1956) pp. 197–203. 33 Lord Kinross, Atatürk: A Biography of Mustafa Kemal, Father of Modern Turkey (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1965) p. 521. 34 Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History p. 212. 35 C. Weisband, Turkish Foreign Policy 1943–1945: Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973) pp. 44–45. 36 Ferenc Vali, A Bridge Across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey (Baltimore, MD and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971) pp. 28–29. 37 Turkey’s hard bargaining tactics were considered mostly to be the result of its desire to buy time. Especially after witnessing what happened to Poland, it seems that Ankara wanted the arms to be delivered first prior to any commitment. See, Selim Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War: An ‘Active Neutrality’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) pp. 79–83. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid. p. 92. 40 Ibid. p. 213. 41 Ibid. 42 For example, the Dodecanese islands, which had been occupied by Italy when they were part of the Ottoman Empire in the 1911–1912 War, were given to Greece as an Allied country in the Paris Conference. 43 Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War: An ‘Active Neutrality’ p. 174. 44 It seems that Stalin was mainly picking up on British Foreign Minister Winston Churchill’s suggestion a year earlier. Churchill, who was quite angry and disappointed at Turkey’s reluctance to join the war, had played with the idea as a demonstration to Turkey of the possible consequences of its policy. However, the Foreign Office, which worried about ‘the possibility of Churchill’s making concessions to Russia’ on this issue ‘had prevailed on the British Foreign Minister to take into account long-term importance of Turkey for Britain’. Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War: An ‘Active Neutrality’ p. 178. 45 Ibid. p. 180. 46 Ibid. 47 Vali, A Bridge Across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey p. 34. 48 Ar. A. Ulunian, ‘Soviet Cold War Perceptions of Turkey and Greece, 1945–1958’, Mezhdunarodnyi istoricheskii zhurnal, No. 2, Archive No. 2, March–April 1999,

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Analiticheskie issledovaniia v istericheskoi nauke, at http://www.history.machoun. ru/all/number_02/analiti 4/3/ ‘Turkic-Islamic population in the USSR which was considered by the Party apparatus as a permanently existing threat to the state unity’, A. Anatoliyev, ‘Letter from Ankara,’ Izvestiya, 6 May 1947, in Ulunian, ‘Soviet Cold War Perceptions of Turkey and Greece, 1945–1958’, ibid. Eduard Mark, ‘Revolution by Degrees: Stalin’s Nationalist Front Strategy for Europe, 1941–1947’, Working Paper #31, Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, http://wwocs/so/edi/topics/pubs/ACFB11. pdf Based on Feridun Cemal Erkin, Under-secretary in the Turkish Foreign Ministry between 1945 and 1947, in George S. Harris, ‘Turkey and the U.S.’, in Karpat (ed.) Turkey’s Foreign Policy in Transition, 1950–1971 p. 53. Economic aid was almost exclusively for Greece, which was considered in more dire need of economic assistance. Oral History Interview with George C. McGhee, by Richard D. McKinzie, Washington, DC, 11 June 1975, for the Truman Presidential Museum and Library. George C. McGhee was the co-ordinator of aid to Greece and Turkey (1947–1949). Later he became the US ambassador to Turkey (1951–1953). Harris, ‘Turkey and the U.S.’, in Kemal Karpat, Turkey’s Foreign Policy in Transition, 1950–1971 p. 54. Oral History Interview with George C. McGhee, by Richard D. McKinzie, Washington, DC, June 11, 1975, for Truman Presidential Museum and Library. Ibid. This was the third largest contingent after the US and South Korean forces. Harris, ‘Turkey and the US’, in Kemal Karpat, Turkey’s Foreign Policy in Transition, 1950–1971 p. 47. Atila Eralp, ‘Turkey and the European Union in the Post-Cold War Era’, in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari (eds) Turkey’s New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000) p. 177. For DP’s foreign policy towards the Middle East see Huseyin Bag˘ ci, Türk Dıs¸ Politikasinda 1950’li Yıllar (1950s in Turkish Foreign Policy) (Ankara: METU Press, 2001) pp. 41–100. Harris, ‘Turkey and the U.S.’, in Kemal Karpat, Turkey’s Foreign Policy in Transition, 1950–1971 p. 54. The Pact of Mutual Co-operation Between the Kingdom of Iraq, the Republic of Turkey, the United Kingdom, the Dominion of Pakistan, and the Kingdom of Iran, signed on 24 February 1955. Elei Podeh, The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: The Struggle over the Baghdad Pact (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995). The Baghdad Pact ended in 1958 when the nationalist government of General Qasim came to power through a coup and immediately withdrew Iraq from the Pact. Some analysts go as far as calling the Baghdad Pact the ‘most embarrassing debacle’ in Turkish foreign policy. Robins, ‘The Foreign Policy of Turkey’, in Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (eds) The Foreign Policies of Middle East States p. 317. Harris, ‘Turkey and the US’, in Kemal Karpat, Turkey’s Foreign Policy in Transition, 1950–1971 p. 58.

Notes 159 66 This relationship developed as part of Israel’s ‘periphery strategy’. In line with that strategy Israel established similar ties with Iran as well. See Samuel Segev, The Iranian Triangle (New York: Free Press, 1988) 67 The availability of previously classified material has enabled scholars both to challenge the conventional wisdom and to revise long-standing historical interpretations of the events that took place before, during, and after October 1962. The declassified record shows that US officials were well aware that their deployment of Jupiter missiles near the Soviet border in Turkey in 1959 would be a ‘provocative’ step similar to the deployment of Soviet missiles in ‘Mexico or Cuba’. ‘Memorandum of Conference with the President’, 6 June 1956, in Lawrence Chang and Peter Kornbluh (eds) The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: The Making of U.S. Policy, A National Security Archive Documents Reader, Second edition (New York: The New Press, 1998). 68 Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow (eds) The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1997). 69 Harris, ‘Turkey and the U.S.’, in Kemal Karpat, Turkey’s Foreign Policy in Transition, 1950–1971 p. 58. 70 The island of Cyprus lies in the eastern Mediterranean 40 nautical miles off the coast of Turkey. With an area of 3,572 square miles, Cyprus is the third largest island in the Mediterranean Sea. 71 For the history of the Cyprus conflict during this period see Tozun Bahcheli, GreekTurkish Relations Since 1955 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990). . 72 For the texts of US President Johnson’s letter and Turkish Prime Minister Inönü’s reply see the Middle East Journal (Summer 1966) pp. 386–393. 73 Harris, ‘Turkey and the U.S.’, in Kemal Karpat, Turkey’s Foreign Policy in Transition, 1950–1971 p. 59. 74 Ibid. p. 65. 75 The embargo was effective between 5 February 1975 and 4 September 1978. 76 Ömer Karasapan, ‘Turkey and the U.S. Strategy in the age of Glasnost’, Middle East Report, Vol. 19, No. 5 (September–October 1989) p. 7. 77 Bruce Kuniholm, ‘Turkey and the West Since Second World War’, in Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Nation (eds) Turkey Between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996) p. 57. 78 Ibid. 79 Gary Sick, ‘The US in the Persian Gulf: From Twin Pillars to Dual Containment’, in David W. Lesch (ed.) The Middle East and the United State: A Historical and Political Assessment, Second Edition (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999) pp. 278–279. 80 Harris, ‘Turkey and the US’, in Kemal Karpat, Turkey’s Foreign Policy in Transition, 1950–1971 pp. 66–67. 81 A.H. Ulman and R.H. Dekmejian, ‘Changing Patterns in Turkish Foreign Policy, 1959–1967’, The Middle East Journal, Fall 1967. 82 Harris, ‘Turkey and the US’ p. 61. 83 Yasemin Celik, Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999) pp. 50–51. 84 Eralp, ‘Turkey and the European Union in the Post-Cold War Era’, in Makovsky and Sayari (eds) Turkey’s New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy p. 177. 85 Ibid. p.178.

160 Notes 86 Karpat, ‘Introduction’, in Kemal Karpat, Turkey’s Foreign Policy in Transition, 1950–1971 p. 9. 87 American Foreign Policy Documents, 1977/1980 p. 593. 88 In addition to Turkey the following countries in the region became part of this new policy: Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Oman, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. 89 John Tirman, ‘Improving Turkey’s “Bad Neighborhood”’, World Policy Journal, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Spring 1998) p.. 62. 90 Ömer Alantar, ‘Türkiye-ABD Ilis¸kilerinin Ulusal Güvenlik Boyutunun Dönüs¸ümü’, in Gencer Özcan and S ¸ ule Kut (eds) En Uzun On Yıl: Türkiye’nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dıs¸ Politika Gündeminde Doksanlı Yıllar (The Longest Decade: The 1990s in Turkey’s National Security and Foreign Policy Agenda ) (Istanbul: Boyut Kitapları, 1998) p. 228. 91 Sevilay Kahraman Elgün, ‘Rethinking Turkey–European Union Relations in the Light of Enlargement,’ Turkish Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 2000) p. 5. 92 Eralp, ‘Turkey and the European Union in the Post-Cold War Era’ pp. 179–180. 93 See, for instance, Robert S. Chose et al., ‘Pivotal States and US Strategy,’ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75 (1995) pp. 35–51. 94 See, for instance, Alan O. Makovsky, ‘The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy’, SAIS Review (Winter–Spring 1999) pp. 92–113. 95 Malik Mufti, ‘Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy’, Middle East Journal, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Winter 1998). 96 Meliha Benli Altunıs.ık, ‘Turkish–US Security Relations: The Middle East Dimension’, in Mustafa Aydın and Cagrı Erhan (eds) Turkish–American Relations: 200 Years of Divergence and Convergence (London: Routledge, 2004). 97 Sean Kay, ‘What is a Strategic Partnership?’ Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 47, No. 3 (May/June 2000) pp. 15–25. 98 For what this package contained see Bruce Kuniholm, ‘Turkey and the West’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 2 (Spring 1991) p. 36. 99 Aykan, Türkiye’nin Kuveyt Krizi (1990–91) Politikası (Turkey’s Kuwait Crisis (1990–91) Policy) (Ankara: Dis Politika Enstitüsü Yayinlari, 1998) p. 60. 100 National Security Adviser Sandy Berger, Turkish Daily News (TDN), 14 November 1999. 101 Baskin Oran, Kalkık Horoz: Çekic Güç ve Kürt Devleti (Poised Hammer: Hammer Force and Kurdish State) (Istanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1996) p. 105. 102 Prior to the UN embargo Iraq was Turkey’s second largest trading partner and top crude supplier. However, with the UN sanctions regime this trade largely came to a halt. The embargo is estimated to have cost Turkey 30–60 billion dollars. A major problem was the closing of the 1.6 million-bbl/d capacity twin oil pipeline running from Kirkük in Iraq to the port of Ceyhan in Turkey. 103 For bargaining episodes between the two countries up until 2001 see Meliha Benli Altunisik, ‘Turkish–US Security Relations: The Middle East Dimension’, in Aydın and Erhan (eds) Turkish–American Relations: 200 Years of Divergence and Convergence. 104 Hürriyet, 5 July 2003. 105 Eralp, ‘Turkey and the European Union in the Post-Cold War Era’ pp. 179–180. 106 Ibid. pp. 181–182. 107 William Hale and Gamze Avci, ‘Turkey and the European Union: The Long Road to Membership’, in Rubin and Kirisci (eds) Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power p. 31.

Notes 161 108 Eralp, ‘Turkey and the European Union in the Post-Cold War Era’ p. 182. 109 Turkey’s population is larger than all member and candidate countries, except Germany. 110 In addition to the political aspect, the Copenhagen criteria have two more elements: the economic criteria and the implementation of the acquis communautaire of the Union. Although the recent financial crisis in Turkey underlined the weaknesses of the Turkish economy, Turkey’s fulfilment of the economic criteria is generally considered to be more satisfactory by the EU. Meltem Muftuler-Bac, ‘Turkey in the EU’s Enlargement Process: Obstacles and Challenges’, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Summer 2002) p. 81. 111 Ziya Onis, ‘Greek–Turkish Relations and the EU: A Critical Perspective’, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 6, No. 3 (2001) pp. 31–45. 112 Hale and Avci, ‘Turkey and the European Union: The Long Road to Membership’, in Rubin and Kirisci (eds) Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power p. 42. For an historical perspective on the importance of the ‘Turk as the Other’ in European self-definition see Iver B. Neumann and Jennifer M. Welsh, ‘The Other in European Self-definition: An Addendum to the Literature on International Society’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 17 (1991) pp. 327–348. 113 Müftüler-Bac, ‘ Turkey in the EU’s Enlargement Process: Obstacles and Challenges’ p. 88. 114 Amikam Nahmani, ‘What Says the Neighbor to the West? On Turkish–Greek Relations’, in Rubin and Kirisci (eds) Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power p. 72. 115 F. Stephen Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2002) p. 84. 116 Not fully satisfied with the initial wording of the Summit Resolution on Cyprus and the Aegean, Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit decided initially not to go to the Summit. To prevent a diplomatic blunder, Javier Solana, EU’s High Representative for the Common and Foreign Security Policy, and Günter Verheugen, Commissioner responsible for enlargement of the EU, flew to Ankara late at night on 10 December to convince the government that Cyprus and the Aegean issues did not constitute conditions attached to Turkey’s candidacy. Only then did the Turkish Prime Minister fly to Helsinki to be present at the ceremony. Hürriyet, 11 December 1999. 117 For the importance of Cyprus as a strategic asset see Eyup Ozveren ‘Geo-strategic Significance of Cyprus: Long-term Trends and Prospects’, Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 4 (December 2002–February 2003) pp. 35–50. 118 The Greek Cypriot side also had significant reservations about the Annan Plan and yet managed to emphasise its will to accept the Plan as a framework. Interestingly, even the nationalist government of Papadopoulos that came to power as a result of elections that were held during the negotiations, announced despite its previous rhetoric that it accepted the Annan Plan ‘with the provision that gaps in federal legislation and security be filled in’, ‘Attempts to Unify Cyprus Before Entry into EU Fails’, Wall Street Journal, 12 March 2003 p. A16. 119 Right after the Gulf War a refugee crisis of major proportions emerged when the Saddam regime launched a military campaign to suppress the Kurdish rebellion in the north of the country. About half a million Iraqi Kurds escaped over the border into Turkey. Ankara’s appeal for assistance was met by the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 688, which created a safe haven in northern Iraq to be protected by international forces headed by the US. Thus in 1991 Operation Provide Comfort

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136

(OPC) was established to conduct a humanitarian operation and to return refugees to their homes. Later the operation continued (OPC II) to deter a new Iraqi attack on the Kurds and to enforce the northern no-fly zone. The Turkish Grand National Assembly extended the mandate for the OPC every six months. Milliyet, 7 January 1996. For Turkish–Israeli relations in this period see Meliha Altunıs¸ık, ‘Turkish Policy Toward Israel’, in Makovsky and Sayarı (eds) Turkey’s New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy pp. 59–73. Yeni Yüzyıl, 6 January 1998. Estimated to be one-fifth of the population. Sule Kut, ‘Turkey in the Post-Communist Balkans: Between Activism and Self-Restraint,’ Turkish Review of Balkan Studies, Vol. 3 (1996/1997) p. 42. Duygu Bazog˘ lu Sezer, ‘Turkey in the New Security Environment in the Balkan and Black Sea Region’, in Mastny and Nation (eds) Turkey Between East and West p. 81. These concerns had a significant impact in the formulation of policy. As a result sometimes Ankara was considered as ‘over-cautious’ in its Balkan policy. See Sule Kut, ‘Turkish Policy Towards the Balkans’, in Makovsky and Sayarı (eds) Turkey’s New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy p. 89. Ilhan Uzgel, ‘The Balkans: Turkey’s Stabilizing Role’, in Rubin and Kirisci (eds) Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power pp. 49–50. Heinz Kramer, A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999) p. 149. Uzgel, ‘The Balkans: Turkey’s Stabilizing Role’, in Rubin and Kirisci (eds) Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power p. 62. Kramer, A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States p. 151. Uzgel, ‘The Balkans: Turkey’s Stabilizing Role’, in Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirisci (eds) Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power p. 63. Gareth Winrow, Turkey in Post-Soviet Central Asia (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995); Mustafa Aydin, ‘Turkey and Central Asia: Challenges of Change’, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Summer 1996) pp. 157–177. Philip Robins, ‘Between Sentiment and Self-Interest: Turkey’s Policy Towards Azerbaijan and Central Asian States’, The Middle East Journal Vol. 47, No. 4 (Autumn 1993) pp. 593–610. On Turkish foreign policy regarding the Baku-Tiflis-Ceyhan pipeline see Meliha Altunisik, ‘Turkey and the Changing Oil Market in Eurasia’, in Libby Rittenberg (ed.) The Political Economy of Turkey in the Post-Soviet Era: Going West and Looking East? (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998); Michael P. Croissant and Bülent Aras (eds) Oil and Geopolitics in Caspian Basin (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999); Bülent Gökay, The Politics of Caspian Oil (London: Palgrave, 2001). Sabri Sayari, ‘Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, Issue 1, Fall 2000. Also see Svante E. Cornell, ‘Turkey and the Conflict in Nagorna-Karabakh: A Delicate Balance’, Middle Eastern Studies (January 1998) pp. 51–72. Ziya Onis, ‘Turkey and Post-Soviet States: Potential and Limits of Regional Power Influence’, MERIA: Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 2 (June 2001) p. 3. Larrabee and Lesser, Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty p. 100.

Notes 163 137 Duygu Bazog˘ lu Sezer, ‘Russia: The Challenges of Reconciling Geopolitical Competition with Economic Partnership’, in Rubin and Kirisci (eds) Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power pp. 197–226. 138 Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774–2000, p, 325. 139 For the importance of coincidence of interests in middle power and leader relationship and the concept of ‘followership’ see Andrew F. Cooper et al., ‘Bound to Follow: Leadership and Followership in the Gulf Conflict’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 3 (1991) pp. 391–410. 140 Ibid. Conclusion 1 Keyder, ‘Whither the Project of Modernity? Turkey in the 1990s,’ in Kasaba and Bozdog˘ an (eds) Rethinking Modernity and National Identity p. 40. 2 See, for example, Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (Illinois: Free Press, 1958). 3 Muslim religious orders during this period constituted an important institutional network, some of which remained hostile to the modernisation project, especially to its secular and Western nature. However, it should also be noted that most of these tarikats pursued their interests within this system by using their close relations with centre-right political parties. 4 Jean-Francois Bayart, ‘Republican Trajectories in Iran and Turkey: A Tocquevillian reading’, in Ghassan Salame (ed.), Democracy without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1994) p. 290. In his comparison between Iran and Turkey Bayart concludes that, ironically, due to such ‘processes of social change and their relationships with the political sphere . . . the Turkish Republic is a genuine Islamic republic, and the Iranian Revolution was not an Islamic revolution’, p. 290. 5 Cizre-Sakalliog˘ lu, ‘The Anatomy of the Turkish Military’s Political Autonomy’, Comparative Politics. 6 See, for instance, F. Stephen Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2002); Dietrich Jung, Turkey at the Crossroads: Ottoman Legacies and a Greater Middle East (with Wolfang Piccoli) (London: Zed Books, 2001).

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Bibliography 169 Cizre, Ümit. ‘From Ruler to Pariah: The Life and Times of the True Path Party’, Turkish Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring 2002) pp. 82–101. Cizre-Sakallıog˘ lu, Ümit. ‘The Anatomy of the Turkish Military’s Political Autonomy’, Comparative Politics (1997) pp. 151–166. Cizre-Sakallıog˘ lu, Ümit and Erinç Yeldan. ‘Politics, Society and Financial Liberalisation: Turkey in the 1990s’, Development and Change, Vol. 31 (2000) pp. 481–508. Cornell, Svante E. ‘Turkey and the Conflict in Nagorna-Karabakh: A Delicate Balance’, Middle Eastern Studies (January 1998) pp. 51–72. Danielson, Michael N. and Rus¸en Keles¸. ‘Urbanisation and Income Distribution in Turkey’, in Ergun Özbudun and Aydın Ulusan, The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Turkey (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1980) pp. 269–309. Eralp, Atila. ‘Turkey in the Changing Postwar World Order: Strategies of Development and Westernisation’, in Ays¸e Öncü, Çag˘ lar Keyder and Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Developmentalism and Beyond – Society and Politics in Egypt and Turkey (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1994). Fitzgerald, Edward Peter. ‘France’s Middle Eastern Ambitions, the Sykes–Picot Negotiations, and the Oil Fields of Mosul, 1915–1918’, The Journal of Modern History Vol. 66 (December 1994) pp. 697–725. Göle, Nilüfer. ‘Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: The Case of Turkey’ in Augustus Richard Norton, Civil Society in the Middle East Vol. 2 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996) pp. 17–43. Güney, Aylin. ‘The People’s Democracy Party’, Turkish Studies Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring 2002) pp. 122–137. Hourani, Albert. ‘Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables’, in William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers (eds) The Beginnings of Modernisation in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century (Chicago, 1968) pp. 41–68. Kahraman-Elgün, Sevilay. ‘Rethinking Turkey-European Union Relations in the Light of Enlargement’, Turkish Studies Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 2000) pp. 1–20. Kalaycıog˘ lu, Ersin. ‘The Motherland Party: The Challenge of Institutionalisation in a Charismatic Leader Party’, Turkish Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring 2002) pp. 41–61. Karaosmanog˘ lu, Ali. ‘The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey’, Journal of International Studies Fall 2000, Vol. 54, No. 1: 199–216. Karasapan, Ömer. ‘Turkey and the U.S. Strategy in the age of Glasnost’, Middle East Report Vol. 19, No. 5 (September–October 1989) pp. 4–10, 22. Karpat, Kemal. ‘The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789–1908’, International Journal of Middle East Studies Vol. 3 (1972) pp. 243–281. Kay, Sean. ‘What is a Strategic Partnership?’ Problems of Post-Communism Vol. 47, No. 3 (May/June 2000) pp. 15–25. Keyder, Çag˘lar. ‘Class and State in the Transformation of Modern Turkey’, in Fred Halliday and Hamza Alavi (eds) State and Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1988) pp. 191–221. Kiris¸ci, Kemal. ‘Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices’, Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 36, No. 3 (July 2000) pp. 1–22. Kuniholm, Bruce. ‘Turkey and the West’, Foreign Affairs Vol. 70, No. 2 (Spring 1991) pp. 35–47. Makovsky, Alan O. ‘The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy’, SAIS Review (Winter–Spring 1999) pp. 92–113. Mardin, S ¸ erif. ‘Centre-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics’, Daedalus (Winter 1973) pp. 169–190.

170 Bibliography Mufti, Malik. ‘Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy’, Middle East Journal Vol. 52, No. 1 (Winter 1998) pp. 32–50. Mutlu, Servet. ‘Ethnic Kurds in Turkey: A Demographic Study’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4 (November 1996) pp. 517–541. Müftüler-Bac, Meltem. ‘Turkey in the EU’s Enlargement Process: Obstacles and Challenges’, Mediterranean Politics Vol. 7, No. 2 (Summer 2002) pp. 79–95. Neumann, Iver B. and Jennifer M. Welsh. ‘The Other in European Self-definition: An Addendum to the Literature on International Society,’ Review of International Studies Vol. 17 (1991) pp. 327–348. Önis¸, Ziya. ‘Redemocratisation and Economic Liberalisation in Turkey: The Limits of State Economy’, Studies in International Economic Development Vol. 27, No. 2 (Summer 1992) pp. 3–24. —— ‘Greek–Turkish Relations and the EU: A Critical Perspective’, Mediterranean Politics Vol. 6, No. 3 (2001) pp. 31–45. —— ‘Turkey and Post-Soviet States: Potential and Limits of Regional Power Influence’, MERIA: Middle East Review of International Affairs Vol. 5, No. 2 (June 2001). Özbudun, Ergun. ‘Income Distribution as an Issue in Turkish Politics’, in Ergun Özbudun and Aydın Ulusan, The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Turkey (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1980) pp. 55–82. Sayarı, Sabri. ‘Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era’, Journal of International Affairs Vol. 54, Issue 1 (Fall 2000) pp. 169–182. —— ‘Political Parties, Party Systems, and Economic Reforms: The Turkish Case’, Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. 31, Issue 4 (Winter 1996/1997) pp. 29–46. S¸ enses, Fikret. ‘An Assesment of the Pattern of Turkish Manufactured Export Growth in the 1980s and Its Prospects’, in Tosun Arıcanlı and Dani Rodrik, The Political Economy of Turkey – Debt, Adjustment and Sustainability (London: Macmillan, 1990) pp. 60–75. Tachau, Frank. ‘Social Change and Electoral Behaviour in Turkey: Toward a ‘Critical Realignment’?’, International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 4 (1975) pp. 467–468. —— ‘Turkish Political Parties and Elections: Half a Century of Multiparty Democracy’, Turkish Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 2000) pp. 128–148. Tirman, John. ‘Improving Turkey’s ‘Bad Neighborhood’, World Policy Journal Vol. 15, No. 1 (Spring 1998) pp. 60–67. Toksöz, Mina. ‘The Economy – Achievements and Prospects’, in Brian Beeley (ed.) Turkish Transformation – New Century, New Challenges (Cambridgeshire: Eothen Press, 2002) pp. 141–164. Toprak, Binnaz. ‘Civil Society in Turkey’, in Augustus Richard Norton, Civil Society in the Middle East, Vol. 2 (Leiden: E.J Brill, 1996) pp. 87–118. Ulman, A.H. and R.H. Dekmejian. ‘Changing Patterns in Turkish Foreign Policy, 1959–1967’, The Middle East Journal (Fall 1967) pp. 772–785. Yavuz, M. Hakan. ‘Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux: The Rise of NeoOttomanism’, Critique, No. 2 (Spring 1998) pp. 19–41. Yes¸ilada, Birol. ‘The Virtue Party’, Turkish Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring 2002) pp. 62–81.

Index

Abdül Hamid II 5–8, 10 Abdülmecid 15 Ahmet Rıza 7 Ahrar Fırkası 8 Alexandretta/Hatay question 97–98, 100; cessation to Turkey 97 Alevis 41, 55 Anatolian Tigers 82–3, 86 Arab: nationalism 10; provinces 10, 12; countries 105–106, 107–108, 127 Armenia 15 Armenian: insurrection 12; population 18; Republic 14 army 2–3, 7–8, 11–13, 15, 32, 37, 42 Association for the Defence of Rights 13 Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal 13, 15–18, 20, 22–23, 26, 47, 94, 134; and foreign policy 91–92 Bahçeli, Devlet 62 Baghdad Pact 105 Balkan Wars 9 Balkans 7, 127–129; Balkan Entente 99; Balkan Pact 105; Bosnian crisis 128; competition with Greece in 128–129; Kosovo crisis 128–129; Ottoman legacy in 127–128; South-east Europe Co-operative Initiative 129; South-east Europe Multinational Force 129 Basic Organisation Law (1921) 21 Bayar, Celal 29 Baykal, Deniz 56 bourgeoisie: creation of 11, 77; industrial 11; Ottoman 5 Britain 12, 14, 17, 95–99, 100–106 British 13, 15, 22, 96, 98, 101–102, 104; mandates 14 bureaucracy 2–3, 8, 11; palace 5; see also bureaucrats bureaucrats 3, 5, 8

Caliphate 13, 16, 21 Capitulations 4, 11, 15 Cem, ˙Ismail 123, 128 Central Asia and the Caucasus 129–131; and Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline 116, 124, 130; ethnic conflicts in 130; oil resources of 130; Turkey as a model in 129 Çiller, Tansu 51, 54, 56, 57, 61, 64, 84, 119 Cold War: end of 54, 90, 112 Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) 7–12, 25 constitution: 1876 5, 7; 1924 16, 20; 1961 33, 35, 44, 73, 109; 1982 44, 46, 65, 92 corruption 54, 56, 59, 71–72, 80, 87 coups: 1960 32–33; 1971 37–38; 1980 42–44, 49, 52, 65, 78, 92, 112, 135; post-modern coup of 1997 60 Cyprus 138; and EU 121–122; 124–125; Annan Plan 125; intervention 40,75, 109–110; issue 40, 109–110; origins of 106–107 Demirel, Süleyman 34–35, 37, 40–41, 44, 48, 50–51, 54, 61, 63, 77, 93, 107 Democracy Party (DEP) 53–54; see also Kurdish Democrat Party (DP) 25, 27, 28, 32, 33, 34, 38, 46; in power 28–31, 70–72; and foreign policy 91–92 Democratic Left Party (DSP) 48, 61, 63, 64 Dervis,, Kemal 64, 85 devaluation 72, 75, 77, 84 Ecevit, Bülent 35, 38, 40, 44, 48, 61–64, 84–85, 110, 117, 123; and opium issue 107

172 Index economic liberalisation 48, 49, 51, 66, 78–87, 92, 111–112; 24 January Decisions 41–42, 77–78 economic crisis 55, 64, 84, 109, 135 elections: 1950 28–29; 1954 31; 1957 31; 1961 33; 1965 34, 35, 36; 1969 36; 1973 38, 39; 1977 40; 1983 45–46; 1987 48, 50; 1991 46, 50–51, 53; 1995 56–57; 1999 62–64; 2002 64–65; municipal 1984 46; 1989 50; 1994 56 elite 1, 3–5, 7, 22–23, 68; economic 18; governing 134; military-bureaucratic 32, 35, 38, 47, 57, 65–66, 113; political 76; provincial 23; state 18 Erbakan, Necmettin 37, 43, 47, 56, 58, 59, 60, 63, 94 Erdog˘an, Recep Tayyip 63, 64, 65, 123 European Union (EU)/ EC/EEC 65, 67, 90, 105, 110–112, 114, 119–122, 136; Ankara agreement 105, 119; Copenhagen Summit 120–121; Customs Union 84, 110, 119–120; ESDP 120; goal of becoming a member 89; Helsinki Summit 114–120, 124; legislation 64; Luxembourg Summit 120, 124; rejection of bid for membership 90 Evren, Kenan 42, 43, 44 February 28 Process 59–62 Felicity Party (SP) 63, 64 First World War, and Turkey 9, 11, 68, 88, 94, 99, 131 foreign direct investment 79, 84 foreign investment 77, 79, 82; Department 79; Code 79 foreign policy making: and bureaucracy 91–92; and economy bureaucracy 92, 110; and military 92, 118; and parliament 92–94; and presidency 92–93 France 2, 12, 14–15, 95–97; payment of debts 96–97; Alexandretta question 97 Franco-Turkish Agreement of May 1926 97 French 22 Free Republican Party 17 Germany 84, 101 geopolitics, and foreign policy 88–89 Grand National Assembly (1920) 13–16; see also Turkish Grand National Assembly; Parliament

Great Powers 94–97, 100, 102; rivalry 100, 101, 131; politics 100 Greece 9, 13–14, 18, 98, 105, 110, 122–125, 134; and EU 121; and Helsinki Summit 124; and Öcalan affair 123; Dodecanese islands 14, 99; Imia/Kardak crisis 122; see also Balkans; Cyprus, issue Greek: forces 15; invasion 13 Gross National Product (GNP) 68–69, 75–76, 79, 80–81 Gulf War (1990–1) 51–52, 83, 92, 114–118 Gül, Abdullah 63, 65 Gürsel, Cemal 32 head-scarf issue 60, 63 history, and foreign policy 91 Hizbullah 53–54 identity xvii–xviii, 7, 9, 135; domestic 89; Islamic 90; national 20–21, 90; Ottoman 6–11, regional 89–90 Iltizam (land tenure) 2 Imam Hatip Schools 60, 137 Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) 19, 36, 73, 75–78, 83, 86, 110; policy 68, 72 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 64, 72, 75, 78, 84–86 Independence Tribunals 17 Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association (MÜSI˙AD) 55, 66, 82 Industrial Development Bank 70–71 industrialisation 11, 18–19, 36–37, 69 Iran 98–99, 126 Iran–Iraq War 79, 111, 113 Iraq 99, 112–14, 126; Kurds in 117; northern Iraq 53–54, 117, 119; Turcomans in 118 Iraq War 93, 94, 138; and bargaining with the US 117–118 Islahat Fermanı 3 Islam 5–6, 9–10, 21, 30, 32, 37–39, 42–43, 64; political 66, 90, 138 Israel 58, 92, 106, 114, 126–127 Italy 9, 14–15, 99, 101; invasion of Libya 9; troops 13 I˙nönü, Erdal 48, 51, 54 I˙nönü, ˙Ismet 15–16, 26–27, 33–34, 38, 95, 100–102; and foreign policy 91; and Johnson letter 107

Index 173 I˙zmir Economics Congress 18 Justice and Development Party (AKP) 25, 63–65, 67, 86, 94, 117–118, 122–123, 125, 136, 138 Justice Party (AP) 33, 34–35, 37, 38–40, 44, 45 Karayalçın, Murat 54 Kurdish: challenge 138; ethno-nationalism 66; identity 51–52, 136; issue 44, 52–54, 62, 83, 90, 121, 126–127, 137; nationalism 90, 114; People’s Labour Party (HEP) 51, 53; population in Turkey 52; voters 50 Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) 41, 47, 51–55, 60, 62, 90, 113, 121–123, 126–128, 131, 136, 138 Kurds 20–21 Kutan, Recai 63 landlords 2, 11, 13, 18 Lausanne: Conference 15, 95, 98; Treaty 15–16, 96, 99, 106, 131; restrictions 19 League of Nations 14–15, 22, 95–97; Turkey’s membership in 99 left of the centre 35, 38–40 lobbies, and foreign policy 93 Mahmud II 2 Marshall Plan 70–71, 104 media, and foreign policy 93–94 Middle East 108–109, 112–114, 125–127, 135, 138; see also Arab; Iran; Israel military 1, 26, 39, 45–46, 53, 55, 59–62, 65–66, 78–79, 121, 126; forces 88; in foreign policy 92, 135 modernisation 1, 16, 43, 52, 90, 135; of the army 3, 11; process 10; project 16, 23, 26–27, 30, 35, 37, 55, 58, 65, 134, 136–137, 139 Montreaux Convention 99–100, 103, 131 Mosul issue 12, 14–15, 17, 95–98, 131; and League of Nations 95–96; and Sheikh Said rebellion 96; Count Teleki Commission 96; Motherland Party (ANAP) 45–51, 56, 59, 61–64, 79, 81 multi-dimensional foreign policy 106–110 multi-party politics: transition to 25–27, 66, 91 Mudros Armistice 12, 97 Nation Party (MP) 28, 36

National Order Party (MNP) 37–38, 49 National Pact 13, 19, 97 National Salvation Party (MSP) 38–40, 43, 47–51 National Security Council 33, 44, 58, 60–61, 85, 120 Nationalist Action Party (MHP) 36, 40, 43, 51, 62–64, 90 Nizam-ı Cedid 2 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 90, 93, 107–109, 114, 120, 123; membership in 104–105; and ESDP 120; in the Balkans 128–129 Operation Provide Comfort (OPC) 126 Ottoman Freedom Society 7 Ottomanism 5, 9, 10–11, 20 Öcalan, Abdullah 62, 63, 112 Özal, Turgut 41, 45–47, 49, 50, 52, 54, 78–79, 81, 113, 115–116; and foreign policy 92–93 Pan-Islamism 10 Pan-Turkism 10, 21 Parliament 5, 7–8; see also Turkish Grand National Assembly Peace Keeping: participation in 114–115, 117, 128–129, 132–133 People’s Democracy Party (HADEP) 54; see also Kurdish; Kurdistan Workers’ Party populism 21–22 privatisation 79, 81, 83, 85–86 Progressive People’s Party 17 Public Debt Administration (PDA) 8 Republican Peasants’ Nationalist Party (CKMP) 32–33, 36–37 Republican People’s Party (CHP) 17, 21, 25– 35, 38–40, 43–45, 48, 56, 62, 64, 137; and foreign policy 92, 110 Russia 5, 14, 129–131; and Chechen Conflict 130; and Cyprus issue 130; and PKK 131 Sadabad Pact 99 Second World War, and Turkey 68–69, 100–102, 131 secularisation 8, 11–12, 23, 135; programme 21 secularism 20–22, 30, 35, 57, 59, 134–136 Selim III 2

174 Index Sened-i ˙Ittifak 2 Settlement Law 20–21 Sevres Treaty 14, 95; ‘new Sevres’ 126 Sezer, Ahmet Necdet 63, 85, 93 Sheikh Said Rebellion/Revolt 17, 134 Sincan affair 59, 126 Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP) 48–49, 51–52, 54, 56 Soviet Union 15, 95–96, 99–101, 103–104; demands of June 1945 102–103; Neutrality and Non-Aggression Pact of 1926 96, 99; normalisation of relations 108; proposal of revision of the Montreux Convention 102; Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression of 1925 102 state formation, and foreign policy 94–100 State Planning Organisation 73, 79 statism 19, 21 Susurluk incident 54 Syria 14, 112–114, 127; Adana Agreement 127; support for the PKK 127 Takrir-i Sukun Kanunu 17 Tanzimat 3; period 7; reformers 4 tarikats 137 trade unions 35–37, 44 Treaty of Berlin 9–10 True Path Party (DYP) 45, 48–51, 54, 56, 61, 64 Truman Doctrine 103–104 Türkes,, Alparslan 32, 36, 43, 62 Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) 16–17, 115, 118, 120–121 Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen

Association (TUSI˙AD) 74, 78, 82–83, 93 Turkish Workers’ Party (TI˙P) 35–36, 38 Turkish-Islamic Synthesis 42–43, 46, 59, 137 ulema 2, 4, 12 United Nations 102; in the Balkans 128–129 United States 75, 93, 94, 103–109, 111–112, 138; and Turkey in the post-Cold War era 115–119; arms embargo 107, 110, 112; arrival of the Battleship Missouri 103; crisis with Turkey 106–107, 109; Defence Co-operation Agreement of 1969 107; Defence and Economic Co-operation Agreement (DECA) of 1980 112; Rapid Deployment Force 111; strategic partnership with 116 Vahdettin IV 15 village guard system 53–54; see also Kurdish, issue Virtue Party (FP) 61, 63 War of independence 13, 15–16, 68, 91, 94–95 Welfare Party (RP) 47, 50, 51–63, 90 Westernisation 5, 16, 22–23, 27, 35, 89, 100, 135–136; and foreign policy 104 World Bank 72, 75, 78, 84–86 Yılmaz, Mesut 56, 59, 61–62, 64, 120 Young Ottomans 4–6, 10 Young Turk period 6–8