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CI{AP'IER XIII The UnitY of the Mind I s lr et - l beg i n b y m e n ti o n i n g th o s e facts about the m ind r v hic h e v e ry o n e a d mi ts a n d w h i ch every theory has t o t ak e in to a c c o u n t. ( r ) I t is ad m i tte d th a t th e to ta l s ta te of a man' s mi nd aL any m om e n t ma y b e , a n d g e n e ra l l y i s, di fferenti ated. This differentiation takes trvo different forms' (ri) My t ot al s t at e o f m i n d a t a n y m o m e n t nray consi st of mental events of various kirtds. I may be feeling tired, utdutittg tea, thinhing 0f rny book, and so on. (/) There m ay be in my to ta l m e n ta l s ta te a t any moment a num ber o[ m e n ta l e v e n ts rv h i c h a re o f the same ki nd but lrave different epistemological oly'ects. I may be t hink ing of my te a , o f m y b o o k , o f th e mul ti pl i cati ont able, and s o o n . We ma y s u m th i s u p by sayi ng that the tc-rtalstate of a mind at any time may be differentiated qualit at iv ely o r o b j e c ti v e l y o r i n b o th l vays. A s w e hav e s een, id e n ti ty o f q u a l i ty i s c o m p a ti bl e rvi th di versi ty of objec t s . S i mi l a rl y , i d e n ti ty o f o b j e ct i s compati bl e f u a l i ty . 8 .g ., I mi g h t at the same ti me wit lr div er s ity < .' q te a , l o rrg i n g fo r mv tea, and so on. my o f t hink ing be to ta l s ta te o f m i n d i s di versi fi ed both ev e r.y P r obably o b j e c ti v e l y I a n d n o doubt there are a n d qualit at iv ely c o n n e x i o n s b e trv e e n th e tw o ki nds of int im at e c au s a l c lif f er ent iat i o n . S ti l l , th e y a re d i s ti n c t fo rms of di fferenti at ion ev en if th e y n e v e r o c c u r i n i s o l a ti o n from each other. ( z ) O n t h e ' fa c e o f i t th e re a re tl vo fr' rndamental l y c lif f er er r tk in d s o f me n ta l e v e n ts ' v i z ., those w hi ch do and t hos e r v h i c h d o n o t h a v e e p i s te mol ogi cal obj ects. Com par c , r . g ., th e tw o s ta te m e n ts " l feel ti red" or " I

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feel cross" w i th t he t wo st at em ent s t 'l see a chair " or " I want my tea ". The former seem to express /tozu, and not zultat, I am feeling. The latter seem to express zahat, and not hoza, I am perceiving or desiring. I will cal l them resp ect ively t 'non- r ef er ent ial" and , . r ef er enti al " mental event s. ( Cf . Chap. VI . ) Som e people have argued that all mental events are really referential. Thi s may possibly be t r ue; but t heir ar gum ent s do not convi nce me, and t heir conciusion seem s t o m e paradoxi cal . I t hink it ver y likely t hat m y t ot al m ent al state at any mo m ent is never wholly non- r ef er ent ial and never w holly r ef er ent ial ; but t his is as f ar as I am w i l l i ng to go. I t her ef or e assum e t hat t her e ar e these tw o di ffer ent kinds of m ent al event , however closely they may always be connected rvith each other i n real l i fe. (S ) A t the sam e t im e t her e exist a num ber of dif f er ent total mental states, u'hich we say ', belong to different mi nds " . It i s p ossible f or t her e t o be t wo cont em por ar y mental events which have exact ly t he sam e det er m inat e qual i ti es and the sam e epist em ological object ; but t hese tw o mental eve nt s cannot belong t o t he sam e m ind. (To thi s i t w ould gener ally be added t hat no m ent al event can bel ong t o m or e t han one m ind, and t hat ever y mental event mu st belong t o som e m ind. But , in view of the facts of abnormal and supernormal psychology, i t w oul d perhaps be unwise t o insist on t his as st r ongly as on the other p oint s which have been m ent ioned. ) (4) Certain series of successive total mental states are sai d to " bel ong t o a single m ind". And t he event s rvhich are differentiations of a pair of total states belongi ng to the same m ind t hem selves belong t o t hat m ind. (It w oul d commonly be held t hat ever y t ot al m ent al state is part of the history of some mind which endures for some time and has other earlier or later total states.) These are the n.rain facts rvhich every theory has to take into consideration. I now propose to state various theoretically possible analyses of them.

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Alternative Theoriesabout the Unity of the Mind.We may begin by dividing all theoriesinto two great and (B) Non-centregroups,viz. (A) Centre-Theories, Theories. By a centre-theory I mean a theory which ascribes the unity of the mind to the fact that there is a stands in Centre-which certain particular existent-a to all the mental events relation a common asymmetrical a mind, and of certain which would be said to be states does not stand in this relation to any mental events which would not be said to be states of this mind. By a non-centre theory I mean one which denies the existence of any such particular Centre, and ascribes the unity of the mind to the fact that certain mental events are directly inter-related in certain characteristic ways, and that other mental events are not related to these in the peculiar way in which these are related to each other. Now centre-theories may be sub'divided into (a) Pure Ego Theories, and (D) Theories that do not assume a Pure Ego. By a Pure Ego I understand a particular existent which is of a different kind from any event; it owns various events, but it is not itself an event. No doubt the commonest form of the Centre theory has inBut it seems conceivable that the volved a Pure Ego. u n it y of t he m i n d m i g h t b e d u e to th e e xi stence of a Centre, and yet that this centre might itself be an event. It is possible that this is what William fames had in mind when he talked of the " passing thought " as being the " thinker ". So we had better teave room for theories of this type. (A, Pure Ego Theories. Theories which assume a ") special kind of existent Centre-a Pure Ego-may be divided according to the view rvhich they take about mental eveirts. A mental event is certainly a Substantive; i.e., it is the kind of entity which can be a logical subject of a proposition, but cannot play any other part in a proposition. But there are two different kinds of substantives, viz., those which exist and those which

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only subsist. A Pure Ego, if there be such a thing, is an existent substantive. A fact or a proposition is a substantive, in the sense defined above. We can say that " The execution of Charles I was a political mistake " or that " It is probable that Edwin will marry Angelina ". Here rve have factsor propositionsfunctioning as subjectsof other propositions. And they cannot play any other part in a proposition. They are therefore substantives. But they do not exist (though they may contain existents as constituents); they merely subsist. Now, granted that mental events are substautives, it might be held (i) that they are merely subsistent, or (ii) that they are existent substantives. Non-centre theoriesabout the mind are obliged to hold that mental eventsare existent substantives; but Pure Ego theories have already got an existentsubstantive,viz., the Pure Ego. They can thereforetake their choice about mental events. They can regard mental events either as facts about Pure Egos, or as existentsof a pecuiiarkind rvhich stand in specially intimate connexion with existents of another kind, viz., Pure Egos. We will now consider thesetwo forms of Pure Ego theory in turn. (i) On this view there is a plurality of different Pure Egos. All these Pure Egos have certain causal characteristicsor t'faculties", e.g., the power of remembering, the powerof reasoningand so on. Besidethis, each Pure Ego at each moment has somedeterminateform of some determinable non-causalquality; and each Pure Ego at each moment has some determinateform of some determinablerelation to some object or other. A mental event is the fact that a certain Pure Ego has a certain determinateform of a certain determinable non-causal quality at a certain moment ; or it is the fact that a certain Pure Ego standsat a certainmoment in a certain determinateform of some determinable non.causalrelation to a certain object. The first kind of fact is what rve have called a " non-referential" mental event ; the secondkind of fact is what we have called a ,'referential"

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m ent al ev en t. E.g ., w e mi g h t ta k e ,. ti redness" as one determinable quality, and " crossness" as another. Then the mental event of feeling tired is the fact that a certain Pure Ego has a certain determinate form of the quality of tiredness at a certain moment. Again, perceiving and desiring would be two determinable relations; and the mental event of seeing.a chair would be the fact that a certain Pure Ego has this determinate form of the relation of perceivin g at a certain moment to a certain chair. Now a Pure Ego can have determinate forms of several different determinable qualities at the same time i eB.t it can at the same time have the quality of tiredness in a certain degree and the quality of crossness in a certain degree. Similarly, it may have the same determinate relation to several different objects at the same time, or it may have at the same time different kinds of relation to the same object. A total mental state would then be the fact that a certain Pure Ego at a certain moment has several different non-causal qualities, stands in noncausal relations of several different kinds, and stands in the same kind of non-causal relation to several different objects. To say that all these contemporary mental events are differentiations of a single total state of a certain mind is just to say that each of them is a fact about the same Pure Ego and the same moment of time and about different qualities or relations or the same relation and different objects. S o m uc h f o r w h a t w e m i g h t c a l l th e ' (transverse uni ty of a cross-section of the history of a mind " on this view. T he " longit u d i n a l u n i ty " o f a m i n d , as w e mi ght cal l it , c ould be e x p l a i n e d o n th i s v i e w i n tw o al ternati ve rvays. (a) The simplest theory would be that the same Pure Ego persists ; and that it has different determinate qualities, or stands in different determinate relations, or stands in the same determinate relations to different objects, at different times. To say that two successive total states are states of the same mind is just to say that both of them are facts about the same Pure Ego,

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about different moments of time, and about the same or different qualities or relations or objects. (B) It rvould, however, be possible to hold a vierv which is a kind of compromise betrveen a Central and a non-Central Theory. It might be held that the unity of each total state requires a Pure Ego. But it might be held that the longitudinal unity of a mind does not require that one and the same Pur e Ego should be a com m on constituent of a series of successive total states. It might be held that there is a different Pure Ego for each different total state of the same mind, and that two successive total states are assigned to the same mind because of certain characteristic relations which they have to each other and which they do not have to other total states which would not be assigned to this mind. This second Theory is a Central Theory for the transverse unity, and a non-Central Theory for the longitudi nal uni ty of the m ind. Whichever form of this theory we may take it follorvs that every mental event m ust be t 'or vned " by som e Pure Ego. For every mental event is a fact about some Pure Ego, and it may be said to be " owned " by the Pure Ego rvhich it is about. I think that it would also follow from either form of the theory that no mental event cou ld be owned by m or e t han one Pur e Ego. For a mental event is the fact that a certain Pure Ego has a certain quality or stands in a certain relation to a certain object at a certain moment. Now, although two Pure Egos might have precisely the same quality and stand in precisely the same relation to the same object at the same time, yet it would be one fact that Pure Ego A had this quality or stood in this relation to this object, and it would be another fact that Pure Ego B did so. Hence there would be two mental events and not one. Finally, although on either form of the theory every mental event would be orvned by some Pure Ego and no mental event would be orvned by more than one, it would be possible on the second

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form of the theory that there might be mental eventg which were not states of any mind. For there might be certain mental events which did not stand in such relations to any mental event of earlier or later date that the two could be regarded as successive slices of the history of a mind. (ii) We will now consider the second great division of Pure Ego theories, viz., those which regard mental events as existent substantives and not merely as sub. sistent facts about the qualities and relations of Pure Egos. On this type of theory rve must suppose that non-causal qualities, such as tiredness or crossness, belong, not to Pure Egos, but to mental events. We must further assume a peculiar asymmetric relation of 'ro wner s hip" bet w e e n a P u re E g o a n d c e r tai n mental events. On the first form of Pure Ego theory .(owner. ship " was not a peculiar material relation ; a Pure Ego owned a state when the state was the fact that this Pure Ego had such and such a quality or stood in such and such a relation at a certain time. Ownership was thus the fonnal relation of a subject to a fact about that subject. On the present form of the theory mental events are not facts about Pure Egos, and the ownership of a mental event by a Pure Ego cannot be dealt with in this simple way. Let us consider the analysis of a typical mental state on the two forms of the Pure Ego theory. We will begin rvith the kind of state which is expressed by the phrase " I feel tired ". On the first form of the theory this can be analysed into: .. A certain Pure Ego has a certain determinate form of the determinable quality of tiredness now.'l On the second form of the theory it w o u ld be analy s e d i n to : .,T h e re i s a mental event characterised by a certain determinate form of the determinable quality of tiredness, and this event is owned by a certain Pure Ego." Next let us consider a refer. ential mental event, such as that which would be e xp res s edby t he p h ra s e : ,,I a m th i n k i n g o f t he number

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2." On the first form of the theory this could be anal ysed i nto: " A c er t ain Pur e Ego st ands nor v in a certain determinate form of the determinable relation the num ber 2. " O n t he second f or m of ' cogni si ng' to of the theory it could be analysed into : " There is a mental event rvhich stands in a certain determinate form of the determinable relation of ' cognising' to the number z, and this event is owned by a certain Pure E go." There are several points to be noticed about these alternative analyses. In the first place, on both theories there is a relation of the Pure Ego to the mental event, and also a relation of the Pure Ego to the determinate quality, in the case of a non-referential state of mind. On the first theory, the Pure Ego is characterised directly by tiredness ; on the second theory, the Pure Ego has to the quality of tiredness a compound relation which is the l ogi cal product o f t he t wo r elat ions of "owning" and " being characterised by ". For, on the second theory, the Pure Ego ozans something which is characterisedd7 tiredness. The difference is that, on the first theory, the relation between the Pure Ego and the quality is direct, like that of father to son ; whilst, on the second theory, it is indirect, like that of uncle to nephew. Again, on the first theory, the relation of Pure Ego to mental event is the formal relation of a subject to a tbct about that subject ; whilst, on the second theory, it is the non-formal relation of " ownership " between one existent substantive of a certain kind and another existent substantive of a different kind. Similar remarks apply to referential mental states on the two theories. On the first theory, the Pure Ego stands directly in a cognitive relation to an object. On the second theory, it stands in a compound relation to this object ; this relation is the logical product of the tw o rel ati ons of " owning " and , . cognising " ; f or t he Ptrre Ego ozuns something which cognises the object. It must, therefore, be admitted that both theories are

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able to deal u'ith all the various relations which any theory has to recognise ; they differ here only in the fact that a relation rvhich is direct and simple on one theory is indirect and complex on the other. Secondly, on the present form of the Pure Ego theory it is not logically impossible that there-should be mental events which are not owned by any Pure Ego at all ; nor is it l o g i c ally im pos s i b l e th a t s o me me n ta l e v ents shoul d be orvned at once by several Pure Egos. On the first form of the theory it follorved logically from the nature of mental events that there could not be unowned or co mm on m ent al e v e n ts ; i f th i s i s to b e ma i ntai ned on the present form of the theory it rvill be necessary to add certain synthetic propositions about the relation o f tt or v ner s hip " . Th er e is one o th e r p o i n t w h i c h h a d b e tt er be mentioned at this stage. As stated by us, both forms of tbe l)ure Ego theory have presupposed a plurality of d i ffe r ent det er m in a b l e m e n ta l q u a l i ti e s a n d a pl ural i ty of different determinable relations to an epistemological On the first theory these qualities directly object. characterise the Pure Ego, and these relations directly connect the Pure Ego with epistemological objects; on the second theory the qualities directly characterise me nt al ev ent s , and th e re l a ti o n s d i re c tl y c o n nect mental Norv I do not events with epistemological objects. th i n k t hat eit her t h e o ry c o u l d d i s p e n s e w i th a pl ural i ty of different.determinable mental qualities. For there are certainly different kinds of feeling, such as " feeling c ro s s " , e tc ., a n d i t s e e ms i mpossi bl e ti re d " , t t f eeling to regard the difference between feeling tired and feeling cross as simply a difference of relation to some object or as a difference in the objects to which something is related. It rvould seem then as if " tiredness " and ti crossness" were so many different non - relational d e ter m inables . B u t, i f w e o n c e g ra n t a p l ural i ty of d i ffer ent det er m in a b l e me n ta l q u a l i ti e s , i t mi ght be suggested that rve could do without a plurality of

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different determinable mental rclations to objects. We have counted cogni sing as one kind of det er m inable relation to an object, and desiring as another kind of determinable relation to an object. But could rve not manage w i th onl y a single det er m inable r elat ion t o an object, rvhich rve might call " objective reference" ? M ight not the di fferencebetrv eencognising and desir ing sim ply be a difference in the qualities of the term which stands at the moment in the relation of reference to an object? On the first form of the Pure Ego theory this su$gestion u'ould work out as follorvs. Suppose I think of my tea first, and then desire my tea. There would, on both occasions, be simply some determinate form of the general relation of reference between my Pure Ego and my tea. But on the second occasion, i.e,, vhen I desired my tea i n addi ti on to thinking of it , m y Pur e Ego would have a certai n charac t er ist ic qualit y which it did not have on the first occasion. A thing rvould be " desired " rvhen it stood in the relation of being " referred to " by a Pure Ego rvhich had at the time a certain specific quality. On the second form of the Pure Ego theory the suggestion rvould rvork out as follorvs. A desire for my tea would be a mental event rvhich (a) has a certain characteristic quality, and (/) has the relation of objective reference to my tea. A mere thought of my tea rvould be a mental event rvhich (a) lacks this characteristic quality, and (d) has the relation of objective reference to my tea. It may be remarked that all other mental attitudes torvards objects presuppose the cognitive ai ti tude; rve cannot de sir e, f ear , hat e, or love anyt hing, rvithout having an idea of the object torvards rvhich rve take thi s atti tude. Hence it would be plausible t o i denti fy the cogni ti ve r elat ion r vit h t he gener al r elat ion of objective reference; and to suppose that all other mental atti tudes consist of t he holding of t his r elat ion betw een a P rrre E go or a m ent al event and an epist em ological object, together rvith the fact that this Pure U :: ,. mental event ha s at t he t im e a cer t ain char act er -

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is t ic qualit v rv h i c h d e te rm i n e s w h e th er the atti tude i s c alled t ' des i re " , o f t' l o v e " , c l r ' ( h a te " or rvhat not. 'fhus rve get a cross-division of Pure Ego theories .according to rvltether they do or do nol assume a plur alit y of d i ffe re n t k i n d s o f re l a ti o n of reference to objec t s . I rv i l l n o rv l e a v e th c e x p o s i ti on of the vari ous possible forms of Pr.rre Ego theory, and rvill pass to the t heor y of a C e n tre rv h i c h i s a n e v e n t a n d not a P ure E go. (A, b) C-en/t'a/-Euen/Tluories. It is evident that thcse form a kind of half - rvay huse betrveen Pure Ego t heor ies and N o n -C e n tre T h e o ri e s o f the mi nd. They r es em ble P u re Eg o th e o ri e s i n th e fact that the unit y of a to ta l me n ta l s ta te a t a n y moment depends on a c om mo n re l a ti o n i n w h i c h a l l i ts di fferenti ati ons s t and t o a c o m m o n C e n tre . T h e y re s embl e N on-C entre T heor ies in th e fa c t th a t th i s C e n tre i s i tsel f an event and not a pec ul i a r k i n d o f e x i s te n t s u b s ta nti ve; i t i s of the s am e nat ur e a s th e e v e n ts rv h i c h i t u n i f i es. I thi nk that t he m os t p l a u s i b l e fo rm o f th i s th e ory w oul d be to ident iiy t he C e n tra l E v e n t a t a n y m o ment w i th a mass T h e l o n g i tu d i n a l uni ty of a sel f of bodily f e e l i n g . t hr ough a p e ri o d o f ti m e rv o u l d th e n depend on the f ac t t hat t h e re i s a ma s s o f b o d i l y fe e l i ng w hi ch goes on c ont inuous l y th ro u g h o u t th i s p e ri o d and vari es i n qualit y not a t a l l o r v e ry s l o rv l y . At any moment there ar e m any s u c h m a s s e s o f b o d i l y fe el i ng, w hi ch are num er ic ally d i ffe re n t h o rv e v e r mu c h t hey may be al i ke in qualit y . ' fh e s e fo rm th e C e n tre s of a nurnber of different contemporary total states of mind. Each of t hem is a t h i n s l i c e o f a l o n g a n d h i g h l y uni form strand of bodily f e e l i n g ; a n d e a c h o f th e s e strands of bodi l y f eeling ac c o u n ts fo r th e l o n g i tu d i n a l u n i ty of onc mi nd. T he t r an s v e rs c u n i ty o f a to ta l m e n tal statc nri ght be accounted for in two different ways on this theory, r v hic h ar e si rn i l a r to fo rms (i ) a n d (i i ) of the P ure E go t heor y . ( i) We m i g h t s u p p o s e tl .ra t each cross-secti < l n of one o[ t h e s e s tra trd s h a s v :rri o trso ther qual i ti es besi de t hat qualit y i n w h i c tr a l l a d j a c e n t c ro ss-secti onsof the

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same strand closely resemble each other. These other qualities may vary sharply betrveen adjacent crosssections of the same strand. .E.g., suppose we take t$,o adjacent sections of a certain strand, each of which lasts for a minute. There may be a predominant resemblance in quality between the two ; but the first may have i n ad dit ion a ( , t oot hachy" qualit y, and t he second may have in addition a ,, headachy " quality. The transverse unity of the total mental state will consist in the fact that the same Central Event has a pl ural i ty of di ffe r ent det er m inat e qualit ies in addit ion to that quality in which it resembles adjacent Central Events of the same strand. So far we have considered only non-objective mental events. Objective mental events could be dealt with as follorvs. We might suppose that the same Central Event, which has these vari ous qual i ti es, also st ands in var ious det er m inat e forms of various determinable relations to vari