To the Image of the Trinity: A study in the Development of Aquinas' Teaching

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STUDIES AND TEXTS 96

TO THE IMAGE OF THE TRINITY A Study in the Development of Aquinas' Teaching BY

D. JUVENAL MERRIELL

PONTIFICAL INSTITUTE OF MEDIAEVAL STUDIES

D. Juvenal Merriell To THE IMAGE OF THE TRINITY A STUDY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AQUINAS' TEACHING One of the most thought-provoking ideas that the Bible presents is the notion that man has been created in the image of God. Since the age of the Fathers of the Church, in particular since Augustine, Catholic theologians have seen the image of God as an image of the Trinity. St. Thomas Aquinas inherited and developed this tradition in his own teaching. Augustine's De Trinitate is the foundation on which Thomas built. Augustine himself conceived of the image of the Trinity as the mind's acts of remembering, knowing, and loving God, but at the end of that work he emphasized the analogy between the formation of the inner word and of love in the mind on the one hand and the eternal processions of the Word and the Holy Spirit in God on the other. By examining in depth the principal passages on the image in the Scriptum super Sententiis, the De veritate, and the Summa theologiae we find that the development of Thomas' position is largely based on the appropriation of Augustine's conception of the image in terms of the two processions. Although Thomas does not explicitly apply this notion of the image to the spiritual life, it is clear that the image of the Trinity as he conceives it is the foundation in man's nature that makes him capable of being raised to participate in the eternal life of the Trinity.

Acknowledgment This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Canadian Federation for the Humanities, using funds provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

CANADIAN CATALOGUING IN PUBLICATION DATA Merriell, D. Juvenal (Donald Juvenal), 1952To the image of the Trinity (Studies and texts, ISSN 0082-5328 ; 96) Bibliography: p. Includes index. ISBN 0-88844-096-0 1. Thomas, Aquinas, Saint, 12257-1274 - Views on the Trinity. 2. Thomas, Aquinas, Saint, 12257-1274 - Views on the image of God. 3. Trinity. 4. Image of God. I. Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies. II. Title. III. Series: Studies and texts (Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies); 96. BT110.M47 1990

231'.044

© 1990 by

Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies 59 Queen's Park Crescent East Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5S 2C4 PRINTED BY UNTVERSA, WETTEREN, BELGIUM

C89-093980-2

Contents

Preface

vii

Abbreviations

ix

1

St. Thomas and the Image of the Trinity

2

St. Augustine's De Trinitate

1 13

PART ONE 3 Thomas' First Exposition: The Scriptum super Sententiis A. B. C. D. E.

Definition of imago The Structure of Book 1, Distinction 3 The Four Static Characteristics of the Image The Fifth Characteristic: Actual Imitation Grace and the Indwelling of the Trinity

39 41 51 57 69 80

PART Two 4 The Development of St. Thomas' Doctrine in De veritate, question 10 A. B. C. D.

Augustine and Aristotle Levels of Perfection: The Ontology of the Image Ascent to God: Analogy and Conformation From the Scriptum to the De veritate

95 98 110 132 148

PART THREE 5 Thomas' Doctrine of the Image in the Summa theologiae A. B. C. D.

153

Imago Dei'm the Plan of the Prima pars 158 Ontological Foundations of the imago Dei in la, question 93 170 The Imago Dei as a Representation of the Trinity 190 The Image of the Trinity and the Indwelling of the Trinity . 226

Vi

6

CONTENTS

Conclusion

237

Bibliography

247

Index Locorum

255

General Index

259

Preface

Theological anthropology in one form or another has been popular among theologians and historians of theology in recent years. Consequently, it is only fair that I should give the reader some idea of the content and method of this study from the beginning. Its main concern is St. Thomas Aquinas' teaching about the image of the Trinity in man. Aquinas' thought on this subject developed over the years, and so it is necessary to examine carefully the passages in which he deals with the subject at length. To enter into his thought necessarily means to follow it step by step: this is a painstaking and tedious task, but essential to full and proper understanding. This study, then, is in the nature of a commentary, although it is not rigidly tied to the order of the texts under consideration. The relevance of the subject can be viewed from two angles: in relation to the thought of St. Thomas himself, and to modern theology and contemporary concerns. The concept of the image of God is profoundly interconnected with the Christian doctrine of God and with the Christian view of man. It is not surprising to find the concept appear unexpectedly in various sections of Thomas' Summa theologiae. Before all these ramifications of the notion of image of God can be properly explored, however, it is necessary to come to grips with the principal passages in which Thomas examines the notion in detail. For reasons of length I have confined this study to the concept itself of the image of God and more particularly to its most significant aspect: the image as image of the Trinity. Much of Thomas' theology is pre-supposed in his exposition of the image of the Trinity. I cannot here reproduce his doctrine of the Trinity or his psychology of man, although both are fundamental to his teaching about the image of the Trinity. The image of God is a complex notion because it is a relational concept and is connected with most of the rest of theology. For this reason it has great relevance for many topics of discussion today. It is, I believe, worth consulting St. Thomas on most points, and so this study is devoted to determining what he actually taught about the image of God. The implications of his teaching are not hard to draw, but first we should be sure of what he says. I restrict myself to this latter objective. If previous scholarship on the subject is not discussed at length here, it is not because I have had no use for it. All that I have read in the secondary

Viii

PREFACE

literature, however, is inadequate in one way or another for the purpose of this study. None of the earlier works grapples sufficiently with the texts themselves. This study is directed to Thomas' text itself, although the insights of other scholars are acknowledged and weighed. My interest in the Christian interpretation of the imago Dei grew from a course in patristic theology given some years ago by Fr. John Egan of Regis College, Toronto, and especially from a course on the Holy Spirit in the writings of Thomas Aquinas taught by Fr. Walter Principe of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto. Fr. Principe kindly undertook the direction of my doctoral dissertation, entitled "The Image of the Trinity hi Man According to St. Thomas Aquinas". I am indebted to him for his careful reading and criticism of my thesis, which I defended in 1984. This book is that thesis revised. I have excised some sections that were not central to the argument, and have re-written and revised others. The bibliography is altered by a few items, but, as far as I could find, there have been no noteworthy additions to Thomistic studies on this topic. In substance, therefore, there are no major differences between thesis and book. For the material production of my thesis and its new form, I would like to thank the staff of Fax Facilities for Writers, Toronto, especially Kate Hamilton and Ann Phelps. Finally, I wish to acknowledge the assistance and support given by my religious community, the Oratory of St. Philip Neri in Toronto.

Abbreviations

NOTE: This list is not complete. Abbreviations for works of St. Thomas that are cited only a few times are not given and should be clear from the text. Abbreviations for the divisions of scholastic works are standard, with the possible exception of "qa." for quaestiuncula. I have used existing English translations where possible, but have modified them where necessary. All unacknowledged translations are my own. Beaurecueil

CCL Cont. gent.

CSEL De pot. De Trin. De ver.

DS Leon.

M.-J. de Beaurecueil, "L'homme image de Dieu selon saint Thomas d'Aquin," Etudes et recherches 8 (1952): 45-82; 9 (1955): 37-96. Cited as [1] or [2] followed by page: e.g., Beaurecueil [1]:77. Corpus Christianorum: Series Latina. Turnhout: Brepols, 1953- . S. Thomae Aquinatis Liber de Veritate Catholicae Fidei contra errores Infidelium sen "Summa contra Gentiles", vols. 2-3, ed. Ceslaus Pera et al. Turin: Marietta, 1961. Cited by book, chapter, and Marietti paragraph: Cont. gent. 4.26. no. 3627; Marietti, p. 298. Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum. Ed. Academia Litterarum Vindobonensis. Vienna, 1866- . De potentia, in S. Thomae Aquinatis Quaestiones Disputatae, vol. 2, ed. P. Bazzi et al. Turin: Marietti, 1965. S. Aurelii Augustini de Trinitate libri XV, ed. W. J. Mountain, 2 vols., CCL 50-50A. Turnhout: Brepols, 1968. Cited by book, chapter, and section: De Trin. 15.15.25; CCL 50A:499. S. Thomae de Aquino, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, in vol. 22. Opera omnia iussu Leonis xiii P.M., Rome: Editori de San Tommaso, 1970-1976. Translations are based on Thomas Aquinas, Truth, vol. 2, trans. James V. McGlynn. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1953. Dictionnaire de theologie catholique. Ed. A. Vacant, E. Mangenot, and E. Amann. Paris: Letouzey et Ane, 1902-1950. Leonine edition: S. Thomae de Aquino opera omnia iussu Leonis xm P.M. edita, cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum. Rome, 1882- .

x NPNF

PG

PL

Sent.

Sullivan Sum. theol.

h

A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, 2 series, ed. Philip Schaff cum al. New York, 1890ff; rpt. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1956- . Unless specified, all references are to vol. 3 of the 1st ser. for Augustine, On the Trinity, trans. Arthur West Haddan and rev. William G. T. Shedd. Patrologiae Cursus Completus. Series Graeca, ed. J. P. Migne. Paris, 1857-1866. Cited by volume, column and, where necessary, by section: PG 65:413a. Patrologiae Cursus Completus. Series Latino, ed. J. P. Migne. Paris, 1844-1864. Cited as for PG. Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. Unless otherwise specified, all references are to S. Thomae Aquinatis Scriptum super libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, 4 vols., ed. Pierre Mandonnet and Maria Fabianus Moos. Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1929-1947. Cited by book (volume number is same): 1 Sent, d.3, q.4, a.4, sol.; p. 120. John Edward Sullivan, The Image of God: The Doctrine of St. Augustine and its Influence. Dubuque, Iowa: Priory Press, 1963. 5". Thomae de Aquino Summa Theologiae, 5 vols., cura et studio Instituti Studiorum Mediaevalium Ottaviensis. Ottawa: Studium Generale O.P. 1941-1945. Usually cited simply by part, without title: 3a, q.4, a.l, ad 2m; Ottawa, p. 2448.

1 St. Thomas and the Image of the Trinity According to Christian tradition the truth about man's nature and the dignity of his vocation is expressed in the words of Genesis concerning the creation of man. On the sixth day of creation, at the end of His work, God created man. And He said: Let us make man to our image and likeness: and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the air, and the beasts, and the whole earth, and every creeping creature that moveth upon the earth. And God created man to His own image: to the image of God He created him: male and female He created them.1

This sacred text has been the subject of much reflection within the Church from its beginning. St. Thomas Aquinas has his place in this tradition. In the company of other Christian thinkers he recognized hi these words of Genesis an authoritative revelation of God's plan for the human being. Creation, Pope John Paul n has recently taught, is an act of giving that includes "the beginning of God's salvific self-communication to the things he creates."2 God has set his mark on man by creating him in His image. He has made man for Himself. With the aid of faith, Christians have come to see hi the words of Genesis 1:26 the primordial invitation to enter into the mystery of the divine Trinity. God is three Persons. Therefore, His self-communication must entail hi some fashion a communication of His triune life to His creature. This self-communication has its initial moment hi the act of creation, as Pope John Paul explains: 1 Gen. 1:26-27, Douay-Rheims version. Cf. Vulgate: "et ait: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, et praesit piscibus marts, et volatilibus caeli, et bestiis, universaeque terrae, omnique reptili, quod movetur in terra. Et creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam: ad imaginem Dei creavit ilium, masculum et feminam creavit eos." 2 Dominum et Vivificantem, Encyclical Letter of the Supreme Pontiff John Paul n, "On the Holy Spirit in the life of the Church and the world," Vatican translation (Sherbrooke, Quebec: Editions Paulines, 1986), p. 18.

2

THOMAS AND THE IMAGE OF THE TRINITY

This is true first of all concerning man, who has been created in the image and likeness of God: "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness." "Let us make": can one hold that the plural which the Creator uses here in speaking of himself already in some way suggests the Trinitarian mystery, the presence of the Trinity in the work of the creation of man? The Christian reader, who already knows the revelation of the mystery, can discern a reflection of it also in these words.3

Further on in the encyclical the Pope affirms this exegesis again: The Triune God communicates himself to man in the Holy Spirit from the beginning through his "image and likeness". Under the action of the same spirit, man, and through him the created world, which has been redeemed by Christ, draw near to their ultimate destinies in God.4

The Pope in these passages is simply giving new expression to a belief common in the Catholic Church over the ages. His words re-introduce us to the mystery of the image: the triune God is the beginning and the end of man. St. Thomas hi his teaching on the image of the Trinity begins with this truth of faith and by the gift of wisdom casts light on its hidden riches. From the earliest days of the Church, Christians have recognized the importance of the words "Let us make man to our image and likeness." In fact, the first chapters of Genesis were a favorite subject for speculation among Jews as well as Christians. The ma'aseh bereshit, the account of creation in the first chapter of Genesis, was one of the central texts around which the esoteric traditions of early Jewish mysticism began to take shape.5 The Gnostics, too, made use of the account of creation in Genesis in the development of their various cosmologies.6 Because the verses about the image offered an opportunity for heterodox interpretations, or at least for dubious private speculation, one of the Desert Fathers is reported to have given the following warning: "Don't let a woman enter your cell, don't read apocrypha, don't speculate about the image."7 Nevertheless, in the great battle against Gnosticism, the early Fathers of the Church found it necessary to reflect on the image of God in the course 3

Dominum et Viviflcantem, pp. 18-19. Dominum et Viviflcantem, p. 95. 5 See Gershom Scholem, Kabbalah (New York: Quadrangle; New York Times Book Co., 1974), p. 11. See also Jean Danielou, The Theology of Jewish Christianity (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1964), p. 107. 6 See Danielou, Jewish Christianity, pp. 69-85, 108, 114; Danielou, Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1973), pp. 395-398. See also Hans Jonas, The Gnostic Religion, 2nd ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958), pp. 147, 154-155, although he downplays the influence of Jewish traditions in the Poimandres. 7 Sopater, in "Apophthegmata Patrum," PG 65: 413a, cited in Jean Kirchmeyer, "Grecque (Eglise)," DS 6 [1967] 818. 4


3

of defending the Catholic belief in the divine authorship of the world and man's position within that world. In the works of most of the Fathers from St. Irenaeus onwards the concept of the image of God plays an important part.8 Patristic reflection on the image of God attained its greatest and most systematic elaboration in the thought of St. Augustine, especially in his lengthy theological investigation of the Trinity, the De Trinitate. Since Augustine, no work has supplanted the De Trinitate as an authoritative guide for the theological reflection of the Western Church on the scriptural notion of the image of God. From the earliest times of the Church, at least from the era of the Apologists, Christians found intimations of the plurality of the divine Persons in the plural form used in Genesis: "Let us make man to our image."9 In the East, however, the emphasis on the different roles of the divine Persons in the work of creation led most theologians there to assert that God the Father had made man according to the image par excellence, that is, according to the Son. The Son, as St. Paul teaches, is the perfect Image of the Father. In their view, then, man is an image of the Image of God.10 In the West, St. Augustine inherited a different line of thought that had been developed by Irenaeus and Tertullian: the plural forms in the text indicate the operation of all three Persons in the making of man. However, it remained for Augustine explicitly to draw the conclusion that God the Trinity had made man to the image of all three divine Persons. For Augustine, if God the Father is speaking to God the Son and God the Holy Spirit in Gen. 1:26, then the words "our image" must indicate that the exemplar to which God has made man is the divine "we," the Trinity.11 Man is the image of God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, not just the image of the Son. In his De Trinitate Augustine searched for the location of the image of the Trinity in man's nature. His investigation was a theological tour de force, and provided the foundation for both Trinitarian theology and theological anthropology in the Latin tradition of the Church during the ensuing centuries. 8

See Kirchmeyer, "Grecque," DS 6 [1967] 812-822; G. B. Ladner, The Idea of Reform (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959); H. Merki, "Ebenbildlichkeit," Reallexicon fur Antike und Christentum, vol. 4 (1958), col. 459-479; Aime Solignac, "Image et ressemblance, m Peres de 1'Eglise," DS 7 [ 1967] 1406-1425; and John Edward Sullivan, The Image of God: The Doctrine of St. Augustine and Its Influence (Dubuque, Iowa: The Priory Press, 1963), esp. pp. 165-203. 9 See Sullivan, pp. 167-168. 10 Clement of Alexandria speaks explicitly of man as eixwv TTJG eixovoc,, but the fundamental conception of the Logos as the exemplar on which God has modeled man is common to most of the Eastern Fathers. See Merki, col. 466-467. 11 De Trin. 7.6.12; CCL 50: 266.

4


Owing to the character of Augustine's writings, it is not always easy to comprehend the fullness of his teaching. Those who have presented his teaching have often fastened on one aspect of Augustine's thought to the neglect of others. In the specific case of the image of God, St. Thomas Aquinas stands out among the disciples of Augustine, for he appears to have been the first of the scholastic masters to grasp the true intention, structure, and development of Augustine's search for the image of the Trinity.12 Thomas understood that Augustine found the image of the Trinity at its best hi man's acts of knowing and loving God because in these acts man reflects the eternal processions of the Son as the eternal Word from the Father and of the Holy Spirit as Love from the Father and the Son. Thus Aquinas conceived of the image of God as an ineradicable capacity for God in man, the foundation for man's participation in the life of the divine Trinity to which man is called by God's grace. In this he faithfully followed Augustine. Before proceeding to examine the teaching of St. Thomas on the image of God, something must be said about previous scholarship. A number of studies on Thomas' doctrine of the image have been made in this century, but they have their deficiencies. Thomas wrote about the image of God in a number of his works, from his earliest theological opus, his commentary on the Sentences, to the masterpiece of his final years, the Summa theologiae. Studies written earlier in this century ignore the possibility that there might have been some development in Aquinas' understanding of the subject from his earlier to his later works. Some of these studies draw indiscriminately from the Angelic Doctor's works, without any concern for the arrangement, composition, and organization of each work and the context in which each was written.13 More recently there have been articles on the use of the notion of the image of God in specific works and texts of Aquinas.14 These studies, 12 From the texts of the most important 13th-century theologians up to Aquinas and from secondary literature it can be concluded that no master prior to Thomas really understood the De Trinitate as a whole. Bonaventure understood that Augustine was engaged in a search, as we shall see later in Part I, but he seems to have missed the most important part of Augustine's findings. 13 See Paulus Paluscsak, "Imago Dei in homine," in Xenia Thomistica, ed. Sadoc Szabo, vol. 2 (Rome: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1925), pp. 119-154; Ian Hislop, "Man, the Image of the Trinity, According to St. Thomas," Dominican Studies 3 (1950): 1-9; Mannes Matthijs, De imagine Dei in homine secundum doctrinam S. Thomae Aquinatis, Quaestiones speciales theologiae speculativae (Rome: Institutum Pontificium Internationale "Angelicum,M1955). 14 See Aelred Squire, "The Doctrine of the Image in the De veritate of St. Thomas," Dominican Studies 4 (1951): 164-177; Ghislain Lafont, "Le sens du theme de 1'image de Dieu dans 1'anthropologie de saint Thomas d'Aquin (la Pars, qu. 93)," Recherches de science religieuse 47 (1959): 560-569; F. J. A. De Grijs, Goddelijk mensontwerp: Een thematische studie over het Beeld Gods in de mens volgens het Scriptum van Thomas van Aquine (Hilversum-Antwerpe: Paul Brand, 1967); Dalmazio Mongillo, «La Concezione dell'Uomo nel


5

limited to particular works, cannot offer a view of the complete teaching of Thomas, whether there is any development from one work to another or not. Some of the newer studies are not much help for the understanding of Thomas' teaching because they reveal, unintentionally, more of their authors' own theological opinions than the thought of Aquinas.15 In all of these studies, of course, there are useful insights and observations. Two studies, however, deserve particular notice because they examine the principal passages in which Thomas wrote about the image. In 1952 and 1955 Fr. M.-J. de Beaurecueil published two extensive articles in which he attempted to trace the chronological development of Thomas' teaching on the subject.16 Near the beginning of his study he quotes a significant remark from a review (in the Bulletin Thomiste) of an earlier study of Thomas' doctrine of the image: We could wonder whether some chronological considerations might not have been necessary so as to give the texts their exact value in each case. Doubtless, we might have grasped the general sense of St. Thomas' thought on this point better if we had followed the progress of its elaboration.17 De Beaurecueil cites this observation as his methodological starting-point. In the same note he also gives a precise summary of his conclusions: In effect, it is sufficient to compare St. Thomas' solution of the problems raised by the image in the Commentary on the Sentences, the De Veritate, and the

Prologo della lallae," in De Homine: Studio Hodiemae Anthropologiae, Acta vn Congressus Thomistici Internationalis, vol. 2 (Rome: Officium Libri Catholic!, 1972), pp. 227-231; Louis B. Geiger, "L'homme, image de Dieu: A propos de Summa Theologiae, la, 93, 4," Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 66 (1974): 511-532; Battista Mondin, "La dottrina della Imago Dei nel Commento alle Sentenze," in Studi Tomistici, vol. 2: San Tommaso e I'odierna problematica teologica (Rome: Pontificia Accademia Romana di S. Tommaso d'Aquino, 1974), pp. 230-247; Jaroslav Pelikan, "Imago Dei. An Explication of Summa theologiae, Part 1, Question 93," in Calgary Aquinas Studies, ed. Anthony Parel, (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1978), pp. 27-48. 15 Of course, every interpretative study runs the risk of revealing the scholar's mind rather than shedding light on the text studied. However, it seems that De Grijs' work is especially at fault on this score. See the review in Rassegna di Letteratura Tomistica 2 (1967): 225-229. Another work with a promising title turns out to be half an attack on Aquinas' doctrine and half an attempt to assimilate his doctrine to the author's own views: Olegario Gonzalez de Cardedal, Teologia y Antropologia: El hombre "imagen de Dios" en el pensamiento de Santo Tomas (Madrid: Editorial Moneda y Credito, 1967). 16 Marie-Joseph Serge de Laugier de Beaurecueil, "L'homme image de Dieu selon saint Thomas d'Aquin," Etudes et Recherches 8 (1952): 45-82 and 9 (1955): 37-97. 17 Beaurecueil [1]:45, n. 1: "on peut se demander si des considerations chronologiques n'auraient pas ete necessaires pour dormer toujours aux textes leur valeur exacte: on aurait sans doute mieux saisi le sens general de la pensee de saint Thomas sur ce point, si Ton avail assiste au progres de son elaboration. ... B.T., t. m, no. 893."

6


Summa, in order to perceive an undeniable evolution of his thought. Starting from the Augustinian foundation, we see his thought undergo modification in two main directions: on one hand it moves towards a more and more rigorous realism under the influence of Aristotelian psychology; on the other the scriptural theme takes on a more and more defined meaning of an anthropological sort, in a general vision of the universe dominated by Dionysian insights18

He begins with an examination of the sources of Thomas' doctrine in the Bible, St. Augustine, and the Sentences of Peter Lombard. However, in the two principal parts of his work, he attempts to show the development of Thomas' thought in the two directions just mentioned, and within each of these parts he traces the development of a number of different aspects of the image of God. The result is a thematic study that makes it difficult to discern the broad lines along which Thomas' doctrine evolved from one work to the next. According to Beaurecueil himself, he was the first scholar to examine the doctrine of the image of God in Aquinas' works from the standpoint of the development of his thought. On this ground alone his study is indispensable for all later students of the subject, if they admit the importance of this approach. A reading of Aquinas' texts, however, had led me to question some of the central features in de Beaurecueil's picture of the evolution of Thomas' doctrine of the image of God. In the course of this study I will indicate various specific points on which I differ from him. De Beaurecueil's thesis, that hi his teaching on the image, Thomas moved away from Augustine in the direction of Aristotle and Dionysius, is not persuasive. Also, it is not correct to see a sharp division between the theological and the anthropological aspects of the image of God in the works of St. Augustine, a division that Aquinas healed, according to de Beaurecueil, by minimizing the theological aspect.19 As a result of this view, he gives little consideration 18 Ibid.: "Effectivement, il suffit de comparer la solution proposee par saint Thomas aux problemes souleves par 1'Image dans le Commentaire des Sentences, le de Veritate et la Somme, pour s'apercevoir d'une evolution indiscutable de la pensee. Partant d'un donne augustinien, on la voit se modifier selon deux directions principales: d'une part on va vers un realisme de plus en plus rigoureux sous 1'influence de la psychologic aristotelicienne; d'autre part, le theme scripturaire prend une signification de plus en plus determinee, d'ordre anthropologique, dans une vue generate de 1'univers commande par des inspirations dionysiennes." 19 See ibid., 49: He finds that Augustine approached the theme of the image from the "two great poles" of his thought-the soul and God. "D'un cote on aura une etude anthropologique, de 1'autre une investigation relevant de la theologie trinitaire. ... Une telle dualite, a la fois subjective et objective, est-elle irreductible?—Certes, non: et ce sera precisement le merite de saint Thomas que d'en realiser 1'unification. Pour 1'eveque d'Hippone, le probleme de I'unite ne semble pas meme s'etre pose." Perhaps because there was no problem.


7

to the image of God as a representation of the Trinity, judging that Thomas came to consider this aspect of the image secondary. Thomas himself asserts straightforwardly in the Summa that, if man is the image of God, he is ipso facto also the image of the Trinity.20 Beaurecueil neglects the image of the Trinity and so does not do justice to what is really the most important part of Thomas' teaching on the image. One other author has made a significant contribution to the systematic study of Aquinas' doctrine of the image of God. In his book on the image of God according to the doctrine of St. Augustine, Fr. John Sullivan devotes a chapter to examining St. Thomas' views in relation to Augustine's.21 After a brief account of the tradition from Augustine to Aquinas, Sullivan divides his discussion according to the distinction between two aspects of the image of God, as image of the divine nature and as image of the Trinity. Sullivan, like de Beaurecueil, adopts a chronological approach, but places greater emphasis on the influence of Augustine, as he says at the outset: The genius of St. Thomas will place the augustinian teaching on more sure, more secure scientific and aristotelian foundations. But this is not the work of a moment, it is not the work of a young and inexperienced mind, nor was it a work accomplished by the Angelic Doctor himself in his earliest writings. Rather it was the fruit of repeated examinations of the augustinian deposit and of the greater assimilation and use of the aristotelian instrument. As a consequence our discussion of the teaching of St. Thomas must give due prominence to the chronological development of this doctrine in the works of Aquinas.22

In the section on the image of the Trinity, Sullivan studies Thomas' doctrine in each of the three major discussions of the image in Thomas' works. He does not divide this section thematically, and so the evolution of Aquinas' teaching is more clearly visible. However, Sullivan does not pay much attention to the position of the texts in each work or to the particular character of the work. In a short study this is understandable, but an examination of the context of the principal passages is necessary for an accurate analysis of the author's teaching. As for Sullivan's conclusions concerning the development of Thomas' doctrine, they are balanced and adequate for the most part; but he fails to discern the debt Thomas owed to Augustine in the final development of his teaching hi the Summa theologiae. Sullivan's discussion, of course, is only a chapter in a book on Augustine's doctrine and does not pretend to provide a close and comprehensive examination of Aquinas' texts. 20 21 22

la, q. 93, a. 5, resp. Sullivan, pp. 204-287. Sullivan, p. 217.

8


A careful reading of the relevant passages of Thomas' works reveals significant differences between the several expositions of the theme. Therefore it is right to follow de Beaurecueil by examining the texts hi chronological order so as to investigate any development hi Thomas' understanding from the earlier to the later texts. Also, it is important to examine the texts as they appear within the wider context of each particular work. Human thought does not transpire hi a vacuum, as Thomas himself would have been the first to admit. It is important to perceive, if possible, the purposes for which a work was written, the literary form that gives it shape and structure, and the authors and audience to which it responds and addresses itself. Chenu has admirably championed this approach to Aquinas' works, emphasizing especially the literary genres to which his works belong. His work on Aquinas is invaluable as a guide for the examination of the context of Thomas' thought.23 There is, however, a more essential principle that should guide the reading of the texts of an author of the intellectual stature of St. Thomas. Although it is important to understand the literary rules Thomas is following and the authorities and masters whom he is addressing, it is not sufficient to know these things (as Chenu himself warns) if we are to understand what Thomas means to say in the text under study.24 We need also to consider the internal context the work itself provides for each passage. We must ask what Thomas means to convey to us by choosing a particular word, by addressing one specific problem rather than another, by putting his material in the order that he does. He did not compose his works simply by selecting some literary genre and considering what others had said or would say. His works are not dictated by these considerations, but rather are shaped by the structure of the truth as he perceived it, and by his intention to convey that truth. We must try to discern the internal logic and rationale of the work hi which a particular text is set. It is necessary to attempt to think as Thomas thought, to see things as he did. In this study some attention will be given to the historical genesis of Aquinas' thought, but the primary intention is to bring out the meaning of the text as an expression of truth. Hence certain texts will be examined in some detail hi order to see how Thomas sought to convey the truth about the image of the Trinity. 23

See M.-D. Chenu, Introduction a I'etude de saint Thomas d'Aquin (2nd ed. Montreal: Institut d'Etudes medievales; Paris: Vrin, 1954); trans. A.-M. Landry and D. Hughes, Toward Understanding St. Thomas (Chicago: Regnery, 1964). 24 See Chenu, Introduction, pp. 167-170 and esp. p. 167: "chez saint Thomas, 1'appareil didactique masque plus qu'ailleurs la presence de 1'esprit. II faudra done poursuivre, au prix d'une lente et tenace maturation, les grandes vues intellectuelles en oeuvre dans les constructions, et n'en pas rester aux anatomies, si exactes soient-elles."


9

There are three parts of this study, corresponding to the three major discussions of the image of God appearing in the Scriptum super Sententiis, the De veritate, and the Summa theologiae. There is no need to catalogue or analyze the various minor references to the image of God scattered through the other works. Most of them are incidental and add nothing to our understanding of Thomas' teaching on the image.25 There are a few longer passages that merit some consideration but do not constitute expositions of the same importance as the three major treatments of the image. Although these passages shed light on the historical genesis of Thomas' mature teaching on the subject, none of them gives us a substantial presentation of the doctrine that suffices to capture and convey the truth concerning the image. It is the three works just mentioned then, that provide the central focus of this study. Before examining the texts of Aquinas, it is necessary to take a look at the teaching of St. Augustine in his De Trinitate. This work was the authoritative text on the image of God for scholastic theologians, and Thomas cites it again and again. Without some understanding of this complex theological investigation it is impossible to appreciate properly the development of Thomas' understanding of the image of the Trinity. Some reference must also be made to the doctrine of the image of the Trinity in the works of the scholastic masters prior to St. Thomas. In the twelfth century theologians took great delight in the notion of the image of God and its many aspects.26 In fact, there is such a wealth of references to the image, which tend in such a variety of directions, that it is hard to discern any general pattern of development in this period. If we wish to detect possible sources of influence on Thomas, the twelfth century seems too distant from him, except for Peter Lombard's Sentences, on which Thomas and his contemporaries had to lecture. Of far greater importance for Thomas' own work were the more systematic and sophisticated expositions of the 25 Most of these references can be found using the new Index Thomisticus: Sancti Thomae Operum Omnium Indices et Concordantiae, ed. Robertus Busa (Stuttgart: FrommannHolzboog, 1974- ). I have made a study, unpublished, of the references to the image of God that occur in Thomas' commentaries on Scripture: "The Image of God in Man in the Scriptural Commentaries of St. Thomas Aquinas." Although there are some interesting passages, there is only one minor reference to the image of the Trinity. 26 See the richly documented study on this period by Robert Javelet, Image et ressemblance au douzieme siecle, de saint Anselm a Alain de Lille (Strasbourg: Letouzey, 1967). Unfortunately the historical development of the notion is not really examined in this work. Some light is shed on this development in a short article by Ludwig Hodl, "Zur Entwicklung der fruhscholastischen Lehre von der Gottebenbildlichkeit des Menschen," in L'homme et son destin d'apres les penseurs du moyen age, Actes du premier Congres International de Philosophic Medievale, 1958 (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1960), pp. 347-359.

10


image of God in the works of immediate predecessors and contemporaries. In particular, we must look at the works of Alexander of Hales, the great Summa fratris Alexandri, and the earlier works of St. Albert and St. Bonaventure. From a comparison of these works with the teaching of Aquinas on the image of the Trinity, it appears that Thomas drew on these earlier writings in his first treatment, the Scriptum super Sententiis. However, the development of his teaching in his later works owes very little to the works of other schoolmen,27 and I have referred to these works primarily in examining the texts of Thomas' Scriptum. In the Latin tradition of Christian theology since the time of Augustine, the exposition of the image of God has been above all the exposition of the image of the Trinity. Aquinas, too, emphasizes the Trinitarian aspect of the image of God, and this study therefore concentrates on the image of the Trinity. There are many secondary topics of interest, such as the existence of the image of God in the angels, the relative excellence of the image of God in man and woman, and the relation between the image of God in man and the Image of God that is God the Son. This study would be overlong if these topics were to be examined; the same holds for those areas of theology in which Thomas makes some application of the notion of the image of God, such as Christology and the study of grace and its effects. All of these aspects and implications of the notion of the image are secondary in Thomas' teaching to the consideration of the image of God as an image of the Trinity found in the structure of man's mind. This focus on the Trinitarian aspect of the image of God makes comparison with one other theological topic particularly relevant. It would seem that an examination of Thomas' teaching on the indwelling of the Trinity should shed some light on his exposition of the image of the Trinity, or vice versa. For the presence of the Trinity by grace hi the soul of the just man must bear some resemblance to the mark of the Trinity that every man bears by virtue of the image of God. One expects that Aquinas will draw out the similarity and perhaps show how the indwelling of the Trinity is a fulfilment 27

Confirmation of this judgment can be found in the assessment at the end of Michael Schmaus' study on Albert, "Die trinitarische Gottesebenbildlichkeit nach dem Sentenzenkommentar Alberts des Grossen," in Joseph Moller and Helmut Kohlenberger, eds., Virtus politico: Festgabe zum 75. Geburtstag von Alfons Hufnagel (Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1974), pp. 295-298. Secondary literature on the image of God (and even more so on the image of the Trinity) in the work of the 13th-century scholastics is not verry extensive. It seems nearly impossible to obtain a copy of R. Bruch's dissertation which probably sheds a good deal of light on the relationship between Thomas' doctrine and the works of other schoolmen of his time: "Die Gottesebenbildlichkeit des Menschen nach den bedeutendsten Scholastikern des 13. Jahrhunderts," Diss. Freiburg 1946.


11

or actualization of the image of the Trinity. We shall discover, however, that Thomas does not meet this expectation. A word should be said about the two expressions "image of God" and "image of the Trinity". These two phrases refer to one and the same reality in the rational creature, although by our power of reason we can distinguish aspects in this one reality that justify the use of one or the other phrase. Because God is a Trinity of Persons, any creature that bears the image of God necessarily bears the image of the Trinity. However, it is possible for us to consider God without adverting to the Trinity of Persons in God. So, too, we can consider the image of God without thinking about the image of God specifically as the image of the Trinity. It was Thomas' usual practice to speak of the image of the Trinity only when he was studying the Trinitarian aspect of the image, but he did not mean to make any real distinction between the image of the Trinity and the image of God. Our concern with the Trinitarian aspect of the image of God, means that I shall refer to the image of God usually as the image of the Trinity. Sometimes, however, it will suffice to speak of it simply as the image of God. It should also be noted that the Latin translation of the key phrases of Scripture on the image of God has been followed. In Gen. 1:26-27, although the Hebrew and Greek texts may suggest other possibilities, the Vulgate has the phrase ad imaginem.2* Thomas considered the preposition in this phrase important for the understanding of the notion of the image of God. Therefore, it is best here to keep close to the Latin version by writing "to the image," although this may sound more awkward in English than the translation "in the image." Thus we can follow the Douay-Rheims version: "And God created man to His own image: to the image of God he created him: male and female He created them."29 There are unmistakable differences in Aquinas' various expositions of the image of the Trinity. We will see whether these differences are connected with a possible rereading and reinterpretation of Augustine's writings. In conceptualizing the image of the Trinity there are alternative ways of considering the reality, and Thomas did not always choose the same one. First, one can conceive of the divine Trinity in terms of the three Persons, but one can also think of the Trinity in terms of the two eternal processions 28

The Hebrew has "be-selem" (or related forms): the preposition be usually indicates a place or state in which. Hence, in English versions, we are accustomed to hear "in the image." The Greek of the Septuagint has xar'etxdva: the preposition xara gives a somewhat different sense to the phrase, so that it would mean "according to the image." 29 Cf. King James version of the same verse: "So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them." Obviously the KJV follows the Hebrew, while the DRV sticks to the Latin.

12


by which the second and third Persons originate from the first. If one focuses on the processions, it should mean a view of the image of the Trinity that brings out the more active side of the image within man. Second, there are two different, although not mutually exclusive, ways of looking at the relationship between a thing that is an image and its exemplar. One can look at the relationship in terms of a proportionality between the image and the exemplar, such as we find in the case of the reflection of an object in a mirror. In this case there is a certain equality between the relation of the parts in the mirror image and the relation of the parts in the physical object. Yet there is always a distance between the image and the object which remains undiminished as long as we introduce no further considerations. However, in certain cases, it is possible to look at the relationship in terms of an assimilation or conformation of the thing that is the image to its exemplar. This view implies a more active element in the relationship, in which the distance between image and exemplar is seen to diminish, if not to disappear. Thomas sometimes characterized these two aspects of the relationship between image and exemplar in terms of analogy (analogia) and conformation (conformatio or conformitas). As we examine the works of Aquinas, we should keep in mind that we can conceive the image of the Trinity as a triad of entities or a pair of acts and that we can view the relation of the image to the divine exemplar in terms of analogy or of conformation.

2

St. Augustine's De Trinitate

Modern Thomists have tended to focus on the philosophical doctrines of Aquinas and consequently, have stressed the influence of Aristotle on Aquinas. However, Thomas himself was a theologian by profession. Aristotle indeed provided Thomas with useful instruments for the pursuit of theology, but Aristotle could hardly be taken as a model for a Christian theologian. Thomas found his master in St. Augustine. He sat at the feet of Augustine not simply because he accepted the authority of the great Doctor of the Church, whom the scholastic masters commonly esteemed as the best expounder of Catholic truth, but also because he perceived the penetrating genius of Augustine. Thomas was perfectly aware of the difficulties that Augustine's method and style often occasioned his readers, but he had a gift for getting to the heart of Augustine's teaching and for appreciating its truth. It does not need to be demonstrated that Augustine's De Trinitate exercised the greatest influence on St. Thomas in his own teaching on the image of the Trinity. Even a superficial reading of Aquinas' texts shows that the De Trinitate remained the constant basis of Aquinas' teaching, although in fact, the treatise is cited explicitly more frequently in Thomas' later texts on the image than in his earlier ones. Still, what we need to ask is how Thomas read the De Trinitate, how deeply he understood it, and whether he reached this understanding hi his earliest treatment of the image of God or in the course of his later works. Before we can answer these questions, however, it is necessary to explore Augustine's work itself in some detail. Secondary literature on Augustine and his works is vast, but there is surprisingly little written on Augustine's De Trinitate as a particular work with its own special structure and movement.1 It is a defensible use of the 1

See Alfred Schindler, Wort undAnalogic in Augustins Trinitdtslehre (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1965), p. 119. He claims that no real commentary on the De Trinitatehas been written. (Perhaps Schindler's judgment is a bit harsh. We have what virtually amounts to a commentary in the extensive introductions, notes, and appendices to La Trinite in the Bibliotheque

14

AUGUSTINE'S DE TRINITATE

superlative to say that the De Trinitate is the most profound and powerful work of theological investigation in the Christian tradition. Michael Schmaus, an authority on Augustine's Trinitarian theology, echoes the judgment of other scholars when he refers to the De Trinitate as the "most important literary monument that theological speculation about the Trinity has produced."2 Later theological works may offer a more scientifically systematic presentation of the doctrine of the Trinity, but not even Thomas' own Summa theologiae can challenge the position of the De Trinitate as a dramatic but meditative, poetic but rigorous, introduction to the mystery of the triune God. When one reflects that this work has proved the lasting foundation of subsequent theological reflection in the Western Church, it seems all the more remarkable that scholars have preferred to concentrate their efforts on Augustines' other writings, such as the Confessions and the City of God, which, albeit masterpieces, take second place as theological works to the De Trinitate? Since its is Thomas' teaching that is the chief subject of this book, it would be inappropriate to note more than a few points concerning the plan and structure of the De Trinitate. It is necessary to insist first of all that there is a plan to the work. Some scholars have been so impressed by the length of years over which Augustine composed and revised the treatise that they have given the impression that it is an almost formless jumble of haphazard Augustinienne edition (Euvres de saint Augustin, vols. 15-16 (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1955). However, there are several scholars who are responsible for this work, and their reflections, excellent as they may be, do not constitute a complete, unified analysis of the De Trinitate as a whole.) Since 1965 there have been two notable studies on the De Trinitate and its structure. One is a short but illuminating attempt to analyze the structure of the work in terms of its dramatic movement: Edmund Hill, "St. Augustine's De Trinitate: The doctrinal significance of its structure," Revue des etudes augustiniennes 19 (1973): 277-286. Hill has elaborated his theory at greater length in: The Mystery of the Trinity (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1985). In this study of the Catholic doctrine, he devotes seven chapters to Augustine's De Trinitate as the best introduction to the mystery of the Trinity. The other is a dissertation on the De Trinitate that rightly criticizes earlier approaches, but proposes a rather odd division and interpretation of the work: Donald Evert Daniels, "The Argument of the De Trinitate," Diss. University of Georgia, 1976. 2 Michael Schmaus, Die psychologische Trinitdtslehre des hi. Augustinus (Minister: Aschendorff, 1927), p. 2: "Die 15 Bucher De trinitate uberragen an Tiefe der Gedanken und an Reichtum der Ideen alle ubrigen Werke des Kirchenvaters. Sie sind das gewaltigste literarische Monument, das sich die theologische Trinitatsspekulation setzte." 3 Hill, "St. Augustine's De Trinitate," Til judges the De Trinitate the greater work: Augustine's "dramatic sense is most clearly exhibited in his two great masterpieces, the Confessions and the City of God, respectively presenting his own personal drama and the drama of the Church. It is my contention that the De Trinitate is a comparable dramatic presentation of the mystery of God, and incidentally a greater masterpiece than either of the other two more famous works. The dramatic form it takes, from the point of view of the writer and reader, is that of a quest, a search for God."


15

accretions.4 From Augustine's own words we know that the work took a long time, that he found it difficult to write, but that he himself viewed it as a unified whole.5 We also know that he intended his work for the ears of readers of some intelligence who, he says, wished to understand what they believed.6 It should be evident that Augustine composed the work with great care and attention to its form and development, in spite of the span of time 4

This chronological approach is rightly criticized in Hill, "St. Augustine's De Trinitate," 278-279 and Daniels, "The Argument of the De Trinitate" pp. 4-5. 5 On the difficulty of composing the work and the length of years which it took, we have evidence in a number of letters which Augustine wrote to various friends, who were importuning him to complete it. From the years 410-416 we find references to the De Trinitate in Epp. 120, 143, 162, 169, and 174. The last letter (Ep. 174) was written to bishop Aurelius of Carthage, but was intended to serve as a prologue to the authorized edition of the De Trinitate. In it Augustine concisely says that the work took a long time: "De trinitate, quae deus summus et verus est, libros iuvenis inchoavi, senex edidi" (PL 33: 758; CSEL 44:650). In this letter and in his Retractations (Retr. 2.15.51; PL 32:635; CSEL 36:147-149), he explains that certain men, who greatly desired to have the work, pirated a portion of it before it was finished. Augustine was angered by this act, but he obviously had been finding the work so difficult that he was almost glad to have an excuse to wash his hands of it. However, his friends would not let him off the hook, and so he forced himself to complete the work and edit it: "venom multorum fratrum vehementissima postulatione et maxime tua iussione compulsus opus tarn laboriosum adiuvante domino terminare curavi eosque emendates, non ut volui, sed ut potui, ne ab illis, qui subrepti iam in manus hominum exierant, plurimum discreparent, venerationi tuae per filium nostrum condiaconum carissimum misi et cuicumque audiendos, legendos describendosque permisi" (Ep. 174; PL 33:758; CSEL 44:651). Here Augustine himself says that he found the work a labor and that he was not very satisfied with the edition he had finally completed. In the same letter he also declares that he considered the work largely unintelligible except taken as a whole because of its character as a search: "non enim singillatim sed omnes [libros] simul edere ea ratione decreveram, quoniam praecedentibus consequentes inquisitione proficiente nectuntur" (Ep. 174; PL 33:758; CSEL 44:650). His insistence that the work forms a whole is borne out by the summary at its end (De Trin. 15.3.4-5; CCL 50A:462-467). Cf. Hill, "St. Augustines' De Trinitate," 279. 6 Augustine was aware that he was treating very tricky questions, and that erroneous answers would prove dangerous to his readers. See Ep. 143:4; PL 33:586; CSEL 44:254: "periculosissimarum quaestionum libros de genesi scilicet et de trinitate diutius teneo, quam vultis et fertis." He thought that the work would be understood by few: "ab his me revocari et retardari inruentibus de transverse* quibuslibet quaestionibus nolo, ita ut nee libros de trinitate, quos diu in manibus verso nondumque complevi, modo adtendere velim, quoniam nimis operosi sunt et a paucis eos intellegi posse arbitror" (Ep. 169.1; PL 33:743; CSEL 44:612). Yet is it not correct to say that the De Trinitate is an esoteric work intended for only a few illuminati, for in the work itself Augustine insists that all men are called to seek God, a task that requires the exercise of the understanding (see esp. De Trin. 15.2.2-3; CCL 50A:460-462). Augustine a number of times assumes a certain slowness or dullness of mind on the part of his readers, and even himself (see De Trin. 10.12.19; CCL 50:332: "etiam tardioribus dilucescere haec possunt dum ea tractantur quae ad animum tempore accedunt et quae illi temporaliter accidunt cum meminit quod antea non meminerat et cum videt quod antea non videbat et cum amat quod antea non amabat"). Thus it seems that he meant his work for anyone who wished to use his reason, starting from faith. Cf. Schindler, Wort undAnalogic, p. 6.

16


(roughly twenty years from 400 to 420) that separated its inception from its completion.7 The De Trinitate is a search, an inquisitio, as Augustine puts it. It is the embodiment of a principle of Catholic theology that Augustine constantly invoked and that St. Anselm later formulated: faith seeking understanding (fides quaerens intellectum}? Indeed, because he considered the work a continuing quest, Augustine wished it to be published as a whole rather than in serial installments, lest the reader mistake a stage in the search for its conclusion.9 Previous studies have mistakenly divided the work into sections as if it were a scientifically ordered treatise. For many years it has been common to divide the fifteen books of the work into a theological section (books 1-7) and a philosophical section (books 8-15), or alternatively into a scriptural section (books 1-4) and a more strictly rational section (books 5-15). There is some truth behind these divisions, but they tend to obscure the unity of substance, theme, and method that guides Augustine's search. Throughout the work Augustine insists that we must begin from a firmly held faith in the Trinity if we wish to arrive at the slightest understanding of this divine mystery. At the very beginning of the work, and repeatedly thereafter, he berates those heretics "who disdain to begin with faith, and are deceived by a crude and perverse love of reason."10 In books 8 to 15, in which Augustine searches for an analogy for the Trinity, primarily in man as the image of God, he admonishes his reader not to relinquish the Catholic faith, which is the only basis for the search, as he states clearly in book 9: We certainly seek a trinity — not any trinity, but that Trinity which is God, and the true and supreme and only God. Let my hearers then wait, for we are still seeking. And no one justly finds fault with such a search, if at least he who seeks

7 The chronology is unclear. Most scholars place the beginning about 399, but the terminus is harder to determine, falling sometime in the 420s but before 428. Schindler, Wort und Analogic, pp. 7-10, argues for the completion of book 15 by 421, although he suggests that the editing of the work may have taken place 416-425. 8 See Jaroslav Pelikan, The Growth of Medieval Theology (600-1300) (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 258-260. He cites an important passage on the relation of faith and understanding in Augustine's De Trinitate. "Faith seeks, understanding finds; whence the prophet says, 'Unless ye believe, ye shall not understand'" (De Trin. 15.2.2; NPNF, p. 200). However, this fundamental tenet of Augustine's theology can be found explicitly or implicitly on almost every page of the De Trinitate, beginning from the insistence on the initiumfldei'm the first sentence (De Trin. 1.1.1; CCL 50:27). See n. 10 below. 9 See n. 6 above. 10 De Trin. 1.1.1; NPNF, p. 17; CCL 50:27: "Lecturus haec quae de trinitate disserimus prius oportet ut noverit stilum nostrum adversus eorum vigilare calumnias qui fidei contemnentes initium immature et perverse rationis amore falluntur."


17

that which either to know or to utter is most difficult, is steadfast in the faith.... For a certain faith is in some way the starting point of knowledge.11

Nowhere in the De Tnnitate does he profess to offer reasons or proofs of the Trinity that would amount to a rational demonstration of the truth about the Trinity without the aid of faith. Instead, Augustine's intention is to show how far faith with the aid of reason can proceed towards an understanding of that truth. Although Augustine sometimes refers to the second half of his work as a search for the Trinity through creatures, it is not correct to characterize his approach as philosophical. Books 8 to 15 contain many long passages that resound with the words of Scripture, and the reader thus should recall that faith, not reason, is the basis of Augustine's search throughout the work. Book 11 alone presents an almost entirely unuiterrupted piece of psychological investigation. Even here, however, Augustine does not let his reader forget that the search inwards is meant to be a search upwards: he is not practising subjective introspection, nor is he pursuing a philosophical study of man. Augustine is engaged in a theological ascent to a God who is pure spirit. Our only hope of coming to know that God is to follow His lead by the light of faith along the more inward path (modo interiore) that lies through our own soul, the most spiritual of created things known to us by reason.12 De Tnnitate is not exactly a polemical work, but it is directed against heretics who had attacked the Catholic faith in the Trinity. Perhaps it would be more precise to say that it is directed against the roots of the heretics' errors. Thus it is really addressed to all who count themselves Christians, for Augustine makes it clear that the roots of theological error lie in man's condition of sin and ignorance. On account of this fundamental blindness in which all men find themselves, Augustine constantly asserts the need for the Christians to assure themselves that they hold the true faith and not some deceitful counterfeit. In the pivotal book 8 he insists on the necessity of a true faith if the believer is to love and know God: "indisputably we must take care, lest the mind believing that which it does not see, feign to itself something which is not, and hope for and love that which is false."13 Repeatedly he calls 11

De Trin. 9.1.1; NPNF, p. 125; CCL 50:292-293. At the beginning of book 8, which Hill, as well as other scholars, considers pivotal in the De Tnnitate, Augustine speaks of the more inward way he will use to investigate the doctrine of the Trinity in the following books: "Nunc itaque in quantum ipse adiuvat creator mire misericors attendamus haec quae modo interiore quam superiora tractavimus, cum sint eadem, servata ilia regula ut quod intellectui nostro nondum eluxerit a firmitate fidei non dimittatur" (De Trin. 8.1.1; CCL 50:269). Augustine insists that the subject matter of th second half of the work will be the same as that of the first, although the approach used differs. 13 De Trin. 8.4.6; NPNF, p. 118; CCL 50:275. 12

18

AUGUSTINE'S DE TRINITA TE

his reader to purify his mind from its inclination to picture God in terms of the carnal and psychical world in which man's sinful desires have engrossed him. Heresy is simply the result of succumbing to this inclination. The De Trinitate, then, is not so much a polemical work as an ascetical one, for its purpose is to exercise the mind of believers in order to purge and preserve them from error and to help them to see God by the illumination of true faith. Nevertheless, Augustine addresses himself specifically to certain difficulties that had arisen in the defense of the Catholic faith against the heresy of Arius and its offshoot, Macedonianism. Scholars have been puzzled by the concern with Arianism in the De Trinitate because there were scarcely any Arians in Augustine's part of Africa in the period 400-420, and the imperial court had become predominantly Catholic.14 However, if we see the work as directed against the heresy and its roots rather than against heretics, then it is possible to understand why Augustine responded to the heresy of Arius and his descendants. For Augustine must have recognized that the Arians had posed some serious questions that struck deep at the heart of the Catholic faith and demanded a far more searching, painstaking, and masterly reply than the schismatic plague of Donatism or the more refined, spiritual errors of Pelagianism. Augustine did not have a parochially narrow mind, and he realized the immensity of the danger to the faith that Arianism presented, even if, until his last year, his corner of the empire had been largely spared the ravages of the Arians.15 There are two difficulties that Augustine mentions at the outset, and throughout the work he returns to them. First, how are we to understand that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit work indivisibly as one God, yet play distinct roles within the created world? Second, how can we understand the distinction of the Holy Spirit within the Trinity since we cannot say that the Father or the Son or both have begotten Him?16 In the first difficulty we have the root of the Arian heresy. The Arians constantly attacked the Catholic position as Sabellian. They could not see how the essential unity of the three Persons did not imply the Sabellian error of denying the real distinction of the Persons. If the three Persons are one God and work together in every 14

See Schindler, Wort und Analogic, pp. 1-6. The Contra Maximinum grew out of Augustine's debate with the Arian bishop Maximinus in 428; about 418-419, he wrote a refutation of an Arian sermon (Contra sermonem Arianorum). These works are thus posterior to the writing of most of the De Trinitate. In 399 there was no threat of Arianism in Africa, but perhaps Augustine had in mind the battle against Arianism lead by St. Ambrose at Milan before Augustine's residence there (384-387). 16 De Trin. 1.5.8; CCL 50:36-37: "Movet etiam quomodo spiritus sanctus in trinitate sit, quern nee pater nee filius nee ambo genuerint, cum sit spiritus patris et filii." 15


19

divine act, why is it that the Father did not suffer on the cross as well as the Son? In the second difficulty, however, Augustine formulates a more recently discussed problem. From 360 or so, attention began to be focused on the Holy Spirit. In the East some Arians came to accept the divinity of the Son but refused to admit that the Holy Spirit was consubstantial with the Father and the Son. These heretics were variously labeled Macedonians or Pneumatomachi ("fighters against the Spirit"). In 381 the Council of Constantinople affirmed the divinity of the Holy Spirit. Orthodox theologians by then realized that the Spirit had been neglected in their reflections. Consequently, this era witnessed the composition of treatises and sermons on the Holy Spirit from the hands of the great Alexandrian and Cappadocian Fathers, and their reflections were made available to the Latin West by St. Ambrose.17 Augustine, however, perceived that the Catholic belief in the consubstantiality and co-eternity of the three Persons made it very difficult to see how the eternal procession of the Holy Spirit was to be distinguished from the eternal procession of the Son. We quite naturally think of the production of one person from another as an act of generation or begetting. Why not say that the Holy Spirit is generated or begotten, as the Son is? But then there would be two Sons in the Trinity. The Macedonians, in fact, apparently argued that the Catholic belief necessarily led to the absurd conclusion that there are two brothers in the Trinity.18 Therefore, it was urgently necessary, Augustine realized, to show that the two eternal processions could be distinguished in some way. It is odd that most scholars have failed to notice that these two problems—more clearly the second—recur throughout the De Trinitate and give a specific direction to Augustine's investigation of the mystery of the Trinity.19 In books 1 to 7 Augustine concentrates on the first problem rather 17

St. Jerome is well-known for his nasty remark that Ambrose plagiarized his work on the Holy Spirit (De Spiritu sancto) from Didymus' treatise, which Jerome translated. See A. Palmieri, "Esprit-saint," DTC 5[1967]:747 where he says that Ambrose's work "est puisee directement aux sources grecques." He adds that Ambrose used the works of other Greek Fathers besides Didymus. 18 See G. Bardy, "Macedonius et les macedoniens," DTC 9 [ 1927]: 1477-1478. Bardy cites the Dialogi contra Macedonianos, falsely attributed to Athanasius, as a source for the Macedonian accusation that an eternal procession of the Spirit necessarily means that there are two brothers in the Trinity. 19 Scarcely any studies seem to comment on the important passage in book 1 where Augustine states the two difficulties. One scholar notes not only Augustine's preoccupation with the problem of the personal distinction of the Holy Spirit, and his concern to distinguish the generation of the Son from the procession of the Spirit, but also the recurrence of the problem of the procession throughout the De Trinitate, see Ferdinand Cavallera, "La doctrine de saint Augustin sur 1'Esprit-Saint a propos du 'De Trinitate,'" Recherches de Theologie

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than the second, especially in books 1 to 4 where he invokes Scripture and explains its controverted texts in order to show that the Son and Holy Spirit are equal to the Father in divinity, although Scripture reveals that the Son is less according to His humanity. Thus in these books Augustine shows how to read Scripture according to the rule of faith: the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are revealed to be one God, who works in the world without any division between the three Persons, but the missions of the Son and the Spirit, to which the New Testament clearly witnesses, manifest the eternal processions which clearly distinguish these two divine Persons from God the Father.20 Although Augustine concentrates on the first problem, he does not forget the second in these books. Indeed, it becomes clear that the second problem is a sort of precipitate from the first, a crystallization of the problem of maintaining a personal distinction within a triune God who works indivisibly. By means of the great canonical rule that St. Athanasius and others had carefully formulated to explain how certain passages of Scripture about the Son of God refer to His divinity while others refer to His humanity, Augustine proceeds to distinguish between the eternal procession of the Son and the temporal mission by which He became incarnate as a man. Augustine devotes most of his discussion in these first books to the Incarnation of the Son, but he does not neglect the Holy Spirit. As soon as he has spelled out the canonical rule in book 2, he stops to consider how it might be applied to the texts on the mission of the Holy Spirit.21 We must not interpret these texts, he says, as if they implied that the Spirit is less than the Father or the Son, but rather as a revelation, through the mission, of the eternal procession of the Spirit from the Father. ancienneetmedievalel (1930): 365-387, 3 (1931): 5-19. His list of references (pp. 386-387) to the problem is not complete, but should be noted: "Sur la procession du Saint-Esprit, le probleme pose dans le De Trinitate i, 8; n, 5 est discute longuement xv, 45-50, mais il y est fait allusion dans bien d'autres passages rv, 28-32; v, 15-17; vi, 7, 10, 11; vn, 6; vm, 10, 17; rx, 1,17; xii, 5; xv, 10,12, 27, 38." Other scholars have noted the problem but not recognized its importance in the De Trinitate. See esp. Schmaus, Trinitdtslehre, pp. 135, 378, 381. There is, however, one short article that points out the failure of scholars to note the persistence of the question about the procession of the Holy Spirit throughout the De Trinitate. see Agostino Trape, "Nota sulla processione dello Spirito Santo nella teologia trinitaria di S. Agostino e di S. Tommaso," in Studi Tomistici, vol. 1: San Tommaso, Fonti e riflessi del suo pensiero (Rome: Pontificia Accademia Romana di S. Tommaso d'Aquino, 1974), pp. 119125. He traces the problem through the De Trinitate to the solution given in book 15, and then briefly argues that St. Thomas used this solution in his Summa (without citing Augustine). 20 Hill has made an excellent contribution to scholarship by pointing out the importance of the relation between missions and processions in the movement of the De Trinitate in both "St. Augustine's De Trinitate" 282-283 and Mystery, pp. 65-72. 21 De Trin. 2.3.5; CCL 50:85-86.


21

However, Augustine immediately grasps the difficulty of distinguishing this procession of the Spirit from the procession of the Son, although he realizes that he cannot yet tackle the problem: But whereas both the Son is of the Father, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, why both are not called sons, and both not said to be begotten, but the former is called the one only-begotten Son, and the latter, viz. the Holy Spirit, neither son nor begotten, because if begotten, then certainly a son, we will discuss in another place, if God shall grant, and so far as He shall grant.22

Augustine does not handle the problem here, because, as Edmund Hill points out, he is concerned primarily with the missions in books 1 to 4 and only later turns to the consideration of the processions.23 In books 1 to 4 Augustine is first of all engaged in expounding the missions (and especially the redemptive Incarnation of the Son) as the manifestation of the Trinity that lays the foundation of Christian faith. For without this faith it is impossible to enter into the mystery of the triune Godhead. Yet the interdependence between the two problems emerges once again at the end of book 4, when Augustine explains how the mission of the Holy Spirit reveals what the Christian should believe about the Holy Spirit (especially the doctrine of the filioque), although the entire Trinity accomplishes this mission indivisibly.24 Books 5 to 7 are usually taken as a distinct section of the De Trinitate, in which Augustine gives a dry, technical treatment of certain problems of theological linguistics raised by the Arians' objections to Catholic belief.25 Certainly Augustine indicates some sort of division between books 4 and 5 when he states at the end of book 4: The arguments of heretics must first be discussed and refilled, which they do not produce from the divine books, but from their own reasons, and by which, as they think, they forcibly compel us so to understand the testimonies of the Scriptures which treat of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, as they themselves will.26

It should be clear that Augustine connects the subsequent books to the first four by pointing out that these rational arguments are intended to yield exegetical rules by which the heretics can twist Scripture to any sense they choose. Augustine tackles the heretics on their own ground: he uses tradition22 23 24 25 26

De 7/7/j. 2.3.5; NPNF, p. 39; CCL 50:86. Hill, "St. Augustine's De Trinitate" 282-283. De Trin. 4.20.29-4.21.32; CCL 50:199-205. Even Hill regards them in this way; see "St. Augustine's De Trinitate" 282-283. De Trin. 4.21.31; NPNF, p. 86; CCL 50: 204-205.

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al philosophical concepts (mainly Aristotelian) to demolish their supposedly rational arguments. However, the scriptural texts and the theological language of the fourth century are very much present throughout these books, so that it is wrong to make too sharp a break between books 4 and 5. Furthermore, although the Arian argument refuted hi book 5 may be accurately characterized as an argument from reason, in books 6 and 7 Augustine deals with a problem that arises from the exegesis of a verse of St. Paul (1 Cor. 1:24). Although the problem leads Augustine into a lengthy discussion of essential versus personal attributes of God, these books are nearly as scriptural in substance and method as books 1 to 4. It is better to see books 5 to 7 as a stage in the movement of the De Trinitate, a stage in which Augustine begins to shift his attention from the first problem of the equality of the three Persons to the second problem about the procession of the Holy Spirit. In fact, the transition to the second problem gets under way in book 5. After Augustine has arrived at the admissible, if somewhat bare, orthodox formulation of "one essence, three hypostases or persons," he goes on to distinguish essential attributes of God, which can be predicated of the entire Trinity, from certain special attributes, which cannot properly be predicated of all three Persons. Here Augustine raises the problem of the personal name of the Holy Spirit, for the name "Holy Spirit" can be predicated essentially of God, who is spirit and is holy, as well as properly of the third Person.27 Thus, the problem of essential versus personal predication that occupies Augustine in books 6 and 7 is first raised by the difficulty about the name "Holy Spirit" which can be predicated both essentially and personally of God. We see here the transition from the first problem to the second. The equality of the three Persons allows us to predicate the essential attributes of all three Persons, but this equality must not be understood in a Sabellian sense. There are certain proper attributes that can only be predicated of one divine Person because they express a real relation that distinguishes one Person from another in God. In the case of the Holy Spirit, however, we have a problem, because the very name "Holy Spirit" can also be predicated essentially of the entire Trinity. Augustine devotes the remainder of book 5 to examining the name "Gift" as a proper designation of the relation that 27

De Trin. 5.11.12; CCL 50: 219: Trinitas autem filius nullo modo dici potest. Spiritu vero sanctus secundum id quod scriptum est: Quoniam deus spiritus est, potest quidem universaliter dici quia et pater spiritus et filius spiritus, et pater sanctus et filius sanctus. Itaque pater et filius et spiritus sanctus quoniam unus deus et utique deus sanctus est et deus spiritus est potest appellari trinitas et spiritus et sanctus. Sed tamen ille spiritus sanctus qui non trinitas sed in trinitate intellegitur in eo quod proprie dicitur spiritus sanctus, relative dicitur cum et ad patrem et ad filium refertur quia spiritus sanctus et patris etfllii spiritus est."


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really distinguishes the Spirit from the Father and the Son. In the course of his examination he once again raises the question of how we can distinguish the relation between Father and Spirit from that between Father and Son: "And here, too, that question conies to light, as it can, which is wont to trouble many, Why the Holy Spirit is not also a son, since He, too, comes forth from the Father, as it is read hi the Gospel."28 Augustine finds it very difficult to describe the substantial relation of the Holy Spirit, for the scriptural name "Gift" indicates the relation between the Spirit and the creatures to whom God gives Him, more than it reveals the relation of the Spirit to the Father and the Son, although it does show His procession from both Father and Son. In book 6 Augustine finally introduces his notion of the Holy Spirit. It represents an amazing step in the unfolding of the doctrine of the Trinity. Here he moves from previously accepted descriptions of the Spirit as the unity or communion of the Father and the Son to the designation of the Spirit as the love of the Father and the Son.29 In book 15 Augustine eventually gives a brilliant scriptural defense of this designation of the Holy Spirit. Although there is some precedent among earlier Fathers for naming the Holy Spirit as Love, Augustine is the first to make any significant use of this notion.30 From book 6 onwards, the theme of the Holy Spirit as Love comes to dominate Augustine's quest. Already in this passage we find the fundamental Augustinian vision of the divine Trinity: "One who loves Him who is from Himself, and One who loves Him from whom He is, and Love itself."31 All of the 28

De Trin. 5.14.15; NPNF, p. 94; CCL 50:222. De Trin. 6.5.7; CCL 50:235: The Son is equal to the Father and consubstantial. "Quapropter etiam spiritus sanctus in eadem imitate substantiae et aequalitate consistit. Sive enim sit unitas amborum sive sanctitas sive caritas, sive ideo unitas quia caritas et ideo caritas, quia sanctitas, manifestum est quod non aliquis duorum est quo uterque coniungitur, quo genitus a gignente diligatur generatoremque suum diligat." 30 For the patristic precedents of Augustine's notion of the Spirit as amor, dilectio, or caritas, see Schmaus, Trinitatslehre, pp. 371-372, and esp. Frederic Bourassa, "Theologie trinitaire chez saint Augustin," Gregorianum 58 (1977): 711. Bourassa documents earlier references to the Spirit as unitas or nexus of the Father and the Son, but the only evidence he gives for his claim that "certains theologiens comprennent la personnalite de 1'Esprit comme etant I'Amour mutuel du Pere et du Fils et lew unite dans la deite" is Augustine's own assertion in the short treatise Deflde et symbolo (9.19) that certain men had dared to identify the Holy Spirit inasmuch as He is the communion and common divinity of Father and Son, with the mutual love and charity of the Father and the Son. Who were these audacious quidaml Augustine certainly valued their contribution, and he uses this passage from the earlier work (393) in the De Trinitate. Perhaps it is a rhetorical device used to conceal the fact that he was himself the first to speak of the Spirit as Love. Augustine was still a newcomer to the ecclesiastical world of Africa in 393 and probably had to watch his step before this gathering of bishops. 31 De Trin. 6.5.7; NPNF, p. 100; CCL 50:236: "Et ideo non amplius quam tria sunt: unus diligens eum qui de illo est, et unus diligens eum de quo est, et ipsa dilectio." 29

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analogies for the Trinity that Augustine later examines are connected with this insight. Book 8 is commonly considered to be the beginning of the final part of the De Trinitate, in which Augustine attempts to discover an analogy for the Trinity in some part of the creation. In this sense it is the pivotal center of the work. Hill rightly sees book 8 as the opening of Augustine's consideration of the eternal "processions that constitute the inner heart of the divine mystery, and so the goal of Augustine's quest."32 Nevertheless, it would be wrong to view the De Trinitate as if it were a series of compartments on a train, connected only by an external corridor. As has already been indicated, books 5 to 7 do not so much form a separate unit in the work as provide a transition from the first books to the later ones. What is striking about book 8 is the continuity of subject and secondary motifs from book 7, although Augustine gives a decisive new direction to his search in the later book. We should begin by noting that the fundamental theme that provides the methodological procedure for the De Trinitate, the theme of the necessity of faith before vision, recurs in book 8.33 Here, however, it is woven together with the subject of love, which is developed from its first appearance in books 6 and 7 to produce eventually the first analogy for the Trinity: "he that loves, and that which is loved, and love."34 We have here a direct likeness of the divine Trinity of love that Augustine presented hi book 6. Furthermore, the search for an analogical likeness of the Trinity in the creature is anticipated in Augustine's discourse on the vestige of the Trinity at the end of book 6,35 and hi his increasing attention to the Son as Image of God, which he relates in book 7 to the all-important notion of man as the image of God.36 In particular, at the end of book 7 Augustine lays the foundation for the search for the image of the Trinity by giving the Trinitarian exegesis of Gen. 1:26: Both let us make and our are said in the plural, and ought not to be received except in terms of relative names. For it was not that gods might make, or make after the image and likeness of gods, but that the Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit might make after the image of the Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit, that man might subsist as the image of God. And God is the Trinity.37 32

Hill, "St. Augustine's De Trinitate" 282. De Trin. 8.4.6-8.5.8; CCL 50: 274-279. 34 De Trin. 8.10.14; NPNF, p. 124; CCL 50: 290: "Ecce tria sunt, amans et quod amatur et amor." 35 De Trin. 6.10.11-12; CCL 50: 241-242. The use of love as the analogue for the Holy Spirit, who is "non genitus sed genitoris genitique suavitas" (CCL 50: 242), should be noted. 36 De Trin. 6.2.3; CCL 50:230; 6.10.11; CCL 50:241; 7.3.5; CCL 50, pp. 252-253; 7.6.12; CCL 50:266-267. 37 De Trin. 7.6.12; NPNF, p. 113; CCL 50:266: "Et faciamus et nostram pluraliter dictum 33


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Finally, there is no break from the consideration of the topic of essential and personal attributes in book 7 to the pursuit of the operation of love as an analogy for the Trinity in book 8. In book 7 Augustine shows how the relationship of body and soul fails to yield a proper analogy for understanding the essential unity of the three really distinct Persons. Then in book 8 he says that we must turn inward to see if we may find some way to understand this threesome through the scrutiny of the highest point of our mind where we touch what is eternal and true.38 Augustine had a genius for shifting gradually from one topic to another in a way that does not draw attention to the change that is occurring. Thus in book 8 we move by an incredible transition from the somewhat abstracted, grammatical discussion of why the Trinity is not three greatnesses or three goods, to the seemingly unrelated investigation of the process of love. Yet on closer examination we see that this surprising move is really a very logical progression up the scale of being towards the mystery of God.39 Books 9 to 15 together constitute the authoritative text on the image of the Trinity, and without it medieval developments of the doctrine of the image cannot be understood. As we shall see, Bonaventure and Aquinas were both aware of the movement of this section of the De Trinitate, although Peter Lombard obscured its order in his Sentences. There are several stages in Augustine's investigation of man as an image of the Trinity, yet the entire search unfolds from the analogy of love in book 8 and is explicitly aimed at the solution of the problem concerning the distinction of the Holy Spirit from the Son by means of the notion of love.40 Because each man is the image of est et nisi ex relativis accipi non oportet, non enim ut facerent dii aut ad imaginem et similitudinem deorum, sed ut facerent pater et filius et spiritus sanctus ad imaginem ergo patris et filii et spiritus sancti ut subsisteret homo imago del, deus autem trinitas." The NPNF translation of nisi ex relativis has been changed from "except as of relatives" to "except in terms of relative names." 38 De Trin. 8.1.1-8.2.3; CCL 50: 268-271. 39 In fact, the De Trinitatem some ways resembles a musical composition, in which themes are introduced, developed, and repeated, interwoven one with another. H.-I. Marrou has noted this in his "Retractio" at the end of Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique, 2nd ed. (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1949), p. 667: "Saint Augustin precede comme un habile musicien qui fait entendre delicatement, mezza voce, confiee a une voix secondaire et executee par un instrument discret, 1'esquisse d'un theme qui va bientot faire 1'objet d'un developpement principal. L'auditeur n'y prend pas garde, mais quand ce theme reapparait, eclate au premier plan de 1'orchestre, loin d'en etre surpris, nous nous appercevons que nous le connaissons deja, nous le reconnaissons ... ." 40 De Trin. 9.1.1; CCL 50:293-294: "veluti nunc cupimus videre utrum ilia excellentissima caritas proprie spiritus sanctus sit." See De Trin. 9.2.2 for the triad of love as starting-point for the triad mens, notitia, amor, as at least one scholar has noted. See Richard Tremblay, "La theorie psychologique de la Trinite chez Saint Augustin," Etudes et recherches 8 (1952): 84: "L'esprit s'aime. L'amour et non le logos de saint Jean, voila bien le vrai point de depart d'Augustin."

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the Trinity, Augustine insists that we turn inward to consider the triad of love as it operates within that which is highest in man, mind (metis). However, the triad appears to break down in this case, because when the mind is considered as loving itself, that which loves and the object it loves are one and the same thing, leaving us only a dyad of the mind and its love. Augustine now draws on the great principle he had already elaborated hi his discussion of faith and love in book 8: nothing is loved unless it is first known in some way.41 With this principle he arrives at a triad of the mind (mens), its knowledge of itself (/lotftfa sui), and its love of itself (amor sui), which he proceeds to examine for its adequacy as an image of the Trinity hi terms of the consubstantiality and equality of its members.42 (For the sake of simplicity I will refer to this as the first Augustinian triad.) Thus it becomes clear that Augustine has not simply left behind the first problem of the equality and unity of the three divine Persons. However, he is more concerned with the opportunity this image of the Trinity affords us for understanding the procession of the Holy Spirit as love. In the rest of book 9 and most of book 10 he investigates the adequacy (and also the insufficiency) of the triad as a means of perceiving the distinction between the eternal processions of the Son and of the Spirit. Taking up the analysis of knowledge from book 8, Augustine shows how every act of knowledge entails the conception of an interior word from the form that the mind beholds hi the eternal truth, and how love always accompanies this conception or begetting of the word, joining it to the mind as medium and bond.43 Then, at the end of book 9 Augustine once again raises the question, "Why the Holy Spirit is not also to be either believed or understood to be begotten by God the Father, so that He also may be called a Son."44 By examining the process of knowing in the image of God that is the mind, Augustine distinguishes love as the desire or will that conjoins the mind and the knowledge born from the mind, from knowledge, which is the bringing forth of a word or image that is equal to the mind in which it was discovered or born. We cannot go into the details of this first major attempt 41

De Trin. 8.4.6; CCL 50:275: "quis diligit quod ignorat?" Cf. De Trin. 9.3.3; CCL 50:295-296: "Mens enim amare se ipsam non potest nisi etiam noverit se. Nam quomodo amat quod nescit?" Also, De Trin. 10.2.4; CCL 50:316: "neque omnino quidquam ametr incognitum, arbitror me persuasisse verum diligenter intuentibus." 42 De Trin. 9.4.4-9.5.8; CCL 50: 297-301. 43 Augustine sums up his first exposition of the pair of word and love in a passage well-known to the scholastic masters, particularly to Aquinas. See De Trin. 9.10.15; CCL 50:307: "Verbum est igitur quod nunc discernere et insinuare volumus, cum amore notitia. Cum itaque se mens novit et amat, iungitur ei amore verbum eius." 44 De Trin. 9.12.17; NPNF, p. 132; CCL 50:308.-


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to differentiate the two processions of the Son and of the Holy Spirit and the difficulties engendered by this conception, which Augustine confronts in book 10, but it is important to note that he returns in the end, in book 15, to the analogy of word and love. For reasons that are not clear, Augustine was not satisfied with the triad of mem, notitia, amor. Perhaps he found the perpetual circle of habitual self-knowledge and self-love too static and selfishly introverted. In any case, at the end of book 10 he selects a new triad (which we will call the second triad): memoria, intelligentia, voluntas.45 St. Thomas realized that this second triad of memory, understanding, and will was not meant to correspond precisely to the first, although there is a clear connection between the cognitive terms notitia and intelligentia and between the appetitive terms amor and voluntas. Augustine decides at this point that the perpetual self-presence of the mind makes it difficult to discern distinct acts of memory, understanding, and will when the mind is its own subject. Therefore, in book 11 he sets out to examine the corresponding triads that appear in the temporal processes of sensation and recollection (or imagination). Throughout this exposition he stresses the conjunctive role of the intention or will and remarks how the will is not related to the other two members of the triad as parent or as offspring.46 Augustine states clearly that the trinities in book 11 do not constitute any image of the divine Trinity because they belong to the outer man rather than to the inner man, with whom the image of God is found, as Scripture shows. In books 12 and 13 he moves towards the image of God by distinguishing the application of the mind's power of reason to the objects of temporal action and knowledge (scientia), from the pure contemplation of the eternal and unchangeable verities through wisdom (sapientia). Here he expatiates once again on the necessity of faith if we intend to ascend to the image of God and to the divine Trinity itself. Book 13 strikes a tone reminiscent of the first books of the De Trinitate inasmuch as it sets the development of the 45 This triad is given as the medieval theologians commonly referred to it, that is, as a set of three substantives, although Augustine himself usually gives verbal forms of the three when he speaks of this triad, as Walter H. Principe has shown: "The Dynamism of Augustine's Terms for Describing the Highest Trinitarian Image in the Human Person," in Studio Patristica, vol. 18, ed. Elizabeth A. Livingstone (Oxford and New York: Pergamon Press, 1982), pp. 1291-1299. Sometimes the third member is said to be amor or dilectio, especially when Augustine is considering the triad in terms of the object of its acts; for voluntas Dei does not normally convey the sense that God is the object of our will, but rather it usually means God's own will. Similarly, it is not usual to speak of "willing God" (velle Deum), and so we tend to find forms of amare or diligere Deum. 46 DeTrin. 11.5.9; CCL 50:345; 11.6.12; CCL 50:348-349; 11.9.16; CCL 50:353; 11.11.1; CCL 50:355.

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search for an understanding of the Trinity in the context of the drama of salvation history.47 In book 14, which is often considered to be the climax of the De Trinitate, Augustine finally returns to his second triad of memoria, intelligentia, voluntas, but in the context of the stage of the ascent to God to which wisdom, the contemplation of things eternal, brings us. Because man's mind is in some sense eternal inasmuch as his soul is imperishable, the selfpresence of the mind constitutes at both the habitual and active levels a true image of the Trinity in the triad of memory, understanding, and will. Nevertheless, he does not consider this triad a proper image of the Trinity in itself, only inasmuch as this triad makes man capable of raising his memory, understanding, and will to God Himself: This trinity, then, of the mind is not therefore the image of God, because the mind remembers itself, and understands and loves itself; but because it can also remember, understand, and love Him by whom it was made. And in so doing it is made wise itself.48

Augustine makes it clear that the image of God consists properly of the memory, understanding, and love of God, and that the memory, understanding, and love of self constitute a sort of potential image of God that is not the image in the full sense. St. Thomas eventually came to grasp this. Augustine ends book 14 with a meditation on the reformation of the image of God through grace to the glory of the heavenly contemplation of God. In a sense this is the dramatic culmination of the De Trinitate, although not in any way the proper ending of the work. One other important passage in book 14 should be noted. In chapter 7, which Thomas carefully studied in his later works, Augustine distinguishes between a habitual level of memoria, intelligentia, and voluntas, which can be basically reduced to the memory, and an active level in which intelligentia takes form as a word conceived in an act of thinking (cogitatio). Augustine insists that this active level of memoria, intelligentia, and voluntas more properly constitutes the image of the Trinity than the habitual level. The passage is worth quoting at length because of its importance for the development of Aquinas' doctrine: 47

Augustine himself notes the identity of subject matter in books 4 and 13, in which he considers the redemption of man in Christ, although with two different ends in mind: De Trin. 13.20.25; CCL 50A:418. 48 De Trin. 14.12.15; NPNF, p. 191; CCL 50A:442: "Haec igitur trinitas mentis non propterea dei est imago quia sui meminit mens et intellegit ac diligit se, sed quia potest etiam meminisse et intellegere et amare a quo facta est. Quod cum facit sapiens ipsa fit."


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For if we refer ourselves to the inner memory of the mind by which it remembers itself, and to the inner understanding by which it understands itself, and to the inner will by which it loves itself, where these three are always together, and always have been together since they began to be at all, whether they were being thought of or not; the image of this trinity will indeed appear to pertain even to the memory alone; but because in this case a word cannot be without a thought (for we think all that we say, even if it be said by that inner word which belongs to no separate language), this image is rather to be discerned in these three things, viz. memory, intelligence, will. And I mean now by intelligence that by which we understand in thought, that is, when our thought is formed by the finding of those things, which had been at hand to the memory but were not being thought of; and I mean that will, or love, or preference, which combines this offspring and parent, and is in some way common to both.49

Augustine argues that the image is to be discerned in the active level of the triad because the act of discursive thinking is necessary if our mind is to generate a word from its memory. Although he is only speaking of these acts in terms of the self as object of the acts, nevertheless, he again stresses the importance of the production of the word: And hence, when it (the mind) is turned to itself by thought, there arises a trinity, in which now at length we can discern also a word; since it is formed from thought (al. knowledge) itself, will uniting both. Here, then, we ought to recognize, more than we have hitherto done, the image of which we are in search.50

Clearly, Augustine has not lost sight of his primary objective: to discern in the mind an image of the Trinity that will allow us to distinguish the special character of the two eternal processions of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. 49

De Trin. 14.7.10; NPNF, p. 188; CCL 50A:434-435: "Nam si nos referamus ad interiore mentis memoriam qua sui meminit et interiorem intellegentiam qua se intellegit et interiorem voluntatem qua se diligit, ubi haec tria simul sunt et simul semper fuerunt ex quo esse coeperunt sive cogitarentur sive non cogitarentur, videbitur quidem imago illius trinitatis et ad solam memoriam pertinere. Sed quia ibi verbum esse sine cogitatione non potest (cogitamus enim omne quod dicimus etiam illo interiore verbo quod ad nullius gentis pertinet linguam), in tribus potius illis imago ista cognoscitur, memoria scilicet, intellegentia, voluntate. Hanc autem nunc dico intellegentiam qua intellegimus cogitantes, id est quando eis repertis quae memoriae praesto fuerant sed non cogitabantur cogitatio nostra formatur, et earn voluntatem sive amorem vel dilectionem quae istam prolem parentemque coniungit, et quodam modo utrisque communis est." 50 De Trin. 14.10.13; NPNF, p. 191, translation modified; CCL 50A:441: "Ac per hoc quando ad se ipsam cogitatione convertitur fit trinitas in qua iam et verbum possit intellegi. Formatur quippe ex ipsa cogitatione [al.: cognitione], voluntate utrumque iungente. Ibi ergo magis agnoscenda est imago quam quaerimus." Haddan and Shedd miss the sense of the gerundive agnoscenda when they render it "we may recognize" in their NPNF translation.

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Scholars of Augustine seem to have failed to grasp the significance of the last book of the De Trinitate, that is, book 15. It is easy to dismiss it as nothing more than a summary of the preceding books plus a concluding evaluation that gives a sceptical verdict on the entire enterprise of books 8 to 14.51 This view, however, fails to take into account the lengthy section on the processions of the Word and the Spirit that takes up the last two-thirds of book 15. Only one study I have read shows an awareness of the true significance of this final section.52 To understand the true function of book 15 in the De Trinitate as a whole, we should first observe that something is missing in book 14. For Augustine presents the triad, memoria, intelligentia, voluntas, in its highest form, in which man actively remembers, knows, and loves God, but he fails to give any real evaluation of this image of the Trinity as an adequate analogy of the Trinity. What we need to realize is that Augustine has reserved his assessment of the image for book 15; determining exactly how much the image can reveal of the mystery of the Trinity is the precise subject of the book. At the beginning of book 15 he states that we have found the image of God, but now we must see whether the image can really help us to understand that God is a Trinity: And whether this [uncreated nature] is the Trinity, it is now our business to demonstrate not only to believers, by authority of divine Scripture, but also to such as understand, by some kind of reason, if we can.53

Augustine thus declares that in book 15 he will sometimes draw on Scripture to demonstrate the eternal processions in the Trinity, but that he will also use the image of God that is man as an analogy for those who wish to seek some understanding of these processions. As he goes on to explain, we are meant 51 Schindler, Wort und Analogic, pp. 215-217, stresses this note of scepticism, by which Augustine supposedly reveals "die grundlegende Ungenauigkeit der Urbild-Abbild-Beziehung." Hill, "St. Augustine's De Trinitate," 283 surprisingly assesses book 15 similarly: "Finally, in bk xv Augustine admits in effect that this quest has failed—as he knew all along it would and must before faith gives way to sight, and as long as we are confined to looking for God and at God per speculum in aenigmate." 52 E. Hendrikx, "Introduction," to Augustine, La Trinite (livres i-vn): \—Le mystere, (Euvres de saint Augustin 15 (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1955), p. 20: "Le livre xv, enfin, est le fruit mur des expositions parfois laborieuses qui precedent, le couronnement de tout I'ouvrage. Augustin y reprend le dogme trinitaire et montre dans le miroir du Dieu un et trine qu'est 1'esprit de rhomme, les processions en Dieu des Personnes divines en tant que manifestations de la vie immanente de 1'Etre pur Esprit qu'est Dieu." 53 De Trin. 15.1.1; NPNF, p. 199; CCL 50A:460: "Quae utrum sit trinitas non solum credentibus divinae scripturae auctoritate, verum etiam intellegentibus aliqua si possumus ratione iam demonstrare debemus."


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to assume that no one will begin to understand the doctrine of the Trinity unless he first accepts it by faith. In the first section of book 15 Augustine gives a double review of his investigation so far. First, he gives a fairly straightforward summary of the work, describing the contents of each book.54 Second, he traces more intimately the development of the quest for a means of understanding what faith teaches about the Trinity. After showing that consideration of the essential attributes of God, which reason can attain through studying creatures, cannot demonstrate a plurality of Persons within God,55 he delineates tha path of his search through the various created trinities from book 8 to book 14 and arrives at the crucial question: In such a way, then, I say, as we see in all these instances most undoubted trinities, because they are wrought in ourselves, or are in ourselves, when we remember, look at, or desire these things;—do we, I say, in such manner also see the Trinity that is God; because there also, by the understanding, we behold both Him as it were speaking, and His Word, i.e., the Father and the Son; and then, proceeding thence, the love common to both, namely, the Holy Spirit.56

Here, then, is Augustine's formulation of the divine Trinity he is trying to discern through the created trinities: it is the processional Trinity of the Word spoken from the Father, and the Love proceeding from both. However, Augustine proceeds to deliver an apparently devastating critique of the adequacy of the image of God as an analogy for the Trinity.57 In addition to the more obvious discrepancies between the mind of man, which belongs to one person, and God who is three Persons, Augustine points out that memoria, intelligentia, and voluntas are really essential attributes in God, providing no proof of the distinction of three Persons in God. Thus as far as the search for understanding goes, we are once more confronted with the first, more general problem of the apparent contradiction between a complete equality between the three Persons and the real distinction of the Persons. It seems that we cannot find any attributes that signify the distinction of the Persons rather than Their essential equality. Yet, witnessing the collapse of his attempt at an analogical elucidation of the divine Trinity, Augustine still cries, "I seek Thy face evermore."58 Pausing 54

De Trin. 15.3.4-5; CCL 50A:462-467. De Trin. 15.4.6-15.6.9; CCL 50A:467-472. The explicit connection with book 7 and the problem of wisdom as an essential attribute that faith shows can be appropriated to the Son should be noted. 56 De Trin. 15.6.10; NPNF, p. 204; CCL 50A:473. 57 De Trin. 15.7.11-13; CCL 50A:474-479. 58 De Trin. 15.7.13; CCL 50A:479. 55

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to reassess his search to glimpse the Trinity through the creature, he reassures himself of the possibility of such an endeavor by invoking St. Paul's line, "We see now through a glass, in an enigma, but then face to face" (1 Cor. 13:12) and by interpreting it in terms of the image of God.59 According to Augustine, the phrase "through a glass" (per speculum) signifies the mirror-image of God that we are by virtue of our mind, while the expression "in an enigma" (in aenigmate) refers to the obscurity of this likeness. Therefore, these words offer encouragement because they show that in spite of the difficulty its obscurity causes us, the image of God is indeed a mirror through which we can glean some knowledge of that Trinity in which we believe. Augustine proceeds with renewed resolution to scrutinize man's mind as the image of God for a likeness of the Trinity. In a long section he studies the conception of an interior word in the mind as the best likeness of the eternal procession of the divine Word, and in an even longer section he examines the Holy Spirit in terms of the procession of love.60 Augustine seems to start from the beginning again, but he eventually makes reference to the triad of memory, understanding, and will. He has not rejected this highest triad, but he prefers to focus specifically on the generation of the word rather than more generally on the act of understanding. This shift of emphasis is immensely important for the development of Aquinas' teaching on the Trinity and on the image of the Trinity. We must understand the procession of the eternal Word not in terms of the act of understanding—an essential attribute in God—but in terms of the generation of a word within the mind. For in God the name "Word" is a strictly personal name, designating only the Son, never the entire Trinity. Augustine does not neglect the negative, "enigmatic" side of the likeness of the divine Word in our own word, but he does not allow his exposition of the dissimilarity between our word and the Word of God to give the lie to the positive analogy that he has demonstrated. In the section on the Holy Spirit, Augustine begins with a scriptural demonstration that the Holy Spirit is properly called Love and the Gift of God, in spite of the problem that love, like wisdom, is also predicated essentially of God.61 Thus he once more points out that in themselves the terms memoria, intelligentia, voluntas are insufficient to reveal the Trinity 59

De Trin. 15.8.14-15.9.16; CCL 50A:479-483. Augustine has used this Pauline verse a number of times throughout the work to characterize his search. 60 On the Word: De Trin. 15.10.17-15.16.26; CCL 50A:483-501. On the Holy Spirit: De Trin. 15.17.27-15.27.48; CCL 50A:501-530. 61 DeTrin. 15.17.27-15.19.37; CCL 50A:501-514.'


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unless we understand the triad in terms of the processions of word and love.62 Augustine is at his best in his exegetical demonstration that the Holy Spirit is specially named Love. He recapitulates the methodological movement of the De Trinitate first by giving this scriptural proof, then by providing a short refutation of an Arian attempt to disprove logically the Catholic faith, and finally by considering the likeness of the Holy Spirit in the image of God.63 In a general admonition, Augustine makes it clear that no one will perceive the divine Trinity in the triad, memoria, intelligentia, voluntas, unless he remembers, understands, and loves that triad, which is his very own self, precisely as a means to remembering, knowing, and loving God.64 In other words, we must first know by faith the Trinity we are looking for if we are to recognize its image in our mind as, in fact, an image of that highest Trinity. Augustine goes on to show that our will or love provides a certain likeness of the divine Love that is the Holy Spirit, but he also stresses the dissimilarity that obscures this likeness. Finally, he recalls the second problem of the De Trinitate, the specific difficulty concerning why the Holy Spirit cannot be said to be begotten; but he seems so discouraged by his repeated failure to provide an adequate solution that he almost concludes the work without making any further attempt. However, in the end Augustine offers a valuable solution that depends on the fundamental doctrine of the procession of the Spirit from both the Father and the Son (the basis of the filioque). He supports his argument with a quotation from an earlier sermon of his on the subject of the Holy Spirit.65 However, Augustine realized that his argument does not give 62

De Trin. 15.17.28; CCL 50A:502-503. At first, the refutation of Eunomius' argument (De Trin. 15.20.38; CCL 50A:515-516) that the Son is not consubstantial with the Father because the Father begot the Son by His will, not from His nature, seems out of place; but Augustine introduces it because he is trying to show that the Scriptural designation of the Son as "Son of God's love" does not mean that the Son is the Son of the Holy Spirit, but rather that "God's love" here means the essential attribute of love (or will) that is identical with God's nature or essence. Eunomius' argument, however, is the same sort of attempted logical legerdemain as the Arian argument presented in book 5. 64 De Trin. 15.20.39; CCL 50A:516-517: "De creatura etiam quam fecit deus quantum valuimus admonuimus eos qui rationem de rebus talibus poscunt ut invisibilia eius per ea quae facta sunt sicut possent intellecta conspicerent, et maxime per rationalem vel intellectualem creaturam quae facta est ad imaginem del, per quod velut speculum quantum possent, si possent, cernerent trinitatem deum in nostra memoria, intellegentia, voluntate. Quae tria in sua mente naturaliter divinitus instituta quisquis vivaciter perspicit et quam magnum sit in ea unde potest etiam sempiterna immutabilisque natura recoli, conspici, concupisci (reminiscitur per memoriam, intuetur per intellegentiam, amplectitur per dilectionem), profecto repent illius summae trinitatis imaginem." There are no parentheses in earlier editions, and there is no need to add them as far as the sense goes. This is an intentionally involuted passage, meant to indicate the circular act of introspection necessary for the image to perceive itself as image. 65 De Trin. 15.27.48; CCL 50A:529-530. The sermon forms part of his commentary on th Gospel of John. 63

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any analogical reason to help us understand what we believe about the Holy Spirit. At the very last minute, just before his final prayer to the Trinity for the strength to continue seeking the face of God, Augustine briefly sketches the solution to the problem of the distinction of the Holy Spirit's procession: Yet that light shows to thee these three things in thyself, wherein thou mayest recognize an image of the highest Trinity itself, which thou canst not yet contemplate with steady eye. ... but our thought is formed by that which we know; and there is in the mind's eye of the thinker an image most similar to that thought [al.\ knowledge] which the memory contained, will or love as a third combining these two as parent and offspring. And he who can, sees and discerns that this will proceeds indeed from thought (for no one wills that of which he is absolutely ignorant what or of what sort it is), yet is not an image of the thought [aL knowledge]: and so that there is insinuated in this intelligible thing a sort of diiference between birth and procession, since to behold by thought is not the same as to desire, or even to enjoy will.66 Whether Augustine was exhibiting modesty or also a certain wiliness, here, on the next-to-last page, is the adumbration of the solution that medieval theologians, especially St. Thomas, would develop to distinguish the procession of the Holy Spirit from the procession of the Word.67 For Augustine shows how the distinction can be understood analogically in terms of the difference between thought and will, between word and love. Thought entails the production of an image in the conception of a word, whereas will involves no such production of an image in the unitive procession of love. The Bishop of Hippo leaves it for his successors to develop this clue. Thomas does not give us a commentary on the De Trinitate of Augustine, but he was aware of its special character as a search for an understanding of the Trinity that begins from the Catholic faith. In order to understand his 66 De Trin. 15.27.50; NPNF, p. 227, translation modified; CCL 50A:532-533: "Ipsa [lux] tibi tamen ostendit in te tria ilia in quibus te summae ipsius quam fixis oculis contemplari nondum vales imaginem trinitatis agnosceres ... sed ex illo quod novimus cogitatio nostra formetur, sitque in acie cogitantis imago simillima cognitionis eius quam memoria continebat, ista duo scilicet velut parentem ac prolem tertia voluntate sive dilectione iungente. Quam quidem voluntatem de cognitione procedere (nemo enim vult quod omnino quid vel quale sit nescit), non tamen esse cognitionis imaginem, et ideo quandam in hac re intellegibili nativitatis et processionis insinuari distantiam quoniam non hoc est cogitatione conspicere quod appetere vel etiam perfrui voluntate, cernit discernitque qui potest." Migne's edition (on which the NPNF translation is based) has cogitationis for cognitionis in the two places I have italicized. Migne must be wrong, because Augustine always insists that cogitatio is the one cognitive act that cannot be found in the memory. Also, Haddan and Sheed for some reason ignore the superlative simillima, translating it simply as "resembling." 67 Most scholars overlook this final text on the problem of the Holy Spirit, but Sullivan, p. 146, and Trape, "Nota sulla processione," p. 124, notice it and appreciate its importanc


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own teaching on the image of the Trinity, which draws on Augustine's work as the outstanding exposition of the subject, it is important to have some idea of the structure and development of the De Trinitate. Several points should be mentioned in conclusion. In its form the De Trinitate is a continuous whole. Any reader who ignores the whole by looking too narrowly at a particular section will probably misunderstand what Augustine means in that particular section. Thus most scholars seem to have missed the importance of book 15, without which the work as a whole cannot be understood. Book 15, in fact, reveals that Augustine did not consider his search a complete loss. To the problems raised by the Arian heresy concerning the unity and distinction of the three divine Persons Augustine offers a solution in the analysis of the triadic image of God in terms of the two processions of word and love. It is these two processions, rather than the three members of the triad, that Augustine emphasizes in book 15 as the culmination of his search. In particular, it is the procession of love as a likeness of the procession of the Holy Spirit that is the central insight, so dear to the mind of Augustine, around which the De Trinitate develops. Medieval theologians, including St. Thomas, mined the De Trinitate for riches they found useful in their own work. We should not forget, however, that the work itself is a masterpiece, woven with a thematic richness that can fittingly be likened to a musical movement from the great compositions of Bach and Mozart. As we shall see, Thomas came to understand how the De Trinitate works as a whole and so arrived at a better understanding of Augustine's doctrine than his predecessors.

PART ONE

3

Thomas' First Exposition: The Scriptum super Sententiis

When St. Thomas first began to teach theology at Paris in 1252, he followed the prevailing custom of using Peter Lombard's Summa Sententiarum as his basic textbook. Lombard's text provided an excellent, systematic framework for a course of theology. As a bachelor of the Sentences (baccalarius Sententiarum), the apprenticed theologian was not narrowly bound to a strict commentary on the letter of the text, but was free to discuss at length various questions that arose from the text or bore some relation to it. For this reason the subsequent redaction of Thomas' course on the Sentences is not a proper commentary on the text and is more correctly entitled the Scriptum super Sententiis.1 Thomas gave a schematic analysis (divisio) for each of the standard chapters (distinctiones) of the text, and usually appended a concise explanation (expositio) of specific exegetical problems arising from the text. The ordered series of questions and articles reflects the new theologian's own thinking and the preoccupations of the theological world of his own day. The articles of the Scriptum are not merely formal exercises dictated by the format of the Lombard's text, but represent Thomas' own interests and insights. The ferment of speculation on the theme of the image of God that arose in the twelfth century was not without effect in the thirteenth: the topic was alive, and still a subject of controversy. The Sentences gave ample opportunity to the new theologian to try his hand at the exposition of the image of God. Peter Lombard gave special prominence to the conception of man as the image of the Trinity by opening his treatment of the Trinity at the beginning of his work with a sober presentation of the Augustinian teaching on the imago Trinitatis (bk. 1, d.3). Reflecting the richness of the concept 1 See James A. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d'Aquino. His Life, Thought, and Work (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1974), pp. 358-359. Fr. Welsheipl's view is that Thomas lectured on the Sentences for four years (1252-1256).

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THOMAS' FIRST EXPOSITION

of the image, the Sentences include two further discussions on the image of God in the distinctions on Image as a proper name of the second Person of the Trinity (bk. 1, d.28) and on the creation of man to the image of God (bk. 2, d.16). Fr. de Beaurecueil points out that Peter Lombard's inclusion of the theme of the image of God in his textbook guaranteed the theme a place in the development of systematic theology it otherwise might not have possessed.2 Nevertheless, Peter Lombard's separation of these different aspects of the image of God presented an obstacle to the unified exposition of the theme. De Beaurecueil has made much, perhaps too much, of the difficulties that this separation made for St. Thomas in his first attempt at the presentation of systematic theology in his classes on the Sentences. In book 1, distinction 3 of the Scriptum Thomas closely follows Peter's distillation of Augustine's search for a created analogue of the Trinity within the higher part of man's soul. It is not man that is the ultimate object Thomas is trying to understand in this section, but the divine Trinity, of which man's mind gives a certain reflection. In contrast, Thomas focuses on man when the Sentences later return to the notion of the image of God in book 2, distinction 16; for in this distinction Peter deals with the creation of man. De Beaurecueil stresses the opposition between the anthropological perspective of this section of Thomas' work and the Trinitarian focus of book 1, distinction 3. While one cannot deny the difference of aim between the two sections, it is more useful to observe how one section complements the other. A comparison gives the initial impression that there is almost no connection between the two treatments. For one thing, there is little mention of the Trinitarian character of the image of God in book 2. However, the connection of the two sections lies fundamentally in their common effort to explain how it is possible for man to be the image of God. The answer is the same in both books: man is the image of God according to the higher part of his soul, his intellect or mind. Thus in his analysis of the image of the Trinity in book 1 Thomas focuses on man and the structure of his soul as the immediate object of study, although his ultimate intention is to show how the structure of man's soul constitutes a real ontological basis for an analogy of the Trinity. Therefore, despite the different contexts of these two investiga-

2

See de Beaurecueil [ 1]:60: "Alors qu'on aurait pu reserver 1'etude de VImago Dei aux Commentaires de la Genese, ou laisser aux spirituels le soin d'en tirer parti a la maniere cistercienne, Pierre Lombard lui donne place dans un expose systematique de la doctrine chretienne. Sans cette option peut-etre n'aurions-nous jamais eu la question 93 de la la pars." This is perhaps an exaggerated view of the dependence of thirteenth-century theology on Lombard's text.


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tions of the conception of man as the image of God, the focus in both sections is on man and his nature as a real likeness of God. A. DEFINITION OF IMAGO The definition of "image" Thomas formulates at the beginning of the two discussions on the created image of God provides the most obvious material for their comparison. The definition proposed in book 2 reveals a clear development over the first attempt in book 1. Thomas devotes the three concluding questions (3-5) of book 1, distinction 3 to the study of the image of the divine Trinity. Of these, the first deals with the precise subject in which the image is located, while the second and third cover various points concerning Augustine's triadic divisions of the image. The first question (q. 3) contains a single article, which has been given a misleading title: "Whether the mind alone is the subject of the image."3 The article itself is not primarily concerned with the Augustinian concept of mind (metis), which Thomas does not even bother to mention in the body of the article. Thomas' real aim is to formulate a definition of "image" that will restrict the image of God to the higher part of the rational creature, where an image of the Trinity may be discerned among its faculties or habits. The article determines at what level in the order of created beings an image of the Trinity can be found. In the responses to the arguments it becomes clear that the image of the Trinity is found primarily in the faculties of man's higher part, the faculties of his mind (in potentiis mentis).4 In this article Thomas is more interested in these faculties and their relations than in an analysis of the concept of mens, and this preoccupation shapes the definition of "image" he formulates here. (In book 2, as we shall see, he is more concerned with the subject of the image rather than with its parts). Aquinas begins his definition of "image" by contrasting it (in terms of the general concept of likeness) with the notion of vestige he had explained in the previous question. According to the Augustinian tradition, every creature reveals its Creator inasmuch as He has left His mark or trace on it. This trace of God is metaphorically called a "vestige," from the Latin word vestigium, which means literally a "footprint." As Thomas has explained in question 2, a vestige is a likeness (similitude) of another thing, but one that is imperfect although it gives some knowledge of the thing of which it is the likeness.5 As 3

1 S«itd.3,q.3,a.l;p. 109. 1 Sent d.3, q.3, a.l, ad lm; p. 110. 5 See 1 Sent, d.3, q.2, a. 1, sol.; p. 100: Tria ergo considerantur in ratione vestigii: scilicet similitude, imperfectio similitudinis, et quod per vestigium in rem cujus est vestigium devenitur." 4

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a footprint reveals only the imprint of the man's foot and not his face, his heart, or his mind, so the creature, as mere vestige, shows us only the mark of God's creative action and His essential attributes. For the essential attributes of God belong to God by virtue of His essence, without regard to the distinction of Persons in God. In creation and in all operations ad extra, God works by the power identical with His essence and common to all three Persons of the Trinity. Therefore, creatures give us knowledge of the common agency and essence of God. Creatures by themselves give us no clear knowledge of the existence and character of the three Persons in God. The vestige of God gives a clue to the inner, personal life of God inasmuch as certain essential attributes are appropriated to the three persons of the Trinity. This connection, however, is not evident without the aid of divine revelation.6 We are able to perceive a trace of the Trinity in other creatures only when our eyes have been enlightened by faith to recognize this mark for what it is. In some creatures there is a higher level of likeness to the triune God: the likeness of the image (similitudo imaginis).1 Thomas devotes the second part (qq. 3-5) of his analysis and exposition of distinction 3 to the image of the Trinity. In his initial definition of "image," he repeats that "a vestige is a confused and imperfect likeness of some thing."8 An image is also a likeness, but it must be distinguished from a vestige by the greater perfection of its likeness. Aquinas expresses this difference in this definition: 6

Thomas does not distinguish the vestige from the image very clearly in book 1, distinction 3. An image is not necessarily a perfect likeness, but Thomas defines the vestige in terms of the imperfection of its likeness. It is more proper to speak of a vestige of the Trinity than of a vestige of God because the vestige in every creature is a more imperfect likeness of God as a likeness of the Trinity than as a likeness of God's nature and essential attributes. See 1 Sent, d.3, q.2, a.l, sol.; p. 100: "Et quia creaturae magis deficiunt a repraesentatione distinctionis personarum, quam essentialium attributorum; ideo magis proprie dicitur creatura vestigium, secundum quod ducit in personas, quam secundum quod ducit in divinam essentiam." In fact, we get a clue to the Trinity through the essential attributes, which are more clearly represented in the creatures. See 1 Sent, d.3, q.2, a.l, ad 3m; p. 100: "per vestigium non devenimus in cognitionem personarum, nisi valde confuse; quia per appropriata personis, magis quam per ipsarum propria, sicut patet ex littera. Appropriata autem sunt essentialia, quamvis similitudinem habeant cum propriis personarum." Thus only faith reveals the creature as a vestige of the Trinity, because only faith allows us to recognize that certain essential attributes can be appropriated to certain divine Persons, whose proper attributes are unknown as such to reason unaided by faith. 7 According to Thomas' analysis of the text of distinction 3, the section devoted to the discovery of likenesses of the Trinity in the created world is divided according to two classes of likeness, vestige and image. See 1 Sent, d.3, div. lae ptis text.; p. 89: "Hie ostendit Trinitatem personarum per similitudines in creaturis: et primo per similitudinem vestigii; secundo per similitudinem imaginis." 8 1 Sent, d.3, q.3, a.l, sol.; p. 109.


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An image, on the other hand, represents a thing in a more well-defined manner, according to all its parts and the arrangement of its parts, from which it is possible to perceive something of the inner characteristics of the thing (de interioribus rei).9 This first attempt to define "image" is more a description than a definition proper. However, it serves to distinguish image from vestige. The definition is also admirably tailored to the particular instance of image that Thomas is considering here—the image of the Trinity. For the insistence on a representation of the thing's parts and their relations already suggests that the image of God is to be found where there is a likeness of God that represents the three divine Persons and their relations of consubstantiality, distinction, and equality. In the following responses to the arguments of this article, Thomas applies this definition to show that the image of God is only to be found in those creatures that reflect the inner triune life of God in the highest faculties proper to the intellectual nature. This definition of "image" lacks precision on two counts (in contrast to the clarity of the definition in book 2, distinction 16). First, the phrase magis determinate ("in a more well-defined manner") suggests that the distinction between image and vestige is simply a matter of degree. Aquinas does not make matters clearer when, immediately after the definition of "image," he states that the image of God is found solely in those creatures that represent God "more perfectly" (perfectius) by virtue of their own nobility.10 Clearly, Thomas holds that the image of God exists in some creatures and not in others. Yet, this use of the comparative degree suggests that the line between them is not well-defined but a somewhat arbitrary division between greater and lesser degrees of similitude. After concluding that the image of God is found in angels and in man Thomas ends the solution by allowing that "other creatures inasmuch as they have a greater or lesser share in God's goodness come closer to the notion of the image."11 Nevertheless, to be properly called an image of God a creature must possess a certain nobility. There may be higher and lower ranks of nobility, but there is a definite break between nobility and commoner. Hence the division between image and vestige is not as vague as one might be led to believe by the imprecision of Thomas' definition. The definition reveals a second weakness in its description of the image in terms of the inner characteristics of its exemplar, for the phrase aliquid de 9

Ibid. Ibid. 1 Sent, d.3, q.3, a.l, sol.; pp. 109-110: "Alia autem, quae plus et minus participant de Dei bonitate, magis accedunt ad rationem imaginix." There is something odd about the comparative words in this sentence. 10 11

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interioribus rei ("something of the inner characteristics of the thing") is extremely imprecise. With the benefit of his other texts, we might assume that Thomas is referring to the form or essence of the thing. An image reveals more than the surface of the thing it represents; it reflects the inner essence of the thing. It would not be very precise to refer to the form or essence as (more literally translated) the "interiors of the thing." However, this odd terminology in the definition may be intended to fit the Trinitarian focus of distinction 3. In light of the context, Thomas may have considered that a particularly vague term such as interiora was preferable if the function of the image of God is to reveal not only God's essence but also the three divine Persons. St. Thomas gives a more sophisticated definition of "image" in distinction 28. The context is the discussion of the proper names of the divine Persons. According to tradition, the word "Image" was a proper name of the eternal Son, although certain patristic texts refer to the Holy Spirit as an image. Difficulty arose on account of the use of "image" to signify not only a certain divine Person, but also the divine essence. At the end of the text of distinction 28, Peter Lombard warns that sometimes the word "image" denominates the substance or essence of God rather than a divine Person.12 He quotes texts from Fulgentius (from De fide ad Petrum, mistakenly attributed to Augustine) and from Hilary as examples of this usage. Thomas devotes an entire question of three articles to these few lines of Peter's text. He distinguishes various senses of the word "image" in order to clarify our application of the word to God. It is the application of the word to God's essence that poses a problem: to speak of the divine essence as an image seems to imply that God's essence is a copy or imitation of some prior exemplar. Aquinas realized that a more careful definition of "image" was demanded to explain such use of language. In Thomas' new definition the key term is the word species. His inspiration—or occasion—for the choice of this word lay chiefly in one of the two definitions of "image" taken from St. Hilary of Poitier's treatise, De synodis. According to the form of Hilary's definition Thomas inherited, "an image is the species—admitting no difference—of the thing of which it is the image" (imago est ejus rei ad quam imaginatur, species indifferens}.™ Whatever 12

1 Sent, d.28, text.; p. 670: "Illud etiam sciri oportet, quia, cum supra dictum sit, imaginem relative dici de Filio, sicut verbum vel Filius, interdum tamen reperitur secundum substantiam dici." 13 1 Sent d.28, q.2, a.l, obj.l; p. 677. Hilary was preoccupied with the defense of the divinity of the Son against the Arians. His treatise De synodis is an explanation of the creeds and canons of various ecclesiastical councils of the years 341-358. One of the bones of contention was the correct significance of the title "Image" that Scripture gives to the Son. Hilary reports that the Council of Ancyra in 358 condemned a modalistic ("Sabellian")


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Hilary may have meant by the term species,14 for Thomas it evoked the philosophical concept of species (as connected with that of genus). Thomas accepts the sense of species proposed in an argument in distinction 28: "species does not concern the external parts of a thing, but rather it means the internal quiddity."15 This interpretation of the word species forms the basis of his new, more scientific definition of "image" in terms of the relation of imitation. It is a sign of his genius—he appears to be original here—that Thomas was able to formulate a scientific definition out of the various elements of Hilary's two definitions of "image."16 Every relation has a ground or fundament on which is based the reference of the subject of the relation to its term. When we use the word "image," we usually have in mind the subject of a particular relation. Thomas says that the relation between the image and its term, called its "exemplar," is a sort of imitation. To support this classification of the relation of imageness as a relation of imitation, he argues from a traditional etymology that derives identification of the Son with the Father that was based on the Pauline text that the Son is the "image of the invisible God" (Col. 1:15). In explanation of this canon, Hilary writes: "Exclusa est assertio volentium nominibus tantum Patrem et Filium praedicare; cum quando imago omnis, ejus ad quem coimaginetur species indifferens sit. Neque enim ipse sibi quisquam imago est; sed eum, cujus imago est, necesse est ut imago demonstret. Imago itaque est rei ad rem coaequandae imaginata et indiscreta similitude. Est ergo Pater, est et Filius: quia imago Patris est Filius; et qui imago est, ut rei imago sit, speciem necesse est et naturam et essentiam, secundum quod imago est, in se habeat auctoris" (PL 10:490b-c). Thomas uses both definitions of image found in this text, although his quotations are at times at variance from the original as we know it. 14 Probably Hilary uses species here in the derivative sense of a likeness, such as an image or statue. See Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1879), p. 1736. In classical Latin, the word species was synonymous with forma, and commonly referred to the outward appearance or figure of a thing. It also had a transferred sense of a quality that set a group of things apart, a kind, a particular sort—that is, a "species" as we commonly use the term in English. In this sense it was used by Cicero and Seneca to translate the Aristotelian term for species (eidos) as opposed to genus (yevoq). Hilary had little philosophical education, but from other passages it appears that he used the word species to mean something more than a mere external form or likeness, something closer to the intelligible form of the thing. However, it is difficult to read species as either "quiddity" or "form" in this particular line of Hilary. Unless one reads imago in the improper sense of the form or quality according to which one thing is the image of another, i.e., as the ground of the relation between the image proper and its exemplar. Which is precisely what St. Thomas does in this article. 15 1 Sent, d.28, q.2, a.l, obj.l; p. 677. 16 Among Thomas' immediate predecessors and contemporaries, only Albert in his commentary on the Sentences seems to anticipate this definition in terms of species. In d.28 Albert fails to use Hilary's definition with species, but in d.31 he uses Hilary's definition in formulating his own definition that points in the direction of Thomas' definition. See 1 Sent., d.31, a.6, sol.; Borgnet 26:10. The Franciscans seem to have judged—historically they were right—that Hilary's definitions were meant to apply to the Son as Image of the Father. So Sum. Alex, lib.2, no. 336, a.l, ad 1m; Quaracchi 2:409.

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imago from imitago (meaning "an imitation"), a substantive related to the more common noun, imitatio.11 The relation of imitation has its ground, according to Thomas, in the species or nature of the exemplar inasmuch as the image possesses a certain quality that makes it a sign of the exemplar's species. By specifying the ground of this type of imitation, Thomas arrives at a sort of definition of "image" according to common and particular notions (similar to the definition of a substantive according to genus and species): Now that in respect of which there is imitation is some quality, or form signified by way of quality. Hence, likeness (similitude} belongs to the notion of image. This is not sufficient, however, for it is necessary that there be some approach to equality (adaequatio) in that quality, whether according to equality or according to a proportion. This is made clear by the case of a small image, in which the proportion of the parts to one another is equal to that of the large object of which is is the image. Therefore, "approach to equality" is put into its definition. It is also necessary that this quality should be the express and proximate sign of the nature and species of the thing itself; whence we do not say that a person who imitates another in fairness of skin is the image of that one, but rather he who imitates according to the shape, or countenance (flgura), which is the proximate and express sign of the species and nature. For we see that the shapes of the different species among the animals are different.18

Thus the relation of imitation, in one sense, falls under the more general relation of likeness or similarity, for the ground of all relations of similarity is unity in some quality. Therefore, the subject of this relation of imitation, that is, the image, may be called a likeness (similitude). 17

1 Sent d.28, q.2, a. 1, sol.; p. 678: "ratio imaginis consistit in imitatione; unde et nomen sumitur. Dicitur enim imago quasi imitago." This etymology was employed in the 12th century by authors of various schools. See Javelet, Image et ressemblance, au douzieme siecle, de saint Anselme a Alain de Lille (Strasbourg: Letouzey 1967) 2:133, n. 50. Javelet quotes a text from the school of Anselm as an early case of this etymology in the 12th century: "'Ad imaginem et similitudinem suam. Imago dicta quasi imitago' (Glossa vocabulorum in Genesim, Clm 22307, 4v-5r).M 18 1 Sent, d.28, q.2, a.l, sol.; p. 678: "Illud autem respectu cujus est imitatio, est aliqua qualitas, vel forma per modum qualitatis significata. Unde de ratione imaginis est similitudo. Nee hoc sufficit, sed oportet quod sit aliqua adaequatio in ilia qualitate vel secundum qualitatem vel secundum proportionem; ut patet quod in imagine parva, aequalis est proportio partium ad invicem sicut in re magna cujus est imago; et ideo ponitur adaequatio, in definitione ejus. Exigitur etiam quod ilia qualitas sit expressum et proximum signum naturae et speciei ipsius; unde non dicimus quod qui imitatur aliquem in albedine sit imago illius, sed qui imitatur in figura, quae est proximum signum et expressum speciei et naturae. Videmus enim diversarum specierum in animalibus diversas esse figuras." The italicized word (qualitatem) should probably be aequalitatem. It makes little sense to speak of an approach to equality in a quality according to the quality. With the corrected reading there is a contrast between two degrees of adaequatio: strict aequalitas and proportio.


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In order to distinguish image from other sorts of likenesses, Thomas proceeds to specify this likeness in terms of the degree of unity in the quality necessary to constitute the likeness as an image. The image must approach equality with its exemplar with regard to the quality that grounds the relation of likeness. This adaequatio (or simply aequalitas, as Thomas usually puts it) with regard to quality may attain a strict equality of the image and the exemplar with regard to the quality, as in the case of father and son; or it may rest at some type of proportionality, such as exists between a painting and its object. It is interesting to note that Thomas may have found these characteristics of likeness and equality hi Hilary's second definition: "an image is a likeness inseparably united to a thing so that it may become equal with the thing" (imago est rei, ad rem coaequandam, indiscreta et unita similitude).19 There remains yet one more step in the specification of the image in order to set it apart from other sorts of imitation. An image cannot be merely any likeness that approaches equality, but must stand as an express and proximate sign of the exemplar's species. The ground of the relation of image is not any quality, but only a quality that can serve as the express sign of the exemplar's species or nature. A white shirt is like a white sheet in respect of its color, but we do not call one the image of the other. Shape or figure, however, is well-suited to serve as the basis of the relation of image, because a thing's shape is a clear sign of its species or nature, even when its shape is revealed in another thing, such as a painting or a statue. The ultimate ground of the image's likeness to its exemplar is the exemplar's species or nature itself, for shape or any other quality is not in itself the basis of the relation of image, but only inasmuch as it signifies the exemplar's species. Thomas is careful to describe the ground of the relation of image at the beginning of the passage translated above, as "some quality, or form signified by way of quality." In this way he makes allowance for the more perfect grades of image in which the ground of the relation of imitation is found not only in some quality that signifies the exemplar's species or nature, but also more directly in the species or nature itself, which the image 19 1 Sent, d.28, q.2, a.l, obj.5; p. 677. The incorrect spelling (coaequamdam) of the gerundive in the edition has been corrected here. The fifth argument of the article pits this definition against Hilary's other definition, but Thomas replies that the characteristics of likeness and equality from the second definition are included in the notion of species indifferens found in the first: "indifferentia speciei intelligitur et similitude et aequalitas, qualis ad imaginem requiritur; unde illae duae definitiones in idem redeunt" (1 Sent d.28, q.2, a.l, ad 5m; p. 679). It should be noted that Hilary's second definition is first quoted by Thomas in 1 Sent d.3, q.3, a.l, obj.5. The element of adaequatio is already singled out in Thomas' reply to this argument (1 Sent d.3, q.3, a.l, ad 5m; p. 111).

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of the higher grade shares with its exemplar, as we see in the case of father and son. Thomas adds one further note to his new definition of "image." Aside from the determination of the ground of this type of imitation, it is also necessary to point out that there is a certain order (ordo) between the relata. The exemplar is prior to the image.20 Thomas is careful to add that the word "image" is sometimes improperly applied to the exemplar. In his later works Thomas underlines this characteristic of an order between image and exemplar more forcefully in terms of causal connection. With this new definition of "image" in terms of a relation of imitation and its ground, it is easier to determine what things are in fact images and hi what sense we can speak of man or even God as image. To the particular problem raised in Lombard's text concerning the predication of the divine essence as image, Thomas could now reply that sometimes the word "image" is improperly applied, not only to the exemplar, but also to the ground of the relation of image, and even to its cause. Hilary's first definition of "image" is the prime example: "an image is the species—admitting no difference— of the thing ... ." As Thomas points out, the indifferentia speciei ("the lack of difference in species") is the cause or reason for calling something an image.21 However, a cause often comes to be called by the name of its effect. Hence as cause and ground of the relation by which we call man an image of God, the divine essence may also be designated as image. The divine essence can also be called "image" insofar as it is the ground of the relation of image between the Son and the Father. For the Son is the perfect Image of the Father on account of the perfect likeness, indeed the 20

1 Sent d.28, q.2, a.l, sol.; p. 678: "Ex parte autem imitantium duo sunt consideranda: scilicet relatio aequalitatis et similitudinis, quae fundatur in illo uno in quo se imitantur; et adhuc ulterius ordo: quia illud quod est posterius ad similitudinem alterius factum, dicitur imago; sed illud quod est prius, ad cujus similitudinem fit alterum, vocatur exemplar, quamvis abusive unum pro alio ponatur." This confusion applies to the word exemplar as well as to imago. Cf. the French "exemple," which can mean either the pattern or the copy. 21 1 Sent, d.28, q.2, a.l, ad 2m; p. 678: "ista definitio [Hilary's first] data est per causam: non enim illud quod est imago, est ipsa species in qua fit imitatio, proprie loquendo; sed indifferentia speciei est causa quare dicatur imago. Vel dicatur, quod utrumque potest dici imago, et illud quod imitatur, et id in quo est imitatio, quamvis non ita proprie; et sic definit Hilarius." Note that Thomas prefers to turn Hilary's phrase species indifferens into the more abstract notion of indifferentia speciei. In this way he designates the specific type of likeness that is the formal cause of the relation of imageness and also the specific notion that gives the full determination to the definition of "image." Properly speaking, however, it is the species (or its sign) which is the ground of the relation, the id in quo. Thus Hilary's term species indifferens may either signify imprecisely the cause or reason for calling something an image, the ultimate difference of every image, which is the indifferentia speciei; or designate the ground of the relation of imageness, which is the species of the exemplar, although it is improper to call the ground of imageness by the name "image."


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identity, of nature or essence between Father and Son.22 In the case of the image of God in certain creatures, God by His essence is not only the exemplar of which the creature is an imperfect image, but by His essence, especially considered as His goodness, He is also the ground of this relation, according to which the creature is made to the image of God. The creature imitates God by participating a likeness of God's essence.23 Comparison of Thomas' new definition with his earlier attempt in distinction 3 reveals the greater precision of the second definition. Whereas in distinction 3 it is stated that "something of the inner characteristics of the thing" are revealed in the image, in distinction 28 this function of the image is restated more clearly and succinctly in terms of the exemplar's species as the ultimate ground of the image's relation to its exemplar. With this well-defined criterion, it is easier to distinguish what is an image of a certain thing from what is not. There is now no suggestion of ambiguity, that it might be a matter of degree that separates the image from what is not an image. It is important to appreciate the stability that Thomas' new definition brings out in the conception of image. An image is based on a definite form or quality it possesses. Its stability rests on the invariability of its exemplar's species or nature, of which the image's form is the clear and express sign. By his new, more scientific definition, Thomas confirms the ontological status of the image as a thing that is truly related to its exemplar.24 When St. Thomas comes to discuss man as the image of God in book 2, distinction 16, he begins with a short definition of "image" that is simply an abridged version of the precise definition of book 1, distinction 28. An image is properly the subject of a specific kind of imitation. This kind of imitation is distinguished by its ground, which is "something that expresses the species and essence; on account of which it [the image] is called the 'species admitting no difference' by Hilary."25 Thomas appears to have been satisfied with the earlier definition. In fact, there is almost no new material in the first article of book 2, distinction 16, which is basically a rearrangement of 22

Thomas treats the particular application of "image" to the divine essence in the article that follows the one on the definition of "image": 1 Sent d.28, q.2, a.2; pp. 679-680. 23 1 Sent d.28, q.2, a.2, sol.; p. 680: "Si autem dicatur imago id in quo est imitatio, sic natura divina est imago, quia in ipsa est duplex imitatio. Una personae ad personam, secundum quod Filius in natura divina quam habet a Patre, imitatur Pattern. Alia creaturae ad Creatorem, inquantum creatura imitatur Creatorem, sed imperfecte, secundum aliquam similitudinem bonitatis ipsius." 24 It is possible that Thomas wrote his short treatise De ente et essentia about this time, and the improved definition of "image" in terms of species may be one of the fruits of preoccupation in this work with some of the basic concepts of metaphysics, including genus and species. Scholars date the De ente et essentia in Thomas' first years as Sententiarius. 25 2 Sent d.16, q.l, a.l, sol.; p. 397.

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material from the earlier article of book 1, distinction 28, where Thomas had defined "image" precisely. Here the material is adapted to answer the question, Can a creature be an image of God?26 Thomas repeats that an image need not possess the same species as its exemplar—it suffices that it possess some quality that is a sure sign of the exemplar's species. Thus as a statue is the image of a man, so man—or some other creature—can be the image of God. It is this important possibility that Thomas' definition of "image" allows him to assert in the first article of book 2, distinction 16, in order that we may better understand the truth of the words of Gen. 1:26, which stand in the authoritative, pivotal position of the first sed contra of the article: "Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram." Furthermore, comparison of the application of the second definition of "image" to man in book 2, distinction 16, with the use of the less refined definition in book 1, distinction 3, indicates that there was no fundamental change in Thomas' understanding of the image in the course of his lectures on the Sentences. The development in terminology between the two definitions is not the result of a supposed opposition between the Trinitarian focus of book 1, distinction 3, and the anthropological context of book 2, distinction 16. In fact, the anthropological context of book 2, distinction 16, had nothing to do with the formulation of the latter definition, for Thomas worked out this definition in book 1, distinction 28, as we have seen. The occasion for the development was simply the need for a clearer definition of "image" to explain the various applications of the word. The first definition is closer to a mere description than a definition proper, whereas the latter definition is expressed in proper metaphysical terms. The descriptive approach of the first definition was sufficient for the examination of the image of God in man as a representation of the Trinity; however, it must not be concluded that Thomas held a phenomenological view of the image of God in man in book 1, distinction 3. It is clear from his careful examination of Augustine's psychological theory of the image that he considered that the image of God has a definite ontological status in man's soul. The metaphysical terminology of his later definition simply permits Thomas to affirm more clearly the ontological status of the image of God in man when he comes to treat of the creation of man in book 2, distinction 16. His teaching remains constant from the beginning: the creature is the 26 According to the listing of the articles at the beginning of d.16, q.l, the subject of the first article is: "utrum in aliqua creatura imago Dei inveniri possit." Thomas sometimes says that the image of God is in the creature, or is found in the creature, but he also allows that the creature itself is the image of God. Thomas concludes the body of the article in such a straightforward manner: "et ideo creatura potest esse imago Dei, licet non perfecta" (2 Sent d.16, q.l,a.l,sol. ; p. 398).


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image of God on account of its intellectual nature, which is the express sign of the divine nature. B. THE STRUCTURE OF BOOK 1, DISTINCTION 3 The preceding section lays the foundation for the understanding of St. Thomas' doctrine of man as the image of the Trinity as he presented it in the course of the Scriptum super Sententiis. His chief discussion of this subject is occasioned by the extensive section on the imago Trinitatis in book 1, distinction 3, of the text of the Sentences. Following Peter Lombard, Thomas concentrates on the second of Augustine's psychological analogies for the Trinity, the triad of memory, understanding, and will, which was commonly interpreted as the three faculties (potentiae) of the higher part of the soul. The fundamental points of his teaching on the image of the Trinity in the Scriptum may be stated briefly: (1) The image of the Trinity is grounded in the faculties (if we can stretch the term) of the higher part of man's soul, his mind. (2) It is found in the faculties according to their lowest level of activity, that is, in the state of first act, whether or not first act is completed by second act in the full operation of the faculty. (3) The image of the Trinity functions chiefly as a static mirror-image that points to its exemplar by means of a likeness of analogy or proportion. (4) It exists by virtue of man's nature, and so remains permanently, whether he is in the state of grace or not. Underlying these propositions is the notion, supported by Thomas' more precise definition of "image," that the image has a certain stability: the image reflects the eternal, unchanging relations of the three divine Persons by mirroring the Trinity in the unchanging nature of man and his highest faculties. Thomas divides the text of distinction 3 into two parts. Distinction 3 deals with the knowledge of God that we derive from the created world, as opposed to the knowledge that is received on the basis of the authority of sacred Scripture and the Fathers, which is the subject of distinction 2. In distinction 3, Peter Lombard first presents a series of ways by which man may reason from created things to a certain knowledge of God's existence and His essential attributes. Next, Lombard shows that there is a likeness of the Trinity that can be discerned in every creature, although not without the aid of revelation.27 At this point Thomas divides Lombard's text: the remaining 27 1 Sent d.3, text.; p. 82: "Ecce ostensum est, qualiter in creaturis aliquatenus imago Trinitatis inducatur; non enim per creaturarum contemplationem sufficiens notitia Trinitatis potest haberi vel potuit sine doctrinae vel interioris inspirationis revelatione. ... Adjuvamur

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section, although far longer than the one that precedes it, is devoted to the consideration of the image of the Trinity found in man's mind. The real subject of distinction 3 is the knowledge of the Trinity we can gain from the rational observation of creatures. Therefore, Thomas divides the distinction in terms of the certainty of the different ways by which we can know the Trinity by means of creatures. Thus the first part of the text shows that creatures in general give us some certain knowledge of the unity of God and His essential attributes, but only a glimmer of the truth about the Trinity of divine Persons. In the second part, Lombard turns to the one creature that can give us a clearer understanding of the mystery of the Trinity: man, in whose mind a definite image of the Trinity is found. Although Thomas' own series of articles on the image of the Trinity is shaped partly in response to various problems current at the time of his lectures on the Sentences, his articles also reflect something of the substance as well as the order of the Lombard's text. First, Peter reversed the order of the two chief psychological triads of Augustine's De Trinitate, relegating the triad of mem, notitia, amor (from book 9) to second place. This reversal probably reflects the more systematic approach of the Sentences, hi which the heuristic movement of Augustine's work would have been inappropriate. It also reflects a desire to confirm the ontological status of the image of God. It was easier to assign a definite ontological status to the triad of memoria, intelligentia, voluntas. Peter asserts that these are natural properties or powers (vires) of the mind.28 The concern about the ontological condition of the Augustinian imago Trinitatis is connected with a slight, but important, shift in the understanding of the function of the image as a means to the knowledge of the Trinity. Peter attributes to the psychological image a certain value for Christian apologetics. It not only serves to elucidate what the Christian already believes, but it can also be used to help a person to believe that God is a Trinity of Persons. The psychological image of the Trinity is not an arbitrary concept of the theologians. It is really there hi every man's mind, and the rational examination of tamen in fide invisibilium per ea quae facta sunt." Peter usually reserves the term imago for the image of the Trinity in man, while he uses the word vestigium for the likeness of the Trinity common to all creatures. However, he is not always precise in his usage. 28 1 Sent d.3, text.; p. 84: "Mens enim, id est, spiritus rationalis, essentia spiritualis est et incorporea. Ilia vero tria, naturales proprietates seu vires sunt ipsius mentis, et a se invicem differunt." De Beaurecueil [1]:62 regards this text as an indication of a first step in the direction of an ontological interpretation of the Augustinian analogy: "Notons settlement le gauchissement vers une interpretation ontologique, lorsqu'on nous parle de naturales proprietates seu vires ipsius mentis. Ces expressions conviendraient mal au plan de la conscience ou se placait le docteur d'Hippone."


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the triadic image can make it easier for a man to believe in the Trinity.29 Lombard is quite aware that the dissimilarity between image and exemplar is greater than the similarity. Peter Lombard is not saying that there is rational proof that God is a Trinity of Persons, but rather that by means of the image of the Trinity reason can be led to join with faith in the ascent to the knowledge of the triune God. In his Scriptum super Sententiis, Thomas remains faithful to this view of the ontological status of the psychological image and its functional value as an effective sign of the Trinity. Aquinas' genius for scientific organization is evident hi his division of the second part of the text of distinction 3 (the part devoted solely to the image of the Trinity) and the subsequent arrangement of his own questions and articles on the subject. Thomas divides the text in three. First, there is the question of the "substance of the image." Next, there is a section—the bulk of the text, in fact—on "that according to which the image is noted." Finally, the text covers the function of the image according to which "it leads to the Trinity of Persons."30 We can discern in these three parts Thomas' usual plan for the scientific study of any entity. He begins with the question of whether the entity under investigation really exists (an sit?), then moves to the question of what exactly the entity is (quid sit?), and often concludes by considering the operations or functions of the entity that serve to perfect it.31 If we look at the brief enumeration that introduces the questions Thomas devotes to the image of the Trinity, we find a certain correspondence between them and the division of the text, which elucidates the scientific arrangement of Thomas' study of the image. The first question (q. 3) deals with the "subject of the image," whereas the following two questions (qq. 4-5) treat 29

1 Sent, d.3, text.; p. 87: "Mens itaque rationalis considerans haec tria et illam unam essentiam in qua ista sunt, extendit se ad contemplationem Creatoris, et videt Trinitatem in imitate et unitatem in Trinitate.... Intellexit ergo unum esse Deum, unum omnium auctorem; et vidit quia absque sapientia non sit, quasi res fatua; et ideo intellexit eum habere sapientiam quae ab ipso genita est; et quia sapientiam suam diligit, intellexit etiam ibi esse amorem. Quapropter juxta istam considerationem, ut ait Augustinus in lib. K De Trinit., cap. i, col. 961, t. vra, "credamus Patrem, et Filium, et Spiritum sanctum unum esse Deum ... .'" 30 1 Sent, d.3, div. 2ae ptis text.; p. 106. 31 The questions an sit? and quid sit? are the two basic questions we ask about a simple entity, according to Aristotle (Anal. Post, n, 1). However, Thomas often divides his investigations of particular entities into three parts, adding to the two basic questions a third concerning the operations that are consequent on the essence of the entity under study. Cf. Sum. theol. la, q.2, prol. and Sum. theol. 3a, q.l, prol. We may note a similar threefold division in the examination of a peculiar sort of entity, sacra doctrina. Thomas approaches the study of theology by examining it first as a science and asking (1) whether such a science exists, (2) what exactly is this science, and (3) by what method this science works. See J. A. Weisheipl, "The Meaning of 'Sacra Doctrina' in Summa theologiae i, q.l," The Thomist 38 (1974): 49-80.

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of "the parts of the image that have been enumerated."32 In fact, question 3, as we have shown above, simply demonstrates that an image of the divine Trinity does exist in certain creatures. Thomas shows the substantiality of the image by indicating that the image inheres in a real subject. In this question, contrary to the suggestion in the title, in which the word mens figures prominently,33 Thomas only alludes to the image as a triad of faculties in the mind in the replies to the arguments. The examination of the image proper is discussed in the following questions: does the image consist of faculties (q. 4) or of habits (q. 5)? In the course of these questions the function or end of the image as a sign of the Trinity is also revealed. Thomas follows the Sentences in its reversal of the order of the two Augustinian triads. He appears to have been aware of the structure and development of Augustine's De Trinitate, as we can see in his response to a confusion over the multiplicity of images that Augustine had proposed: Augustine means, that in respect of any sort of object there is an image in some sense, but chiefly in respect of that object which is God and that which is the soul. For he is seeking in many things a likeness of the Trinity, so that he may arrive at a perfect image.34

If Thomas was aware of the order of the two triads in Augustine's work, he chose to accept the reversal of their order because the order of science requires that the principal and best solution come first.35 Although Augustine is the chief authority for the doctrine of the psychological image of the Trinity Thomas examines in distinction 3, Thomas did not intend to turn his lectures into a commentary on the De Trinitate. His aim 32 1 Sent d.3, q.3, prol.; p. 108: "Ad intelligentiam hujus partis duo quaeruntur: 1° de subjecto imaginis; 2° de partibus imaginis enumeratis." It is clear that, of the following three questions, question 3 falls under the first question, while both questions 4 and 5, in which the two Augustinian triads are examined, are included under the second. 33 1 Sent d.3, q.3, a. 1, tit.; p. 109: "Utrum tantum mens sit subjectum imaginis." The titles are usually the addition of copyists and editors and often, as in this case, do not accurately indicate the content of the article. 34 1 Sent d.3, q.4, a.4, ad 2m; p. 121. 35 Thomas briefly explains Lombard's reversal of the triads in the single article devoted to the triad, mens, notitia, amor, "haec assignatio sumitur secundum essentiam et habitus consubstantiales; praedicta autem secundum potentias. Unde in ista non est tanta conformitas sicut in praedicta, nee ita propria assignatio: propter quod etiam ultimo ponitur" (1 Sent d.3, q.5, a.l, sol.; p. 124). Bonaventure's appraisal of Augustine's earlier triad is the same: "Unde Augustinus hanc assignationem primo ponit investigando, ut per hanc deveniat ad illam, in qua finit speculationem suam. Unde haec assignatio non est propria, sicut alia; unde Magister earn secundo ponit tanquam non principalem" (1 Sent d.3, p.2, a.2, q.l, resp.; Quaracchi 1:89). Thomas may have derived his explanation from Bonaventure's, for there is a great similarity between the two. Also, the word conformitas is a central term in Bonaventure's discussion of the image (see 1 Sent, d.3, p.2, a. 1, q.2, resp.; Quaracchi 1:83), whereas Thomas uses it nowhere else in this distinction.

THOMAS'FIRST EXPOSITION

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was to present the truth of Augustine's doctrine. Furthermore, it should be noted that Thomas does not even bother to expound the doctrine of the psychological image, for he assumes the readers' knowledge of its general features. In Thomas' eyes, the truth of Augustine's doctrine needed to be defended by an examination of the ontological reality of the image and of its ability to yield some knowledge of the divine Trinity. In light of this intention, Thomas devoted most of his effort to the investigation of Augustine's later and more satisfactory triad, memory, understanding, and will, while he briefly dispatched the earlier triad (mind, knowledge, and love) in the course of one short article.36 The text of distinction 3 of the Sentences taken as a whole suggests that there is a set of characteristics according to which the parts of the psychological image represent the Trinity of Persons in God.37 With regard to the preferred triad, memory, understanding, and will, both Thomas and Bonaventure note three such characteristics in their division of the text: distinction, consubstantiality, and equality.38 Thomas adds two more characteristics, order and actual imitation, when he enumerates the qualities according to which the psychological image, as a triad of faculties, represents the Trinity: As it was said, "image" means an express representation. Now an express representation exists in the faculties themselves on account of five things. Of these two have their basis in the soul itself, namely, the consubstantiality and the distinction of the faculties; and therefore, they remain unchanged with regard to whatever the objects may be. However, the other three, namely, equality, and order, and actual imitation, are related directly to the objects, so that they vary in relation to different objects.39

In this text, Thomas simply declares that these five characteristics are the basis of the relation of "express representation" that constitutes the triad of faculties as an image of the Trinity. These characteristics, with the exception 36 In contrast, Bonaventure's geometrical sense of balance leads him to devote the same number of articles three to each triad, even though he shares Thomas' opinion of the lesser worth of the earlier one. 37 Following Augustine's example in the De Trinitate, Peter Lombard judges the adequacy of the triadic image primarily in terms of the characteristics of equality and consubstantiality. 38 Thomas actually refers to these three as distinctio personanim, unitas essentiae, and aequalitas personarum (1 Sent, d.3, div. 2ae ptis text.; p. 107) whereas Bonaventure speaks of the "imaginis conditiones, quae sunt trinitas, unitas et aequalitas" (1 Sent, d.3, div. text.; Quaracchi 1:67). 39 1 Sent, d.3, q.4, a.4, sol.; pp. 119-120. Albert gives a list of characteristics which includes ordo-. "imago autem [ducit] aequaliter in processionem personarum ab invicem, et consubstantialitatem earum, et etiam aequalitatem, sicut jam infra dicetur, quando ostendetur ordo istarum virium, et aequalitas, et consubstantialitas" (1 Sent d.3, a. 19, ad 7m & 8m; Borgnet 25:118).

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of the last one, actual imitation, can be predicated truly of the divine Trinity. Consubstantiality, distinction, equality, and order characterize the relations within the Trinity. It is the attribution of these characteristics-all five of them—to the three faculties of the mind that are supposed to represent the three divine Persons, that poses a number of problems. There is a certain correspondence between these five characteristics and the five articles of question 4, in which Thomas resolves some of these problems. We can match the characteristics to the articles as follows. The articles are described as they are listed in the prologue of question 4: Art. 1: on the parts of the image—what each one is and how they differ

distinction

Art. 2: how they are related to the essencewhether they are the essence itself of the soul

consubstantiality

Art. 3: how they are related to each other, that is, whether one takes its origin from another

order

Art. 4: on these (parts) compared to their object, that is, in respect of what object an image of the Trinity is found in them

equality

Art. 5: on these (parts) compared to their acts, that is, whether the said faculties are always in act.40

actual imitation

The correspondence is not easy to discern in the cases of articles 4 and 5. Article 4 examines the three characteristics that vary with the objects that the mind is able to remember, understand, and will; but a close reading reveals that the article places greater emphasis on the characteristic of the equality of the faculties than on the other two (order and actual imitation). In the case of article 5, the correspondence can be accepted only if the interpretation of the phrase actualis imitatio as some sort of active state of the image's faculties is correct. In any case, it is clear that Thomas examines the Augustinian triad of memoria, intelligentia, voluntas in terms of these characteristics. We can already see that Thomas envisaged the image as a mirrored reflection of its examplar. It is primarily a relationship of proportionality, in which the likeness of image to exemplar is seen as the similarity of the relations among the parts of the image to the relations among the parts of the exemplar. Thomas does not entirely ignore the dynamic aspect of the image, for the inclusion of the characteristic of actual imitation along with 40

1 Sent, d.3, q.4, prol.; p. 111.


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the four static characteristics, as we shall see, interjects an element of the more active, functional side of the image. As we have seen, the general definition of "image" Thomas sketches in this distinction is especially apt for the case of the image of the Trinity. The static aspect of the image of the Trinity as a proportional representation is suggested by the reference in the definition to the parts of the exemplar and their arrangement, whereas the dynamic function of the image of the Trinity is a particular case of the general function of every image, which is to lead the beholder to a perception of the interior characteristics of the exemplar.41 Thomas seems already to have realized the importance of the active aspect of the image, but at this stage in the development of his thought, he faithfully follows the Lombard's emphasis on the static, proportional aspect of the image of the Trinity.

C. THE FOUR STATIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE IMAGE The first characteristic of the image of the Trinity that Thomas examines is the distinction of the faculties of the mind. Thomas seems to have considered this characteristic as the primary condition for the image of the Trinity. Even before examining it directly in article 1 of question 4, he refers to the distinction of the faculties three times in the responses of question 3. In the body of the single article that constitutes question 3, he proposes his general definition of "image." It is only in the responses to the arguments that he deals with the problems of the Augustinian identification of the human mind (mens) as the image of the Trinity. In the first four arguments it is claimed that the image of God may be found in creatures other than man or in other parts of man. Thomas concedes that there is some likeness of God in man's sense of sight (ad 1m) and in his faculty of free will (ad 2m). However, the likeness of God in these two faculties falls short of the "perfect likeness" that belongs to the image of the Trinity in man's mind. In both these cases, Thomas maintains that the perfect likeness of the image requires the distinction of several faculties.42 In the case of the angels (ad 4m), he admits that in the simple sense the angel is a more perfect image of the Trinity. However, in respect of the distinction of the divine Persons, man more clearly reflects the Trinity than does the angel, for 41

1 Sent d.3,q.3, a. 1, sol.; p. 109. 1 Sent d.3, q.3, a.l, ad 1m; p. 110: "in nullo esse perfectam similitudinem, sicut in potentiis mentis, ubi invenitur distinctio consubstantialis et aequalitas. Constat autem ilia tria in visu dicta non esse consubstantialia, et ideo solum in mente ponit imaginem." See also ibid., ad 2m; p. 110: "in libero arbitrio non potest esse perfecta similitude, cum non inveniatur ibi aliqua distinctio potentiarum." 42

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the faculties of man's mind are more distinct than are the faculties of the angel.43 Here Thomas seems to single out the one characteristic, distinctio, as the most fundamental characteristic of the Trinitarian image. Perhaps there is a connection between this emphasis and his stress on the distinction and arrangement of parts of the image in the general definition of "image" given in the body of this article. In the first article of question 4, Thomas attempts to prove that man's mind has three and only three distinct faculties, which are identical with Augustine's later triad of memory, understanding, and will.44 He assumes that Augustine's basic doctrine of the image is known: to each divine Person there corresponds one member of the psychological triad that constitutes the image of the Trinity in man's mind. There was no need for Thomas to explain that memory was meant to represent the Father, intellect the Son, and will the Holy Spirit. He does not question the fittingness of this correspondence, except inasmuch as there were doubts about the reality of some parts of the Augustinian image. In the first article of question 4, he investigates the ontological status of the three parts. It was necessary first to see whether the mind truly has three such faculties, each distinct from the other. For the blessed Trinity is three really distinct Persons, and the psychological image must first of all reflect the distinction of the Persons. However, Thomas was also concerned to show that there are only these three faculties in the mind, for otherwise Augustine's second triad would be an arbitrary selection among a larger number of the mind's faculties. There must be a one-to-one correspondence between the Persons of the divine Trinity and the faculties of the mind. The characteristic of distinction rests upon this correspondence, for distinction within the image can only exist where there is a definite number of parts and each part is really distinct from the others. Of course, the number of parts in the image of the Trinity must be three.

43 1 Sent., d.3, q.3, a.l, ad 4m; p. 110: "imago Trinitatis potest attendi tripliciter. Vel quantum ad expressam repraesentationem divinorum attributorum ... . Vel quantum ad distinctionem personarum; et sic expressior est similitude in homine quam in angelo, quia in angelo suae potentiae sunt minus distinctae." Thomas almost seems to say that the angel is the better image of the divine essence, whereas man is the better image of the divine Trinity. There was a very strong tradition that man is simpliciterthe most perfect created image of God, if not the only created image of God. However, the hierarchical ordering of the angels above man conflicted with this tradition, and Thomas always asserted that the angel is simpliciterthe more perfect image. 44 The title ("Utrum memoria pertineat ad imaginem") is patently misleading, for the article treats of all three parts of the image, although memory presents greater difficulties than intellect or will do. Compare the more accurate description in the prologue of question 4.


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In article 1 Thomas confronts a controversial problem of the scholastic psychology of the period. It was a matter of the precise understanding of the concept of a psychological faculty and the application of this concept to the three members of Augustine's second triad, especially to the first member, memory. De Beaurecueil and other scholars have seen in Thomas' handling of this problem a conflict between the theological authority of Augustine's theory of the image of the Trinity and the psychological doctrine of Aristotle and his followers.45 In fact, it is more truly a conflict between a particular interpretation of Augustine's psychological image and the Aristotelian psychology. As we have seen, Peter Lombard interpreted the triad of memory, understanding, and will as faculties of the mind, or more exactly as "natural properties or powers (vires) of the mind."46 With the increasing influence of Aristotelian psychology in the thirteenth century, the word potentia came to be used to designate these members of Augustine's triad. The transition to this Aristotelian terminology was well established by the time of Thomas' immediate predecessors in the Franciscan and Dominican schools. However, this shift in terminology gave rise to a problem for the interpretation of Augustine's triad, for it is difficult to apply the Aristotelian concept of a faculty, translated into Latin as potentia, to the first member of the Augustinian triad, memory. This difficulty became familiar as a well-known problem in scholastic psychology: how can there be a special faculty of memory at the level of the mind that is distinct from the faculty of understanding (or intellect)? There is no need to give a detailed account of the debate and Thomas' solution, but a few points should be observed. First and foremost, Thomas tried to remain faithful to the Lombard's interpretation of the Augustinian triad as three faculties or powers of the mind, and he did this by putting aside the strict Aristotelian notion of a psychological faculty. Whereas the Aristotelian faculty is always defined in terms of its proper act or operation, Thomas accepts a broader sense of the term "faculty" that appears to be inspired directly by Peter Lombard's equivalence of faculty and natural property. Thomas holds that memory, at the level of the mind, is different from memory at the level of the senses. The higher memory is simply the mind's power of retaining the intelligible species of the things it knows. However, 45

One of de Beaurecueil's chief theses is that there is a progress in the course of Thomas' works towards a more realistic view of the image of God in terms of Aristotelian psychology. See de Beaurecueil [ 1]:65: "L'evolution de la doctrine a travers I'osuvre theologique de saint Thomas peut d'abord etre caracterisee par un progres vers une conception realiste de VImago Dei, sous 1'influence de la psychologic aristotelicienne.". 46 1 Sent d.3, text.; p. 84: "naturales proprietates seu vires sunt ipsius mentis."

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this higher memory has no proper act or operation of its own, beyond the state of retaining the intelligible species.47 For the mind knows or understands these species by the proper act of the intellect, not of the memory. Therefore the mind's power of memory is not a proper faculty with its own operation; and it can be called a faculty only in the broader sense of a "property that follows upon the essence of the soul according to its nature."48 Memory is an essential property of the soul. It is a property that is accidental, not to one or another individual soul, however, but to all souls; for it arises from the nature of the soul itself.49 Thomas' interpretation of the image's faculties as "properties" seems to be directly related to Peter Lombard's phrase, naturales proprieties sen vires. In fact, the entire article appears to have been inspired by the particular line of the Lombard's text that includes this phrase, for the article is primarily a defense of his statement that those three things, that is, memory, understanding, and will, "are natural properties or powers of the mind itself, and they are different, one from the other."50 Second, it should be noted that Thomas reaches the conclusion that the mind must possess these three faculties and only these three, by demonstrating briefly their origin in the essence of the soul. The essential property of memory arises from the essence of the soul because the soul is a created thing that needs to be moved from a state of potentiality to a state of act in order to reach its perfection. The basic acts or operations by which the soul reaches its perfection are the acts of understanding and willing. In order to understand something, the soul must first receive the intelligible species of the thing. It may receive the species from the thing itself by means of the physical senses, but the soul may also receive the species without the assistance of the senses, for the soul has a certain power of retaining the intelligible species. We may refer to this power as a sort of memory. This 47

1 Sent, d.3, q.4, a.l, ad 3m; p. 113: "philosophi accipiebant potentias illas tantum quae ordinantur ad aliquem actum. Proprietas autem retentiva ipsius animae non habet aliquem actum; sed loco actus habet hoc ipsum quod est tenere." 48 1 Sent, d.3, q.4, a.l, sol.; p. 112: "omnis proprietas consequens essentiam animae secundum suam naturam, vocatur hie potentia animae, sive sit ad operandum, sive non." 49 Thomas distinguishes the essential property from mere individual accidents by referring to it as a "proper accident." This distinction is central to the solution of the problem of the relation between the mind and its faculties in the next article (a.2). 50 1 Sent, d.3, text; p. 84: "Illae vero tria [scilicet memoria, intelligentia, et voluntas], naturales proprietates seu vires sunt ipsius mentis, et a se invicem differunt." Note the textual parallel in the description of Thomas' first article in the prologue of question 4: "de partibus imaginisquidunaquaeque sit, etqualiter abinvicemdifferant" (1 Sent, d.3, q.4, prol.; p. 111). The article demonstrates Lombard's statement by showing that the three parts of Augustine's image have a real ontological status as natural or essential properties, and that they are distinct, one from the other.


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power is an essential property of the soul, for without it the mind would have no ability to think of a thing without the immediate presence of the thing to the senses. The faculty of intellect, which is a faculty in the narrower, Aristotelian sense as well as in the broader sense, follows causally upon the power of memory, for there naturally arises a knowledge of the species that the memory retains. Furthermore, the soul has a natural inclination to the thing it has come to know for the simple reason that it is the proper and fitting object that brings the intellect into act. Thus the soul must possess another faculty, the faculty of will, which arises from the prior faculties of memory and intellect. Thomas concludes by stating that "it is impossible to proceed further, for the will exists with regard to the end, because its object is the good, and the perfection of a thing does not extend beyond its end."51 Finally, the first line of the solution of the article has a special importance for Thomas' doctrine of the image of the Trinity in the Scriptum super Sententiis. It contains the key to the difference between his earlier teaching and the positions he came to hold in later works. The first line reads: I reply that it ought to be said that any property that follows upon the essence of the soul according to its nature is here called a faculty (potentia) of the soul, whether it is oriented towards operation or not.52 On the basis of this broader definition of "faculty," Thomas accepts the traditional interpretation of the Augustinian triad, memory, intellect, and will, as the faculties of the mind. He here gives the Augustinian image a definite ontological status as a triad of the essential properties of the mind. This is the first of the four points of Thomas' doctrine, which we outlined above. The other points follow easily from this most basic assertion that the image of the Trinity lies in the faculties of the mind. For Thomas understands the faculties as the proper accidents that follow by nature upon the essence of man's soul. The responses to the arguments of this article already make it clear that the image exists in man prior to the complete actualization of the mind's faculties in their operations, which are second, or perfect, acts, and prior to the elevation of man's nature by divine grace.53 Thomas cleverly makes Peter Lombard's simple phrase, naturales proprietates, the cornerstone of his first attempt at presenting the doctrine of the image of the Trinity.54 51

1 Sent d.3, q.4, a. 1, sol.; p. 113. See n. 48. 53 See 1 Sent d.3, q.4, a.l, ad 3m and 7m; pp. 113, 114. 54 Albert also seems to have realized the usefulness of Lombard's term proprietas as a key to the problem of the relation of the faculties to the essence of the soul. See 1 Sent., d.3, a.34, 52

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The second characteristic of the image of the Trinity, consubstantiality, is closely bound to the first characteristic, for no image would provide a suitable representation of the Trinity that did not reflect the unity of essence as well as the distinction of the three divine Persons. Thomas himself speaks, at one place, of the second characteristic as a quality modifying the first, when he says that the more perfect likeness of God that distinguishes the image from the mere vestige is based on the "consubstantial distinction and equality" of the faculties of the mind.55 The faculties of the Augustinian triad must be shown to have some unity in the essence of the soul so that the unity of essence that the Trinity of persons possesses may be adequately represented. Hence, in article 2 of question 4, Thomas investigates how the faculties are related to the essence of the soul.56 As Thomas has already indicated in the prologue of the question, article 2 deals with the question, "Whether these faculties are the essence itself of the soul."57 Thomas concentrates in this article on this philosophical problem, which he inherited from his predecessors, to the almost complete exclusion of any consideration of its theological context. The only apparent connection to the discussion of the image of the Trinity is the quotation of the Augustinian line from which the controversy arose: "These three are one mind, one life, one essence."58 In reply to this authoritative assertion, Thomas mentions the image, but nowhere else does it figure explicitly in his explanation. By Thomas' time the philosophical problem of the relation between essence and faculties in the soul had become very well delineated, and it needed no introduction and no indication of its relevance to the doctrine of the image of the Trinity. Excellent studies have been made of the history of this problem, from its origins in the text of St. Augustine to the opinions of the twelfth-century teachers and to the more precisely focused controversies of the thirteenth century.59 The short solution of the problem that Peter Lombard gives in the sol.; Borgnet 25:140; "Dicendum, quod in veritate vires animae proprietates sunt, sicut dicit Magister, et uno modo substantiates sunt, alio modo consequentes esse." 55 1 Sent d.3, q.3, a.l, ad 1m; p. 110: "sed in nullo esse perfectam similitudinem, sicut in potentiis mentis, ubi invenitur distinctio consubstantialis et aequalitas." 56 See 1 Sent, d.3, q.4, prol.; p. 111. 57 Ibid. The second clause in the description of article 2 gives the controversial form, while the first clause is a more purely scientific reference to the article's investigation of the image's characteristic of consubstantiality. 58 1 Sent, d.3, q.4, a.2, obj.l; p. 115: "Videtur quod essentia anima sit suae potentiae. Primo per hoc quod dicitur in littera: "Ista tria sunt: una mens, una vita, una essentia.'" Augustine means the triad of memory, understanding, and will. Lombard quotes this line in the text of distinction 3. 59 See Odon Lottin, "L'identite de Tame et de ses facultes avant saint Thomas d'Aquin," in Psychologic et morale auxif etxnf siecles, vol. 1 (Louvain: Abbaye du Mont-Cesar, 1942),


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Sentences (in book 1, distinction 3) is important because it helped to draw the problem to the attention of the Parisian doctors of the thirteenth century. About the time that they made the Sentences a classroom textbook, they were also beginning to make use of the Aristotelian psychology. Thomas' solution of the problem follows the general direction of the solution adopted by the early Franciscans and St. Albert, but Thomas' mastery of Aristotelian philosophical concepts permitted him to demonstrate the Franciscan position with greater adequacy. The early Franciscans had no adequate terminology to express their insight concerning the ontological status of the soul's faculties. They realized that the faculties were neither identical with the essence of the soul, on the one hand, nor merely accidental to the soul, on the other, but they did not have words to explain this. Thomas is able to demonstrate the precise ontological status of the faculties by his distinction between common and proper accidents. Common accidents are those accidents arising from the peculiar causes that form the individual of the species, whereas proper accidents are those belonging to all the individuals of the species because they arise from the causes of the species itself.60 The soul's faculties are accidents, because they are indeed as accidental to the creaturely essence of the soul as the operations of which they are the proximate causes; but they are proper accidents because they arise from the essence of the soul, not from the individuation of the species. For the soul has a natural inclination towards its completion by means of the operations that arise from its faculties, and so these faculties are proper accidents that always accompany the essence of the soul.61 Thomas allows that the faculties may be identified with the soul inasmuch as the soul is considered a potential whole (totum potentiate). The soul can be said to be the totality of the power (potential required to accomplish its various operations by means of those faculties or powers (potentiae) that arise from its essence.62 In this loose sense, we can say that the faculties of pp. 485-502; and Pius Kiinzle, Das Verhaltnis der Seele zu ihren Potenzen: Problemgeschichtliche Untersuchung von Augustin bis und mil Thomas von Aquin (Freiburg, Switzerland: Universitatsverlag, 1956). 60 1 Sent d.3, q.4, a.2, sol.; p. 116: "et ideo dico, quod sunt accidentia: non quod sint communia accidentia, quae non fluunt ex principiis speciei, sed consequuntur principia individui; sed sicut propria accidentia, quae consequuntur speciem, originata ex principiis ipsius." 61 Thomas' argument has far greater metaphysical force than solutions of his predecessors, including that of his teacher, Albert the Great. 62 Thomas, like Albert, applies the concept of totum potentiale (or potestativum) to this problem of psychology. Lottin, however, has shown that John of La Rochelle had anticipated Albert, see Lottin, Psychologic et morale 1:501. In fact, there is a reference to the faculties as partes virtuales sive potentiates in Alexander of Hales, Glossa in IV libros Sententiarum; 1 Sent d.3, no. 49; Quaracchi 1:66.

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the mind are consubstantial, for they are all rooted in the one essence of the soul. Thomas' solution in article 2 is a direct development from article 1, in which he conceived of the image's faculties as the essential or natural properties of the mind. In article 1, Thomas explains that the triad, memory, understanding, and will, is a set of faculties, if we understand the term faculty as "any property that follows upon the essence of the soul according to its nature."63 This notion of a faculty as a natural property is also the key to Thomas' solution for the problem of the relation of the soul's essence to its faculties. Thomas only needed to add that these properties are accidental to the soul. He does this in article 2 by speaking of the faculties as "proper accidents, that follow upon the species, taking their origin from its principles."64 There are important implications in this solution for Thomas' attempt to ascertain the ontological status of the image of the Trinity. The image of the Trinity reflects the consubstantiality of the divine Persons imperfectly. In one sense, the representation of the Trinity is accidental to the essence of the soul. Thomas does not seem to have been upset by this consequence of his solution.65 Perhaps he was already beginning to see that a precise proportionality between image and exemplar was not necessary and was not to be expected. The conception of the image of the Trinity as a set of proper accidents, the faculties of the mind, by which the soul is oriented towards its proper perfection, indicates that Thomas had already begun to realize that the image of God in man is connected to the operations by which man reaches his perfection. However, Thomas was not yet ready to follow these implications to their conclusions. In the Scriptum he contented himself by indicating that the consubstantiality of the blessed Trinity is reflected to some degree in the origination of all three faculties of the mind from the essence of the soul. The third characteristic of the image, which Thomas examines in article 3 of question 4, is order. Number itself implies order.66 In the divine Trinity 63

See n. 48 above. See n. 60 above. 65 He may have known that Augustine himself realized this fact, later interpretations notwithstanding. See Augustine, De Trin. 15.7.11; CCL 50A:474, where he admits that the image fails to represent the unity of essence of the three Persons inasmuch as man is one person to whom the three faculties are not identical, but merely belong: "Sed haec tria ita sunt in nomine ut non ipsa sunt homo." 66 Thomas states this principle of arithmetic, with its metaphysical application, at the beginning of the solution of article 3: "omnis numerositas, quae descendit naturaliter ab aliquo uno, oportet quod descendat secundum ordinem, quia ab uno non exit nisi unum" (1 Sent. d.3, q.4, a.3, sol.; p. 118). 64


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there is an order of origin, for the second Person proceeds from the first Person, and the third Person from the first and second. If man's mind with its three faculties is to mirror the divine Trinity, it must exhibit a similar order. Article 3 deals with the difficulty of discerning such an order among the three faculties. St. Thomas admits the premise of the first argument of the article—that all of the soul's faculties come into existence simultaneously at the moment of its creation. Therefore, there is no temporal order among the faculties. However, there is a natural order of the faculties.67 Thomas has already sketched this order in article 1: from memory proceeds intellect, and from memory and intellect proceeds will. In article 3 he gives an explanation of the dependence of one faculty on another. First, he gives the general principle that there must be an order among a fixed number of things that all arise out of one source. In the case of the soul and its faculties, Thomas has already shown that the faculties are proper accidents that arise from the essence of the soul. Therefore, they must arise in a fixed order in such a way that one faculty presupposes the existence and activity of another. An act of the intellect requires a prior act of the imagination, which presents the intellect with the phantasm of that which is to be understood. Sometimes, however, the intellect may simply draw upon the mind's faculty of retaining the intelligible species of things, as Thomas explained in article 1. Similarly, an act of the will only arises from an act of the intellect, for nothing is desired or loved unless it is known to us in some way.68 It is interesting to note the emanationist terminology that Thomas uses to express the causal dependence of one faculty on another. He speaks of the faculties as "flowing" or "going forth" from the essence of the soul and one from the other.69 Whatever the origin of such usage, these terms are highly 67

1 Sent, d.3, q.4, a.3, ad 1m; p. 118: "quamvis sint simul tempore, nihilominus tamen una naturaliter prior est altera." 68 See p. 26, n. 41 for the source of this Augustinian doctrine. 69 1 Sent, d.3, q.4, a.3, sol.; p. 118: "cum multae potentiae egrediantur ab essentia animae, ... cum omnes fluant ab essentia.» Fluere and egredi are the most frequently used terms, but procedere and emanare are also used occasionally. Cf. 1 Sent, d.3, q.4, a.2, s.c. 3; p. 116: "oportet potentias animae diversas esse ab essentia, utpote emanantes ab ipsa." Thomas retains these terms in the parallel articles of the Summa theologiae (la, q.77). He seems to use the phrase potentiae fluunt ab essentia animae as if it were a standard formula in the current discussions of psychology in his time. Terms such as emanare tend to make one think of a Neoplatonic origin for this formula. The use of this formula may also be found in Albert; as Kiinzle notes, the formula is the common terminology of master and disciple: "Die Vermogen gehen namlich aus der Wesenheit der Seele hervor, 'fliessen' aus ihr, was schon Albert immer wieder betonte" (Das Verhdltnis der Seele, p. 174). Defending his position that the faculties are not really accidents, but natural properties of the essence of the soul, Albert writes: "et ideo non est [potentia

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suggestive for the comparison of the mind and its faculties to the processions of the Trinity. In the Scriptwn, however, Thomas does not consider the image of the Trinity in terms of the two processions of the inner word and love in the human mind, although these are the closest analogues of the two divine processions, as he shows in his later works. The correspondence between the three faculties and the three divine Persons leads him instead to focus on the emanation of one faculty from another. Thomas does not examine the precise order of the three faculties of the mind in article 3. He waits until the next article to show that the order of these faculties in fact varies with respect to the objects of their acts. There is a natural order of the faculties which does not change. This order is related to the definition of each faculty in terms of the general type of object that determines the proper act of that faculty. However, in article 4, Thomas is explicitly concerned with the varying status of the image of God vis-a-vis the different objects that determine the operations of the mind's faculties. The operations of the faculties exhibit a different order depending on the particular type of object determining the operations. In the case of corporeal things, the act of intellect precedes the act of memory, for we must come to know such a thing before we have any memory of it. When it is the case of one's own soul or of God, the thing is already present to our mind in a certain way before we even begin to think about either of these incorporeal entities; and consequently we find an order of operations that is the same as the natural order of the mind's faculties. In this case the order of the faculties reflects the order of the divine Persons. The fourth characteristic of the image of the Trinity, equality, is connected to an active level of the faculties that constitute the image. In order to counter the errors of the Arians, Augustine devoted many pages to the demonstration of the equality of the three divine Persons; and consequently he considered it important to show that this characteristic of the Trinity is also seen in its image. What does it mean to say that the will is equal to the intellect, or the memory to the will? It is not a case of simple quantitative equality, for the faculties are themselves incorporeal qualities of the soul. However, the faculties are principles of the soul's acts, and so Thomas compares the naturalis] omnino accidens, sed propria passio fluens de principle substantiae: et sic se habent omnes vires animaeTad animam. Unde patet, quod non sunt accidentales, sed naturales proprie et immediate fluentes ex ipsa substantia animae" (Summa de creaturis, p. 2, tr. 1, q.8, a.2, ad 4m; Borgnet 35: 106). Avicenna may be the source of the notion of the faculties as natural properties emanating from the essence of the soul. For Avicenna's notion of the emanation of faculties, see Avicenna Latinus: Liber de anima sen Sextus de naturalibus IV- V, ed. S. van Riet (Louvain: Editions orientalistes; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968), p. 181.


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objective fields of their respective acts. We may then speak of the equality of two faculties if the power of one faculty extends over the same range of objects as the power of the other. Thomas asserts that this basic equality exists among memory, intellect, and will, for "whatever things are grasped by one faculty, are grasped by the other."70 Whether the object which is present to the soul is an external thing, or the soul itself, or even God, all three faculties are engaged in grasping the object. Thus the faculties of the image mirror the indivisible operation of the divine Trinity, in which the power of one Person has the same extent as the power of the others. In article 4 Thomas makes a distinction between this minimal, but basic type of equality among the faculties and a simple, more perfect equality. This distinction is examined in relation to a division between classes of objects. In one class belong all the things we come to know by means of acquired habit—everything that is external to the soul. When one of these objects is present to the soul, the three faculties are all engaged in grasping it, but not each to the same degree. Aquinas shows that the equality between the intellect and the will must be qualified in this case, for "it is not that whatever we understand, we will simply, but rather that in some way they are in the will, inasmuch as we will to understand them."71 There are many cases in which we come to know some external thing or person, but are not moved to love this thing or person. In these cases the simple act of the will, which is love, does not follow automatically on the simple act of the intellect. A simple equality with regard to the object does not necessarily exist in the case of these external objects, but there remains the minimal equality according to which all three faculties are always engaged together with regard to any object. With regard to the other class of objects, the simple equality between the faculties exists at all times. There are only two objects in this class: one's own soul, and God. Both of these objects are always present to the soul in a certain way. From this presence it follows naturally, as Thomas demonstrates in article 5, that the soul always knows and loves itself, and also always knows and loves God at a certain rudimentary level. In these cases, the object of the intellect also moves the will to its simple act of love. Not only is the will engaged by reason of the command it has over the functioning of the intellect, but the object, when known by the intellect, elicits the will's simple act of love. We are not only aware of ourselves at all times, but we also always love ourselves at this fundamental level. The object is present in such a way that it moves all three faculties to their simple acts. Thus there is a simple equality 70 71

1 Sent d.3, q.4, a.4, sol; p. 120. Ibid.

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among the three faculties because each faculty grasps the object by its own simple act. In article 4 Thomas also speaks of a different type of equality that exists in the faculties of the mind: the equality between the faculties and their object, as distinct from the equality between one faculty and another. It is curious that Thomas should consider this type of equality, for it exists only in the case in which the soul is the object of its own faculties. By equality between a faculty and its object, Aquinas means that both the faculty and the object possess the same ontological status in the hierarchy of beings. Corporeal things exist at a lower level than the soul and its faculties, while God occupies an infinitely higher position than the soul.72 Only when we consider the case of the soul as it knows and loves itself do we find such an ontological equality between the faculties and their objects. In article 4 Thomas concludes that the image of the Trinity is found in the soul in the highest degree when the faculties are turned to God as their object, although there is no equality between the faculties and their object. Thomas declares that this type of equality is not essential to the constitution of the image.73 If we compare this equality of faculty and object with the simple equality of faculty to faculty it is possible to discover why he considered the former insignificant. The image is supposed to reflect the characteristics of the divine Trinity. The equality of the three Persons is a very important characteristic of the Trinity. This divine equality is quite obviously mirrored in the equality that exists among the three faculties under certain conditions. The equality that exists between the faculties and their object has no correspondence to the simple equality of the three divine Persons. Why then did Thomas bother to mention this equality? First of all, his teacher, St. Albert, had already distinguished between these two different kinds of equality in the parallel passage of his Commentary on the Sentences, and he attributes this distinction to Augustine: But if it is the case of the equality of the image which is principally proved here, then according to Augustine it is necessary to say that we can note it in two ways: for either the equality is understood only according to the acts that go 72

Aquinas does not seem to include the case of another soul or an angel as object of our own faculties. However, he would probably include them in the first category of things that are learnt per habitum acquisitum. Thomas meant to include in the first category all things not naturally present to one's own faculties, and this comprehends angels and other souls as well as rocks and trees. 73 1 Sent d.3, q.4, a.4, sol.; pp. 120-121: "imago quodammodo attenditur respectu quorumlibet objectorum; verius autem respectu suiipsius, et verissime respectu hujus objecti, quod est Deus; nisi tantum quod deest aequalitas potentiae ad objectum, quae etiam non multum facit ad imaginem."


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forth from the faculties to the object, or according to the object and the faculty.74

Albert concludes that the second kind of equality is found in the image only if we consider the case of the soul as the object of the faculties. To this analysis Thomas adds that the equality of faculty and object is insignificant for the existence and perfection of the image of the Trinity. This development of Albert's distinction is a step in the direction of the more dynamic view of the image of God that Thomas holds in his later works. By concluding that the equality between faculty and object is not essential to the image, he opens the door for his later adoption of Bonaventure's notion of a conformitas between the image's faculties and their highest and most proper object, God.75 In the Scriptum Thomas does not give much thought to the relation between the image's faculties and their object because of his adherence to the traditional view of the image as a static, proportional reflection like the image produced by a mirror. In his later works he comes to view the image as a more dynamic imitation of the Trinity in which the soul is conformed to God through its activity. D. THE FIFTH CHARACTERISTIC: ACTUAL IMITATION The dynamic aspect of the image of God is not entirely absent from Thomas' teaching on the image in the Scriptum. The four characteristics already treated all show the static side of the image as a proportional, mirror-like representation. There is, however, a fifth characteristic, which Thomas called actualis imitatio, which adds a different element to his analysis of the image. Whereas each of the four previous characteristics is a property of the divine Trinity that the image's triad of faculties shares to some degree, the fifth characteristic is not properly a quality of either the exemplar or the image. Thomas places imitation in the category of relation. In distinction 28, he defines "image" in terms of imitation as a relation. Here in distinction 3 Aquinas speaks of a special kind of imitation, actual imitation, as a characteristic of the image of the Trinity. 74

Albert, 1 Sent, d.3, a.32, sol.; Borgnet 25:134: "Si vero attendatur aequalitas imaginis quae hie principaliter probatur, tune secundum Augustinum, oportet dicere, quod adhuc duobus modis potest attend!: aut enim aequalitas accipitur penes actus egredientes a potentiis super objecta tantum, aut penes objectum et potentiam." Albert saw that the simple equality between two faculties was really an equality between their respective acts. 75 Cf. Bonaventure, 1 Sent, d.3, p.2, a.l, q.2, resp.; Quaracchi 1:83: "Quoniam igitur, cum anima convertitur ad Deum, sibi conformatur, et im^go attenditur secundum conformitatem: ideo imago Dei consistit in his potentiis, secundum quod habent obiectum Deum."

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In article 4 Thomas includes actual imitation among the characteristics of the image that vary with the objects presented to the image's faculties. When the object is any exterior thing of corporeal nature, the characteristic of "actual representation of the Trinity itself does not exist there inasmuch as it intends those objects that do not express the Trinity."76 In contrast, Thomas asserts that when the object of the acts of the three faculties is one's own soul, then "the actual imitation of the Trinity itself is preserved there, inasmuch, that is, as the soul itself is an image that expressly leads to God."77 As for the case in which God is the object, Thomas makes the bare assertion that the characteristic of actual imitation is present, as if this assertion were self-evident.78 These three statements are all that Thomas says directly about actualis imitatio. Imitation is the name Thomas and his predecessors gave to the relation between the image and the thing it represents. In the phrase actualis imitatio it is the word actualis that distinguishes actual imitation as a characteristic of the image from the relation of imitation that constitutes the image. What Thomas may have had in mind is the active imitation the Greeks called mimesis. This imitation is something more than a relation of likeness or derivation: it is an act of re-presenting the original. It is significant that Thomas seems to use imitatio and repraesentatio interchangeably in distinction 3. An image is meant to lead to (ducere in) its exemplar. A painting does this by an arrangement of colors on a canvas. God cannot be adequately represented hi this way, of course. He can only be presented by a certain presence in the mind. Man is an image of God because God is able to make Himself present on the canvas of the human mind by this intentional presence. In the acts by which man catches hold of God in knowledge and love, man becomes a representation of God. Man thus makes God present in a new way and becomes an active re-presentation of God. If this interpretation is correct, it is then clear why actual imitation is a characteristic that depends on the presence of certain objects to the mind. Actual imitation occurs only when the exemplar is actively re-presented in the faculties that compose the image of God. Therefore, God must, directly 76 1 Sent, d.3, q.4, a.4, sol.; p. 120: "et ideo non est ibi actualis repraesentatio ipsius Trinitatis, secundum quod intendit illis objectis quae non exprimunt Trinitatem." In this case, repraesentatio is synonymous with imitatio, as it seems to be in other passages of distinction 3. Cf. 1 Sent, d.3, q.4, a.l, sol.; p. 109: "Et ideo in illis tantum creaturis dicitur esse imago Dei quae propter sui nobilitatem ipsum perfectius imitantur et repraesentant." 77 1 Sent. d.3, q.4, a.4, sol.; p. 120: "Servatur etiam ibi actualis imitatio ipsius Trinitatis, inquantum scilicet ipsa anima est imago expresse ducens in Deum." 78 Ibid.: "Si autem considerentur respectu hujus objecti quod est Deus, tune servatur ibi actualis imitatio."


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or indirectly, be the object of the three faculties if the image is going to have the characteristic of actual imitation. The soul must remember God, know Him, and love Him. In this way God is made present on the canvas of the mind's potentiality. This representation of God is most obvious in the saint, whose acts all tend to point to God. The saint is pre-eminently an icon of God that leads men to contemplate the God whom the saint makes present by the power of grace. Nevertheless, it is also possible for God to make Himself present in the faculties of the mind without turning a man into a saint. In the Scriptum Thomas argues for the position that God at all times is sufficiently present in the faculties of the mind to make man a representation of God according to all five characteristics of the image, including actual imitation. In article 4 Thomas claims that actual imitation occurs when the faculties are turned to the soul as the object of their acts, as well as when they are turned directly to God. When God is the thing present to these faculties, it is easy to see that God is being actively re-presented in the mind. However, God can also be represented by the soul inasmuch as the soul is the express image of God. When a man considers his own soul, he is making present to himself something that by its nature can lead his mind to God. As Thomas says, actual imitation exists in this case, because "the soul itself is an image that expressly leads to God."79 Such a mode of re-presenting God is indirect when compared to the case where God is the direct object of the mind's acts, but it suffices for actual imitation. On this point there was a gradual development among the masters of the thirteenth century. Actual imitation at first seems to have been restricted to the soul that turns directly to God, usually with the aid of grace. Alexander of Hales thought that the image exists only in a potential state when the soul considers itself.80 He also seems to have restricted the active condition of the 79 80

See n. 77 above. Alexander, 1 Sent, d.3, no. 34; Quaracchi 1:54-55: Traeterea, quaestio est utrum sit imago secundum quod vires referuntur ad Deum, vel secundum quod referuntur ad ipsam animam.... Respondeo: hie non est nisi una trinitas secundum unam comparationem animae, sed duplex secundum duplex intelligibile, quia ista vel sumuntur in ordine ad se ipsa, se apprehendendo, vel in ordine ad Deum. Secundum quod ad se comparantur, dicitur esse imago potentialiter solum; ut autem referuntur in Deum, est imago in effectu sive actu. Sicut aliquis apprehendit figuram secundum se primo; quando autem comparat ad aliud in quod ducit, actu fit imago; sic quae erat potentialiter imago in conversione sui ad se, dum actu convertitur ad Deum, actu fit imago.—Vel dicendum est quod in imagine huiusmodi consideratur discretio eorum quae sunt in imagine, et aequalitas eorum inter se, et relatio per imitationem ad rem cuius est imago. Discretio virium eadem est utrobique; sed quoad aequalitatem plus convenit ut sit imago secundum quod vires ad animam referuntur. Sicut enim Deus se cognoscit, intelligit ac diligit, sic anima se. Sed quoad" imitationem propter quam vel secundum quam facta est, magis est imago secundum quod ad Deum refertur."

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image to the realm of grace.81 In the Franciscan Summa fratris Alexandra^ phrase actualis imitatio is explicitly tied to the state of grace.82 Albert made a similar connection in one passage of his Summa de homine.*3 However, he also allowed for actual imitation at the natural level, but insisted that God must be the direct object of the faculties.84 In his Commentary on the Sentences Albert took a broader view: the soul actively imitates God when it directly touches God as its object, but also when it explicitly considers itself as the image of God. If it does not advert to itself as the image of God, the soul imitates God only in a potential or habitual way.85 Elsewhere in his Commentary Albert spoke of the actus imitandi as a characteristic belonging to the image most of all when God is the object of the mind's knowledge, but also when the mind itself is the object.86 In this passage Albert comes close to the position Thomas was to take. Finally, only two years prior to 81 Ibid.: "Ad praecedens vero dicendum est quod, cum dicitur imago secundum id quod potest esse particeps Dei, sicut posse dicitur dupliciter: secundum actum et habitum, sic imago dicitur dupliciter. Amissa ergo Dei participatione, est imago secundum habitum, licet non actu imitetur." Cf. Alexander, Quaestiones disputatae 'antequam esset frater', q.26, disp., memb.5, no. 23; Quaracchi 1:475: "Respondeo: Est imago [secundum] actum, et haec non est in peccatore, quia non iam imitate Creatorem secundum actum. Aliter autem dicitur secundum habitum, et haec dicitur in peccatore et in iusto." 82 Sum. Alex. lib. 1, no. 50, sol.; Quaracchi 1:77: "quae quidem gratia est similitude, qua anima est imago actu, id est in imitatione actuali." 83 Albert, Summa de creaturis, p. 2, tr.l, q.73, a.2, particula 1, qa.2, s.c.2; Borgnet 35:608: "Item, Imago dicite ab imitando: imitatio vero actualis non est nisi in actibus potentiarum animae, sicut etiam dicit Augustinus, quod meminit se, et intelligit se, et diligit se. Cum ergo actus non perficiant nisi virtutes, actualem imaginem magis faciunt virtutes quam gratia: ergo potius deberent dici imago recreationis quam gratia." The Summa de homine, from which this text is taken, is an early section of the Summa de creaturis. 84 Albert, Summa de creaturis, p.2, tr.l, q.73, a.2, particula 2, quaesitum 2, ad qa. 1 an 2; Borgnet 35:616: "triplex est imitatio, secundum actum scilicet, et secundum potentiam, et secundum perfectionem meriti. Prima est secundum verum et bonum quod Deus est tantum: quia tune tanta est intelligentia quanta est memoria, et tanta est voluntas naturalis quanta est unitas essentiae in tribus personis: eo quod Deus unus in tribus personis memoratur, intelligitur, et dilectione naturali diligite. Et haec imitatio secundum actum dicitur pro tanto: quia tune imago actu ducit in exemplar, et perfectius quam potest ostendit ipsum, eo quod idem est in imagine et exemplari. Secundum autem verum et bonum quod est ipsa mens, est imitatio secundum potentiam: eo quod tune potentialiter et non actu ostendit exemplar." 85 Albert, 1 Sent d.3, a.22, sol.: Borgnet 25:122: "anima per intellectum, memoriam, e voluntatem potest immediate ferri in Deum, et tune actu imitate et formate ad Trinitatem et unitatem. Aliquis etiam potest convertere se ad ipsas potentias prout sunt ex se invicem, et aequant se: et sic iterum tendit in Creatorem, sed incipit a creatura; et si quandoque noscendo se non advertit ut ab hoc ducatur in Deum, tune habitualiter vel potentialiter imitate." 86 Albert, 1 Sent, d.3, a.32, sol.; Borgnet 25:134: "imaginem duo perficiunt, scilicet actus imitandi exemplar, et aequalitas: et quoad actum imitandi magis est imago in notitia veri et boni quod Deus est, quam in notitia veri et boni quod mens est: quia in illius notitia actu intellectus conjungitur, in isto autem non habet Deum nisi sicut in speculo."


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Thomas, Bonaventure expressed a similar opinion on this point. There is a greater conformity between the soul and God, he said, when the faculties are turned to God, but the conformity is not lost when the soul considers itself because to be conformed to the image is necessarily to be conformed to the exemplar.87 Thomas is indebted to his teacher Albert on many points concerning the image, and among them should be included his reference to actual imitation. By the phrase actualis imitatio Thomas appears to mean the same characteristic that Albert expresses as imitatio secundum actum or actus imitandi. By these phrases both Dominicans mean the function by which the image leads the mind to God when its three faculties are directly or indirectly turned to God through their acts. Albert's work made it possible for Thomas to use the phrase without evoking its earlier connection with grace and the image of re-creation. Albert had weakened, if not completely severed, this connection. According to Thomas, the faculties of the image, inasmuch as they are directed to God through their acts, make God present in a way and lead the mind to the divine Trinity. Aquinas deals with one problem connected with the characteristic of actual imitation in article 5 of the question concerning the image of the Trinity in the faculties of the mind. According to tradition, the image of God is not completely destroyed by man's sin, but continues to exist at the level of nature in spite of the loss of grace. The image exists properly when it possesses the five characteristics, including actual imitation. Actual imitation, however, occurs only when the mind makes God present in a certain way by acts of knowing and loving God or one's own soul. Therefore, it seems that the image of God properly exists only when man knows and loves God or himself. If the existence of the image is continual, then it seems that the mind must be engaged in continual acts of knowing and loving God and the soul. In article 5 the arguments point out that this is problematic: we do not think about our own souls or about God at every moment, nor are we aware that we always love our own souls or God in an active manner. Aquinas inherited this problem from his predecessors, and his solution follows Albert's very closely.88 The problem, and also its solution, arise from Augustine's insistence that the mind remembers, knows, and loves itself prior to any inquiry or reflection concerning itself.89 Augustine likened the 87

Bonaventure, 1 Sent, d.3, p.2, a.l, q.2, resp.; Quaracchi 1:83: "Rursum, quoniam anima est imago Dei, et quod convertitur et conformatur imagini, et imaginato, ideo anima, secundum quod convertitur supra se, non recedit a conformitate; et ideo imago consistit in his potentiis, secundum quod habent animam pro obiecto." 88 Albert, 1 Sent, d.3, a.27; Borgnet 25:125-126. 89 See De Trin. 14.7.9-10; CCL 50A:433-435. Augustine's distinction between the inner

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pre-conceptual knowledge of one's soul to the sort of knowledge that a musician has of music when he is actually thinking about some other subject at the moment. He does not use the term, but this sort of knowledge is precisely what Aristotle called habitual knowledge. However, Augustine speaks of this knowledge as if it were active at some level of consciousness below the level of thinking, although he admits that it seems to fall under the heading of memory because we are not always aware of it. Augustine's unsatisfying remarks concerning this pre-conceptual level of memory, knowledge, and love stimulated inquiry in the thirteenth century. With the aid of Aristotelian psychology, the new masters attempted to describe these various acts of the faculties more accurately. Thomas seems to have had a clearer sense of the problem Augustine had raised than did his predecessors. Albert does not formulate the question with any precision, for his article is simply a jumble of distinctions between a number of different acts—knowing, understanding, thinking, discerning, and willing.90 Albert simply tries to show that each of the three faculties has its own proper reflexive act, which continues uninterrupted from the moment the soul is created. Thomas also wishes to demonstrate this in his own article, but he is aware that there is a fundamental problem: the existence of a pre-conceptual act of the intellect is dubious. Following Albert, he distinguishes the discursive acts of thinking and discerning, and dismisses them as intermittent as far as cognition of one's own soul or God is concerned. Following Albert again, Thomas asserts that there is a simple act of the intellect, understanding (intelligere}, which is nothing more than the beholding or intuition (intuitus) of the intelligible thing present in some way to the intellect.91 So far the master and the disciple are in agreement. Albert goes on to distinguish this simple intuition (which he calls intellectus) from the simple awareness (notitia) by which the memory also grasps the thing present in the soul.92 In contrast, Thomas shows no concern for this triad of memory, understanding, and will, and the more manifest triad of memory, understanding, and will that occurs when we think about ourselves, is very important, for he is more interested in the latter triad because of its greater usefulness for the exposition of the processions of the inner word and love. His medieval interpreters tended to stress the inner triad, and so they neglected the more dynamic character of the latter triad and its special connection with the processions of word and love. 90 Albert, 1 Sent, d.3, a.27; Borgnet 25:125-126. The title of this article reflects its lack of focus: "Quomodo differant haec quinque per ordinem, nosse se, intelligere se, velle se, discernere se, et cogitare se?" 91 Thomas, 1 Sent, d.3, q.4, a.5, sol.; p. 122: "Intelligere autem dicit nihil aliud quam simplicem intuitum intellectus in id quod sibi est praesens intelligible.... intelligere nihil aliud dicit quam intuitum, qui nihil aliud est quam praesentia intelligibilis ad intellectum quocumque modo." 92 Albert, 1 Sent, d.3, a.27, ad 1m; Borgnet 25:126: "memoria tantum novit retinendo


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distinction between memory and intellect in this article, and even equates the simple act of intuition in the intellect with the mere presence of the intelligible object, without considering in the slightest the confusion between memory and intellect this equivalence might cause. Instead, Thomas dwells upon the distinction between the simple act of the intellect and the discursive acts of the intellect, namely, thinking (cogitare) and discerning (discernere). This shift of perspective is indicative of Thomas' own discernment of the problematic nature of the simple act of intellect. Already a doubt had entered his mind: is there indeed such an act of the intellect, beyond or beneath the ordinary discursive acts of our intellect? To this question Thomas replies in the affirmative, although his hesitation is discernible. Thomistic exegetes have varied in the interpretation of this embarrassing passage. Embarrassing it is, for Thomas later (in the De veritate) refers to this pre-conceptual knowledge of one's own soul and of God as habitual knowledge, not actual.93 Gardeil attempted to explain away this passage of the Scriptum by arguing that what Thomas meant by this simple intuitus is really the same thing as the habitual cognition to which he refers in his later works.94 It may be true that the realities to which Thomas refers are one and the same, but Gardeil fails to explain why Thomas should have used such uncharacteristic language in the earlier passages. Lonergan suggests that Thomas may be referring to the mystical experience of God in this passage of the Scriptum, but dismisses this explanation as contrary to Aquinas' clearly stated thesis that this intuition of God pertains to the natural level of the image of the Trinity.95 Whatever the precise nature of the intuition, Thomas makes it clear in article 5 that he is referring to acts of the notitiam rei secundum speciem, vel secundum substantiam, si res per seipsam praesens est in anima, sed intellectus intuetur rem in notitia quae est species rei vel substantia ipsius si per se praesens est in anima." 93 De ver. q.10, a.8, resp.; Leon., pp. 321-322. 94 A. Gardeil, "La perception experimentale de 1'ame par elle-meme d'apres S. Thomas," in Melanges Thomistes (Le Saulchoir, Kain: Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques, 1923), p. 225, n.3: He remarks that the passage from 1 Sent., d.3, q.4, a.5, "ou S. Thomas parle d'une intelligence (intuitus) confuse d'elle-meme, qui ne quitte jamais 1'ame, n'est pas contraire a cette doctrine [of De Ver. q.10, a.8], car S. Thomas y declare que cet intuitus consiste en la simple presence de 1'intelligible a 1'intelligence quocumque modo. C'est reserver le mode de la connaissance habituelle." 95 Bernard J. Lonergan, Verbum: Word and the Idea in Aquinas (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), pp. 91-94. Lonergan rightly distinguishes between the Augustinian notion of 1 Sent, d.3, q.4, a.5, and the Aristotelian solution that Thomas introduces. The Aristotelian solution itself poses no problem, for it simply asserts that the soul is aware of the light of the agent intellect, and hence of itself, in every ordinary act of the intellect. This self-presence is not problematic because 'it does not posit any special act of the intellect beyond the ordinary ones.

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intellect, although he indicates that these acts are incomplete and indeterminate.96 In this particular case it is neither correct to assimilate the sense of this early text to later solutions of the same problem, nor to see a complete reversal of opinion in the adoption of different terms in later texts. Thomas does not often use the term intuitus to refer to human cognition.97 Usually he applies the term to God's simple act of knowledge. He almost always uses the word intuitus to mean a simple act of the intellect. Clearly the term is more applicable to the supremely simple act of God's intelligence than to the complex process of man's intellect. The complete act of our intellect cannot properly be called "intuition." However, Thomas distinguishes steps in the operation of the intellect, and in one text he notes two main stages that apply not only to man's intellectual process but even to the simple act of God's understanding: first, there is the "simple intuition of the intellect in the knowledge of the intelligible thing," but second, there is the "ordering of the intelligible thing to its manifestation" to oneself or to another person.98 According to Thomas, it is the word conceived in the 96 In the arguments of a. 5 it is clear that Thomas wants to know whether the faculties are always active (in actu) with regard to the soul and God. In the body he attempts to distinguish several acts of cognition—that he means acts seems to be indicated by his use of infinitives (cogitare, discernere, intelligere). He also uses the indicative mood in the conclusion to the Augustinian demonstration: "Sed secundum quod intelligere nihil aliud dicit quam intuitum, qui nihil aliud est quam praesentia intelligibilis ad intellectum quocumque modo, sic anima semper intelligit se et Deum, et consequitur quidam amor indeterminatus" (1 Sent, d.3, q., a.5, sol.; p. 122). It is true that Thomas nowhere in the body uses the term actus, and it is clear that by intuitus he meant a very rudimentary, incomplete sort of act in which the intentio of the knower is not directed at the thing known, nor is the thing known present in ratione obiecti. Nevertheless, the comparison of intelligere with the complete operation of the intellect, cogitare, implies that intelligere is some sort of act, however imperfect. 97 In the Busa index to Thomas'works, the word intuitus in all its forms takes up less than two pages. Only a few of the occurrences of the word involve the attribution of intuitus to man. In fact, in many of the passages Thomas explicitly distinguishes intuitus as a simple, complete act of the intellect proper only to God and the angels, from the discursive act of reason that is the complete act of intellect proper to man. There are a few texts (in the Scriptum, the D veritate, and the Summa theologiae) where Thomas speaks of the habitus known as intellectus, by which we grasp first principles, as a simplex intuitus of the principles. This is clearly a case of a habitual state of cognition, not an act. There seem to be only two texts where intuitus refers to a complete act of man's intellect, and this is the simple but complete act Thomas calls contemplatio, in which discursive reason comes to a halt and gives way to an intuitus of the simple truth. See Sum. theol. 2a2ae, q.180, a.3, resp.; Ottawa, p. 2309: "angelus simpli apprehensione veritatem intuetur, homo autem quodam processu ex multis pertingit ad intuitum simplicis veritatis." Cf.2a2ae, q.180, a.6, ad 2m; Ottawa, p. 2314: "ut scilicet cessante discursu, figatur eius [i.e., animae] intuitus in contemplatione unius simplicis veritatis. Et in hac operatione animae non est error; sicut patet quod circa intellectum primorum principiorum non erratur, quae simplici intuitu cognoscimus." In our article of the Scriptum, however, Thomas is not referring to the act of contemplatio when he speaks of intuitus, unless we wish to concede that all men are contemplatives from birth. 98 1 Sent, d.27, q.2, sol.; p. 655: "in operationibus intellectus est quidam gradus. Primo


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intellect that serves as the fundamental manifestation of what has been understood. Man's complete act of intellect requires this second stage, for there is no thinking without words. Intuition, the first stage of the intellect's act, is an incomplete act on the human level. Usually it does not occur without its completion in the second stage. However, Thomas seems to have considered that the simple presence of God or one's own soul to the intellect suffices to cause an act of intuition, even when this act is not completed by the conceptual or verbal stage of the intellectual process. He makes it clear that this intuition is not a complete operation of the intellect by explaining that the intelligible thing is present, but not in the role of object (in ratione objecti)?9 Nor does this act of intuition require that the soul consciously focus its attention on itself or on God.100 Aquinas explicitly distinguishes the act of intuition from the complete operation of the intellect in one of the responses to the arguments.101 We must conclude that he meant this act of intuition to be taken as an incomplete act of the intellect, not as an act in the more proper sense of operation. Evidently Thomas himself found the application of the term intuitus to the permanent state of pre-conceptual awareness of self and of God misleading, for he in fact dropped it and adopted the concept of habitus to describe this state.102 It is not that it was incorrect to use the term intuitus, for Thomas clearly states that he means by the term nothing more than the presence of the intelligible thing to the intellect. What was misleading was the ordinary sense inherent in the word intuitus according to which it is a simple, but also a complete, act of the intellect. enim est simplex intuitus intellectus in cognitione intelligibilis, et hoc nondum habet rationem verbi. Secundo est ibi ordinatio illius intelligibilis ad manifestationem vel alterius, secundum quod aliquis alteri loquitur, vel sui ipsius, secundum quod contingit aliquem etiam sibi ipsi loqui, et haec primo accipit rationem verbi; unde verbum nihil aliud dicit quam quamdam emanationem ab intellectu per modum manifestantis." 99 In both the Augustinian and the Aristotelian solutions of article 5, Thomas clearly states that the intelligible thing does not function as the object of the intellect's operation, that is, it does not determine a complete operation of the intellect. 100 1 Sent, d.3, q.4, a.5, sol.; p. 122. The complete operation of the intellect requires the direct advertence of the subject (intentio cognoscentis). 101 1 Sent, d.3, q.4, a.5, ad 2m; p. 122: Thilosophus loquitur de intelligere, secundum quod est operatic intellectus completa distinguentis vel cogitantis, et non secundum quod hie sumitur intelligere." 102 Thomas does not consider that the self-presence of the soul is properly characterized as a habitus, but he uses the term to indicate the state that makes the soul ready at any moment to become actually aware of itself. As Thomas says in De ver., q.10, a. 8, the soul is always present to itself by its very essence and does not require any additional habitus to dispose itself for the act of self-knowledge.

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However, it is precisely the active condition of the mind owing to the continuous presence of the self and God to the faculties that Thomas wished to maintain in his early work. For the five characteristics (and particularly the characteristic of actual imitation), which are the conditions for the existence of the three faculties of the mind as the image of the Trinity, are found only when the faculties are directed toward God by His direct presence or His indirect presence through the soul. However, a faculty of the soul cannot be directed to God unless it is put into act in some way by its object: otherwise it will remain in an inert state of mere potentiality without direction towards any specific object. Therefore, if the image of the Trinity is to exist permanently in the faculties of the mind, the faculties must remain continuously in some state of activity caused by the presence of God or the soul itself. Clearly this state of activity is not identical with the perfect operations of the faculties. At the root of the distinction between the incomplete acts of man's faculties, such as Thomas' case of intuition, and their perfect operations is the Aristotelian distinction between the actus imperfecti and the actus perfecti.103 The actus imperfecti always entails movement towards a completion that has not yet been reached. Into this category fall all those inclinations of man's faculties to their proper objects and all the subsequent movements of these faculties prior to their completion in the actus perfecti that are proper to man.104 The unceasing presence of God and the soul to the mind's faculties 103 See De pot. q.10, a.l, resp.; Marietti, p. 254: "si largo modo accipiamus motum pro qualibet operatione, sicut Philosophus accipit in m de Animo, ubi dicitur, quod sentire et intelligere sunt motus quidam, non quidem motus qui est actus imperfecti, ut definitur HI Physic., sed motus qui est actus perfecti." Cf. the exposition of this distinction in Lonergan, Verbum, pp. 101-106. Also, it is interesting to note that Thomas uses this distinction in a text that comes right after his 1 Sent d.3. See 1 Sent, d.4, q. 1, a.l, ad 1m; p. 132: "Differt autem operatic a motu, secundum Philosophum, Ethic, v, cap. iv, v, et vi, quia operatio est actus perfecti, sed motus est actus imperfecti, quia existentis in potentia." 104 It is easy to understand that the natural inclination of the will to its object is a sort of movement. See Sum. theol. la, q.5, a.4, ad 1m; Ottawa, p. 30: "appetitus est quasi quidam motus ad rem." However, the faculties of intellect and sense also have a natural inclination to their object, apart from the application the will commands. See Q. d. de animo, a. 13, ad llm; Robb, p. 194: "intellectus quidem naturaliter appetit intelligibile ut est intelligibile. Appetit enim naturaliter intellectus intelligere et sensus sentire." A good explanation of the two senses of the word actus in Aquinas' psychology is found in William R. O'Connor, The Eternal Quest: The Teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas on the Natural Desire for GW(New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1947), pp. 113-116. He is concerned with the acts of the will, but the distinction between imperfect and perfect act applies to the acts of the intellect also. See esp. p. 113: "The act of the will when it moves towards its end is not an act in the same sense that the free act of choice of means to the end is an act. The former is the imperfect act of movement; while the latter is the perfect act of operation. ... Natural appetite is never the complete and perfect act, which is the operation or activity that is exercised by a power. It is always the incomplete and imperfect act of motus; a movement that the agent suffers rather than actively causes."


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suffices to establish this initial movement towards God. In the Scriptum Thomas defends the permanence of the image of the Trinity by arguing from the continuous state of this imperfect activity that exists in the three faculties. From the development of Aquinas' teaching on the image of the Trinity in his later writings, it is possible to discern the conflicting tendencies at work in his first attempt to formulate his teaching. In the Scriptum Thomas accepts the traditional scholastic view that the enduring image of the Trinity, defaced but not destroyed by sin, lies in the three faculties of the mind. However, he seems already to be aware that the image could not simply be considered as a completely static representation of the Trinity, like a picture on the wall. He may already have realized that St. Augustine, the great authority on the image of the Trinity, himself preferred to speak of the acts of these three faculties when he referred to the triad of memory, understanding, and will.105 Whatever the reason, Thomas' insistence on some sort of active state of the faculties that make up the image is evident in his use of the term actualis imitatio and in the attention he gives to the problem of a continuous activity directed towards God. However, Thomas had not yet come to see the image of the Trinity in terms of the two processions in God. This probably reflected a lack of full appreciation of Augustine's text at the tune. It must be remembered that the plan of the Sentences dictated a treatment of the image of the Trinity before the commentator had had the chance to expound the doctrine of the Trinity itself. It is likely that a better knowledge of Augustine's De Trinitate, with its conclusion in favor of the psychological analogy of the two processions, eventually led Thomas to shift from the conception of the image in terms of faculties to an understanding of it hi terms of complete operations. In the Scriptum he followed his predecessors in examining the image according to a list of characteristics that brings out mostly the static relations between the three faculties. This method must have hampered any attempt to see the image in terms of a more fully active state of the mind. Among these characteristics actual imitation provided Thomas with his only opportunity to expand on the dynamic aspect of the image at this stage of his teaching.

105

See Walter Principe, "Dynamism of Augustine's Terms for Describing the Highest Trinitarian Image in the Human Person," in Stadia Patristica, vol. 18, ed. Elizabeth A. Livingstone (Oxford and New York: Pergamon Press, 1982), pp. 1291-1299, in which he shows that Augustine uses the verbal forms related to the words memoria, intelligentia, voluntas more often than the nouns themselves. He sees this as proof that Augustine conceived of the highest form of the image of the Trinity in terms of the dynamism of man's activity.

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E. GRACE AND THE INDWELLING OF THE TRINITY From this examination of the text of the Scriptum it is clear that the fundamental assumption of St. Thomas' earliest exposition of the doctrine of the image of the Trinity is that the image is an enduring reality in man. St. Augustine had cast doubt on the permanence of the image of God in his earlier works, but later came to hold the common opinion of the Fathers that the image of God remains in man's mind, although it is terribly defaced by sin.106 It seems that even the authority of Augustine did not lay to rest the doubt that sin could unmake the image of God. Thomas directly faces this difficulty in the exposition at the end of distinction 3, where he expounds a text from Augustine: "Even in the mind itself, before it participates God, His image is found; although it is deformed when the participation of God is lost, the image of God nevertheless remains." AGAINST: Ps. 72:20: "O Lord, in thy city thou shalt bring their image to nothing."—It ought to be said that, as the Gloss says on the verse of Psalm 4, "The light of thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us," the image of God in man is threefold. There is the image of creation, which is reason, inasmuch as it approximates the imitation of God's intellectual nature; and this is called an image in the same way as the torso of a statue can be called an image. Again, there is another image, the image of likeness, which consists in the distinction of the faculties that represent the Trinity of Persons; and this may be compared to the image in a statue set off distinctly by the delimitation of its parts. Again, there is the image of re-creation, which consists in the habits arising from grace, and imitates God in act: and this may be compared to the image in a statue with regard to its color and other decorations. In this third sense the image does not remain after sin, but in the other two it does.107 106

See Aime Solignac, "Image et ressemblance ii: Peres de 1'Eglise," DS 7 [1967] 142 Augustine did not abandon the opinion that sin destroys the image until the beginning of the Pelagian controversy, about 412. He pronounces definitely in favor of the permanence of the image in De Trinitate, and explicitly corrects his earlier opinion in the Retractations. 107 1 Sent, d.3, expos. 2ae ptis text.; pp. 124-125. Thomas refers to the Glossa ordinari, sometimes attributed to Walafrid Strabo, but considered to be a later compilation issuing primarily from the school of Anselm of Laon in the twelfth century. As Mandonnet indicates, the Gloss itself is cryptically terse: "Imago creationis, ratio: recreationis, gratia; similitudinis, tota Trinitas" (PL 113:849d). It is likely that Thomas' interpretation of the imago similitudini as the three faculties of the image rather than the three Persons of the divine exemplar owes something to Peter Lombard's gloss of the same verse, in which he elaborates the clipped original: "imago similitudinis est, ad quam factus est homo, qui factus est ad imaginem et similitudinem non Patris tantum, vel Filii, sed totius Trinitatis. Aug. Per memoriam, simili Patri; per intelligentiam, Filio; per dilectionem, Spiritui sancto" (Comm. in Psalmos, 4.; PL 191:88). Albert clearly refers the imago similitudinis to the three faculties: "imagini similitudinis quae est in tribus potentiis, scilicet memoria, intelligentia, et voluntate" (1 Sent.


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It is clear that in the Scriptum Thomas regarded the image of re-creation, which he elsewhere identifies directly with grace itself, as the image of God in an improper sense. In any case, this image can indeed be lost, inasmuch as grace and the virtues that flow from it are driven out by sin. In contrast, the image of creation remains because it lies in man's rational nature, and with it remains that "image of likeness" which Thomas interprets as the faculties of man's mind that represent the divine Trinity.108 In effect, Aquinas rests the defense of the permanence of the image of God on his prior demonstration of the ontological reality of the image. Thomas has shown that the image lies primarily in man's nature, for by his mind man reflects the intellectual nature of God and by the faculties of his mind he reflects the three Persons in God. Grace, which establishes its proper habits and operations in man's faculties, may depart from the soul, but man's nature remains, and with it the image of the Trinity. In the course of the discussion of man as the image of God in the second book of the Scriptum, Thomas categorically denies that the image of God is dependent on the possession of grace.109 Although he accepts the Gloss's identification of grace with the image of re-creation, he prefers to speak of grace as the likeness of God rather than the image of God. It was traditional to distinguish the image from the likeness of God in terms of nature and grace.110 In distinction 3, Thomas identifies the likeness of God with the habits grace establishes, and so distinguishes the likeness of God from the image of God: "Therefore, it is said that when man lost the likeness of God through sin, he departed into the region of unlikeness, but he did not lose the image."111 Elsewhere Thomas often refers to grace as the likeness of God.112 d.3, a. 19, sol.; Borgnet 25:117). Thomas' interpretation of the triplex imago changes radically in the Summa theologiae (la, q.93, a.4, resp.). 108 In De ver. q.27, a.6, ad 5m; Leon. p. 814, Thomas goes so far as to merge the imago similitudinis into the imago creationis so that there is a neat proportionality between the natural image and the graced image: "imago creationis consistit et in essentia et in potentia, secundum quod per essentiam animae repraesentatur unitas personarum; et similiter imago recreationis consistit in gratia et virtutibus." Briefly stated, the analogy stands—essence: faculties:: grace: virtues. This passage from his later work helps to confirm the close connection Thomas makes between the image of the Trinity and the imago creationis in the Scriptum. 109 2 Sent, d.16, q.l, a.3, ad 2m; p. 403: "imago invenitur in homine et in angelo quantum ad naturalia sua, non quantum ad habitum gratiae vel gloriae." 110 This distinction appears among the Greek Fathers, who interpreted the word dftoitoais, the second term of the couplet in Gen. 1:26 (LXX), as a dynamic state of assimilation to God. See especially Clement of Alexandria. 111 1 Sent d.3, q.4, a.l, ad 7m; p. 114. 112 Cf. 1 Sent, d.l, q.2, a.l, ad 4m; p. 38; d.3, q'.2, a.3, ad 2m; p. 105; d.14, q.3, sol.; p. 328; 2 Sent, d.37, q.l, a.2, ad 4m; pp. 947-948; 3 Sent, d.13, q.3, a.l, ad 2m; p. 419.

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In one passage he does speak of grace as the image of God, but at the same time he also carefully distinguishes the senses of the term "image" according to which it can be predicated of grace as well as of man. In the proper sense "image" refers to the subject of the relation of imitation-it is that which imitates some other thing.113 Grace is not an image of God in this sense, as Thomas clearly states in this passage: The soul and grace are both called the image and likeness of God, but in different ways. For the soul is called the image inasmuch as it imitates God, but grace is called the image as that by which the soul imitates God; just as a body with shape is called an image in a different way than the shape itself.114

The soul is the image of God in the proper sense. The image proper is the thing that imitates the exemplar. With characteristic metaphysical perspicacity, Aquinas saw that the image proper must be a substance, man's soul, not some common accident that does not necessarily accrue to this substance, however important this accident may be for the perfection of the image. For Thomas firmly held that grace is an accidental quality of the soul.115 In the ontology of the image, grace is a quality that does not form the ground or fundament of the relation of imageness, but rather serves to perfect the ground and thus to augment or elevate the relation. In the text we have just read, however, Thomas clearly compares grace to the ground of the relation of image, for grace, too, can be said to be that by which (the id quo) the soul imitates God. Therefore grace can be called the image of God in the same improper sense according to which the ground of the relation can be called the image.116 The soul, which is the image of God by nature, is raised to a higher level of likeness by the gift of grace, but Thomas prefers not to speak of either this higher level or grace as an image of God. By grace the soul is indeed constituted as a likeness of God in a new way, but by grace the soul would not be constituted as an image of God; for it is by reason of its intellectual nature that the soul is an express sign of its exemplar's species, and thus an image of God. Created grace functions as a form that assimilates the soul, on which it is bestowed, to God. Therefore, grace itself must resemble God, but only by virtue of its power to make souls resemble God. By virtue of this power 113

Seen. 21 above. 2 Sent. ±26, q.l, a.2, ad 5m; pp. 672-673. 115 See 2 Sent d.26, q.l, a.2; pp. 670-673. 116 Above, pp. 47-48. The substantial form of man is the ground according to which man is the image of God. In a similar way the accidental form, grace, is the ground of the renewed image. 114


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Thomas sometimes refers to grace as the perfect likeness of God, although this use of language must also be qualified: Sanctifying grace (gratia gratumfaciens), is called the perfect likeness according to that which it adds to other creatures; not simply speaking but with regard to other created likenesses.117

Thomas means that God created grace as His likeness inasmuch as it is the instrumental cause by which God brings other creatures to a more perfect likeness of God than the likeness they already possess by nature. The distinction between the initial likeness of God and the perfect likeness instilled by grace is clear-cut in the Scriptum. Thomas insists on this distinction when he argues in book 2 that even Adam in his original state of innocence stood hi need of grace to attain eternal life.118 Responding to an argument that the assimilation to God that grace works is redundant since man has already been made hi the image and likeness of God hi the state of nature, he asserts that there are different levels of likeness to God: The likeness of God that belongs to man according to his natural condition is other than that likeness by which man is assimilated to God through grace. Nor is it unfitting that man be assimilated to God in more ways than one, since a new likeness of God arises in creatures according to any grade of goodness that is added on top of others.119

Thus the new likeness of God to which grace raises a man is distinct from the old likeness, which is the image of God, to which man was originally created according to his nature. Although there is obviously some connection between the two likenesses, it is clear that Thomas maintains that the image of God lies hi man's natural condition and that the likeness of God to which grace elevates man is not to share the name of image. He probably hoped by this means to avoid confusion between the states of nature and grace hi man. Grace establishes a relation of imitation by which the soul attains a new likeness of God, yet grace itself does not constitute the soul as image of God. Thomas does not spell out the relation between the new likeness of God that grace adds to the soul and the image of God that the soul of man is simply by its nature. It is important to keep hi mind this restriction (granted a few exceptions) of the term imago Dei to the natural level hi the Scriptum, for this restriction is abandoned hi Aquinas' later works.

117 118 119

1 Sent, d.3, q.2, a.3, ad 2m; p. 105. 2 Sent d.29, q.l, a.l; pp. 739-742. 2 Sent. d. 29, q.l, a.l, ad 5m; pp. 741-742.

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Given Thomas' association of the image of God with man's nature and his almost complete refusal to speak of the image in relation to the state of grace, it is not surprising that he makes almost no explicit connection between his teaching on the image of the Trinity at the beginning of book 1 of the Scriptum and his treatment of the indwelling of the Trinity that follows later in the same book. The reader eagerly seizes on the concept of assimilation, which figures so centrally in Thomas' exposition of the indwelling, but no clear connection with the earlier analysis of the image of the Trinity can be found.120 The indwelling of the Trinity is, of course, tied to grace, for by means of the gift of sanctifying grace the Trinity comes to dwell in the soul of the just man. We have already seen that Thomas often speaks of grace as the likeness of God, which assimilates man to God. Thus it is readily intelligible why the concept of assimilation should play an important role in Thomas' doctrine of the indwelling. However, this connection of the indwelling to the likeness of grace means in effect that the indwelling does not lie on the same side of the divide between nature and grace as the likeness of God that Thomas calls the image of the Trinity in the Scriptum. In the first part of distinction 3, Thomas adverts to the connection between the indwelling and grace as a perfect likeness of God.121 In an earlier passage, Thomas had not only associated the indwelling with the likeness of grace, but he also sharply dissociated it from the image of God. An argument is presented that every human being, in fact every creature, can be an object of fruition, because we can enjoy him or it in God on account of the likeness of God (whether image or vestige) every creature bears.122 Thomas answers that the creature can be an object of fruition only when God dwells in that creature through the likeness of grace: 120

Cunningham's eloquent plea notwithstanding. See Francis Cunningham, The Indwelling of the Trinity: A Historico-Doctrinal Study of St. Thomas Aquinas (Dubuque, Iowa: Priory Press 1955), p. 19: "For it [the Scriptum super Sententiis] connects the mysteries of the indwelling of the Trinity in man and of the image of the Trinity in man, and from this conjunction each mystery illumines the other, and is itself enriched by such a role. On this level the task is intrinsically difficult because of the theological profundities involved, and the difficulty is increased by the phraseology of the Sentences which has led so many astray." Cunningham is wrong on this point. There may be some connection in the Summa theologiae, but in the Scriptum Thomas makes no connection between the two mysteries. 121 The connection is made in one of the arguments, but is not rejected. One can conclude that at least Thomas was aware of this connection in a passage that shortly precedes the treatment of the image of the Trinity. 1 Sent, d.3, q.2, a.3, obj.2; p. 104: "Sed aliquae creaturae sunt quae sunt perfecta similitudo divinae bonitatis, sicut gratiae gratum facientes, cum quibus Deus dicitur inhabitare in nomine." 122 1 Sent, d.l, q.2, a.l, obj.4; p. 37: "Praeterea, Apostolus ad Philemonem, xx, dicit: Itaque, frater, ego te fruar in Domino. Ergo etiam homine in Deo frui possumus, et per consequens quolibet homine, qui est ad imaginem Dei, et qualibet creatura, in qua est vestigium Dei."

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The just man is not to be enjoyed (fruendum) absolutely (simpliciter), but rather in God; so that God is the object of fruition, and the holy man represents that very object through the likeness of grace, in which God indwells. It does not follow, however, that a man in the state of sin is to be enjoyed in God, for there is not in him the grace which makes God to indwell and which is the express copy of that highest goodness which is to be enjoyed. Much less does it follow with regard to the irrational creatures. For the likeness of the image and of the vestige does not suffice for this, but only the likeness of grace.123.

Here again Thomas sharply distinguishes between the likeness that is the image of God and the likeness that is grace, an express copy of God's goodness but not the express sign of His essence. Coming so close to the beginning of book 1, this text is an indication that he would make little connection between the following sections on the image of the Trinity and the indwelling. Following the arrangement of the Sentences, Thomas treats of the indwelling of the Trinity in the middle of the set of distinctions concerning the Person of the Holy Spirit (dd. 10-18). Distinctions 10-13 deal with the eternal procession of the Holy Spirit, while distinctions 14-18 are concerned with the temporal procession. It is in the course of these last distinctions that the subject of the indwelling of the Trinity naturally arises, in connection with considerations on the invisible mission of the Son as well as of the Spirit.124 It is the plain, if unsatisfying, fact that Thomas does not once refer to the image of the Trinity in this section.125 This total absence of the notion of the image of the Trinity from the section in which the indwelling is treated is in contrast to the significant, although brief, use of the notion Thomas makes in the preceding section on the eternal procession of the Holy Spirit (dd. 10-13). Following the principles established in distinction 3, he uses the likeness found in the image of the Trinity as a means of presenting certain truths about the procession of the Holy 123

1 Sent d.l, q.2, a.l, ad 4m; p. 38. The indwelling is treated primarily in distinctions 14-15. There is some secondary material in distinction 17, which is concerned with the gift of charity. Distinction 16 (the visible mission of the Holy Spirit) and 18 (donum as the proper name of the Spirit) have little to say on the indwelling. 125 There are two references to the image of God in this section, but they are insignificant because they do not indicate the Trinitarian aspect of the image at all. One is a general reference to all creatures as representing God as images or vestiges of Him, and it is part of an argument whose thesis is rejected (1 Sent d.l6, q.l, a.l, obj.2; p. 370); and the other is a peculiar sed contra asserting that charity is a better representation of God than the natural image of God in man (1 Sent d.17, q.l, a.5, s.c.2; p. 405). Both of these texts reinforce the separation between the image of God and the likeness that is grace. 124

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Spirit. Thomas is aware of the limited usefulness of any created likeness for the demonstration of the eternal Trinity. Although he invokes the image of the Trinity several times to support his position, he also refers to the image in two arguments he later proceeds to refute.126 In response to these two arguments he warns explicitly that the image is a deficient representation of the Trinity, and that one must beware of imputing to the divine Trinity the creaturely limitations found in its image. Thomas does not deny all demonstrative value to the image. In the opening articles of distinctions 10, 11, and 13, the argument from the image of the Trinity figures prominently among the arguments sed contra. However, it must also be noted that he does not take up these references in the body of the articles. We must conclude that Thomas believed that the image of the Trinity has an authoritative value for the understanding of the mystery of the Trinity, but that its demonstrative value rests on the prior acceptance of the Catholic faith.127 Before returning to the discussion of Thomas' exposition of the indwelling of the Trinity, one common feature of all his references to the image of the Trinity in the section on the eternal procession of the Holy Spirit is worth noting. In all of these texts Thomas refers to Augustine's earlier triad of mind, knowledge, and love (mens, notitia, amor). Peter Lombard had placed this triad second, and Thomas himself considered it to be strictly secondary to the triad of faculties. However, in the context of the eternal procession of the Spirit, Augustine's first triad is far more suitable because the keystone in the Western theological understanding of the Holy Spirit is Augustine's perception that the Spirit proceeds as the love of the Father and the Son. In this section all Thomas' references to the image of the Trinity exploit this triad in one and the same way. A good example is the sed contra in favor of the doctrine of the filioque-. The same thing is shown through a likeness. For there is an image of the Trinity in the soul. But in the soul love, which represents the Holy Spirit, proceeds from knowledge, which represents the Son. Therefore, in God, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.128

126 Thomas uses the image to support the following points: the Spirit proceeds as love (1 Sent d.10, q.l, a.l, s.c.l; pp. 261-262); the Spirit proceeds from the Son (d.ll, q.l, a.l, s.c.2; p.277); and there are processions in God (d.13, q.l, a.l, s.c.2; p. 302). He uses the image in support of the following positions, which he rejects: the procession of the Son is prior to the procession of the Spirit (d.12, q.l, a.l, obj.3; p. 290); and the Spirit proceeds through the Son (d.12, q.l, a.3, obj.3; pp. 293-294). 127 See 1 Sent, d.3, q. 1, a.4; pp.97-99. The examination of the image of the Trinity is useful only to those who are aware of the exemplar by some other way. 128 1 Sent, d.ll, q.l, a. 1, s.c.2; p. 277.


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Thomas makes use of the triad in a simple manner, pointing out the direct correspondence between the members of the triad and the divine Persons. This application of the image reveals that Thomas still viewed it primarily as a static picture in whose proportions the theologian is able to detect certain features of the divine Trinity. One of the advantages of the triad, mens, notitia, amor, for the theological function of the image is that it gives a clearer indication of the two divine processions. As we have seen in the analysis of distinction 3, Thomas failed to reflect on the processions of word and love in his treatment of the image of the Trinity. Here, in his study of the procession of the Holy Spirit, he again shows a certain weakness of thought, for he makes notitia represent the Son, without ever mentioning the far closer correspondence between our inner word (verbum) and the Son, who is also the Word of God.129 Thomas' use of Augustine's earlier triad is perhaps a step towards the fuller understanding of the image of the Trinity hi terms of the two processions.130 It also reveals that he had not yet assimilated Augustine's own teaching in the De Trinitate, remaining to a great extent bound by the accepted Augustinianism of his day. In contrast to the theological role, however brief, Thomas gives to the notion of the image of the Trinity in the section of the Scriptum on the eternal procession of the Holy Spirit, he makes not the slightest reference to the image of the Trinity in his treatment of the temporal procession, in which he expounds the indwelling of the Trinity. We have already discovered the fundamental reason for the lack of connection: Thomas persistently associates the image of the Trinity with the natural level, whereas the indwelling of the Trinity belongs to the realm of grace. Still, admitting this distinction, one expects to discover a certain parallelism or similarity between the image and the indwelling because they are both created effects that serve to manifest 129 Thomas speaks of notitia as proceeding from mens (1 Sent. d. 13, q. 1, a. 1, s.c.2; p.302), but he also seems to have been aware that this usage was not very accurate. See 1 Sent d. 10, q.l, a.l, s.c.l; pp. 261-262: "Sed in imagine creata procedit aliquid per modum notitiae, et aliquid per modum amoris. Cum igitur in Trinitate increata procedat Filius per modum notitiae, erit alia persona procedens per modum amoris." This text properly distinguishes between notitia and that which proceeds "according to notitia," although Thomas does not bother to elaborate on the aliquid that proceeds, but that can only be specified as the verbum. 130 It is interesting that, in the only explicit citation of the image of the Trinity in the treatment of the creation of man in the image of God in bk. 2, d.16, Thomas again chooses to speak of the triad of mens, notitia, amor. See 2 Sent. d. 16, q.l, a. 1, ad 4m; p. 398: "ad rationem imaginis non exigitur aequalitas aequiparantiae, cum magni hominis in parva pictura imago exprimatur; sed exigitur aequalitas proportionis, ut scilicet eadem sit proportio partium ad invicem in imagine quae est in imaginato: et talis aequalitas invenitur in anima respectu Dei: quia sicut ex Patre Filius, et ex utroque Spiritus sanctus, ita ex mente notitia, et ex utraque amor procedit."

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one and the same divine Trinity. However, no such parallelism is suggested hi the Scriptum. There is one striking difference between Thomas' expositions of the doctrine of the Trinity. In the later Summa the elucidation of the mystery rests on a simple statement of the psychological analogy: there are two divine processions, and the best analogues we can find for them among created things are the two immanent processions of inner word and love within the rational creature.131 In the earlier Scriptum Thomas makes use of the psychological analogy, but with less clarity. He interweaves two analogous likenesses of the procession of the Son: the procession of nature, as well as the procession of intellect. According to Thomas, the second divine Person is properly called the Son, because He proceeds by an eternal generation from the Father and shares His nature. There is no real distinction between this procession of nature and the procession of intellect, according to which the Son is also called the Word, and there is no real difference between the Son and the Word: one Person with two proper names.132 However, Thomas refers to the procession more often in terms of the procession of nature than in terms of the procession of intellect. This preference in effect obscures the use of the psychological analogy. It is not surprising, then, that any connection between the image of the Trinity and the temporal processions of the divine Persons goes unremarked in the Scriptum. For the psychological analogy is simply the reverse side of the doctrine of the image of the Trinity. Hence to downplay the psychological analogy necessarily makes it difficult to see the connection between the image of the Trinity and the processions of the divine Persons. In fact, in the Scriptum Thomas seems to prefer a more Dionysian model for the divine processions to the psychological analogy of Augustine. In the first article on the procession of the Holy Spirit, he neglects the image of the Trinity, to which he has given honorable mention in one sed contra, and turns instead to the general procession of all creatures from God as an analogy for 131

As Thomas teaches in the opening article of the section on the Trinity: Sum. theoLla, q.27, a. 1. In a.2 he proceeds to show that the procession of the second divine Person can also be called generatio, but the analogy from generation among creatures is secondary to the analogy from the procession of word in the mind of the rational creature. The second Person is Son because He is the Word. 132 See 1 Sent d.13, q.l, a.2, sol.; p. 304: "Dico igitur secundum hoc, quod est in divinis aliqua processio secundum quam una persona procedit ab una; et haec est processio generationis, secundum quam Filius est a Patre, et ideo dicitur esse per modum naturae vel intellectus; procedit enim ut Filius, et ut Verbum: quia in utroque modo istarum processionum, scilicet naturae et intellectus, est unius ab uno processio." Thomas seems here to suggest that generatio is the best name for the procession, and that natura and intellectus are the two acceptable analogues for the procession.


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the two divine processions.133 In the analysis of the procession of creation, Thomas discovers two principles or modes of this procession in the divine nature and the divine will: In the procession of creatures, there are two things to consider with respect to the Creator Himself: namely, the nature, from whose fullness and perfection the perfection of every creature is both effected and copied, as it has been said above; and the will, from whose liberality, and not by the necessity of nature, all these things are conferred on the creature.134

Thomas goes on to show that these two aspects of the procession of creatures from God have then- exemplar cause hi the two eternal processions within God. Therefore, we may understand that the Son proceeds according to nature as the perfect Image of the divine nature, through whom all creatures have some share hi that nature; while the Holy Spirit proceeds according to will as the Love hi whom all creatures enjoy the liberality of God. It is a rich demonstration, and it leads to the conclusion that the Holy Spirit proceeds by way of love—the great fruit of Augustine's meditation on the Trinity. However, the fundamental analogy hi this demonstration is not Augustinian, but Dionysian in inspiration, and it is not surprising that nowhere in this article does Thomas refer to the procession of the Son as the procession of the Word. The primary analogy for the divine processions in the Scriptum is the procession of all creatures from God according to nature and will rather than the processions of word and love hi the image of God, which only rational creatures bear. This Dionysian analogy for the processions hi the Trinity remains an obstacle to any direct connection between the image of the Trinity and the indwelling. The mission of the Son is effected through the gift of wisdom, by which the soul is assimilated to the Son, who is the Word that manifests the Father.135 Thus Thomas made greater use of the psychological analogy when he came to the exposition of the indwelling. However, the Dionysian view, with its emanationist terminology, continued to exercise its influence. One result is a peculiar passage in which Thomas seems to state that there are really two pairs of temporal processions on account of the divine agency in the exitus of all creatures from God as well as in their reditus to Him.136 As 133

1 Sent d.10, q.l, a.l, sol.; p. 262. Ibid. 135 1 Sent d.15, q.4, a.l, sol.; p. 350. 136 1 Sent d.14, q.2, a.2, sol.; p. 325. Thomas opens on an unabashedly Dionysian note: "Respondeo dicendum, quod in exitu creaturarum a primo principle attenditur quaedam circulatio vel regiratio, eo quod omnia revertuntur sicut in fmem in id a quo sicut principio prodierunt." 134

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he states in the text, he is concerned here with the invisible missions by which the creature returns to God, but he does not hesitate to speak of creation also in terms of another pah* of temporal processions: Therefore, the procession of the divine Persons into creatures can be considered on two scores: Either as the reason of going forth from the Principle, and such a procession is thus noted according to the natural gifts, by which we subsist: just as Dionysius says (rv De div. nom., cap. rv, col. 694,1.1) that divine wisdom and goodness proceed into creatures. However, we are not talking about such a procession here.137 In this passage it is worth noting that Thomas uses a text from Dionysius in order to show that the procession of creatures from God has its reason, its exemplar, in the eternal procession of the divine Persons understood hi terms of the two essential attributes of God, wisdom and goodness, that are commonly appropriated to the Son and the Holy Spirit respectively. The Dionysian vision of the reflection of the divine processions in the procession of all creatures from God obstructs the realization of some connection between the image and the indwelling because it causes us to overlook the special likeness of the Trinity in the minds of rational creatures alone. Although we may observe some correspondence, it is the failure to focus on the analogy of the two processions of word and love that is primarily responsible for Thomas' neglect of the similarity between the image and the indwelling of the Trinity. Thomas failed to consider the image of the Trinity in terms of the two processions of word and love. In fact, he scarcely adverts to the divine processions at all, except when he discusses the characteristic of order among the three faculties. If we look carefully at his description of this characteristic, we see that the divine processions are reflected in the emanation of one faculty from another. This order among the faculties, however, is by no means the proper analogy for the two divine processions, for the Son does not proceed from the Father as intellect from memory, nor the Holy Spirit as will from memory and intellect. Intellect and will are essential attributes of God, not personal properties, as Augustine clearly pointed out and as Thomas knew very well. In keeping with the most proper form of the psychological analogy, the Son proceeds as the Word, while the Holy Spirit proceeds as the mutual love between the Father and the Son. This is the final teaching of Augustine, expressed at length in the last book of the De Trinitate. Thomas ignores this most proper form of the psychological analogy in distinction 3. One can only surmise that he had not yet read Augustine's De Trinitate itself, or had not yet assimilated its true teaching. 137

1 Sent d.14, q.2, a.2, sol.; pp. 325-326.


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In the Scriptum Thomas failed to see beyond Peter Lombard's picture of the image as a triad of faculties to the more dynamic conception of the image in terms of the two processions of word and love. It was probably the simple numerical discrepancy between the triad of the image and the two divine processions that effectively obstructed the perception of any similarity between the image and the indwelling of the Trinity.138 In the Scriptum Thomas consistently asserts that the image of the Trinity abides hi the three faculties because of their lasting orientation, their inchoate movement, towards God. Thus the image of the Trinity does not consist in those perfect, but intermittent acts of knowing and loving God he calls complete operations of man, but in the imperfect acts in which the soul is drawn towards its perfection by certain initial and incomplete movements. Thomas insists that the image of the Trinity belongs to man's nature. It does not depend on grace, for grace is only necessary to attain to certain intermittent, complete operations that are beyond man's natural powers to accomplish. However, the image at the basic level does not consist in these operations or any other operations. Man is created to the image of the Trinity, and he cannot lose that image. It is clear, then, that the image of the Trinity is primarily a static reflection of certain characteristics of the eternal Trinity. Its unchanging proportions mirror the distinction and consubstantiality of the divine Persons, and also Their order and equality. Thomas introduces a more dynamic aspect of the relation between the image and the exemplar by his reference to the characteristic of actual imitation; but he could not make much of this dynamic aspect without a thorough rethinking of his interpretation of the image. The focus of the investigation in the Scriptum is the proportionality between the image and the exemplar, while little is said of the active conformation of the image to its exemplar. In the Scriptum super Sententiis Thomas affirms the permanence of the image in man's nature by means of a careful exposition of the exact ontological status of the image. The theological function of the image as a similitude of the Trinity rests on the reality of the image of the Trinity. Consequently Thomas concerns himself with the particular problems of the psychology of the image (bk. 1, d. 3) and also with the precise definition of the word "image" (bk. 1, d. 28). He again asserts the reality of the image in 138

The indwelling itself belongs to all three Persons, but it must be seen that Thomas does not directly mention the indwelling itself most of the time. He treats the indwelling in the context of the temporal procession of the Holy Spirit, and he concentrates explicitly on the two invisible missions. However, the greater obstacle is found in the lack of connection between the three Persons and the two processions in the treatment of the image of the Trinity in d.3.

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his treatment of the creation of man (bk. 2, d. 16), where he confirms the association of the image with man's nature. The dignity of man lies in this ineradicable seal of the triune God on his soul. It is this seal that marks each human being from the moment of his creation as the possession of God alone. This seal is no superficial mark, for it lies in man's very nature and gives man his first movements towards the knowledge and love of God. Although Thomas stresses the static character of the image of the Trinity in the Scriptum, even in this earliest exposition he includes in his conception of the image a sense of the dynamic orientation of the image and its faculties towards its Creator.

PART TWO

4

The Development of St. Thomas' Doctrine in De veritate, Question 10

Several years after his first presentation of the doctrine of the image of the Trinity in the Scriptum super Sententiis, St. Thomas re-examined the theme in the course of his public disputations during his first Parisian regency (1256-1259). These disputations came to be known in published form as the Quaestiones disputatae de ventate. Academic disputations offered the master and the university community a formal occasion for a more advanced and more topical discussion of theological matters than the daily classroom exposition of the sacra pagina of the Bible allowed. Although the format of the published disputation is closely related to the question and article form of the Scriptum and the Summa theologiae, the disputed questions bear witness to their original setting by the profusion of arguments presented on both sides of the issue at stake and by the master's thorough-going determination. Often one finds the fullest, although not necessarily the most masterly, treatment of a particular topic among Thomas' disputed questions rather than in his great theological syntheses. The disputation naturally demanded a response directed to the critical ears of his colleagues as well as to the less proficient understanding of his pupils, and through those colleagues to the positions and authorities themselves that the master had to take into account, interpret, and evaluate. Thus the disputed questions offer some of the best evidence of the master's thought in the midst of theological controversy and also of the direction in which his investigation of the truth was developing.1 1 On the literary form of the disputed question and its historical development, see Bernardo C. Bazan, «La quaestio disputata» in Les genres litteraires dans les sources theologiques et philosophiques medievales, Actes du Colloque international de Louvain-la-Neuve 25-27 mai 1981 (Louvain-la-Neuve: Institut d'fitudes Medievales de 1'Universite Catholique de Louvain, 1982), pp. 31-49. Bazan states that the disputed question was a regular part of the master's teaching. Although the bachelors took part in the dispute in the roles of opponens and respondens, the master was in charge. "Le maitre est done Yauteurde la question disputee"

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THOMAS' DOCTRINE

Although the public disputation often served as a forum for debate on issues of current interest in the academic community, the master remained free to set the subject of each disputation as he pleased (except in the case of the quodlibetal disputations). The systematizing genius of St. Thomas is evident in the choice of topics in the first series of his disputed questions, the De veritate. In recent years the systematic organization of the Summa theologiae has received much attention from scholars, but little consideration has been given to the noteworthy order of the De veritate. In spite of the contingent circumstances of the disputed questions, it is clear that Thomas planned the questions as a series of investigations that would form a fairly ordered study of certain areas of theology. The disputed questions of the first Parisian regency form one large series to which the earliest cataloguers gave the title De veritate. Although Fr. Spiazzi, in his introduction to the Marietti edition of the De veritate, has argued that the entire series of questions should be understood as a "theology of truth,"2 one must not place more weight on the title than it can properly bear. One of the earliest cataloguers, Nicholas Trevet, refers to the series as De veritate et ultra. Fr. Weisheipl sees this designation as evidence that the title of the series was simply taken from the title of the first question, which deals with the definition and characteristics of veritas, and applied to the entire series.3 Still, the title De veritate is an appropriate designation for at least the greater number of these questions. It is not clear exactly how many of the total of 29 questions Thomas actually disputed in each of the three years. On the basis of a certain unity of subject, Weisheipl's division seems reasonable. He puts questions 1 to 7 in the academic year of 1256-1257, questions 8 to 20 in 1257-1258, and questions 21 to 29 in 1258-1259.4 Thus Thomas would have examined (p. 38). See also Antoine Dondaine, Secretaires de saint Thomas (Rome: Editori di S. Tommaso, 1956. Dondaine remarks (p. 214) that we cannot know for sure what elaboration took place between the actual dispute, the magistral determination, and the final edition of the question for publication, although it is certain that the master could modify and expand and re-arrange what had actually been said. In the case of the De Veritate, Dondaine has shown that we have a text that was dictated by Thomas. Therefore, we have a work in the shape and state intended by its author. 2 Raymundo Spiazzi, in his introduction to Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae, vol. 1, (Turin: Marietti, 1964), p. xxvi: "Si quis in tanta disputationum varietate unitatem quandam vel organicitatem componere velit, has quaestiones ut summarium quoddam theologiae de Veritate forsan habebit." 3 Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d'Aquino: His Life, Thought and Work (Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, 1974), p. 123. 4 Weisheipl, Friar Thomas, p. 126. Mandonnet and Glorieux preferred to place q.8 in the first year, but it seems senseless to divide the two questions on angelic cognition (qq. 8-9) between two years.


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God's knowledge in the first year, turning to the rational creature's knowledge in the second year. The third section, however, is concerned with the good and volition, concluding with three questions on grace. The application of the title De veritate to the questions of this third year is difficult to justify. This leads one to speculate that Thomas intended questions 21 to 29 to form a separate series, which might have been designated more appropriately by the title, De bono. Aquinas published a later series of disputed questions entitled De malo, which suggests a prior series under the title of De bono. If Thomas did conceive of a series De bono, in which he planned to examine the subject of volition in order to complement his prior investigation of cognition in questions 1 to 20 of the De veritate, it is not difficult to understand how the later series came to be included under the title of the first. For questions 21 to 29 form a group that seems curiously incomplete. It should have included questions on the virtues and vices, which in fact Thomas did undertake to dispute later on (De virtutibus and De malo). One might conjecture that Thomas did not know that his third year as a master (1258-1259) would be the last year of his first Parisian regency until sometime in the beginning of 1259. For whatever reasons his Dominican superiors decided to recall him to Italy, and in the spring of 1259 Thomas presided at the inception of William of Alton as his successor in the Dominican chair customarily reserved for foreigners.5 Thomas probably disputed the final questions on grace in an attempt to give some completion to the series of questions on volition. Thus the sudden shift from the orderly examination of the parts of the appetite to the questions on grace finds an explanation in his realization that his stay in Paris was about to end. Questions 21 to 29 would then have come to be included hi the De veritate because they were incomplete and because they did bear a certain relation to the earlier set of questions properly designated as De veritate. It is most likely, then, that Thomas planned the disputed questions of his first Parisian tenure as a whole, embracing two series of questions, one devoted to the study of cognition and its object, truth, and the other to the study of volition and its object, the good. Thus a more accurate title for the entire set of questions would have been De vero et bono. Thomas clearly considered the two transcendentals, the true and the good, as an ordered pair. Together they give a certain completion to the first of all the transcendentals, being (ens). The complementarity of the true and the good is clearly expressed in the initial articles of the two sets of questions. Both ask what, if any, meaning the notions of true and good add to the primary notion 5

Weisheipl, Friar Thomas, p. 129.

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of being.6 In the first of these key articles, Thomas indicates the fundamental relationship between the two transcendentals and the soul. In a subsequent article he points out that the notions of true and good entail a certain circularity of exchange between the soul and the things that are its objects.7 In this circle, truth is associated with the movement from the thing to the soul, whereas the good entails a movement from the soul back to the thing. This active interchange between the soul and its objects constitutes the perfection of the soul. The entire De veritate is an extended consideration of the perfection through knowledge and love that God possesses eternally and bestows on the rational creature. In Christ the created rational nature comes to share most fully the perfection which God possesses by nature. It is another sign of the unity of the two series of questions that each concludes with a question concerning the human nature of Christ and the elevation of human knowledge and human will through the hypostatic union.8 Thus the distinction of the two series of questions lies in the fundamental difference between the true and the good, while their unity is based on the perfection of the rational creature through the participation of truth and goodness by means of the intellect and the will.

A. AUGUSTINE AND ARISTOTLE At the beginning of the second year of his magistral disputations (12571258), St. Thomas turned to the discussion of man's knowledge of truth, to which he devoted all of the remaining disputations that year (qq. 10-20). Thomas re-examines the Augustinian doctrine of the image of the Trinity in the first of these questions, in which he investigates the extent and the limits of human cognition at the level of nature. Although man's natural knowledge might seem to be a subject more proper to the domain of philosophy, Thomas approaches the subject from a decidedly theological angle. Scholars have tended to overlook the theological purpose and framework of question 10 and have placed undue emphasis on Thomas' use of Aristotelian psychology. Such a misperception has also entailed a misunderstanding of the position Augustine held for Thomas as he disputed these questions. 6

De ver. q.l, a.l, and q.21, a.l. Each article concludes with a definition of the transcendental with which it is concerned, but the greater portion of the solution of each is occupied with a comparison between both the terms verum and bonum and the prior notion of ens. 7 De ver. q.l, a.2, resp.; Leon., p. 9. 8 De ver. q.20, prol.; Leon., p. 571: "Quaestio est de scientia animae Christi"; and De ver. q.29, prol.; Leon., p. 849: "Quaestio est de gratia Christi."


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The chief theological authority, after sacred Scripture, in the De veritate as> a whole, Augustine is also the prime authority for the doctrine of the image in question 10. It is a mistake to treat this text as if it were primarily a philosophical treatise. We should recognize the Augustinian inspiration that underlies its organization, and the primacy of the De Trinitate in particular in Thomas' careful handling of his citations from Augustine. It then should be easier to see that the development of Thomas' doctrine of the image from the Scriptum to the De veritate is largely dependent on his growing insight into Augustine's teaching. In his study of the development of Thomas' doctrine of the image of God, de Beaurecueil sees his presentation of the image in De veritate, question 10, as an important step towards a realistic concept of the image. As a bachelor of the Sentences, Thomas did not dare criticize the Augustinian conception of the image directly, but in the De veritate he brings to bear against Augustine the full weight of Aristotelian psychology. De Beaurecueil considers question 10 primarily a "discussion that is located purely at the level of an objective and scientific study of the human reality," in which Thomas adverts to the doctrine of the image only inasmuch as the scientific study of the soul has important "consequences" for the doctrine of the image.9 Later in his article, de Beaurecueil makes much of the fact that Thomas does not even mention Augustine's name in the body of the first article of question 10, in which Thomas gives a very Aristotelian analysis of the term mens and notes that Augustine is instead relegated to the arguments and their particular responses.10 This fact supports the conclusion, according to de Beaurecueil, that Thomas was primarily engaged in a scientific examination of man's soul, to which the notion of the image of God was incidental and the teaching of Augustine largely irrelevant. De Beaurecueil shows no awareness of the theological framework of question 10 and sees the question as a simple triumph of Aristotelian psychology over Augustine. Sullivan holds a similar, although somewhat modified, position. He observes that in the De veritate Thomas presents his Augustinian teaching on the image of the Trinity in the middle of an examination of Aristotelian psychology: 9 De Beaurecueil [ 1]:65: "C'est dans la q.10 du de Veritate que va se faire la critique du mens et des trinites psychologiques, mise au point qui affectera considerablement la doctrine de 1'Image. On n'y envisage celle-ci que pour y voir les consequences d'une discussion qui se place au pur plan d'une etude objective et scientifique de la realite humaine." 10 De Beaurecueil [ 1]:72: "... tout nous place dans le contexte d'une etude scientifique et objective de Tame humaine. Saint Thomas part d'une definition nominale et developpe son argumentation sans meme mentionner saint Augustin: on ne le retrouve que dans les objections, pour interpreter sa doctrine en fonction des resultats acquis.''

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In accord with the nature of the Quaestiones Disputatae the treatment of the image of the Trinity is enveloped in the presentation of the aristotelian psychology, and especially its "theory of knowledge". Man's knowledge begins in the senses, and terminates at that point where knowledge gathered through the senses must terminate.... This view of the nature of man and his knowledge is the receptacle into which Augustine's teaching about the divine image is openly received in the De Veritate.n According to this view, question 10 is primarily a treatise of Aristotelian epistemology, in spite of its Augustinian title: "De mente, hi qua est imago Trinitatis." Sullivan does not offer any explanation for the odd intrusion. He tends to see the relationship between the Augustinian and Aristotelian conceptions of the soul in the question, as a stage in Thomas' development hi which the Augustinian position is modified in favor of Aristotelian psychology. In the philosophical elaboration of the doctrine of the image of God, Sullivan sees a triumph of Aristotle over Augustine, although he also acknowledges that Thomas shows a greater understanding and appreciation of the original Augustinian conception of the image in the De veritate than he did in the Scriptum.12 Failing to turn to the theological context of question 10, Sullivan also fails to appreciate the true relationship between the Aristotelian epistemology and the Augustinian doctrine of the image of the Trinity that marks this question. In recent years it has been recognized that it is misleading to read the major works of St. Thomas as if they were philosophical writings. Aside from the commentaries on Aristotle and a few short works, Aquinas' writings are theological. In interpreting passages in those theological works that have a philosophical character, we must be careful not to forget the theological context of the passages. De veritate is a theological work: God is the primary subject with which Thomas is concerned in these disputations of his first years as a master of theology at Paris. In the first twenty questions of the De veritate, Thomas concentrates on the divine attribute of truth. Question 10 falls among the second year's disputations (qq. 8-20) which examine the creature's participation of divine truth. Following proper theological order, Thomas considers the angels' knowledge of truth (qq. 8-9) before he turns to man's powers of cognition (qq. 10-20).

11

Sullivan, p. 251. Sullivan, p. 258: "Practically every advance he [Thomas] makes over his earlier teaching with regard to the structure of the image is in accord with the thought of Augustine, and urged by appropriate texts from the latter's work. ... The incomplete notion which Augustine had of the process of knowledge is not that of Aquinas, and the African Doctor uses a different philosophical instrument to explain the operations of the created trinities." 12


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If we study questions 10 to 20, we do not find that they comprise a philosophical treatise on human cognition. First, these questions begin with the decidedly unphilosophical notion of the image of the Trinity. Second, although question 10 is limited to the consideration of man's natural knowledge, the ten questions that follow are almost all concerned with distinctly theological matters. Questions 11 to 14 deal primarily with the divine assistance given man for reaching the truth.13 Although the subject of questions 15 to 17 is certain principles of human knowledge, these questions are drawn mainly from Christian tradition: they are concerned with the relation between practical reason and sin.14 Questions 18 to 20 are unquestionably theological, for they are all concerned with human cognition as it occurs in special states of man's soul virtually unknown to unaided reason: Adam's state of innocence (q. 18), the state of the soul after death (q. 19), and the special case of the soul of Christ (q. 20). Thus all these questions presuppose a theological framework, even though not every article treats of realities beyond the limits of natural reason. Where philosophy can be of assistance, Thomas avails himself of its arguments. But the perspective of the work remains theological. Thomas studies man as he stands related to God and as he can be seen by the light of God's revealed word. Within question 10 itself Thomas makes frequent use of Aristotelian psychology to illuminate man's natural powers and processes of knowledge. This, however, does not turn the question into a philosophical treatise on human cognition. Such a treatise proper would have to dwell at length on man's senses and his faculty of imagination, as Aristotle's De anima does. The theologian, however, is not directly concerned with the corporeal side of man's nature, but rather with the soul, as Aquinas states at the beginning

13

Questions 12 and 13 are devoted to the divine gifts of prophecy'and rapture, and question 14 deals with the divinely-bestowed habit of faith. Question 11, entitled De magistro, may seem to fall more within the realm of the natural; but in this question Thomas teaches that God is the principal teacher of man. Also, not only men, but angels may share the function of teacher. Finally, the last article is concerned with a topic of burning interest among the theologians of Paris at the time: whether teaching is more a function of the active than the contemplative life. Indeed, this disputation probably took place in the fall of 1257, not long after the Parisian masters had grudgingly accepted the two mendicant friars, Bonaventure and Thomas, as colleagues of theirs, in submission to strong pressure from Pope Alexander iv. 14 Question 15 looks at the Augustinian distinction between ratio superior and ratio inferior. After two articles on the ontological status of this pair, Thomas concentrates on their role in the act of sin. Question 16 is concerned with the habit of synderesis and its relation to sin. Question 17 deals with the act of conscience and its authority. Note the nonphilosophical topic of the last article: whether conscience is more binding than the command of a prelate. All these questions presuppose the acceptance of the Christian tradition with regard to sin and the rational element of man's moral acts.

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THE DEVELOPMETiT OF THOMAS' DOCTR1NL

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of the treatise on man's soul in the Summa theologiaeJ Furthermore, he is concerned primarily with those faculties of the soul in which the virtues that guide man to his perfection are established.1* In question 10 of the De veritate Thomas is particularly concerned with those operations by which man shares, by his nature, in God's knowledge of the truth. The subject of question 10, then, is not simply man. but rather man related to God. Thomas was not writing a treatise on human cognition, but investigating man's participation of divine truth and his ascent to the knowledge of God. Although some of the articles of question 10 appear to offer a purely Aristotelian analysis of man's cognitive processes, the guiding spirit of the question is Augustinian. As the title aptly states, Thomas is specifically interested in the mind {mens) of man inasmuch as it is the subject of the image of the Trinity.17 In these few words the fundamentally Augustinian spirit of Thomas' investigation is clearly proclaimed. The series of articles that compose the question follow an order that reflects the order of Augustine's De Trinitate, In books II to 14 of the Λ Trtnitate, Augustine pursues his search for an adequate image of the Trinity by examining the various trinities he discerns in the psychological processes of human cognition. In this search he begins with the process of the sense of sight, and proceeds upwards Lo the higher powers until he reaches an acceptable image of the Trinity in the operations of knowledge and love of one's self and finally the true image in the knowledge and love of God. There is a similar ascending movement in the order of the articles of Thomas' question. Article 7 provides a key to Thomas' order, for it sets forth a certain hierarchy among the objects of man's knowledge. Thomas argues that the image of the Trinity is founded solely upon the knowledge and love of the higher objects in this hierarchy, namely, the soul itself and God. We have already seen this distinction in the Scriptum, where Thomas explored whether the image exists when the object of its three (acuities is either any

u Sum. thtùl 1», q,75, prol,: Ottawa, P· 438s "Naturarli autcm hnminrs considerare perline! ad theokagum ex parte animar, nun autem ex parte corporis, nisi secundum habitudinem quarti habet corpus ad ammani" This section of tbc Summa has also been read in the past as if it were a philosophical treatise. See Weisheipl. Friar Thomas, p. 232: "Invariably the manual on Thomlsuc psychology' followed the order of the Summa, qq. 75-B9. without realizing that the philosophical order of investigation differsradicallyfrom the theological order followed by Thomas in the Summa.' " Sum. iheoL, la. q.78, prol.; Ottawa, p. 471: "Ad consideraliunem aulcm Thcoluju pertinet inquirere specialiter solum de potentiis intellective et appetitivi*, in quibus vinutes inveri iuntur." ,T De ver. q.10. a. 1, prat.: Leon., p. 295: " Quaestio est de mente in qua est imago Trinilatis."

Merriell, D. Juvenal (Editor). To the Image of the Trinity: A Study in the Development of Aquinas Teaching. Toronto, ON, CAN: Pontifical Institute for Medieval Studies, 1990. ρ 102. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/utoronto/Doc?id=10215243&ppg=113 Copyright© 1990. Pontifical Institute for Medieval Studies. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law.

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of the treatise on man's soul in the Summa theologiae.15 Furthermore, he is concerned primarily with those faculties of the soul in which the virtues that guide man to his perfection are established.16 In question 10 of the De veritate Thomas is particularly concerned with those operations by which man shares, by his nature, in God's knowledge of the truth. The subject of question 10, then, is not simply man, but rather man related to God. Thomas was not writing a treatise on human cognition, but investigating man's participation of divine truth and his ascent to the knowledge of God. Although some of the articles of question 10 appear to offer a purely Aristotelian analysis of man's cognitive processes, the guiding spirit of the question is Augustinian. As the title aptly states, Thomas is specifically interested in the mind (mem} of man inasmuch as it is the subject of the image of the Trinity.17 In these few words the fundamentally Augustinian spirit of Thomas' investigation is clearly proclaimed. The series of articles that compose the question follow an order that reflects the order of Augustine's De Tnnitate. In books 11 to 14 of the De Trinitate, Augustine pursues his search for an adequate image of the Trinity by examining the various trinities he discerns in the psychological processes of human cognition. In this search he begins with the process of the sense of sight, and proceeds upwards to the higher powers until he reaches an acceptable image of the Trinity in the operations of knowledge and love of one's self and finally the true image in the knowledge and love of God.n t h i

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material thing, or the soul itself, or God.18 Thomas repeats this threefold division of the objects of man's faculties in De veritate, question 10, article 7: If we distinguish the knowledge of the mind according to objects, we find in our mind a threefold knowledge. There is the knowledge by which the mind knows God, by which it knows itself, and by which it knows temporal things.19 His conclusion also remains almost the same as in the Scriptum: the image of the Trinity does not exist insofar as the mind considers only temporal things, but requires that the mind be directed either to God or to itself. This Augustinian division among the objects of the mind's faculties provides the basic structure of question 10, in which Thomas begins with the examination of man's knowledge of material things and ascends to his knowledge of his own soul and finally to his knowledge, however limited, of God. Article 7 is the numerical and conceptual center in the schema of the thirteen articles of question 10. In the six previous articles Thomas examines the mind as the subject of the divine image and the mode of knowledge proper to its ontological level. The six subsequent articles turn to the mind's knowledge of the higher objects by which the mind is properly the image of the Trinity. There is a certain balance among the articles according to the threefold division of objects in article 7: Thomas devotes three articles to the knowledge of temporal things (aa. 4-6), three to knowledge of self (aa. 8-10), and three to knowledge of God (aa. 11-13). There is also a certain symmetry hi the explicit references to the Trinity in the first, the central, and the final articles. Thomas demonstrates the ontological foundation of the image of the Trinity in man's nature in article 1, but he does not actually prove the existence of the image. The existence of the image of the Trinity is simply accepted on the basis of the belief hi the Trinity and the authority of the Augustinian teaching on the image of the Trinity. The image of the Trinity is rooted hi the nature of man's mind, but Thomas concludes in article 13 that one must not assume that the image of the Trinity is accompanied by an explicit self-consciousness that would amount to a natural knowledge of the divine Trinity. Articles 1 to 7 establish the natural conditions of the existence of the image of the Trinity; articles 8 to 13 simply 18

1 Sent d.3, q.4, a.4, sol.; pp. 120-121. De ver. q.10, a.7, resp.; Leon., p. 316: "Ut igitur cognitionem mentis secundum obiecta distinguamus, triplex cognitio in mente nostra invenitur, cognitio scilicet qua mens cognoscit Deum, et qua cognoscit se ipsam, et qua cognoscit temporalia." (The new Leonine edition necessitates corresponding alterations to McGlynn's translation.) The slight lexical change from res corporales in the Scriptum to temporalia in the De veritate is probably due to the more Augustinian phrasing of the question in the De veritate'm terms of the contrast between aeterna and temporalia. 19

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deduce the consequent limits within which the image is confined at the level of nature. There remains, however, the question of how Thomas handled Augustine's position in question 10. At first sight many of the articles appear to confirm de Beaurecueil's observation on article 1—that Thomas relegates Augustine to the responses to the arguments. There is often no direct allusion to Augustine in the determination of the article.20 The doctrine Thomas formulates in the determination is often markedly Aristotelian. More specifically, the three articles on man's knowledge of material things (aa. 4-6) present the Aristotelian theory of abstraction without any apparent reference to Augustine's doctrine of illumination. This seeming triumph of Aristotle over the authority of Augustine has received more attention than any other feature of this question of the De veritate. In purely philosophical matters, Aquinas is a disciple of Aristotle, but we have already shown that De veritate, question 10, is far from a purely philosophical discourse. Throughout the De veritate, Augustine is the chief authority, although Aristotle is cited almost as often as Augustine. In fact, Chenu and others have concluded that the De veritate reflects a profound and painstaking reading of Augustine's works.21 Certainly question 10 reveals that Thomas had the text of Augustine before him and pondered over the precise meaning of his words in order to expound the true thought of the Doctor. It is incorrect to view Thomas' approach to Augustine as confrontational or critical. Gilson argued that Thomas rejected Augustine's teaching as a basis for Christian philosophy in favor of Aristotle, but he admitted that as far as the theory of knowledge goes, Thomas never openly criticizes Augustine.22 20

In fact, Augustine is cited in the determination of five of the thirteen articles: aa. 2, 3, 7, 8, 9. 21 Chenu believes that the De veritate was inspired by Thomas' first real encounter with the text of Augustine. See Chenu, Introduction a I'etude de saint Thomas d'Aquin (2nd ed., Montreal: Institut d'Etudes Medievales; Paris: Vrin, 1954), p. 47: "II semble que les questions De veritate (12 5 6 -12 5 9) aient etc inspirees et alimentees par la premiere rencontre personnel et profonde d'Augustin. Les lire non comme une demolition, mais comme une assomption dans une autre analyse noetique de la tres riche experience d'Augustin." Sullivan, pp. 254-255, considers this opinion very likely. 22 Etienne Gilson, "Pourquoi saint Thomas a critique saint Augustin," Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen age 1 (1926-1927): 126: "Le thomisme serait done ne, en tant que philosophic, d'une decision philosophique pure. Opter contre la doctrine de Platon, pour celle d'Aristote, c'etait s'obliger a reconstruire la philosophic chretienne sur d'autres bases que celles de saint Augustin." In this article Gilson shows Thomas' preference for an Aristotelian epistemology over an Augustinian theory of illumination that was often tainted by Avicennian influences. However, he admits that Thomas does not openly confront Augustine. See p. 6: "Chaque fois que la doctrine augustinienne de rillumination se trouve en cause, saint Thomas assimile les textes litigieux et les amene a son propre sens avec une subtilite parfois deconcertante."


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In a study of Thomas's handling of texts from Augustine in the De veritate, Wilhelm Schneider has argued that Thomas never contradicts Augustine, although he sometimes indirectly corrects him.23 In Thomas' eyes Augustine clearly held a position of authority Aristotle could never approach, although at the purely philosophical level Aristotle might come closer to the truth or state it in clearer terms. In the format of the disputed question, the argument from authority has its proper place in the arguments for and against the particular thesis of the article. It is not surprising, therefore, to find Augustine named time and again in the arguments of question 10 on account of his great authority. If Thomas does not always refer directly to him in the body of every article, it should not be concluded that he has rejected or forgotten Augustine's teaching. He usually develops a close line of reasoning within each article proper, working from principles already accepted to the conclusion to be demonstrated. In this process within the determination, the citation of authorities is generally a secondary feature. Thomas may insert a name or a text at a certain point to show that he has authoritative support for the particular step he has just reached in his proof—not to prove the step, but to show that he is still in good company, or to suggest that his demonstration helps to explain the true sense of the authoritative text he has cited.24 If he is attempting to refute errors as well as to demonstrate truth, he sometimes will give a catalogue of various positions and their proponents, as he does in article 6 on the question of the source of our knowledge of material things.25 In this case, Thomas does not bother to name the proponents of each position, for he does not need to cite their names or their texts hi order to distinguish truth from error in their positions. It is important to recognize that the determination of an article cannot properly be understood if it is artificially separated from the arguments and the replies. In the case of article 3 of our question, as we shall see later, there is direct reference to the arguments in the body of the article. It is no sign of any demotion of Augustine that his name sometimes figures more 23

Die Quaestiones disputatae 'De veritate' des Thomas von Aquin in ihrer philosophiegeschichtlichen Beziehung zuAugustinus, Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophic und Theologie des Mittelalters 27, 3 (Munster: Aschendorff, 1930), p. 93. 24 See Chenu, Introduction, pp. 111-113 on the use of authorities in Aquinas' works, esp. pp. 112-112: "L*auctoritas medievale a un jeu beaucoup plus souple que l'argument moderne de tradition, et n'a pas a en remplir le but scientifique. Ainsi peut-on discerner a cote de references reelles et positives (utilisables, certes, en documentation theologique), des recours purement dialectiques et de simples citations decoratives." The use is indeed subtle, and it differs to some extent depending on the type of work. The auctoritates have an especially important role in the process of the disputed question. 25 De ver. q. 10, a.6, resp.; Leon., pp. 311-312.

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prominently in the arguments than in the determination. In the disputation the arguments and their replies formed a part of the whole academic event that was equal in importance to the determination by the master that followed. The mere absence of Augustine's name in the determination of any article of the disputed questions cannot be taken to suggest that Thomas meant to play down or reject Augustine's teaching on a particular topic. Let us briefly examine two articles of De veritate, question 10, in which Thomas does not refer to Augustine in the determination. First, in article 1 Thomas cites Aristotle twice and Dionysius once in the course of his determination, but fails to mention Augustine, as de Beaurecueil has remarked.26 Nevertheless, without Augustine, Thomas could never have written this article. The article necessarily presupposes the existence of Augustine's teaching on the image of the Trinity in man's mind; its central task is to examine the precise sense of Augustine's term mens. It is superfluous to spell out Augustine's name, for the word mens suffices to evoke his memory. Augustine's De Trinitate poses a problem for the reader, because the word mens in one text seems to designate the essence of the soul while elsewhere it refers only to the higher part of the soul. Thomas formulates this question hi the language of Aristotelian psychology: is the mind the essence of the soul, or merely one of its faculties? Leaving aside the problem of the translation in terminology entailed in the Aristotelian phrasing, Thomas clearly preserves the original Augustinian matrix of the question. He selects the two chief texts of Augustine's De Trinitate that pose the interpretative problem concerning the sense of the term mens, and from each text he forms the first argument in favor of each of the two positions.27 Of the sixteen arguments Thomas gives for both sides, nine make clear reference to Augustine.28 At one level, then, article 1 is addressed to the text of Augustine and to the disciples of Augustine and their attempts to understand the Doctor's thought. In the determination itself Thomas' primary concern is to arrive at the truth, but he does not shun the aid others have offered. Towards the end of the determination Thomas virtually alludes to Augustine's De Trinitate when he recalls that the subject of the investigation is not the mens without any further qualification, but the mens inasmuch as the image of God is found in it.29 This reference places us squarely in the world of Christian psychology 26

See n. 10 above. De ver. q.10, a.l, obj.l and s.c.l; Leon., pp. 295, 296. 28 Obj. 1, 2, 3, 5 and s.c. 1, 3, 5, 6. Thomas does not mention Augustine's name in s.c. 5, but he is obviously referring to the text already quoted in obj. 5. 29 De ver. q.10, a.l, resp.; Leon, p. 297: "et sic mens, prout in ea est imago, nominal potentiam animae et non essentiam." 27


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where Aristotle is by no means the best-qualified guide. Furthermore, the determination is, in effect, a reconciliation of the two texts of Augustine, for Thomas shows how one sense of the word mens is derived from the other on the basis of the general principle, which would have been familiar to Augustine, that a thing may fittingly be designated by the name of its highest part. Thomas manages to retain Augustine's sense of man's dignity—that the image of God resides in the superior part of man's soul, the mind, which distinguishes the soul of man from the soul of the brute animal. Thus article 1 stands within the true tradition of Augustinian teaching, expounding the sense of the great Doctor's text and preserving his characteristic conception of man's nature in terms of his highest faculties and divine vocation. In some of the other articles of question 10, the Augustinian element is expressed more openly in the body of the article. Those who see question 10 as the liberation of Thomas from the bonds of Augustine's teaching point to the dominance of the Aristotelian doctrine of abstraction in the three articles (aa. 4-6) on human knowledge of material things. In article 5 Augustine's name does not appear at all, not even in the arguments. Nevertheless, a strong undercurrent of Augustinian thinking runs through these three articles and finds its fullest expression in article 6, where Thomas weighs the causes of our knowledge of material things. In the determination Thomas straightforwardly states his preference for the Aristotelian position over the various erroneous positions he has briefly sketched: Therefore, the opinion of the Philosopher is more reasonable than any of the foregoing positions. He attributes the knowledge of our mind partly to intrinsic, partly to extrinsic, influence. Not only beings separated from matter, but also sensible things themselves, play their part.30

Nevertheless, what follows is not meant to be simply a presentation of the Aristotelian position, for Thomas formulates his solution so that it embraces Augustine's epistemology as well as Aristotle's. In his solution Thomas concludes that there is some truth in the last of the catalogue of erroneous positions that he has sketched earlier in the determination. As Thomas presents it, the position resembles the Plotinian theory of sensation, according to which the soul forms likenesses of sensible things within itself hi the presence of these things, but without any causal action of the things on the soul.31 In some of his writings Augustine seems 30

De ver. q.10, a.6; resp.; Leon., p. 312. De ver. q.10, a.6, resp.; Leon., p. 312: "Alii vero dixerunt quod anima sibi ipsi est scientiae causa: non enim a sensibilibus scientiam accipit quasi per actionem sensibilium aliquo modo similitudines rerum ad animam perveniant, sed ipsa anima ad praesentiam sensibilium in se similitudines sensibilium format." McGlynn suggests Augustine's De Genesi ad litteram, 31

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to have held this position, but in book 11 of the De Trinitate (the work Thomas had before him in De veritate, q. 10) he proposes a much more Aristotelian model of sensation, including the analogy of the signet ring and the wax.32 Nevertheless, many over the centuries have considered this last position in Thomas' catalogue as Augustinian. In fact, it is noteworthy that Thomas does not entirely reject the position: "Sed haec positio non videtur totaliter rationabilis." He criticizes it because it is easily reduced to the unacceptable Platonic theory of reminiscence. Augustine himself came to reject Plato's theory of reminiscence, although he did not completely abandon the notion of reminiscence.33 Thomas adopts Augustine's modified notion of reminiscence. With Augustine he rejects any suggestion of the pre-existence of the soul or a prior state of knowledge. However, he concludes his determination of article 6 with the admission that the theory of reminiscence contains an element of truth. In some sense, Thomas says, we already have knowledge of what we come to learn because all knowledge is derived from universal principles known immediately by the light of the agent intellect.34 The textual parallels between the final paragraph of Thomas' determination and his presentation of the last erroneous position show the elements of truth in the position that Thomas accepted: the soul indeed has an interior principle of knowledge, and it can in some sense be said to contain within itself from its beginning all the knowledge it shall ever attain.35 bk. 12, as a source of this position, as well as Plotinus, Alcher of Clairvaux, and William of Auvergne: see Truth, p. 431, n. 22. 32 See esp. the section on sensation: De Trin 11.1.1-11.2.5. Augustine is the bane of interpreters. His thought on many issues changed and developed. This passage from his most extensive investigation of the nature of the mind in his mature period must be given due weight against his early philosophical works and also against the specialized consideration of vision in De Genesi ad litteram. 33 Augustine's rejection of Plato's theory is stated in a number of texts, of which one is quite unequivocal: De Trin. 12.15.24. 34 De ver. q.10, a.6, resp.: Leon., p. 313: "Et secundum hoc verum est quod scientiam mens nostra a sensibilibus accipit; nihilominus tamen ipsa anima in se similitudines rerum format in quantum per lumen intellectus agentis efficiuntur formae in sensibilibus abstractae intelligibiles actu, ut in intellectu possibili recipi possint. Et sic etiam in lumine intellectus agentis nobis est quodam modo originaliter omnis scientia indita mediantibus universalibus conceptionibus quae statim lumine intellectus agentis cognoscuntur, per quas sicut per universalia principia iudicamus de aliis et ea praecognoscimus in ipsis, ut secundum hoc etiam ilia opinio veritatem habeat quae ponit nos ea quae addiscimus ante in notitia habuisse." 35 Thomas' description of the erroneous position, "ipsa anima ad praesentiam sensibilium in se similitudines rerum format" (p. 316), should be compared with his explication of the intrinsic agency: "nihilominus tamen ipsa anima in se similitudines rerum format in quantum per lumen intellectus agentis efficiuntur formae a sensibilibus abstractae intelligibiles actu" (p. 313). The textual similarity indicates that Thomas considered the position correct as far


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As we see from the subsequent responses to the arguments of article 6, Thomas knew full well that the truth of this corrected theory of reminiscence is in fact the doctrine of St. Augustine.36 He connects the universal principles in which all our knowledge is implicit with the immutable reasons and the uncreated truth of which Augustine speaks: The first principles, of which we have innate cognition, are a certain likeness of the uncreated truth. Thus when we judge about other things through these principles, we are said to judge about these things through immutable reasons or through the uncreated truth.37

Article 6 can be seen as an attempt to show that Augustine's teaching is compatible with Aristotelian epistemology. It is, however, perhaps more correct to see it as an Augustinian reading of Aristotle, for the emphasis is far stronger on the interior cause of our knowledge than on the exterior agency of the material things themselves.38 A similar case could be made for each article of question 10. We cannot rightly conclude from the mere absence of Augustine's name that Thomas has turned away from his teaching. The genius of Augustine pervades the entire question. Where Thomas is not directly concerned with the texts of the great Doctor, he remains, nevertheless, profoundly aware of his thought. Nowhere does he reject Augustine's epistemology, nor is it fair to claim that the disciple is engaged in a sly attempt to twist Augustine's words to his own purpose. Thomas may have rejected the Augustinianism that many of his contemporaries confused with the true doctrine of Augustine, but his esteem and love for Augustine's proper teaching runs very deep. He recognized Augustine's fondness for Plato, but it is no more correct to categorize Augustine as a Platonist than it is to label Thomas an Aristotelian. Both recognized only one true teacher, who is the uncreated Truth. A proper as it goes, although an explanation that the soul is receptive as well as active should be added. Again, the formulation of the Platonic theory of reminiscence as the "praedictam opinionem quae ponit omnium rerum scientiam animae humanae naturaliter insitam esse" (p. 312) seems to find an echo in a line of Thomas' solution: "Et sic etiam in lumine intellectus agentis nobis est quodam modo originaliter omnis scientia indita" (p. 313). 36 See esp. ad. 3m, 5m, and 6m. 37 De ver. q.10, a.6, ad 6m; Leon., p. 313: "prima principia quorum cognitio est nobis innata sunt quaedam similitude increatae veritatis; unde secundum quod per ea de aliis iudicamus, dicimur iudicare de rebus per rationes incommutabiles vel per veritatem increatam." McGlynn's translation has been altered on the basis of the readings in the new Leonine text. 38 Thomas states clearly that the interior agency is primary while the exterior agency of the phantasm is strictly instrumental. See De ver., q.10, a.6, ad 7m; Leon., p. 314: "in receptione qua intellectus possibilis species rerum accipit a phantasmatibus, se habent phantasmata ut agens instrumentale vel secundarium, intellectus vero agens ut agens principale et primum."

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appreciation of the teaching of both theologians reveals that they agree on the truth to a greater degree than their students have tended to realize. De veritate, question 10, then, bears witness to the great influence of Augustine. Thomas ordered his disputation along Augustinian lines and kept the teaching of Augustine constantly before him. The question is not an essay in Aristotelian psychology or epistemology, but an examination of the Augustinian doctrine of the image of the Trinity. Thomas draws on a number of Augustine's works, but above all on that great masterpiece, the De Trinitate, the fundamental source of the doctrine of the image of the Trinity. The number of citations from the De Trinitate hi question 10 is nearly twice the number from all the other works of Augustine put together. As one would expect, Thomas refers mainly to the later part of the De Trinitate, where Augustine pursues his search for the image of the Trinity. Several articles, especially article 3, reveal that he had mastered this section of Augustine's work. It seems, however, that he had not yet realized the significance of book 15, which he rarely cites. Still, the spirit of Augustine's treatise is ever present. The mind must turn inwards to its own nature in order to move upwards to God, who alone is higher than itself. De veritate, question 10, reflects the Augustinian model of the ascent to God through His image. B. LEVELS OF PERFECTION: THE ONTOLOGY OF THE IMAGE A significant advance occurs in Thomas' analysis of the ontological status of the image of God from the Scriptum super Sententiis to the De veritate. In the Scriptum Thomas basically accepted the commonly held interpretation of Augustine's second psychological triad of memoria, intelligentia, voluntas as a triad of faculties. Although he qualified this analysis to some degree by his considerations on the state of perpetual, though nascent, activity hi which the faculties exist, Thomas followed the traditional interpretation. In De veritate, question 10, he does not reject the conception of the image as a triad of faculties, but he no longer considers it the principal level of the image. After studying Augustine's De Trinitate carefully, Thomas realized that the image of the Trinity is principally found in the acts of memory, understanding, and will, rather than in the corresponding faculties. Thomas rejects any conception of the image that sacrifices the reality of Augustine's triads to a fondness for facile symmetry. The unity of essence and Trinity of Persons hi God is not reflected primarily in man's mind taken as his essence, and its three faculties. Through a more faithful reading of Augustine, Thomas came to understand that the image of the Trinity exists principally in the acts of


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the higher part of man's soul, the mind. In the first three articles of De veritate, question 10, Thomas carefully presents his theory of the ontological status of the image in the light of his reconsideration of the teaching of Augustine. Article 1: The Concept o/mens Aquinas turns first to the definition of the Augustinian term mens. Whereas he gave a very cursory analysis of the term in the Scriptum,39 he now devotes the first article of De veritate, question 10, to a more precise determination of the ontological status of the mind (mens) in keeping with Augustine's thought. As we have already seen, the text of Augustine suggests the two answers that are proposed in the title of the article: "First it is asked whether the mind, inasmuch as the image of the Trinity is located in it, is the essence of the soul or some faculty of it."40 In the Scriptum, apparently following a passage in Albert's Commentary, Thomas listed three possible meanings for the term mens, but settled on the one that best fitted the Augustinian texts cited in Peter Lombard's book, without bothering to determine which meaning is most proper and how the others are related to it.41 He identified the mens with the "higher part of the soul," as Augustine himself does in the De Trinitate from book 12 onwards. Thomas bases this identification on a nominal definition of mens taken from the traditional etymology of the word: Sometimes it ["mind"] is taken to mean the intellect itself as it examines things, inasmuch as "mind" (mens) is derived from the verb "measure" (metior); and according to this sense it is also understood above, that mind is the higher part of the soul.42

As Thomas goes on to show, one advantage of this definition of "mind" as the higher part of the soul is that it covers the important use of the term mens for the subject of the three faculties of memoria, intelligentia, voluntas. 39

1 Sent, d.3, q.5; pp. 123-124. De ver. q.10, a.l, prol.; Leon., p. 295. 41 Thomas seems to have derived his list of meanings from Albert. Cf. Albert, 1 Sent., d.3, a.34; Borgnet 25, p. 141: "Hie notandum quod mens dicitur quatuor modis, scilicet memoria quandoque: sicut Augustinus dicit, quod mens meminit sui: quandoque dicitur intellectus rem examinans, et ita accipitur a Joanne Damascene, et sic dicitur a metior metiris, quia metiendo rationes rei, examinat rem: et quandoque dicitur superior pars rationalis animae, in qua sunt tres vires animae imaginis: quandoque dicitur tota rationalis anima, vel intellectualis natura, sicut beatus Dionysius saepe vocat Angelos divinas mentes." In the Scriptum, Thomas combines Albert's second and third meanings into one. 42 1 Sent d.3, q.5, sol.; p. 123. 40

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However, Thomas then oddly concludes that the triad of mens, notitia, amor refers to the essence of the soul and its consubstantial habits.43 In effect, he implies that the higher part of the soul is the very essence of the soul. Thomas allows himself to use the word "essence" according to a common meaning that it still retains; for we often speak of that which is best or highest in a thing as its essence. In the Scriptum Thomas apparently let this imprecise use of the word "essence" pass without remark. In the De veritate he makes a careful study of this inexact application of the term essentia to the higher part of the soul, the mind. Thomas begins from the same nominal definition of mens, although he states it in slightly different words. He now derives the word mens from the verb mensuro, which is a derivative form of the simpler verb metior but has the same meaning: "to measure."44 From this etymology Thomas again concludes that the mind is the intellect, which measures all things by its principles: The name "mind" (mens) is taken from the verb "measure" (mensuro). For things of any genus are measured by that which is least and the first principle in their genus, as is clear from the Metaphysics, book 10. Thus the name "mind" is applied to the soul in the same way as the name "intellect." For the intellect knows about things only by measuring them, as it were, according to its principles.45

Here Thomas adds that the intellect is a faculty of the soul, not its essence.46 In the Scriptum he had identified the mind as the higher part of the soul with the essence of the soul. Now in the De veritate he seems to accept the principle invoked in the first sed contra-, every part that is found in the soul is a faculty.47 In the De veritate Thomas clearly recognizes the impropriety of 43

1 Sent, d.3, q.5, sol.; p. 124: "mens sumitur hie, sicut et supra, pro ipsa superiori parte animae, quae est subjectum praedictae imaginis, et notitia est habitus memoriae, et amor habitus voluntatis; et ita haec assignatio sumitur secundum essentiam et habitus consubstantiales." Thomas thus follows Bonaventure's analysis of this triad and his rejection of Albert's interpretation of the triad as three habits. See Bonaventure, 1 Sent, d.3, p. 2, a.2, q.l, resp.; Quaracchi 1, p. 89. 44 De Beaurecueil [ 1]:70 seems to have overlooked the etymology in 1 Sent, d.3, q.5, or else he failed to see the basic equivalence of the verbs (metior said mensuro) as different forms of the same root. He remarks that in the De veritate, "saint Thomas introduit sa solution par une etymologic (mens venant de mensurando), qui d'ailleurs ne figure pas aux Sentences." 45 De ver. q. 10, a. 1, resp.; Leon., p. 296. With regard to this identification of the two terms mens and intellects, see Chenu's discussion of these terms as related to the Aristotelian and Dionysian concepts of vovq and to Augustine's concept of mens (Introduction, pp. 84-86). 46 De ver. q.10, a.l, resp.; Leon., p. 296: "Intellectus autem, cum dicatur per respectum ad actum, potentiam animae designat: virtus enim sive potentia est medium inter essentiam et operationem, ut patet per Dionysium ..." 47 De ver. q.10, a.l, s.c.l; Leon., p. 296: "Sed contra, anima non habet alias partes nisi suas potentias; sed mens est quaedam pars animae superior, ut Augustinus dicit in libro De Trinitate; ergo mens est potentia animae."


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identifying a part of the soul, even its highest part, with the essence of the soul. Nevertheless, instead of determining more precisely what exactly the mind is, he devotes the remainder of his determination-and it is by far the greater portion—to a justification of the improper application of the term mens to the soul's essence. Thomas leaves the examination of the mind as a faculty to the subsequent replies to the arguments. Thomas vindicates the traditional use of the word "mind" to refer to the essence of the soul by a carefully articulated demonstration of the naming of the soul. First, he shows that it is the general case that we name the essence of any thing by the name of its highest faculty or power. For the essences of things are not known to us directly, whereas their faculties are more directly known to us through the acts proper to them. However, the essence of a thing can only be known and properly named through the faculty or power that is most proper to the thing as the most comprehensive and the highest principle of its power. After this statement of the general principle, Thomas examines the specific case of the essence of man's soul. He compares the human soul to the soul of plants and the soul of brute animals according to the Aristotelian hierarchy of faculties of the soul. The soul of plants is named the nutritive or vegetative soul because it has no higher faculty than the nutritive faculty. Similarly, the soul of animals is designated as the sensitive soul or even simply as sense because its highest faculty is the faculty of sense. Of all the faculties that a soul may possess, man's soul includes the highest: But the human soul reaches the highest level there is among faculties of the soul and takes its name from this, being called intellective, or sometimes also intellect and similarly mind, inasmuch as from it [the human soul] such a faculty naturally flows, as is proper to it above other souls.48

Thus Thomas concludes his argument by indicating the metaphysical basis for designating the soul itself by the name of its highest faculty. Retaining the metaphor he used in the Scriptum, Thomas continues to speak of the faculties of the soul as flowing naturally from its essence, by which he means that the faculties are proper effects that proceed from the essence of the soul as from their cause. In response to the sixth argument, Thomas states that the faculty lends its name to the essence of the soul inasmuch as any proper effect serves to make its cause known.49 Thus mens may designate the essence of man's soul because it designates first the faculty 48

De ver. a. 10, a.l, resp.; Leon, p. 297. De ver. q.10, a.l, ad 6m; Leon., p. 299: "secundum Philosophum in vm Metaphysicae, quia substantiates rerum differentiae sunt nobis ignotae, loco earum interdum diffinientes accidentalibus utuntur secundum quod ipsa accidentia designant vel notificant essentiam ut proprii effectus notificant causam." 49

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that is the proper effect of that essence, and so can designate also the constitutive difference that distinguishes man's soul from the soul of the animal. Thomas permits the application of the term mens to the essence of the soul, but he insists that in its proper sense the term refers to a faculty of the soul. He also insists that the image of the Trinity is found in us according to this highest faculty of the soul, to which the name mens properly belongs: It is clear then that in our soul "mind" designates that which is highest in its power. Hence, because the image of God is found in us according to that which is highest in us, the image will belong to the essence of the soul only according to the mind, inasmuch as "mind" designates its highest faculty.50

Several arguments show the apparent difficulty that results from this analysis: if the image is composed of a triad of faculties, and if the subject of the image, that is, the mind, is also a faculty, then there would result a case in which one faculty is the subject of other faculties.51 Thomas resolves this difficulty by simply correcting the premise that the faculty of the mind is the subject of the image. It was customary to speak of the mind as the subject of the image, and such usage was closely tied to the view that the mind is the essence of the soul hi which the faculties of the image inhere as proper qualities inhere in their subject. In his reply to the eight argument, Thomas concedes that the mind is the subject of the image, but only on condition that the word "mind" is understood according to its improper extension to the essence of the soul: Mind, when it designates the faculty itself, is not related to intellect and will as subject, but rather as a whole to its parts; but if it is taken for the essence of the soul inasmuch as such a faculty proceeds naturally from it, mind will designate the subject of the faculties.52

In this text Thomas makes it clear that the mind contains the faculties of the image as a whole contains its parts rather than as a subject possesses its accidents. Thus the mind is not a particular faculty like the intellect or the will, but rather a general faculty that embraces a number of particular faculties.53 Thomas also refers to the mind as a totum potentiate, as he did in the Scriptwn.54 Thus the mind is not one particular faculty, but a group of 50

De ver. q.10, a.l, resp.; Leon., p. 297. This difficulty is most clearly related in obj. 8, but obj. 2, 7, and 9 are closely related. 52 De ver. q.10, a.l, ad 8m; Leon., p. 299. 53 De ver. q.10, a.l, ad 9m; Leon., p. 299: "una potentia particularis non comprehendit sub se plures; sed nihil prohibet sub una generali potentia comprehendi plures ut partes." 54 De ver. q.10, a.l, ad 7m; Leon., p. 299: "mens non est una quaedam potentia praeter memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem, sed est quoddam totum potentiate comprehendens haec tria." Cf. 1 Sent., d.3, q.4, a.2, ad lm; pp. 116-117. 51


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faculties. Thomas speaks of it as a "certain genus of faculties of the soul" that are distinguished by the spiritual mode of their acts.55 The mind is properly the higher intellectual part of man's soul, to which belong the particular faculties of intellect and will. Hence Thomas distinguishes two senses of the term mens in relation to the parts of the image of the Trinity. If we take the faculties of the image together as a whole, we have the mind as a general faculty, a totum potentiate, the highest part of man's soul. However, we can also speak of the mind as the subject of the image because it is permissible to refer to the essence of the soul as mind. All the faculties of the image are accidents (although proper, not common, accidents) of the soul's essence, but they compose that higher part of the soul, the mind, properly so-called, by which the very essence of the soul may be designated, as the cause is fittingly designated by its proper effect. Thus the mind, properly speaking, contains the faculties of the image as a whole contains it parts; but in the extended sense the mind refers to the subject of the image's faculties, the essence of the soul. In this way Thomas carefully preserves two complementary truths about the image of God: the image is located in the highest part of the soul, but it is also rooted in the very essence of the soul. In this way, too, he preserves that tension inherent in the scriptural references to the image of God: man is made to the image of God, but also man is the image of God. In the De veritate Thomas comes to consider the image in terms of its dynamic relation to God, but he continues to maintain that the image can never be separated from man's nature. Article 2: Memory in the Mind In the second article of question 10, St. Thomas reconsiders the traditional problem of the existence of a sort of memory in the mind. Augustine had made memory the first part of his principal version of the image of the Trinity. However, this memory could not be the normal faculty of memory in the sensible part of the soul because the triad of memoria, intelligentia, voluntas is situated in the higher part of the soul, the mind. Under the influence of the Augustinianism of his time, Thomas argued in the Scriptum that there is in fact a sort of faculty of memory that belongs to the mind.56 55

De ver. q.10, a.l, ad 2m; Leon., p. 298: "mens potest comprehendere voluntatem et intellectum absque hoc quod sit essentia animae, in quantum scilicet nominal quoddam genus potentiarum animae, ut sub mente intelligantur comprehend! omnes illae potentiae quae in suis actibus omnino a materia et condicionibus materiae recedunt." 56 1 Sent, d.3, q.4, a.l, sol.; pp. 112-113.

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In the De veritate Thomas maintains the fundamental thesis that there is a sort of memory in the mind, but he no longer considers it necessary to speak of this intellectual memory as a faculty, even in the extended sense he employed in the Scriptum.51 It seems likely that by the time he disputed De veritate, question 10, Thomas had come to realize from careful study of Augustine's De Trinitate that the interpretation of the triadic image as three faculties had no real basis in Augustine's own teaching. Article 2 of question 10, when examined closely, bears out this conjecture. Thomas leaves direct discussion of the ontological status of memory as a part of the image of God in man's mind for the article that follows. In the present article of the De veritate, he considers primarily the existence of this peculiar sort of memory and its function, by which its existence is apprehended. Article 2 provides good evidence for the thesis that Thomas had become well acquainted with the text of Augustine's De Trinitate at some tune after he had written the first book of the Scriptum and before he composed question 10 of the De veritate. In the article of the Scriptum in which he treats the question concerning intellectual memory, Thomas cites Augustine in only one of the arguments. In fact, this argument purports to disprove the existence of a faculty of memory that would form part of the image of God on the grounds that memory is common to both man and beast, and that what is common to man and beast pertains to the sensible part of the soul, which is below the level of the image.58 Thomas cites book 12 of the De Trinitate to support the thesis that what is common to man and beast lies in the sensualitas, that is, the sensible part of the soul. Thomas repeats this argument in the De veritate as the first argument against the existence of a memory in the mind, but there is a subtle shift to a more Augustinian mode of expression.59 Augustine does not use the term sensualitas in the first chapters of De Trinitate, book 12, on which both arguments draw.60 He 57

See pp. 59-60. In the Scriptum Thomas knew that this memory was not a proper faculty, but he took care to show that it could be called a faculty if that term were understood to refer to any natural or essential property of the soul. 58 1 Sent d.3, q.4, a.l, obj.l; p. I l l : "Videtur quodmemorianon pertineat ad imaginem. Sicut enim dicit Augustinus, xii De Trinit, cap. 1, col. 997, t. vin, quod in anima reperies commune cum brutis, ad sensualitatem pertinet. Memoria autem est communis nobis et brutis. Igitur cum imago non sit in sensualitate, videtur quod memoria ad imaginem non pertineat." 59 De ver. q.10, a.2, obj.l; Leon., p. 299: "Secundo quaeritur utrum in mente sit memoria. Et videtur quod non quia, secundum Augustinum xin De Trinitate, illud quod est commune nobis et brutis non pertinet ad mentem; memoria autem nobis et brutis communis est, ut patet per Augustinum x Confessionum; ergo memoria non est in mente." As the Leonine editor indicates, the number of the book of the De Trinitate is incorrect and should be "xn," as it is correctly cited in Sum. theol., la, q.79, a.6, obj.l. 60 He speaks of the part of man common to man and beast as the exterior homo.


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chooses rather to speak of that which is not common to us and the beasts: reason or mind.61 In the De veritate Thomas states the thesis of his argument in terms that are closer to the text of Augustine, and he also documents the argument with an additional reference to Augustine (his disquisition on memory in the Confessions). In the article hi the Scriptum, Thomas shows no knowledge (beyond the quotation that Peter Lombard gives in distinction 3 of the Sentences) of the important passages on intellectual memory in book 14 of Augustine's De Trinitate.62 This is not the case in the De veritate. It is clear that Thomas had studied Augustine's text and in particular knew the pertinent chapter of book 14 in which Augustine himself argues for the existence of intellectual memory.63 In one of the sed contra arguments of article 2, Thomas refers to Augustine's proof of the existence of memory in the mind and mentions Augustine's use of a passage from Virgil.64 Thomas' knowledge of this chapter of the De Trinitate is further supported by the references Thomas makes in two of the arguments to a text of Cicero's.65 Both arguments refer to the same passage that Augustine quotes from Cicero in his chapter on intellectual memory. It is improbable that this is mere coincidence. As we have seen in the preceding section, Thomas had made himself familiar with the text of the De Trinitate prior to the composition of question 10. The arguments of article 2 in this question reveal that he had before him the particular chapter in which Augustine dealt with the problem to which Thomas addresses his article.

61

De Trin. 12.2.2; CCL 50:357: "non sunt tamen rationis expertia nee hominibus pecoribusque communia." De Trin. 12.3.3; CCL 50:357: "Illud vero nostrum ... ita versatu ut non sit nobis commune cum pecore rationale est quidem, sed ex ilia rationali nostrae mentis substantia qua subhaeremus intelligibili atque incommutabili veritati tanquam ductum et inferioribus tractandis gubernandisque deputatum est." 62 1 Sent d.3, text.; p. 84: "Illud etiam sciendum est, quod memoria non solum absentium est et praeteritorum, sed etiam praesentium, ut ait Augustinus in xrv lib. De Trinit., cap. XT, col. 1047, t. vm, alioquin non se caperet." Thomas refers to this line of the Sentences in the Scriptum in response to the argument that there can be no intellectual memory because memory is always concerned with things that are past and which are known as past only by the sensible part of the soul. See 1 Sent, d.3, q.4, a.l, ad 2m; p. 113: "Ad secundum dicendum, quod aequivocatur nomen memoriae. Memoria enim, secundum quod hie accipitur, abstrahit a qualibet differentia temporis, ut in littera dicitur, quia est praesentium, praeteritorum et futurorum." 63 De Trin. 14.11.14; CCL 50A:441-442. 64 De ver. q.10, a.2, s.c.2; Leon., p. 300: "sed memoria etiam proprie accepta se habet aequaliter ad omne tempus, ut dicit Augustinus xw De Trinitate, et probat per dicta Virgilii qui proprie nomine memoriae et oblivionis usus est." 65 De ver. q.10, a.2, obj.3 and s.c.4; Leon., pp. 299-300. Thomas is referring to M. Tullius Cicero's De inventione.

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Thomas not only knew Augustine's chapter on intellectual memory, but also recognized the importance of the more significant remarks concerning memory in the earlier chapters of De Trinitate, book 14.66 At the beginning of the determination of article 2, Thomas notes that memory is commonly understood to refer to the awareness of things past, as Augustine had done in his chapter on intellectual memory.67 Thomas accepts this common meaning of memory as the proper sense of the word: memory always includes the awareness of something from the past accompanied by the sense of the passage of time between the past moment in which we first perceived the thing and the present moment. He explains that memory in this proper sense belongs to the sensible part of the soul, not to the intellect, because the awareness of time belongs to sense rather than to intellect.68 Thomas cites the Philosopher in support of the conclusion that memory belongs properly to the general faculty of sense, but he must have been aware that Augustine also accepted this proper sense of memory, which he examines at length in book 11 of the De Trinitate.69 After he has settled the proper meaning of memory, he turns his attention to the less proper application of the term to the sort of memory that belongs to the intellect. The heart of Thomas' determination is his vindication of Augustine's notion of intellectual memory, to which he appends a lengthy refutation of Avicenna's explanation of the functioning of this type of memory. First, Thomas' use of the Augustinian term notitia should be noted. This term is often best translated as "knowledge," because for Augustine and for Aquinas it is usually a general term for any state of intellectual cognition. It does not necessarily refer to a complete act of the intellect. In fact, Augustine often uses notitia to refer to a sort of habitual cognition in contrast to the proper acts of cognition.70 Thomas does not use the word notitia here in a strictly 66

De Trin. 14.6.8-14.7.10; CCL 50A:430-435. Thomas must have had this section before his eyes, for he not only refers to it in article 2, but also explicitly makes its teaching the basis of his determination in article 3. 67 De ver. q.10, a.2, resp.; Leon., p. 300: "Dicendum quod memoria secundum communem usum loquentium pro notitia praeteritorum accipitur." Augustine begins his chapter with the common objection against intellectual memory, that memory is of things past, which Cicero also states. See De Trin. 14.11.14; CCL 50A:441-442. 68 De ver. q.10, a.2, resp.; Leon., p. 300: "Unde cum memoria secundum propriam sui acceptionem respiciat ad id quod est praeteritum respectu huius mine, constat quod memoria proprie loquendo non est in parte intellectiva sed sensitiva tantum, ut Philosophus probat." 69 The first argument of article 2 with its reference to Augustine's notion of a memory common to man and beast indicates Thomas' awareness of Augustine's position. Thomas is well aware that Augustine uses the term memoria to refer to two distinct phenomena in the soul. 70 E.g., De Trin., 14.6.9; CCL 50A:432: "quaerendum est quonam modo ad cogitationem pertineat intellectus, notitia vero cuiusque rei quae inest menti etiam quando non de ipsa cogitatur ad solam dicatur memoriam pertinere."


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exclusive sense, but rather in the inclusive sense of the English word "knowledge." He explains how the term memory can be given to all knowledge that has already lodged in the mind: However, since the intellect not only understands the intelligible thing, but also understands that it understands that particular intelligible thing, the name "memory" can therefore be extended to the knowledge (notitia) by which one knows the object of which he has also had knowledge at an earlier time, insofar as he knows he had it earlier, although he does not know the object as in the past in the manner explained above. In this way all knowledge (notitia) not received for the first time can be called memory.71

Thus Thomas bases the application of the word "memory" to a function of the mind on the phenomenon of the continuity of knowledge. Acts of knowledge are not merely sporadic, disconnected events, for the mind by its continued presence to itself can know its previous acts of knowledge. Thomas distinguishes two modes by which knowledge is preserved in the intellect: either the mind can continue the act of knowledge without any break in its attention, or it can store the knowledge and turn its attention to other things until a later time. As he points out, the latter mode has a better claim to the name of memory because the interruption or suspension of the active condition of the knowledge resembles more closely the passage of time that is associated with memory in the proper sense. According to Thomas, we may say that we have a memory of what we know habitually, but not always actually.72 Thus he comes to the conclusion that hi the mind memory refers to a habitual state in which prior attainments of the mind are preserved to facilitate the progress of the mind in the path of knowledge and love. It may seem that Thomas has struck a very un-Augustinian note by the introduction of the term habitualiter into the description of memory in the mind. Augustine does not use the terms habitus, habitualis, and habitualiter in his psychological descriptions of memory and knowledge. Nevertheless, Thomas uses these Aristotelian terms to express what Augustine really seems to have meant by memory as part of the image of the Trinity in man's mind. After his remark connecting memory with a habitual state of cognition, Thomas reaches the main conclusion of the article:

71

De ver. q.10, a.2, resp.; Leon., pp. 300-301. De ver. q.10, a.2, resp.; Leon., p. 301: "Sed hoc contingit dupliciter: uno modo quando consideratio secundum notitiam habitam non est intercisa sed continua; alio vero modo quando est intercisa, et sic habet plus de ratione praeteriti, unde et magis proprie ad rationem memoriae attingit, ut scilicet dicamur illius habere memoriam quod prius habitualiter cognoscebamus non autem in actu." 72

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And in this way memory does exist in the intellectual part of our soul; and Augustine seems to understand memory in this sense when he makes it a part of the image, for he means that everything that is retained in the mind in a habitual mode so that it does not issue in act, pertains to memory.73 He then proceeds to examine how this memory within the mind functions; but he has already made his point in the lines just quoted. The point is that there is a sort of memory in the mind that Augustine identified as one part of the image of the Trinity. The entire article presupposes the doctrine of the image in Augustine's De Trinitate, and Thomas' conclusion must be seen as the exegesis and vindication of Augustine's teaching on the peculiar sort of memory that exists in the higher part of the soul, the mind. Thomas aptly describes Augustine's notion of memory in the mind in terms of a habitual state of retention, although Augustine did not actually use the word "habitual." Augustine himself illustrates his notion of memory by means of the case of the musician who turns his mind to geometry for a time.74 The musician does not forget his music while his mind is occupied elsewhere, nor does he cease to understand and love it. In effect, Augustine is describing a particular case of the habit of science, as Aristotle would have termed it.75 Augustine uses this case to explain the sort of self-knowledge that is hidden away at the back of the mind, out of the sight of the mind's eye. Whenever we turn our thought towards it, this self-knowledge reveals that all along our mind has been remembering itself, understanding and loving itself, while its attention has been directed elsewhere.76 It is clear that Augustine meant by this hidden knowledge a habitual state of the mind between mere potentiality and the complete act that entails the process of thinking.

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De ver. q.10, a.2, resp.; Leon., p. 301. De Trin. 14.7.9; CCL 50A: 433. Augustine gives a brief statement of this teaching in th previous chapter. See De Trin. 14.6.8; CCL 50A:432: "Sicut multarum disciplinarum peritu ea quae novit eius memoria continentur, nee est inde aliquid in conspectu mentis eius nisi unde cogitat; cetera in arcana quadam notitia sunt recondita quae memoria nuncupatur." 75 And as Thomas terms it at the end of his determination. See De ver. q.10, a.2, resp.; Leon., pp. 301-302: "Et ideo alii dicunt quod species intelligibiles in intellectu possibili remanent post actualem considerationem, et harum ordinatio est habitus scientiae; et secundum hoc vis qua mens nostra retinere potest huiusmodi intelligibiles species post actualem considerationem, memoria dicetur." 76 De Trin. 14.7.9; CCL 50A:433-434: "Hinc admonemur esse nobis in abdito mentis quarundam rerum quasdam notitias, et tune quodam modo procedere in medium atque in conspectu mentis velut apertius constitui quando cogitantur; tune enim se ipsa mens et meminisse et intellegere et amare invenit etiam unde non cogitabat quando aliunde cogitabat."


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Augustine refers this habitual state of knowledge to the memory, but he is careful not to identify the two. He says that the inner memory, inner understanding, inner love seem to pertain to memory alone.77 The point of this section of the De Trinitate is to show that this inner state cannot simply be reduced to memory alone, for in some sense the mind continues to know and love itself as well as remember itself. Augustine refers to a specific state of memory as distinct from the states of understanding and love, but he also allows that in some sense the habitual states of understanding and love belong to the state of memory. In the main conclusion of article 2, Thomas draws attention to Augustine's reference to memory as embracing the inner states of understanding and love. Thus Thomas rightly considers that Augustine's notion of memory includes all that the mind holds in a habitual state within itself. In the final section of the determination of article 2, Thomas gives some indications of his judgment on the ontological status of memory as the first part of the image. We need not examine his refutation of Avicenna's theory of intellectual memory, but his elaboration of Aristotle's thesis that the intellect is the place of the forms reveals that memory in the mind is neither a proper faculty nor a habit. In fact, Thomas describes memory as a vis, that is, a power of the mind.78 The term vis is not a precise term, and for Thomas it has a wider application than the term potentia, which usually refers in psychological matters to a proper faculty. Thomas explains why memory is not a distinct faculty in article 3, but he already suggests this analysis by the use of the word vis in the determination of article 2 and in the response to the fifth argument. Memory in the mind is a sort of potency for the retention of intelligible species.79 As Augustine did not confuse memory with the state of retained knowledge, neither does Thomas identify memory with the habit

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De Trin. 14.7.10; CCL 50A:434: "Nam si nos referamus ad interiorem mentis memoriam qua sui meminit et interiorem intellegentiam qua se intellegit et interiorem voluntatem qua se diligit,... videbitur quidem imago illius trinitatis et ad solam memoriam pertinere." Augustine earlier poses the problem of the reduction of the image to memory alone—a possibility he clearly wishes to bar. Cf. De Trin. 14.6.9; CCL 50A:432-433: "quaerendum est quonam mod ad cogitationem pertineat intellectus, notitia vero cuiusque rei quae inest menti etiam quando non de ipsa cogitatur ad solam dicatur memoriam pertinere. Si enim hoc ita est, non habebat haec tria ut et sui meminisset et se intellegeret et amaret, sed meminerat sui tantum, et postea cum cogitare se coepit tune se intellexit atque dilexit." 78 De ver. q.10, a.2, resp.; Leon., p. 301-302: "et secundum hoc vis qua mens nostra retinere potest huiusmodi intelligibiles species post actualem considerationem, memoria dicetur." 79 De ver. q.10, a.2, ad 5m; Leon., p. 302: "Et praeterea mens non dicitur habere vi memorativam ex hoc quod actu aliquid teneat sed ex hoc quod est potens tenere."

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of science. Memory is a potency to retain intelligible species, whereas the habit of science is the ordering of these species, which memory allows the mind to retain.80 Nevertheless, the habit of science pertains to memory, because memory makes it possible to know things habitually. In article 2 Thomas sometimes loosely applies the name "memory" to the habitual knowledge (notitia) that the power of memory enables the possible intellect to preserve. Thomas realized that the memory Augustine considered the first part of the image is the retentive capacity of the mind to which all habitual love as well as knowledge pertains in some way. In the De veritate, then, St. Thomas works out the problem of memory hi the mind so that we can properly understand Augustine's notion of the image as the triad of memory, understanding, and will. Throughout article 2 Thomas had in mind Augustine's idea of intellectual memory from De Trinitate, book 14. He explains and defends Augustine's teaching and shows how it is compatible with Aristotle's notion of the intellect as the place of the forms. Intellectual memory is not a separate faculty of the mind, but rather the mind's capacity for retaining intelligible species. It is this retentive capacity that allows knowledge and love to exist at a habitual level in the mind. Article 3: Augustine's Triads In article 3 Thomas raises the question whether memory is a distinct faculty in the mind.81 However, he turns the article into a concise exegesis of Augustine's various versions of the image of the Trinity in his De Trinitate. In the Scriptum Thomas already realized the difficulty entailed in the common interpretation of the Augustinian triad of memoria, intelligentia, voluntas as three faculties, but his analysis of the triad lacked precision. In the De veritate Thomas no longer permits the scholastic passion for symmetry to interfere with the determination of the truth of Augustine's doctrine. Thomas clarifies the precise ontological status of Augustine's trinities against the misinterpretations to which the Bishop's doctrine had been subject. He also ranks Augustine's different versions of the image according to their degrees of perfection. 80 De ver. q.10, a.2, resp.; Leon, pp. 301-302: "species intelligibiles in intellectu possibili remanent post actualem considerationem, et harum ordinatio est habitus scientiae; et secundum hoc vis qua mens nostra retinere potest huiusmodi intelligibiles species post actualem considerationem, memoria dicetur." 81 De ver. q.10, a.3, prol.; Leon., p. 303: Tertio quaeritur utrum memoria distinguatur ab intelligentia sicut potentia a potentia."


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Thomas implies no criticism of Augustine in his exposition of the doctrine of the image. De Beaurecueil makes too much of the difference of method between Augustine and Aquinas when he distinguishes a phenomenological approach in Augustine and contrasts it with the ontological emphasis of Thomas' work.82 In the De Trinitate Augustine is not engaged in a meaningless search through any and every trinity in the mind. His investigation rests on a solid ontological foundation: God created man in the image of the Trinity. Augustine's method in the De Trinitate is, of course, heuristic, but at each step he carefully tests his findings to see whether a particular trinity not only gives an adequate representation of the divine Trinity but also really exists in the soul.83 Thomas adopts a different mode of presentation in his works according to the particular aim of each work, but he remains faithful to Augustine's teaching. Attempting to give a concise analysis of the ontological structure of the image of the Trinity in De veritate, question 10, article 3, Thomas naturally makes use of the Aristotelian distinction of faculty, habit, and act. However, the application of these terms to Augustine's doctrine is more a matter of a convenient shorthand than an attempt to alter or develop the Doctor's teaching. Nor does Thomas' ranking of the several versions of the image mean that he judged Augustine's investigation a confused attempt at a scientific treatise. Thomas recognized that the De Trinitate is an ascending search for the proper image of the Trinity. Consequently, he saw a hierarchy among the various created trinities that Augustine discerns in the course of his examination of man's soul. All the arguments of article 3 examine the distinction of intellectual memory from the faculty of intellect, and Thomas devotes the last section of his determination to the precise ontological analysis of this distinction. This issue gives him occasion to make a more general examination of the ontological status of the image of the Trinity in its several versions. In the arguments he begins to assemble the materials for his analysis of the image 82

De Beaurecueil's first thesis is that there is a development in Thomas' works towards a more scientific and objective study of man as the image of God. See De Beaurecueil [ 1 ]:65: "Le commentaire des Sentences fait surgir des comparaisons et des oppositions entre les idees proposees par le texte et 1'opinion des philosophes. Saint Thomas, encore timide, les resout en s'efforgant de sauvegarder le donne augustinien; mais ce dernier est des maintenant transpose sur le plan ontologique. Ou ses conceptions d'origine phenomenologique, devront tot ou tard ceder le pas aux resultats de I'analyse scientifique." 83 An example of Augustine's concern for the ontological status of the image is the careful study he devotes to the problem of the reduction of habitual understanding and love to the domain of memory, in the section of book 14 of the De Trinitate which we have examined above (pp. 119-122).

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according to the three levels of act, habit, and faculty. Book 14 of Augustine's De Trinitate is the source of most of the important elements for the analysis. In one argument, however, Thomas refers to the Aristotelian principle that there are only two faculties, intellect and will, in the intellectual part of the soul.84 Two other arguments identify intellectual memory with the faculty of intellect on the grounds that memory and intellect have the same act and the same object.85 On the other side, Thomas records an obvious argument in favor of the traditional position that memory, understanding, and will are three faculties: the image is supposed to reflect the equality of the three divine Persons; there is no equality between a faculty and a habit or an act; therefore, all three parts of the image must be faculties, if at least one part is indeed a faculty.86 Another argument for the triad of faculties hangs on Augustine's assertion of the permanence of the image. As part of the image, memory cannot be an act, for acts do not continue forever in our soul. Therefore, all three elements of the image must be faculties.87 Of more interest is the first argument in favor of three faculties. It entails an exegesis of an important line from book 14 of the De Trinitate in which Augustine defines the image of God in terms of man's ability to employ his intellect to contemplate God. Thomas draws a connection between the potentiality expressed by the verb potest that Augustine uses in the passage and the potentiality of the faculties (potentiae) of the soul. Therefore, the image must be found in the soul's faculties, and the parts of the image, that is, memoria, intelligentia, voluntas, must be faculties.88 Of all the arguments the most significant are the third and fourth arguments for the identification of memory with intellect. These two arguments in effect form one concise examination of the Augustinian term intelligentia. Although it is often correct to translate this word as "intellect," the Latin 84 De ver. q.10, a.3, obj.5; Leon., p. 303: "Praeterea, in intellectiva parte animae non invenitur aliqua potentia nisi cognitiva et motiva vel affectiva; sed voluntas est affectiva vel motiva, intelligentia autem est cognitiva; ergo memoria non est alia potentia ab intelligentia." 85 De ver. q.10, a.3, obj. 1 and 2; Leon., p. 303. In the first argument it is claimed that the same act of retaining intelligible species is attributed by Augustine to the memory and by Aristotle to the possible intellect. 86 De ver. q.10, a.3, s.c.3; Leon., p. 304. 87 De ver. q.10, a.3, s.c.2; Leon., p. 304. 88 De ver. q.10, a.3, s.c.l; Leon., pp. 303-304: "Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicitxrv De Trinitate, quod secundum hoc anima est ad imaginem Dei quod uti ratione atque intellectu ad intelligendum Deum et conspiciendum potest; sed potest anima conspicere secundum potentiam; ergo imago in anima attenditur secundum potentias." Thomas moves from the potestto the general notion of the soul's potency (potentia), to the specific notion of the soul's faculties (potentiae).


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does not necessarily refer to the faculty of intellect. It can also refer to the act or the habitual state of understanding. Thomas realized that by the term intelligentia Augustine usually signifies the act or habit in his discussion of the image in De Trinitate, book 14. In the third argument, book 14 is cited for its distinction between the act of intelligence, which requires that we actually think of the particular object, and the habit of intelligence, which remains when we have ceased to think of that object.89 The question of article 3 is then posed for each of the possible senses of the term intelligentia. If intelligentia refers to the act, the question obviously loses its sense, for it is asked whether memory is a faculty distinct from the faculty of intelligence, not whether it is distinct from the act of intelligence. If intelligentia refers to the habit, Augustine himself suggests in a crucial passage that the inner state of understanding belongs to memory alone, so that there would be no distinction between memory and intelligence as two different faculties of the mind.90 Thus at the level of habit there appears to be no real distinction between memory and understanding. In the fourth argument Thomas presents the third possible signification of intelligentia: the faculty of understanding. Thomas does not mention Augustine because he seems to have realized that Augustine does not explicitly consider the parts of the image as faculties. Furthermore, the argument addresses a counterposition that appears to be a statement of Avicenna's distinction between memory as the storehouse of intelligible species and the possible intellect as a faculty limited to the actual consideration of intelligible species.91 In response to this Avicennian position, the fourth argument shows 89

De ver. q.10, a.3, obj.3; Leon., p. 303: "Praeterea, intelligentia accipitur duplicit secundum Augustinum xrv De Trinitate: uno modo prout dicimur intelligere illud quod actu cogitamus, alio modo prout dicimur intelligere illud quod non actu consideramus." This is a correct statement of the two levels of intelligentia Augustine distinguishes in the key section of book 14 on which Thomas had already drawn in article 2. See De Trin. 14.6.8-14.7.10; CCL 50A:430-435. Thomas states the argument without using the term habitus (or any of its derivatives), although he does use the terms actus and potentia. (Obj. 3 and 4 are virtually unintelligible as they appear in the Marietti edition; the Leonine edition gives a text that makes more sense.) 90 De ver. q.10, a.3, obj.3; Leon., p. 303: "secundum vero quod intelligimus ea quae no actu cogitamus, nullo modo a memoria distinguitur sed ad memoriam pertinet, quod patet per Augustinum xiv De Trinitate ubi sic dicit 'Si nos referamus ad interiorem mentis memoriam qua sui meminit, et interiorem intelligentiam qua se intelligit, et interiorem voluntatem qua se diligit, ubi haec tria simul semper sunt, sive cogitarentur sive non cogitarentur, videbitur quidem imago Trinitatis ad solam memoriam pertinere'; ergo intelligentia nullo modo distinguitur a memoria sicut potentia a potentia." 91 A comparison of the brief statement of this position in argument 4 with the long exposition of Avicenna's theory of intellectual memory that Thomas gives in article 2 suggests that Thomas considered the brief statement in argument 4 a sufficient reference to the

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that the faculty of intelligence has more than one function: it includes the habitual state of understanding something when we are not actually thinking of it, which can be identified with the function of memory, as well as the complete act of understanding for which thinking is required. In support of this assertion, the argument cites the principle that it belongs to a faculty both to possess a habit and to make use of it. The argument applies this principle by declaring that Augustine's phrase intelligere non cogitando signifies the simple possession of a habit, while his phrase intelligere cogitando is a case of using that habit in the act of understanding.92 Thus the pair of the third and fourth arguments prepares the ground for Thomas' own analysis of the Augustinian triads in terms of act, habit, and faculty. In the determination of article 3, Thomas shows a marked development beyond his earlier interpretation of the two main triads of Augustine's doctrine of the image. In the Scriptum he considered the triad, of memoria, intelligentia, voluntas, to be a better version of the image of the Trinity than the triad, mem, notitia, amor. Thomas retains this evaluation in the De veritate, but he now distinguishes more than one ontological level of the preferred triad, memoria, intelligentia, voluntas. He preserves the traditional view of this triad as a trio of faculties, and devotes the final section of the determination to the question of the distinction of memory and intellect at this level. However, Thomas prefers another interpretation according to which the triad refers to the acts of memory, understanding, and will rather than to the corresponding faculties. Thus in the De veritate Thomas finds that the image of the Trinity exists at three levels hi man's soul-act, habit, and faculty. He now insists that the image is found principally in the complete operations of understanding and loving. Once again Thomas describes the image in terms of the relation of imitation, but in the De veritate he uses the notion of imitation in order to distinguish two levels of the image of the Trinity in the soul:

Avicennian theory. Cf. De ver. q.10, a.3, obj. 4; Leon., p. 303: "Si dicatur quod intelligentia est quaedam potentia secundum quam anima est potens actu cogitare, et sic etiam intelligentia qua non dicimur intelligere nisi cogitantes, distinguitur a memoria sicut potentia a potentia" with De ver. q.10, a.2, resp.; Leon., p. 301: Avicenna "vult quod species actualiter non consideratae non possunt conservari nisi in parte sensitiva, vel quantum ad imaginationem quae est thesaurus formaruni a sensu acceptarum, vel quantum ad memoriam quantum ad intentiones particulares non acceptas a sensibus. In intellectu vero non permanet species nisi quando actu consideratur, post considerationem vero in eo esse desinit." 92 De ver. q.10, a.3, obj.4; Leon., p. 303: "Contra, eiusdem potentiae est habitum habere et uti habitu; sed intelligere non cogitando est intelligere in habitu, intelligere autem cogitando est uti habitu; ergo ad eandem potentiam pertinet intelligere non cogitando et intelligere cogitando, et sic per hoc non diversificatur intelligentia a memoria sicut potentia a potentia."


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It should be said that the image of the Trinity in the soul can be assigned two ways: one way, according to the perfect imitation of the Trinity; the other, according to an imperfect imitation.93

By perfect imitation Thomas means, as he goes on to state, that the soul imitates the Trinity perfectly by its acts: it remembers, it actually understands, it actually wills.94 There is some resemblance between this perfect imitation and the characteristic of actual imitation in the Scriptum; but perfect imitation refers only to the perfect or complete acts of intellect and will, whereas in the Scriptum actual imitation refers primarily to the imperfect acts by which the soul perpetually knows itself and God. It is probable that Thomas based his choice of the terms perfectand imperfect imitation in the De veritate on the distinction between perfect and imperfect acts.95 Perfect imitation requires perfect, or complete, acts, although it follows that the image of the Trinity will not exist continually at this highest level because perfect acts occur intermittently in the human mind.96 In Thomas' new interpretation of Augustine's triad of memoria, intelligentia, voluntas in terms of perfect acts, the Augustinian concept of verbum plays a crucial role. Thomas focuses on the likeness between the divine Word, who is the second Person of the blessed Trinity, and the inner word of the human mind, which proceeds from within the mind in the perfect act of intelligence. Our soul best imitates the Trinity when it is engaged in its perfect act, or operation, of understanding, because this act is necessary for the generation of our inner word. In the determination Thomas states his interpretation in his own words, before quoting a key text from Augustine's De Trinitate in support of his exposition: The soul, in fact, perfectly imitates the Trinity in this, that it remembers, actually understands, and actually wills. This is so because in the uncreated Trinity the middle Person in the Trinity is the Word. However, there can be no word without actual thinking. Hence, according to this way of perfect imitation, Augustine assigns the image in these three things—memory, understanding, and 93

De ver. q.10, a.3, resp.; Leon., p. 304. Ibid.: " Anima quidem perfecte Trinitatem imitatur secundum quod meminit, intelligit actu et vult actu." 95 Thomas explains imperfect imitation in terms of habitual knowledge and love, but he considered the habitual state a state of imperfect act. See De ver. q.10, a.2, ad 4m; Leon, p. 302: "Nee tamen sequitur quod semper intelligatur secundum illam speciem, sed solum quando intellectus possibilis perfecte fit in actu illius speciei; quandoque vero est imperfecte in actu eius, scilicet quodam modo medio inter puram potentiam et purum actum, et hoc est habitualiter cognoscere." 96 De ver. q.10, a.3, ad s.c. 2; Leon., p. 305: "semper est in anima imago Trinitatis aliquo modo, sed non secundum perfectam imitationem." 94

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will—inasmuch as memory refers to habitual knowledge, understanding to actual thought that proceeds from that knowledge, and will to the actual movement of the will that proceeds from thought.97

In this passage Thomas assumes that the similarity between the eternal Word in the uncreated Trinity and the inner word of the human act of understanding is well-known. He does not bother to give any explanation of the existence of this inner word in the complete act of understanding—this he has already done in the question De Verbo earlier in the series De veritate.9* Man comes closest to the inner life of the Trinity when within his mind a word issues from his store of knowledge and from the birth of this word there arises a further procession of love, by the movement of the will. In these processions are mirrored the eternal processions of the Word and the Spirit within God. Therefore, Thomas here interprets memory as a habitual state of knowledge, as he has already explained in article 2. He refers the term intelligentia to the act of thinking that arises from habitual knowledge in the mind, loosely identifying the act of thinking with the procession of the inner word. Finally, he interprets voluntas as the complete act of will, the actual movement of the will that proceeds from the prior act of intellect. In the passage quoted above, Thomas does not distinguish between the acts and the terms of the two processions hi the human mind. He speaks as if it is the act of thinking (actualis cogitatio) that proceeds from memory, although it is more proper to say that the word proceeds from the memory in the act of thinking. Behind this lack of precision is the text of Augustine. Augustine himself often does not bother to distinguish the term from the act. Usually the words cogitatio and conceptio refer to the act of thinking, but sometimes they also refer to the resulting thought or conception, which Augustine called the "inner word."99 In any case, here Thomas is not concerned with the precise correspondence between the image and its exemplar, but with the ontological status of Augustine's triad. Thomas 97

De ver. q.10, a.3, resp.; Leon., p. 304. De ver. q.4. Although the question is concerned with the divine Word, the first article examines the various senses of verbum and its application to human cognition as well as divine. Thomas explains that the inner word is the term of the perfect act of the intellect, which requires the discursive process of thinking in the case of the human intellect. See esp. De ver. q.4, a.l, ad 1m; Leon., p. 120: "cum verbum interius sit id quod intellectum est nee hoc sit in nobis nisi secundum quod actu intelligimus, verbum interius semper requirit intellectum in actu suo qui est intelligere." 99 E.g. De Trin. 15.10.18; CCL 50A:484: "Quaedam ergo cogitationes locutiones sunt cordis." De Trin. 15.10.19; CCL 50A:486: "Necesse est enim cum verum loquimur, id est quod scimus loquimur, ex ipsa scientia quam memoria tenemus nascatur verbum quod eiusmodi sit omnino cuiusmodi est ilia scientia de qua nascitur. Formata quippe cogitatio ab ea re quam scimus verbum est quod in corde dicimus." 98


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stresses the connection between the word and thought because the procession of the word requires the act of thinking, which is the complete operation of the intellect. For this reason, Thomas appends the following quotation from Augustine to his interpretation of the triad: This appears expressly from what he says in book 14 of the De Trinitate: "Since a word cannot be there," in the mind, that is, "without thought (for everything which we speak we think by that inner word which belongs to the language of no people), that image is discerned more readily in these three: memory, understanding, and will. However, I mean now that understanding by which we understand when we are thinking, and that will which joins this offspring with its parent."100

Thomas derives his interpretation of the image in terms of acts of intellect and will from Augustine's teaching. By means of this quotation from an important section of De Trinitate, book 14, Thomas shows that Augustine himself supports this interpretation rather than the common view of the image as a triad of faculties. To the lower level of habits and faculties Thomas assigns Augustine's first triad, mens, notitia, amor. This triad signifies the imperfect level of imitation to which the image attains.101 Thomas' interpretation of the triad does not vary significantly from the interpretation in the Scriptum, except for the change in his analysis of the term mens, which Thomas now interprets as a faculty, as we have seen hi article I.102 However, hi his exegesis of Augustine's work, he now indicates a certain correspondence between Augustine's two triads. If we recall the threefold interpretation of the term intelligentia as act, habit, and faculty in the third and fourth arguments, we find a key to this section of Thomas' determination. Thomas always considered Augustine's second triad-memoria, intelligentia, voluntas-preferable to his earlier triad, mens, notitia, amor. In his determination Thomas simply interprets the two terms intelligentia and voluntas of the preferred triad first as acts, then as habits, and finally as faculties. In each case the main problem for Thomas is what to make of the first member of the triad, memoria. As for the earlier triad, Thomas identifies notitia and amor with the habitual states of intelligentia and voluntas by 100

De ver. q.10, a.3, resp.; Leon., p. 304. Ibid.: "Imago vero secundum imperfectam imitationem est quando assignatur secundum habitus et potentias, et sic assignat Trinitatis imaginem in anima in K De Trinitate quantum ad haec tria: mens, notitia et amor, ut mens nominet potentiam, notitia vero et amor habitus in ea existentes." 102 See 1 Sent d.3, q.5, sol.; p. 124: "haec assignatio sumitur secundum essentiam et habitus consubstantiales.1' 101

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showing that Augustine uses both notitia and intelligentia to refer to a habitual state of knowledge: In place of "knowledge" (notitia), he could have put "habitual understanding" (intelligentiam habitualem), for both can be taken in the sense of habit. This is clear from what he says in book 14 of the De Trinitate: "Indeed; can we correctly say that a particular musician knows (novit) music, but does not now understand (intelligit) it because he is not now thinking about it? This opinion is obviously absurd."103

Thomas does not go on to identify mens in the first triad with memoria in the second, but he concludes that the habitual states of notitia and amor may be said to belong to memory alone, on the basis of another text from the same section of Augustine's work: And so, according to this designation, these two, that is, knowledge (notitia) and love, taken as habitual, belong to memory alone, as is clear from the authoritative citation from the same [Augustine] which was adduced in the arguments.104

As he has already shown in article 2, memory is a capacity of the faculty of mind or intellect by which the mind is able to store knowledge and love in a habitual state. Mens and memoria are not interchangeable terms, but in both triads it is true that the habitual states of knowledge and love are stored away, whether we say it is in the faculty of mind, or more specifically in its power of memory. Whereas in the active level of the triad, memoria, intelligentia, voluntas, the second and third terms refer to acts that issue forth within the mind, at the habitual level of the image the second and third terms refer to habitual states of knowledge and love that remain unactivated in the depths of the mind, stored there by virtue of its capacity of memory. Finally, Thomas grants that the image may also be understood as a triad of faculties. If the image of the Trinity has its most complete existence in the active condition of the triad, memory, understanding, and will, then it must have a certain radical existence in the faculties from which the acts arise.105 In support of this third level of the image, Thomas refers to the text of 103

De ver. q.10, a.3, resp.; Leon., p. 304. Ibid. Thomas is referring to argument 3. For the quotation in argument 3, see n. 90 above. This is a clear case of the integral unity of the determination and the arguments and of the importance of the auctoritas in the article as a whole. 105 De ver. q.10, a.3, resp.; Leon., pp. 304-305: "Sed quia actus sunt in potentiis radicaliter sicut effectus in causis, ideo etiam perfecta imitatio, quae est secundum memoriam, intelligentiam actualem et voluntatem actualem, potest originaliter inveniri in potentiis secundum quas anima potest meminisse, intelligere actualiter et velle, ut per verba Augustini inducta patet." 104


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Augustine already quoted in the first sed contra.106 The acts of understanding and will are effects, of which the faculties of intellect and will are the causes. Once again memory poses a problem: is there really a distinct faculty of memory hi the mind to which the function of intellectual memory belongs? This is, of course, the problem to which Thomas addresses himself explicitly in article 3, and his solution spells out the ontological status of memory in the mind which he had already indicated hi article 2. Thomas first states clearly that memory is not a separate faculty distinct from the faculty of intellect. His argument is based on the Aristotelian principle that diversity of faculties is caused by diversity of objects. Between intellectual memory and intellect there is no real diversity of objects, for the object of both is simply the intelligible. Any difference of past, present, and future is accidental to the intelligible and cannot serve to divide into two the faculty of which the intelligible is the object. Therefore, intellectual memory belongs to the faculty of intellect. Although this identity of memory and intellect might appear to threaten the distinction of the parts of the image of the Trinity, Thomas maintains that there is a sufficient diversity of function between memory and intellect to reflect the distinction between the divine Persons.107 In effect, it is the same difference as that between the actual and habitual functions of the one faculty of intellect, to which Thomas has already drawn attention in the fourth argument. Thus the traditional triad of faculties stands, but its weakness is revealed in the doubling of one faculty to play the two roles of memoria and intelligentia. It is clear that the inspiration for Thomas' new analysis of the image lies hi that section of book 14 of Augustine's De Trinitate in which he dwells on the problem of intellectual memory and suggests two levels, habitual and actual, for his triad of memoria, intelligentia, voluntas.m Thomas weaves the determination of article 3 around passages from this section, and the key to his preference for the image at the level of acts is Augustine's remark on the connection between the inner word and the act of thinking. In article 3 Thomas shows a new awareness of the importance of the processions in the attempt to understand the mystery of the Trinity. Thomas is aware that the 106

See n. 88 above. De ver. q.10, a.3, resp.; Leon., p. 305: "Nihilominus tamen, etsi memoria non est potentia distincta ab intelligentia prout intelligentia sumitur pro potentia, tamen invenitur trinitas in anima etiam considerando ipsas potentias secundum quod una potentia, quae est intellectus, habet habitudinem ad diversa, scilicet ad tenendum notitiam alicuius habitualiter et ad considerandum illud actualiter, sicut etiam Augustinus distinguit rationem inferiorem a superiori secundum habitudinem ad diversa." 108 De Trin. 14.6.8-14.7.10; CCL 50A:430-435. 107

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image resides permanently in man at the level of the faculties, but not in their acts; yet the impermanence of the image at the actual level no longer deters him from considering this level as the primary state of the image. In the first three articles of De veritate, question 10, St. Thomas expounded an ontology of the image, and in his exposition he adhered faithfully to the doctrine of Augustine's De Trinitate. First, the image inheres in the essence of the soul, although it is identical not with the soul, but with the higher part of the soul, the mind. The mind is a general faculty of which the faculties of intellect and will are the two parts. Nevertheless, in article 2 Thomas shows that there is a sort of memory in the mind so that the mind can truly be said to furnish us with an image of the Trinity in its memory, understanding, and will. This capacity of memory in the mind belongs to the faculty of the intellect, although its function is distinct from the intellect's complete act of understanding. In article 3 Thomas took the important step of breaking with the earlier scholastic understanding of Augustine's second triad as three faculties. Thomas shows that it is better and more truly Augustinian to understand the triadic image hi terms of the perfect or complete acts of understanding and will, which have their roots in the habitual knowledge that the mind's memory makes possible. In this active level of the triad we are able to catch a glimpse of the divine processions in the procession of the inner word in the act of thinking and the subsequent procession of love hi the act of willing. The image of the Trinity has its roots in man's nature and in his faculties, and it always exists at that level; but the image exists primarily when the mind is raised to a certain perfection in its principal acts of understanding and willing. C. ASCENT TO GOD: ANALOGY AND CONFORMATION After examining the subject in which the image of the Trinity inheres and the ontological structure of the image, Thomas turns to the functioning of the image and the conditions proper to the image. Acts, habits, and faculties hi the mind are determined by the objects to which they are directed, and so the conditions the image requires for its perfection are determined by the objects of the human mind. Thomas again reveals the influence of his new understanding of Augustine's teaching in his emphasis on the close connection between the image of the Trinity and the ascent of man to the knowledge and love of God. What makes man fully the image of God is not the use he makes of his faculties in the everyday business of this world, but the turning of these faculties towards God. In the Scriptum Thomas stressed the permanence of the image of God in the natural faculties of man's mind,


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while in the De veritatehe takes greater notice of the assimilation to God that is necessary for the actualization of the image. In a sense, the image of the Trinity is something to be achieved. It has a rudimentary and indestructible existence in the faculties of these soul, but it only attains its completion when a man directs these faculties to the higher tilings, and especially to God. We have already seen that Thomas organizes question 10 around its seventh article, in which he establishes the relationship between the image of the Trinity and the hierarchy of the objects of man's knowledge. He divides these objects into three classes: God, self, and temporal things, a classification that occurs in virtually identical terms in the Scriptum.109 By using the term temporalia Thomas indicates that he is aware of the Augustinian origin of the classification. In article 7 the first argument quotes from the section of the De Trinitate in which Augustine distinguishes between knowledge (scientia) and wisdom (sapientia) in terms of the difference between temporal and eternal objects of our knowledge.110 The first and third arguments sed contra also refer to this Augustinian distinction.111 With regard to the existence of the image of God, the greatest division falls between temporal objects of knowledge and the two eternal objects, the soul and God. This is Augustine's main thesis hi books 12 to 14 of the De Trinitate, and Thomas shows a perfect knowledge of Augustine's position by the references in the argument. Augustine insists that no image of the Trinity exists inasmuch as the mind considers temporal objects. In the Scriptum Thomas was not so definite and concluded that the image exists in a certain way (quodammodo) with regard to any object of knowledge.112 In the De veritate Thomas does not obscure the clear-cut distinction: 109

1 Sent d.3, q.4, a.4, sol.; p. 120. De ver. q.10, a.7, obj.l; Leon., p. 314. Augustine makes this distinction at the beginning of book 12 of the De Trinitate. 111 De ver. q.10, a.7, s.c. 1 and 3; Leon., pp. 314-316. 112 1 Sent d.3, q.4, a.4, sol.; p. 120. Also, in the Scriptum he interpreted the same text of Augustine which appears in De ver. q.10, a.7, obj.l as support for his assertion that the image exists to some extent with regard to all objects of the mind. Here is Augustine's text (from De Trin. 12.4.4) as he cites it in the Scriptum: "Cum in natura mentis humanae quaerimus Trinitatem, in tota quaerimus, non separantes actionem temporalium a contemplatione aeternorum." It appears that Thomas must have read this text out of context, for he is not really correct in his interpretation of Augustine when he writes in 1 Sent d.3, q.4, a.4, ad 2m; p. 121: "Augustinus vult, quod respectu quorumlibet objectorum sit aliquo modo imago: sed praecipue respectu hujus objecti quod est Deus et quod est anima." Further evidence for Thomas' earlier ignorance of Augustine's text is found in the fact that his citation in the Scriptum deviates from the authentic version, which he later uses in De ver. q.10, a.7, obj.l, Leon, p. 314: "cum quaerimus trinitatem in anima, in tota quaerimus, non separantes actionem rationalem in temporalibus a contemplatione aeternorum.'' In response to the argument that draws on this text, Thomas now points out that Augustine makes it quite 110

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However, in the consideration of temporal things no image is found, but rather a certain likeness of the Trinity that comes closer to the character of a vestige, just as the likeness Augustine attributes to the sense faculties also does.113

Once again, in the De veritate Thomas shows himself faithful to the true Augustine. In the determination of article 7, Thomas begins by setting out the definition of "image" hi order to see whether the image of God continues to exist in man's mind no matter what object he has before him. In a few lines he repeats the definition he had elaborated earlier in the Scriptum: Likeness is essential to the complete notion of image, but not every or any likeness is an image. The image must possess the fullest (expressissima) likeness of its exemplar, by which it is able to represent the very species of the exemplar. For example, a physical image of a thing represents it by reproducing its physical shape, because shape is a proper sign of the thing's species.114 Thomas goes on to examine the specific case of the image of the Trinity in the light of this definition. He points out that some likeness of the Trinity is found in the soul at every level of cognitive activity, in the senses as well as hi the mind. As he notes, Augustine himself says no less. However, applying his definition of "image," Thomas warns that the likeness of the Trinity fulfills the conditions required for an image only in the case of a specific sort of cognition belonging to man's mind. There must be a more express (expressiof) likeness of God in the mind than the likeness that exists hi the general case of all human cognitive activity.115 In the rest of the determination Thomas examines the conditions necessary for the fuller, or more express, likeness of the Trinity that constitutes man as the image of God.

clear in the adjoining passages that the likeness of the Trinity that is found in the soul when it considers temporal objects does not constitute an image of the Trinity. See De ver. q.10, a.7 ad 1m; Leon, p. 317: "trinitas quidem aliqua invenitur in mente secundum quod se extendit ad actionem temporalium, sed tamen ilia trinitas non dicitur imago increatae Trinitatis, ut patet per ea quae ibidem Augustinus subiungit." 113 De ver. q.10, a.7, resp.; Leon., p. 317. 114 De ver. q.10, a.7, resp.; Leon., p. 316: "Dicendum quod rationem imaginis similitude perficit; non tamen quaelibet similitude ad rationem imaginis sufficiens invenitur, sed expressissima similitude per quam aliquid repraesentatur secundum rationem suae speciei; et ideo in corporalibus imagines rerum attenduntur magis secundum figuras quae sunt specierum propria signa, quam secundum colores et alia accidentia." Thomas ultimately owes the definition of "image1' as an expressa similitude to Augustine, although Augustine includes more of an active sense in the word expressa. Cf. Augustine, De div. quaest. 83, q.74; PL 40:85 115 De ver. q. 10, a.7, resp.; Leon, p. 316: "Invenitur autem in anima nostra aliqua similitude Trinitatis increatae secundum quamlibet sui cognitionem, non solum mentis, sed etiam sensus, ut patet per Augustinum in xi De Trinitate; sed in ilia tantum cognitione mentis imago Dei reperitur secundum quam in mente nostra expressior Dei similitude invenitur."


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Thomas now briefly states his classification of man's cognitive activity in terms of the division of objects that determine the act of cognition: God, self, and temporal things.116 He examines the relationship of likeness between man's mind and the divine Trinity in each case to see whether the likeness is sufficiently express to be an image of God. In order to judge whether the likeness is express or not, he quietly introduces a distinction between two types of express likeness: likeness of analogy (secundum or per analogiam) and likeness of conformation (secundum conformationem or per conformationem).ni He does not define these two terms explicitly, but clarifies their meaning by his application of them later in the text. Although Thomas did not use this pair of terms in the discussion of the image of the Trinity prior to the De veritate, we shall see that the distinction they capture so nicely is not a new one. The two terms express a very significant contrast in the manner of conceiving the image of the Trinity. Thomas uses them efficiently 116 Ibid.: "Ut igitur cognitionem mentis secundum obiecta distinguamus, triplex cognitio in mente nostra invenitur, cognitio scilicet qua mens cognoscit Deum, et qua cognoscit se ipsam, et qua cognoscit temporalia." 117 Conformitas and conformatio should be translated by the English "conformation," because this word conveys the active sense of the Latin words better than the English word "conformity," which has a sense of something already achieved and static. Thomas seems to use the two Latin words interchangeably in this text. Cf. Sum theol. Ia2ae, q.62, a.3; Ottawa, p. 1036, in which the difference between hope and charity is expressed in terms of the distinction between the will's motus intentionis and its conformitas adflnem (resp. and ad 1m), while in the same article this distinction is rephrased in terms of "motus in finem et conformatio ad finem per amorem" (ad 3m; emphasis mine). In this case both terms seem to refer to a sort of conformity that is a spiritual union based on a certain connaturality. In the Busa index conformatio shows only 12 entries, whereas there are over 3 pages of references under conformitas. In general, conformatio has a more active sense, while conformitas is more static in its meaning. Conformitas is the state of union or likeness at which a thing arrives by the process of conformatio. In fact, Thomas at one point—and we should note that it is in the De veritate—explicitly distinguishes the two terms. See De ver. q.23, a.7, ad 11m; Leon, pp. 672-673: Thomas explains that "similitude et conformitas quamvis sint relationes aequiparantiae," do not necessarily entail a reciprocity of likeness between the two terms; whereas "conformatio, cum sit motus ad conformitatem, non importat aequiparantiae relationem sed praesupponit aliquid ad cuius conformitatem alterum moveatur" (emphases mine). This article is a parallel of the discussion of the conformity of the human will to the divine will in 1 Sent. d.48. See the definition of conformitas in 1 Sent, d.48, q.l, a.l, sol.; p. 1080: "conformitas est convenientia in forma una, et sic idem est quod similitude quam causat unitas qualitatis." Nevertheless, the distinction is not always so clear-cut, as can be seen in De ver., q.23, a.7 itself, in which conformitas appears at times to be a merely syntactical substitute for the verb conformari. In the Summa Thomas at one point seems to identify conformitas with assimilatio, which usually has an active sense. See 3a, q.l3, a.l, ad 3m; Ottawa, p. 2507: "Ad scientiam enim speculativam habendam sufficit sola conformitas vel assimilatio scientis ad rem scitam." This text is an important parallel for the description of knowledge as conformitas in De ver. q.10, a.7. Thus conformitas and conformatio are sometimes interchangeable, and conformitas in some cases is assimilated to the more active sense of conformatio.

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to establish a hierarchy of levels of the image in relation to the three classes of objects of our knowledge. In the case of temporal objects, Thomas concludes that there is not an image of the Trinity because there is neither a likeness of analogy nor a likeness of conformation. He explains briefly why the likeness of conformation is absent in this case: ... because material things are more unlike God than the mind itself is, whence the mind does not become fully conformed to God when it is informed with the knowledge of these things.118 What he means by the term conformatio is apparently the process by which the mind becomes more like its object. Thomas here describes this process of assimilation in this way: the mind is informed by the knowledge of its object. Material things, however, when they inform the mind, do not conform the mind to God, because they are less like God than the mind is. They cannot assimilate the mind to God. Knowledge of material things informs the mind with the likeness of lower things; it cannot lift the mind to God, cannot make the mind more like God. Nor can knowledge of temporal things constitute a likeness of analogy between the mind and God inasmuch as a temporal thing that begets knowledge, that is, actual understanding, of itself in the soul is not of the same substance as the mind itself, but something foreign to its nature; and thus the consubstantiality of the uncreated Trinity cannot be represented through it.119 By analogy Thomas here refers to the proportionality by which the structure of the image mirrors to some degree the relations within the divine Trinity. In De veritate, question 2, article 11, he had used the term analogia to cover both a proportion between two things and a proportionality between two pairs of related things. It is the latter sense of analogy that Thomas uses in question 10. Thomas was not yet prepared to apply the former sense of analogy to the relationship of creature to God, as he did in later works. Consubstantiality is one of the characteristics of the image of the Trinity that Thomas studied in the Scriptum. There is a significant shift in his analysis of this characteristic in the De veritate. In the Scriptum he considered consubstantiality as one of the characteristics that did not vary according to the type of object, for all three faculties of the image are always rooted in the

118 119

De ver. q.10, a.7, resp.; Leon, p. 316. Ibid.


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one essence of the soul.120 Thomas does not deny this basic consubstantiality of the three faculties in the De veritate, but rather considers the consubstantiality of a slightly different triad. Augustine himself speaks often, even in book 14 of the De Trinitate, of a triad in which the first member is not memory but the object that begets knowledge of itself in the mind. In the case not only of sense perception and recollection, but also of rational knowledge of a temporal thing, Augustine points out that the object is always external and adventitious.121 In the De veritate Thomas prefers Augustine's model of the begetting of knowledge by its object to the rigid "Augustinian" model of the three faculties. He is thus able to impart a more dynamic element into the mirror-like proportionality of the likeness of analogy. However, consubstantiality in this new sense does not exist between the temporal object of knowledge and the mind, so that there is no adequate likeness of analogy with respect to this type of knowledge. The Father is consubstantial to the Son whom He begets, whereas the temporal object is not consubstantial to the knowledge it begets in the mind. Turning to the mind's knowledge of itself, Aquinas does not bother to discuss the likeness of conformation at this point. Presumably, there can be no direct conformation of the mind to God when the mind is turned to itself as its object, for the same reason that a temporal object cannot serve to conform the mind to God. However, the likeness of analogy is found at its best in this case: But in the likeness by which our mind knows itself there is a representation of the uncreated Trinity according to analogy, inasmuch as, in this case, the mind in knowing itself begets a word expressing itself, and love proceeds from both 120

1 Sent., d.3, q.4, a.4, resp.; p. 120: "duo se tenent ex parte ipsius animae, scilicet consubstantialitas et distinctio potentiarum, et ideo se habent indifferenter respectu quorumlibet objectorum." 121 Thomas is speaking of the rational knowledge of temporal things, which Augustine examines in relation to the existence of the image on the grounds that such knowledge is not eternal (14.2.4), that it is received from an external object (14.8.11), that it is adventitious (14.10.13). Augustine does not refer explicitly to consubstantiality in book 14, and Thomas probably has imported the idea of lack of consubstantiality between object and subject from the earlier discussion of sensation and recollection in book 11. See esp. the distinction between sensation and recollection on the score of object-subject consubstantiality in De Trin. 11.4.7; CCL 50:342-343: "quod est intentio voluntatis ad corpus visum visionemque copulandum ut fiat ibi quaedam unitas trium quamvis eorum sit diversa natura, hoc est eadem voluntatis intentio ad copulandam imaginem corporis quae inest in memoria et visionem cogitantis, id est formam quam cepit acies animi rediens ad memoriam, ut fiat et hie quaedam unitas ex tribus non iam naturae diversitate discretis sed unius eiusdemque substantiae quia hoc totum intus est et totum unus animus" (emphasis mine). Augustine goes on to say, however, that consubstantiality does not really exist in the case of recollection, for the real object of recollection is the external thing.

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of these, just as the Father, uttering Himself, has begotten His Word from eternity, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from both.122

This passage helps us to understand what Thomas meant here by analogy: it signifies the sort of proportionality that exists between an image in a mirror and its exemplar, the equality or similarity between the ratio of the parts in the image and the ratio of the parts hi the exemplar. Again, this consideration of the analogy between the mind and God is more dynamic, hi contrast to his earlier presentation hi the Scriptum. For the image now reflects more clearly the inner movement of the divine Trinity, and especially the two processions of word and love, which Thomas failed to mention even once in the distinction of the Scriptum on the image of the Trinity. This is a very significant step towards his final exposition of the image of the Trinity in the Summa theologiae. In contrast to the analogical likeness that obtains between the mind and God hi the case of self-knowledge, the knowledge of God makes man the image of the Trinity according to the likeness of conformation. It is a simple case of the general assimilation of the one who knows something to the thing he knows: But in that cognition by which the mind knows God Himself, the mind itself is conformed to God, just as every knower, as such, is assimilated to that which is known.123

Analogy (hi the sense of proportionality) yields a likeness between image and exemplar in which the observer prescinds from any special causal relationship between the two: the observer simply notes the common features belonging to the image and the exemplar and the similarity of the relationship between those features in each. Conformation, on the other hand, introduces to our consideration the special operational relationship by which the exemplar acts on its image to assimilate it to itself. In this case God acts as object of knowledge on the mind and thus assimilates the mind to the Trinity, which is the exemplar of the mind. Thomas argues that the likeness according to conformation is greater than the likeness according to analogy, so that the image of the Trinity is found in man's mind primarily hi the case of the knowledge of God: But there is a greater likeness through conformation, as of sight to color, than through analogy, as of sight to intellect, which is related in a similar way to its

122 123

De ver. q.10; a.7, resp.; Leon., p. 316. Ibid.


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objects. Hence the likeness of the Trinity in the mind is more express when it knows God than when it knows itself.124

Thomas leaves it to the reader to spell out the implications of his terse simile drawn from the act of vision. Color is the proper object of the sense of sight, and vision takes place through a process of assimilation of the sense to its object, color. The faculty of sight is informed by color and in some sense actually becomes color. Against this example of the likeness of conformation, Thomas contrasts the relation of likeness between the faculty of sight and the faculty of intellect. There is a certain analogy, a proportionality, between the faculty of vision and its objects, on the one hand, and the faculty of intellect and its objects on the other. However, this likeness of analogy touches only a limited number of features held in common by the faculties of sight and intellect. There is an element of distance and disparity that characterizes this likeness of analogy in contrast to the likeness of conformation, which arises from the direct action of colors on the faculty of sight. Applying this simile of the faculty of sight to the mind as image of God, we see that the likeness to God is much greater when God is the object of knowledge, for by His presence to the mind as its object He assimilates the mind to Himself. In contrast, the likeness is a lesser one when we consider only a relation of analogy (in the sense of proportionality) between the mind and God, for the proportionality between God and the highest of His creatures always pales in comparison with the infinite distance between the creature and the Creator. Furthermore, analogy does not necessarily imply difference, but it always entails some element of distinction between one thing and the other; whereas conformation refers to a union that in some way bridges the difference. De Beaurecueil sums up the contrast between conformation and analogy neatly when he says that "the one is communion, the other remains at the extrinsic level of 'parallelism.'"125 Thomas concludes his determination with a summary: the image of the Trinity is found in the mind primarily (primo et principaliter) when it is knowing God. It exists at a secondary level after a certain fashion (quodam modo et secundario) when it is knowing itself. It is not found at all when the 124 De ver. q.10, a.7, resp.: Leon., pp. 316-317: "Maior est autem similitude quae est per conformitatem, ut visus ad colorem, quam quae est per analogiam, ut visus ad intellectum qui similiter ad sua obiecta comparatur; unde expressior similitude Trinitatis est in mente secundum quod cognoscit Deum quam secundum quod cognoscit se ipsam." 125 De Beaurecueil [2]:46. Commenting on the pair of terms, analogia and conformatio, he writes: Tassimilation de 1'intelligence a 1'objet qui 1'informe est bien plus fondee dans 1'etre que la comparaison possible entre la vision intellectuelle et la vision sensitive; 1'une est communion, 1'autre demeure au plan extrinseque du 'parallelisme.'"

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mind is considering temporal objects, for then the likeness of the Trinity only attains the level of vestige.126 Thomas adds an important note on the secondary mode of the image, which sheds more light on the relation between the likeness of analogy and the likeness of conformation. The image of the Trinity exists in a secondary way when the mind knows itself, but especially when the mind considers itself as the image of God so that it does not stop at itself but goes on to perceive God. By considering our own mind as an image of God so that we come to some knowledge of God, we are considering the relation of analogy between our mind and God. In this case, the likeness of analogy serves to lead the mind to the likeness of conformation, because consideration of the analogy leads us to know God in some way and to be conformed to Him through this knowledge. Thus the image of the Trinity is properly constituted by the likeness of conformation, and only indirectly by the likeness of analogy inasmuch as the analogy can help to turn the mind to union with God. Augustine himself says exactly the same thing: This trinity, then, of the mind is not therefore the image of God, because the mind remembers itself, and understands and loves itself; but because it can also remember, understand, and love Him by whom it was made.127 Thus conformation to God is the condition of the primary image of the Trinity: the mind must actively know and love God. Thomas did not invent the distinction between the likeness according to analogy and the likeness according to conformation. This distinction has its roots in Augustine's De Trinitate where the image is sometimes viewed as an analogical likeness of the Trinity, sometimes as the likeness produced by operational assimilation to God.128 Thomas did not use the term conformatio in the discussion of the image of the Trinity in the Scriptum, but there is some sense of its meaning in his use of the term actualis imitatio, which implies a more active assimilation to God than the other characteristics of the image imply.129 We have examined some of the precedents of the phrase actualis 126

De ver. q.10, a.7, resp.; Leon., p. 317: "Et ideo proprie imago Trinitatis in mente et secundum quod cognoscit Deum primo et principaliter, sed quodam modo et secundario etiam secundum quod cognoscit se ipsam, et praecipue prout se ipsam considerat ut est imago Dei, ut sic eius consideratio non sistat in se sed procedat usque ad Deum. In consideratione vero rerum temporalium non invenitur imago, sed similitude quaedam Trinitatis quae magis potest ad vestigium pertinere sicut et similitude quam Augustinus assignat in potentiis sensitivis." 127 De Trin. 14.12.15; NPNF, p. 191; CCL 50A:442-443. 128 Fr. Sullivan suggest that "some influence of the De Trinitate can be seen in the distinction between an image of analogy and an image of conformity" (p. 254). 129 Cf. 1 Sent, d.3, q.4, a.4, sol.; p. 120: "Servatur etiam ibi actualis imitatio ipsius Trinitatis, inquantum scilicet ipsa anima est imago expresse ducens in Deum."


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imitatio in the previous part. The distinction between an analogical likeness and a conformative likeness is already present in Alexander of Hales' distinction between aequalitas and imitatio, in which he associates the proportionality of aequalitas with the case in which the mind knows itself, and the more direct relationship of imitatio with the case in which the mind is turned to God as the object of its faculties.130 Albert develops this distinction between aequalitas and imitatio when he discusses how the image depends on the presence of certain objects of knowledge.131 He comes close to using the term conformatioas a synonym for imitatio™ However, the clearest source of Thomas' use of the term conformatio is to be found in Bonaventure.133 Thomas' determination in article 7 of De veritate, question 10, finds a close parallel in the comparable article of Bonaventure's Commentary on the Sentences.13* There is the same tripartite division of objects of knowledge, and Bonaventure's conclusion is identical with the conclusion Thomas adopts in the De veritate (in contrast to his earlier position in the Scriptum). There is, according to Bonaventure, only a vestigial likeness of God in the case of external objects, whereas there is an image of God if one's own soul is the object of the mind's faculties; but the image exists primarily (primo et principaliter) when God is the object of the faculties.135 Bonaventure explains why the two objects make such a difference by drawing a distinction between conformitas and aequalitas, of which two 130 Alexander, 1 Sent, d.3, n.34; Quaracchi 1:55: "sed quoad aequalitatem plus convenit ut sit imago secundum quod vires ad animam referuntur. Sicut enim Deus se cognoscit, intelligit ac diligit, sic anima se. Sed quoad imitationem propter quam vel secundum quam facta est, magis est imago secundum quod ad Deum refertur." 131 Albert, 1 Sent, d.3, a.22; Borgnet 25:122-123. Cf. a.32, sol.; p. 134. 132 Albert, 1 Sent, d.3, a.22, sol.; Borgnet 25:122: "anima per intellectum, memoriam, et voluntatem potest immediate ferri in Deum: et tune actu imitatur et formatur ad Trinitatem et unitatem." 133 Fr. de Beaurecueil fails to note this influence of Bonaventure when he attempts to reduce Augustine and Bonaventure (although he only speaks of the Itinerarium) to proponents of the likeness of analogy. See de Beaurecueil [2]:46-47: "Au dela du probleme particulier qui, dans cet article [De ver. q.10, a.7] a donne lieu a la distinction entre 'analogic' et 'conformation' envisagees ici au point de vue connaissance, il faut voir la dissociation entre deux perspectives selon lesquelles on peut envisager I'Imago Deiet en elaborer la doctrine: 1'une d'elles est celle de S. Augustin; S. Bonaventure dans son Itinerarium mentis ad Deum en a exploite les ressources avec une virtuosite inegalable: voyant dans 1'analogie le fondement de 1'intelligibilite du reel. ... A cette voie [d'Augustin] s'oppose celle de la 'conformation' qui s'attache a la realite des natures, envisagees selon leur procession a partir de Dieu et leur retour a Lui par la similitude divine." De Beaurecueil goes on to say that Thomas opted for conformatio over analogia. 134 Bonaventure, 1 Sent, d.3, p.2, a.l, q.2, resp.; Quaracchi 1:82-84. 135 Bonaventure, 1 Sent, d.3, p.2, a.l, q.2, resp.; Quaracchi 1:83: "Concedendum est ergo, quod imago consistit in his potentiis, secundum quod ad animam convertuntur; primo tamen et principaliter, ut ostendunt primae rationes, secundum quod convertuntur ad Deum."

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he clearly considers conformitas the more important.136 He asserts that an express conformation to God is necessary for the existence of the image. Conformation to God is accomplished either directly by turning the faculties to God as their object, or indirectly by reflecting on one's own soul as an image of God.137 Bonaventure makes it clear that the image remains when the soul is turned to itself as the object of its knowledge, insofar as the soul knows itself as image and sees the exemplar—God—in the image. Conformation to the image, that is, one's soul, entails conformation to the exemplar of the image. Thomas' conclusion concerning the secondary level of the image (when the mind is its own object) is very similar to Bonaventure's, and reflects the Franciscan's emphasis on the likeness of conformation that ensues when the soul considers itself an image of God. Although Thomas argued that conformation, rather than analogy, is the principal cause of the express likeness that constitutes the image of the Trinity, he did not reject the analogical conception of the image in terms of the traditional characteristics he had examined in the Scriptum. Article 3 is in effect a defense of the distinction of the three parts of the image, memoria, intelligentia, and voluntas, although Thomas rejects the traditional view that these parts are really three distinct faculties.138 In the same article Thomas explains how the image retains the characteristic of equality among its three

136 Bonaventure, 1 Sent., d.3, p.2, a.l, q.2, ad 5m; Quaracchi 1:84: "Unde ratio imaginis, quoad quid, est plus in conversione ad Deum; quoad quid, est plus in conversione animae supra se. In conversione ad Deum est plus, quia plus habet de ratione venustatis et conformitatis; in conversione ad se, plus habet de ratione consubstantialitatis, et aequalitatis." In the body of the article Bonaventure considers the image only in terms of conformitas and thus indicates that this aspect of the image is far more important than any aequalitas. The presence of the term venustas is reminiscent of a passage from Albert in which imitatio and aequalitas are contrasted. Cf. Albert, 1 Sent, d.3, a.22, ad 4m; Borgnet 25:123: "duo attenduntur in imagine, scilicet substantialitas et aequalitas: et secundo, pulchritude, et venustatio colons." Albert connects pulchritudo to imitatio as a characteristic for which the objective presence of God is necessary. There is a connection between this distinction and the ancient aesthetic theory of the two elements of beauty: proportionality and color (or light). Augustine originally made the connection between imago and beauty by his interpretation of the term species in Hilary's analogy for the Trinity ("aeternitas in patre, species in imagine, usus in munere") according to one of the senses of the Latin word, by which it signifies beauty. See De Trin.

6.10.11;CCL 50:241.

137 Bonaventure, 1 Sent, d.3, p.2, a.l, q.2, resp.; Quaracchi 1:83: Trimo enim imago attenditur secundum expressam conformitatem ad imaginatum; secundo, quod illud quod conformatur imagini, per consequens conformetur imaginato." Bonaventure here refers to the exemplar as imaginatum: the thing imaged. 138 Note the appearance of the term distinctio in De ver. q.10, a.3, ad 1m; Leon, p. 305: "quamvis memoria prout est in mente non sit alia potentia ab intellectu possibili distincta, tamen inter intellectum possibilem et memoriam invenitur distinctio secundum habitudinem ad diversa."


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parts, even though each of its parts is not a separate faculty.139 Because he bases the image of the Trinity more on the conformation of the mind to God than on the analogical likeness between the mind and God the Trinity, Thomas does not show anxiety about the degree of equality among the parts of the image. He suggests that there is a sufficient degree of equality hi the identity of object among the three parts of the image, whether these parts are faculties, habits, or acts.140 Failing the unity of the object, a certain general equality between act, habit, and faculty remains because the quantity of any act, habit, or faculty is gauged solely in relation to the act.141 Thomas implies that a minimal sort of equality among the three parts suffices for the existence of an analogical likeness between the mind and the divine Trinity. A perfect proportion between God and His created image is impossible, so that it is no embarrassment to the Christian doctrine of the image of God to admit this inadequacy in the analogical likeness. In article 7 Thomas deals with several arguments in which the standard characteristics of the image of the Trinity feature prominently. In the sixth argument the case is made that the equality among the parts of the image requires that memory, understanding, and will should each extend to all the objects of the mind and thus cover the same range of objects.142 In reply Thomas argues that not every sort of equality that exists in the mind is sufficient by itself to establish the image of the Trinity, for other characteristics are also required.143 Thomas allows that equality is a characteristic of the image, but cautions that not every sort of equality is relevant.

139

De ver. q. 10, a. 3, ad s.c.3; Leon, p. 305. Ibid.: "inter potentiam et actum et habitum potest esse aequalitas secundum quod comparantur ad unum obiectum, et sic imago Trinitatis invenitur in anima secundum quod fertur in Deum." It seems that the last remark is simply an example of the equality of the image in the case of one object, God. 141 Ibid.: "et tamen etiam communiter loquendo de potentia, habitu et actu invenitur in eis aequalitas, non quidem secundum proprietatem naturae quia alterius modi habet esse operatic, habitus et potentia, sed secundum comparationem ad actum secundum quam consideratur horum trium quantitas; nee oportet quod accipiatur unus actus tanturn numero aut unus habitus, sed actus et habitus in genere.M 142 De ver. q.10, a.7, obj.6; Leon., p. 315. The argument finds the equality of the image in the mutual comprehension of its parts, as Augustine indicates. A somewhat difficult premise states that this mutual comprehension is not characterized by equality unless each part of the image comprehends the other in the case of every class of object. The will must will memory and understanding, the memory must remember understanding and will, and so on, whether the object of the three parts of the image is God or the soul. 143 De ver. q. 10, a.7, ad 6m; Leon., p. 318: "quamvis aequalitas ad imaginem pertineat quae in mente nostra invenitur, non tamen oportet quod respectu omnium imago attendatur respectu quorum aliqua aequalitas invenitur in ipsa, eo quod plura alia ad imaginem requiruntur, unde ratio non sequitur." 140

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Another of the arguments attempts to show that two characteristics of the image, consubstantiality and equality, are found even when the senses are informed by their objects, and hence all the more do they exist in the mind when it considers these same temporal objects.144 In this case Thomas simply denies that these characteristics are really present in the operation of the senses. He has already denied that there is any consubstantiality between the mind and its temporal objects, and here he denies consubstantiality in the case of the senses and their sensible objects, disproving the premise of the argument. As for the characteristic of equality, he points out that sometimes the eye does not see all that could be seen, so that there is an inequality between the sense and the sensible object.145 Equality is the characteristic of the image that draws the most attention in the De veritate, as it had done in the works of Thomas' predecessors. Thomas gives the most extensive treatment of this characteristic in his reply to the second argument of article 7. This argument attempts to prove that the image remains when the mind deals with temporal objects because it still possesses equality and order.146 In this case it is a matter of the equality between the mind and its object. The argument claims that there is a greater equality between the mind and a temporal object than between the mind and an eternal object. In reply Thomas repeats the traditional wisdom he had already stated in the Scriptum-. this sort of equality is irrelevant to the existence of the image of the Trinity. Instead, what matters is the equality between one faculty and another in the image.147 Thomas gives an interesting explanation of how this equality is far greater when the mind considers God as its object than when it is turned to material objects: Between the memory our mind has of God and the actual understanding and love of God there is found a greater equality than between the memory it has of temporal things and the understanding and love of them. For God is knowable and lovable of Himself, and thus is understood and loved by each person's mind to the same degree to which He is present to the mind, for His presence in the mind is the memory of Him in the mind. Hence, the understanding is equal to the memory held of Him, and the will or love is equal to this understanding. Material things as such, however, are not intelligible or lovable, and so this equality is not found in the mind in respect of them.148 144

De ver. q.10, a.7, obj.9; Leon., p. 315. De ver. q.10, a.7, ad 9m; Leon, p. 318: "inter sensibile et sensum non invenitur consubstantialitas eo quod ipsum sensibile est extraneum a sensus essentia, nee etiam invenitur aequalitas cum quandoque non semper tantum videatur visibile quantum visibile est." 146 De ver. q.10, a.7, obj.2; Leon, p. 314. 147 De ver. q.10, a.7, ad 2m; Leon, p. 317: "non enim est attendenda aequalitas inter obiectum et potentiam, sed inter unam potentiam et aliam." 148 Ibid. 145


145

As Thomas says "memory" here means simply the presence of the object to the mind, as he has explained in article 2. The simple presence of God to the mind suffices to produce a proportionate understanding and love of God, because God is by nature knowable and lovable. Such is not the case with material things. Therefore, the equality on which the likeness of analogy is partly based is greater when the mind is turned to God than when it is turned to material objects. In the same argument of article 7, it is also suggested that the characteristic of order is found among the parts of the image whether the object is eternal or temporal. It should be noted that the argument gives the parts according to Augustine's earlier triad of mens, notitia, amor.149 Thomas does not deny that knowledge always proceeds from the mind, and love from knowledge, no matter what the object of knowledge is. Instead, he points out, as he did in the Scriptum, that the proper order within the image is lost in the case of temporal objects if we are considering the other triad of memoria, intelligentia, voluntas: Neither is there the same order of origin, since they [material things] are present to our memory because they have been understood by us, and thus memory arises from understanding rather than the reverse. The opposite is the case in the created mind with respect to God Himself, from whose presence the mind participates the intellectual light so that it can understand.150

The final sentence of his text is particularly interesting because it gives a clue to Thomas' understanding of the knowledge of God that establishes the highest level of the image of the Trinity. Thomas does not specify what sort of presence of God he means in this particular passage. In the context it must refer to a presence that makes God known and loved to some degree, because Thomas speaks of the origin of understanding and will from this presence of God. However, in this case Thomas must be thinking of the image at the level of the faculties, for he does not say that the presence of God engenders an act of knowing God but rather that it causes the mind to participate the intellectual light by which man is able (possii) to understand things. Presumably Thomas would grant that the intellectual light makes it possible for the mind to attain an actual knowledge of God at some time, but he is not speaking of the act of understanding in this passage.151 It is curious that 149

De ver. q.10, a.7, obj.2; Leon., p. 314: "origo etiam personarum repraesentatur in cognitione temporalium sicut et in cognitione aeternorum quia utrobique ex mente procedit notitia et ex notitia procedit amor." 150 De ver. q.10, a.7, ad 2m; Leon., p. 317. 151 See Sullivan, p. 257, who interprets the passage in this way: "Memoria Dei is not habitual knowledge and love of God as we might expect, but it is the presence of God to the

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he explains the origin of intellect from memory by referring to the participation of the intellectual light that arises from the presence of God. However, this is simply a more Augustinian formulation for the notion of the light of the agent intellect that dominates the preceding article, where Thomas says that this light proceeds from God.152 Thus at the center of man's very nature there is a likeness of God founded on the conformation of our intellect to God by our participation of the intellectual light that arises from the presence of God to the mind. Such a rudimentary likeness of conformation establishes the image of the Trinity in the faculties of the mind, so that man can eventually come to know and love God in a more perfect conformation to God through his complete operations. From these scattered references to the various characteristics of the image of the Trinity we see that Thomas did not prefer the likeness of conformation to the exclusion of the likeness of analogy. Nevertheless, he no longer bothers to list the characteristics together as if they represent a complete set of criteria for the existence of the image. In fact, in the determination of article 7, Thomas explains the highest level of the analogical likeness between the mind and the divine Trinity (in the case of self-knowledge) without soul as giving being to it, and its proper being, that is intellectuality. It is the common presence of God which is referred to here; God present and giving the light of the intellect to the soul that it might understand. Intelligentia Dei is actual knowledge of God, which does not attain to the essence of God, but rather to the quid non est God is not known through his essence either, but through his effects. This knowledge of God does flow from the memoria Dei in a very limited way, as it is God's presence which gives to the soul the light of reason by which it can know him." Sullivan in effect reads this passage on intellectual light in terms of the potential level of the image in which memoria, intelligentia, and voluntasare faculties, although memorials simply the presence of God as the cause of the mind's intellectuality. Aelred Squire is incorrect to interpret the memoria Dei in De ver. q. 10 as the presence of God through grace. See his "The Doctrine of the Image in the De veritate of St. Thomas," Dominican Studies 4 (1951): 177: "Returning now to the somewhat curious statement that God's presence to the soul is a memory of Him, I think it is plain enough that just as I am in my memory by my presence to myself, so God is, through grace, in the memory of the soul by His presence to the soul.... But He who is present to all his creatures according to the mode of their being, is present by grace to his rational creatures to be known." Thomas is quite explicit that this presence of God is the natural presence of immensity. See De ver. a.l 1, ad 8m; Leon, p. 337 "mens nostra cum intelligibilitate quam habet ut proprium quoddam, etiam cum aliis communiter habet esse; unde quamvis in ea sit Deus, non oportet quod semper sit in ea ut forma intelligibilis sed ut dans esse sicut est in aliis creaturis." Also, see De ver. q.10, a.l 1, ad 11m Leon, p. 338: "quamvis divina essentia sit praesens intellectui nostro, non tamen est ei coniuncta ut forma intelligibilis quam intelligere possit quamdiu lumine gloriae non perficitur." Thus the presence of God that Thomas speaks of in these texts is simply the presence by which He creates and conserves the mind and its faculties of intellect and will. In no way is God present in ratione obiecti here. 152 De ver. q.10, a.6, resp.; Leon., p. 313: "quod quidem lumen intellectus agentis in anima procedit sicut a prima origine a substantiis separatis et praecipue a Deo."


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mentioning any of the standard characteristics. Instead of speaking of the characteristics that draw attention to the static relationship between the three parts of the image, Thomas focuses on the reflection in the mind of the two eternal processions of the Word and the Holy Spirit. Already Thomas seems to have sensed that it was unnecessary to get entangled in the complications attached to the triad, memoria, intelligentia, voluntas, for he does not mention any of these terms in this passage. Instead, he has laid hold of the far clearer and more straightforward analogy of the processions of word and love, the form of the psychological analogy of the Trinity to which Augustine finally turned in the last book of the De Trinitate. The image of God finds its highest level in the likeness of conformation by which the distance between the parallel planes of the likeness of analogy is bridged through the assimilation of the mind to God in knowing and loving Him directly or indirectly. Throughout his life man possesses the image of the Trinity at two levels: the habitual and the potential. Inasmuch as the mind is always present to itself, as Thomas explains in article 8, the mind, its self-knowledge and self-love form an imperfect, but permanent, image of the Trinity according to the likeness of analogy, at the habitual level of the mind. There is also a rudimentary image of the Trinity according to the likeness of conformation that is found in the faculties of the mindmemory, intellect, will—inasmuch as by His physical presence God creates and sustains the mind's capacity to know and love every object it can, including God. Beyond these two fundamental levels of the image of the Trinity, man can rise to more perfect levels. As far as the likeness of analogy goes, the mind intermittently reaches a higher level in its reflexive acts of self-knowledge. Occasionally it may strive to ascend through analogical reflection on its own nature and constitution to the knowledge of God. Without the help of faith, however, it is impossible for the mind to understand itself as the image of the Trinity, because man cannot know the Trinity by reason alone, as Thomas shows in article 13. Finally, man can attain a better likeness of conformation by seeking to know and love God. In the last articles of question 10 (aa. 11-13) Thomas deals with man's knowledge of God. Reason allows us to know God's existence, but faith is necessary for knowledge of the three Persons in God. Conformation effects the highest level of the image when the essence of God is directly present to man's mind as the object of his intellect, but this is usually reserved for heaven; and the proper preparation in this life for the beatific vision of God is the gift of the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity. Thomas does not consider the image in terms of these higher degrees of conformation in question 10.

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THOMAS' DOCTRINE D. FROM THE SCRIPTUM JO THE D£ VERITATE

Augustine's De Trinitate was the greatest influence on the development of Aquinas' teaching on the image of the Trinity in the De veritate. Thomas shows very little direct acquaintance with Augustine's masterpiece in the Scriptum, but he seems to have acquired an intimate, firsthand knowledge of the De Trinitate sometime prior to the composition of De veritate, question 10, which was probably disputed in the fall of 1257. Following Augustine's authentic teaching, Thomas makes three significant changes in his presentation of the doctrine of the image. First, in his new analysis of the ontological status of the image of the Trinity, he considers that the best image is constituted by the acts of memory, understanding, and love, rather than by the corresponding faculties. In the Scriptum he had recognized that the image finds its perfection in the habits and acts that complete the likeness of the Trinity, but he had insisted that the image itself is found primarily in the faculties of the mind. In the De veritate he does not reject the image at the level of the faculties, but the image in its most perfect sense consists of the acts of these faculties. Second, in his explanation of the likeness of the Trinity that constitutes the mind as the image of God, Thomas focuses on the similarity between the two processions within the mind and the two divine processions in the Trinity, rather than on the five characteristics of the image presented in the Scriptum. There is a direct connection between Thomas' new emphasis on the processions and his preference for an image that consists of acts, for Augustine himself pointed out that the procession of our inner word requires an act of understanding. Faithful to Augustine's teaching, Thomas now prefers to consider the analogical likeness between the image and the divine Trinity in terms of the active, processional aspect of the inner life of the Trinity. Again, Thomas does not deny or drop the earlier conception: he still refers to the characteristics of the image, but they take second place to Augustine's final development of the psychological analogy for the Trinity. Finally, Thomas finds the image at its best when the mind is conformed to God through an active knowledge and love of God. In the Scriptum he suggests something similar to the likeness of conformation by his references to the characteristic of actual imitation, but in general he considers the image only in terms of the likeness of analogy. In the De veritate Thomas prefers a more dynamic version of the image. He perceives the superiority of the likeness of the Trinity that the mind attains through the active assimilation to God that occurs when it actively knows and loves God. Thomas scarcely needed to remind his reader that the image of the Trinity finds its perfect actualization in the glory of heaven, of which the life of grace


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gives a foretaste in this world. However, in De veritate, question 10, he does not consider the conditions of the image of the Trinity when grace and the light of glory elevate the mind above its natural limitations. We can only speculate about the connections he might have made between the image of the Trinity and the indwelling of the Trinity, for he says almost nothing about the indwelling in the De veritate.153 It is worth noting, however, that the changes in Thomas' doctrine of the image make it easier to observe a certain similarity between the structure of the image and the indwelling of the Trinity. In particular, his new consideration of the two processions in the image suggests some connection with the two divine missions that establish the indwelling of the Trinity. In the Summa theologiae the parallelism between the image and the indwelling is clearer, but this development rests upon the new insights that mark Thomas' teaching on the image of the Trinity in the De veritate. Thomas teaches in the De veritate that acts perfect the image and that the virtues and gifts of grace help to perfect the image.154 Thus he breaks down the conceptual barrier separating the image of the Trinity from the likeness grace adds to the soul, according to his earlier teaching in the Scriptum. In the De veritate the roots of this division are gone. Thomas still finds the image in man's nature, but he locates it more precisely in the mind as the human soul's potentiality for the acts of understanding and willing. This potentiality is rooted in the essence of man's soul, and hence every man from the moment of his creation is by nature the image of the Trinity, representing the inner life of the blessed Trinity in the rudimentary orientation of his soul towards the true and the good. Thomas, however, makes it clear that the image finds its realization and completion in the complete acts, or operations, which actualize the mind as the potentiality in which the image is rooted. Whether man accomplishes these acts by nature or by grace, it is these acts of knowledge and love that constitute the image in the full sense. Thus the image of the Trinity is something like a tree: it is truly there when it is still only a seed in the ground, but it is a poor specimen of its kind if it does not put forth branch and leaf, and bear fruit, thus reaching its true fulfillment. Thomas takes the motif of the ascent of the mind to God from Augustine's De Trinitate and uses it as the guiding principle in the development of De veritate, question 10. The image of the Trinity finds its fullest perfection in 153 See De ver. q.10, a. 10, s.c.2; Leon., p. 332. Elsewhere in the De veritate I have found only one significant reference to the indwelling: De ver., q.27, a.2, ad 3m. 154 See De ver. q. 10, a.7, ad 7m and 8m; Leon., p. 318, where he mentions that faith, hope, charity, wisdom, and other habits of this sort perfect the image.

15 0


the vision and love of God that the saints enjoy in heaven. Behind Thomas's new and deeper understanding of the image of the Trinity in the De veritate lies the genius of Augustine and his De Trinitate. De Beaurecueil and Sullivan both fail to appreciate how deeply indebted Thomas is to Augustine in this second exposition of the doctrine of the image. It is clear that Thomas read the text of his great predecessor with care, pondered its crucial passages, and drew new insight and inspiration from its teaching to form his own question on the mind as the image of the Trinity. All the chief developments of Thomas' doctrine from the Scriptum to the De veritate can be traced to Augustine—the importance of acts, the reflection of the two processions, the conformation of the mind to God. Thomas was not less concerned about the ontological conditions of the image in the mind when he first taught the doctrine of the image of the Trinity in the Scriptum super Sententiis, as de Beaurecueil has suggested, but rather in the De veritate he is able to correct and improve his ontological analysis of the image and the conditions of its fulfillment, by his penetration into the true teaching of Augustine in the De Trinitate. Aristotle gives him help in saving Augustine from his interpreters, but the truth about the image in man's mind is all there in Augustine, and Thomas knew this. However, as we shall see, he had still more to discover in Augustine.

PART THREE

5 Thomas' Doctrine of the Image Thomas' Doctrine of the Image

St. Thomas perfected his teaching on the image of the Trinity in the Summa theologiae. There is no drastic development in Thomas' doctrine of the image between the De veritate and the Summa, but there are significant changes. The special character of the Summa gave Thomas the opportunity to compose a more coherent and complete exposition of his doctrine. Also, the Summa sets the doctrine of the image in relation to other areas of theology, revealing its important place in the systematic organization Thomas gave to the science of sacra doctrina. Many of the developments in Thomas' teaching as it appears in the Summa are connected with its breadth of vision. Thomas builds on the arguments of De veritate, question 10, but adapts his conclusions about the image to the grander edifice of the Summa. Between De veritate, question 10, and the Summa Thomas occasionally made reference to the notion of the image of God, but for the most part these references are incidental and brief, offering no information on the development of his doctrine. There are, however, two passages in the accepted works of Thomas that dwell at some length on the image of the Trinity and allow us a glimpse of certain lines along which Thomas was directing his thought: one is found in Summa contra gentiles 4.26, and the other in De potentia, question 9, article 9.1 In both cases Aquinas introduces the image of the 1 Scholars generally agree that the Summa contra gentiles was written in the years 1259-1264. Book 4 would have been composed in Orvieto, probably about 1263-1264. 1 Thomas would have had occasion to ponder the writings the Fathers on the Trinity Scholars generally agree that the Summa contra ofgentiles was written in the about years this time, forBook at the4 request of Pope iv in in 1263 he wrote his work Contra errores 1259-1264. would have beenUrban composed Orvieto, probably about 1263-1264. Graecorum during thehad summer of that year. He thusofhave had many Trinitarian Thomas would have occasion to ponder thewould writings the Fathers on of thethe Trinity about this time,atfor the request of PopeofUrban iv in 1263 he wrote hisdoctrine, work Contra errores passages hisatfingertips on account the primary disputed point of the fllioque. Graecorum during the summer of that year. would thus have had many ofinthe The disputed questions De potentia wereHe composed in Rome, probably theTrinitarian first year passages at hisinfingertips on account of the primary point Dominican of doctrine,studium; the filioque. (1265-1266) which Thomas taught at the newlydisputed established see Weisheipl, Friar questions Thomas De d'Aquino: Life, Thought,in and Work (Garden City, The disputed potentiaHis were composed Rome, probably in the firstN.Y.: year (1265-1266) in which Thomas taught atpoints the newly established Dominican studium; see Doubleday 1974), p. 363. Fr. Weisheipl out that the "De potentia is chronologically

154

THE DOCTRINE IN THE SUMMA

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Trinity to illustrate a particular thesis on the Trinity, and thus seems to be relegating the notion of the image to the position of a coda to the treatise on the Trinity. What is worthy of remark in these two passages with regard to the development of Thomas' teaching on the image is found more fully and systematically presented in the Summa theologiae. A few points of doctrine from the Contra gentiles and the De potentia should be noted because they shed some light on the presentation of the image of the Trinity in the Summa. First, Thomas defines the image of the Trinity primarily in terms of the two processions of inner word and love. It is clear that he had begun to realize the power of this simplest and final form of Augustine's psychological analogy for the Trinity.2 Secondly, he never explicitly mentions the triad of memory, understanding, and will. If any analogue is given for the first Person in the Trinity, it is the mind itself or simply the rational creature. There is no mention of memory. Thomas prefers to speak of both God the Father and the mind as the principium of their respective processions.3 Finally, the Trinitarian context of both passages naturally brings out the likeness of analogy, but in the De potentia Thomas concludes with an important note on the likeness of conformation, in which he points the way to his final integration of the two types of likeness in the Summa theologiae* Thus prior to the composition of the Summa Thomas had had the occasion to reconsider some of the conclusions about the image of the Trinity he had developed in the De veritate, in the different context of a theological reflection on the Trinity. Such reflection must have helped Thomas to tidy up some of the loose ends of his teaching on the image.

and speculatively the immediate predecessor of the first part of the theological Summa" (p. 200). On many points it gives a lengthier, more advanced discussion than the Summa offers at a slightly later date. 2 See Depot, q.9, a.9, resp.; Marietti, p. 249: "Nam Deus intelligendo se, concipit verbum suum, quod est etiam ratio omnium intellectorum per ipsum, propter hoc quod omnia intelligit intelligendo seipsum: et ex hoc verbo procedit in amorem omnium et sui ipsius. ... Cuius quidem ternarii similitude in creaturis apparet tripliciter: ... Alio modo secundum eandem rationem operations; et sic repraesentatur in creatura rationali tantum, quae potest se intelligere et amare, sicut et Deus, et sic verbum et amorem sui producere." 3 See Cont. gent. 4.26, nos. 3631-3632; Marietti, p. 299: "Et sic tria in mente inveniuntur: mens ipsa, quae est processionis principium, in sua natura existens; et mens concepta in intellectu; et mens amata in voluntate. ... cum ex dictis manifestum sit esse in divina natura Deum ingenitum, qui est totius divinae processionis principium, scilicet Patrem; et Deum genitum per modum verbi in intellectu concepti, scilicet Filium; et Deum per modum amoris procedentem, scilicet Spiritum Sanctum." 4 Depot, q.9, a.9, resp.; Marietti, p. 249: The likeness of the Trinity is found" Tertio modo per unitatem obiecti, in quantum creatura rationalis intelligit et amat Deum; et haec est quaedam unionis conformitas, quae in solis sanctis invenitur qui idem intelligunt et amant quod Deus."

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Further light may be shed on the development of Thomas' doctrine of the image by the newly-resurrected commentary on book 1 of the Sentences that appears to be a reportatio of Thomas' lectures delivered in Rome in the academic year 1265-1266.5 Of particular relevance for this study is the appended set of four articles on the image of the Trinity.6 From examination of these articles it seems that the doctrine is Thomas' own, but in too rough a form to be of much value. The articles presuppose the Scriptum and the De veritate and suggest a date prior to the Summa theologiae. We need not bother with the details of the doctrine, which is tied to the Sentences and its deficiencies, especially in consideration of the work that needs to be done to edit and appraise the commentary as a whole. Thomas began his masterpiece, the Summa theologiae, in Rome, where he had been sent to establish a provincial studium at the Dominican priory of Santa Sabina. His assignment in Rome was the first strictly academic job he had held since leaving Paris in 1259. The Roman Province decreed the opening of the studium in order to give young Dominicans of some intellectual promise a more concentrated training in theology than their individual priories could provide. Thus Thomas would have been faced with a classroom of beginners, who required a course of studies somewhat different from that prescribed by the syllabus of a Parisian regent master. Thomas did lecture on the Bible and hold disputations before his Dominican students, but a more systematic introduction to the elements of theology was needed. He apparently attempted to use the Sentences for this purpose, for at the time it was the standard text for beginners to read as well as for the Parisian bachelor to cut his teeth on. We now have a manuscript that seems to contain a reportatio of these lectures, as has been mentioned above. However, 5 The Leonine Commission recently discovered a manuscript (Lincoln College, Oxford MS. lat. 95) that contains a copy of book 1 of Thomas' Parisian Scriptum super Sententiis with marginal glosses and appendices that are said to belong to an "alia lectura fratris Thome." External evidence points to the existence of some sort of second commentary on book 1 from the years 1265-1266. See Weisheipl, Friar Thomas, pp. 216-217. Thomas' authorship has been debated, but ably defended by Fr. Boyle: see H.-F. Dondaine, "'Alia lectura fratris Thome'? (Super 1 Sent.)" Mediaeval Studies 42 (1980): 308-336; and Leonard E. Boyle, "Alia lectura fratris Thome," Mediaeval Studies 45 (1983): 418-429. 6 Fr. Walter H. Principe kindly transcribed these articles for me, using a microfilm in the library of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies. The articles were too long to place in the margins of Parisian distinction 3, so they were placed at the end of book 1. Here are the titles as given in the introductions. Fol. 124ra: "Quaeritur de imagine, et primo de mente, et circa hoc quaeruntur duo: primo, quid sit mens; secundo vero utrum in mente est imago Trinitatis secundum memoriam, intelligentiam, et voluntatem." Fol. 124va= "Item quaeritur utrum in istis tribus, scilicet memoria, intelligentia, et voluntate, attendatur imago Trinitatis quantum ad quaecumque obiecta, vel solum quantum ad Deum." Fol. 124vb: "Hie quaeritur utrum haec tria, scilicet memoria, intelligentia, et voluntas, insint substantialiter animae."

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Thomas concluded that the Sentences was not really a suitable textbook for the teaching of beginners. To fulfill the need for a clear, concise presentation of the elements of theology, Thomas had to provide a new text, and to this end, as he himself states in his prologue, he began the composition of the Summa theologiae. Although he may have conceived the idea of the Summa in 1265, Thomas did not begin work on it until 1266. Thus he would probably have finished the series of disputations De potentia about the time he was writing the first questions of the Summa. His lectures on the first book of the Sentences must date from about the same time. He therefore would have come to write the treatise on the Trinity in the Summa from a fairly recent reconsideration of the Trinitarian section of the Sentences as well as from the disputations concerning the Trinity that form the last part of the De potentia? Thomas completed the prima pars of the Summa at Viterbo, where he had been assigned in the summer of 1267 to be close to the court of Clement iv and to serve as lector in the local Dominican priory. Thus the treatise on the creation of man (qq. 75-102) would have been composed in the relative leisure of Viterbo, probably from the end of 1267 to the spring of 1268.8 Before he left Viterbo for Paris in the fall of 1268, Thomas had begun the secunda pars. How much he had finished before his departure we do not know, but he probably had completed at least the first five questions of the prima secundae that form the introductory treatise on beatitude.9 This short section bears a close relation to the prima pars, and in particular to the question on the image of God (la, q.93), so that it is valuable to know that it probably originated in the same environment and period as the prima pars did. Thus the background of the first part of the Summa, in which Thomas expounds the doctrine of the image of the Trinity and the elements of theology most closely related to this theme, is the classroom setting of the Dominican studium, followed by the assignment to the papal court at Viterbo. If we are to discern the lines of development in his teaching on the image of God, we must remember that Thomas had been lecturing on the Trinity to his students and even holding disputations on certain questions of Trinitarian theology. In the careful organization of the Summa, it is not 7

See Weisheipl, Friar Thomas, p. 361. The Summa was probably begun in 1266. Thomas would have lectured on the Trinity from the Sentences during the academic year 1265-1266. Of the De potentia, questions 7 to 10 (on the Trinity) probably date from spring, 1266. 8 Weisheipl, Friar Thomas, p. 361. In q.79 Thomas used a translation completed by William of Moerbeke on Nov. 22, 1267. Therefore, it is not likely that Thomas wrote q.75 much earlier than that date. 9 Weisheipl, Friar Thomas, p. 257.


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surprising that Thomas presents the doctrine of the image of the Trinity in the section on the production of man at some distance from the treatise on the Trinity. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to see this separation as a development towards a more anthropological conception of the image, according to which the image is viewed less as the basis of an analogy for the Trinity and more as a reality of man's condition.10 As we have already seen, Thomas never really separated the anthropological from the Trinitarian aspect of the image of God, in spite of the inherited division between the two discussions of the image of God in the Sentences. Thomas always maintained that the image of the Trinity has its roots in man's very nature. It is a mistake to see the analogical use of the image for reflection on the Trinity as a denial of its reality in the structure of human nature. In fact, the Trinitarian aspect of the image of God is particularly prominent in the exposition of the image in the Summa. It has been observed that Thomas virtually abandoned Augustine's favorite triadic division of the image (memoria, intelligentia, voluntas) in the Summa, but it is wrong to conclude immediately that Thomas was discarding Augustine's doctrine of the image of the Trinity for a more realistic, Aristotelian interpretation of the image.11 If there is any development in Thomas' works with regard to Augustine, it is in the direction of a more profound penetration and appreciation of the doctrine of the De Trinitate. In the Summa Thomas succeeds in making the connection between the doctrine of the image and the theological presenta10 De Beaurecueil misinterprets the Summrfs plan, according to which Thomas treats the image in the section on the production of man rather than in the treatise on the Trinity. See de Beaurecueil [2]:50: "La place qui lui [VImago Dei] revient dans la Somme est done en accord avec les indications du litre de la q. 93 pour nous manifester que S. Thomas 1'envisage dans une perspective purement anthropologique, independamment de 1'usage que pourrait en faire 1'analogie au service de fins ulterieures." In effect, this is the second of de Beaurecueil's two main theses. According to this second thesis, Thomas develops a more anthropological view of the image, using the scriptural notion of the image of God to study man in relation to the cosmic hierarchy of beings rather than employing the image as an analogy for the Trinity. 11 We have already rejected this view of the development of St. Thomas' teaching between the Scriptum and the De veritate. It must also be rejected with regard to the final development of his doctrine in the Summa. De Beaurecueil is not correct when he writes of Thomas' analysis of the structure of the image as if Thomas had moved away from Augustine. See de Beaurecueil [1]:82: "La Somme etudiera pour lui-meme le probleme, sans se laisser guider par le docteur d'Hippone. ... Les positions augustiniennes, au lieu de mener la recherche, ne sont plus evoquees que comme un donne a bien entendre selon les conclusions de 1'analyse objective du reel." A false opposition between Augustine and realism. De Beaurecueil fails to appreciate the full significance of book 15 of the De Trinitate. So does Sullivan, p. 262: "There does not seem to be any new element of Augustinian influence perceptible in the formal treatment of the trinitarian facet of the image. Rather, there is an obvious area in which the influence of Augustine seems to wane, and it is to be seen in the abandoning of the augustinian terminology for the trinities in man."

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tion of the Trinity more manifest than he had in his earlier works. In this way he also shows himself a true disciple of St. Augustine, casting new light on Augustine's masterpiece in his own more systematic unfolding of theology in the Summa.

A. IMAGO DEIJN THE PLAN OF THE PRIMA PARS In the Summa there is only one extended text on the image of God: question 93 of the prima pars. Several questions arise immediately. Why does St. Thomas expound his teaching on the image at this particular place in the Summa rather than elsewhere? How does the exposition of the image of God fit into the carefully conceived plan of the Summa! How is the notion of the image of the Trinity related to the various sections of the Summa! What is the relative importance of the notion of the image of God in the organization of the Summa! It was almost inevitable that readers should have raised these questions and searched for answers to them, for there has been considerable interest in the notion of the image of God in the middle of this century. Various studies on the central role of the scriptural theme of the image of God in the theological anthropology of the Fathers of the Church have spurred students of Thomas to investigate the place of this notion in his theology. Ghislain Lafont has produced the most thorough study of the role of the notion of the image in the structural organization of the Summa.12 According to Lafont, Thomas remains faithful to the traditional theological anthropology of the Fathers inasmuch as he made the theme of the image of God central to the anthropology of the Summa.13 Louis Geiger also supports this view of the importance of the concept of imago Dei in the section of the prima pars on man.14 The perspective of the present study, especially its focus on the image of the Trinity, gives a different slant to the observations these scholars have made. 12

Lafont first published his investigations in an article that was limited to the role of the theme of imago Dei in the anthropological section of the Summa: "Le sens du theme de I'lmage de Dieu dans 1'anthropologie de saint Thomas d'Aquin (la Pars, qu. 93)," Recherches de science religieuse 47 (1959): 560-569. He expanded this study and pursued the theme of the image through the rest of the Summa in his subsequent book: Structures et Methode dans la Somme theologique de saint Thomas d'Aquin (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1961). 13 Lafont, Structures et Methode, pp. 265-266: "La notion la plus capable de rassembler de maniere simple 1'anthropologie thomiste nous semble etre celle de I'lmage de Dieu; c'est aussi la notion classique en Tradition chretienne. Elle n'est pas, chez saint Thomas, un instrument technique d'elaboration: c'est cette notion que les developpements techniques ont mission d'eclairer." As we shall see, Lafont exaggerates the importance of the theme of the image in the Summa as a whole and even in the anthropological part of the prima pars. 14 Louis B. Geiger, "L'homme, image de Dieu: A propos de Summa Theologiae, la, 93, 4," Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 66 (1974): 511-532.


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In the introduction to question 93 of the primapars, Thomas briefly gives his reason for placing the exposition of the image of God at this point: "Next we must consider the end or term of the production of man, according as he is said to have been made to the image and likeness of God."15 The discussion of the image is to be found in the section on the production of man. In the prologue to question 75 he divides the theological study of man into two parts: first, the theologian must examine the nature of man; but secondly, he must also study the production of man.16 Students of Aquinas have often neglected to take into account the section on the production of man (qq. 90-102) because of their preoccupation with the endeavor to distil a Thomist philosophy of man from the preceding section on the nature of man (qq. 75-89).17 In order to appreciate the theological structure of the treatise on man we must briefly place it in the larger context of the prima pars. There is an inescapably historical tone to the entire division of the primapars concerned with the creation (qq. 44-119). In effect, in its broad outlines this division forms a sort of commentary on the first several chapters of Genesis. The historical character of the act of creation is also indicated hi the Neoplatonic designations of this division in terms of the procession or emanation of creatures from God.18 As Thomas himself states, theology is not concerned with creatures in se, but only as they are related to God as their beginning and end.19 Therefore, the theologian studies the nature of the creature only to discover its relation to God, and both reason and revelation indicate that the relation is dynamic. Creatures proceed from God and return to Him, and within the field of this circular movement lies all the sacred history to which the Bible bears witness. The theologian studies the nature of man as a necessary preliminary to the investigation of sacred history. Therefore, the section on the production of man is really more primary in the theological 15 la, q.93, prol.; Ottawa, p. 572: "Deinde considerandum est de fine sive termino productions hominis, prout dicitur factus ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei." 16 la, q.75, prol.; Ottawa, p. 438 "Et primo, de natura ipsius hominis; secundo, de eius productione." 17 Chenu's influence has succeeded to some degree in correcting this imbalance; see his remarks in Introduction a I'etude de Saint Thomas d'Aquin (Montreal: Institut d'Etudes Medievales; Paris: Vrin 1954), pp. 274-275. Lafont and Geiger both seem to agree with Chenu's principles in their approaches. 18 la, q.2, prol.; Ottawa, p. 11: "tertio, ea quae pertinent ad processum creaturarum ab ipso"; la, q.44, prol.; Ottawa, p. 279: "considerandum restat de processione creaturarum a Deo"; la, q.45, prol.; Ottawa, p. 283: "Deinde quaeritur de modo emanationis rerum a primo principio, qui dicitur creatio." 19 See la, q.2, prol.; Ottawa, p. 11: "principalis intentio huius sacrae doctrinae est Dei cognitionem tradere, et non solum secundum quod in se est, sed etiam secundum quod est principium rerum et finis earum, et specialiter rationalis creaturae."

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enterprise. However, the theologian must also appreciate the specific difference that distinguishes man from other animals if he is to perceive what God actually accomplishes in man through his history and if he is to discern what path God directs us to follow. Thomas follows roughly the same order in his arrangement of the section on the procession of creatures from God as he did in the corresponding section of his commentary on the Sentences. After a short discussion of the production of creatures in general, he turns to the distinction of creatures. Thomas follows the traditional order derived from a figurative exposition of Gen. 1:1: "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth." Some of the Fathers interpreted heaven as a reference to the angelic creation, because they thought that there must be some oblique reference to the creation of the angels in the first lines of Genesis, which fail to mention the angels directly.20 According to this interpretation, the earth signifies the formless matter from which God proceeded to separate and shape all things in this visible world. Therefore, the proper order for the theological study of creatures is to begin with the angels and then to follow the distinctions within the material world that are marked out in the six days chronicled in Genesis. It was traditional to complete the study of the Hexaemeron with a treatise on the creation of man (De hominis opificio). Obviously this order does not correspond to the hierarchical order of beings, according to which the student should study man before the lower creatures, but the Summa is a theological work and studies creatures in relation to God, not in themselves. Thomas is content to follow the order of sacred history, and even to see a certain logic in this order, by which we proceed first to the purely spiritual creature, then to the purely corporeal, and finally to the partly spiritual, partly corporeal creature, man. Perhaps Thomas found this order more suitable for the via doctrinae than the metaphysical order, inasmuch as it moves from the simpler creatures to the more complex, as if we were starting from the parts in order to understand the composite. There is a rough parallelism between the treatise on the angels and the treatise on man in the primapars. As intellectual creatures the angels are also made to the image and likeness of God, although this truth is not directly

20

Especially Augustine. See la, q.66, a.4, obj.l; Ottawa, p. 406: "Dicit enim Augustinus, xii Confess., ad Deum loquens: 'Duo reperio quae fecisti carentia temporibus,' scilicet materiam primam corporalem et naturam angelicam." See also De civitate Dei 11.9; CCL 48:328; although here Augustine prefers to find the creation of the angels in the words, Fiat lux. Gregory the Great also accepted this interpretation of Gen. 1:1; see Moralia in lob 32.12.16; PL 76:615, where he interprets caelum et terrain as "simul spiritalia atque corporalia."


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asserted in Scripture. Thomas, in fact, held that the angels possessed the image of God to a higher degree than man, but he does not discuss the image in the treatise on the angels. There is only one significant reference to the image of God, in the article on the angels' knowledge of God. By his nature the angel knows God because the image of God is imprinted on that nature so that it serves as "a sort of mirror representing the divine likeness."21 This statement reveals the simplicity of the angelic nature, for the angel knows God in the simple act of self-knowledge. Unlike man, the angel does not need to labor by the circuitous path of discursive reason to attain a knowledge of God. Because the angelic nature is not encumbered by a corporeal mode of existence, the angel always knows himself by means of his essence, always sees the image of God implanted in his nature, and thus always knows God in this likeness. This passage must be compared to the last article of the section on man's knowledge in this life, in which it is a question of man's natural knowledge of God. It is argued that man knows God before he knows anything else because the image of God is in his mind: "that which is known first in the image is the exemplar by which the image is formed."22 Thomas replies that the image only gives direct and instantaneous knowledge of its exemplar if it is a perfect image.23 Thomas arranges the section on man according to the same order he follows in the questions on the angels.24 In the case of the angels, he first treats of their nature (qq. 50-60), including the relationship between their substance and corporeal things, their knowledge, and their will. Then he discusses the creation or production of the angels (qq. 61-64). The brevity of the section on the angels in comparison with the vast extent of the section on man, if one considers the secunda pars and also the tertia pars as part of the section on man, reflects the comparative simplicity of the nature and history of the angels. Because of the complexity of man, Thomas divides the study of the two faculties of his mind, intellect and will, into a first part that deals with these faculties as faculties, and a lengthier part that deals with their respective operations. In fact, Thomas reserves the treatment of the operations of the human will for the secunda pars, which means that the study of 21 la, q.56, a.3, resp.; Ottawa, p. 343. There is only one other reference to the image: in la, q.59, a.l, s.c.l. Augustine's triad of memoria, intelligentia, voluntas is combined with the assertion of the existence of the imago Dei in the mens angelica to reach the conclusion that there is voluntas in the angel. 22 la, q.88, a.3, obj.3; Ottawa, p. 549. 23 la, q.88, a.3, ad. 3m; Ottawa, p. 549. 24 See Lafont, Structures et Methode, p. 165: "L'etude de I'homme, commencee a la question 75, semble batie sur le meme modele exactement que celle des Anges, et on assiste a une regroupement de la matiere dispersee en plusieurs endroits dans les autres ouvrages."

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man's nature technically includes the entire secunda pars as well as questions 75 to 89 of the prima pars.25 The history of the angels is briefly recounted, for at the moment of creation they were faced with the choice that led some immediately to eternal bliss and others to eternal loss. With the angels the circle of exitus and reditus is complete in the first act of the angelic will, whereas for man, the way stretches out through all the vicissitudes of his earthly existence.26 In four questions Thomas disposes of the history of the angels. He covers the act of creation by which the angels were brought into being, the perfection of the angel in the act informed by grace that merits the reward of eternal beatitude, and the damnation of the fallen angel that follows his sinful act of rebellion. In comparison, the history of man requires questions 90 to 102 of the prima pars just to recount the production of man. Then it takes all of the tertiapars to tell of the divine Savior who made Himself the way for men to reach their end, of the sacraments He gave them to aid them on the way, and of the final resurrection to eternal life or eternal punishment. The instantaneous completion of the circle of the angel's life means that Thomas can treat of the perfection of the angel under the section on their production, but the long path that brings man to his perfection in God, means Thomas cannot do the same in the treatise on man. In the treatment of man's history, he accepts a clear-cut separation between the exitus from God and the reditus to Him. Nevertheless, the end of man seems to be already discernible at the moment of his creation. As Thomas treats of the beatitude that perfects the being of the angel (q. 62) immediately after he deals with the creation of the angel (q. 61), so in the section on the production of man, he speaks of the end of man's production (q. 93) immediately after he has finished explaining the actual production of the first man and woman (qq. 90-92). Why did Thomas turn to consider man's end when he had just begun to speak of the production of man? An answer to this question requires an examination of Thomas' use of the term finis and its relation to the other causes of being. 25 See la, q.84, prol.; Ottawa, p. 511: "Actus autem appetitivae partis ad considerationem moralis scientiae pertinent: et ideo in secunda parte hums opens de eis tractabitur, in qua considerandum erit de morali materia. Nunc autem de actibus intellectivae partis agetur." 26 See Lafont, Structures et Methode, p. 166: "A ce point de vue, cependant, le probleme de construction theologique etait moins simple que pour les Anges. Comme nous 1'avons vu, en effet, un seul acte constitue toute I'economie du developpement, de 1'histoire de 1'Ange; par cet acte en effet est realise le merite angelique. Pour rhomme, les principes sont les memes, mais 1'application differe; saint Thomas 1'avait d'ailleurs remarque des son etude des Anges: 'Homo secundum naturam non statim natus est adipisci ultimam perfectionem, sicut angelus. Et ideo homini longior via data est ad merendum beatitudinem quam angelo.' Un etalement dans le temps, fruit de la condition incarnee, modifie la figure concrete de 1'histoire humaine."


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At the beginning of the Summa, Thomas divides the subject of sacra doctrina according to a distinction that reason can draw between God as He is in Himself and God as He is the beginning (principium) and end (finis) of things, especially of the rational creature.27 On the basis of this distinction, one expects a fairly precise division between the study of the exitus of the creature from God its beginning and the reditus of the creature to God its end. Indeed, Thomas does set aside the reditus of man to God as the subject of the secundapars and also the tertiapars. However, the conception of God as the end of the creature is not so neatly confined to the later parts, but emerges in important places throughout the prima pars. There is good reason for this peculiar ubiquity of the notion of finis: for Thomas the term finis means in some sense both the beginning and the end of an action.28 We are used to thinking of the end as the terminus of a motion, so that the end of a thing would be its completion or perfection. However, when we speak of having the end of the thing in mind, we are adding to the notion of an end a peculiar sort of causality that is the beginning of the movement by which the thing will eventually reach its terminus, its perfection. The causality that the end exercises is called final causality. It is well known that among the four causes of Aristotelian philosophy the final cause holds a pre-eminent place. For Thomas it is the causa causarum, for unless an agent intends some end, it will have no reason to exercise its efficient causality in order to establish some form as the immediate cause of the being of its effect.29 At the beginning of this order of causing is the end as the principle that moves the appetite or will of the agent. Thus it is proper to consider the end at the beginning of the investigation of any causal act. At the beginning of the division on the procession of creatures from God, Thomas explains that the goodness of God is the ultimate end God intends in the act of creation. The divine goodness is also the end the creature strives to attain. In the following text Thomas indicates the ultimate basis for his

27

la, q.2, prol.; Ottawa, p. 11: There follows the tripartite division of the Summa, although the precise correspondence between the three parts and the distinction of the subject of sacra doctrina just quoted is not entirely clear. It seems that the prima pars covers both God in se and God as the beginning of things, leaving both the secunda and tertia partes to cover God as end. 28 Ia2ae, q.l, a.3, ad 1m; Ottawa, p. 713: "finis non est omnino aliquid extrinsecum ab actu, quia comparatur ad actum ut principium vel terminus." 29 la, q.5, a.2, ad 1m; Ottawa, p. 28: "Bonum autem, cum habeat rationem appetibilis, importat habitudinem causae finalis, cuius causalitas prima est, quia agens non agit nisi propter finem, et ab agente materia rnovetur ad formam; unde dicitur quod finis est causa causarum. Et sic in causando bonum est prius quam ens, sicut finis quam forma.'' Cf. la, q.5, a.4, resp.; Ottawa, p. 30.

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subsequent connection between the image of God and the end of the production of man. When He exercises His causality ad extra, God intends solely to communicate His perfection, which is His goodness. And each creature intends to attain its perfection, which is a likeness of the divine perfection and goodness. Therefore, the divine goodness is the end of all things.30

It is the divine goodness that moves God to share this goodness with the creature through the creation and perfection of the creature. Thus the divine goodness is first of all the end as the principle that initiates the act of creation. Then the divine goodness is also the end of the act of creation inasmuch as the act of creation terminates at a created likeness of the divine goodness. As we shall see, in the case of man, this likeness is the rational soul as the image of God. Finally, the divine goodness is the end God has ordained for the creature and which the creature intends as it strives to reach its perfection, a further likeness of the divine perfection and goodness. God, under the attribute of His goodness, must be seen as the final cause of both the creation and the perfection of His creatures. His end is to communicate His goodness to His creatures, first by bringing them into being, second by drawing them to perfection in Hun. In the act of creation the finis opens ("end of the work") is distinguished from the finis operands ("end of the worker"): the finis operis is the form of the creature through which the creature has its being, but the finis operantis extends further to include the perfection God intends for the creature.31 In the case of the rational creature, the act of creation terminates at the existence of an intellectual nature, but this nature only finds its completion in the operations that assimilate it to God most perfectly. God is the final cause of the rational creature's operations by which it strives to realize its likeness to God as fully as possible. Thus the finis operantis of the Creator includes the finis operantis of the creature, for the creature cooperates with the Creator by striving towards the end to which He has ordained it, the perfection of its nature. It is this nature itself, however, which is the finis operis of the first stage of the assimilation to God, which takes place in the act of creation. 30

la, q.44, a.4, resp.; Ottawa, p. 283. See 2a2ae, q.141, a.6, ad 1m; Ottawa, p. 2115. Thomas spells out this Aristotelian distinction in slightly different terms in De pot. q.3, a. 16, resp.; Marietti, p. 87: "El quamvis forma sit finis operationis, ad quem operatic agentis terminatur, non tamen omnis finis est forma. Est enim aliquis finis intentionis praeter finem operationis, ut patet in domo. Nam forma eius est finis terminans operationem aedificatoris; non tamen ibi terminatur intentio eius, sed ad ulteriorem finem, quae est habitatio; ut sic dicatur, quod finis operationis est forma domus, intentionis vero habitatio." Here Thomas refers to the finis operis as the "finis operationis," and to the finis operantis as the "finis intentionis." 31


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We must now return to the prologue of the question on the image of God to determine the significance of the connection Thomas makes between the image and the "end or terminus of the production of man."32 It has been suggested that Thomas meant something different by each of the two terms in this phrase: finis sive terminus.33 However, in the prologue at the beginning of the section on the production of man, Thomas states the subject of question 93 without the second term: "on the end of the production."34 It seems likely, therefore, that the conjunction sive simply serves to place the word terminus in apposition to finis, although the two words do not have precisely the same meaning. Thomas clarifies the sense of the word finis in this phrase by adding the word terminus, for the word finis has several senses, as we have seen. By the word terminus Thomas affirms that he is referring to the end that terminates the act of the production of man. Because the act of creation terminates in the thing that has come into being, the end of the act itself (/?«/$ operis or finis operationis) is the thing itself or more properly its form.35 Thus the end of the production of man is the form of man, his soul. As Thomas states, in the case of the generation of man, the form of man and the end of his generation are the same thing, man's soul.36 In the creation 32

la, q.93, prol.; Ottawa, p. 572. See de Beaurecueil [2]:51-53. He thinks it unlikely that Thomas would use two different terms if one is simply the equivalent of the other. 34 la, q.90, prol.; Ottawa, p. 558: "secundo de fine productionis." 35 See n. 31 above for references to texts on finis operis or finis operations. These two phrases are clearly interchangeable, for Thomas applies them both to the same referent in the analysis of the two ends in the case of the building of a house. The house itself is termed the finis operis or finis operationis, as opposed to the purposes for which the builder built the house, which are the finis operantis or finis intentionis. Sometimes Thomas identifies the finis operis with the thing itself which has been produced, but he also speaks more specifically of the finis generations as the forma of the thing produced. See Com gent 3.26, no. 2089; Marietti, pp. 36-37: "Quae autem sunt perfectiones rei ad speciem, non sunt finis rei: immo res est finis ipsarum; materia enim et forma sunt propter speciem. Licet enim forma sit finis generationis, non tamen est finis iam generati et speciem habentis: immo ad hoc quaeritur forma ut species sit completa." See also In I Metaphys. lect. 4, no. 71; Marietti, p. 23: "finis generationis est forma ipsa, quae est pars rei. Finis autem motus est aliquid quaesitum extra rem quae movetur." As the text from Cont. gent. 3.26 reveals, there is a fine, but important distinction between the thing as end and its form as end. The form is for the sake of the thing, which can only exist when its species is complete; but generation terminates at the form which the agent has produced. In the case of any sort of generation or production, the end of the act is the form of the thing produced. 36 See In 8 Metaphys. lect. 4, no. 1737; Marietti, p. 415: "Hae autem duae causae, scilicet finis et forma, forte sunt idem in numero. Quod quidem dicit, quia in quibusdam sunt idem, in quibusdam non. Finis enim generationis hominis est anima. Finis vero operationis eius est felicitas." Cf. the commentary on the principal Aristotelian text on this coincidence of formal and final cause: "Dicit [Aristoteles] ergo primo quod multoties contingit quod tres causae concurrunt in unam, ita quod causa formalis et finalis sint una secundum numerum. Et hoc intelligendum est de causa finali generationis, non autem de causa finali rei generatae. Finis 33

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of the first man, the divine act terminates at the soul, which God has created out of nothing to be the form of the body He has shaped from the elementary matter already created.37 Creation ends at form; growth and perfection come after. Yet the ensuing articles of question 93 can easily lead the reader to think that Thomas must have meant the title of the question to refer to the finis operantis in the creation of man, that is, man's eternal beatitude. When we think of the word "end" in relation to man, we usually think of that end for which man himself strives, his beatitude. Geiger has interpreted the prologue of question 93 in terms of the ultimate end of man.38 Such an interpretation runs counter to the literal sense of the phrase finis productions, which has just been explained. It also creates a problem concerning the structure of the Sumtna-, for if we accept this interpretation, we must explain why Thomas discusses the ultimate end of man in two places: la, question 93, and Ia2ae, questions enim generationis hominis est forma humana; non tamen finis hominis est forma eius, sed per formam suam convenit sibi operari ad finem" (In 2 Physic, lect. 11, no. 242; Marietti, p. 117). The end of the generation of man is simply the form of man. This end is distinct from the end of man once generated, that is, his ultimate end, which is beatitude, to which man's operations, as distinct from his generation, are ordained. 37 The Aristotelian analysis of generation can be applied analogously to the case of the creation of man. One must remember that the creation of the soul itself is not a production in the same sense as generation is. Generation presupposes matter, whereas creation is ex nihilo. In the Christian view held by St. Thomas, there is an act of creation involved not only in the production of the first man, but also in the generation of every man who follows, for the soul of each man is a subsistent, immaterial form that cannot be produced except by creation ex nihilo. Thomas speaks of the generation of man because man in some sense generates his offspring by disposing the material required for the body, of which the newly created soul is the form. In the case of the production of the first man, God Himself disposed the material for the body to which the first soul belonged. Creation is not generation, but both creation and generation are operations of an active potency that is ordained to the production of something. 38 Geiger, "L'homme, image de Dieu," uses the text of Com. gent 3.26 to distinguish the section of the Summa on the nature of man from the question on the image of God. In Cont. gent. 3.26 Thomas says that the perfect definition of a thing includes the end for which a thing has been made as well as the end that a thing has already attained at the moment of its generation, namely its form and its species (which Geiger translates as "nature"). However, Geiger identifies the finis productions of man with the use or operation for which the thing was made (finis rei) rather than with the form that is the finis generationis. Thus he concludes that the study of the image of God in man (q. 93) forms the completion of the study of man's nature (qq. 75-89): "Si nous appliquons cette notion de la definition parfaite au probleme de 1'image de Dieu dans l'homme, nous devons dire que, dans le traite de I'homme de la Somme theologique, la fin qui est la nature de l'homme et la fin qui est sa destination, voulue par le Createur, sont etudiees separement. ... La fin pour laquelle 1'etre humain est produit, inscrite dans sa nature meme, et voulue par le Createur, n'est abordee qu'a la question 93" (p. 519). He seems to misinterpret the meaning of the phrase finis productions in the prologue to question 93, since this end is not man's destination, but in fact his nature. Man's destination is in fact studied separately, in the secunda pars.


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1-5. For Thomas divides the treatise on man between the prima pars and the rest of the Summa, in contrast to the treatise on the angels, which he summarizes briefly in the prima pars. Thomas considers man in relation to God as man's end in the secunda pars, whereas in the prima pars he treats of man in relation to God as man's principle or beginning.39 In light of this division, it would be strange to find a question devoted to the examination of man's ultimate end in the section of the prima pars on the production of the first man. It is more fitting to explain the meaning of the phrase finis productionis hi terms of the finis operis that concludes the act of creation by which man comes into being, rather than in terms of the ultimate end of man. There is some confirmation in the text for the analysis of the title of the question on the image of God in terms of the finis operis or finis operations. We must first advert to the second part of the title. Thomas specifies what he means by the "end or terminus of the production of man" by connecting the phrase with the scriptural assertion that man has been made to the image and likeness of God.40 Aquinas summons the words of Gen. 1:26 to give substance to the more abstract, philosophical terms of the first phrase. This invocation of the scriptural account of the creation of man ties question 93 to the surrounding questions (qq. 90-102), which constitute a sort of treatise De hominis opiflcio, completing Thomas' version of the traditional commentary on the Hexaemeron.41 Set in the midst of an exposition of the production and state of the first man, it seems likely that Thomas means by the phrase finis productionis the form at which the act of creation terminates, rather than the ultimate end of man. We may note a small confirmation of 39

There is, of course, the brief consideration of God as final cause of all things (la, q.44, a.4), but Thomas means primarily that God is the end in the sense of the causa causarum without which creation would never have been effected. To the objection that Thomas has already examined the beatific vision in la, q. 12, it should be replied that Thomas does not deal specifically with man in that question, nor is he really concerned with the vision of God as an act in which any creature's beatitude consists, except incidentally. If one examines the question in conjunction with question 13, one discovers that these two questions, which come at the end of the section on God's essence, are really concerned with two related attributes of God: His knowability and His nameability. 40 la, q.93, prol.; Ottawa, p. 572: "Deinde considerandum est de fine sive termino productionis hominis, prout dicitur factus ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei." 41 After the treatise on the angels, Thomas treats the production of purely corporeal creatures in a short series of questions (65-74) on the six days of creation recounted in Gen. 1. It was traditional from the time of the Fathers to complete this commentary on Gen. 1 with an explanation of the creation of man, which was sometimes treated as a separate work, although it complemented the commentary on the creation of the lower creatures. Following the ordo scientiae, Thomas interrupts this exposition of Gen. 1 with the section on the nature of man. Lafont has noted this order: "Apres 1'Hexaemeron qui situe rhomme dans le cadre de sa creation historique, nous trouvons une etude detaillee de la nature et de la psychologic de rhomme, puis un De hominis opiflcio" (Structures et Methode, p. 165). Cf. Lafont, "Le theme de I'lmage," p. 566.

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this interpretation in the use of the past participle factus hi the paraphrase of Gen. 1:26 in the title, which suggests that the end of production is a state man has already attained by virtue of his existence. Another corroboration of this interpretation can be found in a text from the first question of the section on the production of man. In question 90, Thomas discusses the creation of the soul. In the second article of this question, he asks whether God made the soul from some pre-existing substance or created it from nothing. Against the first alternative, Thomas quotes Gen. 1:27, where it is said that God created man to His image. In order to apply this text to the creation of the soul, Thomas explains that "man is to the image of God according to the soul."42 This argument indicates that man has been made to the image of God inasmuch as God has created his soul. If the image of God signifies the end of the production of man, as Thomas states in the prologue of question 93, then the end of man's production is, in fact, man's soul, which is the form of man. As we have seen, the form of a thing produced is the finis opens, not the finis opemntis. Therefore, this text on the image of God suggests that we are correct to interpret the finis productionis of man as his form rather than as his ultimate end. A remark that Thomas makes in question 93 on the same fine from Gen. 1:27 sheds some light on the title of the question. There was an old tradition among the Greek Fathers that these verses signified that God had created man on the model of His divine Son, because Scripture elsewhere gives the Son the title of Image.43 It is this exegetical tradition that Thomas confronts in article 5 of question 93. Thomas did not accept this interpretation of Gen. 1:26-27, but he realized that one of the factors that contributed to this difference of opinion is the ambiguity of the preposition in the recurring phrase ad imaginem Dei. For our present purposes, we need only consider one alternative that Thomas mentions: "this preposition ad may designate the terminus of the making, so that the sense would be, 'Let us make the man 42

la, q.90, a.2, s.c.l; Ottawa, p. 560. For some of the references, see Jean Kirchmeyer, "Grecque (Eglise)," DS 8 6[1967]: 815-816; H. Merki, "Ebenbildlichkeit," Reallexicon fur Antike und Christentum, 4[1958]: 466-467; and Gerhart Ladner, The Idea of Reform: Its Impact on Christian Thought and Action in the Age of the Fathers (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), pp. 84-97. Going back to Philo, the Alexandrian school placed great emphasis on the preposition in the phrase xar'eixova of Gen. 1:26, distinguishing the divine Son who is tout court the Image of God from man who is only according to the image of God. Philo was the first to speak of man as the "image of the Image," and Irenaeus, Clement, Origen, Athanasius, and Gregory of Nyssa all conceived of man as the image of the Logos. See Kirchmeyer, col. 815: "On peut resumer 1'ensemble de la tradition sur ce point, en disant que l'homrne est a 1'image du Verbe incarne et que c'est par la mediation du Verbe incarne qu'il est 1'image de Dieu." 43


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in such a way that our image should exist in him.'"44 In this text the phrase terminus factionis recalls the equivalent phrase of the prologue, i\\& finis sive terminus productions, but here Thomas gives an explanation for the connection between the scriptural verses on man's creation and the technical expression for the end of the production of man by his exegesis of the preposition ad45 Taking the preposition according to its usual sense "to," Thomas interprets the image of God as the terminus or end of God's act of making man. Again, he seems to be referring to the end that terminates the act of creation, and not to the further end that perfects the creature. The image of God is somehow intimately connected with the form of man, his soul, at which the act of creation terminates. In concluding this section we should note the fundamental distinction between the question on the image of God and the treatise on man's beatitude at the beginning of the secunda pars. That there is a connection between the two discussions is evident because Thomas does connect the highest level of the image of God with the state of beatitude. Nevertheless, question 93 is not directly concerned with man's ultimate end, his beatitude, but rather with man's nature, especially the structure of his soul, by which he possesses the fundamental capacity for beatitude. In question 93, Thomas is analysing how God has stamped man with His image from the moment of creation. There are, of course, levels of the image of God in man that are reached only with the aid of grace and the light of glory. Still, Thomas studies the image of God in question 93 in order to investigate the form of man as the terminus of God's communication of His likeness in the act of creation. The secunda pars, with its initial study of man's beatitude as his ultimate end, is introduced by a consideration of man as the image of God, inasmuch as man is envisaged, like God, as the principle of his own acts, rather than as the terminus of the act of creation.46 Man attains his ultimate end by his 44

la, q.93, a.5, ad 4m; Ottawa, p. 577: "Cum autem dicitur quod 'Deus fecit hominem ad imaginem suam," dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo, quod haec praepositio ad designet terminum factionis, ut sit sensus: Faciamus hominem taliter ut sit in eo imago nostra." Thomas is following Augustine's refutation of the Greek position on the image; this explains why he uses the verb fecit, as Augustine does, rather than the Vulgate's creavit See De Trin. 12.6.6-7; CCL 50:360-362. 45 Jaroslav Pelikan has noted the importance of the preposition ad for the title of question 93: "The preposition provided the biblical warrant for treating of the image of God as 'of the end or term of the creation of man' ... This meaning of at/was elaborated later in the body of the question, in article 5." See "Imago Dei: An Explication of Summa theologiae, Part 1, Question 93," in Calgary Aquinas Studies, ed. Anthony Parel (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1978), p. 41. 46 Ia2ae, prol.; Ottawa, p. 710: "Quia, sicut Damascenus dicit, homo factus ad imaginem Dei dicitur, secundum quod per imaginem significatur intellectuale et arbitrio liberum et per se potestativum; postquam praedictum est de exemplari, scilicet de Deo, et de his quae

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acts, so that his beatitude does not belong to the consideration of the creation of man but to the consideration of man's imitation of God's creative action. Because he has been created the image of God according to his nature, man is able to reflect not only the nature of God, but also His divine operations. Thus the secunda pars hi a sense picks up where question 93 of the prima pars leaves off. Thomas first considers the image as the terminus that concludes God's creation of man. In the secunda pars, following Damascene, he considers the image the principle of human action inasmuch as man has the power to direct his own acts in pursuit of his ultimate end. Although there may be some overlapping between the exposition of the image of God hi question 93 and the later investigations of man's beatitude, this fundamental distinction between the act of man's creation and the process of man's perfection divides the two sections at the same time as it indicates their connection.

B. ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE IMAGO DEI Before we turn to the central concerns of St. Thomas' exposition of the image of the Trinity in the Summa, we must see whether there is any significant development in his teaching on the definition of the image of God and the foundation of the image in man's nature. Whereas Thomas dealt with these fundamental considerations in three different locations in the Scriptum super Sententiis?1 in the Summa he has brought them together in question 93, where they form the subject of articles 1 to 4. This unification of material is in itself a development worth noting. Peter Lombard examined the analogical use of the image of the Trinity at the beginning of the treatise on the Trinity in book 1 of the Sentences, whereas he considered the creation of man to the image of God in the treatise on the creation in book 2. This division made it impossible for Thomas to give a unified, systematic treatment of the image of God in his commentary on the Sentences. In the Summa, as we have seen, Thomas unites his considerations on the image of God under the title of the end of the production of man, accepting the specific place Scripture gives to the image in the account of creation in Genesis. This location of question 93 in the Summa appears to prove a victory for the anthropological perspective processerunt ex divina potestate secundum eius voluntatem; restat ut consideremus de eius imagine, idest de homine, secundum quod et ipse est suorum operum principium, quasi liberum arbitrium habens et suorum operum potestatem." See Dalmazio Mongillo, «La Concezione dell'Uomo nel Prologo della lallae," in De Homine: Studio Hodiernae Anthropologiae, (Rome: Officium Libri Catholici, 1972) 2:227-231. Mongillo brings out the parallelism between God the exemplar and man the image. 47 1 Sent. d.3; 1 Sent, d.28; 2 Sent., d.16.


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of the discussion of the image in the second book of the Scriptum, against the Trinitarian perspective of the earlier treatment in the first book.48 However, one must be careful not to neglect the significance of the articles on the image of the Trinity in question 93, and also the relation, in spite of the intervening pages, between this discussion and the treatise on the Trinity. Question 93 contains nine articles, which can be divided roughly according to their correlation with the two distinctions on the image of God in the Scriptum. Articles 5 to 8 deal primarily with the image of the Trinity. They naturally reflect in their substance and arrangement the advances made in the De veritate and other works. In contrast, articles 1 to 3 and 9 are exactly parallel to the four articles of book 2, distinction 16, of the Scriptum. It is not immediately evident why Thomas detached the article on the terms "image" and "likeness" from the first three articles to make it the last in question 93, that is, article 9. Perhaps he held that an exegesis of the terminology of Gen. 1:26 should follow the exposition of the doctrine contained in the Scripture. A similar order occurs in question 91, on the production of the body of the first man, where various problems concerning the sacred text and its language are left to the final article. Both articles deal with the fittingness (convenientia) of the language of Scripture.49 In the prologue to question 91, the last article is said to concern the "mode and order of the production" of the body.50 It may not be too far-fetched to view article 9 of question 93 as a consideration de modo at the end of the study of the image of God. It deals with the mode of speech found in the authoritative text that declares the existence of the image of God. Thus the arrangement of question 93 roughly follows the traditional division of a subject for investigation: an sit? (a. 1), quid sit? (aa.2-8), and de modo (a. 9). We still have to account for the anomalous article 4. It is concerned with the exposition of the triplex imago of the Gloss on Psalm 4:7. Thus it has parallels in the earlier passages in which Thomas interprets this gloss. In the Scriptum he gives his analysis in the expositio at the end of book 1, distinction 3. There is a very significant change in his interpretation of the triplex imago in the Summa, for he removes all reference to the Trinity in this later treatment. Furthermore, Thomas relates his exegesis to the preceding articles of question 93 by connecting the three levels of the image to the ascending states of perfection in man's soul: nature, grace, and glory. Thus article 4 fits 48

See de Beaurecueil [2]:54-56. The title of this section of de Beaurecueil's article states his point of view: "Unification de la doctrine au profit de la perspective anthropologique." 49 la, q.91, a.4, prol.; Ottawa, p. 567: "Videtur quod inconvenienter corporis humani productio in Scriptura describatur." la, q.93, a.9, prol.; Ottawa, p. 582: "Videtur quod similitudo ab imagine non convenienter distinguatur." 50 la, q.91, prol.; Ottawa, p. 562: "Quarto: de modo et ordine productionis ipsius."

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in with articles 2 and 3, which specify the meaning of the image of God by examining it in relation to the hierarchy of creatures, from irrational animals to angels. If we note that article 4 considers the image of God primarily in terms of the two operations of an intellectual nature, another aspect of the arrangement of question 93 appears. For the order of articles in question 93 reflects in a certain way the entire division devoted to God as He is in Himself (la, qq. 2-43). Articles 5 to 8 treat of the image of God inasmuch as it represents the divine Trinity, whereas articles 1 to 4 are concerned with the image as it reflects the essence of God. Within this first group article 1 demonstrates the existence of the image, while articles 2 and 3 clarify the nature of the image as a specific likeness of God. Finally, article 4 deals with the image in terms of the imitation of the divine operations, which Thomas has treated in questions 14 to 26. Thus article 4 serves as an introduction to the examination of the image of the Trinity in articles 5 to 8. This relationship finds its model in the connection between the study of the two immanent acts of the divine essence and the Trinitarian development of this study by means of the psychological analogy of the Trinity. Thus the very arrangement of question 93 reveals the exemplarity that characterizes the relationship between God and His image. Article 1: The Image and Divine Exemplarity In article 1 Thomas characterizes the relationship of image in terms of exemplar causality, not in terms of final causality.51 In fact, every page of question 93 is pervaded by an awareness of the divine exemplarity that constitutes man as an image of God. With respect to the definition of image in terms of exemplarity, there is little change from the Scriptum to the Summa. Thomas has simply edited the first three articles of book 2, distinction 16, of the Scriptum to serve as the first three articles of question 93; and there is no significant change in the definition of image that emerges in the course of these articles. There is one oddity in the presentation of the definition of image in the Summa. Instead of giving the complete definition in article 1, as he did in 51

De Beaurecueil and Geiger both tend to overemphasize final causality. See de Beaurecueil [2]:51-54, 58-59; and Geiger, "L'homme image," pp. 515-520, 524-526, 529-531. In contrast, Lafont shows an appreciation of the exemplarity that exists between God and His image. See Lafont, Structures et Methode, pp. 265-291. On the parallelism of the text of the prologue of the secunda pars as a confirmation of the importance of the relationship of exemplarity between God and His image, man, see Mongillo, "La Concezione deH'Uomo," pp. 227-231.


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the comparable article of the Scriptum, Aquinas begins the definition in article 1, but does not complete it until article 2.52 He starts with the genus to which all images belong, namely, likeness. Next he adds the qualification that an image must be a thing that is "expressed from another, for it is called an 'image' because it is made for the imitation of the other thing."53 What Thomas leaves to article 2 is the very important specification of the sort of likeness that constitutes an image: a likeness based on the species of the exemplar. Why did he divide the definition in this way, when he gave the complete definition in the first article in the Scriptum?* Thomas may have felt free to do this because he had already defined "image" once in the Summa, in the question on the name Image that properly belongs to the second Person of the Trinity (la, q. 35). In this first definition, he mentions right away that "not any likeness suffices for the notion of image, but a likeness, that is in the species of the thing, or at least in some sign of the species."55 He also gives a fuller explanation of the other qualification of the image, its origin from its exemplar, in the earlier definition.56 It seems, therefore, that Thomas felt no need to repeat the complete definition of image when he came to question 93, but simply selected the elements of the definition that he required for the line of reasoning in each article.

52

Beaurecueil gives the following explication of this division of the definition of the image: "C'est la problematique meme des Sentences qui engageait S. Thomas a mettre en avant S. Hilaire: la difficulte qui surgit contre la possibilite de 1'image divine dans la creature, vient en effet de la ressemblance exacte qu'elle requiert. Dans la Somme, 1'article 1'aurait pu conserver le meme point de depart: la conclusion cut etc identique. Si S. Thomas ne fait intervenir ce point de vue qu'a I'article suivant, pour delimiter le domaine de 1'image, c'est qu'il se situe dans la perspective exprimee par le titre de la question 93. L'image est fin ou terme d'une production; elle est copie d'une modele. C'est cette dependance causale par rapport a 1'exemplaire qui la definit au premier chef. Nous demeurons dans le contexte de la creation, ou tout etre est envisage par rapport au principe premier dont il participe, et non plus au plan d'une comparison entre Dieu et rhomme, abstraction faite de la dependance fondamentale qui cree leur similitude" (de Beaurecueil [2]:64). 53 la, q.93, a.l, resp.; Ottawa, p. 572. 54 It should be noted that the arguments of both articles are virtually identical, if one observes that Thomas has compressed the Scriptum's three arguments pertaining to Hilary's definitions into one argument in the Summa. The sed contra is the same assertion of the existence of the created image of God found in Gen. 1:26. Also, the body of the article of the Summa follows the same lines as the earlier text, beginning with the definition of the image and then turning to the distinction between the created and the uncreated image of God. 55 la, q.35, a.l, resp.; Ottawa, p. 224. 56 In question 93, Thomas does not even bother to give the name of this characteristic, origo, although he gives the same Augustinian counterexample of two eggs. In question 35, he is particularly interested in this characteristic, for the proper attribution of the name Image to the Son is based on this characteristic of origo, on which the distinction of the divine Persons is founded. See la, q.35, a.l, resp.; Ottawa, p. 224.

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In article 1 Thomas simply shows that man can be an image of God even though the Son of God is the Image of God in the fullest sense. That the image of God in fact exists in man is a proposition that rests primarily on the authority of Scripture: the quotation of Gen. 1:26 in the sed contra bears the burden of the proof. Thomas does say that "it is manifest that in man there is found some likeness of God that is derived from God as from an exemplar."57 It is the infinite distance, of course, between this exemplar and its copy (exemplatum} that underlies the inequality in the likeness between God and man.58 Nevertheless, we refer to this likeness of God in man as an image of God, because Scripture does so. Scripture also indicates the imperfection of this image by saying that man is ad imaginem Dei, "for the preposition ad signifies a sort of approach, which befits a distant thing."59 In this article, the principal objective is to show that the notion of image is sufficiently broad to be applied to man. Thomas leaves it until later to show the real basis for this application. In article 1 he is simply proving that there is nothing in the notion of image that is contrary to the scriptural assertion that man is the image of God. What Thomas stresses in article 1 is the relation of exemplarity between God and man. Thomas concentrates on the element of origin necessary for every image. One egg is equal (in species and in shape) to another egg, but it cannot be called the image of the other, because it is not expressed from the other, not modeled after it and not caused by it. Equality is not required for every image, but origin is. An image must proceed from its exemplar, inasmuch as it must derive from it as a copy from its model. Thus the most basic causality entailed in the notion of image is exemplar causality.60 57

la, q.93, a.l, resp.; Ottawa, p. 572. Ibid.: "non tamen est similitude secundum aequalitatem, quia in infinitum excedit exemplar hoc tale exemplatum." 59 Ibid. 60 Exemplarity is essentially tied to the relation of imitation, which adds to the notion of likeness the characteristic of origin. Thomas uses the term origo in two of his attempts to define "image" which he made in the course of commentaries on the Epistles of St. Paul. See In 1 Cor. 11, lect. 2, no. 604; Marietti, p. 347: "de ratione imaginis in communi duo sunt. Primo quidem similitude, non in quibuscumque, sed vel ipsa specie rei, sicut homo filius assimilatur patri suo. Vel in aliquo quod sit signum speciei, sicut figura in rebus corporalibus. ... Secundo requiritur origo. Non enim duorum hominum, qui sunt similes specie, unus imago alterius dicitur, nisi ex eo oriatur, sicut filius a patre. Nam imago dicitur ab exemplari. Tertio ad rationem perfectae imaginis requiritur aequalitas." We should note the connection between origo and exemplar. Cf. In 2 Cor. 4, lect. 2, no 126;, Marietti, p. 467: "ad hoc quod aliqui perfecte sit imago alicuius, tria requiruntur, et haec tria perfecte sunt in Christo. Primum est similitude, secundum est origo, tertium est perfecta aequalitas.'' In both texts we find the same list of three characteristics that Thomas presents in la, q.93, a.l. Note that species is considered under the general characteristic of similitude. 58


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In article 1 Thomas points out that the relation of exemplarity can exist between God and creature as well as in the case of the perfect exemplarity that exists between God the Father and God the Son, who is the perfect Image of God. Thomas states that God is the exemplar of man, so that man can be called the image of God.61 It should be noted that God alone can make this image of Himself: the stone and wood idols that men have fabricated are no images of God. "God Himself has placed in man a spiritual image of Himself."62 God has made a likeness of Himself that is derived from Himself as an image from its exemplar. Thus God is in some sense the extrinsic formal cause of man, as the exemplar on which He has modeled man. In the act of creating man, God has intended and effected a likeness of Himself in a creature, however imperfect that likeness may be. The image of God is the intrinsic formal cause of man considered as the terminus or end of God's creative exercise of exemplar causality. In article 2 Thomas focuses on this relation of exemplarity in terms of the likeness of species between God and man. Before leaving article 1 we must examine Thomas' interpretation of the scriptural phrase ad imaginem Dei. We have already seen how Thomas connects the phrase with the more philosophical expression in the prologue: the end or terminus of man's creation. Thomas gives an alternative interpretation of the phrase in article 5. The preposition ad may indicate that the image of God is the terminus of the production of man, but in another way, this preposition ad can point to the exemplar cause, as when we say, "This book has been made to that one." In this way the image of God is the divine essence itself, which is loosely called "image" inasmuch as "image" is used for the exemplar.63

There is an improper sense of the word "image," then, according to which it means the exemplar rather than the copy. It is important to note that the exemplar of the image of God in man is not any divine idea, but the essence of God. In article 1, however, Thomas interprets "image" in the phrase ad imaginem according to its proper sense: it refers to the copy, not the exemplar. Thomas sees the preposition ad as a sign of the imperfection of the image of God in man. God the Son, the perfect Image of God, is never said to be "to the image of God." Man, on the other hand, can be called simply the image of God, but Scripture also says that he is made "to the image of God" 61

la, q.93, a.l, resp.; Ottawa, p. 572. la, q.93, a.l, ad 1m; Ottawa, p. 572. 63 la, q.93, a.5, ad 4m; Ottawa, p. 577. This "abuse" of the word imago has been examined at greater length in the Scriptum. See Chapter 3, section A, pp. 48-49. 62

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to indicate the imperfection of the likeness of God in man.64 Thus Thomas interprets the preposition ad as a qualification of the likeness of God in man from the moment of creation. It does not indicate that the image is the end to which man tends and moves throughout his life. One must not be misled by the language of distance and motion that Thomas uses to explain the connection between the common meaning of the word ad and the creation of man as image of God. We often speak of the imperfection in a relation of likeness in terms of distance. In the body of article 1 Thomas points out that ad signifies some sort of approach and thus indicates that there must be distance, in some sense, between the thing and the terminus it approaches.65 However, this analysis of the preposition is meant to show that the scriptural phrase ad imaginem Dei signifies the imperfection of the image of God in man. In fact, Thomas derives this interpretation from Augustine's De Trinitate.66 Thomas probably means that the act of creation by which man has been brought from nothing to the likeness of God can be understood analogically as a movement that terminates in the image of God that man possesses. The act of creation necessarily entails that the creature will be infinitely less perfect than its Creator. Man has approached God because God has made man like Himself, but there is always a distance between man and God inasmuch as man can never attain to an equality with his Creator. In question 35, too, Thomas finds the imperfection of the image of God in man in the words of Genesis: To signify in man the imperfection of the image, man is not only called "image," but also "to the image," by which a sort of movement, of a thing that tends towards perfection is signified.67

Again, Thomas uses the language of motion to show the sense of man's imperfection contained in the scriptural words. It is clear that Thomas is 64

la, q.93, a.l, ad 2m; Ottawa, pp. 572-573. Theologians found the principal warrant for calling man directly the image of God in 1 Cor. 11:7: "Vir quidem non debet velare caput suum: quoniam imago et gloria Dei est." 65 la, q.93, a.l, resp.; Ottawa, p. 572. 66 See De Trin. 7.6.12; CCL 50: 266-267: «... Sed propter imparem ut diximus similitudinem dictus est homo ad imaginem, et ideo nostram ut imago trinitatis esset homo, non trinitati aequalis sicut filius patri, sed accedens ut dictum est quadam similitudine sicut in distantibus significatur quaedam vicinitas non loci sed cuiusdam imitationis." From the verbal similarities—accessus and distans—v/e can conclude that Thomas probably had this passage in mind. 67 la, q.35, a.2, ad 3m; Ottawa, p. 225. Lafont notes that this text indicates the difference between the imperfect and perfect images of God, but he adds: "Par ailleurs, ce texte insinue le caractere dynamique et progressif de 1'Image" (Structures et Methodes, p. 268). This may be true, provided that one understands that it is the image that develops, and not that the image is the end of the development.


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speaking of the imperfection of an image of God that exists in man from the moment of creation. This text seems to suggest that the imperfection of the image is tied to man's condition as a creature that must strive for its perfection. It does not mean that the image of God is something at the end of man's labors or something toward which he moves in the course of his life. Thomas primarily sees expressed in the phrase ad imaginem the imperfection of the image of God in man, that is, the distance that separates the exemplar from the image, rather than the movement of man towards his ultimate end. Thomas briefly refers to Hilary's definitions of image in the third argument of article 1, giving himself occasion to anticipate the analysis of the term species with which he completes the definition of "image" in article 2. He gives a short explanation of Hilary's phrase species indifferenses indifferences in the response differwence in thef e re ns in thendiffpecies indiffgerens in thediffer the res in the responvse hi the resps 68

to the argument in order to refute the argument that this definition excludes the possibility of man as image of God. Thomas' counterargument rests on an analysis of the word indifferens in terms of the concept of unity: Because a thing that is one is an undivided being (ens indivisum), in the same way the species is said not to differ (indifferens) in that it is one. However, something is called "one" not only in number or species or genus, but also according to a certain analogy or proportion; and thus there is a unity or congruity of the creature with God.69

Thus Thomas shows how Hilary's definition of image does not exclude the possibility of a created image of God. God and man can be said in a certain sense to share the same species, inasmuch as there is an analogical likeness between God and man according to species. Let us compare Thomas' analysis of the term species in his earlier treatment of Hilary's definition in question 35. There Thomas finds that a difficulty arises from the definition with regard to the proper attribution of the name Image to the Son. The word species used in Hilary's definition seems to indicate the essence or form, so that the definition of image in terms of species would rule out the use of "image" as a proper name for a divine Person rather than as a term for the divine essence.70 In solving this difficulty, Thomas states that Hilary's term species means the "form derived (deductam} from one thing," the exemplar, to another thing, the image, so that "the image is said to be the species of something, just as that which is assimilated to something is said to be its form, inasmuch as it has a form similar to that 68 la, q.93, a.l, obj.3; Ottawa, p. 572: "Hilarius dicit, in libro De synod, quod 'imago est eius rei ad quam imaginatur, species indifferens.'" 69 la, q.93, a.l, ad 3m; Ottawa, p. 573. 70 la, q.35, a.l, obj. 2; Ottawa, p. 224.

indiff

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thing."71 Thomas interprets species in the definition of image in terms of form, and more precisely in terms of the communication of form from one thing to another. In fact, in this passage from question 35, Thomas analyzes Hilary's definition in terms of form in such a way that it is clearly applicable to the generation of the divine Son in the perfect likeness of God the Father; but it is also applicable to the production of the creature to the image of God. We can speak analogically of man as the species or form of God in the sense that Thomas explains. For by the act of creation God has assimilated man to Himself by giving man a form that in some way is like God's own nature. In this text we see the relation of image analyzed in terms of the standard model of generation, which can be applied equally to the case of a univocal agent or to that of a non-univocal agent.72 In the creation of man, God as non-univocal agent makes man's soul the terminus of His operation, so that the soul is not only the final cause of the operation and the formal cause of the new entity, but also is the likeness of its efficient cause.73 For the soul is the intrinsic form of man, and this form is modeled on an extrinsic form or exemplar, which is none other than the essence of its efficient cause, God. Man is called the image of God by virtue of his form, his rational soul, which is like God according to species, although not identical in species. This passage on the definition of the image in terms of species and form confirms our hypothesis that the final causality with which Thomas connects the production of man as image of God is the causality of the finis opens that lies in the form of man, his soul. Article 2: The Image as a Sign of God's Species In article 2 of question 93 Thomas finally settles down to the task of explaining the specification of image in the genus of likeness. It is the notion of species that enables us to discriminate between those creatures that possess the image of God and those that do not. Perhaps for this reason Thomas delayed mention of this element in the definition of image until the second 71 la, q.35, a.l, ad 2m; Ottawa, p. 224: "species, prout ponitur ab Hilario in defmitione imaginis, importat formam deductam in aliquo ab alio. Hoc enim modo imago dicitur esse species alicuius, sicuti id quod assimilatur alicui, dicitur forma eius, inquantum habet formam illi similem." 72 See In 2 Physic, lect. 11, no. 242; Marietti, pp. 117-118. 73 In fact, the form of the new thing would not be the end or final cause of the operation if it were not also a likeness of the agent's form. See la, q.44, a.4, ad 2m; Ottawa, p. 283: "forma generati non est finis generationis nisi inquantum est similitude formae generantis, quod suam similitudinem communicare intendit."


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article, in which he asks whether the image of God is found in irrational creatures. For the most part, this article follows the parallel article of the Scriptum closely. There is some refinement in Thomas' use of the Aristotelian terminology of genus and species, but there is no substantial change of position. Thomas specifies the exemplar causality necessary for the existence of an image by showing that the likeness between image and exemplar must be more than a likeness according to genus or according to a common accident. For the notion of image a likeness according to species is required, or at least a likeness according to a proper accident of the species, for which Thomas gives as the best example the accident of figure, or shape. Once again Thomas acknowledges his debt to Hilary for the use of the term species in this context.74 As in the Scriptum Thomas adds that the likeness of species is manifestly grounded in the ultimate difference of the species.75 Now the difference of a species is the formal constituent that distinguishes the members of that species from members of other species in the same genus. The constitutive difference of the species is derived from the form common to those things that belong to the species.76 In the case of man, the difference is the term "rational" or "intellectual," which is derived from the intellectual nature of man.77 In the case of God, we cannot properly speak of genus, species, and difference, for He is pure act and pure form. However, in article 2 Thomas indicates that there is a certain order in the attributes of God that corresponds to the hierarchy of beings. Thus the divine attribute of intelligence corresponds to the constitutive difference of intellectual creatures, who hold the highest place in the hierarchy of created beings and the position closest to God.78 There is a certain likeness of species between man and God based 74

la, q.93, a.2, resp.; Ottawa, p. 573: "Requiritur autem ad rationem imaginis quod sit similitude secundum speciem, sicut imago regis est in filio suo; vel ad minus secundum aliquod accidens proprium speciei, et praecipue secundum figuram, sicut hominis imago dicitur esse in cupro. Unde signanter Hilarius dicit quod 'imago est species indifferens.'" 75 Ibid.: "Manifestum est autem quod similitude speciei attenditur secundum ultimam differentiam." Cf. 2 Sent, d.16, q.l, a.2, resp.; p. 400. 76 See De ente et essentia 2; Leon., p. 37 lb: "designatio autem speciei respectu generis est per differentiam constitutivam quae ex forma rei sumitur"; De ente et ess. 2; Leon., p. 372ab: "Differentia vero e converse est sicut quaedam determinatio a forma determinata sumpta." 77 See la, q.3, a.5, resp.; Ottawa, p. 19: "Semper autem id a quo sumitur differentia constituens speciem, se habet ad illud unde sumitur genus, sicut actus ad potentiam. ... rationale vero sumitur a natura intellectiva, quia rationale est quod naturam intellectivam habet." 78 la, q.93, a.2, resp.; Ottawa, p. 573: "Assimilantur autem aliqua Deo, primo quidem, et maxime communiter, inquantum sunt; secundo vero, inquantum vivunt; tertio vero, inquantum sapiunt vel intelligunt. Quae, ut Augustinus dicit in libro Octog. trium Quaest: 'Ita sunt Deo similitudine proxima, ut in creaturis nihil sit propinquius.' Sic ergo patet quod solae intellectuales creaturae, proprie loquendo, sunt ad imaginem Dei."

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on this correspondence between the specific difference of man and the intellectuality of the nature or essence of God. Irrational creatures do not possess this highest and least common attribute of intellectuality, and so cannot properly represent God's nature.79 We are now hi a better position to see that the image of God in man refers fundamentally not to man's ultimate end and perfection, but to the likeness of God that he possesses by his very nature as a rational being. In the course of the following articles Thomas repeats several times the argument that the constitutive ground of the image of God is the intellectual nature.80 At the end of article 2 he states that the notion, image of God, is based on a "likeness in nature" that distinguishes the relation of exemplarity between God and His image from the common exemplarity that exists between God and every creature inasmuch as every creature is an image of an exemplar idea in the divine mind.81 Nature has a number of meanings in the Aristotelian tradition, but in this context it seems to refer primarily to the formal principle of a being. In the case of God, His nature or essence is pure form without the slightest admixture of the material, for He is pure act as opposed to potentiality. In the case of man, the intellectual nature does not exclude the element of undesignated matter, and is equivalent more properly to the forma totius. In 79 Thomas restates his argument later on. See la, q.93, a.6, resp.; Ottawa, p. 578: "Nam quantum ad similitudinem divinae naturae pertinet, creaturae rationales videntur quodammodo ad repraesentationem speciei pertingere, inquantum imitantur Deum non solum in hoc quod est et vivit, sed etiam in hoc quod intelligit, ut supra dictum est. Aliae vero creaturae non intelligunt; sed apparet in eis quoddam vestigium intellectus producentis." A rational creature represents the species of God, if we may allow ourselves to use the term as synonymous with the essence of God, by imitating not only the commonly participated attributes of God, but also the highest and least commonly participated attributes. 80 la, q.93, a.3, resp.; Ottawa, p. 574: "quantum ad id in quo primo consideratur ratio imaginis, quod est intellectualis natura." Ibid.: "quantum ad hoc non attenditur per se ratio divinae imaginis in nomine, nisi praesupposita prima imitatione, quae est secundum intellectualem naturam." la, q.93, a.4, resp.; Ottawa, p. 575: "cum homo secundum intellectualem naturam ad imaginem Dei esse dicitur." la, q.93, a.4, ad 1m; Ottawa, p. 575: "tarn in viro quam in muliere invenitur Dei imago quantum ad id in quo principaliter ratio imaginis consistit, scilicet quantum ad intellectualem naturam." 81 Thomas counters Boethius' improper application of the notion of image of God to the world by distinguishing between two modes of divine exemplarity. God is exemplar cause of all things inasmuch as He makes all things according to the immutable ideas of them fixed in His mind. Just as an artist makes his works so that they imitate the "speciem artis quae est in mente artificis; sic autem quaelibet creatura est imago rationis exemplaris quam habet in mente divina. Sic autem non loquimur nunc de imagine, sed secundum quod attenditur secundum similitudinem in natura; prout scilicet primo enti assimilantur omnia, inquantum sunt entia; et primae vitae, inquantum sunt viventia; et summae sapientiae, inquantum sunt intelligentia" (la, q.93, a.2, ad 4m; Ottawa, p. 574). Thus the exemplar of the image of God is properly the nature or essence of God including its attribute of intellectuality.


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this context, however, Thomas regards the intellectual nature as that from which the ultimate difference of the species of man is derived. Nature here is primarily the form, although the form as it signifies the whole of man.82 Furthermore, the relation of likeness between God's nature and man's cannot be based on the material part of man, because there is nothing corresponding to matter in God. Therefore, the ground of the relation of likeness in nature between God and man lies in a similarity of form, which means concretely a likeness between the essence of God and man's soul.83 We find a suggestion of this conclusion in the line of Augustine that Thomas quotes in the sed contra of article 2: "God made man to His image, inasmuch as He gave him an intellectual mind, by which he stands above the beasts."84 Man is the image of God according to his soul, and more precisely according to his mind, that is, his soul as an intellective soul, about which Thomas has more to say in the later articles. Thomas locates the ground of the image of God in man in the formal cause of man, his soul, inasmuch as by his soul man participates the divine quality of intellectuality, which in a way specifies the essence of God. Thomas has not rejected his earlier interpretation of the image in terms of formal causality for a new analysis in terms of final causality.85 Our examination of the first articles of the question confirms the identification of the final cause, as end of the production of man, with the formal cause of man in this context. What is new in the Summa is a certain sophistication in Thomas' application of the Aristotelian causal analysis to the special case of the creation of man to the image of God. In the Summa Thomas realizes that the formal cause of man, his rational soul, can also be viewed as the final cause of his production, if we apply the causal analysis used in natural philosophy to the object of the theologian's study. For the natural philosopher should examine the form not only as form of the thing but also as end of the generation of the thing.86 82

See De ente et ess. 2; Leon., p. 372b: "neque differentia forma, sed a forma sumpta ut significans totum." 83 The relation of likeness is based on a congruity of form (inasmuch as this congruity is a unity of quality). See la, q.4, a.3, obj. 3; Ottawa, p. 25: Traeterea. Similia dicuntur quae conveniunt in forma"; and ad 3m; Ottawa, p. 26: "non dicitur esse similitude creaturae ad Deum propter communicantiam in forma secundum eandem rationem generis et speciei, sed secundum analogiam tantum, prout scilicet Deus est ens per essentiam, et alia per participationem." 84 la, q.93, a.2, s.c.l; Ottawa, p. 573. 85 See de Beaurecueil [2]=58, where he argues for such a change in Thomas' understanding. 86 See In 2 Physic, lect. 11, no. 246; Marietti, p. 119: "Et dicit [Aristoteles] quod etiam forma et quod quid est pertinet ad considerationem naturalis, secundum quod etiam finis est et cuius causa fit generatio. Dictum est enim supra quod forma et finis coincidunt in idem; et quia natura operatur propter aliquid, ut infra patebitur, necesse est quod ad naturalem pertineat considerare formam non solum inquantum est forma, sed etiam inquantum est finis."

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Analogically, the theologian must consider the form of man, his soul, not only in itself as form, but also as the end or terminus of the creative act by which God establishes it as a likeness of His essence. In fact, Thomas does precisely this in the prima pars, by treating first of the nature of the soul (qq. 75-89) and then turning to the theologically more central study of man's soul as the end of his production (q. 93).87 Thus Thomas' connection between final causality and the image of God is not a substantial development in his doctrine of the image, but rather a fruit of his genius for scientific precision and organization. One significant effect of Thomas' decision to present the doctrine of the image in terms of the end of the production of man is that it permits us more clearly to see the image as a reality intimately bound up with God's creation of the soul. The image is not an arbitrary and fanciful invention of theologians. To study the soul as the end of man's production is to examine the form of man as the end of the assimilative act of creation. Therefore, it is to study the soul in relation to God, the principle of its being. Every agent produces an effect that is like itself, and in the act of creation God, too, produces things like Himself in some way, however remote. Thus every creature is a likeness of God, but man is also an image of God, as Thomas has shown, on account of the likeness of the divine essence that God has imprinted in him by giving him a rational soul. The image is the unavoidable mark of God that every spiritual substance coming forth from the hand of God necessarily bears by virtue of the participatory communication of form that takes place in the act of creation.88 We can now understand why in the Summa Thomas separates the traditional problems of psychology that were connected with Augustine's doctrine of the image of God from his treatment of the image in question 93, and scatters them through the section on the nature of the soul (qq. 75-89). For these problems belong properly to the study of the soul as the formal cause of man's being rather than as the final cause of his creation, although historically they may have arisen from the reading of Augustine's texts on the image. In effect, this separation only confirms the ontological foundation of the image by illuminating more clearly the nature of the soul so that the qualities it possesses may appear later as the ground of the relation of imageness between man and God.

87

Geiger, "L'homme image," p. M9, has noted that the study of man must include a consideration of man's end as well as of his nature. 88 See la, q.4, a.3; Ottawa, pp. 25-26.


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Article 4: The Perfection of the Image in the Imitation of God's Acts After articles 1 and 2, in which Thomas has established the notion of the image of God on a solid footing and limited its existence to rational creatures, he begins to examine the degrees of perfection that are possible for the image. The ontological foundation of the image in the form of the rational creature does not eliminate the possibility that one creature may be more to the image of God than another. Thomas first defends the superior excellence of the image of God that the angel possesses by virtue of his more perfect intellectual nature. Thus article 3 is devoted to the traditional dispute whether man or angel possesses the higher degree of the image.89 We need not stop to consider the details of this classical locus in the treatment of the image of God. Nor do we need to spend time on the traditional problem in terminology inherent in the distinction of "image" and "likeness" that Thomas reconsiders in article 9. His discussion there confirms his definition of image in terms of genus and species. In substance this article departs little from the comparable article of the Scriptum, although it shows a superior organization and clarity. One feature merits attention here: the use of the term similitudo to refer not only to the genus of image, but also to the subsequent perfection of the image.90 The rational creature can never lose the image of God, but it may bring the image to a higher degree of perfection by those operations that establish virtue in the creature.91 Thomas considers the levels of perfection at which the image may exist in man in article 4. Article 4 logically follows article 3. Both are concerned with the relative perfection of the image in various rational beings. In article 3 Thomas compares man with the angels in respect of the image of God; in article 4 he examines the state of the image of God with regard to various distinctions among human beings. We already know the answer to the question of article 4, which Thomas poses in the prologue to question 93: "whether the image

89

la, q.93, a.3, resp.; Ottawa, p. 574: "imago Dei est magis in angelis quam sit in hoininibus, quia intellectualis natura perfectior est in eis, ut ex supra dictis patet." Thomas differs from many other scholastics (including Bonaventure) on this point. He does not feel bound by the failure of Scripture to apply the term "image" to the angels, probably because he would have considered such a restriction to be a case of misguided literalism. 90 la, q.93, a.9, resp.; Ottawa, p. 582: "similitudo ... consideratur etiam ut subsequens ad imaginem, inquantum significat quandam imaginis perfectionem; dicimus enim imaginem alicuius esse similem vel non similem ei cuius est imago, inquantum perfecte vel imperfecte repraesentat ipsum." 91 la, q.93, a.9, ad 4m; Ottawa, p. 583: "dilectio virtutis pertinet ad similitudinem; sicut et virtus."

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of God exists in every man."y2 The image of God exists in a creature by virtue of its intellectual nature. Obviously a creature cannot lose its nature without perishing completely. Therefore the image of God exists ineradicably in every creature that has a rational nature. Thomas gives the traditional scriptural authority for the permanence of the image of God in the sed contra of article 4: "Psalm 38:7: 'Surely man passes through in the image.'"93 However, in article 4 Thomas does more than show that the image is found in all men, for he is really concerned to examine the different modes according to which the image of God is found in man. Although all men have been made to the image of God according to their intellectual nature, some men possess a higher level of the image of God than nature alone can give. To sum up his explanation of these degrees of likeness, Thomas returns to the Gloss on another verse of the Psalter: Whence, on that verse, Psalm 4:7, "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us," the Gloss distinguishes a threefold image, namely, of creation, of re-creation, and of likeness. Therefore, the first image is found in all men, the second in the just alone, but the third only in the blessed.94

Thomas here gets the Gloss' order of the triple image right, in contrast to his odd interpretation at the end of book 1, distinction 3 of the Scriptum.95 The imago similitudinis here represents the highest perfection of the image, in keeping with the interpretation (in article 9) of the term similitude as the perfection of the image. Thomas reads the Gloss in terms of a hierarchy of degrees of likeness. Aquinas explains the threefold existence of the image of God in man by means of an analysis of the intellectual nature's imitation of God in which he weaves together a variety of insights from his previous works. We have already noted that article 4 has no precise parallel in the Scriptum, although the use of the Gloss on Psalm 4:7 is common to both. There is'some resemblance to the conclusion of the passage on the image of the Trinity in De potentia, question 9, but the differences outweigh the similarities.96 First, in the earlier text Thomas speaks of a threefold likeness rather than a threefold image, and these three likenesses are the vestige of the Trinity, the image of creation, and the image of re-creation. Second, in the De potentia Thomas is referring to the likeness or image of the Trinity, whereas in the Summa, as we shall see, he makes no mention of the Trinity at all in article 92 93 94 95 96

la, q.93, prol.; Ottawa, p. 572. la, q.93, a.4, s.c.l; Ottawa, p. 575. la, q.93, a.4, resp.; Ottawa, p. 575. Cf. 1 Sent, d.3, expos. 2ae ptis text.; p. 125. See Chapter 3, n. 107, and pp. 80-81. Cf. De pot. q.9, a.9, resp.; Marietti, p. 249.


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4. Third, the image of creation in the De potentia is considered in terms of the self as the object of the rational creature's operations, whereas in the Summa the image of creation is seen in terms of God as the object of these operations. Fourth, in the De potentiate image of re-creation seems to refer primarily to the life of the blessed, although it could refer to the just in this life as well, while in the Summa the image of re-creation is interpreted strictly in terms of the operations of the soul in the state of grace in this life. Thus the dissimilarities between the two texts show that Thomas must have carefully reconsidered the levels of the image in man. In substance, the argument of article 4 is a synthesis of elements from at least two of Thomas' earlier works, elements that previously he had not united so closely. Insights from De veritate, question 10, predominate, but elements from the passage of the De potentia contribute to the development of the argument in the Summa. We can see a certain interplay between these sources in the first part of the solution of article 4: Because man is said to be to the image of God according to the intellectual nature, he is to the image of God in the highest degree (maxime) according as the intellectual nature is best (maxime) able to imitate God. Now the intellectual nature best (maxime) imitates God in respect of this: that God understands and loves Himself.97

Thomas' repeated use of the word maxime indicates a similarity between article 4 and article 3, in which the key word is magis. Both articles examine and compare the levels of the image of God that are found in rational creatures, whether they differ in species or only in state.98 Man possesses the superlative degree of the image of God to which he can attain, inasmuch as his intellectual nature has the ability to imitate God at the highest level. This connection between the image and the power to imitate God recalls Thomas' notion of actual imitation in the Scriptum. However, the following development of the connection in terms of imperfect and perfect acts suggests that the closer source is the De veritate's analysis of the image of the Trinity in terms of perfect and imperfect levels of imitation." 97

la, q.93, a.4, resp.; Ottawa, p. 575: "Respondeo. Dicendum quod cum homo secundu intellectualem naturam ad imaginem Dei esse dicatur, secundum hoc est maxime ad imaginem Dei, secundum quod intellectualis natura Deum maxime imitari potest. Imitatur autem intellectualis natura maxime Deum quantum ad hoc quod Deus seipsum intelligit et amat." 98 In article 3 it is phrased either as: "imago Dei magis est in angelis," or "angelus magis est ad imaginem Dei"; while in article 4 Thomas uses the superlative form: "homo est maxime ad imaginem Dei." 99 See De ver. q.10, a.3, resp.; Leon., p. 304: "imago Trinitatis in anima potest assignari dupliciter: uno modo secundum perfectam imitationem Trinitatis, alio modo secundum imperfectam."

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What the intellectual nature imitates when it best imitates God are the two immanent acts of God. In the De veritate Thomas speaks of the imitation of the divine acts, but he speaks more specifically of the two immanent acts of understanding and love in the Contra gentiles and in the De potential In the Summa, however, Thomas makes no direct reference to the Trinity in this first passage on the imitation of the divine acts, but limits himself to the consideration of these acts as essential acts of God. Continuing his argument to its conclusion that there are three levels of the image of God in man, Thomas explains how the intellectual nature can imitate the exemplar acts of God's self-understanding and self-love: Whence the image of God can be considered in man in three ways: in one way, according as man has a natural aptitude for understanding and loving God; and this aptitude consists in the very nature of the mind, which is common to all men. In another way, according as man knows and loves God actually or habitually, but imperfectly; and this is the image through the conformation of grace. In a third way, according as man actually knows and loves God perfectly; and in this way the image is noted according to the likeness of glory.101

Hence, Thomas concludes, we can speak of man as the image of God hi three ways according to the three states of man: nature, grace, and glory. In no previous text does Thomas directly make such an association between the levels of the image and those three states of man. There is some similarity between this distinction of three levels of the image and the De veritate's analysis of the Augustinian triads hi terms of act, habit, and faculty; but on closer inspection the correspondence breaks down.102 First of all, in the De veritate there is no mention of grace or glory. Moreover, hi the Summa we do not find a clear correspondence between the three levels of the image and the triad of faculty, habit, and act. Thomas associates the first 100

See Cont gent 4.26, no. 3632; Marietti, p. 299; but in this text he refers more to the divine processions of the Word and Love than to the simple acts of understanding and loving. See De pot. q.9, a.9, resp.; Marietti, p. 249: "sic repraesentatur in creatura rationali tantum, quae potest se intelligere et amare, sicut et Deus, et sic verbum et amorem producere, ut haec dicitur similitude naturalis imaginis." There is the same stress on the processions, so that here Thomas refers to the acts as notional acts by which the Persons proceed—as he properly should in the context, where it is a question of the image of the Trinity. 101 la, q.93, a.4, resp.; Ottawa, p. 575: "Unde imago tripliciter potest considerari in homine. Uno quidem modo, secundum quod homo habet aptitudinem naturalem ad intelligendum et amandum Deum; et haec aptitude consistit in ipsa natura mentis, quae est communis omnibus hominibus. Alio modo, secundum quod homo actu vel habitu Deum cognoscit et amat, sed tamen imperfecte; et haec est imago per conformitatem gratiae. Tertio modo, secundum quod homo Deum actu cognoscit et amat perfecte; et sic attenditur imago secundum similitudinem gloriae." 102 De ver. q.10, a.3, resp.; Leon., pp. 304-305.


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level with nature, without mentioning any particular faculties; and he speaks of the second level, which grace effects, in terms of both habit and act. Nevertheless, the general progression from natural aptitude to perfect acts suggests the influence of the De veritate. It appears that Thomas has applied the De veritate's analysis of the image in terms of act, habit, and faculty to the examination of the condition of the image of God according to the three states of man, although he does not intend to make a one-to-one correspondence between the three states and the De veritate's triad of faculty, habit, and act. In the passage just quoted, one of the most important features is the persistent analysis of the image in terms of acts that have God as their object. This feature ties the passage to the study of the image in relation to the various objects of man's knowledge that Thomas made in the De veritate. In particular, it once again opens the question of the likeness of analogy and the likeness of conformation Thomas had most recently broached in the De potential03 In the De potentia, although he describes the natural image of God in terms of the likeness of analogy between the self-reflexive acts of man and the self-reflexive acts of God, he sees the graced image primarily in terms of the likeness of conformation.104 In the article of the Summa, however, when Thomas uses the superlative maxime, he means to restrict our consideration of the image to man's orientation and movement towards God as object of knowledge and love. For Thomas considers only God as the object of man's acts of knowledge and love in this article. Thus from the start of article 4 Thomas restricts our consideration of the image to the likeness according to conformation. We must note, however, that the conformation to God actually takes place according to the conformity of grace and glory, while it exists in a potential mode at the level of nature, as far as Thomas indicates here.105 In contrast to the De potentia, he presents the natural level of the image in the Summa in terms of the likeness of conformation rather than the likeness of analogy, if we understand the likeness of analogy strictly in terms of the parallelism 103

See De ver. q.10, a.7; and Depot., q.9, a.9. De pot. q.9, a.9, resp.; Marietti, p. 249. 105 The conformation that the objective presence of God causes occurs primarily in the acts of knowing and loving God, but the likeness of conformation can be considered to exist radicaliter'm man's intellectual nature. In this article Thomas uses the term conformitas twice, in relation to the states of grace and glory: "haec est imago per conformitatem gratiae" (la, q.93, a.4, resp.; Ottawa, p. 575), and "de imagine quae est secundum conformitatem gratiae et gloriae" (ad 2m and 3m; p. 576). Cf. 3a, q.45, a.4, resp.; Ottawa, p. 2710: "adoptio filiorum Dei est per quandam conformitatem imaginis ad Filium Dei naturalem. Quod quidem fit dupliciter, primo quidem fit per gratiam viae, quae est conformitas imperfecta; secundo, per gloriam patriae, quae erit conformitas perfecta." 104

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between self-reflexive acts in man and God. However, as in the De potentia, Thomas brings out the analogical aspect of the likeness of conformation. For at each level of the image, Thomas shows, man imitates God by knowing and loving God (whether actually or in radice), for thus man imitates, in the best way possible, God's acts of knowing and loving Himself. Although this analogy may not be as neat as the analogy that man's self-reflexive acts provide, it offers a better representation of the divine acts because the likeness between man's acts and God's acts is greatest when God by the conformation of grace and glory in some way specifies man's acts as the object of man's knowledge and love. Thomas sheds more light on the relation between conformation and analogy in the later articles where he deals with the image of God as the image of the Trinity. Several times we have noted that in article 4 Thomas refrains from making any reference to the Trinitarian aspect of the image of God, although he draws the elements of his argument from earlier texts that all concern the image of the Trinity. In the beginning of this section, it was suggested that there is a broad similarity between the arrangement of the articles of question 93 and the order of the questions on God (qq. 2-43); and that according to this similarity article 4 corresponds to the section on the divine operations (qq. 14-26). Just as the section on God's operations primarily treats of the two simple, immanent acts of knowing and loving, so article 4 examines the likeness of these acts in man. As the section does not examine the divine acts with regard to the concomitant processions and relations of the divine Persons, so article 4 is not concerned with the inner processions that reflect the Trinitarian processions. Thomas here even abandons his old interpretation of the imago similitudinis as the image of the Trinity in the three faculties of the mind. In article 4 Thomas considers the image of God in man as an image of God's operations of knowing and loving Himself. Yet it is precisely this presentation of the image of God in terms of the two immanent acts of the intellectual nature that lays the foundation for the exposition of the image of the Trinity, just as the division on God shows that the two divine processions correspond to the two immanent acts of the divine nature. Thus article 4 logically comes immediately before the articles on the image of the Trinity. In the questions on God, Thomas considers the divine operations within the section on the essence or nature of God. In article 4 on the image we should note the close connection that Thomas makes between the operations proper to the image of God and man's intellectual nature, thereby tying article 4 to the preceding articles on man's nature as the foundation of the image. Of course, in man essence and operation are not identical, as they are in God; but man's operations have their roots in his nature. Thus in the


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Summa's study of man Thomas places the investigation of man's operations within his study of the nature of the soul, although he needs the entire secunda pars to examine the acts of man's will.106 "Nature" can signify the principle of a thing's movements, and thus signifies the formal principle of the thing.107 Man's soul is his formal principle, which is the principle of his acts. It is natural that in question 93 Thomas should consider the operations proper to the image of God in relation to their principle, man's intellectual nature. Again, as Thomas is not concerned here with the soul as soul, but with the soul as the end of the divine act of creation, so with the operations of the soul. In article 4 Thomas examines the operations of man's intellectual nature inasmuch as they bear the stamp of God's acts of knowing and loving. By the act of creation God has made a creature with a nature that requires a process of development in order to attain his perfection. Thomas' insistence that the image of God is based in man's nature does not deny this process. In fact, it suggests that the image of God admits of degrees of perfection according to the stages of man's progress, because it is his nature that requires this progress. In article 4 the use of the word maxime shows that there are degrees of perfection in the image. However, according to the letter of the text the maximum degree of the image of God is explicitly tied to the intellectual nature of man, and not directly to his operations.108 Thomas says that the intellectual nature imitates God to the highest degree (maxime) in three ways. By the highest degree of the image he means the orientation of man to God in the broadest sense, including both the fundamental capacity of his nature to know and love God, and the habitual states and acts that fulfill this capacity. (It should be noted that Thomas actually identifies the capacity with the very nature of man's mind.109) Whether man imitates God's ever-active essence by means of his own acts or merely by his capacity for these acts, Thomas states that it is man's intellectual nature that does the imitating according to which man is made to the image of God. Of course, 106 See la, q.75, prol.; Ottawa, p. 438, where Thomas divides the study of the nature of man's soul into sections on the essence, the faculties, and the operations of the soul. See la, q.84, prol.; Ottawa, pp. 510-511, in which he postpones study of the acts of the will until the secunda pars because they belong to the field of moral science. 107 See the Aristotelian exposition of the meanings of "nature" in la, q.29, a.l, ad 4m; Ottawa, pp. 192-193. 108 la, q.93, a.4, resp.; Ottawa, p. 575: man "est maxime ad imaginem Dei, secundum quod intellectualis natura Deum maxime imitari potest. Imitatur autem intellectualis natura maxime Deum quantum ad hoc quod Deus seipsum intelligit et amat." Man imitates God's acts by means of his acts, although man is always moving from potency to act and so imitates God's acts in several states from potency to act. Nevertheless, Thomas repeatedly says that the intellectual nature imitates God. 109 See n. 101 above.

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the acts of knowing and loving God take man beyond the moment of his creation and lead him towards his ultimate end, but in this article Thomas stresses the foundation of these acts in man's nature. He only mentions the state of beatitude here in terms of the perfection that it gives to the image of God rooted in man's nature. He thus completes the parallel between article 4 and the section of the Summa on the divine operations, which concludes with a short question on God's beatitude (q. 26). His actual investigation of man's beatitude must wait until his consideration of the ultimate end of man in the secunda pars.110 In retrospect, it appears that the substance of Thomas' new exposition of the ontological foundations of the image of God in the Summa is nearly identical with his teaching in the Scriptum, although in article 4 he has made use of the insights of the De veritate to present the levels of perfection at which the image of God can be found. Thomas has confirmed the teaching of the Scriptum by a more careful, systematic formulation of the definition of "image" in terms of species. He insists that the image of God has a sure ontological foundation in man's intellectual nature, which, considered as the formal principle of man, is the terminus of God's act of creation. Thomas repeats the word "nature" again and again. Although the image is perfected by grace and glory, it is rooted in man's nature, in his capacity to know and love God. C. THE IMAGO DEI AS A REPRESENTATION OF THE TRINITY Whereas the arrangement of articles 1 to 3 and 9 of question 93 follows exactly the articulation of book 2, distinction 16 of the Scriptum, the order of the section of question 93 that deals with the image of the Trinity (aa. 5-8 finds some parallel in the set of articles in De veritate, question 10 that deal most directly with the image of the Trinity (aa. 1,3,7). There is no precise antecedent for article 5 of the Summa's treatment. Previously, Thomas had never devoted a separate article to the proof of the existence of the image of the Trinity, for the weight of the Augustinian tradition sufficed to make the 110 There is no justification to be found in article 4 for Lafont's remark that Thomas is working from a theology of beatitude. See Structures et Methods, pp. 270-271: "Si, comme le fait saint Thomas en cet article, on etablit les degres de I'lmage en se referant a une theologie de la beatitude,... Saint Thomas etablit ici les trois etats par rapport au troisieme, le principal, qui se realise dans la beatitude." Lafont fails to note that the word maxime applies to all three levels and is predicated of the intellectual nature. The third level, realized in the state of beatitude, may be the highest actualization of man's capacity to know and love God, but the text does not make it the focus or base of the rest of the article.


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question almost unthinkable. However, articles 6 to 8 correspond to the three articles of the De veritate, for in both works Thomas specifies the ground of the image of the Trinity, first in terms of man's mind, then with regard to the acts, habits, and faculties of the mind, and finally in respect of the objects of these acts. In this arrangement of the exposition of the image of the Trinity, Thomas is far from the Scriptum's investigation of the image of the Trinity in terms of the five characteristics of the image. In fact, the Summa offers us the first systematic presentation of Thomas' doctrine of the image of the Trinity since the Scriptum. In its chief conclusions it stays close to the developments in the De veritate. We could summarize the Swnma's teaching in one sentence: man bears the image of the Trinity according to his mind principally because of its acts that are directed to their highest object, God. At this level of reduction no development appears between the De veritate and the Summa. However, the texts themselves reveal a different story. First of all, the problems of psychology that preoccupied Aquinas in his investigation of the image of the Trinity hi both the Scriptum and the De veritate have been removed to the questions on the nature of the soul in the Summa. These problems do not belong to the study of the soul as the end of man's production. Second, the context of the discussion of the image of the Trinity in the Summa is different from the context in the De veritate, and this difference has affected the later treatment. In the De veritate Thomas treats of the image in relation to the range of man's cognitive powers, whereas in the Summa he focuses on the image of God itself. Thus he is able to reveal more clearly the divine exemplarity that has marked man with the image of the triune God. Third, the precise analysis of the image of the Trinity in the Summa is witness to significant developments that have already appeared in abbreviated form in the passages on the image embedded in the studies on the Trinity in the Contra gentiles and especially in the De potentia. We have already seen the result of these developments in article 4 of our question in the Summa. In the following exposition of the image of the Trinity the results are even more remarkable. For the first time Thomas succeeds in presenting the image of the Trinity so that its ontological foundations in man's nature are perfectly clear, but also so that its structure is perfectly integrated with the theological presentation of the Trinity. One result of the removal of the psychological questions from the exposition of the image of the Trinity is that Augustine dominates these pages of the Summa even more distinctly than he does those of De veritate, question 10. Although the other articles of question 93 are dotted with quotations from Augustine, articles 5 to 8 are so saturated with lines from Augustine's De Trinitate that one might justifiably get the impression that Thomas is

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simply presenting a digest of the doctrine contained in that work.111 Aside from Augustine, Thomas cites no other non-scriptural authorities except for a handful of Fathers in the arguments of article 5 and one incorrect—and duly condemned-interpretation of Augustine from Peter Lombard's Sentences in article 7. Of Augustine's other works, Thomas quotes once from the City of God, once from the De Genesi ad litteram, once from On Eighty-three Questions. A comparison of the references to Augustine's De Trinitate in these articles with Thomas' use of the work in the De veritate reveals that Thomas must have reread Augustine's work. Once again, there are more quotations from book 14 than from any other book, but there are new quotations that suggest a careful re-examination of book 14 and also a further study of other books. In particular, the emphasis on the two processions of word and love suggests that Thomas had read book 15 and realized its significance as the final statement of Augustine's teaching. Although it is true that many of the passages that Thomas quotes are found in the arguments and their solutions rather than in the body of the article, this does not necessarily mean that Thomas regards these texts as unimportant, as we have seen in the case of the De veritate.m If anything, Thomas shows himself to be a more faithful and devoted disciple of St. Augustine in the Summa than he did in the De veritate. It is correct to speak of Thomas' perspective in his exposition of the image of the Trinity in the Summa as realistic in the sense that he is as concerned about the ontological foundations of the image of the Trinity here as he had been from the Scriptum onwards. It is wrong, however, to see an opposition 111

Pelikan has tabulated the explicit quotations from Augustine's works to be found in the articles of question 93: "there were two quotations from Augustine in article 1, two in article 2, two in article 3, one in article 4, four in article 5, four in article 6, ten in article 7, four in article 8, and four in article 9" ("Imago Dei" p. 44). This list, of course, does not include the less direct allusions to Augustine's words and the many verbal echoes of Augustine's phrases. 112 De Beaurecueil fails to see the renewed influence of Augustine in the Summa's study of the imago Trinitatis. See de Beaurecueil [1]:82: "La Somme etudiera pour lui-meme le probleme [of the image's triadic structure], sans se laisser guider par le docteur d'Hippone. ... Les positions augustiniennes, au lieu de mener la recherche, ne sont plus evoquees que comme un donne a bien entendre selon les conclusions de 1'analyse objective du reel." Sullivan also downplays the Augustinian influence in the Summa s treatment of the image of God: "Insofar as the doctrine of the Summa is common to the earlier works it has been compared with the thought of Augustine, and influences noted where possible. There does not seem to be any new element of Augustinian influence perceptible in the treatment of the trinitarian facet of the image. Rather, there is an obvious area in which the influence of Augustine seems to wane, and it is to be seen in the abandoning of the augustinian terminology for the trinities in man. The trinities in augustinian terms do not appear in any prominent part of Thomas' mature thought, but only in the objections and answers thereto" (Sullivan, pp. 261-262). Sullivan goes too far in speaking of the "abandoning" of Augustine's trinities, and he misses the new influence of book 15 of the De Trinitate.


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between this realism and the traditional Augustinian use of the image for the analogical understanding of the Trinity.113 Perhaps the most striking feature of articles 5 to 8 in question 93 is the repeated occurrence of the word repraesentare in one form or another, and especially in the phrase repraesentatio speciei. Thomas insistently describes the image of the Trinity in terms of the function of representation, and speaks of the image as representing the species of the Trinity. By this terminology it is clear that Thomas means to relate the image of the Trinity to the ontological foundations of the image of God we have already studied in the previous chapter. For Thomas the reality of the image of the Trinity lies precisely in the exemplar causality that distinguishes those creatures that God has created to His image from other creatures. As he did in the first articles of question 93, here also Thomas analyzes the image of the Trinity in terms of divine exemplarity. His exposition represents the triumph of the Augustinian search for an analogy for the Trinity. Question 45: Representations of the Trinity in Creation Before proceeding, however, we should look at the one important text of the Summa on the image of the Trinity that lies outside question 93, for it, too, features the use of the term repraesentare. It forms a proper counterpart to the investigation of the image in question 93, for it examines the image of the Trinity, not as the end of any production, but with regard to the principle of the image's production, which is the triune God. In question 45 Thomas studies the act of creation in general terms, but in article 7 he asks whether there is some vestige of the Trinity in every creature, a vestige that would reveal the causality of the divine Persons in the act of creation.114 This question rests on a prior question: what, if any, causality do the divine Persons properly exercise in the work of creation? In article 6 Thomas answers by showing that in the act of creation the common agency of the divine Persons that has its principle in the divine essence does not exclude a certain causality proper to each divine Person.115 What is at stake in article 6 is the fittingness of the language of the Creed, which attributes the name of Creator to God the Father and ascribes different 113 De Beaurecueil opposes the analogical use of the image of God to the realistic treatment of the image. See n. 10 above. 114 In the article itself the question is put in terms of necessity. See la, q.45, a.7, prol.; Ottawa, p. 290: "Videtur quod in creaturis non sit necesse inveniri vestigium Trinitatis." 115 la, q.45, a.6, resp.; Ottawa, p. 290: "Et ideo creare convenit Deo secundum suum esse; quod est eius essentia, quae est communis tribus Personis. Unde create non est proprium alicui Personae, sed commune toti Trinitati. Sed tamen divinae Personae secundum rationem suae processionis habent causalitatem respectu creationis rerum."

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roles to the Son and to the Holy Spirit hi the work of creation.116 Thomas explains that the divine processions are in some sense the cause and reason (ratio} of creation.117 For God creates things through His intellect and His will, and so He works through His Word and through His Love, that is, the Holy Spirit.118 In effect, Thomas repeats the Dionysian teaching of the Scriptum, that the eternal processions are the cause of the procession of creatures from God, with the qualification that the processions are the cause of creation inasmuch as they include the essential attributes of knowledge and will.119 Thomas always insists that the power of creating belongs to God by virtue of His nature or essence, not by virtue of the real relations that constitute the divine Persons. Nevertheless, God's essence is not a Person, but three Persons, and His essence with its power of creating belongs to each of the three Persons in the way proper to each Person. Therefore, although God creates by virtue of His essence, God is a three-Person agent, so that the distinctions between the three Persons are necessarily reflected in the action common to all three. On the basis of this truth Thomas interprets the words of the Creed in terms of proper attribution and appropriation of essential attributes. The divine Son, for instance, creates by virtue of the essential power of creating He has from God the Father, from whom He proceeds as the Word conceived in the eternal act of divine understanding. Therefore, the Son is properly He "through whom all things were made" because in the act of creation He creates by virtue of a power that comes from the first Person. Therefore, the Son is properly the middle cause through which God acts.120 Inasmuch as the Son is the Word, however, the essential attribute of wisdom is appropriated to Him, so that the same words of the Creed can be understood to refer to the Son as the divine wisdom through which God has worked his masterpiece.121 Thus each divine Person has a proper role in the work of creation common to all three. 116

la, q.45, a.6, obj.2; Ottawa, p. 289. la, q.45, a.7, ad 3m; Ottawa, p. 291: "etiam processiones Personarum sunt causa et ratio creationis aliquo modo." 118 la, q.45, a.6, resp.; Ottawa, p. 290: "Deus est causa rerum per suum intellectum et voluntatem, sicut artifex rerum artificiatarum. Artifex autem per verbum in intellectu conceptum et per amorem suae voluntatis ad aliquid relatum, operatur. Unde et Deus Pater operatus est creaturam per suum Verbum, quod est Filius, et per suum Amorem, qui est Spiritus Sanctus." 119 Ibid.: "Et secundum hoc processiones Personarum sunt rationes productions creaturarum, inquantum includunt essentialia attributa, quae sunt scientia et voluntas." 120 la, q.45, a.6, ad 2m; Ottawa, p. 290. 121 Ibid.: "Filio autem appropriatur sapientia, per quam agens per intellectum operatur, et ideo dicitur de Filio, per quern omnia facta sunt." 117


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It logically follows that the three divine Persons leave Their mark on every thing They have created. In article 7 Thomas quickly draws this conclusion and moves on to examine what sort of mark creatures in fact do bear: "I answer: it ought to be said that every effect in some way represents its cause, but hi various fashions."122 By using the verb repraesentare, Thomas immediately places the discussion of the relation between the Trinity and the creature in the context of exemplar causality. All creatures represent the Trinity inasmuch as they bear the imprint of the causality proper to God as a Trinity of Persons, although such a likeness is nothing more than the representation proper to a vestige or trace. To the discerning eye of faith the vestige reveals the action of the Trinity hi its creation, but hi itself it does not reveal the form of the Trinity.123 For every creature reflects certain essential attributes of God that the illumination of faith enables us to appropriate to one or another of the three Persons.124 However, the reflection of these essential attributes in the presentation of the vestige does not properly represent the form of the Trinity, but only its causal action. As smoke is a sign that indicates the presence of fire as its cause, but does not represent the form of fire, so the vestige indicates the causality of the Trinity without representing Its form, that is, the origin and relations of the divine Persons. Among rational creatures, however, there is a higher type of representation of the Trinity inasmuch as the rational creature reflects not only the essential attributes that can be appropriated to one Person or another, but also the very properties of the Persons. Thomas explains how the rational creature represents the Trinity by means of its own processions of word and love: Now the processions of the divine Persons are found according to the acts of intellect and will, as it was said above. For the Son proceeds as the Word of the intellect, and the Holy Spirit as Love in the will. Therefore, in rational creatures, in which there are intellect and will, there is found a representation of the Trinity by way of image, inasmuch as there is found in them a word that has been conceived and love that proceeds.125

122

la, q.45, a.7, resp.; Ottawa, p. 291. Ibid.: "Nam aliquis effectus repraesentat solam causalitatem causae, non autem formam eius, sicut fumus repraesentat ignem; et tails repraesentatio dicitur esse repraesentatio vestigii; vestigium enim demonstrat motum alicuius transeuntis, sed non quails sit." 124 la, q.45, a.7, ad 1m; Ottawa, p. 291: "repraesentatio vestigii attenditur secundum appropriate" 125 la, q.45, a.7, resp.; Ottawa, p. 291: Trocessiones autem divinarum Personarum attenduntur secundum actus intellectus et voluntatis, sicut supra dictum est; nam Filius procedit ut Verbum intellectus, Spiritus Sanctus ut Amor voluntatis. In creaturis igitur rationalibus in quibus est intellectus et voluntas, invenitur repraesentatio Trinitatis per modum imaginis, inquantum invenitur in eis verbum conceptum et amor procedens." 123

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Thomas asserts that this representation is an image of the Trinity because he has already defined the representation that is an image as a likeness of the form of its cause.126 Every image is modeled on an exemplar. We have already seen that the rational creature alone has God as its exemplar cause in the strict sense, for it is an image, not of one of the divine ideas, but of the very form or essence of God. Hence, also, only the rational creature is an image of the Trinity, for the Trinity is, strictly speaking, the exemplar of no other creatures. In this article Thomas uses the word repraesentatio to indicate the exemplarity that exists between the divine Trinity and Its creatures. By means of the distinction between the vestige and image he shows that rational creatures alone reflect the Trinity as their exemplar in the proper sense, whereas other creatures have the Trinity only as an indirect exemplar because they reflect the essential attributes that are appropriated to the divine Persons. It is important to note that in both of these articles of question 45 the final form of Augustine's psychological analogy for the Trinity dominates Thomas' position without any rival. In article 6 Thomas proves the causality of the divine processions by showing that God works all things through His Word and His Love, as an artisan works by means of the word conceived in his mind and for the love of the thing he is making.127 There is no reference to the old analysis of the processions in terms of nature and will, nor is there any mention of the Augustinian triads. Instead, Thomas favors the final analogy in book 15 of Augustine's De Trinitate, where the mystery of the Trinity is presented in terms of the two processions of word and love. In article 7 Thomas naturally presents the image of the Trinity as a representation of the two divine processions, inasmuch as the rational creature reflects the divine processions by the inner word that its intellect conceives and by the love that its will brings forth. In this short passage on the representation of the Trinity the fundamental teaching of the Summa on the image of the Trinity is already delineated. Question 93, article 5: The Existence of the Image of the Trinity After the first discussion of the image of the Trinity in the context of the causal roles of the divine Persons in the act of creation, it seems unnecessary to question the existence of the image of the Trinity. Nevertheless, Thomas 126

Ibid.: "Aliquis autem effectur repraesentat causam quantum ad similitudinem formae eius, sicut ignis generatus ignem generantem, et statua Mercurii Mercurium; et haec est repraesentatio imaginis." 127 Seen. 118 above.


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does open his treatment of the image of the Trinity in question 93 with an article intended to prove that in man there is an image of the Trinity. In his earlier works Thomas did not deem it necessary to defend the existence of the image of the Trinity, so we must ask why he devotes an entire article to the question in the Summa. First of all, Thomas tends to arrange his questions in the Summa according to scientific order. Before asking what a thing is, scientific inquiry requires that we determine whether it even exists: an sit. It is not surprising then, that Thomas begins his discussion of the image of the Trinity by asking in article 5 whether there is any such thing. Second, the question about the existence of the image of the Trinity is stated in such a way as to relate the new subject to the previous articles of question 93. At the beginning of the article the common conclusion of the various arguments is put in these words: "It seems that in man there is no image of God according to the Trinity of divine Persons."128 Thomas has already shown that the image of God is found in man. Now he is simply asking whether the exemplar of that image is God not only according to His nature or essence but also according to the Trinity of divine Persons. Thomas is not trying to show simply that an image of the Trinity exists, but that the image of God in man—the subject of the previous articles-is also an image of the Trinity. Third, Thomas had become acquainted with some of the texts of the Greek Fathers on the image of God and consequently would have had the opportunity to realize that they generally did not perceive the image of God as an image of the Trinity.129 In fact, Thomas makes the lengthiest response of article 5 to a position prevalent in the East since the time of Origen, that man is really the image of only one divine Person, the Son.130 Apparently Thomas had become aware that the notion of the image of the Trinity required some 128

la, q.93, a.5, prol.; Ottawa, p. 576. Thomas would have had occasion for such a discovery in his ecumenical work for Urban rv, for whom he consulted the writing of the Greek Fathers to compose his Contra errores Graecorum. 130 la, q.93, a.5, ad 4m. See n. 42 above. See Kirchmeyer, col. 816: "L'effort d'un Augustin pour retrouver dans 1'esprit humain une replique de la vie des trois Personnes est en grande partie etranger aux preoccupations habituelles de 1'Orient. Certes, les elements d'une theorie trinitaire de 1'image de Dieu ne manquent pas, a toutes les epoques, mais ces ebauches aboutissent rarement a une elaboration constante et explicite." So strong was the notion of the Son as the mediator between man and God the Father that the Greek theologians in general failed to see the entire Trinity as the terminus in the relation of image between man and God. Also, they did not have the benefit of Augustine's doctrine on the procession of the Holy Spirit as Love, and so they lacked the powerful psychological analogy with which Augustine laid out the image of the Trinity. 129

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defense in the systematic exposition of the image of God on account of the differing interpretations of the image of God among the Fathers. Finally, in question 45 Thomas does not in fact explain why there is an image of the Trinity in some creatures, because he is more concerned with the vestige of the Trinity that God has stamped on all creatures by virtue of the causal roles of the divine Persons in the act of creation. He introduces the image of the Trinity in order to explain what the vestige is not. Also, the focus in question 45 is on the agent of creation, whereas in question 93 it is on the terminus or end of creation. Any question about the reality of the image of God belongs properly to the discussion of the image as the end of the production of the creature, because creation is a real relation in the creature, not in God.131 In article 5 the real proof that the image of God is indeed the image of the Trinity lies in the very old interpretation of Gen. 1:26 found in Hilary's De Trinitate, which Thomas cites in the sed contra.132 Hilary inherited the Christian exegetical tradition that the plural forms Faciamus and nostrum in this verse indicate that all three divine Persons created man, not just God the Father.133 In question 91, article 4, where Thomas discusses the propriety of the language which Scripture uses in the account of creation, he has already noted that the words Faciamus hominem signify the plurality of the divine Persons, against the traditional Jewish interpretation that God addressed these words to the angels.134 Augustine developed this Trinitarian interpretation of Gen. 1:26-27 in the passage of the De Trinitate that Thomas 131

See la, q.45, a.3, ad lm; Ottawa, p. 286. la, q.93, a.5, s.c.l; Ottawa, p. 576: "Sed contra est quod Hilarius dicit in iv De Trin.-. per hoc quod homo dicitur ad imaginem Dei factus, ostendit pluralitatem divinarum Personarum." 133 See Sullivan, pp. 165-203 on the Christian exegesis of the plural forms in Gen. 1:26 as an indication of the Trinity. See also R. McL. Wilson, "The Early History of the Exegesis of Gen. 1:26," Studio Patristica, vol. 1, Part I, 5, "Biblica," ed. Kurt Aland and F. L. Cross, Texte und Untersuchungen, 63 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1957), pp. 426-437. Some of the Fathers, beginning with the author of the Epistle of Barnabas and Justin Martyr, considered that in Gen. 1:26 God the Father is addressing God the Son. Theophilus of Antioch appears to have been the first to include the Holy Spirit in the divine plural, and Irenaeus and Tertullian did likewise. This tradition probably had its roots in Jewish speculations that Gen. 1:26 shows God addressing His personified attribute of Wisdom. 134 la, q.91, a.4, ad 2m; Ottawa, p. 567: "non est intelligendum Deum angelis dixisse: 'Faciamus hominem'; ut quidam perverse intellexerunt. Sed hoc dicitur ad significandum pluralitatem divinarum Personarum, quarum imago expressius invenitur in homine." Thomas does not specify the quidam who hold the perverse interpretation, but it was the traditional position of Jewish exegetes, including Philo. Justin Martyr attempts to refute this position, arguing that the plural form indicates that God is speaking to His divine Son. See Sullivan, pp. 167-168; Wilson "The Early History of the Exegesis,", pp. 421-425; and Jules Lebreton, Histoire du dogme de la Trinite, vol. 2 (Paris: Beauchesne, 1928), pp. 338-339. 132


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paraphrases in the reply to the fourth argument of article 5. It is important to realize that for Thomas the authoritative proof of the actual existence of the image of the Trinity is found in the words of Gen. 1:26. There is no rational proof of the existence of the image of the Trinity because there is no rational proof of the existence of the Trinity. In one argument it is objected that the very existence of an image of the Trinity would furnish sufficient proof of the Trinity. Thomas replies that the image of the Trinity that exists in man is not a perfect image and so cannot prove the existence of the Trinity to a mind unillumined by faith.135 He quotes Augustine to explain the vast difference that makes it impossible for us to move by reason alone from the triad we see in the structure of our mind to the divine Trinity we can and must believe, but not see, in this life.136 Obviously we would not see that the triad in the mind is an image of the divine Trinity unless we already believed that God is in fact a Trinity of Persons. Therefore, the demonstration in the body of article 5 rests on a belief in the Trinity. Indeed, the central demonstration of article 5 is a reply to the first and second arguments that attempt to show that the image of God exists in man solely with respect to the essence of God, and not with regard to the Trinity of divine Persons. Basing his answer on the fundamental tenet that "in God himself one nature exists in three Persons," Thomas concludes that the image of God must have as its exemplar both the divine nature and the divine Persons.137 He devotes the greater part of his argument to showing that reason cannot exclude the possibility of the image of the Trinity. The distinction of the divine Persons is bound up with the essence or nature of God because one Person proceeds from another in a manner that befits the divine nature. "Hence," Thomas says, "to be to the image of God according to the imitation of the divine nature does not exclude the condition that it should be to the image of God according to the representation of the three Persons; but rather one follows upon the other."138 Far from excluding the possibility of the image of the Trinity, reason shows that we should expect to find the image of the Trinity wherever we find the image of God, if we accept that God is a Trinity. Lafont has noted the simplicity of this argu-

135

la, q.93, a.5, obj. 3 and ad 3m; Ottawa, p. 576. la, q.93, a.5, ad 3m; Ottawa, p. 576: "Sed, sicut Augustinus dicit in xv De Trin., maxima est differentia huius trinitatis quae est in nobis, ad Trinitatem divinam. Et ideo, ut ipse ibidem dicit, 'trinitatem quae in nobis est, videmus potius quam credimus; Deum vero esse Trinitatem, credimus potius quam videmus.'" 137 la, q.93, a.5, resp.; Ottawa, p. 576. 138 Ibid. 136

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merit.139 Fundamentally, Thomas says that the image of God implies the image of the Trinity because the essence of God does not exist apart from the Trinity of Persons. In spite of the simplicity of the argument, there are some indications within it of the greater complexity that Thomas' subsequent exposition of the image of the Trinity reveals. In the first part of his demonstration Thomas stresses that the distinction of the divine Persons is dependent on the origin of the Persons, or more properly, on the relations of origin.140 He indicates that the reader should refer to the earlier treatise on the Trinity, where he also begins with the study of the origin or procession of the divine Persons and the relations of origin (la, qq. 27-28). Thus he shows the foundation for the investigation of the image of the Trinity: the primary resemblance must be found in the reflection of the divine processions. It should also be noted that Thomas here uses the word repraesentatio for the first time in question 93. It appears in the central conclusion just quoted. Thomas seems to contrast the phrase "representation of the three Persons" with the preceding phrase "imitation of the divine nature." He may not have intended any sharp distinction between the terms repraesentatio and imitatio, for he is following a pattern in terminology discernible in his earlier works. In the Scriptum, the verb repraesentare and its derivatives are used only in the distinction on the image of the Trinity, whereas in book 2, distinction 16, on which the first part of question 93 of the primapars is modeled, the word imitare appears to the exclusion of the other term. Subsequent texts in question 93 all focus on the image of the Trinity, and the term repraesentare generally predominates. In De veritate, question 10, article 7, the term repraesentatio is closely associated with the likeness of analogy. As noted earlier, Thomas always observed some distinction between the analogical aspect of the image of God and the imitative aspect.141 Perhaps this distinction is also suggested in the contrast between the imitation of the divine nature and the representation of the Trinity in the passage now before us. In article 4 Thomas describes the imitation of the divine nature in terms of the actual imitation that occurs when man is conformed to God by imitating the divine acts of knowledge and love that are directed to God 139 Lafont, Structures et Methode, p. 284: On article 5 he writes that "La reponse, positive, tient dans un raisonnement theologique d'une simplicite presque deroutante." 140 la, q.93, a.5, resp.; Ottawa, p. 576: "distinctio divinarum Personarum non est nisi secundum originem, vel potius secundum relationes originis." 141 In the Scriptum there is already a suggestion of this distinction in the difference between the characteristic of actual imitation and the other characteristics, which give an analogical representation of the Trinity in terms of a proportionality between the mind and the Trinity. The distinction is clearer in the De veritate, where analogy and conformation are contrasted.


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Himself as the object. It is possible to discern a representational aspect in this imitation of God's nature, but Thomas does not explicitly mention it. For Thomas representation seems to be connected with a more explicitly proportional sort of likeness.142 As he will show hi the following articles, the representational aspect presupposes the imitative, for the reflection of the divine processions rests on the imitation of the immanent acts of the divine nature. Thus article 5 is not as simple as it first appears. In the prologue to question 93 Thomas gives an indication of the complexity of this article when he states that in the fifth place it will be inquired "whether in man the image of God exists with respect to the essence, or with respect to all the divine Persons or rather to one of Them."143 Its complexity appears in the long reply to the fourth argument. In that argument an attempt is made to give Augustinian authority to the theory that man is made to the image of God the Son. Thomas does not actually indicate any awareness that certain Greek Fathers held that man is the image of the divine Son.144 His reply to this theory is largely a paraphrase of Augustine's refutation of a similar theory whose origin Augustine does not bother to name.145 Thomas follows Augustine's careful exegesis of Gen. 1:26-27, by which he shows that God the Trinity made man to the image of God the Trinity.146 142

Thomas seems to use the term repraesentare in some sort of connection with the process of cognition by means of likenesses. He uses the term in this way in his discussion of our knowledge of God in la, q. 12. In the article on the vestige of the Trinity in all creatures (la, q.45, a.7) we have seen that he uses the verb repraesentare to describe the relation of likeness between every effect and its cause. Here, too, the cognitional aspect appears, for Thomas says that the vestige "demonstrates" the movement of its cause. We use the footprints of an animal to discover where it has gone. A representation makes its exemplar present again in a different way from its ontological presence by making it present to the intellect or senses, whether it represents merely the causality of the exemplar (as a vestige does) or the form of the exemplar as well (as an image does). This does not mean that the representation is not real or that the likeness between the representation and the thing it represents is an invention of the observer's mind. Imitation (at least in the active sense) implies a bridging of the distance that separates the likeness from its exemplar, whereas representation seems to point to the distance that keeps the two apart, although it also implies that there is some causal relation between the two, which gave rise originally to the representation. 143 la, q.93, prol.; Ottawa, p. 572. 144 See n. 129 above. 145 See De Trin. 12.6.7; CCL 50:361-362; Augustine refutes this theory in the course of his lengthier refutation of the theory that there is an image of the Trinity, not in each individual man but in the family's trio of father, mother, and child. 146 la, q.93, a.5, ad 4m; Ottawa, p. 577: "Cum ergo dicitur, 'Ad imaginem Dei fecit ilium,' non est intelligendum quod Pater fecit hominem solum ad imaginem Filii, qui est Deus, ut quidam exposuerunt: sed intelligendum est quod Trinitas Deus fecit hominem ad imaginem suam, idest totius Trinitatis."

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At the end of his reply Thomas adds his own note on the precise sense of the phrase ad imaginem. We have already examined his first suggestion in this passage, namely, that the preposition ad signifies the terminus of the production of man.147 From the rest of his study of the image of God, we can infer that Thomas favors this interpretation. However, Thomas also allows that the preposition ad can refer to the exemplar cause, although in this case the word imago would be used in an improper sense to stand for the exemplar rather than for the image proper. Thomas insists, however, that the exemplar cause of the image of God is the divine essence itself.148 In this way he counters the Greek theory that the exemplar cause to which God made man is the divine Word. Thomas completes his note on the meaning of ad imaginem by adding that the divine essence can be called "image" in another sense of the word, inasmuch as the divine essence is the ground according to which one divine Person imitates and so resembles another.149 Thus in this lengthy response Thomas grapples with the difficulty of the words of Gen. 1:26-27 in order to describe the theological foundations Augustine had already demonstrated for the doctrine of the image of the Trinity. Article 6: The Image of the Divine Processions Article 6 places us firmly in the sphere of St. Augustine's doctrine of the image of the Trinity. Thomas asks "whether the image of God is found in man only according to his mind."150 The term mens recalls Thomas' analysis of the Augustinian notion of the mind as the ground of the image of God in De veritate, question 10, article 1. In the Summa Thomas has transferred the discussion of the problems of psychology to the questions on the nature of the soul (la, qq. 75-89).151 Aside from the introduction of the term mens, it seems as if Thomas has already answered the question of article 6 in article 2, where he has explained that the image of God is found in intellectual creatures alone, because only they possess a likeness of God according to species on account of their ultimate difference, their intellectuality. Nevertheless, the ultimate difference is abstracted from the forma totius, and there remains the question whether the image of God is found in the composite 147

See Chapter 5, section A, pp. 168-169. la, q.93, a.5, ad 4m; Ottawa, p. 577: "Alio modo, haec praepositio ad potest designate causam exemplarem, sicut cum dicitur: Iste liber est factus ad illud. Et sic imago Dei est ipsa essentia divina, quae abusive imago dicitur; secundum quod imago ponitur pro exemplari." 149 Ibid.: "Vel, secundum quod quidam dicunt, divina essentia dicitur imago, quia secundum earn una Persona aliam imitatur." Cf. 1 Sent., d.28, q.2, a.2, sol.; p. 680. 150 la, q.93, prol.; Ottawa, p. 572. 151 In particular, see la, q.79, a.l. 148


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intellectual creature according to every one of its parts or only according to its highest part, its intellective faculty or mind. Accordingly, Thomas deals with this question in article 6, although he does more than give a simple answer to it. In the arguments of article 6, Thomas sets out a number of traditional texts on the image of God that might suggest a less exclusive determination of the ground that constitutes man as the image of God. St. Paul's straightforward statement that "the man is the image of God" might suggest that the entire man is the ground of the image, not just his mind.152 Then hi the reading of Gen. 1:27 the proximity of the distinction between male and female to the account of the creation of man to the image of God could be taken as evidence that the image of God is found in man according to the body as well as the mind, since male and female are distinguished according to the body.153 Thomas finds another argument for a connection between the image of God and man's body in the traditional use of the term "figure" in the definition of "image." Among corporeal things the image of a thing is often based on the corporeal quality of figure or shape as the sign of the exemplar's species.154 This close connection between image and the corporeal quality of figure suggests that the image of God might be found in man according to his body.155 Finally, Thomas considers the possibility that the image of God might be found in man according to the cognitive faculties of his soul that are lower than the mind. The argument is based on Augustine's exposition of the triadic structure of every cognitive act, from sensation up, although it goes beyond Augustine in its assertion that the three types of vision—bodily, imaginative, and intellectual—must each provide a ground for the existence of an image of the Trinity.156 These arguments raise problems not discussed in article 2 and provide a distinctive setting for the following exposition of the difference between the image and the vestige of the Trinity. 152

la, q.93, a.6, obj.l; Ottawa, p. 576. la, q.93, a.6, obj.2; Ottawa, p. 576. This argument is also found in Summa fratris Alexandri, lib. 2, no. 340, obj.3; Quaracchi 2, p. 412. 154 Thomas usually mentions flgura somewhere in his definition of "image". See la, q.93, a.2, resp.; Ottawa, p. 573: "Requiritur autem ad rationem imaginis quod sit similitudo secundum speciem, sicut imago regis est in filio suo; vel ad minus secundum aliquod accidens proprium speciei, et praecipue secundum figuram, sicut hominis imago dicitur esse in cupro." 155 la, q.93, a.6, obj.3; Ottawa, p. 576. Thomas has already given a reply to this argument at the beginning of the questions on God. In one of the arguments that attempt to show that God is a body, a similar connection between image and figure is used to read the scriptural texts on the image of God as proof that God has a figure and so must be a body. See la, q.3, a.l, obj.2; Ottawa, p. 15. 156 la, q.93, a.6, obj.4; Ottawa, p. 577. 153

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It becomes apparent in the replies to these arguments that Augustine's De Trinitate provides the immediate background for these problems. It is also the source of the sed contra, in which the connection between the image of God and man's mind is affirmed by means of an astute collation of two texts from St. Paul that share certain common phrases. Augustine dwells at length on these two texts (Eph. 4:23-24 and Col. 3:10) in book 14 of the De Trinitate, where he discusses the renewal of the image of God in man.157 Augustine is concerned to show that these texts, which both speak of renewal in terms of putting on the new man, mean that the image of God is reformed in man's soul, not created entirely anew. Thomas draws on Augustine's exegesis of the texts to form his own argument for the exclusive connection between the image of God and man's mind. He simply notes that according to Eph. 4:23-24, putting on the new man belongs to the mind, while in Col. 3:10 it is attributed to the image of God; and then draws the conclusion that the image of God must belong to the mind alone.158 Although Augustine himself does not state this argument, Thomas appears to have drawn it from Augustine's collation of the two texts. In the body of the article, Thomas quickly reaches his conclusion on the basis of article 2. He begins by restating the conclusion of article 2: "although hi all creatures there is some likeness of God, a likeness of God by way of image is found only in the rational creature, as it has been said above."159 At this point Thomas adds that in other creatures there is only a likeness of God by way of a vestige.160 This is the first time that Thomas uses the term vestigium in question 93, and the two phrases per modum imaginis and per modum vestigii immediately evoke the exposition of the vestige of the Trinity in question 45. As we shall see, question 45, article 7 is the immediate source of the elements of Thomas' demonstration in article 6. Meanwhile, Thomas continues his simple argument by stating a truth that derives directly from the reference in article 2 to the ultimate difference of the rational creature: "But that by which the rational creature exceeds other creatures is the intellect or

157

De Trin. 14.16.22; CCL 50A:451-454. la, q.93, a.6, s.c.l; Ottawa, p. 577: "Sed contra est quod Apostolus dicit, Ad Ephes. 4,23: 'Renovamini spiritu mentis vestrae, et induite novum hominem'; ex quo datur intelligi quod renovatio nostra, quae fit secundum novi hominis indumentum, ad mentem pertinet. Sed Ad Co/055. 3,10 dicit: 'Induentes novum hominem, qui renovator in agnitionem Dei, secundum imaginem eius qui creavit eum'; unde renovationem quae est secundum novi hominis indumentum, attribuit imagini Dei. Esse ergo ad imaginem Dei pertinet solum ad mentem." Thomas derives the interpretation of the phrase "spiritu mentis vestrae" as a pleonastic expression for the word mens from Augustine's passage. 159 la, q.93, a.6, resp.; Ottawa, p. 577. 160 Ibid.: "in aliis autem creaturis per modum vestigii." 158


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mind."161 With this premise Thomas then draws the conclusion that "neither in the rational creature itself is the image of God found, except on account of the mind."162 His argument hinges on the difference between the rational creature and other creatures. It is clear that the presence of the image of God is determined by this difference and not by what all creatures possess in common, as Thomas had taught in his earlier works, following the guidance of Augustine.163 After reaching the main conclusion Thomas adds, by way of an initial response to the arguments, that there is a likeness of God in the other parts of a rational creature, although it is only a vestige and not an image. As he explains, the vestige of God is found in these parts of the rational creature on the same grounds that the vestige is found in other creatures, which the rational creature resembles on account of its lower parts.164 Thomas now embarks on a long account of the difference between image and vestige, first in general terms, and then in its application to the difference between rational and non-rational creatures as likenesses of God. This account is meant to clarify how the image of God is found in man according to his mind, while a vestige is also found in him according to his lower parts. In his general distinction of image and vestige, Thomas repeats the basic distinction made hi question 45, article 7, but there is a significant difference in his presentation. Thomas starts by saying that the reason why the image of God is connected with the mind alone "can be understood clearly if we attend to the way in which a vestige represents and that in which an image represents."165 As we have seen, Thomas used the term repraesentare in the discussion of the vestige of the Trinity in question 45. However, in question 93 he proceeds to analyze the difference between vestige and image by means of the concept of species he had used to define "image" in article 2: For an image represents according to a likeness of species, as it has been said. A vestige, however, represents after the fashion of an effect, which represents its cause in such a way that it nevertheless does not attain to a likeness of species. For the imprints that are left by movement are called vestigia ["tracks" or "traces"]; and likewise ashes are called the vestige of fire, and the devastation of a land is called the vestige of an enemy army.166 161

162 163

Ibid.

Ibid.

See De ver. q.10, a.l, resp.; Leon., p. 297. Cf. Augustine, De Trin. 12.1.1-12.4. CCL 50:356-358. 164 la, q.93, a.6, resp.; Ottawa, p. 577: "In aliis vero partibus, si quas habet rationalis creatura, invenitur similitude vestigii; sicut et in ceteris rebus quibus secundum partes huiusmodi assimilatur." 165 Ibid. 166 la, q.93, a.6, resp.; Ottawa, pp. 577-578.

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By re-introducing the notion of a likeness of species, Thomas is able to state the distinction between vestige and image in more precise terms. In question 45 he used similar terminology to describe the type of representation an image provides, for he speaks of the image in terms of a "likeness of the form" of its cause.167 However, in question 93 Thomas not only describes the image in terms of the likeness of species, but he also negatively defines the representational function of the vestige in the same terms. Also, his examples of vestiges furnish a clearer illustration of the meaning of the term. Having distinguished the two terms, Thomas arrives at the real interest of his article: the systematic division and exposition of the different types of the likeness of God in creatures. It is easiest to grasp the unfolding of Thomas' presentation by condensing it with the aid of a chart: likeness:

of God's nature

of Trinity of Persons

image (in rational creatures)

1 in its mind or intellect

3 in two processions in its mind

vestige (in other creatures)

2 in its disposition made by God's intellect

4 in its substance, species, order

Aquinas gives the division of the likeness of God in the first sentence of this section of the body of the article, referring back to the distinction between image and vestige: Therefore, we can note a difference of this sort between rational creatures and other creatures, both inasmuch as the likeness of the divine nature is represented in creatures, and inasmuch as the likeness of the uncreated Trinity is represented in them.168

Thomas marks this new division between the likeness of the divine nature and the likeness of the Trinity with the conclusion of article 5 in mind. As we have seen, he had concluded from the inseparability of the divine nature and the divine Persons that the image of God is found in man, both in regard to the imitation of God's nature and in regard to the representation of the Trinity of Persons.169 Thus the most important development in article 6 is the 167

la, q.45, a.7, resp.; Ottawa, p. 291: "Aliquis autem efFectus repraesentat causam quantum ad similitudinem formae eius, ... et haec est repraesentatio imaginis." 168 la, q.93, a.6, resp.; Ottawa, p. 578: "Potest ergo huiusmodi differentia attendi inter creaturas rationales et alias creaturas, et quantum ad hoc quod in creaturis repraesentatur similitudo divinae naturae, et quantum ad hoc quod in eis repraesentatur similitude Trinitatis increatae." 169 la, q.93, a.5, resp.; Ottawa, p. 576. Lafont sees these two aspects of the image of God in terms of the reverse application of the psychological analogy that Thomas uses to show both the intellectuality of God's nature and the processions that constitute the divine Trinity. On article 6, see Structures et Methode, p. 285: "Ici, c'est la double lumiere de cette analogic qui


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extension of the connection between the mind and the image of God to include the likeness of the Trinity as one aspect of the image of God in the mind. Thomas' order of exposition of the four likenesses of God is indicated in the chart by the numerals 1 to 4. First, rational creatures bear the image of God on account of their likeness to the divine nature. In a certain way they represent the species of God because they imitate God inasmuch as they understand as well as exist and live. As Thomas indicates, he is simply repeating his earlier explanation (in article 2) of the image as likeness of species.170 In contrast, non-rational creatures do not understand, and so the likeness of the divine nature they possess is only a "certain vestige of the intellect that produces them" that can be detected in their structure and arrangement.171 In other words, there is no likeness of species between the non-rational creature and God because it does not possess an intellect, but merely bears the trace of the divine intellect which created it. There is no representation of God according to species in this case. In explaining the likeness of the divine Trinity both by way of image and by way of vestige, Thomas largely repeats his exposition of the image and vestige of the Trinity in question 45. However, in his presentation of the image of the Trinity there is an even greater emphasis on the two divine processions as the basis of the image of the Trinity: Similarly, because the uncreated Trinity is differentiated according to the procession of the Word from the one who speaks, and of Love from both, as it has been held above, in the rational creature, in which there is found a procession of word according to the intellect and a procession of love according to the will, we can speak of an image of the uncreated Trinity on account of a certain representation of species.172

est projetee sur 1'homme: son intelligence (qu'on la considere en elle-meme ou aux divers degres de son activite etudies a I'article 4) fonde la ressemblance a la nature divine; 1'acte intellectuel, considere tres precisement dans la procession du terme emis, fonde la ressemblance du Verbe." 170 la, q.93, a.6, resp.; Ottawa, p. 578: "Nam quantum ad similitudinem divinae naturae pertinet, creaturae rationales videntur quodammodo ad repraesentationem speciei pertingere, inquantum imitantur Deum non solum in hoc quod est et vivit, sed etiam in hoc quod intelligit, ut supra dictum est." 171 Ibid.: "Aliae vero creaturae non intelligunt; sed apparet in eis quoddam vestigium intellectus producentis, si earum dispositio consideretur." 172 Ibid.: "Similiter cum increata Trinitas distinguatur secundum processionem Verbi a dicente, et Amoris ab utroque, ut supra habitum est; in creatura rationali, in qua invenitur processio verbi secundum intellectum, et processio amoris secundum voluntatem, potest dici imago Trinitatis increatae per quandam repraesentationem speciei." Cf. n. 125 above for the parallel passage in la, q.45, a.7.

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Thomas immediately goes on to add that in non-rational creatures such a representation does not exist, for in them "there is not found the source (or principle) of a word, and a word, and love."173 He then proceeds to describe the vestige of the Trinity in much the same terms—the triad of substance, species, order—although he succeeds in making the function of the vestige as a sign of its cause clearer than he did in question 45.174 Having described the vestige of the Trinity, Thomas concludes the body of the article by stating that "in man a likeness of God is found by way of an image according to the mind, but according to the other parts, by way of a vestige."175 Several features of Thomas' new description of the image of the Trinity should be noted. First of all, the word processio is the central term. Thomas no longer analyzes the image of the Trinity primarily in terms of a triad of faculties, or even acts, in man's mind, but rather in terms of the two immanent processions that reflect the two divine processions. His use of the word "procession" also serves to stress the active condition of the mind necessary for the existence of the image in its fiill sense. Nevertheless, Thomas does not reject a more static view of the image in terms of the source of the processions and the two terms that proceed from it. He speaks of the source of the word, the word, and love. But there is no reference to the Augustinian concept of memory. Thomas' triad consists of the source of the two processions and the two terms of the processions. It is no longer a triad of faculties, habits, or acts, as he had analyzed the image in the De veritate. Instead, Thomas completes the development of the teaching he had already sketched in the De potentia. As we have noted, it is incorrect to see this development as an abandonment of Augustine's doctrine, for it is in fact a more faithful reading of the De Trinitatethat lies behind this teaching of the Summa.m It seems that Thomas had come to realize the significance of book 15 of the De Trinitateviith its emphasis on the processions of word and love. One further point should be noted: Thomas' description of the image of the Trinity in terms of "a certain representation of species." He seems to be using the word "species" here in a loose sense to signify the structure or form of the Trinity. In the earlier articles of question 93, "species" is usually a synonym for "nature" or "essence," or for "substantial form." Here it seems 173 Ibid.: "In aliis autem creaturis non invenitur principium verbi, et verbum, et amor." This negative comparison with the image was not made in the parallel passage of q.45, a.7. 174 He indicates the function clearly in the line that precedes the detailed description of the triad of substantia, species, ordo. See ibid.: "sed apparet in eis quoddam vestigium quod haec inveniantur in causa producenti." The haec refers to the three terms in the preceding line: principium verbi, verbum, amor. 175 Ibid. 176 See Chapter 5, section C, pp. 191-192.


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to refer simply to the divine relations, which are in fact identical to the divine essence, although they really distinguish the divine Persons. What is important to note is the representational function of the image of the Trinity. No matter how strongly Thomas may stress the element of conformation in the image of the Trinity, his repeated use of the term "representation" indicates that he did not abandon the analogical aspect of the image. We do not need to examine hi detail the responses to the arguments of article 6, but Thomas' unabashed reliance on St. Augustine should suffice to refute the theory that Thomas was turning away from Augustine when he wrote this part of the Summa. In the first response Thomas cites no authority, although Augustine would have agreed that man is not essentially the image of God because the mind, according to which man is said to be the image of God, is only part of man.177 To the second argument, which relies on an exegesis of Gen. 1:27, Thomas replies with a summary of Augustine's interpretation of this verse against several erroneous positions.178 Thomas draws on the same section of the De Trinitate he has used in article 5, but had not used prior to the Summa. In reply to the third argument, which emphasized the special tie between image and bodily figure or shape, he quotes from another work of Augustine to show that, compared with the bodies of other animals, man's upright figure rightly appears to have been made to the image of God. However, Thomas explains, this is only an appearance, a sign of the image of God in man's soul; in fact, a mere vestige of that true image.179 In its subject the fourth response is the most relevant to this study, although it does not present any new developments. The argument suggests 177 la, q.93, a.6, ad 1m; Ottawa, p. 578: "homo dicitur imago Dei, non quia ipse essentialiter sit imago, sed quia in eo est Dei imago impressa secundum mentem; sicut denarius dicitur imago Caesaris, inquantum habet Caesaris imaginem." Cf. De Trin. 15.7.11; CCL 50A:474. We have already remarked on this point of Augustine's doctrine in the previous part, in relation to Thomas, De ver. q.10, a.l. 178 la, q.93, a.6, ad 2m; Ottawa, p. 578. Basically, Thomas summarizes Augustine's refutation of the theory that the image of the Trinity is found in a human group, the family of father, mother, and son, rather than in the human individual. Cf. De Trin. 12.5.5-12.6.8; CCL 50:359-363. Then he briefly states Augustine's own position that the image of the Trinit is found in man according to his mind, and so equally in man and woman, in accordance with the true reading of Gen. 1:27, where the words "male and female He created them" follow the assertion that God created man to His image. The idea of the family group as image of the Trinity has achieved more support in our own age, but Thomas followed Augustine in rejecting it outright. 179 la, q.93, a.6, ad 3m; Ottawa, p. 578: Thomas quotes from Augustine's book De 83 quaest. He then adds: "quod tamen non est sic intelligendum, quasi in corpore hominis sit imago Dei; sed quia ipsa figura humani corporis repraesentat imaginem Dei in anima, per modum vestigii."

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that either the corporeal sense of vision or the process of imagination is sufficient for the existence of the image of God. In his response Thomas again reveals his thorough knowledge and appreciation of Augustine's De Trinitate. This time he gives an admirable epitome of book 11 of the De Trinitate, in which Augustine shows that there are certain trinities in the processes of human vision and imagination respectively. Again, Thomas did not reveal a very specific knowledge of this section of Augustine's work in his earlier writings, but now he shows a perfect mastery of Augustine's peculiar terminology.180 Thomas also masterfully presents Augustine's explanation that each of these two trinities falls short of constituting an image of God. It is clear that Thomas had arrived at a better comprehension of Augustine's De Trinitate and its dynamic as a search for an image of the Trinity. Unlike most of his predecessors, Thomas knew exactly how to use Augustine's masterpiece in his own more systematic presentation of the doctrine of the image. Article 7: Ontological Levels of the Image of the Trinity In article 7 Thomas continues the Augustinian investigation of man for an image of God that can best represent the Trinity. This article reveals Thomas' profound understanding of the movement of Augustine's search in the De Trinitate. In its substance the article has a close parallel in De veritate, question 10, article 3, which Thomas must have had before him. In the earlier article Thomas was preoccupied with the problem of the precise psychological status of memory in relation to the other parts of Augustine's triad of memory, intellect, and will. Having already dealt with this problem of psychology (in la, question 79, article 7), Aquinas is free in the Summa to concentrate on the analysis of the parts of the image of the Trinity in terms of the categories of act, habit, and faculty. He draws the same basic conclusion from his study of Augustine as he did in the article in the De veritate, but his presentation in the Summa shows a finer understanding of Augustine and a more penetrating insight into the structure of the image of the Trinity. Now that the psychological difficulties of Augustine's triad have been handled, Thomas is able to give article 7 a straightforward title: "whether the 180 To exemplify Thomas' mastery of Augustine's terms, one might quote the brief resume Thomas gives of Augustine's triad in the act of imagination, la, q.93, a.6, ad 4m; Ottawa, p. 579: "Similiter etiam in visione imaginaria invenitur primo species in memoria reservata; secundo ipsa imaginaria visio, quae provenit ex hoc quod acies animae, idest ipsa vis imaginaria, informatur secundum praedictam speciem; tertio vero invenitur intentio voluntatis coniungens utrumque." Cf. esp. De Trin. 11.3.6; CCL 50:340-341.


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image of God is in man according to the faculties, or according to the habits, or the acts."181 In the arguments Thomas proceeds to present various of Augustine's triads in order to suggest that Augustine denied that the image of the Trinity is based on the active state of the soul. We will consider these arguments along with Thomas' solutions later. Thomas himself unequivocally asserts that the image is found in man principally according to certain acts of the soul. As he did in the De veritate, he correctly shows that Augustine himself supports this conclusion. In the sed contra he once again shows his knowledge of Augustine's De Trinitate. Here he draws the conclusion from Augustine's triadic analysis of the sense of sight and the process of imagination that Augustine is writing about the act of seeing and the act of imagining. By the same reason, Thomas concludes, the image of the Trinity must be found in the mind according to its active condition.182 In the body of the article Thomas does, in fact, show that Augustine himself supports the conclusion that the image of the Trinity has its ground principally in the active state of the mind. Augustine's authority pervades the entire article, not just the initial arguments and their responses. De Beaurecueil is wrong to see this article as the relegation of Augustine's teaching to the sidelines, even if Thomas does not make explicit reference to the traditionally accepted Augustinian triads in the body of the article.183 What has actually taken place hi Thomas' new presentation is a development in his understanding of Augustine's teaching and a corresponding shift of emphasis onto other elements of that teaching that had previously been overlooked. Thomas has already laid most of the groundwork for his demonstration in the previous article. In the body of article 7 he begins by repeating some of the conclusions previously reached. Once more he stresses the phrase repraesentatio speciei as the key to the exposition of the image of the Trinity.184 To 181

la, q.93, prol.; Ottawa, p. 572. la, q.93, a.7, s.c.l; Ottawa, p. 579. This argument should be compared with the fourth argument and its reply in the previous article. In both articles Thomas makes use of the study of the lower types of vision in book 11 of the De Trinitate. 183 De Beaurecueil rightly notes that the traditional Augustinian triads are mentioned only in the arguments and their replies, but he undervalues the importance of these passages as constituents of the complete article. See de Beaurecueil [ 1 ] :81: "La demonstration tout entiere se developpe sans qu'il soil fait mention des trinites augustiniennes. Elles n'apparaient qu'en objection, avec la seule valeur d'un donne traditionel a interpreter conformement aux conclusions du corps de rarticle." Further on, he plays down the importance of Augustine: "La Somme etudiera pour lui-meme le probleme, sans se laisser guider par le docteur d'Hippone. ... Les positions augustiniennes, au lieu de mener la recherche, ne sont plus evoquees que comme un donne a bien entendre selon les conclusions de 1'analyse objective du reel" (p. 82). 184 la, q.93, a.7, resp.; Ottawa, p. 579: "Respondeo. Dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad rationem imaginis pertinet aliqualis repraesentatio speciei." 182

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THEOLOGIAE

the notion of representation he adds the consideration of degrees of the image, recalling the earlier study of different levels of the image in article 4, although he does not imply any precise correspondence. Given an image of the Trinity in the soul, Thomas writes, "it is necessary that it be noted principally according to this—that to the highest degree (maxime) that is possible it approaches to the representation of the species of the divine Persons."185 By using the word maxime, Thomas hearkens back to article 4, where he employs the same word to introduce the three levels at which the image of God is found. Here, however, he explicitly states that he is speaking of the miage of the Trinity and how it may be discerned in man's soul. Therefore, we must not expect to find any precise identification of the levels of the image distinguished in article 4 with the ontological analysis of the image of the Trinity found in article 7. Thomas proceeds to analyze the image of the Trinity along the Lines already laid down in article 6. What best specifies the divine Trinity is the distinction between the Persons that arises from the two processions: "The divine Persons, however, are distinguished according to the procession of the Word from the one who speaks and of the Love that joins both together."186 Here Thomas adds the crucial proposition from Augustine that had also served as the critical premise of his argument in the De veritate: "But the word in our soul 'cannot exist without actual thinking,' as Augustine says in De Trinitate, book 14."187 Thus Thomas is able to reach his conclusion that "first and principally the image of the Trinity is noted in the mind according to acts."188 As a corollary, it follows that the image of the Trinity can be discerned in a secondary way according to the faculties and especially the habits of the mind in which the acts by which the image is primarily noted have the virtual existence of an effect contained in its cause.189 In this conclusion the Summa does not differ from the De veritate. 185 Ibid.: "Si ergo imago Trinitatis divinae debet accipi in anima, oportet quod secundum illud principaliter attendatur quod maxime accedit, prout possible est, ad repraesentandum speciem divinarum Personarum." The Ottawa edition reads divina instead of divinae, without making any note of the Leonine text, which has divinae. To speak of a "divine image of the Trinity" is a bit loose, although to speak of the "divine image," meaning the "image of God," is acceptable. 186 Ibid.: "Divinae autem Personae distinguuntur secundum processionem Verbi a dicente, et Amoris connectentis utrumque." Love as connectens (rather than progrediens) is a constant theme in Augustine's De Trinitate: see, e.g., De Trin. 14.7.10, CCL 50A:435; 15.21.41, CC 50A:519; 15.23.43, CCL 50*520-521; 15.27.50, CCL 50A:532. 187 Ibid.: "Verbum autem in anima nostra 'sine actuali cogitatione esse non potest,' ut Augustinus dicit xiv De Trin." 188 Ibid. 189 Ibid.: "Sed quia principia actuum sunt habitus et potentiae, unumquodque autem virtualiter est in suo principio; secundario, et quasi ex consequenti, imago Trinitatis potest


213

The Summa surpasses the earlier work, however, in its analysis of the image of the Trinity in its principal state. Thomas concludes that the image of the Trinity is discerned primarily in respect of the mind's acts, "inasmuch as, that is, from the knowledge that we have we form an inner word by thinking, and from this we burst forth into love."190 In order to perceive the refinement of Thomas' analysis of the immanent acts on which the image of the Trinity is based, we must compare the corresponding passage in the De veritate: There can be no word without actual thinking. Hence, according to this way of perfect imitation, Augustine assigns the image in these three thingsmemory, understanding, and will—inasmuch as memory refers to habitual knowledge, understanding to actual thought that proceeds from that knowledge, and will to the actual movement of the will that proceeds from thought.191

In the Summtfs demonstration no mention is made of memory. Thomas has not rejected Augustine's triad, but instead he has followed Augustine's lead in De Trinitate, book 15, where Augustine concentrates on the two processions of the word and love, rather than on his psychological triads. In article 7 Thomas specifies the divine Trinity by means of the two eternal processions, and he logically proceeds to describe the representation of the species of the divine Persons in terms of the two processions within man's mind. Hence he speaks of the formation of an inner word and the eruption of love, although the first term of Augustine's triad is included under the word notitia, by which Thomas usually means the habitual knowledge designated as memory in the De veritate. In the Summa, however, the image of the Trinity is not found in the acts of the mind, but according to these acts. In the De veritate it is the acts of thinking and willing that best represent the second and third Persons, whereas here it is the terms that proceed hi these acts, the inner word and love, that come closest to representing the Persons adequately. For this highest representation the acts are necessary, because without the acts the two terms would not proceed. Thus the teaching of the Summa reflects the development of Thomas' understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity along with his new appreciation of Augustine's final analogy of the two processions.

attendi in anima secundum potentias, et praecipue secundum habitus, prout in eis scilicet actus virtualiter existent." 190 Ibid.: "prout scilicet ex notitia quam habemus, cogitando interius verbum formamus, et ex hoc in amorem prorumpimus.'' 191 De ver. q.10, a.3, resp.; Leon., p. 304.

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We should compare Thomas' distinction of primary and secondary degrees of the image of the Trinity hi article 7 with his elaboration of the three levels of the image of God hi article 4. First, Thomas speaks of the acts of knowing and loving hi both articles. However, hi article 4 these human acts are seen only as the means by which man imitates the essential acts of knowing and loving hi God. There is no mention of the personal dimension of the two divine acts that man imitates. In contrast, Thomas considers these same human acts in article 7, but now inasmuch as they represent the notional acts of speaking and loving hi God, the acts by which the second and third Persons proceed. In God the essential act of understanding is also an act of producing a word. The procession of the word in God is a notional act because it denotes, it gives us a notion, of the personal relation between the Son (as Word) and the Father.192 Second, the acts of knowing and loving constitute the principal state of the image of the Trinity in article 7, while these acts may be found hi both the second and third levels of the image of God in article 4. Therefore, no precise correspondence exists between the levels of nature, grace, and glory to which Thomas assigns the image hi article 4 and the states of the image according to acts, habits, and faculties in article 7. Third, hi article 4 Thomas is mainly concerned with the connection between the image of God and man's nature. He finds the basis of the connection in man's natural capacity to imitate God's acts of knowing and loving Himself. However, he is not interested directly in the ontological analysis of the image, but in its functional modes at the levels of nature, grace, and glory. In article 7, Thomas more directly analyzes the ontological foundations of the image. He now has added the condition that the image of God must be an image of the Trinity, and this condition allows Thomas to establish primary and secondary degrees of the image in terms of its actuality. A suggestion of a dynamic movement towards the actualization of the image of God is introduced, and this new element hi the conception of the image of God arises from the difference between the fundamental emphasis on nature in article 4 and the concentration on processions in article 7. If we accept that the genius of St. Augustine pervades the body of article 7, we need not view the arguments that precede it and the following responses as a mere bow to convention on Thomas' part. In the body Thomas establishes the principle that vindicates the element of truth in the various sketches that Augustine proposes in his search for the best image of

192

For the phrase actus notionalis see esp. la, q.37, a.l, resp.; Ottawa, pp. 233-234; and la, q.41, a.l; Ottawa, pp. 156-157.


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the Trinity. In the responses Thomas handles the text of the De Trinitate mth a sure touch that we must attribute to a fresh reading of the work. In the second response Thomas proceeds with his exegesis of the De Trinitate and its two triads, mens, notitia, amor and memoria, intelligentia, voluntas. He dodges the question of the ontological status of the members of these triads—are they acts, or habits, or faculties?—until the third response. In the second response he shows an admirable grasp of the essential development in books 9 to 10 of the De Trinitate. He sees that Augustine realized the failings of his first triad of mind, knowledge, and love, and so turned (at the end of book 10) to the second triad of memory, understanding, and will, all within the mind.193 In effect, Thomas uses his knowledge of the development within the De Trinitate to brush aside the conclusion of the argument. It does not really matter whether the mind is an act or a faculty, because the triad of mens, notitia, amor was left behind by Augustine in his search for an image of the Trinity. In the third response, however, Thomas confronts the question of the ontological status of the highest triad at which Augustine arrived: memory, understanding, and will. In the argument Thomas sets out the influential interpretation of Peter Lombard: "these three are 'the natural powers of the soul.'"194 In response Thomas repeats the interpretation of the crucial chapters of De Trinitate, book 14, which he had already formulated in the De veritate. Augustine himself shows that there is a primary and a secondary state of the triad, depending on the presence or absence of actual thinking. In effect, Thomas presents Augustine as the authority for his distinction between primary and secondary levels of the image of the Trinity in terms of act and habit. However, he also replies bluntly to the Lombard's interpretation, denying outright that the triad of memory, understanding, and will is three faculties or powers.195 Again, Thomas appears to be simplifying his own earlier teaching. Instead of expounding the acceptable sense of the Master's 193

la, q.93, a.7, ad 2m; Ottawa, p. 580. Thomas shows a more complete understanding of the text of the De Trinitate in this response than he did in the De veritate, although even in the Scriptum he was aware of the broad lines of the work's movement from one triad to another. 194 la, q.93, a.7, obj. 3; Ottawa, p. 579; Traeterea. Augustinus, x De Trin., assignat imaginem Trinitatis in anima secundum 'memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem.' Sed haec tria sunt 'vires naturales animae,' ut Magister dicit, ra distinctione i libri Sent Ergo imago attenditur secundum potentias, et non secundum actus." 195 la, q.93, a.7, ad 3m; Ottawa, p. 580: "Ex quo patet quod imaginem divinae Trinitatis potius ponit [Augustinus] in intelligentia et voluntate actuali, quam secundum quod sunt in habituali retentione memoriae; licet etiam quantum ad hoc aliquo modo sit imago Trinitatis in anima, ut ibidem dicitur. Et sic patet quod memoria, intelligentia et voluntas non sunt tres 'vires,' ut in Sent dicitur." Cf. the more explicit rebuke of Lombard in la, q.79, a.7, ad 1m; Ottawa, p. 488.

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exegesis, as he did in the Scriptum, Thomas simply denies the literal truth of the exegesis. In fact, Thomas correctly grasps Augustine's sense of the triad, for Augustine located its three members at the levels of act and habit, but not at the level of faculty. In the fourth response Thomas softens his refutation of the Lombard by admitting that the image of the Trinity does have a sort of virtual existence at the level of the faculties. Thomas has already explained this position in the body of the article, but here he takes pains to show that Augustine gives some support for this position. In the fourth argument the permanence of the image of God is cited as proof that the soul's acts cannot be the constitutive ground of the image since human acts are intermittent. This is the old problem Thomas faced in the Scriptum. In the Summa he draws on the psychological investigations he presented in De veritate, question 10. Augustine asserted that the mind always remembers, knows, and loves itself, but Thomas points out that Augustine was thinking of a habitual state of mind, below the definite act of discursive thinking. As in the De veritate, Thomas does not admit that the proper acts of the mind last forever, except in the sense that the acts have a certain permanent existence inasmuch as they are contained in their principles, the habits and faculties.196 He concludes his response with a quotation from the De Trinitate he had also used in De veritate, question 10, article 3, to show that Augustine allows a minimal existence of the image of God at the level of the faculties. Article 8: Assimilation of the Image to the Divine Processions If it has become apparent that Augustine's De Trinitate dominates article 7 of question 93, it should be easy to see that such is also the case for article 8. This article, too, parallels an article in the De veritate (q. 10, a. 7), and covers exactly the same topic. In the Summa it is asked whether the image of the Trinity exists in man with regard to every object of his acts, or only with regard to one object, God.197 However, the article in the De veritate plays a different role in the development of the question in which it is set. We have seen how article 7 occupies the pivotal position in De veritate, question 10, giving the key to the hierarchical ordering of man's cognitive acts according to the ascent from the inferior to the higher objects of his knowledge, from 196

la, q.93, a.7, ad 4m; Ottawa, p. 580: "ideo oportet dicere quod actus, etsi non sempe maneant in seipsis, manent tamen semper in suis principiis, scilicet potentiis et habitibus." 197 In the Summa the topic is phrased by means of the expression "per comparationem ad obiectum quod est Deus" (la, q.93, a.8, prol.; Ottawa, p. 580); while in the De veritate t form of the question reflects the epistemological emphasis of question 10. Cf. De ver. q.10, a.7, obj.l; Leon., p. 314: " secundum quod materialia cognoscit, an solum secundum quod cognoscit aeterna."


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temporal things to his own soul and God. In the Swnma, Thomas has already examined man's cognitive acts according to the same ascending order in questions 84 to 89. Thus article 8 of question 93 treats the same topic as the comparable article of the De veritate, but in a context that is detached from the analysis of cognition in De veritate, question 10. Instead, article 8 serves as the crowning touch to Thomas' exposition of the image of the Trinity. In the article he works out the consequences of those insights that govern the preceding articles in order to complete the specification of the image of the Trinity in accordance with the full doctrine of Augustine's De Trinitate. All four arguments take the position that to make God the one and only object that suffices for those acts on which the existence of the image of the Trinity depends is to define the conditions of the image too narrowly. Thomas quotes the same passage from the De Trinitate in the second argument that he used in the first argument of the parallel article in the De veritate. In contrast, the third and fourth arguments are new, and they have a more directly theological tone than the arguments in the De veritate. They touch on the state of the image in relation to the gift of grace and the vision of glory. In the first argument Thomas simply refers to the Summa's fundamental conception of the image of the Trinity in terms of the two processions in order to assert that these two processions occur whatever the object of the acts of intellect and will may be. We will examine these arguments in more detail when we consider their responses. Thomas finds the perfect quotation from the De Trinitate—one he had not used in the De veritate—to counter the arguments in favor of a less restricted range of objects that suffice to establish the image of the Trinity. From Augustine's text Thomas makes a succinct a fortiori argument: Augustine says in De Trinitate, book 14, that "the image of God exists in the mind not because it remembers itself and understands and loves itself, but because it can also remember, understand, and love God, by whom it was made." So much the less, therefore, is the image of God noted in the mind according to other objects.198

Augustine held that the image of God is found in man's soul because of man's ability to turn to God in knowledge and love. Man's self-knowledge and self-love is a condition that allows man to turn to God because man can see through his soul to the God who created him. Inasmuch as man's knowledge and love stop at self-contemplation, however, Augustine does not allow that they constitute the basis of the image of the Trinity. Much less, 198

la, q.93, a.8, s.c.l; Ottawa, p. 581.

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Thomas concludes, would the knowledge and love of things lower than the soul provide such a basis. In the body of the article Thomas once again begins with the principles that he has formulated earlier in question 93. He repeats the definition of "image" in terms of the representation of species: "it ought to be said that, just as it was said above, 'image' means a likeness that in some way reaches to the representation of species."199 Thomas commenced the solution of the parallel article hi the De veritate with a similar definition of "image" in terms of a representation of the exemplar according to its species.200 In the Sumtna, as we have seen, Thomas does not hesitate to speak of the image of the Trinity in terms of the phrase, "representation of species." Here he continues the introduction to his solution by indicating that we must look for the image of the Trinity in the soul "according to something that represents the divine Persons by means of a representation of species, as it is possible for a «9fll creature. Here Thomas launches out on a line of reasoning that differs greatly from the argument in the De veritate, although in both articles he reaches the same conclusion. In the De veritate he follows an inductive approach, proceeding through the three classes of the objects of human cognition to determine whether the likeness of the Trinity that rests on the acts specified by each class of objects can be called an image. In contrast, Thomas' procedure in the Summa is more straightforward and deductive on account of the refinement of the conceptual tool that the phrase "representation of species" provides. He simply begins from his developed formulation of the "species" of the divine Trinity and then deduces what objects of the mind will constitute the mind as an adequate representation of that species. Thomas begins the main argument of his solution from the same statement of the distinction between the divine Persons he has used in the two previous articles: the "divine Persons are distinguished, as has been said, according to the procession of the Word from the one who speaks, and of Love from both."202 Before moving on to the representation of the processions in man's soul, he analyzes the divine processions in respect of the object of the notional acts: "The Word of God, however, is born from God according to the knowledge of Himself, and Love proceeds from God according as He 199

la, q.93, a.8, resp.; Ottawa, p. 581. De ver. q.10, a.7, resp. : Leon., p. 316: "non tamen quaelibet similitude ad rationem imaginis sufficiens invenitur, sed expressissima similitude per quam aliquid repraesentatur secundum rationem suae speciei." 201 la, q.93, a.8, resp.; Ottawa, p. 581. 202 Ibid.: "Distinguuntur autem divinae Personae, ut dictum est, secundum processionem Verbi a dicente, et Amoris ab utroque." 200


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loves Himself."203 This is nothing new in itself, but Thomas follows an order in the Summas solution—unlike that in the De veritate—that presents the exemplar first and then displays the image. In God it is God himself who is the object that specifies the two acts by which the second and third divine Persons proceed. It is this objective specification of the two notional acts that the image should represent as best it can. Thomas proceeds to point out that each different object will specify a different word when we come to know that object and a different love when we love it. His argument is cryptically brief at this crucial step: It is clear, moreover, that a diversity of objects diversifies the species of the word and of love. For in man's heart the word conceived from a stone is not the same in species as that conceived from a horse, nor is the love the same in species. Therefore, the divine image is noted in man according to the word conceived from the knowledge of God and the love derived from thence.204

Perhaps the force of the argument can be expressed this way: the "species" of the divine Persons is simply the divine essence to which each Person is identical although each is really distinct from the other two. It is this species, the divine essence, that specifies the notional acts, and that determines the species of the Word and Love as one in species with God the Father. If man is to represent the species of the divine Persons, he must not only represent the three Persons by means of the human processions of word and love, he must also represent the species of the divine Word and Love. It is only possible to represent the species of these divine Persons when the object that specifies man's word and love is the same as the object that specifies the divine Word and Love. That object is God Himself in His divine essence. Man must know God in order that he may properly represent the Trinity according to the processions of word and love. Thomas concludes this central argument by adding that, if man is to bear the image of the Trinity, God must be the object of his soul, although the image may remain even though the soul is not engaged at the time in the act of knowing God: "And thus the image is noted in the soul according as it is led to God or as it is natural for it to be led to God."205 203

Ibid.: "Verbum autem Dei nascitur de Deo secundum notitiam sui ipsius, et Amor procedit a Deo secundum quod seipsum amat." 204 Ibid.: "Manifestum est autem quod diversitas obiectorum diversificat speciem verbi et amoris; non enim idem est specie in corde hominis verbum conceptum de lapide et de equo, nee idem specie amor. Attenditur igitur divina imago in nomine secundum verbum conceptum de Dei notitia, et amorem exinde derivatum." Augustine's presence behind this passage is suggested by the use of the word cor. 205 Ibid.: "Et sic imago attenditur in anima secundum quod fertur, vel nata est ferri in Deum."

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After he has reached this important conclusion, Thomas goes on to explain that God may be present to the mind as its object in two ways: first, as the direct and immediate object of the mind, but secondly, as the indirect and mediated object, comparable to the presence of an object in a mirror.206 By the indirect objective presence of God, Thomas has in mind the presence of God through His image in a man's own mind: Therefore, Augustine says in the De Trinitate, book 14, that "the mind remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself. If we discern this, then we discern a trinity—not yet God, however, but now an image of God." But this is not so because the mind is led ultimately to itself, but inasmuch as through this it can be led to God; as appears from the authority cited above.207

Thomas uses the quotation from Augustine to explain that the image of God can exist when the direct object of the mind is the mind itself. However, mere self-presence is not enough. As a basis for the image of God, self-presence is sufficient only inasmuch as it provides a basis for the objective presence of God. Thomas refers to the passage from Augustine already quoted hi the sed contra in order to balance the quotation in the body of the article. He therefore accepts the strict thesis of the De Trinitate that the mind's objective self-presence is not a sufficient condition for the image of the Trinity unless it is understood as a pre-condition for the objective presence of God. If we compare the conclusion of Thomas' solution in the Summa with the conclusion of De veritate, question 10, article 7, we find that Thomas has moved slightly towards a greater restriction in the conditions necessary for the image of the Trinity. In the Scriptum he allowed that the image could exist in some way no matter what the mind's object happens to be. In the De veritate he restricted the field to the higher objects, one's own soul and God. However, he did add that the image of the Trinity exists only in a secondary manner inasmuch as the mind knows itself, and that mainly (praecipue)) when it sees through itself to God.208 In the Summa, as we have just seen, Thomas asserts that there is only one object, God, whose presence, potential or actual, suffices for the existence of the image of the Trinity. Self-knowledge does not suffice unless it is understood as the basis for knowledge of God. In keeping with this conclusion, Thomas does not bother to distinguish between the likeness according to analogy and the likeness according to 206

Ibid.: "Fertur autem in aliquid mens dupliciter: uno modo, directe et immediate; alio modo, indirecte et mediate, sicut cum aliquis, videndo imaginem hominis in speculo, dicitur ferri in ipsum hominem." 207 Ibid. 208 See Chapter 4, n. 126.


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conformation. He used this distinction in the De veritate to establish a certain order between the likeness of the Trinity based on objective self-presence and that based on the objective presence of God. This distinction loses its point in the Summa because Thomas refuses to consider the two likenesses as independent. The likeness based on self-presence does not constitute the image of the Trinity except inasmuch as it provides the basis for the likeness based on the presence of God. Furthermore, Thomas' main argument completely ignores the distinction between analogy and conformation and in fact reveals elements of both likenesses in the image of the Trinity. Thomas had already indicated the unification of analogical and conformational elements of the image in the De potential In the Summa Thomas speaks of God as the object of man's knowledge from which the word and love that constitute the image of the Trinity proceed, but not once does he mention the conformation of the mind to this divine object. It is incorrect to see this article as a triumph of the concept of conformation over that of analogy, as de Beaurecueil does.210 If anything, the element of analogy is more obvious, on account of the predominance of the term repraesentatio. In the article in the Summa, Thomas begins with a description of certain features of the exemplar and then points out the corresponding features in the image. What saves the result from flat parallelism is that the analogy is no longer a simple analogy of proportionality, but has become a sort of analogy unius ad alterum, as de Beaurecueil suggests.211 Thomas explains the image as a representational likeness, but he also includes an element of conformation by insisting that the object of man's knowledge and love must be the same as the object of God's knowledge and love. In other words, Thomas locates the principle of the analogical likeness between man and God in man's participation of God's knowledge and love. Hence to make an opposition between the analogical and the conformational elements is contrary to Thomas' intention in the Summa. As a study of the image of God in terms of exemplar causality, the concept of analogy naturally 209

Cf. De pot. q.9, a.9, resp.; Marietti, p. 249. See de Beaurecueil [2] =47: "Des le De Veritate 1'option est faite, et c'est uniquement dans la perspective de la 'conformation' que va etre resolu dans la Somme le probleme des rapports entre image et objets de connaissance." See also p. 48: "Le mouvement de sa pensee se caracterise assez bien comme le passage d'une conception secundum analogiam a une conception secundum conformationem, pour emprunter les termes du De Veritate." But these terms cannot be so easily applied to the Summa. 211 De Beaurecueil [2]:49: "Dans la perspective de S. Thomas, elle [1'analogie] change meme de nature: on passe de 1'analogie de proportionalite, pouvant s'exprimer sous forme de rapport, qui caracterise le 'parallelisme,' a 1'analogie unius ad alterum propre aux relations entre les creatures et leur auteur, dont elles participent, en tout ce qu'elles sont et possedent de realite positive." 210

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predominates, as Thomas' use of the term "representation of species" shows. However, in article 8 Thomas has explored the causal basis of this analogical likeness in terms of the fundamental capacity of man for a conformative union with God in knowledge and love. In response to two of the arguments, Thomas sheds some light on the participation of the divine processions that constitutes the image of the Trinity in man. In the first argument, it had been asserted that the presence of any object suffices to establish the image because there is always the production of an inner word and the procession of love whenever the mind knows and loves anything.212 Thomas has already shown in the respondeo that not every object suffices for the establishment of the image, for it requires a representation of the species of the divine Persons. He replies to the first argument by simply stating that the notion of image requires something more specific than that there be any procession whatsoever of one thing from another. It is necessary also to note "what proceeds from what, namely, that the Word of God proceeds from knowledge about God."213 Both de Beaurecueil and Lafont interpret this last fine as an assertion of man's participation or communion in the divine procession of the Word.214 However, it is not clear that Thomas meant to refer to the procession hi the image rather than to the procession in the exemplar. On the one hand, the phrase Verbum Dei seems to refer to the second Person of the Trinity, but on the other, the expression notitia de Deo seems to signify more appropriately man's knowledge of God than God's knowledge of Himself. It is difficult to explain away the obvious sense of the second phrase. We therefore must interpret the "Word of God" as a human participation of the divine Word of God. Consequently, in the image of God man participates in a creaturely manner by his knowledge of God in the procession of the divine Word. 212

la, q.93, a.8, obj.l; Ottawa, p. 580. la, q.93, a.8, ad 1m; Ottawa, p. 581: "Dicendum quod ad rationem imaginis, non solum oportet attendere quod aliquid procedat ab aliquo; sed etiam quid a quo procedat, scilicet quod Verbum Dei procedit a notitia de Deo." 214 See de Beaurecueil [2]:48: To the first argument, "S. Thomas lui repond qu'il ne suffit pas, pour qu'il y ait Imago Dei, de la production d'une verbe et de la procession d'un amour: il faut qu'il y ait communion a 1'activite divine elle-meme, selon laquelle le Verbe de Dieu precede d'une connaissance ayant Dieu pour objet." Cf. Lafont, Structures etMethode, p. 270: After quoting la, q.93, a.8, ad 1m, he writes, "Cette reponse vaut, en son contexte, de toute connaissance de Dieu; elle vaut par excellence de cette connaissance et de cet amour dans lesquels Dieu est source et terme de 1'acte spirituel de rhomme. La condition d'origine se trouve alors pleinement realisee; la conjonction actuelle entre Dieu et rame-Image en connait pas d'intermediaire. C'est Dieu lui-meme qui precede de Dieu au travers des actes humains." Both scholars consider that the passage refers to a procession within man's soul that in some way participates the divine procession of the Word. 213


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Some confirmation of this interpretation of the image in terms of a participation of the divine processions may be found in Thomas' response to the fourth argument. In that argument one feature of the vision of glory (i.e., the beatific vision) is singled out in order to make a point about the image of God, because the vision of glory constitutes the basis for the image of God in man at the level of glory. There it is argued that the object of the vision of glory is not only God but also temporal things, and thus concluded that the image of God can be found in man when he is considering temporal things as well as when he has his gaze fixed on God.215 Thomas counters by making the obvious clarification, that the principal object of the vision of glory is always God and that temporal things may be objects of this vision only inasmuch as they are seen in God.216 He goes on to quote from Augustine in order to explain the character of this beatific vision of temporal things: And this is what Augustine says in the De Trinitate, book 14, that "in that nature to which the mind will happily cleave, it will see as unchangeable all that it may see." For the ideas (rationes) of all creatures are also in the uncreated Word itself.217

By the last sentence Thomas is simply explaining Augustine's use of the word "unchangeable" to describe the way things will be known to us in the beatific vision. In the vision of God we will see all things as in their cause. In knowing God by the supernatural light of glory, we will share in the procession of the divine Word, in which the reasons or ideas of all things are contained as in the artist's concept. Thomas probably means to point once again to the perfected relation of exemplarity that exists between the divine procession of the Word and the human procession that participates in the divine procession by virtue of the beatific vision. Of the remaining responses to the arguments, only the third need detain us. In the second Thomas again reveals his knowledge of Augustine, giving a lengthier reference to the context in the De Trinitate from which the ambiguous authority of the argument is taken, than he did in the De veritate.21* In the third argument Thomas touches on the question of the 215

la, q.93, a.8, obj.4; Ottawa, p. 581. la, q.93, a.8, ad 4m; Ottawa, pp. 581-582. 217 la, q.93, a.8, ad 4m; Ottawa, p. 582: "Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit, xrv De Trin., quod 'in ilia natura cui mens feliciter adhaerebit, immutabile videbit omne quod videbit.' Nam et in ipso Verbo increato sunt rationes omnium creaturarum." 218 Cf. De ver. q. 10, a.7, ad 1m; Leon., p. 317. In the SummaThomas refers to Augustine's example of a habit as object of our memory, intellect, and will, and follows Augustine's critique of this triad as insufficient for an image of the Trinity because of the adventitious character of habits, in particular, of faith. 216

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relation between the image and grace. In the Christian dispensation the knowledge and love of God is considered to be primarily the effect of grace. However, the argument errs by interpreting this truth as if it implied an exclusive relationship between grace and our knowledge and love of God. For this would mean that the image of the Trinity, which must be based on the knowledge and love of God, would belong only to those who were in a state of grace.219 Thomas corrects the error by recalling in his response that there is a natural knowledge and love of God as well as the meritorious knowledge and love of God that springs from grace alone.220 Thomas has not specifically mentioned the natural acts of knowing and loving God in the previous articles of question 93, but he has discussed them in earlier questions of the prima pars. It is necessary to keep in mind that the image of the Trinity can achieve a certain level of perfection in the state of nature, so that its actualization is not exclusively bound up with the acts that spring from grace or the light of glory. Thomas is more concerned in this response to affirm that all men bear the image of the Trinity by their very nature on account of its basic capacity to understand and love God. He borrows the words of Augustine, which he had just used in the last response of the previous article, to assert this natural capacity, and paraphrases the ensuing passage in the text of the De Trinitate: And this also is a natural thing, that the mind can use its reason to understand God, according to which we have said that the image of God always remains in the mind; "whether this image of God is so overthrown," as if overshadowed, "that it is almost annihilated," as in those who do not have the use of reason, "or it is darkened and deformed," as in sinners, "or it is shining and beautiful," as in the just, as Augustine says in De Trinitate, book 14.221

In this response Thomas has elaborated the brief allusion to nature in the body of the article. For he has already said there that the "image is noted in the soul according as it is led to God or as it is natural (nata est) for it to be led to God."222 Thus Thomas has continued to think of the image of God as a likeness that is implanted in man's very nature, no matter what may happen to that image in the course of a man's life. 219 la, q.93, a.8, obj.3; Ottawa, p. 581: "Praeterea. Quod Deum intelligamus et amemus, convenit nobis secundum gratiae donum. Si igitur secundum memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem seu dilectionem Dei attendatur imago Trinitatis in anima, non erit imago Dei in homine secundum naturam, sed secundum gratiam. Et sic non erit omnibus communis." 220 la, q.93, a.8, ad 3m; Ottawa, p. 581: "Dicendum quod meritoria Dei cognitio et dilectio non est nisi per gratiam. Est tamen aliqua cognitio et dilectio naturalis, ut supra habitum est." 221 Ibid. 222 See n. 205 above.


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These few articles which we have been examining, contain Thomas's fully developed teaching on the image of the Trinity. The doctrine of Augustine in the De Trinitate is the principal source and guide for Aquinas' own exposition of the image of the Trinity in the Summa. In particular, Thomas adopts Augustine's final preference for an understanding of the image in terms of the two processions of word and love, whereas in his earlier works Thomas was content to stick to Augustine's psychological triads. In the Summa Thomas puts to one side the psychological issues historically connected with the doctrine of the image and treats them elsewhere, with the result that the relationship between the doctrine of the Trinity and the notion of the image of God becomes more visible. Thus Thomas, ever faithful to St. Augustine, could bring out in higher relief the relation of exemplarity between the divine Trinity and its image hi man's soul, a relation that finds its expression in Thomas' repeated use of the phrase "representation of species." To find a representation of the Trinity necessarily requires a study of the faculties and acts of man's mind, but Thomas never loses sight of the guiding principle of question 93: that the image of God is found in man according to his nature or species, considered as the end of his production. In the articles on the image of the Trinity, Thomas has very little to say about the relation between the image and man's ultimate end, his beatitude. It is clear that man attains the highest level of the image in the state of beatitude, but Thomas is not primarily concerned with man's end in his exposition of the image of God. In question 93 he shows that man is the image of the Trinity according to his capacity to know and love God, a capacity, that belongs to his intellectual nature, whether it is fulfilled at the natural level or at the levels of grace and glory. The study of the image of the Trinity points towards the beatific perfection of man because man does not properly represent the divine processions except when he participates them by knowing and loving God actively. Such a participation is very imperfect at the natural level compared with the conformation that the beatific vision effects. Nevertheless, in question 93 St. Thomas does not forget that the image of the Trinity is rooted in man's nature and its capacity for God. The image is the end of God's creation of man. Man's rational soul, the term of his production, is the image of God by virtue of its capacity to participate God's notional acts of knowledge and love and so to represent the species of the Trinity. Man's nature is of course oriented towards the fulfillment of this capacity of the soul in some way, but Thomas leaves the actual examination of this fulfillment to the later parts of the Summa.

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D. THE IMAGE OF THE TRINITY AND THE INDWELLING OF THE TRINITY St. Thomas developed his reflection on the image of God in the Summa at a time when he had been re-examining the mystery of the blessed Trinity. We have seen that he does not de-emphasize the Trinitarian aspect of the image of God in question 93, but arrives at a more coherent, more penetrating view of the image of God as a representation of the Trinity. We cannot but wonder about the relation between the doctrine of the image of the Trinity contained in question 93 and the earlier questions on the Trinity (qq. 27-43). There is a similarity, at least of language, between the teaching on the image in question 93 and the treatment of the indwelling of the Trinity in question 43. This proximity stands in contrast to the lack of connection between the distinction on the image and the section on the indwelling in the Scriptum. How significant is this development? It is natural to expect that there should be some points of contact between the questions on the Trinity and the presentation of the image of the Trinity. We have already noted the general similarity of structure between the section of the prima pars that treats of God in Himself (qq. 2-43) and the exposition of the image of God (q. 93).223 In question 93, article 4 plays an important role through its analysis of the image as a reflection of the divine operations, for it serves to introduce the image as a representation of the Trinity. There is no discernible parallel between the order of the articles (5-8) on the image of the Trinity and the arrangement of the questions on the Trinity (qq. 27-43). However, the doctrinal proximity of the presentation of the image of the Trinity to the questions on the Trinity is a sign of Thomas' thesis that the image is a representation of the species of the Trinity. Thomas does not explicitly invoke the aid of the image of the Trinity to expound the doctrine of the Trinity, but he relies on Augustine's final psychological analogy in his attempt to make the belief in the Trinity intelligible to the mind of the believer. Thus the doctrinal similarity between the questions on the Trinity and the question on the image of the Trinity rests fundamentally on the analogical use of the image of the Trinity to present the doctrine of the Trinity. In using the psychological analogy in his study of the Trinity Thomas does not explicitly mention the image, although he obliquely refers to the image in certain key passages. Perhaps he considered it premature to refer to the image of the Trinity before he had come to discuss the creature that bears that image. One passage is especially worthy of note. In it Thomas reflects on his 223

See Chapter 5, section B, p. 172.


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use of Augustine's psychological analogy. In question 32 Thomas concludes his reflections on the divine Persons in general with a discussion of our knowledge of the divine Persons.224 He is mainly occupied in this question with the technical concept of notions (notiones), the abstract ideas or properties by which we can know the divine Persons.225 However, he begins the question with an article on our natural knowledge of the Trinity, in which he concludes that we cannot prove the existence of three Persons in God by reason alone. Reason cannot prove (probare} the Trinity, although it can refute arguments against the Trinity. However, reason also has a further role in conjunction with the gift of faith. Thomas does not discuss this function hi the body of the article, but introduces it in one of the arguments. In the second argument, after citing several authoritative opinions to the effect that we can prove the Trinity, Thomas adds that Augustine used the psychological analogy to manifest the Trinity: But Augustine proceeds to manifest the Trinity of Persons from the procession of a word and of love in our mind. We have followed this way above. Therefore, the Trinity of Persons can be known through natural reason.226

Thomas distinguishes between the words "prove" and "manifest" in his reply to the second argument. There are reasons for the divine Trinity, but these reasons do not suffice to compel us to believe that God is a Trinity. They do not lead us demonstratively from certain known effects to the Trinity as thencause. However, these reasons serve to manifest the Trinity because they allow us to understand how various effects in the created world make sense once we believe that God is indeed a Trinity. Thomas goes on to say that the likeness of God in our intellect is not sufficient to prove anything about God because in God and man intellect does not exist according to a univocal sense of the term "intellect."227 Nevertheless, he does not deny that we can make use of the likeness of God in our mind to manifest the Trinity. Thomas does not reject this use of the image of the Trinity. 224 See la, q.29, prol.; Ottawa, p. 191: "quarto vero, ea quae pertinent ad notitiam Personarum." Compare the earlier section on the substance or nature of God, which Thomas concludes with two questions on the knowing and naming of God (qq. 12-13). 225 See la, q.32, a.3, resp.; Ottawa, p. 212: "notio dicitur id quod est propria ratio cognoscendi divinam personam." 226 la, q.32, a.l, obj.2; Ottawa, p. 208: "Augustinus vero procedit ad rnanifestandum Trinitatem Personamm, ex processione verbi et amoris in mente nostra; quam viam supra secuti sumus. Ergo per rationem naturalem potest cognosci Trinitas Personamm." 227 la, q.32, a.l, ad 2m; Ottawa, p. 210: "Similitude autem intellectus nostri non sufficienter probat aliquid de Deo, propter hoc quod intellectus non univoce invenitur in Deo et in nobis."

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Returning to the second argument, we should note that Thomas employs the first person—something rare in an argument—to endorse Augustine's use of the image of the Trinity. As Thomas says, he has followed Augustine's way of manifesting the Trinity. It is highly significant that he sums up the psychological analogy that Augustine had developed, and which he himself claims to follow, by speaking of the "procession of a word and of love hi our mind."228 We have seen that in question 93 he expounds the image of the Trinity in terms of these two processions. Thus it is clear that Thomas had already worked out this primary thesis in his doctrine of the image when he was writing the questions on the Trinity. When he finally arrived at the actual exposition of the image of the Trinity in question 93, he would have been guided by the analogical use of the image of the Trinity made earlier in the questions on the Trinity. With this explicit statement of his method, it is easier to see that Augustine's final development of the image of the Trinity in terms of the two processions is the foundation on which Thomas begins to build his presentation of the Trinity. Thomas first deals with the processions in God at the beginning of the section (q. 27). In the attempt to defend the orthodox belief in the divine processions against the errors of Arms and Sabellius, Thomas finds the best analogy for the divine processions in the processions that accompany the two immanent acts of the intellectual nature. He does not explicitly mention the image of God here, but he speaks of the likeness of God that is found in intellectual creatures, even if this likeness also fails to represent God adequately: Because God is above all things, what is said of God is not to be understood according to the mode of the lowest creatures, which are bodies, but according to the likeness belonging to the highest creatures, which are intellectual substances. However, the likeness found in them also fails in the representation of what is divine.229

With characteristic modesty, Thomas does not offer a proof for the Trinity but simply proposes an analogy that will not lead to erroneous positions. Lower creatures cannot provide any safe analogy. We must turn to the highest creatures for an analogy for the divine processions. Thomas finds an acceptable analogy in the created mind's immanent actions, according to which something proceeds within the agent. 228

See n. 226 above. Lafont has grasped Thomas' emphasis on the processions in his Trinitarian theology, but he fails to see that Thomas, by his own confession, is following in Augustine's steps. See Structures etMethode, p. 88: "La procession est justement ce commun denominateur que personne avant saint Thomas semble n'avoir degage avec autant de lucidite." 229 la, q.27, a.l, resp.; Ottawa, p. 182.

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In the first article of question 27, Thomas singles out the act of understanding as the most apparent immanent action. Later on he argues that in the intellectual nature there are only two acts that are immanent: the act of the intellect and the act of the will.230 Thus in the intellectual substance bearing the likeness of God there are only two processions, associated with these two acts, that can help us understand the two divine processions: The procession of a word, however, is noted according to the intellectual act. According to the operation of the will, however, a certain other procession is found in us, namely, the procession of love, according to which the object that is loved is in the lover, just as through the conception of a word the thing that is spoken or understood is in the one who understands.231

It must be noted that the vast distance that separates the created intellectual nature from God does not cause Thomas to hesitate in his conclusion that there is really a procession of word and a procession of love in God: "Hence, as well as the procession of word, another procession is posited in the divine, which is the procession of love."232 Given the existence of two processions in God, the likeness of God in the intellectual creature leads us to conclude that these two divine processions must be the processions of word and of love. Thus Thomas clearly draws on Augustine's doctrine of the image of the Trinity in question 27. Furthermore, he follows Augustine's final preference for the version of the image in which the two processions of word and love are highlighted. Unlike his ambivalent use of the Augustinian psychological analogy in the Scnptum, Thomas' adoption of the analogy of word and love is wholehearted in the Summa. His debt to Augustine can be seen especially in article 4 of question 27, where Thomas attempts to solve the key question of the De Trinitate: why is the procession of love not a kind of generation? Augustine's work is governed by the search for an answer to the seemingly innocent suggestion that we should be able to say that the Holy Spirit is begotten of God if He proceeds from the Father. Thomas brings to the solution of this problem some ideas not derived from Augustine, but his solution is fundamentally based on the insight into the nature of love that Augustine first suggested at the very end of his investigation.233 In his analysis 230

la, q.27, a.3, resp.; Ottawa, p. 184: "in divinis non est processio nisi secundum actionem quae non tendit in aliquid extrinsecum, sed manet in ipso agente. Huiusmodi autem actio in intellectual! natura est actio intellectus et actio voluntatis." 231 Ibid. 232 Ibid. 233 See above, p. 34. Agostino Trape has shown in a short study that Thomas finds his solution for the problem about the distinction between the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit in Augustine's De Trinitate. See his "Nota sulla processione dello

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of love Thomas simply perfects the fundamental insight contained in Augustine's psychological analogy. Considering the employment of the psychological analogy in the questions on the Trinity, one might expect Thomas to speak more explicitly about the image of the Trinity when he deals with the missions of the divine Persons in question 43. After all, the effect of these missions is the indwelling of the Trinity in the rational creature, which already bears the image of the Trinity. Nevertheless, we find no reference to the image of the Trinity in this question. This lack of any explicit connection is the more puzzling in the Summa because of the terminological and doctrinal similarities between the exposition of the divine indwelling and the question on the image of God. In the Scriptum the discrepancy in the treatment of the two subjects is so great that it is easy to understand why Thomas made no connection between them. Such is not the case in the Summa. An analysis of Aquinas' doctrine of the indwelling reveals the similarities between the image of the Trinity and the indwelling. In question 93 Thomas has shown that the image of the Trinity is a representational likeness in which, at the highest level, the intentional presence of God assimilates the soul to the divine acts of knowledge and love in which the life of the blessed Trinity unfolds. In the actualization of the image, God is the object of the faculties of intellect and will. So also, in the case of the indwelling of the Trinity, God presents Himself to the soul of the just man as the object of the soul's knowledge and love.234 In both cases there results an assimilation of the soul to the divine Trinity on account of a conformation of the human acts of intellect and will to the divine processions of the Word and of Love.235 So complete is the assimilation that the soul in both cases is said to participate

Spirito Santo nella teologia trinitaria di S. Agostino e di S. Tommaso," in Studi Tomistici, vol. 1 (Rome: Pontificia Accademia Romana di S. Tommaso d'Aquino, 1974), pp. 119-125. Trape claims that this is only one case of a more general continuity of doctrine between the two Doctors. See esp. p. 119: "Voglio dire: leggendo, dopo il De Trinitate di S. Agostino, la Somma teologica di S. Tommaso nelle questioni dedicate alia Trinita, si raccoglie la netta convinzione che ci si trovi di fronte a una splendida continuita di pensiero, ma non la convinzione che qui ci siano soluzioni che la non c'erano." 234 la, q.43, a.3, resp.; Ottawa, pp. 272-273: "Super istum modum autem communem, est unus specialis, qui convenit naturae rationali, in qua Deus dicitur esse sicut cognitum in cognoscente et amatum in amante. Et quia cognoscendo et amando creatura rationalis sua operatione attingit ad ipsum Deum, secundum istum specialem modum Deus non solum dicitur esse in creatura rationali, sed etiam habitare in ea sicut in templo suo. Sic igitur nullus alius effectus potest esse ratio quod divina Persona sit novo modo in rationali creatura, nisi gratia gratum faciens." 235 See also la, q.43, a.5, ad 2m, where Thomas interprets missio in terms of assimilation to the divine Person by means of the appropriated gift.


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in the divine processions.236 In some sense, as Dom Lafont notes in the case of the image, "God Himself proceeds from God through human acts."237 In both cases, by making Himself the object of the intellect and will of the rational creature, God brings His eternal procession into the created world so that the Son and the Holy Spirit proceed not only eternally but also temporally. By virtue of the temporal processions the rational creature participates in the eternal processions. One interesting verbal parallel suggests that Thomas realized the closeness between the discussions of the image and the indwelling. In question 93, article 7, Thomas uses a rare expression to indicate the procession of love: "from the knowledge that we have we form an inner word by thinking, and from this we burst forth into love."238 The phrase prorumpere in amorem is a curious expression that captures Thomas' notion of love as a vital motion that impels the one who loves out of himself towards the object of his love. It does not appear to come from Augustine's De Trinitate, for Augustine usually speaks of love as the force that connects and yokes together, and he does not draw attention to the explosive quality of love. I do not know where Thomas got this expression. However, he uses the phrase in only one other text, and that is in question 43, article 5, where he describes the gift of wisdom by which the divine Word comes to the soul and assimilates it to Himself. The mission of the Son takes place only according to "a conditioning or informing of the intellect such that by means of it the intellect bursts forth into the passion of love."239 Here again the verb is prorumpere. These are the only texts where Thomas describes love with this expression. What can we make of this? Mere coincidence? We cannot be sure. For a man who carefully weighed his words, however, this occurrence suggests that he repeated the phrase because he was aware of the connection between his notions of the image and the indwelling of the Trinity. Yet he never adverted specifically to this similarity. 236

For the indwelling, see la, q.38, a.l, resp.; Ottawa, p. 237: "habere autem dicimur id quod libere possumus uti vel frui ut volumus. Et per hunc modum divina Persona non potest haberi nisi a rationali creatura Deo coniuncta. Aliae autem creaturae moveri quidem possunt a divina Persona, non tamen sic quod in potestate earum sit frui divina Persona et uti effectus eius. Ad quod quandoque pertingit rationalis creatura, ut puta cum sic fit particeps divini Verbi et procedentis Amoris, ut possit libere Deum vere cognoscere et recte amare." This text helps to elucidate the central passage on the indwelling (la, q.43, a.3, resp.). 237 Lafont, Structures et Methode, p. 270: "C'est Dieu lui-meme qui precede de Dieu au travers des actes humains." 238 la, q.93, a.7, resp.: Ottawa, p. 579: "ex notitia quam habemus, cogitando interius verbum formamus, et ex hoc in amorem prorumpimus." 239 la, q.43, a.5, ad 2m; Ottawa, p. 274: "Non igitur secundum quamlibet perfectionem intellectus mittitur Filius: sed secundum talem institutionem vel instructionem intellectus, qua prorumpat in affectum amoris."

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Why did Thomas not attempt to draw any explicit connection between the doctrines of the indwelling and of the image in the Summal240 First of all, it is necessary to recall the different contexts in which Thomas presents the two doctrines. Question 93 on the image of God is set in the midst of the study of the creation of man. Thomas examines the image of God as the end of the production of man. As we have seen, Thomas does not mean that the image of God is the ultimate end of man towards which he strives during his life, but rather the formal cause of man as the terminus of the divine act of creation. Although Thomas does discuss the levels of the image of God that man attains through the operations that go beyond the simple existence of his nature, nevertheless, question 93 is centred on the nature or species of man as the end of the act of creation. In contrast, question 43 on the divine missions and the indwelling of the Trinity falls within the questions on God, although it immediately precedes the division on creation. Although question 43 appears to be concerned with the created effects at which the temporal processions of the divine Persons terminate, Thomas states that the question deals with the comparison of the divine Persons with one another.241 If we look closely at the articles of question 43, we see that Thomas is not writing about the indwelling as if it were nothing more than a created effect that is loosely associated with the divine Persons. He is primarily trying to show that the divine missions are temporal extensions of the eternal processions. Thus the missions fall within the section of the Trinity rather than in some later part that deals with the rational creature, because the divine Persons are involved in the missions in a more manifest way than They are in the act of creation. The study of the divine missions, therefore, is included under the heading of the relationship between the Persons because the missions must be understood first in terms of the eternal relations of origin between the Persons. 240 It is possible but not clear that there is some connection. At the end of his book Francis Cunningham attempts to shed some new light on Thomas' doctrine of the indwelling in a short study of his doctrine of the image of the Trinity. See The Indwelling of the Trinity: A Historico-Doctrinal Study of the Theory of St. Thomas Aquinas (Dubuque, Iowa: Priory Press, 1955), pp. 340-349. He thinks that the use of the phrase res in sua similitudine in the presentation of the indwelling in the Scriptum points to a close connection between this presentation and the theory of the image of the Trinity in the same work. Unfortunately, Cunningham does not examine the Scriptum's teaching in context, nor does he note the development of Thomas' doctrine of the image in his later works. Cunningham's coda on the image of the Trinity is an excellent piece of speculation with which Thomas might have agreed, but we do not know that Thomas actually thought that the two doctrines of the image and the indwelling are complementary. 241 la, q.42, prol.; Ottawa, p. 263: "Deinde considerandum est de comparatione Personarum ad invicem. Et primo, quantum ad aequalitatem et similitudinem; secundo, quantum ad missionem."


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The divine presence in the indwelling belongs to an order that far surpasses the order of creation. Therefore, it is not too surprising that Thomas does not detail any connections between the indwelling of the Trinity and the image of the Trinity, for he considers the latter in the context of the creation of man. In the case of the image, God the Trinity is present primarily as exemplar cause of the rational nature. This nature has a capacity to be led to God through some participation in the divine processions of the Word and Love. In question 93, however, Thomas is not explicitly concerned with the presence of the three divine Persons that establishes the higher levels of the image by means of grace and its gifts. A second difference that may help account for Thomas' silence concerning any connection between the image of God and the indwelling of the Trinity is the discrepancy between the set of individuals to whom one can attribute the image of the Trinity and those to whom one can attribute the indwelling of the Trinity. Every rational creature by its nature possesses the image of the Trinity and cannot lose it; whereas only those rational creatures who enjoy the state of grace are the dwelling places of the Trinity. Thus what conceptually sets the image apart from the indwelling is the difference between nature and grace. Of course, Thomas does speak of a level of the image of God that is tied to the state of grace. However, as we have seen, in his discussion of the image of the Trinity (la, q. 93, aa. 5-8), he says very little about beatitude or grace, other than to insist that the best representation of the Trinity—the case when the soul knows and loves God—can exist according to man's natural knowledge of God.242 Therefore, the indwelling of the Trinity would produce a special case of the image of the Trinity; but only one case, although at a high level. Finally, it should be noted that Thomas makes no reference to the indwelling of the Trinity in the Summa outside of the question on the divine missions. There are some insignificant texts that mention the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in relation to grace and charity. In the prima pars, the word inhabitare (or one of its derivatives) appears only twice outside question 43, and then only to explain the meaning of the term "thrones" as a designation of one of the angelic orders.243 What this absence of the word probably indicates is that Thomas did not want to burden his beginners with an oversubtle system of theology in which the connections between one part and another were painstakingly elaborated. The Summa is characterized by simplicity. Thomas runs through the essentials of a topic, and then tends to leave it and move on to the next. The notion of the indwelling is a 242 243

la, q.93, a.8, ad 3m; Ottawa, p. 581. la, q.63, a.9, ad 3m; Ottawa, p. 389; q.109, a.l, ad 3m; Ottawa, p. 654.

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complicated notion that Thomas preferred not to employ in the elucidation of other topics in the field of theology. It is not surprising, therefore, that he avoided the complexity of making an explicit connection between the difficult notion of the indwelling and the equally complex notion of the image. In spite of Thomas' failure to indicate any connection between the indwelling and the image of the Trinity and in spite of the real differences between the indwelling and the image hi Thomas' teaching, there is a fundamental similarity between questions 43 and 93. This similarity, however, does not lie hi some special connection between the indwelling and the image of the Trinity. Instead it springs from Thomas' use of Augustine's psychological analogy for the Trinity. It is the vision of the Trinity in terms of the procession of word and love that lies at the root of the resemblance between question 43 and question 93. With the consistent application of this analogy it is not surprising that the indwelling of the Trinity appears to be one level of the actualization of the image of the Trinity. It is likely that Thomas would have agreed with this conclusion. The indwelling is in fact a participation by grace hi the divine processions of the Word and of Love, a state that cannot reasonably be distinguished from the imago recreationis in which by grace the soul knows and loves God at the actual or at least habitual level. Nevertheless, it is conjecture to attribute this conclusion to Thomas himself. It is truer to see the resemblance between his doctrines of the image and the indwelling as a result of the consistent application of the insights of Augustine's De Trinitate to both topics. Before concluding our examination of Thomas' doctrine of the image in the Summa, a word should be said about the importance of the concept of the image of the Trinity in the Summa as a whole. Lafont has noted many of the texts of Thomas in which the image of God is mentioned and sees the concept of the image as one of the idees mattresses—tf not the chief idea—that govern the organization of the Summa, It is true that the idea that man reflects God in his autonomy and freedom in a general way lays the foundation for the secunda pars in its prologue. Such a view, however, exaggerates the role of the concept of the image in the Summa, for the references to the image of God are scattered through the secunda pars and the tertia pars without any apparent plan. Certainly the more specific concept of the image of the Trinity does not play an important role outside of the primapars, for Thomas makes only one mention of the imago Trinitatis after question 93 of the prima pars.244 Of the passages that refer to the image of 244 3a, q.63, a.3, s.c.l; Ottawa, p. 2831. Thomas is quoting Albert's definition of sacramental character: "Character est distinctio a charactere aeterno impressa animae rationali, secundum imaginem consignans trinitatem creatam Trinitati creanti et recreanti.''


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God in the later parts of the Summa, none offers any considerations on the image of the Trinity. In fact, in the pages that follow his exposition of the image in the prima pars, Thomas is content to make use of the concept of the image as an instrument useful for making a point, but not as a subject to dwell on in and for itself. More light is shed on the image of the Trinity and its significance in Thomas' system of theology by the use he makes of it in the questions on the Trinity in the prima pars. In the Summa Thomas succeeded in uniting the consideration of the ontological and the analogical aspects of the image of God that the Sentences had artificially divided. He does this, not by minimizing one or the other of these aspects, but by showing how one necessarily entails the other. The image of the Trinity is a reality rooted in man's nature because it is the stamp of the divine exemplar that man receives in the very act by which God creates his soul. In other words, the ontological status of the image necessarily entails an element of the analogical because the image by its very definition depends for its existence on the exercise of an exemplar causality. To remove or to downgrade the analogical side of the image of God would be to fail to see the true character of the image as the end of the production of man. Man's soul bears the mark of its Creator and so it necessarily represents its cause analogically. In the Summa, by setting aside the purely psychological problems associated with the examination of the image of the Trinity, Thomas was able to manifest more clearly the unity of the ontological and analogical aspects of the image, and to reveal the significance of the concept of the image for the theological investigation of both man and God.

6

Conclusion

In the Summa theologiae St. Thomas brought to perfection his teaching on the image of the Trinity as the ultimate foundation of man's dignity. Man possesses dignity because he is like God in a way that raises him above all other creatures on earth. In a study on the dignity of the human person, Jacques Maritain has captured the essence of Thomas' theological anthropology: Finally, we turn to religious thought for the last word and find that the deepest layer of the human person's dignity consists in its property of resembling God—not in a general way after the manner of all creatures, but in a proper'way. It is the image of God. For God is spirit and the human person proceeds from Him in having as principle of life a spiritual soul capable of knowing, loving and of being uplifted by grace to participation in the very life of God that, in the end, it might know and love Him as He knows and loves Himself.1

Maritain does not spell out how man reflects the eternal Trinity by his participation in the life of God. However, such a participation by grace in God's knowledge and love implies a share in the processions by which the Word and Love proceed within God's acts of knowing and loving. Such is Thomas' teaching in the Summa. By his very nature man is the image of the Trinity because by virtue of the spiritual nature of his soul man has the capacity to know and love God and so to share in the very life of the Trinity. Thomas had no opportunity to perfect his doctrine concerning the image of God prior to the Summa. As we have seen, the order of the Sentences made it difficult for Thomas to give a unified exposition of the image of God in the Scriptum. This separation in the Scriptum caused Fr. de Beaurecueil to make a false division between the theological function of the image as an analogical instrument for understanding the Trinity, and the anthropological 1

Maritain, The Person and the Common Good, trans. John J. Fitzgerald (New York: Scribner's, 1947), p. 32.

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reality of the image as a structure of the soul that gives man a special place in the universe. Thomas did not mean to imply that there is any real difference between the image of the Trinity, treated in book 1, and the image of God in man, as presented in book 2. Nevertheless, the simple fact of such a division meant he had no occasion to show how man is indeed the image of the Trinity by virtue of his very nature and species. In the De veritate Thomas was able to present the image of the Trinity unfettered by this difficulty. No distinction between the theological and anthropological aspects of the image can justifiably be found in this second treatment, nor can it be said that one aspect is sacrificed for the sake of the other, as de Beaurecueil suggests. Yet, in spite of the theological character of question 10, the epistemological focus necessarily keeps it from being a proper, systematic exposition of the image of God itself. It was left to the Summa theologiae to set the treatment of the image in its proper place and to give it a scientific order and completeness. We have seen how Thomas accomplished this by welding together and refashioning the material from the Scriptum (book 2, distinction 16) and from the De veritate, and by drawing on the insights into the mystery of the Trinity in the Contra gentiles and the De potentia. We must attribute much of the doctrinal perfection of Thomas' teaching on the image of God to the stimulus and insight that the prima pars provided, with its systematic reflection on the triune God and the creation of man. Tracing the development of Thomas' teaching from his first works to the productions of his mature years is a fascinating task. A concern with the development of Thomas' doctrine should not obscure the constants that mark it from beginning to end. Of the points Aquinas always taught, perhaps the most important is the consistent connection he made between the image of God and the intellectual species or nature of man. One feat of Thomas' genius was his development of a general definition of "image" in terms of the concept of species. He formulated it in the Scriptum and never needed to modify it. In applying the definition to man as image of God in the Scriptum and in the works that follow it, Thomas showed that the intellectuality of man is a sign of the intellectuality of God, which in a loose sense is the species of God. Man is the image of God by virtue of his rational soul, so that he can never lose the image of God. In spite of the movement towards a conception of the image in terms of the acts proper to the mind, Thomas never faltered in his affirmation that the image of God is permanent. In the Summa Thomas confirms that the image is rooted in man's nature by placing the question concerning the image of God in the section on the creation of man. Thomas associates the image with the end of man's production, which is the form of man, his rational soul, considered in relation to the exemplar

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cause, the creating God. Thus at the moment of creation God imparts His own image to man, stamping His ineffaceable likeness in the very nature of man's rational soul. It is an absolutely central tenet of Thomas' teaching that the image of God has its ground in man's nature. What Thomas came to realize in the De veritate, and what he formulated more precisely in the Summa, is that it is not enough merely to assert that man is the image of God by virtue of his intellectual nature. Man never loses his intellectual nature, but his nature does not permit man to remain in an unchanging state of existence. Because he is a creature, and the lowest of rational creatures, man's nature requires that he seek his perfection. Man comes into the world incomplete, needing to attain his fulfillment through the operations proper to his intellectual nature. He is oriented towards these operations and moved towards the completion of these operations by the initial, imperfect acts that constitute the rudimentary dynamism of his faculties. In the Scriptum Thomas considered the image of the Trinity primarily at this initial level of activity in which the faculties always exist. From the beginning he remained constantly occupied with examining and reconsidering the ontological status of the image as Augustine had delineated it. In the Scriptum he followed closely the accepted view that the triad memoria, intelligentia, voluntas hi which Augustine found an image of the Trinity, is three faculties. Because man is never without his faculties, such an interpretation seemed to guarantee the permanence of the image quite well. Nevertheless, Thomas appears already to have had a sense that the dignity of the image according to Augustine's true teaching demanded a consideration of the realization that the operations of intellect and will confer on the image of the Trinity. He put something of this insight into his notion of the image's fifth characteristic, actual imitation, although he seems to have associated this characteristic with the imperfect, rudimentary acts of the faculties rather than with their complete operations. Under the influence of Augustine's own words in the De Trinitate, Thomas in the De veritate made a significant advance in his teaching on the image of the Trinity. In the latter work he did not deny that the image is rooted in the faculties of the mind and even in the very essence of man's intellective soul, but he came to see that the image as the imitation of the divine Trinity has its principal existence at the active level of memory, understanding, and will. He showed with great exegetical skill that Augustine himself taught this truth. Thomas correctly discerned that Augustine preferred to consider the triad as acts, because it is only in our act of understanding that our mind conceives an inner word. In the De veritate Thomas first showed some awareness that the most proper analogy for the Trinity is found in man's inner processions

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of word and love, which reflect the divine processions of the Word from the Father, and of the Holy Spirit as the mutual Love of the Father and the Son. Nevertheless, Thomas still preferred to hold onto the traditionally favored triad of memoria, intelligentia, and voluntas, and devoted his energy to refining the analysis of its ontological status in the soul. Theological reconsideration of the doctrine of the Trinity in the course of his lectures and disputations at Rome in 1265-1266 (the lectura on book 1 of the Sentences and the De potential enabled Thomas to take the step from the common conception of the image of the Trinity as a triad in the soul to the view that the image is chiefly found in the mind's two interior processions of word and love. Thomas must have reread Augustine's De Trinitate at this time, for the first part of the Summa (and already the Depotentia at an earlier date) show a mastery of Augustine's teaching that surpasses the comprehension Thomas had previously shown in the De veritate. Thomas handles Augustine's triads in a few responses, whereas he unfolds the doctrine of the image of the Trinity entirely in terms of Augustine's analysis of the processions of word and love. At its principal level the image of the Trinity requires that the mind be in a state of activity so that the operation of its intellect may terminate in an inner word, and the operation of will may produce love as its terminus. Nevertheless, the representation of the Trinity exists in some way from the moment in which God created man to His image, because the intellectual nature bears within itself the capacity to know and love God. There is also a certain development in Thomas' understanding of the criteria that a likeness of the Trinity must meet if it is to be considered truly an image of the Trinity. From the Scriptum onwards he uses certain criteria to test whether man bears the image of the Trinity when his mind is considering any sort of thing or only when it is turned to a special object such as itself or God. Thomas grew firm in his restriction of the image to the knowledge of the highest object alone, namely, God. In the Scriptum he allowed that the image exists "in a certain way" even when the mind is directed towards material things, but from the De veritate onwards he was too familiar with Augustine's thought to admit such a possibility. In the De veritate, however, he considers self-knowledge sufficient to constitute the mind as image of the Trinity; but in the Summa theologiae he adds the qualification that self-knowledge suffices only if it leads to knowledge of God. This progressive narrowing of the limits within which the image of the Trinity finds its basis for existence is connected to a change in Thomas' selection of the criteria by which he determined what suffices for an image. In the Scriptum Thomas simply fists five characteristics belonging to the image of the Trinity. He inherited these characteristics from the Augustinian tradition. All five characteristics must be present for the existence of the

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image in the proper sense. Thomas continued to refer to these characteristics in the De veritate, but he appears to have found them inadequate as a set of criteria. Instead, he asserts that a likeness must meet one or the other of two conditions if the likeness is to be an image of the Trinity. Either the likeness must be based on some analogy between the mind and the triune God, or it must be based on the conformation of the mind to God. Thomas describes conformation in terms of the assimilation of the knower to that which he knows. Thus conformation makes the mind like God by informing the intellect through God's objective presence and so bringing the mind to participate in God's personal life to some extent. In contrast, analogy refers to a proportionality between the mind and God, a similarity between the relation of consubstantiality in the triad of the mind and the relation of consubstantiality within the divine Trinity. Thomas already suggests in the De veritate that the best analogy for the Trinity is to be found in the proportionality between the relations involved in the processions of word and love in our mind and the relations involved in the processions of the Word and Love in God. In the Summa theologiaeThomas perfects his understanding of the criteria the image must meet by simplifying his teaching. Already in the De potentia he had begun to unify the analogical and conformational conditions for the image of the Trinity. In the Summa he completes this development and simply states as the criterion for the image that it must serve as a repraesentatio speciei. Thomas uses this expression throughout his examination of the image of the Trinity, and it becomes clear that it refers first of all to the analogical element in the relationship between the image and its exemplar. He lucidly shows the proportionality that holds between the processions of the Persons in God and the processions of word and love in the mind. Nevertheless, the representation of species entails more than a relation of proportionality, for it also includes an element of conformation. For at its highest level God acts directly on the mind as the object specifying its acts of understanding and love, perfecting the proportionality between the mind and the Trinity by conforming the acts of the mind to the inner activity of the divine Trinity. Thus in the Summa the constant criterion for the image, the representation of species, combines the De veritate's two conditions, analogy and conformation, which Thomas had never claimed to be mutually exclusive. Because of the inclusion of an element of conformation in the Summa's criterion for judging the image, Thomas insisted that the mind be turned, directly or indirectly, towards God if we are to discern an image of the Trinity in man. In this conclusion he proves faithful to the intention of Augustine in the De Trinitate.

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Finally, by the expression repraesentatio speciei Thomas unites the examination of the image of the Trinity to the ontological analysis of the image as a sign of its exemplar's species. Throughout his discussion of the image of God in the Summa Thomas reaffirms that the ground of the relation of man to God as the image of God is man's intellectual nature. More specifically, the image is based on the intellectual nature's capacity for knowing and loving God. Although this capacity is fulfilled by the acts of a man's life and perfected by the vision and love of God that the saints enjoy in heaven, Thomas insists that the image rests on this capacity and so is rooted in man's nature from the moment of his creation. For this reason, he never makes any explicit connection between the indwelling of the Trinity and the image of the Trinity, although in the Summa we are almost justified in assuming such a connection because there is such a close resemblance hi the analysis of both the image and the indwelling. In both cases Thomas bases his analysis on Augustine's psychological analogy in the processions of word and love. It is clear that the gift of grace and the light of glory serve to bring the image to its highest perfection, as Thomas himself states. Thomas says nothing explicitly about the image, however, in his questions on the indwelling and on beatitude. It would seem that he remained faithful in this respect to Scripture, which associates the image of God with the creation of man: "And God created man to His own image" (Gen. 1:27). Throughout the development of Aquinas' teaching on the image of the Trinity we have noted the increasing influence of Augustine's doctrine of the image as he expressed it in his De Trinitate. We must reject de Beaurecueil's thesis that Augustine's influence waned as Thomas grew older and fell increasingly under the spell of Aristotle and Dionysius. Sullivan more correctly perceives the relationship of Thomas to Augustine when he concludes: In the De Trinitate of Augustine, Thomas found the dialectical preview to a truly scientific treatment of the doctrine of the image of the Trinity. He read and re-read this great work and finally assimilated its contents into his original theological synthesis.2

However, he fails to notice the influence of Augustine on the final developments of Thomas' doctrine in the Summa, because he misses the significance of book 15 of De Trinitate and of Augustine's final emphasis on the analogy of word and love. In studying De veritate, question 10, we have seen how masterfully Thomas marshals the crucial passages from the De Trinitate to expose the real teaching of Augustine. We should not be surprised to see that 2

Sullivan, p. 272.

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in the Summa Thomas shows an even more acute insight into Augustine's method and doctrine in the De Trinitate. In the very phrase repraesentatio speciei, around which the Summa's analysis of the image of the Trinity turns, we see the teaching of Augustine. For the word "representation" conveys the reality of the image that serves to make something present again, the reality that Augustine took such pains to verify; but it also signifies the analogical function of the image as a thing that makes another thing present to the observer. In the Summa Thomas manifests the perfect unity between the ontological analysis of the image of the Trinity and the consideration of its analogical function, a unity that lies at the heart of Augustine's own investigation of the image. Thomas arrived at his fine comprehension of Augustine's De Trinitate through the careful study of the text. This in itself suggests that he had to explore Augustine's work on his own, with scant assistance from his predecessors. From the reading of comparable passages on the image of the Trinity in the works of Alexander of Hales, Albert, and Bonaventure, and in the Franciscan Summa fratris Alexandri, we find little to suggest that anyone prior to Thomas had really understood the movement and teaching of the De Trinitate. M. Schmaus bears out this appraisal in his remarks at the end of his study of Albert's long treatment of the image, pointing out that no one before Thomas appreciated and used Augustine's analogical examination of the processions of word and love.3 A comparative study of the use to which other theologians of the thirteenth century put Augustine's De Trinitate would probably confirm that Thomas towers above other exegetes of Augustine. Christians have always defended the dignity of man on the ground that God created man to His image and likeness. St. Leo the Great, preaching against the temptation to worship the sun and the moon, urged his congregation to remember that God had given man a special dignity above all other things in the world of space and time: "Awake, O man, and recognize the dignity of thy nature. Recollect thou wast made to the image of God, which although it was corrupted in Adam, was yet refashioned in Christ."4 The 3 Michael Schmaus, "Die trinitarische Gottesebenbildlichkeit nach dem Sentenzenkommentar Alberts des Grossen," in Virtus politico: Festgabe zum 75. Geburtstag von Alfons Hufnagel, edd. Joseph Moller and Helmut Kohlenberger (Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1974), pp. 295-296: "Aber erst Thomas von Aquin hat mit einer fur die ganze spatere Trinitatslehre folgenreichen Konsequenz und Systematik fur die Erklarung der innergottlichen produktiven Akte die von Augustinus grundgelegte, von Anselm von Canterbury weiter entfaltete metaphysisch-psychologische Konzeption geboten. Wie es dazu bei ihm kam, bedarf noch der theologiegeschichtlichen Aufklarung.'' 4 Leo, Serm. 27.6; NPNF 2nd ser., 12:141; PL 54:220b: "Expergiscere, o homo, et dignitatem tuae cognosce naturae. Recordare te factum ad imaginem Dei; quae, etsi in Adam corrupta, in Christo tamen est reformata."

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Romans used the word dignitas to refer to a position of authority and honor that the state conferred on a few individuals. Christians, in contrast, believed that God had bestowed a certain dignity on every man when he created Adam to His image, and that this dignity had not been utterly destroyed by Adam's fall. In his exposition of the Apostle's Creed, St. Thomas uses the modernsounding expression "human dignity" to signify the special position that God gave man at the moment of creation. Referring to the benefits the Christian receives by considering the first article of the Creed, that God is the creator of heaven and earth, he writes: Fifth, we are led from this to knowledge of human dignity. For God made all things for the sake of man, as it is said in Ps. 8:8, "Thou hast subjected all things under his feet." And among creatures after the angels man is more like to God, whence it is said in Gen. 1:26, "Let us make man to our image and likeness." ... For God made man that he might be over all things that are on earth and that he might be under God. Therefore, we ought to act as master over things, but we should be under, obey, and serve God. And by this means we will arrive at the fruition of God that He has granted us.5

As Thomas also explains in this passage, God has dignified man with His image, not with regard to his body, but with regard to his soul, which distinguishes man from other corporeal creatures. By virtue of his rational soul, man has been given authority over the beasts, but his dignity consists of more than his position of earthly dominion. As de Beaurecueil states in his concluding remarks on man's dignity, "the true dignity of man is situated still higher: it resides in his capacity for the infinite, which opens him to the riches of the supernatural life."6 By implanting His image in man's nature, God has given man a capacity for attaining eternal beatitude at His right hand, a dignity that far exceeds man's honor as master of the earth. Thomas shows that human dignity, bestowed on man with the image of God, is not primarily a matter of man's right to respect and service, but rather of God's right to man's obedience and work. If man honors and realizes his God-given dignity, he will eventually possess the fruits of his labor, the reward of an eternal life in which, through knowledge and love, he will directly enjoy the infinite Source of all that is true and good. In the course of a life devoted to theological reflection and teaching, St. Thomas Aquinas came to see that the dignity of man cannot be detached from his relation to God as the image of the Trinity. God has not made man 5

In Symb. art.1; Opuscula theologica, no. 886, Marietti, p. 198. De Beaurecueil [2]:95: At the natural level, man is called to know and serve God in the totality of creation. "Mais la vraie dignite de l'homme se situe encore plus haul: elle reside dans sa capacite d'infini, qui 1'ouvre aux richesses de la vie surnaturelle." 6

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a little god whom He has set loose to lord it over his own sandbox in splendid autonomy. As Thomas reconsidered the doctrine of the image of the Trinity, he penetrated deeper into the Christian truth that God has made man for Himself by giving man the capacity to enter into the eternal life of the divine Trinity. In his earliest teaching on the image of the Trinity, Aquinas still held by the traditional interpretation that man is an image of the Trinity according to the three faculties of the mind in which we find a representation of the three Persons like a reflection in a mirror. Through Thomas' study of Augustine's De Trinitate he came to realize that man reflects the divine Trinity not merely as a mirror reflects a thing set some distance from it, but as an actor who imitates the character he plays by entering into his character's life. Thus, according to Thomas, man is the image of the Trinity primarily because he can come to know and love God as God knows and loves Himself. In the saint with whom God shares His life, the Father in some sense begets His Word, and Father and Son breathe forth Their love as the Spirit. What Thomas taught about the image of the Trinity in its perfect state of fulfillment we find admirably and forcefully expressed in the following words of St. John of the Cross: The soul now loves God, not through itself, but through Himself; which is a wondrous brightness, since it loves through the Holy Spirit, even as the Father and the Son love One Another, as the Son Himself says, in Saint John: "May the love wherewith Thou hast loved Me be in them and I in them."7

St. Thomas held that man is the image of the Trinity by virtue of his intellectual nature, inasmuch as by his nature man is inclined to know and love God and is capable of accepting the invitation of grace that the triune God makes when He calls man through Christ to participate in the innermost life of the Trinity. Thus the image of the Trinity is not a perfection reserved for the elect alone, although only the blessed in heaven bear that image according to its perfection. Every man bears the image of the Trinity in his soul, and in Christ God invites man to bring this image to its perfection. Man belongs to the Trinity because of the image to which he has been created, and so man can find no perfect rest outside that perfect circle of divine light and love, the ever-living Trinity. At his birth it may appear that man is merely a mirror image of God that reflects the distant Trinity in the proportions of his mind. Nevertheless, through the continuing action of God on the soul every man reveals that his true personal dignity lies in his capacity to imitate God actively by participating in the personal fife of God, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. 7 John of the Cross, Living Flame of Love (Second Redaction), stanza 3, no. 82, in The Complete Works of John of the Cross, ed. and trans. E. Allison Peers, 2nd ed., vol. 3 (London: Burns Gates and Washbourne, 1953), p. 186.

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Dander, Franz, S. J. "Gottes Bild und Gleichnis in der Schopfung nach der Lehre des hi. Thomas v. Aquin." Zeitschrift fur katholische Theologie 53 (1929): 1-40, 203-246. De Grijs, F.J.A. Goddelijk mensontwerp: Een thematische studie over het Beeld Gods in de mem volgens het Scriptum van Thomas van Aquine. Diss. HilversumAntwerpen: Brand, 1967. Hoffman, Adolf. "Die Gottebenbildlichkeit des Menschen (Gn. 1,26) in der neueren Exegese und bei Thomas von Aquin." In Urbild undAbglanz: Beitrdge zu einer Synopse von Weltgestalt und Glaubenswirklichkeit — Festgabe fur Herbert Doms zum 80. Geburtstag, ed. Johannes Tenzler, pp. 345-358. Regensburg: Josef Habbel, 1972. Hubscher, I. De Imagine Dei in Homine Viatore secundum doctrinam S. Thomae Aquinatis. Louvain: F. Ceuterick, 1932. Rohner, Ansehn, O.P. "Thomas von Aquin oder Max Scheler: Das Ebenbild Gottes." Divus Thomas [Freiburg] 1 (1923): 329-355.

Index Locorum This index does not include references to authors whose works are cited only a few times in this study. References to these authors can be found in the General Index. Scripture Genesis 1.1: 160; 1.3:160; 1.26-27: 1, 11, 168, 198, 201, 202; 1.26: 1-3, 24, 50, 81, 167, 168, 171, 173-176, 198, 199, 244; 1.27: 168, 169, 203, 209 Psalms 4.7: 80, 171, 184; 8.8: 244; 38.7: 184; 72.20: 80 1 Corinthians 1.24: 22; 11.7: 176, 203; 13.12: 32 Ephesians 4.23-24: 204 Colossians 1.15: 45; 3.10: 204 Albert the Great Commentarii in I Sententiarum d.3, a.19, sol: 80-81; d.3, a.19, ad 7m& 8m: 55; d.3, a.22, sol.: 72, 141; d.3, a.22, ad 4m: 142; d.3, a.27: 73; d.3, a.27, ad 1m: 74-75; d.3, a.32, sol.: 68-69, 72, 141; d.3, a.34, sol.: 6162, lll;d.31, a.6, sol.: 45 Summa de creaturis p.2, tr.l, q.8, a.2, ad 4m: 65-66; p.2, tr.l, q.73, a.2, particula 1, qa.2, s.c.2: 72; p.2, tr.l, q.73, a.2, particula 2, quaesitum 2, adqa.l & 2: 72 Alexander of Hales Glossa in IV libros Sententiarum 1 d.3, no.34: 71, 72, 141; 1 d.3, no.49: 63 Quaestiones disputatae 'antequam esset frater' q.26, disp.l, memb.5, no.23: 72 [Alexander of Hales] Summa fratris Alexandri lib. 1, no. 50, sol: 72; lib.2, no.336, a.l, ad 1m: 45; lib.2, no.340, obj.3: 203

Augustine Confessiones: 117; 12.12: 160 De civitate Dei: 192; 11.9: 160 De diversis quaestionibus 83: 192; q.51: 179; q.74: 134 Defide et symbolo 9.19: 23 De Genesi ad litteram: 192 De Trinitate 1.1.1: 16; 1.5.8: 18; 2.3.5: 20, 21; lib.4: 28; 4.20.294.21.32: 21; 4.21.31: 21; lib.5: 22; 5.11.12: 22; 5.14.15: 23; lib.6: 22; 6.2.3: 24; 6.5.7: 23; 6.10.11-12: 24;

6.10.11: 24, 142; lib.7: 22, 25; 7.3.5: 24; 7.6.12: 3, 24, 176; lib.8: 17; 8.1.1-8.2.3: 25; 8.1.1: 17; 8.4.68.5.8: 24; 8.4.6: 17,26;8.10.14:24. lib.9:52, 129, 215; 9.1.1: 16-17,25; 9.2.2: 25; 9.3.3: 26; 9.4.4-9.5.8: 26; 9.10.15: 26; 9.12.17: 26;lib.lO: 27, 215;

10.2.4:

26;

10.11.18:

62;

10.12.19: 15; lib. 11: 17, 118, 134, 211;

11.1.1-11.2.5:

210;

11.4.7:

137;

108;

11.3.6:

11.5.9:

27;

11.6.12: 27; 11.9.16: 27; 11.11.18: 27; lib.12: 27; 12.1.1-12.4.4: 205; 12.1.1: 116; 12.2.2: 116, 117; 12.3.3: 117; 12.4.4: 133; 12.5.512.6.8: 209; 12.6.6-7: 169; 12.6.7: 201; 12.15.24: 108; lib.13: 27, 28;

13.20.25: 28. lib.14: 122, 124, 192, 215; 14.2.4: 137; 14.4.6: 124, 224; 14.6.814.7.10: 118, 125, 131; 14.6.9: 118, 121; 14.7.9-10: 28, 73-74; 14.7.9: 120, 130; 14.7.10: 29, 121, 125, 127, 129, 212; 14.8.11: 137, 220;

256

INDEX LOCORUM

14.10.13: 29, 137; 14.11.14: 117, 118; 14.12.15: 28, 140; 14.14.20: 223; 14.16.22: 204. lib.15: 23, 27, 35, 110, 157, 192, 196,208,213,229,242; 15.1.1:30; 15.2.2-3: 15; 15.2.2: 16; 15.3.4-5: 15, 31; 15.4.6-15.6.9: 31; 15.6.10: 31; 15.7.11-13: 31; 15.7.11: 64, 209; 15.7.13: 31; 15.8.14-15.9.16: 32; 15.10.17-15.16.26: 32; 15.10.18: 128; 15.10.19: 128; 15.17.27-15.27.48: 32; 15.17.2732; 15.17.28: 33; 15.19.37: 15.20.39: 33; 15.21.41: 212; 15.23.43: 212; 15.27.48: 33; 15.27.50: 34, 212 Epistulae 120: 15; 143: 15; 162: 15; 169: 15; 174: 15 Retractationes 2.15.51: 15 Bonaventure Commentaria in primum librum Sententiarum d.3, div. text: 55; d.3, p.2, a.l, q.2,resp.:54, 69, 73, 141, 142; d.3, p.2, a.l, q.2, ad 5m-. 141-142; d.3, p.2, a.2, q.l,resp.: 54, 112 Thomas Aquinas Collationes super credo in Deum a. 1, no.886: 244 De anima a. 13, ad llm-. 78 De ente et essentia: 49; c.2: 179, 181 Depotentiaq.3, a.16, resp.: 164; q.9, a.9: 153; q.9, a.9, resp.: 154, 184, 186, 187, 221; q.10, a.l, resp.: 78 De veritate q.l, a.l: 98; q.l, a.2, resp.: 98; q.2, a. 11: 136; q.4, a.l, ad 1m: 128; q.10: 98-102, 104, 110, 148, 153, 190, 191, 217; q.10, a.l: 104, 129, 132, 202; q.10, a.l, prol.: 102, 111; q.10, a. 1, obj.l: 106; q.10, a.l, obj.2: 106, 114; q.10, a.l, obj.3: 106; q.10, a.l, obj.5: 106; q.10, a. 1, obj.7: 114; q.10, a.l, obj.8: 114; q.10, a.l, obj.9: 114; q.10, a.l, s.c.l:

106, 112; q.10, a.l,s.c.3: 106; q.10, a.l, s.c.5: 106; q.10, a.l, s.c.6: 106; q.10, a.l, resp.: 106, 112-114, 205; q.10, a.l, ad 2m: 115; q.10, a.l, ad 6m: 113; q.10, a.l, ad 7m: 114; q.10, a.l, ad 8m: 114; q.10, a.l, ad 9m: 114. q.10, a.2: 104, 115, 128, 130-132; q.10, a.2, obj.l: 116, 118; q.10, a.2, obj.3: 117; q.10, a.2, s.c.2: 117; q.10, a.2, s.c.4: 117; q.10, a.2, resp.: 118-122, 126; q.10, a.2, ad 4m: 127; q.10, a.2, ad 5m: 121; q.10, a.3: 104, 105, 123, 132, 142, 210, 216; q.10, a.3, prol.: 122; q.10, a.3, obj.l: 124; q.10, a.3, obj.2: 124; q.10, a.3, obj.3: 125, 130; q.10, a.3, obj.4: 125, 126; q.10, a.3, obj.5: 124; q.10, a.3, s.c.l: 124, 131; q.10, a.3, s.c.2: 124; q.10, a.3, s.c.3: 124; q.10, a.3, resp.: 127131, 185, 186, 212; q.10, a.3, ad 1m: 142; q.10, a.3, ad s.c.2: 127; q.10, a.3, ad s.c.3: 143. q.10, a.4: 104; q.10, a.5: 104, 107; q.10, a.6: 104; q.10, a.6, resp.: 105109, 146; q.10, a.6, ad 3m: 109; q.10, a.6, ad 5m: 109; q.10, a.6, ad 6m: 109; q.10, a.6, ad 7m: 109; q.10, a.7: 102, 104, 146, 200, 216; q.10, a.7, obj.l: 133, 216; q.10, a.7, obj.2: 144, 145; q.10, a.7, obj.6: 143; q.10, a.7, obj.9: 144; q.10, a.7, s.c.l: 133; q.10, a.7, s.c.3: 133; q.10, a.7, resp.: 103, 134-141, 187, 218, 220; q.10, a.7, ad 1m: 134, 223; q.10, a.7, ad 2m: 144, 145; q.10, a.7, ad 6m-. 143; q.10, a.7, ad 7m: 149; q.10, a.7, ad 8m: 149; q.10, a.7, ad 9m: 144. q.10, a.8: 104, 147; q.10, a.8, resp.: 75, 77; q.10, a.9: 104; q.10, a. 10, s.c.2: 149; q.10, a. 11, ad 8m-. 146; q.10, a.ll,ad llm: 146; q.10, a.13: 1 4 7 ; q . l l : 101;q.l2: 101;q.l3: 101;

INDEX LOCORUM

q.14: 101; q.15: 101; q.16: 101; q.17: 101; q.18: 101; q.19: 101;

q.20: 101; q.20, prol.: 98; q.21, a.l: 98; q.23, a.7, ad 11m: 135; q.27, a.2, ad 3m: 149; q.27, a.6, ad 5m: 81; q.29, prol.: 98 Expositio et lectura super Epistolas Pauli Apostoli: In 1 Cor. 11, lect.2, no.604: 174; In 2 Cor. 4, lect.2, no. 126: 174 Scriptum super Sententiis: 1 Sent. d.l, q.2, a.l, obj.4: 84; d.l, q.2, a.l, ad 4m: 81, 85; d.3: 39, 40, 44, 49, 50, 87, 90, 91, 170; d.3, text: 51-5, 59, 60, 117; d.3, div. lae ptis text: 42; d.3, q.l, a.4: 86; d.3, q.2, a.l, sol.: 41, 42; d.3, q.2, a.l, ad 3m: 42; d.3, q.2, a.3, obj.2: 84; d.3, q.2, a. ad 2m: 81, 83; div. 2ae ptis text: 53, 55; d.3, q.3, a.l, prol.: 53-54; d.3, q.3, a.l, tit: 41, 54; d.3, q.3, a.l, obj.5: 47; d.3, q.3, a.l, sol.: 42, 43, 57; d.3, q.3, a. 1, ad 1m: 41, 57, 62; d.3, q.3, a.l, ad 2m: 57; d.3, q.3, a, ad 4m: 58; d.3, q.3, a.l, ad 5m: 47. d.3, q.4, prol.: 56, 60, 62; d.3, q. a.l:57, 59, 65;d.3, q.4, a.l,tit.:58 ; d.3, q.4, a.l, obj.l: 116; d.3, q.4, a. sol: 60, 61, 64, 70, 115; d.3, q., a.l,ad2m: 117; d.3, q.4, a.l, ad 3m: 60, 61; d.3, q.4, a.l, ad 7m: 61, 81; d.3, q.4, a.2, obj.l: 62; d.3, q.4, a.2, s.c.3: 65; d.3, q.4, a.2, sol.: 63, 64; d.3, q.4, a.2, ad 1m: 114; d.3, q.4 a.3: 66; d.3, q.4, a.3, sol.: 64, 65; d.3, q.4, a.3, ad 1m: 65; d.3, q.4, a. 55, 66; d.3, q.4, a.4, sol.: 55, 67, 68, 70,71, 103, 133, 137, 140; d.3, q. a.4, ad 2m: 54, 133; d.3, q.4, a.5: 5 73; d.3, q.4, a.5, sol.: 74-77; d.3, q a.5, ad 2m: 77; d.3, q.5: 111; d.3 q.5, sol.: 54, 112, 129; expos. 2ae ptis text: 80, 171, 184.

257

d.4, q.l, a. 1, ad 1m: 78; d.10, q.l, a. 1, s.c.l: 86, 87 ; d.lO, q.l, a.l, sol: 89; d.ll, q.l, a.l, s.c.2: 86; d.12, q.l, a.l, obj.3: 86; d.12, q.l, a.3, obj.3: 86; d.l3, q.l, a.l, s.c.2: 86, 87; d.13, q.l, a.2, sol.: 88; d.14, q.2, a.2, sol.: 89-90; d.14, q.3, sol.: 81; d.l5,q.4,a.l,sol.:89;d.l6,q.l,a.l, obj.2: 85; q.17, a.5, s.c.2: 85; d.27 q.2, sol: 76-77; d.28: 40, 50, 69, 91 170; d.28, text: 44; d.28, q.2, a.l, obj.l: 44, 45; d.28, q.2, a.l, obj.5: 47; d.28, q.2, a.l, sol.: 46, 48; d.2 q.2, a.l, ad 2m: 48, 82; d.28, q., a.l, ad 5m: 47; d.28, q.2, a.2: 49; d.28, q.2, a.2, sol.: 49, 202; d.4 q.l, a.l, sol.: 135. 2 Sent, d.16: 40, 43, 92, 170, 17 173, 190, 200; d.16, q.l, prol.: 50; d.16, q.l,a.l,sol.:49, 50;d.l6, q.l, a.l, ad 4m: 87; d.16, q.l, a.2, sol.: 179; d.16, q.l, a.3, ad 2m: 81; d.2 q.l, a.2: 82; d.26, q.l, a.2, ad 5m: 82;d.29, q.l,a.l:83;d.29, q.l,a.l, ad 5m: 83; d.37, q.l, a.2, ad 4m: 8. 3 Sent, d.l3, q.3, a.l, ad 2m: 81. On the Roman Lectura super primum Sententiarum in Lincoln College, Oxford MS. lat 95: 155 Sententia super Metaphysicam 1, lect.4, no.71: 165; 8, lect.4, no.!737:165 Sententia super Physicam 2, lect.ll, no.242: 165-166, 178; 2, lectll, no.246: 181 Summa contra gentiles 3.26: 165, 166; 4.26: 153, 154, 186 Summa theologiae la q.2, prol.: 53, 159, 163; q.3, a.l, obj.2: 203; q. a.5, resp.: 179; q.4, a.3: 182; q.4, a. obj.3: 181; q.4, a.3, ad 3m: 181; q. a.2, ad 1m: 163; q.5, a.4, resp.: 163; q.5, a.4, ad 1m: 78; q.12: 167; q.13: 167; q.26: 190; q.27, a.l: 88, 229;

258

INDEX LOCORUM

q.27, a.l, resp.: 228; q.27, a.2: 88; q.27, a.3, resp.: 229; q.27, a.4: 229230; q.29, prol.: 227; q.29, a.l, ad 4m: 189; q.32, a.l, obj.2: 227, 228; q.32, a.l, ad 2m: 227: q.32, a.3, resp.: 227; q.35, a.l, resp.: 173; q.35, a.l, ad 2m: 178; q.35, a.2, ad 3m: 176; q.37, a.l, resp.: 214; q.38, a.l, resp.: 231; q.41, a.l: 214; q.42, prol.: 232; q.43: 226, 232-234; q.43, a.3, resp.: 230, 231; q.43, a.5, ad 2m: 230, 231. q.44, prol.: 159; q.44, a.4: 167; q.44, a.4, resp.: 164; q.44, a.4, ad 2m: 178; q.45, prol.: 159; q.45, a.3, ad 1m: 198; q.45, a.6, obj.2: 194; q.45, a.6, resp.: 193, 194, 196; q.45, 2m: 194; q.45, a.7: 204, 205, 2 208; q.45, a.7, prol.: 193; q.45, a.7, resp.: 195, 196, 201, 206; q.45, a. ad 1m: 195; q.45, a.7, ad 3m: 194 q.56, a.3, resp.: 161; q.59, a.l, s.c.l: 161;q.61: 162;q.62: 162; q.63, a.9, ad 3m: 233; q.66, a.4, obj.l: 160. q.75, prol.: 102, 159, 189; q.77: 65; q.78, prol.: 102; q.79, a.l: 202; q.79, a.6, obj.l: 116; q.79, a.7: 210; q.79, a.7, ad 1m: 215; q.84, prol.: 1 189; q.88, a.3, obj.3: 161; q.88, a.3, ad 3m: 161; q.90, prol.: 165; q.90, a.2, s.c.l: 168; q.91, prol.: 171; q.91, a.4, prol.: 171; q.91, a.4, ad 2m: 198.

q.93: 156, 162, 166, 170, 182, 2, 226, 228, 230, 232-234; q.93, prol.: 159, 165, 167, 183-184, 201, 20 210-211; q.93, a.l: 172, 192; q.93, a.l, obj.2: 177; q.93, a.l, obj.3: 177; q.93, a.l, resp.: 173-176; q.93, a.l, ad 1m: 175; q.93, a.l, ad 2m: 175176; q.93, a.l, ad 3m: 177; q.93, a.l, ad 4m: 175; q.93, a.2: 172, 173,175, 177, 178, 192, 202, 204, 205, q.93, a.2, s.c.l: 181; q.93, a.2, resp.:

179, 203; q.93, a.2, ad 4m; q.93, a.3: 172, 192; q.93, a.3, resp.: 180, 183, 185; q.93, a.4: 171-172, 183, 188, 192, 200, 212, 214, 226 q.93, a.4, s.c.l: 184; q.93, a.4, resp.: 81, 180, 184-187, 189; q.93, a.4, 1m: 180; q.93, a.4, ad 2m: 187; q.93, a.4, ad 3m-. 187. q.93, a.5: 168, 182, 193, 209; a.5, prol.: 197; q.93, a.5, obj.3: 199; q.93, a.5, resp.: 7, 199, 200, 2 q.93, a.5, ad 3m: 199; q.93, a.5, ad 4m: 168-169, 197, 201, 202; q. a.6: 191, 192, 202, 212; q.93, a. obj.l: 203; q.93, a.6, obj.2: 2 q.93, a.6, obj.3: 203; q.93, a.6, obj.4: 203; q.93, a.6, s.c.l: 204; q.93, a., resp.: 180, 204-208; q.93, a.6 1m: 209; q.93, a.6, ad 2m: 209; q.93, a.6, ad 3m: 209; q.93, a.6, ad 4m 210. q.93, a.7: 191, 192, 210, 216; q.93, a.7, obj.3: 215; q.93, a.7, s.c.l: 211; q.93, a.7, resp.: 211-213, 231; q.93, a.7, ad 2m: 215; q.93, a.7, ad 3m: 215; q.93, a.7, ad 4m: 215; q.93, a.8: 191, 192; q.93, a.8, prol.: 216; q.93, a.8, obj.l: 217, 222; q.93, a.8, obj.2: 217; q.93, a.8, obj.3: 217, 224; q.93, a.8, obj.4: 217, 223; q.93, a.8, s.c.l: 217; q.93, a.8, resp.: 218-220, 224 q.93, a.8, ad 1m: 222; q.93, a.8, a 3m: 224, 233; q.93, a.8, ad 4m: 22 q.93, a.9: 192; q.93, a.9, prol.: 171; q.93, a.9, resp.: 183; q.93, a.9, ad 4m: 183; q. 109, a. 1, ad 3m: 233. Ia2ae prol.: 169-170; q.l, a.3, ad 1m: 163; q.62, a.3, resp.: 135; q.62, a.3, ad 1m: 135; q.62, a.3, ad 3m: 135. 2a2aeq.l41, a.6, ad 1m: 164; q.l80, a.3, resp.: 76; q.l80, a.6, ad 2m: 76. 3a q.l, prol.: 53; q.13, a.l, ad 3m: 135; q.45, a.4, resp.: q.63, a.3, s.c.l: 234

General Index

accident, common vs. proper 60, 63-64, 115 act, perfect and imperfect 51, 78, 127, 185, 239 actual imitation 55-56, 69-79, 91, 127, 140-141, 148, 185, 200, 239 actus imitandi 72-73 adaequatio 46-47 agent intellect 75, 108, 146 Albert the Great 10, 45, 55, 61-63, 65-66, 68-69, 72-75, 80-81, 111112, 141-142,234,243 Alcher of Clairvaux 108 Alexander iv, Pope 101 Alexander of Hales 10, 63, 71-72, 141, 243 Ambrose, Saint 18, 19 amor. See love analogy, as proportionality 12, 51, 135143, 145-148, 154, 177, 187-188, 200-201, 209, 220-222, 241; unius adalterum 136, 181, 221 Ancyra, Council of 44 angels 10, 43, 76, 96, 100-101, 111, 160-162, 172, 183, 185, 198, 233 Anselm of Canterbury 16, 243 Anselm of Laon, school of 80 Arianism 18-19, 21-22, 33, 35, 44, 66 Aristotle 59, 61, 74, 78, 105, 113, 150, 163-166, 179-181, 189, 242; influence on Aquinas: see Thomas; psychology 59, 61, 74, 98-102, 104, 106-110, 112-113, 118, 120-124, 131; theory of abstraction 104, 107109 Arius 18, 228

assimilaton to God 81-84, 89, 133, 135-136, 138-142, 147, 148, 164, 177-180, 182,230-231,241 Athanasius, Saint 168 Augustine 6, 7, 9, 80, 160, 173, 179, 181, 182, 219; and Arianism 18-19, 21-22, 33, 35; De Trinitate 3, 4, 13-35, 40, 52, 54, 55, 58, 62, 64, 66, 73-74, 79, 80, 86-87, 89-90, 98-100, 103, 106, 108, 110-112, 115-118, 120-134, 137, 140, 142, 143, 147150, 154, 157-158, 161, 169, 176, 191-193, 197-199, 201-202, 204, 205, 208-217, 220, 223-231, 234, 239-243, 245; influence on Aquinas: see Thomas; on image of the Trinity: see image of the Trinity; psychology 17, 73-74, 100, 104, 107-109, 116121, 137, 146-147, 203; use of philosophy 17, 22, 107-109 Avicenna66, 104, 118, 121, 125-126 Bardy, G. 19 Barnabas, Epistle of 198 Bazan, B. 95 beatitude 147, 162, 166, 167, 169-170, 186-187, 190, 223, 225, 233, 242, 244-245 Beaurecueil, M.-J. de 5-8, 40, 52, 59, 99, 104, 106, 112, 123, 139, 141, 150, 157, 165, 171-173, 181, 192, 193, 211, 221, 222, 237, 238, 242, 244

Boethius 180 Bonaventure 4, 10, 25, 54, 55, 69, 73, 101, 112, 141-142, 183,243

260

GENERAL INDEX

Bourassa, F. 23 Boyle, L. 155 Bruch, R. 10 Busa, R. 9, 76, 135 capax Dei, man as 169, 186, 189-190, 222, 224-225, 233, 237, 240, 24, 244-245 cause, efficient 163, 178, 182; exempla 172, 174-175, 178-180, 193, 19 196, 201-202, 221, 223, 233, 23 238-239; final 162-169, 172, 17 181-182; finis operisvs. finis operantis 164-168; formal 163-169, 175, 177-182, 189-190, 232, 238; univocal vs. non-univocal agent 178 Cavallera, F. 19 characteristics of image of God. See image of the Trinity, five characteristics Chenu, M.-D. 8, 104, 105, 112, 159 Christ. See Son of God Cicero 45, 117-118 Clement iv, Pope 156 Clement of Alexandria 3, 81, 168

Didymus the Blind 19 difference, constitutive 179. See also man, constitutive difference of Dionysius the Areopagite, pseudo- 6, 88-90, 106, 111-112, 194,242 distinction, as characteristic of image 43, 55-62, 91, 131, 142 Dondaine, A. 96 Dondaine, H.-F. 155 end (finis) as final cause: see cause, final; as terminus 163-170, 175-176, 178, 182 equality, as characteristic of image 26, 43, 55-56, 66-69, 91, 124, 141-145; in definition of image: see image, and equality Eunomius 33

faculties (potentiae), general vs. particular 114-115, 124, 132; interrelations 57-59, 61, 65-69, 74-75, 121, 12 naturales proprietates or vires 52, 59-61, 64, 215; related to essence of soul 60, 62-65, 112-115, 155; relat ed to objects of acts 66-79, 131, 13 cogitare, cogitatio. See thinking 137-139, 142-147; vis vs. potentia conformation (conformatio, conformi121-122. See also image of the Tritas) 12, 54, 69, 73, 91, 135-143, nity, level of faculties 146-148, 150, 154, 186-188, 200, faith 16-18, 21, 24, 31, 33, 42, 52-53, 209, 221-222, 224, 230, 241 86, 103, 147, 195, 199, 227 Constantinople I, Council of 19 consubstantiality, as characteristic of Father (in God) 154, 193, 207-208 image 26, 55-56, 62-64, 91, 136- figure (shape) 46-47, 82, 134, 174, 20 209 137, 142, 144, 241 finis. See cause, final; end contemplatio 76 creation, and image. See image of God, form. See cause, formal; species and creation of man; as procession free will 57, 169-170,234 from God 89-90, 159-160, 163, 19 Fulgentius of Ruspe 44 See also God, exitus and reditus of creatures; man, creation of; Trinity, Gardeil, A. 75 Geiger, L. 5, 158, 159, 166, 172, 182 causality of Persons Gilson, E. 104 Cunningham, F. 84, 233 Glorieux, P. 96 Danielou, J. 2 glory. See image of God, in glory Daniels, D. 14, 15 Gloss 80-81, 171, 184

GENERAL INDEX

Gnosticism 2 God: appropriation of attributes to Persons 42, 90, 194-195; divine knowledge and intellect 76, 194, 206-207, 214, 218, 221, 225, 227, 230, 237; divine will or love 89, 214, 221, 225, 230, 237; essential vs. personal attributes 22, 25, 31, 32, 42, 90, 194196; exitus and reditus of creatures 89-90, 159, 162-164; goodness of 163-164; man's natural knowledge of 42, 51, 147, 161, 233; memory of 144-146; object of mind's faculties 66-79, 102-103, 127, 132-133, 135, 138-148, 154, 155, 185, 187-188, 191, 200-201, 216-217, 219-225, 230-231, 233, 234, 237, 240-242, 245 Gonzalez de Cardedal, O. 5 grace, and image of God: see image of God, and grace; and indwelling of the Trinity 85, 87, 149, 230, 233, 234; as likeness of God 81-85, 149 Gregory the Great, Pope 106 Gregory of Nyssa 168 Grijs, F.J.A. de 4, 5 habitus 77, 119-122, 125-126 Hendrikx, E. 30 Hilary of Poitiers 44-45, 47-49, 142, 173, 177-179, 198 Hill, E. 14, 15, 17, 20, 21, 24, 30 Hislop, I. 4 Hodl, L. 9 Holy Spirit: as love 23, 25-27, 32-35, 89-90, 138, 154, 194-197, 207, 212, 218-219, 229-231, 237, 240-241, 245;filioque2l, 23, 33, 86, 90, 138, 153, 207, 218; Gift as proper name 22-23, 32; improperly called Image 44; procession of 18-23, 26-27, 3235, 85-87, 89-90, 128, 138, 147, 154, 195, 207, 212, 218, 229-231, 237, 240-241, 245

261

Image: as proper name of the Son 3,10, 24, 40, 44, 48-49, 85, 168, 173-175, 177-178 image: and equality 46-48, 87, 138,141, 174; and exemplar 45-49, 82, 138, 173-175, 178, 179, 196, 202, 241; and ground or ftmdament 45-49, 82; and likeness 41-42, 46, 134, 173174, 178-179, 182, 183; and species 44-50, 134, 173-175, 177-180, 190, 193, 203, 205-208, 211-213, 218, 225, 226, 232, 238, 241-243; as express likeness 134-135, 139, 218; as relation of imitation 45-46, 49, 69-70, 126-127, 173, 174, 199-201, 213, 239; definition of 41-51, 58, 69, 134, 172-174, 177-179, 183, 190, 203, 218, 238; etymology 45-46, 173; improper usage 48, 82, 175, 202 image of God: according to immanent acts in mind 172, 185-190, 200-201, 213-214, 226, 228; according to mind or intellectual nature or soul 40, 41, 51-52, 57, 80-81, 90-92, 102-103, 107, 114-115, 132, 149, 157, 164, 168-170, 178-191, 202209, 211, 214, 224-225, 232-233, 235, 237-239, 242, 244-245; ad imaginem interpreted 11, 115, 168169, 174-177, 202; and creation of man 87, 92, 164-170, 173, 175, 176, 178, 181-182, 189-190, 198, 202, 225, 232, 235, 238, 242; and grace 28, 51, 61, 71-73, 80-85, 147-149, 154, 169, 171, 184-188, 190, 214, 217, 224, 233, 234, 237, 242, 245; and non-rational parts of man 57, 102, 134, 137, 144, 203, 205, 209211; essence of God as exemplar 49, 172, 174-175, 177-178, 180-182, 196, 199, 202; essence of God as ground 49, 202; essence of God as image 44, 48, 175, 202; Gnostic

262

GENERAL INDEX

notions 2; "image and likeness" 81, 171, 183; "image of creation" 80-81, 184-185; "image of likeness" (imago similitudinis) 80-81, 184, 188; "image of re-creation" 72, 80-81, 184185, 234; in angels 10, 43, 57-58, 160-161, 172, 183, 185, 198; in free will 57, 169-170, 234; in glory 147150, 169-171, 184-188, 190, 214, 217, 223-225, 242, 245; in man and woman 10, 180, 203, 209; its subject 53-54, 103, 114-115, 132; Jewish notions 2, 198; levels of perfection (nature and grace) 73, 75, 81, 83-84, 87, 90-91, 149, 171, 183-190, 212, 214, 224-225, 233; patristic notions 2, 3, 30-31, 158, 168-170, 197-198, 201-202 (for individual positions of Fathers, see entries under names); permanence 51, 73, 78-81, 91-92, 124, 132, 147, 148, 183-184, 188190, 216, 233, 238-239, 242, 244; Son as exemplar 3, 168, 197-198, 201-202 image of the Image of God 3, 168 image of the Trinity: according to analogy or proportional likeness 12, 46-47, 51, 56-57, 64, 69, 79, 87, 91, 135-143, 146-148, 154, 187-188, 200-201, 209, 221-222, 235, 241, 243, 245; according to conformation 12, 69, 91, 135, 138-143, 146-148, 150, 154, 186-188, 200, 209, 221222, 230, 241, 245; according to different objects of knowledge 27-29, 66-79, 102-103, 132-147, 155, 185, 187,188,191,216-225,240; according to processions 4, 12, 66, 79, 87-91, 131-132, 147-150, 154, 188, 192, 195-196, 200-201, 206-208, 212-214, 217-219, 221-222, 225, 228-230, 233-234, 239-243, 245; actual level 4, 12, 28-29, 51, 61, 72-73, 78-79, 110-111, 126-132,

146-150, 186-191, 208, 210-216, 225, 234, 238-240, 245; Augustine's first triad (mens, notitia, amor) 2627, 52, 54-55, 86-87, 112, 126, 129-130, 145, 215; Augustine's second triad (memoria, intelligentia, voluntas) 27-33, 51-52, 54-56, 58-59, 61,64, 110-112, 115, 120, 122-132, 140, 142, 145, 147, 148, 154, 155, 157, 161, 208, 210, 213, 215-216, 239-240; five characteristics 26, 43, 55-79, 90-91, 124, 131, 136, 140148, 191, 200, 239-241 (see also actual imitation, consubstantiality, distinction, equality, order); habitual level 28, 72,112,126,129-131, 147, 186, 189, 210-212, 214-216, 234; identical with image of God 11, 190, 192-193, 196-202, 206-207, 214, 238; in family 201, 209; its imperfection 30-33, 53, 86, 174-177, 199; level of faculties 41, 43, 51-52, 5455,57-59,61,64,66,78-81,90-91, 110, 116, 122, 124, 126, 129-133, 136, 142, 145-148, 188, 208, 210212, 214-216, 239, 245; potential or rudimentary level 72, 124, 147, 149, 186-190, 212, 216 imagination 27, 203, 210, 211 imitago 46

imitation: as relation constituting image 45-46, 49, 69-70, 126-127, 173, 174, 184-186, 189, 199-201, 239; related to conformation 141, 200, 245; related to representation 70, 180, 199-201, 207, 245. See also actual imitation indwelling of the Trinity 10, 84-85, 89-91, 149, 226, 230-234, 242 intellect. See understanding intelligentia. See understanding intuition (intuitus) 74-78 Irenaeus, Saint 3, 168, 198

GENERAL INDEX

Javelet, R. 9, 46 Jerome, Saint 19 John Damascene 111, 169-170 John of La Rochelle 63 John of the Cross 245 John Paul n, Pope 1, 2 Jonas, H. 2 Justin Martyr 198 Kirchmeyer, J. 2, 3, 168, 197 knowledge (notitia) 26-27, 118-122, 219-222, 224-225, 230, 231; act of 26,74,119,121,137-139,146,214; habitual 74-75, 118-122, 128-130, 132, 213; related to memory 74-75, 118-122, 130, 144-146; related to understanding (intelligentia) 27, 7475, 118-121, 129-130 knowledge (scientia) 27, 120-122, 133 Kiinzle, P. 63, 65 Ladner, G. 3, 168 Lafont, G. 4, 158, 159, 161, 167, 172, 176, 190, 199-200, 206-207, 222, 228, 231, 234 Lebreton, J. 198 Leo the Great, Pope 243 likeness (similitudo):as genus of image 41-42, 46, 134, 173-174, 178-179, 183; "image and likeness": see image of God, "image and likeness"; of analogy (secundum analogiam) 51, 135-143, 145-148, 154, 181, 187188, 200-201, 220-222, 241; of conformation (secundum conformationem) 135-143, 146-148, 154, 187-188, 220-222, 241; of the Trinity 51, 134, 139-140, 184, 206-207, 218, 221. See also image of the Trinity; vestige Lonergan, B. 75, 78 Lottin, O. 62-63 love, actual and habitual 120-122, 126130, 186, 214, 219, 224-225, 230-

263

231; as analogy for Trinity 24-27; as related to will 27, 67, 128-129, 207, 229, 240; procession in man 32-35, 128, 132, 137, 148, 154, 195-196, 207-208, 213, 219, 222, 227-229, 231, 240-242. See also God, divine will or love; Holy Spirit, as love ma'aseh bereshit 2 Macedonianism 18-19 man, constitutive difference of 114, 179181, 202, 204-205; creation of 1, 2, 40, 50,160,162,164-170,176,178, 181-182, 232-233, 235, 238, 239, 244; dignity of 1, 107, 237, 243-245; end of 2, 162-170, 182, 190, 225, 232 Mandonnet, P. 80, 96 Maritain, J. 237 Marrou, H.-I. 25 Matthijs, M. 4 McGlynn, J.V. 107-108 memory, intellectual 59-61, 115-122, 129, 131-132, 144-146, 154, 208, 213; related to knowledge and understanding 28-29, 59-61, 74-75, 118126, 128, 130-132, 146; sensible 115-118 mens. See mind Merki, H. 3, 168 mind (mens) 26-29, 41, 52, 54, 57, 102, 106-107, 111-115, 117, 120122, 129-130, 132, 154, 155, 202; and intellect 111 -115, 132; as related to soul 111-115, 209; self-presence of 27, 28, 66-67, 70-78, 120, 127, 220-221 missions, divine 20, 21, 85, 89-90, 149, 230-233 Mondin, B. 5 Mongillo, D. 4, 170, 172 notitia. See knowledge (notitia)

264

GENERAL INDEX

order, as characteristic of image 55-56, 64-66, 90-91, 144-145 Origen 168, 197 Palmieri, A. 19 Paluscsak, P. 4 participation of man in God 4, 80, 145-146, 221-223, 225, 230-231, 233, 234, 237, 241, 245 Paul, Saint 22, 32, 45, 174, 176, 203, 204 Pelikan, J. 5, 16, 169, 192 Persons, divine. See Trinity Peter Lombard 6, 9, 25, 39-40, 44, 48, 51-55, 57, 59-62, 80, 86, 91, 111, 117, 170, 192,215, 216 Philo 168, 198 Plato 104, 108-109 Plotinus 107-108 Pneumatomachi 19 potentiae. See faculties potential whole. See totum potentiate Principe, W. 27, 79, 155 processions, divine: see Trinity; in man: see image of the Trinity, according to processions; love; word; temporal: see missions properties, natural (of mind). See faculties, naturales proprietates proportionality. See analogy; image of the Trinity, according to analogy psychological analogy. See Trinity, psychological analogy for quality, as ground of image 46-47 recollection 27, 137 representation of God 55, 70-71, 136, 137, 180, 193, 195-196, 201, 205-209, 211-213, 218, 221-222, 225, 226, 241-243, repraesentatio speciei 134, 180, 205-208, 211-213, 218, 219, 225, 226, 241-243

134, 199219, 245; 193, 222,

Sabellius 18, 228 Schindler, A. 13, 15, 16, 18, 30 Schmaus, M. 10, 14, 20, 23, 243 Schneider, W. 105 Scholem, G. 2 Seneca 45 sensation 27, 107-108, 118, 134, 137139, 144, 203, 210 shape. See figure similitude. See likeness Solignac, A. 3, 80 Son of God: as Image: see Image, as proper name of Son; as Word: see Word; generation or procession of nature 88, 178, 229; in human nature 20, 162, 168, 245 Sopater 2 soul: as end of production of man 164166, 168-169, 178, 182, 189, 191, 225, 235, 238; object of mind's faculties 66-78, 102-103, 127, 133, 135, 137-143, 146-147, 185, 187-188, 217, 220-221, 240 species: as form or nature 45-50, 134, 165, 173-175, 177-180, 190, 193, 203, 205-208, 211-213, 218, 219, 222, 225, 226, 232, 238, 241-243; Hilary's species indifferens 44-45, 47-49, 177-179; intelligible 59-61, 120-122, 124-126 Spiazzi, R. 96 Squire, A. 4, 146 Sullivan, J. 3, 7, 34, 99-100, 140, 145146, 150, 157, 192, 198, 242 Summa fratris Alexandri 10, 45, 72, 203, 243 terminus. See end Tertullian 3, 198 Theophilus of Antioch 198 thinking (cogitatio) 28-29, 34, 74-77, 118, 120-121, 125-132, 212-213, 215,231 Thomas Aquinas: at papal court 153,

GENERAL INDEX

156; at Paris 39, 95-97, 100-101, 155, 156; at Rome 153, 155-156, 240; composition of Summa theologiae 154-156; debt to Augustine 4, 6, 7, 13, 20, 25, 27, 28, 32, 34-35, 54-55, 58, 86-87, 98-100, 102-111, 115-134, 137, 140, 146-150, 154, 157-158, 169, 173, 176, 181, 182, 190-193, 196, 198, 199, 201-202, 204, 205, 208-217, 219, 223, 225231, 234, 239-243, 245; disputations 9, 95-98, 101-102, 105-106, 148, 153-156, 240; influence of Aristotle on 6, 7, 13, 59, 61, 78, 98-102, 104-107, 109, 113, 118-119, 121124, 131, 150, 157, 163-166, 179181, 243; lectures on Sentences 3940, 155-156, 240; methods of studying his works 4-9, 98-100, 104-106, 158-160, 192, 238; system of Summa theologiae 153, 156-163, 166-172, 182, 188-191, 197, 226, 233-235, 238; theologian, not philosopher 98-102, 104, 109-110, 155156, 159-160, 182; use of philosophy 45, 59-60, 62-63, 78, 99-101, 104-109, 113, 136-139, 145-146, 150, 163-166, 179, 181 totum potentiate 63, 114-115

Trape, A. 20, 34, 229-230 Tremblay, R. 25 Trevet, Nicholas 96 Trinity, analogies for 16, 24, 25, 30-31, 51,88-89, 142, 157, 193,228,239, 241; as object of faith 16-17, 21, 31, 33, 42, 52-53, 86, 103, 147, 195, 199, 226; causality of Persons in creation 2, 3, 193-196, 198; consubstantiality 43, 62, 64, 136-137, 219, 241; distinction of Persons 18, 2223, 42, 43, 57-58, 131, 173, 199200, 212, 218; equality of Persons 20, 22, 43, 66, 68, 124; indwelling of. See indwelling of the Trinity;

265

man's knowledge of 17, 30-31, 5152, 86, 103, 147, 195, 199, 226-229; notional acts 186, 214, 218-219, 225, 245; order of Persons 64-66; processions 11-12, 20-21, 26-27, 30-35,66,79,87-90, 131-132, 147, 148, 150, 186, 188, 194-196, 199201, 206-207, 212-214, 218-219, 222-223, 225, 228-234, 237, 240241, 245; proper attributes 42, 44, 194-195, 227; psychological analogy for 26-34, 51, 79, 88-90, 147, 148, 154, 157, 172, 196, 197, 206, 226230, 234, 242; relations 22-23, 194, 200, 209, 214, 232; unity of operation 18, 20, 21, 67, 193-194 triplex imago 80-81, 171, 184. See also image of God, "image of creation," "image of likeness," "image of recreation" understanding (intelligentia) 27; act of 28, 32, 60, 65-67, 74-78, 118-121, 125-132, 136, 138-139, 145-146, 148, 154, 186, 213, 229, 230, 239240; as faculty of intellect 59, 61, 111-115, 118-122, 124-127, 130132, 138-139, 145-146, 154, 161, 195-196, 207, 227, 230, 231; habitual 118-122, 125-130, 132 Urban iv, Pope 153, 197 vestige, concept of 41-43, 195, 205-206; of the Trinity (or God) 24, 42, 52, 84-85, 134, 140-141, 180, 184, 193, 195-196, 198, 201, 203-209 vires (natural properties of mind). See faculties, naturales proprietates Virgil 117 vis. See faculties, vis vs. potentia voluntas. See will

Weisheipl, J.A. 39, 96-97, 153-156 will (voluntas) 26, 27, 34, 60-61, 65,

266

GENERAL INDEX

67, 74, 97-98, 114-115, 124, 127132, 137, 154, 161, 163, 195-196, 207, 213, 229-231, 240 William of Alton 97 William of Auvergne 108 William of Moerbeke 156 Wilson, R, McL. 198 wisdom (sapientia) 27-28, 89-90, 133, 194, 198, 231

Word (in God) 32, 34, 87-90, 127-128, 138, 147, 154, 194-196, 207, 212, 214, 218-219, 222-223, 229-231, 237, 240-241, 245 word, as inner word in man 26-27, 28-29, 32, 34, 76-77, 87-90, 127129, 131-132, 137, 147, 148, 154, 195-196, 207-208, 212-213, 219, 221-223, 227-229, 231, 239-242

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