Transcending Self-Interest: Psychological Explorations of the Quiet Ego

Transcending Self-interest PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLORATIONS OF THE QUIET EGO

Edited by

Heidi A.Wayment Jack J. Bauer

DECADE of BEHAVIOR

AMERICAN

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PSYCHOLOGICAL WASH I N G T O N ,

ASSOCIATION

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In the U.K., Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, copies may be ordered from American Psychological Association 3 Henrietta Street Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU England Typeset in Century Schoolbook by PageGrafx, Inc., St. Simon's Island, GA Printer: Edwards Brothers, Inc., Ann Arbor, MI Cover Designer: Berg Design, Albany, NY Technical/Production Editor: Devon Bourexis The opinions and statements published are the responsibility of the authors, and such opinions and statements do not necessarily represent the policies of the American Psychological Association. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Quiet Ego Conference (1st: 2005 : Northern Arizona University) Transcending self-interest: psychological explorations of the quiet ego / edited by Heidi A. Wayment and Jack J. Bauer. p. cm. — (Decade of behavior) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-1-4338-0340-6 ISBN-10:1-4338-0340-2 1. Egoism—Congresses. 2. Self-interest—Congresses. 3. Self—Congresses. I. Wayment, Heidi A. II. Bauer, Jack J. III. Title. BJ1474.Q44 2005 155.2'5—dc22 2007039932 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A CIP record is available from the British Library. Printed in the United States of America First Edition

APA Science Volumes Attribution and Social Interaction: The Legacy of Edward E. Jones Best Methods for the Analysis of Change: Recent Advances, Unanswered Questions, Future Directions Cardiovascular Reactivity to Psychological Stress and Disease The Challenge in Mathematics and Science Education: Psychology's Response Changing Employment Relations: Behavioral and Social Perspectives Children Exposed to Marital Violence: Theory, Research, and Applied Issues Cognition: Conceptual and Methodological Issues Cognitive Bases of Musical Communication Cognitive Dissonance: Progress on a Pivotal Theory in Social Psychology Conceptualization and Measurement of Organism-Environment Interaction Converging Operations in the Study of Visual Selective Attention Creative Thought: An Investigation of Conceptual Structures and Processes Developmental Psychoacoustics Diversity in Work Teams: Research Paradigms for a Changing Workplace Emotion and Culture: Empirical Studies of Mutual Influence Emotion, Disclosure, and Health Evolving Explanations of Development: Ecological Approaches to Organism-Environment Systems Examining Lives in Context: Perspectives on the Ecology of Human Development Global Prospects for Education: Development, Culture, and Schooling Hostility, Coping, and Health Measuring Patient Changes in Mood, Anxiety, and Personality Disorders: Toward a Core Battery Occasion Setting: Associative Learning and Cognition in Animals Organ Donation and Transplantation: Psychological and Behavioral Factors

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In memory of my father and baby twin sister —Heidi A. Wayment To my wife and children —Jack J. Bauer

Contents Contributors

xv

Foreword

xvii

Preface

xix

Introduction Heidi A. Wayment and Jack J. Bauer 1. The Psychology of the Quiet Ego Jack J. Bauer and Heidi A. Wayment Part I. Putting the Ego Into Perspective

3 7 21

2. The Lure of the Noisy Ego: Narcissism as a Social Trap W. Keith Campbell and Laura E. Buffardi

23

3. A Terror Management Perspective on the Quiet Ego and the Loud Ego: Implications of Ego Volume Control for Personal and Social Well-Being Spec Kosloff, Mark J. Landau, Daniel Sullivan, and Jeff Greenberg

33

4. In Search of the Optimal Ego: When Self-Enhancement Bias Helps and Hurts Adjustment Virginia S. Y. Kwan, Lu Lu Kuang, and Belinda X. Zhao

43

5. Taming the Wild Ego: The Challenge of Humility Julie Juola Exline 6. From Egosystem to Ecosystem: Implications for Relationships, Learning, and Weil-Being Jennifer Crocker Part II. The Importance of Awareness in Quieting the Ego 7. Beyond Me: Mindful Responses to Social Threat Kirk Warren Brown, Richard M. Ryan, J. David Creswell, and Christopher P. Niemiec 8. Individual Differences in Quiet Ego Functioning: Authenticity, Mindfulness, and Secure Self-Esteem Michael H. Kernis and Whitney L. Heppner 9.

Self-Compassion: Moving Beyond the Pitfalls of a Separate Self-Concept Kristin D. Neff

53

63 73 75

85

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CONTENTS

10. The Role of Awareness and Autonomy in Quieting the Ego: A Self-Determination Theory Perspective Christopher P. Niemiec, Richard M. Ryan, and Kirk Warren Brown 11. Motivation, Threshold for Threat, and Quieting the Ego Holley S. Hodgins Part III. The Importance of Others in Quieting the Ego 12. Hierarchy Among Selves: An Implication for Relations With Persons Versus Groups Lowell Gaertner, Constantine Sedikides, Michelle Luke, and Jonathan luzzini

107

117 125 127

13. Allo-Inclusive Identity: Incorporating the Social and Natural Worlds Into One's Sense of Self Mark R. Leary, Jessica M. Tipsord, and Eleanor B. Tate

137

14. Perspectives on the Self in the East and the West: Searching for the Quiet Ego Derrick Wirtz and Chi-yue Chiu

149

15. The Collective and Compassionate Consequences of Downward Social Comparisons Heidi A. Wayment and Erin M. O'Mara

159

16. Collective Angst: How Threats to the Future Vitality of the Ingroup Shape Intergroup Emotion Michael J. A. Wohl and Nyla R. Branscombe

171

17. Beyond the Individualistic Self: A Framework for Prosocial Motives and Judgments M. Audrey Korsgaard and Bruce M. Meglino

183

Part IV. Developmental Perspectives on Quieting the Ego 18. How the Ego Quiets as It Grows: Ego Development, Growth Stories, and Eudaimonic Personality Development Jack J. Bauer 19. Homonegativity and the Lesbian Self: Portraits of the Ego as Either Transcender or Occluder of Negative Social Stereotypes Ed de St. Aubin and Kim Skerven 20.

Self-Development Through Selflessness: The Paradoxical Process of Growing Wiser Monika Ardelt

197

199

211

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21. Generativity, the Redemptive Self, and the Problem of a Noisy Ego in American Life Dan P. McAdams

xiii

235

Author Index

243

Subject Index

253

About the Editors

263

Contributors Monika Ardelt, PhD, University of Florida, Gainesville Jack J. Bauer, PhD, University of Dayton, Dayton, OH Nyla R. Branscombe, PhD, University of Kansas, Lawrence Kirk Warren Brown, PhD, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond Laura E. Buffardi, MS, University of Georgia, Athens W. Keith Campbell, PhD, University of Georgia, Athens Chi-yue Chiu, PhD, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign J. David Creswell, PhD, University of California, Los Angeles Jennifer Crocker, PhD, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor Ed de St. Aubin, PhD, Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI Julie Juola Exline, PhD, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH Lowell Gaertner, PhD, University of Tennessee, Knoxville Jeff Greenberg, PhD, University of Arizona, Tucson Whitney L. Heppner, MS, University of Georgia, Athens Holley S. Hodgins, PhD, Skidmore College, Saratoga Springs, NY Jonathan luzzini, PhD, Hobart and William Smith Colleges, Geneva, NY Michael H. Kernis, PhD, University of Georgia, Athens M. Audrey Korsgaard, PhD, University of South Carolina, Columbia Spec Kosloff, MA, University of Arizona, Tucson Lu Lu Kuang, MA, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ Virginia S. Y. Kwan, PhD, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ Mark J. Landau, PhD, University of Kansas, Lawrence Mark R. Leary, PhD, Duke University, Durham, NC Michelle Luke, PhD, University of Southampton, Southampton, England Dan P. McAdams, PhD, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL Bruce M. Meglino, PhD, University of South Carolina, Columbia Kristin D. Neff, PhD, The University of Texas at Austin Christopher P. Niemiec, MA, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY Erin M. O'Mara, MA, University of Tennessee, Knoxville Richard M. Ryan, PhD, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY Constantine Sedikides, PhD, University of Southampton, Southampton, England Kim Skerven, PhD, Alverno College, Milwaukee, WI Daniel Sullivan, University of Arizona, Tucson Eleanor B. Tate, MA, Duke University, Durham, NC Jessica M. Tipsord, MA, University of Oregon, Eugene Heidi A. Wayment, PhD, Northern Arizona University, Flagstaff Derrick Wirtz, PhD, Northern Arizona University, Flagstaff Michael J. A. Wohl, PhD, Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada Belinda X. Zhao, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ

Foreword In early 1988, the American Psychological Association (APA) Science Directorate began its sponsorship of what would become an exceptionally successful activity in support of psychological science—the APA Scientific Conferences program. This program has showcased some of the most important topics in psychological science and has provided a forum for collaboration among many leading figures in the field. The program has inspired a series of books that have presented cuttingedge work in all areas of psychology. At the turn of the millennium, the series was renamed the Decade of Behavior Series to help advance the goals of this important initiative. The Decade of Behavior is a major interdisciplinary campaign designed to promote the contributions of the behavioral and social sciences to our most important societal challenges in the decade leading up to 2010. Although a key goal has been to inform the public about these scientific contributions, other activities have been designed to encourage and further collaboration among scientists. Hence, the series that was the "APA Science Series" has continued as the "Decade of Behavior Series." This represents one element in APA's efforts to promote the Decade of Behavior initiative as one of its endorsing organizations. For additional information about the Decade of Behavior, please visit http://www.decadeofbehavior.org. Over the course of the past years, the Science Conference and Decade of Behavior Series has allowed psychological scientists to share and explore cutting-edge findings in psychology. The APA Science Directorate looks forward to continuing this successful program and to sponsoring other conferences and books in the years ahead. This series has been so successful that we have chosen to extend it to include books that, although they do not arise from conferences, report with the same high quality of scholarship on the latest research. We are pleased that this important contribution to the literature was supported in part by the Decade of Behavior program. Congratulations to the editors and contributors of this volume on their sterling effort. Steven J. Breckler, PhD Executive Director for Science

Virginia E. Holt Assistant Executive Director for Science

Preface The past several decades in America have been characterized by a nearly fanatic preoccupation with "me" and "mine." Western psychology has also been influenced by this cultural obsession, which has resulted in a relatively onesided representation of human cognition, affect, and behavior as primarily motivated and enhanced by self-interest. In this volume, we have assembled a group of contributors whose work focuses on understanding and documenting what it means to transcend individualistic aspects of the self (e.g., excessive self-interest, ego defenses). Consequently, this volume recognizes that people are connected to something larger than the self, explores how they transcend self-interest and an individualized sense of self, and addresses the benefits and drawbacks they may encounter as a result. Although ideas related to the notion that people can transcend the immediacy of their self-interests is not new, the appearance of these ideas in contemporary psychology has waxed and waned. Furthermore, the public face of Western psychology has helped to perpetuate the idea that the self is of utmost importance. The elevation of self-enhancement goals (of individuals and collectives) over self-transcendent goals is at the heart of many current social, political, and economic woes. Thus, the objective for the creation of this volume was to bring more attention to the empirical study of transcending egoism. Our belief is that this volume captures the wide variety of research that describes the multifaceted nature of self-interest and the benefits of the awareness of self-interested concerns as well as the social, developmental, cognitive, and clinical variables that aid our understanding of the nature and benefits of regulating and managing these tendencies for the greater good of self and others. We hope the chapters begin to capture what is clearly a renewed interest in the scientific investigation of a wide variety of psychological constructs related to keeping the ego in check. The impetus for this volume was a 2005 conference entitled "The Quiet Ego: Implications of a Less Defensive Orientation Toward the Self and Others"; therefore, we would both like to thank all of the conference attendees for their enthusiasm, the support and collaborative spirits of the authors who have contributed to this volume, and our "Quiet Ego" team of students who helped organize the conference: Jenna Hamilton, Lindsay Richerson, Desiree Sharpe, Jen Shott, and Stephanie Wells. We extend special thanks to Holley S. Hodgins and Jennifer Crocker for their early support of the conference; their enthusiasm was key in making it a reality. In addition, we are especially grateful to the American Psychological Association (APA) Science Directorate for its generous support of the stand-alone conference and to Northern Arizona University for providing us with significant funding to get it off the ground. Numerous people at Northern Arizona University arranged financial or other forms of support: Kathy Cruz-Uribe, Susanna Maxwell, Ramona Mellott, Rob Till, Linda Shadiow, Gypsy Denzine, Janina Burton, Peter Schwepker, Astrid Sheil, and graduate students in Heidi's 2005 and 2006 social psychology seminars. We are very

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appreciative of the support of the APA Books Department, particularly Lansing Hays, Maureen Adams, Genevieve Gill, and Devon Bourexis, and the help of anonymous reviewers. We also thank all the people in our lives who have been influential to us in our pursuit of these ideas, who have taught us more than we could ever hope to return, and who are an inspiration. I (Wayment) would like to thank my husband, Craig Steele, for his keen insights, sense of humor, and unwavering support. I also thank my children, Hannah and Dean; my stepsons, Benjamin and Quinton; my sister, Aleta; my brother, Mark; my mother and stepfather, Gertrud and Willi Menges; and my father-in-law, Stanley Steele, for their unique ability to live in the moment. I (Bauer) wish to express loving gratitude to my wife, Tricia, for her perpetual support, ideas, and patience over the course of organizing the conference and the book. I also thank my children, Jackson and Grace, for their love, patience, and self-transcendent inspiration. Finally, I extend deep thanks to my parents, Carolyn and John Bauer, and my uncle, Bud Kramer, for their support, guidance, and conversations on precisely the topics of this book since before I can remember. Finally, we both consider ourselves fortunate to have had the opportunity to work together on this project and to have had such wonderful mentors, including Shelley Taylor, Roxane Silver, and Margaret Kemeny (Wayment) and Dan McAdams, George Bonanno, and Jim Youniss (Bauer). We hope that researchers, practitioners, and graduate students enjoy the work represented in each chapter. Taken together, these chapters represent a great deal of empirical research and offer insight into the importance of transcending egoistic self-interest, methods for studying these processes, and the implications of doing so.

Transcending Self-interest

Introduction Heidi A. Wayment and Jack J. Bauer Thousands of psychological studies have identified egotism as an important influence on human behavior. This volume seeks to address the question, What can research psychologists gain, both in explaining human behavior and in advancing psychological science, by examining the perspective that our thoughts, feelings, and actions are also influenced by a need to transcend egotism? The chapters in this volume, which represent current research from a variety of disciplines within the field of psychology, including clinical, developmental, industrial/organizational, personality, and social psychology, address this question. These chapters not only reflect a variety of methods and research orientations but also represent many established and new theoretical perspectives and constructs that are crucial in understanding the importance of transcending egotism.

Overview of Parts Our challenge was to organize the chapters in a way that captured some of the main themes that arise when considering a quiet ego. For example, to understand the concept of a quiet ego, we need to first consider the "noisy" ego and its advantages and disadvantages. Thus, Part I of this volume is entitled "Putting the Ego Into Perspective." The chapters in Part II, "The Importance of Awareness in Quieting the Ego," highlight some of the intrapsychic mechanisms that can explain or describe how individuals are able to quiet their otherwise-egoistic tendencies. Parts III and IV include chapters that help us ultimately understand how the quiet ego emerges from our social and developmental contexts. Over the course of the past few years, we have seen that there is a tendency to juxtapose the concepts of egotism and self-interest with being other-focused and considering others' needs. One of the important assumptions that cuts across all of the chapters is that a quieted ego does not imply a negation of self in favor of the care and concern for others (see also chap. 1). However, we did want to address the ability of our social and human connections to motivate and inform a quieted ego. Accordingly, Part III of the volume is entitled "The Importance of Others in Quieting the Ego." Finally, the chapters in Part IV,

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"Developmental Perspectives on Quieting the Ego," address important questions about developmental influences on the creation and maintenance of both noisy and quiet egos. Next, we briefly describe the chapters in this volume part by part as well as how they fit into two primary perspectives on the nature of ego quieting. To facilitate a common thread among the chapters, we asked authors to respond to two of the following three questions: 1. How do you conceptualize and measure aspects of the quiet ego? 2. What does your work say about the importance and benefits of a quiet ego? 3. What about the importance and benefits of a not-so-quiet ego? In the end, we believe we have a collection of chapters that provides the reader with a rich overview of the current interest among research psychologists about the quieted ego, many well-articulated avenues for future research, and a blueprint for incorporating the ideas of a less defended self into the mainstream of psychological inquiry and application.

Overview of Chapters This volume begins with our (Bauer & Wayment, chap. 1) overview of the quiet ego, its historical and theoretical underpinnings, and a consideration of why this term may serve as a useful concept to consider a variety of psychological processes today. Beginning with chapter 2, Part I contains five chapters that highlight some of the advantages and disadvantages of excessive self-focus and self-interest as related to psychological well-being and adjustment. W. Keith Campbell and Laura E. Buffardi explain in chapter 2 the allure of the noisy ego and, more specifically, how narcissism affords short-term benefits but long-term costs. Spee Kosloff, Mark J. Landau, Daniel Sullivan, and Jeff Greenberg detail in chapter 3 how the ideas of quiet and noisy egos fit within the context of terror management theory and argue that an authentic existence involves oscillating between both as appropriate; they also suggest factors that may help achieve that balance. In chapter 4, Virginia S. Y. Kwan, Lu Lu Kuang, and Belinda X. Zhao explain and deconstruct the concept and measurement of self-enhancement, outlining ways in which moderation and situational discretion in the use of self-enhancement are key to understanding adjustment. The last two chapters in Part I not only expand on the benefits and drawbacks of egotism but also go a step further and propose psychological constructs that may lead to a quieter ego. In chapter 5, Julie Juola Exline contrasts what she calls the "wild" (noisy) ego with the "humble" (quiet) ego and describes the difficulties and challenges in studying humility as a potentially important factor in a quiet ego. In chapter 6, Jennifer Crocker closes Part I with her argument that there is a dual motivational system that encompasses not only the motivation behind noisy ego behaviors (i.e., egosystem goals) but also the motivation behind supportive and compas-

INTRODUCTION

5

sionate behaviors (i.e., ecosystem goals). All the chapters in Part I describe both the noisy and the quiet egos, their unique and important contributions to behavior, and the importance of balance for optimal human functioning. Part II contains five chapters that focus on the intrapsychic skills and abilities to reduce egoistic motivation and behaviors, most notably the ability to be an impartial observer of the self, as one integrates awareness with a secure sense of self and purpose. Part II leads off with chapter 7, by Kirk Warren Brown, Richard M. Ryan, J. David Creswell, and Christopher P. Niemiec, who pursue the premise that identification with the self can lead to its overprotection and that mindfulness, or the ability to be a witness to the self and all of its processes, is a step to reducing defensiveness. Michael H. Kernis and Whitney L. Heppner argue in chapter 8 that individuals with a "strong sense of self" are more likely to reflect quiet-ego tendencies, and they explain the authentic self in the context of mindfulness and self-esteem. In chapter 9, Kristin D. Neff describes the concept of self-compassion, or feelings of care and nonjudgmental understanding of the self, and how it stands in contrast to self-esteem or our cultural valuation of the separate self. Next, Christopher P. Niemiec, Richard M. Ryan, and Kirk Warren Brown show in chapter 10 how the autonomous self-regulation of self-determination theory facilitates intra- and interpersonal harmony, whereas introjecting but not integrating others' values into one's self-identity makes for a noisier ego. Finally, in chapter 11, Holley S. Hodgins describes in more detail how the selfdetermination theory construct of autonomy provides a motivational basis for understanding people's ability to take in information in a less biased and defensive way. Part III contains six chapters that are devoted to the role that others may play in quieting the ego, from the extent to which others are incorporated into the self-concept, to the identification with individuals and groups, to the explicit considerations of others. The first three chapters are primarily focused on the extent to which others are included in the self-concept. In chapter 12, Lowell Gaertner, Constantine Sedikides, Michelle Luke, and Jonathan luzzini explore the motivational hierarchy of the individualistic, relational, and collective selves and which of these might be most conducive in quieting the ego. Next, in chapter 13, Mark R. Leary, Jessica M. Tipsord, and Eleanor B. Tate consider the impact of incorporating the larger social and physical world into the self-concept and describe a new construct they call "allo-inclusive identity" and its benefits. In chapter 14, Derrick Wirtz and Chi-yue Chiu review theoretical conceptualizations of the self from Western and Eastern traditions to explore how incorporating others into the self-concept, as well as negative emotions, can lead to a more subdued ego. The next two chapters focus on possible implications of identifying with others on the ego and focus to some extent on the negative emotions such identification can produce. Heidi A. Wayment and Erin M. O'Mara argue in chapter 15 that although the literature on downward social comparisons has found that comparing oneself with less fortunate others is self-enhancing, the processes of feeling similar to those others may open the door for collective and compassionate outcomes that can help quiet the ego. In chapter 16, Michael J. A. Wohl and

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Nyla R. Branscombe focus on the dilemma for individuals whose collective identifications are threatened and suggest ways to reduce the threat to the collective ego. Finally, M. Audrey Korsgaard and Bruce M. Meglino, drawing primarily from the literature in industrial/organizational psychology, describe in chapter 17 the motive of other-interest that is gaining favor in explaining work-related behaviors and examine the motives and underlying judgment processes associated with self- and other-interest. Part IV contains four chapters that emphasize the role of personality development in quieting the ego. In particular, these chapters focus on the narrative construction of self-identity, where the individual's subjective interpretations of self and others are compared with broader measures of psychosocial development (thereby merging qualitative and quantitative data). In chapter 18, Jack J. Bauer presents the case that the ego quiets as it grows, portraying the developmentally quieter ego as one that interprets the self and others in increasingly more integrative terms, in addition to more emotionbased forms of growth. Ed de St. Aubin and Kim Skerven outline in chapter 19 how, among self-identified lesbians, a narrative self-identity that transcends instead of internalizes the social stigmas toward sexual orientation facilitates psychosocial maturity, well-being, and a range of ego-quieting characteristics. In chapter 20, Monika Ardelt gives a developmental account of wisdom wherein movement toward higher levels of wisdom and self-actualization correspond to increasing degrees of selflessness—all illustrated with narratives of people who scored high on her quantitative measure of wisdom. In chapter 21, Dan P. McAdams paints a rich portrait of how an American prototype of life stories—the "redemptive self—features the hardships and benefits of quieting the ego over the life course. Here the individual (especially in midlife) harnesses a range of quiet-ego qualities in constructing a life story that transforms difficulties into opportunities for generativity.

The Psychology of the Quiet Ego Jack J. Bauer and Heidi A. Wayment Egotism is in. For the past few decades, it has been okay to "look out for Number 1," with the assumption that "Number 1" refers to an individualistic notion of the person—and then mostly in the immediate moment, without regard for the individual's own long-term interests. Advertising and marketing campaigns feed our cultural obsession with egoistic pursuits, and political and economic forces help make many self-indulgent behaviors and expectations a perceived necessity. The burgeoning business of self-help books in pop psychology has contributed to the cultural endorsement of excessive self-interest, selling advice on how to be, or to get, anything one wants. What is wrong with that? To start, excessive self-interest is not entirely in the interest of the self: As the chapters in this book demonstrate, the problems of egotism include not only social disharmony but also diminished personal well-being, health, productivity, and self-esteem. Public messages from academic psychology and the social sciences have taken fierce stands against unchecked egotism (e.g., Lasch, 1979/1991; Twenge, 2006), have surveyed the conflicts in American life between self-interest and collective concern (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985; Putnam, 2000), and have pointed down paths of lessened ego investment (e.g., Leary, 2004; Schwartz, 2005). In addition, the academic and popular interest in positive psychology demonstrates a widespread concern for the problems of egotism and the ways of transcending it. Finally, the self-help industry is not entirely about selfish gain: Books on the humanistic, prosocial forms of personal growth have always made bestseller lists and are still on the rise in that respect (Korda, 2001). Thus, it is no cultural coincidence that psychological research has recently emerged to examine the transcendence of self-interest. We use the terms the quiet ego and quieting the ego to connote the individual who routinely transcends egotism as well as the need to turn down a few notches the booming volume of egotism, on both individual and cultural levels. The blossoming of research on transcending self-interest has grown in scattered patches across the vast field of psychology. With this book we hope to provide a unifying source and framework for understanding and advancing this research. In this chapter, we introduce this research as a new area of scientific inquiry, provide a framework for understanding the empirical research on the quiet ego, sketch psychology's historical interests in quieting the ego, and finally, point to current research and future directions that we find especially

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exciting. By way of preview, researchers tend to take one of two approaches to conceptualizing the quiet ego: (a) as a balance between the interests of the self and others or (b) as the development of self-awareness, interdependent identity, and compassionate experience.

The Quiet Ego as a Topic of Empirical Inquiry This chapter and book are an attempt to give a name to the theoretically disparate research programs that aim toward understanding how people transcend egotism. Rooted in the earliest underpinnings of psychology and philosophy, academic interest in quieting the ego is not new. Most recently, the positive psychology movement has cleared a path for empirical research on quieting the ego. Many of positive psychology's interests deal with quieting the ego, notably forgiveness, gratitude, mutual love, courage, responsibility, altruism, and tolerance (e.g., Snyder & Lopez, 2001). As we discuss later in this chapter, the range of topics dealing with quieting the ego is vast. However, underlying all this research is a central focus on how the individual interprets the self and others—in particular, how the individual might arrive at a less defensive, more integrative stance toward the self and others. In our struggle to find a unifying language for this area of research, we sought a term that conveyed the concerns of scientific psychology as well as the culture at large. To us, the term quiet ego conveys the notion that the core problems of egotism deal with the individual's screaming for attention to the self. Far from meaning a "squashed" or "lost" ego, we see in the quiet ego a self-identity that is not excessively self-focused but also not excessively other-focused—an identity that incorporates others without losing the self. In addition, the phrase quieting the ego conveys the sense of process we were seeking.

Meanings of Ego and Quiet Ego In thinking about the contents of this book on quiet-ego topics, we learned that there were several interpretations of what a quiet ego might be. Some interpreted a quiet ego as a fragile, squashed, or unwillingly silenced ego. Others thought of the "strong, quiet type"—a person who has a self-confidence born of self-understanding and feels no need to talk in depth about things. This latter interpretation is a little closer to the meaning of quiet ego in this volume, although the physical strength and loquaciousness of the individual are not of particular concern. To us, the relatively quieter ego listens to others as part of a psychosocial harmony, whereas the noisier ego tunes others out as one would tune out background noise. The quieter ego is attuned to internal rhythms of people's (including the self's) psychological dynamics, whereas the noisier ego is attuned more to the clamoring boom of people's external appearances. The quieter ego, compared with the noisier ego, has more balance and integration of the self and others in one's concept of the self, a balanced recognition of one's strengths and weaknesses that paves the way for personal growth, and a greater compassion for the self and others. The quieter ego is less under the spell or the "curse"

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of the self's (Leary, 2004) responsibilities and social images. The quieter ego realizes that the self is ultimately a construction or story that not only creates a sense of unity and purpose in life (McAdams, 1985) but also casts illusions, some constructive and some destructive. The noisier ego spends much of its energy identifying and defending the construction of self as if it were not a construction, and then asserting itself into the world. However, quiet is not categorically beneficial; there are risks and benefits associated with both quieter and noisier egos. Many of the chapters in this volume describe these trade-offs in great detail. Turning to a more technical definition, research on quieting the ego has roots in a range of theoretical and methodological approaches, which in turn are rooted in varying definitions of ego. These definitions can be grouped into five (nonexhaustive) sets: 1. Ego = the self, notably affective evaluations of the self, such as selfesteem, self-confidence, self-worth, and self-image (as connoted by a strong, wounded, boosted, or deflated ego). 2. Ego = the self, notably in relation to others, as in identifying with others, bonding with others, and identities that include versus exclude others. 3. Ego = that which constructs, organizes, or evaluates the concept of self; that which is aware of or witnesses experience; James's (1890/1950) "I" (in contrast to "Me"); consciousness itself; one's frame of reference, or, in psychoanalytic theory, the "synthetic function." 4. Ego = the arbiter, defender, or transformer of internal impulses (e.g., of biology and society in psychoanalytic theory). 5. Ego = an ego that too readily capitulates to the id, resulting in selfseeking motivation, egotism, and conceit (as connoted by a big ego). Of these five approaches to the definition of ego, researchers in scientific psychology tend to adopt one of the first three. Definitions 1 and 2 equate the ego with the self. Here, the characterization of ego typically emphasizes an affective dimension (as with self-esteem and Definition 1) and/or a psychosocial dimension (as with relational self-concepts and Definition 2). Whereas Definitions 1 and 2 are more common and straightforward, Definition 3 distinguishes the ego from the self and perhaps requires more explanation. Definition 3 views the self as a construction of the ego. Here, the ego is viewed more as a verb (i.e., a process) than a noun (i.e., a product). The ego (i.e., James's "I") is that which interprets objects and "brands" (James, 1890/1950) them as part of the self (i.e., the "Me") or not. These perceived objects of identification are what constitute one's concept of self.

Research Approaches to Ego Volume: Quiet Enough or Ever Quieter? Research on the quiet ego that adopts the first three approaches to the definition of ego (i.e., Definitions 1-3) involves a primary focus on the individual's interpretations of self and others. However, in line with the varying approaches

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to defining the ego, researchers differ in the degree to which they characterize ego-quieting as a good thing. These differences can be described in terms of a primary emphasis on either balance or growth.

Balance: Seeking a Quiet-Enough Ego Research that adopts either of the first two definitions of ego tends to view some ego-quieting as desirable but too much ego-quieting as undesirable. From this perspective, if an ego gets extremely quiet, it can lose its identity or be squashed. Thus, the notion of balance is key in this research (and is seen mostly in theoretical perspectives and operational definitions). Two kinds of balance emerge. First, in line with Definition 1, is a. positive-negative balance in one's self-evaluations. This research tends to show that one problem with a noisy ego is a relative inability to perceive and think about the negative qualities in one's life, particularly in U.S. culture (see chap. 14, this volume). Of course, too much thinking about those negatives (i.e., too much ego-quieting) results in a squashed ego, and research points to an optimal balance of positive and negative self-evaluation (Bauer & Bonanno, 2001). Second, in line with Definition 2, is a self-other balance in one's psychosocial concerns. Too much concern for the self leans toward egotism and narcissism (see chap. 2, this volume), but too much concern for others leans toward unmitigated communion, a condition in which one's own ego or identity is lost (Helgeson & Fritz, 1999). These two forms of quiet-ego balance are in practice related, if only because the tendency to focus on the self to the exclusion of others typically involves an unrelenting push to view the self as positive. In the balance approach to a quieter ego, optimal human functioning involves an ego that is quiet enough to hear others and to balance one's concerns with those of the self (the chapters in Parts I and III of this volume tend to take this approach).

Growth: Seeking an Ever-Quieter Ego Research that adopts Definition 3 tends to view ego-quieting as desirable, period. From this perspective, an ego can get quieter and quieter without becoming lost or squashed. This approach generally contends that "the ego quiets as it grows" (see chap. 18, this volume). The ego's frame of reference for viewing the self widens in psychosocial space, such that the view of self is not lost but instead becomes increasingly more integrative. From the balance/quietenough perspective, a growing ego tends to connote a big or inflated ego. From the growth perspective, a growing ego becomes increasingly aware of the self (cognitively), less defensive (emotionally), increasingly interdependent in its construal of self and others (cognitively), and increasingly more compassionate toward others and the self (emotionally).1 As the ego grows, the self neither J

A balance between the self and others is implicit here (note that the first two qualities of a growing ego just listed are agentic concerns, whereas the next two are communal concerns). In fact, balance itself is part of what grows (i.e., self and others become increasingly more optimally balanced) as part of the developing, quieting ego.

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takes up all of one's psychosocial space nor gets entirely crowded out by considering others. Instead, the ego's very interpretations of self are progressively transformed in a sequence that proceeds roughly from selfish (preconventional) to group focused (conventional) to interdependent (postconventional). The interdependent self2 is not a lost self; in contrast, it is stronger, more resilient, and more self-assured than ever. In the growth approach to a quieter ego, optimal human functioning involves an ego that becomes ever quieter as it gradually identifies with an increasingly wider and deeper psychosocial world (the chapters in Parts II and IV of this volume tend to take this approach).

A Shared Resonance The balance and growth approaches are not entirely at odds; in fact, we perceive more similarities than differences at a broader level. To start, the two views share a common interest in transcending egotism. Although the two groups advocate turning ego volume down either just enough or all the way, these images have more to do with definitions of ego and ego volume than with the resulting qualities of a quieter ego. Both groups present empirical research to support the psychosocial benefits of nondefensive awareness, interdependence, complexity of perspective taking, and compassion toward self and others. In the end, both approaches can well incorporate both balance and growth, even if the empirical measures or theoretical orientations at hand are primarily rooted in one approach or the other.

Position on Self-Interest Egoistic self-interest seems not only to bring some short-term gain but also to cause long-term pain, for others as well as for the self (see chaps. 2-4, this volume). In addition, self-interest itself is an essential component of psychological health and social interaction (a personal sense of competence and self-understanding are critical to most widely accepted models of psychosocial development, e.g., Erikson, 1950; for a discussion of the problems of unmitigated communion, see Helgeson & Fritz, 1999). The balance approach calls for a balance of interests in the self and others. Similarly, the growth approach calls for an ego that transforms self-interest from being individualistic to increasingly interdependent. The problem with excessive self-interest is a matter of either self-other imbalance or lack of psychosocial growth. Having distinguished these approaches to the study of quieting the ego, we now turn to the qualities of a quieter ego itself that are common to both camps. 2

Here the term interdependence has a different meaning than in research on individualism versus collectivism (in which collectivist interdependence can also function as unmitigated communion; see chap. 14, this volume). In the present context, interdependence refers to a level of maturity at which one understands both one's psychosocial independence (something that itself takes some maturity) and one's inextricable connectedness with others and culture. This kind of interdependence generally does not develop before young adulthood, if at all (Labouvie-Vief, 2006; Loevinger, 1976).

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Prototypical Qualities of a Quieter Ego It is probably impossible to map out the entire field of quiet-ego research. In attempting to generate a list of quiet-ego phenomena, we stopped at approximately 100 topics. Just about any topic in psychology can have some relation to the problems or transcendence of egotism. This book showcases a range of the research that has examined quiet-ego topics; however, it only begins to scratch the surface. For example, in addition to the specific areas addressed by the chapters in this book, there are potential physiological, neurological, immunological, and biological influences related to ego defenses; specific selfrelated emotions, such as depression and anxiety; and ego-quieting behaviors. Some (and only some) important quiet-ego topics not showcased in this volume include emotional intelligence (e.g., Salovey & Grewal, 2005), gratitude (e.g., Emmons & McCullough, 2004), forgiveness (e.g., Rye, 2005), outgroup tolerance (e.g., Brewer & Pierce, 2005), consumerism (Kasser & Kanner, 2004), community service (Metz & Youniss, 2005), the psychobiological limitations to a quiet ego (e.g., Kemeny, 2003), and the psychobiological benefits of meditation (e.g., Davidson et al., 2003). Despite the vast range of quiet-ego topics, we posit four prototypical qualities of a quieter ego: (a) detached awareness, (b) interdependence, (c) compassion, and (d) growth. Our aim in positing these four qualities is not to stake a claim of truth about the quieter ego but instead to stimulate an empirically informed dialogue about the basic components of the quieter ego. First, detached awareness deals with a nondefensive sort of attention: mindfulness (Brown & Ryan, 2003; Langer, 1989), that is, being aware of the positives and negatives of a situation or of the self or others and being focused on the present (or even the past or the future, as appropriate to the situation). Here detached awareness refers to a subjective interpretation of the present situation in which that interpretation is not predicated on how that situation makes one feel about oneself; that is, the person's awareness is detached from egoistic appraisals of the situation (as we discuss in the next paragraph, detached does not refer to a lack of interpersonal communion). Detached awareness depends on a certain degree of openness and willingness to accept what one might discover about the self or others (among other things), but neither of those two alone guarantees detached awareness. Among its many benefits is that detached awareness allows for a less defensive interpretation of the self and others in the present moment. Second, interdependence deals with a largely conceptual interpretation of the individual's mutual relations with others (from dyads to groups and beyond), that is, a balanced or developmentally more integrated interpretation of the self and others. Central to interdependence is the capacity to understand other people's perspectives in a way that allows one to identify with those other people. This interdependence is not mere conformity or agreeableness; it involves the ability to see past differences to more underlying, unifying aspects of other individuals'humanity. This interdependence, as well as compassion, may seem to be at odds with detached awareness. However, detached awareness is precisely what facilitates those two, especially in times of conflict. For instance,

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when intimate partners are in an argument, the capacity to mentally detach from one's own views, ideals, and expectations is precisely what clears a path toward understanding the perspectives of both self and other (Gottman, Coan, Carrere, & Swanson, 1998). Third, compassion deals with a largely emotional stance toward the self and/or others that involves acceptance, empathy, and a desire to foster the well-being of the person or group. We view interdependence and compassion as closely related because they are the relatively more conceptual and more emotional facets of psychosocial identification. Either one can trigger the other. For example, the conceptual understanding of one's interdependence with others may lead to compassion, and one's feelings of compassion may lead to a conceptual interpretation or insight that the self and others are interdependent. Fourth, growth deals with a humanistic or prosocial kind of development over time, where one either is concerned with or actually establishes heightened levels of quiet-ego qualities, such as awareness, interdependence, and compassion. Even the mere subjective concern for growth can quiet the ego. Like nondefensive awareness, growth-oriented thinking clears a space for understanding multiple perspectives. Part of the problem of egoistic self-interest is a limited scope of time by which one interprets the situation; egotism channels the mind toward the immediate moment (see chap. 2). In contrast, a concern for growth forces the individual to question the long-term effects of current actions. Furthermore, growth interpretations view the present situation (notably, conflicts) as part of an ongoing process instead of as a permanent end (which, if one is under threat, can be easily exacerbated into a threat to one's self and existence; see chap. 3). These four qualities of a quiet ego are closely related, and yet each has been studied relatively independently. Each one can be viewed as a state, a trait, a skill to cultivate intentionally, and a trigger for the emergence of the others. Furthermore, these four quiet-ego qualities, either individually or collectively, can be found at the root of most quiet-ego characteristics. For example, gratitude involves an awareness of one's lack of provision and some sense of interdependence. Humility involves self-awareness tempered by selfcompassion. Wisdom has been defined as any one of the four or as a combination of any of the four. Finally, a quieter ego is not defined by behavior, any more than the ego (or the self) itself is a behavior. The relative quietness or noisiness of the ego is a matter of how the individual interprets the self and others—with detached awareness in a balanced, integrated, compassionate, or growth-oriented manner.

Psychology's History of Concern With Quieting the Ego Interest in quieting the ego has an enduring, distinguished history in psychology. Indeed, it may well be historically one of the field's central theoretical concerns, although an actual body of research on these concerns has emerged only recently. In the historical sketch that follows, we highlight some of the key

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elements of ego-quieting that are found in research today but that were emphasized by the great figures and movements in psychology's history. Perhaps the most famous use of the term ego is the Latin translation of Freud's das Ich. Here, the ego, among other things, is trapped between the selfish (i.e., other-less) desires of the id and the equally strong desires of the superego. Freud's intrapsychological model of the ego resonated with a theme long found throughout the arts and humanities—that the individual is torn between the pull of biology and society, or between agency and communion (Bakan, 1966). To resolve these conflicts in the immediate moment, the ego uses a range of defenses, the more immature of which cause problems not only for others but also, eventually, for the self. Freud proposed a path to help resolve inner conflict that deals with a central element of quiet-ego research today: awareness of one's ego defenses. Jung (1951/1978) elaborated on this process, identifying layers of unconscious ego defenses that are encountered and defused along the path of individuation. Psychoanalytic theories eventually came to emphasize the social nature of the individual (e.g., Erikson, 1950; Horney, 1950/1991; Sullivan, 1953/1992), advocating another key element of quiet-ego studies, namely, balance of self and others in one's sense of self. Although the strictly psychoanalytic views of ego and self are largely different than those of contemporary research on ego-quieting, the basic ideas of awareness and balance as necessary for healthy functioning took hold in the field. To awareness and balance the humanistic psychologists (e.g., Maslow, 1968; Rogers, 1961) added at least two key ingredients of a quiet ego: (a) growth and (b) compassion. Regarding growth, the humanistic movement shifted the emphasis of therapy away from unearthing egotism to transcending it. In other words, personally working on the kinds of things that foster growth—such as openness, humility, self-awareness, acceptance of self and others, genuineness, and self-improvement—would pave a more promising path toward optimal human functioning than would regurgitating one's troubles. William James (1890/1950, 1902/1990) stands out among many great figures in psychology's history for having paved a path toward empirical research on quieting the ego. His famous chapters on the stream of consciousness and the self, as well as his Varieties of Religious Experience (1902/1990), all suggest the immense pull toward egotism, the difficulties of transcending it yet the human need to transcend it, and some paths toward that aim. James's division of the self into the I and the Me—plus his descriptions of the "empirical" self's constituents, self-esteem, and other processes of self-identity—have all shaped current research on the self and on quieting the ego in particular. His examination of mystical states of consciousness, in which workaday perceptions of the self are expanded to the point of perceived unity with all people and the universe, pointed to the role of an expanded self-identity in quieting the ego. In a philosophical sense, James's plea for psychology to adopt a position of radical empiricism, in which anything perceived could be studied scientifically, opened researchers' minds to the possibility of empirically studying the effects of the ego, even if doing so would be difficult (on this point, we see how far psychology has come in merely 100 years). From his philosophical approach to scientific psychology to the actual phenomena he considered, James made clear that quieting the ego should be of central concern to the field of psychology.

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Two closely related fields—personality psychology and social psychology—are each influenced by James's (1890/1950) portrayal of the self and are at the heart of much contemporary, empirical research on quieting the ego. Both fields have historically framed the self in terms of others (Allport, 1937; Erikson, 1950; Mead, 1934/1967). Social psychologists have found creative, shocking, and often humorous ways of demonstrating just how selfish people are. Experiments in social psychology over the past 70 years have shown that given the slightest incentive or threat individuals are quick to exhibit blind obedience, ruthless conformity, fierce ingroup dedication and outgroup exclusion and discrimination, self-protection, self-serving biases, blaming of others, and to otherwise place other people at a disadvantage (e.g., Milgram, 1953; Sherif, 1958). However, these types of findings were not counterbalanced with research on the ways in which people could reduce their excessive self-interest. Current research in social psychology is increasingly showing how people do just that (some excellent examples of which appear in this book). The field of personality psychology approaches the quiet ego as a property of the individual person rather than the situation. Adler (1927/1998) argued that the self is a fiction that people create. Kelly's (1955) theory of personal constructs advanced that idea, emphasizing the constructed and malleable nature of the self. In these constructivist approaches, the relatively quieter ego is more aware of the fact that the self is a set of constructs; the noisier ego is less aware of this fact, and this diminished awareness limits the capacity to grasp others' points of view (e.g., Loevinger, 1976). In his dynamic study of the whole person, Murray (1938) outlined, among other things, a set of needs that function and compete to varying degrees within the individual, many of which can, on balance or in combination, form relatively noisier and quieter egos (e.g., needs for dominance, aggression, exhibition, affiliation, and understanding). Erikson's (1950) psychosocial theory of personality development demonstrated how the ego develops in proportion to its capacity to identify with an increasingly broader spectrum of people and psychosocial concerns. Murray's and Erikson's work helped pave the way for narrative research (e.g., McAdams, 1985), in which the subjective interpretations of self and other—which are at the heart of the ego's quietness or noisiness—can be studied empirically. Another important tradition in personality psychology, especially in the past 25 years, is the study of broad personality traits. Allport (1937) identified a vast array of traits that helped later researchers to distill the famous Big Five traits, one of which,Openness to Experience, is central to quieting the ego (as seen in numerous chapters in this book). Developmental psychology has also contributed a great deal of theory and research on quieting the ego. In most theories of cognitive and social-cognitive development, development is defined loosely as an increasing capacity to differentiate and integrate conceptual perspectives (e.g., see Piaget, 1970). This increasing integration of perspectives involves a corresponding, normative decline in egocentrism throughout childhood and adolescence (and may continue in adulthood; Labouvie-Vief, 2006). Vygotsky (1978) argued that nothing facilitates this kind of development like interactions with other people and actively incorporating their views into one's own, which are key elements of a quieter ego as presented in this book. Many of the famous theories of psychosocial

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personality development chart precisely these capacities as they progress over time (e.g., Erikson, 1950; Kohlberg, 1969; Loevinger, 1976). Finally, underlying all this work (notably, Piaget, 1970) is the breadth and depth of human development outlined by James Mark Baldwin, who charted human development as an increasing ability to integrate, among other things, perspectives on the self and others (Broughton, 1981).

The Future of Quiet-Ego Studies In the past, empirical investigations in psychology have emphasized the varieties of human egotism, whereas most research on quieting the ego takes a more constructive approach, emphasizing the varied paths toward transcending egotism. The frontiers of studying the quiet ego scientifically seem to point down at least a few paths. One involves adopting new perspectives on previously existing concepts and theories in psychology. Examples from this book include the study of narcissism as a social trap (chap. 2), the trade-offs of noisy and quiet egos in terror management theory (chap. 3), the undesirable effects of self-enhancement bias (chap. 4), mindfulness in the processes of self-identity versus mindlessness (chap. 7; see also Langer, 1989), whether identifying with persons or groups better facilitates a quieter ego (chap. 12), the different paths toward a quiet ego in the individualist West and collectivist East (chap. 14), the viewing of downward social comparison as a vehicle for compassion instead of merely self-aggrandizement (chap. 15; see also Wayment, 2004), the questionable assumptions of rationality and self-interest in the organizational sciences (chap. 17), and wisdom defined in terms of increasing capacities for meaning making and selflessness (chap. 20). Another path involves the explicit identification of previously existing research as "quiet-ego" topics. For example, research on self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 2000) often focuses on transcending selfish impulses by appealing to a more autonomous orientation toward self and others—where autonomous means not simply "independent" but instead the consideration of the authenticity or intrinsic humanity of both the self and others in everyday life (see chaps. 8,10, and 11, this volume). This research involves a part of positive psychology that deals specifically with quieting the ego. Yet another path to the future of quiet-ego studies involves the creation of new phenomena for empirical study. Examples in this book include egosystem versus ecosystem goals (chap. 6), humility (chap. 5), self-compassion (chap. 9), allo-inclusive identity (chap. 13), collective angst (chap. 16), growth stories and growth goals (chap. 18), transcending versus occluding undesirable stereotypes (chap. 19), and the redemptive self (chap. 21). In other words, a great deal of research currently going on in psychology is already dealing with quiet-ego issues. One of the aims of this book is to make this fact known to the field. Looking to the horizon of human potential, one likely source of ideas is humanistic psychology. We tend to view humanistic psychology as focused on some of humanity's deepest and greatest potentials, many of which are just beyond reach of empirical study, but others of which

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may well be ready for prime time in research.3 Theorists in and around humanistic psychology, and transpersonal psychology in particular, have been mapping the more subtle qualities and farther reaches of human growth and ego-quieting (Walsh & Vaughan, 1993). For example, Wilber (2000), along with his proponents and opponents, are generating exciting models of the individual's transformation of consciousness. Much of this work extends scientifically established theory and can be (and to some degree has been) translated into new, empirically measurable constructs. Another area of promise is cross-cultural studies. Some studies have shown that quiet-ego characteristics function similarly across cultures (e.g., intrinsically motivated goals; Sheldon et al., 2004), whereas other studies suggest that different cultures take different paths to a quiet ego (see chap. 14, this volume). If one looks to the earliest philosophical traditions in the East and West, one sees that cultural concerns for quieting the ego seem to have a universal appeal. Research in this area can help clarify the properties of the quiet ego while also helping to refine current concepts of cultural differences such as individualism and collectivism. Similarly, we have discovered that Buddhist philosophy and practices are common among many of the researchers interested in this topic. This is not to say that Buddhism is by any means the only path to a quieter ego, but we were pleasantly surprised by how many conversations at the Quiet Ego Conference (see Preface, this volume) involved explicit references to Buddhist notions of compassion, mindfulness, and meditation. Thus it seems that religious ideas— notably the more transcendent, less ethnocentric ones—will be likely sources for future research on quieting the ego, which is, after all, a central concern of religions. Buddhism, as a psychologically minded system of thought, has already been such a source (e.g., see discussions of mindfulness—Brown & Ryan, 2003; emotions that help vs. hinder well-being—Ekman, Davidson, Ricard, & Wallace, 2005; and self-compassion—Neff, 2003). Christianity has already played a considerable role (see, e.g., discussions of gratitude—Emmons & McCullough, 2004; humility—Exline & Geyer, 2004; and forgiveness—Rye, 2005). In the end, we think that research on quieting the ego will continue to spread through the application of rigorous, empirical methods to models of transcending egotism that at one time seemed to be the exclusive domain of the humanities. We believe that the field of psychology is well poised to help society better understand the costs of excessive self-interest and the benefits of transcending it. This book happens to showcase empirical, psychological research on quieting the ego. However, human interest in quieting the ego is much broader, extending past the sciences and humanities to the arts, politics, business, media, education, religion, and beyond. People interested in quieting the ego from across these areas are contributing in their own ways toward a collective understanding of the problems and transcendence of egotism. We hope this book serves as a first step toward a more unified effort on behalf of psychology to lay an empirical foundation for society's understanding of these issues. 3

This is not to suggest that no empirical research goes on within humanistic psychology, only that humanistic psychology's existence outside the mainstream of research in fields such as personality, social, and developmental psychology is well known and unfortunately ignored or disparaged.

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Langer, E. J. (1989). Mindfulness. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Lasch, C. (1991). Culture of narcissism: American life in an age of diminishing expectations. New York: Norton. (Original work published 1979) Leary, M. R. (2004). The curse of the self: Self-awareness, egotism, and the quality of life. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Loevinger, J. (1976). Ego development. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Maslow, A. H. (1968). Toward a psychology of being. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold. McAdams, D. P. (1985). Power, intimacy, and the life story: Personological inquiries into identity. New York: Guilford Press. Mead, G. H. (1967). Mind, self, and society from the standpoint of a social behaviorist Chicago: University of Chicago. (Original work published 1934) Metz, E. C., & Youniss, J. (2005). Longitudinal gains in civic development through school-based required service. Political Psychology, 26, 413-437. Milgram, S. (1953). Behavioral study of obedience. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 67, 371-378. Murray, H. A. (1938). Explorations in personality. New York: Oxford University Press. Neff, K. D. (2003). Self-compassion: An alternative conceptualization of a healthy attitude toward oneself. Self and Identity, 2, 85-101. Piaget, J. (1970). Piaget's theory. In P. Mussen (Ed.), Carmichael's manual of child psychology (pp. 703-732). New York: Wiley. Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community. New York: Simon & Schuster. Rogers, C. R. (1961). On becoming a person. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Rye, M. S. (2005). The religious path toward forgiveness. Mental Health, Religion, & Culture, 8, 205-215. Salovey, P., & Grewal, D. (2005). The science of emotional intelligence. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 14, 281-285. Schwartz, B. (2005). The paradox of choice: Why more is less. New York: Harper Perennial. Sheldon, K. M., Elliot, A. J., Ryan, R. M., Chirkov, V., Kim, Y.-H., Wu, C., et al. (2004). Selfconcordance and subjective well-being in four cultures. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 35, 209-223. Sherif, M. (1958). Superordinate goals in the reduction of intergroup conflict. American Journal of Sociology, 63, 349-356. Snyder, C. R., & Lopez, S. J. (2001). Handbook of positive psychology. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Sullivan, H. S. (1992). The interpersonal theory of psychiatry. New York: Norton. (Original work published 1953) Twenge, J. M. (2006). Generation me: Why today's young Americans are more confident, assertive, entitled—and more miserable than ever before. New York: Free Press. Vygotsky, L. S. (1978). Mind in society: The development of higher psychological processes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Walsh, R., & Vaughan, F. (1993). Paths beyond ego: The transpersonal vision. New York: Tarcher/Putnam. Wayment, H. A. (2004). It could have been me: Vicarious victims and disaster-focused distress. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30, 515-528. Wilber, K. (2000). Integral psychology. Boston: Shambhala.

The Lure of the Noisy Ego: Narcissism as a Social Trap W. Keith Campbell and Laura E. Buffardi For at least 2,500 years, a clear and compelling case has been made for the benefits to both self and society of quieting the ego. From the historical Buddha's sermon at the Deer Park and the Katha Upanishad to the Book of Ecclesiastes, individuals can find convincing support for a quiet approach to life. Nevertheless, egotism has continued to rise in our society, even reaching new heights in the past several decades (e.g., see Twenge, Konrath, Foster, Campbell, & Bushman, in press; see also Foster, Campbell, & Twenge, 2003; Twenge & Campbell, 2001). In this chapter, we address two questions: (a) Why do the demands of egotism—the "noisy ego," so to speak—continue to be heard? and (b) What does the study of egotism's costs teach about the benefits of quieting the ego? Our focus is on the individual-difference variable of narcissism. We use narcissism as a window for observing egotism or self-enhancement in action. To briefly presage our argument, we posit that narcissism is a trade-off between several benefits to the individual and several costs to the individual and to society. It is important to note that this type of trade-off is remarkably seductive and self-sustaining. Narcissism's benefits for the self often occur in the short term and are emotional and affective in nature. In contrast, the costs typically appear in the longer run and are experienced by both the narcissistic individual and others. Because of this pattern of benefits and costs, we argue that narcissism operates like a social trap. Before making our argument in detail, we define narcissism and describe a systemic model that can be used to represent it.

Narcissism: The Noisy Ego in Action What makes the noisy ego demand attention? In the case of narcissism, we can identify both the structure of the ego and its function, where structure refers to both the self-concept and personality and function refers to self-regulation strategies. In regard to structure, narcissism is primarily associated with positive and inflated self-views and relatively little interest in warm or intimate relationships with others (Paulhus, 2001). Narcissistic individuals' self-views are positive in domains connected with agency, such as dominance, status, intelligence, and physical attractiveness (Brown & Zeigler-Hill, 2004; Gabriel, 23

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Critelli, & Ee, 1994). There is also evidence that these views are inflated insomuch as narcissism positively predicts self-perceived intelligence and attractiveness but not objectively assessed intelligence and attractiveness (Gabriel et al., 1994). In addition, narcissistic individuals see themselves as special and unique (Emmons, 1984) and entitled to special treatment (Campbell, Bonacci, Shelton, Exline, & Bushman, 2004). In contrast, they do not report the same level of self-enhancement on communal traits, such as warmth and agreeableness (Campbell, Rudich, & Sedikides, 2002). Indeed, narcissism negatively predicts self-reported agreeableness (Bradlee & Emmons, 1992) and even Intimacy and Affiliation as measured with the Thematic Apperception Test (Carroll, 1987). In regard to function, people with narcissistic personalities must selfregulate to maintain their inflated self-views on agentic domains; that is, they engage in a range of behaviors that ensure they continue to feel positively about themselves. These self-regulation efforts are shaped by narcissistic individuals' relative lack of interest in communal relationships. This lack of concern for others allows for a greater degree of interpersonal exploitation and manipulation in the service of self-regulation. Narcissistic self-regulation is pervasive across all facets of life. It can be seen in private fantasies of power and fame (Raskin & Novacek, 1991), spontaneous monologues that tend to be about the self (Raskin & Shaw, 1988), interpersonal conversations that turn into opportunities to self-promote (Vangelisti, Knapp, & Daly, 1990), attention seeking and showing off (Buss & Chiodo, 1991), materialism (Vohs & Campbell, 2006), game playing in relationships (Campbell, Foster, & Finkel, 2002), and other social domains. In short, when there is an opportunity to look and feel good, narcissists are likely to jump at it (Wallace & Baumeister, 2002). These clear efforts at self-regulation have led researchers to model narcissism as a self-reinforcing system. Such models typically involve the current self-concept (i.e., a positive view of the self), a social action that further enhances a positive view of the self (e.g., winning a public competition, a display of grandiosity), and some affective or esteem-laden consequence of this process. One of the earliest social-personality models was Raskin, Novacek, and Hogan's (1991) model of narcissistic self-esteem management, which focused on narcissistic individuals' displays of grandiosity in the interest of maintaining and bolstering self-esteem. Campbell's (1999) self-orientation model focused directly on romantic relationships, demonstrating that people with narcissistic tendencies seek out partners who are high in status and admire them as part of an effort to increase the narcissistic person's own social status and self-esteem. Morf and Rhodewalt (2001) presented a dynamic self-regulatory processing model that provided a more complete account of narcissistic self-enhancement that included affect regulation. Baumeister and Vohs (2001) focused directly on the affective qualities of narcissistic self-regulation by proposing what is essentially an addiction model of narcissism; that is, the narcissistic individual receives a "rush" when self-enhancement is experienced, which reinforces the desire to experience self-enhancement. It is important to note that this model also contains the habituation component common to all addictions: The situations that provide the rush to narcissistic individuals initially will not be potent enough to provide the same rush after repeated exposure. In their

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work on self-conscious emotions, Tracy and Robins (2004) linked narcissism more specifically to the emotion of pride. More recently, Campbell, Brunell, and Finkel (2006) proposed an agency model of narcissism that represented an effort to incorporate the previous systemic models of narcissism while adding the basic emphasis on the agentic concerns that narcissistic individuals exhibit (e.g., Paulhus, 2001). This model used the term narcissistic esteem as a label to describe the affective rush, pride, and dominance-tinted self-esteem associated with narcissistic self-enhancement. Although our focus is primarily on the noisy ego, it also is important that we briefly address the relationship between narcissism and the quiet ego; in other words, how are we conceptualizing a quiet ego? The simple answer to this is that low levels of narcissism are indicative of a quiet ego. There is a hidden complexity in this answer, however, because one can conceptualize low narcissism in at least two ways. First, low narcissism might be thought of as psychological dependence and weakness. Second, it might be thought of as a robust self-system but one lacking in grandiosity, self-centeredness, and a need to constantly maintain and defend status and esteem. We endorse a conceptualization of the quiet ego that is aligned with the second conceptualization; in other words, quieting the ego is not about weakness or passivity but about approaching life without grandiosity and puffery and with an interest in connecting with others and the world.

The Nature of Social Traps Imagine that you want to catch a lobster. The standard way to do this is to place a special type of cage, which offers easy entry and a difficult exit, at the bottom of the sea. Inside the cage you would put something that a lobster would find tasty, such as the head of a cod. The trap works because the lobster, drawn by the easily obtainable tasty fish head, enters the cage. He enjoys his stay for awhile, eating the fish head in the comfort of the cage. The downside, of course, comes later, when he tries to escape, cannot, and is hauled into a boat. The two basic mechanisms of a trap such as a lobster cage are (a) the lure of an immediate benefit to the self and (b) the longer term costs to the self that are ignored initially. There are some classic variations on this trap as well. For example, imagine that a psychologist is substituted for the lobster and the tasty fish head is replaced by equally tasty donuts. The psychologist might be lured to the donut by the rush of sugary goodness. Although there is no physical cage, the psychologist might sneak back, so to speak, the next day, for another donut. Day after day this happens, and as the psychologist grows more depressed by his increased girth and failing health, the donut runs become more frequent, and he graduates to oversized bear claws, because more pastry is needed to provide the same fleeting rush of positive affect and joy. Eventually, the psychologist develops diabetes and is hospitalized. In a sense, he has been trapped by his own craving for sugar and carbohydrates. Another classic example of a trap involves a group or society instead of an individual. Imagine the lobster fisher rather than the lobster. The fisher gets his or her reward from hauling in the lobster: The more lobsters, the bigger the

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reward. At the same time, there are 100 other lobster fishers facing the same "more lobsters equal more reward" equation. As long as the entire fleet of fishers can restrain from overharvesting, everyone can be moderately successful. What often happens, however, is that a significant number of fishers go for the bigger catch. Like the lobster in the trap with the tasty fish head, this strategy works well in the short term. In the longer term, however, the whole fleet suffers as the fishery is depleted and eventually destroyed. In his seminal review on social traps, Platt (1973) described three forms of traps (along with several others). The first two examples are variants of individual traps, or self-traps. More specifically, the first represents a time-delay trap, in which the individual selects a short-term benefit and then suffers a longer term cost. Often, this entails a clear problem with delay of gratification (e.g., "I will buy this car now instead of waiting until I actually make enough money to safely afford it"). The second represents a sliding-reinforcer trap, in which the benefit of a particular course of action decreases slowly as the costs increase. Often, this entails a form of habituation (e.g., "I do not get the same mellow feeling from the same amount of alcohol, so I gradually increase my intake from a single tequila sunrise to several shots of mescal [tequila]"). The third example is an individual goods and collective bads trap. The "tragedy of the commons" (Hardin, 1968) fits this mold. In this type of trap, a behavior that leads to an individual good also leads to a collective bad. Because the individual is a member of the collective, of course, the bad might befall him or her to some extent as well. Social traps often exist when individual actions that benefit the self in the short term lead to negative consequences to the self and to the collective. The negative consequences typically occur in the longer term, although the time frame that constitutes the longer term varies dramatically. The time interval from initial use of methamphetamine to serious negative consequences can be relatively short; in contrast, the depletion of the fish in the Grand Banks went on for hundreds of years and many generations before cod fishing was banned.

When the Noisy Ego Chases the Lure: Narcissism as a Social Trap Overview The function of a trap is relatively clear when the reward is as simple and biologically straightforward as a chocolate cookie or cocaine. What we argue is a little—but not much—more complex. In short, we argue that the experience of egotism and its concomitants (e.g., status, esteem, pride) can act in a similar way. Thus narcissism, as an individual-difference variable that operates as part of an ego-enhancing and -sustaining system, should make the individual susceptible to certain social traps. Consider the following example. Hal, a narcissistic person, leases a new Mercedes. This has a small immediate cost (i.e., the lease payment), but this cost is easily outweighed in the short run by the self-enhancing benefits of the

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car. Hal gets a rush of narcissistic pride every time he throws his Mercedes keychain on the counter at a bar or the gym, catches his reflection in the rearview mirror, or walks to get his car in a lot full of the Hyundais and Fords that, according to Hal, "only losers drive." For Hal, driving the Mercedes has other benefits as well. He manages to catch the attention of an attractive, albeit somewhat shallow woman, who seems to admire him greatly. This pumps up his ego further, and the added confidence enables him to be more successful at his sales job. Hal buys an expensive wardrobe and a bigger Mercedes. He marries his attractive girlfriend and joins an elite country club. At this point in his journey, Hal is like the lobster happily munching away at the fish head without knowing he is trapped. His narcissism is working like a charm. Unfortunately, the trap starts to close at this point. He begins to neglect his wife in favor of a young colleague at his office, whom he convinces that his marriage is on the outs because of his wife's self-absorption. His wife, sensing the neglect, compensates by buying lots and lots of expensive shoes and having the house remodeled. Stuck with the high credit card bills, Hal starts to cut a few corners at work. He exploits his clients and colleagues and hopes that his charm will keep him out of trouble. His stress starts to show in his short temper and increased interest in drinking mojitos at lunch. He puts on weight from the alcohol, and his girlfriend starts to avoid him. One day, after having too much to drink, he yells at her, and she retaliates by telling his wife (and the other employees at the office) about the affair. In short order, Hal loses his wife in an expensive divorce and is asked to leave his job. This example has characteristics of each of the traps described earlier. There is a time-delay trap (e.g., leasing an ego-enhancing car with the cost of poor long-term financial stability), a sliding-reinforcer trap (e.g., no longer being satisfied with his attractive wife and finding a girlfriend on the side), and an individual goods and collective bads trap (e.g., Hal's cutting corners with his clients harms the entire firm). Although this example is somewhat fanciful, and we acknowledge that other personal qualities of Hal's and situational forces beyond his control surely contributed to his downfall, we can search the research literature on narcissism to see whether support for its trap-like nature exists. If narcissism operates like a trap, we should find three things: (a) the benefits of narcissism to the self are largely immediate, (b) the costs of narcissism to the self are typically experienced in the long term, and (c) the outcome of narcissism for others is generally negative. In simple terms, the existence of (a) and (b) suggests a time-delay or sliding-reinforcer trap, and (a) and (c) suggest an individual goods and collective bads trap. Some Benefits to the Self There is a compelling case to make for the psychological benefits of narcissism. First, narcissism feels good in the short term (Rose, 2002; Sedikides, Rudich, Gregg, Kumashiro, & Rusbult, 2004). It is linked to greater positive affect and less anxiety and depression. It is also linked to pride (Tracy & Robins, 2004), self-esteem (Brown & Zeigler-Hill, 2004), and inflated views of one's academic

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and intellectual abilities (Campbell, Goodie, & Foster, 2004; Gabriel et al., 1994; Paulhus, Harms, Bruce, & Lysy, 2004). There is also a proposed (although at this stage only anecdotal) rush associated with narcissistic individuals' experience of self-enhancement (Baumeister & Vohs, 2001). Narcissism also provides many tangible benefits to the individual. People with narcissistic tendencies are better performers in public competitive tasks (Wallace & Baumeister, 2002) and resilient in the face of the negative feedback they receive (Campbell, Reeder, Sedikides, & Elliot, 2000). They also are able to extract resources more rapidly from the commons in a classic commonsdilemma task (Campbell, Bush, Brunell, & Shelton, 2006). Finally, narcissism predicts a wide range of advantages in the initiation of interpersonal relationships. In certain contexts, when compared with nonnarcissistic individuals, narcissistic individuals find it is easier to be liked as friends or acquaintances (Oltmanns, Friedman, Fiedler, & Turkheimer, 2004; Paulhus, 1998), dating partners (Foster, Shrira, & Campbell, 2003), potential leaders of a group (Brunell, Gentry, Campbell, & Kuhnert, 2006), and even as celebrities on reality television shows (Young & Pinsky, 2006). Some Costs to the Self Narcissism also has its costs. The confidence and inflated self-views that make narcissistic individuals feel good and perform well in public also, for example, lead to decreased academic performance over time (Robins & Beer, 2001), diminished performance on multiple laboratory-based betting tasks (Campbell, Goodie, & Foster, 2004; Lakey, Goodie, & Campbell, 2006), and even pathological gambling (Lakey et al., 2006). Narcissistic individuals also tend to underperform when performance is not public and there is no opportunity for glory (Wallace & Baumeister, 2002). The self-promoting, exciting personality and charm that lead narcissistic individuals to be so successful at initiating relationships are not enough to sustain relationships (which usually demand a level of concern or caring for the other). Thus, over time, people with narcissistic tendencies become less liked (Paulhus, 1998), and their romantic relationships are more likely to fall apart (Foster, Shrira, & Campbell, 2003). Their violence is even likely to land them in jail (Bushman & Baumeister, 2002). On a similar note, although narcissistic individuals excel at becoming leaders, there is no evidence that they are more effective leaders (Brunell et al., 2006); neither is there evidence that they excel at maintaining celebrity status (Young & Pinsky, 2006). An additional cost of narcissism is a hypothesized addiction to the rush of self-enhancement (Baumeister & Vohs, 2001). Consequences for Others The costs of narcissism for others and for society have garnered some empirical verification. Coworkers of narcissistic individuals, for example, receive an undeservedly small portion of any group success and an overly large portion of the blame for failure (Campbell et al., 2000). Narcissistic individuals' selfenhancing attributional style is often linked with anger and aggression to-

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ward anyone who criticizes them (Bushman & Baumeister, 2002; Rhodewalt & Morf, 1996). Indeed, this aggression can even extend to persons associated with the criticizer (Gaertner & luzzini, 2005). Other threats, such as social rejection and autonomy restriction, also lead to violence on the part of people with narcissistic tendencies (Bushman, Bonacci, Van Dijk, & Baumeister, 2003; Twenge & Campbell, 2003). Narcissistic individuals' ability to rapidly extract resources also has significant consequences for the common good, notably, rapid destruction (Campbell, Bush, et al., 2006). Finally, there is a range of negative consequences reported by people who enter relationships with narcissistic individuals. These consequences can range from mild annoyance with the narcissistic person to deeply troubled romantic relationships filled with infidelity, game playing, manipulation, and control (Campbell, Brunell, & Finkel, 2006). In organizational settings, there is evidence that narcissistic individuals are more likely to be corrupt leaders (Blickle, Schlegel, Fassbender, & Klein, 2006).

Summary Consistent with the metaphor of a trap, the benefits of narcissism to the self are plentiful, affective-emotional, and generally immediate. The costs of narcissism are generally apparent in the longer term, not affective-emotional, and borne by others or society. This is consistent with narcissism as a social trap.

Conclusions: What Are the Benefits of a Quiet Ego? In this chapter, we have answered the question of why the demands of egotism—the noisy ego, so to speak—continue to be heard. The answer, at least as it applies to narcissism, is that the benefits of a noisy ego are immediate and affective and the costs occur in the longer term and are often paid by others. Thus, egotism shares similar patterns of reinforcement with chocolate and nicotine (i.e., good and rush-producing in the short term, bad in the long term) and driving sport-utility vehicles (i.e., good for the individual, bad for the commons). A quieter ego, in comparison, has all the initial attraction of tofu and a Toyota Prius. Who wouldn't rather be driving down the highway, cigar clamped firmly in one's jaw, behind the wheel of a "competition yellow" Hummer? Lost in the siren call of the noisy ego, however, are the fainter and perhaps more durable benefits of the quiet ego. Many of these payoffs are the flip side of the costs of narcissism. For the self, the quiet ego brings accurate selfperception, less irrational risk taking, and a willingness to take responsibility for mistakes and correct them. Although this might not feel as good in the short run, in the long run this approach leads to higher levels of functioning. The quiet ego has some very significant interpersonal benefits as well, including more stable and resilient interpersonal relationships. Finally, the quiet ego is clearly a boon for others. A quiet ego means less aggression, less manipulation, less dishonesty and infidelity, less resource destruction, and less destructive competitiveness. Beyond simply avoiding the traps of narcissism, quieting the

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ego has three other potential benefits. First, quieting the ego might be a difficult task in the short run—one that demands both self-control and compassion. In the longer run, however, it is easier to operate one's life from the perspective of a quiet ego. Chasing attention, fame, and status takes a tremendous amount of resources, and it is a pursuit that never ends. Second, the noisy ego demands cognitive attention. An individual might be enraptured by him- or herself, but this self-absorption prevents that person from seeing others as more than actors in the individual's play. In contrast, the quiet ego might allow for a more direct experience of the world. Recent research on wisdom in older age, for example, has found that self-transcendence is negatively related to narcissism (Levenson, 2006). Third, at a societal level, quiet egos can exist as equals; in contrast, noisy egos perform best in the company of weaker others. In Prisoner's Dilemma (Axelrod, 1980) terminology, a community of quiet egos can more easily make the cooperative rather than the defect choice (e.g., compete). In contrast, the noisy ego will do better when making the defect choice within a community of submissive individuals. To some extent both approaches benefit the individuals who use them, but the former seems to us more human.

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Sedikides, C., Rudich, E. A., Gregg, A. P., Kumashiro, M., & Rusbult, C. E. (2004). Are normal narcissists psychologically healthy? Self-esteem matters. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 400-416. Tracy, J. L., & Robins, R. W. (2004). Putting the self into self-conscious emotions: A theoretical model. Psychological Inquiry, 15, 103-125. Twenge, J. M., & Campbell, W. K. (2001). Age and birth cohort differences in self-esteem: A crosstemporal meta-analysis. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 5, 321-344. Twenge, J. M., & Campbell, W. K. (2003). "Isn't it fun to get the respect that we're going to deserve?" Narcissism, social rejection, and aggression. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 261-272. Twenge, J. M., Konrath, S., Foster, J. D., Campbell, W. K., & Bushman, B. J. (in press). Egos inflating over time: A cross-temporal meta-analysis of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory. Journal of Personality. Vangelisti, A., Knapp, M. L., & Daly, J. A. (1990). Conversational narcissism. Communication Monographs, 57, 251-274. Vohs, K. D., & Campbell, W. K. (2006). [Narcissism and materialism]. Unpublished raw data, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada. Wallace, H. M., & Baumeister, R. F. (2002). The performance of narcissists rises and falls with perceived opportunity for glory. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 819-834. Young, S. M., & Pinsky, D. (2006). Narcissism and celebrity. Journal of Research in Personality, 40, 463-471.

A Terror Management Perspective on the Quiet Ego and the Loud Ego: Implications of Ego Volume Control for Personal and Social Well-Being Spee Kosloff, Mark J. Landau, Daniel Sullivan, and Jeff Greenberg In this chapter, we examine the metaphors of quiet ego and loud ego from the perspective of terror management theory (TMT; see Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997). TMT offers an empirically substantiated framework for understanding the psychological functions of these ego orientations and their potential to manifest in ways that promote or undermine personal growth and social harmony. We begin by considering what the ego is and what it means for an ego to be quiet or loud. Then we present a TMT analysis of the quiet ego and loud ego and the research supporting it. We conclude by considering the implications of TMT and research for understanding how to best promote ways of flexibly adjusting the ego's "volume" in the interest of reaping the growth and prosocial benefits of quietness and loudness.

The Quiet Ego and the Loud Ego: Neither on Its Own Is Sufficient for Personal and Social Well-Being Two important functions of the ego—the mind's central decision-making apparatus—are (a) to mediate between the interests of the individual and the interests of others (Becker, 1973; Freud, 1957) and (b) to strike a balance between assimilating experiences into familiar knowledge structures and forging novel conceptions of the world (Piaget, 1955). Regarding these functions, we can conceptualize a spectrum: At one end is the loud ego, which orients the individual toward seeking personal benefit, asserting his or her uniqueness and value, and sharing that value or imposing it on others; at the other end is the quiet ego, which orients the individual toward transcending personal concerns to integrate social knowledge and experience with existing self-structures. As discussed in chapter 1, a number of perspectives have been proffered as to where the optimal level of human functioning lies along this spectrum, and although each is unique, most equate the ideal personality with a quiet temper33

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ing of egoism and self-aggrandizement in favor of mterrelatedness, tolerance, and openness to experience (reviewed in Coan, 1977). Consistent with these views is evidence that a characteristically loud preoccupation with sustaining a high level of self-regard can have negative personal and social consequences. For example, a heightened motivation to assert and gain validation for one's claim to a self-defining identity can interfere with personal improvement by blocking openness to others' perspectives and preventing acknowledgment of one's personal shortcomings (Wicklund & Steins, 1996). Furthermore, individuals with high but unstable self-esteem are particularly derogatory and aggressive toward others who criticize them (see chap. 8, this volume). Although this research highlights some downsides to ego loudness, the truth regarding optimal selfhood may not be so unidimensional. First, the effects of aggressive self-promotion and the uncompromising expression of a unique vision are not necessarily problematic. In almost every reach of cultural life—politics, sports, art, science—a readiness to pursue and preserve personal significance and potency often aids the creative and enthusiastic realization of both one's own goals and those of society. A loud ego can ensure that one's authentic gifts are used to the benefit of everyone. Indeed, in a comparative study of several creative individuals who helped shape the modern era—ranging from artists, such as Picasso; and thinkers, such as Einstein; to activists, such as Gandhi—Gardner (1993) found each creator to be characterized by strong egoism and a propensity to alienate others. These figures demonstrate that, although a loud ego orientation has the potential to yield a rigid and static mentality characterized by narcissistic self-interest, loudness may also provoke powerful embracing of possibilities and a socially beneficial will to innovate and lead (see chap. 2, this volume). Second, the quiet ego may not be unequivocally beneficial. The loss of individual identity has been shown to have startlingly negative consequences. Milgram's (1974) obedience studies demonstrated the extent of the inhumanity of which people are capable when, at the command of an authority figure, they turn down the inner protests of their conscience. Research also shows that certain social contexts that diminish self-awareness render the individual more likely to become sadistically authoritative or, conversely, sheepishly submissive (e.g., Haney & Zimbardo, 1998). Arthur Koestler (1978) recognized the real world significance of these findings: "Throughout human history, the ravages caused by excesses of individual self-assertion are quantitatively negligible compared to the numbers slain ad majorem gloriam out of a self-transcending devotion to a flag, a leader, a religious faith" (p. 78). The quiet ego was much in evidence during the My Lai massacre, when men who, under normal circumstances, conceived of themselves as moral individuals silenced inner qualms about slaughtering civilians in the interest of their company or the ideal of a U.S. victory. Indeed, we have learned from tragedies such as Jonestown, Waco, Heaven's Gate, and 9/11 that the urge toward immersive self-transcendence can result in the most extreme expression of the quiet ego—turning down the volume completely through self-termination. Both the quiet and the loud ego orientations can manifest in personally and socially maladaptive forms. The loud ego can be defensively rigid in assert-

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ing the superior validity of certain limited conceptions of the world and defending an inflated sense of personal value; conversely, the quiet ego can permit the mindless adoption and defense of group norms and beliefs, resulting in a muted expression of personal potential. These considerations lead us to believe that individuals (and, ultimately, society at large) may be best served by sustaining a flexible, situationally appropriate balance between the two orientations: Turn down the ego volume when it means expanding the self to incorporate new experiences, celebrating others, and acknowledging personal limitations in a reasoned and constructive manner, but turn up the volume when it means offering personal gifts, advocating creative solutions, and rallying against malevolent voices. To better understand how the individual might attain an optimal balance between the self-assertive loud ego and the self-transcendent quiet ego, we believe it is important to consider the psychological functions served by both of these orientations.

The Interplay of Quiet Egos and Loud Egos: The Contributions of Otto Rank Otto Rank (1941/1958) proposed that the ego arbitrates primarily between desires for individual value and connectedness to others and that these desires stem from a central motivational source that lies at the heart of the human existential condition. The core problem, he wrote, is that we are at least implicitly aware of the fact that death is always potentially imminent and an inevitable termination of our selves. Rank proposed that because consciously ruminating on this existential reality could trigger severe anxiety, we are motivated to repress death concerns by perceiving ourselves as playing valuable and enduring roles in a meaningful cultural drama. Rank's (1941/1958) pertinent insight was that the underlying motivation to deny the reality of death lies at the root of the complementary impulses of the ego to assert its unique value and to immerse itself in the security of a greater whole that transcends the self. These ideas were further explored by Rank's intellectual disciple, Ernest Becker (1973), who argued that individuals respond to the fact of death with a craving to be remembered for one's uniqueness, a desire to know that one's life has counted for something special in the staggering cavalcade of all human lives. Faced with the devastating possibility of obliteration, the ego must be capable of orienting the individual toward demonstrating unique self-worth, to stand out from the masses. If the ego fails in this capacity for loudness, then the person faces the risk of losing all that is unique in the self, of being swallowed up by the crowd and by history and reduced to one among billions of merely mortal creatures destined to die and be forgotten. Yet by the same token, people also deny death by transcending the self—merging with some larger and more enduring whole. Many people are profoundly comforted by the belief that their lives are ensconced in an allencompassing scheme (e.g., God's plan or the progression of history) and unfold according to its logic and ultimate purpose. Others derive a symbolic sense of

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immortality through their identification with enduring social groups, leaders, or ideologies (e.g., a nation, a sports team) that have the potential to exist in perpetuity. This line of defense against death concerns requires the ego to quiet its individual strivings to profit from the psychological protection afforded by complete immersion in the collective entity or worshipped other. When the individual copes with death through self-transcendence, opportunities to embrace freedom or individuate oneself in a way that forces separation from the larger whole can be psychologically threatening. Rank (1941/1958) clarified that people rarely adopt one or the other ego orientation in coping with death concerns; instead, these tendencies usually operate in tandem, because in most cases efforts to secure self-worth function simultaneously to bolster the perceived meaning and significance of the cultural systems on which one's self-esteem is based. However, there may be cases in which these tendencies conflict. In their ambitions to improve themselves, boast of their accomplishments, and get ahead, people may symbolically stand apart from a meaningful cultural order. We can imagine, for example, a scientist (e.g., Galileo) on the verge of a breakthrough discovery, or a young Chinese woman from a strongly collectivist background considering severing familial and traditional ties to pursue a lucrative career in the American business realm. Both of these individuals stand to distinguish themselves with a special achievement that affirms their creativity and competence, yet if they were to do so, they would undermine their own faith and participation in the symbolic structures (paradigms, values, traditions) that give life meaning. Attaining a balance between the quiet ego and the loud ego—alternately stressing either orientation in the service of optimal functioning—is rendered difficult by the fact that, in some situations, emphasizing one of those ego orientations may undermine the death-denying bases of meaning and value provided by the other.

Evidence That the Quiet Ego and the Loud Ego Serve a Terror Management Function TMT (Greenberg et al., 1997) is a social psychological theory that builds on Rank's (1941/1958) and Becker's (1973) analyses of the motivational underpinnings of human behavior. The theory posits that the uniquely human awareness of death engenders a potential for terror that people manage through a dual-component anxiety buffer consisting of two things: (a) a cultural worldview—a humanly constructed set of beliefs about the nature of reality that imbues the world with meaning and offers the promise of protection and some form of immortality to those who fulfill prescriptions for valued conduct and (b) self-esteem—the belief that one is fulfilling the individually internalized standards of value, norms, and social roles derived from the culture. By maintaining faith in the cultural worldview and perceiving oneself to be a valuable participant therein, people symbolically qualify for death transcendence and hence can maintain psychological equanimity despite their foreknowledge of mortality. Symbolic immortality can be obtained by perceiving oneself as part

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of a culture that endures beyond one's lifetime or by creating enduring testaments to one's existence (e.g., great works of art or science). Literal immortality is procured by means of the various afterlives promised by almost all organized religions. Insofar as belief in a cultural worldview and having self-esteem function to provide protection against death concerns, then reminders of death (mortality salience, or MS) should intensify reliance on and defense of these psychological structures. This broad hypothesis is supported by a large array of studies demonstrating the influence of MS (operationalized, e.g., as open-ended questions about death or subliminal death primes) on a wide range of cognitive and behavioral efforts to bolster important sources of meaning and personal value (for reviews, see Greenberg, Solomon, & Arndt, 2007; Greenberg et al., 1997). Many of these studies have demonstrated that affectations associated with the loud ego—asserting personal worth and imposing one's cultural beliefs and identity—are exacerbated by MS. MS boosts efforts to live up to individual standards of value in a diverse array of behavioral domains, including risky driving behavior, fitness intentions, and displays of physical strength (Greenberg et al., 2007). Research also shows that MS motivates disidentification from one's ingroup when affiliation with that group is thought to have negative implications for self-esteem. Furthermore, MS increased physical aggression (assessed by the amount of painfully spicy hot sauce administered to a fellow participant) toward those who attacked participants' political orientation. Research also shows that MS sometimes increases quiet ego tendencies. For example, one study (Pyszczynski et al., 1996) found that participants interviewed in front of a funeral home exaggerated the degree to which others agree with their opinions, suggesting that subtle intimations of mortality decreased willingness to deviate too far from internalized conventional beliefs. MS also increases identification with valued groups, including one's university, nationality, political party, and sports team, and it leads people to donate more money to charities that benefit one's ingroup (Greenberg et al., 2007). MS similarly engenders inflated regard for a wide range of people, concepts, and objects that represent the broader culture to which one subscribes, and it increases adherence to cultural norms (Greenberg et al., 1997, 2007). This work helps demonstrate the role of immersion in self-transcending collectives in providing symbolic immortality. In addition to identifying with and defending a meaningful group, the quiet ego can orient the individual toward transferring power to and investing faith in an exalted other, such as a lover, mentor, or political figure. From a TMT perspective, these figures command affection and devotion in part because they promise the individual validation of the self's significance through unconditional affection, or a significant role in a grand cultural vision that transcends death. Supporting this analysis, Mikulincer, Florian, and Hirschberger (2003) showed that MS increases investment in romantic relationships. In the political realm, Landau et al. (2004) found that reminders of death and the 9/11 terrorist attacks increased support for President George W. Bush, a political leader who portrays himself as spearheading a divinely sponsored crusade intended to triumph over evil.

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When Terror Management Needs Undermine the Benefits of the Quiet Ego and the Loud Ego: Implications for Personal Growth By coupling Rank's (1941/1958) analysis with TMT research, we can gain a deeper understanding of why, in some situations, the quiet ego and the loud ego might conflict with each other. Rank's analysis suggests that individuals manage existential fears by maintaining an optimal balance between asserting individuality and immersing the self in the security of the crowd. Indeed, Simon et al. (1997) found that MS increased efforts to maintain such a balance. Specifically, they told some participants they were very similar to their peers and told other participants they were very different from their peers. After MS, participants who had been given feedback that they were conformists reported opinions very different from the average person, whereas participants who were told they were deviants reported opinions very similar to the average person. A further implication of this analysis is that, in their reluctance to challenge protective meaning, people can muffle the beneficial expressions of their loud egos. For example, creative activity distinguishes the individual but can also thereby threaten social connections that provide protection from mortality concerns. In support of this idea, MS led participants who had displayed their creativity to experience increased guilt and make increased efforts to re-imbed themselves in a sense of collective validation through enhanced social projection (Greenberg et al., 2007). In a related line of research, Landau, Greenberg, and Sullivan (2006) examined how people respond to mortality primes when personal accomplishments threaten to diminish the exalted status of others who provide symbolic protection. Consistent with prior research, MS increased efforts to self-enhance in important domains, but this effect was eliminated and even reversed when self-enhancement meant surpassing a valued political leader or the participant's parents. Another study assessed the possibility that conflicting loud and quiet ego defenses contribute to the tendency for people to underperform when confronted with negative cultural stereotypes (i.e., stereotype threat). MS was predicted to strengthen identification with one's group even if it meant squelching efforts to excel. Accordingly, mortality-primed women who were stereotyped to fare poorly on an academic test underperformed even when the task was quite easy. These results suggest that people are often reluctant to loudly self-enhance or distinguish themselves with excellence because doing so can cleave them from important sources of terror-assuaging meaning. TMT research shows that quiet and loud ego orientations allay death concerns and that adopting either orientation can threaten to undermine the psychological protection afforded by the other. Although more research is needed, the findings so far indicate that people sometimes reduce this conflict by squelching their loud egos, even if it means taking a negative attitude toward their own creativity and competence.

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Toward an Optimal Balance: Managing Terror While Benefiting From Both Ego Orientations Given the potential for conflict between the quiet and loud egos, reaping the benefits of both orientations while assuaging death-related concerns seems quite challenging. Achieving such a balance may require a psychological context of flexibility, in which the individual expansively shares his or her talents yet also processes input from others in an open-minded and accommodating manner. TMT research points to aspects of the individual, situation, and culture that may facilitate the emergence of such flexibility. Dispositional Factors in Ego Flexibility Existing research suggests that having a reliable basis of psychological security reduces defensive manifestations of the loud ego. For instance, individuals with high self-esteem do not respond to MS with strengthened assertion of their cultural beliefs' superiority, whereas people with low self-esteem do (Harmon-Jones et al., 1997). Moreover, Taubman Ben-Ari, Florian, and Mikulincer (1999) observed that, although MS increased risky driving behavior (both in self-reports and on a driving simulator) among participants who valued their driving ability as a source of self-esteem, a boost to self-esteem eliminated this MS-induced need to demonstrate personal value. Secure attachment style has been associated with similar attenuations of defense. For example, MS increased the severity of punishment for a moral transgressor among insecurely attached individuals but not among securely attached individuals (Mikulincer et al., 2003). Furthermore, securely attached individuals were found to be more creative after MS than insecurely attached individuals (Greenberg et al., 2007). Research also supports the idea that dispositional features moderate the quiet ego's potential for uncritical adherence to ingrained brands of thinking. For instance, among individuals high in personal need for structure, MS increased preference for conventional structure over novel stimuli (Greenberg et al., 2007), yet individuals low in personal need for structure did not respond to MS with these structuring tendencies, suggesting that simplicity and familiarity may be less central to their protective worldview. In sum, individuals equipped with psychological defenses that permit a secure and flexible ego orientation are less likely to manage mortality concerns through rigidly defensive expressions of the loud ego and quiet ego. Situational Factors in Ego Flexibility Impending information about one's success in acquiring meaning and value may aid or hinder flexibility at either volume of the ego. Harmon-Jones et al. (1997) observed that receiving a self-esteem boost reduced MS-induced worldview defense. However, research also suggests that the nature of social

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validation individuals receive may temper the extent of defensiveness they exhibit. For instance, Schimel, Arndt, Pyszczynski, and Greenberg (2001) found that receiving positive feedback for one's achievements did not alleviate participants' tendency to defensively distance themselves from a negatively portrayed other, whereas receiving positive feedback for intrinsic aspects of the self (i.e., "who one is") did alleviate this and other defensive responses, such as downward social comparison and conformity. This suggests that positive interpersonal feedback may maximize the benefits of the quiet ego and the loud ego when the feedback is a response to intrinsic self-characteristics, as opposed to contingent self-features rooted primarily in external efforts to garner others' approval. A situationally heightened sense of social connection may also decrease the negative outcomes associated with rigid ego orientations. Arndt, Routledge, Greenberg, and Sheldon (2005) showed that by first informing participants that they are quite similar to others, creative action after MS could transpire without generating guilt and that, when primed with tasks that enhanced attention to others, participants under MS actually increased reports of optimal psychological functioning (see Greenberg et al., 2007). Such findings support the notion that situations conducive to fulfilling needs in personally significant yet socially embedded ways can help individuals constructively mitigate concerns with mortality. Cultural Factors Although certain kinds of worldviews may predispose individuals to respond to MS with rigidity and conventionality, others may inspire increased openness to alternative ways of thinking and expressing. For example, whereas people with an authoritarian worldview responded to MS with intense derogation of dissimilar others, those with a politically liberal worldview (which strongly emphasizes tolerance) responded with more liking for dissimilar others (see Greenberg et al., 1997). These findings illustrate how positive and negative potentials of the loud ego and the quiet ego arise in different individuals' enculturated views of reality. Whereas people rigorously committed to convention and authority may seek protection from existential fears in aversive social action, adhering to tolerance-based cultural conceptions may foster assertions expressing the righteousness of accepting different others. Different religious worldviews prescribe different norms of ritual and propriety, which in turn may require more or less defensive forms of adherence. In line with this, Jonas and Fischer (2006) found that individuals high in intrinsic religiosity (i.e., those who have truly integrated spirituality into the self), when reminded of their religiosity, did not demonstrate worldview defense or elevated death thought accessibility after MS. In contrast, individuals high in extrinsic religiosity (i.e., those who use religion merely to fit in) reaped no such benefit from being reminded of their religiosity.

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Summary and Conclusion The theory and research we have examined in this chapter suggest that the human experience is a challenging balance between dual motivations to assert the self and its strengths, on the one hand, and to sustain mutually beneficial social bonds, on the other hand. The notion of transcending the self to attain a harmonious relation with one's surrounding social and natural environment is indeed an alluring ideal captured in many prominent and thoughtful views of human nature (e.g., see Coan, 1977; chap. 13, this volume), yet such a goal is not without its trade-offs. We believe that for individuals to fully actualize their potential they must address their needs not only to merge with others but also to emerge with the force of an active, creative agent in the world. The ideas of Rank (1941/1958), Becker (1973), and TMT converge to suggest that human defensive needs are multifaceted and cannot be satisfied by an ego gauged to "mute" the self entirely, or to simply "shout" aggressively at the world. Although we could thus say that one optimal mode of selfhood would be to maintain a constant moderate volume, such an approach may preclude the important benefits of both the quiet and loud ego orientations for the individual and humanity at large. It seems, instead, that a readiness for productive oscillation between self-assertion and self-transcendence is essential if one is to avoid a static, inauthentic existence. In the words of Richard Coan (1977), "a flexibility that permits sequential expression of contrasting modes—and under some conditions, an integrative merging of them—is more consistent with our basic nature and permits something closer to a full realization of our developmental potentials" (p. 293). We have reviewed research specifying a handful of resources that may contribute to such flexibility, including intrinsic self-esteem, secure attachment style, low need for structure, high valuing or salience of tolerance—each of which helps mitigate maladaptive quiet and loud ego responses to reminders of mortality. Several of the chapters in this volume also describe such resources. However, what we really do not know yet is whether such terror management resources can lead people to be appropriately quiet or loud as the situation requires. For example, if a person bearing some of these qualities was on a decision-making team, and was particularly knowledgeable regarding an issue, would she or he be particularly likely to pipe up and offer insights? If this same person was less knowledgeable than other team members, would he or she be particularly quiet and open to the insights of those others? To assess such ideas, paradigms must be developed in which individuals are placed in two situations: (a) one in which being quiet is most beneficial and (b) one in which being loud is most beneficial. Although MS should lead people who are prone to a rigidly quiet ego to be quiet in both situations and those prone to a rigidly loud ego to be loud in both situations, people with intrinsically based self-worth or a low need for structure may instead react to MS with flexible adjustments of ego volume attuned to the situation at hand. Future research along these lines may help us more fully and directly assess what situational and dispositional factors facilitate assuagement of death concerns

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while nurturing the ego's positive potentials for dynamic expression and social conscience.

References Arndt, J., Routledge, C., Greenberg, J., & Sheldon, K. M. (2005). Illuminating the dark side of creative expression: Assimilation needs and the consequences of creative action following mortality salience. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31,1327-1339. Becker, E. (1973). The denial of death. New York: Free Press. Coan, R. W. (1977). Hero, artist, sage, or saint? A survey of views on what is variously called mental health, normality, maturity, self-actualization, and human fulfillment. New York: Columbia University Press. Freud, S. (1957). The ego and the id. London: Hogarth Press. Gardner, H. (1993). Creating minds. New York: Basic Books. Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., & Arndt, J. (2007). A basic but uniquely human motivation: Terror management. In J. Y. Shah & W. L. Gardner (Eds.), Handbook of motivation science (pp. 114134). New York: Guilford Press. Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., & Pyszczynski, T. (1997). Terror management theory of self-esteem and social behavior: Empirical assessments and conceptual refinements. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 29, pp. 61-139). New York: Academic Press. Haney, C., & Zimbardo, P. G. (1998). The past and future of U.S. prison policy: Twenty-five years after the Stanford Prison Experiment. American Psychologist, 53, 709-727. Harmon-Jones, E., Simon, L., Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., & McGregor, H. (1997). Terror management theory and self-esteem: Evidence that increased self-esteem reduces mortality salience effects. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 24-36. Jonas, E., & Fischer, P. (2006). Terror management and religion—Do religious beliefs prevent worldview defense following mortality salience? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91, 553-567. Koestler, A. (1978). Janus: A summing up. New York: Vintage Books. Landau, M. J., Greenberg, J., & Sullivan, D. (2006). When self-esteem and meaning collide. Unpublished manuscript. Landau, M. J., Solomon, S., Greenberg, J., Cohen, F., Pyszczynski, T., Arndt, J., et al. (2004). Deliver us from evil: The effects of mortality salience and reminders of 9/11 on support for President George W. Bush. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30, 1136-1150. Mikulincer, M., Florian, V, & Hirschberger, G. (2003). The existential function of close relationships: Introducing death into the science of love. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 7, 20-40. Milgram, S. (1974). Obedience to authority. New York: Harper & Row. Piaget, J. (1955). The child's construction of reality. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Pyszczynski, T., Wicklund, R. A., Floresky, S., Gauch, G., Koch, S., Solomon, S., & Greenberg, J. (1996). Whistling in the dark: Exaggerated estimates of social consensus in response to incidental reminders of mortality. Psychological Science, 7, 332-336. Rank, O. (1958). Beyond psychology. New York: Dover Books. (Original work published 1941) Schimel, J., Arndt, J., Pyszczynski, T., & Greenberg, J. (2001). Being accepted for who we are: Evidence that social validation of the intrinsic self reduces general defensiveness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80, 35-52. Simon, L., Greenberg, J., Arndt, J., Pyszczynski, T., Clement, R., & Solomon, S. (1997). Perceived consensus, uniqueness, and terror management: Compensatory responses to threats to inclusion and distinctiveness following mortality salience. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23, 1055-1065. Taubman Ben-Ari, O., Florian, V, & Mikulincer, M. (1999). The impact of mortality salience on reckless driving—A test of terror management mechanisms. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 35-45. Wicklund, R. A., & Steins, G. (1996). Person perception under pressure: When motivation brings about egocentrism. In P. M. Gollwitzer & J. A. Bargh (Eds.), The psychology of action: Linking cognition to behavior (pp. 511-528). New York: Guilford Press.

In Search of the Optimal Ego: When Self-Enhancement Bias Helps and Hurts Adjustment Virginia S. Y Kwan, Lu Lu Kuang, and Belinda X. Zhao Readers familiar with Greek mythology will remember Narcissus as an egotistical man who scorned the love of a nymph named Echo and so was cursed by the gods to fall in love with his own reflection in a pond. Enthralled by his own beauty, he refused to leave his image even to eat or sleep, and he slowly wasted away. Some say that was the end to it, whereas others say that he turned into the narcissus flower. Either way, his vanity became his curse, leading to his tragic ending. Many similar cautionary tales of the ancient Greeks, who were strong proponents of accurate self-perception and humility, demonstrate clearly their hearty disapproval of narcissism. Even centuries later, modern psychology looks on it unfavorably enough to deem it a disorder. According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.; American Psychiatric Association, 1994), individuals with narcissistic personality disorder exhibit a grandiose sense of self-importance and an unreasonable sense of entitlement. These individuals are interpersonally exploitative and have deficits in empathy and a need for excessive admiration (see also chap. 2, this volume). Not many people actually qualify as having a narcissistic personality disorder, although overly positive self-evaluations (i.e., self-enhancement bias) are pervasive in today's U.S. society (Taylor & Brown, 1988). In the 1970s, nicknamed the "Me Decade," people began to turn toward concentrating on their own desires and pleasures. The self began to gain popularity quickly then, and snowballed into the egocentric culture of today. With the recent trend of elevated self-esteem and bigger egos, psychologists have begun to explore the nuances and ramifications of self-enhancement bias, leading to a debate that has spanned 3 decades and continues today. Is self-enhancement good or bad? As it turns out, the answer here, as in any complex situation, is "It depends." Some studies have found that self-enhancement is beneficial to adjustment, whereas other studies have found that selfThe authors gratefully acknowledge the support of National Science Foundation Research grant BCS-0541896 for the preparation of this work.

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enhancement is detrimental to adjustment. The time has come to take a more balanced look at both the benefits and the costs of self-enhancement bias and to weigh them against each other in different situations. There may be a time and place for self-enhancement. Not all ego-enhancing strategies are purely self-serving, and in some situations a strong sense of self may be beneficial to others as well. Nevertheless, the key to optimal adjustment may require the ability to recognize when the situation calls for self-enhancement and when it is best to quiet the ego. We begin our discussion with a brief review of the debate over the value of self-enhancement bias. We then review a componential approach to selfenhancement and discuss the factors that influence the link between selfenhancement bias and adjustment.

The Debate: Self-Enhancement Bias and Adjustment A basic assumption about mental health is that psychological adjustment requires the ability to accurately discern reality. This assumption dates back to our forefathers of Western civilization, the ancient Greeks, and can be best summed up by the Socratic admonition to "Know thyself." In contrast to this long-standing view that self-insight is necessary to function effectively, Taylor and Brown (1988) argued that overly positive, self-enhancing illusions about the self are the hallmark of mental health. This new perspective drew considerable attention and has led to a protracted debate between those who believe that psychologically healthy individuals perceive themselves accurately and those who believe that it is more adaptive to have positive illusions. Subsequent research has yielded divergent results, and it is unclear whether self-enhancement has a positive (e.g., Bonanno, Field, Kovacevic, & Kaltman, 2002; Sedikides, Rudich, Gregg, Kumashiro, & Rusbult, 2004; Taylor, Lerner, Sherman, Sage, & McDowell, 2003), negative (e.g., Block & Colvin, 1994; Colvin, Block, & Funder, 1995; Shedler, Mayman, & Manis, 1993), or mixed (e.g., Paulhus, 1998; Robins & Beer, 2001) impact on mental health. The pattern of findings in the literature suggests that whether selfenhancement bias is good or bad for adjustment depends in part on which aspect of adjustment was examined (Paulhus, 1998; Robins & Beer, 2001). Two aspects of adjustment, namely, intrapsychic adjustment (i.e., feeling good about the self) and social adjustment (i.e., forming and maintaining harmonious relationships with others), have received the most empirical attention on their relation with self-enhancement. Previous findings have shown that self-enhancement bias is good for intrapsychic adjustment, but a review of the methods calls this conclusion into question. Almost all measures of intrapsychic adjustment used in the research on self-enhancement have been selfreports (e.g., self-esteem, life satisfaction), which are of doubtful import here. Individuals who self-enhance are likely to do so in most aspects of their life, including their self-view, leading them to positively distort their self-evaluations. Therefore, self-report measures that contain a self-evaluation component may well be positively biased and of questionable validity (Colvin et al., 1995; Shedler et al., 1993).

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The findings linking self-enhancement bias to social adjustment, however, have shown less consensus. Some studies suggest that self-enhancement bias promotes social adjustment. In their review, Taylor and Brown (1988) integrated research showing the positive value of self-enhancement bias in promoting mental health and social adjustment. Self-enhancers are seen by their peers as likable and good at maintaining close relationships (e.g., Felson, 1981; Taylor et al., 2003). Other studies, however, have shown that self-enhancement bias is a risk factor for interpersonal conflict (Atwater & Yammarino, 1997). Selfenhancement bias can generate a vicious cycle of rigid and constant positive self-regard that continually and cumulatively alienates friends (Colvin et al., 1995; Paulhus, 1998). Also, people who are close to individuals who selfenhance describe such people as defensive and as having difficulties in forming close interpersonal relationships (Kwan, John, Robins, & Kuang, 2007; Norem, 2002). Individuals who self-enhance are seen negatively by their peers in study groups (Paulhus, 1998) and are regarded by their close friends as less honest (Bonanno, Rennicke, & Dekel, 2005). These divergent findings about the value of self-enhancement add to the debate regarding whether self-enhancement bias is adaptive or maladaptive. In an attempt to settle this debate, Kwan, John, Kenny, Bond, and Robins (2004) proposed that the issue has gone unresolved because researchers have used two rather different conceptions of self-enhancement that have not been properly distinguished. One conception originated from Festinger's (1954) social comparison theory and compares the perceived self with perceived others; thus, individuals who self-enhance are those who perceive themselves more positively than they perceive others. The other conception originated from Allport's (1937) notion of self-insight and compares self-perception with perception by others; thus, individuals who self-enhance perceive themselves more positively than they are perceived by others. Both of these conceptions compare self-perception with important criteria (i.e., perceptions of others and perceptions by others), but each conception is incomplete without the other. According to the social comparison conception, individuals may be labeled as self-enhancers for two different reasons: (a) because they have an overly positive self-perception or (b) because they are actually better than others. Likewise, according to the self-insight conception, individuals may be labeled as self-enhancers for two different reasons: (a) because they have an overly positive self-perception or (b) because they generally see people (including themselves) very positively. Thus, the social comparison conception confounds self-enhancement with the person's actual standing. The self-insight conception confounds self-enhancement with how the person generally perceives others. The two previous conceptions of self-enhancement are different from each other, and each confounds self-enhancement bias with an irrelevant component. Also, these confounds are not inconsequential. The relation between self-enhancement and adjustment varies depending on the way in which self-enhancement is conceptualized and measured (Kwan et al., 2004, 2007). To address the problem of confounds in the conceptualization of selfenhancement, Kwan et al. (2004) proposed a componential approach to self-

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enhancement. By extending the social relations model (SRM; Kenny, 1994) to self-enhancement, Kwan et al.'s componential approach identified three components in self-perception. Conceptually, these components are (a) the socially desirable merit of the individual (i.e., the target effect in SRM terms), (b) the general tendency to perceive others in a benevolent manner (i.e., the perceiver effect in SRM terms), and (c) the self-perception bias (i.e., the relationshipwith-the-self effect in SRM terms). Thus, these three components are referred to, respectively, as merit, benevolence, and self-perception bias (i.e., target effect, perceiver effect, and relationship-with-the-self effect). Given that there are multiple components of self-perception, the componential approach to self-enhancement bias hints that the question of whether self-perception bias is good or bad for adjustment may be too simple. This suggests that if we are to understand how self-enhancement bias relates to adjustment, then other components in self-perception (i.e., both merit and benevolence) must also be included in the research design to gain a better picture of its subtleties. In terms of simple effects, the componential approach to self-enhancement and previous findings suggest three predictions. First, liking should be related positively to merit. People who have more desirable characteristics, such as skills or talents, are better liked by others. Second, liking should also be related positively to benevolence. People who like others elicit reciprocity. People who see others in a positive light and like them are in turn liked. Third, liking should be related negatively to self-enhancement bias. People who selfenhance behave in self-centered ways that make them less likable. Results, however, may be more complicated than previously thought because the three components may interact. The link between social adjustment and self-enhancement bias may depend in part on merit: People may dislike only individuals who self-enhance but who do not command socially desirable qualities (i.e., those who have low merit). This is a compensatory model in which socially desirable qualities of the individual can compensate for the social costs of self-enhancement bias. This moderator account thus suggests that some individuals who self-enhance, such as highly skilled and talented people, may still be well liked because they have high merit. A focused program of research is now needed to examine these kinds of interaction effects and to delineate their generality. The componential approach predicts that, among individuals who self-enhance, those with low merit should be the worst off in terms of being liked and included, because they are lacking this compensatory effect. On a similar note, the link between social adjustment and selfenhancement bias may depend in part on benevolence: People may dislike only individuals who feel superior and see others negatively (i.e., with low benevolence). A general positivity may offset the social costs of self-enhancement bias. People may still like individuals who brag about themselves but also hold high regard for others. What is important in understanding the value of self-enhancement bias is pinpointing the degree to which an individual who self-enhances has each of these desirable qualities and their configuration. There may be different

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profiles among individuals who self-enhance: For example, some have more socially desirable qualities, such as benevolence or merit, than others. Having other socially desirable qualities may compensate for the negative costs of selfenhancement bias. Recently, Kwan and Kuang (2007) illustrated exactly this, explaining why self-enhancement bias sometimes appears to be good for social adjustment and other times appears to be bad for social adjustment. Their findings demonstrated that whether self-enhancement bias is good or bad for social inclusion depends on whether the individual possesses other socially desirable qualities. Possessing self-enhancement alone was detrimental for social adjustment; people generally disliked individuals who self-enhanced. However, possessing other socially desirable qualities, such as merit and benevolence, can compensate for the negative cost of self-enhancement. Also, the lack of socially desirable qualities made the people who self-enhanced especially disliked. These findings suggest that self-enhancement is harmful when the individual does not have positive qualities. Just as other qualities can affect whether individuals who self-enhance are welcomed, so can the situation. An adaptive individual is one who uses the required skills in the right situation. Different circumstances require the individual to use different skills and demonstrate different abilities to achieve different goals. Having a balanced ego requires the ability to use selfenhancement only in advantageous situations. Self-enhancement bias may be beneficial in situations in which characteristics of individuals who selfenhance match the demand of the situation. It is important to take an integrative approach to examine how different configurations of qualities possessed by individuals who self-enhance and situation-to-situation variability affect adjustment. Previous studies have often examined self-enhancement bias in contextfree situations. For example, people have been asked to compare their selfratings with normative criteria without specifying the context (i.e., asking participants to compare themselves with "a hypothetical generalized other" or "most other people"; e.g., Alicke, 1985; Brown, 1986; Buunk & Van Yperen, 1991; Svenson, 1981; Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995). A more ecologically relevant approach is to take into account the nature of the situations in which individuals who self-enhance are being evaluated. A recent study alluded to self-enhancement bias being good for adjustment in some instances but not others. For example, individuals who selfenhance and who survived the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center showed more resilience than individuals who did not self-enhance (Bonanno et al., 2005). The positively skewed expectations of individuals who self-enhance and their beliefs in their coping may be beneficial when they are facing extreme adversity. Biased expectations and beliefs in the health domain (e.g., Taylor et al., 1992) might prove more beneficial than biased self-perceptions in personality and achievement domains. However, even as they are more mentally resilient, people who self-enhance are rated by their friends as less well adjusted socially, showing that the interpersonal costs are still heavy (Bonanno et al., 2005).

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Recently, Kwan and Kuang (2007) examined the value of selfenhancement bias in three common situations: (a) getting along interpersonally, (b) working collaboratively toward a shared goal, and (c) striving together against another force for the purpose of attaining a reward. Each of these situations portrays different situational features or demands. The value of a self-enhancement bias depends on the coordination of self-enhancement with the demands of the situation. Self-enhancement is beneficial in competitive situations, such as when teams are competing for a single title or award, or when people are working together as a team against an outside force. In a competitive situation, individuals who self-enhance are actually preferred. A grandiose sense of selfimportance may impress others, signaling to rivals a keen sense of confidence and fueling everyone's competitive urge. However, findings show that individuals who self-enhance do poorly and are disliked more in noncompetitive interpersonal situations that are not related to work, in which empathy and cooperation are prized. The self-centered nature of individuals who self-enhance makes it difficult for them to get along with people in everyday interpersonal interactions, because their self-centeredness alienates others and results in interactions that are awkward and uncomfortable. The excessive self-promotions of individuals who self-enhance, especially if their claims of superiority are not backed by skills, creates negative impressions (Paulhus, 1998). The value of self-enhancement in situations such as working collaboratively with others toward a shared goal falls in between that for competitive situations and that for interpersonal situations. On the one hand, self-enhancement qualities such as egocentricity and grandiosity convey that one has the confidence to get things done. On the other hand, these same qualities hamper smooth interactions with others and make individuals who selfenhance less likable. Therefore, the association between self-enhancement and social inclusion in collaborative situations reflects a combined pattern of both the positive correlates and the negative correlates.

Conclusions Is it better to have a noisy ego or a quiet ego? The answer is still "It depends." Such a question tries to simplify self-enhancement to a coin toss of being either good or bad, but as a part of human nature, in which almost nothing is simple, self-enhancement is governed by complexities and variables as tangled as human society itself. Thus, the better question that we have discussed is "What makes for an optimal and balanced ego?" How and where does selfenhancement fit into social adjustment? We believe an optimal ego involves balancing self-enhancement and other qualities that influence its adjustment value, as well as coordinating self-enhancement with the context to meet the demands of the situation. Other qualities of the individual and the nature of the situation have been shown to have an effect, either beneficial or deleterious, on the adjustment of an individual who self-enhances. Future research needs to take into account a model of self-enhancement

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bias that is illustrative of its dual nature. Self-enhancement bias can be an asset in competitive situations, but it is detrimental in interpersonal situations, engendering social costs. People may turn a blind eye to self-centeredness in competitive situations, which serve as a perfect breeding ground for individuals who self-enhance. Abetter understanding of the effects of self-enhancement in work-related situations has important implications for personnel selection. In the workplace, it is a common view that leadership calls for an individual to dominate, be assertive, take charge, and have confidence (Frank, 1993; Lord, DeVader, & Alliger, 1986). These qualities appear to be in line with the characteristics of an individual who self-enhances. Thus, organizations can benefit by placing people who self-enhance in positions that require competitiveness and self-importance and avoid putting them in positions that require people management skills. Self-enhancement can be beneficial at the opportune moment. As we have shown, self-enhancement in a competitive work environment garners the approval of others, because it projects confidence and productivity. This is the case, however, provided that there are other socially desirable qualities within the individual. With no other skills or abilities, an individual who selfenhances is simply a narcissistic person. However, self-enhancing in social and interpersonal situations tends to do an individual more harm than good, giving others the impression of less emotional connection and likability, especially as time passes. Constantly selfenhancing in social situations may cause one to lose friends. Thus, the key to an optimal ego appears to be to be able to wield the power of self-enhancement at the right place and time. Self-enhancement is not good or bad on its own, but for maximal benefits and minimal costs, it should be a tool in a person's repertoire that is used only under certain circumstances, not a defining feature of that person's personality. Someone who never self-enhances, however, may not gain the career success that he or she hopes to achieve, whereas someone who self-enhances indiscriminately with the necessary skills may be successful in his or her competitive career but at the heavy cost of alienating friends and losing meaningful relationships. Even at work, one must have good relationships with other people to be successful. Someone who is disliked by both superiors and coworkers is not likely to rise very far in the ranks, but neither is someone who does not have the self-confidence to make others believe he or she has the requisite ability. Moderation and situational discretion are key. As U.S. society becomes more and more individualistic, narcissism is rising as well (Lasch, 1978; Twenge, 2006). In a culture in which we are all striving for our own goals and status symbols, we are losing sight of relationships with others. Yet we are not simply individuals; we are parts of families, teams, organizations, companies, friendships, and cultures. Our relationships define us just as much as our personalities and abilities do. Perhaps it is time that we attempt to concentrate less on promoting the self and more on balancing the self with our external environment. A noisy ego may be good under some situations, but self-enhancing in the long run is as adaptive as Narcissus staring at his reflection all day.

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References Alicke, M. D. (1985). Global self-evaluation as determined by the desirability and controllability of trait adjectives. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49,1621-1630. Allport, G. W. (1937). Personality: A psychological interpretation. New York: Holt. American Psychiatric Association. (1994). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (4th ed.). Washington, DC: Author. Atwater, L. E., & Yammarino, F. J. (1997). Self-other rating agreement: A review and model. In G. R. Ferris & K. M. Rowland (Eds.), Research in personnel and human resources management (Vol. 15, pp. 121-174). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. Block, J., & Colvin, C. R. (1994). Positive illusions and well-being revisited: Separating fiction from fact. Psychological Bulletin, 116, 28. Bonanno, G. A., Field, N. P., Kovacevic, A., & Kaltman, S. (2002). Self-enhancement as a buffer against extreme adversity: Civil war in Bosnia and traumatic loss in the United States. Personality and Social Personality Bulletin, 28, 184-196. Bonanno, G. A., Rennicke, C., & Dekel, S. (2005). Self-enhancement among high-exposure survivors of the September llth terrorist attack: Resilience or social maladjustment? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 88, 984-998. Brown, J. D. (1986). Evaluations of self and others: Self-enhancement biases in social judgments. Social Cognition, 4, 353-376. Buunk, B. P., & Van Yperen, N. W. (1991). Referential comparisons, relational comparisons, and exchange orientation: Their relation to marital satisfaction. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 17, 709-711. Colvin, C. R., Block, J., & Funder, D. C. (1995). Overly positive self-evaluations and personality: Negative implications for mental health. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68, 1152-1162. Felson, R. B. (1981). Ambiguity and bias in the self-concept. Social Psychology Quarterly, 44, 64-69. Festinger, L. (1954). Motivation leading to social behavior. In M. R. Jones (Ed.), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation (Vol. 2, pp. 191-218). Lincoln: University of Nebraska. Frank, M. S. (1993). The essence of leadership. Public Personnel Management, 22, 381-389. Kenny, D. A. (1994). Interpersonal perception: A social relations analysis. New York: Guilford Press.

Kwan, V. S. Y, John, O. P., Kenny, D. A., Bond, M. H., & Robins, R. W. (2004). Reconceptualizing individual differences in self-enhancement bias: An interpersonal approach. Psychological Review, 111, 94-110. Kwan, V. S. Y, John, O. P., Robins, R. W., & Kuang, L. L. (2007). Conceptualizing and assessing self-enhancement bias: A componential approach. Manuscript submitted for publication. Kwan, V. S. Y, & Kuang, L. L. (2007). When does self-enhancement affect social adjustment? Manuscript submitted for publication. Lasch, C. (1978). The culture of narcissism: American life in an age of diminishing expectations. New York: Norton. Lord, R. G.,DeVader, C. L., & Alliger, G. M. (1986). A meta-analysis of the relation between personality traits and leadership perceptions: An application of validity generalization procedures. Journal of Applied Psychology, 71, 402-410. Norem, J. K. (2002). Defensive self-deception and social adaptation among optimists. Journal of Research in Personality, 36, 549-555. Paulhus, D. L. (1998). Interpersonal and intrapsychic adaptiveness of trait self-enhancement: A mixed blessing? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 1197-1208. Robins, R. W., & Beer, J. S. (2001). Positive illusion about the self: Short-term benefits and longterm costs. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80, 340-352. Sedikides, C., Rudich, E. A., Gregg, A. P., Kumashiro, M., & Rusbult, C. E. (2004). Are normal narcissists psychologically healthy? Self-esteem matters. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 400-416. Shedler, J., Mayman, M., & Manis, M. (1993). The illusion of mental health. American Psychologist, 48, 1117-1131.

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Svenson, 0. (1981). Are we all less risky and more skillful than our fellow drivers? Acta Psychologica, 47,143-148. Taylor, S. E., & Brown, J. D. (1988). Positive illusions and well-being: A social psychological perspective on mental health. Psychological Bulletin, 103, 193-210. Taylor, S. E., & Gollwitzer, P. M. (1995). Effects of mindset on positive illusions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 213-226. Taylor, S. E., Kemeny, M. E., Aspinwall, L. G., Schneider, S. G., Rodriguez, R., & Herbert, M. (1992). Optimism, coping, psychological distress, and high-risk sexual behavior among men at risk for acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 460-473. Taylor, S. E., Lerner, J. S., Sherman, D. K., Sage, R. M., & McDowell, N. K. (2003). Portrait of a selfenhancer: Well adjusted and well liked or maladjusted and friendless? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84,165-176. Twenge, J. M. (2006). Generation me: Why today's young are more confident, assertive, entitled— and more miserable than ever before. New York: Free Press.

Taming the Wild Ego: The Challenge of Humility Julie Juola Exline In this chapter, I introduce the metaphor of a wild ego. There are several ways the term wild could be used, three of which are relevant here. First, a creature that is wild is one that roams free, with no limits, nothing to fence it in. Second, wildness could imply a lack of constancy—a tendency toward instability or rapid fluctuation, of being tough to pin down. Third and finally, being wild could imply being untamed and disconnected from others, having a maverick quality in which autonomy and individuality are prized above all else. In this chapter, I begin by outlining ways each of these three facets of wildness (or, as other authors in this volume describe, "noisiness") might be helpful in understanding problems with the ego. Next, I shift the focus to description of a humble or quiet ego, which I contrast with the wild ego. I conclude the chapter by exploring some challenges that can arise if one tries to tame or humble the ego. Please note that, in keeping with the focus of this volume, the word ego is used here to refer to a broad sense of self, one that encompasses a wide range of self-oriented perceptions and motivations.

The Wild Ego: A Quick Look at Benefits and Costs Before addressing the dangers of a wild ego, it seems important to consider some of its potential benefits. A wild ego could be framed as a positive, expansive self-view, one associated with positive emotion and confidence. Such qualities should energize people to pursue goals, as has been shown in research on stable self-esteem (Kernis, 2005). The flexibility of a wild ego could be a strength, especially if contrasted with a rigid self-view that admits no discrepant feedback. A sense of self-respect should also promote assertiveness, reducing the odds that a person will be exploited by others. It is clear, then, that a positive self-view can bring its share of benefits. But how much is too much? As discussed in chapter 2 (this volume), an inflated sense of self can get people into trouble, as evidenced in many studies in the field of psychology. An exaggerated, cocky sense of confidence can lead people to set goals that are too high (Campbell, Goodie, & Foster, 2004), particularly if there is an opportunity to show off and gain the admiration of others (Wallace & Baumeister, 2002). An overconfident person may expect to 53

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reach lofty goals with minimal effort, and failure can be particularly deflating when expectations have been set so high. (For a creative look at these problems as they apply to the post-Baby Boomer "Generation Me," see Twenge, 2006.) In more general terms, positive emotions foster expansive attitudes in which people tend to take on new projects and activities (Fredrickson, 2001). Excessive optimism about what one can achieve could easily cause a person to become overextended, as readily seen in the case of mania. Thus, even if positive emotions and confidence facilitate the pursuit of goals, people are likely to benefit by having some awareness of their limitations. What about the second quality of a wild ego, the tendency toward rapid and frequent fluctuation? Within the past decade, a growing literature has demonstrated costs associated with unstable self-esteem. For example, a recent review by Kernis (2005) suggested that unstable self-esteem is positively associated with hostility, defensiveness, reactivity, and problems with the regulation of emotions (see also chap. 8, this volume). As Crocker and Wolfe (2001) showed, many people see their sense of personal worth or value as being contingent on some external factor, such as performance, appearance, or social approval. When one's sense of self-worth is at stake, the prospect of failure is likely to be terrifying, creating tremendous performance pressure on the domains in question. Broadly speaking, moods and energies can fluctuate wildly when people focus excessively on the self (Leary, 2004) or on the pursuit of selfesteem (Crocker & Park, 2004). Also as discussed in chapter 2, some of the most glaring costs of a wild ego center on its social features: disconnection, competitive strivings, and distancing from others. To use an image from the animal kingdom, one might picture monkeys that are preoccupied with their respective places in the dominance hierarchy. Seeing resources as limited, they view others as rivals and behave accordingly. What happens when humans perceive their worlds in terms of a social hierarchy, focusing on how their own status, power, and privileges stack up against those of others? Seeing oneself as the low person on the social totem pole would obviously be an unpleasant prospect. However, there can also be costs to seeing oneself as a winner. Being the target of envy can cause empathic distress, relationship strain, and fears of retaliation or rejection (Exline & Lobel, 1999). Of course, people who are oriented toward dominance will actively pursue superior status, craving the power, respect, and success that they associate with it. This is the stance of a narcissistic individual, and it tends to foster interpersonal strife. Individuals who feel superior to others often feel entitled to special privileges, making them prone to exploit others by taking more than their rightful share (Campbell, Bonacci, Shelton, Exline, & Bushman, 2004). A narcissistic, inflated sense of entitlement also makes people more likely to blame others (McCullough, Emmons, Kilpatrick, & Mooney, 2003), hold grudges (Exline, Baumeister, Bushman, Campbell, & Finkel, 2004), and seek vengeance (Brown, 2004; Twenge & Campbell, 2003). In relationships, narcissistic individuals tend to seek out people who will admire them and make them look good (Campbell, 1999), and they then show low commitment to these partners (Campbell & Foster, 2002). As a result, partners of narcissistic individuals

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often end up feeling used and unsatisfied. Their initial positive impressions of the narcissistic person usually diminish over time. All of these factors can make it difficult for narcissistic individuals to maintain satisfying intimate relationships (see chap. 2, this volume). In seeking a prototype of the wild ego, one might envision a person with a narcissistic, grandiose sense of self—but one characterized by a certain fragility (Kernis, 2005; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Zeigler-Hill, 2006). The term threatened egotism (Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996) is a useful label for this stance. In threatened egotism, one can see all three aspects of wildness: (a) arrogance, (b) a desire to dominate others, and (c) an underlying fragility. For the threatened egotist, one of the major bases of self-worth would be a need for superiority and dominance—inherently unstable qualities that also represent disconnection from others. Because of this shaky foundation, the threatened egotist would not have a firm conviction of personal worth, instead harboring an enduring—but hidden—fear of being exposed as worthless. The only way for this person to maintain a sense of value and security would be to cling desperately to a sense of the self as superior. The social world would become a hostile place in which one's own interests must be guarded with vigilance. This person's ego would be like a balloon inflated beyond the point of stability, ready to burst at the slightest provocation. In keeping with this view, the threatenedegotism pattern has been identified as a major source of violent behaviors, ranging from domestic violence to genocide (Baumeister et al., 1996).

Humility and the Quiet Ego Given the costs of a wild ego, one might wonder about alternatives: What would a quiet ego be like? One aspect of a quiet ego may be a sense of humility, a concept that has begun to receive theoretical and empirical attention over the past decade. The term humility is often misunderstood. For example, Tangney (2000, 2002) has described how people often confuse humility with humiliation or low self-esteem. A recent study of college students revealed, somewhat surprisingly, that they held quite positive views of humility, often associating it with modesty about achievements or abilities (Exline & Geyer, 2004). Yet even though the students tended to see humility as a strength, they saw it as a quality that was more suitable for certain types of people (e.g., religious seekers, subordinates) than for others (e.g., leaders, entertainers). In two recent overviews, Tangney (2000, 2002) identified several key features of humility: an accurate sense of one's abilities; the ability to acknowledge mistakes, imperfections, gaps in knowledge, and limitations; openness to new ideas, contradictory information, and advice; keeping one's abilities and accomplishments in perspective; low self-focus or an ability to "forget" the self; and an appreciation of the value of all things. In another recent conceptual article (Exline, Campbell, et al., 2004), my colleagues and I offered a tentative definition of humility as a nondefensive willingness to see the self accurately, including both strengths and limitations. Both of these views of humility seem closely related to the concept of a quiet ego as used in this volume. Thus, al-

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though fine-grained distinctions could be made among the concepts, the terms humility, humble ego, and quiet ego are used interchangeably in the paragraphs that follow. The core qualities of a humble, quiet ego contrast directly with those of a wild ego. First, a quiet ego is one that is not inflated—at least, not deliberately. Because humans are notoriously imperfect gauges of reality, it may be unreasonable to insist on a completely accurate self-view to describe a person as humble. However, a humble person should be able to tolerate an honest look at the self, reflecting on both strengths and limitations in an evenhanded way. It is important to note that a humble self-view need not be negative or selfdeprecating, and it does not require a sense of inferiority to others. A humble person might see the self as a relatively small part in a larger scheme of things, perhaps in comparison to God or to the universe. When seen from such a broad perspective, however, one would appear to be about the same size as all other humans. Second, a secure, stable basis of self-worth should provide the foundation for a quiet ego. A secure attachment style should be a major asset, particularly if it is rooted in a sense of being unconditionally loved—perhaps by a parent, a relationship partner, or God. Beliefs about the inherent value and dignity of life might provide another type of solid foundation. Regardless of the exact source, people may need a secure sense of personal worth before they can tolerate an honest assessment of their strengths and weaknesses. If people lack such a foundation, feedback about limitations could prompt defensive reactions. It could also prompt depressive responses or self-loathing, particularly among people who already have negative self-views. Third, relative to the wild ego, a quiet ego should involve a greater sense of connection with others. Granted, some humble people might live a hermit's lifestyle, but for those trying to function in the social world, it seems likely that seeing oneself as similar to others—and connected to them in meaningful ways—should help to quiet the ego. Seeing oneself as serving a valuable role within a larger system should work against competitive strivings and preoccupation with one's place in a status hierarchy. The group with which one feels connected could range from a small unit (e.g., one's family) to one that is much more inclusive (e.g., humanity, living things, the universe). In terms of promoting dispositional humility, one might speculate that a broad, perhaps universal sense of connection would be more effective than a more limited set of bonds with family or close friends. This possibility awaits empirical testing.

The Humble, Quiet Ego: An Undervalued Psychological Stock? Now that many costs of the wild ego have been documented in the psychology literature, it seems timely to consider possible benefits of a humble, quiet ego. What hypotheses could be offered at this point? One hypothesis is that humility should facilitate good social relationships. Because they are not seeking social dominance, humble people should be willing to learn from others (Tangney, 2000, 2002) and to give credit where it is due. To the extent that it helps people

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to transcend self-interest, humility should also pave the way for virtues such as forgiveness, repentance, and compassionate love. Because they do not fear being seen as vulnerable or inferior, humble people should be willing to serve others and to receive from others. A quiet ego might also restrain people from adopting judgmental attitudes, because those who are humble should not need to derogate others to feel better about themselves. In more individual terms, humility should help people to set realistic goals. By protecting people from excessive ego involvement in their goals, a humble outlook should reduce the amount of energy that people need to spend on selfenhancement and mood regulation, leaving more energy for other pursuits. Humility should also free people to admit that they need help, thus opening the door to accepting resources from others that can save time and energy. A quiet ego should also facilitate an attitude of self-compassion (Neff, 2003) after people make errors. When considering the potential benefits of humility, the fable of the tortoise and the hare may be helpful to consider. In this tale, a naturally speedy but cocky hare wastes time during a race, eventually losing to his opponent—a steady and persistent tortoise. One might envision humility as the tortoise in this race, with narcissism symbolized by the hare. Humility is an unassuming quality, one that may not impress people much in terms of first impressions. On the surface, the narcissistic individual may seem much more able and impressive. In the long run, however, the personal and social benefits of humility should pay off. Time—and empirical testing—will tell. Despite its potential benefits, humility seems to be an undervalued stock in modern Western culture, which has been obsessed with the promotion of self-esteem (Twenge, 2006). There seems to be a delicate balance to strike when considering the self-esteem movement. Although the dangers of egotism are clear, self-esteem could be adaptive to the extent that it represents a sense of personal worth, motivation, and confidence. When seen through this lens, healthy self-esteem seems compatible with a quiet ego. Perhaps high selfesteem poses problems only when it runs wild, knowing no sense of personal limitation or accountability—only unlimited opportunity, entitlement, and competitive success.

Humility as the "Master Virtue"? Probably Not . . . At this point, it seems important to clarify that I am not proposing humility as the ultimate virtue, one that can stand alone. It would seem ironic to make such a bold claim about such an unpretentious virtue. Granted, humility might provide a good foundation for virtuous action. It could be seen as a protective coating or cushion, a shock absorber that protects the ego from bumps. Or it might be like a screen, one that sifts out damaging aspects of corrective feedback while admitting useful parts. Humility appears to be a protective and temperate quality, one that moderates goal pursuit and saves emotional energy. When considered alone, humility does not seem to be an energizing force; it is a stabilizing, protective one.

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One implication of seeing humility as protective is that a humble person could also be a passive one. Of course, a humble outlook in no way rules out the presence of achievement strivings, but if a humble person is to be active in goal pursuit, then there needs to be some infusion of motivation and energy into the system. Competitive success or dominance would probably not be the goals of choice, but other motivators might include a desire to learn, creative strivings, or a desire to serve others or God. If a person's humility stems from a deep sense of connection with others, this sense of interdependence should encourage prosocial pursuits. Yet because prosocial motives are not a required element of the definition of humility (Exline, Campbell, et al., 2004), it remains possible that a humble person might pursue goals that are nonsocial or even antisocial. For example, if energized primarily by a personal desire for cleanliness, a humble person could spend many days ridding the house of dust bunnies and never get around to helping others. Worse, a government-sponsored engineer might humbly and dutifully help his country to design weapons of mass destruction. If humility is to be a prosocial quality, then prosocial motivators are needed.

Why Are There So Little Data on Humility? Measurement Snags and Preliminary Findings Some readers may wonder why I am emphasizing conceptual work and testable hypotheses instead of providing an in-depth review of research on humility. The reason is that, to date, little empirical work has focused directly on the humility construct. The first step is to develop several reliable and valid measures of humility, and humility is not an easy concept to measure (see Exline, Campbell, et al., 2004, for a discussion). For example, do people who are humble realize that they are humble? If they do, would they rate themselves as humble on a self-report questionnaire? Is humility unidimensional or multidimensional? Despite these difficult issues, advances are being made on the measurement front. Rowatt and colleagues (Powers, Nam, Rowatt, & Hill, 2007; Rowatt et al., 2006) have developed a measure of humility based on the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) and have used semantic-differential methods to assess humility. Another research team has been developing a multidimensional self-report measure (Bollinger, Kopp, Hill, & Williams, 2006; Kopp, Hill, Bollinger, & Williams, 2006). Furthermore, some larger inventories of personality and character strengths also include subscales relevant to humility (e.g., Costa & McCrae, 1992; Lee & Ashton, 2004; Peterson & Seligman, 2004). Although there is little published research on humility, the data that do exist seem to fit with the notion of humility as a character strength. For example, humility has been linked with altruistically motivated helping (Rowatt et al., 2007) and good school performance (Rowatt et al., 2006). Humility is negatively linked with narcissism (Bollinger et al., 2006; Rowatt et al., 2006) and positively linked with forgiveness (Powers et al., 2007; Rowatt et al., 2006) and qualities such as gratitude, spirituality, and agreeableness (Rowatt et al., 2006).

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Challenges in the Study of Humility: A Quick Sketch of Our Journey At this point in the chapter, I shift gears. In this last section, I provide a brief, first-person account of some challenges that my colleagues and I have encountered in our study of humility. Our attempts to understand humility can best be described as a rocky road—and, aptly enough, a humbling one. My interest in humility-related themes began in the early 1990s. As a graduate student at Stony Brook University, I was introduced to social comparison research by my advisor, Marci Lobel. While acquainting myself with the social comparison literature, I became troubled by the themes of competitiveness and self-enhancement that seemed to prevail: Was everyone so preoccupied with being superior to others? Partly in response to my question, Marci and I began a series of projects on the social dangers of outperforming others (e.g., see Exline & Lobel, 1999; chap. 15, this volume). I was introduced to the concept of humility during my postdoctoral work with Roy Baumeister and Dianne Tice at Case Western Reserve University. Roy had secured a grant from the John Templeton Foundation to study links among egotism, humility, and forgiveness. We could see from existing research that egotism often led to aggression and self-defeating actions, and the remedy seemed obvious to us at the time: We reasoned that if we could encourage people to focus on their limitations, then they would start to act in constructive, prosocial ways. In our first study, we asked undergraduates to describe a time when they had felt humble. We predicted that writing this "humble essay" (compared with a "proud essay" or no essay) would make people more forgiving toward a player who had betrayed them in the Prisoner's Dilemma game (Axelrod, 1980). The findings were mixed (Exline & Zell, 2007): Although some students who wrote humble essays became more cooperative, they were those who recalled pleasant experiences, such as gazing at stars. Many people associated humility with shameful experiences, with a classic example being a student who recalled getting drunk and throwing up on a friend. Shame, in turn, tended to foster aggression. In another set of forgiveness studies (see Exline & Zell, 2007, for an overview), we asked people to recall offenses of their own that were similar to those that had been committed against them. We reasoned that focusing on one's own offenses would facilitate humility and empathy, both of which should encourage forgiveness. Our hypotheses were largely supported for men, but not for women. Among women, thinking about one's own misdeeds seemed to create negative emotions and defensive social comparisons instead of empathy. My research team encountered similar problems in studies of acts of kindness (Exline & Fisher, 2005). As part of a project funded by the Institute for Research on Unlimited Love, we began to test a conduit model of love: If people recall or experience acts of kindness that others have done for them, will they be inspired to pass on kindness to others? Once again, the results were mixed. In general, having people recall times when they received kindness did motivate them to be generous, but memories of receiving kindness often prompted

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feelings of weakness, guilt, or obligation. These negative emotions in turn made people less likely to show kindness to others. These studies have taught my colleagues and me that facing people with their limitations does not necessarily make them more kind, empathic, or forgiving. In hindsight, these findings make sense: After all, the use of ego threat is a standard social psychological technique used to elicit aggressive and selfdestructive behavior. We were essentially threatening people's egos in these studies, but we were expecting them to reflect on the feedback and respond as humble people would. In retrospect, this was too much to expect. As suggested in research on self-affirmation (e.g., Steele, 1999) and attachment (e.g., Cassidy & Shaver, 1999), it may be vital to help people feel secure before giving them humbling feedback. One promising strategy from clinical lore is the sandwich technique. The premise is that when confronting someone, it can be effective to sandwich critical input between several pieces of positive input. The positive input may help to reduce defensive reactions. (The same procedure also goes by the whimsical name of the "kiss, kick, kiss" strategy.)

Conclusion and Future Directions As suggested by trends within psychology and the broader culture, this seems like a good time to invest energy in the study of the quiet ego. Although studies have revealed many benefits of self-esteem, the dangers of the wild ego are also becoming apparent. As I have described in this chapter, a humble or quiet ego would enable people to consider their strengths and limitations in an evenhanded, nondefensive way. There is good reason to propose that a humble stance could yield both personal and social benefits, especially over the long term. However, more empirical work is needed before firm conclusions can be made about the costs and benefits of a quiet ego.

References Axelrod, R. (1980). Effective choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 24, 3-25. Baumeister, R. R, Smart, L., & Boden, J. M. (1996). Relation of threatened egotism to violence and aggression: The dark side of high self-esteem. Psychological Review, 103, 5-33. Bellinger, R. A., Kopp, K. J., Hill, P. C., & Williams, J. (2006, August). The validation of a measurement of dispositional humility. Poster presented at the 114th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, New Orleans, LA. Brown, R. P. (2004). Vengeance is mine: Narcissism, vengeance, and the tendency to forgive. Journal of Research in Personality, 38, 576-584. Campbell, W. K. (1999). Narcissism and romantic attraction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77,1254-1270. Campbell, W. K, Bonacci, A. M., Shelton, J., Exline, J. J., & Bushman, B. J. (2004). Psychological entitlement: Interpersonal consequences and validation of a new self-report measure. Journal of Personality Assessment, 83, 29-45. Campbell, W. K, & Foster, C. A. (2002). Narcissism and commitment in romantic relationships: An investment model analysis. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28, 484-495. Campbell, W. K., Goodie, A. S., & Foster, J. D. (2004). Narcissism, confidence, and risk attitude. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 17, 297-311.

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Cassidy, J., & Shaver, P. R. (Eds.). (1999). Handbook of attachment. New York: Guilford Press. Costa, P. T., Jr., & McCrae, R. R. (1992). Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R) professional manual. Odessa, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources. Crocker, J., & Park, L. E. (2004). The costly pursuit of self-esteem. Psychological Bulletin, 130, 392^14. Crocker, J., & Wolfe, C. T. (2001). Contingencies of self-worth. Psychological Review, 108, 593-623. Exline, J. J., Baumeister, R. R, Bushman, B. J., Campbell, W. K., & Pinkel, E. J. (2004). Too proud to let go: Narcissistic entitlement as a barrier to forgiveness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 894-912. Exline, J. J., Campbell, W. K., Baumeister, R. R, Joiner, T., Krueger, J. L, & Kachorek, L. V. (2004). Humility and modesty. In C. Peterson & M. Seligman (Eds.), Character strengths and virtues: A handbook and classification (pp. 461-475). New York: Oxford University Press. Exline, J. J., & Fisher, M. L. (2005, January). Sentimental journeys and balanced accounts: Emotion, social exchange, and decisions to "pass on" acts of kindness. Poster presented at the sixth annual meeting of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, New Orleans, LA. Exline, J. J., & Geyer, A. L. (2004). Perceptions of humility: A preliminary study. Self and Identity, 3, 95-114. Exline, J. J., & Lobel, M. (1999). The perils of outperformance: Sensitivity about being the target of a threatening upward comparison. Psychological Bulletin, 125, 307-337. Exline, J. J., & Zell, A. L. (2007). Does a humble attitude promote forgiveness? Challenges, caveats, and the role of gender. In W. Malcolm, N. De Courville, & K. Belicki (Eds.), Women's reflections on the complexities of forgiveness (pp. 235-251). New York: Routledge. Fredrickson, B. L. (2001). The role of positive emotions in positive psychology: The broaden-andbuild theory of positive emotions. American Psychologist, 56, 218-226. Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. K. (1998). Measuring individual differences in implicit cognition: The Implicit Association Test. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 1464-1480. Kernis, M. H. (2005). Measuring self-esteem in context: The importance of stability of self-esteem in psychological functioning. Journal of Personality, 73, 1-37. Kopp, K. J., Hill, P. C., Bellinger, R. A., & Williams, J. (2006, August). A humble undertaking: Research on the measurement of humility. Poster presented at the 114th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, New Orleans, LA. Leary, M. R. (2004). The curse of the self: Self-awareness, egotism, and the quality of human life. New York: Oxford University Press. Lee, K, & Ashton, M. C. (2004). Psychometric properties of the HEXACO Personality Inventory. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 39, 329-358. McCullough, M. E., Emmons, R. A., Kilpatrick, S. D., & Mooney, C. N. (2003). Narcissists as "victims": The role of narcissism in the perception of transgressions. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 885-893. Morf, C. C., & Rhodewalt, F. (2001). Unraveling the paradoxes of narcissism: A dynamic selfregulatory processing model. Psychological Inquiry, 12, 177-196. Neff, K. D. (2003). The development and validation of a scale to measure self-compassion. Self and Identity, 2, 223-250. Peterson, C., & Seligman, M. E. P. (2004). Character strengths and virtues. New York: Oxford University Press. Powers, C., Nam, R. K., Rowatt, W. C., & Hill, P. C. (2007). Associations between humility, spiritual transcendence, and forgiveness. Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, 18, 74-94. Rowatt, W. C., McCullough, G., Johnson, M., LaBouff, J., Mohiuddin, A., & Tsang, J.-A. (2007). Dispositional humility and prosocial motivations for helping. Manuscript submitted for publication. Rowatt, W. C., Powers, C., Targhetta, V, Comer, J., Kennedy, S., & LaBouff, J. (2006). Development and initial validation of an implicit measure of humility relative to arrogance. Journal of Positive Psychology, 1, 198-211. Steele, C. M. (1999). The psychology of self-affirmation. New York: Psychology Press.

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Tangney, J. P. (2000). Humility: Theoretical perspectives, empirical findings and directions for future research. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 19, 70-82. Tangney, J. P. (2002). Humility. In C. R. Snyder & S. J. Lopez (Eds.), Handbook of positive psychology (pp. 411-419). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Twenge, J. M. (2006). Generation me: Why today's young Americans are more confident, assertive, entitled—and more miserable than ever before. New York: Free Press. Twenge, J. M., & Campbell, W. K. (2003). "Isn't it fun to get the respect that we're going to deserve?" Narcissism, social rejection, and aggression. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 261-272. Wallace, H. M., & Baumeister, R. F. (2002). The performance of narcissists rises and falls with perceived opportunity for glory. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 819-834. Zeigler-Hill, V. (2006). Discrepancies between implicit and explicit self-esteem: Implications for narcissism and self-esteem instability. Journal of Personality, 74, 119-143.

6 From Egosystem to Ecosystem: Implications for Relationships, Learning, and Well-Being Jennifer Crocker Egosystem motivation—the desire to construct, maintain, protect, and enhance positive images of the self—underlies a great deal of human behavior (Crocker, Nuer, Olivier, & Cohen, 2006). In this chapter, I propose that egosystem goals are motivating but costly for learning and growth, relationships, and wellbeing. I propose an alternative: ecosystem motivation, in which others' needs have priority, in a non-zero-sum framework. This framework ironically suggests that when people give priority to supporting and having compassion for others, they are more likely to satisfy their own fundamental needs and experience increased well-being.

Egosystem and Ecosystem Motivation People want to see themselves in a positive light, and they want others to agree with their rosy self-views. Over the past 3 decades, social psychological research has documented widespread self-enhancing biases in judgments of the self, defensive responses to self-threats, and self-serving attributions for success and failure (see chap. 4). This research suggests that people have egosystem goals: They desire to construct, maintain, and defend positive images of themselves and to see themselves as worthy and valuable. This research portrays people as concerned with others only insofar as others satisfy desires of the self, bestowing worth and value on the self through their evaluation, acceptance, rejection, reflection on, or comparison with the self.

The research reported in this chapter was supported by National Institute of Mental Health grant R01 MH58869. I am grateful to Noah Nuer, Marc-Andre Olivier, and Sam Cohen, my friends and collaborators at Learning as Leadership, Inc. The idea of egosystem and ecosystem motivational frameworks is theirs; my role has been to translate it into psychology. I also am grateful to Paul Denning, without whose tireless efforts the data for the Goals and Adjustment to College Study would not have been collected; to the graduate students and postdoctoral fellows in my laboratory; and to Rebecca Caulfield, Timothy Cavnar, Andrew Crocker, and Sarah Franz for their assistance with data collection and entry.

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Yet people sometimes genuinely care about and prioritize the well-being of others; they are compassionate, generous, and supportive of others, without concern for what this means for their self-image (Batson, 1998; Brown & Brown, 2006; see also chap. 15, this volume). Drawing on the biological notion of an ecosystem, my colleagues and I (Crocker, Nuer, et al., 2006) defined ecosystem motivation as a "motivational framework for the self in which people see themselves as part of a larger whole, a system of individuals whose actions have consequences for others, with repercussions for the entire system" (p. 48). In this framework, the well-being of the self and others is not a zero-sum proposition. Consequently, in ecosystem motivation people are willing to prioritize the well-being of others, not out of virtue or self-sacrifice but instead because ultimately it is the best way—and perhaps the only sustainable way—to ensure that their own and others' fundamental needs (as opposed to their egosystem wants) are met. Ecosystem goals are not limited to specific activities, such as community service, volunteer work, or philanthropy; any of these activities could be motivated by either egosystem or ecosystem goals. Similarly, ecosystem goals are not limited to specific relationships, such as people with whom one has a communal relationship; in any interaction with another person, one can try to get others to acknowledge desirable aspects of the self, or one can have the intention to be supportive, compassionate, and do no harm. Although people may differ in their chronic tendencies to be motivated by egosystem or ecosystem goals, social life requires both motivational systems and the capacity to switch flexibly between them. Just as brilliant plumage can signal to females that a male bird would be a good mate, and fur standing on end can make a wolf appear larger and more intimidating, construction of desired images can help people gain resources and fend off threats. For example, a reputation for loyalty may foster inclusion in groups that control resources, whereas a reputation for ruthlessness may prevent attempts at cheating by others. Threats to desired images can have serious social and financial consequences. Consequently, egosystem goals that are focused on attending to how one appears to others as well as to the self may be essential to human social life (Schlenker, 2003). However, giving support to others, behaving authentically, and disclosing one's fears and weaknesses build closeness and trust in relationships (Murray, 2005). Responsiveness to others' needs strengthens social bonds (Reis, Clark, & Holmes, 2004) and increases the likelihood that one will receive support from others. Therefore, ecosystem goals focused on supporting others in a non-zero-sum framework may also be essential to human social life.

Costs and Benefits of Egosystem and Ecosystem Goals Although egosystem and ecosystem goals both contribute to human social life, they have quite different psychological and social consequences. When people have egosystem goals, they are highly motivated and energized; and they obtain social and material resources for the self; but they may unintentionally undermine their learning, relationships, and well-being. When people have ecosystem goals that prioritize the needs or well-being of something larger

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than themselves, or of other people, they may forgo or give away social or material resources but paradoxically enhance their learning, relationships, and well-being.

Motivation Egosystem goals are highly motivating. People want to experience the boosts to self-esteem and the emotional high of success, praise, acknowledgment, recognition, admiration, and feelings of superiority, and they want to avoid the loss of self-esteem and intensely negative emotions that can accompany criticism, failure, rejection, feelings of inadequacy or inferiority, and contempt (Crocker & Park, 2004). When the ego quiets, therefore, people may become unmotivated or unenthusiastic, lacking in passion. However, ecosystem goals may also be a source of motivation and enthusiasm, albeit without the intense self-relevant emotions of pride and shame that accompany success and failure at egosystem goals (Crocker, Nuer, et al., 2006). Egosystem goals may lead to obsessive passion, and ecosystem goals may lead to harmonious passion (Vallerand et al., 2003).

Learning and Growth When performance goes smoothly, learning is compatible with egosystem motivation; by learning and growing, people can demonstrate ever-greater competence, enhancing their self-image. When people encounter difficulty or setbacks, however, egosystem motivation is incompatible with learning; mistakes, criticisms, setbacks, and failures become self-threats to be defended against, instead of learning opportunities (Crocker & Park, 2004; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Goldenberg, 2003). For example, under self-esteem threat, people reject or dismiss negative feedback (Baumeister, 1998), derogate the source of negative feedback (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1982), or search for explanations that diminish their own responsibility (Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1985). Each of these responses decreases the likelihood that people will identify and understand their own contribution to the problem and therefore undermines learning (Niiya & Crocker, 2006). Learning is also compatible with ecosystem goals; when the well-being of other people or something larger than the self is at stake, people may care deeply about improving their own abilities so they can better contribute or support others. Furthermore, because they are not focused on self-image, ecosystem goals may foster learning and growth better than egosystem goals at precisely those moments when learning is most difficult and important: when things are not going well, or when one is on the receiving end of criticism, rejection, or failure.

Relationships In egosystem motivation, relationships become subtly, or blatantly, antagonistic. For example, in achievement domains one person's success diminishes oth-

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ers' accomplishments. In social relationships, the goal of winning over another person focuses the self on gratifying one's own desires, perhaps at the expense of others. Furthermore, in the egosystem framework, others become judges or evaluators of the self, creating tension in relationships; consequently, egosystem goals should foster feelings of competition and conflict, undermine closeness, and increase feelings of loneliness. In contrast, in ecosystem motivation, people do not view relationships as being zero sum in nature; ecosystem goals support both the self and others. Consequently, ecosystem goals build social bonds and create collaborative, supportive relationships.

Well-Being Egosystem goals may undermine well-being because they foster feelings of loneliness and, over time, diminish the social support people receive from others. Ecosystem goals, however, should enhance well-being, because they foster feelings of closeness and build social support. Social support has benefits for both physical and psychological health (Cohen & Syme, 1985; Pierce, Sarason, & Sarason, 1996; Sarason, Sarason, & Gurung, 1997; Uchino, 2004; Uchino, Cacioppo, & Kiecolt-Glaser, 1996). Furthermore, the perception that others are available and supportive is more strongly related to health and well-being than is objective social support received from others (Cohen & Syme, 1985). If egosystem goals undermine social support, and ecosystem goals increase it, then these goals should also have consequences for psychological well-being and depression.

The Goals and Adjustment to College Study At the start of their freshman year of college, 199 students were paid to participate in a study of goals and adjustment to college (Canevello & Crocker, 2007; Crocker & Canevello, 2007; Crocker, Niiya, & Luhtanen, 2007). Students gave their informed consent, completed a series of pretest questionnaires, and received instructions for completing the remainder of the study. Participants accessed a Web-based survey once each week for 10 weeks in the fall semester and completed a questionnaire about their goals in the past week, their psychological well-being, their academic outcomes, and their relationships. Finally, they completed a posttest survey. Participants were paid for taking part in the study, and they could earn a bonus for completing all 12 surveys; consequently, of 199 students in the study, 194 completed all 12 surveys.1 Each week, students rated their egosystem and ecosystem goals over the past week in two domains (academics and friendships). Examples of egosystem items included "avoid showing your weaknesses," "avoid being wrong," "avoid being criticized by others," "get others to recognize or acknowledge your intelligence," "convince others that you are right," and "do things you know you can succeed at." Examples of ecosystem items included "have compassion iMore detail on the methods and procedures of the study are available from the author.

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for others' mistakes and weaknesses," "be supportive of others," "avoid being selfish or self-centered," and "avoid doing anything that would be harmful to others."

Goals and Outcomes The study design provided multiple opportunities to examine the correlates and consequences of egosystem and ecosystem goals. Hierarchical linear modeling analyses were used to examine short-term within-person associations between weekly goals and weekly outcomes; weekly egosystem goals and weekly ecosystem goals were entered simultaneously as within-person predictors of weekly outcomes. These analyses revealed whether changes in participants' goals led to changes in their outcomes, regardless of their average levels of the goals and outcomes. Regression analyses were used to examine individual differences in chronic egosystem and chronic ecosystem goals; each outcome (averaged across the 10 weeks) was regressed onto average egosystem and average ecosystem goals scores across the 10 weekly reports, gender, and social desirability. Relatively long-term changes in outcomes were investigated in regression analyses that predicted posttest outcomes from chronic egosystem and ecosystem goals, controlling for pretest levels of the outcome, gender, and social desirability. RELATIONSHIPS. Ecosystem goals foster feelings of closeness and social support, whereas egosystem goals foster feelings of loneliness and decreased social support. Several findings from the Goals and Adjustment to College Study support this conclusion. Each week, participants rated their relationship closeness and feelings of loneliness; on weeks when their egosystem goals were relatively high (compared with their own baseline), participants reported feeling more loneliness. On weeks when their ecosystem goals were relatively high (again, compared with their own baselines), participants reported feeling more closeness. Furthermore, participants with high average egosystem goals tended to be high in loneliness over the 10 weekly reports, especially if they were also low in ecosystem goals. Participants with high ecosystem goals, however, tended to feel closer to others across the 10 weekly reports, especially if they were low in egosystem goals. A third set of analyses examined changes in perceived social support from the pretest at the beginning of the semester to the posttest at the end of the semester. Students with high average levels of ecosystem goals during the 10 weekly reports showed increases in social support from friends, but only if they were also low in egosystem goals. Additional items included in the weekly survey enriched our understanding of why egosystem and ecosystem goals have these effects. Ecosystem goals were strongly associated with believing that it is important that people look out for each other, whereas egosystem goals were strongly associated with believing that people should look out for themselves, even at the expense of others, and with more frequent interpersonal conflicts. These associations were consistently observed both for individual differences in chronic goals and for changes in goals from week to week.

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Both between- and within-person analyses indicated that egosystem goals were associated with increased loneliness and conflict and a zero-sum perspective on relationships, whereas ecosystem goals were associated with increased relationship closeness and a non-zero-sum perspective on relationships. Analyses of change over time suggested that ecosystem goals increased social support, but only for people who were also low in egosystem goals. LEARNING. Ecosystem goals fostered an orientation toward learning and growth. Each week, participants completed measures of learning orientations, including a measure of growth goals, interest in their courses, whether they had asked questions in class, and self-regulation (e.g., completing assignments on schedule, staying focused on important goals, not procrastinating). On weeks when their ecosystem goals were high (relative to their own baselines), participants were higher in growth goals, had more interest in their courses, asked more questions in class, and improved their self-regulation compared with weeks when they were low in ecosystem goals. Furthermore, participants who averaged high in ecosystem goals across the 10 weekly reports also reported more growth goals and more interest in their courses, asked more questions in their classes, and reported better self-regulation. Egosystem goals were unrelated to any of the learning orientation measures in these analyses. Egosystem and ecosystem goals also predicted changes in students' achievement goals over the semester. Students completed three measures of learning goals and three measures of performance goals at pretest and posttest. Average egosystem goals across the 10 weekly reports predicted increases over the semester in the goal to avoid failure (performance avoidance goals), the goal to outperform others (performance approach goals), and the goal to demonstrate one's intelligence (ability-validation goals). Average egosystem goals also predicted decreases over the semester in the desire to learn from failure. Average ecosystem goals predicted increases in the goal to acquire knowledge and in the goal to learn from failure over the semester. Both between- and within-person analyses of learning-oriented outcomes, and analyses of changes in achievement goals across the first semester of college, indicated that ecosystem goals were associated with increased learning orientations. Unexpectedly, egosystem goals were not related to any of the weekly measures of learning orientations. Egosystem goals did, however, predict increases in performance-focused achievement goals over the first semester of college. WELL-BEING. Egosystem goals undermine well-being, whereas ecosystem goals improve well-being. Each week, participants reported on their feelings of vitality, engagement in the present moment, self-esteem, anxiety, and stress; these measures were combined into a composite well-being measure. Wellbeing was higher on weeks when participants were high, relative to their own baselines, in ecosystem goals. Within-person changes in well-being were not associated with changes in egosystem goals, except for one of the well-being indicators—being engaged in the present moment. Furthermore, the more ecosystem goals participants had on average across the 10 weekly reports, the

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higher their well-being; the more egosystem goals they had, the lower their average well-being. Students also completed measures of anxiety, depression, and stress at pretest and posttest. Egosystem and ecosystem goals did not predict changes in stress across the semester, but they did predict changes in anxiety and depression. Students with higher average egosystem goals became more depressed and more anxious over the first semester of college, whereas students with higher average ecosystem goals became less depressed and anxious over the first semester. Within- and between-person analyses, and analyses of changes over time, all indicate that egosystem goals undermined psychological well-being, whereas ecosystem goals improved psychological well-being.

Mechanisms Egosystem motivation might affect well-being through a variety of routes, and at different levels of analysis. Egosystem goals may use the fight-orflight physiological system, which evolved to mobilize resources in response to threats to survival, whereas ecosystem goals may use the physiological systems for attachment, which promote caregiving and the protection of others, especially offspring. In a physiological sense, egosystem motivation activates the fight-or-flight response, raising cortisol levels (Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004) and undermining immune system responses (Dickerson, Kemeny, Aziz, Kim, & Fahey, 2004). Ecosystem motivation is hypothesized to activate endocrine systems that support caregiving, which is called the species-preservation system (Henry & Wang, 1998) or the tend-and-befriend system (Taylor et al., 2000). The attachment hormones oxytocin, progesterone, and perhaps vasopressin are implicated in the tend-and-befriend system (Henry & Wang, 1998; Taylor et al., 2000). In humans, nasal inhalation of oxytocin increases trust (Kosfeld, Heinrichs, Zak, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2005) and down-regulates cortisol during marital conflict (Ditzen, Bodenmann, Ehlert, & Heinrichs, 2006). Thus, egosystem and ecosystem goals may affect learning, relationships, and well-being through their physiological connections to the neuroendocrine systems associated with the fight-or-flight and tend-and-befriend responses to stress. In a psychological sense, the more people attempt to construct desired selfimages, the more their attention will be focused on how others see them, leading to high public self-consciousness and social anxiety (Schlenker & Leary, 1982). Egosystem motivation might be associated with decreased intrinsic motivation or increased extrinsic motivation, which are negatively related to well-being (Deci & Ryan, 2000; see also chap. 10, this volume). Egosystem motivation might be linked to greater self-judgment and self-criticism, as people continually evaluate whether their behavior is consistent with the self-images they wish to construct, or to external contingencies of self-worth. Because one cannot completely control how others see the self, people with egosystem motivation may feel they are at the mercy of other people. Several psychological mechanisms could also account for the effects of ecosystem motivation on learning, relationships, and well-being. When people

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are driven by ecosystem motivation, they may be higher in self-compassion and less critical of their own mistakes and weaknesses, seeing them as part of the human experience (Neff, 2003; see also chap. 3, this volume). Ecosystem motivation may be associated with the sense that one can be the source of need satisfaction for oneself and others. Ecosystem motivation may create a non-zero-sum, less competitive view of others, fostering feelings of closeness and building social support. Ecosystem goals may give people a reason to learn even when learning is difficult or ego threatening; what better reason to learn than because it will help one support the people and things about which one cares?

Caveats and Conclusions The results of the Goals and Adjustment to College Study suggest that egosystem goals have considerable costs to relationships and well-being, and although they can foster growth they do so less effectively than ecosystem goals. Ecosystem goals are associated with increased learning, increased relationship closeness and decreased loneliness, and increased well-being. The fact that these effects were replicated in between-person analyses of chronic goals and outcomes over a semester, analyses of changes from the beginning to the end of the semester, and in within-person analyses of relationships between weekly goals and weekly outcomes is important for several reasons. First, the between-person effects indicate that people differ reliably and consistently in how much they have egosystem and ecosystem goals, and those individual differences are related to individual differences in learning, relationships, and well-being. Second, the fact that these effects were consistently observed in within-person analyses means that these goals can change from week to week, and when they do, outcomes also change. This suggests that people might be able to increase their growth goals, relationship closeness, and well-being, and decrease loneliness, by increasing their ecosystem goals. Third, the within-person analyses examined effects of variations around individuals' own averages on these measures, regardless of whether they were chronically high or low in egosystem or ecosystem goals. Thus, unlike the between-person effects, the within-person effects cannot be due to unmeasured individual differences that affect both goals and outcomes. Interventions that helped people explore the costs and benefits of their egosystem goals and helped them clarify, if they chose to, ecosystem goals, could have salubrious effects on relationships, learning, and well-being. People sometimes erroneously assume that egosystem goals are bad and that ecosystem goals are good. Both egosystem and ecosystem motivation, and the ability to switch flexibly between them, are important to human social life. Both have important benefits and important costs. My research emphasizes the costs of the egosystem and the benefits of the ecosystem because in modern, individualistic societies they are underappreciated. It is neither possible nor desirable to rid oneself entirely of egosystem goals. Problems develop when people overemphasize egosystem goals, or rigidly adhere to them even when the results are counterproductive. Instead, it is helpful to be aware of the qual-

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ity of one's goals and their likely consequences and to choose to operate out of one motivational framework or the other at each moment. When egosystem goals contribute to one's survival or well-being, giving them up is reckless. However, when the only thing at stake is one's ego, then ecosystem goals may be more constructive. The benefits of ecosystem goals are not a result of being a "good person," or even aspiring to make the world a better place or to make a difference for other people some day in the future. Practicing ecosystem goals, using them as a compass to guide behavior during the routine and mundane activities of one's daily life, improves relationships, learning, and ultimately creates sustainable well-being for oneself and others.

References Batson, C. D. (1998). Altruism and prosocial behavior. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Piske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology (4th ed., Vol. 2, pp. 282-316). New York: McGraw-Hill. Baumeister, R. F. (1998). The self. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology (4th ed., Vol. 2, pp. 680-740). New York: McGraw-Hill. Brown, S. L., & Brown, R. M. (2006). Selective investment theory: Recasting the functional significance of close relationships. Psychological Inquiry, 17, 1-29. Canevello, A., & Crocker, J. (2007). What predicts entity and incremental theories of relationships'? Intrapersonal and interpersonal consequences of the goal to support others. Manuscript submitted for publication. Cohen, S., & Syme, S. L. (1985). Social support and health. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Crocker, J., & Canevello, A. (2007). Creating and undermining social support in communal relationships: The role of compassionate and self-image goals. Manuscript submitted for publication. Crocker, J., Niiya, Y., & Luhtanen, R. K. (2007). Ecosystem goals and learning orientations. Manuscript submitted for publication. Crocker, J., Nuer, N., Olivier, M.-A., & Cohen, S. (2006). Egosystem and ecosystem: Two motivational orientations for the self. Unpublished manuscript. Crocker, J., & Park, L. E. (2004). The costly pursuit of self-esteem. Psychological Bulletin, 130, 392-414. Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2000). The "what" and "why" of goal pursuits: Human needs and the self-determination of behavior. Psychological Inquiry, 11, 227-268. Dickerson, S. S., & Kemeny, M. E. (2004). Acute stressors and cortisol responses: A theoretical integration and synthesis of laboratory research. Psychological Bulletin, 130, 355-391. Dickerson, S. S., Kemeny, M. E., Aziz, N., Kim, K. H., & Fahey, J. L. (2004). Immunological effects of induced shame and guilt. Psychosomatic Medicine, 66, 124-131. Ditzen, B., Bodenmann, J. G., Ehlert, U., & Heinrichs, M. (2006, June). The effects of social support and oxytocin on psychological and physiological stress responses during marital conflict. Paper presented at the International Congress of Neuroendocrinology. Retrieved November 13, 2007, from http://www.upmc.eom/NR/rdonlyres/848E9740-E2C8-4E47-90AC-lD2AA5FB9AlC/0/ Ditzen.pdf Greenberg, J., & Pyszczynski, T. (1985). Compensatory self-inflation: A response to the threat to self-regard of public failure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49, 273-280. Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T, & Solomon, S. (1982). The self-serving attributional bias: Beyond self-presentation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 18, 56-67. Henry, J. P., & Wang, S. (1998). Effects of early stress on adult affiliative behavior. Psychoneuroendocrinology, 23, 863-875. Kosfeld, M., Heinrichs, M., Zak, P. J., Fischbacher, U., & Fehr, E. (2005, June 2). Oxytocin increases trust in humans. Nature, 435, 673-676. Murray, S. L. (2005). Regulating the risks of closeness: A relationship-specific sense of felt security. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 14, 74—78.

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Neff, K. D. (2003). Self-compassion: An alternative conceptualization of a healthy attitude toward oneself. Self and Identity, 2, 85-101. Niiya, Y, & Crocker, J. (2006). Acquiring knowledge and learning from failure: Theory, measurement, and validation. Unpublished manuscript, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Pierce, G. R., Sarason, B. R., & Sarason, I. G. (1996). Handbook of social support and the family. New York: Plenum Press. Pyszczynski, T., Greenberg, J., & Goldenberg, J. (2003). Freedom versus fear: On the defense, growth, and expansion of the self. In M. R. Leary & J. P. Tangney (Eds.), Handbook of self and identity (pp. 314-343). New York: Guilford Press. Reis, H. T., Clark, M. S., & Holmes, J. G. (2004). Perceived partner responsiveness as an organizing construct in the study of intimacy and closeness. In D. Mashek & A. P. Aron (Eds.), Handbook of closeness and intimacy (pp. 367-389). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Sarason, B. R., Sarason, I. G., & Gurung, R. A. R. (1997). Close personal relationships and health outcomes: A key to the role of social support. In S. Duck (Ed.), Handbook of personal relationships (2nd ed., pp. 547-573). New York: Wiley. Schlenker, B. R. (2003). Self-presentation. In M. R. Leary & J. P. Tangney (Eds.), Handbook of self and identity (pp. 492-518). New York: Guilford Press. Schlenker, B. R., & Leary, M. R. (1982). Social anxiety and self-presentation: A conceptualization and model. Psychological Bulletin, 92, 641-669. Taylor, S. E., Klein, L. C., Lewis, B. P., Gruenewald, T. L., Gurung, R. A. R., & Updegraff, J. A. (2000). Biobehavioral responses to stress in females: Tend-and-befriend, not fight-or-ftight. Psychological Review, 197, 411-429. Uchino, B. N. (2004). Social support and physical health: Understanding the health consequences of our relationships. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Uchino, B. N., Cacioppo, J. T., & Kiecolt-Glaser, J. K. (1996). The relationship between social support and physiological processes: A review with emphasis on underlying mechanisms and implications for health. Psychological Bulletin, 119, 488-531. Vallerand, R. J., Blanchard, C., Mageau, G. A., Koestner, R., Ratelle, C., Leonard, M., et al. (2003). Les passions de 1'Ame: On obsessive and harmonious passion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 756-767.

Beyond Me: Mindful Responses to Social Threat Kirk Warren Brown, Richard M. Ryan, J. David Creswell, and Christopher P. Niemiec For millennia, philosophers and spiritual leaders have pointed out that attempts to secure our "selves," even at the expense of others, are a primary source—if not the source—of personal distress and interpersonal strife (Waldron, 2003). Many traditional moral and religious cultures have focused on modifying the expression of behavior to ameliorate the excesses of selfcenteredness, egotism, and other problematic products of self-identification (Leary, 2004; Waldron, 2003), but there has also been long-standing interest, especially among Asian and several Western contemplative and scholarly traditions, in "taking a look inside" to closely examine the properties and operation of the self and to investigate qualities of consciousness that can facilitate more adaptive ways of being with oneself and others. In this chapter, we consider theory and findings from our program of research on mindfulness that begin to integrate these traditions with contemporary research psychology. Mindfulness is an exemplar of the experiential mode of conscious processing and concerns a receptive state of mind wherein attention, informed by a sensitive awareness of what is occurring in the present, simply observes what is taking place; this is in contrast to the conceptually driven mode of processing, in which occurrences are habitually filtered through cognitive appraisals, evaluations, memories, beliefs, and other forms of cognitive manipulation (see Brown & Cordon, in press, and Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 2007, for reviews). We discuss how mindfulness can facilitate personal and relational well-being through an easing of self-identification, or ego quieting. Our domain of interest is one in which such identification is known to be easily aroused, and the consequences of which are legion—when the self is under threat by others.

The Mental Construction of Me Study of the self has been of key interest to psychologists, psychiatrists, philosophers, sociologists, and, more recently, neuroscientists, and this wideWe thank Jeff Green for helpful suggestions on an earlier version of this chapter.

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spread interest reflects the centrality of the self to human experience. Two views of self predominate today, namely, (a) what McAdams (1990) described as the "I" self, which has been studied within organismic theories (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 1991), and (b) the "Me" self, which has been central to social constructionist views of self. Of particular interest to the present discussion is the Me self, which is derived from the Mead-Cooley tradition (Ryan, 1993) and concerns the creation of personal identity. This Me self involves an identification with particular attributes, roles, group memberships, and belief systems that effectively narrow down competing possibilities for thought and action that are both derived from and consistent with the social inputs and appraisals to which one has been exposed over time (e.g., Gilbert, 2005). This personal identity is a mental model, formed from ongoing life experiences and cognitive elaborations on those experiences and inseparable from the larger social and cultural contexts in which it is formed and continually operates, even in individualistic societies (e.g., Waldron, 2003). Together, these characteristics highlight a view of identity as dynamic, constructed, contingent, and, perhaps most important, an emergent property of the mind and brain, not an entity in its own right. The existence of personal identifications and internalized constructions contributes to the lay view of self; specifically, people generally regard themselves as substantial—distinct from other selves and objects; as individual— unique and indivisible; and as essential—relatively constant or the same over time (Metzinger, 2003). Perhaps most critical for the present analysis is that humans treat their mental self-representations as if they were real. This has two important implications for social interactions. The first implication is that, in real or imagined interactions, self-related thoughts and feelings are engaged and then feed back to influence the way individuals behave. In this way, social exchanges can be viewed as interactions between the self-representations of those individuals, in which each person's perceptions, reactions, and responses to the other are filtered through and mediated by his or her internalized views of self and other (Leary, 2002). A second implication of the reified self for social interactions is that when it is threatened, people respond in defensive ways. Most immediately, defensive response to social threat is manifest as a mental, emotional, and/or behavioral reaction to events and experiences on the basis of how they affect, or could affect, the identity. This reflects one form of primary appraisal: Events and experiences are judged as bad, good, or neutral in reference to Me. When perceived as bad, such events or experiences are treated as threatening or harmful, something with which one then has to cope in some way. However, judgment of the opposite kind is also problematic; even when judged as good for Me, those events or experiences will inevitably end, something that can again be regarded as threatening or harmful when personal identity is projected into the future. These self-relevant and inevitably biased judgments can negatively influence psychological well-being, the quality of social relationships, and ways one negotiates the social world. More problematic still, this evaluative reactivity to events and experiences may occur nonconsciously because, over time, our reactions can become habitual and automated (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). Thus, quality of experience may be

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compromised without notice and without apparent (i.e., a consciously known) cause. Because personal identity is a central preoccupation for the individual (e.g., see chap. 12, this volume; Gaertner & Sedikides, 2005), and because events and experiences regularly impinge on it that require maintenance and protection, a final consequence of self-identification is that a great deal of life energy may be spent in the service of Me, with a variety of associated costs (e.g., see chap. 6, this volume; Crocker & Park, 2004; Ryan, 1993). Finally, when so deeply invested in it—when one presumes that one is this Me—the individual may have little access to other aspects of the self that reflect more authentic functioning (e.g., unbiased processing of self-relevant information; Kernis & Goldman, 2006; see also chap. 8, this volume).

Mindful Attention as Antidote to Self-Identification If investment in identity, or the Me self, is problematic, then how can the individual have a more adaptive relationship to one's self? From one perspective, the proposition appears quixotic, given the deeply entrenched, pervasively influential nature of identity. Yet theorists informed by both Buddhist and organismic psychologies (e.g., Leary, 2004; Ryan, 1993) argue that a primary way that identity is fueled is by a lack of awareness of our thought patterns, emotional reactions, desires, and behavioral tendencies. This view suggests that if one could get a clear, moment-to-moment look at one's ways of thinking, feeling, and acting, then the automatic flow of self-representations could be interrupted, their constructed nature seen more clearly, and responses could be made with more choice instead of in reaction to identity-based productions (Rabinowitz, 2006). This view argues for the value of an observant stance on our experience—a self-as-knower, not as an agent of reflexive cognition, in which attention simply informs thought about the self, as in "self-awareness" (e.g., Duval & Wicklund, 1972), but instead as an inner witness, in which the contents of consciousness—including self-relevant thoughts, images, and identities—and one's overt behavior are on display. One conceptualization of this basic witnessing capacity is mindfulness, in which internal and external events and occurrences are simply seen as phenomena "rather than as the objects of a conceptually constructed world" (Olendzki, 2005, p. 253). Bringing such open, receptive attention to bear on experience may permit a clearer recognition that self-representations are simply mental concepts; that is, in observing that thoughts come and go; memories arise and replace each other; desires emerge, develop, change, and vanish, and so on, the identity may become less substantial and engrossing, allowing for disidentification with it—that is, when the functioning of the Me can be observed, then one is clearly not that Me. Theorists argue that because mindfulness permits an immediacy of contact with events as they occur, without the overlay of discriminative, categorical, and habitual thought, consciousness takes on a clarity and freshness that reduce reactivity and permit more objectively informed responses, unbiased by self-centered biases and prejudices (e.g., Nyanaponika Thera, 1973).

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Mindfulness and Social Threat As an open or receptive attention, mindfulness may facilitate exposure, or nondefensive processing of threatening experience (e.g., Baer, 2003), leading to desensitization and a reduction in emotional reactivity; a greater tolerance of unpleasant states; and, consequently, more adaptive responding in social and other situations in which self-representations are under threat. Thus, more mindful individuals should show lower levels of anger, anxiety, and other emotional responses in social threat situations that represent a disengagement from the "urgencies of risk assessment" (Allen & Knight, 2005, p. 250) and should manifest cognitive and behavioral responses that reflect greater tolerance, less judgment (including censorship, condemnation, and exclusion), and, more generally, less concern for the status of personal identity in social threat contexts. In the remainder of this chapter, we present preliminary evidence that mindfulness supports nondefensive processing in three social contexts in which identity is commonly threatened: (a) romantic relationship conflict, (b) social exclusion by members of an ingroup, and (c) worldview rejection by an outgroup member.

Romantic Relationship Conflict A primary basis for identity is a presumed dichotomy between self and not-self that, at the interpersonal level, is reflected in images of self, other, and the relationship, developed from learning experiences and memories of how one was viewed and treated by the other, how one adjusted behavior to maximize reward and minimize punishment, and so on (Rabinowitz, 2006). These mental representations of self and other can color the perception and interpretation of past events and present interactions (Leary, 2002), perhaps most strongly when images of the self and "my" relationship are threatened by conflict. In such circumstances, self-protective strategies, including avoidance, withdrawal, or aggression, may be invoked to minimize personal hurt, threats to self-esteem, and loss of power (Epstein & Baucom, 2003). When the identity is engaged in this way, direct, unmediated contact with the other is inhibited. Romantic relationships are a primary arena in which the engagement of images of self and other can have detrimental effects. The investment of self in the partner and the relationship, coupled with an attachment to seeing the relationship unfold in particular ways, represents psychological tinder for couple conflict. However, mindfulness may have value in couple conflict situations through processes that reflect an abeyance of the ego. For example, the receptive attentiveness that defines mindfulness may promote a greater ability or willingness to take interest in a partner's thoughts, emotions, and welfare and thereby to be less invested in one's own reactions. Boorstein (1996) argued that mindfulness promotes an ability to witness thoughts and emotions so as not to react impulsively and destructively to them. Through a willingness to contact experience directly rather than defend against it, mindfulness may promote attunement, connection, and closeness in relationships (e.g., Welwood, 1996). Barnes, Brown, Krusemark, Campbell, and Rogge (2007) conducted two studies to examine the role of mindfulness in romantic relationship function-

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ing, with a particular interest in examining how this quality of consciousness affects responses to relationship stress. In the initial, 10-week longitudinal study with dating college students, the authors found that dispositional mindfulness, assessed with the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003), was associated with greater capacities to respond constructively to relationship stress. For example, Barnes et al. (2007) found, after controlling for gender, length of relationship, and time spent together each month, that higher mindfulness was related to greater accommodation (Rusbult, Verette, Whitney, Slovik, & Lipkus, 1991)—a self-reported willingness to inhibit tendencies to act destructively, and instead to respond constructively, when the romantic partner had acted in a way that was potentially destructive to the relationship. In the second study, Barnes et al. (2007) tested whether mindfulness would predict more adaptive cognitive, affective, and behavioral responses in the heat of a relationship conflict. Using a conflict discussion paradigm, they asked steadily dating heterosexual partners to engage in a discussion of the most conflictual issues currently challenging the relationship. The authors found that for both members of the couple, dispositional MAAS scores predicted lower emotional stress reactions—hostility and anxiety—to the conflict, and these effects were explained by lower hostility and anxiety, respectively, measured on entry into the discussion. These results showed that instead of simply buffering the effects of emotional reactions during conflict, mindfulness helped inoculate individuals against the arising of those reactions. The capacity of mindfulness to inhibit reactivity to conflict was also evident in the cognitive judgments that each partner made; those higher in trait mindfulness showed a more positive (or less negative) pre-post conflict change in their perception of the partner and the relationship. The study also supported the importance of a mindful state in challenging exchanges, in that state, or current mindfulness was related to several indicators of better communication quality, as assessed by objective raters. Both of Barnes et al.'s (2007) studies lend support to the notion that mindfulness can enhance healthy romantic relationship functioning (cf. Carson, Carson, Gil, & Baucom, 2004) and suggest that one way it may do so is by facilitating a greater willingness to be present to a partner when challenged in ways that could provoke identity defense. There is some indication that this other-centeredness may extend beyond the romantic context and be reflected in a more general compassionate concern for others. For example, Shapiro, Schwartz, and Bonner (1998) found that, relative to control participants, medical students who received practical training in mindfulness showed increases in empathy over time, despite the fact that postintervention assessments were collected in a high-stress period, during final examinations. Social Exclusion Another interpersonal situation that presents significant identity challenges is social exclusion. As social creatures, humans have an inherent need to belong (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 1991) and are highly motivated to avoid social demotions

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and exclusions (e.g., Allen & Knight, 2005; Leary, 2004). The perception that one has been rejected, even by strangers, can quickly provoke psychological distress (e.g., Leary, 2004). Identity, as already noted, is strongly influenced by the opinions and reactions of others, and negative evaluative reactions to rejection occur because the individual's sense of self-worth is invested in, or contingent on, validation by others. However, with the capacity to recognize the identity as a construction, events such as rejection that impinge on it may be less likely to be destabilizing because a deeper sense of self is operational that is grounded in awareness (Ryan & Brown, 2003). Creswell, Eisenberger, and Lieberman (2008) tested aspects of this argument, specifically by examining the proposition that with consciousness more firmly rooted in mindful attention, individuals are less likely to experience distress when excluded by members of a group. In line with our proposition that mindfulness promotes more open, nondefensive processing of challenging events, Creswell et al. also examined whether the more mindful person's greater equanimity in the face of exclusion was due to reduced reactivity to this form of social threat, measured by functional magnetic resonance imaging of neural regions known to be implicated in the experience of social pain and distress. College students in Creswell et al.'s (2008) study engaged in a ball-tossing video game (i.e., Cyberball), ostensibly with two other student participants situated in nearby functional magnetic resonance imaging scanners. In fact, each participant was interacting with a computer. In the first block of trials, the participant was included in the ball-tossing game by what he or she thought were the other players; then, in a second block of trials, the participant was excluded from the ball tossing. The results showed that mindfulness, assessed with the MAAS upon entry into the study, predicted lower self-reported social distress after the exclusion experience. Mindfulness also predicted reduced activation of the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) during the exclusion task relative to the inclusion task; the dACC is a neural region associated with reports of physical and social pain (Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003). Analyses also showed that the reduced dACC activation partially mediated, or helped to explain the relation between, mindfulness and lower social distress. These findings provide initial evidence for an association between mindfulness and reduced reactivity to social exclusion distress, and suggest that this association may be explained, in part, through reduced reactivity of the dACC during social exclusion. The picture painted by Creswell et al.'s (2008) study is consistent with Barnes et al.'s (2007) examination of romantic couple conflict described earlier, in that it suggests that mindfulness predicts a more subdued response to social threat—in this case, apparent rejection by peers—and that this attenuated response is due, in part, to reduced evaluative reactivity to that threat (see also Creswell, Way, Eisenberger, & Lieberman, 2007). Furthermore, Creswell et al.'s (2008) the study findings appear to support the conceptualization of mindfulness as a receptive, experiential mode of stimulus processing, in contrast to an analytic mode, wherein events and experiences are processed in an abstracted, ruminative fashion (Teasdale, 1999).

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Worldview Defense The social embeddedness of the individual is reflected not only in intimate relationships and peer groups but also in broader social or cultural groups defined by their shared worldviews. These worldviews, reflecting values, ideals, or beliefs about the world and the place of the individual or group in it, provide a sense of shared meaning and order that acts to affirm personal and group identity (e.g., see chap. 3, this volume; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2004). Tajfel (1981) defined social identity or group identity as "that part of the individual's self-concept which derives from his [or her] knowledge of membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (p. 255). Paralleling romantic relationship conflict, investment in a relational identity—in this case, an ingroup identity—can lead to conflict and antagonism when that identity ("us" and "ours") is threatened by an outgroup or something representative thereof ("them" and "theirs"). As contemporary world events and the historical record suggest, people will often act as strongly to ward off threats to their social identities as they do to defend their own persons against attack. As discussed in chapter 3 of this volume, terror management theory (TMT; Solomon et al., 2004) argues that a key trigger for social identity defense is the threat of death. According to TMT, the knowledge of one's inevitable demise creates an omnipresent potential for anxiety that is managed by affirming or defending cultural worldviews. A common way in which this is manifest is by upholding ingroup worldviews and by derogating outgroup members whose views are counter to those of the ingroup. In so doing, people are enabled to view themselves as valuable members of a permanent reality. Such action affirms the features of the ontological self—in this case, the social self—noted earlier in this chapter, namely, substantiality, independence, and essentialism. From a scientific perspective on the self, however, such affirmation attempts to "turn reality on its head" (Waldron, 2003, p. 147). If, as we have argued, more mindful people are less invested in identity, will they show less worldview defense, particularly when, as TMT argues, their sense of self is threatened by a confrontation with their own mortality? In a series of four studies, Niemiec, Brown, and Ryan (2006) addressed this question by first assessing mindfulness among American citizens and then asking them to write either about their death (mortality salience condition) or about TV watching (control condition). After a brief delay, they then read a pro-U.S. essay and an anti-U.S. essay purportedly written by two different foreigners. The outcome in these studies was a series of evaluations of the essay authors and their opinions. Across several independent samples, the findings showed that participants with lower MAAS mindfulness scores in the mortality salience condition evidenced worldview defense, as reflected in stronger derogation of the anti-U.S. (outgroup) essay author and higher favoritism toward the pro-U.S. (ingroup) essay author. In contrast, the ratings of participants higher in mindfulness showed no worldview defense. In an effort to explain these findings, Niemiec et al. found that more mindful individuals, when confronting their death, spent more time writing about it and used more death-related

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words to describe it, suggesting a greater openness to processing this threatening potentiality. In turn, analyses showed that this more receptive processing of mortality helped to explain the association between mindfulness and lack of worldview defense.

Conclusions and Further Considerations In this chapter, we have highlighted findings from several studies showing that mindfulness facilitates a capacity to respond less defensively to social threat, manifest in reduced emotional reactivity to interpersonal conflict and peer rejection and a lack of worldview defense in the face of social identity threat. These findings are consistent with the thesis that mindfulness helps to reduce identity investment, or to quiet the ego. The research in this area is still nascent, and more work is needed to examine more thoroughly the relation of mindfulness to identity and its functioning. However, the preliminary findings suggest that mindfulness tempers a primary set of symptoms of identity investment, namely, defensive response. What are the adaptive implications of mindful responses to social threat? One could argue that in hostile and other dangerous situations, a defensive state of mind, instead of a receptive one, is highly adaptive because it offers protection to the physical organism (Allen & Knight, 2005). It may appear that mindfulness, with its emphasis on receptivity to even threatening events and experience, has adaptive costs. Although this remains an open empirical question, Buddhist scholars and, more recently, clinical psychologists using mindfulness-based therapies (e.g., Hayes, 2002), argue that mindfulness does not eliminate identity but instead contextualizes it, so that its functions can be channeled more flexibly, constructively, and with more choice toward, for example, an engagement of reflectively considered values, goals, and activities that support personal and social well-being. This involves a fundamental change in the place of identity in consciousness and in day-to-day life, because it entails a shift in the locus of personal subjectivity from conceptual representations of the self and others to awareness itself (e.g., Deikman, 1996). Research on the implications of such a shift, although still in its infancy, is promising. Given the harm that identity investment is known to cause in interpersonal and social affairs, such research may offer valuable contributions to enhancing the quality of people's social lives.

References Allen, N. B., & Knight, W. (2005). Mindfulness, compassion for self, and compassion for others. In P. Gilbert (Ed.), Compassion (pp. 239-262). New York: Routledge. Baer, R. A. (2003). Mindfulness training as a clinical intervention: A conceptual and empirical review. Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 10, 125—143. Bargh, J. A., & Chartrand, T. L. (1999). The unbearable automaticity of being. American Psychologist, 54, 462-479.

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Barnes, S., Brown, K. W., Krusemark, E., Campbell, W. K., & Rogge, R. D. (2007). The role of mindfulness in romantic relationship satisfaction and responses to relationship stress. Journal of Marital and Family Therapy, 33, 482-500. Boorstein, S. (1996). Transpersonal psychotherapy. Albany: State University of New York Press. Brown, K. W., & Cordon, S. (in press). Le sentiment de 1'existence: The phenomenological nature and emotional correlates of mindfulness. In F. Didonna (Ed.), Clinical handbook of mindfulness. New York: Springer Publishing Company. Brown, K. W., & Ryan, R. M. (2003). The benefits of being present: Mindfulness and its role in psychological well-being. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84, 822-848. Brown, K. W., Ryan, R. M., & Creswell, J. D. (2007). Mindfulness: Theoretical foundations and evidence for its salutary effects. Psychological Inquiry, 18, 211-237. Carson, J. W., Carson, K. M., Gil, K. M., & Baucom, D. H. (2004). Mindfulness-based relationship enhancement. Behavior Therapy, 35, 471-494. Creswell, J. D., Eisenberger, N. I., & Lieberman, M. D. (2008). Neurobehavioral correlates of mindfulness during social exclusion. Manuscript in preparation. Creswell, J. D., Way, B. M., Eisenberger, N. I., & Lieberman, M. D. (2007). Neural correlates of mindfulness during affect labeling. Psychosomatic Medicine, 69, 560-565. Crocker, J., & Park, L. E. (2004). The costly pursuit of self-esteem. Psychological Bulletin, 130, 392-414. Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1991). A motivational approach to self: Integration in personality. In R. Dienstbier (Ed.), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation (Vol. 38, pp. 237-288). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. Deikman, A. J. (1996). "I" = awareness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3, 350-356. Duval, S., & Wicklund, R. A. (1972). A theory of objective self-consciousness. New York: Academic Press. Eisenberger, N. L, Lieberman, M. D., & Williams, K. D. (2003, October 10). Does rejection hurt? An fMRI study of social exclusion. Science, 302, 290-292. Epstein, N. B., & Baucom, D. H. (2003). Couple therapy. In R. L. Leahy (Ed.), Roadblocks in cognitive-behavioral therapy (pp. 217-235). New York: Guilford Press. Gaertner, L., & Sedikides, C. (2005). A hierarchy within: On the motivational and emotional primacy of the individual self. In M. D. Alicke, D. A. Dunning, & J. I. Krueger (Eds.), The self in social judgment (pp. 213-239). New York: Psychology Press. Gilbert, P. (2005). Compassion and cruelty. In P. Gilbert (Ed.), Compassion (pp. 9-74). New York: Routledge. Hayes, S. C. (2002). Buddhism and acceptance and commitment therapy. Cognitive and Behavioral Practice, 9, 58-66. Kernis, M. H., & Goldman, B. M. (2006). A multicomponent conceptualization of authenticity: Theory and research. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 38, pp. 283-357). New York: Academic Press. Leary, M. R. (2002). When selves collide: The nature of the self and the dynamics of interpersonal relationships. In A. Tesser, D. A. Stapel, & J. V. Wood (Eds.), Self and motivation: Emerging psychological perspectives (pp. 119-145). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Leary, M. R. (2004). The curse of the self. New York: Oxford University Press. McAdams, D. P. (1990). The person. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Metzinger, T. (2003). Being no one. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Niemiec, C. P., Brown, K. W, & Ryan, R. M. (2006). Being present when facing death: The role of mindfulness in terror management. Manuscript submitted for publication. Nyanaponika Thera. (1973). The heart of Buddhist meditation. New York: Weiser Books. Olendzki, A. (2005). The roots of mindfulness. In C. K. Germer, R. D. Siegel, & P. R. Fulton (Eds.), Mindfulness and psychotherapy (pp. 241-261). New York: Guilford Press. Rabinowitz, J. (2006). Cultivating presence. Unpublished manuscript, Jewish Family Services, Richmond, VA. Rusbult, C. E., Verette, J., Whitney, G. A., Slovik, L. F., & Lipkus, I. (1991). Accommodation processes in close relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60, 53-78.

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Ryan, R. M. (1993). Agency and organization: Intrinsic motivation, autonomy and the self in psychological development. In J. Jacobs (Ed.), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation (Vol. 40, pp. 1-56). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. Ryan, R. M., & Brown, K. W. (2003). Why we don't need self-esteem: On fundamental needs, contingent love, and mindfulness. Psychological Inquiry, 14, 71-76. Shapiro, S. L., Schwartz, G. E., & Bonner, G. (1998). Effects of mindfulness-based stress reduction on medical and premedical students. Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 21, 581-599. Solomon, S., Greenberg, J., & Pyszczynski, T. (2004). The cultural animal: Twenty years of terror management theory and research. In J. Greenberg, S. L. Koole, & T. Pyszczynski (Eds.), Handbook of experimental existential psychology (pp. 13-34). New York: Guilford Press. Tajfel, H. (1981). Humans and social categories. London: Cambridge University Press. Teasdale, J. D. (1999). Emotional processing, three modes of mind and the prevention of relapse in depression. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 37, 53-77. Waldron, W. S. (2003). Common ground, common cause: Buddhism and science on the afflictions of identity. In B. A. Wallace (Ed.), Buddhism and science (pp. 145-191). New York: Columbia University Press. Welwood, J. (1996). Love and awakening. New York: HarperCollins.

8 Individual Differences in Quiet Ego Functioning: Authenticity, Mindfulness, and Secure Self-Esteem Michael H. Kernis and Whitney L. Heppner As stated in previous chapters, a noisy ego is a defensive, self-aggrandizing ego. People with noisy egos often have as their prime directive the protection and enhancement of a fragile sense of self and its worth. They tend to be overly aggressive and defensive, and they abhor anything that suggests they are less than perfect. In contrast, individuals with quiet egos do not gear their efforts toward constantly defending or bolstering their sense of worth. Instead, they take their sense of worth to be a given, neither needing to be constantly earned nor capable of being easily taken away. They are accepting of their weaknesses, and it takes a great deal for them to feel threatened. We believe that people with a quiet ego possess a "strong sense of self (Kernis, Paradise, Whitaker, Wheatman, & Goldman, 2000, p. 1297), that is, stable and secure feelings of self-worth (i.e., secure high self-esteem), clear and confidently held self-knowledge, and self-regulatory styles that reflect agency and self-determination. Recent research and theory (Goldman, 2004; Kernis & Goldman, 2006) indicate that authentic functioning, defined as the unimpeded operation of one's true self in one's daily enterprise (Goldman & Kernis, 2002; Kernis, 2003), is integrally tied to a strong sense of self. We believe that another aspect of healthy functioning inherent in a strong sense of self is mindfulness, the capacity to be fully present and aware in the present moment (Brown & Ryan, 2003; see also chap. 7, this volume). In this chapter, we focus on the roles that authentic functioning, mindfulness, and secure high self-esteem play in the operation of a quiet ego. We begin by presenting a multicomponent conceptualization of individual differences in authentic functioning. Next, we present research findings that associate authentic functioning with mindfulness and report the results of two studies indicating that authentic functioning and/or mindfulness relate to relatively low aggressiveness. After this, we report research findings that link daily felt authenticity with daily high self-esteem, and we end the chapter with a discussion of research that demonstrates that high authenticity relates to secure high self-esteem and that both predict relatively low levels of verbal defensiveness. Preparation of this chapter was facilitated by National Science Foundation grant BCS-0451029. 85

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Authenticity We conceptualize authenticity as "the unimpeded operation of one's core or true self in one's daily enterprise" (Goldman & Kernis, 2002, p. 18; Kernis, 2003). Kernis and Goldman (2005, 2006; Goldman & Kernis, 2002) suggested that authenticity comprises four distinct but interrelated components: (a) awareness, (b) unbiased processing, (c) behavior, and (d) relational orientation. Awareness refers to being aware of one's feelings, motives and desires, strengths and weaknesses, and self-relevant cognitions. It also involves being motivated to learn about oneself, to be aware of inherent dualities in one's personality aspects, and to have trust in one's self-knowledge. Unbiased processing involves being objective when processing information related to one's positive and negative attributes and qualities. Stated differently, it involves not denying, minimizing, exaggerating, or ignoring positive or negative self-evaluative information, regardless of whether the information is externally provided or internally generated. Behavior refers to acting in accord with one's values, preferences, and needs as opposed to acting merely to please others or to attain rewards or avoid punishments. In addition, behavioral authenticity involves the free and natural expression of one's feelings, motives, and inclinations, and sensitivity to the fit between one's self and dictates of the environment. Relational orientation involves valuing and engaging in openness and truthfulness in one's close relationships. In other words, it involves being genuine and not fake in one's close relationships and allowing close others to see the real you, both good and bad. Goldman and Kernis (2004) developed the 45-item Authenticity Inventory (Version 3 [AI-3]) to assess these four components of authentic functioning. Internal reliabilities and test—retest correlations are adequate. Moreover, correlation and confirmatory factor analyses support the view that these components of authentic functioning are interrelated yet distinct and that these interrelationships are best explained by a broad latent construct of authentic functioning (a single second-order authenticity factor model, as reported by Kernis & Goldman, 2006, along with the scale itself). Goldman (2004) examined the relation between authentic functioning and various aspects of adjustment and well-being. Table 8.1 displays the correlations between total authenticity and some of the measures he examined (also reported in Kernis & Goldman, 2006). As can be seen in the table, authenticity relates positively to life satisfaction, positive affect, self-actualization, vitality, self-concept clarity, mindfulness, and adaptive coping strategies.

Authenticity, Mindfulness, and Aggressive Behavior As noted earlier, recent theory and research link authenticity to the construct of mindfulness. Mindfulness is defined as moment-to-moment awareness (Kabat-Zinn, 1990) or as enhanced awareness and attention to the present moment (Brown & Ryan, 2003). Highly mindful people are highly aware not only of environmental stimuli, as has often been emphasized (e.g., Langer, 1989), but also of internal stimuli and aspects of self-knowledge. In addition,

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Table 8.1. Correlations Between Authenticity and Various Aspects of Psychological Functioning Psychological functioning

Authenticity

Subjective well-being Life satisfaction Positive affect Negative affect Self-actualization Vitality Self-concept clarity Self-concept differentiation Mindfulness Active coping Planning

.32** .40** -.24* .61** .23* .68** -.32** .49** .48** .31**

Note. From Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Vol. 38, Figures 3, 4, and 5), edited by M. P. Zanna, 2006, San Diego, CA: Elsevier. Copyright 2006 by Elsevier. Adapted with permission. *p < .05. **p < .01.

mindful people experience their present moments in an open and relatively nondefensive manner (Hodgins & Knee, 2002; see also chap. 11, this volume). These considerations suggest that the more mindful people are, the higher they should score on the AI-3, in particular on the Awareness and Unbiased Processing subcomponents. Indeed, recent research (Lakey, Kernis, Heppner, & Lance, in press) revealed that dispositional mindfulness, as measured with the Mindful Attention and Awareness Scale (Brown & Ryan, 2003), positively correlates with the Awareness (r = .40, p < .01) and Unbiased Processing (r = .53, p < .01) subscales of the AI-3, as well as with the total AI-3 (r = .55, p < .01). Furthermore, like authenticity, dispositional mindfulness is linked to a number of positive psychological outcomes, including lower neuroticism, depression, anxiety, and unpleasant affect, and to higher self-esteem, vitality, and self-determination (Brown & Ryan, 2003, Study 1). In addition, state mindfulness relates to higher state autonomy and pleasant affect and to lower state unpleasant affect (Brown & Ryan, 2003, Study 4). Anger and aggressive behavior often reflect an attempt to restore one's damaged feelings of self-worth after threat (Feshbach, 1970). Kernis, Granneman, and Barclay (1989) found that whereas individuals with fragile high self-esteem reported especially high tendencies to experience anger and hostility, individuals with stable high self-esteem reported especially low tendencies. These considerations suggest that one quality associated with a quiet ego is a relatively low tendency to respond to an insult or rejection with aggression. If this is true, then the greater an individual's dispositional authenticity or mindfulness, the lower should be his or her dispositional tendency toward aggressiveness. Recent research in our laboratory involving undergraduate students as participants confirmed this proposition (Heppner et al., in press, Study 1). Specifically, negative correlations emerged between the AI-3 and

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a measure of hostile attributional bias (the Hostile Attribution Bias Scale; Lakey, Kernis, Heppner, & Davis, 2005; r = -.23, p < .01), and the Aggression Questionnaire (Buss & Perry, 1992; r = -.24, p < .01). Likewise, scores on the Mindful Attention and Awareness Scale were inversely related to scores on the Hostile Attribution Bias Scale (r = -.17, p < .05) and Aggression Questionnaire (r = -.34,p