The US, NATO and Military Burden-Sharing

THE US, NATO AND MILITARY BURDEN-SHARING

This study establishes that political, economic, and military-technological changes transform the international system and alter the way in which a state views its and others’ responsibilities and burdens for responding to international crises. It assesses the distribution of the costs of raising and supporting armed forces, the risks of deploying them overseas and using them in combat or peace operations, and the extent to which members of the system have a responsibility for maintaining international order in the context of three instances of multinational military intervention – the Multinational Force deployment in Lebanon in 1982–83, the first Persian Gulf War in 1990–91 including information on the impact of the recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the United Nations’, and subsequently NATO’s, intervention in the Balkans 1992–99. Peter K. Forster holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from Penn State and is active in NATO’s Partnership for Peace Consortium. His current research focus is on security sector reform in the former Soviet Union. Recent articles focus on American interests in Uzbekistan and in the Caucasus. Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State University (Delaware County) and is the author of numerous works in the fields of national security policy, nuclear strategy and arms control, military persuasion, conflict termination and other aspects of US and other security policies. He is an award-winning teacher and has advised the US government and private contractors on defense matters.

CASS CONTEMPORARY SECURITY STUDIES SERIES

MILITARY STABILITY IN EUROPE The CFE Treaty Jane M.O. Sharp MACMILLAN, KHRUSHCHEV AND THE BERLIN CRISIS, 1958–1960 Kathleen Newman US NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY 1989–1997 Tess Oxenstierna NATO’S SECRET ARMY Operation Gladio and terrorism in Western Europe Daniel Ganser THE US, NATO AND MILITARY BURDEN-SHARING Peter Kent Forster and Stephen J. Cimbala RUSSIAN GOVERNANCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY Geo-strategy, geopolitics and governance Irina Isakova THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND FINLAND 1938–1940 Diplomatic sideshow Craig Gerrard RETHINKING THE NATURE OF WAR Edited by Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom THE MODERN YUGOSLAV CONFLICT, 1991–1995 Perception, deception and dishonesty Brendan O’Shea

THE US, NATO AND MILITARY BURDEN-SHARING Peter Kent Forster and Stephen J. Cimbala

First published 2005 by Frank Cass 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Frank Cass 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” Frank Cass is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group © 2005 Peter Kent Forster and Stephen J. Cimbala All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Forster, Peter Kent. The US, NATO, and military burden-sharing / Peter Kent Forster and Stephen J. Cimbala. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. North Atlantic Treaty Organization—Armed Forces— Appropriations and expenditures. 2. United States—Armed Forces—Appropriations and expenditures. I. Cimbala, Stephen J. II. Title. UA646.3.F675 2005 ISBN 0-203-00250-4 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-415-35607-5 (Print Edition)

CONTENTS

Preface Acknowledgments

vi xii

Introduction

1

1

The Concept of Burden-Sharing

8

2

The Multinational Force in Lebanon 1982–84: national collective action

32

The Persian Gulf crisis: American leadership and global sharing

63

The Balkans: increased European responsibility and long-term commitment

98

3

4

5

Conclusion

153

Selected bibliography Index

170 181

v

PREFACE

When President George W. Bush stood on the deck of an aircraft carrier on May 1, 2003 and declared an end to the active combat phase of the war against Iraq, his political star seemed to crest on the basis of a rapid and decisive military victory over the despised regime of Saddam Hussein. But, to the surprise of the Bush Administration and many military experts, the euphoria of May was soon replaced by the uncertainty of the post-war occupation and reconstruction of Iraq. By September 2003, President Bush was reluctantly heading to the United Nations for a cosmetically disguised concession speech. The United States was a reluctant suitor in September for a United Nations whose political approval for military intervention against Iraq the preceding March was judged by Bush as unnecessary or irrelevant. What had happened between May and September to change the Bush Administration from a diplomatic posture of swaggering unilateralism to a policy of reluctant multilateralism in its approach to the reconstitution and reconstruction of post-war Iraq? The short answer is that the Bush Administration learned a hard lesson in those few months: peace, especially the peace that follows a controversial military intervention, is harder than war. The object of a war, as Clausewitz emphasized, is to advance the policy objectives of a state or coalition of states. Or, in another variation on the same theme: the object of a war is a better peace. Even officials in the Bush Administration acknowledged as much. They optimistically assumed that an anti-Saddam Iraqi majority, empowered by the hated dictator’s deposition, would rally to the United States as a liberating force, not as an occupying power. Therefore the political clean-up and economic reconstruction of Iraq could be handled by the war-making coalition (the United States and the United Kingdom) and cooperative Iraqis without major involvement on the part of other powers, including the French, Germans, Russians and others who were doubters about the necessity for war in Mesopotamia. The US Department of Defense civilian leadership estimated that US occupying and rebuilding forces in Iraq could be reduced to some 30,000 by September 2003: in actual fact, some 127,000 US troops remained in Iraq during the third week of September. vi

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Iraq had, in fact, become a cesspool of post-war conflict. Attacks on US forces by terrorists and guerrilla fighters were orchestrated by various antiAmerican and anti-occupation groups. These factions included unrepentant Fedayeen Saddam, out of work Ba’ath party officials, criminals released by the hundreds of thousands from Iraq jails immediately prior to the outbreak of war, and Islam’s new mujahedeen infiltrating across the Iraqi border from a variety of Arab and Islamic countries. In addition, much of Iraq’s infrastructure that supported the delivery of food, water, power and other essentials had been destroyed by looters and rioters or by others with more explicitly political reasons for impeding the post-war recovery. Instead of occupying a country that could be rapidly stood up as a constitutional democracy with a viable market economy, the United States found itself caught up in preventing anarchy, restoring basic services, and trying to convince the majority of uncommitted Iraqis that its intentions were benign, instead of exploitive. After a month of false starts following the end of active combat against Hussein’s forces, the first US proconsul in charge of Iraq, retired Gen. Jay Garner, was replaced by former Ambassador Paul Bremer. Bremer presided over a Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) that had de facto control over Iraq. In addition, the United States oversaw the appointment of an interim authority called the Iraqi Governing Council, including twenty-five members selected to represent the major national and religious factions within Iraq. This Council was to serve as a temporary national authority until a constitution could be written and national elections held in the spring or summer of 2004. In June 2004, formal sovereignty was unexpectedly turned over to new Iraqi leaders with nation-wide elections postponed until January 2005. Although the CPA, the Governing Council and the transfer of sovereignty were points of progress, the US military supporting the transition to democratic rule found itself overtaxed to provide for missions from humanitarian relief to major combat actions. As the US occupation continued for months supported by no multinational authority and a small “coalition of the willing,” the legitimacy of the US presence began to appear dubious to Iraqi nationals with no prior agenda of anti-Americanism. The US unwillingness or inability to obtain United Nations Security Council authorization for war against Iraq in 2003 left the United States and Britain with the major responsibility for peace making and nation building in Mesopotamia. The second President Bush preferred a unilateral approach to war and, until persuaded by events to off from that position, a post-war nationbuilding plan that minimized or excluded important roles for most of America’s European allies or for the United Nations. This preference of Bush II for unilateralism in Iraq 2003 was in marked contrast to the approach taken by the first President Bush in building a coalition for war in 1990 and 1991. By the time that war broke out in January 1991, vii

PREFACE

President George H.W. Bush had obtained a UN resolution authorizing the use of force to expel Iraq from Kuwait. The first President Bush used this UN resolution as muscle in order to prod a reluctant and divided Congress to support Operation Desert Storm. That military operation defeated Iraq in thirty-nine days of air war and 100 hours of ground combat. In an unprecedented feat of diplomatic coalition building, the first Bush Administration, in addition to having obtained UN approval for military action, had also forged a war-winning coalition that included Arab and Islamic states opposed to Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. Hussein was effectively reduced to a coalition of one against many, ensuring his defeat before the war even began. In addition, on account of the large multinational coalition participating in Desert Storm, the operation acquired international legitimacy. Therefore, the post-war restraints imposed upon Hussein’s regime, including a Kurdish protectorate in Northern Iraq, economic sanctions and UN inspections for weapons of mass destruction, helped to contain the irrepressible Iraqi dictator and diminish his military capability throughout the 1990s. What accounted for the difference between two Bush Administrations: the first, insisting upon a multilateral approach to military intervention and post-war follow-up; and the second, preferring to avoid the complications of multilateralism and coalition building until post-war complications forced rethinking? There are many possible answers to this question, including some differences in the personalities of the two presidents; the ideological leanings of their principal advisers; and the geopolitical setting within which the first Bush Administration had to work (the Cold War fading, but the Soviet Union still standing in a nominally bipolar world) compared to the second (a post-Cold War landscape of uncontested US military supremacy facing unstructured and distributed threats, including terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction). One important difference between the two administrations is directly pertinent to our concern in this study. The first President Bush had fought in World War II and had served in many important diplomatic and policy posts during the Cold War. His brief on world affairs included service as UN ambassador, envoy to the People’s Republic of China, head of the CIA, and two terms as vice president of the United States. His personal and professional appreciation for the most important lesson of World War II and the Cold War was singular. What was that lesson? From the defeat of Hitler to the defeat of Hussein, it was that when the political and military assets and influence of the United States and free, democratic Europe are combined, the resulting coalition will eventually prevail over any adversary. That was true from 1945 until the end of the Cold War, and it remains true now. It was proved again in Afghanistan in 2001–02, where the Taliban regime was routed and al-Qaeda at least temporarily scattered to various hideouts inside and outside of Afghanistan. viii

PREFACE

In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon of September 11, 2001, NATO for the first time invoked its Article V guarantee: an attack on one member is an attack against all. The United States received overwhelming and unconditional support for the war against terror from its NATO allies. Crowds in London sang the “Star Spangled Banner.” France’s influential daily Le Monde proclaimed: “We Are All Americans Now.” Russia’s President Vladimir Putin was the first head of state to call President Bush with condolences for the victims of 9-11, opening the door to a more positive spin on US-Russian relations that helped both states to forget Russia’s diplomatic furor with NATO over the latter’s war against Serbia about ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in 1999. The US military intervention in Afghanistan, which would have been anathema to the Kremlin even several years earlier, was now acceptable, and Russia even cleared the way for US bases in the former Soviet Republics in Central Asia and provided intelligence support for US and allied forces in Afghanistan. The United States stood, in the immediate aftermath of 9-11 and its subsequent victory in Afghanistan, temporarily at the head of a nearly universal coalition of law-abiding states, across several continents and including NATO, Russia, China and a number of Arab and Islamic regional powers. In addition, NATO committed itself to help in the post-war security regime of Afghanistan and took over formal responsibility for the military aspects of Afghan security and stabilization in 2003. Of course, the idea of a comprehensive “war on terror” had a chimerical quality: terrorism was a method, not an entity, and a method of warfare that had survived since antiquity. Terror qua terror could not be eradicated, but a strategic crimp could be put in the size, speed and lethality of major terrorist networks that stalked the United States and allied nation states. Prosecuting the war on terror raised important questions of burdensharing among the United States, America’s NATO allies and other states. Fighting terrorism is not, for the most part, about inflicting defeat on conventional armies, air forces and fleets in battle. At the sharp end, counterterrorism is intelligence and police work: terrorists succeed when they remain invisible by infiltrating the domestic society and blending within its culture. Finding terrorist cells nested within a larger matrix of society demands surveillance and law enforcement cooperation from the host states. Inter-state cooperation against terror imposes burdens and tradeoffs among competing interests. For example: after 9-11, Pakistan’s government agreed to security cooperation with the United States against the Taliban, despite a prior history of collaboration between the Taliban and the intelligence services of Pakistan. Pakistan’s help on terrorism was encouraged by the US willingness to suspend economic sanctions imposed on Pakistan after Islamabad’s open declaration of its nuclear weapons capability in 1998. ix

PREFACE

Burden-sharing, among states fighting transnational terrorists, requires that information deemed very sensitive by their respective law enforcement and intelligence agencies is, atypically, shared with foreigners. Even if this information is “scrubbed” of its most sensitive domestic political content, it may still cause the heads of foreign intelligence and internal security bureaus to shed tears as their state secrets migrate across international borders. In addition, democratic societies pride themselves on maintaining a separation of function between agencies charged with the mission of internal security and those responsible for foreign intelligence operations. In the United States, the FBI is the lead agency for domestic security, and the CIA for foreign intelligence. Until recently, a legal wall of separation prevented routine sharing of information about suspected terrorists between the two agencies. Collapsing this wall has been a matter of great political controversy in the United States, and civil libertarians opposed to the USA Patriot Act of 2001 regard this step as a vital compromise of Americans’ legal protection against arbitrary government behavior. Another front on the US war against terrorism was the second Bush Administration’s fundamental geostrategic equation: failing states, typically ruled by tyrants, equal terror. This policy fails to recognize that most autocratic regimes were the breeding ground for terrorism, either directly or indirectly. Some autocratic regimes suppressed legitimate dissent, thus driving the need for political expression into unofficial channels, including mosques and Islamic religious schools, which also became breeder reactors for terrorists. Other autocratic regimes, which tend to draw the attention of the Bush Administration, actively sponsored terrorist attacks against the United States or its allies. The Bush strategy against terrorism thus included an objective of “draining the swamp” of unfavorable autocratic regimes and replacing them with democratic societies less nurturing to political malcontents, including transnational terrorists. President George W. Bush labeled Iraq as one of the “axis of evil” countries that supported terrorism, part of his justification for taking military action to depose the Hussein regime in 2003 despite the absence of UN and NATO support. But important American allies in NATO did not buy into the “tyrants equal terror” equation as avidly as did the United States. Nor were they convinced that Saddam Hussein could not be contained without war. As a result, the United States found itself at war for regime change in Iraq with more support from the former Soviet bloc states of eastern Europe than it obtained from its Cold War European allies. This sit-down strike by the French, Germans and other major NATO partners complicated the US management of the post-war nation building and reconstitution to which President Bush was committed. US leaders had recognized by September 2003 that a virtually unilateral approach to war making had created a power vacuum in post-war peace making. Even America’s prodigious x

PREFACE

defense budgets and economy could not provide the economic wherewithal needed to reconstitute a war-torn and politically oppressed Iraq. In addition, the security dilemmas presented by the sudden collapse of Hussein’s military and police state were not capable of being resolved solely by US post-war occupation troops and a US-dominated provisional government that admittedly had more experience in eliminating threats than building nations. The “post-conflict” re-stabilization of Iraq, as well as that of Afghanistan after the military campaign against the Taliban, would require that the United States share authority, if it wished to share the burdens of political and military commitment. In Afghanistan, the United States had benefited from its multilateral approach to pre-war diplomacy, both in terms of coalition allies who fought against the Taliban and in post-war military peace operations and civil administration. And, even under these presumably favorable political preconditions, Afghanistan remained a hard nut to crack. As of the summer of 2003, the interim Afghan government headed by Prime Minister Hamid Karzai had barely extended its sovereignty outside of Kabul. Much of the remainder of Afghanistan was in the hands of warlords or existed as a virtual anarchic no man’s land, where authority was up for grabs. But the situation in Afghanistan, frustrating as it was for those who sought to put into place a viable post-Taliban regime, was at least not complicated by international suspicions of US unilateralism and charges of imperialism. With NATO in charge of the military peacekeeping in Afghanistan, a coalition that included most of the world’s richest states and the world’s leading military power provided international legitimacy as well as development dollars and military muscle. The cases of Afghanistan and Iraq support the importance of burdensharing among allies or among “coalitions of the willing” involved in war or peace operations. The twenty-first century will find the United States and its allies engaged in conflicts that cover the spectrum from large-scale, conventional wars to peace and stability operations, as well as a variety of uses of force in support of coercive diplomacy. There is little of value that the United States, powerful as it is, can accomplish without the support of its NATO and other allies. In the world of “distributed threats” with which policy planners and military commanders must deal, including possible attacks from non-state actors like terrorists, multilateralism is not a choice, but a necessary concomitant of an effective policy and strategy. With the acceptance of multilateralism comes the challenge of burdensharing. Our investigation of past cases of US and allied burden-sharing, in the chapters that follow, holds lessons for present and future policy makers. Or, if not, they can learn the hard way: as policies sink and forces are used up in bottomless pits wrongly described as strategies.

xi

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We gratefully acknowledge Penn State University World Campus and Delaware County Campus for administrative support for this project, although the university bears no responsibility for arguments or opinions herein. We are especially grateful to our spouses, Sue Forster and Betsy Cimbala, and children for putting up with the distraction of still another research project.

xii

INTRODUCTION

Defense is expensive, controversial, and problematical – even for an uncontested superpower. Collective defense in the name of national security is harder still. Especially in pluralist democracies, the use of military power for war or for other political purposes energizes the machinery of government and raises the emotional temperature of political debate. Alliances among pluralist democracies for the purpose of war or other security missions bring out all the problems of transnational cooperation that one can imagine – and then some. Alliances engaged in military deployments or other interventions cannot avoid wrestling with the thorny issue of burden-sharing. Burden-sharing is the distribution of costs and risks among members of a group in the process of accomplishing a common goal. The risks may be economic, political, military or other. A family is, in part, a burden-sharing arrangement – and much of the burden-sharing is emotional. In an alliance among states for the promotion of collective defense or security, as in the case of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), burdens that have to be shared include the costs of raising and supporting arms of service, deploying them overseas, and using them in combat or peace operations. Costs of military intervention are not only economic. Wars and other military operations can influence public opinion and, in some cases, cause governments to fall. States sending troops into harm’s way in the name of alliance solidarity are always aware that the chain of commitment is only as strong as its weakest link. More than one military alliance has been dragged to defeat by the impetuosity of overly ambitious heads of state, or equally encumbered by poor military performance on the part of generals in the field. In this study, we look at the experience of the United States and other member states of NATO in three situations of multinational military intervention: in Lebanon, in the Persian Gulf, and in the Balkans. Each case study represents an important period in the distribution of power, interest, and values that scholars refer to as the “international system” of states. Intervention in Lebanon took place in the 1980s, while the Cold War was 1

INTRODUCTION

still in progress. The Gulf War of 1991 (Operation Desert Storm) marked the transition from the Cold War to the uncertain environment of the post-Cold War world. The Balkan interventions in the 1990s were made necessary and possible by the post-Cold War disintegration of the Soviet Union and the subsequent breakup of Yugoslavia. The three cases of burden-sharing among NATO member states (and others) amount to more than a sequential consideration of incidents of military intervention. We also provide a vantage point or perspective that evaluates the narrative of events surrounding these military interventions. These military involvements included one major coalition war, one traditional peacekeeping operation, and one exercise in peace enforcement. Despite this diversity of purpose and intent, all involved considerable economic cost and political risk for the participants. Therefore controversy about burden-sharing was inevitable, and decisions about the distribution of costs and risks had to be taken within and among state actors. Our perspective on burden-sharing compares cases from different time periods, in diverse international systems and among actors with a variety of goals. In addition, it draws its “database” of evidence from cases that take place in and outside of Europe. Although the primary actors whose roles are to be evaluated – the United States, France, Germany, Italy, and Great Britain – are all members of NATO, the events occurred outside NATO’s traditional geographic area of operation as defined in the Washington Treaty, which established the alliance in 1949. Their locales make the cases even more relevant to future US or NATO engagements in collective security, apart from collective defense, including “out of area” operations calling for commitments from one or more NATO member states. Today, the geographic area in which burden-sharing is applied has expanded to include the entire world, as individual states and multinational organizations seek to determine the scope of their responsibilities and their political, economic, and military capabilities in responding to a spectrum of international operations. This shift is evident in the increased focus on the out-of-area deployment by NATO allies. As actors re-define areas of responsibility and interests, the debate surrounding financial and military commitments will intensify.1 Multinational operations introduce unique burdens, including the responsibility for developing and maintaining coalitions, compromising on the use of force, establishing clear and agreed upon mission objectives, determining operational command and control, which heretofore have received little attention, assessing financial viability, and assuming the burdens of reconstruction after hostilities have ceased. Each case presented here had a different level of international oversight. The Multinational Force (MNF) deployment in Lebanon was neither sanctioned nor supported by the United Nations. UN Security Council resolutions approved 2

INTRODUCTION

Operations Desert Shield and Storm, but command was centered with the war-fighting Coalition led by the United States, and financial commitments were voluntary. The UN Security Council approved the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia. UN Security Council Resolution 1031 mandated that NATO was responsible for the “military aspects” of General Framework Agreement for Peace (hereafter Dayton Accords) in Bosnia-Herzegovina and established IFOR “to implement the peace.” In December 1996, SFOR, representing the second stage of the joint UNNATO initiative in Bosnia-Herzegovina, replaced IFOR and was assigned to “stabilize the peace.”2 Although the UN ultimately authorized use of force in Kosovo, initial NATO preceded UN authorization in 1999. The new international system has expanded the geographic area in which burden-sharing is assessed, has re-ordered the criteria by which it is measured, and has extended its institutional paradigm beyond NATO. While burden-sharing emerged from the United States’ Cold War global policy and the European response to such a policy, post-Cold War instabilities and threats have changed this paradigm. Increased demands in terms of money, military personnel and matériel, and a commitment to sustained involvement in multilateral operations, was the paradigm of burdensharing for the United States and some of its NATO allies in the late twentieth century. As the UN Security Council, the United States and various US allies in NATO deliberated whether to wage another war against Iraq in 2003, within the post-“9-11” context of international terrorism and its threats to security, the globalization of burden-sharing and the military costs and risks attendant to international burden-sharing only loomed larger. And the post-conflict phase in Iraq in 2003–04 has presented its own decision points with regard to the multilateral sharing of responsibility for state building and stabilization.

Plan of the book Our comparative approach to military burden-sharing provides empirical data that answers the following questions: • • •

What are the collective benefits that compel an actor to consider collective actions? How are the burdens – distribution of risk, allocation of risk, and a responsibility for world order – assumed? Who ignored the incentives/punishments associated with involvement or non-involvement?

Each case study presented in Chapters 2–4 starts with a historical summary of the crisis and assesses the problems that attracted world 3

INTRODUCTION

attention and incited world action. The perspective section examines the collective and private benefits of intervention, identifies the burdens and their distribution among the participants, and analyses the incentives for and defections from involvement. Each case concludes with a summary of the distribution of risk, allocation of defense burdens, and assumption of responsibility for world order. Additional assessments involve the role assumed by the European allies, Russia, and the United States in each situation. The first case, the multinational deployment of French, Italian, American, and later British troops in and around Beirut, Lebanon in 1982, occurred in an international system regulated by the Cold War’s military–ideological conflict. The political structure was one of two superpowers guaranteeing the military and political security of and providing leadership to their respective blocs. As was to be expected during the Cold War period, the United States assumed the majority of the political, economic, and military responsibility for the Lebanese action primarily because it perceived the crisis within the context of superpower competition. Cooperation was initiated through bilateral negotiations. Neither NATO nor the UN played an active role in the activity. While France and Italy demonstrated a strong commitment to this operation and accepted commensurate responsibilities, the other European allies accepted American leadership and control in the Mediterranean. The Soviet Union was confrontational and obstructionist. The second case, the 1990–91 Persian Gulf War, took place during a period of systemic transition that, in some aspects, may be characterized by Pax Americana. The United States, while retaining the military capability to launch such an operation, needed military and political cooperation to lend international legitimacy to the operation. In order to execute the operation, the United States also required significant financial support from Germany, Japan, and Saudi Arabia, a prominent regional actor. The use of military force in the Gulf War was sanctioned by UN Security Council Resolution 678, which established the strategic parameters of the operation. The ouster of Iraq from Kuwait had a great deal of international support; however, some hopes for an expanded operation against Iraqi territory fell short of Coalition consensus. In particular, the Soviet Union, France, and the Arab members of the Coalition were vocal supporters of the limited objectives outlined in Resolution 678. Strategic and tactical military plans designed to meet the objectives were the purview of the Coalition commanded by the United States. While a number of NATO allies participated in the military operation, this was not a NATO operation. In 1990–91, the Soviet Union was in a weakened global position. Convinced that Western economic assistance was more essential than an independent foreign policy, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev generally acquiesced to the US-led intervention. The erosion of Soviet military and 4

INTRODUCTION

political capabilities further obfuscated any strenuous objection. Assuming the role of a military neutral, the Soviet Union sought to avoid conflict between the Coalition and Iraq prior to January 1991 then acted as an intermediary in bringing the conflict to its conclusion. In addition to demonstrating the decline of the Soviet Union as a great power, the Persian Gulf crisis reflected the emergence of a new great power, no longer defined by military capabilities, in the international system and limits of applying comparative advantage to burden-sharing. The third case examines the United Nations efforts at resolving the Bosnian civil war as well as NATO’s actions in Kosovo. While initial European intervention was aimed at arresting genocide and generally containing the Bosnian conflict, Bosnia emerged as a test case for burdensharing in the post-Cold War era. The United States chose Bosnia as a testing ground for its evolving policy of discriminate multilateralism enunciated in Presidential Policy Directive #25 and the National Security Revitalization Act. Alternating between bellicose threats and appeasement, Russia was, at times, an advocate for Serbian and Bosnian Serb interests but also contributed troops to UN and, more significantly, NATO peacekeeping operations. The Russian government’s willingness to assume the risks and costs of deploying troops in Bosnia, in spite of pressing domestic political and economic problems, is indicative of the emerging relationship between a country’s international prestige and its willingness to accept of risks, costs, and responsibilities for maintaining global security. The connection between sharing the burdens of responding to international crises and establishing international prestige is further emphasized by Germany’s ability to overcome historical, legal, and psychological barriers to be involved in Somalia and Bosnia. Failure to assume the responsibilities of maintaining international order insures that a state is neither viewed as a global power nor are its interests considered in the resolution of crises. Of great significance in the Bosnian War is the failure of the UN and Europeans to enforce peace. Early in this conflict, the UN went beyond sanctioning international action and assumed command and control for the military operation. The failure of the UN-orchestrated and led operation has dispelled utopian ideals that the United Nations can provide effective global leadership in establishing peace and order in the new international system in the absence of great power and, especially US, leadership. Bosnia also raised increasing concerns over the European ability to respond effectively to threats to its security. These points were further proven when Serbia initiated an ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo. As with Bosnia, the UN failed to effectively lead. An emerging humanitarian crisis eroded NATO credibility and continued European resistance to a ground war in the Balkans resulted in the United States leading the military action in Kosovo. Finally, while confirming that there 5

INTRODUCTION

is actually a new international system in place, the Balkan conflicts also confirmed that the international system remains anarchic. The cases introduce the impact of issues such as increased geographic distances and the existence of combat situations on the burden-sharing debate. One difference exposed in this study is the differences in burdensharing between the theoretical confrontations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and the reality of the deployment of troops into combative situations such as Lebanon, the Persian Gulf, and the Balkans. Furthermore, these cases explore the merger of military and humanitarian missions, which demand a synthesis of the tangible and intangible expenses of collective defense and collective intervention. Not only are the types of operations described herein costlier and riskier, but also the missions, because of their nature, lend themselves to shifting goals that alter the associated burdens of involvement. Consequently, countries are applying greater caution and spending more time assessing the costs and benefits prior to involvement. A third area of particular interest is the impact that the coalescence of domestic and international policies has had on burden-sharing. This is particularly evident in the risks, such as casualties and failed intervention, associated with cooperative military operations. The loss of twenty-five Pakistani troops in June 1993 and the subsequent ninety-three American casualties in October in Somalia, represent minor military casualties, even when compared against deaths and injuries in regular training exercises. However, when viewed through political lens, certainly the latter incident had a dramatic impact on public opinion in the United States and resulted in President Clinton’s decision to withdraw American forces by March 31, 1994.3 The implications of failed intervention are particularly relevant to great powers and superpowers because of their global responsibilities and capabilities. Failure to achieve a mission’s objectives can restrict other actions and enhance domestic support for burden shedding and isolationism. The concluding chapter summarizes our findings. It evaluates the implications of these findings on the current status of trans-Atlantic security with particular emphasis on the emerging European defense identity. It assesses the changing role of the Soviet Union and Russia in the international system. Finally, it offers some perspectives on sharing international responsibilities and actions that will be needed to preserve global stability in the twenty-first century.

Sources Primary sources used in this study include US government documents, particularly those of Congressional hearings on burden-sharing, as well as US documents related to the three case studies, and speeches by presi6

INTRODUCTION

dents and other heads of state and other ranking government officials. Of particular interests were those documents that emphasized identifying and distributing burdens and those illustrating the incentives that motivated countries to be involved in the collective interventions. We have also relied on interviews with members of former Ambassador Robert Hunter’s staff, who are attached to the American mission to NATO, representatives from the Department of Defense, individuals from the Office of the former Ambassador for Burden-sharing, Raymond Caldwell, in the Department of State, and personnel involved in NATO planning and defense policy at the French, British, and German embassies in Washington to provide different perspectives on burden-sharing and its evolution. A third primary source is the reports provided by NATO, the North Atlantic Association (NAA), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Western European Union (WEU). Another significant contribution to this work has been the United Nations’ assessments and supporting documents for peace enforcement operations and resolutions and discussions regarding the crises. A great deal of quantifiable information may be gathered from United Nations documents that outline country assessments for peace enforcement, individual country’s defense budgets, and analysis of military and airlift capabilities such as men in the field, purpose of units and equipment, and casualties suffered in the operations.

Notes 1 Duke, Simon, The Burdensharing Debate, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1993, 188. 2 History of the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, on-line @ www.nato.int/sfor/docu/d981116a.html. September 2002. 3 On June 5, 1993, twenty-five Pakistani soldiers were killed, ten were missing, and fifty-four were wounded in a series of ambushes by Somali militiamen against United Nations Operations in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) forces in south Mogadishu. On October 3, eighteen United States Rangers were killed and seventy-five wounded while participating in an operation aimed at capturing key aides to General Aidid suspected of complicity in the June 5 attack. On October 9, 1993, President Clinton announced the United States’ intention to withdraw its forces from Somalia by March 31, 1994. (The United Nations and the Situation in Somalia, United Nations, April 1995.)

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1 THE CONCEPT OF BURDEN-SHARING

This chapter defines burden-sharing, identifies its major attributes, and explains our approach to measuring the costs and risks of burden-sharing in the case studies that follow. We compare the attributes, costs and risks of burden-sharing, with deliberate emphasis upon the United States and NATO, in both Cold War and post-Cold War international systems. As a result, this chapter develops the frame of reference and hypotheses that will guide the more specific investigation of burden-sharing in the three case studies that follow. Greater complexity in the burden-sharing debate emerged in the late 1980s and continues to the present. Increasing demands for international cooperation in preserving international security, the broadening of the definition of security, and the growing global influence of non-military powers such as Germany and Japan demonstrate the limits of studying burden-sharing in the traditional financial–military paradigm. Testifying before the House of Representatives Committee on Burden-sharing, former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown observed that burden-sharing is first a political issue then a military one because alliances, the forum in which the debate emerges, are political arrangements more than a military structure.1 In this chapter, we accept this broader approach to the definition of burden-sharing. Such an approach expands the kinds of burdens being assessed and the way in which they are measured. Much of the existing literature on burden-sharing analyzes the concept from the outdated environment of the Cold War. We argue that the expanded international agenda reflects the on-going international importance of distributing risks and assuming costs for maintaining world order. Certainly, the financial costs associated with participating in international operations, providing for the common defense, and maintaining troops overseas are viable measures of a country’s acceptance of burden-sharing. However, additional strategic, operational, and tactical burdens also have emerged in the new security environment. At the broadest political level, burdens have particularly expanded. The readiness to accept the political implications, 8

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including the possibility of negative domestic and international reaction to the participation in multilateral operations, failed intervention, the provision of territorial access or over flight permissions in support of an intervention operation, and the long-term financial and personnel commitment necessitated by nation building, were seldom considered in the Cold War burden-sharing equation. Additionally, operational concerns such as providing unique military capabilities to an operation, committing to enforcing counter proliferation and counter-terrorism policies, and the acceptance of casualties are additional burdens. The distribution and assumption of these burdens now need to be considered. A third aspect contributing to a renewed international awareness of burden-sharing is the increasing legitimacy that results from and need for international cooperation in response to the multiplicity of regional conflicts and civil wars that violate the rules of humanity, spawn power vacuums, and destabilize regions. Clinton’s national security strategy made explicit the US preference for multilateralism in humanitarian interventions and peace operations.2 In his speeches to the UN General Assembly in September 1993 and again in 1994, President Clinton reinforced this policy by noting that, “We (the United States) cannot solve every problem . . . and (The United States) has no desire to be the world’s policeman.”3 While all states retain the right to respond unilaterally to direct threats, as evident in the George W. Bush doctrine espoused after 9-11, today’s asymmetrical conflicts create a paradox. First, ultimate victory in the “war on terrorism” demands multilateralism. However, since the existence of the world’s “great powers” is not directly threatened by the terrorist threat, countries respond selectively and permit decisions to be postponed until crises reach an extreme level. Under such circumstances, foreign policies are characterized as being reactive and driven by the necessity of response to extreme scenarios. These scenarios often demand a long-term political and financial commitment in circumstances in which a resolution may be unattainable. Such situations tend to inflame the debate surrounding who should assume costs, risks, and responsibilities.

What is burden-sharing? Theoretically, burden-sharing emerges from collective action in which groups coalesce to fulfill a common purpose. In Mancur Olson’s seminal work, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, he contends that although groups coalesce for a common purpose, there is no shared perspective on how to distribute the costs of their agreed upon action.4 Olson further introduces the concept of pure and impure actions or benefits resulting from an action. Purity of an action is determined by the extent to which its effects may or may not be denied to non-participants. For example, once a community decides to establish a 9

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public park, the benefits of that park cannot be withheld from any members of the community regardless of their contribution to its development. Thus, the public park is a non-excludable public good. A similar debate has traditionally influenced burden-sharing. The extent to which defense and the allocation of defense resources may be considered a public good, as opposed to a private one, is one of core factors in assessing burden-sharing. In particular, this debate has focused on the extent to which the benefits of extended deterrence and other collective defense policies, particularly those of NATO, may be denied to those who choose not to pay for them. In their 1966 study An Economic Theory of Alliances, Olson and Richard Zeckhauser contended that the contribution of collective defense resources provides no reward to the paying country other than those resulting from the collective defense. This model assumed a 100 percent commitment by participants to defense and thus theorized that collective defense, particularly when characterized by deterrence, was a pure public good. Furthermore, the model assumed that larger actors placed a greater value on collective defense because they had more to lose if it failed. Under such circumstances, collective defense, theoretically, would be provided by larger countries regardless of contributions made by various recipients; thus, there is an incentive for countries to contribute as little as possible to it. “Exploitation of the large by the small” and “free ride” are the terms applied to these phenomenon. Specifically, “free ride” applies to anyone who contributes less than the marginal value they derived from the consumption of a non-excludable public good. “Exploitation of the large by the small” will be discussed later in the context of values and collective action.5 Olson and Zeckhauser’s approach has some theoretical validity, although its practical application has been limited by changing threats and methods by which countries respond to them. Olson and Zeckhauser’s definition of defense as a public good was limited primarily to the concept of nuclear strategic deterrence. The commitment of US strategic forces to defend West Europe did make defense a public good. Luxembourg received equal benefit as Germany regardless of their contribution to the common defense. However, Olson and Zeckhauser’s theory is less easily applied to conventional defenses, which are finite resources. While public goods are unaffected by consumption, conventional defense is influenced by consumption. Resources expended in one area precludes their use elsewhere. For example, the United States’ new strategic doctrine is a capability-based strategy that seeks to “dissuade” and “reassure” while identifying those who are capable of threatening the United States. Within the context of this pre-emptive doctrine, the United States is prepared to expand overseas deployments but decisions to intervene militarily are to be based more heavily on national interests. The theoretical application of this strategic policy indicates the consumable nature of defense resources. 10

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If the United States were expending defense resources to counter Iraqi aggression in the Persian Gulf and combating al-Qaida in Afghanistan, it may not be prepared to respond to a renewed conflict in Macedonia or Bosnia. Under these circumstances, defense is no longer a public good. Olson and Zeckhauser’s second assumption, that alliance commitments reflect national interests, neglects the private benefits accruing to countries from their expenditures on defense resources. James Golden, in The Dynamics of Change in NATO: A Burden-Sharing Perspective, contends that there is no unity of objectives between national defense contributions and alliance defense contributions.6 “Production of almost any (defense) contribution produces privately consumable benefits for the producer aside from the externality that is consumed by all alliance nations.”7 Under such circumstances, defense is viewed as a multidimensional concept whose products may be used for protection or selfaggrandizement. These are the private or national benefits of defense. The private features of defense may provide internal stability, regional security, and economic benefit.8 Additionally, they provide incentives for individual states to produce defense-related goods and thus negate the benefits attributed to “free ride.” In the context of NATO, Turkey maintains one of the largest standing armies. Turkish defense contributions certainly enhance NATO’s overall capability, particularly in the eastern Mediterranean and on the former Soviet Union’s southern flank. However, Turkey’s defense capabilities have afforded its military an influential role in domestic Turkish politics, including a series of military and military supported governments. Turkish defense forces have been used to suppress opposition including extending its war with PKK into Iraq. Also, Turkey’s defense capabilities have enhanced Turkish influence in Central Asia, thus expanding its regional sphere of influence. Each of these roles potentially runs counter to NATO objectives. Finally, if defense is defined as a private good or as one that is held by a privileged group, then benefits may be withheld. Under such circumstances, “free ride” tendencies are counterbalanced by the fear of exclusion from the group in which defense is a private good.9 Fear of exclusion from the benefits of collective defense have convinced the countries of eastern Europe to assume the costs of joining NATO. A second fundamental factor impacting burden-sharing is the role of group interaction that is necessary for collective action. Collective action is based on three fundamental premises. First, the benefits accrued from collective action cannot be obtained unilaterally nor may be obtained in greater amounts by multilateral action. Second, all groups are formed to achieve a collective benefit and the production costs and level of benefit being provided is improved by the cooperation.10 Third, as no one participant realizes complete fulfillment, the achievable results of collective action are based on sufficiency or “satisficing” rather than optimum 11

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goals.11 According to Cooper and Zycher in Perceptions of NATO BurdenSharing, the benefits accrued from collective actions are measured differently among actors.12 Countries apply different values depending upon their national goals, perceptions of threats, and capabilities. Thus, in the context of burden-sharing, differences emerge over whether individual contributions to collective initiatives are “fair and equal” relative to the individual’s ability to contribute. One of the recent trends in assessing a state’s assumption of burdens is the role of “comparative advantage.”13 Comparative advantage results in burden-sharing being accepted as a multidimensional concept that includes political, economic, and social as well as military costs and is measured in terms of acceptance of roles, risks, and responsibilities as well as financial costs.14 Norway, with a population of eight million and gross domestic product of $111.3 billion, provides $40 million to help the Palestinians develop a national infrastructure. Notwithstanding this example, comparative advantage is very dependent upon the risks associated with the operation being undertaken. In a peacekeeping operation, a willingness on the part of a country to assume the financial costs of such deployment without contributing troops represents a good use of comparative advantage. Comparative advantage may be applied because the operational risks of deployment such as casualties or becoming embroiled in a conflict are minimal. On the contrary, similar financial contributions in a peace enforcement or intervention operation, while still demonstrating a level of comparative advantage, should not be considered as substantial a contribution. The operational risks of deployment such as political ramifications of failure or casualties have lessened the value of the financial contributions. Successful collective action influences burden-sharing in different ways. Collective action requires a small group that agrees upon its objectives. To occur, all members must realize a degree of satisfaction as it relates to their self-interests. As self-interest is always a percentage of the common interest, the higher the percentage of self-interest the greater likelihood that an actor will participate.15 Within a small group, it is easier to reach a consensus on objectives because there are fewer opinions to be aggregated; it is more difficult for a member to maintain anonymity; and “peer pressure” enforces compliance. From a burden-sharing perspective, the small group theory limits the number of participants and thus increases the potential scope of members’ financial, political, and military contributions but also reduces the total amount of contributions available. Second, collective action is successful if the benefit may be achieved at a lower cost if pursued collectively.16 Certainly this acts as a positive incentive to increased participation and can enhance the distribution of the costs. A third criterion for successful collective action is leadership. Individual rationality is insufficient to produce collective rationality and someone is 12

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needed to convince the participants to subordinate self-interest to common welfare.17 In the interdependence that defines collective action, decisions made independently by individuals may result in a collective failure.18 Self-interest defines the goals and means, which differ among actors leading to different political and military strategies. Leadership acts to coalesce these differences and to direct them toward a more unified objective. Leadership also helps sway indecisive decision-makers and convinces hesitant members of the collective benefits of participation. Leadership, however, must be effective. Collective failures result from the inability to use or improper use of institutional power to provide incentives.19 These premises explain why groups may agree to combine resources and provide evidence of what may cause collective failure. However, they only begin the process of assessing the effectiveness of collaboration. As previously mentioned, successful collective action demands shared values and a need to unanimously define objectives of the action. Such a prerequisite either severely limits the extent of action, such as defining success in the Persian Gulf War as the ouster of Iraqi forces from Kuwait rather than the destruction of Saddam Hussein’s regime, or divides the group. These indicate the dynamic and unpredictable nature of collective action that in turn influences the real and perceived contributions to collective actions. Within the context of this study, the international shift from collective defense to collective security is a third core factor influencing burdensharing. Burden-sharing has been impacted by the extension of collective defense to the more politically and militarily risky, and less defined, objectives of collective security. Collective defense is understood as a means of preparing a defense of assistance and not perpetuating the development of individual country defenses or “re-nationalizing” defense policies.20 Its primary manifestation is as an alliance and its functional elements are defined in Article 38 of NATO’s Rome Summit (NATO Press Communiqué: Heads of State Report, 1991): As an integrated military structure relying on cooperation and coordination agreements including collective force planning; common operational planning; multinational formations; and stationing of forces outside of home territory. It also includes mutual basis crisis management; re-enforcement arrangements; consultation procedures; common standards and procedures for equipment, training, and logistics; joint exercises, infrastructure, armaments and logistics cooperation. Collective defense is a military concept supported by military functions. It requires military capabilities and power. Collective defense’s primary manifestations within NATO are strategic deterrence and mutual defense 13

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enunciated in the “attack on one is an attack on all” philosophy of the Washington Treaty Article 5. During the Cold War, the greatest risk of collective defense was the escalation of conflict with the Soviet Union culminating in the unimaginable consequences of global nuclear war. As a result, the concept was geographically limited to the European and Asian theaters. Moreover, the likelihood of this extreme scenario was limited by the fundamental desire for self-preservation by both the United States and the Soviet Union. Under such circumstances, the burdens of collective defense, as defined by NATO, were relatively easily defined and less divisible from a member’s role in the Alliance. Collective security broadens the definition of security, beyond those of collective defense, encompassing a wider range of risks of less devastating consequences but of greater frequency of occurrence. It assumes that national security demands a focus well beyond things “foreign” and “military,” in other words, things “domestic” and “political” and that alliance “security and stability do not lie solely in the military dimension.”21 It demands a level of self-abnegation and definition of morality. Yet, the geo-political security interests of states may limit its effectiveness.22 Its objective is to institutionalize and enforce international law, a normative concept, particularly in an anarchic system with no enforcement mechanism. Multilateralism is its basic form of implementation. One of the primary actions of collective security is the maintenance of global order through compellence rather than deterrence. Compellence demands some form of intervention – war, military operations other than war such as peace enforcement deployments, or coercive diplomacy – that must be both sustainable and long term. Further, collective security operations are not geographically limited and require power projection capabilities that reduce the impact of geography on operations. One of the easiest ways to study collective security is by assessing the impact of military and other interventions. Decisions regarding whether military intervention is appropriate and the level of force to be used causes rifts among allies, quickly politicizes collective actions, and increases the participants’ risks. Each of these burdens and responsibilities need to be examined. Also, a country’s motivation to participate in military actions that may not have direct relevance to their national interests is less. Military intervention is expensive, unpredictable, and runs the risk of embroiling a country in an inextricable “quagmire.”23 When becoming involved in military intervention, countries risk the implications of a failed mission, the impact of the use of force, and being drawn further into an unsolvable conflict through “mission creep.”24 They also face the dilemma of what is left after the conflict and what is their responsibility to physically, economically, and politically rebuild a country. This last point is becoming an increasingly divisive issue within NATO as it appears the United States is the primary military intervention force and its European 14

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allies are left with re-construction and nation building. In essence, collective security, and its related interventionist policies, hastens the consequences that often erode the cohesion in alliances. In a collective security environment, less unanimity of goals exist and as a result the time frame in which effective cooperative action may occur is limited. In 1990–91, support for the US-led coalition against Saddam Hussein was global. By September 1996, support for action against Hussein in response to his incursions against the Kurds in northern Iraq had almost completely disappeared and only selectively re-emerged as the United States sought support for a new offensive in 2002–03. Most Arab states, Russia, China and even NATO ally France denounced the use of force in 1996 and remained unsupportive in 2002. Saudi Arabia, a primary supporter of coalition action against Iraq in 1991 refused to grant over flight access to US planes attacking Iraqi installations in 1996 and denied the use of Saudi territory for operations in 2002. While the nature of defense, the role of collective action, and the increasing international focus on collective security rather than collective defense all influence burden-sharing, they do not define it. Fundamentally, the debate over burden-sharing is the manifestation of the split between interests in receiving the benefit accrued from group action and the “willingness to pay for this action.”25 It reflects the self-interest of members involved in a collective endeavor to disburse the costs of the endeavor as widely as possible. While theoretically rooted in collective and group action, burden-sharing reflects national interests constrained by and integrated with an interdependent environment. It emerges as actors seek to expand their policy options in spite of the constraints imposed by the finite availability of resources. By requesting others to assume some of the costs or burdens associated with particular actions, the requester is able to expend resources elsewhere. However, no institutional authority exists to enforce compliance or to levy assessments. In addition to these core factors, there are a number of supporting concepts that act as incentives for participation in collective actions but also politicize the burden-sharing debate. Opportunity costs, efficiency, spillover, relevancy, and externalities reflect burden-sharing’s practical nature and heighten the political consequences of involvement thus influencing participation. What is given up in order to contribute? What is the value of what is being contributed and achieved? And to what extent are the commitments being applied to the collective objective? The answers to these questions define the incentives that entice actors to participate. Generally, incentives may be characterized as self-preserving, self-aggrandizing, or self-abnegating. These are manifested in a variety of actions that seldom occur within a vacuum. For example, participation in a humanitarian financial relief mission may be an example of selfabnegation but also may reflect the comparative advantage that a country 15

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such as Japan possesses as well as increasing Japanese prestige. Thus, Japanese financial contributions to such an effort are not pure altruism. However, incentives are rarely as clear as a direct threat to national security such as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. Most incentives tend to be more subtle. One such incentive is coercive pressure. Coercive pressure often is used by the United States to force another country to act in a certain way. In March 1991, Congress passed a bill that banned arms sales to Germany and other allies who, at that time, had not paid their full financial pledge in support of the Gulf War. While this bill did not threaten vital German security interests, it was a sufficient incentive to coerce full payment of the outstanding debt. Incentives such as coercive pressure impose an unknown cost upon a country. Spillover is another example. Spillover is a benefit or detriment received by a non-paying member from the provision of good and may be an incentive or disincentive to participate.26 For example, NATO’s forward defense doctrine benefited France because if war occurred, it would be fought initially on German territory giving the French time to prepare and offering an opportunity for negotiations. France thus received a benefit for which it assumed little cost especially after its withdrawal from NATO’s unified military command in 1966. On the other hand, it was primarily negative spillovers that compelled France and Germany to deny US requests for over flights and the use of air bases, respectively, in support of the 1986 strike against Libya. Externalities such as colonial commitments or historical animosities also may precipitate involvement as occurred with France in Lebanon in 1982 and Chad in 1984. In Collective Action Theory and Applications, Todd Sandler uses game theory to identify incentives. The theoretical game model, “Chicken,” provides a scenario in which the consequences of no action are worse than taking action.27 Translated to the security environment, permitting Iraq to benefit from its aggression against Kuwait was worse than the prospect of war with an army thought to be quite formidable and possessing chemical and biological capabilities. In contrast, another game model, “Prisoner’s Dilemma,” rewards inaction, implying that there is little need to assume risk and costs by a non-participant. Depending upon a potential participant’s perspective, these approaches provide reasons for either participating or not. Incentives such as political–economy and geography often influence states’ behavior. Political–economy directly influences the incentives of involvement by broadening the benefits and costs. In the context of collective action, the unity of politics and economics reflects a situation in which motivating groups strive to reach common goals involving both the allocation of resources and the distribution of goods and services.28 The greater the threat to either political or economic values, the greater the incentive for action. Political–economy is closely related to geography. 16

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Threats in regions of closer proximity act as a catalyst to action regardless of other variables. For example, political and economic instability in Haiti is more likely to arouse a direct American response than similar circumstances in Liberia. In addition, threats impacting former colonial possession also cause countries to be involved. According to Sandler, the defense of colonies is not as vital to domestic sovereignty as closer threats.29 His assumption is that defending colonial interests may not provide sufficient incentive for action depending upon other variables. While in some cases Sandler may be correct, the extent of international activities in which France, in particular, chooses to be involved appears to contradict his point. A further perspective on incentives is the “reverse value incentive.” This theory contends that once a good is received without contribution, the demand for the good strengthens and thus the willingness to pay increases when the recipient is faced with the possibility of the good’s availability being decreased.30 This concept has formed the basis for much of the American Congressional debate on burden-sharing. The Mansfield Debates from 1966–74 and other Congressional activities such as Sam Nunn’s 3 percent proposal have their foundation in this theory.31 While the issue of distribution of costs has always existed in alliance relationships, the burden-sharing debate and its supporting literature really emerged in the aftermath of World War II. With the formation of NATO in 1949 and the implementation of containment in Korea, a debate arose about how the costs of collective defense should be distributed. The umbrella measure, applied particularly to the United States’ Western European allies, was the provision of an effective territorial defense for Western Europe. However, contribution to the common defense was only a manifestation of burden-sharing. Most critically, burden-sharing reflects the differences in interests and perceptions surrounding goals, means, costs, and benefits of collective actions.32 The American–European debate was spawned by a lack of consensus on what is of value and how contributions supporting what values should be measured. Values play a critical role in the individual decision-making process regarding assumption of costs. States must determine the value of a collective good (i.e. collective defense) and those goods they are willing to sacrifice in order to have resources that may be contributed.33 However, it may be reasoned that those who value the action more are prepared to assume a greater proportion of the costs of providing it, a circumstance which may result in an opportunity for exploitation.34 This situation might occur most often in the relationship between a great power who has a wide range of interests to protect and a lesser power whose interests are less diverse and extended. Under such circumstances, the lesser power may abrogate responsibility and reduce its contribution under the assumption that the great power will readily assume the costs in order to protect its 17

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expansive interests. Thus, values enhance the “exploitation of the large by the small.” The relationship between values and burden-sharing is important in two other related areas. First, human nature tends to dictate that each individual holds its values in higher esteem than its neighbor. In such circumstances, each alliance member considers other members’ behavior independent of its own.35 Termed the “zero conjectural variation,” this means that others’ contributions are never counted objectively. As a result, others’ contributions are never viewed as being sufficient. The implication is that actors always demand more of their coalition partners intensifying disagreement among actors. Second, values define costs. The German’s must weigh their lack of international participation in peace enforcement against their desire to be viewed as a “great power.” Lack of involvement translates into lost prestige. Other costs may include regional instability, exclusion from the global community, financial losses, war, and loss of life. Since burden-sharing results from states’ interactions, it also is dynamic and multidimensional. It changes with changes in strategic doctrine, the development of new technology, and the alterations in diplomacy or the global environment.36 Within the NATO burden-sharing debate, four watershed events exemplify its dynamic nature: the creation of NATO that spawned the transatlantic debate on the distribution of costs for European defense; the Harmel Report issued in May 1967 that focused NATO strategic doctrine on more expensive conventional forces; the collapse of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact that forced NATO to re-examine its role, change its force structure, and re-define its strategic doctrine; and the revolution in military affairs that has exponentially increased the United States’ military capabilities vis-à-vis other alliance members. Another indication of the debate’s multidimensional nature is the various means countries use to measure their level of contributions. All levels have a measure of validity and contribute to the fluid nature of burden-sharing. During the Cold War, two levels of contributions existed. In the first, the United States favored a bilateral model that measured US defense commitments versus those of individual countries. This yielded agreements such as the Offset Agreements of 1961–63 that resulted from an attempt by the US Congress to correct unfavorable US balance of international payments. Germany agreed to buy new military equipment from the United States; to accept US supply and maintenance support for the existing equipment in the Bundeswehr; and to share the costs of the Bundeswehr’s use of US training facilities and research and development projects.37 In the mid-1970s, the Offset Agreements were replaced by Host Nation Support (HNS) agreements that committed nations hosting US troops, primarily Germany, Japan, and South Korea, to paying a variety of infrastructure and support costs such as housing. 18

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A second level of contribution is the cumulative model in which US contributions are measured against the contributions of the NATO allies. The European allies still favor this approach, because the aggregate numbers of their contributions tend to lessen the impact of the United States’ contribution. For example, non-US contributions account for more than 50 percent of NATO’s total active and reserve defense personnel and tactical combat aircraft.38 Thus, the European contribution to common defense is more significant. A new third level of contribution that reflects burden-sharing’s sensitivity to the international security environment has emerged as a result of the European efforts to define a common foreign and security policy. The political will of European members of NATO and the EC to contribute to European actions, particularly, peacekeeping and peace enforcement has emerged as a critical measure of sharing the burdens of collective security. This measure also has spawned an intra-European burden-sharing debate that only promises to intensify as Europe seeks to define its role in responding to international crises. The Political Report Committee of NATO’s North Atlantic Assembly released the following statement in October 1995: However, the “Preliminary Conclusions on the Formulation of a Common European Defence Policy goes on to remind states of the requirement to maintain the necessary levels of resources to provide, on an equitable basis, suitable, properly equipped, trained and maintained defence capabilities and military forces” to carry out collective defence, “project the security and stability presently enjoyed in the West throughout the whole of Europe”, foster stability in the southern Mediterranean countries, and conduct peacekeeping and other crisis management measures under the authority of the UN Security Council or the CSCE, “acting either independently or through WEU or NATO.” All of this provides an extensive theoretical framework for understanding burden-sharing. However, it is essential to recognize that the practical application of burden-sharing is limited to the scope of specific agreements committing resources.39 Burden-sharing remains subordinate to realism. For example, allied support for the US imposition of economic sanctions against Poland, following the declaration of martial law in 1981, was limited and hence ineffective. Thus, it may be surmised that burdensharing failed. The US policy of “active containment” against Iran in the early 1990s provides another example. While professing continuation of this policy, the Clinton Administration allowed the Iranian government to provide arms to the Bosnian government in 1995. In 1993, Japan, while seemingly accepting some of the costs of “active containment” by 19

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supporting, in principle, the US embargo against Iranian oil, was actually buying 370,000 barrels per day. Conoco, a US company, spent one billion dollars on off-shore exploration in Iranian waters and up to 25 percent of the overseas refined oil shipped to the United States by US companies is purchased from Iran.40 All of these examples illustrate that the sharing of burdens are sensitive to governmental and non-governmental actions aimed at serving other interests. Moreover, it is quite evident that there is limited authority to force anyone to accept a greater share of the burden than they are willing to assume. Finally, the threats of terrorism, failed states, and civil war ignited by national, ethnic, and religious conflicts insure that the international environment will continue to be anarchic and stability and security may only be guaranteed through engagement.

Measuring the burdens: assessing impacts As a result of new theoretical initiatives and environmental changes impacting on the burden-sharing debate, the classical input and output measurements used to determine contributions need to be redefined.41 This study broadens the traditional scope of burden-sharing and allows for the examination of new burdens and measures. To effectively assess burdens in the new security environment, it is essential to analyse political, economic, and military burdens simultaneously. This approach recognizes that there is an intrinsic link among the attributes and these attributes seldom, if ever, occur in a vacuum. Burdens such as territorial access, over flight rights, and base access have related political costs that need to be added to any equation calculating burdens. Although Wohlstetter suggests that the provision of access to threatened areas or proximity to threatened areas is not a burden, history contradicts his position.42 Use of basing facilities in Italy, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia has been critical to operational effectiveness in Bosnia and Iraq in 1991 and the lack of access to Turkish facilities proved problematic in Iraq in 2003. However, the political ramifications for providing access or over flight permissions include charges of complicity that result in a state being ostracized from culturally similar states, embargoes and other acts short of war being imposed, and even direct attack. These are hardly inconsequential when making decisions on whether or not to participate. Nor are the long-term effects to regional stability, particularly in the case of Saudi Arabia, clear. It is for these reasons that the Persian Gulf monarchies prefer that US forces remain “over the horizon” and that pre-positioned matériel or deployed forces maintain a low profile. Legal or constitutional restrictions on involvement such as those imposed upon Germany and Japan also create inequities when considering the distribution of the burdens. The acceptance of global responsibility is measured by the willingness of a state to become involved in intervening 20

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operations. “It [out-of-area operations] is defining the international role of the re-unified Germany and Germany is today an ‘indecisive superpower.’”43 This remains true in 2004. During the 1991 Gulf War, Germany practiced “checkbook diplomacy” or contributing financially rather than contributing troops. While Germany’s contribution of approximately $12 billion helped offset the costs of deploying troops, the inequalities prompted an unidentified NATO officer to comment, “they buy – we die.” The inequality of “checkbook diplomacy” has been intensified by the new increased risk of military casualties that must be assumed by the states participating in interventions. In Western society, the threat of loss of life has emerged as a major criterion regarding involvement in and commitment to collective interventions. From the United States’ perspective, the political impact of the loss of life emerged with Vietnam. The nightly casualty reports and accompanying news footage prompted the imposition of tight controls on the media in Panama, Grenada, and the Persian Gulf. Loss of life is a reality. For example, through January 9, 1995, UNPROFOR had reported sixty-one deaths in Bosnia; The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) recorded thirty-nine deaths; and 1,194 peacekeepers have died since the beginning of those operations.44 The consequences of casualties have deep political ramifications that quickly erode a country’s willingness to remain involved, reinforce tendencies toward isolationism and burden shedding, and inhibit the ability of a standing government to enact policies. Other burdens of interventionist operations include the impact of poorly defined goals and, even more costly, failed missions. When contemplating military intervention, questions of feasibility cannot be divorced from desirability. If a mission is not responding to a perceived threat to vital interests, a great deal of political capital must be expended to justify the costs domestically. In Haiti, the Clinton Administration pointed to mass immigration and increased Caribbean instability as well as future trade opportunities in a differently governed Haiti to convince the US population that the United States should assume the responsibility of altering the existing situation. Under such circumstances, the costs of Operation Uphold Democracy were justified. Moreover, the mission in Haiti could be accomplished. In contrast, the situation in Somalia illustrated the costs of a poorly defined mission that eventually failed. Without clear objectives, operations become susceptible to “mission creep” that threatens to extend operations beyond reasonable goals and operational capabilities. As the mission in Somalia evolved from guaranteeing the delivery of humanitarian assistance to “nation building,” the financial and political costs increased. The intervening forces engaged in hunting warlords and attempted to control territory. The forces were insufficient in size and lacked the appropriate “rules of engagement” to successfully complete either operation. While the humanitarian part of the mission was 21

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deemed a success, the UN reported, “It [the international community] could neither impose peace nor coerce unwilling parties into accepting it.”45 Multinational action was unable to change the existing political situation. The total cost of the operation was approximately $1.64 billion. Thirty-nine peacekeepers died, a number since augmented by the death of civilian aid workers. The UN has promised “to assist the Somali people to achieve a political settlement” while reaffirming the obligations of its members to implement an arms embargo.46 Both commitments imply that the UN may need to request political, military, and economic support from its members in the future. Failed missions erode prestige and credibility of participants, cause them to question the wisdom of involvement, and hinder their ability to exhibit leadership or contribute to future operations. Thus, an important measurement of the acceptance of burdens must be the political risks associated with failed intervention. The assumption of the risks of failed intervention is intrinsically tied to a country’s leadership role. Notwithstanding, the demands of leadership are a seldom-recognized burden. In 1956, the United States refused to support the Franco-British intervention at Suez. As the leader of the Western world, the United States chose to accept the ramifications of pressuring two of its closest allies rather than risk a confrontation with the Soviet Union. In the post-Cold War, American leadership remains critical. The first Bush Administration formed and maintained the coalition that allowed multilateral action against Hussein. The second Bush Administration executed leadership in dealing with Afghanistan as a terrorist haven but demonstrated a lesser ability to lead in the second Iraq war. In the Balkans, US leadership was paramount in both military and political conclusions to those conflicts. Thus, the United States, empowered by its credibility and prestige, assumed the burden of leadership. Although more easily identified than the political burdens, military and economic burdens also have complexities. The geographic shift in areas of operation has intensified the debate about military capabilities such as force projection and sustained deployment capabilities. During the Cold War, Soviet–American global competition insured that both would identify its proxies in regional crises. This is no longer the case. The United States has accepted Russian intervention in Chechnya as an internal Russian issue. Although prepared to protect US citizens, the United States, to date, has contended that civil war in Nigeria is a West African problem. However, the United States did assume the lead in stabilizing Liberia and provided political support to British and French efforts in Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast, respectively. The United States initially recommended a complete withdraw of UN forces from Rwanda but later committed troops to support a humanitarian mission. Regardless, the lack of strong international leadership in addressing the roots of conflict in Africa has allowed ethno-religious conflict to dominate African politics. 22

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Often, the lost opportunity costs and other sacrifices resulting from being involved are overlooked in assessing contributions. Secretary of Defense William Perry was forced to request an additional $270 million from Congress in order to fund the Rwandan deployment or face having no spare parts for tank divisions, conducting only emergency repairs on the Atlantic Fleet aircraft, and dismissing civilian workers.47 It cost the United States $265 million between October 1994 and March 1995 to remove Haiti’s military government. In addition, it was assessed $65 million of the UN peacekeeping operation in Haiti; provided $215 million in economic development support, and contributed $311 million in Fiscal Year 1993 prior to the intervention.48 The costs incurred by the United States for the Somalia operation forced the federal government to eliminate $203 million in university research projects.49 Similar decisions must be made whenever a country is asked to participate or support a collective action. Other less obvious costs include the necessary force configurations, enhanced force capabilities, and the demand upon certain military units that enhances the ability to respond to new threats. The extension of security responsibilities creates military and economic burdens that have not been realized in the past. For example, in 1989 it cost the United States three times as much as its European allies to project a brigade, air combat squadron, or major ship globally.50 Additionally, simply mobilizing forces has costs. A full 50 percent of NATO’s defense force and 15 percent of its rapid reaction force are reserves.51 Mobilization of these forces requires extracting resources from the civilian sector. Also, forces designated for deployment must be properly trained and equipped for their mission. It takes six months to properly prepare troops who have participated in a peace operation to be effective in a war-fighting mission. Air and sea units are essential to project forces into crisis areas and to maintain communications. However, the use of such units strains the military capability. Then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, John Shalikashvili, noted that “we’re running them ragged” referring to the constant use of US Marine Expeditionary Forces and C-130 cargo crews to support global actions.52 Thus, with the increasing gap between the capabilities of US forces and the European allies, a serious question has risen as to whether it is advisable to divert US strategic airlift capacity to deploy allied troops rather than US ones. Part of the new assessment of burdens requires identifying comparative advantages and creating means by which they may be figured into the burden-sharing equation. A serious question is how should intelligence capabilities be measured. For example, while the United States has a great advantage in electronic intelligence gathering, Britain and France retain a good human intelligence network in certain areas. Another relevant example is Italy’s strong reputation for training internal security and counter-terrorist forces. Economic burdens must also not be excluded. In addition to the 23

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financial losses caused by mobilizing reserves from their civilian professions, economic burdens include the financial costs of countering arms proliferation, development assistance aimed at modernizing and stabilizing lesser developed states, and the potential loss in trade or other relationships resulting from collective action against a state. While the United States has committed $1.2 billion to nuclear safety and security in the former Soviet Union, it remains one of the world’s largest weapons exporters.53 Germany, also a large weapons exporter, claims most of its armor is sold to NATO allies. However, review of its registered weapons systems sales indicates that Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iran have received tanks, artillery systems, and fighters.54 Further, the United States also remains a major supplier of arms. The sale of weapons to regions of instability may quickly be translated into military and political burdens if intervention is necessary to diffuse conflict or instability. From a development perspective, the United States has passed off much of the financial responsibility for promoting democracy and market economies in east and central Europe to its European allies. The United States committed $125 billion to the Marshall Plan in 1947 and has only given Poland $100 million by 1995. Between 1989 and September 1994, Germany, on the other hand, was responsible for 10 percent of investment in central and east Europe that included a total of $88 billion in government support.55 Limited US involvement in eastern Europe is predicated upon the United States interests in those regions. European allies and Germany, in particular, have a great deal to gain from a stable market to its east. Globally in 1994, the United States ranked second behind Japan in total aid with $9.9 billion. Japan committed $13.2 billion, France $8.4 billion and Germany $6.75 billion.56 In addition, political support for collective actions involves economic as well as political costs that each country must calculate prior to supporting or becoming involved in an operation. The United States found little support for its deployment to the Persian Gulf in September–October 1994. Arguing that the costs of security were Kuwait’s responsibility, Saudi Arabia, no longer feeling as threatened by Hussein as in 1990, was hesitant to pay the $500 million bill for the deployment. The Russians, to whom Iraq owes more than $10 billion and has $17 billion in economic agreements, objected to the action fearing that more destruction of the Iraqi infrastructure and economy would reduce their chances of collecting on their debt. France, Great Britain, and Germany also opposed toughening sanctions because they enjoyed lucrative trade contracts that may have been canceled had they supported the US action. Similar defections occurred in March 1995, when the United States imposed an embargo against Iran in response to their deployment of troops on the islands in the Straits of Hormuz. This study places a greater emphasis on participation in collective 24

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military intervention and assessing the related contributions. In the preceding sections, the burdens have been identified. The measurement of those burdens encompasses a wide range of criteria including troops and matériel, operational capabilities, and force structure committed to specific operations; financial contributions in terms of voluntary contributions to participating states and UN assessments; political support in a variety of forms; and commitment to arms reduction and counter-proliferation. As a result of the nature of the cases used, economic assistance to developing countries, supporting reforms in east Europe and the former Soviet Union, broader peacekeeping and peace enforcement involvement, strategic force components, and contributions that offset the stationing of troops overseas may be tangentially referenced but are not discussed in detail. All of this is prelude to accepting that burden-sharing measures are imprecise and even by expanding the factors being evaluated remain sensitive to the international environment in which they are applied and the purpose for which they are used. For simplicity, I am assessing the distribution of burdens under three broad areas: the distribution of risk, the allocation of defense resources, and the assumption of responsibility for global order. The distribution of risk is measured by the extent to which risks associated with a particular action are distributed among the primary actors and the level of risks that are accepted both in terms of involvement in specific operations and by comparing the risk across crises. It has been suggested that the United States chose involvement in Somalia because it apparently presented fewer risks than Bosnia. Whether in the end this proved to be true is debatable. More applicable may be that involvement in Rwanda, which involved fewer risks than either Somalia or Bosnia, was avoided because of the failed mission in Somalia. The distribution of risk assesses the impact of failed intervention and casualties on participants. Finally, it evaluates the effect of having a multinational organization authorize or command an operation. The distribution of risk, in essence, answers the questions of who is involved, how are they involved, and why. The allocation of defense resources encapsulates the traditional defense-related burdens and may be assessed in three areas. While a broader context is explained here, for the purposes of this study the primary measures used to assess the allocation of defense resources attribute will be the financial and military contributions made to the operations and the operational capabilities of the primary actors. The linkage between the distribution of risk and the allocation of defense resources are apparent in issues such as a base access, which enhances the projection of forces or supplies to a region, or mobilization of reserve forces. Both have political as well as defense costs associated with them. Another issue that links the defense allocation and political risks are decisions on the use of military force, whether to respond to military attacks proportionally or disproportionally. For example, deterrence by 25

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punishment, that is punishing an opponent’s civic society and economy, changes burdens to a greater extent than does deterrence by denial, destroying an opponent’s military capabilities. The choice of weapon systems used to retaliate may exclude certain participants because they lack the technological capability and also raise political issues. In the Persian Gulf, Saddam probably refrained from using chemical weapons extensively because he feared a US nuclear response. However, any attempt by the United States to use nuclear weapons would have undoubtedly fractured the Coalition. Other examples of issues that link the political, economic, and defense aspects of burden-sharing are willingness to accept nuclear weapons on one’s territory or the implications resulting from the mobilization of reserves. Israel’s civilian workforce is negatively affected if Israel is required to maintain a prolonged mobilization of its reserve components. The problem in measuring burdens results from the difficulties in quantifying and comparing defense contributions.57 Effective spending with regard to defense is nearly impossible to measure in peacetime because no performance measure exists. One example of an attempt at quantifying these measures is the Division Equivalent Firepower that compares firepower delivered by different countries’ armored units. It is based on the Weapon Effectiveness Index (WEI) that applies factors to firepower, mobility, survivability, and age of equipment.58 The WEI may be applied to a variety of weapon systems. While possibly providing a better appreciation for their theoretical efficiency in combat, this measurement does little to enhance our understanding of whether the finances spent to construct the unit were efficiently spent or whether someone may have been able to do that better. Nor does it help us determine the unit’s effectiveness against force configuration “X.” Once performance is evaluated in conflict, effectiveness of equipment and personnel vis-à-vis the opposition is more easily determined. Still the quality of the enemy can prejudice the results. Israeli pilots have a reputation for being vastly superior to their Arab counterparts. Do Israeli pilots have such a reputation when compared to the top American or Russian pilots? The superiority of the Israeli pilots in 1967 made up for deficiencies in numbers and the quality of their equipment. UN restrictions on NATO’s use of force damaged the Alliance’s credibility in Bosnia. The vagueness of the issue quickly becomes apparent when only assessing on quantifiable military criteria. In an attempt to clarify the assessment of operational capabilities, this study asks the question of what is being committed, in both financial and defense resource terms, and who is best prepared to respond to the need. For example, US airlift capabilities and logistical support are critical to successful UN action.59 The participation of German AWAC crews from Geilenkirchen Air Base was essential to the enforcement of the “no fly” zone over Bosnia. In February 1993, when the debate emerged regarding 26

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continued German participation in support of this operation, USAF General James Davis, SHAPE Chief of Staff, noted that non-participation by the German forces might not ground the Bosnia operation but would “hurt very badly.” Another measure of this attribute is the aggregated security resources of information and technology transfer and research and development. The provision of defense knowledge or technology to an ally, the deployment of military trainers, and the shared use of equipment and expertise are prominent examples. In the Persian Gulf, Japanese navigation guides were used. Operation Sharp Guard relied on US intelligence to impose the blockade on the former Yugoslavia. Two ancillary issues emerge from this kind of cooperation. One is competition among arms-producing corporations. The other is that while the provision of technology may increase an allied capability, control over further distribution of that technology is lost. Assumption of responsibility for world order or global security is a broad attribute that encompasses a range of activities some of which reflect self-interests and others that suggest moral or altruistic motives described as “self-abnegation.”60 Previously discussed within the context of the burdens, global responsibility includes arms control and proliferation initiatives, involvement and support of long-term peace enforcement operations, and actions in a wide range of international issues such as terrorism, arresting drug trafficking, environmental preservation, population control, and immigration. For the purpose of this study, this attribute will be measured partly in terms of positive and negative contribution to arms control and peace enforcement efforts within the context of the cases. Second, the measures will include an assessment of the costs involvement beyond the specific actions of the cases. These are the residual or on-going burdens of an operation such as building civil society. Traditionally, this is an area in which the European allies, particularly the French and British, have outperformed the United States. Both their colonial experiences and status as middle-level powers have permitted them greater latitude and neutrality in assuming responsibilities such as establishing judicial systems, police forces, and other government functions. For this reason, the Europeans view this as a critical measure of burden-sharing. The British Embassy in Washington pointed to the heavy involvement of British troops in supporting of international operations as a strong justification for Great Britain not assuming a greater proportion of support for US forces deployed in the United Kingdom.61

Conclusions and hypotheses The willingness of states to assume the burdens of collective intervention is directly and primarily proportional to their perception of threat. Changes in the international system have altered the perception of threat 27

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by replacing nuclear war and superpower confrontation with what Huntington called “suppressed conflicts resulting from cultural factors.”62 Within this context, security is redefined and a much greater reliance is placed on regional security mechanisms and multilateralism. As a result, there are new methods of distributing risk, allocating resources, and assuming responsibility. More specific hypotheses relate to assessment of the attributes of burden-sharing within the specific international systems. In the Cold War period, the United States accepted the greatest share of the risk within the context of the East–West conflict. The United States responded globally on the premise that all global confrontation either directly or indirectly reflected the superpower confrontation. The collective actions that occurred did so primarily under US leadership with the United States assuming the responsibility of building and maintaining consensus among actors. Institutional involvement was limited. The UN was marginalized to a peacekeeping function and a forum for international debate. NATO provided a forum for consultation among the allies but exerted little, if any, organizational control over operations. In fact, the extent to which the opportunity for discussion was utilized was minimal. During the same period, many actions, such as Vietnam, were unilaterally undertaken by the United States. In collective operations such as Lebanon in 1958 or 1983, the defense resources were shared to a greater extent albeit among few contributors. Individual participants assumed the financial expense of the operation. Finally, primarily the British, French, and Italians who undertook peacekeeping operations also shared the responsibility for world stability. The United States assumed the responsibility of responding to Soviet aggression. Germany’s involvement was limited to humanitarian efforts. By the time of the Persian Gulf War, the impotence of the Soviet Union had influenced the paradigm. The Coalition’s mission was defined and limited by the United Nations. However, the United States still assumed the primary risk of enforcing the UN’s sanctions, building and leading the Coalition, and accepting the greatest risks if the action should fail. By sanctioning action, the UN created an environment of shared responsibility. States could both absolve themselves of much of the political risks and still participate. International institutional involvement had other ramifications. By having the UN define operation’s goals and thus its limits, many barriers to participation, such as being ostracized or eroding trade relations, were eliminated. When faced with exceeding the UN’s sanctioned operational objectives, many participants threatened defection thus eroding the multinational nature of the Coalition and increasing the risks of continued action. This reduced the mission’s effectiveness and created an environment in which the primary threat, although weakened, remained. The results are that the need to share burdens continues. There28

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fore, the level to which a coordinating institution defines strategic and tactical objectives influences the burdens to be distributed. Finally, the Balkan conflicts showed that multilateral military intervention on behalf of universal organizations or regional coalitions required decisive great power leadership or risked embarrassing failure. The UN accepted the risks of enforcing its own sanctions and building an intervening coalition. A large number of states assumed the burden of deploying troops. Costs were assessed using the UN’s peacekeeping assessment policy. The European prominence in the early stages was trumpeted by some as a sign of the continued development of a collective European security system. However, the attempt at UN-coordinated and commanded collective action was ineffective. The lack of unanimity of objectives and coordinated tactical responses eroded the UN’s, NATO’s, and the EU’s prestige and credibility. The primary lessons are: that strong military leadership is essential to interventions and institutional control needs to be limited to allow military forces to respond effectively to their environment. The initial case study focusing on experiences in Lebanon in 1982–83 demonstrates these lessons as well as introducing other aspects of burden-sharing.

Notes 1 Measures of Defense Burdensharing and US Proposals for Increasing Allied Burdensharing. Committee on Armed Services, US House of Representatives, HASC 100–114, May 10, 1988: 48, hereafter HASC May 1988. 2 The National Security Strategy of the United States, hereafter National Security Strategy, 1994: 6–7. 3 Clinton, speeches to UN General Assembly, 9/93 and 9/94. 4 Olson, 1965: 21. 5 A pure public good is one that, upon production of which, becomes impossible or prohibitively expensive to exclude anyone from its consumption (i.e. nonexcludable) and the consumption by one does not detract from others’ ability to consume it. Mine sweeping during the Iran–Iraq War provides a practical example. An expanded definition is available in Sandler et al. (1978: Chapter 1). Further discussions of the characteristics of public and private goods particularly as they relate to defense may be found in Olson (1965) and Olson and Zeckhauser (1966). 6 Golden, 1983: 23. 7 Boyer, 1993: 14. 8 Oneal and Elrod, 1989: 440; Gonzales and Mehay, 1991: 107. 9 Gonzales and Mehay, 1991: 109. 10 In the Logic of Collective Action, Olson cites a series of sources defining the role of organizations. Harold Laski contended that “associations exist to fulfill purposes which a group of men have in common”; Aristotle stated that political associations are created and maintained because of the general advantages they bring; and Arthur Bentley added that shared interests are the common characteristic of groups. 11 Olson, 1965: 30–1.

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12 Cooper and Zycher, 1989: iv. 13 See Boyer (1993); Duke (1993: particularly Chapters 8–10). 14 The 1988 Eurogroup definition refers to burden-sharing as a process in which the “benefits, responsibilities, and risks should be shared and should be seen as shared fairly among all alliance members” (Eurogroup, 1988: 18). During a 1995 interview, Lt Colonel Daniel Edgerton, Special Assistant to the United States Ambassador-at-Large for Burdensharing, emphasized the equitable sharing of the roles, risks, responsibilities, and costs as the determining factors of sharing the burden. 15 Olson, 1965: 25. 16 Ibid.: 26 17 Sandler, 1992: ix; Golden, 1983: 42. 18 Sandler, 1992: 7. 19 Ibid.: 11. 20 Ikle, HASC 100–114, May 1988: 256. 21 Allison and Treverton, 1992: 86. 22 “Crisis Management and NATO Reform” Javiar Solana, Rome 6/15/98. 23 Haass, 1994: 8. 24 The discussions on when to use force in the post-Vietnam era were initially postulated by then-Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in November 1984 and have most recently been reiterated in President Clinton’s Presidential Policy Directive #25 Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations May 1994. They include involvement only when vital interests of the United States or allies are at stake; ensuring that public and Congressional support for the operation exists; and that the use of force is the last resort and is, if possible, multilateral. Forces should only be deployed in sufficient strength to achieve their goal that is defined and attainable; operations should be short in duration, and an exit strategy should exist. “Mission creep” refers to incremental changes in the objectives guiding interventionist operations. A prime example is the shift in mission policy in Somalia from one of insuring the delivery of humanitarian aid to the population to one of capturing Muhammad Farah Aidid and the more political operation of nation building. 25 Olson, 1965: 21. 26 Boyer, 1993: 8. 27 Sandler, 1992: Chapter 4. 28 Sandler et al., 1978: 3. 29 Sandler, 1992: 97. 30 Olson, 1965: Chapter 2. 31 All these proposals sought to increase European defense spending by threatening to reduce American troop presence if certain financial criteria were not met. In the case of Sam Nunn, he proposed a 33 percent reduction if the Europeans failed to increase defense spending by 3 percent in 1983. See Duke (1993) and Sloan (1985, 1989) for a more comprehensive discussion of this aspect of the burden-sharing debate. 32 Cooper and Zycher, 1989: v. 33 Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966: 268. 34 Olson, 1965: 5. 35 Sandler, 1984: 103. 36 Sandler, 1992: 105. 37 Duke, 1993: 59. 38 Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense, 1993: A-14. 39 Golden, 1983: 21.

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40 Unidentified Clinton Administration Official, The New York Times, hereafter, NYT, 3/96. 41 Traditionally a range of defense and security criteria have been used to measure the contributions made by individual countries to the common defense. The most prominent among these are the percentage of Gross Domestic Product allocated to defense, per capita percentage of GDP allocated to defense, and the number of men and material committed to NATO’s primary objectives. Other measurements of lesser significance include specific operational contributions; military assistance to NATO nations in the development of defense industries; peacekeeping and humanitarian operations; and economic assistance. A review of the Department of Defense’s Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense since 1989 demonstrates the evolution that is occurring in measuring the acceptance of burdens by individual countries. 42 HASC 100–114, May 1988: 269. 43 Kremp, Die Welt, 2/93. 44 UN Report on Peacekeeping, 1/9/95. 45 The United Nations and the Situation in Somalia, 1995: 33. 46 Ibid.: 35–6. 47 “Pentagon Worries About Cost of Aid Mission,” NYT, 8/5/94. 48 NYT, 9/17/95. 49 NYT, 1/17/93. 50 Cordesman in Coffey and Bonvicini, 1989: 78. 51 North Atlantic Assembly Report, 11/94. 52 “Pentagon Worries About Cost of Aid Mission,” NYT, 8/5/94. 53 International Herald Tribune, hereafter IHT, 4/25/95. 54 This Week In Germany, hereafter TWIG, 11/11/94: 1. 55 TWIG, 10/7/94: 1. 56 TWIG, 6/30/95: 2. 57 Duke, 1993: 3. 58 Ibid.: 145. 59 General Maurice Barele, France, UNPROFOR. 60 Arnold Wolfers suggested that a collective security system depended upon a degree of self-abnegation. States find themselves pledged to participate in collective actions against countries with which they have trade or other relationships or against a breach of peace in regions where they have little or no interests (see Dougherty and Pfalztgraff, 1981: 110–11). 61 British Defense Attaché, UK Embassy Washington, Interview, 9/96. 62 See Huntington (1996) for a discussion of how clashes between civilizations are the greatest threat to world peace.

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2 THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON 1982–84 National collective action

Introduction American, French, Italian, and subsequently British participation in the Multinational Force (MNF) that entered Lebanon in August 1982 represented an attempt at peace enforcement and conflict resolution in an (from NATO’s standpoint) out-of-area operation.1 Each participant had different reasons for responding to the Lebanese crisis. The United States, as a global superpower, sought to counter the threat of increased Soviet influence in the Middle East, restore damaged international prestige, and protect economic interests. Italy was motivated by humanitarian concerns. France had historical ties to the region, strong relations with the Arabs, and wanted, as per usual, to counterbalance American influence. Great Britain joined later, at the request of the United States, and felt participation was essential to maintaining its waning great power status. The experience in Lebanon yielded a number of lessons. It re-affirmed that Cold War collective operations tended to be national in character.2 It confirmed that the United States was prepared to assume a large share of the burdens of a multinational operation when a perceived Soviet threat was present. Also, Lebanon showed how mission creep and local circumstances impact the burdens of intervention. Finally, it demonstrated that the distribution of costs and benefits of failed intervention are not necessarily apparent until after military defeat has forced the intervening to leave.

Burden-sharing revisited Between 1979 and 1982, the burden-sharing debate re-emerged as a central issue among the NATO allies. Ronald Reagan was elected on the platform of “peace through strength.” He dubbed the Soviet Union the “evil empire” and contended that Soviet hegemony was the fundamental problem in world politics. The American arms build-up, started by President Carter, accelerated. Reagan’s philosophy defined almost all foreign 32

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policy within the context of the East–West conflict and his “Rollback Doctrine” opposed Soviet influence globally. For example, military training and arms were provided to Contras fighting the left-wing Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the Afghan mujahadeen fighting Soviet occupation. Reagan’s anti-Soviet approach increased tensions between Washington and its European allies by raising concerns over American commitments to European security and intensified the debate over NATO’s out-of-area role. The West German, British, and Italian governments had accepted the politically risky deployment of Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) but were unclear whether these missiles more closely linked American strategic forces to Europe or de-coupled them. The Reagan Administration also emphasized the strategic mobility of American forces deployed overseas pointing out that they would be used to pursue American interests. The importance of the Middle East made it a focal point for the out-ofarea debate. Geographically and strategically, it connects Europe, Africa, and Asia while commanding air and sea communication routes. Economically, it has large reserves of energy resources. Politically, it is unstable and thus attracts superpower attention. Events in this region unmistakably influenced Alliance security. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iranian Revolution, both in 1979, and the outbreak of the Iran–Iraq War in 1980 threatened the free flow of oil through the Straits of Hormuz and the security and political stability of the Persian Gulf’s oil-rich monarchies. Although Egypt and Israel were abiding by a “cold peace,” the Arab–Israeli conflict had not been resolved. If war started again, the potential for direct superpower confrontation, as occurred in 1973, was quite real. With the exception of the American orchestrated Egyptian–Israeli Peace Treaty in 1979, which coalesced the Arab world against Egypt, the United States remained unsuccessful in attempts to secure a comprehensive Arab–Israeli peace in the aftermath of the October 1973 War.3 At the same time, the Israeli–American relationship shifted from a moral dimension to a strategic one. Rather than stressing “shared democratic values,” the relationship focused on the strategic benefits of Israel to the United States.4 This shift increased Israeli assertiveness, pushed Syria closer to the Soviet Union, and eroded Arab confidence regarding American influence over Israel. Only resolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict could enhance regional stability, provide opportunity for political and economic reform among more radical Arab states, and curtail Soviet regional involvement. All were objectives of American Middle East policy. In June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon. Since 1975, Lebanon had been beset by civil war. The National Pact, which had neutralized the Lebanese Army and provided a semblance of fragile national cohesion since independence in 1943, had completely deteriorated into factional and confessional fighting. In January 1976, Syria gladly accepted an Arab League 33

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mandate and intervened. The Syrians were interested in guaranteeing their influence in Lebanon and insuring that Israel’s did not expand.5 While seeking to exclude Israel from Lebanese politics, neither the Syrians nor the Lebanese government sought to curb the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) attacks against Israel. In 1978, the Israelis had responded with a limited invasion. The combatants were separated by the 4,000 man United Nations Intervention Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Concurrently, Israel supported the creation of the South Lebanon Army, which served Israeli needs by creating a semi-autonomous security zone in south Lebanon. Sporadic conflict continued over the Lebanese–Israeli border punctuated by Israeli air raids on the alleged PLO stronghold in Beirut and elsewhere. In June 1982, Israel swept aside UNIFIL and drove toward Beirut. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon was the catalyst to a series of events that resulted in the deployment of French, Italian, and American troops as part of the so-called Multinational Force (MNF). Originally justified as being needed to secure Israel’s northern border, the invasion’s actual objectives were to eliminate PLO presence in Lebanon and establish a pro-Israeli government in Beirut. Although only marginally effective in securing peace on the Israeli–Lebanese border since UNIFIL’s deployment in 1978, the UN’s remaining credibility in Lebanon was destroyed by the Israeli invasion. Contributing further to the perceived ineffectiveness of international mediation, the United States vetoed a French proposal, supported by the Soviet Union, for a UN Security Council Resolution demanding a cease-fire monitored by UN observers and recommending the removal of the PLO from Lebanon. Instead, the United States proposed the creation of an independent multinational force. The ineffectiveness of UNIFIL, Israel’s inherent mistrust of the UN, and the United States’ strong stand against UN involvement in June 1982 insured that any operation in Lebanon would not be UN orchestrated. A second reason for advocating a multinational force was the Soviet Union’s reserved response to Israel’s invasion. Initially the Soviets issued timid and vague warnings to the United States and Israel.6 Whether because of reduced Soviet regional influence since 1973, political divisions and frailty within the Soviet leadership, or the uncertainty about the intentions of Ronald Reagan, these warnings offered little real risk of superpower confrontation. On the contrary, the Soviets wanted to control the Israeli–Syrian conflict and seemed indifferent to the fate of the PLO.7 As the conflict continued, Soviet agitation increased. Statements from the Soviet Foreign Ministry referred to Lebanon as a “region of proximity to the Soviet Union and events impacting the Soviet Union.”8 In the middle of June, the Soviets placed two airborne units on alert, re-assigned some ships to the eastern Mediterranean, moved weaponry to the airports in the southern Soviet Union, and requested over flight permission from Turkey. 34

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President Reagan, responding positively to direct calls from Brezhnev, applied pressure on Israel to halt its advance. Simultaneously, the Soviets pressured Syria to accept a cease-fire in support of this request. It was the Soviet Union’s reserved reaction that encouraged the United States to actively pursue a compromise that furthered American regional objectives and reduced Soviet influence. First, the Reagan Administration wanted to get foreign troops out of Lebanon. The PLO was considered an obstacle to a comprehensive regional peace plan. Syrian presence was destabilizing, threatened Israel, and indirectly furthered Soviet influence. In addition to serving regional objectives, achieving a Syrian withdraw might stabilize the Lebanese situation by potentially eliminating substantial military support for pro-Syrian factions. It might even convince Syria to reconcile with the United States. The end to Israeli intervention would repair damaged American prestige with moderate Arabs, whose support was critical to the broader regional peace process. Second, the existing Lebanese government was pro-American and the Israelis entertained high hopes that Bashir Gemayel would favor their side against Syria, the Palestinians, and the Muslim militia. A stable pro-Western, governmentenhanced Israeli security, might promote peace between Lebanon and Israel and reduce opportunities for Soviet proxies. As the conflict in Lebanon reached a critical stage, the United States sought to mediate a cease-fire. On August 12, 1982, President Reagan demanded an end to the fighting around Beirut and proposed a plan that assured the safe departure of the PLO fighting force, guaranteed the safety of remaining non-combatants, advocated the restoration of sovereignty and authority of the Lebanese government, and proposed that a multinational force be inserted between the Israelis, PLO, Syrians, and the Lebanese Christians and Muslims.9 France and Italy committed 860 and 575 troops respectively to complement the 850 US Marines dispatched by Reagan to carry out the mission. Great Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark decided not to participate. Although willing to support a UN force, the Soviet Union warned against the deployment of American troops. The MNF participants ignored Moscow’s warnings and on August 21, 1982, a French force of 350 deployed in Beirut. The United States contingent followed on August 25 after more than 2,600 Palestinians had already departed from Beirut. On August 26, the remaining French forces and the Italians entered Beirut. French and Italian forces assumed positions in the more dangerous, but more visible, and thus politically beneficial area along the Green Line separating Christian east Beirut from Muslim west Beirut. The American forces remained in the port area.10 Although the allied forces shouldered a comparable military burden, the political credibility of the United States was pivotal to the deployment of the first MNF. The great power commitment was a prerequisite to a 35

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compromise among the divergent groups. The PLO saw the United States as a guarantor of its safe withdrawal. Israel, although opposed to the principle of the MNF, particularly in southern Lebanon, did accept a US-led MNF.11 Moreover, Israel, the PLO, and the Lebanese government all rejected a UN force as being ineffective and prejudiced. Although the United States had proposed the formation of the MNF, there was only limited cooperation among its participants. On August 20, 1982, Reagan recognized the French and Italian willingness to participate as evidence of their sense of responsibility and the urgency of international action in Lebanon.12 In spite of an agreement of expediency for multinational action, the French rejected a combined command for the MNF. The French felt that a combined command under American leadership would not serve French interests. It would directly link the French and American initiatives, which Paris wanted to avoid. Moreover, it would constrain French independence of action and damage the privileged Franco–Arab relationship. Instead, coordination was to take place through liaison personnel and ad hoc biweekly meetings, which included the four participants and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), the government’s military. Further coordination would be dictated by local events. The effect of limited cooperation meant that MNF’s policies and actions, rather than being coordinated and multinational, reflected the national interests of its members. The failure of the initial cease-fire between Israel and Syria also indicated that the United States had limited influence over Israel and could not broker Syria’s interests. Still, the United States assumed a leadership role in seeking a resolution to the Lebanese crisis and committed its prestige to that end. The United States, affirming its national interests, used the crisis to propose the Reagan Peace Plan that reflected the United States’ regional and global policies rather than offering a concrete solution for the Lebanese situation.13 The Reagan Plan also showed that the United States’ policy makers did not have a good grasp of the Lebanese situation. Both Israel and Syria, overextended in Lebanon, were seeking the best formula to extricate their forces. Rather than expediting their departure, the Reagan Plan gave both a reason to remain in Lebanon and deflected the Palestinian question.14 Also, rather than enhancing American prestige, the Plan weakened it. The Israelis rejected it out of hand since it neither recognized their sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza nor coincided with their interpretation of the Camp David agreement. The Israeli rejection illustrated the limits to Washington’s influence in Tel Aviv. Others’ disillusionment with the Plan was expressed through a series of counter proposals. Most moderate Arabs, in whom confidence in America’s role as a regional peace broker was meant to be instilled, rejected Reagan’s proposal. King Fahd of Saudi Arabia coordinated an Arab counter proposal, the Fez Plan, calling for the creation of an 36

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independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital and re-affirming the PLO as the “sole representative of the Palestinians.” Soviet Chairman Leonid Brezhnev proposed a settlement stressing an independent Palestinian state yet recognizing Israel’s right to exist. The Lebanese crisis, the Palestinian question, and a comprehensive solution to the Arab–Israeli conflict were becoming intrinsically linked. Neither Lebanon nor the Arab–Israeli conflict could be resolved without first addressing the Palestinian question. Meanwhile, the MNF succeeded in its primary tactical objective, to secure the departure of the PLO from Beirut. Furthermore, it was assumed that the newly elected Phalangist President Bashir Gemayel’s government would control Lebanon and stop the fighting. Convinced that things in Lebanon were stabilizing, the American MNF contingent (USMNF) unilaterally withdrew on September 10. Over the next two days, the Italian and French contingents also withdrew. The day after all MNF forces left, President Gemayel was assassinated in a bombing. The emerging parliamentary cohesion that Gemayel had orchestrated was destroyed. Inter-factional fighting resumed. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) entered Beirut and stood by passively while Christian militia massacred Palestinian men, women, and children in the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatilla. Questions were quickly raised as to whether an MNF presence could have prevented the massacre. Many held the United States responsible for the massacre because it had guaranteed the safety of Palestinian non-combatants. The UN Security Council condemned the massacre as “criminal” and the Italians, strong supporters of the Palestinians, asked the United States and France to re-deploy forces in Beirut. By the middle of September, Lebanon had returned to anarchy. The possibility of economic recovery was waning and the country was in dire need of humanitarian assistance and political reconciliation. Under the circumstances, the government of Lebanon separately requested each MNF participant to re-deploy its forces. President Amin Gemayel, who had replaced his assassinated brother, approached the United States while Prime Minister Shafiq al-Wazzan, a Sunni Muslim, negotiated with the French and Italians. Distressed by the camp massacres and concerned about the implications of renewed instability, President Reagan announced, in a September 20 speech to the nation, that a new MNF was being deployed to restore peace to Beirut, help a stable government emerge in Lebanon, and play a role in a lasting and just resolution to the Arab–Israeli conflict.15 The MNF was not to be engaged in combat but would operate under peacetime rules of engagement and be withdrawn if hostilities escalated.16 The United States also promised military and economic aid to Gemayel.17 The MNF’s mission was to create a “presence” that would increase the confidence of the Lebanese government. It was a military force ordered to carry out a political mission. It had neither the 37

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military strength nor the political mandate to enforce a peace settlement. The LAF was responsible for suppressing inter-factional fighting and guaranteeing a “safe” environment in which the MNF could operate. The removal of Israeli and Syrian forces was to be handled through diplomatic efforts and was not the responsibility of the MNF. Western leaders assumed that the new government of Lebanon, with minimal Western support, would seek to implement Western objectives in the face of Syrian, Syrian-supported Muslim, and Israeli opposition. Later, as it became apparent that the government of Lebanon, even with the political support of the MNF, was unable to accomplish these goals and, in fact, was deteriorating under increased pressure from Syria and Syriansupported factions, the United States’ policy shifted from passive support to active involvement. However, the political realities of the international system and the domestic agendas of the MNF participants made it politically inexpedient to increase the size of the MNF sufficiently to secure the government’s rule. Therefore, in the final analysis, American goals exceeded its reach. The MNF failed to accomplish anything of value and suffered significant casualties in the process.18

The re-deployment of the MNF To demonstrate their foreign policy independence, the French strove to be the first to redeploy portions of their MNF contingent. On September 24, a French force of 350 men re-entered Beirut assuming positions in its metropolitan and the northwest sectors of greater Beirut, dominated by the Maronites and Syrians. The French chose this position because of their historical involvement with these communities. The remaining French force of about 1,150 was deployed over the next few days. On September 27, 1,400 Italians, who sympathized with the Palestinians, assumed positions in south central Beirut that was a Palestinian area. On September 28, 1,200 United States Marines took up positions south of the city along the sea and near the airport.19 The area of US deployment epitomized the differences in opinion in the Reagan Administration over American involvement. The State Department felt American involvement was crucial to the United States’ prestige in the Middle East. The Defense Department, envisioning American troops becoming embroiled in a civil war, opposed the deployment altogether. Once deployment was a foregone conclusion, the latter sought to guarantee the troops’ security by deploying them in areas that were removed from civilian populations and easily exited by sea or air. Despite these precautions, the Americans incurred their first casualty on September 30 as one marine was killed and three wounded while trying to defuse an Israeli cluster bomb. In October and again in November, President Gemayel requested that the MNF be increased to as many as 30,000. French President Francois 38

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Mitterrand agreed to an insignificant increase of 450 men and promised military, financial, and technical assistance.20 Italian Prime Minister Giovannia Spadolini agreed to increase Italy’s contribution and to broaden the MNF’s mandate and composition.21 Seeking to re-assert American leadership in the wake of the allies’ increased commitment, President Reagan issued National Security Directive #64, which demanded the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon by the end of 1982. The United States also promised to consider deploying an additional 15,000 troops once foreign forces left. Finally, the Directive stated that the USMNF would not be withdrawn until the government of Lebanon could exert sovereignty beyond Beirut. National Security Directive #64 was the first indication that the United States did not have a clear policy of direct action. It wed the United States, specifically, and the MNF tacitly, to the government of Lebanon. It infinitely extended MNF’s presence in Lebanon by directly linking it to the withdrawal of foreign force. Finally, it militarized the situation by implying a MNF role in the extension of the government of Lebanon’s authority. The United States further militarized the situation in December when USMNF began re-training and arming the LAF. Realizing that a larger force was needed to implement the new mission, the United States assumed the responsibility of finding additional partners. NATO allies Great Britain, Belgium, Turkey, and Greece as well as Sweden, Austria, South Korea, and Spain, a future NATO member, were asked to contribute a battalion each. With the exception of Great Britain, all declined either on the basis of constitutional restrictions barring participation in non-UN sponsored actions or because all costs of the operation were to be borne solely by the participant. The British agreed to deploy a token ninety-man force to the west of the American positions in a predominantly Druze area. Through early 1983, the MNF’s mission in Lebanon began to unravel. Negotiations between Gemayel and the MNF governments to increase the MNF’s size undermined Gemayel’s credibility and the MNF’s neutrality. The Syrian and non-Christian factions gradually began viewing the MNF not as neutral peacekeepers but as guarantors of the Gemayel regime and as reserves to his LAF.22 Syria, re-invigorated by renewed Soviet support and disillusioned by limited American influence over Israel, became more assertive. Syrian President Hafez al-Asad used Gemayel’s reliance on the MNF to persuade a disenchanted Walid Jumblatt, the leader of the Druze faction, not to cooperate with the Gemayel government. Jumblatt’s dissatisfaction with Gemayel emerged from his belief that the LAF forces were helping the Christian Phalange militia in their struggle against the Druze. Jumblatt institutionalized his opposition with the creation of the “National Salvation Front” in mid-1983. In March, the MNF’s environment turned increasingly hostile. French, Italian, and American contingents took casualties from grenade attacks. 39

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On April 18, terrorists bombed the United States embassy in Beirut. In May, Druze and Muslim factions rejected further deployment of the LAF or the MNF into former Israeli and Syrian areas without political steps toward reconciliation.23 The United States further contributed to the MNF’s deteriorating position by resuming support for Israel. The House of Representatives approved an extra $300 million in aid to Israel; allowed the sale of F-16 fighters that had been frozen since the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear facilities at Osirak in 1981; provided a grant for the Israeli Lavi fighter project; and agreed to an Israeli-proposed memorandum of strategic understanding. Although excused as measures aimed at “countering the intrusion of Soviet military influence into the region,” the Memorandum of Strategic Understanding and other steps were intended by the United States as enticements for an Israeli withdrawal.24 Re-focusing attention on Israel was an indication of mounting US frustration in Lebanon. But it further isolated American activities from Lebanon’s Muslim factions and eroded moderate Arab governments’ confidence in the United States. On April 10, King Hussein of Jordan rejected all peace plans but the Saudi initiative. Faced with declining Arab support, the United States again sought to gain the initiative by shifting its energies from a comprehensive regional settlement to arranging a separate peace between Israel and Lebanon. Secretary of State George Schultz’s efforts, which resulted in the May 17 Accord between the Gemayel government and Israel, indicated all foreign forces would withdraw simultaneously. The May Accord was indicative of the US tendency to proceed with foreign policy initiatives without consulting its European allies. None of the European participants supported it. More significantly, the Accord marked the end of the United States, and implicitly the MNF’s, role as neutral brokers in Lebanon and further weakened America’s diminishing prestige. It radicalized Syria’s position increasing Asad’s resolve to remain in Lebanon and pushed Syria still closer to its Soviet patron. Syria renewed its military build-up in Lebanon that prompted an equivalent Israeli response, increased its active support of Druze and Muslim factions opposed to Gemayel, and aided radical PLO factions against Arafat. The internal PLO struggle was a concern to the United States, who, in spite of its lack of support for Arafat, did not want the PLO to split into radical factions aligned with Syria and Iran. Asad also refused to see President Reagan’s Middle East envoy, Philip Habib. The United States’ primary role as an intermediary among all major parties collapsed. As it became apparent that the May Accord was not receiving broad support and American influence was declining, the United States resorted to power politics. Robert McFarlane who advocated a credible threat as the best deterrent to re-emerging hostilities in Lebanon, generally, and against the MNF, specifically replaced Habib.25 Although President 40

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Reagan refused to significantly increase the US contributions to the MNF, he unilaterally ordered American carriers into the eastern Mediterranean as a demonstration of American resolve and increased its military capability.26 This only served to heighten Syrian–Muslim opposition to the United States and Gemayel. Events now overtook the United States. Israel, facing mounting casualties and increasing domestic opposition to its involvement in Lebanon, announced a phased withdrawal of the IDF.27 As the Israelis evacuated the Shouf Mountains, which overlooked Beirut, President Reagan promised to fill the void by having the MNF accompany the LAF into the region, an action that had already been denounced by the Druze. Before either the LAF or the MNF was ready to move into the Shouf Mountains, the Israelis pulled back and fighting erupted between the Druze and Christian Phalange militias. The LAF soon joined the conflict. Although President Reagan did authorize American forces to support allied forces and the LAF, Gemayel’s requests for IDF and subsequently MNF intervention were rejected. Regardless, the French MNF were attacked, as were the USMNF Marines at Beirut International Airport (BIA). In response to these attacks French, British, and American carrier-based aircraft flew over Beirut. On August 28, USMNF returned fire for the first time. On September 2 in accordance with the May 17 agreement, Gemayel asked the Arab League to terminate the Arab Defense Force mandate. In principle, this request cast Syria as an occupying power equivalent to Israel and seemingly justified the American demands that Syrian forces be withdrawn. It also neutralized the Soviet position that until that time had characterized the MNF deployment as an unauthorized American intervention but supported Syria’s presence as a legitimate operation authorized by the Arab League. Throughout September, fighting between the LAF and the Druze intensified in the Shouf Mountains around the town of Suq al-Gharb. On September 19, when it appeared that the American trained and armed LAF might wither under the Druze offensive, the US Sixth Fleet opened fire on the Druze forces. With American support, the LAF held their positions. The Battle of Suq al-Gharb directly involved American forces on the side of the LAF and positioned the MNF as allies of the increasingly unpopular Gemayel government that lacked political consensus within Lebanon. The outbreak of hostilities between the LAF and the Syriansupported Druze nullified the MNF’s peacekeeping mission.28 Moreover, Syria’s refusal to honor Gemayel’s request for withdrawal meant that either Syria would be permitted to stay in Lebanon or would have to be forced to leave. With Gemayel’s military power weakened, only the MNF, and the United States in particular, was capable of forcing a Syrian withdrawal. Reflecting the on-going discrepancy between the Departments of 41

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Defense and State, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that the rules of engagement for the USMNF should remain unchanged. However, Secretary of State Schultz contended that the United States needed a “major show of force” to resolve the situation.29 President Reagan supported Shultz’s position. The allies also reluctantly supported the American request for increased military activity. On September 22, French jets attacked Syrian and Druze positions in retaliation for the death of ten French soldiers caused by Syrian and Druze shelling. The British dispatched three “pocket carriers” to the eastern Mediterranean. The Italians prepared to support their forces with land-based aircraft. Both the British and Italian parliaments, however, expressed concern over American action. Seeking to maintain the neutrality of their forces and thus enhance their security, they criticized American support of the LAF as risky escalation. Responding to the American action, the French, who had used force to retaliate for attacks upon their troops, contended that France “would never associate itself with a policy that could result in the partition of Lebanon and the division of the Middle East into Russian– Syrian and America–Israeli areas of influence.”30 Ironically, the show of force produced the desired results. On September 26, Nabih Berri’s Shiite faction (the AMAL), the Christian Lebanese Forces, the LAF, and the National Salvation Front agreed to a cease-fire cooperatively arranged by the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. Talks on national reconciliation began in Geneva with the United States and Syria observing. The MNF’s role, however, quickly emerged as an issue. While Lebanese Foreign Minister Elie Salem, a Greek Orthodox Christian, saw the MNF as providing political and logistical support for the government, Syrian Foreign Minister Abdul Halim Khaddam called it “a grave threat to security and peace in the region.” The foreign ministers of the MNF participants also began discussions concerning the replacement of the MNF with a UN peacekeeping force to which the French and Italians were willing to assign some of their troops. While all groups agreed that neutral observers, such as forces from Greece or Yugoslavia, might be acceptable, the Druze, the AMAL with Saudi support, and Syrians supported by the Soviets, opposed any MNF presence in such a peacekeeping force and questioned the rationale of any UN deployment.31 Although agreements on force separation and peacekeeping deployments were unattainable, the cease-fire held. The United States resupplied the LAF and increased pressure on Gemayel to use the LAF to provide security for the MNF.32 Regardless, terrorist attacks directed against the MNF contingents continued. On October 23, terrorist bombings of the US Marine headquarters and primary French facilities resulted in 241 and fifty-nine dead, respectively. The loss was devastating. In the aftermath, President Reagan again sought to demonstrate leadership. National Security Decision Directive #111 outlined greater American 42

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diplomatic involvement in promoting a compromise, demanded a major financial commitment for reconstruction of Lebanon from all MNF participants, greater MNF cooperation, and a rapid withdrawal of the IDF. MNF foreign ministers publicly reaffirmed their commitment to maintaining the MNF. At the same time, both the United States and France launched retaliatory air strikes and naval bombardments against Shiite and Syrian targets. In reality, the MNF’s remaining cohesion was deteriorating, domestic support for its mission diminished, and the MNF was being directly targeted by terrorist groups as well as factions opposed to the Gemayel government. The participants began planning for the MNF’s withdrawal. On November 3, the Italian Communist Party presented a motion to the Italian legislature asking for withdrawal. Although the motion was defeated, Italian President Pertini announced a “gradual reduction” of the Italian force and withdrew one half of its troops. President Reagan, while continuing to call Lebanon a vital interest to the United States, admitted that if the Lebanese government collapsed or had no chance of restoring order, the MNF had no purpose.33 The United States also accelerated its training and equipping of the LAF in preparation for the Americans’ imminent departure. The French transferred 500 men to UNIFIL in order to maintain a presence in Lebanon once the MNF departed. By late January 1984, the situation was untenable. MNF casualties, at the hands of terrorist and Syrian-supported factions, continued to rise. The Lebanese government ceased to function as an entity when the cabinet resigned following continued fighting between the LAF and Shiite militia. The LAF disintegrated as thirty brigades defected to the Syrian-supported militia in west Beirut and the Bekaa Valley. On February 7, the British contingent withdrew to ships offshore and exited the area on March 22. On February 8, the Italians announced their intent to withdraw their remaining forces. Six days later, President Reagan announced that the American forces would withdraw from Lebanon in thirty days. By February 26, they were re-positioned offshore. The French seeking to maintain a portion of their MNF contingent, as the nucleus of an envisaged UNsponsored peacekeeping force, submitted a resolution to the Security Council. However, agreement on the specific language could not be reached and the Soviet Union vetoed the resolution. Lebanon’s only recourse was some form of political compromise with Syria. On March 5, Gemayel abrogated the May 17 Accord and visited Asad in Damascus. The United States’ attempts at curbing Syrian influence in Lebanon had failed. On March 31, the French left Beirut and two days later, the government of Lebanon requested that the United States, France, Great Britain, and Italy terminate the MNF.

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The collective and private benefits of allies’ intervention in the Lebanese crisis Why did NATO allies, the United States, France, Italy, and subsequently Great Britain intervene in Lebanon? Reasons for joint intervention included establishing favorable conditions for a regional peace process, responding to a humanitarian crisis partially caused by allied malfeasance, averting the re-emergence of Soviet influence in the region, and re-establishing American prestige by responding to increasing Soviet interference and internal conflict in the Middle East since 1979.34 Multilateral intervention provided a semblance of international legitimacy. It distributed the risks, costs and responsibilities of intervention more broadly. However, the lack of coordination among the intervening forces causes some doubt as to the extent to which the MNF may be truly characterized as an international operation. Of all the motives for intervention, the collective guilt resulting from the Sabra and Shatilla massacres was the immediate catalyst to French, American, and Italian involvement. In the language of collective action, Lebanon represented the extreme case scenario. The participants reacted to a situation that exceeded acceptable norms and for which they felt responsible. However, their willingness to accept the costs and responsibilities of long-term involvement was directly proportional to their national interests. Continued conflict in Lebanon did not threaten the vital interest of most European countries, thus many refused involvement. In essence, the threat in Lebanon was low thus the collective benefits of involvement also were low. In assessing the reasons for involvement, it is apparent that Italy and Great Britain’s response, to a great extent, was predicated upon humanitarian objectives, while perceived national benefits stimulated French and American action. The United States deployed troops in Lebanon to restore its damaged international prestige, to re-establish credibility as a proponent of Middle East peace, and to demonstrate its leadership in opposing Soviet expansion. Involvement was central to its prestige and provided an opportunity to expand the Middle East peace process.35 The United States’ apparent complicity in the Israeli invasion, its subsequent inability to exert meaningful control over Israelis, and its failure to protect Palestinian non-combatants had convinced moderate Arabs that Washington was unprepared or unable to demonstrate an evenhanded Middle East policy. Such circumstances enhanced opportunities for Soviet influence and created obstacles to the peace process. France’s involvement in Lebanon was a mixture of countering a preponderance of American influence in out-of-area operations, historical and economic regional interests, and support for humanitarian causes. In 1981, then newly elected President Mitterrand had outlined his criterion for French international involvement based upon the assumption that 44

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international instability resulted from the economic gap between the First and Third Worlds. Thus, France supported populations struggling for freedom and social justice and professed a policy of backing United Nations’ intervention. However, when France had direct interests in a region, they were less supportive of UN involvement. The defining element of French involvement, outside of NATO, was its belief that problems were the result of regional issues with unique problems and not an extension of the East–West conflict.36 In many respects, France was either intentionally or unintentionally acting in competition with the United States. France did not attribute Middle East instability to Soviet aggression and supported a Soviet role in Lebanon. It advocated internationalism initially seeking a UN mandate and deploying troops only when the United States vetoed their resolution. When the MNF’s effectiveness was destroyed, they again advocated a UN peacekeeping force only to be defeated by a Soviet veto. France contended that the United States was too focused on Soviet Union expansionism to be sensitive to local problems and too closely tied to Israel. Other European allies including Italy shared this perspective.37 Counterbalancing the United States was not France’s only incentive. France, generally, tried to act as a global player with an autonomous foreign policy. While such operations were costly, France was not part of NATO’s integrated military structure. This meant that Paris unilaterally determined its commitments to the Alliance and that burden-sharing was not a motivating factor. As a result, France enjoyed greater flexibility in the use of its military resources. In the Middle East specifically, French Gaullist policies, since 1967, had been quite pro-Arab. Although Mitterrand was more sympathetic to Israel, oil and access to markets still resulted in pro-Arab policies. Thus, France’s economic ties to the Middle East provided an important incentive for involvement in Lebanon. While the French economy could withstand the loss of its Lebanese market, continued Lebanese instability could spillover into other important Mediterranean markets.38 France’s colonial and mandate experiences strengthened its role as an independent negotiator with ties to both Syria and Lebanon. Furthermore, France rejected any implied efforts at creating a “second Israel” of Christian Arabs in lands dominated by the Maronites and advocated the legitimacy of a whole Lebanon. They accused the United States of promoting such a proposal and cited it as an example of self-serving American policy. Finally, France’s historic ties also translated into relatively strong domestic support for French involvement. Comparable American support was never evident. Italy shared France’s geostrategic and economic interest in the Mediterranean. Like France, the direct threat from the Warsaw Pact countries was limited, enhancing operational flexibility. Through treaties with Malta and participation in UNIFIL, Italy had demonstrated a growing commitment to an active role in North Africa and the Mediterranean region prior to 45

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1982. However, Italy also had limited its out-of-area responsibility by refusing to participate in international efforts to patrol the Straits of Hormuz in 1980.39 Italy’s out-of-area policy combined national interests with assuming the responsibilities of multilateral membership in NATO and the European Union (EU). Its Middle East policy was linked to the EC’s Venice Agreement in 1980, which stressed the rights of the Palestinians and called for PLO involvement in peace negotiations. Thus, Italy also counterbalanced American support for Israel with sympathy for the PLO. While Italy would have preferred to be part of a UN force, it responded to a direct request for assistance from the Lebanese government for humanitarian assistance. Its purpose was to restore law and order in an assigned area and to ensure that the PLO was not dismantled. Italy’s commitment to humanitarian concerns and peacekeeping was evident in the time spent on acculturating its forces to the Lebanese environment and the deployment of a field hospital to alleviate the scarcity of medical services among the Palestinians. Reaction against the camp massacres was strong in Italy and provided backing for the government’s policy for an “extreme response to extreme circumstances.” Even the Communist Party did not oppose initial participation. However, as the deployment continued in an increasingly hostile environment, Italian involvement emerged as a political question in a volatile political system. The result was that Italy was the first to reduce its level of participation. Its colonial history and the dismantling of its empire drove much of Great Britain’s out-of-area participation. Great Britain’s restraint on the use of military force reflected its Europeanization. It ceased to contribute troops to SEATO and CENTO in 1969 and 1975 respectively.40 In Lebanon, much of the British incentive may be attributed to its “special relationship” with the United States and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s Reaganesque belief that the Soviet Union needed to be contained. Related to the policy of containment, Great Britain believed that Europe needed to accept greater responsibility for out-of-area security. Britain’s involvement in Lebanon resulted from a wish to show solidarity with the United States, a desire for peace and stability in a region of historical interest and strategic importance, and belief that the continued Middle East instability heightened East–West confrontation and Soviet opportunism. In this sense, the British involvement reflected American concerns. Having attaining self-sufficiency in oil in 1981, the economic impact of a potential Arab oil embargo was minimal on Great Britain. This, however, did not allow the Thatcher government to implement a forceful policy. British military contributions were constrained by internal politics. The opposition Labor Party was not disposed to direct action and both the Labor and the Conservative parties were sensitive to financial, commercial, and strategic issues. Moreover, the British viewed their confrontation with Argentina over the Falklands as a much greater threat to 46

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national interests. As a result, the British contribution was very modest and did little more than “show the flag.” Like the Italians, they remained neutral observers for the most part. From a burden-sharing perspective, understanding what incentives or collective benefits motivated intervention in Lebanon is vital, however, it is equally as important to understand the reason that caused others not to join. First, only a limited number of states were capable of intervening.41 The French, British, Italians, Americans, and Turks, either because of their geographic location or military capabilities, were the only ones really able to intervene in Lebanon. Second, no multinational organization was involved. While the four participants were all members of NATO, its organizational structure was not used. Communication consisted of government-to-government interaction with some ad hoc in-country liaison. The French, who wanted no links to the American forces rejected a unified command. Their rejection was counter to both the Italian and the American position. The United States had twice, in August 1982 and again in September 1983 when fighting increased, proposed a unified command.42 The forces deployed were regional units not generally committed to Alliance responsibilities. The French, Italians, and British all maintained specific forces for such out-of-area operations. The United States Marines were attached to the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean or deployed from bases in the United States. In particular, American facilities in Europe were not used to support this operation. In spite of UNIFIL’s presence in southern Lebanon, further UN participation in the Lebanese crisis was precluded by American and Soviet competition in the Security Council and a lack of support from both Lebanon and Israel. The UN functioned as a forum for international discussion, but following the American veto of the French resolution sanctioning a UN force in August 1982, no further serious resolution was forthcoming until February 1984. At that time, the French again proposed a UN peacekeeping force to replace the MNF. The Soviet Union vetoed the resolution, not wishing to provide the MNF with an honorable exit or legalize “US intervention.”43 In essence, Lebanon is the epitome of the UN stagnation resulting from superpower competition during the Cold War. Among those who were asked but chose not to participate in the MNF were the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Sweden, Austria, S. Korea, and Australia. Constitutional prohibitions on non-UN mandated military actions outside of NATO, limited military force projection capabilities, and insufficient financial resources were the primary reasons for their inability to share the burdens. Moreover, most countries perceived little threat from the Lebanese crisis and envisioned greater costs if more closely involved. The NATO allies also expressed their general dissatisfaction with the operation by refusing to assume other 47

THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON 1982–84

defense burdens to offset any of the MNF’s financial and military contributions. The Federal Republic of Germany was not asked to participate directly in the MNF because of its responsibility to defend central Europe and its constitutional restrictions specifically prohibiting the deployment of German forces outside of NATO. Germany also had just had national elections that had brought the more conservative Christian Democratic Union/Christian Socialist Union (CDU/CSU) to power. Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s government had made a major commitment to the INF deployment. There was no desire among US policy makers to increase German domestic unrest or anti-NATO feelings by advocating out-of-area responsibilities at this time. West Germany did provide political support. Kohl agreed with the United States that a comprehensive Middle East peace required American, German, and European cooperation. He also supported the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon.44 This policy mirrored that of Kohl’s predecessor Helmut Schmidt who had supported European cooperation in the deploying of American forces but rejected German participation.45 Although not needed in the case of Lebanon, Germany was prepared to offset the out-of-area deployment of American forces attached to NATO by assuming their Alliance responsibilities. Finally, the Kohl government was prepared to be involved in a European economic aid action. Still, Germany had not progressed to a level of international maturity that allowed it to assume the major risks and responsibilities of burden-sharing in non-NATO territory.

Identification and distribution of burdens The Lebanese operation presented a variety of strategic and tactical burdens. There was the need to control the Lebanese situation so that its influence on broader regional peace initiatives was minimized. In addition, someone needed to assume leadership in arranging a compromise within Lebanon itself and leading the intervening force. The level of risk and responsibility assumed by various participants fluctuated in proportion to their international stature. In the Cold War environment, the implications of involvement were much greater for the United States, a superpower, than for a mid-level power such as France. Once involved the implications of failure became a major consideration. Mission failure would damage the United States’ international prestige that would influence its ability to act effectively in other international crises and erode the political will needed to undertake foreign policy initiatives. On the other hand, because of its prestige, the United States had a greater ability to enforce decisions and pressure recalcitrant states. For example, initial American deployments attracted international attention 48

THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON 1982–84

but increased the chances of a peaceful settlement. American forces reversed the paranoia and violence, built government confidence, and stabilized Beirut. The United States accepted a large share of the burden for organizing and maintaining the MNF operation. The Reagan Administration not only advocated international action but also promised American involvement. The United States also used its prestige to seek additional participants until early 1983. Although American leadership was unattractive to both the Italians and the French who advocated a policy that excluded the superpowers, it was central to the operation. Only the United States was acceptable to all parties in Lebanon. The PLO and Israel had acquiesced to the August 1982 agreement on evacuating the PLO from Beirut because it was guaranteed by American troops. Syria, defeated and overextended, also tacitly accepted American presence in Lebanon hoping that it would get Israel to withdraw. President Gemayel saw American involvement as preferable to either Israeli or Syrian dominance.46 Tactically or operationally, all intervening countries assumed the risks of deploying troops in a hostile environment in which the potential for casualties was high. However, because the MNF lacked international authorization, the size of the intervening forces, their financial cost, the level of military support offered to Lebanon, and the availability of additional forces either for the MNF or to support the deployed units were exclusively the responsibility of the MNF participants. Although many countries were willing to assume responsibilities in conjunction with UNIFIL or in the distribution of humanitarian assistance, most were not prepared to assume the risks of the MNF operation. The failure to recognize the inconsistency between the mission’s objectives and the capabilities of its participants created additional burdens. When President Reagan supported the extension of the Lebanese government’s sovereignty beyond Beirut and committed his government to an American presence until all foreign forces withdrew, he enlarged an already existing discrepancy between the MNF’s purpose and capabilities. He heightened the tactical risks and responsibilities without providing the means to implement these plans. The MNF lacked the military strength to force the Syrians or Israelis to leave. Moreover, its constituent governments lacked the political will for a long-term deployment. Over time, the inability to focus the MNF’s mission also hindered the peace process. The MNF’s support for Gemayel emboldened him with a sense of confidence that allowed him to avoid compromise with his domestic opposition.47 When combined with an increasing lack of political consensus regarding Gemayel’s legitimacy, the Muslim population feeling alienated and threatened struck not only at Gemayel but also at the MNF. Among the participants, domestic opinion was another shared burden. The length of deployment, financial costs, and, above all, casualties 49

THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON 1982–84

directly influenced domestic public opinion that determined who would gain or maintain political power in a democracy. France and Italy, both of whom initially had relatively strong public support, accepted high-risk military positions because they viewed the operation as one of peacekeeping and demonstrating political support for the government of Lebanon. However, when the Italians’ security was threatened, public pressure quickly turned in favor of terminating involvement. As casualties increased, public support eroded for an action that did not threaten national territory. Traditionally, the French have had only limited public support for sustained operations in a hostile environment, but, in this case, historical considerations took precedent.48 Opposition to involvement in Lebanon grew more slowly and thus reduced the political cost of involvement. Deployment was never popular in the United States, although it was deemed by the government to be strategically important. Prior to its involvement in Lebanon, the United States’ experience in peace enforcement operations had been limited to participation in the Multinational Force and Observers. By 1982, the Reagan Administration had assumed a policy in which the foreign deployment of American forces must serve American national interests at acceptable costs.49 Lebanon appeared to meet this criterion. It was a security interest because of the threat of increased Soviet influence. The operation initially appeared to be one of limited risk. It was assumed that public opposition would increase dramatically if there were casualties, therefore, American troops were deployed in a presumed relatively safe area. As the operation continued, President Reagan shared the domestic political risks by requesting and receiving Congressional authorization, under the War Powers Act, for an extended deployment. Internationally, he defused allied criticism of American “staying power” by committing American forces to long-term involvement. British deployment in the Druze area reflected distance historical ties with that population. More importantly, Britain viewed its Lebanese deployment strictly as a peacekeeping operation. When British troops came under fire, opposition grew in the government and among the population. The government was accused of being subservient to the United States and allowing the mission to be corrupted. Additional risks emerged as the mission evolved from neutral peacekeeping to one of active military involvement. A superpower cannot commit forces without the risk of becoming someone’s surrogate or being bated into military action.50 Although the shift in the mission’s objectives impacted USMNF most directly, the preponderance of the American role in the MNF meant that the MNF policies tended to be identified with US policies. Thus, as the American role altered, the risks for the MNF, as a whole, increased dramatically. As American public opinion opposed long50

THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON 1982–84

term involvements overseas and the United States had other global responsibilities, the United States had a small window of opportunity in which to find an acceptable solution to the Lebanese crisis. When diplomatic initiatives stalled, the United States sought to impose its will on all parties by using force. Under the initial rules of the engagement, American troops were only permitted to engage in self-defense, yet as attacks upon the Americans increased and their support for the LAF grew during 1983, these rules were stretched until the Americans were virtually involved in a war. In spite of its internal lack of cohesion, the MNF had an organizational meaning to the Lebanese. The result was that while individual MNF units, for the most part, acted unilaterally, their actions had ramifications for all participants. The Lebanese factions did not necessarily differentiate among individual participants. Thus, as the United States escalated its military activity and increased support for Israel, the credibility of the entire MNF suffered in Arab eyes. The United States led diplomatic efforts by proposing a comprehensive regional settlement, seeking to resolve the immediate Lebanese crisis by organizing direct Israeli–Lebanese talks, and carrying out “shuttle diplomacy” between Israel and Syria. The European allies focused more on the internal Lebanese circumstances holding discussions with the Gemayel government as well as major opposition leaders. The Defense Ministers of the three European MNF participants visited Lebanon. In addition, Gemayel was entertained in all four capitals, meeting with the respective heads of state. The French and Italians went further by meeting with opposition leaders. As with the deployment, American leadership in the regional peace process was essential. Through American efforts, the ill-conceived May 17 Accord and the September 1983 cease-fire were negotiated. Even as late as July 1983, Gemayel noted that the Lebanon’s and the Middle East’s problems could be best resolved by the United States and the Arab community.51 Habib convened Lebanese–Israeli talks in December 1982. In the same month, King Hussein and an Arab League delegation visited Washington. President Reagan secretly negotiated with Hussein and Saudi officials in hopes of gaining their agreement to the Reagan Plan. In January 1983, George Schultz met with Hosni Mubarak in an effort to involve Egypt in Lebanese negotiations. However, the United States failed to successfully convert any initiative that would satisfy the needs of the contending parties. Moreover, it curtailed its flexibility by chaining itself to the May Accord, which had limited allied involvement and no Arab support, and to the Reagan Peace Plan that aimed at a comprehensive regional solution rather than focusing on the Lebanese situation. The United States did not pay sufficient attention to the Lebanese situation. While focusing on the Middle East negotiations, it neglected internal 51

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Lebanese power brokers such as Jumblatt and Berri. These failures injured American prestige, encouraged calls within the Department of Defense that emphasized other global priorities, and made the United States a “scapegoat” for the Lebanese failure. France, a proponent of an international solution, assumed the responsibility of involving the international community in the Lebanese situation. It offered a series of resolutions to the Security Council aimed at limiting the role of individual foreign powers and authorizing the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force. The attempts were supported by Great Britain, Italy, Egypt, and the Netherlands, but were rejected initially by the United States and later the Soviet Union.52 France was very active in pursuing negotiations among the warring parties. Jumblatt visited Paris in October 1983 and returned with Nabih Berri after the MNF’s withdrawal. France also maintained a continuous dialogue with the Gemayel government to reassure it of France’s support and to promote efforts at compromise. Like France, Italy focused its diplomatic efforts on the internal Lebanese crisis. The Italian cabinet expressed strong support for Gemayel during his envoy’s visits to Rome in September and November 1983. Premier Bennito Craxi also met with Jumblatt in September 1983 to explore Italian mediation.53 Italian Defense Minister Giovannia Spadolini visited Beirut immediately after the terrorist attacks against the French and American forces. An additional measure of responsibility was providing humanitarian assistance. In the National Security Decision Directive #111, President Reagan sought significant MNF contributions to Lebanon to assist in reconstruction and to promote national reconciliation. By that time, Italy had already committed seventeen billion lira to humanitarian aid and $10 million in medical assistance.54 It promised an additional $100 million in reconstruction and development assistance in November 1983.55 France promised one billion francs in assistance in June 1983. Jointly, the French and the United States sponsored a $12–20 billion reconstruction consortium under the auspices of the World Bank. Independently, the US Congress also authorized $50 million for emergency relief in August 1982. Ironically, between 1962 and 1983, total economic assistance to Lebanon was $174.8 million or an average of $7 million annually. In 1984, after MNF’s withdrawal, economic aid was $28.4 million.56 Another measure of burden-sharing consists of the defense resources allocated to the operation. Troop strengths, with the exception of the British contingent, were relatively proportional in numbers and equipment. Table 2.1 is a composite of troop contributions, deaths, and wounded of the four MNF participants. The size of the contingents was designed to create a “presence” and according to Reagan was adequate for their mission.57 The MNF was a political statement of support. Forces were not deployed to enforce a 52

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Table 2.1 Multinational Force troop contributions and casualties Country

Troop strengtha

Killed

Wounded

France United States Italy Great Britain

2,000 1,600 2,200 120

74 264 1 0

50 137 32 0

Sources: Reagan’s Public Papers, 1984: 444; Hallenbeck, 1987: 275; NYT, 10/25/83. Note a Official troop strengths as of October 22, 1983. These are slightly higher than the original deployment figures.

military solution. Force size was also sensitive to Soviet reaction. Precautions were taken to limit American involvement to a level equal to the Europeans. A second point illustrated in Table 2.1 is the number of casualties. Although American troops were positioned away from population centers as a protective measure, they were ill prepared to deal with terrorist threats. The majority of American and French dead and wounded resulted from the bombing of the marine and French headquarters, respectively. Each country was financially responsible for its expenses, therefore, fiscal concerns limited the size and composition of the forces.58 The financial commitments were a significant burden when it is considered that the United States spent three times as much to deploy a brigade, air combat squadron, or major ship globally as did the Europeans.59 Third, the local and international environment influenced troop strength. In the case of the United States, the troop strength and composition reflected concern over becoming enmeshed in a civil war, the “Vietnam Syndrome,” and the Soviet response to American deployment.60 Reserve forces enhanced strategic and regional military capabilities of the MNF. The availability of these reserve forces differentiated the military burden accepted by the MNF allies. Certainly NATO naval forces enhanced military capabilities. The French and British both maintained Mediterranean naval forces that included aircraft carriers or could be augmented by them. Although the Italians lacked deep water navy capabilities, they had land-based aircraft and naval artillery available for tactical support. Although France and Italy maintained forces dedicated to out-of-area operations, most of these were not deployed in Lebanon. Moreover, they lacked the force structure and the capability to effectively project significant military strength outside of NATO.61 To have significantly increased their forces in the Middle East, France and Italy would have required significant American logistical support and strategic airlift capabilities. For the United States to undertake the deployment of allied troops, it meant resources would have been diverted from its own build-up 53

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capacity. The United States had the Sixth Fleet available for support and the battleship New Jersey augmented its firepower. The United States also had strategic relationships with Israel and Egypt and was establishing similar ties with Jordan and various Gulf States, however, such relationships were of little benefit because of the nature of the conflict. The French slightly increased their contingents when Gemayel requested it in the fall of 1982. However, these increases did not enhance their military capabilities dramatically. The Italians were not asked to do so. In addition, the French moved their carriers off the coast of Lebanon and conducted airstrikes against the Syrians and Syrian-supported groups. Italy was prepared to use land-based aircraft and naval artillery for tactical support but never did. Finally, Great Britain provided naval air support from the HMS Fearless and RFA Reliant. Twelve planes from these ships provided air support and flew over Beirut in the summer and fall of 1983. However, the British contingent was too small and too lightly armed to provide true military support. It was the epitome of the “presence” mission in Lebanon. Although independently orchestrated, the MNF was dependent upon American logistical support and military capability if it were to assume either a deterrent or enforcement role. Support services to the MNF such as intelligence and advisers to the LAF were evenly distributed. While the United States had a preponderance of electronic surveillance and information gathering capabilities, the British and French had extensive area expertise and human intelligence. The Italians were strong in internal security training and counter-terrorism. The failure of the MNF emphasized the non-utilization of those comparative strengths vital to the operation. After the re-deployment of the MNF in September 1982, much of the United States’ focus shifted to military assistance. The USMNF assumed responsibility for training and arming the LAF. In April 1983, Congress approved the $251 million Lebanese Army Modernization Plan. The initial $150 million was used for Special Forces training and new equipment, including tanks, armored personnel carriers, and heavy artillery. In August, an additional sixty-eight M48-A5 tanks and $100 million in credits were earmarked for the LAF.62 Through specialized training and the delivery of heavy weapons, the United States enhanced the LAF’s fighting capability. This build-up intensified the potential of the conflict and increased the MNF’s risks. The United States was seeking to establish the LAF as a credible force, reducing the need for the MNF. In 1984 as the MNF disintegrated, military assistance to Lebanon declined to $15.6 million with the French providing most of the assistance. The Lebanese operation was evidence that national interests rather than collective benefits determine the primary objectives of intervention. Under such circumstances, the distribution of burdens was limited. Without an international mandate or promise of defrayed costs for 54

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deployment, most countries excused themselves on constitutional and financial grounds and accepted a “free ride.” The United States did make some vague promises of in-kind support to potential participants but these were insufficient to motivate action. Moreover, American, French, and Italian troops were already deployed and undertaking the responsibility for global stability when additional participation was requested. The benefit of deploying additional forces remained unclear, particularly, in an environment in which there was no consensus on the degree of international involvement. Also, NATO allies perceived out-of-area operations as being solely the responsibility of the United States. Finally, the desire for a “free ride” was pervasive because the perceived level of threat was low and the political costs of involvement high. The Netherlands had suffered greatly from the Arab oil embargo in 1973 and was determined to remain neutral in the Middle East. Turkey, who had major military commitments on its border with the Soviet Union, was concerned with the Kurdish rebellion in eastern Turkey, was very sensitive to its political and religious ties to the Middle East, and pursued a policy of neutrality unless directly threatened.

Conclusions The 1982 MNF deployment in Lebanon had few attributes of a truly collective action. Participation in the MNF was requested and arranged bilaterally between the Lebanese government and the French, Italians, and Americans. States decided independently to participate. Contributions of troops were voluntary and authorized by the individual legislatures. All expenses of deployment were assumed by the individual states. Communications among the forces were limited and tactical coordination non-existent, as shown in the unilateral withdrawal of American forces after the PLO departure in September 1982 and the French decision to retaliate with air strikes in September 1983. Although there were broadly accepted objectives such as supporting the government of Lebanon and ending the war, only limited agreement concerning the means by which these objectives were to be accomplished was apparent. The British envisioned short-term operations in which they would maintain neutrality. The Italians also envisioned a short-term deployment and confined their operations to the greater Beirut area. Although the United States initially wanted a short-term deployment, subsequent political promises made by President Reagan extended involvement indefinitely. Reagan also extended the geographic boundaries of the operation to include most of Lebanon. The French had committed themselves to a longer-term deployment at the outset. They wanted a government of national reconciliation in Lebanon that would recognize France’s unique role in the area. Even as late as February 13, 1984, President 55

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Mitterrand reaffirmed this commitment and disconnected France’s mission from the MNF: France has a mission to fulfill: to ensure the security of its citizens in Lebanon and maintain French interests including its schools and religious sects.63 Operationally and strategically, the collective action in Lebanon was a failure. National reconciliation talks were aborted. The Gemayel government, deprived of other options and severely weakened, surrendered to Syrian influence. The Syrian success increased Soviet power. The American inability to support its Lebanese allies and its renewed support for Israel prompted some moderate Arabs to distance themselves from Washington. Rather than playing the mediator’s role, Mubarak proposed direct US–PLO talks, and King Hussein chastised Washington for choosing Israel. Although pleased with its improved relations with the United States, Israel gained little benefit from its efforts at concluding a second peace treaty with an Arab country. Failed intervention created negative perceptions among the US Congress, the European allies, and the American populace regarding American international commitment and domestic willingness to be involved.64 At the conclusion of the operation, the Italians felt that the MNF had eroded the viability of multinational operations. France was further convinced that it should remain as independent as possible. The MNF’s deployment and eventual retreat damaged the European allies’ attempts at assuming greater responsibility for out-of-area actions. The lack of a united European initiative may be attributed to internal European division regarding the Middle East as well as paralysis resulting from American and Israeli assertiveness.65 After the 1973 oil crisis, there was no unified European effort to secure energy resources but a series of individual contracts.66 The Carter Doctrine, identifying the Persian Gulf as a region of national interests, and Reagan’s “rollback doctrine” left Europeans concerned that the United States was prepared to risk conflict with the Soviet Union and worried that the United States would rely too heavily upon the use of military force. Finally, Europeans had been encouraged to accept American leadership in handling out-of-area crises and to concentrate on more regional issues. For a collective operation to succeed, a clearly identified and popularly supported mission is imperative. Clarity in an operation engenders support from allies and from the populations affected. A cohesive organizational goal can provide such guidance and offer the support needed for sustainability. In the case of the MNF, the “presence” mission was vague and had no tangible goal. In spite of the erroneous belief that the presence of American marines would bring peace, it inhibited consensus building and 56

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allowed individual divergent policies to be implemented. For example, during the course of the MNF’s deployment, the United States shifted from peacekeeper to combatant, from opponent of Israel to ally, and from engagement to withdrawal.67 The lack of organizational cooperation precluded any combined efforts at distributing the burdens. In a multilateral operation, there should be more explicit and predetermined burden-sharing among coalition partners than would be typical for separately decided and separately tasked deployments.68 Typically, international sponsorship increases legitimacy and removes many legal and political barriers, thus broadening participation. It also lessens tendencies toward countries assuming a “free ride.” These presumed benefits from coordinated multilateralism were absent in Lebanon. The United States may have provided financial and political support to enhance the operation’s sustainability and to pursue a settlement. Such an approach would have avoided alienating public opinion. Instead, it assumed the role of a peacekeeper and eventually peacemaker. As a superpower, the United States’ role was expected to provide the preponderance of military deterrence. This responsibility made the United States less effective as a peacekeeper and inhibited flexibility in a nonmilitary environment. The United States lacked the diplomatic acumen and patience to negotiate a settlement in an increasingly hostile environment. Instead, as frustration grew, the temptation to strike back increased. Perhaps, France’s or Great Britain’s long tradition in the region and their different perspectives on the use of force may have been more effective. American public opinion also opposed peacekeeping involvement, thus, little domestic political support for the operation existed. The United States could have supported the other allies more effectively by using its logistical capabilities and political prestige. Undoubtedly, American political prestige would have remained stronger if it had stayed out of the fighting. While the Soviet threat may have been over emphasized by the United States in the initial stages of the MNF operations, Soviet influence did eventually alter the burdens of the operation. Soviet military and political support contributed directly to renewed Syrian assertiveness that aborted the May 17 Accord and caused other Lebanese factions to turn against the Gemayel government. Enhanced Syrian military capabilities filtered down to their factional allies intensifying combat and increasing the MNF’s risks. The Israelis first reported that the Druze was using Soviet equipment. As a result of increased military capabilities and opposing political resolve by the anti-MNF factions, the prospects for a political settlement gradually disappeared and with it the MNF’s political will to remain in Lebanon. Also, Soviet assistance increased Syria’s ability to maintain and project influence in Lebanon. While the strategic value of Lebanon to Syria was unquestioned, in 1982, the Syrians may have found an agreement that 57

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guaranteed Israeli withdrawal as well as their own acceptable. It has been suggested that such an agreement was being negotiated in the fall of 1982.69 Moreover, it is probable that the suggested agreement formed the basis of the May 17 Accord. By the beginning of 1983, any previous agreement had been discarded. The tide was turning in favor of a Syrian victory without conditions. Finally, Soviet recalcitrance in the United Nations heightened the political cost of MNF involvement. By vetoing the February 1984 French resolution, the Soviet Union ensured that the MNF would withdraw in defeat. In sum, the Lebanese environment discouraged either peacekeeping or nation building and offered forbidding barriers to truly multinational burden-sharing. The merger of limited conventional war, classical guerrilla war, and terrorism, that characterized the Lebanese Civil War, dissolved the seemingly apparent distinction between war and peace. It distorted policies that were not well defined initially. It increased risks and made the assumption of responsibility for negotiating a settlement a “no win” situation. The American forces trained and armed the primarily Christian LAF. When it was threatened with military defeat, they intervened. When Syrian troops assumed a more active role, the United States retaliated against them. The United States resorted to military escalation to achieve its objectives. The emphasis on an expanded military role was made without consideration of the security of involved forces, the military capabilities of the units, or the concurrent slowing of the diplomatic process. This, combined with a basic misunderstanding of the environment, greatly increased the political and military risks.70 The United States faced increased and expanded hostility. Syria rejected compromise and continued to undermine the Lebanese government. Gemayel’s legitimacy further eroded. The shift also intensified the existing disagreement among the allies. Lebanon was an operation predicated upon American involvement but without American control. When the United States tried to exert control over events, the operation unraveled. The circumstances that the United States had sought to avoid became a reality. Without a far greater commitment of forces than anyone was prepared to make, the MNF had little choice but to withdraw.

Notes 1 There were actually two Multinational Force deployments. The first lasted from August 21, 1982 until September 13, 1982. The second Multinational Force was deployed September 24, 1982 and the last components, the French forces, were withdrawn in March 1984. The British contingent did not participate in the initial deployment and joined the second MNF until November 1982. 2 During the Cold War decisions on collective action reflected the national interests of the participants. There was little application of NATO collective security to the Alliance’s periphery nor was there an institutional context to direct

58

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3

4 5

6 7

8 9

10 11 12 13

operations (Coffey and Bonvicini, 1998: 1). The United Nations’ role was limited and often eliminated by superpower competition in the Security Council. European organizations such as the European Community and broader regional organizations such as the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) focused on economic relationships, continental development, and European security. The Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) deployment resulted from a guarantee by the United States to monitor security arrangements in the Sinai following the Egyptian–Israeli Peace Treaty. The MFO is significant to burdensharing for a number of reasons. The United States assumed responsibility for organizing and leading the 2,500 man MFO that had representation of ten countries including the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy. The United States provided the largest contingent of 1,210 men. The cost of the operation, about $100 million per year, was split among the United States, Egypt, and Israel. This also was the first post-World War II American commitment as the mainstay of a multinational, as distinct from United Nations’ sponsored, presence in an area of conflict. The Soviet Union and Arabs opposed UN involvement on the grounds that a UN sanctioned operation implied UN complicity with the Camp David process. Cobban, 1991: xx. The Syrians initially intervened to protect Lebanon’s Christian population who were under severe attack by various Muslim factions including Yasir Arafat’s faction of the Palestinian Liberation Organization. Damascus had no interest in a PLO-dominated Lebanon. Nor did the Syrians wish to invite an Israeli invasion aimed at saving the beleaguered Maronite Christians. Spechler in Kellerman and Rubin, 1988: 166. In the first month of the conflict, the Syrians sustained heavy losses in Soviet supplied weaponry. Not only did this erode Soviet credibility in the eyes of its Middle East allies, but it also brought into question the capability of its similarly equipped Warsaw Treaty Organization air defense and combat forces. In his article in Kellerman and Rubin (1988), Spechler proposes that the Soviet Union ignored the PLO because it was viewed more as an obstructionist to Soviet objectives in the region. Moreover, it was evident that no level of military aid would be sufficient to defeat the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) without risking escalation. Spechler in Kellerman and Rubin, 1988: 167. According to President Reagan’s news conference on August 23, 1982, the MNF mandate was “to provide an interposition force at agreed locations and thereby provide the MNF presence requested by the government of Lebanon to assist it and LAF [Lebanese Armed Forces] in the Beirut area. This presence will facilitate the restoration of the Lebanese government’s sovereignty and authority over the Beirut area and thereby further its efforts to assure the safety of persons in the area and to bring an end to the violence that has tragically recurred.” Hallenbeck, 1987: 101. Pelcovits, 1984: 28–9. The Public Papers of the Presidents, Ronald Reagan, hereafter Reagan Public Papers, 1982: 1062. The Reagan Plan did not deal specifically with Lebanon but, instead, outlined the American position on a Palestinian settlement. The Plan called for the self-government of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza in union with Jordan; freezing Israeli settlements in contested areas such as the West Bank;

59

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14 15 16 17 18

19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

28 29 30 31

32 33 34

guaranteeing Israeli security; leaving Jerusalem undivided with its permanent status to be negotiated at a latter date. King Hussein of Jordan, who publicly praised the Plan, started negotiations with Arafat on a joint approach to the Palestinian question. These conversations continued until April 1983. Spiegel, 1985: 421–2. Reagan Public Papers, 1982: 1187–9. Report of the Department of Defense (Long) Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, hereafter the Long Commission Report. Spiegel, 1985: 424. The United States decided against a force of 15,000 men primarily because the recollection of Vietnam was so fresh. The 1,200 man force also could be deployed more quickly at less cost and without using forces committed to NATO’s central command. It also kept the American forces in proportion to the Italian and French contingents. Finally, it was thought that a smaller force would be less likely to provoke a confrontation with the Soviet Union. See Hallenbeck, 1987: 126–7 for a more in depth discussion of the American decision process on the size of its MNF contribution. Haass, 1994: 24. NYT, 10/21/82. Reagan Public Papers, 1982: 1424. Pelcovits in McDermott and Skjelsbaek, 1991: 58. Hallenbeck, 1987: 206. Ibid.: 177–8, 213. Ibid.: 289. Reagan Public Papers, 1983: 728. In June, Israeli dead in Lebanon had reached 500. This figure in proportion to population is equal to 30,000 American dead. In Vietnam, the United States lost over 57,000. On July 5, Yitzhak Shamir announced a phased withdrawal from Lebanon and on July 20, the Israeli cabinet approved the withdrawal of IDF force to the Awali River which is south of the Shouf Mountains that dominate Beirut to the east. Long Commission Report. NYT, 9/23/83: A1. French Foreign Minister, Claude Cheysson in McDermott and Skjelsbaek, 1991: 274. Opposition to any UN observers was based on military and political interests. Observers inhibited military force’s freedom on movement and ability to achieve group objectives. Second, the Druze and AMAL objected on the grounds that what they had gained as a result of the fighting might be taken away if a UN force either legitimized the partition of Lebanon or promoted reconciliation based on the National Pact. The Syrians opposed UN observers because such a force formalized the May 17 Accord and the division of Lebanon. In support of their Syrian clients, the Soviets promised to veto any UNSC resolution aimed at such an action. Hallenbeck, 1987: 254. McDermott and Skjelsbaek, 1991: 17. From a Western perspective the situation in the Middle East had deteriorated and was providing the opportunity for Soviet influence. With the exception of the Israeli–Egyptian Peace Treaty in March 1979, instability and conflict dominated the strategically critical area. In 1979, the pro-West Shah left Iran in the hands of a “caretaker government” headed by Shapur Bakhtiar, which was replaced by the Islamic fundamentalist Khomeini regime. The Soviet Union

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35 36 37 38

39 40 41 42 43 44 45

46 47 48 49 50 51 52

53 54 55 56 57 58

invaded Afghanistan putting Soviet air units within easy striking distance of the Persian Gulf. An unpredictable and initially pro-Soviet Saddam Hussein assumed undisputed control in Iraq and in September 1980 attacked Iran, heightening concerns of access to Persian Gulf oil through the Straits of Hormuz. Oil prices which were already on the rise because of shortages, increased further as refining, pumping, and storage facilities were damaged. Christian Science Monitor, 11/10/93 hereafter CSM and Reagan Public Papers, 1982: 1187–9. McDermott and Skjelsbaek, 1991: 149. Common Security Interests in the Middle East, House of Representatives Armed Services Committee Hearing, April 20, 1988 hereafter HASC Middle East Security, 1988: 8. In 1980, French oil imports from the Mediterranean basin and the Middle East was $26.78 million. Italian imports were $20.6 million. In addition, both countries accepted large investments of petro-dollars and viewed the region as easily accessible to their exports. In 1987, Italy did send naval units to the Persian Gulf area. Duke, 1993: 185. Coffey and Bonvicini, 1989: 7. McDermott and Skjelsbaek, 1991: 31. Sergei Losev, Moscow World Service, 3/2/84. Reagan Public Papers, 1982: 1470–5. In response to the request for a German force in the Persian Gulf in 1980, Helmut Schmidt clearly stated that Germany was prepared to assume greater burdens in Europe but was not willing to be involved in out-of-area operations. “We cannot send troops into the Persian Gulf” but “We have no inhibitions on seeing American troops being moved from Europe to the Persian Gulf . . . there should be a division of labor in the western defense alliance . . . (Germany) is ‘prepared to be helpful in taking up the slack’ in Europe” (Schmidt in Wells and Bruzonsky, 1987: 230). Spiegel, 1985: 424. Ibid.: 426. Cordesman in Coffey and Bonvicini, 1989: 88–91. Golden, 1983: 2. Hallenbeck, 1987: 98–9. Reagan Public Papers, 1983: 1072. Resolution 508 and 509 (June 5 and 6, 1982) were aimed at stopping military activities in Lebanon an across the Lebanese–Israeli border. The June 26 proposal demanding an end to the fighting and imposition of a peacekeeping force was vetoed by the United States. Resolution 521 was introduced after the camp massacres and offered the UN as the best alternative to a difficult situation. Finally, France submitted the February 1984 Resolution again requesting a UN force but was vetoed by the Soviet Union. ANSA, 9/8/83. Beirut Domestic Service, 6/25/83. ANSA, 11/5/83. United States Overseas Loans and Grants, 1991, as cited in Presidential Policy Directive #25. Reagan Public Papers, 1983: 1746. For the period from October 1, 1983–March 1984, the cost to the United States for the deployment was $69.743 million. This included $14.6 million for the USMC, $44.9 million for the navy, and $243,000 for army support (Reagan

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59 60 61

62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70

Public Papers, 1984: 444). American expenses were higher than the norm because of the number of supporting forces involved and the troops’ distance from home bases. While these additional costs are attributable to exerting a global influence, they also need some recognition as an assumed burden. Cordesman in Coffey and Bonvicini, 1989: 78. Marines were used because Marine Amphibious Units are less permanent than army units, are supported by their attached naval forces, and were quickly deployed. France maintains a 47,000 man Force de Action Rapide (FAR) dedicated to out-of-area operations. However, the French lack the strategic airlift capabilities to deploy the force effectively and efficiently. The FAR also is designed to influence low-intensity conflicts. They also have the French Foreign Legion. The Italians maintain the 10,000 man Forza di Intervento Rapido. These forces have good inter-operability with American forces but limited power projection capabilities especially if forced entry was required (Cordesman in Coffey and Bonvicini, 1989: 85–6 and Armed Services Committee Hearing on Common Security Interests in the Middle East, April 20, 1988). Hallenbeck, 1987: 149–55, 212. Spiegel, 1985: 28. Haass, 1994: 105. Hader, 1992: 112. Wells and Bruzonsky, 1987: 218. Spiegel, 1985: 424. Pelcovits, 1984: 84. Spiegel, 1985: 424. Although “mission creep” did not become a universally recognized term until the United Nations’ operation in Somalia in 1993, its basic characteristics are certainly evident in Lebanon. “Mission creep” refers to the gradual, yet significant, change in the objectives of a mission. It typically is used when the initial humanitarian objectives are replaced by political ones. In the case of Somalia, it was the shift away from providing humanitarian assistance to capturing Muhammad Farah Aidid.

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3 THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS American leadership and global sharing

Introduction The Gulf War was characterized by a series of paradoxes. The response to the Persian Gulf crisis exposed the realities of an interdependent world as it seemed to usher in a new age of US military and economic preeminence. The war and crisis pointed to the uniqueness of military and economic capabilities as separable instruments of influence, although it also emphasized the relationships among political, military, and economic capabilities and objectives. First, during the Cold War, economic issues were frozen within the paradigm of strategic priorities. However, as Edward Luttwak pointed out during his Senate testimony, this was different in the post-Cold War. An adequate supply of Persian Gulf oil to western Europe and Japan provided a measure of security against Soviet political pressure during the Cold War. Preservation of such supplies was less important and possibly less attractive to the United States in a “geoeconomic” era in which economic capacity is more important than military capacity.1 Second, the Gulf crisis illustrated that in spite of a greater reliance on diplomacy and economic sanctions to resolve conflict, some crises still required force. The organization and implementation of military action are most successfully handled by a hegemon. Collective security requires leadership and thus the burdens are not equally distributed. Militarily, the Persian Gulf operation required a massive deployment that only the United States was capable of orchestrating and leading. Only the United States had the military might to “draw the line in the sand.” The United States also assumed the majority of the political responsibility for organizing and maintaining the Coalition. However, Washington recognized that such an operation required international legitimacy that only could be provided by UN authorization and collective military action. Furthermore, the United States lacked the economic strength to assume the operation’s financial burdens unilaterally and quickly asked its allies to provide financial support. The American need for financial support and international 63

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legitimacy were indicative of the extent to which American political power had been marginalized. These demands also expanded the variety of burdens to be shared. In addition to the traditional assessment of defense resources and direct financial contributions to the United States, burdens, such as the assumption of political and military risk, the costs and risks of sustained deployment, and support to other countries effected by the crisis and international organizations involved in humanitarian operations, needed to be considered. Moreover, the new international political structure raised questions regarding others’ willingness to accept American leadership, particularly, if decision making was not going to be shared. Third, even though the Iraqi invasion was another blow to Arab nationalism, which had been waning since 1973, Arab cooperation, particularly Syrian and Egyptian, was essential to any counteraction. Failure to achieve significant Arab support and involvement would make the operation seemed to be driven by anti-Arab feelings and neo-colonialism. Furthermore, Arab participation could only be insured by Israeli neutrality regardless of the extent of aggressive acts against it. To establish international legitimacy, political sensitivity toward traditional Cold War adversaries acting in a new environment was necessary. During the Cold War, the lack of Soviet, Chinese, or American acquiescence either stagnated or eliminated opportunities for international action by inhibiting UN action. In the new political structure, legitimization of international action had become an accepted norm. At a minimum, this required Soviet and Chinese abstention on the United Nations Security Council votes. The Persian Gulf also represented a test of the Soviet Union’s commitment to cooperation rather than international conflict. Sharing responsibility among the allies was essential. As early as 1988, the Congressional Budget Office had proposed that the allies fund the incremental costs of deploying US forces in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf and that NATO allies assume 60 percent of the costs for acquiring and operating C-17 airlift fleet needed for rapid deployment to the region.2 Allied response to these proposals was lukewarm at best, and the debate remained unresolved in 1990. Early in September 1990, Secretary of State James Baker called upon the allies not just to transport American troops to the Gulf but also to commit their own forces. It was estimated that Iraq had 450,000 men, 3,600 tanks, 2,400 artillery pieces and 600 combat aircraft in the Kuwaiti theater.3 Deterring further aggression by such a force and subsequently forcing it to comply with the United Nations Security Council resolutions required a significant military commitment. Developing and sustaining political and military participation among the Europeans and Japanese required balancing differing foreign policy philosophies including the use of diplomacy and force, particularly in regional crises, addressing allied concerns of American hegemony, and overcoming legal and psychological barriers to out-of-area activity. Ini64

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tially, the European Community, with the exception of Great Britain, refused to provide either troops or financial support to the operation claiming this was an Arab crisis that needed to be resolved by the Arabs. French President Francois Mitterrand accused President Bush of organizing an operation, to drive a wedge between the Arab and European worlds, further slowing down the creation of a grand European alliance and set up a New World Order dominated by Washington.4 Such a response only served to intensify the out-of-area debate that had been raging since the Iran–Iraq War. To what extent was the United States responsible for and willing to protect oil interests that were more vital to Europe than America?5 The differences in opinion between European commitment to their security interests and American “heavy handedness” was summarized by Henry Kissinger, over a period of 10 years, many of the security responsibilities that the United States is now shouldering in the Gulf ought to be carried by the Europeans who receive a larger share of the oil from the region.6 Moreover, Germany and Japan demonstrated that they still had not reached a level of international maturity sufficient to accept the broad responsibilities of global leadership. Finally, the ultimate decision to use direct military action to remove Saddam from Kuwait created its own set of burdens. Use of force was generally a point of major disagreement between the United States and its European allies. Both the allies and non-combatants, such as the Soviet Union, needed to be convinced that there was no other option. This included persuading them and some US political leaders that sanctions were ineffective. Once President Bush made an unequivocal decision to use force, the American strategic plan was based upon the Powell Doctrine that required a clearly defined political purpose and overwhelming military force. To achieve an overwhelming military force, a major commitment of defense resources was needed. The initial deployments of Operation Desert Shield, designed to defend Saudi Arabia, were significantly less than those required to liberate Kuwait offensively. To retain political unity among the constituencies, the military mission needed to be limited tactically by political goals rather than permitted to achieve strategic victory. There was a narrow time frame in which the operation could occur. “To wait with 200,000 troops would have been feasible, perhaps. To wait with more than 400,000 is impossible.”7 A further consideration was the domestic impact of a military campaign against a well-armed and 65

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entrenched adversary. Populations needed to be prepared to accept the high number of casualties that were anticipated from such an operation. This chapter provides a chronology of the Persian Gulf crises from August 1990 to March 1991. The chronology is broken into three sections: the Iraqi invasion, Operation Desert Shield, and Operation Desert Storm and the aftermath. The chronology is followed by an assessment of threats and collective benefits of the actions taken in the Gulf and an evaluation of the burdens and their distribution. The chapter includes a discussion of the qualitative differentiation that occurred in the value of contributions, the roles played by multilateral organizations, the role of the Soviet Union and the European allies, and the lessons learned. Finally, it concludes with a comparison of the Iraq War that started in 2003.

Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield The August 2, 1990, Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was the culmination of a dispute over oil production and territorial issues. It prompted global condemnation that isolated Iraq, caused a schism in the Arab World, and resulted in a unique collective security experience. The high level of Kuwaiti and United Arab Emirate (UAE) oil production was the initial focus of the intra-Arab dispute. Although Kuwait and the UAE had rejected Iraqi requests to cut production in March 1990, President Mubarak was able to negotiate a production reduction agreement in July. Iraq also accused Kuwait of “stealing” oil from the Iraqi side of the productive Rumailah fields that straddled the Kuwait–Iraq border. Claiming to be defending pan-Arabism as well as Gulf security against the opulent and self-centered Kuwaiti royal family, Saddam launched a major military invasion. On August 3, the Arab League in a vote of fourteen to seven condemned the invasion, demanded immediate withdrawal of Iraqi troops, but in an effort to retain Arab control over events, called for no foreign intervention.8 World condemnation also was harsh and immediate. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 660 condemning the invasion. On August 3, the United States and the Soviet Union jointly banned arms sales to Iraq and Kuwait. President Bush froze Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets in the United States and began to mobilize world leaders and public support against Saddam. The United States and the United Kingdom also dispatched naval forces to the Persian Gulf. Within a matter of days, the success of President Bush’s diplomatic efforts was evident. China joined the arms ban and the European Community (EC) and Japan agreed to sanctions. On August 6, the UNSC imposed sanctions on Iraq. Although the steps taken represented a unique level of international and regional cooperation, they did little to reduce the immediate threat of further Iraqi expansion or to alter the existing situation in the Gulf. This 66

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required the continuation of military deterrence, which was a major undertaking, and ultimately another major military operation. First, intelligence estimated that Iraq had a million-man army. It was estimated 173,680 troops were in Kuwait and an equal number, approximately eleven divisions, were in southern Iraq. The Iraq army also had 5,000 tanks, many of which were newer Soviet models, as well as surface-tosurface missiles that could be armed with chemical warheads and had an extended range of 450 kilometers.9 The effort required to deploy a force able to deter further aggression, let alone conduct an offensive operation, was massive. Even if they were unified enough to launch a coordinated response, the Gulf States, represented by the Gulf Cooperation Council, lacked the combined military capabilities to deter or effectively counter Iraq aggression. If the United States was to respond, it needed to arrange ground deployment in Saudi Arabia, build consensus among the Arabs for such a deployment, and enlist support financially as well as political and military from its allies. The first issue was resolved on August 6, when King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, under heavy pressure from Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, agreed to “host” a US deterrent force that began deploying on August 7. The purpose of Operation Desert Shield was to protect Saudi Arabia from Iraqi invasion. The United States wanted to make a long-term commitment without violating Saudi rights of sovereignty. Thus, it was agreed that American forces would remain “as long as they were needed or until asked to leave.” American resolve was further illustrated by the decision to call up 50,000 reservists by the end of September.10 American officials also assumed that the Saudis would only provide host nation assistance to the deployed forces, however, it quickly became apparent that they were prepared to do more. Regardless, neither action restrained Saddam who annexed Kuwait on August 8. The UNSC responded with Resolution 662 that rejected the annexation. In agreeing to the Resolution, the Soviet Foreign Ministry warned the United States against taking military action without United Nations’ approval. So while international condemnation of Iraq remained strong, there was no consensus on further steps. By the end of August, the four circumstances increased the pressure on collaborating states and made time a critical issue in maintaining collective support. There was an emerging schism within the Arab community. One side, composed primarily of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, and Syria favored an unconditional Iraqi withdrawal promulgated by whatever means were necessary. The other, more decidedly pro-Iraq, demanded an Arab settlement, denounced the Cairo Summit, and contended that American and other foreign troops hindered the peace process. In a vote of twelve to nine at the hastily convened Cairo Summit, the Arab League decided to contribute forces to the Coalition thus legitimizing the American strategy. The Arab League vote, albeit not unanimous, was a 67

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significant victory for US diplomacy and strategy and eliminated future actions being perceived as being anti-Arab. Although Mubarak had initially sought to contain the crisis within the Arab community, Egypt was the first to deploy troops. The level of Arab support increased in early September when Syria and Morocco sent lightly equipped units. The Syrian commitment was particularly important. If Syria, a state with strong Arab nationalists and anti-West feelings, had been convinced to join the pro-Iraqi faction, the Coalition’s international legitimacy would have been severely eroded. In addition, new Iraqi initiatives indicated that there was a limited time frame in which to be effective and to resolve the crisis in a matter acceptable to the United States. On August 12, Saddam announced that he would be willing to negotiate an Iraqi withdrawal within the context of resolving other Middle East problems including Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, and Golan Heights, Syrian involvement in Lebanon, and Iraqi holdings in Iran. Although the United States rejected any linkage, the Iraqi proposal opened opportunities for France and the Soviet Union to intensify diplomatic efforts. It also raised speculation that the Arab world might be willing to acquiesce to the Iraqi aggression in exchange for negotiations on a range of regional issues. Also, Saddam, making one of his greatest mistakes of the crisis, decided not to allow foreigners to leave Iraq, and thus created a hostage situation that he said could only be resolved if American troops withdrew from Saudi Arabia. In spite of increasing the international outrage against Saddam, this announcement added another potentially divisive variable to the Coalition equation. Finally, the international military build-up was continuing but the role of those forces remained unclear. The emerging question was how long could forces be maintained politically, socially, and economically in the field. UNSC Resolution 665 allowed for “commensurate measures to enforce sanctions.” However, Chinese objections in the Security Council had sidelined American requests for the statement condoning the use of force. The international community was seeking to control international behavior through an economic embargo, which, as a coercive measure, is limited in its scope and applicability. Even successful sanctions require time and a deterrent force to be effective. So while still demonstrating international resolve, this approach demanded patience and extended the time frame in which participants needed to assume the political and social costs of deployment. September 1990 was a critical month for strengthening international consensus and developing shared responsibilities. Although consensus on an Iraqi withdrawal and the restoration of ante-bellum Kuwait was reached among the European allies, Arabs, and Islamic states, there was no international consensus on how to achieve these objectives. Soviet and 68

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Chinese acquiescence was necessary for a UN authorized action and, over the next few weeks, the Soviet Union indicated that it was prepared to act within the boundaries of a new post-Cold War politico-military paradigm. At Helsinki, President Bush received Soviet support for tighter economic sanctions and a de-coupling of Iraq from other Middle East issues. In President Bush’s and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev’s joint statement following the Helsinki meeting, the Soviet Union expressed willingness to consider tighter economic sanctions and rejected a direct linkage between Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait with other Middle East issues.11 The Soviets did not offer to provide troops to the Coalition nor did they support using military force. However, in an address to the UN later in September, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevarnadzne announced that the Soviet Union would support the use of force in a UN framework. On September 30, the Soviets re-established diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia, which had been broken since 1939, and said they were willing to join Coalition forces. This was a step that was never taken, but it was the closest the Soviet Union came to full participation in the Coalition. On September 20, China reversed its previous critical tone regarding US deployment and announced that it was supportive of Saudi Arabia’s right to self-defense using American troops. While the United States was working to achieve acquiescence from the Soviet Union and China, it also presented its Allies with an “Action Plan” for burden-sharing. On September 9, Baker asked for “responsibility sharing” that went beyond logistical support for US forces. Japan, Germany, and the EC responded by making initial financial contributions to the deployment and to the “front-line” states in the region. During October and November, the United States and the United Kingdom perceptibly shifted toward using military force to oust Iraq. Certainly, the Bush Administration had never been averse to reducing Iraq’s military capabilities, if the opportunity presented itself. In testimony before the US Senate, Henry Kissinger contended that the destruction of Iraq’s offensive military capabilities was fundamental to regional stability and to avoiding an indefinite American military presence in the area.12 On October 30, the possibility of US offensive action was first raised. The rhetoric became more intense in early November when the United States announced plans to augment the 230,000 troops, already deployed to defend Saudi Arabia, with an additional 170,000 troops, including three tank divisions from the European theater. The deployment of armored units was a key indicator that the United States was prepared, if necessary, to undertake a ground offensive to liberate Kuwait. The United Kingdom also was increasingly committed to a forceful removal of Iraq from Kuwait. In mid-October, British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd announced that Saddam could leave of his own free will or by gunpoint. Later that month during her meeting with Yevgeny Primakov, 69

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Gorbachev’s special envoy to the Middle East, Margaret Thatcher stated that withdrawal was insufficient and that Iraq’s military and, perhaps, its industrial capacity needed to be destroyed.13 The increased desire to eliminate Iraqi military strength was rooted in a belief that Iraq was a “rogue” state that could not be trusted. Continued frustration over Iraqi intransigence and deception regarding efforts at resolving the crisis and disclosing information on their chemical and nuclear weapon programs contributed to this perspective. The military option also was being explored because of the finite time frame during which international consensus against Iraq could be maintained. The strains of maintaining international consensus were already appearing. First, the Soviet Union was pursuing its own peace initiative. While Gorbachev had re-committed the Soviet Union to the UNSC position on Iraq, he also had appointed Primakov, a pro-Arab and more conservative member of the Soviet leadership, as his Middle East adviser. Known for regional expertise and support for the Arabs, Primakov undertook a diplomatic mission meeting with Saddam twice, as well as visiting London and Washington. A successfully arranged Soviet compromise would preclude any opportunity of destroying Iraqi military capacity and increase Soviet regional influence. Second, Saudi rejection of a Moroccan-proposed Arab Summit threatened to weaken the critical Arab coalition. Third, the United States was scheduled to turn over its chairmanship of the UNSC at the end of November to Yemen. As chairman of the Security Council, it was within Yemen’s purview to submit resolutions on using force to an open debate. This would expose the fissures with the Security Council and the UN as a whole and thus erode the Coalition’s international legitimacy. Two significant events allowed the United States to orchestrate the passing of the UNSC Resolution 678, authorizing the use of force before relinquishing the chairmanship. First, a portion of Primakov’s negotiations with Saddam in October had focused on the release of Soviet advisers who were being held in Iraq.14 When Saddam failed to live up to his agreement to allow the departure of 1,000 advisers, the Soviet position hardened. The Soviets supported the United States both in opposing the demands of the Arab Maghreb Federation for an open debate on international action against Iraq and in voting for UNSC Resolution 678. Second, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen was invited to the United States, thus ending China’s diplomatic isolation that had resulted from the Tiananmen Square massacre. China abstained on the Resolution. On November 29, UNSC Resolution 678 authorizing “all necessary force” to remove Iraq from Kuwait, if they did not withdraw by January 15, 1991, was passed. The six weeks preceding the start of Operation Desert Storm were characterized by a flurry of diplomatic activity aimed at avoiding war. These included a meeting between Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz and Secretary of State James Baker that resulted in no movement, an initiative 70

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by Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, and a series of EC initiatives. The EC initiatives reflected the differences in regional policy between most European countries and the United States. They also marked the last efforts by Europe, and France in particular, at maintaining some independence from the United States. In the wake of a canceled meeting between President Bush and Aziz in December, the French brought before the EC a motion to meet with Aziz regardless of the US position. In early January, French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas gathered German, Italian, and Soviet support for the EC to open an independent dialogue with Baghdad. The primary objective was to link an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait with the convening of an international conference on the Middle East. Although the French presented the initiative as the “carrot” in a combined Paris–Washington “carrot-stick” approach to pressuring Saddam, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom rejected the proposal and criticized the French for “freelance diplomacy.” Predicating its response on demonstrating international solidarity against Iraq, the same premise used by the United States to avoid a UNSC debate on Resolution 678, the United Kingdom objected to the meeting. A greater affront came from Aziz who rejected the proposal and characterized the EC as being “submissive to the US.”15 The United States satisfied with the November resolution authorizing action refused to allow further UNSC debate on the issue. On January 14, the EC said it would make no further peace efforts. German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, recognizing that they were on the brink of war, supported American policy. The Bundestag urged an Iraqi withdrawal but defeated calls from the opposition for a resolution tightening the embargo. It rejected the use of force. France, in spite of wide EC criticism, joined Algeria, Yemen, and Libya in one further appeal to Saddam. The proposal, rejected by the United States and the United Kingdom in the UN, received no response from Iraq. In a move reminiscent of Hungary in 1956, Soviet tanks invaded Lithuania to crush its growing independence movement on January 13. Needing Soviet support in the UNSC at this critical time, the United States offered a muted condemnation. On January 16, the United States and its allies began the air war against Saddam’s forces in Kuwait and southern Iraq. Operation Desert Storm was undeniably an American-led operation. Strategically, the military operation was the execution of the American AirLand doctrine. By using technological superiority to offset numerical differences, the AirLand doctrine sought to achieve control of the air then use air power to destroy the enemy’s command, control, communications, and intelligence capabilities (C3I). Once this was achieved, ground forces would be used to incapacitate the enemy’s remaining military forces. In the Gulf, the doctrine worked well. Operational command was the responsibility of US General Norman Schwarzkopf in consultation with 71

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Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan Abdul Aziz. All orders to Arab units were conveyed through Sultan Aziz. The prime objectives were the ouster of Iraq from Kuwait and the restitution of a balance of power in the region as defined by the UNSC. However, the manner in which this could effectively be done was unclear. Thus, from the outset of the operation, military targets including the infrastructure that supported Iraq’s warmaking capabilities namely bridges and factories, its nuclear, chemical, and biological development and storage facilities, the Iraqi army and, in particular, the elite Republican Guards, were all attacked. The Europeans and other allies accepted American leadership and assumed varying levels of responsibility. The United Kingdom made a point of stressing that this was a UN operation and that it was not a war with Iraq. It also paid a heavy price early in the conflict losing six planes and having its captured pilots appear on Iraqi television. Although the Italian constitution prohibits war as a recourse to settling international disputes, Italy confirmed its direct involvement on January 17 at the WEU meeting, officially calling it an “international policing operation.” Germany, who had explicitly said it could not join the military action because of constitutional restrictions, did support the use of force and provided some military assistance to Turkey including deploying 300 personnel. More significantly, the action in the Gulf acted a catalyst for domestic debate on Germany’s international commitment and its constitutional restraints. In another example of the new post-Cold War paradigm, France joined the Coalition forces. Although France had advocated a peaceful settlement right until the moment when military action started, once the operation began, it offered strong and, for France, unprecedented support to the United States. On January 16, the National Assembly supported President Mitterrand’s decision to involve French troops and to place them under US military command for an “indefinite period.” These decisions initiated an internal struggle between Mitterrand and Defense Minister Jean-Pierre Chevenement. Although unable to reject the National Assembly’s endorsement, Chevenement, an outspoken advocate for the Arabs and Iraq, on January 17 announced that French troops could only fight in Kuwait. Mitterrand rejected any restrictions on the role of French forces and demanded full French engagement in all facets of the military operation. Mitterrand’s goals were to avoid any fissure within the MNF that might weaken its ability to act effectively and to maintain strong relations with the United States in order to play a strong role in the post-war Middle East. On January 24, in spite of street protests and opposition from the French Communist Party (PCF), French aircraft bombed Iraq. From the outset, the Iraqi response to hostilities was intended to create a political situation that would erode the Coalition’s unity and establish Saddam as the new Nasir, prepared to stand up against Western imperial72

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ism. First, in addition to bellicose warnings and dogmatic proclamations of a jihad, Iraq launched SCUD surface-to-surface missiles against Saudi Arabia and Israel.16 By attacking Israel, Saddam sought to incite Israeli retaliation that would have made continued Arab participation in the Coalition untenable. Second, he did not use his air force, either assuming that it would have been annihilated or wishing to preserve it for later actions. Nor did Saddam revert to non-conventional weapons such as chemical weapons, which he possessed and could have been delivered by the SCUDs. Third, a wave of international terrorism emerged. In the first twelve days there were twenty-nine terrorist attacks against allied targets including ten in Turkey on January 28. Other cities attacked included Manila, Lebanon, Paris, Marseilles, and Athens. The purpose was to demonstrate that the war would have far reaching and immediate effects upon the lives of the Coalition’s citizens. Fourth, the Iraq forces in Kuwait practiced a “scorched earth” policy. By lighting oil wells and storage facilities, Iraq sought to destroy any hopes of an economically viable Kuwait and to hamper allied air efforts. From the beginning of the war, there were a series of international efforts at establishing a cease-fire.17 None materialized. The war was prosecuted with minimal casualties, thus political opposition in both the United States and Europe was muted. Moreover, since there was no indication from Iraq that it was prepared to accept the UNSC resolutions, international opposition to the war also was limited. The resolutions were the fundamental uniting feature of the Coalition. To accept a cease-fire without Iraqi compliance provided Iraq with a political victory and offered no guarantee of a complete Iraqi withdrawal. If Iraq did not withdraw after a cease-fire was in place, it was very probable that a new UNSC resolution would be needed to initiate a new action. Both in terms of international support and Coalition participation this was improbable. Such a result would be a major blow to American prestige and set serious precedents for international collective action. On January 27, the United States gave its first indication that it was prepared to discuss ending hostilities. Secretary of State Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh, who had replaced Shevardnadze, issued a joint Soviet– American communiqué stating that hostilities could end if Iraq unequivocally committed to a withdrawal, accompanied by immediate concrete steps to comply with all resolutions. It also stated that the liberation of Kuwait not the destruction of Iraq was the international objective.18 With a ground campaign pending, there was emerging international concern over the level of force being used and the United States’ objectives. Although the communiqué was aimed at reducing those concerns, the Soviet Union became a stronger advocate for ending hostilities. Both conservative and liberal factions supported the heightened Soviet engagement. Conservative members of the Communist Party of the 73

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Soviet Union (CPSU) and the military grew restless over the poor performance of Soviet weaponry and the total disregard for the 1972 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Iraq. More liberal elements wished to insure the Soviet Union a role in the post-war peace process. On February 9, Gorbachev stated that, “The logic of (coalition) military operations and the character of military actions threaten to exceed Resolution 678” and is aimed at “deliberate destruction.”19 On February 12, Primakov launched a belated diplomatic initiative that resulted in a major Soviet proposal on February 17. However, the United States, Great Britain, and the other European allies had rejected a similar offer for an Iraqi conditional withdrawal two days earlier. Upon receipt of the Soviet proposal, the United States consulted with the allies. Italian Prime Minister Guilio Andreotti contended that it was “perfectly in line” with the UNSC resolutions. In a unique example of allied collaboration in an out-of-area operation, France and Great Britain authorized President Bush to respond to the proposal for all the allies. President Bush said the Soviet plan was “well short of what is required” and issued an ultimatum that provided more specific time frames on the initiation and completion of Iraqi withdrawals and prisoner exchanges. Failure to comply with the ultimatum would result in Coalition ground action within one week. On February 21, Iraq rejected the American stipulations and accepted the Soviet proposal. The next day, both the Soviet proposal and the American counter-proposal were presented to the UNSC. The Soviets offered a slightly revised plan and Gorbachev pleaded with Bush to allow more time to integrate the Soviet and American proposals. Bush refused to extend the ultimatum’s deadline and on February 24, the ground war started. The ground war strategy against Iraq was executed with few flaws. Iraqi forces were overwhelmed and encircled. Within two days, Iraqi resistance had collapsed, however, the UNSC still rejected any cease-fire until Iraq accepted all twelve resolutions. On February 27, President Bush announced the liberation of Kuwait as the most forward allied units reached the Euphrates River within 250 kilometers of Baghdad. On the same day, Saddam accepted all UNSC resolutions. Although some favored continuing hostilities until Saddam was removed from power, in one of the controversial moments of the war, allied military action was suspended. Once Iraq accepted the resolutions, support for further action within the Coalition and UNSC disappeared. Arab forces were not interested in having American and British troops enter Baghdad as a conquering army. Moreover, controversy over the impact of removing Saddam from power and thus creating a power vacuum in Iraq had already begun to emerge.20 On March 3, Resolution 686 implemented a formal cease-fire. Subsequently Resolutions 687 and 689 demanded the verifiable destruction of all 74

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Iraqi non-conventional weapons’ capability and established a demilitarized zone to be patrolled by UNSC member observers between Iraq and Kuwait. The impact of the war was a series of paradoxes. First, militarily, it appeared to be an unequivocal victory for the Coalition. Iraq had lost 3,500 tanks, 2,140 pieces of artillery, and 2,000 armored personnel carriers. The Allies had lost thirty-six planes, twenty-seven of which were American. However, the Republican Guards were retained as an effective fighting force, which was used to suppress internal revolts and ensure Saddam’s control of power in subsequent months. Second, although bombed by the allies and outlawed by United Nations, resolution, the Iraqi nonconventional capability was not eliminated. Politically, approval ratings for the United States, France, and the United Kingdom governments were between 78 percent and 80 percent with President Mitterrand personally receiving a positive mark from 85 percent of his people.21 American prestige soared. It had succeeded in eliminating the specter of Vietnam and Beirut from its military forces. Because of the speed and apparent decisiveness of the victory, states sought to align themselves with American policy. Foreign Minister Roland Dumas announced that an international peace conference was not essential to pursuing a comprehensive regional peace. This marked a departure from France’s independent-minded Gaullist policies and provided opportunity for later collaboration with the United States.22 The Soviet Union, scrambling to avert a complete loss of regional influence, agreed to cooperate with the United States as a co-sponsor of a broader peace conference. In order to avoid being excluded from subsequent regional events, it needed to establish a political presence, which could only be done through cooperation with the United States. For the Soviet Union, the war was an embarrassment. Not only was its dependence on Western economic support revealed, but also its lack of an effective military intervention capability was exposed. Its weaponry had been decimated. A long-time client had been devastated. The geostrategic balance, already being questioned in Moscow, was further disrupted as American forces were within 400 miles of the Soviet Union. The predicted political turmoil in the Arab world and particularly in North Africa did not materialize. This alleviated anticipated pressure on France, Spain, and Italy. Calls for an international conference to settle the Arab–Israeli conflict were muted because of the PLO’s support of Iraq. The Palestinians felt betrayed by their European constituency and the Israelis sought the “marginalization” of Europe in any negotiations.23 The war, however, re-focused attention on the instability of the Middle East, which had been eclipsed in the excitement of the revolutionary changes in east Europe. A new impetus was given to the Arab–Israeli peace process, which started with the Madrid Conference of October and November 1991 75

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and culminated with the Oslo Agreement that was signed in Washington in September 1993. In spite of these successes, the political and military landscape did not completely favor the United States. The effort needed to deploy the Gulf force indicated that the American doctrine of fighting two major regional conflicts simultaneously required re-evaluation. The Gulf War had stretched American military capabilities to its limits. More importantly, at a time when the United States was seeking to reduce its global security burden, it was evident that the European allies were not prepared to assume a leadership role in accepting global responsibility. While the war had increased American prestige, it had left Europe with an ambiguous role. While contributions varied among individual states, there was no definable European effort. While the United States was demonstrating the importance of its leadership in the “New World Order,” Europe was vacillating and evaluating its role.24

The collective and private benefits of allied intervention in the Persian Gulf Threats to national interests were the primary incentives that enticed international collective action in the Persian Gulf. On August 8, President Bush outlined the American objectives of the Persian Gulf operation – the withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the restoration of the legitimate Kuwaiti government within its legitimate borders, the protection of American citizens in the region, and the restoration of stability in the Persian Gulf. In this announcement, President Bush made it clear that responding to unprovoked aggression was a collective benefit to the world. Under such auspices he was able to create a broad-based international coalition with limited objectives. The international response demonstrated a shared responsibility of advocating a peaceful resolution to the conflict and punishing the unjustified use of force. It also provided a test for a more cooperative post-Cold War international environment. While apparently suggesting a more neo-liberal approach to international relations, upon closer examination of the national interests, it becomes clear that altruism as a motivator for participation is limited. Other benefits, such as preserving access to relatively inexpensive oil, containing Iraqi expansion, reducing the prospects for increased regional conflict, and eliminating an emerging regional power, cloud the delineation between collective and private benefits. Access to oil supplies is perhaps the best example of the ambiguity surrounding collective and private benefits. Curtailed access and increasing price of oil dramatically influence individual economies. Additionally, the global impact of the possibility of disrupted supplies to industrialized economies made Saddam’s control of significant oil reserves a collective 76

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threat. Through various American administrations the Persian Gulf has been termed a vital interest of the United States and an “umbilical cord of the industrialized free world.” Testimony on Iraqi aggression before the Senate Armed Services Committee and statements in the National Security Revitalization Act H.R. Bill #7 also illustrated the global nature of this threat.25 Containment of the conflict in terms of both deterring Iraqi expansion toward Saudi Arabia and preventing other uses of force by Iraq had mixed characteristics. An unconfined Iraq could threaten Saudi oil fields, apply military pressure on Syria, seek to engage Israel in a larger regional conflict, or support Kurdish insurgence against Turkey.26 Any of these risks increased the military and political burdens globally. The private benefits, in avoiding expanded or escalated conflict to those states most likely to be involved, are obvious. The private benefits received by the United States demonstrate their importance in motivating action. As a result of the Iraqi threat, American influence in the region increased. It achieved one of its Cold War objectives of establishing a permanent military presence in the area and increasing the amount of pre-positioned equipment. The transfer of payments to the United States by allied countries yielded an American surplus in balance of trade figures for the first quarter of 1991. From the Gulf States’ perspective, American engagement enhanced their security and insured its continued involvement in seeking resolutions to Middle East problems. Another quasi-collective benefit of acting against Iraq was the prospect of reducing its military capabilities. Through primarily German and French assistance, Iraq had developed or was developing a nonconventional capability that would probably destabilize the entire region.27 The destruction of this capability as well as a reduction of its conventional forces would enhance regional stability and impede the need for future international action in the region. To allow Saddam to retain his military capability would have obliged someone, probably the United States, to assume the financial costs and risks of continued high-level deployment in the region. The destruction of Iraqi capabilities also provided some clear private benefits. The need for the international community to face the issue of continued presence in the region was reduced. Regional antagonists ranging from Syria and Iran, hardly friends of the United States, to Israel enjoyed enhanced regional power as a result of Iraq’s defeat. Security in bordering states including NATO ally Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the smaller Gulf states was enhanced. As in all crises, individual perceptions of threats and private rewards were significant in enticing action against Iraq. The weakening of Iraq militarily and politically was a benefit to Syria, however, active Syrian participation in the Coalition was not a prerequisite to this happening. Syria’s direct involvement, however, enhanced its status in the West and the Arab 77

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world including closer ties with Egypt. Egypt received a forgiveness of $6.7 billion indebtedness.28 Turkey gained a new acceptance in the West. Of particular significance was the deployment of German, Belgian, and Italian planes as a reminder that Turkey was a NATO ally and thus protected under NATO’s collective defense article. The war also reduced the concern that Iraq could support Kurdish insurgencies and gave Turkey greater freedom of action, which it later took by invading northern Iraq in 1995. Finally, it received increased military aid from Germany. On the other hand, Turkey did experience an increase in the Kurdish threat and the loss of substantial revenues from the closed pipeline and the end of overland trade with Iraq. The French really had only two choices in the crisis, either to become engaged through the Coalition or remain passive observers. The final French decision to thoroughly commit to the deployment occurred only after its embassy in Kuwait was sacked by Iraqi troops. There was no real opportunity to demonstrate an independent foreign policy that would have been effective. Under the circumstances, engagement allowed France to play a role. The importance of this choice became more evident as France moved closer to the American position and the magnitude of the victory became apparent. Great Britain quickly assumed a prominent role in the crisis. British involvement provided an opportunity to demonstrate commitment to its “special relationship” with the United States as well as its desire to play a regional role. British motivation also was enhanced by Kuwaiti investments that “propped up the Pound,” strengthening Great Britain’s global position.29 Israel re-established its strategic importance to the United States. In the dynamic environment of the post-Cold War and the decline of the Soviet Union, Israel’s importance as the “unsinkable aircraft carrier” was waning. The Likud Party’s opposition to land for peace initiatives had further eroded Washington’s support. However, by assuming neutrality and not retaliating against Iraqi attacks, Israel positioned itself as a victim of aggression, a position it had not known since the 1960s. It gained credibility in the United States, which acted as a catalyst to an enhanced American security guarantee and increased military assistance including Patriot anti-missile systems. Finally, a number of states stood to benefit directly from the war. Raised security concerns provided opportunities for increased arms sales by major arms suppliers such as the United States and France. The “good showing” of many allied weapon systems during the “shooting war” increased the eagerness of countries to buy them.30 There also was the reconstruction of Kuwait estimated at one trillion dollars, for which Kuwait promised lucrative contracts to the allies.31

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Identification and distribution of burdens The burdens associated with the Gulf crisis are broadly characterized as political, military, financial, and residual or continuous. The political burdens of the crisis generally are the development and maintenance of international support for the operation. Its elements include developing and maintaining the Coalition, insuring Israeli neutrality, promoting Arab involvement, and withstanding domestic opposition. With the exception of the latter, the vast majority of these risks were shouldered by the United States. American military capability, global prestige, and leadership are key stabilizing factors in the region and were essential factors in rallying support against Saddam. During his testimony before the Senate Armed Services’ Committee, Henry Kissinger outlined the United States’, and implicitly the West’s, options for dealing with the Persian Gulf crisis. The United States could endorse the consensus of the United Nations, a UN option, that would place the responsibility on the UN for resolving the crisis; support the industrialized democracies’ policies, the G-7 option, in which the G-7 members would seek to reach consensus on action; or assume a leadership that would use diplomacy and coercion to get others to participate. Only the last option guaranteed that Saddam would not retain Kuwait and maintain his military capacity.32 Building on Kissinger’s premise but eschewing unilateralism, the United States decided to lead and coordinate an international response. The European Community’s inability to reach consensus on a diplomatic initiative did not auger well for a coordinated European military response. Europe lacked a security structure to coordinate a military response. While individual countries assumed the risks of contributing to a multinational force, there was no consolidated European political will sufficient to develop and maintain a coalition. Leadership implies risks. First, the consequences of failure, both internationally and to the United States, were substantial. If unsuccessful, the neo-isolationists in the United States would achieve a major victory in their attempts to get America to withdraw internationally. The negative impact of such withdrawal would be magnified because of the revolutionary changes in the international system. Defeat would have severely weakened moderate Middle Eastern regimes. For example, the breakup of Saudi Arabia would have been a real danger. Kissinger predicted that failure would lead to the collapse of some Gulf States and increase fundamental and radical pressures on Egypt, Morocco, and Turkey.33 Creating a coalition required tactful diplomacy as well as coercion. Potential participants needed to be convinced of the need to share the risks, costs, and responsibilities of responding to the international threat. By the end of August, the Bush Administration had drawn up an action plan in which the European and Asian allies as well as Gulf States would 79

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share the costs of military intervention and a prolonged blockade. The United States was forcing responsibility sharing on its allies. Among the European allies, who had a greater stake in oil economies being threatened by Saddam, establishing responsibility sharing was not a simple prospect. Great Britain was a key supporter of military action and, at times, exhibited a more forceful attitude than the United States. However, the development of the North Sea oil fields had greatly reduced British dependency on Gulf oil. Through involvement, Great Britain sought to demonstrate its “special relationship” with the United States at a time that German–American relations appeared to be prominent. The French vacillated between their traditional ties to the Arab world and commitment to independence of action and their belief in a united Europe for which the Gulf was becoming a test. Full French commitment only came after Iraqi indiscretions, the failure of their independent diplomatic initiatives, and the resolution of the Chevenement dispute.34 Germany immediately rejected direct military involvement and between September 1990 and January 1991 made personnel and financial contributions smaller than Portugal’s.35 It did, however, allow the deployment of allied matériel through and from bases in Germany, the importance of which should not be underestimated. Under increasing pressure from European allies and the United States, Germany made larger financial contributions in early 1991.36 Other European states also made contributions that were limited by their capabilities. While many contributions did little to alter the tactical military or financial situation, they did signify the international legitimacy of collective action and the extent of Iraqi isolation. Two critical features in forming an effective coalition were obtaining the acquiescence of the Soviet Union and China in the UNSC and developing broad Arab support including direct military participation. Intrinsically linked to Arab involvement was the maintenance of Israeli neutrality. Soviet and Chinese pledges to abide by the arms embargo and their support of a series of UNSC resolutions testify to the United States’ ability to isolate Iraq internationally. In January, international solidarity was threatened by the Soviet opportunism. Its invasion of Lithuania presented an immediate paradox to the activities in the Gulf. Although the invasion generated public outcry, the Bush Administration maintained Soviet support in the UNSC through a calibrated response. Involving leading Arab states in the Coalition was a priority of the United States. Initially, some Arab leaders including Egypt’s Mubarak had tried to resolve the crisis within an Arab forum. As the Arab bloc splintered and no resolution was readily available, there was greater acceptance of international cooperation against Iraq. However, acceptance of international mediation did not necessarily translate into Arab involvement. Pan-Arab sentiments still needed to be overcome and key Arab regimes needed to be persuaded to join. From a Western perspective, 80

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Arab participation was needed to eliminate labels of neo-imperialism. It also was critical in maintaining the support of skeptical southern European allies. Spain’s Foreign Minister Francisco Fernande Ordonez, for example, concluded that war with Iraq would lead to “a collision course between Islam and the West.”37 Egypt because of its close ties with the United States was prepared to join the Coalition once its efforts at mediation failed. Although Mubarak faced some discontent within the military, public support for Egyptian involvement was generally widespread even among the Muslim Brotherhood. First, Egyptian public opinion had been swayed against Iraq by the flight of Egyptian expatriates. Second, Egypt received major financial incentives in the form of debt relief from the West. Third, Iraq was Egypt’s prime competitor for leadership of the Arab world. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), mindful of their security, willingly joined the Coalition knowing that only American military power could provide adequate defense against Iraq. Jordan vacillated because of its large Palestinian population who supported Saddam, its concern for its security, and the economic impact of abiding by the American coordinated sanctions that eliminated its trade with Iraq. Jordan also recognized that the American deployment was in the Gulf and would do nothing to enhance its security. A significant example of American leadership was its ability to convince Syria to become a member of the Coalition. Syria, a representative of Arab nationalism, added important legitimacy to the effort. Here again, the lack of European prestige was evident. Even though France maintained closer relations with Syria, which still was included on the State Department’s list of states supporting terrorism, Secretary Baker was able to negotiate Syrian participation. Baker overcame strong anti-American and anti-West feelings in Damascus. Undeniably the unique circumstances played a critical role. Iraq was a sworn enemy of President Hafez al-Asad and its defeat enhanced Syrian regional influence and security. Syria was anxious to end the years of being a pariah. Direct involvement promised to lead to a more beneficial relationship with the West. Significant in leading to a compromise was Syria’s willingness not to link the Iraq issue to larger Middle Eastern issues. Syria did not want to open discussions on its role in Lebanon. This position allowed the United States to avoid commitments on the Arab–Israeli questions. Although brought into the Coalition, Syria remained aloof threatening to pull out if Israel became involved militarily and restricting its armed forces to defensive operations.38 Critical to Arab participation and unity in the Coalition was Israeli neutrality. Israeli involvement in hostilities would introduce the Arab–Israeli conflict into the Gulf. Domestically, such a scenario would become untenable for most Arab states.39 On the other hand, non-retaliation in the face of attacks on Israeli cities and citizens was in direct contradiction to Israel’s right of self-defense doctrine. Only the United States had sufficient 81

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influence in Israel to negotiate an agreement on neutrality. In order to do so, it committed an additional $13 billion in aid to offset losses arising from Iraqi missile attacks and to help absorb Soviet Jews. Militarily, the Coalition promised to target SCUD launchers to reduce the likelihood of attack. Most significantly, the United States provided Israel with advanced Patriot missile technology and US crews to accelerate their effective use. This was the first deployment of American forces in Israel. Once developed, the Coalition needed to be sustained. The United States continued to push the ouster of Iraq in the UN by reminding members of the resolutions’ commitments and deadlines. It successfully halted debate in the UNSC as the deadline for authorized use of force approached and refused to entertain cease-fire proposals that fell short of the authorized objectives once the war started. It also continued to advocate the use of force as authorized by the UN. One of the major threats facing the United States was time. Time jeopardized the effectiveness of military deterrence and action as well as the sustainability of the economic embargo. Once the troops were deployed, there was no interest in extending deadlines for protracted negotiations. Under any circumstances, the deployment of a military force is expensive and fraught with political issues. These factors are multiplied when the force is multinational. Even the small contingents deployed in Lebanon in 1982–83 support this contention. Governments change their perspectives, whether in response to increasing public opposition, financial constraints, or lack of interest. Leaderships and governments change. In the midst of the build-up for Desert Storm, Prime Minister Thatcher left office. However, John Major, who replaced her, did not seek to change British policy. Other global crises develop that deflect attention or require action. Domestic troubles at home require troops to be re-deployed domestically. Another risk was the sustainability of the economic embargo. To be effective sanctions must hurt and require a military enforcement capability. Even with such prerequisites, sanctions take a long time to impact. The primary concern surrounding sanctions was that defections might occur thus weakening or eliminating their intent. Iraq possessed a valuable commodity that could entice many to break ranks with the international community. Moreover, prior to the embargo, it had been a relatively lucrative market. Table 3.1 indicates the economic costs of sanctions to Iraq’s largest trade partners. In spite of these pressures, the United States was able to maintain both the military and the economic alliance. Another political burden is the impact of public opinion on the willingness to participate. Cultural and historical factors, economic hardship, moral suasion, and casualties in conflict influence public opinion. In the case of the Gulf, Saudi Arabia accepted many important political risks. The deployment of foreign forces violated the long-held Saudi policy of having support “over the horizon” but only minimal presence in-country. 82

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Table 3.1 Iraq exports and imports 1989 Country

1989 Iraqi Exports: $12 billion total (99% from oil)

United States 9.2% to the US Germany 12.5% Japan 5.2% France 5.1% United Kingdom 7.9% Italy 4.0% European Community 7.1% Turkey 9.2% Brazil 3.7%

1989 Iraqi Imports: $10.29 billion total 19.2% from the US 1.1% 9.1% 6.3% 0.7% 5.1% 14.4% 11.7% 12.7%

Source: Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1990: 37639.

A major concern was raised about the deployment’s impact on Saudi political stability. First, there were a large number of non-Islamic troops in close proximity to Islam’s most holy cities. The fact that the Saudis had asked for help also jeopardized their role as protector of Mecca and Medina. Finally, Saudi Arabia allowed an attack on another Arab state from its territory which under other circumstances would have been reprehensible. Turkey also accepted a large risk from spillover. Although Turkey opted not to open a second front, it did eventually allow air combat missions to be flown from Turkish territory.40 By shutting down the Iraqi pipeline in August 1990 and supporting the UN embargo, it was calculated that Turkey lost $5.5 billion in trade.41 Throughout Europe, the start of hostilities initiated a series of anti-war demonstrations. Fifty thousand demonstrated in Paris, 40,000 in London, and 200,000 across Germany.42 Although singly impressive, such numbers did not present a threat to the governments and, as previously discussed, public opinion generally supported the Gulf action. The increase in terrorism also was a concern to many governments. There also was a great deal of concern over the potential escalation of the conflict. If Iraq decided to use its chemical weapon capability, the allied governments would need to reach a consensus on the type and level of response. Escalation to chemical or nuclear exchanges would have increased military and civilian casualties while undoubtedly causing serious disagreements among Coalition partners. Moreover, Israel was a prime target. It is highly unlikely that Israeli neutrality could have been preserved if it had been subjected to chemical weapon attacks. Although a seemingly attractive option, Saddam probably refrained from using chemical weapons out of fear of either chemical or possibly nuclear retaliation. As a result, the allies avoided a potentially divisive decision. 83

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Regardless of the weapons used, casualties were a great concern to all governments with troops “on the ground.” The level of casualties would directly influence public support for any military operation. Best-case scenarios presented prior to the start of hostilities envisioned several thousand American troops killed and maimed for life and an unknown number of missing in action.43 In reality, the allies succeeded in defeating Iraq with minimal loss of life (Table 3.2). In reviewing the figures, two points are obvious. First, whether attributable to the effective execution of the AirLand doctrine, the superiority of allied equipment, or the incompetence of Iraqi troops, the total casualty figures are incredible. No one could have predicted that the confrontation between two and a half million manned forces would result in such numbers. These figures negated any significant public outcry against the war. Regardless, from a burden-sharing perspective, it is evident that the United States, with the highest number of casualties, assumed the largest cost. In the Gulf Crisis, the allocation of defense resources was an essential measure of a contribution. In contrast to Lebanon, the Gulf Crisis was a more traditional war. The enemy was easily defined and had an organized military of substantial strength. As previously discussed, war heightened the risks to the military forces involved. Second, power projection capabilities in terms of both logistics and military offensive capabilities were essential. This was not a peacekeeping or even a peace enforcement operation. It was an offensive military campaign, which required that a sizable military force be deployed as quickly as possible. Because of the size of the force required and the rapidity with which it needed to be deployed, airlift capabilities were essential. The transport

Table 3.2 Persian Gulf casualties Country

Killed

Wounded

Missing

Captured

United States United Kingdom France Italy Saudi Arabia Egypt United Arab Emirates

293a 17b 2 1 26 19 6

467 43 25c – N/A 74 N/A

45 8 – – 10 – –

21 2 – 1 – – –

Sources: Keesing’s Contemporary Archives; Department of Defense Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, final report to Congress, April 1992; and the Army’s Military History Department. Notes a The United States suffered 148 killed in action and 145 non-battle-related deaths. b Includes nine killed by US friendly fire. c Estimated.

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operation had had no preliminary planning and was faced with changing priorities. A major mobilization effort, using military as well as civilian aircraft, was launched.44 Great Britain, France, and Italy all maintained some tactical capabilities, albeit insufficient to deploy their forces and matériel. Only the United States possessed significant strategic airlift capabilities, which meant that the United States had to transport both its forces and those of its allies. Between August 1990 and August 1991, 14,200 missions transported half a million personnel and 245,000 tonnes of equipment.45 Of these, 250 missions were donated as in-kind support by Korea, Japan, Kuwait, Denmark, Luxembourg, and Italy. Among these, Japan bore the most significant burden with 119 missions.46 While these contributions were an important additional asset, the majority of the airlift operation was coordinated and staffed by the United States. Host nation and other non-combatant support also were valuable in facilitating the deployment and supply of the Coalition. Of significant noncombatant support was Germany’s willingness to provide base access rights, certain equipment, and ammunition, which facilitated the deployment.47 Spain, Egypt, the United Kingdom, Italy, Greece, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and France provided base access, over flight permission, and re-fueling support. Italy allowed the full use of its military and civilian airports in spite of opposition from the Catholic Church, Christian Youth Groups, and Italian Communist Party (ICP).48 The Gulf States and Saudi Arabia provided a range of host nation support including food, fuel, water, and facilities. In addition to its contributions to supporting American forces, Saudi Arabia provided $3.4 billion in host nation support to nonUS forces. Still, Operations Desert Shield and Storm were military missions. As such the contributions of military resources are a significant measure of burden-sharing. The military operation was an international effort. Thirtysix countries contributed forces with the majority provided by the United States, Great Britain, France, and Saudi Arabia (Table 3.3). As a global power, the United States had, by far, the largest power projection capabilities. Most countries configure their forces to defend their territory. This is even true in NATO, which is focused on defense. Without American participation, an effective military response could not have been mounted. Of political significance is the support of the Arab world, which, excluding Saudi Arabia’s commitment, was 68,310. Finally, both the French and the British commitments represented their largest out-of-area deployment since the collapse of their colonial empires. Table 3.3 does not fully show the significance of the American commitment. The United States deployed 75 percent of its tactical aircraft, 42 percent of its modern battle tanks, and 46 percent of its aircraft carriers to the Gulf. From a personnel perspective, 46 percent of the marine corps and 37 percent of the army were engaged in the Gulf. The United States 85

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Table 3.3 GAO report on allied troop contributions in the Persian Gulf Country

Troops

United Statesa United Kingdom France Saudi Arabiab Egypt Syria Other Arabsc Other Non-Arabs Muslimsd

482,000 31,930 19,330 137,160 39,160 14,800 14,350 11,530

Source: Persian Gulf Allied Burden Sharing Efforts, GAO report, 1991. Notes a Estimate of US forces by mid-January 1991. b Estimate of entire Saudi Arabian armed forces committed to conflict. c Kuwaiti 7,800, GCC (Oman 940, UAE 1,450, Qatar 1,580, Bahrain 700), Morocco 1,880. d Senegal 500, Pakistan 8,700, and Bangladesh 2,330.

also deployed 70,000 troops and 40,000 pieces of equipment from Germany.49 The less tension-filled environment of the post-Cold War allowed the United States to reduce its presence in central Europe without serious threat of increased Soviet pressure. American commitments in terms of both numbers and percentages far exceeded those of the allies. The numbers also indicate that simultaneous deployment of a similar force to meet another crisis would be extremely difficult, if not impossible. A further element used in the assessment of military burden-sharing is financial contributions. Under this umbrella are the monetary costs of deployment and contributions made to offset those costs. No international institution accepted the authority to impose assessments to support Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Without such a controlling authoritative organization, all financial and military contributions were voluntary. The United States committed its forces without regard for whether the Coalition or others would offset any costs or risks, which, according to Olson and Zeckhauser (1966), promotes “free ride” tendencies. In the Gulf, this did not occur. The estimated total cost of deployment was $71 billion. The United States’ expenses alone exceeded $61.1 billion. The United Kingdom’s were $6 billion and France’s were somewhere between $1.6 and $1.8 billion.50 In contrast to the theoretical models, allied in-kind and financial contributions to the United States totaled $54 billion (Table 3.4). In addition, Kuwait provided $1.3 billion and $1 billion to Great Britain and France respectively.51 Table 3.4 summarizes allied financial contributions to the United States for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. 86

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Table 3.4 Allies’ financial contributions to US for Desert Shield and Desert Storm (billions of $) State

1990 pledge

1991 pledge

Total pledge

Cash received

In-kind receivedb

Total received

Saudi Arabia Kuwait UAE Japan Germany Korea Othersa

3.3 2.5 1.0 1.68 1.1 0.8 0.03

13.6 13.5 3.1 8.3 5.5 0.28 0.23

16.8 16.0 4.1 10.1 6.6 0.36 0.26

12.8 16.0 3.9 9.5 5.8 0.15 0.04

4.0 0.04 0.02 0.56 0.68 0.1 0.22

16.8 16.04 4.1 10.1 6.5 0.25 0.26

Total

9.7

44.2

53.95

44.9

5.6

50.5

Sources: Persian Gulf Allied Burden Sharing Efforts, GAO report, 1991: 3; Report #12 OMB 10/15/92. Notes a Includes Italy, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Denmark, Luxembourg. b In-kind assistance includes host nation support, transportation, construction and support vehicles, medical equipment, and electronics. Complete listing available in Report #12 OMB, Table 12, 10/15/92.

President Bush also established the Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group that included the EC and twenty-four other countries. This organization provided $16.2 billion in economic assistance to countries such as Jordan and Turkey, which were impacted by the crisis. Also, bilateral agreements netted $9.2 billion in military and financial support to MNF participants and affected countries.52 In spite of broad allied support for the actual operation, there were some ancillary financial burdens that were not covered. These include non-defense expenses such as transportation, education, and veterans’ support related to the operation. While home re-deployment may occur over a longer time than the operational deployment, it still requires a major commitment of transportation resources as well as a need to reassimilate veterans either into other military occupations or civilian professions. In the case of the Gulf, the Coast Guard incurred $33.4 million in transportation expenses. Educational expenses for US veterans are estimated at $18.9 million. Veterans’ Affairs has spent $253.3 million related to the Gulf and these figures promise to rise with the medical problems resulting from Gulf War Syndrome and other maladies. Finally, the expense of rehabilitating equipment was quite high because of the erosion caused by desert sand and demands of combat. A further measure of burden-sharing is the assumption of responsibility for global order. In the case of the Persian Gulf, this may be examined in two contexts. First are those measures that have already been discussed in a different context. Second, aggression should not be rewarded by 87

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malfeasance. This has been challenged on the grounds that access to oil and Kuwait’s favorable attitudes vis-à-vis the West were the primary motivating factors, not international law.53 As an unidentified State Department employee asked, “What would have been the international response if Syria, rather than Kuwait, had been Saddam’s target.” Regardless, response to the Gulf Crisis represents a triumph of international law and consensus. The United States expended the necessary diplomatic energy to establish a collective response. It exhibited a willingness to work within the UN’s organizational structure and abide by its decisions. For example, faced with international dissension, the United States did not seek to conquer Baghdad or to annihilate the Republican Guard. Additional accusations, based on the interpretation of the UN Charter, imply that the United States abused its role within the United Nations. Under American leadership, articles demanding an assessment of the effectiveness of sanctions were disregarded and regional agencies were not given sufficient time to arrange a compromise.54 Undeniably, the United States and its allies did apply pressure in the United Nations resulting in its support, in the form of UNSC resolutions, for all actions. Since the UN is hesitant to invoke collective security measures, other than peacekeeping operations, someone willing to accept leadership and apply pressure on others is needed. Furthermore, UN authorization was of a sufficiently high level that in a speech before parliament in January 1991, British Prime Minister John Major declared that the United Kingdom was not at war with Iraq but supporting UN resolutions. Other financial commitments include contributions to international organizations for refugee relief and support to affected countries, as examples of global responsibility. In the former case, allied countries provided $404 million to help resolve refugee problems. Major contributors were Japan ($143 million), Germany ($52.6 million), the European Commission ($52 million), and the Netherlands ($39 million).55 Egypt and Turkey were the primary recipients of aid to impacted countries.

Gulf War redux In 2003 the United States went to war against Iraq once again. The objectives of the George W. Bush Administration were more ambitious than those of the United States and allied Coalition that fought Iraq in 1991. The United States sought regime change in Baghdad: the ouster of the Hussein regime and its replacement by an eventually democratic government. In addition, the international system, especially its power setting, was very far removed in 2003 from its basis in 1991. In 1991, the world had just emerged from the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union was foreseeable, but not yet foreordained. The United States was thus constrained, in the earlier conflict, to accept the validity of a multilat88

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eral approach to containment, and eventually to war. President George H.W. Bush in 1991 regarded it as indispensable to obtain the consensus of his NATO allies and support from the United Nations before implementing UN and US Congressional resolutions to expel Iraq from Kuwait. The world power distribution in 2003, compared to 1991, was more lopsidedly in favor of US ability to have its way without requiring the assistance of allies. The Soviet Union was gone, and the United States had emerged after a decade of post-Cold War as the world’s leading military and economic power. This putative American hegemony provided one incentive to have done with Hussein in 2003 compared to the more limited war that was fought to expel Iraq from Kuwait in 1991. Another incentive for broader ambition in 2003 was provided by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 against the US World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The George W. Bush Administration embarked upon a global war against terrorism and against rogue states that might sponsor terror or pass weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to terrorists. The Bush national security strategy of 2002 even called for pre-emptive attacks against terrorists or rogue states that might attack US or allied territory, or forward deploying forces, with WMD. The line between pre-emptive and preventive war was not as finely drawn as it might have been in the Bush strategy. In making the case for war against Iraq in 2002 and 2003, President Bush and his advisers emphasized the risks posed by Iraq’s probable possession of large quantities of chemical and biological weapons. The post-war failure to find these munitions, despite almost a year of painstaking search by the Iraqi Survey Group, resulted in a diplomatic and domestic politics flap during the 2004 US presidential campaign. The Bush Administration was accused of accepting faulty intelligence, of cherry picking from ambiguous intelligence about Iraq, or both. The influence of the Iraqi National Congress on high Bush officials prior to the outbreak of war led to further suspicions of the integrity of the Administration’s case for preventive war. The choice for preventive war against Saddam Hussein led to controversy within the UN Security Council and among US NATO allies. France and Russia would not support UN authorization for war against Iraq, preferring continued weapons inspections and sanctions. And within NATO, France and Germany opposed military actions against Hussein until Iraq had more time to comply with UN inspectors’ demands. The effective burden-sharing among NATO allies in 1991, and the willingness of the UN Security Council to back military intervention against Hussein then, were not replicated in the more contentious atmosphere of 2003. In part, the lack of multinational cooperation against Iraq in 2003 arose from perceptions and fears of US hegemony on the part of Europeans and others. Even some US allies felt the weight of American twenty-first century influence as a brooding omnipresence. Further, the Bush II Administration’s 89

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tough and unilateralist rhetoric alienated diplomatic circles from Paris to Moscow. US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, for example, had spoken of France and Germany as representatives of the “old Europe,” in contrast to the former Soviet states of East Central Europe that now appeared to support the United States in its higher military profile. The Bush decision for war regardless of allied support (only Britain provided major military forces) was predicated upon the recent success of US military operations against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. In 2001 the United States had been able to oust the Taliban from power in Kabul with a combination of air power, special operations forces and indigenous ground forces provided by the Northern Alliance. This “Afghan model” of warfare, based on exploitation of advanced technology for reconnaissance, command-control and communications, and longrange precision strike, was accepted by the US Department of Defense as a possible template for future war. Rumsfeld and other DoD officials felt that US military success in Afghanistan vindicated their arguments about the need for military “transformation.” Transformation would maximize the exploitation of technology and small, elite forces to prepare for the emerging forms of future war. Manpower-intensive wars of attrition were passé: future war would require knowledge-intensive strategies and smaller forces on the ground, supported by long-range air, missile and artillery fires. Given these assumptions about transformation and about favorable recent experience in Afghanistan, the Bush Administration opted for war against Iraq with minimum numbers of ground troops. And the rapid success of the campaign to overthrow Hussein seemed to vindicate the optimists in the Department of Defense. The active combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom was begun on March 19 and was declared as having been concluded on May 1. But subsequently, the United States found itself in an unexpected post-conflict quagmire. The problem of stabilizing post-war Iraq had been underestimated in pre-war planning. There were insufficient numbers of US forces in place to deter or prevent widespread looting of weapons and destruction of infrastructure, including facilities for providing power and water. The post-war US Coalition Provisional Authority disbanded the entire pre-war Iraqi army, sending some 400,000 armed and trained potential partisans into disgruntled unemployment. The power vacuum left by the collapse of the Hussein regime left security in many parts of Iraq in the hands of local politicians or militias whose priorities were based on protecting their ethnic or religious values and identities. As the United States struggled to manage the post-conflict war in Iraq in 2003 and 2004, the Bush Administration became more interested in multilateral cooperation and in moving toward a prompt transfer of power to the Iraqis. Despite the denials of some officials, the United States was 90

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facing a widespread guerrilla war in Iraq waged by, at least: (1) unrepentant Baathists deposed as a result of Hussein’s overthrow; (2) al-Qaeda and other foreign insurgent fighters who sought to turn Iraq into a political embarrassment and military stalemate for the United States; (3) former military and security employees of the Hussein regime who, although not high-ranking Baathists, nevertheless resented their loss of a paycheck and professional identity; (4) other displaced, disoriented or disgusted persons who opposed the US invasion in principle or felt that a new government in Iraq would not serve their interests. As US casualties increased, presidential interest in burden-sharing caused some backpedaling from previously assertive unilateralism. By February 2004, the Bush Administration had invited the United Nations to help sort out disagreements about Iraq’s future government and the timing of elections. President Bush also indicated in early 2004 that he appreciated NATO’s contribution to the post-conflict pacification of Afghanistan and would welcome NATO’s involvement in Iraq. “I believe in NATO,” said the President to NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer during their conversations in January. Having encouraged Mr de Hoop Scheffer to increase NATO’s profile in Afghanistan, Bush also urged the alliance to get hands on in Iraq: “The more of a NATO role the better.”56 The Bush stance toward NATO was a significant departure from prior skepticism about its relevance in the post-9-11 world order. In addition, NATO’s willingness to accept responsibility for stabilizing Kabul and the surrounding area in Afghanistan represented its first “out-of-the-area” commitment of this type. The United States sought to have NATO expand upon its limited commitment of 6,000 troops in and around the Afghan capital in order to assume broader stabilization missions, including support for US military operations against remaining Taliban. NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander called upon its members to provide alliance forces for deployment in five provincial Afghan cities. Meanwhile, on another front, Washington urged NATO to take over the 9,500 multinational brigade in Central Iraq. However, SACEUR Gen. James L. Jones fretted that NATO was providing insufficient numbers of troops for the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan per se.57 The Bush Administration was apparently being pushed into acquiescent multilateralism, not only by the events in the pertinent theater of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also by the politics of an election year and by NATO’s own need to define its post-9-11 identity more specifically. Taking on additional responsibility for Afghanistan and playing a major part in stabilizing Iraq would challenge NATO’s “out-of-area” capabilities as never before. In a world in which terrorism and its connection to irresponsible states loomed large among presumptive threats to the United States and its allies, NATO’s burden-sharing experience and capabilities made it possible for alliance power projection outside of Europe 91

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to assume a higher profile. In addition, Iraq 2003–04 provided a lesson for the United States about the limits of unilateralism in the construction of failed or deposed states: shared responsibility opened the door to international assistance that was desperately needed and, very much after the fact, finally acknowledged as such.

Conclusions The Gulf crisis and war of 1991 established a precedent and model for international burden-sharing on behalf of collective security in the postCold War world. International legitimization was critical to isolating Saddam Hussein. It countered his assertions of victimization by the West and Israel, increased the effectiveness of economic sanctions, and assured that his access to additional military resources would be limited. Multilateral institutions legitimized actions; for example, the United Nations authorized economic sanctions and subsequently military action, but exerted almost no control over their implementation. The UN also allowed the United States, in coordination with its allies, to assume strategic and tactical command of the operation. The collective decision making involved the Arab League, the United Nations, and the WEU. While each strongly opposed Saddam’s aggression, none was able to orchestrate burden-sharing or to exert real leadership in the field. As previously discussed, both of these responsibilities fell primarily to the United States. Even in the environment in which American command was undisputed, the United States did not make unilateral decisions. For example, the key European allies agreed to its response to the Soviet Union’s proposal, before the ground war started. The United States also acceded to UN and Arab requests not to enter Baghdad although that would have been quite possible. This collaborative approach to decision making was unique. One organization that did not accept an active role was NATO. Even though NATO’s Defense Planning Committee had responded positively to American requests for a contingency plan to support a deployment of US and NATO forces to southwest Asia, it maintained its primary position that out-of-the-area operations were the prerogative of individual members and not Alliance issues.58 In the Gulf crisis, the United States did seek NATO involvement, viewing it as an opportunity to re-allocate resources among the membership and a means to redefine its role. The North Atlantic Council rejected the American proposal on August 10, 1990, stating that NATO would remain a forum for discussion but each country would contribute in its own way. It also added that it would defend Turkey if attacked. Burden-sharing would be voluntary and ad hoc. The Alliance would have no formal role. Regardless of whether the American request was premised on shedding burdens, NATO’s rejection 92

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exhibited, in many respects, the same lack of international maturity as shown by the EC. While NATO and Europe each hesitated to assume new roles in a changing world, the Soviet Union displayed a new internationalism. As Gorbachev stated, Our unity in condemning it [aggression] and our shared concern at the outcome of the crisis are also a sign of radical change in our mode of thinking and in the understanding of the goals and means of world politics.59 Although at times indecisive, a reflection of unstable internal policies, the Soviet Union generally maintained a hard-line in condemning the invasion, demanding Iraqi withdrawal and supporting a peaceful international solution. Secretary of Defense Cheney characterized the Soviet performance as “admirable,” and there was no evidence of Soviet collusion in the invasion. Soviet support, or at least acquiescence to the use of force to expel Iraq from Kuwait, was necessary for the multinational coalition to accomplish its objectives at an acceptable cost. On the contrary, had it assumed an adversarial role the circumstances would have been quite different. Soviet political support for Iraq would have eliminated UN authorization and may have doomed the Coalition. Military support, including intelligence sharing and arms supply, would have increased the risk and changed the dynamics of the military campaign. Even in a more confrontational era, direct Soviet involvement probably would have been restricted to SAM crews and possibly air sorties. However, it is also interesting to speculate whether the Soviet Union would have even permitted such adventurism by Saddam Hussein because of the risk of confrontation with the United States. The Gulf War was unique in the broad acceptance of American leadership, even though the United States was expecting that others assume large portions of the burdens. Early in the crisis, the United States demanded shared risks from its allies. It received support in varying levels but, in total, the level of support was unprecedented. Enforcement of economic sanctions, international consensus, military contributions, and financial and logistical costs reflected shared responsibilities. This sharing resulted from a combination of collective benefit, coercion, and selective incentives. Furthermore, the private benefits offered at each stage of the operation ensured that the operation remained multinational and did not degenerate into an American effort.60 Desert Storm also demonstrated that collective security operations still may require the use of military force. This demanded a substantial commitment from the United States as the only power capable of such a military operation. As a result of its 93

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prominent role, both militarily and politically, the United States also assumed command of the military operation and the role of spokesman for the Coalition or, at least, for its European contingent.

Notes 1 See Edward N. Luttwak’s written testimony in Crisis in the Persian Gulf Region: US Policy Options and Implications, Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, S.Hrg. 101–1071 (September 11, 13, November, 27–30, December 3, 1990): 323–4. 2 See Duke, 1993: 183. The debate was based on the premise that the oil supplies were more critical to the allies than the United States. In response to the Iran–Iraq War in 1980, NATO’s Defense Planning Council had acknowledged the importance of the region and agreed to, “a suitable division of labor within NATO” to respond to threats. However, the majority of the allied response was intended to be host nation support and offsetting US troop deployments. In 1990, this was no longer sufficient from the American perspective. See SCAS, Crisis in the Persian Gulf. 3 Middle East Report, 1991: 24. 4 This quote appeared in Le Monde on December 6, 1991. It was translated by Leon Hader in Quagmire America in the Middle East, page 108. For a more complete discussion of the European perspective that the United States was using the Gulf crisis to re-assert its declining hegemonic power, see Hader, 1992. 5 For more information on this debate see Common Security Interests in the Middle East, Committee on Armed Services, US House of Representatives, HASC 100–113 (April 20, 1988). 6 Henry Kissinger, US Senate Committee on Armed Services, Crisis in the Persian Gulf Region: US Policy Options and Implications, 1990: 278, hereafter SCAS, Crisis in the Persian Gulf. 7 Luttwak, SCAS, Crisis in the Persian Gulf, 325. 8 Iraq, Jordan, Mauritania, Sudan, Yemen, and the PLO opposed the decision. 9 SCAS, Crisis in the Persian Gulf, 1990: 10, 18. 10 Cheney, SCAS, Crisis in the Persian Gulf, 1990: 19. 11 While acknowledging that linkages did exist, the Soviet position was that aggression could not be rewarded and that their active participation in the Palestinian issue was predicated upon an Iraqi withdrawal. The segmenting of the issues represented a major achievement for the United States. Traditionally, the Soviets had supported linking Middle East issues and convening international conferences to resolve them. 12 Kissinger, SCAS, Crisis in the Persian Gulf, 1990: 261. 13 Primakov, 1991: 47. 14 At the start of the war, there were approximately 6,000–8,000 Soviet citizens in Iraq. These included military advisers, contractors, and technical experts involved in a range of economic projects. 15 NYT, 1/16/91. 16 See Keesing Contemporary Archives. From January 17 until January 31, fiftyseven SCUDs were fired at Haifa, Tel Aviv, Riyadh, and Dhahran. Five people were killed including four Israelis and 224 were injured. 17 On January 17, Yemen and Libya had called on the UNSC to stop the conflict. On January 21, the Soviet Union, India, and Algeria put forward a peace pro-

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18

19 20

21 22 23 24 25

26

27

posal. On January 23, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Tunisia, and Mauritania called for a UNSC meeting and the interjection of a Maghreb peacekeeping force in Kuwait. These appeals were ignored by the UNSC. February 2, Iran’s offer to mediate between Iraq and the United States was well received by the UN General Assembly, the Soviet Union, Turkey, and France but rejected by the United States. On February 11 and 12, the Nonaligned Movement was unable to reach an agreement on a plan for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait in conjunction with a departure of foreign forces from the Gulf. The communiqué also expressed mutual support for comprehensive peace in the Middle East but did not mention an international conference. This represented a fundamental shift in Soviet policy regarding Middle East peace conferences. Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1991: 37982. The failure to remove Saddam Hussein remains a point of controversy. Such an ouster was unpopular with other Arab leaders who could face similar fates. In addition, removal by the Coalition would have placed the responsibility for maintaining order with Iraq on the Coalition that was neither prepared to spend the money nor provide the resources for such an operation. Thus, it was determined that various Iraqi internal insurgencies should be fostered. However, it became painfully clear that little cohesion existed among various opposition groups including the Shi’a in the south and the Kurds in the north. As a result, it was predicted that the outcome of the impending civil war would be either the “Lebanonization of Iraq” or a decided tilt toward Islamic fundamentalism or both. Any of these results favored Iran and the latter, particularly if it meant a Shi’a entity in southern Iraq, was viewed as a threat by Saudi Arabia. Thus, there was an effort to contain Saddam’s military action against various groups through the imposition of “no fly” zones but there was only limited efforts at supporting insurgency. Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1991: 378–98. NYT, 3/14/91. Hader, 1992: 109. “EC Leaving Diplomacy to US,” The Washington Post, hereafter WP, 3/8/91. For broader discussions of the American policy toward the Persian Gulf see: President Carter’s State of the Union Address January 1980; Reagan Administration on the importance of the Persian Gulf The New York Times, 3/5/81; Senator John Warner’s testimony in Crisis in the Persian Gulf Region: US Policy Options and Implications, Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, S.Hrg. 101–1071 (September 11, 13, November, 27–30, December 3, 1990): 7; and statements in the National Security Revitalization Act House of Representatives’ Bill #7 Report #104–18 104th Congress 1st Session, February 6, 1995: 138 which discusses the new global security environment. Once the Bush Administration made the determination to go to war, intelligence assessments determined that the Saudi wells and pipeline were sufficiently well defended as not to be threatened. However, between the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait on August 8 and the meaningful implementation of Operation Desert Shield in mid-September, it is questionable whether an Iraqi blitzkrieg against Saudi Arabia could have been stopped with conventional weapons. There was a debate between the Bush Administration and nuclear experts led by Gary Milhollin, Director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, on the timeliness of Saddam Hussein’s nuclear capability. See Milhollin’s testimony in Crisis in the Persian Gulf Region: US Policy Options and

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28 29 30 31 32 33 34

35

36 37 38 39

40 41 42 43 44

Implications: 522–34. However, the Administration also stressed Iraq’s other capabilities such as the range of its modified SCUD missiles that was estimated at 435 miles. See Crisis in the Persian Gulf Region: US Policy Options and Implications: 700. SCAS, Crisis in the Persian Gulf, 1990: 66. Hader, 1992: 113. Sandler, 1992: 179. Ibid. Kissinger, SCAS, Crisis in the Persian Gulf, 1990: 262–3. Ibid.: 263. An internal crisis occurred as the French government was discussing its participation in direct Coalition military action against Iraqi territory. Various factions within the French government held different perspectives on France’s involvement in the Persian Gulf. For example, a communist–environmentalist coalition had opposed supporting the United States’ action at all. Initially, Socialist Defense Minister Jean-Pierre Chevenement took exception at President Mitterrand’s decision to place French forces under American command. The simmering disagreement reached a crisis level when Chevenement, a founding member of the Franco–Iraqi Friendship Society, strongly opposed using French forces to attack Iraqi forces and cities. Chevenement contended that French activities should be limited to Kuwait and characterized further actions would severely damage France’s traditional Arab ties. Characterizing further action as “America’s War,” he felt France was merely abetting the United States’ attempts at restoring its domination over Europe through military leadership. Similarly, he felt that the military destruction of Iraq would eliminate an existing counterbalance to the American–Saudi Arabian relationship in the Gulf. The crisis was resolved when President Mitterrand overruled Chevenement, who then resigned. The United States had asked Germany to provide transportation, German troops, and financial support for impacted states. Kohl offered only to transport troops to the Gulf, assigned three German minesweepers to Crete as an offset to Gulf deployment, and provided $1.1 billion of in-kind support. See “Kohl Expected to Give No Excuses, No Troops,” WP, 9/15/90. In order to secure final payment of German commitments, the US Senate passed a bill in March 1991 banning arms sales to Germany and other allies until their Gulf War debts were paid. Hader, 1992: 116. See Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa’s discussion of Syria’s role in “Asad Urges ‘Brother’ to Quit Kuwait,” NYT, 1/13/91. Syria’s 15,000 troops were only to be used for defensive purpose. Mubarak did state that Egypt would remain in the Coalition even if Israel became involved. In addition, there is speculation that Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States also had little choice but to remain in the Coalition regardless of their dislike for Israel. Initially, Turkey would allow it bases to be used only for refueling and wound evacuation but no strike origination. Later, it succumbed to pressure to use its sophisticated airfields to launch strikes. NYT, 1/14/91. “Crowds in European Cities Protest War in Gulf Area,” NYT, 1/18/91. Luttwak, SCAS, Crisis in the Persian Gulf, 1990: 325. Eighty percent of the load to the Gulf was carried by commercial aircraft and 20 percent by military. See Military Airlift – Prospects for Europe, report to the

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45 46 47

48

49 50 51 52 53 54

55 56 57 58

59 60

Assembly of Western European Union, November 6, 1995, hereafter Military Airlift, WEU Report, November 1995. Military Airlift, WEU Report, November 1995. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, final report to Congress, Department of Defense, April 1992: P-8. Germany provided sixty Fuchs Nuclear, Biological, Chemical reconnaissance vehicles that offset an “equipment shortfall” and demonstrated the importance of interoperability within NATO by providing 120mm tank ammunition. See Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, final report to Congress, Department of Defense, April 1992: F70. The ICP advocated the withdrawal of Italian troops from the Gulf and the closing of bases to US troops involved in the conflict. Indicative of the changed international landscape was the refusal of the Italian parliament to respond to the ICP’s request. Once one of the strongest communist parties in West Europe, the ICP rejected its more left-wing platforms and reconstituted itself as the Party of the Democratic Left (PDS) on February 3, 1991. Time, 3/4/91. United States Costs in the Persian Gulf Conflict and Foreign Contributions to Offset Such Costs, report #21 Office of Budget and Management, October 15, 1992; Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1991: 38113. Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1991: 38113. Persian Gulf Allied Burden Sharing Efforts, GAO report, 1991: 5. Childers, Middle East Report, March–April 1991. These points reference Article 42 which require a review of the sanctions’ effectiveness and Chapter VIII of the UN Charter that talks about regional arrangements and local communities’ resolving disputes. See Childer’s Middle East Report, March–April 1991 for a more detailed perspective on this subject. Persian Gulf Allied Burden Sharing Efforts, GAO report, 1991: 22. Elaine Sciolino, “Drifting NATO Finds New Purpose With Afghanistan and Iraq,” The New York Times, February 23, 2004, p. A6. Ibid. “They [NATO Ministers] agreed that it would be essential to be prepared against the eventuality of a diversion of NATO-allocated forces, which the US and other countries might be compelled to make in order to safeguard the vital interests of member nations outside the North Atlantic Treaty area . . . Ministers of nations concerned affirmed the intention of their countries to provide host nation support to facilitate the reception and employment of reinforcement forces. Ministers recognize that the developing situation would entail a suitable division of labor within NATO.” See Duke (1993: 230–1) for a more in-depth discussion of this issue. Snow, 1993: 190. Sandler, 1992: 179.

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4 THE BALKANS Increased European responsibility and long-term commitment

Introduction The Balkan conflicts of the post-Soviet era were the culmination of an evolving US military policy from aggressive multilateralism to the discriminate multilateralism envisioned in the Presidential Policy Directive #25. On the whole, continued deployments in Bosnia and Kosovo represent a victory for increased European responsibility sharing while simultaneously highlighting their inefficiencies in defense capabilities.1 The European’s lack of defense capabilities has intensified the debate on European security and defense policy. The length of the Balkan deployments also has shifted the burden-sharing debate to one between NATO and the European Union rather than solely within NATO and to a second among the Europeans rather than between the Europeans and the United States. Finally, the Balkan deployments have highlighted the increased importance of the political aspects rather than simply the military ones of burden-sharing. In particular, the willingness of states and multinational institutions to accept responsibility for world order reduces pretexts of American unilateralism. The 1990s war of Yugoslav secession, or disintegration, was the second major conflict of the post-Cold War era and the first to be fought on European soil since the end of World War II. The war’s primary cause was “balkanization,” the arbitrary establishment of political boundaries without concern for national, ethnic or religious diversity. Nationalist feelings fanned by latent religious and ethnic animosities produced a conflict characterized by the heinous doctrine of “ethnic cleansing” that ensured a war as brutal as the one evaluated by the Carnegie Balkan Commission in 1913.2 In Bosnia alone, more than 260,000 people died, 60 percent of Bosnian property and a large part of its infrastructure was devastated.3 Surrounding states such as Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Greece, who feared being engulfed in the conflict or overrun by refugees, viewed the conflict with the greatest concern. The great powers responded slowly seeking to contain the war and provide humanitarian assistance. Increasing regional 98

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instability, the atrocities of war, and the threat of expanding conflict eventually captured European and UN attention prompting a larger international effort. From the outset, the United States deemed this to be a European problem and only offered political support through the UN. Over the next two and half years, costly international efforts at mediation, moral persuasion, military pressure, and humanitarian relief were ineffective. In November 1994, more than two years after the conflict started, former US National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski succinctly captured the essence of the Bosnian conflict: “What Bosnia shows is the inability of Europe to act and the failure of America to lead.”4 In Bosnia, the fundamental principles of the “new world order” that theoretically formed the basis of the Coalition against Saddam Hussein – the rule of law and the opposition to unprovoked aggression – were violated. The authority of the United Nations was ignored. Protection of human rights, including access to humanitarian aid, was denied. Moral outrage caused by the brutality of the conflict and, more importantly, the threatened credibility of the UN and later NATO attracted global attention. Eventually, by late 1995, these concerns resulted in an international effort to resolve the conflict. While these efforts did mark a high level of responsibility sharing, prior to June 1995, response to the Bosnian crisis was characterized by European unwillingness to provide sufficient resources to resolve the conflict and blatant burden shedding by the United States. Furthermore, dissension surrounding the appropriate course of action was evident not only within the UN but also in more homogeneous organizations such as the EC, the WEU, and NATO. This chapter examines the transformation of the Bosnian operations from one commanded and controlled by the UN to one led by NATO and NATO’s eventual leadership in the war against Serbia in Kosovo. It assesses the inability of the United Nation Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to effectively handle multiple tasks, let alone stop hostilities in Bosnia and evaluates the successes of NATO’s Intervention Force (IFOR) and subsequently the Stabilization Force (SFOR). It evaluates how the lack of a clear mission led to a “mission creep” that changed the operation’s burdens and their measurements in Bosnia. While admitting that participation in the Bosnian operation was quite broad, this assessment points out that levels of contributions varied greatly. As with previous chapters, this one focuses on the roles and contributions of France, the United Kingdom, Germany, the United States, and Russia in both conflicts and the changing nature of responsibilities between a UN-led and NATO-led operation. It examines the levels at which each accepted risk, allocated resources, and assumed responsibility for re-establishing stability in the region. However, the central role of multilateral organizations in this operation also draws attention to the institutional commitment of the UN and NATO. This chapter confirms that, as the perceived level of 99

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threat to national interests and critical institutions increased, so did the willingness of the United States and NATO to assume greater burdens.

The Bosnian conflict The War of Yugoslav Secession did not engulf Bosnia until April 1992, but in June 1991, fighting started in Croatia. The separatist Serb minority supported by the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) opposed the Croatian government’s declaration of independence. In the wake of failed EC attempts to resolve the conflict, the WEU, on September 23, 1991, expressed its readiness to fully participate in “an effective UN force to secure a cease-fire.”5 Also in September, UN Security Council Resolution 713 imposed an arms embargo against Yugoslavia. In October, UN SecretaryGeneral Javier Perez de Cuellar appointed former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance as his Personal Envoy for Yugoslavia. Recognizing its limitations, the UN decided against deploying a peacekeeping force in a combat situation. In spite of mediation efforts, the Croatian conflict showed no signs of lessening. Acknowledging that the danger of failure for a UN peacekeeping mission was great in an environment of continued hostilities, Secretary General de Cuellar still proposed deployment contending that failure was less “grievous” than the possibility of expanded conflict.6 In February 1992, the UN authorized a twelve-month deployment of the 14,000 men UNPROFOR with a projected budget of $640 million. Troops were to be contributed by member states and funding would be assessed in accordance with the UN Peacekeeping Assessment Policy.7 UNPROFOR was fully deployed in accordance with UNSC Resolution 749 on April 7 1992.8 Europe assumed a strong role in crisis management, initiating an ECsponsored Conference on Yugoslavia whose aim it was to establish a settlement that protected territorial integrity and ethnic rights of ethnic Serbs and Croats. UNPROFOR was charged with establishing an environment conducive to implementing such a settlement. Concurrent with UNPROFOR’s deployment in Croatia, the UN designated selected areas in Croatia as UN Protected Areas (UNPAs), which were to be demilitarized and maintained as havens for refugees. UNPROFOR was responsible for ensuring compliance of the demilitarized UNPAs as well as verification of the Yugoslavia National Army’s (JNA) withdrawal from Croatia, as mandated by the UN. In addition, it was to support the humanitarian efforts of other UN agencies. During the summer of 1992, UNPROFOR’s mission expanded. It was ordered to monitor JNA presence in newly designated “pink zones” as well as Serb populated areas outside of the UNPAs, and to control civilian entry in the UNPAs. In October, the force was asked to monitor the demilitarization of the Prevlaka Peninsula near Dubrovnik and the Peruca Dam. In spite of 100

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the increased risk of confrontation associated with these operations and its expanded responsibility, neither UNPROFOR’s rules of engagement precluding the use of force to achieve any of these objectives nor its size were altered. In February 1992, the circumstances in Bosnia were analogous to those in Croatia. With the secession of Croatia from Yugoslavia, Bosnia was left with the choice of remaining part of a Serb-dominated Yugoslavia or declaring independence. In a national referendum, boycotted by the Bosnian Serbs, 99 percent of the Muslim and Croat population voted for independence. The declaration of independence and subsequent global recognition of Bosnia represented a continued erosion of Serb preeminence in the former Yugoslavia and threatened the Serbian minority in Bosnia. In response, the Serb minority initiated a military offensive against Muslims that resulted in Bosnian Serbs overrunning 70 percent of Bosnia. The situation would further deteriorate in April 1993, when the Bosnian Croatian minority, backed by Croatia, joined the conflict. The resulting triangular conflict continued for the next three and a half years amid UN efforts, supported by NATO, toward containment and resolution. In April 1992, forty UNPROFOR military observers were sent to the city of Mostar, in southern Bosnia, on the premise that a cease-fire was imminent. In early May, however, the negotiations collapsed and fighting resumed. Declaring that the risk of life was unacceptable, the UN Secretary General ordered the UNPROFOR observer force to withdraw. The first Bush Administration offered moral and political support to the UN and European efforts in resolving the conflict, but made it clear they viewed Bosnia as a European issue and would not deploy American ground troops. The Administration’s position was strongly influenced by Defense Department assessments concluding that a meaningful military action would require 100,000 men and a public willingness to accept heavy casualties. Moreover, the operational circumstances were more reminiscent of Lebanon than the Persian Gulf and offered a poor scenario for the implementation of the AirLand Doctrine that had been so successful in the latter. From late spring through the fall 1992, international involvement in Bosnia increased without credible results. International consensus on the need for action was evident as the UNSC passed a series of resolutions isolating Yugoslavia, increasing humanitarian assistance, and re-deploying UN peacekeepers. After shells killed civilians in Sarajevo on May 30, the UNSC passed Resolution 757 imposing an economic embargo on Serbia and Montenegro and punishing them for their support of the Bosnian Serbs. In its first collective action since the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO’s foreign ministers announced that the Alliance was prepared to support peacekeeping activities including involvement in the maritime monitoring of the embargo.9 In July, UNPROFOR was re-introduced in 101

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Bosnia to support humanitarian deliveries using the Sarajevo airport and to supervise the concentration of warring parties’ heavy weapons in UNPROFOR controlled areas as stipulated in UNSC Resolution 758.10 As in Croatia, however, UNPROFOR’s assigned responsibilities continued to change requiring more resources than were available. In August, it was authorized to “use all measures necessary” to deliver humanitarian relief throughout Bosnia and to protect UN Higher Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) personnel and convoys of civilian detainees. In October, it was ordered to monitor compliance by all sides of the no fly zone established by UNSC Resolution 781. In November, the Secretary General contemplated having UNPROFOR provide border controls to stop the infiltration of weapons and personnel from Yugoslavia and Croatia but decided against the operation. It was decided that the force was not prepared to handle the mission and an incomplete operation would further “stain” the force’s credibility.11 In spite of these efforts, by the end of 1992, the situation remained anarchic. Bosnia was engulfed in war and the UN’s credibility was shaken. UNPROFOR had neither the military strength nor the UN mandate to achieve its mission. Its use of force was restricted solely to self-defense, which prevented UNPROFOR from carrying out its proscribed mission. Lacking both a UN mandate and sufficient armed forces, UNPROFOR needed to rely on the willingness of the warring parties to implement its military mission. As a result, both the Bosnian Muslim government and the Serbs blamed UNPROFOR for not being able to fulfill the UN mandate or to alter the existing circumstances. In January 1993, intense hostilities resumed in Croatia as Croatian forces captured the supposedly demilitarized Peruca Dam. In retaliation, Serb forces broke into the storage facilities in the Croatian UNPAs and stole heavy weapons. UNPROFOR also sustained direct attacks. All of the benefits accrued to the UN for reaching the cease-fire on April 6, 1993 was destroyed by UNPROFOR’s inability to defend the UNPAs. UNPROFOR’s ineffectiveness in Croatia negatively influenced its efforts in Bosnia as well. In January, the UN-sponsored Vance–Owen peace initiative was announced.12 Although tacitly supported by Russia and openly condoned by the EC, the United States characterized the plan as an UN–EC initiative and remained adamant in its refusal to commit American ground troops, particularly under the circumstances outlined. This was significant because the Vance–Owen plan required a military commitment that exceeded UNPROFOR’s capabilities. It required forces to be separated and returned to designated areas, border monitoring, demilitarization of Sarajevo, the opening of routes, and restoration of a civilian infrastructure outlined in the agreement. Recognizing UNPROFOR’s limitations, UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar initiated discussions with 102

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NATO in April on the insertion of a force, which was estimated to require 60,000 to 75,000 troops, to implement the UN’s policies. If NATO undertook the operation, authority would reside with the UN Security Council and financial expenses would be met collectively by UN member states.13 This stipulation guaranteed that the United States could not be convinced to participate, which immediately placed the United States at odds with its NATO allies. If the Alliance agreed to participate, could the United States remain on the sidelines without severely jeopardizing its prestige? The difficult decision was postponed as repeated rejection of the Plan by the Bosnian Serb “Assembly” and the deterioration of Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Muslim relations made implementation a moot point.14 In spite of the co-chairman’s continued effort, by May, the Vance–Owen initiative was dormant. Even as the Vance–Owen initiative was being explored, conflict in eastern Bosnia intensified. On March 13, the Serbs bombed the eastern Muslim enclave of Srebrenica. The UN responded with Security Council Resolution 816 authorizing the use of “all necessary measures” to ensure a total “no fly” ban over Bosnia. On April 12, NATO assumed responsibility of enforcing Operation Deny Flight.15 France, the Netherlands, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States provided aircraft. Turkey and Italy allowed sorties to be flown from NATO bases on their territory to augment carrier-based operations. Operation Deny Flight spread the responsibilities of the conflict more broadly and directly involved NATO military assets in the support of UNPROFOR. It also established an official liaison between UNPROFOR and NATO. The new alliance had little visible impact and the situation deteriorated into a humanitarian disaster. Ignoring UN and NATO threats of retaliation, Bosnian Serbs continued to attack cities in eastern Bosnia, including Srebrenica. As more Muslim refugees poured into Srebrenica, civilian casualties increased. UN relief efforts were also hampered by Serbian interference, further exacerbating already poor conditions. On April 16, UNSC Resolution 819 directly cited the Bosnian Serbs for deliberate interdiction with humanitarian relief efforts and reaffirmed UN opposition to “ethnic cleansing” and acquisition of territory by force and established Srebrenica as a demilitarized “safe area.” Enforcement of the Resolution would be the responsibility of UNPROFOR, and its force in Srebrenica was increased. The Resolution also reflected a broadening international consensus that Bosnian Serbs should be condemned as the perpetrators. In early May and again in early June, the Security Council passed subsequent UNSC Resolutions 824 and 836. The former added Sarajevo, Tuzla, Gorazde, and Bihac as “safe havens.” The latter expanded UNPROFOR’s mandate making it responsible for the protection of “safe havens,” including deterring attacks, monitoring cease-fires, and 103

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promoting the withdrawal of military and paramilitary units other than those of the Bosnian Muslims. It also authorized UNPROFOR to use all means necessary to conduct this operation including the use of selfdefense in response to bombardment, hindrance of movement, or armed incursion. Member states were asked to contribute forces to facilitate this change in responsibility. NATO would provide air cover for these operations. Implemented to prevent genocide, contain the conflict, and insure the supply of humanitarian matériel, the “safe haven” policy had broad reaching political ramifications. First, while demonstrating the UN’s resolve to protect the citizenry, it simultaneously exposed its military weakness. The UN lacked the military capabilities to adequately protect the “safe havens.” For example, with the exception of Sarajevo that had a detachment of 6,690 Ukrainian, Russian, Egyptian, and French troops, the other five “safe haven” areas had troop deployments that ranged from sixty-nine Ukrainians in Zepa to 1,244 Bangladeshis and Danes in Bihac. Srebrenica had approximately 400 Dutch troops, Tuzla 1,139 Norwegian and Jordanian troops and Gorazde 300 Ukrainians and British. These troops were responsible for protecting refugee and resident populations ranging from 30,000 in Zepa to 430,000 in Sarajevo and 446,000 in Tuzla.16 Moreover, although the UN saw the policy as an attempt at balancing the arms embargo, which more negatively affected the Bosnian government, the Bosnian Serbs interpreted it as a threat. Second, the “safe haven” policy raised the risks of the operation and intensified the debate between the United States and its European allies over the role that the former was willing to play in Bosnia. The Clinton Administration supported a more stringent policy and lobbied the allies to implement Clinton’s campaign policy of “Lift and Strike.”17 The allies, led by France and Great Britain, rejected the approach as being militarily ineffective and increasing the risk to its deployed forces. Lord Owen, espousing the traditional European position on the use of force, commented that increased use of force would undoubtedly further jeopardize peace. The Europeans also resented the United States throwing its political support behind military action when it was not sharing the military risks by deploying ground troops. In essence, the quintessential Cold War burden-sharing argument was reversed. The Europeans were shouldering the more risky military responsibilities while the United States was taking a contradictory political position that threatened to further erode military effectiveness by publicly exposing the allies’ differences. Third, the “safe haven” policy dramatically increased the risks for UNPROFOR and NATO forces. It marginalized UNPROFOR’s neutrality by differentiating the treatment of Bosnian government troops versus other forces, particularly Bosnian Serb forces, and committed it to a policy of deterrence for which it did not have the sufficient military force. 104

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UNPROFOR force commanders estimated that to implement “deterrence by force” would require 34,000 troops in Bosnia alone. At the time, the total UN deployment was 31,000 in Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia with a ceiling of 34,700.18 With questions emerging around who would provide additional forces and how would they be financed, burden shedding resulted. When the Clinton Administration supported the expansion of UNPROFOR, Congress quickly questioned whether an additional six month deployment at $87 million price tag was justified.19 As it evolved, the “safe haven” policy also raised NATO’s involvement. In April, the Alliance agreed to provide air support to the UN under the controversial Integrative Policy.20 Although the policy insured that actions would be collective and have international support, it also provided an excuse for inaction because of bureaucratic stagnation and lack of unanimity. Most critically, the Integrative Policy, while indicating that NATO’s actions were supporting the UN, directly linked NATO to successful resolution of the conflict thus putting its credibility at risk. Through the remainder of 1993, conflict between factions intensified, attacks on UNPROFOR rose, and a debate over operational control between the UN and NATO emerged as a point of contention. In May, the Croat–Muslim war re-ignited around Mostar. Croat forces cut the main supply routes into Bosnia from the Adriatic and initiated its own campaign of “ethnic cleansing” against the Muslims. UNPROFOR was given the responsibility of re-opening the supply lines. With the increasing conflict in western and southern Bosnia, the United States deployed 315 troops to Macedonia to reinforce the UNPROFOR contingent there. By March 1995, the American contingent had reached 540, a little more than half of the number authorized by the UN. Rather than indicating a greater commitment to direct involvement, the limited Macedonian deployment punctuated the limits of American willingness to be directly involved. By 1993, American foreign policy was caught in the midst of a struggle between realism and neo-liberalism. Much of the success of the Gulf War had dissipated and the United States was focusing on reducing responsibilities. Primary interests such as Russia, allies, trade, potential global or direct threats such as renewed Iraqi aggression in the Persian Gulf and regional concerns such as Haiti were competing for attention with demands for leadership, humanitarian operations, and creation of a new security order.21 Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that the American role in Bosnia was characterized by military burden shedding. In response to European cries for stronger leadership, Secretary of State Warren Christopher said the United States assessed crises as being either of national or of humanitarian interests. Intervention would occur mainly in the former. Bosnia was classified as the latter.22 Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Peter Tarnoff went further, describing the American 105

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“deferral to Europe” on Bosnia as a reflection of an international shift. While retaining interventionist capabilities, the American leadership role as a power broker was much reduced because of domestic economic weakness.23 Notwithstanding these comments, the United States retained its inability to relinquish control over events that frustrated its allies all the more. Meanwhile, mounting financial problems, increased attacks on UN convoys as well as UNPROFOR, and hostage taking of UNPROFOR personnel led the new Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, to consider abandoning the operation in June 1993. The Secretary General noted that the UN peacekeeping account was a paltry $1.26 million and $2.236 billion in assessments were unpaid. The United States’ unpaid share was $779 million.24 Recognizing the UN’s financial plight and NATO’s military expertise, the Secretary General admitted that the UN was prepared to turn the mission over to NATO if NATO assumed the costs and responsibility for the operation. The “UN flag must not become a flag of convenience,” Boutros Ghali warned.25 The proposal accentuated the Alliance’s problems. The United Kingdom expressed concern about financing the NATO operation. When Boutros Ghali recommended approaching Japan and Saudi Arabia for funding, the Alliance balked, saying that asking non-members for financial assistance sent an unacceptable message regarding the Alliance’s credibility. France was concerned that a NATO operation would have to be commanded and controlled by the United States and threatened to withdraw its contingent under such circumstances. The United States, while prepared to provide political leadership, still refused to deploy ground forces. Russia, fearing increased NATO influence in southern Europe, also objected to greater NATO involvement. As a result, Boutros Ghali’s proposal was rejected. In February 1994, the implementation of any plan guaranteeing the territorial integrity of Bosnia appeared slight. On the contrary, the Greater Serbia–Greater Croatia Agreement of March 1991 re-emerged as a possibility when Croatia elevated its direct involvement by invading Bosnia with 3,000–5,000 regular troops.26 Faced with a potential Serbo–Croatian alliance that threatened to wipe out the Bosnian Muslims, an already desperate situation completely engulfed UNPROFOR. Needing to rotate troops out of Srebrenica and to re-open the Tuzla airport, that had been closed by shelling, the UN authorized UNPROFOR to use offensive action if their rotation movements encountered Bosnian Serb resistance. NATO air support was requested. Two days of unidentified shelling of the Sarajevo marketplace killed sixty-eight civilians and wounded 160. In response, the UNSC authorized NATO airstrikes but no targets were identified. The shelling also prompted NATO’s Heads of State, meeting in Brussels, to issue an ultimatum, under which the Alliance was “deter106

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mined to eliminate obstacles to the accomplishment of the UNPROFOR mandate” and prepared to respond with air strikes to prevent the “strangulation of Sarajevo, safe areas, and other threatened areas.”27 Additionally, the ultimatum called for the withdrawal of all heavy weapons from around Sarajevo and placing them under UNPROFOR control. NATO’s ultimatum, although endorsed by all Alliance members, further exposed the Alliance’s differences. Germany supported the ultimatum but would not participate in its enforcement.28 The United States endorsed the deployment of an additional 3,500 UN troops but rejected the UN request for 10,000 American troops. It did, however, use its political leverage to encourage increased pro-Serb Russian activity that resulted in a cease-fire. Admitting that securing heavy weapons was close to their policy, the Russians contended that the threat of airstrikes was excessive and onesided as it only threatened the Bosnian Serbs. As a compromise, Moscow proposed that the Bosnian Serbs turn their weapons over to Russian forces and that Sarajevo be completely de-militarized. They also requested a UNSC meeting to discuss the state of affairs. Acquiescing to Russian demands, the Bosnian Serbs withdrew their weapons to NATO’s established perimeter and agreed to open Tuzla for humanitarian supplies. On February 23, a cease-fire agreement was reached and the UNSC enacted Resolution 900, calling on the parties to cooperate with UNPROFOR in its consolidation. The UN again requested additional troops and equipment be contributed by its members to monitor compliance. This request went unfulfilled. Although Russian willingness to work through the UN, rather than to proceed unilaterally, was evidence of its continued integration in the international community, the ceasefire was short-lived. On February 28, NATO shot down four Serbian jets violating the no fly zone. On March 12, Serbian forces attacked the “safe haven” of Gorazde. Although requesting air support, UNPROFOR did not authorize attacks. While this was occurring, the United States sent more contradictory messages. Clinton displayed political leadership by bringing Muslim and Croat representatives to Washington and, with the Russians, mediated a federation between them. The Framework Agreement and Outline of a Preliminary Agreement for Confederation, formally signed in Bonn on March 10, was the beginning of the process that would culminate in the Dayton Accords more than fifteen months later. The Administration also tacitly approved Croatia’s re-arming and the Bosnian Muslims purchasing arms from sympathetic Muslim states, including Iran. The implications of Muslim support went beyond arms sales as mercenaries from Iran and Afghanistan joined the Bosnian Muslim forces.29 Iranian involvement and the interjection of foreign fighters intensified the religious dimension of the conflict and raised concerns about the potential spread of Islamic 107

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fundamentalism in the Balkans, which became more prevalent with the emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The military message was no clearer. Within a week, the Administration vacillated between accommodation and confrontation. On April 4, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake gave a speech at Johns Hopkins University in which he abdicated responsibility to the UN, stressing that multilateralism, consensus, and unanimity were the key to pursuing action. Moreover, the United States dropped the “Lift and Strike” policy by renouncing the use of force. Lake’s position was based upon Defense Secretary William Perry’s and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili’s assessment that airstrikes around Gorazde would be ineffective because of the lack of meaningful target.30 On April 8, Lake reversed the Administration’s position and announced that the United States would use air power to protect “safe havens.” On April 10 and 11, NATO launched three strikes against the Serb forces around Gorazde. In the last one, a British plane was shot down. On April 22 further NATO strikes were authorized but then canceled when the situation stabilized and the Bosnian Serbs withdrew. The Gorazde confrontation directly involved the American military in combat, provided new impetus to diplomatic efforts, and caused a major UN re-evaluation of UNPROFOR’s general operations. By striking at the Serbs, NATO re-established some of its deterrent capability. Although American planes had been placed under UN tactical control for the operation, Richard Holbrooke made it clear that the United States would command its forces if they were involved: To whatever extent Americans are involved in the area or in any other way in Bosnia, we will not be limited or constrained by this insane “dual-key” system with the UN and NATO.31 Diplomatically, America, Russia, the UN and the EC renewed their efforts at a new cease-fire. After the rejection of four peace proposals, it was decided that intensified action was needed.32 A Contact Group composed of ministerial representation from the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, the EC, and Russia was created on April 25. On July 5, the Group submitted a proposed peace plan that allocated 51 percent of Bosnia to a Bosnian–Croatian Federation (i.e. Bosniac–Croat Federation) and 49 percent to the Bosnian Serb’s semi-autonomous Republika Srpska. Unless the involved parties could reach a compromise among themselves this plan was to be accepted as presented. While representing the most codified international solution yet, the means of enforcement remained vague. The Bosniac–Croat Federation, the Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia accepted it. Although pressured by Belgrade, the Bosnian Serbs rejected the pro108

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posal. By rejecting the internationally accepted proposal, the Bosnian Serbs established themselves as the recalcitrant party and alienated outside support. Angered by the response, Yugoslavia President Milosevic severed politico-economic ties and then closed his border isolating the Bosnian Serbs. Although this appeared to be a major step toward isolating the Bosnian Serbs, as the conflict proceeded, Milosevic’s commitment to Bosnian Serb isolation became more ambiguous. Moreover, the Contact Group’s plan still required a deterrent force. Effective enforcement was hindered by the UN’s assessment that UNPROFOR’s effectiveness was limited by the unwillingness of its members to contribute sufficient forces to meet the operation’s scope and that its credibility was all but destroyed.33 Although the UN had been successful in protecting civilians, the “safe area” operation had required more manpower than was available and had eroded neutrality by labeling one side the aggressor. The supervision and enforcement of the weapons’ exclusion zone was more equitable in its application but also required that UN troops be prepared to use force. The re-evaluation of UNPROFOR’s role contributed to mounting concerns regarding the effectiveness of UN-led collective action and members’ willingness to contribute to such operations. It also accentuated the differences between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The latter role was one for which the UN was unprepared. It had neither sufficient military forces nor the mandate to handle adversarial situations. The Contact Group’s mission also raised concerns regarding the political perception of a peace enforcement operation and its impact on participation. The higher risks and costs of peace enforcement made it more difficult to sell domestically. Furthermore, existing contributions to UNPROFOR had been made based upon a peacekeeping resolution, the redefinition of which would permit states to re-assess their commitments. This could lead to the entire operation unraveling. Finally, the Secretary General noted that stricter enforcement of exclusion zones or “safe areas” or lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnian government would change the nature of UN presence, create unacceptable risks for UNPROFOR, and increase the conflict.34 Cognizant of these concerns, the UN sought to re-establish itself as a peacekeeping force in a position paper presented by the Secretary General in January 1995. It stated that, first, UNPROFOR’s “safe haven” intention was to protect people and not territory. Second, UNPROFOR’s mission was to maintain neutrality and to have the “safe haven” policy complement not contradict the force’s original humanitarian mission. Third, UNPROFOR was instructed to finalize plans that permitted withdrawal on short notice if the conflict intensified. In addition to apparently contradicting UNSC Resolution 836 regarding UNPROFOR’s mandate, this reassessment also raised major questions about how UNPROFOR might be 109

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extricated. Only NATO and, primarily the United States, possessed sufficient power projection capabilities to cover a withdrawal under such potentially hostile circumstances. But whether the United States was willing to undertake such an operation remained unclear. The UN’s re-assessment forced NATO to clarify its military mission. NATO formulated a new request to the UN under which it would have greater latitude in the use of force and embark upon a policy of “deterrence by denial.”35 It also requested the identification of multiple targets, any of which could be chosen for attack, and the ability to use multiple strikes against single targets. Also, it advocated the elimination of advanced warnings of strikes. The UN refused the request. The UN’s refusal limited the Alliance’s action to “pinprick” assaults on minor military assets such as individual tanks that violated the exclusion zones and thus eroded the deterrent capacity of both organizations. In November 1994, circumstances in Bosnia continued to undermine the UN’s, and by association, NATO’s credibility. In addition, a schism between the United States and its European allies was causing friction in NATO. On November 3, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution, prompted by the United States and supported primarily by Islamic countries, asking for the arms embargo against Bosnia to be lifted. The Russians and Europeans abstained. On November 11, the United States’ Senate voted sixty-nine to twenty-nine to terminate American participation in enforcing the UN arms embargo against the Bosnian government including the sharing of intelligence on arms shipments. Actual discontinuation of American enforcement was predicated upon a number of events and allowed for presidential interference.36 The strong American response was prompted by a growing frustration over the UN’s handling of the crisis. On a broader scale, by siding with the Bosnian Muslims, the United States was attempting to limit or reduce the influence of radical Islamic states.37 The US action also implied that it might consider violating the embargo itself. American arms sales to the Bosnian government would increase Bosnian–Muslim military capability but also justify a Serbo– Russian alliance with unknown consequences.38 The American action was an unmistakable effrontery to the UN, a blow to Alliance solidarity, and potentially, an invitation for a broader war. More and better quality weapons, regardless of the source, increased the risks to UNPROFOR. Faced with rising risks, the European allies decided to assume the responsibility of maintaining the embargo without US participation. Their decision stood as a negative referendum on America’s role as a global leader and a strong endorsement of increased European acceptance of security responsibilities and NATO’s emerging CJTF program. As the arms embargo debate simmered, the war intensified in the northwestern corner of Bosnia as the Bosnian government and Croatia launched a combined offensive to end Serbian encirclement of the city of 110

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Bihac. Threatening to re-ignite the Croatian civil war, Serbs counterattacked from the Croatian region of Krajina. The use of napalm by Serbian planes from the Udbina airfields in Krajina increased the already mounting civilian casualties around Bihac and marked a military escalation in the war. On November 21, NATO responded with its strongest out-ofthe-area action to date. Thirty-nine planes from the United States, United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands attacked the Udbina airfields and Serbian surface-to-air (SAM) missile batteries that had fired at the NATO planes. For the first time, NATO was apparently willing to escalate its role in the conflict and to strike beyond the geographical confines of Bosnia. The day after NATO’s strike, the United States, still without ground forces in Bosnia, proposed that NATO carry out direct attacks on advancing Serbian forces around Bihac and pre-emptive strikes against Serb SAM batteries. It also advocated a “hot pursuit” doctrine that allowed NATO to chase planes into Croatia and stricter enforcement of the “no fly zone.” However, the European allies were not prepared to accept the expanded military role for fear of increased reprisals against UNPROFOR. Already, the airstrikes had resulted in UNPROFOR being shelled. NATO’s Bihac action eliminated any vestiges of Alliance neutrality and labeled the Serbs as the primary aggressors and hence targets for NATO’s reprisals.39 These actions were carried out in spite of Russian objections. While raising questions about Russia’s future actions in the conflict, they also effectively demonstrated Russia’s diminished international power. Militarily the decision’s impact was insignificant. Concerned about hitting civilians and UNPROFOR, additional NATO sorties, aimed at halting the Serbian advance, were ineffective. The Bihac “safe haven” collapsed and UN personnel were detained. Unable to reach consensus on a military response and faced with an apparent Bosnian–Serb fait accompli, the international community’s commitment to an internationally mediated solution was failing. On November 27, Defense Secretary William Perry announced: The Serbs have occupied 70 percent of the country. There is no prospect . . . , of the Muslims winning that back. . . . The Serbs are in control of the situation.40 With the collapse of the Bihac perimeter, new threats and risks confronted the international mission in Bosnia. The UN’s mission was becoming untenable. Its credibility had suffered another major setback in spite of the revised mission in the wake of Gorazde. It had little leverage with any of the warring parties and limited confidence to pursue new initiatives. Although more a private issue among Alliance members, NATO’s inability to protect Bihac had damaged its credibility as well. Senator Robert Dole suggested this was the collapse of NATO. To restore its prestige, the 111

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Alliance needed to move beyond “pinprick” attacks and respond more forcefully, regardless of the increased threat to the forces on the ground. NATO needed to cast off the veil of neutrality under which it had been operating. However, no one was prepared to initiate such a confrontational policy and diplomacy remained the primary effort. On November 28, the Contact Group announced it was prepared to mediate negotiations on a confederation between Bosnia and Yugoslavia. Faced with a breakdown in NATO unity, erosion of its prestige, and increasing pressure for the withdrawal of UNPROFOR, the Clinton Administration appeared prepared to sacrifice Bosnian territorial integrity for the sake of Alliance unity and containing the conflict.41 In a speech at Princeton University, on November 30, Anthony Lake stated that a confederation was not an outcome the United States supported but it would accept it. Lake went on to point out that it was “up to the parties to agree.” The rationale was that if UNPROFOR withdrew without a settlement, the war would undoubtedly escalate and probably expand. Without a European ground force to mitigate, there would be increased pressure on Yugoslavia to directly intervene.42 The prospects of a European withdrawal intensified negotiation efforts and fighting was temporarily halted with a four-month truce concluded between the Bosnian government and the Bosnian Serbs on December 31. In conjunction with the temporary cease-fire, efforts at a political solution were renewed by the Contract Group, who after a six-month hiatus, resumed discussions with the Bosnian Serbs. The new initiative indicated that it might be possible to amend the supposedly unamendable July 1994 proposal. The Serbs wanted control of Srebrenica and Gorazde as well as a portion of Sarajevo. The Bosnian government rejected any changes. The United States, defying UNSC Resolution 942 that prohibited contacts with the Bosnian Serbs until they accepted the July 1994 plan, opened talks with the Bosnian Serbs. Not only was American unilateralism again flouting the UN, but it was also sending a strong message to the Bosnian Serbs regarding the West’s lack of resolve. In the course of bilateral negotiations with the United States, the Bosnian Serbs demanded all of Sarajevo, Tuzla, and 50 percent of the territory.43 Finally, the EC sought to invigorate a French proposal for tripartite negotiation among Yugoslavia, Croatia, and Bosnia’s presidents. This plan, however, was doomed by the need to forcefully impose any agreement on the Bosnian Serbs, who were not included in the negotiations. Not surprisingly, all initiatives proved to be ineffective. The inability of the West or the world to speak with a single voice simply strengthened the Bosnian Serb resolve to seek a resolution by force. As the truce’s expiration date approached, heavy fighting resumed around Bihac. Again the UNSC sought to strengthen UNPROFOR by extending its mandate, in Resolution 982, until November 30 and restructuring it. Forces in Croatia 112

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and Macedonia were re-named the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation Croatia (UNCRO) and the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEF), respectively. The hope was to make UNPROFOR a more effective military force by changing its command structure. The impact was minimal. By April, fighting had spread to Tuzla, Gorazde and other areas. Serb forces began to shell Sarajevo again. In May, when the Serbians refused to withdraw heavy artillery from Sarajevo’s outskirts, NATO launched air attacks on the ammunition depot near Pale. The Serbs countered by bombarding Tuzla and seizing 400 peacekeepers. The WEU President, Sir Dudley Smith, appealed to all European members to increase their contributions to UNPROFOR on a scale equal to that of France and the United Kingdom. The plea went unfulfilled. On May 31, Boutros Ghali reported to the UNSC that four options existed with regard to UNPROFOR: the force could be withdrawn, which might well require significant military assistance from the United States; it could continue on its present course; its mandate could change to increase its use of force; or its mandate could be revised to carry out only realistic peacekeeping missions. The taking of UNPROFOR personnel as de facto prisoners, however, did prompt strong action from the European allies. On June 3, France convened a conference in Paris that included the fifteen defense ministers from the EC countries and NATO for the purpose of creating a rapid reaction force to protect UNPROFOR.44 Authorized by the UN, operational command was the responsibility of General Bernard Janvier, commander of UN forces in the former Yugoslavia, who, in turn, delegated authority to General Rupert Smith commander of the UN forces in Bosnia. Both Russia and China abstained on the UNSC resolution vote and no Russian troops joined the force. Certainly, Russia was not supportive of increased European military presence in the Balkans. However, it had few alternatives to offer. Although not participating directly in the rapid reaction force, the United States deployed the aircraft carrier Theodore Roosevelt to the Adriatic. The Clinton Administration also pledged $95 million to directly finance the force and to pay for supporting American equipment, airlift logistics, and intelligence. Symptomatic of the increasing battle between the Executive and Legislative branches, Congress refused to support the President’s funding request. Germany also assumed a more active role, sending nine German Tornado fighters and 1,000 troops to Italy. In a more significant change in Germany’s out-of-the-area policy, Germany committed the use of German troops, if they were needed, to cover UNPROFOR’s withdrawal. The Bundestag approved Germany’s involvement on July 7. The decision by the European NATO allies to organize and equip the rapid reaction force appeared to be a significant step in the Europeans 113

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assuming increased responsibility. German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel called it the last chance for a peacekeeping mission.45 It also was the first implementation of the CJTF agreement. The rapid reaction force, however, faced organizational, operational, and logistical problems that precluded it being ready in time to respond to the latest Serbian offensive against the “safe havens” of Srebrenica and Zepa in July. During this offensive, Serbian forces overran the UN’s “safe havens,” incarcerating and executing civilians. The collapse of safe areas marked the final destruction of the UN’s credibility and forced the international community to face the real atrocities of the Bosnian conflict. According to Kinkel, the conflict had a fundamentally new character.46 It also caused further dissension within the EC, the UN, and the Contact Group. Finally, the collapse in Srebrenica illustrated the UN’s unwillingness to accept the risks of military action. The Netherlands Institute for War Documentation (NIOD) report on Srebrenica concluded that, “Dutchbat had to keep the peace where there was no peace,” and there existed a “misplaced confidence” in the UN’s readiness to use airpower to protect Srebrenica.47 A French parliamentary report released in November 2001 reinforced the NIOD’s conclusion by contending France and Britain lacked the political will to intervene.48 As dissension increased, the urgency to resolve the conflict before support for multinational action completely disintegrated. At a meeting of the UNSC and EC representatives, the French questioned the purpose of UNPROFOR and submitted a motion to re-take the captured areas by force.49 Although Russian Foreign Minister Andre Kozyrev said that Russia would support a multinational force to protect “safe areas,” it joined the United Kingdom in opposing offensive action.50 The debate ended with an ambiguous resolution endorsing the use of military resources to restore the status quo but only recommending, rather than demanding, that this be accomplished force. Within the EC the debate on European withdrawal intensified. As with the UN discussions, the French favored using force with UN approval while the British sought to reevaluate the operation in totality. In the United States, the Republican Congress and the Democratic Administration clashed over the United States’ role. President Clinton supported committing up to 25,000 US troops to facilitate the withdrawal, provided they were not subject to the dual-key approval. Congressional leaders Robert Dole and Newt Gingrich, in a letter to Clinton, responded that Congress would not authorize troops or funds for such a risky mission. While others debated, NATO emerged as the single multinational capable of taking the lead. On July 21, The NATO members of the Contact Group issued an ultimatum threatening “continuous” airstrikes, regardless of Western hostages, if the Serbs attacked Gorazde. Units of the now deployed rapid reaction force supported by heavy artillery were moved to Sarajevo. Reciting the Serbian argument that the Bosnian 114

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government was using “safe areas” as staging grounds for attacks, Russia objected to the increased military action. Maintaining collective consensus demanded sensitivity to Russian objections, thus the Contact Group limited the ultimatum to Gorazde.51 Still, the ultimatum signaled much deeper NATO involvement and fundamentally changed the international response to the crisis. As was the case with the rapid reaction force’s deployment, the UN, under the orders of Secretary General Boutros Ghali, expressed willingness to significantly revise the dual-key command structure governing the use of force. Rather than consultation with the UN civilian representative prior to taking military action, the authority for authorizing action was placed with the commander of all UN forces in the former Yugoslavia, French General Bernard Janvier. He delegated authority for requesting close air support to British Lieutenant General Rupert Smith, UNPROFOR’s Bosnian commander. NATO operations remained under the authority of its commander in charge of alliance forces in the Balkans, Admiral Leighton Smith, and an American. Tactically and strategically the changes meant that military men were making decisions as to when and how to use force. Moreover, General Smith had commanded the First British Armored Division in the Persian Gulf and, unlike his predecessor, Sir Michael Rose, was respected by the United States and viewed as more disposed to the use of force. Finally, the ultimatum and the new decisionmaking structure provided the opportunity for meaningful recourse against Serbian aggression. Following a mortar attack on Sarajevo in late August, the meaning of the new policy became evident in Operation Deliberate Force. Implementing a coercive war doctrine, NATO sought to use military assets to force the Bosnian Serbs to comply with all UN conditions. Most of the NATO forces assigned to Operation Deny Flight with the exception of the Germans, who were still operating under restricted rules of engagement, participated in the operation. Operation Deliberate Force was the riskiest action undertaken by NATO or UN to date in the conflict. It was a direct commitment to using force to stop the fighting and to punish the Serbs rather than responding with ineffective retaliatory strikes. It promised either to establish an environment of peace or increased conflict. It also risked alienating Russia and Yugoslavia, which recently had become more cooperative. Through the early fall, the fighting continued but Operation Deliberate Force was having an impact. The Serbian resolve was weakening. The Croatians re-took Krajina. In the middle of September, the true military capabilities of the United States were felt for the first time as Tomahawk cruise missiles struck Serbian positions around Sarajevo. Following these attacks on September 14, the Serbs agreed to withdraw their heavy weapons and start cease-fire negotiations. Operation Deliberate Force was suspended to give negotiations a chance. At Majorca on 115

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September 22, EC members agreed to finance one-third of the $4 billion in development requested by Bosnia and to supply 25,000 troops to replace the existing UN forces.52 This was a meaningful step toward Europe’s institutionalizing its role in responsibility sharing. Finally in October, as the Bosnian government and its Croatian allies continued to pressure the Serbs, a cease-fire was implemented. The cease-fire agreement reached in November 1995, at Dayton Air Force Base in Ohio, re-established the critical role of NATO and American leadership in the international community. The agreement also demonstrated that a positive application of force remained. It left the UN and European Union pondering the limits of their roles and responsibilities. At Dayton, it was agreed that a new peacekeeping force numbering 60,000, the Implementation Force (IFOR), would be deployed to replace UNPROFOR. Command and control would reside with NATO, and the United States would commit 20,000 troops, initially for a period of one year. The country was divided into three zones of responsibility with the French, Americans, and British assuming leadership. UNSC Resolution 1031 authorized IFOR’s deployment on December 15, 1995. In January 1996, Russian forces joined IFOR under the “tactical control” of the American-commanded Multinational Brigade. According to President Clinton, American involvement reflected its leadership and commitment to humanitarianism, stability in central Europe, and “democracy, liberty and peace.” Clinton went on to outline the President’s role as one of matching demands of leadership to strategic interests and the ability to make a difference characterized as the ability to impact a situation with action but not a willingness to be a “world policeman.” Finally, he noted that Europe, alone, could not end this conflict.53 The speech established the justification for American involvement and subtly criticized European ineffectiveness. On December 6, the Bundestag formally approved German participation in IFOR by a vote of 543 to 107, indicating that Germany was prepared to accept increased international responsibilities.54 Reiterating its September commitment, the EC promised $1.3 billion through 1999 in development aid.55 The Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina was signed in Paris on December 12, 1995. It established a cessation of hostilities and divided Bosnia into two entities sharing a loose political confederation. The Accords incorporated the territorial integrity and international guarantees of the Vance–Owen plan but, reflecting the realities of the forces confronting one another on the ground, made greater concessions to both the Bosnian Croats and the Serbs. The legal integrity of Bosnia was maintained with Sarajevo as its capital. A semi-autonomous Serb republic, Republika Srpska, comprised of 49 percent of Bosnia, was created. Croatia’s national borders were secured and ties between the Bosnian Croats and Croatia proper were permitted. All parties were forced to submit to the inter116

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national peacekeeping force, IFOR, to assist in the implementation of territorial and military provisions of the agreement.56 The UN retained responsibility for the policing and humanitarian missions. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (formerly the CSCE) enjoyed expanded international responsibilities, which included supervising elections, monitoring human rights, and developing confidence-building measures. According to NATO’s Council of Foreign and Defense Ministers’ communiqué on December 5, 1995, Operation Joint Endeavor will attest to NATO’s capacity to fulfill its new mission of crisis management and peacekeeping. In addition to helping define a new role for the Alliance, the operation allowed NATO to re-establish some of it lost credibility. Although the Bosnia operation was being conducted in an environment of shared responsibility, the General Framework Agreement for Peace’s (GFAP) foundation and continued peace in Bosnia still rested upon IFOR. IFOR was immediately responsible for implementing the military aspects of the GFAP including separating the warring parties. On October 2, 1996, the UNSC, noting with satisfaction the results of the September 14, 1996 elections in Bosnia, terminated all sanctions against Yugoslavia. Notwithstanding, a continued military presence was needed to secure the peace. With IFOR’s one-year mandate due to expire in December 1996, NATO agreed to organize the Stabilization Force (SFOR), which would have a reduced military presence and focus on implementing the civilian portions of the Dayton Accords. The UNSC Resolution 1088 authorized SFOR as the legal successor to IFOR until June 1998. Subsequently, SFOR’s mandate has been extended but its deployment size has been reduced from its initial 32,000 troops that remained until 1999 to an estimated force of 7,000 by June 2004.57 Over its eight-year deployment SFOR has broadened the concept of burden-sharing in post-conflict reconstruction and succeeded at its basic mission of enhancing the security environment in Bosnia. As of March 2004, twenty-seven countries including sixteen NATO and eleven nonNATO members have contributed troops to the SFOR. SFOR’s broad undertaking represents expanded burden-sharing and has established an important precedent for similar operations such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq. Within Bosnia, SFOR’s legitimacy was bolstered by its ability to enforce GFAP and its willingness to expand its role. SFOR was given oversight of the demobilization of 300,000 Bosnian–Serb, Croat, and Muslim forces and the exchange of prisoners of war. Although not originally addressed in the GFAP, SFOR also assumed a role in the capturing of “war criminals.” From a security perspective, SFOR has been instrumental in the collection and disposal of armaments thus reducing the dangers of a sub-regional arms race.58 It also was able to maintain the peace when Nikola Popsalev, an extreme nationalist who supported Karadzic, was elected President of Republika Srpska in 1998. 117

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Furthermore, SFOR has supported and enhanced successes of other organizations. In support of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, it has implemented the procedures needed to repatriate displaced peoples. It also supported the OSCE in creating an environment conducive for national and municipal elections. SFOR also played a critical role in the OSCE’s confidence-building measures that resulted in the appointment of the first Bosnian defense minister, an important step in the demilitarization of Bosnia’s independent military forces and subsequently resulted in the first ethnically mixed defense exercise in April 2004. Finally, the lessons learned from the SFOR deployment will influence the planning and execution of future crisis management and peace enforcement missions.

Conflict in Kosovo While NATO and a myriad of international organization struggled to stabilize Bosnia, Kosovo managed to maintain an uneasy peace in spite of increasing Serb nationalist pressure. Kosovo, one of seven functional areas of the South Slav confederation established after World War I, is a “holy” land to the Serbs, who succumbed to Ottoman domination in 1389. In 1939, Serbs represented 39 percent of the Kosovo population. However, a high birthrate among the indigenous Albanian population, the wartime deportation of Serbs, and Tito’s policy of “no return” dramatically shifted the demographic balance in the favor of the ethnic Albanians. Harassment of the remaining Serbian population was commonplace until 1989. But as the parts of Yugoslavia sought independence and disintegrated into war, Slobodan Milosevic increased federal, or Serbian, control over Kosovo. He replaced Kosovar-Albanians with Serbs, disbanded the autonomous government, and ultimately revoked its semi-autonomous status within Yugoslavia. These actions ultimately eroded the legitimacy of Kosovar leader Ibrahim Rugova, who had advocated a Ghandian approach of civil disobedience and incited increased Albanian militancy embodied in The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Concerned with increasing ethnic conflict in Kosovo, President Bush issued a vague warning to Serbia not to attack ethnic Albanians in 1992. President Clinton reiterated the warning in 1993. However, little else was done. In February 1998, Serbian attacks reached the proportions of “ethnic cleansing” and a fully fledged conflict erupted between Serbian military and police and Albanian factions including the KLA, who sought independence for Kosovo. Up to 400,000 people were forced to leave their homes.59 Refugees fled to Albania and Montenegro, straining these countries’ social systems. Another humanitarian disaster was emerging in Europe. The Contact Group demanded that Milosevic make progress toward ending the conflict in four weeks or face sanctions. Milosevic 118

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ignored the ultimatum. In late March the European Union approved sanctions against Belgrade. Three days later, President Clinton declared that the United States would not commit ground troops to stop the growing genocide. Undeterred but unwilling to engage in a military campaign, the European Union issued the London Resolution that promoted Albanian autonomy within a unified Yugoslavia with full independence to be discussed later. Both sides rejected the proposal. Milosevic intensified his attacks, and ironically by the summer of 1998, blame had swung to ethnic Albanians.60 In reality, the Albanians appeared to be the easier target for international influence. International support for action against Yugoslavia was limited. First, Kosovo was a recognized part of Yugoslavia not a separate country like Bosnia. Thus, intervening in Kosovo meant violating state sovereignty. Second, Russia and China were concerned that by authorizing international intervention in Kosovo, they would be establishing a precedent in which human rights violations become a raison d’être for violating national sovereignty potentially curtailing their freedom of action in Chechnya and Tibet, respectively. Thus, they refused to support multilateral action. Third, even though President Clinton backpedaled away from his March no ground troops pronouncement by suggesting in May that all options should be considered, the European allies and the United States remained divided on the use of force. Finally, a domestically weakened President Clinton had insufficient support for a unilateral American operation. However, as the situation on the ground deteriorated, the risks of not responding increased. Reincarnating the traumas of World War II and more recently Rwanda, refugees streamed toward Albania and Montenegro. Faced with the prospect of Kosovo endangering NATO’s credibility and threatening to unravel its accomplishments in Bosnia, on October 13, 1998, NATO approved a plan for unilateral action if Serbia did not comply with its ultimatum.61 NATO’s threat was sufficient to get Milosevic to agree to withdraw forces from Kosovo. UN Security Council Resolution 1023 endorsed OSCE ground and NATO aerial surveillance missions to monitor compliance. NATO also deployed an extraction force to Macedonia in case the OSCE mission required assistance.62 Notwithstanding NATO and the OSCE’s efforts, the situation again deteriorated in early 1999. Again, the threat of NATO airstrikes resulted in renewed negotiations, this time at Rambouillet, France in February and again in March 1999. At these talks, the United States pressured the Albanians to accept the London Resolution. If the Albanians agreed to the autonomy compromise and the Serbs did not, NATO would strike the Serbs. Reluctantly, the Albanians agreed to compromise but the Serbs refused to sign. Aware of the deliberations that had occurred over the use of force in Bosnia, Milosevic ignored the threats. Instead, he intensified 119

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the Serbian offensive. Unable to achieve a diplomatic solution, NATO made good on its threat and on March 24, 1999, launched Operation Allied Force without UN authorization. The seventy-eight-day air campaign resulted in the destruction of Serbia, strained relations within NATO, and antagonized both Russia and China. Despite problems including an American air strike on the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade and on-going Franco-American disagreements over targeting and relentless bombing, the military campaign achieved its objective. Even with the Serbian withdrawal, criticism did not stop. Antagonists argued that the ethnic cleansing had not been stopped quickly enough and the Serbian withdrawal was attributable to eroding Russian support for Milosevic rather than NATO strikes. Regardless, by June military success was assured and the international community coalesced around the postconflict reconstruction. On June 10, the UNSC passed Resolution 1244 authorizing the creation of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to oversee stabilization and reconstruction. The NATO-led multinational Kosovo Force (KFOR) entered Kosovo on June 12 and provided security for the civilian relief efforts. A NATO Extraction Force also was deployed in Macedonia in case KFOR met stronger than anticipated opposition. Finally, a commitment to nation building was institutionalized in the Stability Pact that promised to reconstruct and democratize the Balkans. KFOR’s international composition was impressive. Although Germany had been hesitant to commit ground troops as recently as May, Berlin agreed to contribute significant forces to KFOR. This moved Germany from a peripheral role in Bosnia to a central one in Kosovo re-defining postWorld War II German foreign policy. Russia also agreed to participate in KFOR six days after its initial deployment. Russian troops initially circumvented KFOR and took the Pristina’s main airfield. However, direct conflict was avoided when British General Sir Michael Jackson refused to re-take the airfield by force in spite of orders from Supreme Allied Commander Wesley Clark to do so. The confrontation was resolved by having the Russian forces placed under American command and resulted in the implementation of NATO’s “red card” policy concerning non-alliance members. Since its deployment, KFOR has been able to reduce its presence while allowing civilian authorities to assume greater responsibility. Notwithstanding, the situation in Kosovo remains fragile. The Stability Pact is too broad to effect serious reforms. In particular, it has not been successful in creating strong state institutions. Indicative of the lack of governance has been the re-emergence of the KLA that KFOR claimed to have demilitarized in September 1999. The KLA has assumed much of the responsibility for Albanian security and continues to threaten stability in Kosovo and neighboring Macedonia. Kosovo also faces a serious demographic problem. Many Serbs left as the Yugoslav army withdrew. Additionally, a large percentage of the population is still refugees.63 This group 120

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provides a fertile ground for recruitment by the KLA and is not contributing to social development. Sporadic violence continues and threatens to re-ignite ethnic conflict. To date, the most serious outbreak of violence occurred in March 2004 and resulted in twenty-two dead and 400 wounded including ten KFOR soldiers. This episode resulted in an increase in the number of KFOR personnel. The question that remains for the Balkans is whether the multinational efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo have created an environment for peace or merely provided an interlude to war.

The public and private benefits of collective intervention in the Balkans In both cases, the incentives for collective action in Bosnia and Kosovo evolved as the nature of the conflict changed. In neither case were the reasons for intervention as clear as the moral incentive of opposing aggression that motivated action in the Persian Gulf. In fact, intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo could be seen as being contradictory to this foundation of international politics. The Bosnian and Kosovo conflicts could be considered intra-state conflict. Although acts against humanity consistently re-focused international attention on Bosnia and Kosovo, they did not incite a sufficient response from the United States, the UN, or the Europeans to end the conflicts. Only, when protecting UN and NATO credibility and avoiding regional instability became prime incentives were sufficient resources allocated. Regardless, international morality and commitment to democratic ideals, as incentives of collective action, were dealt a severe blow in Bosnia and Kosovo. The moral motivation of responding to the acquisition of territory by aggression or humanitarian need was tempered by high risks of failure, loss of life, and the lack of military capability. While the clarity between public and private benefits is not well defined in the Balkan case, incentives, while emerging from both public and private benefits, reflected greater levels of self-interest. There are four distinct collective threats that are attributed to the Balkan conflicts. First, the impact of continued destabilization in the volatile Balkan region and the potential that the conflict might spread to other areas was internationally recognized. The region has many ethnoterritorial disputes including Greece and Turkey, Albania and Yugoslavia, and Greece and Macedonia. For example, the Croatian offensive against the Serbian enclave in Krajina threatened to re-ignite a Serbo–Croatian conflict that would have likely drawn in neighboring states such as Albania, Macedonia, and even Hungary.64 Additionally expanding upon Huntington, “continued unrest in the Balkans potentially could fracture southern Europe along the politico-cultural divide previously marked by the Ottoman and Hapsburg Empires.”65 Bosnian and Albanian Muslim loyalties and identification rest with the broader Islamic community not 121

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with their patron, the United States. Evidence shows that the Muslims in both conflicts were supported by more extreme Muslim constituencies and even engaged foreign fighters. Continued conflict presents opportunities for the development of Islamic extremism in southern Europe and thus heightens the instability of the region and the exportation of terrorism elsewhere. Thus, reducing instability in the region becomes a public good. A second collective threat that prompted action in the Balkans was the humanitarian disaster that occurred. “Ethnic cleansing” remains a repulsive doctrine in the international community. The rape, torture, and mass executions of civilians exceeded the norms of international behavior. Civilian casualties caused by shelling of Sarajevo and other locations plus the exposure of Serbian atrocities in Srebrenica were the prelude to innumerable UNSC resolutions, the changing of UNPROFOR’s role and subsequently became the catalyst for Operation Deliberate Force. A similar progression of events occurred in Kosovo, where Milosevic’s refusal to heed international condemnation and warns ultimately resulted in the use of force. While human rights violations captured media attention and led to an increased use of force, the overwhelming refugee population was a more destabilizing consequence of the Balkan wars. In December 1991, the UN reported 500,000 displaced persons and “victims” requiring protection and assistance in the former Yugoslavia. By August 1992, the number had risen to 2.7 million requiring more than $1 billion in assistance. Six months later, March 1993, half of Bosnia’s population, an estimated 2.28 million, would be considered refugees. That number eventually reached 2.74 million, with an additional 800,000 and 647,000 in Croatia and Yugoslavia, respectively. In Kosovo, 500,000 Kosovars were displaced and at the start of NATO’s air campaign, it was estimated that 4,000 refugees were arriving at the Albanian border hourly.66 The strain placed upon humanitarian agencies providing basic necessities was immense. While the provision of food and financial assistance acted as stop gap measures, only peace could resolve the problem. The financial and social impact on social services and law enforcement operations in host countries trying to absorb displaced populations was also escalating. Only in 1997 did Germany, which accepted the largest number of Bosnian refugees (i.e. 320,000), begin repatriation in spite of objections from the Bosnians themselves.67 A third public good that acted as an incentive for states to assume the risks of participation was the preservation of the United Nations’ credibility. The UN’s effectiveness as a global mediator and peacekeeper was severely tested in Bosnia, and by many accounts it did not pass. Its ineffectiveness contributed to NATO’s non-sanctioned action in Kosovo and the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, which reflects a continued flaunting of the UN’s purpose. Notwithstanding, avoiding the erosion of the UN’s credibility remains an important public good. However, maintaining the 122

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credibility of the UN is not a pure public good either. An effective UN, able to assume international responsibilities, is essential to an America seeking to free its resources to conduct the war on terrorism and redistribute the burdens of nation building worldwide. Its efficacy also is critical to any nation interested in decreasing American influence in the management of international crises. Maintaining the credibility of the UN then becomes a private good. Fourth, the Balkans represented an opportunity for Europe to demonstrate its readiness to assume leadership and independence from the United States in responding to a regional crisis. It provided the opportunity for Europe, as a quasi-unified entity, to establish itself as an equal to the United States in international prestige. Bosnia was a practical test for the European Security and Defense Initiative and a unified security policy, as well as those new initiatives such as CJTF. However, its inability to effectively manage the crisis cast doubts upon the relevance of CJTF, WEU restructuring to meet new emerging threats, and European efforts to reach consensus on political and security issues. Kosovo offered a similar opportunity but simply displayed the gap between American and European military capability. Notwithstanding, in both operations a growing European acceptance of responsibility for world order has evolved. Whether considering Schroeder’s commitment of $5 to $6 billion annually to integrate the Balkans into the European community, the European allies’ commitments to KFOR, the European Force’s (EUFOR) assumption of responsibility for maintaining peace in Macedonia in March 2003, the Europeans are assuming greater responsibilities and accepting greater risks in securing southern Europe. As evident in the last example, defining pure public goods in the international arena is fraught with inconsistencies and contradictions. The ambiguities of differentiating between private and public goods is further complicated in collective environments such as those involving NATO or the Contact Group. While each of the benefits discussed above has private components, those private benefits are intrinsically linked to collective action, and thus, in many cases, the benefits or detriments to individual participants is negligible. On the contrary, one undisputed characteristic of private benefits is their direct link to self-interests and thus their high impact on individual states. It is at this point that the comparison between European involvement, as primarily a public good, and NATO and Contact Group involvement as private ones diverge. The postponement or even inability of Europe to reach consensus on a common defense effort has limited impact on its individual states’ ability to conduct foreign policy. On the contrary, failure by NATO or Contact Group to meet the challenges, posed by Bosnia or Kosovo, would have immediate and potentially long-term effects on each member’s foreign policy. NATO and the Contact Group are privileged groups whose actions serve the self-interests 123

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of their limited membership. Thus, maintenance of their prestige is a private good realized by its members and others upon whom the members bestow support or protection. This point becomes clearer when assessing the American reasons for becoming involved in both Bosnia and Kosovo. Secretary of State Madeline Albright justified US interests in Kosovo by explaining that “we went into Bosnia therefore we need to go into Kosovo.”68 In other words, reestablishing NATO’s military credibility and defining its new global role were critical incentives for the United States. In fact, these points were essential to the Alliance’s preservation.69 Even if the importance of the strategic security umbrella was diminished, the collapse of NATO’s security and consultative structure would undoubtedly increase feelings of threat among many states, while providing others with opportunities for aggrandizement. It also would severely weaken the United States’ tie to Europe. Finally, failure to restore its credibility and to define a new role provided significant ammunition for Alliance opponents on both sides of the Atlantic and, thus, conceivably could erode members’ willingness to accept the new obligations of Alliance membership and damage one of the primary goals of securing the Cold War victory through future expansion and the Partnership for Peace (PfP). NATO’s roles in the Balkans, nation building, maintaining stability in southeastern Europe, and forging working relationships with non-Alliance members and international institutions were key components in restoring its prestige and providing purpose in the post-Cold War. Such accomplishments emphasize the Alliance’s diversity and have re-defined the burdens that members are expected to accept. First, a continued military presence in Bosnia remains the only means of maintaining peace and establishing a security environment. Even an on-going NATO presence has not been sufficient to stop all conflict in Kosovo. Second, as experiences in Germany, Japan, and South Korea show, nation building not only requires a long-term commitment and leadership by a great power but also demands multilateralism. Third, there are financial needs to support military operations and re-construction that again must be shared by many. Fourth, the development and maintenance of international partnerships require political leadership and international prestige. These are the challenges that confronted NATO in the Balkans and will continue to do so in future peace enforcement situations. NATO was not the only group that benefited from Balkan stability. The Contact Group certainly had a mixed private and public agenda in both conflicts. The Contact Group’s formation resulted not from a direct threat to any member’s security but from a desire to contain conflict, implement peace, and retain or expand influence. In some respects, the Contact Group represented a new European “Security Council.” As such, participation enhanced each participant’s prestige. Thus involvement was 124

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important to Germany, the emerging “great power,” as well as Great Britain, France, and Russia who were seeking to maintain or re-establish their own positions in the international structure. For Moscow, Russian participation was critical. The Group’s initiatives were in a region of traditional Russian influence and interest. As a result of the implications for NATO expansion and instability in the various sections of the former Soviet Union, it was important that Moscow exert some influence in the way the international community set precedent in responding to emerging crises. Also, it offered Russia an opportunity to exert influence and even a level of independence in spite of its general international weakness. The benefits accrued to individual countries, while still complex, tended to be more easily identified. In all cases, the atrocities perpetrated against civilians and risks of regional instability were important incentives. In addition to these, France, for example, envisioned involvement as strengthening Europe’s defense and security identity while demonstrating that Europe was able to solve a European problem without American assistance. Both incentives reflected the traditional French attempts at limiting American influence. In retrospect, this did not occur, but instead Bosnia and more particularly Kosovo identified the limits of European capability. However, while embarrassed by Dutch misfeasance at Srebrenica and the technology gap exposed during the Operation Allied Force, the conflicts provided an impetus to expanded European responsibility sharing. Subtly, the conflicts have shifted the burden-sharing debate to one that calls for increased burden-sharing among Europeans to handle European situations. Other benefits of involvement, which accrued to France, were closer relations to its own increasing Muslim population and the Maghreb states. France sought to ensure that religion, in particular the Christian–Islamic confrontation, did not become a greater divisive factor in the conflict and thus create additional foreign and domestic problems. Humanitarianism and regional security were paramount catalysts to British involvement. Although less disposed to the issue of European defense credibility because of its “special relationship” with the United States, British involvement was still important to demonstrate its solidarity with its European partners as well as Washington. The British take great pride in making significant burden-sharing contributions to global security. The Balkans represented such an opportunity.70 Even though Germany bore partial responsibility for inciting the conflict as a result of its role as the primary advocate for international recognition of the independent states of the former Yugoslavia, self-interest dictated that Germany maintain a low profile early in the Bosnian conflict. As the conflict intensified, Germany vacillated between accepting responsibility and maintaining its politically safe post-World War II international posture of no out-of-the-area operations. Its unwillingness to assume a greater role in Bosnia was compounded by its historical role in the 125

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Balkans as well as the underestimated costs and demands of re-unification. Initially, these issues outweighed Germany’s desire for a new international role and its support for a meaningful European security structure. Although its European allies remained critical, Germany was able to use limited American involvement as an excuse to avoid greater German involvement. However, as the conflict’s broader implication became clear, German involvement was the only way to avoid irrevocable damage to their international prestige and to maintain a role in forming Europe’s new security structure. Although constrained from effective participation in the air campaign by domestic political divisions and its lack of power projection capability, Germany sought a leadership role in the KFOR deployment. Although initially declining to commit ground troops to KFOR in May 1999, the Bundestag subsequently approved a commitment of upwards to 5,000 troops, a number that eventually rose to over 6,000.71 Chancellor Schroeder also unveiled the so-called “Schroeder Plan” which committed $5 to $6 billion per year to integrate the Balkans into the European Community.72 German involvement in Kosovo was indicative of a new German prospective regarding its willingness to assume the risks and responsibility of global order. As the only superpower, the United States assumed a “wait-and-see” posture before becoming involved in both crises. From its onset, the Bosnian conflict was characterized by violations of human rights, the acquisition of territory by aggression, and interference with humanitarian efforts. While provoking a strong political response, these violations incited little interest in military action from Washington. Assessing European self-sufficiency in crisis management, as well as Moscow’s response to a crisis in its traditional sphere of influence was important to the United States.73 Under the Clinton Administration, the United States had committed itself to a policy of multilateralism and responsibility sharing. Ultimately, however, both crises required American leadership. The crises also provided a forum for the United States to express its displeasure with the UN. In Bosnia, the issue was the UN assessment process. In Kosovo, it was the UN’s inability to authorize the use of force. Both cases notified the world that the United States would not be its policeman. American support for UN peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations would be predicated upon a more discriminate choice of operations by the UN and reduced US dues to support these operations with the deficit being assumed by other industrialized states, particularly Germany and Japan. Such a re-assessment would reflect the economic realities and increasingly institutionalize peacekeeping.74 These issues were of sufficient interest to the United States to constrain its involvement. Europe’s inability to resolve either conflict resulted in an erosion of NATO’s credibility and increased pressure upon the United States to 126

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demonstrate greater leadership. In Bosnia, the Clinton Administration correctly sought to initially disassociate Bosnia from NATO; claiming it was not a test of NATO’s new role. It also sought to resolve emerging disputes among the allies by separating the events from the organization. Eventually, it became clear that the separation was impossible. With no other effective regional organization and the UN’s incapacity to control the situation, NATO was forced to assume a role in Bosnia. While defense of democratic ideals and humanitarianism were cited as important American interests in Bosnia, the real threat was the impact of the United States’ failure to honor its transatlantic commitment and continue to demonstrate global leadership.75 By the fall of 1995, NATO’s viability was being questioned and American leadership was needed to restore it. It was floundering under the constraints of an inadequate command structure, poor rules of engagement, and the ineffective use of resources. Continued American inaction would have caused an irreparable rift with the Alliance’s European component and ripped the Alliance apart. Thus, as with American non-involvement early in the conflict, the incentive to greater participation was predicated upon national interests. While credibility played an important role for the initiation of combat operations in Kosovo, the greatest success of the Kosovo campaign were the fact that the Alliance held together and the Europeans’ recognition that more burden-sharing, particularly in the improvement of their defense capabilities, was needed. In spite of disputes over the use of ground forces that pitted American aversion over casualties against the British belief that air attacks were ultimately not a viable means of coercive diplomacy, NATO emerged from Kosovo as a more viable force for improving stability in the twenty-first century. Moreover, the Europeans assumed a leadership role in KFOR while accepting the need to improve their deployability, interoperability, sustainability, and survivability.

Identification and distribution of burdens The burdens associated with the Balkan conflicts, as with other cases presented here, are broadly characterized as political, military, financial, and residual or continuous. For Bosnia, the majority of the burdens initially were assumed by the United Nations and to a lesser extent the European Union and NATO. When the UN and the European Union were unable to secure the situation, the United States emerged from its lethargy to assume leadership and a large part of the risk in ending hostilities in Bosnia. In the reconstruction phase, subsequent to Dayton Accords, responsibility sharing has again broadened. However, it remains unclear whether the division of labor among multiple multinational organizations has served Bosnia, as the task of establishing a unified multi-ethnic country remains incomplete. 127

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In Kosovo, Russia’s new independent foreign policy initially lobbied against multilateralism under UN auspices and the Western allies, constrained by leaders weakened by domestic problems, but was unable to reach unanimity on a plan of action. However, when NATO finally did final act, the United States assumed a majority of the burdens during the military operation. Notwithstanding, the subsequent stabilization phase has been characterized by increasing European involvement. In Bosnia, the political risks of the operation were greatly influenced by constantly evolving policies and actions seeking to implement UN resolutions. Unlike in the Persian Gulf, UN control of the operation was not limited to authorizing military action but also included strategic and tactical command over many operational facets including political negotiations, military operations, and humanitarian efforts. UNPROFOR was UN organized, commanded, and financed. The chain of command included the UN force commander who reported to the Secretary General’s civilian representative who was ultimately responsible to the Secretary General. Non-military operations also were directly linked to the UNSC and the Secretariat through the Secretary General’s special envoy and other UN representatives. The UN’s active participation established the operation’s international legitimacy. This broadened the number of participants by legitimizing involvement in the eyes of domestic populations. Without UN coordination, public opinion in many states would have not allowed involvement in such a threatening environment. As British Defense Minister Malcolm Rifkind stated, “If the consent is not there, the UN will not remain, . . . We [the British] are not going to wage a war.”76 The UN also played a leadership role in coordinating negotiations aimed at a political settlement of the conflict and maintaining political cohesion within the international community. Between September 25, 1991 and April 28, 1995, the UNSC enacted seventy-three resolutions directly relating to the situation in Yugoslavia and the President of the Security Council issued an additional seventy statements. These statements demonstrated the international community’s desire to settle the conflict. Also, UN leadership defused potential conflicts stemming from threats to traditional spheres of influence. This was of particular significance in the case of Russia, which strongly advocated UN involvement as a means of countering NATO engagement in the region. Within the framework of the European Community’s Conference on Yugoslavia, the UN also assumed broad responsibility for negotiating a settlement. Direct and consistent UN involvement started in October 1991 with the appointment of the Secretary General’s special envoy who was responsible for communication among the UN, the European Union and its standing committee on Yugoslavia, and the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe. EC and UN collaboration culminated in the 128

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Vance–Owen plan which ultimately only differed slightly from the Dayton Accords. Obviously, the European Union also played an active role. The Contact Group was a European initiative, which the United States reluctantly joined. The US Senate vote favoring involvement was fifty-one to fortynine. In spite of a high level of coordination, the European Union abrogated much of the leadership, necessary to resolve the conflict, to the UN. Rather than implementing a unified plan for dealing with the conflict, its most powerful members, France, Italy, Germany, and the United Kingdom, provided insufficient political or military support to execute the UN’s increasingly confrontational policies and resorted to quarreling among themselves over military policy and long-term commitment. From this perspective, Bosnia provides a glimpse of the future with regard to burden-sharing among the European Union membership. These efforts are representative of the most significant political burden assumed by the UN in the post-World War II period. In addition to demonstrating their commitment to resolving the conflict, it meant that these organizations assumed the risks of failing to achieve a settlement. As it became increasingly apparent that the multinational organizations were unable to implement a settlement or even protect territory and people, their credibility crumbled and their organizational viability was threatened. At this point, risks increased to individual countries. In order to protect UN credibility and re-affirm NATO importance, the United States, in particular, and others were prepared to accept an increasing share of the burdens later in the conflict. The United States was prepared to lead a multinational force when its interests were plain, the cause was right, the mission achievable, and the support was international.77 Although international support was high and the cause may have been right, the risks of being drawn into an unending quagmire in Bosnia were initially too high for the United States. Notwithstanding, the United States was not prepared to allow circumstances in Bosnia to evolve without its input. As a result, it sought to assert a high level of political control without equal military involvement. While damaging its international prestige, straddling the fence of applying political pressure and military non-involvement was still insufficient to convince Washington that greater involvement was warranted. The disintegration of NATO and the prospect of increased Islamic fundamentalism in southern Europe, however, did represent significant threats to national interest. As these became more real, the United States intensified diplomatic initiatives to establish an environment in which it would be domestically acceptable to deploy forces. The first was the Muslim–Croat agreement and later the Dayton Accords. Militarily, in conjunction with its NATO allies, it pressured the UN to change the rules of engagement and eventually led a military campaign against the Bosnian Serbs. In a review of 129

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subsequent data, it is evident that the American military commitments to Operations Deny Flight and Deliberate Force were substantial. From a political risk-sharing perspective, Kosovo reflected the Bosnian situation. Starting in 1992, the Bush Administration and subsequently the Clinton Administration issued warnings to Milosevic not to attack the ethnic Albanian population. Even though the civil disobedience approach of Ibrahim Rugova apparently postponed the need for a decision by the United States to take more forceful action, subsequent delays in taking action, even as Serbian suppression intensified, indicate that neither administration was willing to support their threats with credible force. The difference between Kosovo and Bosnia was that no other organization sought to take significant action either. While the international community pursued diplomatic and economic measures, there was limited enthusiasm for military action. The reasons for UN and European inaction may be attributed to a lack of confidence resulting from their military debacles in Bosnia, the continuing demands of stabilizing Bosnia, and the legal question surrounding intervention in what was characterized as an intra-state dispute. Ultimately, Milosevic’s continued flouting of diplomatic efforts while pursuing a policy of genocide raised the political risks to such a level that the individual Western countries and NATO needed to respond. Unlike Bosnia, NATO acted without a clear UN mandate concerning the use of military force. This lack of international legitimacy resulted in increased domestic pressure upon governments not to participate, led to significant disagreements within NATO, and alienated Russia and China, both of whom feared the future implications of resorting to armed intervention without international authorization. UN Security Council 1244, however, legitimized the post-conflict involvement. It established an environment of heightened responsibility sharing that included European leadership within KFOR and the extensive distribution of responsibilities for the postconflict reconstruction. The sharing of military burdens in the Balkans needs to be divided between military actions requiring the extensive use of force and those that may be characterized as peace-enforcement or peacekeeping operations. In both Bosnia and Kosovo, the military strike operations were predominantly handled by the United States while the European allies and others have provided the bulk of the post-conflict military forces. These circumstances reflect a shift in the burden-sharing debate from a military contributions focus to new political and functional concerns. Notwithstanding the Defense Capabilities Initiatives (DCI) that emerged from Europe’s limited capability in prosecuting the war in Kosovo, military contributions as the substance of the burden-sharing debate have diminished. Instead, burden-sharing has emerged as a political and functional debate in which multilateralism is required to provide political legitimacy to inter130

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ventions and the acceptance of functional responsibility by a large number of countries is important for the long-term demands of post-conflict reconstruction. Actions in Afghanistan and Iraq validate this point. The United States was quite capable of handling the combat military actions in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and in the former case even rejected military assistance as curtailing American freedom of action and effectiveness. However, the political and functional realities of both situations clearly illustrate the need for others to be meaningfully engaged. In Bosnia, the ineptitude of command and control destroyed the effectiveness of the European-led and manned UNPROFOR. Notwithstanding, the UN acted as a unifying force in legitimizing the actions and thus the distribution of the political burdens. Thirty-seven countries including nine EC members contributed personnel to the UN observer force, international police force, and UNPROFOR (Appendix A). France was the largest individual contributor to UNPROFOR with nearly 4,500 troops deployed. Jordan, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom each deployed more than 3,000 personnel. In addition to Pakistan and Jordan, other predominantly Islamic countries including Egypt, Malaysia, Bangladesh, and Turkey contributed more than 1,200 troops. A third group in which participation was high were the former communist eastern European countries and former states of the Soviet Union. Participation in UNPROFOR represented not only a contribution of military resources but also the acceptance of a high level of risk, which increased as the forces’ neutrality diminished and their roles changed. Between February 1992 and March 1994, UNPROFOR suffered 167 deaths and 924 casualties, which represented the largest loss of life in any peacekeeping operation.78 France lost fifty-four men and had 600 wounded, by far the majority of all casualties. British casualties included eighteen dead. Casualties, as well as the hostage taking of UNPROFOR personnel, contributed to continual discussions of withdrawing UNPROFOR, which would have entailed new and increased risks and responsibilities. Another major military burden assumed by the European allies was the creation of the rapid response force whose mission it was to protect other UNPROFOR units performing humanitarian and monitoring operations. The rapid response force received neither financial support nor troops from the United States. The former was supported by President Clinton but not approved by Congress. Approval of such funding would have placed the United States, a staunch critic of “check diplomacy,” in the position of being the financial participant only. The rapid reaction force represented the operationalization of NATO’s CJTF policy, which sought to provide the Europeans with a mechanism by which they could lead military operations that more directly affected their security. In the Bosnian conflict, the force had little impact and was removed to the less risky Croatian border when IFOR took over. However, even the creation of such 131

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a force represented an increase in the European acceptance of responsibility and marked a significant step toward defining a unified security policy. In the other two UN-coordinated and NATO-manned operations, Operation Sharp Guard and Operation Deny Flight, the United States and the allies each contributed in varying degrees. Operation Sharp Guard, initiated in June 1993, was comprised of forces from fourteen NATO countries and was an example of significant coordination between the WEU and NATO. German participation represented part of the gradual evolution of Germany’s more active role in international military operations, a role that was to intensify in Kosovo and later Afghanistan. The greatest controversy resulting from Sharp Guard occurred when the United States threatened to terminate its involvement. The reduction of American assistance from a resource perspective was minimal. The United States was only contributing a single ship and a few aircraft to the operation. However, the United States was sharing particularly sensitive intelligence with its allies on arms shipments, which was a service the United States reserved for extreme circumstances such as the Falkland War or the French intervention in Chad. In the case of maintaining the arms embargo, American information gathering was critical to the operation’s success and was an example of its unique defense capabilities. The United States’ arms embargo decision was one of many strategic differences that emerged between the United States and its European allies. It again raised questions concerning the American commitment to NATO as well as its respect for the UN. NATO’s decision to maintain the embargo, regardless of American participation, was further evidence of Europe’s maturation toward accepting common defense responsibilities. While Operation Sharp Guard measured European maturity and demonstrated international collectivity, it was neither militarily risky nor an overwhelming success. First, where active, the enforcers had a far greater defense capacity than their targets and could effectively control the flow of goods and arms. However, the effectiveness was limited because of the geography of the region, the level of forces committed, and the unity of objectives among those units imposing the embargo. For example, Iran, probably with American knowledge, made an unhindered arms delivery to Bosnia in 1994. Iran also had identified the war as a religious conflict in 1992 thus providing a stimulus for other Islamic states to become more involved. Saudi contributions, ostensibly humanitarian but widely acknowledged to be military, were nearly a billion dollars between 1992 and 1995. Further reports estimate that 80–90 percent of the $2 billion in arms that flowed into Bosnia went to the Muslims.79 In addition, American and European officials identified new unmonitored trade routes through Macedonia and Albania. These countries, already struggling economically, were reluctant to interfere with trade that provided income. Both Greek and Italian companies sought to profit from the embargo by 132

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selling goods, petroleum in particular, at a premium price in Yugoslavia. It is estimated that in nine months in 1994, Greek companies shipped nearly 22 million gallons of gas and diesel fuel to Albania for transportation on to Yugoslavia and Bosnia. Italian companies contributed another 14 million. In April 1995, Bulgaria and China urged to have the embargo lifted because it was threatening third-party countries. Bulgaria’s losses as a result of the embargo totaled $6.1 billion.80 The implication was that the embargoes’ already limited effectiveness was being further eroded as economic hardships experienced by Bosnia’s traditional trade partners were increased. More than anything, the embargo represented a good example of decreasing international interest in the conflict’s outcome or resolution. Although authorized by the UN, Operation Deny Flight had far greater risks. The availability of NATO air power, according to the WEU and the UN respectively, increased UNPROFOR’s bargaining power with regard to convoys and contributed to the “effective containment of warring factions’ air activities.”81 As a result, Deny Flight evolved into a combat mission as evident from the mission’s target list and the planes fired upon and lost. Deny Flight involved 4,500 personnel from twelve NATO countries in a two and a half year operation. In many respects, it was the epitome of US Secretary of Defense William Perry’s vision of the global distribution of burdens that stressed comparative advantage in sharing burdens. In spite of the accolades, its effectiveness was questioned because of the large number of violations that continued to occur. However, Deny Flight was one of the Coalition’s more proactive efforts at using force effectively. Table 4.1 lists the participants’ contributions to the operation. Belgium, Canada, and Denmark provided crews for the eight NATO E-3A early warning aircraft that supported this operation as well as Sharp Guard. The breadth of involvement demonstrates a high level of burdensharing, although the United States provided a preponderance of the air capability. While indicating the importance of American air capability to Table 4.1 Operation Deny Flight participant contributions Country

Planes

United States France United Kingdom Italy Netherlands Germany Spain Turkey Norway

100 33 28 20 15 14 11 8 2

Source: Operation Deny Flight Fact Sheet, NATO, 12/21/95.

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NATO, the relatively large American commitment to Deny Flight was not a substitute for ground troops. Indicative of increasing German participation was its contribution of fourteen Tornado fighters. The contributions of France, the United Kingdom, and Italy are not surprising considering both their regional interests and ancillary interests such as France’s commitment to a common defense policy. Dutch and Spanish contributions may be attributed to their commitments to WEU as well as NATO solidarity. Host nation support and over-flight permissions were also burdens. Base access reduces an operation’s geographic obstacles and can be critical to the strategic success of military operations. In the case of Bosnia, the operation’s high level of international legitimacy significantly reduced the spillover threats and risks of accepting these burdens. As a result, airbases in Italy, Germany, Greece, and the United Kingdom were used. Hungary and Austria provided over-flight permissions. The United States and France each deployed a carrier in the Adriatic to further strengthen the operation. As of December 20, 1995, Operation Deny Flight had flown 23,021 sorties aimed at air interdiction over Bosnia, 27,077 close support and strike missions, and 29,158 sorties flown by early warning aircraft, reconnaissance flights, and air tankers.82 The forces were involved in providing air support on a number of occasions to UNPROFOR, attacking the Serbian ammunition dump at Pale, the Serb SAM site at Otoka, Serbian armor around Sarajevo, and participated in one air-to-air combat mission. France and Spain had aircraft damaged, while the United States and United Kingdom both lost aircraft. No pilots were lost in the operation. In review, the operation’s effectiveness was dubious. Although able to limit air operations over Bosnia, its military impact was limited. The region’s topography as well as the operational controls precluded air power from being used to dramatically alter circumstances on the ground. Deny Flight increased operational risks, however. While representing a highly coordinated operation, Deny Flight also contributed to mission creep, eroding UN and NATO neutrality. It also heightened the latter’s participation thus increasing the risk to NATO’s credibility and amplified the military risk to ground forces. Both situations intensified the American–European disagreement. Of all military operations in Bosnia, Operation Deliberate Force, aimed at using force to compel the Serbs to abide by UN resolutions, altered the operational burdens and increased the risks of involvement. It was a military operation and encompassed the associated measurements of mission success, defense resources allocated, casualties and loss of matériel, and the highly politicized risks such as mission failure, splitting the Coalition, and negative responses by the Serbs. These political risks were of particular significance. NATO, with its military effectiveness already being ques134

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tioned, could ill afford another ineffective military operation and the success of Deliberate Force was far from certain. The Russians’ response to overt NATO military action against the Serbs remained questionable. Although the possibility of a military response was practically nonexistent, increased Russian support for the Serbs could change the complexion of the war particularly if Moscow decided to provide arms or if Russian volunteers sided with the Serbs. Moreover, high casualties or loss of matériel could cause the international Coalition to disintegrate, jeopardizing all international efforts. In addition, there was no guarantee that military pressure upon the Serbs would force compliance. In conclusion, the operation was a success. It demonstrated international commitment both to maintaining the UN’s reputation and to settling the conflict. It reestablished much of NATO’s credibility and illustrated how it might effectively be involved in international crises. Table 4.2 shows the composition of the NATO forces (fighters, bombers, and attack planes) dedicated to Operation Deliberate Force. Operation Deliberate Force reflects the persistent reality of Western military burden-sharing – if the United States is not involved neither NATO nor the WEU is prepared to assume significant responsibilities. The United States provided more than 50 percent of the aircraft used in Deliberate Force. As compared to the less risky Deny Flight, NATO members with the exception of Turkey reduced their commitment to Deliberate Force, a combat mission. The most frequent explanations for defections by other members are constitutional restrictions on offensive action, the lack of effective capabilities to undertake the missions, and concern over negative domestic opinion. Germany, abiding by restrictions on offensive action by its armed forces, did not participate. The operation was a NATO function and therefore precluded non-members from participating. Even without structurally or legally imposed restrictions, it is highly unlikely that Russia would have contributed forces toward to an offensive mission against the Serbs.

Table 4.2 NATO members’ contributions to Operation Deliberate Force Countries

Aircraft

United States France United Kingdom Netherlands Italy Spain Turkey

100 22 18 9 8 8 8

Source: Operation Deliberate Force Fact Sheet, NATO, 12/21/95.

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Kosovo further confirmed that burden-sharing in the new international environment was transformed into exercise for establishing political legitimacy for military intervention and functional responsibility for postconflict reconstruction. In Kosovo, the collapse of the Rambouillet negotiations eliminated the possibility of a political settlement and left NATO with no option but war. NATO, however, faced two problems with a traditional military operation. First, there was limited European support for ground war, and thus the risk of significant casualties among Coalition forces needed to be minimized. Second, civilian casualties and collateral damage had to be lessened. This was essential to maintaining domestic support for military action within the Alliance, to ensuring Russian neutrality, however, grudging that may be, and finally to gaining international authorization for the post-conflict operations. As a result of these restrictions, a disproportionate amount of the burdens for the military campaign in Kosovo were assumed by the United States. Of the 1,000 planes deployed by NATO, 769 were American. The United States flew 60 percent of the 35,000 sorties and seven of the eight ships that launched cruise missiles were American.83 Only the United States had the precision-guided munitions and satellite targeting capabilities to pinpoint attacks. Moreover, American stealth technology reduced the risk to pilots. No planes were lost during the operation. Further, only the United States possessed the aerial re-fueling capabilities that permitted the execution of the policy of “gradual escalation.”84 As the campaign escalated to include increasingly damaging attacks on Serbia, the need to achieve the objective of Serbian withdrawal overrode minimizing collateral damage. As happens once war has started, achieving the political objective took precedent over unintended destruction. Notwithstanding, the military action succeeded in forcing the Serbian forces to withdraw, saved NATO’s credibility, ultimately stopped the ethnic cleansing, and resulted in no NATO casualties. Whether basing his comments more on the political ramifications of American unilateralism rather than European military contributions to Operational Allied Force, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Henry Shelton did recognize that the United States could not have handled Operation Allied Force alone. In the context of the Balkans, the greatest responsibility for global order is the residual or continuous burdens subsequent to the military operations. Although the world eventually orchestrated responses to the unprovoked aggression and subsequent humanitarian disasters, it also assumed the residual responsibilities of maintaining security and creating a civil society. These responsibilities require financial resources for reconstruction and the repatriation of refugees, persecution of war criminals, and the creation of a civilian infrastructure designed to build and manage a civil society. In Bosnia, the IFOR and SFOR deployments, which assumed both mili136

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tary and civilian operations, were critical in assuming these responsibilities. They also represented broad burden-sharing. The United States deployed 20,000 troops to Bosnia and had an additional 12,000 supporting forces in the region as part of the IFOR operation.85 Eighty-three percent of IFOR’s total manpower, illustrated in Appendix B, came from NATO countries. It also marked a significant US commitment to NATO, which had been missing during most of the conflict. Another measure of willingness to accept risk is the geographic region of deployment assigned to participants. IFOR reflects the continued importance of American leadership to maintaining peace. The United States took up positions in the northeast bordering Croatia and Serbia and included Srebrenica and Tuzla. France deployed in the southeast, which included Sarajevo and Mostar and also bordered on Yugoslavia. The British contingent had the central command around Banja Luka and did not border on Yugoslavia but did border Croatia both in the north and in the south. The European Rapid Reaction Force was moved to the west around Bihac. These deployments have remained consistent from a British, French, and US perspective during the Stabilization Force (SFOR) operation. Bosnia is representative of the international community’s willingness to accept the long-term deployment responsibilities of nation building. The demonstration of great power commitment to extension of a time frame for a military presence was essential to continued peace in the region. In accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1088, SFOR was organized as a transition from IFOR and initiated Operation Joint Guard on December 20, 1996. Initially SFOR was comprised of 32,000 troops and was responsible for contributing to a secure environment and consolidating peace by deterring and halting hostilities.86 A critical commitment to SFOR was made when NATO, including the United States, extended its deployment until June 1998 and has continued to do so. Although the United States firmly believes that peace cannot be guaranteed through continued military presence, it decided not to again break with its NATO allies and withdraw its force unilaterally.87 If it had, the French, who viewed this as a NATO operation requiring a high level of participation, threatened to withdraw their forces as well. SFOR’s success can be measured in its ability to consistently enhance the security environment and thus reduce its presence in Bosnia. Moreover, force deployments in the designated sectors indicate an increase in burden-sharing among the participants. As the drawdown of SFOR troops has occurred, the Multinational Brigade North (MNB-N), the sector headed by the United States, now has the fewest number of troops totaling approximately 2,700. Multinational Brigade Southeast, the main French region, and Multinational Brigade Northwest, have 4,200 and 3,400 troops, respectively.88 Moreover, twenty-nine states are now contributing forces to SFOR, which has a total strength of 11,900. The significant reduction from 137

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the original 60,000 deployed in December 1995 is illustrative of SFOR’s success. By 1999, SFOR was nearly half its original strength and will be reduced to 7,000 in June 2004.89 Finally, NATO and the EU continue to negotiate the replacement of SFOR with a European force that would be the EU’s second peacekeeping operation.90 This initiative will intensify the debate within the EU over sharing the burdens of intervention and reconstruction, however, it also is indicative of the progress made in the European acceptance of responsibility for its security. Critical to reconstruction is the development of a civil structure to manage and secure the country. Two critical processes are needed. First, independent military forces need to be disarmed or integrated into a national civilian controlled military. In Bosnia, the progress, although slow, is occurring. However, it is still too early to judge the ultimate success of the military integration in Bosnia. Whether regional forces accept central authority remains to be seen. In Kosovo, this process is far from complete as evident from the 2004 clashes in Mitrovica. A second important initiative is the prosecution of war criminals. Without an indictment of war criminals by The Hague, reconciliation is not possible.91 IFOR rejected any role in searching for or detaining suspected criminals. Instead, this responsibility was left to an ill-prepared UN coordinated International Police Task Force (IPTF). The IPTF was established to stabilize society, facilitate elections, and arrest war criminals. As a result of different opinions and practices regarding law enforcement among the contributing states, it was weak and lacked unity in command and standardized procedures and operations.92 Ultimately SFOR’s responsibilities were expanded to include this delicate but necessary task. Although Radovan Karadzic, the former leader of Republika Srpska, and the Serbian General Ratko Mladic, both of whom were believed to be responsible for “ethnic cleansing” have not yet been captured, the apprehending and prosecuting of war criminals should be considered a success. Other military actions undertaken by SFOR include clearing mines, arms control efforts, and confidence-building measures. Clearing mines that pose a threat to civilians, humanitarian operations, and military forces have been assigned to the warring parties. This process promises to be slow and its effectiveness remains unclear. Arms control and confidencebuilding measures, such as information sharing among parties on military issues and commitment to arms reductions, also have been implemented. Significant among these was SFOR’s ability to maintain unity with the Bosnian–Croat Federation by deterring the HDZ’s, the Bosnian Croat nationalist party, efforts at disrupting the creation of a new Bosnian government and possible secession from the federation in 2001. A more risky initiative has been the efforts at establishing military equality, which includes a proposed $800 million training and arming of 138

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the Muslim–Croat Federation Army. While the goal was to create a deterrent force, the development of the Federation Army counters arms reduction efforts. The United States has contributed arms and communication equipment totaling $100 million. Turkey has provided $2 million in training.93 These activities have been opposed by most of the allies and represent a level of global irresponsibility. Additional weapon acquisitions have been financed in the amount of $140 million by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, and Malaysia, which introduces a religious element to military development. The possibility of religious incited animosities continues to be a concern as there are more than 200 Iranian revolutionaries providing training in terrorist operations and creating “Islamist brigades.”94 Recent events seem to indicate that the control of defense forces may be stabilizing but it remains to be seen the extent to which actual integration among military and security services occurs and more importantly how effective civilian control is over both organizations. Post-conflict stabilization has been no less troublesome in Kosovo. The UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) assumed administrative responsibility for the international presence in Kosovo in June 1999. No civil administrative structure existed. There was a significant refugee problem. And, someone needed to ensure the Yugoslav army’s compliance with the Military Technical Agreement, which “synchronized” the withdrawal of Serb forces with KFOR deployment, and the demilitarization of the KLA. KFOR’s initial ground force deployment was nearly 50,000 troops including tanks. Thirteen non-NATO countries including Russia participated. The United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy each assumed command of one of the multinational brigades. The KFOR commander was Lt General Jackson who reported to the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR), General Wesley Clark. Table 4.3 provides a summary of KFOR contributions as of October 2001. Most significant was the substantial contribution by France, Germany, Italy, and the UK. Additionally Spain, Greece, and the Netherlands also displayed a willingness to accept the responsibilities for stabilizing and rebuilding Kosovo. The United States provided only 16 percent of the troops for KFOR. In addition, Italy, France and Spain assumed leading roles in functions such as policing. Finally, the EU’s economic assistance, $671 million in 1999 and $704 million in 2000, has been substantially more than the United States, which has only accounted for 16 percent of the total economic assistance.95 Thus, Kosovo is indicative of a high level of burdensharing. KFOR, which provided security for the UNMIK, has been recognized as NATO’s largest and most successful operation.96 Regardless, contributions, particularly of troops, have not been made without controversy. In March 2002, German Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping sought to “significantly” reduce German participation in the 139

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Table 4.3 KFOR contributions Country

Personnel

Belgium Canada Czech Republicb Denmark France Finlanda Germany Greece Hungaryb Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Norway Polandb Portugal Spain Turkey UK US

800 800 175 900 7,300 796 4,918 1,670 324 4,500 26 1,456 980 N/A 295 1,200 940 3,900 5,300

Compilation Source: www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/nations/ default.htm 4/21/00 and 10/01. Notes a Non-NATO member. b Non-NATO but PfP member.

Balkans in order to concentrate more heavily on the war on terrorism.97 With 6,000 troops in Bosnia and Kosovo, Germany was being strained to meet new commitments in Afghanistan. The German circumstances as well as the military campaign demonstrate the continuing lack of sufficient military capabilities among the Europeans and supported the point made by Scharping in 1999 that the problem with NATO was not too much America but not enough Europe. The Defense Capabilities Initiative, which was launched in April 1999 as a result of the Kosovo campaign, has sought to close the gap capability between the Europeans and the Americans but also has invigorated a burden-sharing debate within the EU. Finally, Kosovo demonstrated improvements in the political burdensharing or the willingness to accept responsibilities for global order. Although criticized for its delay in taking military action, NATO and subsequently UN actions succeeded in containing the conflict, erased some of the European embarrassment caused by blatant inaction in Bosnia, and reengaged Russia. Kosovo has been a relatively successful example of implementing the “Holbrooke Doctrine” that combines diplomacy with the threat of force. 140

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Conclusions Chaos in Bosnia and Kosovo from 1992 to the present provides a laboratory for gathering evidence about the ends, ways and means that different multilateral institutions support collective security and conflict settlement. When a number of institutions have interests and an active role in a crisis, the lack of congruity among their objectives or capabilities becomes an important “driver” of political and military outcomes. Five multilateral institutions of varying size and experiences continue to play military, humanitarian, and political roles in Bosnia and four do so in Kosovo. Their strengths, weaknesses, and unique organizational cultures caused inter-institutional conflict that influenced operational effectiveness. The lack of coordination sent ambiguous messages to the warring parties and failed to resolve the conflict. However, when unity of command was established in the form of NATO, both conflicts were brought to a relatively rapid conclusion. Then, the burdens of stabilization and reconstruction could be more easily distributed and the post-conflict era has witnessed increased compatibility among the institutions. In Bosnia, the political authority initially rested with the UN. However, the UN failed to approach the operation in the proper context. Bosnia was a peace enforcement operation not a peacekeeping one. Inexperience in the former contributed to mission creep that forced participants to decide between assuming increased burdens in order to implement UN policies and protect its credibility or to remain neutral while the UN’s credibility crumbled. Denial policies, such as protecting safe havens and maintaining no fly zones, require effective military deterrence and as result have military ramifications. The UN’s command of the operation was also contradictory. In some circumstances, the UN membership was unwilling to provide sufficient forces and the UN was unable to coerce more. In other circumstances, the UN General Secretary’s staff was not prepared to authorize the means necessary to carry out the mission or met with opposition from those countries who were concerned about the risks to their deployed forces. As a result, the UN became engulfed in a conflict that it was unable to control. The erosion of its credibility and neutrality increased the risk to deployed forces, which proceeded to undermine incentives for increased participation. Furthermore, the added risks and casualties sparked public debates in European capitals about complete withdrawal. These debates encouraged the Bosnian Serbs to believe that intensified actions against UN forces would hasten their departure and hence contribute to Serbian freedom of action and eventual victory. As a result of its experience in Bosnia, the UN hesitated to deploy forces in Kosovo. Instead, it abrogated much of the initial responsibility to NATO and the EU but assumed a more active role in the post-conflict 141

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stages of the crisis. This latter role apparently is one that the UN is well positioned to handle. Although characterized as a European problem, neither the EC nor the WEU were prepared to assume broad leadership responsibilities in Bosnia. The EC played an important role in establishing a framework for negotiations but remained primarily a forum for intra-European discussion. It did not initiate an overarching leadership or policy to coordinate European action in the Balkans. Moreover, it had no military with which to enforce a broader policy. In Bosnia, the WEU, a smaller and more focused organization, did provide some military direction but gradually became marginalized. It provided a unified command for the European component of UNPROFOR as well as initiating an arms embargo enforcement. The WEU also demonstrated resolve as a component of NATO and accepted responsibility for enforcing the embargo even as the United States was contemplating withdrawing. However, the WEU’s small steps toward establishing a more defined European security identity were overshadowed by its inability, as the prime military organization and component of UNPROFOR, to stop hostilities and facilitate UN actions. This failure created doubts regarding the WEU’s usefulness and ability to make a contribution to European security.98 Moreover, the WEU abrogated most political responsibility to the EC, which gradually marginalized its military role. In their 1995 ministerial meeting in Lisbon, the WEU ministers’ statement on Yugoslavia made no reference to a WEU role in the conflict. In the final analysis, Bosnia, the WEU’s most significant military action, resulted in the organization’s demise. In the wake of Bosnia, the WEU ceased to exist as the Europeans pursued a new avenue toward military autonomy under the auspices of the European Security and Defense Initiative. The fourth organization, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), has a membership second in size only to the UN. Its broad membership allows the OSCE to establish a level of credibility as a mediator. Although it lacked an operational structure that would have permitted the administration of many tasks, the OSCE performed well in the reconstruction of Bosnia and Kosovo. Seeking an identity in the postCold War, the OSCE acted as a broad forum for consultation and coordination of multilateral operations, such as the arms embargo. It played a critical role in the integration of Russia as well as other east European countries in the Bosnian operation. The OSCE continues to play an important role in supervising elections, monitoring human rights, and confidence-building measures. NATO, the fifth organization, played, for the first time, a subordinate role to the UN for much of the early conflict in Bosnia. This caused controversy among its membership. The organization struggled both with its post-Cold War confidence and defining its role. It operated in a new inter142

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national environment that included its first out-of-the-area operation, its first combat ground operation, and its first joint operation with members of the PfP. Under UN command, in Bosnia NATO provided the forces for Operations Sharp Guard, Deny Flight, and ultimately Deliberate Force. It also was responsible for planning contingencies around a potential UNPROFOR withdrawal. Part of NATO’s subordinate role resulted from unclear policies governing out-of-the-area operations and reflected the Alliance’s lack of confidence in defining its post-Cold War role.99 The result of its abrogation was an ill-defined military plan. This was not corrected until it assumed responsibility for supporting UNPROFOR and, most specifically, lifting the siege around Sarajevo. NATO’s strengths prior to Dayton were in recognizing the necessity of force as part of deterrence and its ability to sustain military pressure on the combatants. In the aftermath of the Dayton Peace Accord, NATO defined its international responsibilities with greater clarity and effect. Operation Joint Endeavor (IFOR) and Operation Joint Guard (SFOR) demonstrate a concrete level of responsibility sharing in peace enforcement. They also indicate that NATO resources may be lent to others. In Kosovo, NATO assumed a leadership role acting without explicit UN approval. The Kosovo operation proved that the Alliance remains a viable institution for candid transatlantic interaction. In spite of caustic disagreements, it emerged from Kosovo stronger and to a great extent transformed and prepared to assume new responsibilities for global order. Although engaged in Bosnia, the PfP was a fledging organization. By the time of the Kosovo crisis, the PfP had had five years to improve its processes. The PfP provided a mechanism for the eastern European countries to more thoroughly participate in the post-conflict governance of Kosovo, further isolating Milosevic and increasing the unity of east and west Europe. The Alliance’s primary role in these operations established its postCold War role and proved its “enduring value.”100 It succeeded in stopping the killing and guaranteed a period of time in which peace would exist.101 NATO collaboration with the east Europeans under the Partnership for Peace made it clear that the former Soviet bloc could provide indispensable contributions to European security and beyond. Finally, NATO involvement with strong American presence re-affirmed the transatlantic commitment. In summation, Kosovo and Bosnia yielded a number of “lessons learned” about the potential for success in multinational peace operations, as well as leading to important insights about the inter-allied distribution of burdens in the form of costs and risks. In the Balkans, the Europeans accepted a greater share of the responsibility for handling their own security concerns. The wars, after all, were a greater threat to them. However, they demonstrated a lack of military capabilities as well as political unity 143

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and will to enforce peace. Although the United States shirked leadership for three years in Bosnia and delayed forceful action in Kosovo, it remains evident that American political and military power are essential elements for maintaining international stability. Bosnia and Kosovo exposed the limitations of the UN and delineated the different burdens of peace enforcement and peacekeeping.102 Moreover, these operations clearly illustrated that successful conflict prevention and conflict management requires clarity of the mission’s objective, unity of command, timely political decision making and continuous international commitment, and realistic rules of engagement.103 Bosnia provided an opportunity for broader German participation in multilateral actions and a more highly integrated role for Russia. Perhaps most critical for the long term, Bosnia demonstrated for the first time that NATO could play an effective role in crisis management and resolution. In Kosovo, the lessons learned from Bosnia resulted in strong NATO military action, an enhanced German participation, a positive Russian role, and a renewed commitment on the part of the Europeans to assume a greater share of the responsibility for their own security. Both operations represented a “grand coalition” not only among the Alliance membership but also including the PfP.104 Lastly, the Balkans have indicated that burden-sharing as conceived during the Cold War era may have relevancy within the European context but is no longer as applicable to the transatlantic relationship. Military burden-sharing, in spite of the focus on the Defense Capability Initiative, has become passé with regard to the American–European relationship. The realization of the revolution in military affairs means that the United States has the military capability to fight conventional, and to a more limited extent, unconventional conflicts unilaterally. However, the transatlantic burden-sharing debate is not dead. Instead, it now revolves around the political legitimization of intervention to avoid the perception of American unilateralism and the needed contributions to support the functional responsibilities required of post-conflict transformation, stabilization, and normalization. Furthermore, the Balkan experience provided an initial glimpse of the emerging European debate on burden-sharing which will more generally reflect those of the Cold War. Issues such as GDP dedicated to defense development and men and matériel committed to operational responsibilities will become increasingly prevalent as Europe tries to define its own security responsibilities.

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Appendix A United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR); United Nations Observers, and International Police Task Force (IPTF) contributions Country Argentina Bangladesh Belgium Brazil Canada Colombia Czech Republic Denmark Egypt Finland France Ghana Indonesia Ireland Jordan Kenya Lithuania Malaysia Nepal Netherlands New Zealand Nigeria Norway Pakistan Poland Portugal Russian Federation Slovak Republic Spain Sweden Switzerland Tunisia Turkey Ukraine United Kingdom United States Venezuela Total

Police

Troops

Observers

23 40 0 6 45 12 0 45 0 41 41 0 15 20 71 50 0 25 49 10 0 48 31 19 29 39 36 0 0 35 6 12 0 9 0 0 0

854 1,235 1,038 0 2,091 0 971 1,230 427 463 4,493 0 220 0 3,367 967 32 1,550 899 1,803 249 0 826 3,107 1,109 0 1,464 582 1,267 1,212 0 0 1,464 1,147 3,405 748 0

5 43 6 34 15 0 37 14 27 12 11 32 29 9 48 47 0 27 5 48 9 10 39 34 30 12 22 0 19 19 6 0 0 10 19 0 2

757

38,220

680

Source: Department of Public Information, United Nations, September 1996.

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Appendix B Intervention Force contributions Countryc

IFOR Troops

United Kingdoma Francea Germanya Italya Netherlandsa Canadaa Russiab Malaysia Spaina Bangladesh Belgiuma Turkeya Denmarka Greecea Pakistan Swedenb Portugala Finlandb Czech Republicb Polandb Norwaya Hungaryb Austriab Luxembourga Estoniab Slovak Republicb

13,000–14,000 10,000 4,000 2,100 2,000 1,200–1,500 1,500–2,000 1,600 1,000–1,500 1,250 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 0,300–900 0,850 0,800 0,800 0,750 0,400 0,300 0,300 0,100 0,100–200

Sources: NATO, US Department of Defense, and The New York Times. Notes a NATO member. b Partnership for Peace members, which also includes all NATO members. c The table only shows countries that contributed at least 100 troops to IFOR. Egypt, Latvia, Lithuania, and Ukraine also have contributed.

Notes 1 In December 2003, an EU force of 7,000 troops started a three-year mandate as the core of the UN-mandated Stabilization Force (SFOR). More than 80 percent of SFOR’s 12,000 complement are European. “US and EU in Dispute On Control of Bosnia Force,” Judy Dempsey, Financial Times (March 9, 2004). 2 George Kennan cited the specific report filed by the Carnegie Balkan Commission in “The Other Balkan War: A 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect, with a new Introduction and Reflections on the Present Conflict cited in ‘The Balkan Crisis: 1913 and 1993.’ ” New York Review of Books (June 27, 1993).

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3 Yugoslavia emerged as a federation of south Slavic and other peoples in 1918. Slovenia and Croatia had belonged to the Hapsburg Empire. This area was predominantly Catholic and more economically developed. The Hapsburgs annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908. The central part was Serbia, emancipated from the Ottoman Turks in 1828. The Serbs were Yugoslavia’s largest ethnic group and most politically experienced. They are Eastern Orthodox. To the south, were Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro. Two autonomous regions, Kosovo dominated by Albanians, and Vojvodina comprised the other parts of multiethnic Yugoslavia. With the secession of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia, the truncated Federal Republic of Yugoslavia comprised of Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Vojvodina has assumed Yugoslavia’s international status. The use of Yugoslavia in this dissertation refers to this truncated state. 4 Brzezinski, NYT, 11/2/9/94: A16. 5 Fassino, “The Situation in Former Yugoslavia,” WEU Assembly, 10/95. 6 Kennan, “The Balkan Crisis: 1913 and 1993,” New York Review of Books, 6/27/93. 7 UN Peacekeeping Assessment Policy is based upon General Assembly Resolution 3101 establishing financing for the UN Emergency Force II (UNEF II) deployed in the Sinai Peninsula in 1973. Under the Resolution, the UN membership is divided into four groups – permanent members of the Security Council (Group A), specifically named economically developed states that are not members of UNSC (Group B), economically less developed states (Group C), and specifically named economically less developed states (Group D). Assessments to pay for peacekeeping operations are based upon the contribution of each group’s members to the regular UN budget. Groups A and B pay 100 percent of their individual apportionment of the total budget for peacekeeping. Additionally, Group A members are expected to assume any unapportioned amount of such operation. For the United States, this means that it is responsible for 31.7 percent of an operation’s costs plus one fifth of any amount that is not apportioned to other members. Groups C and D pay 20 percent and 10 percent of their total budget contributions respectively. The percentage assessed is a major point of contention between the United States and the UN. In President Policy Directive #25, President Clinton has demanded a reduction in the American assessment to 25 percent. 8 The Secretary General’s Special Representative headed the United Nations Protection Force for the former Yugoslavia. The Force includes military, civil affairs (including civilian police), public information, and administrative components. Its mission was to create the conditions of peace and security necessary for an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis in the framework of the EC’s Conference on Yugoslavia. It lasted from February 1992–March 1995. Its headquarters were Zagreb, Croatia. In 1993, the military structure reorganized into three units: UNPROFOR Croatia commanded by Major General A. Tayyeb (Jordan); UNPROFOR Bosnia-Herzegovina commanded by General Sir Michael Rose (UK) and UNPROFOR former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Brigadier-General Tryggve Tellefsen (Norway). In November 1994, it reached its top strength of 38,810 including military forces, UN military observers, civilian police, and international and local civilian staff. This was UN’s largest peacekeeping force ever. The force had a military strength of 33,345 led by the Force Commander, Bertrand de Sauville de La Presle (FR) who was the fourth Force Commander. 9 US Department of State Brief – Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1996.

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10 UNPROFOR’s presence was credited for permitting 2,476 aircraft carrying 27,460 tones of food to reach Sarajevo between July 3, 1992 and January 31, 1993. UN in Yugoslavia, 1995: 10. 11 Secretary General de Cuellar concluded that UNPROFOR was not sufficient in size to effectively provide border control and symbolic or selective efforts would only further erode the force’s “stained credibility,” UN in Yugoslavia, 1995: 7. 12 The Vance–Owen Plan, named for the Co-Chairman of the Steering Committee established at the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia Special UN Envoy Cyrus Vance and European Community mediator Lord Owen, was a comprehensive peace plan initially proposed on January 4, 1993, during talks in Geneva. The plan sought to preserve the territorial integrity of Bosnia by outlining the state’s constitutional principles, proposing a map that organized the country into ten provinces, and an agreement for peace negotiations. The Bosnian Serbs would have controlled 43 percent of Bosnia’s territory with the Croats and Muslims sharing 57 percent (UN in Yugoslavia, 1995: 30). 13 UN in Yugoslavia, 1995: 30. 14 In March, the Bosnian Croats and Muslims had signed the Plan with a revised provincial map, however, the Bosnian Serbs continued to reject it. In April UNSC Resolution 816 endorsed the Plan as the basis for peace in the region and invoked greater sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on April 26 as punishment for the Bosnian Serb intransigence. On May 2, Bosnian Serb leader Dr Radovan Karadzic’s signed the agreement but it was not approved by the Bosnian Serb “Assembly,” a quasi-legislative body created primarily to allow Karadzic greater international flexibility. 15 Operation Deny Flight had three components: aerial monitoring and compliance of UNSC Resolution 816 establishing the “no fly zone”; close air support of UNPROFOR controlled by UN; conduct air strikes with UN approval of targets threatening UN declared safe areas. Authorized by UNSC Resolutions 781, 816, 824, 936 all of which were terminated on 12/15/95 and Operation Deny Flight officially ended with transfer of authority to IFOR. 16 “Safe Areas: A Policy Under Siege,” NYT, 7/10/95. 17 In August 1992, then presidential candidate Governor Bill Clinton had proposed that, if elected, he would seek to implement a “Lift and Strike Policy” in Bosnia. It would include lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims thus facilitating their ability to defend themselves and using air strikes to, in essence, batter the Bosnian Serbs into submission. Secretary of State Warren Christopher lobbied the European allies to accept the proposal in April 1993 but was rebuffed by the Europeans led by the French and British who were concerned about the safety to peacekeeping units. The Administration dropped the initiative. 18 UN in Yugoslavia, 1995: 14. 19 Boston Globe, 4/1/94: 12. 20 One of the most controversial agreements of the Bosnian War was the Integrative Policy characterized by the Dual Key approach to authorize the use of NATO military assets to support UN forces. Under the agreement, UN commanders working through the UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy selected targets and authorized the strikes to be carried out by NATO planes. This operational plan inhibited NATO’s effectiveness by reducing target selection and curtailing tactical innovation. It also raised a divisive political issue. The new role of NATO as a subcontractor to the UN angered oppon-

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21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29

30 31 32 33 34

35 36

37 38 39 40 41

42 43

ents of any out-of-the-area NATO operations as well as those, such as the United States, who objected to relinquishing command and control of the Alliance’s forces. For a range of interpretations see Warren Christopher, NYT, 7/16/93: A3; Michael Mandelbaum, NYT, 6/9/93; and Deputy Secretary of State Clifton R. Wharton Jr., NYT, 6/1/93: A3. NYT, 6/4/93: A12. NYT, 7/16/93: A3. United Nations Peacekeeping Former Yugoslavia – UNPROFOR, United Nations, September 1996, hereafter UN Peacekeeping – UNPROFOR. “Boutros Backs NATO Role,” NYT, 9/20/93. UN Peacekeeping – UNPROFOR, September 1996. UN in Yugoslavia, 1995: 21. Klaus Kinkel, This Week in Germany, 2/11/94, hereafter TWIG, 1. Although the number of foreign and Bosnian “Islamic fighters” who fought with the Bosnian Muslim army was never completely clear, at the end of 1995 it was estimated that 2,000 Iranian and Afghanis were still in Bosnia. The Dayton Accord obliged them to leave and NATO has consistently pressured Sarajevo to comply. A major concern for the US deployment was potential confrontation with Iranian mercenaries near Tuzla (IFOR – OMRI Release, 1/10/96). NYT, 4/4/94. Holbrooke, The Future of NATO and Europe’s Changing Security Landscape, 1995. The four plans were the Carrington–Cutiliero initiative, the Vance–Owen proposal, the HMS Invincible package, and the EC Action Plan. UN Peacekeeping – UNPROFOR, 1996: 30. See UN Peacekeeping – UNPROFOR, 1996: 30. Bosnian government, as distinct from Bosnian Federation or the Republika Srpska, refers to the internationally recognized Muslim-led government of the Bosnian Republic headed by President Alija Izetbegovic. “Deterrence by denial” means the destruction of an opponent’s military capabilities as opposed to “deterrence by punishment” that focuses on punishing an opponent’s civil society and economy (Stephen Cimbala, 1997). The bill required the ending of US enforcement of the arms embargo after the withdrawal of UN troops or within twelve weeks from the date of the Bosnian government requesting the removal of UN forces. In addition, it provided for a series of thirty day waivers by the President if such waivers were needed for the safe withdrawal of UN forces. Huntington, 1996: 289. Erwin, Penn State Newswire, 8/2/95. On December 20, 1994, White House spokeswoman Dee Dee Myers outlined the United States’ official position, “The Bosnian Serbs are the aggressors in this war” (NYT, 12/20/94). Defense Secretary William Perry, Meet the Press, November 27, 1994. See NYT, 11/29/94 in which an unnamed senior administration official announced a new policy focusing on insuring NATO unity and containing conflict to Bosnia. A noted lesser objective was helping to preserve Bosnia. The Washington Post, 12/1/94 quoted a Lake aide as saying, “[White House] accepts the fact that we have to salvage as much as we can get.” Erwin, Penn State Newswire, 8/2/95. Fassino, 10/95.

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44 The European rapid reaction force was a “hard hitting” force numbering about 12,500 men. It was comprised of 5,000 British troops from the 24th Airmobile Brigade, Task Force Alpha that was a multinational unit of French, British, Dutch, and Belgians, and German support troops, and a supplementary French force of 4,000. In addition, the United Kingdom also had just deployed artillery, engineering, communications, and a helicopter unit to Bosnia. Its mission was to protect UNPROFOR, secure land routes to Sarajevo for humanitarian convoys, enforce exclusion zones, and to escort convoys by force, if needed, to besieged enclaves. Rules of engagement allowed shooting in self-defense. 45 TWIG, 6/26/95: 1. 46 TWIG, 7/21/95: 1. 47 “Report Blames Dutch Military for Srebrenica,” Reuters, 4/11/02. 48 Ibid. 49 “Europeans Debate Options,” NYT, 7/13/95. 50 TWIG, 7/21/95: 2. 51 In retrospect, European and Clinton officials admitted that limiting the area was interpreted as Western weakness of resolve and providing the Serbs with opportunities elsewhere (“Ambiguous Ultimatum: Allies Show Differences,” NYT, 7/24/95: A6). 52 TWIG, 9/29/95: 2. 53 Clinton, “The Right Thing to Do,” NYT, 11/28/95: A14. 54 National Public Radio reported on 10/26/95 that Chancellor Kohl had committed German forces to a follow-on mission. 55 TWIG, 12/8/95: 1. 56 The Dayton Accords’ military contingency related to troop withdrawal to cease-fire lines, temporary continuation of a ban on arms imports, and storing heavy weapons. Politically, a centrally elected president and parliament were to preside over the semi-autonomous Bosnian Croat Federation, comprising 51 percent of Bosnia and the Republika Srpska that had the remaining 49 percent. The government was created by a constitution that also established a banking and court system. Both the Bosnian–Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska would have their own president and legislature and retained their own militia. Elections would be internationally supervised. All groups were guaranteed a right of re-settlement. 57 SFOR Fact Sheet January 2004 available on-line @ www.nato.int/sfor/factsheet/restgruct/t040121a.htm. 58 “History of the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” NATO Document January 2004 available on-line @ www.nato.int/ sfor/docu/d981116a.htm. 59 “NATO’s role in relation to the conflict in Kosovo,” NATO on-line @ www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm. 60 “What Does the US Know About Atrocities in Kosovo,” Christian Science Monitor, 8/26/98: 11. 61 NATO demanded an end to hostilities, the withdrawal of Yugoslav troops, unrestricted distribution of humanitarian assistance, a return of refugees, and negotiation with the Albanians toward a permanent autonomy. National Public Radio, 10/12/98. 62 “NATO’s role in relation to the conflict in Kosovo,” NATO on-line @ www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm. 63 The refugee population is estimated to be 45 percent of the total population (Dobbins, 2002: 113).

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64 65 66 67 68 69

70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84

85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93

Erwin, Penn State Newswire, 8/2/95. Huntington, 1996: 296–7. Defense Press Service, 3/30/99. TWIG, 4/4/97: 2. CNN, 2/22/99. On November 28, 1995, President Clinton delivered a speech outlining a new action for Bosnia. In this speech he cited NATO’s leadership and Alliance credibility and sustainability as a justification for American involvement. Clinton also stressed American leadership, which is not easily invoked through NATO. Finally, Presidential Policy Directive #25, which is one of the Clinton Administration’s defining foreign policy statements, notes that US military participation is directly proportional to the American command and control of US forces but that the United States is prepared to allow operational control to be handled through NATO. Interview with British Defense Attaché William Shapcott, Washington DC, 1996. See Richard Holbrooke, “Creation of New European Security Architecture Under Way,” USIS Defense, February 22, 1995. Clinton, UN General Assembly Speech, September 1993. NYT, 6/9/95. See Holbrooke, 2/22/95, in which the creation of a European security architecture is outlined as a top foreign policy priority of the Clinton Administration. See British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind’s statement in “Europeans Debate Option for a UN Force in Bosnia,” NYT, 7/13/95. UN in Yugoslavia, 1995: 27; UN Peacekeeping – UNPROFOR, 1996: appendix. Huntington, 1996: 286–8. Fassino, 10/95. Ibid. Ibid. Operation Deny Flight Fact Sheet, NATO, 12/21/95. NYT, 11/22/95: A8. Secretary Cohen’s June 1, 1999 address on military operations in Kosovo and “Air Wars Won’t Stay Risk-Free General Says,” NYT, 6/18/99: A16. The other ship launching Sea Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCM) was British. The planned air assault using this policy both violated the American AirLand Doctrine that had been so effective in the Persian Gulf and was reminiscent of the coercive war doctrine used in Vietnam. Moreover, it discounted the fact that civilian and collateral damage are difficult to measure. Status of Contributions as of February 1997, UN Secretariat, March 12, 1997: 50–5. Ibid. Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Resolution 1035, 3/29/96. SFOR Organization, 10/13/03, http//www.nation.int/sfor/organisation/sfororg.htm. Ibid. The EU assumed responsibility for policing Macedonia from the UN in 2003. “EU, NATO Hope For Bosnia Transfer by End of 2004,” AFP, 1/21/04. The Role of Europe in Bosnia and Herzegovina, WEU Document #1541, October 1996. Ibid. NYT, 3/22/96; Huntington, 1996: 287.

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94 Secretary of Defense William Cohen, CNN, 3/23/97. 95 Dobbins, 2003: 127–8. 96 “KFOR as a Model for the Transformed NATO,” NATO Press Conference, 2/11/04. 97 “Germany-Berlin Wants Substantial Reduction in Balkan Force,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3/25/02. 98 WEU in the Atlantic Alliance, WEU Assembly, 11/6/95. 99 Willy Claes referring to out-of-the-area operations remarked in early 1992 that “We [NATO] will look very carefully to the conditions and to the rules before saying yes,” Review, 42, no. 6. 100 NATO General Secretary Solana speech, 11/4/96. 101 Cohen, CNN, 3/2/97. 102 See Richard Haass (1994: 57–62) for a discussion of forms of interventions. Peacekeeping involves the deployment of unarmed or lightly armed forces into a peaceful environment, or at least one in which the contending parties have agreed to cease hostilities, with the explicit purpose of supporting the political agreements reached by the warring parties. The deployed forces are present with the acceptance of the contending parties. The forces are assumed to be neutral. Such operations are authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. In contrast, peace enforcement, often authorized under UN Charter Chapter VII, is a proactive intervention aimed at stopping “acts of aggression” or “breaches of peace.” It assumes a measure of restraint in the use of force as compared to war-fighting but does not assume that the environment is stable. Usually, peace enforcement assumes that one of the antagonists is opposed to the deployment, thus neutrality is not a consideration. 103 Joulwan and Shoemaker, December 1998: 17. 104 NATO General Secretary Javier Solana, London, 3/4/97.

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5 CONCLUSION

The past half-century of geopolitics and international relations holds many lessons. For American and allied European policy makers, one lesson transcends the others. When the great democracies of North America and Europe stand together, they are an irresistible force for peace, prosperity and stability. When, on the other hand, the great democracies of the West fail to coordinate their foreign policies, defense strategies and military actions, chaos is invited, and evil may triumph. Synchronization of strategies and foreign policies among democratic states faced with hard challenges requires bargaining and coalition building. From the guns of August, 1914 to the guns of August, 1990, burden-sharing was the electric current that makes possible the congruity of aims and means by which alliances accomplish their stated purposes. The twentieth century is a history of alliance purposes that were fully achieved, partly accomplished, or defeated in the effort. The United States was a reluctant co-belligerent dragged into World War I only in 1917, and it appeared as a force in battle only in the final year of battle on the Western front. American foreign policy and military strategy between the two world wars were based on the naive assumption that Europe’s burdens were its own – no part of America’s future. Events soon proved otherwise. President George W. Bush’s visit to the Normandy beaches and cemeteries on the sixtieth anniversary of D-Day in 2004 reaffirms the hard lessons of Omaha Beach, and of Chateau-Thierry a generation earlier. The existence and survival of political freedom is not a given. It demands shrewd politicians and stalwart commanders at the ramparts: supported by a democratic public prepared for sacrifice. And in the so-called “peacetime” of the Cold War, from approximately 1946 through 1989, the lessons of the two world wars were reaffirmed: freedom is always under attack from those who fear it. Nowadays the stalkers of free societies are mainly the products of civilizations other than the Western one. Fueled by a combustible mixture of nationalism and religious fundamentalism, terrorists and other antisystemic forces have turned to asymmetrical warfare in order to disable 153

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the spread of democracy and its cohabitant, economic globalization. The intent of al-Qaeda and others is to drive the West out of the Middle East, South Asia and other regions so that these areas are, in their retro vision, safe for Talibanization. Terrorism is only one of many causes for contemporary societal dysfunctions that lead to failed states. Population growth, urbanization, ecological disaster, mass migration, and armed insurrection challenge governments throughout the formerly colonized “Third World,” creating stresses that spill over into the streets of Europe, the United States, and other parts of the developed world. The Internet provides a shared electronic universe that expedites the cooperation of dissidents across continents. The computer discs and other high-tech paraphernalia found by US troops when they liberated al-Qaeda stores in Afghanistan are revealing: a perverse mixture of ancient hatreds and myths combined with modern technology and supported by a willingness to carry out apocalyptic tactics of destruction. In this study, we show some of the reasons why such tactics as those of the 9-11 terrorists, however disruptive they might be in the short run, will ultimately fail. Free peoples can, under the duress of necessity or the scourge of moral embarrassment, cooperate across the boundaries of statehood in order to guarantee their security. But, among allies as among extended families, the process of getting to “yes” involves considerable give and take. Policies must be adjusted toward the consensus position if the alliance is to accomplish its war or peace aims. Policy objectives at the margin, however dearly held by one or more parties, will be sacrificed. Within each member of a democratic alliance, governments must “take it to the electorate” in the form of political leadership that explains why multilateralism is a necessity instead of a mere luxury or a nuisance. And, in addition to the compromises required by inter-alliance strategy and policy making, there is the additional constraint imposed by the international system: including state and non-state actors, each with its own brief for action and identity crisis of the day.

Dimensions of cost and risk Throughout the 1990s the international system continued the evolution from one dominated by the ideological–military conflict of the Cold War to a “multipolar and multicivilizational” one.1 This evolution has significantly changed the variables that determine the international system’s structure and, consequently, the methods by which the risks and responsibilities of maintaining order in the international system are distributed. Changes to the international system have led to the identification of three important dimensions of cost and risk for multinational burdensharing in today’s world. The first are the implications of non-involvement and failed intervention. The second constitute the hidden burdens that 154

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emerge only after an operation has been undertaken. These may be new burdens that result from a change in the mission, such as occurred when the United States shifted its Somalia policy from supplying humanitarian aid to capturing antagonistic warlords. Or, they may be residual or continuous burdens including the costs of long-term commitments needed to resolve deeply rooted conflicts or to re-build nations such as those in Rwanda, the Balkans, and Afghanistan. The third is the impact of the increasing violence against peacekeeping and peace-enforcement units and its influence on domestic support for such operations. A country which decides not to accept the responsibilities of collective actions risks losing influence over the crisis at hand and may suffer longerterm negative international reactions. France decided to remain part of the Coalition against Saddam in 1991, in spite of internal opposition to extending the war to Iraqi territory, because it wanted to maintain a modicum of French influence over the peace settlement. In the Balkans, limited American involvement and a lack of consensus on the use of force jeopardized NATO and UN credibility, which eventually required a more significant American role. Perhaps a better example of the costs of noninvolvement is evident in Germany’s role during the Gulf War. German “checkbook diplomacy” during the Gulf War led its European allies to question whether they should follow Germany’s lead in the proposed political unification of Europe and the world to question the extent to which Germany’s international resurrection had truly happened. Whereas non-involvement threatens a country’s ability to deter a crisis’ undesirable actions, participation in collective actions may positively impact the image of a country. For example, Jordanian involvement in Bosnia did much to re-establish its international legitimacy badly damaged as a result of support for Saddam early in the Gulf conflict. The risks of failed intervention, in contrast to non-involvement, also are great especially when vital interests are not at stake. Although the costs resulting from a failed intervention are theoretically distributed among all participants in a collective security environment, the system’s great powers still assume the largest share of the risk. Failed intervention may result in damaged international prestige, a decreased willingness and, potentially, capability to respond to new threats emerging from regional hegemons who contribute to instabilities, and domestic disagreements that weaken a government’s ability to reach consensus and implement policy. The American failure in Lebanon damaged its prestige and further contributed to the United States’ self-doubt that had emerged from its failure in Vietnam. However, the international system’s bipolar structure lessened the impact of the Lebanese failure on the United States. For Middle Eastern countries such as Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, the United States, in spite of its failure in Lebanon, remained the only plausible broker of a regional peace settlement as well as their eventual guarantor of security. 155

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Thus, once the United States abandoned its objectionable military interventionist approach in 1983, the peace process was actually reinvigorated. No such circumstances or systemic governance exists in a multipolar world. The implications of failed American intervention in the Persian Gulf would have been much more severe in 1991 and similar risks exist in Iraq today. In 1991, if the United States had either lost the war or, a more probable scenario, failed to maintain sufficient international support for aggressive military action, Saddam’s development of WMD would have been unrestrained, and he would have retained sufficient military capacity to establish Iraq as the region’s hegemon. Allowing Saddam to dominate the Persian Gulf and influence the global economy would have presented a myriad of challenges to the West. A second implication of failed intervention in the Gulf would have been the creation of insurmountable obstacles to the United States assuming global leadership as the Soviet Union disintegrated. Without American leadership, the international system would have been decidedly more anarchic. Other rogue states would have sought increased power while generally heightening the perceived sense of insecurity. In Bosnia, the UN’s failed intervention resulted in continued hostilities. In Kosovo, delayed NATO intervention permitted “ethnic cleansing” to continue and risked the organization’s viability. In both situations, if the United States had not successfully applied significant military and diplomatic pressure, it is unlikely that the wars would have stopped. More significantly though, failed intervention by the United States would have eroded the emerging international belief and trust in multinational institutional intervention as an approach to deal with international instability. Furthermore, it would have curtailed the willingness on the part of states to cooperate in collective security operations and led to a re-emergence of the more constrained collective defense environment. The cases presented here also provide interesting data on the residual or continuing burdens associated with collective security actions. Compelling Iraq to abide by the UN resolutions, particularly with regard to weapons of mass destruction and rebuilding Kuwait, continue to be an expensive task. In 1998, Operation Desert Fox, the enforcement of the “no fly zones” and anti-aircraft eradication, cost $250 million.2 The United States, which has assumed the majority of the responsibility for enforcing sanctions, has endured terrorists’ attacks on interests in the Middle East and ultimately on the United States. It also continues to face mounting international criticism for its heavy reliance on the use of force for pursuing the ouster of Saddam in 2003. On-going deployments in Bosnia and Kosovo also provide undisputable evidence that, in the environment of deep-rooted antagonisms that characterize clashes between cultures, peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations are costly and time con156

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suming. Continued separation of warring factions, creation of a civil society, apprehension and persecution of war criminals, and removal of mines within Bosnia and Kosovo still demand international involvement and commitment of resources. In spite of efforts by NATO, the OSCE, and the UN at securing these objectives, it is obvious that continued deployment of SFOR and KFOR remain necessary to forestall future hostilities. Furthermore, reconstruction or “nation building” operations demand long-term commitments that require a willingness on the part of those participants accepting responsibilities to assume the financial costs of maintaining overseas deployments, to forego other opportunities, and to accept on-going risks for their deployed forces. Such operations need a country to assume the increased risks of leadership in maintaining an international commitment to a resolution. Often such long-term commitments have little domestic support within the participating countries since many of the cultural clashes facing the international community pose only a limited threat of broader conflict.3 In Bosnia, for example, the political support for a continued operation is eroding in both the United States and Europe.4 Frequent, long-term, and large overseas military deployments also impact countries’ military readiness, which is an inadequately assessed burden. Prior to the Iraq War of 2003, the continued deployment of American troops in the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans complicated the armed forces’ training and repair schedules, reduced the US Navy Atlantic fleets squadrons’ flying time and deferred the maintenance of their planes, and postponed the purchase of spare parts because of the lack of sufficient funds.5 A more recent ramification of longer overseas deployments is the declining pool of US Air Force pilots as personnel are unwilling to serve the longer tours.6 Finally, it takes six months to re-train troops who have served in peace support operations before being effectively introduced into a war-fighting mission. A further burden that has increased relevance in an international system characterized by greater conflict is the rising violence perpetrated against peace-enforcement forces charged with executing collective security operations. Most influential is the increasing number of casualties sustained by peace-enforcement units, which makes states more reluctant to participate in such operations. A second concern that erodes participation are the other acts of violence against peacekeepers such as the mob violence faced by SFOR units in Bosnia and more recently KFOR forces in Kosovo, hostage taking and terrorists attacks. While it appears that many neo-liberal approaches discount these burdens, it is precisely these burdens that differentiate contributions and raise questions concerning comparative advantage and “contribution models.” Since the inception of the burden-sharing debate, the willingness to risk casualties has been accepted as a significant contribution to common defense. In the context 157

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of NATO, this willingness was measured in terms of troops committed to forward defense. However, the actual assessment of casualties was a theoretical debate because the much-feared NATO-WTO confrontation in central Europe never materialized. In the new collective security environment, military casualties are a more common experience. Casualties inflame a country’s domestic political environment and threaten its commitment to continued involvement in collective actions. The bombing of the Marine Headquarters in Lebanon in 1983 acted as a catalyst to the United States’ eventual withdrawal from Lebanon, for example. On the other hand, the minimal number of casualties in Desert Storm significantly influenced public opinion in favor of the war allowing politicians to avoid the domestic costs of conflict and ultimately enhanced American prestige. The United States’ lack of willingness to commit ground forces in the Yugoslav wars of secession was, at least, partially based upon the high estimate of casualties that accompanied deployment plans. To place one’s military personnel in circumstances in which the risk of casualties is high, particularly when national interests in the outcome of a conflict are dubious, is one of the most distinguishing aspects of the new burden-sharing paradigm. As an unidentified NATO commander commented with regard to Germany and Japan’s provision of financial support but no troops during the Persian Gulf War, “they pay and we die.” Under the circumstances in which one country is absorbing casualties, while others are not, the acceptance of other burdens including financial support or humanitarian assistance by the latter is marginalized. Regardless of their other contributions, countries, who refuse to place troops in the field, do not accept a full share of the burdens. Such examples provide evidence that a hierarchy of contributions exists and were further proven by Germany’s acceptance of increasing responsibility in Kosovo and subsequently Afghanistan. A meaningful assessment of contributions made to collective security initiatives, thus, requires the analysis of contributions not only in each of the areas discussed but also an assessment of their relationship to one another.

International systems and multinational burden-sharing Three general propositions relating to the impact of the international system on burden-sharing can be supported from the evidence here. First, a country’s willingness to assume the burdens associated with collective defense or collective security is directly proportional to its perception of threat, and that perception of threat is directly tied to the international system. Second, regardless of the international system in which a collective action takes place, great power involvement remains an essential ingredient for success. Finally, changes in the international system have been a 158

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catalyst in accelerating the European allies’ acceptance of the responsibility for their security and global order. One of the most contested issues surrounding an individual’s or group’s willingness to contribute to a collective effort is the relationship between the private benefits (i.e. self-interest or national interests) and the public benefit (i.e. community interests) being served by the action. This debate, between self-interest and self-abnegation as the incentives for participation, continues to be significant in assessing burden-sharing. However, in contrast to civil or domestic systems, the international system’s distinction between private benefits or detriments and public ones is much less clear. Often, public values may act as a catalyst for initial action. International response to Somalia was initially driven by a desire to provide humanitarian assistance. Over the course of an operation, however, private incentives may gradually emerge. In Somalia, the shift from providing humanitarian relief to nation building caused a change in incentives. A changing or dynamic environment such as the one in Somalia often is the cause for altering decisions on accepting risks and responsibilities and thus the distribution of burdens. The extent to which there is a preponderance of private or public incentives in relationship to the other is dependent upon the crisis’ circumstances. By evaluating the extent to which benefits and costs of participation impact individual countries, a qualitative determination of the incentives may be made. If the benefits or detriments accrued from participation significantly impact a country’s national interests, then the incentives for participating may be assumed to be private or motivated primarily by self-interests. If, on the other hand, the benefits or detriments have a low impact on an individual country, and, by participating they serve international interests, the incentives are more public. Most frequently, public and private benefits coalesce to produce action. French and British participation in the UN’s mission in the former Yugoslavia was motivated by their desire to contain conflict in Europe, respond to a humanitarian crisis, and demonstrate that Europe was able to deal with its unique security concerns. In these cases, a union existed between the private and public benefits of participation. While international order may depend less on leadership and followership than on each nation’s willingness to do its appropriate share or contribute, by participating in collective actions “international influence, honor, and even prerogatives” will accrue to the contributing countries more or less in proportion to their contribution.7 Threat, as perceived by a state, also has public and private dimensions. When a state’s “irreducible” foreign policy objectives are in danger, threat is private. The United States’ response to terrorist attacks on the American homeland after 9-11 is illustrative. The vital interests of international organizations or of multinational coalitions are more difficult to specify. 159

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Although there are many private ramifications and detriments that result from the destruction of the UN’s credibility, a case may be made that preservation of its credibility is a public good as well. Thus, private and public dimensions of threat again coalesce. In the Balkans, the threat to UN and NATO credibility provided a significant incentive for large scale US and Allied involvement and the related acceptance of burdens. In these cases, the question becomes whether the erosion of NATO or UN credibility created a more private threat dimension rather than a public one. The level of perceived threat is an important variable in determining a country’s participation in collective actions and willingness to accept the associated risks and burdens. Threat, however, does not exist in a vacuum and thus is influenced by the international system. For example, American national interests were not threatened by the Lebanese civil war per se. Instead, instability in Lebanon concerned the United States because it hindered the United States’ regional goals and provided the Soviet Union with an opportunity to increase regional influence. These broader threats acted as a catalyst to American involvement. Most of the European allies, Italy and France being the exceptions, did not feel sufficiently threatened by the crisis in Lebanon to contribute military forces or to provide financial assistance to the MNF. As a result, burdensharing was minimal. The 1991 Persian Gulf War presents a very different scenario. In this case, many perceived their national interests to be quite threatened. As a result, the level of burden-sharing was high. Although the United States assumed the leadership for establishing and maintaining the Coalition and contributed the preponderance of the military force, others made significant contributions in terms of military and financial resources and assuming political risks. The participation in the Gulf War also presented the international community with an opportunity to assume an altruistic position against aggression, weapons proliferation, and even, to an extent, terrorism. All of which may be characterized as public threats. In contrast to the US and allied war against Iraq, the Balkans present a better example of the manner in which divergent state threat perceptions are related to variable willingness to carry the load. The Balkans are also an excellent study of a crisis’ dynamic and unpredictable nature and how that nature impacts the distribution of burdens. Instability in southern Europe was perceived as a much greater threat in Europe than in the United States. Initially, the United States was quite prepared to allow the Europeans to demonstrate their autonomy in resolving their own security dilemmas. As a result, the European allies initially assumed a large share of the political and military burdens in Bosnia. As the variables of a crisis changed, the perceived threats also changed, which influenced countries’ perspectives of their responsibilities. As the Bosnian conflict continued, 160

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the credibility of the UN and NATO was eroded by their ineffective use of military deterrence. Fearing that it would be called upon to assume the increased responsibility for policing the international system, the United States intervened militarily and politically to bolster the UN’s and NATO’s weakened credibility. In Kosovo, the maintenance of NATO credibility necessitated strong action at a time when the alliance was being challenged to demonstrate its viability. The United States’ role in ending immediate hostilities in the Balkans is also an excellent example of the importance of great power participation, regardless of the international system, in peace enforcement or multifunctional peacekeeping.8 Although under attack in today’s multilateral security environment, a great power’s prestige and military capability remain essential to establishing order in the international system. In the Cold War environment of Lebanon in 1982, the ineffectiveness of multinational organizations was evident. Proposals that the UN deploy a peacekeeping force to separate the Israelis and Palestinians initially were unacceptable to Israel and thus resulted in an American veto of the proposed resolution. When Israel and the United States were prepared to accept a UN force, the Soviet Union felt it was in its interests to veto the proposed resolution. The PLO, the Israelis, and the Lebanese government, however, did accept American participation as an important component to settling the conflict. It was perceived that only the United States could guarantee the security of the groups involved and provided the prestige needed to implement a cease-fire among the warring parties. In the 1991 transitional period, only the United States possessed the international prestige and military capability to counter Saddam’s expansion. By the time of the Yugoslav wars of secession, Pax Americana was in transition. Still, significant American participation was essential to reaching the Dayton agreement, in forcing Milosevic to withdraw from Kosovo, and in having broad participation in the post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction operations. Each of these circumstances reflects reliance upon American leadership and military capabilities and demonstrates the critical importance of great power involvement in peace-enforcement operations. Notwithstanding these perspectives, many of the problems in the post-Cold War world are multinational and multilateral and require international cooperation to solve them.9 Others may assume responsibilities for many operational functions not requiring the use of force. The UN plays an important role in leading and coordinating these collective responses to many crises. Eventually other multinational organizations will do the same. However, the United States, because of its ability to effectively allocate military resources and leadership, must assume a prominent role in circumstances in which conflict is occurring. Regardless, the United States cannot simply withdraw even in circumstances in which the UN has assumed a 161

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leadership role, for two reasons: first, because it is a member of the organization and, second, because of its international leadership.10 This study further proves that the great power’s role in the international system remains constant – what has changed is the way we define great power. This is not unexpected because one manifestation of systemic change is the emergence of new great powers.11 The United States’ critical role in initially keeping SFOR together is a good example of its leadership responsibilities and capabilities. However, SFOR’s evolution and KFOR’s emergence also demonstrate that others are prepared to assume responsibility. Moreover, those who have sought increased responsibility must also be considered great powers. This proliferation of countries that can influence the international system increases the pool among whom burdens may be shared and provides increased opportunities for multinational responses to international crises. The expanding role of the multinational institution is another manifestation of systemic change. In a multipolar system, international institutions contribute significantly to burden-sharing by establishing the international legitimacy of the operation and authorizing the use of force both of which increase the number of willing participants. In Lebanon, there was no institutional legitimacy for the MNF and participation was severely curtailed. In the absence of UN operational legitimization, many states either invoke their constitutional restrictions or simply reject participation and thus shed their burden. The critical role of international legitimization in creating a broad coalition is evident in George W. Bush’s policies in confronting Iraq. Although able to use American prestige to bribe and cajole thirty-four countries into joining the “Coalition of the Willing,” increasing risks and the continued lack of international legitimization demand that the United States carry the vast majority of the burdens and subject the operation to the whimsical nature of the participants’ domestic politics as illustrated by Spain’s decision to leave Iraq. On the contrary, in spite of the high risks of the operation in the Balkans, UNPROFOR, IFOR, SFOR, and KFOR all have had broad international representation. Multinational organizations play an essential role in distributing the political risks and thus expanding the number prepared to assume responsibilities for international order. However, as US and NATO participation in multinational operations from the Gulf War of 1991 through NATO’s air campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999 show, contingent particulars having to do with states’ incongruous aims or limited means almost guarantee an unequal divisibility of costs and risks. As a result of their difficulties in reaching unanimity, many multinational organizations are not effective in handling an operation’s tactical military command nor do they possess the military resources needed to impose cease-fires and settlements. As a result, there remains a need for a balance between great power leadership and capabilities and 162

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institutional legitimacy. In the Persian Gulf crisis, this balance reached an apex. Broad participation occurred because Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm were authorized by the UN. American military resources were the foundation of the Coalition that effectively used force against Saddam. In Bosnia, however, the UN assumed control beyond its capabilities and expertise. It sought to enforce policy with insufficient military forces. By failing to provide UNPROFOR with sufficient capabilities to use force effectively and by refusing to authorize punitive airstrikes by NATO forces, the UN failed to deter violence against both civilians and its own forces. The European Union, which was the other primary multinational organization involved in Yugoslavia, also was culpable. Simply throwing money at the problem proved unsatisfactory, while the EU’s wait-and-see policy was disastrous. The public bickering and lack of unity among the European allies reassured the Bosnian-Serbs and their Serbian clients that the Europeans were not prepared to launch a serious peace-enforcement effort.12 The result was continued conflict first in Bosnia and subsequently in Kosovo that was stopped only when a balance between the multinational organization’s and “great power’s” roles was established.

Déjà vu all over again As this study was being completed the issue of military burden-sharing, at least between the United States and its European allies, may be considered moot. From a military perspective, there is no burden-sharing between these groups. It has become increasingly evident from the Persian Gulf War 1991 through the Balkan conflicts to Afghanistan and Iraq that the United States is willing to assume the preponderance of the military burdens. Rather than negating the importance of burden-sharing however, this trend has served to simply elevate the attention paid to the political aspects of burden-sharing. It has become increasingly important to broadly disburse the political burdens of collective action both to avoid the overt perception of American unilateralism and to accomplish post-war stabilization and normalization. The former German Chancellor Bismarck once noted that every Alliance has a horse and a rider and that one should strive to be the rider. Throughout NATO’s history, the United States has been the rider but sustained deployments in the Balkans, 9-11 and the subsequent war in Afghanistan, and commitment to disarming Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction and dislodging the regime of Saddam Hussein, has left the George W. Bush Administration trying to decide whether it is best to be the rider or simply to give up the horse. Recent events have the Administration simultaneously initiating American troop reductions in the Balkans, seeking international support to 163

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re-build Afghanistan while using NATO as the pivot of a stabilization force, and struggling to assemble a winning coalition even within NATO to confront Saddam. Concurrently, European globalism has increased. In January and February of 2003, the United States and Britain demanded a more assertive UN posture against Hussein, including more intrusive inspections and a more explicit threat of military action than some other Security Council members and NATO allies could stomach. France was the permanent member of the Council most opposed to war until all other options including more intrusive inspections had been given additional time to function. France was supported by Germany, whose relationship with Washington had become strained in the autumn and winter of 2002–03 on a variety of security and foreign policy issues. The particulars over military action and burden-sharing in Mesopotamia, both regarding the conduct of the war itself and the postwar reconstruction of Iraq, were among many indicators of a transformation of NATO’s regime as an alliance. This transformation, begun in the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War and Soviet disintegration, reorganized NATO’s capabilities and redefined its political selfconcept in the direction of a flexible Eurasian security community. In this evolving version of a new NATO, the Alliance has expanded its membership to include East, Central and Southern European states that were willing to meet the Alliance’s criteria of market economies, political democracies, and the assumption of responsibility for collective security. The latter is particularly evident in the participation of new full and Partnership for Peace members both in Afghanistan and the Iraq conflict.13 For example, the “Coalition of the Willing” has a large Polish contingent as well as Ukrainian and Azeri forces. In fact, the willingness to participate in out-of-the-area actions has almost become a right of passage for new Alliance states and those seeking membership. NATO’s geographical and functional expansion also changed its relationship with Russia from former adversary or wary observer of NATO enlargement into that of a potential strategic partner, albeit one with its own agenda of security issues apart from NATO. The more inclusive and more ambitious NATO does not necessarily make the dilemmas of military burden-sharing any easier. And in some respects it might complicate burden-sharing. For example: although “NATO” as such did not wage war in Afghanistan in 2001–02 nor did NATO have the political responsibility for disarming Iraq, it was obvious that NATO members’ participation was desirable, if not necessary, in both military operations and was essential in the post-war rebuilding of new political orders. And in both cases, although the United States was willing to do the heavy lifting in terms of combat actions, Washington could not bring both closure to the military phase and provide for postwar pacification by itself. Thus, to lessen its burden and to offer political 164

CONCLUSION

legitimization, the United States found it necessary to share decision making about post-war Afghanistan. To do so, some twenty-two states have contributed forces to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) designed to protect the interim post-Taliban Afghan regime. Notwithstanding, the United States maintains a sizable military force in Afghanistan outside of the ISAF command structure to continue counter-terrorist actions. Issues of burden-sharing also relate to the war against terror following 9-11. Consensual support existed among the American and allied NATO publics for prosecution of the war against terror by all legal means. However, “terrorism” was a broad compass, and various North American and European states differed as to the specifics in defining the most important threats and the appropriate responses. No one can deny that the United States received important support from allied governments in and outside of Europe in the post-9-11 war against al-Qaeda. The cooperation among allied NATO intelligence and security organs was especially important. Nevertheless, some wondered whether more could or should have been done. The prospect of war against Iraq in 2003 was of concern to some observers who feared that it would detract from the immediate priorities of intelligence and defense cooperation against terrorism. These and other events since 9-11 support the case for the framework of analysis outlined earlier in this book. The importance of international threat perceptions, the questions of capability and cooperative security, and the issues of political identity all come together when states must cut the cake of military burden-sharing. Putting troops in harm’s way, whether in the name of peace enforcement, humanitarian rescue, or war-making tout court, requires that leaders decide who will lift which loads, and for how long. Despite the United States’ status as the world’s singular military superpower and leading economy at the dawn of the twenty-first century, questions of burden-sharing are as pertinent now as formerly. The United States can do very little by itself in the way of military intervention without dysfunctional political side payments both at home and abroad. Multilateral security cooperation may be the bane of hubristic American neo-conservatives, or a source of frustration for an emerging cadre of thinly concealed neo-imperialists. But multilateralism is also a fact of military life in the twenty-first century in order for states to prevail and accomplish their objectives at an acceptable cost, therefore, burden-sharing is equally unavoidable as an important issue for future policy and military studies. The purpose of this study has been to explore the impact of systemic change on burden-sharing. It has established that states’ willingness to accept risks, allocate defense resources, and assume responsibility for international order is dependent upon the international system which 165

CONCLUSION

defines the perceived threats and opportunities that act as primary incentives for nation-state action. In the time covered by this study, the impact of the changes in burden-sharing has been so significant that the concept was replaced by “responsibility sharing” in the jargon of the Clinton Pentagon and State Department. Responsibility sharing represents an attempt to establish a more equitable assessment of the distribution of the dangers and burdens of collective security stimulated by a change in perceived threats within the international system. Responsibility sharing has been positively influenced by the emergence of a stronger European security and defense identity. The development of a regional security network in East Asia has improved the national defense capabilities among many allied countries, all of which compels the United States to demand that the costs of forward deployment be shared internationally. In many respects, responsibility sharing represents a greater reliance on the Canadian model of contributions that assesses a country’s contribution in relation to its capabilities, and does not necessarily equate contribution in terms of total costs. Mr Walsh termed it moving the focus of assessment from the “debit to the credit side” of the ledger.14 The newly emerging security phenomena are only partially formed and thus comprehensive responsibility sharing remains more conceptual than practical. Few of the collective arrangements, currently in existence, have the requisite political, economic, and defense resources and capabilities to effectively contribute to peace enforcement operations. As is evident from the cases presented here, though, coercion and willingness to effectively use force remain important factors even in a responsibility sharing environment. However, as a result of insufficient military capabilities or certain historical perceptions concerning the legality of the use of force, the distribution of burdens, in some operations, is limited. Another inhibitor to responsibility sharing is the level of threat perceived by individual states. This perception is never equal, thus the most critical incentive for participation cannot be proportionate.15 In terms of areas of responsibility or interests, the United States, because of its global prestige, interests, and capabilities, feels compelled or is forced to respond internationally more frequently than most of its European allies. Thus, American leadership and commitment continue to remain a prerequisite to international order and too much American burden shedding is neither desirable nor advisable. President George W. Bush’s war against terrorism shows the need for American leadership in international security matters; but, it also shows America’s dependency upon allied governments and their military, intelligence and internal security forces if this war is to be pursued to any outcome approximating success.

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Notes 1 See Samuel Huntington, 1996: Chapter 1. Huntington’s contention is that in the post-Cold War era, distinctions among peoples are not based on ideology, politics, or economics but on ancestry, religion, language, history, values, customs, and institutions. In developing his theory Huntington has ascribed the tenets of traditional nationalism into a much larger group. While having some validity, this approach dilutes nationalism and ignores intra-cultural sensitivities. For example, unity among Muslims is negatively affected by the deeply rooted hatred between Shi’a and Sunni Islam. 2 “Clinton Sets Kosovo Emergency Funding at $6 Billion,” Defense Press Service, 4/21/99. 3 In The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order, Huntington points out that clan conflict in Somalia and tribal clashes in Rwanda have limited consequences, although neighbors in the latter case may be impacted. However, clashes occurring on “fault lines between civilizations” such as Bosnia in which “cultural commonalities and differences shape the interests, antagonisms, and associations of states” are more dangerous (1996: 28–9). 4 When the United States was debating whether to maintain its contribution to SFOR in spring and summer 1997, France let it be known that if the United States would withdraw from this action, they also would withdraw. More recently, NATO decided to support Biljana Plavsic as president of Republika Srpska. In spite of her support of ethnic cleansing policies during the war, Plavsic’s willingness to accept some of the stipulations put forth at Dayton has greater promise to establishing an environment in which peace can grow and NATO may depart. See “The Lesser of Evils,” Newsweek, September 1, 1997: 39. 5 NYT, 9/2/94. 6 “All Things Considered,” NPR, 8/27/97. 7 Hendrikson, 1995: 3. 8 “Multifunctional peacekeeping” resulted from the UN’s experiences in Somalia and Bosnia and was first addressed as an extension of peacekeeping in the January 1995 Supplement to the UN Secretary General’s 1992 Agenda for Peace. Its primary instruments are disarmament, sanctions, and enforcement actions that are identified as the “coercive” elements of peacekeeping (Lightburn, 1996: 3). 9 “US Participation in United Nations Peacekeeping Activities.” Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, House of Representatives, June, September, October 1993. 10 Madeleine K. Albright outlined the United States’ responsibility to continued engagement even when not leading in her testimony before the House Foreign Relations Committee on “US Participation in UN Peacekeeping Activities,” 6/24/93: 3–7. 11 See Robert Gilpin (1981) and Kenneth Waltz (1979) cited in Chapter One of this study. 12 NPR, Morning Edition, 7/22/97.

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13 Troop contributions by country to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq: ISAF personnel as of February 2004 Country

Contributions

Canada Germany France Italy United Kingdom Norway Belgium Turkey Greece Spain Denmark Afghanistan United Statesa Bulgaria Sweden Finland Romania Croatia Netherlands Azerbaijan Albania Poland FYRM Latvia Luxembourg Hungary Estonia Ireland New Zealand Lithuania Switzerland Czech Republic Portugal

1,859 1,737 530 494 325 247 232 147 122 121 106 82 79 49 46 37 34 33 25 23 22 13 11 9 9 8 6 5 4 2 2 1 1

Source: NATO, www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/02-february/ e0209b.htm. Note a An additional 11,000 US forces in Afghanistan do not serve under ISAF command.

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Contributions of troops and police in Iraq 3/16/04 Country

Contributions

United States United Kingdom Italy Poland Ukraine Spaina Netherlands Australia Romania Bulgaria Thailand Denmark South Koreab Hondurasa El Salvador Hungary Japanb Norway Mongolia Azerbaijan Dominican Republica Portugal Latvia Lithuania Slovakia Czech Republic Philippines Albania Georgia New Zealand Moldova Estonia Macedonia Kazakhstan

130,000 9,000 3,000 2,460 1,600 1,300 1,100 0,800 0,700 0,480 0,440 0,420 0,400 0,370 0,380 0,300 0,240 0,179 0,160 0,150 0,150 0,128 0,120 0,118 0,102 0,80 0,96 0,70 0,70 0,61 0,50 0,31 0,37 0,25

Source: “Nations Participating in Iraq Operations,” AFP, 3/16/04. Notes a Spain, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic withdrew their forces from Iraq starting in May 2004. b Japan and South Korea’s forces are strictly non-combatants and in the late spring 2004 are scheduled to increase to 550 and 3,000, respectively.

14 Walsh, Author’s Interview August, 1995. 15 Duke, 1993: 189.

169

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Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary General, “Peacekeeping and Conflict Prevention: What Risks and Threats in Geopolitics in the Future?” Aspen Institute (January 13, 2000). Javier Solana, Secretary General of NATO, North Atlantic Assembly Meeting, Athens (May 20, 1996). ——, Atlantic Treaty Association Assembly, Rome (November 4, 1996). ——, North Atlantic Assembly Meeting London (March 4, 1997). ——, “Crisis Management and NATO Reform,” speech in Rome, May 15, 1998. Margaret Thatcher, Former British Prime Minister, Address to National Press Club, CNN (November 11, 1995). Miguel D. Walsh, Assistant for NATO Policy, Department of Defense, European/NATO Policy (Interview August, 1995). Defense Attachés, Embassies of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany (Phone Interviews 1996).

Government reports and documents A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. The White House, July 1994. The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1987. The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations. Presidential Policy Directive #25, May 1994. Common Security Interests in the Middle East. Committee on Armed Services. US House of Representatives, HASC 100–113, April 20, 1988. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War. Final Report to Congress. Department of Defense, April 1992. Crisis in the Persian Gulf Region: US Policy Options and Implications. Committee on Armed Services. US Senate. S.Hrg. 101–1071, September 11, 13; November 27–30; December 3, 1990. Daggett, Stephen and Kathleen Hicks. Defense Budget: Alternative Measures of Costs of Military Commitments Abroad. CRS Report for Congress (June 16, 1995). ——. Defense Burdensharing: Is Japan’s Host Nation Support a Model for Other Allies? CRS Report for Congress, June 20, 1994. Defense Burdensharing Alternatives for the Future. Committee on Armed Services, US House of Representatives. HASC 100–124, May 12, 18, 24, 1988. Defense Burdensharing: The Costs, Benefits, and Future of US Alliances. Committee on Armed Services. US House of Representatives. HASC 100–111, February 2, March 1–2, 1988. Defence Capabilities Initiative. NATO Press Release NAC-S(99)69, 4/25/99 on-line at www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99s069e.htm. Garamone, Jim, DoD Studies Kosovo Lessons Learned. American Forces Press Service, October 14, 1999. Bosnia–Herzegovina. Department of State Brief, 1997. Discriminate Deterrence Long-term Strategy. The White House, January 1988. European Security Issues and the Cost of Defending the Post-INF Europe. Committee on Armed Services. US House of Representatives. HASC 100–115, March 15–16, 1988.

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The Future of U.N. Peacekeeping Operations. Committee on Foreign Affairs. US House of Representatives, March 25, 1992. Holbrooke, Richard C. The Future of NATO and Europe’s Changing Security Landscape. Statement before Subcommittee on Airland Forces. US Senate, April 5, 1995. The Impact of the Persian Gulf and the Decline of the Soviet Union on How the United States Does Its Defense Business. Committee on Armed Services. US House of Representatives. HASC 102–117, February, March, April, May, June, 1991. Measures of Defense Burdensharing and US Proposals for Increasing Allied Burdensharing. Committee on Armed Services. US House of Representatives. HASC 100–114, May 10, 1988. National Security Revitalization Act. United States House of Representatives. HR #7 no. 104–118, Parts I, II, and III, February 6, 1995. National Security Strategy of the United States. The White House, March 1990. NATO Handbook. NATO Office of Information and Press. Brussels, Belgium, 1995. Office of Management and Budget Report 12, October 15, 1992. Persian Gulf Allied Burden Sharing Efforts. Report to the Chairman, Committee on Armed Services. House of Representatives. US GAO (December 1991). Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan. 1982, 1983, 1984, US GPO, Washington, DC, 1984–85. Reaction to Burdensharing Proposals. Committee on Armed Services. US House of Representatives. HASC 100–128, September 27, 1988. Report of the Department of Defense Burdensharing. Panel of the Committee on Armed Services. US House of Representatives, August 1988. Report of the Department of Defense (Long) Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act. October 23, 1983 (December 20, 1983). Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense. Department of Defense Report to US Congress, May 1993. SFOR Lessons Learned in Creating a Secure Environment with Respect for the Rule of Law. US Army Peacekeeping Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle PA, May 2000. Strategic Assessment 1995. Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1995. United States’ Costs in the Persian Gulf Conflict and Foreign Contributions to Offset Such Costs. Report #21 Office of Budget and Management, October 15, 1992. “US Participation in United Nations Peacekeeping Activities.” Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, House of Representatives, June, September, October 1993. The United States and the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War World: Toward SelfDeterrence. Report Prepared for the Committee on Foreign Affairs. US House of Representatives, August 1994.

UN documents Assessment of Member States’ Contribution for the Financing of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) from January 12, 1993 to February 20, 1993.

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Concepts of Security. United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs. Study Series #14, 1986. Financing the United Nations Protection Force. General Assembly Resolution 47/210, March 24, 1993. Financing the United Nations Protection Force. General Assembly Resolution 47/210/Add. 1, October 23, 1993. Letter from Secretary General to President of Security Council, January 23, 1997. Letter from Secretary General of NATO to Secretary General of UN, January 22, 1997. Monthly Report to UNSC on Stabilization Force Operations, January 31, 1997. Report of the General Secretary Pursuant to Resolution 1025 and 1026, February 6, 1996. Report of the General Secretary Pursuant to Resolution 1035, March 29, 1996. Status of Contributions as of February 1997. United Nations Secretariat, March 12, 1997. United Nations Peacekeeping: Former Yugoslavia – UNPROFOR. United Nations, September 1996. United Nations Peace-keeping: Update December 1994. United Nations, February 1995. The United Nations and the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia. United Nations, March 15, 1994 and Add. 1, January 23, 1995. The United Nations and the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia. United Nations, April 1995. The United Nations and the Situation in Somalia. United Nations, April 1995.

NATO, OSCE, WEU reports and documents The Role of Europe in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Assembly of the Western European Union, Document 1541, October 15, 1996. Collective Security Revisited: Working Group on Transatlantic and European Organizations. North Atlantic Assembly, May 1995 and October 1995. Decisions by the CSCE Member Representatives. Budapest Summit, December 1994. “History of the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” NATO Document, January 2004 available on-line at www.nato.int/sfor/ docu/d981116a.htm. IFOR/OMRI Release, NATO (January 10, 1996). Available on-line at www.nato.org/bosnia. Meeting of the North Atlantic Council. Ministerial Session. Final Communiqué. NATO Headquarters. Brussels, December 10, 1995. Meeting of the North Atlantic Council. Defense Ministers’ Session. Final Communiqué. Brussels, December 17–18, 1996. Military Airlift – Prospects for Europe. Report by the Technological and Aerospace Committee, Assembly of Western European Union, Document #1484, November 6, 1995. NATO Fact Sheets including Operation Deny Flight, KFOR, SFOR available at www.nato.int.

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NATO Press Communiqué: Heads of State Report, Brussels, November 1991. NATO Press Communiqués: Ministerial Meeting of North Atlantic Council, Berlin, June 3, 1996. “NATO’s Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo.” NATO on-line at www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm. New Trends in North American Countries’ Foreign Policy and Their Implications for Transatlantic Co-operation in Security and Defence Matters, Document #1457-1, NATO, May 15, 1995. North Atlantic Assembly Report, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, November 1994. Press Statements by NATO General Secretary. Report to Ministers by the Political-Military Steering Committee/Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping, May 31, 1995. Security in a Changing World Guidelines for Finland’s Security Policy. Report by the Council of State to the Parliament, June 6, 1995. SFOR Fact Sheet January 2004 available on-line at www.nato.int/sfor/ factsheet/restgruct/t040121a.htm. SFOR Organization, October 13, 2003. Available on-line at www.nation.int/sfor/ organization/sfororg.htm. Sub-Committee on the Southern Region (draft report), October 1995. Western Defense: the European Role in NATO, Eurogroup, NATO, Brussels, May 1989. WEU Contribution to the European Union Intergovernmental Conference of 1996. WEU Council of Ministers, Madrid, November 14, 1995. WEU in the Atlantic Alliance. Assembly of Western European Union Political Committee, Document #1487, November 6, 1995.

180

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Note: page numbers in italics refer to tables or figures Afghanistan: Bush Jr. 22; Germany 132, 158; mujahadeen 33; NATO xi, 91; postwar 165; Soviet Union 33, 61n34; Taliban viii, ix, 90; US ix African politics 22–3 Aidid, Muhammad Farah 30n24, 62n70 air bases 16, 20, 85, 96n40, 134 AirLand doctrine 71, 84–5 airstrikes 106–7, 108, 111, 119–20 Albania 133 Albanians, ethnic 119, 130 Albright, Madeline 124 Allied Force Operation 120, 136 AMAL 42, 60n31 Andreotti, Guilio 74 anti-terrorism ix–x anti-war demonstrations 83 Arab–Israeli conflict 75 Arab–Israeli peace 33, 75–6 Arab coalition 64, 70, 80–1 Arab Defense Force 41 Arab League 33–4, 41, 51, 66, 67–8, 92 Arafat, Yasir 40, 59n5, 60n13 Argentina 46–7 Aristotle 29n10 arms embargo 100, 110–11 arms trade 16, 24, 67, 132–3 al-Asad, Hafez 39, 40, 81 association 29n10 Aziz, Abdul 72 Aziz, Tariq 70–1 Baker, James 64, 69, 70–1, 73, 81 Bakhtiar, Shapur 60–1n34 Balkans: burden-sharing 127–40, 144, 160–1; collective threats 121–2; Contact Group 108–9, 112, 114–15, 118–19, 123–5, 129; containment 98; EU 125;

Germany 139–40; global order 136; multilateralism 29; NATO 1–2, 124, 155, 160; Russia 5; UN 29, 155, 160; US 99, 160–1; see also Bosnia; Croatia; Kosovo; Yugoslavia benefits 11, 76–8, 121–7, 159 Bentley, Arthur 29n10 Berri, Nabih 42, 52 Bessmertnykh, Alexander 73 Bihac 103–4, 111 Bismarck, Otto Edward Leopold von 163–4 Bosnia 3, 5; arms embargo 110–11; arms trade 132–3; Bush Snr. 101; casualties 98; Clinton 104, 105, 107, 112, 114, 116, 119, 127, 148n17; EU 127; Germany 5, 26–7, 125–6, 140; humanitarian interventions 98; Iran 132; Islamic countries 139; Jordan 155; NATO 26, 127, 142–3; no-fly zone 103, 148n15; refugees 120–1, 122; safe havens 103–4, 109–10, 114; UN 5, 127, 156; UNPROFOR 131; US 143–4; WEU 100, 142; see also IFOR; SFOR Bosnian Croats 101 Bosnian Muslims 101, 103, 106, 107–8, 110, 149n29 Bosnian Serbs 108–9 Boutros Ghali, Boutros 106, 115 Bremer, Paul vii Brezhnev, Leonid 34–5, 37 Brown, Harold 8 Brzezinski, Zbigniew 99 burden-sharing: anti-terrorism ix–x; Balkans 127–40, 144, 160–1; Coalition Provisional Authority 79; Cold War 9; comparative advantage 12; contribution 157–8; costs/risks 154–5; Deliberate

181

INDEX

burden-sharing – contd. Force Operation 134–5; democracy 153; economic factors 23–4; EU/NATO 98, 140; Eurogroup 30n14; financial 8–9; Gulf War 79–88, 160; host nation support 18, 134; IFOR 136–7; international system 158–9; Israel 26; Kosovo 136; Lebanon 160; multidimensional 20; multilateral 130–1; NATO 1, 2, 18, 32–3; Olson 9–10; over flight requests 134; peer pressure 12; political 8–9; practical 15; reconstruction 141; SFOR 136–7; stabilization 141; systemic change 165–6; terrorism 20; US 163–4; values 17–18 Bush, George H. W. vii–viii; Bosnia 101; Gorbachev 69; Gulf War 79–80, 87; Hussein 22; Mitterrand 65; NATO 89; Powell Doctrine 65–6; Soviet Union 74 Bush, George W.: Afghanistan 22; Hussein 89; Iraq vi, 88–92, 162, 163–4; Normandy beaches 153; unilateralism vii–viii, 89–90; war against terrorism x, 9, 166 Cairo Summit 67–8 Caldwell, Raymond 7 Carnegie Balkan Commission 98, 146n2 Carter, J. 32–3, 56, 95n25 casualties: Bosnia 98; civilian 111, 122; Gulf War 84; Iraq 91; Lebanon 37, 44, 60n27; media 21; MNF 39–40; Multinational Force 39–40; Pakistani troops 6, 7n3; peace enforcement 157–8; peacekeeping 21; Somalia 6, 7n3, 21; UNPROFOR 21 Chad 16 Chechnya 22 checkbook diplomacy 21, 155 Cheney, Richard 67, 93 Chevenement, Jean-Pierre 72, 80, 96n34 China 66, 68, 70, 80 Christian Lebanese Forces 42, 59n5 Christian Phalange militia 39 Christopher, Warren 105 civil society 27, 138 civilian casualties 111, 122 CJTF agreement 110, 114, 123, 131 Clark, Wesley 139 Clausewitz, Carl Von vi Clinton, W. J.: Bosnia 104, 105, 107, 112, 114, 116, 119, 127, 148n17; Haiti 21; Iran 19; Milosevic 130; multilateralism 9, 30n24; Somalia 6, 7n3

Coalition Provisional Authority: Bremer vii; burden-sharing 79; collective benefits 77–8; Egypt 81, 96n39; France 72; victory 75, 90 Coast Guard 87 Cold War: burden-sharing 9; collective defense 14, 32; ending viii; freedom 153; Lebanon 4; NATO 1–2, 28, 58–9n2; Soviet Union 14 collective action 11, 12–13, 15, 24, 63–4 colonial legacy 16, 17, 27 commitment 11 comparative advantage 12, 15–16, 157 compellance/deterrence 14 Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe see CSCE Conoco 20 Contact Group 108–9, 112, 124–5; EU 129; Milosevic 118–19; NATO 114–15, 123–4 containment 17, 19–20, 88–9, 98 Contras 33 contribution 12; burden-sharing 157–8; Deliberate Force 135; Deny Flight 133; Germany 97n47; Gulf War 84–5, 86; IFOR 146; Iraq 169; ISAF 168; KFOR 140; models 19, 166; NATO 31n41, 106; Partnership for Peace 164; UN peacekeeping 106; UNPROFOR 131, 145; zero conjectural variation 18 Cooper, Charles A. 12 costs 18, 154–5 Craxi, Bennito 52 credibility: NATO 99, 110, 119, 124, 126–7, 134–5, 155; UN 99, 102, 122–3, 155 Croatia 100–1, 102 CSCE 19, 59n2; see also Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Davis, James 27 Dayton Accords 3, 107, 150n56, 161; Bosnian Muslims 149n29; IFOR 116, 143; SFOR 117, 143 defense 10–11; collective 1, 10, 13–14, 15, 32; European capabilities 98; resource allocation 25–6, 52; spending 26, 30n31 Defense Capabilities Initiatives 130, 144 Deliberate Force Operation 115–16, 122, 130, 134–5, 143 democracy 153, 154 Deny Flight Operation 103, 115, 130, 132, 133–4, 143, 148n15 Desert Fox Operation 156 Desert Shield Operation 3, 65–76, 87, 163

182

INDEX

Desert Storm Operation viii, 2–3, 66–76, 82, 87, 93, 158, 163 deterrence 10, 14, 26, 149n35 Division Equivalent Firepower 26 Dole, Robert 111, 114 Druze faction 39, 41, 42, 50, 57, 60n31 dual-key system 108, 114, 148–9n20 Dumas, Roland 71, 75 economic embargo 82, 101 Edgerton, Daniel 30n14 Egypt: Arab bloc 80; Coalition Provisional Authority 81, 96n39; debt 78; Gulf War 68; Israel 33; refugee relief 88 ethnic cleansing 98, 103, 118, 122, 138, 156 EUFOR 123 Eurogroup 30n14 Europe, eastern 24 European Commission 88 European Community 66 European Security and Defense Initiative 142 European Union: Balkans 125; Bosnia 127; burden-sharing 140; Contact Group 129; defense capabilities 98; Defense Capability Initiative 144; defense spending 30n31; Gulf War 76; KFOR 123, 127, 130, 139; NATO 46, 98, 140; peacekeeping 28; prestige 29; rapid reaction force 113–14; SFOR 146n1; shared responsibility 98 exploitation 10, 17–18 externalities 16 Fahd, King 36–7, 67 Falkland Islands 46–7 HMS Fearless 54 Fez Plan 36–7 France: Chad 16; Coalition 72; colonial legacy 16, 17, 27; eastern Europe 24; embassy in Kuwait 78; Gemayel 52; Gulf War 72, 80, 86; Lebanon 16, 32, 35–9, 42, 44–5, 47, 50, 53, 55–6, 62n61; Middle East 45; MNF 53; peacekeeping 28; Persian Gulf 96n34; spillover 16; UNIFIL troops 43; war against terror ix free riding 10, 11, 55, 57, 86 game theory 16 Garner, Jay vii Gemayel, Amin: Arab League 41; France 52; Israel 40; Lebanon 57; MNF 38–9, 43; US 37, 49, 51 Gemayel, Bashir 35, 37

General Framework Agreement for Peace see Dayton Accords geopolitics viii, 32, 33, 45–6, 77, 153 Germany: Afghanistan 132, 158; air bases 85; arms sales 24; Balkans 139–40; Bosnia 5, 26–7, 125–6, 140; checkbook diplomacy 21; Contact Group 125; contribution 97n47; global influence 8, 65; Gulf War 4, 72, 80, 155, 158; humanitarianism 28; KFOR 126; Kosovo 132, 140, 158; MNF 48; Persian Gulf 61n45; rapid reaction force 113; refugee relief 88; re-unified role 21, 126; Somalia 5; US coercion 16 Gingrich, Newt 114 globalization 154 Golden, James 11 good: collective 17; public/private 10, 11, 29n5, 122 Gorazde 103, 107, 108, 112, 114, 115 Gorbachev, Mikhail 4–5, 69, 70, 74, 93 Greater Serbia–Greater Croatia Agreement (1991) 106 Gulf Cooperation Council 67, 81 Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group 87 Gulf States 77, 85 Gulf War: burden-sharing 79–88, 160; Bush Snr. 79–80, 87; casualties 84; coalition 15, 80–1; Cold War 2; contribution 86; Egypt 68; EU 76; France 72, 80; Germany 4, 72, 80, 155, 158; Japan 4, 85, 158; Kuwait 13; Mitterrand 72, 96n34; Morocco 68; NATO 92–3; non-defense expenses 87; over flight requests 85; Pax Americana 4; refugee relief 88; Saudi Arabia 4, 15, 85; Soviet Union 4–5, 28, 80; Syria 68; UK 72, 86; UN 63–4; UNSC 2–3; US 4, 63–5, 76, 86, 93–4, 156; see also Iraq Gulf War Syndrome 87 Haass, Richard 152n102 Habib, Philip 40, 51 Haiti 17, 21, 23, 105 Harmel Report 18 Holbrooke, Richard 108, 140 de Hoop Scheffer, Jaap 91 Hormuz, Straits of 24, 33, 46, 61n34 Host Nation Support agreements 18, 134 hostages 68, 106, 157 human rights violations 122, 126 humanitarian interventions 121–7, 146, 152n102; Bosnia 98; comparative advantage 15–16; failed 154–5;

183

INDEX

humanitarian interventions – contd. Germany 28; Lebanon 37, 44–8; multilateralism 9; nation building 21; rules of engagement 21–2; Sarajevo 102; Somalia 30n24, 159 Hunter, Robert 7 Huntington, Samuel P. 28, 31n62, 121, 167n1, n3 Hurd, Douglas 69 Hussein, King 40, 51, 56, 60n13 Hussein, Saddam: Bush Jr. vi, 89; Bush Snr. 22; hostages 68; Israel 83; Kuwait 65; non-removal 95n20; oil 76–7; regime destroyed 13, 90 IFOR (NATO Implementation Force) 3, 99, 116–17, 131–2, 136–7, 146 institutions, international 28, 86 intelligence networks 23 Intermediate Nuclear Forces 33 International Police Task Force 138 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 165, 168 Internet 154 Iran 19, 20, 24, 33, 60–1n34, 132 Iran–Iraq war 33, 61n34 Iraq vii, x–xi; Arabs 64; Bush Jr. vi, 88–92, 162, 163–4; contribution 169; demilitarized zone 75; economic embargo 82; ground war 74, 90; imports/exports 83; Israel 73, 77, 83; Kurds 78; Kuwait 4, 13, 64–5, 66–8, 70, 93; PLO 75; post-war unrest vii, 3, 90–1; power vacuum 74; Republican Guards 75; sanctions 24, 92; Saudi Arabia 73, 77, 95n26; SCUD missiles 73; Soviet citizens 94n14; Soviet Union 74, 93; Syria 77; troops 169; UN 92; US 122 Iraqi Freedom Operation 90 Iraqi National Congress 89 ISAF see International Security Assistance Force Islamic countries 121–2, 131, 139 Islamic fundamentalism 107–8, 122, 129 Israel: burden-sharing 26; Egypt 33; Gemayel 40; Iraq 73, 77, 83; Lebanon 33–4, 41; neutrality 80, 81–2; Syria 34–5, 36, 51; US 56, 78, 81–2 Israeli–Egyptian Peace Treaty 60–1n34 Israeli Defense Forces 37, 59n7, 60n27 Italy: air access 20, 85; Communist Party 43, 97n48; geopolitics 45–6; Gulf War 72; Lebanon 32, 35–9, 47, 50, 52, 53, 62n61; Palestinians 38; peacekeeping 28 Ivory Coast 22

Jackson, Michael 120, 139 Janvier, Bernard 113, 115 Japan 8; containment 19–20; eastern Europe 24; Gulf War 4, 85, 158; prestige 16; refugee relief 88; sanctions 66 JNA (Yugoslav People’s Army) 100 Joint Endeavor Operation 117, 143 Joint Guard Operation 137, 143 Jones, James L. 91 Jordan 40, 81, 155 Jumblatt, Walid 39, 52 Karadzic, Radovan 117, 138 Karzai, Hamid xi KFOR (NATO Stabilization Force) 120–1; contribution 140; deployment 139, 157; EU 123, 127, 130, 139; Germany 126 Khaddam, Abdul Halim 42 Khomeini, Ayatollah 60–1n34 Kinkel, Klaus 114 Kissinger, Henry 65, 69, 79 Kohl, Helmut 48, 71 Korea 17 Kosovo ix, 118–21; burden-sharing 136; Defense Capabilities Initiatives 130; Germany 132, 140, 158; Milosevic 122, 161; NATO 5, 143, 156; Russia 128; stabilization 139; UN 141–2; US 5, 143–4 Kosovo Liberation Army 108, 120–1 Kozyrev, Andre 114 Krajina 111, 115 Kurds 15, 55, 77, 78 Kuwait 24, 86; French embassy 78; Hussein 65; Iraq 4, 13, 64–5, 66, 68, 70, 93; liberation 73, 76 Lake, Anthony 108, 112 Laski, Harold 29n10 leadership 12–13, 63–4, 162–3; see also United States of America, hegemony Lebanese Armed Forces 36, 38, 39, 41–3, 51, 54 Lebanon 160; Christians 59n5; civil war 33, 58; Cold War 4; France 16, 32, 35–9, 42, 44–5, 50, 53, 55–6, 62n61; free riding 55, 57; Gemayel 57; humanitarian interventions 37, 44–8; Israel 33–4, 41, 60n27; Italy 32, 35–9, 47, 50, 52, 53, 62n61; massacres 37, 44; May Accord 40, 51, 57; mission creep 62n70; MNF 2–3, 32, 34, 35–8, 41, 55, 162; National Pact 33; NATO 1–2, 39,

184

INDEX

47–8; PLO 35; Reagan 39, 41, 43, 49, 50; Soviet Union 4, 45, 161; Syria 39, 42, 57–8, 81; terrorism 42–3; troops 35–6; UK 32, 39, 43, 46–7; UN 161; US 32, 47, 48–9, 53–4, 155–6; US Marines 38, 158 Leighton Smith, Admiral 115 Liberia 17, 22 Libya 16, 94n17 Lithuania 71, 80 London Resolution 119 Luttwak, Edward 63 Macedonia 105, 120 McFarlane, Robert 40 Madrid Conference 75–6 Major, John 82, 88 Mansfield Debates 17 Marshall Plan 24 massacres 37, 44, 70 May 17 Accord 40, 51, 57 media 21 Middle East 32–3, 42, 45–6, 68, 95n18 Milholin, Gary 95–6n27 Milosevic, Slobodan 109, 118, 119–20, 122, 130, 161 mission creep 14, 21, 30n24, 32, 62n70 missions, failed 21, 22, 48, 154–5 Mitterrand, François: Bush Snr. 65; Gulf War 72, 96n34; Lebanon 44–5, 55–6; MNF 39; public approval 75 Mladic, Ratko 138 Montenegro 101 Morocco 68 Mostar 101 Mubarak, Hosni 51, 56, 68, 80, 96n39 mujahadeen 33 multilateralism 9; aggressive/discriminate 98; Balkans 29; burden-sharing 130–1; Clinton 9, 30n24; containment 88–9; organizations 99–100; security 28 Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) 59n3 Multinational Force (MNF) 32, 38–9, 43; casualties 39–40; deployment 58n1; Germany 48; Lebanon 2–3, 32, 34, 35–8, 41, 55, 162; PLO 37; Reagan 59n9; Soviet Union 58; US 50–1, 61–2n58 Muslim–Croat agreement 129; see also Bosnian Muslims Muslim–Croat Federation Army 139 Muslim Brotherhood 81 nation building 21, 124, 157, 159 National Salvation Front 39, 42

National Security Revitalization Act (US) 5, 77 NATO Extraction Force 120 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) ix, x, 7; Afghanistan xi, 91; airstrikes 106–7, 108, 111, 119–20; Alliance 101, 107; Article V viii–ix; Balkans 1–2, 124, 155, 160; Bosnia 26, 127, 142–3; burden-sharing 1, 2, 18, 32–3; Bush Snr. 89; CJTF program 110, 131; Cold War 1–2, 28; collective defense 13–14; Contact Group plan 114–15, 123–4; contribution 31n41, 106; credibility 99, 110, 119, 124, 126–7, 134–5, 155; cumulative model 19; Deny Flight Operation 115; dual-key system 108; early warning aircraft 133–4; EU 46, 98, 140; Gorazde 107; Gulf War 92–3; KFOR 120–1; Kosovo 5, 143, 156; Lebanon 1–2, 39, 47–8; members’ interests 97n58; out of area capabilities 91–2; prestige 111–12; reorganized 164; reserve forces 23, 53; Rome Summit 13; safe haven policy 104–5; Turkey 11; UNPROFOR 103; US 103, 164–5; Warsaw Pact 6; WEU 19, 132 neo-imperialism 81 neo-isolationism 79 neo-liberalism 76 Netherlands Institute for War Documentation 114 Netherlands refugee relief 88 New Jersey battleship 54 new world order 99 Nicaragua 33 Nigeria 22 no-fly zone 103, 148n15 non-involvement 154–5 North Atlantic Association 7 North Atlantic Treaty Organization see NATO Northern Alliance 90 Norway 12 Nunn, Sam 17, 30n31 Offset Agreements 18 oil 88; Iran 20; Iraq 61n34, 76–7; UK 46, 80; US 76–7, 94n2 Olson, Mancur 9–10, 11, 29n10, 86 Ordonez, Francisco Fernande 81 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 7, 117, 118, 128–9, 142; see also CSCE Oslo Agreement 76 over flight requests 16, 20, 34–5, 85, 134

185

INDEX

Owen, David 104 Pakistan ix, 6, 7n3 Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) 34, 35, 37, 59n5, 75 Palestinians 12, 37, 38, 59–60n13, 94n11 Paris Peace Agreement 116 Partnership for Peace 124, 143, 144, 164 Patriot Act (US) x Pax Americana 4, 161 peace enforcement 2, 9, 152n102, 155, 156–8 peacekeeping 2, 28, 152n102, 156–7; casualties 21; comparative advantage 12; multifunctional 167n8; US 57; violence against 155 peer pressure 12 Perez de Cuellar, Javier 71, 100, 102–3, 148n11 Perry, William 23, 108, 111, 133 Persian Gulf 1–2, 61n45, 77, 95n25, 96n34; see also Gulf War; Iraq Pertini, Alessandro 43 Peruca Dam 100, 102 Plavsic, Biljana 167n4 Poland 19, 24 political-economy 16–17 Popsalev, Nikola 117 Powell Doctrine 65–6 prestige: EU 29; Germany 18; Japan 16; NATO 111–12; Turkey 78; US 44, 52, 57, 73, 75, 76, 158 Prevlaka Peninsula 100 Primakov, Yevgeny 69–70, 74 proximity factors 17 public good 10, 11, 29n5, 122 Putin, Vladimir ix al-Qaeda viii, 90, 154, 165 Qian Qichen 70 Rambouillet negotiations 119, 136 rapid reaction force 113–14, 115, 137, 150n44 Reagan, Ronald: Hussein, King 51; Lebanon 39, 41, 43, 49, 50; MNF 59n9; Persian Gulf 95n25; Rollback Doctrine 33, 56; Schultz 42; Soviet Union 32–3, 34–5 Reagan Peace Plan 36, 51, 59–60n13 reconstruction 14–15, 141 refugees 88, 103, 119, 120–1, 122 RFA Reliant 54 religious factors 139 Republican Guards, Iraq 75

Republika Srpska 108, 116, 117, 167n4 reserve forces 23, 53 responsibility: global 20–1, 27; shared 98, 166 reverse value incentive 17 Rifkind, Malcolm 128 risk 25, 93, 110 Rollback Doctrine 33, 56 Rome Summit 13 Rose, Michael 115 Rugova, Ibrahim 118, 130 rule of law 99 rules of engagement 21–2, 101 Rumsfeld, Donald 90 Russia: Balkans 5; Chechnya 22; Kosovo 128; UNPROFOR 107; war against terror ix; see also Soviet Union Rwanda 22, 25, 119, 167n3 Sabra refugee camp 37, 44 safe haven policy 103–5, 109–10, 114 Salem, Elie 42 sanctions 24, 66, 92, 93 Sandinistas 33 Sandler, Todd 16, 17 Sarajevo 102, 103, 107, 114, 115, 122 satisficing 11–12 Saudi Arabia: air bases 20; Desert Shield Operation 65–6; Fahd 36–7; foreign policy 82–3; Germany 24; Gulf War 4, 15, 85; Iraq 73, 77, 95n26; Soviet Union 69 Scharping, Rudolf 139, 140 Schmidt, Helmut 48, 61n45 Schroeder, G. 123, 126 Schultz, George 40, 42, 51 Schwarzkopf, Norman 71–2 security: collective 14, 31n60; cooperative 165; emerging 166; geopolitical 14; Gulf States 77; multilateralism 28; national 14; regional 28 self-abnegation 27, 31n60, 159 self-interest 12–13, 15, 159 Serbia ix, 101 Serbo-Croatian alliance 106 SFOR (NATO Stabilization Force) 3, 99; burden-sharing 117–18, 136–7; continued deployment 157; EU 146n1; US 167n4 Shalikashvili, John 23, 108 Shamir, Yitzhak 60n27 Sharp Guard Operation 27, 132, 143 Shatilla refugee camp 37, 44 Shelton, Henry 136 Shevarnadzne, Eduard 69

186

INDEX

Shouf Mountains 41 shuttle diplomacy 51 Sierra Leone 22 small group theory 12 Smith, Dudley 113 Smith, Rupert 113, 115 Somalia: casualties 6, 7n3, 21; clan conflict 167n3; Germany 5; humanitarian interventions 30n24, 159; mission creep 21; nation building 159; UN 21–2; US 25, 155 Soviet citizens in Iraq 94n14 Soviet Union 18; Afghanistan 33, 61n34; Bush Snr. 74; Cold War 14; Communist Party 73–4; Gulf War 4–5, 28, 80; Iraq 74, 93; Israeli-Syrian conflict 34–5; Lebanon 4, 45, 161; Lithuania 71, 80; Middle East 95n18; MNF 58; Palestinians 94n11; Reagan 32–3, 34–5; Saudi Arabia 69; Syria 56, 59n7; US 75 Spadolini, Giovannia 39, 52 spillover 16, 83 Srebrenica 103, 112, 114, 122, 137 stealth technology 136 Suez crisis 22 Supreme Allied Commander in Europe 139 Suq al-Gharb, battle of 41 Syria: Arab League 33–4; Coalition 81; Gulf War 68; Iraq 77; Israel 34–5, 36, 51; Lebanon 39, 42, 57–8, 81; Soviet Union 56, 59n7; US 35 Taliban viii, ix, 90 Tarnoff, Peter 105–6 terrorism viii, x, 153–4; burden-sharing 20; Lebanon 42–3; US 159–60; see also war against terrorism Thatcher, Margaret 46, 70, 82 Theodore Roosevelt 113 threat 121–2, 160, 165; see also risk assessment Tiananmen Square massacre 70 Turkey: air bases 20, 96n40; Gulf War 72; Kurds 55, 77; Lebanon 47; NATO 11; over flight requests 34–5; prestige 78; refugee relief 88; spillover 83 Tuzla 103, 107, 137 UN (United Nations): Balkans 29, 155, 160; Bosnia 5, 127, 156; collective decisions 92; coordination 161–2; credibility 99, 102, 122–3, 155; Croatia 100; Gulf War 2–3, 63–4; Haiti 23; Iraq 92; Kosovo 141–2; Lebanon 161;

marginalized 28; observers 60n31; Rwanda 22; sanctions against Iraq 92; Somalia 21–2; US vi, 91, 126 UN Confidence Restoration Operation Croatia 113 UN High Commission on Refugees 102, 118 UN Mission in Kosovo 120, 139 UN peacekeeping 106, 126, 147n7 UN Preventive Deployment Force 113 UN Protected Areas 100, 102 UN Protection Force see UNPROFOR UN (United Nations) Security Council vii, 2–3, 34, 68, 70, 88, 89–90, 128 UN (United Nations) Security Council Resolutions: No. 508 61n52; No. 509 61n52; No. 521 61n52; No. 660 66; No. 662 67; No. 665 68; No. 678 4, 70, 71, 74; No. 686 74; No. 687 74–5; No. 689 74–5; No. 713 100; No. 749 100; No. 757 101; No. 781 102; No. 816 103, 148n12; No. 824 103; No. 836 103, 109; No. 900 107; No. 942 112; No. 982 112; No. 1023 119; No. 1031 3; No. 1088 117, 137; No. 1244 120, 130 UNIFIL (UN Intervention Force in Lebanon) 34, 43, 45–6, 47, 49 unilateralism vii–viii, 28, 90, 92, 136, 163–4 United Arab Emirate 66 United Kingdom: colonial legacy 27; Gulf War 72, 86; Iraq/Kuwait 69–70; Lebanon 32, 39, 43, 46–7; oil 46, 80; peacekeeping 28; special relationship with US 78, 80; UNSC Resolution 678 71; war against terror ix United States of America ix, x, 14–15; arms sales 16, 24; Balkans 99, 160–1; Bosnia 143–4; Bosnian Muslims 110; burden-sharing 163–4; Congressional Budget Office 64; Defense Department vi, 38, 101; embassy bombed 40; foreign policy 105; Germany 16, 37, 49, 51; Gulf War 4, 63–5, 76, 85–6, 86, 93–4, 156; hegemony viii, 18, 22, 28, 57, 64–5, 89, 162; Iranian oil embargo 20; Iraq 91, 122; Israel 56, 78, 81–2; Kosovo 5, 143–4; Lebanese Armed Forces 54; Lebanon 32, 47, 48–9, 53–4, 155–6; Macedonia 105; Marine Expeditionary Forces 23, 38, 56–7; Marine Headquarters bombed 41, 42, 53, 158; Middle East 33; MNF 50–1, 61–2n58; National Security Revitalization Act 5, 77; NATO 103, 164–5; oil 76–7, 94n2; Palestinians 59–60n13; Patriot Act x;

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United States of America – contd. pilots 157; Poland 19, 24; prestige 44, 52, 57, 73, 75, 76, 158; rapid reaction force 113; Saudi Arabia 15; SFOR 167n4; Somalia 6, 7n3, 25, 155; Syria 35; troops 6, 7n3, 18, 105, 119; UN 91, 126; unilateralism 28, 92, 136, 163–4; UNSC Resolution 678 71; World War I 153 UNOSOM II 21 UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force) 3, 147n8, 148n10, 149n34; air support 134, 148n10; border controls 102; casualties 21; chain of command 128; contribution 131, 145; Croatia 100; difficulties 99, 131; hostages 106; Islamic countries 131; NATO 103; reintroduced 101–2; rules of engagement 101; Russia 107; safe haven policy 104–5, 109–10; US troops 105; WEU 113, 142; withdrawal 112 Uphold Democracy Operation 21 values 17–18 Vance, Cyrus 100 Vance–Owen peace initiative 102, 103, 116, 129, 148n12 Venice Agreement 46 Veterans’ Affairs 87 Vietnam 21, 28, 155 Vietnam Syndrome 53 war, pre-emptive/preventive 89 war against terror ix, x, 9, 165, 166

war crimes 138 War Powers Act 50 Warsaw Pact 6, 18, 45 Washington Treaty 2, 14 al-Wazzan, Shafiq 37 Weapon Effectiveness Index 26 weapons see arms trade weapons of mass destruction viii, 89, 156 Weinberger, Caspar 30n24 Western European Union 7; Bosnia 100, 142; CJTF agreement 123; collective decisions 92; NATO 19, 132; UNPROFOR 113, 142 Wohlstetter, Albert 20 Wolfers, Arnold 31n60 World Bank 52 World Trade Centre viii World War I 153 Yemen 94n17 Yemen, UNSC 70 Yugoslavia 147n3; arms embargo 100; blockade 27; breakup 2; secessions 98, 100, 158; see also Bosnia; Croatia; Kosovo Zeckhauser, Richard 10, 11, 86 Zepa 114 zero conjectural variation 18 Zycher, Benjamin 12

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