Theories of Democratic Network Governance (Language and Globalization)

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Theories of Democratic Network Governance Edited by

Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing

Theories of Democratic Network Governance

Also by Eva Sørensen POLITICIANS AND NETWORK DEMOCRACY (in Danish) ROLES IN TRANSITION (co-author with Birgit Jæger) (in Danish) NETWORK GOVERNANCE: From Government to Governance (co-author with Jacob Torfing) (in Danish)

Also by Jacob Torfing DISCOURSE THEORY IN EUROPEAN POLITICS: Identity, Policy and Governance (co-editor with David Howarth) NEW THEORIES OF DISCOURSE POLITICS, REGULATION AND THE MODERN WELFARE STATE

Theories of Democratic Network Governance Edited by

Eva Sørensen Professor of Public Administration Roskilde University, Denmark

and Jacob Torfing Professor of Politics Roskilde University, Denmark

Editorial matter, selection, Introduction and concluding chapter © Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing 2007 All remaining chapters © respective authors 2007 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published in 2007 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–1–4039–9528–5 hardback ISBN-10: 1–4039–9528–1 hardback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Theories of democratic network governance / edited by Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1–4039–9528–1 (cloth) 1. Political planning. 2. Policy sciences. 3. Public – private sector cooperation. 4. Public administration. I. Sørensen, Eva, 1957– II. Torfing, Jacob. JF1525.P6T43 2007 351.01—dc22 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 09 08 07 Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham and Eastbourne

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Contents List of Tables, Figures and Boxes

xi

Foreword

xii

Notes on Contributors

xiii

Introduction: Governance Network Research: Towards a Second Generation Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing The rise of governance network research The aims of this book Defining governance networks Merits and problems of network governance First and second generation research Plan of the book

Part I

1 3 7 8 11 14 20

Governance Network Dynamics

1 Theoretical Approaches to Governance Network Dynamics Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing

25

Introduction Historical institutionalism Rational choice institutionalism Social constructivist (or normative) institutionalism Poststructuralist institutionalism Similarities and differences The structure of Part I

25 31 33 35 38 41 42

2 Mechanisms of Governance Network Formation – a Contextual Rational Choice Perspective Nils Hertting

43

Introduction Interpretation, rational choice and mechanisms Contextual mechanism: perceived interdependencies

v

43 45 47

vi Contents

Actor calculation mechanism: preference for informal networks The game mechanism: the problem of continuous cooperation Collective actors and vertical games Conclusion 3 Virtuous and Viscous Circles in Democratic Network Governance B. Guy Peters Institutionalization and deinstitutionalization Factors associated with virtuous and viscous spirals Political factors Functional factors Social pressures Other factors in explaining success Characteristics of the members Operating environment Tasks Summary and conclusions 4 Decentred Theory, Change and Network Governance Mark Bevir and R. A. W. Rhodes Introduction Positivist approaches to network governance Decentring network governance The analysis of change in networks Managing change in networks Conclusions

Part II 5

50 51 56 57 61 62 65 66 69 70 71 71 73 74 74 77 77 78 80 81 83 87

Governance Network Failure

Theoretical Approaches to Governance Network Failure Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing Interdependency theory Governability theory Integration theory Governmentality theory

95 98 102 104 106

Contents vii

6

Similarities and differences The structure of Part II

108 110

Closure and Governance Linze Schaap

111

Introduction Governance networks: open, closed, or both? A systems theoretical contribution? Governance networks and types of social systems Two types of closure Three explanations for closure The relations between explanations for closure Governing closed networks? Governing veto power? Governing closed frames of reference? Governing closed policy communication systems? Some concluding remarks

111 112 113 117 118 121 123 124 125 128 129 131

7 Consensus and Conflict in Policy Networks: Too Much or Too Little? Joop F. M. Koppenjan Introduction Consensus and conflict: an exploration of two ambivalent concepts The first face of policy networks: a surplus of consensus The second face of policy networks: insufficient consensus The true face of policy networks and its implications for network governance Conclusion: managing the consensus–conflict dimension in network-settings 8

133 133 135 138 143 147 151

Network Governance: Effective and Legitimate? Tanja A. Börzel and Diana Panke

153

Introduction Networks as governance The demand for effectiveness and legitimacy Effectiveness and legitimacy: a trade-off? Conclusion

153 154 156 163 165

viii Contents

Part III 9

Metagovernance

Theoretical Approaches to Metagovernance Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing

169

Introduction Interdependency theory Governability theory Integration theory Governmentality theory Similarities and differences between the theories Where to go from here?

169 170 172 175 178 180 181

10 Governing the Formation and Mobilization of Governance Networks Peter Triantafillou Introduction Governmentality and advanced liberal government Mobilizing agency Governing through the formation of autonomy and interdependencies Governing the performance of networks Conclusion 11

Meta-governance as Network Management Erik-Hans Klijn and Jurian Edelenbos Introduction: a network management perspective on meta-governance Process design and management: setting up and facilitating network interactions Institutional design: changing the network Good network management: skills and competencies Research challenges

183 183 185 187 190 194 196 199

199 201 206 211 213

12 Governing Outputs and Outcomes of Governance Networks Laurence J. O’Toole, Jr

215

Framing the subject Two notions of meta-governance Meta-governance in action

215 218 221

Contents ix

Possibilities for public authorities to shape network outputs and outcomes Meta-governance via policy formulation Assisting in the play of the game Linking and segmenting games Changing the game: active meta-governance by public authorities Conclusion

Part IV

226 228

Democratic Network Governance

13 Theoretical Approaches to Democratic Network Governance Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing

14

223 223 224 225

233

Introduction Governance networks and liberal democracy Governance networks and postliberal democracy Similarities and differences between the theories Where to go from here?

233 234 236 245 246

Governance Networks and Participation Allan Dreyer Hansen

247

The common good Learning democracy Equality Conclusion

249 251 254 258

15 Networks and Democratic Ideals: Equality, Freedom, and Communication John S. Dryzek Applying the standard democratic principles to networks Beyond lingering statism in democratic theory Networks and the communicative aspect of democratic theory Who communicates Beyond models of democracy The contribution of governance networks to democracy Conclusion

262

263 264 266 268 269 271 273

x

Contents

16 Democratic Accountability and Network Governance – Problems and Potentials Anders Esmark Democratic network governance? Accountability as a democratic norm Accountability and inclusion First challenge: finding the holders and holdees Accountability and publicity Second challenge: sufficient publicity Accountability and responsiveness Third challenge: adequate responsiveness Conclusion The Second Generation of Governance Network Theory and Beyond Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing

274 274 276 278 282 284 287 290 293 295

297

Governance networks are here to stay A multi-theoretical approach to network governance Contributions to our understanding of governance networks Where next?

297 299 303 310

Bibliography

316

Index

343

List of Tables, Figures and Boxes

Tables I.1 Overview of four different governance network theories 1.1 Overview of four different approaches to institutional analysis 7.1 Implications of the level of consensus and conflict within networks 9.1 Differences between the four governance network theories 13.1 Four theoretical approaches to postliberal democracy

17 30 151 181 236

Figures 2.1 6.1 6.2 7.1

Perceptions, calculations and games in governance network formation Types of closure Relationships between clarifications for closure Policy games and arenas that cut across various policy networks

57 120 124 148

Boxes 4.1 4.2

Ten lessons on how to manage your network Local practical solutions

xi

84 84

Foreword This volume is a part of a small series of books that aims to analyse how governance networks contribute to the governing of our increasingly complex and fragmented societies. The book series consists of three books: Theories of Democratic Network Governance edited by Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing, Methods in Democratic Network Governance edited by Peter Bogason and Mette Zølner, and Democratic Network Governance in Europe edited by Martin Markussen and Jacob Torfing. The three books are self-contained volumes that can be read independently, but they are all part of the same endeavour to develop a second generation of governance network research that focusses on new and important questions about the dynamics of governance networks, the conditions for their success and failure, the attempt to metagovern governance networks and their democratic problems and potentials. The contributing authors are either members of the Centre for Democratic Network Governance that was established at Roskilde University in 2003, or have been associated with the Centre as guests or visiting research fellows. Anonymous reviewers have provided valuable comments to earlier versions of the chapters. Our student assistants have collected data and gathered material for the books, and Andrew Crabtree and Jon Jay Neufeld have helped to improve the language. We thank them for their excellent work. Jacob Torfing Series Editor Roskilde

xii

Notes on Contributors Mark Bevir, Professor, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, USA. Tanja A. Börzel, Chair of European Integration, Otto-Suhr-Institute for Political Science, Centre for European Integration, Free University of Berlin, Germany. Allan Dreyer Hansen, Associate Professor, Department of Social Science, Roskilde University, Denmark. John S. Dryzek, Professor of Social and Political Theory, Australian National University, Australia. Jurian Edelenbos, Research Fellow, Department of Public Administration, Erasmus University of Rotterdam, The Netherlands. Anders Esmark, Associate Professor, Department of Social Sciences, Roskilde University, Denmark. Nils Hertting, PhD in political science and Research Fellow at the Institute for Housing and Urban Research, University of Uppsala, Sweden. Erik-Hans Klijn, Associate Professor, Department of Public Administration, Erasmus University of Rotterdam, The Netherlands. Joop F. M. Koppenjan, Associate Professor, The Faculty of Technology, Policy and Management, The Delft University of Technology, The Netherlands. Laurence J. O’Toole, Jr, Professor of Public Administration, Department of Public Administration & International Affairs, The University of Georgia, Athens, USA. Diana Panke, PhD Student, Otto-Suhr-Institute for Political Science, Centre for European Integration, Free University of Berlin, Germany. B. Guy Peters, Maurice Falk Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, USA. R. A. W. Rhodes, Professor, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia. xiii

xiv Notes on Contributors

Linze Schaap, Leader of Centre for Local Democracy, The Faculty of Social Science, Erasmus University, The Netherlands. Eva Sørensen, Professor of Public Administration, Department of Social Science, Roskilde University, Denmark. Jacob Torfing, Professor of Politics, Director of Centre for Democratic Network Governance, Department of Social Science, Roskilde University, Denmark. Peter Triantafillou, Assistant Professor, Department of Social Science, Roskilde University, Denmark.

Introduction Governance Network Research: Towards a Second Generation Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing

The structures and processes of public policy-making and societal governance are rapidly changing. The many reports about the failure of national and local governments to solve concrete policy problems and exploit new opportunities through hierarchical command and control have triggered an increasing use of market regulation in the provision of public goods and services. Hence, privatization of public enterprises, construction of quasi-markets, contracting out of public services, competitive deregulation and commercialization of the remaining public sector in accordance with the principles of the New Public Management doctrine have been in fashion since the early 1980s. The limits to the neo-liberal quest for ‘less state, more market’ not only include the standard problems of imperfect competition, unstable and insufficient market supply, unchecked externalities and growing inequality. The marketization strategy also fails to reduce the need for state regulation which seems to grow rather than diminish in the face of increased marketization. Last but not least, it fails to facilitate collectively oriented and pro-active governance on the basis of joint objectives and mutual trust. Despite of the many problems of the neo-liberal marketization strategy, political decision makers around the world continue to worship the market forces, mainly out of an ideological concern for the facilitation of free choice and the promotion of incentive-driven individual action. Whereas the critics of market regulation call for a return to state steering, the true believers in competitive market regulation claim that only more market will solve the problems since only a perfect market can produce perfect regulation ( Jessop, 2000: 224 ff.). 1

2


Now, in the last decade, the heated ideological debate about whether to base societal governance on either state or marked has been challenged by new developments in societal governance. Hence, in order to compensate the limits and failures of both state regulation and market regulation new forms of negotiated governance through the formation of public–private partnerships, strategic alliances, dialogue groups, consultative committees and inter-organizational networks have mushroomed. The empirical examples are numerous, so let us just mention a few to get an impression of what we are talking about: The construction of a huge, EU-funded shopping centre in major city carried the promise of new jobs in construction and retail. In order to ensure that as many of the unemployed people from the local area would get a job a large network of public agencies, private business firms, and voluntary organizations was formed. The actors in the network formulated a joint plan for their efforts to train and recruit local, unemployed people to the large construction firms and the many new stores and shops. A large national bridge-building project stirred up a lot of public controversy about the environmental problems caused by the increasing amount of heavy traffic, the destruction of a coastal habitat, and the physical obstacles to the free water flow at sea. In order to find a sustainable solution to the environmental problems the national government was forced to negotiate with a large network of EU-agencies, formal groups of environment experts, environmental movements, interest organizations, local governments, etc. Public hearings, joint fact finding, and on-going negotiations resulted in substantial concessions that in many ways changed the original project. The Employment Guidelines formulated by the European Union stipulate the over-all policy objectives on the basis of which the member states draft their own National Action Plans and monitor the results of their implementation of national initiatives in the field of active employment policy. The Employment Guidelines are a result of political negotiations which not only involve the European Commission, several General Directories, and the European Council, but also representatives from the member states, national and transnational movements and interest organizations, and various regional development associations.

Introduction 3

The empirical examples demonstrate the need to abandon the false choice between state and market governance and to study the role, function and impact of different kinds of governance networks. In particular it is clear that policy making and public governance is no longer congruent with the formal political institutions in terms of parliament and public administration. The formulation and implementation of public policy increasingly take place in and through interactive forms of governance involving a plurality of public, semi-public and private actors. This does not mean that central and local governments are ‘hollowed out’ since many of the old state powers are still in place and new capacities are developed (Hirst 1994; Pierre & Peters 2000). The state still plays a key role in local, national and transnational policy processes, but the state is to an increasing extent ‘de-governmentalized’ as it no longer monopolizes the governing of the general well-being of the population in the way that it used to (Rose 1999). As such, the idea of the sovereign state governing society top-down through comprehensive planning, programmed action and detailed regulations is losing its grip, and is being replaced by new ideas about a pluricentric governance based on interdependence, negotiation, and trust.

The rise of governance network research The study of governance networks is a novel research field that is founded on the ‘discovery’ of non-hierarchical forms of governance based on negotiated interaction between a plurality of public, semi-public and private actors. Whereas interorganizational relations already became a central research topic in the beginning of the 1970s (Evan 1976; Heclo 1978), the role of horizontal networks of organized interests in the production of public policy and governance only came to the fore in the beginning of the 1990s. The edited volumes of Marin and Mayntz (1991) and Kooiman (1993) played a crucial role in the promotion of governance network research. These widely read books were soon followed up by the equally influential works by Scharpf (1994), March & Olsen (1995), Rhodes (1997a) and Kickert et al. (1997). More recently, edited volumes by Heffen et al. (2000), Pierre & Peters (2000), Bang (2003) and Hajer & Wagenaar (2003) have further consolidated the field of governance network research, which now constitutes an important area of research within Public Administration. In a nutshell, the argument prompting the rise of governance network research is that policy, defined as the attempt to achieve a desired outcome, is a result of governing processes that are no longer fully controlled by the

4


government, but subject to negotiations between a wide range of public, semi-public and private actors, whose interactions give rise to a relatively stable pattern of policy making that constitutes a specific form of regulation, or mode of coordination (Mayntz 1993a, b). It is this pluricentric mode of coordination that in the literature is dubbed governance networks. The construction of, or reliance upon, governance networks is by no means a new phenomenon. In many countries and policy areas there is a long tradition for corporatist involvement of the social partners in the formulation and implementation of policy, especially at the level of national policy making and at the state level in federal systems. There are numerous examples of public policy and governance being based on political dialogue between public authorities and functionally defined groups and organizations rooted either in the capitalist market economy or civil society. However, the new thing is that political theorists and central decision makers to an increasing extent tend to view governance networks as both an effective and legitimate mechanism of governance. The inclusion of relevant and affected groups and organizations in governance networks help to overcome problems in terms of societal fragmentation and resistance to policy change, and thus tends to make the governing processes more effective (Mayntz 1993a). At the same time, the participation of a plurality of stakeholders in the decisionmaking process tends to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the public policy and governance (Scharpf 1997). These practical and scientifically justified insights are reflected in and underlie a large number of government reports that recommend the use of governance networks at the local, national, and even the transnational level (EU 2001a, b). The increasing prominence of governance network research is rooted in central insights developed in organization theory and political theory (Klijn 1997). The conception of organizations as open systems adapting to changes in the environment (Mintzberg 1979), and the recognition that this environment consists of other organizations paved the way for a new focus on the interorganizational exchange of information and resources that takes place in and through relatively stable forms of interorganizational negotiation (Benson 1978; Aldrich 1979). Likewise, the recognition of the limits of the corporatist and neocorporatist image of an ‘iron triangle’ between the state, the trade unions and the employers organizations spurred the attempt of political theorists to distinguish between different kinds of policy networks, according to their degree of integration, stability and exclusiveness (Heclo 1978; March & Rhodes 1992; Rhodes 1997a). However, if both organizational studies and political theory gradually arrived at some protean notion of governance networks, the real

Introduction 5

break-through came in the field of policy analysis. Decision-making theorists pointed out the limits of the rational actor model in the face of the complex streams, processes and interactions found with the increasingly fragmented polity (Cohen et al. 1972) and implementation theorists demonstrated the failure of central planning and programming in the face of the resistance of street level bureaucrats, user groups and interest organizations (Pressman & Wildawsky 1973; Lipsky 1980). The inescapable conclusion was that the formation and implementation of policy become more efficient if the key actors are somehow included in the policy process (Sabatier 1986; Bogason 1991; Mayntz 1993b). The study of inclusive, participatory and interactive policy making in and through various forms of governance networks was facilitated, and further stimulated, by the adoption of new methods of investigation in policy analysis that recommended a ‘backward mapping’ of the political actors that contributed to the production of a certain policy output (Hjern & Hull, 1984). By asking the question of who were involved in the decision-making process that produced this particular outcome, one is bound to identify a network of social and political actors. The recent academic focus on governance networks has an empirical background in the widespread recognition of the increasingly fragmented, complex and dynamic character of society (Kooiman 1993; Jessop 2002; Klijn & Koppenjan 2004). Fragmentation increases as a result of the functional differentiation of society into relative autonomous subsystems and the proliferation of relatively independent public and private organizations. At the same time, the break-up of the sedimented forms of political alignment and identification spurs the multiplication of political actors and identities. Complexity increases as a result of the growth and interweaving of ‘wicked problems’ characterized by blurred and contextual understandings of the nature of the problem, the effects of various solutions and the potential conflicts between the stakeholders. It is further augmented by the concurrence of the growing demand for knowledge-based decision making and the advent of new forms of risk and uncertainty. Finally, new societal dynamics are created partly by the multiplication and interconnection of spatial and temporal horizons of action, and partly by the blurring and contestation of the boundaries between institutions, sectors and regulatory scales. This leads to a contingent articulation and interaction of different rationalities, procedures and strategies for public policy making and governance, which in turn give rise to new and unpredictable developments. The central decision makers in public and private organizations at different regulatory scales tend to see the new forms of interactive network governance as the

6


most suitable answer to the challenge posed by increasing societal fragmentation, complexity and dynamism. Leading politicians and entrepreneurial administrators have taken network governance to their hearts. Institutionalized contacts and negotiations with relevant and affect actors are frequent and the formation of different kinds of boards, committees, partnerships and dialogue groups where stakeholders are invited to contribute to public policy and governance is a standard procedure. The increasing reliance on governance networks is a part of a new governmentality. Hence, the key ambition of what is referred to as ‘advanced liberal government’ is to ‘govern at a distance’ by involving a plethora of ‘intermediary groups’ (citizen groups, professionals, voluntary organizations, social partners and private firms) in the governing of society through the construction of self-regulating networks of responsible actors (Rose & Miller 1992; Dean 1999). The mobilization of the free action of resourceful and energetic actors within a framework of norms and rules that ensures a certain degree of conformity with the overall objectives of government can relieve the state from some of it regulatory burdens and help to reach various target groups with the deployment of less resources and less display of repressive control from above (Rose 1996). The new ways of thinking and practicing governance through the shaping of interactive networks of capable and responsible actors spurs the academic interest in studying governance networks. Governance network researchers are convinced that they are on to something, and their own enthusiasm about the new forms of governance feeds back to organizations, administrators and politicians. The result is a self-perpetuating growth of a new research area which is still young and has not yet become sedimented into a new paradigm with its own clear-cut definitions, taxonomies and methods. The new and rapidly growing field of governance network research is cross-disciplinary, problem-driven, multi-level, comparative, and stimulates interactive research. Political studies of institutions, power and decision making are articulated with sociological studies of culture, communication and social control and organizational studies of cognitive frames, learning and resource exchange. Different theoretical approaches are drawn upon in the attempt to address research problems derived from studies of concrete, empirical cases of network governance. The research strategy will often be based on retroduction rather than pure cases of empirical induction or theoretical deduction. The analytical focus on policy output and the backward mapping of the key policy actors will often lead to the unravelling of multi-level governance networks that include

Introduction 7

actors from different local, national and even transnational levels. To better understand the distinctive forms, dynamics and outcomes of network governance one can benefit from using a comparative research design that facilitates comparison between most similar, or most dissimilar, governance networks. Finally, the close study of interactive modes of policy making based on a problem-driven, retroductive research strategy will tend to stimulate interaction with the analytical object. Interaction with the network actors can help to sharpen the research questions, to provide access to hidden aspects of the network processes and to validate the analytical conclusions on a pragmatic basis.

The aims of this book Governance network research is empirically oriented, but the study of the conditions, functioning and implications of interactive forms of network governance certainly carries an explanatory ambition, though not in the classical sense of aiming to establish deterministic causalities with a law-like character. The goal is to produce an open-ended, contextbound knowledge that is relevant for the actors engaged in network governance. Explanation is established through theoretically informed empirical analysis of network-based policy processes and policy outcomes. These processes and outcomes are results of the institutionally conditioned interactions between the network actors; the particular form and character of the network; the attempts by outside agencies to regulate its form and functioning; and the external conditions for network governance including the socioeconomic conditions, the predominant governmentality, and the co-existence of different modes of coordination. The theoretical underpinning of the explanatory ambitions is not always as clearly delineated as one might wish. The scholars within the first generation of governance network research seldom explicate their theoretical point of departure and they tend to borrow concepts and arguments from other scholars in the field, thus producing a somewhat eclectic and confusing theoretical landscape. The result is not only the lack of sufficient clarity and rigour, but also a failure to see the productive differences between the theoretical positions in the field of governance network research. In order to solve this problem and enhance the theoretical selfawareness of governance network theory, this edited volume aims to renew and refocus the theoretical and analytical debate on governance networks by raising a series of pressing questions about: 1. the dynamics of governance networks; 2. the conditions for governance network

8


success and failure; 3. the forms and functions of metagovernance; and 4. the democratic implications of network governance. As such, the book will address key questions like: Why and how are governance networks formed, developed, reshaped and terminated? What are the conditions for governance networks to produce public policy and governance on the basis of stable, negotiated interaction between interdependent, but relative autonomous actors? How is it possible for political authorities of various kinds to regulate self-regulation governance networks in order to minimize the risk of governance failure and maximize the prospect of success? How can be assess the problems and merits of governance networks in relation to normative standards of democracy, and what is the result of such an assessment? Leading scholars in the field of governance network research will attempt to answer these fundamental questions by drawing on different theoretical approaches while paying attention to the analytical tensions and similarities between them. The book is conceptual and problem-oriented in its focus, and systematic and comprehensive in its analysis. As such, it aims to define and clarify the central concepts that are used within governance network research and apply them in analytical discussions of the problems that are frequently encountered in concrete governance practices. The problems and research questions are identified in relation to the successive steps in the governance process and the answers draw on a wide ranging spectrum of relevant theories. The overall ambition of the book is to create a platform for the development of a second generation of research into the problems and potentials of new forms of interactive governance that tend to spread faster and wider than most academics have hitherto recognized.

Defining governance networks Today, everybody talk about ‘governance’ and ‘networks’. The problematization of the idea of the sovereign power of government has prompted a wide-spread circulation of the notion of ‘governance’, and the complex interaction of economic, social and political actors, sites and processes have stimulated the use of the ‘network’ metaphor. Both terms are blanket terms that seem to cover many different phenomena. As such, the notion of ‘governance’ is deployed in the World Bank’s recommendation of ‘good governance’, international relations debates about the possibility of ‘governing without government’, discussions

Introduction 9

about the institutional conditions for ‘economic governance’, the private sector’s vision of new forms of ‘corporate governance’, the discourse of New Public Management (NPM), and, more generally, in attempts to capture the new patterns of public–private cooperation and partnership (Rhodes 1997a; Kersbergen & Waarden 2004). The notion of ‘networks’ is an equally popular term than enters into many different conceptual constellations. As such, there are frequent references to communication networks, inter-firm networks, social networks, professional networks, cross-border networks, terror networks, and network-centric warfare ( Jessop, 2002). In a somewhat different sense, Castells (1996) even claim that we live in a network society. To gain conceptual precision we will have to narrow scope of application of the two new, fashionable, but notoriously slippery, terms. Hence, we shall take the notion of ‘governance networks’ to refer to a particular type of networks and a particular form of governance. As such, we shall define a governance network as: 1. a relatively stable horizontal articulation of interdependent, but operationally autonomous actors; 2. who interact through negotiations; 3. which take place within a regulative, normative, cognitive and imaginary framework; 4. that is self-regulating within limits set by external agencies; and 5. which contributes to the production of public purpose. This definition includes most of the features commonly ascribed to governance networks (Rhodes 1997a: 53; Jessop 2002: 228f.). It makes no claim to originality, but rather aims at capturing the essence of that which is commonly referred to by the notion of governance networks. Let us attempt to unpack this dense definition of governance networks by considering each of the defining aspects in turn. First, governance networks articulate a number of private, semi-public and public actors who, on the one hand, are dependent on one another’s resources and capacities, and, on the other hand, are operationally autonomous in the sense that they are not commanded by superiors to think or act in a certain way (Marin and Mayntz, 1991). In order to become a part of a particular governance network the political actors must demonstrate that they have a stake in the policy issues at hand and that they can contribute resources and capacities of a certain value to the other actors. The relations of interdependency mean that the network actors are horizontally rather than vertically related. However, the horizontal relation between the actors does not imply that they are equal in terms of authority and resources (Mayntz 1993b: 10f.). There might be asymmetrical allocations of material and immaterial resources among the network actors, but since participation is voluntary and the

10 Theories of Democratic Network Governance

actors are free to leave the network, and since the actors are mutually dependent on each other, nobody can use their power to exert hierarchical control over anybody else without risking to ruin the network. Second, the members of governance networks interact through negotiations that combine elements of bargaining with elements of deliberation. The network actors may bargain over the distribution of resources in order to maximize outcomes. But in order to facilitate the development of negative and positive coordination (Scharpf 1994), this bargaining must be embedded in a wider framework of deliberation that facilitates learning and common understanding. However, deliberation within governance networks will seldom lead to unanimous consensus (Klijn & Koppenjan 2000: 146f.) since it takes place in a context of intense power struggles that tend to breed conflict and social antagonism. As such, joint action will often rest on a rough consensus where a proposal is accepted despite persistent disagreement. Third, the negotiated interaction between the network actors does not take place in an institutional vacuum. Rather, it proceeds within a relatively institutionalized framework, which is more than the sum of its parts, but do not constitute a homogenous and completely integrated whole (March & Olsen 1995: 27 ff.; Scharpf 1997: 47). The institutionalized framework is amalgam of contingently articulated ideas, conceptions and rules. As such, it has a regulative aspect since it provides rules, roles and procedures; a normative aspect since it conveys norms, values and standards; a cognitive element since it generates codes, concepts and specialized knowledge; and an imaginary aspect since it produces identities, ideologies and common hopes. Fourth, the governance networks are relatively self-regulating since they are not part of a hierarchical chain of command and do not submit themselves to the laws of the market (Scharpf 1994: 36). Rather, they aim at regulating a particular policy field on the basis of their own ideas, resources and dynamic interactions, and do so within a regulative, normative, cognitive and imaginary framework that is adjusted through negotiations between the participating actors. Nevertheless, governance networks always operate in a particular political and institutional environment that must be taken into account, since it both facilitates and constrains their capacity for self-regulation. Fifth, governance networks contribute to the production of public purpose within a certain area (Marsh 1998). Public purpose is an expression of visions, values, plans, policies and regulations that are valid for and directed towards the general public. Thus, the network actors are engaged in political negotiations about how to identify and solve

Introduction 11

emerging policy problems or exploit new opportunities. Networks that do not contribute to the production of public purpose in this broad sense cannot be counted as governance networks. Governance networks, as defined above, can take many different empirical forms depending on the political, institutional and discursive context in which they emerge. They might be dominated by loose and informal contacts, but they can also be tight and formal. They can be intraorganizational or interorganizational; self-grown or initiated from above; open or closed; short-lived or permanent; and have a sector-specific or society-wide scope. Finally, some governance networks might be preoccupied with the formulation of policy, whereas others are preoccupied with policy implementation. The multiplicity of governance networks attest to the broad relevance of the concept for describing the contemporary forms of societal governance. Many actual forms of interactive governance will fail to meet all the criteria specified in the definition of governance networks. However, they may still carry many of the defining traits of governance networks and thus form part of the broad family of governance networks. Exactly where to draw the line between what constitute a governance network and what does not is a matter of discretional judgement in relation to a particular empirical case. But one should bear in mind that governance network research is not preoccupied with classification, but rather aims to provide a new perspective on how society is governed.

Merits and problems of network governance Whereas the early governance network theorists saw governance networks as a synthesis of state and market (Mayntz 1991: 11), later governance network theorists tend to see governance networks as a distinctive mechanism of governance that provides an alternative to state and market (Rhodes 1997b: xii; Jessop 2002: 228 ff.). As such, governance networks distinguish themselves from the hierarchical control of the state and the competitive regulation of the market in at least three different ways. In terms of the relationship between the actors, governance networks can be described as a pluricentric governance system as opposed to the unicentric system of imperative state regulation and the multicentric system of competitive market regulation (Kersbergen & Waarden 2004: 148). Hence, imperative state regulation is based on the undisputed centrality and power of the state that turns everybody else into subjects with clearly defined rights and obligations. Competitive market regulation is based on an infinite number of self-interested actors who


are not bound by any common purpose or obligation. By contrast, governance networks involve a large number of autonomous, but mutually dependent, actors who interact in order to produce public purpose. In terms of decision making, governance networks are based on a reflexive rationality as opposed to the substantial rationality that governs imperative state regulation and the procedural rationality that governs competitive market regulation (Mayntz 1993b: 13 ff.; Scharpf, 1997: 46; Jessop 2000a: 6–7). Whereas imperative state regulation aims to translate the substantial political values of the government into detailed laws and regulations that are implemented and enforced by publicly employed bureaucrats, competitive market regulation relies on the invisible hand of the market forces that leads to a Pareto-optimal allocation of goods and services in so far as the rules and procedures ensuring free competition are carefully observed. By contrast, governance networks make decisions and regulate various issues in and through reflexive interaction that involves on-going negotiation between a plurality of actors who build on their interdependencies in order to produce joint decisions and collective solutions in the face of persistent conflicts between diverging interests, conceptions and world views (Mayntz 1993b: 14; Scharpf 1994). Finally, compliance with collectively negotiated decisions is neither ensured by means of the legal sanctions of the state or out of fear of economic loss on the market. Rather, it is ensured through the generation of generalized trust and political obligation which over time become sustained by self-constituted rules and norms (Nielsen and Pedersen, 1988). The distinctiveness of each of the three mechanisms of governance implies that the governing of society must be based on a pragmatic choice between state, market and governance networks, or of the right combination of these different modes of coordination ( Jessop 2002: 246). Depending on the political task or policy problem at hand the central decision makers must choose between different governance mechanisms that each have their own particular strengths and weaknesses. Today, governance networks are increasingly seen as a suitable response to the question of how to tackle complex, uncertain and conflict-ridden policy problems. Hence, both political scientists and political decision makers praise governance networks for their potential contribution to efficient governance. Efficiency gains derive from the distinctive features of governance networks. First of all, governance

Introduction 13

networks are claimed to have a large potential for proactive governance as the network actors can identify policy problems and new opportunities at a relatively early stage and produce flexible responses that allow for adjustments to the complexity and variety of the concrete conditions (Klijn & Koppenjan 2000: 114; Kooiman 2000: 155f.). Second, governance networks are seen as important instruments for the aggregation of information, knowledge and assessments that can help qualifying political decisions. The network actors often have a deep knowledge that is relevant for policy making and public governance, and when the knowledge of all the actors is added up, it represents an important basis for making an ‘intelligent’ choice of a feasible option (Kooiman 1993: 4; Scharpf 1999: 20). Third, governance networks are said to establish a framework for consensus building, or, at least, for the civilizing of conflicts among stakeholders. Governance networks tend to develop their own logic of appropriateness that regulates the process of negotiation, the formation of a rough consensus, and the resolution of endemic conflicts (Mayntz 1993b: 17; March and Olsen 1995: 27 ff.). Finally, governance networks are supposed to reduce the risk of implementation resistance. If the relevant and affected actors are involved in the decision making process they will tend to develop a sense of joint responsibility and ownership for the decisions and this will oblige them to support, rather than hamper, the implementation process (Sørensen and Torfing, 2003: 614). Now, the problem is that the potential efficiency gains of governance networks can only fully realized in well-functioning governance networks. Changes in the composition of the network actors, the presence of unresolved tensions and conflicts, weak and ineffective leadership, frustration over the lack of clear and visible results, and external events that disturb the policy process can destabilize governance networks and turn them into malfunctioning talking shops. A careful metagovernance of the self-regulating governance networks might prevent major dislocations and mitigate the detrimental impact of various disturbances, but it is a difficult task to optimize the functioning of governance networks on all dimensions (Kickert et al. 1997: 9; Klijn & Koppenjan 2004b: 114). Nevertheless, even apparently well-functioning networks might cause problems for public policy making either by blocking new and innovative policy initiatives or by trying to shift the costs of their own policysolutions to outsiders (Scharpf 1993). In this case governments and other


political authorities must use their powers to influence the composition, conceptions and incentives of the network actors.

First and second generation research Although the field of research is relatively new, it is possible to talk about a first and a second generation of governance network research. The first generation set out to convince us that something new was going on. As such, it was primarily preoccupied with explaining why governance networks are formed; how they differ from the hierarchical rule of the state and the anarchy of the market; and how they contribute to effective and proactive governance within different countries and policy fields and at different regulatory scales. The first generation did an excellent job in linking the rise of network governance to new societal trends (Kooiman 1993), in fleshing out the distinctive features of governance networks vis-à-vis state and market (Mayntz 1993b; Rhodes 1996; Jessop 1998) and in analysing the function and effects of governance networks in different countries, policy areas and levels of regulation (Mayntz & Marin 1991). Slowly but surely, the research agenda has moved beyond the preoccupations of the first generation of governance network research. Governance networks no longer represent something new and exotic; they are something we must live with and make the best of. At this stage, new and as yet unanswered questions have come to the fore and constitute the research agenda of a second generation of governance network research (Pierre 2000). The emergence of a new generation is neither a matter of new and younger researchers entering the field nor a matter of a clear break with the past; rather, it is a matter of a gradual renewal and enlargement of the research agenda to include four pressing questions: 1. How can we explain the formation, functioning and development of governance networks? 2. What are the sources of governance network failure and the conditions of success? 3. How can inter alia public authorities regulate self-regulating governance networks through different kinds of metagovernance? 4. What are the democratic problems and potentials inherent to network governance?

Introduction 15

Some governance network theorists have drawn our attention to the dynamic aspects of governance networks, either in terms of the institutional conditions for developing the identities and capabilities of the actors and the political accounts and adaptiveness of the network as a whole (March & Olsen 1995), or in terms of the isomorphic pressures on different organizational fields for adopting particular organizational designs or modi operandi (Powell & DiMaggio 1983, 1991). However, it is also crucial to explore the factors triggering and facilitating the formation of governance networks as well as the reasons and conditions for dismantling or reshaping obsolete or dysfunctional network structures. Other researchers have pointed to the fact that governance networks are no panacea, but regularly fail to sustain processes of negotiated interaction that lead to the production of public purpose. The recognition of the possibility of governance network failure calls for a systematic analysis of the political and institutional conditions for success with regard to the formation of well-functioning governance networks that contribute to societal problem solving (Scharpf 1994; Jessop 2002). In continuation with this, many theorists have started to look at how public authorities and other influential political actors attempt to regulate governance networks that are themselves characterized by a high degree of self-regulation (Kickert et al. 1997; Milward & Provan 2000b; Jessop 2002). This regulation of self-regulation is referred to as ‘metagovernance’, or ‘network management’, and there have been several attempts to distinguish between different strategies, technologies and tools of metagovernance (Klijn & Koppenjan 2004b; Sørensen 2005). Finally, there is growing interest in normative questions about the democratic legitimacy of governance networks (Rhodes 1997b; Mayntz 1999; Pierre and Peters 2000). The recent surge of governance networks is a result of a pragmatic search for means of effective and proactive governance. But governance networks cannot be legitimized merely by reference to the quality of their output, i.e. to their problem-solving capacity (Scharpf 1997). The input legitimacy of governance networks is equally important and so is the possibility for ensuring democratic control and accountability. The assessment of the democratic performance of governance networks is a difficult task since it is far from obvious what the relevant standards of democracy are. New research suggests that we should analyse and assess the ‘democratic anchorage’ of governance networks both in relation to different political constituencies (elected politicians, the members of the participating groups and organizations, and the affected citizens) and in an internal grammar of


democratic conduct (Sørensen & Torfing 2005a). However, more research on the democratic problems and potentials of governance networks is needed in order to develop adequate standards for a democratic audit of network governance. In sum, the second generation of governance network research raises a series of important questions to be critically examined and answered on the basis of different theoretical perspectives. The contributions to this edited volume will draw on a wide range of theoretical approaches within institutional theory, governance network theory and democratic theory. Institutional theory will help to answer the question about the formation, functioning and development of governance networks that is dealt with in Part I. Governance network theory will help us to provide some answers to the question about the sources of governance network failure and the question of how to metagovern self-regulating governance networks. These questions are dealt with in Parts II and III, respectively. Finally, Part IV will introduce democratic theory in order to answer the normative question about the democratic problems and potentials of governance networks. Naturally, the clear division of labour between the three bodies of theory will not be strictly maintained since the research questions posed by the authors of the individual chapters often require a pragmatic combination of concepts and arguments drawn from all three bodies of theory. The three bodies of theory are defined broadly, but in order to provide an initial mapping of the three different theoretical terrains, we shall distinguish between four theoretical positions on the basis of their different conceptions of social action and societal governance. As such, the four theoretical landmarks differ in two important respects. First, they differ according to whether they conceive rational calculation or culture-bound rule-following to be the driving force of social action. Is social action driven by self-interested individuals’ rational calculation of costs and benefits, or is it shaped by rules, norms and values intrinsic to particular cultures and historical contexts? Second, they differ according to whether they perceive persistent conflicts or smooth coordination as the defining feature of societal governance. Some theories tend to view conflict and power struggles as a constitutive, and yet potentially destablizing, feature of societal governance, whereas other theories tend to downplay the role of conflict and instead conceive indifference or inappropriate action, caused by the lack of coordination, as the major obstacle to societal governance. The four theoretical landmarks provide central reference points, not only for people who want to expand a critical dialogue between different theoretical approaches, but also for those

Introduction 17 Table I.1 Overview of four different governance network theories Calculation

Culture

Conflict

Interdependency theory [Rhodes 1997a, b; Kickert et al. 1997; Jessop 1998, 2002]

Governmentality theory [Foucault 1991 Dean 1999; Rose and Miller 1992]

Coordination

Governability theory [Mayntz 1991, 1993; Scharpf 1993, 1994, 1997; Kooiman 1993]

Integration theory [March and Olsen 1995; Powell and DiMaggio 1983, 1991; Scott 1995]

who want to move beyond the established theories and explore new land. Since governance network theory constitutes the theoretical backbone of this book, we shall briefly present an overview of the four theoretical positions that emerge when we divide the main theories in the field of governance network theory according to the analytical distinctions between calculation-culture and conflict-coordination. A synoptic overview of the theoretical mapping of paradigmatic theories that are relevant for the study of governance networks is presented in Table I.1. We have named the four theoretical positions presented in the four-fold table interdependency theory, governability theory, integration theory and governmentality theory (Sørensen & Torfing 2005b). We have added references to particular works of leading theorists that we conceive to be emblematic for the different theoretical positions. We should like to stress that some of the theorists referred to in the table might not even perceive of themselves as governance network theorists. Whereas governance networks are clearly at the centre of the works of the theorists associated with interdependency theory and governability theory, the theorists associated with integration theory and governmentality theory only vaguely, and in passing, refer to ‘relatively stable, selforganizing networks’ (March and Olsen 1995: 70), ‘organization fields of relevant actors’ (Powell & DiMaggio 1983: 148), and ‘the construction of multiple forms of agency through which rule is accomplished’ (Dean 1999: 209). Nevertheless, we deem that they are all making important contributions to grasping the intricacies of network governance. We should also like to stress that many theorists cited in the table, and several of the contributors to this book, aim to transgress the analytical distinctions that define the theoretical positions displayed in Table I.1. However, we believe that the heuristic value of establishing some central


theoretical reference points merits our one-sided and reductive attempt to simplify the theoretical terrain. To give an initial flavour of how the four theoretical positions contribute to the analysis of interactive governance we shall briefly consider how they define governance networks, explain their formation, and account for the forces that link the different actors in a governance network. Interdependency theory has developed in a critical dialogue with corporatist and policy network theory and has a certain affinity with historical institutionalism. It defines governance networks as an interorganizational medium for interest mediation between interdependent, but conflicting actors each of whom has a rule and resource base of their own. Governance networks are results of the strategic actions of independent actors who interact because of their mutual resource dependencies and thereby counteract the institutional fragmentation caused by NPM. Governance networks are formed through incremental, bottom-up processes, but are often recruited as vehicles of public policymaking by public authorities. The network actors seek to realize different interests through internal power struggles, but they are held together by their mutual interdependence, which facilitates negotiation, compromise and joint learning processes. Governability theory was developed mainly by people associated with the Max Planck Institute in Cologne. It starts off from a critical investigation of the changing conditions for governing society and has a certain affinity with rational choice institutionalism. It defines governance networks as a horizontal coordination between autonomous actors who interact in and through different negotiation games. The formation of governance networks is seen as a functional response to the increasing societal complexity, dynamics and diversification that undermine the ability to govern society efficiently through the traditional means of hierarchy and market. Governance networks are formed through the construction of game-like situations that enhance horizontal coordination, and they are held together partly by the anticipated gains from resource pooling and joint action and partly by the development of mutual trust and institutional rules that help to overcome collective action problems. Network-based governance tends to enhance the governability of modern societies. Integration theory is a name for the organization sociological studies of political governance and socioeconomic regulation that take place in increasingly disintegrated polities. Although it is not always fully recognized by the emblematic theorists themselves, integration theory has a certain affinity with hermeneutics and social constructivism. It defines

Introduction 19

governance networks as a relatively institutionalized field of interaction between relevant and affected actors that are integrated in a community defined by common norms and perceptions. Governance networks may serve as means for improving the effectiveness and legitimacy of societal governance, but they can also be seen as a normative response to the twin problems of totalitarian over-integration and individualistic under-integration of social agency. They are formed through a bottomup process whereby contacts that are established due to the recognition of interdependence are evaluated and extended on the basis of institutionalized logics of appropriateness. Over time, governance networks develop their own logic of appropriateness, which is often influenced by isomorphic pressures. The network actors become normatively and cognitively integrated through the construction of solidarity and common identities and frames of reference. Governmentality theory is the name of a broad research programme initiated by the poststructuralist, political philosopher Michel Foucault in the last years before his death in 1984. The theory of governmentality focuses on how we collectively think and organize the governing of society. It explores how the present governmentality tends to enrol a plurality of actors in the governing of particular spheres, groups and individuals, and thereby contributes to a further decentring of power and governmental agencies that multiply and form networks with a ‘rhizomatic’ character, to use Deleuze & Guattari’s (1987) famous metaphor. Governmentality theory is not a network theory per se, and it does not have any clear definition of governance networks. However, it implicitly conceives governance networks as an attempt of an increasingly reflexive and facilitating state to mobilize and shape the free actions of self-governing actors. Governance networks are construed as a political response to the failure of neo-liberalism to realize its key goal of ‘less state and more market’. The problematization of neo-liberalism leads to the formulation of a new governmentality programme, associated with advanced liberal government that aims to shift the burden of government to local networks in which the energies of social and political actors are mobilized and given a particular direction in order to ensure conformity. Governance networks are held together and framed by particular technologies and narratives that recruit social and political actors as vehicles of power. There are many family resemblances between the four theories of network governance, but there are also significant differences. Both similarities and differences will be further explored in Chapters 5 and 9 which aim to compare the four theories of network governance with regard to


what they have to say about success and failure network governance and the attempts to metagovern self-regulating governance networks. Institutional theory and democratic theory can also be theoretically mapped by using the four-fold Table I.1 presented above. This is demonstrated in Chapter 1 that compares different theoretical positions within the new institutionalism with regard to how they explain the dynamics of governance networks, and in Chapter 13 that compares different democratic theories with regard to their conception of the democratic problems and potentials of governance networks.

Plan of the book As already hinted above, the book is divided into Parts I–IV, each devoted to answering one of the four big questions posed by the second generation of governance network research. Each part begins with an overview chapter that aims to flesh out and compare the theoretical answers to the question at hand that can be found, or construed, on the basis of the analytical mapping of the four paradigmatic positions within the relevant body of theory. In each of the four parts, the overview chapter is followed by three independent chapters that aim to provide more detailed answers to different aspects of the overall research question. The authors are free either to associate themselves with one of the four paradigmatic theories, combine different theories in an innovative way, or transgress the analytical scheme by drawing upon other relevant theories or developing a new theoretical approach. The three chapters following the overview chapter are structured in accordance with a stylized description of the different phases in the political process of network governance: first, the governance network is formed; then, it gives rise to negotiated interaction between a plurality of relevant and affected actors; and finally, it produces some kind of public value. Part I focuses on governance networks dynamics. The overview chapter is followed by a discussion of mechanisms of governance network formation (Chapter 2, Nils Hertting); an analysis of virtuous and viscous circles in democratic network governance (Chapter 3, Guy Peters); and a study of attempts to manage change in networks (Chapter 4, Mark Bevir and Rod Phodes). Part II analyses the conditions for governance network failure by discussing three crucial dilemmas that confront the network actors and the metagovernors. First, there is a discussion of the sources and impact of different forms of closure and openness (Chapter 6, Linze Schaap).

Introduction 21

Then, there is a study of the negative and positive effects of conflict and consensus (Chapter 7, Joop F.M. Koppenjan). Finally, there is discussion of the relation between effective and legitimate network governance (Chapter 8, Tanja Børzel and Diana Panke). Part III addresses the important question of metagovernance. The review chapter is followed by a discussion of the formation and mobilization of governance networks (Chapter 10, Peter Triantafillou); a study of how to metagovern networks through network management (Chapter 11, Erik-Hans Klijn); and an analysis of how outputs and outcomes of networked policy processes can be influenced through different forms of metagovernance (Chapter 12, Laurence J. O’Toole). Part IV of the book assesses the democratic implications of network governance. A brief overview of different approaches to the analysis of democratic network governance is followed by a discussion of the democratic norms for participation in governance networks (Chapter 14, Allan Dreyer Hansen); the demands for democratic dialogue and communication (Chapter 16, John Dryzek); and the challenges to democratic accountability (Chapter 16, Anders Esmark). The conclusion takes stock of the answers provided by the various authors and assesses the need for further research of the research questions that have been posed in this volume. It also discusses the future directions of governance network research that might expand, or move beyond, the research agenda of the second generation.

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Part I Governance Network Dynamics


1 Theoretical Approaches to Governance Network Dynamics Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing

Introduction Governance networks contribute to the production of public policy and governance. Political visions, policy ideas, comprehensive plans, informal norms and detailed regulations are often crafted, or at least influenced, through policy processes involving relevant and affected actors from state, market and civil society. The networked policy output is a contingent result of negotiated interaction between a plurality of interdependent, and yet operationally autonomous, actors. The form and character of the policy output depends on the form and character of the horizontal interplay between the network actors. The negotiated exchange between the various actors changes over time and varies from governance network to governance network. Basically, network-based governance is a complex and potentially chaotic process in which numerous interests, identities and rationalities fuse and collide. However, the interaction between the network actors does not take place in a void, but rather proceed within a relatively institutionalized framework that facilitates and constrains political interaction and thus affects the production of the outputs and outcomes of governance networks. The institutionalized framework consists of more or less sedimented rules, norms, cognitive paradigms, and social imaginaries that are constructed in and through negotiated interaction. The fact that governance networks are stabilized by the contingent and tentative formation of rules, norms, etc. does not turn governance networks into organizations in the sense of relatively formal and unified institutional actors. Governance networks might recruit public agencies, social partners, social movements and other forms of political organizations, and they might even aspire to form, or become, an organization. 25


However, governance networks are not themselves organizations since they generally lack the defining characteristics of organizations in terms of an overriding and unifying objective, a political leadership capable of imposing formal sanctions on the participants, and a chain of command permitting governing by decree. The network actors’ autonomy and interdependency prevent the exercise of hierarchical monitoring and control that is normally associated with Weberian-type organizations. Governance networks cannot even be defined as institutions in the strict sense of well-integrated systems of social interaction based on relatively fixed rules, norms and procedures. Governance networks are marked by a profound institutional ambiguity since, at the beginning, there are no clearly defined and commonly accepted rules, norms and procedures and no formal constitution that predetermine how legitimate decisions are made (Hajer & Versteeg 2005). Governance networks bring together a wide range of political actors who have different rule and resource bases. The network actors engage in an intercultural and pluricentric interaction marked by conflicts, ambiguity and uncertainty. In the outset, the actors might try to establish a mode of interaction that facilitates cooperation and joint decision-making. They might even try to stabilize this mode of interaction through the construction of formal and informal rules and the development of shared norms, values and conceptions. However, this does not transform governance networks into institutions in the sense of well-integrated social systems that are based on common rules, norms and compliance mechanisms that enable a stable reproduction of the social pattern of interaction and the role and identity of the actors. Governance networks are complex and dynamic systems in which centripetal and centrifugal forces constantly undermine each other so that order and stability only exist as a partial limitation of disorder and instability. Governance networks bring together a range of relevant and affected actors in contingent interactions that over time may become subject to processes of institutionalization and de-institutionalization that construct a regulative, normative cognitive and imaginary framework for negotiation and joint decision making. The institutionalized framework both enables and constrains the interaction of the network actors. Hence, it might facilitate interaction by ensuring the codification of political compromises, lowering the transaction costs of horizontal coordination, developing the identities and capacities of the actors, and recruiting individuals, firms and organizations as free, active and responsible actors. At the same time, it might constrain interaction by regulating conflicts, influencing the perception of problems,

Theoretical Approaches to Governance Network Dynamics 27

preferences, costs and benefits, defining appropriate actions, and constructing particular rationalities and technologies. The institutionalized framework of interaction is dynamic and incomplete as the network actors will aim to influence and adjust it by invoking elements and aspects of their own rule and resource bases that will gradually modified and changed in the course of interaction. Public authorities might aim to subject governance networks to a particular set of formal rules, norms and procedures (metagovernance), but the network actors will often oppose these, or find ways of getting around the formal constraints that are imposed upon them. The rules, norms, etc. that are constructed through the self-regulated interaction of the network actors will often have an informal character and in periods of turbulence and change governance networks will be hold together by story telling and common symbols rather than clearly defined rules and norms. In sum, governance networks are neither organizations nor institutions in the strict and narrow sense of the terms, but relatively institutionalized frameworks of negotiated interaction within which different actors struggle with each other, create opportunities for joint decisions, forge political compromises and coordinate concrete actions. Conflicts sustained by the cultural, social and political differences between the relatively autonomous actors prevent governance networks from being transformed into stable political institutions. However, the relative institutionalization of governance networks, which facilitates and constrains negotiated interaction, permits us to draw on institutional theory in order to understand the dynamics of governance networks by taking into account the mutual conditioning between the interaction of the network actors and the tentative rules, norms and procedures that are developed in the course of action. Institutional theory is indispensable for any attempt to grasp the functioning and development of governance networks as it helps us to understand the complex interplay between political agency and the emerging structures of their interaction. In this first part of the book we shall draw on theories associated with the new institutionalism. Whereas the old institutionalism focused on the formal and constitutionally defined political institutions in terms of parliaments, governments, and legal systems (see Finer 1954; Duverger 1959; Johnson 1973), the new institutionalism has a much broader institutional focus that covers not only the formal political institutions, but also the less formal institutionalizations of the patterns of interaction between different political actors (Rhodes 1995: 54; Peters 1999: 18). The new institutionalism claims that in the world of politics ‘institutions matter’ and it sets out to explore the interaction of politics and


institutions through theoretically informed case studies of the genesis, impact and transformation of formal and informal institutions. The new institutionalism conceives institutions as a structural feature of social systems that provides a certain degree of order and stability to social interaction by means of regulating and affecting the beliefs and behaviour of the actors. This common conception of the role of institutions hides a number of competing theoretical approaches that tend to disagree about the nature of institutions, how they affects human behaviour and how they are constructed and transformed. Although the analytical labels might differ, it is common to distinguish between three theoretical positions within the new institutionalism: historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism and social constructivist (or normative) institutionalism (Campbell 1994; Hall & Taylor 1996; Peters 1999). There might be partial overlaps and cross-overs between the three institutionalist approaches (Torfing 2001), but it is nevertheless possible to identify some clear differences in their basic analytical assumptions. The historical institutionalist approach focuses on the institutional mediation of conflicts and claims that political struggles over scarce goods may result in political compromises that are institutionally codified and tend to regulate and influence the future political struggles giving rise to a path-dependent development (Hall 1993; Pierson 1994; Thelen & Steinmo 1992). Historical institutionalism sets itself out from the other approaches by its emphasis on political conflict and power struggles, but it contains a certain ambiguity in its conception of the social and political actors. Hence, on the one hand, it sides with rational choice institutionalism in its understanding of human action as basically driven by self-interested calculations. On the other hand, it sides with social constructivist institutionalism in claiming that the interests of the rational actors are influenced by the rules and norms, cognitive paradigms and learning processes that are embedded in the institutional framework of negotiation. However, despite the partial endogeniezation of the actors’ interests and preferences, the rational calculations and power resources of the actors gain the upper hand in the explanation of political outcomes. The interests and preferences might be affected by the feasible strategies of the actors and their institutionalized interaction, but when first they are fixed, the actors act rationally in order to maximise their outcome within the limits set by the institutional framework. Rational choice institutionalism focuses on the choices made by individual actors with pre-given preference who are acting on the basis of a bounded rationality within an institutional setting that defines the range of options, their pay-offs and the kind of games that are likely to


emerge between strategically interdependent actors (Ostrom 1990; Dunleavy 1991; Scharpf 1997). In contrast to historical institutionalism, the starting point is individual rather than collective actors. The actors act rationally to maximize personal utility within the constraints set by the institutional framework of their interactions. The absence of a common utility function might lead to conflicts between the self-interested actors. However, the fundamental problem in relation to governance is not the presence of political conflicts between different political groups, but rather individual defection or noncompliance with the rules defined by the institutional framework. However, the institutional design of the right incentives in terms of rewards and punishment (Calvert 1995) and the repetition of rational games over time might facilitate greater cooperation and mutual compliance (Axelrod 1984). Social constructivist (or normative) institutionalism is in many ways the antidote of rational choice institutionalism (Powell & DiMaggio 1991; Scott 1995). The interests and preferences of the actors are intrinsic to the identity of the social and political actors which is shaped and reshaped in a particular institutional context. The actors do not act on the basis of a logic of consequentiality, but on the basis of a logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen 1989). They match the institutionally embedded rules, norms and cognitive paradigms with their own identity and the situation in which they are placed, and they are acting appropriately on the basis of their own constitutive interpretations of the institutionally defined rules, norms, etc. (March & Olsen 1995). The emphasis on the institutional embeddedness of the actors, and the broadening of the definition of institutions to include ideas, knowledge, conceptual codes, symbols, rituals, and other cultural artefacts (March & Olsen 1989), means that the actors can be conceived in terms of neither an utility-maximizing ‘economic man’ nor a power-maximizing ‘political man’. Social actors are normative creatures as their identity, capacities and aspirations are shaped by the social and political communities to which they belong. Normative integration of the social actors to competing conceptions of the common good is seen as an important condition for democratic governance. Social constructivist institutionalism is rooted in interpretative sociology and organizational studies. Its emphasis on the endogenous character of the actors’ interests, conceptions and operational rationalities is shared by poststructuralist theories of politics, governance and institutions. However, these poststructuralist theories tend to be highly skeptical about the prospect of normative integration due to the ineradicable presence of power and social antagonism. Although poststructuralism


can hardly be said to provide a clear and coherent theory of institutions, there has been an increasing emphasis on the interplay between politics and institutions (Clegg 1990; Dyrberg & Torfing 1992). Foucault (1979, 1990) has always stressed the intrinsic link between power and institutions, and also Laclau (1990) has paid attention to the institutional sedimentation of politically constructed social relations. As such, it is possible to add a fourth theoretical approach to the three approaches mentioned above (Campbell & Pedersen 2001). The poststructuralist, or discursive, approach to institutional analysis tends to see institutions as vehicles for local and decentred power strategies that aim to work upon the free individuals through a combination of discipline, normalization and governmental self-regulation. Power involves the production of particular forms of subjectivity that takes place in and through the articulation of discursive forms of knowledge and truth that over time become sedimented into institutionalized rules, procedures, rationalities and totalizing world views. If we add the poststructuralist perspective on institutional analysis, we have four theoretical approaches that can be mapped by using the same analytical distinctions as we used in the mapping of the theories of network governance presented in the introductory chapter. The emerging four-fold table is shown in Table 1.1 where a couple of emblematic works have been added in order to indicate what hides behind the analytical labels defining the four theoretical approaches to institutional analysis. There is a close connection between theories of governance networks and institutional theory. In fact, each of the four theories of governance

Table 1.1 Overview of four different approaches to institutional analysis Calculation

Culture

Conflict

Historical institutionalism [Hall 1986, 1989; Peters, et al. 2005; Rothstein 1992; Thelen & Steinmo 1992]

Poststructuralist institutionalism [Clegg 1990; Dean 1999; Foucault 1991a; Rose 1999]

Coordination

Rational choice institutionalism [Moe 1990; Olson 1965; Ostrom 1990, 1991; Riker & Ordeshook 1973]

Social constructivist (or normative) institutionalism [March & Olsen 1989, 1995; Powell & DiMaggio 1983, 1991; Scott 1995]


networks that were presented in the introduction is underpinned by a particular institutionalist approach. Hence, interdependency theory is underpinned by historical institutionalism, governability theory by rational choice institutionalism, integration theory by social constructivist institutionalism, and governability theory by poststructuralist institutionalism. The neat correspondence between the theories of network governance and the institutionalist approaches is to some extent founded on a tautology since in most cases the representatives of the particular theory of governance networks are more or less identical with the representatives of the corresponding institutionalist approach. However, it is by no means a perfect match, and the link between governance network theory and institutional theory is not always explicit. Nevertheless, the link is important since there is much to learn about the dynamics of governance networks from an encounter with the different strands of the new institutionalism. Let us take a closer look at the theoretical insights into governance network dynamics that are provided by the four institutionalist approaches.

Historical institutionalism Institutional theory can help us to understand the crucial role that institutions play in the formation, functioning and transformation of governance networks. Historical institutionalism defines institutions as the ensemble of formal and informal rules, norms and procedures that regulate the political action of collective actors. Institutions are conceived as both the medium and outcome of the political struggles of a plurality of interest-based actors. Political struggles about the formulation and implementation of public policy take place within an institutional framework which is itself a result of the codification of political compromises obtained in past political struggles. When it comes to explaining the formation of governance networks, institutions play a dual role. On the one hand, governance networks are developed in an attempt to overcome the institutional and organizational fragmentation caused by the implementation of the principles of New Public Management (Rhodes 1997a: 45; 2000: 54). The increasing ‘agentification’ of the local public sector is countered by the formation of governance networks that facilitate crosscutting coordination between individual agencies. As such, governance networks are the aggregate result of local actors’ strategic attempt to cope with the consequences of institutional reform. On the other hand, when the fragmented, local actors aim to establish horizontal relations of negotiated coordination


with other actors, the formation, or reactivation, of particular rules, norms and procedures might help to highlight and reinforce the mutual dependency between the actors and to regulate the access to the governance network (Kooiman 1993). Hence, institutionalized norms about ‘holistic governance’ and ‘teamwork’ encourage the actors to recognize their interdependency, and institutionalized rules and procedures determine who can be considered as legitimate members of governance networks. Historical institutionalism has even more to offer when it comes to explaining the functioning of governance networks. The negotiated exchange between the network actors will over time result in the codification of political compromises and experiences into a loosely defined set of rules, norms and procedures that channel, guide and sustain further interaction within the network and thereby enhance its robustness. The institutional framework helps to stabilize the interactions within the governance network by providing rules about legitimate decision making, furnishing norms that support the development of generalized trust, and establishing procedures for the regulation and resolution of conflicts. The institutionalization of norms and values might also change and modify the identities and preferences of the actors so that the risk of future conflicts is reduced. However, the institutional framework is not always supporting the development of well-functioning governance networks. The institutional codifications might constrain new and innovative policy making because the regulative and normative framework reflects old and long-forgotten compromises and fails to take into account the new societal conditions. The institutional framework might also be too weak to tame the fierce conflicts and power struggles that emanate from an interest-based policy making. Finally, the institutionalization of divisions between central and peripheral members of the governance network may sustain, or even strengthen, an asymmetric distribution of resources between the network actors. This might lead to a marginalization of certain network actors that will be tempted to leave the governance network because they have no chance of being heard. Such a defection will tend to reduce the legitimacy of the governance network. The most significant contribution of historical institutionalism is probably the argument about the path-dependent transformation of governance networks (Hodgson 1994; Krasner 1984). Institutionalization is always a matter of degree and in the highly institutionalized governance networks deliberate attempts to bring about radical changes in their form and functioning are likely to fail. The contingent codification of


past conflicts, and the institutionalization of strategic responses to past events, will tend to create a certain lock-in effect, according to which particular rules, norms and procedures ‘freeze’ the patterns of interaction, even when it results in a sub-optimal functioning of the governance network. As such, the complexity and opaqueness of governance networks might spur the development of self-sustaining mental models that define how the negotiated interaction in the network should be organized and evolve (Pierson 1998). The institutionally conditioned path-dependency will not prevent changes in the governance network and the networked policy making, but only permit evolutionary and incremental changes that require a lot of political pressure and tend to favour the preservation of status quo over the dissolution and transformation of the old path. Revolutions and radical reforms are rare, but might occur at breaking points in history where the institutional equilibrium is punctuated by new events that problematize and dislocate the old path and create a branching point where new paths might be chosen as a result of intense political struggles (Hall 1986).

Rational choice institutionalism Historical institutionalism claims that institutions facilitate and constrain action, but it is not always entirely clear about how it is that institutions actually affect action. This is certainly not a problem in rational choice institutionalism which clearly specifies how institutions matter. Institutions are defined more narrowly as the formal and informal rules and the associated compliance system that are found within a particular arena of action. The institutional rules determine the external conditions for the rational choice of individual actors. As such, institutions tend to determine the actual range of choices and options of the actors; the pay-offs of the different options, or combination of options; the available information about options, costs and benefits; and the structure of the game played by the rational interdependent actors. The development of modern society is said to provide favourable conditions for the formation of governance networks and for explaining the forms and functioning of these in terms of the rational choice of individual actors. The functional differentiation of society into plurality of relatively autonomous systems, sub-systems and organizations means that no single public or private actor is capable of governing society alone (Kooiman 2000: 142). Therefore, governance must necessarily rely on horizontal coordination between actors coming from different systems, subsystems and organizations. The rational actors tend to realize


this and they begin to form horizontal networks of societal coordination because it is rational for them to do so. The actors have a relative autonomy, but they are dependent on each other’s resources and expertise in order to ‘get things done’. As such, they will tend to form governance networks on the basis voluntary contracts, whenever they perceive the potential benefits to be higher than the costs. The formation of governance networks is hampered by the presence of collective action problems as the actors might choose to free ride. However, collection action problems might be overcome in institutional settings where there is a known tradition for giving real influence to governance networks; where participation gives access to important and scarce resources and immediate benefits in terms of political recognition and social status; where the entry rules ensure that the most important actors are included; and where the transaction costs of networking are lowered by mutual trust. Collective action problems are not only hampering the formation of governance networks, but might also jeopardize their general functioning. Opportunistic action, and/or indifference to the negative externalities of one’s own actions, provides a constant threat to horizontal coordination through negotiated interaction. It is tempting for the network actors to try to reap the fruits of the network while contributing as little as possible to its general functioning and disregarding the costs that are generated by the self-interested action of the winning coalition within the network. Therefore, the construction of well-functioning governance networks will depend on the creation of institutional rules, norms and incentive structures that will favour games that build relations of trust and cooperation rather than distrust and competition. Hence, ‘split-adollar’ games are to be preferred to ‘prisoners-dilemma’ games, although repeated prisoners dilemma games that facilitate learning might also do the trick. In general, the preferred games are those that emphasize the positive interdependence of the actors and increase the costs of non-cooperation. Rational choice institutionalism generally claims that institutions are difficult to transform, or dissolve, because they often assume the character of a private good for the involved actors. This argument also applies to governance networks which may provide a means for the participating actors either to gain access to particular benefits and resources that would otherwise be inaccessible, or to shift the costs of particular plans or regulations to the external environment. In situations where governance networks have assumed the character of a private good for the actors, institutional transformation requires deliberate attempts to


change the preferences of the actors. When first the individual preferences of the actors are changed, it will be rational for them to change the institutional rules and norms that regulate their negotiated interaction. However, rational choice institutionalism has little to say about how preferences can be changed and often falls back on the somewhat naïve assumption that external changes in the environment will automatically alter the preferences of the individual actors.

Social constructivist (or normative) institutionalism Social constructivist institutionalism also has a relatively clear understanding of how institutions affect the action and interaction of network actors. Institutions are defined broadly as not only the ensemble of formal and informal rules, norms and procedures, but also the knowledge, values, codes and conceptions that informs and support them (March & Olsen 1989: 22). Institutions affect the identities, perceptions, capacities and routines of the actors which in turn determine their actions and interactions. Institutions are not reduced to an external constraint on the rational action of individuals, but define the repertoire of appropriate action of different kinds of agency. Rational action might be appropriate in a certain institutional context, but mostly rational calculation is used post hoc to justify action which is formed by a particular logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen, 1995: 8, 29). However, the emphasis on rule-governed action does not mean that the actors are structurally determined by the institutional context of their actions. The matching of the particular situation to a certain rule (March & Olsen, 1989: 25f.) and the interpretation of the matching rule both call for a constitutive intervention of human agency who must select a rule and determine its content on the basis of a legal reasoning that aims to compare the present situation with past experiences (March & Olsen, 1995: 32f.). Social constructivist institutionalism provides both a micro-level understanding of how institutions affect the formation of governance networks and macro-level understanding of how institutional designs that favours the formation of governance network are spread. The micro-level theory of network formation emphasizes the interaction between interdependent organizations and the institutional logic of appropriateness on which these organizations are based (March & Olsen, 1995: 107 ff.). Organizations tend to contact other organizations because they are dependent on each others resources and capacities. Who they might contact is not so much determined by a rational


calculation of the possible outcome of that particular contact, but rather depends on institutional norms specifying who it is appropriate to contact. The actors constantly evaluate their interorganizational contacts and this is done on the basis of the rules, norms, values and conceptions that are found within their particular group, or organization. The contacts that are deemed positive on the basis of the internal logic of appropriateness will tend to become repeated and this might over time lead to the formation of a governance network. This might even institutionalize its own logic of appropriateness. If the network is not already organized around a particular public task, or policy problem, it might later become the locus of public governance and policy making. March and Olsen’s bottom-up explanation of the institutional conditions for network formation is supplemented by Powell and DiMaggio’s (1983) top-down explanation of the spread of contingent organizational designs through isomorphic pressures that force organizational fields to adopt a particular organizational principle which, today, might well be that of interactive network governance. Public and private organizations’ concern for legitimacy often overrules their concern for efficiency. Organizations that operate in uncertain environment may seek to obtain legitimacy by giving in to isomorphic pressures. Coercive isomorphism involves the adoption of organizational designs recommended by higher level political authorities from which the organizations in the organizational field receive important resources. Mimetic isomophism involves voluntary attempts to copy designs from other organizations that appear to be successful and legitimate. Finally, normative isomorphism involves adopting organizational designs favoured by the professional groups inhabiting particular organizations. The combination of different isomorphic pressures provides a strong homogenizing force. However, Powell (1991b: 194 ff.) has later brought attention to the fact that heterogeneity and ambiguity in the environment of the organization field might weaken the isomophic pressures and their homogenizing force. In much the same vein, Røvik has emphasized the need for organizational translation of organization designs through operationalization, selection, combination and fusion of their different elements. To this Friedland and Alford (1991) have added that there will often be conflicts between and within organizations about which organizational designs to pursue and which to reject. All in all, social constructivist institutionalism provides us with a well-developed theory about the factors that might facilitate or constrain the homogenizing spread of organizational designs that, for example, favours the formation of governance networks.


Institutions also affect the functioning of governance network by providing the conditions for developing the identities and capacities of the network actors (March & Olsen, 1995: 49f.). Identity is defined as the sum of our often simplified images of ourselves and others, our interpretations of these images, and our attempts to live out these interpretations in and through our social and political practice (March & Olsen, 1995: 74). Likewise, capacities are defined as the sum of the rights, resources, competences and organizational know-how which the individual and collective actors possess (March & Olsen, 1995: 92). Wellfunctioning governance networks require the construction of solidarity among the actors; the creation of identities that are compatible with and supports democratic political processes; and the civilization of conflicts between different solidarities and identities (March & Olsen, 1995: 63 ff., 72 ff., 178 ff.). The identities of the network actors are shaped and reshaped through socialization, education, reflection, action and interaction which is conditioned by the logic of appropriateness that has been developed within the governance network. The development of democratic political identities must be combined with attempts to develop the capacities of the network actors through political empowerment whereby rights are created, resources are generated and distributed, and competences are enhanced (March & Olsen, 1995: 91 ff.). However, the transformation of rights, resources and competences into political action that makes a difference requires the development of the political reflexivity and know-how of the actors. It goes without saying that the institutional conditions for network governance is crucial for the political empowerment of the network actors. In addition, we should not forget that the development of the political capacities of the actors also depends on the development of their political identity. In fact, capacities create identities, and identities create capacities (March & Olsen, 1995: 103). As for the transformation of governance networks, social constructivist institutionalism firmly rejects the belief in the ‘efficiency of history’ that guarantees a perfect match between institutions and their external environment (March & Olsen, 1995: 10f., 40 ff.). There is no mechanism whereby changes in the environment automatically induce changes in the preferences of the network actors which in turn lead to intentional reforms that construct an optimal institutional design. The rationalist account of institutional change completely overlooks how institutions condition the actors’ perception of their environment and how organizations aim to control and shape their environment. The alternative historical institutionalist account depicts political institutions as stable


configurations that have their own internal dynamic that is protected from the environment through ignorance, distancing, or rejection (Krasner 1988). Institutions live their own quiet life until the day where the gulf between the demands from the environment and the internal rules and procedures has become too big and the institutions are either destructed or transformed through big and fatal crises. March and Olsen (1995: 185 ff.) tend to agree with the main argument advanced by the historical institutionalists, but they urge us not to forget that institutions also have some relatively stable procedures for how to gather information about and assess changes in the environment and eventually transform and adapt the institutional rules and norms in accordance with the institutionally embedded logic of appropriateness.

Poststructuralist institutionalism Poststructuralist institutionalism does not constitute a unified theoretical paradigm and fails to provide a comprehensive account of the formation, functioning and transformation of institutions, organizational fields, or governance networks. In fact, poststructuralist institutionalism does not even aim to develop such an account. Rather, it seeks to offer a certain problematization of the institutions of governance by means of revealing their political ‘origin’ in a myriad of political struggles, their discursive conditions of possibility, and their power effects. Foucault (1991a: 103) criticizes the liberal and Marxist obsession with the state and claims that instead of searching for the essence of the state, we should analyse how the unity, competences and limits of the state are produced in and through the dominant ‘governmentality’ that comprises a collective and institutionalized way of knowing how to govern and be governed. The notion of governmentality is developed through a genealogical study of how government, in the sense of the ‘conduct of conduct’, has been problematized in modern society and how this problematization has formed the basis of the formation and institutionalization of an art of government that circumscribes and conditions concrete acts of government. The art of government is founded on particular discursive constructions of the subjects, objects, means and telos of government, and the discursive constructions are invested in particular institutions that establish and distribute particular roles, identities, rules, norms, calculations, conceptions and imaginaries (Dean 1999). The institutions of government are not a result of conscious choices on the part of the actors, but rather the result of the sedimentation of discursive strategies that are


taken granted and recursively validated in the course of action (Laclau 1990: 33–35). The institutions of governance are vehicles for the exercise of power, but power is not analyzed in terms of repression, prohibition and taboo, but rather conceived as a field of crisscrossing discursive strategies that produce and regulate particular subjectivities. Previously the citizens of the feudal state were subjected to a sovereign power based on centralized authority, laws, and physical punishment, but in modern society there was an increasing reliance on the deployment of disciplinary techniques aiming to create docile bodies and normalizing practices aiming to shape and regulate the soul by means of defining what is normal and what is pathological. Recently, the increasing emphasis on the government of the population has taken the form of subtle attempts to mobilize and shape the freedom of individual actors and different target groups on the basis of a particular institutionalized understanding of how this freedom should be exercised and what its exercise should accomplish (Foucault 1991a: 103). Power is exercised through the construction and regulation of governance networks. In line with the historical institutionalist approach, poststructuralist institutionalism tends to view the institutions of governance as the medium and outcome of political power strategies. However, poststructuralist institutionalism claims that political strategies are ‘intentional, but non-subjective’ in the sense that they always aim to achieve or accomplish something, and yet cannot be seen as the result of the choice, decision, or strategic manipulation of an individual subject or collective agency (Foucault 1990: 94f.). This deliberate decentring of the subject clearly takes us beyond the actor-centred theory of historical institutionalism. Poststructuralist institutionalism rejects objectivist explanations of governance networks as a functional response to the gradual evolution of the inner logics of modern society. It also rejects the alternative explanation of governance networks as the result of the rational decisions of interdependent actors. Governance networks are to be explained in terms of the conditions of possibilities that are provided by the current governmentality that aims to govern at a distance through the mobilization and regulation of self-regulating individuals, organizations and networks. The present governmentality is developed in response to the problematization of both state rule and market regulation. The new governmentality program advances a global strategy for interactive governance that simultaneously supports, and is supported by, local strategies and experiences. Both the global and the local strategies of


governance, and the governance networks they engender, are stabilized by institutional forms that are conceived in terms of ‘regimes of practices’, defining what can be said and what can be done, which rules to impose and which reasons to give and what to take for granted in the interaction between a multiplicity of actors (Foucault 1991b: 75). Foucault (1980: 194) sometimes invokes the notion of dispositif, or apparatus, as a name for the relatively institutionalized discursive strategies that facilitate the contingent articulation of dissimilar subjects and objects within a relatively unified grid, assemblage, or network. In relation to the functioning of governance networks, poststructuralist institutionalism draws attention to the productive effects of the power strategies invested in particular institutions. Institutions contribute to the construction of particular subjectivities. The social and political actors are not naturally inclined to interact in and through governance networks. Neither are they automatically endowed with the capacities, sentiments and self-perceptions that are required for governance network to function properly. The actors involved in network governance must be constructed in and through institutionalized power strategies that hail them as active, responsible, self-regulating, and even democratic, actors. The institutionalized power strategies also play a crucial role for the functioning of the governance network as a whole. They will often help to construct a particular narrative that defines the overall purpose and mission of the governance networks and offers more or less technical ways of defining the problems at hand and selecting the feasible options (see Hajer 1993, 1995). The institutionalized narrative creates an operational closure by including and excluding various issues, particular forms of knowledge and certain actors. Poststructuralist institutionalism offers two different ways of understanding the institutional dynamics of governance networks. The first emphasizes the so-called tactical polyvalence of the institutionalized discourses of governance. The tactical function of discourse is neither uniform nor stable, and the discursive elements can come into play in various and opposed strategies (Foucault 1976: 100f.). In other words, the ultimate undecidability of social meanings and identities permits gradual changes of the institutional framework of action through constant displacements, modifications and resistances (Laclau 1990: 26 ff.). The other way to understand institutional transformation is through the notion of problematization and dislocation (Laclau 1990: 39 ff.). New events that cannot be integrated, domesticated, or otherwise accounted for by the relatively institutionalized discursive system will tend to reveal its limits and might even cause its partial breakdown. This will


open a strategic terrain for hegemonic struggles aiming to construct a new order by providing a new reading principle that offers a particular understanding of the crisis and the possible ways to solve it. As such, gradual transformation or ruptural change can both be explained by the theories informing poststructuralist institutionalism.

Similarities and differences The main difference between social constructivist institutionalism and poststructuralist institutionalism is that the latter tends to see institutions as an integral part of crisscrossing power struggles, whereas the former conceives institutions as a means for the integration of fragmented actors and organizations. There is also an important analytical difference between the emphasis on the individual interpretation of the institutional rules in social constructivist institutionalism and the emphasis on the discursive construction of subjectivities in poststructuralist institutionalism. However, both the social constructivist and the poststructuralist institutionalism highlight the role of norm-based action and the institutional shaping of the identities of the network actors. As such they reject the rationalist theory of action that underlies both rational choice institutionalism and historical institutionalism. The gulf between the rationalist and the anti-rationalist strands of institutionalist theory is wide and impossible to bridge. However, we should remember that what really divides the four theories is not the question of whether or not action is rational. Both March and Olsen (1989, 1995) and Foucault (1976, 1991b) will claim that action can be informed by a certain rationality, but they will insists that there are many different rationalities and that these are contingently constructed within particular institutional contexts. Historical institutionalism is sometimes portrayed as sort of compromise between rational choice institutionalism and social constructivist, or normative, institutionalism (Hall & Taylor 1996). However, the emphasis of interest-based calculations seems to bring historical institutionalism closer to rational choice institutionalism than to the culture-orientated institutionalisms that tend to emphasize the institutional and discursive conditions for the formation of the actors identities and preferences. Truly, there are attempts to insist on the role of learning and the impact of norms, values and policy paradigms (Hall 1993; Campbell 1997). But the role assigned to institutions in these arguments can still be analysed within a rationalist perspective as a matter of constraints on the range of feasible options. Hence, historical institutionalism shares with rational


choice institutionalism the emphasis on the transformative capacities of social and political actors. Only, historical institutionalism tends to think of political actors in terms of collectively organized actors and tends to relax the assumption of the pre-given interests of the actors much more than most rational choice institutionalists are prepared to do. Finally, historical institutionalists insist that institutional constraints are often very difficult to remove in the short run and therefore tend to preserve status quo, or only permit incremental changes.

The structure of Part I The chapters in Part I will further scrutinize the role of institutions for the formation, functioning and transformation of governance networks. Drawing on insights from the theories associated with the new institutionalism the three chapters will address crucial question about the necessary and sufficient conditions for the formation of governance networks; the development of virtuous and vicious circles in the functioning of governance networks; and finally the factors determining the endurance or change of governance networks over time.

2 Mechanisms of Governance Network Formation – a Contextual Rational Choice Perspective Nils Hertting

Introduction* Where do governance networks come from? How do they emerge and why do they arise? Until recently these issues have not been prioritized in the network governance literature. Focus has been on the outcomes and political consequences of governance networks. Still, it seems appropriate to claim there is a lack of elaborated theoretical arguments about governance network formation (Hay & Richards 2000). If, however, governance networks are ‘here to stay’ and network governance should be ‘taken seriously’, we need a better understanding of the mechanisms of governance network formation. If the ‘second generation of network governance research’ specifically address meta-governance strategies (cf. Sørensen & Torfing in the Introduction), a crucial element should be systematic attempts to answer the questions above. It is the purpose of this chapter to develop some theoretically informed arguments about the formation and institutionalization of governance networks from what I call a contextual and ‘thin’ rational choice perspective. According to a historical account, network modes of coordination evolve as a response to functional and organizational fragmentation and differentiation in public policy (Rhodes 1997a). First, the post-war strategy of implementing welfare policies through functionally specialized organizations and welfare sectors caused ‘over-organization’ (Hjern and Hull 1982). Secondly, NPM-strategies, including ‘agentification’ of public authorities and ‘marketization’ of the public sector increased 43


fragmentation even more (Rhodes 1997a; Pierre & Peters 2000). The historical account claims that these processes not only undermine hierarchical coordination but also create a need for new modes of governance to secure coordination, resource mobilization and problem solving. In other words, lack of coordination on the societal level, generates new governance arrangements in order to make coordination more efficient. According to this approach – Bevir and Rhodes call it ‘positivist’ in Chapter 4 in this volume – the functioning of governance networks as institutional mechanisms for coordination and resource mobilization explains why they exist. Such a functionalistic account of governance network formation makes explicit questions about the micro-mechanisms of governance network formation irrelevant; the functional consequences have been reason enough (Elster 1989). Consequently, the policy network concept often refers to structural relations of interdependencies within a policy field as well as to the informal institutions for coordination that may evolve in such a context at the same time.1 It is the merit of such grand functionalistic theories to sum up and condense historical trends. However, in order to produce more detailed ideas and insights about crucial mechanisms for governance network formation such an approach is not adequate. From a functionalistic conceptualization it seems that differentiation, fragmentation and interdependencies are sufficient mechanisms to bring about some kind of network mode of coordination. They are not. Such an account obscures the role of more or less strategic real-world actors in governance network formation and, as a consequence, the potential cooperation problems and dilemmas of organizing governance networks (Blom-Hansen 1997; Hay & Richards 1998).2 To better understand how and why governance networks are formed and how and why attempts to form such networks sometimes fail it seems reasonable, I argue, to ask what conditions are crucial for the formation of governance networks from the perspectives of interdependent actors. Even though ‘meta-governance’ strategies might help the development of governance networks (Sørensen & Torfing, Chapters 1 and 9 in this volume), governance networks are appealing as institutions capable of making and implementing legitimate policies in the absence of top down authority. Hence, it is of fundamental theoretical interest to ask under what conditions we should expect governance networks to evolve from purposeful horizontal interactions among real-world actors (Scharpf 1994: 43). That is, when and how should we expect networks, capable of producing efficient and legitimate policies and implementation, to evolve endogenously among actors without external meta-governors?

Mechanisms of Governance Network Formation 45

Interpretation, rational choice and mechanisms In this chapter I adopt a non-formal, context-oriented and ‘thin’ rational choice perspective to address these questions. The basic idea is that governance networks are products of interactions among more or less rational actors that invest in institutional arrangements to improve their capacity to implement various policy ideas. It is ‘context-oriented’ because I claim rational choice is a method for interpreting how political actors understand and give meaning to their actions in specific contexts or situations. It is ‘thin’ (Ferejohn 1991) since the idea of rationality is deliberately defined in a broad way. The rational choice approach has been questioned and appears controversial in governance networks studies (Rhodes 1997a: 174f.; Toke 2000). While rational choice analysis is often applied to stable and highly institutionalized political settings, governance networks often evolve in some kind of institutional vacuum between formal organizations. In such dynamic situations, uncertainty about the ‘rules of the game’, the set of players and their action alternatives and outcomes seems to limit the value of rational choice (cf. O’Toole 1993). That is, the nature of governance networks does not fit nicely with mainstream rational choice analysis. Sharing the argument for taking real world actors seriously and understanding governance network formation endogenously and ‘bottom up’, Bevir and Rhodes therefore argue for a ‘decentred’ approach and ‘to focus the social construction of policy networks through the ability of individuals to create meaning’ (Bevir & Rhodes, Chapter 4 in this volume). Following scholars like James D. Johnson (1990), John Ferejohn (1991), Bates et al. (1998), Bo Bengtsson (1998) and most recently Colin Hay (2005), however, I am arguing that rational choice analysis is a method for understanding the meaning that actors give certain actions in specific situations. Such a rational choice approach might be seen as a framework for reconstructive and interpretive studies.3 The idea that actors act rationally is a ‘methodological commitment’ (Popper 1965: 362), not a hypothesis about individuals and their behavior. As a methodological device, the concept of rationality should be broad, almost empty (cf. Ostrom 1990). According to such a ‘thin’ concept of rationality, actors act on the basis of a perceived rather than an objective reality (Elster 1989: 31; Ferejohn 1991: 282). The preferences of rational actors may reflect subjectively defined interests and cultural or normative orientations. What is a rational action, therefore, cannot be understood without analyzing


the meaning that actors attribute to a specific action in a specific social, political or administrative context (Scharpf 1997: 19f.). Such a rational choice method modestly assumes that actors promote governance networks because they believe such institutional arrangements will help them accomplish some kind of goal or meaning. This is not to make the public choice assumption that actors always try to maximize their selfinterest, regardless of norms and rules that go with their position. On the contrary, given the importance of organizations, professions and other more or less institutionalized actors it seems reasonable to expect that network formation strategies are very much based on the institutional and normative frameworks that define the roles of individual actors, such as social workers, school principals, national bank presidents, ministry of environment civil servants etc. Hence, rational choice analysis requires cultural knowledge and political anthropology (Bates et al. 1998: 628). The point is that rational choice analysis provides us with a tool for investigating ‘what rational can mean’ for actors in different situations and contexts ( Johnson 1990: 118). Theories are tools and one tool cannot fit every social science research endeavor. There should be nothing controversial about that. To stress the interpretive nature of rational choice analysis is not to claim that a context-oriented and ‘thin’ rational choice perspective is always appropriate. Rational choice makes a virtue of being ‘anti-holistic’. It reduces the internal complexity of political actors in order to understand outside political situations and contexts from the perspective of ‘thinly’ and contextbound rational actors. Understanding individual processes of learning and cognition requires different analytical devices (cf. Tsebelis 1990: 39f.). Mechanisms: incentive and opportunity structures The ambition in the rest of this chapter is to discuss three types of mechanisms of governance network formation by adopting such a context-oriented and ‘thin’ rational choice approach. Following Hedström & Swedberg (1996), a mechanism oriented analysis is characterized by three core features. First, a mechanism oriented analysis strives to establish immediate and close links between input and output elements of analytical entities. Second, the mechanism orientation includes a focus on relatively specific phenomena; a mechanism oriented analysis is limited in its scope. Third, the mechanism approach is based on the principle of methodological individualism, that is, the idea that actors with meanings and intentions produce those processes and changes we try to understand in social science, not casual laws beyond the reach or understanding of social actors (Coleman 1990: 8).4


From this third principle it logically follows that mechanisms are not decisive or deterministic conditions. Instead, I suggest, a mechanism should be defined and understood as an incentive and opportunity structure.5 That is, when a mechanism is working in a specific social situation the actors perceive they have the opportunity and the incentive to act in a certain way. Again, such incentives need not necessarily be economic or related to self-interests. The more specific arguments about network formation mechanisms are organized around three related questions: 1. What are the contextual incentives for network formation? 2. What strategic calculations and choices should we expect of the single interdependent policy actor? 3. And, finally, what interactions or games should we expect to support or constrain the formation and institutionalization of governance networks? In the final analysis I discuss the contribution a contextual and ‘thin’ rational choice perspective can make to the second generation of governance network studies (Torfing & Sørensen, Introduction in this volume) and our understanding of governance networks formation.

Contextual mechanism: perceived interdependencies The concept of interdependency is crucial to theories about governance networks. ‘Networks develop and exist because of the interdependency between actors’ (Klijn 1997: 31). But what is interdependency and what can it mean to real-world actors? Resource and strategic dimensions of interdependencies In order to understand how interdependencies are interpreted as an incentive structure for governance network formation, we should highlight two aspects of how actors perceive such dependency relations. Analytically, a distinction between resource dependencies and dependency relations that produce strategic externalities should be useful (cf. Hertting 2003: 61). In the network literature, the concept of resources and resource exchanges has been crucial. According to inter-organization theory, all organizations are dependent on certain fundamental and critical resources. Functionally specialized organizations need to exchange resources with others in order to achieve their goals: Actor A is dependent


on Actor B if A, in order to bring about a preferred action, needs a resource that B controls. If B at the same time need a resource that A controls, A and B are interdependent (Scharpf 1978; Benson 1982). Such dependencies are managed by resource exchanges and actors may invest in trustful network relations in order to make such exchanges more efficient. Actors in governance networks are organized by a joint interest in securing critical resources in a policy system (Klijn 1997: 31). Strategic aspects of interdependencies, in contrast, are not managed through material or financial resources exchange. The actors have the necessary resources to implement their actions, but the outcome is dependent on the actions of other actors. If actor A’s action is producing outcomes in interaction with actions taken by actors B, C and D, then A’s capacity to implement its own policies is dependent on the strategic choices of B, C and D. We may claim that such interdependencies are found on the outcome rather than the action level. To talk about information as a resource is not sufficient reason for incorporating this aspect of interdependencies. Information exchange is necessary but not always sufficient. Such dependency relations require control exchange (Coleman 1987) to be successfully managed. When the outcomes of the strategies of a set of actors interfere with each other, every single actor in the set is motivated to transfer a part of its right to autonomously choose and design its strategies to the rest of the set of actors, in exchange for a similar right to control their choice of actions. By explicating this aspect of dependencies, we are stressing the fact that perceived conflicts may be motives for a set of actors to develop governance networks (cf. Stoker 1991: 49f .). Two points have been made. First, the experience of interdependency is equivalent with that of lack of implementation capacity. Interdependent actors cannot implement their goals on their own (Hanf & O’Toole 1992). Second, we need to look beyond resources and include strategic externalities in order to understand how actors may perceive interdependencies and why they will try to develop governance networks. The distinction between resource and strategic dependencies is analytical. In real world governance, these are two related aspects of dependencies. However, as modern welfare societies have increasingly become products of political projects (cf. Wildavsky 1979) we should expect interdependencies to increasingly include this strategic dimension. Mutually perceived, mutually recognized and changing interdependencies It is perfectly compatible with a ‘thin’ rational choice approach that experiences of mutual dependencies need not necessarily be objectively


true. It is perceptions together with desires that stimulate actors to build institutional arrangements, for tomorrow including networks. As a consequence of its reductionistic character, the rationalistic perspective cannot explain how these perceptions come into existence at the individual level (cf. Wildavsky 1991). Rational choice analysts need to understand perceptions but not to understand their origin. If we are to understand the complete chain of events behind network formation, however, we should also strive to understand the power struggles between actors to define and re-redefine the policy issue and construct the dominant discourses of specific networks (cf. Toke 2000; Hajer 2003).6 It seems reasonable to argue that network formation is easier when the actors share a mutual understanding and shared perception of the policy problem (Zafonte & Sabatier 1998). From what has been said above, however, a completely shared understanding of the cause-andeffect relations should not be necessary to the emergence of governance networks. The actors may recognize and agree about the existence of interdependencies without sharing specific beliefs about the issue at hand. This is one of the characteristics of issue networks as opposed to policy communities (Rhodes & Marsh 1992). Even though a completely shared understanding is not necessary, dynamics and changing perceptions will probably create uncertainty among actors. Empirically, such uncertainty induced by dynamic perceptions may threaten the formation of governance networks (see below); analytically, it may reduce the relevance of rational choice (O’Toole 1993). Nevertheless, if political actors themselves are able to deliberately form governance networks on the basis of a collective understanding of their relations, anthropologically oriented rational choice analysts should also be able to grasp them and, hence, make relevant interpretations (Scharpf 1997: 40f., Bates et al. 1998). Hence, to become a fruitful method, context-oriented rational choice rest on some basic ideas of social constructivism. Symmetrical and asymmetrical interdependencies The consequence of structural interdependencies is that actors experience a lack of implementation capability. Having said this, it is essential to note that the importance of such dependencies is not always equally distributed. Interdependencies may be more or less asymmetrical. In a time when the complex and interdependent nature of society is emphasized, it seems appropriate to stress that a dependency relation between a set of actors can be described as mutual while the relative importance of the issue concerned can be asymmetrical (Hernes 1975;


Scharpf 1978).7 Therefore it is important to relate dependencies among actors to their evaluation of the specific problem or issue concerned. It is possible to find situations where all actors are aware of strong mutual dependencies, while the intensity of their motives for handling the situation through some kind of coordination still differs slightly. As we will see below, even small asymmetries may cause big problems when it comes to institutionalizing governance networks among limited rational actors.

Actor calculation mechanism: preference for informal networks Formally interdependent actors can be independent, but functionally they lack autonomy. They need some kind of exchange to be able to implement their goals. Yet, this is the very stuff of bargaining and negotiations (Elster 1990); this is not sufficient to an understanding of why and when interdependent actors strive for governance networks. Why should they? The need for institutions The rationale of the negotiator is to find better strategies through exchange and cooperation with others without giving up her autonomy. The dilemma of the negotiator, however, is that the search for more efficient collective strategies may conflict with the distribution of the value of these strategies (Scharpf 1997: 137ff.). Innovative strategies follow from creativity, deliberation, open communication and mutual trust. At the same time it may very well be a rational strategy for a single actor to hide or lie about its beliefs and preferences in order to create a better starting point for negotiations. That is, negotiations have an intrinsic cooperation problem: if both actor A and B strategically manipulate the information about their preferences and capabilities this will lead to imperfect negotiations and lack of coordination in the policy process. Having said this, it seems reasonable to expect that actors that repeatedly find themselves in this dilemma will value highly some kind of institutional framework (cf. Williamson 1996). If the actors perceive interdependencies as quite stable and find a repeated need for negotiations we should expect them to invest in institutions that make the single negotiation or deliberative activity more efficient. Hence, efforts to establish governance networks may be understood as strategies for establishing an institutional framework for more efficient negotiations. Hence, network formation is institutional design; that is, investments into the future in order to compensate for limited rationality and opportunistic behavior and to secure action capacities (cf. Tsebelis 1990).


The strategy of informality and generalized trust Institutions need not be formal. Governance networks are not. But why would (thinly) rational and interdependent actors prefer informal modes of coordination based on trust? One answer is that perceived interdependencies make ‘contingent consent’ (Levi 1990) possible. If interdependent actors believe they will need efficient channels for resources and control exchanges in the future they can make their cooperative strategies contingent on cooperative responses. Hence, governance networks and generalized trust could be seen as the outcome of such contingent cooperation.8 The informal character of governance networks is not only compatible with but also an inevitable outcome of this strategy. Governance networks are preferred to more formal institutional arrangements because they make a ‘cheap’ exit strategy possible. In informal institutions actors may easily withdraw their institutional consent if others do not ‘deliver’. This strategy of informality and generalized trust is somewhat paradoxical given the focus on interdependencies in the network literature. If the exit possibility is the reason why collective actors prefer network-like governance institutions, then we would expect stable governance networks to evolve among actors that have at least some capacity to implement their goals on their own or have other potential network partners to cooperate with (cf. Blumberg 2001). A governance network seems to be a stable institutional outcome among not completely interdependent actors. The value of informality presupposes a potential to act alone or together with other partners.

The game mechanism: the problem of continuous cooperation Governance networks can be seen as the product of institutional strategies among a set of interdependent actors in order to solve problems with communication, information, opportunism and transactions in complex negotiations. It is, then, not sufficient to outline the network formation rationale for the single actors. From an actor perspective governance networks as institutions might be regarded as a collective good (cf. Kickert & Koppenjan 1997; Carlsson 2000). In the social sciences it is well known that individual preferences for such collective goods are not sufficient for their provision. In that respect, governance networks are just like organizations. Governance networks are institutional outcomes on an aggregated or collective level.


Governance network as continuous cooperation What makes governance networks special, compared to other institutional mechanisms, is the continuous need for cooperation among actors. While cooperation may take place within a hierarchical context, a typical hierarchy coordinates through top down directives; and while the typical market coordinates through the aggregative outcome of a large number of autonomous and anonymous spot-contracts, we also know that negotiations and constellations may take place within market contexts. Network governance, however, needs cooperation to become a working mechanism of coordination (Zintl 1993; Scharpf 1997: 47). Consequently, we may conclude that formation should not be conceptualized as a distinct and temporary phase in a sequence of network governance. A governance network is never formed, established or institutionalized once and for all. To work as an institution for coordination, interdependent actors need to continuously constitute the network.9 They have to demonstrate their recognition of and identification with the network while they ‘use’ it in on the levels of policy production and operative actions (cf. Ostrom 1990: 53f and O’Toole, Chapter 12 in this volume). Below I will discuss three specific cooperation problems on the constitutional or formation level of governance networks identified within game theory. Referring to the previous discussion on interpretive rational choice, a ‘game’ is neither a dependent, nor an independent variable. It is an ideal type used to understand what it means to be rational in different game-like situations. Hence, the interactions are interpreted as reflections of how actors perceive and construct the governance process. In order to do so, in empirical research we need information about the set of actors that are involved in handling interdependencies, their perceived implementation capacity and available strategies, and their evaluation of expected institutional outcomes as products of different combinations of available strategies in the situation (Hermansson 1990, Ostrom 1990, Scharpf 1997). Here, three out of many formally defined games are highlighted as tools for understanding why the formation of a governance network may be troublesome or even fail although every actor would gain from such an institutional framework. The free riding problem The first cooperation problem to be discussed is ‘free riding’ (cf. Olson 1971). This is the situation where everybody would gain from cooperation, but each actor would gain even more if everybody but he or she is cooperating. Game theoretically, this situation is typically defined as a


Prisoner’s Dilemma. In such a situation not to cooperate is a ‘better’ choice, regardless of what choices the rest of the actors make. Within the vocabulary of game theory, not to cooperate is a dominant strategy (Elster 1989, Hermansson 1990). The free rider problem in network governance is a strategic situation where every actor will gain from the existence of effective governance networks. For each and every actor, however, the best situation is when everybody else is engaged in establishing and sustaining of such a network institution while he or she is enjoying the fruits of the network without contributing. If every actor follows this strategy there will always be a lack of efficient governance networks in the policy process. And since non-cooperation is a dominant strategy in Prisoner Dilemma situations this will always be the case.10 But is this a relevant analytic model? Is it possible to gain from the fruits of governance networks without supporting them? To some extent it seems so. A free riding strategy in governance network formation might be to communicate false and misleading information on own perceptions, preferences and potential actions in the process of constructing a common knowledge about interdependencies. This is an attempt to exploit the dependency and trust of others in order to improve one’s own position. If this is the game real actors play we have a situation where perfect network governance would be a collective good never realized. But there are also less flagrant forms of free riding: actors may not seriously invest time and energy in collecting and disseminating information on their positions; within organizations, higher level principals may send networking agents without resources, knowledge and authority to run the contacts with the rest of the network. ‘Conflict avoidance’ might also be interpreted as a free riding strategy (Hertting 2003: 326f.). The Prisoners Dilemma is known for its cynical view on the possibilities of cooperation; and rightly so. The model configures a situation where the rationality of the individual leads to irrationality for the collective. The problem is not lack of information about the perceptions, possibilities and preferences of others. No matter how they act, non-cooperation is always best for the individual and mutual non-cooperation is the only equilibrium. Hence, it is not only hard to establish cooperation; it will also be difficult to maintain it if, by some means, it is established (Elster 1989: 105; Hermansson 1990). The assurance problem The problem with the Prisoner Dilemma model is not the cynicism as such, however. The problem is that this stylized game logic has become


the model for cooperation problems. But every cooperation problem is not a Prisoners Dilemma. There are also less obvious problems identified within game theory. What is known as the Assurance Game describes a situation logic that threats cooperation despite a clear joint interest in mutual cooperation. In such a game each actor would get the highest pay off if he or she and everybody else did cooperate. Thus, if cooperation begins there is really no reason for anyone to end it. Mutual cooperation is equilibrium. If, however, one of the actors for some reason does not cooperate, it is also rational for the rest not to do so. The worst outcome is to be the lonely co-operator, ‘the sucker’, who genuinely tries to establish and sustain a network while the rest of actors are not. If all actors try to avoid this position and choose not to cooperate, there will be no governance network and the actors will end up in the second-worst outcome.11 As an analytic tool, the Assurance Game centers our attention on the strategic consequences of uncertainty in what seems to be an idyllic situation. The game highlights the problem of misinterpretations and lack of information in network formation. In the framework of ‘thin’ rational choice this is not an inconsistency.12 If limited rational actors lack reliable information about each other’s preferences they have reason not to cooperate in the Assurance Game. That is, although every single actor believes that everyone would gain most from network governance, it is rational for an actor not to cooperate if she doubts that the other actors make the same interpretation. That is, while complex interdependencies trigger preferences for network formation on one level, complexity may prevent the realization of such networks on another. The Assurance Game seems to grasp the logic of the ‘structural dilemma’ in network governance (Börzel 1998). According to Börzel this dilemma evolves from the ‘insecurity caused by intra-organizational control and the need for intra-organizational implementation of inter-organizational compromises’ (1998: 261). The problem is not disagreement on the need for governance institutions among the networking actors, but the lack of assurances that these network preferences will be turned into efficient network strategies, a lack due to internal interactions within participating organizations, professions, coalitions etc. The uncertainty is a rationale for non-cooperation. (Below I will come back to the issue of collective actors in network governance formation.) The generosity problem Finally, the game known as the Battle of the Sexes tells the story about the husband and wife who want to spend the night together. However,


she prefers the boxing game, while he prefers the ballet. The two parties have a common interest in coordinating so that they will reach one of two superior outcomes: spending the night together at the ballet house or the boxing stadium, rather than spending the night alone.13 The game illustrates a situation with two different cooperation equilibriums and a conflict between actors over which is preferable. In this situation it is not sufficient that the actors are allowed to communicate and enter into agreements with each other. At least not if the difference between getting the most and the second most preferred outcome is important to both actors. And this is the most important insight from the game: communication and negotiations are not enough for attaining the common good, that is, a governance network. What is needed is generosity. In order to reach stable cooperation, Actor A has to allow Actor B to reach B’s most preferred outcome while A accepts a less preferred one, or vice versa. Hence the Battle of the Sexes captures what might be called the generosity problem with governance network formation.14 Is such an analytic game model at all relevant to governance formation? I believe so. At the heart of the network governance rationale is a specific idea about the value of informal relations and trust-based coordination. A rational actor will give up just as much autonomy as is necessary to establish a coordination institution that will make the implementation of its own goals more efficient than would no coordination – and no more. This is not a very demanding assumption. Nevertheless, it points out a delicate dilemma for interdependent actors: that of balancing the need for more cooperation in order to improve the capacity to act and the desire to maintain sovereignty. This dilemma may trigger tricky games between interdependent actors with a shared preference for some kind of coordination. Even though network institutions are informal compared to organizations, the degree of informality and the arrangements for creating trust may vary. This variation may be a most strategic concern to actors in institutional design.15 The problem is no longer that some actors ruin network governance by being tempted to take the free ride-strategy, nor that the structural complexity requires an extraordinary amount of assurance and solidarity between the actors. The actors agree that they will all benefit from a network-like institution, but they disagree about its specific form; its modus operandi.16 The problem, then, is to identify one out of many possible institutional solutions when all of them will improve local coordination. The irony of the game played is that the very multiplicity of more or less


informal arrangements may prevent any of them from being realized (cf. Elster 1989). Above it was noted that asymmetries in interdependencies affect what is a rational institutional design. The value of informality depends on the potential to act alone or together with others. Despite a common interest in coordinating actions with a minimum loss of autonomy small variations in the specific institutional preferences may cause big problems in governance network formation. If real world games have incentive structures similar to the Battle of the Sexes, there will always be one partner who sees another potential network-like solution that would increase her pay off even more. Therefore, we should expect informal network governance not to attain a stable equilibrium (Hertting 2003: 342ff.). Consequently, this game model helps us to understand why there may be continuing cooperation among interdependent actors despite a failure to institutionalize a governance network that works efficiently as a coordination and resource mobilization device.17

Collective actors and vertical games So far we have explored the potential of rational choice assuming that the interdependent actors can be treated as more or less unitary and homogenous. It was even argued that institutionalized roles, as complexity reducing devices among real networking actors, is a methodological presumption for rational choice analysis. Such an assumption is sometimes, but not always, reasonable. This is an empirical issue. It depends on how the actors of the game are conceived. Often, however, it seems reasonable to expect that network partners are perceived as multi-level actors. That is, interpretation, strategic calculus and choices are supposed to be affected by decisions made on different organizational levels. The networking actors, that is, represent an organization that is an instrument for political, civil or private assemblies or boards. Hence actors in network governance are not only horizontally dependent on each other but also vertically dependent on other levels. Actors in networks governance formation often have ‘twofold loyalties’ (see Häusler et al. 1993). Trust and agreements that evolve in horizontal games between networking actors need to be approved or at least accepted within formal organizations or among a constituency. If efforts to develop horizontal relations are too successful, this is the dilemma, they may lead to more suspicion and mistrust in the vertical game within the interacting organizations. On the other hand, internal disputes within the organizations or the constituency may


negatively affect the trustworthiness of local agents in the horizontal games. This is the vertical game of collective actors in governance network formation. To have honesty simultaneously in both horizontal and vertical games of network formation, it seems, is more easily said than done (Hertting 2003: 329).

Summary and conclusion Where do governance networks come from? In this chapter some ideas about the mechanisms of governance network formation have been formulated from a contextual rational choice perspective. The starting point was simple. Governance networks were supposed to be formed in purposeful interactions among structurally interdependent actors to improve their implementation capabilities. Formulated as an interpretive and context-oriented methodology, it was argued that rational choice seems to help us ask relevant questions and development relevant ideas about the mechanisms of governance network formation. This is not the first attempt to do so (O’Toole 1993; Scharpf 1994). However the arguments, the structure of the arguments and the conclusions presented here differ. Following the well-known macro-micro-macro schedule of James Coleman (1990), the mechanisms formulated, examined and elaborated are presented in the Figure 2.1. To single actors, the experience of being interdependent is equivalent to experiencing lack of implementation capacity. Two different dimensions of interdependencies were emphasized: resource dependencies handled through resource exchanges and strategic externalities handled through control exchange. The distinction is analytical. As such

Structural interdependencies

Governance network Network gaming

Policy actors experience lack of implementation capability

Network design strategy

Preference for coordination Calculations for informal institutions in order to improve negotiations

Figure 2.1 Perceptions, calculations and games in governance network formation


it emphasizes the fact that mutual dependencies may be more or less important to actors. The degree of asymmetry is crucial. Furthermore, the experience of a mutual understanding of dependency relations is not necessary. A mutual recognition is sufficient. Second, an internal calculus for informal network modes of coordination was formulated. Formally independent but functionally interdependent actors prefer, cetaris paribus, informal and trust-based networks to more formal modes of coordination. Informal networks make it possible to manage interdependencies more efficiently without surrendering formal autonomy while remaining able to leave the institution whenever that becomes desirable. If the exit possibility is why collective actors prefer network-like institutions, however, we should expect stable governance networks to evolve among actors that have at least some capacity to implement their goals on their own, or have other potential network partners to cooperate with. Hence there seems to be a limit to the degree of dependency as an incentive for network formation. Actors that perceive a highly asymmetrical interdependence will probably prefer more formalized forms of coordination. Compared to hierarchies and markets, governance networks need continuous cooperation to work as an institutional arrangement for policy production. Hence there is no distinct formation-phase of networks. They need to be established and confirmed through cooperative actions and attitudes all the way. From this observation, three different cooperation problems where formulated through game theory: the free-rider problem, the assurance problem and the generosity problem. Rational choices of many individual actors may very well end up as irrational outcomes for the collective. Therefore, governance network formation may fail among a set of rational actors that would all gain from it. This is not necessarily due to irrationality. Furthermore, game theory teaches us that there is a threat to governance network formation even in idyllic situations like the Assurance Game. Furthermore, the analysis of the ‘generosity problem’ defined by the Battle of the Sexes suggests that small details may have major consequences for the formation and maintenance of governance networks. Even small differences with regard to the preferred institutional arrangements, reflecting slightly different perceptions of interdependencies, may turn governance network formation into a frustrating endeavor, and make governance network formation failure a regular experience. In the final ‘game’ analysis the prospects for straightforward or even successful network formation may seem disappointing. At least it should be clear that, from a rationalistic perspective, shared recognition


of interdependencies as well as a shared preference for governance networks is not sufficient for the formation of governance networks. Somewhat paradoxically, to analytically treat actors as rational is perhaps most productive when governance network formation fails although interdependent actors agree about the need for it (cf. Miller 2000). This is not to say that governance networks are not here to stay, or should not be taken seriously. However, in order to understand metagovernance and the prospects of meta-governance strategies, we need analytic tools that reveal rather than obscure the opportunities and incentives to form governance networks among real world actors.

Notes *

1.

2.

3.

4.

5. 6.

An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the workshop on ‘Democratic Network Governance: Theoretical Puzzles’ in Roskilde, Denmark, 28–29 April 2005. I would like to thank the workshop participants, including Allan Dreyer Hansen, Laurence O’Toole, Hans-Erik Klijn and the editors Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing, for helpful comments. I would also like to thank Bo Bengtsson and Evert Vedung for earlier discussions on the arguments of this chapter. The definition of O’Toole et al. (1997) makes this very explicit: ‘An implementation network, like any other policy network, is the pattern of linkages traced between organizational actors who are in some way interdependent. It is also a socially constructed vehicle for purposive action. Like organizations themselves, implementation networks are intended to be used as instruments for mobilizing the energies and efforts of individual actors to deal with the problem at hand’ (139, my italics). See also Pierson (2000b) for a discussion on functionalistic reasoning on institutional design within political science. This seems also to be true for the literature on ‘network management’ (Kickert et al. 1997). These theorists seem more concerned with identifying what instruments might be used, rather than what strategic incitements may guide managers and meta-governors in different network situations. On this issue I am particularly indebted to influences from and discussions with Bo Bengtsson. For a more elaborated argument, see Hertting 2003, ch. 4 (in Swedish). See also O’Toole, Chapter 12 in this volume. O’Toole argues for a ‘heuristic use’ of game theory. It should be noted that the principle of methodological individualism has a more pragmatic and policy relevant dimension. If the principle is adapted the analysis will focus on the level where possible interventions need to be implemented, that is, by actors. This is also to say that scientific interpretations about phenomena at the system level which refer to the incitements at the actor level will become more useful and policy relevant than a statistical explanation where only aggregated data is used. See Elster (1990), Bengtsson (1999) and Hertting (2003) for more elaborated discussions on the mechanisms and rationality. Interdependency relations in homelessness policy, for instance, are interpreted very differently if we think that the heart of the problem is the homeless


7.

8. 9. 10.

11.

12. 13. 14. 15.

16. 17.

individuals and their way of life, or the existing housing stock and the functioning of the housing market. From the former perspective (or narrative), actors dealing with social services, mental illness, drug abuse, crime and health care are seen as crucial. From a more structural oriented perspective on the causes of homelessness, housing companies, planning authorities, housing investment banks etc become most relevant. It should be obvious that there is no need to talk about interdependencies if they are completely asymmetrical (cf. Scharpf 1978). The point should rather be understood from the opposite perspective: in order to understand processes of governance network formation it might be crucial to understand how important the relevant issue at stake is. This idea is also similar to that of ‘repeated games’ as explanation for the emergence of cooperative norms (Axelrod 1986). In terms of the institutional grammar of Crawford & Ostrom (1995), governance networks are neither rules nor norms, but ‘strategies in equilibrium’. With pay off-values of the game matrix this is to say that the actors do not achieve what is best for the collective, i.e. mutual cooperation (3,3), or what is best for the individual, i.e. everybody but oneself cooperates (1,4 or 4,1). That is, the preference ordering for every actor is: (1) mutual cooperation (governance network), (2) everybody but oneself cooperates (a governance network is established but ego is not a core participant), (3) no-one cooperates (no network), (4) oneself cooperates but no-one else does (no network). Quite the opposite: it exemplifies the value of game theory in analysing interactions among limited rational actors. See Hermansson 2003:140f., and Scharpf 1997:74f. for presentations and analysis of the Battle of the Sexes game. The Battle of the Sexes logic as a generosity problem is formulated by Hermansson (1990, 2003). Cf. Miller’s analysis of dilemmas in political hierarchies (2000:539). For a more general discussion on the politics of institutional change, see Tsebelis 1990, chapter 4. See also Schneider 1993:263ff. for a similar point. In Hertting (2003) I have interpreted the phenomenon of ‘repeated cooperation in frustration’ over 15 years or more in Swedish urban governance as the reflection of a Battle of Sexes game.

3 Virtuous and Viscous Circles in Democratic Network Governance B. Guy Peters

Much of extensive literature on network governance centers on established patterns of relationships among actors (see Bogason 2000; Sørenson and Torfing 2003) in networks, although the relationships found at any one time are, of course, the products of development over time. The nature of the networks at that single time reflects the political and organizational processes that have created them, the continuing challenges of maintaining effective networks, and also comprise the foundation for strengthening or weakening the relationships in the future. Like most important social phenomena there is a dynamic that supports networks, but also like most other social phenomena, those dynamics are less well-understood than are the static conditions. As we study networks and their relationship to the public sector and to public policy, there is a tendency to focus on those relationships that have been successful. This tendency is in part because those relationships that are not so successful are generally dissolved rather quickly and hence are not so visible as are the more successful ones. Further, we rarely ask questions about the networks that never even formed at all, and what conditions led to their absence. To the extent that the theory on networks develops further we should be able to specify conditions that are conducive to the formation of these structures and then examine likely circumstances in which the networks did not form – the dogs that do not bark. The focus on the surviving networks, therefore, appears to constitute a selection bias (Geddes 2003), if at times an unwilling or unconscious one, in the study of these structures, and therefore may lead us to believe theoretically that networks are more significant actors, and more readily formed structures, than they may actually be in the real world. 61


A more conscious bias in favor of functioning networks may creep into the work because most scholars who do research on networks are not only interested in these patterns of governing intellectually, but also tend to be committed to this form of governing as a more democratic alternative to the traditional patterns of parliamentary democracy (see Denters et al. 2003). Therefore, there has been some tendency (probably again largely unwitting) to report positive results and to dismiss any failures as aberrations.1 While this commitment to the approach to governance is understandable, and in some ways is laudable, it can make gauging the true size of the population of networks, and therefore their relative success and failure in organizing social actors for involvement in the policy process, more difficult than it might otherwise be. Even in the cases of positive network formation and operation, however, there has been little discussion of the dynamics of developing effective patterns of interaction within the networks. To the extent that there have been explanations of successful development, these explanations have assumed that the individuals involved, and especially the skills of their leadership, were the principal factor in the observed success (see Kickert et al. 1997). Those personal factors are certainly important, but there are other structural factors that also should be considered when conceptualizing these processes of developing networks. In particular, the nature of the organizations as collective actors (rather than the individuals within them), the tasks being undertaken by the networks, and the political environment in which the network operates will all have some influence on the success of these structures. This paper will utilize institutional theory to help understand the process of creating and maintaining networks, and also for understanding the range of relationships among public and private sector actors involved in the policy process. In particular, I will be discussing process of institutionalization and deinstitutionalization within structures that link state and society. These processes have been discussed primarily in reference to more formalized structures, but much of the same logic can apply to these less formal social structures composed of a number of individual organizations (see Peters 2005). The various conceptualizations of institutionalization in the literature all provide some insight into processes of creating stable patterns of interaction among the actors within an organization, or in our case a collection of organizations.

Institutionalization and deinstitutionalization The fundamental process of concern here is the process of creating and strengthening institutional relationships among the actors within a

Virtuous and Viscous Circles in Democratic Network Governance 63

network, and conversely the processes by which those relationships can be weakened. The concept of institutionalization is a familiar one in political analysis (Polsby 1968; Huntington 1968), but tends to take on different meanings dependent upon the particular conception of institutions that is being used (see Torfing this volume). Institutions are such a central phenomenon in social and political life that a number of scholars have addressed these structures, and naturally have done so in his or her distinctive manners. Thus, there is no single conception of institutionalization (or indeed institutions) that can be used to discuss virtuous and vicious cycles in networks, but rather there are several alternatives. For normative and sociological conceptions of institutions institutionalization involves creation of a normative structure that can influence the behavior of individuals who are members of the structure. Philip Selznick (1954), a leading scholar in the founding days of this tradition, argued that institutionalization was ‘infusing a structure with meaning greater than necessary for the mechanical achievement of their tasks’. In other words, creating an institution (as opposed to a simple organization that can be effective even if it remains merely a mechanical entity) involves creating within the individuals who participate an attachment that extends beyond simply getting a job done – the structure has to mean something to the individuals.2 In this sociological conception deinstitutionalization involves the members of the structure losing that personal commitment and begin to conceptualize their involvement with the structure in purely mechanistic and utilitarian manners (see Oliver 1992). Alternatively, individuals may begin to attach a different meaning to their involvement from the one held by the organizers of the structure, and therefore create different internal cultures within the one structure. Those alternative interpretations of the reality within which the institution functions then makes it substantially more difficult for the institution (in this case a network) to fulfill its stated purposes. This pattern of multiple realities may be particularly likely in networks, given that many different conceptions of the policy area can be held by different organizations which are involved in the network. For example, much of the network literature in the Netherlands focuses on networks working in environmental policy, and environmental groups, farmers, industrialists and ordinary citizens may attach different meanings to their involvement, even if it is meaningful for all of them. Rational choice conceptions of institutionalization focuses on rules and compliance with rules, or on the manipulation of incentives in order to produce the involvement of individuals with the institution


(Ostrom 1990; Shepsle 1989). Given their informal nature and minimal enforcement mechanisms networks are not ordinarily well-suited for the imposition of rules, although informal rules may begin to have the same force as more formalized norms. Another means of considering the formation of institutions from a rational choice perspective is that they are a mechanism for reducing transaction costs among the actors involved in the network (Williamson 1996). Reducing those costs can be done through rules, through creating routinized patterns of interaction, or through moving decisions with collective consequences into some larger structures.3 Thus, networks may want to maintain internal solidarity by avoiding some decisions. Rules are not likely to be as viable a source of compliance in policy networks as they are in other settings, but the networks do still provide powerful incentives for their members to participate. The ability to participate in making and implementing policies relevant to their members provides organizations an important reason to remain members of the network, and hence they are likely to remain members so long as they capable of exerting that influence. Indeed, the danger is that organizations become coopted by their membership in networks and begin to consider membership in the network more important than pursuing the particular goals of their members.4 Further, institutionalization in this utilitarian conception of the dynamics of networks would be considered too calculating by the normative institutionalists, who would require some deeper commitment to the structure in order to say that institutionalized stability had been achieved. Finally, from the perspective of historical institutionalism, the nature of networks and the interaction among their members may be structured by their initial formative moments. That perspective, however, to a significant extent begs the question of when that moment has occurred for a network, and how networks can respond to changing policy demands and changing membership if their formation is so crucial. Paul Pierson (2000a), for example, has emphasized the importance of positive feedback in reinforcing behaviors in the historical institutionalism, with a virtuous cycle thereby being institutionalized and being able to carry the initial policy ideas forward to even greater success. This argument is close to that of the rational choice institutionalists, but focuses more on the maintenance of the policies of the network more than on the involvement of actors, something that appears assumed in much of the historical institutionalist literature.


Factors associated with virtuous and viscous spirals While the above conceptual definitions and schemes for analysis provide the means for understanding changing relationships among the actors in networks, we should go further, and begin to identify variables that will contribute to the success or failure of policy networks. Unlike the numerous schemes for identifying institutions and institutionalization, there has been somewhat less work identifying the factors associated with the formation and maintenance of those structures. Christine Oliver (1992) has, however, developed an analytic scheme for examining the factors associated with the deinstitutionalization of existing institutions, and this scheme can simply be run backwards to consider factors that may be associated with the initial development of institutions, and their successful maintenance. Although her analysis was directed primarily toward private sector organizations of various types, the same logic can be used to understand the creation, or dissolution, of institutionalized network structures. Oliver’s framework contains five factors that affect the possibility and rate of change in institutions. Two of these factors are characteristic of any organization or institution, not just network structures. On the one hand, all social systems are entropic. Unless ‘energy’ of some sort is imported (see Katz and Kahn 1978) into the social system that system will tend to break down, or in terms relevant for this paper, they will deinstitutionalize. So, for networks, the energy that is needed from the environment is the continued active support of the relevant social actors, as well as perhaps the capacity to attract new members whenever new groups are formed and become significant actors in the policy field. Also, if the problem with which the network is concerned develops new dimensions, it may have to adjust and begin to import new actors if it wishes to be successful.5 Thus, if we assume that the environment of most policy networks is turbulent, then there will be a need for continuous adjustment and involvement of actors as they emerge to fit into niches created in that environment. In contrast, institutions and other social structures have some inertial pressures so that once they have been created they tend to persist unless there are significant reasons to dismantle the structure (see Zucker 1988). For networks in the public sector inertial pressures tend to be especially strong for those institutions that have been in place for longer periods of time. As in the conventional arguments from historical


institutionalists these networks and their patterns of doing business have been able to survive initial tests and have institutionalized an effective pattern. Although they may face future challenges their internal processes are assumed to have become sufficiently routinized to weather those challenges, and to overcome the types of pressures for deinsitutionalization that are outlined below. Inertia may be even more relevant for social systems than other types of systems because the individuals involved in the institutions derive some benefits simply from their participation in the organization.6 For networks the intrinsic values of participation may not be so great for individuals, given that they are already members of an organization that should be providing some of those benefits. Still, the opportunity to interact with a wider range of people concerned with the same issues, and perhaps also to be involved in a larger pattern of social action may enhance the intrinsic appeal of participation and build on the existing inertia. The other three factors in Olivier’s framework for understanding deinstitutionalization (or by inference institutionalization) are identified as being political, functional and social. These pressures are certainly relevant for the networks with which we are concerned in this analysis, although their nature may be substantially different than for private sector organizations. The framework is relevant even though networks are composed of individual organizations that themselves may be subject to the pressures for deinstitutionalization. Although the individual organizations would be a worthy subject for an inquiry of their own, in this Chapter I will consider changes at that level to be a second order consequence (or perhaps cause) of institutionalization or deinstitutionalization at the network level.

Political factors Much of the theorizing about institutionalization and the breakdown of institutions has been done in the context of the private sector so that ‘political’ in this framework means something rather different than we might assume at first glance. In this model ‘political’ refers to the extent to which the established values and myths within the institution are accepted, and the success of the institution in producing the desired outcomes for its members. In other words, institutions will be engaged in virtuous cycles when the institutionalized practices produce both greater acceptance among the members, and therefore also greater involvement of those members in the functioning of the network.


Saying that growing consensus or dissensus on values and symbols within a network is crucial for its maintenance borders upon being a tautology. The more important question is the source of that internal consensus, or lack thereof. To some extent that internal conformity of network members may be a function of the consistency of ideas and real economic interests among the membership. Part of the logic of networks is to include the range of interested parties surrounding a policy area, but that inclusiveness may increase problems in maintaining internal consensus. The crucial factor for the internal effectiveness of the institution (network) may be the capacity to create common commitment toward the content of the network – a product or a process or a clientele – even if the actual approaches to that content may be substantially different (see Scott 1987). Some network scholars have discussed this dimension of network development in cognitive terms.7 In particular, scholars have argued that effective management of networks involves eliminating the ‘dialogue of the deaf’ that may result from alternative conceptions of the tasks of the network and the creation of common languages and understandings. This process then involves altering to some extent the cognitions of the members of the network. Part of the task for leadership is in framing the issues and the responses for the network.8 The term framing generally is used to describe the process for developing common conceptions of policy issues among a set of actors, and Schön and Rein (1996) and others (see Bevir and Rhodes, Chapter 4 in this volume) have used the concept of ‘reframing’ to describe how changing cognitive maps in a policy are can enable seeming intractable policy problems to be resolved. That cognitive level of action may be crucial for networks that are truly inclusive of a range of actors and interests in a policy area. In a network with those diverse values developing a common frame may be the only means of actually achieving institutionalization, a premise that would fall clearly in the sociological institutionalism described above. Similarly, Eugene Bardach’s concept (1999) of ‘collaboration’ as means of coping with the classic administrative problem of coordination is in essence a call for reframing issues so that multiple organizations can find them acceptable to their own policy commitments while at the same time cooperating with others. In addition to the necessary cognitive mobilization, the political capacity to generate consensus in the network may also be a function of the degree of mutual dependence of the members of the network. Although almost by definition the members of a network have some level of interdependence, that mutual dependence does vary. For


example, if the network for delivering a service involves both funders and the groups that can actually deliver the services, and representatives of the recipients of the services then this structure is more likely to be successful in cooperation than are structures that have members that are less dependent upon one another. Resource dependency approaches to politics (Rhodes 1988) and to organizational theory have pointed to the importance of that interdependency in defining interactions and in institutionalizing the networks. Further, the internal consensus or dissensus within a network may be affected by its connection with other institutions and networks. On the one hand institutions may want to be connected broadly to their task environments in order to be able to influence those environments and to be more successful (see functional pressures, below) in achieving their policy goals. On the other and, however, to the extent that the network is connected to the external task environment its internal consistency and the integration among the members may be lessened. In particular, to the extent that individuals or in the case of networks organizations play boundary spanning roles those structures may not be able to maintain their institutional integrity to the extent that others structures are. That boundary-spanning role may create resource dependence outside the individual network and hence potentially make it more effective in achieving its tasks in that external environment. Politics is a factor in shaping networks therefore both within the networks and between the networks and the external environment. To some extent the arguments presented here (and in the following section) present networks with a dilemma. On the one hand, if the emphasis is placed on creating external links that could be functional for the achievement of goals within the task environment then the capacity to create a common frame within the network itself may be reduced. On the other hand, however, too much of an emphasis on the external dimension may reduce internal cohesion and lead eventually to deinstitutionalization. While I am attempting to minimize the role of individuals in this analysis, this is clearly a problem for which effective leadership within the network will be crucial. Framing and reframing are appealing analytically, but practically may not be as easy to achieve as it might appear. We should expect the interest groups and other actors involved in the typical network to have commitments to particular ways of viewing and policy area, and also to have genuine interests. Likewise, ideologies may intervene to limit the capacity of members of a network to cooperate and to develop a common conceptualization of their tasks and their environment. Therefore,


simply saying one wants to reframe may well be insufficient to overcome the resistance. At this point the political capacity of the leadership of the network becomes crucial for institutionalization.

Functional factors In addition to the political factors, based largely on the self-interests of the members of the networks, what Oliver calls functional factors influence the capacity of networks (or other structures) to institutionalize. Practices within networks may be more or less conducive to their achieving policy goals for the members, or even in the internal management of the affairs of the network itself. In other words, while some practices may not be favored by the members of an institution those practices may still be effective, and hence may be maintained even in the face of the disfavor of some members. Conversely, even if internal practices continue to be accepted internally by the members they may be abandoned if they are externally dysfunctional (see Covaleski and Dinsmith 1988). Given the above definitions of functional factors, I will also be concerned with the macro-level relationships between the policy-making processes (including networks involved in the process) and the public as a whole. In particular, there are two alternative outcomes possible in the relationships between the success of building networks internally, and their success of making and implementing policy. We can think of these two outcomes as the internal and the external success of networks. The Oliver framework tends to treat these two forms of success as complementary processes, but in reality the two goals may be almost conflicting with one another for the attention of members of networks. Milward and Provan’s work (1998), on the other hand, tends to demonstrate the close linkage of internal and external factors in the effectiveness of network governance. On the one hand, we could argue that there are virtuous circles in which success in making and implementing public policies are associated with more positive perceptions, and greater legitimacy, of the policymaking apparatus. In terms of the normative approach to institutions the myths, symbols and routines of the network will become more widely accepted. That greater legitimacy, in turn, will enhance the capacity of these policy-making structures to be effective in subsequent rounds of making policy, and success will beget success for the future of the network. In other words, success may breed success at this locus for analysis, as well as in the relationships among the actors themselves.


The alternative hypothesis would be that higher levels of integration within a policy network may separate that network from the rest of the policy system. That separation, in turn, may make the network less successful in achieving its collective purposes in the context of a complex policy process involving a number of actors and a variety of connections with the private sector. Effective policy making in many policy fields, and almost certainly a growing number of policy areas. may require the capacity to coordinate and integrate across policy areas. Therefore, creating higher levels of integration in a network within the policy area may involve some judgment about the extent to which the network should focus on internal consistency and how much it should focus on the capacity to work effectively with other networks within their own, and other, policy areas.

Social pressures Just as networks themselves may change, so too can the environment within which they function. At the most proximate level these changes in the social setting of the network can reflect changes in other networks with which any one network interacts. At a more remote, but perhaps at a more significant level for networks concerned with public policy, there can be changes in the receptivity of government to networks pressures or changes in the policy priorities of government. For example, if there are high levels of political change in the society and frequent turnovers in government then networks may not be as effective in institutionalizing themselves and institutionalizing their political influence as they would be in more stable political environments. Those problems would be exacerbated if the changes in partisan control of government also involved significant ideological changes. During the past several decades the rapid changes introduced in government practices will have had a major influence on networks and on their capacity to exert influence on policy. For example, the NP Management (NPM) has tended to influence government in the direction of utilizing markets more than political influences such as networks to make and implement policy. To some extent the market-based reforms usually associated with NPM and participatory reforms reflected in the use of networks have been implemented simultaneously, sometimes in the same countries and policy areas. Therefore, there are changes in the policy-making environment that may make the effectiveness of networked governance formats less effective than they might otherwise be, and perhaps producing some deinstitutionalization.


Just as governments have been altering their patterns of delivering policy, the society may also change its assessment of the efficacy of political action versus market action, or other forms of private action, in obtaining goals. The well-documented loss of faith on public action (Pharr & Putnam 2000) may also affect the involvement of actors in policy networks, even if those networks are perceived as an alternative to more conventional forms of public sector action. If actors begin to believe that public action is fruitless, their involvement with the network may actually intensify, believing that these more informal structures may be the only effective means of achieving their goals (McLaverty 2002).

Other factors in explaining success The Oliver model provides a useful framework for analyzing processes of institutionalization and deinstitutionalization, but several other factors should also be mentioned that do not fit neatly into this analytic scheme. Although one purpose of the institutionalization framework is to remove the emphasis on individuals, some impact of individuals can not, or should not, be ignored.

Characteristics of the members Individuals do play an important role in explaining the success or failure of networks in creating a virtuous cycle of development. It is rather obvious that organizations that are better resourced and populated with more capable individuals will have a higher probability of being effective both internally and externally.9 That having been said, however, there are other, somewhat less obvious, characteristics of the members of networks that will also influence the upward or downward trajectories of the relationship. The consistency of the membership of the network will have a significant impact on the development of the network. In the first instance a membership of an network that is more consistent in terms of their interests (meaning economic or social interests) is more likely to be successful in maintaining internal cohesion and institutionalizing, especially in the sense defined by Selznick. Further, these networks would be capable of making decisions readily (given the relative lack of internal dissent) and hence might be more effective political actors in dealing with their external environment. On the other hand, more consistent networks may have a more difficult times being as effective – defined in terms of having their


decisions actually implemented – as desired by their members than would more heterogenous networks. The more heterogenous networks may have difficulty in making decisions and in creating social integration, but once they have decided something it is more likely to be acceptable to other relevant interests in the policy area. The danger of success in implementing programs for the network is that the decisions that are possible with a wide range of interests involved are suboptimal. Indeed, they may not be much different from the decisions that might be reached by the interaction of multiple networks, each of which was more internally homogeneous. The discussion of ‘epistemic communities’ in the literature on networks (Adler 1992) demonstrates one of the most important sources of consistency among a network, and hence a major source of successful institutionalization. These policy communities founded on the basis of a common body of knowledge tend to have very strong integration, given that the members have already been socialized into a profession or into a scientific discipline that tells then what the important questions are, and what the right answers to those questions probably are. Again, however, the greater likelihood of successful integration of these structures may make it less probable that they will be able to deal effectively with other groups who lack the common perspective on the issues. That difficulty in interaction with other networks may be overcome for purposes of external effectiveness by the legitimacy conferred by scientific expertise, but in the end the technical solutions may not always triumph in a complex political environment. As networks develop over time they face the need to replace member or simply add new members. The capacity of the network to control its own patterns of socialization, and perhaps even to control its own membership, will be important for enhancing and maintaining integration and institutionalization. In her discussion of institutions Elinor Ostrom (1990) discusses membership rules as one of the crucial decisions that must be made for the development, and the maintenance of institutions, and for our purposes the development of networks. Although, as noted, networks have perhaps more difficulty in enforcing rules than do other types of structures, membership may be one area that is easier for them to control. Finally, the relative equality among the constituent members of the network will influence the degree of institutionalization and integration within the network. One can, however, hypothesize contradictory patterns of relationship. On the one hand, a network composed or relatively equal actors, in terms of size, resources, etc. may find integration


easier. The absence of a dominant player may facilitate the cooperation of the members who would all believe that they are able to pursue their interests and shape the programs of the network. On the other hand, however, having a strong and even dominant actor involved in the network may provide a focus for its activity and may enhance institutionalization.

Operating environment As well as the characteristics of the members affecting the capacity of networks to integrate themselves and to be successful in pressing their demands on the political systems, the nature of the operating environment also influences those networks. Although I will now consider these issues separately, they may also be related to the characteristics of the networks themselves. The networks can not be considered in isolation from the content of the programs that they are involved with, not the overall political context within which they function. Most of the discussion of the virtues, or even possibilities, of network governance has been conducted within Northern European countries characterized by high levels of individual and social trust. This precondition is not available in all European societies, much less in most of the rest of the world. Therefore, to the extent that these conceptions of governance are to be generalizable, they may have to be considered in very broad comparative context. That having been said, the development of network type structures may be a means of fostering greater social trust and cooperation. Individuals may learn how to cooperate within a network of common interests and that learning may contribute to developing more extensive social capital in the society. At one point in the development of the literature on policy implementation scholars of public administration were criticized for focusing on the ‘single lonely organization’ (Hjern & Porter 1980). While that problem has been overcome (see Winter 2004) much of the contemporary literature might be criticized for focusing on the ‘single lonely network’. Just as institutional theory has as a basic premise that the environment of institutions is other institutions, so too should the network literature concentrate some attention of the environment of any one network, composed at least in part by other networks. The complexity of that environment will influence the capacity of each network to integrate programs, just as more complex environments affected the capacity of individual organizations. One of the most relevant concerns for a network is the range of issues with which it must be involved. I will hypothesize that the greater the


range of issues that any network is forced to cope with politically the greater will be the internal strains and hence the less will be the likelihood of successful institutionalization of the network. While we can define a network as those organizations interacting over a single policy area or issue that may merely define away the problem, rather than attempting to understand the consequences of the almost inevitable connection of any network to a range of concerns and the need to work in ways that produce more effective integration. The nature of the operating environment of networks, as composed of other policy networks and other programs makes coordination one of the important policy demands for networks. While individual programs must be made to work well, so too must the assembly of programs in government as a whole. At a minimum the programs within a particular area of policy, e.g. economic development or social policy, should work together effectively. Coordination has been one of the continuing concerns of government, and given the connections of networks to governance the need for coordination is no less. However, as I argued above with respect to the general effectiveness of networks, I would expect that networks that are more effective internally would be less effective in dealing with other networks in their environment.

Tasks Yet another factor affecting the capacity of networks to integrate effectively is the nature of the tasks being undertaken by the network. Networks are in some settings responsible for both policy formulation and for policy implementation, or they may responsible for only one or another of these activities. Everything else being equal, we would expect networks responsible for implementation to find it easier to institutionalize and to integrate than are those responsible for both activities, and also that networks responsible for implementation only would have the easiest time developing stable working patterns. Formulating public policies is potentially highly contentious, especially if the network is inclusive and involves a range of social interests. As a consequence having to decide on a common approach may make institutionalization difficult, especially when considered from the sociological perspective of creating common value commitments among the members.

Summary and conclusions Networks are an increasingly important component of governing in a range of countries, especially those in Northern Europe. Even if one is


not as committed to this concept as a means of enhancing governance and legitimacy as some scholars are, it is difficult to deny the role that these aggregations of organizations and individuals often do play in governing. The role played by networks varies substantially by country and by policy area within countries, but in order to be effective these institutional structures must develop and then maintain some degrees of internal commitment from their members. They must also have some capacity to make decisions that can satisfy their members and achieve their own collective policy goals. Even if networks are successful in forming initially, they are still under threat of deinstitutionalizing and succumbing to the entropic pressures present in any social system. Although the individuals involved in networks are important for shaping those networks, there are also a number of structural factors that can affect the success of these structures. The types of organizations that are involved in networks, the size of those networks, and the range of activities in which the networks are involved all affect the ability of networks to institutionalize effective internal interactions. Those same factors also affect the capacity of the networks to represent the interests of their members to official and unofficial actors outside the network. Given that to be successful in getting what it (or more precisely its members) want from their involvement in the policy process any one network is likely to have to work with others, the institutional approach also must be extended to examine interactions between that network and its environment of other networks and institutions.

Notes 1. In fairness, most areas of the social sciences tend to report positive results rather than results that might bring into question our favorite theories. 2. In terms of Etzioni-Halevy’s (1964) theory of organizations the participants must have a moral form of compliance with the dictates of the institution, rather than the remunerative relationship that would be adequate for most organizations. 3. Williamson used transaction cost analysis as a means of understanding the virtues of the firm within the more market as a means of organizing activity and bringing together. 4. These cooptive arguments have been made about several types of European policy making arenas, and have been in place for some years. See, for example, Heisler (1974) and Duran (2000). 5. For example, as immigration becomes a significant dimension for employment policy in many countries networks established to deal with labor market issues must expand to include those new actors. 6. One classic approach to organizations focused on the ‘solidary incentives’ offered by memberships in the organization that is, some people would

76 Theories of Democratic Network Governance participate in organizations simply for the social interactions, rather than to get anything material or to achieve any particular purposes. 7. The institutional literature also has utilized cognitive terms to describe the basis for forming institutions. One of W. Richard Scott’s (1995) three dimensions of institutional analysis is the cognitive, along with the regulatory and the normative. 8. In institutional theory the sociological/normative approach has argued this role for leadership very clearly in the context of institutional change. See Brunsson and Olsen (1993). 9. Obvious, perhaps, but not necessarily always true. For example, some organizations of the disadvantaged have been successful in registering moral claims that have overcome the apparent powers of opposing interests.

4 Decentred Theory, Change and Network Governance Mark Bevir and R. A. W. Rhodes

Introduction Governance is often defined as self-organizing, inter-organizational networks. Of course, people define governance in all kinds of ways. Nonetheless, social scientists typically appeal to inexorable, impersonal forces such as the functional differentiation of the modern state or the marketization of the public sector to explain the shift from hierarchy to markets to network governance. We will invoke the Anglo-governance school as an illustration of such a postivist approach to network governance. We also will offer a decentred alternative to such positivist approaches. To decentre is to focus on the social construction of a practice through the ability of individuals to create, and act on, meanings; it is to unpack a practice in terms of the disparate and contingent beliefs and actions of individuals (Bevir & Rhodes 2003: ch. 4). When we decentre governance, we challenge the idea that inexorable, impersonal forces are driving a shift from bureaucratic government to networks. We argue, instead, that governance and networks are constructed differently by many actors against the background of diverse traditions. After decentring governance theory, we turn our attention to the analysis of network dynamics. We contrast the mainstream accounts of the conditions under which networks change, succeed and fail with a decentred account. We also provide a brief illustration of how ethnography helps us to recover meanings among network actors. Finally, we criticise comprehensive accounts of governance, suggesting that a decentred theory prompts us to study the everyday practices of situated agents whose beliefs and actions are informed by traditions and expressed in stories.1 77


Positivist approaches to network governance Behind the idea of network governance, there usually lurks the idea that its emergence reflects something akin to a logic of modernization – a logic of functional specialisation and institutional differentiation. Entrenched institutional patterns purportedly ensured that neo-liberal reforms lead not to markets but to the further differentiation of policy networks in an increasingly hollow state. Social scientists typically use a concept of differentiation here to evoke differences based on function. Because they use differentiation in this way, they offer broadly positivist accounts of governance. They treat governance as a complex set of institutions and institutional linkages defined by their social role or function. They make any appeal to the contingent beliefs and preferences of agents largely irrelevant. In Britain, positivist accounts of network governance challenge the Westminster model (Rhodes 1997a, 2000c; Richards & Smith 2002, Stoker 1999, 2004; and for discussion Marinetto 2003). They capture recent changes in British government in a way the Westminster model cannot. They start with the notion of policy networks or sets of organisations clustered around a major government function or department. These networks commonly include the professions, trade unions and big business. So, the story continues, central departments need such networks to cooperate in delivering services. They allegedly need their co-operation because British government rarely delivers services itself; it uses other bodies to do so. Also, there are said to be too many groups to consult so government must aggregate interests; it needs the legitimated spokespersons for that policy area. The groups in turn need the money and legislative authority that only government can provide. Policy networks are a long-standing feature of British government; they are its silos or velvet drainpipes. The Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher sought to reduce their power by using markets to deliver public services, bypassing existing networks and curtailing the ‘privileges’ of professions, commonly by subjecting them to rigorous financial and management controls. But these corporate management and marketization reforms had unintended consequences. They fragmented the systems for delivering public services, creating pressures for organisations to co-operate with one another to deliver services. In other words, marketization multiplied the networks it aimed to replace. Commonly, packages of organisations now deliver welfare state services. Positivist accounts of governance thus concentrate on the spread of

Decentred Theory, Change and Network Governance 79

networks in British government. They tell us not only that fragmentation created new networks but it also increased the membership of existing networks, incorporating both the private and voluntary sectors. They also tell us that the government swapped direct for indirect controls, so central departments are no longer either necessarily or invariably the fulcrum of a network. The government can set the limits to network actions: after all, it still funds the services. But it has also increased its dependence on multifarious networks. The Anglo-governance school conceives of networks as a distinctive co-ordinating mechanism notably different from markets and hierarchies and not a hybrid of them. They associate networks with characteristics such as trust. In their view, trust is essential because it is the basis of network co-ordination in the same way that commands and price competition are the key mechanisms for bureaucracies and markets respectively (see Frances 1991: 15, and Powell 1991a). Shared values and norms are the glue that holds the complex set of relationships in a network together. Trust is essential for co-operative behaviour and, therefore, the existence of the network. With the spread of networks there has been a recurrent tension between contracts on the one hand with their stress on competition to get the best price and networks on the other with their stress on co-operative behaviour. Other key characteristics are said to be reciprocity and interdependence (Rhodes 1997c). In short, the Anglo-governance school tells us a story of fragmentation confounding centralisation as a segmented executive seeks to improve horizontal co-ordination among departments and agencies and vertical co-ordination between departments and their networks of organisations. An unintended consequence of this search for central control has been a hollowing out of the core executive. The hollowing out of the state suggests the growth of governance has further undermined the ability of the core executive to act effectively, making it increasingly reliant on diplomacy. The state has been hollowed out from above by for example international interdependence, and from below by for example marketization and networks, and sideways by agencies. Internally the British core executive was already characterised by baronies, policy networks and intermittent and selective co-ordination. It has been further hollowed out internally by the unintended consequences of marketization, which fragmented service delivery, multiplied networks and diversified the membership of those networks. Externally the state is also being hollowed out by membership of the EU and other international commitments.


Decentring network governance A decentred theory of network governance explores the institutions of governance by studying the contingent meanings that inform the actions of the individuals involved in all kinds of practices of rule. Positivist accounts of network governance focus on issues such as the objective characteristics of policy networks and the oligopoly of the political market place; they stress power-dependence, the relationship of the size of networks to policy outcomes, and the strategies by which the centre might steer networks. To decentre governance is, in contrast, to focus on the social construction of patterns of rule through the ability of individuals to create meanings in action. A decentred approach changes our conception of governance. It encourages us to examine the ways in which patterns of rule, including institutions and policies, are created, sustained, and modified by individuals. It encourages us to recognise that the actions of these individuals are not fixed by institutional norms or a logic of modernization, but arise from the beliefs individuals adopt against the background of traditions and in response to dilemmas. A decentred theory highlights the importance of beliefs, traditions, and dilemmas for the study of governance (see Bevir & Rhodes 2003, 2006). Any existing pattern of rule will have some failings. Different people will have different views about these failings since they are not simply given by experience but rather constructed from interpretations of experience infused with traditions. When the perceived failings of governance are in conflict with people’s existing beliefs, such failures pose dilemmas. Such dilemmas push people to reconsider their beliefs and the traditions informing those beliefs. Because people confront these dilemmas against the background of diverse traditions, there arises a political contest over what constitutes the nature of the failings and what should be done about them. Exponents of rival positions seek to promote their particular sets of theories and policies. This contest then leads to a reform of governance. So, any reform can be understood as a contingent product of a contest of meanings in action. The reformed pattern of rule established by this complex process will display new failings, pose new dilemmas, and be the subject of competing proposals for reform. There will be a further contest over meanings, a contest in which the dilemmas are often significantly different, and the traditions have been modified from accommodating previous dilemmas. All such contests take place in the context of laws and norms that prescribe how they should be conducted. Sometimes the relevant laws


and norms have changed because of simultaneous contests over their content and relevance. Yet while we can distinguish analytically between a pattern of rule and a contest over its reform, we rarely can do so temporally. Rather, the activity of governing continues during most contests, and most contests occur partly within local practices of governing. What we have, therefore, is a complex and continuous process of interpretation, conflict, and activity that produces ever-changing patterns of rule. A decentred theory of network governance entails a shift of topos from institutions to meanings in action. It suggests positivist approaches to governance tend to restrain the centrifugal impulse of narratives of network governance. Positivist approaches reduce the diversity of network governance to a logic of modernization, institutional norms, or a set of classifications or correlations across policy networks. Their proponents tame an otherwise chaotic picture of multiple actors creating a contingent pattern of rule through their conflicting actions. A decentred theory implies that network governance arises from the bottom-up. Any pattern of governance is a product of diverse practices made up of multiple individuals acting on all sorts of conflicting beliefs which they have reached against the background of several traditions and in response to varied dilemmas. A decentred theory leads us, then, to replace aggregate concepts that refer to objectified social laws or institutions with one’s that we craft to explain the particular beliefs and actions of interest to us. It inspires narratives of traditions and dilemmas. So, what does this decentred theory tell us about the analysis and management of change in the networks.

The analysis of change in networks Current explanations of how networks change appeal to inexorable, impersonal forces such as the functional differentiation of the modern state or path dependency. They rely on exogenous, not endogenous, causes, arguing, for example, that networks create routines for policy making and change is incremental (Marsh & Rhodes 1992: 261). They identify four broad categories of change: economic, ideological, knowledge and institutional, and all are external to the network. Indeed, the most common and recurrent criticism of policy network analysis is that it does not, and cannot, explain change (for a summary of the argument and citations see Richardson 2000). So, policy network analysis stresses how networks limit participation in the policy process; decide which issues will be included and excluded from the policy


agenda; shape the behaviour of actors through the rules of the game; privilege certain interests; and substitute private government for public accountability. It is about stability, privilege and continuity. There have been several efforts to build the analysis of change into governance networks (see for example Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993; Marsh & Smith 2000; Richardson 2000). We focus on decentred analysis because it offers both an explanation of change in networks and the appropriate tools of analysis. A decentred theory prompts a shift of topos from institution to individual and a focus on the social construction of policy networks through the ability of individuals to create meaning (Bevir & Rhodes 2003, ch. 4). It thereby encourages us to look for the origins of change in the contingent responses of individuals to dilemmas. As noted earlier, a dilemma arises for an individual or institution when a new idea stands in opposition to an existing idea and so forces reconsideration. Because we cannot read-off the ideas and actions of individuals from objective social facts about them, we can understand how their beliefs and actions, and social practices change only by exploring the ways in which they think about, and respond to, dilemmas. An analysis of change and developments in government must take place through a study of relevant dilemmas. We build change into the heart of our account of networks by exploring how individual actors respond to dilemmas and reinterpret and reconstruct traditions. Ethnography studies individual behaviour in everyday contexts; gathers data from many sources; adopts an ‘unstructured’ approach; focus on one group or locale; and, in analysing the data, stresses the ‘interpretation of the meanings and functions of human action’ (paraphrased from Hammersley 1990, 1–2). The task is to write thick descriptions or our ‘constructions of other people’s constructions of what they are up to’ (Geertz 1973: 9, 20f.; see also: Heclo & Wildavsky 1974; Bevir & Rhodes 2003, 2006; Richards & Smith 2004). We cannot provide a detailed exploration of change in networks here. Any such account would need to recognise that individuals have several antidotes to, and coping mechanisms for, challenges to their belief systems. Such challenges can take the form of responding to different beliefs or to the actions of others and any response will be affected by the salience of those beliefs and actions for the several parties. Also, analyses of network dynamics require an understanding of how beliefs are constructed both in the complex patterns of social interaction and the handed-down traditions. However, we can illustrate both our theory and methods ‘in action’ by a brief analysis of managing networks.


Managing change in networks Under what conditions do networks succeed, and under what conditions do they fail? How do we manage networks so they are successful and do not fail? The mainstream literature on networks can muster a long list of conditions fostering networks (for citations see Rhodes 2006a). Networks are said to thrive where markets and hierarchies fail, where trust and reciprocity characterise the relationships between organisations, where management is by negotiation, not command, and where there is a substantial measurement of agreement on at least the means and probably the ends of policy. Also, as with any other form of public sector management, success depends on the relevant information, skills and resources. When actors husband information and resources, when in effect they refuse to share, then the cooperation that defines networks is unlikely to be forthcoming. The mainstream literature also identifies several other more specific conditions under which networks are said to arise. ● ● ● ● ● ● ●

●

Actors need reliable, ‘thicker’ information, or local knowledge. Quality cannot be specified or is difficult to define and measure. Commodities are difficult to price. Professional discretion and expertise are core values. Service delivery is localised. Cross-sectoral, multi-agency cooperation is required. Monitoring and evaluation incur high political and administrative costs. Implementation involves haggling (or disputes over who owns the policy).

Equally the mainstream literature suggests that networks, like all other resource allocation mechanisms, are not cost free and identifies the conditions under which they will fall. ● ●

●

When closed to outsiders and unaccountable for their actions. When they generate conflicts: between individual and organisational commitments, local and national public expectations, flexibility and rules, and network goals and national regulators. When they serve private interests, not the public interest, and are hard to hold to account.

84 Theories of Democratic Network Governance ● ●

When they cannot be to steered. When they conflict with other governing structures.

So, the task confronting governments is to create the conditions that foster networks (or bureaucracies, or markets) and to steer them so that, for example, they remain accountable and do not flounder through internal conflicts. How do you manage in inter-organizational contexts where, in sharp contrast to intra-organisational contents, no manager can impose objectives on the other participating organizations? The normal answer is by hands-off management and through persuasion where independent actors agree objectives; senior management does not set them. There has been an upsurge of advice from both academics and consultants on what to do to run a network (and for a comprehensive review of tools for network governance, see Salamon 2002). We give two examples (see Boxes 4.1 and 4.2). Box 4.1 draws on American experience.

Box 4.1 Ten lessons on how to manage your network Be representative of your agency and network. Take a share of the administrative burden. Operate by agenda orchestration. Recognise shared expertise. Stay within the decision boundaries of your network. Accommodate and adjust while maintaining purpose. Be as creative as possible. Be patient and use interpersonal skills. Recruit constantly. Emphasise incentives. Source: Agranoff (2003: 29).

Box 4.2 Local practical solutions Explore and agree the objectives of cross-boundary working. Develop a shared understanding of what the network is for. Develop an appropriate shared strategy. Clarify roles, expectations and responsibilities for all players. Create a culture in which cross-boundary working is likely to succeed. Create appropriate shared service delivery systems. Have a clear idea of what success would look like. Source: Goss (2001: 97–100).


Or, in the same vein, but based on UK experience, Box 4.2 provides the following pearls. As Perri et al. (2002: 130) point out network management ‘is not rocket science’, and it is hard to disagree. But a decentred theory raises more fundamental objections. Typically, policy-oriented work on governance treats hierarchies, markets, and networks as fixed structures that governments can manipulate using the right tools. A decentred theory undercuts this idea of a set of tools we can use to manage networks. If networks are constructed differently, contingently, and continuously, we cannot have a tool kit for managing them. In short, there is no essentialist account of networks which can be used to provide a tool kit for managing networks. A decentred theory encourages us to foreswear management techniques and strategies but, and the point is crucial, to replace such tools with learning by telling stories and listening to them. While statistics, models, and claims to expertise all have a place in such stories, we should not become too preoccupied with them. On the contrary, we should recognize that they too are narratives about how people have acted or will react given their beliefs and desires. No matter what rigour or expertise we bring to bear, all we can do is tell a story and judge what the future might bring. In a decentred approach, to generalise means to diagnose and make informed conjectures. We cast conjecture in the form of narratives or stories. Policy analysis is a form of storytelling. So, for a decentred theory to produce policy advice, we must tell stories that answer the following questions (and for a more detailed discussion see Bevir et al. 2003). What stories do we tell? What is the plot of our story? Who are the leading characters? What are the informing metaphors? What proverbs do we use? The road to understanding change network governance lies in decentred accounts focusing on the political ethnography of networks to generate narratives that give due recognition to the creative individual. Networks are constructed by individual actors and not created by governments or imposed by the researcher. As researchers, we write constructions about how other people construct the world. So, how do we write these constructions? We use the example of management reforms in the police service to provide an illustrative example (Fleming & Rhodes 2005). The research draws on interviews with 27 senior and middle-level officers and managers, and on focus group discussions. The reforms were understood by the respondents as a shift from command and control bureaucracy through markets to networks, and the shift posed some acute dilemmas. Their key problem


was not the limitations of working with contracts or any other governing structure but rather the attempt to balance apparently contradictory demands. They know how to rewrite the rulebook, manage a contract, or work with neighbourhood watch but they struggle to reconcile these ways of working, believing they conflict and undermine one another. We illustrate briefly both their views on the limits networks and on the conflicts between networks and other ways of working. There is commitment from those who see community networking as the future. I think the community policing thing is a good idea – I think it works – the problem of course is that it is hard to keep people in the same place for significant periods, but I think it’s good, I think it’s good for the community. We come up with lots of initiatives – we are good at that – but we are poor finishers – too many goals really. I think we should hit on three things and do them. Even the traditional copper sees some virtue in a more integrated approach. A whole of government approach might consider bringing all services under the police umbrella – ambulance, fire, security, so for example if there was a major football game. The events planner could ring one number and organise police officers, St John’s Ambulance, private security; traffic coordination. A policy like this would give us a better response to things too. The others might not have the powers but they would have the powers to detain until we arrived or at least provide a liaison point with the police on the ground. It would give us much better surge capacity. But there is also a clear stereotype that the police focus on crime and see networking as soft. Police don’t want to get into the crime prevention stuff though. No one wants to do these jobs – they want to leave it to the warm and fuzzies. Police want to wear their underpants on the outside and save the world – they want to make the person pay. Culture has changed to some extent but it is still influenced by older people. People who are attracted to the policing role often have that mindset.


They also see the conflict of ideas in reform and it manifests itself in an aversion to change and criticisms of the leadership but several managers are all too well aware of the contradictions. One officer makes the point with brutal simplicity: ‘Terrorism is a problem – it doesn’t go with the ideology of community policing and crime management.’ Some officers appreciate the dilemmas they confront and recognise the need to fit their managerial strategies to the context. Command and control is situational. In my team, I don’t have subordinates. I have team members. Years ago a constable wouldn’t speak to a superintendent – this is not the case now. I invite their ideas and input and encourage them to talk to me. If they are happy I have a productive working team. However, as I said, it’s situational. Fighting fires is a good example. As a commander, when I want something done, it isn’t up for negotiation, I tell the troops. We have to rely on command and control in these situations.2 Mainstream accounts of police reform use ‘police culture’ as an explanatory variable (see Chan 1997). As Davies and Thomas (2003: 682) point out, police organisations are resistant to change because of ‘a co-existence of formalized bureaucratic and standardised working practices, with a deeply entrenched and pervasive occupational culture’ of hierarchical subordination. However, these interviews with officers suggest that conflict between incompatible ideas simply makes it too easy for dynamic conservatism to win out. Reform is impeded not by recalcitrant actors – although it often is – or by police culture – which can act as a brake – but more importantly by the dilemmas created by the irreconcilable ideas of bureaucracy, markets and networks. The central dilemma of police reform is this unholy trinity (and for a more detailed discussion see Jessop 2000a and Rhodes 2006b). In sum, a decentred theory of networks provides: a critique of mainstream accounts of how networks change; an alternative conception of networks as constructed differently, contingently, and continuously; a storytelling alternative to the mainstream tool kit for managing networks; and an alternative to the techniques of positivist social science by using ethnographic methods focus on the creative individual as the agent of change.

Conclusions Positivist accounts of network governance, including those of the Anglo-governance school, aspire to be comprehensive. Social scientists


typically aim to provide a general account of what network governance looks like and why. For example, governance is often characterised by multiplying networks replacing the bureaucratic hierarchies of the welfare state. Such comprehensive accounts of network governance identify one or more defining features. This defining feature then acts as a central focus that allegedly explains other pertinent features of network governance. For example, the spread of networks allegedly explains the greater reliance of states on ‘trust’ and ‘diplomatic’ styles of management, or it embraces the search for co-ordination through joint ventures, partnerships, and holistic governance. Similarly, networks succeed where there is trust, reciprocity, cooperation and agreement. What do such comprehensive accounts imply about the nature of network governance? They imply, first, that we can define ‘governance’ by reference to one or more of its essential properties, such as multiplying networks, where we can define a network by the interdependence of its members (whether people or organizations). They imply, second, that these essential properties are general ones that characterise all cases of governance: so, we will find governance in its new guise if and only if we find a spread of networks, or we will find networks if and only if we find interactions based on trust across organisations. They imply, finally, that these essential properties can explain at least the most significant other features of network governance. A comprehensive account of network governance makes sense, even as a mere aspiration, only if these implications are valid. But why would we assume that network governance has one or more essential features? A decentred theory implies there is no comprehensive account of network governance. There is no necessary logical or structural process determining the form governance or the success or failure of networks. Rather, an adequate theory of change and networks should accept that networks both arise from and change as a result of diverse actions and practices inspired by varied beliefs and traditions. Patterns of rule arise as the contingent products of diverse actions and political struggles informed by the beliefs of agents as they arise against the backcloth of traditions. This conclusion applies whether we are talking about the civil service, public sector reform, or the rise and fall of specific networks. Once we reject the idea of a comprehensive account of network governance, we can no longer define it by any allegedly essential properties. Rather, we understand general concepts such as network governance by using them in cases. Their meaning derives from the ways in which we use them in various contexts. What is more, the absence of a comprehensive account of network governance suggests there are no set ways in


which we must – or must not – use the term. There need be no single feature shared by all those cases or narratives to which we would apply the general term ‘network governance’. We understand ‘network governance’ as a set of family resemblances. Wittgenstein (1972) famously suggested that general concepts such as ‘game’ should be defined by various traits that over-lapped and criss-crossed in much the same way as do the resemblances between members of a family – their builds, eye colour, gait, personalities. He considered various examples of games to challenge the idea that they all possessed a given property or set of properties – skill, enjoyment, victory and defeat – by which we could define the concept. Instead, he suggested that the examples exhibited a network of similarities, at various levels of detail, so that they coalesced even though no one feature was common to them all. We do not master such family resemblances by discovering a theory or rule that tells us precisely when we should and should not apply it. Our grasp of the concept consists in our ability to provide reasons why it should be applied in one case but not another, our ability to draw analogies with other cases, and perhaps our ability to point to the criss-crossing similarities. Our knowledge of ‘network governance’ is analogous to our knowledge of ‘game’ as described by Wittgenstein: it is ‘completely expressed’ by our describing various cases of governance in and through networks, showing how some cases can be considered as analogous to these and others cannot. No doubt some of the family resemblances that characterise network governance derive from a focus on meaning in action and apply to all patterns of rule. A decentred theory highlights, first, a more diverse view of state authority and its exercise. All patterns of rule arise as the contingent products of diverse actions and political struggles informed by the varied beliefs of situated agents. So, the notion of a monolithic state in control of itself and civil society was always a myth. The myth obscured the reality of diverse state practices that escaped the control of the centre because they arose from the contingent beliefs and actions of diverse actors at the boundary of state and civil society. The state is never monolithic and it always negotiates with others. Policy always arises from interactions within networks of organisations and individuals. Patterns of rule always traverse the public, private, and voluntary sectors. The boundaries between state and civil society are always blurred. Trans-national and international links and flows always disrupt national borders. In short, state authority is constantly being remade, negotiated, and contested in widely different ways within widely varying everyday practices.


Second, these everyday practices arise from situated agents whose beliefs and actions are informed by traditions and expressed in stories. In every network, we can identify traditions, often embodied in rituals and routines. Actors pass on these traditions in large part by telling one another stories about how things are done, and about what does and does not work. For example, British civil servants are socialized into the broad notions of the Westminster model, such as ministerial responsibility, as well as the specific ways of doing things around here; they are ‘socialized into the idea of a profession’, and learn ‘the framework of the acceptable’ (Bevir & Rhodes 2006, ch. 7). Network governance is not any given set of characteristics. It is the stories people use to construct, convey, and explain traditions, dilemmas, and practices. A third family resemblance is that the central state has adopted a less hands-on role. Its actors are less commonly found within various local and sectoral bodies, and more commonly found in quangos concerned to steer, co-ordinate, and regulate such bodies. A decentred theory suggests, crucially, that such steering, co-ordination, and regulation take many diverse forms. In Britain, the pre-eminent example is ‘joined-up’ government as the Blair government seeks to devise policy instruments that integrate both horizontally across central government departments and vertically between central and local government and the voluntary sector (Bevir 2005: 83–105). A decentred theory provides: a grasp of the family resemblances that contribute to a general characterisation of network governance; a distinctive analysis of change in networks; and an emphasis on the role of storytelling in network management. Nonetheless, it denies any logic to the specific forms that network governance takes in particular circumstances. It resolves the theoretical difficulties that beset the positivist alternatives. It avoids the unacceptable suggestion that institutions fix the actions of individuals in them rather than being products of those actions. It replaces unhelpful phrases such as path-dependency with an analysis of change rooted in the beliefs and practices of situated agents. And yet it allows political scientists to offer aggregate studies by using the concept of tradition to explain how they come to hold those beliefs and perform those practices.

Notes 1. On the limits of both rational choice theory (as in Hertting, ch. 2) and historical institutionalism (as in Peters, ch. 3), see Bevir 2005: ch. 1. For fuller discussion of a normative or ideational strand of institutionalism (as in Peters, ch. 3), see Adcock et al. 2006. On the differences between post-structuralism (as in

Decentred Theory, Change and Network Governance 91 Triantafillou, ch. 10) and our approach see Bevir 2004. On traditions and the analysis of institutions see Rhodes 2006c. For a symposium in which we discuss our approach with scholars inspired by positions akin to rational choice, new institutionalism, and post-structuralism, see Finlayson et al. 2004. 2. All quotes from Fleming and Rhodes 2005: 199–200. See also Fleming 2006.


Part II Governance Network Failure


5 Theoretical Approaches to Governance Network Failure Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing

The increasing and more systematic use of governance networks in public policy and governance can be seen as a political response to the many reports of government failure and market failure that emerged in the 1970s and onwards. The attempts of central and local governments to govern society through comprehensive planning programmes, macro-economic fine-tuning and elaborate systems of bureaucratic control were accused of being too costly and of failing to provide flexible responses to emerging policy problems and new challenges. The neoliberal marketization strategy aimed to solve these problems by means of privatizations, deregulation and the introduction of quasi-markets that supposedly stimulated an efficient and flexible allocation of goods and services. However, market imperfections, negative externalities and the failure to provide proactive solutions to societal problems have revealed the limits of the neoliberal revolution. In this situation governance networks have been seen as an attractive alternative, or complement, to governance through hierarchies and markets. Although it is still subject to political contestation, governance through negotiated interaction between public and private actors is by many political decision makers supposed to provide flexible and proactive solutions to problems and challenges characterized by a high degree of complexity, uncertainty and interdependency. The ever expanding discourse on partnership and joint up government bears witness to the warm political embrace of new forms of network governance. Many people have great expectations that governance networks will facilitate an informed, consensual and legitimate decision making that will lead to responsive, just and tailor-made solutions. Nonetheless, there are good reasons to expect that governance networks will not deliver all this and that they are just as prone to crisis and failure as state 95


and markets. Indeed, there are many discouraging examples of governance networks that are either weighted down by political apathy, irreconcilable conflicts and an unproductive group think. Neither is it difficult to find examples of the ‘worst case scenario’ where governance networks are initiated by politicians, controlled by public administrators, and finally given no real influence on public governance. Surely, there are also encouraging examples of flexible and proactive network governance with a real impact on public policy making. But the problem is that network governance relies on precarious social and political processes and takes place in an uncontrollable political and economic context. Hence, many things can go wrong and prevent effective network governance. As such, it might be difficult to motivate the relevant actors to participate due to the presence of high transaction costs and small immediate chances for a single actor to gain real political influence. It might be impossible to resolve the internal conflicts in the network and build a sufficient amount of trust to allow the network actors to reach common solutions that go beyond the least common denominator. There might be an inadequate attempt to metagovern the self-regulating governance networks due to the absence of a resourceful and legitimate metagovernor, the failure of the metagovernor to understanding how governance networks can be governed, or political resistance from the network actors to external interference. Finally, there might be a discrepancy between the temporal and spatial horizons of the government and the various governance networks. Hence, the protracted negotiation process in governance networks might clash with the deadlines prompted by the election cycle that drives the actions of elected politicians. Likewise, particular governance networks might not operate at the same scale as the responsible political authority, or might even have difficulties identifying the relevant political authority with whom to negotiate its policy proposals ( Jessop 2002: 239). The euphoric praise of the merits of governance networks has prevented an understanding of the reasons for governance network failure and the conditions for success (Klijn & Koppenjan 2000: 117). There have been many attempts to demonstrate the advantages of governance networks, but the causes of failure have received little attention. In this second part of the book we shall aim to compensate this neglect by devoting three whole chapters to a theoretically informed discussion of some of the key aspects of governance network failure and the political and institutional conditions for success. Before looking further into the various conditions for success and failure, we shall in this chapter provide an overview of different theoretical approaches to analysing

Theoretical Approaches to Governance Network Failure 97

governance network failure. We shall see what the four theories of network governance presented in the introduction have to say about governance network failure in order to briefly assess the differences and similarities. However, first we need to define more clearly what we mean by failure. Clearly, when we talk about governance network failure, we are referring to an inability to provide effective governance through negotiated interaction between a plurality of public and private actors. So everything depends on what we mean by effective governance. We should be careful not to define and measure effective network governance in the same way as we measure the effectiveness of state and market governance (Jessop 2002: 236). Effective government is defined as the ability to transform substantial values and majoritarian decisions into standardized policy outputs and problem-solving policy outcomes. This will not provide a fair standard for measuring the effectiveness of governance networks since one the main ideas of network governance is to formulate and implement public policy through negotiated interaction that seeks to transform the resources, competences and preferences of a plurality of actors who aim to provide tailor-made solutions to specific cases. When it comes to market governance, effectiveness is defined as the ability to provide low cost Pareto-optimal solutions at the basis of procedures ensuring perfect competition. This also provides an entirely unfair yardstick for measuring the effectiveness of governance networks since in such networks economic competition is replaced by political negotiations that at best can be expected to provide satisfying rather than optimizing solutions. Nevertheless, if the effectiveness standards pertaining to state and markets seem to be unfair, and slightly off the point, when it comes to measuring the efficiency of governance networks, they are not completely irrelevant. Hence, it is clearly a problem if governance networks fail to define any common objectives and reach some collective decisions that take us beyond the least common denominator, or if they produce joint solutions that are either overly costly or tend to shift the costs of the benefits offered to the network actors to external groups and actors. While this is true, we should nonetheless continue to look for relevant effectiveness standards elsewhere in order to make sure that we measure the effectiveness of governance networks in relation to their own particular strengths rather than in relation to the inherent strengths of state and market. It is consistently argued that the main virtue of governance networks is their ability to formulate and implement policy solutions that are both flexible and proactive. Flexibility refers to the ability to adjust


public policy and governance to the ever changing context, preferences and experiences of the actors within a particular policy field. That a particular policy is proactive means that it aims to take the future opportunities and constraints into account. Flexible and proactive governance can be obtained through ongoing contacts and negotiations between informed and empowered network actors, who might confront each other in intense power struggles, but who are urged to listen to and engage with each other, because of their mutual resource dependencies, the existence of institutional rules, norms and incentives, and the proliferation of public discourses that are hailing the social and political actors as responsible partners in processes of joint governance. Governance networks provide favourable conditions for flexible and proactive governance, but there is no guarantee that network governance will result in effective governance (Jessop 2002: 230). Flexible and proactive network governance is first and foremost conditioned by the ability of the relevant and affected actors to establish and maintain a relatively well-functioning governance network based on active engagement and trustful exchanges. In addition, the network actors must be capable of identifying and defining relevant policy problems and determine their interrelations and causes. Finally, they must be able to create a regulative, normative and cognitive framework that facilitates problem-oriented negotiations based on agonistic respect and supports the production of well-informed and learning-based solutions in the face of persistent conflicts and power struggles. This broad definition of effective network governance, and the underlying conditions of possibility, provides a possible starting point for the discussion of governance network failure. However, as we shall see, the different theoretical approaches to network governance have different criteria for assessing the success and failure of governance networks; they offer different explanations of why governance networks sometimes fail; and they provide different accounts of the conditions for success. Let us take a closer look at some of the main theoretical strands in the literature in order to provide an overview of the different accounts of governance network failure.

Interdependency theory Interdependency theory (Rhodes 1997a) tends to view governance networks as a mechanism for interest mediation between a number of autonomous, strategic actors who are mutually dependent on each others resources (knowledge, innovative ideas, funding, formal authority, etc.)


in order to govern and regulate a particular policy area. The strategic policy actors cannot solve the pressing problems that confront them on their own because they do not have the necessary resources and capacities and because other actors may block the solutions that they prefer. Hence, the strategic actors are forced to engage in negotiated interaction with other actors in order to exchange resources and capacities and find jointly acceptable policy solutions. It follows that the ultimate criteria for assessing the success, or failure, of governance networks is their capacity for joint problem solving through negotiated exchange of resources. Since governance networks are often dealing with complex and vaguely defined problems that arise in a conflict-ridden and uncertain terrain, problem solving is not a question of doing the right thing that solves the problem once and for all. Rather, it is a question of defining and solving a problem in a way that is acceptable to the key stakeholders and do not harm those who are not participating in the network and who might veto a particular solution (Klijn & Koppenjan 2000: 117). Formulating and implementing a satisfactory solution to unclear, complex, and basically ‘wicked’ policy problems requires: 1. that all the most relevant and intensely affected actors are included in the networkbased negotiations; 2. that the actors are willing to pool their resources; and 3. that they can somehow agree on a common conception of the nature of the problem, the range of feasible options and the most important decision-making premises. There is no guarantee that these requirements are fulfilled. In fact, there is whole set of hindrances that must be overcome in order to facilitate network-based problem solving. Let us see how this can be done by looking at the three requirements in turn. The inclusion of the relevant and affected actors might be hampered by the closedness of governance networks. Schaap and van Twist (1997) identify four different forms of closedness whereby particular network actors, or the governance network as a whole, exclude other relevant and affected actors. First, there is unconscious social closedness if the rules, norms and procedures that regulate the access to a governance network exclude certain actors from the network. Second, social closedness is conscious if the network actors realize that some relevant actors are excluded, but are unwilling to remove the political or socio-cultural barriers for access to the network. Third, there is an unconscious cognitive closedness to the extent that, owing to the discursive frame of reference of the network actors, other actors are excluded from the negotiations in the governance network. Finally, cognitive closedness becomes conscious when the network actors reflect on the exclusionary


effects of their frame of reference, but are unwilling to change it in order to facilitate a broader participation in the governance network. Whereas unconscious social or cognitive closedness might be counteracted by stimulating the reflexivity of the network actors and empowering the weak and marginalized actors, it is more difficult to counteract conscious forms of social and cognitive closedness. Social and cognitive fixation must be broken up by means of reframing strategies that question the legitimacy of interest-based exclusions, problematize the network actors’ frame of reference, and provide incentives for decisions based on a broader inclusion of stakeholders. However, it is not enough to open up the closed and exclusive governance networks as some policy actors will choose not to participate, either out of fear for losing their autonomy and identity through participation in public policy making, or because they are so big and powerful that they will gain very little from mutual exchange with other actors. Resource pooling basically means that the network actors are willing to share all their different resources in terms of formal authority, legal rights, legitimacy, knowledge, experiences, innovative ideas, political competences, organizational capacities, and financial means. However, the problem is that the network actors tend to operate in an uncertain social and political terrain, where they cannot be sure how the other actors will respond to their actions. Uncertainty as to whether other actors will act opportunistically when the occasion emerges will prevent resource sharing due to the development of defensive, non-cooperative strategies. This fatal problem is overcome by the development of trust, which is defined as the stable perception of an actor A that another actor B will abstain from opportunistic behaviour (Nooteboom 2002). Although trust does not logically imply reciprocal action, it is unlikely that trust based on non-reciprocal action can be sustained in the long run (Klijn & Koppenjan 2004b: 83). A high degree of interdependence is conducive for the development of trust since trust permits mutual exchange of resources. Trust is developed on the basis of concrete experiences with social and political interaction with particular actors, but it might over time develop into a general norm-based expectation that all actors will act in a non-opportunistic, or even reciprocal, manner. If this happens in a particular governance network we will say that it based on a high level of trust, which will tend to facilitate the pooling of resources between the interdependent actors. The last requirement that must be fulfilled in order to safeguard the problem-solving capacity of governance networks is the provision of a common framework for negotiation and compromise formation.


A common framework is not given in advance. In fact, governance networks are characterized by the absence of a clear and formal constitution that forms and guides the problem-solving process (Hajer & Versteeg 2005). The network actors must themselves construct a commonly accepted framework for identifying and defining policy problems and for crafting and selecting satisfactory solutions. However, there are many hindrances for the creation of such a framework. As such, Klijn and Koppenjan (2004b: 115ff ) draw our attention to five important problems. First, the network actors might be caught in a ‘dialogue of the deaf’ due to the presence of persistent conflicts between different frames of reference that are perpetuated by selective fact-finding and research. The cure for this problem is frame reflection, cross-frame debate and joint fact-finding (Rein & Schön 1986, 1992). Second, there might be a limited coordination between the network actors either because they fail to recognize their mutual dependency or because uncertainty increases the perceived risks of joint action. This problem can be mitigated by increased interaction that might help to reveal resources complementarities between the actors, and by development of procedural rules that ensure compensation of those actors who carry the costs emanating from the unintended outcomes of joint action. Third, the lack, weakness, or incompatibility of institutional rules and norms might increase the transaction costs of cooperation and lead to social and political fragmentation. The solution to this problem is institution building and institutional reforms which are something that often take a long time and require a strong political leadership. Fourth, the lack of systematic metagovernance, due to persistent conflicts between different would-be metagovernors, incompetence on the part of the predominant metagovernor, or resistance from the network actors, might lead to crisis, stagnation and fragmentation. This problem can be solved by an authoritative decision that places the responsibility for metagoverning a particular governance network with a qualified and experienced political agency. Last but not least, external events might in one stroke undermine sedimented perceptions, procedures and power relations and leave the network actors in a state of chock and bewilderment. A flexible redefinition of the tasks of the governance network that aims to exploit the new opportunities opened by the new events is crucial for reducing their negative and disruptive effects. As such, there are many things that can go wrong and lead to governance network failure and the only cure seems to be a conscious and


careful network management that aims to regulate the internal processes and institutional framework of governance.

Governability theory Governability theorists define governance networks as a relative institutionalized arena for horizontal coordination between relatively autonomous actors (Mayntz 1991; Kooiman 1993; Scharpf 1994, 1997). The functional differentiation of modern society results in an increasing proliferation and autonomization of social systems and subsystem and a growing fragmentation of social and political actors who tend to think of themselves as free and autonomous actors (Mayntz 1991). This makes it more and more difficult for central government agencies to govern society. However, the governability of society can be restored by the formation of crosscutting governance networks that facilitate horizontal coordination between a range of operationally autonomous actors. Coordination between actors with different preferences, resources and codes is made possible by the presence of interdependency (Mayntz 1991). However, mutual dependence between a group of actors does not necessarily lead to the formation of governance networks. The development of institutional rules, norms and procedures that help the autonomous actors to recognize their interdependency, and act upon it, is crucial for the formation of governance networks. A common set of rules, norms and procedures is also decisive for the development of negative coordination, where the network actors aim to avoid stepping on each others toes, or even positive coordination, where the network actors modify their preferences and begin to develop common perceptions and preferences (Scharpf 1994: 45). Institutions reduce the transaction costs and help to create and sustain trust among the network actors, both of which will enhance the capacity for coordination within governance networks. This is important since ultimately successful network governance is a function of the ability of governance networks to produce negative and/or positive coordination through negotiated interaction (the only difference between the emphasis on coordination in governability theory and the emphasis on problem solving in interdependency theory is that the former adopts a system perspective on societal governance whereas the latter adopts an actor perspective). According to Mayntz (1991: 16), the problem is not so much the presence of conflicts and antagonisms between the actors, but rather their myopic indifference to the negative externalities they produce in the course of action.


The production of institutional rules and norms helps to minimize negative externalities and facilitates the formation of mutually acceptable compromises that take the negative externalities into account. However, in order for the horizontal coordination within governance networks to solve the fundamental problem of the mounting ungovernability of society, they must not only create a balance between political demands and the available capacities and resources, but also provide a balance between the need for flexible policy adjustments and the need for order and stability (Kooiman 1993). Governability is defined as a ‘permanent balancing process between governing needs on the one hand and governing capacities on the other’ (Kooiman 1993: 43). Governance networks are successful to the extent that they contribute to an effective and legitimate adjustment of governing needs to the available capacities and of governing capacities to the articulated needs. Political problems and opportunities are transformed into governing needs when the social and political actors call for action in relation to perceived policy problems. In principle, all problems and opportunities can be turned into governing needs. However, governance networks might help to reduce the articulation of governing needs by mean of involving those who articulate governing needs in the hard and troublesome problem solving process. At the same time, governance networks might contribute to the enhancement of the governing capacities by integrating the relevant and affected actors as responsible co-producers of solutions and by pooling their resources. The attempt to govern our increasingly complex, dynamic and diverse society must take all this complexity, dynamism and diversity into account, rather than simply ignoring it or declaring it unwanted (Kooiman 1993: 48). Governance must be flexible in order to cope with complex patterns of social and economic interaction, dynamic forces that destabilize status quo, and a growing diversity of meanings and life-styles. Flexibility is ensured by the integration of a plurality of autonomous actors whose conflicting conceptions and strategies tend to make governance networks just as complex as the social and political reality they attempt to govern. However, the complex interaction of autonomous, strategic actors within relatively self-regulating governance networks might conflict with the need for stable planning, steering and coordination (Kooiman 1993: 44f ). But governability theorists do not give up the ambition of a smooth societal coordination on the basis of common goals and ideas that ensure political stability and democratic legitimacy. As such, they insist that governance networks must be metagoverned in order to make sure that the flexible policy making, which aims to mirror


the complex and dynamic society, goes hand in hand with the need for stable coordination in accordance with the democratic goals of society.

Integration theory Whereas interdependency theory views interest–based conflicts as the stumbling bloc of governance networks, governability theory perceives the lack of coordination and the failure to balance needs with capacities and flexibility with stability as the main sources of governance network failure. However, the two theoretical approaches are in perfect agreement when it comes to the question of what drives social and political action. As mentioned above, both theories are based on what March and Olsen (1995: 7 ff) define as a ‘logic of consequentiality’ as opposed to their own favoured ‘logic of appropriateness’. March and Olsen claim that social and political actors do not act on the basis of rational calculations of costs and benefits, but rather act on the basis of a situational interpretation of the matching rules, norms and procedures and a contextual conception of their identity which is shaped and reshaped by the institutional framework. March and Olsen’s definition of governance networks is based on Mayntz’ definition that tend to emphasize the negotiated coordination of interdependent, but relatively autonomous actors (Mayntz 1989; March & Olsen 1995: 70). Surprisingly, March and Olsen fail to address Mayntz’ implicit understanding of governance networks as a framework for rational, though institutionally mediated, games between calculating actors and to emphasize the constitutive role of the institutionally embedded logic of appropriateness that shapes the identities and interactions of the network actors. The institutional aspect of governance networks is highlighted by Powell and DiMaggio (1983: 148) who define an ‘organizational field’ as the totality of public and private organizations and groups that operate within a certain area, but rush to emphasize that organizational fields owe their existence to their institutional structuration that involves the formation of patterns of interorganizational interaction, relations of dominance, shared knowledge and information, and common perceptions of goals and tasks. Organizational fields that are governed by negotiated self-regulation, rather than by hierarchical command or market competition, are exactly what we in this context will denote governance networks. Although March and Olsen do not emphasize the institutional aspect in their definition of governance networks, they clearly emphasize the institutional basis of the political interaction that takes place within


governance networks (March & Olsen, 1995: 27ff). Governance networks are deemed successful to the extent that they solve relevant policy problems and exploit new opportunities, and their capacity to produce such positive outcomes depends on their institutional adaptiveness. The pace of societal transformations is increasing and the formulation of adequate responses to new problems and challenges requires a constant institutional adaptation of public policy and governance to the ever changing environment. Institutional adaptation is not ensured by the ‘efficiency of history’ (March & Olsen 1995: 184 ff), but is a result of institutional conditioned perceptions of the need for changes and the desired and feasible courses of action. Intelligent adaptation is based on learning, but learning is by March and Olsen (1995: 197) conceived in anti-rationalistic terms as an institutionally conditioned experience of the past, contemplation of the future, and imitation of others. Adaptation on the basis of experiencebased learning does not lead to the formation of ‘one best fit’ since it is limited by the ignorance of the interplay between causal factors in the present and in the future; hampered by conflicts between the actors identities and the institutionalized logics of appropriateness; and problematized by the ambiguity of the preferences, norms and rules that are defined within the different logics of appropriateness (March & Olsen, 1995: 197f). As such, experienced-based learning is a process with many obstacles and pitfalls. However, ideally, the learning process runs through three integrated phases: 1. experimentation based on variation and risk taking; 2. selection and inference from experiments based on socially constructed evaluations; 3. retention of learning in institutional rules and procedures that ensure a tacit, collective memory (March & Olsen 1995: 199 ff). The presence of a plurality of autonomous network actors facilitates the collection of a wide range of information about the problems and opportunities facing the governance network. In addition, the interaction between relevant, affected and interdependent actors might also ensure a high degree of reflexivity in governance networks. As such, the prospect of developing a high degree of adaptiveness in governance networks through experience-based learning appears to be good. However, the learning-based adaptiveness of governance networks might be impeded by the lack of capacities for experimentation, the conservative identities of actors who want to preserve status quo, and the failure to resolve the internal conflicts between the actors that struggle over the assessment of experiments and the formulation of strategies for institutional reform.


The lack of adaptiveness decisively reduces the chances that governance networks will produce effective problem solving and exploit new opportunities. The cure for this problem is conscious attempts to develop the adaptiveness of governance networks through conscious metagovernance (March & Olsen 1995: 223 ff). One possibility is to facilitate experimentation by means of constructing the right incentives, aligning motivations, and weakening strict accountability regimes and high governance aspirations that both tend to penalize failure much more than they reward success. Another possibility is to facilitate knowledge production by means of improving patience, the validity and reliability of accounts, memory and learning from others.

Governmentality theory The governmentality theorists tend to view governance networks as a part of a new governmentality. Governmentality is defined as a collectively shared mentality, or rationality, that condition how we organize and produce concrete acts of government which aim to enhance the general well-being of the population by regulating the conduct of individual and collective actors (Dean 1999: 2; Foucault 1991a: 103). It consists of contingently articulated forms of knowledge, calculations and technologies that are drawn upon and combined in the actual governing of society. The liberal governmentality has been transformed through the problematization of the historically contingent governmentality programmes. Hence, the programme of laissez faire liberalism was problematized due to its failure to deal with the mounting problems of social inequality, economic instability and market externalities. In response to this problematization a new welfare state programme was developed. The social welfare of the population should be enhanced through an elaborate system of bio-political interventions based on statistical information and expert knowledge and carried out through a combination of comprehensive planning, bureaucratic rule and a host of disciplinary and normalizing technologies. The neoliberal revolution in the 1980s claimed that the welfare state was too big and inefficient, and called for the expansion of the unfettered rule of the market forces. However, the market had to governed and regulated, not in order to mitigate its detrimental effects on social equality and cohesion, but in order to reduce the competition hampering effects of society and construct the individuals as rational, risk-taking entrepreneurs (Dean 1999: 159 ff; Gordon 1981: 41f). Now, the failure of the neo-liberal governmentality program and its tidal wave of privatizations, quasi-markets and free consumer


choice to reduce public expenditure and alleviate the burden of the state has prompted the development of a new form of advanced liberal government (Dean 1999: 165f ). Advanced liberal government introduces a new kind of reflexive governance that carefully considers how different tasks can best be solved. Is it through the imperative command of public authorities, through the free reign of the market forces, or through the construction and regulation of the responsible actions of selfregulating citizens, firms, communities, partnerships, and networks? The latter option involves the mobilization of the knowledge, resources and energies of a plurality of actors whose identities and free actions are shaped by rules, norms and narratives that tend ensure conformity with the overall objectives of governance (Rose 1999). The mobilization of a plurality of public and private actors within relatively self-regulating governance networks helps to realize the key ambition of advanced liberal government which is to ‘govern at distance’ through the shaping of the freedom of autonomous actors (Rose 1996: 43). Governmentality theory has no intention to improve societal governance in general or network governance in particular. It is merely concerned with analysing and problematizing how we govern and are governed. However, the different historical forms of governmentality may contain normative ideas of proper governance that can help distinguish between success and failure. Hence, echoing the classical liberal concerns, the program of advanced liberal government is concerned with the scope and economy of governance (Dean 1999: 19). The first demand is that governance should reach and include ‘each and all’. The population is divided into a number of target groups and all the individuals belonging to these groups must be targeted and subjected to governance. As such, governance should be totalizing in the sense that it must include every individual and the population as a whole. However, governance must not be totalitarian in the sense of suppressing the freedom that the acts of government aim to mobilize and guide in a particular direction. On the contrary, governance should aim to increase the individual capacity for free and responsible action. In other words, totalization must be combined with individualization. The second demand is that governance should be economic in the sense that the objectives of governance should be realized through the deployment of the least possible amount of resources. Governance must economize with its resources and minimize the costs of governance. Resources and costs are primarily defined in fiscal terms, but also include the deployment of force and repression, which should be kept at a minimum.


Network governance is successful to the extent that two classical liberal demands are fulfilled. Ideally, governance network should be able to meet the two criteria for success quite easily. Not only are governance networks recruiting and mobilizing local actors who either organize, or have a close connection or access to the individuals belonging to various target groups. The local network actors also deploy their own energy, knowledge and resources in order to adjust the overall objectives to the local needs and to target the subjects that are constructed by, and subjected to, a particular form of governance. However, governance networks do not always produce a well-targeted and economic governance. Although this is not something which is discussed by the governmentality theorists, it is clear that there are many obstacles to meeting the two demands. As such, the ability to govern ‘each and all’ depends on the recruitment and mobilization of all the relevant stakeholders. However, conflicts and lack of incentives might prevent this. In addition, the problem is that it is far from all target groups that are organized, or presented by particular organizations. Weak and diffuse groups with little resources are often difficult to organize, or to reach through local organizations. As for the demand for economic governance, there are two considerable risks. First, it might take a lot of time, energy and resources to mobilize, organize and manage governance networks due to the presence of political apathy, conflicts and political resistance. Second, they might become so strong in terms of their political power and influence that they are capable of attracting much more resources than it actually requires to solve a particular governance problem. The attempt to counteract these problems and ensure a well-targeted and economic governance in and through self-regulating networks and partnerships involves a combination of political empowerment and disempowerment of the social actors. It also involves the discursive construction of solidaristic values and orientations that can counteract the pursuit of egoistic network interests.

Similarities and differences The four theoretical approaches all recognize the possibility that governance networks might fail. They provide valuable input to the discussion of the criteria for assessing the success and failure of governance networks and they help us to see how problems and obstacles might be overcome. Interdependency theory and governability theory both view governance networks as a means to produce a certain


outcome. As such, interdependency theory emphasizes the problemsolving capacity of governance networks, whereas governability theory emphasizes their contribution to horizontal coordination across institutions, levels and actors. In both cases the achievement of the desired outcome is, ultimately, conditioned by the ability of the actors exploit their mutual dependence to overcome the externalities emanating from their operational autonomy. The main difference between the two approaches is that interdependency theory tends to see interest-based conflicts as the main threat, whereas governability theory is more concerned with the problem of indifference and also emphasize the problems of maintaining a balance between governance needs and governance capacities as well as between flexibility and stability. The cure is the development of generalized trust, a common set of rules and norms, and a careful metagovernance. Integration theory tends to be more concerned with the internal processes of governance networks than with their capacity for problemsolving. The network actors tend to develop a common and relatively institutionalized logic of appropriateness that shape their identities and govern their interaction. However, in order to provide good and sound solutions to relevant policy problems, the institutional framework of policy making within governance networks must adapt to changes in the environment. Intelligent adaptation requires experience-based learning that might be hampered by the lack of learning capacities, cognitive closedness, and internal conflicts between the network actors. Again conflicts seem to be a key obstacle to successful network governance, but conflicts are here thought of as something to be overcome through processes of institutional socialization and integration. Governmentality theory is in many respects the odd man out. Successful network governance is neither assessed in terms of their problem-solving capacity nor in terms the internal processes facilitating problem-solving. Instead, governance networks are too be evaluated on the basis of criteria articulated by liberalism that is conceived as a particular governmentality rather than an abstract philosophical doctrine. Like all governance, the governance produced by the networked interaction of active, responsible and self-regulating actors should reach it target without being too costly and without deploying unnecessary force and repression. However, governmentality theory is not really interested in evaluating the performance of governance networks, but is merely concerned with revealing the contingent, and ultimately political, character of the way we govern ourselves and others. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the participation of all relevant and necessary actors,


which is also emphasized by interdependency theorists, and conflicts and lack of incentives, which is also emphasized by governability theorists, might prevent governance networks from governing ‘each and all’. Internal conflicts and lack of incentives to self-restraint might also prevent economic, low-cost governance. However, in line with the governmentality approach it would be more appropriate to conceive strategies of empowerment and disempowerment and discursive storytelling as the proper cure for governance network failure. The four theoretical approaches might point out different sources of governance network failure and propose different ways of solving the problems. However, the various sources of governance failure seem to supplement rather than contradict each other, and the different cures all seem to involve the exercise of some kind of metagovernance (see the third part of this book).

The structure of Part II Although the discussion above might give the impression, successful network governance is not merely a question of facilitating the construction of governance networks that are open, consensual and efficient. Indeed, it can be shown that successful network governance requires a certain degree of closure, conflict and legitimacy. As such, governance network failure can more generally be seen as a result of the failure to balance openness and closure, consensus and conflict, and efficiency and legitimacy. The need to counteract the development of fatal imbalances between these key aspects of network governance, and the great difficulties involved in attempt to strike the right balance, is discussed in Chapters 6–8 that deal with each of the three dilemmas in turn.

6 Closure and Governance Linze Schaap

Introduction Governance and closure: an uncomfortably linked pair. For do governance networks not guarantee openness? If so, then when would networks tend to be closed? And if closure occurs, can it help to explain governance network failure, that is, the ‘inability to provide efficient governance through negotiated interaction between a plurality of actors’ (see Chapter 5)? Or does the cause of governance network failure lie within the definition itself? For a significant presupposition is present within this definition; that is, governmental actors intend to steer, but how can one steer through negotiations? Insight into the closed nature of governance networks could help us understand governance failure and how the primacy of governmental decision-making itself can cause governance failure. Governance failure may be the result of denying the underestimated tendency of social systems such as governance networks to be closed, the idea that closure is a negative feature of networks, or the assumption that governance networks can be considered as instruments for steering intentions. This chapter aims to address these questions. How can we understand the openness and closure of governance networks, and how can we deal with them? What kinds of closure exist? To what extent are openness and closure necessary conditions for governance? And to what extent do they contribute to governance failure? The insights applied in order to answer these questions are drawn from theories on autopoietic social systems (for example Luhmann 1984a; Schaap 1997). The analysis presented here therefore fits the so-called ‘socio-cybernetic systems approach to governance’ (Rhodes 1997a: 50f).1 In that approach, society is centre-less and the political system is one among many systems. 111


Matters of closure and openness are occasionally discussed in the literature; however, there is little consensus on how to perceive closure and openness. The two concepts are generally treated as mere features of governance networks. Their exact value and weight can only be determined via empirical research. As a result, it remains unclear what exactly closure and openness are and what factors cause or influence them. The next sections will deal with these topics. I will present two different stands on the openness and closure of governance networks: the first focusing on the closure of networks and the second emphasizing the open character of governance networks.

Governance networks: open, closed, or both? In a large part of the governance literature, ‘closure’ does not appear to be an issue. For example, Pierre and Peters (2000) pay no attention to it at all, and neither does John in his book on local governance (John 2001). On the contrary, John only links ‘governance’ to notions of openness and ‘government’ to closure. When ‘government’ was the dominant governing pattern, ‘closed institutions of local politics permitted rule by small, elite cabals’ (John 2001: 3). When ‘governance’ became a custom, networks became more open (John 2001: 9). Bogason appears to be of a similar opinion in his discussion of fragmentation, a typical governance feature: ‘… one may see the state as intertwined with society and vice versa, not as a closed entity directing social actors’ (Bogason 2000: 37). Closure and governance would seem to represent two separate worlds. But are such claims not overly optimistic? The shift to governance may certainly lead to an increase in social and cognitive openness; that is, improved access to policy-making for actors as well as interests and ideas. However, one may wonder whether there are not also other, allegedly less favourable, results. For example, under certain conditions, could governance lead to the exclusion of groups and/or interests and ideas? This might occur, since governance increases cognitive and social complexity, thereby allowing more participants and aspects to be taken into account, but also implying an increased number of normative dilemmas and more uncertainty regarding policy outcomes. There are authors who deal with the potentially closed nature of governance networks. Rhodes and Marsh (1992: 247ff; see also Rhodes 1997a: 43f), for instance, distinguish between policy communities and issue networks (using policy networks as the generic term). Policy communities have several characteristics, including potentially limited numbers of participants and a conscious exclusion of some groups. This refers

Closure and Governance 113

to the social closure of policy communities. Closure at a cognitive – be it normative – level appears to be another feature of policy communities, as participants share the same basic values. Rhodes and Marsh further argue that networks can never be wholly closed (1992: 259). For example, changes in the environment affect the network. Such changes can be economic, ideological, knowledge/technical, and institutional in nature (ibid. 257). They assume that networks ‘contain, constrain, redirect, and ride out such change, thereby materially affecting its speed and direction’ (ibid. 260). One could say that networks themselves influence or even determine the kind of change actually taking place. If that is the case, what is then decisive? What determines the containing, constraining, redirecting, and riding out the change? If the conservatism of networks is dynamic (ibid. 260), what makes it dynamic? What leads to the conservatism? We seem to require an additional concept in this regard. Most explanations of such difficulties in governance are sought in actor-related features. Hanf and Scharpf (1978), for instance, point to the distribution of power and resources in the network. Rhodes and Marsh (1992) argue that actors’ self-interests may cause closure. The relatively closed nature of policy communities, resulting in incremental changes, favours ‘the status quo (it. Rhodes & Marsh) or the existing balance of interests in the network’ (ibid. 263). Mayntz (1987) and Mayntz and Scharpf (1995, as cited in Kooiman 2003: 81–3) argue that selfgoverning tendencies, increasing autonomy of networks, increasing abilities to resist political governance actors, and the lacking political will and administrative competencies to intervene and govern are the main causes of steering difficulties, that is, governance failure. However, we still require a more encompassing explanation for closure and the openness of governance networks (see Schaap & Van Twist 1997: 62). The balance of power and resources in the network or actors’ selfinterest may very well be of importance, but we must determine where interests arise; whether there are perceptual differences with regard to the balance of power and resources; what consequences this will have; and whether closure can be surmounted by interventions. Similarly, the question of the relationship between the openness and closure of separate actors and the network as such has hardly been dealt with.

A systems theoretical contribution? As stated in the introduction, this chapter aims to shed light on the relationship between both openness and closure, on the one hand, and governance on the other. Decision was also made to apply insights from


autopoietic systems theory. Although the closure of social systems can be considered a more or less natural effect of increasing complexity, and autopoiesis helps to understand the closure of social systems (Luhmann 1984a, 1990a, b; in‘t Veld et al. 1991), applying Luhmann’s theory on autopoietic social systems can nevertheless represent a hazardous operation. A considerable number of authors mentioned autopoiesis in their analysis of governance but ultimately decided not to go through with it.2 Nevertheless, the theory of autopoietic social systems is potentially useful in understanding openness and closure, together with possibilities and impossibilities of network governance (Schaap 1997; Schaap & Van Twist 1997; Esmark 2003). I will test its usefulness in this chapter. Luhmann’s theory on autopoietic social systems stresses the closed nature of social systems. For understanding reality and gaining knowledge of it, we must make distinctions (see the logic of distinction, Spencer Brown 1972). By applying distinctions, we assign meaning to our environment, but this is a paradoxical kind of openness: the openness depends on the use of a closed distinction. When we use the distinction ‘inside–outside’, we can divide everything we see in terms of either inside or outside. We are open to everything, but, and this is the paradox, only by using one distinction at a time. Every observation we make, every meaning we assign, refers to our own distinctions. Selfreferentiality is therefore a feature of every observer; using distinctions at the same time means being selective. We cannot perceive something as ‘red’ when applying the inside–outside distinction. Openness and closure therefore go hand-in-hand. Systems are no longer either closed or open, as they are both. The main question for systems theory, according to Luhmann (1984a: 25), is how self-referential closure can generate openness. Society does not consist of individuals, but of communications (Luhmann 1984a). Individual persons interact and communicate. They select information, they select a specific form for sending the message, and the receiver of the message selects a meaning, since he applies his own distinctions for understanding the message. Communication is necessarily a threefold selective process. In ongoing interaction, meaning uncouples itself from the individual psychic systems. Social systems do not consist of individual thoughts of psychic systems, but of communications. Communication has an ‘autonomizing’ effect (Luhmann 1984a: 200; Kiss 1990: 97). Social meaning acquires a certain amount of autonomy; social systems emerge, losing a one-to-one link to the meanings assigned by individual participants. This will even occur in simple


conversations between a limited number of persons. Not every issue ‘fits’ the interaction, even if one of the participants wants it to. The social system needs the environment for energy and information, but it is not the same. This is even more the case at the societal level, as such. Social systems have emerged, which in Luhmann’s understanding (1984a) are communication systems. They also create their own distinctions, and they create boundaries in doing so, deciding what the system is and what it is not. Which aspects of reality are meaningful to the system depends on internally determined distinctions. The system, therefore, determines itself, its knowledge, its past, its future, and its goals. All social systems are self-referential and self-reproductive; hence, they are referred to as autopoietic (Luhmann 1984a). Functional differentiation is a characteristic of modern society (Luhmann 1982). Functionally differentiated sub-systems have emerged, such as the juridical, political, economic, scientific and religious sub-systems. Autopoietic social systems have a central code to which every observation refers. All communication in which reference is made to the distinction ‘to have or to not have’ is economic communication (Luhmann 1989), while ‘power or no power’ is the central code of the political sub-system (Luhmann 1984b), and ‘truth or not’ the one of the scientific sub-system (Luhmann 1990c). Social systems continuously apply their own distinctions and create and reproduce their own identity, which consist of values, a self-steering programme and roles. To analyse system identities, the central questions are the following: a. Which social systems ( communication systems) can be distinguished and which distinctions do they use to assign meaning to empirical phenomena? b. What are the structures, that is, values, underlying a systems communication, self-steering programme and the roles being recognized in the systems communication? c. In what way are these systems closed? The self-referentiality has a fundamental impact on the possibilities for influencing social systems from the outside, as through political steering. Effective political intervention is difficult to achieve due to the closed nature of the systems (Schaap & Van Twist 1997). However, systems do influence or at least incite or irritate – one another – since they are each other’s environments. Several intersystem


relations are at stake: ●

●

●

Interpenetration (Luhmann 1984a: 289ff). Individuals (that is, psychic systems) bring their own backgrounds, education, habits and so on to the system. They can influence the interaction, while both systems keep their autonomy. The results of interpenetration can be temporary, or may last a little longer when new expectations arise; in systems terms: new structures. Interference (or: structural coupling between systems: Luhmann 1984a: 441 ff; Teubner 1989: 110; Teubner 1991: 133). In this intersystem relation, one system relies on other systems for information and ‘Sinn’. To put it differently: they expect parts of their environment to remain unaltered. In other words, they make themselves dependent on other systems for their development (Kneer & Nassehi 1991: 346). Interference can take on various shapes (Teubner 1989: 111), for instance persons playing roles in different systems or events leading to disturbances in different systems. Linkages. Whereas interference is still a rather temporary contact, linkages are more or less permanent. Social systems co-develop via linkages. For instance, a contract links the economic and juridical sub-systems of society. The same holds for formal organizations and networks. Several sub-systems come together, their information and sense-making must function alongside for a long time, dealing with the same events.

Intersystem relations may develop, but they do not lead to less closed characteristics of social systems. The interpretation and reconstruction of the relation remains determined within each and every system. Systems’ autonomy remains unchanged. This is the case even with linkages. A contract or a governance network between, for instance, a local authority, social housing corporations and private investors (all of them formal organizations, hence social systems) may be very relevant for the development of a deprived area, each of them maintaining its autonomy. A formal organization may (as it does) combine economic and juridical insights, but such linkages will not influence the economic and juridical sub-systems in society. A network (if considered an autopoietic system) contains elements and insights from several sub-systems, be they juridical, economic, scientific, religious, environmental, or political, the sub-systems they come from will continue to be autonomous (see Koppen 1991). A system’s self-steering program will repeatedly stand in the way of an outsider wanting to govern the system. Government may want to


influence the internal policies of private organizations, but the organizations’ self-steering programs will determine what kind of effects government measures will have. The counter side of this situation is that the same program may also cause a highly effective government policy. The approach adhered to in this chapter may be linked to interdependency and governability theories, as discussed in Chapter 5, provided that resources and interdependencies are not understood as objectively existing objects, but rather as meanings assigned in communication. This means that there are no resources and interdependencies beyond those perceived by social systems; ignored resources and interdependencies do not exist. Coordination, for instance, as in governability theory, does not mean making use of existing interdependencies when the latter are not perceived by the involved systems.

Governance networks and types of social systems Luhmann distinguishes between three types of social (that is, communication) systems. First, there is society as such, consisting of all possible ‘communications’. Society has been differentiated in functional sub-systems, such as the juridical, economic and political sub-systems. The second types of social systems are formal organizations in which a strong emphasis exists on membership as a means of inclusion and exclusion. The third type is (human) interaction, in which the communication is face-to-face and very much ad-hoc. The latter type of system has been considered a systems’ equivalent to networks. Esmark (2003: 7) states: ‘networks, i.e. interaction systems?’ and, ‘the temporarily and spatially limited coupling achieved by an interaction system can in fact be achieved without destroying the operational autonomy of the implied organizations.’ This is an interesting attempt at linking ideas on network governance to systems theory; however, it is not without difficulties. Interaction systems, as stated previously, consist of immediate, face-to-face communications. In networks, however, there is much more communication. Networks may exist for many years and communication may assume numerous forms and not only face-to-face. Furthermore, even if we were to treat networks as interaction systems, the potential closure problem would not vanish, as interaction systems themselves are also closed systems. In empirical research (see Schaap 1997, 2003), it therefore proved useful to conceptualize a fourth type of social system: policy communication systems. This kind of system is based on policy distinctions (for instance, strong-weak regional authority) that assign meaning to all kinds of policy proposals and information. Such policy communication


systems strongly resemble policy communities (see Rhodes & Marsh 1992). As all autopoietic social systems, they do have a central code and distinctions based on that, as well as values, a self-steering programme and roles. Interaction is a feature of policy communication systems (as is the case in autopoietic interaction systems), but not just face-to-face interaction. They are based on membership (as are formal organizations), but membership is voluntary, that is, it may change overnight and it is not formally regulated. In the study of governance networks, it is an empirical matter to determine whether policy communication systems exist, what are their code and distinctions, their values, self-steering programme and roles (see Schaap 2003). When it comes to understanding closure, as stated previously, the usual suspects are actor-related features, particularly actors’ self-interest. Important to note at this stage is that self-interest is not an objective and predictable phenomenon that can be attributed to some actors. Instead, it is to be treated as a role (that is, an expectation) some actors may play. Studying governance networks means analysing the values, the self-steering and the roles; that is, finding out how the system perceives individual persons and their actions. They may be understood as individual human beings, as the representatives of an organization, or as the delegates of it. The policy communication system can attribute various meanings to actors, varying from ‘provider of information’, or ‘having legal powers’, or ‘possessing vital financial resources’ to ‘final decision-maker’. In the third section above, I asked the questions, ‘What determines the containing, constraining, redirecting, and riding out the change? If networks’ conservatism is dynamic (ibid. 260), what makes it dynamic? What leads to the conservatism?’ The answer now is: the policy communication system does.

Two types of closure Governing closed social systems is an important matter; however, we must first distinguish between different kinds of network closure. Considering the literature on networks, distinction can be made between two kinds of closure: social and cognitive closure. Another distinction runs between the closure of separate actors and the closure of an entire network: closure within networks or closure of networks (Schaap & Van Twist 1997). Closure in the social dimension occurs when certain actors are excluded from the interaction, for example because other actors fail to appreciate their contribution or dislike their presence and attendance.


The number of potential links between actors in the network is deliberately restricted, for instance in policy communities, as discussed by Rhodes and Marsh (1992: 247ff ). The entry of actors into the network (and the concomitant relative closure in the social dimension) can be informally arranged, and it can be made formally verifiable by, for example, introducing institutionalized membership as a condition of participation in interaction (Hayward 1986: 16; as cited by Jordan 1990: 327). Governance network closure in the social dimension, that is, social exclusion, can also result from a conscious strategy or unconsciously applied rules. In addition to closure in the social dimension, closure in the cognitive dimension can also occur. Two forms of cognitive closure can be identified, that is, closure in the sense of an inability to perceive and closure in the sense of an unwillingness to perceive. The latter is a conscious strategy, whereas the former is not. In the first form of cognitive closure, none of the actors in a network have direct access to the reality ‘outside’. They must first perceive that reality and assign meaning to it before it can play a role in their decisions. For this purpose, actors have their own frame of reference (Rein & Schön 1986): a frame of reference that organizes their perceptions and thus enables the interpretation of a complex reality. Frames of reference have selective and regulatory effects that facilitate the ascription of meaning, and this effect is a requirement for interpretation, since it is impossible to fathom reality the way it ‘really is’ for actors in all its complexity. The fact that actors by definition ascribe selective meaning (supported by their own frame of reference) to reality results in cognitive closure. Actors are then cognitively closed to those aspects of reality to which they do not ascribe any meaning or to which they ascribe a different meaning. Cognitive closure stemming from an unwillingness to perceive can also occur when actors declare a particular line of approach to be out of order. Phrases such as, ‘We’re not discussing that now’ or ‘You can’t consider every angle’ are symptomatic of this. In contrast to the first type of cognitive closure, this constitutes a (goal) conscious strategy to reduce complexity. Social and cognitive closure interfere with one another. Excluding certain actors (social closure) opens the door for the promotion of an exclusion of particular points of view (cognitive closure). Conversely, downplaying (consciously or unconsciously) certain aspects of reality as they are perceived (cognitive closure) can result in certain actors not being involved in the interaction (social closure). Thus, the two types of closure can reinforce one another.


This overview offers a number of distinctions: between the social and cognitive dimensions of closure and between conscious and unconscious exclusion. Social closure or exclusion means that actors are excluded from the interaction, excluded from membership of the governance network. A network is closed in the cognitive dimension if and when knowledge, information, ideas, or proposals are ignored and denied access to the agenda. Both social and cognitive closure can be conscious and unconscious in nature. Actors and networks can make deliberate choices for denying access to either other actors or information. Closure can also result from informal rules, habits, standard operating procedures – of which the actors or network are hardly aware. One distinction that has only been implicit up to this point is between actor and governance network. As stated previously, the network literature often leaves open as to whether it is the closure of actors or the closure of networks that is at stake. The various types of closure are as likely to occur at the network level as a whole as at the level of the actors within it. Actors are defined here as the individuals, groups or organizations active in a network. The distinction between them is of an analytical nature and can be defined empirically in a number of ways. It is merely intended as an aid to analysing (steering problems resulting from) conscious or unconscious, social or cognitive closure. When I use the term ‘actors’, here it is understood that any further interaction on their part, for instance, within their own organization, is not the subject of research. The term ‘network’ indicates the opposite: here, it is precisely the interaction between actors and the impact that this interaction has on governance that is to be highlighted. Figure 6.1 can serve as a basis for diagnosing the problems that occur in the management of and within governance networks. Dimension

Social Actors’ Closure

Social Network’s Closure

Cognitive Actor’s Closure

Cognitive Network’s Closure

Unconscious

1 Unconscious exclusion by actors

3 Unconscious exclusion by networks

5 Actors’ inability to perceive

7 Networks’ inability to perceive

Conscious

2 Conscious exclusion by actors

4 Conscious exclusion by networks

6 Actors’ unwillingness to perceive

8 Networks’ unwillingness to perceive

Figure 6.1 Types of closure


Figure 6.1 shows that we are dealing with eight forms of closure: two types of closure (conscious and unconscious) in two dimensions (social and cognitive) and at two levels (actor and network). In the following sections, the causes of these forms of closure will be cursorily examined (for a more extensive analysis, see Schaap & van Twist 1997).

Three explanations for closure Distinguishing types of closure is one thing, but explanations are required if we want to cope with closure. Explanation is initially to be found in the supposed interdependent nature of governance networks. Actors depend on each other’s resources for the achievement of their objectives and the fulfilment of their policies (Aldrich 1979; Benson 1982; Kickert et al. 1997). Despite their interdependence, actors in a network are always relatively autonomous and thus to some extent able to cut themselves off from the intervention of other actors. Interdependence implies that each of the actors possesses veto power. The governance of policy networks thus constantly means operating in a field of tensions between dependence and autonomy. The actors in the network will not automatically accommodate the objectives of one actor, even when that one actor is ‘government-related’ (Kiser & Ostrom 1982). One may expect veto power to result in a number of conscious forms of closure, since it takes a deliberative decision to use veto power (see Figure 6.1, forms 2, 6, and 4): conscious social exclusion at the actor level, actors’ conscious cognitive closure, and conscious social exclusion at the network level. A second explanation of the closure of networks factor is the existence of actors’ ‘frames of reference’ (Rein & Schön 1986), which function as filters. Actors only perceive ‘the’ facts if and insofar as their frame allows. This offers an explanation for the relative closure occurring when there is a confrontation between different points of view, and actors attempt to reach consensus by means of a ‘closing’ argument based on ‘the’ facts. The filtering effect of the frames determines the receptivity to new developments, as well as the actor’s explanation for them. Information from other actors is not perceived in the way it is intended but in the way it is interpreted by an actor, modified by the filtering effect of the frame. Sometimes actors can only ascribe meaning to totally new developments and facts by having a different frame. To achieve such a ‘reframing’, however, the actor must at the very least clearly understand why his present frame of reference is inadequate for perception. This is not as easy as it seems, because in order to


understand this, the actor must see what he has been unable to perceive. In order to be able to do so, he must first undergo ‘reframing’. Closure of actors’ frames of reference will surely cause the following forms of closure: actors’ conscious cognitive closure (form 5, ‘unwillingness to perceive’), when actors willingly declare issues, opinions and arguments out of the question; actors’ unconscious cognitive closure (form 5, an ‘inability to perceive’), since actors may not be able to understand the specific issues, opinions and arguments, due to their frame of reference. Finally, closed frames of reference may result in unconscious social closure (form 1), when interaction with specific actors is thought to be irrelevant, unnecessary or rejected without any reflection regarding the reasons why. There is a relation between those two explanations. Each actor ascribes (selective) meaning through his own frame of reference and bases his actions on this interpretation and perception. It thus stands clear that an actor’s opinions about his own negotiating options or those of someone else; of his own position of power or that of someone else; every idea about his own interests or the interests and motives of the other actors in the network; are inevitably the result of a process of ascribing meaning; a process that cannot be isolated from that actor’s frame of reference. The use of veto power is therefore a result of an actor’s frame of reference. Communication between actors cannot compensate for the closed nature of frames of reference. Communication is not a process in which one actor broadcasts a message received by another actor. Instead, three selections of meaning are being made as a result of which social meaning attains autonomy (see the third section above). This leads us to the third factor causing closure. Due to the role they play in the policy communication system (network), they must acknowledge the existence of restrictive values and norms, customs and rules. They have a social and symbolic dimension. The symbolic side concerns external phenomena, such as traditions, ceremonies, rites, myths, heroic figures and so on and so forth. Then there is the social side, the (underlying) rules of interaction, which determine what is (not) correct in interaction between actors; what is good and what is not; and what is appropriate and what is not. In applying those phenomena, the network continuously reproduces them. We may therefore conceive a governance network as an autopoietic social system, more specifically as an autopoietic policy communication system (see previous discussion in this chapter). Applying this theoretical approach, one can understand the closure of a network, apart from closure of individual actors. The closed network


policy communication system, then, will most probably lead to a number of specific kinds of closure. First of all, it will result in unconscious cognitive network closure (form 7, network’s inability to perceive), since the network’s structure, self-steering programme and perceived roles will exclude issues, opinions and arguments. It will also lead to conscious cognitive network closure (form 8, unwillingness to perceive), when a deliberate choice is being made in the network’s communication process to deny excess to specific issues, opinion and arguments. Finally, it may lead to unconscious social network closure (form 3, unconscious exclusion by networks) and conscious social network closure (form 4, conscious exclusion by networks), when actors are denied access to the interaction.

The relations between explanations for closure It was earlier stated that the possession of veto power is not an objective fact independent of actors’ perception, but on the contrary, merely attains meaning for actors through the frames of reference via which they identify that veto power in order to subsequently be able to attach consequences to them. Actors’ positions of power and the way in which they ‘frame’ reality influence each other, but the frame level is the most fundamental of all. Extending this argument, I now state that actors’ frames of reference develop in communication processes, processes embedded in the network policy communication system. The frames and the policy communication system influence each other, but the system must be considered to be the most comprehensive. Actors’ interpretations can, in any case, only become socially relevant the moment when communication about that perception becomes possible, thus at the moment when the interpretation between actors becomes nameable. In this sense, the network policy communication system forms a condition for framing within networks. Furthermore, the system not only describes what actors perceive but also has a structuring effect: it also constructs a reality. By ‘articulating’ reality, certain aspects of reality are highlighted while other aspects are glossed over and thus fall outside of the (intellectual) field of vision. We can now schematically represent the cohesiveness between the three (interfering) clarifications for closure (see Figure 6.2). Considering the network policy communication system as the main and encompassing source for closure means that cognitive kinds of closure are the more influential ones, not so much the social ones.

124 Theories of Democratic Network Governance Closure through the possession of veto power Embedded in the closure of actors' frames of reference In interaction with the closure of the network policy communication system

Figure 6.2 Relationships between clarifications for closure

In other words, cognitive closure represents a natural phenomenon in social systems and may possibly lead to social closure. In the remainder of this chapter, slight emphasis will be placed on cognitive closure.

Governing closed networks? Because of the closed nature of network policy communication systems, effective intervention is difficult to achieve. This holds for all systems wanting to govern, including the political subsystem. Political power may exist, but is no more than the language of the political subsystem itself (see Luhmann 1981, 1990b). Power is nothing but communication, based on the communication code ‘power or no power’; an actor is powerful only when this code is being used. When communication is based on different codes, for example justice or no justice, governmental activities assume different meanings. Policy necessitates reflection; politics should take into account the closure of social systems and their autopoietic identity, forcing them to make an image of themselves as they are observed by other systems. Policies may then stand a chance to become effective. Consequently, making an analysis of the environment is a necessary condition for governance. It then becomes obvious that talks of effective policy-making, effective governance and policy failures tend to be hazardous. Perceptions of what is effective or what is a failure differ. Actors may co-operate for different reasons, meaning that not all outcomes will be acceptable to all participants. If an agreement in the negotiations between those participating in the network is reached, then the question becomes whether interested but not involved outsiders may consider that result to be acceptable. In other words, the self-steering of a closed network policy communication system can be effective as far as the network itself is


concerned, but it can result in something another system will definitely assign a negative meaning. For pragmatic reasons, however, we can decide to take one system’s point of view, for instance the political subsystem wanting to intervene in developments in other subsystems. In the remainder of this chapter, I will explore tools for the governance of networks and thus for dealing with the closed nature of network policy communication systems. The three explanations for closure discussed previously (actors’ veto power, their frame of reference, and network policy communication system) will be of use. The emphasis will be on finding ways for dealing with the three types of explanations; not so much the eight types of closure. Being able to deal with the specific forms of closure will be the logical result of being able to cope with their causes. It must be kept in mind that the first and second causes of closure are embedded in the third. Governing a network policy communication system may take the shape of targeting veto power and it may even be effective. However, this effectiveness will depend on the actors’ frames of reference. Reframing those frames may be another goal of governance, but then again, the frames depend on the network policy communication system’s self-steering program. In the remainder of this chapter, I will leave it at that and distinctively discuss how we can deal with the three causes of closure.

Governing veto power? The veto power of actors, so it was concluded, is one of the causes of conscious forms of social closure among actors and in networks and of actors’ cognitive closure. Attempt at breaking through these forms of closure can only be successful if this consciously-used veto power is accounted for. If this is not done (or done incompletely), then any attempt at forcing openness will prove to be no more than a superficial, symptoms-related treatment. In the literature, several strategies and instruments can be found for handling veto power. Kickert and Koppenjan (1997: 46ff) provide an overview and distinguish between ‘game management’ and ‘network structuring’. The first is meant as the management of the interactions within an already-existing governance network, the latter to influence the structures and/or self-steering program of a network or to create a new network. A governance network manager might decide to apply game management strategies as well as network structuring for breaking


through the closure resulting from the use of veto power. Kickert and Koppenjan (ibid.) mention the following. The first strategy is (selective) network activation, initiating or stimulating interaction between some of the participants in the network; it is aimed at solving specific problems. This way, if a certain actor is expected to use the veto power and thus create a barrier in the negotiations, the other involved actors can disregard the barriers. Of course, this can only be done as long as the resources of that specific actor are not exclusive. If the actor possesses necessary and unique resources, the other actors must find a way to deal with this difficult actor. Selective network activation can still be of use. It may be necessary to restructure and expand the network slightly further and to include more issues and actors. That way, a situation may eventually result in which the difficult actor himself becomes dependent on resources possessed by other actors. Network expansion is not without risks, or course; it may lead to increased complexity and additional kinds of veto power. The second strategy involves arranging interaction, creating commitment amongst some of the participants, sometimes in a formalized manner. This is a useful strategy once actors already reach some kind of agreement, some kind of mutual understanding, or even a shared interest goal. Commitment then means that the actors promise to refrain from using the veto power, or to use it only under certain specified circumstances. The commitment can have a formalized nature, but that is not always a necessity. In some situations, especially when actors deal with one another in multiple processes and/or networks, actors cannot possibly withdraw at the price of being unreliable. When selectively activating the network or arranging interaction does not lead to agreement and actions, a third strategy might be of use. Brokerage is an option – that is, bringing problems, solutions and actors together – since they develop independently, as policy-making and decision-making are fragmented and non-linear processes. A broker may find solutions to problems that the involved actors themselves had not thought of. In certain circumstances, an actor considering the use of veto power may discover the existence of alternative options. Brokerage is no guarantee, but it may prevent the emergence of interaction barriers. Brokerage may also stimulate the manifestation of conflicting proposals and thus the creation of advocacy coalitions (Sabatier 1988, in: Kickert & Koppenjan 1997: 49). A fourth strategy is to facilitate interaction and create procedures for ongoing interaction in such a manner that consensus is within reach. Facilitating then means creating procedures for ongoing interaction,


discussions, negotiations, and decision-making. Actors must bind themselves to those procedures; if not, facilitating will not prevent the use of veto power. Whether agreed-upon procedures will actually do so depends on the kind of procedures. As long as creating a blockade or stepping out of the interaction represents acceptable options, closure of the first kind – by the use of veto power – remains a possibility. The last game management strategy is mediation and arbitration, to be applied in cases where interaction is difficult or even blocked. This strategy is an option in those cases where an actor has already used veto power or at least threatened to do so. An independent actor from within or outside the network may undertake several mediating activities in order to maintain interaction. If insufficiently successful, binding or non-binding arbitration may represent the last resorts. Here again, there is no guarantee for success. Even when actors commit themselves to arbitration and to accept the verdict, it may still appear difficult to enforce the decision (Kickert & Koppenjan 1997: 51). Public actors in particular cannot easily be forced to act at will, potentially their public duties stand in the way. An arbitration decision may not be legally binding per se. In addition to game management strategies, Kickert and Koppenjan (1997: 51ff) describe ‘network structuring’ as an option. I have already mentioned the option of expanding the network and introducing new actors to the interaction in order to decrease the uniqueness of the resources of an actor threatening to use veto power. Network structuring is a more general option than just that. A network manager may consider changing the network as such by the introduction of new actors, by pulling out involved actors, or by changing the dependencies between actors. Those measures can only be undertaken if the network manager has the required capacities. As far as public actors are concerned, this may help. Central government, for instance, can influence the statutory position of local and regional authorities and their legal capacities. It can also attempt to modify the legal and financial capacities of private actors; however, it cannot be certain that the results will be as expected. A further option is what might be referred to as ‘management by chaos’, that is, to disturb the network (Kickert 1993), since ‘(B)y drastically disrupting the environment of the system, it may be brought out of balance to such an extent that the leap to a new internal balance becomes possible’ (Kickert & Koppenjan 1997: 53). Fundamental changes in legal and financial provisions, for instance, could be decided upon. They allegedly disrupt the environment in the systems. However,


it is questionable whether the new balance would lead to more preferred outcomes. The opposite may just as likely be the case. Dealing with veto power, we may conclude, is no simple task. A number of strategies are available to prevent the use of veto power; however, none of them can guarantee success. In addition, mediation and arbitration are options when (the threat of) veto power is already at stake. Even then, there is no certainty of bringing the veto-wielding actor to her knees. Actors within the network ultimately have two options: the first is to simply accept that veto power is a continuous threat and to accept the use of it. This will most likely result in fewer preferred situations for many actors. An alternative option is to simply give it a try; that is, to apply as many strategies as possible in order to prevent the use of veto power and apply mediation and arbitration as soon as blockades are actually created. Trial and error will demonstrate whether this works.

Governing closed frames of reference? Dealing with closure because of veto power proved to be difficult. For governing a governance network, it may be necessary to delve a little deeper and deal with individual frames of reference. Frames of reference, as stated previously, are the sources for the use of veto power. Again, the strategies for game management and network structuring may be of use (see Termeer 1993; Termeer & Koppenjan 1997). Whatever the strategy may be, the keyword for influencing the frames of reference is reflection. The network manager can selectively activate the network and initiate or stimulate interaction between some participants in the network. That way, actors with different frames of reference will be confronted with different perceptions and they may feel stimulated to reflect on their own perceptions. Actors can arrange a certain amount of shared views and perceptions, or at least know each other’s frames of reference, to some extent. Brokerage, facilitating interaction, mediation and arbitration may support this process. The same holds for the network structuring strategy. All of these strategies can be applied in such a manner that they influence the frames of reference. Brokerage, for instance, may be aimed at furthering a common language (Termeer & Koppenjan 1997: 92), as actors with contrasting professional backgrounds do not automatically understand one another. A mediating actor can strive for mutual understanding between actors. One of the intervention strategies occasionally suggested in this context is that of ‘reframing’. In this strategy, the intention is to have actors


reflect on their own frame of reference by making them conscious of the existence of alternative frames of reference and other possibilities for assigning meaning to reality (Levy & Merry 1986: 99). There is little point in such an intervention if actors consciously declare those alternative frames of reference to be out of order and refuse to recognize that other perceptions are possible regarding the nature of the problem or what is to be done; an opinion they might support by the use of veto power. Calling in external advisors, recruiting new personnel, appointing a committee, introducing new ideas, stimulating reflection or arranging reframing in order to break through the closure of frames of reference can be successful. The problem is that the potential success of reframing depends on the same closed frames of reference. If a frame of reference wilfully closes itself from alternative perceptions, no remedy is possible. The actor apparently treats the perceptions as norms and prevents learning (see Luhmann 1984a: 436ff). If the frame of reference leaves open the possibility of learning, reframing is an option. Again, a prediction of the results of the application of one strategy or the other, or of the application of strategies as such, cannot be made. Actors already interacting for a long time may well enough know each others’ views and perceptions and, thus, each others’ frames of reference. They will know what can be done or not. Things will be more complicated in newly established or issue networks. Actors have limited mutual experiences and will simply have to wait and see. Increasing interaction and discussion will most probably be useful. The greater the discussion and interaction, the more likely actors get to know the frames of reference of other actors and their own. Simulations may assist the reflection process.

Governing closed policy communication systems? Finally, we must reflect on the closure of the policy network system, as this is the most encompassing level in the governance network. The policy network system determines whether the use of veto power is allowed and whether frames of reference can be formed and altered. The policy communication system of a network contributes to the inclusion and exclusion of actors and views in the network. Actors can distance themselves from the dominant policy communication system, which may lead to reflection at that level, but such distancing does have its limits. If the actors entirely fail to comply with the game rules of the network, they are literally sidelined. In this sense, the closed policy communication system functions in a structuring manner: through the


policy communication system of the network, actors are assigned a meaning in the communication that they are not entirely able to determine or control. Steering closed social systems, hence governing governance networks with closed policy communication systems, requires reflection. Actors, including governments, must take into account the closure of social systems and their autopoietic identity. If they do so, their awareness of the closed nature of the social environment of government might increase. Governments may become aware of the functional differentiation of society and thus of their non-hierarchical position. Other social systems are equal to the political sub-system that governments may want to govern, but governmental will as such is an insufficient tool for steering society. It is the era of the ‘Entzauberung des Staates’ (Willke 1987a); governments can no longer act as if they were fairy tale kings and queens. Other social sub-systems have their own perception of government and its actions. Any governments would therefore be well advised to make an image of itself as it is possibly observed by other systems. Governmental steering and policy measures may then stand a chance of becoming effective. Consequently, analyzing the environment is a necessary condition for governance. A first, rather simple, possibility is to make use of the self-referentiality of the juridical sub-system. Government may for instance change contract law and will thus stimulate changes in other systems (Teubner 1989); or it may create provisions for interest groups to participate in judicial procedures or it may create the duty for authorities to consult citizens or interest groups. In doing so, the self-steering program, the policy communication system or other social systems will have their doing. This option could be interpreted as network structuring at the meta-level. A second, more complicated, method for effective governance is governing in such a manner that the changes of policy failure are decreasing, necessarily takes the shape of context steering (Teubner & Willke 1984; Willke 1987b; 1991) or inciting governance (Schaap 1997). A number of options are available, keeping in mind that applying these options means inciting other closed systems, not getting what you want. Political intervention aims at coupling the autonomous self-steering of societal systems with political wishes, using diverse steering instruments. Moreover, political intervention no longer aspires to regulate society at large, but instead offers policy options; the effectiveness of those options increases if a choice between a limited set of options is mandatory. Providing options means that the autonomy of the sub-systems to be governed remains intact; it also means providing stimuli for choosing.


Options may concern internal regulations for private companies, for contracts, and so on. Options may also concern governmental structures, as was the case in the UK when the Blair Government obliged municipalities to decide on system reform and choose among a number of government models (Pratchett 2002: 333ff; Stoker 2002: 35; Sullivan 2003: 49ff). An actor providing options leaves the choice to others; however, options may be accompanied by requirements or by legal and financial provisions. A closed policy communication system in a governance network may thus be triggered or seduced to open up and allow for intervention. To be offered a choice among a limited number of options can be attractive, as it diminishes the noise in the environment of the system.

Some concluding remarks Dealing with closed governance networks, understood as closed systems, is not easy; that is for sure. We may be able to analyse and categorize types of closure; even find explanations. To actually govern closed systems is yet another thing. In this chapter, I explored the potential contribution of Luhmann’s theory of autopoietic social systems to the discussion on governing governance networks. This enabled me to distinguish between several kinds of closure, providing a heuristic tool for analyzing closure. A second contribution was the analysis of explanations for closure. And thirdly, the autopoiesis concept provided a basis for finding alternative strategies for the governance of closed systems. The core of the governance model discussed in this chapter is the fundamental acceptance of the autonomy and self-steering of closed social systems, governance networks with closed policy communication systems among them. Directly influencing such kinds of systems is impossible at the cost of destroying them by legal or financial means. In this model, the autonomy – and yes indeed, the closure – of systems is to be cherished. They are the better source for dynamics, for progress, for development. Systems may appear immobile or conservative, but that is in the eye of the beholder. The conservatism will most surely have a dynamic character, depending on the internal self-steering program of the system. Closed social systems continuously change, as long as the environment provides stimuli for assigning meaning and learning. That very circumstance, external stimuli leading to internal changes, is the better option for governmental actors to influence governance networks. Actors with steering wishes and intentions had better wait a little, however. If governing means making decisions regarding policy


content, executing the policies and forcing society and its networks to oblige, then government runs a risk. It may diminish or even destroy the self-steering potential of society, which will result in total dependence on government. In some sectors of society, this may already be the case. This does not mean that government will have to retreat, to the contrary. That would lead to fewer stimuli for systems, hence fewer opportunities for development and learning. Instead of a retreat or traditional governing, an alternative is at hand. Governments may increasingly define their tasks as network game managers and the actors responsible for network structuring. As such, they should leave the choices regarding the content of decisions to others. Even then, they would be entitled to suggest solutions and possible policies. In other words, government may become the actor steering the context of networks, offering stimuli – partly procedural, partly consisting of choices between varying content. The better option for politics is a policy of options.

Notes 1. Rhodes apparently interprets the socio-cybernetic approach as an actororiented approach, discussing the multiplicity of actors, interdependencies among them, and so on. This interpretation can be challenged, as Luhmann (who might be considered the founder of the approach) hardly ever spoke of actors, but rather of social systems, especially in his later works on autopoiesis (see Luhmann 1984). 2. Mayntz (1987: 101ff ) did recognize Luhmann’s basic analysis of societal differentiation and the operational closure of societal subsystems; however, she denied that the characteristics of the features of modern societies would lead to governance problems (as discussed previously), since she considered selfinterest to be the main source of closure. Scharpf (1988) limited the autopoiesis analysis to a certain kind of social systems (those that heavily depended on government for their financial means). His solution to systems’ closure was to adapt the governance instruments to the specific kind of system that was to be governed. Pierre and Peters (2000: 39) considered autopoiesis to be a potential approach to the analysis of governance, but refrained from exploring the potentialities. Bogason (2000: 74), referring to Luhmann’s work, acknowledged the fact that society consisted of ‘subsystems which basically operate on their own; there is a whole language structure linked to each subsystem making it operate perfectly on its own, but on the other hand preventing it from communicating perfectly with other sub-systems’. Nevertheless, he did not discuss this theoretical approach any further, because ‘it operates at a level of abstraction that is too high for the analysis of collective public action in the locality’. Kooiman also refrained from an analysis of autopoiesis, sometimes without saying why (for example 2003: 124).

7 Consensus and Conflict in Policy Networks: Too Much or Too Little? Joop F. M. Koppenjan

Introduction One of the criticisms of theories on policy networks and governance is the lack of attention devoted to power and conflict (Barns 1997). Indeed, reading through the literature on policy networks – and especially on policy network management – one is struck by the approach to the network processes and management challenges as a politically neutral and predominantly managerial activity (for example, Agranoff 1986, 2003; O’Toole 1988; Mandel 1990, 2001; Glasbergen 1995; Kickert et al. 1997). Key concepts are interdependencies and coordination. Due to interdependencies between a diverse set of public and private actors, public decision making, implementation and service delivery is about mobilizing, facilitating and guiding collaboration processes. These processes can be characterized as problem solving: putting pieces of a puzzle together, realizing package deals that provide win-win situations: solutions that benefit all of the involved actors and society as a whole (Scharpf 1978; Dery 1984). While attention to conflicts and power relations is almost absent, the opposite is true for the concept of consensus. Network governance primarily appears to be a consensus-building method: mobilizing resources and creating support to solve a serious societal problem or deliver a highly appreciated public service. The implication being that within network settings, there is a serious lack of consensus, though consensus itself is something good. Consensus is worth striving for, and perhaps even something we cannot have enough of. 133


The emphasis on consensus building has rendered policy networks and network theory the target of criticism from both academics and practitioners (Tatenhove & Leroy 1995; Barns 1997). Striving for consensus and the accompanying preference for ‘softer’ steering instruments, such as covenants and consultation, lead – so runs the criticism – to protracted deliberation processes that consume excessive energy and money but ultimately produce weak compromises, deadlocked decision making or non-implementation, in addition to hindering administrators and politicians from doing what they have been hired for: shouldering their responsibilities. Instead of network processes, there is a need for positive action, leadership and a clear and transparent division of responsibilities. This criticism of the policy network approach as a normative model runs somewhat parallel to the characterization of policy networks found in the slightly more dated literature on policy networks (Ripley & Franklin 1987; Jordan 1990; Marin & Mayntz 1991; Marsh & Rhodes 1992). According to this literature, networks are characterized by an overdose of consensus, thus excluding important interests and considerations and producing beneficial advantages for established oligarchies. Networks do not call for consensus building; rather, there is a need for confrontation and conflict capable of breaking through existing network structures and reducing their perverted outcomes. In this contribution, we aspire to shed more light on these contradictory views on the role of consensus and conflict in policy networks and network theory. How is it possible for so many different perspectives to exist regarding the same phenomenon? In addition to this question, we raise a normative issue: how should we value the occurrence or absence of consensus and conflict? Ultimately, we are interested in the implication of the answers to these questions for network governance. In order to address these questions, we will first explore the concepts of consensus and conflict (see next section). We will then proceed to take a closer look at the two contrasting approaches to policy networks in network-related literature mentioned above. In the following section, an overview of the literature presenting policy networks as forms of intensive cooperation with a surplus of consensus is given. Next the literature that presents networks as multi-actor settings with a lack of consensus is described. In the penultimate section, the two perspectives are compared and contrasted, and we examine how it is possible that they can present such different images. A meta-position is explored, consisting of a contingency approach to the management of the consensus-conflict dimension. In the final section, the implications of these observations for network governance are discussed.

Consensus and Conflict in Policy Networks 135

Consensus and conflict: an exploration of two ambivalent concepts Consensus means agreement, often understood as agreement in the field of more fundamental values. Understood in this way, the concept of consensus connects to that of deliberation: the process of an exchange of opinions upon which consensus is established (Butler 1987; Elster 1998); however, this is not the only interpretation of the concept. Apart from agreements on norms and values, consensus may also refer to problem formulations and objectives, solutions or policy measures, working methods, technologies or interaction rules, and so forth. The most minimal consensus can concern an ‘agreement to disagree’, making it possible for interdependent actors who disagree about almost everything to coexist without fighting. Also, because actors may be dependent upon one another as regards more then one issue, agreement on one topic may be accompanied by agreement or disagreement on another. Furthermore, actors may consider the issue with regard to which they have developed consensus as vital or less important. In other words, consensus may vary in scope, level and intensity. Conflict is not exactly the opposite of consensus. The absence of agreement does not imply controversy per se. After all, interests, perceptions and preferences may diverge. Conflict assumes differences of opinion between parties regarding, for instance, interests, views and preferences. They are relevant in so far as they prevent actors from realizing their goals. At worst, a conflict may consist of parties mobilizing their resources in an all-out struggle aimed at the destruction of the opponent. Conflict may be about the division of scarce resources but may just as well be caused by an incompatibility of character as by ideological differences (Coser 1956; Cobb & Elder 1983). As with consensus, conflicts may vary in scope, level and intensity. The positive and negative functions of consensus The concept of consensus is ambivalent. On the one hand, it has positive connotations. A certain degree of consensus is a necessary precondition for cooperation between different parties (Scharpf 1978, 1997; Susskind & Cruikshank 1987). Consensus can also denote the degree to which parties form part of a community: that they have not merely developed common ground for action, but also a shared identity. Instead of being an essential precondition, consensus can also be viewed as something worth striving for unto itself.


On the other hand, consensus may have drawbacks. For example, the consensus democracy in the Netherlands has been judged very differently over the years. Not so long ago, the harmonious cooperation between the public sector, employers and employees referred to with the term ‘polder model’ was seen internationally as an ideal, shining example; currently, it serves as the explanation for lagging economic performance: consensus standing in the way of innovation and competition. In education in particular, the Dutch consensus culture is said to nip any form of excellence in the bud: anything above average gets cut down. A high degree of consensus may mean that there is no room for deviating perceptions, preferences and interests, no room for innovation, no room for competition and excellence. Janis (1982) has examined the consequences that excessive consensus can have for group decision making and shown the extent to which the quality of the decision making suffers as a result. In small groups marked by extreme consensus, specific problem definitions and their solutions become accepted and inviolable at an early stage. Information is biased and searching behaviour is suppressed; important goals, interests, effects and alternative options are insufficiently examined; critical voices are quashed. This leads to choices for solutions being made prematurely, before the effects and risks of those choices have been adequately examined (see also Hart 1990). At the level of policy communities and entire nations, consensus among a majority of the population may lead to the neglect or suppression of the opinions and interests of minorities. Schattschneider (1960) talks about the ‘mobilization of bias’. Mobilization of bias occurs through the working of conscious or unconscious mechanisms of exclusion that Bachrach and Baratz (1962) refer to as ‘non-decision making’. Consensus can obviously be the effect of historical processes through which parties have gradually developed a shared identity that is transferred to new generations through lengthy socialization processes. However, oppression, violence and state terror may also play an important role. Behind the Chinese government’s pursuit of a ‘harmonious society’ lurks a totalitarian regime that endeavours, both at home and abroad, to maintain the illusion of unanimity while at the same time ruthlessly crushing any opposition. Nevertheless, even if consensus is not obtained under duress, it may still be a terrible thing, since the content of consensus, just like the goal of cooperation, may comprise something absolutely reprehensible. Whereas consensus may work against minorities, consensus-based decision making works the other way around, providing minorities with


veto-power. This mechanism explains why consensus decision methods are used in the context of empowerment strategies of weakly organized or underrepresented groups (Butler 1987). Besides contributing to empowerment, which may be judged in a positive light, consensus decision making may lead to a reduction of policy efficiency due to minorities blocking the implementation of the decisions preferred by majorities, prolonged deliberations and suboptimal outcomes. Requiring consensus makes it difficult to realize effective and innovative policy proposals and creates unfavourable conditions for bargaining, since actors do not develop the skills to realize trade-offs. However, although consensus building is often associated with consensus decision making – attempting to increase the level of agreement in certain settings – it does not necessarily imply the use of consensus as a decision rule. Consequently, consensus building does not automatically generate the same sort of impacts as consensus decision making and should not be confused with the latter.

The negative and positive functions of conflict In the same way as consensus, conflict in the context of an interaction setting between multiple, interdependent actors, may be valued in different ways. It may hinder cooperation, prevent problem solving or may even result in parties mobilizing their resources in an all-out destructive struggle producing lose-lose situations. As with consensus, however, conflict is not by definition negative. Conflicts may fulfil a number of positive functions. ●

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Conflicts are an expression of the importance that parties attach to certain values, problems or solutions. Conflicts demonstrate the vitality of an administrative system and prove that disagreements are not suppressed and parties are not discouraged or silenced by non-decision making. Conflicts generate information about the opinions of stakeholders, alternative problem definitions, undervalued effects and goals, as well as alternative options. Conflicts can lead to the initiation of research and bring about the gathering of knowledge. Conflicts may result in new problems or solutions being placed on the agenda, in the rethinking of existing priorities, and in the realization of reforms and innovations (Coser 1956; Crozier & Friedberg 1980; Brown 1983; Mastenbroek 1987; Schellenberg 1996).


In the same way as consensus building and consensus decision making, conflict generation as a decision-making strategy and problem-solving process may be judged in different ways. It may be considered a means of mobilizing resources to empower minorities, build coalitions and guide the attention of the general public, the media and decision makers to previously neglected interests or issues (Cobb & Elder 1983). However, seeking conflicts may also result in blocked interaction processes or the destruction of trust and social capital. All things considered, the concepts of consensus and conflict are multi-dimensional and ambivalent. The scope, level and intensity of consensus and conflict may differ: this is not always recognized and may give rise to misinterpretation regarding the possibility or impossibility of achieving joint action. Furthermore, the concepts and strategies used to accomplish them may be appreciated in different ways. The contradictory views on consensus and conflicts in network theory are examined in the next sections.

The first face of policy networks: a surplus of consensus Network theory is criticized for its high degree of conceptual ambiguity about what ought to be understood by the concept of networks (Dowding 1995; Blom-Hansen 1997; Börzel 1998). Acknowledging the many nuances in network relations, the network literature – insofar as it is relevant to the discussion of the consensus-conflict dimension – appears to fall into two groups (Rhodes 1990; Van Waarden 1992). The first strand of network literature sees a policy network as a tightly connected, exclusive group of actors. This group includes the slightly older literature on subsystems, subgovernments, iron triangles, neo-corporatism and policy communities. Alternatively, the second group emphasizes the fragmented and dynamic nature of policy networks. In this section, the first group is discussed. The debate on subsystems, subgovernments and iron triangles in the US Subsystems and subgovernments, terms used by authors such as Freeman (1965) and Ripley and refer to patterns of interaction between actors involved in making decisions in a special area of public policy, especially actors connected with the US Congress: congress committees, executive agencies and special interest groups. Subgovernments, according to Ripley and Franklin (1987), are involved in routine decision-making


for extended periods. This set of participants is consequently well informed about both the content of policy issues and procedures. The concepts of subsystems and subgovernments are more or less synonymous with the more contested concept of ‘iron triangles’. Milward and Wamsley (1985) have attempted to give the concept of subsystems a somewhat broader meaning: they are heterogeneous, have variable cohesion and exhibit internal complexity. The horizontal structure of pressure groups, civil servants and politicians is, according to these authors, connected with a vertical structure in which ‘government programs bind program professionals and their professional associates through all layers of government into vertical functional autocracies’ (Milward & Wamsley 1985). In this manner, Milward and Wamsley link the idea of subsystems with implementation networks of service delivery (Hjern & Porter 1981; O’Toole 1988). The latter literature is also inspired by interorganizational theory, with its emphasis on resource dependency and resource exchange (Levine & White 1961; Benson 1979; Aldrich & Whetten 1981). Laumann and Knoke (1987) stress the role of private participants in these networks: ‘despite their lack of formal decision making authority, many private participants possess sufficient political clout to secure that their interests will be taken into account.’ Neo-corporatism and policy networks: the European experience In Europe, the concept of neo-corporatism may be regarded as one of the origins of network theory: the state grants powerful interest groups, especially employers and trade unions, a special position in the political process, thus enhancing the steering capacity of government and creating consensus for the implementation of jointly decided solutions (Schmitter & Lehmbruch 1979; Cawson 1986). In contrast to pluralism, the policy process is relatively closed: only well-organized and state-licensed interest groups play a prominent role in policy formation. In this way the fundamental conflict between capital (employers) and labour (unions) was resolved. Building on both interorganizational theory and neo-corporatism, the concept of policy communities was elaborated in Europe. Whereas neo-corporatism primarily refers to economic issues at the macro-level, policy communities were identified in various policy areas at the meso-level of government (Heisler 1974; Koppenjan et al. 1987; Jordan 1990). Policy communities, according to Rhodes, are networks ‘characterized by stability of relationships, continuity of a highly restrictive


membership, vertical interdependencies based on shared service delivery, responsibility and insulation from other networks and invariably from the general public (including parliament)’ (Rhodes 1988: 78). Members of policy communities share certain interests that separate them from others. They have also developed more or less formalized organizational arrangements that support their interactions and exclude others (advisory boards, consultation procedures, state-approved membership). To a greater extent than the US literature on interorganizational relations, subsystems and subgovernments, the concept of policy communities refers to the opinions and values shared by actors. Actors within policy communities share a policy paradigm: a view of the world, their surroundings, the issues at play, actors that are part of the communities and the main instruments and strategies that can or must be used (Benson 1982; Wilks & Wright 1987; Klijn 1997). To address the issue of the role of consensus within networks, which has been relatively neglected within network theory, we can build upon the literature on policy learning, policy frames and discourse analysis.

Policy networks and the role of consensus Actors within policy networks are involved in close interaction over an extended period as a result of which they develop a joint perception of their world, the problems they deal with and the technologies they use in doing so (Veld et al. 1991; Termeer 1993). These joint perceptions relate to what Sabatier (1988) referred to as the policy core. The policy core is the set of assumptions underlying existing policies that are fundamental to the identity and core interests of the actors in a policy coalition. The policy core cannot be subject to discussion and is difficult to change. Rein and Schön state that within communities, there is a joint perception or frame with regard to the nature of issues and the relations between the parties involved. Hall (1993) would call this a policy paradigm. This consensus prohibits policy learning: perceptions and policies will only be adapted as long as claims from the outside are not fundamental. Interestingly enough, Hall (1993) connects the static concept of policy paradigms with the more dynamic idea of policy discourses. The concept of policy discourses suggests that consensus is not based on a static, delineated set of ideas and values; instead, it is considered to be constantly maintained, reshaped and discovered in an ongoing discussion between members of a policy community, producing assumptions


and discussion rules that fulfil the function of meaning creation and gate-keeping at the same time. A policy discourse is a storyline that structures the debate, determining which arguments are valid or not. It is both a method by which actors attempt to arrive at shared meanings and an instrument of consensus guarding: a tool for the exercise of power by means of which actors attempt to impose their own interpretations of reality on others (Hajer 1995; Hoppe 1999). Not all parties have the same opportunities in this argumentation game. Experts, policy makers, institutionalized interest groups and the media will be most influential. Politicians and citizens are floored and outmanoeuvred by information overload and an array of interpretations. Weakly organized interests are not heard (Hoppe 1999; Hajer & Wagenaar 2003; Koppenjan & Klijn 2004). The consensus on policy content within policy networks is often strengthened by expert knowledge and scientific research. Knowledge production is not an autonomous process. Policy network and knowledge production are often intertwined. Scientific epistemological communities are occasionally even colonized by the government when it funds scientific activities and educational programs or establishes and maintains authoritative scientific institutes that develop knowledge monopolies in their field. Research is frequently prompted by perceptions of the policy community and by knowledge as developed within the dominant framing of the problem. Knowledge develops in interaction between knowledge producers, policy makers and interest groups making subjective decisions partly inspired by societal influences. Research and knowledge are thus intertwined with policy networks and framebounded, contributing to and strengthening the consensus on policy formulation and the set of policy alternatives to be considered within policy networks (Wynne 1989; Gibbons et al. 1994; Veld 2000; Nowothy et al. 2001). Policy networks and the overproduction of consensus Authors of this older strand of network literature share the perception of networks as relatively closed settings for interaction in which interdependent yet autonomous actors have gradually developed formal and informal relationships supported by joint perceptions and values and a common language and identity. These networks can thus be regarded as arrangements for settling conflicts between mutually dependent actors within a specific policy area or sub area. The consensus underlying policy


networks can therefore be understood as institutional capital, resulting from a unique historical learning process of enduring interaction. Although this consensus is very functional for the actors involved in settling their conflicts and renders interaction possible (which is necessary for dealing with their interdependencies and joint interests), the literature on policy networks generally stresses the dysfunctionality of this consensus. Authors judge that these networks have developed excessive consensus. The consensus that actors have developed on the basis of their joint interests results in ‘mobilization of bias’ and ‘non-decision making’ (Schattschneider 1960; Bachrach & Baratz 1962; Olson 1965; van Eijk & Kok 1975; Cobb & Elder 1983). At first sight the policy-making within the network may have pluralistic features: within a multi-actor setting actors pull and push with regard to problem definitions and policy measures while non of them wins or looses all the time. At a closer look issues that threaten the joint interests of the members of the network or that do not fit their common reality definitions may systematically be kept out of the arena. Due to this ‘consensus overdose’, networks are relatively closed to the outside world, with the following implications: ●

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a lack of opportunity to address new problems and problem definitions or unorthodox innovative measures that threaten the interests of the established parties. Consequently, policy networks prohibit effective and innovative policies. networks are organized around the common interests of their members. They are privileged oligarchies, optimizing particularistic interests at the cost of public interests. this is the more true, since authors who are supposed to represent the public interest are not part of the policy network; or if they are, are socialized in such a manner that they identify themselves with the interests of the network. processes within networks are not transparent, not open to democratic accountability mechanisms and difficult to control from the outside. other societal actors who do not share the interests and views of the policy network are excluded. Especially the interests of underrepresented or non-represented actors (which include future generations) are not articulated or taken care of. interests and actors that are part of other policy networks do not have access to the policy formation and implementation arenas within the policy network. Policies are therefore designed and decided upon


from a narrow sectoral view, thus limiting the possibilities for more integral or holistic approaches to problems (Marin & Mayntz 1991; Marsh & Rhodes 1992).

The second face of policy networks: insufficient consensus However, the approach to policy networks as subsystems or policy communities is not the only possible approach, nor is it undisputed. It has already been indicated in the previous section that Milward and Wamsley (1985), for example, pointed out that the degree of cohesion and ‘closedness’ of networks can vary significantly. Each network has its own characteristics. In particular, the more sociologically oriented network approaches concentrate on mapping out the morphological characteristics of networks and their internal differences (Laumann & Knoke 1987). The observation of the existence of different types of networks made Heclo (1978) challenge the concept of iron triangles. In his view, networks are virtually the opposite of closed. They are characterized by a large number of actors involved in administrative processes in varying configurations. The boundaries of the network are vague: ‘participants move in and out constantly’. That is why Heclo spoke of issue networks with a strongly ad hoc character (see also Kenis & Schneider 1991). This approach fits in with Kingdon’s description of the fragmented nature of the American political system (1984, 1995). Kingdon argued that in the USA, agenda-building activities, the development of policy measures and the making of policy decisions take place in separate processes, which he calls ‘streams’. Due to this institutional fragmentation, the natural state for public decision making is one of a lack of consensus. The opportunities available for realizing policies are therefore very limited. It is only under exceptional conditions that problems, solutions and political preferences meet. Under these exceptional conditions of consensus – policy windows – policy can be brought about. These conditions usually only exist temporarily; consensus is extremely vulnerable and difficult to maintain.

Multi-actor and multi-purpose games in settings with weakly developed institutions As a result, processes within networks acquire an unstructured character within which actors must exert themselves to articulate their problems


and place them on the agenda, linking them to solutions that have often been devised by others, while at the same time ensuring that they acquire and retain sufficient support to propel these problem-solution combinations through the relevant decision-making circuits and get them implemented within a complicated implementation structure (compare Pressman & Wildavsky 1973). The lack of consensus leads to laborious interaction processes, games in which a changing set of actors with divergent interests, goals and perceptions pull and push to bring about problem formulations, policy measures and resources. They are characterized by conflict, impasses, misunderstandings, unexpected twists and turns, and sudden breakthroughs. A successful outcome is not guaranteed: the interaction may become deadlocked, stop altogether, or end up in compromises that are unsatisfying for all concerned (Allison 1971). Attempts at solving conflicts over problem formulations or solutions using expert knowledge or scientific research works counterproductively. Since knowledge production does not develop independent of societal processes, social conflict and problem frames may enter the research domain. Experts and scientists often do not agree on even basic facts, and their contradictory reports may contribute to information overload and confusion. Expert knowledge and research outcomes embraced in specific policy arenas often encounter a lack of authoritativeness in wider circles and trigger investments in contra-expertise, resulting in competing claims of truth, policy advocacy and report wars (Hoppe 1999; Veld 2000). Issue networks, arenas and policy networks The meaning of the concept of ‘issue network’ bears strong resemblance to that of the concepts of ‘arena’ and ‘game’. Issue networks appear to be more or less the same as arenas in complex policy processes. They are occasionally also considered to be an advocacy coalitions or adhocracies: sets of actors negotiating with one another about the way to solve a specific problem or realize (or block) a particular project (Allison 1971; Crozier & Friedberg 1980; Sabatier 1988). By-products of these interactions may be game rules or shared perceptions. Depending on the duration and the success of the interaction, these may assume more solid shape and become institutionalized. Issue networks, arenas and advocacy coalitions may thus also be regarded as proto-networks; interactions in networks’ early stages. How is it possible that authors differ so greatly in opinion with regard to the essential characteristics of the policy network phenomenon?


One explanation is that in reality, different networks co-exist. Due to the specific issues at stake, the characteristics of the wider policy area or the particular historical development of interaction processes, policy networks may have developed differently (Koppenjan et al. 1987; Rhodes 1988; van Waarden 1992). Lowi (1963), for instance, using the term arenas in this context, argued that depending on the nature and intensity of the conflict or the clash of interests between a set of actors, a specific configuration of actors or ‘arena’ develops. Some arenas have a more pluralist (open) character; others tend towards a more elitist (exclusive) structure (see also Olson 1965). Heclo provided a historical explanation for these differences (Heclo 1978). The nature of networks shifts under the influence of social developments. Following his line of reasoning, one might state that networks are no longer able to develop or maintain the closed character that they had in the heyday of iron triangles and neo-corporatism, due to societal differentiation, citizens becoming more self-conscious, the rise of powerful interest groups and private organizations, the growing administrative density, the increasing role of the mass media, politicians taking active stands, and the more stringent requirements imposed on transparency, accountability and democratic legitimacy. New issue networks will increasingly arise and penetrate existing policy networks. It may be assumed that these types of horizontal settings, in which consensus, for all intents and purposes, is lacking, primarily occur in three current policy situations (Klijn & Koppenjan 2004): 1. when the need for interaction arises for the first time between actors who were not previously aware of their mutual dependencies; 2. when new problems or actors manage to penetrate existing networks, thus creating chaos so that new forms of consensus must be developed in order to tackle previously unknown, politicized problems or to enable interaction between old and new participants; and 3. when problems cut across networks so that actors from different networks must learn to interact with one another. This latter example in particular reveals that in some situations, the lack of shared institutions and consensus in a network situation cannot be equated with an institutional vacuum. On the contrary, interaction is possibly hampered by the presence of a variety of frames, paradigms or policy cores firmly anchored in the networks of which the various representatives are a part. It is precisely in these situations that fundamental policy controversies may develop, where parties question each


other’s policy cores (Rein & Schon 1986, 1992; Sabatier 1988; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993; Schön & Rein 1994). Rein and Schön use the term ‘frame conflicts’ to typify these controversies: conflicts between parties about whose frames apply. In addition, a lack of joint values, shared language, and common rules may inadvertently result in a ‘dialogue of the deaf’, which blocks the realization of joint solutions and the tackling of societal problems (van Eeten 1999; Klijn & Koppenjan 2004). Governance in issue networks Since institutional arrangements and shared outlooks, values, languages and rules are relatively weakly developed or inconsistent in this area, there are few mechanisms available to mitigate conflicts, and there is a strong need for consensus building in order to enhance interaction and make joint results possible. Much of the literature on interorganizational management, intergovernmental management and network management deals with this problem of conflict reduction and consensus building (for example Agranoff 1986, 2003; O’Toole 1988; Mandel 1990, 2001; Kickert et al. 1997). In general, there are three main strategies for dealing with this problem: 1. rearranging relations in order to make interaction and consensus building unnecessary or easier; 2. negative coordination: avoiding interaction or conflict (at the cost of not benefiting from the advantages of collaboration); and 3. positive coordination: strategies aimed at conflict reduction and consensus building (Scharpf 1978, 1997). With regard to the third category of network governance recommendations, most authors consider attempts to create consensus about values difficult: as mentioned earlier, the adjustment of policy cores, frames or paradigms is very difficult. Some authors actually advise against it. By seeking this type of agreement, the drawbacks of consensus decision making discussed earlier (policy inefficiency, lack of innovation, absence of a will to negotiate) will be triggered. Olsen (1972), for instance, states that ‘… if decision makers clarify their values and beliefs, conflict will arise’. Striving for shared values ignores the fact that a pluriformity of values exists in a complex society. Instead of a consensus on values, most authors suggest that there is a need for a strategic consensus, which at the same time recognizes and respects the various interests and perceptions


existing within network situations (Brown 1983; Agranoff 1986; Hanf & O’Toole 1992). According to Glasbergen (1995), this strategic consensus may be about goals and problem perceptions; however, at this level, values and norms remain pretty much at stake. Some authors suggest it is far more practical to focus on the development of solutions that are advantageous to all of the involved parties. By bargaining (trading off costs and benefits that are valued differently in such a way that the involved parties are better off), investing resources in developing solutions with added value and exploring the solution space in search of integrative solutions, win–win-situations can be realized. Scharpf (1978, 1997) calls this strategy ‘problem solving’ (compare also Fisher & Ury 1981; Teisman 2000). For the realization of these win–winsituations, actors need not agree on perceptions, objectives or values. Strategic consensus may also refer to the development of a certain agreement on interaction rules as a minimum requirement for actors entering into interaction processes (Burns & Flam 1987; Ostrom 1990; Klijn 2001). In order to bring and keep parties together in these circumstances entrepreneurs, brokers, facilitators and arbiters are considered essential (Friend et al. 1974; Forester 1989; Mandell 1990). In addition to the development of strategic consensus, positive coordination can be realized through conflict resolution. Conflict regulation mechanisms, mediation and arbitration are indispensable attributes for conflict resolution. Van Eeten (1999) shows how, in the case of dialogues of the deaf, ‘crossovers’ can be sought by redefining a problem, creating a new agenda or developing a joint language. Agreeing to disagree can provide the first step in bringing about a minimum of consensus that at least allows for coexistence and perhaps for future rapprochements.

The true face of policy networks and its implications for network governance Recognizing the existence of two perspectives on policy networks renders it easier to understand the role of consensus and conflict within these networks. It becomes clear that it is not so much the normative positions taken by authors on networks or consensus and conflict that differ, but rather, that the authors are actually talking about different networks. The authors subscribing to the first approach describe closed networks. In these networks, a high degree of consensus has been developed which in some respects is very functional. Where consensus has been carried too far, however, it leads to the exclusion of interests, the


production of negative externalities, a lack of transparency, external accountability and democratic legitimacy, and innovation fails to occur. The authors representing the second approach are talking about completely different types of networks or employ a different perspective in which representatives of the ‘closed’ policy networks, as described by the authors of the first approach, meet each other in an arena cutting across these policy networks. See Figure 7.1. In short: the empirical findings of both groups of actors are not mutually exclusive but are, on the contrary, highly compatible with one another. This also holds true for their normative positions. The opinion regarding the negative consequences of an overdose of consensus in closed policy communities is quite likely to be shared by the authors of the second approach; however, they are addressing different settings or issues when making their recommendations for network management as a method of consensus building. The network governance recommendations they suggest are not intended for consensus dominated networks, which the authors of the first approach have in mind. The insight that the two approaches are not conflicting but complementary offers an opportunity to search for a meta-position. This might consist of a contingency approach: the degree to which

Policy network 1

Policy network 2 arena 2

policy game 1

policy game 2 policy game 3

arena 1

arena 3

Figure 7.1 Policy games and arenas that cut across various policy networks Source: Klijn & Koppenjan (2004: p 88).


excessive consensus or conflict exists depends on the characteristics of the specific situation. Given the different characteristics of network situations, network governance logically cannot be restricted to strategies directed towards solving a lack of consensus; instead, they should also counteract an overdose of consensus and a lack of functional conflict.

Network governance and the management of the consensus-conflict dimension If we agree that interaction between mutually dependent parties is the central issue in network theory, we can then argue that both consensus and conflict perform important positive functions in policy networks. Since consensus plays a role in specific, ad hoc interactions – but may also be institutionalized in the form of a durable set of joint values, norms, outlooks, frames, language and rules at the level of the network – it makes sense to distinguish between two levels within policy networks: the institutional level and the interaction level. At the institutional level, consensus is an expression of the degree to which actors within the network have learned to interact. It can be considered as institutional capital: the yield of enduring, unique historical processes of institutionalization and learning that makes earlier generic experiences, knowledge and wisdom available for current interaction. At the level of specific games and processes in specific arenas, a certain level of consensus is a necessary precondition for interaction in situations of mutual dependency. At this level, consensus contributes to problems being dealt with promptly; supplies the rules by means of which complex and conflicting-inducing issues are made manageable; and ensures that interaction costs are reduced. The presence of conflict at the institutional level may be an indication that the network is not completely closed nor static, as a result of which institutionalized values, norms, frames, rules, etcetera are questioned, reflecting opportunities for development and adaptation to new circumstances. At the interaction level, conflict may contribute to the articulation of formerly underrepresented interests, trigger the mobilization of new resources, information and research, and promote the transparency of processes. Since a greater variety of views, information, ideas and options are forwarded through conflict, it contributes to the quality of interaction processes and the innovativeness of the solutions and policy measures contemplated (Coser 1956; Brown 1983; Mastenbroek 1987).


Too much or too little Besides fulfilling positive functions, consensus and conflict within policy networks may become dysfunctional (Brown 1983). Excessive consensus at the institutional network level leads to the systematic suppression and exclusion of problems, interests, parties and innovations. Too little consensus means that an institutionalized practice hardly exists, meaning that interaction processes develop with difficulty and derail easily. At the process level, excessive consensus manifests itself in a lack of participation, information, options and variety, which ultimately results in ineffective and non-innovative solutions. A lack of consensus may lead to the escalation of conflicts but also, in the absence of conflicting interests or when parties have limited involvement, to prolonged stagnation or interaction failing to get off the ground. Excessive conflict at the institutional level means that a network disintegrates, or that a struggle for the institutional relations within the network will make it impossible for interactions between parties concerning other, substantive matters to come about. Too little conflict leads to insufficient articulation of interests, and inadequate allocation of resources and use of capacities within the network. In concrete interaction processes, excessive conflict means that problem solving stagnates and transaction costs mount or – if one of the parties manages to get its own way – that ineffective solutions are brought about and relations between the parties involved are seriously damaged. This latter observation helps us remember that the interaction and institutional levels are connected and that events within processes have an impact on the institutional level. Too little conflict within interactions may lead to the excluding of important insights, interests or options, to insufficient energy being generated to tackle a problem, or to insufficient variety being created so that a decision lacks the necessary quality. Table 7.1 summarizes the implications of the level of consensus and conflict within policy networks. This reflection on the role of consensus and conflict in networks and interaction processes within networks yields some important insights into the requirements for good network governance. Contrary to the dominant emphasis on consensus building and conflict regulation in network literature, an important challenge for network management is to prevent and reverse overinvestment in consensus building and to pursue a healthy level of confrontation and conflict.

Consensus and Conflict in Policy Networks 151 Table 7.1 Implications of the level of consensus and conflict within networks Institutional level Consensus

Conflict

Interaction level

Too much

systematic exclusion of interests and parties, non-transparency

exclusion of problem perceptions, information, alternatives, innovation

Functional

offers certainty in uncertain setting; moderates conflict through enduring relations

simplifies problem solving; reduces transaction costs

Too little

no sustainable institutional solutions

interaction is not brought about or reaches deadlock

Too much

hinders process; network disintegrates

high transaction costs; solutions are not brought about or are ineffective, with negative consequences for relations

Functional

prevents closedness; does justice to pluriformity, promotes transparency

has mobilizing and accelerating effects; contributes to information provision, variety, quality and innovation

Too little

insufficient articulation of interests and inadequate allocation of resources and use of capacities

lack of commitment and variety; too little mobilization of resources

Conclusion: managing the consensus–conflict dimension in network-settings Of course, the question remains: to what extent can governance influence the content and degree of consensus and conflict? A number of conditions regarding consensus and conflict are difficult to manipulate. There are legal, social and cultural differences between sectors and countries that can support or hamper the network governance aimed at bringing about consensus or influencing conflict. In a country with a strong civil society and a tradition of ‘wheeling and dealing’, with relatively moderate socio-economic cleavages, all this will be easier to achieve than in a country torn by internal strife due to fundamental differences, inequity and a long tradition of hostility and mutual distrust. Even in the first situation, however, not every conflict or consensus is


governable. Within these limiting conditions, an important challenge to network governance is to manage the content and degree of consensus and conflict in network situations. This analysis shows that in contrast to the dominant view of network governance as a form of conflict reduction and consensus building, network governance should also include strategies to promote a functional level of conflict and prevent consensus from being taken to excess. Moreover, this analysis emphasizes that network governance is not a politically neutral activity, aimed at conflict reduction and consensus building. Influencing the degree and nature of consensus and conflict in a network situation is pre-eminently political in nature. This means that network governance is an exercise of power and will be the subject of struggle and manipulation. It should therefore be embedded in the democratic process and surrounded by safeguards.

8 Network Governance: Effective and Legitimate? Tanja A. Börzel and Diana Panke

Introduction Network governance has been present in the domestic affairs of highly industrialized states for a long time. Corporatist arrangements, for instance, constitute one such form of network governance. With the ‘governance turn’ in International Relations and European Studies, (Jachtenfuchs 2003) network governance beyond the nation state has been increasingly studied (Reinicke 1998; Kohler-Koch & Eising 1999; Börzel & Risse 2005). Many authors consider network governance as a significant solution to a whole variety of problems relating to governance within and beyond the nation-state (Marin & Mayntz 1991; Kooiman 1993; Le Galès & Thatcher 1995; Reinicke 1998; Cutler, et al. 1999). In this perspective, the success of network governance (NWG) is defined on the basis of the NWG’s effectiveness. As a consequence, legitimacy, as the second yardstick for good (and successful) governance, is often neglected. This chapter is based on the assumption that the criterion for successful governance is twofold: it must be effective and legitimate. Hence, overemphasizing effectiveness as yardstick for successful governance – as much of the literature on network governance does – is problematic and might lead to attestations of success, where there is none. Another strand of the literature takes legitimacy issues seriously and explicitly criticizes network governance for its lack of democratic participation and accountability (e.g. Scharpf 1993; Benz 1995; Brühl et al. 2001). Since successful NWG requires effectiveness and legitimacy, it is elementary to inquire about the possible relationships between both standards for good governance. While some scholars have argued that legitimacy problems can be compensated by effectiveness gains (e.g. Reinicke 1998), others contend that there is a certain trade-off 153


between effectiveness and legitimacy (Scharpf 1999; Börzel & Hösli 2003). The more effective (network) governance is (or in Scharpf’s terms: the higher the output legitimacy), the more problems of (input) legitimacy it suffers, and vice versa. This chapter argues that network governance is in demand for both in order to provide a viable alternative to other forms of governance. It examines the relationships between effectiveness and legitimacy and inquires whether effectiveness and legitimacy are necessarily competing yardsticks for good governance in networks. We claim that the two standards for good governance do not necessarily compete. Under certain conditions, effective and legitimate governance are complementary or even reinforcing. The chapter proceeds in four steps. In the first part, we identify the main features of networks that distinguish them from other types of governance arrangements. The second part defines effectiveness and legitimacy as the two main normative standards for good (network) governance. Their possible relationships are discussed in the forth part. The chapter concludes with a short summary of the argument and some considerations for future research.

Networks as governance The governance literature distinguishes between three major types of social order: markets, hierarchies, and networks1 (Lindblom 1977; Williamson 1979; Powell 1990). While hierarchies coordinate social action by using command and control mechanisms, markets are spontaneous orders that emerge form the self-coordination of autonomous actors. Networks, in turn, function by non-hierarchical coordination based on the exchange of resources and/or trust. Political scientists have adopted this typology when studying political structures and processes. Here, governance refers to the setting and implementation of collectively binding norms and rules for the provision of public goods and services (Kohler-Koch 1999). While public actors have the power to impose such norms and rules hierarchically, private actors engage in voluntary self-regulation. In networks, finally, public and private actors cooperate on a non-hierarchical basis in the making of public policies. Some have adopted a more narrow understanding of governance and reserve the concept for the non-hierarchical coordination between public and private actors, i.e. networks. Governance involves the ‘[f]ormulation and implementation of collectively binding decisions through the participation of state and non-state actors in public/private

Network Governance: Effective and Legitimate? 155

networks’ (Mayntz 2002). In this view, network governance is ‘governance without government’ (Rosenau & Czempiel 1992) to which others have referred to as ‘cooperative’ (Mayntz 1998), ‘modern’ (Kooiman 1993), ‘interactive’ (Kohler-Koch 1997) or simply ‘new’ (Héritier 2002). The different understandings of (network) governance can be quite confusing. While there is no authoritative definition, the literature seems to agree on two characteristics as being constitutive of networks, which are causally linked and make them distinct from alternative types of governance. The first relates to the equal involvement of public and private actors (structure), and the second refers to the mode of non-hierarchical coordination (process). Governance structures emerge from the actors involved and their relationships. Markets are structures of spontaneous order, in which (private) actors stand on equal footing and autonomously coordinate their actions (no structural coupling). Hierarchies, by contrast, are characterized by relationships of domination and subordination between (public) actors which substantially constrain actors’ autonomy of action (tight coupling). Unlike markets, hierarchies are able to act intentionally by hierarchically coordinating the actions of (private) actors based on the possibility to use force. In networks, finally, public and private actors enjoy equal status (although the distribution of financial, material, or ideational resources can be unequal). Public actors may have the power to impose decisions on private actors. Yet, their relationship with private actors is not defined by domination but based on the exchange of resources. Private actors offer public actors information, expertise, financial means, or political support, which the latter need to make and enforce collectively binding norms and rules. In exchange, private actors receive substantive policy influence since public actors do not adopt and implement policies against the interest of the private actors involved. With regard to governance processes, we can distinguish two modes: hierarchical and non-hierarchical coordination (steering). Hierarchical coordination involves authoritative decisions, which can be imposed on actors against their will. Those decisions can be unilateral, e.g. by administrative order or judicial ruling, but they also include majority voting, since the minority has to bend to the will of the majority (Scharpf 1992). Drawing on theories of social action, non-hierarchical coordination can take two forms (cf. Checkel 2001; Börzel & Risse 2005). Rationalist theories point to positive (side payments) and negative (sanctions) incentives or negotiated compromises on the basis of fixed preferences (bargaining). Sociological approaches, by contrast, emphasize non-manipulative


processes of learning and persuasion, in which actors are socialized into new norms and rules and change their preferences accordingly (arguing). Governance structures and processes are causally linked. While states can steer hierarchically and non-hierarchically, networks, by definition, are based on non-hierarchical coordination. Markets, by contrast, are not able to steer or govern at all since they are unable to act intentionally. Therefore, markets are not a mode of governance but can only serve as steering instruments if market principles (e.g. price mechanisms) are invoked to influence actors’ behaviour (Mayntz 1997). In sum, network governance refers to the formulation and implementation of collectively binding decisions by the systematic involvement of private actors with whom public actors coordinate their preferences and resources on a voluntary (non-hierarchical) basis. Many authors celebrate network governance as a significant solution to a whole variety of problems of governance within and increasingly beyond the nationstate (e.g. Marin & Mayntz 1991; Kooiman 1993; Le Galès & Thatcher 1995; Reinicke 1998; Cutler, Haufler & Porter 1999). In an increasingly complex and dynamic world, where hierarchical co-ordination is rendered difficult if not impossible and the potential for deregulation is limited due to the problems of market failure, networks seem to remain the only form of governance that is capable of providing collective goods and services. Yet, the effectiveness of network governance has been challenged on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Likewise, network governance has been criticized for its lack of democratic participation and accountability. Finally, some scholars seem to suggest that there is a zero-sum relationship between the two standards for good governance. Increasing effectiveness necessarily reduces the legitimacy of network governance, and vice versa. The next section will argue that network governance needs to be both effective and legitimate in order to provide a viable alternative to hierarchy. The remainder of the chapter will then evaluate the effectiveness and legitimacy of network governance and explore potential tensions between the two normative standards for good governance.

The demand for effectiveness and legitimacy The core of governance is authoritative rule making or the production of public goods and services for a certain group of people. Since authority has been organized in political orders (cities, empires, states as opposed to the ad hoc exercise of power), political philosophers have always been concerned with an important question: What distinguishes good from


bad governance? Early answers focused on the legitimacy of political orders as a normative criterion (Aristotel 1993; Plato 1973). Max Weber’s writings on the protestant ethic, the legality and the rational political order advanced a less normative standard (Weber 1966, 1976): effectiveness. Effectiveness: solving problems and meeting demands Effective governance encompasses a substantive and a procedural aspect (cf. Héritier 2003; Neyer 2004). Firstly, effective governance produces policies that solve the problems and satisfy the demands they were designed to cope with (goal attainment; problem-solving capacity). Secondly, effective governance requires the production of sufficient policy output without delays or deadlocks at reasonable cost (efficiency). Like legitimacy, effectiveness is a standard for good governance, because it contributes to the maintenance of political systems. In systemtheoretical perspective, political systems exist in order to produce collectively binding outcomes, suited to solve problems and satisfy demands. When it fails to fulfil its problem-solving (Easton 1965), goalattainment and adaptation tasks (Parson 1976), there is no functional reason for the future maintenance of the respective political system. In other words, an ineffective political system that produces either predominantly inadequate outcomes or too few solutions to cope with the environments or other sub-system’s problem-pressures or demands cannot maintain itself in the long run (Easton 1957; Parson 1960). The emergence of network governance has been closely related to the declining effectiveness of hierarchy (state failure) in domestic politics and the absence of hierarchy (anarchy) in international politics, respectively. Under the conditions of environmental uncertainty and increasing international, sectoral, and functional overlap of societal sub-systems, network governance has a crucial advantage over hierarchy and market. While markets (deregulation) are unable to control the production of negative externalities (problems of market failure), hierarchies (governments) do no longer possess and control all necessary resources to produce polices capable of addressing societal problems. Through network governance, governments can mobilize resources in situations where they are widely dispersed among public and private actors at different levels of government, international, national, regional, and local (Kenis & Schneider 1991; Marin & Mayntz 1991; Kooiman 1993; Mayntz 1993; Le Galès 1995; Wolf 2000). Private actors offer public actors information, expertise, financial means, or political support, which the latter need to make and enforce collectively binding norms and rules. In


exchange, private actors receive substantive policy influence since public actors do not adopt and implement policies against the interest of the private actors involved. Whether network governance is really more effective than its two rivals is ultimately an empirical question. The evidence presented by the literature is at best mixed. One problem is that many studies suffer from a selection bias. There is more research on successful network governance arrangements than there is on failures. For instance, is the world a better place because non-governmental organizations (NGOs) sitting at the negotiation table were able to kill the prospects for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI); or would a MAI that included human rights and environmental concerns have been preferable? In addition, no empirical studies comparing government attempts to solve certain problems by means of hierarchy with network governance arrangements for similar purposes have been undertaken yet. It would go beyond the scope of this chapter to systematically evaluate the effectiveness of network governance. Instead, the next paragraph presents a few empirical examples form international politics, which challenge the effectiveness of network governance (cf. Börzel & Risse 2005). Private actors certainly provide public actors with important resources to make international policies work. In the issue areas of international development and of humanitarian aid, for instance, public–private partnerships between UN organizations and the private sector (mainly NGOs) were simply a necessity given the lack of material resources of international organizations. Similarly, in the human rights area we can observe that the regular provision of information by the NGOs community to various UN human rights committees and national governments has not only greatly improved our knowledge about human rights violations, but has also increased compliance with international human rights norms (Risse et al. 1999). However, it is unclear whether the mutual resource dependency of public and private actors actually leads to a net increase in the problem-solving capacity of network governance. If the international community strips international organizations such as the UN of material resources, the sharing of authority with non-state actors can easily result in problem-shifting rather than problem-solving as international organization come to rely on NGOs. In many cases, network governance arrangements between states, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and/or companies are simply neoliberal solutions in disguise; that is, they amount to the privatization and de-regulation of formerly public services. This seems to be very much the case concerning public–private partnerships involved in the


humanitarian aid and development sectors. Moreover, international organizations and states do not have the ability to reassume responsibility for delegated tasks in cases of private failures as functions were delegated because they were not capable of delivering them in the first place. Finally, the inclusion of private actors as the primary rule-targets in the process of rule-making can certainly increase the problem-solving capacity by ensuring compliance with international norms and rules (Chayes & Chayes 1993; et al. 1998). Yet, including private rule targets in international treaty-making and other governance arrangements might simply lead to ‘lowest common denominator’ solutions or even result in deadlock. If those who have to bear the costs of compliance are involved in the negotiating process, they may attempt to weaken international rules and regulations or prevent them altogether (Héritier 2003). Ultimately, then, the purported ‘good news’ about private actor compliance might in fact not tell us very much about the successful solution of cooperation and compliance problems through network governance.2 We might end up with international policies that do very little to address problem-solving challenges. In sum, the effectiveness of network governance may be less promising than often assumed by the literature. This is all the more problematic because effectiveness gains are often seen as a compensation for the weak legitimacy of network governance, if such problems are considered at all (cf. Scharpf 1999). We argue, by contrast, that network governance has to be both effective and legitimate to serve as a functional equivalent or even substitute for hierarchy. Legitimacy: generalized support and voluntary obedience The stability of any political order does not only depend on its effectiveness but ultimately rests on the obedience of individuals with collectively binding norms and rules. Max Weber (Weber 1966, 1976), identifies three sources of obedience: self-interest, legitimacy, and fear (see also Hurd 1999). Whereas the three are functional equivalents, only legitimacy can secure the stability of political systems in the long run. Political order cannot be maintained purely on the basis of fear. The threat and use of coercive force presuppose a wide array of effective monitoring and sanctioning institutions, the repeated use of which would quickly deplete a system’s resources and lead to collapse in the longer run. Arbitrary monitoring and sanctioning economizes resources, but is not sufficient to deter non-compliance, particularly with costly norms and rules (Axelrod 1984).


Specific reciprocity is equally prone to non-compliance. Firstly, political systems are simply not capable of making decisions that serve everybody’s self-interest. Since obedience imposes costs, incentives towards non-compliance are especially strong for actors with opposing substantial interests. Secondly, even actors whose substantial interests are served by a political decision have incentives for non-compliance. Similar to fear the absence of centralized monitoring and enforcement institutions renders the strategy of free-riding increasingly attractive, since actors can benefit from the others’ compliance without themselves paying the costs (Hardin 1982, 1986; Axelrod 1984). This strategic reasoning holds true regardless of the extent to which rules reflect the self-interest of actors. Unlike fear and self-interest, legitimacy towards a political system leads to a ‘generalised preparedness to accept, within a certain margin, a decision whose content is not yet known’ (Luhmann 1975: 25).3 If actors regard a political system as legitimate, they acknowledge political power as rightful (Weber 1966) and voluntarily obey its decisions even in cases in which political outcomes do not correspond to their self-interest. Legitimacy is conducive to the maintenance and stability of political order, since the attribution of rightness to the existence of a political system institutionalizes compliance as a norm, which guides individual action even in cases of incompatible interests (Luhmann 1996). Should individuals disobey, a legitimate political order enjoys the generalized support of the vast majority of its subjects, in exercising the use of coercive force as the last resort for restoring compliance. At first sight, legitimacy is not an issue for network governance. Network governance is based on the voluntary cooperation of public and private actors. By definition, it precludes the use of force and induces voluntary compliance by consensus decisions. Since those affected by the rule have a say in the rule-making, political decisions should not produce any conflicts with the self-interest of the rule-addressees.4 Likewise, if the very purpose of legitimacy is to induce compliance as a norm, which is considered appropriate for all procedurally correct decisions regardless of their content, one could argue that if those who define the content of rules are also those who bear the costs, there is no functional demand for legitimate governance anymore. On normative grounds, legitimacy appears to be irrelevant as a quality standard for network governance. Yet, in the real world, network governance hardly ever brings about congruence between those who define the rules and those who must bear the costs of compliance. Again, international politics provides some illustrative examples.


On a first glance, the legitimacy implications of NWG differ between the national and the international context. NWG arrangements with deficits regarding democratic legitimacy might matter less within states than on the international level as regards the implications for the overall legitimacy of governance-systems. While undemocratic NWG co-exists with democratic institutions within most of the modern states, such compensatory institutions are extremely rare or even completely lacking on the international level. This could indicate that demands for democratic legitimacy are higher for NWGs beyond than within nationstates. However, governance-systems on the international level usually cover sectoral or functional tasks rather than the whole variety of regulative, distributive, and re-distributive issues as dealt with within states (Lowi 1972). NWGs on the international level do not render democratic institutions within nation-states obsolete. Hence, NWGs on the international level do co-exist with democratic institutions in states as do NWGs within single states. In the absence of hierarchy in the international system, network governance has not only been heralded as a more effective alternative to inter-state cooperation in international organizations and regimes. Many argue that network governance also helps to improve accountability and transparency at levels of governance beyond the nation-state. The participation of representatives from the corporate sectors and transnational civil society is taken to enhance the participatory and democratic nature of international institutions, by helping to improve the correspondence between the ‘rulers’ and the ‘ruled’ through the creation of a transnational demos (Florini 2000b; Reinicke & Deng 2000).5 Moreover, many INGOs, epistemic communities, and other transnational advocacy networks command undisputed moral authority in a given issue-area, as demonstrated by Amnesty International and Transparency International in the areas of human rights and corruption respectively (Keck & Sikkink 1998; Galtung 2000). Including these moral authorities in governance mechanisms is said to increase governance legitimacy. It has to be asked, however, whether such hopes can be satisfied. Some have contended that the inclusion of private actors, both for-profit and not-for-profit, augments rather than alleviates the problems of democratic legitimacy in international institutions because private actors contribute to the ‘de-governmentalization’ and ‘commercialization’ of world politics (Brühl et al. 2001). The participation of non-state actors does not necessarily make international governance more democratic and therefore more legitimate. This is especially true if inclusion is incomplete


and the participation of NGOs and other non-state actors is selective and lacks transparency. More than thirty years ago, Karl Kaiser raised exactly the issue of the democratic accountability of transnational actors (Kaiser 1971). Why is the Transatlantic Business Dialogue including multinational corporations, EU and US officials more democratic than direct negotiations between the democratically elected US government and the EU Commission representing equally democratic member states? The situation is even more complicated where the participation of civil society actors in international governance is concerned. While the representatives of non-profit organizations are not generally elected, these actors can legitimately claim to represent the public interest from which they draw their moral authority (Wolf 2000). Moreover, many NGOs have the seal of government approval through the legal recognition extended to such organizations (Florini 2000a). However, there is an increasing gap (and subsequently growing conflict) between those representatives of transnational civil society who are allowed inside the governance mechanisms and those who remain outside. While most transnational civil society groups claim to represent the public interest, some NGOs tend to be self-selected and elite-driven (Keohane & Nye 2001). To some degree, the ‘participatory gap’ (Reinicke & Deng 2000) is unavoidable and the resulting conflict within civil society might actually be helpful, as it keeps both sides honest. But evidently network governance also raises concerns about transparency and exclusivity: which INGOS are allowed to sit at the bargaining table and how much information about international negotiations can they disclose to the public if they wish to maximize their influence on bargaining outcomes? Moreover, the global cleavage between the rich and powerful in the North, on the one hand, and the poor and powerless in the South, on the other hand, is reproduced in transnational civil society. The INGO world overwhelmingly represents the civil society of the OECD world including their cultural values (Boli & Thomas 1999). Southern NGOs have only limited resources to push their concerns in the INGO community. In fact, one could even argue that this is part of a broader pattern of Western global hegemony in the international system. Thus, including selected non-state sectors in network governance arrangements does not resolve the democratic deficit of international governance and helps at best to alleviate democratic legitimacy deficits of NWG. Whether networks decrease or, on the contrary, even exacerbate the legitimacy problems of governance, seems to depend on several conditions. The crucial question is how inclusive or exclusive the network governance arrangements are. The more exclusive the networks, the less


accountable and the less transparent they become. However, ‘allinclusive’ governance arrangements might lead to a serious lack of efficiency and reduced effectiveness. In other words, there appears to be a trade-off between legitimacy and effectiveness. The final section of this chapter, however, will argue that this trade-off only holds under certain conditions.

Effectiveness and legitimacy: a trade-off? Legitimacy and effectiveness are both standards for good governance within network arrangements. It has been argued that effectiveness and legitimacy constitute competing governance requirements (Scharpf 1999; Börzel & Risse 2005). This becomes truly problematic if we concede that network governance is in serious demand for legitimacy given the incongruence of rule-makers and rule-addressees in most existing network governance arrangements. Any attempt to increase the democratic legitimacy would necessarily compromise the efficiency and, in turn, also the effectiveness of network governance. However, current public and scholarly debates overlook that the two standards for good governance do not necessarily compete with each other but can also be complementary or even reinforcing. The perceived trade-off between effectiveness and legitimacy is due to the exclusive focus on politics. Opening-up the decision-making processes in networks for a broader number of actors increases the diversity of interests represented but also renders decision-making more difficult. If actors within NWGs argue, it will be more difficult to achieve a consensus when there are many participants. If bargaining prevails, even compromises that reflect the lowest common denominator will become more difficult to achieve, the higher the number of actors at the negotiation table. Any reform to solve the legitimacy problem necessarily appears to create additional problems for effectiveness and vice versa. If, however, the emphasis of reforms is put on political institutions (polity) and political outputs (policy) rather than on political processes (politics), a trade-off between effectiveness and legitimacy may be circumvented. The concept of legitimacy as defined above primarily relates to the polity dimension. From the core values of legitimacy, different criteria for the gestalt of political institutions can be derived. Effectiveness, by contrast, is mainly a matter of policy requiring a high problem solvingcapacity of policy outputs irrespective of core values of legitimacy. We argue that polity reforms aimed at increasing legitimacy can also enhance the effectiveness of policy.


In our modern times, two different models of democracy are prominent, from which two different polity-related reforms to increase legitimacy can be derived:6 liberal and deliberative democracy. While both rest on the core values of equality and liberty, the content and scope of these two values are interpreted differently leading to alternative ideal typical institutional designs of a polity. Deliberative democracy defines liberty in a positive way as the liberty to participate in politics (Rousseau 1996; Schaal & Strecker 1999; Dryzek 2000). Equality is insofar important as equal participation of those who are affected by policies is mandatory. The equal participation of stake-holders, in turn, requires agenda-setting to be transparent. A second precondition is that the decision-making process is accessible for all individuals, irrespective of their resources. Liberal democracy, by contrast, is based on a negative definition of liberty as individual freedom from the state (Holden 1988). Hence, active participation in the policy-making process is not a value in itself. Rather, liberal democracy highlights the principle of equal representation. By delegating decision-making competencies, representation allows individuals to enact their liberty without active engagement in the political sphere. At the same time, representation must be restricted to protect the public sphere from abuses of individual liberty and equality by those who exercise delegated power. Elections provide individuals with an effective tool to control their representatives and hold them accountable if decision-making is transparent. Most existing network governance arrangements suffer from legitimacy problems since they produce political decisions which are binding for actors that have not had the chance to participate in the policy process. In order to remedy the problem, the two alternative models of democracy suggest different institutional solutions. From the perspective of deliberative democracy, reforms of network governance should aim at increasing the access of affected actors. Broader access is a step towards ideal discourse conditions. As newer studies demonstrate, high inclusion can improve the discursive quality of interactions and facilitate policy outcomes beyond the lowest common denominator (e.g. Deitelhoff 2003). Hence, polity reforms strengthening the deliberative democratic legitimacy of network governance can also increase the effectiveness of outcomes. From the perspective of liberal democracy, reforms should introduce electoral control mechanisms for all participating actors opening up network arrangement for ex-post sanctions by the public. If networks are held responsible for their decisions, the quality of policy outputs is likely to increase as well.


Thus, polity reform can theoretically increase both: legitimacy and effectiveness. Whether this will actually work out is ultimately an empirical question. For assessments based on the liberal polity reform model, empirical investigations would have to consider on which basis and by whom representatives are selected and whether this fulfils the formulated criteria for effectiveness. For examinations according to the deliberative model, it must be gauged who defines affectedness, whether all affected actors have really access to decision-making arenas, and – very importantly – whether inclusion alone does the job or whether power struggles and differences in bargaining or economic power of participants within the networks prevent true deliberation. If so, how can power differences between included actors be neutralized? Put differently: how is arguing strengthened and bargaining downgraded? First empirical insights gained in the literature on international negotiations show that arguing and bargaining coexist (Risse 2000, 2003; Holzinger 2004), indicating that access alone cannot prevent bargaining. Wide access and inclusion do not automatically translate into arguing and innovative consensual results. Polity reforms are, thus, only the necessary and not the sufficient condition for successful network governance.

Conclusion Effectiveness and legitimacy are both important standards for good (network) governance since they are crucial for the maintenance of political order in the longer run. Hence, successful network governance on the national as well as on the international level cannot do without effectiveness and legitimacy. Yet, it is often claimed that there is a tradeoff: one standard can only be improved by comprising the other. The above discussion showed that legitimate and effective network governance is not necessarily mutually exclusive but can be complementary or even reinforcing. Increasing the liberal or the deliberative democracy in strengthening the accountability or the inclusiveness might very well contribute to an increase in the effectiveness of outcomes, due to possible ex-post sanctions or to deliberations. Increasing the legitimacy of NWGs is all the more important since several empirical studies pinpoint that network governance on the national and on the international level is not per se effective. As a consequence, effectiveness cannot compensate for the lack of democratic legitimacy in network governance arrangements. Likewise, doing away with democratic legitimacy altogether does


not do the trick either. Especially lacking a complete congruency between the rule-makers and the rule-addressees compliance problems arise in NWG at least in the longer run. Polity-related reforms could be one way to escape the dilemma and contribute to the success of network governance within and beyond the nation state. Whether such reforms actually work out and which additional variables are of importance, is a question open for further empirical research.

Notes 1. Next to networks, communities and clans (Ouchi 1980), on the one hand, and associations (Streeck & Schmitter 1985), on the other, are also subsumed under the third type of governance. Like networks, they are based on nonhierarchical coordination. 2. As similar argument is made by (Downs et al. 1996) with respect to interstate relations. 3. The term ‘within certain margins’ refers to the precondition that all decisions are taken on the basis of and strictly according to prior defined procedures (Luhmann 1996). 4. Free-riding is a potential problem in all governance arrangements. It will become especially likely if self-interest is the only source of compliance. Hence, NWG could profit from legitimacy as a compliance-fostering mechanism, because this could prevent free-riding activities, especially in the absence of transparency and monitoring mechanisms (Abbott et al. 2000; Keohane et al. 2000). Network governance arrangements do, however, possess two functional equivalents that foster compliance: (1) The number of actors is relatively small (compared to the governed and the government in states) and substitutes for institutional mechanisms increasing transparency; and (2) there are iterative games in network governance arrangements, which combined with a low number of actors and transparency is favourable for the development of a norm of diffuse reciprocity. 5. This is not to say that governance beyond the nation state needs a “transnational demos” to be legitimate (cf. Brock 1998; Zürn 2000). 6. Criteria of what constitutes legitimacy develop incrementally (Sternberger 1968, 1986; Habermas 1976). With the beginning of the enlightenment, religious legitimacy as a shared standard of legitimate governance declined as a result of which the existence of ultimate reason was challenged or even denied (Habermas 1976: 43). This process led to the development and prominence of democratic standards as the only substantive basis for legitimate governance in modern states.

Part III Metagovernance


9 Theoretical Approaches to Metagovernance Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing

Introduction An increasingly important issue for governance network theory is how and to what extent it is possible for governors to regulate self-regulating networks. It is generally recognized that governance networks must be regulated if they are to contribute to the efficient governing of society. But since a constitutive feature of governance networks is self-regulation, it is not possible to regulate governance networks by means of traditional sovereign forms of detailed, hierarchical and bureaucratic regulation. Sovereign forms of regulation would inevitably undermine the self-regulating capacity of the networks. Governance network theory describes how efforts to harvest the governing capacity of selfregulating networks, while still being able to ensure an overall societal governance, has brought with it a growth in new forms of governance, and suggest ways in which such forms of regulation can be developed further (Mayntz & Marin 1991; Kooiman 1993; Scharpf 1997; Pierre & Peters 2000, 2005; Rhodes 2000b; Milward & Provan 2000b; Richardson 2000; O’Toole & Meier 2000; Van Heffen, et al. 2000; Goss 2001). These new forms of governance differ from traditional forms of sovereign regulation in that they regulate networks and other self-regulating actors without reducing their space for manoeuvring in any radical way. Governance network theories term these new ways of regulating selfregulating networks ‘network management’ (Kickert et al. 1997; Rhodes 1997a) or – the term we have adopted in this chapter – ‘metagovernance’ (Kooiman 1993, 2003; Jessop 2002). Interdependency theory, governability theory, integration theory and governmentality theory all stress different ways in which to exercise metagovernance. The next sections give an outline of the perceptions and forms of metagovernance 169


that are discussed in each of the four governance network theories. Then follow an analysis of the similarities and differences between the four theoretical approaches to metagovernance, and a description of the choices that are to be made when choosing one approach and form of metagovernance from the others. Finally, we pinpoint some of the questions that need to be answered in order to improve our theoretical understanding of how metagovernance is, and can be, exercised.

Interdependency theory Interdependency theorists such as Rod Rhodes (1997), and Walter Kickert, et al. (1997) share the view that the governance potential of networks can be increased considerably through metagovernance because the latter can help to forward the negotiation process through conflict mediation, process planning, and diplomacy. There is a permanent risk that conflicts between network actors will reduce or even destroy the self-regulating capacity of a governance network, and thus the main objective of metagovernance is to avoid a situation in which conflicts undermine the formulation of shared goals. However, since conflict reduction is generally difficult to promote at a distance, the most efficient way of regulating networks is through various forms of hands-on metagovernance that bring the meta-governing actor (metagovernor) in direct interaction with the self-governing networks (Klijn et al. 1995: 442; Kickert & Koppenjan, 1997: 40; Rhodes, 1997: 56; Klijn & Koppenjan 2004: 203). This direct interaction between the network and the metagoverning actor can either take the form of process management or network participation. Through process management, the metagovernor seeks to facilitate the network in various ways in order to support and increase its selfregulating capacity. This form of metagovernance is non-interventionist in that the objective is not so much to obtain influence on the content of the self-regulation, as it is to promote negotiated self-regulation as such. Hands-on metagovernance can also be performed through network participation, where the metagovernor becomes a member of a selfregulating governance network. This form of hands-on metagovernance is more interventionist than process management as it grants the metagovernor a platform for obtaining influence on the content of the self-regulation. However, the condition of possibility for obtaining this influence is that the metagovernor plays by the horizontal rules inherent in network governance, and obtains influence with reference to the resources that they put into the network and not, as might be tempting

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for public authorities, on the basis of their formal hierarchical authority vis a vis the network. Interdependency theory claims that, in principle, metagovernance can be carried out by anybody who has the necessary resources to do so. The reason why state actors often play a central role as metagovernors is that they tend to possess the resources that are central for exercising metagovernance such as legal, institutional and financial resources (Kickert, et al. 1997: 168). Interdependency theorists are particularly interested in the potential role of public administrators as metagovernors (Kickert Klijn & Koppenjan 1997: 192; Rhodes 1997a: 52). In fact many interdependency theorists re-conceptualize public administration as public management and hence inscribe network processing and network participation as two new tool kits that can be taken into use by public administrators in an effort to govern society as efficiently as possible (Kickert et al. 1997: 168; Rhodes 1997a: 56). What interdependency theorists suggest is that the traditional ideal typical image of public administrators as rule-following bureaucrats should be exchanged with an image of them as creative, pragmatic, and engaged process facilitators and network participants. Interdependency theorists argue that public administrators have a good chance of governing networks efficiently by means of various forms of hands-on metagovernance, but at the same time they insist that network governance and the metagovernance of networks will often fail (Rhodes 2000b: 355; Jessop 2002: 243f). Rhodes (2000b: 355) argues that governance networks are by nature difficult to regulate because of the complex and conflictual relationship between network actors, and because network governance is difficult to combine with other forms of governance such as hierarchy and market, which both weaken the horizontal interaction and cooperation within the networks (Rhodes 1997a: 57). For Jessop (1998: 43; 2002: 236ff), the propensity to fail is not a specific characteristic of governance networks. All forms of governance tend to fail. State failure and market failure are well known facts, and network governance and metagovernance will fail as well (Jessop 2002: 236–43). Governance networks fail when they are unable to overcome continuous disagreement among the network actors about the goal of the governing process, while metagovernance fails when it does not succeed in enabling a network to overcome such conflicts. Since all forms of governance fail, there is no one superior form of governance. Networks are not superior to the state and market. They are yet another imperfect way of governing society. Accordingly, metagovernors should neither give up state, market or networks, but make


use of them all in turn or in combination in ways that reduce the degree of governing failures as much as possible in concrete governing processes. Interdependency theory predominantly has a descriptive approach to metagovernance. A number of empirical studies show how metagovernance is carried out and advocated in current public sector reforms and they evaluate how it contributes to the efficient governance of society.

Governability theory Governability theorists such as Jan Kooiman (1993), Renate Mayntz (1993) and Fritz Scharpf (1997) put considerable emphasis on the need for metagovernance. They actually insist that hierarchical regulation of self-regulating networks is a precondition for making networks an efficient form of governance. The need for a hierarchical regulation of governance networks rests on the assumption that unregulated networks are highly unstable because the individual network actors tend to choose individual strategies for optimizing their interests instead of developing a shared strategy together with the other network actors. Another destabilizing factor is the negotiated nature of network cooperation since it constantly places the network actors in the ‘negotiators dilemma’ that is in a situation where they risk loosing invested resources if the other network actors choose not to fulfil their part of a negotiated agreement (Scharpf 1994: 45). Faced with the negotiator’s dilemma, many network actors choose not to take any risks and fall back on individual strategies with externalities and lack of coordination as the aggregated outcome. Due to the propensity of the network actor to choose individual strategies, networks are continuously on the brink of collapsing as a collective form of governance. But this inherent instability of governance networks can be reduced through forms of metagovernance that increase and illuminate the interdependency between the network actors: the higher the level of interdependency between the network actors, the greater are their willingness to search for shared goals and their eagerness to take risks. While interdependency theory regards state, market, and network governance as equally imperfect forms of governance with varying strengths and weaknesses, governability theory stresses the advantages of governance networks over state and market. In today’s complex, dynamic and diversified societies, it is argued (Kooiman 1993: 36; Mayntz 1993b: 11; Scharpf 1994: 41) governance networks represent the most efficient means to produce efficient governance, because they are


in themselves complex, dynamic and diversified. However, due to the inherent instability of governance networks, the potentials of governance networks can only be realized through intensive metagovernance that increases their stability and ability to coordinate action (Mayntz 1993a: 15; Scharpf 1994: 41). While interdependency theory primarily underlines the importance of hands-on forms of metagovernance for the efficient regulation of governance networks, governability theory first and foremost stresses the value of hands-off metagovernance through institutional design. Institutions structure the conditions under which self-governing actors interact and, as such, they structure the relations of interdependency that lead to the establishment of networks among certain actors and competition among others (Scharpf 1994: 40; Kooiman 2003: 155). In Kooiman’s words metagovernance through institutional design involves the construction of ‘the “rules of the game”… the medium through which actors can act and try to use these rules in accordance with their own objectives and interests’ (Kooiman 1993: 258). This game structuring is exercised through the deliberate strategic design of institutional conditions which visualizes and increases the interdependency structures between specific actors (Kooiman 1993: 251). Game structuring can be performed in different ways: 1. through the institutionalization of plus-sum games that enhance network cooperation by redistributing the resources of the network actors; 2. by making it clear to the network actors that they network ‘in the shadow of hierarchy’, which means that the right to self-regulate will be reduced or removed by the metagovernor if the network is unable or unwilling to solve a defined policy problem (Scharpf 1994: 40–1, 367); and 3. through various forms of incentive steering. These three forms of game structuring gradually become more and more interventionist the first being the lowest level of intervention and the third, the highest. While the construction of plus-sum games merely promotes network cooperation among a defined group of actors, the existence of a heavy shadow of hierarchy, and most markedly incentive steering seeks to influence the content of the self-regulation. Since governability theorists regard the exercise of metagovernance as a precondition for efficient network governance, considerations about the role of governance networks become inseparable from considerations about the role of the state. Both Mayntz (1993: 18) and Scharpf (1994: 40) emphasise that there is basically a mutually beneficial relationship between governance networks and the state. Governance networks fulfil some of the governing needs that would otherwise have to be fulfilled


by the state, while the state establishes the conditions for efficient coordination of individual action both within and between networks. Governability theory argues that this interdependency between governance networks and the state means that the need for hierarchical state rule is as strong as ever. The growing need for governance networks does not indicate a goodbye to hierarchical state rule. Rather it calls for new forms of state rule. Kooiman contends that the central role of governance networks in contemporary processes of societal governance: ‘has nothing to do with a withdrawal of the state or with the state disconnecting itself from society, but with a state that governs in other, more apt, ways. In many cases “other” will mean more connecting than disconnecting. The task of governments in contemporary, complex societies is to influence social interactions in such ways that political governing and social self-organisation are made complementary’ (Kooiman 1993: 256). The state is not weaker than before, but in today’s society it must gain influence through the hands-off metagovernance of social interaction. Mayntz agrees that the position of the state is by no means threatened by the increased role of governance networks because of the ability of the state to define the institutional rules of the game: ‘what we are dealing with is not so much a loss of state control as a change in its form. Societal self-regulation takes place, after all, within an institutional framework that is underwritten by the state’ (Mayntz 1993a: 31). Seen from this perspective, the strength of the state vis-à-vis governance networks depends on the ability of the state to metagovern by the strategic construction of institutional designs that increase the selfregulating capacity of governance networks, and the coordination capacity of the state (Kooiman 1993: 255f ). In order to prepare the state for this new metagoverning role, the state must reorganize itself. The traditional organizational lines of demarcation between politics and administration and between state and society make even less sense as the distinction between metagovernance and self-regulation becomes still more crucial as the core principle for the distribution of competence between the different actors that participate in the governing process at different levels and stages be it inside or outside the state (Kooiman 1993: 257). Today, the central questions are not how to separate politics from administration or the state form the market and civil society. The central question that should guide considerations concerning the reorganization of the state apparatus must be how to simultaneously upgrade the capacity of the state to metagovern and the best possible conditions for self-regulating governance networks. In Kooiman’s words, the job consists in striking ‘an effective and legitimate


balance between social self-organization and political–administrative intervention’ (Kooiman, 1993: 255). The ability to strike this balance calls for organizational patterns within the state that are radically different from those characterizing the traditional liberal state. In contrast to interdependency theorists, governability theorists are generally prescriptive in their approach to metagovernance. They argue that the hands-off metagovernance of self-regulating networks represents a favourable alternative to neo-liberal efforts to increase the governing capacity of the state by means of the market as well as to traditional bureaucratic forms of state rule. Kooiman (1993: 250) directly criticises public leaders and others who are engaged in reorganizing the public sector for paying too little attention to the ongoing changes that are taking place in society, and the need for new forms of governance that these changes bring about. In addition, he accuses social scientists for doing too little to make public leaders aware of the role that metagovernance and governance networks can play in meeting the new challenges that these societal changes bring with them (Kooiman 1993: 249). It is not enough to produce convincing research results. These results must also be disseminated to those who might make use of them in their efforts to increase the governability of society.

Integration theory Integration theorists like James G. March and Johan P. Olsen (1989, 1995) and Richard Scott (1995) stress that the political identities and capacities of the involved actors are crucial for the degree to which governance networks are able to contribute to the governing of society. Accordingly, a core element in the exercise of metagovernance – a term that is not used by the integration theorists themselves – is the strategic formation and development of the political identities and capacities of the network actors. The metagovernance of identities is exercised hands-off through the shaping of institutional rules, norms and logics of appropriateness within the self-governing networks; through the production of specific forms of knowledge; through story telling about ‘best practices’; through a forceful campaigning of specific frames of meaning; and through the construction of symbols and rituals. All these identity producing forms of metagovernance seek to influence the network actors’ perception of themselves and the context they are part of: Who are they as social and political actors? Who are the other actors within and outside the network? What is the overall purpose of the network? What is appropriate conduct within the network as well as in relation to


external actors? The metagovernance of identities can be seen as an interventionist form of metagovernance as the identity of the network participants have considerable impact on the content of what is being self-regulated. The metagovernance of the network actors’ capacities is less interventionist as the main ambition is to supply the self-regulating actors with the resources that they need in order to be able to regulate themselves and not to influence the content of the self-regulation. The metagovernance of the network actors’ capacities is performed hands-off through the strategic shaping and transformation of political rights, through the distribution of various social, financial, authoritative and institutional resources as well as through more hands-on metagovernance that supports the development of the political know how and general learning abilities of the network actors (March & Olsen 1995: 223ff). But what is the precise purpose of the efforts to metagovern networks through the shaping of the network actors’ identities and capacities? One of the central objectives that motivates the exercise of identity producing metagovernance is the formation of a strong democratic political community within and between networks March and Olsen (1995: 63ff). Hence, metagovernance should enhance solidarity and a strong sense of communality among the involved actors within the network through the creation of shared meaning and common visions that facilitate consensus. Metagovernance should also promote the shaping of democratic political identities among the political actors. This can be done by means of story telling that refers to the network actors as ‘responsible citizens, interest organizations, firms and voluntary organizations’, ‘attentive politicians’, and ‘responsive administrators’. The purpose of such references is to spread and consolidate an image of the network as being a part of a democratic political system that subscribes to a set of democratic values including values such as mutual respect, reciprocity and communality. Metagovernance of the network actors’ political capacities concerns the mobilization and enhancement of their ability to act individually and collectively in order to make a difference to the governance of society. However, from a democratic point of view, it is not enough merely to enhance the capacities of the involved as much as possible, and to mobilize them in concrete governance processes. Metagovernance must deliberately seek to regulate the native of the capacities that are created, who obtains them, and when and how they are brought into use (March & Olsen 1995: 130ff). Seen from a democratic perspective, it is important to ensure that the differences between the political


competences that different network actors possess are not too large. Metagovernance must ensure a level of equality in the distribution of competencies that installs a considerable degree of interdependency between the network actors in order to ensure that all network actors gain some level of influence. Finally, the metagovernance of political capacities involves the shaping of democratic ideals that define where, when, and how specific political capacities can be used. Individual and collective actors must use their capacities to obtain political influence, and have a duty to mobilize all their powers to withstand the illegitimate use of public power. At the same time, metagovernance must seek to prevent network actors from using their competencies to undermine the democratic process both within and between networks. It is rather unclear who integration theorists perceive to be performing metagovernance. Scott (1995: 93f ) emphasizes the central role of the state in the regulation of organizational fields. The state is not merely one among a plurality of political actors, due to its monopolized right to exercise legitimate coercion, it has a unique position for exercising metagovernance of organizational fields. Hence, it has the capacity to construct and change the institutional framework within which governance networks regulate themselves, and to interfere in various conflicts between self-regulating actors. However, March and Olsen (1995: 69) argue that the Weberian concept of the state as a unitary political organization with a monopoly on the legal exercise of coercion is inadequate if we are to grasp the reality in the disintegrated polities of today. Never the less, March and Olsen, on several occasions, refer to ‘the political system’ or simply ‘the government’ as the executor of metagovernance while they, on other occasions, more diffusely refer to ‘society’ or ‘the modern democracy’ as the executor of metagovernance. All in all, we are left with a relatively confused image of who the metagovernor is. In general, integration theory tends to have rather high expectations as to the possibility of regulating self-regulating governance networks efficiently by means of identity shaping and capacity creating forms of metagovernance. This is due to the basic assumption in integration theory that actors and their actions are, by and large, conditioned by existing structures of meaning, and that it is possible to systematically influence action through the shaping of these structures of meaning. Furthermore, integration theory tends to have a prescriptive approach to metagovernance since it seeks to outline how the metagovernance of governance networks should be performed in order to increase the democratic quality of societal governance processes.


Governmentality theory Even though governmentality theorists such as Michel Dean (1999), Michel Foucault (1991a), and Nicolas Rose (1996) – like the integration theorists – do not use the term metagovernance, the regulation of selfregulation plays a central role in their understanding of how governance is exercised. The term governmentality refers to the institutionalized collective mentalities that define what governance is and how it is performed. Governmentality theory sees the regulation of self-regulation as central element in the dominating governmentality in advanced liberal societies. We recognize this image of governance as metagoverned self-regulation in the subjectivations and rationalities articulated in most contemporary governmentality programs, and we recognize it in the governance techniques that are currently proposed from benchmarking to contracting out. In order to get a more precise idea about how metagovernance is being performed today, it is necessary to take a closer look at the historically specific liberal governmentality program of which metagovernance as the regulation of self-regulating governance networks is a part. Rose (1996: 43) claims that a core feature of the liberal governmentality program is the effort to govern at a distance without getting involved in the detailed governance activities and the conflicts between different actors. Dean (1999: 165) claims that advanced liberal metagovernance concerns a simultaneous subjectification and subjection of self-regulating actors. Advanced liberal metagovernance constructs and mobilizes free subjects, while at the same time placing them within specific conditions of possibility and specific power relations. On the one hand, metagovernance establishes partnerships, hearings, negotiations, user boards, free choice and participation incentives (‘subjectification’). On the other hand, metagovernance constructs a set of norms, standards, benchmarks, and performance indicators, and various hierarchical instruction and control mechanisms, which in sum make it possible to measure, evaluate and sanction the self-regulating actors (‘subjection’). In other words, metagovernance has two sides. It constructs and mobilizes the network actors’ energies, resources, capacities and knowledge, and it ensures that the empowered, selfregulating actors act within the limits set by specific discursive conditions of possibility, which do not manifest themselves as external boundaries to self-regulation, but through their presence in the minds of the self-regulating actors. Metagovernance mobilizes the energies, resources, capacities and knowledge of the network actors through the use of technologies of


agency, while it disciplines their minds through various technologies of performance (Dean 1999: 167ff). Different kinds of contract technologies make it possible for public institutions to form binding ties with firms, organizations, groups, and citizens and thereby include them in various governance networks. These governance networks are then forced to act within specific social, political and financial conditions of possibilities through ongoing evaluation practices. The force that is exercised neither has the character of legal sanctions or financial loss on a free market. Rather, the force lies in naming and shaming actors as either a success or a failure. What is at stake is the general reputation of the actors. Metagovernance through various interrelated forms of subjectification and subjection is predominantly exercised hands-off through the construction of meaning and institutionalized technologies, and it has a decisive interventionist top-down character. However, it is also possible to point out forms of metagovernance within the advanced liberal governmentality program that are less interventionist and more bottomup. Hence, one of the central performance indicators that are used to evaluate self-regulating actors including governance networks is their responsiveness to affected citizens (Dean 1999: 169). However, since it is most often centralized government who define the performance indicators even this responsiveness is an outcome of top-down metagovernance. This conclusion gives a strong hint about who governmentality theorists view as the primary provider of metagovernance. Even though Foucault recognizes that metagovernance can be performed by a wide range of actors including private actors, he emphasizes the central role of the state in this respect. The state is not one among many power holders, but the instance that all exercise of power must relate to, not in the sense that all exercise of power derives from the state, but in the sense that over time, more and more instances of power are controlled by the state. With reference to the narrow meaning of the word ‘government’ as state, one can say that the many forms of power that are exercised in society have become governmentalized (Foucault 1986: 224). The state plays a central role in setting the scene for the self-regulating actors and in governing ‘the conduct of conduct’. The starting point for the metagoverning state is the discursive construction of the objects, tool kits, identities, and purposes of self-regulation. But this form of state rule is enforced through the many disciplining technologies and sovereign forms of rule that the state masters. This understanding of the role of the state has some parallels to Scharpf’s (1994) claim that network governance takes place ‘in the shadow of hierarchy’. If the


discursive metagovernance fails it can make use of more direct forms of governance, even though more direct forms of metagovernance is likely to meet considerable resistance due to the articulation of citizens as empowered selfregulating contributors to the production of public governance. The approach that governmentality theory takes to metagovernance is more descriptive than prescriptive. It describes the contingent discursive conditions of the possibility for exercising governance in advanced liberal democracies, and indicates that, seen form a historical perspective, the ability to metagovern self-regulating networks through various forms of subjectification is considerable.

Similarities and differences between the theories There are many similarities between the four governance network theories with regard to their views on metagovernance. They all insist that self-regulating networks have become an inseparable part of modern governance processes, and that they contribute to the production of efficient societal governance. For that reason, societal governance can no longer be exercised through sovereign bureaucratic forms of governance but must take the form of metagovernance. However, there are also many differences between the theories. For one thing, interdependency theory and governmentality theory are predominantly descriptive, while governability theory and integration theory are prescriptive. There are also differences in their approach to how metagovernance can be carried out. Interdependency theory primarily focuses on how hands-on forms of metagovernance facilitate network formation, network negotiations and outcome orientation in networks. Governability theory, integration theory and governmentality theory on their side take issue with various forms of hands-off metagovernance, which work through different forms of institutional framing of governance networks. Governability theory suggests that metagovernance involves the construction of institutionalized games that promote coordinated collective action between self-interested actors, while integration theory and governmentality theory point to how metagovernance is exercised through the cognitive and discursive framing of identities, capacities and meaning. Interdependency theory also differs from the other governance network theories in its view on the degree to which it is possible to metagovern governance networks. Its starting points in a calculus actor oriented approach to human action and a conflict view on what

Theoretical Approaches to Metagovernance 181 Table 9.1 Differences between the four governance network theories Approaches to metagovernance

Interdependency theory

Governability theory

Integration theory

Governmentality theory

Perspective Form Efficiency

Descriptive Hands on Low

Prescriptive Hands off High

Prescriptive Hands off High

Descriptive Hands off High

constitutes governance processes, lowers its expectations to the possibility of governing society in general and to the possibility of regulating self-regulating networks in particular. The many conflicts between selfinterested rational actors mean that the metagovernance of networks fails more often that it succeeds. By contrast, the other theories tend to regard metagovernance as a highly effective means to govern networks. Governability theory and integration theory regard the institutionalization of incentive structures, normative rules, and cognitive images as a forceful means to regulate autonomous actors, while governmentality theory describes metagovernance as a highly efficient advanced form of subjection and subjectification. The differences between the four theories are summarized in Table 9.1. Although the four theories have different approaches to the question of perspective, form and efficiency, these differences do not entail any clear cut choices. Descriptive and prescriptive perspectives are often hard to separate completely; hands on and hands off forms of metagovernance tend to function well together; and metagovernance that tend to be efficient in some contexts, might not be so in others. As such, the different perspectives, forms, and evaluations of metagovernance that the four theories provide seem to be more supplementary than exclusive.

Where to go from here? The four theories of governance networks have provided knowledge about the driving force behind the emergence of metagovernance, how it is and can be performed, and what the problems and potentials of metagovernance are. However, some of the central questions relating to improving our understanding of metagovernance that have been raised by the second generation of governance network theorists have only briefly been discussed and analysed by the first generation of governance network theories. In this book we have selected three questions, which are in need of further theorizing if we are fully to qualify and develop our understanding of metagovernance. These questions


concern: 1. how the formation and mobilization of governance networks is regulated through metagovernance; 2. how network negotiations are metagoverned; and 3. how metagovernance affects the production of outputs and outcomes of governance networks. These topics are dealt with in the next three chapters, which in different ways combine and transgress the theoretical positions to metagovernance presented in this chapter.

10 Governing the Formation and Mobilization of Governance Networks Peter Triantafillou

Introduction This chapter is motivated by a specific concern over the capacity of contemporary (network) governance studies1 to critically address the governing of networks. This concern is nurtured by the proximity between the problem space informing contemporary political action, on the one hand, and the theoretical imagery informing governance studies, on the other. When politicians, civil servants, business managers, NGOs and concerned citizens’ attempt to explain the existence and justify the need for mobilizing governance networks, they often provide a set of explanations that, I think, are remarkably close to those provided by contemporary governance studies. Perhaps the reader will agree that in contemporary society, narratives of the following type are encountered quite commonly: ●

●

●

Because society has grown increasingly complex, public problems cannot be solved by the state alone. Without drawing on the knowledge and resources of diverse public-and private actors, state action is doomed to failure. While the market may serve as an excellent mechanism for solving information-demanding problems, it is incapable on its own of providing satisfactory solutions to a wide range of collective problems, such as social and economic inequality and environmental problems. It is therefore necessary to include and stimulate the participation and interaction of a wide range of state, market and civil society 183


actors in order to provide legitimate and effective solutions to contemporary problems. True, one finds political calls for the state to remain the locus of policy-making, or others who would prefer the market to constitute the primary decision-making and problem-solving mechanism. In other words, we find many conflicting opinions within contemporary political discussions regarding the role of the state. Nevertheless, I believe that the narratives outlined above have become rather widespread among influential politicians, civil servants, business managers, NGOs and citizens participating in or attempting to promote various forms of governance networks. Moreover, despite the fuzzy and often contradictory character of these narratives, I think it is fair to assert that they constitute a problem-space that is remarkably close to the theoretical imagery underpinning many governance studies. By theoretical imagery, I am referring to types of research questions, key concepts, objects of enquiry and lines of argumentation. Some academics assert rather bluntly that the state is being ‘hollowed out’ (Rhodes 1994; Saward 1997). Others ask how policy input and policy delivery are shaped in a society characterized by increasing complexity, where hierarchical co-ordination is rendered difficult if not impossible, and the potential for market solutions is limited because of the problems of market failure (for example Mayntz 1993b; Kooiman 1993). And yet other, more normative (policy recommending) governance publications inquire as to when and under what conditions of interaction diverse public and private actors succeed in mobilizing resources and capacities in a manner that will improve problem-solving capacities (Kickert & Koppenjan 1997: 53–8). These and similar questions are all very relevant and legitimate; however, I do not view them as adequate for understanding the role networks play in contemporary forms of government. My concern does not regard what some view as the insufficient capacity of the aforementioned studies to explain changes in policy formation and policy outcome (for example Dowding 1995). Nor does it regard what others take to be the tendency of the governance literature to overstate the autonomy of the networks vis-à-vis (central) state authorities (Marinetto 2003). Instead, my concern regards the proximity between the research questions informing many governance network studies and the selfunderstanding and reflections of contemporary forms of rule, notably advanced liberal government. This term is unfolded below, but essentially

Governing Formation and Mobilization of Governance Networks 185

addresses the multifarious reflections over – and answers provided to – the following problem: how can the self-governing capacities of individuals, groups, organizations and networks be developed and facilitated? I believe that the proximity between advanced liberal governmental thinking and governance studies poses a number of important limitations on the ways in which we can analyze governance networks. In particular, I think we must detach ourselves more fundamentally from the self-understanding of advanced liberal government in order to be able to illuminate those modalities of power that work not through force or coercion, but above all through diverse governing mechanisms seeking to facilitate the self-governing capacities of diverse actors. The aim of this chapter is therefore to discuss two interrelated working hypotheses on the conception of the governing of governance networks: first, the proximity between the problem space of advanced liberal government and the theoretical imagery underpinning many governance studies poses important limitations on the capacity of these studies to address critically the role played by agency, autonomy and interdependency in the shaping of governance networks. Second, by adopting Foucault’s conception of government, we may overcome some of these limitations and open a space for the critical analysis of the formation and mobilization of governance networks in our societies. It should be stressed that rather than attempting to test or verify these hypotheses, I use them as practical guidelines for my conceptual discussions. Moreover, both hypotheses are based on the (unquestioned) assumption that the theoretical imagery underpinning many governance studies actually approximates the problem space of advanced liberal government.

Governmentality and advanced liberal government Michel Foucault introduced the notion of governmentality in his 1978 lectures at College de France on ‘Security, Territory and Population’ (Foucault 1978; see also Foucault 1988). While Foucault had explicitly avoided the question of the state in his studies of disciplinary power, his problematization of the exercise of power over territories and populations forced him to deal with the forms of political power evolving around the modern territorial states in Western Europe. However, the key category for addressing this issue was neither power nor state power, but the notion of government. Government referred not to the government (the state apparatus), but to the manifold ways in which the conduct of individuals and groups are directed. Defined as ‘the conduct


of conduct’, government refers to the diverse schemes, programs and methods seeking to structure and nurture the field of actions of others (Foucault 1982, p. 221). By implication, the practice of government is inevitably an exercise of power. However, the notion of conduct points not only to the directing of the conduct of others, but also to the ways in which one conducts oneself. If by freedom, we are referring not to the absence of power but to the diverse and everyday forms of reflections, choices and actions we make with regard to ourselves, then it becomes clear that advanced liberal government implies not only the exercise of power, but also the ways in which we (individuals, organizations and networks) exercise our freedom. The term governmentality – Foucault’s neologism contracting the terms government and rationality – was coined to denote a set of historically specific constellations of problematizations, forms of knowledge and practices of government (Foucault 1991a: 102; Foucault 1991b: 78–82). This concept seeks to point out two things: first, that schemes, programs and methods seeking to shape the conduct of others are always already informed by particular forms of knowledge regarding the object to be governed and by particular sets of queries or problematizations. And, second, that the forms of knowledge turning an issue into an object or a problem of government is informing and structuring the types of schemes, programs and methods that are selected and developed for solving the problem. To take a close example, if contemporary forms of knowledge depict increased societal complexity and state overload as the main problem, they obviously influence the type of possible governmental actions that are deemed proper. Based on the notion of governmentality, advanced liberal government may be understood neither as an ideological doctrine, nor as a partypolitical programme entailing, for example, privatization. It may instead be understood as a plurality of often contradictory governmental schemes, programmes and methods informed by a particular manner of reflecting on – or more precisely problematizing – the practice of governing. From this point of view, it is possible to talk about three broad types of political rationalities that have dominated Western European societies since the end of the 18th century, namely liberal, social liberal, and advanced liberal government. These three types ought to be considered ideal types that aim to capture certain aspects of multifarious and overlapping reflections on how to govern the wealth, health and welfare of a population. As such, liberal government, articulated most clearly by the Scottish moral philosophers Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson, conceives of civil society as a distinct sphere with a natural/inherent


capacity of self-governance that the state should be wary of disturbing. Social liberal government, which emerges towards the end of the 19th century, is above all concerned with the problem of how to ensure solidarity and devise (diverse insurance) mechanisms promoting social security (Donzelot 1988). Advanced liberal government shares the problematization of excessive state intervention with liberal government. Unlike liberal government, however, civil society is not regarded as a sphere with a natural capacity for self-governance. Rather, the latter capacity must be artificially constructed on the basis of diverse governing mechanisms that will provide the institutional conditions necessary to stimulate and facilitate its self-governing capacities (see Burchell 1996: 27–30). Thus, what characterizes the problem space of advanced liberal government is not primarily the concern for excessive state intervention, but questions such as: how can the capacities of individuals, groups, organizations, and networks be nurtured and facilitated to deal with the problems of their own and/or the wider community? What sort of schemes, devices and methods may be brought into play so as to create an institutional setting that will prove conducive to the self-steering and problemsolving capacities of diverse actors and networks? Conceived as a problematization evolving around the question of how best to augment the self-steering capacities of diverse actors, advanced liberal government has less to do with de-regulation and more to do with the re-regulation of the relations between public and private organizations and the relations within them.

Mobilizing agency How can we understand and analyse the mobilization of a network and the capacities of its respective participants to handle policy problems? In this section, I attempt to argue that we must be very cautious in the ways in which we address the agency of network participants. I attempt to explain why we cannot take actors for granted, that is, individuals or organizations equipped with a capacity to act. I argue that in the case of governance networks, agency – the capability to act – is something that always already depends on a series of devices, methods, and techniques seeking to form and mobilize the capacities of individuals and organizations to act in particular ways. In the attempt to explain the mobilization of networks, many network studies tend to attribute significant importance to the interests of the (potential) network participants.2 Notwithstanding the important


differences in the understanding of interest formation, many network studies tend to resort to the pursuit of interests when accounting for the formation of networks. However, as is well argued in the political science literature, we cannot take the interest of individuals and organizations for granted. Neo-institutionalist theory of a certain constructionist bend, such as March and Olsen (1989), have even argued that the behaviour of political actors is shaped not by rational self-interest (or logic of consequentiality), but by various institutions (rules and norms) forming a logic of appropriateness. In line with March and Olsen (1989: 160–6), I believe that the point is not that individuals and organizations do not hold interests, but rather, that these interests are always already informed by – and depend upon – particular norms (such as maximizing utility), particular forms of knowledge (such as ego psychology or neoclassical economics), and particular techniques for calculating the rational as opposed to the irrational path of action (such as cost–benefit analysis). While I find March and Olsen’s social constructionist approach appealing, I do not think their theory is entirely suitable in order to critically analyse the formation of agency. Not only are March and Olsen paying quite limited attention to power and conflict, their very ambition for proposing a more or less universal theory (a truth) about the formation of agency may prove counter-productive. Thus, if the capacity to exercise power over a subject depends upon a certain theoretical knowledge or truth concerning the conditions under which that subject will act in particular ways, it is obviously problematic to take that truth as the foundation for studying power. Consequently, if our purpose is to propose a critical analysis of various workings of advanced liberal government, such as governance networks, we may be better off with an epistemologically speaking less ambitious conceptual framework that explicitly addresses the methods, devices and techniques of power involved in the formation of agency. One way of grasping the mobilization of agency in networks is to view agency as the result rather than the cause of diverse social practices. During the last two or three decades, our societies have experienced the emergence of a whole series of practices around norms of activism, participation and empowerment. This includes opinion polls, surveys, public hearings, citizen panels, workshops, and consensus conferences (for example Rowe & Frewer 2005). Such technologies of agency may seek to bring forth the voice and choice of citizens, organizations and networks.3 They may also seek to enable and induce these groups to be


active and participate more directly in policy implementation through, for example, the contracting out of public services, public-private partnerships and regional development agencies (for example Chalmers & Davis 2001). A crucial qualification must be made in this regard: my argument is not that the agency of individuals and organizations are governmental puppets or by-products of structural forces working behind our backs. Instead, my argument is that, in real life, our actions are always already taking place in relation to particular understandings of the issue calling for action. Moreover, such actions always take place in relation to the attempts of other social groups seeking to make us act in particular ways. By the same token, I think we ought to be cautious in applying the term meta-governance, at least if that term suggests that attempts at mobilizing networks can be reduced to the orchestration of a unitary governor standing above or behind network governance. While the state may act as an important – if not the most important – relay for network governance, it would be highly problematic to reduce network governance to the intentions or will of the state. Thus, if power works through the mobilization of diverse networks, I suggest we see this not as the orchestrations of a unitary meta-governor, but as the polyvalent and multifarious technologies employed by a wide range of public and private actors for often quite different reasons. Subsequent to these clarifications, we may return to the ways in which technologies of agency may be instrumental to the formation and mobilization of governance networks. While the formation, shape and functioning of these networks vary immensely, which is an important feature of their governmental abilities, they nonetheless often seek to formulate policies based on a certain level of consensus and legitimacy by organizing clusters of stakeholders in loose, issue-based networks that may cut across national boundaries. These networks need neither be formalized in the sense of being governed by more or less universal rules or procedures, nor do they need to be initiated or organized by public authorities, though the latter may play an important role by urging certain individuals and organizations to participate and by providing expertise, facilities and political opinions on proposals for possible ways of handling the issue in question. In sum, if networks are regarded as characterized by close interactions between various individuals and groups with regard to the handling of a specific (policy) issue, we ought to study the means by which such interactions are stimulated.


Governing through the formation of autonomy and interdependencies A wide range of network scholars tend to emphasize the self-organizing and/or autonomous character of governance networks. For example, March and Olsen explain that: ‘contemporary democratic polities … involve relatively stable, self-organizing networks of interdependent but partly autonomous actors with resource bases and rule structures of their own’ (March & Olsen 1995: 70). Bob Jessop takes self-organization to: include self-organizing interpersonal networks, negotiated interorganizational co-ordination, and decentred, context-mediated inter-systemic steering. The latter two cases involve self-organized steering of multiple agencies, institutions, and systems which are operationally autonomous from another yet structurally coupled due to their mutual interdependence (1998: 29).4 Characteristic for both of these definitions of governance networks is that they equate autonomy with insulation from state power. A governance network must have ‘its own’ power distinct from that of the state to qualify as a governance network. Because of this understanding, we repeatedly end up spending time resolving the question: who is governing the network’s actions? The network itself or – through more or less subtle avenues – the state? That which is excluded from this line of who-questioning is the how of governing: how, by what devices, methods and techniques, are the autonomy and interdependencies of networks formed? This line of questioning implies that we understand autonomy not as the more or less perfect insulation from state power, but as a particular form of governing. More precisely, it entails conceiving autonomy as a specific constellation between the exercise of power and the exercise of freedom. My basic premise is that autonomy is never the freedom to do nothing nor to do anything, but to do something. If we accept the premise that this ‘something’ is not something merely invented by the network in isolation from the surrounding world, then it becomes pertinent to ask: what activities is the ‘autonomous’ network undertaking and what relations can be identified between these activities and activities carried out by other groups? In particular, what sort of rapport exists between the activities of the network and the devices, methods and techniques involved in the attempt to form and mobilize the self-steering capacities of that network?


By understanding autonomy not as the absence of power but as a particular form of power-freedom relation, a space is cleared for analyzing the diverse instruments of mobilizing, forming and thereby governing the capacities of networks to undertake particular tasks, functions, and services ‘on their own’. In other words, the question is not how autonomous networks really are, but instead: for what purposes and by what means are the self-organizing and self-steering capacities of this or that network being formed and mobilized? This brings us to the question of interdependence, which is a key tenet in many definitions of governance networks (see above; see also Kickert et al. 1997: 6). What is defining governance networks, we are told, is not only that they are (partly) autonomous, but also that they are interdependent in terms of resources, such as manpower, expertise and finance. In fact, some tend to regard these interdependencies among network actors as the functional requirement of the complex nature of society characterized by functional differentiation (Mayntz 1991) or by the complex nature of the problem to be solved, which leaves public policymaking in a state of permanent uncertainty (Klijn & Koppenjan 2004: 1–16). I am not disputing the empirical accuracy of these diagnoses; nevertheless, I believe that by basing our research agenda solely on the complex or uncertain character of our world in favour of other aspects, we risk overlooking the ways in which networks are created and shaped by the manifold attempts to make individuals and organizations participate in problem-solving activities by teaming together in a network. Network formation through legal and financial methods A few examples may illustrate how dependencies among network participants can be created through framework legislation or through the allocation of financial resources. In the Nordic countries, framework laws have been widely utilized for several decades to support the public service activities of local authorities and various private actors. In Denmark, for example, a municipal reform in 1970 entailed the enactment of laws stipulating the powers of local government to collect taxes and decide on a wide range of key welfare policy areas (Esping 1994; Villadsen 2000). In some cases, such laws have more or less deliberately supported the formation of local governance networks. In Sweden, the central government has applied a combination of framework laws, economic incentives and evaluations to structure and steer networks of regional and municipal authorities involved in the implementation of care for the elderly (Johansson & Borell 1999). While the network did not attempt to include new (private) actors, the re-structuring of


existing relations between the public authorities resulted in quite dramatic changes (not all positive) in the provision of care for the elderly (ibid. 590). In Denmark, Local Coordination Committees on Preventive Labour Market Measures were created in 1998 by law with the aim of increasing the possibilities of employment (Damgaard 2002). The Committees are supposed to provide advice to the municipal councils and others (for example, enterprises and unions) and to improve local cooperation between different authorities and actors. The committees’ activities are financed by an annual grant. A case study of the establishment of a Local Coordination Committee in a Danish municipality showed that not only were new actors brought into play, including the organization of disabled people and the medical practitioners, the engagement of the traditional local labour market partners (the municipality, representatives of employers and employees, and local enterprises) was effectively modified so as to address a wider social policy agenda (ibid. 21). Second, the interdependencies solidifying a network may also be formed through the allocation of financial resources. In recent years, governmental ambitions appear to rely increasingly on projects requiring several groups to team up in the identification and/or implementation of policy issues. The requirement that two or more organizations team up is found in more than just EU projects and national research funding. Within urban and housing policies, we also find several examples of (central) state authorities using the allocation of financial resources to promote the formation of so-called partnerships between local groups, such as residents and shop owners (for example Harding 1998; Bache 2000). Needless to say, the network relations formed between actors applying for public funding for a particular social issue may be very fragile and last no longer than to the termination of the collaborative project. Moreover, the actors’ motivation for forming a (tentative) network may have more to do with pecuniary concerns than with the embracing of a particular normative agenda (Sherlock et al. 2004). Nevertheless, the point remains that a network of hitherto discrete actors and the interdependencies between them may be inaugurated and formed – however unevenly – through the allocation of financial resources. Network formation through norms Objection might correctly be raised that my example is not particularly representative of the formation of governance networks. By focusing on a case in which state action, laws or the allocation of public funds


played a key role in mobilizing the network, I have neglected the many instances where governance networks are formed under the presence of little or no state intervention. Nonetheless, the formation and mobilization of networks may be shaped not only through state action, but also through norms. I conceive here of norms as codes of conduct that are always already inscribed in the social practices they inform (see Triantafillou 2004: 494–7). While certain norms may be propagated by the state apparatus, it is usually more than problematic to reduce their existence to the intentions of the state. Even if the state favours certain norms, it will often be unable to control the diverse practices that they may give rise to. In particular, norms of participation, transparency and social responsibility permeate our societies. These norms have informed the formation of various governance networks, the mobilization of which cannot be reduced to the actions of the state. For example, the norms or regulative ideals informing public organizations and their relations to citizens appear to have changed significantly over recent decades. The dominating norm informing the tasks of public organizations no longer seems that of the neutral implementation of more or less universal welfare programmes formulated and adopted by politicians, but rather that of specific service provision and an institutional setting for the nurturing of the self-reliance and problem-solving capacities of individuals, communities and networks. Correspondingly, citizens are no longer primarily regarded by public authorities (and by citizens themselves?) as legal subjects entitled to the more or less passive reception of welfare services, but rather as a stakeholder with a legitimate interest in ensuring that public money is spent efficiently and/or the participation in the formulation and/or implementation of a certain policy. Citizens increasingly make demands for transparency in decision-making processes. Thus, one finds that individuals and groups often establish temporary, issue-based networks, such as concerned taxpayers, environmental protection groups, disability groups and labour organizations. On the one hand, these groups may seek to promote their interests by taking advantage of the new image of public organizations as being attentive to the concerns of society by including societal groups in the decision-making processes. On the other hand, public authorities may take the initiative to mobilize such networks in order to gain (input) legitimacy to make policies easier to implement by ensuring that the most powerful, relevant societal groups are more or less accepting the policies. The norms informing private (for profit) companies also appear to have recently undergone a significant transformation. Under headings


such as Corporate Social Responsibility and Management Ethics, it has become increasingly difficult for private companies to publicly depict their mission solely as that of seeking to maximize profit (Whitehouse 2006). Instead, ‘serious’ private companies, including many of the largest transnational corporations in the world, are publicizing glossy mission statements on their own responsibility for labour standards, the environment, the local community, etc. Correspondingly, shareholders are no longer regarded as the sole legitimate purveyors of company policies, but the larger and much more diffuse group of ‘stakeholders’. The latter category is open for contestation, and various labour unions, environmental groups, local community groups and many others seek to convince the companies via an array of different strategies that they ought to be considered legitimate stakeholders. Again, the point is that the changing norms informing the activities of the private companies appear to favour the formation of diverse networks of citizens and groups that make claims to be heard and included on specific political issues. In sum, the conduct of both public and private organizations has changed significantly during the last few decades and in some cases this has given rise to more or less institutionalized governance networks. While the formation of some of these networks – and thereby the interdependencies between its participants – can be rather directly traced to the actions of the state, the norms of participation, transparency and social responsibility are clearly informing the actions of numerous other (private) organizations who may effectively initiate – or at least contribute importantly to – the formation of governance networks.

Governing the performance of networks As already noted, various technologies of agency seeking to mobilize governance networks are always, to a certain extent, shaping the latter in a certain direction. At the same time, however, at least in principle they provide a wide room of manoeuvre for the network. One answer to the problem of ensuring that networks actually undertake the tasks they are supposed to in a qualified and effective manner is the wide array of devices and methods that may be dubbed technologies of performance. This term includes the devices and methods that seek ‘to penetrate the enclosures of expertise fostered under the welfare state and to subsume the substantive domains of expertise to new formal calculative regimes’ (Dean 1999: 169). These technologies were developed, inter alia, in the context of the contracting out and outsourcing of formerly public activities. In a wide


range of institutional settings, we are witnessing the dispersion of techniques for the devolution of budgets, benchmarking, (self-) evaluation and assessment techniques that all seek to make organizations and networks themselves strive to perform better in relation to more or less stable norms of performance. By urging – and at times even forcing – networks to constantly evaluate their own performance according to more or less officially recognized standards and norms, these technologies may be crucial for the functioning of issue-based networks. Not only may they allow for a certain room for external steering by central public authorities, they may also establish a more or less stable common conception among participants in the network of how things ought to be conducted and thereby ensure the internal cohesion of the network. The notion of technologies of performance cannot be neatly separated from the notion of technologies of agency, as presented above. It is not that technologies of agency simply nurture diverse capacities to act, whereas technologies of performance seek to shape and restrict these actions in particular ways. On the one hand, I take technologies of agency as always already nurturing a particular form of agency in a particular direction. On the other hand, I see technologies of performance as always assuming and at times even seeking to facilitate the capacities of networks to handle certain issues and problems by themselves. As an illustration of the interrelationship between network governance and technologies of performance, I turn to the case of the European Employment Strategy (EES). In the absence of common legally binding employment policy, the EES depends on annual National Action Plans on employment (NAP). These NAPs, which are structured by common guidelines, are subjected to annual benchmarking, peer-reviews and form the basis for recommendations issued by the Commission to the member states on how to improve their employment policy (Hodson & Maher 2001). While the NAP clearly is not a legally binding policymaking instrument, the guidelines nonetheless urge member state governments – in dialogue with local public authorities, representatives of employers and employees, and possibly other non-state actors – not only to take actions, but also to reflect on and address their employment policies in terms of the guidelines. This clearly does not entail a harmonization or standardization of employment policies. Yet when combined with the annual benchmarking, peer review and recommendations from the Commission, the process around the NAP urges member states to conceive their employment problems and the solutions to them in a particular manner (Haahr 2004). Moreover, the guidelines directly urge member state governments to develop and stimulate the mobilization of


employment policy networks (Esmark & Triantafillou, forthcoming). Thus, the guidelines, benchmarking, peer reviews and the Commission’s recommendations seem to some extent to influence not only the processes determining who should participate in the network (and who should not), but also what themes and what broad goals ought to be addressed by the network. A word of caution may be appropriate here. While there can be little doubt about the governing ambitions of the EU and other metagovernors, one ought to be careful to avoid exaggerating the ability of meta-governance to control the actual outcome of political processes of networks. Guidelines, benchmarking, peer reviews and other devices can doubtlessly generate important political effects, but these can hardly be controlled by any single actor. For example, the data produced through the Commission’s benchmarking analyses of the member states’ employment policies may be used and abused by all parties in the network to favour their particular interests.

Conclusion This paper was motivated by a concern regarding the capacity of governance studies to critically address the governing of networks. This concern was based on what I perceive to be the proximity between the problem space of advanced liberal government and the theoretical imagery underpinning many governance studies. Both tend to base their understanding of the need for state/public sector reform on a (structural) functionalist narrative of increasing societal complexity and the hollowing out of state capacities due to pressure from above (‘globalization’) and from below (calls for influence by increasingly vocal public and private groups). In particular, this problem space fits well with the many political reforms in our societies seeking to mobilize the self-steering capacities of citizens, organizations and communities through governance networks. My first hypothesis stated that the proximity between the theoretical imagery of many governance studies and the problem space of advanced liberal government poses certain limits to the capacity of the former to illuminate the forms of power involved in the latter. First of all, there is a danger that governance studies, at least in the crudest functionalist versions, may reduce the calls from our politicians to establish public–private partnerships or governance networks to little more than functional reflexes. While this clearly is not representative of all


governance studies, it is worth noting that many of these have little concern for power, except in a purely instrumental fashion, that is, as a device for improving governance. Moreover, even if several governance studies do discuss issues of power, they often end up discussing gains and losses in the actors’ power resources: how does the introduction of network governance affect the distribution of power, in particular between central state authorities and the various networks? One of the problems with this conception of power as a resource, as a thing that can be held by a particular actor, is that it entails viewing power as a zero-sum game: if a local network gains power, it must be at the expense of the power held by a central authority. However, by framing power in this manner, it tends to overlook the ways in which advanced liberal government multiplies and spreads through more subtle (non-legally binding) mechanisms. While legally binding mechanisms may be less important than in the past – though I would doubt even that – the capacity to pursue and implement social and political goals may actually be enhanced through a wide array of more or less new governing technologies that stimulate the self-steering capacities of networks. In short, the governing of governance networks may constitute a plus-sum game if attention is directed to the devices, methods and techniques of governing rather than the actors. By focusing rather narrowly on actors and their interactions within a network, as many governance studies do, it becomes very difficult to bring to the fore those workings and effects of network governance that depend on a wide set of both legally binding and non-legally binding governing instruments. My second hypothesis was that Foucault’s conception of government may redress some of the blind spots of governance studies and critically address the problem space of advanced liberal rule. Rather than taking for granted the diagnosis that our societies are characterized by state overload and increasing complexity requiring new forms of governance (be that through markets or networks), we may apply Foucault’s conception of government to address the actual devices by which the governing of governance networks hinges on the formation and mobilization agency, autonomy and interdependence in very instrumental ways. My discussion was supported by examples of some of the ways in which networks may be formed and mobilized by a rather diverse set of legal, economic and (political) devices and instruments. These devices not only aimed to mobilize and structure the agency and autonomy of particular individuals and groups, but also to form particular interdependencies between them so as to form a network with the capacities to


handle particular policy issues. In this manner, the Foucauldian conception of government may draw attention to some of the instrumental and productive aspects of network governance that often go unnoticed in many network studies. The point of such a conception is, of course, not to condemn network governance or other forms of advanced liberal rule, but to enhance the space allowing us to address critically what currently appears to be one of the fastest growing forms of governing in contemporary societies.

Notes 1. I admittedly use the rather vague term ‘(network) governance studies’, or just ‘governance studies’ to denote the rapidly growing and variegated (political science / public administration) studies dealing with recent forms of governing practices in general and the role of networks in these practices in particular. 2. Some even conceive networks primarily as an instance of interest intermediation (e.g. March & Rhodes 1992). 3. I use the term technologies of agency in a manner similar to Barbara Cruikshank’s notion of technologies of citizenship (Cruikshank 1999). However, I have chosen the term technology of agency to underscore the norms of activism and participation embedded in these practices rather than the norms for deciding what is regarded the proper conduct of a citizen. For the same reasons, I choose to distinguish the term technologies of agency from technologies of contract and performance (for an alternative categorization, see Dean 1999: 167–8). 4. For a similar emphasis on the role of autonomy in network governance, see Rhodes (1997a: 15).

11 Meta-governance as Network Management Erik-Hans Klijn and Jurian Edelenbos

Introduction: a network management perspective on meta-governance There have been countless publications that have attempted to conceptualise the trend towards governing through and in networks. In the analysis of public policy and management, this literature is distinctive because of its focus upon an entire network, rather than the actions of individual actors (Hanf & Sharpf 1978; Scharpf 1978; Milward & Wamsley 1985; Kaufman et al. 1986; Kooiman 1993; Kickert et al. 1997; Rhodes 1997a; Agranoff & McGuire 2001; Mandell 2001; Klijn & Koppenjan 2004a). Network management and governance When these publications discuss guidance activities, they make frequent use of terms like (meta-) governance, management and network management. Network management has become the most popular of these referents within the literature, but before elaborating further it is necessary to clarify the phenomena to which these terms apply. Meta-governance, often roughly described as ‘the regulation of social processes’ (see introductory chapter), involves many control and steering activities. As networks are made up of many actors with different resources and are characterized by complex interaction processes, they cannot be easily controlled; this is why we prefer the word ‘guidance’ or ‘facilitation’. The word (meta-) governance covers a wide array of guidance mechanisms including self-steering (Rhodes 1997a). This corresponds with the observation that many outcomes in networks are the consequence of strategic interaction between actors who have negotiated policy content or desired measures (Rhodes 1997a). If explicit policy is needed to solve societal 199


problems or to organize service and policy implementation, then most of the time, self-steering will not be enough. Since we are dealing with autonomous actors, each with their own perception of the problem and their own chosen strategy, we need to address the question of collective action. Cooperation and the coordination of actors efforts requires more active and deliberate managerial strategies. There remains, however, some scope for self steering within interaction processes. This chapter focuses on these strategic attempts to manage (not control!) ongoing interaction processes between the actors in networks. It is concerned with attempts to guide not only the pursuit of goals of individual actors, but rather, influence the interaction between actors. We call these activities ‘network management’. While network management can be identified as strategies or governance, it is significant to note that not all strategies or governance approaches are equivalent to network management. Meta-governance, seen as network management, attempts to deliberatively guide governance processes in networks. This requires the manager to work out strategies to deal with the different perceptions, preferences and strategies of actors. Network management aims to initiate, guide and facilitate interaction processes between actors (Friend et al. 1974), to create and change network arrangements with the aim to achieve better coordination (Scharpf 1978; Rogers & Whetten 1982; Mandell 1990; Kickert et al. 1997). It assumes that a satisfactory outcome is often impossible without active network management. Structure of this chapter In this chapter we address the following main question: ‘What is network management and what strategies can be employed to realize it?’. The literature describes various network management strategies. We shall draw a distinction between process design and management on the one hand and institutional design on the other (Gage & Mandell 1990; Klijn & Koppenjan 2004a). Process design and management is concerned with facilitating interaction between actors in policy process. It requires steering strategies aimed at bringing different perceptions of the actors together, coordinating interactions, and other activities. The question to be addressed is what strategies seem to be most suitable and acceptable in networks situations? The manager accepts the characteristics of the network (position, rules, historical traditions etc.) as given, and tries to stimulate cooperation between the actors in order to reach concrete and acceptable outcomes. This type of network management is discussed in detail in the following section.

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Network strategies focusing upon institutional design are employed when the goal is to change the institutional characteristics of the network, e.g. the actors’ positions, the entry rules or other more drastic forms of intervention geared to adjusting the structure of the network. The focus is upon identifying suitable institutional design, as well as the available strategies for effecting it. We deal with these strategies in the penultimate section. We conclude with a discussion of the skills and competencies that a network manager needs to implement both strategies.

Process design and management: setting up and facilitating network interactions Given the problem of collective action, network interactions lack a ‘self executing’ character (Olson 1965). Cooperation often needs a push from a process manager, usually an independent person (or group), who can facilitate the interaction process as impartially as possible. At the same time, the facilitator should be a person who receives benefits from the possible results of the interactions or from involved actors. Process design and process management According to earlier research, complex processes in networks can only deliver good and satisfying outcomes if they are intensively supported by independent process management (Friend et al. 1974; Hanf & Scharpf 1978; Gage & Mandell 1990; Klijn & Koppenjan 2000; Mandell 2001), and are based upon well-designed organizational guidelines (a process design) for interactions (de Bruijn et al. 1998; Edelenbos 2000; Edelenbos & Klijn 2006a). In practice, inter-organizational processes often evolve together with agreements regarding the nature of the interaction process, as well as, the participation and ground rules. In network theory these are known as the process design. Since the process design supports the interaction of the actors, it is essential that they accept it. The process design is made interactive by the stakeholders, which also enables it to become authoritative. There is no standard design or blueprint. The actual design of the process depends on the situation-specific features in which the interactive process unfolds. The literature identifies several key principles of process design (see de Bruijn et al. 1998): ●

Openness: all relevant actors are involved in the process at an early stage. This reduces the risk of a blockage, delivers more information and thus enhances the quality of the solutions.

202 Theories of Democratic Network Governance ●

●

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Safety: actors are often wary about cooperating because they are afraid of undermining their interests. They are only prepared to participate if their core values and interests are protected. This aspect also has to be reflected in the process design by, for example, an obligation to inform the actors of new developments, exit rules for the actors, veto powers, or (hard or loose) linkages between decisions in the process. Progress: provisions need to be made for an ongoing process (e.g. agreement on timetables, important decisions, the activities of various actors, conflict resolution etc.). These criteria need to contain incentives designed to keep the actors in the process. Content: although network processes do not start with a fixed content (like a solution), content does plays an important role in the process design. A creative and appealing idea can mobilize actors into deploying their resources in the network processes. To achieve this, it is necessary to create variety in ideas. This will enrich the initial initiative that subsequently evolves with the process.

Every process design is a balancing act between these different principles, which must also be attuned to the specific characteristics of the interaction process. The tension between these four principles also require considerations of trade offs. These can take the form of a dilemma. The principles should be combined and elaborated in such a way that they meet the specific needs and problems of the process. Process design is not ‘self-executive’. It must be developed during the interaction process, applied, and if necessary, adapted. Together with other activities, this forms part of process management (Gage & Mandell 1990; Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan 1997; de Bruijn et al. 1998; Edelenbos 2000). In other words, there is a constant interplay between process design and process management, which is further complicated by the fact that the environment in which the process unfolds is in a continuous state of flux. Hence, the design is not static, but evolves with the process (Koppenjan 2001). Process management fulfils a crucial role here. On the basis of theoretical insights, we may expect interactive processes to yield the best results when the design is constructed well (ground rules for timetabling, conflict management, responsibility, roles, etc.) and active process management is employed, which uses the process design flexibly and focuses on the specific interaction situation. Empirical research (Edelenbos & Klijn 2006a) shows that an adaptive process-management style is required to realize satisfactory outcomes for inter-organizational cooperation. Adaptive process management implies a reasonably detailed process design that evolves flexibly with the developments in the inter-organizational process.


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Process-management strategies The literature features an enormous number of process management strategies for guiding stakeholder interaction (Hanf & Scharpf 1978; O’Toole 1988; Gage & Mandell 1990; Kickert et al. 1997; Agranoff & McGuire 2001, 2003; Mandell 2001; Klijn & Koppenjan 2004). These may be classified as follows: 1. activation of actors and resources: selective activation, coalition building, building common ground, resource mobilization; 2. creation of organizational arrangements: realizing ad hoc cooperation structures, like sounding boards, project groups, consultation groups, etc.; 3. guidance of interaction: mediation, brokerage, conflict resolution, etc.; 4. goal-achieving strategies: creating divergence and convergence in the perceptions of problems and solutions; 5. joint knowledge production: the strategy of searching collaboratively for information questions and ways to answer them; and 6. trust creation: the strategy of developing a relationship of trust with other interested actors in the network. These process management activities do not stand alone, they are practised in combination. The process manager has to simultaneously implement a range of different strategies (see Kickert et al. 1997; Agranoff & McGuire 2001). In other words, he has to activate actors and resources (Scharpf 1978; Mandell 1990), he has to coordinate goal-achieving mechanisms, which includes influencing the perceptions and goals of other actors, he has to foster or create organizational arrangements to facilitate interactions between actors (Agranov & McGuire 2003) and, last but not least, he has to coordinate the flow of actions and interactions between different actors (Kickert et al. 1997). The strategies that are ultimately selected often depend on the course followed by the interaction process. If the process stagnates because of conflicting perceptions, energy needs to be invested in developing a mutually acceptable compromise (goal-achieving strategies). This can be attained by, for instance, analysing differences, searching for common ground, generating new solutions or changing and influencing existing perceptions. When the process stagnates, organizational arrangements or intensive process management are necessary to address the lack of linkages between the actors’ interactions. Hence, to improve interactions one must invest in temporary organizational resources, such as project groups, consultation platforms or mediators who can re-vitalize the interaction.


Activation and arranging: getting the process started Strategies to activate actors or resources are necessary to start the process. The literature stresses that the network manager has to identify the actors needed to set up an initiative and actually create a situation in which they become interested in investing their resources (see also Lynn 1981). Scharpf (1978) calls this ‘selective activation’. He notes that the correct identification of participants, as well as the absence of opposition from other actors who possess the resources to block initiatives, is absolutely crucial in inter-organizational policy-making. Sometimes the manager has to try to deactivate actors because their involvement is not productive. Once the process gets started it is necessary to clarify the actors’ goals and perceptions (Forrester 1989) and to invest time and money in developing solutions that create opportunities for participation Klijn & Koppenjan 2004a). Sometimes, however, the process lacks creative solutions capable of satisfying the various actors. In such cases, more variation needs to be introduced by, for instance, inviting different teams of experts to compete against each other in formulating solutions (Teisman 1997). The creation of temporary organizational arrangements to facilitate interaction is also important (Rogers & Whetten 1982). The transaction costs of these arrangements must, of course, be kept to a minimum (Williamson 1996), but at the same time the actual arrangements have to be acceptable to the actors. Goal-achieving and guiding strategies: managing content and interactions Goal-achieving strategies are primarily focused upon generating solutions and influencing the actors’ perceptions of the nature of the problem and the possible solutions. If different actors turn out to have different perceptions and favour different solutions, then a process of exchanging and converging perceptions is often necessary to achieve joint action (Klijn & Koppenjan 2004a). This is achieved by strategies aimed at, for example, clarifying perceptions, seeking goal congruence or combining goals in different packages. It can also be achieved by introducing new actors or new ideas to get more variation in the perceptions. Whereas the management strategies for goal achieving have a strongly cognitive character, the strategies for managing the interactions have a strongly social character. They include, among other strategies, mediating between actors, maintaining an attractive agenda, maintaining communication with the outside world, and mediating and mitigating conflicts


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(or trying to use them for ongoing interactions). Basically, all these strategies are aimed at facilitating and speeding up the interaction process. Joint knowledge production: supporting the search for a shared content More and more articles are appearing on joint knowledge production as a network management strategy (Ehrmann & Stinson 1999; van Bueren et al. 2003; van Bueren & Edelenbos 2004). Joint knowledge production is a type of process strategy that helps to develop the content of interaction processes in networks. It is based on the assumption that non-recognition of unreliable knowledge can generate certain problems when knowledge needs to be produced for inter-organizational cooperation. Experience has shown that it is very difficult to produce knowledge that is acceptable to most parties (Lindblom & Cohen 1979; van Bueren et al. 2003). In complex processes actors spend most of their time challenging one another’s research, trying to prove the contestability of premises or the inadequacy of a database and so on. This results in ‘knowledge disputes’ and piles of reports presenting contradictory conclusions, both of which seriously hamper the quest for well-negotiated and shared knowledge in networks. Stakeholders with differing viewpoints and interests must work together in joint fact-finding exercises to develop data and information, analyse facts and forecasts, develop common assumptions and informed opinions. Finally, they must also use the information they have collected to reach decisions together (Ehrmann & Stinson 1999: 376). To fill gaps in knowledge and to eliminate knowledge disputes, independent experts and interested actors (such as private parties, authorities and interest groups) draw up a research design in mutual consultation. The research design is, in effect, the outcome of a process of discussion and negotiation between stakeholders and external experts, rather than something that has been laid down in advance. Together they search for workable methods in the quest for knowledge and the guiding principles, assumptions and suppositions on which these methods are based. They also ratify by mutual agreement the (fundamental, temporal and geographical) system boundaries and the scope of the study (e.g. When will the study begin and end? Which effects will be included in the study? Which criteria will be used to evaluate these effects? Which subjects will be part of the study, and which will not?). If the stakeholders are unable to decide which methods should be used, they may opt for several (competing) methods and/or sensitivity analyses to determine the extent to which the outcomes will vary for the


different assumptions on which the different methods are based. They may also decide to integrate various research models. Finally, they may decide to set up a ‘Committee of Wise Men’ comprising independent experts from different disciplines and charged with the task of settling persistent knowledge disputes. Generating trust: facilitating and consolidating cooperation Trust is often cited as a contributory factor in smoothly running network processes. It is seen as the answer to complexity in networks (Lane & Bachman 1998; Rousseau et al. 1998; Nooteboom 2002). Basically, trust implies a more or less stable perception by the actors of one another’s intentions; hence, they refrain from opportunistic behaviour. Trust has several potential benefits. First, it can facilitate and cut the costs of cooperation (fewer transaction costs). Second, it consolidates cooperation and makes the actors more willing to invest in it, thereby improving its robustness. Third, it enhances the results of cooperation. More problemsolving and innovation capacity is generated because the resources of the actors are combined (Edelenbos & Klijn 2006b). If trust is so important, then we need to know how it can be realized so that we can use it to advantage. A number of process-management strategies have been distinguished in this domain (Edelenbos & Klijn 2006b): ●

●

Intensify interactions: the expectation of beneficial transactions in the future stimulates the emergence of trust (Axelrod 1984). Actors must also feel that there is reasonable reciprocity in the efforts they make and the risks they run (Chiles & McMackin 1996). It is also important to display the efforts and performance of individual actors and to formulate common criteria for judging them. This way, the perception of performance, reputation and mutual trust can grow (Deakin & Wilkinson 1998). Stabilize and manage interactions: vehement disruptions and frequent contract renegotiations can negatively influence performance and trust (see e.g. Milward & Provan 2000a). It is important to stabilize interactions and expectations. Research has revealed a relationship of mutual reinforcement between trust and collective problem-solving (see e.g. Sako 1998). Active process management is needed to achieve this.

Institutional design: changing the network Institutional design is the second network-management strategy addressed in this chapter. It is an indirect strategy (unlike process management which is more hands-on and can therefore be seen as a


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direct strategy), which focuses on realizing institutional changes in the network. Institutional design is based on the assumption that the institutional characteristics of the network influence the strategies and cooperation opportunities of the actors. It attempts to change one or more of these characteristics (see Klijn & Koppenjan 2004a). Very little has been written about institutional design in networks. What is institutional design? Institutional design strategies are usually aimed at changing formal or informal rules in networks (Ostrom 1986; Dimaggio & Powell 1983; Klijn 2001). Rules lie at the heart of institutions. Many authors even see them as the defining characteristic. For instance, Scharpf (1997: 38) describes institutions as ‘systems of rules that structure the course of actions that a set of actors may choose’. Institutions are thus, in short, sets of rules, which influence, guide and limit the behaviour of actors. In this sense, networks may also be regarded as institutions: they are not only patterns of social relationships between mutually dependent actors but also systems of rules. Therefore rules can be considered a part of networks that also give them institutional meaning. Networks are characterized, after all, by specific and unique sets of formal and informal rules. Each network has its own history, in the course of which, rules have been formed and subsequently undergone development (Klijn, 1996, 2001; Burns & Flam 1997; Scharpf 1997). The rules of the network are ‘activated’ by the actors, who apply them in their interactions. This does not mean that these rules are always clear or even fully known to the actors. On the contrary, rules are often ambiguous and require translation in the interactions (March & Olsen 1989). Just as a judge tries to interpret a specific case (offence) in the light of an existing rule, an actor in the network tries to interpret the meaning of events in the light of the network rules that he is familiar with. It is in this way that network rules influence the interactions in the network. Although rules may be the product of deliberate design behaviour, they are still only valid if the other actors in the network recognize them as such. This immediately reflects the essential difference between social and physical rules. Social rules, and thus also rules in networks, can only continue to exist if they are adhered to by the actors and are truly respected in concrete game behaviours. Rules that are broken by the actors, either consciously or unconsciously, or are not (or no longer) respected, lose their validity (Burns & Flam 1997). Institutional design aims specifically at bringing about changes in the institutional characteristics of networks. It therefore needs to be seen in a separate light from the gradual changes in institutional characteristics


that occur through adaptations over time or because institutional arrangements lose their regulative power. These emergent, almost unconscious, processes of (de-) institutionalization are more or less by-products of the strategic games that actors play (Giddens 1984; Ostrom 1986). Institutional design refers both to the activity of trying to change the institutional features of policy networks, and to the content of the institutional change that is targeted. Given that we defined institutions in terms of rules, institutional design is the deliberate attempt to change the rules (either formal or informal) of networks. Since most rules develop gradually over time or, in the case of formal rules, are created in complex institutional arenas, institutional design strategies are time-consuming and difficult to implement. As a result, they are unsuitable for achieving changes in policy games that are already underway. Types of strategy for institutional design There are roughly three types of strategy for institutional design (see Klijn & Koppenjan 2004a). First, strategies aimed at the network composition: these strategies attempt to change or influence the composition of the network. They are based on the premise that (changes to) the composition of the network has (have) an influence on the interactions (and thus the outcomes) occurring within it. There are various ways in which the composition of a network may be changed, for example, by consolidating or changing the actors’ positions or by adding new actors. However, strategies may also be aimed at changing the access rules for actors or at influencing the network as a whole. This can be pursued by promoting network formation and self-regulation, or through modifications to the system. The strategies range from relatively light interventions, such as laying down the actors’ positions (which merely confirms achieved and existing rules) to more encompassing interventions, like system modification. System modification not only involves a wider range of rules, it also has a deeper impact on the position and identities of the actors. This generally inspires greater resistance. Second, there are institutional strategies aimed at the network outcomes. These strategies try to influence the standards or the logic of costs and benefits in a sustainable way, which has the consequence that the games within networks then evolve differently because other strategic choices are made. The target of intervention here is therefore not the actors as in the previous example, but their choices. A sustainable influence needs to be exerted on the actors’ strategic choices and the subsequent outcomes. The most important institutional-design strategies in


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this category are strategies to change the pay-off structure (financial or other rewards that are connected to strategies and decisions), strategies to change professional codes (standards by which the actors see their professional activities and identities) and strategies to change evaluation criteria (standards by which the actors judge the outcomes). The two last types are closely connected. The third category consists of strategies aimed at network interactions. These strategies try to influence the rules that regulate the process in networks. The aim is to facilitate interaction between the actors, create a framework and establish linkages. Interventions in this category include conflict-settlement mechanisms (to regulate conflicts between actors) and the introduction of certain procedures (thus fixing a specific interaction or decision sequence). Strategies such as certification (standards of quality attached to the characteristics of an actor or his relation to other actors) and influencing supervisory relationships also fall into this category. Institutional tensions: the example of interactive policy development As said before, strategies to change the institutional context of the network are not easy to implement and therefore need to be seen as highly delicate operations. Although many definitions and descriptions of institutions stress perpetuity and stability, we expressly wish to counter this with the possibility of short-term variants a.k.a. ‘proto-institutions’ (see Lawrence et al. 2002). This is because our network perspective recognises the dynamic character of institutions. Deinstitutionalization – rather than institutionalization – comes into play. In our view, a temporary process like interactive policy development (but other processes as well) often imposes a temporary institutional structure (methods, phasing, rules and roles for stakeholders) on top of, or alongside, existing institutions. This then has implications for the current situation (Edelenbos 2005). Experience (in the Netherlands) of the introduction of interactive policy development (citizen involvement) illustrates this observation. The introduction of interactive policy development may be accompanied by the re-evaluation and repositioning of political and administrative institutions. Interactive policy development admits a form of direct, deliberative democracy (King 2003; Verweij & Josling 2003) in a representative democratic system. This may cause a certain amount of institutional tension within the existing administrative system (Edelenbos 2005). New ground rules and actors’ roles accompanied by interactive


policy-making are often rejected by the existing administrative system. This is because it is primarily based on norms of representative democracy, such as hierarchical accountability and the ‘primacy of politics’. Empirical analysis (Edelenbos 2005) has revealed that institutional dissociation occurs between the interactive process and the existing administrative structures and procedures. We were struck by the way the temporary procedures of the interactive process differed greatly from the existing procedures, and moreover often existed in isolation from one another. In addition, the roles of the various actors appeared to be extremely rigid. The way in which public servants, politicians and administrators, but also citizens and interest groups, perceived their roles, did not seem to be all that open to change. Traditional role patterns dominated the fulfilment of new roles in interactive policy development. Politicians adopted a very reluctant attitude and remained safely entrenched behind their familiar institutions. Public servants saw the interactive process primarily as a political whim, which has to be tolerated and skewed wherever possible in the direction of standard procedure in the course of the process. If a form of interactive policy development is permitted within an existing institutional framework, then roughly speaking two responses may occur during and after the interactive process, institutional intransigence or institutional change. In the former case, institutional intransigence, the existing institution has a decisive impact on the new institutions of the interactive process. The existing institutions sweep away the new ones or ignore them. The representative democratic system continues to dominate. In the latter case, institutional change, the new institutions of the interactive process have a decisive impact on the existing institutions. The new institutions are absorbed by the existing ones, merging into a hybrid, where the two exist side by side. Another possible scenario is that the new institutions completely overrule the existing ones. A third scenario could be that the existing and new institutions merge into a symbiosis, something new that neither can be deduced from the existing nor the new institutions. Hence, when we look at the question of institutional change we assume that there is a reciprocal relationship between existing and new institutions. New institutions of interactive policy development have an impact on existing institutions, but existing institutions, likewise, have an impact on the new institutions of interactive policy development. Conclusion: institutional design as process The strategy of institutional design requires special attention for the institutional interrelationships between existing and new rules. New


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institutions need to be somehow adapted and incorporated into existing ones if they are to have any chance of being ‘picked up’ (Weimer 1995; de Jong 1999). But how can such an adjustment take place? There is a dilemma between, on the one hand, the risk of rejection of new institutions because they differ too much from the status quo. And on the other, the risk that the change will be so small (when new institutions are too similar to the old ones) that experiments with interactive policy development, which are often announced with a great flourish, will have very few institutional consequences (Edelenbos 2005). New institutions must, to a certain extent, be in line with existing ones, but at the same time they have to be sufficiently different to be capable of realizing institutional change. Healey (1997: 268) argues along the same lines: … new ideas and organizing routines need to grow from the specific concerns of stakeholders. (…) They must develop with the grain of local contingencies. Yet, to carry transformative power, they must have the capacity to challenge existing conceptions and re-frame ways of thinking, ways of valuing and ways of doing things. By definition, institutional design is a search in each individual situation for the norm of the minimum allowed institutional deviation. A workable balance has to be struck between the rejection and absorption of new institutions in creating networks (Edelenbos 2005).

Good network management: skills and competencies Publications on the network approach invariably stress that network management is far from easy. It requires knowledge of the network and a range of competencies, not least negotiation skills. This is because network-management strategies are conducted in a context of mutual dependency. Thus, as said earlier, a network manager is not a central actor or a director, but rather a mediator and a facilitator (Forester 1989; Gage & Mandell 1990). A network manager cannot (and should not try to) control all the interactions in the complex network. The interactions in networks are far too numerous and diverse for that. Complex processes often have their own dynamics, and are to some degree selforganizing. However, the self organizing aspect of complex processes does not mean that there is no need for deliberate network management. Complex processes are often lengthy due to deadlocks, disputes and so on. There is often a desperate need for actors who are committed to the process to be guided to generate fresh and promising solutions for pressing societal problems. This guidance includes connecting the various


actors and the decisions within the network. To this extent, network manager must be selective and pick the right moment to influence interactions and proposed solutions. Network management is often the art of bringing together different streams, such as perspectives of actors, their problem definitions and solutions, at a time when this can make a difference (see also Kingdon 1984). Network management becomes dirigisme, when the network manager’s presence is too dominant in the interaction process and blocks emergent positive movements and couplings. Required managerial skills Interaction management in networks is a difficult job that requires a lot of effort, interaction and commitment. It also requires the manager to know his network. First of all, a network manager needs analytical skills so that he can comprehend and fathom a complex network of actors with different sorts of relations, perceptions of problems, solutions, etc. Second, he must have some substantive knowledge of the issues dealt with in the network. This involves being able to ask the right questions without personally having to come up with the right answer (de Bruijn et al. 1998). Third, a network manager must have the ability to make a workable and authoritative design for network interactions. He must be able to use the network analysis to construct a design (with process agreements) for the network interactions. Fourth, he must have the skills to estimate, choose and implement the right network strategies. Design and management are two sides of the same coin and lie at the very heart of network management. This calls for an adaptive management style; the process manager must first design the network interactions carefully by paying close attention to the time phases of the process, the determination of the budget, the role allocation, the method of conflict resolution, accountability, substantive frameworks, auxiliary conditions, etc. All of this implies that the network interactions are regulated and choreographed somehow prior to the actual implementation of the process. The process manager must also apply an adaptive style in the implementation of the process design, which must be carried out with an eye to the specific conditions and developments in the network situation. He must change the ground rules and the roles to ensure that the network processes unfold smoothly (Edelenbos & Klijn 2006a). A network manager (or more than one network manager) needs to play an active role to achieve interesting results (Gage & Mandell 1990; Alter & Hage 1993; Agranoff & McGuire 2003). We are not suggesting very heavy and intense network management; the (self-regulated) dynamics of the


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network processes determine for a great part the evolving interactions. However, a carefully thought-out process design can prevent nonproductive dynamics. Basically, the design must be continuously adapted to the complex dynamics of the network processes. Design and management must be seen (and treated) as a continuous interplay. We mentioned in the previous section that institutional obstacles can also hinder successful interaction (Klijn & Koppenjan 2004a; Edelenbos 2005). Many studies indicate that a lack of active strategies on the part of the network manager contribute to failures in interaction (Hanf & Scharpf 1978; Mandell 2001; Bueren, Klijn & Koppenjan 2003). A good network manager has the ability to very quickly assess the network conditions and to identify and assess the explicit and – more importantly – the implicit rules. This is the fifth skill required of the network manager. On the basis of this assessment the network manager must consider the feasibility of the newly formulated rules and roles for the network game. It all boils down to a balancing act between trying something new, together with ‘business as usual’.

Research challenges We conclude this chapter by pointing out that there are still many unanswered questions about the skills and competencies required of a network manager. Meier and O’Toole (2001) conducted research on success and failure in different educational networks and found that managerial networking was positively correlated with primary goals, but also with other indicators of organizational performance. They did not, however, look at specific managerial strategies discussed in this chapter. Nor did they ask questions about the skills and competencies needed for successful network management. Available case study material demonstrates the importance of network management strategies, but we still know very little about which strategies seem to be most effective in which situations and – more importantly – how they can be successfully implemented. We therefore need further research which can provide systematic information on the actual behaviour and the tool kits of network managers. We also need to gain more insight into the conditions under which managers make a success of steering complex decision-making processes in networks, as well as the actual effects of network-management strategies. The multifarious characteristics of networks and the wide range of strategies within the


network games make this a difficult research assignment. It will probably necessitate additional research methods besides surveys and case studies. We suggest the deployment of action research methods, which will allow the behaviour, skills and competencies of network managers to be closely observed and monitored.

12 Governing Outputs and Outcomes of Governance Networks1 Laurence J. O’Toole, Jr

How is it possible – indeed is it possible – for democratically elected governments to shape the outputs and outcomes2 of network governance? What role can be sketched for public authorities who may have reason to attend to the direct or ultimate products of governance networks? How are networks likely to respond? Can public authorities operate at a meta-level to shape network results in the interests of the broader public? What dilemmas and complications can be foreseen? This chapter analyses the interaction between governance networks and public authorities, particularly with regard to the latter’s efforts to regulate or otherwise influence policy outputs and outcomes in network settings. It does so by situating the subject in the context of a model of governance that suggests the likely influence but not control available to public authorities over such results. Once this framework is sketched, the chapter examines the notion of meta-governance and distinguishes two such concepts. Working primarily from one of these, the chapter then offers a game-theoretic heuristic to analyze the ways that governments can shape the outputs and outcomes of networks.

Framing the subject Governance networks can offer advantages in delivering outputs and outcomes – enhancing political legitimacy among interested stakeholders, increasing technical capacity to produce valuable results, and leveraging administrative capacity to generate reliably successful implementation (O’Toole 1997). In addition, it is clear, reliance on governance networks is often inevitable and is quite routinely an explicit choice of legislative bodies (for systematic evidence from one country, see Hall & O’Toole 2000, 2004). 215


Despite their utility and relative ubiquity, nonetheless, governance networks offer certain significant drawbacks. In a sense, these can be seen as the other side of the coin from the advantages of bureaucratic systems. The latter are often unresponsive to direct influence by stakeholders, whereas governance networks have their outputs and outcomes shaped by the networked stakeholders who coproduce results. Whereas that form of action may seem more accessible and responsive to those in the network, it can also be less sensitive to those not represented directly there, including the relatively diffuse or unorganized interests in the relevant community (see Lowi 1979), and less mindful of any overall notion of the public interest. Second, whereas hierarchical institutions can sometimes move slowly and pay considerable attention to procedural formality and regularity, governance networks are less regularized and transparent arrays. They can be fluid and responsive to stimuli, but at the expense of certain kinds of fairness and usually at the expense of coherent and visible forums for access by those who are not extant parts of the club. Third, bureaucracies tend to operate as autoregressive systems, that is, they operate today (and produce outputs today) in fashions that greatly resemble the patterns of yesterday. Bureaucracies are typically considerably more stable systems than are networks (O’Toole & Meier 1999). Meier and I have developed inductively, from the empirical literature, a general model of public management and performance that expresses this reality. Explicating the model briefly can help to focus on some relevant features of governance and networks: Ot 1 (SM1) Ot1 2 (Xt/S) (M3/M4) t where O is some measure of output or outcome, S is a measure of stability, M denotes management, which can be divided into three parts M1 management’s contribution to organizational stability through additions to hierarchy/structure as well as regular operations, M3 management’s efforts to exploit the networked environment, M4 management’s effort to buffer shocks emanating from the network, X is a vector of environmental forces, t is an error term, the other subscripts denote time periods, and 1 and 2 are estimable parameters.

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The model is inertial, nonlinear, and contingent. It represents formally the production of outputs or outcomes and indicates, for instance, that system stability (ranging from rigid hierarchical patterns to fluid, networked arrays) is a critical determinant of performance. It also indicates some points of leverage in shaping such results. Several managerial functions play roles, when operating in and on such systems from one or another level, and also that forces external to (for instance) a network itself – the ‘X’ vector – can be crucial in shaping what happens. One component of this vector can consists of the effort and direction of influence applied by public authorities onto the functioning of the system of interest.3 Stability has its obvious advantages, as analysts since Weber (1946) have noted, as well as some recognizable drawbacks. Less stable network patterns can adapt more flexibly but are also more likely to be subject to pressures for cooptation from organized interests in their interdependent environment (see O’Toole & Meier 2004). In general, then, their network outputs are more easily shaped, or attenuated, by strategic action of parties seeking to manage from within the network (or pressing on it from outside). Contrariwise, this logic suggests that governmental ‘control’ over network outputs and outcomes is likely to be a chimera. Multiple actors, including public authorities, may have the capacity to influence the results of network action, but none of them can successfully exert unilateral direction. Furthermore, the logic also suggests that whatever influence a government is actually able to exert is subject to attenuation over time. In short, there are no autopilot possibilities. Rather, one can expect a continuing tendency, unless checked, toward weakened governmental direction over the network production. There are several reasons. First, governments sometimes intentionally seek and prefer attenuated influence. Public authorities have reasons to distance themselves from certain controversial or difficult issues (for an analysis, see O’Toole & Meier 2004). They may even prefer to outsource production to a network rather than handling these responsibilities in house. Second, sometimes governments coproduce outputs and outcomes with networked others; if so, the use of lengthy principal-agent chains almost certainly results in reduced influence over actors closer to the final stages of production. Third, cooptative tendencies in networks can work to reinforce inequities present in the broader social setting, and governments are likely to have difficulties reducing such dynamics


(O’Toole & Meier 2004). Overall, then, stable and active governmental regulatory paths can tend toward atrophy during processes of implementation via governance networks. This conclusion does not mean that government is powerless when dealing with networks. Later in this chapter, a number of points of governmental leverage in and over networks are identified. It does mean, however, that realism should counsel public authorities to forsake strategies of control for more nuanced and sometimes indirect approaches based on an understanding of how networks actually operate. In the remainder of this paper, the notion of meta-governance itself is first explicated. A heuristic is then offered to help analyse the potential for governments to shape the outputs and outcomes of networks. Finally, some conclusions can be offered.

Two notions of meta-governance If one is interested in meta-governance of networks, it can be important to distinguish issues connected to two different albeit related types of ‘levels’. The first alludes to public authority as a kind of superordinate decision maker. The idea of the democratic state as holding, at some point, a monopoly of coercion to be exercised in the public interest seems to require that governing authorities do more than preside in the midst of or participate in joint decision making but rather stand at some remove, at least on critical issues. Various ways of conceiving of this normative, and perhaps empirical, ‘differentness’ represented by public authorities can be sketched. One, linked to the traditional notions of a liberal society, would be to consider public authorities as providing room for discretion on the part of other social actors – whether networked or otherwise – in the ‘private’ realm. The public authorities, from this perspective, set the parameters within which other actors may exercise freedom to maneuver and decide, and the authorities operate to check any excesses on the crucial issues. Another would be close to the game-theoretic concept of last mover, coupled with a default mechanism. That is, social actors can work jointly to decide and act, but public authorities are free to make the last or definitive move in the multi-actor game; and should social actors not be able to jointly produce acceptable outputs and outcomes, government decides by default. A third related way of characterizing this sort of meta-role for public authorities is to think of government as sitting at the apex of a societal hierarchy, with ultimate responsibility to stop or undo inappropriate actions by others. Various concrete special


powers accorded to public authorities – ratifications, vetoes, amendment powers, and so forth – are then presumably justified by this kind of supervisory role. In any of these notions, the issue then becomes: how can governments operate to shape or check the decisions and actions of governance networks when such an effort is justified? In considering this question, however, it can be helpful to make use of another meaning of meta-governance. In their well-known analysis, Kiser and Ostrom (1982) sketch three ‘levels of action’. The operational level encompasses concrete moves to take action in the world. The legislative or policy level – which can entail moves by actors far beyond actual formal legislatures – sets rules (that is to say, policies) about how, where, and when various operational moves can happen. Finally, the constitutional level of action sets the understandings about how policies are made or changed. Although later work by Ostrom emphasizes that social systems may operate on more levels than even these three (1999), those enumerated here are sufficient to make the key point here regarding meta-governance.4 In particular, this formulation emphasizes distinctions among levels of action rather than among types of actors. Any social actor might spend time and effort working in two or even all three levels; indeed, some specific moves or strategies might even function simultaneously on multiple levels of action. This idea carries a number of ramifications, only one of which needs to be emphasized here. Whereas meta-governance in the earlier-summarized conceptualization conjures the notion of public authorities as sitting above or apart from the actions of networks, the Kiser–Ostrom formulation suggests that the ‘apart-ness’ to be emphasized is best considered a kind (level) of effort developed by whichever social actors become involved in setting or changing the basic rules of the game. That is, thinking of meta-governance as constitutional decision making, and perhaps certain kinds of policy decision making (including certain moves by managers), brings to the fore a more complex reality of meta-governance that needs to be treated seriously: public authorities may not be the only ones working at the meta-level. In fact, it becomes an empirical question as to whether public authorities are at all involved at the meta-level; an alternative might be that other social actors sometimes set the basic rules of the game that ultimately (at another level of action) produces outputs and outcomes. So what? There are several ramifications. Networks themselves may be capable of anticipating (or responding) and enacting rules to shape outputs and outcomes. For instance, when operating at the legislative level (in Kiser’s and Ostrom’s sense), networks of actors can collectively


agree to impose restrictions on certain operational actions allowable to all the actors in the network to reduce second-order collective action problems – free riding, overuse of common pool resources, and so forth (Ostrom 1990). In this type of situation, self-organizing efforts of networks constitute, in effect, meta-self-governance. Indeed, it should be clear that under appropriate circumstances, meta-governance need not be conducted solely or primarily from outside; a network, or parts of a network, can meta-govern the network. As Ostrom herself has documented in great detail (1990), cases spanning hundreds of years on several continents demonstrate that governments need not necessarily even be involved in some successful kinds of meta-governance. In addition, various network actors may themselves seek to take action at one of the meta-levels, even if not collectively. Different actors may have agendas that would be furthered by, for instance, an alteration in a legislative-level decision. Pursued separately, meta-moves may be attempted by several network actors even simultaneously. One could think of this possibility as involving different actors pulling, or enticing, their network collaborators in different directions, more or less as force vectors operating at varying strengths and in various directions. The ultimate meta-outcome in such an action space would be the sum of the vector forces, which would be a resultant rather than a consciously selected end state that had been chosen by any actor. Note that this variant of meta-governance could also develop without public authorities being directly involved in any of the meta-moves. Finally, there is the role of government itself in actions at the metalevels. Certainly governments can become active in shaping legislative and even constitutional choices in governance networks. If and as they do so, meta-governance in these two distinct senses becomes closer to the same notion. Even here, nonetheless, matters are unlikely to be simple. Multiple different public authorities of the ‘same’ government may seek a role, and often formal superiors refrain from intervening to impose a coherent governmental position. Also, a given government often sits in a nested array of multilevel governmental systems – whether as in a federal arrangement like that structuring the 85,000 governments within the USA or in the evolving system of the European Union. In addition, when public authorities do become involved in efforts at meta-governance of the Kiser–Ostrom variety, they are unlikely to be alone. Other actors are also interested in shaping actions at the meta-levels, even if a public authority is primus inter pares. Actions aimed at meta-governance thus typically involve actions by public


authorities to shape the context and operations of the setting in which they themselves are interdependent. This statement holds, whether one is talking about corporatist settings in which some notion of partnership is explicit, or in pluralist systems, where conventional wisdom has it that government should not be considered ‘just another’ social partner. In a wide variety of democratic settings, the possibilities for meta-governance via government are real but hardly unilateral. I approach the issue of meta-governance primarily by adopting the Kiser–Ostrom conceptualization, albeit with the clear recognition that some empirical circumstances allow for public authorities’ adopting a role that involves a kind of standing-apart, and some sensible normative claims justify such authorities being able to do so on key issues. The two notions are not explicitly at odds, but the Kiser and Ostrom explication is more likely to capture the actual, consequential, rules-grounded moves that in turn shape the context of networked action.

Meta-governance in action The foregoing coverage strongly suggests that a consideration of the prospects for meta-governance by public authorities should not be conceived as a top-down affair (for instance, Mazmanian & Sabatier 1989), nor as a radically bottom-up process (Hjern & Hull 1982a). In the field of policy implementation, most researchers have sought to work from a theoretical perspective combining insights of both approaches while also avoiding some of the weaknesses of each. Similarly here, such a strategy seems apropos. Unfortunately, it is easier to prescribe an appropriate melding of top-down and bottom-up ideas than to develop such an approach in detail. Several candidate approaches, however, have been put forward. A promising route has been sketched by Bressers and colleagues via a ‘contextual interaction theory’. Here, the basic insights of bottom-up analysts about the importance of interaction processes has been linked in detail to a well-developed set of ideas about policy instruments (Bressers 1983, 2004; Bressers & Klok 1988; Bressers et al. 2000). In the current chapter, a framework linked to this last-mentioned one is adopted as a heuristic. Game theory, I argue, can be employed to help understand the options available to governments if they are interested in shaping performance in and through networks. In this sense, therefore, the analysis in the chapter is built upon an implicit foundation in governability theory, as explicated in the introductory chapter. In


particular, the heuristic used here clearly does emphasize calculation on the part of network actors, although such an assumption does not preclude the notion of cultural ties. Similarly, the perspective assumes at least occasional conflict (differences in interest) among the actors, although ‘coordination games’, to use the game-theoretic notion, are also possible under some circumstances. The emphasis here, it is important to note, is on game theory used heuristically rather than, in a strict sense, as a theory aimed at prediction (see O’Toole 2004). Game theory has been explored for similar purposes in other kinds of settings (see Lynn 1993; O’Toole 1996; Scharpf 1997). While game-theoretic approaches implicitly assume equality of power between or among actors or actor constellations, and thus represent a set of circumstances somewhat narrower than could be expected in the real world, where governmental actors may have at least formal power advantages on some decisions (Bressers et al. 2000), this constraint does not pose a serious limitation to the use of the approach heuristically. Where power is shared among a set of interdependent actors, a relatively common circumstance in networks, the approach does offer some important advantages. First, it builds a melding of top-down and bottom-up insights into the logic of the perspective itself. All actors are treated as strategic decision makers and therefore must have their preferences taken into account. Second, the outputs and outcomes of gametheoretic interactions are driven by the full set of actors and their preferences – the result may, indeed, be something that no one had preferred. These fundamental notions fit the circumstances of many realworld efforts to produce action via networks. Third, the foregoing coverage suggests that government as actor is best represented as enmeshed among other social actors rather than as standing apart from them; either way, however, game theory offers appropriate analytic representations. Government-as-standing-apart can be represented as a two-party game (government and network) or, more complicatedly, as a two-level set of nested games (a within-network game connected to a linked game between network and government). Government-asnetwork-member can be modeled as an n-party game within the network. Finally, while the heuristic of game theory is rather abstract, it is employed here in preference to a catalogue of policy instruments available to government for shaping network results. Many different typologies of such instruments can be found in the literature, but virtually all are ad hoc and oversimplified depictions of what are actually a large set of much more nuanced and varied tools. These, in turn, can be


understood and compared by representing them on several different dimensions – provision or removal of resources to target groups, proportionality of governmental response to target-group behavior, amount of information needed to apply the instrument, and several more (for a full exposition, see Bressers & O’Toole 2005). The game-theoretic treatment is, in effect, an analysis at a higher level of generality, and consideration of particular instruments can be derived from the more general coverage. The emphasis here, then, is on game theory as a tool to help identify alternatives that may be useful for meta-governance, rather than as a theory employed to predict actions, outputs, or outcomes. The reason is straightforward. As a branch of applied mathematics, game theory treats as ‘solutions’ the determination of (for instance) Nash equilibria, even if such ‘solutions’ constitute failures of cooperation. The game-theoretic solution to the well-known Prisoners’ Dilemma, to note but one example, is mutual defection – a result that represents not only a failure of interdependent actors to cooperate with each other, but also a selfinterest-driven outcome that does not even represent a Pareto-optimal situation. In analyzing the practical world of governance, one is necessarily more interested in governance solutions than mathematical ones. Treating the theoretical apparatus as a heuristic provides considerable leverage in understanding practical problems of interdependent action. The reason is that the theoretical structure suggests potential difficulties as well as leverage points for improving the odds of appropriately cooperative action. Changing or at least influencing outcomes is precisely what public authorities have in mind when they engage in efforts at meta-governance.

Possibilities for public authorities to shape network outputs and outcomes What practical possibilities are available to address the challenge of meta-governments faced by public authorities? The options are discussed in terms, and from the perspective, of relevant and legitimate public authorities.

Meta-governance via policy formulation If governance involves more than governments, it is nonetheless true that governments have a major point of leverage that can shape what happens via networks: public policy. Leaving aside for now the questions of how


policy gets made and the extent to which governments may either be open to network influence during formal policy adoption, or delegate policy choices to governance networks, governments typically possess formal authority to operate at the meta-level across a broad range of governance challenges. While governance networks must be treated very seriously for a host of reasons – including political, technical, resource, and/or managerial advantages that networks bring to addressing the practical problems of governance – the opportunity to set the policy game in motion gives public authorities a considerable channel of influence. In game-theoretic terms, this sort of move sets parameters for one or more ensuing games yet to be played. The point should not be taken too far, for network characteristics themselves can shape the policies that governments adopt (Bressers & O’Toole 1999); but that limitation by no means signals that governments operate as mere puppets of networks. Policy formulation is important, but it only begins the game (or adds a game to an extant mix, or modifies an already-established game). Additional kinds of moves available to public authorities for metagovernance can be organized into three categories. Coverage begins with the least overt type and then moves to others of increasing complexity and intrusiveness.

Assisting in the play of the game Public authorities can often initiate moves that do not shift the gametheoretic structure of the situation. Such moves may seem at first to be relatively trivial but can be important when the game being played in the network is not far out of synch with the preferences of democratic governments. If the main thing needed is to help the interdependent actors coordinate their efforts – that is, if network actors’ own preferences are close to the government’s objectives but the actors face difficulties in concerting themselves for the right kind of action – several forms of governmental assistance can increase the probability of success. Public authorities can use informational instruments to signal moves by some network actors for the coordinative benefit of others, in such a way that a relatively benign scheme of networked operations can be stabilized around the status quo. Assisting in the development and maintenance of transparent information systems, similarly, can be a step taken by public authorities to help facilitate the sensible production of results. A simple coordination game could nevertheless shift toward suboptimal production if one or more players perceive the game to be something different – as would be the case, for instance, if actors have


insufficient information about others’ motives and commitment. Encouraging iteration in well-functioning or benign network settings can also be an important contribution by a public authority. None of these moves seems remarkable, but assisting the play of a sensible game rather than changing the pattern of interdependence can sometimes be crucial.

Linking and segmenting games Activities involved in policy formulation, along with those designed to assist in the play of the game, can be rather successful varieties of metagovernance under circumstances in which networked actors do not have widely divergent preferences. Under different scope conditions, for instance, when preferences are not so easily meshed, other approaches can be necessary. When differences in points of view are larger, metagovernance may require that simpler moves be supplemented by efforts to link and/or segment the multiple games among the actors. Although analyses of governance networks are sometimes framed as if a given network has influence over one, or one type of, output or outcome, the real world presents a more complex picture – one that can be amenable to meta-governance by public authorities. Again, the reasons can be understood by using game-theoretic logic. It has been shown mathematically that in patterns of multiactor interdependence, connecting two or more issues (games) under consideration by essentially the same set of actors (with the same sets of preferences) can have a major impact on the choices made. Identifying and explicitly connecting the linked games in a given network, or building connections where they did not exist originally, can nudge the choices of governance networks. Connecting games, therefore, so that network actors understand that the links are being explicitly considered, can shape collective action. Similarly, two or more games may be causally connected but collectively unrecognized. Here a public authority can change network operations by identifying the connection and highlighting its importance. Such a move can shift actors’ preferences and/or cognitive structures. Governance networks may generate outputs and outcomes in successive games over time. Public authorities can assist in the achievement of public objectives by brokering agreements across these games. A government could offer network actors flexibility on some issues now, in exchange for concessions on another to be considered later. (Consider the possibilities presented by covenants with industrial groups on


environmental issues, as developed in the Netherlands.) Public authorities have particular advantages in serving in such a broker role, particularly in network settings lacking substantial institutionalization. Similar points can be made regarding the option of ‘disconnecting’ games among network actors. Sometimes network actors are reluctant to commit themselves and their resources to the fulfillment of a rather complex program, given their sense of uncertainty in the venture. If the reasons have to do with the perceived riskiness of investing a great deal in collective action, it may be possible for a public authority to disaggregate the task into a series of smaller ones, each involving less risk. Doing so can help in several ways. First, not too much is gambled at any one time. Second, if participants see that others are likewise investing in the early parts of the operation, they may perceive less risk. And third, this dynamic can encourage a sense of trust among the full set of actors. (Note here the thread connecting the point to governability theory and not merely interdependence theory. I believe that each of these perspectives has merit.) In short, by operating at the meta-level in disaggregating the elements of large and potentially costly network operations, public authorities can increase the odds of success. Finally, governmental authorities can also link games across different levels, in the Kiser-Ostrom sense. In such situations, a public authority can assist in congealing a solution to the second-order collective action problem well known to game theorists (enforcing and/or monitoring adherence to commitments that are collectively in the interests of all participants, even though each can be tempted to shirk while others contribute) – including by extracting contributions from network members to create a monitoring and enforcement mechanism. The meta-governance moves discussed thus far can be important in inducing the production of network outputs and outcomes desired by a government. Not infrequently, however, the game within a network, or between a governance network and a public authority, is not structured so benignly. In such situations, rather than merely assisting the play of the game, or helping to link or decouple network games from each other, public authorities may need to consider changing the game that is being played or contemplated.

Changing the game: active meta-governance by public authorities When the matrix of preferences in a governance network is closely aligned with the agenda of the government, the foregoing steps may be


sufficient to help shape network results appropriately. When the only feasible game-theoretic ‘solutions’ essentially involve practical failures, from the standpoint of public authorities, more vigorous options can be considered.5 And while multiple actors may be able to contribute to the shaping or re-shaping of the game, public authorities are clearly among these potentially influential meta-governors. One obvious way of changing the game is by influencing preferences. Public authorities can use persuasion (perhaps supplemented by incentives) to seek a shift in the ordering of preferred options among network actors – in the direction of an acceptable or superior overall result. Such authorities can also seek to operate at a more general level on network activities, by persuading participants of the value to them of long-term, stable cooperation rather than a short-term, narrowly self-interested calculus. Such persuasive efforts can focus on constitutional-level contextual features like the understood norms of conduct within network operations – transparency, promise keeping, good faith, reciprocity, civility, and trust. Encouraging the development of such norms can shift the choices of participants and gradually develop greater prospects for stable, appropriate network solutions. Trust, for instance, converts a Prisoners’ Dilemma game into a solvable cooperative effort. It also reduces transaction and monitoring costs, and lowers the rate by which future payoffs in repeat-game situations are discounted to present value. The importance of public authorities’ role in promoting the development and mutual strengthening of such norms, including by operating in accord with them from the meta-level as well as using them in assessing and contributing to policy and operations in the network, should not be underestimated. Employing persuasion to increase the odds of network agreement and cooperation amounts to changing the game, but it does so by building on the assumption that agreement and concertation among the partners generates acceptable outputs and outcomes, rather than an inappropriate conspiracy. (It is no accident that the English word ‘collaboration’ is double edged, signaling both cooperative action and also a sinister, subrosa plot.) What if this relatively benign condition does not obtain? In such situations, public authorities may need to resort to other methods for changing the game. The most obvious involves using formal authority to render certain outputs illegitimate (for instance, illegal). Another straightforward possibility invokes formal authority to change the value of certain choices available to networks – either positively (for instance, via subsidy schemes, or by linking certain outputs to additional attractive payoffs


that government can create) or negatively (through the use of penalties such as fines, reporting requirements, regulatory oversight, or enhanced connections to additional policy requirements). Not to be overlooked is the opportunity often afforded public authorities to modify the network’s structure. Depending on the circumstance, such authorities may be able to mandate links for certain purposes, or buffer nodes against the need to coordinate with certain others. If the networks of interest are purely self-organizing, and must remain so, public authorities may find their role in altering network structure relatively limited. But if the networks are subject to at least some mandated participation or some governmental review of the acceptability of participation, the influence of public authorities can be substantial. Designation of a lead actor, or insistence that certain actors should or should not be regular participants, can shape decisively the results of network operations. Similarly, devices as simple as accreditation and licensing can be used by public authorities to craft the composition of likely networks. As Schattschneider pointed out long ago (1960), determining who sits at the table to contribute to a joint decision heavily tilts the decision in one direction or another.

Conclusion Amid the institutional intertwining characteristic of a networked world, public authorities are neither in control nor impotent. Nor do they operate as merely another participant in interdependent action. By virtue of special status, expectation, and formal authority, governmental agencies can shape not just the processes but also the results of network production. There is no guarantee that such authorities will enhance the public value of such outputs and outcomes; indeed, they can sometimes exacerbate inequalities and abet unmonitored and self-interested behavior. Nevertheless, governments can play key roles in governance, including in and on governance networks. Public authorities have the potential to operate at the meta-level in both senses of that term: by making moves that shape action at policy and constitutional levels, not only as a direct participant in operations, and in influencing at one remove the games of interdependent choice characteristic of networked decision making. Such efforts can be understood as moves to set games in motion via governance networks, assist in their execution, connect or disconnect strategic interactions across the range of games in play, and change a game toward a more playable – or acceptable – collective result. A variety of instruments, and also


instrumental moves, can assist. Although a simple typology does injustice to the range and subtlety of instruments available, it is clear that informational tools and suasion, regulatory options, incentive-based possibilities, and combinations of all these can be effective. They can operate with outputs as targets, or on the range of options available for legitimate consideration, or on the networked actors themselves – individually or collectively – with a focus on operations, policy, constitutional-level aspects, or all three. While public authorities must adjust to a world of networked governance, and while such a world inevitably means a diffusion of influence in exchange for increased capacity, it does not necessarily signal a disappearance of public authority and governmental influence. Meta-governance in networks may be a complex and thus far inadequately understood craft, but its potential should be clear – and clearly worth developing.

Notes 1. An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the workshop on ‘Democratic Network Governance: Theoretical Puzzles’, in Roskilde, Denmark, 28–29 April 2005. Thanks for helpful comments are due to the workshop participants, especially Diana Panke, Allan Dreyer Hansen, Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing. 2. These terms are used here in the fashion typical in the research literature. Outputs are the direct products of a governance system (decisions, regulations, subsidies, and tangible results like water or air cleaned, roadways paved, or criminal suspects arrested). Outcomes refer to the ultimate result of such interventions: increased overall employment, cleaner ambient air, reduced crime rate. The distinction is important, but for reasons of space the issue is treated generally in this chapter, so that both types are included simultaneously in the analysis. The difference to be kept in mind for present purposes is this: The generation of outcomes involves a more complex causal chain, and usually more coproducing actors, than does the production of outputs. In general, the networks involved in influencing outcomes are larger, the ability of any actor or set of actors to ‘govern’ the network more constrained, and thus the metagovernance challenges more significant. 3. Modeling the performance of networks of organizations is considerably more complex than modeling the performance of an organization operating within an interdependent setting. We are at work on aspects of the first-mentioned subject as well, although this work goes beyond the reach of the present paper (for initial modeling efforts, see Meier and O’Toole 2004). 4. The distinctions developed by Kiser and Ostrom are similar in some respects to the three ‘orders’ of governing explicated by Kooiman (for instance 2000: 154–61). The operational level corresponds roughly to Kooiman’s first-order governing, while the legislative or policy level is somewhat similar to his notion of second-order (institution-building) governing. The meta-governing referenced in Kooiman’s third-order concept of a normative ‘mortar’ seems a

230 Theories of Democratic Network Governance somewhat looser idea than the rule-based constitutional level sketched by Kiser and Ostrom. The two approaches are similarly multilevel, but I employ that by Kiser and Ostrom because its explicitly rule-based institutionalism is clear and offers rather direct links to the game-theoretic perspective developed here. 5. Here and elsewhere, some parallels to the analysis provided by Klijn and Edelenbos (2006) should be evident. In general, their treatment of process management corresponds roughly to the less intrusive forms of metagovernance covered earlier in this chapter. Their explication of institutional design largely fits with this section on changing the game. The current treatment hews more closely to game-theoretic concepts, and thus to the frequently multi-actor aspect of meta-governance. This chapter provides heuristic guidance in identifying the variables and points of leverage, and the chapter by Klijn and Edelenbos probes more deeply the specifics of the managerial moves that may be apropos.

Part IV Democratic Network Governance


13 Theoretical Approaches to Democratic Network Governance Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing

Introduction Governance network theorists have mainly been interested in the role of governance networks in enhancing governance efficiency while less attention has been directed towards the impact of governance networks on democracy. Their reflections about the democratic problems and potentials of governance networks have been relatively brief and sketchy. However, the content of these reflections are highly intriguing as they suggest that while governance networks certainly represent a threat to representative democracy they do not necessarily threat democracy as such. They could become a central building block in the development of new forms of democracy (Goss 2001; Jessop 2000b; Kickert et al. 1997: 174; Pierre & Peters 2000: 67; Rhodes 1997a: 21; Skelcher 2004; Wolf 2002). Bob Jessop (2000b: 17) claims that governance networks might prove valuable as a means of linking different units of democratic governance in the global, polycentric political systems of our time. Rod Rhodes (1997a: 9; 1997b: xiv) suggests that governance networks represent an important functionally organised supplement to the territorially organised institutions of representative democracy. Jan Kooiman (1993: 36; 2000: 143) regards governance networks as a promising way of enhancing the flexibility of democratic institutions in order to increase the adaptability of democracy to the specific characteristics of concrete governance processes. Fritz Scharpf (1999: 18ff) points to governance networks as an important means to increase democratic outcome legitimacy because they increase knowledge exchange and shared understanding between policy makers and stakeholders. As such governance network theorists have opened the door to a complex and radical discussion about the future of democracy and the role 233


that governance networks might play in it. However, as several governance network theorists contend, governance research still needs to take the full step across the doorstep into the realm of democratic thought and address the question of the relationship between governance networks and democracy head on (Rhodes 1997b; Scharpf 1999; Pierre 2000; Peters & Pierre 2000; Mayntz 2003; Skelcher 2004). This part of the book focuses on the democratic problems and potentials of governance networks. In order to reflect on this issue we need to consider more closely what is meant by democracy. Currently, we witness a marked shift in the perception of what democracy is and how it should be institutionalized. As we shall see, this shift can be described as a move from a liberal to a postliberal perception of democracy. Evidently, the assessment of the democratic implications of governance networks depends very much on how democracy is defined. Accordingly, it is necessary to take a closer look at the competing notions of democracy. First, we give a brief outline of the traditional theories of liberal democracy and their interpretations of governance networks. Then follows a description of how four emerging postliberal theories of democracy relate to governance networks. Finally, we analyse the differences and similarities between the old and new theories of democracy and pose three central questions regarding the democratic problems and potentials of governance networks that need to be addressed.

Governance networks and liberal democracy The large and heterogeneous body of literature that theorists on democracy denote liberal theories of democracy (Macpherson 1977; Holden 1993) share the view that democracy can be defined as a political system in which the members of a territorially defined political community – i.e. a nation state – govern themselves either through direct citizen participation or through the election of representatives. One way of obtaining some degree of structure in this complex body of liberal democratic thought is to group the theories according to different criteria. Many such efforts have been made in order to produce clarity, but, as always, with some degree of oversimplification as its price. Knowing that the price of clarity is a loss of detail and complexity, we adopt James G. March and Johan P. Olsen’s (1989: chapter 7) division of liberal theories of democracy into two groups: the predominantly aggregative and the predominantly integrative theories. The common feature of the aggregative theories is that they regard democracy as a way of dividing political power equally among the

Theoretical Approaches to Democratic Network Governance 235

citizens by means of general elections, and a way of ensuring the maximum level of individual liberty by means of various forms of minority protection and a large private sphere. The traditional institutions of representative democracy are expected to produce this political equality and individual liberty. By contrast the integrative theories regard democracy as a means to supplant political battles for power with reasoned deliberation directed towards identification of the common good. Accordingly, the main purpose of democratic institutions is to develop a sense of communality and obligation to act in the interest of the common good among the citizens. The means to do so is intensive citizen participation in the many voluntary organizations, institutions and groups that constitute civil society. Hence, a proper functioning of the traditional institutions of representative democracy calls for a strong civil society that is capable of developing the citizens into democrats that make decisions in the interest of the common good. Although the aggregative and the integrative theories of liberal democracy differ in several respects they share the view that democracy calls for a sharp borderline between state and society: aggregative theories of democracy regard it as a precondition for ensuring an equal distribution of political power in the state as well as for ensuring individual liberty in the private sphere; integrative theories regard it as a means to ensure an autonomous realm of reasoned deliberation that can foster the development of democratic citizens. Seen from the perspective of the theories of liberal democracy the question about the democratic problems and potentials of governance networks is quickly answered: Governance networks represent a threat to democracy because they undermine the borderline between state and society. Aggregative theories of liberal democracy see governance networks as a threat to political equality because they undermine the sovereign position of the elected government and a threat to individual liberty because collective decision-making is spreading into the private sphere. Integrative theories contend that governance networks contribute to expanding the scope of public participation in processes of political decision-making, but stress that networks are more oriented towards the promotion of particularistic interests than on the promotion of the common good of society as such. In so doing, they threaten the development of democratic citizens instead of promoting it. In sum, both aggregative and integrative theories of liberal democracy see governance networks as a danger to democracy. Governance networks might be effective but they are certainly not democratic.


Governance networks and postliberal democracy While a traditional liberal approach to democracy leads to an overly negative evaluation of the democratic problems and potentials of governance networks, a more complex and optimistic view is reached when taking a postliberal approach to democracy (Sørensen & Torfing 2005c: 218). In the last two decades, new theories of democracy have surfaced that in different ways surpass the traditional liberal theories of democracy. They (1) seek to reformulate the basic ontological positions of the aggregative and integrative theories of liberal democracy; (2) renounce the traditional institutions of representative democracy, including its call for a sharp demarcation between state and society; and (3) challenge the idea that democracy is confined to decision making within a given polity. Hence, post-liberal theories of democracy search for new perceptions of democracy, and new institutions of democracy that do not take the existence of a well-defined homogenous nation-state and a sharp demarcation between state and society as their starting point. Postliberal theories of democracy share the ambition of developing such new perceptions and institutions of democracy, but they do so from very different theoretical starting points. As was the case with governance network theory, it is possible to divide the emerging postliberal theories of democracy into four groups according to whether they take departure from a conflict or a coordination approach to governance, and whether they hold a calculation or a culture view of human action. Each of these theoretical approaches to democracy indicates ways in which governance networks could contribute positively to the development of new form of democracy. Below we shall see how. Competitive democracy The competitive theories of democracy share the view that democracy is basically a means of regulating battles for power among self-interested Table 13.1 Four theoretical approaches to postliberal democracy

Conflict

Coordination

Calculation

Culture

Competitive democracy [Etzioni-Halevy 1993; Hirst 2000] Outcome democracy [Fung & Wright 2003; Young 2000]

Agonistic democracy [Connolly 1991, 1995; Mouffe 1993; 2000] Community democracy [March & Olsen 1995; Sandel 1996]


actors with the aggregative theories of liberal democracy, but they reject the idea that it is possible to contain political battles within the realm of the state and the institutions of representative democracy. Among these theorists we find Eva Etzioni-Halevy (1993) who seeks to reformulate traditional democratic elite theory and its call for competition as a means of balancing elite power in a society where semi-public sub-elites play a significant role. Etzioni-Halevy (1993: 53) insists that the core feature of representative democracy is not primarily that it allows the people to appoint and control political elites through elections. All the way back to Charles Montesquieu, representative democracy has been celebrated for its ability to institutionalize competition among autonomous elites, and thereby establish a situation in which various elites within the political system keep each other at bay. Etzioni-Halevy (1993: 53–4) takes a further step in claiming that semi-public sub-elites, such as social movements and other actors placed in the grey zone between the public and the private sphere, can in fact enhance democracy. Hence, they can supplement the horizontal balancing of powers between different political elites and parts of the state apparatus with a vertical balancing of powers between the established elites and subelites. While ordinary people do not have the necessary knowledge and capacity to keep track of the decisions and actions made by the ruling elites, sub-elites have the capacity to ensure public control over the ruling elites between elections. According to Etzioni-Halevy, sub-elites, who have been more or less ignored by traditional elite theory, are not only central to democracy because they increase the pressure on the ruling elites. Sub-elites are also important because they establish an intermediary level between the people and the ruling elites that facilitates mobility between the people and the political elites (Etzioni-Halevy 1993: 194). This level gives citizens an opportunity to play an active role in policy processes without themselves becoming political elites, and it serves as a training ground for the citizens in which they learn to play by the rules that regulate processes of political competition. Paul Hirst (2000) is another important contributor to a postliberal competitive theory of democracy. His associative model of democracy suggests that representative democracy at the national level ought to be supplemented with publicly founded, but relatively self-regulating voluntary associations at the local level that provide a host of public services to the population. The establishment of such self-regulating voluntary associations will increase the vertical balance of power between democracy from above (representative democracy) and democracy from below (self-regulating voluntary associations). The role of the


state will be to define the overall political goals and financial frames within which the voluntary associations operate, while the task of the associations will be to produce public services in competition with one another. Hirst claims that in the world of today, the principle of affectedness must play a vital role in considerations concerning how to ensure equal access to political channels of democratic influence. The equal right to vote in national elections will remain important, but the territorially defined representative democracy must be supplemented with a functionally defined democracy for the affected stakeholders. In such a model of ‘associative democracy’ (Hirst, 1994), the access to channels of influence should be distributed equally, not among all citizens, but among those who are affected by the decisions taken by the local associations. (Hirst 2000: 29). Hirst operates with a number of mediating consociational institutions linking the self-governing associations with each other and with the state. These consociations play a central role in balancing and connecting the local and national levels in the associative model of democracy through a process of negotiated governance (Hirst 2000: 30). The consociation has many of the same characteristics as governance networks, as they link interdependent, but relatively autonomous, actors in an effort to reach solutions to shared problems through horizontal negotiation and mutual coordination. As such, the two contributors to a postliberal theory of competitive democracy mentioned above agree on the need for a vertical balancing of powers between political elites and strong local actors, and an ongoing competition, contestation, and coordination between them. Furthermore, they point to the importance of providing all affected citizens access to channels of influence that supplement those made available by the institutions of representative democracy. Seen from the perspective of the competitive theory of democracy, governance networks might under certain conditions contribute to the strengthening of democracy. First, they could be seen as a way of recruiting, nurturing and organizing political sub-elites. Second, governance networks could function as a stepping-stone that enhances the mobility between political elites and ordinary citizens. Third, they could prove to be a fruitful way of organizing coordination processes among a plurality of autonomous actors and between top-down state rule and bottom-up self-regulation. However, the competitive perspective on democracy also points to a number of potential dangers for democracy when involving networks in


governance processes. Etzioni-Halevy (1993) fears that governance networks between elites and subelites might undermine elite autonomy and elite competition. In addition, she stresses that the informal character of many governance networks is likely to result in a low level of accountability and publicity in the decision-making process. Hirst claims that there is a risk that governance networks might encroach on tasks that are to be dealt with exclusively by the state. These tasks include: (1) the distribution of powers and responsibilities between the national, regional and local governments and civil society; (2) the provision of the main source of internal democratic legitimacy for the citizens; and (3) the establishment of a primary and democratically legitimate actor in the dealings with other nation states and political entities (Hirst 2000: 31). Hence, competitive democracy does not see governance networks as the saviour of democracy: they pose a range of democratic pitfalls, but contrary to liberal theories of democracy, they are also seen as having certain democratic potentials. Outcome democracy A number of postliberal theorists on democracy share the calculus approach to human action with the aggregative theories of democracy, but tend to measure the quality of democratic governance more on its ability to produce desired outcomes through various forms of coordination than on how decision makers are democratically legitimized. Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright (2003) have developed a model of democracy they refer to as ‘Empowered Participatory Governance’ (EPG), which in some respects is inspired by Jürgen Habermas’ deliberative model of democracy. However, while the EPG-model regards deliberation as a core ingredient in a well-functioning democracy, Fung and Wright take a far more pragmatic and praxis-oriented approach to democratic governance than that found in Habermas’ ideal-typical model of deliberative democracy. The guiding principle in the EPG-model is that democratic institutions ought to be judged by their ability to solve policy problems experienced by the people ‘more effectively than alternative institutional arrangements’ (Fung & Wright 2003: 25). Fung and Wright argue that three guidelines are to be followed when designing democratic institutions capable of effectively solving defined problems (Fung & Wright 2003: 16ff). First, democratic governance institutions must be geared to dealing with practical concerns and concrete situations. The suggestion here is that we ought to bid farewell with specific characteristics to the generic image of democratic institutions as permanent entities. Institutions should be designed for concrete situations. Second, the


capacity for effective problem solving is increased if the political process is organized in a manner ensuring the bottom-up participation of the relevant stakeholders. The stakeholders possess valuable insights and a concrete engagement that enhances efficient problem solving and the responsible and engaged implementation of decisions. Third, democratic governance must take place through deliberative problem solving where ‘the participants find reasons that they can accept in collective action’ (Fung & Wright 2003: 17). Deliberation is enhanced in situations in which power is shared among the participants since power sharing contributes to the mutual respect between the participants (Fung & Wright 2003: 23). Conflicts that hamper effective problem solving can be avoided through this form of balanced, or negotiated, deliberation only. Iris Marion Young (2000) is also intensely concerned with the quality of the outcome of democratic governance processes. She is heavily inspired by John Rawls’ claim that democracy ought to be measured in terms of its ability to provide just solutions (Young 2000: 27). Like Rawls, she argues that since there is no common good according to which it is possible to measure whether an outcome is just or not, justice must be ensured procedurally. The outcome of a process of democratic decision-making can be deemed just if: all significantly affected by the problems and their solutions are included in the discussion and decision-making on the basis of equality and non-domination, and if they interact reasonably and constitute a public where people are accountable to one another (Young 2000: 29–30). Hence, the central goal in Young’s efforts to develop democratic institutions is to establish procedures capable of producing just outcomes that is outcomes, which are to an equal extend in the interest, not of all citizens but of the affected by the decision being made. The outcome democracy defined by Fung and Wright and Young point to several ways in which governance networks could enhance democracy. Governance networks tend to follow all of the guidelines advanced by Fung and Wright: they are usually constructed around the solution of specific problems or tasks; they tend to facilitate bottom-up participation; and they provide an arena for negotiated deliberation between autonomous and mutually dependent actors. As such, governance networks contribute to effective policy making and policy outcomes. In so far as governance networks respect the procedural demands


advocated by Marion Young, they will also help to enhance just outcomes. However, outcome democracy also points to a number of potential dangers for democracy connected to the use of governance networks. Young (2000: 52) is worried that situations occur where specific groups of stakeholders are systematically excluded from the governance networks, and that the level of publicity will become too low, while Fung and Wright (2003: 33) point to the danger that a few strong actors will dominate the networks. In addition, Fung and Wright (2003: 21) claim that the establishment of a plurality of self-governing networks might lead to an atomization and fragmentation of the political processes that will make it difficult to ensure a democratic governance of the overall political development of society. However, according to Fung and Wright, the potential dangers for democracy can be avoided through a system of centralized supervision and coordination: Unlike New Left political models in which concerns for liberation lead to demands for autonomous decentralization, empowered participatory governance suggests new forms of coordinated decentralization. Driven by the pragmatic imperative to find solutions that work, these new models reject both democratic centralism and strict decentralization as unworkable (Fung & Wright 2003: 21). This call for centralized supervision is not unlike the demand for meta-governance expressed by many governance network theorists. Community democracy In line with the integrative theories of liberal democracy, the postliberal theories of community democracy maintain that a democratic polity cannot be reduced to a legally defined unity. In a democratic society citizens are linked together by open dialogue and public debate taking departure from a shared sense of connectedness and collective identification. However, the postliberal theories of community democracy reject the idea of a unified democratic community so outspoken in the integrative theories of liberal democracy. The ongoing displacement of political power upwards to inter- and supranational institutions and downwards to local political institutions, voluntary organizations, and private firms has lead to a situation in which the nation state can no longer play the role as the unifying point of identification that defines the group of individuals that belong to a given polis. Moreover, no other


overarching point of collective identification is ready to assume its place. As Michael Sandel states: Since the days of Aristotle’s polis, the republican tradition has viewed self-government as an activity rooted in a particular place, carried out by citizens loyal to that place and the way of life it embodies. Selfgovernment today, however, requires a politics that plays itself out in a multiplicity of settings, from neighbourhoods to nations to the world as a whole. Such a politics requires citizens who can think and act as multi-situated selves. The civic virtue of our time is the capacity to negotiate our way among the sometimes overlapping, sometimes conflicting obligations that claim us, and to live with the tension to which multiple loyalties give rise (Sandel 1996: 350). In a multi-sited governance process of multi-situated selves, we require democratic institutions and norms capable of helping people to navigate within a patchwork of collective identifications and orientations. Postliberal theories of community democracy also relinquish the notion that reasoned debate leads to the identification of an all-embracing common good. Instead, they argue that reasoned debate leads to the construction of shared stories of past, present and future that render meaningful collective behaviour possible (March & Olsen 1995: 63ff; Sandel 1996: 350). Democracy is promoted through the telling of stories that construct democratic rules, norms and logics of appropriateness in and between political communities. Community democracy theorists have also shown an interest in identity formation as a means of enhancing the level of democratic political empowerment among the citizens. Democracy involves the shaping of political capacities and political identities that support a democratic ethos of reciprocity and a high level of political engagement (March & Olsen 1995: 91ff; Sandel 1996: 333). In sum, community democracy renounces the notion that a democratic political process presupposes a unified and homogenous political community; that political engagement is directed towards the promotion of a pre-political common good; and that the development of empowered citizens with a strong sense of communality must necessarily proceed within an autonomous civil society. They perceive the nation state as one out of many competing and overlapping points of political identification, and they regard the establishment of linkages and bridges between political identities, narratives and communities as an important democratic task that postliberal theories of democracy must take into account.


Governance networks might prove to be an important means of establishing such linkages and bridges, as they bring together stakeholders with different points of identification in an autonomous environment, which enhances communication, coordination, negotiation and cooperation between them. Furthermore, governance networks increase public participation and engagement and thereby contribute to the empowerment of citizens. However, governance networks also pose a threat to democracy. First, overlaps and ties between political communities might turn out to be systematically structured in ways that tend to marginalize certain communities and identities. Second, governance networks might empower and engage the few while disempowering and disengaging the many. Third, there is a danger that the loosely coupled nature of governance networks will prevent the development of a point of identification and orientation in the governance networks that makes them capable of working towards a shared objective. Agonistic democracy Finally, one can identify the emergence of a group of postliberal theories of agonistic democracy. These theories combine a conflict perspective of democracy with a cultural understanding of the nature of human action. Like the aggregative theories of liberal democracy they regard democracy as a way of regulating political conflicts while rejecting the idea that actors are basically driven by rational calculations of costs and benefits of alternative forms of action. Instead, they combine the conflict approach to democracy with an integrative understanding of subjectivity as an outcome of social processes of identity formation that are shaped by contingent hegemonic articulations. Agonistic theories of democracy claim that traditional theories of liberal democracy have overly focussed on the regulation of the three faces of power: direct power through decision-making, indirect power through non-decision-making, and ideological power through the shaping of other actors’ perceptions. But they have ignored the question of how discursive power that constructs the actors’ identity, world view and scope for legitimate action can be democratically regulated. The key questions raised by these theorists concern how individuals discursively construct themselves and others as democratic actors; how the best conditions for discursive contestation are created, and how discursive images of the polity and the political issues at stake produce patterns of inclusion and exclusion (Mouffe 1993, 2000b; Connolly 1995).


William Connolly (1991) and Chantal Mouffe (1993) argue that the core objective of democracy is to facilitate an ongoing discursive contestation. Politics consists of battles between competing discursive images of society, its borders, and the identity of those inhabiting it. One of the key objectives for theories of democracy is to consider how these battles are to be democratically regulated. Connolly (1991) and later Mouffe (1993) argue that the principal democratic task consists in transforming antagonistic friend-enemy relations into agonistic relations, whereby people disagree on substantial and procedural issues but respect one another’s right to voice dissimilar opinions. In Mouffe’s words: ‘the aim of democratic politics is to construct the “them” in such a way that it is no longer perceived as an enemy to be destroyed, but as an “adversary”, that is, somebody whose ideas we combat but whose right to defend those ideas we do not put into question’ (Mouffe 2000b: 101–2). Therefore, democracy’s worst enemy is essentialist beliefs that stipulate the existence of a pre-political common good. Such beliefs might serve to legitimize efforts to remove democracy and establish a totalitarian regime in situations where the outcome of a democratically regulated political process does not realize that which a minority defines as the common good. The best protection against totalitarianism is the recognition of the political, and therefore contingent, character of the common good. In line with this argument for the primacy of politics, agonistic theories of democracy emphasize the political character and effects of the constitution and demarcation of the polity. The tendency in traditional theories of liberal democracy to regard the polity as a pre-political entity means that the political patterns of inclusion and exclusion it establishes tend to become invisible, and thus escape political contestation and democratic regulation. This is problematic because the scope of the polity has severe political implications not least through the patterns of inclusion and exclusion it installs (Connolly 1995: 135ff). The theories of agonistic democracy open up for different ways in which governance networks can contribute positively to democracy. First, governance networks might widen the scope of discursive contestation because they involve a plurality of public and private actors in the governance process. New actors obtain a platform through which they can raise their voice and claim to be heard. Second, network governance promotes a politization of the construction of the polity because the construction of governance networks takes place as an integrated part of the policy process. Hence, patterns of inclusion and exclusion and the constitutional rules that regulate networks are settled not in advance but as an integrated part


of the policy processes within the networks. Finally, the fact that governance networks are held together by relations of interdependency enforces a negotiation process that may help to transform antagonistic relations into agonistic ones. Negotiation processes force hostile actors to communicate and thus to get a better and more nuanced image of each other. However, agonistic democracy also points to ways in which governance networks might undermine democracy. The overall worry concerns the danger that governance networks integrate the network actors to an extent that does not only lead to a transformation of antagonism into agonism, but transforms agonistic disputes into rational technocratic problem-solving discourses that evaporate any chances of democratic contestation from competing discourses.

Similarities and differences between the theories Each of the postliberal theories of democracy points to ways in which governance networks might contribute to enhancing democracy in a society that becomes increasingly multi-levelled and multi-centred. Governance networks provide a means to increase the flexibility of our democratic institutions and to increase the number of citizens who participate actively in processes of political decision-making. Postliberal theories furthermore agree that governance networks cannot stand alone. They should rather be seen as a supplement to the traditional institutions of representative democracy and thus as making way for the development of a political system that combines territorially and functionally organised democratic institutions. One of the specific tasks of the institutions of representative democracy is, as argued by Hirst and by Fung and Wright, to regulate governance networks and the relationship between them in order to enhance their democratic qualities and avoid the democratic dangers that they contain. Hence, the democratic potentials of governance networks are not harvested automatically, but must be nurtured through a deliberate effort to regulate them through various forms of metagovernance. While the postliberal theories of democracy agree that governance networks bring with them a number of potential problems for democracy, they tend to focus on different problems. Young and Sandel argue that governance networks might result in a systematic exclusion of specific groups of stakeholders and particular political identities while including others. This might result in a situation where a number of citizens are excluded from participating in networks and thus from exercising influence on decisions that affect them.


Other postliberal theorists are more worried about the democratic quality of the decision-making processes within networks once they are formed. Hence, Fung and Wright argue that there is a risk that strong network actors dominate the network processes. March and Olsen on their side question the extent to which network actors reach a level of integration that makes them able to develop a common point of identification and orientation. Etzioni-Halevy, Mouffe and Connolly have the opposite concern, namely that the network actors establish so strong a hegemony that little space is left for discursive contestation and openness. Finally, Etzioni-Halevy and Young are worried that the informality of governance networks might make it difficult to ensure the level of publicity regarding the governance networks, which is necessary in order to ensure their democratic accountability.

Where to go from here? It should now be clear that taking departure form a liberal approach to democracy leads to the conclusion that democracy is threatened by governance networks because they undermine representative democracy. However, seen from a postliberal approach to democracy one reaches a much more complex conclusion. Governance networks contribute in various ways to enhancing democracy but they also raise serious problems that must be dealt with. With reference to the postliberal theories of democracy, at least three questions must be answered if governance networks are to become a positive contribution to democracy: 1. how can it be ensured that all affected are allowed the access to participate in governance networks?; 2. how can it be ensured that network actors participate in the networks on equal terms, and develop a collective orientation, and that the networks allow for discursive contestation and openness between network actors and networks; and 3. how can publicity be promoted in and around governance networks in order to ensure democratic accountability. These problems will be addressed in the next chapters.

14 Governance Networks and Participation Allan Dreyer Hansen

In this chapter we shall take a closer look at governance networks from the perspective of participatory theories of democracy. The aim is twofold: First, to contribute to the overall debate regarding the democratic legitimacy of governance networks. What are their potentials and shortcomings when viewed in light of participation? Second, the aim is to specify and reformulate the participatory tradition in ways that help specify concrete analyses of the democratic quality of governance networks. The second aim occupies most of the space in the article on the grounds that it is very difficult to assess the general democratic standing of governance networks. It is not possible to deduce the democratic quality of governance networks from the concept itself, neither with negative or positive conclusions. Even though certain (probably) widespread features of governance networks – such as the limited access and absence of publicity around them – are definitely not democratic, such features are not inherent to the notion of network, as such (which some positive experiences also suggest).1 Moreover, even if they are not completely outweighed, then they are at least partially countered by other aspects contributing to the advance of democracy. Any serious encounter must be more specific, posing questions of a more detailed character than simply whether network governance is democratic or not. Such questions should focus on the extent to which governance networks live up to a different, more precisely specified participatory norm. The participatory tradition includes internationally established authors such as Carole Pateman (1970), C.B. Macpherson (1977), Benjamin Barber (1984), as well as the somewhat less renowned Danish theorist Hal Koch (1981 (1946)). The term ‘participatory’ was first coined by Arnold Kaufmann in 1970 (Cunningham 2002: 123), but as the inclusion of Koch indicates, this way of thinking has roots from well 247


before the 1970s and stretching back to the civic republican tradition headed by Jean Jacques Rousseau (Cunningham 2002: 123f). The participatory tradition can be understood to consist of three different but interrelated claims, namely that democracy is something to be learned; that it involves equality among citizens; and finally, that the results of democratic processes promoting widespread civil participation lead to the realization of some kind of a common good. As Pateman states, ‘In the participatory theory “participation” refers to (equal) participation in the making of decisions, and “political equality” refers to equality of power in determining the outcome of decisions … [T]he justification for a democratic system … rests primarily on the human results that accrue from the participatory process’ (Pateman 1970: 43). Participatory theory claims that participation can reduce problems such as apathy among the citizenry and their general orientation towards particular interests as often claimed by so-called realists (Schumpeter 1976 (1943)). As Barber writes, ‘people are apathetic, because they are powerless, not powerless because they are apathetic’ (Barber 1984: 272). This leads to a claim that democratic participation ought to be broadened to as many social spheres as possible; it should not be restricted to the state or the parliament. This positive valorisation of participation speaks in favour of governance networks, because they blur the sharp distinction between state and civil society by bringing together representatives from both public and ‘private’ organizations in efforts to govern society. However, the participatory tradition has linked the norms of equality and democratic learning to the notion of the promotion of a ‘common good’ (in the singular) defined through consensus as the overall purpose of democracy (I substantiate this claim in the next section). This demand could easily make most governance networks problematic due to their narrow scopes and aims. The aim of this chapter is to argue that the notion of a ‘substantial’ common good inherent to democracy can not be maintained.2 This does not invalidate all claims made by the participatory tradition, as such; rather, it necessitates their reformulation. Moreover, a problematization of an ideal of a singular common good allows for consideration of the democratic potentials and problems of governance networks, opening a potential space for positive effects in spite of their narrow perspective. Since the meaning of the common good has direct impact on the articulation of the other norms, the article starts here. The next section presents the norm or principle of learning, which I argue must be parted into two subfields, namely learning the skills of democracy and acquiring

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a democratic ethos of ‘listening to the other’. I then discuss the possibility of reformulating the principle of equality. This discussion includes two considerations: that of equality in terms of access (by the affected) to networks and that of equality among the participants ‘within’ a network. Each section concludes with a discussion of how these norms may be utilized in concrete analysis, as well as of how governance networks can generally be assumed to meet the different democratic norms. The article concludes with a number of general considerations regarding governance networks when viewed from the perspective of participation.

The common good The idea of a common good plays a central role in the tradition of participatory democracy. As Pateman states, through ‘the participatory situation … each independent but interdependent individual is “forced” to appreciate that there is only one right answer, to apply the word “each” to himself’ (Pateman 1970: 24). Hal Koch (Koch 1981 (1946)),3 makes the same type of claims when arguing that ‘the essence of democracy is not the vote, but the dialogue, the negotiation, the mutual respect and the sense of the general interest, that grows from it’ (23) and further, that the democratic task is to ‘find the right solution to the conflicts’ (27), where both the general interest and the right solution is in the singular. Even Benjamin Barber, who explicitly distances himself from a ‘unitary democracy’ (being kept together by pre-political ties) and its ‘substantive consensus’, maintains that ‘a strong democracy’ must be able to transform conflicts into ‘creative consensus’ (Barber 1984: 9).4 The question is how literally such statements are to be taken. Most participatory theorists would likely introduce a set of qualifications stating that the common good cannot be reached, as such, but that participation would help citizens to move in that direction without ever actually reaching it.5 However, my contention is that consensus has represented an ideal for the participatory tradition and that the ideal of consensus can be perceived as a democratic ideal of identifying one common good present underneath actual democratic processes and functioning as a (counterfactual but still present) aim that the participatory processes should strive for and be evaluated against. The problem of the idea of a common good in the singular is that it gives the impression that the extent to which a process can be viewed as democratically healthy depends upon its ability to produce one (and only one) result. When Pateman argues with Rousseau that there is only one right answer


(resulting from the ability of seeing one self as ‘each’), this positions the researcher as one who can judge the pertinence of the process by examining its outcome. One would have to decide on what the right answer in a particular situation is, and then judge the distance from the actual results. My claim is that a reformulated participatory theory of democracy should instead be grounded in the notion that democracy involves power, politics and conflict, and that the formulation of a universal common good in the traditional meaning of the phrase is ultimately unsustainable (see Mouffe 1992). Unanimity and consensus is not only unlikely, but actually democratically undesirable (Laclau 1996a; Laclau 2001). Stated succinctly, the reason for this is a radical pluralism characterizing the modern world, that is, a pluralism that does not render the disappearance of differences in identities and interests a likely scenario. A non-exclusionary consensus of the common good is simply not perceivable. Rather than hiding exclusions behind a claim of consensus of the common good, democracy consists of keeping the exclusionary moments open, making them possible arenas of renewed democratic struggle (Mouffe 2000b). But does this mean that the very notion of a common good must be abandoned? I do not think so, nonetheless, the common good must be reformulated as regards the procedures and ethos supporting democratic politics. The common good is not a matter of the existence of one just result, but rather democracy itself: allowing all parties and interests to have a say in the democratic struggles and accepting all democratic positions as legitimate opponents or ‘adversaries’ in ongoing ‘agonistic’ struggles and exchanges (Connolly 1995; Mouffe 2000a, b; Mouffe 2000). There can be no democracy without some notion of a common good; however, the point is that the common good remains empty and contested (Mouffe 2000b). Participants might well agree that they are aiming for just results (as Iris, e.g. Marion Young suggests [Young 2000: 50]). The problem is that they are most likely to disagree on what that means should be in a given situation. Decisions and (temporary) exclusions (of points of view) are therefore here to stay – also within processes that meet democratic standards. As regards governance networks, this reformulation of the notion of a common good raises two questions: first, one must consider the extent to which a governance network functions according to a democratic ethos, that is, accepting democratic rules of the game, including a willingness to listen to the other, equality amongst members, and so forth. I return to this question later in the discussion of learning. Second, one must


consider the fact that even though the notion of a substantial common good (that is, actual unanimous agreement on decisions) is abandoned as a desirable outcome of any political process, one ought to continue to engage in more substantial questions regarding the way the participants argue their case. Hence, a democratic ethos demands that the network participants are willing to argue their case with reference to a broader perspective than that of their own particular interests. When evaluating the democratic quality of concrete governance networks, one must then look for forms of argumentation that establish links between particular points of view and the wider interests of the society in which the network is a part. Such interests could include that of justice and defending the weak, or at least the concrete aims of the network as something that goes beyond the spontaneous interests of the different members. These higher principles (as well as the aims of the network) are ultimately ‘empty signifiers’ and the links established with them by the network members are of a hegemonic kind (Laclau 1996b). That which makes such battles democratic is exactly the acceptance by the participants that any such link is temporary in nature and can legitimately be contested. If we accept such a reformulation of the common good, how do governance networks then fare? In the first place, such a move appears to be a prerequisite of the very possibility of judging governance networks democratic at all. Since most governance networks are formed in order to pursue narrow objectives, they will rarely serve a common good in any strong sense. It is only to the extent that we accept that democracy cannot be about the realization of any substantial common good that governance networks can be thought to make a positive contribution to democracy. This does not imply that any governance network is functioning in ways that are democratically legitimate. Rather, it means that what is required are concrete analyses of how individual networks function in practise in order to measure their democratic quality. What must be analyzed is the extent to which the network takes broader societal aims into consideration or reflects on its own (possible) ‘externalities’ and the like (which many networks probably do not). If such forms of argumentation and consideration can be traced, it indicates the working of a norm of a (de-universalised) common good and ought to be read as something positive in terms of democracy.

Learning democracy As mentioned above, the participatory tradition regards learning as a central contribution of democratic participation. In Pateman’s words,


‘the major function of participation … is therefore an educative one, educative in the very widest sense, including both the psychological aspect and the gaining of practise in democratic skills and procedures’ (Pateman 1970: 42).6 The argument is based on the persistent (and convincing) claim that democracy is not something naturally given, but represents a set of practises and identities that must be acquired, learned and re-learned. I take this argument to point to a central aspect of democracy, but in need of considerable reformulation in the light of the above-presented claim for a de-universalization of the notion of a common good. Acquiring democratic skills through participation is a classic idea in participatory democracy (Macpherson 1977). In order to function in a decision-making context, one requires an array of skills: the ability to form an opinion; capacity to determine and defend one’s interests; ability to state an opinion; experience with participation in meetings; the ability to make public statements and take issues to the vote; and so forth. All of these skills remain pertinent, and governance networks should also be assessed according to the degree to which they promote such learning and ‘democratic empowerment’. Since governance networks often provide opportunity for participation to actors who are not trained politicians, this is the point where they have one of their strongest democratic potentials. Changing identities and listening to the other However, acquiring the practical skills is only one part of the story. A learning process also affects the participants’ ‘psychological aspects’, in Pateman’s words, or, as I choose to call it, their ‘democratic ethos’. Development of a democratic ethos will reveal itself in the form of changes taking place in the participants, regarding their interests, their identities and their views. The problem with the defined goal of such changes as defined in the participatory tradition is that it was directed towards the identification of a predefined substantial common good. This would lead the researcher to raise inquiry as regards the extent to which psychological changes moved in the desired direction or not. If not, or if not to a sufficient degree, it could be concluded that the process has not realised (all) it’s democratic potentials, and could be so criticised. In the absence of such a ‘the only one right answer’-standard for measuring the democratic impact of democratic learning in governance networks, things become slightly more complicated. Changes of points of views and identities are still appreciated to be seen as central to


democracy. As Connolly puts it, ‘[d]emocratic politics, then, is probably the site of a tension or productive ambiguity between governance and disturbance of naturalized identities. It thrives only while this tension is kept alive’ (Connolly 1993: 208). Based on the thesis that all identity is ultimately contingent, what we should appreciate about democracy is not merely its capacity to produce ‘governance’, that is, the actual decisions and results. The very disturbance of ‘naturalized identities’ resulting from the interaction with others having different interests and perspectives (might) lead to (greater) awareness of one’s own contingency and therefore a greater acceptance of others. Rather than looking for changes in the involved participants’ identities that are in accordance with a pre-established ‘correct answer’, one ought to be sensitive to changes in democratic identities that move towards an increased acceptance of the contingency of one’s own perception of the common good, and hence an increased acceptance of different views. Even though such democratic standards are difficult to measure, they ought to be taken as signs of participatory democracy working well. Of course not all changes bear witness to ‘a learning democracy’, just as the absence of such change does not necessarily point to a lack of democracy. In judging which does and which does not, the analysis must refrain from stating a substantial common good to judge the registered changes against. The failure of a given process to lead to what the researcher (or single parties within the process) perceive to be the common good is not a proof of it’s undemocratic form. Decisions involve excluding certain interests and points of views, and presumably the parties holding the excluded views do not experience the decision as rational or in accordance with the common good. Rather than directing the analysis towards substantial outcomes of the processes, one should focus on some of the aspects of the process leading up to the decision making into account, the democratic ethos. Participants of course have a legitimate right to stick to their points of view and well established identities. What should be demanded is, first, that the participants accept the possibility of loosing, but of course with the right to keep fighting for their beliefs; and second, that the participants are willing to listen to each other. Even though change is merely a likely – as opposed to a necessary – outcome of a democratic process, the elements making such change possible are something that must be part of any democratic process. For a process to be democratic, all points of view should be made clear, and the participants should be willing to listen to each other, rather than forcing one’s will trough. This is what I refer to as ‘a democratic ethos’.


Participants actually persuading one another can hardly be a democratic demand, and many issues cannot be settled in agreement; however, to be democratic, a (deliberative) process of stating points of view and listening to the others should precede decision-making. When analyzing concrete governance networks, attention should then be paid to the degree to which all of the affected parties are heard and are able to influence the setting of the agenda and the degree to which others are willing to listen and take different views into consideration. This focus in the participatory tradition on equal access and the debate of all points of view is of great importance for democracy, but it should be stressed that consensus cannot be elevated to a sign of a well-functioning democracy. In concrete empirical analysis, it is difficult to measure the willingness to listen to one another in a given network. The proof of one’s willingness to listen cannot be measured by the degree to which one changes one’s mind, since that is not the necessary outcome of a democratic process. Subsequent to thorough consideration, one might choose to maintain one’s original view. So the proof of the willingness to listen cannot be applied in terms of signs of change in the involved participants. Accordingly, this standard remains a somewhat ‘fluffy’ demand, probably only open to highly interpretative forms of judgement and analysis: is it the overall impression that there is a culture of debate and mutual acceptance? One might seek insights of this nature, either by observations of networks ‘in action’ or through interviews. Group interviews will likely be revealing, but individual qualitative interviews can also help highlight this aspect (Hansen et al. 2006; Sørensen and Damgård 2006). Learning democracy and governance networks Learning democracy and listening to the other are probably the democratic norms established by the participatory tradition according to which governance networks are most likely to score well. Obviously there are no guarantees, but since networks often include actors from outside the established set of political actors, such networks are likely to increase the democratic learning of those involved.7 However, such positive ‘internal’ processes might be countered by other aspects of governance networks, such as the patterns of exclusion they bring with them. This is the topic for the next section.

Equality Equality is one of the basic norms in the participatory tradition. For example, Pateman terms ‘full participation’ the situation in which ‘each


individual member has equal power to determine the outcome of decisions’ (Pateman 1970: 71). Efforts to ensure equality raise two problems, each significant for governance networks. The first is the question of how to ensure equal access to participation in decision-making bodies, which is the general problem of inclusion. The second problem concerns ensuring equality between the members within decision-making bodies, in this case governance networks. Access to/inclusion in networks According to the participatory tradition, in order to ensure equal access, participation must be widespread, something close to ‘full participation’ or participation by all. Not necessarily participation everywhere, all the time, but in order to lead to the desired goals of learning and deliberation, a significant number of the citizens must participate. However, the ideal of ‘full participation’ has met substantial criticism8 and is indeed difficult to imagine in a contemporary differentiated mass society. How could such a society function if based on active participation by all citizens? Equal participation must be reformulated, and Iris Marion Young’s work represents an effort to redefine the participatory claim of the full access of all in a manner that might apply to the question of how to evaluate patterns of inclusion and exclusion in governance networks (2000). Young formulates the problem of equality in terms of the inclusion of the affected: ‘A democratic decision is normatively legitimate only if all those affected by it are included in the process of discussion and decision making’ (Young 2000: 23). Governance networks often have a narrow functional scope that would quickly be at odds with a claim of ‘full participation by all’. Young makes it possible to rearticulate the logic of equality in a manner rendering it more sensible to the way governance networks function: access ought to be granted to all of the affected, not to all citizens. It does not follow, however, that governance networks actually do meet Young’s norm of inclusion of the affected, but this way of posing the question makes engaging in concrete analysis much more productive.9 When dealing with the notion of ‘inclusion of the affected’, however, two problems must be taken into account. First, we must consider how it is determined who the affected are. This is not an easy task: in one way or another, we are all more or less affected by most of the decisions made somewhere in the world. If we were to follow the consequences of this point, Young’s reformulation would not really help us formulate criteria for equal network participation. Her answer to this problem is to state that one should be ‘significantly’ affected, that is, ‘that decisions and


policies significantly condition a person’s options for actions’ (ibid.). While this qualification does help somewhat, it merely displaces the same problem. Whose conditions are significantly affected remains an open question, and with it, who should therefore be included in the decisionmaking process.10 The notion of ensuring the inclusion of the significantly affected generally points to the problem of representation in, and publicity around, governance networks. These are serious democratic questions; however, they lead to some extent outside of the participatory tradition. I shall therefore return to them towards the end of this article. What we must consider at this point is how to approach the idea of the inclusion of the significantly affected in concrete analyses of governance networks. First, one ought to attempt to establish whether different actors themselves believe that they are affected – but not included – in the network. If this is the case, if there are explicit criticisms of exclusion in the field under study, the conclusion is rather straightforward: in such cases, the network does not meet the participatory standard of inclusion. Often, however, one might be facing a situation without explicit criticism of exclusion. In the case in which people are well aware of the network and its effects for them – but simply choose not to participate – this absence of participation cannot be regarded as democratically illegitimate exclusion. What matters here is whether the choice to participate or not is an ‘empowered one’, that is, based on an actual opportunity to be included. There are two basic forms of being disempowered vis-à-vis governance networks. First one might be unaware of the existence of the network. If such unawareness is caused by lack of public information about it, it might effectively mean that all those affected by it, are disempowered. Even in situations where not all affected are ‘disempowered by unawareness’, lack of publicity around the networks is definitely an undemocratic trait. Secondly, affected actors might be aware of the network, but are unable to influence it. This might be due to a more general lack of resources, including of course the case where one due to a relatively weak position one is unaware of the existence of the network. In both cases the networks fail to live up to the norm of equality. When doing concrete analysis, it will often be difficult to judge whether lack of influence are caused by undemocratic disempowerment. Evaluation must rely on concrete judgements from case to case. However, it is important to keep in mind that absence of participation is not in itself necessarily a sign of democratic illegitimacy. As long as the choice not to participate is an empowered one, there is nothing undemocratic


about it. It is simply a result of the high number of potential channels of influence facing us all in modern societies. Equality within networks The second part of the norm of equality regards the processes transpiring within the governance network, that is, the relations between its members. Equality among the participants within decision-making bodies are often pointed to as one of the (potentially) democratic aspects of governance networks, since members of networks are said to be in a less hierarchical relationship than is (often) the case in institutions of representative democracy. Networks are said to be linked together by the interdependence of the members rather than by formal rules. Even though the relationships between the participants might be less hierarchical in a traditional sense, it might be assumed that asymmetries in resources among the participants might produce asymmetric patterns of influence within a network. There will undoubtedly always be asymmetry in the distribution of resources. There will always be imbalances, and the interesting problem is to what extent such imbalances overlap, creating more less systematic inequality in resources and influence. Rather than demanding strict equality (which is in all circumstances impossible), critical assessment should raise inquiry as to the degree to which asymmetries in the patterns of interdependencies within a governance network lead to significant differences in influence.11 Equality and governance networks Governance networks hold a mixed relation to the norm of equality. To a certain extent, easy access or broad inclusion could be said to run contrary to the ‘purpose’ or reasons for the formation of most networks, that is, most problem solving calls for limited participation. I take it that most governance networks are not ‘spontaneously participatory’, but rather rest on (often unclear) forms of representation (see Esmark’s contribution to this volume). There might well be networks that are relatively open to broad participation (as in the city renewal programme mentioned earlier), but such networks tend to be a minority. Viewed from the perspective of the participatory tradition, this is obviously a shortcoming. If limited participation is the result of empowered decisions by the affected, this is not a democratic problem; however, if it is the result of the exclusionary manner of functioning in the network and/or a lack of publicity surrounding the networks, this is quite


problematic from any democratic point of view, and highly so in the participatory perspective. If we turn to the processes inside the networks, we might expect them to fare better. Networks are founded on interdependence between the members, but even though the interdependence probably rules out cases of complete dominance by some members over others, equality between them, on the other hand, cannot be taken for granted. In relation to differences in resources, the answer must also be concrete analysis asking questions in terms of degrees: to what extent does this network live up to the standards of inclusion? To what extent do the differences in resources lead to undemocratic differences in influences?

Conclusion I have specified three norms of participation in this article that can be utilized in the concrete analysis of networks within a de-universalised, re-articulated version of the participatory tradition: aiming for something common; learning democracy in terms of rules and practises and of a democratic ethos; and equality as the inclusion of the affected in governance networks and as relatively equal patterns of influence between the members of the networks. Even though they have been disarticulated from their original framework of consensus around a substantial common good, these norms remain essential to democracy. Moving beyond the traditional participatory perspective, such a framework has two major consequences for the study of governance networks. In the first place, it generally makes it meaningful to investigate the democratic quality of concrete networks. Raising the traditional universalistic claims to networks would presumably render them illegitimate from the outset. Secondly, it changes the way in which one questions the democratic legitimacy of governance networks. Instead of asking whether networks are legitimate or not, one poses questions about the extent to which they function in accordance with the different norms from the participatory tradition. Obviously such questions can only be answered in concrete analyses of governance networks and will probably turn out to be quite a complicated matter involving a set of pro et contras. One set of problems that will conceivably turn up in such analyses is the extent to which the weakness of one or more of the principles might be cured by the strength of one or more of the others. Even though it is not necessarily so, it appears likely that networks scoring high on the principles of participation do so in terms of ‘learning’ democracy, that


is, on empowering the members and providing forums that promote willingness to listen and mutual respect due to the existence of (although of the asymmetrical) interdependencies between the network members. In many cases, however, these positive sides are likely to be countered by unequal patterns of access (strongly limited inclusion in) the network and/or highly limited publicity around the decisionmaking processes (Pedersen et al. 1994). This is not an unlikely scenario and raises the question as to whether the norm of learning democracy might weigh more than the norm of equal inclusion. Even though democratic norms can be achieved to a greater or lesser degree, I find it difficult to see how even the most empowering network relations can compensate for a lack of equal access of the affected to participate in governance networks. However, broader means of providing access or inclusion than those traditionally pointed out by the participatory tradition must be considered. As I have briefly outlined in the above, democratic inclusion does not necessarily involve active participation, but rather an informed or empowered choice. Obviously, a central precondition for such an empowered choice is the presence of publicity in and around governance networks. It is only possible to form an empowered choice to the extent that the affected know what is going on in and around the networks. It is not difficult to understand why the participatory tradition has not really placed emphasis on publicity. Publicity appears as a prerequisite only in the case of representation, making a distinction between representing and the represented. This distinction is ultimately what the participatory tradition attempts to do away with, and therefore publicity is not really required. However, modern democracy in general – and governance networks in particular – is, as pointed out by Esmark, of a representative nature. It is therefore pertinent to ask whether governance networks require representative forms of appointment, such as voting and the like. Not providing a conclusive answer to this question, it is worth emphasizing that publicity is a necessary prerequisite for representative democracy as well as for participatory democracy; without that, not even the best ‘learning processes’ within the governance networks qualify them as democratic.

Notes 1. One example is the Danish ‘city renewal programme’, explicitly trying to establish network politics in order for the renewal (better) to meet the interests and expectations of the inhabitants. The democratic merits of these


2.

3. 4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

experiments were to a large extent based on the absence of formal rules of access, forms of decision making etc. (Bang and Hansen 2005). A critique of a substantial common good opens the question whether the position adopted in this chapter is a procedural one? The answer to that question is affirmative if by procedural we only mean that democracy (even in principle) is unable to lead to only one correct ‘substantial’ answer. The answer is in the negative, if procedural is taken in any strong sense, simply because to agree on a set of procedures requires a whole set of substantial agreements as well. Agreements on procedures cannot be established strictly procedurally. My position is not strictly anti-consensual, but rather accepts Chantal Mouffe’s argument that democracy needs consensus on the ‘rules of the games’. But firstly, such a consensus cannot be ‘universal’, but will always be established through exclusions; secondly, it will always give rise to a set of plural or particular interpretations, leading to quite diverse ‘substantial’ outcomes (Mouffe 1993). All translations of Hal Koch are my own, ADH. Cf. Macpherson who talks about the demising room for compromise as a prerequisite of participatory democracy (Macpherson 1977: 114). See David Held for a general critique of the idea of ‘the end of politics (Held 1987: 105f). Though not all. E.g. Iris Marion Young states that ‘knowing that they are answerable to others, and that they are mutually committed to reach agreement, means that each understands that his or hers best interests will be served by aiming for a just result’ (Young 2000: 50 italics added). She also criticises the aggregative model for being ‘sceptical about the possibility of normative and evaluative objectivity’ (ibid. 21). Cf. Pateman’s analysis of the notion of Rousseau’s notion ‘forced to be free’, as pointed out by Cunningham. Pateman interprets this as ‘the strength to look to the common good’ (rather than something one is ‘forced to’) gradually brought about through the participatory process’ (Cunningham 2002: 132). Jon Elster has criticised a position that claims that the primary aim of participation is the educative one, i.e. the process itself (Elster 1983). His point is that learning democracy is necessarily a bi-product (Elster 1985), something that can only be achieved to the extent that it is not seen as the primary purpose of the action: we do not learn democracy if we participate with the intention of learning – we only learn it if we participate with the intention of making politics, decisions etc. Even though some proponents of participation definitely are struck by his critique I think that Pateman (mostly) avoids it. C.f. her criticism of J. S. Mill (1991 [1861]), that exactly connects influence and power to learning (Pateman 1970: 33). In a Danish context this was also some of the conclusions from a large project on ‘democracy from below’ (in which the concept of democratic empowerment is also developed). C.f. (Bang, Hansen et al. 2000; and Sørensen and Torfing 2000). C.f. from an otherwise sympathetic position, Walzer (1989). It should be noted that both Pateman and Macpherson are aware of the impossibility of ‘full participation’ in modern complex societies (Pateman 1970; Macpherson 1977: cp. 4).

Governance Networks and Participation 261 9. Young’s focus on the affected are also productive beyond the focus on governance networks, since it opens the possibility of moving beyond the boundaries of nation states that (so far) constitute citizenship, raising issues of democracy across formal divides of ‘demoi’ as Bohman puts it (Bohman 2005). 10. In the final analysis such determinations are undecidable, and as such decisions involving exclusions. This makes them strictly political, something that Young does not pay sufficient attention to. However, this does not change the potential productivity of the concept in concrete analysis. It only makes the political aspects of such analysis themselves more obvious. 11. One should bear in mind that the participatory tradition never really it self has come to terms with the presumably high demands placed on participants in terms of what Young calls ‘articulatedness’ which in case of its generalisation, itself would lead to exclusion (Young 2000: 37f).

15 Networks and Democratic Ideals: Equality, Freedom, and Communication1 John S. Dryzek

Democratic theory has historically proceeded under the assumption that the proper – and perhaps exclusive – locus of political authority is the sovereign state claiming exclusive political authority over a defined territory and population. A well-defined demos can therefore accompany the sovereign state, with a claim to popular control over policy decisions that is fairly straightforward – at least in theory, if rarely in practice. The democratic ideal of political equality can then be defined in terms of the equal capacity of all citizens in the demos to exercise control over policy decisions. Additionally, state democracy in practice is almost always liberal democracy. And liberal democratic theorists can specify a number of rights – freedom of thought, expression, association, and assembly, more controversially rights to private property and subsistence – necessary to make such a system work.2 Public authority so constructed constitutes a relatively neat package. Those wedded to such a picture greet any departure with horror. So for example Lowi (1999) condemns the cooperative environmental governance applauded by Sabel et al. (1999) as an abdication of public authority that allows stakeholders to generate outcomes that suit themselves – but at the expense of a public interest properly defined at the highest levels of state government. Governance networks (as defined in Chapter 1) complicate this neat picture of public authority quite substantially. Networks can be generalpurpose, but often they are issue-specific, often informal, occasionally transnational. But if they are consequential, then like all sources of authority in today’s world their legitimacy ought to rest on their democratic qualities. So the question asked in this chapter is: can the key (liberal) democratic ideals of popular control, political equality, and rights to basic political liberties be redeemed in the context of governance 262

Networks and Democratic Ideals 263

networks? The simple answer is ‘no’. I will outline the reasons for this simple answer, then proceed to a cautious ‘maybe’. But what the rise of governance networks ultimately demands is a conversation with democratic theory about what democracy can and should mean (though not, I hasten to add, any new model of democracy; there are already too many models of democracy).

Applying the standard democratic principles to networks ‘Political equality’ is on the face of it hard to operationalize in a network. Equality as an ideal is contested within democratic theory, but most conceptions of political equality define it in terms of citizens’ proper positions in relation to the construction of sovereign authority: citizens stand formally equal before this authority, even if they are unequal in material endowments. Equality is a crucial aspect of democracy largely because individuals cannot easily exit the state; given that the state looms large and inescapable in the lives of members of the demos, the democratic ideal demands that they have equal capacity to influence what it does to them. (Of course, the state does different things to different people, so in practice the pursuit of equality will often have to be issue-specific.) Networks generally do not loom so large, and it may be possible to escape the consequences of their decisions. Individuals can choose to exit networks in relatively costless fashion. They can less easily choose to exit the state, except by emigration, and even if they turn their back on the state, it is likely to retain a very strong interest in them. Political equality as an ideal is less compelling in voluntary associations in which individuals are mostly only part-time participants. ‘Popular control’ would normally be operationalized as the degree to which policy decisions are responsive to the informed wishes of citizens assembled in the demos. But in a network there is no single demos. Networks may produce outcomes that apply to a demos as conventionally defined (coterminous with the state). Or their outcomes may apply to a subset of the members of the demos; or apply to multiple demoi across state boundaries. Applying conventional notions of popular control over networks would imply their complete subordination to the state, such that popular control could be exercised at one remove. Democracy at one remove is problematic to begin with; and any such subordination would reduce governance networks to tools of the state. This may be how some networks are set up, though governance networks can extend well beyond such instrumental use.


‘Freedom’ hardly makes sense as an attribute of a network itself. Or at least the liberal concept of freedom as negative liberty, guaranteed by rights against the arbitrary power of the state and against other members of the polity, hardly makes sense. A network may be parasitic upon freedoms secured by a liberal state or states; but the idea that freedom can be somehow secured within a network itself is problematic, given the absence of sovereign authority. A republican conception of freedom as non-domination (Pettit 1997) perhaps fares somewhat better. Republicans have typically been as wedded to the sovereign state as have liberals, but their conception of freedom travels better to networks. We could evaluate networks in terms of the degree to which non-domination is institutionalized in their practices. Given any relatively informal character of networks, we should not expect non-domination to be institutionalized in laws and rights; rather it is a matter of observing the degree to which non-domination is respected in the actual operation of the network, and the degree to which individuals feel absolutely confident that nobody has the capacity to exercise arbitrary authority over them. Republican freedom rests on the idea that no actor has the capacity to dominate another – so merely observing the absence of overt domination is not enough to be at all sure that it is present, for some actors may still fear others and adjust their behavior accordingly. Analysis must cut deeper, to ascertain that no actor is indeed capable of dominating another, and that no actor feels this threat. Obviously this is an ideal, from which real-world networks will depart to greater or lesser degree.

Beyond lingering statism in democratic theory On the face of it, then, it seems hard to transport into networks some of the familiar constituent criteria of democracy from their traditional home in the demos tied to the sovereign state. But democratic theory is a lively and multifaceted enterprise. So is there any way to move beyond the application of some very traditional criteria, and so bring democratic theory into more fruitful conversation with networks? The answer is a very qualified yes, but only once we move beyond the lingering statist disposition in democratic theory. Consider three cases in point where this disposition lingers: deliberative democracy, cosmopolitan democracy, and critical theory. Deliberative democracy has been the dominant theme in democratic theory for the past decade and a half. Deliberative democracy began as a


challenge to established aggregative models of democracy. Indeed, it was quite common to contrast deliberative and aggregative democracy, with aggregation being the dominant theme in those variants of liberal democratic theory (notably those influenced by market economics) that take preferences as given, defined prior to political interaction. In its emphasis on informed and critical citizen deliberation, deliberative democracy was a successor to models of participatory popular in the 1960s and 1970s, perhaps requiring innovative institutional homes. However, by the late 1990s, many deliberative theorists were emphasizing the institutions of the liberal state – notably legislatures and courts – as key homes for deliberation. This change was celebrated by Bohman (1998) as a central aspect of ‘the coming of age of deliberative democracy’. John Rawls was identified as one of the sources of deliberative democracy, even though his kind of deliberation requires only cogitation on the part of a single individual. In the 1990s Rawls (1997: 771f; 1999: 139) did eventually declare himself a deliberative democrat – but saw the United States Supreme Court as an exemplary deliberative institution. If deliberative democracy is moving to a stress on courts and parliaments, it is correspondingly less capable of engaging governance networks. Cosmopolitan democracy as developed by David Held (1995) and his associates at first looks as though it escapes the statist confines of established democratic theory. The basic justification for cosmopolitan democracy is that power has escaped sovereign states, and now lies in the international system, where democracy must follow. However, the democratically constituted transnational authorities that cosmopolitans seek look very familiar: legislatures, courts, referenda, and executives, leading eventually to a global parliament that holds all global bodies accountable, accompanied by a global legal system. Cosmopolitans still seek a single overarching demos, even though it is no longer tied to the state. The international system as currently constituted contains many governance mechanisms, such as networks, regimes, and discourses, that help constitute what James Rosenau (1992), Oran Young (1994) and other international relations scholars call ‘governance without government’. Cosmopolitans want to wipe these mechanisms out or subordinate them in the name of very traditional conceptions of political authority. (I note in passing that international relations scholars who praise governance without government typically have no interest in democracy; like all international relations scholars, they are preoccupied with order, not democracy.) Critical theory has in the past decade (with Habermas 1996 central) turned its focus to democracy, with a crucial test of its claims being how


it can cope with a globalizing world. In discussing this condition, Scheuerman (2006) faults ‘overly defensive’ versions of democracy that stress communication in the public sphere as a defense against corporate globalization. Scheuerman poses the issue as either popular control over institutions capable of exercising binding authority, or influence without power, which is all the public sphere yields. He dismisses in passing ‘An insufficiently critical homage to (non-state) “governance” [that] should not lead us to obscure the indispensable functions existing state and new state-like institutions will need to perform in achieving novel forms of self-legislation, and the rule of law.’ In short, deliberative democrats, cosmopolitan democrats, and critical theorists often seem unwilling or unable to let go of centralized state or state-like institutions; and to that extent, their theories have limited applicability to governance networks.

Networks and the communicative aspect of democratic theory However, if we take seriously the fact that today, at least to a substantial degree, ‘Talk-centric democratic theory replaces voting-centric democratic theory’ (Chambers 2003: 308), matters begin to look more promising. Given their polycentric character, networks rest on relatively egalitarian communication across different actors (that is, they are much more symmetrical than hierarchies, where communication up and down levels takes on quite different form). So it ought to be possible to apply critical standards to both the procedure and content of interaction within networks. When it comes to procedure, it is possible to apply standards of communicative rationality from Habermas. That is, interactions should be as free as possible from domination (the exercise of power), strategizing, deception and self-deception. The ideal would then be a network composed of competent and reflective actors engaged in a search for mutual understanding to coordinate their actions. Of course, networks in practice will all fall short to greater or lesser degree. The Habermasian standards are controversial, and would be rejected as excessively rationalistic by agonistic democrats. For agonists, the key to democratic communication is respectful engagement across difference. Agonism is intended in Mouffe’s words to convert enemies into adversaries, fighting into critical engagement, and so antagonism into agonism. The required attitude comes about in moments of conversion rather than persuasion, as the other is seen in a new light. Agonists are


preoccupied with engagement across deep difference, though in principle many kinds of differences can be affirmed and processed in agonistic fashion. In many cases deep difference will not be an issue in a network; in other cases it will (for example, in developing policy on what to do with minority non-liberal cultures in a liberal society). One case where deep difference does arise in a network context is analysed by Schlosberg (1999). The environmental justice movement in the United States developed from a series of local actions against corporations and governments generating hazards such as incinerators, waste dumps, and toxic pollutants, especially as inflicted on low-income and ethnic minority communities. In its early days in the 1980s the movement confronted mostly unresponsive governments, as well as uninterested mainstream environmental organizations. Thus it organized as a kind of counter-network, very different to the hierarchical organization of the mainstream environmental groups. Bodies such as the Citizens’ Clearinghouse on Hazardous wastes and Southwest Network for Economic and Environmental Justice were crucial in mobilizing the network. Deep difference existed between the different communities facing common hazards: for example, Hasidic Jews, African-Americans, and Latinos in Brooklyn. To operate effectively, the movement had to develop informal norms of respect across difference, a kind of critical pluralism. This kind of movement network might seem a bit different from governance networks, which if they are based on communities of interest or culture are unlikely to face the same kinds of challenges negotiated (with some success) by the environmental justice movement. However, with time this movement itself developed connections with both government (for example, through the US Environmental Protection Agency’s Office of Environmental Justice) and the mainstream environmentalist organizations. Sometimes these connections were problematic (as when mainstream groups stepped in late in particular campaigns and negotiated deals with polluters, leaving out local grassroots groups). But the kind of democratic ethos developed in the more clearly oppositional days of the movement did persist into this engagement with government. This kind of engagement with government would not necessarily please agonist theorists. The agonistic ideal of democracy concerns how individuals and groups relate to each other. It is first and foremost the respectful content of interaction that matters. Agonists have little interest in collective decision of the sort that states and networks can produce, and which is seen as the essential task in more conventional models of democracy as decision-making procedure. However, agonists


might have less of a problem in connecting to governance than they would to any linkage to government of the sovereign statist variety. The standards of agonists and Habermasians are not the only ones that could be applied to communication within networks. A relatively relaxed approach would go beyond the Habermasian privileging of argument to permit all forms of communication. Iris Young (2000: 52–80) refers to ‘inclusive political communication’ that would also cover greeting, rhetoric, and narrative. Performances, jokes, and gossip might also be welcomed. However, all such communication should be (a) capable of inducing reflection, (b) non-coercive, (c) capable of connecting particular experiences to some general point (Dryzek 2000: 68). If no reflection is induced, the communicative task is incomplete. If communications are coercive, basic democratic (and liberal) principles are violated. If communications cannot connect the particular to the general, they may reinforce and harden the position of an enclave or subculture, but not reach those with different viewpoints. An emphasis on communicative sources of democratic standards is not however completely adequate, because one might get exemplary communication within an unrepresentative elite (just as in Ancient Athens, with a highly restricted polis featuring communicative excellence internally, but repression externally). Thus we need to look at the ‘who’ as well as the ‘what’ of democratic communication.

Who communicates Resources can be found in deliberative democracy to answer this question too. The theory of deliberative democracy arrived as an account of democratic legitimacy. That is, a decision is regarded as legitimate to the degree all affected by it have the right, opportunity, or capacity to participate in deliberation about the decision in question (Manin 1987: 352; Cohen 1989: 22; Benhabib 1996: 69). While there can be problems in operationalizing this ideal (Parkinson 2003), as a criterion it can be applied as a matter of degree. We can think of networks as more or less inclusive of those affected by a decision, as well as more or less deliberative when it comes to the participation of those affected. So the key idea here is a ‘democracy of the affected’ (Eckersley 2000). That is, the relevant demos for any decision consists of those affected by it. From the point of view of any one citizen, influence should be concentrated on the issues that affect him or her most deeply. There would, then, be multiple demoi (in James Bohman’s terms), not one single all-purpose


demos. These demoi could exist at different levels, below, above, and across the state. We are now in a position to rethink democratic ideals of popular control and political equality. In a network, popular control can be operationalized in terms of responsiveness of collective decisions to deliberation on the part of those affected. One complicating factor here is that ‘the affected’ is not always a well-defined group, especially when there are degrees of affectedness. Taking this difficulty into account, political equality can be operationalized in terms of inclusion proportionate to the degree an individual or group is affected by the relevant collective decisions. While this operationalization might seem to allow inequality – because those most affected have the most say – this inequality is likely to cancel out across different networks or different issues. There is a further complication here when it comes to networks set up by or in the shadow of the state. If such networks influence or determine how public funds get spent, then ‘those affected’ encompasses everyone who pays taxes. Public choice scholars would regard it as crucial that networks not be allowed to solve their own problems – possibly in exemplary democratic fashion when it comes to inclusion and voice of all those affected – if the network as a whole is engaged in a collective rent-seeking exercise at the expense of taxpayers in general. Or to put it in the very different language of critical theory: interests that look ‘public’ and ‘generalizable’ within the network may look very private and partial from the point of view of the state.

Beyond models of democracy These extensions notwithstanding, it would appear that there is an uneasy fit between existing models of democracy (in all their variety) and governance networks. Does this mean that we need a new model of democracy for a networked world? Not necessarily. Perhaps such a world makes models of democracy obsolete; not because they are democratic, but because they are models. A model is a fully-specified ideal set of conditions, a comprehensive whole with logical connections between its parts. Advocates of particular models of democracy normally present them as universally applicable to all situations. The very idea of a model implies something that is fixed and static. In a world of multiple demoi and multiple governance mechanisms, perhaps the time has come to move beyond models of democracy, and toward thinking instead about processes of democratization that can be applied in any context,


without reference to any ideal end state. ‘Democratization’ here means not the spread of liberal democracy to more corners of the world – the conventional usage in comparative politics. Instead, it means deepening of the democratic qualities of any situation, structure or process. Such deepening can be recognized along three dimensions (Dryzek 1996): franchise, scope, and authenticity. Franchise refers to the number of affected actors engaged in control of a situation. Normally the term is used in connection with voting, but its meaning can be extended to participation of any sort. Thus an increase in franchise connotes democratization in any setting, whether or not votes are taken (of course in networks they usually are not). Franchise can be linked to both the ‘popular control’ and ‘political equality’ criteria. Greater popular control on the part of more equal individuals means an increase in the effective franchise. Of course it is not any individuals who matter here. Rather, it is the population of individuals who are affected by relevant collective decisions. Advance on the franchise dimension should be sought only within this population. Scope refers to the range of issues under collective control. Correspondingly, an increase in scope means a reduction in peremptory claims on behalf of particular actions or values. For example, claiming that an economic policy of deregulation, welfare state reduction, and free trade is demanded by globalization is a peremptory claim. An increase in scope would subject such claims to critical scrutiny, and bring areas such as national security as well as the essentials of economic policy under collective control. A network no less than a state can be a means of collective control. Authenticity means the degree to which control is substantive rather than symbolic, exercised by informed, reflective, and competent actors. Authenticity relates very closely to the key concerns of deliberative democrats about the character of communication. There is no problem at all in applying the authenticity dimension to networks as opposed to sovereign authorities. In applying these three criteria, several additional considerations should be borne in mind. First, advance on any one of the three dimensions should never be bought at the expense of retreat on any other of the three dimensions. This is because there is no common metric that would enable us to tell whether any such advance was worth it. This constraint would also guard against the worries of (say) liberals about extension of public control into areas traditionally demarcated as private, which liberal rights protect. Feminists have also pointed out that this ‘private’ realm can also be a site of oppression that should be rectified


by public means. A democratic adjudication of scope here might proceed in terms of the protection afforded by franchise and authenticity: that is, the empowerment of those at the receiving end of ‘private’ oppression, and the protection of the individual autonomy necessary for authentic democratic participation. Second, advance in the long term should never be bought at the expense of retreat in the short term; given uncertainty, it is never clear that the long term benefit of (say) suspending democratic procedures in a crisis will in fact eventuate.

The contribution of governance networks to democracy While it takes some hard work and conceptual stretching to do so, it is, then, possible to apply democratic theory to networked governance. However, democratic theory itself is transformed in the encounter, having to let go of some key tenets, and bend others. All this stretching and bending is likely to make some democratic theorists uncomfortable, which explains their resistance to letting go of the sovereign state, operating under a constitution, governed by the rule of law, whose legitimacy rests on responsiveness to a single and well-defined demos. It is probably less troublesome to start from the opposite direction, and instead of asking how to apply democratic theory to governance networks, to ask instead how governance networks can contribute to democracy – or democratization. In light of the theory of discursive democracy, the important thing about networks is not that they constitute a polity-substitute, ripe for the application of polity-derived criteria for evaluating democracy such as popular control, political equality, and liberal freedoms. Instead, any particular network can be seen as a site where discourses can or should meet, as part of larger processes that help constitute discursive democracy. My conception of discursive democracy here is an insistently critical sub-category of deliberative democracy. Discursive democracy emphasizes engagement across discourses in the public sphere. The results of this engagement can influence more formal authority structures (such as governments). But the engagement itself can be intrinsically valuable in its constitution and reconstitution of social relationships (see Dryzek 2000 for more detail on how discursive democracy in this sense differs from deliberative democracy that is beholden to liberal constitutionalism). Of course there are times when a particular network may be characterized by a single discourse, as opposed to engagement across multiple discourses. Indeed, this may be the normal case. For example, those engaged in environmental networks often subscribe to a discourse of


sustainable development. Those involved in international economic affairs are coordinated largely by the discourse of market liberalism, or neo-liberalism. Certainly the presence of a shared discourse can produce substantial benefits, not least on the grounds of deliberative economy: it is not necessary for participants to continuously debate first principles. Moreover, a shared discourse is a low-cost way of coordinating the actions of members of a network. Thus when it comes to efficiency and even problem-solving effectiveness, there may be much to be said for stabilization of a network through a shared or hegemonic discourse. However, from the point of view of discursive democracy, a multiplicity of discourses existing in association with a network is much more healthy. Such multiplicity provides grist for the engagement across discourses that is at the heart of discursive democracy. It means that networks can play a role in the production of public opinion in the public sphere, not simply act as an arm of government. Multiple discourses mean multiple points of entry for different sorts of actors. For example, in environmental affairs, sustainable development discourse can be exclusionary, especially when it is bent in a business-friendly direction (as it has been lately). Welcoming a discourse of environmental justice means a place for advocates of those at the receiving end of environmental risks and hazards. Admission of green radical discourse means representation for the advocates of ecosystemic integrity and nonhuman nature, which are normally ignored in sustainable development. The simple existence of multiple discourses in the vicinity of a network does not however guarantee that they are contributing to discursive democracy (or democratization). Much turns on how discourses engage one another. This might be done through manipulative means. Consider for example the ‘war of ideas’ that accompanies the US-led ‘war on terror’. The ‘war of ideas’ is a metaphor used by US leaders to describe their intention to destroy discourses that provide comfort for Islamic radicalism–along with other anti-American dispositions. The fact that this ‘war’ is prosecuted in inept and generally counterproductive fashion should not obscure the fact that its intention is to advance the standing of pro-American discourses by any means possible; propaganda, public relations, advertising, planting stories in the press, cultivating sympathetic reporters, funding compliant media, and so forth. The intention is most certainly not to engage other discourses (including for example European sceptics about the use of military power), but to defeat them. Sometimes the idea of ‘soft power’ (Nye 2002) is proposed as a gentler alternative. Soft power involves being solicitous of the interests of others in the international system in an


effort to induce others to share one’s values and viewpoints, and so generate supportive actions. (There is also a ‘cultural’ aspect to soft power, making use of US domination of the worlds of popular culture and higher education.) However, soft power is treated by its American proponents as something for the US to impose upon the world; it thinks of the rest of the world as tabula rasa in discourse terms, not already alive with its own discourses. The only actor seen as the legitimate purveyor of soft power is the United States, and that right is backed by the very hard power of military and economic dominance. Advocates of soft power are not interested in any deliberative exchange with the rest of the world, only the bending of the world to US interests. What matters, then, is not the simple existence of multiple discourses in the presence of a network, but how they are engaged. If this engagement proceeds according to principles of respect, reciprocity, and equality in the capacity to raise and challenge points, it can help contribute to discursive democracy. If it proceeds in terms of propaganda, manipulation, spin, and public relations, it can undermine democracy, discursive or otherwise.

Conclusion The fit between governance networks and existing models of democracy, especially those of a statist disposition, is not going to be an easy one. The fit between governance networks and ‘talk-centric’ deliberative, communicative, and discursive approaches to democracy is much easier, though much remains to be done on how this connection can be worked out in practice. I have argued that a discursive approach emphasizing discourse contestation can most fruitfully illuminate both the democratic potential and democratic problems of governance networks. Democracy is about a conversation between theory and practice, not the evaluation and design of practices in terms of models. The conversation between democratic theory and governance networks has begun, and it promises to be productive and fruitful.

Notes 1. This research was supported by Australian Research Council Discovery Grant DP0342795. 2. The two principles of ‘political equality’ and ‘popular control’ are the starting points for democratic audits, which began in the United Kingdom a decade ago and have since been applied in New Zealand, Australia, Canada, and elsewhere. For a justification of these principles see Beetham (1999).

16 Democratic Accountability and Network Governance – Problems and Potentials Anders Esmark

Democratic network governance? This chapter concerns the democratic problems and potentials of network governance. Thus, the article is not about the theoretical elaboration of the concept of network governance, which is dealt with in great detail elsewhere in this volume; rather, the question is whether the use of networks by state and public authorities for purposes of policy formulation, implementation and delivery can be considered an instrument not only of governance, but also of democratic governance. Democratic theory offers an abundance of democratic values, standards and norms against which actual political decision-making processes can be measured. The democratic standard employed in this article is that of democratic accountability. When assessing network governance from an accountability perspective, one should obviously take note of the fact that the notion of accountability is deeply rooted in the liberal doctrine of representative government. Correspondingly, assessments of network governance from the viewpoint of democratic accountability have often yielded negative results, or, at the very least, considerable concern as to the democratic value of network governance. The essence of such concerns is captured nicely by March & Olsen: Policies are made in complex networks of actors … because many participants contribute in many different ways, it is difficult even in principle to identify who is responsible for political outcomes and thus to establish political accountability. In particular, limiting accountability to officials seems myopic in modern political systems. Political outcomes are the product of ‘many hands’ (1995: 158). 274

Democratic Accountability & Network Governance 275

Such concerns are certainly not unfounded. In many instances, network governance can be conducted in a manner rendering it difficult to maintain the standards of political accountability. Nonetheless, the contention of this article is that network governance and accountability are not necessarily adverse: network governance can even be said to hold great potential for strengthening accountability. In order for this potential to be realized, however, the theoreticians and practitioners of network governance must develop a clearer notion of networks as representative institutions and conduct network governance accordingly. The democratic norm of accountability is fundamentally premised on the idea of representation. The democratic promise invoked by the norm of accountability is not one of direct democracy, strong participatory democracy or radical democracy; instead, it is one of proper representation. Consequently, the article does not deal with theories of direct, participatory or radical democracy. Rather, the article deals with strands of democratic thinking that can be labelled as ‘postliberal’, provided that we take this to mean strands of thinking critically engaged in the revision and further development of the central tenets of liberalism rather than something beyond or in fundamental opposition to liberalism; in particular, drawing on theories of functional representation and theories of representation through deliberation in order to develop a notion of accountability that is not limited to the conventional doctrine of electoral representation. Theories of functional representation largely coincide with what Sørensen and Torfing identifies as competitive democracy elsewhere in this volume. The term ‘functional’, however, is meant to stress that I take the autonomy of functionally delimited groups – rather than competition – to constitute the core of this strand of thinking. Theories of representation through deliberation refer to a subset of the larger field of deliberative democracy, which do not take the core deliberative notion of a well-working public sphere of sustained moral or rational argument to be an alternative to representation, but rather a particular way of sustaining representation. The article specifies three dimensions of democratic accountability that must be considered in this respect: inclusion, publicity and responsiveness. The question of inclusion relates both to representatives (or decision-makers) and those being represented. Accountability requires that it is possible to discern who the decision-makers are in relation to a given decision and who should be counted among those represented by the decision-makers in question. Secondly, the relationship between decision-makers and those affected must be one of sufficient publicity. Accountability requires a public sphere in which decision-makers argue


openly and remain ready to explain and assume responsibility. In other words, accountability requires a public sphere and what might be referred to as a discourse of accountability, which is to say a discourse of providing explanations and assuming responsibility. Furthermore, publicity requires that those affected have sufficient access to relevant information, which is also occasionally referred to as transparency or openness. Finally, accountability requires sufficient responsiveness. Without the possibility of those represented to correct the action of the representatives, that is, to impose sanctions, accountability remains without value. For the sanctions to remain legitimate, however, clear mandates specifying the desired course of action must be in place. The article proceeds through the following steps: first, the notion of accountability is discussed in general terms and more specifically as a democratic norm and the roots of this norm in democratic theory. Secondly, the relationship between accountability and inclusion is elaborated, followed by an assessment of network governance in this regard. Thirdly, accountability is discussed in terms of publicity followed by an assessment of network governance. Fourthly and finally, the brief conclusion aside, accountability in terms of responsiveness is made the background against which to evaluate network governance.

Accountability as a democratic norm Accountability is not necessarily democratic, nor is it even necessarily political. The term ‘accountability’ refers both to the subject and the object of an account. The subject of an account is the person being held accountable: the person ‘subject to giving an account’, either to oneself or someone else. The object of the account is that which is accounted for in providing the account, be it events, actions, feelings, physical objects and so forth. At the most general level, then, accountability implies a subject accounting for an object, which is to say providing an explanation as well as assuming responsibility for the object. Thus, accountability implies the existence of more or less institutionalized and formalized rules of making explanations and giving and assuming responsibility. At the most general level, accountability is simply a particular type of relation between subjects and objects, which forms a basic existential premise of modern rationalized culture (Power 1997). Conceived more specifically as a question of democratic governance, accountability implies that decision-makers can be called upon by those whom they represent to explain and assume responsibility for their decisions.


As such, accountability is historically linked to representation and even more specifically to electoral representation as conceived within the ‘aggregative’ or ‘liberal-protective’ strand of thinking that count Hobbes, Madison, Bentham and James Mill among its founding fathers (Macpherson 1977; Held 2000). Here, accountability emerges as the raison d’être of the electoral institutions of representative government. The core of this democratic strand of thinking is that: … governors must be held accountable to the governed through mechanisms (the secret ballot, regular voting and the competition between political representatives, among other things”) which give citizens satisfactory means for choosing, authorizing and controlling political decisions (Held 2000: 88; bold added). According to this well-established liberal doctrine of electoral representation, accountability is basically to be secured through what has been called the ‘remarkably stable structure’ of representative electoral institutions: 1. rulers, those who govern, are selected through elections; 2. while citizens are free to discuss, criticize and demand at all times, they are not able to give legally binding instructions to the government; and 3. rulers are subject to periodic elections (Manin et al. 1999: 3). The fact that accountability is first and foremost a democratic norm framed within the liberal doctrine of electoral representation invites the question of whether the evaluation of network governance from the viewpoint of accountability is in fact a futile exercise. Assessments from such a perspective tend to produce a swift and negative judgment regarding network governance, as networks ‘undermine the institutions of representative democracy and the autonomy of civil society’ (see Sørensen and Torfing Chapter 13 in this volume). According to the conventional liberal doctrine, networks are in conflict with the OPOV-principle (one person, one vote – formerly the OMOV-principle), with the autonomy of civil society, with the sovereign position of elected government, with the orientation political towards the common good and so on. More specifically in terms of accountability, the danger inherent in network governance, as seen from the liberal perspective, is that networks imply negotiation and shared decision-making, thus turning actors who cannot be called to explain or assume responsibility into de facto decision-makers. Networks are thus associated with both obscure decision-making and ‘buck-passing’. Another threat is that relations of accountability come to be established within networks rather


than between elected representatives and their constituency. Within network governance, elected representatives are likely to form relations of accountability with fellow network members rather than with their constituency – a critique well known from earlier debates about corporatism, iron triangles and so forth. As seen from the liberal interpretation of accountability, then, the undemocratic nature of network governance appears a foregone conclusion and any further discussion about the democratic potentials of network governance unnecessary. However, the story need not end here. If we turn to the different strands of postliberal thinking and move beyond the narrow doctrine of electoral representation, networks may emerge as a democratic potential rather than as a threat. Following postliberal thinking, we can conceive of representation as extending beyond electoral institutions. The postliberal alternative, though, is by no means a radical alternative suggesting the end of electoral institutions. The point is simply that electoral institutions are a necessary but insufficient condition of accountability. Even in cases where electoral institutions are working well, they cannot produce sufficient accountability. This is where networks enter the scene: networks may alleviate the accountability deficiency of electoral institutions. For networks to fulfil such a role, however, it is essential to recognize, first, that networks should a supplement rather than replace electoral institutions and, secondly, that networks themselves must work within a framework of representation. Drawing on theories of functional representation and representation through deliberation, I now turn to a more detailed elaboration of the three criteria of democratic accountability – inclusion, publicity and responsiveness – together with an assessment of the democratic problems and potentials with respect to each of these criteria.

Accountability and inclusion The question of inclusion is probably the most fundamental of questions in democratic theory and practice: who should be included in a political community (and by implication: who can legitimately be excluded)? In terms of accountability, it should be emphasized that inclusion does not imply direct participation in the decision-making of a political community. Rather, being included means being represented in decision-making. In terms of accountability, more specifically, proper inclusion means being able to assume the role of an accountability holder, that is, someone in a position to hold someone accountable,


which in turn can be designated (although not exactly in the Queen’s English) as the accountability holdees: Our system of accountability has two types of people: Either you are an accountability holder or you are and accountability holdee. It’s great to be an accountability holder. It’s not so much fun to be an accountability holdee (Behn 2001: 2). Being an accountability holdee – or simply being held accountable – may not be much fun, but it is nonetheless something that those who make decisions on behalf of others must live with in a system of democratic governance. The most basic problem involved in any discussion of democratic accountability is determining who can legitimately assume the role as accountability holders in relation to a certain group of decision-makers, who can in turn be designated as accountability holdees. According to the electoral doctrine, legitimate relations of accountability are first and foremost electoral relations between electorates and their elected politicians. There may be some variations as to whom politicians are actually seen as accountable to: only to those who voted for them, to their regional constituency, to all eligible voters or to all citizens in the political community (including non-voters), nevertheless, accountability remains for many of the liberalist persuasion a matter of proper and well-functioning electoral systems (Przeworski et al. 1999). However, any political–administrative system includes a second relation of accountability. Besides the political accountability of elected politicians to their constituencies, the liberal doctrine also acknowledges the administrative accountability of administrators and administrative units. Following the liberal doctrine, administrators are accountable first and foremost to the political institutions (executive, legislative and judiciary). Administrators ought to accept the role of accountability holdees in relation to the political institutions due to the fact that the latter has been delegated the role of accountability holder through the popular mandate at election time. However, the liberal doctrine also acknowledges that elected politicians are not the only legitimate accountability holders in relation to the administration. As rule-bound bureaucrats, civil servants should be accountable also to the law, to standards of proper conduct as defined their professional peers, to citizens and to a somewhat abstract but nonetheless important ‘public ethos’ (Peters 1995; du Gay 2000).


However, postliberal theories of democracy have voiced critique of the notions of political as well as administrative accountability suggested by the electoral doctrine. The basic proposition that sufficient representation ought to be fundamentally recast as a question of affectedness plays a vital role in both theories of functional representation and deliberative democracy. At the core of theories of functional representation is the notion that the establishment of functionally defined and self-governing ‘associations’ or ‘organizations’ are in fact equally (if not more) important as the territorially based democracy of citizenship and elections. In the associative democracy of Paul Hirst, the argument in favour of such functionally delimited and relatively autonomous associations is their capacity to ensure that those affected by decisions – the stakeholders – are included in decision-making. According to a functionalist principle of inclusion, stakeholders – rather than citizens – are the legitimate accountability holders. However, associations based on a functionalist principle of inclusion are not to take the place of conventional representative institutions, but rather to supplement the latter primarily at the local level (Hirst 2000). The principle of functionalist inclusion is also important to democratic elite-theory, which takes the autonomy of functionally defined elites to be the crowning achievement of western democracy (see Esmark 2003 for a more elaborate discussion on this point). Ultimately, the relative autonomy of elites is important on the grounds that it prevents a system of rule from forming into a concerted power structure. In other words, elite autonomy is seen to give a system of rule a ‘progressive potential’ (Etzioni-Halevy 1993: 199). The ‘concerted power structure’ that democratic elite theory seeks to avoid is defined by two well-known trademarks from corporatism, that is, the subjugation of elites to the state and collusion between elites from different functional domains. The democratically viable alternative to subjugation and collusion is called coordination (Etzioni-Halevy 1993: 109–21). For democratic elite theory, accountability holders are sub-elites and public in relation to the elites (accountability holdees) within functionally defined domains and organizations such as schools, universities, hospitals and so on. The most comprehensive reframing of representation and accountability is probably found in theories of representation through deliberation. Some versions of deliberative democracy have a strong participatory flavour to them, emphasizing the direct participation of citizens in the public sphere as the true aim of deliberative democracy, but other


proponents of deliberative democracy hold that representation is both necessary and desirable (Young 1997, 2000). However, adequate representation is to be sustained through a process of deliberation in the public sphere rather than simply through elections. We can thus conceive of the relation between accountability holdees and holders as a relation between ‘a special class of political deliberators’ ‘deliberating for all’ and those being deliberated for (Gutmann & Thompson 1996: 129). In other words, the role of accountability holder is no longer determined by inclusion in a particular electoral system; rather, it is inferred from the considerably more complex notion of being affected by a decision that is the subject of a deliberative process: If we reject, as deliberative democracy suggests that we should, the view that representatives are accountable only to those who can vote for them, then we face a formidable challenge in determining who should count as the constituents to whom they owe an account (Gutmann & Thompson 1996: 131). As is the case with theories of functional representation, the principle of affectedness is at the core of this relation. Rather than a functionally delimited organization or association, however, the relation of accountability is to be established in an open and pluralistic public sphere of sustained moral or rational argument. In theories of representation through deliberation, accountability holders are therefore not considered stakeholders in a narrow functional sense, but as members of a public, or in the words of Gutmann & Thompson, a ‘moral constituency’. Gutmann and Thompson suggest three types of moral constituents not present in an electoral constituency: non-residents (territorially excluded), groups (excluded by principles of universality) and future generations (temporally excluded) (Gutmann & Thompson 1996: 145). The notion of a moral constituency presents a more inclusive notion of legitimate accountability holders, certainly compared to an electorate, but also as compared to most notions of a functionally delimited set of stakeholders. The possible set of accountability holders is also widened. Assuming the role of representatives in a deliberative process may well include others than the elected officials. In principle, the notion of deliberative accountability extends to anyone claiming the position of a representative, such as journalists, organizational spokespersons, experts and so forth, or anyone else assuming the role of deliberator for some or all


in the public sphere. Insofar as actors take the position of representatives, they do in fact by implication become accountability holdees, not just to their readers, their organizational members or their peers, but also to the moral constituency. In fact, widening the field of eligible accountability holdees may be an equally important democratic challenge as widening the field of accountability holders. As stated earlier, however, it is more fun being an accountability holder than an accountability holdee.

First challenge: finding the holders and holdees From the perspective of the conventional liberal doctrine, networks cannot conform either to the standards of political accountability or administrative accountability. When elections constitute the only source of political accountability, the most notable characteristic of networks is of course that they comprise few politicians and have no electorates. The network is not a representative body in electoral terms and thus, its members are not subject to direct relations of accountability. In terms of administrative accountability, the case looks no better. Even when civil servants do participate in networks, they do so at the risk of becoming accountable to network members and particularistic interests rather than politicians, citizens and a public ethos premised on the notion of a public good. However, we need not turn to conventional liberalism to perceive of network governance as problematic. In terms of inclusion, accountability is essentially about assigning a sufficient degree of clarity to the roles of accountability holders and holdees. A viable democracy requires relations between clearly defined accountability holders and clearly defined accountability holdees. Irrespective of how the roles of accountability holders and holdees are perceived substantially, getting decision-makers to assume the role of accountability holdees in relation to specified and clearly defined accountability holders is the most basic and simple precondition implied in democratic accountability. In general, the potential problem with network governance in this respect is that the network structure itself tends to blur the clearly defined roles of accountability holders and holdees in favour of a situation in which each actor is equally an accountability holder and holdee. Such blurring should come as no surprise, since all of the known definitions of network governance stress symmetry, interdependence, horizontality and negotiations as prominent trademarks. The relation between accountability holder and holdee, by contrast, is essentially


asymmetrical, hierarchical and non-negotiable. The accountability holder is in a superior position – based on popular sovereignty – to the holdee and stands in judgement over the holdee. In this sense, the worst-case scenario from any perspective is that there is a fundamental mismatch between the structures required by democratic accountability and the structure of networks. Lacking a clear distinction, neither the role of accountability holder nor the role of accountability holdee will be fulfilled through network governance. This is certainly not an uncommon critique: ‘buck-passing’, a lack of clear responsibility, decision-makers wihtout accountability holders and so forth are all known critiques in relation to network governance. However, acknowledging that there is in fact a worst-case scenario does not imply dismissing network governance altogether. Turning instead to the issue of what is required of network governance from the perspective of democratic accountability, the basic rule involved is that networks ought to first and foremost be considered representative forums of accountability holdees. Whereas participatory strands of thinking tend to associate the democratic potential of networks with the capacity to include a large number (and potentially all) relevant stakeholders, thinking about network governance in terms of accountability instead requires that we recognize networks more clearly as representative forums and strengthen their capacity to work as such. In other words, the relationship between accountability holders and holdees should not be seen as a relationship inside networks; but rather, as a relation between accountability holders (stakeholders) outside of the network and their accountability holdees within the network. The organizational features of the network structure render networks a poor choice for sustaining accountability internally, which is to say that networks should not stretch across both sides of the distinction between accountability holder and holdee, but remain on the latter side. In other words, networks should refrain from attempting to include accountability holders. Making network governance an asset for democracy from the viewpoint of accountability thus implies acknowledging that network members should always be considered accountability holdees and never accountability holders. As simple as this may seem, the rule is nonetheless in conflict with the common perception inspired by more participatory strands of thought that networks can and should include the accountability holders themselves. Building on this premise, network governance can be considered to have substantial democratic potential from a postliberal perspective. First, networks are in many ways the organization of choice from the


perspective of theories of functional representation: networks very often display the characteristics of functionally delimited and partly selfgoverning organizations created or self-grown in relation to a specific policy problem or policy area. Furthermore, networks are flexible in relation to the scale of the problem or policy in question (local, regional, national, transnational). The most important democratic value added by networks is their capacity to bring all of the relevant stakeholders together in relation to a particular decision or problem. However, following the argument made above, we should take care not to think of networks as being able to include all stakeholders, but rather, as potentially being able to include representatives of all stakeholders. It follows that the network should not be considered a unified collective with a common set of stakeholders, but an array of network members, each with their own set of stakeholders to whom they are accountable. Following the same line of argument, networks could also be considered a democratic asset for identifying the moral constituency mentioned by theories of representation through deliberation. However, this implies conceiving of networks as proper deliberative forums of ‘some deliberating for all’ according to the rules of proper political communication. Or in short, the democratic potential of network governance hinges on the capacity of networks to function as public spheres in themselves. This capacity is certainly not a given, but from the perspective of democratic theory of the public sphere that has long since abandoned the notion of a single common national public sphere in favour of several multi-layered and loosely coupled public spheres (Habermas 1996), the case for network governance may appear quite promising. However, in order to further probe the potential of network governance in relation to the deliberative perception of accountability, we must turn to the notion of publicity.

Accountability and publicity The relation between accountability holders and holdees is a relation of informed consent. The institutional structures of accountability are meant to guarantee that the decisions of the governors are always based on the informed consent of the governed (March & Olsen 1995: 150). Calling decision-makers to explain their decisions and assume responsibility requires procedures through which the accountability holders can demand and receive explanations by accountability holdees. Such procedures can be designated as procedures of publicity, which is to say


procedures of openness, transparency and access to information. In a more technocratic vein, we may refer to them as procedures of ‘monitoring’. The different democratic strands of thinking remain in agreement on some of the basics of publicity, such as of documenting decisions when exercising governmental authority and the laws granting citizens the possibility of access to these documents. Accurate records and journals are a fundamental prerequisite of publicity. A vital meaning of accountability is ‘keeping account’ of decisions made. Accountability implies ‘… an obligation for keeping accurate records of property, documents, or funds’ (Shafritz, cited in Behn 2001: 4). Although openness and access is the minimal standard of publicity, it is certainly not employed without exception. Any state or public authority retains the right to keep decisions secret or confidential. Rules of secrecy and confidentially are legitimized with reference both to the national interest, efficiency of administration and the privacy of citizens. Most theories of democracy, however, recognize the need for exceptions to the rule of openness and access: there is always a trade-off to be considered and no universal rule to determine the optimal balance between publicity and secrecy (March & Olsen 1995: 163). As seen from the perspective of the liberal tradition, informed consent first and foremost requires sufficient information to choose between competing politicians at election time. By contrast, the deliberative strand of thinking takes the notion of publicity to be the core principle of democracy itself, making the notion of publicity more demanding and more complex. In general, deliberative democracy takes informed consent to presuppose, not simply to inform about decisions made, but a sufficient deliberative process within a public sphere. In other words, the publicity required to produce informed consent is equated with the existence of a public sphere sustaining a particular kind of political communication: The responsibility of the representative is not simply to tell citizens how she has enacted a mandate they authorized or served their interests, but as much to persuade them of the rightness of her judgement (Young 2000: 131). A proper public sphere not only implies procedures of making decisions public, but also a particular way of justifying these decisions, which in some way or another makes reference to universal rationality or morality in the process of deliberation. The key figure here is undoubtedly Jürgen Habermas. Habermas has presented variations on


this theme throughout his oeuvre, from his original thesis about ‘The Transformation of The Public Sphere’ (Habermas 1962) past communicative action (Habermas 1995–97 [1981]) and discourse ethics (Habermas 1991) to the current writings about postnationalism (and the EU) (Habermas 1998). At the core of these writings, and deliberative democracy more broadly, is an attempt to transform the ideal of scientific enlightenment into practical standards of communication in the public sphere. Such standards imply that political communication ought to conform to an ideal of rational reflexivity. Emphasizing the debt to Kantian moral philosophy, Gutmann & Thompson characterize the difference between liberal (procedural and constitutional) democracy and deliberative democracy in the following manner: … deliberative democracy raises the stakes of democratic accountability. It requires more than do procedural and constitutional democracy. A deliberative principle of accountability asks representatives to do more than try to win re-election, and more than to respect constitutional rights. In a deliberative democracy representatives are expected to justify their actions in moral terms (Gutmann & Thompson 1996: 129). From the perspective of theories of representation through deliberation, accountability requires that accountability holdees (and holders) conform to a certain standard of political communication. Theories of representation through deliberation pose strict conditions on how explanations are to be made and responsibility assumed, that is, on the basis of rational reflexivity and moral consistency. These criteria constituted what may be labelled a discourse of accountability, or, put differently: accountability as a particular discursive genre or script within the larger framework of proper political communication. A discourse of accountability is basically a discourse based on the notion of choices, causality and (personal) responsibility. Such a discourse may be difficult to sustain in the face of causal complexity, interconnectedness, historical forces and structural dynamics being outside of human control (globalization being the most apparent example). Nonetheless, accountability requires this particular form of discourse.

Second challenge: sufficient publicity Perhaps the most persistent critique of network governance is that networks are closed, inaccessible and dominated by technocratic discourse.


In short, networks are supposedly the antithesis of the procedures of publicity necessary to constitute the relation between the accountability holder and accountability holdee as a relation of informed consent. Proponents of a strong theory of the public sphere have always been inclined to see decisions made in networks as decisions taken in ‘darkness’ and secrecy, as opposed to the soothing light of public scrutiny. Not least media researchers and journalists themselves have voiced such a concern. Although sometimes based on somewhat metaphorical concept of networks, there is clearly some truth to the proposition that networks do not always fit smoothly with the procedures of publicity. The question is to what extent the publicity offered by networks is sufficient to ensure the informed consent of the accountability holders outside of the network on the decisions made within the network. As stated above, the point is not that everyone must be included in the network – which is the concern of strong notions of inclusion and participation – but rather, to what extent networks institutionalize procedures of publicly assuming responsibility and giving explanations according to given standards of communication in relation to the stakeholders or moral constituency outside of the network. In the deliberative vein, the question is to what extent networks can be made to work as deliberative forums based on an acceptance of a representational structure, which is to say that some deliberate for all. There are at least three issues to consider here: maintaining records and journals, the role of the media, and the extent to which networks conform to a discourse of accountability. 1. Keeping strict records and journals of decision-making processes is a trademark of both political and administrative institutions in most western democracies. It is one of the cornerstones of the Weberian bureaucracy and implemented almost without exception in legislative and judicial bodies; however, the executive is a different matter. In most cases, the executive is entitled to a great deal of secrecy, even in a parliamentary democracy where the legislative (and by implication, the people) can hold the executive accountable by calling the executive to respond to questions raised. The problem in most traditional representative bodies, however, is not keeping the records, but gaining access to them. Laws on access to documents vary a great deal, and even access to documents that are not classified as secret might be subject to various informal obstructions, such as delay, insufficient documentation or deliberate overload. Nonetheless, we do have the benefit of formal rules on the matter in the case of the traditional representative bodies.


In the case of networks, a basic problem is that the position of networks within the framework of laws on documentation and access is fuzzy at best. Networks do not enjoy the status of a ‘subject of law’. However, networks may nevertheless keep sufficient records. First, many participants are well trained in the conventional procedures of keeping records of decision-making and will do so almost automatically. Secondly, most networks have some form of secretariat. In cases where such a secretariat is based in a branch in the public administration (typically the case in Denmark), the secretariat will keep documents subject to the same rules of access as any other part of the administration. There are, however, also cases where there is no secretariat or where the secretariat is based in the private sector. Although a private secretariat may keep and grant access to documents, networks involved in the production of public policy and service should preferably have a secretariat based within the public administration. Public secretariats represent a relatively simple way to bring the procedures of documentation and access up to speed with the rules of the country in question – leaving aside for now the issue of whether these are in themselves problematic. 2. Procedures of documentation and access to documents are of course insufficient according to any notion of publicity. The notion of publicity also involves more direct forms of monitoring. The most direct form of monitoring is of course presence during the process of deliberation itself, as for example being present during parliamentary debate. Some networks are closed and do not offer this possibility; others are fairly open. Networks may even be more open to some form of participation as opposed to simple monitoring, but our concern here is primarily with networks as a representative forum, that is, a forum of representatives subject to monitoring and sanctions. Given the fact that decisions made in parliament are often pro forma acceptance of decisions made in networks, opening up avenues for direct monitoring is immensely important. Network participants could doubtlessly do more on this point, but there is also a problem to consider for which networks cannot be blamed: the fact that direct monitoring appears to be of little interest. Direct monitoring has more or less been substituted for mediated monitoring. The increasing importance of media and journalists in politics has been lamented for a long time. It was an important part of Habermas’ original version of the fall of the public sphere and it continues to carry the blame for both ‘commercialization’ and ‘conversationalization’ (Fairclough 1995). However, for better or for


worse, ‘public’ primarily means ‘in the media’ in contemporary politics. With respect to the issue of monitoring, the most important implication is obviously that monitoring is not direct, but monitoring by proxy. Citizens do not monitor directly, but have professional monitors and auditors – most notably journalists – monitor and audit for them: ‘The basic story of auditing is everywhere the same. Auditors are agents of others who cannot be as well informed’ (March & Olsen 1995: 164). The issue here, however, is not the extent to which monitoring by proxy is in itself problematic. Rather, the question is, given the circumstance that ‘mediated politics’ is a fact of current and future democracies (Bennet & Entman 2001), how network governance fares under such circumstances. A fundamental problem in this context is that journalists are still lagging far behind in coming to terms with the reality of network governance. Journalists remain predominantly oriented towards traditional representative – national and local – institutions (Cook). Thus, we encounter a clash between the working routines and news criteria of journalists and the complex reality of network governance. The problem sometimes assumes the form of a self-fulfilling prophecy: the news criteria and working routines of political journalists define network governance as lacking clear accountability holdees, which clashes with the need for personal responsibility and clearly defined sinners and thus the lack of accountability holdees become the reality offered to citizens. Of course, journalists may be right, as stated earlier. However, the role of journalists is to maintain the discourse of accountability, even in cases where it is not easily applied. Furthermore, journalists may be wrong in many cases: even if networks do in fact consist of members who assume the role of accountability holdees, institutionalize procedures of documentation and access and offer reasonable openness, accountability holders may lack sufficient means of monitoring due to the fact that journalists do not assume their democratic role as the intermediary accountability holder. 3. The final issue to be considered here is the discourse of accountability. The basic problem here is that many networks are deeply embedded in modes of discourse that do not conform to the discourse of accountability. Most networks are to some extent expert-networks or technocratic networks meant to produce policy solutions or services within specific policy areas with a tendency to talk in terms of functional necessities rather than contingency, choices and personal responsibility. In other words, the discourses employed by networks


very often tend to be elitist or technocratic. It may be that such discourses are indeed ‘functional’ in relation to the policy problems at hand, but this remains a matter of efficiency. From the perspective of democracy, networks need to maintain the construction of accounts – or the discourse of accountability – in order to be held accountable. As always, sustaining a particular mode of communication is not merely a matter of institutional reform: the challenge is to cultivate a particular form of discourse within the network. Such cultivation remains one of the most important democratic challenges to network governance.

Accountability and responsiveness Accountability implies that accountability holders have some level of control over the actions of accountability holders (Peters 1995). Specifying the roles of accountability holdees and holders, institutionalizing procedures of publicity and maintaining a proper discourse of accountability are essential, but accountability also requires the possibility of imposing sanctions on the accountability holdees. Thus, March & Olsen identify two sources of accountability: information (roughly equating to what I have just called publicity) and sanctions: ‘A presumption of democratic accountability is that unfavourable information leads to the imposition of sanctions on political actors’ (March & Olsen 1995: 165). In short, the real touchstone of any system of accountability is the level of responsiveness of the accountability holdees to the accountability holders: Accountability is, in this view, a property of institutional structures, whereas responsiveness is a consequence of interaction within these structures. Put another way, responsiveness is a measure of how much accountability an institutional structure permits (Ferejohn 1999: 131). Sanctions can generally be understood as the means of punishment. Or, in other words, the relationship between accountability holder and holdee is also a relationship between punisher and punishee (Behn 2001: 8). Legitimately administering punishment requires a negative outcome of a comparison between a mandate already given and decisions made by the accountability holder. Temporally speaking, sanctions come after mandates. In terms of the policy process, sanctions presuppose the existence of mandates, which can be compared with


policy outcome in order to judge whether the imposition of sanctions is necessary. A positive evaluation does not result in sanctions, but (at least in principle) a renewal of the mandate already given. A positive evaluation means lack of change and business as usual, whereas a negative evaluation means more or less radical change for the accountability holdee: They recognize that, if someone is holding them accountable, two things can happen: When they do something good, nothing happens. But when they screw up, all hell can break loose. Those whom we want to hold accountable have a clear understanding of what accountability means: Accountability means punishment (Behn 2001: 3). Holding decision-makers accountable in order to secure sufficient responsiveness, in other words, implies two questions: first, what is the legitimate mandate through which the accountability holder can specify the desired course of action to the accountability holdee? Mandates are an institutionalization of the capacity of accountability holders to provide instructions to accountability holdees. In terms of accountability, the importance of mandates lies in the fact that mandates specify the desired course of action that the accountability holders are going to hold the accountability holdee accountable for. In other words, mandates specify – more or less precisely – the decisions expected of the holdee. The authorization of the accountability holdee through the specification of some form of mandate is an integral aspect of any relationship between accountability holder and holdee.1 The second question is which sanctions – or forms of punishment – may legitimately be employed according to the principle of democratic accountability if the mandate given is not followed? The most straightforward answer is provided by the liberal tradition: in the case of political accountability, sanctions mean being voted out of office. Since legitimate mandates are regarded as given exclusively through the electoral process, the only legitimate sanction offered is the revocation of the mandate. In addition to ordinary elections, most electoral systems employ extraordinary measures of ‘non-confidence votes’, recall and so forth. In other words, the sanction is the negation of the mandate. ‘Throwing the bastards out’ when dissatisfied with their performance is the basic form of sanction. Administrative accountability, on the other hand, is associated with mandates in the form of job descriptions and sanctions, such as warnings, being demoted, fired and the re-organization of public administration units.


Not surprisingly, conceiving of mandates only as electoral mandates and sanctions as the revoking of these mandates is considered overly limited by the various postliberal positions. These positions generally share the notion that mandates ought to be much more flexible and re-negotiable than is possible through elections. Similarly, sanctions should cover a much wider spectrum of means of corrections than the crude yes/no offered by elections. A crucial argument in functional democracy is that functionally delimited associations and organizations make possible much more specific and flexible mandates based on shared understandings and knowledge of problems and policy, especially in cases where such associations and organizations are constituted on the local level of governance. Mandates can be given through hearings, meetings, specialized channels of discussion and continuously adjusted and re-negotiated through these very same channels. The issue of sanctions is less clear, but the primary sanction is probably exit instead of voice, that is, to withdraw from the association or organization in question. Democratic elite theory conceives of sanctions as the ability of sub-elites and the public to replace the elites at the head of the functionally delimited domains or organizations. Such means of imposing sanctions do not imply elections, but rather, a sufficient degree of elite rotation within the functionally delimited spheres of society, or in other words: … the public standing in judgment over the elite’s performance and its ability to weaken, demote or dismiss the elites when it is dissatisfied with its performance (Etzioni-Halevy 2001: 167). Theories of representation through deliberation understand responsiveness on the basis of mandates and sanctions as an ongoing adjustment in the public sphere. Electoral mandates and sanctions are considered a completely insufficient means of ensuring responsiveness. What is needed is rather a continuous renewal of the popular mandate through proper deliberation. No sanctions are required in a perfect public sphere, as the quality of political communication ensures that the mandate can be constantly renegotiated and specified. Conversely, one of the more important sanctions in the public sphere is ‘silencing’, that is, excluding someone from the process of deliberation. In cases where accountability holdees do not conform to proper standards of communication, such a sanction may be considered legitimate.


Third challenge: adequate responsiveness The liberal conception of political accountability based on electoral mandates and sanctions, on the one hand, and administrative accountability based on orders from the political level and sanctions such as being demoted of fired on the other, does not fare very well with the reality of network governance. Network members are seldom politicians. Even when they are, their participation in networks is not covered by mandates or sanctions. In some instances, the participation of civil servants in networks may be subject to orders and instructions from the political level and to more or less clearly specified sanctions. But in many cases they are not; and in any case, network members include other actors in addition to than civil servants. In short, networks evade political accountability and to some extent also administrative accountability, according to the liberal doctrine. Once again, however, the postliberal strands of democratic thinking may lead to less pessimistic conclusions. The postliberal notion that democracy actually requires more flexible and less crude mandates and sanctions than those offered by elections and conventional means of politically controlling the administration may in fact point to networks as an important supplement to conventional representative institutions. However, our core question remains how to create and maintain the network as a representative forum in itself. According to postliberal thinking, democracy requires mandates that can be continuously revised and re-negotiated, as well as less crude sanctions. At least two themes must be considered in this regard: the plurality of possible mandates and sanctions and the mechanisms through which mandates and sanctions can be imposed. 1. Following the proposition that the network ought to be considered a forum of accountability holdees, accountable for their decisions to different and perhaps partially overlapping sets of stakeholders or moral constituencies, the issue of adequate responsiveness through mandates and sanctions is primarily a question of the relation of each network member to his or her own set of stakeholders. In other words, there is no single type of mandate or sanctions that applies to a network. The network should not be considered a collective identity subject to the same mandate, but a forum for coordination between actors each subject to their own mandates and sanctions, depending on the set of stakeholders or the moral constituency that they


represent: ‘Deliberative democracy does not specify a single form of representation. It searches for modes of representation that support the give-and-take of serious and sustained moral argument’ (Gutmann & Thompson 1996: 131). The important challenge, however, is to ensure that each network member is in fact subject to clear mandates and sanctions from their relevant stakeholders. This is no easy task. Many networks are constituted through contacts with ‘usual suspects’, meaning the usual organizations – if not even the usual persons – within these organizations, without any further consideration as to whether they are actually proper representatives, that is, subject to mandates and sanctions. The degree to which network members are in fact the proper representatives – sufficiently responsible to a clearly defined set of stakeholders – must be made an explicit condition of network formation and durability. This is of course primarily an issue of the initial selection of network members and possibilities of excluding and including new members during the lifetime of the network. Such considerations would also render it possible to map whether a network constitutes a suitable set of mandates in relation to the policy problem in question. 2. The next question to be considered is of course what can be considered legitimate mandates and sanctions in network governance. Most network members are subject to organizational mandates, that is, mandates from the branches of administration, organizations or social movements that they represent. If the network is to remain operative, the question of how to specify proper mandates must be left to the organizations in question. Participation in network governance thus requires an effort by the organizations themselves. What is required is more a question of ensuring that all of the relevant stakeholders enjoy some form of representation. In this respect, stakeholders who are not very well organized or not organized at all ought to be of particular concern. Networks have a tendency to favour strong organizational representatives for reasons of pragmatism and efficiency, but for network governance to be democratic in terms of accountability, non-organized stakeholders must be given the opportunity to specify mandates for appointed representatives. Thus, a condition of democratic network governance will in some instances be the creation of organizations or loosely coupled organizations that can serve as a means of including non-organized stakeholders. As regards sanctions, a possible course of action would be to develop mechanisms of periodic review of the network as a collective actor


‘from above’ as well as ‘from below’ Democratically speaking, the value of subjecting networks to review and sanctions from above in this respect lies within its capacity to extend the already existing chain of mandates and sanctions from the people to political institutions and on to the network itself. It would be interesting, however, to consider the issue of how accountability holders could govern networks directly, including the possibility of sanctions: of shutting the network down. Such mechanisms could take the form of periodical reviews or hearings with the added bonus of being able to vote the network ‘out of office’.

Conclusion While basically acknowledging that network governance is in fact capable of producing results adverse to the norm of accountability, the basic line of argument in this chapter has been that networks hold a good deal of potential for strengthening democracy, not in terms of the sort of participatory or direct democracy that often constitute the preferred strand of thinking when making a case for the democratic virtues of democracy. Accountability remains a norm of primary concern for liberal thought and postliberal thought engaged in the rethinking of proper representation as the core of democracy. Correspondingly, my discussion of network governance in terms of accountability has emphasized the need to think of networks as representative forums rather than means of participation and direct democracy. My point in this respect is certainly not that the participation and direct democracy are irrelevant and thus to advocate a sort of ‘the end of history’-thesis. Alternatives to liberalism remain relevant in general as well as in relation to the debate about network governance. However, setting aside pragmatism and the division of labour between this and other contributions in this volume (see chapters by Hansen 14 and Dreyzek 15), it is my contention that the concept of the network as a representative forum subject to the standards of accountability must play a more vital role in future thought regarding the democratic potential and problems of network governance. Furthermore, it seems important to stress that increasing the representative capacity of networks need not be at the cost of other democratic potentials. Democratic norms and standards, which are often perceived as being in conflict or at least a matter of grave either/or-choices at the level of normative theory and debate, are often combined in ways that


are less orderly and even more creative at the level of concrete decisionmaking and governance. While not exactly keeping the purity and strictness of coherent systems of thought and theoretical traditions, such pragmatic mixing of democratic traditions in concrete decision-making processes and institutions may often produce highly interesting and legitimate results. Thus, rather than taking an increase in the representative potential of network governance to mean the end of other democratic potentials of networks, one should rather look for ways in which increased attention to representation can be combined with democratic norms and standards in the concrete practice of network governance,

Note 1. Mandates and responsiveness are sometimes regarded as an alternative to accountability and sanctions. (Manin et al Przeworski & Stokes 1999a). Such reasoning is in no small part inspired by Hanna Pitkin’s distinction between authorization called the ‘mandate conception of representation’ and ‘accountability conception’ based on sanctions (Pitkin 1967, see also Stokes 1999). As emphasized by Iris Young, however, Pitkin herself notes that the idea that these modes of representation constitute distinct systems of rule in themselves is misconstrued (Young 2000: 128).

The Second Generation of Governance Network Theory and Beyond Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing

This book has aimed to deliver theoretically informed answers to new and pressing questions about the dynamics of governance networks, the conditions for their success and failure, the forms and functions of metagovernance, and the democratic problems and potentials of network governance. In this concluding chapter we aim to assess the answers that the authors have given to these questions. We pinpoint and discuss their theoretical points of departure, summarize and compare their answers, and identify areas where further discussion and research needs to be done in the future. Our assessment of the theoretically informed answers to the questions raised by the new second generation of governance network theory will be followed by speculations about where this kind of research might go next. However, first we briefly restate the argument about the importance of focussing on interactive governance through networks.

Governance networks are here to stay Today governance networks proliferate to an astonishing extent within different policy areas and levels of governance. The institutional forms, the patterns of participation and the supporting rhetoric might differ from country to country or from level to level, but the core feature in terms of governance through negotiated interaction among a plurality of relevant and affected policy actors tends to remain the same. The political and societal background for the recent surge of network governance is that public governance is confronted by a huge dilemma which an increasing reliance on network-based governance might help to solve. On the one hand, there are high and ever increasing demands that public policy and governance must be proactive, flexible, strategic, 297


targeted, knowledge-based and responsive. On the other hand, the societal systems that are supposed to be governed according to these high demands are becoming increasingly complex, fragmented, multi-layered and dynamic. There has always been a discrepancy between the ambitions and capacities of governance, but the gulf is widening and becoming more and more visible. In this situation, the mobilization of the knowledge, energy and resources of a plurality of public and private actors within different kinds of governance networks seems to offer promising way of realizing the growing ambitions of modern governance in an increasingly differentiated polity. At least, this explains why central decision-makers at the local, national and transnational levels increasingly conceive governance networks as an effective and legitimate mode of governance and an important supplement to traditional forms of governance in terms of hierarchy and market. The central decision makers’ celebration of the new forms of network governance is spurred by political pressures from an increasing number of professional interest organizations, politically engaged citizen groups and constructive and problem-driven ‘everyday makers’ who want to be able to influence the output and outcomes of the political and administrative system in and through active participation in the processes of agenda setting, policy formulation and policy implementation. The pressures from ‘below’ are further sustained by pressures from ‘above’ where international and transnational organizations like the World Bank and the European Union advocate the inclusion of stakeholders in public policy making as a part of their quest for ‘good governance’. Last but not least, new information and communication technologies facilitate a rapid and easy identification of stakeholders, exchange of knowledge and organization of meetings. The increasing reliance on governance networks does not mean that the use of traditional forms of governance in terms of hierarchy and market is diminishing. On the contrary, there are many examples of how hierarchical governance by politicians and executive administrators is reinvigorated by the adoption of new steering and control techniques in terms of management by objectives, performance measurement and bench marking. Likewise, privatization, contracting out and the introduction of quasi-markets within the public sector are still on the top of the political agenda in most Western countries. But in many cases, the proliferation of governance networks seems to run parallel to the reinforcement of hierarchy and market. In fact, governance networks often help to sustain the new forms of hierarchical governance by providing valuable inputs to the formulation of the overall policy objectives and by coordinating the actor’s attempt to reach their targets. Governance

The Second Generation of Governance Network Theory and Beyond 299

networks also help to counter the competitive logic of the market by the generation of trust and mutual learning. However, governance networks are not merely an appendix to hierarchy and market, they also provide an alternative mode of governance that might be preferred in cases where the policy problems, objectives and solutions are unclear and ambiguous and where there are many stakeholders with potentially conflicting interests. No matter whether governance networks are supplementing or replacing the traditional forms of governance, they tend to be constrained by the operation of the market forces and to be influenced by the hierarchical forms of government. Hence, the expansion of private markets and public quasi-markets tend to create a ‘no-go area’ for governance networks as the political negotiation of goals and solutions among interdependent network actors easily come into conflict with the autonomy of the independent market operators. At the same time, governance networks are operating in the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ as the formation, functioning and development of governance networks are shaped and reshaped by the strategic interventions of government officials at different levels (Scharpf, 1994). At present, it seems that governance networks are here to stay. It is becoming more and more difficult to govern society from a privileged centre and interactive coordination of objectives, funding and policy actions among a host of relevant and affected policy actors seem to be a prerequisite for effective governance. Therefore, it is increasingly important to address the questions raised by the second generation of governance network research. It is no longer enough to explain why governance networks are formed, to show how they differ from hierarchy and market, and to account for their contribution to effective and proactive governance in different countries and policy fields. We must learn to live with governance networks and develop a critical and theoretically informed understanding of their dynamic development, the conditions for their success and failure, the different forms of metagovernance, and how to assess and improve their democratic performance. Empirical studies based on standard and non-standard methods are also important, but these should be based on a theoretical understanding of the key questions of the second generation of governance network research.

A multi-theoretical approach to network governance The different theories of governance networks that have been developed from the early 1970s onwards provide the basic theoretical framework for answering our four basic research questions. The answers to the first


question about the formation, functioning and development of governance networks also draw on the new developments within institutional theory and the answers to the last question about the democratic problems and potentials of governance networks primarily draw on various forms of democratic theory. In order to emphasize the analytical diversity of governance network theory, institutional theory and democratic theory, we have aimed to map the rival approaches within the three theoretical fields according to their paradigmatic conceptions of social action and the societal systems of governance. Hence, the rival theories and approaches within each of the three theoretical fields have been divided into a four fold table that combines calculation based and culture based views of social action with conflict based and consensus based conceptions of societal governance. We are perfectly aware that ‘hell is the fury of a misplaced specimen’, but we believe that a heuristic mapping of different approaches and theories will help to keep the theoretical fields open and to provide different, complementary and even conflicting answers to the four basic research questions raised by the second generation of governance network research. The authors, who have contributed to this volume, have been asked to clarify their theoretical point of departure for answering the questions that we had posed to them. However, they have been free either to associate themselves with one of the theoretical positions in the four-fold tables, to combine them in any sort of way, or even to transcend the analytical distinctions altogether by drawing on other theoretical resources that are not easily captured by the four fold tables that aim to map the theoretical fields invoked in this volume. Not all the authors agreed with our way of mapping the three theoretical fields, but they ended up positioning themselves in relation to the three theoretical maps. The authors, whose chapters appear in Part I, have been struggling to answer the fundamental question about the dynamics of governance networks. How are governance networks formed? How are they are functioning? How do they develop and change over time? Niels Hertting’s argument draws on game theory to explain the formation of governance networks. However, he claims that rational choice institutionalism should be supplemented by other institutionalist approaches that are better suited to explaining the struggles and conflicts that determine the actors’ perception of their mutual dependencies. Guy Peters initially discusses the contributions of historical institutionalism and rational choice institutionalism to understanding the institutionalization


and deinstitutionalization of governance networks, but his main argument builds on an analytical model based on sociological organization theory and normative institutionalism. Finally, Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes aim to develop a decentred theory of the change of governance networks in response to success and failure. Their theory emphasizes the social construction of network relations by situated social actors whose beliefs and actions are shaped by traditions and story telling. The hermeneutic aspect of their theoretical account of network change is in line with normative institutionalism and their emphasis on decentred structures and actors involved in discursive story telling brings them close to poststructuralist institutionalism. However, their strong emphasis on the radical contingency of social practices and the absence of a theory of discursive power struggles makes it difficult to assimilate them into these theoretical positions. This is hardly surprising as they deliberately seek to trancend the analytical framework in the search for a pragmatist theory inspired by the post-analytical philosophy of Wittgenstein. The authors in Part II have aimed to answer the crucial question about the conditions for success and failure of governance networks. Linze Schaap deals with the dilemma between openness and closure and works his way from interdependency theory via governability theory to a more rigorous system theoretical position inspired by the works of Luhmann. The latter clearly trancends our initial mapping of governance network theory. Joop Koppenjan focuses on the dilemma between consensus and conflict and his analysis mainly draws on interdependency theory although there are also references to key insights from governability theory. Finally, Tanja Börzel and Diana Panke’s discussion of the trade-off between the effectiveness and legitimacy of governance networks is firmly based on governability theory. The authors contributing to Part III discuss how different aspects of network-based policy processes can be metagoverned. Peter Triantafillou focuses on how governance networks are formed through the construction of autonomous and interdependent actors and clearly bases his argument on Foucault’s theory of governmentality. Erik-Hans Klijn and Jurian Edelenbos analyse the metagovernance of governance networks in terms of process management and institutional design and their analysis is firmly grounded in interdependency theory. Finally, Laurence O’Toole draws on governability theory in his discussion of the metagoverning of network-based policy outputs and policy outcomes. The authors in Part IV have aimed to assess the democratic problems and potentials of network governance. Allan Dreyer Hansen takes issue


with the communitarian variants of participatory democracy and discusses the question of democratic participation in governance networks on the basis of theories of agonistic democracy. John Dryzek focuses on the democratic demands for equality and freedom in relation to network-based deliberation processes. He emphasizes the communicative aspect of democracy and develops a theory of discursive democracy which is founded on a critical engagement with a Habermasian version of communitarian democracy. Finally, Anders Esmark discusses the democratic accountability of governance networks on the basis of theories of competitive democracy and a ‘thin’ version of communitarian democracy that emphasizes the importance of public deliberation. On the whole, the authors have located themselves within the theoretical terrain that has been mapped by the three four-fold tables. Most of the authors associate themselves with one of the theoretical positions (Peters, Koppenjan, Börzel and Panke, Triantafillou, Klijn and Edelenbos, O’Toole, Dryzek). There are a few examples of cross-fertilization (Hertting, Hansen, Esmark), but only two cases where the authors deliberately attempt to trancend the theoretical positions of the four-fold tables and the analytical distinctions on which they build (Bevir and Rhodes, Schaap). The fact that most of the contributions fall within the theoretical territory mapped by the three four-fold tables does not in any way prove the authority or validity of our theoretical mapping and the analytical distinctions on which it builds. The authors were asked to position themselves in relation to these particular theoretical landmarks and they might have had great difficulties in doing so. However, at least, the four-fold tables have proved their value as heuristic tools for distinguishing between different theoretical approaches. Other ways of cutting the cake can easily be imagined, but this way of doing it helps to spot important theoretical differences, combine different approaches, and trancend the established positions in search for new ones. When looking at how the authors place themselves in the theoretical landscape, it is clear that the theoretical positions are not equally represented in the contributions to this volume. We have selected the authors both in order to cover particular research questions and in order to represent particular theoretical approaches, but with a small number of authors it has been impossible to ensure an even distribution of the contributions in terms of their theoretical approach. Hence, it comes as no surprise that the most well-established theories and approaches are better represented than the novel ones. Another observation is that the theoretical points of departure of the different authors are closely linked to the theoretical problem that they are addressing. This might be seen


as an evidence of the problem-driven research approach that seems to dominate in the study of policy, governance and democracy.

Contributions to our understanding of governance networks It is time to assess the answers provided by the contributing authors. The four parts of the book have addressed crucial questions about: 1. the dynamics of governance networks; 2. the reasons for governance network failure; 3. how to metagovern governance networks; and 4. the democratic problems and potentials of governance networks. Each of the four parts consisted of four chapters: a review chapter presenting different theoretical approaches to the issue at hand, and three thematic chapters attacking the particular research question from different angles. In this section, we summarize the contributions of the thematic chapters, and identify loose ends and issues that must be dealt with by the second generation of governance network theory. Understanding network dynamics The first part of the book takes on the difficult task of producing new theoretical insights into the dynamics of governance networks. In Chapter 2 Nils Hertting shows how governance networks differ from other institutional settings by not being formed once and for all, but again and again. The particular game structures inherent in governance networks give rise to free riding problems, assurance problems and generosity problems, and for that reason governance networks are permanently on the brink of falling apart. Accordingly, their survival demands constant efforts to stabilize them in and though ongoing attempts to ensure policy coordination. This emphasis on the vulnerability and instability of governance networks increases our understanding of the process of network formation, but it also calls for further reflection on the reasons why actors choose to form networks in the face of the various problems relating to collective action. In addition, it raises a broader set of questions that need to be addressed by the second generation of governance network research: How can the sources of instability be reduced through various forms of institutionalization? How are the preferences and motivations of the actors shaped by the institutional conditions and traditions? Is the formation of governance networks path-dependent? In Chapter 3 Guy Peters theorizes further on the inherent vulnerability and instability of governance networks, and the specific institutional


dynamics that cause it. In order to be effective, he argues, governance networks must reach some level of stability that is achieved through institutionalization and deinstitutionalization. Effective network governance requires the presence of committed network actors (individual as well as collective) who are capable of making decisions and producing desired outcomes. It also requires that governance networks are capable of interacting with and relating to outside actors from other networks and/or institutions. Further considerations on how the actors’ commitment to interaction, their capacity for joint action and their ability to relate to outside actors are initiated and consolidated in and through different institutional structures would be very interesting in this respect. Among other things, it is central to the second generation of governance network theories to address the question of how governance networks function in an institutional context dominated by institutional features associated with the rule of the state, the market, or civil society. In Chapter 4 Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes stress the central role of beliefs and traditions for the functioning and transformation of governance networks. They point to the efforts of the individual network actors to cope with contradictory demands deriving from competing narratives on how governance is produced as one of the main sources of network transformation. The recognition of the importance of individual coping strategies directed towards the balancing of competing demands seems crucial for our understanding of network transformation. It does, however, remain somewhat unclear as to what extent existing beliefs and traditions are to be perceived as a source of such competing demands, and thus whether an integrated part of network transformation is changes of such beliefs and traditions. If so, the uncovering of institutionalized beliefs and traditions is crucial for our efforts to understand how and why governance networks are being transformed. This interplay between network transformation and the transformation of institutionalized beliefs and traditions needs to be further analysed. However, a better understanding of network transformation also calls for an analysis of how governance networks and the narratives that ensure their internal cohesion are affected by changes in the broader political, cultural and socioeconomic context. While transformations of networks might not be easy to impose from the outside, contextual changes are likely to produce dilemmas that, whether intended or not, transform governance networks in one way or another. Reasons for governance network failure Part II has aimed to enhance our theoretical understanding of the reasons for governance network failure and the conditions for success.


In Chapter 6, Linze Schaap considers the extent to which network closure is likely to cause network failure. He identifies different kinds of social and cognitive closure on the part of the actors or the network as a whole and he explains these different forms of closure as a result of: 1. the accommodation of the veto powers of the interdependent network actors; 2. the filtering effects of the common frame of reference; and 3. the networks’ imbeddedness in a particular policy specific communication system. While Schaap provides important insights into the impact of different forms of network closure, he does not touch upon the closure invoked by different forms of self-exclusion, whereby relevant and affected policy actors either construct the governance network as an enemy, or believe that participation in it will somehow compromise their identity. This issue needs further attention by the second generation of network theorists, and opens a more general debate about the relationship between exclusion, network closure and governance failure. Will exclusion necessarily produce closure? Will closure necessarily result in governance network failure, or is some degree of closure necessary in order to govern successfully? In Chapter 7 Joop Koppenjan argues that a certain balance between conflict and consensus is needed in order for governance networks to function properly. Conflicts do not necessarily produce failure. Of course, the presence of long, strong and irreconcilable conflicts can be damaging, but the absence of conflicts is equally problematic. In fact, a certain level of conflict will help to prevent closure, enhance plurality, promote transparency, mobilize actors, and provide new information, higher quality and more innovation. However, as Koppenjan argues, a certain degree of consensus is also important in order to avoid network failure as consensus helps to provide certainty, establish enduring relations, simplify problem solving and reduce transaction costs. While the recognition of the importance of balancing conflict and consensus is important for understanding why networks sometimes fail, it remains somewhat unclear how consensus and conflict are related to each other, and how the two concepts are defined. Is consensus the absence of conflict, or is consensus a result of conflicts and power struggles and itself conditioned on the exclusion of a constitutive outside of enemy forces? Such considerations call for a general debate about the nature of politics, negotiated governance and conflict resolution. In Chapter 8 Tanja Börzel and Diana Panke analyse the relationship between effectiveness and legitimacy. They argue that the relationship between the two is not necessarily, as it is often argued, that of a trade off. In fact, governance networks might help to transform the relation between effectiveness and legitimacy into a plus-sum game where the


two crucial objectives compliment and reinforce each other. However, the plus-sum game between effectiveness and legitimacy is not ensured merely by means of enhancing the capacity for effective problem solving through the inclusion of active, knowledgeable and responsible stakeholders. It is not enough to increase output legitimacy through the production of more effective policy outcomes. Governance networks should also enhance democratic input legitimacy by increasing participation, deliberation and accountability. This intriguing claim for the need to increase the input legitimacy of governance networks raises the important question, which is only marginally considered by Börzel and Panke, about how governance networks are to be held accountable through public scrutiny and political sanctions. In addition, we need to study how the demand for increased democratic legitimacy can be realized in different institutional settings and at different levels of governance. Metagoverning governance networks The third part of the book has focussed on the question of how to metagovern governance networks. In Chapter 10 Peter Triantafillou looks at how governance networks are formed and mobilized through metagovernance. He shows that the metagovernance of governance networks is not, as most governance network theorists tend to argue, first and foremost a matter of affecting the structures of interdependency between rational, self-interested network actors. Metagovernance is primarily exercised through a combination of technologies of agency that shape the identities, norms and interests of the network actors and technologies of performance that regulate the calculations and conduct of the network actors. By focussing on the institutional devices, methods and technologies of metagovernance, rather than on the exercise of political authority over the network, it becomes possible to see the relation between power and freedom as a positive-sum rather than a zero-sum game. The emphasis on institutional technologies that shape the identity of the network actors and construct the normative framework for their interaction provides a new insight into the practice of metagovernance in advanced liberal societies. However, it remains a little unclear who the metagovernors are, how their identity as metagovernors is shaped and what guides the regulatory practices. The technologies of metagovernance are a part of a certain governmentality that tends to change over time, but it is not clear what drives the historical changes. In Chapter 11 Erik-Hans Klijn and Julian Edelenbos ask how governance networks can be metagoverned through the exercise of network


management that combines process management and institutional design. Process management can be exercised through the activation of particular actors, the creation of organizational arrangements, the guidance of network interactions, formation of goal-achieving strategies, joint knowledge production, and the creation of trust. Institutional design is carried out through transformations of the game structures that regulate the patterns of interaction between the network actors. Klijn and Edelenbos argue that the complexity of network management means that the designated network managers must possess a broad range of skills including analytical skills, substantive knowledge, design competences, capacities to assess, choose and implement workable network strategies, and the ability to access network conditions. The authors make an important contribution to understanding how complex networks can be managed, but we need further reflection on the effect of network management on governance networks. In particular, we need further discussion of how governance networks can be metagoverned without ruining their capacity for self-regulation. How can process management and institutional design help to facilitate self-regulation and how do we avoid network management resulting in the disempowerment of the network actors? In Chapter 12, Laurence O’Toole follows up on the question of how to regulate governance networks in order to improve their functioning. He focuses on the interaction between public authorities and governance networks in order to investigate how public authorities can shape the outputs and outcomes of governance networks through various forms of metagovernance. O’Toole shows how public authorities are neither in total control nor completely impotent vis-à-vis governance networks. The specific status, expectations and formal authority of government agencies permit them to operate at a meta-level of governance concerned with policy formation and constitutional regulation and not just at the operational level of concrete governance processes. That allows them to influence the games that structure the interaction within network governance. This identification of the specific capacity that public authorities have for exercising metagovernance is important and convincing, but further studies are needed in order to assess how the capacity to exercise metagovernance depends on the location of the public authorities at particular levels of governance (local, national, transnational) and on the specific character of the governance network and the actors it inhabits. Do local authorities have the same capacity to govern networks as national and transnational authorities, and are public authorities capable of metagoverning governance networks


consisting of strong business corporations in the same ways and to the same degree as governance networks consisting of local citizens? Democratic problems and potentials The fourth and final part of the book has dealt with the crucial question about the democratic implications of governance networks. In Chapter 14 Allan Dreyer Hansen looks at the question of the democratic problems and potentials of governance networks through the lens of a reformulated theory of participatory democracy. He concludes that governance networks are likely to have positive as well as negative effects on democracy. On the one hand, governance networks might strengthen democracy through the facilitation of democratic learning and empowerment of the involved actors and through the promotion of responsive deliberation based on agonistic respect. On the other hand, these democratic potentials are likely to be countered by democratic problems in terms of unequal patterns of participation and limited publicity and transparency. Accordingly, we need to consider what democratic norms count the most in order to be able to assess the aggregated effects of governance networks on democracy. Hansen’s identification of the ambiguous democratic effects of governance networks is convincing, but it does seem rather unclear why governance networks necessarily provide a more unequal access, and are more focussed on particularistic interests than territorial forms of participation and governance such as city councils, neighbourhood councils, etc. A clarification of these issues calls for a general discussion about the relationship between territorially and functionally demarcated forms of governance, and for an analysis of the way these forms of governance regulate democratic participation. In Chapter 15, John Dryzek discusses how governance networks can possibly realize the democratic ideals of political equality, popular control and political freedom. The question he raises is whether these democratic ideals, which constitute the backbone of the territorially demarcated forms of liberal parliamentary democracy, can be redeemed in the context of the much more issue-specific, informal and sometimes transnational governance networks. Dryzek claims that it is possible to apply the demand for political equality, popular control and political freedom to governance networks, but it requires a rethinking of the content of these values, and of the liberal theories of democracy as such, along the lines of a discursive theory of democracy. Seen from the perspective of discursive democracy, political equality must be reinterpreted as a demand for inclusion of all those who are affected by the decisions of a particular governance network. Popular control must be


reinterpreted as a question of the scope of issues that the affected should be able to control and as a question of the how much control the affected should have with a particular issue. Finally, political freedom must be understood as access to contestation through all the available forms of communication. The claim for the necessity to reinterpret liberal theories of democracy and its basic norms is compelling, but it raises the central question as to how the reinterpreted democratic values are to be institutionalized: How do we regulate the processes that lead to defining who should be considered as affected? How should we decide who is to control what? How can we ensure that this control is substantial and not merely symbolic, and how can we maintain the highest possible level of contestation? Governance networks might contribute to promoting norms associated with a discursive democracy, but it is important to consider how governance networks can be institutionalized and articulated with other institutionalized forms of democracy. In Chapter 16, Anders Esmark addresses the pressing question about the democratic accountability of governance networks. Starting from a post-liberal democratic line of thinking he focuses on three central aspects of accountability: inclusion, publicity and responsiveness. Inspired by functionalist theories of representation Esmark claims that the members of governance networks should not be seen as accountability holders, but rather as accountability holdees. Hence, a governance network should be seen as a representative forum that must seek accountability among a broader environment of affected stakeholders. Seen from this perspective, he argues that governance networks have the potential to enhance democracy. The enhancement of democracy is not, as some might argue, a result of the introduction of some kind of direct participation. Rather, it is the result of the introduction of a new form of functional representation that contributes to ensuring the democratic accountability of the political system as a whole by supplementing the democratic accountability produced by parliamentary democracy. The claim that network participants should first and foremost be seen as accountability holdees points to the fact that governance networks in most cases consist of political sub-elites and, therefore, should not be interpreted and evaluated as a form of direct citizen participation. However, it remains somewhat unclear whether it is possible to distinguish between the role of governance networks as an accountability holdee in relation to the stakeholders and as an accountability holdee in relation to the political authorities or other governance networks. This issue needs further consideration by the second generation of governance network research. But even more importantly, the new insights


into the democratic accountability of governance networks calls for a general discussion about how a democratic relationship between governance networks as accountability holdees and the broader set of affected stakeholders is to be institutionalized and maintained.

Where next? We hope that this book will help to renew and enlarge the research agenda in the field of governance network theory. Hence, to the questions raised by the first generation of governance network research we have added some new and intriguing questions that aim to refocus the scholarly debate about the new interactive forms of negotiated governance. The authors have through their excellent contributions provided some initial answers to the questions we have raised, but there is some way to go before we have fully explored the terrain that has been opened by the new questions and answers, and there are crucial challenges ahead. The theoretical challenge is to find new ways of sharpening reformulating, comparing, combining and even transgressing the theoretical approaches discussed in this volume and the analytical distinctions on which they build. The theoretical approaches all have particular strengths and weaknesses in answering the questions of the second generation of governance network research. Therefore, we must find ways of exploiting the advantages of the different approaches, while eliminating, or compensating for, their inherent limitations. This must be done through a reformulation of the competing theoretical frameworks or the construction of new frameworks out of the old ones. It is tempting to try to incorporate arguments from other theories into a particular promising theoretical framework, or to try to fuse different theories into a new framework, but in both cases it is important to avoid an eclectic combination of theoretical arguments that are informed by different analytical assumptions and ontologies. At the empirical level, we need individual and comparative case studies based on clear operationalizations of the theoretical concepts in order to refine the theoretical concepts and arguments and test how the extent to which they can capture the empirical richness of the concrete networked policy processes. As such, we need empirical studies that aim to uncover the institutional conditions for the formation and transformation of governance networks, the context dependent dilemmas conditioning their functioning, the deployment and effects of different forms of metagovernance, and the extent to which governance networks are democratically anchored (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005a).


The methodological challenge is to expand the methodological bag of tools to include other than the standard qualitative social science methods in terms of research interviews and document studies. Other non-standard methods such as focus group interviews, observation studies, diary writing and social network analysis can help us to reveal the form and character of the formal and informal relations between relevant and affected policy actors. The application of a broader range of social scientific methods will help to provide a richer data base that will facilitate the generation of plausible research results on the basis of triangulation. Another methodological challenge is to develop a more interactionist research practice based on a continued dialogue with the knowledgeable and reflexive policy actors inhabiting the empirical field that we are studying (Zouridis, 2003). Interaction with the actors who are involved in particular governance networks can help us to sharpen our research questions by focussing on relevant policy problems, identify and gain access important data sources and qualify our interpretation of data and test the plausibility of our conclusions. The research agenda in the field of governance network theory will be transformed and expanded several times in the years to come, both in response to new theoretical impulses and re-orientations and in response to empirical developments in a politico-administrative environment where the institutionalized forms of network governance are constantly problematized by political, administrative and lay actors. A couple of interesting questions are already calling for our attention. One question relates to the conceptions, reasons and rationales informing the political choice between different combinations of hierarchy, market and networks in relation to particular policy problems. Another question concerns the positive and negative effects that hierarchy and market may have on governance networks and vice versa. A third question is about the impact of political cultures and traditions on the form and functioning of governance networks in different countries and at different levels. A fourth question concerns the role of governance networks in linking actors from different countries, levels and spheres in transnational, multi-level and multi-cultural networks in which the rules and norms guiding negotiated policy interaction are far from clear in the outset. Several other important questions could be mentioned, but only time will tell whether any of them will make their way to the top of the research agenda. However, the future of governance network research should not be allowed to drift ahead without deliberate and reasoned attempts to point the large community of governance researchers in new directions.


Several contributions to this book seem to suggest that the future analysis of governance networks will benefit from a more careful analysis of different kinds of decentred structures. As such, we need to focus more on: the discursive structures that help unify different and conflicting actors around common objectives and joint policy making; the structures of interaction that assign and distribute different roles and functions to the network actors; and the power structures that define the political conflicts and cleavages between the network actors and determine the output and outcome of their negotiated interaction. Network analysis often has great difficulties accounting for the internal cohesion and external boundaries of governance networks, conceived as loosely-defined coalitions of policy actors (Knox et al., 2006: 121). The network actors might have conflicting preferences and interests, might come from different cultures and might use different linguistic and behavioural codes, but still engage in stable policy negotiations with each other. This is commonly explained by the actors’ mutual need for policy coordination and exchange of resources. But what is it that should be coordinated? How is the object of coordination and joint regulation defined and dealt with by the actors? Networkbased policy processes dealing with a particular policy problem rarely include all the relevant and affected actors. We might, therefore, ask how the in-group and out-group are defined and how the inclusion and exclusion of policy actors is regulated. In order to answer these pertinent questions, the analysis of governance networks will benefit from a closer analysis of the emerging discursive structures and story lines that construct a hegemonic conception of policy problems, political values and feasible solutions within a particular governance network and define the limits and boundaries of the network by positing a threatening other of enemies and policy disasters that, at once, negate and stabilize the policy discourse of the governance network (Hajer, 1993, 1995; Howarth, 2000; Torfing, 1999). Governance networks are held together by the policy discourse that the networks actors enact and re-enact in the course of interaction. The structuring of the policy discourse around tendentially empty signifiers like ‘modernization’, ‘efficiency’, and ‘social justice’ permits a large number of policy actors to subscribe themselves into the networked policy making, but as the dominant actors succeed to define the content of the empty signifiers exclusions are inevitable. The policy discourse defines a common room for negotiation and the actors will play different roles and have different functions in these negotiations. Despite the seemingly horizontal articulation of policy actors within governance


networks and their mutual dependency on each other’s resources, there are often huge differences among the network actors in terms of the intensity, direction and density of their contacts and in terms of their position in relation to different actors and cliques. A careful analysis of the structures of interaction will help to establish the overall shape of the network and the character and centrality of the different network actors. This will in turn facilitate the determination of the different brokerage roles of the network actors who might perform important roles as coordinators, gatekeepers, representatives, etc. The quantitative techniques associated with Social Network Analysis (Scott, 1991) are helpful in analysing the interaction structures within governance networks, but since this type of analysis is blind to the content of the network interactions, it should be firmly anchored in political and social anthropological network theory (Knox et al., 2006). The analysis of the structures of interaction makes it possible to understand the different positions and roles of the network actors. The structural position of the network actors is an important source of influence for the individual actors and it is often sustained by key resources in terms of formal authority, knowledge, money, organizational capacities, etc. However, the distribution of resources among the network actors does not tell the full story about the power relations within governance networks. Of course, the deployment of different kinds of resources are important for the exercise of power, but the value and significance of the actors’ resources is always contextually determined and, in the last instance, the exercise of power rests on the power strategies of the actors and the way these strategies are framed by the discourse that constructs the cohesion and boundaries of the governance network. The analysis of the power structures of governance networks involve careful analysis of how the different network actors succeed to influence the concrete decision-making, the political agenda of the governance network, and the commonly accepted values, objectives and beliefs. But the analysis of the ‘three faces of power’ (Lukes, 1974) must be imbedded in an analysis of how the network actors draw upon, enact and transform the policy discourse that supports and constrains the governance network by invoking a particular set of inclusions and exclusions of meaning, actions and metaphors (Torfing, 1999). The emphasis on power, conflict and antagonism will help to develop a more critical perspective on the hegemonic conception of the modern governance. Although one should be careful not to generalize, there is a strong tendency in the literature on governance networks and among policy makers to deny the political character of network governance by


emphasizing the rational, consensus-oriented deliberation that is supposed to result in pragmatic problem solving through a plus-sum game without any losers. The official partnership rhetoric that supports the formation and development of governance networks at different levels is often informed by the same belief in a non-adversarial, managerial policy making. According to Chantal Mouffe (2005), the implicit idea of a network-based policy making without politics is a part of a dangerous post-political vision that aims to eliminate conflict and antagonism in the name of a rationalist consensus. Contrary to the optimistic belief that the elimination of political conflict and social antagonisms, and the political passions they are invoking, will lead to a strong and harmonious democracy, the post-political elimination of strife, passion and social antagonism from the political and democratic domain will tend to spur the formation of moral antagonisms based on increasingly essentialist and fundamentalist values that cannot be subjected to democratic deliberation and therefore constitute a threat to democracy. In other words, ‘a healthy democratic process calls for a vibrant clash of political positions and an open conflict of interests’ (Mouffe, 1993: 6). Of course, this does not mean that governance networks should be turned into battlegrounds for irreconcilable conflicts between sworn enemies. Social antagonisms are an intrinsic part of public governance and they must find ways of expressing themselves at the level of democratic policy making, but they must be tamed by the development of a democratic ethos and a grammar of democratic conduct that turn ‘enemies’ into ‘adversaries’ and replace ‘antagonistic clashes’ with ‘agonistic respect’ based on the recognition of the contingency of all political interest, beliefs and values. Our speculations about the future agenda of governance network research, and the need to focus more explicitly on the structures of discourse, interaction and power, should not blind us to the fact that recent trends in the debate on governance tend to turn the study of governance networks into a subset of a broader research program focussing on governance through ‘regulated self-regulation’ (Cruikshank, 1999; Dean, 1999; Rose, 1999). According to this argument, governments at all levels are facing mounting pressures to solve complex policy problems through flexible, targeted, timely and responsive interventions, while, at the same time, deploying a minimum of political force and fiscal resources. A way out of this impasse is that the governments seek to rely more on practices of ‘regulated self-regulation’, whereby individuals, target groups, private enterprises, public institutions, governance networks, etc. are called upon to regulate themselves in


accordance with broadly defined goals, norms, values and rationalities. Today, governance at a distance, through the regulation of self-regulation, is not restricted to the formation and activation of governance networks. Increasingly, citizens are expected to regulate themselves in relation to norms defining a healthy living. Ethnic groups are expected to organize and regulate themselves in order to enhance their social and cultural integration into mainstream society. Private firms are hailed by the discourse of Corporate Social Responsibility to developed new forms of sheltered employment and to facilitate integration of different groups of unemployed. Public institutions are called upon to translate general political objectives into relevant local targets to be reached through the construction of partnerships with private actors. In short, a whole range of societal actors are expected to mobilize their energies, resources and knowledge in practices of self-regulation that are metagoverned by political authorities at various levels. In this perspective governance networks are revealed as one among many examples of regulated self-regulation and the notion of metagovernance is expanded to other studies of governance, which in turn might inspire and feed back into the study of how to develop and sustain democratic network governance.

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Index access, to networks, 255–7 accountability administrative, 279 as a democratic norm, 276–8 holders and holdees, 282–4 and inclusion, 278–82 and information, 290 political, 279 and publicity, 284–6 and responsiveness, 290–2 and sanctions, 290–1 activation, networks, 204 activism, 188 actor calculation mechanism, 50–1 adaptation/adaptiveness, 105–6 adaptive process management, 202 Adler, E., 72 administrative accountability, 279, 291 advanced liberal government, 6, 107, 184–5 definition of, 186 and governmentality, 185–7 advocacy coalitions, 144 affectedness, 280, 281 ‘agentification’, 31, 43 agonistic democracy, 243–5, 266–8 Agranoff, R.I., 84, 133, 146, 147, 199 Aldrich, H.E., 4, 121, 139 Alford, R.R., 36 Allison, G.T., 144 Alter, C., 212 anarchy, 157 Anglo-governance school, 77, 79 anthropological network theory, 313 apathy, 248 arenas, 144, 145, 148 arguing, 156 Aristoteles, 157 Aristotle, 242 associations, 237–8 associative democracy, 237–8, 280 assurance problem, 53–4

asymmetrical allocations, 9 attenuated influence, 217 authenticity, 270 autonomy of functionally delimited groups, 275 governing through formation of, 190–4 autopoietic social systems, 111, 114, 115, 122 autopoietic systems theory, 113–17 Axelrod, R.A., 29, 159, 160, 206 Bache, I., 192 Bachman, R., 206 Bachrach, P., 136, 142 ‘backward mapping’, 5 Bang, H., 3 Baratz, M.S., 136, 142 Barber, B., 247, 248, 249 Bardach, E., 67 bargaining, 155 Barns, M., 133, 134 Bates, R.H. et al., 45, 46, 49 Behn, R.D., 279, 284, 285, 291 Bengtsson, B., 45 Benhabib, S., 268 Bennet, W.L., 289 Benson, J.K., 4, 21, 48, 139, 140 Benz, A., 153 Bevir, M., 67, 77, 80, 82, 90 Bevir, M. et al., 85 bias, mobilization of, 136 Blom-Hansen, J., 44, 138 Blumberg, B.F., 51 Bogason, P., 5, 61, 112 Bohman, J., 265 Boli, J., 162 Borell, K., 191 Börzel, T.A., 54, 138, 153, 154, 155, 158, 163 bottom-up network formation, 36, 45 bounded rationality, 28 343

344 Index Bressers, H. et al., 221, 222, 223, 224 brokerage, 126, 128 Brown, L.D., 137, 147, 149, 150 Brühl, W. et al., 153, 161 Bruijn, J.A. de et al., 201, 202 Bueren, E. van, 205, 213 Burchell, G., 187 Burns, T.R., 147, 207 Butler, C.T., 135, 137 Calvert, R.L., 29 Campbell, J.L., 28, 30, 41 capacities, of network actors, 37 Carlsson, L., 51 Castells, M., 9 Cawson, A., 139 central planning, 5 Chalmers, J., 189 Chambers, S., 266 change managing in networks, 83–7 in networks, 81–2 Chan, J., 87 Chayes, A., 159 Chayes, A.H., 159 Checkel, J.T., 155 Chiles, T.H., 206 China, ‘harmonious society’, 136 civil society, 235 Clegg, S.R., 30 closedness, of governance networks, 99–100, 301 closed networks, governing, 124–5 closed policy communication systems, governing, 129–31 closure cognitive, 118, 119 explanations for, 120–3 and ‘frames of reference’, 121–2 and governance, 111–32 and government, 112 and interdependence, 121 of networks, 118 relations between explanations for, 123–4 social, 118, 119, 120 types of, 118–21, 305 within networks, 118 Cobb, R.W., 135, 138, 142

cognitive closedness, 99 cognitive closure, 118, 119 Cohen, D.K., 205 Cohen, J., 268 Cohen, M.D., 5 Coleman, J.S., 46, 48, 57 collaboration, 227 collective action, 201 collective action problems, 34 collective behaviour, 242 collectively negotiated decisions, 12 ‘common good’, 248, 249–51 and governance networks, 250–1 communication, 114, 115, 122, 266–8, 286 community democracy, 241–3 competitive democracy, 236–9, 275 complexity, 5 compromise formation, 100 conflict, 27, 28, 33, 133, 222, 240, 243, 305 at institutional level, 149 at interaction level, 149 excessive, 150 implications of level within networks, 151 meaning of, 135 negative and positive functions, 137–8 ‘conflict avoidance’, 53 conflict reduction, 146, 170 conflict resolution, 147 Connolly, W.E., 243, 244, 250, 253 consensus, 254, 305 at institutional level, 149 concept of, 133 drawbacks, 136 excessive, 150 and group decision making, 136 implications of level within networks, 151 insufficient consensus in policy networks, 143–7 meaning of, 135 and minorities, 136–7 policy networks, and the overproduction of consensus, 141–3

Index 345 consensus – continued positive and negative functions, 135–7 role and policy networks, 140–1 surplus in policy networks, 138–40 consensus building, 134, 146 conservatism, 113, 118 constitution, 101 content managing, 205–4 in process design, 202 context steering, 130 ‘contextual interaction theory’, 221 contextual mechanism of governance network formation, 47–50 mutual dependencies, 48–9 perceptions, 49 resource and strategic dimension of interdependencies, 47–8 symmetrical and asymmetrical interdependencies, 49–50 contingency approach to management, 134 Cook, 289 cooperation, 52, 201, 217–18 problems, 44 and trust, 206 coordination, 74, 117, 200 coordination games, 222, 224 corporate social responsibility, 194, 315 corporatist arrangements, 153 Coser, L.A., 135, 137, 149 cosmopolitan democracy, 265 Covaleski, M.A., 69 critical theory, 265–6 Crozier, M., 137, 144 Cruikshank, B., 314 Cruikshank, J., 135 Cunningham, F., 247, 248 Cutler, C.A. et al., 153, 156 Czempiel, E.O., 155 Damgaard, B., 191, 254 Davies, A., 87 Davis, G., 189 Deakin, S., 206 Dean, M., 6, 17, 38, 106, 107, 178, 179, 194, 314

decentred theory, 77, 80–1, 88, 90, 301 change in networks, 81–2 decision making, governance networks, 12 decisions collectively negotiated, 12 documenting, 285, 287–8 ‘degovernmentalization’, state, 3 deinstitutionalization, 209, 301 and institutionalization, 62–4 pressures for, 66 Deitelhoff, N., 164 Deleuze, G., 19 deliberate accountability, 281 deliberative democracy, 264–5, 268, 280–1, 286, 293 democracy, 164 aggregative theories of, 235 associative model, 237–8 contribution of governance networks, 271–3 definition of, 234 impact of governance networks, 233–4, 308–10 learning, 251–2 liberal theories of, 234–5 models of, 269–71 ‘democracy of the affected’, 268 democratic accountability, network governance, 274–96, 309–10 ‘democratic anchorage’, 15 democratic elite theory, 280, 292 democratic ethos, 252, 253 democratic legitimacy, 4 democratic theory, 300 communicative aspect and networks, 266–8 democratization, 270 Deng, F., 161, 162 Denmark Local Coordination Committees on Preventive Labour Market Measures, 192 municipal reform, 191 Denters, B.O. et al., 62 Dery, D., 133 DiMaggio, J., 15, 17, 29, 36, 104 Dimaggio, P., 207

346 Index Dinsmith, M.W., 69 ‘disconnecting’ games, 226 discursive democracy, 271–2, 302 discursive structures, 312 and storylines, 312 documentation procedures, 288–9 Donzelot, J., 187 Dowding, K., 138, 184 Dryzek, J.S., 164, 268, 270, 271 Dunleavy, P., 29 Duverger, M., 27 Dyrberg, T.B., 30 Easton, D., 157 Eckersely, R., 268 economic governance, 108 Edelenbos, J., 201, 202, 205, 206, 209, 211, 212, 213 Eeten, M. van, 146, 147 effective governance, 97, 98 effectiveness, 157–9 demand for, 156–7 and legitimacy, 163–5, 305–6 effective network governance, 98 ‘efficiency of history’, 37, 105 Ehrmann, J.R., 205 Eijk, C. van der, 142 Eising, R., 153 Elder, C.D., 135, 138, 142 electoral mandates, 292 electoral representation, 277–8, 279 elites, 237, 239 Elster, J., 44, 45, 50, 53, 56, 135 Employment Guidelines, European Union, 2 employment policy, 195–6 ‘Empowered Participatory Governance’ (EPG), 239 empowerment, 188 endogenous evolution, 44 ‘energy’, 65 Entmann, R., 289 environmental justice movement, 267 ‘epistemic communities’, 72 equality, 254–5 and governance networks, 257–8 political equality, 263 within networks, 257 Esmark, A., 196, 117, 280

Esping, H., 191 ethnography, 82 Etzioni-Halevy, E., 237, 239, 280, 292 EU, 4 Employment Guidelines, 2 Europe, 139–40 European Employment Strategy (EES), 195 Evan, W.M., 3 face-to-face communications, 117 failure in governance, 171–2 governance networks, 15, 102–3, 108–9, 301, 304–6 Fairclough, N., 289 feminism, 270–1 Ferejohn, A., 45, 290 Finer, H., 27 Fisher, R., 147 Flam, H., 147, 207 Fleming, J., 85 flexible policy solutions, 97–8 Florini, A., 161, 162 Forester, J., 147, 211 formal organizations, 117 Forrester, 204 Foucault, M., 19, 30, 38, 39, 40, 41, 106, 178, 179, 185, 192, 301 fragmentation, 5, 44, 79, 102 ‘frames of reference’, 121–2, 123 governing closed frames of reference, 128–9 Frances, J., 79 franchise, 270 Franklin, G., 134, 138 freedom concepts of, 264 political, 309 Freeman, J.L., 138 free riding, 34, 52–3, 303 Frewer, L.J., 188 Friedberg, E., 137, 144 Friedland, R., 36 Friend, J.K. et al., 147, 200, 201 functional democracy, 292 functional differentiation, 115

Index 347 functionalist inclusion principle, 280 functionally delimited groups, autonomy, 275 functional representation, 275 Fung, A., 239, 240, 241 Gage, R.W., 200, 201, 202, 203, 211, 212 Galtung, F., 161 ‘game management’, 125, 127, 128 game mechanism of governance network formation, 51–6 assurance problem, 53–4 free riding problem, 52–3 generosity problem, 54–6 problem of continuous cooperation, 51 games, 89 ‘disconnecting’, 226 linking and segmenting games, 225–6 game structuring, 173 game theory, 221–2, 221–3, 300 Gay, P. du, 279 Geddes, B., 61 Geertz, C., 82 generalized trust, 51 generosity problem, 54–6 Gibbons, M. et al., 141 Giddens, A., 208 Glasbergen, P., 133, 147 goal-achieving strategies, 204–5 Gordon, C., 106 Goss, S., 85, 169, 233 governability, definition of, 103 governability theory, 17, 18, 301 and governance network failure, 102–3, 108–9, 301 and metagovernance, 172–5 governance and closure, 111–32 definitions of, 77, 88 failure, 171–2 in issue networks, 146–7 and network management, 199–200 networks as, 154–6 notion of, 8–9 openness, 112

governance network failure, 5, 95–110, 304–6 and governability theory, 102–3, 108–9, 301 and governmentality theory, 106–8 and integration theory, 104–6 and interdependency theory, 98–102 governance network formation, 43–60, 183–98 actor calculation mechanism, 50–1 contextual mechanism, 47–50 game mechanism, 51–6 mechanisms, 46–7 governance network research, 3–7, 14–20 first generation, 14 second generation, 14, 16, 43 governance networks, 2–3, 262–3, 297–9 analysis of change in, 82 autonomy, 190–1 benefits of, 216–17 closed nature of, 111 closedness of, 99–100 and closure, 120–1 and common good, 250–1 conditions for success and failure, 7 as continuous cooperation, 52 contribution to democracy, 271–3 decentred theory, 80–1 decision making, 12 defining, 8–11 definitions of, 9, 102, 104 democratic implications, 8, 308–10 democratic legitimacy, 15–16, 247 democratic potential, 284 dependence of actors, 9 drawbacks of, 216 dynamics of, 7, 303–4 effectiveness, 154, 156, 158 and equality, 257–8 formation, 183–98 governing outputs and outcomes, 215–30 impact on democracy, 233–4 impact of political cultures and traditions, 311 increased legitimacy, 69

348 Index governance networks – continued institutional ambiguity, 26 institutionalized framework, 10 interdependence, 121, 191 interdependency, 9–10 internal cohesion and external boundaries, 311 and learning democracy, 254 legitimacy, 153 and liberal democracy, 234–7 linkage of internal and external factors, 69 management of the consensusconflict dimension, 149 metagovernance, 306–8 mobilization, 183–98 negotiations, 10 operationally autonomous actors, 9 optimization of functioning, 13 outcomes, 108–9, 225–6 and participation, 247–61 path dependent transformation, 32–3 patterns of relationships in, 61 as a pluricentric governance system, 11–12 policy making in, 5 policy solutions, 97–8, 99 positive approach, 78–9 and postliberal democracy, 236–45 production of public purpose, 11 self-regulation, 10 social exclusion, 119 and social systems, 117–18 as a solution, 153 and state, 173–4 as a synthesis of state and market, 11 as a threat to democracy, 243 and traditional governance, 298–9 governance processes hierarchical coordination, 155 non-hierarchical coordination (steering), 155 governance structures, and processes, 156 ‘governance turn’, 153

governing outputs and outcomes of governance networks, 215–30 performance of networks, 194–6 through formation of autonomy and interdependencies, 190–4 governing processes, 3 government art of, 38–9 and closure, 112 Foucault on, 185–6, 192 governmentality and advanced liberal government, 185–7 definition of, 106 Foucault on, 186 governmentality theory, 17, 19 and governance network failure, 106–8, 109–10 and metagovernance, 178–80 government failure, 95 Guattari, F., 19 guiding strategies, 204–5 Gutmann, A., 281, 286, 294 Haahr, J.H., 195 Habermas, J., 265, 266, 284, 286 Hage, J., 212 Hajer, M., 3, 26, 40, 49, 101, 141, 312 Hall, P.A., 28, 33, 41, 140 Hall, T.E., 216 Hammersley, M., 82 Hanf, K., 48, 113, 147, 199, 201, 203, 213 Hansen et al., 254 Hardin, G., 160 Harding, A., 192 Hardin, R., 160 Hart, P., 136 Häusler, J. et al., 56 Hay, C., 43, 44, 45 Healey, P., 211 Heclo, H., 3, 4, 82, 143, 145 Hedström, P., 46 Heffen, O. van, 169 Heffen, O.V. et al., 3 Heisler, M.O., 139 Held, D., 265, 277 Héritier, A., 155, 157, 159

Index 349 Hermansson, J., 52, 53 Hernes, G., 49 Hertting, N., 47, 53, 56, 57 hierarchical regulation, 172 hierarchies, 154, 155, 157, 299, 311 Hirst, P., 3, 237, 238, 239, 280 historical institutionalism, 28, 31–3, 41–3, 64, 300–301 Hjern, B., 5, 43, 73, 139, 221 Hodgson, G.M., 32 Hodson, D., 195 Holden, B., 164, 234 ‘holistic governance’, 32 Holzinger, K., 165 homelessness policy, 59n6 Hoppe, R., 141, 144 horizontal coordination, 33 horizontal networks, 3, 34 Hösli, M., 154 Howarth, D., 312 Hull, C., 5, 43, 221 human interaction, 117 human rights, 158, 161 Huntington, S.P., 63 Hurd, I., 159 identities, changing, 252–4 identity, of network actors, 37 implementation resistance, 13 incentive and opportunity structure, 47 inciting governance, 130 inclusion, 275 and accountability, 278–82 in networks, 255–7 ‘inclusion of the affected’, 255–6 inertia, in institutions, 65–6 informality, 51, 56, 58 informal networks, 58 information, as a resource, 48 informed consent, 285 INGOs (international nongovernmental organizations), 162 input legitimacy, 306 instability, 303 institutional ambiguity, governance networks, 26 institutional design, 206–7, 210–11 definition of, 207–8 types of strategy for, 208–9

institutional dissociation, 210 institutionalization concepts of, 63 and deinstitutionalization, 62–4: characteristics of members, 71–3; functional factors, 69–70; operating environment, 73–4; political factors, 66–9; social pressures, 70–71; tasks, 74 rational choice conceptions, 63–4 institutionalized discourses of governance, tactical polyvalence of, 40–1 institutionalized framework, 10, 25–7 institutional tensions, 209–10 institutional theory, 27, 300 institutions, 31 inertia in, 65–6 need for, 50 and power, 30 integration theory, 17, 18–19 and governance network failure, 104–6, 109 and metagoverance, 175–7 interaction, 117 structures of, 312 interaction processes, 150 interactive policy development, 209–10, 211 interdependencies, governing through formation of, 190–4 interdependency, 9–10, 47–8, 121 interdependency theory, 17, 18, 98–102 and governance network failure, 98–102, 108–9 and metagovernance, 170–2, 180–1 interest formation, 188 interest groups, 139, 145 interference (structural coupling between systems), 116 ‘intermediary groups’, 6 interorganizational negotiation, 4 interorganizational relations, 3, 140 inter-organization theory, 47, 139 interpenetration, 116 intersystem relations, 116

350 Index ‘iron triangles’, 4, 138, 139, 145 issue networks, 49, 112, 143, 144–6 governance in, 146–7 Jachtenfuchs, M., 153 Janis, I.L., 136 Jenkins-Smith, H.C., 82, 146 Jessop, B., 1, 5, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 87, 96, 97, 98, 169, 171, 190, 233 Johansson, R., 191 John, P., 112 Johnson, J.D., 45, 46 Johnson, N., 27 joint knowledge production, 205–6 Jong, M. de, 211 Jordan, G., 119, 134, 140 Josling, T.E., 209 journalists, 289 Kahn, R.L., 65 Kaiser, K., 162 Katz, D., 65 Kaufmann, A., 247 Kaufmann, F.X. et al., 199 Keck, M., 161 Kenis, P., 143, 157 Keohane, R., 162 Kersbergen, K.V., 9, 11 Kickert, W.J.M., 3, 13, 15, 51, 62, 125, 126, 127, 170, 171, 184, 202, 203 Kickert, W.J.M. et al., 121, 133, 146, 169, 170, 171, 191, 199, 200, 233 Kingdon, J.W., 143, 212 King, L.A., 209 Kiser, L.L., 121, 219 Kiss, G., 114 Klijn, E.H., 4, 5, 10, 13, 15, 47, 48, 51, 96, 99, 100, 140, 141, 145, 146, 147, 148, 170, 171, 191, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 206, 207, 208, 212, 213 Klok, P.J., 221 Kneer, G., 116 Knoke, D., 139, 143 ‘knowledge disputes’, 205 knowledge production, 141, 144 Knox, H. et al., 312, 313 Koch, H., 247, 249 Kohler-Koch, B., 153, 154

Kok, W.J.P., 142 Kooiman, J., 3, 5, 13, 14, 32, 33, 102, 103, 113, 153, 155, 156, 157, 169, 172, 173, 174, 175, 184, 233 Koppen, 116 Koppenjan, J.F.M., 5, 10, 13, 15, 51, 96, 99, 100, 125, 126, 127, 128, 139, 141, 145, 146, 148, 170, 171, 184, 191, 199, 200, 201, 202, 204, 208, 213 Koppenjan, J.F.M. et al., 145 Krasner, S.D., 32, 38 Laclau, E., 30, 39, 40, 250, 251 laissez faire liberalism, 106 Lane, C., 206 Laumann, E.O., 139, 143 Lawrence, T.B. et al., 209 learning, 105, 299 learning democracy, 251–2 and governance networks, 254 legal and financial methods, of network formation, 191–2 Le Galès, P., 157 legitimacy, 159–63 demand for, 156–7 and effectiveness, 163–5 of network governance, 153 Lehmbruch, G., 139 Leroy, 134 Levi, M., 51 Levine, S., 139 Levy, A., 129 liberal democracy, and governance networks, 234–7 Lindblom, C.E., 154, 205 linkages, 116 linking and segmenting games, 225–6 Lipsky, M., 5 listening, to others, 254 local governance, 112 local public sector, 31–2 Lowi, T.J., 145, 161, 216, 262 Luhmann, N., 111, 114, 115, 116, 124, 129, 160 Lukes, S., 314 Lynn, L.E., 204 Lynn, L.E. Jr, 222

Index 351 McGuire, M., 199, 203, 212 McMackin, J., 206 Macpherson, C.B., 234, 247, 252, 277 macro-micro-macro schedule, 57 Maher, I., 195 ‘management by chaos’, 127 management ethics, 194 management reforms, police service, 85–7 mandates, 293–4 Mandell, M.P., 133, 146, 147, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 211, 212, 213 Manin, B., 268, 277 March, J.G., 3, 4, 10, 13, 15, 17, 29, 35, 36, 37, 38, 41, 49, 104, 105, 112, 113, 118, 119, 134, 175, 176, 177, 188, 190, 207, 234, 242, 274, 285, 289, 290 Marin, B., 3, 9, 14, 134, 143, 153, 156, 157, 169 Marinetto, M., 78, 184 marketization, 78, 79, 95 marketization strategy, 1 markets, 154, 155, 156, 157, 299, 311 private, 299 quasi-markets, 299 Marsh, D., 4, 81, 82, 134, 143 Mastenbroek, W.F., 137, 149 Mayntz, R., 3, 4, 5, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 102, 104, 113, 134, 143, 153, 155, 156, 157, 169, 172, 173, 174, 184, 191, 234 Mazmanian, D., 221 Meier, K.J., 169, 213, 216, 217, 218 members, characteristics of, 71–3 Merry, U., 129 metagovernance, 7, 15, 44, 96, 101, 106, 199, 221–3 advanced liberal metagovernance, 178 as constitutional decision making, 219 differences between theories, 180–1 and governability theory, 172–5 of governance networks, 306–8 and governmentality theory, 178–80

hands-off, through institutional design, 173 of identities, 175–6 and integration theory, 175–7 and interdependency theory, 170–2 legislative level, 220 levels of, 218–21 of network actors’ capacities, 176 as network management, 199–214 by public authorities, 226–8 and state, 174 theoretical approaches, 169–82 via policy formulation, 223–4 methodological challenge, 310 methodological individualism, 46 micro-level theory of network formation, 35 Miller, G., 59 Miller, P., 6 Mill, J.S., 252 Milward, H.B., 15, 69, 139, 143, 169, 199, 206 minority protection, 235 Mintzberg, H., 4 mobilization of agency, 187–9 bias, 136, 142 mode of coordination, 4 monitoring, 288 moral constituency, 281 Mouffe, C., 243, 244, 250, 266, 314 multi-actor and multi-purpose games, 143–4 Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), 158 multilevel governance networks, 6 multilevel governmental systems, 220 multi-theoretical approach, network governance, 299–303 Nassehi, A., 116 National Action Plans on Employment (NAPs), 2, 195–6 national bridge-building project, 2 negotiated governance, 2 negotiation, 100 governance networks, 10 neocorporatism, and policy networks, 139–40

352 Index neo-institutionalist theory, 188 Netherlands, 136, 226 interactive policy development, 209 network literature, 63 network, definition of, 74 network composition, 208 network dynamics, 77, 303–4 network formation bottom-up explanation, 36 through legal and financial methods, 191–2 through norms, 192–4 network governance, 89 democratic accountability, 274–96 multi-theoretical approach, 299–303 political character, 313–14 network interactions, 209 setting up and facilitating, 201–6 network literature, Netherlands, 63 network management, 15, 84–5, 169, 306–7 analytical skills, 212 choice and implementation of strategies, 212 design for network interactions, 212 and governance, 199–200 metagovernance as, 199–214 skills and competencies, 211–12 strategies, 213–14 substantive knowledge, 212 network outcomes, 208 network participation, 170 networks, 154, 155 access to/inclusion in, 255–7 activation, 204 application of democratic principles, 263–4 change in, 81–2 and the communicative aspect of democratic theory, 266–8 concept of, 138 equality of members, 72–3 equality within, 257 failure in, 83–4 as governance, 154–6 governing performance of, 194–6 heterogeneous, 72

implication of level of consensus and conflict within, 151 managing change in, 83–7 notion of, 9 as representative institutions, 275 and rules, 64 selection of members, 294 success in, 83 and systems theory, 117 tools for, 84 ‘network structuring’, 125, 127, 128 network transformation, 304 new institutionalism, 27–8 New Public Management (NPM), 9, 31, 43, 70 Neyer, J., 157 NGOs (non-governmental organizations), 158, 162 Nielsen, K., 12 non-hierarchical coordination (steering), 155 non-hierarchical forms of governance, 3 Nooteboom, B., 100, 206 normative institutionalism see social constructivist institutionalism norms, network formation through, 192–4 Noworthy, H.P.S. et al., 141 Nye, J.S. Jr., 162, 272 Oliver, C., 63, 65, 69 Olsen, J.P., 3, 10, 13, 15, 17, 29, 35, 36, 37, 38, 41, 104, 105, 175, 176, 177, 188, 190, 207, 234, 242, 274, 285, 289, 290 Olson, M., 52, 142, 145, 146, 201 openness, in process design, 201 operating environment, 73–4 operationally autonomous actors, 9 OPOV (one person, one vote) principle, 277 opportunistic action, 34, 100 ‘organizational field’, definition of, 104 organizational resources, 203 organizations, as open systems, 4 organization theory, 4 Ostrom, E., 29, 45, 52, 64, 72, 121, 147, 207, 208, 219, 220

Index 353 O’Toole, L.J. Jr, 45, 48, 49, 57, 133, 139, 146, 147, 169, 203, 213, 215, 216, 217, 218, 222, 223, 224 outcome democracy, 239–41 output legitimacy, 306 outputs and outcomes of governance networks, 215–30 Parkinson, J., 268 Parson, T., 157 participation, 188 and governance networks, 247–61 ‘participatory’ tradition, 247–8, 302 Pateman, C., 247, 248, 249, 251–2, 255 path dependent development, 28 path dependent transformation, 32–3 Pedersen, O.K., 12, 30 Pedersen, O.K. et al., 259 Perri et al., 85 Peters, B.G., 3, 15, 27, 28, 44, 62, 112, 169, 233, 234, 279, 290 Pettit, P., 264 Pharr, S.J., 71 Pierre, J., 3, 14, 15, 44, 112, 169, 234 Pierson, P., 28, 32, 64 Plato, 157 pluralism, 250 plurality, in autonomous network actors, 105 pluricentric governance systems, 11–12 pluricentric mode of coordination, 4 police service, management reforms, 85–7 policy, definition of, 3 policy analysis, 4–5 policy communication systems, 117–18 governing closed policy communication systems, 129–31 policy communities, 49, 112–13, 118, 139–40 closure in, 119 policy core, 140 policy discourse, 141, 312 policy formulation, 225 policy games, 148

policy implementation, 200, 221 policy making, in governance networks, 5 policy networks, 4, 64, 78, 144 factors for success and failure, 65 insufficient consensus, 143–7 and neocorporatism, 139–40 and the overproduction of consensus, 141–3 and the role of consensus, 140–1 surplus of consensus, 138–40 policy paradigms, 140 policy problems, 12–13 framework for, 101 policy solutions, 99 political accountability, 279 political cultures and traditions, impact on governance networks, 311 political equality, 263, 270, 308 political freedom, 309 political theory, 4 politics, 162, 163 polity, 163 polity reform, 165 Polsby, N., 63 Popper, K., 45 popular control, 263, 269, 270, 308 Porter, D.O., 73, 139 positivist approaches, 44, 77, 78–9, 80, 81 postliberal democracy, 275 and governance networks, 236–45 similarities and differences between theories, 245–6 poststructuralism, 29–30 poststructuralist institutionalism, 38–41 differences from social constructivist (or normative) institutionalism, 41 Powell, W.W., 15, 17, 29, 36, 79, 104, 154, 207 power, 39, 133, 197 governmentalization, 179 and institutions, 30 soft, 272–3 Power, M., 276 power structures, 311, 314

354 Index Pratchett, L., 131 preferences, 227 Pressman, J.L., 55, 144 ‘prisoners-dilemma’, 34, 53, 223, 227 privatization, 298 proactive governance, 98 process design content in, 202 progress in, 202 process management, 170, 200, 201–6 adaptive process management, 202 strategies, 203 ‘proto-institutions’, 209 Provan, K.G., 15, 69, 206 Przeworski, A. et al., 279 public administration, 171 public authorities, 27, 218, 307 metagovernance by, 226–8, 307 modification of network’s structure, 228 and network outputs and outcomes, 223–4 powers of, 219 public choice assumption, 46 ‘public ethos’, 279 publicity, 259, 275–6 and accountability, 284–6 sufficient, 287–90 public management and performance model, 216–17 public–private partnerships, 9, 158, 189, 196 public purpose, 11 public sphere, 285–6, 287, 289, 292 Putnam, R.D., 71 rational choice approach, 45–50 rational choice institutionalism, 28–9, 33–5, 300 similarity to historical institutionalism, 41–2 rational reflexivity, 286 Rawls, J., 240, 265 reflexive government, 107 reflexive rationality, 12 ‘regimes of practices’, 40 ‘regulated self-regulation’, 314 regulation, 15 Reinicke, W.H., 153, 156, 161, 162

Rein, M., 67, 101, 119, 121, 140, 146 relationship patterns, 61 representation, 275 representation through deliberation, 275, 280–1, 286 representative institutions, networks as, 275 resource dependencies, 47, 68, 139 resource pooling, 100 resources, 313 responsiveness, 276 and accountability, 290–92 adequate, 293–5 Rhodes, R.A.W., 3, 4, 9, 11, 14, 15, 27, 31, 43, 44, 45, 49, 67, 68, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85, 87, 90, 98, 111, 112, 113, 118, 119, 134, 138, 140, 143, 144, 169, 170, 171, 184, 199, 233, 234 Richards, D., 43, 44, 78, 82 Richardson, J., 81, 82, 169 Ripley, R.B., 134, 138 risk, 5 Risse, T., 153, 155, 158, 163, 165 Risse, T. et al., 158 Rogers, D.L., 200, 204 Rose, N., 3, 6, 107, 178, 314 Rosenau, J.N., 155, 265 Rousseau, D. et al., 206 Rousseau, J.J., 164, 248 Røvik, 36 Rowe, G., 188 rules, and networks, 64 Sabatier, P.A., 5, 49, 82, 126, 140, 144, 146, 221 Sabel, C. et al., 262 safety, in process design, 202 Sako, M., 206 Salamon, L.M., 84 sanctions, 290–1, 294–5 Sandel, M.J., 242 Saward, M., 184 Schaal G.S., 164 Schaap, L., 99, 111, 114, 115, 117, 118, 120, 130 Scharpf, F.W., 3, 4, 10, 12, 13, 15, 29, 44, 46, 48, 49, 50, 52, 57, 102, 113, 133, 135, 146, 147, 153, 154,

Index 355 Scharpf, F.W. – continued 155, 159, 163, 169, 172, 173, 179, 199, 200, 201, 203, 204, 207, 213, 222, 233, 234, 299 Schattschneider, E.E., 136, 142, 228 Schellenberg, 137 Schlosberg, D., 267 Schmitter, P.C., 139 Schneider, V., 143, 157 Schön, D.A., 67, 101, 119, 121, 140, 146 Schumpeter, J.A., 248 scope, 270 Scott, J., 313 Scott, R., 175 Scott, W.R., 29, 67, 177 secretariats, 288 ‘Security, Territory and Population’, 185 selection bias, 61 selection of members, networks, 294 self-governing capacities, 185, 187 self-interest, 113, 118 self-organization, 190 self-referentiality, 115 self-regulation, 10, 169, 180 self-steering programmes, 116, 118, 123, 124, 130, 199 Selznick, P., 63 ‘shadow of hierarchy’, 299 Shafritz, 285 Shepsie, K., 64 Sherlock, K.L. et al., 192 Sikkink, K., 161 Skelcher, C., 233, 234 Smith, M., 82 Smith, M.J., 78, 82 social capital, 73 social closedness, 99 social closure, 118 social constructivist approach, 188 social constructivist (or normative) institutionalism, 28, 29–30, 35–8 differences from poststructuralist institutionalism, 41 social exclusion, 119 social liberal government, 187 Social Network Analysis, 313 social pressures, 70–71

social systems, 115 closure, 114 formal organizations, 117 and governance networks, 117–18 human interaction, 117 policy communication systems, 117 society, 117 societal dynamics, 5 societal fragmentation, 4, 5 societal governance, 2 societal problem solving, 15 society, 117 ‘socio-cybernetic systems’ approach, 111 soft power, 272–3 Sørensen, E., 13, 15, 16, 17, 43, 61, 236, 254, 310 sovereign power, 8, 262 Spencer-Brown, G., 114 stability, 217 state, 38, 89, 174, 189 ‘degovernmentalization’, 3 and governance networks, 173–4 ‘hollowing out’, 184, 196 role of, 174 state failure, 157 Steinmo, S., 28 Stinson, B.L., 205 Stoker, G., 48, 78, 131 strategic consensus, 146, 147 strategic externalities, 47 Strecker, D., 164 ‘structural dilemma’, 54 structures, of interaction, 312, 313 subgovernments, 138–9 subsystems, 138–9 Sullivan, H., 131 Susskind, L., 135 Swedberg, R., 46 Sweden, framework laws, 191 tactical polyvalence, of institutionalized discourses of governance, 40–1 tasks, 74 Tatenhove, 134 Taylor, R.C.R., 28, 41 ‘teamwork’, 32

356 Index technologies of agency, 177–8, 188–9, 195 of performance, 179, 194–5 Teisman, G.R., 147, 204 Termeer, C.J.A.M., 128, 140 Teubner, G.C.M., 116, 130 Thatcher, M., 153, 156 Thelen, K., 28 Thomas, G.M., 162 Thomas, R., 87 Thompson, D., 281, 286, 294 Toke, D., 45, 49 top-down government, 3 Torfing, J., 8, 13, 16, 17, 28, 30, 43, 61, 236, 310, 312, 313 traditions, 90 transaction costs, 64, 96, 102, 204 transnational actors, democratic accountability, 162 Transnational Business Dialog, 162 transparency, 193, 194 Triantafillou, P., 193, 196 trust, 51, 88, 100, 227, 299 and cooperation, 206 Tsebelis, G., 46, 50 Twist, M.J.W. van, 99, 113, 114, 115, 118, 120 uncertainty, 5 unconscious cognitive closedness, 99 unconscious social closedness, 99 Ury, W., 147 US, 138–9 Veld, R.J. et al., 114, 140, 144 Versteeg, W., 3, 26, 101 vertical games, 56–7 Verweij, M., 209

veto power, 121, 122, 123, 126, 127, 128, 129, 137, 305 governing, 125–8 Villadsen, S., 191 Waarden, F.V., 9, 12, 138, 145 Wagenaar, H., 3, 141 Wamsley, G.L., 139, 143, 199 ‘war in ideas’, 272 Weber, M., 157, 159, 160, 217 Weimer, D.L., 211 welfare policies, 43, 193 welfare state, 106 services, 78 Westminster model, 78, 90 Whetten, D.A., 200, 204 Whetten, H.D.A., 139 Whitehouse, L., 194 White, P.E., 139 Wildavsky, A., 48, 49, 55, 144 Wildavsky, D., 82 Wilkinson, F., 206 Wilks, S., 140 Williamson, O.E., 50, 64, 154 Willke, H., 130 Winter, S., 73 Wittgenstein, 89 Wolf, K.D., 157, 162, 233 World Bank, 8 Wright, E.O., 239, 240, 241 Wright, M., 140 Wynne, B., 141 Young, I.M., 240, 255, 268, 281, 285 Young, O., 265 Zintl, R., 52 Zofante, M., 49 Zouridis, S., 310 Zucker, L.G., 65

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