Trade Union Merger Strategies: Purpose, Process, and Performance

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TRADE UNION MERGER STRATEGIES

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Trade Union Merger Strategies Purpose, Process, and Performance

RO G ER UNDY

1

3

Great Clarendon Street, Oxford ox2 6dp Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York © Roger Undy, 2008 The moral rights of the author have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published 2008 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose the same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Data available Typeset by SPI Publisher Services Ltd, Pondicherry, India Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by Biddles Ltd., King’s Lynn, Norfolk ISBN 978–0–19–954494–3 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2

To Claire, Kim, and Ruth. And in memory of Kerry Undy.


Preface The research for this book started in 1988 when Lord (Bill) McCarthy and I were commissioned by the TUC to write a report on union mergers for the TUC’s 1989 ‘Special Review’. Between 1988 and 2007, many full-time officials with experience of union mergers cooperated in this study. In addition, a smaller number of union leaders involved me more directly in the development of some aspects of their own merger strategies. This later ‘action research’ was very helpful in improving my understanding of the complex politics of intra-union negotiations. Given that this study was firmly grounded in the Oxford School of Industrial Relations and therefore very reliant on empirical data, the above cooperation was vitally important. I am therefore heavily indebted to trade union leaders, officials, and activists who by their cooperation made the study possible. As regards academic advice and other encouragement, I am very grateful for the assistance of academic colleagues and friends at Templeton College, Oxford. But in particular I would like to thank Bill McCarthy, Rod Martin, and John Gennard for their continuing interest in my research and for their very helpful comments on an earlier draft of this book. Along with OUP’s four advisers and the commissioning editor, David Musson, they helped improve this book’s structure and content. From the trade union movement Brendan Barber and Ed Sweeney were also kind enough to comment constructively on an early draft of this manuscript. It should also be noted that over the 20 or so years of this research my family’s tradition of combining activism in the Nonconformist Church, Labour Party, and Trade Union movement helped sustain my interest and commitment to complete this longitudinal study, which for most of the time ran parallel with the usual teaching and administrative duties of a College Fellow and Business School academic. Last, the support of Templeton College and more recently of the Saïd Business School was of critical importance in helping me complete this study. Not least, the field work was largely funded out of my College and Business School allowances, while sabbatical leave gave me significant periods of time when I could concentrate on this research. Most importantly, however, both College and School provided the administrative and library support necessary for a work of this kind. In particular, Doreen Hirons played a key role in translating endless hand-written drafts of interview schedules, surveys, and chapters into readable and orderly text. Her work, over many years, was most appreciated.

R.U. 2007


Contents Tables and Figures Glossary

x xi

PART I. INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT 1. Nature and Purpose of the Study 2. Union Strategies in Context

3 22

PART II. TRANSFERS 3. Transfer Strategies

57

4. Transfer Negotiations

94

5. Transfers: Post-Merger Performance

110

PART III. AMALGAMATIONS 6. Amalgamation Strategies

133

7. Amalgamation Negotiations

169

8. Amalgamations: Post-Merger Performance

190

PART IV. CONCLUSIONS 9. Mergers: Good or Bad for Unions?

229

Appendices References Index

249 273 281

Tables and Figures Tables 1.1. All unions’ transfers of engagements and amalgamations by year 1967–2004

5

1.2. TUC mergers 1978–2004: number of TUs merging

11

1.3. TUC mergers 1978–2004: number of members merging

12

2.1. Trade unions: gaining and losing 1979–2004

34

3.1. Minor transferring unions (1978–89) (staff associations, not affiliated to TUC pre-merger)

60

3.2. Minor transferring unions (1978–89) (TUC-affiliated unions)

61

3.3. Minor unions ‘no intention to merge’ (1989) (TUC-affiliated unions)

62

3.4. Minor unions’ merger objectives (1989 and 2004)

66

3.5. Major merging unions 1979–89

77

3.6. Major unions’ merger objectives (1989 and 2004) 6.1. Amalgamations and aborted amalgamations studied

81 134

Figures 1.1. Unions in mergers: all unions (data from Table 1.1)

10

1.2. Members in mergers: all unions (data from Table 1.1)

10

1.3. TUC unions’ merger activities (data from Tables 1.2 and 1.3)

13

1.4. Balanced and dominant partner mergers under different degrees of competition

19

4.1. Dominant partner transfers under different degrees of competition

96

7.1. Balanced and dominant partner amalgamations under different degrees of competition

170

Glossary AABTD (H&M)

Amalgamated Association of Beamers Twisters & Drawers (Hand and Machine)

AACE

Association of Adult & Continuing Education

AAES

Association of Agricultural Education Staffs

AASA

AA Staff Association

AASLSA

Axis the Sun Life Staff Association

ABAS

Association of Broadcasting & Allied Staffs

ABPD

Association of British Professional Divers

ACTAT

Association of Cinematograph Television & Allied Technicians

AEEU

Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union

AEU

Amalgamated Engineering Union

AFDSC

Association of First Division Civil Servants

AFHTWFAW

Amalgamated Felt Hat Trimmers, Wool Formers and Allied Workers

AGSA

Anchor Group Staff Association

AGSRO

Association of Government Supervisors & Radio Officers

AHMIT

Association of Her Majesty’s Inspection of Taxes

ALAE

Association of Licensed Aircraft Engineers

ALCES

Association of Lecturers in Colleges of Education in Scotland

ALGUS

Alliance & Leicester Group Union of Staff

ALSCI

Association of Lecturers in Scottish Central Institutions

AMCSA

A Monk & Company Staff Association

AMICUS

(AEEU & MSF Amalgamated Union, 2002)

AMPS

Association of Management and Professional Staffs

AMPSSA

Australian Mutual Provident Society Staff Association

AMU

Associated Metalworkers Union

ANHSO

Association of National Health Service Officers

ANZBG

Australia & New Zealand Banking Group

APAC

Association of Patternmakers & Allied Craftsmen

APEX

Association of Professional, Executive Clerical & Computer Staff

APLOA

Amalgamated Power Loom Overlookers Association

APW

Association of Preparatory Workers Clerical and Computer Staff

xii

Glossary

ASBSBSW

Amalgamated Society of Boilermakers Shipwrights Blacksmiths & Structural Workers

ASJFHAW

Amalgamated Society of Journeymen Felt Hatters and Allied Workers

ASLEF

Amalgamated Society of Locomotive Engineers & Firemen

ASPBH

Association of Staff of Probation & Bail Hostels

ASTMS

Association of Scientific Technical & Managerial Staffs

ASTWKT

Amalgamated Society of Textile Workers & Kindred Trades

ATWO (B&D)

Amalgamated Textile Warehouse Operatives (Bolton & District Branch)

ATWU

Amalgamated Textile Workers Union

ATWU (Oldham)

Amalgamated Textile Workers Union (Oldham)

ATWU(SA)

Amalgamated Textile Workers Union (Southern Area)

ATWU(SS)

Amalgamated Textile Workers Union (Staff Section)

AUAW

Amalgamated Union of Asphalt Workers

AUCL

Association of University & College Lecturers

AUEW

Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers

AUEW—E

Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers—Engineering Section

AUEW—TASS

Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers—Technical Administrative & Supervisory Section

AUT

Association of University Teachers

BACM

British Association of Colliery Management

BACM etc.

British Aircraft Corporation Military etc. Staff Association

BAEA (Equity)

British Actors Equity Association

BASA

British Aerospace Staffs Association

BACOSA

Britannic Assurance Chief Office Staff Association

BALPA

British Airline Pilots Association

BASSA

British Aerospace Senior Staff Association

BCSA

British Cement Staff Association

BFAWU

Bakers Food & Allied Workers Union

BDWWWA

Blackburn & District Weavers Winders & Warpers Association

BECTU

Broadcasting Entertainment Cinematograph and Theatre Union

BESO

Bank of England Staff Organisation

BETA

Broadcasting & Entertainment Trades Alliance

BIFU

Banking Insurance & Finance Union

Glossary BNRDTWU

Burnley Nelson Rossendale & District Textile Workers Union

BNZLSA

Bank of New Zealand London Staff Association

BRTTS

British Roll Turners Trade Society

BSU

Britannic Supervisory Union

BTOG

British Transport Officers Guild

CATU

Ceramic & Allied Trades Union

CAWFGB

Cooper & Allied Workers Federation of Great Britain

CBSSA(1)

Chelsea Building Society Staff Association

CBSSA(2)

Coventry Building Society Staff Association

CC89

Cabin Crew 89

C&CTWA

Colne & Craven Textile Workers Association

CDPLOA

Colne & District Power Loom Overlookers Association

CECSSA

Church of England Children’s Society Staff Association

CERAM

Ceram Research Staff Association

CGNUSA

CGNU Staff Association

CHCC

College of Health Care Chaplains

CLSA

Corporation of London Staff Association

CMA

Communication Managers Association

xiii

CMLASFSA

Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Field Staff Association

CMSA

Clerical Medical Staff Association

COHSE

Confederation of Health Service Employees

COMMUNITY

(ISTC & KFAT Amalgamated Union, 2004)

COSESA

(No further details given)

CPSA

Civil & Public Services Association

CSMTS

Card Setting Machine Tenters Society

CSSAUL

Clerical and Secretarial Staffs Association of the University of Liverpool

CSU

Civil Service Union

CWU

Communication Workers Union

DSA

Diplomatic Services Association

EETPU

Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunications & Plumbing Union

EIGSA

Excess Insurance Group Staff Association

EIS

Educational Institute of Scotland

EMA

Engineers & Managers Association

EPIU

Electrical & Plumbing Industries Union

xiv

Glossary

ESSA

Eagle Star Staff Association

ETA

Entertainment Trades Alliance

FAA

Film Artistes Association

FBU

Fire Brigades Union

FDA (or AFDSC)

First Division Association (Civil Servants)

FTAT

Furniture Timber and Allied Trade Union

GCSF

Government Communications Staff Federation

GFTU

General Federation of Trade Unions

GLSA

Greater London Staff Association

GMA

Gas Managers Association

GMB

(GMBATU & APEX Amalgamated Union, 1989)

GMBATU

General Municipal Boilermakers & Allied Trades Union

GPMU

Graphical Paper & Media Union

GRESU

Guardian Royal Exchange Staff Union

GSA

Grindleys Staff Association

GSMA

Girobank Senior Managers Association

GULO

General Union of Loom Overlookers

HC & SA

Hospital Consultants & Specialists Association

HDHTTFS

Huddersfield & District Healders & Twisters Trade and Friendly Society

HDPLOS

Haslingden & District Power Loom Overlookers Society

HPA

Hospital Physicists Association

HSPEA

Hawker Siddeley Power Engineers Association

HVA

Health Visitors Association

IGSA

Imperial Group Staff Association

IoJ

Institute of Journalists

IPCS

Institute of Professional Civil Servants

IPMS

Institute of Professionals, Managers & Specialists

IRSF

Inland Revenue Staff Federation

ISA

Imperial Supervisors Association

ISTC

Iron & Steel Trades Confederation

IUHS

Independent Union of Halifax Staff

KFAT

National Union of Knitwear, Footwear & Apparel Trades

LBPCGW

Lancashire Box Packing Case and General Workers etc.

LHASA

Leicester Housing Association Staff Association

Glossary LPBSSA

Leeds Permanent Building Society Staff Association

LR(UK)SA

Lloyds Register (UK) Staff Association

LSAUK

Lufthansa Staff Association UK

LSEFA

Lawrence Scott & Electromotors Foreman’s Association

LSLASA

Law Society’s Legal Aid Staff Association

MARC

Management Association of Reckett & Coleman

MDSA

Ministry of Defence Staff Association

MMSA

Mercantile Marine Service Association

MNAOA

Merchant Navy & Airline Officers Association

MPOU

Managerial and Professional Officers Union

MSF

Manufacturing, Science & Finance Union

MU

Musicians Union

NACO

National Association of Co-operative Officials

NACODS

National Association of Colliery Overmen, Deputies & Shotfirers

NAEMS

National Association of Executives Managers and Staffs

NAFO

National Association of Fire Officers

NALGO

National & Local Government Officers Association

NALHM

National Association of Licensed House Managers

NAPLO

National Association of Power Loom Overlookers

NAPO

National Association of Probation Officers

NASD

National Amalgamated Stevedores and Dockers

NASPO

National Association of Senior Probation Officers

NASUWT

National Association of Schoolmasters Union of Women Teachers

NATFHE

National Association of Teachers in Further & Higher Education

NATSOPA

National Society of Operative Printers Graphical & Media Personnel

NATTKE

National Association of Theatrical Television & Kine Employees

NAYHW

National Association of Youth Hostel Wardens

NCTU

Northern Carpet Trades Union

NCU

National Communications Union

NDDBA

Nottingham & District Dyers & Bleachers Association

NDPLOS

Nelson & District Power Loom Overlookers Society

NEBSSA

North of England Building Society Staff Association

NGA

National Graphical Association

NGA(82)

National Graphical Association (1982)

NIBCAWU

North of Ireland Bakers, Confectioners & Allied Workers Union

xv

xvi

Glossary

NICE

Nationally Integrated Caring Employees

NLBD

National League of the Blind and Disabled

NORSA

Northern Rock Building Society Staff Association

NPBSSA

National & Provincial Building Society Staff Association

NSA

Nielson Staff Association

NSBGW

National Society of Brushmakers & General Workers

NSMM

National Society of Metal Mechanics

NTAWU

Nottingham Textile & Allied Workers Union

NTFMFS

National Tile Faience & Mosaic Fixers Society

NUA&AW

National Union of Agricultural and Allied Workers

NUBE

National Union of Bank Employees

NUBOM etc.

National Union of Blastfurnacemen Ore Miners Coke Workers and Kindred Trades

NUCPS

National Union of Civil & Public Servants

NUDAGO

National Union of Domestic Appliance & General Operatives

NUDBTW

National Union of Dyers, Bleachers & Textile Workers

NUFLAT

National Union of Footwear Leather & Allied Trades

NUFSO

National Union of Funeral Service Operatives

NUGMW

National Union of General and Municipal Workers

NUGSATU

National Union of Gold Silver & Allied Trades Union

NUHKW

National Union of Hosiery & Knitwear Workers

NUIW

National Union of Insurance Workers

NUIW (PS)

National Union of Insurance Workers (Pearl Section)

NUIW (RLS)

National Union of Insurance Workers (Royal Life Section)

NUIW (RS)

National Union of Insurance Workers (Refuge Section)

NUKFAT

National Union of Knitwear Footwear & Allied Trades

NULMW

National Union of Lock and Metal Workers

NULO

National Union of Labour Organizers

NUM

National Union of Mineworkers

NUMA

National Unilever Managers Association

NUMIM

National Union of Musical Instrument Makers

NUM(N)

National Union of Mineworkers (Nottingham)

NUPE

National Union of Public Employees

NUR

National Union of Railwaymen

NURMTW

National Union of Rail Maritime & Transport Workers

Glossary

xvii

NUS

National Union of Seamen

NUSC

Natural Union of Scale Makers

NUSMW etc.

National Union of Sheet Metal Workers Coppersmiths & Heating & Domestic Engineers

NUT

National Union of Teachers

NUTAW (RD)

National Union of Textile & Allied Workers (Rochdale Districts)

NUTGW

National Union of Tailors and Garment Workers

NUWDAT

National Union of Wall Coverings Decorative & Allied Trades

NWLDCTWU

North West Lancashire, Durham & Cumbria Textile Workers’ Union

NWSA

Nat West Staff Association

NWSS

National Wool Sorters Society

OPUT&AW

Oldham Provincial Union of Textile & Allied Workers

PCS

Public & Commercial Services Union

PFS

Procurator Fiscals Society

PLCWTWU

Power Loom Carpet Weavers and Textile Workers’ Union

PMBSA

PMB Staff Association

POA

Prison Officers Association

PROSPECT

(IPMS & EMA Amalgamated Union, 2001)

PSU(1)

Phoenix Staff Union

PSU(2)

Prison Service Union

PTC (or PSTCU)

Public Services, Tax and Commerce Union

RCNSA

RCN Staff Association

REOU

Radio and Electronic Officers Union

RMT

National Union of Rail, Maritime & Transport Workers

RRMA

Rolls Royce Management Association

RUBSSO

Rossdale Union of Boot, Shoe & Slipper Operatives

SALSA

Sun Alliance & London Staff Association

SARAC

Staff Association of RAC Employees

SCOP

Society of Chief Officers of Probation

SCPS

Society of Civil & Public Servants

SDACT & AWA

South Derbyshire Area and the Colliery Trades and Allied Workers Association

SFA

Springfields Foremans Association

SF & HEA

Scottish Further & Higher Education Association

xviii

Glossary

SHVA

Scottish Health Visitors Association

SIMA

Steel Industry Management Association

SIPTU

Services, Industrial Professional Technical Union (Ireland)

SLADE

Society of Lithographic Artists, Designers, Engravers & Process Workers

SLCWWA

South Lancashire & Cheshire Weavers and Winders Association

SLTWU

Scottish Lace & Textile Workers Union

SOGAT(75)

Society of Graphical & Allied Trades 1975

SOGAT(82)

Society of Graphical & Allied Trades 1982

SPOA

Scottish Prison Officers Association

SSPS

Sheffield Sawmakers Protection Society

SUKSA

Squib UK Staff Association

SUPLO

Scottish Union of Power Loom Overlookers

SWSWU

Sheffield Wool Shear Workers Union

TCOA

Telephone Contract Officers Association

TGWU (or T&G)

Transport and General Workers Union

TSA

Telecommunications Staff Association

TSSA

Transport Salaried Staffs Association

TUC

Trades Union Congress

TULO

Trade Unions and Labour Party Liaison Committee

TVFPEA

Television & Film Production Employees Association

TWSA

Thames Water Staff Association

TWU

Tobacco Workers Union

UAPLO

United Association of Power Loom Overlookers

UCATT

Union of Construction, Allied Trades & Technicians

UCW

Union of Communication Workers

UDM

Union of Democratic Mineworkers

UFAA

United Friendly Agents Association

UFFMA

United Friendly Field Management Association

UJF&KTO

Union of Jute, Flax & Kindred Textile Operatives

UKAPE

United Kingdom Association of Professional Engineers

UNiFI

(Barclays Bank Union)

UNIFI

(BIFA, UNIFI & NWSA Amalgamated Union, 1999)

UNISON

(COHSE, NALGO & NUPE Amalgamated Union, 1993)

Glossary UNITE

(AMICUS & T&G Amalgamated Union, 2007)

URTU

United Road Transport Union

USDAW

Union of Shop Distributive & Allied Workers

UTAW

Union of Textile & Allied Workers

UTW

Union of Textile Workers

WGGB

The Writers Guild of Great Britain

WISA

WISA—the Union for Woolwich Staff

WWU

Wire Workers Union

YAPLO

Yorkshire Association of Power Loom Overlookers

YHASA

Youth Hostels Association Staff Association

YSTC

Yorkshire Society of Textile Craftsmen

xix


Part I Introduction and Context


1 Nature and Purpose of the Study INTRODUCTION Trade unions in the developed world have been under considerable pressure to reform in order to combat difficulties faced since the 1980s. The source of unions’ problems has been much debated in terms of adverse external developments and the failure of unions to adapt internally to the new environment. Externally, unions’ challenges have been identified, inter alia, as globalization, increased international competition, technological change, and the decentralization of bargaining (Sverke 1997: 3). Amongst the consequences of such changes has been a marked decline in union density across most industrialized societies, with some notable exceptions in Scandinavia (Golden et al. 1999: 182–202). Various strategies have been promoted and adopted by unions in order to find an effective response to such difficulties. One of the most common has been to restructure their job territories via mergers in the hope of improving, or even transforming, union behaviour. Unions organizing across such diverse industrial relations systems as those found in Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, and the USA have followed such a strategy (Sverke 1997). In Australia, in the late 1980s, the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) instigated a merger policy with the aim of creating a small number of more efficient and effective unions (Dabscheck 1995). Similarly, one faction in the USA’s union federation, the AFL-CIO, argued in 2005 for the consolidation of smaller unions as a means, amongst other measures, of helping regenerate the dwindling labour movement in the USA (FT 2005b). Yet there are few studies of an empirical nature as noted by Michelson (2000) and Chaison (2001) which have assessed systematically the effectiveness of such a strategy, including an examination of the post-merger performance of unions. The absence of empirical evidence regarding the efficacy of mergers does not, however, deter instigators of mergers (mainly national full-time officials and some peak organizations, such as national federations) from making major claims for their merger policies. There is also a sound logic behind

4

Nature and Purpose of the Study

such rhetoric. Briefly, the core thesis is that the concentration of union members into fewer unions, especially if associated with a plan to reduce interunion competition, will enhance the new merged unions’ collective bargaining power vis-à-vis employers and the political influence exercised in relation to governments. Further, it is commonly assumed that mergers automatically produce economies of scale and therefore release more resources and funds to support other strategies: particularly, in a period of falling membership, strategies intended to increase the recruitment and retention of union members. Hence, in a period of union decline, mergers may be important aids to union regeneration. But, on the other hand, if mergers fail to live up to their advocates’ expectations, or are not primarily intended to solve the problems of membership loss, their contribution to union regeneration may be negligible or even counterproductive. For mergers absorb much time, energy, and resources and can therefore generate significant opportunity costs. This empirical and longitudinal study of British unions’ mergers aims to assess the efficacy of union mergers. In the process, it looks to develop a satisfactory explanation of the causes and outcomes of different types of mergers and analyse the performance of merged unions. Given that it may take several years for a merger to be agreed, and then several years post-merger for the new union to re-organize itself on the lines originally agreed in the merger negotiations, a longitudinal study is essential for this task. In addition the practice in Britain, and some other countries, for a small number of unions to engage repeatedly in a series of related mergers also demands a longitudinal study if the consequences of such an iterative merger strategy are to be fully appreciated. The fact that British unions have a relatively long history of merging (Table 1.1) also facilitates such a study. The central period covered by the research is 1978–2006 (with some minor references to relevant events in 2007). The causes of union mergers are studied from 1978 to 2004, with particular reference to the mergers listed in tables 1.2, 1.3 and 2.1, while the post-merger performance of unions is assessed up to 2006. This has the advantage, when union regeneration or revitalization is a major topical concern (see Frege and Kelly 2004), of covering the peak of British unions’ membership in 1979, prior to entering a period of decline which lasted from 1980 to 1998 before stabilizing from 1998 to 2006. The following findings regarding British unions’ mergers should also have resonance for unions in other developed countries; they share many of the same traits and similar choices of union strategies. Also the economic and political context influencing unions’ merger choices had common elements. Further, the frameworks developed below for analysing British unions’ mergers should also be transferable to other countries. But the factors influencing

Table 1.1. All unions’ transfers of engagements and amalgamations by year 1967–2004 (column d (): this is the number of new unions formed by the amalgamating unions) Year

1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987

a

b

c

d

e

f

g

h

No. of trade unions

No. of unions transferred

No. of members transferred

No. of unions amalgamated

Total no. of members amalgamated

Total no. of unions in mergers (b & d)

Total members in mergers (c & e)

Total membership of trade unions

606 586 565 543 525 507 519 507 470 473 481 462 453 438 414 408 394 375 373 335 330

6 6 10 13 9 11 9 7 16 13 10 9 13 12 4 8 8 16 10 32 4

8,307 48,051 43,052 90,295 129,322 92,056 28,371 26,382 35,321 58,803 16,975 14,354 17,101 22,701 8,617 122,082 63,320 101,018 41,824 50,530 7,077

9 (4) 4 (2) 2 (1) 9 (3) 8 (3) 7 (3) 7 (2) — 5 (2) 2 (1) 2 (1) 2 (1) — 3 (1) — 10 (4) 2 (1) 6 (2) 3 (1) — 2 (1)

1,198,872 437,223 12,019 1,392,383 85,540 41,078 132,182 — 202,702 58,000 1,359 43,644 — 90,534 — 1,333,125 2,000 41,284 31,702 — 118,123

15 10 12 22 17 18 16 7 21 15 12 11 13 15 4 18 10 22 13 32 (or 23b ) 6

1,207,179 485,274 55,071 1,485,678 214,862 133,134 160,553 26,382 238,043 116,803 18,538 57,998 17,027 113,235 8,617 1,455,207 65,320 142,302 73,526 50,530 125,200

10,194,000 10,200,000 10,479,000 11,187,000 11,135,000 11,359,000 11,456,000 11,764,000 12,026,000 12,387,000 12,846,000 13,112,000 13,289,000 12,947,000 12,182,000 11,593,000 11,236,000 10,994,000 10,716,000 10,539,000 10,475,000 (cont.)

Table 1.1. (Continued) Year

1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Totals 1967–2004

a

b

c

d

e

f

g

h

No. of trade unions

No. of unions transferred

No. of members transferred

No. of unions amalgamated

Total no. of members amalgamated

Total no. of unions in mergers (b & d)

Total members in mergers (c & e)

Total membership of trade unions

9 9 13 6 3 9 2 4 6 7 4 8 9 3 3 4 5 330

19,800 3,700 19,632 79,000 5,367 42,374 70,782 6,498 7,942 14,222 16,218 14,244 11,044 10,932 5,480 3,492 249,669 1,605,955

4 (2) 2 (1) 6 (3) 4 (2) 2 (1) 3 (1) — 2 (1) 2 (1) — 2 (1) 3 (1) — 2 (1) 2 (1) — 2 (1) 119 (50)

653,500 877,000 207,303 355,777 944,009 1,512,893 — 280,811 155,185 — 265,902 179,544 — 105,046 1,079,185 — 62,471 11,809,862

13 11 19 10 5 12 2 6 8 7 6 11 9 5 5 4 7 449

673,300 880,700 226,935 434,777 949,376 1,555,267 70,782 287,309 163,127 14,222 282,120 193,788 11,044 115,978 1,084,665 3,492 312,140 13,415,817

10,376,000 10,158,000 9,947,000 9,585,000 9,048,000 8,700,000 8,278,000 8,089,000 7,935,000 7,795,000 7,807,000 7,898,000 7,779,000 7,781,000 7,751,000 7,736,000 7,559,000

315 309 287 276 289a 282 260 247 241 234 220 218 221 206 196 197 195

Notes: This table has been compiled from a number of sources, including, for the period 1967–77, data from A. B. Aston’s Ph.D. Thesis ‘Trade Union Mergers in Britain 1950–82’; Certification Officer’s Reports for the period 1976–2004/5; Department of Employment Gazette (subsequently Labour Market Trends) for the period 1967– 2004/5; Research for Change in Trade Unions, Undy et al. (1981); TUC Reports; newspaper cuttings and specialist journals. The figures for the membership of the non-TUC unions, where not directly available, have been calculated from a number of sources. a In 1992, the Certification Officer treated the NUM as several different areas and branches, rather than as one union. b In 1986, 10 unions transferred to the GMB. They were all members of one federation of textile unions; hence, this transfer can be treated as 10 or 1 transfer.


7

the choice of merger partners and the processes of merging sometimes differed, as between countries, in some important respects. In particular, such considerations were affected by the legal requirements, the role of federations, and the pattern of union structure (industrial, occupational, and political divisions) as demonstrated in Waddington et al.’s study of unions’ mergers in Germany and Britain (2005). Hence, some aspects of merger activity may, as between countries, be sui generis. It is important to note this caveat, particularly as it will be argued below that the choice of merger process in Britain, between transfer (absorption) and amalgamation, plus the associated bidding for merger partners, played an important part in shaping merger outcomes. To elaborate on the above introduction and further explore the nature and purpose of the study, the remaining sections of this chapter discuss: first, the British merger process and level of analysis; second, the method of study; third, the scope and coverage of the research; fourth, the interpretative framework; and fifth, the structure of this book and some of the key findings.

THE MERGER PROCESS AND LEVEL OF ANALYSIS As mentioned above, the legal requirements, which determine the methods formally used to conclude a merger in Britain, also play a part in shaping the form and outcome of British mergers. They largely achieve such an effect by influencing primarily the choice of merger partner and the partner unions’ merger negotiations. It is important, therefore, to define and describe the legally prescribed merger options before turning to examine the research in more detail. In this study merger is treated as a generic term meaning the joining together, via a statutory procedure, of two or more unions. In Britain, such mergers are achieved by one of two methods, transfer of engagements or amalgamation. A transfer of engagements involves a union moving its membership, property, etc. from the transferor union to the transferee or receiving union. Only the transferor union is required to ballot its members, and the transfer is confirmed by a simple majority of those voting. As the transferor is normally much smaller than the transferee, transfers may also be viewed as absorptions (Chaison 1996: 5). In contrast, an amalgamation brings together two or more unions, generally of a similar size or status, to form a new amalgamated union. All the amalgamating unions are required to ballot their members and secure their approval, again by a simple majority, to the instrument of amalgamation.

8


The instrument is required either to set out the new rules of the amalgamated union or to state how the new rules will be developed. It must also indicate what rules will apply in some critical areas, such as members’ contributions and benefits. As a result, amalgamations normally require a much greater expenditure of resources and time, and involve much more complex inter-union negotiations, than the average transfer does. The following discussion therefore distinguishes, in its analysis, between transfers and amalgamations, and between the transferor (minor) and transferee (major) unions in transfers. The above statutory requirements thus ensure that a decision to merge is a deliberate choice of the unions involved. This in turn, in all the cases studied, resulted in the national leadership (and usually the full-time officials), initiating and managing the merger process. Hence, mergers may be viewed primarily as the result of national leaders exercising a strategic choice. The question as to why leaders made such a choice is therefore central to the study. From this national perspective, the causes of, and goals sought in, union mergers; the forces shaping merger negotiations; the organizational form adopted by the newly merged unions (particularly amalgamations); and the factors influencing post-merger performance will be explored. The cumulative effect of mergers on both the structure of trade unions, that is, their morphology, and the regeneration of the wider union movement will also be discussed.

METHOD OF STUDY The general approach is within the historical–institutional tradition associated with the Oxford School of Industrial Relations (see Gospel 2005: 20–6). But also, in common with some studies of business mergers and acquisitions, a broad process perspective is adopted (Larsson and Finkelstein 1999: 3) following mergers from merger search to merger outcome. Failed merger attempts and unions rejecting mergers are also included in the study: both help improve the study’s validity. The combination of research techniques employed included two surveys (addressed to general secretaries), in 1989 and again in 2004, of all the TUC-affiliated unions; a survey in 1994 of unions expressing ‘no interest’ in merging in 1989; some 60 formal interviews plus telephone enquiries; and participatory action research involving leading full-time officials and lay activists (the action research initially involved work with Lord McCarthy for the TUC’s special review in 1989, and subsequently, in the late 1990s, consultancy work for four unions contemplating mergers). Further material was also provided by postgraduate students’


9

dissertations 1 (supervised by the author) and primary documents and papers provided by merging unions. SCOPE AND COVERAGE OF THE RESEARCH The research focus is on mergers involving unions affiliated to the Trades Union Congress (TUC), Britain’s pre-eminent peak union organization, and concluded between 1978 and 2004. However, it is important to note briefly that such mergers may be seen as an integral part of a longer merger movement stemming from the relaxation of legislation governing mergers in 1964 (Undy et al. 1981: 168). The magnitude of the longer merger movement may be gauged by scanning down Table 1.1 (all union mergers). As can be seen, there was continuous merger activity between 1967 and 2004 composed mainly of transfers, each involving relatively small numbers of members, punctuated by amalgamations affecting much larger groups of members. Over this 38-year period, 449 mergers were concluded including 330 transfers and 119 amalgamations. In total, some 13.4 million union members were involved in mergers, of which almost 12 million participated in amalgamations. These reduced the 119 amalgamating unions to 50 new unions. An appreciation of the trend and scale of all union mergers (1967–2004) is best gained, however, from Figures 1.1 and 1.2 (based on data in Table 1.1), which, following Waddington (1995), show the percentage of unions merging in the form of moving averages. Figure 1.1, based on the percentage of unions involved in mergers (transfers plus amalgamations), that is, merger intensity, shows that year on year there was little variation in the percentage of unions involved in mergers (the bulge in the mid-1980s was composed of a number of unrelated and ‘exceptional’ block transfers of unions). Turning to the percentage of union members involved in mergers, Figure 1.2 shows, in contrast to Figure 1.1, that there was much greater variation in the percentage of union members merging, that is, the density of merger activity. The direct cause of the marked increases in members affected, as demonstrated in Figure 1.2, was a small number of mega amalgamations (involving a million or so members). British unions were therefore clearly 1

Over the period of the study four students reading for the University of Oxford’s M.Sc. in IR and HRM completed dissertations that focused on individual union’s merger strategies. Also an M.Phil. student completed a dissertation examining the causes of union mergers. All worked under the author’s supervision. The five dissertations (Little 1991; Sadiq 1994; Hodges 1994; Ben-Yehuda 1997; Theodoridis 2000) and the associated research provided much useful data regarding, in particular, the GMBs, BIFU’s, IPMS’s and UNIFI’s merger strategies. This work was much appreciated by the author and is given due recognition (cited) when quoted in the text.

10

Nature and Purpose of the Study 10%

Merger intensity

8%

6%

4%

2%

0% 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002

Year

Figure 1.1. Unions in mergers: all unions (data from Table 1.1) Note: All unions’ five-year moving average of merger intensity 1967–2004.

in the habit of merging well in advance of the problems they experienced as membership and union density declined in the adverse environment of the 1980s and 1990s. As for the TUC unions, the total number of TUC unions transferred and amalgamated between 1978 and 2004 was 225, as shown in Table 1.2. The total 10%

Merger density

8%

6%

4%

2%

0%

1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002

Year

Figure 1.2. Members in mergers: all unions (data from Table 1.1) Note: All unions’ five-year moving average of merger density 1967–2004.


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Table 1.2. TUC mergers 1978–2004: number of TUs merging Year

a No. of TUC unions

1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995d 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total

112 112 109 108 105 102 98 91 88 87 88 78 76 74 72 70 68 67 73 75 74 77 76 70 70 69 70 —

b No. of TUC unions transferred 2 4 4 1 6 3 7 3 11 (or 2b ) 1 1 — 1 2 — 3 (1)c 2 1 1 1 1 4 2 2 2e 3 68 (or 59) f

c d e No. of TUC unions No. of non-TUC Total of unions amalg. (no. of new unions transferred merging with TUC unions formed) to TUC unions unions (b + c + d) — — — — 6 (3) — 2 (1) 3 (1)a — 2 (1) 2 (1) 2 (1) 4 (2) 4 (2) 2 (1) 3 (1) — 2 (1) 2 (1) — 2 (1) 3 (1) — 2 (1) 2 (1) — 2 (1) 45 (21)

6 8 7 2 2 4 8 7 1 3 5 7 12 3 2 5 1 — 4 6 3 6 4 1 1 2 2 112

8 12 11 3 14 7 17 13 12 (or 3) 6 8 9 17 9 4 11 1 4 7 7 6 10 8 5 5 4 7 225 (or 216)g

Notes: This table has been compiled from a number of sources, including Certification Officer’s Reports; Department of Employment Gazette (subsequently Labour Market Trends for the period; Research for Change in Trade Unions, Undy et al. (1981); TUC Reports; newspaper cuttings and specialist journals. The figures for membership of the non-TUC unions, where not directly available, have been calculated from a number of sources. The EETPU, although excluded from the TUC in 1989 and 1990, is included in this table for the whole period. a This figure includes all three parts of the NUM which merged to form the UDM. b The transfers in 1986 involved a federation of textile unions to the GMB. There were 10 textile unions involved. This merger may therefore be categorized as 1 or 10 transfers. c This was a ‘nominal’ merger only. It involved the Yorkshire Area of the NUM transferring to the NUM. d In 1995 the TUC clarified (and relaxed) the process by which applications for affiliation to the TUC were treated (TUC, General Council Report, 1995, p. 144). e These were nominal mergers only. They involved the Midlands & Yorkshire areas of NACODS transferring to NACODS. f and g The number of transfers vary from 69 to 60 and the total unions merging from 214 to 205, depending on the categorization of the federation of textile workers transfer to the GMB in 1986.

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Table 1.3. TUC mergers 1978–2004: number of members merging Year

a No. of TUC members

1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total 1978–2004

11,865,390 12,128,508 12,172,508 11,601,413 11,005,984 10,512,157 10,082,144 9,855,204 9,585,729 9,243,297 9,126,911 8,652,318 8,416,832 8,192,664 7,786,885 7,647,443 7,298,262 6,894,604 6,790,339 6,756,544 6,638,986 6,749,481 6,745,907 6,722,118 6,685,353 6,672,815 6,423,694 —

b c d e No. of No. of TUC No. of non-TUC Total no. of TUC members in members joining union members members amalgamations TUC unions involved in TUC transferred by transfer transfers and amalgamations (b, c, & d) 2,481 10,300 3,533 2,092 116,979 55,665 87,255 34,526 42,000 1,922 13,000 — 16,701 73,338 — 36,114 — 6,107 1,363 6,127 13,997 10,044 7,326 10,432 5,330 — 247,661 804,293

— — — — 1,330,066 — 40,784 31,702 — 118,123 653,500 877,000 205,303 355,777 944,009 1,512,893 — 280,811 155,185 — 265,902 179,544 — 105,046 1,079,185 — 62,471 8,197,301

11,834 6,574 18,898 6,167 5,103 7,155 8,000 4,626 5,007 5,155 5,482 3,699 3,000 750 3,542 5,216 300 — 5,264 8,095 2,221 6,355 3,218 500 150 4,492 2,008 132,811

14,315 16,874 22,431 8,259 1,452,148 62,820 136,039 70,854 47,007 125,200 671,982 880,699 225,004 429,865 947,551 1,554,223 300 286,918 161,812 14,222 282,120 195,943 10,544 115,978 1,084,665 4,492 312,140 9,134,405

Notes: This table has been compiled from a number of sources, including Certification Officer’s Reports; Department of Employment Gazette (subsequently Labour Market Trends); Research for Change in Trade Unions, Undy et al. (1981); TUC Reports; newspaper cuttings and specialist journals. The figures for membership of the non-TUC unions, where not directly available, have been calculated from a number of sources.

for all unions merged in the same period was 284. Hence, the TUC’s unions accounted for 79% of all mergers concluded between 1978 and 2004. Moreover, the TUC unions’ dominance of mergers, by reference to the number of union members involved, was even more pronounced. As can be seen in Table 1.3, the number of union members affected by TUC mergers between 1978 and 2004 was 9,134,405, that is, 97% of the total (9,368,872) for all unions.


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14% Intensity (1986 = 12) Intensity (1986 = 3) Density

12%

Merger activity

10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0% 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Year

Figure 1.3. TUC unions’ merger activities (data from Tables 1.2 and 1.3) Note: TUC unions’ five-year moving average of merger intensity and density 1978–2004.

Over the 1978–2004 period, as Figure 1.3 reveals, there was considerable divergence between the proportion of TUC unions, as against members, merging. For, the mega amalgamations completed in 1992 and 1993 and again in 2002 produced sharp upward movements in the line plotting trends in the density of merger activity. The reasonably consistent rate of mergers completed by TUC unions at between 7% and 13% over the 1978–2004 period (see line plotting merger intensity) therefore contrasts sharply with the rate at which union members were merged: the latter (merger density) varied between 1% and 10% in the same period. The TUC’s unions were much more prone to agree a transfer than an amalgamation: as shown in Table 1.2 transfers accounted for 80% (180) of all the 225 mergers listed. Transfers from non-TUC unions (112) to TUC unions exceeded the (68) transfers between TUC unions. In total, 180 transfers resulted in 937,104 members joining other unions. Amongst these were 132,811 trade unionists brought under the orbit of the TUC via the transfer of 112 non-TUC unions to TUC-affiliated unions. The average size of non-TUC transferring unions was 1,200. Such unions rarely had more than 5,000 members (only five unions, or 5%, exceeded 5,000). The TUC’s transferring unions were, on average, larger, but they still tended to be amongst the smallest of the affiliates. Their average size was 11,800. However, 29 (43%) of the TUC’s transferring unions had fewer than 5,000 members (see Appendix 1 for a list of all transfers to TUC unions

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1978–2004). Thus, it can be readily seen that merger by transfer was largely, but not solely, reserved for use by relatively small or minor unions. These transfers were largely covered in the research by the two surveys. But in some important cases the larger transferor unions’ leaders were also interviewed and the relevant papers scrutinized. In common with Australia (Michelson 2000: 113) and Canada (Yates and Ewer 1997: 139), a small number of large or major unions had a disproportionate effect on mergers by transfers or absorptions. In total, some 30 transferee unions in Britain were responsible for absorbing almost all transfers between 1978 and 2004. Further, at the end of 2004 just three transferee unions, and their antecedents involved in previous mergers, absorbed the great majority, that is, 136 or 76% of transfers listed in Table 1.2 and an even higher proportion of union members transferred, that is, 817,000, or 88%. The three leading transferee unions absorbing transfers were AMICUS, a union with its roots in engineering and the recruitment of craftsmen (86 transfers); the GMB, initially a general & municipal workers’ union (31 transfers); and the T&G, grounded in transport but also sharing the GMB’s interests in general workers (19 transfers). By 2006 all three were conglomerate unions competing for membership across much of the private sector. In order to arrive at the total number of cumulative transfers absorbed by the leading three merger unions between 1978 and 2004, genealogical trees were developed for each union (see Appendix 3). For example, AMICUS’s total of 86 transfers is composed of 40 concluded by the ASTMS & MSF (white collar unions), 29 by the EETPU/AEEU (electrical & engineering unions), 12 by UNIFI (banking & finance union), and 5 by AMICUS itself. A study of Britain’s recent merger movement, as regards transfers, is therefore largely a study of the above three unions and their antecedents. All three, and the more important of their antecedents, were therefore periodically reviewed over the research period and each figures prominently in the following chapters. Turning to amalgamations, these as noted above generally involved the TUC’s larger unions. For example, the average size of the smaller of the amalgamating unions between 1978 and 2004 was 110,000, and that of the larger partner 295,000 (see Appendix 2 for a list of the TUC’s amalgamations 1978–2004). Only 4 out of the new 20 amalgamated unions formed in this period had less than 100,000 members post-merger. Yet in the TUC, at its peak in 1980, only 27 of its 109 member unions had more than 100,000 members. In this study, 10 of the 21 amalgamations involving TUC unions concluded between 1978 and 2004 are covered in depth. These include the biggest four amalgamations and an even spread of unions in the private and public sectors (see Table 6.1). In total, the 10 amalgamations included in the study accounted


15

for some 6.6 million members or 79% of all those involved in amalgamations between 1978 and 2004. The largest amalgamation between 1978 and 2004 was that which formed UNISON (1,512,893), predominately organizing in the public sector in 1993. This just exceeded in size the formation of AMICUS (1,144,211), the largest private-sector amalgamation, in 2002. AMICUS’s partner unions (AEEU and MSF), in contrast to UNISON’s (COHSE, NALGO, and NUPE), were long practised in the art of merging. Both the leaders of the AEEU and MSF had concluded a high number of transfers and been involved in previous amalgamations. For example, the AEEU itself was formed from the AEU (engineering) and EETPU (electricians and plumbers) amalgamation in 1992, which also created a union of over 1 million members. Similarly the GMB, a conglomerate union, had experience of amalgamations. Its amalgamation (958,000 members) in 1982 with the Boilermakers signalled its determination at the time to enter the ‘merger market’ after failing to secure a number of earlier mergers. Subsequently, its agreement to amalgamate with APEX (clerical workers and computer staff) in 1989, creating an 877,000strong union, ranked high in terms of the number of members involved. Further, in 2007, two of the leading merger unions, AMICUS and the T&G, amalgamated to form UNITE and hence concentrate some third of the TUC’s membership in one union. This merger does not figure large in this study, but its potential contribution to British unionism is briefly discussed in the final chapter. Other amalgamations covered include, in chronological order, the formation of the printing and paper union combining SOGAT(82) and NGA(82) to form the GPMU (301,147) in 1991; the civil servants unions (IRSF & NUCPS) forming PTC (169,987) in 1996 and subsequently PTC & CPSA combining to form the PCS (265,943) in 1998; the formation of UNIFI (179,544) in banking and finance in 1999 from BIFU, UNiFI, and NWSA, and the amalgamation of the technical and civil service union (IPMS) and the engineering managers (EMA) to form PROSPECT (105,759) in 2001. In addition, two abortive amalgamations, involving the GMB and T&G in 1994 and IPMS and MSF in 1998, are examined.

INTERPRETATIVE FRAMEWORK Students of union mergers have tended to concentrate on the causes of mergers and the merger process. In examining the causes of mergers, some researchers have taken a long-term view and examined the pattern of mergers, and associated merger waves (Buchanan 1974; Waddington 1995). Such an

16


approach may be combined with case studies. Others, examining the causes and the processes of mergers, have tended towards a series of case studies, or a particular case, for example, Morris (1986) and the banking unions. Yet others have made cross-country comparisons. Perhaps the best known of these is Chaison’s study of national profiles of mergers covering the USA, Canada, Britain, Australia, and New Zealand (1996). Two or more country comparisons, for example, Canada and Australia, have also been drawn by Yates and Ewer (1997) and Britain and Germany by Waddington et al. (2005). The research method adopted—primarily relying on either aggregated data or case studies—has influenced the emphasis given to the explanatory factors. This has resulted, as noted by Michelson (2000: 107), in students emphasizing the importance of either external or internal factors in their explanations of mergers. As could be predicted, given the different primary research methods, students putting aggregated data at the forefront of their research have tended to give greater weight to external factors. For example, Waddington (1995) in arguing that British trade unions in 1966 embarked on a third merger wave stressed the effects of economic cycles on merger trends. There are, however, very significant difficulties in correlating trends in mergers, as expressed in waves, with changes in the external environment. For tables of mergers, such as that compiled for Table 1.1, record the year the merger was legally consummated, not the year that the unions concerned, possibly under pressure, directly or indirectly, from changes in their environment, decided to seek a merger. As will become evident later in this study, it is a matter of research and interpretation of the evidence, as to the date when a union decided to launch a merger search. Some unions might take one or two years and others a decade or more from the decision to merge and the date of consummation. This study does not therefore use the aggregated data to correlate merger trends with general changes in the merging unions’ environments. The interpretative framework adopted in this study, therefore, falls largely in the internal factors camp and emphasizes the crucial role played by unions’ national leaders in shaping merger strategy. However, external factors are not ignored. It is clear that changes in a union’s environment may act directly on the union leadership, or be filtered through the union’s decision-making processes, to prompt questions of merger. For example, loss of members due to the changing composition of the workforce, or changes in a union’s job territory because of the actions of a competitor union, may have this effect. Both could also act indirectly on the union by adversely affecting its financial well-being. Some small unions involved in transfers were particularly prone to such externally generated pressures. On the other hand, larger unions


17

with a merger habit frequently needed no such external prompting to pursue a merger. Leaders in such unions proactively sought incoming transfers as part of a standing and ‘taken-for-granted’ merger policy. In contrast, in small potential transferor unions previously rejecting a merger, the election, defeat, or retirement of a general secretary could change the course of merger activities: the new general secretary could reverse policy and initiate a transfer policy. Hence, while external factors may play an important part in prompting unions to merge, they do not, of themselves, determine mergers. This is dependent on the leadership considering the options and choosing to respond to such developments by merging. An understanding of the role of agency, as exercised by the union’s national leadership, is therefore essential for an examination of the causes, processes, and outcomes of mergers. To facilitate such an analysis, leaders are perceived in this study as acting in a rational manner when pursuing mergers. That is, the leader is taken as wanting a particular outcome—a merger—in preference to another outcome, for example, retrenchment. Such a decision is arrived at following some kind of cost–benefit analysis. Associated calculations may also lead to the choice of a particular merger partner and shape the consequent form taken by the newly merged union. This is not to argue, however, that the leaders’ rational choice is objective and necessarily economic in nature. As will be shown, union leaders, in making such choices, are bounded by their organizational and institutional context and culture; their own experiences and abilities; and potentially, their vested interests. Further, in assessing whether or not to merge, and in determining which union to merge with, union leaders’ rationality is concerned with means and ends. The associated restructuring, in both transfers and amalgamations, starts primarily with issues of job territory, including membership, but, in some cases, particularly amalgamations, it extends into other areas of union behaviour. This is captured, following Undy et al. (1996: 7–9), by reference to the leaders’ concerns to protect or improve three dimensions which combine to form the union’s own world. As described in the qualified contingency model developed in 1996 (Undy et al. 1996), these are the political, democratic, and administrative dimensions of the union. Political, in this sense, refers to the main objectives and means of trade unions. It covers the union’s ideological position and its approach to industrial relations, both procedural and substantive components, and its political affiliations. Democratic dimensions include the union’s democratic ethos and its structure of government. Administration is to do with the efficient management of the union and particularly its financial well-being. However, different groups in the union, for example, lay members (including activists) and the full-time officials, may differ in their

18


views as to which dimensions of union behaviour should be revised and in what way. The leadership in merger negotiations will have to take this into account or face possible rejection of the proposed merger. The content of merger negotiations is therefore multifaceted and not centrally concerned with achieving some objectively justified economic outcome. Further, because of the potential for principals (activists and members) and agents (full-time officials) clashing over proposed adjustments in the above dimensions of union behaviour and associated issues, questions of ‘moral hazard’ may also be pertinent. Hence, in addition to the above territorial, political, democratic, and administrative dimensions, attention is also paid to a merger’s potential for changing union leaders’ (and full-time officials’) careers and associated employment interests. If this appeared particularly significant in shaping the merger process or outcome it is discussed by reference to the ‘leaders’ imperatives’. The nature of the cost–benefit calculations will also vary case by case, depending on a number of factors. In particular, it will be contingent on the type of merger (transfer or amalgamation), the relative size of the merging unions, and their experience of merging. In the case of amalgamation, or the transfer of a relatively large union, there may well be a formal assessment of the costs and benefits. In contrast, if the receiving or major union involved in a transfer has an institutional predilection to merge, then it may conclude that the incoming transfer of a minor union warrants no more than a cursory assessment. Further, as regards ‘merger search’, path dependency may largely determine the choice of merger partner(s). For once a union has a history of merger activity, or closely associated unions have chosen to merge, a pattern of mergers may be institutionalized and therefore become very hard to reverse (Pierson 2000: 252). As will be demonstrated a major union could over time therefore absorb a number, or cluster, of unions of a similar kind. The result, it will be argued, was to produce three merger streams composed of minor or transferor unions. In each stream, the minor unions showed similar territorial origins and strategic goals. These are categorized as geographic concentration, cognate trade, and white-collar assimilation streams. At the next stage of the merger process, the achievement of the goals set by the sophisticated or rudimentary cost–benefit analysis rests on the merger negotiations—both inter- and intra-union. For if talks break down the particular merger is aborted, although the rejected union may find an alternative partner. Further, the form of the merged union resulting from the negotiations may have a very significant impact on the consequent merged union’s performance. Hence, merger negotiations are a critical area of study. Broadly, merger negotiations, freely entered into by the potential merger parties, are


19

EFFECTIVE COMPETITION QUADRANT 4: Balanced Partner Mergers with some degree of effective competition

QUADRANT 1: Dominant Partner Mergers with some degree of effective competition

A) TRANSFERS: No transfers

A) TRANSFERS: Most white collar assimilation and cognate trade transfers

B) AMALGAMATIONS: No amalgamations

B) AMALGAMATIONS: NUGMW & ASBSBSW (GMBATU 1982) GMBATU & APEX (GMB 1989)

BALANCED PARTNERS

DOMINANT PARTNERS

A) TRANSFERS: No transfers

A) TRANSFERS: Geographic concentration & minority of white collar assimilation & cognate trade transfers

B) AMALGAMATIONS: SOGAT(82) & NGA(82) (GPMU 1991) AEU & EETPU (AEEU 1992) COHSE, NALGO & NUPE (UNISON 1993) IRSF & NUCPS (PTC 1996) CPSA & PTC (PCS 1998) AEEU & MSF (AMICUS 2002)

B) AMALGAMATIONS: BIFU, UNiFI & NWS (UNIFI 1999) IPMS & EMA (PROSPECT 2001)

QUADRANT 3: Balanced Partner Mergers with little or no effective competition

QUADRANT 2: Dominant Partner Mergers with little or no effective competition

NO EFFECTIVE COMPETITION

Figure 1.4. Balanced and dominant partner mergers under different degrees of competition

viewed as ‘integrative’ or win-win negotiations (Walton and McKersie 1965). The subsequent differences in problem-solving behaviour are taken as significantly influenced by the relative size and status of the merging unions and the degree of competition, from other unions, for the ‘hand’ of the particular partner. In brief, the negotiations between partner unions of a similar size and status are classified as ‘balanced partner’ negotiations and those between partners which differ significantly in size and status as ‘dominant partner’ negotiations. Balanced and dominant partner mergers are also further divided according to the degree of competitive bidding, affecting their negotiations. This is presented in Figure 1.4, which is used in Chapters 4

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and 7 to structure the analysis, respectively, of transfer and amalgamation negotiations. Finally, in viewing mergers primarily as the product of leaders’ bounded rational choices, it is also important to place them in perspective, so as to appreciate the significance of mergers in shaping union behaviour in general. This is achieved by setting the mergers in their wider environmental context and noting the merging unions’ use of other complementary strategies. For, as will be shown, unions negotiating mergers were also capable of pursuing a range of other strategies to help improve their position vis-à-vis government, employers, and union members. Nevertheless, some commentators have suggested that mergers primarily served to divert union resources away from attempts to regenerate trade unionism in general. As Dabscheck put it, in criticizing the centrally led drive for mergers in Australia, mergers caused unions to ‘turn in on themselves’ (1995: 135). This latter criticism is considered in the concluding chapter by reference to unions’ post-merger performances.

THIS BOOK’S STRUCTURE The next chapter, in concluding Part I, sets the scene for the following study of union mergers by describing the historical and environmental context and the changing state of British unions between 1978 and 2006. It also discusses unions’ use of non-merger strategies that were primarily developed to combat a general deterioration in their condition over this period. As for the rest of this book, it is divided into Part II: Transfers, Part III: Amalgamations, and Part IV: Mergers: Good or Bad for Unions? In Part II, examining transfers, Chapters 3, 4, and 5 discuss, respectively, transfer strategies, transfer negotiations, and transfers’ post-merger performances. Care is taken to distinguish between transferors’ (minor unions) and transferees’ (major unions) strategies and performances. The role of the leading merger unions in determining the pattern of transfers (and the subsequent competitive market for transfers) is emphasized. In Part III, Amalgamations, a similar structure is adopted, with Chapter 6 considering amalgamation strategies, Chapter 7 amalgamation negotiations, and Chapter 8 amalgamations’ post-merger performances. In discussing amalgamation negotiations, it will be seen that balanced partner amalgamations provided the partner unions with particular opportunities and challenges that marked them out as very different to transfers and dominant partner amalgamations in both character and transforming potential.


21

In conclusion, in Part IV: Mergers: Good or Bad for Unions?, the relative contribution of transfers and amalgamations to partner unions’ performances is evaluated. The reasons why some merger strategies and negotiations were more productive than others are also explored. Further, the implications of mergers for the wider union movement are discussed. It will be argued that while transfers generally benefited the transferor, if not the transferee, amalgamated unions had significant difficulties in delivering the gains sought by their protagonists. Partly, but not wholly, due to these difficulties British unions’ mergers proved to be ineffective vehicles for union regeneration.

2 Union Strategies in Context INTRODUCTION Before examining unions’ merger strategies for the period 1978–2006, it is important to set unions’ merging and non-merging strategies in their context. Such contextualization helps identify both externally generated threats and opportunities, and the often associated internal difficulties union strategies were intended to meet. It also serves to highlight how changes in the environment over time influenced the aims and the subsequent efficacy of such strategies. ‘Strategies’, in relation to unions, are taken as being composed of reasonably cohesive, consistent, and integrated actions used to generate and support a policy. Strategies may also be written and formal, and resemble a corporate strategic plan. Some of Britain’s largest unions had such formal strategies at different points over the period 1978–2006. For example, the Manufacturing Science & Finance Union’s (MSF’s) strategic plan in 1993, titled ‘MSF into the 21st Century’, included six strategic goals and a reference to future mergers. More common, however, amongst the smaller unions was a broad understanding of the union’s strategy, without it being formally articulated in a policy or strategy paper. Following Mintzberg (1987: 66–75), such unions will be taken as having ‘realized’ strategies that may be discerned from the pattern of behaviour displayed when pursuing a particular issue or resolving some perceived problem. Hence, strategies of both the ‘realized’ and formally prescribed kind will be examined in this chapter. In setting the context for the examination of the pattern, purpose, and outcomes of union mergers, the rest of this chapter is structured as follows. First, the unions’ external environment will be examined by reference to economic, political, and social factors, followed by an assessment of the policies and actions of employers (including managers acting as employers). Second, the changing state of trade unions will be assessed by reference to their political standing, membership, finance, and bargaining power. Third, unions’ strategies for dealing with the other major actors in

Union Strategies in Context

23

the industrial relations environment, that is, government, employers, members, and employees will be considered. In conclusion, the development of unions’ strategic capability and the nature of their strategic choices will be discussed.

UNIONS’ EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT The influences on union behaviour discussed in this section are, for heuristic purposes, treated as exogenous to trade unions as organizations. However, it is necessary in this longitudinal study to qualify such a device. For the unions themselves contributed much, even if unintentionally, to the difficult circumstances in which they found themselves. In particular, unions’ rejection of the incomes policy devised by the Labour government in the later 1970s, and the consequent large-scale strikes that combined to form the ‘Winter of Discontent’ in 1978–9, had a most damaging economic and political ‘fallout’ which ‘is difficult to exaggerate’ (McCarthy 1992: 39). Even in the new millennium, the shadow cast by the ‘Winter of Discontent’ still blighted union and the New Labour government’s relationship, following New Labour’s electoral defeat of the Conservatives in 1997 (Undy 2002: 638). Further, the manner in which unions responded to the changed environment in the period, for example, the failure of the miners’ strike in 1984–5 to reverse government policy on pit closures, served to undermine unions’ influence in general in both industrial and political spheres, as it demonstrated that even Britain’s most powerful union could not succeed by the force of industrial action. Nevertheless, despite these caveats, it is by examining in turn the economic (largely the labour market), political, and social factors at work in this period, and the employers’ exploitation of an environment which encouraged the reassertion of the managerial prerogative, that the size of the challenge faced by the unions can be best understood. Economic and particularly labour market changes were generally detrimental to trade unions throughout the period. By the mid-1990s, they had helped reduce markedly both the job territories traditionally occupied by trade unions and the degree of influence national unions could exercise over employees’ terms and conditions of employment. Initially changes in the economic cycle, and subsequently more secular labour market developments, generally undermined trade union organization. The ‘worst economic recession of the post-war years’ (Kessler and Bayliss 1998: 39) ran between 1979 and 1981, as the first Thatcher government turned its back on incomes policy and

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sought to reduce an inflation rate of some 10% by adopting a tight monetary policy. The resulting unemployment reached a peak of 3.2 million (12%) in 1984. Unemployment fell below 2 million between 1987 and 1990. However, there was another recession in 1989–92, and unemployment again reached 3 million in the early 1990s. The latter figure probably underestimated the degree of unemployment in 1990–3, as the means of calculating the number of unemployed were changed some 30 times in ways that largely reduced the headcount (Lindsay 2003: 555). Since 1993, the economy has become much more stable. The gross domestic product (GDP) grew in each consecutive quarter (Lindsay 2003: 551), that is, between 1993 and 2003 there were no recessions. Further, inflation reduced and settled at 2 percentage points either side of 2.5% over this period (the Bank of England’s target). Nevertheless, unemployment remained at around 5%: an unemployment figure similar to that of the mid1970s (Lindsay and Doyle 2003: 47). However, by 2002 there were considerably more people in employment: 27.9 million in 2002 as against 22.6 million in 1979. Yet trade union membership that stood at some 13 million in 1979 dropped continually year on year from 1980 to 7.8 million in 1998 after which it stabilized around 7.7 million to 7.5 million in 2004 (see Table 1.1). Union membership therefore fell both during cyclical contractions of employment and for much of the longer-term expansion of employment. The cyclical reductions in employment in the early 1980s and 1990s disproportionately reduced employment in male-dominated industries, particularly manufacturing. As these were the most heavily unionized parts of the private sector, it was not surprising that union membership was adversely affected by such developments. But it was secular trends in the composition of employment that had the most damaging effect on union organization. As discussed by Nolan and Slater (2003: 58–80), the contours of the British labour market were subject to radical changes in sectoral, occupational, gender, and non-standard forms of employment between 1978 and 2003. Summarily, during the deindustrialization of Britain, manufacturing experienced an almost continual loss of employment. In the 1980s and early part of the 1990s, it lost around 3% per annum. Between 1995 and 2000, it lost 0.6% per annum (IER 2001: 12). In combination, between 1978 and 2000, manufacturing, construction, mining, energy, and water lost around 3.5 million jobs. Services, in direct contrast, gained some 5 million jobs over the same period, from 15.5 million to almost 21 million employed. Moreover, for unions looking for some reversal of such trends the outlook was bleak. It was forecast that manufacturing’s share of employment—at 24.5% in 1981 and 17.8% in 1991—would continue to fall (IER 2001: 15).


25

Occupational structure followed the industrial transformation in undergoing radical change. In broad terms, managerial, professional, technical, and personal service occupations all expanded between 1981 and 1999 while skilled trades declined. The combined managers and senior officials, professional and associated professionals, and technical occupations expanded from 27.7% (6.8 million) in the share of occupations in 1981 to 36.8% (10.1 million) in 1999, skilled trades declined from 17.4% (4.3 million) in 1981 to 13.7% (3.7 million) in 1999 (IER 2001: 32). Amongst the growth in non-manual occupations, there was also a relatively marked expansion, between 1992 and 1999, in long-established private-service jobs (such as sales assistants, receptionists, and hairdressers) while health, education, and caring occupations also expanded (Nolan and Slater 2003: 66). Where such jobs were largely associated with the public sector—the increasing professional and managerial workers being a case in point (Nolan and Slater 2003)—it was not all ‘bad news’ for the unions as they had 59% density in the public sector in 2004. However, the expansion of private services did not coincide with an increase in union membership: in 2004 there was only some 17% unionization in the private sector (DTI 2005: 1). Associated with the above structural adjustments were changes in individual and workplace-related characteristics. In particular, there were pronounced changes in the gender composition of the workforce. In 2002, female employment stood at a record high of 12.9 million, 45% of total employment (Duffield 2002: 605). This compared with some 10 million women in employment in 1978 (Bower 2001: 108). As the recession of the early 1980s petered out women’s employment grew rapidly between 1983 and 1990. It reached around 12 million in 1990 and another 843,000 were added between 1990 and 2000 (Bower 2001). At the same time, as women became more economically active men’s activity rate declined. Women’s activity rate increased from 60% to 73% between 1978 and 2000, while men’s rates dropped from around 90% to 84% in the same period (Twomey 2001: 93). Moreover, the expansion of women’s employment was very much concentrated in the growing service industries. Between 1990 and 2000, female employment in services grew by 1.2 million. By 2000, about 90% of women’s jobs were in this sector and of these around a third of employed women were in public administration, education, and health. As with the above changes in industry and occupations, the growth in women’s employment did not auger well for trade unions which, even at their peak membership in the late 1970s, were not noticeably successful in recruiting women. In 1978, women’s density was 38%, while for men it stood at 63% (Waddington 1992: 293). By 1990, 30% of the female labour force were in trade unions, and male density had declined at an even faster rate to 36%

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(Beatson and Butcher 1993: 676). The position had deteriorated even further for trade unions in 2003 when, despite seeing the year-on-year fall in aggregate membership halt in 1998 with a minor increase to 7.155 million, union density for women and men reached the same figure, that is 29%. In 2005, union density amongst women marginally exceeded that for men: 29.1% compared to 28.5% (DTI 2005). This adjustment in gender ratios appears to owe more to the above restructuring of labour markets and occupations than it does to either changes in women’s propensity to join unions or unions’ adoption of more women-friendly policies and structures (see Kirton 2005; Sayce et al. 2006). Parallel with the above changes was an increase in non-standard patterns of employment. In particular, part-time work expanded rapidly. In 1984, it accounted for around 21% of all jobs. By 2003, it had increased to 26% (McOrmand 2004: 26; Nolan and Slater 2003). Clearly, the expansion noted above in service industries raised demand for part-time workers. As noted by Cully et al. (1999: 32), in wholesale and retail, hotels and restaurants, and education and health, there was by 1998 a high proportion (around 40%– 55%) of workplaces where part-time workers constituted a majority. Women, in this workplace-based study, held 81% of the part-time jobs in the private sector and were mainly low skilled. Such women employees may appear to be in need of union representation, but they remained generally unorganized (Cully et al. 1999: 86). Finally, as regards the key economic and labour market factors influencing union behaviour in this period, globalization also undermined national trade unions. Indeed, some authorities examining union decline across large parts of the industrialized world focused on globalization—or increased economic integration—as the major, if indirect, contributor to the loss of unions’ influence and hence membership (Golden et al. 1999: 196). In this context, governments were encouraged to embrace free market ideologies and abandon policies aimed at managing demand. Instead supply-side policy was preferred. As a result, corporatism and regulation of the labour market were rejected, while more flexible labour markets were encouraged and unionization discouraged. Additionally, employers in globalizing corporations similarly undermined union power by directly threatening, or actually moving, production and services to other countries, if unions in existing plants or offices obstructed or resisted cost-cutting measures. In their analyses of such adverse structural developments in twelve countries, Golden et al. concluded that it was unions in Britain and the USA that were most disadvantaged by such developments. As indicated above, political and social factors in Britain interacted with more general economic developments, to produce between 1978 and 1997


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an industrial relations climate particularly antipathetic to trade unionism as compared with the rest of Europe. This owed much to the electoral successes of the Conservatives, who won four consecutive elections between 1979 and 1992. The failure of the Labour government and trade unions to secure agreement on incomes policy and the consequent extensive and damaging strikes in the ‘winter of discontent’ in 1978–9 gave the Conservatives the ideal platform for popularizing their proposed regulation of trade unions in the interest of the public good and a free labour market. Following their election success in 1979, Conservative governments rapidly moved to introduce what would be the first of seven pieces of legislation regulating trade unions. Incrementally, over the period 1980 and 1993, Conservative governments restricted union’s ability, inter alia, to engage in strikes, recruit members, take secondary industrial action, organize closed shops, collect members’ subscriptions, and elect leading national union officials in a manner of their own choosing. Also, perhaps even as significantly as the legislation, the Conservatives successfully backed the National Coal Board in its year-long conflict with the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) in 1984–5. This demonstrated to all unions the determination of the Thatcher-led government not to suffer the same fate as the previous Conservative government which ‘lost to the miners in 1974’ (Adeney and Lloyd 1986: 2). As well as helping change the balance of power between employers and unions by legal intervention and displaying employer resolve in the public sector, the Conservative governments also sought to diminish trade union’s role in society. Specifically, they dismantled the institutional frameworks that promoted tripartism and cooperative relationships between government, employers, and unions: one surviving exception was the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS). Union leaders were also largely removed from quangos and other bodies where the government had influence. Unions, in 1984, were also identified as ‘the enemy within’ by Mrs Thatcher. All such actions were ideologically as well as economically grounded. For Mrs Thatcher was influenced in her policymaking by the writings of Hayek who identified unions as not only economic liabilities but also ‘anti-social and unethical because they (fed) liberal illusions such as solidarity or the notion of social justice’ (McCarthy 1992: 54). Also, as early as the 1987 general election, the Labour Party had started to question seriously how a future Labour government would relate to the trade unions. At the time, the Labour Party was still dependent on the trade unions for 71% of its total income and 94% of its 6 million members affiliated via the trade unions (Webb 1992: 15–18). Nevertheless, as trade unions became less influential in their own sphere of industrial relations, Labour was under less pressure to include them in their deliberations. Compared to the 1970s,

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there was clearly little political mileage for Labour in claiming to be the party that could best deal with the unions. In these circumstances, a close observer of the 1987 election (later one of Tony Blair’s team of advisers at 10 Downing Street) claimed Labour, in 1987, ‘. . . saw the unions as a positive disadvantage’ (Bassett 1991: 315). Labour’s traditional view of the unions’ political cachet had therefore changed when, rebranded as New Labour, it won the 1997 general election. Further, prior to this electoral success, a programme of modernization had reduced the trade unions’ constitutionally prescribed role inside the Labour Party. These reforms included removing the union’s direct financial support of MPs and reducing the union’s share of the Party Conference vote to 50% as compared to 90% in the 1970s (Seyd and Whiteley 2001: 74). Hence by 1997 the trade unions had significantly less influence over New Labour’s policymaking processes. Nevertheless, most unions were committed to New Labour’s internal reforms and in the search for an end to Conservative rule worked with the Party’s modernizers to produce an ‘electable’ New Labour Party (Ludlam 2001: 114). The result in 1997, 2001, and 2005 was the election of three New Labour governments which adopted and continued an economic policy much more aligned than previous Labour governments to a deregulated labour market. New Labour also retained much of the Conservative’s legislation that restricted both unions’ organization of industrial action and the processes unions used for the election of their national leaders. ‘Fairness not favours’ was the slogan New Labour adopted to describe its ‘even-handed’ approach to industrial relations issues and legislation. The aim was partnership at work while avoiding ‘over burdensome regulation’ of the labour market (Blair 1998: 3). New Labour’s ‘fairness not favours’ industrial relations policy did not, however, prevent the unions gaining significant advantages under the New Labour governments. In the first period of office, in particular, the unions made procedural and substantive gains. Procedurally, while not resurrecting formal tripartism, New Labour invited the trade unions to join numerous bipartite bodies (unions and employers) including the low-pay commission (overseeing the introduction of the national minimum wage) and the plethora of Task Forces, including the Competitiveness Advisory Group Task Force, established by the DTI. The TUC and leading trade union officials were given ready access to ministers, and on some issues, the Prime Minister (Undy 2002: 643–4). After the 2001 election, the government also created a public service forum through which ministers would discuss the reform of public services with the relevant trade unions. Moreover, just prior to the 2005 election, the ‘Warwick Agreement’, negotiated in July 2004, offered further advantages to the trade unions. As New Labour sought to


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maximize the trade unions’ electoral support for the forthcoming election, it promised improvements in working conditions, pensions, and public services (TULO 2005). Substantively, the TUC listed, in 1999, 26 new individual and collective rights gained after the 1997 election. Perhaps most importantly the Employment Relations Act 1999 improved the position of trade unions and employees in a number of critical areas. In particular, trade union claims for employer recognition for collective bargaining received statutory support. Workers were also given the legal right to be accompanied in discipline and grievance procedures. Protection for trade union members involved in lawful industrial action and threatened with dismissal was also extended. Further, in signing up to the EU’s Social Chapter, New Labour accepted a number of directives of potential advantage to the unions. Amongst such directives, the European Workers Council Directive was extended to the UK and subsequently in 2003 the government, if reluctantly, prepared to transpose the EU’s national level Information and Consultation Directive to the UK (DTI 2003). Thus, although the TUC complained, with good cause, that the New Labour government ‘systematically minimised the effect of the EU instruments at the stage of transposition into UK law’ (TUC 2001: 31), the industrial relations legal environment was changed in the unions’ favour by a series of union and employee ‘friendly’ innovations following New Labour’s successes in the 1997 and 2001 general elections, with more promises of improvements following the 2005 election. Outside of traditional union interests, New Labour’s enthusiasm for both supply-side solutions to the UK’s economic problems and social partnership between employers, employees, and trade unions further encouraged unions to adopt new roles at work and in wider society. The National Skills Task Force, the National Advisory Council for Education and Training, and Investors in People all found willing trade union participation. Building on the learning agenda, the TUC was instrumental in establishing a ‘pivotal role’ for itself and its member unions in raising skill levels and increasing access to learning (TUC 2000: 74). Financially, the TUC benefited from some £1.5 million of government funding for each of three years for its Learning Services Project. Individual unions also sought funding from the Union Learning Fund, often in cooperation with employers. By 2001, just over 200 union projects had drawn on the fund and a further £7 million had been allocated by the government for 2001–2. Parallel with the above developments the DTI’s ‘Partnership at Work Fund’, aimed at developing better employment relations at all levels and building trust in the workplace, was established in 1999 and it sponsored its first projects in 2000, drawing on £1.2 million of government funding. This again

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promoted union involvement in new areas, although initiatives that had employer and employee, but not union involvement, were also supported. However, unions were predominant in cooperating in this programme. In the first round of 33 projects, individual unions, or the TUC, participated in 24 (73%). By summer 2003, there had been some 160 projects costing £5 million. In 2004, a more controversial government initiative promised more direct financial support to trade unions. The proposed ‘trade union modernization fund’ was tabled as part of the government’s amendments to existing labour legislation. It was envisaged to be worth between £5 million and £10 million, spread over several years, starting in 2005 or 2006. In particular, the government was looking for trade unions to use the fund to train union representatives in the areas of business and people management, review internal union organization, and improve communication with members. Not surprisingly, the proposal was criticized by employers’ organizations (FT 2004b). New Labour’s general approach to the public sector, the last remaining stronghold of trade unionism, was, in contrast, a continuing source of conflict between unions and the New Labour governments. Most notably privatization—the private finance initiative, the public–private partnership, and the private-sector provision of public services—was the cause of union and government disagreements. The extension of privately provided services into the National Health Service brought the government and public-sector trade unions into regular verbal, if not industrial, conflict (Undy 2002: 650). Moreover, government attempts to raise the normal retirement age of publicsector workers from 60 to 65 further aggravated union and government relations in 2005 (FT 2005a). The role of employers in the period also changed, particularly between 1979 and 1997, when they increased their influence and discretion vis-àvis trade unions. The aim of Conservative governments’ labour legislation to ‘weaken trade union power, to assert individualist rather than collective values and to reassert (the) employer prerogative’ (Dickens and Hall 1995: 236) set the tone for the period. As a major employer (29% of employees were in the public sector in 1979 and 20% in 1996 (Kessler and Bayliss 1998: 133)), the Conservatives also set the tone by adopting a hostile stance towards public-sector trade unions. Trade unions were derecognized in some parts of the public sector, encouragement for public-sector employees to join the appropriate union was removed from the civil service staff handbook, the consultative role of trade unions was reduced, and collective bargaining rights were withdrawn from some public-sector employees (Kessler and Bayliss 1998: 132–8).


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The private sector saw the growth of the specialist employee relations manager and the rise of human resource management. These developments ran parallel with a more unitarist view of employee relations and an increased emphasis on direct communication to employees: ‘There was a major shift (between 1980 and 1988) from channels involving representatives . . . to channels where employees communicated directly with management, largely on occasions and on terms set by management themselves’. (Millward et al. 2000: 135). Employers’ preference for such an individualistic approach reflected their lack of commitment to joint regulation as the institutional structure supporting joint regulation withered between 1980 and 1997. Also ‘declining support from management (for union representation) accentuated the fall (in union membership) in the 1980s as the closed shop was progressively curtailed by legislation and fewer managements strongly encouraged (union) membership’ (Millward et al. 2000: 228). Even the previously highly unionized engineering industry was affected. By 1998, only 19% of workplaces in engineering recognized trade unions, compared to 65% in 1980. Unions had particular difficulties in gaining recognition in foreign-based companies and newer workplaces. Further, derecognition of trade unions (6% of workplaces) was more common than new recognition (4% of workplaces) between 1990 and 1998 (Millward et al. 2000: 97–106)—a period when the Conservatives’ repeal of union recognition legislation no doubt facilitated such action by anti-union employers. Finally, as regards managers’ treatment of trade unions in the private sector, there was a ‘dramatic shift from union to non-union representatives between 1980 and 1998’ (Millward et al. 2000: 114). It is difficult to see how such a change could have occurred without active management promotion of non-union representation: in which case such representatives’ ability to act as an alternative to trade unions as an independent collective voice was questionable. After the election of the New Labour government in 1997, employers tended to moderate their attitudes and policies towards trade unions. The EU’s social policy and the government’s political, if cautious, rehabilitation of trade unions also assisted unions looking to build or retain their relationship with employers. For example, the retail giant Tesco saw its union partner, USDAW, as a useful ally in approaching government on issues related to the retail industry. Also some employers that had been contemplating derecognizing unions adopted a more positive policy and sought union and employer partnership agreements after New Labour took office (Undy 2003: 282). After 1997, therefore, the new political and associated legislative environment caused at least some employers to reflect on their industrial relations policies and adjust them in the unions’ favour.

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The external environment in which unions sought to organize was therefore largely a source of difficulties for trade unions. Most noticeably, in the period up to 1997, the economic, political, and social developments conspired against unions’ traditional interests, and employers were not inclined to miss the opportunities provided to alter their relationship with the unions. Even when the government changed in 1997, New Labour was not minded to restore the kind of legal framework and corporatist institutions that had existed at the height of unions’ influence in the late 1970s. How this affected key aspects of trade unions will be explored in the following section.

STATE OF THE UNIONS From 1978 to 2006, British trade unions underwent a number of radical changes, many of which were directly and indirectly related to the shifts in the external environment examined above. As will be shown later, such developments affected aspects of unions’ strategic choices, including the option of merging and the choice of merger partner. The most important of these changes will now be briefly discussed by reference to the unions’ political standing, membership and finance, and bargaining power. The unions’ political standing probably underwent the most radical change in the shortest time. In less than a decade, trade unions moved from a position in 1978 of national prominence and influence—in some eyes, they were the ‘Fifth Estate’ (Taylor 1978)—to virtual exclusion from the corridors of power by 1990. By the mid-1980s, they were being denigrated by a government which had consistent public support (as expressed in general elections and in public opinion polls) for its anti-union legislation (Undy et al. 1996: ch. 4). For the TUC and the larger unions accustomed to a close, if not always harmonious, relationship with government, this required a reassessment of their political role. Further, the election of New Labour in 1997 did not offer an easy solution to the trade unions’ political predicament. New Labour’s continued support for a deregulated labour market and privatization, and its call for unions to cooperate constructively with employers in partnership fashion, required the unions and the TUC in particular, to reflect on what strategies should be adopted for dealing with both government and employers. Union membership also suffered in this period, as the economic and political changes noted above adversely affected trade unions’ traditional job


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territories. Aggregate union membership peaked at 13.2 million in 1979, but the above changes helped produce, between 1979 and 2004, a fall of over 40% in union membership. In terms of density by reference to employees, it declined from 54% in 1979 to 29% in 2004: density in the private sector dropped to 17% while in the public sector it remained relatively high at 59% in 2004 (Grainger and Crowther 2007). As British unions have primarily tended to recruit in either private- or public-sector territories, the above decline in aggregate membership affected some unions more than others. Table 2.1 records changes in union membership following the peak in 1979 by reference to 34 trade unions affiliated to the TUC which had a continuous existence over the 25-year period to 2004. The 34 unions accounted, in 2004, for 94% of the TUC’s affiliated union members and 52% of individual affiliated unions (most of the remaining 32 unions joined the TUC after 1979). In calculating changes in membership between 1979 and 2004, changes in membership associated with antecedent merger partners have been taken into account. In the case of ‘losing’ unions, all members gained by such antecedent mergers have been calculated by reference to their 1979 membership figures. For instance, ‘UNISON’ membership in 1979 is the sum of NALGO’s, NUPE’s, and COHSE’s membership in 1979 (these were the three unions forming UNISON in 1993). This figure is then compared with the membership of UNISON in 2004 and used to calculate the percentage loss of UNISON’s membership between 1979 and 2004. For ‘gaining’ unions, the figures recorded for 1979 do not include any merger gains. Rather, the actual gains made by merger are noted in column 1. For example, it is noted in column 1 that the AUT (University lecturers) added 2,500 members via mergers, while the figures given for the AUT’s membership in 1979 and 2004 are those actually recorded in the TUC’s report for both years. As can be seen from Table 2.1, just 9 (27%) of the 34 unions listed increased membership between 1979 and 2003. But eight of these achieved growth even when mergers are discounted (mergers largely accounted for the FDA’s (top level civil servants) increase in membership). Of the nine ‘gainer’ unions, six were in the public sector, and of these, four were teacher unions. The three other ‘gainers’ BALPA (airline pilots (+76%)), EQUITY (actors (+29%)), and WGGB (writers (+32%)) were all private-sector unions. Further, along with the POA (prison officers (+67%)), and the FDA (+36%) they may also be defined as ‘niche’ unions. That is, they were all recruiting in a segment of job territory largely sheltered from competing unions and delivering a tailormade service to a clearly defined membership. A combination of niche union and an expanding, or at least not contracting, job territory enabled them to

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Table 2.1. Trade unions: gaining and losing 1979–2004 (including mergers) (Primary source: TUC Reportsa and ∗ indicates merger unions) Trade union (A) ‘Gaining’ trade unions NASUWT (teachers) BALPA (pilots) ∗ POA (prison officers) (3,233 from mergers) ∗ AUT (university teachers) (2,500 from mergers) ∗ FDA (civil servants) (3,788 from mergers) WGGB (writers) Equity (actors) ∗ EIS (teachers) (∗ 2,000 from mergers) ∗ NATFHE (teachers) (1,331 from mergers) (B) ‘Losing’ trade unions NUT (teachers) ∗ UNISON (general workers) HCSA (hospital consultants) MU (musicians) USDAW (retail & distribution workers) ∗ CWU (postal workers & telecom engineers) ∗ PROSPECT (scientists & engineers) CSMTS (textile workers) ∗ PCS (civil servants) ASLEF (train drivers) ∗ BFAWU (bakers) ∗ BECTU (broadcasting & film technicians) TSSA (railway managers) ∗ GMB (general workers) ∗ T&G (general workers) NUDAGO (engineers) ∗ AMICUSb (general workers) UCATT (building trades) ∗ RMT (railway & shipping workers) ∗ Community (general workers)

Size 1979–2004

Percentage gain/ Percentage loss

Primary sector 2004 Pub./Priv.

122,058–223,486 4,428–7,778 20,469–34,119

+83% +76% +67%

Pub. Priv. Pub.

30,880–46,954

+52%

Pub.

8,368–11,390

+36%

Pub.

1,623–2,142 27,688–35,610 48,479–54,269

+32% +29% +12%

Priv. Priv. Pub.

64,786–66,880

+3%

Pub.

253,142–239,796 1,657,926–1,301,001 3,756–2,922 41,550–31,283 470,017–331,703

−5% −22% −22% −25% −29%

Pub. Pub. Pub. Priv. Priv.

369,175–258,696

−30%

Pub./Priv.

150,142–105,044

−30%

Pub./Priv.

130–88 443,302–295,063 24,478–15,001 44,221–25,823 53,986–26,192

−32% −33% −39% −42% −52%

Priv. Pub. Priv. Priv. Priv.

69,573–31,034 1,388,061–600,106 2,093,281–816,986 5,500–2,011 3,320,472–1,200,000 347,777–110,886 227,046–67,476

−55% −55% −61% −63% −64% −68% −70%

Priv. Priv./Pub. Priv./Pub. Priv. Priv./Pub. Priv. Priv.

267,498–62,471

−77%

Priv. (cont.)


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Table 2.1. (Continued) Trade union CATU (ceramic workers) BACM (coal mining managers) ∗ GULO (textile workers) NACODS (coalmining deputies) NUM (coal miners)

Size 1979–2004

Percentage gain/ Percentage loss

Primary sector 2004 Pub./Priv.

42,523–9,973 17,160–3,580 2,410–265 19,146–610

−77% −79% −89% −97%

Priv. Priv. Priv. Priv.

253,142–3,042

−99%

Priv.

Private sector = Priv.; public sector = Pub. The TUC figures may in some cases understate an affiliated union’s total membership. This downward adjustment, as compared to figures reported to the Certification Officer, may be prompted by unions’ concerns to exclude retired, unemployed, and student members (who often pay little or no subscriptions) from their TUC affiliation figures: hence reducing their TUC affiliation fees. However, the above figures should provide a reasonable estimate of the percentage change in core or paying membership between 1979 and 2004, assuming unions did not radically change their manner of calculating their TUC affiliation in this period. b The figure for AMICUS membership in the TUC’s 2004 report did not include the gains made by the 2004 transfer of UNIFI and the GPMU. The figure of 1,200,000 was the TUC figure for 2005 which did include the UNIFI and GPMU transfers.

a

sustain and increase membership even in the anti-union environment of the period. Amongst the 25 (73%) ‘losing’ unions, the losses ranged from −5% for the NUT (teachers) to −99% for the NUM (coal miners). Generally, unions recruiting in the public sector, or primarily in the public sector, suffered less severely than those in the private sector. For example, at the lower end of membership loss (seven unions losing 30% or less members) five were public sector or public/private sector unions. Unions organizing in the recently privatized sectors, amongst other territories, had mixed experiences. Some, such as UNISON, recruiting in gas, water, and electricity, maintained a relatively strong position post-privatization (47% union density in general across all three industries in 2004: Grainger and Crowther 2007). On the other hand, job losses were so large in some privatized industries that unions recruiting solely in the affected industry, albeit with high density, were decimated. For example, the three coal mining unions suffered such a fate. The NUM lost 99%, NACODS 97%, and BACM 79% of their 1979 membership. The miners’ strike 1984–5, followed by a series of pit closures leading to privatization, and the breakaway of the Union of Democratic Mineworkers (UDM) based in the Nottinghamshire coalfield, left the NUM in a parlous state. In these circumstances, both the NUM and BACM unsuccessfully sought mergers (the NUM had extended but abortive talks with the T&G between 1990 and 1992,

36


while BACM in 1993 almost concluded a merger with the EMA (engineering managers in power stations)). A number of unions that actively sought and successfully concluded mergers also figured amongst the unions losing a high percentage of members between 1979 and 2004. Most noticeably, three of the leading merger unions of the period, GMB (−57%), T&G (−61%), and AMICUS (−64%), were among such unions. Similarly, three unions formed out of amalgamations in the public sector, that is, UNISON, CWU (postal workers and telecom engineers), and PCS (civil servants) all lost members albeit in the lower 22%–33% range. In the PCS’s case much of the fall was probably due to the reduction in civil servants’ jobs in the 1980s and 1990s before expanding again in the new millennium. Subsequently, in 2005–6, the GMB, T&G, and AMICUS, all recruiting in similar if diverse job territories, entered into merger talks. The GMB withdrew in 2006, but in 2007 the T&G and AMICUS amalgamated to form ‘UNITE’, which organized some 30% of the TUC’s total membership. Despite the increase noted previously in women’s employment in private services and the expansion of white-collar jobs covering managerial, professional, and technical occupations, the larger unions recruiting such employees in the private sector did not figure in the ‘gaining’ list. For example, USDAW, the shop workers and distribution union which, in 1979, had 290,000 (61%) women members out of 470,000 members, only had 196,000 (59%) women out of 331,000 in 2004; over the period it lost 29% of its membership in total. The MSF, which helped form AMICUS in 2002, also did not flourish in this period when it could have been expected to gain from the expansion of white-collar jobs, as noted above. It started the period with some 490,000 members in 1979 (when it was ASTMS) and despite adding a further 300,000 by mergers, its membership still fell by 50% between 1979 and its merger with the AEEU in 2002. Outside of the effects of industrial and occupational restructuring, and the increase in women’s employment, the age of union membership also came to exercise trade unions. As the TUC noted in 1998, ‘Workers under 25 years old remain half as likely as the average worker to hold a union card’ (TUC 1998b: 65). However, levels of union membership (among the young) have always been comparatively low (Payne 1989: 111). In 1983, less than 25% of employees aged 16–19 years were in trade unions. But, as union density declined in general, union membership amongst workers aged younger than 20 years dropped to just 6% (Sneade 2001: 437). At the other end of the age scale, retired members also caused concern amongst some unions. Unions which had traditionally either charged very low subscriptions to retired members, or given them free membership, found


37

that they had a growing proportion of such members. In some cases, such members had the right to be active in the union, for example, in UNIFI (banking and finance) pensioner members were entitled to stand for the national executive committee of the union. Further in the GPMU (printing, paper, and publishing), they also had a number of benefits, while paying no subscriptions. In 2003, prior to agreeing a merger with AMICUS in 2004, the GPMU closed its retired members’ section. Unfortunately for the unions, many of them had not secured a sound financial position during the years of growth in the 1970s. Even in this early period, many drew on investments to fill the gap between subscription income and expenditure (Willman 1990: 318). Hence they found themselves in greater financial difficulties as membership fell. For example, a survey of 60 unions by the TUC in 1990 found that aggregated expenditure exceeded aggregated income by some £5 million. Among those in financial trouble were two of Britain’s biggest unions, the T&G and the AEU (engineers) (Labour Research 1992: 9). In 1995, things were a little better as aggregated union income at £79.3 million was marginally higher than aggregated expenditure at £76.6 million. But this was only after the three largest unions—the T&G, AEU, and GMB—amongst others had reduced staff very substantially to cut costs (Kessler and Bayliss 1998: 173). In the later 1990s, there was some further improvement as the largest 10 unions had an aggregated surplus in 1998 of £16.6 million. However, several large unions had had to cut back costs, mainly employment related, to secure this improvement (Labour Research 2000: 18). Nonetheless, financial difficulties returned to threaten several large unions, including the MSF, GMB, GPMU, and UNIFI between 2001 and 2004. Of these, the GMB was the most severely affected. It recorded a £17 million deficit in 2003 (FT 2004a). Its position was much improved, however, in 2005 after another round of redundancies. In the same year, the financial position of most of the TUC’s largest unions also improved as gross income was increased by 3.5% and gross expenditure reduced by 7.2% (Labour Research 2006: 7). Hence, unions’ financial fortunes varied widely between 1979 and 2006, as they adjusted their costs and subscriptions in the light of falling and then stabilizing membership figures. Unions’ bargaining power was, not surprisingly given the above developments, much weakened after 1979. As predicted by the dependency theory of bargaining power (Martin 1992: ch. 2), once the other key actors in industrial relations, that is the government and employers, perceived themselves as no longer reliant, or less reliant, on trade union cooperation to achieve their objectives, union power was reduced. Following the example set by the Conservative government, many employers also found that they had a ‘better alternative to negotiating agreements’ (BATNA) with trade unions (see Fisher

38


and Ury 1981: 101 for a discussion of the BATNA). The alternative to negotiating, or bargaining collectively, was unilateral employer action, possibly after discussing their intentions with employees or their growing number of nonunion representatives. Some indication of the degree to which bargaining power moved in the direction of the employer can be gauged by reference to changes in bargaining structure and industrial action. Bargaining coverage—the proportion of employees (or workplaces) whose terms and conditions are determined by collective bargaining—fell from 64% of workplaces (with 25 or more employees) in 1980 to 42% in 1998 (Machin 2000: 631–45). The total of employees whose pay was so determined was just 33% in 1998 (Brown et al. 2000: 614) compared to over 60% in 1979. Perhaps most tellingly, even in workplaces where unions were still recognized for bargaining purposes, ‘the proportion of workers covered by collective bargaining declined from 86% in 1984 to 67% in 1998’ (Brown et al. 2003: 203). Parallel with these developments bargaining scope also diminished: ‘In particular there was a substantial increase in the proportion of unionised workplaces where pay bargaining was not taking place’ (Millward et al. 2000: 168). In addition, Brown et al. (2000: 619) concluded that ‘Workplace union activity is much less concerned with the control of work than twenty or thirty years ago’. Another contributory factor reducing union influence over basic terms and conditions of employment was the demise of multi-employer bargaining and, therefore, national agreements. In 1984, such agreements helped determine pay in 41% of workplaces, by 1998 only 13% were covered by multi-employer agreements. In the public sector, the decline in the coverage of national agreements was particularly steep. In 1984, 82% of public sector workplaces had pay determined at the national level; by 1998, this had dropped to 39% (Millward et al. 2000: 194). Local level pay determination replaced many of the national agreements in the public sector. As a consequence, public-sector trade unions had to service negotiations across many more bargaining units, rather than in one or two set piece national negotiations. Last, it is worth noting the remarkable fall in strikes between 1979 and 2004 as a further indicator of the decline in union power. Apart from a surge in working days lost due to strikes in 1984 (27 million days lost), almost entirely due to the year-long miners’ strike, since 1980 working days lost have been consistently below the level of the 1970s. In the 1970s, the annual average days lost due to strikes was 12.9 million (29 million in the year of the ‘winter of discontent’). In the 1980s, this dropped to 7.2 million and in the 1990s to 6.6 million (Wrigley 2002: 42). In 2003, there were just 0.5 million days lost (this was after a minor revival in strike days in 2003 to 1.3 million (Monger 2004: 235)). As regards the number of strikes: in 1979, the ‘winter of discontent’,


39

there were 2,125 strikes and in every year in the 1970s there were more than 2,000 strikes. By the end of the 1980s, the number of strikes had fallen to 781 in 1988 and 701 in 1989. From 1990 (630 strikes), there was an almost continual year-on-year fall in the number of strikes. The lowest point was reached in 2003 with just 133 strikes (Monger 2004: 236). To conclude: the state of British unions generally deteriorated between 1979 and 1997 on three measures, political standing, membership, and bargaining power. Between 1997 and 2005, there was some improvement in political standing, following New Labour’s election victories, and the continual fall in aggregated union membership experienced since 1980 levelled out in 1998. Also between 1979 and 1998, a small number of unions proved exceptions to the general rule and actually increased membership. In contrast, there was little sign of a resurgence of bargaining power by 2006. Further, many unions were frequently in and out of financial difficulties throughout the whole period. How unions responded strategically to the above changes will be examined in the next section.

UNION STRATEGIES Union strategies will be discussed by reference to unions’ political and industrial objectives and means as expressed in both their formal strategies and in their behaviour towards other key actors in industrial relations, government, employers, union members, and employees as potential members. Unions’ strategy towards government was, and is, traditionally coordinated by the TUC. However, when the Labour Party is in power a second channel of influence into the Labour Party is also open to affiliated unions: the TUC itself is not affiliated to the Labour Party. Initially following the election of the Conservatives in 1979 the unions were largely united in their vocal opposition to the new government and in particular to its proposed labour legislation. After the Conservatives won a second consecutive election in 1983, the TUC reflected on its adversarial stance in a debate at the 1983 Congress under the heading ‘TUC Strategy’ (TUC 1983: 470). In a heated debate, which exposed the rift between militant and moderate unions, Congress explicitly rejected ‘industrial action designed to overthrow a democratically elected government’ (TUC 1983: 479). The TUC also agreed to re-engage in a dialogue with the Conservative government. Subsequently, the failure of the miner’s strike in 1984–5 helped to reinforce the ‘New Realism’ that first surfaced at the 1983 Congress. Also, the changing composition of the TUC’s affiliated membership,

40


most noticeably the increase in representation of white-collar workers, helped the shift towards moderation (Taylor 1987: ch. 5). As union membership continued to fall and the Conservative Party continued to win general elections, the TUC regularly reviewed its strategies. In particular, each time the Labour Party failed to make significant inroads into the Conservative vote, the TUC reflected on the failure of its latest initiative to reverse its declining fortunes. In one such period of introspection, a ‘Special Review Body’ reported (1988 and 1989) on different aspects of TUC policy. Crucially, it was later concluded that the TUC should seek to establish unions as ‘strong sound partners in a successful economy’ (TUC 1992: 3). This theme was further developed following the election of John Monks as general secretary of the TUC in 1993 and the ‘Re-launch of the TUC’ in 1994 (Heery 1998). Following such deliberations, the TUC sought to promote unions as ‘partners in progress’, that is, ‘not part of Britain’s problems but part of the solution to Britain’s problems’ (TUC 1997b: 1). This shift in emphasis was an integral part of the TUC’s ‘New Unionism: The Road to Growth’ agenda presented to the TUC’s 1996 Congress. The success of the Irish TUC in helping turn round the Irish economy was cited in support of this latest initiative. As Heckscher has argued, albeit in respect of the USA’s trade unions (Heckscher 2001: 62), in the flexible and competitive labour markets of the period, unions had to be perceived as contributing to the common good and not just their own sectional interest if they were to recommend themselves to society at large. In Britain, this was also very important to New Labour as it sought to distance itself from ‘Old’ Labour and therefore from ‘Old’ unions. Hence, under the title ‘New Unionism’, social or industrial partnership was presented by the TUC as its means of persuading New Labour that the ‘government, unions and employers (should) work together in jobs, investment, training and Europe’ (TUC 1999: 3). Social (or industrial) partnership was a strategy intended to shape both union–government and union–employer relationships. Moreover, the TUC was confident it would resonate with existing and potential union members who did not identify with the rhetoric of struggle, strike and strife in today’s world of work (TUC 1999: 8). The TUC looked to the New Labour government to respond to its partnership initiative. This would have ideally involved the introduction of tripartite structures formally bringing the unions back into the government’s decision-making process. However, New Labour had little interest or incentive to provide such a structure. Indeed, it was not until after the 2001 election that anything approaching such a formal arrangement was organized and this forum was limited to the public sector. Hence, the kind of formal political rehabilitation sought by the TUC from New Labour failed to materialize.


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Social partnership, as the key to union–government relations, was therefore seen by some unions as less than satisfactory. This dissatisfaction found expression in the unions’ use of the second channel—direct to the Labour Party—to criticize the New Labour government. A number of unions on the militant wing of the trade union movement also sought to exert pressure on the New Labour government by withdrawing support from the Labour Party. The FBU (firefighters) disaffiliated from the Labour Party in 2004. In the same year, the RMT (railways) was expelled from the Labour Party for supporting alternative, more left-inclined, political parties. And the CWU (postmen) threatened to cut its funding for the Party in 2004 unless it gave a commitment to keep the Post Office in state ownership. Prior to this, a group of centre-left general secretaries, representing Britain’s four biggest unions—UNISON, AMICUS, T&G, and GMB—earned themselves the title of ‘awkward squad’ by combining to inflict several defeats on policy issues which the government supported at the 2003 Labour Party Conference (The Times 2003b). The almost unanimous union support for the New Labour government of 1997 had therefore started to unravel by the 2005 general election. The emergence of several centre-left and left-wing leaders in the late 1990s and new millennium, including Simpson (AMICUS), Woodley (T&G), Curran (GMB), Hayes (CWU), and Serwotka (PCS), also made it more difficult to sustain the social partnership strategy in relation to government. Aspects of New Labour’s policies, particularly the transposition of European social policy and the reform of labour legislation and, most importantly, issues related to public sector and privatization, brought the government into repeated disagreements with Britain’s largest unions. Not surprisingly, in 2004, and following the election in 2003 of a new general secretary of the TUC, Brendan Barber, the TUC launched another ‘Strategic Review’. Individual unions’ strategies towards employers were also reviewed in the above climate. Obviously, traditional collective bargaining did not cease in the period, but it was, as shown above, much reduced in coverage and scope. For, as the GMB put it in a report to its Congress in 1997, ‘Over the past 18 years all unions have been handicapped by a hostile environment. . . . Unemployment has sapped confidence and undermined unions’ negotiating strength. . . . Workers have become well aware of their vulnerability. . . . Our biggest problem has been in establishing union organization on new sites in the face of hostile employers.’ Moreover, the existing complex union structure of conglomerate, ex-craft, industrial, and specialist unions, more or less guaranteed, in the private sector, that at least two unions could mount a legitimate claim to organize most groups of non-unionized

42


employees. Hence in the intensified and competitive search for new members, unions differentiated themselves by adopting different strategies towards employers. Union strategies towards private-sector employers, as suggested by the strike data, became progressively more moderate after 1980—apart from exceptional and sporadic conflicts. A combination of changes in the unions’ environment, as previously discussed, reduced both the efficacy of strikes and the union members’ and leaders’ willingness and ability to sustain prolonged strike action. In particular, the very substantial loss of jobs (and union members) in strike-prone industries (mines, docks, and vehicle building) and the threat of moving jobs abroad, all made employees and unions more cautious regarding recourse to industrial action. Further, the relatively low rate of inflation mitigated against wage strikes. For, if workers were ‘out’ for more than a brief period the consequent loss of earnings would not be compensated for, in the short run, by any resulting marginal increase in wages. In addition, the Conservatives’ labour legislation resulted in union leaders centralizing control over strike decisions and, in the light of many unions’ financial difficulties, taking care that unions did not breach the new restrictions on mass picketing and secondary action, both of which had been used with some success in the 1970s. Moreover, the imposition of secret ballots, and the accompanying requirement to state what action was being proposed, encouraged unions, in the above climate, to substitute action short of a strike and limited one-day strikes for the previous ‘all-out’ strikes. Finally, and procedurally, the tactical use of strike ballots to bring employers back to the bargaining table after a failure to agree, and the employers’ reluctance to table the ‘final offer’ until they saw the ballot result, helped resolve disputes before the threatened action was implemented. Hence in a weakened bargaining state most unions reduced their use of industrial action as the associated outcome became more problematic. Second, amid the above general moderation of unions’ employer-related strategies there were still some significant variations between the strategies of private-sector unions. In the early 1980s, and for most of the period, three private-sector unions, the EETPU (electricians), the AEU (engineers), and the MSF (manufacturing, science and finance), tended towards the moderate end of the continuum (in 1992 the EETPU and the AEU merged to form the AEEU, and in 2002 the AEEU merged with the MSF to form AMICUS). They all adopted a broadly cooperative approach towards employers. The EETPU, in particular pioneered, in the early 1980s, the use of single union no-strike deals in its search for new recognition agreements. In 1985, the leadership of the EETPU was circulating direct to employers a brochure entitled ‘The Union for Your Future’ and urging unions to ‘opt for genuine partnership’ with employers, long before the term ‘partnership’ became common currency


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(Bassett 1986: 66). The EETPU also carried its cooperative approach towards employers to extreme lengths in 1984 when it signed a single union deal with Hitachi which resulted in five other unions being derecognized (Bassett 1986: 133–5). It was not long after this, in 1988, that the EETPU was suspended from the TUC after it rejected the TUC’s ruling in inter-union disputes arising from the EETPU’s single union agreements with Christian Salvessan and Orion Electric. In both cases, the EETPU had signed single union agreements which had undermined the T&G’s prior claim to recognition (TUC 1988: 23–7). The AEU, later the largest union in the AEEU merger, was also noted in 1993 as sharing a ‘common philosophical approach to modern trade unionism’ with the EETPU (AEEU 1993: 15). The AEU and AEEU followed the EETPU’s example and signed single union deals, sometimes with no-strike clauses. The AEEU also argued that a partnership-based approach to industrial relations was one of the important factors making international competitors, such as Germany and Sweden, leaders in manufacturing industry. It was, therefore, a system to be applied in the UK (Taylor 1994: 119). Later in the 1990s, the TUC’s model of partnership that included commitment to the success of the enterprise, transparency in consultation over business plans, adding value by making best use of its human resources, improving the quality of working life, and independent representation of the workforce’s legitimate interest (TUC 1999: 13) had some similarities with that of the AEEU’s earlier approach to employers. Once the statutory support for union recognition was known to be imminent—it was included in the Employment Relations Act (ERA) 1999— the AEEU and subsequently AMICUS capitalized on their well-publicized support for a cooperative or partnership strategy. Between 1997 and 2002, the AMICUS unions (AEEU and MSF) signed 363 or 21% of the total (2,154) recognition agreements made by 25 different unions (Gall 2004: 265). This included, for example, a ‘no-strike partnership deal’ with Monarch Airlines (FT 1999). A study by Heery and Simms (2001) also showed that some 50% of unions signing recognition deals acknowledged that a policy of social partnership had helped them, at least occasionally, to secure such agreements. In 2001, the AEEU’s general secretary (Sir Ken Jackson) again restated the AEEU’s support for single-union no-strike deals at the union’s national conference (FT 2001). The union was also a recipient of money from the government’s partnership fund. However, a change of direction was signalled in 2003, when the newly elected general secretary (Derek Simpson), who had defeated Sir Ken Jackson, remarked, in his inaugural address to the members, ‘We are interested in a partnership that delivers for our members . . . and not a partnership for the sake of single union recognition. If we are to attract the union

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members of tomorrow it is time we got back to basics’ (AMICUS circular undated). The MSF’s national leadership was also contemplating in 1993, from a moderate stance, how it could best respond to the decentralization of bargaining, more flexible pay structures, the growing use of short-term contracts, the individualization of employee relations, and the introduction of HRM, when research suggested one in five companies employing over 1,000 employees had withdrawn union recognition. The union’s response was to seek to participate in ‘a new social partnership which recognises the constructive contributions that unions have to make to the success of the business’ (MSF 1993: 17). Yet, the above brief sketches of the leading moderate unions’ strategies vis-à-vis employers only tells part of the story. In parallel with the above cooperative approach, especially towards ‘new’ employers, both the EETPU and the AEU/AEEU were prepared to take industrial action in support of members employed in more established firms. For example, as noted by Bassett (1986: 83–4), when the EETPU was launching its no-strike deals in 1984 it was also organizing a number of strikes including those against ITV, Austin Rover, Thorn EMI, Lucas, and Perkins Engines. Later in the period, the EETPU was also noted for its militancy at Fords (FT 1990). The AEU was also similarly likely to organize industrial action when circumstances were deemed to justify it. Indeed, in 1989–90 it led one of the biggest strikes of the decade. This was the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions’ (CSEU) strike in support of the shorter working week. It accounted for 327,000 days lost in strikes in 1990 (Bird 1991: 380). Hence, even unions best-known for sponsoring single union and no-strike deals could also adjust or jettison their moderate cooperative strategy to suit the particular circumstances of the moment. Although no strike deals had limited appeal, outside of the originators of the strategy, the single union deal itself became more prevalent. By 1998, 43% of all unionized workplaces recognized just one union and 72% of managers in these workplaces reported that this was the result of a formal single union agreement. Most of these agreements were in the private sector (Cully et al. 1999: 91–4). Although initially suspicious of single union deals the T&G and GMB, the two big general unions, joined the EETPU and AEU in bidding for such deals. Also, at one stage, the GMB produced its own brochure aimed at attracting employers to the GMB’s version of single union recognition (Bassett 1986: 147). But neither the T&G nor the GMB was so committed as the EETPU and AEU to either single union deals or partnership agreements. Another private-sector union that also weighed the pros and cons of partnership plans, rather than endorsing them uncritically, was UNIFI, the


45

banking and finance union. UNIFI’s leading two partnership agreements, with Barclays Bank and the Co-operative Bank, were intended to improve their rather fraught industrial relations: there was a major strike at Barclays Bank in 1997 and a series of disputes in the Co-operative Bank in the mid1990s. As stated in the Barclays ‘Partnership Project’, both sides were committed to building a relationship based on ‘trust and respect, co-operation and problem solving, commitment to the success of the business and a shared agenda for the benefit of the staff, customers and shareholders’ (UNIFI 2000: 5). Finally, as regards private-sector unions, the GPMU (printing, paper, and publishing), a union imbued with the craft ethos, was more strongly attached to traditional collective bargaining activities. In the 1980s, its partner unions (SOGAT(82) and NGA(82)) were at the forefront of conflicts over both the use of new technology and compliance with the Conservative’s legislation regulating strike action. The most notable dispute brought SOGAT(82) and the NGA(82) into conflict with News International in 1985 over the employer’s plans to relocate its printing operations from Gray’s Inn Road and Bouverie Street to a new plant in Wapping, employing the latest technology. This dispute also brought the two printing and paper unions into conflict with the EETPU (electricians) which was charged with helping the employer replace the two printing unions’ members with an alternative workforce (Gennard 1990: 501–4). Also, in the 1980s, the NGA(82) became one of the few unions to have its funds sequestered for flouting the new labour legislation on strikes (Gennard 1990: 491). But, later in the period (2003), the GPMU increased the more ‘employer friendly’ side of its activities. It signed a partnership deal with Huhtamaki which prompted a change of ethos in the company, including the provision of joint working parties (IRS 2003). Also the GPMU signed an industry-wide partnership agreement with the British Printing Industries Federation which aimed to develop a ‘new industrial partnership to improve the industry’s productivity and working environment’ (GPMU 2003b: 2). As one of the few unions still negotiating issues of national substance with an employers’ association, this was a rare example of a private-sector industrywide partnership agreement. Turning, briefly, to public-sector unions’ strategies vis-à-vis employers, unions recruiting solely or primarily in the public sector were not generally under the same structural pressures as their private-sector colleagues to moderate their behaviour. Even if faced by privatization most public-sector unions could, realistically, hope to follow their members into newly privatized jobs without employment being decimated and with the opportunity to retain relatively high levels of union density. For example, union density in the privatized utilities was over 50% in 2000 (Sneade 2001: 440), and in the privatized

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railways density was even higher in 1997 at 80% (Cully and Woodland 1998: 353). Hence, although public-sector unions were not immune from the twin pressures of membership loss and inter-union competition for recognition in new job territories, the pressures were not as severe as those experienced by most private-sector unions. Moreover, although the Conservatives’ rhetoric in the 1980s promised the demise of unions, Winchester and Bach (1995) concluded that the distinctive features of public-service industrial relations remained largely intact throughout the 1980s and early 1990s (Winchester and Bach 1995: 329). And in local government, conventional national negotiations were sustained throughout the period, but with some scope for greater local flexibility. Nevertheless, almost all the public corporations were privatized; collective bargaining was decentralized, particularly in the civil service; performance-related pay was introduced; the terms and conditions of some senior civil servants and managers were individualized; there were several efficiency drives; and pay review bodies were introduced for nurses and midwives in 1983 and for teachers in 1986. Hence, although much of the above employer-driven change in industrial relations prior to 1997 caused the public-sector unions some difficulties, it did not fundamentally weaken their bargaining rights. Therefore, when New Labour assumed power in 1997 it found itself dealing with public-sector unions which remained in reasonable health—at least compared to their private-sector counterparts. Initially, New Labour benefited the public-sector unions as it restored union recognition to GCHQ via a ‘joint partnership’ agreement with PTC and reinstated the reference to trade union membership in the civil service handbook (the Conservatives had removed both recognition at GCHQ and the clause in the handbook). New Labour also promoted consensual industrial relations via its partnership initiative. This led to an increasing number of partnership agreements across the public service sector. For example, the leading civil service union (PCS) signed a ‘National Partnership Agreement’ with the Cabinet Office in 2000, which resulted in joint working parties of the PCS, other civil service unions, the Cabinet Office and the Treasury identifying and promulgating best practice across the civil service. The PCS later, in reviewing its ‘2001 PCS Plan’, noted that the National Partnership Agreement had led to better union and government relations. The health service also contributed significantly to the growth of union– employer partnerships. Incentives associated with hospitals’ achievement of ‘three-star’ status and hence access to extra funding included references to union and management working together in partnership. All four health authorities listed in a review of 34 partnership agreements in 2003 stated that the reason for adopting such agreements was government policy


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(IRS 2003: 10). Further, a major revision of the terms and conditions of employment of all staff in the NHS titled ‘Agenda for Change’ was launched in 2003 under the partnership label. It was piloted in 12 sites under a ‘partnership agreement that saw staff, unions and management working together to see the changes through’ (UNISON 2003). Less ambitious partnership schemes involving UNISON also addressed learning and development opportunities in local authorities (Munro and Ranbird 2000) and health and safety (UNISON 2004b). UNISON also promoted itself to employees in the community and voluntary sector with the claim that ‘UNISON knows that confrontational tactics are not helpful in this sector’ (UNISON 2004a). The term ‘partnership’ had therefore gained considerable support in the public sector by 2004. But much of what the public-sector unions discussed or negotiated with management attracted the title of partnership, regardless of the content. Standard industrial relations issues that normally resulted in an element, at least, of distributive bargaining, such as pay determination and absenteeism, could be found subject to partnership agreements. Further, such esoteric and nebulous problems as to how to change an organization’s culture entailed the same partnership process. Partnership was thus clearly in vogue by 2004, but what it entailed, apart from indicating a willingness on the part of union and management to work together cooperatively, became less specific. A small number of public-sector (and in one case formerly public-sector) unions were, nonetheless, still rather militant at the start of the new millennium. The RMT (railways—privatized), the FBU (firemen), and the CWU (postmen), all largely free of inter-union competition for members, working in specialized fields and led from the left politically, were more inclined in practice to pursue conventional distributive bargaining. The RMT led a series of strikes on a range of issues across many of the different train companies and London Underground between 2001 and 2004. The FBU also ran a strike campaign aimed at achieving a substantial (40%) pay rise between 2002 and 2003. Threats by government to use its emergency powers and introduce a Bill to impose a pay settlement, all added to the growing animosity generated by the dispute (The Times 2003a). The strike ended in June 2003, but the ill-will it engendered between the FBU and the New Labour government contributed to the FBU’s decision in 2004 to disaffiliate from the Labour Party. During 2000–3, the CWU was also more or less in constant dispute with one or other parts of the Royal Mail. For example, in the year to March 2001 approximately 66,000 working days were lost in the Royal Mail mainly through unofficial strikes (Sawyer et al. 2001: 11). One solution proposed to help resolve this fractious relationship was a Partnership Agreement. This was intended to

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create ‘a climate in which management and unions can work together to further the aims of the business and in which disagreements which inevitably occur are resolved in an orderly and non-confrontational manner’ (Sawyer et al. 2001: 66). Nevertheless, the CWU was again organizing strike action in 2007 against the management’s proposed restructuring of the postal service and its latest pay offer. Union–employer strategies since 1979, with some notable exceptions, therefore became more moderate and cooperative. Unions were pushed in this direction by both membership loss and the parallel reduction in unions’ bargaining power. This particularly affected unions in the private sector. Their difficulties were also compounded by often intense inter-union competition for membership and, in particular, by the scramble for new recognition agreements with non-unionized employers. In the public sector, there was, in practice, if not in rhetoric, both less management hostility and a lower level of inter-union competition. But unions in both sectors still exercised a degree of choice in determining their strategies towards employers. The EETPU, and subsequently the AEEU and initially AMICUS, promoted single union deals and no-strike agreements. Most other private-sector unions either rejected no-strike deals or were very cautious in offering employers such arrangements. Partnership deals were, however, generally more acceptable, even if some union leaders remained sceptical of their regenerative powers. In the public sector, UNISON recognized the value of partnership agreements most notably in its approach to employers and employees in the community and voluntary sector, and in health. In contrast the RMT, FBU, and CWU, all on the left politically, and organizing in sheltered job territories (sheltered from inter-union competition), opted for a largely conventional adversarial stance towards their employers. Turning to union–member relationships, the choice of union strategies aimed at members and potential members was much debated in the 1990s and into the 2000s. Various academics and practitioners offered their analysis of different sources of union regeneration in the USA (Turner et al. 2001), Australia (Peetz 1998), and in a wide ranging sweep covering much of the industrialized world (Sverke 1997). These studies explored, inter alia, the relationship between unions’ community movements, the links between immigrant labour and unionization, and the potential revitalization offered by a more campaigning and politically focused union agenda. In Britain, unions’ choice of strategy tended to be discussed by reference to a servicing or an organizing strategy, although, as will be shown below, these were in practice normally used in combination and not as alternatives. The TUC’s Special Review Body in 1989 identified the provision of highquality service or benefits as a key component in ‘Organizing for the 1990s’.


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Subsequently, the servicing strategy was promoted and placed in its wider context by Bassett and Cave (1993). It was argued that as individualism gained ground at the expense of collectivism, union members should be treated as consumers or clients rather than participating members. Unions should therefore emulate organizations that serviced individual needs, for example, the Automobile Association. In practice, trade union servicing had two related strands of service. The first was the provision of individual benefits, and the second, the servicing of members’ bargaining and representative needs by professional or full-time officials. The first strand, individual benefits, had an established role in union servicing. For, as Bain had noted in 1970, white-collar unions already had an impressive list of such services or benefits, including accident pay, educational services, funeral benefits, convalescent facilities, superannuation benefits and free legal aid, unemployment benefits, and benevolent grants. A minority also provided discount trading schemes, most types of insurance, a continental holiday scheme, and help with individual problems (Bain 1970: 96). Well before this, in the 1850s, some craft unions had similarly supported their members with a range of friendly society benefits such as sick pay, superannuation, and accident benefits, all, obviously, in the absence of the welfare state (Jefferys 1945: 28). Somewhat later, in 1998, the TUC demonstrated the continuity of such services by listing the 25 most commonly provided benefits or services in a survey of 41 unions (TUC 1998a: 5). Free legal help in employment and non-employment matters were the most commonly provided benefits, followed by financial/tax advice and discounted motor services and holidays. In 2002, a similar survey noted that in the previous year 21 unions had added to their benefits or services. The additions reflected advances in technology, retailing and changing tastes with a growth in 24hour helplines, discounted gym fees, pet insurance, and Microsoft software (TUC 2002: 5–7). The second strand of the servicing strategy required unions to employ professional full-time officials to act for members both in collective bargaining and in individual cases, such as grievance and disciplinary procedures, rather than relying on lay members, such as shop stewards. Unions organizing professionals and managers were at the forefront of such servicing. For example, the IPMS, later PROSPECT, which organized professionals, specialists, and managers in the civil service and the EMA (engineering managers in power stations) traditionally serviced their members in this manner. Over 80% of IPMS members in 1997 rated the involvement of full-time officers in collective negotiations as very important, and they gave a similar response to full-time officers’ involvement in dealing with members’ individual contracts (Ben-Yehuda 1997: 42). BIFU, later UNIFI, the banking and finance

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union, was also historically attached to a servicing model which relied heavily on its full-time officials to solve individual and collective problems for its members. A number of unions not particularly known for their attachment to the servicing strategy were drawn towards it in the early 1990s as a possible means of regeneration—and some were no doubt also keen to support the TUC’s strategy of that time. However, it was the cheaper strand of the servicing strategy, that is, the new individual benefits or services that most appealed, particularly as selling new financial services could also provide a further source of income for the unions. In contrast, the strand that required increasing numbers of full-time officers to service the membership was less attractive: it was much more costly and as the number of bargaining units increased, the pressure on existing full-time officers made it difficult for many unions to sustain the same level of full-time officer servicing. One of the most thorough going approaches to the benefits strand of the servicing strategy was adopted by the GMB, which aimed to create a ‘more consumer-responsive unionism’ (Heery 1996: 180). As expressed in its 1997 report to the GMB’s Congress, the aim was to help grow membership by matching GMB services to workers’ wants. The MSF in its strategy paper ‘MSF into the 21st Century’ also set out to review its services and adapt them to changed circumstances (MSF 1993: 8). However, the MSF’s commitment to the servicing strategy suffered a setback when the policy was rejected at its 1994 Conference (Carter and Poynter 1999: 505). The ISTC (iron and steel workers), looking to break out of its shrinking job territory and turn itself into a community union in the 1990s, also extended its range of services and benefits. Its new recruitment literature carried the slogan ‘Join us and get benefits for you and your family’. The EETPU, expelled from the TUC in 1989, reviewed its position as it sought to protect itself against ‘poaching’ by the TUC’s affiliated unions. It subsequently launched a revised services package under the direction of its newly founded Membership Services Department. At the other end of the political spectrum from the EETPU, the T&G and UNISON both conducted strategic reviews in the 1990s which led to new and extensive lists of individual services: by 2004 the T&G was promoting ‘T&G Care’ as an unrivalled and comprehensive package of benefits and services. Hence unions across the political spectrum paid attention to the servicing strategy and many enhanced the benefits package on offer. Despite efforts made to improve and market individual services and benefits, there was little evidence that they contributed much to union recruitment and retention. Indeed, Waddington, in a study of members’ reasons for joining and leaving trade unions, concluded that the ‘broader range


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of individual services has had no effect on the rate of unionization in either the expanding area of the economy or the areas of traditional membership strength’ (Waddington 2003: 240). Nevertheless, given the degree of interunion competition for members, unions ignoring the new servicing strategy ran the risk that marginal members could, if dissatisfied, join some other union for the missing services. Further, some of the new financial and discounting services were low cost, or even income generating, unlike more traditional benefits, such as legal aid and superannuation, which could be very costly. The organizing strategy, which was part of the TUC’s New Unionism package, was also adopted by many of the above unions towards the end of the 1990s and into the new millennium. In contrast to the servicing strategy, and potentially at odds with partnership agreements, the organizing strategy emphasized the role of members as activists confronting employers and, by so doing, remedying employees’ problems. Success in such confrontations was used to raise the union profile and attract more people to the cause. This strategy appeared particularly popular amongst unions in the USA and Australia. After reviewing the international experiences, the TUC spelt out the model’s key principles: making organizing the unions’ priority, investing real resources in its work, developing a strategic approach, increasing the use of dedicated organizers, and building lay representatives’ confidence and skills. The TUC claimed that by following such an approach to recruitment ‘membership decline is halted—and reversed’ (TUC 1997a: 41). In support of its organizing strategy, the TUC launched an Organizing Academy in 1998. Initially, in 1999, 11 unions sponsored a total of 36 trainees on their 12-month training programme. By 2003, 161 trainees had graduated from the Academy (Heery et al. 2003b). However, the total number of sponsoring unions was only 18 out of the TUC’s 70 affiliated unions. A small number of unions repeatedly supported the Academy and employed a high percentage of the organizers. In particular, the GPMU (printing, paper, and publishing), ISTC (iron and steel and community union), USDAW (retail and distribution), and UNISON (public sector) sponsored a significant number of trainees. The PCS (civil service) in 2001 was similarly engaged with the Academy: it saw the ‘organizing agenda’ as a central component in its strategic plan. Absence from the TUC’s Organizing Academy did not, however, indicate a lack of enthusiasm for the organizing strategy, or at least some version of it. The T&G and the GMB were both highly committed to an organizing agenda. Between 1987 and 2003, the T&G ran a series of organizing programmes. In 1995, it aimed to develop an organizing culture as it moved resources from

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servicing into organizing (Blyton and Turnbull 1998: 108). This subsequently led to the ‘Strategy for Growth’ and the allocation of financial resources to back the ‘Investment for Growth’ plan and in particular ‘organization and recruitment’. This involved putting £1.9 million into this activity in 2001 and aiming for £3 million in 2003 and 2004 (T&G 2002: 20). The GMB in the mid-1990s also switched resources towards an organizing strategy. The GMB’s strategy for 1996–9 was ‘to change our culture so that organization and recruitment work is the top priority of everyone in the GMB’ (internal GMB paper 5 December 1995). In 1997 after a detailed analysis of the changing composition of the GMB’s membership, yet more resources were steered towards areas of the union offering ‘best prospects of success’ (GMB 1997: 16). At the 1999 Congress, the organizing strategy was again confirmed in ‘Organize for 2000’. As noted by Heery et al. (2003a: 58–62), there was a clear shift amongst most British unions in the 1990s to adopt formal policies for organizing and recruiting. Late in the 1990s part of this was associated with preparation for the ERA (Employment Relations Act) and its promised support for union recognition. In most cases, unions aimed to focus their recruitment activities on ‘in-fill’ recruiting, that is, consolidating membership in existing job territories. But there was also an interest in extending beyond such territory into greenfield sites. Indeed, three of the leading unions based in manufacturing (i.e. GPMU, the T&G, and GMB) were noted in 2002 as also directing their full-time officers tasked with recruitment to focus on greenfield organizing: a majority of full-time officials in the three unions subsequently reported involvement in securing such recognition (Heery et al. 2003b: 14–15). As regards its potential for success, the organizing strategy received stronger support from research into employee motivations for joining and remaining in a union as compared to the servicing strategy. Waddington’s studies of some 10,000 members in 12 different unions showed that over 40% of union members were recruited by the union, as against 30% who were proactive in joining a union (Waddington and Whitson 1997). When asked why they joined in the first place, the main reason given was to gain the protection offered by collective representation, in terms of problems at work and improvements in pay and conditions. Also, in an analysis of union success in using the ERA to increase recruitment, Heery et al. (2003a: 72–3) noted that the more successful unions were those relying on organizing methods and on specialist organizers. Unions did not, however, generally see the servicing and organizing strategies as alternatives. In coming to terms with the new environment, after initially doing little in the early 1980s other than work for the return of an old


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style Labour government, they subsequently looked to adopt whatever selfhelp solutions to the problem of declining membership were on offer. The TUC’s support for both the servicing and the organizing strategies also helped encourage its members to take such strategies seriously. Unions thus largely adopted a contingency approach by selecting whichever parts of the two strategies they found best suited their own membership territory, ideological inclinations and financial standing.

CONCLUSION Unions developed a number of strategies for dealing with government, employers, members, and potential members in the hostile climate of the period studied. But at the start of the period they appeared to do little but await the arrival of a ‘white knight’, in the form of an old style Labour government. Once this had failed to materialize following the two 1980s general elections, unions largely driven by growing membership loss, reduced political and industrial influence, and financial difficulties belatedly realized that they needed to review radically their own modus operandi. Also, starting in the same period, and into the new millennium, unions became much more professional in their policymaking and management of their internal affairs. This was due in part to the employment of professional managers in senior positions and the use of consultants and academics in policy formulation. Lessons drawn from other national union federations, in particular the USA, Australia, and Ireland, further reinforced the need to adopt a strategic response to their problems. As a result, unions as diverse industrially and occupationally as UNISON, T&G, GMB, MSF, PCS, ISTC, and UNIFI developed formal strategic plans which addressed a range of issues including partnership with employers, and the servicing and organizing strategies aimed at members and potential members. In determining which strategies to adopt, unions were generally both eclectic and pragmatic. The main exceptions were when the leadership changed or ideological biases played a part in limiting a union’s use of certain strategies, such as no-strike deals, partnership agreements, and organizing strategies. But this did not always preclude them from considering such arrangements, particularly signing partnership agreements. For, intense inter-union competition for members made unions, and particularly those in expanded job territories, loath to pass up any opportunity to gain a competitive advantage. Rather, unless resolutely opposed to a particular strategy—as some unions opposed no-strike deals—unions tailored the strategy to meet their ideological reservations.

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In turning later to examine unions’ merger strategies, and the outcome of mergers, the above comment on the content of other union strategies and unions’ development of a formal strategic capability will be particularly pertinent. For mergers were not just a means to change one or more unions’ job territories, they could also have consequences for other strategies. A merger could also provide an opportunity, not realized by other means, to review and revise radically the merging unions’ political and recruitment strategies and their internal democracy and administration.

Part II Transfers


3 Transfer Strategies INTRODUCTION The strategies of the minor (transferor) and major (transferee) unions are identified below by reference to the characteristics and behaviour of the transferring unions, the relevant policy statements and related documents, and the research surveys and interview findings. Such strategies are presented as primarily composed of two main parts: purpose and process. Strategic purpose is described in terms of the transferring unions’ merger motivations and process as the conditions sought in the associated merger search and transfer negotiations. Because the transferor unions’ motivations differed significantly, in some important respects, from those of the transferee unions, it is necessary to examine separately the policy and practices of the two types of partner unions. The rest of this chapter is therefore structured as follows: the second section examines the minor (transferor) unions’ strategies, before considering the major (transferee) unions’ strategies in the third section. In conclusion, the fourth section, titled ‘the merger market’, discusses the competitive nature of the transfer process.

THE MINOR TRANSFERRING UNIONS The minor partners’ transfer strategies are first considered by reference to the transferor’s more obvious characteristics, that is, their territorial interests, recent changes in membership and financial standing. Second, the characteristics of a group of similarly sized unions expressing ‘no intention to merge’ are compared and contrasted with those of the transferor unions. Third, different subgroups or ‘merger streams’ of transferor unions are identified. Last, a typology of transferors’ merger strategies is developed.

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Transfer Strategies

Minor Transferring Unions’ Characteristics and Motivations The most distinctive characteristics of the 180 minor transferring unions were territorial. With a few exceptions, they were small in size (average 5,206). Out of the 180 transferring unions, the 112 not affiliated to the TUC, pretransfer, tended to represent the smaller end of the spectrum: average size 1,200. This compared to an average of 11,800 for the TUC unions which transferred. Also the 112 non-TUC transferors were largely staff associations or managerial/technical unions organizing within a particular company or recruiting a strictly defined group of employees. They were therefore ‘closed’ to employees outside of their existing and restricted job territory (Turner 1962: 249). Similarly, but on a larger scale, the minor TUC-affiliated unions, concluding and seeking transfers in this period, also tended to be relatively closed unions. Hence, when the job territory in which they organized contracted such unions found it difficult to expand into new territory. For they normally neither had the resources, nor the will, to break out of their shrinking territory by directly recruiting in a new job territory; instead they sought transfers. In a study of minor unions’ merger motivations in 1981, Undy et al. (1981: 167) categorized such transfers as primarily ‘defensive’. That is the minor unions were perceived as reluctantly seeking and concluding transfers, which would signal the end of their independent existence, in order to avoid some other adverse eventuality, such as financial disaster. A typically defensive merger would therefore follow one, or both, of a minor union’s marked decline in membership and financial difficulties. The following discussion refines this thesis by analysing changes in membership and finance of 42 (18 TUC and 24 non-TUC) transferor unions and 28 (TUC) minor unions rejecting mergers, initially surveyed in 1989. The consequent merger behaviour, between 1989 and 2004, of the 28 unions rejecting mergers is also examined. The membership and financial history of the 42 transferors was traced back for five years prior to the date of transfer and a number of financial measures and ratios, as developed by Willman et al. (1993: 7–19), used to analyse the unions’ changing financial fortunes (see Appendix 4). Drawing firm conclusions from such measures and ratios is not, however, without its problems. Unions are not run as profit maximizing, or even satisficing, businesses. Unions may well incur costs without the expectation of selling additional services, but with the intention of eventually covering the increased expenditure by increasing existing members’ subscriptions. Also local branches of the unions may hold funds not included in the national financial returns. Further, property values may not be regularly updated and consequently the

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union’s net worth substantially undervalued. Moreover, the employer may, particularly in the case of staff associations, provide a hidden subsidy via secondments of salaried officials and provision of offices, telephone and computers, etc. Nevertheless, even given the above caveats, if unions find they cannot fund their national operations from income they will, over time, become insolvent. As most unions rely heavily on subscription income (in 1989 on average 82% of union income came from subscriptions (Willman et al. 1993)) a major fall in membership is also likely, other things remaining equal, to have a damaging effect on a union’s financial position. For administrative costs, which frequently absorb over 75% of the union’s total expenditure, include a large element of relatively fixed costs, such as full-time officers’ salaries and associated overheads. Thus a union facing a decline in membership, a resulting reduction in subscription income and difficulties in trimming its administrative costs, may find itself reducing its net worth as it draws on its reserves to fund the deficit between income and expenditure. If this situation continues the leadership may contemplate a radical cost-cutting exercise and/or a defensive transfer. An ‘Index of comparative Security’, combining finance and membership data drawn from the above 42 unions, was therefore developed to help assess the difficulties, if any, which minor transferring unions faced just prior to merging. A score of 6 or less indicated a strong financial position, while a score of 10 or more suggested serious financial difficulties, or a combination of a significant loss of members and less severe financial difficulties (see Appendix 4 for further details on the index). This was then used to rank the transferors listed in Tables 3.1 and 3.2: Table 3.1 is composed of unions not affiliated to the TUC (largely staff associations), and Table 3.2 is composed of the TUCaffiliated unions. Table 3.1 shows that only a minority (11 of 24) of the transferring staff associations faced significant financial difficulties (scores of 10 or over). Moreover, amongst the staff associations in the finance sector (first part of Table 3.1), only 3 of the 10 were experiencing financial problems. Indeed, most of the finance-sector associations outperformed the other associations across almost all measures (see Appendix 4). This may, as mentioned earlier, have been the product of the indirect financial support many staff associations received from their employers. As regards the 14 staff associations outside of the finance sector, half were in serious financial difficulties and they had also experienced a major loss of members, ranging from a drop of 71% in the Telecommunications Staff Association (TSA) to a 21% reduction in the PMB Staff Association (PMBSA). It is also noteworthy that the smaller of such organizations tended to be at

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Transfer Strategies Table 3.1. Minor transferring unions (1978–1989) Union

Size at time of transfer

% change in membership in 5 years preceding transfer

Staff associations, not affiliated to the TUC pre-merger GSA 352 −14 NORSA 616 −3 AMPSSA 297 28 BNZLSA 102 −52 BACOAS 616 12 CBSA(2) 167 −24 ESSA 6,163 18 SALSA 8,036 33 BESO 3,930 −9 CBSS(1) 234 −1 All the above were finance-sector associations CSSA, etc. 424 2 RRMA 615 −11 SUKSA 275 −4 ISA 119 −43 RCNSA 157 99 IGSA 684 −57 ANHSO 3,945 1 PMBSA 277 −21 TWSA 2,314 −24 BCSA 799 −42 UFFMA 125 −48 NAEMS 883 −33 AMPS 5,436 −31 TSA 462 −71

Index of comparative security 1 1 6 6 6 6 7 10 14 16 2 2 3 6 6 6 10 13 18 19 21 21 21 21

least as financially healthy as the relatively larger ones: there appeared to be no return to scale at this level of operation. It may be concluded, therefore, that financial difficulties, at least amongst the staff associations, were not, for most of the group, the sole or dominant reason for transferring to a larger union. As regards the motivations of the TUC-affiliated transferor unions, Table 3.2 suggests that financial considerations played a more important role in shaping this group’s decision to transfer. Only 6 of the 18 appeared financially healthy, while 8 were in financial difficulties and 4 others were approaching this state. Moreover, 13 had lost 14% or more of their members. Also, as noted in respect of transferring staff associations, the larger unions were no more immune than the smaller unions from financial pressures. The average size of those experiencing financial difficulties was 27,209, and that of

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Table 3.2. Minor transferring unions (1978–1989) (TUC-affiliated unions) Union

NUTGW WWU GLSA (∗ T)NWLDCTWU (T)C&CTWA (T)ATWO(B&D) APAC (T)ATWU(SA) (T)BDWWA FTATU NUDBTW NSMM (T)OPUTAW NUBOMCW NUSMWCHDE NUAWW (T)ATWU(SS) HVA

Size at time of transfer

% change in membership in five years preceding transfer

Index of comparative security

68,065 4,899 12,122 4,741 900 1,085 7,556 610 600 31,642 45,756 25,454 3,000 4,907 58,837 63,261 561 15,901

−9 −5 −25 −4 −22 3 −21 −30 −22 −39 −22 −36 −46 −49 −21 −14 −22 0

1 1 2 2 3 4 9 9 9 9 11 12 12 13 13 18 19 29

∗

The seven unions marked (T) were among the 10 unions transferring to the GMB from the textile industry federation of unions in 1986. Source (of raw data): M. Sadiq (unpublished), M.Sc. dissertation, Oxford, 1994.

the group of six immune from such problems, 15,302. It was therefore only a minority of the TUC unions opting to transfer engagements that were in a relatively healthy financial position at the time of merging.

Characteristics of ‘No intention to merge minor unions’ The extent to which a deteriorating membership and financial position may alone motivate minor unions to transfer may also be gauged by comparing the above findings with those of 28 unions of similar size which in the 1989 survey stated, often in a robust manner, that they had no intention to merge. For example, the AABTD noted that ‘we wish to remain independent’; the FAA ‘prefer to stay on our own for present’; and HC&SA ‘membership chose to remain independent’. Table 3.3 ranks the ‘no intention to merge unions’ using the same measures, ratios, and index as applied to the transferring unions (N.B. as the raw material for this analysis was from a different source the period of change calculated is 10 and not 5 years as in Tables 3.1 and 3.2). In

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Table 3.3. Minor unions, ‘no intention to merge’ (1989) (TUC-affiliated unions) Union

Size

% change in membership over preceding 10 years

Index of comparative security

BALPA MU POA FBU BAEA NAPO

4,340 39,598 23,699 45,683 40,388 6,447

12 −3 19 21 60 30

3 4 7 8 9 10

All the above either increased or suffered no significant decrease in membership CATU 1,308 −30 SWSWU 17 −39 URTU 20,681 −35 ASLEF 19,065 −13 CSMTS 92 −25 NLBD 2,784 −14 NULMW 5,295 −26 PLCWTWU 3,200 −46 NUSC 822 −42 NALHM 11,851 −30 ASTWKT 2,512 −52 NACO 4,474 −21 IRSF 53,523 −22 RUBSO 2,519 −69 BFAWU 34,032 −22 FAA 2,094 −18 NCTU 866 −57 HC&SA 2,362 −37 NUDAGO 3,100 −44 AABTD 470 −58 SUPLO 65 −65 YAPLO 537 N/A

4 4 5 6 7 7 7 8 8 10 12 12 13 14 15 16 16 17 21 N/A N/A N/A

Source (of raw data): K. Little (unpublished), M.Phil. thesis, Oxford, 1991.

this case, given the potential importance of membership loss in the decision to transfer, the table is subdivided into those unions which either grew in membership (or suffered only a marginal decline) and those which suffered more than a 10% loss of membership. The assumption being made is that the first six unions may have been opposed to transfers at least partly because their membership base appeared secure. As for those losing members, the second and larger group of 22 unions in Table 3.3 had an average membership loss of 37%. However, within this group the index score of comparative security varied very widely from 21 for the National Union of Domestic Appliances and General Operatives (NUDAGO),

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indicating very serious difficulties, to 4 for the Ceramic and Allied Trades Union (C&ATU), indicating a very healthy financial position. Moreover, four of the group (CATU, SWSWU, URTU, and ASLEF), despite losing members, recorded a good score on the security index of 6 or less. For example, C&ATU had a net worth in 1989 of £4,509,820, or £144 per capita despite losing 30% of its members and the United Road Transport Union (URTU), combined a healthy net worth per capita of £85 (net worth £1,755,085), with an increase in its investment income of 45% and a relatively modest increase in its administration cost of 9.4%. The latter figure compares with an overall increase in administrative costs of 22% for all unions in Table 3.3. Nevertheless, these were exceptional cases. Most of the unions in the second section of Table 3.3 were, in 1989, in serious financial difficulties. On the basis of the measures, ratios and index used the Film Artistes’ Association (FAA), Northern Carpet Trades’ Union (NCTU), Hospital Consultants and Specialists Association (HC&SA) and the National Union of Domestic Appliances and General Operatives (NUDAGO) appeared to be in terminal decline. Yet in 1989 they rejected a transfer as a means of resolving their problems. Between 1989 and 2004, the above 28 minor TUC unions rejecting future mergers in 1989 produced two marked diverging merger tendencies. The top 11 unions in Table 3.3, from BALPA to ASLEF, all of which apart from NAPO displayed a healthy financial state in 1989, remained independent in 2004. Of the 18 unions below them, from CSMTS to YAPLO, only 4 survived as independent entities in 2004 and 1 of these, NUDAGO, was in transfer negotiations. The national officer cited continuing membership loss, rather than financial difficulties, as the key factor driving a merger. Also, as NUDAGO’s general secretary approached retirement age there was no volunteer to take over the top post and this was also cited (in interview) as a critical factor in persuading the union to merge. Similarly, in the NULMW’s and NCTU’s transfers to the T&G in, respectively, 2004 and 2000, their general secretaries were due to retire and the appointment of a new official, not averse to merging, helped tip the balance towards a transfer (from interview). Hence the index of security and associated assessment of membership loss, while not necessarily associated with an immediate urge to merge in 1989, still proved a reasonable predictor of which minor unions would transfer in the longer run. Nevertheless, the interpretation of what kind of membership and financial crisis warranted a change in merger policy varied between the 28 unions. It was a subject for internal debate and, in some cases, influenced by the general secretary’s retirement. It can be concluded from Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3, therefore, that changes in the union’s job territory, particularly membership loss and consequent

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financial difficulties, were characteristics of many minor transferring unions, and therefore indicative of a defensive merger. However, such adverse developments were not always a sufficient reason for merging. For, a large minority of the unions in the ‘no intention to merge’ group experienced both loss of membership and financial difficulties, yet they concluded that radical retrenchment was preferable to surrendering their autonomy by transferring to some larger organization. In contrast to the above ‘defensively’ minded transfers, a significant minority of the transferring unions were in reasonable financial condition and were thus not driven to merge by such considerations. Further insight into this latter group’s transfer motivations may be gained by examining the staff associations in the finance sector listed in Table 3.1. From interviews, the motivating forces affecting these associations appeared largely political, that is, they were centrally concerned with the staff associations’ core objectives and means. Their main interest was in changing the character of their unions towards more ‘unionate’ (Blackburn 1967) organizations rather than in resolving financial problems: effective collective bargaining, independence of the employer, and membership of the TUC were key issues in driving their transfer strategy. In the words of one official, the transfer involved ‘joining the trade union movement’ (NORSA, in interviews). Their pursuit of ‘unionateness’ was, however, tempered by their desire to remain free of party political affiliation to the Labour Party. In many cases, this shift in character was sought by leaders who had ‘ . . . a great belief in proper trade unionism’ (Phoenix Staff Union, interview). Hence, a number of staff associations’ transfers may be clearly differentiated from those completed by more defensively minded unions. Such organizations were therefore more positive in their transfer strategies: they sought transfers as a means of enhancing their services and gaining legitimacy by joining the wider trade union movement.

Minor Unions’ Search Strategies and Merger Streams The strategic process associated with the minor unions’ search for transfer partners will initially be discussed by reference to the general territorial preferences displayed by actual and potential transferring unions. This will be followed by an analysis of the general political, democratic, and administrative concerns of the transferring unions and, finally, a discussion of particular minor union’s transfer strategies. As regards job territory, the majority of minor unions transferred to unions that had at least some members in the same industries or occupations. Of 69 mergers surveyed between 1978 and 1989, 49 (71%) involved unions sharing

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the same industrial interests. Between 1990 and 2004 out of 64 mergers surveyed, 45 (70%) followed the same industrial pattern. As regards mergers between unions that shared the same occupational interests, 45 of 67 (67%) mergers concluded between 1978 and 1989, and 33 of 62 (53%) concluded between 1990 and 2004 fell into this category. Two related surveys sent to general secretaries in 1989 and 2004 also asked how many unions were interested in future transfers to a larger union. In 1989, 28 or 40%, and in 2004, 28 or 43% replied in the affirmative. The unions so inclined were then asked to rate, in terms of their importance, 11 factors affecting their choice of merger partner (the answers rated: 5 points necessary, 3 very important, 2 important, 1 not very important, and 0 unimportant). The responses in each year identified ‘common occupational and industrial identity’ as among the most important 6 of 11 factors. Indeed in 2004 common occupational identity was ranked second and common industrial identity fourth in importance (Table 3.4). The preference for a transfer to unions sharing a common territory helped produce three types of merger streams. First were geographic concentration mergers. These typically entailed a regional or district union, recruiting in a specific industry and/or occupation, joining the national union organizing solely in the same territory. This form of merger had a long history (Hughes 1967: 16). Second, white-collar assimilation mergers involved a firmor employer-specific white-collar union (or staff association), joining a TUCaffiliated union in the same job territory. Third, cognate trade transfers involved industrial national unions, transferring to a general or conglomerate union with an existing and significant presence in the smaller union’s territory. Geographic concentration mergers were well ingrained in the union consciousness and continued throughout 1978–2004. There were at least 17 in this period. In particular, unions in the textile and apparel industries were wedded to such geographic concentration mergers. For example, as the industry contracted the Yorkshire Society of Textile Craftsmen (YSTC) and the Huddersfield & District Healders & Twisters Trade & Friendly Society (HDHTTFS) transferred to the National Union of Dyers and Bleachers (NUDBTW) in 1980. In 1979 the South Lancashire and Cheshire Weavers and Winders Association transferred to the Textile workers Union. Later, in 1996, the Rossendale Union of Boot, Shoe and Slipper Operatives transferred to NUKFAT. In a different industrial context, in 2000, the Scottish Prison Officers Association (SPOA) transferred to the Prison Officers Association (POA). The result was, by 2004, that there were only some five regional or district and job-specific unions remaining in the TUC. Scope for further transfers of this kind was thus extremely limited.

Table 3.4. Minor unions’ merger objectives (1989 and 2004) Q. To what extent will the following be important when negotiating a merger with a larger union in the future? (necessary (5), very important (3), important (2), not very important (1), and unimportant (0)) 1989 Survey Ranking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 a z

Issue Financial securitya High degree of autonomy in larger uniona Increases your bargaining powera Terms and conditions of full-time officers and job security, same or bettera Common occupational identifyc Common industrial identityb Similar structure and system of governance (e.g. branch, region, and executive)a Similar political interestsa Similar method of selecting officialsa Similar level of subscriptions and benefitsc The new merged union will have a better chance of signing single union agreementsa

2004 Survey Score

Ranking

85 80 70 65

1 2 3 4 5 6

61 60 57

7

56 54 50 21

7 7 10 11

Issue High degree of autonomy in larger unionx Common occupational identityx Financial security y Common industrial identify y Increases your bargaining powerz Terms and conditions of full-time officers and job security, same or betterz Similar structure and system of governance (e.g. branch, region, and executive) y Similar political interest y Similar level of subscriptions and benefitsx Similar method of selecting officials y The new union will have a better chance of signing single union agreementsx

26 unions answered question; b 25 unions answered question; c 24 unions answered questions; x 27 unions answered question; y 26 unions answered question; 25 unions answered question.

Score 91 86 82 75 70 56 53 53 53 47 39

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White-collar assimilation mergers were generally, for the transferring union, also geographically localized, but organized in a specific firm. They involved white-collar (and some technically based) staff associations joining TUC unions. Over 50 relatively small transferring organizations came within this category between 1978 and 2004. In most cases, they approached whichever large national unions had an established and significant whitecollar (including technical and/or managerial) interest in their field. In this process, they were absorbed or assimilated into the wider union movement which had previously directly benefited from a major growth in white-collar unionism in the early 1970s. However, the relaxation of the TUC’s affiliation criteria, following its ‘relaunch’ in 1994, removed one of the incentives for such transfers. For, following this change, staff associations or staff unions could more easily join the TUC directly, rather then seeking ‘unionateness’ and the TUC’s imprimatur, by transferring to a TUC-affiliated union. As a result, by 2003 there were seven such ‘in-house’ unions directly affiliated to the TUC, including the Britannia Staff Union (BSU), the Abbey National Group Union (ANGU), and the Alliance & Leicester Union (ALGUS) all of which had been identified by UNIFI (the national finance union) as potential transferors. The third stream of cognate trade transfers between unions with shared territorial (i.e. industrial and/or occupational) interests saw national unions, often in declining job territories, join a larger and often a conglomerate union with an existing interest in their territory. There were some 23 such transfers between 1978 and 2004 (also, as will be described later, a number of amalgamations had a similar pedigree). Such mergers included the transfer of the National Union of Funeral Service Operatives (NUFSO) to the Furniture & Timber unions (FTAT) in 1978, the Agricultural Workers Union (NUA and AW) transfer to the T&G in 1982, the National Union of Insurance Workers (NUIW) to the MSF in 1999, and UNIFI to AMICUS in 2004. In contrast to the above territorially biased merger streams, there was a fourth category of territorially miscellaneous transfers between unions in dissimilar territories. Amongst these was the Tobacco Workers’ Union (TWU) transfer to AUEW-TASS (Draughtsmen) in 1986 and seven transfers to the EETPU (electricians) in 1990. Included in the latter’s similarly diverse transfers was the Institute of Journalists. In the late 1990s and into the 2000s, the Iron & Steel Trades Confederation (ISTC) also absorbed transfers from outside its traditional territory. These included the National League for the Blind & Disabled (NLBD) and the PLCWTU (carpet makers union) in 2000. In brief, the above transfers to TASS and to the EETPU were largely politically motivated. In TASS’s case it was, at the time, absorbing

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unions whose leadership had similar Communist Party sympathies, while the EETPU was looking for more right-wing transfers. In the ISTC’s case, it was accepting such disparate mergers as part of its ‘community union’ strategy. Outside of territorial interests, the minor unions tended to have similar priorities when searching for a transfer partner. These will be discussed in general by referring, first, to the survey findings summarized in Table 3.4 and second, by examining a small number of transfers in more depth, including two relatively large cognate trade transfers in 2004 by UNIFI (finance) and the GPMU (printing, paper, and publishing) to AMICUS. In examining the generality of unions’ transfer priorities, political objectives and means, democratic ethos and government, and administration will be discussed. As regards potential transferors’ priorities when contemplating a merger, these were, as shown in Table 3.4, very much the same in both the 1989 and 2004 surveys of those TUC affiliates willing to contemplate a merger with a larger union. Indeed, the top six objectives were identical across the years, although they differed in their order. As expected, territorial concerns, as reflected in both occupational and industrial identity, were highly rated in both surveys. Such a rating was also politically rational as, by combining with unions in the same job territory, the minor union could also expect to enhance its bargaining power by reducing inter-union competition and presenting a united front to common employers. Further, in such transfers the full-time officers’ expertise in a particular industry or occupation could continue to be usefully employed. Not surprisingly, therefore, an increase in bargaining power was also ranked in the top six in both surveys. In contrast, party political interests were not so highly rated. Issues of union democracy and administration, on the other hand, were given the highest rating: autonomy and financial security headed the potential transferor’s list. If autonomy could be secured, this made other issues of democracy and administration less pressing. For, if the incoming union could be guaranteed, in perpetuity, or for a more limited period, a high degree of autonomy, for example, in its own section or trade group, concerns over the general structure and system of government, the selection of officers and subscriptions and benefits were much less critical. The maintenance or improvement in the terms and conditions of employment of full-time officers and their job security also figured prominently in both the surveys. Clearly in stressing financial security and job security, the full-time officers did not wish to go from ‘the frying pan to the fire’ by transferring to a union which was incapable of ensuring their own survival (or offer voluntary redundancy on acceptable terms).

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In terms of what those actually transferring sought from the major partner, autonomy was also the critical issue in the minor unions’ merger search. For example, the 10 white-collar assimilation transferors to the MSF completed between 1990 and 2001 all sought autonomy. According to the lead negotiator for the MSF, they demanded full autonomy in both their collective bargaining activities and in policymaking. White-collar unions transferring to the more centralized BIFU (later UNIFI) also raised similar issues. For example, the transfer of the Bank of England’s Staff Organizations (BESO) in 1987 (after talks lasting most of the 1980s) included claims from BESO to retain its own subscription rate, operate a separate section, and organize its own annual conference (Hodges 1994). The only international transfer of a specialist white-collar union covered in the study raised the same issue. In 2003, the Association of Flight Attendants, affiliated to the British TUC, sought a transfer to an American union, that is the Communication Workers of America (CWA). As reported to its members, the AFA’s ‘two most important provisions’ (of the merger) ‘are the ones that ensure the AFA continues to be the AFA after the merger’ (including its own subscriptions rate). Further, if the merger did not meet the AFA’s expectations it sought an opt-out (within four years) ‘from the date of merger’ (AFA 2003). National unions in cognate trade transfers to general unions also required high degrees of autonomy when negotiating a transfer. For example, the Dyers and Bleachers (NUDBTW, 40,000 members) on transfer to the T&G in 1982 looked to occupy a new Textile Trade Group within the T&G and also retain its own separate affiliation to the Labour Party and TUC. Even smaller national unions joining the T&G, such as the National Association of Licensed House Managers (NALHM, 12,000 members) which transferred in 1997, while not looking for a new trade group did wish to maintain a large degree of autonomy over its collective bargaining arrangements. Similarly, minor unions transferring to the GMB, including the Tailor & Garment Workers (NUTGW, 73,000) in 1991 and the Furniture and Timber Workers (FTAT, 32,000) in 1993, both required high degrees of both operational and policymaking autonomy. Other national unions, such as the Communication Managers Association (14,000 mainly post office managers) in 1998 and the National Union of Insurance Workers (10,000) in 1999, negotiating transfers to the MSF, also emphasized their claims for autonomy, including, in the CMA’s case, a ‘trial’ merger period of three years with an ‘opt-out’ clause. Last, as regards national unions’ transfers to general unions, the transfer searches of UNIFI and the GPMU prior to joining AMICUS in 2004 are worth more detailed examination, particularly as they added some 250,000

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members to AMICUS’s 1 million members. UNIFI’s transfer to AMICUS in 2004 represented one of the most sophisticated and formalized strategic approaches to such a transfer. UNIFI, in its previous role as a major merging union (BIFU), had a long history of absorbing minor staff unions as part of its ‘taken-for-granted’ policy for growth in the finance sector. The aim was to end divided representation in the finance sector by making UNIFI ‘the’ finance union. Ed Sweeney, general secretary from 1996, made this the key goal in his election campaign. In 1999, the amalgamation (discussed in Part III) which formed UNIFI by merging BIFU, UNiFI (Barclays Bank Union), and NWSA (NatWest Staff Association) was a critical step in this direction, but it still left the finance section of the MSF (in the process of amalgamating with the AEEU to form AMICUS), a leading organizer in the industry outside of UNIFI’s orbit. Between 1999 and 2002, UNIFI, under internal pressure from falling membership (a 30% loss between 1994 and 2000) and financial difficulties (in 1999, UNIFI had a deficit of some £3 million), examined its options, including a transfer to a general union. Following radical changes in banking practices, UNIFI had already restructured internally during the 1999 amalgamation, including changing its bargaining structure to match the management-driven decentralization of bargaining. Also steps had been taken to cut costs, while also attempting to reorientate UNIFI’s full-time officials towards recruitment of new members, rather than concentrating on servicing existing members. There was also internal criticism of the National Executive for failing to find an effective role in the union after collective bargaining issues had been delegated to the newly formed National Company Committees. Further, the branch structure had, in common with many other unions, found it difficult to attract an active cadre of members. UNIFI, in considering its response to the above problems, formally examined two broad options, stay independent or merge. As regards the first option one of the key concerns was whether or not UNIFI alone could generate the resources required to rebuild its membership base. In a report commissioned by UNIFI, three models of its future financial position were developed based on different assumptions regarding, inter alia, membership growth or decline, subscription rates, and combinations of cost-cutting measures. It was clear from this analysis that UNIFI could turn its financial position around by a judicious use of cost-cutting measures over three or four years. The key problematic variable in each model, however, was the assumption regarding future recruitment and retention of members. Although recruitment and retention rates were closely monitored by UNIFI, future changes in employment in its core job territory were not easily predicted. Moreover, even if such

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employment did grow, UNIFI could not be confident of achieving membership growth because its density was also in decline. But, most importantly, action to solve the financial difficulties would not, of itself, help UNIFI achieve its key objective of ending divided representation and so achieving one union for banking and finance. UNIFI thus considered four merger options. The first was not mutually exclusive. This was to continue to absorb incoming transfers from the remaining small banking and finance unions and staff associations. But it was recognized that this of itself would not solve UNIFI’s problems. Further, it was not something UNIFI could guarantee to achieve: it would be up to the relevant staff associations to decide if they wished to merge and, if so, to choose between UNIFI and the MSF (AMICUS). Hence, while such incoming transfers were acknowledged as part of UNIFI’s ongoing policy they were not alternatives to merging with a larger union. The other three options were mutually exclusive. They were to merge with one of three unions: the CWU (communications and post office workers), USDAW (shop and distribution workers), and AMICUS that was in the process of being formed by the amalgamation of the AEEU and the MSF (completed in 2002). The CWU was quickly discarded as an option when it did not respond positively to UNIFI’s initial approach. As for the remaining two options, in terms of territorial interests USDAW, although primarily a mainstream retail union, had recognition agreements with retailers set on expanding their financial services. It also organized callcentre employees. But the number of USDAW’s membership in financial services was far lower than the 50,000 or so organized by the MSF. Otherwise, USDAW’s political, democratic, and administrative system and structures did not appear to be barriers to a merger with UNIFI. USDAW had a similar structure to UNIFI for bargaining with its major employees; it had a strong group (115) of full-time officers that played major roles in negotiations and, like UNIFI, it was not averse to signing partnership agreements with its leading employers. It also shared UNIFI’s democratic ethos regarding the importance of lay member involvement. But it did not have the kind of sectoral or trade group structure commonly found in the big general unions: it had no recent merger history which would have led to such an internal restructuring. However, in respect of key administrative functions, USDAW was organizationally and financially sound. Indeed, a financial assessment suggested that USDAW would continue to generate significant surpluses on its income and expenditure account (in 2000 it had a surplus of £1.6 million) for the next five years. The AEEU/MSF (AMICUS) option matched the USDAW option in terms of administrative and political functions and exceeded it as regards job territory

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and democracy (government). Administratively, and particularly in relation to financial security, the MSF had a history of financial problems. In 2000, MSF’s income and expenditure account recorded a deficit of £700,000, compared to a surplus in 1999 of £370,000. On the other hand, the AEEU produced a surplus of £7.7 million in 2000, and moreover, it had net assets of over £60 million on its balance sheet in the same year (this was double that of USDAW and far in excess of the MSF’s net assets of £14 million). Hence, transferring to AMICUS was financially more attractive than transferring to the MSF. Politically, in the field of collective bargaining and representation at the workplace, both the MSF and the AEEU had similar arrangements to those adopted by UNIFI in its National Company Committees. Further, the MSF was committed to the kind of organizing agenda adopted by UNIFI, and it was also experienced in applying it in the finance sector. Also, both the MSF and AEEU had an ageing core of full-time officials, including many in senior posts, who were expected to retire in the near future, so providing opportunities for incoming officials from merging unions. Politically, with a capital ‘P’, AMICUS would, as Britain’s largest private-sector union, also exercise considerable influence vis-à-vis government which could be useful to UNIFI. The two main advantages the MSF/AEEU option provided were, however, in respect of job territory and democracy (internal government). In respect of job territory, MSF offered two opportunities not matched by USDAW. First, it had some 50,000 finance members which, under the ‘right’ government arrangements, could be merged within AMICUS with UNIFI’s 150,000 members. Second, a merger with the MSF would stop the small staff associations in banking and finance playing UNIFI off against MSF in future merger negotiations. The system of government being planned for AMICUS further promised the kind of autonomy which UNIFI sought in the proposed finance section. Of the 21 sections planned for AMICUS, the finance section, combining UNIFI’s and MSF’s (finance) membership, would be the largest at 200,000 and UNIFI could expect to be the dominant force within this section. Moreover, the plans were for the officials in each of AMICUS’s sections to determine their own internal organization, within the general system of government and agreed financial parameters. In transferring to AMICUS, UNIFI could therefore expect to negotiate an agreement which would see it take a significant step towards solving its main territorial problem, that is, ending divided representation in banking and finance and, in terms of democracy and government, it would give UNIFI the required autonomy. The GPMU (printing, paper, and publishing), a craft union in its ethos, also secured a transfer to AMICUS in 2004. Prior to entering into negotiations

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with AMICUS the leadership of the GPMU, in the face of severe membership loss and financial difficulties associated with seemingly insoluble constitutional problems, determined in 2001 that it could not continue as a viable independent union. In brief, the financial autonomy enjoyed by some of its branches, which retained over 50% of their income, compounded the financial difficulties experienced by GPMU due to membership loss. Once the GPMU launched a merger search, it focused on the CWU (communications), T&G (general workers), and AMICUS as possible merger partners. As was the case with UNIFI, the CWU option was rejected early in the search. Hence, the GPMU had to choose between AMICUS and the T&G. Both unions offered the GPMU written outline terms that guaranteed a high level of autonomy. Nevertheless, there were robust exchanges inside the GPMU and in the Scottish press (The Herald 2004) regarding the relative merits of the two merger partners (GPMU 2003a: 70) and over the role played by officers in GPMU branches concerned to safeguard their branches’ existing financial status in any transfer: ‘The antics of some branch officers over the last two or three years have been nothing short of a disgrace . . . ’ (GPMU 2004: 3). In the consultative ballot in January 2004 when members were asked to choose between the two short-listed unions, the members (38% turnout) showed a clear preference for the executive’s choice of AMICUS, by 73%, compared to 27% for the T&G. AMICUS was attractive to the GPMU’s executive and members for a combination of territorial, democratic, political, and administrative reasons. Territorially, AMICUS’s albeit limited organization of technical and craft workers in printing and paper outweighed that of the T&G. Also AMICUS was willing to transfer such members into a sector specially created for the GPMU. In terms of democracy and government, the autonomy granted to the GPMU included running its own affairs for five years, virtually unaltered, after which it would be further integrated into AMICUS. Also, AMICUS agreed a procedure with the GPMU which would stop the ‘Taliban’ branches, as the financially autonomous branches were colloquially known, from continuing to hold monies separate to, and outside the control of, the national union. Finally, as regards administration, AMICUS’s financial position was such that it could help resolve the GPMU’s difficulties while offering a subscription rate for full-time workers of £2.12 a week: this represented a reduction for most of the GPMU’s members. Hence, AMICUS offered the GPMU a high degree of autonomy, and a much greater degree of centralized control over its branch finances: the latter was critical as it stopped the ‘Taliban’ branches from continuing to exploit their financial freedom at the expense of the national union.

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Last, as regards what were noted above as miscellaneous and largely politically motivated transferors (outside of the mainstream of transfers to unions in similar job territories), these also sought a high degree of autonomy in the larger organization. This was perhaps to be expected, given that there was no common occupational or industrial identity to be exploited post-merger. Transfers from diverse white-collar associations into the EETPU (and later AEEU and AMICUS) were also attracted by the EEPTU’s largely autonomous Federation of Professional Associations (FPA) in 1990 which operated as a separate section within the larger union. Similarly, the white-collar TASS (later MSF) when drawing in transfers from a number of small craft unions placed them in a separate section titled, in their case, the ‘united crafts section’. This section, after the MSF merged with the AEEU to form AMICUS in 2002, was given continued autonomy as a separate crafts section inside AMICUS.

Minor Transferring Unions’ Strategies: Summary and Conclusions The process of transferring therefore started in minor unions with a rudimentary or, less likely, a sophisticated and written, cost–benefit analysis of the continued independence and transfer options. Loss of members and associated financial problems triggered many such assessments. However, not all unions in such difficulties opted for merger. A number of unions chose to remain independent and face draconian cuts in expenditure rather than merge, although the election of a new general secretary could lead to a reassessment of such an option. Of those that did choose to transfer, their strategies may be classified according to both purpose and process. As regards strategic purpose, this was largely dictated by the motivating forces originating in the minor unions’ job territory and the leaderships’ perceptions of the minor unions’ future viability. As for those unions seeking transfers in response to falling membership and, in some cases, financial difficulties, the turning point was when the national leadership questioned the viability of the union. Although almost all such unions would have preferred to stay independent, they recognized that a transfer had certain advantages; critically the avoidance of yet more painful retrenchment. These were, in terms of strategic purpose, the classic ‘defensive’ transfers. In contrast, a number of staff associations, in whitecollar assimilation mergers, approached a transfer in a much more positive light. The major union was perceived as offering the minor union advantages it could not generate for itself despite a satisfactory financial position and a stable or growing membership. For some, it was also part of a

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process of their evolution from a staff association, somewhat dependent on the employer, to a more independent and unionate organization. The larger union offered them the opportunity to improve their capacity to service their members and may thus, in reference to strategic content, be termed ‘progressive’. Apart from the geographic concentration mergers, which were largely defensive, but followed a preordained pattern to the ‘natural parent’, that is, the logical national union organizing in their territory, other defensive and progressive transferring unions generally had a number of potential partners, even though they generally wished to transfer to a union in the same or similar job territory. For, they normally found that one or more national industrial or occupational unions, general or conglomerate unions, or in the late 1990s the ISTC’s brand of community unionism, offered a merger choice. In this competitive context, the minor unions searching for transfers could look to satisfy a number of conditions. In completing the strategic process, the minor unions sought to satisfy, in order of priority, the following interests: democratic ethos and government, administration, and political objectives and means. In terms of democracy and government, virtually all transferring unions wanted the highest degree of autonomy they could negotiate. At a minimum, they wanted control over their own collective bargaining activities and, if negotiable, to retain their own independent branches and conferences. As regards administration, the defensive unions, in particular, wanted assurances of financial and job security for their officials. Last, in terms of political objectives and means, both defensive and progressive unions looked for improved services, including increased bargaining power and enhanced membership benefits. Minor unions’ transfers may therefore be classified by reference to a combination of strategic purpose and process. The largest group of minor transferring unions, that is, those primarily concerned with their viability, may be said to have developed a defensive autonomy and a greater security strategy. On the other hand, the smaller group of minor unions, prompted to seek a transfer by a more positive agenda, may be classified as adopting a progressive autonomy and improved servicing strategy.

THE MAJOR TRANSFERRING UNIONS This section first examines the characteristics and motivations of the generality of the major, or transferee, unions. Second, the factors influencing

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the major unions’ search for transfers and their associated strategies are discussed. Third, the focus is narrowed down to the role played in transfers by the three leading merging unions and their antecedents. In conclusion, the types of transfer strategy adopted by the transferee unions are discussed.

Major (Transferee) Merging Unions’ Characteristics and Motivations The major merging unions were amongst the larger of the TUC’s unions. For example, of the 17 unions in Table 2.1 accepting incoming transfers between 1997 and 2004, only 6 had fewer than 50,000 members. The two surveys, 1989 and 2004, showed that absorbing unions by transfer was consistently a minority union activity. In 1989, 20 (29%) of the 70 respondent unions had absorbed minor unions by transfer between 1978 and 1989 and between 1990 and 2004 18 (28%) of the 65 unions surveyed had similarly absorbed smaller unions. Yet, in total, major unions absorbing transfers and extant in 2004 organized some 5 million members, or almost 80%, of the TUC’s total membership. Territorially, the major merging unions covered very diverse areas; they were not concentrated in a particular sector, industry, or occupation. For example, the 17 transferee unions extant in 2004 included 6 solely or primarily public-sector unions and 11 solely or predominantly private-sector unions. Also as shown in Table 2.1, apart from the public-sector unions organizing teachers, prison officers, and senior civil servants, all the other unions accepting incoming transfers since 1979 lost members over this longer period, despite absorbing other unions. The losses ranged from 22% for UNISON (public sector) to 89% for the GULO (textile workers). Of the 20 major merging unions studied at the mid-stage of the period, in 1989, 18 were subjected to further scrutiny as regards membership change and financial standing. This revealed, as shown in Table 3.5, a very wide range of experiences. (N.B. The membership figures in Table 3.5 include members gained by merging.) Changes in membership between 1979 and 1989 varied from a loss of 63% for the ISTC (iron and steel) to an increase of 28% for BIFU (later UNIFI, banking and finance): of the 18 major merging unions listed in Table 3.5, 11 lost members and 7 gained members. In terms of financial standing, the major merging unions in 1989 displayed marked variations: there appeared to be no guarantee that an increase in membership necessarily resulted in good financial standing. A score of 6 or below,

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Table 3.5. Major merging unions 1979–89 Union

Size in 1989

NUTGW SOGAT(82) NGA(82) IPCS NALGO GMB EIS SCPS (NUCPS) ISTC TGW BIFU POEU (NCU) BETA ASTMS (MSF) AEU NATFHE NUIW NUHKW

73,122 185,150 131,538 89,730 754,701 789,556 45,571 118,394 41,730 1,270,776 168,408 154,410 31,719 653,000 793,610 81,407 17,257 43,526

% change in size since 1979 −37 −10 18∗ −9 12 −18 −6 10∗ −62 −39 28∗ 23 −28 33∗ −47 15 −14 −40

Index of comparative security (1989) 3 3 4 5 5 6 7 8 9 9 10 11 12 15 17 27 N/A N/A

Source (of raw data): K. Little (unpublished), M.Phil. thesis, Oxford, 1991. ∗ This membership growth was primarily the product of mergers.

as an indicator of sound financial health, shows six of the major merging unions were in a good financial position in 1989. The remaining 10 unions, for which financial data were available, included 6 in a much less satisfactory position (score of 10 or above). As 14 of the 18 unions in Table 3.5 saw administrative costs outstrip increases in subscription in this period, the above deterioration in their financial position was not surprising. Moreover, marked increases in administration costs were not just the preserve of unions losing members. For example, BIFU (banking and finance), NCU (communications), NGA(82) (printers), NATFHE (teachers in further education), NUCPS (civil servants), and NALGO (local authorities) all increased their membership between 1979 and 1989 while their administrative costs per capita rose, respectively, by 76%, 54%, 223%, 30%, 73%, and 187%, in the period 1979–89. Further, the transferee’s unwillingness or inability to control administrative costs as they grew in size did not appear to make them any more sensitive in 1989 to the potential costs of absorbing more minor unions in the future. For, as will be discussed below, in 1989 the requirement that smaller incoming unions were financially sound was ranked 10th of 12 considerations by major unions contemplating a further merger with a smaller union. Hence, several of the major merging

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unions were in 1989 no more immune from falling membership and financial difficulties than the unions they absorbed. Turning to the major unions’ merger motivations: one common and obvious territorial denominator was that incoming transfers immediately added members en bloc to the existing membership base. Indeed in some interviews, particularly where the recipient had recently lost members, ‘adding numbers’ was noted as the primary goal of the merger. ‘Numbers’, further, helped the recipient union maintain its relative status, as reflected in the pecking order of unions. Also, as will be shown later in this chapter, sometimes an incoming transfer was particularly prized because it denied a competing union the same instant growth. In general, the major unions were also looking to add numbers to an existing and significant occupational or industrial base. This was affirmed when the major merging unions were asked to define their previous merger policies in the 1989 and 2004 surveys by reference to the defensive, consolidatory, or aggressive (expansionist) typology. In 1989, of the 21 respondents asked this question, 14 indicated that this policy had been consistently one or the other of these: 9 (64%) opted for consolidatory, 1 (7%) defensive, and 2 (14%) aggressive. In addition, four unions stated that their policy varied between the three types over the period 1979–89: two combined defensive and consolidatory and the other two, aggressive and consolidatory, policies. Another respondent described his union’s policy as exploratory and another as opportunistic. In 2004, out of the 22 respondents 17 replied as follows: 8 (47%) were consolidatory, 2 (12%) defensive, and 1 (6%) aggressive. Five other unions referred to adopting different combinations of the three typologies over the 1990–2003 period. In addition, one described his union’s policy as confused. Over the two surveys, 55% therefore referred solely to a consolidatory policy and, in addition, 22% referred to combining a consolidatory policy with either defensive or aggressive policies. Consolidation was, thus, the most cited territorial factor influencing the major merging union’s transfers. Major unions were also occasionally, but not frequently, primarily motivated by political factors (unions’ objectives and means) when contemplating incoming transfers. Exceptionally, the larger transfers were seen as having consequences for the major unions’ bargaining power, members’ benefits, and standing inside the Labour Party and the TUC. Also its ideological identity could be enhanced by such a transfer. Further, a series or cluster of transfers of a similar nature could cumulatively have this effect. For example, absorbing several unions engaged in collective bargaining with a common employer could be expected to strengthen the major union’s position by reducing duplication of representation, hence limiting inter-union conflicts.

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Democratic considerations, affecting the ethos, structure, and system of government of the major merger unions, while a feature of most transfers, from the minor union’s perspective, were not generally factors motivating the major union to absorb ‘incoming’ transfers. But they could indirectly affect the government structure of major unions. For, as both the 1989 and 2004 surveys showed, around half of the major merging unions, 11 (52%) and 9 (41%), respectively, had changed their structures and rules in the relevant preceding periods to give themselves a better chance of concluding mergers. The changes most favoured were the creation of new sectors, trade groups, or sections to provide greater autonomy for the incoming transfers (11 unions), an increase in executive seats (5 unions), and rule changes to give the union discretion to recruit outside its traditional job territory (2 unions). Other changes included adjustments to the political fund, increasing full-time officials’ salaries, and facilitating the organization of self-governing associations. Three unions made changes to facilitate mergers in both periods, that is, the GMB, ISTC, and UNISON (NALGO between 1979–89). But there was little evidence that a transfer was motivated by a major union’s desire to reform its own democracy and government. Indeed, the way transferring unions were absorbed, by giving them autonomy over much of their decisionmaking activities, more or less determined that the incoming transfers would, at least initially, have little, if any, effect on the major unions’ own systems and structures of government. Transfers were, therefore, rarely, if ever, sought by a major union as a means of reforming its own democratic ethos and government, but overall they indirectly had the effect of largely standardizing the major merger unions’ internal structures into semi-autonomous sections or trade groups. Administrative concerns, such as financial issues (subscriptions and investments), properties, full-time official : member ratio, organizational and departmental structures, membership records, and publications, were again not central to the major union’s decision to seek or accept a transfer. Most transferring unions were individually too small for the receiving union to see itself gaining some significant administrative advantage from a particular transfer. Indeed, at least one major merging union in the early 1990s, the EETPU, saw some advantage in securing transfers from very small unions which had little or no administrative baggage and, specifically, no full-time officials, but a reasonable income stream. The British Cement Staffs Association transfer to the EETPU with just 600 members and no full-time officials was a case in point. For, finding incoming full-time officials’ jobs equal to their own perceptions of their status, or offering attractive severance terms, could add significantly to the costs of absorbing minor unions.

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Major Unions’ Transfer Searches and Strategies In 1989, 30 (43%) of 70 unions surveyed, and in 2004, 30 (46%) of 65 unions, expressed interest in a future merger with a smaller union. All such unions were asked to indicate which, out of 12 factors, they would consider necessary (5 points), very important (3), important (2), not very important (1), and unimportant (0) in their negotiation with a future minor incoming union. The results are recorded in Table 3.6. The above responses reasserted the importance of territorial issues and specifically occupational and industrial consolidation. They were the topranking considerations in both 1989 and 2004, with similar scores in both years. Indeed, as was the case in the survey of minor union’s merger intentions noted previously, there was little change in the ranking between 1989 and 2004. Five of the six factors ranked most highly in 1989 were again ranked in the top six in 2004. These were, in descending order, common occupational identity, common industrial identity, increase your bargaining power, the union accepts your system of government, and provide scope for recruiting non-unionists. However, the inclusion, albeit ranked sixth, in 2004 of ‘the smaller union is financially sound’ (at the expense of ‘the union’s full-time officers accept the same terms and conditions of employment as your officers’, which dropped from third in 1989 to seventh in 2004) is noteworthy. In 1989, concerns over the incoming union’s financial status were ranked 10th. This suggests that, in contrast to the relaxed position adopted towards the minor union’s financial state in 1989, the major merging unions in 2004 were at least a little more sensitive to the potential detrimental effect on their own organization of accepting transfers from minor unions in financial difficulties. At the lower end of the table, the ranking, apart from financial concerns, was almost identical in 1989 and 2004. Major merging unions’ interests in transfers that brought in new occupational or industrial groups, or helped them sign single union agreements, were relatively low. They also did not give much weight to transfers as a source of political bonding. As regards questions of members’ benefits, they appeared to be willing to adjust their own arrangements to accommodate those of the minor union. In 2004, as against 1989, the major unions were also more accommodating in respect of minor unions which wished to maintain their officers’ existing terms and conditions post-merger, rather than insisting on them conforming with the major unions’ practices. Major unions in searching for incoming transfers therefore primarily focused on territorial issues. They looked to build on their existing membership base and exploit any opportunities the incoming unions offered to recruit

Table 3.6. Major unions’ merger objectives (1989 and 2004) To what extent will the following be important when negotiating a merger with a smaller union in the future? (necessary (5), very important (3), important (2), not very important (1), and unimportant (0)) 1989 Survey Ranking 1 2 3

4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Issues Common Occupational Identityb Common Industrial Identitya The union’s full-time officials accept the same terms and conditions of employment as your officersa Provides added scope for recruiting non-unionistsa The union accepts your system of governmenta Increases your bargaining powera The union accepts your level of subscriptions and benefitsa Similar political interestsa Brings in new occupational groups of membersa The smaller union is financially sounda The new merged union will have a better chance of signing single union agreementsb Brings in new industrial groups of membersc

2004 Survey Score

Ranking

87 79 78

1 2 3 4

73

5

72

6 7

71 67 63 58

7

9 10

55 45

11

42

12

Issue Common Occupational Identityw Common Industrial Identityx Increases your bargaining powerv The union accepts your systems of governmentx Provides added scope for recruiting non-unionistsw The smaller union is financially sound y The union accepts your level of subscriptions and benefits y The union’s full-time officers accept the same terms and conditions of employment as your officersz Similar political interestsx Brings in new occupational groups of members y The new merged union will have a better chance of signing single union agreements y Brings in new industrial groups of members y

Score 87 84 82 71 68 66 58 58

57 53 46 45

30 unions answered question; b 29 unions answered question; c 28 unions answered question; v 30 unions answered question; w 29 unions answered question; x 28 unions answered question; y 27 unions answered question; z 26 unions answered question.

a

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non-unionists: ‘in-fill’ recruiting of this kind was central to many unions’ recruiting drives, partly driven by concerns over their own falling membership density. By combining membership in the same job territory, they also sought political advantage in the form of an increase in their own bargaining power. Major merger unions’ strategies may therefore be generally classified as consolidatory and power seeking.

The Leading Major Unions’ Transfer Strategies Although 17 of the 37 unions in Table 2.1 had accepted in-coming transfers between 1979 and 2004, just 3 unions and their antecedents absorbed 76% (136) of all transfers to affiliated TUC unions and 88% (817,000) of all union members transferred. The three unions were AMICUS, 86 transfers; T&G, 19 transfers; and GMB, 31 transfers. In the late 1990s, they were joined in their proactive search for incoming transfers by the ISTC (later renamed COMMUNITY) four transfers. Before examining the factors that differentiated the leading transferee unions from the rest, and each other, it is necessary to identify which antecedent unions were the main contributors to the 136 transfers and, particularly, the 86 transfers into AMICUS between 1978 and 2004. As regards AMICUS, the most productive antecedents (40 transfers) had their origins in the ASTMS and AUEW–TASS amalgamation that formed the MSF in 1988. This largely white-collar and private-sector amalgamation, involving managerial, supervisory, and technical staffs, and the subsequent transfer activities of the MSF (prior to the MSF’s amalgamation with the AEEU to form AMICUS in 2002), included 15 transfers to ASTMS, 6 to AUEW–TASS, and 19 to MSF itself. A second set of 29 antecedent transfers originated in the EETPU (electricians) amalgamation with the AEU (engineers) to create the AEEU in 1992. This amalgamation involved two former craft unions which had attempted to amalgamate on several other occasions: they first seriously discussed an amalgamation in 1917 (Lloyd 1990: 126). Last, but not least important of the antecedent unions, UNIFI, transferring to AMICUS in 2004, had completed 12 transfers since 1978. In addition, AMICUS itself negotiated five transfers between its formation in 2002 and 2004. The GMB’s and T&G’s genealogy also involved mergers with unions which had a history of transfer activity, post-1978. In the GMB’s case, the amalgamation with APEX in 1989 and two transfers, absorbing the NUTGW in 1991 and FTAT in 1993, were the most significant in respect of inherited transfers. APEX (clerks and computer staff) had completed four transfers since 1978, the

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NUTGW (tailor and garment workers) two, and FTAT (furniture and timber workers) three (in addition, two other smaller incoming transfers (ATWU and MPOU) had previously absorbed three unions in total). The remaining 19 transfers were accounted for directly by the GMB (and its predecessor NUGMW). As regards the T&G, all but 2 of the 19 transfers, that is, those previously absorbed by the NUDBTW (Dyers and Bleachers) which joined the T&G by transfer in 1982, were directly negotiated by the T&G. The transfer strategies of the leading merger unions and their antecedents may be distinguished from the other transferee unions by reference to both their strategic purpose and process. In terms of purpose, they were critically differentiated by the scope of their territorial ambitions. They combined consolidatory transfers, which added numbers to members in established job territories, with expansionist transfers that helped them diversify into new job territories. This produced a merger process that required senior officials to search actively or aggressively for potential transfer partners. Additionally, a majority of them formally planned their merger searches from the centre and linked them with a wider growth strategy. Prior to the AMICUS amalgamation, ASTMS and subsequently the MSF were the archetypal expansionists. Unlike the GMB, which followed a similar strategy for a limited period in the late 1980s and into the early 1990s, ASTMS and the MSF were consistently in this mode for the whole period. Indeed, ASTMS established this strategy in the 1970s: between 1969 and 1976, in a period of rapid membership growth it absorbed 17 unions by transfer (Undy et al. 1981: 203). Subsequently, between 1978 and the formation of the MSF in 1988, in a period of rapid membership decline, it completed a further 15 transfers. In particular, ASTMS and subsequently the MSF, after securing a toehold in insurance in 1970 via transfers from the Prudential Staff Association, used transfers (13 between 1978 and 2002) to expand into the finance sector. Also, following an incursion into health in 1970 through the transfer of the Medical Practitioners Union (MPU) and the Guild of Hospital Pharmacists (GHP) in 1974, the transfer of the Health Visitors Association (HVA) in 1990 gave the MSF access to a new and growing part of the health service. In 1998, the MSF’s successful bid for the Communication Managers Association (CMA) also took the MSF into a new organization: the Royal Mail. In combination with TASS’s more politically inspired transfers, which brought a number of craft unions, for example, pattern makers (APAC) and sheet metal workers (NUSMW), into the MSF via the 1988 ASTMS/TASS amalgamation, the long-term strategic effect of the above expansionist transfers was critical for MSF’s subsequent amalgamation with the AEEU to form AMICUS in 2002. For, by its expansionist strategy, the MSF stopped other

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unions specializing in finance (UNIFI), health (Royal College of Nurses, COHSE, and UNISON), Royal Mail (Communication Workers Union), and in craft engineering (AEEU) from establishing a monopoly over such job territories. As a result, the MSF ensured that the only way competing unions could secure a united front, or single union in such territories, was by cooperating or merging with the MSF. For a limited period, and then sporadically, the EETPU (electricians) and later the AEEU (engineers and electricians) pursued expansionist transfers. Twelve transfers to the EETPU, negotiated when it was excluded from the TUC in 1989 and 1990, fell into this category. However, for the EETPU, they were more important as political symbols of its virility, or ability to survive and prosper outside the TUC, than they were indicative of its ability to increase its membership by transfer. The 11 included organizations recruiting small groups of workers well outside the electricians’ usual orbit, for example, probation officers (NAPLO), prison officers (PSU), firemen (NAFO), and journalists (IoJ). After its merger with the engineers (AEU) to form the AEEU, the former leaders of the electricians, holding the key jobs inside the AEEU, continued to negotiate the occasional expansionist transfer. This ran contrary to the engineers’ historical mission of pursuing mergers that would create ‘one union for engineering’. Nevertheless, one of the most significant expansionist transfers was secured in this phase of development. This involved the transfer of Cabin Crew 89 (CC89), 4,500 members in 1999: it was a breakaway from the T&G and had been a transfer target of the electricians (EETPU) since 1990. Hence, this transfer took the AEEU, and then AMICUS, into a job territory previously the preserve of the T&G. Finally, in 2004, AMICUS, continuing the expansionist tradition of the MSF, secured two of the biggest ever transfers of British unions as it absorbed both UNIFI (finance) and the GPMU (printing, paper, and publishing) and by so doing immediately added some 250,000 members to its 1 million existing members. The GMB, unlike the T&G, MSF, and UNIFI, did not, in the 1960s, 1970s, and the early 1980s, have an established record as a major merging union. But in two relatively short periods of merger activity, between 1986 and 1993, and again between 1998 and 2001, it actively sought and completed a number of expansionary transfers. In the earlier phase, 1986–93, of the 15 transfers completed in this period, the three largest, that is, Greater London Staff Association (GLSA), 13,000 in 1988; National Union of Tailor & Garment Workers (NUTGW), 73,122 in 1991; and the Furniture, Timber & Allied Trades (FTAT) 31,642 in 1993, were all expansionist and significantly bigger than most other unions’ transfers. In 1993, however, this merger policy was

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abandoned when the GMB launched its ‘organic growth strategy’ supported by dedicated financial support: the cost of this strategy took the GMB knowingly into a series of annual financial deficits. In the later 1990s, the GMB again sought and concluded one further expansionary transfer with the Managers & Professional Officers Union (MPOU). This gave the GMB an entry to senior officers in local government. In contrast to the GMB, the other long-standing general workers’ union, the T&G, had a consistent record of growth by transfers stemming from the 1920s, including 30 transfers spread over the period 1970–2001 (T&G 2002: 197). Since 1978, the T&G continued to pursue an active search for transfers with varying success: most noticeably between 1987 and 1993 it failed to complete several transfers as it unsuccessfully vied with the GMB for the ATWU’s (textiles), NULO’s (Labour Party organizers), and FTAT’s (furniture and timber) transfers. Nevertheless, the T&G still concluded 19 transfers between 1978 and 2004, of which 7 served to extend the scope of the T&G’s occupational, but not its industrial, job territory. Most significantly, the NUDBTW (Dyers and Bleachers), 39,984 members; EPIU (electricians and plumbers), 51,000 members; and NALHM (licensed house managers), 6,127 members had this effect. The NUDBTW transfer was also expected to give the T&G an advantage in its search for further transfers from the smaller textile unions. The EPUI, which was originally a breakaway from the EETPU of members opposed to the EETPU’s ultra-moderate political tendencies, also helped reinforce the T&G’s left-wing image. Contrary, in 2004, to the GMB’s rather jaundiced view of mergers, the T&G was still actively pursuing transfers; including, in 2003 and 2004, its failed attempt to persuade the GPMU (printing, paper, and publishing) to join the T&G rather than AMICUS. It was after this failed bid that the T&G entered into talks with AMICUS to form UNITE in 2007. UNIFI (banking and finance) saw its name changed from NUBE to BIFU to UNIFI via mergers, as it actively sought and concluded 12 transfers between 1978 and 2002. Perhaps, most critically, in 1978 the transfer of the Guardian Royal Exchange Staff Union (GRESU) with 5,729 members to the 130,000 strong NUBE (National Union of Bank Employees) took NUBE into insurance and acted as the catalyst for its rebranding as the Banking Insurance and Finance Union (BIFU). This was followed by BIFU’s pursuit of more transfers from staff associations in insurance, including the Phoenix Staff Union (PSU) in 1979 and the Royal Life Section of the National Union of Insurance Workers in 1982. In entering the insurance sector, BIFU and from 1999 UNIFI (formed by the amalgamation of BIFU, UNiFI (Barclays Bank Union), and the NWSA (NatWest Staff Association)) were in direct competition with the MSF for the transfer of those staff associations which formed the core of

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the white-collar assimilation transfers referred to above. The GRESU, PSU, and NUIW (Royal Liver section) transfers were therefore the start of BIFU and UNIFI’s expansionist strategy to secure for itself a significant position in insurance, while also consolidating their membership in building societies and banks with further transfers. Overall, therefore, UNIFI was more limited in its territorial ambitions, compared to AMICUS, GMB, and the T&G. It did not wish to go beyond finance, but rather to widen its scope within finance from banking and building societies to insurance: transfers were the vehicle chosen for this purpose. Last, the ISTC was, compared to the four unions discussed above, late in adopting an expansionist transfer strategy. Prior to 1994, the ISTC had looked to absorb cognate trade unions by transfer and not to recruit outside its iron and steel roots. As described in the 1989 survey, the ISTC’s merger policy was ‘to consolidate our strong position within the iron, steel and metals industry’. At this stage, the ISTC viewed mergers between unions which did not share common industrial or occupational identity as ‘irrational’. In this consolidatory phase, the ISTC absorbed the blast furnace union (NUBOM, etc., 5,000 members) in 1985 and the wire workers (WWU, 5,000) members in 1991. In the mid-1990s, the ISTC, under a new national leadership, reviewed and radically changed its merger strategy. From the late 1990s, the ISTC became the fifth leading merger union as it actively sought transfers that would take it into new job territories. In this expansionist phase, from the late 1990s onwards, the ISTC sought transfers from a range of small unions, most noticeably from those affiliated to the GFTU (which the ISTC joined in the early 1990s). The League for the Blind and Disabled (NLBD) transferred its 2,000 members to the ISTC in 2000 and the local carpet weavers’ union in Kidderminster (PLCW and TW) joined the ISTC in the same year with 1,300 members. The knitwear and footwear union (KFAT) also successfully balloted on joining ISTC in an amalgamation in 2004. Clearly, in this phase, the ISTC’s merger rationale had been radically revised. It was no longer based on common industrial or occupational identity; rather, it had embraced community unionism. The strategic process and therefore the transfer searches of the leading merger unions were in general also much more formalized and highly developed than those of the other occasional transferee unions. The planned approaches adopted by the leading unions varied, but were likely to combine some of the following elements: a clearly stated strategic objective; monitoring of transfer activities by the general secretary and leading officials; an assessment of the potential transferor unions’s resources; building pre-transfer relationships with the target union’s leaders; and providing support for the transferor union, pre-transfer.

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UNIFI’s and the ISTC’s strategic objectives were well articulated in various internal documents and in UNIFI’s case, in its rules. UNIFI was intent on ending ‘divided representation’ by competing unions and staff associations in the finance industry by making itself ‘the’ finance union. In the late 1990s, the ISTC adopted its ‘community unionism’ policy. In both cases, transfers were key components of what both unions saw as a wider recruitment policy dictated by the unions’ existing but restricted territorial interests. These interests, in UNIFI’s case, were conventionally industrial, but in the ISTC’s case they were unconventionally spatial or geographic. In a shrinking industry and with a very high density of 90% membership and considerable financial reserves, the ISTC in 1966–7 looked ‘outside the box’ to do something ‘different for the twenty-first century’ (from interview). The transfers of the League for Blind and Disabled and the Kidderminster carpet weavers were thus for an Iron and Steel union symbolic ‘breakout’ mergers. The ASTMS, MSF, GMB, T&G, EETPU and AEEU were all more interested, as compared to UNIFI and the ISTC, in transfers as a means of adding numbers, in almost any areas that broadened their base and gave greater recruitment potential. The ASTMS in the late 1980s wrote to some 80 staff associations enquiring about possible transfers. Its successor, the MSF, continued this practice of proactive sweeps for transfers ‘with expansionist potential’ and saw itself in the ‘merger market’ (from 1994 interview). From the late 1980s and into the 1990s, the national officers of the MSF were expected to ‘produce an annual strategic plan’ that included an ‘active merger strategy’ (from correspondence with the national officer responsible for the MSF’s financial- and health-sector transfers). The EETPU followed a similar strategy in the 1980s and early 1990s of ‘periodically writing to all the likely staff associations about joining the EETPU’ (from interview). More systematically, the GMB, in its active phase in the late 1980s and into the 1990s, outlined in its ‘Success in the 1990s’ strategy paper, the ‘merger tasks for the year ahead’. These included the identification of new transfer partners to ‘continue the momentum towards creating a larger union’. In 1993, the GMB’s ‘Merger Strategy’ paper included an assessment of all TUC-affiliated unions in terms of ‘targets for possible future merger’. These were sought to support the three aims of the GMB’s policy, that is, ‘grow to a more economic size; move into attractive new recruitment territories; and consolidate strength in industries where we already have a presence’. A thumbnail sketch of all the TUC’s affiliated unions assessed and graded each potential transferor union against 10 criteria: 5 of advantage and 5 of disadvantage to the GMB. The growth opportunity offered by each union was set against the risks posed by such a transfer to the GMB’s identity, political, and financial interests. It was

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soon after this exercise and the abortive amalgamation talks with the T&G in 1993–4 that the GMB changed course and abandoned its proactive transfer strategy. The T&G also had a series of formal and general strategic reviews between the late 1980s and 2004. In 1989, however, the general secretary, Ron Todd, stated (interview) that the T&G had never had, and did not have in 1989, a formal merger policy, despite publishing ‘Forward with the T&G’ a strategic review. In this period, the T&G normally waited for an approach, rather than proactively searching for transfers. But, as the then largest British union, it came under ‘pressure to retain leadership in size’ (interview). In 1989, despite the absence of a formal merger strategy, the T&G was in merger talks with the National Union of Seamen (NUS), the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), and the National Union of Hosiery & Knitwear Works (NUHKW). All three transfers failed to materialize. The NUS merged with the railwaymen (NUR) in 1990 to form RMT, the NUM remained independent and the NUHKW amalgamated with the footwear union (NUFLAT) to form KFAT in 1990. The T&G became less reactive and complacent regarding mergers in the later 1990s and into the 2000s. Further general strategic reviews, including ‘One Union T&G’ in 1992 and associated reviews throughout the 1990s, saw the T&G revise and formalize its merger strategy. In 1999, in a continuation of the ‘One Union T&G’ debate, the issue of the T&G’s merger strategy was formally raised, as the T&G examined its ability to deliver on recruitment, service, and representation. An analysis of the T&G’s strengths, weakness, opportunities, and threats (SWOT analyses) in 1998, and the competition faced by the T&G from the AEEU, GMB, and UNISON for transfers helped push the T&G towards a more ‘open’ merger policy. This led the T&G in the late 1990s, compared to the late 1980s, to consider ‘any merger’ including public-sector white-collar unions, which could take it into new territory (interview). In contrast to the formal strategic assessments of union policy and related transfers, made at various points by the GMB, MSF, UNIFI, and T&G, the EETPU’s (and subsequently the AEEU’s and AMICUS’s) transfers appeared to be less subject to formal pre-planning and therefore more opportunistic. In the case of the EETPU and AEEU, the leaders shaping transfer activities were not noted for formal detailed analyses of their merger options. As an official of the AEEU put it in 1994, the EETPU rationalized the decision after the transfer (interview). The AEU prior to amalgamating with the EETPU to form the AEEU also tended to be more informal and opportunistic in its transfer activities. In the 1980s, it also noticeably failed to secure a whole series of transfers that it actively pursued, including the sheet metal workers (NUSMW, etc.), metal mechanics (NSMM), clerks and computer staff (APEX), and the

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lock makers (NULM). The marrying of the AEEU and MSF in the AMICUS amalgamation in 2002 therefore combined two rather different approaches to transfers. As regards AMICUS’s initial and significant transfer activities, the transfer of UNIFI (150,000 members) in 2004 was the product of both the MSF’s and UNIFI’s plans for a single union in finance. It had a strategic pedigree and had been raised on a number of occasions in the previous 20 years. But in the pre-transfer process, AMICUS, and particularly the MSF and former AEEU officials negotiating the transfer, did not subject UNIFI to a detailed cost– benefit analysis, such as UNIFI had conducted prior to choosing AMICUS as its preferred partner. However, AMICUS did commission a ‘due diligence’ report that described UNIFI’s basic state, including its financial position, at the time of the transfer talks. In the same year, 2004, but without the pre-planning associated with the MSF’s and UNIFI’s search for a single union in finance, AMICUS also completed the transfer of the 100,000 members in the GPMU (printing, paper, and publishing), against very strong competition from the T&G. It differed from the UNIFI transfer in important strategic respects. In the absence of a territorial imperative—the degree of overlap between AMICUS’s maintenance craftsmen in printing and paper for the GPMU’s membership was minor compared with the common finance territory shared by the MSF and UNIFI—the appeal of the GPMU transfer, apart from adding substantial numbers, was conditioned by the two unions’ shared craft and political values. In this context, the unexpected election of the left-wing and engineering-based Derek Simpson to the general secretaryship of AMICUS in 2002 helped facilitate the transfer. By displacing the sitting general secretary, Sir Ken Jackson, formerly of the EETPU and an ultra-moderate politically, Simpson’s election helped the GPMU’s national leadership counter the objections of its disaffected local officials in the GPMU to joining AMICUS. For Sir Ken Jackson’s presence had served to remind the GPMU’s membership of the role played by the EETPU in the notorious ‘Wapping’ dispute between the GPMU and News International in 1985: the EETPU was vilified inside the GPMU for assisting News International win the 1985 dispute (Gennard 1990: 501–12). Hence, inherent factors, such as craft values and political identity, and an unexpected change in AMICUS’s leadership were the key to AMICUS’s successful bid for the GPMU’s transfer. The leading merger unions therefore displayed some noteworthy differences in their approach to transfers. In particular, the majority had well developed and formalized strategies. These included the GMB, ISTC, MSF (and its predecessor ASTMS), T&G, and UNIFI. But the GMB did not consistently pursue such a strategy over the 1978–2004 period, and the ISTC was a newcomer to the group. Hence, the MSF, T&G, and UNIFI had the most

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consistent and most formally organized strategic approach to transfers. The EETPU and the AEEU, on the other hand, were much less sophisticated in their merger strategy. They tended, apart from the period when the EETPU was outside the TUC and politically motivated in its merger searches, to follow an informal and more opportunistic strategy. In amalgamating to form AMICUS in 2002, the MSF and AEEU therefore brought two quite different approaches to subsequent transfers. In 2006, it was too soon to know which, if either, approach would be adopted by AMICUS, but the further amalgamation with the T&G in 2007 to form UNITE more or less guaranteed that this new mega union will embrace the expansionist traditions of its two main antecedents.

Major Unions’ Transfer Strategies: Summary and Conclusions As noted in the previous sections, minor transferring unions tended not to have formally prescribed strategies. In contrast, the leading merger unions tended to have formal strategies for transfers. Moreover, some major unions conducted detailed studies of the transferee and transferor choices available. Nevertheless, most major unions were also ready to act opportunistically if an unplanned transfer opening came to their notice, albeit guided by ‘takenfor-granted’ assumptions of what kind of minor union was an acceptable transferor. As regards transferee unions’ strategic purpose and process, these unions are best treated as composed by two separate groups. First, there were the 12 unions extant in 2004 that occasionally agreed on incoming transfer. Second, there was the smaller group of three leading merging unions (and their antecedents), which dominated the transfer market between 1978 and 2004. They absorbed 76% of all transfers. The first group’s territorial aspirations were largely to use transfers to consolidate or, in a minority of cases, defend their existing job territories by adding numbers that could result in an increase in their bargaining and political power. Hence, their strategy may be classified as consolidatory and power seeking. The second group of leading merger unions were similarly inclined to employ such an approach, but in addition they also actively sought some transfers that would help them diversify into new job territories. It was this strategy, classified as a territorially aggressive and expansionist strategy, that differentiated the leading merger unions from the rest. Also, as noted above, it was members of this latter group that had the more formalized transfer strategies. Transfers were, therefore, in some important respects treated as territorially strategic. However, even the leading merger unions, while very conscious of

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the territorial advantages associated with transfers, did not generally, prior to conducting transfer negotiations, assess in detail the consequences of a specific transfer for their own internal organization and services (the GMB was an exception to this general rule). Further, there appeared to be no retrospective assessment of the cumulative effect of transfers on the transferee union. One obvious reason for such a casual disregard of the non-territorial consequences of transfers was that most individual incoming transfers were too small to have much effect on the larger unions’ internal workings. In addition, there was a tendency amongst the leading merger unions for transfers to become habitual and not subject to individual scrutiny. However, the main reason for the absence of detailed pre-merger analysis appeared to be the assumption that either the negotiation of the transfer or the post-merger management of the transferring union would be sufficient to deal with any potential problems. The consequences for the leading merging unions relying on such an approach will be examined later, when examining transfer negotiations and their outcomes.

CONCLUSION: THE MERGER MARKET As may have been gathered from the above discussions, competition for transfers was not exceptional. As regards the demand for mergers, the 1989 and 2004 surveys of transferee unions (21 respondents in 1989 and 22 in 2004) showed that 37 or 57% of mergers reported by the above unions between 1978 and 1989 were subject to competitive bidding. The figures for the period 1990–2004 suggested that competition may have been slackening in the latter period as only 23 or 38% of mergers reported as completed between 1990 and 2004 were noted as competitive. But a number of unions were reluctant to discuss this issue and the data, as a result, probably understate markedly the degree of competition in this second period. The leading unions most likely to report facing competition for mergers successfully completed were BIFU (predecessor to UNIFI) which experienced competition in 6 (85%) of its 7 reported transfers, GMB 5 (83%) of 6, T&G 6 (60%) of 10, and ASTMS and MSF 9 (56%) of 16. In the 2004 survey, the T&G competed for 4 (80%) of its 5 transfers, the GMB 3 (50%) of 6, UNIFI 2 (50%) of 4, and MSF 7 (47%) of 15. As to which unions competed for the above consummated mergers, the most frequently cited competitors in 1989 were ASTMS and MSF combined with a total of 11 references, the T&G 9, AEU 7, EETPU 5, and BIFU 4. In 2004, it was generally the same unions, or their successors, that figured in

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the competition. The MSF had six references, T&G four, and the GMB three. In total, 16 and 17 unions were cited, respectively, as competing for mergers successfully completed between 1978 and 1989 and 1990 and 2004. Outside of the successfully concluded mergers, the 1989 and 2004 surveys also asked unions not completing a merger in the two periods examined, whether or not they had been approached for a merger. Such unions may be taken as representative of the ‘supply’ of unions likely to be approached by the leading merger unions for a transfer. In the 1989 survey, 49 or 70% of the 70 unions surveyed had not been directly involved in a merger between 1978 and 1989, and the comparative figures for 1990–2004 were 42 or 65% of the 65 unions surveyed. However, of the 49 unions in this ‘no merger’ category in 1989, 27 (55%) had been approached for a merger. The 27 approached noted that six unions had made unsuccessful multiple bids: the GMB (9), ASTMS/MSF (8) and the T&G (7), APEX (4), ISTC (2), and EETPU (2). In 2004 and covering the period 1990–2004, the 42 non-merger unions surveyed reported marginally diminished merger activity. Of the 42, 18 (42%) were approached by a named union seeking their transfer (four additional unions noted that they had been approached in two cases by seven unions, but they refused to name the unions involved). Again the GMB, two references, the T&G, two, and UNIFI, two, were the most active in unsuccessfully searching for mergers. It was clear from interviews, that in transfers with multiple approaches, the leaders of the minor merging unions were adept at playing one union off against another. Sometimes, this resulted in relatively open contests as the leaders asked their delegate conferences, or the members, to choose between different offers. For example, prior to FTAT’S 1993 transfer to the GMB, FTAT’S delegate conference was asked to choose between offers from the GMB and the T&G. Also, more recently, the GPMU’s transfer to AMICUS in 2004 was preceded by a membership consultative ballot on the merits of AMICUS’s and the T&G’s offers. In other potential transfers, the national leaders held exploratory talks with several unions and then recommended a particular course of action to their executive. This was the case, for example, in the CMA’s transfer to the MSF in 1998. The CMA’s leadership explored several options, including two public-sector unions, the PTC and IPMS, before opting for the predominantly private-sector MSF. There was, therefore, a merger market that led to competitive approaches for many of the transfers completed in the period under review (of which at least half were formally acknowledged). Some unions, such as UNIFI, MSF, GMB, and at one stage the EETPU, also made periodic general enquiries of staff associations and unions regarding possible interest in transfers. In

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addition, some minor unions, particularly those in the GFTU, reported being regularly approached informally at conferences and other meetings by union leaders searching for transfers. There were, therefore, in addition to transfers actually completed, many approaches that were abortive. Clearly, if minor unions were set on a geographic concentration merger, then this would largely be free of competitive pressures as the path was largely preordained. But for the rest, the territorial overlap between the leading merger unions and the presence of the specialist national unions that could claim a particular expertise in the minor unions’ job territory, normally provided the minor unions with a degree of merger choice. How the ‘market’ shaped transfer negotiations and subsequently impacted on the merged unions’ performance will be discussed in the following two chapters.

4 Transfer Negotiations INTRODUCTION This chapter examines inter-union negotiation strategies and tactics as employed in transfers. As will be demonstrated, the different negotiating contexts and strategies had a significant impact on the overall process and outcomes of merging. The following, first, establishes the framework for assessing the contextual factors exercising most influence over the merging partners’ bargaining power. Second, this framework is used to cluster the unions’ transfers according to the partners’ relative status and the presence or absence of competitive bids. Third, the type of negotiation issues is discussed by reference to political objectives and means, democratic ethos and government, and administration. In addition, the question of the leaders’ imperatives as expressed in the negotiations over the terms and conditions of the minor unions’ leaders will be considered. Last, there is a summary and conclusion.

BARGAINING POWER AND THE CONTEXTUAL FACTORS In general, inter-union transfer negotiations took the form of integrative or win–win bargaining (Walton and McKersie 1965) and involved two unions seeking a mutually advantageous settlement and possibly synergy. However, there could be important elements of distributive or win–lose negotiations. For example, the minor unions could claim more seats on the major union’s national executive committee than it was willing to offer. In such situations, there could be ‘trade-offs’ in search of a compromise agreement that was not ideal for either party. Alternatively, if the issue was a major source of conflict, then it could be avoided and put to one side for resolution after the merger had been formally completed. As indicated by Martin (1992: 26–7), one of the most productive ways of analysing the parties’ relative bargaining power is through the use of dependency theories. These focus attention on the degree of the parties’

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inter-dependence, that is, the extent to which either party relies on the other for achieving their bargaining objectives. This, in turn, raises questions about the relative level of commitment of either party towards a particular outcome and the availability of alternative solutions. If one of the parties is not particularly committed to the outcome, or has access to alternative solutions, the bargaining power of the other party, other things remaining equal, is diminished. Thus, the power of the merger negotiators can be seen as a function primarily of their unions’ relative resources and their commitment to (or need for) a particular merger. The latter consideration was strongly influenced in transfers by the existence of alternative merger partners or the option of remaining independent: without such alternatives the minor union concerned was pressured to reach agreement with its chosen partner. In other words, the existence of a good BATNA (Fisher and Ury: 1981), that is, the best alternative to a negotiated agreement, was clearly of considerable significance in merger negotiations. In assessing the transferor and transferee unions’ relative resources, objective considerations such as membership size, financial standing, and the type or grade of members clearly contribute to the assessment. But, more subjective considerations such as the negotiators’ perceptions of the standing of a union’s leading officials, its historic role in the labour movement, and its influence within the TUC and/or Labour Party could also be taken into account. Such objective and subjective considerations will, in this analysis, be seen in combination as determining the relative status of the merger partners. It is possible therefore to view a merger between unions which differ so much in terms of status that, although they both freely chose to take the other as their partner, one may be taken as being the dominant partner in the negotiations. Such dominant partner negotiations included all the transfers studied. However, such transfers varied in the degree of dominance enjoyed by the major partner. The transfer of a very small staff association to a major union, for example, the Labour Organisers Union (NULO) of some 150 member to the GMB with 877,000 members, provides an extreme case of dominant partner merger. In contrast, the transfer of the historically important and wealthy Tailors & Garment Workers (NUTGW) with 73,122 members to the same union, while still representing a dominant partner merger, was clearly one in which the GMB’s dominance was, by comparison with NULO’s transfer, more muted. Thus, in our categorization, dominant partner mergers were the product of negotiations in which, pre-merger, one partner had an innate and distinct status advantage over the other, even if the extent of this advantage varied between the different merger partners. Transfers in Figure 4.1 are therefore located in the Dominant Partner half of the Balanced Partner to Dominant Partner continuum. As for the second

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Transfer Negotiations EFFECTIVE COMPETITION QUADRANT 4

QUADRANT 1

A) TRANSFERS. No transfers

A) TRANSFERS. Most white collar assimilation and cognate trade transfers

BALANCED PARTNERS

DOMINANT PARTNERS

A) TRANSFERS. No transfers

A) TRANSFERS. Geographic concentration & the remaining white collar assimilation & cognate trade transfers

QUADRANT 3

QUADRANT 2


Figure 4.1. Dominant partner transfers under different degrees of competition

(vertical) continuum, which divides unions into those facing effective merger competition and those with no competitors, transfers can be found in both quadrants 1 and 2. But, as shown in Figure 4.1, most of the white-collar assimilation transfers and around half of the cognate trade transfers studies were competitive. The geographic concentration mergers and the remaining white-collar assimilation and cognate trade transfers were non-competitive. The following discussion starts by examining transfers in quadrant 1 (dominant partner and competitive).

TRANSFER NEGOTIATIONS: QUADRANT 1 Quadrant 1, dominant partner transfers with some degree of effective competition, was largely composed of unions in the white-collar assimilation and cognate trade merger streams. Minor unions in both streams generally had the opportunity to ‘shop around’ for a major merger partner, even though most sought a partner which organized in their existing job territory. In the process of negotiating such transfers, different dimensions of union behaviour were


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addressed. These will now be examined by reference to political objectives and means, democratic ethos and government, administration (including finance), and the leaders’ imperatives. As regards political objectives and means, transferors, if they had a strong political or ideological preference, tended to combine both territorial and political considerations in their merger search. For much of the period, this pointed the minor left-wing, or militant, unions towards AUEW-TASS or T&G, rather than the more moderate AEU, EETPU, and GMB. For those white-collar assimilation transferors in finance that wished to maintain their political neutrality, BIFU and subsequently UNIFI, both unaffiliated to the Labour Party, frequently proved more attractive than the affiliated MSF. But, as regards the negotiation of transfers, the question of ideological bias tended to condition the minor union’s preference, as between competing partners, rather than figuring in the main negotiation over the terms of the transfer. For example, when the GLSA opened exploratory talks in 1987 with the GMB, NALGO, and the T&G, those with NALGO and the T&G collapsed over a combination of issues, including the GLSA’s preference for the moderate GMB, rather than the more left-inclined NALGO and T&G (Sadiq 1994: 39). The issues of collective bargaining, particularly the provision of bargaining services, were addressed in a number of negotiations. For the white-collar transferors in particular, the expertise offered in this field by the competing major unions was an important consideration in their assessment of their potential partners’ offers, as they looked for advice on how to respond to more sophisticated management practices. As in the case of NORSA’s (Northern Rock Building Society staff association’s) transfer to BIFU in 1989, most staff associations wanted to acquire the bargaining expertise and improved services of a national union. In this instance, BIFU offered a dedicated full-time officer to advise and work with the staff association when required, while still giving it autonomy over its bargaining activities (Hodges 1994: A38–A43). In similar fashion, questions as to which major partner offered the best membership benefits could also form part of the negotiation. For example, the MSF’s and PTC’s competitive bidding for the transfer of the CMA led to improved death benefits for the CMA’s members. In this case the MSF, which did not have such a benefit for its own members, topped the PTC’s offer. Similarly, the NUTGW’s transfer to the GMB in 1991 saw the NUTGW keep a funeral and death benefit higher than that available to the GMB’s own members. However, negotiations over members’ benefits did not usually appear to generate ‘sticking-points’ over which the negotiation would be won or lost by the competing major unions. Generally, the minor unions were satisfied when their benefits were ‘levelled-up’ to those of the major union in the course of the negotiations.

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As regards the minor unions’ political interests as affected by joining an organization affiliated to the TUC or Labour Party, these did not usually generate much debate in transfer negotiations. Most of the non-TUC-affiliated transferors were pleased to join the TUC, but less enthusiastic regarding the Labour Party: the latter could normally be avoided by opting out of the political levy. As for the larger transferors already in the TUC and Labour Party pre-transfer, special arrangements were sometimes negotiated to recognize their status in both organizations. For example, the Dyers and Bleachers on transferring to the T&G in 1982 successfully negotiated its own separate affiliation to both TUC and Labour Party, albeit for a limited period. Also, UNIFI and the GPMU on joining AMICUS in 2004 negotiated a continued presence for both unions’ leaders at the TUC and for the GPMU’s general secretary in representing the union in discussions with the Labour Party. Overall, therefore, arguments over political objectives and means did not normally play a dominant, or even significant, role in determining the outcome of major unions’ competitive transfer bids. If the transferor or transferee were ideologically incompatible, then the negotiations either did not start or were aborted at an early stage. Nevertheless, the provision of collective bargaining services and membership benefits could generate competitive bids and occasionally they played a part in securing the transfer for the major parties willing to meet the minor unions’ demands. But, as will be discussed below, these were generally secondary considerations as compared to questions of union government. Issues of democratic ethos were not much in evidence in transfers, unlike amalgamations, but questions regarding government structure were at the centre of the minor unions’ negotiation agendas. Indeed, it was essential for the major union to offer at least some degree of autonomy to the transferor unions, operating under effective competition, in order to figure in the subsequent detailed merger negotiations. For, as the AEU’s failure to secure any transfer of note between 1978 and 1992 demonstrated, if the major unions had no trade groups or other autonomous sections, there was little chance of competing successfully for transfers. AUEW-TASS (subsequently MSF) exploited, inter alia, this weakness in the AEU’s government structure to bid successfully (against the AEU) for the NUSMW (sheet-metal workers) in 1983, APAC (pattern-makers) in 1984, and NSMM (metal mechanics) in 1985. It was only following the restructuring of the AEU, after merging with the EETPU in 1992 to form the AEEU, that the successors to the AEU found themselves competing on equal terms for the incoming transfers of minor unions. After further restructuring, following the formation of AMICUS in 2002, the changes again paid off as AMICUS in 2004 completed the incoming transfers of UNIFI


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and the GPMU, against, in the latter’s case, aggressive competition from the T&G. The two long-standing conglomerate unions, the T&G and GMB, also regularly competed against each other for cognate trade transfers. The GMB, when it employed its expansionist strategy, in the later 1980s and early 1990s, had a temporary governmental advantage over the T&G. The T&G in this period tended to offer a deal that subsumed the incoming minor union in one of its existing trade groups. This often required the incoming minor union’s leaders and members to play a secondary role to the existing trade group secretary and members. In contrast, the GMB in forming new sections to accommodate the incoming unions provided both a higher degree of autonomy and a greater status to the incoming union. Largely, as a consequence, the GMB secured the transfer of the NUTGW (Tailor and Garment Workers) in 1991 and FTAT (Furniture and Timber Trades) in 1993 against the T&G’s competing bids. Also the NUTGW preferred the GMB to joining the newly formed National Union of Knitwear, Footwear and Apparel Trades (NUKFAT) with which it had a much closer territorial affinity. Further, the GMB made both the NUTGW and FTAT ‘Rule Book’ mergers, that is, their rights were enshrined in the GMB’s rule book. As a consequence, their autonomy was secured, in some critical areas, against subsequent unilateral policy changes by the parent union. Such long-term guarantees of security for transferors were, however, rather exceptional. The MSF and UNIFI followed a similar route to the T&G and GMB in restructuring their governance to assist their assimilations of white-collar staff associations and, in the MSF’s case, to attract some of the cognate trade transferors away from the AEEU, GMB, and T&G. Sections in UNIFI tended to provide the transferors with collective bargaining autonomy, while retaining general policymaking at the centre of the union. However, the MSF went further than most competitors by also offering some incoming transferors a very high degree of policymaking autonomy, retention of their separate officers and their own national conference. In winning the competition for the transfers of Lufthansa Staff Association UK in 1999, the Corporation of London Staff Association in 1999, and Leicester Housing Association Staff Association in 2001 the MSF put its negotiation success in all three cases down to offering ‘full autonomy’ (interview). In a similar deal the CMA, on transfer to MSF in 1998, concluded a three-year service level agreement with the MSF. Under this deal, the CMA saw itself functioning much as it had pre-transfer, with the option, after three years, of leaving the MSF with the CMA’s funds intact, should its members be dissatisfied with the arrangements. The NUIW’s transfer to the MSF in 1999 also offered the NUIW ‘the best of both worlds. We continued to enjoy a high level of industrial autonomy, retained substantial assets, gained

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access to all the benefits of belonging to a larger organization’ (interview). The CMA considered the precedent for such transfers to the MSF had been set by the HVA’s agreement, made with the MSF in 1990, which saw the financially destitute HVA largely retain its own structure and organization in the MSF, after a highly competitive bidding process. As a result of the above pressures to restructure their government structures, all the leading merging unions had, by the end of the 1990s, adopted sectional or group structures within which transferor unions could exercise similarly high levels of autonomy over their own affairs, particularly their collective bargaining activities. In many cases, the major unions also gave the transferor unions control over their own branch structures and conferences. This added to the complexity of union government as such structures were usually imposed on the major unions’ existing geographic structure which included the MSF’s highly decentralized form of government, the GMB’s regionalized system and the T&G’s more centralized scheme of organization. By the late 1990s, the major merging unions had therefore largely exhausted the scope for gaining competitive advantage by further structural reform. There was, however, still an opportunity to offer a number of other government incentives to secure a transfer. One option was to make the period of autonomy more attractive. For example, in the T&G, in its talks with the NULMW (lock and metal workers union) in 2004, a five-year transitional term was offered in some areas of government. This included guaranteeing reserved seats on the T&G’s national executive for five years, after which the NULMW’s members would stand for election to the executive in competition with other members. It was also common to find competing offers regarding the number of executive seats allocated to the transferred unions. For example, the GPMU in 2005 was offered six executive seats by both the T&G and AMICUS. As noted by the GMB ‘one legacy of mergers is a larger executive’ (interview). Issues associated with union government also frequently raised questions regarding the role and responsibilities of full-time officials. These questions were sometimes amongst the most difficult to resolve during the merger negotiations. However, when the transferor union had a BATNA, that is, it could approach other political partners for a transfer, it could successfully press the case for special and favourable treatment. For example, UNIFI, in its transfer to AMICUS, looked to secure its own regional officers’ commitment to servicing UNIFI members. In this case, AMICUS’s preference was for the incoming UNIFI full-time officials to report to AMICUS’s senior regional officials. A compromise agreement was reached that gave UNIFI a five-year period in which its regional officers would remain under UNIFI’s senior


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officials’ control. Subsequently, the GPMU, which was familiar with UNIFI’s transfer agreements, secured a similar five-year deal with AMICUS covering its regional officials. Such detailed discussions were the ‘meat’ in negotiations over union government, and they were at the centre of many competitive transfer negotiations. Turning next to questions regarding administration, and particularly finance, as noted previously many of the minor merging unions were in financial difficulties, but some had considerable assets, including properties. Not surprisingly, therefore, financial issues became negotiable issues in a number of competitive transfers. Further, the poor financial state of many of the major merging unions did not appear to influence consistently the offers made to potential transferors. The main issues raised tended to be the debts or assets of the transferor, the level of subscriptions, and control over the income generated and properties. As for the debts of transferor unions, most major unions were not deterred by such consideration, if they could see some larger, say territorial, advantage. Indeed, as noted previously the HVA (Health Visitors Association) had several suitors, even though it had some £1 million plus debts. The MSF, which won the contest for the HVA’s transfer, also had a substantial deficit at the time (1990) of the transfer (see Table 3.5). In this, as in many other cases, it appeared that because the dominant partner was so much larger than the incoming minor union, it was assumed that the major union could absorb and resolve the financial deficits that came with many transferor unions without any great difficulties. Also, if the major unions wished to secure the transfers against competitive bids, they did not appear to examine too closely the incoming union’s financial difficulties or the related issue of its claimed membership figures. Due diligence reports, unless they showed the minor union to be in very serious difficulties, were generally sufficient to gain the minor union’s financial acceptance. In the case of transferor unions that were not in financial difficulties, these tended to want to protect themselves against ‘asset stripping’ by the major unions. Also, some minor unions with higher subscription rates than the dominant partner sought to maintain the higher rate and to retain the surplus so generated for their own use: a number of transferors to the MSF and GMB came into this category. For example, the MPOU on joining the GMB in 2001 secured an agreement to keep the higher rate and the associated surplus, as did the NUIW on joining the MSF. But such deals were rather exceptional. It was generally agreed by transferors in less favourable circumstances that subscription rates, and associated membership benefits, would be harmonized at the point of transfer or soon afterwards, with the minor union accepting the subscriptions and benefits of the major unions.

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This could also help ‘sell’ the merger to the transferors’ membership particularly if, as in the case of the GPMU’s transfer to AMICUS in 2004, the GPMU’s subscription rate of some £3 a week was reduced to AMICUS’s rate of £2.12 per week (if the GPMU had transferred to the competing T&G the subscription would have been £2.10 per week). Because the GPMU was already in financial difficulties with a subscription rate of £3, such a reduction appeared generous. However, in possible compensation for such a reduction, the transfer also dealt with a major source of the GPMU’s financial difficulties. The financial autonomy of former SOGAT branches that had seen them collect the unions’ subscriptions and retain some 50% of such income for their own use was curtailed. As a result, the national union asserted its authority over both the collection and allocation of the GPMU’s branches’ subscription income. As to the question of the leaders’ imperatives and their place in merger negotiations, this will be discussed by reference to the minor unions’ negotiators’ vested interests in their terms and conditions of employment, careers, and roles as full-time officials in the now merged union. These issues were critical for virtually all merger negotiations. Clearly, union officials were not inclined to accept compulsory redundancy or reduction in their status and salaries on transferring to a larger union. It was not therefore surprising that it was standard practice for the major unions to offer a ‘no-compulsory’ redundancy clause in the transfer agreement. However, in competitive transfers it was also possible for the major union to seek a bargaining advantage from such concerns by offering better personal terms to the incoming officials than those proposed by the alternative partner. Such proposals could obviously raise questions amongst lay activists and full-time officials about the propriety of such offers. For example, it was thought by some members of the GPMU that one faction’s support for a transfer to the T&G, rather than AMICUS, was influenced by the different voluntary redundancy terms on offer. In this case, the T&G was offering a scheme that did not ‘cap’ the amount of redundancy money available. In contrast, AMICUS’s proposal limited the maximum sum available to two years’ salary. The T&G’s offer was thought to appeal strongly to the GPMU’s long-serving branch officials. In the event, the GPMU, via an indicative ballot of the membership, and on the strong recommendation of the national leadership, voted for a transfer to AMICUS. Terms and conditions of employment of transferor full-time officials were also enhanced in many mergers. This was perhaps most noticeably the case when a cognate trade transfer involved a specialist national union joining one of the conglomerate unions. FTAT (furniture and timber trades), on seeking a transfer with either the T&G or GMB in 1992–3, was a case in


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point. FTAT’s full-time officials were on a comparatively low salary (they tied officials’ salaries to the industry rate), and they were therefore almost certain to gain a marked increase in salary whichever large union they chose as their transfer partner. In opting for the GMB, one of the higher-paying major unions, the officials’ salaries approximately doubled (interview). This in turn reflected the general tendency for transferor unions’ full-time officials’ terms and conditions of employment to be harmonized upwards to the level of the transferee union. Similarly, the smaller white-collar unions’ officials could be offered different personal deals by competing major unions. For example, the leading official of the Royal Liver and Composite section (NUIW), in negotiations over a transfer to either ASTMS, BIFU or APEX, was offered different employment packages by the competing unions. In this case, the deal finally struck in 1982 (with BIFU) was not made with the union offering the best personal package (Hodges 1994: A17). An exception to deals that generally improved officials’ terms and conditions was the EPIU’s transfer to the T&G in 1995. The EPIU’s three full-time officials all took a cut in salary down to the level of comparable officials in the T&G. Career aspirations, dependent at least initially on the roles that full-time officials and lay activists could expect to fill in the transferee union, similarly generated opportunities for counter-bidding by the transferee unions. If the transferor union was of the size to have a general secretary and several fulltime officials, all had to be assured of a role in the transferee union (assuming they did not opt for redundancy or retirement). In such transfers, the leading full-time officials would generally be given comparable roles in the appropriate trade group, sector, section, or national branch of the major union. In exceptional cases, involving the largest of the transferor unions, the general secretary could also be offered the post of deputy general secretary of the transferee union. The assistant general secretary of such transferor unions could expect a similar high-ranking job in the transferee union. The UNIFI and GPMU transfers to AMICUS produced this kind of settlement. Also the transferor unions’ lay activists could expect guaranteed seats, probably for a limited period of three to four years, on the larger union’s lay national executive. Finally, on the importance of the leaders’ imperatives in competitive mergers, the sympathetic handling of the ambitions of the minor partners’ leaders was of considerable importance in securing a deal. Attitudinal structuring (Walton and McKersie 1965) and the associated development of high-trust relationships played an important part in persuading general secretaries of minor unions to accept a comparatively lesser role in the larger union. For the transferor’s leaders, if they become disaffected, could readily turn to the competitor unions for an alternative agreement. In several cases,

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it was reported that a failure to give a minor union’s leader the respect that was expected led to a breakdown in such negotiations. For example, the absence of the T&G’s leading officials in negotiations with ATWU and FTAT, both of which joined the GMB, was considered a factor in helping the GMB secure these transfers. In contrast, the MSF’s assiduous courting of the CMA’s and NUIW’s leadership was central to these unions’ transfers to the MSF. In conclusion, regarding dominant partner unions with some degree of effective competition, the successful conclusion of such merger negotiations was not primarily dependent on the dominant partners’ inherent size or status advantages. The existence of competitors gave transferor unions, and particularly those indifferent to the major unions’ territorial and ideological identities, an element of choice that helped them negotiate from a position of some bargaining power. Further, as the major merging unions, by the end of the period, offered similar degrees of autonomy to the transferor unions, bargaining opportunities shifted into different areas of union government, administration, and the leaders’ imperatives. A minor union could, therefore, if it so wished, explore what terms were available in such areas by opening parallel discussions with competing unions (there was no evidence that the major unions collaborated to counter this activity). Putting a package deal together that covered such a range of issues was obviously complex and offered the negotiators the opportunity to exchange advances in one area for concessions in another. Each deal on offer therefore differed in some respects, because of the different weights given to the various elements and the negotiators’ bargaining skills. However, the result was broadly decided in the same way in each case, that is, the relative generosity of the competing major unions was vital in determining which major union the transferor union decided to join. Such generosity included, inter alia, settling debts, increasing the number of executive members, overlaying the unions’ existing structure with new decision-making bodies, for example, sectional conferences, offering attractive redundancy and early retirement terms, and finding jobs of the appropriate status and salary for the incoming officials. For some major unions, beating the competition was also an important consideration, which affected their bidding behaviour. Further, because transfer negotiations did not culminate in a ballot of the major unions’ members, the terms and conditions of the deal were not subject to the same internal scrutiny as applied to amalgamations. Also the extent to which costly precedents could be set which would influence subsequent transfer terms did not seem to carry much weight. In this process, the leading transferee unions therefore appeared to pay little, if any, attention to the cumulative financial costs of their transfer deals.


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TRANSFER NEGOTIATIONS: QUADRANT 2 Transfers concluded in quadrant 2 (dominant partner mergers with little or no effective competition) tended to produce the least contentious set of negotiations. Both the transferor and the dominant partner generally had strong attachments to a particular merger which was thought to offer clear advantages to both parties. In the case of the very small number of unions in the geographic concentration stream of mergers, the minor union organized at the district or regional level naturally progressed to the national union specializing in its field. As for the transferor unions in the cognate trade or white-collar assimilation merger streams that were not subject to competitive bids, they normally had very strong preferences for a merger with a larger union organizing in, or very close to, their own particular job territory. In addition, a relatively small number of transferor unions had strong ideological preferences that narrowed their merger options and resulted in them joining a specific dominant union chosen for its ideological character: a majority of the 14 transferors joining the EETPU between 1989 and 1992 came into this category. As described in interview, some were breakaway unions which other major unions affiliated to the TUC ‘would not touch with a barge pole’. Hence, such minor unions had little choice when seeking a transfer but to join the ultra-moderate and (at the time) non-TUC affiliated EETPU. Competitive bidding could also be eliminated, or greatly reduced, by the dominant union incrementally integrating the potential transferor into its sphere of influence prior to a formal merger. Several transfers were the product of such pre-merger activity. The MSF and BIFU (later UNIFI), in particular, developed close working relationships with several potential transferor unions well in advance of any formal merger proposals. In the MSF’s case, this was to ‘impress them with our knowledge of the industry and the advantage of working with the MSF’ (in interview). This included inviting officers of the potential transferor to conferences and seminars run by the MSF and providing research services and other assistance. BIFU followed a similar strategy, as did the EEPTU which in the 1980s formed a Council of Managerial and Professional Staffs (COMPS) for staff associations and professional bodies interested in drawing on the EETPU’s services. Such initiatives helped build higher levels of trust between the major and minor unions prior to opening formal merger negotiations. It also served to exclude other major unions and hence potential bidders, from building similar ‘close relationships’ with such merger targets. But, while such pre-merger activities helped secure a ‘competition-free’ merger negotiation, they did not necessarily reduce the costs of merging as compared with competitive mergers. For, if the dominant partner was strongly committed to securing a particular merger, and the

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minor partner was prepared to remain independent if certain conditions were not met, the dominant union still needed to negotiate, rather than dictate the terms of the merger. In such transfer negotiations, issues associated with political objectives and means were, as in quadrant 1, of little consequence for the merger negotiations. Ideological bias, as in the case of the EETPU’s search for transfers between 1990 and 1992, shaped the merger search rather than merger negotiations. As regards collective bargaining issues and representation at the TUC or Labour Party, these were normally resolved amicably in the merger negotiation. Further, if the transferor had developed a close working relationship with the major union pre-merger, then they would also have clarified many of their collective bargaining questions prior to actual transfer. For example, the Bank of England Staff Organization’s (BESO) transfer to BIFU in 1987 had been preceded by two years’ cooperation, during which BIFU had helped BESO address changes in pay review, shift working, and autonomy in the Bank of England; subsequently, it also agreed to include BESO’s leader in BIFU’s delegation to the TUC. As regards membership services and benefits these, as in quadrant 1, tended to be levelled upwards, although if the minor union had exceptionally good benefits (sometimes associated with a higher-subscription rate), these could be ring-fenced and reserved for the minor union and not used as a precedent to raise benefits within the dominant union. For example, the EETPU allowed its transferors, if they had a higher rate of subscription pre-merger, to retain whatever surplus this generated and use it to enhance its own services. As regards questions of democratic ethos and government, the transferor unions were again generally able to negotiate a high degree of autonomy in the field of collective bargaining, but they largely merged into the major unions’ existing government structure in terms of general policymaking. If they warranted it, in terms of size, they could also secure seats on the relevant representative bodies. However, in the EETPU, during its politically inspired and expansionist transfers of the early 1990s, transferors were given considerably more autonomy. The formation of the Federation of Professional Associations (FPA) in 1990 provided the incoming minor unions with an umbrella organization which largely functioned outside the EETPU’s more traditional government structure. Hence, disparate transferors such as the Institute of Journalists, the Prison Service Union, and the Television and Film Production Employees Association were somewhat isolated from the main body of electricians and plumbers. Administrative and financial issues were addressed in a similar fashion in quadrant 2 as discussed above for quadrant 1. As put by the ISTC, which concluded two small non-competitive and expansionist transfers as it sought


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to make itself a ‘community union’, if they were not ‘basket cases’ financially, transferors were not rejected on financial grounds (interview). Hence, the relatively wealthy ISTC agreed transfers with the financially troubled union for the disabled (NLBD) and the Kidderminster Carpet Workers (PLCW and TWU) in 2000. As with most, if not all, major unions accepting transfers from small largely impoverished transferors, the reasoning was that if the minor union was wanted for territorial or political reasons, the major union would deal with any consequent financial problems, post-merger. Last, as regards quadrant 2 transfers, questions over the leaders’ imperatives were an important element in such negotiations, but, obviously, they were not subject to counter-bidding from competing unions. Nevertheless, care was taken by the major unions to give the minor unions’ leaders the assurances they required regarding their treatment in the bigger union. Hence, transferors were normally guaranteed no compulsory redundancies and full-time officials salaries and conditions were generally harmonized upwards to the level of compatible officials in the major union. If they enjoyed more favourable terms and conditions, then these were usually ‘red circled’ and thus maintained for the remaining period of the relevant officials’ employment. In summary, as regards quadrant 2 (dominant partner transfers with no effective competition), the success of merger negotiations in this quadrant, as compared to quadrant 1, rested less on the generosity of the major merging unions and more on the partners’ shared territorial or ideological interests. Moreover, the use of pre-merger close working agreements helped build hightrust relationships that eased the subsequent merger negotiations. Nevertheless, if the minor unions could opt to remain independent, rather than merge, they still retained some bargaining power. Also, if the dominant unions sought some significant advantage from a specific merger they were prepared to negotiate concessions rather than forgo the merger. Further, because the major union did not wish to appear patronizing, and thus put the relationship in jeopardy, they were committed to making agreements acceptable to the minor unions’ negotiators. Hence, even minor unions in financial difficulties struck what appeared from the outside to be favourable deals.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS The transfer negotiations were generally conducted in a cooperative manner. The major and dominant partner did not usually impose solutions on the minor partner in either competitive or non-competitive transfers. Indeed, the major partner, once it had determined that a particular transfer was an

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attractive proposition, mainly on territorial or political grounds, appeared to respond to the minor union’s agenda rather than negotiate according to some pre-planned scheme to integrate the minor union post-merger. Further, the presence of competing major unions enhanced the minor unions’ inherent bargaining power (the option of remaining independent) and in some cases helped the minor unions improve significantly the terms offered by the successful major union. This was probably most influential when the major union was also seeking to prevent the competitor union securing a particular transfer, rather than just seeking the transfer for its own purposes. Competitive bids putting the T&G against the GMB, and the MSF against BIFU, were likely to give the negotiators this additional incentive to win the contest. Moreover, the leading major unions’ negotiators, largely free of the need to convince their wider membership of the value of the transfer (there was no ballot of the major unions’ members) and operating in a climate which assumed transfers were ‘good’, had considerable discretion to meet the minor unions’ demands. Also, because most minor unions were so small, the cost of meeting a single transferor’s needs was itself likely to be negligible compared to the cost of running the larger union, but the cumulative cost of such transfers and the precedent set for future transfers were not so insignificant. In the above competitive environment, the main source of a major union’s competitive advantage at the start of the 1978 and 2006 period had been the level of autonomy unions such as the T&G and ASTMS could provide for the minor unions. But by the 1990s, similar government structures, providing similar levels of autonomy, were common to all the leading merger unions. Hence the merger unions’ competitive advantage tended to be found in other considerations. As a result, bargaining over other inducements, such as additional seats on the larger union’s executive and conference, or improvements in benefits, and the leaders’ imperatives, could determine the success of negotiations. The ‘relative generosity’ of the major competing unions thus influenced critically the outcome of many of the negotiations in quadrant 1. As a result, some minor unions gained concessions that appeared disproportionately favourable, given their financial difficulties. The dominant partners in quadrant 2 (no effective competition) should therefore have had an advantage, vis-à-vis the minor unions, not available to them in quadrant 1. In this different context, they should have completed mergers at a lower cost. This was particularly the case when the merger appeared preordained (geographic concentration stream) or primed by premerger close working agreements. Also, the common territorial or political interests of the partners in this quadrant helped oil the merger process.


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However, unless it was in extreme financial difficulties the transferor could still opt to stay independent, instead of merging. It therefore retained some bargaining power. Further, the dominant partner, probably in the interests of building a high-trust relationship in the longer-term, did not generally exploit its inherent bargaining advantage in the merger negotiations. Instead, they appeared to ‘indulge’ the minor union rather than adopt a more distributive and therefore divisive bargaining strategy. As in the case of competitive transfers, the major union seemed to assume any resulting difficulties could be resolved post-merger.

5 Transfers: Post-Merger Performance INTRODUCTION In this chapter, the post-merger performance of both the minor (transferor) and major (transferee) unions and the factors influencing that performance are discussed. It is important, however, to note first that the context in which the unions operated post-merger was not static: there was no holding other things equal. Further, in studying different mergers’ performances over the 1978–2006 period some have been monitored at intervals over 15 or more years, while more recent mergers have only been traced over a year or so. In studying such changes in a dynamic environment, care therefore needs to be taken in declaring specific changes the result of the transfer, rather than the product of some extraneous event. Similarly, a more recent merger may not be sufficiently developed to allow a judgement on its likely and eventual success or failure. Hence care needs to be taken in commenting on the origin and values of changes in the post-merger unions’ behaviour. Due scepticism also needs to be applied when assessing the claims made by respondents to the surveys and interviewees regarding the benefits of their particular mergers. The following will discuss, first, transferors’ and, second, transferees’ performances. Such outcomes will be measured against the previously established framework of job territories, political objectives and means, democratic ethos and government, and administration. In addition, the leaders’ imperatives will be discussed, where relevant.

MINOR UNIONS: THE OUTCOMES AND THE CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS It is sufficient, as regards the minor or transferor unions’ territorial interests, to note that despite generally continuing to decline post-transfer, particularly if in the geographic concentration and cognate trade merger streams, some of

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the larger cognate transferors initially secured a nominal ‘increase’ in membership. This was most noticeably the case when a transferor both acquired a new section, trade group, or national branch in the dominant partner’s organization and an agreement that the dominant partner would decant part of its existing membership into the transferor’s new section. For example, on UNIFI’s and the GPMU’s transfers to AMICUS in 2004, the dominant partner transferred some 50,000 finance members into the finance sector formed by UNIFI and 20,000 or so members into the print, paper, and publishing section designed for the GPMU. As both UNIFI and the GPMU expected to function as largely autonomous units inside AMICUS for at least five years following their transfers, such additions were particularly welcome. Similar ‘decanting’ practices were also followed in the GMB and T&G, following the transfer of a relatively large union. But, generally, the smaller transferor saw responsibility for future territorial changes shift more rapidly to the dominant partner. Hence, the territorial consequences of transfers will be given more attention in the third section of this chapter when discussing the major unions’ outcomes. In terms of political objectives and means, the transferors, which tended to join unions sharing the same ideological bias, largely benefited from their transfer to dominant partner unions. Capital ‘P’ political gains were particularly important for the white-collar assimilation transferors, and they duly received the legitimating imprint of the TUC via their transfers to such affiliated unions as BIFU, UNIFI and the MSF. In most cognate trade transfers, the transferor was already affiliated to the TUC and whatever had been agreed regarding transitory arrangements was implemented. For example, UNIFI’s and the GPMU’s leaders both retained their roles inside the TUC and (for the GPMU) in the Labour Party, and both no doubt benefited by speaking for AMICUS, rather than their original smaller unions. Collective bargaining arrangements and the transferors’ bargaining powers were either initially little affected by merger, mainly because of the high degrees of autonomy agreed with the partner unions, or improved post-merger. The most noticeable beneficiaries were again the white-collar assimilation transferors. They gained expertise in the form of experienced negotiators and funds to support industrial action. As the officials in BESO recognized, after its transfer to BIFU, the merger gave substance to its threats of industrial action. In some instances, the larger cognate trade transferors, making the ‘book’ gain in membership, noted above, also increased their industrial muscle. For, their absorption of the dominant partners’ existing cognate membership, in, for example, the GMB, T&G, and AMICUS, succeeded in ending divided representation in areas where they faced a common employer. Hence, the transferor in its new guise could expect greater

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solidarity; in particular, UNIFI’s transfer to AMICUS achieved such improvements across a number of companies in the finance sector. In addition, the most assured political advantage secured by the smaller of the transferor unions was improved membership services and benefits. Many gained a dedicated full-time official to help with individual cases and, as the NUIW’s general secretary commented, the most important gain was the ‘integrated package of benefits’ offered by the MSF. And even some of the larger transferors secured improvements in this latter area. For example, UNIFI noted that AMICUS provided their members with a ‘superior benefits package’. These could include one or more improvements in legal aid, 24-hour helplines, financial and advisory services and ‘in-house’ training, and educational opportunities. The democratic ethos and government of most transferors was, in contrast, largely preserved unchanged for a significant period post-transfer. The high degree of autonomy initially negotiated tended to protect the transferor’s existing government structure and related activities for several years. For example, FTAT (a ‘rule book section’ of the GMB on its transfer, in 1993) still maintained unilateral control over a number of issues, including the work responsibilities of its national secretary (he or she could only be deployed to work elsewhere in the GMB by agreement) in 2004. The transferor’s own branch and district structure could also be protected in the instrument of transfer. Often, it could only be merged with those of the dominant union by agreement. However, severe financial crises in the merged union could result in the marked revision of such agreements. For example, following the ‘Klein Report’, commissioned in 1991 by the T&G when it was in considerable financial difficulties, its government structure was radically reorganized. As a consequence, the Dyers and Bleachers (transferred to the T&G in 1982), for example, lost its biennial conference and its district level of organization. Hence, while transferors could claim the right to retain their own organizational form, as agreed on transfer, they were not above reform if the circumstances warranted it. However, short of such a ‘burning platform’, the dominant partner normally had to bide its time in reorganizing the transferors’ government structure. Only when the collective memory of what had been promised started to fade, and the old guard in the transferor vacated their posts, could the dominant partner hope to review and reform the transferor’s autonomous existence, unless the terms of transfer attached a finite time period to the relevant parts of the transfer agreement. As regards administrative services, the majority of transferors (average size 5,206 members) had little in the way of departments and backroom staff. The full-time officers responsible for processing members’ individual grievances and negotiating with employers, and some minor secretarial support,


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provided whatever else was required administratively to run the union. For example, even the Dyers and Bleachers (40,000 members on transfer) largely relied on one research officer and a library for its ‘in-house’ backup services. Hence, the mass of smaller transferors made significant gains in the form of research departments, publications, membership record facilities, and access to a wider range of legal and financial advice. Further, the larger partners’ purchasing power also reduced the transferors’ cost of buying external goods and services. In contrast, the exceptionally large transferors, such as UNIFI and the GPMU (both over 100,000 members), were much better served at head office pre-merger by a range of departments, and further staff at regional (UNIFI) and branch (GPMU) level. Given the standard guarantee of no compulsory redundancies they either kept their own complement of staff (unless they opted for redundancy) or they were absorbed into the dominant partners’ existing departments. Financially, the transferors also stood to gain from the merger. Most importantly, many of those in the geographic concentration and cognate trade merger streams were secured against existing or expected financial difficulties. Generally, the dominant partner provided the funds to help them manage their financial problems in a more civilized manner, thus avoiding the worst aspects of retrenchment associated with remaining independent. The minority of transferors in good financial health were also treated favourably. Their funds could be ‘ring fenced’, at least for a period. For example, after joining the MSF the CMA, despite the MSF’s cash flow problems, retained control over its funds untouched by the dominant partner for the first three years of the merger. The transferors, in summary, therefore, generally made significant improvements, as compared both to their pre-transfer positions, or the retrenchment faced, if they remained independent. Those in most difficulties and adopting a defensive autonomy and greater security strategy due to a combination of membership loss and financial difficulties made the most tangible gains. As an official in the NUIW put it, their transfer to the MSF helped them ‘manage their decline’ in a more effective manner. In the Dyers and Bleachers case (transferring to the T&G) the point was made more starkly: ‘The Dyers and Bleachers could not have been sustained outside of a merger’, nor could its staff and full-time officials have been employed ‘until their retirement dates’. Further, unions and staff associations in the white-collar assimilation merger stream seen as committed to a progressive autonomy and improved servicing strategy also made substantial if less tangible gains by becoming proper and legitimate unions via the growing unionateness secured by transfer. As seen from the transferor’s perspective, the opportunity to make the above gains was the product of the context and the process and purpose of

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the transfer negotiations. In respect of context, the leading dominant partner unions were known to be searching to consolidate or expand their job territories. Further, the blurring of territorial boundaries (industrial and occupational) by previous mergers and shifts in employment patterns made union structure or morphology quite complex: there was often no one ‘natural’ partner for the transferors in the cognate trade and white-collar assimilation merger streams. Instead, several dominant partners could be considered potential transferees. This made the negotiation of many transfers competitive, as demonstrated by different dominant partners regularly bidding for the same potential transferor. As for the transferors in the non-competitive quadrant, they too had a number of contextual factors working in their favour. Apart from the option to remain independent, the leading dominant union’s political policies of building pre-merger ‘closer-working’ arrangements with the transferor could also strengthen the transferor’s position. In such pre-merger partnerships, the transferor gained access, at low or no direct costs, to the dominant unions’ resources. Further, the dominant partner’s investment in such arrangements meant it would incur ‘sunk-costs’ if it failed to turn the trial period of close working into a full transfer. Hence, even when not having the advantage of competitive bidding, such transferors could still raise the stakes for the dominant union should they fail to satisfy the transferors’ ‘sticking-points’. Also, if driven by shared ideological identities, transferors could also expect preferential treatment, due to their common and close political association with the transferee. In both quadrants 1 and 2 (Figure 4.1), the inherently integrative transferring process also mitigated against the dominant partner exploiting its superior bargaining power. Moreover, in looking to build a long-term relationship, while giving the smaller partner a high degree of autonomy, it was important that the transferee did not sour the relationship by appearing conflictual rather than conciliatory. Hence, the process enhanced the transferors’ chances of securing a mutually satisfactory outcome, instead of one biased towards the innately more powerful partner. Finally, the purpose of the transfer negotiations, as seen by the transferors, tended in the great majority of individual transfers to raise no substantial issues of immediate consequence for the dominant partner union. The average transferor’s individual demands therefore had the important negotiating advantage of being relatively ‘unimportant’ to the transferee. This was particularly salient once the dominant partner had adjusted its structure of government to accommodate transferors’ interests in a high degree of autonomy. For, once this change in government had been secured, transferors’ demands could normally be met without seriously threatening established officials’ and


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members’ vested interests, at least for the agreed pre-integration period. Moreover, even if the transferee appeared excessively generous to the transferor, this was rarely challenged by the transferees’ lay activists or members, because they had no formal say in concluding the transfer.

MAJOR UNIONS: THE OUTCOMES AND CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS Turning now to consider the dominant partner’s post-transfer performance, as regards territorial issues the impact made by transfers will be assessed by reference, primarily, to their effect on the dominant partner’s size, coverage (industrial and occupational), and growth potential. Given the wide disparity in membership size between the leading merger unions (average size in the mid-1990s 600,000) and the transferors (average 5,206), it was the exceptional individual transfer which had a significant effect on the dominant merger partner’s size. Most noticeably the T&G and GMB between 1980 and 1993 and later in the period, AMICUS in 2004, negotiated incoming transfer with exceptionally large transferors (over 30,000). The T&G secured the transfers in 1982 of the Dyers and Bleachers (40,000) and the Agricultural Workers (67,000). Later, in 1991 and 1993, the GMB successfully completed, respectively, the transfers of Tailor & Garment Workers (73,000) and FTAT (31,000). All four transferring unions were, at the time, losing members. The GMB described, in 1994, the purpose of the transfers as helping keep the GMB ‘at a sustainable size’ (interview). That is to say, both transfers went some way to compensating the GMB for its own loss of membership. In so doing, they helped the GMB maintain the scale of its operations. Also, in the early 1990s, the GMB was in talks with the T&G for an amalgamation, and it wished to seize the initiative by showing it could secure mergers against competition from the T&G. Such large transfers were therefore important symbolically for the two general worker unions. They helped them maintain their predominant positions in the hierarchy of the trade union movement and to demonstrate their relative competitive abilities in the merger market. After the transfer of FTAT in 1993, the next large transfers were not concluded until late in 2004, when both UNIFI (150,000) and the GPMU (100,000) transferred to AMICUS. The latter transfer was again secured in the face of strong competition from the T&G. Apart from adding significant numbers to the recently formed AMICUS, both transfers served to demonstrate the shift in the former AEEU’s status as a craft and engineering based union into

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a much more expansionist-minded organization challenging both the T&G’s and the GMB’s positions as the leading private-sector general unions. Further, such expansion, via the two exceptionally large transfers, helped draw both the T&G and GMB into amalgamation talks with AMICUS in 2005, leading to the formation of UNITE (AMICUS and T&G amalgamation) in 2007. The large raft of small transfers did not individually have much effect on either the size or territorial coverage of the dominant partners. The small numbers they added normally consolidated the dominant partners’ existing territorial coverage: 98 (83%) of 118 transfers surveyed involved unions inhabiting the same industrial territory, and 72 (59%) of 122 transfers were reported as organizing the same occupational groups. As for the minority of expansionary transfers, it was the leading three merger unions (AMICUS, T&G, and GMB), and their antecedents, which completed the great majority of such transfers. These were seen by the GMB as ‘putting more legs on the stool’ (interview). If such transfers involved one of the exceptionally large transferors, such territorial diversification could be accomplished by a single transfer, as was the case with the Tailor & Garment Workers transfer to the GMB in 1991. There were also some much smaller individual transfers which could give the dominant partner a ‘toehold’ in a new territory and which, if followed up by a cluster of transferors in the same territory, could add another significant ‘leg to the stool’. Such cumulative transfers could, and indeed did, change significantly the dominant partners’ job territory. AMICUS’s antecedents’ transfers most noticeably had this effect. As noted in Chapter 3, ASTMS and its successor the MSF employed this strategy. Over the period 1978–2002, they transformed a white-collar engineering supervisory and technical union into one which covered the medical profession, the voluntary sector, finance, and the universities, while also acquiring a significant number of blue-collar engineering craftsmen. This combination of engineering craft and finance interests subsequently played a critical part in helping the MSF secure its amalgamation with the AEEU to form AMICUS in 2002 and, second, attracted UNIFI to join AMICUS by transfer in 2004. In the absence of such cumulative transfers, it must be doubtful if the financially troubled MSF could have secured the amalgamation terms it sought from the AEEU in 2002. In a similar fashion to that of the MSF, UNIFI, prior to transferring to AMICUS in 2004, also successfully used cumulative transfers to extend its territory beyond banking into the wider finance sector. The T&G’s and GMB’s competitive venture into textiles also followed a similar pattern. The ISTC’s later entry into the transfer market and its success in attracting in 2000 the National League of the Blind and Disabled and the Kettering Carpet union into transfers also changed its job territory. By diversifying in this manner, the


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ISTC reduced its traditional reliance on the shrinking iron and steel industry to 40% of its total membership. In terms of the potential offered by such transfers for the future growth of the dominant union, the associated opportunities were limited. As regards the majority of transfers that involved unions in the geographic concentration and cognate trade merger streams, these transferors had generally been losing members at a rapid rate pre-merger, despite recruitment drives initiated to reverse this trend. As a result, many combined membership loss with a highdensity membership. For example, the CMA, on transfer to the MSF in 1998, claimed 90% union density in its mail centres, the core of its organization in the Royal Mail. Similarly, in the fast-declining world of the traditional insurance salesmen, the NUIW claimed 80% density prior to joining MSF in 1999. Also, there was a tendency for transferors to bolster their negotiating positions by overstating the size of their membership pre-transfer. Hence, once they had been absorbed the dominant partner could find it had both little scope for further recruitment and fewer members than predicted. Further, occasionally the members of the transferor did not fully support the choice of partner and left the new union on transfer. For example, the EPIU (electricians), on transfer to the T&G, lost some members who did not wish to join a general workers’ union. Not all geographic concentration or cognate trade transferors were, however, such lost causes. An exception amongst the cognate trade transferors was FTAT’s absorption by the GMB in 1993. The leaders of FTAT, with some 30,000 members at the point of transfer, expected their membership to continue to fall: FTAT had already lost some 13,000 members between 1989 and 1993 as employment in wood and wood products itself fell from 97,000 in 1989 to 83,000 in 1992 (Labour Market Trends 2000: 532). But after joining the GMB, the decline was unexpectedly reversed. By 2004, there were some 40,000 members in the construction, furniture, timber, and allied trades section of the GMB, largely recruited from within FTAT’s previous core territory. Even allowing for the GMB initially decanting its existing timber and related membership into the new section, this was a considerable achievement. The GMB’s investment in its new organizing and recruitment strategy in the mid1990s, including a successful recruitment drive in Remploy, contributed to this recovery. Also an unexpected upturn in employment in wood and wood products to 86,000 in 1997 and the subsequent stabilization around 84,000 employees in 2004 helped create an environment in which such recruitment drives were, post-merger, more productive. The scope for post-transfer growth in new job territories was therefore limited to a minority of transferors, as noted by transferees in the two surveys. In aggregate, the potential to recruit non-unionists in new occupational

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territory between 1978 and 2004 was judged by respondents a possibility in 38 (32%) of 118 transfers surveyed, while the scope for recruiting nonunionists in new industrial territory was negligible as only 12 (10%) of 115 transfers were seen as offering such potential. Most notably BIFU, UNIFI and the MSF absorbing unions in the white-collar assimilation stream reported post-merger membership gains in the finance sector prior to the restructuring of finance employment in the 1990s. For example, following the transfer of the Northern Rock Building Society staff association to BIFU in 1989, union membership in the society increased from 750 to 1,200 by 1994. Similarly, BESO and the Phoenix Staff Union that transferred to BIFU in 1987 and 1979, respectively, reported significant increases in union density following their transfers. In all cases, this was perceived as at least partly accounted for by the increased professionalism and improved services their members received following their merger with BIFU (Hodges 1994: A2–A43). Later, in 1999, a more controversial transfer of Cabin Crew 89 (a breakaway from the T&G) to the AEEU also provided the opportunity for the AEEU to expand into some non-unionized areas of civil aviation. Initially, the EETPU during its period outside the TUC (1989–92) had courted Cabin Crew 89, but after the AEU and EETPU had amalgamated (1992) to form the AEEU and decided to seek re-affiliation to the TUC, such a transfer was judged too politically sensitive. By 1997, however, the sensitivities had eased and Ken Jackson (general secretary AEEU) took the risk of re-approaching Cabin Crew 89 for a transfer. Such a move gave Cabin Crew 89 the legitimacy it sought inside the labour movement, while it also provided the AEEU with entry to a new part of civil aviation. Despite continued T&G hostility inside BA to Cabin Crew 89, the AEEU successfully built on this transfer to add six further recognition agreements in civil aviation. This included, inter alia, cabin crew in Virgin Airways and clerical staff in Air Tours. By 2004, the initial civil aviation membership (4,500) of Cabin Crew 89 had been approximately doubled. The territorial advantages secured by the dominant partners post-transfer were therefore variable. Obviously, the exceptionally large transferors had the most immediate impact on the size of the dominant partners. However, of the six large transferors noted above, only one, FTAT, gave the dominant partner (GMB) a relatively stable hold on a new group of workers. The other large transferors were all in marked decline at the time of merging and this continued post-merger in the case of such transfers to the T&G and GMB. As for the transfers in 2004 of UNIFI and the GPMU to AMICUS, both transferors claimed at the time of transfer that there was scope in their respective industrial territories for more effective recruitment to reverse their decline. It is too soon to pass judgement on such claims, but in 2007 the signs were not


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very promising. As was the case in many transfers there was, in the short term, a significant reduction in membership. In UNIFI’s case, this was in the order of 14% (from 200,000 in 2004 (combining UNIFI’s and MSF’s finance membership) to 172,000 in 2007 in AMICUS’s finance section). The GPMU’s loss was around 29% (from 120,000 (combining GPMU’s and AMICUS’s claimed printing and paper members) to 85,000 in 2007 in AMICUS’s graphical, paper, and media section). Outside of the exceptionally large transfers, the average individual transfer was clearly too small to have a significant impact on either the dominant partner’s size or territorial coverage. Also, in the clear majority of cases, such transfers saw the dominant partners absorb unions recruiting in the same territory as itself. However, a particular transfer, or more likely a series of cumulative transfers, concentrated largely in a particular occupation, rather than a new industry, helped the dominant partners diversify and hence increase their territorial coverage. Adding more ‘legs to the stool’ in this fashion also prevented the dominant partner from being marooned in its own declining core territory. As noted, the ASTMS, MSF, BIFU, and UNIFI (all by 2006 in AMICUS) had some success in extending their coverage in this manner. A small minority of transfers also expanded the transferees’ territorial scope (mostly increasing occupational coverage) and provided the opportunity to recruit non-unionists. Most noticeably, it was largely transfers from within the white-collar assimilation merger stream that provided such opportunities. Following such transfers the dominant partners’ professional services and their more effective recruitment activities could help produce a ‘real gain’ in unionization post-merger. But these were the exceptional transfers. Next, the effect of transfers on the dominant partner’s political objectives and means will be discussed by reference to its: political bias or ideological bent; relationship with the TUC, international union federations, and the Labour Party; bargaining power vis-à-vis employers; and membership benefits. As regards the dominant partner’s political bias or ideological bent, most transfers had little, if any, chance of affecting radical change in such areas. This was primarily because the great majority of individual transferors were too small for them to exercise much post-merger influence over either the formal policymaking bodies of the dominant partner or, if present, the unofficial factions or caucuses informally developing national policy and sponsoring candidates in national elections. Second, there was a general tendency in transfers for the transferor and transferee to share the same ideological preferences pre-merger. Hence, most transferors reinforced the existing political bias of the dominant partner. The two clusters of transfers that, as noted previously, stood out as politically inspired, rather than being territorially driven, were those organized by

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AUEW-TASS in the mid-to-late 1980s and those of the EETPU between 1989 and 1992. In the case of AUEW-TASS, whose leadership was strongly associated with the Communist Party, three transfers were used to build a stronger alliance of the left. In the EETPU, five years later, the transfers of 14 small staff associations and unions were intended to bolster the ultra-moderate EETPU as it sought to challenge the TUC’s authority by promoting itself as an alternative centre for trade union organization (the EETPU had been expelled from the TUC in 1989). In both cases, the political advantages gained were short-lived. AUEW-TASS, after it amalgamated in 1988 with the ASTMS to form the MSF, saw its communist faction defeated in national leadership elections in 1991, and its influence in the MSF neutered by a newly formed moderate faction (MSF for Labour) organized by former ASTMS officials. As for the EETPU, after amalgamation with the AEU to form the AEEU in 1992, the new amalgamated union determined in 1993 to re-affiliate to the TUC and at this point a number of the EETPU’s ultra-moderate transferors withdrew from the new AEEU. Hence the politically motivated cluster of transfers, in common with the generality of individual transfers, was initially successfully used to reinforce the dominant partner’s existing political bias. However, in both TASS’s and the EETPU’s cases, such gains did not survive the political ‘fallout’ of subsequent amalgamations. In terms of increased influence inside the TUC, international union federations, and the Labour Party, the effect of transfers on the dominant partners was either benign or advantageous. Transfers usually added a number of affiliated union members and if they took the dominant partners into a new job territory it could also acquire seats on the relevant committees of the TUC or enter new international union federations. For example, as regards the latter bodies, the GMB affiliated to the International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers Federation, following its absorption of several textile unions. Also, a transfer could occasionally bring into the dominant partner union full-time officials active in some critical part of the TUC and Labour Party. The two exceptionally large transfers to AMICUS in 2004, for example, brought into AMICUS Ed Sweeny (UNFI) who was a leading figure on various TUC bodies, and Tony Dubbins (GPMU), also active in the TUC, but most noticeably Chairman of the Trade Unions and Labour Party Liaison Committee (TULO). This latter body and Dubbins played the central role in drafting the Warwick Agreement between the unions and the Labour Party in July 2004. This provided the framework for the work- and employmentrelated policies to be implemented during the New Labour government’s third term in office. Dubbins also continued post-transfer to chair TULO in his new capacity as a deputy general secretary of AMICUS. The transfers of such influential figures in the labour movement clearly enhanced the dominant


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partner’s power resources with a capital P. But such gains were the exception. In general, run-of-the-mill individual transfers, while having a largely positive effect on the dominant partner’s position inside affiliated bodies, did not significantly enhance its existing political influence. The transferees most frequently claimed political benefit was that their bargaining power vis-à-vis employers was increased. Of 119 transfers surveyed between 1978 and 2004, 85 (71%) were stated by the dominant partner to increase its bargaining power. Most of these were consolidatory transfers. In the main these added to the dominant partners’ latent bargaining power by, as cited by the dominant partners, reducing dual representation, introducing single-table bargaining, adding elite groups of workers (mainly craftsmen and managers) to the existing bargaining unit, and making the dominant partner the largest union in multi-union negotiations. Assuming other things remained equal, the first three changes should all have helped the dominant partner restrict the employers’ opportunities to exploit inter-union differences during negotiations, that is, prevent the employer playing one union off against another. Also, the fewer the bargaining agents, and the more allembracing the dominant partner, the less chance the employer would have of substituting one work group for another during a withdrawal of labour. Further, new elite groups should have added more ‘market power’ to the negotiations, as they were likely to be less easily replaced than the lower-skilled workers. As regards the advantage claimed for being the largest union in multiunion negotiations, this presumably helped the dominant party resolve any inter-union difficulties in its favour. Some dominant partners also noted that their expansionary transfers increased their bargaining power. In most cases, such assertions seemed to confuse increased bargaining power with increased bargaining coverage. However, the ISTC added more substance to such a proposal. For the ISTC argued that its expansionist transfers reduced its reliance on Corus (formerly British Steel), which was almost the sole employer of ISTC’s membership in the early 1990s. Hence, in this period, the ISTC’s survival was dependant on this single employer’s commercial success. By diversifying via transfers, the ISTC, in line with classical bargaining theory (Martin 1992: 26–7), reduced such dependency and therefore enhanced its bargaining power vis-à-vis its main but now not sole employer. Further, any dominant partner similarly diversifying and restructuring internally into trade groups, sections, or sectors via transfers could also better cross-subsidize industrial action. For example, it could levy members in work in order to support those involved in a withdrawal of labour. Also, both consolidatory and expansionary transfers should have added to the dominant partners’ power resources in general if they produced economies of scale.

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The above structural changes that increased latent bargaining power did not of themselves, however, necessarily result in the dominant partner being any more prone to exercise its bargaining power. Such application was dependant on other factors such as the environment, union leadership, solidarity, and ideological bias (Kelly 1998). As noted by one general secretary, the environment, particularly previous job losses in the transferor unions, mitigated against increased militancy. Moreover, as transferor and transferee normally had a shared ideology it was unlikely that a transfer would make the dominant partner itself more militant. Further, the common practice of giving the transferor a very high degree of bargaining autonomy tended to separate the transferor’s and transferee’s decision-making practices in the field of collective bargaining. Each kept their own bargaining identities and behaviours, at least for several years post-merger. Also, the legislative framework introduced by the Conservatives in the 1980s, and largely retained by New Labour after 1997, required the members of the relevant bargaining unit alone to vote in mandatory secret strike ballots. In addition, the decentralization of collective bargaining in the private sector, where the dominant partners were largely concentrated, and the legal restrictions on secondary action, meant there were very few, if any, occasions when the dominant partner’s total membership could be mobilized in any form of industrial action. Therefore, in practice, even if the transferors did generally increase the dominant partner’s power resources and its latent bargaining power, the opportunities it had to exercise it had by the 1990s become more restricted. Last, as regards political objectives and means, the dominant partners’ membership benefits were largely unaffected by transfers. As noted above, it was the transferor that normally benefited from adopting the dominant partner’s membership benefits, rather than vice versa. If the transferor had higher or additional benefits compared to those available in the dominant partner they were not normally adopted by the dominant partner. Overall, therefore, the political objectives and means of the dominant partner were either untouched or enhanced by transfers. By and large, transferors reinforced the existing political bias of the transferee and added marginally to its existing influence inside the TUC, international union federations and, if affiliated, the Labour Party. Exceptionally, a cluster of transfers and the larger transfers of like-minded political allies could have more impact, at least in the short term. In terms of gains made that might directly benefit the dominant partners’ membership, there was little evidence of any improvement in membership benefits, such as friendly benefits, educational, and financial services. However, more relevant was the increase in the dominant partner’s latent bargaining power in relation to new and existing employers. Unfortunately,


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this was to some considerable extent neutralized by the restrictive bargaining context described in Chapter 2. The effects of transfers on the dominant partners’ democratic ethos and government will now be examined. As regards the democratic ethos, that is, the established way of resolving internal differences of interest, ideology, and orientation between leaders, activists, and ordinary members (Undy and Martin 1984: 186–9), this was largely immune from transferors’ influences for two main reasons. First, it was the product of a complex number of factors over many years, such as the founding leaders’ values, the initial membership base (craft, general, and white-collar workers), previous amalgamations, and the tolerance, or lack of it, of oppositional groups or factions. As such, it was deeply embedded in the dominant partner’s behaviour. Second, as the transferor was normally smaller than a region or section, and sometimes even smaller than a local branch of the dominant partner, it lacked the resources to change the established ethos, even if it had the political will to do so. Nevertheless, given the autonomy automatically granted to the transferor it could, at least for the transitory period, expect to sustain its own ethos inside the larger organization. Hence, a dominant partner that was, say, generally officer-led might find that it had, via a transfer, recruited a union wedded to a member, or activist-led process of policymaking. The GMB, in absorbing FTAT, was an example of such a merger. But even in this case the effect on the GMB’s democratic ethos appeared negligible. The government structure of the dominant partner was more clearly affected by transfers. However, the changes that the dominant partners themselves introduced in order to gain a competitive edge, or to nullify some other union’s advantages in the transfer market, had more impact than structural changes made to accommodate a particular transfer. Most noticeably, the dominant partner unions became more vertically divided, or bifurcated, into collective bargaining and general policymaking channels (Undy et al. 1981). The transferor was normally given a high degree of bargaining autonomy in the first channel, but much less autonomy in the policymaking channel. Hence, if, as was common in the white-collar assimilation merger stream, the transferor bargained at the company level it continued this practice inside the larger union. On the other hand, if the transferor had a negotiation with a national employer’s body, already covered by the dominant partner, as in some cognate trade transfers involving textile and printing unions, they could be subsumed in the existing bargaining arrangements. However, because of the employer-driven decentralization of bargaining, as described in Chapter 2, the outcome of the dominant partner’s policy of providing bargaining autonomy was more likely to further decentralize and fragment decision-making in the bargaining channel.

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The manner in which such bargaining autonomy was achieved varied among the dominant partners. In the EETPU’s case, the transferors it absorbed between 1989 and 1992 were organized into the Federation of Professional Associations (FPA), a ‘separate entity’, which ensured that there was little exchange between transferors in the FPA and the rest of the EETPU. A similar separate grouping was organized by AUEW-TASS for its transferring craft unions. Hence, in both the EETPU and AUEW-TASS, diversification led to a high degree of segregation. In contrast, the mix of expansionary and consolidatory transfers sought by the GMB, T&G, and later AMICUS was accommodated by sectionalizing (or sectorizing) the new and existing membership by industry and occupation. The GMB, in the 1970s a highly regionalized union, had by 1994 introduced eight industrial sectors to improve its organization and assist its associated transfer strategy. The T&G, noted for its trade group structure, radically reorganized it in 1972 to accommodate the transfer of the National Union of Vehicle Builders (NUVB) and continued to adjust its government structure periodically throughout the 1978–2006 period. Most importantly, following the ‘One Union T&G’ strategic review in 1992, a series of changes were initiated which resulted in 1999 with the clustering of its 15 trade groups into four national industrial sectors. This reorganization was seen as helping it overcome the problem of coordinating activities common to different trade groups while making the T&G more attractive to potential transferors, particularly the larger transferors. AMICUS, in turn, following its formation in 2002, listed 22 industrial, occupational, and professional sectors in its new 2003 rule book. Each sector was to have ‘autonomy to decide its own policies and objectives and, wherever practicable, to preserve its internal structures’ (AMICUS 2003: 1). The ISTC, albeit on a much smaller scale, also adopted sectional organization to support its community union strategy. In a further variation on the autonomy theme, UNIFI and the MSF both adopted sectional structures and both, by the end of the 1990s, placed most emphasis in servicing members’ collective bargaining needs at the lowest level of organization in company committees or local bargaining groups. The above planned decentralization and fragmentation of union government was determined via the policymaking channels of the dominant partners, frequently following a strategic review of the union’s performance. The processing of such government changes was therefore dictated by rules which normally required either a rules revision conference or the national conference agreeing proposals initiated by the leading national officials or lay activists. It was usually a highly politicized process during which the different factions, or vested interests, looked to advance their particular causes. Hence, it would have appeared highly questionable to use a transfer as a means of rewriting the dominant partner’s rule book or restructuring union government. This would


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have bypassed the established legitimating process, particularly as it was only the transferor’s membership, and not those of the dominant partner, which voted on the transfer of engagements agreement. Hence, a transfer in itself had a far less significant direct impact on the dominant partner’s structure of government than the actions taken by the dominant partner to secure such transfers. Nevertheless, the effects of transfers on the policymaking channel of government are worth noting. Following transfers the dominant partner usually experienced a proliferation of both decision-making bodies and representatives in the policymaking channel. For, in order better to integrate the autonomous transferors into the policymaking channel, they were normally given reserved positions on the dominant partner’s national executive and the national conference. Further, many transferors were guaranteed their own separate sectional conferences on an annual or biennial basis. Indeed, in the T&G, if the transferor was not large enough to command a conference it could organize a biennial general meeting. The EPIU, for example, benefited from this latter arrangement. Also, if the transferor’s membership was concentrated in a particular region it could have a disproportionate influence on the dominant partner’s regional level of government. For example, the Dyers and Bleachers gained this latter advantage after transferring to the T&G. Thus transferors also helped disperse and fragment decision-making in the policymaking channel of government. But, as one general secretary noted, by making the national bodies larger and more diverse, transfers may also have strengthened the general secretary’s position by increasing the need for his or her unifying leadership. The effects of transfers on the dominant partner’s government structures were therefore largely the result of internally planned changes intended to help it secure a competitive advantage in the merger market. As a result, the dominant partner became both more decentralized and fragmented in the bargaining channel. In the policymaking channel, there was a growth in both representative bodies and representatives, as the dominant partner attempted to give the transferor some discretion in minor policy areas, while simultaneously integrating it more fully into such key policymaking bodies as the national executive and national conference. In discussing the effect of transfers on the administration of the dominant partner, economies of scale and scope, the financial impact of transfers, and the opportunities provided to reallocate resources will be examined. Economies contingent on an increase in size are normally defined as either economies of scale, derived from a reduction in the cost of servicing as the size of the union grows, or economies of scope, arising from the application of existing assets, including knowledge, to increase the services provided. A major problem in applying such frameworks to the dominant partner unions

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in this study, as well as the absence of any detailed figures on the costs of different union services pre- and post-transfer, is that they were losing members and shrinking in size over the longer term of the period studied (see Table 2.1), while gaining membership in the short run each time they completed a transfer. Nevertheless, when asked an open-ended question as to what problems transfers solved, reference was regularly made to economies of scale. For example, a T&G interviewee, commenting on the advantages gained via transfer, first noted economies of scale, and second, commented on the importance of making changes in administration as ‘half trade union’s income may go on systems that could be common across trade unions’. The gains claimed tended to include, as regards economies of scale, improved use of existing buildings, maintaining full-time official/member ratios, merging branches, and reducing the cost of ‘bought-in’ services. Economies of scope were probably more important as a source of gain than economics of scale, as transfers should have allowed the dominant partner to increase returns to its existing assets, including, as noted by interviewees, expanded research activities, training and development of new members, spreading negotiation expertise and knowledge of occupational and industrial problems (particularly in consolidatory transfers), combining membership records (although some dominant partners, for example the T&G, did not have centralized membership records until very late in the 1978–2006 period), and wider circulation of publications. However, many transfers made it difficult for the dominant partners to realize the above economies. First, the terms of transfer frequently restricted access to such economies by giving the transferor five years or more to retain their own organizational structure. Second, some changes, such as the merging of branches, were made conditional on the transferor agreeing to such a change. Third, the decentralization and fragmentation of decisionmaking in the collective bargaining channel and the proliferation of bodies in the policymaking channel limited the implementation of centrally initiated economies of scale and scope. The direct financial effect of most transfers, as expected from the previous discussion of their motivation to merge, was also not immediately conducive to an improvement in the dominant partner’s financial health. It was the exceptional transferor in the cognate trade or geographical concentration streams of mergers that improved the financial standing of the transferee. Such exceptions included the NUTGW’s and FTAT’s transfers to the GMB: the GMB gained a total of some £17 million in equities and properties from the two transfers. In the longer run, other dominant partners could also hope to sell off the properties of transferors, unless, as in the HVA’s transfer to the MSF, the transfer terms gave the transferor the right to retain its own head office. On the other hand, some transfers unexpectedly added directly to the dominant


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partners’ costs. For example, payments into full-time officials’ superannuation schemes were sometimes required. The Agricultural Workers’ transfer to the T&G was one such case. The potential longer-term financial savings from transferors, most of which were losing members, were also limited. Indeed, when asked if the transferor offered the transferee the potential for financial savings, only 32 (28%) of 115 transfers surveyed between 1978 and 2004 were seen as offering this advantage. Last, as regards administration, reference was made to transfers facilitating the reallocation of resources. In particular, the administrative burden previously carried by the transferor could, post-merger, be carried by central administration. As a result, additional resources could be moved to such ‘front office’ activities as organizing and servicing the membership. Again, while the logic was sound, there was little evidence offered to show that specific transfers had this effect. Rather, while cumulative transfers, or one or two large transfers, helped sustain existing services in the short-run, it was the longer-term decline in the dominant partners’ membership, and the often recurrent associated financial problems, that primarily caused the dominant partner to initiate periodic formal strategic reviews, including an examination of resource allocation. These reviews, most noticeably in the MSF, AMICUS, T&G, and UNIFI, were more important than individual transfers for prompting both the search for greater economies and a more effective allocation of resources. For, as the GMB noted, mergers could ‘mask a deteriorating financial position’ (interview) and, as a result, remedial action needed to deal with long-term decline could be postponed. Individual transfers in general did not therefore normally act as the catalyst for a radical review of the dominant partners’ existing administrative and financial management. Overall, therefore, while there were some administrative and financial gains to be made from some transfers, these were not an important feature of most transfers. The dominant partners, while often expressing interest in scale advantages following a transfer, did not appear to plan actively for such advantages when negotiating the terms of transfer, nor did they systematically explore what options existed for such gains post-transfer. As noted previously, most transfers were probably too small to warrant such close attention. However, cumulative transfers probably did offer some such opportunities. But such questions only seemed to attract serious attention when a financial crisis caused the dominant partner to launch one of its periodic strategic reviews, or initiate a cost-cutting exercise. Finally, turning to consider the leaders’ imperatives, it was only the exceptionally large transfers that generally caused problems for the transferees’ existing full-time officials and administrative staff. Occasionally, if following such transfers the dominant partners’ relevant membership were decanted

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into a new grouping or section provided for the transferor, the transferees’ associated full-time officials and administrative staff could find themselves reporting to the transferors’ officials leading the new group or section. If, as was the case in UNIFI’s and the GPMU’s transfer to AMICUS in 2004, the transferors’ general secretaries became deputy general secretaries in the dominant partner union, existing officials with aspirations to play such roles could also find their chances of promotion restricted. The consequent dissatisfaction amongst the dominant partners’ full-time officials or administrators could result in internal divisions damaging to the smooth running of the union, as noted by interviewers when asked about the general problems caused by mergers. On the other hand, and more positively, as reported by the GMB, some transfers brought ‘talented individuals’ into the larger union. In the case of both the GMB and the T&G, a number rose to prominent positions in both unions, including that of general secretary. In summary therefore, and in contrast to the transferors, the transferee or dominant partner union’s post-merger performance was not uniformly improved by transfers. Territorially, the leading major unions completed transfers that, at least initially, helped compensate them for their own membership decline and also, occasionally, to diversify into new job territories. Most were, however, too small to have a significant impact on either membership size or territorial coverage. It was only clusters of transfers, or exceptionally large transfers, that had such an impact. But even then most transfers moved existing union members between different unions rather than providing the dominant partner with the opportunity to recruit significant numbers of non-unionists. Nevertheless, in a period of falling union membership, the leading major partners by combining consolidatory and expansionist transfers accrued a growing share of a shrinking unionized job territory. The effect of transfers on the political, governmental, and administrative performance of the dominant partner tended to be muted. As far as political or ideological interests were affected, transfers largely strengthened the existing tendencies, at least in the short run, as ‘like joined like’. Further, latent collective bargaining power was generally enhanced, but the context in which unions negotiated mitigated against its use: the ‘power-seeking’ strategy was therefore only successful in part. Membership benefits as drawn by the dominant partners’ members largely remained unchanged by transfers. Government structure was more directly affected by the changes made by the dominant partner to attract transfers, than it was by the transferors themselves. Broadly, this planned restructuring, and the subsequent transfers, decentralized and fragmented the dominant partners’ collective bargaining activities. In the general policymaking channel of union government, there was a proliferation of committees and an increase in the number of representatives. Such


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developments were obviously not conducive to economies of scale nor likely to reduce the administrative machinery needed to support the key services. The process of transfers did not therefore generally cause the dominant partner to reflect systematically on what advantages, other than territorial gains, could be developed post-transfer: the new transferor was largely left to behave in its pre-transfer manner. In most cases, it was only when the dominant partner got into subsequent financial difficulties, related or not to previous transfers, that it initiated a strategic review of its organization, including changes in the way in which transferors might be both integrated into the wider union and the economies of scale and scope achieved. In short, transfers, because they were individually rather insignificant and not subject to internal scrutiny and approval by activists or members, were not suitable vehicles for promoting radical internal reforms in the transferee unions.

CONCLUSIONS The minor or transferor unions, whether stimulated by defensive or progressive motivations, generally secured a high level of autonomy and improved financial security. This appeared a highly favourable outcome given the premerger state of most minor unions. It was facilitated by the leading major merging unions’ tendency to view transfers uncritically as a ‘good thing’. Hence, a particular transfer, or cluster of transfers, was rarely rigorously and formally assessed pre-merger or post-merger, by the dominant partner, in terms of its costs and benefits. Further, the existing union structure, or morphology, meant that most transferors could identify two or more potential partners with an interest in consolidating or expanding into their job territory. As a consequence, the competing partners’ relative generosity, and in noncompetitive transfers, the willingness of the dominant partner to indulge the transferor, delivered significant benefits to the transferors as expressed in the instrument of transfer and accompanying side-letters or other understandings. Further, there was no evidence that the dominant partner unilaterally varied or reneged on such terms. Any significant changes that were subsequently made appeared jointly agreed, or were accepted as necessary when the union got into financial difficulties. Transfers therefore radically improved the position of many transferors. It enabled them to either manage their decline in a much more civilized manner (defensive transfers) or helped them service their members in a more unionate fashion (progressive transfers). Also most transferring members received a more comprehensive and improved range of benefits.

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As for the dominant partners, territorially, individual transfers brought some minor initial gains in membership and scope of job territories, but they only rarely helped the dominant partner break into new and expanding job territories, or to recruit non-unionists. But clusters of territorially similar transfers could serve to reposition a union in the competitive merger market. Transfers were generally benign or positive as regards the political bias and bargaining activities of the dominant partner; they tended to reinforce the existing political bias and increase the transferees’ latent bargaining power. However, neither was of much immediate benefit given the adverse climate in which unions negotiated with government and employers. As regards individual transfers’ direct impact on the government or administration of the larger union, this was marginal, but radical changes in government were made pre-merger by the dominant partners to attract and accommodate transferors in general. Over time, the financial problems many transferors bequeathed the dominant partner may also have inadvertently helped prompt periodic strategic reviews, but there was little evidence that the dominant partner used transfers as a vehicle for introducing its own planned government or administrative reforms. Rather, most transferors were gradually absorbed into the larger unions’ general policymaking channels at some financial cost, but without any great difficulties. Collectively, therefore, transfers incidentally restructured the government of Britain’s leading unions, particularly in their collective bargaining channels. Further, territorially, they helped concentrate a higher proportion of Britain’s shrinking union membership into a smaller number of unions. In so doing the external structure, or morphology, of British unions became somewhat more complex as cumulative transfer strategies helped the leading merger unions cut across existing union boundaries. All this helped prepare the ground for, and thus facilitated, the amalgamations and particularly the mega amalgamations of primarily private-sector unions to be discussed below in Part III.

Part III Amalgamations


6 Amalgamation Strategies INTRODUCTION Amalgamations, while much fewer in number than transfers, were responsible between 1978 and 2004 for the greater part (90%) of union members involved in mergers. They therefore frequently resulted in significant restructuring of unions’ job territories. Further, the legal framework, which required each amalgamating union to secure majority membership support in a secret ballot to successfully conclude an amalgamation, also called for such a ballot to include reference to either a new rule book or details of, inter alia: the structure of the new union; the means of choosing the leading decision-making bodies and principal officers; and the members’ contributions and benefits. Hence, amalgamations not only restructured job territories, but also had the potential to change radically the merging unions’ government structures and systems. The decision to amalgamate therefore generally resulted in extensive negotiations over the constitution, organization, and leadership of the new amalgamated union. The issues at stake were thus of crucial interest to all the unions involved. The risks if the talks failed were considerable, not least for the leading negotiators’ careers, as will be shown below in the case of the aborted IPMS and MSF amalgamation. Hence, amalgamations, unlike incoming transfers, could not be treated by the larger union on a casual or ‘taken for granted’ basis: they called for a more rigorous and sophisticated approach by all the unions involved. Many of the unions responded by developing formal strategies which helped shape the union’s merger aims and purposes. They also influenced, as will be demonstrated later, the newly amalgamated union’s post-merger performance. A cross-section of 10 amalgamations, and 2 aborted amalgamations, form the core of this chapter. These cover the GMB’s 1980s amalgamations and all but two of the amalgamations completed between 1992 and 2004 (the exceptions are the NCU and UCW (1995) and ISTC and KFAT (2004) amalgamations). Table 6.1 lists the amalgamations and aborted amalgamations

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Amalgamation Strategies

Table 6.1. Amalgamations and aborted amalgamations studied Year

Unions amalgamating

Members

New union

1982

National Union of General and Municipal Workers (NUGMW) and Amalgamated Society of Boilermakers etc. (ASBSBSW)

838,415

119,585

General Municipal Boilermakers and Allied Trades (later GMB)

General Municipal and Boilermakers etc. (GMBU) and Association of Professional Executive, Clerical and Computer Staff (APEX)

797,039

GMB

Society of Graphical and Allied Trades 1982 (SOGAT(82)) and National Graphical Association 1982 (NGA(82))

176,144

1989

1991

1992

1993

1996

1998

Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU) and Electrical, Electronic Telecommunication and Plumbing Union (EETPU)

79,961

958,000

877,000

Graphical Paper and Media Union (GPMU)

301,147

125,033

702,228 375,175

Confederation of Health Service Employees (COHSE) and National and Local Government Officers (NALGO) and National Union of Public Employees (NUPE)

201,993

Inland Revenue Staff Federation (IRSF) and National Union of Civil and Public Servants (NUCPS)

57,907

Civil and Public Services Association (CPSA) and Public Services Tax and Commerce Union (PTC)

Total members

Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union (AEEU)

1,077,403

UNISON

1,512,893

759,735

551,165

112,080

116,681

Public Services Tax and Commerce Union (PTC)

169,987

Public and Commercial Services Union (PCS)

265,943

149,262

(cont.)


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Table 6.1. (Continued) Year

Unions amalgamating

1999

Banking Insurance and Finance Union (BIFU) and UNiFI (Barclays Bank Union) and NatWest Staff Association (NWSA)

2001

2002

Members 112,972

Total members

UNIFI

179,544

PROSPECT

103,759

42,729 23,845

Institute of Professional Managers and Specialists (IPMS) and Engineers and Managers Association (EMA)

74,245

Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union (AEEU) and Manufacturing Science and Finance Union (MSF)

728,211

Aborted amalgamations 1994 GMB and T&G (Transport and General Workers Union) 1998 Institute of Professional Managers and Specialists (IPMS) and Manufacturing, Science and Finance Union (MSF)

New union

29,514 AMICUS

1,144,211

416,000

834,835; 949,107

74,584

429,602

studied. In total, the 10 amalgamations accounted for 60% of all union members involved in mergers between 1978 and 2004. As can be seen from Table 6.1, the amalgamations involved unions in both the private and public sectors. However, each amalgamation, bar one, was concluded between unions recruiting predominately in one of the two sectors. The exception was the IPMS (civil service) and EMA (privatized energy) amalgamation. Also, the aborted IPMS and MSF amalgamation attempted, but failed, to bridge the public/private divide. Further, the private sector amalgamations and aborted amalgamations involved the leading transferee unions identified in previous chapters as driving the merger market. These were AMICUS (and its antecedents: MSF, EETPU, and UNIFI), GMB, and T&G; as noted above, the GPMU also transferred to AMICUS in 2004. There was, therefore, over the period 1978–2004 a series of amalgamations and transfers which concentrated some 1.3 million union members within AMICUS. In 2006, merger talks were

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also concluded between AMICUS and the T&G. In 2007, this produced a new ‘mega’ and predominately private sector union ‘UNITE’ comprised of some 2 million members: 30% of the TUC’s membership. As regards the predominantly public sector amalgamations, these also resulted in a concentration of members in fewer unions. UNISON (1.5 million members), formed in 1993, combined primarily trade unionists in local government, the health service, and utilities (including privatized employees). Over the 1978–2004 period, UNISON, PTC, and PCS amalgamations helped reduce the number of local and central government unions in the TUC from nine to five (the FDA, organizing the ‘top civil servants’, remained immune from amalgamation overtures in this period). This left the PCS as the dominant force in the civil service and UNISON similarly positioned in local government, plus significant interests in the NHS and many privatized industries. Amalgamations in the private and public sector were influenced by a number of common factors. However, there were some important differences which suggested that it would be useful to structure the following discussions of amalgamation by reference to the two different sectors. For, as noted by Terry (2000: 2–4), public service industrial relations and unions have certain distinctive characteristics. In particular, all public service unions have the same ultimate employer—the government. They therefore have to be directly engaged with government, not least in attempts to influence government policies which directly affect their members. Also, the public sector ethos conditioned the unions’ behaviour in a manner not found in the private, for profit, sector. Further, as discussed in Chapter 2, the context in which unions amalgamated had a more adverse effect on private sector unions’ recruitment and retention of members (see Table 2.1), as compared to their public sector counterparts. Finally, the decentralization of bargaining in the public sector came as more of a shock to the highly centralized public sector unions: the larger private sector unions had themselves promoted the decentralization of bargaining in the 1970s (Undy et al. 1981: 263–313). In combination, these factors influenced some important aspects of the public service unions’ amalgamation strategies. Amalgamations therefore largely involved unions which shared similar occupational or industrial interests and had common recognition and bargaining rights with at least some employers. Further, a number of such amalgamating unions had an historical mission to combine with competing unions to form an industrial union, or in some cases, a craft union, with the aim of stopping inter-union strife and consequently increasing union bargaining power. As a result, the scope of their search for amalgamation partners was limited. In contrast, the GMB, a conglomerate union, had no such common


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job identity or mission. It had a more open view as to the choice of amalgamation partners. The following discussion therefore draws a broad distinction in its first two sections between private and public sector unions as it, first, examines the most obvious relevant characteristics of the individual amalgamating unions and, second, considers the amalgamating unions’ strategic purposes and processes. Third, in conclusion, the different amalgamating union’s strategies will be categorized.

AMALGAMATING UNIONS’ CHARACTERISTICS The most obvious and relevant characteristics of the amalgamating unions were membership and financial standing. As regards membership, they were amongst the largest in the TUC. The private sector unions averaged 288,000 and the public sector averaged 252,883 members at the time of amalgamation. However, each of the 14 private sector unions lost members in the 5 years preceding their particular amalgamation. The losses ranged from −2% for the NGA(82) to −20% for APEX and eight lost 10% or more of their membership in the preceding five years. In contrast, of the eight public sector unions amalgamating, the NUCPS was relatively stable and two increased members (3% NALGO and 9% IRSF) in the preceding five years and of the five losing membership, the losses varied from −15% (NUPE) to −3% (COHSE). The four unions in the two aborted amalgamations also lost members in the five years preceding the breakdown in their talks: GMB −16% and T&G −27%; and IPMS −17% and MSF −22%. Financially, under half of the above unions (10 out of 22) were in financial difficulties prior to amalgamation. But, in addition, three were predicting future financial problems at the time of amalgamation unless some radical action was taken. As regards the private sector amalgamations, the GMB in 1982 and 1989, when it amalgamated with the Boilermakers and APEX, respectively, was relatively well placed financially. As shown in Table 3.5, it had in 1989 a security index score of 6 and its total income comfortably covered its expenditure for most of the 1980s (Willman et al. 1993: 144). It was later in the mid-1990s that its financial position started to deteriorate, followed by severe financial difficulties in 2003–5. For five years prior to the 1982 amalgamation, the Boilermakers union was failing to cover its expenditure from subscription income and it drew on its investment income to cover the gap. By 1982, it had exhausted its cash reserves and was in severe financial difficulties (Sadiq 1994: 29). APEX, in 1986, was also in financial difficulties.

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It had been struggling to solve its financial problems since the early 1980s by a round of cuts and restructuring. In 1986, ‘as membership continued to fall and as no long-term solutions to the Union’s financial situation emerged’, it sought an amalgamation (Marsh and Ryan 1997: 236). The two amalgamations involving former craft unions in paper (SOGAT(82)) and printing (NGA(82)) in 1991 and between the engineers (AEU) and electricians (EETPU) in 1992 had different financial histories, although all four were losing members. The 1991 GPMU amalgamation brought together two unions which had been in reasonable financial health in the 1980s (Willman et al. 1993: 20–33). As Table 3.5 also shows, in 1989, SOGAT(82) scoring 3 and NGA(82) scoring 4 on the index of financial security were amongst the better financed unions. However, SOGAT(82), in particular, suffered a significant loss of members (−15%) in the five years premerger. This required it to take strong remedial action to correct a number of growing problems in its different financial accounts in the 1980s (Gennard and Bain 1995: 301–38). In contrast, the NGA(82)’s membership had been more stable in this pre-amalgamation period. However, it too had a difficult financial period in the mid-1980s (Gennard 1990: 237–49) and in 1990 and 1991, it was drawing heavily on its substantial investments to cover its expenditure. In the AEU and EETPU 1992 amalgamation to form the AEEU, the two unions came together with quite different financial records. The AEU struggled throughout the 1980s with the financial consequences of a heavy loss of membership (18% loss in the five years prior to amalgamation). From 1978 to 1986, it was selling off assets to fund the union and at the end of this period, it was close to a liquidity crisis (Willman et al. 1993: 160–6). By the late 1980s, the position had improved, although as the general secretary admitted in 1991, the AEU was in ‘deficit for three of the previous five years’ (EETPU Consultative Conference Report 1991: 24). Yet, he declaimed to the EETPU’s National Industrial Committee’s representatives, who were openly suspicious of the AEU’s financial position, ‘We in the AEU don’t have to do anything in the way of amalgamation for financial reasons’ (EETPU Consultative Conference Report 1991). In contrast, the EETPU came to the 1992 amalgamation with a record of financial success, despite losing 10% of its members in the five preceding years. As noted by Willman et al. (1993: 190–1), the EETPU achieved, in aggregate, financial surpluses over the period 1978–89. Further, it also, over the same period, generated sufficient membership income to cover its administrative costs (Willman et al. 1993). The formation of UNIFI, in 1999, brought together two unions in some degree of financial difficulty, associated with declining membership, and one in a reasonable financial state. BIFU, by far the biggest of the three amalgamating unions forming UNIFI, had a deficit on its income and expenditure


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account for each of the five years preceding the amalgamation. The deficits varied between £725,000 and £94,000 a year. It had also reduced its investments over the same period to subsidize its operations. The Barclays Bankbased partner (UNiFI) also generated deficits in three of the preceding five years, ranging from £403,000 to £159,000. But in the year prior to the amalgamation, it achieved a small surplus of £37,000. In contrast, the smallest of the three finance unions, the NatWest Staff Association (24,000 members) had a surplus in three of the five years before the amalgamation, including a surplus of £53,000 in 1997. It also increased its investments in the same period from £281,000 to over £1 million. Last chronologically in the private sector amalgamations was the formation of AMICUS in 2002. This brought together two unions, the AEEU and MSF, with sharply contrasting financial records. The AEEU radically transformed its financial position between 1994 and 2002: it registered a surplus on its income and expenditure account in each year. This varied between a low of £219,000 in 1995 and a peak of £7.7 million in 2000. At the same time, its net assets increased from £4.2 million to £65 million (the latter figure also understated its financially strong standing as much of its property was entered at cost price). In comparison with the AEEU, the MSF had a very chequered financial history and was the ‘poor man’ of the merger. It was known for having periodic financial crises in the 1980s. Shortly after it was formed in 1988 (ASTMS and AUEW-TASS amalgamation), it commissioned a report into its financial difficulties and in 1993, it was in the middle of a programme of debt repayment (£8 million borrowed). In 1994 and 1995, it registered substantial deficits on its income and expenditure account of £1.4 million and £3.3 million, respectively. In 1995, its net assets also fell by £4 million. However, the position improved between 1996 and 1999 when the MSF recorded surpluses of between £1.4 million and £4 million on its income and expenditure account. But just prior to the amalgamation, in 2000, it again registered a deficit of £7 million. AMICUS was therefore an amalgamation between one exceptionally well-endowed union, the AEEU, and one in longrunning financial difficulties, the MSF. In addition, regarding private sector unions’ financial status, two of the three unions involved in the aborted amalgamations talks, that is, the TGWU (in talks with the GMB in 1994) and the MSF (in discussion with IPMS in 1998) had financial difficulties (the MSF’s have already been described). The T&G in 1990 and 1991 experienced very substantial deficits of £6.8 million and £12.4 million, respectively. This led to a major overhaul of its structure and organization (Labour Research 2000: 18). In contrast, the GMB, as noted above, was financially sound in the early 1990s, as was the IPMS in 1998. As for the public sector unions, the three amalgamating unions creating Britain’s largest amalgamation, COHSE, NALGO, and NUPE, in 1992, had

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contrasting financial positions. COHSE and NUPE had financial problems. In two of the five years prior to the amalgamation, they both failed to cover their total expenditure from total income: COHSE also expected its financial position to deteriorate. In NUPE’s case, it was increasingly relying on a relatively small investment pool to cover the gap between subscription income and total expenditure. On the other hand, NALGO generated surpluses in all five years pre-merger, from a high of £7.5 million in 1988 to a low of £4 million in 1989 and 1992. The remaining public sector unions involved in the amalgamations studied also had varying financial fortunes pre-merger, but none were in immediate and severe financial difficulties. The bigger of the civil services unions, the CPSA, had surpluses in its income and expenditure accounts in four out of five years between 1993 and 1997 and the NUCPS, after some difficulties, had a surplus in 1995, prior to its merger with the IRSF. The IPMS was also relatively financially sound. It built up a series of surpluses in the 1990s despite losing membership. Also in the late 1990s, it had net assets of over £18 million. The IRSF and EMA, while not in immediate financial difficulties, feared that they would encounter more severe financial problems in the immediate future should their membership decline. They both therefore chose to go for amalgamations ‘now’ while in reasonable financial positions, rather than wait until they would be less attractive financially to potential partners. Most of the amalgamating unions were therefore not driven to merge by an immediate financial imperative. Fewer than half, at the time of amalgamations, were in severe financial difficulties, although most had taken remedial action in the recent past to correct actual or potential financial problems. Those unions where financial issues carried most weight and contributed significantly to the amalgamation decisions were the Boilermakers, APEX, MSF, UNIFI, and NUPE. Also, in looking forward, COHSE, IRSF, and EMA were influenced by financial considerations to amalgamate sooner rather than later.

AMALGAMATING UNIONS’ STRATEGIC PURPOSES In addition to the above financial problems influencing some amalgamating unions’ mergers, a combination of other factors played the major part in prompting most of the above amalgamations. Also, some factors weighed more heavily in some unions than in others. The following discussions will explore the complex interaction of motivating forces by considering, first, private and, second, public sector amalgamations. Reference to amalgamating unions’ job territories, political objectives and means, democratic ethos and


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government, and administrative concerns will be made, where relevant. Also, in some cases, the process of amalgamating and the roles played by leaders and activists, will be integral to the discussions, particularly where intraorganizational conflicts temporarily or permanently disrupted the proposed amalgamation. In examining the private sector unions’ amalgamations, it helps in untangling their motivations and purposes to consider them in the following order: one, the GMB’s two amalgamations, and the GMB and T&G’s aborted talks; two, the formation of the GPMU; three, the UNIFI amalgamation; and, four, the AEEU and AMICUS amalgamations (as the focus in the IPMS and MSF failed amalgamation is on the IPMS (civil service union) this case is included in the discussion of public sector amalgamations). The GMB prior to its amalgamation with the Boilermakers union in 1982 had notably failed to secure any mergers of significance for several years. Indeed, it had, up to 1973, tended historically to give priority to financial security and a high level of benefits for its existing members, rather than growth (Undy et al. 1981: 134–5). But following the election of a new general secretary, David Basnett, in 1973, it adopted a formal strategy for expansion, combining mergers and organic growth. It first unsuccessfully approached the Boilermakers for an amalgamation in the mid-1970s, before concluding the amalgamation in 1982. Territorially, this was an important breakthrough for the GMB. It signalled the end of its ‘restrictive-passive’ approach to growth (Undy et al. 1981: 128) and placed the GMB at the centre of the merger movement until a further change of policy in 1993–4, when it adopted an organic growth strategy. The GMB, alone, out of the leading amalgamating unions, had no logical territorial partner. As a conglomerate, any job territory was worth considering. Further, it was primarily interested in amalgamating in order to expand into new job territories rather than in consolidating its position. The Boilermakers’ amalgamation brought into the predominately semi- and unskilled GMB (or more precisely, the NUGMW as it was then titled) craftsmen in shipbuilding, construction, and engineering industries. Further, the APEX amalgamation in 1989 helped the GMB expand its white collar interest into insurance, financial services, and civil air transport. Both amalgamations were also exceptionally competitive. In the Boilermakers’ amalgamation, the GMB faced competition from the AEU and NUSMW (sheetmetal workers), both with strong interests in shipbuilding, and the T&G. In APEX’s case, its short list of potential partners, in addition to the GMB, was composed of the AEU, ASTMS (later MSF), and T&G. Competition of this intensity reflected the GMB’s use of amalgamations to penetrate into what was seen as other major unions’ more ‘natural’ job territories.

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While the GMB was drawn to these amalgamations largely by territorial concerns, the Boilermakers and APEX were, in contrast, most concerned with administrative—particularly financial—democratic and government issues. As noted above, they were both in financial difficulties and in common with many minor transferring unions, they both sought a high degree of autonomy inside the GMB. Compared to the other potential partners, and particularly the AEU which emerged as the most significant threat to the GMB in these negotiations, the GMB offered the Boilermakers a high degree of autonomy in its own Boilermaker’s Section. As a result, the Boilermaker’s Section had its own set of rules and seats on the GMB’s new Executive. Similarly, APEX, at least initially, secured from the GMB a new section titled the ‘APEX Partnership’, to which GMB transferred its existing white collar members. The above sectionalization of the GMB also suited the GMB’s interests in government and administrative reform. In negotiating the amalgamation with the Boilermakers, the GMB exploited the opportunity it presented to question the efficacy of its own unitary structure (absence of industrial sections or trade groups) based on strong regional government, which was seen as undermining the GMB’s ability to guarantee autonomy to incoming unions. The Boilermakers’ demand for autonomy, and the consequent changes in organizational form, was hence critical for the GMB’s subsequent success in transfer markets, as noted in Chapter 3. Political objectives and means played some part in prompting the Boilermakers and APEX amalgamations with the GMB. But neither the Boilermakers nor APEX were centrally concerned to improve their bargaining power. Political association, with a capital ‘P’ was, however, important for APEX. Its general secretary, Roy Grantham, a leading moderate, was keen to build an alliance with a similarly inclined politically moderate union. Hence, although ASTMS (MSF) and the AEU were territorially closer to APEX than was the GMB, both were politically less acceptable to APEX in the late 1980s. ASTMS, at this point, was in merger talks with AUEW-TASS whose leadership had strong links to the Communist Party: it was therefore too far to the left for APEX’s general secretary. In contrast, the moderate AEU was in amalgamation talks with the ultra-moderate EETPU, recently expelled from the TUC. But APEX’s leadership feared its Conference delegates would oppose an amalgamation with the AEU because of the EETPU’s expulsion. The GMB, as both a moderate but loyal member of the TUC, therefore had the political edge over the other possibly more territorially congruent unions. The subsequent aborted amalgamation talks held by the expansionistminded GMB and T&G, between 1992 and 1994, were prompted initially by the two general unions’ shared territorial concerns over the coming AEEU and UNISON amalgamations. They felt they could be ‘squeezed’ in the metal


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working industries by the AEEU and in public services by UNISON. Hence, although neither industry was the main recruiting ground for either the GMB or T&G, they had existing interests in these areas which such amalgamations were perceived to threaten: they had 200,000 combined members in engineering and 300,000 in public services. In response, the two general unions launched a joint working initiative, which was not initially intended to lead to amalgamation talks. However, the activists involved became interested in such developments and in 1993 the two unions’ Conferences voted for exploratory amalgamation talks. These examined the benefits of ‘Building a New Union’. Most of the areas explored were political, in the sense of objectives and means. These covered membership benefits and services; industrial servicing, including collective bargaining; and political representation on the TUC, Labour Party, and Parliament. The second strand was concerned with membership recruitment (job territory), and the third focused on internal government and administration. These talks were terminated in 1994 by the GMB’s executive withdrawing its support for the amalgamation. Given the two unions’ very different organizational forms and traditions, particularly, the strong role played by the GMB’s regions in national policymaking and the different compositions of the two executives (the T&G’s lay and the GMB’s full-time and lay executive members), this was not surprising. Also, the absence in both unions of a clear territorial imperative to amalgamate, and the ‘drift’ into amalgamation talks, suggests the national leadership of both unions were not fully committed to finding common solutions to the complex differences that emerged. Finally, the manner in which the talks appeared to be heading in 1994, towards potentially extended negotiations on the detail of the amalgamation, did not encourage the GMB leadership to continue the negotiation. The merger’s motivations were therefore not strong enough to carry the project forward given the dispersed centres of power and associated intra-organizational bargaining inside the GMB. Further, given the conflicting and ingrained nature of the GMB’s and the T&G’s systems of government, it was not surprising that the GMB again withdrew from amalgamation talks with the T&G (and AMICUS) in 2006. The GMB’s amalgamation motivations were therefore in all cases primarily territorial. The Boilermakers and APEX amalgamations were both intended to extend rather than consolidate the GMB’s job territory. Further, both amalgamations helped the GMB start the process of internal sectionalization of the union. Also, in neither case were they balanced partner amalgamations: both the Boilermakers and APEX were much smaller than the GMB, and driven by financial difficulties. Therefore, in some important respects, they were both more like transfers than amalgamations. In contrast, the abortive talks in 1994

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between the GMB and T&G were rooted in both unions’ desire to protect their common territorial interests against other unions’ possible intrusions. However, such threats proved largely unfounded, and thus the amalgamation attempt lacked a territorial imperative. Moreover, the potential advantages identified in the talks did not enthuse or engage the full support of the GMB’s geographically dispersed (regional) leadership. The formation of the GPMU in 1991 had quite different territorial roots to those affecting the GMB’s two amalgamations. The GPMU may be said to have been territorially pre-ordained by a series of geographic concentration and cognate trade mergers. These had reduced the 13 manual unions, dedicated in 1951 to the printing and paper industry, to just 2 in 1993, that is SOGAT(82) and NGA(82) (see Gennard 1990 and Gennard and Bain 1995). The GPMU amalgamation was therefore the last stage in a process of consolidation which aimed to form an industrial union. Over the preceding 30 years, prior to the 1991 amalgamation, the leading antecedents of SOGAT(82) and NGA(82) had periodically vied with each other as they actively sought mergers amongst the smaller printing and paper unions. The NGA(82), rooted in craft unionism and a member of the ‘labour aristocracy’, increasingly found its interests clashing with those of SOGAT’s which were more widely spread across semi- and unskilled workers. Indeed, the NGA(82)’s earlier mergers were primarily concerned to maintain craft control over its work as new technology threatened and reduced its traditional job territory. In the 1980s, a combination of yet more radical technological change, concentration of ownership in the industry, union de-recognition, and inroads into both unions’ traditional territory by the EETPU’s single union deals pointed to increasing membership loss and reductions in bargaining power (Gennard 1995: 200–19). In this increasingly hostile industrial environment, the two unions made competing claims for recognition and bargaining rights resulting in ‘interminable inter-union fights’ which were the ‘prime reason’ for the amalgamation (GPMU 1993: 157). The central purpose of the amalgamation was therefore to enhance the new combined unions’ power in relation to common employers by preventing the use of divide-and-rule tactics. Also, the relevant political actors, including the Labour Party and the TUC, were to be more effectively influenced by the larger union. Beyond the UK, the unions were also looking to strengthen the amalgamated unions’ role in Europe in order to guard against low wage competition from Central and Easter Europe (Gennard 1995: 194–245). In addition, the amalgamation was expected to improve the unions’ administration by releasing resources and improving the financial base. As regards democratic ethos and government structure, these did not figure large in the motivation to merge or in the expressed purpose of the amalgamation.


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Hence, there was no pre-amalgamation notion of an ideal government model or design for the new union. In the GPMU balanced-partner merger (both unions were of a similar size and financial standing), common territorial interests therefore determined the choice of amalgamation partners. External developments in the printing and paper industry, and the history of geographic concentration and cognate trade mergers, made the formation of an industrial union for printing and paper the ‘natural’ culmination of an extended period of consolidation by merger. The purpose was rationally political: the unions sought an increase in power as a function of combination and the formation of an industrial union. The UNIFI amalgamation in 1999 was primarily organized by BIFU. It was a critical part of BIFU’s general merger activity aimed at consolidating union membership in the sector and therefore putting an end to ‘divided representation’. Just as the NGA(82) leadership saw the GPMU merger stopping internecine strife between competing unions in print, so BIFU sought the same outcome in the finance sector and in retail banking in particular. Further, technological developments in finance and the concentration of ownership in the sector had, as in printing, given a new edge to existing moves to consolidate union membership in the finance sector. For between 1989 and the UNIFI amalgamation in 1999, employment in retail banking fell by 27% from 3000,000 to 220,000 (Morris et al. 2001: 241). In the five years preceding the amalgamation, the combined BIFU, NWSA, and UNiFI membership also fell from 209,000 to 178,000 (−15%). This membership loss was not, however, solely due to the decline in employment in retail banking: union density also declined. Between 1995 and 1999, union density in the six leading retail banks (HSBC, NatWest, Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds/TB, and Barclays) fell on average from 58% to 46%. By 1999, the three unions’ total membership only exceeded 50% density in NatWest (56%), Royal Bank of Scotland (51%), and Barclays (56%). In looking to consolidate membership in its primary job territory, retail banking, BIFU was therefore also motivated by defensive concerns as it sought to reverse its own membership decline and the concomitant deteriorating financial position (as noted above). Political considerations, in terms of a changing bargaining agenda and a search for increased bargaining power vis-à-vis the banking employers, also spurred BIFU towards this amalgamation in the mid-1990s. Previously, in the 1970s and 1980s, BIFU had competed aggressively for membership in both Barclays Bank and in NatWest Bank, directly against UNiFI and the NWSA, respectively. As noted by Morris et al. (2001: 245), the leaders of the three amalgamating unions had, in this period, ‘been involved in repeated campaigns to vilify the other’s values and performance’. Historically, such antagonism was rooted in BIFU’s view of staff associations as employer sponsored

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bodies intended to stop the spread of ‘proper’ unionism in banking, and specifically to thwart BIFU. Critically, BIFU’s view changed as the loss of members noted above adversely affected its financial security and the staff associations’ character became more ‘unionate’ as both UNiFI and NWSA adopted more traditional bargaining roles in their respective banks and explored affiliation to the TUC. Further, the election of new general secretaries in all three unions brought a change in relationships between the three key players. In particular, the election of Ed Sweeny in 1996 to the top post in BIFU and Rory Murphy in 1994 to the same post in NWSA, opened the way to closer working. Also Murphy, as a former assistant general secretary of MSF, joined the NWSA as a professional trade union leader, rather than, as previously, the general secretary being an employee of NatWest—again a sign of NWSA’s growing ‘unionateness’. Sweeney, committed to ending divided representation and seeking cooperation with other unions in the industry, rather than trying to eliminating them, played the crucial part in building the bridges necessary for amalgamation. BIFU therefore focused on joint working arrangements, joint campaigns against job losses, and combined bargaining approaches to their joint employers. In this new guise, the aim was to increase the unions’ bargaining power by inter-union cooperation, not competition. BIFU was also encouraged to take this new route by the knowledge that failure to court successfully UNiFI and NWSU could see both unions eventually transferring to the MSF. As regards government and administrative issues, these helped shape the smaller unions, that is, UNiFI’s and NWSA’s merger ambitions, while also providing BIFU with an opportunity to review its own internal structure. BIFU, a relatively non-factionalized union with a regional structure, but largely reliant on full-time officer servicing of its membership and collective bargaining units, tended traditionally to control its bargaining activities from the centre. Obviously, as relatively small single employer organizations, UNiFI and NWSA also had central control over their own bargaining activities. They also wished to retain this bargaining autonomy in the new amalgamated union. The solution, National Company Committees, each responsible for collective bargaining in one of the banks and finance companies organized by the new union, suited all three unions. In particular, while ensuring UNiFI and NWSA continued to service their own members, it also allowed BIFU to decentralize bargaining responsibility to its own numerous bargaining units. These had mushroomed in recent years as bargaining was decentralized and fragmented. For example, the Royal Bank of Scotland had moved from 2 to 39 bargaining units and introduced individualization of pay systems based on performance. BIFU had encountered considerable difficulties in supporting these newly devolved activities from the centre and in maintaining the


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national executive’s constitutional responsibility for the resulting collective agreements. Hence, the introduction of national company committees, which met UNiFI’s and NWSA’s demands for bargaining autonomy, also helped BIFU adjust its structure to service more effectively the employer-inspired decentralization and fragmentation of collective bargaining. The purpose of the UNIFI amalgamation was therefore essentially political: it sought an increase in the three unions’ bargaining power vis-à-vis their common employers via consolidation of membership. The key to its success was the recognition in BIFU that cooperation between unions, whose characters had developed in a similar and ‘unionate’ fashion, was preferable to continued inter-union conflict. Further, BIFU’s commitment to forming an industrial union, as displayed in its previous success in the transfer market, made UNiFI and the NWSA amongst the largest of the remaining single-employer staff associations, the rational choice as BIFU’s amalgamation partners. Another private sector union with a similar historic mission to form an industrial union was the AEU (Amalgamated Engineering Union). Initially rooted in nineteenth-century craft exclusive unionism, it was struggling, as early as 1945, with the question of whether or not it ‘could transform itself into an industrial union’ (Jefferys 1945: 259). Over a decade, starting in 1992, it was central to two amalgamations which achieved this goal: in 1992, the AEEU was formed by the AEU and EETPU amalgamation, and in 2002, the nascent industrial union, the AEEU, converted itself into the largest private sector conglomerate AMICUS (1,144,211) by amalgamating with the MSF. Territorially, the AEU and EETPU’s 1992 amalgamation was the culmination of the consolidation of craft-dominated engineering unions formed by previous geographic concentration and cognate trade mergers. The latter had involved national specialist unions, such as the Foundry, Plumbing, and Construction Workers’ unions, merging into the engineers’ and electricians’ unions. As the smaller unions ceased their independent existence, the scope for the AEU’s and EETPU’s further growth by transfers became limited. The obvious solution was to amalgamate the two key unions. However, since the electricians’ union was founded in 1889, when they adopted the Amalgamated Society of Engineers’ rules (Lloyd 1990: 1), the engineers and electricians had repeatedly attempted, but failed, to agree such an amalgamation. Prior to 1992, the most recent failure had been but three years earlier in 1989. The causes of this failure set the context for the successful talks which restarted almost immediately in 1990. In the mid-1980s, the AEU’s long-standing commitment to the creation of an industrial engineering union with itself at the core, or, at least, the consolidation of all craft dominated engineering unions, was given added impetus by its financial difficulties. For, following the loss of 10% (100,000)

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of its members between 1984 and 1989, the engineers had made a series of redundancies amongst both full-time officials and staff which had helped ameliorate, but not solve, the associated financial problems. An amalgamation with the financially sound EETPU hence offered to deliver both the unions’ long-term industrial mission and solve the short-term financial deficit. Nevertheless, it was the AEU that aborted the talks in 1989. The cause of the AEU’s withdrawal was threefold: first, the democratic ethos and government of the two unions differed significantly; second, the political affiliations of the two were in tension; and, third, the leading officials in the AEU and EETPU had conflicting career aspirations. As regards democracy and government, the AEU was a highly factionalized union with moderate and broad left organizations generally accepted as legitimate actors in the union’s political process. In contrast, the EETPU was run by a national leadership which shared a common politically moderate, right of centre, ideology. In 1989, the moderate faction (or ‘Group’) inside the AEU held a majority on the key decision-making bodies, that is, the national executive and national committee. This would normally have led to political harmony between the two unions, but on this occasion, the ‘Group’ inside the AEU was split over some critical aspects of the proposed amalgamation. Most significantly, many members of the ‘Group’ were strong supporters of the continued election of full-time officials and sustaining the influential role played by the AEU’s national and district committees. All three were threatened in 1989 by the terms of the proposed amalgamation. Secondly, as noted previously, the EETPU had been expelled from the TUC in 1988 and many in the ‘Group’, and those in the AEU’s broad left faction (or ‘Engineering Gazette’), were resolutely opposed to merging with a union which was not affiliated to the TUC. Moreover, the EETPU’s behaviour in this period, when it tried to establish itself as a rival centre of union organization to the TUC and courted favour with Mrs Thatcher by nominating members to public bodies as alternatives to TUC nominees, had alienated many of its former allies in the AEU. There was also a fear that the EETPU would try, via the amalgamation, to divorce the AEU from the TUC, in its bid to raise the status of its own ultra-moderate policies. As a result of the above government and political conflicts, the disaffected ‘Group’ members and the broad left inside the AEU combined at the national committee to reject the amalgamation proposals. Similar oppositionist tendencies were present on the AEU’s executive committee. These were exacerbated by the third factor, the conflicting aspirations of the AEU’s two leading national officials. In the AEU’s constitution, the ‘division of powers’ between president and general secretary served to give both incumbents a high degree of influence over decision-making. As the


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AEU was the larger partner in the amalgamation, both could also reasonably expect to hold the same posts in the new union. However, the agreement in 1989 was for the president (Bill Jordan) to be president of the new union, but for the general secretary of the EETPU (Eric Hammond) to be its general secretary. This left the AEU’s general secretary (Gavin Laird) out in the cold, without a significant post in the new union. As a result, the joint persuasive power of president and general secretary at the executive level of the AEU was ruptured. Indeed, Laird supported those in the executive who opposed the amalgamation. Hence, both the national committee and national executive of the AEU voted against and therefore stopped the AEU’s amalgamation with the EETPU in 1989. The key to the successful 1990–2 talks was therefore in solving the problems which halted the 1989 amalgamation. Critically, the EETPU was motivated by changes in its circumstances between 1989 and 1992 to agree a new basis for the amalgamation. Three issues threatened the EETPU’s hold on its existing job territory and helped change its position. First, it was not finding life outside the TUC as promising as it had expected. Not only had it failed to conclude the AEU amalgamation, but it had also failed to merge with any union of substance in its drive to create a new grand alliance of moderate unions. In particular, its attempt to attract the largest construction and building union (UCATT) into a merger failed. Second, the EETPU was concerned that the AEU’s financial difficulties would lead it to engage in merger talks with competitor unions, particularly the GMB. Third, and most importantly, in 1991, the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions (CSEU), which was co-ordinating selective industrial action for the shorter working week in engineering and controlling a strike fund payment of some £120 per striker a week, threatened to expel any member union not affiliated to the TUC. The AEU, which dominated the CSEU, did not oppose this proposal. If this had been implemented, the EETPU would have found itself isolated in the industry and its members exposed to poaching by competing unions. In the above circumstances, and critically for the resumption of amalgamation negotiations, the leading official inside the EETPU, Eric Hammond, agreed to step aside from the general secretaryship of the new union. This left the way clear for Gavin Laird, general secretary of the AEU, to fill the post for the first two years of the new union. Further, with the two general secretaries agreeing on the succession plan, they had a common personal and career interest in finding a solution to the key government issues. In brief, the divisive questions of election or appointment of full-time officials, and the role of the district and national committees, were avoided. They were put to one side until after the amalgamation. The two unions thus merged on the

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basis of a minimalist rule book which did little more than bolt the two unions together, largely unchanged constitutionally, into the AEEU. The subsequent amalgamation in 2002 between the AEEU and MSF into AMICUS was similarly driven by the engineers’ territorial mission to protect its craft ethos and form an industrial union. As Laird stated in 1991 when promoting the formation of the AEEU, ‘. . . when the AEU and EETPU have merged, executive council are sure this will lead to further amalgamations’ (AEU 1991). In order to achieve its industrial union mission, the AEEU also needed to absorb the MSF’s engineering craft sections. Indeed, despite the fact that some 50% of the MSF’s membership was outside of manufacturing, one of the AEEU’s lead negotiators was reported, no doubt tongue in cheek, as asking the MSF if they had any other members in addition to their ‘metal bashers’. As the AEEU’s general secretary (Sir Ken Jackson) put it in 2000 in arguing for the amalgamation, ‘The TUC, the Government and employers will (after the merger) have to listen to the voice of skill’, and ‘Above all it will be impossible for the voice of skill and professional qualification to be drowned out (if the amalgamation is consummated)’ (AEEU 2000: 6). At the time, the AEEU was also concerned that the MSF, still in financial difficulties after failing to complete the IPMS merger, would join one of the AEEU’s competitor unions, such as the GMB or T&G. Such a merger would have enhanced the conglomerate unions’ minority stakes in craft areas. Political issues also figured in the AEEU’s amalgamation strategy. Collective bargaining was seen to be enhanced by combining across shared territories. The AEEU highlighted the potential advantage by giving prominence to statements from shop stewards across several different sectors who looked forward to closer working with colleagues in the MSF. For example, ‘At British American Tobacco, the AEEU and MSF already enjoy a good working relationship. . . . A merger will only increase our political influence and strength’ (AEEU 2001: 12). Also in the area of political ideology, the AEEU’s dominant moderate faction had much in common with the ‘MSF for Labour’ faction which had successfully quashed the broad left inside the MSF. As for democratic and government issues, these were again left to one side for resolution after the amalgamation. In regard to administrative questions, the AEEU was in a very secure financial position in 2002. It was therefore confident that it could resolve the MSF’s financial problems without threat to its own financial position. The MSF in the late 1990s was, for its part, in urgent need of financial assistance, particularly as it had failed to merge with the financially sound IPMS in 1998. In 2000, its accountants were pressing for an ‘emergency £3 million savings package to balance its books’ as it faced a ‘financial catastrophe’ (Guardian 2001: 8). Encouraged by its partnership with the AEEU in their


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joint ‘Alliance for Manufacturing’ campaign, the MSF looked to the AEEU for support in solving its financial problems and for more resources to ‘enable us to assist our members when they need help’ (MSF 2000). Not surprisingly, in promoting the amalgamation, it stressed the financial strengths of an AEEU/MSF merger, claiming that the new unions’ £60 million income and assets of around £100 million would make it ‘. . . financially strong as well as politically and industrially better placed to serve the interests of its members’ (MSF 2000). Hence, while the AEEU was primarily looking to consolidate and extend its hold on its engineering territory, the MSF, while agreeing with the industrial logic of a strong manufacturing union, was largely motivated by more pressing defensive concerns. It urgently needed to resolve long-standing financial difficulties which had their origin in the post-merger restructuring of the two unions, ASTMS and TASS, which formed the MSF in 1988. The debts MSF had incurred to resolve such problems had not been alleviated by a series of transfers between 1988 and 2001 which had seen it absorb a large number of smaller unions, some of which were themselves in financial difficulties. To summarize on private sector amalgamations: the majority of the private sector amalgamations had common territorial and historical motivations. Apart from the GMB’s two amalgamations, the rest involved one partner or more intent on forming a new industrial union. Of these, three unions, the NGA(82), EETPU, and AEU, had at their core their long-standing commitment to protect skilled craftsman’s interests and a history of consolidatory mergers. But later, in AMICUS’s case, because the MSF had extensive interests outside of engineering, and indeed manufacturing, this amalgamation resulted in the creation of a more general private sector union. Further, when, as discussed previously, UNIFI and then GPMU transferred to AMICUS in 2004, this served to make it Britain’s largest conglomerate union, rather than the industrial engineering union sought by its predecessors. It also paved the way for AMICUS’s talks in 2005–6 with the T&G (and initially the GMB) to form the ‘super’ primarily private sector general or conglomerate union, UNITE, in 2007. In contrast to the above unions’ historical and emotional commitments to forming new industrial unions, the GMB’s successful amalgamations and the aborted 1994 GMB and T&G talks did not originate in any such wellestablished territorial mission. Rather, the GMB’s successful forays into amalgamations had much in common with its transfers: they were about expanding into territories and adding numbers. They were not intended to form some new kind of amalgamated union but to extend and adjust, respectively, the GMB’s territorial reach and government structure. They did not, therefore,

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threaten, unlike the abortive talks with the T&G, the GMB’s existing internal balance of power nor its general ethos of government. Turning to the public sector unions’ amalgamations: these will be discussed in strict chronological order. This makes sense as the two amalgamations most closely related in terms of initiatives, that is, the two amalgamations combining civil servants—PTC in 1996 and PCS in 1998—followed each other chronologically. It is also helpful to discuss the UNISON amalgamation first as it set a precedent for large, or mega, amalgamations. UNISON, formed in 1993 by NALGO (759,735), NUPE (551,165), and COHSE (201,993), brought together unions primarily organizing white collar and blue collar workers in local government, the NHS, water, and universities. NALGO also had significant interests in the privatized utilities. Although the three unions had overlapping territorial interests in public services, UNISON was the least predictable of the amalgamations studied. None of the three unions were notable for their merger activities and there were no merger streams which pointed the way towards such an amalgamation. As regards a historical mission to form a single (industrial) union for local government, NUPE had a largely dormant commitment to such an ideal, but NALGO, the largest and the best-financed union in local government, was not in this tradition. Indeed, as an association of local government officers, it initially, in the early twentieth century, stood apart from trade unionism and prior to joining the TUC in 1965, it had tended to be ‘parochial and isolationist’ in its policies (Undy et al. 1981: 225). In the absence of an existing territorial mission, such as a commitment to industrial unionism in NALGO, and NUPE’s lukewarm attachment to it, it was changes originating in the public service unions’ political environment which played the critical role in motivating the UNISON amalgamation. As the general secretary of NALGO put it in interview in 1989, ‘Mrs Thatcher (and her Conservative government) was the catalyst for the UNISON merger talks’. In the face of privatization, compulsory competitive tendering, decentralization of bargaining, pay review for nurses, anti-union rhetoric and associated job loss, and declining union density, the three unions turned to examine the potential advantages of amalgamation. This built on the experience of the NALGO and NUPE liaison committee and the three years of talks between NUPE and COHSE for closer working in the health service. As was articulated at NALGO’s 1998 conference, ‘The attacks that local government faces and the need for maximum unity now make the merging of unions (NALGO and NUPE) an urgent priority’ (NALGO 1998). In addition, NUPE’s financial difficulties, and COHSE’s concerns over its future financial security, as noted above, added to the pressure both smaller unions felt for an amalgamation with the financially sound NALGO.


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The advantages of the UNISON amalgamation were not, however, selfevident to all interested parties. Inside NALGO, in particular, there were divergent views as to the efficacy of such a merger. Inter-union conflict during industrial disputes and NUPE’s record of ‘poaching’ members had soured relations, as well as providing further reasons for the amalgamation as a means of resolving such problems. Hence, unlike some of the private sector amalgamations, which were territorially pre-ordained, the unions in the UNISON merger, but particularly the leaders of the financially sound NALGO, had to construct and articulate a persuasive case for the formation of UNISON. This was essential to quieten the arguments inside NALGO against the proposed merger. Territorially, changes in job grades and boundaries had made it more difficult for the three unions to maintain clear demarcation lines between their job territories. The amalgamation therefore offered help in reducing growing inter-union competition for members. However, inside NALGO and NUPE, there were fears that by mixing ‘bosses (NALGO) and workers (NUPE)’ in the one union, both sets of members might react by leaving the union and joining competitor unions or staff associations. Further, political differences also raised difficult issues. In particular, NALGO’s long-standing political neutrality was perceived by some members and leading activists (including those associated with the then SDP) as threatened by joining with NUPE and COHSE. These latter unions were both supporters of, and affiliated to, the Labour Party and could thus lead NALGO to abandon its own politically neutral stance. But, probably most important of all, NALGO and NUPE’s democratic ethos, government structures and practices were in conflict. Briefly, NALGO as a ‘member (or activist)-led’ union contrasted with NUPE, an ‘officer-led’ union. Moreover, NALGO had a long history of factionalized conflict on its executive and conference across the full spectrum, right, centre, and left, of union politics, whereas NUPE was largely non-factionalized. Also, NUPE’s lay activists tended to defer to the national full-time officials on both policymaking and implementation. Further, NALGO as a professional association had a more sophisticated approach to strategy making and a formalized process for producing and digesting written papers. This formalized system was emphasized during the amalgamation talks and adapted to the amalgamation process, including each union hiring its own academic adviser to act as a consultant to their leading officials. As a result, a proliferation of papers dissecting most of the important issues were widely circulated and discussed during the four years of merger talks. The lay activists who played a central role in decision-making in NALGO were, compared to their lay counterparts in the GMB, AEEU, and AMICUS amalgamations, therefore well informed about and frequently involved in the detail of the UNISON amalgamation.

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A central question, particularly for NALGO’s national full-time officials, was therefore how, after they had convinced themselves of the value of the amalgamation, to carry their lay activists with them. Even as late in the talks as 1991, they were still struggling with this issue as it was recognized that future work needed to be done in ‘clarifying the case for a New Union’ (COHSE, NALGO and NUPE 1991: 5). However, what emerged as the key sticking points were not differences over the political objectives and needs of the new union, but its proposed democratic ethos and related government issues. In particular, NALGO’s activists required a cast-iron guarantee that the new union would be lay controlled, or member led, and not subject to officer domination. Thus, a new rule book fully developed and embracing NALGO’s democratic ethos in the form of governance and related structures was an essential requirement of the UNISON merger. This would ensure that principles of lay representation and a member-centred approach were ‘reflected in all aspects of the design of the new union’ (COHSE, NALGO and NUPE 1991: 58). Moreover, NALGO’s introduction of self-organizing groups for ‘disadvantaged’ members (and the associated equality agenda) was seen by some leading activists as central to the new amalgamated union’s scheme of organization (see Fryer 2000: 42). As a quid pro quo for the NALGO model of government, NUPE secured safeguards for its low-paid members in the form of ‘fair representation’ and COHSE settled for a separate section for its health service workers. In agreeing a new comprehensive and detailed rule book before the three unions’ conferences and memberships voted for the amalgamation, UNISON was clearly differentiated from the GMB, AEEU, and AMICUS amalgamations. The UNISON amalgamation’s purpose was therefore also primarily political. It was intended to unite the three unions ‘in the face of a common employer, or groups of like-minded employers’ (NALGO and NUPE 1988) and improve member services. The process of securing the agreement, however, rested critically on issues of democratic ethos and government. A ‘New Union’ with a new rule book, but one which strongly reflected NALGO’s democratic ethos, was the chosen solution. Further, it guaranteed the support of NALGO’s influential lay activists for the project. The PTC and PCS civil service amalgamations, in 1996 and 1998, respectively, were intimately related. Unlike the UNISON amalgamation, the larger of the two unions in the 1996 PTC amalgamations, NUCPS (112,080), and its antecedents, had a long record of merger activity. By this process, over some 20 years prior to the PTC amalgamation in 1996, a stream of cognate trade mergers had reduced the number of civil service unions from 12 to 6. The NUCPS was itself a product of this process, following the mergers of


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the SCPS (executive grades), CSU (low paid support and specialist grades), AOML (officers in the ministry of labour), and the CEG (Customs and Excise Group). In addition, the NUCPS (or its antecedents) had failed on three separate occasions to secure the ‘big prize’, that is, an amalgamation with the CPSA (Civil and Public Services Association), the largest of the civil service unions. In 1990, the NUCPS had almost succeeded in completing this latter amalgamation, only for the CPSA’s leadership to abort the merger at the last possible stage. Despite this set-back, the NUCPS, and particularly its general secretary, John Sheldon, remained firmly committed to the equivalent of industrial unionism in the civil service. In examining how the PTC and PCS amalgamations helped move the civil service towards creating such an industrial union, the following will: first, consider the IRSF’s relatively formal and sophisticated cost–benefit analysis of both the amalgamation option and its partner unions; second, discuss the motivations which determined the NUCPS’s approach to the PTC amalgamation; and, third, assess the PTC’s and the CPSA’s motivations and purposes in agreeing to create the PCS. The IRSF and NUCPS both recognized, in the early 1990s, that their common civil service interests could be better advanced by forming a closer working relationship. As in the UNISON amalgamation, they both faced radical changes in their work environment emanating from the Conservative government’s reforms. These threatened to weaken their bargaining power and reduce their ability to defend their members’ industrial interests: ‘The IRSF is facing change on an unprecedented scale and depth—its clear and robust recognition arrangements, high membership density (90%), high level of employer facilities, centralized employment and negotiation structure are now either changing or being challenged’ (IRSF 1992: 2). It was ‘precisely because of such attacks’ (from government) that the IRSF continued to ‘examine how unions (IRSF/NUCPS) can work more closely’ (IRSF 1992: 1). In particular, as a ‘niche’ union, the IRSF saw its Inland Revenue territory fragmenting and under the direct threat of privatization. Such a process would, it was feared, remove the job boundaries which made the IRSF relatively secure and of a viable size, in its traditional ‘niche’ territory. In a formal assessment of the strength and weaknesses of the case for merger (as against independence), it stressed, amongst the strengths of merger: potential economies of scale; service improvements; strengthening its membership base; and breaking out of its ‘one department’, that is, Inland Revenue job territory. Amongst the weaknesses were: the IRSF’s loss of independence; time and effort involved in merging; loss of specialist services; and the risk of adopting what it saw as the NUCPS’s full-time officer dominated ‘complex, inefficient and bureaucratic structure’ (IRSF 1992: 5).

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Subsequently, and after surveying its members, the IRSF elaborated on the ‘template’ against which it would assess an amalgamation with the NUCPS. In language redolent of that used by NALGO in the UNISON merger, the IRSF first stressed democratic concerns, arguing that a fundamental goal was ‘a membership-centred union’. Second, it emphasized the territorial logic of common industrial identity. The new amalgamated union would also have to be decentralized and provide the new conference and executive with a welldefined structure. At the time, the executive of the IRSF was concerned with the growing Trotskyite influence at its own conference, which was frequently at odds with the more moderate national executive. Hence, the emphasis on democratic issues reflected the IRSF leadership’s interests in restructuring its own decision-making processes in order to make the new union more ‘representative’ of the unions’ members’ political interests. As will be seen below, this theme repeated itself in the later PCS amalgamation. Administrative arrangements also exercised the IRSF, particularly as it was suspicious of the NUCP’s financial position. As a result, the question as to which part of the new union would be responsible for the IRSF’s financial resources became an issue. The IRSF, while seeking continued autonomy over its own collective bargaining activities, thus also sought safeguards against the former NUCPS spending the IRSF’s monies, post-amalgamation. The NUCPS, the larger of the two unions forming PTC (NUCPS, 112,080 and IRSF, 59,907) was fundamentally intent on creating an industry-wide civil service union. Further, a largely unsuccessful 19-week campaign in 1981 of selective strikes in the civil service, against the first Thatcher government’s decision to tear up the civil service Pay Agreement, had helped keep this goal alive. It had provided a sharp reminder of the difficulties of organizing effective industrial action when nine different unions were involved and the employer was the government. Territorially, therefore, a merger between NUCPS and any other civil service unions was a further step in the right direction. The territorial attractiveness of the IRSF, as against that of any other civil service unions, was therefore a relatively minor consideration for the NUCPS: the two shared job territory in the Inland Revenue, but the NUCPS had only a minor interest in this department. Nevertheless, with future fragmentation of departments and the promised privatization of some functions, the two could, in future, have been in more intense competition for the same employees. For, as noted in the merger discussions, job boundaries between civil service departments were under review, including: Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise; Inland Revenue and National Insurance; Inland Revenue and DSS; and Employment and Benefits Services (NUCPS and IRSF 1994: 5 and 6). All such changes could have blurred the IRSF and NUCPS members’ job boundaries and thus encouraged inter-union conflict.


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More important than territorial interests, however, were the NUCPS’s concerns over political, democratic ethos, and government issues. These interacted to make the IRSF a very attractive partner for the NUCPS. Politically, or more accurately ideologically, an amalgamation with the IRSF was seen as helping the NUCPS’s leading national officials reform the NUCPS’s political position. The NUCPS was traditionally a left-of-centre union in which a caucus of former Communist Party activists played an important part. Known colloquially as ‘tankies’, and associated with those supporters of the ‘Morning Star’ who remained loyal to the Soviet Union following the Soviets’ subjection of opposition in Czechoslovakia, they had been an integral part of the SCPS power structure at the time of its merger with the CSU (this formed the NUCPS in 1987). The national leadership of both the NUCPS and the IRSF therefore had a mutual interest in finding ways of reducing the influence of left-wing factions inside their unions. Moreover, if the NUCPS’s leadership wished to amalgamate subsequently with the CPSA, it had to move the new PTC more towards the political centre ground, closer to that of the dominant groups inside the IRSF. This was essential, because the CPSA, one of the most factionalized and politicized of the civil service unions, had for a decade had a national executive dominated by the moderate faction led by a leading ultramoderate general secretary, Barry Reamsbottom. The route to reaching this political realignment lay in the democratic ethos and government system to be embedded in the new amalgamated union. As the NUCPS and IRSF were committed to creating a new union and ‘not just bolting two unions’ together (NUCPS and IRSF 1994: 1), there was an opportunity to redesign the government of the two unions. Apart from the IRSF’s insistence on sectional autonomy, there was little difference in principle between the two unions’ national leaders on the design of the new rule book. Both looked to reduce the powers enjoyed by the National Conference, which they saw as open to left-wing and unrepresentative factional influence. Hence, they designed rules which would strengthen the executive, elected by secret ballot, and provide the mass of the membership with a greater role in policymaking, again via secret ballots. Such moves were sure to recommend the PTC to the CPSA’s national leadership. The purpose of the PTC amalgamation was therefore complex. It had intertwined territorial, political, and democratic dimensions. It helped the IRSF and NUCPS combine across commonly shared job territories and so enhance their bargaining power vis-à-vis the government. At the same time, the reform of the union’s government systems in a new rule book promised to reduce the influence exercised by the left-wing elements in both unions. But for the NUCPS’s national leadership, the wider territorial purpose was critical. The formation of the PTC was the stepping stone towards its historic mission of an

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industrial union for the civil service. For, by converting the NUCPS into the PTC, it transformed itself into the largest civil service union and, at the same time, made itself a more politically and democratically acceptable partner for the CPSA. The arguments mounted by the PTC and CPSA between 1996 and 1998, for their amalgamation into the PCS, resembled the classic collective bargaining (not syndicalist) case for industrial unionism (Clegg 1976: 53). As the TUC had long recognized, such consolidatory mergers could, in theory, if replacing multi-union representation, result in: greater bargaining strength; harmonizing internal sectional differences; developing coherent wages policy; reducing issues of demarcation between members with changing job boundaries; developing a more unified policy for the industry; and reducing duplication of representation (TUC 1964: 108–9). At one of the first formal meetings, in February 1996 to begin the process of merging, the TUC’s general secretary, John Monks, addressed the meeting and reiterated the TUC’s continuing preference for a form of industrial unionism, by, in this case, encouraging a merger which would lead to the PTC and CPSA rationalizing ‘on the basis of a particular sector’ (CPSA 1996a: 1). In the case of the PTC and CPSA merger, this was particularly appropriate: both unions operated in duplicate in virtually all the growing number (over 300) of delegated bargaining units, as they separately represented clerical and secretarial staff (CPSA) and managers and specialists (PTC). They both also had, in common with UNISON, strong interests in gender and equal opportunity issues, reflecting the importance and numerical dominance of women members in each union. The new union would also account for some 70% of all unionized civil servants. As expected, therefore, given the common work environment and membership, there was considerable agreement between the national leaders of PTC and CPSA regarding the motivations for the new union. Following the February 1996 meeting, referred to above, during which nine elements were identified as important for developing the new union, a pamphlet ‘New Union: Your Future’ (CPSA 1996b) elaborated on these to make the public case for the amalgamation. After stressing the territorial overlap between members, in terms of grade of work involved, and the likelihood of yet future blurring of job boundaries, the paper articulated the case for an industrial union. Politically, as regards the unions’ objectives and means, the stress was laid on better service, through greater bargaining strength and ending the employers’ ‘divide-and-rule tactics’ (CPSA 1996b). This was seen as delivering more attractive membership benefits and services, including inter alia: fair pay levels; improved job security; halting privatization; and a better deal for working parents (CPSA 1996b). As regards democratic ethos and government, the focus was on producing a new union which would be ‘democratic and


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membership centred’ (CPSA 1996b). Administratively, a new single union would ‘cut out the enormous duplication of effort’ (CPSA 1996b). Underpinning the whole process, and motivating and binding the national full-time leaderships of the PTC and CPSA together from the start of the merger negotiations, however, were political issues of an ideological nature and related questions of union government. This was most readily acknowledged in the CPSA’s literature supporting the amalgamation and in the open conflict, towards the end of the negotiations, between the CPSA’s politically moderate national leadership and the hard left and militant lay activists, opposed to the terms of the amalgamation. The ‘ground rules’ (from interview) for resolving such political conflicts and establishing the preferred democratic ethos were developed in the statement of the PTC’s ‘Aims and Values’. These were subsequently amended and agreed with the CPSA’s national leadership for application in the PCS’s amalgamation. Such considerations were a priority right from the start of the informal amalgamation talks between the PTC’s and CPSA’s general secretaries in 1996. As recorded by the CPSA, there was agreement on the ‘crucial importance of ensuring that the (government) structure must be democratic’ (CPSA 1996c ). In 1997, in a paper ‘Building a New Union’, prepared for the Conferences of both unions, the democratic vision for the new union was spelt out in the statement of Aims and Values: the goal of creating a new union was ‘. . . above all a union in which you, the members, take the major decisions’ (CPSA and PTC 1997: 1). By such means, the leaders of the PTC and CPSA sought to ensure that the PCS was politically respectable, by guaranteeing that the mass of the membership, rather than the hard left activists at the national conference, determined future rule changes. Also, by introducing a biennial rather than annual conference, more influence was expected to migrate to the national executive which in the CPSA had for a decade been controlled by the moderates. Such moves were also expected to recommend the newly formed PCS to the New Labour government. Not surprisingly, the hard left factions inside the CPSA (Broad Left and Unity), vigorously opposed such proposals. But bolstered by an indicative ballot of the membership which recorded an overwhelming majority (25,000 to 8,500) in favour of the changes outlined in ‘Aims and Values’, the CPSA’s national leadership ignored the subsequent special conference vote against the proposed innovative and controversial government system and structure. The CPSA thus concluded in 1998 an amalgamation with the PTC in the face of well-organized and vociferous internal opposition. The 1996 and 1998 PTC and PCS amalgamations were therefore in some important respects different from most other mergers in both their origins and motivations. They originated in a long-standing search by the NUCPS

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and its antecedents for an industrial union for civil servants. The PTC and PCS amalgamations were also almost seamless, as the first was clearly sought as a means of securing the second. The purpose was clearly political in terms of securing an increase in bargaining power by combining across common job territories. However, it was also openly ideologically and democratically motivated, as both the leaders of the NUCPS and CPSA attempted to design a form of government which would reduce the influence of the hard left and enhance that of the moderates. At the same time, it had something in common with UNISON as both UNISON and the PTC and PCS amalgamations were at least partly a product of the same hostile environment created by the same government. Further, both were formally strategic in their planning and implementation, and shared strong interests in the equality agenda. But the PTC and PCS amalgamations were more highly controlled and managed from the centre in a sophisticated manner rarely matched in the other mergers. The IPMS (public sector) and MSF (private sector with minority public sector interest) amalgamation talks, aborted in 1998, were exceptional as they cut across the public–private divide. Further, the failure to cement this relationship, which could have helped resolve the MSF’s inherent financial difficulties, contributed significantly to the MSF’s later amalgamation with the AEEU to form AMICUS. Hence, as the main interest in examining this aborted amalgamation is the reason for its failure, the focus will be on the IPMS, which withdrew from the talks, rather than on the MSF. The IPMS’s civil service membership (professionals, managers, and specialists) declined from 104,000 in 1979 to 78,000 in 1997 and from the late 1980s, it actively sought mergers as the ‘niche’ territory it occupied shrank. The merger options were systematically and strategically evaluated in a formal manner, which reflected the IPMS’s professional approach to such issues. The main aim was therefore territorial as mergers were sought which would increase the IPMS’s territorial reach by taking it into potential growth areas. But, because some of its former civil service members had been ‘privatized’, this also pointed it towards recruiting similar occupational groups in the private sector. Initially, in 1992, the IPMS sought territorial expansion by forming a Federation of three unions, IPMS, Society of Telecom Executives (STE), and the Communication Managers Association (CMA). Later in 1993, the Halifax Building Society Staff Association joined the Federation, with observer status (it became a full member in 1994). The IPMS also persuaded the First Division Association (FDA) which organized the highest level of civil servants and the Engineering Managers Association (EMA) to join the Federation in 1995. As intended, the Federation produced economies of scale and financial savings


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for its members in such areas as research, education, common purchasing, and membership services. The IPMS hoped that such concrete advantages would help move the Federation members to a ‘mature stage’, that is, full merger. However, in 1996, the federated unions declined to follow the IPMS’s merger plan. The IPMS then explored several other options: remaining independent; a merger with one or more of the EMA, AEEU, MSF, PTC, and CPSA; a multiunion amalgamation with the MSF, CMA, and NUIW; and a merger with the newly planned PTC/CPSA amalgamated union (PCS). In a traditionally faction-free and centralized union the general secretary, Bill Brett, played a crucial role in directing the IPMS towards the MSF, CMA, and NUIW amalgamation which would create a ‘new union’ straddling the public–private sector divide. Indeed, the IPMS’s journal ‘Negotiator’ carried the headline ‘The MSF Option: Expanding into the Private Sector’ in its special edition promoting the proposed amalgamation (IPMS 1996b: 2). This merger choice was motivated and justified by reference to seven criteria. Two were related to territorial issues: membership (current and future projections; rate of growth/decline; flows in and out) and recruitment potential (in-fill; new employers; presence in growth areas; ability to finance recruitment drives). Political objectives and means were also addressed in two of the seven criteria: capital ‘P’ politics (remaining non-affiliated to the Labour Party; maintaining a high political profile; and securing representation in UK and European Parliaments) and servicing member’s interests in science, energy, and other professional specialisms were both given a high priority. Most stress was placed, however, on the administrative question of financial viability and the government or constitutional issue of IPMS’s autonomy inside whichever merger option was chosen. Overall, the national leadership recommended the MSF amalgamation because it ‘preserved the culture and independence of the IPMS, while providing the basis for high quality common services and (gave) the best opportunity for recruiting in new areas’ (IPMS 1996a: 42). The amalgamation talks with the MSF made good progress in 1996, but in early 1997 a ‘go it alone’ or ‘Independence’ faction was formed by lay activists in the otherwise faction-less IPMS. Subsequently, at the IPMS’s 1997 annual conference, its supporters narrowly succeeded in rejecting the IPMS and MSF’s ‘heads of agreement’ negotiated for the ‘new union’ while carrying a motion for an ‘objective’ assessment of the ‘independence’ option. In arguing against amalgamation with the MSF, the financial standing of MSF was specifically questioned: ‘(the) MSF is heavily in debt and only wants IPMS for its money’ (IPMS 1997b: 2). Also critics of the amalgamation, at the 1997 conference, focused on internal government, political neutrality (rejecting affiliation to the Labour Party) and the quality of servicing; all of which, they argued, would be threatened by a merger with the MSF.

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Underlying the last two objectives was the deeply held view inside IPMS that the purpose of this niche union was to be a professional servicing institute. It was this that was thought to differentiate the IPMS from larger general unions, such as the MSF. As such, the members looked to their full-time officers for a high level of service, including carrying prime responsibility for collective bargaining and individual representation. This attachment to the servicing model was grounded in the IPMS’s job territory and reflected the expectations of its professional, managerial, and specialists in the civil service. Also, their public sector ethos demanded that the IPMS remain politically neutral, unlike the MSF which was affiliated to the Labour Party. Ideally, therefore, from the opposition’s view, IPMS would reject amalgamation and remain a ‘niche’independent union. Also, believing IPMS to be more financially secure than the MSF, the opponents of amalgamation insisted on suspending the amalgamation talks pending an objective study, which would include a financial assessment of the ‘independence’ option. The resulting ‘IPMS: Independence Study’ (Undy 1997) was solely focused on the IPMS: the terms of reference excluded study of the MSF option. It paid ‘particular regard to the financial aspects’ (Undy 1997: 2) and was required to provide recommendations on how IPMS could continue as a viable and independent trade union until the year 2010. In evidence to the team conducting the study, IPMS’s branch officials stressed the strengths which IPMS had in servicing its members and in its financial standing. There was, however, also recognition that the fragmentation of collective bargaining, from 12 bargaining units in 1980 to 253 units in 1996, with no increase in the numbers of full-time officials dedicated to servicing the union’s bargaining activities, was a significant problem. Also, branch respondents were equally divided between those that expected future growth in IPMS’s membership and those that predicted further decline. In this context, the independence study examined three financial scenarios based on different rates of membership growth or decline. Under two of them the IPMS was predicted to require significant cuts in expenditure, coupled with increased subscription rates, to maintain its financial security to 2010. Despite such retrenchment proposals, including reductions in the number of national officials and moves to biennial conferences and biennial executive committee elections, the report was welcomed by those opposed to the amalgamation. They also claimed it was a vindication of their ‘independence’ campaign asserting that the report ‘provides the clearest indication yet that IPMS can remain a viable independent trade union’ (IPMS 1997a: 1). On receipt of the ‘Independence Study’, the national executive launched an extensive consultation process which examined both the ‘Study’ and a


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revised version of the ‘heads of agreement’ negotiated by the MSF amalgamation. The latter sought to garner support for the amalgamation by highlighting government and administrative issues. In particular, the agreement guaranteed the IPMS’s autonomy inside the new union and ring-fenced the IPMS’s assets for five years, post-merger. Also, the complementary and overlapping nature of the IPMS’s and MSF’s job territories was emphasized. Nevertheless, the opponents of the amalgamation used the consultation process to demonstrate the high level of activist opposition to the amalgamation. As a result, the IPMS’s general secretary recognized the dangers posed by proceeding with an amalgamation option which threatened to ‘split the union’ (IPMS 1998b). He then persuaded the national executive to support continued independence for the foreseeable future. Subsequently, and as a consequence of this decision, the general secretary, Bill Brett, took early retirement. The aborted IPMS and MSF (and potentially the CMA and NUIW) amalgamation demonstrated the difficulties inherent in a ‘niche’ union attempting to amalgamate with a larger union primarily organizing employees in an unrelated job territory. But, as the ‘niche’ territory contracted, the IPMS’s general secretary, in particular, could see difficulties in maintaining the relatively expensive professional servicing model, which was the political purpose of the union. In a traditionally non-factionalized union, the general secretary relied on rational arguments and formal cost–benefit schemes of analysis to persuade members that amalgamation with the more territorially diverse MSF was superior to continued independence. Unfortunately for the national leadership, the ‘go it alone’ faction, emotionally attached to the IPMS ‘servicing culture’ and public service ethos, used the ‘Independence Study’ to undermine the case made for amalgamation and to persuade the activists to support retrenchment in the interest of the ‘niche’ union’s continued independence. It was, hence, the intense intra-organizational conflict within the IPMS, and not the inter-union negotiations, which terminated the proposed IPMS and MSF amalgamation. The last of the public sector amalgamations studied, the IPMS (74,245) and EMA (29,514) merger forming PROSPECT in 2001, had its roots in the failed IPMS and MSF merger, discussed above. Indeed, the IPMS’s conference, which formally confirmed in 1998 the termination of the MSF talks, also launched a new ‘multi-faceted union building strategy’ (IPMS 1998a). This was much less territorially ambitious than the attempted amalgamation with MSF. It recognized that any further attempts to take the IPMS out of its ‘niche’ territory, via a ‘breakout merger’ with a larger union would be unacceptable to the IPMS’s activists. Nevertheless, the loss of some 17% membership in the previous five years, due largely to the Conservative government’s

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reforms of the civil service, still left the IPMS contemplating future financial difficulties. An integral part of the new growth strategy was the search for mergers with smaller unions in compatible niche territories. Further, such territorial compatibility was complemented by the search for a union similarly committed to the professional servicing culture embedded in the IPMS. As the IPMS had been searching for such partners since at least the collapse of its ‘Federation’ venture in the mid-1990s, it was very familiar with the merger options available. The EMA, which was a similar but smaller niche union largely recruiting managers and engineers in the privatized electricity supply industry, was the chosen partner. It was, if anything, even more committed to the professional servicing culture than the IPMS. Moreover, its general secretary, Tony Cooper, was a former IPMS official on good terms with the IPMS’s new leadership. Political motivations, at least in terms of bargaining power, were not central to either party in this amalgamation. Although the two shared a common occupational territory, their members were largely employed by different employers. The exception was in BNFL where both had bargaining rights. Outside of BNFL, the EMA could expect to continue servicing its own bargaining activities largely independent of IPMS involvement. Indeed, this was secured in the terms of the amalgamation agreement which gave the EMA a very high degree of bargaining autonomy. It continued to use its own fulltime officials to service its branch structure (the IPMS generally relied on lay branch officials) and to maintain its relatively low ratio of members to full-time officials. Nevertheless, in terms of ideological preferences, there were some gains to be had as both unions were on the moderate wing of the labour movement and both were affiliated to the TUC (neither union was affiliated to the Labour Party). In contrast to most amalgamations, the main motivations for the IPMS and EMA were therefore in the area of union government and administration. More in common with transfers than amalgamations of equals, the EMA looked to continue a largely independent existence in terms of internal decision-making, but in a more secure financial environment. Further, it sought to maintain its costly professional service culture, reliant on its fulltime officials. In order to support such services, its members were willing, post-merger, to pay a higher subscription than IPMS’s members (EMAs .55% to .75% of annual salary). The IPMS, similarly committed to a high level of member services, looked for administrative gains from the amalgamation. The amalgamated union, via financial savings, including closure of some senior posts, was predicted to release sufficient funds to increase the number of dedicated negotiating


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officers. This would enable the new union to ‘deliver the best possible services to (its) members’ (IPMS 2000: 8). As with some other unions, it also saw the creation of PROSPECT, and the adoption of the new occupational, and industrially neutral name, as a catalyst: the new name was intended to symbolize the IPMS’s determination to enter a new phase of development outside of its original civil service territory. Overall, therefore, the formation of PROSPECT was seen by the IPMS as increasing its public profile, under the new name PROSPECT, and launching it into new privatized job territories while still maintaining its focus on senior managers and professionals. It was also hoped that via the rationalization of its administration, the merger would find additional funds to secure and expand the professional service culture common to both IPMS and EMA. However, the manner in which the EMA secured its autonomy inside PROSPECT resonated more with a transfer than the creation, via amalgamation, of a new and differently organized union. To summarize on the public sector amalgamations: the hostile public sector environment affected all the amalgamating unions’ merger motivations, albeit to different degrees. In response to the actions and rhetoric of a militant employer, the larger unions, in the UNISON, PTC and PCS amalgamations, primarily sought to build greater inter-union solidarity, and hence increase their bargaining power, by completing consolidatory amalgamations. The choice of partner was largely dictated by their overlapping job territories. Further, in the case of the PTC and PCS amalgamations, the NUCPS, which was the driving force in these mergers, had a long-standing and strong commitment to industrial unionism in the civil service. This gave this amalgamation a well-defined purpose. In contrast, NALGO’s leadership had to construct a convincing purpose and associated model organization, to mobilize its activists’ support for an amalgamation which ran contrary to NALGO’s more self-serving traditions. As for the smaller unions in the UNISON, PTC and PROSPECT amalgamations, these were influenced by more defensive motivations. But in the PCS amalgamation, the CPSA shared many of the NUCP’s views as to the advantages of a new, and politically moderate, industrial union for the civil service. As regards the IPMS’s venture into amalgamations: as a ‘niche’ union and one committed to the servicing model of union organization, the choice of amalgamating partner was less obvious. Also, because it was financially well endowed, there was no immediate and obvious need to change its structure and organization to make itself more efficient. As a consequence, its attempt to leave its shrinking territory by amalgamating with the MSF proved unacceptable to its activists. Its subsequent amalgamation with the smaller EMA

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was more like a transfer than an amalgamation. It did not therefore threaten to change the IPMS in any radical fashion: as such it proved more acceptable to the IPMS’s activists.

AMALGAMATION STRATEGIES: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION It was the exceptional amalgamating union which did not have a formal and rather sophisticated approach to its merger. The issues at stake were so great that an amalgamation could not be concluded on a ‘taken for granted basis’ by any partner. Nevertheless, some unions were more deliberative than others. Broadly, the public sector unions, and UNIFI, the GMB, and in some policy areas the MSF, were at the more formal and sophisticated end of the spectrum. It was the ex-craft unions, the Boilermakers, AEU, EETPU, NGA(82), and SOGAT(82) which tended to rely most on ‘in-house’ staff and the minimum of paperwork, which approached amalgamations in a less formally structured manner. The elected leaders and professional staff running the public sector unions, and the GMB and UNIFI, felt more comfortable employing consultants and academics, as compared to those in AEU and EETPU, in particular. Indeed, it was said (in interview) that the AEU and AEEU negotiators did not run to more than ‘one side of A4’, as regards preparation for amalgamation meetings. In contrast, the unions involved in the UNISON and PCS mergers produced several volumes of papers covering a wide variety of relevant issues and exploring the different options. In addition, a further factor shaping the different strategic approaches may have been the need to avoid intra-organizational splits. The in-depth and written analysis of the pros and cons of amalgamation was needed in some unions to help persuade sceptical activists and members of the value of amalgamation and to reassure them that their democratic rights would not be diminished. In particular, such considerations affected the UNISON, PTC, PCS, UNIFI amalgamations, and the IPMS/MSF abortive talks. In contrast, the leaders negotiating the AEEU and AMICUS amalgamations avoided the need for such pre-merger in-depth analysis of the preferred democratic ethos and associated form of government by putting such sensitive issues to one side until the amalgamation had been formally agreed. In respect of the amalgamating unions’ strategic objectives, these had some similarities across all the partner unions. Most obviously, the changing and deteriorating environment, particularly in the public sector, in printing and paper, and in banking raised problems which all the partner unions thought


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an amalgamation could help solve. The choice of merger partners was also largely pre-determined by previous merger streams, the resulting proximity of unions’ job territories, and, in some important cases, an inherited and live commitment to industrial or sectoral unionism. The option as to which job territory, or membership market, should be entered via amalgamation was therefore generally very limited. But unions in the same or close job territories could still see the amalgamation as serving somewhat different purposes. As regards the larger unions and the partners of a similar size or status (balanced partner amalgamations), the general aim was to consolidate their positions by amalgamation. In contrast, some of the smaller unions in financial difficulties looked for defensive amalgamations which would help them solve difficulties beyond their own independent resolution. In the absence of a territorial imperative, differences in context, organizational forms, and leaders’ preferences better informed the choice of amalgamation partner and shaped its purpose. For example, the GMB sought and concluded amalgamations in much the same way that it chose its transferors by looking for partners which would expand its job territory. The IPMS, in its abortive talks with the MSF, similarly looked to break out of its shrinking territory by amalgamation. NALGO also differed in terms of motivating factors from most of the other amalgamating unions: it was largely free of external pressures to amalgamate and it lacked an industrial union mission. Hence, once attracted to the notion of merging NALGO largely constructed a rational case for amalgamation from first principles. In terms of the strategic process, in addition to the territorial advantages to be secured from consolidatory, defensive, and expansionist amalgamations, as discussed above, amalgamations also enabled the partners to plan for improvements in political objectives and means; democratic ethos and government; and administration. But the emphasis placed on these dimensions of union behaviour varied widely in each amalgamation. Nevertheless, it would be broadly correct to argue that the consolidatory amalgamations all involved some reference to political objectives and means including an attempt to increase bargaining power vis-à-vis the employer(s) and, in most cases, to improve the standing of the new unions in the TUC and, where affiliated, the Labour Party. As such, these amalgamations had much in common with those transfer strategies previously categorized as consolidatory and power seeking. A significant variation on the above consolidatory and power-seeking strategy was, however, found in the ideological edge given to four amalgamations by the leaders in at least one partner union in the AEEU, AMICUS, PTC, and PCS mergers. Political objectives in these four amalgamations included advancing the interests of the moderate political tendency. Given the size of the unions involved and the key roles they could play in the wider political field,

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this was an important part of the gains sought from these four amalgamations. In particular, the PTC and PCS amalgamations were very much influenced by the potential for internal political reform which the national leaders of the IRSF, NUCPS, PTC, and CPSA saw as integral to their amalgamation strategies. Allied to the above ideological gains sought in the PTC and PCS amalgamations were radical changes in the democratic ethos and government of the two unions. In addition, the UNISON amalgamation called for marked changes in the government of at least two of the partner unions (such changes might also have been expected in the AEEU and AMICUS amalgamations, but these were not integral to the amalgamation itself, rather they came several years after the amalgamation had been consummated). For example, in the UNISON, PTC, and PCS amalgamations one of the most heavily promoted papers in all three mergers was the statement of aims and values of the proposed new unions (which in turn, critically influenced the new rule books). In the PTC and PCS cases, as well as advancing a member-centred union, the rule book attempted to safeguard the interests of members, rather than lay activists, in determining critical areas of policy. In less radical, but still ground breaking changes, UNISON’s constitution, while paying due respect to the membercentred ethos, enhanced the role of lay activists, most notably in self-organized groups, while also embracing ‘proportionality’ in order to guarantee women a place on key policymaking bodies (Terry 2000: 5). As regards administrative concerns, these did not generally feature prominently in any amalgamating unions’ agreed deals. However, PROSPECT exceptionally laid considerable stress on the administrative gain to be had from the IPMS and EMA merger and made it a key feature in its internal promotion of the merger. Additionally, all amalgamating unions gave some thought to economies of scale, even if the detail of how these might be achieved, when routinely all employees were guaranteed jobs in the new amalgamated unions, was left unclear. Hence, the main thrust of the amalgamations studied was towards consolidatory mergers, allied with increased bargaining power. However, unlike transfers, amalgamations also offered those unions with relatively well-formed ideas and strategies the opportunity to change radically the political bias, democratic ethos, and associated government structures. Further, most of the unions studied were organized to exploit such opportunities. The next chapter will examine the manner in which the merger negotiations helped them secure, or not, their expected gains from their ‘new’ unions.

7 Amalgamation Negotiations INTRODUCTION The amalgamating unions’ negotiations are examined by drawing on the framework developed in Chapter 4 (pp. 94–6) and the associated diagram. To summarize this argument, the bargaining power of the partners is taken to be a function of their interdependence. Such interdependence is seen as primarily determined by a combination of the partners’ relative status (assessed, inter alia, by reference to size, financial resources, and standing in the labour movement) and their commitment to the proposed amalgamation. The latter factor is itself influenced by the option of staying independent and the presence or absence of a competing merger bid. As can be seen from Figure 7.1, the competitor element is identified as an important differentiator in the discussion of merger negotiations. The amalgamations studied fall into three quadrants of Figure 7.1 as follows: quadrant 1 (dominant partner amalgamations, subject to effective competition) covers both the NUGMW’s (GMB’s) amalgamation with the Boilermakers (ASBSBSW) and the white-collar APEX; quadrant 2 (dominant partner amalgamations, not subject to effective competition) includes the finance-sector amalgamation (BIFU, UNiFI, and NWSA) forming UNIFI, and the civil service (IPMS) and engineering managers (EMA) merger forming PROSPECT; quadrant 3 (balanced partner amalgamations, not subject to effective competition) includes the large cognate trade amalgamations involving one or more unions with a proven interest in forming an industrial union (or its civil service or local authority equivalent), that is, GPMU (paper and print), AEEU (engineers and electricians), UNISON (local government, utilities, and health), PTC and PCS (civil service), and AMICUS (blue collar and white collar, mainly manufacturing). In the following discussion, the dominant partner amalgamations, three of which resembled transfer negotiations, will be examined first, before focusing most attention on the balanced partner amalgamations which both affected a larger number of union members and offered the greatest opportunity for transforming the merging unions’ organizations. As in the previous chapters,

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Amalgamation Negotiations EFFECTIVE COMPETITION

QUADRANT 4

QUADRANT 1

AMALGAMATIONS No amalgamation

AMALGAMATIONS NUGMW & ASBSBSW (GMBATU 1982) GMBATU & APEX (GMB 1989)

BALANCED PARTNERS

DOMINANT PARTNERS

AMALGAMATIONS SOGAT(82) & NGA(82) (GPMU 1991) AEU & EETPU (AEEU 1992) COHSE, NALGO & NUPE (UNISON 1993) IRSF & NUCPS (PTC 1996) CPSA & PTC (PCS 1998) AEEU & MSF (AMICUS 2002)

AMALGAMATIONS BIFU, UNiFI & NWSA (UNIFI 1999) IPMS & EMA (PROSPECT 2001)

QUADRANT 3

QUADRANT 2


Figure 7.1. Balanced and dominant partner amalgamations under different degrees of competition

the issues resolved in negotiations will be considered by reference to territorial interests, political objectives and means, democratic ethos and government, administration, and the leaders’ imperatives.

DOMINANT PARTNER AMALGAMATIONS The four amalgamations in quadrants 1 and 2, as regards the partners’ basic territorial interests, were asymmetrical: each involved a union at least double the size of the smaller partner. Further, the largest of the partners was generally in a stronger financial position and had a much higher standing in the wider union movement than the other partners did. Yet the dominant partner chose to merge by amalgamation, rather than adopt the cheaper and less demanding transfer process. In each case, this choice represented, in part, the larger unions’ willingness to recognize the sensitivities

Amalgamation Negotiations

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of the smaller union to charges internally that it was being ‘taken over’ or acquired, rather than being treated as an equal merger partner by the larger union. No doubt paying respect to the smaller union in this manner also helped ease the process of negotiation. For example, the ‘equal status agreement’ made between the UNIFI partners had this latter effect and was particularly helpful to BIFU, in the light of its failed attempt to engage UNiFI and NSWA in a merger some 10 years previously (Theodoridis 2007: 77). Territorially, the two competitive amalgamations completed successfully by the GMB (or its antecedents) were intended to extend the GMB’s job territory into new areas. Similarly, the IPMS’s amalgamation with the EMA was intended to have the same effect. In contrast, BIFU, in organizing the UNIFI amalgamation, looked to consolidate BIFU’s dominant position in banking. In addition, all three dominant partners (GMB, BIFU, and IPMS) saw their amalgamations as of considerable symbolic importance. For all three had either failed to secure the same merger in the recent past, or lost out on some other merger opportunities. Failure to complete successfully the intended amalgamation would therefore have raised questions about their merger capability and thus have been a considerable further embarrassment to all three dominant partners. In short, under the above conditions and with such weighty expectations, the GMB’s and the IPMS’s amalgamations were completed in a very similar manner, respectively, to competitive and non-competitive transfers. The talks were largely occupied with resolving questions of union government and the leaders’ imperatives. In both cases, one of the main tasks was to satisfy the smaller partners’ interests in a high degree of autonomy. Further, both the Boilermakers and the EMA, sought and secured from the GMB and IPMS, respectively, guarantees on servicing the smaller unions’ membership. Negotiations over the leaders’ imperatives covered, inter alia, job security, voluntary severance, and the full-time officials’ terms and conditions of employment. But there was no question, in contrast to balanced partner negotiations, but in common with transfers, over the identity of the amalgamated union’s new general secretary: it was self-evidently a job for the dominant partner’s general secretary. In this process of negotiation, there was also no doubt that the dominant partners’ commitments to securing these particular amalgamations benefited the smaller partners. Indeed, the amalgamation terms appeared to be decided by friendly talks rather than contested negotiations. As one leading negotiator put it, their amalgamation was ‘agreed by discussion rather than negotiation’ and that he did not therefore know what his ‘opposite number would have settled for if he had been tougher’ (interview). Further, following the APEX’s amalgamation with the GMB one of the senior negotiators

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summarized the negotiation process as ‘we (GMB) gave them all they wanted, except financial autonomy’ (interview). Hence, although there were some adjustments to the dominant partners’ structure of government to accommodate the smaller incoming unions’ demands for autonomy, there was no attempt to negotiate the transformation of either the GMB’s or IPMS’s structure and process of government (although for the GMB the Boilermakers’ amalgamation was crucial for helping introduce industrial sections into the otherwise geographically (regionally) governed GMB). The formation of UNIFI followed a somewhat different negotiating process. In looking to consolidate its position in banking, enhance its collective bargaining power by cutting out dual union representation and restructuring its internal organization BIFU had a different amalgamation agenda as compared to the GMB and IPMS. As a result, the tripartite negotiations which produced UNIFI took a different form and were more analogous to those employed in balanced partner amalgamations. For example, in 1997, a joint union steering group (JUSG) was formed. It was composed of all three partners’ general secretaries and a small number of full-time officials. In 1997, the JUSG produced a list of 22 items to be resolved in the amalgamation negotiations (Theodoridis 2007: 54). The main issues were those which, in combination, would provide the right balance between national policymaking and the devolution of collective bargaining responsibilities to largely autonomous national company committees. Broadly, within financial and budgetary controls, it was agreed that the national company committees would manage their own affairs. But a new regional level of government was also introduced. It had a role, shared with branches and the national committees, in electing delegates to the national conference and national committee. Such regional adjustments were clearly intended to help integrate the three parties. For, having endorsed national company committees and thus given the two minor partners (UNiFI in Barclays Bank and the NWSA in the NatWest Bank) a very high degree of autonomy, the new union threatened to resemble a loose alliance of autonomous bargaining units. Administration and questions regarding the leaders’ imperatives also exercised the UNIFI negotiators. The harmonization of subscriptions raised some difficult issues, and attempts were made to give the new union’s leadership discretion to increase subscriptions post-merger by up to 5%, if the financial situation warranted it. Attempts were also made to consolidate budgets and address the question of regional expenditure. The aim was to put workable and compatible accounting structures in place by founding day. As regards the leaders’ imperatives the standard pledges of no compulsory redundancy were given, and the question of what to do about staff employed by the banks, but


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seconded to work for UNiFI and NSWA, was explored (Theodoridis 2007: 74). The different unions’ pension schemes were also subjected to scrutiny. In 1998, two academics, Professors Sid Kessler and Fred Bayliss, also reported on the full-time officials’ widely different terms and conditions of employment in order to help the negotiators deal with the question of how best to harmonize such terms and conditions in the new union. But, on the question of who was ‘the’ general secretary of the new union, although there were periodic references to joint general secretaries in various bits of correspondence, the claims of Ed Sweeny, general secretary of BIFU, and the main instigator of the amalgamation, were not seriously challenged. His appointment as UNIFI’s first general secretary reflected the dominant partner’s influence over the negotiation process. Rory Murphy, general secretary of the NWSA, the other very influential figure in the negotiations, was given the title ‘joint’ general secretary. The dominant partner amalgamations studied therefore revealed some significantly different negotiation processes and issues, although in all cases the negotiations progressed in a friendly and positive manner. In the GMB’s and IPMS’s amalgamations, the dominant partners tended to meet the minor partners’ demands rather than seek to produce a ‘new’ union. As in transfers, apart from granting the smaller partner a high degree of autonomy in a separate section, the GMB’s and IPMS’s government structures were largely unaffected by the amalgamation. In contrast, UNIFI was intended to reform BIFU’s organization, as well as meeting UNiFI’s and the NWSA’s interests in securing autonomy for their bargaining activities. The result was a new rule book that decentralized much of BIFU’s previously centralized activities down to national company committees, while trying to integrate the three unions in general policymaking via a reformed regional and national structure. The UNIFI amalgamation was, therefore, exceptionally for the dominant partner amalgamations, used as a potentially transforming opportunity by the dominant partner union.

BALANCED PARTNER AMALGAMATIONS Quadrant 3, balanced partner amalgamations with little or no effective competition, included all the most significant amalgamations studied. Territorially, all the amalgamations in this quadrant, forming the GPMU, AEEU, UNISON, PTC, PCS, and AMICUS combined cognate trade unions looking to form the equivalent of industrial or sectoral unions. However, despite the partner unions sharing common territorial interests, they frequently had

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different traditions, processes, and organizational forms. This resulted, in the absence of dominant partners, in the most complex and sophisticated merger negotiations in the formation of the GPMU, UNISON, PTC, and PCS, and the avoidance and postponement of such negotiations in forming the AEEU and AMICUS. As in the previous discussions, the negotiations, or the absence of them, will be analysed by reference to political objectives and means, democratic ethos and government, administration, and the leaders’ imperatives. Political objectives and means, particularly as regards collective bargaining reform, did not generally occupy much time or generate difficult issues in any of the six balanced partner negotiations. Thus, although all six mergers were expected to increase bargaining power, the negotiations paid little heed to how this could best be achieved. More attention was paid to members’ benefits and these were, as in most amalgamations, generally levelled upwards to the highest benefit available in the partner unions. For example, in the UNISON merger COHSE’s and NUPE’s membership largely benefited from receiving NALGO’s existing benefits. An exception to the general rule of harmonizing upwards was provided by the GPMU negotiations. In the light of SOGAT(82)’s refusal to raise its basic subscription rate to the NGA(82)’s level, access to the NGA(82)’s superior provident and dispute funds was made conditional on individual members of SOGAT(82) paying a supplement over and above their basic subscription (Gennard and Bain 1995: 230–1). Another political issue that exercised the negotiators was the question of UNISON’s political fund. Pre-amalgamation NALGO had a political fund but was unaffiliated to the Labour Party, whereas both COHSE and NUPE had affiliated funds. The solution was for UNISON to have two political funds, one affiliated and one not. Hence, those not wishing to support the Labour Party could, if they so chose, pay into the non-affiliated fund. In contrast, in the negotiation to form the AEEU it was affiliation to the TUC, rather than the Labour Party, which exercised the negotiators. This was to be expected given that the EETPU had recently been expelled from the TUC. However, changes in the EETPU’s leadership and the strong pro-TUC position held by the AEU’s national leadership produced an agreement that the new AEEU would ballot its members on affiliation to the TUC. Another area that could cause difficulties was affiliation to pressure groups. In the PCS’s negotiations, the CPSA’s refusal to continue affiliation to a number of groups on the left, including the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), prevented these affiliations from being adopted by the new union. More significantly UNISON, the PCS (building on ideas developed in the PTC amalgamation), and AMICUS all attempted to build a political consensus during the negotiation by articulating the merging unions’ missions,


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via statements of their ‘aims and values’. In all cases, such statements were aimed at developing a social contract or compact between the union, as an institution, and its members. In the PCS case, this mainly involved issues of union democracy and government and will hence be discussed further below. However, for UNISON and AMICUS their ‘aims and values’ were also concerned with making a statement of the new union’s political goals, including a commitment to improve members’ pay and conditions and employment rights, while ensuring equality of treatment. UNISON also pledged that the new union would provide guaranteed standards of membership service and benefits. In all three unions, the statements of ‘aims and values’ pre-dated and influenced the much more controversial attempt to implement the democratic sentiments expressed in ‘aims and values’ in the unions’ constitutions and, hence, rule books. Issues of democratic ethos and government were critically important in all six balanced partner amalgamations. They also provided the most difficult negotiations. They were so controversial in the AEEU amalgamation that apart from agreeing the bare minimum rules necessary to satisfy the Certification Officer, the question of union government, and the associated rule book, was put to one side to be resolved within four years of merging. This also set the pattern for the AEEU and MSF agreement to form AMICUS. However, in this latter case marginally more progress was made pre-merger in establishing the framework for government. In particular, the ‘aims and values’ statement, in the section on ‘Democratic Structure’, gave the smaller MSF some comfort by assuring its members that there would be separate representation for managers, supervisors, and professionals in what would be a primarily blue-collar union, and that no MSF group would be forced to merge with any other group inside AMICUS. Further, a successful indicative ballot, which asked members if they supported the ‘aims and values’ statement, bolstered the MSF’s negotiating position. It helped legitimize the proposed outline agreement and hence limited the effectiveness of the lay activists’ criticisms of the proposed merger. The question of how the ‘aims and values’ could be converted into a new constitution and rule book was, however, left to be determined by a rules commission and this was not required to report on its deliberations until two years after the merger was formally agreed. Hence, the problems that the AMICUS’s negotiators saw in putting a new rule book to the vote either prior to the merger, or in the merger ballot itself, were avoided. In contrast, the partner unions involved in the GPMU’s, UNISON’s, PTC’s, and PCS’s amalgamations, all spent considerable negotiating time pre-merger constructing the new unions’ constitutions and rule books. In the GPMU, it was largely the product of a compromise agreement negotiated over six years during which the two unions competed with each other for membership and

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employer recognition rights. In addition to the continuing difficult industrial relations context, the two unions also had very different notions of union democracy and contrasting systems of union government (see Gennard and Bain 1995: 222–45). In brief, SOGAT(82) was a federated organization, based on exceptional branch autonomy. Moreover, as compared to most unions, SOGAT(82)’s branches were very large and resembled other unions’ regions, not branches. SOGAT(82) also had full-time officials, including branch secretaries, on its national executive. In contrast, the NGA(82) was far more centralized, and its national executive was composed of lay members. Further, and most critically for the subsequent development of the GPMU, SOGAT(82)’s branches, as compared to the NGA(82)’s, had a much higher degree of financial autonomy: the NGA(82)’s branches retained some 20% of their subscriptions, while SOGAT(82)’s branches vied with the centre for financial dominance by retaining some 40% of their subscription income. The result, in SOGAT(82), was a strong branch system financed at the expense of a comparatively weak national organization. A sticking point for SOGAT(82), in the merger negotiations, was thus, not surprisingly, the retention of its branches’ autonomy and their financial security. The NGA(82) was forced to accept the continuing federated and hence decentralized SOGAT(82) system of branch organization, if the merger was to be agreed. As for the rest of the government structure, this was designed by negotiators who drafted the rule book on a ‘one for you and one for me’ basis (from interview). The result was, therefore, no ideal model of government, but rather a series of compromise agreements reached after negotiating over the details of the two unions’ existing rule books. This had very serious consequences for the new union’s financial status and the problems this caused were not resolved until the GPMU transferred to AMICUS in 2004. In contrast to the GPMU’s pragmatic and often difficult negotiations over the detail of the rule book and SOGAT(82)’s defence of its ‘sticking-points’, the UNISON’s, PTC’s, and PCS’s negotiations were in the earlier stages more shaped by ideas as to what kind of democratic ethos would best serve the new unions. This approach to designing a model rule book was reflected in both UNISON’s and the PCS’s aims and values statements. As regards UNISON, once the case for the new union had been developed the emphasis switched to, first, agreeing the broad shape of government (aims and values) followed, second, by detailed proposals for the constitution and rule book (see COHSE, NALGO and NUPE 1991: 5). Issues of democratic ethos and government therefore dominated the middle and latter phases of UNISON’s negotiation. This was to be expected as all three unions combining to form UNISON had different preferences, as regards the desired democratic ethos, based on their own existing government structures. As the merger talks developed, the differences became more evident and somewhat late in


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the process they were articulated in a study by Ouroussoff (1993) which sought to make ‘explicit the differences in values and beliefs between the three unions cultures’ (Ouroussoff 1993: 1). NALGO was heavily factionalized, looked on itself as member led (or activist led), and was relatively decentralized compared to COHSE and NUPE. Moreover, at the national level, lay member committees, often suspicious of national officials’ motivations, were central to NALGO’s decision-making process. Lower down NALGO’s structure, the branches had relatively high levels of autonomy and a degree of financial independence. For example, branches could draw on their own funds to organize campaigns against national union policy. At the other end of the spectrum was NUPE. It was far more centralized than NALGO and largely devoid of factionalism. Its full-time officers had a major role in shaping union policy. Further, NUPE’s full-time officials tended to have the confidence and support of their lay activists as an ‘officer-led’ union. COHSE was somewhat closer to NUPE than NALGO. Like NUPE, it tended to rely more on full-time officials, than factionalized lay activists, for shaping union policy. It also lacked NALGO’s bureaucracy. COHSE relied more on informal networks and relationships. As a specialist union, organizing in one specific part of the public sector—the health service—it also tended to be more focused, or parochial, in its political outlook and not to have the wider political interests of NALGO and NUPE. There was, therefore, a very low degree of constitutional congruence between UNISON’s partner unions. In the process of reconciling such differences, UNISON’s statement of ‘aims and values’ sought to develop a new democratic ethos around which all partner unions could coalesce. As the ‘aims and values’ were developed a range of working parties, including general secretary level meetings (unlike AMICUS that largely left the negotiations to lower-level officials) and meetings involving lay activists were integral to the process. Moreover, much use was made of academic specialists and lawyers to inform the negotiations, including commissioning papers that explored the progress made and the options available for solving outstanding problems. The role played by the academics in UNISON’s negotiations was particularly beneficial after NALGO’s 1991 conference when its lay delegates demonstrated their independence of the full-time officials by rejecting key parts of the phase two agreement outlining the broad shape of the new union. COHSE’s initial response to NALGO’s unilateral actions was to table a report which clearly identified and criticized NALGO’s revised position on such questions as the elections to service groups and the scope of their responsibilities, the size of the annual conference and its composition, regional officials’ accountability, branch autonomy and financial independence, and the relationship of fulltime officials to members. In all these areas, NALGO’s conference wished to

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maintain a position much closer to NALGO’s existing practices, rather than adopt new arrangements as proposed by the merger negotiators. Not surprisingly as the talks resumed the parties were urged later in 1991 to be ‘prepared to negotiate, respond, be generous and compromise’ (internal paper) to overcome the difficulties arising from NALGO’s conference and COHSE’s critique. No doubt the considerable investment in time and resources needed to get the negotiations thus far, also helped prevent the partner unions withdrawing from the merger. Moreover, each union had by this point identified what they must have or fail to agree in terms of the proposed union constitution. It was further recognized that the only effective way of safeguarding the different unions’ interests was in a non-amendable rule book which would be put directly to the membership in the statutory merger ballot. Hence, phase three, the negotiation of the rule book was initiated. COHSE’s ‘bottom line’ was a guarantee in rule that it would secure a high degree of autonomy for a health service group and an acceptable level of representation in the wider union. For NUPE, ‘fair representation’ for blue-collar men and women was central to its demands, while also resisting proposals that would enhance activists’ control over the new union’s full-time officials. NALGO’s negotiators needed a rule book which would satisfy their activists’ demands that the union would be ‘member centred’. Moreover, it was also concluded that they would have great difficulty getting a vote for the merger unless a rule book was included with the ballot paper. NUPE and COHSE combined, with the aid of lawyers, to draft a complete rule book which one of NUPE’s officials tabled. This then became the subject of ‘clause-by-clause’ negotiations, which managed to satisfy each union’s different ‘sticking-points’. In this process, the expert drafting of papers on the difficult issues helped the parties evaluate and agree on the compromises necessary to finalize the UNISON agreement. The niche IRSF and the much larger NUCPS in amalgamating to form the PTC, the civil services’ biggest union (as a precursor for the PCS amalgamation), brought together two unions with somewhat different constitutions, but with similar factional difficulties. As for their constitutional differences, the IRSF leadership saw themselves as membership-centred and the NUCPS as much more officer-led. Further, the IRSF was to the right of the NUCPS politically, but with a growing challenge from Trotskyites on its executive and conference. In contrast, although it had some similar ultra-left delegates, the NUCPS was more traditionally left-wing and strongly influenced by the ‘tankies’, a group associated with the Communist Party. As could be expected, therefore, once the leaders had decided against a ‘bolting together’ exercise and opted instead for the development of a new rule book for a new union, the changes proposed were subject to close scrutiny and vocal opposition at the unions’ conferences.


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Despite continuing protests from their left-wing activists, the strong and politically aligned national leadership of both the IRSF and the NUCPS successfully carried the mass of the membership with them in support of the new rule book. Building on a formal agreement, adopted in the early 1990s, to form a close working relationship, the two national leaderships had by 1995 negotiated a comprehensive amalgamation agreement, complete with new rule book. This replicated the federated structure already adopted by the NUCPS and gave the IRSF considerable autonomy in a new group (the Inland Revenue Group); the IRSF’s autonomy included control over its own finances, which were ‘ring-fenced’ for five years. As in most other amalgamations, the IRSF also secured guaranteed seats on the national executive, while the branch-based system adopted for electing conference delegates also provided the IRSF with the necessary safeguards. It was in the process of developing such a constitution, which had as its goal ‘a membership-centred union’ and a preference for direct membership participation via workplace ballots (including the right to ballot members on NEC or conference decisions), that the ideas which were to shape the subsequent PCS’s ‘aims and values’ were developed. Following close on the heels of the 1996 PTC amalgamation, the formation of the PCS in 1998 was clearly intended to secure a wider political realignment, combining the moderate groups which had secured control in the PTC with the well-established moderate faction running the CPSA. As a consequence, it was more focused than any other balanced partner amalgamation on creating a new democratic ethos and government structure supportive of its political objectives. It also had certain advantages not available to the UNISON’s partners. Unlike UNISON’s partners, the PCS amalgamation was planned and concluded by officials with extensive experience of amalgamations. In particular, the PTC’s leading negotiations had just completed the IRSF and NUCPS merger and had well developed ideas for implementation in the merger with the CPSA. Also, the CPSA had attempted a number of amalgamations in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, including tentative discussions with the GMB and more serious talks with the NUCPS: all of these had failed, due in part, to difficulties in agreeing a new rule book. Hence, the CPSA was also well aware of the pitfalls in attempting an amalgamation between civil service unions. Additionally, unlike the UNISON’s partners, the existing ethos and government of the PTC and CPSA had much in common. Both were highly factionalized. Further, the moderate factions at the time of the merger negotiations controlled the national executives of both unions, while at their national conferences they were both more open to left-wing influences opposed to the national leadership. The PTC’s and CPSA’s general secretaries did not generally defer to their lay activists at conference, and they had the

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confidence of the majority of their colleagues on their respective national executives. Hence, several factors likely to bear on the negotiations of the democratic ethos and government were more favourable at the start of the PTC’s and CPSA’s negotiations as compared to those affecting UNISON’s negotiations. In particular, the PTC’s and CPSA’s negotiators had a high degree of political and constitutional congruence. Issues concerning the preferred democratic ethos and government of the new union were highlighted by the CPSA as of critical importance in the first phase of negotiations in 1996. Initially, the partner unions’ approach to questions of union democracy and government was to tackle the difficult issues head-on and develop a new rule book. The responsibility for such work fell to the senior officers of the CPSA and PTC. They worked on the production of a new constitution and rule book largely by comparing and contrasting the two unions’ existing rule books and attempting to reconcile areas of difference. In July 1996, the two executives were presented with said draft rules complete with references to the unresolved issues and footnotes identifying the different options. It was recognized that in drafting rules in this manner the negotiators and their unions were ‘constrained by the current rule books and policies of the two unions’ (CPSA 1996d: 1). The nature of the above negotiations changed radically, however, later in 1996 when the PTC proposed, and drafted, a ‘Statement of Aims and Values’. This paper covered membership democracy, union representatives, the national conference, finances, and branch structure. It was aimed at providing a vision for the new union. For the CPSA, it represented a ‘watershed’ in the merger negotiations. It switched the focus away from the negotiation of the minutia of the rule book to a discussion of the principles which would guide both unions in the formation of a new constitution. Further, as the CPSA’s senior officials recognized, it was also a politically astute paper intended to find favour with the moderate majorities on both unions’ executives. At this stage, the negotiators moved to draft a jointly agreed version of the PTC’s aims and values which was then circulated throughout the two unions. It emphasized the central role envisaged in the new union for the ordinary member. The aim was to enfranchise the members by giving them a full say in all important union decisions, even if they could not attend union meetings. In particular, each individual member would have the following rights: to vote for their representative at local and employer levels, to be consulted over major changes in pay and conditions, and to have the final say before fundamental changes could be made both in the new union’s constitution and in union policy. As the supporting correspondence noted, the above proposals were intended to produce a new balance between the rights and responsibilities of the national executive, the union conference, lay representatives, and members of the


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union (internal memo). In brief, they enhanced the influence of individual members and the national executive, at the expense of the national conference. Further, as in AMICUS’s amalgamations, the ‘aims and values’ statement was put to the membership in a ballot. Both unions’ members endorsed the statement by a five to one majority. Subsequently, an indicative ballot on the proposed merger was also successful: both ballots helped the CPSA’s and PTC’s officials and executives confront their conferences’ opposition to the proposed merger. Following the agreed ‘aims and values’ consultation, attention switched to converting the aims and values into rules. In an innovatory move, the rule book was divided into principal and supplementary rules. Principal rules were those which could not be changed without the support of a simple majority in a membership ballot. These included, inter alia, the introduction of a biennial delegate conference and biennial national executive elections (these both replaced annual elections). Further, the membership’s involvement in voting on rule and policy changes was also enshrined in the principal rules. In contrast, supplementary rules could be changed at the biennial delegate’s conference, by a two-thirds majority. Hence, the PCS’s ‘aims and values’ statement led to marked changes in crucial elements of the two unions’ former rule books as they affected the power balance between member, executive, and conference. These proposals were driven by the officials’ and executives’ concerns over the influence exercised by left-wing factions at their annual conferences. Nevertheless, the translation of the new democratic model into rules was not without its difficulties. As in all the balanced partner amalgamations, compromises were still required to reach agreement on particular clauses in the rules. In the PCS case, the number and titles of the senior full-time officials to be written into rule were disputed by the two unions. However, there was no doubt that the ‘aims and values’, which articulated what the lead negotiators and the moderates in the two unions most required of the merger, gave the negotiation of the constitution and associated rule book an agreed purpose which was largely absent from the other balanced partner negotiations. Administrative matters and particularly financial issues tended not to dominate amalgamation negotiations, but the attention such issues received varied quite widely between the different amalgamation partners. Not surprisingly, given the minimalist approach to the instrument of amalgamation used for the AEEU’s and AMICUS’s amalgamations, little was agreed pre-merger in terms of administration. However, financial concerns were raised in the AEEU amalgamation by the EETPU, whose lead negotiator, Eric Hammond, was said to be accompanied by the union’s accountant at key negotiation meetings. Despite initially just ‘bolting’ the two unions together, largely unchanged, it

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was agreed that should either of the two sections (AEU and EETPU) fail to finance itself in the interim period, that is, between the formal merger and the subsequent agreement on the new rule book, the other section would assume responsibility for both sections’ finances. This was necessary to assure the EETPU, suspicious of the AEU’s claimed financial security, that, prior to further integration, the AEU section would not become a financial liability for the new union. In the AMICUS’s amalgamation a little more progress was made in general regarding the organization of the new union. The MSF, with continuing financial difficulties, obviously looked to the relatively wealthy AEEU to help solve its problems. It also had a commitment to provide its branches with a degree of financial independence based on 5% retention of subscription income. However, the clearest indication of progress on financial issues pre-merger was the agreement to freeze the MSF’s subscription rate between the 2001 and the post-merger completion of the new rule book in 2003. This helped harmonize the MSF’s subscription rate with the lower AEEU rate by 2003. It also, no doubt, helped the MSF ‘sell’ the amalgamation to its members. Much more effort was put into the other four amalgamations to make progress on administrative and financial issues. In the formation of the GPMU, agreement was reached across a number of areas, including the location of the new union’s head office but, as noted by Gennard and Bain (1995: 225), ‘negotiations over financial and branch boundary issues were difficult and at times acrimonious’. Calculations on the cost of running the new union, as made by the NGA(82), suggested that on the basis of the subscription rates proposed by SOGAT(82), the new union would soon run into financial difficulties. Eventually, the NGA(82) accepted SOGAT(82)’s demands that its members not ‘pay a penny more’ in subscriptions and that its position on subscriptions and the distribution of income between branches and head office was ‘non-negotiable’. As the general secretary of the NGA(82) put it, in interview, the NGA(82) would not have secured the amalgamation if it had ‘insisted on changes in SOGAT(82)’s subscriptions’. In the most sophisticated set of negotiations, in UNISON, PTC, and the PCS, considerable effort was made to resolve a number of administrative issues. However, in no case did the negotiators appear to share a common understanding of the financial costs of the amalgamation they were negotiating. No figures detailing costs appeared to circulate during the PTC and PCS talks and when questioned the leading figures in the PTC negotiation claimed not to know the costs of the PCS merger. In UNISON, the position was less clear. The new union’s running costs were calculated, and they did include the cost of the merger. However, sensitivities as to the weak financial state of both COHSE and NUPE, as compared to NALGO’s healthy financial


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position, helped restrict the free circulation of such data: there was concern that those in NALGO opposed to the merger would use such data to claim that COHSE and NUPE ‘wanted NALGO’s cash’ (from interview). Also, as regards estimates of the income likely to be generated by the new unions, this raised difficult issues for the negotiators when the level of subscriptions needed to fund the new union was calculated. COHSE, in particular, was intent on holding the subscriptions for its members to a relatively low level in order to compete with the Royal College of Nurses (RCN). Further, the three unions each had different vested interests in the proposed banding of subscriptions, as each tended to have members whose salaries would lead to most of them being concentrated in a particular band. All this added to the complexity of UNISON’s subscription negotiations. As a result, the bottom band of the subscription rates was revised downwards and the financial figures amended to suit the ‘realpolitik’ of the negotiations. Perhaps, most importantly, it was suggested that if the subscription rates had been set to produce a break-even figure for the new unions, the unions would have lost their merger ballots. The PCS appeared, as compared to UNISON, much more confident of the economies of scale it expected to make, following post-merger rationalization. Such confidence was reflected in the agreement to freeze subscriptions between 1996 and 2002. Moreover, in 1997, a year before the merger was put to the ballot, a paper prepared for the PTC by consultants outlined the key administrative tasks to be addressed leading up to, and 12 months after, the merger was agreed. This included questions regarding financial control and the preparation of a financial plan for the new union. In addition, a timetable was set for agreeing the new management structure. Last, as regards balanced partner negotiations, the negotiations over the leaders’ imperatives will be discussed. In common with most other mergers, the negotiators agreed on a guarantee of no compulsory redundancies. Also, salaries and terms and conditions were generally levelled up to that of the highest paying partner union: in some unions this was phased in over an agreed period. An indication of the cost of such harmonization was estimated by the GPMU at some £250,000 in year one. The AEEU’s estimated costs were somewhat higher (the AEU’s salaries were raised to those of the EETPU’s), at some £500,000 in the first year of harmonization. But the issue, which was an important distinguishing feature of balanced partner negotiations, was the question as to which officials would hold the top jobs in the new merged union. Unlike most other mergers, in balanced partner negotiations there was rarely a natural choice for general secretary of the new union. Each of the general secretaries, deputy general secretaries, and assistant general secretaries could be expected to mount a reasonable claim to be considered for a similar position in the hierarchy of the new amalgamated union (unless they opted

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for voluntary redundancy or early retirement). Even if the unions put to one side, for later resolution, difficult questions over the rule book or membership benefits, they had to reach agreement, or an understanding, on either who inherited the top jobs or what process would be used to choose between the leading candidates for such jobs in order to complete the merger. Negotiations as to who secured which top job and on what terms were successfully concluded in five of the balanced partner negotiations. The exception was the GPMU. In this case, it was agreed to hold a contested election between the two partner unions for the posts of general secretary and president. The sitting general secretaries and presidents in SOGAT(82) and the NGA(82) fought the elections. It may have been expected that SOGAT(82), as the larger union, would have won both elections. However, superior campaigning by the NGA(82), in an election delayed by, amongst other factors, complaints to the Certification Officer regarding electoral practices in SOGAT(82) and the NGA(82), helped the NGA(82)’s candidates win both elections (Gennard and Bain 1995: 240–5). Of the remaining four unions, the AEEU made decisive choices regarding the initial holders of the top jobs, while AMICUS, the PTC, PCS, and UNISON adopted less clear-cut options. As previously noted, the AEEU’s amalgamation had stalled in 1989, inter alia, over the choice of general secretary. When the deal was concluded in 1992, the general secretary of the AEU (Gavin Laird), and not as proposed in 1989 the general secretary of EETPU (then Eric Hammond), secured the same position in the new union, albeit for two years only. Following this period, the EETPU’s new general secretary, Paul Gallacher, was to succeed to the post. Positions on the new interim executive, pending the production of a new rule book, were shared equally: 11 seats each. The leadership of AMICUS, the PTC, PCS, and UNISON was agreed and organized on a different basis to the GPMU and the AEEU. AMICUS, the PTC, PCS, and UNISON all preferred a ‘joint general secretaries’ solution. This was a necessary condition for reaching agreement on the merger in all unions and was seen as the means of giving each sitting general secretary equal status. UNISON, however, differentiated between the ‘equal’ claims of its three general secretaries in a manner not common to AMICUS, PTC, and PCS. In UNISON, the agreement implicitly recognized that NALGO was both the biggest and the most financially secure union. Hence, although each of the three partners was allocated a joint general secretary the former general secretary of NALGO, Alan Jinkinson, was also made ‘the’ general secretary of the new union for the first three years. In an indication of the problems in negotiating over such matters, NUPE’s general secretary, Rodney Bickerstaffe, was noted in the instrument of amalgamation as ‘entitled’ to be a candidate in the next election for general secretary. It was also reported, in interview, that


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the other senior officers had pledged to support Rodney Bickerstaffe in this election. Thus the succession was promised to NUPE, even if not enshrined in the merger agreement: Rodney Bickerstaffe duly contested and won election to UNISON’s top job. AMICUS’s negotiations produced an agreement that the two existing general secretaries would become joint general secretaries cooperating to run the union in the period leading to their retirements, or until the required fiveyearly elections. It was expected that Sir Ken Jackson (AEEU) would retire first (he was some five years older than Roger Lyons (MSF)). However, if Sir Ken left first, it was agreed that the AEEU section would elect a replacement who would become joint general secretary with Roger Lyons. However, on Lyons’ retirement, the AEEU’s new general secretary would become ‘the’ general secretary representative of all AMICUS members. The MSF’s leading official was thus, in terms of the agreement, given an assured period as joint general secretary. The appointment of Clive Brooke (IRSF) and John Sheldon (NUCPS) to joint general secretary posts in the PTC was relatively uncontroversial, as was the PCS’s (1998) adoption of the joint general secretary model. For, as one of the CPSA’s leading negotiators put it, ‘you could not have got a (PCS) merger without (agreeing to) two general secretaries’ (interview). Further, the moderate factions in both the PTC and the CPSA were intent on continuing the moderates’ control of the new union. The two leading and very influential general secretaries, John Sheldon (PTC) and Barry Reamsbottom (CPSA), were thus appointed PCS’s joint general secretaries: the intention was that John Sheldon, the elder of the two, would retire first in January 2001 and that Barry Reamsbottom would then become ‘the’ general secretary of the PCS. In summary, the partner unions in quadrant 3 (balanced partner amalgamations with no effective competition) were bound together by common territorial interests and they had few, if any, problems in dealing with questions related to their political objectives and means. But they did find themselves in conflict over one or more issues associated with democratic ethos and government, administration, and the leaders’ imperatives which proved difficult to resolve to their mutual satisfaction. In dealing with these controversial areas, the AEEU, AMICUS, and the GPMU tended to be more informal and less reliant on third-party assistance, for example, lawyers, consultants, and academics, as compared to UNISON, PTC, and the PCS which were more open to such external support. The latter three unions also made much more use in negotiation of formal processes, including various working parties and the production of extensive written records and briefing papers. In particular, at various critical stages in UNISON’s negotiations, the ‘outsiders’ produced papers which summarized progress and outlined the main options open to

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the different partner unions. In other words, they helped ‘oil’ the process and brought a new perspective to questions which were difficult to resolve. As regards the ‘difficult questions’ concerning the new union’s democratic ethos and government, the AEEU and AMICUS avoided what could have been potentially ‘deal breaking’ conflicts by postponing such negotiations for resolution inside four years (AEEU) and two years (AMICUS) after the statutory merger ballot. The GPMU, UNISON, PTC, and the PCS partner unions took the alternative approach and confronted and resolved such questions prior to the statutory ballot. In the GPMU’s case, this brought a largely pragmatic response from the partner unions. They sought compromises, where possible, over the detail of the new rule book, and where this was not achieved, concessions were made to satisfy the other parties’ ‘sticking-points’. For example, the NGA(82) reluctantly accepted SOGAT(82)’s insistence on retaining its branches’ financial autonomy. As there was little constitutional congruence pre-merger between SOGAT(82) and the NGA(82), such negotiations were particularly difficult. UNISON, PTC, and the PCS differed significantly from the other unions in their approach to questions of democratic ethos and government. UNISON and the PCS, and to a lesser extent the PTC, looked for ideal or model solutions to such questions, before finally negotiating compromises over the details of the new rule books. Statements of aims and values, by both UNISON and the PCS, helped concentrate attention on the overall purpose of the new constitution and rule book. In the PCS, this enabled the partners to develop a consensus as to what the union was ‘for’, which moved the negotiations more rapidly to a successful conclusion. Also, the PTC and PCS negotiations were aided by a high degree of ideological understanding between the leading negotiators and, in the PCS’s case, a higher level of constitutional congruence between the PTC and the CPSA partner unions pre-merger, as compared to the other amalgamations. Further, both the PTC and PCS partners had similar experiences of factionalism pre-merger. By comparison, UNISON was hampered by a low level of constitutional congruence between NALGO and NUPE. Moreover, the informal political system of factionalism in NALGO was foreign to NUPE. Hence, the PTC and PCS merger partners had inherent advantages, as compared to the other partners, when it came to designing and agreeing a new constitution and rule book prior to the statutory merger ballot. The four unions agreeing on new constitutions and rule books, premerger, were also better placed than the two which postponed such issues, as regards questions of administration. Not least, by agreeing the rule book, the GPMU, UNISON, the PTC, and the PCS had a better understanding of what conferences, branches, and full-time officer posts would have to be funded post-merger. They should also have been better placed to agree


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on the level, collection and distribution of subscriptions. However, political sensitivities regarding different unions’ financial status, and the likely use of such financial data by those opposed to the amalgamations, limited the scope for pre-merger planning of administrative and financial reforms. Moreover, the general tendency to maximize membership support for the merger ballot by holding down subscriptions mitigated against pre-merger costing exercises, which could, unintentionally, have cast doubt on the financial propriety of the proposed subscription level. As for the leaders’ imperatives, the decisions as to who would hold, and succeed to, the senior national posts were the most pressing balanced partner amalgamation questions for resolution pre-merger. All the partner unions managed to solve such questions either by opting for election (GPMU), appointing a single person (AEEU), or some form of joint general secretaries (AMICUS, UNISON, the PTC, and PCS).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS The 10 amalgamations studied tended, in terms of negotiating behaviour, to divide into two groups. All but one of the four dominant partner amalgamations (the exception was UNIFI) negotiated in a similar manner to the transferor and transferee unions explored in Chapter 4. That is, the larger partner treated the smaller partner as a transferor, although there were normally public protestations as regards the ‘equal status’ of the amalgamation parties. In these negotiations, the dominant partner largely gave the smaller partner, under both competitive and non-competitive conditions, whatever was required to secure the merger. As a result, the smaller union acquired a high degree of autonomy and, apart from the associated restructuring, there were no other significant changes in the dominant partner’s existing government or administrative arrangements. In contrast, UNIFI’s negotiations were intended to reform the dominant partner (BIFU’s) organization, and as such involved the kind of detailed negotiation noted in balanced partner amalgamations. However, if push came to shove, BIFU, as the dominant partner by some margin, had the resources to assert its authority. As regards the six balanced partner amalgamations, without effective competition (quadrant 3), these produced the most complex and difficult negotiations. The partners shared common job territories, and in most cases had at least one partner committed to industrial unionism, as an end goal, but they did not usually share much else of relevance to the negotiation, apart from the exceptional case of the PCS’s partners. Differences over organizational

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form and culture, and different perceptions of the value and legitimacy of factional activity, helped structure the negotiators’ behaviour. Hence, it was common for one or more leading figures, or groups, to consider their union’s processes, structures, or practices superior to that of the other partner. The search for model or ideal solutions was not therefore easily accommodated. Nevertheless, ‘statements of aims and values’ represented attempts to give a model form to the proposed new union, rather than replicate the ‘best bits’ of the existing organizations. Given such preoccupations, it was not surprising that issues of democratic ethos and government were either at the heart of balanced partner negotiations, or so sensitive and difficult that they were set aside to be resolved post-merger (AEEU and AMICUS). If the partners had a high degree of constitutional and ideological congruence, as in the PCS amalgamations, it was easier for the negotiators to reach a consensus over the democratic ethos which could help shape the new union’s constitution. However, in all the balanced partner amalgamations, extended negotiations over the detail of the new rule, either before or after the merger was formally agreed, was a necessary and central part of the amalgamation process. The above negotiations over the new union’s constitution and rule book, while important in their own right, were also salient because they had consequences for the leaders’ imperatives. In the absence of a dominant partner, each merging union could mount a claim for one or more of its officials and executives to inherit, or succeed to, leading positions in the new union. Obviously, prior questions as to the number of such posts and how they would be filled—by election or appointment—were to some degree influenced by those looking to continue their careers in the new union. Pressure to accommodate the ambitions of the leading officials could thus lead to an increase in the number of such posts, for example, joint not single general secretaries. In addition, the general levelling-up of salaries and the harmonization of conditions could further increase the costs of merging. Even if unions could postpone writing the new rule book, they could not, in balanced partner negotiations, avoid dealing with leadership issues. In respect of administration and finance issues, there were marked differences between the balanced partners as to how far these were addressed premerger. If one union was highly suspicious of the other’s financial motivations, actions could be taken to protect the funds of the wealthier partner, at least in the short run. But, on the other hand, even if one partner could see significant financial problems arising from the other partner’s insistence, say, on branch funds being sustained at a relatively high level, this issue could be put to one side if it threatened to derail the negotiations. Further, even if predictions of the future income and expenditure suggested the new unions would not break even, corrective action could be postponed until after the merger, so as to


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avoid the political embarrassment associated with admitting such difficulties. In short, calculations as to whether or not the new union would start its life as a financially viable organization were not critical to concluding an agreement to amalgamate. It can therefore be concluded that across all the three quadrants in Figure 7.1 the amalgamation negotiations generally concentrated on internal concerns. They did not normally focus on how the new union could be best organized to meet external challenges or to adjust to a new environment. Moreover, there was little evidence that the internal considerations were informed by ideas as to how the merger partners could achieve a synergistic outcome to their negotiations. Rather, assertions were made regarding the political advantages, such as increased bargaining power, which would follow from forming a larger union. For example, in the case of the balanced partner amalgamations there was a general acceptance that moves towards industrial or sectoral unionism would deliver some, largely unstated, bargaining advantages. Also, there was little interest in negotiating deals which would stand later detailed financial scrutiny. Hence, in a period when many unions were in financial difficulties, one reasonably common legacy was to leave the new amalgamated unions’ post-merger management a number of difficult administrative issues to resolve.

8 Amalgamations: Post-Merger Performance INTRODUCTION In assessing the post-merger performance of amalgamated unions, it must be first noted that the same caveats as were discussed in Chapter 5 regarding an assessment of post-transfer partners’ performance, also apply to amalgamations. In brief, the effect of a changing environment over time and the influence of other factors unrelated to the amalgamation need to be recognized and taken into account before concluding that a post-merger change in an amalgamated union’s performance was the product of the amalgamation, rather than some other extraneous event. Also in studying the performance of amalgamated unions allowance must be made for the time taken for changes agreed in the amalgamation negotiations, or prompted by the amalgamation, to have an impact on post-amalgamation behaviour. As will be seen in some cases, it took several years for the effects of the amalgamation to work their way through the new union’s systems and structures. In the following discussion, the amalgamations involving dominant partners (quadrants 1 and 2 of Figure 7.1) will be briefly examined first before concentrating on the balanced partner amalgamations’ outcomes (quadrant 3 of Figure 7.1). The outcomes achieved will be assessed by reference to the established framework of job territories, political objectives and means, democratic ethos and government, administration, and leaders’ imperatives.

DOMINANT PARTNER AMALGAMATIONS In respect of the amalgamations completed under competitive conditions (quadrant 1), both involving the GMB, these were, as reported previously, intended to expand the scope of the GMB’s territorial interests and boost its membership size. But the GMB expected much less in terms of concrete gains from the Boilermakers as compared to APEX. The former were in marked decline, although they did add a craft dimension to the GMB’s generally

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semi-skilled and unskilled membership. Further, because the GMB had failed to agree any merger of any substance for many years the Boilermakers’ merger did effectively signal the GMB’s emergence as a key player in the competitive merger market. As for APEX it was expected to strengthen the GMB’s white collar and women’s interests. Indeed, the GMB had planned, postamalgamation, to build on its presence in manufacturing, finance, insurance, the AA, electricity supply, and the Coal Board; all areas where the GMB had a low level of membership. Moreover, their analysis of union density in areas of APEX’s organization had suggested the GMB could recruit a significant number of non-unionists by ‘in-fill’ recruitment. However, by the mid-1990s, the GMB was disillusioned by its merger strategy. The Boilermakers had proved a more costly amalgamation than expected and APEX had failed to provide a ‘springboard’ into areas of growth. As for the two dominant partner, but non-competitive, amalgamations (UNIFI; PROSPECT), they both brought the dominant partner some territorial advantages in terms of the scope of their recruitment, as well as an immediate increase in membership. But the advantages varied quite widely. In driving forward the UNIFI amalgamation the dominant partner BIFU experienced important, but somewhat unintended, territorial consequences. For, the newly amalgamated UNIFI was designed to be a ‘magnet’ drawing other small finance unions and staff associations into the new union. But such transfers did not materialize. Instead, UNIFI’s membership fell, initially, at the rate of 900 members per month, from 181,419 in 1998 (combined BIFU, NWSA, and UNiFI membership) to 157,997 in 2000 (–13%). Union density in the four leading banks continued its medium-term (since 1995) decline, and the NWSA section suffered a further significant fall in membership following job losses due to the Royal Bank of Scotland’s takeover of the NatWest Bank. As in a number of other amalgamations, it was also acknowledged that in concentrating on managing the internal processes of the newly amalgamated union, the leadership initially ‘took its eye off the ball’ as regards retention and recruitment. The IPMS amalgamation with the EMA in 2001 to form PROSPECT also had disappointing consequences for membership growth. This amalgamation, by 2005, had done little or nothing to increase membership beyond that recorded at the time of amalgamation. Also, coincidentally, despite the IPMS reversing a period of decline, between 1979 and 1998, the equivalent section of PROSPECT again lost members in 2003 (some 400 down over the year despite absorbing some 700 members transferred from the PCS). Overall, therefore, in dominant partner amalgamations, the larger union benefited territorially in terms of widening the scope of their job territories, but they largely failed to convert this into a sustained increase in

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membership. As for the minor amalgamation partners, they were all either pre-amalgamation, or soon afterwards, recruiting in a shrinking job territory. Also, the smaller of the transferors tended to find life immediately after amalgamation less satisfactory, blaming lack of servicing, or loss of identity, as the source of such problems. However, as some interviewees noted, the concentration, post-merger, on the internal management of the new union, at the expense of retention and recruitment activities, may also have significantly contributed to the consequent loss of members in some previously highdensity workplaces. As for political objectives and means, the dominant partner amalgamations largely continued to hold the same political positions and ideology as the partners shared pre-merger. Unlike the unions forming balanced partner amalgamations, they were generally non-factionalized and their senior officials tended to shape policy, free of organized internal opposition. Hence, there were no sharp changes in political orientation, nor given the dominance of the major partner, any radical improvements in political influence, apart from the IPMS, which by forming PROSPECT with 100,000 members gained increased representation inside the TUC’s hierarchy. As for union–Labour Party relations, these were largely unaffected as, apart from the GMB, none of the other dominant partners were affiliated to the Party. As regards the dominant partner amalgamated unions’ bargaining position vis-à-vis employers, this was noticeably improved post-merger by UNIFI. This consolidatory amalgamation cut out dual representation in both Barclays Bank and NatWest Bank. As a consequence, UNIFI signed a beneficial partnership agreement with Barclays which would have been extremely difficult to achieve if UNiFI and BIFU had continued to vie for membership by each assuming a more militant posture than the other. A similar reduction in dual representation further benefited the GMB in ship-building (Boilermakers’ merger) and in some areas of white-collar organization where both the GMB and APEX shared a common job territory. Hence, in both UNIFI and the GMB the latent bargaining power of the merger partners was increased. In PROSPECT’s case, there was less scope for increasing bargaining power as the minor partner largely operated in different bargaining units to those organized by the dominant partner (the exception was their shared interests in BNFL). Nevertheless, PROSPECT moved to enhance its bargaining position in general by fulfilling its pledge to reallocate resources into its collective bargaining activities. This involved increasing the number of full-time officials dealing with negotiations across the two partner unions from 36 to 38. Further, PROSPECT also strengthened its regional representation to support local collective bargaining and servicing of its members. But there was some tension between the EMA and IPMS over the use of lay activists, as against full-time


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officials, to improve such local services. On the one hand, the EMA relied almost solely on full-time officials for such servicing, including managing the branch functions, whereas, on the other, the IPMS had the advantage of using lay activists, supported by employer-funded ‘facility time’, to maintain its branch network. As regards membership benefits these were generally harmonized upwards to the satisfaction of both partners. For example, the IPMS gained by developing the EMA’s recently introduced 24-hour helpline. Exceptionally, following adjustments post-merger to the financial benefits package provided by PROSPECT, the smaller partner, the EMA, felt it acquired an inferior package; unfortunately for the EMA, the IPMS had only recently entered into a new contract with its preferred suppliers and this replaced the EMA’s own tailormade financial package. Generally, therefore, political objectives and means in the dominant partner amalgamations were, post-merger, unchanged or marginally improved in the new amalgamated union. The gains made tended to be the product of combining ideologically aligned unions or, in UNIFI’s case, by organizing formerly competing unions across common collective bargaining units. Also, even though PROSPECT’s partners did not share the main collective bargaining benefits, because they operated in discrete bargaining units, the additional resources released by the merger were used to employ more full-time negotiators and hence improve bargaining services. In most cases, the minor partners also inherited the dominant partners’ normally superior benefits package. As regards post-merger changes in democratic ethos and union government, these were relatively limited in most dominant partner amalgamations. In common with many transfers, but in contrast to balanced partner amalgamations, the dominant partner’s main structural adjustment was to provide the minor partner with a section, or its autonomous equivalent, inside the existing larger organization. This was the position in the GMB’s two amalgamations and in the PROSPECT amalgamation. Although such a restructuring was innovative for the GMB, it did not seriously challenge the regional officials’ critical role in union government. In contrast, BIFU, in forming UNIFI, adopted a national company committee structure and by so doing radically changed its own internal organization by decentralizing and dispersing its bargaining activities. This had the effect of significantly reducing the status of its policymaking executive which had previously determined bargaining issues centrally. Post-merger all but one minor partner, over the period studied, retained the structural autonomy agreed in the amalgamation negotiations. Exceptionally, following APEX’s amalgamation with the GMB, its autonomy was relatively short-lived. Initially, APEX formed the APEX Partnership inside the GMB,

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organizing all the GMB’s white-collar membership. But in 1994 the GMB reviewed its organization and opted for an industrially based structure. This led to the great majority of its white-collar members being reallocated to their appropriate industrial sections. As a result, within five years of the amalgamation few members were left in what had been APEX Partnership, now renamed the GMB’s Commercial Section. These changes exposed the weaknesses of APEX’s amalgamation agreement as compared to the guarantee of autonomy the Tailor and Garment Workers and FTAT had secured via their transfers of engagements to the GMB. The wider implications of APEX’s absorption into the GMB are therefore that merger by amalgamation, involving dominant and minor partners, may provide the minor partner with less security in the medium term than that provided by a transfer of engagements. Administrative reforms, post-merger, were common to all the dominant partner amalgamations, but they varied in their degree and purpose. All partners sought economies of scale and scope, particularly those which needed to address financial difficulties. Properties were sold and officials moved into shared offices. For example, the GMB demolished APEX’s London office and built a new GMB head office on the site. UNIFI sold the NWSA’s Bournemouth head office three years after the merger and PROSPECT disposed of at least two of the EMA’s offices. Departments were merged and duplication of services reduced in all four dominant partner amalgamations. Most unions also secured reductions in staffing levels. For example, UNIFI made 40–50 voluntary redundancies within two years of the amalgamation. PROSPECT produced some £400,000 savings per annum from its post-merger reorganization of headquarters staff and, in addition, it expected further savings from a more efficient membership records department. But, unlike the other dominant partner amalgamations, PROSPECT was committed pre-merger to reinvesting such ‘savings’ in new posts to improve services. Enquiries regarding the net financial consequences of merging, particularly questions regarding the costs of amalgamations, were largely unproductive. Most of the amalgamating partners either failed to keep a record of such costs or would not disclose such information. Nevertheless, it was clear that as the newly amalgamated unions developed, costs unknown, or uncalculated, at the point of amalgamation could become significant. For example, in at least two cases the minor partners’ pension schemes were found not to be as sound as first assumed by the dominant partner. This added to the costs of harmonizing salaries and member benefits. Of the unions in financial difficulties premerger the UNIFI partners experienced the most pressing difficulties. UNIFI’s total membership was in decline, its subscription income was not meeting expectations and BIFU, the dominant partner, had previously drawn on its


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investments to fund its running costs. The merger agreement also allowed the minor partners to keep their head offices for three years post-merger, thus denying UNIFI the chance to initiate immediate post-merger property sales. Further, UNIFI borrowed to fund its redundancy scheme. To generate income it sold 49% of its subsidiary company, UNISERVICE, for £1,000,000. In addition in 2001–3 UNIFI increased its subscriptions by £1 a month (raising its subscriptions from £8.90 to £9.90 a month). Clearly, UNIFI’s immediate postmerger economies, and the associated attempts to manage its finances more effectively, were insufficient to meet the costs of the amalgamation in a period of membership decline. Indeed, although UNIFI gradually realized economies of scale and improved its financial position it still had some financial problems when it transferred to AMICUS in 2004. The PROSPECT amalgamation (2001), driven by the financially sound IPMS, did not initially try to make net savings; instead it used the opportunity to ‘be more effective’. However, by 2004 it was also forecasting a deficit for the next three years. A combination of factors in 2003–4, including disappointing subscription income, investment and property income in decline and problems in the former EMA’s pension scheme were all identified as contributing to its financial problems. Its redundancy scheme and incidental expenses associated with the post-merger adjustment had also generated a ‘one-off ’ cost of £350,000 in 2003–4. Given the commitment made to improving service, the savings made from the economies were not available for offsetting the loss of subscriptions income. Hence, as in UNIFI, PROSPECT moved to improve its membership recruitment and retention, and to increase subscriptions. Post-merger management, or administration, of the amalgamated unions’ resources was therefore critically important following the formation of UNIFI and PROSPECT to deal with the potentially damaging financial consequence of the two amalgamations. In the GMB’s case, the very big differences in size between the dominant partner and the minor partners (Boilermakers and APEX) enabled the GMB, at least initially, to absorb the financial costs of the two amalgamations, without radical changes in organization or administration. However, in the UNIFI and PROSPECT amalgamations, it largely fell to the former dominant partner to find solutions to the newly amalgamated union’s financial difficulties. No doubt PROSPECT’s increased professionalization of its administration function, with the appointment of a Resource Director, helped it respond quickly to the unexpected downturn in its financial position. But, in UNIFI, the longer-term decline in the dominant partner’s membership and its underlying weak financial position was further damaged by the costs associated with its post-merger restructuring, particularly redundancy costs. An unintended consequence of the need for firm central control over the resources and their internal allocation was that the minor niche

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partners tended to experience ‘post-merger life’ more as a takeover, rather than an amalgamation. Last, as regards dominant partner amalgamations, leaders’ imperatives were generally not a cause of significant concern post-merger, although some issues arose regarding full-time officials’ pension schemes. The merger negotiations therefore normally satisfactorily resolved the key vested interests, such as the allocation of senior jobs and the issue of salary harmonization. Also, sectional conferences satisfied the minor unions’ activists’ interests in exercising their independent policymaking judgements, even if these were largely restricted to the field of collective bargaining. Closer integration normally developed over time as those that guarded the vested interests of the minor partner retired or assumed senior posts in the wider union. To conclude on dominant partner amalgamations, there was no common pattern of achievement post-merger across the four amalgamations. Territorially, dominant partners initially extended their scope, but there was no discernible longer-term gain in membership. Apart from the Boilermakers and APEX helping sectionalize the GMB, little other organizational change of note was associated with this merger. In contrast, the dominant partners in UNIFI and PROSPECT primarily used the amalgamations to initiate changes in one or more other dimensions of union behaviour post-merger. UNIFI radically adjusted its bargaining structure while also attempting to reverse its deteriorating financial position. PROSPECT, in contrast, did not initially seek to reduce costs, but chose instead to reallocate newly released resources to improve its performance by adding to its negotiating officers and restructuring at regional level. As for the minor partners, they secured a high degree of bargaining autonomy but they also had to adjust post-merger to operate under the dominant partners’ largely unreconstructed policymaking structure and administration. Shortly following the amalgamation two of the new amalgamation unions also experienced financial problems which appeared not to have been foreseen by those planning and subsequently managing the amalgamation.

BALANCED PARTNER AMALGAMATIONS The six balanced partner amalgamations (see quadrant 3 of Figure 7.1) each involved relatively large unions sharing a common territorial interest. Most of the partner unions had also vied with each other in recruiting new members and in seeking recognition from employers. In forming the GPMU (1991, 301,147), AEEU (1992, 1,077,403), UNISON (1993, 1,512,893), PTC (1996,


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169,987), PCS (1998, 265,943), and AMICUS (2002, 1,144,211), each amalgamation therefore promised to help resolve territorial conflicts between the partner unions. In five cases, they also combined unions with a recent (post1967) history of merger activity in the cognate trade merger streams (GPMU, AEEU, PTC, PCS, and AMICUS) and the white-collar assimilation stream (AEEU and AMICUS). It was only the UNISON partners that lacked recent merger experience. Territorially, the leaders of the three public-sector amalgamated unions, UNISON, the PTC, and PCS, saw significant advantages in becoming, respectively, the largest union in Britain (UNISON) and the largest in the civil service (PTC and PCS); size counted for much in all three cases. For example, UNISON, as the largest union, immediately achieved a position in the TUC and in the Labour Party not previously open to its largest partner NALGO. Similarly in the civil service the NUCPS in initiating the PTC and PCS amalgamations established, in the PCS, ‘the union’ which government had to come to terms with when setting, as an employer, the civil service’s terms and conditions of employment. Further, the GPMU, AEEU, and AMICUS organizing primarily in the private sector improved, directly on merging, the relative status of the partners vis-à-vis competitor unions in their core job territories. Post-merger membership consolidation or growth was an issue for all the amalgamated unions. However, for those concentrated in the private sector— GPMU, AEEU, and AMICUS—combining with unions in similar territories offered little in terms of new growth opportunities. Most noticeably the GPMU and the AEEU in the early 1990s inherited falling membership rolls. The subsequent AMICUS (2002) amalgamation was concluded in a period when union membership was more stable, but the main job territory (manufacturing) occupied by AMICUS’s partner unions was still in decline. In contrast UNISON (1993) and the PCS (1998), while concerned with changes in the public sector which threatened jobs, including privatization, were recruiting in more secure job territories. The GPMU experienced immediate membership loss post-merger: between 1991 and 1993 it fell from 301,147 to 250,230, a 17% loss. Even allowing for the tendency to exaggerate membership size pre-merger, this was a marked reduction. But in a period of rapid technological change and the derecognition of the GPMU in sections of the newspaper industry, it was not surprising. As also could be expected the GPMU rapidly moved post-merger to improve its membership recruitment and retention activities. It adopted a ‘3Rs’ policy of ‘recruitment, retention, and reorganization’, and made particular efforts to cater for women’s and young members’ interests in its renewed membership drives. The GPMU was also a leading supporter of the TUC’s Organising Academy launched in 1998; it claimed in 2004 to have employed

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more ‘graduates’ of the Academy than any other union. Indeed, the GPMU’s assistant general secretary was chairman of the TUC’s Organisation and Recruitment Committee and an active advocate of the organizing strategy. Nevertheless, continuing technological change, growing international competition and the associated closure of companies, continued to reduce the GPMU’s membership. In 2004, on transfer to AMICUS, the GPMU’s membership had shrunk to some 100,000, compared to the 300,000 claimed at its formation in 1991. The AEEU, UNISON, and the PCS also developed more sophisticated recruitment and retention strategies post-merger. The AEEU (1992), and later as a partner in the AMICUS (2002) amalgamation, was significantly influenced in its initial recruitment and retention activities by the former EETPU (even though the electricians were the smaller partner in the 1992 amalgamation). The EETPU had pioneered the use of single-union no-strike agreements, and its leaders were also proponents of partnership agreements, as supported by the 1997 New Labour government. The AEEU was particularly successful in using such policies to gain sole union recognition from some large inward investors, including Toyota and Honda. It was also adept at using the union recognition clauses in the 1999 Employment Relations Act; out of 450 recognition agreements monitored by the TUC the AEEU was responsible for 134 (30%). Yet, despite securing many new recognition agreements, including some with large employers, the continued decline of manufacturing sector employment badly affected the AEEU. By 2002, when the AEEU and the MSF formed AMICUS, the AEEU’s initial 1992 membership of 1 million had shrunk by 27% to 730,000. Moreover, the 730,000 figure overstated the AEEU’s actual membership. For in this period the AEEU adjusted its membership records to retain ‘members’ on the books who would previously have been removed for non-payment of subscriptions. In the relative safety of the public sector UNISON, the PTC and PCS also introduced recruitment and retention initiatives. Nevertheless, UNISON in the hostile climate of the early 1990s suffered from a number of setbacks, including derecognition amongst the recently privatized utilities. For example, South West Water derecognized UNISON. In this context, and recognizing the probable inflation of the partner unions’ membership figures pre-merger, UNISON’s membership fell from 1.5 million (1993) to 1.3 million in 1997. This, and associated financial problems, helped trigger a strategic review of UNISON’s operations in 1995. Amongst other proposals, the new strategy looked to move resources down the structure and promote the introduction of ‘branch’ development plans aimed at improving membership recruitment. Drawing on its regular membership surveys and surveys of those recently leaving the union, UNISON also looked to address what it saw as retention


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issues: a 1996 survey showed some 40,000 members were leaving UNISON annually because they were dissatisfied with its services (Waddington and Kerr 1999: 195). Such actions may well have helped UNISON, which also adopted the ‘organizing strategy’, grow to 1.3 million in 2004, after falling in membership to 1.2 million in 1998. However, union density in its core territory, local government, was calculated by UNISON in 2004 to have remained reasonably constant around the 50% level, since the 1993 amalgamation. The PCS, building on the PTC’s related policies, performed better than the other balanced partners as regards membership growth. Initially, it lost some 20,000 members in the first year, post-amalgamation. But, subsequently, it had the advantage of recruiting in an expanding civil service: employment rose from 505,000 in 1998 to 570,000 in 2004. In addition, a number of post-merger initiatives also helped increase its membership. In particular, the process of membership retention was directly assisted by the amalgamation. For, prior to forming PCS, many civil servants in the main grades had to change unions on promotion (from CPSA to PTC) if they wished to remain union members. Post-merger there was obviously no such requirement to change union affiliation: continuity of membership was assured. Also, the PCS embraced the PTC’s organizing strategy and increased its organizers from 8 to 20 under the new ‘National Recruiting Strategy’, which was itself subjected to periodic reviews. For example, in 2000 the strategy ‘Mk II’ set out recruitment priorities for both the civil service and the commercial sector. At this stage, while the PCS was still controlled by politically moderate national officials, it also aimed to combine the organizing strategy with strong support for partnership agreements. Subsequently, following a shift to the left at the top of PCS in 2002, the recruitment strategy was again reviewed, this time with the assistance of a Cranfield-administered membership survey. The PCS also drew on the advice of a consultant who designed a PCS scorecard, including new membership growth targets. In more militant mode PCS’s membership most noticeably increased in departments affected by industrial action. For example, in 2003–4, the PCS claimed an increase of 6,000 members in the DWP (Department for Work and Pensions) directly related to the PCS’s dispute with that department. Nevertheless, on the union’s own calculations in 2004, there were still some 1,250,000 non-members employed in civil service jobs and the PCS’s density appeared to have been maintained rather than increased since the amalgamation. Further, density in what had been the IRSF’s niche territory actually fell following its integration into the PTC/PCS from 85% in 1995 to 70% by 2003 (interview). In terms of membership gained by transfers post-amalgamation, only AMICUS increased its membership significantly by such action. As noted previously, it gained ‘market share’ in 2004 by absorbing both UNIFI (150,000)

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and the GPMU (100,000) into the recently formed AMICUS. Building on these transfers, AMICUS then opened talks with the T&G and GMB for a further ‘super-union’ amalgamation. AMICUS subsequently merged with the T&G in 2007 to form UNITE (the GMB withdrew from the amalgamation talks in mid-2006). For AMICUS’s general secretary, Derek Simpson, a key player in the proposed amalgamation with the T&G, this merger was ‘the most significant of AMICUS’s many successes’, indicating that ‘other unions felt compelled to consider joining with us’ (AMICUS 2006). The balanced partner amalgamations therefore all sought subsequent membership gains. But any immediate or medium-term gains were largely dependent on expanding within existing job boundaries. Such increases were therefore reliant on improving existing recruitment and retention strategies and practices. In most cases, efforts were made to build on one or more partners’ proven approaches to such critical issues. Apart from the AEEU, which under the EETPU’s influence adopted single union agreements, the amalgamated unions were drawn towards the more adversarial organizing strategy promoted by the TUC. However, the context in which the GPMU and AEEU organized was such that while these private-sector unions’ strategies probably helped slow the rate of membership loss, they could not reverse it (as regards AMICUS, now the AMICUS section of UNITE, it is too soon (2007) after its foundation to pass judgement on its recruitment and retention activities). In contrast two public-sector unions, UNISON and PCS, both benefited from a change in context. Most notably, the election of a New Labour government in 1997 made it easier, at least initially, for both UNISON and the PCS to work as partners with public-sector managers. However, by 2006, both UNISON and the PCS had adopted a more militant approach to a third New Labour government intent on reducing both the cost of public-sector pensions and the numbers employed in the civil service. Hence, balanced partner amalgamations gave the EETPU and the more formally strategic NALGO and the PTC the opportunity to implement their existing and, in the EETPU’s case, contrasting strategies for recruitment and retention on a bigger canvas. Also, if membership was not too adversely affected by major job losses in their base territories, the balanced partner amalgamations eventually released resources which, once the amalgamation had ‘settled down’, could be directed to support such strategies by, for example, hiring more organizers and recruiters. But the success they all enjoyed was largely in moderating attrition rates in existing job territories, rather than increasing union membership and density in new and expanding nonunionized territories. Next, turning to political objectives and means, apart from the GPMU, which was largely unaffected by ideological divisions, but subject to internal


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conflicts between the national leadership (former NGA(82)) and some branch secretaries (former SOGAT(82)), the other five balanced partner amalgamations all inherited ideologically based factions from one or more of the partner unions. Moreover, in the AEEU, PTC, PCS, and AMICUS the ideological identity of the new unions underwent radical political change post-merger due, inter alia, to factional realignments. UNISON, in contrast, although heavily factionalized and experiencing ideological changes amongst its lay executive, managed to maintain a higher degree of political continuity both internally and in its policymaking. In particular, it remained focused on the equality agenda inherited from NALGO. The AEEU (AEU and EETPU) and AMICUS (AEEU and MSF), both started their new existences with their moderate credentials intact. The AEU, in 1992, was nationally governed by a moderate majority on its executive and led by a moderate president and general secretary: all were associated with, and supported by, the AEEU’s moderate ‘Group’. This was a well-established and well-funded faction which was accepted as part of the fabric of the union, but not formally recognized in the union’s rules. However, the moderates controlling the EETPU had dispensed with such factions and were largely unchallenged by the left (many of whom had resigned from the EETPU to form the breakaway EPIU, which subsequently transferred to the T&G). Further, the AEU’s moderates’ grip on the new AEEU seemed guaranteed by the terms of the amalgamation which made the former AEU responsible, should there be a vacancy, for electing the president of the AEEU (at the time a full-time post at least on a par with that of the general secretary as regards status and influence). To help maintain the political balance, the EETPU similarly held responsibility for the general secretary post. But, in 1995 and 1996, respectively, the president and general secretary posts both became unexpectedly vacant. As a consequence, the AEU’s moderate Group imploded as it squabbled over its choice of candidate for the president’s post. This helped the left’s candidate, Davey Hall, win the 1995 presidential election. In 1996, the former EETPU members elected the moderate Ken Jackson as general secretary. Hence, by 1996, the AEEU, expected by most commentators to be a bastion of moderation and dominated by the AEU, had seen its moderate faction collapse, a left-wing candidate secure the presidency and the EETPU’s moderate candidate elected as general secretary. A new moderate faction, largely organized ‘top-down’ by the AEEU’s national officials, was launched in 1997. It initially took the title ‘AEEU United’, and it inherited the ‘Group’s’ funds (it later became ‘AEEU Members First’). As for the left, they regrouped around the Engineering Gazette, more recently (2005) retitled the ‘Gazette’. The broad left grouping had some successes in elections to the AEEU’s executive in the 1990s. However, major changes in the

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governance of the AEEU (to be discussed below) saw the leading ‘left’ official, Davey Hall, resign from the presidency in 1997. Related changes, initiated by Ken Jackson, also changed the presidency and executive from full-time official to lay positions. During this process, the moderates reasserted their control over all the key posts in the AEEU, including a 38 to 10 majority for the faction ‘AEEU United’ on the 1997 new lay executive. Furthermore, the union also appointed a chief executive responsible for union administration reporting to Ken Jackson as general secretary. This affirmation and centralization of the moderates’ control of the AEEU helped secure the 2002 amalgamation with the moderate MSF. The formation of AMICUS, unintentionally, however, heralded a period of radical political change. At the time of the amalgamation, the AEEU’s and MSF’s moderate groups, respectively ‘AEEU United’ and ‘MSF for Labour’, had majorities on their executives as well as the support of their two general secretaries, the newly knighted Sir Ken Jackson (AEEU) and Roger Lyons (MSF). However, the AEEU subsequently attempted to continue the joint general secretaryship of Sir Ken beyond that envisaged in the terms of the AMICUS amalgamation. In brief, Sir Ken, who was some five years older than Roger Lyons, was urged by supporters in the former AEEU to extend his period of office beyond the age of 65 to ensure his and therefore the AEEU’s moderates continued control of the general secretaryship. Such a move was also intended to restrict Roger Lyons’ and MSF’s influence inside AMICUS. Sir Ken Jackson, originally in the EETPU, was therefore selected as the moderate candidate for the 2002 election to the AEEU’s share of AMICUS’s joint general secretaryship. Unfortunately for the moderates, there was resentment inside the union over the attempt to extend Sir Ken’s tenure beyond 65. Also, the moderate faction proved to be less well organized electorally than expected and there appeared to be an ex-AEU preference for Simpson. In a very acrimonious election that generated claims of ballot rigging and electoral malpractice, Sir Ken lost to the Broad Left’s, or the Gazette’s, candidate, Derek Simpson, who originated in the AEU. Moreover, following a complaint to the Certification Officer in 2004, Roger Lyons who had not fought an election in the previous five years was removed from his joint general secretary’s post (Certification Officer 2004–5: 38). As a consequence, Derek Simpson, supported by the Broad Left, which subsequently made strong inroads into AMICUS’s executive, was the sole general secretary of AMICUS. This signalled a radical shift to the left in AMICUS. Simpson subsequently denounced singleunion no-strike agreements, and similar ‘sweetheart deals’, agreed between AMICUS and employers. He also joined the ‘awkward squad’ of general secretaries (T&G, GMB, and UNISON) critical of New Labour. Further, his election was very significant for securing the transfer of the centre-left GPMU


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to AMICUS. Hence, AMICUS, the successor to one of Britain’s most moderate unions of the 1990s, the AEEU, was by 2004 led from the left and a proponent of the ‘super union’ amalgamation between the T&G and AMICUS. Both the leadership of the PTC and PCS also underwent radical ideological shifts post-amalgamation. Critically, the former NUCPS, previously controlled by the left-wing ‘tankies’, moved to the right after joining the IRSF to form the PTC in 1996. A more moderate or centrist faction in the former NUCPS, broadly aligned with New Labour, combined with the moderates in the former IRSF to change the power balance inside the newly amalgamated PTC. In this process, the moderates ousted the ultra-left from the new union’s executive and secured control of the PTC’s key policymaking bodies. As a result, the PTC became more politically acceptable to the ultra-moderates leading the CPSA and thus helped secure the PTC and CPSA 1998 amalgamation, which the leadership of the NUCPS had pursued for many years. Further, the moderates in the PTC played the central role in drafting the ‘aims and values’ papers which established the template for the PCS’s new government structure. The PCS in 1998 was therefore initially led by the moderates’ factions and the two joint general secretaries, John Sheldon (PTC) and Barry Reamsbottom (CPSA). The CPSA’s moderates were, however, in almost constant conflict, particularly at the conference, with the ultra-left or the ‘Trots’. Indeed, the inter-factional conflicts inside the CPSA earned it the sobriquet ‘the Beirut of the trade union movement’ (interview). But, the CPSA moderates, led in a very disciplined manner by Barry Reamsbottom and his close associates, had successfully maintained their electoral supremacy on the CPSA’s executive for a decade. Not surprisingly, therefore, in the first elections to the PCS’s new national executive the moderates in both the CPSA and the PTC ‘swept the board’ (interview), leaving no broad or ultra-left candidates on the PCS’s first 1998 executive. By 2000, however, the moderates’ position in the PCS was coming under strain. The PCS’s two joint general secretaries were finding it extremely difficult to work together. This led to a clash of major proportions, which eventually destroyed the two moderate groups’ alliance. The focal point of this internecine conflict was Barry Reamsbottom’s tenure as ‘the’ general secretary of the PCS, following John Sheldon’s retirement in January 2001. In 2000, Barry Reamsbottom commenced proceedings against PCS claiming he was entitled to remain as general secretary until his retirement in 2004. But the PCS moved to hold an election for the post in 2000 which Mark Serwotka, a left-wing candidate, won and which Barry Reamsbottom did not contest (although there was a moderate candidate, Hugh Lanning, formerly of the NUCPS). After a series of internal clashes between the different factions,

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including a ‘near riot’ (Independent 2002) at an executive meeting intended to resolve the question as to who was the legitimate general secretary, the position was resolved by the High Court. This judgment confirmed that Mark Serwotka was ‘the’ general secretary as from June 2002 and that Barry Reamsbottom had ceased to be general secretary in May 2002 (PCS 2002). Following the above political shambles the factional composition and ideological bent of the PCS underwent radical change. The left was the first to organize across the NUCPS/CPSA divide under the title ‘Left Unity’. By 2004, it was the dominant faction in the PCS, supporting the new general secretary. Outside of the Left’s cross-partner alliance, the remaining factions proved largely incapable of mounting a serious challenge to ‘Left Unity’. The potential opposition was diffused across: the NUCP’s ‘Membership First’, retitled the ‘Democrats’; the CPSA’s moderate group; and the IRSF’s moderates. There was also, for a period, a faction titled the ‘Alliance’, which was organized around those opposed to Barry Reamsbottom’s continuation as general secretary. Thus, an amalgamation driven to a large extent by the PTC’s and CPSA’s negotiators’ ambitions to form a moderate and politically stable civil service union was within six years of its formation controlled by the left. Further, its first elected general secretary, Mark Serwotka, had had no part in the merger negotiation and had, indeed, at the time opposed the amalgamation. Political influence in the TUC, Labour Party (apart from the PTC and PCS which were unaffiliated), and national and international federations of unions was enhanced by all the balanced partner amalgamations. In combination, an increase in the size of the affiliated body, the payment of one consolidated affiliation fee, and the end to dual and therefore potentially conflicting delegations was achieved by all the balanced partner amalgamations. However, the actual gains depended on the new leadership grasping such opportunities. In at least two cases, the AEEU’s and AMICUS’s amalgamations, the general secretaries were not inclined to play leadership roles at the TUC and indeed delegated such responsibilities to their deputies, whereas the GPMU’s, UNISON’s, and the PCS’s leaders were more clearly engaged with the TUC. For unions affiliated to the Labour Party size clearly also had its advantages. The Party still needed the trade unions’ financial support, and it valued the resources unions put at its disposal in elections. Also the unions retained an influential voice at the Party Conference. In these circumstances, the UNISON amalgamation, more than any other balanced partner merger, served to promote NALGO, its largest and wealthiest partner, from its pre-merger party–political neutrality into a prominent role within the Party. Indeed, by 2005, UNISON’s general secretary (a former NALGO official) was a member of the ‘awkward squad’ of four union leaders (UNISON, AMICUS, T&G, and GMB) who frequently criticized the New Labour government and repeatedly questioned


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the government’s public-sector policies. This may be seen as representing the end of NALGO’s long trek from being rather isolationist and non-political in its early period, to being a full and leading member of the labour movement. The national federations organizing unions in the CSEU (Confederation of Shipbuilders and Engineering Unions) and in the CCSU (Council of Civil Service Unions) also became dominated by, respectively, the AEEU (and subsequently AMICUS), and the PTC and PCS. Internationally, the GPMU was probably the union which was most concerned with exploiting its new enhanced role in the international field as it strengthened its position in the IGF (International Graphical Federation) and the EGF (European Graphical Federation) post-amalgamation. In respect of collective bargaining reform, the balanced partner amalgamations, in creating largely industrial or sectoral unions, were clearly aiming for synergy in the field of collective bargaining: the amalgamated union’s bargaining power was expected to exceed that of the sum of the individual partners’ bargaining power. Critically, as discussed above regarding consolidatory transfers (Chapter 5: pp. 121–2), but on a much bigger scale, the balanced partner amalgamations should have increased the partners’ latent bargaining power by substituting integrated action for inter-union competition. Action taken to develop and exploit such power post-amalgamation was, at least in the first two or three years of existence, more marked in the GPMU, UNISON, and PCS, as compared to the AEEU and AMICUS. The latter two unions appeared disadvantaged in this respect on two accounts. First, they did not agree on associated changes in bargaining responsibilities and structure until several years after the amalgamation was officially confirmed. Second, they were also far more decentralized and differentiated in their bargaining channels than were the GPMU, UNISON, and the PCS. Hence, the national leaders in the AEEU and AMICUS were relatively remote from the decisionmaking processes which helped determine bargaining behaviour in the myriad of bargaining units which influenced their members’ terms and conditions of employment. In contrast, the GPMU, UNISON, PTC, and the PCS resolved most organizational issues affecting collective bargaining either by pre-merger negotiations or by executive action at the national level post-merger. A major factor helping all four unions act in this matter was the relatively centralized bargaining structure which determined pay and conditions for large groups of their members. The GPMU’s and UNISON’s partners, in particular, participated in national negotiations of central importance to many of their members. In the GPMU’s case, it was, for a private-sector union, exceptional, in that it negotiated at least six national agreements, including one with the BPIF (British Printing Industries Federation) which covered general printing.

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GPMU’s general secretary, in 1994, saw the 1993 negotiation with the BPIF as demonstrating the benefit of the GPMU’s new combined bargaining power. Further, at local levels, the amalgamation was also seen as ending what had often been outright conflict between the NGA(82) and SOGAT(82), as they competed for recognition in a period of radical technological change. In UNISON’s early years, the ‘greater coordination of collective bargaining activities’ was described by its first general secretary (interview, 1994) as the ‘number one’ positive gain from the amalgamation. For example, it strengthened the partner unions’ voice in the NHS, including the influence exercised in Review Bodies. Further, as the former general secretary of the COHSE put it, ‘UNISON will not be ignored’ by the employer, whereas previously the employer would have called in the RCN (Royal College of Nursing) rather than COHSE for consultation (interview, 1998). In 1997, the groundbreaking ‘single status’ agreement negotiated in local government covering, inter alia, manual, administrative, and professional staff groups in one agreement also heralded a radical break from the previous practice of separate negotiations. This, as a senior UNISON official remarked, ‘would not have got off the ground’ without the UNISON amalgamation (interview, 1998). In the PCS’s case, its main challenge in the area of collective bargaining was to meet the demands of its members for effective representation in each of the 400-plus bargaining units created by the government’s division of the civil service into discrete departments and agencies: each of the bargaining units had previously been organized by both the PTC and the CPSA. Therefore, coordination between the merging unions was again critical for bargaining success. Following the PTC’s strategy, the PCS, directed from the centre, organized teams of full-time officials to deal with pay and grading in the 400 bargaining units. The leadership also moved rapidly to deal with the issue of duplicate ‘facility’ time which had previously given both the PTC and the CPSA the use of lay officials to support local bargaining activities. The return of a Labour government in 1997, and the associated partnership approach to unions and management relations it promoted, also helped the then ‘moderate’-led PCS to build a new cooperative relationship between unions and management. As can be seen above, there was therefore evidence of an increase in the amalgamated unions’ latent bargaining power, post-merger. However, in five of the six balanced partner amalgamations (GPMU, AEEU, UNISON, PTC, and PCS) there was no noticeable immediate post-merger change in their political orientations which could have caused them to adopt a more militant negotiating stance. Further, the environment of the period mitigated against such a change in policy. The moderates driving the AEEU, PTC, and PCS amalgamations also had no interest in such a change in policy: all were committed to partnership-type agreements with employers. The GPMU and


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UNISON, both more inclined to the centre-left of the political spectrum, were also not noticeably more militant post-amalgamation. Indeed in all six balanced partner amalgamations the immediate post-merger concerns tended to be dominated by internal questions, such as government and administrative issues (including finance), rather than collective bargaining reform or its political radicalization. The exception to the above, as regards political orientation, immediately post-amalgamation, was AMICUS. The election of Derek Simpson in 2002 and the ‘Gazette’s’ success in the subsequent executive elections gave the union’s political rhetoric a more militant edge. But as regards changing the union’s bargaining activities towards a more aggressive and militant stance this was not noticeably a product of the political changes. Given that most collective bargains made by AMICUS were dealt with at the local level and therefore subject to local scrutiny and local circumstances, it was only exceptional deals that came to the attention of the national leadership. Hence, a change in politics at the top of such a large and highly decentralized union had little consequence for most of the union’s many bargaining units. In contrast the political upheaval inside the PCS in 2002, at a time when the public-sector unions were taking a more jaded view of the New Labour government, did coincide with an upsurge in militancy. As the government looked to cut back on jobs in the civil service and improve its efficiency, the PCS’s membership opted for a more left-wing leadership, compared to the moderate factions which led the amalgamation. In these circumstances, the PCS supported industrial action over pay issues, job reductions and the ‘dress code’. In reviewing PCS’s ‘Goals, Structures and Strategies for Success’ in 2002, the PCS also set out its aim of restoring a nationally agreed framework for pay and conditions across the civil service. Further, it launched a review of ‘partnership working’ which had been embraced by the previous more moderate national leadership at the time of the amalgamation. Clearly, in the PCS, the shift to the left in 2002 resulted in the union adopting a more militant stance and seeking, in a strategic fashion, to use the resources it had released through the amalgamation to strengthen its representative and bargaining capabilities. In respect of membership benefits and services, post-amalgamation, these were commonly improved across all the balanced partner amalgamations, if only because they were, in general, immediately or gradually harmonized upwards to the ‘best’ provided by any one partner union. However, in some cases, the opportunity provided by the amalgamation to rationalize benefits, or limit certain benefits to ‘higher-paying’ members, was also taken. For example, following the AEEU amalgamation provident benefits were reviewed, resulting in the removal of funeral benefit, while fatal accident benefit was

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increased. In the GPMU, because of SOGAT(82)’s refusal to increase subscriptions to the NGA(82)’s level, there were differential unemployment and dispute benefits. For example, former NGA(82) members received a minimum of £60 a week strike benefit while former SOGAT(82) members received a minimum of £10 a week benefit. In some unions, action was also taken postamalgamation to move more resources into membership benefits and services. For example, UNISON piloted ‘UNISON DIRECT’ in the 1990s as a callcentre facility for members’ phone-in and email queries, before making the service nationally available in 2000. Other unions also radically extended education training facilities largely by making one or more partners’ facilities open to all partner unions. For example, in the AEEU and AMICUS amalgamations the EETPU’s and the MSF’s training facilities, respectively, became available for use by the other partners. Also in the PCS, the amalgamation released resources, to the value of some £1 million, to develop a new ‘learning centre’. Political objectives and means were therefore directly affected by the balanced partner amalgamations. As regards the amalgamations’ effects on collective bargaining power and membership benefits, the changes were generally advantageous. However, the political or ideological bias of the amalgamated partners, and the underpinning factional organizations, did not always develop post-merger in the manner envisaged by the leaders who planned and negotiated the amalgamations. Most notably, in the highly factionalized AEEU, AMICUS, and PCS the amalgamation helped produce unexpected and unintended reverses of political fortune for the larger balanced partners’ leaders and their supporting moderate factions. In each case, the decision to have two top jobs of equal status, a president and general secretary in the AEEU and joint general secretaries in AMICUS and the PCS, contributed significantly to the consequent political upheaval. In the AEEU, a series of unforeseen events, including the death of the former AEEU’s leading contender for the presidency of the new union and the associated implosion of the previously highly successful moderate ‘Group’s’ electoral machine, resulted in the smaller partners’ (the EETPU’s) ultra-moderate officials securing most of the key national posts in the AEEU. Politically, apart from a brief period when the left (Engineering Gazette) held the presidency, the former EETPU’s leadership dominated the AEEU politically. From the AEU’s perspective, the amalgamation therefore led to an ‘EETPU takeover’ (from interview). When AMICUS subsequently also adopted a joint general secretary system of leadership, the leading contender from the AEEU, the incumbent, Sir Ken Jackson, was generally expected to win the election to the AEEU’s share of the top two jobs. However, the moderates, largely organized around the former EETPU’s membership, had failed to replace the ‘Group’ with an equally effective electoral machine, and there was considerable resentment


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over the extension of Sir Ken’s tenure of office and the associated EETPU’s domination of the AEEU. Moreover, the broad left ‘Gazette’ faction, mainly based on the AEU, had been revived. As a result, Derek Simpson and the ‘Gazette’s’ left-inclined supporters replaced the ultra-moderates at the top of AMICUS. Moreover, Derek Simpson was installed as the sole general secretary of AMICUS when the Certification Officer removed the MSF’s general secretary, Roger Lyons, from office. Hence, the leading moderates in the AEEU and MSF, who planned and executed the AMICUS amalgamation, did not inherit the new organization. As regards the PCS, the level of conflict and animosity generated between the two joint general secretaries and their associated, and similarly politicalaligned factions, probably outranked that reached in the AEEU’s and AMICUS’s amalgamations. The differences in management style and policy between John Sheldon (PTC) and Barrie Reamsbottom (CPSA) in the PCS eventually cut across the usual ideologically based factionalism to create a new anti-Reamsbottom coalition combining disillusioned moderates and the broad-left. The level of division was such that it needed a High Court judgment to resolve the question as to who was indeed general secretary of the PCS given the competing claims of Reamsbottom, and the surprise winner of a general secretary election, Mark Serwotka. Thus, in the three balanced partner amalgamations that combined well-developed political factions with joint leadership of the newly amalgamated union, the failure to clearly identify a single voice of authority and establish procedures for leadership succession which were above reproach contributed to marked political upheaval postamalgamation. This reflected the twin and related influences of factionalism and leadership imperatives which operated informally outside of the control of the formal government structures and systems, as agreed in the instruments of amalgamation. Issues of democratic ethos and government, perhaps not surprisingly given the factionalized nature of the AEEU, UNISON, PTC, PCS and AMICUS, and the degree of constitutional dissonance inherent in amalgamating the centralized NGA(82) and federated SOCAT(82), exercised all the balanced partner amalgamations post-merger. Most noticeably, the AEEU and AMICUS spent much of the first four years and two years, respectively, agreeing a new rule book. There was no ‘civil service’ to help produce a ‘blueprint’ or plan a strategy for the newly amalgamated AEEU. The work was largely left to the leading officials, including the AEU’s and EETPU’s national executives, both at the time composed, exceptionally, of full-time officials. By 1994, after two years of talks, the AEEU negotiations were ‘in crisis’ (interview) over both minutia and issues of substance. As for the minutia, there was conflict between AEU and EETPU executives over the attendance of full-time officials at the proposed

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biennial policy conference and the composition of the conference’s standing orders committee. Also, more substantially, there were marked differences of opinion regarding the election or selection of officials, the composition of the policy conference and the conference’s power to instruct, rather than advise, the national executive. In the absence of any new model constitution, or an aims and values statement, the solution was found in searching for a ‘middle way’ or compromise between the AEEU’s and EETPU’s existing rules and executive member’s preferences. The resulting AEEU rule book, accepted in 1996 by a membership ballot, critically moved the local power base, which in the AEU had resided in the branches and district committees, to shop stewards and industrial committees and conferences, broadly adopting the EETPU’s structure of national industrial conferences. At the same time, elections to the post of full-time officials were maintained, and the national executive continued to be composed of elected full-time officials. Further, although policy conference decisions were binding on the national executive, it could opt to conduct a postal ballot of the members on any question of policy or rule amendment. Overall, and in brief, these changes tended to centralize decision-making and reduce the AEU’s branch activist’s influence as previously exercised through indirect elections from district and divisional committees to the lay members’ national committee (the AEU’s policy conference). Almost immediately following the introduction of the 1996 rule book, the newly elected general secretary, Ken Jackson (formerly EETPU), sponsored further changes in the AEEU’s government structure. These were expressed in a new 1997 rule book, and further rule amendments were introduced in 1998 by executive decision. This was a remarkable and opportunistic initiative directed from within the former EETPU team built around the new general secretary. It resulted in the removal of the post of president (which had vied with that of general secretary for influence at the national level); the introduction of a lay executive; the retirement or relocation of the existing executive (composed of full-time officials); the introduction of regional officials; the appointment, instead of election, of all full-time officials; and the appointment of a chief executive reporting to the general secretary. The above adjustments to officer posts were also partly achieved by offering generous terms to full-time officials whose status and employment prospects were adversely affected by the changes. Also a review of full-time officials’ salaries was initiated to ensure that the AEEU’s salary structure was on a par with other leading unions. As a result, the AEEU’s government was further centralized and the former AEU’s officials’ influences diminished. It also made the AEEU much more merger friendly as the introduction of a new salary structure, a lay executive,


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and the appointment of full-time officials gave the AEEU a more or less ‘standard’ form of reward structure and union government: hence from this point the AEEU shared a greater degree of constitutional congruence (and common pay structures) with its potential merger targets. Further, as will be discussed below, in the longer term the changes to the executive were cost-effective and hence helped to improve the AEEU’s financial position—an additional attraction to merger partners. AMICUS in 2002 therefore largely inherited the AEEU’s government structure, as reformed by the former EETPU’s leaders. It was, as a consequence, and as compared to the former AEU, a more attractive amalgamation partner for the MSF, UNIFI, and GPMU: all of which could accommodate their different territorial interests in the new bifurcated industrial structure. Indeed, following two years’ post-merger rule book negotiations, AMICUS’s 21 industrial, occupational, and professional sections were given autonomy over industrialrelated policies and objectives and a high degree of discretion over their own internal organization. Further, the regional structure introduced into the AEEU was extended in AMICUS and given a greater policymaking role, within national guidelines: this particularly suited the MSF which had a history of regional government. However in 2005, the resurgent left inside AMICUS, strongly supportive of the AEU’s democratic traditions, sought to restore some aspects of the AEU’s structure and systems as previously jettisoned in the reforms of 1997 and 1998. Amongst such proposals was the reintroduction into AMICUS of district committees, but the most radical (and successful) motion was for the election of all full-time officials. If these proposals had been implemented, they would have caused considerable difficulties for AMICUS’s planned super-merger forming UNITE in 2007 with the T&G. For the T&G had a long-standing commitment to the appointment of full-time officials and was unaccustomed to dispersed centres of power, as previously provided in the AEU by its district committees. As it is a new rule book for UNITE is promised for 2008 and the indications are that the new union will not turn the clock back in order to replicate the AEU’s form of devolved government. Changes in government structure in the GPMU, UNISON, PTC, and the PCS were much more limited post-merger than those in the AEU and AMICUS: the GPMU, UNISON, PTC, and PCS all agreed new rule books prior to their amalgamations. But of these four it was the PCS which introduced the most noteworthy change. Critically, in the PCS, the ‘palace revolution’ and High Court judgment, as discussed above, led to a revision of the PCS’s governance. In combination Serwotka’s election victory and the antiReamsbottom and left-wing faction’s success in winning a majority on the executive and conference brought into power members of the ‘Left Unity’

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faction, which the PCS’s new model government had originally intended to contain and restrict to an oppositional role. This change in the political control of the PCS enabled the left to sponsor successfully motions which replaced the biennial conference and biennial election of the executive with annual meetings and processes. Both proposals were supported by a ballot of the membership, as required under the PCS’s principal rules. Further, factional identity was given a new legitimacy when the factional allegiance of candidates for office was printed on the ballot papers. In the GPMU, its government structure was largely left unchanged postamalgamation. But this was not for want of attempts at change. Over several years, the national leadership, dominated by former NGA officials, promoted reforms. In particular, they looked to curb the branches’ financial independence. However, this imbalance between the centre and the branches was initially exacerbated by the merging of NGA(82) and SOGAT(82) branches, which served to create ‘even larger territorial barons’ (interview). Hence, some former SOGAT(82) branches became even more financially secure as they retained an even greater share of the GPMU’s subscription income. Arguments from the national officers regarding the damage such branch autonomy was inflicting on the national union were regularly mounted at the GPMU’s biennial delegate conference. Nevertheless, the federated structure inherited from SOGAT(82) and alien to the NGA(82) survived largely immune to proposed reforms right up to the GPMU’s transfer to AMICUS in 2004. Post-amalgamation, changes in UNISON’s government structure, best known for its ‘proportionality’ clauses and self-organized groups, were minor. But, as in other amalgamations, unforeseen financial difficulties following the merger eventually prompted a review of resources which, in turn, raised questions about the right balance between national, regional, and local levels of government. But, before the resulting strategic review was launched, concerns over UNISON’s governance were raised by NUPE and COHSE officials who found the practices of NALGO, the larger partner, somewhat disconcerting. For example, both NUPE and COHSE were discomfited by the more ‘macho’ style of UNISON meetings and the role of factions in shaping and presenting arguments, both of which developments were inherited from NALGO. Also NUPE’s officials found the more aggressive questioning and sometime heckling of officials at executive meetings a radical departure from their previous experiences when lay members had tended to defer to their officials’ advice. Moreover, the lay chairmanship of some leading committees also undermined the role previously played by the leading officials in COHSE and NUPE in such meetings. As a result, COHSE, in particular, largely retreated into its health service organization and conference. Its presence at the national executive, which had been reasonably prominent in the first stages of the amalgamation, with 28 of 120 delegates, dropped to 4 of 100 by 1998. It was not surprising, in


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a 1998 interview, therefore, to hear a leading official (former NALGO) describe UNISON’s internal organization as functioning broadly on the same lines as pre-merger NALGO. To counter the isolation of the partners into their ‘own silos’ (interview), UNISON took action to integrate more effectively its three partners. The merging of an initial 3,200 branches to 1,200 by 2004 was a key feature of this integration. Also the merging of the two political funds into one, in the late 1990s, was a further step towards a common internal identity. But there was no major review of government structure. Hence, the Strategic Review launched in 1995, while examining the responsibilities and resources of the national, regional, and local levels of government was concerned centrally with making economies and improving efficiency and not initiating government reforms. UNISON’s formal government structure therefore survived largely intact but, as in other balanced partner amalgamations, the partners’ different organizational cultures, particularly the factional influences inherited from NALGO, were instrumental in shaping the process of government. As demonstrated above, post-merger changes in the democratic ethos and government of the balanced partner amalgamations varied widely across the five unions. The AEEU and AMICUS, in postponing decisions on a new rule book until after their amalgamation (a tactic also adopted when forming UNITE), ensured that the first few years in the AEEU and AMICUS would be largely spent, at the national level, negotiating the new formal government structure. But it was a subsequent change in the political power balance within the AEEU, to the advantage of the smaller partner (EETPU), that led to the most radical changes in democratic ethos and government structure. In what had become a factional vacuum, due to the collapse of the AEU’s moderate Group and the ineffectiveness of the left, the new leadership, in an opportunistic and piecemeal fashion, centralized national control around the general secretary as it persuaded members of the advantages of the appointment and not election of full-time officials. Nevertheless, following the formation of AMICUS by the AEEU and the MSF, the left was revived and the Gazette faction gained sufficient influence to win the general secretary election. Of the other three balanced partner amalgamations, which were progressed in a much more planned and strategic manner, only the PCS sought significant changes post-amalgamation in the democratic ethos and structure of government. Again, this came about because of clashes between joint general secretaries and their associated factionalized supporters. As for UNISON and the GPMU, there was little formal change in either the democratic ethos or government structure post-amalgamation, but in the GPMU this was not for lack of effort. Apart from UNISON, therefore, the rest of the balanced partner amalgamations’ leaders looked to review and change important aspects of the

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agreed government structure post-amalgamation. In three cases, the AEEU, AMICUS, and the PCS, the changing factional influences and associated developments in national leadership all helped destabilize the initial political or ideological balance inherited from the amalgamation and, in so doing, led to further government reform. Administrative issues, post-amalgamation, were addressed in all the balanced partner amalgamations. Given the relatively large size of the merging partners and their common territorial interests, all six unions expected to make some economies post-merger. It was not, however, a central issue in any of the pre-merger negotiations. Indeed, because of political sensitivities regarding the partners’ different financial status and the problems that talk of future redundancies could cause, it was exceptional for the parties premerger to examine in any detailed manner the cost of the proposed amalgamation and the income it would generate. The calculations that were made tended to do little more than add together, pre-merger, the partner unions’ different costs and incomes. In general, it was therefore assumed that administrative arrangements, including any financial problems, would be resolved post-amalgamation by the senior national officials. Broadly, if required, costs (mainly people) would be cut and income (mainly subscriptions) would be raised. The search for economies of scale and scope was given added impetus in the GPMU amalgamation by a number of factors. First, it was continuing to lose members and, second, compared with the other four balanced partner amalgamations, neither of the GPMU’s partners was post-merger in a particularly good financial state. The amalgamation compounded existing problems. In particular, SOGAT(82)’s insistence on retaining both its existing lower rate of subscriptions and its branches’ financial autonomy limited the new union’s scope for correcting its financial problems. As it was, the GPMU’s general fund fell from £13.86 million on amalgamation to £9.63 million within the first 12 months of the union’s operation, ‘as a result of a deficit incurred of £4.23 million’ (GPMU 1993: 158). A significant contributing factor was the failure of the GPMU to achieve the estimated first year’s contributions income of £17.5 million: it was only £14.6 million (GPMU 1993). As for the GPMU’s expenditure, it incurred some £1.4 million redundancy costs in the first year (40 jobs) and it increased its pay bill in year one by £0.25 million, as it harmonized salaries. Although the GPMU’s financial position ebbed and flowed until its transfer to AMICUS in 2004, the decisions made at the time of amalgamation continued to hamper any attempt to solve the financial difficulties it encountered as its membership continued its decline. UNISON experienced some financial difficulties arising from its amalgamation, but its existing financial strength (or NALGO’s financial strength)


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and its relatively stable membership helped it weather such difficulties, as compared to the repeated crises faced by the GPMU. Further, UNISON had financial data, pre-amalgamation, which estimated the income required to run the new union in order to break even. Work was also undertaken to estimate the start-up costs for UNISON. It suggested that £5–£10 million would be needed to cover such items as new stationery, a logo, and promotional material. Nevertheless, UNISON started life with a predicted financial deficit. With the advantage of hindsight, it was not therefore surprising that in the first 18 months of its existence UNISON recorded a £9 million deficit on its income and expenditure account: its total funds over the 18 months were similarly reduced by £9 million (Certification Officer 1995: 52–3). It continued in deficit on the income and expenditure account into the mid1990s, including £1.6 million in 1996 and £1.4 million in 1997. But because UNISON’s branches also held considerable sums of money, UNISON claimed an overall surplus between £600,000 and £1.0 million over the two years (interview). In the light of such problems and in common with the other four balanced partner amalgamations, major redundancies followed UNISON’s merger. These were, however, delayed for some two years as UNISON debated its required manning levels. Such manpower planning was also complicated by UNISON’s negotiations with four different staff unions over the terms of redundancy and the large number of applications from employees wanting to take advantage of the redundancy and early retirement package. In 1995, UNISON incurred around £13 million in redundancy costs, while cutting its salary bill by £11 million (from £45 to £35 million) in one financial year, due to some 400 (of 1,800) employees taking redundancy. But there can be no doubt that the agreed harmonization of benefits and salaries, plus the proliferation of union conferences post-amalgamation (some 14 in 1998) and the expansion of self-organizing groups, also added significantly to UNISON’s costs. As for the AEEU and the PCS, both enjoyed much more financial success post-amalgamation. As regards the AEEU, the general secretary claimed in 2002, just as the AEEU and MSF combined to form AMICUS, that ‘in the ten years of its existence, the AEEU has generated a financial surplus every year’ (AMICUS 2002: 26). This was a quite remarkable achievement given that in the first four years of its existence the new rule book negotiations were a major distraction which dominated ‘the Unions’ affairs’ (AEEU 1997: 30). The initial relatively small 1993 surplus of around £1 million (income and expenditure account) reached £3.7 million in 1996 and remained around or above this figure until 2000 when it was £7.7 million (Undy 1997: 87). The initial round of the AEEU’s redundancies was conducted individually

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by the two partner unions using their own voluntary redundancy schemes. This produced about 60 job losses in the EETPU by the end of 1993. But the big savings came later when, as reported above, the full-time national executive was replaced by lay members in the later 1990s. Against such cost reductions, the initial harmonization of pay and conditions, which helped raise the pay bill by £0.75 million spread across 1993–4 (total wage bill for the former AEU officials receiving this increase was around £5 million), was rather insignificant. AMICUS, inheriting the AEEU’s strong financial position in 2002, was therefore, apart from the financial problems brought into the amalgamation by the MSF, and subsequently in 2004 by UNIFI and the GPMU, well placed to absorb the financial costs associated with amalgamation. Nevertheless, as in most amalgamations, the initial effect was adverse: following a surplus of £4 million in 2002, AMICUS recorded a deficit of £1.8 million in 2003 and some £9 million operating deficit in 2005. It moved to deal with its financial problems by introducing a redundancy programme, initiating a sale of property and increasing its subscription rates. In 2006, it was forecasting a return to surplus, but it is too soon to judge the longer-term financial effects of this amalgamation. The PCS, building on the PTC’s amalgamation two years earlier, carried forward the existing rationalization programme initiated by the PTC. Given the pre-amalgamation pledge of no increases in subscriptions due to the amalgamation, it managed its finances so as to maintain the initial subscription level for four years. In the first year, some 70 employees (out of approximately 450) took voluntary redundancy, or early retirement, funded by the general fund and the pension fund. It was expected that a further 20 employees would also take redundancy over the next two years. Unlike some other unions, the PCS also moved rapidly to dispose of properties in London. By 2004, it had moved from six buildings into one. This helped it to break even during the first four years of its existence. A small surplus (£200,000) was generated on its income and expenditure account in 1998, before producing small deficits in 1999 and 2000. However, in 2002–3 it ran into a substantial deficit of £7 million (against a total income of £22 million) largely because of the costs incurred in industrial disputes and the High Court case involving its two general secretaries. In restoring its financial balance, the PCS moved to raise subscription rates and guarantee itself a regular increase in such subscriptions by linking the rates paid to a percentage of salaries. The balanced partner amalgamations therefore prompted the search for economies of scale and scope across all six unions. Further, commitments made at the time of amalgamation to additional conferences and related


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meetings—the ‘double democracy factor’ (UNISON interview, 1998)—and the harmonization of benefits and salaries, all added to costs. Further, pledges to hold subscriptions at pre-amalgamation prices and concerns over competitor unions’ subscription rates initially restricted increases in subscription income. All the unions therefore tended to focus on the same sources of savings. Redundancies (sometimes associated with the aim of reducing fulltime officer and membership ratios), property sales, combined use of offices, and the exploitation of increased purchasing power (when buying-in services) were the main sources of economies of scale. As for economies of scope, the merging of departments, campaigns, branches, membership records (often a difficult and lengthy process), training, and negotiation expertise were reasonably common across the five unions. The manner in which the unions dealt with the above issues, however, varied widely between the six unions. Although there was little preamalgamation planning for administrative reform, UNISON, PTC, and the PCS tended to be the more systematic and professional in tackling these issues post-amalgamation. UNISON, faced with immediate financial problems, also experienced difficulties in maintaining service levels following its round of redundancies. It launched, in response, the 1995 ‘Strategic Review’. This was still being reviewed and implemented internally in 2004. Its focus was on economies in service delivery while also attempting to professionalize and improve such services, particularly at the regional level and below. In traditional NALGO fashion, UNISON’s approach to such problems was to draw on the skills of its top management team to drive through the reforms while reporting to the lay national executive. On the finance side, it also improved the central collection of subscriptions and looked to keep staffing costs down to 50% of available income (in 2004 it hovered around 52%). Further, in 2004 UNISON was finally moving to confirm common terms and conditions of employment across all the partner unions (something it had been working on since the amalgamation in 1993). In the PTC and PCS amalgamations, the responsibility for administrative reforms and management of the unions rested, as in UNISON, with the Senior Officials. Initially, under its politically moderate leadership and following the changes initiated in the PTC’s short existence (1996–8) the PCS launched its ‘2001 Plan’. This was a far-ranging strategy document covering all aspects of the PCS’s activities. It also reflected the moderates’ preferences by starting its analysis with ‘partnership working’ in the civil service: a form of union and employer relations much favoured by its then general secretaries and national executive. The ‘Plan’ both prioritized the work of the PCS and identified those senior full-time officials responsible for each section of the report.

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The national executive was also persuaded to allocate £2 million towards its delivery. This was intended to help fund, inter alia: new staff appointments in bargaining, campaigning, communications and recruitment; new IT support; and an extended range of publications. This plan was subject to periodic review and in 2002 faced criticism from both consultants and the PCS’s own national executive. The consultants noted the ambiguities as to what the ‘Plan’ was for, including its function as a ‘management tool’ and its helpfulness in setting goals and facilitating the allocation of resources. In contrast, the national executive’s critique noted the emphasis on management and the processes of the organization, rather than outcomes. The need to rebuild the PCS’s financial position following expenditure on a major dispute in the DWP was also highlighted. At this stage, the emphasis switched more towards further cost savings (particularly reductions in the number of senior officials) and internal consolidation following the difficulties over the general secretary’s post. There was also a preference for a ‘strategic focus’, rather than a detailed plan, to guide further developments in the PCS. In contrast to UNISON’s, PTC’s, and the PCS’s professional and managerially led planned reform of the new organization post-amalgamation, the GPMU, AEEU, and AMICUS were more reliant on individual officials’ initiatives. But if, as in the GPMU, the pre-amalgamation agreement structured the organization in a particularly critical manner which one of the partners chose vigorously to defend, there was little scope for subsequent radical reform. However, in the AEEU and AMICUS the situation was far more fluid. In these two cases, the post-amalgamation negotiations over a new rule book also led to discussion over a whole range of other issues which one or other party noted as due for post-amalgamation resolution. Further, the factional nature of the government in both the AEEU and AMICUS meant issues of administration also became politicized. Hence, even though there was no grand strategic plan in either organization there was a keen awareness that decisions about which officials opted for redundancy and which partners’ head offices were closed could have important political consequences. For example, the decision to appoint full-time officials in the AEEU (and dispense with elections for such posts) and to disband district committees, even if appearing as ad hoc decisions, interacted to help the former EETPU’s officials assert control over the government and administration of the AEEU. Such an opportunistic and piecemeal approach also avoided the opposition which a formal strategic plan may have generated. Last, as regards balanced partner amalgamations, there is the issue of the leaders’ imperatives. In this kind of merger questions of moral hazard were commonly raised and in some amalgamations they helped produce radical


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changes in leadership and, in consequence, in union organization and policy. Such developments post-amalgamation largely originated in the difficulties post-merger of agreeing clear and enforceable power-sharing arrangements when the partners were of a similar size, status, and relatively well resourced. Also the choice of joint general secretaries was a recipe for internal conflict, particularly if one was not clearly seen as being superior to the other. Further, if as in the GPMU and AEEU, the smaller partners’ leaders emerged as the key national decision-makers it caused resentment amongst the larger partner’s officials and activists. Activists in such circumstances were particularly prone to identify with their original unions and to resist further integration into the new union. For example, the resistance of former SOGAT(82) branch secretaries to reform in the GPMU stemmed at least partly from their identification with the former union’s federated structure, as well as their vested interests in retaining control of what they saw as the branches’ and not the central union’s financial resources. The development post-amalgamation of redundancy and early retirement schemes also fuelled suspicions that full-time officials were ‘feathering’ their nests. In the AEEU, in particular, the willingness of the full-time executive to move to less prestigious posts was thought to be facilitated by generous compensation for loss of office. Also, attempts to retain office beyond the normal or contractual terms of office were sometimes seen as driven by personal gain rather than more altruistic motives. Such attempts in the AEEU and the PCS resulted, respectively, in complaints to the Certification Officer and a High Court case. Finally, as regards moral hazard, different partners had different conventions regarding full-time officials’ ‘perks’ and compensation packages. Following amalgamations these different mores could also generate questions as to what was and was not acceptable behaviour. In the more factionalized unions, such as the PCS and AEEU, political factions could also exploit such grievances and promote policy changes intended to limit the scope of patronage and associated rewards. In conclusion, as regards balanced partner amalgamations: they produced the most radical changes associated with any category of mergers. However, there were still significant differences between the six unions in both the substance of the changes and the processes used to achieve such reforms. Also the context in which the three primarily public-sector unions organized gave them territorial and other advantages unobtainable by the three private-sector unions. But, also of critical importance in shaping some unions’ behaviour were unexpected ‘internal’ events, such as unforeseen conflicts between previously cooperating factions and general secretaries. Broadly, all the balanced partner amalgamations, in trying to integrate their often culturally and constitutionally different organizations, experienced

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what an official in the PCS called a period of ‘dysfunctionality’ postmerger. Territorially, most were disappointed immediately post-merger with the actual number of members in the newly combined union. They also tended to have either, or both, underestimated the costs of the amalgamation and overestimated the income it would generate. In putting issues of administration aside until after the amalgamation the new unions were also not best placed to ‘hit the ground running’. For example, membership records departments were often not well organized to sustain basic processes such as registering applications for membership of the new union. As was mentioned in a number of cases, the internal focus on the amalgamation, and the related integration issues, meant that ‘the amalgamation’ itself readily became the most important business of the union, hence the dysfunctionality. Medium- and longer-term, territorial gain, in terms of consolidating membership in shared job territories, was sought by all the balanced partner unions. Most of them adopted the TUC’s organizing strategy, while the AEEU made effective use of single-union deals, to improve membership recruitment and retention. Such initiatives helped the private-sector unions moderate their membership loses, while the public-sector UNISON and the PCS, respectively, stabilized and increased their membership. The latter unions also had the advantage of favourable changes in their ultimate employer— from Conservative to New Labour governments in 1997—and, for the PCS, a subsequent increase in employment in the civil service also increased their membership potential. But, apart from AMICUS significantly changing its job territory in 2004 by absorbing UNIFI and the GPMU (followed by its amalgamation with the T&G to form UNITE in 2007), none of the other amalgamating unions noticeably increased the scope of their job territory, post-amalgamation. In terms of political objectives and means, and democratic ethos and government, the six balanced partner amalgamations made, as intended, positive gains in their latent bargaining power, and they also generally improved members’ benefits. But things did not always work out in practice in the area of political or ideological bias, leadership succession or government structure as those organizing the amalgamations initially intended. Indeed in the highly factionalized AEEU, PCS, and AMICUS, the amalgamations had an unintended and politically destabilizing effect. Not only did the smaller partner (EETPU) come to dominate and restructure the AEEU’s government, but in the PCS and AMICUS the moderates who planned and led the two amalgamations saw the left faction capture the leadership of both unions. Also, in both cases, the decisions to have joint general secretaries contributed to the difficulties which led to the moderates being ousted from the leadership of


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the two unions. Moreover, as the leadership’s ideological bias changed in the PCS associated changes in government structure were initiated to align the new government structure more closely to the resurgent left-wing faction’s preferred notion of democracy. The GPMU and UNISON, on the other hand, made far fewer and less radical changes in their political orientations and government structures post-amalgamation. As for UNISON, this suited the largest of the partner unions, NALGO. It tended to extend its formal and informal (factionalized) process of government and administration to the rest of UNISON. But for the GPMU’s national leadership (dominated by former NGA(82) officials), the refusal of former SOGAT(82) officials to support changes in the formal structure of government was a major obstacle to tackling the GPMU’s inherent financial problems. Administrative reforms in all the balanced partner amalgamations were influenced by financial considerations. Most noticeably the GPMU, UNISON, and AMICUS initiated urgent action post-merger to deal with financial deficits. The related searches for economies of scale and scope tended to concentrate on voluntary redundancies and early retirements, and property sales, to ‘balance the books’ (no union adopted a ‘profit-maximization’ approach to mergers). There was, however, a most marked difference in the way the unions identified and solved their administrative problems. UNISON, PTC, and the PCS were all extremely professional in the way they approached such questions with well-developed strategic plans and managerial direction of reforms, including progress reviews and feedback. In contrast the other three unions were more ad hoc in their development and execution of similar costcutting and income-raising activities. It was in searching for administrative economies, and in changing government structures, that questions of moral hazard came to the fore. In ‘buying people out’, there was clearly scope for reshaping the organization to support particular models of organization which would find favour amongst one or more factions. Equally, seeking to stay in office beyond expected retirement dates raised complaints regarding the motivation behind such proposals. With the leadership of some of the most important unions in Britain at stake it was not surprising that such issues were noted in the national press, particularly when they resulted in court cases and reference to the Certification Officer. All in all, therefore, balanced partner amalgamations offered the potential to reform radically the politics, government, and administration of Britain’s leading unions: they were indeed opportunities for transformation. However, given the interaction between the formal and informal process of union government, and the leaders’ imperatives, the results of such transformations

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were not always, particularly in respect of political outcomes, quite what the instigators of the amalgamation originally intended.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS In conclusion, the post-amalgamation performance of the above unions will be discussed by reference to their potential transforming effects and the attendant problems caused for the partner unions. Because the GMB’s two amalgamations and the PROSPECT amalgamation, in some important respects, were more akin to transfers, and therefore limited in their potential for radical organizational change, the focus will be on the remaining six balanced partner amalgamations, and the UNIFI dominant partner amalgamation: all seven sought to establish ‘new’ unions, rather than just bolting the existing organizations together. The six balanced partner amalgamations, and the UNIFI amalgamation, may be described as adopting a consolidatory and power-seeking strategy. For, as argued by proponents of industrial unionism, consolidation across shared territories can be expected to deliver a significant bargaining advantage. The most immediate effect was indeed territorially consolidatory. Each balanced partner amalgamation and UNIFI produced what was the largest union in its particular job territory. But the resulting combined membership (and therefore subscription income) was not generally as big as expected. Further, apart from the PCS, membership generally and initially continued to shrink post-amalgamation. Some of the membership loss was probably due to overestimates of membership pre-amalgamation, but in several cases it was also thought to be at least partially the product of post-amalgamation ‘dysfunctionality’: an indeterminate period during which the unions’ leadership concentrated on managing the amalgamation rather than recruiting, retaining, and servicing the membership. Subsequently, the amalgamation enabled the new unions to build on whichever partners’ recruitment strategy was deemed most appropriate, and in several cases there was a reallocation of resources to support the chosen recruitment and retention strategy. Nevertheless, apart from the three public-sector amalgamations the other four unions continued to lose a significant number of members post-amalgamation. Hence, the new amalgamated unions gradually got to grips with the problems of combining membership records and recruitment practices and in the process they probably helped reduce membership turnover and improve recruitment, largely by adopting the organizing strategy (except the AEEU and AMICUS,


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which preferred less confrontational approaches). But the balanced partner amalgamations and UNIFI clearly did not transform the partner unions into engines for union growth. In respect of the newly amalgamated unions’ political relationships with the other key actors in industrial relations, employers, government and other unions, the power-seeking aspect of the amalgamation strategy figured large in pre-merger rhetoric. In particular, as regards collective bargaining, reducing ‘dual representation’, by ending inter-union competition, and building greater solidarity, was central to the balanced partner and UNIFI amalgamations. As discussed previously, consolidatory amalgamations, other things remaining equal, increased the unions’ latent bargaining powers. Also, bargaining activities were further strengthened by increasing the related resources. However, the external context generally mitigated against the mobilization of the new unions’ larger membership. Further, for most of the period, the moderate leadership that directed the balanced partner amalgamations and initially, at least, inherited the leadership of the new unions, was not inclined to employ a more overt use of the unions’ enhanced bargaining power. Also, even if they had wished to pursue a more militant bargaining policy, the marked devolution and fragmentation of collective bargaining in all the amalgamated unions, bar the GPMU, largely restricted the national leadership’s direct involvement in such negotiations. Hence, although the consolidatory amalgamations helped boost the new unions’ latent collective bargaining powers, they did not transform a relationship which, due to external developments, continued to favour the employer. It is more difficult to generalize as regards the outcome of power seeking in the TUC, national and international federations, and the Labour Party. Obviously the ending of dual (or triple) representation on such bodies, coupled with a larger affiliation and a single payment of a larger affiliation fee, could be expected to give the amalgamated unions more weight in the policymaking process. For example, UNISON, as the biggest member of the TUC, carried far more influence inside the TUC than any of its individual partners had previously exercised. Further, UNISON, PTC, PCS, and the private-sector GPMU and UNIFI all looked to involve themselves in the TUC at the highest level, whereas the key figures in the AEEU and AMICUS were less enthusiastic members. Similarly, in the more specialized national federations, the PCS in the CCSU, and the AEEU and AMICUS in the CSEU dominated both organizations post-merger. The GPMU, in particular, also made most of its increased presence on the international printing federations. In all the above cases, the amalgamated unions therefore made significant gains in influence, relative to their own past positions and that of other individual unions

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(whether or not they were also more successful in building alliances with other member unions to determine TUC and federation policy was beyond the scope of this study). In the context of the period, however, when both Conservative and New Labour governments rejected tripartism, and employers’ organizations were less willing to engage in employer and union national initiatives, the political influence of the TUC and union federations was at a relatively low ebb. Further, the larger of the balanced partner amalgamated unions were clearly capable of providing for themselves the services which smaller unions sought from the TUC and other union federations. Also the use of the TUC as an intermediary, providing access to New Labour governments, post-1997, while useful, was just one of at least two channels which the larger amalgamated unions had available. For they could frequently gain direct access to the prime minister’s, or other ministers’, offices and they could also apply policy pressures via both the Labour Party (except for UNIFI which was not affiliated) and the MPs they helped sponsor. Thus, while the amalgamations generally increased the unions’ political influence within the above organizations, this was but one factor amongst others which made the outcome of such political developments problematic. As regards the amalgamated unions’ internal reforms, that is, the reform of union government and administration, these were generally more effective in terms of their immediate outcomes, as compared to the above power-seeking developments, mainly because they were less likely to be moderated by adverse external influences. However, in some unions such reforms produced an unexpected post-amalgamation dynamic which destabilized internal relationships, particularly those between leading national officials and factions. This led, in some amalgamated unions, to post-merger changes which were inimical to those who negotiated the terms of the amalgamation. This was most notably the case as regards the new unions’ democratic ethos and government: the most heavily debated and most controversial areas of balanced partner negotiations. Changes in these areas post-merger were largely the product of one, or a combination of, consciously postponed rules reviews (AEEU and AMICUS), and unplanned and unexpected changes in leadership, ideological preferences, and factional organization in the PCS, AEEU, and AMICUS. In these latter three unions, the democratic ethos and government structure was far from stable post-amalgamation. Indeed in the PCS the new union’s model government structure, based on an agreed view as to the new union’s desired democratic ethos, began to unravel within five years of the amalgamation following internecine strife between formerly aligned moderate leaders and factions. Also, in the AEEU the rule book negotiation, postponed until after the merger ballot, was followed by a series of radical changes in the later


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1990s driven through by former EETPU officials (the smaller partner in the amalgamation). This opportunistic restructuring was facilitated by a series of events, including senior national officials (mainly AEEU) either leaving the union or accepting regional posts, the former AEEU’s moderate faction (the ‘Group’) imploding, and the introduction of a new moderate faction organized by the EETPU’s full-time officials. Subsequently, in AMICUS following the unexpected election of a broad-left general secretary, another series of rule amendments were successfully tabled in 2005 (but not acted on prior to the AMICUS and T&G amalgamation in 2007). As compared to the political and organizational fluidity in the PCS, AEEU, and AMICUS, there was much greater post-merger stability in the GPMU’s, UNISON’s, and UNIFI’s democratic ethos and government structure. These functioned in most significant respects, as agreed in the pre-amalgamation negotiations, although UNISON’s strategic review adjusted some elements post-amalgamation. This was not all ‘good news’, however, as in the GPMU’s case its failure to reform SOGAT(82)’s branches further exacerbated the national union’s financial difficulties. As for administrative reforms, these were generally left, apart from the PCS’s and UNIFI’s pre-merger examination of some of the issues, to executive action post-amalgamation. The political sensitivities which surrounded financial issues during amalgamation negotiations made it difficult to deal with suspected financial problems pre-amalgamation. Talk of proposed redundancies and property sales could be similarly politically taboo. Further, most amalgamated unions needed to agree any changes in staffing with their own staff representatives; these were sometimes organized in different unions and prone to extended negotiations. Not surprisingly, therefore, it was the exceptional new union which did not immediately encounter financial and staffing problems post-amalgamation. In some cases, this also raised questions of moral hazard as the officials were suspected by the activists of being driven by vested interests. No doubt all this added to the ‘dysfunctionality’ experienced in the first year or so of the new balanced partner amalgamated unions’ lives. Thus, in the short and the longer term, all the balanced partner amalgamations’ leaders continued to face difficulties in transforming their new unions into significantly more effective organizations. This was the case in both those unions which had well-developed amalgamation strategies and those that were more opportunistic. The external context moderated the expected improvements in both collective bargaining power and political influence. Internal reforms, even those subject to the most professional planning and agreed by all the key players pre-amalgamation, could also be undermined by the politically destabilizing dynamic generated by most of the balanced

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partner amalgamations. Further, administrative adjustments could be delayed and changed by unforeseen financial pressures. Hence, although balanced partner amalgamations offered the partner unions the chance to change radically most aspects of union organization, they also generated problems which made it difficult for the leaders promoting the amalgamation to secure the advantages initially sought and seemingly secured in the formal amalgamation negotiations.

Part IV Conclusions


9 Mergers: Good or Bad for Unions? INTRODUCTION Union mergers, as discussed in Chapter 1, have recently been embraced by a number of unions and union federations, particularly in the developed world, as a means of combating the damaging effects of an adverse environment. The resulting restructuring of unions’ boundaries was intended to help produce more effective and efficient unions. This, in turn, was expected to contribute to unions’ revitalization. Further, unlike some other renewal strategies, mergers were attractive because they could be directly initiated and managed by the partner unions, largely independent of employer or government influence, apart, that is, from adhering to any externally imposed merger regulations. In the British context, however, mergers were already a common feature of union policy, well before the marked adverse change in the union environment which occurred in the 1980s. For, the structure or morphology of British unions in the growth period of the 1960s and 1970s already encouraged union competition for membership, and employer recognition, unlike that of some other Western countries which had more orderly and generally respected union boundaries. In Britain, the comparatively chaotic division of members’ and potential members’ job territories between several different unions therefore frequently prompted inter-union conflicts over boundary issues. Conversely, the same structural factors also caused many unions, most noticeably those that shared the same territorial or political interests, to develop close working relationships and not infrequently merge as a means of ameliorating such difficulties. Hence, it was to be expected in a period of decline that British unions would continue searching and competing for merger partners, largely unconstrained by any considerations as to the effect of such mergers on the wider union movement. Not surprisingly, therefore, the TUC periodically explored the advantages of a more orderly structure, but as one official in a leading merger union put it, ‘it (the TUC) would be dead’ if it played a more active role in promoting particular mergers (interview). Hence, in asking if mergers are good or bad for unions in the British context, it is important to

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examine both the direct effects of mergers on the partner unions and on the wider trade union movement as two separate, if related, questions. This chapter will therefore first summarize and assess the effect of mergers on the unions directly involved in transfers and amalgamations, before, in conclusion, considering the implications of mergers for the revitalization of the wider trade union movement. In each section, the gains and losses made by the partner unions and the union movement will primarily be considered by reference to job territory, political objectives and means, democratic ethos and government, and leadership imperatives.

THE EFFECT OF MERGERS ON THE PARTNERS’ POST-MERGER PERFORMANCE In this section, the focus will, first, be on transfers and, second, on amalgamations. The factors influencing merger strategies, searches, and negotiations will be discussed briefly before turning to evaluate post-merger behaviour.

Transfers The ‘urge to merge’ for transferors was both a function of context and a leadership choice. Either informally and rather crudely, or less frequently, by formal and written reports based on well-grounded analyses, the costs and benefits of remaining independent were weighed against those associated with transferring to a larger union, preferably organizing in, or close to, their existing job territory. In contrast, the transferee, particularly if a habitual absorber of smaller unions, appeared to assume that if transferors helped their territorial aspirations (consolidatory or expansionist), they were good for their unions, in general. The subsequent search for transfer partners was therefore largely restricted by both transferors’ and transferees’ territorial interests. Further, given the history of the leading transferees’ and their antecedents’ growth by transfer, the paths such searches took were reasonably well established. This produced three merger streams: geographic concentration, cognate trade, and whitecollar assimilation. All three streams were composed of clusters of similarly motivated transferors. For many in the geographic concentration and cognate trade streams, the search was for a defensive merger which would offer them security against a further deterioration in one or both of membership and finance, and a high degree of autonomy within the larger union. As for the transferors in the white-collar assimilation stream, these tended to be more


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progressively minded in their motivations. They looked to enjoy a similar degree of autonomy, but were bent on a more positive outcome by becoming more ‘unionate’ and providing their members with improved services. The transferors and transferees were likely to conduct their merger searches in a potentially competitive environment, even if this did not always translate into formal competitive bidding by the transferees. For, it was the exceptional transferor in the cognate trade and white-collar assimilation streams which could not identify at least two potential transferees with some claim to share their occupational and industrial territorial interests. Also, the leading transferees had all, by the end of the period, reorganized their internal governance structures to offer similarly high degrees of autonomy to the potential transferors. Hence, transfer negotiations, although conducted between asymmetrical partners (by reference to relative size and resources), were set in a context that reduced the transferor’s dependence on any one particular transferee. Moreover, the transferee was likely to negotiate in an integrative and win-win manner, look to build a close and harmonious relationship with the transferor, and treat the transferor and its officials generously. Post-merger the transferors secured what had been agreed in the merger negotiations. They therefore generally made immediate gains in critical areas, as compared to their main alternative of remaining independent: particularly as for many of those in the geographic concentration and cognate trade streams continued independence would have meant severe retrenchment. As regards political objectives and means, it was transferors in the white-collar assimilation stream that benefited most significantly. They secured the legitimacy associated with being a ‘proper’ union and became less dependent on their employers for key resources, such as officers and staff. In some cases, the bargaining expertise and financial resources of the transferees also helped increase their bargaining power. Such post-merger developments were less important for the larger of the transferors in the cognate trade stream. They already functioned in a ‘unionate’ manner and largely continued in the field of collective bargaining to behave post-merger, much as they had functioned pre-merger. Their main bargaining gain was thus dependent on ending ‘dual representation’ and consequently increasing their latent bargaining power. In respect of membership benefits, most of the transferors gained significantly from their mergers. They accepted the transferee’s superior benefits package, while ‘red-circling’ any exceptionally good benefit they had provided for themselves pre-merger. The transferors’ pre-merger democratic ethos and government structure was clearly bound to be affected in some manner by joining a larger union. This normally involved adding an extra layer of government to their existing arrangements in the form of representation on the transferee’s national, conference, and regional committees. Outside of such integrating adjustments

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drawing the transferor into the larger unions’ policymaking bodies, the high degree of autonomy secured in the instrument of transfer and sometimes expanded on in associated ‘side letters’, helped many transferors retain the semblance, and much of the substance, of their previous independent existence for several years post-transfer. It was only when the stated period of autonomy expired, or the transferor’s ‘old guard’ retired (or were offered new jobs and responsibilities in the wider union) that the transferor could be more fully integrated. Exceptionally, the threat of a ‘burning platform’, usually a financial crisis, could lead to a strategic review of the union as a whole, including the revision of the transferor’s governance. In these circumstances, the transferor could be expected to cooperate in the consequent structural reforms and forfeit some of its more costly arrangements, such as its own separate conference and dedicated officials, in support of union-wide economies. As for administration, the transferors on average had little in the way of backroom resources, such as research and education facilities. Hence, apart from the larger of the cognate trade transferors, all the others gained from access to such resources. But critically for those unions in financial difficulties, and mainly concentrated in the geographic concentration and cognate trade streams, the main gain was to share their financial responsibilities with the transferee. Debts, problems with funding the full-time official’s superannuation schemes, accommodating leaders’ career aspirations, and managing potential redundancies in an acceptable manner, amongst other problems, could all be more easily resolved with the assistance of the larger union. Turning to consider the transferee’s or major union’s post-merger performance, most transferees were motivated by territorial interests. They sought to add numbers of members who would help consolidate their interests in existing job territories or, exceptionally, help them expand into new occupational or industrial territories. In some instances, the intention was also to stop a competitor union from completing the same transfer. The immediate post-merger effect was indeed to deliver the expected territorial gain (although the increase in paying members was frequently less than that calculated pre-merger). However, in the medium and longer term most consolidatory transfers in the geographic concentration and cognate trade merger streams failed to generate further growth: in the main they produced diminishing returns. In contrast, some white-collar assimilation transfers increased membership in the medium term as the transferee’s improved services, and more effective recruitment methods, helped improve ‘in-fill’ recruitment. Only rarely did such transfers also lead to the penetration of nonunion territory. In general, there was thus little evidence of the recruitment of significant numbers of non-unionists in new territories following transfers. Nevertheless, in relative terms, by extending their territorial coverage and


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preventing other unions creating a monopoly in particular occupations or industries, the leading transferees, by absorbing clusters of small transferors, helped sustain their position in the union hierarchy. This subsequently helped make two of the most active merger unions, that is, the MSF and UNIFI, attractive merger partners, respectively, for the AEEU and AMICUS. In reference to improvements in other areas of union behaviour, the transferees made some minor gains in political objectives and means. In general, transfers brought together unions sharing the same political agenda and ideological perspectives. Hence, the large cognate trade transfers, and clusters of like-minded smaller unions, increased the number of affiliated members and subscriptions the transferees made to the TUC and Labour Party. Also the transferees’ collective bargaining power was generally enhanced both by those consolidatory transfers which ended dual representation and any expansionist transfers that reduced the transferee’s dependence on a particular employer. However, most individual transfers were too small to have a significant effect on the larger unions’ political clout or its bargaining power. Further, the generally adverse industrial relations and political context limited the transferees’ opportunities to exercise any increased but latent powers. The government structure, if not the democratic ethos, of transferees was reformed indirectly by transfers as the leading merger unions restructured their organizations to make themselves more transfer friendly. Hence, although the impact of individual transfers on such arrangements was minimal, collectively transfers had a marked effect on the government structure of the leading merger unions. They became vertically bifurcated into bargaining and general policy channels and decentralized and fragmented in respect of collective bargaining structures. They also added extra layers of government (separate branches, sectional committees, and conferences) to the transferees’ general policymaking processes while also increasing the reserved seats (for a period) on existing regional and national bodies. In addition, many transferors increased the transferees’ benefits and administrative costs, thus making it initially very difficult for transferees to realize any significant economies of scale and scope. It was therefore frequently several years before the transferee could effectively integrate the transferor, sell its properties, and reduce its labour or associated overhead costs. As the above discussion showed, the average transferor therefore had little to recommend it to the transferee post hoc, apart from a transitory increase in membership and, possibly, an extension of the transferee’s territorial coverage. Yet the transferor both secured much of what it wanted in the transfer negotiations and benefited substantially from the merger for the first three or five years of the post-merger period, if not longer; this appeared a poor exchange for the transferee.

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This asymmetrical and paradoxical outcome, which saw the weaker unions gain at the stronger’s expense, was influenced by several factors. In some cases, it reflected the close political affinity of the partner unions and a close and friendly relationship between the officials negotiating the transfer. They shared common goals and values, including ideological preferences, and this personal and political relationship helped oil the negotiation process. Further, while the transferor made significant gains, the concessions secured were for the leading transferee unions of little immediate consequence, given the much larger scale of their operations. But, perhaps most crucially, the leading merger unions driving the merger market were almost totally focused, in a period of generally declining membership, on maintaining their positions in the wider union hierarchy, as measured by membership size and territorial coverage. In these circumstances, little attention was paid in negotiating individual transfers to anything other than securing a territorial advantage. If other issues were raised it would appear that the transferee assumed it could satisfactorily resolve any related problems post-merger. As regards the cumulative effect of several transfers on the transferee this was rarely formally questioned. The exception was the GMB which, after reviewing its mixed organic and merger growth strategy in the mid-1990s, ditched its merger strategy and switched, albeit temporarily, to a purely organic growth strategy. The leading transferees’ habitual transfer strategies, which were fed by the cognate trade and white-collar assimilation merger streams, therefore appeared implicit and unsupported by any formal cost–benefit analysis: there was little weighing of the overall costs and benefits of either individual or cumulative transfers. Nevertheless, the transferees’ combined consolidatory and expansionist strategies may be seen as normatively rational if viewed through the lens of transaction cost economics. Briefly, from this perspective, transfer strategies may be rationalized as the result of a ‘buy-or-make’ decision: ‘buying’ was agreeing a transfer and ‘making’ was either directly recruiting individual members (making individual contracts) or negotiating new recognition agreements with employers. In the context of the period, the latter two options were both becoming more problematic (Bryson et al. 2004: 128–47). Hence, the transferees’ more certain growth, even if it did not usually generate increasing returns, was rationally achieved via transfers. The effect of such a merger strategy did not necessarily mean that the successful transferees would choose to expend less effort and resources on the direct recruitment of employees or cease to negotiate recognition agreements with employers. Indeed, most individual transferors were too small to register a significant impact on the transferee’s wider policy decisions. However, transferees that absorbed the larger cognate trade transferors, or clusters of small transferors in the geographic concentration or cognate trade


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merger streams, probably incurred some opportunity costs given their own periodic financial crises and their limited resources. It was likely therefore that resources which could have been directed to organic growth strategies were sometimes required to service the needs of the newly acquired transferors. Overall, therefore, transfers were generally good for the transferors and their members across all three merger streams. Many of those in the geographic and cognate trade streams were saved from the pain of further retrenchment and their collective membership benefits improved. For those in the white-collar assimilation stream, transfers provided a new legitimacy, strengthened their bargaining activities, and improved members’ services and benefits. Transferees’ gains, on the other hand, seemed less significant and less tangible. Clearly, there was from all transfers an initial, if frequently transient, increase in membership. Some transferees, particularly those employing a consolidatory strategy and absorbing the larger transferors and clusters of smaller transferors, also experienced increases in their latent bargaining power and some improvement in their political influence vis-à-vis other unions in the TUC and Labour Party. But, in general, transferors did not significantly improve the transferees’ subsequent overall performance. Hence, the transferees, in a period of competitive unionism, appeared to pay a high price for protecting or extending their share of a shrinking unionized job territory.

Amalgamations Amalgamations, while much fewer in number than transfers, had a much greater effect on the numbers of members concentrated in new unions. They also offered the amalgamating partners the chance to review and change radically the government and administration of their unions. Thus, they represented for all partners a potentially transforming opportunity. But they also generated considerable risks. For, as shown above, the leading proponents of such radical changes, even if successfully concluding an amalgamation, could put their careers at risk in pursuing such a strategy. Contrary to many habitual transfers, such initiatives therefore required careful and detailed consideration by all the partners involved, not least because all the partners would have to ballot their members to secure the proposed amalgamation. Thus the initial ‘urge to merge’, while no doubt still prompted by some leaders’ gut instincts, in the case of amalgamations normally required a much more considered and formal exploration of its potential costs and benefits. The 10 amalgamations studied, by reference to motivations and outcomes, fell into two groups. The first was composed of just three dominant partner amalgamations: two involved the GMB merging with the smaller Boilermakers

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and APEX and the other was a similar asymmetrical amalgamation between the IPMS and the smaller EMA. All three were primarily the product of the dominant partners’ interest in expanding its job territory and the defensive motivation of the smaller partners. There was only minor interest in internal reforms and no plan for creating a ‘new’ union. As such, all three had much in common with the large cognate trade transfers. Broadly, the dominant partner initially gave the minor partner a high degree of autonomy and met most of their demands regarding services and benefits. The second group, and the subject of the following discussion, combined the balanced partner amalgamations and one dominant partner amalgamation (UNIFI). The six balanced partner amalgamations creating the GPMU, AEEU, and AMICUS in the private sector, and UNISON and the PTC and PCS in the public sector, and UNIFI, were all largely free of competitive merger pressures. Also, they all looked to develop a new union and to execute radical internal reforms. Negotiations in this group were extensive and required all partners to express views regarding the reform of union government. Five of the amalgamations (GPMU, UNISON, PTC, PCS, and UNIFI) chose to agree on such issues prior to the amalgamation ballot. But in the AEEU’s and AMICUS’s amalgamations, the core of such questions was postponed until after both amalgamations had been formally confirmed by a membership ballot. Later, in 2007, the UNITE amalgamation, combining AMICUS and the T&G, also put the development of a new rule book to one side until after the confirmatory ballot had been won. There were marked differences between the partner unions regarding the degree of sophistication and formality in the planning and negotiation of the above seven amalgamations. UNISON, PTC, PCS, and UNIFI were all much more deliberative than their colleagues in the GPMU’s, AEEU’s, and AMICUS’s amalgamations in designing the new union. The latter tended to be more pragmatic and opportunistic in agreeing on the form of government structure adopted by the new amalgamated union. In contrast in UNISON, PTC, and PCS, and to a lesser extent UNIFI, this subject was at the centre of extensive debates, including detailed arguments over the democratic ethos to be secured in the new union. Associated questions regarding who got what jobs and on what terms also absorbed a great amount of time in all amalgamation negotiations. But government issues were more cogently addressed and articulated in the white-collar and public-sector unions. Last, before evaluating post-amalgamation outcomes, it should also be noted that six of the seven amalgamations were also the product of one or more of the geographic concentration, cognate trade, and white-collar assimilation merger streams. For, in forming the GPMU’s, AEEU’s, PTC’s, PCS’s, UNIFI’s, and AMICUS’s amalgamations, at least one partner had been actively


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pursuing mergers for several years, often with the end purpose of creating an industrial, or equivalent sectoral, union in their core job territory. The above six amalgamations each represented, for the largest union involved, therefore, a step towards this consolidatory goal. It was only UNISON’s partners that came to manage a very large amalgamation without recent and extensive experience of mergers. The post-merger performance of the above seven unions varied in some important respects. Such variations were primarily the product of the different merger negotiations, changes within unions, and shifts in their own microenvironments. One common feature, however, was the effect of amalgamation on the unions’ job territories. Each of the seven amalgamated unions either immediately became the largest union in their respective core job territory or cemented their existing position as the leading union in their field. In terms of inter-union rivalries, this represented, for some of the partners, a very significant and positive change in status. In particular, it gave the EETPU, as part of the AEEU, a new platform for its moderate and cooperative policies towards employers; the NUCPS (PTC) became the key player in the civil service and made itself an attractive partner for its subsequent amalgamation with the CPSA to form the PCS; BIFU (UNIFI) raised its standing vis-à-vis its main competitor in the finance sector, the MSF; and NALGO (UNISON) took centre stage as part of Britain’s biggest trade union, until displaced by UNITE (AMICUS and T&G merger) in 2007. Of these territorial transformations, NALGO’s, as the leading partner in UNISON, was probably the most significant. Pre-merger it was unaffiliated to the Labour Party and it had a history of insularity, standing back from the political infighting which was an integral feature of Britain’s most influential unions, such as the T&G and GMB. By 2005, UNISON’s general secretary was a leading critic of the New Labour government. In a union probably most renowned for its constitutional innovations in the area of equality and diversity, he championed the trades unions’ cause in close association with the leaders of AMICUS, T&G, and GMB. More prosaically, the amalgamations’ immediate effect on the partner’s job territory was to reduce the number of union members recorded postmerger, as compared to the combined partners’ membership count premerger. A combination of factors contributed to such initial adverse developments. First, unions tended to exaggerate their membership size to bolster their negotiating position pre-merger. Second, in some unions members objected to the merger and hence opted out of membership post-merger (this was particularly notable in niche unions, such as the IRSF). Third, in most amalgamations, administrative issues were left for resolution post-merger, and as a consequence the new unions were not fully prepared to manage or integrate the partners’ existing recruitment and retention activities. In these

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circumstances, it was not surprising that in interviews with senior officials references were repeatedly made to ‘taking their eye off the ball’ and making the merger ‘the business’ of the new union, rather than focusing on membership needs, post-merger. This was summed up succinctly as a period of ‘dysfunctionality’: it appeared to be an inherent feature of all balanced partner amalgamations. Subsequently, particularly as the initial loss of members produced a shortfall in the estimated subscription income, new recruitment and retention strategies were reviewed and relaunched, and efforts made to improve the servicing of existing members. In the more formalized unions, this took the form of strategic reviews of the organization and internal debates over the best response to such problems. However, apart from the PCS, which had the advantage of recruiting in an expanding job territory, the initiatives taken, sometimes building on one partner’s successful recruitment campaigns, helped mitigate the loss of members, rather than initiating a growth cycle, or taking the new unions into more promising job territories. In terms of political objectives and means, there was an immediate dividend for all the balanced partners from their consolidatory amalgamations. As noted above, the marked increase in their size raised their status relative to competitor unions. In the field of capital P politics, the leading officials negotiating the amalgamations, and initially those leading the new amalgamated unions, held broadly similar political or ideological positions. This helped weld the partners together and gave them an initial common purpose in their roles in the TUC, national and international union federations, and in the Labour Party. Similarly, as regards their collective bargaining activities, all the balanced partner unions benefited to some degree from their amalgamations. In all cases, the amalgamations ended dual representation and brought together unions previously engaged in intermittent conflict over such questions as bargaining rights, bargaining strategy, and the use of industrial action. The more centralized bargainers (GPMU, UNISON, and PCS) probably experienced most benefit post-merger as their leaders could more easily coordinate negotiations nationally, as compared to their colleagues in the more decentralized and fragmented AEEU, UNIFI, and AMICUS. Further, in harmonizing benefits upwards across all the amalgamated unions the members also saw a direct return from the amalgamation. Hence, overall, the ‘power-seeking’ element of the amalgamated unions’ merger strategies was delivered post-merger, even if the adverse environment generally restricted its use. As regards the new unions’ democratic ethos and government structure, this absorbed much of the national leaders’ energies post-merger. It was, for most unions, at least initially, a question of implementing the government


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changes as agreed pre-amalgamation. The exceptions were the AEEU and AMICUS, which deferred negotiations over these difficult issues until after their amalgamations had been formally approved. In addition, and within a year or so of completing the balanced partner amalgamation, a shortfall in subscription income and the costs of the amalgamation, including redundancies, also made the largely overlooked issue of administrative reform more urgent. The national leadership of the GPMU, UNISON, UNIFI, and AMICUS, in particular, needed to cut costs. UNISON, in NALGO fashion and under instruction from its National Conference, organized a formal strategic review of its organization (Waddington et al. 2005: 213–16). This proved to be a long-term project. It was launched in 1995 and continued in revised form in 2005. Indeed, in 2005 UNISON was still dealing with the harmonization of staff terms and conditions across the three partner unions as agreed in principle in 1993. But UNISON and UNIFI, as compared to the AEEU, PCS, and AMICUS, appeared largely content with their new government structures. Both were largely looking to integrate their partners more effectively and improve the efficiency of the agreed structures, rather than radically change the original agreement. The GPMU over the longer-term (1991 to its transfer to AMICUS in 2002) similarly integrated branches and made other minor adjustments. But this limited tinkering with the given structure was not for want of the GPMU trying to move away from the inherited federated structure that prevented the GPMU’s national leadership from increasing its control over the unions’ assets. In direct contrast to UNISON, UNIFI, and the GPMU, the position in the AEEU, PCS, and AMICUS was far more fluid post-merger (the PTC is not discussed in this context as it was too short lived (two years) to introduce further changes). The fluidity characteristic of post-merger government structures and politics in the AEEU, PCS, and AMICUS was the product of several factors. The formally agreed changes in government structure, directly associated with the amalgamations, and in PCS the carefully planned and executed changes intended to establish a new democratic ethos, were all intended to help facilitate, and run parallel with schemes for leadership succession. The latter were aimed to secure both personal careers and the moderates’ hegemony in the new unions. However, in combination, they helped generate a number of unintended consequences. In the medium term, three to five years, the consequent political effect was akin to opening Pandora’s box. In the AEEU, unforeseen events, including the death of the former AEEU’s leading moderate candidate for the key post of president and the subsequent implosion of the AEU’s moderate’s faction, severely disrupted such plans. As a result, the ultra-moderate and smaller partner (the EETPU) secured national control of the AEEU. This was followed by further reform of the AEEU’s

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government structure, executive and full-time officer selection and promotion to fit the EETPU’s blueprint. As for the AEEU’s subsequent amalgamation with the MSF to form AMICUS, this again, unintentionally, had very significant political and organizational consequences. It contributed, in no small part, to a reversal of personal and factional fortunes. The moderate and joint general secretaries of the AEEU and MSF both lost office shortly after the merger and the rejuvenated left won both the new single general secretary post and a majority on AMICUS’s national executive. As a consequence, moves were made to change some of AMICUS’s key constitutional arrangements, particularly those previously sponsored by former EETPU officials. But the decision to amalgamate with the T&G in 2007 and form UNITE put a stop to all such internal reforms. In conforming with the amalgamating practices of AMICUS, UNITE, by postponing decisions on the rule book and opting for joint general secretaries, also looks to be heading for a period of introspection as the ‘heir apparents’ decide who will stand for election to ‘the’ general secretary post in 2008. As for the PCS, the carefully planned and politically inspired transformation of the two civil service unions into a new model democracy, moderately led and ultimately accountable to the mass of the members, collapsed within five years of its introduction. In common with AMICUS, the PCS opted for two general secretaries, jointly responsible for the running of the new union and implementing the radical plans articulated in the PCS’s aims and values. In this case, the political affinity, broadly shared by the two leading officials, was not sufficient to guarantee harmonious personal relationships or close cooperation between their two supporting factions. The expected and planned moderates’ succession therefore failed to materialize. For, as in the AEEU and AMICUS, the PCS’s partners’ moderate factions failed both to merge and to agree on nominations for the post of general secretary. As a consequence, the more resilient and resurgent left-wing factions combined to win key elections and subsequently changed the new model constitution to suit their notion of union democracy. Hence, it proved difficult in the AEEU, PCS, and AMICUS to embed in the new union the agreed changes in government. Further, the parallel and closely related plans for succession to the top jobs also failed. Some of this unexpected fluidity originated in unplanned and unforeseen events, such as leading figures prematurely departing the scene and personal antipathies. However, much of the reaction against what had been agreed had its origins in the continuing informal and less tangible institutional influences which could not be directly addressed via agreements over the number of seats on the executive, frequency of national conferences, and executive elections. Most importantly, unofficial factional organizations, present at some point in all the


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above partner unions, appeared to be galvanized on the left and disrupted on the moderates’ wing by the above amalgamations. In contrast, in the more politically stable amalgamations, that is the GPMU, UNISON, and UNIFI, apart from the factions in NALGO, no other partner unions had organized political factions. In NALGO’s case, the leading factions played an important role in shaping UNISON’s new constitution, via their representatives on the national executive and conference, and appeared largely content with the resulting government structure, post-merger. Agreeing to amalgamations and promoting government reforms in factionalized unions could thus be hazardous for both the reforms and union leaders’ careers. Balanced partner amalgamations therefore did radically change some aspects of the partner unions’ behaviour, but not always as intended by those promoting and negotiating the amalgamations. The guaranteed increase in size, when creating a union as large as UNISON or AMICUS (and in 2007 UNITE) clearly elevated the partners to a new political prominence. As they were all consolidatory mergers, all partner unions benefited from an increase in their latent bargaining powers in those job territories which saw inter-union competition replaced by one union voice. For the partner unions forming the GPMU, UNISON, and PCS this was a significant advance over their previous bargaining alliances. Political power, in relation to employers, government, and rival unions, was thus potentially enhanced. But the context in which British unions operated limited the efficacy of such gains. Organizationally, the outcomes were more mixed. Initially, all of the amalgamated unions appeared to find managing the agreed merger and integrating the different partners difficult: the amalgamation served to direct attention and resources away from servicing the membership. But the adverse financial consequences of amalgamating usually forced the leadership to address urgently questions of recruitment, retention, and servicing. Also the search for administrative reforms was largely driven post-merger by financial problems. But integrating the partner unions and realizing economies was not easily or quickly achieved. Further, those who initiated the amalgamations, both personally and factionally, were not guaranteed to inherit the new organization they created.

MERGERS AND THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT As demonstrated in Chapter 2, since 1979 British trade unions have declined markedly in both membership and influence. Once it became clear this was not just a short-term reverse of fortunes and that there was no self-correcting mechanism which would restore union growth, unions and academics have

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explored different means of revitalizing the unions. Broadly, future growth in union membership has been seen as running in parallel with, and stimulated by, a significant increase in unions’ influence over industrial relations and related political and economic policies. Recent research and theorizing about such regeneration or revitalization has frequently included reference to the actual or potential contribution of union restructuring and thus mergers to union recovery (see Fernie and Metcalf 2005; Kelly and Willman 2004; Frege and Kelly 2003; Waddington et al. 2005). However, as should be clear from the above discussion of unions’ merger motivations, British mergers were not in practice intended to address such wider labour movement issues. Each merger was focused on achieving its own objectives. Hence, if the above mergers had consequent effects, either positive or negative, for British unionism’s revitalization they were largely incidental. In discussing the subordinate effect of mergers on unions’ revitalization the following will primarily be concerned with assessing the impact of mergers on aggregate union growth and unions’ territorial coverage. Second, the balanced partner amalgamations potential for transforming their organization and hence improving the wider union context will be discussed, including reference to UNITE’s (AMICUS and T&G) 2007 mega amalgamation. The effect of British mergers on British union membership overall is not easily assessed. In addition to the lack of reliable data on actual union membership pre-merger, factors other than those associated with mergers, both internal and external to the union, clearly also affected post-merger unions’ job territories, including membership size and territorial coverage. But, despite the above difficulties, this study can help shed some new light on the revitalization effects of mergers by considering, in summary, the positive and negative effects of different mergers (transfers and amalgamations) on the wider union movement. Further, it is helpful when generalizing in this manner to comment first on the past changes of membership in non-merging and merging unions (as recorded in Table 2.1) before focusing on the ‘immediate’ membership effects of the mergers studied and considering their subsequent and more remote consequences for union recovery. The ‘immediate’ period is taken as lasting two to three years when completing a transfer. In this period, the transferor was almost certainly not integrated into the larger union but still enjoying a high degree of autonomy. As regards balanced partner amalgamations, the partners were still, inside two to three years, recovering from the dysfunctionality of the merger. From Table 2.1, it can be seen that only 9 of 34 unions increased their membership between 1979 and 2004. Moreover, Table 2.1 showed that only two of these (FDA and NATFHE) owed the major part of their growth to mergers. By comparison, the leading merger unions all recorded very significant losses of


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membership over the same period, once an allowance is made for the number of members gained by mergers, including antecedent unions’ acquisitions. For example, the antecedent unions eventually forming AMICUS had a combined membership of 2.7 million in 1979, against a total of 1.1 million in 2003: a fall of some 60%. The T&G also lost some 60% of its membership over the same period. It was, therefore, the relatively small niche unions (most notably BALPA, AUT, FBU, Equity, and WGGB) organizing in sheltered and growing, or at least not shrinking, job territories that grew despite not joining the merger movement. In contrast, extensive merger activity could not prevent the leading merger unions from declining radically over the same period. Clearly, mergers did not help stimulate new growth cycles in the leading merger unions or in the labour movement in general. Despite the above commentary on the leading merging unions’ recent dismal growth record, the following will show that the contribution of mergers to aggregate union growth was more positive when compared to the alternative of not merging. For, the leading merging unions, and the majority of transferors, had few of the territorial advantages of the above growing niche unions. Rather, they were organized in competitive and declining job territories. In these circumstances, the ‘immediate’ effects on the transferors’ aggregate membership (some 830,000 between 1978 and 2006) were on balance positive. The only ‘immediate’ negative effect reported was of some (unquantified) number of transferor members resigning because they were dissatisfied with the choice of transferee. Obviously, some of the dissatisfied may have opted to join other unions (this would seem likely as it was probably the more active trade unionists with some knowledge of the transferee who would have taken such exception). Not all the dissatisfied would therefore have been lost to the wider trade union movement. On the other hand, if the transferors’ dissatisfied members had given the new union a chance to prove itself, they were likely to find that while initially little changed in terms of local organization, the new union gave them a number of advantages. Most significantly, many transferors in the geographic concentration and cognate trade merger streams saw their subscriptions held or reduced, while membership benefits were raised to those provided by the transferee. Similarly, in the white-collar assimilation stream, transferors’ members experienced improved benefits, and assistance with their collective bargaining activities. Transfers, it can be reasonably suggested, therefore ‘immediately’ helped transferors retain their existing members and thereby reduced their existing attrition rates. Moreover, their attrition rates would probably have accelerated had they remained independent and introduced the kind of cuts in benefits and services (or subscription increases) needed to keep many of them financially viable.

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As for transfers helping transferees recruit non-unionists and extend their coverage into non-unionized job territories, the first was occasionally, but the second rarely, achieved. In respect of recruiting non-unionists in otherwise unionized territory, it was the white-collar assimilation transfers that most noticeably offered this opportunity. In some such cases, the transferees’ more effective recruiting techniques, combined with improved services and benefits, helped increase union density by ‘in-fill’ recruiting. But it was only in exceptional circumstances that the transferee benefited by entering more promising ‘greenfield’ sites. Most individual transfers (and dominant partner amalgamations) therefore tended to have an ‘immediate’ and positive effect on attrition rates, but they rarely led to growth in non-unionized territories. Transferors’ subsequent and indirect effects on those dimensions of ‘the transferees’ behaviour which could be considered to assist or detract from the revitalization of trade unions as a whole, need to be considered by reference both to the impact of the few exceptionally large cognate trade transfers and to the cumulative effect of transfers (and clusters of transfers) on the transferees’ growth strategies. For, the great majority of individual transferors were simply too small to have any subsequent influence on the transferees’ initiatives in such areas as political objectives and means, government structures, and administration. In contrast, six exceptionally large cognate trade transfers, ranging between 30,000 and 150,000 members, may have been expected to impact subsequently and indirectly on the transferees’ growth strategies. Of these six, it is too soon (2007) to assess the longer-term effect of UNIFI’s and the GPMU’s transfers, completed in 2004, on AMICUS’s membership growth. They obviously served to diversify AMICUS’s territorial interests but whether or not they will eventually contribute to a significant reversal of fortunes in membership growth remains to be seen. Initially, however, the effect was disappointing. In common with many other transfers, the immediate postmerger period saw marked reductions in the two AMICUS sections largely composed of GPMU and UNIFI members. As for the remaining four large cognate trade transfers (the NUDBTW in 1992 and the NUA&AW in 1982 to the T&G; and the NUTGW in 1991 and FTAT in 1993 to the GMB), the two transferors joining the T&G continued their well-established premerger decline and were gradually absorbed into the T&G. They did not appear to prompt any changes relevant to the issue under discussion. On the other hand, the NUTGW and FTAT were treated differently in the GMB. Both maintained a high degree of autonomy inside the GMB into the new millennium. Over this period the NUTGW continued its long-term decline, whereas FTAT’s membership proved more durable. However, as noted above, the GMB became dissatisfied with the results of its merger strategy and


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abandoned it (albeit temporarily) in the mid-1990s and launched a new ‘organic growth’ strategy. Unfortunately, this not only failed to live up to expectations but also contributed significantly to the GMB’s growing financial difficulties. As for the leading merger unions which successfully concluded merger searches which brought in clusters of transferors organizing in the same job territory, these undoubtedly helped the leading merger unions and their antecedents enter adjacent job territories and in some instances promising new territories, such as the health sector. But many transfers, particularly those concluded under competitive conditions, frequently saw the transferee pay what appeared to be an excessive price for the privilege of taking over financial responsibility for unions which subsequently proved to have limited, if any, growth potential. Further, an important rationale for such transfers was the transferees’ interests in maintaining its status vis-à-vis other competing unions. Success in the transfer market therefore probably reduced both the incentive to focus on non-unionists as the key source of growth and the total resources available to fund relatively costly and uncertain organic growth strategies. The actual and potential contribution of transfers to union resurgence was therefore mixed and varied over time. Nevertheless, transfers of unions facing retrenchment probably helped retain many thousands of members who would otherwise have rapidly become non-unionists. But subsequently, accepting that in this period revitalization was dependent on a new growth cycle initiated by ‘achieving recognition in newer workplaces’ (Fernie 2005: 4) and therefore penetrating non-unionized territory, transfers in the longer term probably helped divert the transferees’ resources away from such endeavours. Balanced partner amalgamations, because of their potential for radically changing all dimensions of union behaviour, offered, in contrast to transfers, different options for union renewal. However, their ‘immediate’ effect was almost certainly to reduce the total membership initially registered by the new merged union, compared to the partners’ combined size pre-merger. Moreover, most also encountered associated financial difficulties in the ‘immediate’ post-amalgamation period. Coupled with the need to implement changes agreed in pre-amalgamation negotiations and to address questions of government structure, administration, and the leaders’ imperatives, it was not surprising that the newly amalgamated unions tended to be absorbed in internal problem-solving rather than revitalization issues in the ‘immediate’ postamalgamation period. In these circumstances, ‘dysfunctionality’ as regards membership recruitment, retention, and servicing was therefore a common feature of balanced partner amalgamations’ ‘immediate’ post-merger developments.

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However, irrespective of the initial difficulties experienced by all the balanced partner amalgamations, they were never likely to trigger directly a renewed union growth cycle. For, the balanced amalgamation partners all looked primarily to consolidate within, rather than expand, their job territories. In particular, the intention was to increase retention rates and improve ‘in-fill’ recruitment (the amalgamations did not of themselves help the partners penetrate new and non-unionized job territories). Post-merger, reductions in inter-union competition for employer recognition, an end to dual representation, harmonizing membership benefits upwards, and, in some cases, allocating more resources to servicing and recruiting members should all have had positive effects on membership retention and recruitment in existing job territories. In the public sector, this helped the PCS increase its membership as employment in the civil service grew while UNISON broadly stabilized its membership after the initial reduction. As for the private-sector unions, their more adverse environments meant that their memberships continued to fall in aggregate despite changes in their retention and recruitment strategies. Subsequent developments prompted by the balanced partner amalgamations, and potentially capable of influencing union renewal, included further internal reforms and attempts to improve the trade union context. But neither the internal reforms nor attempts to improve the context were common across all the seven new amalgamated unions. The PTC and UNIFI were too short lived to initiate significant changes in these areas. As for the other five unions, two (GPMU and UNISON) continued to function internally much as agreed in the merger negotiations and remained centre-left in political persuasion. However, the AEEU, PCS, and AMICUS all experienced marked changes in government structure and political bias post-merger. The informal influences on governance in all three unions, particularly factional organizations and issues associated with the leaders’ imperatives, were instrumental in revising the political orientation of all three unions. Hence, whatever the initiators of the AEEU, PCS, and AMICUS amalgamations had in mind for the new union in the way of political influence, and reform of the wider context, was open to revision by those who inherited the new organization. In the AEEU, the new union became ultra-moderate. It promoted singleunion deals and close cooperation with employers and the New Labour government. In contrast, and somewhat later, the PCS and AMICUS (which absorbed UNIFI and the GPMU in 2004) moved to the left and were both more critical than their predecessors of partnership deals and New Labour governments. Hence, in 2006, UNISON and AMICUS (between them accounting for 35% or so of the TUC’s total membership) were aligned on the left and in cooperation with the T&G and GMB active in promoting


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trade union interests. They were critical of New Labour governments and successfully moved motions at the 2006 Labour Party Conference offering alternatives to New Labour’s health reforms and employment rights policy (FT 2006). This inter-union cooperation and hence its potential to change the union context was further strengthened by the formation of UNITE (the AMICUS and T&G amalgamation)in 2007. Concentration of membership in UNITE brought 2 million members or 30% of the TUC’s total membership into one union. Assuming it manages to survive and prosper after an initial period of dysfunctionality, the new mega and left-inclined union is likely to absorb several medium-sized unions by transfers. This will obviously further raise its political profile and generate questions regarding its relationship with the TUC and Labour Party. The size of its financial contributions to both will clearly be a significant cost to the new union and hence weighed against possible political advantages. As for the TUC, an expanded UNITE, if it chose, could provide services similar to those available from the TUC and offer these to other unions, and particularly potential merger partners. It would also probably gain little benefit itself from the TUC’s role vis-à-vis government, as it could expect to have direct access to the relevant ministers, at least while New Labour remains in power. The future of UNITE’s relationship with the TUC will therefore probably rest as much on the loyalty the leadership of the new union feels to the TUC, as it will on the TUC’s functionality. Finally, the TUC itself will obviously assess how best it can manage the interests of its smaller affiliates, while still retaining the confidence of UNITE. How this relationship develops will play an important part in determining the future role of the TUC as Britain’s single pre-eminent peak organization. In respect of the Labour Party, such a mega union, particularly in alliance with UNISON and the GMB, could carry considerable weight at Party conference, leadership elections, and in TULO (the trade union and Labour Party Liaison committee). However, this is clearly not the same as exerting influence over a New Labour government. Whatever size the new mega union eventually achieves or the union alliances it creates, it would still require a seismic change in the ideology and leadership of a New Labour government for it to defer to trade union demands for the kind of employment rights legislation which could help stimulate unions’ regeneration. Indeed, it could well be that the emergence of such a mega union with increased, but latent, collective bargaining power could push a New Labour government, or any other government, in the opposite direction, given the common approach all the main parties have adopted to maintaining both a relatively free labour market and the legal regulation of industrial action. Hence, it is not surprising in 2007 that the Labour Party, under the influence of the new (Gordon Brown) leadership, is

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again considering adjusting the Party’s policymaking processes to further limit union influence over conference decisions (The Times 2007). Thus, although on balance transfers have been to the individual union’s general advantage and balanced partner amalgamations have provided an opportunity to transform the internal workings of Britain’s largest unions, albeit sometimes in unintended ways, mergers do not of themselves promise to improve the union context. Critically, even if unions’ political influence is potentially increased by mergers, they are short of proposals for changes in labour legislation and economic policy which could simultaneously find favour with a New Labour government and stimulate significant union growth. In their absence, the economic, political, and legislative factors that contributed to the unions’ decline in the 1980s are unlikely to be radically improved via government action; particularly as periodic threats of industrial action in the public sector keep reminding politicians of the danger of helping reverse such conditions. In these circumstances, mergers and the associated concentration of membership into fewer unions will not significantly affect the regeneration of British trade unionism. Hence, in the British context, mergers do not offer a panacea for union decline.

Appendices Appendix 1. Minor unions transferring to TUC unions: 1978–2004 Year

1978

1979

TUC union transferring (i.e. the minor union) and its membership NUFSO(1) NUIW (Pearl Section)

UJF & KTO CAWF of GB NUWDAT NUIW (RS)

Non-TUC union transferring (i.e. the minor union) to TUC union and its membership 1,103 1,378 SARAC NAYHW EIGSA AASA GRESU NUMIM

800 307 315 4,318 5,729 365

ALAE CMLASFSA MARC SLCWWA PSU (1) BACM etc. BASA LSEFA

796 86 650 900 2,552 368 1,131 91

2,050 1,066 3,792 3,392

TUC transferee (receiving) (i.e. the major unions)

FTAT (GMB)(2) ASTMS (MSF/AMICUS) TGWU TGWU ASTMS (MSF/AMICUS) APEX (GMB) NUBE (BIFU/UNIFI/AMICUS) FTAT (GMB) ASTMS (MSF/AMICUS) NUGMW (GMB) NGA (GPMU/AMICUS) ASTMS (MSF/AMICUS) TGWU ASTMS (MSF/AMICUS) ASTMS (MSF/AMICUS) ATWU (GMB) BIFU (UNIFI/AMICUS) EMA (PROSPECT) EMA (PROSPECT) EETPU (AEEU/AMICUS) (cont.)

Appendix 1. (Continued) Year

1980

TUC union transferring (i.e. the minor union) and its membership YSTC HDHTTFS NWSS ATWU (Oldham)

Non-TUC union transferring (i.e. the minor union) to TUC union and its membership 886 120 700 1,827 TCOA ANZBG BACOSA UKAPE TSA NDDBA SIMA

1981

1982

NUGSATU

NUDBTW NUA&AW NUIW (Royal Life Section) ASJFHAW AFHTWFAW AGSRO

1,000 557 605 4,055 282 366 12,033

2,092 ESSA HSPE

6,034 133

NASD BTOG

938 3,065

39,984 66,800 838 258 599 8,500


NUDBTW (TGWU) NUDBTW (TGWU) APEX (GMB) UTAW ASTMS (MSF/AMICUS) ASTMS (MSF/AMICUS) ASTMS (MSF/AMICUS) EETPU (AEEU/AMICUS) EETPU (AEEU/AMICUS) NUHKW (NUKFAT) EETPU (AEEU/AMICUS) AUEW-TASS (MSF/AMICUS) BIFU (UNIFI/AMICUS) EMA (PROSPECT) TGWU TGWU BIFU (UNIFI/AMICUS) NUTGW (GMB) NUTGW (GMB) ICPS (IPMS/PROSPECT) TGWU EETPU (AEEU/AMICUS)

1983

BRTTS NSBGW NUSMW etc.

352 700 54,613 NAEM&S SL&TWU AMPS YHASA

1984

SSPS NUIW (3 sections) AUEW (2 sections) APAC

150 18,000 61,549 7,556 RRMA COSESA CBSSA(1) CBSSA(2) NTAWU BNRDTWU AACE NUTAW (RD)

1985

NUBOM etc. REOU NSMM

800 875 6,473 100

500 2,100 200 300 2,000 1,600 1,300 100 (estimated)

5,057 2,434 27,035 CSSA etc. BNZLSA SUKSA MMSA ALSCI RCNSA GSA

350 257 300 2,700 650 100 369

AUEW-E (AEEU/AMICUS) FTATU (GMB) AUEW-TASS (MSF/AMICUS) NATTKE (BECTU) GMB EETPU (AEEU/AMICUS) ASTMS (MSF/AMICUS) TGWU NUIW (MSF/AMICUS) AUEW-E (AEEU/AMICUS) AUEW-TASS (MSF/AMICUS) EETPU (AEEU/AMICUS) ASTMS (MSF/AMICUS) BIFU (UNIFI/AMICUS) BIFU (UNIFI/AMICUS) TGWU TGWU NATFHE ATWU (GMB) ISTC MNAOA AUEW-TASS (MSF/AMICUS) ASTMS (MSF/AMICUS) ASTMS (MSF/AMICUS) APEX (GMB) MNAOA EIS APEX (GMB) ASTMS (MSF/AMICUS) (cont.)


TUC union transferring (i.e. the minor union) and its membership

Non-TUC union transferring (i.e. the minor union) to TUC union and its membership


(In 1985 the CPSA’s Posts and Telecommunications Group transferred to the POEU (Post Office Engineering Union) to form the NCU (National Communications Union). This involved some 40,000 members transferring. This ‘merger’ is not listed in the Certification Officers’ Reports. 1986 ATWU 28,500 GMB Involving 10 separate transfers of members of the textile ‘federation’ TWU 13,448 AUEW-TASS (MSF/AMICUS) SALSA 4,626 ASTMS (MSF/AMICUS) 1987 AUAW 1,922 TGWU TWSA 1,500 NALGO (UNISON) BESO 3,500 BIFU (UNIFI/AMICUS) NTFMFS 1,134 TGWU 1988 GLSA 13,000 GMB ALCES ⎫ 650 EIS UFFMA ⎪ MSF (AMICUS) ⎪ ⎬ ISA 2,500 MSF (AMICUS) CECSSA ⎪ (estimated) MSF (AMICUS) ⎪ AHMIT ⎭ AFDSC 1989 — IGSA 740 MSF (AMICUS) NORSA 759 BIFU (UNIFI/AMICUS) ⎫ ABPD ⎪ EETPU (AEEU/AMICUS) ⎪ MDSA ⎪ EETPU (AEEU/AMICUS) ⎬ Total SFA EETPU (AEEU/AMICUS) 2,200 ⎪ NDPLOS⎪ EETPU (AEEU/AMICUS) ⎪ ⎭ NASPO EETPU (AEEU/AMICUS)

1990

HVA

16,701 NULO LSLASA NEBSSA ⎫ NICE ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ NAFO ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ PSU (2) ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ IoJ ⎬ TVFPEA ⎪ HDPLOS⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ NAPLO ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ AAES ⎪ ⎪ ⎭ NUMA

1991

NUTGW WWU

1992 1993

73,122 5,143

— YAPLO FTAT NUSC

450 31,642 712

⎫ PMBSA ⎬ AMPSSA CDPLOA⎭ BCSA ANHSO

⎫ ASPBH ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ APW ⎬ AMCSA ⎪ ⎪ HPA ⎪ ⎭ LBPCGW

100 150 380

Total 20,000 (estimated)

Total 1,500 (estimated) Total 1,500 (estimated)

Total 5,216

MSF (AMICUS) GMB GMB BIFU (UNIFI/AMICUS) EETPU (AEEU/AMICUS) EETPU (AEEU/AMICUS) EETPU (AEEU/AMICUS) EETPU (AEEU/AMICUS) EETPU (AEEU/AMICUS) EETPU (AEEU/AMICUS) EETPU (AEEU/AMICUS) NATFHE IPMS (PROSPECT) GMB ISTC IPMS (PROSPECT) MSF (AMICUS) EETPU (AEEU/AMICUS) EETPU (AEEU/AMICUS) NALGO (UNISON) TGWU GMB MSF (AMICUS) AEEU (AMICUS) AEEU (AMICUS) AEEU (AMICUS) MSF (AMICUS) TGWU (cont.)



Non-TUC union transferring (i.e. the minor union) to TUC union and its membership

1994 1995 1996

1997

1998

1999

CERAM EPIU FAA RUBSSO

NALHM

CMA

NUIW

5,100 1,007 1,363

6,127

13,997

300 (estimated)

⎫ SHVA ⎪ ⎪ ⎬ PFS LPBSSA ⎪ ⎪ NIBCAWU⎭ ⎫ UAPLO ⎪ ⎪ APLOA ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬ CHCC NPBSSA ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ AULC ⎪ ⎪ ⎭ GCSF ⎫ AABTD (H&M) ⎬ CMSA ⎭ GMA

10,044 CC89 NSA LSAUK CLSA UFAA BSU

⎫ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭

Total 3,000 (estimated)

Total 8,095

Total 2,221

Total 6,355


MSF (AMICUS) TGWU BECTU NUKFAT UNISON AFDCS IUHS BF & AWU TGWU GULO GULO MSF (AMICUS) BIFU (UNIFI/AMICUS) AUT PSTCU (PCS) MSF (AMICUS) NUKFAT IUHS GMB MSF (AMICUS) AEEU (AMICUS) MSF (AMICUS) MSF (AMICUS) MSF (AMICUS) MSF (AMICUS) MSF (AMICUS)

2000

NLBD SPOA NCTU PLCWTWU

2,142 3,233 601 1,350

2001

MPOU AMU

9,627 805

2002

WISA UTW

5,108 1,389

2003

Midlands area of NACODS & Yorkshire area of NACODS

—

⎫ SCOP ⎪ ⎪ ⎬ BASSA LR(UK)SA ⎪ ⎪ AASLSA ⎭

Total 3,218

LHASA

500 (estimated)

GSMA

150 (estimated)

— SF & HEA CGNUSA 2004

UNIFI GPMU NULMW

142,441 102,088 3,132 AGSA 1,220 DSA 788

(1)

800 3,025

ISTC POA TGWU ISTC MPOU (GMB) AEEU (AMICUS) MSF (AMICUS) UNIFI (AMICUS) GMB AEEU (AMICUS) MSF (AMICUS) UNIFI (AMICUS) AMICUS ALGUS NACODS

NACODS EIS AMICUS AMICUS AMICUS T&G AMICUS FDA

See Glossary for full names of unions given in abbreviations. Initials in brackets give the name of the merged union which the ‘receiving’ union eventually and subsequently transferred to, or amalgamated with, or changed its name to. (2)

Appendix 2. Amalgamations of TUC unions 1978–2004 (membership figures taken from TUC Reports and Certification Officer Reports) Year 1978–81 1982

1983 1984

No. of amalgamations Nil 3

Nil 1

Unions amalgamating

Nos.

National Graphical Association (NGA) and Society of Lithographic Artists, Designers, Engravers and Process Workers (SLADE)

113,579

Society of Graphical and Allied Trades 1975 (SOGAT75) and National Society of Operative Printers Graphical and Media Personnel (NATSOPA)

183,400

National Union of General and Municipal Workers (NUGMW) and Amalgamated Society of Boilermakers Shipwrights Blacksmiths and Structural Workers (ASBSBSW)

838,415

Association of Broadcasting and Allied Staffs (ABAS) and National Association of Theatrical Television and Kine Employees (NATTKE)

To form

Total

National Graphical Association (1982) (NGA82)

136,000

Society of Graphical and Allied Trades 1982 (SOGAT82)

233,861

General Municipal Boilermakers and Allied Trades Union (Later GMB)

958,000

22,421

50,461

119,585

15,712

19,671

Entertainment Trades Alliance (ETA)

35,383

1985

1

1986 1987

Nil 1

1988

1

1989

1990

1

2

National Union of Mineworkers Nottingham (NUM(N)) and South Derbyshire Areas and the Colliery Trades and Allied Workers Association (SDACT&AWA)

31,702

Society of Civil and Public Servants (SCPS) and Civil Service Union (CSU) Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers – Technical Administrative and Supervisory Section (TASS) and Association of Scientific Technical and Managerial Staffs (ASTMS) General Municipal Boilermakers and Allied Trades Union (GMBATU) and Association of Professional Executive Clerical and Computer Staff (APEX) National Union of Railwaymen (NUR) and National Union of Seamen (NUS)

88,335

National Union of Hosiery and Knitwear Workers (NUHKW) and National Union of Footwear Leather and Allied Trades (NUFLAT)

Union of Democratic Mineworkers (UDM)

31,702

(The UDM was subsequently refused membership of the TUC)

29,768 241,000

National Union of Civil and Public Servants (NUCPS)

118,123

Manufacturing Science and Finance Union (MSF)

653,000

GMB

877,000

National Union of Rail Maritime and Transport Workers (NURMTW)

123,000

412,000 797,039

79,961 102,037 20,963 47,238

National Union Of Knitwear Footwear and Apparel Trades (NUKFAT)

82,303

35,065 (cont.)


No. of amalgamations

Unions amalgamating

Nos.

1991

2

Association of Cinematograph Television and Allied Technicians (ACTAT) and Broadcasting and Entertainment Trades Alliance (BETA) Society of Graphical and Allied Trades 1982 (SOGAT82) and National Graphical Association (1982) (NGA82) Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU) and Electrical Electronic Telecommunication and Plumbing Union (EETPU) Confederation of Health Service Employees and National and Local Government Officers Association (NALGO) and National Union of Public Employees (NUPE)

29,976

1992

1993

1994 1995

1

1

NIL 1

National Communications Union (NCU) and Union of Communication Workers (UCW)

To form Broadcasting Entertainment and Cinematograph Technicians Unions (BECTU)

Total 67,695

37,719 176,144

Graphical Paper and Media Union (GPMU)

301,147

125,003 702,228

Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union (AEEU)

1,077,403

UNISON

1,512,893

375,175 201,993 759,735

551,165 122,068 166,707

Communication Workers Union (CWU)

288,775

1996

1997 1998

1999

1

NIL 1

1

2000 2001

NIL 1

2002

1

2003 2004

NIL 1

Inland Revenue Staff Federation (IRSF) and National Union of Civil and Public Servants (NUCPS)

57,907

169,987

Public & Commercial Services Union (PCS)

265,943

UNIFI

179,544

PROSPECT

103,759

112,080

Civil & Public Services Association (CPSA) and Public Services Tax & Commerce Union (PTC) Banking Insurance & Finance Union (BIFU) and UNiFI and Nat West Staff Association (NWSA)

116,681

Institute of Professionals, Managers and Specialists (IPMS) and Engineers and Managers Association (EMA) Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union (AEEU) and Manufacturing, Science & Finance Union (MSF)

74,245

Iron & Steel Trades Confederation (ISTC) and National Union of Knitwear, Footwear and Apparel Trades (KFAT)

Public Services, Tax and Commerce Union (PTC)

149,262 112,972 42,729 23,843

29,514 728,211

AMICUS

1,144,211

416,000

50,100 12,471

COMMUNITY

62,471

Appendix 3. Minor unions transferring to the leading merger unions: 1978–2004 Year

1978

1979

1980

TUC union transferring (i.e. the minor union) and its membership NUFSO(1) NUIW (Pearl Section)

UJF & KTO CAWF of GB NUIW (RS)

YSTC HDHTTFS NWSS

Non-TUC union transferring (i.e. the minor union) to TUC union and its membership 1,103 1,378 SARAC NAYHW EIGSA AASA GRESU NUMIM

800 307 315 4,318 5,729 365

ALAE NUIW (RS) CMLASFSA MARC SLCWWA PSU(1) LSEFA

796 3,392 86 650 900 2,552 91

TCOA ANZBG BACOA UKAPE TSA SIMA

1,000 557 605 4,055 282 12,033

2,050 1,066 3,392

886 120 700


FTAT (GMB)(2) ASTMS (MSF/AMICUS) TGWU TGWU ASTMS (MSF/AMICUS) APEX (GMB) NUBE (BIFU/UNIFI/AMICUS) FTATU (GMB) ASTMS (MSF/AMICUS) NUGMW (GMB) ASTMS (MSF/AMICUS) TGWU ASTMS (MSF/AMICUS) ASTMS (MSF/AMICUS) ASTMS (MSF/AMICUS) ATWU (GMB) BIFU (UNIFI/AMICUS) EETPU (AEEU/AMICUS) NUDBTW (TGWU) NUDBTW (TGWU) APEX (GMB) ASTMS (MSF/AMICUS) ASTMS (MSF/AMICUS) ASTMS (MSF/AMICUS) EETPU (AEEU/AMICUS) EETPU (AEEU/AMICUS) EETPU (AEEU/AMICUS)

1981

NUGSATU

1982

NUDBTW NUA&AW NUIW (Royal Life Section) ASJFHAW AFHTWFAW

2,092

AUEW-TASS (MSF/AMICUS) BIFU (UNIFI/AMICUS) ESSA

1983

1984

BRTTS NSBGW NUSMW etc.

SSPS AUEW (2 sections) APAC

NASD BTOG

938 3,065

YHASA SL&TWU AMPS

100 875 6,473

352 700 54,613

150 61,549 7,556 RRMA COSESA CBSSA(1) CBSSA(2) NTAWU BNRDTWU NUTAW (RD)

1985

NSMM

6,034

39,984 66,800 838 258 599

500 2,100 200 300 2,000 1,600 100 (estimated)

27,035 CSSAUL BNZLSA SUKSA RCNSA GSA

350 257 300 100 369

TGWU TGWU BIFU (UNIFI/AMICUS) NUTGW (GMB) NUTGW (GMB) TGWU EETPU (AEEU/AMICUS) AUEW-E (AEEU/AMICUS) FTATU (GMB) AUEW-TASS (MSF/AMICUS) ASTMS (MSF/AMICUS) GMB EETPU (AEEU/AMICUS) TGWU AUEW-Eng.Section (AEEU/AMICUS) AUEW-TASS Section (MSF/AMICUS) EETPU (AEEU/AMICUS) ASTMS (MSF/AMICUS) BIFU (UNIFI/AMICUS) BIFU (UNIFI/AMICUS) TGWU TGWU ATWU (GMB) AUEW-TASS (MSF/AMICUS) ASTMS (MSF/AMICUS) ASTMS (MSF/AMICUS) APEX (GMB) APEX (GMB) ASTMS (MSF/AMICUS) (cont.)



1986

ATWU Involving 10 separate transfers of members of the textile ‘federation’ TWU

1987

1988

1989

AUAW

GLSA

—

Non-TUC union transferring (i.e. the minor union) to TUC union and its membership 28,500

GMB

SALSA

4,626

BESO NTFMFS

3,500 1,134

1,922

13,000


⎫ UFFMA ⎬ ISA CECSSA⎭ IGSA NORSA ⎫ ABPD ⎪ ⎪ MDSA ⎪ ⎬ SFA ⎪ NDPLOS⎪ ⎪ ⎭ NASPO

Total 2,500 (estimated) 740 759 Total 2,200

AUEW-TASS (MSF/AMICUS) ASTMS (MSF/AMICUS) TGWU BIFU (UNIFI/AMICUS) TGWU GMB MSF (AMICUS) MSF (AMICUS) MSF (AMICUS) MSF (AMICUS) BIFU (UNIFI/AMICUS) EETPU (AEEU/AMICUS) EETPU (AEEU/AMICUS) EETPU (AEEU/AMICUS) EETPU (AEEU/AMICUS) EETPU (AEEU/AMICUS)

1990

1991

1992 1993

1994 1995 1996 1997

1998

HVA

NUTGW

— YAPLO FTAT NUSC

EPIU — NALHM

CMA

16,701

73,122

450 31,642 712

5,100 — 6,127

NULO LSLASA NEBSSA NICE NAFO PSU(2) IoJ TVFPEA HDPLOS NAPLO

100 150 380 200 5,000 2,000 700 200 200 200

AMPSSA CDPLOA BCSA

Total 1,500 (estimated) 750 (estimated)

⎫ ASPBH ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ APW ⎪ ⎪ ⎬ AMCSA HPA ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ LBPCGW⎪ ⎪ ⎭ CERAM —

Total 5,216 300 (estimated)

—

CHCC NPBSSA

500 900

GMA

800

13,997

MSF (AMICUS) GMB GMB BIFU (UNIFI/AMICUS) EETPU (AEEU/AMICUS) EETPU (AEEU/AMICUS) EETPU (AEEU/AMICUS) EETPU (AEEU/AMICUS) EETPU (AEEU/AMICUS) EETPU (AEEU/AMICUS) EETPU (AEEU/AMICUS) GMB MSF (AMICUS) EETPU (AEEU/AMICUS) EETPU (AEEU/AMICUS) TGWU GMB MSF (AMICUS) AEEU (AMICUS) AEEU (AMICUS) AEEU (AMICUS) MSF (AMICUS) TGWU MSF (AMICUS) TGWU — TGWU MSF (AMICUS) MSF (UNIFI/AMICUS) MSF (AMICUS) GMB (cont.)


1999

TUC union transferring (i.e. the minor union) and its membership NUIW

Non-TUC union transferring (i.e. the minor union) to TUC union and its membership 10,044 CC89 NSA LSAUK CLSA UFAA BSU

2000

NCTU

2001

MPOU AMU

2002

WISA UTW — UNIFI GPMU NULMW

601

⎫ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭

⎫ SCOP ⎪ ⎪ ⎬ BASSA LR(UK)SA ⎪ ⎪ AASLSA ⎭

Total 3,218

9,627 805 LHASA

2003 2004

Total 6,355

5,108 1,389 — 142,441 102,088 3,132

500 (estimated)

CGNUSA

3,025

AGSA

1,220


MSF (AMICUS) AEEU (AMICUS) MSF (AMICUS) MSF (AMICUS) MSF (AMICUS) MSF (AMICUS) MSF (AMICUS) TGWU MPOU (GMB) AEEU (AMICUS) MSF (AMICUS) UNIFI (AMICUS) GMB AEEU (AMICUS) MSF (AMICUS) UNIFI (AMICUS) AMICUS AMICUS AMICUS AMICUS T&G AMICUS

The three leading merger unions (and their antecedents) accounted for 136 (76%) of 180 transfers to TUC-affiliated unions between 1978 and 2004. AMICUS (and its antecedents: ASTMS/MSF (40), EETPU/AEEU (29), UNIFI (12), AMICUS (5)) accounted for 86; the GMB 31; and T&G 19. (1) Including transfers to unions which themselves transferred to one of the leading three unions. (2) The unions in brackets are the subsequent transferee unions.

Appendices

265

Appendix 4. The Index of Comparative Security and Related Financial and Membership Data Introduction The measures used to assess a union’s financial position included net worth (the value of year-end union funds), subscription income, total income, and administrative costs. The key ratios combine the above measures as follows: Subscription Income Total Income Subscription Income Subscription/Administrative cost Gap = Administrative Cost Net Worth Acid Test = Administrative Cost Subscription Dependency =

The 42 transferring unions were assessed against the above financial measures and ratios by reference to the five years prior to merger. Changes in membership size were also compared over the same period. These all contributed to the development of the index of comparative security. This was used to rank unions on a scale of 1 to 29. A score of 10 or more was taken as broadly indicative of significant financial difficulties, or a noteworthy loss of members and less severe financial problems. At the lower end of the scale a score of 6 or less indicated a strong financial position. For example, in Table 3.2 the Lancashire Textile Workers’ Union (NWLDCTWU) with an index score of 2 had, prior to merging, experienced a small reduction in membership (–4% over the previous five years), a net worth per capita of £145 (national average in 1989 was £44), a subscription dependency of 57% (national average 82%) and an acid test of 11.7 (the figure of 11.7 indicates that if its net worth was liquid it could cover its administrative costs for 11.7 years without any other source of income). In contrast, at the other end of the index the Agricultural Workers (NUAAW) had a score of 18. It lost 21% of its membership, had net worth per capita of £7, a subscription dependency of 96%, and an acid test of .3 (this last figure shows that if the Agricultural Workers’ net worth was liquid it could cover its administrative costs for just four months). It was, in marked contrast to the Lancashire Textile Workers’ Union (NWLDCTWU), in severe financial difficulties when it merged. The following, first, outlines the method of calculating the index of financial security, while the attached tables list the unions and the financial information used in the calculations.

266

Appendices Appendix 4(1). Index of comparative security: method of calculation Loss of members: Points allocated 11%–20% 1 point 21%–30% 2 points 31%–40% 3 points 41% or > 5 points Net worth per capita: If below £44 in final year points allocated 44–34 1 point 33–24 2 points 23–14 3 points 13 or < 5 points If net worth deteriorating over the period: Points allocated 1 point If negative net worth per capita: Points allocated −1 to −20 10 points −21 to −40 15 points −40 or < 20 points Subscription dependency: Points allocated If in final year % 82–87 1 point 88–92 2 points 93–97 3 points 98 or > 5 points If subscription dependency deteriorating over period: Points allocated If above 82 in final year and deteriorating by: 1%–5% 1 point 6%–10% 2 points 11%–20% 3 points 21% or > 5 points Subscription/administrative gap if in final year 1 or

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