Toleration: The Liberal Virtue

Toleration

Toleration The Liberal Virtue

Bican S¸ ahin

Lexington Books A division of ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC.

Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, UK

Published by Lexington Books A division of Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. A wholly owned subsidiary of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 http://www.lexingtonbooks.com Estover Road, Plymouth PL6 7PY, United Kingdom Copyright © 2010 by Lexington Books All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Sahin, ¸ Bican. Toleration : the liberal virtue / Bican Şahin. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7391-4739-9 (cloth : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-7391-4741-2 (electronic) 1. Toleration. I. Title. HM1271.S34 2010 179'.9—dc22 2010013868

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To my parents

Contents

Acknowledgments

ix

1

Introduction

1

2

Skepticism and Toleration: The Case of Michel de Montaigne

13

3

Prudence and Toleration: The Case of John Locke

31

4

Autonomy and Toleration: The Case of John Stuart Mill

49

5

Conscience and Toleration: The Case of Pierre Bayle

65

6

Two Versions of Liberalism and Their Positions on Toleration

85

7

Conclusion

99

Bibliography

109

Index

115

About the Author

123

vii

Acknowledgments

This book in its current form would not have existed if I had not gone to the Freedom Dinner in November 2007, which took place in Washington, D.C. On that night, I happened to sit at the same table as Dr. Tom Palmer of the CATO Institute. During the dinner, Dr. Palmer suggested that I prepare a reader on toleration. In the process, the idea of preparing a reader was transformed into that of writing an original book. In preparing this book I benefited immensely from both material and immaterial support of the following people and institutions. First of all, I am grateful to the Earhart Foundation and to Professor Leonard Liggio for providing me with a post-doctoral fellowship to carry out research on Pierre Bayle and John Stuart Mill during the fall semester of 2007. This research forms the foundation of chapters 4 and 5. I conducted this research at my second home, University of Maryland, College Park, where I obtained my doctoral degree in 2003. As always, I am grateful to Professor Charles E. Butterworth for facilitating my research at the university. Third, my thanks are due to Dr. Heather Millar, Irene Norton, Kurt Dornheim, and Veronica Matricardi who opened their lovely house in Annapolis, MD, to me. Dr. Millar contributed to this work by accommodating me not only physically but also intellectually. She and I had long discussions on my research. Fourth, I am grateful to Barbara Asal for proofreading some parts of this manuscript. Fifth, I must thank St. John’s College, Annapolis, MD. This unique place of learning has always been a source of inspiration for me. While in Annapolis, I benefited from the Greenfield Library at the College. I am grateful to librarians Andrea Lamb and Cara Sabolcik who welcomed me there. Sixth, I must thank Professor Mustafa Erdogˇan and Professor Atilla Yayla who have always provided great intellectual support to me. Seventh, I am grateful to Professor Chandran Kukathas who brought Pierre Bayle into my attention ix

x

Acknowledgments

when I met him in Salt Lake City, UT, in the summer of 2006 and commented on the first draft of this book in the fall of 2009. Eighth, I am indebted to my institution, the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at Hacettepe University, Ankara, for granting me a sabbatical during the fall semester of 2007–2008 and my colleagues for taking over my courses at the department. I made use of my doctoral dissertation, An Investigation of the Contributions of Plato and Aristotle to the Emergence of the Concept of Toleration, in the preparation of this manuscript. In fact, the first chapter of this book, which consists of an analysis of the concept of toleration, is a revised, updated, and expanded version of the related section of the dissertation. The second chapter, which is devoted to the discussion of toleration on the basis of skepticism through the presentation of Michel de Montaigne’s case, is primarily a reproduction of the related chapter in the dissertation. This chapter from the dissertation was also previously published as an article under the title “A Defense of Toleration on the Basis of Skepticism: The Case of Michel de Montaigne,” in Hacettepe University Journal of Economics and Administrative Sciences. I am thankful to Hacettepe University Journal of Economics and Administrative Sciences for permitting to reprint this material here. The third chapter, which discusses the relation between prudence and toleration through the presentation of John Locke’s defense of toleration, also corresponds to a chapter in my dissertation. I paraphrased some parts of this chapter and somewhat expanded it. The fourth chapter, which hosts the discussion of the defense of toleration on the basis of autonomy and the case of John Stuart Mill, is completely new. It was written during the summer of 2008. As I indicated above, this was one part of my postdoctoral research that was funded by the Earhart Foundation. The other part of my postdoctoral research, i.e., the examination of the relation between conscience and toleration through the case of Pierre Bayle corresponds to the fifth chapter. A separate fellowship from Earhart Foundation in the final year of my doctoral studies at the University of Maryland, College Park, enabled me to focus on writing my dissertation and to finish it in a timely manner. Thus, I am indebted to the Earhart Foundation and Dr. Liggio not only for their support in preparing the fourth and fifth chapters but also other chapters that were largely adapted from my dissertation. The sixth chapter is a presentation of a contemporary debate between two prominent liberal thinkers, namely, Will Kymlicka and Chandran Kukathas, who defend autonomy-based toleration and consciencebased toleration, respectively. This chapter appears largely in “Toleration, Political Liberalism and Peaceful Coexistence in the Islamic World,” an article which I originally published in The American Journal of Islamic Social

Acknowledgments

xi

Sciences. I am grateful to The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences for granting me the copyright to reprint this material. I am also grateful to Institute for Humane Studies for supporting the publication of this book through a grant from The Hayek Fund for Scholars. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Mine S¸ ahin, and my son, Doruk Tolga S¸ ahin, for letting me to travel to the United States for four months and for supporting me during all that time.

Chapter One

Introduction

More than anything, diversity is what characterizes societies of the twentyfirst century. Our contemporary societies are marked by ethnic, religious, racial, ideological, moral, and sexual diversity. Cultural, moral, and ideological pluralism is a fact of our lives. While some people see this phenomenon as a source of richness and thus welcome it, others feel threatened by it. Those who feel threatened have two options before them: they will either learn how to live with diversity or look for ways to suppress it. In fact, the latter attitude provides political theory with the most pressing issue to deal with: social conflict caused by differences.1 However, the former attitude ameliorates social conflict, if not totally avoids it. As a matter of fact, this path may be the only viable answer that political theory has in its arsenal against the conflict caused by diversity. It is called “toleration.”2 Although one can trace the origins of toleration to the work of Aristotle3 who was responding to the conflict between the democrats and the oligarchs in the polis, the full blown concept of toleration emerged as a response to religious conflict in Europe at the beginning of modern times in the sixteenth century.4 Indicating this common view about the connection between the emergence of toleration and religious dissent, Susan Mendus states, Indeed, the story of toleration is predominantly the story of the battle against religious intolerance and persecution, and it is in this context that many important conceptual points about the nature and justification of toleration were first formulated.5

In the early modern era, it was liberal thinkers who contemplated toleration. In a sense, the history of toleration can be seen as the history of liberalism as well.6 Will Kymlicka indicates the connection between toleration and 1

2

Chapter One

liberalism by stating that “[l]iberalism and toleration are closely related, both historically and conceptually. The development of religious tolerance was one of the historical roots of liberalism.”7 Thus, one of liberalism’s ideological roots can be found in the struggle to find a solution to religious conflict. The question that liberal thinkers asked was, “How can conflict that is caused by religious heterogeneity be prevented?” Later on, by including not only religious conflict but also other conflicts that were caused by other differences in contemporary societies, liberalism extended the coverage of toleration. In this sense, liberal theory can be seen as the culmination of the answer(s) that were given to a particular question: “How can individual, religious, ethnic, sexual, gender-based, and cultural differences in a society coexist peacefully?” The concept of toleration holds such a paramount place in liberalism’s answer to this particular question that, with Mark Mercer, we can say, “[t]o live tolerantly is to express a liberal identity.”8 As hinted above, there is not just one answer to the above question, but different answers. In other words, there is diversity among liberals as to the grounds of toleration. In this book, I cover four prominent answers: toleration based on skepticism, toleration based on prudence, toleration based on autonomy, and toleration based on conscience. Furthermore, I illustrate these approaches through the works of four pioneering liberals, namely, Michel de Montaigne, John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and Pierre Bayle, respectively. However, before doing that, I will subject toleration to a conceptual analysis. Here, I discuss what toleration is as much as what it is not. This is the first chapter of our study. The second chapter focuses on the defense of toleration based on skepticism. Very briefly, in the case of toleration that is based on skepticism, a tolerant person may believe that she or he has no rational ground to justify her or his intolerance toward another person. For skeptics one cannot rationally justify her or his intolerance because it is impossible to know anything with certainty. They argue that one can never tell with certainty whether what one claims to know is true or false; thus, knowledge is impossible. In this sense, skepticism questions the bases of our beliefs and tries to show that we cannot have certainty with respect to them. In the absence of certainty, any attempt to impose our own beliefs on someone else corresponds to injustice. Thus, as long as one does not want to commit injustice through imposing her or his own arbitrary position on others, one should be tolerant toward different ways of lives. After presenting theoretical and historical foundations of skepticism, I present one of the most original defenses of toleration based on skepticism. This defense belongs to Michel de Montaigne. He developed his defense of toleration on skepticism primarily in his longest essay in Essays: “An Apology for Raymond Sebond.”

Introduction

3

In the third chapter, I present the defense of toleration based on prudence which advises the intolerant subject to take the costs of acting intolerantly into account. It is most of the time the case that acting intolerantly costs much higher than acting tolerantly. Therefore, it would be much more prudent to act tolerantly toward the object that causes dislike, disgust, or disapproval: [t]olerance is a good pragmatic means to secure other values at this place and time, given a realistic assessment of the costs and benefits of tolerating others in the context of our condition and desires. We tolerate others so that they will tolerate us. Toleration is, in the long run, less costly and more profitable for us than would be the consequences of intolerance. Tolerance, then, is useful in establishing a modus vivendi among competing factions.9

This defense is demonstrated through the argument of John Locke, which he developed in A Letter Concerning Toleration and Second Treatise of Government. In this chapter, I argue that although John Locke defended toleration on the rights of conscience as well, his originality is found in his argument on prudence. In the fourth chapter, I present the defense of toleration that takes individual autonomy as the basis. According to those who defend toleration on the basis of autonomy, an individual’s happiness is attained through leading a good life which is chosen by the individual in question. There are different, and in a sense, competing understandings of the good life and it is up to individuals to “choose” among them. Furthermore, in order for a chosen good life to lead to happiness, it needs to be chosen by the individual her- or himself. Finally, given that we human beings are fallible creatures, this freedom also involves the right to examine, revise, and even drop that understanding of the good life that was accepted previously by the individual. Thus, the concept of autonomy can be defined as the ability of an individual to rationally construct, review, revise, and, if necessary, drop totally her or his understanding of good life. The defenders of toleration based on individual autonomy argue that if individuals are going to lead fulfilled lives, they should be tolerated in their experiments with their lives. After the conceptual analysis of individual autonomy, I turn to John Stuart Mill’s defense of toleration based on this concept. The work in which Mill developed his defense of toleration most elaborately is On Liberty. Thus, I focus on that work as well. The fifth chapter is reserved for the defense of toleration based on conscience. First, I begin by discussing the primacy of conscience among human motives and freedom of conscience as the most important human interest. Accordingly, regardless of its content, every individual has a primary interest in the ability to lead a life that is in compliance with one’s conscience. Whereas shaping one’s life according to one’s conscience is accompanied by happiness,

4

Chapter One

a life led in defiance of the voice of one’s conscience brings about guilt, frustration, and unhappiness. Without being left free to follow the dictates of one’s conscience, one cannot achieve happiness. Thus, one should be tolerated for her or his beliefs. In this sense, in order to attain happiness, which is not possible through leading a life against one’s conscience, one should be left alone, i.e., tolerated, to listen to the voice of her or his conscience. Second, I turn to the first uncompromising defense of toleration based on conscience. This defense was provided by Pierre Bayle. The work in which he put forward his argument to the full extent is A Philosophical Commentary on These Words of the Gospel, Luke 14:23, “Compel Them to Come In, That My House May Be Full.” Therefore, my focus is on that work as well. In the sixth chapter, I present a contemporary debate which takes place between two prominent liberal thinkers, namely, Will Kymlicka and Chandran Kukathas. While Kymlicka defends toleration on the basis of individual autonomy, Kukathas takes the rights of conscience as the basis of toleration. To the extent to which autonomy is at the basis of a particular understanding of good life, i.e., the liberal good life, Kymlicka’s defense of toleration based on autonomy takes a comprehensive/ethical form and places him in the camp of comprehensive or ethical liberals. For these liberals, the ideals and principles that are at the basis of the liberal political order cannot be separated from the ideals and principles that shape the lives of the members of this political order. Individuals who are members of a liberal political order are supposed to embrace such a core liberal value as autonomy. As a result of this acceptance, comprehensive or ethical liberals cannot endorse those understandings of good life which do not take autonomy as a basic value. However, freedom of conscience does not dictate a certain way of life. Thus, Kukathas’ defense of toleration with its emphasis on the rights of conscience places him in the camp of political liberalism. For political liberals, liberalism is a political doctrine which emerges from the pursuit of providing a political framework within which ethically different understandings of good life can coexist in peace. From this perspective, any attempt to build the political edifice on any comprehensive ethical view(s) that exist in the society may cause oppression of those who do not share that ethical view and political conflict which threatens political stability. In order to avoid civil strife and consequent dire results, political liberals abstain from privileging any particular understanding(s) of good life over others. As a result of this stance, political liberalism becomes a more inclusive form of liberalism. Finally, in the conclusion, I evaluate these four theories of liberal toleration on the basis of a criterion with two dimensions. The first dimension of this criterion is concerned with the defensibility of any theory of toleration. How persuasive is a theory of toleration? Can it defend its standpoint against coun-

Introduction

5

ter-arguments? The second dimension is concerned with the inclusiveness of any theory of toleration. This dimension looks at the range of differences that a theory of toleration covers. For example, while some theories of toleration advise the Prince to be tolerant toward the Protestants but not toward the Catholics, another theory defends toleration for all sects within the realm of a sovereign, so long as those sects do not disturb the public order. Thus, the latter sort is more inclusive than the former. After evaluating these four theories of toleration on the basis of this criterion with respect to one another, I argue that it is the concept of conscience that provides the most persuasive and inclusive ground for the defense of liberal toleration.

TOLERATION: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS The etymological root of toleration goes back to Latin word tolerantia. The general notion of enduring and putting up with various items was what this concept denoted in its early history.10 There are two nouns that exist in contemporary English that derived from Latin tolerantia: tolerance and toleration. Generally, while tolerance depicts an attitude, toleration depicts an action. More specifically, tolerance corresponds to a willingness or ability to tolerate; toleration corresponds to the practice of tolerating.11 According to John Horton, toleration involves “a deliberate decision to refrain from prohibiting, hindering or otherwise coercively interfering with conduct of which one disapproves, although one has power to do so.”12 Andrew Jason Cohen provides another, yet similar definition: “an act of toleration is an agent’s intentional and principled refraining from interfering with an opposed other (or their behavior, etc.) in situations of diversity, where the agent believes she has the power to interfere.”13 This attitude can be summarized in one sentence as follows: “I disagree with your position on this matter which I care about but I will not attempt to coerce your behavior.”14 Toleration comprises four main components. The first component is concerned with the subject of toleration. In fact, there are two subjects of toleration: a tolerating and a tolerated subject. Each of these subjects can be an individual, a group, an organization or an institution. In order to qualify as a tolerating subject, a subject needs to exhibit agency. Stated differently, being able to tolerate requires an entity to be capable of doing something, of acting. If a subject does not have the capacity to act, then, it cannot act against an object. However, in order to be tolerated, an entity does not need to be capable of exhibiting agency. For example, in the sense of being tolerated, gays and lesbians as a group can be a subject of toleration. That is, they can be subject of intolerance by those who disapprove of their way of life. Nevertheless,

6

Chapter One

since they lack the necessary structure to act as a group against a subject of toleration who/which is in the position of being tolerated, they cannot be tolerating subjects.15 Thus, as Cohen puts it, “[t]oleration is a behavioral matter; to tolerate X is to engage in a particular type of behavior.”16 The “object” of toleration forms the second component. An action, a belief or a practice can be an object of toleration.17 It is possible to ascertain at least two different understandings of toleration by looking at what is considered as a proper object. These are narrow and broad understandings. According to narrow understanding, in order to be tolerant, one needs to refrain herself or himself from acting against something that really matters to her or him. In this perspective, the differences that form the object of toleration should involve important moral matters.18 The differences in religious beliefs and practices, sexual preferences, and political ideologies can qualify as the object of toleration. From this perspective, such trivial things as differences of tastes cannot be a proper object of toleration. According to Peter P. Nicholson, if toleration is going to be a “moral ideal,” the objects of toleration must involve moral matters.19 One logical conclusion of this approach is that one of the most divisive differences among human beings, namely race, cannot constitute a proper object of toleration. Being a biological fact, race does not have anything to do with moral choice. Another implication of this line of reasoning is that we can apply the notion of toleration properly only to the objects over which tolerated subjects have the ability of making changes. Likewise we can talk about moral responsibility only where there is freedom of choice. In the absence of physical compulsion, one can choose the way she or he behaves among alternative ways of behavior, and thus, can change her or his behavior if she or he wants to, but one cannot change her or his color of skin. When one tolerates someone for a certain belief or behavior, her or his tolerance involves the belief that this belief or behavior is not inevitable in the sense that she or he can expect the tolerated person to believe or act in another way. Yet tolerance also involves not demanding that change. Thus to the extent that it is impossible to change one’s race, showing intolerance toward racial differences is irrational, and therefore racial differences have to be accepted rather than being tolerated. According to the broad perspective, on the other hand, objects that cause simple dislike, distaste, or disgust as well as disapproval can be the objects of toleration. Mary Warnock provides us with an example of the broad perspective.20 Warnock begins by rejecting the claim that a clear line between the moral, which is based on rational argument, and the non-moral, which is not based on rational argument, can be drawn. On the contrary, she thinks that strong feelings may give basis to moral judgments. Traveling on David

Introduction

7

Hume’s path, Warnock claims that “morality is more properly felt than judged of, and moral distinctions are not grounded in reason.”21 However, Warnock does not argue that all cases of toleration have equal value. Knowing that some of the feelings are unimportant, Warnock makes a distinction between strong toleration, which involves the cases of moral disapproval, and weak toleration, which involves the cases of simple distaste and dislike.22 Thus, not only moral disapproval but also dislike, distaste, and disgust provide the occasions in which we can properly employ the notion of toleration. In this sense, the broad perspective of toleration makes it possible to apply the notion of toleration to racial differences.23 To the extent to which racial intolerance is based on a form of dislike, it is a legitimate candidate for the application of the notion of toleration. In this study the broad perspective of toleration is followed. From this perspective, such “trivial” things as different ways of dressing, cooking, etc. can be the proper objects of toleration. The third component of toleration is concerned with the existence of a negative attitude toward the object of toleration in the forms of dislike and/or disapproval: “[w]e are genuinely tolerant of others only when we disapprove of them, or of their actions and beliefs, but nonetheless refrain from imposing our own view.” 24 Accordingly, we cannot be said to show tolerance toward the differences about which we are simply ‘indifferent’25: “[t]he reason for this seems straightforward: we think of ourselves as tolerating only when we recognize something and disapprove or, at least, dislike it. If someone is throwing a ball against my wall, I may tolerate it (or not)—in part because the behavior annoys.”26 If we are allowing the different practices of others without objecting to them, disapproving of them or finding them disgusting, what we are doing is not tolerating but simply being in favor of liberty.27 The fourth component of toleration requires that there must be a significant degree of restraint on the part of the tolerating subject from acting against the object of toleration. We begin to talk about toleration only when someone refrains from interfering with somebody else’s behavior. If you interfere with my behavior, you do not tolerate my behavior. According to Cohen, “[t]his is the condition at the heart of toleration. . . . Put simply, toleration requires that the behavior in question not (negatively) be interfered with—there must be no action aimed at preventing the behavior in question.”28 However, it must be also indicated that rational persuasion would not count as a form of intolerance. A person may employ rational argumentation to persuade another person not to continue with the object of dislike/disapproval.29 As long as one does not resort to coercive means but remains within the boundaries of peaceful persuasion in making somebody else change her or his behavior, she or he would qualify as tolerant: [c]ases where one should tolerate are cases where the only interference permissible is rational dialogue.” 30

8

Chapter One

This also implies that the tolerating subject has the capability to dictate her, his, or its will on the tolerated subject.31 For example, if a person/group/institution refrains from acting against a religious belief or practice despite the fact that this person/group/institution has power to stop it, only then we can say that this person/group/institution exercised toleration: “We may be said to tolerate only in the circumstances where, although we disapprove of the heterodox religion, and although we have the power to persecute, we nevertheless refrain.”32 In Albert Weale’s words, “those who are tolerant could get their way if they chose. This is the distinction between acquiescence and toleration.”33 In this sense, tolerance is not resigning oneself to what one disapproves of out of a sense of helplessness.34 Thus, tolerating subject believes, perhaps falsely, that she/he/it could interfere in some way with the object of toleration.35 In order for an act of non-interference to count as toleration, it must be grounded on the right reasons. As Cohen puts it, “[w]e might say that one endures what one (believes one) has to; one tolerates what one (believes one) should.”36 Toleration that has these features can be seen as a method of managing conflict.37 The conflict that is the subject matter of toleration is caused by differences which are caused by diversity in turn. As Cohen indicates, “[i]f there is no diversity, there are no differences, and if there are no differences, there is nothing to oppose or tolerate.”38 According to Hans Oberdiek, wherever there is difference, especially deep difference, there is a potential object for toleration, and deep differences exist everywhere.39 Some of the deep differences that cause bitter conflict in human societies are concerned with religion, ethnicity, culture, and morality. Not everybody is welcoming toward all sorts of differences. While some people are disturbed by their neighbors’ sexual preferences, others disapprove of some of their fellow citizens’ religious beliefs. Destructive conflict emerges when those people who disapprove of or dislike certain beliefs and/or behaviors attempt to suppress these beliefs and/or behaviors. When this happens, the peaceful coexistence of differences in a society becomes impossible. Thus, if legitimate conflict is not harnessed, it can take destructive forms. In this sense, conflict among individuals with different aspirations poses the most fundamental challenge to the modern philosopher/thinker in the task of keeping society intact as long as possible. If the political philosopher/thinker is going to be successful in this task, she or he must find a way to prevent legitimate conflict from elevating to the level of destructive conflict. As an instrument of accommodating conflict, toleration provides the modern philosopher/thinker with a solution. Toleration does not eradicate either conflict or differences that cause that conflict. It only prevents conflict from taking a destructive twist. The differ-

Introduction

9

ences that cause conflict remain even after the act of toleration. Toleration does not require a person to welcome and/or celebrate the object of toleration that causes dislike, disgust, or disapproval. In Cohen’s words, “[t]oleration is not pluralism or ‘enthusiastic endorsement of difference’ that might be better associated with certain sorts of multiculturalisms—one does not tolerate what one promotes.”40 All that toleration requires is to refrain from prohibiting, hindering or coercively interfering with the conduct of the object of toleration. In that regard, the principle of toleration provides at least two things: first, a private sphere to individuals and groups in which they can experience their differences; second, a window of opportunity through which the differences may come to respect one another in the long run. However, the emergence of toleration requires a mind-set that accepts that differences among human beings are natural, and thus conflict that emerges from these differences is inevitable and legitimate. The simple reason for this is that if one does not think that differences and hence conflict are natural, then one attempts to eradicate that conflict through eradicating the differences that cause conflict in the first place. When one looks at the history of political thought, she or he can realize that the state of mind that makes toleration possible has not always been there. The Paradox of Toleration Every philosopher who grapples with the concept of toleration has to come to grips with “the paradox of toleration.” In other words, she or he must provide persuasive reasons as to why one should not interfere with that which one disapproves of. The fact that toleration requires someone to refrain from prohibiting, hindering or otherwise coercively interfering with exactly what one disapproves of presents the so-called “paradox of toleration.” On one side of the equation lies the object of toleration, that is, an act or belief that causes disapproval, dislike, or disgust, and on the other side, the conscience of the tolerating subject. The conscience of the tolerating subject is a battleground where a fierce fight takes place between the moral values and beliefs of the tolerating subject, which strongly urge the person to stop the object of toleration, and the demands for toleration. In order for the demands of toleration to come out victorious from this battle, the conscience of the tolerating subject must be provided with some good reasons. In fact, the reasons that are presented to overcome the paradox of toleration are different ways of justifying toleration. In the following pages, four different theories of toleration will be presented. These four different theories are justified on the grounds of skepticism, prudence, autonomy, and freedom of conscience. These four grounds

10

Chapter One

for the justification of toleration provide this study with a roadmap. In the rest of the book, each of these four grounds of justification and related theories of toleration provide the subject of analysis in a separate chapter.

NOTES 1. Chandran Kukathas, “Multiculturalism and Nationalism,” in A Handbook of Political Theory, ed. Chandran Kukathas and Gerald Gauss (London: Sage Publications, 2004), 250–64. 2. Thus, toleration does not regard diversity as a source of richness. Rather, it sees diversity as the root cause of the problem, i.e., conflict. However, toleration does not attempt to eradicate differences, which is called intolerance. Intolerance only makes matters worse. 3. Bican S¸ ahin, “An Investigation of the Contributions of Plato and Aristotle to the Emergence of the Concept of Toleration,” unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland, College Park, 2003. On this point see also, Evelyn Barker, “Socratic Intolerance and Aristotelian Toleration,” in Philosophy, Religion, and the Question of Intolerance, ed. Mehdi A. Razavi and David Ambuel (Albany: State Univ. of New York, 1997), 246–55. 4. Henry Kamen, The Rise of Toleration (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967); Alan Levine, Early Modern Skepticism and the Origins of Toleration (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 1999); Cary J. Nederman and John Christian Laursen eds., Difference and Dissent: Theories of Tolerance in Medieval and Early Modern Europe (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1996). 5. Susan Mendus, Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International, Inc., 1989), 6. 6. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), xxvi; Mendus, Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism. 7. Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 155. 8. Mark Mercer, “Grounds of Liberal Tolerance,” The Journal of Value Inquiry 33 (1999): 319–34, 330. 9. Mercer, “Grounds of Liberal Tolerance,” 325. 10. Preston King, Toleration (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1976), 12. 11. The Oxford American Dictionary of Current English (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2000). Since tolerance and toleration share the same verb, namely, to tolerate; and there is only one adjective that describes the person who either has the attitude or performs the action, namely, tolerant, they are going to be used interchangeably in this study. 12. John Horton, “Toleration,” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E. Craig (London: Routledge, 1998), Vol. 9, 429–33.

Introduction

11

13. Andrew Jason Cohen, “What Toleration Is,” Ethics 115 (October 2004): 68–95, 69. 14. Edward Langerak, “Disagreement: Appreciating the Dark Side of Tolerance,” in Philosophy, Religion, and the Question of Intolerance, eds. M. A. Razavi and D. Ambuel (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 111–24, 116. 15. Hans Oberdiek, Tolerance: Between Forbearance and Acceptance (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Pub., 2001), 40–41. 16. Cohen, “What Toleration Is,” 79. 17. Cohen, “What Toleration Is,” 90. 18. Albert Weale, “Toleration, Individual Differences and Respect for Persons,” in Aspects of Toleration, eds. John Horton and Susan Mendus (London: Methuen, 1985), 16–35, 18. 19. Peter P. Nicholson, “Toleration as a Moral Ideal,” in Aspects of Toleration, eds. John Horton and Susan Mendus (London: Methuen, 1985), 158–73, 160–61. 20. Mary Warnock, “The Limits of Toleration,” in On Toleration, eds. S. Mendus and D. Edwards (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), cited in Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism, Susan Mendus (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International, Inc., 1989). 21. Mendus, Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism, 11. 22. Mendus, Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism, 11–12. 23. Susan Mendus states that “although historically the problem of toleration has its origins in religious contexts, and the plea for toleration (in Locke, for example) was a plea for the toleration of different and conflicting beliefs, the modern world has also borne witness to increasing tolerance of what people are.” Susan Mendus, “My Brother’s Keeper: The Politics of Intolerance,” in The Politics of Toleration in Modern Life, ed. Susan Mendus (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), 1–12, 3. 24. Mendus, “My Brother’s Keeper: The Politics of Intolerance,” 3. 25. George Carey, “Tolerating Religion,” in The Politics of Toleration in Modern Life, ed. Susan Mendus (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), 45–63, 46. 26. Cohen, “What Toleration Is,” 71. 27. Mendus, Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism, 8; Mercer, “Grounds of Liberal Tolerance,” 320. 28. Cohen, “What Toleration Is,” 85. 29. Mercer, “Grounds of Liberal Tolerance,” 321. 30. Cohen, “What Toleration Is,” 74. 31. Mendus, Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism, 9. For a contrary view, see Bernard Williams, “Tolerating the Intolerable,” in The Politics of Toleration in Modern Life, ed. Susan Mendus (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), 65–75. 32. Mendus, Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism, 9. 33. Weale, “Toleration, Individual Differences and Respect for Persons,” 18. 34. Cohen, “What Toleration Is,” 72. 35. Langerak, “Disagreement: Appreciating the Dark Side of Tolerance,” 117. 36. Cohen, “What Toleration Is,” 72–73.

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37. As it is used here, conflict broadly means the clash of interests, religious and political beliefs, and/or ways of life. 38. Cohen, “What Toleration Is,” 92. 39. Oberdiek, Tolerance: Between Forbearance and Acceptance, 46–47. 40. Cohen, “What Toleration Is,” 73.

Chapter Two

Skepticism and Toleration: The Case of Michel de Montaigne

The only thing that I know is that I know nothing. Socrates The Holy Ghost is not a skeptic. Luther

Skepticism is a particular epistemological attitude. As Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes indicate, “epistemology discusses the questions of cognition: What is knowledge? How much can we know? Of what can we be certain? In what circumstances our beliefs are justified?”1 There are two basic positions with regards to these questions: skepticism and dogmatism.2 While these two positions are in agreement about the answer to the first question, they are literally at the opposite poles in terms of the answers that they give to the rest of the questions. Both skeptical and dogmatist positions accept that if someone asserts a statement p, but is wrong, that person cannot be said to know that p is true. In this sense, one of the main features of the concept of knowledge is that it is impossible to know what is not true.3 If I state that the capital of Turkey is ˙Istanbul, this statement, being mistaken, cannot be a piece of knowledge. The second point of agreement between the skeptics and the dogmatists concerns the criterion of certainty. This criterion is connected with the former. If it is possible to be mistaken about p, then one cannot know that p. If I know p, I know that p with certainty. The possibility of being mistaken implies an uncertainty in one’s awareness of a given situation, and therefore, corresponds to a lack of knowledge.4 According to this criterion, such a statement as “The capital of Turkey might be Ankara,” although it is correct, cannot qualify as a piece of knowledge. 13

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As indicated above, skeptics and dogmatists agree only on the answer that they give to the question, “What is knowledge?” On the questions of certainty, they radically disagree. At their extreme points, skeptics argue that it is impossible to know anything because it is impossible to attain certainty. They argue that one can never tell whether what one claims to know is true or false; thus, knowledge is impossible. This is the position of “radical skepticism.” As Richard H. Popkin and Avrum Stroll put it “the radical skeptic doubts that any piece of information is any better than any other.”5 However, there is another strand of skepticism according to which some pieces of knowledge are better than others. This is called “mitigated skepticism.” Generally speaking, a mitigated skeptic is committed to the view that information is to be presented in probabilistic terms. Hence, the more probable a piece of information is, the more reliable it is. However, these skeptics continue to believe that no matter how high on the scale of probability, we never reach the realm of knowledge grounded on certainty.6 The dogmatist claims that knowledge is possible and one who knows something knows that thing with certainty. There may be secular and religious forms of dogmatism. In the former form, a dogmatist may believe in the existence of a fixed truth in nature or science. In religious dogmatism, revealed religion provides all the information with certainty that one needs to know. Secular dogmatism relies ultimately on reason. According to the secular dogmatists, the senses are not reliable tools for attaining the truth due to the fact that the objects of sense perception are subject to constant change. However, knowledge must be about fixed phenomena. Otherwise what we know right now as true will be false in a moment, violating the first criterion of knowledge, namely, one cannot know that which is false. Religious dogmatists may also employ reason. However, their motivation for doing so is always to find explanations that prove the truth of sacred religion. It is often thought that there is at least an emotional kinship between skepticism and toleration.7 As indicated earlier, the core of the skeptical argument for toleration is that there is no rational ground for justifying our moral values, and therefore, any attempt to impose our own value system on others forms an arbitrary behavior on our part and corresponds to injustice. If we do not want to commit injustice, we should tolerate the beliefs and/or actions that we believe to be wrong. Nevertheless, as Mendus indicates “the link between skepticism and toleration is not unproblematic. . . . There is in fact no straightforward move from moral or religious skepticism to toleration.”8 Alan Levine illustrates this point by a reference to Dostoyevsky.9 In The Brothers Karamazov, Dostoyevsky states that “if nothing is true, everything is permitted.” In other words, the skeptical stance may also involve the toleration of intolerance. According to

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this mode of reasoning, if we can never have the knowledge of the truth, or if there is no truth about such matters to be discovered, then there is nothing wrong in enforcing uniformity of belief.10 “My inability to know of any way of life that it is worse than any other would mean that I could have no more reason to express tolerance toward a way of life I disapprove of than to express intolerance. Thus, skepticism supports intolerance precisely to the degree it supports tolerance.”11 Therefore, in order for skepticism to lead to tolerance rather than to intolerance, it needs to be interpreted in a certain way. Michel de Montaigne provides us with an example of this kind of interpretation. His justification of toleration on the basis of skepticism will be presented in the last part of this chapter.

ANCIENT SKEPTICISM There are two different traditions of skepticism that flowered in ancient Greece: Academic skepticism and Pyrrhonism. Although Pyrrho of Ellis (360–270 B.C.), from whom Pyrrhonians get their name, lived before the emergence of Academic skepticism, it was the Academic skeptics who formulated skepticism as a philosophical methodology for the first time in the third century B.C. Beginning with Arcesilaus (315–240 B.C.), the Academics embraced the Socratic remark, “All that I know is that I know nothing,” as their motto. For a further two hundred years, the Academy remained skeptical. Another notable leader of the Academy after Arcesilaus in this new era was Carneades (214/13–129/8 B.C.).12 Although we do not possess the writings of either Arcesilaus or of Carneades, as Popkin indicates, later writings by Cicero, Sextus Empiricus, and Diogenes Laertius provide a fairly good idea of the kinds of arguments that they put forward. Thanks to these writings, we know that Arcesilaus attacked the Stoics, and Carneades criticized heavily both the Stoics and Epicureans.13 As dogmatists, the Stoics claimed that there are certain sense perceptions which could not possibly be false either per se or as signs of the true nature of reality. Arcesilaus and Carneades responded to this claim by pointing out that there are no secure criteria that can be established with the purpose of differentiating such kinds of perception from another.14 As a result, the Academics concluded that we must suspend judgment about whether reliable representations of objects actually exist. According to the Academics, this situation confirms that no knowledge claims about what is happening beyond our immediate experience are certain. Depending on the information that we gather through our senses we cannot have knowledge but merely reasonable

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belief. All information that can be gained must be described in probabilistic terms. Thus, Academic skepticism formed a kind of mitigated skepticism.15 According to Annas and Barnes, the Academics were not positive skeptics, believing that nothing should be asserted. As Annas and Barnes state it, Rather, they were essentially critics. . . . Typically, they would take hold of one of the doctrines of a dogmatist philosopher (the Stoics were their usual target) and attempt to reduce it to absurdity. “If you Stoics are right,” they would argue, “and such-and-such is the case, then we cannot know the truth about so-and-so. You Stoics are committed by your own principles to skepticism.”16

Our knowledge about Pyrrhonism comes from the writings of three ancient thinkers: Sextus Empiricus, Cicero, and Diogenes Laertius. The last great Pyrrhonist from antiquity was Sextus Empiricus. While not all of his writings survived, those which did provide us with a good understanding of ancient skepticism. The Outlines of Pyrrhonism, a general introduction to Pyrrhonism in three books, and a further group of eleven books known collectively as Against the Mathematicians are the two works by Sextus that have come down to us. Along with these two works, Cicero’s Academica, and Diogenes Laertius’ Life of Pyrrho form our main sources of ancient Greek skepticism.17 In contradistinction to the Academic skeptics, Pyrrhonian skeptics presented a positive skepticism, thinking that nothing should be asserted. As a skeptical tradition, Pyrrhonism emerged under the leadership of Aenesidemus (?–?) in the first century B.C. during the Roman period. Aenesidemus who probably taught in Alexandria is reported to have attacked both the Academic skeptics and the dogmatic philosophers. He criticized the Academics because they were sure that what is probable and what is improbable can be distinguished from one another, and the dogmatic philosophers because they claimed to have discovered the truth.18 As indicated earlier, Pyrrhonians claim to be the followers of Pyrrho of Ellis. None of his works survived and virtually all we know about him comes from the writings of later skeptics, mainly from Diogenes Laertius and Sextus Empiricus. In Outlines of Pyrrhonism (Book I, 7), Sextus Empiricus states that “Pyrrho appears to us to have applied himself to skepticism more thoroughly and more conspicuously than his predecessors.” Pyrrho accepted an extreme skepticism and lived by it. He rejected all assertion and belief, and as a result, he led a tranquil life. In Pierre Bayle’s words, “[e]verywhere he found reasons for affirming and for denying; and this is why he suspended judgment after having carefully examined all the arguments pro and con, and always concluded that the matter should be looked into further.”19 Indeed, one of the basic principles of Pyrrhonism, i.e., the life of ataraxia, consists in this

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attitude. The word ataraxia is commonly translated into English as “unperturbedness.” The goal for the Pyrrhonians was to attain unperturbedness through epoche,20 i.e., suspension of judgment. In his Outlines of Pyrrhonism (Book I, 8), Sextus Empiricus summarizes this point as follows: Skepticism is an ability, or mental attitude, which opposes appearances to judgments in any way whatsoever, with the result that, owing to the equipollence of the objects and reasons thus opposed, we are brought firstly to a state of mental suspense and next to a state of “unperturbedness” or quietude.

The Pyrrhonian view that tranquility will be found in the suspension of judgment stands in explicit opposition to the widespread Greek view that there is a positive connection between knowledge and fulfillment. According to this latter view, happiness (eudemonia), which is the goal of life, comes from virtuous activity, and virtuous activity necessitates the knowledge of what virtue is. In this view, a philosophical life, that is, the life of inquiry with the purpose of acquiring knowledge based on certainty, is indispensable for the attainment of happiness. However, the Pyrrhonians believe that our troubles are caused exactly by that which is supposed to bring about happiness, i.e., the quest for knowledge with certainty.21 Making human happiness dependent on knowledge leads to failure in the attainment of happiness, because it seems that it is impossible to gain knowledge that is based on certainty. Faced with the appearance that all attempts to answer questions with certainty remain elusive, the Pyrrhonians suspended judgment and hoped to achieve tranquility.22 The suspension of judgment is consistent with a kind of passive acceptance of the world as it is. In Popkin and Stroll’s words, “one lives in this world, acts in it, takes it as it is without reflection.”23 Thus, epoche, i.e., suspension of judgment, leads one to conform to the prevailing customs and standards of one’s society, and to base one’s life on sensory appearances and bodily needs and desires.24 In this regard, it is not misleading to say that the Pyrrhonian way of life is essentially conservative in its consequences.

THE REVIVAL OF SKEPTICISM IN THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD The last time ancient Greek skepticism exerted serious influence before its rediscovery in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was when St. Augustine attacked Academic skepticism in his Contra Academicos. In this work, the famous theologian presented a powerful argument against the skeptical position which was so brilliantly stated in Cicero’s Academica. From the appearance

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of St. Augustine’s Contra Academicos to the Renaissance, the ancient skepticism was practically absent from the circles of the learned. As Schmitt indicates, “the writings of Sextus Empiricus, by far the most important and most detailed of the three, exerted no visible influence during the Middle Ages.”25 However, when rediscovered, it was Sextus Empiricus’ works that exerted the greatest influence on the emergence of modern skeptical philosophy.26 During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the three sources mentioned above were brought into the daylight and disseminated in the Christian West; and during the following century “skepticism emerged as an important philosophical movement, which had a significant impact not merely on philosophical thought, but on theology, science, and literature as well.”27 Perhaps the biggest reason that increased the speed in which ancient skepticism was disseminated in the sixteenth century is the skeptical crisis that was created by the religious confrontation created by the Reformation and Counter-Reformation.28 Some other factors that contributed to the skeptical crisis of the sixteenth century were the new astronomical theories and geographical discoveries. The Judeo-Christian conception of the universe, and humankind’s place in it was shaken by Nicolaus Copernicus (1473–1543), Johannes Kepler (1571–1630) and Galileo Galilei (1564–1642) in the realm of astronomy; and by Vasco da Gama (1469–1524), Christopher Columbus (1451–1506), Sir Francis Drake (1540–1596) and others in the realm of geography.29 However, at this point, it should be emphasized that in opposition to the contemporary belief that skepticism undermines the religious faith, skepticism, as it developed in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, did not generally have anti-religious connotations. As Schmitt puts it “in fact, it was more often used in behalf of religion. In later times—in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries—skepticism came to have an increasingly antireligious tinge, but such was not the case for earlier periods.”30 In 1562 Sextus Empiricus’ the Outlines of Pyrrhonism was translated into Latin for the first time by Henri Estienne. Seven years later, Gentian Hervet presented Sextus Empiricus’ the Adversus Mathematicos to the Latin reading circles of the learned. As Schmitt points out, This is really the crucial event in the development of Renaissance and early modern skepticism, for now by far the most important work of ancient skepticism was generally available for the first time. . . . Once the translations were in print we see a direct development of skepticism as a more potent force in European life.31

It was not long after the translation of Sextus’ works into Latin that two distant cousins, namely, Francisco Sanches (ca.1550–ca.1623) and Michel

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de Montaigne (1533–1592) advanced their skeptically oriented views.32 Sanches’ Quod Nihil Scitur was published in 1576. In this treatise, Sanches attacked the Aristotelian understanding of science which had claimed that it was possible to grasp the necessary causes behind the natural phenomena through deduction from the first principles that are gained by induction.33 In Popkin’s words, he showed that, in Aristotle’s sense of “knowing,” nothing can be known; premisses of syllogisms could not be known to be true unless the conclusions drawn from them were known to be true. (For example, to tell that “All men are mortal” is true, one would have to know “Socrates is mortal” is true.) Hence, there was an unavoidable circularity at the base of Aristotelian theory that prevented it from being a way to knowledge.34

Instead of pursuing knowledge based on certainty, Sanches argued, men should gather factual information based on observation, draw generalizations from these facts, and then test these generalizations against further observations of the phenomenon under investigation. This process would lead to a limited kind of knowledge. According to Sanches, we could not know the true nature of reality and must base our actions on appearances rather than the truth. Sanches called this process the “scientific method.”35 Perhaps the biggest blow to the ancient dogmatist traditions of philosophy, such as Aristotelianism, Platonism, and various forms of Renaissance naturalism, came from Michel de Montaigne. As Popkin states, central issues in modern thought such as the epistemological basis of certitude, the kinds of evidence that can be obtained to support basic beliefs such as the existence of an external world, were proposed in the initial Renaissance presentations of ancient skepticism by Montaigne and his followers.36

Furthermore, Montaigne found a ground in skepticism on which a defense of toleration can be based. In fact, Michel de Montaigne is not the first modern thinker who developed an understanding of toleration on the basis of skepticism. Before Montaigne, Sebastian Franck and Sebastian Castellio had defended toleration toward religious dissidents on the basis of skepticism. Both Franck and Castellio emphasized that religious truth was not easy to be discovered and many doctrines contained in Scripture were too obscure to be grasped with certitude. Given this veil of obscurity over the religious truth, labeling certain people “heretic” and persecuting them afterwards was bound to remain unjustified. Thus, for both Franck and Castellio, in order to avoid shedding the blood of innocent human beings in the name of ambiguous doctrines, we ought to extend toleration to those with whom we disagree on religious matters.37

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What makes Montaigne different and more interesting than his predecessors lies in the fact that he was the most significant thinker that was responsible for the revival of ancient skepticism in the sixteenth century.38 To the extent that he was the most important thinker who advanced skeptical views in the sixteenth century, his defense of toleration on the basis of skepticism merits special treatment. A close examination of Montaigne’s defense of toleration on the basis of skepticism will let us understand the connections between skepticism and toleration better. Therefore, we will now present his understanding of skepticism and then discuss his notion of toleration.

MONTAIGNE’S SKEPTICAL DEFENSE OF TOLERATION Montaigne’s examination of ancient skepticism will be found in his longest essay, “Apology for Raimond de Sebonde,” in the Essays. The apparent reason for Montaigne in writing this essay is to defend Raimond de Sebond, a Spaniard theologian whose Theologia Naturalis Montaigne had translated into French, against two main criticisms. As Montaigne informs us, in Theologia Naturalis Sebonde “undertakes to establish against the atheists and to show by human, natural reasons the truth of all the articles of the Christian religion.”39 The first criticism toward Sebonde’s undertaking consists of the argument that true Christians do not need to prove rationally the articles of their religion because these articles can only be conceived by faith and divine revelation. This is the argument of fideism in favor of the religion. Montaigne agrees with this point to a great extent by stating that “Only faith can embrace, with a lively certainty, the high mysteries of our religion.”40 Furthermore, Montaigne states, “Our religion did not come to us through reasoned arguments or from our own intelligence: it came to us from outside authority, by commandments.”41 However, Montaigne thinks that it is an honorable act to put our natural capabilities into God’s service. Thus to the extent to which Sebonde’s book is seen as a rational supplement to the divinely revealed truth, it can be excused. According to Montaigne, we advance our arguments in favor of divine religion not because God needs our arguments, but as an attempt to honor him through our intellectual service.42 The second criticism from which Montaigne defends Sebonde is concerned with the strength of the rational arguments that Sebonde advances. According to Montaigne, some think that Sebonde’s arguments are rather weak to serve the purpose for which Sebonde employs them. Montaigne finds a greater threat in this criticism and thinks that it is more dangerous and malicious than the first criticism.43 As Popkin points out, Montaigne claims that “since all

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reasoning is unsound, Sebond should not be blamed for his errors.”44 Indeed, this second criticism provides Montaigne with the opportunity to develop his skeptical attack on dogmatism. According to Montaigne, in any philosophical inquiry there are three distinct outcomes that can be arrived at: either the inquiring person will conclude that she or he has found the truth, or that truth is impossible to be found, or that she or he continues to search for truth. These three positions correspond to the positions of dogmatism, the Academic skepticism, and Pyrrhonism, respectively. According to Montaigne, the Peripatetics, i.e., Aristotelians, Epicureans, Stoics, and others subscribe to the dogmatist position. As Montaigne puts it, “they founded the accepted disciplines and expounded their knowledge as certainties.”45 On the other hand, the Academics, including Clitomachus and Carneades, argued that truth cannot be gained by human capabilities. Yet these two positions, that is, that of the dogmatists and the Academics, are criticized by the Pyrrhonians. Pyrrhonians think that the dogmatists who concluded that they have found the truth are infinitely deceived. On the other hand, the Academics who claim that nothing can be known with certainty fail to avoid the dogmatist’s malady because of their opinion about the status of human knowledge, which they hold with certitude. In Montaigne’s words, Pyrrhonians believe that “ignorance which is aware of itself, judges itself, condemns itself, is not complete ignorance: complete ignorance does not even know itself.”46 Therefore, Pyrrhonians abstain from making any assertion. They doubt, and inquire, and do not make themselves sure of anything. One line of Montaigne’s skeptical attack on dogmatism is based on a comparison between human beings and the animals. This comparison is intended to reveal the vanity and presumptuousness of human beings.47 Unlike the ancients who had defined human beings as “rational animals” and placed them above all other animate creatures due to their exclusive possession of reason, Montaigne thinks that rather than being a characteristic that privileges human beings over other creatures, rationality is the very reason that makes them miserable. What is worse is that human beings are not aware of this state of themselves. They think that they know everything and all other creatures are in their service. They place themselves at the center of the universe. According to Montaigne, this presumption is “the very foundation of the tyrannous rule of the Evil Spirit.”48 Let Man make me understand by the force of discursive reason, what are the grounds on which he has founded and erected all those advantages which he thinks he has over other creatures and who has convinced him that it is for his convenience, his service, that, for so many centuries, there has been established and maintained the awesome motion of the vault of heaven, the everlasting light

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of those tapers coursing so proudly overhead or the dread surging of the boundless sea? Is it possible to imagine anything more laughable than that this pitiful, wretched creature—who is not even master of himself, but exposed to shocks on every side—should call himself Master and Emperor of a universe, the smallest particle of which he has no means of knowing, let alone swaying.49

As Levine indicates, if there is any difference between human beings and the animals, Montaigne believes, it is to human beings’ disadvantage. Animals lead the life that nature has prescribed for them. They follow their instincts and stay within the limits of their nature. They attend to their natural needs and desires.50 As Montaigne puts it, “Animals obey the rules of Nature better than we do and remain more moderately within her prescribed limits.”51 On the other hand, human beings run after what is unnatural. Instead of attending to our natural desires that we share with other animals, such as eating, drinking, and procreating, we create “superfluous and artificial” desires. To the extent that they are superfluous and artificial, they necessarily fail to be satisfied. This, in turn, creates tension in the human soul. We are never “at home”: we are always outside ourselves. Fear, desire, hope, impel us toward the future; they rob us of feelings and concern for what now is, in order to spend time over what will be—even when we ourselves shall be no more.52

As Oberdiek points out, for Montaigne, the culprit is imagination. We have a tendency to worry about the future. This tendency, which is caused by the natural faculty of imagination, fills us with all sorts of fear, desire, and hope. These take us away from the here and now.53 Another line of Montaigne’s skepticism is found in his distrust in the capabilities of human reason. As Levine indicates, Montaigne cites certain internal and external factors that cause our reasoning to be unreliable. The distortion that is involved in our sense perceptions, the condition of our body, that is, being sick or healthy, and our emotional state affect the functioning of our reason. The fact that the same object is perceived differently by different people testifies to the distortions that are taking place in the process of sense perception. Similarly, a person thinks and behaves differently in the face of the same situation when she or he is physically sick or emotionally depressed. Thus, due to these internal factors human reason is vulnerable to err.54 Two external factors that cause our understanding to be unreliable are time and place.55 Certain things have been perceived, interpreted, and acted upon differently in different historical times by the same nation or person. Things that used to be socially unacceptable may be welcomed today. Similarly, a person’s point of view may change in time and things that were

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unacceptable and morally wrong once upon a time may become acceptable and correct today. We also witness that the same things may be perceived, interpreted, and acted upon differently in the same historical era by different nations. Who knows which action of the same nation in two different times, or which one of the two different nations’ actions at the same time period is correct? Reason cannot answer these questions by itself. Its biggest helper is our senses. In Montaigne’s words, “now knowledge is conveyed through the senses: they are our Masters: . . . Knowledge begins with them and can be reduced to them.”56 Yet Montaigne believes that “the senses are the proof as well as the main foundation of our ignorance.”57 Montaigne begins his examination of senses by questioning whether human beings are furnished with all natural senses. Observing that there are animals without sight or hearing yet functioning perfectly, Montaigne asks: “Who can tell whether we, also, lack one, two, three, or more senses?”58 Since our senses provide us with the only tools in our search, we could never answer that question. Stated differently, our knowledge of our senses is provided by our senses themselves. We are not aware of our sense of hearing through our sense of sight or any other capacity, but by the sense of hearing itself. Therefore, if we were missing any senses we could not be aware of that situation. This awareness should lead us to conclude that what we perceive through our senses may not be the whole picture. We should not be so presumptuous. As Montaigne states, “our senses are privileged to be the ultimate frontiers of our perception: beyond them there is nothing which could serve to reveal the existence of the senses we lack. One sense cannot reveal another.”59 A second point about the senses made by Montaigne is that, as already noted, the senses are vulnerable to distortion. From seeing that there are animals with a much better sense of hearing or of sight we can infer that our senses are not perfect.60 In the third place, sometimes our state of soul has an impact on how our senses work. As Montaigne puts it, “When we are moved to anger, we do not hear things as they are: . . . Love someone and she appears more beautiful than she is: . . . And anyone we dislike appears more ugly.”61 Finally our senses contradict one another. How are we going to decide which one is closer to the truth? In order to decide we need to have an adjudicative tool. However, how are we going to be sure that this adjudicative tool itself is correct? To prove that this tool has accuracy we need to have a demonstration. To prove this demonstration we need another tool. Thus we are in a cycle: “The senses themselves being full of uncertainty cannot decide the issue of our dispute. It will have to be Reason, then. But no Reason can be established except by another Reason. We retreat into infinity.”62

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Although Montaigne claims that nothing about the eternal essence of things can be known by human beings, he does think that one can know herself or himself. As Levine indicates, “this knowledge is experiential and only of subjective phenomena as felt by a particular person at a particular moment in time.”63 Since all knowledge a person can attain is limited to her or his subjective experience, it is futile to strive for grasping the transcendental truth. For Montaigne, human beings’ natural end and thus interest is summed up in the Delphic injunction: Know Thyself. According to Levine, Montaigne thinks that this is self-interest properly understood.64 It is the ability of self to search itself without interference from outside. It is potentially the most joyful, and at the same time, most frustrating activity for a human being. The reason for joy is that one discovers oneself, her or his individuality. The reason for frustration is that one may see the emptiness of oneself in that there is not any end-point from which our desires, passions, wills come.65 As Screech indicates, Montaigne had realized that “no creature ever is: a creature is always shifting, changing, becoming.”66 In this understanding of self-interest we find one cornerstone of Montaigne’s theory of toleration. Human beings who are aware of the natural limits set on their ability to acquire universal truth will turn inward to search themselves instead. This requires one to be left alone. In order for one to discover herself or himself, one needs to have a private sphere in which one will be free from any outside intervention. Once a human being realizes that having a private sphere in which she or he can enjoy her or his individuality is the most valuable privilege she or he can have, she or he begins to respect the same privilege of her or his fellow human beings.67 As Oberdiek points out, for Montaigne, in this private sphere human beings can satisfy their animal needs, such as eating, drinking, and procreating, and enjoy mental tranquility.68 The Pyrrhonist ideal of ataraxia in which one frees herself or himself from anxiety, which is caused by the futile attempt to attain absolute knowledge, through suspension of judgment (epoche), corresponds to individual self-interest. Individuals who realize their innate inability to attain truth and understand that their self-interest lies in being left alone cannot be swayed by the calls for establishing universal justice by those who believe that they have found the truth. One who realizes her or his own weakness will tolerate other persons’ weaknesses and approach them with neutrality. She or he will let others create their own subjective experiences and lead the lives that they desire. Since this toleration is based on self-interest properly understood, it rejects the Nietzschean definition of toleration as self-denial.69 As Levine indicates, unlike Nietzsche, Montaigne does not think that self-creation is a violent process in which suffering is inevitable. And since what a human being finds

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in herself or himself is ignorance and impermanence, she or he does not have anything to force on others.70 Furthermore, any attempt to force one’s subjective reality onto another may cause the loss of the only chance of attaining happiness by leading to a “state of war.” In a state of war, no one can have a secure private sphere in which she or he can take her or his individual journey of self-discovery. Therefore, it is in one’s self-interest to tolerate others. Provided that one is granted a private sphere, she or he can be expected to obey the laws that order public sphere. Montaigne agrees with Hobbes who has the opinion that without law and order human beings would be at each other’s throats. Therefore, in order to secure continuous enjoyment of our individuality in the private sphere, we need to submit our loyalty to the state in the public sphere. Civil disobedience is not an option for Montaigne. Furthermore, by following the state’s orders, for Montaigne, we do not sacrifice our individuality. What we are doing is only, in Levine’s words, “role-playing.”71 Our consciences do not have to be insulted by that: “all other virtues are born of submission and obedience, just as all other sins are born of pride.”72 The state cannot control the consciences of its subjects but only their external actions. When we obey the state, it is not our conscience but our knees that bend. Montaigne chose to follow the customs and laws that were current in his own society. Given that it is impossible to enact absolutely just laws in the public realm, why bother with prescribing laws instead of going with the ones that are already in place? However, since he believes that self-knowledge is possible, Montaigne prescribes rules for himself in his private sphere and lets others prescribe rules for themselves in their own private spheres. In that regard, what the government form is does not bother Montaigne much. As long as government prevents anarchy, i.e., intolerance by other members in society toward self, and does not attempt to regulate consciences of its subjects, i.e., intolerance by the state itself, Montaigne is willing to submit his loyalty to it. As a skeptic, Montaigne thinks that it is impossible to have the knowledge either of the abstract ideas, such as justice, or of the natural phenomena that are taking place around us. Neither reason nor our senses are reliable tools for achieving the truth. However, unlike a radical skeptic, who thinks that nothing can be known, Montaigne thinks that self-knowledge is possible. In fact, here lies the self-interest properly understood. For Montaigne, a person’s ability of searching herself or himself constitutes self-interest. According to this view, happiness can be reached only when we give up looking for the ultimate truth. Rather we need to turn inward and discover ourselves. No one is any different from other human beings in this respect. Thus, everybody needs a private sphere in which she or he will be tolerated for the beliefs and deeds that are involved in the journey of self-discovery. Thus, toleration becomes a

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basic necessity. Everybody wants to be happy, and everybody’s happiness is dependent on being tolerated.

NOTES 1. Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes, The Modes of Scepticism: Ancient Texts and Modern Interpretations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 4. 2. The words “dogmatism” and “dogmatist” in contemporary English have a pejorative tone. They hint at an irrational rigidity of opinion, a refusal to look impartially at the evidence (see Annas and Barnes, The Modes of Scepticism, 1). In the senses that I am using them here, devoid of that pejorative tone, they merely refer to an epistemological position and to a person who subscribes to that epistemological position, respectively. 3. Richard H. Popkin and Avrum Stroll, Skeptical Philosophy for Everyone (New York: Prometheus Books, 2002), 40. 4. Popkin and Stroll, Skeptical Philosophy for Everyone, 40. 5. Popkin and Stroll, Skeptical Philosophy for Everyone, 57. 6. Popkin and Stroll, Skeptical Philosophy for Everyone, 57. 7. Richard Tuck, “Skepticism and Toleration in the Seventeenth Century,” in Justifying Toleration. ed. Susan Mendus (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1988), 21–36. 8. Susan Mendus, ed., Justifying Toleration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 2. 9. Alan Levine, Sensual Philosophy: Toleration, Skepticism, and Montaigne’s Politics of the Self (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2001), 14–15. 10. John Horton, “Toleration,” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward Craig, vol. 9 (London: Routledge, 1998), 432. 11. Mark Mercer, “Grounds of Liberal Tolerance,” The Journal of Value Inquiry, 33 (1999): 319–34. 323. 12. Annas and Barnes, The Modes of Scepticism, 14. 13. Richard Popkin, “Skepticism,” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards, Vol.7 (New York: The Macmillan Company & The Free Press, 1967), 449–61, 449. 14. Popkin, “Skepticism,” 450. 15. Popkin, “Skepticism,” 450. 16. Annas and Barnes, The Modes of Scepticism, 14. 17. Annas and Barnes, The Modes of Scepticism, 16; C. B. Schmitt, “The Rediscovery of Ancient Skepticism in Modern Times,” in The Skeptical Tradition, ed. Myles Burnyeat (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 225–51, 226. 18. Popkin, “Skepticism,” 450. 19. Pierre Bayle, Historical and Critical Dictionary, translated with an Introduction and Notes, by Richard H. Popkin (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1991), 194.

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20. The act of suspending judgment (epoche) in the Pyrrhonian skepticism has meant different things to different thinkers. For example, according to Christopher Hookway, suspending judgment in the Pyrrhonian tradition corresponds to abandoning the pursuit of truth. For Hookway, the Pyrrhonians give up on the project of inquiry when it appears to them that all questions remain open [Christopher Hookway, Scepticism, (London: Routledge, 1990), 5]. On the other hand, for Montaigne, the suspension of a judgment on any topic does not mean turning away from the project of inquiry, i.e., the search for the truth. According to Montaigne, what makes a Pyrrhonian different from others is that she or he never assents on any topic of investigation: “Now the Pyrrhonians make their faculty of judgement so unbending and upright that it registers everything but bestows its assent on nothing” (“Our Emotions Get Carried Away Beyond Us,” in The Essays, M. de Montaigne, 560). In this understanding, a Pyrrhonian is a perennial seeker of truth. As Montaigne points out, the professed aim of the Pyrrhonians is to shake all convictions about the truth that are held by human beings (“Our Emotions Get Carried Away Beyond Us,” 560). In parallel to Montaigne’s view, Annas and Barnes state that, “inquirers (i.e., the Pyrrhonians, added by the author) persist in their inquiries because they have neither discovered the object of their search, nor concluded that it lies beyond all discovery: they have, as yet, no opinion on the matter” (Annas and Barnes, The Modes of Scepticism, 1). 21. Hookway, Scepticism, 5. 22. Annas and Barnes, The Modes of Scepticism, 17; Hookway, Scepticism, 5. 23. Popkin and Stroll, Skeptical Philosophy for Everyone, 55. 24. Hookway, Scepticism, 6. 25. Schmitt, “The Rediscovery of Ancient Skepticism in Modern Times,” 227. 26. Schmitt, “The Rediscovery of Ancient Skepticism in Modern Times,” 233. 27. Schmitt, “The Rediscovery of Ancient Skepticism in Modern Times,” 228. 28. Richard Popkin, “Skepticism and Modernity,” in The Rise of Modern Philosophy, ed. Tom Sorell (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 15–32, 15. 29. Popkin and Stroll, Skeptical Philosophy for Everyone, 59. 30. Schmitt, “The Rediscovery of Ancient Skepticism in Modern Times,” 229. 31. Schmitt, “The Rediscovery of Ancient Skepticism in Modern Times,” 237. 32. Popkin, “Skepticism,” 452; Schmitt, “The Rediscovery of Ancient Skepticism in Modern Times,” 237. 33. Popkin, “Skepticism,” 452. 34. Popkin, “Skepticism and Modernity,” 20–21. 35. Popkin, “Skepticism and Modernity,” 21. 36. Popkin, “Skepticism and Modernity,” 15. 37. Henry Kamen, The Rise of Toleration (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), 77. 38. Richard H. Popkin, The History of Skepticism from Erasmus to Descartes (Assen: Van Gorcum & Comp. N. V., 1964), 44. 39. Michel de Montaigne, “An Apology for Raymond Sebond” in The Essays. Michel de Montaigne, translated and edited with an introduction and notes by M. A. Screech (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 489–683, 491. Although scholars agree that Montaigne was a skeptic, they remain divided as to whether he was an Academic or a Pyrrhonian skeptic. Popkin believes that Montaigne

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was a Pyrrhonian skeptic. He points out that by revitalizing the Pyrrhonism of Sextus Empiricus during at a time when the intellectual paradigm of the sixteenth century was losing ground, Montaigne deserved to be identified as one of the most crucial designers of modern thought (Popkin, The History of Skepticism). In Popkin’s words, “Montaigne’s genial Apologie became the coup de grace to an entire intellectual world. It was also to be the womb of modern thought, in that it led to the attempt either to refute the new Pyrrhonism, or to find a way of living with it” (Popkin, The History of Skepticism, 55). On the other hand, Levine argues that Montaigne was an Academic skeptic [see Alan Levine “Montaigne’s Conception of the Self: A Non-Rights Basis for Toleration.” Perspectives on Political Science 28, 1999, Issue 2, (Spring 99): 82–94; “Skepticism, Self, and Toleration in Montaigne’s Political Thought.” Pp. 51–75 in Early Modern Skepticism and the Origins of Toleration, edited by Alan Levine. (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 1999); Sensual Philosophy: Toleration, Skepticism, and Montaigne’s Politics of the Self. (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2001)]. According to Levine, although Montaigne does use Pyrrhonist arguments and the Pyrrhonist mode of procedure throughout the “Apology” . . . . Unlike the Pyrrhonists, however, Montaigne focuses his inquiries on human things. . . . . . . Montaigne never thematically discusses Academic skepticism, because he is an Academic skeptic. (Levine, “Skepticism, Self, and Toleration in Montaigne’s Political Thought,” 56–57)

However, identifying Montaigne as a follower of the Academic or Pyrrhonian tradition is not our purpose, especially in light of Annas and Barnes’ observation that “to outside observers there was little difference between the skeptical Academics and the Pyrrhonists.” It is important for and relevant to this study that Montaigne was a skeptic (Annas and Barnes, The Modes of Scepticism, 14). 40. Montaigne, “An Apology for Raymond Sebond,” 492. 41. Montaigne, “An Apology for Raymond Sebond,” 557. 42. Montaigne, “An Apology for Raymond Sebond,” 557. 43. Montaigne, “An Apology for Raymond Sebond,” 500. 44. Popkin, The History of Skepticism from Erasmus to Descartes, 46. 45. Montaigne, “An Apology for Raymond Sebond,” 559. 46. Montaigne, “An Apology for Raymond Sebond,” 560. 47. Popkin, The History of Skepticism from Erasmus to Descartes, 47. 48. Montaigne, “An Apology for Raymond Sebond,” 501. 49. Montaigne, “An Apology for Raymond Sebond,” 502. 50. Alan Levine, Sensual Philosophy: Toleration, Skepticism, and Montaigne’s Politics of the Self (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2001), 57. 51. Montaigne, “An Apology for Raymond Sebond,” 526. 52. Michel de Montaigne, “Our Emotions Get Carried Away Beyond Us,” in M. de Montaigne, The Essays, translated by M. A. Screech as The Complete Essays (London: Penguin Books, 1991b), 11–18, 11. 53. Oberdiek, Tolerance: Between Forbearance and Acceptance, 73.

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54. Alan Levine, “Skepticism, Self, and Toleration in Montaigne’s Political Thought,” in Early Modern Skepticism and the Origins of Toleration, ed. A. Levine (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 1999), 51–75, 58. 55. Levine, “Skepticism, Self, and Toleration,” 58. 56. Montaigne, “An Apology for Raymond Sebond,” 663. 57. Montaigne, “An Apology for Raymond Sebond,” 663. 58. Montaigne, “An Apology for Raymond Sebond,” 664. 59. Montaigne, “An Apology for Raymond Sebond,” 664. 60. Montaigne, “An Apology for Raymond Sebond,” 674. 61. Montaigne, “An Apology for Raymond Sebond,” 673. 62. Montaigne, “An Apology for Raymond Sebond,” 679. 63. Levine, Sensual Philosophy, 5. 64. Levine, Sensual Philosophy, 7. 65. Levine, Sensual Philosophy, 7. 66. M. A. Screech, “Introduction” to Montaigne, The Complete Essays. Translated and edited with an introduction and notes by M. A. Screech (London: Penguin Books, 1991), xiii–xlviii, xxxix. 67. Levine, Sensual Philosophy. 68. Hans Oberdiek, Tolerance: Between Forbearance and Acceptance, 73. 69. Levine, Sensual Philosophy, 7–8. 70. Levine, “Skepticism, Self, and Toleration,” 64–65. 71. Alan Levine, “Skepticism, Self, and Toleration in Montaigne’s Political Thought.” 72. Montaigne, “An Apology for Raymond Sebond,” 543.

Chapter Three

Prudence and Toleration: The Case of John Locke

You forget that creation is not for your benefit: you exist for the sake of the universe. Plato, Laws, 903–904 [T]here is no such Finis ultimus, utmost aim, nor Summum bonum, greatest good, as is spoken of in the books of the old Morall philosophers. T. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 55

As indicated earlier, another solution to the paradox of toleration can be found in the argument based on the principle of prudence. In its essence, prudence advises a person to take the consequences of acting intolerantly toward an object of toleration into account. A person who disapproves of a belief or an action may want to suppress it. However, a simple analysis of cost and benefit prevents her or him from acting in an intolerant way. The disapproving person realizes that the cost of acting intolerantly is much higher than the benefits that could be gained from repressing the object of toleration. It can be argued that this simple calculation of cost and benefit does not necessarily lead to tolerance. Before one ends up with tolerance, a particular state of mind is required, one that will make the emergence of toleration possible. This particular state of mind is related to how one sees conflict.1 If conflict is seen to be a deviation from the natural state of affairs, then it is hard to attain the justification for toleration based on prudence. The reason is that a person who believes that conflict is a deviation from the natural state of affairs tends to reject conflict rather than accept it. In this sense, conflict is seen as something illegitimate. 2 On the other hand, if conflict is seen as something natural that results from the pursuit of different interests of individuals, then 31

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it is easier to achieve toleration based on prudence. In this case, the person who thinks that conflict is unavoidable will seek ways to accommodate it. One way of accommodating conflict, of course, is toleration.3 This state of mind, which takes conflict to be something natural, is a modern phenomenon and emerged only after classical political philosophy was left behind. In order for us to better understand how toleration based on prudence could come about in modern times, we will first examine shortly the basic tenets of classical philosophy. The examination of the philosophy of two classical thinkers, namely, Plato and Aristotle will show that, although their ways of dealing with conflict differed from one another, neither Plato nor Aristotle welcomed conflict in the polis. Both believed conflict in the polis to be a deviation from the natural state of affairs.4

THE ANCIENT PARADIGM To understand the position of the ancients with respect to conflict we first need to understand their moral and political philosophy. To understand their moral and political philosophy we need to familiarize ourselves with their views on human nature. The first thing that must be said about the views of the ancients concerning human nature is that, for them, human beings are by nature social beings. Humans are so constituted by nature that they cannot live, or live well, outside of society.5 Both Plato and Aristotle classify human beings as social animals. In the History of Animals, Aristotle puts human beings under the general category of gregarious animals. The characteristic feature of gregarious animals is that they live together in herds, swarms, and in other forms of communities. Some of the gregarious animals, like bees and ants, share a common good and work for it. Aristotle calls these kinds of animals “political animals” (⫽ zoon politikon). There are others among gregarious animals, like cows and pigs that do not pursue a common good, but seek rather personal interests. For Aristotle, human beings combine the characteristics of both groups.6 To the extent to which human beings are social animals, society (polis) is seen as the creation of nature (phusis) rather than a product of convention (nomos). Thus the sociability of humans does not emerge out of a rational calculation of benefits that can be reaped by living with others, but human beings come to enjoy them due to their natural tendency to live in society. Friendship, love, fraternity are as natural to them as concern with their material interests.7 In Aristotle’s words, “anyone who is cityless by nature and not by chance is either of a depraved sort or better than a human being.”8 A human being outside of society is incomplete.

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The polis facilitates the satisfaction not only of those material needs of humans that they share with other gregarious animals but also, and more importantly, of those they exclusively possess due to their unique character, namely, having reason and ability of speech. The fundamental need of humans that results from their unique capacity to reason and speech is to know. Since this is what makes humans different from all other animals, the perfection of this must be their end. In other words, a life not based on the compulsion of natural necessities but one based on the dictates of reason suits the nature of human beings. In this regard, although polis first emerges to make living possible, later it comes to make “living well” possible.9 Given the distinctive feature of humans is their having reason, according to the ancients, vita contemplativa, the life of contemplation is the highest form of living.10 Such a life would enable human beings to know what the universe (cosmos), the whole, is. That was crucial for the ancients because of their belief that parts cannot be understood in isolation from the whole. The whole, for Plato and Aristotle, was prior to the parts, and we could make sense of the latter only through its relation to the whole. One could understand her or his place in the whole only after grasping what the whole is. In this direction, when the ancients contemplated the whole, they saw a hierarchical order. Unequal parts were ordered hierarchically in a perfect harmony in nature. What was true about the whole must have been true for the parts as well. In that regard, human beings and their polis were formed of unequal parts. As Strauss implies, happiness (eudemonia) of both human beings and polis is achieved through ordering the constituent parts of them after the model of cosmos.11 According to Plato, the constituent parts of the human soul are rational part, spirited part, and appetitive part.12 The creation of justice in individual is the institution of a natural order and government of one by another in the parts of the soul.13 The specific form that justice in individual takes is the absolute rule of rational part in cooperation with spirited part over appetitive part. In parallel to the parts of man’s soul, there exists three distinct classes in polis: the wise, the courageous, and the ambitious. The wise are those in whose souls the rational part is dominant over the rest of the parts of the soul. With respect to the courageous, the spirited part is sovereign over the rest of the parts of their souls. And the ambitious are those who are ruled by their appetitive parts of their souls. According to Plato, there are four virtues in polis in respect to these three classes: wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice.14 Each one of the first three virtues belongs to one class in polis: wisdom is the virtue of the wise; courage is that of the courageous; and temperance is that of the ambitious. For Plato, the fourth virtue, namely, justice is the ultimate cause and condition of the existence of all of the other virtues.15 Put differently, justice is when the other three

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virtues stand to one another in harmony. Justice in polis is the harmonious hierarchical order among three classes. Accordingly, in a just polis the wise must be the rulers; the courageous must be the auxiliaries; and the ambitious must be the traders. In Plato’s words, there are three distinct classes, any meddling of one with another, or the change of one into another, is the greatest harm to the State. . . . on the other hand, when the trader, the auxiliary, and the guardian each do their own business, that is justice, and will make city just.16

In a similar vein, Aristotle too believed in the hierarchical order of man’s soul. In Ethics, Aristotle divides human soul into two parts: rational and irrational.17 While rational part consists of theoretical and practical parts, irrational part comprises nutritive and appetitive parts. There corresponds a division in virtues to this basic division in man’s soul. Accordingly, there are two sorts of virtues: intellectual and moral. Intellectual virtues, such as wisdom, prudence, and understanding belong to rational part of soul. On the other hand, moral virtues, such as courage, temperance, and liberality, belong to the irrational part of soul.18 Moral virtues are concerned with pleasures and pain. In this sense, in general, a moral virtue consists in acting in a right way in view to a pleasure or a pain. For Aristotle, acting in a right way, that is, being morally virtuous, lies in steering an intermediate course between two vices: one being excess and the other being deficiency. Thus, virtue (arete) is a mean condition. For Aristotle, finding the mean, i.e., making just decisions concerning pleasures and pain, requires deliberation. However, being devoid of reason, the irrational part of the human soul cannot achieve this on its own. Thus, the irrational part must be under the control of the rational part, if a human being is ever going to achieve moral goodness.19 Like Plato, Aristotle too thinks that rational part should be sovereign over the irrational part. Thus in polis, those who have capacity for rational deliberation should be citizens. For Aristotle, being a citizen entitles one to have a share in deliberative and judicial offices.20 Furthermore, according to Aristotle, a person is a good citizen if he possesses the virtue of ruling and being ruled.21 In this sense, for Aristotle, the citizens are equals in terms of having capacity for rational deliberation, and therefore, being ruled by one’s fellow citizens does not correspond to injustice. However, a man rules over the slaves despotically since they lack capacity for rational deliberation. As can be seen, in comparison to Plato, Aristotle lowers the threshold for being a ruler. Having the virtues, such as prudence, that belong to the practical part of the rational part of soul would suffice to become a citizen who both rules and is ruled. In order to be

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a ruler in polis, for Aristotle, one does not need to have the wisdom which is the virtue of the wise, namely, the philosophers. Despite these differences, perhaps in details, between Plato and Aristotle, they continue to agree on the main points. These main points include the belief in hierarchical order in nature, the harmony of the parts that are unequal, and agreement of interests of all the parts in the harmonious hierarchical order. In such an order, every part’s interest is served. In Plato’s ideal order, the philosopher-rulers’ prime interest is to contemplate. This interest is served only through the leisure that is provided by the security and services of the auxiliaries and the traders. The interest of the traders lies in controlling their desires and this is managed only through the leadership of the philosophers in cooperation with the auxiliaries. For Plato, the individual has a value only to the extent that she or he is a part of the bigger organism: society. The relationships among the members of society are arranged after the model of harmonious order that exists in the universe. This order is a hierarchical one and it is not the result of blind chance, rather it is a result of intelligent design. Being a part of the universe, the society can only imitate this divine plan that exists in the universe. Thus the relationships in the society should be also hierarchical. In the universe, conflict does not exist. Every part of it has a mission and those parts fulfill their missions harmoniously. When the members of society imitate this divine order in their relationships, a just society emerges. In the Republic, the “Guardians”; in the Statesman, the “true statesman”; in the Laws, the law is in charge of establishing and maintaining this just order in the society.22 In such an understanding of individual and her or his place in society, there is no room for “legitimate conflict.” Conflict is against nature and thus corresponds to injustice. At all costs, justice has to be established in the society. It is evident that this consistent yet rigid philosophy cannot provide a basis for the justification of toleration on the basis of prudence. In fact, toleration that is based on prudence is possible only by rejecting Plato’s views.23 With regard to Aristotle’s philosophy, the first thing that needs to be said is that he also works within the classical paradigm. Along with his teacher, Aristotle too emphasizes the order in the universe. From the order that exists in the universe, Aristotle derives the premise that everything has a purpose toward which it evolves. Nothing in the universe is the result of blind chance. According to this teleological view of nature, when something achieves its purpose, it comes to a rest. At this point of rest, everything performs its function perfectly and in harmony with everything else. And, for Aristotle, when something performs its function excellently, virtue is realized. This ideal state of affairs does not lead Aristotle to reject the existence of conflict among the members of society.24 Ideally, it would be desirable to

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have a society that was founded upon virtue, in which there is no conflict at all. However, that would be a society of philosophers. Yet, for Aristotle, we cannot have a society of philosophers because such a society would not be self-sufficient. We need a society that is made up of individuals with different skills, a society including ordinary human beings whose attainment of virtue is not very high. Inevitably, in such a society, the interests of individuals will clash with one another. Doing away with this conflict would require constant intervention by the rulers and this may not be feasible. Therefore, those who do not have virtue as their primary goal in life will have to be included in the political regime. Perhaps the emergence of a full-blown theory of toleration that is based on prudence was made possible only after this aspect of Aristotle’s thought was furthered and became dominant in the early modern times. In fact, a main feature of the modern political thought lies in the legitimacy that conflict assumed during and after the sixteenth century.

THE MODERN PARADIGM The ideas about individual, society, and state that were developed from the sixteenth century on are designated as “modern political theory.” Starting with Niccolo Machiavelli (1469–1527), a series of “political thinkers,” like Michel de Montaigne, Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), and John Locke (1632–1704) rejected the classical scheme that emphasizes “virtue” as unrealistic.25 This rejection of the classical paradigm by the modern thinkers was primarily based on the latter group’s ideas about the nature of human beings. The pioneer of this new mode of thinking, the Florentine thinker, Machiavelli, thinks that human beings are essentially wicked and motivated only by the pursuit of personal gain. For Machiavelli, human nature is an unstable amalgam of stupidity, cupidity, and malice. In Machiavelli’s words, One can say this generally of men: that they are ungrateful, fickle, pretenders and dissemblers, evaders of danger, and eager for gain. While you do them good, they are yours, offering their blood, property, lives, and children, . . ., when the need for them is far away; but, when it is close to you they revolt.26

For Machiavelli, human beings value temporal things so much that they “forget the death of a father more quickly than the loss of a patrimony.”27 This pessimistic view of human nature leads Machiavelli to think that human society is not a natural entity but rather a product of convention. Human beings did not join society as a result of their natural sociability but rather as a

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result of the calculation of material benefits they would reap by doing so. The principal benefits that can be enjoyed by living in society, for Machiavelli, are security and protection. In that regard, for Machiavelli, human beings were political not in order to excel their nature in society as the ancients believed, but because of their love for power and reputation and with an innate desire to control and dominate others. As can be remembered, for the ancients, individual’s end (telos) dictated the way one should live her or his life. On the other hand, Machiavelli believed that necessity rather than a moral purpose as achieving one’s telos determines the right course of action in both private and political life. As Strauss points out, for Machiavelli, “Classical political philosophy had taken its bearings by how man ought to live; the correct way of asking the question of right order of society consists in taking one’s bearings by how men actually do live.”28 Machiavelli expressed this point in the following way: many have imagined republics and principalities that have never been seen or known to exist in truth; for it is so far from how one lives to how one should live that he who lets go of what is done for what should be done learns his ruin rather than his preservation.29

In a similar fashion, Michel de Montaigne thought that human beings were much closer to animals than to the ancients’ moral being who strove to achieve her or his purpose, namely, leading a virtuous and moral life. The ancients had believed that due to their possession of reason and ability to speak, human beings were superior to all other social animals and therefore had to lead a moral life. As indicated while presenting his defense of toleration on the basis of skepticism, Montaigne believed that not only are human beings not superior to animals, they are worse than animals in terms of controlling their desires.30 Following Machiavelli and Montaigne, Thomas Hobbes too subscribes to a pessimistic view of human nature. He too emphasizes the animal aspects of human beings rather than their distinctive feature, that of reason. According to Hobbes, human beings are motivated not by a moral ideal that can be found out by reason, but by a psychological cause, the desire for self-preservation.31 Not natural sociability of human beings, but the fear of violent death makes them seek shelter in a commonwealth. Security and protection rather than a novel environment in which human beings can excel their nature are the primary benefits that a society provides. For Hobbes, felicity constitutes the aim of life. Unlike classic philosophers who thought that happiness primarily consisted in virtue, Hobbes thinks that “continuall successe in obtaining those things which a man from time to time desireth, that is to say, continuall prospering, is that men call FELICITY.”32

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In order to achieve felicity, what human beings need is not virtue but power. “The POWER of a Man, (to take it Universally,) is his present means, to obtain some future apparent Good.”33 Therefore, the general inclination of human beings is “a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death.”34 Yet Hobbes does not think that this desire for more power is always caused by desire for more intensive pleasure. Human beings may be satisfied with the level of delight that they already attained. The cause of anxiety among them is that they cannot assure the continual enjoyment of this delight. Therefore, in order to assure future satisfaction they seek more power. In this regard, the state is not a school where virtue is taught but a means to guarantee continuous felicity. “The Greatest of humane Powers, is that which is compounded of the Powers of most men, united by consent, in one person, Naturall, or Civill, that has the use of all their Powers depending on his will; such as is the Power of a Comon-wealth.”35 In response to the ancients’ claim that individual’s end is to grasp the meaning of the hierarchical harmonious cosmos and thus to know her or his proper place in that order, Hobbes asserts that there is no natural harmony between the human mind and the universe.36 Behind this assertion of Hobbes lies his faith in the Newtonian paradigm, a mechanical explanation of the universe. According to this paradigm, the universe is understood as a collectivity of bodies which are in constant motion without an aim. This position stands in radical opposition to the Aristotelian understanding of the universe according to which all things move toward some goal and then come to rest. In this sense, Hobbes rejects the existence of an end toward which human beings strive. For Hobbes, “there is no such Finis ultimus, utmost aim, nor Summum bonum, greatest good, as is spoken of in the books of the old Morall philosophers.”37 Thus, modern political philosophy forms a radical break with the ancient political philosophy in terms of both main assumptions about individual and society, and as a result, the institutions that are built upon these main assumptions. For the moderns, the natural state of human beings is not one of harmony and peace, but rather of chaos and misery due to their being wicked and selfish. Human society is not a reflection of the harmony that exists in the universe, but a riot against nature, and nature does not present a conducive environment in which the most basic human desires can be continually satisfied. Society is the invention of human reason in order to satisfy human desires. Peace, which is sine qua non for the continual satisfaction of human desires, does not come naturally. Conflict is what comes naturally. Peace is what human beings want, and the conflict that is detrimental to peace is their natural condition.

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According to the moderns, this is humankind’s dilemma. To attempt to eradicate the conflict is futile. The only way out is to accommodate, to ameliorate conflict so that it will not hinder society from serving its main purpose: continual satisfaction of human desires. Toleration, which is a deliberate decision to refrain from prohibiting, hindering, or otherwise coercively interfering with conduct of which one disapproves, provides a means for controlling conflict. To the extent to which it inflames conflict, intolerance belongs to the state of nature. Toleration is conducive to peace, and peace is the necessary condition for the satisfaction of human desires, the most basic of which is the desire for self-preservation. In terms of looking at individual and society, John Locke agrees on most points with his modern predecessors. Now we turn to present his defense of toleration on the basis of prudence.

THE PRUDENCE ARGUMENT IN JOHN LOCKE’S DEFENSE OF TOLERATION John Locke lived from 1632 to 1704. The main work in which he presents his defense of toleration is A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689). It was written during his exile in Holland between 1683 and 1689. It first appeared in Latin under the title of Epistola de Tolerantia. One interesting fact about Epistola is that Locke never admitted that the work belonged to him. It is believed that it was addressed to Philip van Limborch, a friend of Locke, who was a professor of theology in the Remonstrant seminary in Amsterdam. The English translation appeared at the end of the year 1689. The translator was another friend of Locke, William Popple, who also wrote an introductory note to the translation.38 Making ourselves familiar with the historical context in which Locke developed these ideas would help us understand his argument better. The seventeenth century Britain and Europe provided the context. Both in Britain and in Europe, the seventeenth century was a time of great religious turmoil. In France, for example, the Edict of Nantes of 1598, which had provided a limited religious toleration, was revoked by 1685. In Britain, Henry VIII’s break with Papal Rome by establishing a national church led to a period of strife. During this strife, different beliefs by rulers who had various religious convictions were imposed upon the British people. When the arbitrary acts of the Stuart dynasty were added to the clash involving the Anglicans, the Catholics, and the Puritans, the Civil War of 1642 to 1649 erupted. Between the Civil War of 1642 to 1649 and the Glorious Revolution of 1688, those who dissented were subject to oppression, and many of them, including Locke, had to take refuge abroad.39

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When one takes this historical context into account, the purpose of Locke’s Letter becomes clear: to address the issue of religious intolerance. In justifying religious toleration, Locke makes use of two sorts of arguments: secular and religious. His secular arguments anticipate his great book, Second Treatise of Government (1690). His religious arguments are based on his Protestant faith. Here, I argue that Locke’s stronger argument for toleration will be found in the former argument, i.e., the secular one. Locke’s secular argument advancing toleration depends on one of his basic assumptions about the nature of government: government derives its legitimacy from the consent of the constituent members of the society.40 Indeed, for Locke, not only government’s legitimacy, but also its very existence is dependent on the consent of the individual members of society. According to Locke, prior to the emergence of society, human beings lived in what Locke calls “the state of nature” where they possessed inalienable rights to live, to be free, and to have property. Locke collects these rights under the general name of property.41 In the state of nature, individuals are subject to the law of nature. The principles of the natural law can be ascertained by listening to the dictates of reason. In the absence of a political body, all individuals have a right, perhaps a duty, to enforce the law of nature, and each individual has a right to defend her or his inalienable rights against transgressors. Moreover, each individual has a right to give punishment to those who violate the law of nature. However, only those whose rights are infringed have a right to get compensation.42 For Locke, such a state of nature, although free, is still open to continual dangers. Due to the absence of a law enforcement authority, some individuals may think that violating the law of nature is more profitable than honoring it. Furthermore, human beings cannot be expected to be fair judges while they are judging on the issues that are related to their own rights. They may tend to punish inequitably those who gave harm to their own property. Therefore, excluding the right of self-defense, individuals come together in civil society by giving up the right of implementing the law of nature through the use of force.43 In the face of the uncertainties of the state of nature, the main reason for individuals to establish a political body becomes securing their basic rights. Thus, the function of the government is to protect the property rights of its constituent members. In Locke’s words, “the great and chief end, therefore, of men’s uniting into common-wealth and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property.”44 In A Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke explains that “[t]he commonwealth seems to me to be a society of men constituted only for the procuring, preserving, and advancing their own civil interests.”45 He defines civil

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interests as “life, liberty, health, and indolency of body; and the possession of outward things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like.”46 Therefore, any move by the government or anybody else in the direction of ordering a person’s life, either in religious matters or in any temporal concern, is unjustified. In Locke’s words, The whole jurisdiction of the magistrate reaches only to these civil concernments; and that all civil power, right and dominion, is bounded and confined to the only care of promoting these things; and that it neither can nor ought in any manner to be extended to the salvation of souls.47

Moreover, according to Locke, individuals cannot be reasonably expected to bestow their consent on a government that considers itself responsible for the salvation of the souls of its citizens. The main reason for this is that “no man can so far abandon the care of his own salvation as blindly to leave it to the choice of any other, whether prince or subject.”48 Neither the government nor a particular church can exclusively claim to know the religious truth. However, it must be noted that for Locke toleration that is shown to the citizens is not an absolute one, but rather a qualified one. The main qualification is that the actions and beliefs that are the objects of toleration cannot be those that disturb the public order. In Locke’s words, “those things that are prejudicial to the commonweal of a people in their ordinary use, and are therefore forbidden by laws, those things ought not to be permitted to churches in their sacred rights.”49 By the same token, whatever is permitted in public or private realms should be allowed in churches too. As Locke puts it, “if any man may lawfully take bread or wine, either sitting or kneeling, in his own house, the law ought not to abridge of the same liberty in his religious worship.”50 Thus, the government should tolerate those religious practices that do not pose any threat to the public realm. However, there may be some religious sects, although their practices do not form any threat to the civil liberties of the citizens, their allegiance to a foreign government can undermine the authority of the government. These religious groups will not be tolerated.51 The most important group that is excluded from toleration by this principle in Locke’s England is the Roman Catholics. Since they first and foremost owe allegiance to the Pope in Rome, the government cannot trust its Catholic citizens to stay neutral when it has a clash with the Catholic Church. Since this amounts to having enemy’s soldiers within one’s own land, they should not be granted toleration. Another group that is left out is the atheists. Again, the reason for not extending toleration to this group is not a religious, but a secular one. Because

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they do not believe in God, the Atheists lack the basis on which a moral system can be built. For Locke, it is only possible to be moral through being a believer in God. However, everybody does not have to believe in the same God. As long as they have fear of God, they can be trusted to keep their promises. On the other hand, how can one expect an atheist to keep her or his promise? Since she or he does not have the fear of God, she or he may cheat as soon as the government turns its back. “Promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist.”52 Therefore, the atheists will not be tolerated. One of the religious arguments of Locke for toleration is related to the nature of faith. According to Locke, faith has such a nature that it cannot be compelled by outward force. The government can force individuals to observe certain outward practices. But it cannot control their minds. As Locke put it, “confiscation of estate, imprisonment, torments, nothing of that nature can have any such efficacy as to make men change the inward judgment that they have framed of things.”53 Faith is dependent on inner persuasion. At this point, I must indicate that Locke does not think that nobody has anything to do with the souls of one’s fellow citizens. On the contrary, he thinks that people should be concerned about their fellow citizens’ salvation. In fact, this is one of the greatest duties of a Christian. Yet, all that is available to those who are thus concerned about others’ salvation is peaceful persuasion: “Any one may employ as many exhortations and arguments as he pleases, towards the promoting of another man’s salvation. But all force and compulsion are to be forborn.”54 Another religious argument for toleration that was advanced by Locke is concerned with the belief that there is only one true path to God. However, among many different paths, nobody is infallible as to which path is the true one. Having the monopoly of force does not give a government or a prince the ability to ascertain the correct path. Neither any particular church nor any ordinary person has the perfect knowledge of this path. Everybody needs to decide for herself or himself. As long as individuals are not forced to believe in a certain path, they will be able to find the correct way by themselves. Locke, here, refers to the free market of ideas.55 For truth certainly would do well enough, if she were once left to shift for herself. She seldom has received, and I fear never will receive, much assistance from the power of great men, to whom she is but rarely known, and more rarely welcome. She is not taught by laws, nor has she any need of force to procure her entrance into the minds of men. Errors indeed prevail by the assistance of foreign and borrowed succors. But if truth not make her way into the understanding by her own light, she will be weaker for any borrowed force violence can add to her.56

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The argument that nobody is infallible in ascertaining the true path to salvation and therefore everybody should be left alone in finding this path to salvation by herself or himself may look like an argument for toleration based on skepticism. In fact, this is a misperception. As Nathan Tarcov indicates, Locke seems to presume that true religion is Christianity.57 The only problem is that there are different interpretations regarding the true path to salvation within Christianity and which one of these different interpretations is the true one is not self-evident. Locke does not claim that truth regarding religious issues cannot be known with certainty. Rather he claims that any person may make a mistake in figuring out the truth. Since a person herself or himself is the one who carries the responsibility for choosing a certain path, the right to make the decision regarding the true path must also belong to individual herself or himself. According to Locke, if a government decides to impose its opinion regarding the only path to God onto its citizens, that decision may leave some of the subjects in a precarious situation. The reason is that some citizens may believe that the government’s path goes straight to hell. Given that everybody has an immortal soul that is capable of eternal happiness or misery, the first obligation of each individual is to gain the favor of God. Furthermore, the consequences of following a certain path are borne by the individual herself or himself, not by the government or anybody else. Therefore, following the true path as determined by the individual is of utmost importance to each person. Those citizens who think that the government’s opinion as to the correct path to God is erroneous will have to make a decision. They will either obey the command of the government and forget about their eternal happiness or, given that the highest duty of human beings is to honor God, they will insist on their own path and will take up arms against the government.58 There is no doubt that the second course of action by the citizens would amount to returning back to the state of nature which is full of fears and dangers. In this regard, if sincere inner belief, that is faith, cannot be brought about by outward force, all that intolerance will bring to a commonwealth is destructive conflict and misery: “No peace and security, no, not so much as common friendship, can ever be established or preserved among men, so long as this opinion prevails, ‘that dominion is founded in grace, and that religion is to be propagated by force of arms.’”59 If we do not want destructive conflict to be the dominant feature of our lives, we should learn how to live with those who think, believe, and worship differently from us. In other words, we need to exercise toleration based on prudence. For Locke, “it is not the diversity of opinions, which cannot be avoided; but the refusal of toleration to those that are of different opinions, which might have been granted, that has produced

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all the bustles and wars, that have been in the Christian world, upon account of religion.”60 The main reason for religious groups to be seditious is not because religion inspires them to do so, but rather because of their sufferings and oppression at the hands of the government: “But oppression raises ferments, and makes men struggle to cast off an uneasy and tyrannical yoke . . . there is one thing only which gathers people into seditious commotions, and that is oppression.”61 When the government extends toleration to those with different religious views and protects their civil liberties neutrally, it will find out that they are no longer a threat to civil society. Take away the partiality that is used toward them in matters of common right; change the laws, take away the penalties onto which they are subjected, and all things will immediately become safe and peaceable: nay, those that are averse to the religion of the magistrate will think themselves so much the more bound to maintain the peace of the common-wealth, as their condition is better in that place than elsewhere; and all the several separate congregations, like so many guardians of the public peace, will watch one another, that nothing may be innovated or changed in the form of government: because they can hope for nothing better than what they already enjoy; that is, an equal condition with their fellow-subjects, under a just and moderate government.62

In conclusion, Locke presents a pragmatic case against religious intolerance. It is not based on the belief that diversity is a good in itself and therefore religious diversity should be tolerated. Rather, Locke finds intolerance irrational and thus imprudent.

NOTES 1. It is appropriate to indicate that conflict as used here does not mean open conflict involving armed struggle. Conflict is used to mean the clash of interests, religious and political beliefs, and/or ways of life. 2. On this point, see also Antony Black, “Harmony Versus Conflict: Biological and Strategic Paths to Toleration,” in Toleration: Philosophy and Practice, eds. John Horton and Peter Nicholson (Aldershot: Avebury Series in Philosophy, 1992), 165–79. 3. For a similar view on this point, see Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy Participatory Politics for a New Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 4. Whereas Plato rejected conflict, Aristotle thought that conflict was an inevitable part of social life and sought ways for accommodating it. This is not to say that Aristotle had a full-blown theory of toleration. Rather, it means that Aristotle had

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concepts that might have provided the philosophical seeds of toleration that is based on prudence. See Bican Şahin, “An Investigation of the Contributions of Plato and Aristotle to the Emergence of the Concept of Toleration,” unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Maryland, College Park, 2003. 5. Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953), 129. 6. Bernard Yack, The Problems of Political Animal (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 51. 7. Strauss, Natural Right and History, 129. 8. Aristotle, Politics, translated by Peter L. Phillips Simpson, (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1997), 1253a2–4. 9. Aristotle, Politics, 1252b27–29. 10. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 14; Leo Strauss, “On Classical Political Philosophy,” in An Introduction to Political Philosophy: Ten Essays by Leo Strauss. Edited with an Introduction by Hilail Gildin (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989), 59–79. 11. Strauss, Natural Right and History, 128. 12. Plato, Republic, translated by Benjamin Jowett (New York: Vintage Classics Edition, 1991), 160–61. Benjamin Jowett uses “concupiscent” instead of “appetitive.” However, the word appetitive is more widely used to translate this expression. 13. Plato, Republic, 165. 14. Plato, Republic, 140. 15. Plato, Republic, 148. 16. Plato, Republic, 149–50. 17. Aristotle, Ethics. Trans. J. A. K. Thomson, revised with Notes and Appendices by Hugh Tredennick, Introduction and Bibliography by Jonathan Barnes. London: Penguin Books, 1976, 1102a17–b6. 18. Aristotle, Ethics, 1102b28–1103a10. 19. Aristotle, Ethics, Book II. 20. Aristotle, Politics, 1257b17. 21. Aristotle, Politics, 1277a20. Women were excluded from political participation in the ancient world. 22. Plato, Plato’s Statesman, translated by J. B. Skemp, ed. Martin Ostwald (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1957); Plato, The Laws, translated with an introduction by Trevor J. Saunders (London: Penguin Books, 1975); Plato, Republic. 23. On this point, see also Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. 1. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971). 24. For a similar view, see Bernard, Yack, The Problems of Political Animal (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Bernard Yack, “Community and Conflict in Aristotle’s Political Philosophy,” in Action and Contemplation: Studies in Moral and Political Thought of Aristotle, eds. Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999), 273–92. 25. Leo Strauss, “What is Political Philosophy?” in An Introduction to Political Philosophy Ten Essays by Leo Strauss, edited with an Introduction by Hilail Gildin. (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989), 3–57, 39.

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26. Niccolo Machiavelli, Prince. 2nd edition, translated by Harvey C. Mansfield. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 66. 27. Machiavelli, Prince, 67. 28. Strauss, Natural Right and History, 178. 29. Machiavelli, Prince, 61. 30. Montaigne, “An Apology for Raymond Sebond,” 526. 31. George Sabine, A History of Political Theory (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1959), 460; Strauss, “What is Political Philosophy?” 49. 32. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, eds. Richard E. Flathman and David Johnston (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997), 37. 33. Hobbes, Leviathan, 48. 34. Hobbes, Leviathan, 55. 35. Hobbes, Leviathan, 48. 36. Strauss, Natural Right and History, 175. 37. Hobbes, Leviathan, 55. 38. Maurice Cranston, “John Locke and the Case for Toleration,” in John Locke: A Letter Concerning Toleration in Focus, eds. John Horton and Susan Mendus (London: Routledge, 1991), 78–97, 85. 39. Mendus, Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism, 23. 40. John Locke, Second Treatise of Government (1690) edited, with an introduction by C.B. Macpherson (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 1980), 52. 41. Locke, Second Treatise, 66. For Locke, a person’s property in the broader sense includes her or his rights to life, liberty, and property; the narrow sense includes movable and immovable goods. 42. Locke, Second Treatise, 10–11. 43. Locke, Second Treatise, 47. (The emphasis in the original.) 44. Locke, Second Treatise, 66. 45. John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689) (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1990), 18. 46. Locke, A Letter, 8. 47. Locke, A Letter, 19. 48. Locke, A Letter, 19. 49. Locke, A Letter, 48–49. 50. Locke, A Letter, 48. 51. Locke, A Letter, 63–64. 52. Locke, A Letter, 64. 53. Locke, A Letter, 20. 54. Locke, A Letter, 57. 55. C. L. Ten, “Locke on Political Authority, Property, and Toleration,” in Political Thinkers, ed. David Muschamp (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986), 94–107, 103. 56. Locke, A Letter, 56. 57. Nathan Tarcov, “John Locke and the Foundations of Toleration” in Early Modern Skepticism and the Origins of Toleration, ed. Alan Levine (Lanham: Lexington Books, 1999), 179–95, 182.

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Locke, A Letter, 21. Locke, A Letter, 31. Locke, A Letter, 71. Locke, A Letter, 67. Locke, A Letter, 68.

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Autonomy and Toleration: The Case of John Stuart Mill

Unexamined life is not worth living. Socrates What could be better for a person than his own development of a plan of life that seems to him good? Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State, p. 368

Another solution to the so-called “paradox of toleration “ can be found in the concept of autonomy. As Bernard Williams puts it, “[p]eople can coherently think that a certain outlook or attitude is deeply wrong, and that the flourishing of such an attitude should be tolerated, if they also hold another substantive value in favor of the autonomy.”1 What is autonomy then? A look at the etymology of this concept can be a good place to start. It is a combination of two Greek words: autos (self) and nomos (rule or law). In ancient Greece, a city was believed to have autonomia when it was ruled by its citizens rather than by foreign powers. As a natural extension, when this concept is applied to individuals, what it implies is that they are self-directed/ determined.2 In explaining the “positive” sense of the term liberty, Isaiah Berlin states that, it consists of “the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master.”3 I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men’s, acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from outside. I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a doer—deciding, not being 49

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decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human role, that is, of conceiving goals and policies of my own and realizing them. . . . I wish, above all, to be conscious of myself as a thinking, willing, active being, bearing responsibility for my choices and able to explain them by references to my own ideas and purposes.4

The wishes of this person can be summarized in one sentence: I wish to be “autonomous.” Thus, the idea of self-mastery underlies the concept of autonomy.5 Let us give a formal definition of the concept of autonomy that lies at the basis of an autonomy-based understanding of toleration. Accordingly, autonomy is “a second-order capacity of persons to reflect critically upon their first-order preferences, desires, wishes, and so forth, and the capacity to accept or attempt to change these in light of higher-order preferences.”6 As the only creatures with a reason backed by will, we human beings can deliberate about our desires and wants, and adjust our conduct accordingly. Whereas non-rational animals act on their impulses without deliberation, we, at least sometimes, take time and consider the best way of action before acting. In this respect, it is not misleading to argue that there are different levels of desires or wants. In a formal way of expression, a person A may want to do the action of X. Yet, this information is not enough to know that she will actually do it. The reason is that A may think that doing X collides with doing Y, which has priority over X, and as a result, she may abstain from doing X. For example, Allison may want to enjoy an extra slice of the pumpkin pie that is offered at the Thanksgiving dinner. This is her first-order desire. However, she may also think that eating the extra slice of pumpkin pie is against her diet. She wants to remain loyal to her diet more than she wants the extra slice. This is her second-order desire. Thus, she may refrain from eating the extra slice. In this respect, we human beings have desires about our desires.7 As Gerald Dworkin stated, “[o]ne may not just desire to smoke, but also desire that one not have that desire. I may not just be motivated by jealousy and anger, but may also desire that my motivations be different (or the same).” In fact, for some, this aspect of human character constitutes what distinguishes human beings from other creatures. Of all the creatures, only human beings have the capacity to choose deliberately the way they lead their lives. They can critically evaluate their desires, wishes, and intentions. On the other hand, non-rational animals lack the possibility of autonomy because they do not have the capacity to act on their higher-order desires. They just act on their first-order desires, impulses.8 It is very easy to confuse liberty and autonomy with one another. In reality, they are two different concepts. The difference between the two corresponds

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to the distinction that Isaiah Berlin made between the negative and the positive senses of liberty. Thus, while liberty stands for the absence of interference with the life of an individual (i.e., negative liberty of Berlin), autonomy means the ability of an individual to form her or his life (i.e., positive liberty of Berlin). In Gerald Dworkin’s words, “[l]iberty, power, control over important aspects of one’s life are not the same as autonomy, but are necessary conditions for individuals to develop their own aims and interests and to make their values effective in the living of their lives.”9 The significance of autonomy derives from the role that it plays in the attainment of happiness. Accordingly, an individual’s essential interest lies in leading a good life. Stated differently, individual happiness is attained through leading a good life.10 However, there are different, and in a sense, competing understandings of the good life and it is up to individuals to “choose” among them; hence, the emphasis is on the “freedom of choice.”11 As a natural extension of this assumption, the state must refrain from shaping the lives of its citizens on the basis of any official understanding of the good life. In Ronald Dworkin’s words, “government must be neutral on what might be called the question of the good life.”12 Furthermore, in order for a chosen good life to lead to happiness, it needs to be chosen by the individual herself/himself. As Ronald Dworkin puts it, “no component of [a person’s life] may even so much as contribute to the value of a person’s life without his endorsement . . . no event or achievement can make a person’s life better against his opinion that it does not.”13 Shortly stated, a person can be coerced to lead a certain understanding of the good life. However, it does not necessarily make that person happy, “because a life only goes better if led from the inside.”14 Autonomy is the vehicle through which we give meaning and coherence to our lives. Thanks to autonomy we become the particular persons we are. Our particularities lie in our life plans and projects which cannot be formed without autonomy:15 “By exercising such a capacity, persons define their nature, give meaning and coherence to their lives, and take responsibility for the kind of person they are.”16 Thus, many liberals believe that autonomy is not only an indispensable means for the formation of a good life, but also it is a constitutive part of any good life.17 In this sense, a good life is a self-chosen life.18 Finally, given that we human beings are fallible creatures, this freedom also involves the right to examine, revise, and even drop that understanding of the good life that was accepted previously by the individual. In this sense, “[t]he idea of autonomy is not merely an evaluative or reflective notion, but includes as well some ability both to alter one’s preferences and to make them effective in one’s actions and, indeed, to make them effective because one has reflected upon them and adopted them as one’s own.”19

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It should not be hard to see how autonomy thus understood provides a basis for toleration. If not only the ability to choose but also the ability to critically evaluate and revise it is a constitutive part of the good life, then, for the sake of individual happiness and dignity, individual autonomy must be respected. In this understanding, the demand for the respect for autonomy is the demand for toleration. Individuals should be able not only to form their own understanding of the good life, but they should be allowed to pursue it. In order for one to attain happiness, she or he must be tolerated for the choices that she or he makes with regards to her or his life plan. This point is well stated in the following words of Mark Mercer: a significant part of the good life consists in having freely chosen to pursue the particular way of life we are pursuing. It also consists in being free to pursue it, and so to pursue the ends internal to it and to cultivate the talents and virtues appropriate to an individual living it. Given this, to force a person through intolerance to a particular way of life is just to fail to respect that person as an autonomous agent, part of whose good consists in being free to choose for himself how to live.20

JOHN STUART MILL AND HIS DEFENSE OF TOLERATION ON THE BASIS OF AUTONOMY John S. Mill develops his defense of toleration, which can be seen as one of the early justifications of toleration on autonomy, in On Liberty (1859). Especially the third chapter of this work, which carries the title of “Of Individuality, as One of Elements of Well-Being,” is devoted to the elaboration of this argument. Briefly, a person attains happiness by developing her or his nature. In fact, for Mill, individuality is dependent on this development.21 Thus, in order to gain individuality, and as a result happiness, one needs to have liberty and be tolerated with her or his life experiences that deviate from the customary ways. For J. S. Mill, happiness or well-being forms the primary interest of any individual in life. In a sense, it is the thing that everything else done by an individual aims at. But, this definition does not take us far. What exactly does happiness consist of? What are its elements? We can begin answering these questions by examining Mill’s views on human nature. After all, happiness must be the result of a living in accordance with the basic moral features of human nature, if there is one. Then, what is the moral nature of human beings for Mill, and is there a one-size-fits-all way of living that suits every human being’s nature? The following statement by Mill is instructive in this respect: “Human nature is not a machine to be built after a model, and set to

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do exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces which make it a living thing.”22 Thus, the main feature of human nature is that each individual is unique in terms of her or his potentials. It is not externally determined. Nor is there a fixed goal toward which it evolves. Rather, “it is essentially indeterminate, and so open to improvement in indefinitely many divergent directions.”23 Furthermore, the inward tendencies of an individual cannot be detected externally. Even the wisest person cannot observe the potentials of an individual and prescribe the best way of living for that person. It can be done only by the individual herself or himself: “If a person possesses any tolerable amount of common sense and experience, his own mode of laying out his existence is the best, not because it is the best in itself, but because it is his own mode.”24 In this respect, it is a process of self-discovery. One discovers her or his unique capabilities and pursues an authentic life that suits her or him. This is self-development properly understood. This aspect of Mill’s thought brings Mill in close proximity to Aristotle. Human beings have a telos, to excel their nature. However, unlike Aristotle, Mill believes in the plurality of good life.25 Human beings have a nature that allows them to constantly transform their lives in novel ways. Mill’s entire view of human nature turns out to rest not on the notion of the repetition of an identical pattern, but on his perception of human lives as subject to perpetual incompleteness, self-transformation, and novelty.26

If the human nature is a tree that needs to grow in accordance with its unique tendencies, then, there cannot be a ready-made plan for each and every individual. Rather, theoretically speaking, there are as many different life styles as the number of individuals that exist. Human beings are not like sheep; and even sheep are not undistinguishably alike. A man cannot get a coat or a pair of boots to fit him unless they are either made to his measure or he has a whole warehouseful to choose from; and is it easier to fit him with a life than with a coat, or are human beings more like one another in their whole physical and spiritual confirmation than in the shape of their feet? . . . But different persons also require different conditions for their spiritual development; and can no more exist healthily in the same moral than all the variety of plants can in the same physical, atmosphere and climate.27

Mill is of the opinion that it is impossible to attain happiness unless one develops her or his unique capabilities and fulfills one’s nature. By self-development one gains “individuality.” As can be understood from the title of the third chapter of On Liberty, “Of Individuality as One of the Elements of Well-Being,” it is indispensable for a happy life.

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In proportion to the development of his individuality, each person becomes more valuable to himself, and is, therefore, capable of being more valuable to others. There is a greater fullness of life about his own existence, and when there is more life in the units there is more in the mass which is composed of them.28

One gains individuality when one listens to her or his inner voice, her or his desires and understanding. If one designs one’s life by simply adopting the customs of the society in which she or he lives, one cannot be said to have individuality. As Nicholas Capaldi puts it, “[t]he fundamental truth about human nature, according to Mill, is that human beings can live fulfilling lives only to the extent that each individual takes responsibility for his own life.”29 A person whose desires and impulses are his own—are the expression of his own nature, as it has been developed and modified by his own culture—is said to have character. One whose desires and impulses are not his own has no character, no more than a steam engine has a character.30

In the process of forming our character, in other words, gaining individuality, individuals make choices from a variety of lifestyles. In fact, for Mill, the distinctive feature of human beings is neither their being the possessor of reason nor their ability to make tools. Their distinction lies in their ability to make choice,31 their powers of reflexive thought and deliberate choice.32 In his words, “[t]he human faculties of perception, judgment, discriminative feeling, mental activity, and even moral preference are exercised only in making a choice.”33 Our lives are full of choices. We make choices on a daily basis; we choose a meal from the menu handed to us by the waiter in a restaurant; we choose the TV program that we are going to watch; and we choose the shirt to wear for work every morning. These may be trivial decisions about how we conduct our daily lives. However, some of our choices are not that trivial. In fact, they may be vital. In every person’s life, there are moments at which the choices that are made will have life-shaping effects. For example, the choice of our major, that of work, that of spouse will heavily bear on whether we will lead happy or miserable lives. Thanks to our choices in life, we will either fulfill our potentials or concede to less than what we could achieve or have. But, how are we going to know which way will lead us to fulfillment? Stated differently, which way of life will suit my unique nature? Given that we human beings are fallible, we can make wrong choices. If we were allowed to make choices about important aspects of our lives one time only, the stakes would be too high. In the case of making the wrong choice, our

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lives would be ruined. In order to prevent such an unwanted prospect, human beings should be given freedom to make “experiments in living.” In other words, they should be able to review, and if necessary, revise their life plans. In Mill’s words, As it is useful that while mankind are imperfect there should be different opinions, so is it that there should be different experiments of living; that free scope should be given to varieties of character, short of injury to others; and that the worth of different modes of life should be proved practically, when anyone thinks fit to try them. It is desirable, in short, that in things which do not primarily concern others individuality should assert itself.34 ... To give any fair play to the nature of each, it is essential that different persons should be allowed to lead different lives.35

This is autonomy. To be sure, Mill does not use the concept. However, the freedom of choice to gain individuality corresponds to the concept of autonomy in the toolbox of contemporary political theory. For Mill, this is what differentiates human beings from other creatures. Only human beings are rationally self-directed, i.e., autonomous. If we were to copy one another, we would not need any of the faculties such as perception, discrimination, foreseeing, and imagination. As Mill puts it, “He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation.”36 Although human beings are spontaneous and endowed with faculties that make an autonomous living possible, unless they use them these faculties get dull. They need to be exercised; and human beings employ those faculties while doing experiments in living. He who does anything because it is the custom makes no choice. He gains no practice either in discerning or in desiring what is best. The mental and moral, like the muscular, powers are improved only by being used. ... He who chooses his plan for himself employs all his faculties. He must use observation to see, reasoning and judgment to foresee, activity to gather materials for decision, discrimination to decide, and when he has decided, firmness and self-control to hold to his deliberate decision.37

Autonomy, for Mill, is also the only feature that all different ways of good living have in common. Regardless of their contents, all of them must be the lives that are self-chosen, i.e., based on autonomy. In this respect, autonomy is not a means but an end in itself. It is not employed only to construct a way of life but it is a constitutive part of a happy life. As John Gray comments,

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“[t]here can be no doubt that Mill does take choice-making to be itself a necessary ingredient of happiness . . . Mill seems, in his complex view, to be treating choice-making as itself partially constitutive of a happy life and as instrumental to it.”38 This aspect of Mill’s philosophy makes him an “ethical liberal.”39 For an ethical liberal, the moral values that shape the lives of the members of a society and the political ideals that order the relations among them cannot be separated from one another.40 And the basic moral value for Mill is autonomy.41 Thus, the moral nature of human beings is that they are autonomous creatures.42 Having outlined Mill’s moral philosophy, we can now turn to examine his political views. In the political realm, the main ideal that Mill defends is liberty. Mill takes liberty to be the absence of coercion over individual within a certain minimum area of her or his life. Using Isaiah Berlin’s conceptualization, this corresponds to “negative liberty.” For Mill, the principle of liberty delineates the limits of the area within which the individual will be free from any interference. In fact, in the Introductory to On Liberty, Mill states that “the subject of this essay is . . . civil, or social liberty: the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual43. . . the object . . . is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties or the moral coercion of public opinion.”44 In On Liberty, Mill aims at discovering the common feature of all the human activities that are exempt from social control.45 This feature consists of the fact that all the activities that are exempt from social control are the ones that concern only the individual or her or his voluntary associates. This principle can be formulated as “the harm-to-others-principle.” Accordingly, the only legitimate reason for intervening in the activities of an individual is to prevent harm to others. As long as an individual’s actions do not harm any other individual, she or he should be tolerated. the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.46

Thus, each and every individual is entitled to a sphere of action within which they are free to pursue any action which affects only her- or himself, and if it affects any other individual, it does so by the free, voluntary, and conscious endorsement by that other individual. “This, then, is the appropriate region of human liberty.”47 The first liberties that this region includes are concerned with the inner domain of an individual: the domain of conscious-

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ness. The related liberties are “liberty of conscience in the most comprehensive sense,” “liberty of thought and feeling,” which does not have any limitations with respect to subjects including, practical, speculative, scientific, moral, and theological matters. Although the act of expressing and publishing one’s opinions concerns others, and in this sense not a self-regarding act, Mill includes the liberty of expression and publishing in the same category. He thinks that “being almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself and resting in great part on the same reasons, [liberty of expression] is practically inseparable from [liberty of thought and opinion].”48 Second, this region includes the liberty of tastes and pursuits, and that of forming our own life in accordance with our own character, as long as we do not harm others. Third, there comes the liberty of association. This last liberty is a logical result of the liberty of conducting our lives as we wish. Living like a Robinson Crusoe is not a rule but an exception. Human beings associate with fellow human beings for a variety of purposes. As long as these purposes do not involve that of harming others, they are free to unite with one another.49 Mill discusses the liberty of thought and expression in the second chapter of On Liberty. Mill delineates four grounds in defense of these liberties. First, when we silence an opinion, because we cannot be sure that our opinion is true, we may lose the chance of discovering truth. At the same time, all silencing of opinion is an assumption of our infallibility. Second, the silenced view may contain a part of the truth. The received opinions hardly contain all of the truth. By the collision of different opinions, we may hope to discover the whole truth. Third, it may be that received opinion is not only true but it contains the whole truth. Mill thinks that even in such a case, it is not right to silence different opinions. The reason is that when there is no contestation toward a prevailing opinion, it will be held in the form of a prejudice. Most people will not comprehend its rational grounds properly. Fourth, due to lack of challenge, the received opinion will become a dogma losing its power and vitality in affecting individual action. Furthermore, it will hinder the emergence of any heartfelt new opinions.50 Mill anticipates two major objections to the principle of liberty that he developed. The first objection is concerned with the impact of the so-called “self-regarding actions” and asks “How can any action be purely ‘self-regarding,’ without significant actual or potential impact on the interests of persons other than the agent (and his or her voluntary associates)?”51 Given that human beings are not island but a part of the whole, it may not be possible for an individual to act in such way that does not affect others’ interests in any way. This may correspond to asking the individual not to act at all. The second objection is concerned with harming oneself and can be named “paternalist objection.” Even if we could distinguish between the self-regarding

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and other-regarding actions, the critiques of Mill can argue, “[s]ociety has an obligation in some instances to prevent people from harming themselves.”52 Mill concedes that his Harm-to-Others Principle is weakened by the first objection. He acknowledges that any self-regarding action may have impacts on others. It must be refined. His solution lies in demarcating between two sorts of harms: one that the society should tolerate and the other that society should suppress. In this respect, society can legitimately restrict an individual’s liberty to avoid the violation of a clear obligation to other individual(s). The fact that someone has an obligation means that there is some other person(s) who have a right which the obligated person has to honor. Then, according to this new criterion, the harms against which society will protect us are those that violate our rights.53 In Mill’s words: I fully admit that the mischief which a person does to himself may seriously affect, both through their sympathies and their interests, those nearly connected with him and, in a minor degree, society at large. When, by conduct of this sort, a person is led to violate a distinct and assignable obligation to any other person or persons, the case is taken out of the self-regarding class and becomes amenable to moral disapprobation in the proper sense of the term.54

“The distinct obligations and rights” arise in various ways. Sometimes they are due to a promise or a contract.55 For example, it is the obligation of the tenant to pay the monthly rent to the landlord in accordance with the terms of the rental contract. In other times, these kinds of obligations and rights may attend our social roles such as husband and wife, parent and child, co-workers and fellow citizens. However, not all our obligations have a correlative right and a right-bearer.56 For example, as a citizen of a democratic country, we may accept that we have an obligation to be politically active. However, this does not create a right on the part of our fellow citizens. They cannot legitimately force us to be politically active. Finally, there are other actions of ours, although they affect the interests of others, they do not create any obligations toward other individual(s).57 For example, a seller can enter market with a new product and affect the profits of other sellers adversely. Those sellers who lose their profits due to the competition by the new seller do not have any right to demand compensation for their losses. Let’s turn to examine Mill’s response to “the paternalist objection.” Can society legitimately interfere with the self-regarding actions of an individual that are harming her- or himself? Mill’s answer is a “qualified no.” In general, human beings are free to conduct their lives however they wish, as long as their doing so does not harm others’ distinct and assignable rights. For Mill, individual is sovereign over his own body and mind. Neither his physical nor moral goodness is a sufficient reason to interfere with the conduct of an

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individual:58 “He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise or even right. . . . Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.”59 As can be remembered, for Mill, the road to happiness goes through a self-chosen life. If the aim is the happiness or goodness of an individual, it cannot be achieved by imposing an understanding of good life on that individual, even if that understanding was based on the opinion of the wisest man or woman on earth. Mill does not claim that the life that is chosen by the individual is the best life in itself. Rather it is the best life for this particular person because it reflects his own mode.60 Short of using force, others can employ remonstration to persuade someone about the virtues of their own way of the good life and vices of his life. However, if individual insists on his own way, he should be tolerated. Furthermore, the biggest harm to an individual is to end the possibility of leading a chosen life, i.e., an autonomous life. In this respect, paternalism is self-contradictory because it destroys the autonomy of the individual and the possibility of a happy life.61 As Rapaport points out, “Mill’s notion of human happiness places a low value on security. The risks unavoidable in the assertion of autonomy are far more tolerable than the securities of ape-like automatism.”62 However, there is a qualification of this general rule. It is that one cannot abdicate her or his freedom. An extreme case of this phenomenon would be one’s selling her- or himself to slavery. As a voluntary and conscious act it may be considered as a self-regarding act. However, it ends one’s freedom. On the other hand, the aim of the principle of liberty is to protect the freedom of the individual. Thus, this principle cannot be employed to destroy what it is meant to preserve. In such a situation, society will not tolerate a person’s decision to end her or his freedom.63 It seems that the relationship between the principle of liberty and freedom as autonomy can be discerned now. For Mill, freedom as autonomy is the distinctive feature of human beings. It is the ability to make our decision about our lives. Every human being of age has it. It is also central for gaining individuality, i.e., self-development. Without developing her or his potentials, one cannot gain individuality, and thus, happiness. In the process of self-development, individuals need to make experiments in living and this necessitates making choices. However, individuals need a free space to do all these experiments. This is where liberty enters the picture. In Berlin’s words, Mill believes in liberty, that is, the rigid limitation of the right to coerce, because he is sure that men cannot develop and flourish and become fully human unless they are left free from interference by other men within a certain area of their lives, which he regards as—or wishes to make—inviolable.64

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Thus understood, for Mill, liberty is a means while freedom as autonomy is an end. Liberty derives its legitimacy from the support that it lends to freedom as autonomy.65 It needs to be stated that this is a utilitarian argument.66 Liberty, i.e., toleration, is recommended for the benefits that it provides the individual. Thanks to the principle of liberty (negative liberty), the individual is tolerated with her or his experiments in living within a certain sphere of noninterference. Autonomy can be experienced within the free scope created by the liberty and autonomy is central for individuality, which is an indispensable element of happiness. Thus, liberty contributes to individual happiness via autonomy. In this understanding, the utility is happiness. Toleration is recommended on at least two grounds. First, it contributes to individual happiness. An individual who has liberty “to pursue his good in his own way” can choose the lifestyle that suits his nature most. In the absence of this liberty, she or he would have to wear down her or his unique features to fit in the traditional way of living. As a result of leading the life that is most suitable to one’s own character, one can hope to achieve self-development and happiness. Second, toleration contributes to social progress. It does so by promoting individuality. Individuals who can fulfill their nature to the best can contribute most to the well-being of the society in which they live. An individual who has discovered her or his unique potentials and developed them to the full extent can make her or his highest contribution to the society. On the other hand, an individual who lives the life that was tailored for her or him by her or his family, community, or society at large can hope to be as happy as an automaton can be. A society formed by such unhappy individuals, whose lives are compressed like “a Chinese lady’s foot”67 would not be a progressive one.

NOTES 1. Bernard Williams, “Tolerating the Intolerable,” in The Politics of Toleration in Modern Life, ed. Susan Mendus (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), 65–75, 73. 2. Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 12–13; Richard Lindley, Autonomy, (London: Macmillan, 1986), 5. 3. Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” in Four Essays on Liberty, Isaiah Berlin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 118–72, 131. 4. Berlin, “Two Concepts,” 131. 5. Lindley, Autonomy, 6. 6. G. Dworkin, The Theory, 20, see also G. Dworkin, “Autonomy,” in A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, eds. Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), 359–65, 360.

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7. Lindley, Autonomy, 64–66. 8. G. Dworkin, The Theory, 15; Lindley, Autonomy, 64–66. 9. G. Dworkin, The Theory, 18. 10. Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 10. 11. Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 75. 12. Ronald Dworkin, “Liberalism” in Public and Private Morality, ed. Stuart Hampshire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978). Reprinted in Liberalism and Its Critics, ed. Michael Sandel (New York: New York University Press, 1984), 60–79, 64. On this point, Charles Larmore states that “[p]olitical neutrality requires that the conflicting ideals of the good life be set aside in the political realm; that is, the fundamental political principles should be ones whose justification does not depend on assuming the intrinsic superiority of any of these contested ideals.” See Charles E. Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 73. 13. Ronald Dworkin, “Foundations of Liberal Equality,” in Tanner Lectures on Human Values (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1991), 50, quoted by Gerald Dworkin, “Autonomy,” in A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, eds. Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), 359–65, 363. 14. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, 12; see also, Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 80–82. 15. G. Dworkin, The Theory, 31. 16. G. Dworkin, The Theory, 20. 17. Bruce A. Ackerman is of the opinion that, “[p]erhaps the capacity to develop a rational life plan is not the only good whose existence can be known to us; perhaps there are other things that are valuable in and of themselves. So long as it is morally better to respect my moral autonomy than to force me to achieve one of these other goods, the path has been laid for a rational commitment to Neutrality. It is, in short, not necessary for autonomy to be the only good thing; it suffices for it to be the best thing that there is.” See Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 368. Similarly, John Gray states that “[a]mong us—the inhabitants of modern Western societies characterized by a high degree of social mobility, pluralism in lifestyles and individualism in ethical culture—autonomy is a constitutive ingredient in any form of the good life. If we lacked even a modicum of autonomy, if we were not even part authors of our lives—if our jobs, our marriages or sexual partners, our place of abode or our religion were assigned to us or chosen for us—we would consider our individuality stifled and the goodness of our lives dimisnished.” John Gray, Post-liberalism (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 307, quoted by David Conway, Classical Liberalism The Unvanquished Ideal (London: Macmillan, 1995), 123. 18. Gerald F. Gaus, “The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms” in Handbook of Political Theory, eds. Gerald F. Gaus and Chandran Kukathas (London: Sage Publications, 2004), 100–114, 104. As Gaus indicates, according to those who think that

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an autonomous life is a distinctively liberal conception of the good life, “the good life is a freely chosen life, and so the good life is a free life.” (p. 104). 19. Gerald Dworkin, The Theory, 16–17. 20. Mercer, “Grounds of Liberal Tolerance,” 328. 21. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, first published in 1859, edited, with an introduction, by Elizabeth Rapaport (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Com., 1978), 60–61. 22. Mill, On Liberty, 56–57. 23. John Gray, Mill on Liberty: A Defence, 2nd edition, (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 85. 24. Mill, On Liberty, 64. 25. Gray, Mill on Liberty, 73. 26. Isaiah Berlin, “John Stuart Mill and the Ends of Life,” in Four Essays on Liberty, Isaiah Berlin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 173–206, 189. 27. Mill, On Liberty, 64–65. 28. Mill, On Liberty, 60. 29. Nicholas Capaldi, John Stuart Mill: A Biography (West Nyack, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 268. 30. Mill, On Liberty, 57. 31. Berlin, “John Stuart Mill,” 178. 32. Gray, Mill on Liberty, 85. 33. Mill, On Liberty, 56. 34. Mill, On Liberty, 54. 35. Mill, On Liberty, 61. 36. Mill, On Liberty, 56. 37. Mill, On Liberty, 56. At this point, it must be indicated that it is possible to make a distinction between “autonomy as a purely formal notion (where what one decides for oneself can have any particular content), and autonomy as a substantive notion (where only certain decisions count as retaining autonomy whereas others count as forfeiting it).” G. Dworkin thinks that there is a tension between these two notions of autonomy. In the former view, one can be autonomous regardless of the content of her or his choice. On the other hand, according to the latter view, “the person who decides to do what his community, or guru, or comrades tells him to do cannot . . . count as autonomous.” See G. Dworkin, The Theory, 12. Within this distinction, John S. Mill’s approach seems to correspond to the latter view, i.e., substantive notion of autonomy. 38. Gray, Mill on Liberty, 73. 39. Jason Brennan, “Choice and Excellence: A Defense of Millian Individualism,” Social Theory and Practice, 31, no. 4 (October 2005): 483–98, 485. 40. Jeremy Waldron, “Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive,” Handbook of Political Theory, eds. Gerald F. Gaus and Chandran Kukathas (London: Sage Publications, 2004), 88–99, 91. 41. Nicholas Capaldi, John Stuart Mill, 249–57. 42. John Tomasi, Liberalism Beyond Justice: Citizens, Society, and the Boundaries of Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 4.

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43. Mill, On Liberty, 1. 44. Mill, On Liberty, 9. 45. Elizabeth Rapaport, “Editor’s Introduction,”in On Liberty, John Stuart Mill, edited, with an introduction, by Elizabeth Rapaport (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing company, 1978 [1859]), vii–xxiii, xiv–xv. 46. Mill, On Liberty, 9. 47. Mill, On Liberty, 11. 48. Mill, On Liberty, 11–12. 49. Mill, On Liberty, 11–12. 50. Mill, On Liberty, 50. 51. Rapaport, “Editor’s Introduction,” xvi. 52. Rapaport, “Editor’s Introduction,” xvi. 53. Rapaport, “Editor’s Introduction,” xvii. 54. Mill, On Liberty, 79. 55. Rapaport, “Editor’s Introduction,” xvii. 56. Rapaport, “Editor’s Introduction,” xvii. 57. Rapaport, “Editor’s Introduction,” xvii. 58. Mill, On Liberty, 9. 59. Mill, On Liberty, 9. 60. Mill, On Liberty, 64. 61. Capaldi, John Stuart Mill, 277. 62. Rapaport, “Editor’s Introduction,” xix. 63. Mill, On Liberty, 101. 64. Berlin, “John Stuart Mill,” 190. 65. Capaldi, John Stuart Mill, 277. 66. It must be indicated that Mill’s utilitarianism is different from that of his predecessors, i.e., Jeremy Bentham and James Mill. Even though he states that “I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions” ( p.10), his conception of utility is significantly different from that of the classical utilitarianism. In the classical understanding, as witnessed by the motto “greatest happiness of the greatest number,” happiness is the utility. The content of utility, in this understanding, is described as the presence of pleasure and the absence of pain, which are believed to be objectively detected and measured with a precision of mathematics. On the other hand, even though Mill considers the happiness to be the utility that animates all human activities, he does not think that pleasure contributes to happiness in an unqualified way. As was indicated earlier, there is a teleological aspect of his understanding of human happiness. Happiness comes as a result of self-development and autonomy is crucial for self-development. Furthermore Mill distinguishes between higher and lower pleasures or higher and lower forms of happiness that are qualitatively different from one another. To the extent to which it presupposes a particular content to human happiness, Mill’s utilitarianism is inconsistent with the classical utilitarianism of Bentham and James Mill. 67. Mill, On Liberty, 66.

Chapter Five

Conscience and Toleration: The Case of Pierre Bayle

There can be no compulsion in religion. Qur’an 2:256 [T]here is an unjust persecution which the wicked inflict on the Church of Christ, and . . . a just persecution which the Church of Christ inflicts on the wicked. St. Augustine

Another road whose destination is toleration is paved by the concept of “conscience.” As George Carey puts it, “[t]o tolerate another means to make him free to follow his conscience and exercise his freedom in whatever way suits him within the boundaries of law.”1 But, why should one let another person follow the dictates of her or his conscience? In answering this question, I will begin with an analysis of human nature. If the argument in favor of toleration will have a universal appeal, it must be based on a feature of human nature that is also universal. Following in the footsteps of David Hume, we can identify three motives that lead human beings to action: interest, affection, and principle.2 For Hume, interest in general, and self-interest in particular, is what accounts for the establishment and maintenance of human institutions such as property, law, and morals in general. It is also self-interest on which modern economics depends for explaining and predicting economic behavior. However, this is not to say that it is only self-interest that there is to human moral nature. Rather, it is to say that although human beings have many noble motives, they are not the ones that can account for the emergence of human institutions like justice and property. As Norman P. Barry indicates, in Hume’s 65

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understanding, “although men do have a capacity for benevolence, this is too fragile a sentiment on which to found a social order.”3 The second human motive is affection. Affection is another motive which explains some part of the human conduct that self-interest fails to do. Human beings may attribute more value to their attachments to other individuals than their immediate self-interest and to the opinions of people they hold in high esteem than their own opinions. However, this does not mean that individuals who act out of affection act in a disinterested way. Rather it means that they act in an uninterested way. In this respect, they are not impartial. They are partial not toward themselves but toward the people to whom they have an attachment.4 Furthermore, the object of this attachment is not limited to individuals. It can be directed to institutions such as a political party or a country. However, no attachment is immutable. People can revise and renounce their particular attachments as in the case of denouncing one’s citizenship of a particular country in order to assume another one.5 We human beings form attachments not only to the self, other individuals and/or institutions but also to notions and ideas. The attachments to ideals can be even more powerful than the attachments to the self and others. Human beings may sacrifice their lives and/or the lives of those whom they love dearly for their ideals. This is acting out of principle. A father who turns in his child who is guilty of a crime to the police, when he could help her or him run away, may be said to act on the basis of principle. Why would one act in such an “irrational” way? The reason for acting in this way can be found in human beings’ desire to do what they believe is right or what they believe to be their duty. This is a deontological behavior. The deontology emphasizes the rightness of following a certain path rather than its goodness. It does not take the immediate results of following the right path into account. A certain action may hurt the self-interest of the agent, thus it may not be good for this particular person. However, it may be the right action. For example, saying the truth even in cases where this would hurt our self-interest. The most prominent representative of this line of thinking, without doubt, is Immanuel Kant. In this sense, one acts according to a principle not because it brings about the highest happiness of the highest number of people but because it is the right thing to do. That a course of action is right may be good enough reason to act in that way even if it runs against our immediate interests. People may privilege principle over self-interest and affection as the source of their motivations. However, that does not mean that principle always trumps selfinterest and affection; it means that from time to time it does so.6 Principle as a source of motivation can be named in another way: conscience.

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Conscience can be defined as an ability or a faculty that shows us what is right and what is wrong in conducting our lives. Metaphorically speaking, it is the voice within our breast that constantly warns us against acting contrary to what we believe to be right. When we do obey this voice, we feel rectitude or integrity and when we disobey it what we feel is remorse. The reason behind our failure to follow the dictates of our conscience may be the weakness of will or some external factors such as physical and/or psychological constraint. Some trace the origin of the conscience to God. For them, conscience is God’s deputy within us that is protecting the integrity of our soul. The subject matter, i.e., the moral rules and doctrines, of this God-given faculty is also constituted by God. While some of these rules and doctrines may be so evident as to be found by reason alone, some of them may be very obscure and faith comes to rescue. For some, conscience is neither the voice of God nor given by Him. Rather, it may be a faculty developed as a result of evolution that sanctions the moral rules which are established by reason or discovered through a sentiment such as sympathy. Since antiquity, it has been argued that reason can attain the idea of what is morally right (virtue) and what is morally wrong (vice) and fight against the pull of the passions in the wrong direction. Without doubt, the pioneers of this line of thinking are Plato and Aristotle. In the Laws, Plato distinguishes two sorts of emotion in the human soul: reason and passions.7 We can denote these emotions as rational and irrational emotions, respectively. Plato likens these emotions to the strings of a puppet. These strings pull us in opposite directions; we go back and forward between virtue and vice. We should constantly obey the string of reason which is golden and holy and resist the pull of other strings which are made of inferior materials. Corresponding to the golden string of reason in the human soul, there exists the golden string of law in the polis. Accordingly, law is a public decision about pleasures and pains.8 In achieving virtue and avoiding vice, the biggest helper of a human being is law. On the other hand, Adam Smith rejects the idea that the source of our moral judgments is reason. For Smith the source of human morality is the sentiment of “sympathy.” Sympathy can be defined as the ability of an individual to imagine the feelings of another person. Thus, when we see the plight of a friend, we feel sorry for her. We can even be brought to tears by watching a movie in which a little fictitious girl loses her fictitious mother. This happens thanks to our ability to imagine others’ feelings. In Smith’s view, we not only share others’ feelings, but we also judge them. When we imagine others’ feelings and see if we approve their action as appropriate, we think they act morally. However, when we think that their feelings and their reactions to those feelings are not proportionate, we disapprove of them.9

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A contemporary interpretation of this line of thinking is provided by James Q. Wilson in the following way: when people act fairly or sympathetically it is rarely because they have engaged in much systematic reasoning. Much of the time our inclination toward fair play or our sympathy for the plight of others are immediate and instinctive, a reflex of our emotions more than an act of our intellect, and in those cases in which we do deliberate . . . , our deliberation begins, not with philosophical premises, but with feelings—in short, with a moral sense. The feelings on which people act are often superior to the arguments that they employ.10

One may or may not be able to give a rational explanation for her or his beliefs about right and wrong. In this sense, the content of one’s conscience may or may not be the result of a deliberate design. However, in either case, conscience binds its owner. A Muslim may just find the idea of eating pork unconscionable; for a samurai, the idea of living with dishonour may have been simply unbearable. In such cases, individuals may be willing to endure terrible deprivations to avoid acting against the dictates of conscience.11

Thus, first of all, human beings conduct their lives rationally. For this reason, human action is generally explicable. In our pursuit of various ends, we are motivated by self-interest or affection or conscience, or by some combination of these. Second, these motives, i.e., interest, affection, and conscience, are not hierarchically ordered. One can act solely on the basis of principle at the expense of her or his self-interest or the interests of significant others. However, one can also give up the principle when this clashes with her or his self-interest.12 Third, “[t]he most important source of human motivation is principle—or, better still, conscience. It is important in this context not because conscience always overrules or overcomes other motives: . . . It is important, rather, because conscience is what not only guides us (for the most part), but what we think should guide us. It is this motivation which makes us—distinctively— human.”13 This point is put by Wilson in the following way: Our selfish desires and moral capacities are at war with one another, and often the former triumphs over the latter. However great this war may be and no matter how often we submerge our better instincts in favor of our baser ones, we are almost always able, in our calm and disinterested moments, to feel the tug of our better nature. In those moments we know the difference between being human and being inhuman.14

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We are now in a position to determine the main characteristics of human nature: “human beings are passionate creatures, governed by their attachments, and moved by their desire to pursue a variety of ends. The individual’s attachments and his pursuit of his ends are, nonetheless, rational; that pursuit is, however, governed by conscience.”15 When we fail to follow the dictates of our conscience, we feel remorse. What is the fundamental interest of human beings thus defined? As can be remembered, the liberals who follow J. S. Mill take choice making as the distinctive feature of human beings, and autonomy as the fundamental interest that all human beings share. However, according to the view developed here, the distinctive feature of human beings is that they have conscience. In this respect, the fundamental interest is the ability to lead a life in accordance with the dictates of one’s conscience. This is what we call liberty of conscience. Regardless of the content(s) of her or his beliefs, every individual has a primary interest in living a life according to her or his conscience. If the proposition that the fundamental interest of human beings is the ability to lead a life in accordance with the dictates of conscience is true, then, what we need is toleration.

THE DEFENDER OF CONSCIENCE: PIERRE BAYLE One of the most intolerant times of human history was the post-Reformation era. After the fragmentation of the unity within the Christendom under the Catholic Church with the emergence of Protestantism, there was a big increase in the conflict and related intolerance caused by the conscientious differences. The Huguenots who are the Protestant subjects of the mostly Catholic France were among the persecuted. The Huguenots who were persecuted during the sixteenth century had an environment of relative toleration with the promulgation of the Edict of Nantes in 1598. The Edict had been issued by Henry of the Navarre who had converted from Protestantism to Catholicism to become the King of France. However, this relatively tolerant era did not last long and during the seventeenth century all the freedoms of the Huguenots were abrogated one by one. The final blow to the Huguenots came when Louis XIV abolished the Edict altogether. It was again complete intolerance. As an absolutist monarch, Louis XIV was fearful of the religious heterogeneity. His fear was also being fanned by the clergy who desired a fully Catholic France. In their provocations against the Huguenots, the clergy were referring to St. Augustine who had stated that “there is an unjust persecution which the wicked inflict on the Church of Christ, and . . . a just persecution

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which the Church of Christ inflicts on the wicked.” St. Augustine justified this statement on the basis of the New Testament (Luke 14:23). This is a parable about a feast given by the master of a house. The master of the house instructs his servant to invite people over for the feast. However, everybody declines the invitation with some kind of excuse. One says that he had gotten a pair of oxen and he had to take care of them; another says that he had just gotten married, so he could not come. When he is informed by his servant as to the responses of the people who got invited, the master tells his servant: “Go out into the highways and hedges and compel them to come in, that my house may be filled.” St. Augustine interpreted this line as a proof that God allows the use of force to bring the heretics to the true church. Historically, it was in the hands of St. Augustine that the text was used for the first time to justify the use of force against dissenters from the orthodox interpretation of religion. St. Augustine had referred to this passage to bring by force the Donatists to “the true church.” During the reign of Louis XIV, it was the Archbishop of Paris who was citing both St. Augustine and the parable to justify the persecution of the French Protestants, i.e., the Huguenots. He was not the first after St. Augustine to cite the parable with this aim but appearing just before the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, it was the most influential and followed by other Catholic authors with the same cause.16 Pierre Bayle and Freedom of Conscience Pierre Bayle was born in 1647 as the second child of his family. His father was a Huguenot priest. He received his first education from his father. Because the limited resources of his family could not finance the education of both his brother and himself at the same time, he had to take a break from his education while his elder brother attended higher education. When he resumed his education, he attended a Catholic school in Toulouse. He converted to Catholicism in Toulouse when he could not defend his Protestant views against the arguments of Jesuit scholars there. However, before long, he converted back to Protestantism, which amounted to one of the biggest crimes in France, when he saw the inconsistencies in the arguments of the Jesuits. He had to flee. He found a safe haven in Geneva. However, since he could not do academic studies that he desired, he went back to France disguising his identity. He found a position in a Protestant school in Sedan and worked there till 1681. When the intolerance became unbearable, he had to leave Sedan for a position in Ecole Illustre in Rotterdam, Holland.17 Bayle produced many works. Chronologically, he had penned the manuscript of Various Thoughts on the Occasion of a Comet even before he left

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Sedan for Ecole Illustre in Rotterdam. This work came out anonymously as Letter on the Comet in 1682. He privileges the reason over the superstition in this work. More importantly, his claim that a society that is formed by the atheists can stay in existence was challenging the dogma which stated that a society devoid of religion could not exist. The other work that created a big interest among both Protestants and the Catholics was General Criticism of M. Maimborg’s History of Calvinism. In this work, Bayle was responding to M. Maimborg’s History of Calvinism, which was very critical of the Huguenots. This book had also come out in 1682. In 1683, it was burned by the state hangman in Paris; and more sadly, the monarch who could not capture the author of the book took his revenge by jailing his brother, Jacob Bayle. It was not long before Jacob Bayle lost his life in his dungeon on November 12, 1685.18 Another negative result for Bayle that this work produced was to provoke the jealousy of a colleague who also had written a book against M. Maimborg’s History of Calvinism. This person was Pierre Jurieu (1637–1713) who was a close friend and colleague both in the Academy in Sedan and Ecole Illustre in Rotterdam. In 1685, Bayle published A Philosophical Commentary on These Words of the Gospel, Luke 14:23, “Compel Them to Come In, That My House May Be Full.” The greatness of this work did not help Bayle improve his relationship with Jurieu. On the contrary, it exacerbated Jurieu’s jealousy. Jurieu, who could not refute Bayle’s arguments took another route and convinced authorities that Bayle was an agent of France and an enemy of Protestantism. As a result, Bayle was expelled from Ecole Illustre in 1693.19 Freed from his academic duties, Bayle embarked on writing an ambitious work with the resources provided by his publisher and friend Reinier Leers. In 1696, Bayle’s efforts resulted in one of the greatest works of all times, Historical and Critical Dictionary. This work became one of the main reference books in enlightenment thought and was widely read in eighteenth-century France. Thinkers such as Voltaire and Diderot confessed their indebtedness to this work and Thomas Jefferson included it in the one hundred books that would form the foundation of the Library of Congress.20 Unlike John S. Mill, who advised toleration on the basis that it is conducive to leading an autonomous life, Pierre Bayle builds his case for toleration on the basis of conscience. In a nutshell, for Bayle, the biggest wrong that can be done is to force a person to act against her or his conscience. As Kilcullen and Kukathas state, for Bayle, “[t]o force conscience is to force a person into a state of sin, for it means causing a person to act contrary to what he believes is the voice of God.”21 By forcing a person to act in a certain way, one can change a person’s outward behavior. However, God judges individuals not on the basis of their actions but rather on the basis of their intentions. Therefore, all individuals should be free to live according to their consciences.

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Bayle developed his theory of toleration most elaborately in A Philosophical Commentary on These Words of the Gospel, Luke 14:23, “Compel Them to Come In, That My House May Be Full.” The publication of this work started in 1686 by the publication of Part I and Part II, continued with the publication of Part III in 1687, and was completed by the publication of Part IV in 1688. It should be pointed out that Bayle developed his theory of toleration as a response to religious intolerance. More specifically, Bayle aimed to refute the literal interpretation of the New Testament (Luke 14:23), “Go out into the highways and hedges and compel them to come in, that my house may be filled.” In refuting the literal interpretation, Bayle did not employ the usual tactics of controversy. He did not explain what the parable meant. Rather, he stated what it did not mean. In doing this, he employed reason, the moral precepts of Gospel and the Decalog as the standards of Scriptural interpretation.22 In the first part of A Philosophical Commentary, Bayle employs reason to destroy the literal interpretation. As a philosopher rather than a theologian, he is not satisfied by simply arguing from the morality of Gospel, as a theologian would be. Rather he traces his argument to a higher level, i.e., to philosophy. In his own words: Were I to write a Commentary merely as a Divine, I shou’d not need to take the Argument higher; I shou’d o’ course suppose, that the Gospel is the first Rule of Manners, and that deviating from the Gospel—Morality is, without further proof, the being in a state of Iniquity: but writing as a Philosopher, I’m oblig’d to go back to the original and mother Rule, to wit, Reason or natural Light.23

The natural Light is the phrase that Bayle uses to refer to reason. It was implanted in human beings by God at the very beginning, even before God ever spoke to Adam outwardly about his duty toward Him. For Bayle, this is natural revelation and it has full command in the realm of morality, i.e., ethics. Every Philosophical attentive Mind clearly conceives, that this lively and distinct Light which waits on us at all Seasons, and in all Places, and which shews us, That the whole is greater than its part, that ‘tis honest to be grateful to Benefactors, not to do to others what we wou’d not have done to ourselves, to keep our Word, and to act by Conscience; he conceives, I say, very clearly, that this Light comes forth from God, and that this is natural Revelation.”24

With respect to speculative dogmas of religion, such as Trinity and Incarnation, on the other hand, he did not trust reason but conscience. In this respect, he differed fundamentally from the heterodox rationalists who employed reason primarily in the realm of speculative knowledge.25 Thus, Bayle

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does not reject these doctrines because they are falsified by reason as the Socinians (the Unitarians) do. Heavens forbid I shou’d have a thought of straining this Principle to such a degree as the Socinians do: yet I can’t think, whatever Limitations it may admit with respect to speculative Truths, that it ought or can have any with regard to those practical and universal Principles which concern Manners; my meaning is, that all moral Laws, without exception, ought to be regulated by that natural Idea of Equity, which, as well as metaphysical Light, enlightens every Man coming into the World.26

[Bayle] divided his work into four parts. The first part was devoted to showing that the use of force in making “conversions” destroyed the essence of Christianity. The second part responded to possible objections, and the third part was reserved to a point-by-point refutation of the arguments which St. Augustine had used to justify the use of force by the “true” faith. Finally, the fourth part was formed by the response to Jurieu’s criticisms of the earlier parts of the work. Here, we are going to limit our attention to the first two parts which consist of the core of his argument for toleration. As stated above, in the first part of A Philosophical Commentary, Bayle appealed to reason to show the absurdity of the literal interpretation of Luke 14:23. He opined that since anything that is against the natural Light is necessarily false, if it can be shown that forcing someone to act against the dictates of her or his conscience is against the natural Light and thus wrong, then we can conclude that the literal interpretation is wrong also. In destroying the literal interpretation, Bayle employs nine “proofs.” First, the authentic religious act must be sincere, i.e., must be due to an inner motivation.27 Using force does not produce sincere belief. Thanks to the lights of our reason, we know that there is a Supreme Being who governs everything, who must be adored by mankind, who approves certain actions and rewards them, who disapproves certain actions and punishes them. It is also clear that this Supreme Being must be adored first and foremost through the acts of mind. Just as a king would not take the falling of statues as a result of a gust of wind as a sign of homage to his majesty, God would be pleased by external acts of adoration only to the extent to which these come from a sincere state of mind and will. Thus, the Essence of Religion consists in the Judgments which our Understanding forms of God, and in those motions of Reverence, of Fear and of Love, which the Will feels for him. . . . It’s evident then, that the only reasonable way of inspiring Religion, is by producing in the Soul certain Judgments with relation to God, and certain Motions of the Will.28

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There is no room for doubt that no act of compulsion, e.g., torture, fines, imprisonment, etc., will produce this sincere state of the soul. As a result, the literal interpretation must be wrong.29 Second, violence runs counter to the spirit of Christianity which fosters meekness, patience and humility.30 First of all, the Gospel attracts the zeal and esteem of its believers not through “either the Fear of Men, or Apprehension of temporal Misery [by which] neither the Heart is touch’d, nor the Reason persuaded.”31 The Gospel spiritualizes Man’s nature and treats human beings as mature, reasonable creatures who can understand its principles by their natural Lights. It requires that its principles should be embraced by a principle of reason. Furthermore, it aims to enlighten the understanding of human beings through its truths. Second, Bayle argues that, “the principal Character of JESUS CHRIST, and . . . the reigning Qualities of his Soul, were Humility, Meekness, and Patience.”32 Jesus Christ wants us to love those who are hostile toward us; let alone to persecute those who are not persuaded by the truths of the Gospel, He asks us to pray for those who persecute us. In the face of persecution, Jesus Christ tells the believers not to oppose persecution but fly to another city at most. Third, the use of force in matters of religion will make distinguishing vice from virtue impossible, for every crime that is forbidden by the religion would be legitimated by claiming that it was done for the sake of “true” church.33 Bayle argues that those who persecute the heretics would not call what they are doing persecution but an act of kindness, justice, and charity. For them, only the violence exercised on the faithful can be called persecution: “what might be unjust, if consider’d as not being done in favor of the true Religion, becomes just by being done for the true religion.”34 This Maxim is most evident in the verse “Compel them to come in,” if we suppose that Jesus Christ meant it in a literal sense. Accordingly, Jesus Christ orders us to “Smite, scourge, imprison, pillage, slay those who continue obstinate, rob ’em of their wives and their Children; it’s all right, when done in favor of my Cause: In other Circumstances these might be Crimes of the blackest dye; but the Good resulting from ’em to my Church, expiates and sanctifies these Proceedings.”35 For Bayle, this Maxim confounds virtue and vice, right and wrong, just and unjust. All the barriers that separate these opposites would be removed by this Maxim: “[A]ll actions, be they ever so infamous, must become Acts of Piety and Religion, if tending to the Extinction of Heresy.”36 Furthermore, since every sect believes itself to be the true religion, all sects would feel legitimated in using force and committing all the crimes against whom they think to be heretic. This would correspond to chaos and the total dissolution of society. Thus, the literal sense that leads to this confusion and the total destruction of society is against the natural Light and therefore must be false.

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Fourth, foreigners would be justified to ban Christian missionaries from entering their countries. Bayle reasons that literal sense of the Scripture that gives just grounds to infidels for not letting Christian missionaries into their dominions must be false. The literal sense of the words, “Compel them to come in” does exactly that. Therefore, it must be false. For Bayle, requiring on the one hand that all humanity should be introduced to the Truth, and creating obstacles in front of this end on the other presents a contradiction. Bayle exemplifies this situation through an imaginary mission of the Catholic Church to China. It is quite natural that when the Catholic missionaries set foot in China, they will be summoned to the court of the Emperor of China. After listening to the virtues of Christianity, the Chinese Emperor hearing the missionaries may wisely put that hard question: “What course of action would you take if you failed to convert someone after giving hundreds of sermons?” According to Bayle, these missionaries, who are sincere enough, will have to answer this question in the following way: we have a Command from our God, who was made Man, to compel the obstinate, that is, those, who after hearing our Doctrines shall refuse Baptism; and in consequence of this Command, whenever we have the Power in our hands, and when a greater Evil may not ensue, we are oblig’d in conscience to imprison the idolatrous Chinese, to bring ’em to Beggary, curry ’em with Cudgels into our Churches, hang some for an Example to others, force away their Children, give ’em up to the Discretion of the Soldiers, them, their Wives, and their Goods.37

Upon hearing this, it would be only just for the Chinese Emperor to prevent these missionaries from entering his country. As the worldly sovereign, he is responsible first and foremost for the security of his subjects. Fifth, the literal interpretation would lead to committing crimes by making one act against his conscience. The literal sense of the words, Compel them to come in, opens the road to all sorts of crimes. The defenders of persecution against the Huguenots claim that it will not be left to the zeal of private persons to carry out the Jesus Christ’s order to compel the heretics, but to the political authority of each country which will be advised by the Church members in turn. Thus, conversions will take place in an orderly fashion without excess. If there are any excesses meanwhile, it must result from the fault of the executioner rather than that of the principle. However, Bayle argues that what happened in France was not benevolent conversions but all sorts of crimes. He thinks that these are not a result of wrong implementation of a just rule. They naturally resulted from the literal sense of the parable.38 Such crimes cannot be recommended by either natural revelation or divine revelation. As a result, it must be false.

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The Sixth Argument against the literal Sense is drawn from its depriving the Christians of a main Objection against the Muslims. Accordingly, Islam has spread through compulsion. On the other hand, Christianity was established by gentle, peaceable means, not by persecution inflicted, but by persecution suffered.39 As a result, the literal sense given to Jesus Christ’s words, Compel them to come in, deprives Christians of this argument. Therefore, it must be false. Seventh, Bayle argues that if Jesus Christ had ordered compulsion in making Christians, it is not probable that the Fathers of the first three centuries would be ignorant of it. On the contrary, the Fathers of the Church, whose doctrines the Catholic Church takes as one of the main pillars of faith, had always preached persuasion rather than compulsion in matters of faith. As St. Athanasius, one of the Fathers of Church, puts it, “it is not WITH SWORD AND SPEAR, NOR SOLDIERS AND ARM’D FORCE, THAT TRUTH IS TO BE PROPAGATED, BUT BY COUNSEL AND SWEET PERSUASION.”40 Therefore, the literal sense must be false. Eighth, according to Bayle, the literal sense would render the complaints of the first Christians against their pagan persecutors all vain. To see how this argument goes, let’s suppose that early Christians who were persecuted by their pagan administrators sent an envoy to the court to present their apology and complaints about how they are tortured, imprisoned, and thrown to the wild animals. Let’s further suppose that the passage in question is also known to the pagans and they also have a literal interpretation of it. Having heard the complaints of Christians, the pagans would answer them by saying that they are doing to Christians precisely what the Christians would do to them on the basis of their Scripture, which preaches the use of force, if they had the power,41 thus rendering early Christians without moral high ground against their persecutors. Ninth, if Jesus Christ had really meant persecution when he said [c]ompel them to come in, then, the orthodox party would be totally justified to use force against the heretics. However, each party, believing that they are orthodox and the rest heretic, would feel “compelled” to compel others to come in: “And thus we shou’d see a continual War between People of the same Country, either in the Streets or in the open Field, or between Nations of different Opinions; so that Christianity wou’d be a mere Hell upon Earth to all who lov’d Peace, or who happen’d to be the weaker side.”42 Therefore, the literal sense must be false. Up to this point, Bayle’s arguments come from the stream of Calvinist rationalism and ethics.43 In Part Two, laying the groundwork for his defense of toleration, he turns away from the perspective of reason to the consideration of conscience.44 This is also where Bayle responds to some of the objections

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that can be potentially raised against his refutation of the literal sense of Jesus Christ’s words, “Compel them to come in.” The most important potential objection to Bayle’s argument states that “persecution is not in itself legitimate, but it becomes so when used in the interests of the true faith. In other words, constraint may be used in favor of the truth but not in favor of error.”45 The reason why this objection is so important is that it led Bayle to re-examine his views about the basis of faith and develop his argument for the rights of conscience.46 For Bayle, although reason enables human beings to determine the principles of morality, this rational faculty is not up to the duty in the case of judging as to the truth of speculative doctrines of the religion. In such a case, as Kilcullen and Kukathas put it, Bayle believes that “reason may lead us to see that we should follow some other guide, which will then provide a ‘secondary’ or ‘derivative’ rule.”47 This other guide in Bayle’s system of thought is conscience. For Bayle, conscience is God’s voice in us telling what is right and what is wrong. In Bayle’s words, “Conscience, with regard to each particular Man, is the voice and Law of God in him, known and acknowledg’d as such by him, who carrys this Conscience about him.”48 To the extent to which it is the voice of God in us, obedience to one’s conscience is obligatory and it should never be violated:49 “to violate this Conscience is essentially believing, that he violates the Law of God. Now to do any thing we esteem an Act of Disobedience to the Law of God, is essentially, either an Act of Hatred, or an Act of Contempt against God; and such an Act is essentially wicked, as all Mankind acknowledg.”50 A person becomes aware of this obligation by natural Light. In fact, in the very first chapter of A Philosophical Commentary, Bayle states that Almighty God, before ever he spoke by an external Voice to Adam, to make him sensible of his Duty, spoke to him inwardly in his Conscience, by giving him the vast and immense Idea of a Being sovereignly perfect, and printing on his Mind the eternal Laws of Just and Honest; so that Adam thought himself oblig’d to obey his Maker, not so much because of a certain Prohibition outwardly striking upon his Organs of Sense, as because that inward Light which enlighten’d his Conscience e’er God had utter’d himself, continually presented the Idea of his Duty, and of his Dependance on the Sovereign Being.51

In this respect, for Bayle, the duty to obey conscience is fundamental, and other duties are secondary.52 The contents of this conscience to which obedience is a must are not predetermined. They are determined by the sincere search of the individual. Once they are found, they obtain a binding status for the individual: “God in the present Condition of Man exacts no more from

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him than a sincere and diligent Search after Truth, and the loving and regulating his Life by it, when he thinks he has found it out.”53 For Bayle, conscience does not necessarily show us the true moral qualities of things, but is provided to us as a practical guide for the preservation of our souls.54 In Bayle’s words, “the Conscience of every particular Person shew him not what Objects are in themselves, but their relative natures, their reputed truth.”55 Though what conscience yields may not be the knowledge of things in themselves, one is obliged to follow its dictates anyway: “Conscience, whether true or errant, always obliges.”56 As Bayle puts it, Which, as every one sees, is a plain Argument that we are oblig’d to have the same deference for a reputed as for a real Truth. . . . every Man living, be he ever so ignorant, has it in his power to give one sense or other to what he reads or hears, and to perceive that such a Sense is the true; and here’s what renders Truth to him. It’s enough if he sincerely and honestly consult the Lights which God has afforded him; and if, following its Discoverys, he embraces that Persuasion which to him seems most reasonable, and most conformable to the Will of God.57

As Elisabeth Labrousse points out, one reason for Bayle’s originality will be found in the fact that he does not try to prove that heretic’s doctrines are right; rather “he argues that their error may be invincible, and hence innocent, in which case God is only concerned with the extent to which each individual has been true to the dictates of his conscience.”58 Unlike John Locke whose defense of toleration is based on individual rights, Pierre Bayle’s defense of tolerance is based on duties of individual, duties toward God.59 However, this, in turn, consists in others’ having a duty not to interfere with one’s conscience and acts that attend that conscience. Stated differently, individuals have a right to freedom of conscience and religion because they have a duty to obey their conscience. Furthermore, this is true not only for the orthodox, i.e., true believers, but also for the heterodox, i.e., the heretics. “The conscience of the heretic must be allowed all the rights of the orthodox conscience because speculative truths, which include all of the dogmas of Christianity, are not susceptible of proof, and error may be invincible.”60 Let’s follow this point in Kilcullen’s words: liability to and immunity from blame and punishment are the core of Bayle’s conception of duty and right. Of the two, duty seems to be fundamental; rights arise out of duties, and consist in duties on the part of the others. If I have a duty to do something then I have a right to do it, consisting in other human beings’ having a duty not to try to persuade me voluntarily not to do it, not to blame or punish me if I do it. This is a crucial premiss of Bayle’s case for the rights of heretics: people have a moral right to do their duty.61

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In this respect, for Bayle, toleration that gives freedom of conscience and religion is not based on a right but on a duty, the duty to obey one’s conscience, which is the same as to obey God.62 In order to clarify this point, Bayle refers to an historical event. A woman’s husband steals from his father and leaves his hometown. Later, he joins the Spanish army and fights against the French, losing one leg. In the front, he meets someone who learns enough about his life. Eight years after he left his wife and hometown, the man whom he met in the front goes to his hometown and impersonates him. Pretending that he was the original husband, he deceives the wife and sleeps with her. Now, normally it is a great sin for a married woman to sleep with someone who is not her husband. It is adultery. However, in this occasion, the woman sincerely believes that the man is her husband and carries her duty toward him. If someone is committing a sin here, it is the fake husband. In fact, believing that he was her husband, if she had refused to sleep with the fake husband, she would be committing a sin by failing to do her duty.63 Thus, a sincere “heretic” with an erring conscience is just like the woman who is deceived by the fake husband.64 Everybody believes that her conscience is orthodox, and since obedience to one’s conscience is a duty toward God, she wants to follow the dictates of that conscience. In this sense, an erring conscience has all the rights that an orthodox conscience has. Every individual, even if she or he is in error, must possess the freedom to live a life according to conscience. The fundamental point is that everybody has a duty to follow the voice of conscience. God orders human beings to listen to it. That is to say, a duty (to live in accordance with the dictates of our conscience) creates a right/freedom (freedom of conscience). This right requires others to leave us alone.65 In Lennon’s words, If the heretic has a duty to act as he believes, then he has a right to do so; but if he has a right to do so, then the magistrate has duty not to interfere. Because the individual conscience is autonomous, it ought to be tolerated.66

If the heretic has a moral duty to follow his conscience, then, he has a right to be able to do so. Thus, the magistrate must not intervene with the way in which a person obeys the dictates of his conscience. To be able to fulfill one’s duty to God, i.e., to obey one’s conscience, there must be freedom of conscience. In other words, individuals must be tolerated in following the dictates of their conscience even if they depart from the majority view as to the religious belief and practices in a given society. Short of using or threat of using physical force and/or offering worldly benefits, the government can try to bring the heretics to what it believes to be the orthodox interpretation of the religion through peaceful persuasion. As Bayle puts it,

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it is the Duty of Superiors to use their utmost endeavors, by lively and solid Remonstrances, to undeceive those who are in error; yet to leave ’em the full liberty of declaring for their own Opinions, and serving God according to the Dictates of their Conscience, if they have not the good fortune to convince ’em: neither laying before ’em any Snare or Temptation of worldly Punishment in case they persist, nor Reward if they abjure.67

The primary duty of the sovereign, according to Bayle, is to secure peace and order. Sovereigns, indeed, have “an essential and unalienable Right of enacting Laws for the Preservation of the State and Society.”68 Only with this aim, i.e., to secure public order, a government can interfere with the freedom of conscience of individuals. As long as individuals remain respectful of the laws that preserve the peace and order, do not impose their religious views on others by use of force, their freedom of conscience and religion should not be disturbed on the basis of their dissenting views. so long as the Principles of any Sect overthrow not those Laws which are the Foundation of the Security of Individuals; so long as they preach Submission to the Magistrate, and the chearful Paying of Taxes and Subsidys impos’d by him; and maintain, that no Man ought to be disturb’d in the Possession of his Right, or in the peaceable Enjoyment of his Goods, movable or immoveable, of his Reputation, Life etc. I don’t think there can be any just ground for vexing ’em on the score of their not obeying any particular Law enjoining such a certain Belief, so such a particular form of Divine Worship: for . . . a Magistrate, who enacts Laws of this kind, and enforces the Observation of ’em under pain of Death, Prison, Galley, etc., manifestly exceeds his Power.69

The creation of unity with respect to moral views cannot be the proper role of a government. It can be argued that, if not for theological reasons, for political reasons, the governments may do better to encourage the unity of belief in their realms, because it is from the plurality of views that conflict emerges. To this objection, Bayle responds by arguing that conflict arises not from the plurality of views but from the absence of toleration among them. If there is toleration among different sects, not disorder but harmony will emerge within society. if the Multiplicity of Religions prejudices the State, it proceeds purely from their not bearing with one another, but on the contrary endeavoring each to crush and destroy the other by methods of Persecution. Hinc prima mali labes: Here’s the Source of all the Evil. Did each Party industriously cultivate that Toleration which I contend for, there might be the same Harmony in a State compos’d of ten different Sects, as there is in a Town where the several kinds of Tradesmen contribute to each others mutual Support.70

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In another place, he states, It’s plain to any Man who considers things, that all Disturbances attending Innovations in Religion, proceed from People’s pursuing the first Innovators with Fire and Sword, and refusing ’em a Liberty of Conscience; or else from the new Sect’s attempting, from an inconsiderate Zeal, to destroy the Religion establish’d. Nothing therefore but Toleration can put a stop to all those Evils; nothing but a Spirit of Persecution can foment ’em.71

Furthermore, what holds true for a particular sect with respect to the freedom of conscience and toleration holds true for any other sect. In this sense, Bayle defends universal toleration. There cannot be a middle way between toleration and intolerance. Stated differently, for Bayle, one cannot tolerate discriminatively among sects in a principled way. There is either full toleration or no toleration at all. Half-toleration, i.e., extending toleration to some groups and denying it for others, is not an option. Thus, the Jews, Muslims (he uses Turks for Muslims), Pagans, Unitarians, and atheists72 will all be tolerated. As long as they do not disturb the public order, they deserve toleration. They can even come and preach their religion and make converts just the same way Christians go abroad and make converts. Bayle agrees with his opponents that toleration can justly be denied to those who blaspheme against God. However, he disagrees as to what constitutes blasphemy. For Bayle, blasphemy must be defined by a principle common both to the accuser and the accused, the persecutor and the persecuted.73 Such a common principle may be found in the definition which states that it is blasphemous to insult the faith that one believes in. Accordingly, if a Protestant says that Catholic practice of Eucharist is nonsense, this would not be blasphemy, because he does not do anything against his conscience. Similarly, a Catholic may say that Calvin’s God is fake and cruel. In the Calvinist’s eye, this would be a great blasphemy. Yet, for Bayle, it is not. If these words were uttered by a Calvinist, then they would be blasphemous. In this respect, the scope of blasphemy, which is open to intolerance, gets narrowed down squarely by Bayle.74 NOTES 1. George Carey, “Tolerating Religion,” in The Politics of Toleration in Modern Life, ed. Susan Mendus (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), 45–63, 55–56. 2. Chandran Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Freedom and Diversity (New York: Oxford Uni. Press, 2003).

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3. Norman P. Barry, On Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism (London: Macmillan, 1986), 24. 4. Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago, 44–45. Aristotle’s idea of friendship and the affection that underlies it parallels this phenomenon. According to Aristotle, friendship “is a kind of virtue, or implies virtue, and it is also most necessary for living” (NE 1155a4–5). It is built upon mutual affection (philia). The object of affection between friends, as Aristotle puts it, might be either what is useful, or what is pleasant, or what is good. Corresponding to these three objects of affection, Aristotle enumerates three kinds of friendship: friendship based on utility, friendship based on pleasure, and friendship based on goodness (NE 1155b16–1156b35). 5. Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago, 44–45. It seems that Aristotle’s concept of political friendship can be example of this last sort. Aristotle informs us that political friendship (or concord) seems to be a friendly feeling. That is to say, between the sides in political friendship, the affection (philia) which is the basis of friendship is present. 6. Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago, 48. 7. It is reasonable to think that “passion” in the twofold division of reason and passion in the Laws corresponds to “desire” in the tripartite division of reason, passion, and desire in the Republic. 8. Plato, Laws, translated, with an introduction by Trevor J. Saunders (London: Penguin Books, 1975), 644–45. 9. James Q. Wilson, The Moral Sense (New York: Free Press Paperbacks, 1997), 32. 10. Wilson, The Moral Sense, 8–9. 11. Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago, 47. 12. Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago, 45. 13. Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago, 48. 14. Wilson, The Moral Sense, 11. 15. Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago, 49. 16. Karl C. Sandberg, At the Crossroads of Faith and Reason: An Essay on Pierre Bayle (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1966), 68–69. 17. Thomas M. Lennon and Michael Hickson, “Pierre Bayle,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato. stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/bayle/ (retrieved on 03/08/2010). 18. John Kilcullen and Chandran Kukathas, “Introduction,” in Pierre Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary on These Words of the Gospel, Luke 14:23, “Compel Them to Come In, That My House May Be Full,” edited and with an introduction by John Kilcullen and Chandran Kukathas (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005), ix–xxii, x–xi. 19. Kilcullen and Kukathas, “Introduction,” xi. 20. Kilcullen and Kukathas, “Introduction,” xi–xii. 21. Kilcullen and Kukathas, “Introduction,” xix. 22. Sandberg, At the Crossroads, 70. 23. Pierre Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary on These Words of the Gospel, Luke 14:23, “Compel Them to Come In, That My House May Be Full,” edited and

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with an introduction by John Kilcullen and Chandran Kukathas (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005), 80. 24. Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary, 73. 25. Sandberg, At the Crossroads, 70. 26. Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary, 69. 27. Sandberg, At the Crossroads, 71. 28. Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary, 76. 29. Walter Rex, Essays on Pierre Bayle and Religious Controversy (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), 169. 30. Sandberg, At the Crossroads, 71. 31. Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary, 83. 32. Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary, 83. 33. Sandberg, At the Crossroads, 71. 34. Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary, 88 (emphasis in the original). 35. Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary, 88 (emphasis in the original). 36. Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary, 89. 37. Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary, 95. 38. Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary, 104. 39. Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary, 119. 40. Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary, 122–23 (capitalized in the original). 41. Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary, 125. 42. Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary, 133. 43. Sandberg, At the Crossroads, 71. 44. Amie Godman Tannenbaum, “Interpretive Essay,” in Pierre Bayle’s Philosophical Commentary: A Modern Translation and Interpretation, ed. Amie Godman Tannenbaum (New York: Peter Lang, 1987), 237–38. 45. Sandberg, At the Crossroads, 73. 46. Sandberg, At the Crossroads, 73. 47. John Kilcullen and Chandran Kukathas, “Appendixes,” in Pierre Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary on These Words of the Gospel, Luke 14:23, “Compel Them to Come In, That My House May Be Full,” edited and with an introduction by John Kilcullen and Chandran Kukathas (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005), 575–98, 593. 48. Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary, 113. 49. Rex, Essays on Pierre Bayle, 170. 50. Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary, 113. 51. Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary, 70. 52. John Kilcullen, Sincerity and Truth Essays on Arnauld, Bayle, and Toleration (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 62, footnote 22. 53. Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary, 264. 54. Kilcullen and Kukathas, “Appendixes,” 595–96. 55. Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary, 271. 56. Thomas M. Lennon, Reading Bayle (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 82; see also Perez Zagorin, How the Idea of Religious Toleration Came to the West (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003), 282–83.

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57. Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary, 264. 58. Elisabeth Labrousse, Bayle, translated by Denys Potts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 84. 59. Labrousse, Bayle, 85. 60. Sandberg, At the Crossroads, 73. 61. Kilcullen, Sincerity and Truth, 62. 62. Lennon, Reading Bayle, 84. 63. Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary, 233–36. 64. Lennon, Reading Bayle, 84. 65. Kilcullen, Sincerity and Truth, 62; Labrousse, Bayle, 85. 66. Lennon, Reading Bayle, 85. 67. Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary, 196 (italics in the original). 68. Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary, 190. 69. Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary, 190. 70. Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary, 199–200. 71. Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary, 201. 72. Unlike John Locke, who thinks that since atheists do not believe in God and as a result do not have morality, Pierre Bayle thinks that one does not have to be religious in order to have morality. In his words, “the inclination to act badly is not found in a soul destitute of the knowledge of God any more than in a soul that knows God; and that a soul destitute of the knowledge of God is no freer of the brake that represses the malignity of the heart than is a soul that has this knowledge.” See Pierre Bayle, Various Thoughts on the Occasion of a Comet, translated, with notes and an interpretive essay, by Robert C. Bartlet (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), 180. 73. Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary, 217. 74. Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary, 216–17.

Chapter Six

Two Versions of Liberalism and Their Positions on Toleration

Liberal democracies can accommodate and embrace many forms of cultural diversity, but not all. Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 152 Diversity is, in fact, not the value liberalism pursues but the source of the problem to which it offers a solution. Chandran Kukathas, Liberal Archipelago, p. 29

In the contemporary liberal literature two of these four theories of toleration are in the forefront. They are the theory of toleration based on autonomy and the theory of toleration based on conscience. In fact, the difference of these two theories can be seen in the distinction made between comprehensive or ethical liberalism and political liberalism. Thus, what follows is a presentation of these two theories of toleration through an analysis of two versions of liberalism in the writings of two contemporary prominent liberals, Will Kymlicka and Chandran Kukathas, who follow in the footsteps of John S. Mill and Pierre Bayle, respectively. One can make a distinction between the general principles and ideals that shape a liberal social order’s political framework and the deeper commitments and values that give meaning to the lives of human beings who reside within that framework. With regard to this distinction, a political liberal argues that the former set of principles should not be based on the latter set of values. Stated differently, “[t]he political liberal insists that the articulation and defence of a given set of liberal commitments for a society should not depend on any particular theory of what gives value or meaning to a human life.”1 For a political liberal, “the task liberalism sets itself [is] providing an 85

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account of political order that could command the acceptance of all, irrespective of their moral commitments or ideals of the good life.”2 As Rawls puts it, the problem of political liberalism is: “How is it possible that deeply opposed though reasonable comprehensive doctrines may live together and all affirm the political conception of a constitutional regime?”3 On the other hand, a comprehensive liberal opines that we cannot possibly build a liberal social order without a commitment to deeper values. According to a comprehensive liberal, “[l]iberalism . . . is a robust position in political philosophy, a position whose moral partisanship reaches deep into the foundations of our conceptions of person, freedom, and value.”4 Thus, for a comprehensive liberal, the former set of principles cannot be separated from the latter set of values in a liberal social order. Douglass B. Rasmussen and Douglas J. Den Uyl define comprehensive liberalism(s) in the following way: Comprehensive liberalisms are those defenses of liberalism that take place within larger philosophical doctrines that have something to say in general about what is valuable or best for human beings to pursue or embrace. The defense of liberalism in the comprehensive mode depends in some critical way upon the framework and values of the larger philosophical system. . . . Comprehensive theories suggest that liberalism is of value because it accords with a conception of the good that the comprehensive theory favors.5

However, it must be noted that political liberalism is not totally devoid of any moral content, for no political theory can have any normative appeal if it has no moral assumptions: “The distinction between ‘comprehensive’ and ‘political’ liberalism therefore cannot plausibly be one between moral and non-moral theories. . . . What distinguishes ‘political’ liberalism from ‘comprehensive’ doctrines . . . is that it tries to establish liberalism as a minimal moral conception.”6 An example of comprehensive liberalism can be found in autonomy-based liberalism. As can be remembered from chapter 4, those liberals who defend liberalism on the basis of autonomy believe that a person attains happiness only through leading an autonomous life. A person who acts on the basis of a rule she prescribed for herself can be said to be an autonomous person. Such a person possesses at least three characteristics. First, she has the ability to act; she is not subject to physical coercion or the threat of physical coercion. Second, she acts not out of an irrational pull of desires or some pathological drives but out of rational calculation. She can deliberate about alternative routes of action with respect to a matter that concerns her wellbeing. Third, she is not under the control of the will of others surrounding her. She herself designs her way of life.7

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According to this view, it is not enough to leave the individual alone for her to lead a good life. In addition to standard negative liberties such as freedom from coercion and constraint, one also needs to have economic goods and a cultural environment that fosters an autonomous life. Before one is fully autonomous, she needs to overcome the economic/material needs. However, these cannot be met satisfactorily in a liberal society due to reasons such as illness, disability, and/or unemployment. John Gray thinks that a liberal state has the responsibility to make its citizens autonomous by enabling them through welfare services. He calls such a state an enabling welfare state.8 Furthermore, one also needs to be freed from “the suffocating constrain of social mores and customs.”9 Individual must be provided with “the cultural conditions conducive to acquiring an awareness of different views about the good life, and to acquiring an ability to intelligently examine and re-examine these views.”10 Autonomy is not something that is naturally acquired but something that is learned. One learns about it by doing experiments. These experiments cannot be carried out in an environment which is hostile to questioning established ways of the community. On the contrary, one needs to be encouraged and stimulated to do experiments with her own life and discover her own particular understanding of the good life. In Mill’s words, As it is useful that while mankind are imperfect there should be different opinions, so is it that there should be different experiments of living; that free scope should be given to varieties of character, short of injury to others; and that the worth of different modes of life should be proved practically, when anyone thinks fit to try them. It is desirable, in short, that in things which do not primarily concern others individuality should assert itself.11

In fact, it is in this sense that a life based on autonomy becomes “a distinctively liberal conception of the good life: the good life is a freely chosen life, and so the good life is a free life.”12 To the extent to which a life that is based on autonomy becomes “a distinctively liberal conception of the good life,” liberalism that is based on autonomy takes the form of a “comprehensive liberalism.” At this point, the question as to the fate of those individuals and groups which do not lead an autonomous lifestyle inevitably arises. In Susan Mendus’ words, What needs to be established is what the liberal attitude will be to those forms of life which do not place a high value on autonomy, and this question is most pressing in contexts in which the non-autonomous life-style takes the form of a sub-culture within the framework of a broadly liberal society. Examples of this might be the Muslim community in Britain, or the Amish community in America. In order

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to justify its claim to be both plural and tolerant, liberalism must say something about its response to such groups of people—about the degree of toleration which will be extended to them and the reasons for that toleration.13

As a comprehensive mode of liberalism, autonomy-based liberalism does not seem to meet its promise of providing a plural and tolerant environment. This stance involves requiring all individuals and groups to respect individual autonomy. As Andrew D. Mason claims, the liberal state’s commitment to the concept of autonomy prevents it from remaining neutral toward the understandings of the good life that do not value autonomy.14 The liberal state that takes autonomy to be the liberal value and builds its political framework on it cannot tolerate individuals and groups who do not respect individual autonomy. Thus, Mendus states that, “[t]he pluralism and tolerance which this account of liberalism affords is only between and within life styles which place a high value on autonomy. . . . Tolerance becomes not a virtue, but merely a temporary expedient against the day when all are autonomous.”15 This stance can be seen most clearly in the following words of Deborah Fitzmaurice: once liberal principles are seen to depend on the claim that autonomy is a good, it is clear that the liberal state is bound to be to some extent inhospitable to traditional ways of life. For the principle of autonomy implies that we, as liberals, have an obligation to sustain a public sphere, accessible to all, which is supportive of autonomy. This involves allowing critical speech at the cost of causing offence. We have an obligation to sustain an educational system which nurtures habits of critical reflection. This involves refusing not only support, but permission, to schools which would fail to encourage such reflectiveness.16

An influential example of this mode of thinking can be found in Will Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. In this work, he argues that the formation of a good life, i.e., the autonomous life, does not take place in a vacuum, for human beings live in what he calls societal cultures, defined as a culture which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres. These cultures tend to be territorially concentrated, and based on a shared language.17

Our formation of the good life occurs in a societal culture. We can exercise our freedom of choice in a meaningful way only in a cultural milieu, for “freedom is intimately linked with and dependent on culture.”18 Furthermore, our development of an autonomous character is dependent not on any culture

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but our own culture: “People make choices about the social practices around them, based on their beliefs about the values of these practices . . . And to have a belief about the value of a practice is, in the first instance, a matter of understanding the meanings attached to it by our culture.”19 Our choices are shaped and informed by our culture. Thus, in addition to the existence of such civil liberties as freedom from coercion and constraint, and economic rights in the form of social welfare state benefits, culture’s existence and continuity is also fundamental for our pursuit of happiness.20 However, culture is not homogenous in most societies. Contemporary societies are marked by religious, cultural, and ethnic diversity. Kymlicka distinguishes between two forms of cultural diversity: multination states and polyethnic states. In the case of multination states, cultural diversity emerges from the act of incorporating into a larger state various cultures that were previously self-governing and territorially concentrated. In the case of polyethnic states, the cause of cultural diversity is found in individual and familial immigration.21 Thus, “a state is multicultural if its members either belong to different nations (a multination state), or have emigrated from different nations (a polyethnic state), and if this fact is an important aspect of personal identity and political life.”22 Even though the nation-state has sought to create homogenous societies since its inception by eroding these differences, it has, according to Kymlicka, failed in this endeavor.23 The liberal nation-state must acknowledge the reality of diversity and take the necessary steps to create not only an economically—but also a culturally—just society.24 Kymlicka’s solution to this problem is “group rights,” of which there are three sorts: the right of selfgovernment, polyethnic rights, and representation rights.25 The right of self-government, which is often achieved through federalism, involves devolving as much power to national minorities as possible. Redrawing a country’s internal borders guarantees that they will be the majority population in their traditional homelands.26 On the other hand, polyethnic rights are concerned with claims of financial support and/or legal exemptions for certain ethno-cultural practices. The most well-known examples of the latter sort are the claims of Sikh men to be exempt from wearing a helmet while driving a motorcycle and the demand by Jewish men to wear a yarmulka, as well as the similar demand by Muslim women to wear the hijab, in public spaces. On the other hand, claims of financial support are justified by arguing that the state must preserve cultural diversity by providing material support as a source of social richness. After all, through their subsidization of artistic and cultural events, liberal democracies are already supporting one culture: western culture. Thus, the argument continues, giving material support to minority cultures establishes fairness by treating all cultures equally.27

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Finally, representation rights involve the guaranteed representation of minority cultures in the country’s central representative institutions. This is also thought to be a corollary to the right of self-government. Accordingly, the right of regional self-government may not mean much if the central legislative assembly can make contrary decisions and make it binding for the whole country. Thus, guaranteed representation and veto rights at the central government level help ensure that the right of regional self-government is not a sham.28 For Kymlicka, cultural groups may make two demands on the liberal state/ society at large: non-intervention when the group suppresses internal dissent (internal restrictions) and protection from outside intervention in its cultural affairs (external protections). He states that “[t]he first kind is intended to protect the group from the destabilizing impact of internal dissent (e.g., the decision of individual members not to follow traditional practices or customs), whereas the second is intended to protect the group from the impact of external decisions.”29 While he accepts the second demand readily, he cannot reconcile the first demand with the fundamental liberal value of autonomy: “liberals can and should endorse certain external protections, where they promote fairness between groups, but should reject internal restrictions which limit the right of group members to question and revise traditional authorities and practices.”30 An example of the demand of non-intervention in the face of suppression of internal dissent is provided by the Pueblo, an American Indian tribe. As Kymlicka reports, since the tribal governments are not subject to the Bill of Rights, they can get away with the fusion of church and the state. The Pueblo have a theocratic government. They emphasize the allegiance to the tribal religion and discriminate against those members who convert to other religions. Indeed, the tribal government has denied housing benefits to those members who converted to Protestantism. Without doubt, this is a violation of individual autonomy. For Kymlicka, a liberal state should not tolerate this kind of oppression.31 This stance of Kymlicka stems from his belief that individual happiness can be attained only in an environment that is fostering individual autonomy. A liberal state is one that fosters such a cultural environment. Such a state should be neutral toward different understandings of the good life all of which endorse the value of autonomy. However, it cannot remain neutral in the face of non-autonomous lifestyles. It is not enough that the society in general is a liberal one based on the concept of autonomy. The particular societies within the broader society must also be liberal ones that respect the principle of autonomy. Using Chandran Kukathas’ conceptualization, this is not a “federation” of various societies some of which do not respect the

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principle of autonomy but rather a “union” in which all societies endorse the principle of autonomy.32 Now, the fact that this view is willing to tolerate only those cultural groups that value autonomy transforms it into a comprehensive program. In such a society, there is no room for other ethical views that clash with the fundamental liberal value of autonomy. In this sense, Kymlicka defends orthodoxy, albeit a liberal one. This is a liberal orthodoxy in that it places the principle of autonomy which demands that each and every individual be author of her way of life at the heart of its philosophy. However, as in the case of any defense of orthodoxy, this comes at the expense of the compromise of liberty and toleration. Thus, ironically, Kymlicka’s willingness to defend the liberal orthodoxy in the form of autonomy-based liberalism takes him down the path of intervention. In practice, Kymlicka is unwilling to make the liberal state coerce the illiberal cultural groups to submit to liberal values. Except for such extreme conditions as torture or enslavement, the larger liberal society tolerates illiberal groups. However, this is an inconsistency in Kymlicka’s theory. If we are going to tolerate the illiberal practices of cultural groups anyway, then what is the point of arguing that claims for “internal restrictions” cannot be reconciled with liberal principles? In this sense, the tolerance that Kymlicka extends to the illiberal groups does not depend on his principles, but on an inconsistency. In fact, John Rawls, who had placed rational autonomy (defined as “the capacity to form, to revise, and rationally pursue a conception of the good”33) in the foundations of his A Theory of Justice,34 accepts in his later work that this was a comprehensive program.35 In Political Liberalism, he makes a distinction between political autonomy and moral autonomy. While the first form of autonomy is “the legal independence and assured political integrity of citizens and their sharing with other citizens equally in the exercise of political power,” the second form is “expressed in a certain mode of life and reflection that critically examines our deepest ends and ideals.”36 Such a distinction is unknown to A Theory of Justice and takes moral autonomy as the only form of autonomy.37 However, according to Rawls, there are different understandings of the good life and not all understandings value moral autonomy: “Many citizens of faith reject moral autonomy as part of their way of life.”38 In order to be fair to those groups that do not value individual moral autonomy, in Political Liberalism Rawls takes political autonomy as the foundation on which a political consensus would be built. In this understanding, autonomy is a political principle employed to determine our public rights and responsibilities. Thus, he no longer sees autonomy as a concept that defines the relationship between the self and its ends in all areas of human life.

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Kymlicka thinks that Rawls is a “communitarian” in the private realm, because he does not think that individuals can step back from their understanding of the good life and revise it if necessary; but in the political realm, he considers Rawls a “liberal” to the extent that he thinks individuals can determine their public rights and duties on the basis of autonomy. However, Kymlicka criticizes Rawls by arguing that it is hard to see how individuals who are “communitarians” in the private sphere can be “liberals” in the political sphere. According to him, if a communitarian accepts Rawls’ position and takes part in determining political principles on the basis of autonomy, these principles will, in turn, necessarily interfere with her or his private sphere as well, thus rendering it impossible to remain a communitarian. Thus, Kymlicka opines that Rawls’ solution will not work.39 A more consistent example of political liberalism is provided by Chandran Kukathas’ work, The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom. Unlike Kymlicka, who parallels John S. Mill and advances his defense of liberalism on the basis of autonomy, Kukathas, paralleling Pierre Bayle, bases his model on the assumption that the fundamental value is not freedom of choice based on autonomy, but rather that of conscience. This point is revealed in his statement that “[t]he most important feature of human conduct is its attachment to the claims of conscience. It is this aspect of human nature that reveals what is preeminent among human interests: an interest in not being forced to act against conscience.”40 If the fundamental interest of human beings is not autonomy but the ability to lead a life in accordance with one’s conscience, then what is most needed is liberty of conscience. Accordingly, “[l]iberty of conscience is enjoyed when the individual can indeed live his life under the guidance of conscience (which identifies right and wrong conduct) and is not impeded by others from doing so.”41 The second freedom that logically follows from the liberty of conscience is that of association.42 “Freedom of association protects groups and communities to the extent that those who wish to remain separate from other parts of society, or to break away and form their own associations of like-minded people, are left undisturbed: free to go their own way.”43 Thus, for Kukathas, free individuals must be able to freely associate with their like-minded fellows. In this sense, cultural groups are analogous to civil society’s voluntary associations. Their existence depends on their members’ continuous support. Kukathas accepts that membership in cultural groups is often involuntary, since we are born into them. In fact, many cultural groups refuse to let those who are not natural members become members. However, the adjective voluntary here points to the fact that “ . . . members recognize as legitimate the terms of association and the authority that upholds them.”44

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This last point brings about another fundamental freedom that goes with the freedom of association: the freedom of dissociation. As Kukathas points out, “a society is a liberal one if individuals are at liberty to reject the authority of one association in order to place themselves under the authority of another; and to the extent that individuals are at liberty to repudiate the authority of the wider society in placing themselves under the authority of some other association.”45 In another place, Kukathas claims that “[i]f there are any fundamental rights, then there is at least one right which is of crucial importance: the right of [the] individual to leave a community by the terms of which he or she no longer wishes to live.”46 The individual must be free to exit the cultural group whose practices and/ or values do not appeal to her or him. The importance of this last point cannot be overstated. It is especially this aspect of Kukathas’ theory that makes it a liberal theory. This is to accept the ontological primacy of the individual over any other entity such as group, community or class. The legitimacy of the collectivity depends on the acquiescence of individual. The collectivity will continue to enjoy its legitimacy as long as it satisfies the needs of its members. If individual(s) stops accepting the legitimacy of the group and leaves, the group’s existence may come to an end. Given the individuals’ right to exit, in order to maintain their membership bases, the groups will feel compelled to fulfill the expectations of their individual members. Thus, freedom of exit provides individual with an important means to challenge the collective authority. The difference of such a view from Kymlicka’s theory is that it provides space in the larger liberal society not only for those cultural groups that are in tune with fundamental liberal values, but also for those that are not. In other words, “a liberal society can tolerate illiberal groups and individuals.”47 Thanks to the freedom of association, cultural groups that do not value such liberal values as freedom of choice and autonomy are permitted to exist alongside groups that respect those values. As long as they do not force individuals to become and remain their members, such groups can continue with their illiberal ways. Thus, Kukathas defends a “federation” of societies some of which might be quite illiberal, rather than the “union” of societies all of which are liberal in that they all value “autonomy.” In fact, for Kukathas, it is theoretically possible that all of the particular societies that reside in the liberal polity may be illiberal ones that somehow curtail the freedoms of their members. What makes such a society a liberal one is the prohibition of aggression which involves the use or threat of the use of force except for selfdefense among various societies within the broader society. Using Kymlicka’s twofold distinction about the claims of minority cultures, Kukathas opines that the larger society should tolerate the claims of

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internal restrictions. A group, for example, may refuse to grant its members the freedom to criticize and revise its traditional rules and way of living. Individuals within the group may not enjoy some civil liberties such as freedom of thought and speech within the group. The group does not have to tolerate those members who are unwilling to comply with the traditional ways of the community. The group can expel such members. In this respect, for Kukathas, we should respect not only the conscience of the individual member of a group who cannot endorse the values and/or practices of the group, but the consciences of those members who acquiesce with the traditional ways of the group as well. This latter group of people cannot be forced to tolerate in good conscience those members who go against the traditional ways. What the group cannot do is to force those members who are no longer able to bring their conscience to accept the values and/or practices of the group remain as its members. Thus, going back to the example of the Pueblo, Kukathas does not think that denial of housing benefits by the tribal government to those members who converted to Protestantism necessitates intervention by the liberal state. The Pueblo have the right to demand non-intervention from the state. On the other hand, Kukathas does not endorse some of the external protection claims for minority groups that Kymlicka supports.48 For example, Kymlicka asserts that for the sake of fairness and/or diversity, the state should provide financial support to cultural groups. One negative aspect of providing such support is that it creates incentives for the formation and continuation of groups that would not normally exist.49 When left alone, groups continue to exist only as long as they satisfy their members’ material and/or moral needs. If individual members think that they are not benefiting from their membership, then they will leave the group. Second, cultural groups are not fixed and homogenous entities, for there may be minorities within the minority groups. Thus, state support may lead to preserving the status quo at the expense of oppressing the minority view within the group.50 For these and other similar reasons, Kukathas opposes Kymlicka’s view that the larger society has a duty to provide the resources and opportunities, i.e., group rights, to preserve cultural groups. Thus, for Kukathas, not groups but individuals have rights, the most important of which being liberty of conscience. In this respect, the larger society has neither the right to interfere with a cultural minority’s illiberal way of life nor the duty to promote any culture.51 Kukathas uses the metaphor of an archipelago to describe the social order that emerges from following these principles. In such a social order, there is more than one authority and none of them has the right or the duty to interfere with the affairs of another. In this sense, political society is only one of many different authorities.52 All of these different groups float in a

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sea of toleration: “Liberalism is a doctrine of toleration rooted in a respect for freedom of association and, ultimately, liberty of conscience.”53 Thus, he criticizes Kymlicka for attempting to create a moral unity within the nationstate around “comprehensive liberalism.” For him, liberalism is a minimal moral order that he calls “political liberalism.”54 In addition, he writes that illiberal as well as liberal elements have a right to exist in a system based on political liberalism, for liberalism advocates mutual toleration and thus peaceful coexistence. A liberal regime is a regime of toleration. It upholds norms of toleration not because it values autonomy but because it recognizes the importance of the fact that people think differently, see the world differently, and are inclined to live—or even think they must live—differently from the ways others believe they should. It upholds toleration because it respects liberty of conscience.55

Thus, according to this understanding, the state’s role is limited to providing citizens with a legal framework within which they can pursue their personal dreams freely. The state does not have a duty to make its citizens virtuous human beings or to create a just social system. Its sole duty is to keep the peace and order.56 In this sense, the legal framework’s rules do not consist of any comprehensive moral view. Using Friedrich A. Hayek’s expression, they are “the rules of just conduct.”57 In other words, they are the rules that require individuals to respect the property rights of others and prohibit force and fraud when making contracts among individuals. They do not seek to order individuals’ lives in accordance with an all-comprehensive moral view. Employing Isaiah Berlin’s distinction between negative and positive liberty, the rules of just conduct seek to protect the negative liberty of individuals in the sense of not being limited in one’s actions that do not harm others.58 To summarize this point in Kukathas’s words, For those libertarians who think there is a role for government, its purpose cannot be to improve people, or attend to their welfare, or satisfy their needs, or give them what they deserve. At most, its purpose is to protect individual liberty against invasion by others, whether at home or from abroad. Otherwise, it should leave people alone.59

In this respect, a liberal polity60 based on political liberalism provides a more tolerant framework within which there is more room for diversity, both liberal and illiberal, than a liberal polity based on comprehensive liberalism. The toleration provided by comprehensive liberalism is extended only to those cultural groups and/or individuals who accept such comprehensive values as autonomy. As will be remembered, while Kymlicka was ready to grant

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“external protections” to cultural groups, he was unwilling to grant “internal restrictions” to them. In fact, he thinks that his position is the natural result of “liberal” toleration properly understood. Accordingly, “liberal tolerance protects the right of individuals to dissent from their group, as well as the right of groups not to be persecuted by the state.”61 Thus, Kymlicka thinks that those liberals according to whom toleration and autonomy are “two sides of the same coin” cannot tolerate illiberal groups and/or individuals.62 However, this view of Kymlicka is based on a misunderstanding. Accordingly, to preserve the right of dissent from one’s group, liberalism does not need to demand that all cultural groups respect individual autonomy. Granting the freedom of dissociation (i.e., an individual’s right to leave her or his group) is enough to secure the individual’s right of dissent. If a person cannot reconcile the practices and beliefs of the group of which she or he is a member with her or his conscience, then she or he can stop being a part of that group. As Kukathas emphasizes, this right is not based on individual autonomy but on the liberty of conscience. It should not be forgotten that we should not only protect the conscience of the dissenting individual(s) within a group, but also the conscience of the rest of the group. For this reason, the group has a right to expel those who go against the traditional ways of the group. The group does not have to tolerate those individuals who want to question and revise the traditional understanding of the good life of the group. All that a group has to do is to recognize individual’s liberty of conscience and grant him the right to leave if she does not want to remain as a member. NOTES 1. Jeremy Waldron, “Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive,” in Handbook of Political Theory, eds. Gerald F. Gaus and Chandran Kukathas (London: Sage Publications, 2005), 88–99, 91. 2. Chandran Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Freedom and Diversity (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 16. 3. Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), xx. 4. Waldron, “Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive,” 91. 5. Douglass B. Rasmussen and Douglas J. Den Uyl, Norms of Liberty: A Perfectionist Basis for Non-Perfectionist Politics (University Park, Pa.: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005), 56. 6. Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago, 17. Emphasis in the original. On this point, John Tomasi thinks that looking for “a minimal moral conception” has long been the pursuit of “traditional” or “comprehensive” or to use his term “ethical” liberalism. On the other hand, according to John Tomasi, political liberalism tries to avoid that. See John Tomasi, Liberalism Beyond Justice: Citizens, Society, and the Boundaries of Political Theory (Princeton: University of Princeton Press, 2001), 3.

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7. Susan Mendus, “Liberty and Autonomy,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 87 (1986–1987): 107–20, 107–8. 8. See David Conway, Classical Liberalism The Unvanquished Ideal (London: Macmillan, 1995), 119–20. 9. Mendus, “Liberty and Autonomy,” 108. 10. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, 13; see also Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 81. 11. Mill, On Liberty, 54. 12. Gaus, “The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms,” 104. 13. Mendus, “Liberty and Autonomy,” 116. 14. Andrew D. Mason, “Autonomy, Liberalism and State Neutrality,” The Philosophical Quarterly, 40, no. 161, (Oct., 1990): 433–52. 15. Mendus, “Liberty and Autonomy,” 119–20. 16. Deborah Fitzmaurice, “Autonomy as a Good: Liberalism, Autonomy and Toleration,” The Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 1, Number 1 (1993): 1–16, 14; for a similar approach, see Mark Mercer, “Grounds of Liberal Tolerance,” 331, where he states, “[a] liberal should not tolerate the cruelty and injustice some members of an illiberal group within their common society perpetrate on other members of that group. A liberal should not do so even when the cruelty and injustice is rooted in that group’s traditional practices or has been approved by its members democratically. A liberal should not do so even when the cruelty and injustice is accepted by its victims, or not understood by them for what it is.” 17. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 76. 18. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 75. 19. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 83. 20. Nafiz Tok, “A Critique of Kymlicka’s Theory of Minority Rights,” Bo aziçi Journal, 16, no. 2, (2002): 39–58, 41–42. 21. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 6. 22. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 18. 23. Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 343–47. 24. Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, 362 25. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, chapter 2. 26. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 30. 27. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 30–31 28. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 31–33. 29. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 35. 30. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 37; see also Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, 340–43. 31. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 40. 32. Chandran Kukathas, “Two Constructions of Libertarianism,” The F. A. Hayek Memorial Lecture, Austrian Scholars Conference, Auburn, Al., 2001. 33. John Rawls, “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,” Journal of Philosophy, no. 77 (1980): 515–72, 525, quoted in Gerald Dworkin, “Autonomy,” 359–65, 361.

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34. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999). 35. Rawls, Political Liberalism, xviii. 36. Rawls, Political Liberalism, xliv–xlv. 37. Rawls, Political Liberalism, xliii, footnote 8. 38. Rawls, Political Liberalism, xlv. 39. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 158–63. 40. Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago, 17. 41. Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago, 114. 42. Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago, 115. 43. Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago, 107. 44. Chandran Kukathas, “Are There Any Cultural Rights?” Political Theory, no. 20 (1992): 105–39. Reprinted in Will Kymlicka, ed., The Rights of Minority Cultures (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 228–56, 238. 45. Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago, 25. 46. Kukathas, “Are There Any Cultural Rights?” 238; Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago, 96. 47. Chandran Kukathas, “Can a Liberal Society Tolerate Illiberal Elements?” Policy 17, no. 2 (winter 2001): 39–44. 48. Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago, 5, 77. 49. Kukathas, “Are There Any Cultural Rights?” 234. 50. Kukathas, “Are There Any Cultural Rights?” 236. 51. Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago, 85–89, 252. 52. Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago, 174–75, 213. 53. Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago, 17. 54. Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago, 16–17. 55. Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago, 39. 56. Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago, 213. 57. F. A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), vol. 3. 58. Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” in Four Essays on Liberty, Isaiah Berlin, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 118–72. 59. Kukathas, “Two Constructions,” 3. 60. In the contemporary world, liberal polities mostly take the form of a liberal democracy. 61. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 158. 62. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 37, 152–72.

Chapter Seven

Conclusion

Toleration as a concept emerged in the early modern era with the purpose of dealing with the societal conflict which is caused by differences, especially those that are moral in nature. The emergence of this concept was made possible only after the outlook toward conflict changed. Accordingly, if one sees conflict to be never natural and legitimate, then toleration is impossible to attain. The reason is that a person who believes that conflict is a deviation from the natural state of affairs inclines to reject conflict rather than trying to find the ways to accommodate it. On the other hand, when one sees conflict among human beings caused by differences of interest, belief, and life preferences as natural, and in this sense, inevitable, then the person looks for ways to accommodate that conflict rather than eradicating it. One way of accommodating conflict, of course, is toleration. Within the paradigm of classical philosophy, the relationships among the members of society are arranged after the model of harmonious order that exists in the universe. This order is a hierarchical one and it is not the result of blind chance, rather it is a result of intelligent design. Being a part of the universe, the society can only imitate this divine plan that exists in the universe. Thus the relationships in the society should be also hierarchical. The individual has a value only to the extent that she or he is a part of the bigger organism: society. In the universe, conflict does not exist. Every part of it has a mission and those parts fulfill their missions harmoniously. When the members of society imitate this divine order in their relationships, a just society emerges. In such an understanding of individual and her or his place in society, there is no room for “legitimate conflict.” Conflict is against nature and thus corresponds to injustice. At all costs, justice has to be established in society. It is evident that this consistent yet rigid philosophy cannot provide 99

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a basis for the justification of toleration. In fact, toleration is possible only by rejecting this outlook. On the other hand, the paradigm of modern political theory with its emphasis on the instrumentality of society legitimizes conflict. According to this paradigm, what brings human beings under society is not the pursuit of a universal ideal but rather the search of personal interest. For the moderns, in society, individual interests, be it security, wealth, comfort, or tranquility, are better served. In this sense, the modern philosophers do not see society as a place where individuals are made virtuous citizens but as a place where both individual and common interests are satisfied in the best way. In this sense, the main task in front of political philosophers is to look for ways to keep society intact as long as possible. In such an understanding of society and state, the conflict that results from the pursuit of interest by different individuals is seen as legitimate and inevitable. However, if legitimate conflict is not harnessed, it can take destructive forms. Thus conflict among individuals with different aspirations poses the most fundamental challenge to the modern philosopher in the task of keeping society intact as long as possible. If the philosopher is going to be successful in this task, she or he must find a way to prevent legitimate conflict from elevating to the level of destructive conflict. As an instrument of accommodating conflict, toleration provides the modern philosopher with a solution. By preventing conflicting interests, worldviews, and religious views from taking a destructive twist, toleration contributes to civil peace which is conducive to the continual satisfaction of individual as well as common interest(s). In principle, toleration does not require a person to accept and cherish the action, belief, or practice which she or he disapproves of. All that toleration requires is that one must deliberately refrain from interfering with the object of toleration. The objects of toleration that cause dislike or disapproval belong to the private spheres of individuals. As long as those private beliefs and/or practices do not disturb the common interest of all, there is not any reason for not tolerating them. In other words, toleration expects citizens to be ready to reach consensus only in the matters that are concerned with the common interest. The differences of religious beliefs, of sexual orientation, or of moral views are irrelevant to the determination of the common interest. To this end, we identified four roads that lead to toleration: skepticism, prudence, autonomy, and conscience. Now, let us evaluate the relative strengths of these four roads and related four theories with respect to one another. In evaluating these four theories, we will employ a criterion that has two dimensions. The first dimension is concerned with the relative defensi-

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bility of any theory of toleration. Accordingly, one can judge any theory of toleration by testing its strength against criticism. Does a theory of toleration stand tall or crumble in the face of strong counterarguments? Thus, with respect to the first dimension, a theory of toleration can be either more or less defensible with respect to other theories of toleration. The second dimension is concerned with the inclusiveness of any theory of toleration. This dimension asks what the scope/coverage of any theory of toleration is. On the basis of this criterion, we can classify any theory of toleration as either more or less inclusive compared to other theories. For example, [A] theory may recommend to a Catholic prince to tolerate the Protestants, but not the atheists.1 On the other hand, a theory of toleration that recommends extending toleration to all individuals and groups whose ideas and beliefs differ from ours would be a [more] inclusive theory of toleration [compared to the former theory].2

Before moving on to evaluation, it must be indicated that to the extent to which these four theories support freedom, they all are valuable. However, it is natural that they do not protect freedom to the same degree. The first theory of toleration took skepticism as the foundation of the defense of toleration. We support this theory through Michel de Montaigne’s theory of toleration. It was shown that the rediscovery of the ancient texts on skepticism in the early modern period was crucial in the theoretical defense of toleration on the basis of skepticism. As indicated, skepticism does not necessarily lead to toleration. In the absence of any rationally grounded moral standards, one may easily end up accepting a system in which only naked power decides what is right and what is wrong. To prevent skepticism from leading to this uncivilized state, it needs to be interpreted in a certain way. The French Socrates, Michel de Montaigne, tries to do this. According to Montaigne, all that human beings can know is limited to self-knowledge. Any claim to know objects of knowledge external to our own existence is presumptuous. The greatest joy for a thinking human being, therefore, lies in discovering her or his inner world. As Levine indicates, for Montaigne, this is self-interest properly understood.3 In order for an individual to experience this joy, she or he needs a private sphere in which she or he can embark on the process of this self-discovery. Stated differently, an individual must be tolerated in her or his journey of self-discovery in that private sphere. Thus, this is a plea on behalf of the individual regardless of her or his group affiliations, e.g., Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, atheist, or homosexual. In this regard, Montaigne’s theory is very broad in its coverage of differences, and thus, ranks very high on the axis of inclusiveness. Yet, this approach is not

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free from deficiencies. As was stated at the beginning, skepticism provides a shaky ground for the defense of toleration. It is always possible to hear what Luther said to Erasmus, “The Holy Ghost is not a skeptic.” Regarding moral issues, many people are not skeptics. The appeal of toleration on skepticism may be strong for the skeptics but not for those who are dogmatists in their moral views. As a result, it ranks low on the axis of defensibility. In the second place, we presented the defense of toleration on the basis of prudence. The prudence tells us that it may be cheaper to tolerate than to impose our view by means of force. Indeed, the religious wars in the aftermath of the Reformation in Europe provide a point in view. Despite very high human and material cost, it was not possible to end conflict by eradicating differences. This approach leads to a “continual state-of-war.” If it was impossible to end conflict by eradicating the differences that cause the conflict in the first place, perhaps ameliorating it might be possible. As indicated above, this idea was made possible thanks to the modern outlook toward conflict which does not see conflict as a deviation from the natural state of affairs, as something illegitimate, but as something natural that results from the pursuit of different interests of individuals. In terms of looking at man and society, John Locke agrees on most points with his modern predecessors. Like Machiavelli and Hobbes, Locke believes that what motivates human beings is a desire to preserve their lives. As Leo Strauss indicates, Locke believes that reason teaches man that being master of himself and his own life, he has a natural right to the means of preserving it.4 In this sense, the possession of property which is conducive to the selfpreservation is legitimate, and forms the primary aim of man. According to Locke, before the foundation of civil and political society, human beings lived in the state of nature. In the state of nature, individuals enjoy natural rights that consist of life, liberty, and property that are provided by the natural law. Locke collects these natural rights under the general name property rights. The natural law commands every individual to respect these rights. However, due to the presence of some individuals who do not obey the natural law, the state of nature is not conducive to peaceful living. In order to overcome this problem, individuals join in the civil society and establish a government whose sole duty is to protect these rights of its founders. In Locke’s words, “The great and chief end, therefore, of men’s uniting into common-wealth, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property (italics are in the original).”5 In this sense, political authority receives its legitimacy not from the hierarchical harmonious order that exists in the universe, but from the consent of individuals. According to this view, the legitimate function of political authority is not to determine what duty suits citizens’ natures, but to preserve their individual properties.

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According to Locke, the sole duty of the Prince is to provide peace and stability. The salvation of the souls of his subjects is not up to the Prince. When a Prince exceeds his duty and attempts to save the souls of his subjects, then a perfect recipe for going back to the hardships of the state of nature is created. The subjects who believe that the Prince’s road goes to hell rather than to heaven will take up arms against their sovereign, thus ending the contract. The destructive conflict, which is a feature of the state of nature, will dominate over legitimate conflict, which is a feature of civil society. Therefore, the Prince would do better if he sticks to his main duty. Given this state of affairs, for Locke, prudence recommends tolerating those differences that are not detrimental to public order. However, toleration prescribed by Locke is not unlimited. Individuals and groups who can threaten public order will not benefit from toleration. The Catholics and Turks will not be tolerated because they take their orders from the Pope in Rome and the Sultan in Istanbul, respectively. They always pose a threat to the security of the society. On the other hand, atheists cannot be trusted because they do not have conscience; their oaths are empty. In this way, a big portion of the differences can be dismissed from the scope of toleration. As a result, Locke’s theory of toleration does not go very high on the axis of inclusiveness. It is a relatively exclusive theory of toleration. He is, to use Bayle’s conception, a half-tolerationist. Yet, this is not the only weakness of this approach. One can ask, “What if the Prince thinks that the cost of intolerance may not be too high?” or “What if the Prince believes that for the sake of God there is no cost that cannot be endured?” In these cases, the advice in favor of toleration may not be persuasive. From this perspective, Locke’s theory of toleration ranks low on the axis of defensibility as well. Third, we examined the defense of toleration that is based on the concept of autonomy. The concept of autonomy refers to an individual’s ability to form her or his own understanding of the good life. Given that human beings are fallible, this concept also includes an individual’s ability to revise or drop her or his previous understanding of the good life on a rational basis. This is the way to happiness. Human beings may achieve happiness through freedom to choose from the alternative ways of good life. This understanding is exemplified through the work of John Stuart Mill. John S. Mill develops his defense of toleration in On Liberty (1859). Especially the third chapter of this work, which carries the title of “Of Individuality, as One of Elements of Well-Being,” is devoted to the elaboration of this argument. Accordingly, a person attains happiness by developing his or her nature, which is “[a] tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces which make it

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a living thing.” In fact, for Mill, individuality is dependent on this development.6 In this respect, achieving individuality is a process of self-discovery. One discovers her or his unique capabilities and pursues an authentic life that suits her or him. This is self-development properly understood. This is self-development properly understood. Thus, in order to gain individuality, and as a result happiness, one needs to be free and tolerated with his or her life experiences that deviate from the customary ways. In this perspective, toleration is valuable because it provides a space free of intervention for the exercise of autonomy. It can be argued that this is a principled defense of toleration. It is based on a moral ground. Therefore, with respect to the dimension of defensibility, Mill’s theory is stronger than both Montaigne’s and Locke’s theories. It can be defended against the criticism of relativism which haunts Montaigne’s skepticism-based defense of toleration, for example. Mill does not argue that all understandings of the good life are of equal value. Some are better than others. However, a particular understanding of the good life is the best for a particular person because it was chosen by the individual in question, thus, reflects her or his own mode.7 It is also not prone to the criticism that is leveled against Locke’s defense of toleration based on prudence, i.e., it may be worth persecuting if the cost of persecution is not very high. In this sense, the principle of autonomy provides a stronger moral ground for toleration than both skepticism and prudence. However, one weakness of this theory is that it does not appeal to the individuals and groups that do not take autonomy as an important moral value. In fact, this also provides the soft-point of this theory with respect to the second dimension, i.e., inclusiveness. Although Mill’s autonomy-based defense of toleration is more inclusive than Locke’s theory, it is not as inclusive as Montaigne’s theory. Since this theory takes individual as the ontological foundation, and freedom as the ethical value that is a prerequisite for individual’s happiness, it is a liberal theory.8 However, it is a comprehensive or ethical liberal theory in that it assumes that the good life is a life that is based on selfrealization through self-development and the liberal society is the one that is formed by individuals and groups that share in this understanding of the good life. The individuals and groups that will be tolerated in the liberal society by this theory are limited to the ones that take the concept of autonomy as constitutive of the good life. As a result of this stance, Mill would be less than willing to tolerate those who do not share in his understanding of the good life. Thus, this theory may rank higher than Locke’s theory but lower than Montaigne’s theory on the axis of inclusiveness. As the fourth road to toleration, we analyzed the theory of toleration based on the concept of conscience. For Hume, conscience provides one of the three

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motives for human action, others being interest and affection. Using Adam Smith’s phrase, conscience is the “man within the breast” that constantly evaluates our actions from a moral standpoint. When we do things that we think others will not approve of, we feel shame; when we do things that the man within our breast (i.e., our conscience) does not accept, we feel guilt. We feel pleased and satisfied when we think that we do things others and the man within our breast find pleasing. Conscience provides the most important human motive. As Chandran Kukathas points out, [t]he most important source of human motivation is principle—or, better still, conscience. It is important in this context not because conscience always overrules or overcomes other motives: . . . It is important, rather, because conscience is what not only guides us (for the most part), but what we think should guide us. It is this motivation which makes us—distinctively—human.9

In this respect, regardless of the content(s) of her or his beliefs, every human being has a primary interest in an ability to live according to her or his conscience and this approach is essentially a plea for the freedom of conscience. Historically, this view was first elaborated fully by Pierre Bayle. For Bayle, conscience is the voice of God in us, it instructs us about what is right and what is wrong. Being the voice of God, an individual must obey his conscience. To disobey conscience is to disobey God, and thus a sin. In his words, Conscience, with regard to each particular Man, is the voice and Law of God in him, known and acknowledg’d as such by him, who carrys this Conscience about him: . . . to violate this Conscience is essentially believing that he violates the Law of God. Now to do any thing we esteem an Act of Disobedience to the Law of God, is essentially, either an Act of Hatred, or an Act of Contempt against God; and such an Act is essentially wicked, as all Mankind acknowledge.10

In this sense, it is an individual’s duty to obey her or his conscience. This duty creates a right to be left free (i.e., be tolerated) and it is a society’s responsibility to leave the individual alone. The contents of this conscience to which obedience is a must are not predetermined. They are determined by the sincere search of the individual. Once they are found, they obtain a binding status for the individual: “God in the present Condition of Man exacts no more from him than a sincere and diligent Search after Truth, and the loving and regulating his Life by it, when he thinks he has found it out.”11 For Bayle, conscience does not necessarily show us the true moral qualities of things, but is provided to us as a practical guide for the preservation of our souls.12

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“Conscience, whether true or errant, always obliges.”13 Thus, we have to respect even a heretic’s conscience because she or he has a right to do her or his duty to God. This is another principled defense of toleration. It is neither based on skepticism nor on the simple calculation of cost and benefit. The concept of conscience provides us with a moral ground for the defense of toleration. To the extent to which every individual has a stake in the concept of conscience, the plea for freedom of conscience is very defensible. It also appeals to a broader audience because, unlike autonomy, it is based on a universal concept, i.e., conscience. Although there are individuals and groups in the society who do not see autonomy as a part of their value system, there are no individuals or groups who would not value the ability to lead a life in accordance with their conscience. Thus, it can be argued that of the four theories of toleration, Bayle’s theory is the strongest. It ranks highest on the axis of defensibility. Furthermore, it ranks the same as Montaigne’s theory on the axis of inclusiveness. Except for those who disturb the public order, everyone is entitled to the freedom of conscience, i.e., toleration. Unlike the toleration defended by Locke and Mill, whose theories for Bayle would be theories of half-toleration, this view extends toleration to all sects, including Catholics, Muslims, pagans, and even atheists, thus a theory of universal toleration. We can display the relative strengths of these four theories on a graph in the following way.

Defensibility P. Bayle J.S. Mill J. Locke M. de Montaigne

Inclusiveness Figure 7.1.

Conclusion

107

NOTES 1. Kilcullen and Kukathas call these sorts of theories as “half-tolerationists.” See John Kilcullen and Chandran Kukathas, “Introduction,” in Pierre Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary on These Words of the Gospel, Luke 14:23, “Compel Them to Come In, That My House May Be Full,” edited and with an introduction by John Kilcullen and Chandran Kukathas (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005), ix–xxii, xviii. 2. Bican Şahin and Nezahat Altuntas, “Between Enlightened Exclusion and Conscientious Inclusion: Tolerating the Muslims in Germany,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 29, no. 1 (2009): 27–41. 3. Alan Levine, Sensual Philosophy: Toleration, Skepticism, and Montaigne’s Politics of the Self (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2001), 7. 4. Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1953), 227. 5. John Locke, Second Treatise of Government (1690), edited and with an introduction by C. B. Macpherson (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 1980), 66. 6. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, first published in 1859, edited and with an introduction, by Elizabeth Rapaport (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Com., 1978), 56–57. 7. Mill, On Liberty, 64. 8. Gerald F. Gaus, “The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms” in Handbook of Political Theory, eds. Gerald F. Gaus and Chandran Kukathas (London: Sage Publications, 2004), 103. 9. Chandran Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Freedom and Diversity (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 48. 10. Pierre Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary on These Words of the Gospel, Luke 14:23, “Compel Them to Come In, That My House May Be Full,” edited and with an introduction by John Kilcullen and Chandran Kukathas (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005), 113. 11. Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary, 264. 12. Kilcullen and Kukathas, “Appendixes,” 595–96. 13. Thomas M. Lennon, Reading Bayle (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 82.

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Index

Academy, 15 Ackerman, Bruce, 49, 61n17 acquiescence, 8, 93 action: other-regarding, 58; selfregarding, 57–59 Aenesidemus, 16 affection, 65–66, 68, 82nn4–5, 104 agency, 5 ambitious, 33–34 Amsterdam, 39 ancients, 21, 32–33, 37–38. See also classical political philosophy Anglican, 39 animal: gregarious, 32–33; political, 32; social, 32 Annas, Julia, 13, 16, 28n39 appetitive part, 33–34, 45n12 Arcesilaus, 15 archipelago, 94 Aristotelianism, 19 Aristotle, 1, 19, 32, 33–36, 44n4, 53, 67, 82nn4–5 association, 92–93 assumptions: about individual and society, 38 ataraxia, 16–17, 24; life of, 16 St. Athanasius, 76 atheists, 20, 41–42, 71, 81, 84n72, 101, 103, 106

attachments, 66, 69 St. Augustine, 17–18, 69–70, 73 authentic life, 53, 103–4 authority, 92–94, 102 autonomous, 50,52, 55–56, 59, 62n18, 62n37, 71, 79, 86–88 autonomy: concept of, 3, 49–50, 55, 88, 90, 103–4; as a formal notion, 62n37; idea of, 51; individual, 3–4, 52, 88, 90, 96; moral, 91, 61n17; political, 91; rational, 91; as a substantive notion, 62n37 Barnes, Jonathan, 13, 16, 28n39 Barry, Norman P., 65 Bayle, Jacob, 71 Bayle, Pierre, ix–x, 2, 4, 16, 65, 69–81, 84n72, 85, 92, 105 benevolence, 66 benevolent, 75 Bentham, Jeremy, 63n66 Berlin, Isaiah, 49, 51, 56, 59, 95 Bill of Rights, 90 blasphemy, 81 Calvinist rationalism, 76 Capaldi, Nicholas, 54 Carneades, 15, 21 Castellio, Sebastian, 19

115

116

Index

Catholic church, 41, 69, 75–76, Catholics, 5, 39, 41, 71, 103, 106; Roman, 41 Chinese Emperor, 75 choice: ability to make, 54; freedom of, 6, 51, 55, 88, 92–93 Christianity, 43, 73–76, 78; spirit of, 74 church: true, 70, 74 Church of Christ, 69–70 Cicero, 15–17 citizen, 34 civil disobedience, 25 civil peace, 100 Civil War of 1642 to 1649, 39 Clitomachus, 21 Cohen, Andrew Jason, 5–9 Columbus, Christopher, 18 communitarian, 92 compensation, 40, 58 compulsion: act of, 74 conflict: as the clash of interests, 12n37, 44n1; destructive, 8, 43, 100, 103; illegitimate, 31; legitimate, 8, 35, 99–100, 103; natural, 31–32, 38, 99, 102; religious, 1, 2; social, 1; as the subject matter or toleration, 8 conscience: Bayle’s definition of, 77; definition of, 67; dictates of, 4, 65, 67–69, 73, 78–80; duty to obey, 77; erring, 79; freedom of, 3–4, 9, 70–81, 105–6; liberty of, 57, 69, 81, 92, 94–96; origin of, 67; primacy of, 3; rights of, 3–4, 77; voice of, 79 conscientious differences, 69 consciousness: the domain of, 56 consent, 38, 40–41, 102 conservative, 17 convention, 32, 36 conversion, 73, 75 Copernicus, Nicolaus, 18 cosmos, 33, 38 cost and benefit, 31, 106; analysis of, 31; calculation of, 106 courage, 33–34 courageous, 33–34

criterion: of certainty, 2, 13–14, 17, 19, 21, 43; of defensibility, 4, 100, 102–3, 106; of inclusiveness, 5, 101, 103–4, 106 culture, 8, 54, 88–89, 94; ethical, 61n7; minority, 89–90, 93; sub-, 87; western, 89 Decalog, 72 deduction, 19 deliberate design, 68 Delphic injunction, 24 Den Uyl, Douglas J., 86 deontology, 66 desire: first-order, 50; higher-order, 50; natural, 22; superfluous and artificial, 22 despotic rule, 34 Diderot, 71 difference: cultural, 2; eradication of/eradicating, 8–9, 10n2, 99, 102; ethnic, 2; racial, 6–7; religious, 2; sexual, 2 disapproval, 3, 6, 7, 9, 100 disgust, 3, 6–7, 9 dislike, 3, 6–9, 100 dissent: religious, 1 dissenting view, 80 distaste, 6–7 diversity: ethnic, 1, 2, 89; ideological, 1; moral, 1; racial, 1; religious, 1, 44, 89; as a source of richness, 10n2; as the root cause of conflict, 10n2; sexual, 1 divine revelation, 20, 75 dogma, 57, 71–72, 78 dogmatism, 13–14, 21, 26n2; religious, 14; secular, 14 Donatists, 70 Dostoyevsky, 14 Drake, Francis, 18 Dworkin, Gerald, 50–51, 62n37 Dworkin, Ronald, 51 duty, 40, 43, 66, 72, 77–80, 94–95, 102–3, 105–6; moral, 79

Index

117

Ecole Illustre, 70–71 economic behavior, 65 Edict of Nantes, 39, 69–70 Empiricus, Sextus, 15–18, 27n39 enabling welfare state, 87 Epicureans, 15, 21 epistemology, 13 epoche, 17, 24, 26n20 Erasmus, 101 erring. See conscience error, 42, 77–80 Estienne, Henri, 18 ethics, 72, 76 external protections, 90, 96 Eucharist, 81 eudemonia, 17, 33 experiments in living, 55, 59–60

Glorious Revolution, 39 God, 20, 42–43, 67, 70–73, 75, 77–81, 84n72, 105–6; duty to, 79, 106; voice of, 67, 71, 77, 105. See also conscience good life, 3, 4, 51–53, 59, 61n12, 86–88, 90–92, 96, 103–4; constitutive part of, 51–52, 55–56, 104; formation of, 51, 88; liberal conception of, 61nn17–18, 87; plurality of, 53; the liberal, 4 Gospel, 4, 71–72, 74; moral precepts of, 72 government: function of, 40; nature of, 40; proper role of, 80 Gray, John, 55, 61n17, 87 group rights, 89, 94

fairness, 89–90, 94 faith, 20, 42–43, 67, 73, 76–77, 81 fake husband, 79 fear: of God, 42; of violent death, 37 federalism, 89 federation, 90, 93 felicity, 37–38 fideism, 20 Fitzmaurice, Deborah, 88 Franck, Sebastian, 19 freedom: of association, 92–93, 95; as autonomy, 59–60; of conscience and religion, 78–80; of dissociation, 93, 96 freedom of choice, 6, 51, 55, 88, 92 free market of ideas, 42 French Socrates, 102. See also Montaigne, Michel de friendship, 32, 43; Aristotle’s idea of, 82n4; political, 82n5

happiness: attainment of, 17, 51; eternal, 43; individual, 51–52, 60, 90 harm-to-others, 56, 58 harmony, 33–35, 38, 80; natural, 38 harms: two sorts of, 58 Hayek, Friedrich A., 95 Henry VIII, 39 Henry of Navarre, 69 heretic, 19, 74, 76, 79; conscience of, 78 Hervet, Gentian, 18 heterodox, 8, 78 heterodox rationalist, 72 hijab, 89 Hobbes, Thomas, 25, 36–38 Holy Ghost, 13, 101 homogenous, 89, 94 homosexuals, 101 Horton, John, 5 Huguenots, 69–71, 75 human beings: distinctive feature of, 33, 37, 54, 59, 69 humankind’s dilemma, 39 human nature, 32, 36–37, 52–54, 65, 69, 92; Mill’s views on, 52–54; pessimistic view of, 36, 37 human soul, 22, 33–34, 67 Hume, David, 7, 65, 104, 105

Galilei, Galileo, 18 Gama, Vasco da, 18 Gaus, Gerald F., 61n18 gays and lesbians: as subject of tolerance, 5 Geneva, 70

118

Index

illiberal, 91, 93–96, 97n16 immigration: familial, 89; individual, 89 immortal soul, 43 Incarnation, 72 individual, 2–5, 8–9, 24, 31, 33, 35–43, 49, 51–54, 56–60, 66–69, 71, 77–80, 87–96, 99, 100–106 individuality, 24, 25, 52–55, 59–60, 61n17, 87, 103, 104 individual rights, 78 induction, 19 infallibility: assumption of, 57 inner motivation, 73 inner persuasion, 42 innocent, 19, 78 intellectual service, 20 interest: common, 100; fundamental, 69, 92; material, 32; personal, 32, 100 internal dissent, 90 internal restrictions, 90–91, 94, 96 interpretation: literal, 72–76; scriptural, 72 intolerance: racial, 7; religious, 1, 40, 44, 72 invincible, 78 irrational part, 34 Islam, 76 Jefferson, Thomas, 71 Jesuits, 70 Jesus Christ, 74–77 Judeo-Christian conception of the universe, 18 Jurieu, Pierre, 71 justice, 24–25, 33–35, 65, 74, 99; universal, 24 Kant, Immanuel, 66 Kepler, Johannes, 18 Kilcullen, John, 71, 77, 78, 47, 52, 54, 65, 107n1 knowledge, 2, 13–17, 19, 21, 23–25, 42, 72, 78, 84n72, 101, 105; speculative, 72

Kukathas, Chandran, x, 4, 71, 77, 85, 92–96, 105, 107n1 Kymlicka, Will, x, 1, 4, 85, 88–96 Labrousse, Elisabeth, 78 Laertius, Diogenes, 15, 16 Larmore, Charles, 61n12 law, 25, 35, 42, 44, 49, 65, 67; of nature, 40 Leers, Reinier, 71 Levine, Alan, 14, 22, 24, 25, 28n39, 101 liberalism: autonomy-based, 86, 88, 91; comprehensive, 85–87, 95; ethical, 85, 96n6; history of, 1; political, 4, 85–86, 92, 95, 96n6 liberal polity, 93, 95 liberals: comprehensive/ ethical, 4; political, 4 liberal society, 87, 91, 93, 104 libertarians, 95 liberty: aim of principle of, 59; of association, 57; of conscience, 57, 69, 81, 92, 94–96; of expression and publishing, 57; negative, 51, 56, 60, 95; positive, 51, 95; principle of, 56, 57, 59, 60; of tastes and pursuits, 57; of thought and feeling, 57 Library of Congress, 71 life of contemplation, 33 life style: non-autonomous, 87, 90 Limborch, Philip Van, 39 literal Sense, 74–77 living well, 33 Locke, John, x, 2, 3, 11n23, 31, 36, 39– 44, 46n41, 78, 84n72, 102–4, 106 Louis XIV, 69, 70 Luke 14:23, 70, 72–73 Luther, 13, 101 Machiavelli, Niccolo, 36, 37, 102 Maimborg, M., 71 man within the breast, 105 Mason, Andrew D., 88 Mendus, Susan, 1, 11n23, 14, 87–88 Mercer, Mark, 2, 52, 97n16

Index

middle ages, 18 Mill, James, 63n66 Mill, John S., ix, x, 2, 3, 49, 52–60, 62n37, 63n66, 69, 71, 85, 87, 92, 103, 104, 106 minimal moral conception, 86, 96n6 missionaries, 75 modern paradigm, 36–39 modern political theory, 36–39, 100 Montaigne, Michael de, x, 2, 13, 15, 19–25, 27n20, 27n39, 36–37, 101, 104, 106 morality, 7, 61n12, 67, 72, 77, 84n72, 105 Muslim, 68, 76, 81, 89, 101, 106 nation-state, 89 natural law, 40, 102 natural Light, 72–74, 77 nature: teleological view of, 35 nature of faith, 42 negative attitude, 7 neutrality, 24, 61n17; political, 61n12 New Testament, 70, 72 Newtonian paradigm, 38 Nicholson, Peter P., 6 nomos, 32, 49 non-intervention, 90, 94 Oberdiek, Hans, 8, 22, 24 obligations and rights, 58 oppression, 4, 39, 44 order: hierarchical, 33–35; public, 5, 41, 80, 81, 103, 106 orthodox, 70, 76, 78–79 orthodoxy: liberal, 91 pagan, 76, 81, 106 Papal Rome, 39 passion, 24, 67 paternalism, 59 paternalist objection, 57, 58 peace, 4, 38, 39, 77, 102; and order, 80, 95 peaceful persuasion, 7, 42, 79

119

peripatetics, 21 persecution, 1, 69, 70, 74–77, 80, 81 philosopher, 35, 36, 72 philosophy: classical, 99; classical political, 32–36, 37; modern political. See modern political theory; moral, 32, 56; political, 32, 37–38, 86 phusis, 32 Platonism, 19 pluralism: cultural, 1; ideological, 1; moral, 1 polis,1, 32–35, 67 political animal. See animal political authority, 75, 102 political party, 66 political theory: modern, 36, 100 Popkin, Richard, 14, 15, 17, 19, 20, 27n39 Popple, William, 39 power, 5, 8, 37–38, 41–42, 51, 56–57, 75–76, 78, 80, 89, 91, 101 practical guide, 78, 106 practical part, 34 preferences: first-order, 50; higherorder, 50 primary benefits, 37 primary interest, 3, 52, 69, 105 prime interest, 35 principle(s), 4, 9, 16, 19, 31, 40, 56–60, 61n12, 65–66, 68, 73–75, 77, 80–81, 85, 86, 88, 90–92, 94, 104, 105 private realm, 41, 92 private sphere, 9, 24, 25, 88, 92, 100, 101 prohibition of aggression, 93 property, 36, 40, 46n41, 55, 65, 95, 102 property rights, 40, 95, 102 protection, 37, 90; external, 90, 94, 96 Protestant, 5, 40, 69–71, 81, 90, 94, 101 Protestantism, 69, 70, 71, 90, 94 prudence: concept of 3, 31 public order, 5, 41, 80–81, 103, 106 public realm, 25, 41 public sphere, 25, 88

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Index

Pueblo, 90, 94 Puritans, 39 Pyrrho of Ellis, 15, 16 Rasmussen, Douglass B., 86 rational animal, 21; non-, 50 rational calculation, 32, 86 rational deliberation, 34 rationality, 21 rational part, 33, 34 Rawls, John, 86, 91–92 reality: subjective, 25; true nature of, 15, 19 reason, 7, 14, 21–23, 25, 33, 34, 37, 38, 40, 54, 67, 71–74, 76, 77, 82n7,16, 102; dictates of, 33, 40 reasonable belief, 15–16 Reformation, 18, 102; Counter-, 18; post-, 69 regional self-government, 90 Remonstrant seminary, 39 Renaissance, 18, 19 Renaissance naturalism, 19 restraint, 7 rights: inalienable, 40; polyethnic, 89; property, 40, 95, 102; representation, 89–90; of self-government, 89–90 right to exit, 93. See also freedom of dissociation rules of just conduct, 95 Salvation, 41–43, 102 samurai, 68 Sanches, Francisco, 18 Schmitt, C. B., 18 science: Aristotelian understanding of, 19 scientific method, 19 scripture, 19, 75, 76 Sebonde, Raimond de, 20 secular, 14, 40, 41 security, 35, 37, 43, 59, 75, 80, 100, 103 Sedan, 70, 71 self-chosen life, 51, 59 self-defense, 40 self-denial, 24

self-development, 53, 59, 60, 63n66, 103, 104 self-discovery, 25, 53, 101, 103, 104 self-governing, 89 self-interest, 24, 25, 65, 66, 68, 101 self-interest properly understood, 24, 25, 101 self-knowledge, 25 self-preservation, 37, 39 self-protection, 56 self-regarding. See action, self-regarding senses, 14, 15, 23, 25; natural, 23 sentiment, 66, 67, 105 Sikh, 89 sincere belief, 73 skeptical crisis, 18 skepticism, x, 2, 9, 13–22, 26n20, 28n39, 37, 43, 100–102, 104, 106; ancient, 15–17, 18–20; extreme, 16; mitigated, 14, 16; positive, 16; presentation of, 13–20; and Pyrrhonism, 15, 21; radical, 14 Smith, Adam, 67, 105 social animal. See animal social conflict, 1. See also conflict social control, 56 social mores, 87 social progress, 60 societal culture, 88 society, 2, 4, 8, 17, 25, 32, 35–40, 42, 44, 54, 56, 58–60, 71, 74, 79–80, 85, 90–94, 97n16, 99, 100, 102–3, 105–6; civil, 40, 44, 92, 102–3; dissolution of, 74; of philosophers, 36 Socinians, (the Unitarians), 73 Socrates, 13, 19, 49 sovereign, 5, 33, 34, 58, 59, 75, 77, 80 speculative dogmas, 72 speech: ability of, 33 spirited part, 33 state, 25, 34, 38, 51, 71, 80, 89–90, 94– 96; multination, 89; polyethnic, 89 state of affairs; natural, 31, 99, 102 state of nature, 39–40, 43, 102–3 Stoics, 15, 16, 21

Index

Strauss, Leo, 33, 37, 102 Stroll, Avrum, 14, 17 superstition, 71 Supreme Being, 73 suspension of judgment, 17, 24 sympathy, 67, 68 Tarcov, Nathan, 43 telos, 37, 53 temperance, 33, 34 theologian, 17, 20, 72 theoretical part, 34 toleration: based on autonomy, 2, 4, 49–63, 85; components of, 5–7; conceptual analysis of, 5–10; based on conscience, 2–4, 65–84, 85; definition of, 5; etymological root of, 5; full, 81; grounds of, 2; half-, 81, 203, 106, 107n1; history of, 1; justification of, 1, 10, 35, 100; as a method of conflict management, 8; as a moral ideal, 11n19; narrow understanding of, 6; object of, 6–9, 31, 100; origins of, 1; paradox of, 9–10, 31, 49; based on prudence, 2–3, 31–47, 31–32, 35–36, 43, 45n4, 104; religious, 39–40; as self-denial, 24; based on skepticism, 2, 13–29, 43, 106; strong, 7; subject of, 5, 6; broad understanding of, 6; universal, 81, 106; weak, 7

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Tomasi, John, 96n6 Toulouse, 70 Trinity, 72 Truth, 73, 75–76, 78, 105; divinely revealed, 20; real, 78; religious, 19, 41; reputed, 78; universal, 24 Turks, 81, 103 union, 91, 93 universe, 18, 33, 35, 38, 99, 102; Aristotelian understanding of, 38 unperturbedness, 17 utilitarian, 60, 63n66 violence, 74 virtue, 17, 25, 33–38, 52, 59, 67, 74, 82n4, 88, 105; intellectual, 34; moral, 34 vita contemplativa. See life of contemplation voluntary, 56–57, 59, 92 Voltaire, 71 Warnock, Mary, 6, 7 Weale, Albert, 8 whole, 33, 57, 72 Wilson, James, Q., 68 wisdom, 33–35 wise, 33–35 yarmulka, 89

About the Author

Bican S¸ahin is an associate professor of political science in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at Hacettepe University, Ankara, Turkey. He received his PhD at the University of Maryland, College Park in 2003. His dissertation title is “An Investigation of the Contributions of Plato and Aristotle to the Development of the Concept of Toleration.” Among his research topics are the place of such concepts as toleration and justice in ancient and modern political thought, classical liberal and libertarian philosophy, the relationship between liberal democracy and Islam, and the relationship between state and civil society in Turkey. Some of his most recent publications in English include “Between Enlightened Exclusion and Conscientious Inclusion: Tolerating the Muslims in Germany.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 29, no. 1, ( March 2009): 27–41 (co-authored with Dr. Nezahat Altuntaş); and “Toleration, Political Liberalism, and Peaceful Coexistence in the Muslim World.” The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 24, no.1, (Winter 2007): 1–24.

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